CHINA — ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: Addendum BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]
Date: 19 June 2023
Document codes: WT/DS601/R/Add.1; WT/DS601/R.
Complainant: Japan
Respondent: China
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, India, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, U.S., Vietnam
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 6.5, 6.5.1, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

CHINA — ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS
FROM JAPAN
REPORT OF THE PANEL
Addendum
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This addendum contains Annexes A to C to the Report of the Panel to be found in document

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LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
PANEL DOCUMENTS
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning business confidential
information
11
Annex A-3 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel facilitating arbitration under
Article 25 of the DSU
13
Annex A-4 Interim Review 14
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 44
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 58
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 74
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 78
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 79
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 84
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Chinese Taipei 86
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 92

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ANNEX A
PANEL DOCUMENTS
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning business confidential
information
11
Annex A-3 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel facilitating arbitration under
Article 25 of the DSU
13
Annex A-4 Interim Review 14

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ANNEX A-1
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Adopted on 23 February 2022
Amended on 4 May 2023
General
1. (1) In this proceeding, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). In addition, the
following Working Procedures apply.
(2) The Panel reserves the right to modify t hese procedures as necessary, after
consultation with the parties.
Confidentiality
2. (1) The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept
confidential. Members shall treat as confidential information that is submitted to the Panel
which the submitting Member has designated as confidential.
(2) In accordance with the DSU, nothing in these Working Procedures shall preclude a
party or third party from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.
(3) If a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall
also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential summary of the information
contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public. A party should endeavour
to promptly provide a non -confidential summary to any Member requesting it, and if
possible, within 10 days of receiving the request.
(4) Parties and third parties shall treat business confidential information in accordance
with the procedures set forth in the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning
Business Confidential Information.
Submissions
3. (1) Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall
submit a written submission in which it presents the fact s of the case and its arguments, in
accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(2) Each party shall also submit to the Panel, before the second substantive meeting of
the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(3) Each third party that chooses to make a written submission before the first
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall do so in accordance with the
timetable adopted by the Panel.
(4) The Panel may invite the parties or third part ies to make additional submissions
during the proceeding, including with respect to requests for preliminary rulings in
accordance with paragraph 4 below.
Preliminary rulings
4. (1) If China considers that the Panel should make a ruling before the issuance of the
Report that certain measures or claims in the panel request or the complainant's first written

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submission are not properly before the Panel, the following procedure applies. Exceptions to
this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
a. China shall submit any such request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible
opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel.
Japan shall submit its response to the request before the first substantive meeting of the
Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request.
b. The Panel may issue a preliminary ruling on the issues raised in such a preliminary ruling
request before, during or after the first substantive meeting, or the Pane l may defer a
ruling on the issues raised by a preliminary ruling request until it issues its Report to the
parties.
c. If the Panel finds it appropriate to issue a preliminary ruling before the issuance of its
Report, the Panel may provide reasons for the ruling at the time that the ruling is made,
or subsequently in its Report.
d. Any request for such a preliminary ruling by the respondent before the first meeting, and
any subsequent submissions of the parties in relation thereto before the first meeting ,
shall be served on all third parties. The Panel may provide all third parties with an
opportunity to provide comments on any such request, either in their submissions as
provided for in the timetable or separately. Any preliminary ruling issued by the Pa nel
before the first substantive meeting on whether certain measures or claims are properly
before the Panel shall be shared with all third parties.
(2) This procedure is without prejudice to the parties' right to request other types of
preliminary or pro cedural rulings during the proceeding, and to the procedures that the
Panel may follow with respect to such requests.
Evidence
5. (1) Each party shall submit all evidence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except evidence nece ssary for purposes of rebuttal, or evidence
necessary for answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party.
Additional exceptions may be granted upon a showing of good cause.
(2) If any new evidence has been admitted upon a showing of good cause, the Panel shall
accord the other party an appropriate period of time to comment on the new evidence
submitted.
6. (1) If the original language of an exhibit or portion thereof is not a WTO working
language, the submitting party or third party shall simultaneously submit a translation of the
exhibit or relevant portion into the WTO working language of the submission. The P anel may
grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of exhibits upon a showing of good
cause.
(2) Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing,
preferably no later than the next submission or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following
the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be
accompanied by an explanation of the grounds for the objection and an alternative
translation.
7. (1) To facilitate the maintenance of t he record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout
the course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exhibit
on its cover page. Exh ibits submitted by Japan should be numbered JPN 1, JPN 2, etc.
Exhibits submitted by China should be numbered CHN 1, CHN 2, etc. If the last exhibit in
connection with the first submission was numbered JPN 5, the first exhibit in connection with
the next s ubmission thus would be numbered JPN -6. If a party withdraws an exhibit or
leaves one or more exhibits intentionally blank, it should indicate this on the cover page that
provides the number of the blank exhibit.

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(2) Each party shall provide an updated lis t of exhibits (in Word or Excel format) together
with each of its submissions, oral statements, and responses to questions.
(3) If a party submits a document that has already been submitted as an exhibit by the
other party, it should explain why it is submitting that document again.
(4) If a party includes a hyperlink to the content of a website in a submission, and intends
that the cited content form part of the official record, the cited content of the website shall
be provided in the form of an exhibit a long with an indication of the date that it was
accessed.
Editorial Guide
8. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its
submissions in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions (electronic copy
provided).
Questions
9. The Panel may pose questions to the parties and third parties at any time, including:
a. Before any meeting, the Panel may send written questions, or a list of topics it intends to
pursue in questioning orally during a meeting. If the Panel so decides, written questions
should be sent at least 10 days before the meeting whenever possible. The Panel may
ask different or additional questions at the meeting.
b. The Panel may put questions to the parties and third parties orally during a meeting, and
in writing following the meeting, as provided for in paragraphs 15 and 23 below.
c. In case the Panel decides, pursuant to paragraph 18, to hold a substantive meeting in a
virtual format, the Panel shall send wr itten questions, or a list of topics it intends to
pursue in questioning orally during the meeting at least 10 days before the meeting in
order to facilitate the discussions at the meeting. The Panel may ask different or
additional questions at the meeting.
Substantive meetings
10. The Panel shall meet in closed session.
11. The parties shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.
12. (1) Each party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation w hen
meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU, these
Working Procedures and any Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning BCI,
particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceeding and the submissions of the
parties and third parties.
13. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation no later than
5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) three working days before the first day of each meeting with the Panel.
14. A request for interpretation by any party should be made to the Panel as early as possible,
preferably at the organizational stage, to allow sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.
15. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite Japan to make an opening statement to present its case first.
Subsequently, the Panel shall invite China to present its point of view. Before each party

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takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a
provisional written version of its statement. If interpretation is needed, each party shall
provide additional copies for the interpreters before taking the floor.
b. Each party should avoid lengthy repetition of the arguments in its submissions. Each
party is invited to limit the duration of its opening statement to not more than 75
minutes. If either party considers that it requires more time for its opening statement , it
should inform the Panel and the other party at least 10 days before the meeting,
together with an estimate of the expected duration of its statement. The Panel will
accord equal time to the other party.
c. After the conclusion of the opening statemen ts, the Panel shall give each party the
opportunity to make comments or ask the other party questions.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties.
e. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with Japan presenting its statement first. Before each
party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting
with a provisional written version of its closing statement, if available.
f. Following the meeting:
i. Each party shall submit a final written version of its opening statement no later
than 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working day following the meeting. At
the same time, each party should also submit a final written version of any
prepared closing statement that it delivered at the meeting.
ii. Each party shall send in writing, within the timeframe established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting, any questions to the other party to which it wishes
to receive a response in writing.
iii. The Panel shall send in writing, within the timeframe established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to
receive a response in writing.
iv. Each party shall respond in writing to the questions from the Panel, and to any
questions posed by the other party, within the timeframe established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting.
16. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted in the same
manner as the first substantive meeting with the Panel, except that China shall be given the
opportunity to present its oral statement first. The party that presented its opening statement first
shall present its closing statement first.
17. Each party shall be given the opportunity to comment on the responses to questions
provided by the other party after the second substantive meeting, in accordance with the
timetable adopted by the Panel.
18. If, because of the sanitary crisis related to COVID -19, the substan tive meetings cannot be
physically held in Geneva on the scheduled dates or either party indicates that travel to Geneva
will not be possible for its delegation, the Panel may, depending on the circumstances, choose to
modify the timetable and the working procedures after consulting the parties.
Third-party session
19. Each third party may present its views orally during a session of the first substantive
meeting with the parties set aside for that purpose.
20. Each third party shall indicate to the Panel whether it intends to make an oral statement
during the third-party session three weeks in advance of this session.

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21. (1) Each third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation
when meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each third par ty shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and
shall ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU, these
Working Procedures and the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning BCI,
particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceeding and the submissions of the
parties and third parties.
(3) Each third party shall provide, no later than three working days before the third -party
session, a list of members of its delegation who will attend the session.
22. To ensure the availability of interpreters, the third parties shall also indicate at least
three weeks before the third -party session whether they intend to make their statement in a
WTO language other than English, which is the lang uage in which these panel proceedings are
being conducted, and whether they would require interpretation from English to any other WTO
language.
23. The third party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All parties and third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the oral statements of the third parties. Each third party
making an oral statement at the third -party session shall provide the Panel and othe r
participants with a provisional written version of its statement before it takes the floor. If
interpretation of a third party's oral statement is needed, that third party shall provide
additional copies for the interpreters before taking the floor.
c. Each third party should limit the duration of its statement to 15 minutes and avoid
repetition of the arguments already in its submission. If a third party considers that it
requires more time for its opening statement, it should inform the Panel and the p arties
at least 10 days before the meeting, together with an estimate of the expected duration
of its statement. The Panel will accord equal time to all third parties for their statements.
d. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties shall be given the
opportunity to pose questions to any third party for clarification on any matter raised in
that third party's submission or statement.
e. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to any third party.
f. Following the third-party session:
i. Each third party shall submit the final written version of its oral statement, no
later than 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working day following the meeting.
ii. Each party may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the
Panel before the end of the meeting, any questions to one or more third parties to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iii. The Panel may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the
Panel before the end of the meeting, any questions to one or more third parties to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iv. Each third party choosing to do so shall respond in writing to written questions
from the Panel or a party, within a timeframe established by the Panel before the
end of the meeting.
Descriptive part and executive summaries
24. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of
the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third partie s,

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which shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way
serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination
of the case.
25. Each party shall submit one integrate d executive summary. The integrated executive
summary shall summarize the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in the party's first
and second written submissions, its first and second oral statements, and may also include a
summary of its respons es to questions following the first and second substantive meetings and
comments thereon following the second substantive meeting. The timing of the submission of the
integrated executive summary shall be indicated in the timetable adopted by the Panel.
26. Each party's integrated executive summary shall be limited to 20 pages.
27. The Panel may request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts
and arguments presented in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline m ay not be
specified in the timetable.
28. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary of its arguments as
presented in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the
Panel. This integrated executive s ummary may also include a summary of responses to questions.
The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed six pages. If a third -
party submission and/or oral statement does not exceed six pages in total, this shall serve as the
executive summary of that third party's arguments unless that third party indicates that it does
not wish for the submission and/or oral statement to serve as its executive summary, in which
case it shall submit a separate executive summary.
Interim review
29. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.
30. If no meeting is requested, each party may submit written comments on the other party's
written request for review in accordance with the timetab le adopted by the Panel. Such written
comments shall be limited to the other party's written request for review.
31. If a meeting is requested, the Panel shall consult with the parties on the timing of the
meeting and any further written comments.
Interim and Final Report
32. The interim report, as well as the final report before its official circulation, shall be kept
strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.
Service of documents
33. The following procedures regarding service of documents apply to all documents submitted
by the parties and third parties during the proceeding:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by submitting them
via the Disputes On-Line Registry Application (DORA) https://dora.wto.org by 5:00 p.m.
(Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. The electronic version
uploaded into DORA shall constitute the official version for the purposes of submission
deadlines and the record of the dispute. Upload of a document into DORA shall constitute
electronic service on the Panel, the other party, and the third parties.
b. By 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) the next working day following the electronic submission,
each party and third party shall submit one paper copy of all documents it submits to the
Panel, including the exhibits, with the DS Registry (office No. 2047). The DS Registrar
shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the submission. If an exhibit is in a

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format that is impractical to submit as a paper copy, then the party may submit such
exhibit in electronic format only. In this case, the cover page of the exhibit should
indicate that the exhibit is only available in electronic format. If due to COVID -related
circumstances, the DS Registry is unable to receive paper copies on the designated date,
the paper copies shall be filed once the DS Registry communicates to the parties and
third parties that it is able to receive such copies.
c. The Panel shall provide the parties with the Descriptive Part of the Report, the Interim
Report and the Final Report, as well as all other documents or communications issued by
the Panel during the proceeding, via DORA.
d. If the parties or third parties have any questions or technical difficulties relating to
DORA, they are invited to contact the DS Registry (DSRegistry@wto.org).
e. If any party or third party is unable to meet the 5:00 p.m. deadline because of technical
difficulties in uploading these documents into DORA, the par ty or third party concerned
shall inform the DS Registry ( DSRegistry@wto.org) without delay and provide an
electronic version of all documents to be submitted to the Panel by email including any
exhibits. The email shall be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, the Panel Secretary, the
other party and, if appropriate, the third parties. The documents sent by email shall be
submitted no later than 5:30 p.m. on the due date establi shed by the Panel. The total
size of any email, including all attachments, shall not exceed 10 megabytes per email. If
the file size of specific exhibits makes transmission by email impossible, or it would
require more than five email messages, owing to th e number of exhibits to be filed, to
transmit all of them by email, the specific large file size exhibits, or those that cannot be
attached to the first five email messages, shall be filed with the DS Registry (office
No. 2047) and provided to the other pa rty and, if appropriate, the third parties by no
later than 10:30 a.m. the next working day on an electronic medium acceptable to the
recipient. Due to COVID-related circumstances, the party or third party shall also contact
the DS Registry by phone or ema il in advance of their visit so that appropriate
arrangements for the receipt of such files can be made. The party or third party
concerned shall send a notification to the DS Registrar, copying the Panel Secretary, the
other party, and the third parties, as appropriate, via email, identifying the numbers of
the exhibits that cannot be transmitted by email.
f. In case any party or third party is unable to access a document filed through DORA
because of technical difficulties, it shall promptly, and in any case no later than 5 p.m.
on the next working day after the due date for the filing of the document, inform the
DS Registrar, the Panel Secretary, and the party or third party that filed the document,
of the problem by email and shall, if possible, identif y the relevant document(s). The DS
Registrar will promptly try to identify a solution to the technical problem. In the
meantime, the party or third party that filed the document(s) shall, promptly after being
informed of the problem, provide an electronic version of the relevant document(s) to
the affected party or third party by email, with a copy to the DS Registry
(DSRegistry@wto.org) and the Panel Secretary to allow access to the document(s) while
the technical problem is being addressed. The DS Registr ar may provide an electronic
version of the relevant document(s) by email if the affected party or third party so
requests. The DS Registrar shall in that case copy the party or third party that filed the
document(s) on the email message.
Correction of clerical errors in submissions
34. The Panel may grant leave to a party or third party to correct clerical errors in any of its
submissions (including paragraph numbering and typographical mistakes). Any such request
should identify the nature of the errors to be corrected, and should be made promptly following
the filing of the submission in question.
Appeal Arbitration
35. The Panel takes note of the Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in
this dispute notified by the parties on 11 April 2023 (WT/DS601/6) and of the joint requests of the
parties to the Panel formulated therein.

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ANNEX A-2
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL CONCERNING
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Adopted on 23 February 2022
1. For the purpose of this proceeding, business confidential information ("BCI") is defined as
any information that has been designated as such by a party submitting the information to the
Panel. The parties shall only designate as BCI, information that is not a vailable in the public
domain, the release of which would cause serious harm to the interests of the originator(s) of the
information. BCI may include information that was previously treated by the Ministry of Commerce
of the People's Republic of China as confidential in the course of the anti -dumping proceeding at
issue in this dispute.
2. No person may have access to BCI except a Panelist, a member of the Secretariat assisting
the Panel, an employee of a party or a third party, or an outside advisor to a party or a third party
for the purposes of this dispute. However, an outside advisor is not permitted to access BCI if that
advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or
import of the products that were the subject of the proceeding at issue in this dispute, or an officer
or employee of an association of such enterprises.
3. When third parties receive written submissions pursuant to the Panel's Working Procedures,
the third parties shall receive a version of such written submissions and any exhibits with BCI
redacted in accordance with these BCI procedures. The BCI -redacted versions of written
submissions and exhibits received by third parties shall be sufficient to convey a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the information at issue. Written submissions and exhibits, and
their BCI-redacted versions, shall be submitted at the same time.
4. A third party may request access to the BCI version of a BCI -redacted written submission or
exhibit received purs uant to the Working Procedures. Any such request shall include a list of the
third party's representatives and outside advisors who would like to review the BCI. A party
requested by a third party to provide that third party with access to BCI must provide such access
promptly.
5. A person having access to BCI shall treat it as confidential, i.e., shall not disclose that
information other than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these procedures.
Each party and third party shall have respo nsibility in this regard for its employees as well as any
outside advisors used for the purposes of this dispute. BCI obtained under these procedures may
be used only for the purpose of providing information and argumentation in this dispute and for no
other purpose. All documents and electronic storage media containing BCI shall be stored in such a
manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such information.
6. When a party or third party includes BCI in a submission, the cover and/or first page of the
document containing BCI, and each page of the document, shall be marked to indicate the
presence of such information. The specific information in question shall be placed between double
square brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]. The first page or cover of t he document shall state
"Contains Business Confidential Information on pages xxxxxx", and each page of the document
shall contain the notice "Contains Business Confidential Information" at the top of the page. The
cover and/or first page of the document sh all also identify all those pages in the document that
contain BCI. BCI presented in the form of, or as part of, an exhibit shall be marked to indicate, in
addition to the above, that it contains BCI by putting "BCI" next to the exhibit number (e.g.
Exhibit JPN-1 (BCI)).
7. When BCI is submitted in electronic format, the file name shall include the terms "Business
Confidential Information" or "BCI". In addition, where applicable, the label of the storage medium
shall be clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" or "BCI".

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8. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a
statement shall inform the Panel before making it that the statement will contain BCI, and the
Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures
are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to
the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 4.
9. When a party or third party submits a document containing BCI to the Panel, the other party
and third parties, when referring to that BCI in its documents, including written submissions, and
oral statements, shall clearly identify all such information in those documents. All such d ocuments
shall be marked as described in paragraph 4.
10. If a party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party should
have been designated as BCI and objects to such submission without BCI designation, it shall
promptly bring this objection to the attention of the Panel and the other party or third party,
together with the reasons for the objection. Similarly, if a party considers that the other party or a
third party submitted information designated as BCI, information which should not be so
designated, it shall promptly bring this objection to the attention of the Panel and the other party
or third party, together with the reasons for the objection. The Panel shall decide whether
information subject to an objection will be treated as BCI for the purposes of these proceedings on
the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 1.
11. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized
under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Pane l may, however, make statements of
conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the
Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does
not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.
12. Submissions, exhibits, and other documents or recordings containing BCI will be included in
the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.

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ANNEX A-3
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL FACILITATING
ARBITRATION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE DSU1
Adopted on 4 May 2023
Transmission of the Panel Report
1. After issuance of the final Panel Report to the parties and after receiving a request to suspend
the Panel proceedings for purposes of facilitating an arbitration under the Agreed Procedures for
Arbitration, the P anel shall transmit the final Panel Report in the three working languages of the
WTO (the "Translated Report") to the parties, third parties and the pool of arbitrators, subject to
the protection of business confidential information (BCI) in accordance wit h the Panel's adopted
additional working procedures concerning BCI.2, 3
2. If the Translated Report is not yet available when the request for suspension is made, the Panel
shall transmit immediately the original English language version of the final Pan el Report (the
"original final Panel Report") to the parties, third parties and pool of arbitrators. The Panel shall
transmit the Translated Report in the other two official languages, as soon as the translations
become available.
3. Once transmitted to the parties, third parties and the pool of arbitrators, the original final Panel
Report and/or the Translated Report shall remain confidential.
Suspension of the panel proceedings
4. Once the Translated Report has been transmitted to the parties, third par ties and the pool of
arbitrators, the Panel shall grant the request to suspend the Panel proceedings and indicate when
suspension takes effect.
Lifting of confidentiality and transmission of the confidential record
5. In the event of the filing of a Notice of Appeal, confidentiality of the Translated Report is
thereby lifted such that the Notice of Appeal may include the Translated Report.
6. Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, the record of the Panel proceedin gs, including the parties'
BCI submissions, exhibits and the confidential version of the original final Panel Report shall be
transmitted to the appointed arbitrators and the secretariat staff assisting the arbitrators.
This transmission shall take place through the WTO Disputes On-Line Registry Application (DORA).
7. The Panel shall consult with the third parties in relation to whether the third -party submissions,
third-party oral statements and third -party responses to questions may be transmitted, as pa rt of
the Panel record, to the appointed arbitrators.

1 See the parties' Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU (WT/DS601/6)
("Agreed Procedures for Arbitration"). Through the present Additional Working Procedures of the Panel, the
Panel accedes to, and operationalizes the modalities of, the parties' joint requests formulated in paragraph 4 of
the Agreed Procedures for Arbitration.
2 Unless the parties indicate otherwise, the "pool of arbitrators" shall be understood to comprise all
individuals identified in JOB/DSB/1/Add.12/Suppl.5, as validated in JOB/DSB/1/Add.12/Suppl.8.
3 It is understood that transmission of the Translated Report shall not constitute circulation of the
Panel Report within the meaning of Article 16 of the DSU.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

ANNEX A-4
INTERIM REVIEW
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this annex sets out our discussion of the
arguments made at the interim review stage. We have revised certain aspects of the Interim
Report in light of the parties' request. In addition, we have made certain editorial changes to
improve the clarity and accuracy of the Final Report, or to correct typographical and
non-substantive errors, including those suggested by the parties. Some of the footnote numbers in
the Final Report have changed due to these revisions. The footnote numbers indicated in this
annex pertain to those in the Interim Report, but we have also indicated the footnote numbers in
the Final Report where they differ from those in the Interim Report. The paragraph numbers in the
Final Report remain unchanged.
2 JAPAN'S REQUEST CONCERNING THE REFERENCE TO BILLETS AND SLABS
2.1. Japan suggests we clarify in footnote 8 that throughout the panel proceedings, it used the
term slabs instead of billets because, in its view, slabs is a more precise term to describe the
semi-finished stainless steel productions in question.1
2.2. China submits that if we were to accept Japan's r equest, we should refer to China's position
on this issue, which notes that MOFCOM used the term billets in the investigation, that the
relevant HS codes refer to either billets or slabs, and the relevant HS codes describe the products
in a manner that corresponds to MOFCOM's description of billets.2
2.3. We have added in footnote 8 a reference to the parties' divergent views on the use of
terminologies, albeit not using the detailed text proposed by either of the parties.
3 CHINA'S REQUEST CONCERNING THE REFERENCE TO "PRODUCT CATEGORIES"
3.1. China requests that whenever we refer to billets (slabs), coils, and plates collectively, we use
the word "shapes" and not "product categories". 3 China contends that the term "shapes" would be
more in line with Ch ina's position that one product with different shapes, rather than different
products, were at issue in this investigation.4
3.2. Japan opposes China's request on the ground that the reference to "product categories" is
consistent with our observations a nd findings throughout the Interim Report, while the reference
to "shapes" would be inaccurate and incomplete in light of the relevant discussion in the
Interim Report.5
3.3. We do not find any reference to "shapes" in MOFCOM's final determination in rel ation to any
reference to billets (slabs), coils, and plates, and do find some MOFCOM references to "product
categories" (though MOFCOM's description is not consistent in this regard). We have accordingly
decided to retain the references to "product categories" in our Report. In footnote 68 of the Report
we have added a reference to China's position in this regard, and have also made it clear that the
reference to product categories in our Report does not prejudge any of the substantive issues
before us.

1 Japan's request for interim review, para. 2.
2 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 4.
3 China's request for interim review, para. 3.
4 China's request for interim review, para. 3.
5 Japan's comments on China's request for interim review, para. 4.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

4 JAPAN'S CLAIMS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
4.1 Japan's specific request for review
4.1.1 Paragraph 7.3(c)
4.1. Japan requests us to make certain changes to paragraph 7.3(c) to reflect Japan's arguments
more accurately and comprehensively.6 In particular, Japan requests that we qualify our summary
description of the third ground for its complaint against MOFCOM's definition of the domestic
industry (i.e. that " MOFCOM failed to examine whether the defined domestic industry was
representative") by adding the following text: "in light of the differences among billets (slabs),
hot-rolled stainless steel plates, and hot-rolled stainless steel coils".7
4.2. China considers Japan's changes to be unnecessary.8
4.3. We note that parag raph 7.3(c) describes the third ground Japan has raised in support of its
complaint against MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry (i.e. that " MOFCOM failed to
examine whether the defined domestic industry was representative") in the same way that
paragraphs 7.3(a) and 7.3(b) describe the first and second grounds underlying Japan's complaint.
Japan has advanced two reasons to explain why it considers MOFCOM failed to examine the
representativeness of the defined domestic industry , and we have explored the merits of both of
these lines of argument in our findings . First, we examined Japan's argument in its first written
submission (and further elaborated in response to our questions) that the domestic industry
defined by MOFCOM was unique and di fferent compared to the rest of the producers in China 9;
second that there were significant differences between billets (slabs), coils, and plates. 10 We have
described and explored the merits of both of these lines of argument in our findings. Accordingl y,
we do not find it appropriate to accept Japan's requested changes.
4.1.2 Paragraph 7.12 and footnotes 23 and 24
4.4. Japan requests us to modify a description of China's argument as well as the citation to
paragraph 360 of China's second written submi ssion in paragraph 7.12 of our Report where we
address whether Japan is pursuing a claim challenging MOFCOM's definition of the domestic
industry that it is outside our terms of reference. 11 Japan does so on the ground that
paragraph 7.12 is focused on the relation between paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the panel request,
whereas the description and citations pertain to parts of China's second written submission where
China was examining the relation between Japan's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.12
4.5. China opposes Japan's request on the ground that in paragraph 360 of China's second written
submission it was, in fact, referring to both the relation between paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the
panel request as well as the relat ion between Japan's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.13
4.6. We agree with Japan that in paragraph 360 of its second written submission, China was
referring to the relation between Japan's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, as presented in Japan's panel request, and not the relation between
paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of that panel request. To cite to China's submissions more accurately,
we have replaced the reference to paragraph 360 of China's se cond written submission with other
parts of that submission and also made some modifications to the description of China's argument.

6 Japan's request for interim review, para. 3.
7 Japan's request for interim review, para. 3.
8 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 5.
9 See, e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 486 and 489.
10 See, e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 487-488; response to Panel question No. 4,
paras. 14-17.
11 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 5-6.
12 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 5-6.
13 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 6.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

4.1.3 Paragraph 7.39
4.7. Japan suggests certain changes in this paragraph to reflect its argument more accurately and
comprehensively.14
4.8. China opposes Japan's request, but nonetheless states that if we were to accept the changes
proposed by Japan, we should also reflect certain additions proposed by China.15
4.9. In paragraph 7.39, we addressed China's argument that because of the limited external sales
of billets (slabs), MOFCOM's decision to use those sales volumes as an indicator of production
volume would only minimally affect the outcome in terms of the percentage share of the domestic
industry in domestic prod uction. In doing so, we noted China's statement that in the most recent
time period (first quarter of 2018), the volume of external sales of billets by Chinese producers
represented [[ ***]] of the production of steel billets. 16 However, we noted that give n that the
period of investigation used by MOFCOM in its analysis covered consecutive years from 2014 to the
first quarter of 2018, the data from only the first quarter of 2018 was not adequately
representative of the period MOFCOM used to make its assessm ent. We then set out that, in any
case, nowhere in MOFCOM's final determination is there any discussion or analysis of this kind. In
our view, it is clear that our statement on the lack of discussion or analysis refers to China's above
statement.
4.10. Japan requests us to modify paragraph 7.39 by stating that nowhere in MOFCOM's final
determination is there any discussion or analysis of this kind "other than a mere reference to
'external sales of a few stainless steel billets'". 17 However, we are not persuaded that such a
reference in any way adds to the clarity or accuracy of our findings. We accordingly decline to
make the changes proposed by Japan, and accordingly do not also find it necessary to make the
changes requested by China.
4.2 China's specific request for review
4.11. China requests us to delete footnote 44 of the Interim Report, which contains a calculation
and discussion based on information Japan presented in chart 52 in its first written submission. 18
In particular, China contends that the calculation wrongly suggests that in determining total
domestic production, MOFCOM ignored the production of billets (slabs) by producers that did not
have external sales of billets (slabs).19 However, according to China, MOFCOM did, in fact, account
for the production of billets (slabs) by such producers as (downstream) production of coils and
plates.20
4.12. Japan opposes China's request. Japan contends that the calculation and discussion in
footnote 44 accuratel y identifies the structural issue in MOFCOM's calculation method. 21 In this
regard, challenging China's explanation, Japan contends that China does not explain to whom the
external sales of billets (slabs) (that are used as an indicator of domestic produc tion) are made,
and states that if these external sales include any sales to other producers in China, those billets
(slabs) will be double counted which would ultimately inflate the proportion of the domestic
industry.22
4.13. We note that Japan's respo nse to China's request emphasizes the potential double counting
that may arise from the way MOFCOM accounted for external sales of billets (slabs) in its
determination of total domestic production. Japan's submissions on this point, which we addressed
in our Interim Report, do not directly speak to the factual accuracy of the calculation and related
discussion in footnote 44. In the light of the explanations provided by China in its request for

14 Japan's request for interim review, para. 8.
15 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, paras. 8-9.
16 China's response to Panel question No. 42(a), para. 13.
17 Japan's request for interim review, para. 8.
18 China's request for interim review, para. 4.
19 China's request for interim review, para. 6.
20 China's request for interim review, para. 6.
21 Japan's comments on China's request for interim review, para. 5.
22 Japan's comments on China's request for interim review, para. 9.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

interim review, we have decided to delete footnote 44, and have made certain corresponding
changes in paragraph 7.35 of the Report as well.
5 JAPAN'S CLAIMS CONCERNING MOFCOM'S CUMULATION ANALYSIS
5.1 Japan's specific request for review
5.1.1 Paragraph 7.75
5.1. To reflect MOFCOM's findings more accurately, Japan requests us to modify paragraph 7.75
to note that MOFCOM acknowledged that there were many "grades and product categories
(stainless steel slabs, coils and plates)" of the product concerned.23
5.2. China submits that while MOFCOM referred to the existen ce of many grades of billets (slabs),
plates, and coils, it did not refer to "product categories".24 Thus, China opposes the addition of any
reference to product categories.25
5.3. To reflect MOFCOM's determination more accurately, we have added a refer ence to the
existence of m any grades of billets (slabs), coils, and plates, but not added any reference to
"product categories".
5.1.2 Paragraph 7.76, section 7.2.3.1, and paragraph 7.79
5.4. Japan requests us to modify the description of its arguments c hallenging MOFCOM's
cumulation analysis based on the difference in the "proportion" of billets (slabs), coils, and plates,
as well as different grades of those products among the exports of the European Union, Indonesia,
Japan, and Korea by adding a refere nce to the differences in the "proportion" as well as "volume"
of exports from these sources.26 Japan also requests us to add a reference in paragraph 7.79 to its
argument that because of differences in the proportion, volume and grades of exports of billets
(slabs), coils, and plates from the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea, it was
questionable whether the exports from these sources were in competition with each other.27
5.5. China opposes Japan's request on the ground that our Report correctly and exhaustively
describes Japan's arguments.28
5.6. We decline to reflect the additional references and arguments made by Japan in this
paragraph because, in our view, our findings on Japan's claims concerning MOFCOM's cumulation
analysis adequately address and reflect the relevant issues and arguments in the appropriate parts
of our analysis.
5.1.3 Paragraph 7.80
5.7. Japan suggests certain changes in paragraph 7.80 to reflect its arguments more accurately.
Specifically, Japan requests us to reflect certain arguments that are based on the differences in
absolute volumes of imports of bille ts (slabs), coils, and plates from the European Union, Japan,
Korea, and Indonesia.29
5.8. China opposes Japan's request. In particular, China disputes the facts relied on by Japan to
make its arguments, and also considers that Japan's changes are not relevant to our analysis or
our ensuing conclusion on this issue.30

23 Japan's request for interim review, para. 12.
24 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 10.
25 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 11.
26 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 13-15.
27 Japan's request for interim review, para. 15.
28 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, paras. 12-13.
29 Japan's request for interim review, para. 16.
30 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, paras. 14-15.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

5.9. We decline to reflect the additional references and arguments made by Japan in this
paragraph because in our view our findings on Japan's claims concerning MOFCOM's cumulation
analysis adequately address the relevant issues and arguments to address these claims.
5.1.4 Paragraph 7.82 and footnote 103
5.10. Japan requests us to make certain corrections to ensure that the percentage share of each
of the sources under investigation wit h respect to a grade correspond to the countries/regions in
an alphabetic order. 31 Japan also requests us to add in footnote 103 references to submissions
made by Japanese respondents to MOFCOM.32
5.11. China opposes Japan's request to make certain addi tions on the ground that the additions
requested by Japan in footnote 103 are repetitive and unnecessary.33
5.12. We have made the corrections requested by Japan in paragraph 7.82. However, we do not
consider the additions requested by Japan in footnote 103 are necessary, or otherwise add to the
clarity of our Report. Thus, we decline to make the changes requested by Japan in footnote 103.
5.1.5 Footnote 105 to paragraph 7.85
5.13. Japan requests us to add explanations concerning submissions made by Jap anese
respondents in the underlying investigation, and also to clarify through an explanatory note
whether the page numbers of the non-injury brief (Exhibit JPN-8.b (BCI)) referred to in our Report
pertain to those indicated at the top-right corner or bottom of this document.34
5.14. China opposes Japan's request to make the additions in footnote 105.35
5.15. We consider that the additions in footnote 105 requested by Japan are unnecessary, and do
not add to the clarity of our Report. We accordingly dec line to make the changes requested by
Japan. We also note that when referring to the page numbers of JPN -8.b we have consistently
referred to the page number at the top of the document. Thus, we find it unnecessary to add an
explanatory note on whether we are referring to the page number at the top or bottom of
Exhibit JPN-8.b.
5.1.6 Paragraph 7.85 and footnote 107
5.16. Japan requests us to make certain changes in paragraph 7.85 and footnote 107 to reflect its
arguments more accurately and comprehensivel y, in particular that MOFCOM failed to address the
dominance of intra-group sales with regard to subject imports from Indonesia and Korea.36
5.17. China opposes Japan's request. In particular, China considers the additions requested by
Japan to be unnece ssary, opposes the reference to the word "dominance", which China does not
accept, and disagrees that MOFCOM did not address the question of dominance of such intra-group
sales.37
5.18. While we take note of the objections raised by China, we note that t he additions requested
by Japan pertain to its own arguments, and do not seek to modify our (or China's) views as set out
in the Report. Thus, in the interest of comprehensiveness, we have decided to reflect the changes
proposed by Japan in paragraph 7.85 and added the appropriate citations.

31 Japan's request for interim review, para. 17.
32 Japan's request for interim review, para. 17.
33 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 16.
34 Japan's request for interim review, para. 18.
35 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 18.
36 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 23-24.
37 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 18.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

5.1.7 Footnote 111 (footnote 112 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.87
5.19. Japan requests us to make certain additions in footnote 111 to reflect MOFCOM's findings
more accurately in the underlying investigation.38
5.20. China opposes Japan's request on the grounds that the additions it requests are
unnecessary.39
5.21. In our view, the additions requested by Japan are unnecessary. We accordingly decline to
make the changes proposed by Japan.
5.1.8 Paragraph 7.89
5.22. Japan requests us to delete a reference to its submission when setting out Japan's
arguments regarding volume trends because that particular argument does not refer to volume
trends.40
5.23. China does not comment on Japan's request.
5.24. We have made the changes requested by Japan.
5.1.9 Paragraph 7.90
5.25. Japan requests us to reflect certain additional arguments that it made, as well as to delete a
submission made by China (which in its view does not directly re fer to China's arguments about
the issue under discussion, i.e. differences in the volume trends among the subject imports from
each origin).41
5.26. China notes that paragraph 7.90 summarizes China's arguments, and considers it
inappropriate to insert a reference to Japan's arguments in this paragraph. 42 China also considers
the submission made by China that Japan suggests deleting to be a key point in China's defence
and thus opposes its deletion.43
5.27. We note that Japan's arguments are part of th e record, and we do not find it necessary to
reflect these additional arguments in paragraph 7.90 of the Report. We are also not persuaded
that we should, as requested by Japan, delete the references to China's submissions in this
paragraph.
5.1.10 Paragraph 7.91
5.28. Japan requests us to add a citation to MOFCOM's final determination in a part of the
paragraph where we refer to MOFCOM's finding.44
5.29. China considers the addition proposed by Japan to be unnecessary and objects to it.45
5.30. Considering Japan requests us to add a citation in the part where we were referring to
MOFCOM's finding, in our view a citation to the relevant part of MOFCOM's finding adds to the
clarity of our Report. We accordingly have added the citation requested by Japan.

38 Japan's request for interim review, para. 20.
39 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 19.
40 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 21-22.
41 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 23-24.
42 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 20.
43 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 20.
44 Japan's request for interim review, para. 25.
45 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 21.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

5.1.11 Paragraph 7.94 and footnote 121 (footnote 122 of the Final Report)
5.31. Japan requests us to make a correction of an editorial nature in this paragraph, and cite a
different paragraph number from its first written submission as the source of th e argument set out
in paragraph 7.94.46
5.32. China does not comment on Japan's request.
5.33. We have made the editorial correction requested by Japan. With regard to footnote 121,
while we have added the reference to paragraph 280 of Japan's first written submission as
requested by Japan, we have not deleted the reference to paragraph 278 of that submission (as
also requested by Japan) because we intended to refer to that paragraph as well.
5.1.12 Paragraph 7.95
5.34. Japan requests us to re flect certain additional arguments that it made in these
proceedings.47
5.35. China opposes Japan's request.48
5.36. We find it unnecessary to reflect Japan's additional arguments in paragraph 7.95 of the
Report.
5.1.13 Paragraph 7.96
5.37. Japan requests certain modifications to reflect China's argument more comprehensively and
accurately.49
5.38. China opposes Japan's request, noting that Japan does not support its request by citing any
source.50
5.39. Considering Japan's request pertains to China's arguments, we find it unnecessary to make
the change requested by Japan.
5.1.14 Paragraph 7.98
5.40. Japan requests certain changes in this paragraph to reflect its arguments more accurately.51
5.41. China opposes Japan's request, specifically the proposed use of terms such as "product
categories" in Japan's request.52
5.42. We have made the changes requested by Japan to accurately reflect its arguments, albeit
using language different from that proposed by Japan. With regard to China's objections to the use
of the term product category, we refer to paragraphs 3.1-3.3 above where we addressed those
concerns.

46 Japan's request for interim review, para. 26.
47 Japan's request for interim review, para. 27.
48 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 22.
49 Japan's request for interim review, para. 28.
50 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 23.
51 Japan's request for interim review, para. 29.
52 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 24.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

6 JAPAN'S CLAIM CONCERNING MOFCOM'S CONSIDERATION OF PRICE EFFECTS
6.1 Japan's specific requests for review
6.1.1 Footnotes 136, 137, and 138 (footnotes 137,138, and 139 of the Final Report) to
paragraph 7.103
6.1. In respect of footnote 136, Japan requests us to cite to paragraphs 74 through 138 of its first
written submission, rather than paragraph 74 alone. Japan asserts that paragraph 74 is only the
introductory paragraph to the section of its first written submission that elaborates the ground
referred to in paragraph 7.103(a) of the Report, and does not explicitly state that MOFCOM's
findings were not based on an object ive examination of positive evidence. Japan therefore
requests us to cite to all paragraphs of that section (i.e. paragraphs 74 -138). Alternatively, Japan
requests us to include the concluding paragraph (i.e. paragraph 138) in the citation.53
6.2. In respect of footnote 137, Japan requests us to cite to paragraphs 139 through 187 of its
first written submission, rather than paragraphs 139 through 141 alone. Japan asserts that
paragraphs 139 through 141 merely introduce the section of its first written submission that
elaborates the ground referred to in paragraph 7.103(b) of the Report. Japan therefore request us
to cite to all paragraphs of that section (i.e. paragraphs 139 through 187). Alternatively, Japan
requests us to include the concluding paragraphs (i.e. paragraphs 185-187) in the citation.54
6.3. In respect of footnote 138, Japan requests us to cite to paragraphs 188 through 216 of its
first written submission, rather than paragraph 188 alone. Japan asserts that paragraph 188 only
introduces the sections of its first written submission that elaborate the ground referred to in
paragraph 7.103(c) of the Report. Japan therefore requests us to cite to all paragraphs of those
section (i.e. paragraphs 139 through 187). Alternatively, Japan requests us to include the
concluding paragraphs of those sections (i.e. paragraphs 204 and 216) in the citation.55
6.4. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.5. We note that paragraphs 7.103(a) to 7.103(c) of the Report, to which footnotes 136, 137,
and 138 are attached, do not seek to reproduce all of Japan's factual and legal arguments
regarding the grounds underlying its claim identified in those paragraphs. We address those
grounds in sections 7.3.3.2, 7.3.3.3, and 7.4.4.4 of the Report, iden tifying in more detail
Japan's arguments as relevant. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to cite to all the
paragraphs of the sections of Japan's first written submission in which Japan elaborates those
grounds. However, we have accepted Japan's re quest to include references to the concluding
paragraphs of those sections in the relevant footnotes of the Report. Accordingly, we have added
citations to paragraph 138, paragraphs 185-187, and paragraphs 204 and 216 of its first written
submission to footnotes 136, 137, and 138 of the Interim Report respectively.
6.1.2 Footnote 140 (footnote 141 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.104
6.6. Japan suggests that we modify the footnote to refer to paragraphs 103 and 104 of China's
first written submission, rather than to paragraph 105.56
6.7. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.8. We have added a reference to paragraph 104 of China's first written submission, while
retaining the reference to paragraph 105. We do not consider it necessary to include a reference to
paragraph 103 of China's first written submission in this footnote.

53 Japan's request for interim review, para. 31.
54 Japan's request for interim review, para. 32.
55 Japan's request for interim review, para. 33.
56 Japan's request for interim review, para. 34.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

6.1.3 Paragraph 7.108
6.9. Japan requests us to add a footnote to paragraph 7.108 referring to certain findings of the
Appellate Body in previous disputes "in order for the parties, the third parties, and the other
Members to more accurately understand the Panel's findings in the context of previous findings by
the Appellate Body".57
6.10. China disagrees with Japan, arguing that the references to the Appe llate Body reports made
by Japan are irrelevant to the issue that we address in paragraph 7.108 of our Report.58
6.11. In our view, the relevant findings can be fully understood from the existing text of this
paragraph without the addition of the footnote that Japan requests us to add. We therefore decline
Japan's request.
6.1.4 Footnote 147 (footnote 148 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.110
6.12. Japan suggests that we change the citation to Japan's submission in this footnote to
Japan's first written submission, paragraph 75.59
6.13. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.14. We have accepted Japan's request and have modified the footnote accordingly.
6.1.5 Paragraphs 7.110, 7.114, and 7.115
6.15. Japan suggests that we change the follow ing statement in the manner indicated below
(Japan suggests deleting the struck-through text and adding the underlined text):
However, when it comes to identifying the circumstances in which the prices of
different product categories may or may not be comparable and, therefore, the factual
conditions that would trigger an investigating authority's obligation to make
adjustments take appropriate steps to ensure price comparability, the parties have
expressed competing views.
Japan explains that because makin g adjustments accounting for price differentials between
product categories is just one possible method available to an investigating authority to ensure
price comparability, mentioning only adjustments in the statement quote d above may be
misleading, and the alternative language may better reflect our position. 60 Japan requests us to
make the same change to the relevant portions of paragraphs 7.114 and 7.115.61
6.16. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, arguing that the suggestion does not reflect t he
Panel's position more accurately.62
6.17. We have accepted Japan's suggestion. We agree with Japan that because making price
adjustments is not the only way through which an investigating authority can ensure price
comparability, the broader formulat ion suggested by Japan, namely "take appropriate steps"
instead of "make adjustments", better reflects our position. We have modified paragraphs 7.110,
7.114, and 7.115 accordingly.
6.1.6 Paragraph 7.111
6.18. Japan suggests that we make the following change to better reflect China's position63:

57 Japan's request for interim review, para. 35.
58 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 25.
59 Japan's request for interim review, para. 36.
60 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 37-38.
61 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 46-47.
62 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, paras. 26 and 29.
63 Japan's request for interim review, para. 39.

BCI deleted, as indicated [[***]]

China maintains that the obligation to make adjustments to ensure price comparability
arises only when the following circumstances are present: (a) the investigation covers
various product categories, which have price differences between them; (b) the price
differences between product categories are significant; and (c) the baskets of the
imported and the domestic like product s being compared are not sufficiently similar in
their product mix of different product categories.
6.19. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion and argues that the existing language correctly
reflects China's position.64
6.20. We have modified the relevant part of paragraph 7.111 to reflect the language used by
China at paragraph 62 of its second written submission.
6.1.7 Footnote 151 (footnote 152 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.112
6.21. Japan suggests that we change footnote 151 to refer to paragraphs 21 through 26 of
Japan's second written submission, rather than par agraph 21 alone. Japan asserts that
paragraph 21 of its second written submission refers to only one panel report that Japan relies on
in making the argument referred to paragraph 7.112 of the Report to which footnote 151 is
attached, whereas Japan also su pports that argument by referring to other panel reports in
paragraphs 22 to 26 of its second written submission.65
6.22. China disagrees with Japan suggestion and consider the suggested change to be
unnecessary.66
6.23. We have accepted Japan's request as paragraphs 21 through 26 of its second written
submission pertain to the argument described in the statement in paragraph 7.112 of the Report
to which footnote 151 is attached. We have modified the footnote accordingly.
6.1.8 Paragraph 7.112
6.24. Japan requests us to make the following change to this paragraph in order to better reflect
its position (Japan suggests deleting the struck-through text and adding the underlined text)67:
Moreover, Japan submits that even if the composition of the baskets of subject
imports and of the domestic like products is similar, an objective price effects analysis
can only be performed by comparing similar product categories, and not by comparing
baskets with similar proportions of different product categories changes in the average
prices may have been caused by changes in the product mix and not by actual
movements in the price of each product . Therefore, for Japan, the text of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement or findings of past panels do not require any o f the
three conditions referred to by China to exist for an investigating authority to be
required to take steps to ensure price comparability between various product
categories.68
6.25. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.26. We have accepted Japan's request and made the requested modifications.

64 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 27.
65 Japan's request for interim review, para. 41.
66 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 28.
67 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 43-45.
68 Fns omitted.

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6.1.9 Paragraph 7.116
6.27. Japan requests us to add a footnote to paragraph 7.116 referring to certain findings of
previous panels "in order for the parties, the third parties, and the other Member s to more
accurately understand the Panel's findings in the context of findings by previous panels".69
6.28. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, arguing that there is no indication that we were
relying on the specific findings of the panels referred to by Japan in reaching the conclusions
stated in paragraph 7.116.70
6.29. In our view, the relevant findings can be fully understood from the existing text of this
paragraph without the addition of the footnote that Japan requests us to add. We therefore decline
Japan's request.
6.1.10 Paragraph 7.117
6.30. Japan requests us to add a footnote to paragraph 7.117 referring to certain findings of the
Appellate Body in China – GOES "in order for the parties, the third parties, and the other Members
to more accurately understand the Panel's findings in the context of findings by the
Appellate Body".71
6.31. China disagrees with Japan and considers that the reference to the Appellate Body findings
that Japan points to would not be justified.72
6.32. We have modified paragraph 7.117 and have added a footnote expressing agreement with
the finding in paragraph 200 of the Appellate Body report in China – GOES.
6.1.11 Footnote 157 (footnote 159 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.117
6.33. Japan suggests the following changes to that, in Japan's view, would more accurately reflect
China's arguments and would support our reasoning as to why China's reliance on the relevant
Appellate Body findings is inapposite (Japan suggests deleting the struck -through text and adding
the underlined text)73:
Footnote 157: China asserts, relying on certain findings of the Appellate Body Reports
in past cases such as EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), US – Hot-Rolled Steel, and
US – Zeroing (EC) , that Article 2.4 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement requires an
investigating authority only to make allowance s only in respect of differences in
characteristics of compared transactions that have an impact on prices of the
transactions. For China, the same principle must apply to Article 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement also. (China's response to Panel question No. 21 ,
paras. 112-113 (referring to Appellate Body Report s, EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia),
consider that the findings of the Appellate Body that China refers to were aimed at
ensuring, pursuant to Article 2.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, a "fair comparison"
between the export price and the normal value of transactions involving the same
product from the same producer, without any indication of price comparability
between the imported and domestic like products. Also, none of these findings were
not made in the context of a situation involving product categories that may not be in
a competitive relationship, and hence their price may not be comparable. Thus, we
consider China' s reliance on the relevant findings of the Appellate Body to be
inapposite to its assertion that the same principle must apply to Article 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.34. China disagrees with Japan's description of Appellate Body findings in the a dditional text
that Japan proposes. China also observes that the Panel does not address in this footnote the

69 Japan's request for interim review, para. 48.
70 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 30.
71 Japan's request for interim review, para. 49.
72 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 31.
73 Japan's request for interim review, para. 50.

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relationship between the concepts of "price comparability" in Articles 2.4 and 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement but only finds that the Appellate Body's findings referred to by China
were not made in the context of a situation involving product categories that may not be in a
competitive relationship. According to China, this makes the additional text proposed by Japan
irrelevant to the point made by the Panel in the footnote.74
6.35. We have modified the footnote to account for China's reference to the Appellate Body
reports in US – Hot-Rolled Steel and US – Zeroing (EC) in support of its argument referred to in
this footnote. However, we do not c onsider it necessary to include in the footnote the additional
text proposed by Japan, given that the text proposed by Japan goes beyond the reasoning based
on which we consider China's reliance on the relevant findings of the Appellate Body to be
inapposite.
6.1.12 Footnote 161 (footnote 163 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.119
6.36. Japan requests us to add certain text to this footnote referring to certain findings of
previous panels "in order for the parties, the third parties, and the other Membe rs to accurately
understand the Panel's findings in the context of the panel's previous findings".75
6.37. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, arguing that there is no indication that we were
relying on the specific findings of the panels referred t o by Japan in reaching the conclusions
stated in footnote 161.76
6.38. In our view, the relevant findings can be fully understood from the existing text of this
footnote without the addition of the text that Japan requests us to add. We therefore decline
Japan's request.
6.1.13 Paragraph 7.121
6.39. Japan suggests that we make the following change to paragraph 7.121 (Japan suggests
deleting the struck-through text and adding the underlined text)77:
Thus, China's reliance on China – Autos (US) to support its submission that non -price
differences should be considered to affect price comparability only when they are
shown to affect relative prices is not well unfounded.
6.40. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion.78
6.41. We have accepted Japan's suggestion.
6.1.14 Footnote 163 (footnote 165 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.122
6.42. Japan requests us to add certain text to this footnote referring to certain findings of the
panel in China – X-Ray Equipment "in order for the pa rties, the third parties, and the other
Members to more accurately understand the Panel's findings in the context of the panel's previous
findings".79
6.43. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion and asserts that the reference to the panel will not
be justified.80
6.44. We do not consider it necessary to add the reference to the findings of the panel in China –
X-Ray Equipment identified by Japan. In our view, the relevant findings can be fully understood
from the existing text of this footnote withou t the addition of the text that Japan requests us to
add. We therefore decline Japan's request.

74 Chinas comment on Japan's request for interim review, para. 33.
75 Japan's request for interim review, para. 51.
76 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 34.
77 Japan's request for interim review, para. 52.
78 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 35.
79 Japan's request for interim review, para. 54.
80 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 36.

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6.1.15 Paragraph 7.125
6.45. Japan suggests that we make the following change to paragraph 7.125 (Japan suggests
deleting the struck-through text and adding the underlined text).81:
We share Japan's view that, in the above scenario, a finding of price depression could
not be deemed as a result of an objective examination since observed changes in the
average unit values of the products under investigation as a whole could be the result
of changes in the product mix, rather than changes in prices. fn1 In our view, the panel
of China – Broiler Products paid attention to the same structural issue, in the context
of price undercutting, stating that "the authority mu st ensure that the groups of
products or transactions compared on both sides of the equation are sufficiently
similar so that any price differential can reasonably be said to result from 'price
undercutting' and not merely from differences in the compositi on of the two baskets
being compared ".fn2 China's reliance on China – Broiler Products is misplaced.
Contrary to China's assertion, the panel in China – Broiler Products did not find that
the obligation to ensure price comparability will only arise if ther e are significant
differences in the product mix between domestic and imported products. Rather , in
stating that "the authority must ensure that the groups of products or transactions
compared on both sides of the equation are sufficiently similar" , the pa nel was
addressing what an investigating authority must do to undertake an objective
consideration of price effects in one particular set of circumstances, namely, where (a)
the products under investigation are not homogenous; (b) various product categorie s
command significantly different prices; and (c) the authority performs a price
comparison based on a basket of products or sales transactions. …
New footnote 1: Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.85.
New footnote 2: Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , para. 7.483. (emphasis
added)
6.46. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, asserting that while in paragraph 7.125, the Panel
was only addressing China's reliance on China – Broiler Products , the f irst sentence of
Japan's suggested text relates to Japan's arguments set out in the last sentence of the preceding
paragraph.82
6.47. We agree with China that the first sentence of Japan's suggested text relates to
Japan's argument set out in the precedi ng paragraph, and not to our view concerning
China's reliance on China – Broiler Products. We consider though that expressing our agreement at
the beginning of paragraph 7.125 with the argument of Japan that is set out in paragraph 7.124
will clarify our analysis of the issue at hand. Therefore, we have modified paragraph 7.125 to note
our agreement with Japan's argument described in paragraph 7.124. However, we do not consider
it necessary to refer to the panels' findings in China – X-Ray Equipment and China – Broiler
Products in the manner suggested by Japan.
6.1.16 Paragraph 7.127 and footnote 169 (footnote 171 of the Final Report)
6.48. Japan requests us to reflect more accurately one of its arguments referred to in
paragraph 7.127. Japan also requests us to limit the references in footnote 169 to paragraphs 88
and 89 of its first written submission, while deleting the reference to paragraph 90.83
6.49. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, asserting that Japan's argument has been
correctly described in this paragraph.84
6.50. We have accepted Japan's request. Accordingly, we have modified footnote 169 and the
relevant statement in paragraph 7.127.

81 Japan's request for interim review, para. 55.
82 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 37.
83 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 56-58.
84 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 38.

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6.1.17 Footnote 181 (footnote 183 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.135
6.51. Japan requests us to replace the citation to paragraph 453 of its second written submission
with paragraph 121 of its first written submission.85
6.52. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.53. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.18 Footnote 183 (footnote 185 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.135
6.54. Japan requests us to indicate in the footnote that China refers to MOFCOM's findings on
page 12 of the final determination in making the argument in paragraph 16 of its opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel to which this footnote refers.86
6.55. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.56. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.19 Footnote 186 (footnote 188 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.137
6.57. Japan requests us to qualify the reference to paragraph 7 of its closing statement at the
second meeting with "See also", on the ground that this portion of its argument "is relevant to the
impermissible nature o f the ex post rationalizations presented by China [but] does not directly
address the issue of MOFCOM's finding of 'reasonable difference' in prices among the product
categories".87
6.58. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.59. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.20 Footnote 195 (footnote 197 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.142
6.60. Japan requested us to add "emphasis added" at the end of the citation in this footnote.88
6.61. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.62. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.21 Paragraph 7.143
6.63. Japan requested us to add language to this paragraph to the effect we need not address
Japan's argument concerning MOFCOM's alleged failure to perform an objective examination of
positive eviden ce in relation to attachment 9 to the application and annexes 17 and 34 to the
non-injury brief, given our prior findings that MOFCOM's finding of "reasonable price differences"
was not reasonably and adequately explained. Japan explains that this addition will avoid the
misunderstanding that Japan requested us to review MOFCOM's selection of certain information as
best information available in the framework of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.89
6.64. China disagrees with Japan's su ggestion. China asserts that Japan's suggestion would
distort the Panel's findings, as the Panel did not review Japan's arguments concerning attachment
9 to the application and annexes 17 and 34 to the non-injury brief not because it found doing so to

85 Japan's request for interim review, para. 59.
86 Japan's request for interim review, para. 60.
87 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 61-62.
88 Japan's request for interim review, para. 63.
89 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 64-65.

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be u nnecessary, but because it did not consider this information to be within its terms of
reference.90
6.65. We have modified paragraph 7.143 to address Japan's concern that the finding in our
Interim Report could be misunderstood to suggest that Japan advanced a claim under Article 6.8
and Annex II of the Anti -Dumping Agreement against MOFCOM's selection of certain information
as best information available.
6.1.22 Footnote 215 (footnote 217 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.151
6.66. Japan suggests that we indicate in this footnote that Japan's first written submission quotes
the non-injury brief.91
6.67. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.68. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.23 Footnote 223 (footnote 22 5 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.154 and
footnote 224 (footnote 229 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.155
6.69. Japan suggests that we indicate in the citation in these footnotes the page numbers of the
exhibits to which we refer.92
6.70. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.71. We have accepted Japan's request.
6.1.24 Paragraph 7.158
6.72. Japan requests us to add certain language to make it clear that the non -injury brief at issue
in this paragraph was the one submitted by the Japane se respondents, and not the other non -
injury briefs before MOFCOM.93
6.73. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.74. We have accepted Japan's suggestion.
6.1.25 Paragraph 7.167
6.75. Japan suggests that we make the following additions to this paragraph (Japan's suggested
additions are underlined)94:
… Accordingly, in our view, China's reliance on the Appellate Body's findings in Korea
– Pneumatic Valves is misplaced. The Appellate Body's statements that "[the
investigating authority] relied on the price differentials" and "to the extent an
investigating authority relies on price comparisons" were made in response to Korea's
allegation that there is no obligation to ensure price comparability when making a
finding of price depression or suppress ionfn, and do not prescribe different degrees of
relevance of the issue of price comparability depending on whether a price effects
analysis is based on a comparison of price trends or of prices.248 …
New footnote: Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), paras. 5.242
and 5.247.

90 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 40.
91 Japan's request for interim review, para. 66.
92 Japan's request for interim review, para. 67.
93 Japan's request for interim review, para. 68.
94 Japan's request for interim review, para. 69.

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6.76. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, stating that it is unnecessary to make the changes
that Japan suggests and that Japan's suggested changes are not a part of our reasoning.95
6.77. We agree with Chi na that the changes sought by Japan are unnecessary. In our view, our
statements in respect of China's reliance on the Appellate Body report in Korea – Pneumatic Valves
are already clear, and we do not consider that adding the quotes from that report that Japan
would have us insert will add value to our analysis.
6.1.26 Footnote 252 (footnote 254 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.170
6.78. Japan requests us to add a reference to paragraphs 174 -176 of its first written submission
to this footnote.96
6.79. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.80. We consider that the existing reference to Japan's submissions is adequate to identify the
source of Japan's argument and we need not include the additional citations requested by Japan.
6.1.27 Paragraph 7.171
6.81. Japan requests us to make the following changes as, in Japan's view, these changes will
summarize Japan's arguments more accurately and will contribute to clarifying our findings:
Based on the foregoing analysis, we find that Japan has established that MOFCOM's
finding that there was no issue of price comparability between product categories
MOFCOM's price comparison between subject imports and the domestic like products,
both of which were undistinguished by product categorie s, was inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the following reasons:
a. to the extent that MOFCOM's finding was based on China's view that the obligation to
make adjustments to ensure price comparability arises only when there are significant
price differences between products categories, MOFCOM proceeded on a misconceived
understanding of the notion of price comparability; …
6.82. Japan asserts that it did not contend that MOF COM found that "there was no issue of price
comparability between product categories", nor did MOFCOM make this finding. Japan states that
"MOFCOM simply declined to accept the comments from the interested parties on the need to
conduct price effects analy sis for each of the three product categories". According to Japan, the
suggested changes will reflect Japan's argument against MOFCOM's determination on this issue
more accurately. Japan also contends that removing the phrase "make adjustments to" from
paragraph 7.171(a) will reflect China's argument more accurately.97
6.83. China disagrees with Japan's suggested changes to paragraph 7.171. China contends that
MOFCOM did conclude that there was no issue of price comparability between the three product
categories, and agrees with our formulation. China also disagrees with Japan's suggestion
regarding the deletion of the phrase "make adjustments to", and asserts that our formulation
correctly reflects China's position.98
6.84. We have modified paragraph 7.171 to make our findings clearer. We have made conforming
changes to paragraphs 7.177 and 8.1(d) of the Final Report. We have also modified
paragraph 7.171(a) to reflect the formulation used by China at paragraph 62 of its second written
submission in which China describes the circumstances in which, in China's view, "the obligation to
ensure price comparability is triggered".

95 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 44.
96 Japan's request for interim review, para. 70.
97 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 71-73 (referring to MOFCOM's final determination,
(Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 43-44).
98 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 45.

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6.1.28 Paragraph 7.172 and footnotes 254 and 255 (footnotes 2 56 and 2 57 of the
Final Report)
6.85. Japan requests us to make certa in additions to our summary of Japan's arguments
contained in paragraphs 7.172(b) and 7.172(d), and to include certain additional citations in the
footnotes attached to these paragraphs.99
6.86. China does not consider it necessary to add more detail to the summary of Japan's
arguments, and recalls that the executive summaries of the parties' arguments attached to the
Final Report allow parties to summarize their arguments in more details than the summary
provided by the Panel. China also asserts that we re we to accept Japan's additions, we should also
reflect China's position on each of those issues.100
6.87. We have rephrased paragraphs 7.172(b) and 7.172(d)and have modified certain footnotes
to more accurately reflect Japan's submissions. However, as we do not see this rephrasing as
substantially altering or expanding our summary of Japan's arguments, we do not see the need to
add China's position on each of Japan's allegations. We also recall that apart from finding that
MOFCOM's flawed finding with respect to the price comparability of the three product categories
tainted its series -specific price effects analyses, we do not make additional findings on
Japan's arguments against MOFCOM's series-specific price effects analyses
6.1.29 Paragraph 7.175
6.88. Japan requests us to make certain additions to our summary of Japan's arguments
contained in this paragraph, and to include certain additional citations in the footnotes attached to
this paragraph.101
6.89. China does not consider it necessary to add more detail to the summary of Japan's
arguments, and recalls that the executive summaries of the parties' arguments attached to the
Final Report allow parties to summarize their arguments in more details than the summary
provided by the Panel.102
6.90. We consider that the existing language of this paragraph already reflects the elements
referred to in Japan's suggested textual edits (namely Japan's allegation that MOFCOM improperly
failed to explain its overall conclusion of price depression in ligh t of the alleged divergence in the
prices of the subject imports and the domestic like products and the allegedly "consistently higher"
prices of subject imports). We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the edits suggested
by Japan.
6.1.30 Footnote 256 (footnote 260 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.175
6.91. Japan requests us to add citations to certain additional paragraph of its first written
submission in this footnote.103
6.92. China does not comment on Japan's request.
6.93. We consider that the existing citations are sufficient to reflect Japan's arguments.
6.1.31 Paragraph 7.177
6.94. Japan asserts that the existing language of this paragraph could be read as sugges ting that
we have accepted China's argument that MOFCOM did not find price depression based on a
comparison of weighted average prices of the subject imports and domestic like products as a

99 Japan's request for interim review, para. 74.
100 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, paras. 46-47.
101 Japan's request for interim review, para. 75.
102 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 48.
103 Japan's request for interim review, para. 76.

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whole, but based on its series -specific price effects analyses. To preclude this confusion, Japan
suggests some modifications to the text of this paragraph.104
6.95. China comments that Japan's proposed changes are unnecessary as the contents of the
paragraph are clear and create no risk of confusion.105
6.96. We have added a footnote to this paragraph to address Japan's concern.
6.2 China's specific requests for review
6.2.1 Paragraph 7.101
6.97. China requests us to invert the order of existing paragraphs 7.101(a) and 7.101(b), to
reflect that MOFCOM first asses sed the prices effects by series of grade and then considered
weighted average prices.106
6.98. Japan disagrees with China's request, asserting that our description of these points is
neutral and does not imply that one paragraph takes priority over the other.107
6.99. We agree with Japan that our description of these points is neutral and does not imply that
one paragraph takes priority over the other. However, we have accepted China's request to invert
the order in which paragraphs are listed.
6.2.2 Paragraph 7.127
6.100. China requests us to make certain edits to accurately reflect China's position.108
6.101. Japan does not comment on China's request.
6.102. We have modified this paragraph in the manner requested by China.
6.2.3 Paragraph 7.133
6.103. China requests us to include additional text in this paragraph reflecting " the fact that
unlike these previous cases, in the present case MOFCOM took additional actions to ensure price
comparability between the products at issue".109
6.104. Japan requests us to reject China's request, stating that the Panel did not make the
findings that China's suggested text reflect, and that China's suggested text is contrary to the
Panel's findings.110
6.105. We do not consider it necessary or a ppropriate to make findings comparing
MOFCOM's "efforts" to ensure price comparability in this case with those in previous cases.
Further, in our view, making the findings that China requests us to make does not contribute to
the resolution of the issue at hand – i.e. whether by relying on an examination of price and
non-price differences between product categories in the context of its analysis of the interested
parties' views on product scope, MOFCOM properly established that it was not required to take
specific steps to ensure price comparability between product categories. Therefore, we do not
accept China's request.

104 Japan's request for interim review, para. 77.
105 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 49.
106 China's request for interim review, paras. 9-10.
107 Japan's comments on China's request for interim review, para. 13.
108 China's request for interim review, para. 12.
109 China's request for interim review, para. 13.
110 Japan's comments on China's request for interim review, paras. 16-17.

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7 JAPAN'S CLAIM CONCERNING MOFCOM'S EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE
SUBJECT IMPORTS ON THE STATE OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
7.1 Japan's specific requests for review
7.1.1 Paragraph 7.184
7.1. Japan requests us to include certain language "to more completely ground this discussion of
the legal standard in the relevant Appellate Body decisions". The requested language is
Japan's characterization of the Appellate Body report in China – GOES, paragraph 149.111
7.2. China disagrees with Japan's suggested addition, asserting that it does not seem to China
that the Panel grounded its discussion of the legal standard in the Appella te Body report referred
to by Japan.112
7.3. We do not include Japan's suggested language as, in our view, the existing discussion of
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in this section is adequate.
7.1.2 Footnote 268 (footnote 273 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.185
7.4. Japan requests us to expand the reference to its second written submission in this footnote to
include paragraphs 199 to 205, rather than paragraph 205 alone.113
7.5. China does not comment on Japan's request.
7.6. We have accepted Japan's request.
7.1.3 Footnote 272 (footnote 277 of the Final Report) paragraph 7.185
7.7. Japan requests us to make an editorial correction to a quote from its submissions.114
7.8. China does not comment on Japan's request.
7.9. We have made the requested correction.
7.1.4 Paragraph 7.186
7.10. Japan requests us to attach a citation to MOFCOM's final determination to a statement in
this paragraph. Japan also requests us to add some language to our analysis in the paragraph.115
7.11. China considers it unnecessary to include the additional language suggested by Japan.116
7.12. We have added the citation to MOFCOM's final determination requested by Japan. As
regards the additional analytical language suggested by Japan, we agree with China that it is no t
necessary to make this addition. We also note that Japan does not explain why this addition would
be necessary.
7.1.5 Paragraph 7.193
7.13. Japan requests us to include some additional language and citations to accurately and more
completely reflect Japan's arguments.117
7.14. China does not comment on Japan's request.

111 Japan's request for interim review, para. 79.
112 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 50.
113 Japan's request for interim review, para. 80.
114 Japan's request for interim review, para. 81.
115 Japan's request for interim review, para. 82.
116 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 51.
117 Japan's request for interim review, para. 83.

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7.15. We have accepted Japan's request.
7.1.6 Footnote 287 (footnote 295 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.194
7.16. Japan suggests that we add a reference to paragraph 218 of its first written submission to
this footnote.118
7.17. China does not comment on Japan's request.
7.18. We have accepted Japan's request.
7.1.7 Paragraph 7.194
7.19. Japan requests us to add a citation to Japan's second written submission to one of the
statements in this paragraph.119
7.20. China does not comment on Japan's request.
7.21. We do not consider it necessary to add the requested citation as the source of Japan's
arguments is clear from the citations already contained in this paragraph.
7.1.8 Paragraph 7.211
7.22. Japan requests us to ensure that this paragraph clarifies that Japan has argued that "failing
to substantiate the calculation method behind apparent domestic production amounts to a failure
to provide a meaningful basis for an injury determination".120
7.23. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, stating that the suggestion does not correctly
reflect the argument put forward by Japan.121
7.24. The full paragraph containing Japan's assertion with respect to MOFCOM's alleged failure to
provide a "meaningful basis" for its injury determination appears in Japan's comments on
China's response to one of our questions after the second substantive meeting. This paragraph
provides as follows:
In its Final Determination, MOFCOM merely mentioned that it performed an evaluation
of the market share of the domestic industry "including the captive use". In addition
to the mere reference, MOFCOM provided no evidence or data substantiating the
details or mathematical implicat ions of such an "inclu[sion]", and did not disclose or
even allude to the above complex calculation formula. It thus failed to provide a
"meaningful basis" for its injury determination.122
7.25. We do not understand from this paragraph that Japan is arguing that "failing to substantiate
the calculation method behind apparent domestic consumption certainly amounts to a failure to
provide a meaningful basis for an injury determination". 123 Rather, we understand
Japan's submission to be focused on the MOFCO M's determination of the domestic industry's
market share. We agree with China that Japan's suggested addition does not correctly reflect the
arguments put forward by Japan. We therefore reject Japan's request.
7.1.9 Paragraph 7.221
7.26. Japan requests us to add a statement in this paragraph to the effect that Japan argued
before us that "while MOFCOM noted the overall positive trends with respect to such indices over

118 Japan's request for interim review, para. 84.
119 Japan's request for interim review, para. 85.
120 Japan's request for interim review, para. 86.
121 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 52.
122 Japan's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 49, para. 63. (fns omitted)
123 Emphasis added.

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the POI in its analysis, it based its finding, i.e. conclusive observation on such indi ces" exclusively
on a comparison between the first quarter of 2018 with those for the first quarter of 2017.124
7.27. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, stating that the suggestion does not correctly
reflect the argument put forward by Japan.125
7.28. We note that our description of Japan's argument in this paragraph reflects Japan's own
formulation in paragraph 357 of its first written submission. The additional language that Japan
would have us add does not appear in Japan's first wr itten submission. We therefore reject
Japan's request.
7.1.10 Paragraph 7.222
7.29. Japan requests us to add the underlined text to this paragraph:
China also argues that to the extent that MOFCOM's evaluation did focus on the most
recent period, Japan h as failed to explain why such focus would be unreasonable. 331
In response, Japan argues that "China failed to provide a compelling explanation as to
why MOFCOM concluded that the economic factors showing negative trends supported
an affirmative injury dete rmination in light of the fact that several factors exhibited
positive trends" fn1, as MOFCOM and China indeed noted, but ignored when drawing
conclusions about the indicators being considered.fn2
New footnote 1: Japan's second written submission, para. 225.
New footnote 2: Japan's first written submission, para. 360; second written
submission, para. 224.
According to Japan, the addition of the underlined text would reflect that Japan argued before us
that while MOFCOM did note positive trends in pre -tax profits and return on investment, it
concluded that these indicators worsened based only on a comparison between the figures for the
first quarter of 2018 and those for the first quarter of 2017.126

7.30. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion.127
7.31. We note that the text that Japan wishes us to add (underlined in the quote in
paragraph 7.29 above) does not reflect the argument that while MOFCOM noted positive trends in
pre-tax profits and return on investment, it concluded that these indicators wo rsened based only
on a comparison between the figures for the first quarter of 2018 and those for the first quarter of
2017. The argument presented in the underlined text relates to two different sets of economic
factors: one showing negative trends, and t he other showing positive trends. That argument does
not suggest that MOFCOM did not adequately consider the positive trends within certain economic
factors (namely pre -tax profits and return on investment) but based its conclusion only on a
comparison of trends pertaining to those particular factors between the first quarters of 2017 and
2018.
7.32. We also note that Japan's argument in paragraph 360 of its first written submission that
MOFCOM "failed to provide a compelling explanation as to why the eco nomic factors showing
negative trends supported an affirmative injury determination in light of the fact that several
factors exhibited positive trend" (which is akin to the text that Japan wished us to add) was not
connected to its argument concerning pre -tax profits and return on investment. Rather, the
argument in paragraph 360 Japan's first written submission was connected to MOFCOM's finding
quoted below:
The Investigating Authority considered that the determination of whether domestic
industry was subject to material injury should not be based solely on certain indices of

124 Japan's request for interim review, para. 87.
125 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 53.
126 Japan's request for interim review, para. 88.
127 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 54.

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the domestic industry, but all economic indices and the impact of other factors in the
domestic industry should be considered. The Investigating Authority comprehensively
considered the changes in all indices and found that the domestic industry suffered
from material injury.128
We understood Japan's assertions in paragraph 225 of its second written submission that MOFCOM
improperly "concluded that the economic factors showing negative trends supported an affirmative
injury determination in light of the fact that several factors exhibited positive trends" to also be
related to MOFCOM's finding quoted above, rather than to MOFCOM's findings specifically in
respect of pre-tax profits and return on investment.
7.33. Therefore, in our view, Japan's comments on the Interim Report conflate Japan's
submissions regarding MOFCOM's findings on pre -tax profits and return on investment specifically,
with its submissions regarding MOFCOM's more gen eral finding that material injury existed even
though certain factors showed positive trends. Thus, we reject Japan's request.
7.1.11 Paragraph 7.226
7.34. Japan requests us to make the following changes to this paragraph (Japan suggests that we
delete the struck-through text and add the underlined text)129:
Japan argues that MOFCOM noted several factors presenting positive trends, but failed
to explain in its impact analysis why economic factors showing negative trends
supported an affirmative injury determination when several other factors exhibited
positive trends, other than simply mentioning "all economic indices and the impact of
other factors" without referring to any specific evidence. fn In Japan's view, this failure
rendered MOFCOM's impact analysis inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.340
New footnote: MOFCOM's final determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 50.
7.35. China disagrees with Japan's suggestion, stating that the suggestion does not correctly
reflect the argument put forward by Japan.130
7.36. We consider that the existing language in the paragraph clearly reflects Japan's argument.
Japan's suggested edits do not alter the substance of the existing language. We therefore reject
Japan's request.
8 JAPAN'S CLAIM CONCERNING MOFCOM'S CAUSATION ANALYSIS
8.1 Japan's specific request for review
8.1.1 Footnotes 349-351 (footnotes 357-359 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.232
8.1. Japan requests us to cite to all the paragraphs of the three sections of its arguments that are
summarized in pa ragraphs 7.232(a), 7.232(b), and 7.232(c) in the footnotes attached to those
paragraphs. Alternatively, Japan requests us to include the introductory and concluding
paragraphs of each of the three sections in the footnotes attached to paragraphs 7.232(a),
7.232(b), and 7.232(c).131
8.2. China does not comment on Japan's request.
8.3. We have included citation to the introductory and concluding paragraphs of the relevant
sections of Japan's first written submission as requested by Japan.

128 MOFCOM's final determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 50.
129 Japan's request for interim review, para. 89.
130 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 55.
131 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 90-93.

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8.1.2 Paragraph 7.239 and footnotes 355 -357 (footnotes 36 3-365 of the Final Report)
thereto
8.4. Japan requests us to make certain edits to this paragraph and to the footnotes attached
thereto to that, in Japan's view, would summarize its arguments more accurately and
completely.132
8.5. China disagrees with Japan's suggestions. For China, our views in this part are clear and
unambiguous, and the content that Japan seeks to add would be unnecessary and repetitive.
China notes that Japan's arguments would be reflected in the executive summary of its arguments
attached to the Report.133
8.6. We have made some editorial adjustments to this paragraph and have modified certain
footnotes, as appropriate.
8.1.3 Footnote 362 (footnote 370 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.241
8.7. Japan requests us to include references to some additional paragraphs of Japan's first written
submission to this footnote.134
8.8. China does not comment on Japan's request.
8.9. We consider that the existing citation is adequate for the purposes of the paragraph.
8.1.4 Footnote 364 (footnote 372 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.242
8.10. Japan requests us to include reference to one additional paragraphs of Japan's first written
submission to this footnote.135
8.11. China does not comment on Japan's request.
8.12. We consider that the existing citation is adequate for the purposes of the paragraph.
8.1.5 Footnote 385 (footnote 393 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.253
8.13. Japan requests us to include "emphasis added" at the end of this footnote.136
8.14. China does not comment on Japan's request.
8.15. We have accepted Japan's request.
8.1.6 Footnote 386 (footnote 394 of the Final Report) to paragraph 7.253
8.16. Japan suggests that we ma ke a formatting edit in relation to the indentation of the content
of this footnote.137
8.17. China does not comment on Japan's request.
8.18. We have made the required formatting change.

132 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 94-97.
133 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 56.
134 Japan's request for interim review, para. 99.
135 Japan's request for interim review, para. 100.
136 Japan's request for interim review, para. 102.
137 Japan's request for interim review, para. 104.

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8.1.7 Paragraph 7.259
8.19. Japan requests us to add a citat ion to this paragraph indicating that the information
concerning Gansu Jiu referred to in this paragraph was presented by China in its response to a
Panel question.138
8.20. China considers the addition of the footnote to be unnecessary.139
8.21. We have added the footnote requested by Japan.
8.2 China's specific requests for review
8.2.1 Paragraph 7.249 and footnote 379 (footnote 387 of the Final Report)
8.22. China requests us to revise the text in paragraph 7.249 and footnote 379 to indicate that
China was not in a position to furnish the information in "Section IV of the confidential
questionnaires lodged by the domestic producers" because "the domestic producers did not agree
to sharing this business confidential information in the present proceedings".140
8.23. Japan disagrees with China's request, asserting that China did not indicate before the Panel
that the reason it could not provide the information concerned was the domestic producers' refusal
to provide it and that there is no evidence proving that this was in fact the case.141
8.24. We agree with Japan. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to revise
paragraph 7.249 and footnote 379.
9 JAPAN'S CLAIMS CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT OF CERTAIN
INFORMATION
9.1 Paragraph 7.267
9.1. Japan requests us to modify paragraph 7.267 of our Report to reflect an argument that it
made in paragraph 506 of its first written submission. 142 In particular, Japan requests that our
Report reflect its view that the domestic industry's application did not show good cause because
"the business activities listed in the application contained only broad descriptions, such as
'importers under investigation' and 'start production of products under investigation in Indonesia',
none of which are confidential by nature".143
9.2. China opposes Japan's request on the ground that the additions requested by Japan are
unnecessary and repetitive, and can be reflected in its executive summary.144
9.3. We note that in paragraph 506 of its first written submission, Japan's main argument was
that although, in general, business activities, such as the relation of a domestic producer with an
exporter or importer, or that it is itself an importer of the alleged dumped product, might be
confidential information deserving of protection, the domestic industry's application did not contain
the kind of detailed information that might be deserving of confidential treatme nt. In support of
this argument, Japan referred to what it considered to be broad descriptions in the application.
While we noted and addressed this argument as part of our analysis in paragraphs 7.276 and
7.277 of our Report, we have nonetheless made certain modifications in paragraph 7.267 to reflect
Japan's main argument in this regard.

138 Japan's request for interim review, para. 106.
139 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 57.
140 China's request for interim review, paras. 14-15.
141 Japan's comments on Chinas request for interim review, paras. 20-23.
142 Japan's request for interim review, para. 108.
143 Japan's request for interim review, para. 108.
144 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 58.

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9.2 Paragraph 7.276
9.4. Japan requested several changes in paragraph 7.276 of our Report.
a. In reference to our statement noting Japan's agreement that business acti vities of a
company, specifically whether it is related to exporters or importers, or is in itself an
importer "may" constitute confidential information deserving of protection,
Japan contends that it was merely expressing its acceptance that similar types of facts
could be confidential under other circumstances. 145 Japan requests certain changes to
reflect this contention.
b. Japan requests that we note, in the part of the paragraph where we noted
Japan's contention that the domestic industry's applicatio n did not contain the kind of
detailed information that might be deserving of confidential treatment, that
Japan's contention is based on its view that the application contained only broad
descriptions "importers under investigation" and "start production of products under
investigation in Indonesia", none of which are confidential by nature.146
c. Japan requests us to reflect its argument disclosing the names of companies would
have allowed interested parties to understand critical matters such as the sco pe of the
industry as calculated by MOFCOM.147
9.5. China opposes Japan's request in paragraph 9.4 (a) above on the ground that the formulation
used in the Report more appropriately reflected Japan's position. 148 China finds the other additions
to be unnecessary.149
9.6. Regarding the first request, the Report , in our view, accurately reflects Japan's argument. In
particular, in its first written submission Japan contended that although business activities, that is
a producer's relation with the exporte r or importer, or that a producer is itself an importer "might
be confidential information deserving of protection", the application did not contain the kind of
detailed information that might be deserving of confidential treatment. We consider that our
statement noting Japan's agreement that the business activities of a company, specifically whether
it is related to exporters or importers, or is itself an importer of the alleged dumped product "may"
constitute confidential information deserving of protecti on, accurately reflects Japan's argument
set out above. We thus decline to make the change proposed by Japan.
9.7. With regard to the second request, the additions proposed by Japan expand on the basis for
Japan's main argument, i.e. the domestic industry's application did not contain the kind of detailed
information that might be deserving of confidential treatment. We have decided to thus make the
change proposed by Japan.
9.8. As regards the third request, we note that whether or not the information in question was
necessary to address critical matters does not directly bear on the question on whether there was
good cause for confidential treatment of the information in question under Article 6.5. Instead, a
panel must assess as part of a claim under Ar ticle 6.5.1 whether the non -confidential summary of
such a confidential information is in "sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence". Considering a panel is not required to
address each and every argument made by a party, and the change proposed by Japan does not
directly bear on our enquiry under Article 6.5, we do not find it necessary to reflect it in our
Report.
9.3 Paragraph 7.277
9.9. Japan suggests we delete certain parts of this paragraph, which suggest that Japan agrees
that the description of the business activities of the companies "in this case can constitute
confidential information".150

145 Japan's request for interim review, para. 109.
146 Japan's request for interim review, para. 109.
147 Japan's request for interim review, para. 109.
148 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 61.
149 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 62.
150 Japan's request for interim review, para. 110.

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9.10. China opposes Japan's request by contending that the Report replicates almos t verbatim
Japan's position, as expressed in paragraph 506 of its first written submission, and thus it does not
see why the deletions requested by Japan should be made.151
9.11. In paragraph 506 of its first written submission, Japan stated that although "in general,
business activities 'related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the
allegedly dumped product' might be confidential information deserving of protection, the
Application does not contain the kind of detailed informat ion that might b e deserving of
confidential treatment". 152 We consider our description in paragraph 7.277 accurately reflect
Japan's position. We thus decline to make the changes requested by Japan.
9.4 Japan's claims under Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
9.4.1 Paragraphs 7.279 and 7.284
9.12. Japan suggests that we add a footnote in paragraph 7.279 to reflect Japan's argument
regarding the meaning of "sufficient" under Article 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement.153 Japan
also suggests that we make certain changes in paragraph 7.284 to accurately reflect the findings
of past DSB reports.154
9.13. China does not comment on Japan's request on paragraph 7.279. China opposes the
additions proposed by Japan in paragraph 7.284 on the g round that there is no indication that we
intended to make such specific addition in our Report.155
9.14. We set out the legal standard that we would apply in reviewing Japan's claims under
Article 6.5.1 after taking into account the parties' understandi ng of the obligations under
Article 6.5.1. We do not find it necessary to add a footnote in paragraph 7.279 to reflect the
argument made by Japan regarding this legal standard. We thus find it unnecessary to make the
change requested by Japan and accordingly decline to do so.
9.15. With regard to the additions requested by Japan based on past DSB reports, we note that in
paragraph 7.284 we observed that with respect to the sufficiency of the non-confidential summary,
Article 6.5.1 requires that the non -confidential summary be in sufficient detail to permit a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. The
findings of past DSB reports that Japan requests we add to paragraph 7.284 essentially
paraphrases the obligatio ns under Article 6.5.1 in this regard. Nonetheless, for the sake of
completeness and reflecting the findings of past DSB reports in their context, we have made the
changes requested by Japan in paragraph 7.284.
10 JAPAN'S CLAIMS CONCERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS UNDER
CONSIDERATION WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR MOFCOM'S DECISION TO APPLY
DEFINITIVE MEASURES
10.1 Paragraph 7.321 (section 7.7.3.2 – Definition of the product under consideration)
10.1. Japan suggests we reflect in paragraph 7.321 its submission that interested parties made
multiple challenges to MOFCOM's treatment of billets (slabs), coils, and plates as one product in
the proceedings before MOFCOM.156
10.2. China does not comment on Japan's request.
10.3. We note that argument s made by Japan are already part of the record, and we do not
consider it necessary to reflect these arguments in our Report. We accordingly decline to make the
additional details requested by Japan.

151 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 63.
152 Fn omitted.
153 Japan's request for interim review, para. 111.
154 Japan's request for interim review, para. 112.
155 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 64.
156 Japan's request for interim review, para. 117.

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10.2 Paragraph 7.326
10.4. Japan requests us to add a reference to its submission, relying on previous DSB reports,
that Article 6.9 requires an investigating authority to disclose the facts in such a manner that an
interested party can clearly understand what data the investigating authority has used, and ho w
those data were used.157
10.5. China does not comment on Japan's request.
10.6. We have made the changes requested by Japan, albeit using language different from those
proposed by Japan.
10.3 Paragraph 7.334
10.7. Japan requests certain changes in paragraph 7.334 to properly reflect its argument in
relation to the disclosure of the state of the domestic industry. Specifically, Japan objects to the
statement that it did not contest China's assertion that when the correct data is used to calculate
domestic apparent consumption there is no discrepancy or error of the type alluded by Japan in its
submission. Instead, Japan refers to the parts of Japan's second written submission where it
submits that it contests this assertion.158
10.8. China opposes Japan's request, and contends that at the very least we should add a
reference to the fact that contrary to Japan's submission, China provided to us evidence
corroborating its explanation as to how the figures for apparent domestic consumption and total
domestic production set out in the final determination could be reconciled.159
10.9. We have inserted a new footnote (footnote 505 of the Final Report) in paragraph 7.334 that
reflects the additional arguments that Japan requested us to reflect in our Fina l Report. However,
we note that China provided in its response to our questions after the second meeting
explanations and data showing that one could derive the apparent consumption figures provided in
the final determination by adding to the production output of the domestic industry, the production
volume of excluded producers along with the import volume (and excluded export volume). 160
Japan did not object to these explanations and data in its comments on China's response to Panel
questions after the second meeting. Thus, in the footnote that we have added to paragraph 7.334,
we have also noted the absence of Japan's comments in this regard. Having made these additions,
and considering Japan's comments, we do not find necessary to retain the reference t o Japan's
disagreement with regard to China's assertion that when the correct data set is used there is no
discrepancy of the type alluded to by Japan in relation to the domestic apparent consumption.
10.4 Paragraph 7.335
10.10. In this paragraph we noted China's explanation, relying on record evidence, that to
calculate the domestic industry's market share, MOFCOM used the domestic industry's sales
volume plus domestic captive consumption in the numerator and the total ap parent consumption
in the denominator. Japan requests us to note its argument in paragraph 413 of its second written
submission that the relevant parts of MOFCOM's disclosure do not explain that market share was
calculated this way.161
10.11. China does not comment on Japan's request.
10.12. We note that the focus of paragraph 413 of Japan's second written submission is whether
MOFCOM's disclosure document directly or indirectly explained that the market share was
calculated "this way", i.e. through a nu merator that included external sales volume of billets
(slabs) plus "the domestic captive use". 162 In making our findings in paragraph 7.335, we noted

157 Japan's request for interim review, para. 118.
158 Japan's request for interim review, para. 121.
159 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 65.
160 China's response to Panel question No. 48, paras. 88-91.
161 Japan's request for interim review, para. 122.
162 Japan's second written submission, para. 413. For instance, Japan stated that "[m]ost importantly,
China explains that the numerator of the market share is calculated by domestic external sales volume of

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that in the injury analysis contained in MOFCOM's disclosure, MOFCOM stated that "[i]f the captive
use [of domestic companies] was excluded, the market share of the commodity volume was still
gradually diminished since 2017". We then set out our view that this disclosure would have made
it reasonably clear to the interested parties that the market share figures used as part of the injury
analysis included data on captive consumption. Considering our findings are based on our review
of MOFCOM's disclosure document, in our view, those findings should be understood to address
and reject Japan's arguments in para graph 413 of its second written submission. We do not find it
necessary to repeat Japan's arguments in making our findings, and note that these arguments are
in any case part of the Panel record.
10.5 Paragraph 7.340
10.13. Japan requests us to reflect c ertain arguments it made in the context of MOFCOM's
disclosure concerning its impact analysis.163
10.14. China opposes Japan's request on the ground that in paragraph 7.340 the Report
summarizes China's arguments (and does not present Japan's arguments, or our analysis) and it is
inappropriate to add Japan's argument in this paragraph.164
10.15. We agree with China that paragraph 7.340 refers to China's arguments, and do not
consider it appropriate or necessary to modify this paragraph to refer to the a rguments alluded by
Japan.
10.6 Paragraphs 7.358, 7.359, and 7.363
10.16. Japan requests certain minor changes in these paragraphs in the interest of accuracy and
clarity, or to include citations to its own submissions.165
10.17. China does not comment on Japan's request.
10.18. Considering the changes add to the accuracy and clarity of our Report, or add citations to
Japan's submissions, we have decided to make the changes requested by Japan.
10.7 Paragraph 7.370
10.19. Japan requests us to include additional references to its arguments focusing on why in the
particular circumstances of this case, MOFCOM should have provided, as part of its disclosure of
the essential facts under consideration, (a) a clear explanation of the meaning of the term
"commodity volume" of stainless steel slabs; and (b) figures for the commodity volume of stainless
steel slabs and production volume of coils and plates.166 In particular, Japan requests us to refer to
certain parts of its response to our question as to the ba sis of Japan's disagreement with China's
view that the "total product data" for billets (slabs), coils, and plates were the essential facts under
consideration, and not the individual data for billets (slabs), coils and plates. 167 Japan also
requests us t o reflect its understanding of when facts may be considered essential under
Article 6.9.168
10.20. China does not comment on Japan's request.
10.21. We note that in paragraphs 7.290 to 7.291 of our Report, we set out our understanding of
the investigati ng authority's disclosure obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. In particular, (a) we set out our understanding of when a particular fact is "essential";
and (b) we stated that essential facts must be disclosed in a coherent way so a s to permit an

stainless steel billets plus the domestic captive use". (emphasis original; fn omitted). It went on to state how
MOFCOM's disclosure did not directly or indirectly explain that the market share was "calculated this way".
(Japan's second written submission, para. 413).
163 Japan's request for interim review, para. 123.
164 China's comments on Japan's request for interim review, para. 66.
165 Japan's request for interim review, paras. 124-126.
166 Japan's request for interim review, para. 127.
167 Japan's request for interim review, para. 127.
168 Japan's request for interim review, para. 127.

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interested party to understand the basis for the decision to apply definitive measures.
We explained that we would apply this understanding in reviewing Japan's claims under Article 6.9,
including those addressed in paragraph 7.370. Thus, we do not find it necessary to reflect in
paragraph 7.370 Japan's understanding of when facts may be considered essential under
Article 6.9.
10.22. Moreover, in making our findings we reflected on whether the particular fact in question
was essential, and whether it was disclosed in a coherent way. In particular, in paragraph 7.367
we found that an interested party would be able to understand from certain statements in
MOFCOM's disclosure that MOFCOM used the phrase "commodity volume" to refer to the sales
volume of billets (slabs). Thus, we found that MOFCOM properly disclosed the essential facts in this
regard under Article 6.9, and the question of whether MOFCOM was required to disclose an
explanation of the meaning of the phrase "commodity volume" does not arise.
10.23. With regard to the figures for the commodity volume of stainless steel slabs and
production volume of coils and plates, we found that separate and distinct data sets pertaining to
the sales volume of stainless steel slabs and the production volume of coils and plates did not
comprise essential facts under Article 6.9, and set out the basis for our finding in paragraph 7.370.
We are not persuaded that it is necessary to modify our analysis in paragraph 7.370 to add a
reference to Japan's arguments, which in any case form part of the Panel record.

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ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 44
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 58

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ANNEX B-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Japan has established, in its first and second written submissions, opening and closing
statements at the first and second substantive meetings, and responses to questions from
the Panel to the parties, that the imposition of anti -dumping duties on imports of certain
stainless steel products originating from Japan by the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") of
the People's Republic of China ("China") is inconsistent with China's obligations under the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 ("Anti -Dumping Agreement") and the General Agreement on T ariffs and
Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994").
2. In this case, it is particularly noteworthy that an extremely large variety of products were
included in the basket of imports subject to the investigation ("Subject Imports") and,
consequently, in the basket of dome stic like products. The Subject Imports included at least
three product categories, which also varied in terms of chemical compositions and countries
(regions) of origin. Japan is not challenging the breadth of the product scope and origins, in
and of itse lf. Rather, the central issue is that, despite this situation, proper distinctions
among and assessments of this variety of products were absent from MOFCOM's analysis, as
set forth in its final determination ("Final Determination").
II. MOFCOM'S PRICE EFF ECTS ANALYSIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLES 3.1
AND 3.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
3. Japan claims that MOFCOM's price effects analysis was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to involve an objective e xamination based
on positive evidence. This inconsistency is manifested in the following flaws.
A. Failure to Ensure Price Comparability in Terms of Distinct Product Categories
4. MOFCOM's price effects findings in the Final Determination were inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, as MOFCOM's analysis did not ensure
price comparability between the basket of the Subject Imports and the basket of domestic
like products in terms of the product categories contained therein. As th e Appellate Body
and past panels have found, to the extent an investigating authority's price effects findings
rely on price comparisons, comparability between the prices of the basket of imported
products and the prices of the basket of domestic products needs to be ensured, in the
sense that (i) prices are compared at the same level of trade, and (ii) the products being
compared are sufficiently similar.
5. As the Appellate Body found in China – GOES, the requirement to ensure price comparability
is part of the requirement that a determination of injury involve an "objective examination"
and be based on "positive evidence" under Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. This
requirement "must be met by every investigating authority in every injury determi nation"1,
including when a price effects analysis relies on comparisons of price trends instead of
prices, and regardless of the type of price effect(s) being considered. 2 This is because
non-comparability of prices or price trends "would defeat the expl anatory force that subject
import prices might have for the depression or suppression of domestic prices" 3, and would
not preclude the possibility that "observed changes in the average unit values could be the
result of changes in the product mix, rather than genuine changes in prices".4

1 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 201 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India) para. 109).
2 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.242.
3 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 200.
4 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.85.

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6. In accordance with the findings made by past panels, the differences among products that
are relevant to price comparability include not only price differences, but also other non -
price differences that affect substitutability, and thus competitive relationships, among the
products under investigation from a customer's perspective .5 If subject imports and
domestic like products are not substitutable, subject imports cannot have any effect on the
prices of domes tic like products. This is because a customer would not switch from a
domestic product to an imported product which is not substitutable, even if the latter were
less expensive, and domestic producers therefore would have no incentive to decrease their
prices to compete with the subject imports.
7. In the underlying investigation, MOFCOM's definition of the product scope, and thus the
variety of products included in the basket of the Subject Imports and the basket of domestic
like products, was extremely br oad, and encompassed, at a minimum, stainless steel slabs,
hot-rolled stainless steel coils, and hot -rolled stainless steel plates. Abundant evidence,
which was available to MOFCOM during the investigation, showed that the three product
categories differ significantly in terms of physical characteristics, production processes, uses,
customers, distribution channels, and prices, among other factors. However, MOFCOM's
price effects analysis in the Final Determination did not make any distinction among product
categories, which was inconsistent with the requirement to conduct an objective
examination. In fact, the Final Determination does not address the aforementioned
differences among products in the section on price effects analysis, and only refers to the
differences very briefly, and in a manner that does not involve any objective examination of
the substitutability among the three product categories, in the section describing the product
scope of the investigation. In particular, when describing the produc t scope of the
investigation, MOFCOM focused on the "final usages" of the three product categories.
However, this does not confirm the existence of substitutability among these product
categories. At issue is the substitutability of the products that fall into different product
categories at the point of purchase, rather than similarities in what those products might
eventually be turned into and then used for after further manufacturing.
8. Moreover, the only reference in the Final Determination to price d ifferences among the
products under investigation is MOFCOM's finding that the three product categories showed
"reasonable differences" in prices among them. This finding is again, only included in the
description of the scope of the products under investi gation. Even in this section, the Final
Determination does not provide detailed explanation as to what "reasonable" differences
mean, or any supporting evidence for the finding of "reasonable differences". Nor does the
Final Determination connect that find ing with the price effects analysis. In reaching such
finding, MOFCOM disregarded abundant evidence that showed significant price differences
among the three product categories, without giving any reasoned explanation as to why it
did so. While China alleg es that MOFCOM considered the China Customs data of the Subject
Imports from the Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia") as the basis for its finding of
"reasonable differences" in price, that allegation is unsupported by the Final Determination.
Japan also notes that the relevant data included only data corresponding to two of the three
product categories.
9. In an attempt to justify the defects in MOFCOM's price effects findings, China argues that
products' differences relevant to price comparability are limi ted to "significant" differences
"in price". However, the focus on "significant" differences is not supported by the text of
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or by any findings made by past panels
or the Appellate Body. China also refers to Article 2.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as a
contextual basis for this focus on price differences, as that provision requires allowances be
made only for differences that impact prices even in "a more stringent dumping context".
However, price adjustm ents under Article 2.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement made in the
context of a dumping determination cannot be juxtaposed with price comparisons conducted
in the context of price effects analysis, given the differences in the purposes of price
comparisons made in these two contexts.

5 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, fn 737 to para. 7.483 ("An authority only needs to make an
adjustment where the difference in physical or other characteristics of the products affects their competitive
relationship".). (emphasis added)

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10. China also argues that the Panel is prevented from examining Japan's arguments based on
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, by alleging that Japan essentially
challenges the manner in which MOFCOM used facts available under Article 6.8 and Annex II
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. However, MOFCOM's use of facts available in the Final
Determination was not even related to price comparability among the three product
categories, but related only to the classificatio n of the Subject Imports into each series of
stainless steel grades and to the volumes and prices of the Subject Imports from Indonesia
and the Europe an Union. Japan takes no position as to whether MOFCOM's use of facts
available was consistent with the An ti-Dumping Agreement. The issue here is that
MOFCOM's analysis did not comply with the requirement to involve an "objective
examination" based on "positive evidence".
11. As the foregoing shows, MOFCOM's price effects analysis fell short of explaining whet her the
three product categories were substitutable and thus had competitive relationships with
each other despite their significant differences, and whether and how the alleged
movements in the prices of the Subject Imports and domestic like products were not results
of changes in the product mix, rather than genuine changes in price. For the reasons
described in this section, MOFCOM's price effects analysis, which made no distinctions
among the three product categories, did not involve an objective examin ation based on
positive evidence that could provide a meaningful basis to examine the existence of price
effects, and therefore was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.
B. Failure to Ensure Price Comparability in Terms of D ifferent Series of Grades
and Failure to Perform Series -Specific Analyses That Involved an Objective
Examination Based on Positive Evidence
12. China acknowledges that the differences in the various series of stainless steel grades
impact price comparability, and, although the Final Determination is unclear in this respect,
China maintains that MOFCOM's price effects analysis was made solely on a series -by-series
basis. However, MOFCOM's series -specific price effects analyses failed to substantiate any
explanatory force of the Subject Imports in each series of grades for the alleged effects on
the prices of the domestic like products in the corresponding series, due to the following
flaws.
13. First, MOFCOM did not differentiate between the three product cat egories when attempting
to conduct series-specific price effects analyses. Thus, those analyses failed to ensure price
comparability between each basket of series -specific Subject Imports and the basket of
domestic like products in the corresponding series.
14. Second, the data on which MOFCOM relied to analyse price effects for each series of grades
was inconsistent, which indicates that the classification of the Subject Imports into each
series of grades was inaccurate. Data with such a fundamental defect cannot substantiate
any explanatory force of the Subject Imports for the alleged price effects, and analysis
based thereon cannot constitute an objective examination based on positive evidence.
15. Third, MOFCOM's series-specific analyses did not contain clear price effects findings for each
series of grades. MOFCOM only made some specific findings of price effects with regard to
the 300 series and the "other series", concerning which the Final Determination ambiguously
states that the Su bject Imports had "adverse effects" on the prices of the domestic like
products. The Final Determination does not even clarify which of the three types of price
effects MOFCOM found, and MOFCOM did not make any specific findings of price effects with
regard to the 400 series or the 200 series. China alleges in this Panel proceeding that
MOFCOM properly "consider[ed]" the alleged price effects for each series of stainless steel
grades, but that allegation is unsupported by the Final Determination and is an ex post
rationalization.
16. Fourth, MOFCOM's series -specific analyses did not provide any reasoned explanation as to
how the findings of "adverse" price effects were not undermined by the divergence between
the price trends of the Subject Imports and those of the domestic like products, and by the

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consistent overselling by the Subject Imports, both of which were shown in the data that
was available before MOFCOM during the underlying investigation.
17. Given the foregoing flaws, MOFCOM's series -specific ana lyses could not have provided
positive evidence for an overall finding of an alleged price depressing effect of the Subject
Imports. The unreasonableness of MOFCOM's series -specific price effects analyses leads to
the more plausible reading of the Final De termination that MOFCOM's price effects finding
was ultimately based on an analysis of the weighted average prices of the Subject Imports
as a whole and those of the domestic like products as a whole, meaning that MOFCOM failed
to ensure price comparabilit y in terms of the various series of stainless steel grades. Thus,
MOFCOM's price effects analysis was also inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in this regard.
18. Even assuming, arguendo, that MOFCOM's overall finding of a price depressing effect of the
Subject Imports was based on series -specific analyses, those analyses contained significant
flaws as explained above, and cannot be considered to have involved an objective
examination based on positive evidence. Thus, MOFCOM 's price effects analysis was
inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
C. Failure to Conduct an Objective Examination Based on Positive Evidence of
Price Trends
19. Japan also points out the lack of proper assessment of the pri ce trends of the Subject
Imports and domestic like products in MOFCOM's price effects analysis, which constitutes a
failure to involve an objective examination based on positive evidence in the context of
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
20. First, a finding of a price depressing effect necessarily involves a finding that the prices of
domestic like products have decreased, since that is the meaning of the word "depressed".
However, MOFCOM concluded that the prices of domestic like produc ts were depressed,
even though it expressly acknowledged that those prices showed an overall rising trend
during the period of investigation ("POI"), and offered no reasoned explanation to support
this conclusion.
21. Second, a finding of price depression also must include an examination of the explanatory
force of subject imports for the alleged price effects. This examination should not stop at
merely referring to observed price trends; instead, it should involve an examination of the
manner in which pric e trends in imported and domestic products interact and a reasoned
explanation of the role of the subject imports in the alleged price effects. Even though a
finding of non-parallel price trends does not foreclose a conclusion that the subject imports
had a price depressing effect, such a conclusion does require a well -reasoned explanation,
because divergent price trends tend to undermine the existence of interactions between the
import prices and domestic prices. In the case at hand, the price trends of th e Subject
Imports and the domestic like products were obviously divergent, both on an aggregated
basis and on a series -by-series basis. However, despite China's ex post rationalizations in
this proceeding, MOFCOM did not provide any reasoned explanation as to how the largely
divergent price trends of the Subject Imports and domestic like products interacted with
each other.
D. Failure to Provide a Reasoned Explanation as to How the Fact That the
Subject Imports Consistently Oversold the Domestic Like Products Did Not
Undermine MOFCOM's Finding of Price Depression
22. Finally, Japan submits that MOFCOM's price effects analysis was inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it did not involve an objective
examination based on positive evidence due to the failure to provide any reasoned
explanation as to how the consistent overselling by the Subject Imports did not undermine
MOFCOM's finding of price depression.
23. Under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, a price effects analysis must
involve an objective examination based on positive evidence, which in turn requires a

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well-reasoned explanation as to how subject imports may h ave explanatory force for the
alleged price effects on domestic like products. Accordingly, a finding of price depressing
effects that is made when the subject imports oversell the domestic like products requires a
well-reasoned explanation as to how that overselling does not undermine a finding of price
depression. This is because, while overselling by subject imports may not preclude the
possibility that subject imports had price depressing effects, overselling does tend to
undermine that conclusion.
24. In the case at hand, based on the data presented in the Final Determination, there is no
doubt that the Subject Imports consistently oversold the domestic like products during the
whole POI, both when comparing the prices of the Subject Imports and those o f the
domestic like products on an aggregated basis and on a series-by-series basis, except for an
isolated, limited instance for the 300 series. However, MOFCOM merely mentioned that
limited instance, but did not provide any reasoned explanation as to (i) how the Subject
Imports could have any explanatory force for the alleged price depression despite the
aforementioned overselling, or (ii) how an isolated, limited instance of underselling in one
series of grades, which was observed only during one quarter of a year out of a POI that is
four and a quarter years long, may support a general finding of price depressing effects of
the Subject Imports as a whole.
25. The only attempt at an explanation to address the consistent overselling by the Subject
Imports contained in the Final Determination is a passing reference to a "brand effect"
allegedly possessed by the Subject Imports. However, the Final Determination provides no
explanation as to what this alleged "brand effect" encompasses or how it would or did
materialize, nor does the Final Determination point to any evidence in support of its
existence. Although China refers to certain evidence available to MOFCOM during the
underlying investigation, that evidence actually shows that any brand effect that might have
existed was possessed by the domestic like products, not the Subject Imports. This confirms
that, in this regard as well, MOFCOM's analysis did not involve an objective examination
based on positive evidence.
III. MOFCOM'S CUMULATIVE ASSESSMENT WAS I NCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLES 3.1
AND 3.3 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
A. Legal Standards Under Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of Anti-Dumping Agreement
26. Japan claims that MOFCOM's determination that cumulative assessment was appropriate
was not based on positive ev idence and did not involve an objective examination, and that
MOFCOM's cumulative assessment therefore was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
27. Under Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, investigating aut horities must
determine, through an objective examination based on positive evidence, whether
cumulative assessment "is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the
imported products and the conditions of competition between the import ed products and the
like domestic product". According to the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings , for cumulative
assessment to be "appropriate", "cumulation must be suitable or fitting in the particular
circumstances of a given case". 6 The Appellate Body in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings pointed
out that cumulation is provided for in Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement to deal
with a situation where "imports from [countries with low or declining import volume] could
not individually be identified as caus ing injury", using "an exclusively country -specific
analysis", and "the dumped imports from these countries would not be subject to anti -
dumping duties, even though they are in fact causing injury".7
28. Article VI of the GATT 1994 defines dumping as "pro ducts of one country"8 being sold below
normal value, which indicates that anti -dumping duties may be imposed only on imports
from those individual countries that are in fact causing material injury to the domestic
industry. In other words, a causal link between subject imports and material injury must be

6 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.241.
7 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 116.
8 Emphasis added.

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found on an individual, country-by-country basis. Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
is not an exception, and should not be understood to allow the imposition of anti -dumping
duties on imports from a country, if that country's imports do not cause material injury to
the domestic industry. An imposition of anti -dumping duties under such circumstances
would be contrary to Article VI of the GATT 1994. Thus, an "appropriate" cumulative
assessment should refer to a situation where cumulative assessment, performed in a
manner that involves an objective examination based on positive evidence, can determine
that subject imports from each source have caused material injury to the domestic industry,
even without country-specific analysis.
29. Accordingly, Japan understands that the "conditions of competition" render cumulative
assessment "appropriate" where the subject imports from each source compete with each
other, and where the subject imports from one sour ce therefore can substitute for the
subject imports from other sources. Under those circumstances, even if dumped imports
from all but one of the subject countries ceased to exist as a result of anti -dumping duties,
their market position may be taken over by dumped imports from that one remaining
subject country rather than by the domestic like products. The status of the domestic
industry then, would not improve unless anti -dumping duties also are imposed on imports
from the remaining subject country. Japa n understands that this should be the exact
situation where, as the Appellate Body described, "an exclusively country -specific analysis
may not identify the causal relationship between the dumped imports from [two or more]
countries and the injury suffered by the domestic industry", "even though they are in fact
causing injury". 9 Under those circumstances, even without conducting country -specific
analysis, a proper cumulative assessment could provide positive evidence about the causal
relationship between the subject imports from each source and material injury.
30. Thus, for an i nvestigating authority to determine that cumulative assessment is
"appropriate", by means of an objective examination based on positive evidence, the
authority should perform a careful assessment of the facts and evidence that are relevant to
the "conditions of competition", from the perspective of whether the subject imports from
each source compete with each other, and whether imports from one source can substitute
for lower levels of imports from other sources. As the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings
confirmed, there are no rigid categories of factors to be examined. Instead, facts and
evidence before the investigating authorities that are relevant to the competitive overlaps
and substitutability among the subject imports in the relevant case should be considered to
assess whether cumulative assessment is "appropriate" in light of the "conditions of
competition", in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. When this kind of careful assessment of relevant fact ors is performed,
cumulative assessment may provide positive evidence for a causal link between the material
injury and the subject imports from each source, even "without country-specific analysis".
31. Despite China's allegations, Japan is not arguing th at a country-specific injury assessment is
a necessary prerequisite for, or a requisite part of, cumulative assessment. What Japan is
arguing is that an investigating authority's assessment of "conditions of competition" to
determine whether cumulative ass essment is "appropriate" must not ignore the factors that
are relevant to discerning the existence or lack of competitive overlaps and substitutability.
Such factors include, for example, physical characteristics, uses, price levels, and
distribution channels of the subject imports.
B. MOFCOM's Determination That Cumulative Assessment Was Appropriate Did
Not Involve an Objective Examination Based on Positive Evidence
32. In the investigation at issue, MOFCOM determined that cumulative assessment under
Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement was "appropriate", alleging that there was a
competitive relationship among the Subject Imports and between the Subject Imports and
the domestic like products. However, that determination was not based on positive evide nce
and did not involve an objective examination, as MOFCOM did not identify factual
circumstances in which the Subject Imports competed with each other and with the
domestic like products, such that the Subject Imports from any source could substitute for
the Subject Imports from any other source.

9 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 116.

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33. Indeed, the evidence available to MOFCOM indicated that the Subject Imports were
comprised of different product categories in different series of grades, in varying volumes
and proportions, with divergent and independent price levels, and that the Subject Imports
from each source focused on different product categories and series of grades, and had
different distribution channels and customers. Specifically, Japan has explained that most of
the Subject Imports of stainless steel slabs from Indonesia and most of the Subject Imports
from the Republic of Korea ("Korea") were traded as intra -group sales, while the Subject
Imports from Japan and the European Union were more market-focused.
34. The Final Determinatio n alleges, without substantiation, that a general similarity exists
among the Subject Imports in terms of "physical and chemical characteristics, product
usage, raw material, production technology" as well as "customer group, and the domestic
downstream us ers". The Final Determination then acknowledges, without offering further
explanation, that "there were many grades of the stainless steel billet and hot -rolled
stainless steel plate (coil)", and that "the volume and price change trend of the imports from
four countries (regions) were different" but makes only conclusory statements that "it was
normal to have a certain difference on different specifications and models", "[a] cumulative
assessment does not require completely identical competitive conditions of different
countries (regions)", and that "the differences in the volume and price change trends could
not refute a competitive relationship". These statements, which do not identify positive
evidence supporting the conclusions, cannot amount to "a reaso ned finding that cumulation
is appropriate on the basis of the particular circumstances" as required by the panel in EC –
Tube or Pipe Fittings.10
35. During this proceeding, China asserts that some alleged "overlap" existed among the
Subject Imports from the four jurisdictions, and that this overlap was examined. However,
most of the observations that China makes about the conditions of competition are ex post
explanations, which do not appear and are not discussed in the Final Determination. The
only "overlap" mentioned in the Final Determination is that "all of the dumped imports …
included 300 -series products". However, "300 -series products" actually comprise different
product categories – stainless steel slabs, hot -rolled stainless steel coils, and hot -rolled
stainless steel plates. Among them, the Final Determination does not find any competitive
relationship in a way that establishes that they can mutually make up for each other.
Further, there is no specific product category for which the Final Determ ination finds the
Subject Imports from all four sources were competing with each other. It is impossible to
find that any portion of the Subject Imports from each source compete with, and could
substitute for, each other, even for the "300 -series products", considering the evidence that
suggests the opposite.
36. China also alleges that MOFCOM assessed the conditions of competition "keeping in mind the
existence of intra -group sales" concerning the Subject Imports from Korea and Indonesia.
Intra-group sales are made based on a company group's business choices, and the prices of
intra-group sales normally are determined based on each business group's tax
considerations as "transfer prices", and not through the interaction of open market forces.
Thus, purchase rs in intra -group sales are very unlikely to replace those transactions with
goods purchased from other, unaffiliated, sellers by comparing market prices. However,
MOFCOM did not even refer to these characteristics of intra -group sales from Korea and
Indonesia in its Final Determination. The Final Determination states only that "the
companies in the EU, Japan and Korea and Indonesia sold the dumped imports to the
domestic market by direct sale, distribution and other manners", and thus, "all
manufacturers or dealers had the same or similar pricing strategies; the dumped imports
had the same customer group, and the domestic downstream users could freely purchase
and use the dumped imports originating in the EU, Japan, Korea and Indonesia". The Final
Determination is silent on whether and how MOFCOM considered the existence of intra -
group sales. Such conclusory statements do not constitute the required assessment of the
"conditions of competition".
37. For these reasons, MOFCOM's determination that cumulative a ssessment was appropriate,
without careful analysis of the conditions of competition and how the factual circumstances
of the case made cumulation appropriate, cannot be considered to have involved an

10 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.239.

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objective examination based on positive evidence, and thus, the cumulative assessment was
inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
38. Further, Japan claims that, as a consequence of MOFCOM's cumulative assessment being
inconsistent with Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, M OFCOM's analyses of the
alleged effects of the Subject Imports on the prices of domestic like products, the impact of
the Subject Imports on the domestic industry, and causation also were inconsistent with
Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
IV. MOFCOM'S IMPACT ANALYSIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.4
OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
39. Japan also claims that MOFCOM's analysis of the state of the domestic industry was
inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Under Articles 3.1
and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, at a minimum, investigating authorities must
conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of all the factors listed in
Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The investigating authorities' assessment in this
examination must provide a meaningful basis for examination of the explanatory force of
subject imports for the state of the domestic industry, considering both negative and
positive trends. However, MOFCOM's analysis of the impact on the domestic industry did not
meet this requirement for the following three reasons.
40. First, MOFCOM's analysis addressed only certain deteriorating movements in the individual
factors, and did not consider contradicting evidence. In p articular, MOFCOM's analysis
focused on negative trends in domestic sales prices and volumes in 2015, but provided no
reasoned explanation as to how MOFCOM found the existence of injury, considering the facts
that (i) there were positive trends in sales pr ices and volumes during 2016 and 2017 and
over the entire POI, and (ii) the volume of the Subject Imports decreased during 2015 and
then significantly increased only after 2017. With regard to price trends, while the Final
Determination only references the overall weighted average prices of domestic like products,
even if a series -specific analysis were to be conducted, the Final Determination provides no
reasoned explanation as to how the positive trends in the prices of the 400 and other series
of domesti c like products impacted the explanatory force of the Subject Imports for the
movement in the prices of domestic like products, and thus, the state of the domestic
industry. Also, MOFCOM's assessment of the market share of domestic like products was
disconnected from the evolution of the market share of the Subject Imports, and
inconsistent with the fact that the Subject Imports consistently oversold the domestic like
products. For these reasons, MOFCOM's analysis did not provide a meaningful basis for
examination of the explanatory force of the Subject Imports for the state of the domestic
industry.
41. Second, the calculation and assessment of some injury factors in the Final Determination,
such as domestic apparent consumption, total domestic production, volume of Subject
Imports, and market shares of the domestic like products and the Subject Imports, were
unclear and inconsistent, as it includes contradictory data for these factors. For example, the
figures representing the domestic apparent consumption, as well as the domestic industry's
market share, were inconsistent with other data contained in the Final Determination and
based on inconsistent and unsubstantiated calculation methods. China's attempted rebuttals
only confirm concerns on whether the fac tors considered by MOFCOM were examined
objectively and could provide any positive evidence for the examination of the state of the
domestic industry.
42. Third, MOFCOM's analysis focused excessively on negative trends in certain factors without
due consideration for the fluctuations therein, and MOFCOM did not provide any reasoned
explanation as to how it concluded that overall material injury existed despite the
identification of positive trends. This was the case for capacity utilization, ending inventor y,
pre-tax profit, market share, and return on investment.

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V. MOFCOM'S CAUSATION ANALYSIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLES 3.1 AND
3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
43. Japan makes three independent claims concerning MOFCOM's causation analysis, which
relate to the requirements set forth in the first, second, and third sentences of Article 3.5 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement, respectively, and which also are based on the requirement
that investigating authorities conduct an objective examination based on positi ve evidence
under Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
44. First, Japan claims that, as a consequence of the fact that MOFCOM's analyses of price
effects and impact on the domestic industry were inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 3.4 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement, respectively, MOFCOM's causation analysis also was
inconsistent with Article 3.1 and the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. Under the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement,
investigating authorities must demonstrate that subject imports are, "through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury".11 Japan has demonstrated that
MOFCOM's price effects analysis was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement and that MOFCOM's analysis of the impact of the Subject Imports on
the domestic industry was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. MOFCOM's causation analysis relied on those flawed price effects and impact
analyses, and thereby failed to ascertain that the Subject Imports were causing any injury
through an objective examination based on positive evidence.
45. The second claim, which is separate and independent from the first claim, is that MOFCOM's
causation analysis was inconsistent with Article 3.1 and the second sentence of Article 3.5 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement. The second sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement requires investigating authorities to demonstrate a causal relationship between
subject imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry "based on an examination of
all relevant evidence before the authorities".12 "[A]ll relevant evidence" necessarily includes
"the volume of subject imports and their price effects listed under Article[] 3.2 … [of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement], as well as all relevant economic factors concerning the state of
the domestic industry listed in Article[] 3.4 … [of the Anti-Dumping Agreement]".13 However,
the demonstration of causation also covers "a broader scope than the scope of the elements
considered in relation to price depression and suppression under Article[] 3.2"14 and "the
examination under Article[] 3.4".15 Thus, a claim under the second sentence of Article 3.5 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement may touch upon any issues that cast doubt on "the link
between subject imports, on the one hand, and each of economic factor s listed in
Article[] 3.4 … on the other hand", as those issues could provide "relevant evidence" for the
causation analysis pursuant to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.16
46. MOFCOM's causation analysis failed to constitute an objective examinat ion based on positive
evidence because it failed to comply with the requirement to examine all relevant evidence.
First, MOFCOM's causation analysis did not examine the link between the Subject Imports
and the alleged injury to the domestic industry on a p roduct-specific basis or on a
series-specific basis, even though, given the factual circumstances of this case (i.e. the lack
of substitutability, and thus competitive relationships, among the distinct product categories
and among the different series of s tainless steel grades), a demonstration of causation
cannot constitute an objective examination based on positive evidence without such sectorial
examinations. Specifically, although (i) MOFCOM's price effects analysis failed to examine
individual segments of the Subject Imports and the corresponding domestic like products,
and (ii) MOFCOM's impact analysis did not involve a sectorial injury assessment, individually
examining the commercial flow and state of sales in China, and the impacts on the domestic
industry, specifying the period and product segments in which the alleged price effects were
found, MOFCOM also did not engage in any sectorial examination in its causation analysis.
Second, MOFCOM's causation analysis did not properly consider the low mark et share of the

11 Emphasis added.
12 Emphasis added.
13 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 147.
14 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 147.
15 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 150.
16 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 148.

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Subject Imports over the POI, which casts serious doubts on the alleged "significant squeeze
on the market space of domestic like products" by the Subject Imports. Finally, MOFCOM's
causation analysis did not properly address the fact that the Subject Imports consistently
oversold the domestic like products throughout the POI, which casts serious doubts on the
existence of any causal relationship between the Subject Imports and the alleged injury to
the domestic industry.
47. The third claim is that MOFCOM's non -attribution analysis was inconsistent with Article 3.1
and the third sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. According to the
third sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, investigating authorities must
"examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are
injuring the domestic industry" and ensure that "the injuries caused by these other factors
must not be attributed to the dumped imports". The factors become known when they
"come within the scope of knowledge" of the investigating authority, for example, when
interested parties have "substantiated the existence of such a factor" and pointed out an
impact on the domestic industry caused by that factor during the anti -dumping
proceedings.17 When other factors are known, investigating authorities must "separat[e] and
distinguish[] the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the
dumped imports".18
48. During the underlying investigation, interested pa rties substantiated both a decrease and an
increase in the world market price of nickel, as well as the effect of more stringent
environmental standards in China, and pointed out the impact of these three factors on the
domestic industry. However, even though all of these circumstances were factors other than
the Subject Imports, were known to MOFCOM, and were impacting the state of the domestic
industry, MOFCOM's causation analysis failed to separate and distinguish the effects of any
of these factors. In the present proceeding, China refers to various statements in the Final
Determination in an attempt to show that MOFCOM separated and distinguished the effects
of these other factors, but those are merely superficial, conclusory statements alleging that
those factors could not refute the causal link between the Subject Imports and the alleged
injury to the domestic industry, or that they did not impact the state of the domestic
industry. China has failed to submit any evidence showing data that was availabl e to
MOFCOM during the underlying investigation and used by MOFCOM to arrive at the
aforementioned conclusions.
VI. MOFCOM'S DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY WAS INCONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLES 4.1 AND 3.1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
49. Japan claims that MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry was inconsistent with
Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. This claim is based on three different
arguments, which address three different aspects of MOFCOM's flawed definition of the
domestic industry, all of which ultimately relate to the same core issue: MOFCOM's definition
of the domestic industry introduced a material risk of distortion in the injury analysis.
50. Pursuant to Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the term "domestic i ndustry" could
be defined as "those … whose collective output of the products constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products". The Appellate Body read the
"major proportion" requirement as "having both quantitative and qualitative connotations"19,
and found that an investigating authority shall ensure that the defined domestic industry
"substantially reflects the total production of the producers as a whole" and "must not act so
as to give rise to a material risk of distortion", to ensure the accuracy of an injury analysis.20
The Appellate Body further stated, in connection with the concept of "material risk of
distortion", the "process of the domestic industry definition may be inconsistent with
Articles 4.1 and 3.1 not on ly when distortion actually occurs, but also when the process in

17 Panel Report, Pakistan – BOPP Film (UAE), para. 7.433. See also Panel Reports, China – Autos (US),
Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.267.
18 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 223.
19 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.302.
20 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 412 and 414.

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question risks or is susceptible to lead to distortion ".21 Accordingly, when the domestic
industry is defined in a manner that introduces a material risk of distortion in an injury
analysis, that definition of the domestic industry is inconsistent with both Articles 4.1 and
3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
51. In the investigation at issue, failures in MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry
introduced a material risk of distortion in a t least the three following aspects. First,
MOFCOM's calculation method, which used the external sales volume of stainless steel slabs
plus the production volume of hot -rolled stainless steel coils and hot -rolled stainless steel
plates as an indicator to c alculate the proportion of the domestic industry, gave rise to
structural risks of overestimating the domestic industry's representativeness of the total
domestic production. In particular, Japan has pointed out that if the defined domestic
industry had a higher proportion of external sales compared to those domestic companies
not included in the domestic industry, MOFCOM's calculation method could overestimate the
proportion of the domestic industry. As such, MOFCOM's calculation method is structurally
biased toward inclusion of those domestic producers who have a higher proportion of
external sales of stainless steel slabs, who also are more exposed to direct competition from
the Subject Imports, and thus are more susceptible to the alleged injurious effec ts of the
Subject Imports.
52. China's allegation that the example Japan relies on in its first written submission to present
the existence of a risk of overestimation is "artificial and hypothetical" is inapposite, because
the relevant question is not whe ther overestimation actually occurred, but whether there
was a risk of overestimation. As such, the example included in Japan's first written
submission, which is "a simplified example", effectively demonstrated the existence of the
risk of overestimation.
53. China further alleges that the impact of the MOFCOM's calculation method is "negligible" or
"very low". In response, Japan has clarified that there is no information in the Final
Determination by which to conclude that the distortion introduced by MOF COM's calculation
method was negligible. Furthermore, Japan has stressed that it takes issue with the
structural risk of overestimation, rather than the numerical accuracy or impact of the
calculation method. Notably, in previous cases the Appellate Body h as found it unnecessary
to analyse the numerical impact of the method of defining the domestic industry when
reaching a finding of inconsistency with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
54. Second, MOFCOM disregarded the potential uniquenes s of the domestic industry in terms of
the production proportions of stainless steel slabs, hot -rolled stainless steel coils, and
hot-rolled stainless steel plates. In particular, based on the specific evidence that MOFCOM
had from the very beginning of th e proceeding, MOFCOM must have been able to
understand the possibility that the domestic industry's production ratio of the three product
categories differed from the production ratios for total domestic production. However,
MOFCOM's definition of the dome stic industry simply assumed that the alleged effects and
impacts of the Subject Imports were suffered evenly by all domestic like products without
providing any reasoned explanation for this assumption. MOFCOM's failure to consider the
potential risk of o verrepresentation of a particular product category, and the
representativeness of the defined domestic industry in terms of the proportion of the three
product categories, means that MOFCOM failed to ensure that the definition of the domestic
industry did not give rise to a material risk of distortion in the injury analysis.
55. Third, the proportion allegedly represented by the domestic industry is far higher than, and
not reconcilable with, the market share figures for the domestic industry in the Final
Determination. Specifically, the proportion of total domestic production allegedly
represented by the domestic industry was two or three times as large as the figures for the
domestic industry's market share contained in the Final Determination (the calcula tion
method of which is not explained anywhere in the Final Determination) and the market
share of the domestic industry, calculated as the domestic sales of the domestic industry
over the domestic apparent consumption. The high discrepancy between these f igures,
which was not explained in the Final Determination, indicates that the producers comprising
the domestic industry have some unique business characteristics that affect either the

21 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.321. (emphasis added)

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production volume or the domestic sales. Thus, MOFCOM's definition of the domestic
industry introduced a material risk of distortion in the injury analysis.
56. China attempts to account for the discrepancy by referencing (i) the difference between the
production volume and the sales volume or (ii) the exclusion of some pro ducers from the
calculation. However, even if such a huge discrepancy may be explained to a certain degree
by China's allegations (which in any event are not explained in the Final Determination),
serious concerns remain as to whether the producers include d in the defined domestic
industry genuinely represented a major proportion of the total production, both in qualitative
and quantitative terms.
57. Lastly, China's allegation that Japan's claim and arguments regarding MOFCOM's definition
of the domestic i ndustry is outside the Panel's terms of reference cannot be sustained
because the allegation relies on an inaccurate reading of Japan's request for the
establishment of a panel ("Japan's Panel Request"). The arguments Japan has developed
throughout the pro ceedings are based on a claim contained in item (b) of paragraph 6 of
Japan's Panel Request, which rests on Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement,
interpreted together, and is different from a different, separate claim contained in item (a)
of paragraph 6 of Japan's Panel Request.
VII. MOFCOM'S TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WAS INCONSISTENT
WITH ARTICLES 6.5 AND 6.5.1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
58. Japan also claims that MOFCOM failed to comply with various procedural provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, and thereby harmed the interested parties' due process rights.
First, MOFCOM's treatment of the names of certain companies as confidential was
inconsistent with Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Under these
provisions, investigating authorities must ensure that (i) good cause is shown for
confidential treatment; and (ii) the submitting parties provide a summary of the confidential
information in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of that information, or a
statement of the reasons why such summarization was not possible.
59. In the case at issue, MOFCOM did not ensure either (i) or (ii) above when it treated the
names of companies excluded from the domestic industry in the Appli cation as confidential.
MOFCOM failed to ensure that good cause was shown for the confidential treatment of the
companies' names. The Applicant made generic statements that company names were
"trade secrets", without providing any explanation or evidence s howing why there was good
cause to treat those names (which by their nature are not trade secrets) as confidential. At
the same time, sufficient information was available at the time of the Application to
determine that no good cause had been shown and tha t the information at issue was not
confidential. Japan also has explained that the fact that the company names at issue
eventually were disclosed is not relevant to the assessment that MOFCOM should have
conducted at the time confidential treatment was requested, as the due process rights of the
Japanese Respondents actually were harmed by the improper treatment of the information
as confidential at the time that MOFCOM received the Application, and belated disclosure did
not remedy that harm.
60. MOFCOM al so failed to ensure that non -confidential summaries (or an explanation of the
exceptional circumstances that prevented summarization) were furnished. This is proven by
the total absence of any such summaries or explanations in the underlying investigation
record. The descriptor "[Enterprise Name]", with which the relevant company names were
replaced, does not constitute a proper summary of the information, as it does not allow any
understanding of the substance of the nondisclosed information (i.e. which co mpanies were
excluded). If MOFCOM considered such a summary to be impossible, MOFCOM should have
required the Applicant to identify the exceptional circumstances responsible for that situation
and to provide a statement explaining the reasons why summariza tion was not possible.
MOFCOM failed to do so.

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VIII. MOFCOM'S DISCLOSURE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLE 6.9 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
61. Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires that investigating authorities disclose
"the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether or not
to apply definitive measures", the disclosure of which "ensure[s] the ability of interested
parties to defend their interests". 22 Japan claims that MOFCOM failed to co mply with the
disclosure obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because it failed to
disclose the essential facts underlying (i) its definition of the products under investigation,
(ii) its analysis of price effects, (iii) its use of c umulative assessment, (iv) its analysis of the
state of the domestic industry, (v) its analysis of alleged causation, and (vi) its definition of
the domestic industry. In response to this claim, China insisted that the documents dated
5 July 2019 that MOFC OM issued for the disclosure of essential facts did disclose the
essential facts under consideration, or that certain facts are outside the disclosure
obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
62. Japan disagrees with China's assertions, corrects China's erroneous interpretation of the
obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and further reveals that
China's alleged disclosure in fact does not meet the necessary standards for disclosure under
Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Japan's rebuttal regarding the necessary
standards for disclosure of the essential facts points out that (i) whether a fact qualifies as
"essential" is not determined solely in connection with the findings directly required to
satisfy the substantive obligations as set out by the specific provisions in the Anti -Dumping
Agreement but also in light of " the factual circumstances of each case, including the
arguments and evidence submitted by the interested parties"23, (ii) the right or ability of the
interested parties to defend their interests includes not only the right or ability to make
arguments based on specific rules but also, more broadly, the right or ability to "comment
on the completeness and correctness of the facts being considered by the investigating
authority, provide additional information or correct perceived errors, and comment on or
make arguments as to the proper interpretation of those facts"24, (iii) "essential facts"
include not only those facts that support the decision ultimately reached by the investigating
authorities, but also those facts that are necessary to the process of analysis and
decision-making by the investigating authorities 25, and (iv) the investigating authorities are
required to make disclosures that all ow the interested parties to understand which specific
facts were selected as the basis of the investigating authorities' final determination, rather
than simply disclosing some or all of the facts that merely are or were known to the
investigating authorities.26
IX. THE DISCLOSURES IN MOFCOM'S PUBLIC NOTICE WERE INCONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLES 12.2 AND 12.2.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
63. Finally, Japan claims that MOFCOM failed to fulfil the disclosure obligations in Articles 12.2
and 12.2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, pursuant to which investigating authorities
must disclose, in their public notices, the findings and conclusions reached on all material
issues of fact and law, in sufficient detail, and all relevant information on the matters of fact
and law and all reasons which led to the imposition of final measures. According to past
panels, "material" issues are those "that must necessarily be resolved in order for the
investigating authorities to be able to reach their determination" 27, and the discl osure of
those issues must be made in sufficient detail to ensure that the reasons for reaching the
relevant conclusions can be understood by the public, including interested parties.28

22 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240. (emphasis original)
23 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.130; Russia –
Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.178; and Panel Report, Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate, para. 7.203. (emphasis
added)
24 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, fn 390 to para. 240 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Salmon
(Norway) para. 7.805). (emphasis added)
26 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.133; Panel
27 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.424.
28 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.459.

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64. Japan claims that MOFCOM did not properly disclose information relating to (i) its definition
of the products under investigation, (ii) its analysis of price effects, (iii) its use of cumulative
assessment, (iv) its analysis of the state of the domestic industry, (v) its analysis of
causation, and (vi) its definition of the domestic industry. All of these matters were material
and led to the imposition of the final measure.
X. CONCLUSION
65. As a consequence of the inconsistencies with the Anti -Dumping Agreement described above,
China's anti -dumping measure s on the Subject Imports from Japan are also inconsistent
with Article 1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and MOFCOM's determination to levy the
anti-dumping duties at issue is inconsistent with Article Vl:6(a) of the GATT 1994. Japan
requests the Panel to f ind that China's measures are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement discussed in sections II through IX above, as well as these
two provisions. Japan also requests that the Panel recommend, pursuant to Article 19.1 of
the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, that
China bring its measures into conformity with the GATT 1994 and the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.

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ANNEX B-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The People's Republic of China ("China") has shown, in its first and second written
submissions, opening and closing statements at the first and second substantive meetings, and
responses to questions from the Panel to the parties after the first and second substantive
meetings, that all of Japan's claims that the impositio n by China's Ministry of Commerce
("MOFCOM") of anti-dumping duties on imports of certain stainless steel products originating from
Japan would allegedly be inconsistent with China's obligations under the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping
Agreement") and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") are
groundless and without merit. Indeed, China has established that the measures at issue are fully
in line with China's WTO obligations.
II. ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
 A. MOFCOM's use of the best information available
2. At the outset, it is clear from the kind of claims and arguments that Japan has put forward
that Japan in essence challenges MOFCOM's use of the best information available to reach certain
conclusions in its price effects determination. However, Japan has not raised a claim challenging
the resort by MOFCOM to the facts available, or the type of information that MOFCOM decided to
rely on as the "best information" available, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. Therefore, Japan's claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement,
as developed in this case, must fail.
3. It is undisputed that MOFCO M relied on the best information available, pursuant to
Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, for its price effects assessment. This
was explicitly stated in the Final Determination. 1 This has also been acknowledged by Japan. 2
Japan's claims relating to MOFCOM's price effects determination in essence challenge MOFCOM's
use of facts available. Japan focuses on the amount, type and/or quality of the evidence that
MOFCOM used to reach its conclusions.
4. With respect to price comparability, MOFCOM applied facts available because exporting
producers failed to cooperate. Specifically, as a result of the failure to cooperate, MOFCOM simply
did not have the relevant information on the classification between billets, coils and plates.
Therefore, as facts available, MOFCOM relied on the classification only by steel grade. 3 Japan
failed to claim, let alone demonstrate, that MOFCOM's conclusions on facts available and the
impossibility to distinguish by shape as a result of the lack of cooperation w ere inconsistent with
Article 6.8 and/or Annex II of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. As a result, any arguments
presented by Japan about the distinction by shape are entirely irrelevant to MOFCOM's
determinations. However, even if assuming for the sake of argu ment that there would have been
reasons to take into account that distinction ( quod non), MOFCOM found that it was precluded
from doing so and applied Article 6.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. That remains
unchallenged, and thus inevitably implies that MO FCOM was entitled pursuant to Article 6.8 to
disregard, for its price comparison, any alleged differences between billets, coils and plates and to
rely instead on the distinction by steel grade. For this reason alone, Japan's entire claim on this
point fails.
5. With respect to the series -specific analyses of price effects, the severe lack of cooperation
also precluded MOFCOM from having accurate series -specific information on volume and prices,
forcing MOFCOM to make findings based on Article 6.8 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement. the lack

1 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 44.
2 See, for instance, Japan's responses to the Panel's questions, para. 76.
3 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 43-44.

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of cooperation implied that MOFCOM only obtained limited series -specific volume and price
information with respect to Japan and Korea (given that only one exporting producer fully
cooperated, some provided partial information , and most exporting producers did not cooperate
at all). For the EU and Indonesia, not a single exporting producer cooperated, depriving MOFCOM
from any series-specific price and volume data at all.
6. Japan's claims in relation to these series-specific analyses of price effects take issue exactly
with the approach adopted by MOFCOM to deal with the non -cooperation. Specifically, as regards
MOFCOM's assessment of the price effects per series of steel grade, Japan takes issue with
MOFCOM's findings of adver se price effects being "based only on partial, and partly inaccurate,
evidence".4 These are manifestly issues that can only be addressed under Article 6.8 and Annex
II of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM's reliance on the best information available in t his
respect is undisputed and this goes to the heart of the sufficiency or accuracy of the data that
MOFCOM's price effects analyses were based on. Given that this data was what MOFCOM
considered to be the "best information available", it is inapposite for Japan to argue that this data
was "partial", "inaccurate", or "arbitrarily selected" without a claim challenging the use of this
data under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Obviously, data relied on
pursuant to Article 6.8 is not the "first-best" information that MOFCOM could have used. MOFCOM
correctly considered this to be the "second -best" information, or "reasonable replacements" for
the missing information. 5 To the extent that Japan disagrees with that, Japan should have
evidently raised such concerns under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7. China considers that Japan's claims pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement must fail, given the absence of any claims under Article 6.8 and Annex II in Japan's
panel request (and Japan's submissions).
 B. MOFCOM did not fail to ensure price comparability
8. In line with the relevant requirements, and having detected that there were possible
comparability issues in this investigation with respe ct to various models of the product at issue,
MOFCOM took several steps to ensure compliance with its price comparability obligations. This
process eventually led MOFCOM to determine that there was a comparability issue with respect to
different models bas ed on the series of steel grade. Accordingly, MOFCOM conducted its price
effects assessment separately for each of the relevant series of steel grade: the 300 -series, the
400-series, other series and the 200-series.
9. As regards the division of the produc t into different models based on the shape (billets,
coils and plates), MOFCOM also sought, but was not able to obtain, relevant information from the
interested parties regarding the different prices thereof. Thus, as stated in the Final
Determination, MOF COM "could not obtain the relevant information of classification of the
stainless steel billet and hot -rolled stainless steel plate (coil)". 6 It was thus also precluded from
making its price comparisons for the price effects analysis distinguishing by sha pe. This could
have been the end of MOFCOM's analysis. In addition to that finding, MOFCOM nevertheless also
made an effort to obtain insights in the possible impact of the shape on price comparability.
Based on the best information available, MOFCOM concl uded that the differences between these
product models were "reasonable" and did not give rise to a price comparability issue that needed
to be addressed.
10. China has established that MOFCOM clearly did not intend to leave any price comparability
issue unaddressed, but made significant efforts to obtain from interested parties the information
that would allow it to conduct its price effects analysis objectively, including by differentiating
between different models of the product at issue, if appropriate. The severe lack of cooperation
by interested parties and the resulting limited, incomplete or inconclusive information about the
price variation between certain models at issue, led MOFCOM to rely on best information
available. This lack of necessary info rmation, and the fact that MOFCOM had to rely on the best
information available to overcome this, is crucial when evaluating MOFCOM's compliance with its
obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2. Indeed, the need to take steps to ensure price

4 Japan's first written submission, para. 141.
5 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (Korea), para. 7.28; Appellate Body
Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 294.
6 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p.44.

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comparability " necessarily depends on the factual circumstances of the case and the evidence
before the authority".7
11. MOFCOM's concluded that there was a price comparability issue with respect to the
different series of steel grade, and this was supported by MOFCOM's assessment of the totality of
the evidence before it, including the comments put forward by interested parties as well as
MOFCOM's own assessment of the main characteristics of the product under investigation, and
different models thereof. Contrary to the impression that Japan has tried to create throughout
this dispute, alleging that MOFCOM disregarded the differences between various models of the
product at issue, MOFCOM in fact made a detailed assessment of these differences, for instance
at page 12 of the Final Determination. MOFCOM's assessment therein revealed that the stainless
steel billets, hot-rolled coils and hot-rolled plates at issue were steel products with the same basic
physical and chemical characteristics, which are defined by the metal co ntent thereof, and similar
usages and customer groups. MOFCOM also took note of the interested parties' comments,
according to which the product under investigation could be divided into different series of steel
grade, distinguished by the content of impo rtant alloy elements (such as chromium and nickel)
added. According to the parties' comments, there were significant price differences between these
series of products, mainly owed to differences in terms of the presence of nickel and/or
manganese.8 On this basis, MOFCOM concluded that the metal composition of the product under
investigation is the most important factor in determining its price and use. The evidence before
MOFCOM revealed that different models exist in the industry depending on the c ontent of key
ingredients such as nickel and chromium, and that there were significant price differences in the
market between those models. MOFCOM therefore classified the product under investigation into
300-series, 400-series 200-series, and other series for the purposes of its price comparison.
12. MOFCOM further verified the foregoing by collecting additional information by exporting
producers on their prices of the product at issue by series. 9 The data reported by the exporting
producers in response to MOFCOM's request confirmed MOFCOM's conclusion that the product at
issue was divided into various series of steel grade that had significant price differences between
them. MOFCOM used this information, and corresponding data collected from the domestic
industry, to assess the price effects of the dumped imports separately for each of the relevant
series of steel grade.
13. Having determined that a price comparability issue existed with respect to the different
series of steel grade, and in order to carr y out its price effects consideration in an objective
manner, MOFCOM considered the price effects individually for each of the relevant series. 10 This
mean that, for each of the series, MOFCOM assessed the adverse effects of the dumped imports
of the series concerned on the prices of the domestic like products of the same series. MOFCOM's
assessment in this manner ensured compliance with its obligations as described above, as it
guaranteed that the prices being compared were "comparable" and that MOFCOM's u ltimate
conclusions on the existence of adverse price effects were not affected by any differences in the
product mix of the products being compared.
14. By contrast, MOFCOM concluded that there was no such price comparability issue with
respect to different models based on shape (i.e. billets, coils and plates), as was claimed by some
interested parties. Indeed, in the Final Determination, MOFCOM made a detailed assessment of
the differences that existed between billets, coils and plates but concluded that these did not lead
to a "substantial difference" in terms of their basic characteristics and that, in line with this, the
mere shape difference did not lead to significant price differences.11
15. Thus, contrary to the picture that Japan tries to create, MOFCOM did address the
differences that interested parties claimed to exist between billets, coils and plates for instance in
terms of their physical and chemical characteristics, end uses and customer groups. MOFCOM's
assessment revealed that billets, coi ls and plates were steel products with the same basic

7 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.479.
8 See, for instance, Japanese Respondents, Non-Injury Defense in the Stainless Steel Anti-Dumping
Investigation (Non-Injury Brief), (Exhibit JPN-8.b (BCI)), pp. 13-18.
9 See MOFCOM's Request for additional information (Exhibit CHN-1.b).
10 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 41-42, summarizing the more extensive considerations by
series on pages 36-40.
11 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 12.

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physical and chemical characteristics, as well as similar usages and customer groups. According
to MOFCOM's assessment, the only difference between these models in terms of their "physical
form" (i.e. their shape) could not "disprove the fact that they had the same basic characteristics".
MOFCOM also examined the price differences between billets, coils and plates and found that
these were "reasonable", thus not giving rise to any price comparability iss ue. Accordingly, in line
with its obligations to ensure price comparability, MOFCOM examined the differences that existed
between billets, coils and plates in order to determine whether these impacted price
comparability. MOFCOM concluded that there were n o significant differences between these
models, as "the physical and chemical characteristics and technical indices of hot -rolled stainless
steel plate/coil depended on the physical and chemical characteristics of the stainless steel billet
in the steelmak ing process", so "there was no substantial difference in the basic internal
characteristics". As such, "the difference in physical form" could not "disprove the fact that they
had the same basic characteristics." Also, "[t]he final trading market and usage of stainless steel
billet and hot -rolled stainless steel plate (coil) are consistent" and "[t]heir final usage and
customer group have similarity".
16. All these considerations led MOFCOM to reasonably conclude that these product models did
not have diffe rences between them that were likely to lead to a lack of price comparability.
MOFCOM further confirmed this by examining the price differences between the models and
determining that these were "reasonable", based on the best information available.
17. In this respect, MOFCOM considered that the best information available in this case was the
China Customs Data.12 However, MOFCOM could not rely on this import data from all sources to
determine whether there were significant price differences between billet s, coils and plates, as
this data did not concern products of the same series of steel grade. To overcome this difficulty,
MOFCOM examined whether it could rely on some of this data belonging to the same series of
steel grade. MOFCOM observed that "Indonesia's exports to China mainly comprised of 300-series
products".13 Thus, the import data from Indonesia could accurately reflect any differences that
existed between billets, coils and plates. This data revealed only very minor price differences
between bil lets, coils, and plates. MOFCOM also took into account the other evidence and
information before it, especially the conclusions it reached in the dumping context and its findings
on the basic characteristics of all shapes, and qualified the price differenc es as insignificant and
thus "reasonable" in the sense that they would not impact the price comparability.
18. In any event, the issue of price comparability does not have the same importance in cases
such as the one at issue, which entailed a comparison of price trends of the imported and
domestic products, as compared to a scenario where an authority relies primarily on direct price
comparisons between imports and domestic products.
19. Consequently, MOFCOM's price effects analysis was fully i n line with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
 C. MOFCOM's findings on price trends and adverse price effects
20. Japan's issues with MOFCOM's adverse effects findings are based on Japan's erroneous
allegation that MOFCOM in this investig ation relied on the weighted average prices of the product
as a whole, without distinguishing between the different series of steel grade, for its findings. The
allegation that MOFCOM relied on weighted average prices is a complete and undue
misrepresentation of MOFCOM's findings, which were explicitly and unambiguously based on price
comparisons between products of the same series of steel grade. 14 Moreover, MOFCOM's
considerations and findings varied for each of the relevant series, based on the facts of the case,

12 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 37.
13 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 37.
14 See, for instance, Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 36-37: "[T]he Investigating Authority
noted that stainless steel billets and hot-rolled stainless steel plates (coils) can be divided into specifications of
200-series, 300-series, 400-series and other series according to different metal contents. These specifications
compete with each other in the Chinese market and show certain price differences. […] [T]he Investigating
Authority made price comparisons between dumped imports and domestic like products according to different
specifications. […] Therefore, the Investigating Authority adjusted the exchange rates, customs duties and
customs clearance fees of the 300-series, 400-series and other-series products that were actually exported to
China, and then compared with domestic like products of the same specifications in China". (emphasis added)

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and in addition to price depression also entailed findings of price suppression and price
undercutting, as set out in the Final Determination.
21. For the 300-series, MOFCOM found that there were adverse price effects, in particular price
depression and price undercutting, on the prices of the domestic like products. The considerations
that led MOFCOM to this conclusion are explicitly laid down in the Final Determination. 15 MOFCOM
objectively concluded that there was price depression for the 300 -series, given its observations
about the overall decline of domestic prices in the period considered as well as, importantly, in
the most recent period. This was based on an objective examination, as price depression refers to
a situation where "prices in the importing country decline".16
22. With respect to the 400 -series, MOFCOM's finding of price suppression follows clearly from
MOFCOM's examination of the price evolution of the 400 -series dumped imports and domestic
products. MOFCOM considered that there was price suppression for the 400-series, as it explained
that, affected by the increase in dumped imports of that series, domestic prices did not increase
as they should have, also in light of the development in their costs. 17 China recalls that price
suppression involves a situation where dumped imports "prevent price increases, which otherwise
would have occurred".18 Also, as noted by the panel in China – GOES, "an authority is entitled to
find price suppression whenever prices have not been able to mat ch increases in costs".19 In the
case at hand, MOFCOM explained that while the prices of the 400 -series domestic products
generally showed an upward trend, they were "affected" by the presence of dumped imports of
the same series in that they were just abl e to match the increase in their costs during the POI,
despite the " favorable market conditions" of steady growth in demand and positive industrial
policies.20
23. As regards the price effects of the other series, as set out at pages 39 -40 of the Final
Determination, MOFCOM found an overall decrease in the prices of the other series domestic
products. These findings by MOFCOM of an overall decrease in domestic prices during the period
considered, including in the most recent period, and MOFCOM's references to a "decline" of prices
and the fact that domestic producers were "forced to lower their prices" clearly correspond to a
price depression finding.
24. Finally, as regards the 200 -series, MOFCOM addressed the price effects on domestic
products of the 200-series. MOFCOM had no information concerning the dumped imports in that
series, due to the non -cooperation by the exporting producers. In the absence of "accurate
information on the volume and price of dumped imports" 21 of the 200-series, MOFCOM could not
make a price effects consideration of this series by reliance on the specific import prices for this
series, as it did for the other series. MOFCOM, however, did not leave the 200-series unaddressed
but evaluated the price evolution of the domestic like product. This was in line with the obligation
to make an objective examination which, as has been observed by the Appellate Body, requires
an investigating authority to consider price effects for the "entire range of goods making up the
domestic like product".22 In particular, the Appellate Body clarified in that case that, in its view,
while an investigating authority is not required to establish the existence of price effects for each
of the product types under investigation, it should, in order to make an objective examination,
take into account the presence or, where relevant, absence of price effects for all types making
up the domestic like product. Accordingly, MOFCOM in this case examined the price evolution of
the domestic like product and fou nd that the price trend of the 200 -series domestic like product
was similar to that of the 400 -series, 300 -series and other series of domestic like product. 23
Having made this analysis, and having previously found that the dumped imports of the 300 -,
400- and the other series all had adverse price effects on the respective like products of the same
series, MOFCOM concluded that these adverse effects also had an impact on the prices of the
200-series. Again, the basis for this conclusion was the best in formation available, specifically, as

15 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 37-38, 41-42.
16 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China), fn 650 to para. 7.321.
17 MOFCOM's Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 41-42.
18 See, for instance, Panel Report, Pakistan – BOPP Film (UAE), para. 7.295.
20 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 49.
21 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 37.
22 Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.180.
23 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 40.

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MOFCOM explained, the correlation in prices that MOFCOM found between the domestic
200-series and the other series of domestic products.24
25. As regards MOFCOM's consideration of the volume trends, China has shown tha t MOFCOM
had to rely on best information available. Despite some inconsistencies in this data, MOFCOM
determined that there was "no better information available to be used in the particular
circumstances"25 and if Japan wished to challenge MOFCOM's conclus ion in this respect, it should
have raised a claim of violation of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China
also showed that MOFCOM relied primarily on, first, a comparison of price trends of the domestic
like product with the price tr ends of the imported products and, second, the trends in the
volumes of imported products. Indeed, MOFCOM in the Final Determination set out very clearly
both "how MOFCOM considered the import volume" of each series in its price effects analysis and
"whether and how import volumes and prices interacted".
 D. MOFCOM's consideration of the overselling by the dumped imports
26. Importantly, the overselling does not concern the 300 -series, as explained above. For the
300-series, MOFCOM observed that the price d ifference between the dumped imports and the
domestic products narrowed significantly over the relevant period. 26 In other words, for the
300-series, there was a continuous narrowing of the overselling that over time turned into
undercutting. The undercutt ing observed by MOFCOM was the culmination a trend that was
ongoing throughout the relevant period. Moreover, the significance of this undercutting was
augmented by the fact that the 300 -series imports simultaneously increased their volume and
market share, to an extent that, by the end of the POI, those imports were as relevant in terms
of volume as the domestic like products.
27. Moreover, the existence of overselling (that is, the absence of undercutting) by imports
does not as such undermine a conclusio n that those imports have nonetheless depressed or
suppressed domestic prices. This follows from a plain reading of Article 3.2, which provides that
an investigating authority should consider "whether there has been a significant price
undercutting […] or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a
significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a
significant degree". The language of Article 3.2 therefore clearly implies that price depression and
suppression are not predicated on a finding of price undercutting. The foregoing has also been
confirmed in several previous disputes.27
28. China has set out in detail MOFCOM's price effects consideration per series of steel grade,
including all fact ors and evidence that MOFCOM took into account, and has shown that this was
fully in line with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2. This analysis was made with MOFCOM
having taken into account the existence of overselling by the dumped imports, given that
MOFCOM series-specific consideration always started with an assessment of the price levels of the
imports and the domestic products throughout the whole period of investigation. Through this
assessment, MOFCOM obviously took into account the instances were import prices were higher
than domestic prices and explicitly referred to this overselling itself, stating for instance that "the
price of 400-series dumped imports was consistently higher than that of 400 -series domestic like
products"28 and that du ring the period considered "the price of the domestic like products was
consistently lower than that of dumped imports". 29 Evidently, MOFCOM in this case clearly did

24 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 42.
25 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.166, referring to the applicable
standard for an investigating authority to determine what constitutes the "best information available" for the
purposes of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
26 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 41.
27 See, for instance, Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, para. 7.86: "price depression is not contingent
on the existence of price undercutting, and may be found in a situation where the prices of dumped imports is
higher than the price of the domestic like product". See also Panel Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.274;
Appellate Body Report in China – GOES, para. 137.
28 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 41.
29 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 43.

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provide a "well -reasoned explanation"30 of "how and to what extent the prices of the domes tic
like product were affected in light of the consistent overselling by the dumped imports".31
29. As MOFCOM explained, domestic products and imports competed with each other in the
domestic market and price was an important factor which affected the prod ucts' sales. MOFCOM
also referred in this context to the "brand effect" owned by the dumped imports. In light of this
brand effect, domestic products competed with the dumped imports by keeping their prices lower
than the import prices, and maintaining thi s price differential was essential to the domestic
industry's ability to make sales ("price was an important factor which affected the product
sales"). Accordingly, as the price of dumped imports of specific series declined over the relevant
period, this had "an obviously adverse effect on the price of domestic like products", which had to
follow suit to maintain the necessary price deferential with the dumped imports.32
30. Of note, in previous WTO disputes, it has been recognised that it is precisely in s uch
situations "where imports command a price premium over the domestically produced product" 33
that it is most common for an investigating authority to find adverse effects, even though the
prices of the imports are higher. This is because, in such circum stances, "when dumped import
prices decline, prices for the domestic product may well follow suit, or increase at a slower pace,
or to a lesser extent, to maintain the price differential necessary for the domestic industry to
make sales".34
III. ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.3 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
31. China has shown that most of Japan's claims challenging MOFCOM's cumulative analysis
are, in essence, based on the incorrect legal premise that MOFCOM should have analyzed the
evolution of the volumes and prices of the dumped imports on a country -by-country basis, and
should have ascertained whether the dumped imports from the individual jurisdictions were "in
fact" causing injury to the domestic industry. In any event, it is clear that its interpretati on of the
conditions allowing for a cumulative assessment would impose obligations on investigating
authorities in addition to those required under Article 3.3. of the Anti -Dumping Agreement.
China's position is that this provision, and in particular the s econd condition thereof, requires
nothing more than for investigating authorities to determine whether a cumulative assessment is
appropriate in light of the conditions of competition.
32. The Appellate Body has clearly explained in paragraph 116 of its re port in EC – Tube or
Pipe Fittings that there are circumstances where imports from certain sources may not
individually cause injury, while they are "in fact" causing injury because of their combined impact
with imports from other sources. Consequently, it is evident that cumulation is appropriate when
imports from two countries are cumulatively, but not individually, causing injury to the domestic
industry. China notes that the entire Section VI.B.3 of Japan's first written submission, where
Japan sets out why MOFCOM's cumulative assessment was allegedly inconsistent with Articles 3.1
and 3.3, presupposes that MOFCOM should have engaged in the kind of country -specific analysis
that Japan, in essence, advocates for. Given the erroneous legal standard that Ja pan relies on for
its claims, China submits that these should be dismissed solely for this reason. MOFCOM was not
under any obligation to perform an independent analysis of the prices or volumes of each
jurisdiction in order to determine whether cumulation was appropriate in the light of the
conditions of competition. In any event, even the country -by-country data put forward by Japan
supports, rather than calls into question, MOFCOM's conclusion that the dumped imports from the
four jurisdictions were in competition with each other.
33. Importantly, China has shown that MOFCOM's findings were fully in line with Article 3.3 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM assessed the competitive conditions between i) the
imported products, and ii) the imported product s and the domestic like products. MOFCOM
considered a wide range of elements that could affect the competitive conditions of the dumped
imports and the domestic like products, and determined that, in the light of the competitive

30 Japan's opening statement during the first substantive meeting, para. 31.
31 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.332.
32 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 43.
33 Panel Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 7.77.
34 Panel Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 7.77. (footnote omitted)

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conditions, a cumulative as sessment was appropriate. 35 MOFCOM's analysis revealed that, even
though there were certain differences in the specifications and models between the imports of
different origins, such differences could not refute the appropriateness of a cumulative
assessment. MOFCOM correctly noted, in this respect, that a cumulative assessment does not
require completely identical competitive conditions and the facts of the case before MOFCOM did
show that imports from the different jurisdictions were, in fact, competing with each other.
34. China also points out that the text of Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement refers to
no requirement of substitutability. Article 3.3 provides that investigating authorities may
cumulatively assess imports if they determine that s uch cumulative assessment "is appropriate in
light of the conditions of competition" . The phrase "conditions of competition" in Article 3.3 is not
accompanied by any sort of qualifier (for example, "identical" or "similar"). According to the panel
in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings , "[t]he term is unqualified". 36 Indeed, "the provision contains no
express indicators by which to assess the 'conditions of competition', much less any fixed rules
dictating precisely and exhaustively the relative percentages or levels of such indicators that must
be present".37 There is nothing to suggest that there should be a strong degree of competition, let
alone substitutability, for cumulation to be appropriate. This would be akin to creating additional
obligations under Article 3.3, which, as China has previously highlighted, has been explicitly
rejected by the Appellate Body.38
35. Moreover, and importantly, in assessing the conditions of competition it is recognised that
"[t]here is an element of flexibility, in that there are no predetermined rigid factors, indices,
levels or requirements." 39 This flexibility results in an investigating authority having a certain
degree of discretion in determining whether cumulation is appropriate.40
IV. ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.4 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
36. Regarding the allegation that MOFCOM would have failed to use reliable data, Japan relies
on alleged discrepancies between different sets of data, all related to the apparent domestic
consumption (and resulting market shares). However, Jap an fails to consider in this regard that
the "total national production output" referred to in the Final Determination has been calculated
by excluding three domestic producers: excluding "Baosteel, Tsingshan and Pohang ". When the
production of these three producers is included, the figures on apparent domestic consumption as
presented in the Final Determination can thus perfectly be reconciled with the figures
representing the total national production and the volume of the dumped imports, contrary to
what Japan claims. In addition, Japan ignores the methodology that MOFCOM adopted to
calculate the market share of the domestic industry, which included in the domestic sales volume
used as numerator the captive sales by the domestic industry. This approa ch was followed by
MOFCOM at the request of interested parties, as explained in the Final Determination.41
37. Thus, the sales volume used to calculate the domestic industry's market share was not the
same non-captive sales volume assessed as an injury ind icator. However, as MOFCOM explained,
even having excluded the captive sales, MOFCOM would have reached the same conclusion,
namely that the domestic industry's market share was in decline since 2017. This means that,
even if it is assumed that MOFCOM's methodology led to a discrepancy, quod non, Japan failed to
demonstrate that the alleged discrepancy had any consequence on MOFCOM's injury analysis and
conclusions, thus leading to a violation of Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As
was cl arified in a previous dispute 42, a mere discrepancy in the injury data used by an
investigating authority does not necessarily mean that the data does not constitute positive
evidence or that an evaluation based on such data is not objective. Rather, to le ad to a violation

35 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 31.
36 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.242.
37 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, paras. 7.242-7.267. See also Panel Report, EC – Footwear
(China), para. 7.402.
38 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 117.
39 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.240.
40 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.241.
41 Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b) pp. 49-50.
42 Panel Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, paras. 7.115-7.116.

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of Article 3.4, it must be demonstrated that such discrepancy "was so meaningful as to bring into
question the reasonableness or objectivity" of the authority's evaluation.43
38. Regarding the allegation that MOFCOM focused on deteriorati ng movements in individual
factors and failed to examine positive trends, China considers it important to recall that an
investigating authority's impact assessment under Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement is
not a "checklist" exercise, whereby the authority, in order to conclude that the domestic industry
has been negatively impacted, is required to find that every individual indicator has deteriorated,
and that this deterioration coincided with a surge in the volume of imports. Rather, an authority 's
assessment should be a holistic exercise, which is based on the factors that are relevant in each
specific case, and provides a reasoned conclusion, in line with the requirements of Article 3.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The foregoing has been recog nized in several previous disputes.
For instance, the panel in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) stressed that "there is no
requirement in Article 3.4 that each and every injury factor, individually, must be indicative of
injury".44 An investigating au thority thus can conclude that some of the factors listed in Article
3.4 are not relevant in a specific investigation, or do not indicate injury. This finding does not
preclude the authority from concluding that the domestic industry is injured, as long as the
authority's determination contains sufficient explanations and supporting evidence as to how such
injury has materialized.
39. Japan in this dispute has nitpicked every single instance where a development or trend
during the POI appeared to be not ful ly in line with MOFCOM's overall finding that the industry
was negatively impacted by the presence of the dumped imports. However, China has shown that
all the issues raised by Japan concern minor developments within an overall analysis which
revealed that there was indeed material injury caused by the dumped imports. Contrary to the
impression that Japan tries to create, MOFCOM in this case considered of all relevant factors and
developments and focused particularly on those that it considered most relevan t for this specific
case – while acknowledging, and ensuring that it sufficiently addressed, certain positive trends in
specific time periods.
40. China has also shown that MOFCOM objectively assessed the domestic industry's market
share in relation to the development of the market share of the dumped imports. Indeed,
MOFCOM established that the market share of the dumped imports increased significantly during
the relevant period, and reached an all -time high of 10.44% by the end of that period. This was
accompanied by a decrease in the domestic industry's market share in the end of the POI. It is,
thus, irrelevant that the imports' market share was "below 4%" in the beginning of the relevant
period – if anything, this serves to highlight the significance of the market share gain that the
dumped imports managed to achieve during such a small period.
41. In addition, China has shown that MOFCOM did not fail to objectively evaluate certain
individual factors and their impact on the state of the domestic industry.
V. ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
42. Japan has raised certain purely consequential claims related to MOFCOM's analyses of price
effects, use of cumulative assessment, and examination of the impact of the dumped imports on
the domestic industry.45 Japan argues that the alleged defects in each of these analyses render
MOFCOM's causation analysis also inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
and the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. C hina has shown that
MOFCOM acted fully in line with its relevant obligations, and these consequential claims must
therefore fail.
43. Regarding MOFCOM's alleged failure to base its causation analysis on an examination of all
relevant evidence, as required by Article 3.1 and the second sentence of Article 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Japan has put forward a variety of arguments, which in essence mainly
repeat the claims that Japan put forward in relation to MOFCOM's price effects and impact
analysis. In China's view, most of the arguments that Japan has raised under this "second" claim
are mere repetitions of previous claims and/or purely consequential. China has demonstrated that

43 Panel Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 7.115.
44 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 6.163.
45 Japan first written submission, paras. 387-394.

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MOFCOM's price effects and impact analysis were fully in line with Articl es 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and MOFCOM was not required to duplicate these analyses in its
assessment of causation. In any event, China has shown that MOFCOM's causation analysis in
this respect was fully in line with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
44. Regarding MOFCOM's non-attribution analysis, China has shown that MOFCOM did address
the price of nickel as other factor in its non -attribution analysis. 46 The reason that MOFCOM
focused on the increase, rather than the decrease, in the price of nickel was because this was the
way in which the interested parties had presented their claims. This is obvious, for instance, when
looking at the Japanese Respondents' Comments on the Preliminary Determination, where the
section dealing with the cost of nickel is entitled "The impact of rising raw material costs on the
profitability of stainless steel producers". 47 Similarly, the Non -Injury brief submitted by the
Japanese respondents also refers to "The impact of rising cost of raw materials on the profitability
of stainless steel producer". 48 In both instances, the Japanese respondents focused on the fact
that "Chinese domestic stainless steel producers faced a serious shortage of raw materials and
rising costs" which "which in turn affects the profitability of stainless steel producers".
45. In addition, MOFCOM did not find that the increase of the price of nickel caused any injury
to the domestic industry in the present case, and it was therefore not required to carry out a
non-attribution analysis. Indeed, MOFCOM concluded that "[i]n the context of sustained and
steady growth in domestic market demand, the price fluctuations of raw materials should be
reasonably passed through to the price changes of domestic like products".49 The fact that the
cost of raw materials could not be passed to the downstream industry was due to the fact that
the prices of the dumped imports kept decreasing, as MOFCOM explained. 50 On this basis,
MOFCOM concluded that the "rise in raw material prices could not refute the causal link between
the dumped imports and the material injury of domestic industry". 51 In other words, MOFCOM
found the increase of the price of nickel did not cause any injury to the domestic industry.
46. Finally, C hina has shown that MOFCOM did not fail to appropriately separate and
distinguish the injurious effects of stricter environmental protection regulations from the effects
of the dumped imports. Specifically, MOFCOM found in the Final Determination that "the total
period expenses of the five domestic production companies including environmental protection
expenses did not increase significantly during the injury POI". 52 Therefore, MOFCOM's conclusion
was that the environmental protection expenses did not incr ease and, thus, could not have
caused injury to the domestic industry.
VI. ARTICLES 4.1 AND 3.1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
 A. Japan's claim is no longer before the Panel
47. China considers that Japan's claim regarding MOFCOM's alleged failure to defin e the
domestic industry is no longer before the Panel, to the extent it has ever even been within the
Panel's terms of reference. Indeed, Japan's entire claim under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement is no longer before the Panel, and its c laim under Article 3.1 is entirely
consequential to its claim under Article 4.1.
48. China has explained in detail that Japan's entire claim regarding MOFCOM's definition of the
domestic industry is outside the Panel's terms of reference, as it is clear th at Japan's claim in the
panel request is that China violated Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because MOFCOM,
in defining the domestic industry, relied on the sales volume of billets instead of the production
volume of billets. However, in its fir st written submission, Japan acknowledges that applying the
methodology to which it referred in its panel request, i.e. relying on the production volume of
billets when calculating the total domestic production, was correctly considered as inappropriate
by MOFCOM as this would lead to double counting. Japan even states explicitly that "substituting

46 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 52-53.
47 Japanese Respondents' Comments on the Preliminary Determination (Exhibit JPN-17.B), p. 21.
48 Non-Injury Brief (Exhibit JPN-8.b (BCI)), p. 56. (emphasis added)
49 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 53.
50 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 53.
51 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 53.
52 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 53. (emphasis added)

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the sales volume of stainless steel slabs for the production volume of stainless steel slabs cannot
solve the problem of double -counting".53 Japan then goes on t o develop an entirely different
claim.
49. Since China's first written submission, however, there has been another key development
that now leaves no doubt that Japan's claim regarding MOFCOM's definition of the domestic
industry is, in any event, not even before the Panel anymore. Indeed, in its response to China's
request for preliminary ruling, Japan expressly withdrew its claim as outlined in paragraph 6(a) of
its panel request. 54 As a result, the only "claim" that remains is the claim that it outli ned in
paragraph 6(b) of its panel request. The fact that Japan dropped this claim must have meaning.
China considers that it is clear that Japan's claim outlined in paragraph 6(b) of its panel request is
entirely consequential to its claim under paragraph 6(a) of its panel request.
50. Indeed, it is clear from the plain reading of the language used that Japan presented a
primary claim (6(a)) pursuant to Article 4.1 that "MOFCOM used the sales volume, instead of the
production volume, of stainless steel sla bs when defining the domestic industry" and "did not
define the domestic industry as domestic producers whose output of the products constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production of those product". Moreover, it presented a
consequential claim (6(b)) that, because MOFCOM improperly defined the domestic industry (as
per 6(a)), it as a result violated Article 3.1 because it "failed to base its determination on positive
evidence and conduct an objective examination of the facts with respect to the domestic industry
producing the like products".
51. Japan now tries to claim that the phrase "because China improperly defined the domestic
industry" in 6(b) is an independent claim under Article 4.1 in its own right. However, reading it
that way woul d deprive the claim contained in 6(a) of all its meaning. Indeed, the phrase
"because China improperly defined the domestic industry" in 6(b) is nothing more than a
summary of its claim in 6(a). 6(b) is, and was always meant to be, a consequential claim to 6(a),
that Article 3.1 was violated because of the violation of Article 4.1 as described in 6(a).
52. China submits that it is clear that 6(b) is entirely consequential to 6(a). Without 6(a), 6(b)
can simply no longer stand. Since Japan has expressly with drawn its claim under 6(a), and 6(b)
cannot stand by itself, being entirely consequential, China submits that Japan's claim regarding
MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry is no longer before the Panel – at all.
53. In any event, China submits that it is evident that Japan's claim pursuant to Article 3.1 is
entirely consequential to its claim pursuant to Article 4.1. First and foremost, China refers to the
above, from which it is clear that 6(b) is entirely consequential to 6(a). Japan's claim under
Article 3.1 being contained in 6(b), it is itself entirely consequential to 6(b). Irrespective thereof,
China submits that Japan's claim under Article 3.1 is in any event still consequential to its claim
under Article 4.1. This follows from the language us ed in Japan's panel request, which speaks for
itself. Indeed, Japan claims that "China improperly defined the domestic industry" (Article 4.1)
and, "as a result", "failed to base its determination on positive evidence and conduct an objective
examination of the facts" (Article 3.1). In other words, Japan argues that China violated Article
3.1 "as a result" of its alleged violation of Article 4.1. The text is thus unambiguous about how it
is because of China's alleged failure to properly define the domestic industry (Article 4.1), that
China allegedly failed to base its determination on positive evidence and conduct an objective
examination of the facts (Article 3.1). There is therefore no other way to read Japan's panel
request other than concluding that its claim under Article 3.1 is consequential to its claim under
Article 4.1. Any other interpretation would go against the clear text of Japan's panel request.
54. This is also supported by the overall context of Japan's panel request. The language of
paragraph 6 of Japan's panel request is very different from other paragraphs of Japan's panel
request (paragraphs 1 to 4). The chapeau of the latter paragraphs clearly identifies Article 3.1,
whereas the chapeau of paragraph 6 does not refer to Article 3.1. Claim 6(b) then specifies that it
is made "in conjunction with Article 3.1" and uses the "as a result" language. Japan has also not
put forward any independently developed or coherent arguments under Article 3.1 in its first
written submission, having based all its arguments on Article 4.1.

54 Japan's Response to China's Request for Preliminary Ruling, para. 18.

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 B. MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry was fully in line with China's
WTO obligations
55. Japan's claim has evolved substantially during the course of these proceedings. Initially
Japan claimed that MOFCOM should ha ve added up the production volume of billets, and plates
and coils55, which would inevitably have led to double -counting. Japan then started arguing that
MOFCOM had, in fact, correctly identified "the problem of double -counting when the production
volume of stainless steel slabs, hot-rolled stainless steel coils, and hot-rolled stainless steel plates
is simply totalled" 56, which was in direct contradiction to its claim as originally described in its
panel request. However, Japan then argu es that "substituting the sales volume of stainless steel
slabs for the production volume of stainless steel slabs cannot solve the problem of
double-counting".57
56. In other words, Japan first took issue with MOFCOM's attempt to address double counting,
considering that there would not have been any double -counting at all when adding up the
production volume of billets, and plates and coils. Then, Japan performs a U -turn, entirely
transforming its claim, arguing that MOFCOM was right to address double -counting, but did not
do so sufficiently! Moreover, in its opening statement of the first substantive meeting, Japan
states that "MOFCOM's calculation method, which relied on the external sales volume of stainless
steel slabs instead of the production volume thereof" may have resulted in a "considerable
discrepancy".58 In other words, Japan again seems to suggest that MOFCOM should have relied
on the production volume of billets, even though it clearly acknowledged in its first written
submission that this would have caused double-counting.59 It appears that Japan is still not clear
about the exact claim it would like to present, let alone about the approach it considers that
MOFCOM should have adopted.
57. The foregoing has significantly impacted China's abili ty to defend itself, as up to today
Japan is ambiguous about its exact concerns and continues contradicting itself. Only for this
reason, China submits that Japan has failed to make a prima facie case.
58. In any event, in the specific context of the prese nt case, there is no basis to objectively
consider that MOFCOM did not sufficiently address the double -counting issue. It was MOFCOM, as
an objective and diligent investigating authority, that identified the double -counting issue, as it
was clear that the billets that were captively used were turned into plates and coils. 60 Clearly,
simply relying on what Japan has been arguing, i.e. the adding up of the production volume of
billets, and plates and coils, would inevitably have led to double -counting. MOFCOM verified this
on its own motion and took steps to address the double -counting resulting from the reliance on
all production volumes. This approach was the most logical and least distortive, as it addressed
the double-counting issue to the most reasonable extent possible.
59. China recalls that "the Appellate Body has confirmed that the use of "a major proportion"
within the meaning of Article 4.1 provides an investigating authority with flexibility to define the
domestic industry in the light of what is reasonable and practically possible".61
60. MOFCOM could not rely on the billets that it knew were transformed into coils and plates,
i.e. those captively used. Since MOFCOM had no information on the record as to what happened
with the billets that were sold externally, i.e. those not captively used, it had no choice but to
take those into account, as the starting point for the identification of the domestic industry
pursuant to Article 4.1 is the "like product". 62 In case the investigating authority decides to rely
on the second methodology, namely whether a group of producers represents a "major

55 Japan's panel request, WT/DS601/2, para. 6(a).
58 Japan's opening statement at the first substantive meeting, para. 55.
60 Preliminary Determination (Exhibit JPN-7.b), p. 25; Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-7.b), p. 28.
61 Panel Report, China - Broiler Products, para. 7.416 (footnote omitted), referring to Appellate Body
Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 412-415.
62 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), paras. 7.64, 7.108, & 7.110.

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proportion" of total domestic output, this must be determined in relation to the production of the
like product by the domestic producers as a whole.63
61. Importantly, the like product definition, and product scope, remain uncontested. MOFCOM
could not have taken further action with respect to the sales volume of billets, as it had no
evidence on the record as to what happened to the billets that were sold e xternally. If anything,
this would have resulted in MOFCOM not having made an objective examination based on positive
evidence, and introducing a material risk of distortion.
62. Japan has entirely failed to put forward any credible arguments or evidence t hat relying on
sales volumes of billets rather than their production volume does not address the problem of
double counting, or would result in the introduction of a material risk of distortion. China has also
shown that there is no evidence that would sho w that the domestic industry is unique, as also
agreed by Japan. 64 This is because no such evidence exists, given that the domestic industry is
simply not unique when compared to the total production. What we are talking about here are
simple products - billets, and plates and coils.
63. In any event, it is clear that, irrespective of the potential impact of external sales of billets
as per MOFCOM's approach, this would be negligible, if anything. Indeed, these are minute
volumes. At the same time, we have a finding by MOFCOM that the Applicant and the Supporters
represented 65.18%-81.37% of total domestic output of the like product for the purpose of the
definition of the domestic industry. 65 Of note, the Applicant and the Supporters accounted for all
of the domestic producers that came forward and registered during the investigation within the
specified time limit.66 Moreover, the notice of initiation was published on MOFCOM's website and
invited interested parties to come forward and register for the purpo se of participating in the
investigation within a specified time limit.67
64. This means that, whatever the impact of MOFCOM's approach, it is mathematically certain
that the Applicant and the Supporters would in any event have represented well over 50% of
total domestic output of the like product for the purpose of the definition of the domestic
industry. In this respect, China recalls that, regarding the quantitative aspect, "a major"
proportion should consist of a relatively high proportion of total dome stic production.68 However,
Article 4.1 does not stipulate a specific proportion for evaluating whether a certain percentage
constitutes "a major proportion". 69 For instance, Article 4.1 does not require an investigating
authority to define the "domestic i ndustry" in terms of domestic producers representing the
majority, or over 50%, of total domestic production.70
65. Consequently, while it should be important, serious, or significant, it may be less than 50%
of total domestic production of the like product.71 Indeed, the Appellate Body has confirmed that
it must merely "encompass producers whose collective output represents a relatively high
proportion that substantially reflects the total domestic production".72
66. On the basis of the above, it is evident that MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry
was fully in line with China's WTO obligations. Nothing that Japan has put forward can call this
into question in any way. Indeed, to this day, Japan has failed to show that MOFCOM did not
define the domestic industry as domestic producers whose output of the like products constitutes
a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, despite the fact that
MOFCOM included all domestic producers that came forward and registered in the case within the

63 Panel Report, China - Broiler Products, para. 7.420. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
64 Japan's responses to the Panel's questions, para. 18.
65 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 29.
66 Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 3.
67 See, for instance, Final Determination (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 2.
68 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves, para. 5.40. See also Appellate Body Report,
Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.13.
69 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 411; Appellate Body Report, Russia –
Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.12.
70 Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.341.
71 See also Panel Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 7.11; Panel Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), para. 7.226.
72 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 419. (emphasis added)

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specified time limits, and properly included and excluded all relevant producers for the purpose of
the assessment of the representativity.
67. At the very least, the Panel cannot but conclude that MOFCOM's "evaluation was unbiased
and objective" and that "the establishment of the facts was proper" in accordance with
Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
VII. ARTICLES 6.5 AND 6.5.1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
68. Japan's arguments in these proceedings have exclusively focused on one specific item that
was treated as confidential. Specifically, Japan has only put forward written and oral submissions
on the confidential treatment granted by MOFCOM to the names of certain domestic producers of
the product at issue that were excluded from the definition of the domestic industry in the
Application.
69. China has shown that MOFCOM ensured that there was good cause for treating those
company names as confidential. In this respect, China highlights the systemic concerns flowing
from Japan's suggestion that the interested party submitting confidential information itself should
have an interest not to disclose confidential information, beyond the fact that that information is
worthy of protection simply because of its confidential nature. Suc h an interpretation contradicts
the entire rationale behind Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, which strikes a balance
between the rights of defence and the need to protect confidential information. The protection of
confidential information is of primordial importance in anti -dumping investigations, which involve
a great deal of confidential and sensitive information. The balance struck by Article 6.5 should not
depend on whether the interested party that submits confidential information itself has an
interest in the protection of that confidential information.
70. In addition, China has shown why revealing the names of the companies would have
revealed confidential information in this case. Indeed, this would have taken place where the
company name would be disclosed in connection to a specific activity or other attribute of that
company that is "commercially sensitive" and "not typically disclosed in the normal course of
business".73 In those instances, revealing also the company names would reveal trade secrets of
that company. For instance, in EU – Footwear (China), the reason why certain company names
were kept confidential was to avoid revealing that those companies were complainants or
supporters of the complaint, which could have given rise to commercial retaliation in that case. 74
In the present case, the information that the Applicant wished to keep confidential was the fact
that these companies which were excluded from the domestic industry were respectively "related
to exporter or importer" or were themselves an importer of the product at issue. 75 There was
therefore sufficient good cause for MOFCOM to treat the company names as confidential.
71. Moreover, China has shown that MOFCOM did not fail to ensure that that non -confidential
summaries (or an explanation of the exceptional circumstances why summarization was not
possible) were furnished. Importantly, Japan has not elaborated on any reasons why it considers
the non -confidential summary that was provided by the Appli cant to not have been sufficient.
Importantly, the Applicant did provide a summary which was in sufficient detail to enable the
parties to understand the essence of the underlying information and be able to defend their
interests. Indeed, the Applicant sta ted in footnotes 4 to 7 of the Application that the information
that was redacted was "names of companies excluded from domestic industries". This summary
of the redacted information was given in reference to what the Applicant had already explained,
namely that certain companies were excluded due to them being "importers of products under
investigation" or having "started production of products under investigation in Indonesia."76 China
submits that this summary was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 6.5.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Japan has so far not argued anything to the contrary.

73 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 536.
74 Panel Report, EU – Footwear (China), paras. 7.662, 7.669, 7.673, and 7.685
75 See Application (Exhibit JPN-6.b), pp. 15-16, where the Applicant explains that, in the Application, "if
domestic producer is related to exporter or importer or if it itself is an importer of the products under
investigation, it may be excluded from the domestic industry". Thereafter, in footnotes 4-7, the Applicant
states that the information deducted includes "names of companies excluded from domestic industries. It
involves the trade secrets of enterprises, and is applied for confidentiality."
76 Application, (Exhibit JPN-6.b), p. 16.

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VIII. ARTICLES 6.9, 12.2 AND 12.2.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
72. The seventh and eighth claims of violation put forward by Japan concern MOFCOM's
disclosure and public notice obligations under Articles 6.9, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. Japan alleges that MOFCOM failed to properly disclose to the interes ted parties the
essential facts which formed the basis for its decision to apply definitive measures, in violation of
Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Japan also claims that MOFCOM allegedly failed to
provide in the Final Determination its findin gs and conclusions on all issues of fact and law that it
considered material in sufficient detail and the reasons that led to the imposition of definitive
measures, in violation of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
73. China disagrees with Japan's assertions, and considers that MOFCOM acted in line with the
obligations incumbent on investigating authorities concerning disclosure and public notice.
Indeed, MOFCOM provided sufficient disclosure of the "essential facts", in a manner which
permitted interested parties to understand MOFCOM's factual basis and defend their interests.
Similarly, MOFCOM provided a sufficient explanation of its findings and conclusions on "material"
issues in a manner that these could be clearly discerned and un derstood by the public and the
interested parties. The foregoing relates to all of the issues that have been raised by Japan.
IX. CONCLUSION
74. For the reasons set forth in its submissions, China requests that the Panel rejects the
claims of Japan in thei r entirety and finds that MOFCOM's determinations in the underlying
investigation were fully consistent with China's obligations under the Anti -Dumping Agreement
and the GATT 1994.

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ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 74
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 78
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 79
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of The European Union 84
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Chinese Taipei 86
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of The United States 93

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ANNEX C-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF AUSTRALIA
I. INTRODUCTION
1. These proceedings initiated by Japan raise important questions of legal interpretation and
proper application of key provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
2. Australia's submissions have focussed on key provisions relating to an investigating
authority's definition of a domestic industry (Article 4.1), determination of injury (Articles 3.1, 3.2,
3.4 and 3.5), treatment of conf idential information (Article 6.5), disclosure of essential facts
(Article 6.9) and explanations in public notices (Article 12.2). In particular, Australia has:
(i) observed that an investigating authority bears the responsibility for ensuring that a
broadly defined product under investigation does not introduce a material risk of
distortion in terms of how the domestic industry is defined and in its injury analysis;
(ii) outlined that flaws in an investigating authority's definition of the domestic in dustry
necessarily give rise to a material risk of distortion in its injury analysis;
(iii) outlined the importance of an investigating authority undertaking its injury analysis in
a manner that is objective and based on positive evidence; and
(iv) emphasised that compliance with due process obligations is an essential element of
ensuring anti-dumping duties are applied consistently with the requirements set out in
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
II. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
3. Australia recalls that the definition of "domestic industry" is a "keystone" of an anti-dumping
investigation.1 It sets the scope of the investigation and lays the foundation for the injury and
causation analyses required under Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
4. An investigating authority has an obligation under Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement to define the domestic industry in a way that ensures the definition is reflective of
"domestic producers as a whole of the like products" or those whose collective output "constitutes
a major proportion of the total domestic production" of the like products.2
5. Australia recalls jurisprudence emphasising that "an investigating authority must not act so
as to give rise to a material risk of distortion in defining the domestic industry" and that "an
investigating authority bears the obligation to ensure that the way in which it defines the domestic
industry does not introduce a material risk of skewing the economic data and, consequently,
distorting its analysis of the state of the industry".3
6. Australia submits that if an investigating authority does not properly define "domestic
industry" in accordance with Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and in an objective
manner and based on positive evidence, there will necessarily be a material risk of distortion in its
subsequent injury analysis.

1 Panel report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.397.
2 Article 4.1 Anti-Dumping Agreement.
3 Appellate Body report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 413–416.

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III. INJURY
7. Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires that an injury determination involve an
"objective examination" and be based on "positive evidence". 4 Australia observes that "Article 3.1
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement 'is an overarching provision that sets forth a Member's
fundamental, substantive obligation' with respect to the injury determination, and 'informs the
more detailed obligations in succeeding paragraphs [of Article 3]'".5
 A. PRICE COMPARABILITY
8. Australia recalls the jurisprudenc e establishing that the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires
an investigating authority to ensure that it is comparing "like with like" for the purposes of its price
effects analysis. 6 This is on the basis that "if subject import and domestic prices were not
comparable, this would defeat the explanatory force that subject import prices might have for the
depression or suppression of domestic prices." 7 Accordingly, price comparability needs to be
considered in all price effects analyses to ensure that the injur y determination involves an
objective examination based on positive evidence.8
9. Australia submits that China's interpretation that only significant differences in price will
trigger the price comparability obligation does not reflect the totality of cir cumstances in which
price comparability must be considered. The requirement to ensure price comparability where
there are significant differences in the physical characteristics or uses of product types was
confirmed in China - X-Ray Equipment. 9 Therefore, Australia submits that where there are
differences in the physical characteristics and uses of the product under investigation, including as
a result of a broadly defined product under investigation, an investigating authority must take
these differences into account to ensure price comparability.10
10. Australia considers that an investigating authority's failure to ensure price comparability
brings into question whether an investigating authority's price effects analysis was undertaken in
an objective manner and was based on positive evidence, as required under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
 B. IMPACT ANALYSIS
11. Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires an investigating authority to evaluate
"all relevant economic factors and indices" that have a bearing on the state of the domestic
industry concerned in examining injury, including consideration of the 15 prescribed factors.11
12. Australia submits that, consistent with the requirements of Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement, an investigating authority must explain "in a satisfactory way why the evaluation of
the injury factors set out under Article 3.4 led to the determination of material injury, including an
explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction do not, overall,
undermine the conclusion of material injury".12
13. Where there are positive movements in a number of factors, Australia submits that a panel
should also consider whether an investigating authority provided "a compelling explanation of why

4 Article 3.1 Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5 Appellate Body report, China – GOES, para. 126, citing Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams,
para. 106.
6 Panel report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.277. See also Appellate Body report, China – GOES,
para. 200, Panel report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.65 and Panel report, China – Broiler Products,
para. 7.483.
7 Appellate Body report, China – GOES, para. 200.
8 Panel report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 7.266. See also panel reports, China – X-Ray
9 Panel report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.68, 7.85 and 7.92. See also Panel Reports China –
Autos (US) paras. 7.256 and 7.277; China – Broiler Products, paras. 7.476 – 7.479; Pakistan – BOPP Film
(UAE), paras. 7.309 – 7.310.
10 Panel report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.85.
11 Appellate Body reports, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 156; Thailand – H-Beams, para. 128.
12 Panel report, Korea – Certain Paper, para. 7.272.

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and how, in light of such apparent positive trends, the domestic industry [is], or remain[s],
injured".13
 C. NON-ATTRIBUTION
14. The third sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement includes a "non-attribution"
requirement, which requires an investigating authority to examine any "known factors" other than
the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry. Australia's view is
that where interested parties have made the investi gating authority aware of factors that may be
causing injury to the domestic industry, those factors are "known factors".14 In the case at issue in
these proceedings, the "known factors" were fluctuations in nickel prices, and the effects of stricter
environmental standards.
15. Once these "known factors" have been identified, an investigating authority is required to
separate and distinguish the injurious effects of those known factors from the injurious effects of
the dumped imports. 15 Australia submits t hat an investigating authority has an obligation to
provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of those known
factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects of the alleged dumping.16
IV. DUE PROCESS
16. Australia considers that the due process obligations in Articles 6 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement are critically important.
 A. TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
17. Australia submits that the role of a panel assessing an allegation of a breach of Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not to undertake a de novo review of the evidence on
record to determine whether "good cause" to treat information as confidential was objectively
demonstrated, or if a summary or claim that summariza tion was not possible was objectively
adequate.17 Instead, the panel should assess whether it is discernible from an investigating
authority's final determination or any supporting documents (and in light of the nature of the
information at issue, and the reasons given by the submitting party in its request for
confidentiality) that it met the standard required by Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.18
 B. DISCLOSURE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS
18. Australia observes that Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement has been interpreted to
require an investigating authority to "disclose such facts, in a coherent way, so as to permit an
interested party to understand the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive
measures."19 Australia submits that this requirement is critical to ensuring the provision of
procedural fairness to all interested parties.
19. Australia submits that the determination of which facts are "essential" will depend on the
nature and scope of the particular substant ive obligations, the content of the particular findings
needed to satisfy the substantive obligations at issue, and the factual circumstances of each
case.20

13 Panel report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 7.249.
14 Panel report, EU – Footwear (China), para. 7.484. See also Panel report, Thailand – H-Beams,
para. 7.273.
15 Appellate Body report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel (2001), para. 223.
16 Appellate Body report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel (2001), para. 226.
17 See, for example, Appellate Body reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU),
18 Appellate Body report, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.97.
19 Appellate Body report, China – GOES, para. 240. See also Appellate Body report Russia – Commercial
Vehicles, para. 5.177.
20 Appellate Body reports, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.220, China – HP-SSST (Japan) /

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 C. PUBLIC NOTICE
20. Australia notes that the purpose of Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires any
public notice (or separate report) to set out in "sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating
authorities".21Australia submits that the purpose of Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is
to provide transparency of the authority's decision -making at crucial points of the investigation. 22
Australia agrees with the Appellate Body's observation that parties affected by the imposition of
anti-dumping duties "are entitled to know, as a matter of fairness and due process, the facts, law
and reasons that have led to the imposition of such duties".23
V. CONCLUSION
21. Australia's submissions outline Australia's understanding of the obligations contained in key
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
22. Australia acknowledges that an investigating authority has discretion in defining the scope of
the product under investigation in an anti -dumping investigation. However, even where the
product under investigation i s broadly defined, an investigating authority has a responsibility to
ensure its injury determination is objective and is based on positive evidence. A broad product
scope has implications for the injury determination, including how the investigating autho rity
assesses price comparability and conducts its price effects analysis.
Australia emphasises again the importance of the due process obligations in Articles 6 and 12 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, including to allow interested parties the opportunity to defend their
interests during an anti -dumping investigation, or to seek review of an anti -dumping measure
through domestic avenues or WTO dispute settlement.

21 Article 12.2, Anti-Dumping Agreement.
22 Panel report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, para. 7.104.
23 Appellate Body report, China – GOES, para. 258.

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ANNEX C-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL
1. With respect to the question of whether a domestic industry defined consistently with
Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement may nonetheless be inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Brazil understands that, since Article 4.1 provi des the definition of
"domestic industry", it is relevant for the application of other provisions in the Agreement, for
example Article 3.1, regarding the determination of injury. Articles 4.1 and 3.1, however, refer to
different moments of an anti -dumping investigation, as the definition of "domestic industry" by an
authority precedes the determination of injury and therefore should not be conditioned by the
possible results of the latter.1
2. In previous disputes, the Appellate Body found that a violation of Article 4.1 would also entail
an inconsistency with Article 3.1.2 This reading is appropriate, since Article 4.1 sets out detailed
requirements for the definition of the "domestic industry", and this definition is itself essential to
the corr ect application of Article 3. The interplay between both provisions indicates that a
misconstruction of the definition of the "domestic industry", against the requirements of
Article 4.1, may lead to significant distortions of the whole investigation, part icularly the
determination of injury under Article 3.
3. Conversely, the suggestion that a definition of the "domestic industry" consistent with
Article 4.1 could be in breach of Article 3.1 does not seem to find textual basis in the Agreement.
Such a read ing would amount to introducing, in Brazil's view, an additional test regarding the
definition of "domestic industry", beyond the specific and detailed requirements already present in
Article 4.1.
4. Regarding the question of whether the resort to best inf ormation available by an investigating
authority for a particular aspect of its determination ipso facto precludes a challenge to that aspect
of the determination under a provision of the Anti -Dumping Agreement other than Article 6.8 and
Annex II thereof, Brazil notes that Article 6 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement provides the overall
framework regarding the use of evidence throughout an investigation, so as to guarantee the
procedural rights of the parties. Article 6.8 and Annex II, in particular, set out ru les on the resort
to facts available by an authority in circumstances where "any interested party refuses access to,
or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly
impedes the investigation".
5. Brazil understands that there is no textual basis in the Agreement to suggest that, when an
authority resorts to facts available in a determination, all other possible challenges to aspects of
that determination are precluded in the absence of a specific claim of bre ach of Article 6.8 and
Annex II.
6. Moreover, in Brazil's view, even if there was a claim under Article 6.8 and Annex II and a panel
concluded that an investigating authority correctly resorted to the "best information available" in a
determination, nothing would prevent that panel from finding that such determination could be the
result of breaches of other provisions in the Agreement.

1 Appellate Body Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.34.
2 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.321; Appellate Body
Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, paras. 5.21-5.22.

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ANNEX C-3
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA
1. Canada addresses the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China's (MOFCOM)
price effects analysis in the Final Determination at issue with respect to the requirements of
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and its non -attribution analysis with respect
to the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.5.
I. PRICE EFFECTS
2. An investigating authority's price effects analysis is subject to Article 3.1, which requires an
injury determination to be based on positive evidence and an objective examination. 1 While no
particular methodology is prescribed for examining the price effects of subject imports, a
consideration of price effects must be based on positive evidence and an objective examination.2
3. Article 3.2 provides that investigating authorities shall consider, inter alia, whether the effect
of subject imports is to depress or suppress prices to a significant degree. The Appellate Body has
clarified that an investigating authority must consider whether the subject imports have
explanatory force for the significant price depression or suppression of domestic prices.3
4. Canada disagrees with China's position that Japan's Article 3.1 and 3.2 claims should
necessarily be dismissed because MOFCOM's price effects findings were based on facts available
and Japan made no claims under Article 6.8 and Annex II. 4 A price effects analysis conducted
using best information available may be challenged under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 on the basis that
the analysis of those facts or the methodology employed by the autho rity does not accord with the
obligation to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence, or meet the
requirements of a price effects analysis. 5 The Panel should determine to what extent MOFCOM
relied on best information available and to wh at extent Japan's claim relates to breaches of
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 with respect to MOFCOM's interpretation and analysis of the evidence, and its
price effects analysis, rather than whether it complied with Article 6.8.6
5. Canada observes that certain analysis and language used in the Final Determination appears
to suggest that MOFCOM conducted price comparisons, price trend analyses, and made price
effects findings with respect to the subject imports as a whole and the domestic products as a
whole.7 If the Panel concludes that MOFCOM did make certain comparisons and findings on this
basis, the Panel should carefully assess the implications with respect to both MOFCOM's obligation
to ensure price comparability and with respect to its overall price effects analysis.
1. Price Comparability
6. Ensuring price comparability is both necessary to comply with Article 3.1 and to ensure that
subject imports have explanatory force for a price effect under Article 3.2.8 The obligation to

1 Appellate Body Reports, China – GOES, paras. 125 and 126; Thailand – H-Beams, para. 106.
2 See e.g. Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.41 and 7.42 (citing Appellate Body Reports,
3 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 136.
4 China's first written submission (BCI-Redacted Version), para. 118.
5 Resort to best information available by an authority for an aspect of its determination should not
preclude a challenge to that aspect under provisions other than Article 6.8 and Annex II. It would undermine
the other important obligations of the Agreement if the use of best information available could insulate the
authority from challenges under those provisions simply because a Member has not also challenged that
authority's resort to best information available.
6 See e.g. Canada's responses Panel questions to the third parties, paras. 12-14; Panel Report, China –
Broiler Products, para. 7.174.
7 See e.g. Canada's third party submission, paras. 27, 28, and 39; MOFCOM, Final Determination,
(Exhibit JPN-5.b), pp. 43 and 44; and Japan's first written submission, paras. 151 and 152.
8 The Appellate Body has stated that, if prices are not comparable, "this would defeat the explanatory
force that subject import prices might have for the depression or suppression of domestic prices" and the
failure to ensure price comparability would be inconsistent with Article 3.1. See Appellate Body Report, China -
GOES, para. 200.

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ensure price comparability applies to the consideration of price effects in general, including with
respect to price depression. 9 An authority must take particular care if it was put on notice
concerning the existence of price comparability issues during the investiga tion. If an authority
performs a price comparison on the basis of baskets of products, it must ensure that the groups of
products "compared on both sides of the equation are sufficiently similar" so that any observed
price differential results from a price effect rather than from differences in the composition of the
two baskets being compared. 10 An authority must carefully ensure price comparability, including
by taking product mix differences into account, when relying on comparisons of average unit
values and assessing related trends.11
7. Canada expresses concern regarding China's articulation of the relevant legal standard and
with respect to whether MOFCOM adequately ensured price comparability. Contrary to what China
appears to suggest, price comparability is relevant to a price trends analysis. 12 China also appears
to argue that the obligation to ensure price comparability arises only if the investigation covers
various product types that have significant price differences between them and if the impo rted and
domestic products are not sufficiently similar in terms of the mix of different product types. 13
China omits relevant considerations. In particular, the obligation to ensure price comparability
applies more broadly (for example, with respect to significant differences in physical characteristics
and uses) and might, in certain circumstances, require an authority to take into account
differences between product types even if the price differences between those products are less
than "significant".
8. Panels have found that "significantly different prices" between products or product types
being compared must be taken into account.14 Indeed, the existence of significant price differences
between product types makes the need to ensure price comparability particularly acute, as product
mix issues may undermine the price effects analysis. 15 While Article 3.2 does not reference the
term "significant" with respect to price comparability, what constitutes a "significant" (e.g.
important or consequential) pri ce difference that must be taken into account may be fact -specific,
may vary depending on circumstances, may involve consideration of quantitative and qualitative
factors, and will depend on the totality of the evidence.16
9. However, an authority should n ot ignore differences other than "significant price
differences".17 The obligation to take steps to ensure price comparability arises if there are
significant differences in physical characteristics and uses between products or product types, and
an authority should also take into account product substitutability. 18 Failure to consider and take
such differences into account is inconsistent with an objective examination of positive evidence. 19
These criteria are relevant to a consideration of whether the gro ups of products being compared
are "sufficiently similar" and to the related question of whether the products are actually in a
competitive relationship.20 Comparing the prices of non -competing products or product types may

9 Panel Reports, China – Autos (US), para. 7.277; China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.68; Canada's
third party submission, para. 9.
10 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.483.
11 See e.g. Panel Reports, China – Autos (US), paras. 7.282, 7.283 and fn. 431 to para. 7.270; China –
X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.30, 7.85 and 7.88; and China – Broiler Products, para. 7.494(ii).
12 See e.g. Panel Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.282; Canada's third party submission, para. 25;
China's first written submission (BCI-Redacted Version), paras. 226 and 228.
13 China's first written submission (BCI-Redacted Version), para. 184, see also para. 196 ("the only
product differences that matter" are those "which significantly affect" prices).
14 Panel Reports, China – Broiler Products, paras. 7.483 and 7.490; China – X-Ray Equipment,
para. 7.92. Price comparisons may have to occur at the level of product models or adjustments made.
15 See e.g. Canada's third-party submission, paras. 10 and 11; Canada's third-party statement,
paras. 10 and 14; Canada's responses to Panel questions to the third parties, para. 3; Panel Report, China –
Broiler Products, paras. 7.483, 7.490, and 7.493.
16 See Canada's responses to Panel questions to the third parties, paras. 7-11; see also Appellate Body
Report, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.161 for a relevant definition of the term
"significant".
17 See e.g. Canada's third-party submission, paras. 12 and 22; Canada's third-party statement,
paras. 12 and 13; Canada's responses to Panel questions to the third parties, paras. 4-6. There may be cases
where the facts relating to the physical characteristics and uses of differentiated products indicate that price
differences may be relevant for price comparability even if they are not considered "significant".
18 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.92, see also paras. 7.85, 7.88, and 7.51.
19 See e.g. Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.85 and 7.88.
20 See Canada's responses to Panel questions to the third parties, paras. 5 and 6.

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not give rise to a meaningful pr ice effects analysis that is relevant to the question of causation. 21
In light of specific facts or circumstances, it is possible that differences between product types may
need to be taken into account when considering comparability even if prices do not differ in a
"significant" manner because the prices in question may not actually interact with one another.22
10. An investigating authority should also consider if there are variations in the proportions of
differentiated products within either or both ba skets over time. The panel in China – X-Ray
Equipment found that if an investigating authority compares prices over time in a basket
containing non-homogenous product types, it must ensure price comparability by considering any
changes in the proportion of the product types making up the basket each year. 23 Failure to do so
means that any changes, such as a decline in average unit values, may actually be the result of
changes in product mix, rather than a genuine change in price.24 Analysing price trends in a such a
basket, without taking into account product mix changes each year, is not "an objective
examination of positive evidence".25 Logically, the need to take into account varying proportions of
product types in a basket over time would apply equally when an authority compares prices and
assesses price trends as between baskets of non -homogeneous products. If the product mix
between the two baskets varies, there is a "high risk" that differences in average unit values may
reflect variations in product mix, rather than actual differences in pricing.26
11. In this dispute, the Panel should examine Japan's argument that MOFCOM's price ef fects
analysis was flawed because it failed to ensure price comparability when comparing weighted
average prices for baskets of the subject imports and the domestic like products as a whole. 27 The
Panel should carefully assess Japan's position that these b askets contained products, and series of
products, with significantly differing prices, physical characteristics, and uses 28, and that MOFCOM
failed to take into account that any price changes or trends could be the result of changes in
product mix and com position of the baskets being compared rather than genuine changes in
prices.29 The Panel should explore whether MOFCOM adequately ensured price comparability and
took into account, on the basis of positive evidence and an objective examination, all of the
product differences relevant for determining price comparability (including price, physical
characteristics, and uses).
12. With respect to price, Japan argues that MOFCOM was faced with evidence that there were
"significant differences in the price level s and price trends" with regard to stainless steel slabs,
hot-rolled stainless steel coils, and hot -rolled stainless steel plates.30 In light of that evidence, the
Panel should assess if MOFCOM's conclusion that there were only "reasonable" 31 price differences
among the three products was based on positive evidence and an objective examination, and
whether MOFCOM appropriately took these differences into account.
13. Canada also considers that MOFCOM was on notice that the baskets of subject imports and
domestic like products contained non -homogenous products due to the differing physical
characteristics and uses among the three products. 32 According to Japan, interested parties
informed MOFCOM, and provided evidence demonstrating, that the three products we re
non-substitutable.33 Japan argues that the differences between the three products, and series of
products, demonstrate that they do not compete with one another, thus undermining price
comparability.34 The Panel should assess if MOFCOM ought to have mor e carefully considered
whether significant differences identified in the evidence affected the competitive relationship
between the products and series in the baskets that MOFCOM compared. The Panel should

21 See e.g. Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.50.
22 Canada's responses to Panel questions to the third parties, paras. 1-2 and 4-6.
23 See e.g. Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.57 and 7.88.
24 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.57.
25 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.88 and 7.57.
26 See e.g. Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.490.
27 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 65-66, 89, 135, and 152-158.
28 See e.g., Japan's first written submission, paras 90-110, 122-125, 128, 134, 144, 156, 157, and 158-
169; Canada's third-party submission, paras. 17 and 18; Canada's third-party statement, para. 13.
29 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 89, 156, 172, and 183.
30 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, para. 122.
31 MOFCOM, Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 12.
32 See Canada's third party submission, paras. 17, 18 and 29; Canada's third-party statement, para. 13;
Japan's first written submission, paras. 90-110, 128, 144, 156, and 158-168.
33 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, para. 91 and following.
34 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 134, 158, and 169.

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examine if MOFCOM appropriately considered and exp lained how the prices of potentially
non-competing products in its baskets interacted such that the subject imports adversely affected
domestic like products.35
14. Finally, the Panel should assess if MOFCOM properly considered whether the groups of
products compared were sufficiently similar and if there were differing proportions of the three
products, and the various series of these products, in either or both baskets over time.36 The Panel
should also assess if MOFCOM ought to have considered changing p roportions in product mix for
the purposes of its series -based analyses, as Japan argues that each series contained the three
different products.37
2. Price Depression
15. An investigating authority is required to consider whether subject imports have expl anatory
force for the occurrence of significant price depression and may not disregard contrary evidence. 38
The Panel should consider Japan's argument that MOFCOM failed to explain how a finding of price
depression is consistent with the fact that the pric es of domestic like products "generally rose"
during the period of investigation.39 Moreover, if the Panel determines that MOFCOM's price effects
analysis was, at least in part, based on findings relating to the products as a whole 40, the Panel
should consider if MOFCOM adequately explained, based on positive evidence, its finding of price
depression given that the Final Determination points to an "overall rising trend" 41 of domestic
prices.42 The Panel should also carefully examine MOFCOM's vari ous series -based analyses and
whether MOFCOM was required to better explain how the "overall rising trend" of domestic prices
interacted with these analyses.
16. An investigating authority must take divergent price trends into account, and explain why it
nonetheless considers that the subject imports affect the price of domestic like products. 43 The
Panel should assess Japan's arguments concerning diverging trends both for the product as a
whole44 and, for example, within the 300 -series.45 The Panel should examine whether MOFCOM
carefully considered any divergent price trends and explained, on th e basis of positive evidence
and an objective examination, the explanatory force of the subject imports for price depression in
light of such trends. 46 Even if the Panel finds that certain series -based trends did not diverge but
were instead similar 47, the Panel should assess whether MOFCOM provided "sufficient reasoning"
"as to what explanatory force" those trends "had for the depression or suppression of domestic
prices".48
17. The Appellate Body has confirmed that an investigating authority must provide "an
explanation and analysis of how and to what extent the prices of the domestic like product were
affected in light of the consistent overselling" by subject imports. 49 The Panel should assess
Japan's argument that there was consistent overselling both a t the product as a whole level and
among the different series, with the exception of the 300-series at the very end of the period.50 An
investigating authority must pay particular attention to the issue of overselling if it was raised by

35 Canada's third party statement, para. 13.
36 See e.g. Japan's first written submission, paras. 89 and 172.
37 Japan's first written submission, para. 183.
38 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 154. The Panel should also assess China's
argument that MOFCOM found "price suppression" with respect to the 400-series and, for example, whether
any such finding and analysis conforms with Articles 3.1 and 3.2. See e.g. Canada's third party submission,
para. 53.
39 Japan's first written submission, para. 188; Canada's third party submission, para. 35.
40 See e.g. Canada's third party submission, para. 39.
41 MOFCOM, Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 36.
42 See e.g. Canada's third party submission, para. 42.
43 See e.g. Panel Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 7.295.
44 Japan's first written submission, paras. 198 (citing MOFCOM, Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b),
p. 36), and 199.
45 Japan's first written submission, para. 180. See also Canada's third party submission, para. 49.
46 See e.g. Canada's third party submission, para. 43.
47 See e.g. China's first written submission (BCI-Redacted Version), paras. 326-329.
48 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 210.
49 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves, para. 5.332. Failure to do so is inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2, see para. 5.334.
50 Japan's first written submission, paras. 209-210.

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the interested par ties with reference to evidence. 51 The Panel should assess whether MOFCOM
explained and analysed, on the basis of positive evidence and an objective examination, how its
finding of price depression accords with the overselling.52
18. With respect to MOFCOM's series-based analyses more generally, Canada considers that the
Panel should carefully assess whether MOFCOM's finding that these analyses demonstrated that
the subject imports had an adverse effect on the price of the domestic like products as a whole 53
accords with the requirements of Articles 3.1. and 3.2.54
II. NON-ATTRIBUTION
19. Canada is concerned with MOFCOM's analysis of known factors raised by the interested
parties.55 Article 3.5 requires an investigating authority to examine all known factors, other than
the subject imports, causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as the subject
imports.56 The authority must ensure that injuries caused to the domestic industry by other known
factors are not attributed to the subject imp orts57, by "appropriately assess[ing] the injurious
effects" of those other known factors. 58 The authority must "separate and distinguish the injurious
effects of the dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other factors", and provide "a
satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as
distinguished from the injurious effects" of the subject imports. 59 This exercise must occur before
the authority can conclude that there is a causal link between subject imports and injury caused to
domestic industry.60 Injurious effects of the subject imports and the other known factors cannot
remain "lumped together" and "indistinguishable". 61 A non-attribution analysis must comply with
the overarching obligation established in Article 3.1 that an injury determination must be
conducted on the basis of positive evidence and an objective examination.62
20. The Panel should, for example, assess if MOFCOM objectively examined any injury arising
from rising nickel pric es, or if it simply attributed injury to the subject imports, relying on
unsubstantiated statements. MOFCOM was required do more than fall back on an assertion that
increased nickel prices do not refute the causal link. 63 The Panel should carefully assess whether
MOFCOM's determination fulfilled the requirements of a non-attribution analysis.

51 See e.g. Panel Reports, China – Cellulose Pulp, paras. 7.85 and 7.86; China – Autos (US),
paras. 7.271 and 7.273. See Japan's first written submission, para. 208.
52 See e.g. Canada's third party submission, paras. 44 and 45.
53 See e.g. MOFCOM, Final Determination, (Exhibit JPN-5.b), p. 42; China's first written submission
(BCI-Redacted Version), para. 260.
54 Canada's third-party statement, para. 21.
55 See Japan's first written submission, para. 424; Canada's third-party statement, paras. 60-65.
56 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para. 222. Once such an "'other factor' becomes
'known' to the investigating authority, it is for the investigating authority to investigate", see Panel Report,
China – GOES, para. 7.636.
57 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 222.
58 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 223.
59 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 226.
60 Appellate Body Reports, EU – PET (Pakistan), para. 5.172; US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 223; China –
HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.283; and EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 190.
61 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para. 228.
62 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 106.
63 See e.g. Panel Report, China – Cellulose Pulp, para. 7.192.

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ANNEX C-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Mr Chairman, Members of the Panel, ladies and gentlemen,
1. The European Union thanks the Panel for the opportunity to submit this oral statement.
2. Before we enter into the subject matter of this case, we wish to raise a point of order. We
note that the Russian Federation participates in these proceedings as a third party. The
EU does not intend to engage with the Russian Federation in the context of these
proceedings.
3. Like previous speakers, we wish to express the EU and its Member States ' full solidarity with
Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. The EU condemns in t he strongest possible terms
Russia's unprovoked and unjustified act of aggression against Ukraine, which grossly
violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international security and
stability. The EU demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its
troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine 's territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders and abide by UN
General Assembly resolution t itled "Aggression against Ukraine" supported by 141 states at
the 11th emergency special session. The EU resolutely supports Ukraine 's inherent right of
self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces ' efforts to defend Ukraine 's territorial integrity
and popu lation in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. At all times Russia must
respect its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian and
human rights law, including with respect to the protection of civilians, women and ch ildren.
Russia also needs to stop its disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks.
4. As to the case, it raises interesting legal questions, brought about by what the
European Union understands to have been a fairly broad definition of the product under
investigation in the first place, consisting of a basket containing heterogeneous product
types. It is clear that under Articles 2.1 and 2.6 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement,
investigating authorities have broad latitude to define the product under investigation, and
in particular there is no requirement of internal homogeneity of the product under
investigation. However, it is equally clear that choices regarding the scope of the product
under investigation, and its composition, can have consequences on how compa risons (both
in the dumping and in the injury determinations) have to be carried out.
5. More specifically, as regards the price effects analysis, in this case the assessment of price
depression, the European Union considers that an investigating authority can only establish
that imports have the effect of depressing prices of the domestic like product if the
two compete. In case of heterogeneous product baskets containing non -interchangeable
product types belonging to different market segments, significant differences in the prices
and market shares of these product types must be taken into account. Otherwise, if in the
presence of such heterogeneous product baskets, price trends are compared simply at the
level of the whole basket, differences may reflect differences in the product mix, as opposed
to differences in pricing (as previous speakers have also flagged), in which case the subject
imports do not have explanatory force for price trends in domestic like product .1 Indeed, as
the European Union has already explained in its written submission and as Canada also
rightly points out 2, these principles are fully relevant not only for a static comparison of
absolute values, but also for the trends-based analysis in the case of price depression.
6. The European Union concurs with other third parties 3, that while Article 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a particular methodology for the comparison
underlying the price effects analysis, significant differ ences between product baskets may
well require the investigating authority to perform the price comparison at the level of
product types. As Canada rightly pointed out, this becomes particularly acute where, like

1 See also US's TPS, para. 7.
2 Canada's TPS, para. 25.
3 Australia's TPS, paras. 18-19; Canada's TPS, paras. 9-10 ; The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu' TPS, para. 15.

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here, the investigating authority had been put on notice concerning the existence of price
comparability issues during the investigation.4
7. Regarding Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the European Union agrees with the
United States 5 that while Members have discretion under Article 3.3 to assess whether
cumulation is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among imports and
between imports and the domestic like product, that assessment must bear a reasonable
relationship to the inquiry into whether the various products com pete in the domestic
market of the importing Member. The phrase "conditions of competition" in Article 3.3 is not
accompanied by any sort of qualifier but presupposes the existence of some competition.
Products with non -parallel volume or price trends may also be competing in certain
circumstances.6 Yet, significant differences between products in terms of volumes and prices
may cast doubts over the existence of competition between them.7
8. Finally, the European Union also agrees with Australia 's submiss ion on the crucial
importance of due process rights 8, without which interested parties cannot meaningfully
participate in the investigation, in particular with a view to ensuring that the investigating
authority actually meets the substantive obligations incumbent on it under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. The European Union also concurs with the United States that an investigating
authority's failure to provide relevant information should not be left out of sight when a
Panel considers whether a complainant has met its burden of proof in dispute settlement
proceedings.9
9. The European Union hopes that its written and oral submissions in this case are helpful to the
Panel and we thank the Panel again for the opportunity to submit these comments.

4 Canada's TPS, paras. 9, 22.
5 US's TPS, para. 14.
6 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, paras. 7.253, 7.259.
7 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.260.
8 Australia's TPS, paras. 34 ff.
9 US's TPS, para. 9.

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ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINESE TAIPEI
CHINESE TAIPEI THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu welcomes the
opportunity to present its views as a third party in the dispute concerning China's measures
imposing anti-dumping duties on stainless steel billets (or slabs according to Japan's explanation),
hot-rolled coils, and hot-rolled plates from Japan.
2. In this written submis sion, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu will not address all of the issues upon which there is disagreement between the Parties to
the dispute. Rather, we will confine ourselves to briefly discuss some of the issues raised: namely
Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping agreement.
II. ARTICLE 3.1 OF THE ANTI -DUMPING AGREEMENT REQUIRES THAT THE
INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION BASED ON
POSITIVE EVIDENCE
3. At the outset, it should be noted that an affirmative determination of injury to the domestic
industry is a fundamental precondition for the imposition of anti -dumping measures, along with a
determination of the causal link between the dumped imports and injury.
4. Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires that a determination of injury to the
domestic industry "[b]e based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both
(a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products".
5. The Appellate Body referred to Article 3.1 as an "overarching provision" that sets forth a
Member's fundamental, substantive obligati ons with respect to the determination of injury. 1 The
Appellate body also held that the concept of "positive evidence" relates to the quality of the
evidence that authorities may rely on in making a determination and focuses on the facts
underpinning and justifying the injury determination. The word "positive" means that the evidence
must be of an affirmative, objective, and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.2
6. The concept of "objective examination" aims at a different aspect of the inv estigating
authorities' determination as it is concerned with the investigation process itself. The word
"objective", which qualifies the word "examination", indicates essentially that "examination"
process must conform to the principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. 3 In short, an
"objective examination" requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports,
be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or
group of interested part ies, in the investigation. 4 If an examination is to be "objective", the
identification, investigation, and evaluation of the relevant factors must be even -handed.
Investigating authorities are not entitled to conduct their investigation in such a way that it
becomes more likely that, because of the fact -finding or evaluation process, they will determine
that the domestic industry is injured.5
7. In this dispute, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu holds
the view that the foregoing requirements as set forth by the WTO jurisprudence under Article 3.1
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement should be well maintained when examining the more detailed
obligations in succeeding paragraphs under Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In doing so,
this panel should examine whether MOFCOM provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to

1 Appellate Body Reports, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 106; China – GOES, para. 126; and China – HP-
SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SST (EU), para. 5.137.
2 Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 192; China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SST
(EU), para. 5.138.
3 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193.
4 Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193; China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SST
(EU), para. 5.138.
5 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 196.

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how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings and how those factual findings
supported the overall determinations, in the light of other plausible alternative explanations.
III. Article 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement Requires that the Investigating
Authorities to Proper Consider the Effect of Dumped Imports on the Price of Like
Domestic Products
8. Article 3.2, first sentence, of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires the investigating
authorities "[t]o consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either
in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member" . Article 3.2,
second sentenc e, of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authorities "[t]o
consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as
compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree". That is, the investigating authorities must
consider whether there has been a significant inc rease in dumped imports, and that they must
examine the effect of dumped imports on prices resulting from price undercutting, price
depression, or price suppression.6
9. According to Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , Articles 3.1 and 3.2
do not prescribe a methodology that must be followed by the investigating authorities in
conducting the price effect analysis. Consequently, an investigating authority enjoys a certain
discretion in adopting a methodology to guide its injury analysis. Nonetheless, within the bounds
of this discretion, it may be expected that an investigating authority might have to rely on
reasonable assumptions or draw inferences. In doing so, the investigating authority must ensure
that its determinat ions are based on "positive evidence". Thus, when, in an investigating
authority's methodology, a determination rests upon assumptions, these assumptions should be
derived as reasonable inferences from a credible basis of facts, and should be sufficiently explained
so that their objectivity and credibility can be verified.7
10. This methodology is also reflected in China – GOES when the Appellate Body interpreted the
use of the word "consider" in Article 3.2, where the Appellate Body said the word "conside r"
obliges a decision-maker to "take something into account" in reaching a decision. More specifically,
the word "consider" does "[n]ot impose an obligation on an investigating authority to make a
definitive determination on the volume of subject imports a nd the effect of such imports on
domestic prices. Nonetheless, an authority's consideration of the volume of subject imports and
their price effects is also subject to the overarching principles that it be based on positive evidence
and involve an objective examination".8
11. While an examination of whether there is a price difference between imported and domestic
products may be a useful starting point for an analysis of price undercutting, it does not provide a
sufficient basis for an investigating autho rity to satisfy its obligation under Article 3.2.9 Likewise, it
is not sufficient for an investigating authority to confine its consideration to what is happening to
domestice prices for the purposes of considering significant price depression or suppresion. Rather,
an investigating authority is required to examine domestic prices in conjunction with dumped
imports in order to understand whether dumped imports have "explantory force for the occurrence
of" significant depression or suppression of domestic prices.10
12. According to the Appellate Body, this interpretation is reinforced by the very concepts of price
depression and price suppression. With regard to price depression, it explained that price
depression refers to a situation in which prices are pushed down, or reduced by something. By
definition, an examination of price depression calls for more than a simple observation of a price
decline and also encompasses an analysis of what is pushing down the prices. 11 The concept of
both price depression and price suppression implicate an analysis concerning the question of what
brings about such price phenomena.12

6 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 111.
7 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 204.
8 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES (2012), para. 130-1.
9 Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SST (EU), para. 5.159-5.163..
10 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 138.
11 Appellate Body Report, Russia – Commercial Vehicles, para. 5.100 and 5.103.
12 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 141.

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13. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan) noted that while an
investigating authority has some discretion in how it chooses to assess price effects under
Article 3.2, "a failure to ensure price comparability" would not be consistent with the requirement
under Article 3.1 that "a determination of injury be based on 'positive evidence' and involve an
'objective examination' of, inter alia, the effect of subject imports on the prices of domestic like
products. If subject import and domestic prices were not comp arable, this would defeat the
explanatory force that subject import prices might have for the depression or suppression of
domestic prices" .13 Thus, where an investigating authority fails to ensure price comparability in
price comparisons between dumped im ports and the domestic like products, this undermines its
finding of price effects under Article 3.2, to the extent that it relies on such price comparisons.
14. Meanwhile, the Panel elaborated in China – X-Ray Equipment that "[i]f two products being
analysed in an undercutting analysis are not comparable, for example in the sense that they do
not compete with each other, it is difficult to conceive how the outcome of such an analysis could
be relevant to the causation question".14 The Panel also noted that Article 3.2 "does not mandate a
specific methodology by which to ensure price comparability" , such that an investigating authority
has "multiple options in determining how to proceed".15
15. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Mat su is of the view that the
methodology used by MOFCOM in its price effects analysis should be examined in light of the legal
obligations of Article 3.2 set by the foregoing precedents. Specifically, the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu agrees with Japan's claim that when comparing
the prices of the subject import and domestic prices to establish the existence of price depression,
it is necessary for MOFCOM to ensure that the prices it is using for the comparison are properly
comparable. If there are considerable differences among the products, these factors shall be taken
into account, for example using carefully defined product categories for the collectio n of price
information. If prices of the products which lack comparability are compared, the outcome of this
comparison should not be considered as being based on an objective, unbiased analysis.
16. In the meantime, this Panel should also examine whether MOFCOM has conducted a dynamic
assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of the
dumped imports and those of domestic like products over the entire period of investigation. On
Japan's claim regarding several occurenc e such as divergent price trends, increasing price trends,
consistnet higher price and overselling, this Panel should carefully rule if MOFCOM disregarded
evidence suggesting that the prices of subject imports have no, or only a limited effect on
domestice prices.
IV. ARTICLE 3.4 OF THE ANTI -DUMPING AGREEMENT REQUIRES THAT THE
EXAMINATION OF THE DUMPED Imports ON THE INDUSTRY CONCERNED MUST INCLUDE
AN EVALUATION OF ALL RELEVANT ECONOMIC FACTORS
17. Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement plays an importan t role in setting out how an
investigating authority must determine injury. Article 3.4 states that "the examination of the
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of
all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry". Article 3.4
then lists the relevant economic factors or indicators that must be evaluated. It explicitly states
that this list is not exhaustive. It also stresses that one or several of these factors wil l not
necessarily give decisive guidance as to the existence of injury to the domestic industry or lack
thereof.
18. While not exhaustive, it is widely accepted that the list of factors in Article 3.4 is a mandatory
minimum, and that investigating authorities must therefore collect and analyse data relating to
each of these individual enumerated factors. 16 In addition, investigating authorities must also
collect and analyse data relating to any othe r relevant factors that may have a bearing on the
state of a domestic industry in a particular case. 17 An objective examination in accordance with
Article 3.1 would require the investigating authorities to evaluate each of the factors and to assess
the relevance of each factor and the weight to be attributed to it in the injury assessment.

13 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.242.
14 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.50.
15 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.51.
16 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H Beans, para. 125.
17 Panel Report, Thailand – H Beans, para. 7.225; and Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
para. 195.

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19. In light of the foregoing legal standards, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu believes that the following questions are relevant for t his Panel to determine if
MOFCOM has satisfied the requirements under Article 3.4 in this dispute: (1) whether MOFCOM's
analysis under Article 3.4 was based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry,
including evaluation of each of the listed f actors in the description of the state of the industry; (2)
whether MOFCOM's analysis explained in a satisfactory way why the evaluation of the factors set
out under Article 3.4 leads to the determination of the impact of dumped imports on domestic
industry, including an explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction
do not, overall, undermine the conclusion of the impact of dumped imports on domestic industry.
20. If MOFCOM's analysis was based on selective and inconsiste nt use of information pertaining to
the domestic industry, or if MOFCOM collected and relied upon partial data for its analysis without
proper explanation, MOFCOM did not ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic
industry as whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of objective examination of
the impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry in accordance with Article 3.1 and
Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
V. ARTICLE 3.5 OF THE ANTI -DUMPING AGREEMENT REQUIR ES THAT THE
INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DUMPED IMPORTS AND INJURY TO THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
21. Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires the demonstration of a causal link
between the dumped imports a nd the injury to the domestic industry. Article 3.5 also contains a
"non-attribution" requirement. According to this requirement, investigating authorities must
examine any known factors other than the dumped imports that are injuring the domestic industry
at the same time and they must not attribute the injury caused by these other factors to the
dumped imports. The dumped imports need not to be the sole cause of the injury to the domestic
industry, but the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires that the dumped i mports be a genuine and
substantial cause of material injury and that other causes of injury not be attributed to the
dumped imports.
22. As the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel stated: "[P]rovided that an investigating
authority does not attribute the injuries of other causal factors to dumped imports, it is free to
choose the methodology it will use in examining the 'causal relationship' between dumped imports
and injury" .18 Moreover, based on the Appellate Body analysis in Korea – Pneumatic Valves
(Japan), the Panel's task under Article 3.5 was only "to review whether the investigating authority
properly linked the outcomes of its analyses conducted pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 3.4, taking
into account the evidence and factors required under Article 3.5, in coming to a definitive
determination regarding the causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the
domestic industry".19
23. In the present dispute, if the investigating authority's analysis of causal relationship was based
on a price effects analysis that was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement and an impact analysis that was inconsistent Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement, it can hardly "properly" link the outcomes of its analys es conducted pursuant to
Articles 3.2 and 3.4 to a definitive determination under the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
24. On the other hand, with respect to the "non -attribution" requirement of Article 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel clarified the requirement as
follows: "The non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies solely
in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing inj ury to the domestic
industry at the same time. In order that investigating authorities, applying Article 3.5, are able to
ensure that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not 'attributed' to dumped imports,
they must appropriately assess th e injurious effects of those other factors. Logically, such an
assessment must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors
from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports
are not appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors,
the authorities will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is actually
caused by those imports, rather than by the other fact ors. Thus, in the absence of such separation

18 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 224 and 226.
19 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.203 and 5.280.

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and distinction of the different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no
rational basis to conclude that the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, justifies the imposition of anti-dumping duties".20
25. Based on the aforementioned interpretation of the legal obligation under Article 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu
is of the opinion that if this Panel continues to examine the consistency of MOFCOM's injury
analysis with Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the following issues are relevant in this
dispute: (1) Did MOFCOM make an appropriate assessment of the injury cause d to the domestic
industry simultaneously by the other known factors? (2) Did MOFCOM separate and distinguish the
injurious effects of the dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other simultaneously
known factors?
26. Article 3.5 sets forth no limits or guidelines as to the methodology an investigating authority
may use for purposes of a non -attribution analysis. Nevertheless, according to the panel in US –
Coated Paper, "[i]t does not suffice for an investigating authority merely to 'c heck the box'. An
investigating authority must do more than simply list other known factors, and then dismiss their
role with bare qualitative assertions, such as 'the factor did not contribute in any significant way to
the injury … [A]n investigating auth ority must make a better effort to quantify the impact of other
known factors, preferably using elementary economic constructs or models. However, an
adequately reasoned explanation of the qualitative effects of other factors based on the evidence
before it will suffice".21
27. In interpreting the "non -attribution" requirement of Article 3.5, the Appellate Body in US –
Hot-Rolled Steel recognised that the different causal factors operating on a domestic industry may
interact, and their effects may well be i nterrelated, such that they produce a combined effect on
the domestic industry. Therefore, it may not be easy, as a practical matter, to separate and
distinguish the injurious effects of different causal factors. However, although not easy, this is the
function of the "non-attribution" requirement.
28. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu believes that the
aforementioned approach should be applied to this dispute in examining whether MOFCOM has
met the legal obligation under Ar ticle 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. This Panel should
review whether MOFCOM's explanation of the causal mechanism by which the dumped imports
caused injury to the domestic industry was reasoned and adequate based on the aforementioned
approach.
VI. Conclusion
29. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu appreciates the
opportunity to submit its views in connection with the WTO jurisprudence on the proper
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and respectfully requests
the Panel to take account of the considerations set out above when evaluating the claims set forth
in this dispute, and reserves the right to elaborate our arguments further in an oral statement.
ORAL STATEMENT OF CHINESE TAIPEI
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Panel:
1. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu appreciates this
opportunity to present its views to the Panel as a third party in this dispute. Today the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would like to briefly provide an overview
of the key issues included in the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu's third party submission.
Objective Examination based on Positive Evidence
2. First of all, it should be noted that an affirmative determination of injury to the domestic
industry is a fundamental precondition for the imposition of anti -dumping measures, along with a
determination of the causal link between the dumped imports and injury.

20 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 223.
21 Panel Report, US – Coated Paper (Indonesia), paras. 7.209-7.210.

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3. In light of Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as an "overarching provision" that sets
forth a Member's fundamental, substantive obligations with respect to the determination of injury,
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu believes this panel should
examine whether MOFCOM provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how the evidence
on the record supported its factual findings and how those factual findings supporte d the overall
determinations, in the light of other plausible alternative explanations.
Price Effect
4. Turning to Article 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu agrees with Japan 's claim that it is necessary for MOFCOM to
ensure that the prices it is using for the comparison are properly comparable. If there are
considerable differences among the products, these factors shall be taken into account, for
example using carefully defined product ca tegories for the collection of price information. If prices
of the products which lack comparability are compared, the outcome of this comparison should not
be considered as being based on an objective and unbiased analysis.
5. Furthermore, to satisfy its obligation under Article 3.2, an examination of price depression
calls for more than a simple observation of a price decline and also encompasses an analysis of
what is pushing down the prices. This Panel should also examine whether MOFCOM has conducted
a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of
the dumped imports and those of domestic like products over the entire period of investigation. On
Japan's claim regarding several occurence such as divergent pri ce trends, increasing price trends,
consistnet higher price and overselling, this Panel should carefully rule if MOFCOM disregarded
evidence suggesting that the prices of subject imports have no, or only a limited effect on
domestice prices.
Impact of the Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry
6. With respect to Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body in Thailand – H
Beans and US – Hot-Rolled Steel laid out clearly that an objective examination of the impact of the
dumped imports on t he domestic industry would require the investigating authorities to evaluate
each of the factors, including the list of factors in Article 3.4 and any other relevant factors that
may have a bearing on the state of a domestic industry in a particular case, and to assess the
relevance of each factor and the weight to be attributed to it in the injury assessment.
7. If MOFCOM's analysis was based on selective and inconsistent use of information pertaining to
the domestic industry, or if MOFCOM collected and relied upon partial data for its analysis without
proper explanation, MOFCOM did not ensure a proper evaluation of the sta te of the domestic
industry as whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of objective examination of
the impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry in accordance with Article 3.1 and
Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Causal Relationship between the Dumped Imports and the Injury to the Domestic
Industry
8. Regarding Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement that requires the demonstration of a
causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry, the dumped
imports need not to be the sole cause of the injury to the domestic industry, but the dumped
imports must be a genuine and substantial cause of material injury and that other causes of injury
not be attributed to the dumped imports.
9. In the present dispute, if the investigating authority's analysis of causal relationship was based
on a wrongful price effects analysis and a wrongful impact analysis, it cannot properly link the
outcomes of its analyses to a definitive determination under the firs t sentence of Article 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the other hand, if this Panel continues to examine the consistency of
MOFCOM's injury analysis with Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, it should be examined
whether MOFCOM separated and distinguished the injurious effects of the dumped imports from
the injurious effects of those other known factors, and thus made an adequately reasoned
explanation of the causal mechanism by which the dumped imports caused injury to the domestic
industry.
10. Again, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would like to
extend its appreciation to the Panel for this opportunity to present its views on these issues. Thank
you.

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ANNEX C-6
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION
I. CLAIMS RELATING TO THE INJURY AND CAUSATION DETERMINATIONS
1. Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement directs an authority to examine whether subject imports
significantly depressed the prices of like domestic products. It does not impose specific obligations
on how an authority must conduct a price depression analysis, nor prescribe a particular
methodology or set of factors that must apply in any such analysi s. However, Article 3.1 does
provide that a determination of injury "shall be based on positive evidence and involve an
objective examination of ... the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for
like products".
2. In addition, Artic les 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement require the authority to ensure
comparability between the domestic and subject imported products for which prices are being
examined by making adjustments where required to reflect any material differences. The objective
of such adjustments is to ensure that whatever price differentials arise from a comparison of
domestic and imported goods result from price effects, and not merely from differences in the
products or transactions being compared, absent the necessary adjus tments to control and adjust
for relevant differences in product characteristics.
3. Thus, the question before the Panel regarding Japan's challenge to MOFCOM's price effects
analysis, particularly with respect to price comparability, is whether a reasonable, unbiased
authority, looking at the same evidentiary record, could have reached th e same conclusions as
MOFCOM.
4. Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement Specifies the prerequisites for cumulation. Given these
specified textual prerequisites for cumulation, there is no basis to impose other, unmentioned
prerequisites.
5. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement provides that "[t]he examination of the impact of dumped
imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic
factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry" and enumerates certain fa ctors
that an authority must include in its evaluation. Article 3.4 imposes an obligation on the authority
to conduct an "examination" of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. And
the text of Article 3.4 expressly requires investigatin g authorities to examine the "impact" of
subject imports on a domestic industry, and not just the state of the industry.
6. As recognized by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, subject imports can influence a
domestic industry's performance through volume and price effects. Thus, to examine the impact of
subject imports on a domestic industry, an authority would need to consider the relationship
between subject imports – including subject import price undercutting, and the price depressing or
suppressing effects of subject imports – and the domestic industry's performance during the
period of investigation.
7. In other words, in examining the relationship between subject imports and the state of the
domestic industry pursuant to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, an authority must consider
whether changes in the state of the industry are the consequences of subject imports and whether
subject imports have explanatory force for the industry's performance trends. However, Article 3.4
does not dictate the methodology that should be employed by the authority, or the manner in
which the results of this evaluation are to be set out. The Panel must be able to discern that the
authority's examination of the impact on the domestic industry – an examination that n ecessarily
includes an evaluation of relevant economic factors – is based on positive evidence and an
objective examination. In making this assessment, the Panel must determine whether an unbiased
and objective investigating authority could have reached th e same conclusion as MOFCOM did
here.

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8. Finally, the second sentence of Article 3.5 requires an authority to examine "all relevant
evidence" before it both to ascertain whether there was a causal link between the dumped imports
and the injury experienced by the domestic industry and to examine whether factors other than
the dumped imports were also causing injury. The third sentence of Article 3.5 requires an
authority to examine "any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time
are injuring the domestic industry" to ensure that "the injuries caused by these other factors must
not be attributed to the dumped imports" . A non-attribution analysis is therefore necessary if (i)
there are one or more known factors other than the dumped impo rts that (ii) are injuring the
domestic industry (iii) at the same time.
9. While an authority is under no express requirement to "seek out and examine in each case
on their own initiative the effects of all possible factors other than imports that may be causing
injury to the domestic industry under investigation" , an authority's findings and analysis under
Article 3.5 must comply with the "positive evidence" and "objective examination" requirements of
Article 3.1.
II. CLAIMS RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
10. Article 4.1 must be read in conjunction with Article 3.1. Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement
provides that, with certain defined exceptions, "the term 'domestic industry' shall be interpreted as
referring to the domestic producers a s a whole of the like products or to those of them whose
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
those products".
11. Article 4.1 establishes that the "domestic industry" can be defined as either (1) the
"domestic producers as a whole of the like products" , i.e., all domestic producers, or (2) a subset
of domestic producers "whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production" of the like product s. Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not
require that all domestic producers be included in the domestic industry, nor does it articulate a
minimum limit on the percentage of domestic production that must be included to constitute a
"major proportion" of the total domestic production of those products.
12. Although undefined in the AD Agreement, the term "major proportion" must be interpreted
in the context of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. Thus, Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement sets forth
two overarching obligations that apply to multiple aspects of an authority's injury determination.
The first overarching obligation is that the injury determination be based on "positive evidence" .
The second obligation is that the injury determination involve s an "objective examination" of the
volume of the dumped imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic industry.
Under this obligation, the domestic industry is to be investigated in an unbiased manner that does
not favor the interests of any interested party in the investigation. How an authority chooses to
define the domestic industry has repercussions throughout the course of the injury analysis and
determination; thus, the overarching obligations of Article 3.1 necessarily extend to an authority's
definition of the domestic industry.
13. The plain language of Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement should guide the Panel's
analysis. First, the Panel should consider whether the authority, consistent with Article 4.1 of the
AD Agreement, defined the domestic industry as "domestic producers as a whole" , or instead
defined the domestic industry as those producers whose production constitutes a "major
proportion" of total domestic production of the like product. The Panel should consider whe ther the
authority, consistent with Article 3.1, defined the domestic industry in a fair and unbiased manner.
A flawed definition of the domestic industry can distort an authority's material injury analysis.
14. Accordingly, the Panel is to evaluate wheth er the authority's definition of the domestic
industry introduces a distortion to the analysis. The Panel's analysis on risk of distortion should
thus begin with consideration of the domestic production captured by MOFCOM's definition of the
domestic industry.
15. Even if MOFCOM's definition were to meet the "major proportion" of domestic production
standard of Article 4.1, the Panel should assess whether MOFCOM's definition of the domestic
industry was biased or designed to favor the interest of any group of interested parties in the
investigation, inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. In other words, the Panel must

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determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have reached the same
conclusion as MOFCOM did regarding the definition of the domestic industry.
III. CLAIMS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
16. Article 6 of the AD Agreement balances the protection of confidential information with the
right of parties to be given a full and fair opportunity to see relevant information and defend their
interests. Article 6.5 requires that investigating authorities ensure the confidential treatment of
information. Article 6.5.1 then balances the need to protect confidential information against the
disclosure requirements of other Article 6 provisions by requiring that, if an investigating authority
accepts confidential information, it shall require that confidential information be summarized in
sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information.
17. Based on the above, the Panel should first determine if the investigating authority
appropriately designated information as confidential. The Panel should then determine whether the
investigating authority ensured that a summary o f that confidential information was provided to
other parties in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information.
18. Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement requires that the investigating authority disclose to
interested parties the "essential facts" forming the basis of the investigating authority's decision to
apply anti-dumping duties.
19. The meaning of "essential facts" is informed by the description that these facts "form the
basis for the decision whether to appl y definitive measures" and by the requirement that they be
disclosed "in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests" . Without a full disclosure of
the essential facts under consideration in the underlying determinations, it would not be poss ible
for a party to identify whether an investigating authority's determination contains errors or even
whether the investigating authority actually did what it purported to do. Such failure to provide
this information would result in an interested party being unable to defend its interests.
20. Based on the language of Article 6.9, it stands to reason that "only those methodologies the
knowledge of which is necessary for the participants to understand the basis of the investigating
authority's decision and to defend their interests would be essential facts under Article 6.9". A
panel must assess, in the specific context of each investigation, whether a particular calculation or
methodology constitutes an "essential fact", for which disclosure is required under Article 6.9.
IV. CLAIMS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC NOTICES AND EXPLANATION OF
DETERMINATIONS
21. Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement require authorities to provide "in sufficient
detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact an d law considered material" by
the investigating authority, and "all relevant information on the matters of fact and law" leading to
the imposition of definitive measures. These provisions require an authority to disclose the facts,
law, and reasons that le d to the imposition of anti -dumping duties, so as to enable interested
parties to, among other things, "pursue judicial review of a final determination".
22. The Panel, in evaluating Japan's Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 claims, should assess whether
MOFCOM has set forth its pertinent findings and conclusions, as well all relevant information on
matters of fact and law leading to the imposition of definitive measures, "in sufficient detail".
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT
23. Article 4.1 must be read in conjunction with Article 3.1. Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement
provides that, with certain defined exceptions, "the term 'domestic industry' shall be interpreted as
referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to th ose of them whose
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
those products".
24. Article 4.1 establishes that the "domestic industry" can be defined as either (1) the
"domestic producers as a whole of the like products" , i.e., all domestic producers, or (2) a subset

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of domestic producers "whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production" of the like products.
25. Although undefined in the AD Ag reement, the term "major proportion" must be interpreted
in the context of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. Article 3.1 sets forth two overarching obligations
that apply to multiple aspects of an authority's injury determination. The first overarching
obligation is that the injury determination be based on "positive evidence" . The second obligation
is that the injury determination involves an "objective examination" of the volume of the dumped
imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic i ndustry. Under this obligation, the
domestic industry is to be investigated in an unbiased manner that does not favor the interests of
any interested party in the investigation. How an authority chooses to define the domestic industry
has repercussions thr oughout the course of the injury analysis and determination; thus, the
overarching obligations of Article 3.1 necessarily extend to an authority's definition of the domestic
industry.
26. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as requiring the authority to ensure
comparability between the domestic and subject imported products for which prices are being
compared and to make adjustments where required to reflect any material differences. The
objective of such adjustments is to ensure that whatev er price differentials arise from a
comparison of domestic and imported goods result from price effects, and not merely from
differences in the products or transactions being compared.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
27. Response on Question 1 : Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement sets forth two overarching
obligations. The first obligation is that the injury determination must be based on "positive
evidence". The second obligation is that the injury determination must involve an "o bjective
examination" of the volume of the dumped imports, their price effects, and their impact on the
domestic industry.
28. By its terms, Article 3.1 indicates that these obligations extend to every aspect of an
investigating authority's injury analysi s. Article 3.1 thus requires an investigating authority to
ensure that any material injury determination be based on "positive evidence" and involve an
"objective examination" – including with respect to assessing the impact on domestic producers.
29. To assess the impact on domestic producers, an investigating authority must take into
account which domestic producers it refers to in its definition of the term "domestic industry"
under Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement – and must do so on the basis of positi ve evidence and
through an objective examination.
30. Response on Question 2 : The plain text of Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement specifies the
prerequisites for cumulation. These are the only specified textual prerequisites for cumulation, and
there is no basis to impose other, unmentioned prerequisites, such as the proposed requirement to
foreclose the possibility that the alleged injury to the domestic industry was being caused only by
subject imports from some of the sources under investigation.
31. Response on Question 3 : The text of Article 3.2 does not require an investigating authority
to use any particular type of price undercutting analysis. Nor does it address price comparability,
let alone adjustments for "significant" price differences. However, the analytical methodology an
authority uses must conform with the "positive evidence" and "objective examination" standards
specified in Article 3.1.
32. Response on Question 4: MOFCOM's resort to facts available with respect to one aspect of its
price e ffects analysis does not require Japan to raise a claim under Article 6.8 of the AD
Agreement or preclude claims under other provisions of the AD Agreement.
33. Japan is not challenging China's use of Customs data as facts available to replace missing
questionnaire data. As explained in its first written submission, Japan is challenging MOFCOM's
failure to ensure price comparability, which is properly challenged under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
AD Agreement.

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34. Response on Question 5 : One of the prerequisites in Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement to
cumulate imports is that an investigating authority must determine that such an assessment is
"appropriate in light of the conditions of competition" . Article 3.3 does not identify any specific
conditions of competition that must exist for an appropriateness determination to be warranted.
35. Thus, it is incorrect that an investigating authority may "only" find cumulation to be
appropriate where imports from different sources under investigation are substitutable.
36. Response on Question 6 : Before an investigating authority determines whether to exercise
its discretion to cumulate imports, it must first define the domestic product or products like the
imported products identified in an application.
37. There are no additional substantive provisions to those set out in Article 2.6 relating to the
definition of the "like product" in a particular investigation. Accordingly, an investigating authority
must determine which domestic product is "alike in all re spects, or ... has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration" . The determination of the investigating
authorities regarding the "like product" must be based on positive evidence and an objective
examination of the relevant facts; in those circumstances, the determination is consistent with the
AD Agreement.
38. The hypothetical posed by the Panel appears to presume that the investigating authority
determined that there was a single domestic like product consisting of both M odel A and Model B,
and one domestic industry producing both models. In that case, the authority could cumulate
subject imports from all sources so long as the requirements of Article 3.3 were met.
39. As the United States indicated above in its response to question 2, an investigating authority
may cumulate imports under Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement only if, first, the dumping margins
for the individual countries are more than de minimis, and second, the volume of imports from the
individual countries are not negligible. In addition, the investigating authority must determine that
a cumulative assessment is appropriate "in light of the conditions of competition both between the
imported products and between the imported products and the like domestic product".