EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – REGIME FOR THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS
Document: SECOND RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY ECUADOR AB-2008-8 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – REGIME FOR THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY THE UNITED STATES
Date: 26 November 2008
Document codes: WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU; WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA; WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU; WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA.
Complainant: Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, U.S.
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Belize, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican, Ghana, Grenada, India, Jamaica, Japan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Panama, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname, Venezuela, Côte d’Ivoire, Brazil, Madagascar
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. I, II, III, X, XI, XIII  GATT 1994Art. 1, 3  Import LicensingArt. II, XVI, XVII  Services (GATS)Art. 2  Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)Art. 19  Agriculture

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – REGIME FOR THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND
DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS

SECOND RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY ECUADOR

AB-2008-8

RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY THE UNITED STATES

AB-2008-9

Reports of the Appellate Body

Note:

The Appellate Body issues the above two reports in the form of a single document constituting two separate
Appellate Body Reports: and The cover page, preliminary
pages, Sections I to XII, and the annexes are common to the two Reports. The page header throughout the
document bears two document symbols, and , with the
exception of Section XIII on pages ECU-161 to ECU-163, which bears the document symbol for and contains
the Appellate Body's findings and conclusions in the Appellate Body Report , and
with the exception of Section XIII on pages USA-161 and USA-162, which bears the document symbol for and
contains the Appellate Body's findings and conclusions in the Appellate Body Report

APPELLATE BODY

Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Ecuador

Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
United States

European Communities, Appellant/Appellee
Ecuador, Other Appellant/Appellee/Third Participant
United States, Appellee/Third Participant

Belize, Third Participant
Brazil, Third Participant
Cameroon, Third Participant
Colombia, Third Participant
Côte d'Ivoire, Third Participant
Dominica, Third Participant
Dominican Republic, Third Participant
Ghana, Third Participant
1
Jamaica, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Mexico, Third Participant 2
Nicaragua, Third Participant
Panama, Third Participant
Saint Lucia, Third Participant
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Third Participant
Suriname, Third Participant
AB-2008-8

AB-2008-9

Present:

Baptista, Presiding Member
Oshima, Member
Unterhalter, Member

I. Introduction
1. The European Communities and Ecuador each appeals certain issues of law and legal
interpretations developed in the Panel Report, – Second R ecourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador
 3
(the "Ecuador Panel Report"). The European Co mmunities appeals certain issues of law and legal
interpretations developed in the Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,

1In the Ecuador case only.
2In the United States case only.
3WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, 7 April 2008.

Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States
 4
(the "US Panel Report").
2. Two panels were established 5 pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") to consid er complaints by Ecuador 6
and by the United States 7 concerning the consistency with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994") of certain measures ta ken by the European Communities introducing
a new regime for the importation of bananas. 8 The Ecuador Panel was established on 20 March 2007
and the United States Panel was established on 12 Ju ly 2007. Both Ecuador and the United States
requested that the matter be referred, if possible, to the original panel in EC – Bananas III, pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU. Two of the three panelists from the original proceedings were available to
serve in the present proceedings. As the final composition of both Panels was identical, in this Report
we refer to both Panels collectively as the "Panel".
3. Taken together, the panel requests identified the following measures as being inconsistent
with the European Communities' obligations under the GATT 1994: Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 9 ("EEC Regulation 404/93"), as amended by Council Regulation
(EC) No. 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 10 ("EC Regulation 216/2001"); Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 11 ("EC Regulation 1964/2005") ; and any amendments,
implementing measures, and other related measures. 12 EC Regulation 1964/2005 amended
EEC Regulation 404/93 and introduced a new regime for the importation of bananas. The new system
entered into force on 1 January 2006 and establishe d: (i) a single tariff rate of €176 per metric

4WT/DS27/RW/USA and Corr.1, 19 May 2008.
5WT/DS27/82; WT/DS27/84.
6Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ecuador, WT/DS27/80.
7Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS27/83.
8Ecuador Panel Report, para. 2.1; US Panel Report, para. 2.1. The recommendations and rulings
of the DSB resulted from the adoption on 25 September 1997, by the DSB, of the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS27/AB/R, and the Panel Reports, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,
WT/DS27/R/MEX, and WT/DS27/R/USA, in EC – Bananas III . In this Report, we refer to the panel that
considered the original complaint as the "original panel"; we refer to the panel that considered the first
compliance proceedings br ought by Ecuador as the "first Ecuador Ar ticle 21.5 panel"; and we refer to the
panels in the two present Article 21.5 proceedings collectively as the "Panel".
9Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market
in bananas, Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series, No. 47 (25 February 1993) 1.
10Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93
on the common organisation of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series,
No. 31 (2 February 2001) 2.
11Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 on the tariff rates for bananas, Official
Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 316 (2 December 2005) 1 (Panel Exhibits ECU-1 and US-1).
12Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ecuador, WT/DS27/80, p. 4; Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS27/83, pp. 2-3.

tonne ("mt") for bananas of all origin s (most-favoured nation ("MFN") bananas) 13; and (ii) a tariff
quota of 775,000 mt subject to a zero-duty rate for imports of bananas originating in African,
Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP") countries.14
4. In the original EC – Bananas III proceedings, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and
the United States challenged the European Communities' bananas import regime in force at that time.
The original panel and the Appellate Body in the original dispute ruled that the allocation of tariff
quota shares under EEC Regulation 404/93 was inconsis tent with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 and
was not justified by either the "Bananas Framework Agreement" 15, annexed to the European
Communities' Schedule, or the Agreement on Agriculture . The Appellate Body found that the
"Lomé Waiver"16 did not apply to violations of Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body
and the original panel also found that licence allocation procedures violated Articles I:1 and III:4 of
the GATT 1994 and Articles II and XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(the "GATS").17 On 25 September 1997, the Dispute Settleme nt Body (the "DSB") adopted the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports in EC – Bananas III and recommended that the European Communities
bring its measures into conformity with the cove red agreements. On 20 July 1998, the European
Communities adopted Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 18 ("EC Regulation 1637/98") amending
EEC Regulation 404/93 and, on 28 Octobe r 1998, adopted Commission Regulation (EC)
No. 2362/9819 ("EC Regulation 2362/98") repealing Co mmission Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93 of
10 June 199320 ("EEC Regulation 1442/93").

13EC Regulation 1964/2005, Article 1.1.
14EC Regulation 1964/2005, Article 1.2.
15Framework Agreement on Bananas, annexed to both EC Schedule LXXX and EC Schedule CXL,
originally negotiated in 1994 by the European Communities with Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela (reproduced in Annex VII attached to this Report).
16The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
9 December 1994, L/7604, 19 December 1994 (the "Lomé Waiver"); extend ed by EC – The Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention of Lomé, Extension of Waiver, Decision of the WTO General Council of 14 October 1996,
WT/L/186, 18 October 1996.
17Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 225. The original panel and the Appellate Body
found that this violation of Article I:1 was not justified by the Lomé Waiv er from Article I, because it was not
required by the Lomé Convention.
18Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L Series, No. 210 (28 July 1998) 28.
19Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 regarding imports of bananas into the Community,
Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series, No. 293 (28 October 1998) 32.
20Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93 of 10 June 1993 laying down detailed rules for the
application of the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community, Official Journal of the European
Union, L Series, No. 142 (12 June 1993) 6.

5. On 18 December 1998, Ecuador requested proceed ings pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
alleging that the measures taken by the Europ ean Communities failed to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. The first compliance pa nel requested by Ecuador (the "first Ecuador
Article 21.5 panel") found that the measures taken by the European Communities to implement the
DSB's recommendations and rulings were inconsistent with Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 and
Articles II and XVII of the GATS. The first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel report was not appealed and
was adopted by the DSB on 6 May 1999.
21
6. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the firs t Ecuador Article 21.5 panel suggested that the
European Communities could bring its measures into c onformity by: (i) applying a tariff-only system
without a tariff quota that could include a preference for ACP countries covered by a waiver or a free
trade agreement consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; (ii) applying a tariff-only system
with a preferential tariff quota for ACP countries covered by a suitable waiver; or (iii) maintaining its
bound and autonomous MFN tariff quotas, either w ithout allocating country-specific shares or by
allocating such shares by agreement with all substan tive suppliers consistently with Article XIII:2 of
the GATT 1994. The MFN tariff quota could be combined with the extension of duty-free treatment
to ACP countries covered by the Lomé Waiver from Article I of the GATT 1994 or with a preferential
tariff quota for ACP countries, provided a waiver from Article XIII of the GATT 1994 was obtained.
22
7. In an arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU involving the United States and the
European Communities, the arbitrators determined, as a preliminary matter, that the revised bananas
import regime of the European Communities was in consistent with Articles I and XIII of the GATT
1994 and Articles II and XVII of the GATS. 23 Following the expiry of the reasonable period of time
for the European Communities to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in
EC – Bananas III , the United States requested and obtaine d authorization to suspend concessions
pursuant to Article 22 of the DSU. Pursuant to ar bitrations on the level of suspension of concessions
and other obligations in the years 1999 and 2000, the DSB authorized the United States to suspend
concessions or other obligations up to an amount of US$191.4 million per year, and Ecuador up to an
amount of US$201.6 million per year. 24 The United States suspended tariff concessions; Ecuador,
however, did not exercise its rights to suspen d concessions and other obligations under the
GATT 1994, the GATS, or the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(the "TRIPS Agreement ").

21Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 7.1.
22Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), paras. 6.156-6.158.
23Decision by the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 4.8 and 5.96-5.98.
24Decision by the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 8.1; Decision by the
Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 173(a).

8. On 11 April and 30 April 2001, the European Communities signed two separate
Understandings on Bananas: one with the United States and one with Ecuador. On 22 June 2001, the
European Communities notified both Understandings to the DSB as a "mutually agreed solution"
within the meaning of Article 3.6 of the DSU. 25 On 2 and 9 July 2001, the United States and Ecuador
issued separate communications stating that, while the Understandings identified the means by which
the long-standing dispute over the European Commun ities' bananas import regime could be solved,
the Understandings did not in themselves constitu te a "mutually agreed solution" pursuant to
Article 3.6 of the DSU.26
9. Paragraphs B, C, F (United States) and G (Ecuador) of the Understandings on Bananas
provide:
B. In accordance with Article 16(1) of Regulation No. (EEC)
404/93 (as amended by Regulation No. (EC) 216/2001), the
European Communities (EC) will introduce a Tariff Only
regime for imports of bananas no later than 1 January 2006.

27]
C. In the interim, the EC will implement an import regime on
the basis of historical licensing as follows :
1. Effective 1 July 2001, the EC will implement an
import regime on the basis of historical licensing as
set out in Annex 1.
2. Effective as soon as possible thereafter, subject to
Council and European Parliament approval and to
adoption of the Article XIII waiver referred to in
paragraph F, the EC will implement an import regime
on the basis of historical licensing as set out in
Annex 2. The Commission will seek to obtain the
implementation of such an import regime as soon as
possible.
[F./G.] The EC and [the United St ates and Ecuador] consider that
[these] Understanding[s] constitute[] a mutually agreed
solution to the banana dispute.

25EC – Bananas III, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS27/58.
26EC – Bananas III , Communication from the United States, WT/DS27/59, G/C/W/270; EC –
Bananas III, Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC, WT/DS27/60, G/C/W/274.
27In the Understanding with Ecuador, paragraph B included the following sentence: "GATT Art XVIII
negotiations shall be initiated in good time to that effect, recognizing Ecuador as the principal supplier in these
negotiations."

10. On 14 November 2001, the Ministerial Conferen ce meeting in Doha adopted two waivers
concerning the European Communities' bananas import regime. The first waiver, from Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994 (the "Doha Article I Waiver"
28), was necessary to permit the European Communities
to provide preferential tariff treatment for produc ts originating in ACP states as required by the
relevant provisions of the so-called "Cotonou Agreement". 29 The second waiver, from Article XIII of
the GATT 1994 (the "Doha Article XIII Waiver" 30), concerned the European Communities' separate
tariff quota of 750,000 mt for bananas of ACP origin. The Doha Article XIII Waiver was granted
until 31 December 2005, thus covering the period until the entry into force of the European
Communities' tariff-only regime on 1 January 2006, as foreseen by the Understandings on Bananas.
11. The Doha Article I Waiver contained a separat e "Annex on Bananas", which set out a special
procedure for the rebinding of the European Commun ities' tariff on bananas. This procedure included
a special two-stage arbitration to determine wh ether the European Communities proposed rebinding
would result "in at least maintaining total market access for MFN suppliers". The Annex on Bananas
also provided that, subject to the fulfilment of the requirements of the special rebinding procedure, the
Doha Article I Waiver applied in the case of bananas until 31 December 2007.
12. On 21 January 2002, the European Communities informed the DSB of the adoption of
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2587/2001 31 ("EC Regulation 2587/2001"). At the DSB meeting held
on 1 February 2002, the European Communities re quested that the agenda item relating to the
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings concerning the European Communities'

28Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference held in Doha, European Communities – The ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement, Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/15; WT/L/436 (attached as Annex V to
this Report; this document was also submitted as Panel Exhibits US-3 and EC-2 (Ecuador)). The Doha
Article I Waiver expired on 31 December 2007 in respect of ACP products other than bananas.
29The Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of
States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part, signed in Cotonou,
Benin on 23 June 2000.
30Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference held in Doha, European Communities – Transitional
Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/16; WT/L/437 (Panel Exhibit US-5). Th e Doha Article XIII Waiver expired on 31 December
2005.
31Council Regulation (EC) No. 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L Series, No. 345 (29 December 2001) 13.
Articles 18.1-18.4 of EC Regulation 2587/2001 changed the quotas in the following ways: (i) quota A
of 2.2 million mt for imports from third countries was maintained; (ii) quota B was increased to 453,000 mt for
imports from third countries; (iii) within quotas A and B, bananas from third countries were subject to a
customs duty of €75/mt, while imports of products originating in the ACP countries were subject to a zero duty;
and (iv) quota C, open to imports only from ACP countries and subject to a zero duty, was decreased to
750,000 mt. An out-of-quota tariff preference of €300/mt was established for bananas originating in ACP
countries.

bananas import regime be withdr awn from the DSB agenda. At this DSB meeting, Ecuador stated
that the Understanding on Banan as "constituted a sound basis for the EC to implement a transitional
banana import regime so that by 1 January 2006, at the latest, a WTO-compatible tariff-only regime
would be put into place."32 Ecuador also noted that this regi me "contained various phases, stages and
elements to be implemented."33 Ecuador also stated that it reserved its rights under Article 21.5 of the
DSU.
13. At the same DSB meeting, the United States stat ed that it "was pleased to note that the EC
had increased the quota for Latin American banana exporting countries by 100,000 tonnes effective
from 1 January 2002" and that "[t]he United States had, therefore, terminated the suspension of
concessions in effect since 1999." 34 The United States also said it "would continue to work closely
with the EC and other Members to address any issues that might arise as the EC moved to a
tariff-based system for bananas and implemented the terms of the bilateral Understanding on
Bananas."35
14. On 31 January 2005, the European Communities notified the World Trade Organization (the
"WTO") pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 19 94, that it intended to rebind its tariff concession
for bananas included in EC Schedule CXL (item 0803 00 19) at the level of €230/mt. 36 In the same
communication, the European Communities also sp ecified that the notification constituted the
announcement of the rebinding of its bananas tariff under the terms of the Annex on Bananas. On 30
March 2005, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador , Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Venezuela requested arbitration pursuant to the Annex on Bananas in respect of the European
Communities' proposed rebinding of its tariff on bananas.
15. On 1 August 2005, the arbitrator determined th at the rebinding of the European Communities'
tariff for bananas at the level of €230/mt would not result in at least maintaining total market access
for MFN banana suppliers, taking into account all WTO market-access commitments of the European
Communities relating to bananas, as required under the Annex on Bananas.37 On 27 October 2005, in
a second arbitration pursuant to the same rules under the Annex, the arbitrator reached the same
conclusion with respect to the European Commun ities' second proposed rebinding, consisting of a
MFN tariff rate for bananas of €187/mt and a 775,000 mt duty-free tariff quota for imports of bananas

32Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, para. 5.
33Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, para. 5.
34Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, para. 8.
35Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, para. 8.
36Communication from the European Communities of 31 January 2005, Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations,
Schedule CXL – European Communities, Addendum, G/SECRET/22/Add.1.
37Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP Partnership Agreement, WT/L/616, 1 August 2005.

of ACP origin. The arbitrator, therefore, found th at the European Communities had failed to rectify
the matter in accordance with the fifth tiret of the Annex on Bananas, which required that the
rebinding result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers.
38
16. Following the second arbitration pursuant to the Annex on Bananas, the European
Communities modified its regime for the importation of bananas and adopted, inter alia ,
EC Regulation 1964/2005, the measure at issue in the present dispute (hereinafter, the "EC Bananas
Import Regime"). This Regulation established an MFN tariff rate of €176/mt for bananas. In
addition, it established a preferential tariff quota of 775,000 mt for duty-free imports of bananas
originating in ACP countries. 39 On 20 December 2007, the European Communities adopted Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1528/2007 40 ("EC Regulation 1528/2007"), which repealed EEC Regulation
404/93 and modified EC Regulation 1964/2005, eliminating the preferential tariff quota of 775,000 mt
at zero duty for ACP countries.
17. On 23 February 2007, Ecuador requested, for the second time, the establishment of a panel
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU concerning the alleged inconsistency of the measures adopted by
the European Communities, in particular, EC Regulation 1964/2005 and related measures. 41 O n
29 June 2007, the United States requested the establis hment of an Article 21.5 panel to examine the
same measures taken by the European Communities.

38Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP Partnership Agreement II, WT/L/625, 27 October 2005.
39See supra, footnote 29.
40Council Regulation (EC) No. 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for
products originating in certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States
provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements,
Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 348 (31 December 2007) 1.
41Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 2.42-2.44; US Panel Report, paras. 2.39 and 2.40. The implementing
regulations adopted by the European Communities pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of
29 November 2005 on the tariff rates for bananas, Official Journal of the European Union , L Series, No. 316
(2 December 2005) 1, include the following:
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2014/2005 of 9 December 2005;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2015/2005 of 9 December 2005;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2149/2005 of 23 December 2005;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 219/2006 of 8 February 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 325/2006 of 23 February 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 566/2006 of 6 April 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 966/2006 of 29 June 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1261/2006 of 23 August 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1789/2006 of 5 December 2006;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 34/2007 of 16 January 2007;
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 47/2007 of 19 January 2007; as well as
− Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006.

18. In the course of the proceedings, the Eur opean Communities requested the Panel to
harmonize the timetable of the two cases. The Panel decided not to modify the timetable it had
adopted and stated that harmonization of the timet ables "would have most likely involved a delay in
the proceedings requested by Ecuador" 42, and that harmonizing the timetables for the panel process
was particularly difficult because of the two-m onth gap between the dates on which the two panels
had begun their respective work. The Panel noted that the WTO Director-General composed the
panel requested by Ecuador on 18 June 2007 a nd the panel requested by the United States on
13 August 2007. The Panel further stated that it ha d taken into account in its decision the fact that
Ecuador, "as the complaining party in those procee dings, strongly objected to any changes in the
timetable that would result in extending the proceedings further beyond the 90-day period envisaged
in Article 21.5 of the DSU." 43 However, in the Ecuador Panel Report, the panel noted that "issuance
of the interim report was delayed by the Panel in order to ensure that replies to questions and
comments on replies in the proceedings requested by the United States had been received by that
panel, before the interim report in the current proceedings was issued."44
19. The Ecuador Panel Report was circulated to WTO Members on 7 April 2008; the US Panel
Report was circulated to WTO Members on 19 May 2008. At the joint requests of the parties in both
cases, the DSB agreed: at the DSB meeting held on 2 June 2008, to extend the date for the adoption
of the Ecuador Panel Report to 29 August 2008; a nd at the DSB meeting held on 24 June 2008, to
extend the date for adoption of the US Panel Report also to 29 August 2008.45
20. The following findings and conclusions of the Ecuador Panel are relevant for this appeal:
In light of the findings above, the Panel rejects the preliminary issue
raised by the European Communities that Ecuador is prevented from
challenging the European Communities' current import regime for
bananas, including the preference for ACP countries, because of the
Understanding on Bananas, signed by both Members in April 2001.
46
(c) The European Communities' current banana import regime,
in particular its preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP countries,
is inconsistent with Article XIII:1, with the chapeau of Article XIII:2,
and with Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994;

42US Panel Report, para. 7.7.
43US Panel Report, para. 7.9.
45WT/DS27/87; Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 2 June 2008, WT/DSB/M/251, para. 5;
WT/DS27/88; Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 24 June 2008, WT/DSB/M/253, para. 51.
46Ecuador Panel Report, para. 8.1.

(d) The tariff applied by the European Communities to MFN
imports of bananas, set at €176/mt, without consideration of the tariff
quota for 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt, is
an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set forth and provided for
in Part I of the European Commun ities' Schedule. This tariff is
therefore inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the
GATT 1994; ...
47
The Panel recommends that the Dis pute Settlement Body request the
European Communities to bring the inconsistent measures into
conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.48
21. The following findings and recommendations in the US Panel Report are relevant for this
appeal:
(b) The European Communities has not succeeded in making a
prima facie case that the United Stat es is prevented from challenging
the European Communities' current import regime for bananas,
including the preference for ACP countries, because of the Bananas
Understanding, signed between the United States and the European
Communities in April 2001; and
(c) The European Communities h as failed in making a case that
the United States' complaint under Article 21.5 of the DSU should be
rejected, because the European Co mmunities' current import regime
for bananas, including the prefer ence for ACP countries, is not a
"measure taken to comply" with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB in the original proceedings.
49
(c) The European Communities' current banana import regime,
in particular its preferential ta riff quota reserved for ACP countries,
is also inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 of the
GATT 1994.
50
[T]he Panel concludes that, to the extent that the current
European Communities bananas import regime contains measures
inconsistent with various pr ovisions of the GATT 1994, it has
nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States under that
Agreement.
51
Since the original DSB recommendati ons and rulings in this dispute
remain operative through the results of the current compliance
proceedings, the Panel makes no new recommendation.52

47Ecuador Panel Report, para. 8.2(c) and (d).
48Ecuador Panel Report, para. 8.5.
49US Panel Report, para. 8.1(b) and (c).
50US Panel Report, para. 8.3(c).
51US Panel Report, para. 8.12.
52US Panel Report, para. 8.13.

22. On 28 August 2008, the European Communities notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4
and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certa in issues of law and legal interpretations covered in
the Ecuador and the US Panel Repor ts and filed two Notices of Appeal 53, pursuant to Rule 20 of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review54 (the "Working Procedures").
23. In a letter to the participants and third par ticipants dated 1 Septem ber 2008, the Appellate
Body Division hearing these appeals stated that, in the interests of "fairness and orderly procedure", as
referred to in Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, and after consultations w ith the participants, the
appellate proceedings in respect of the European Communities' appeals of the Ecuador and US Panel
Reports would be consolidated due to the substantial overlap in the content of the disputes. A single
Division would hear and decide the appeals, and a single oral hearing would be held by the Division.
The Division invited all third parties in both cases to a ttend the single oral hearing in the consolidated
appeals. However, it emphasized that, in their written submissions and oral statements, the third
participants were to address only the issues appealed in the dispute(s) to which they were a third party
in the panel proceedings. The United States and Ecuador requested the Appellate Body to issue
separate reports, either in the form of two sep arate documents, or one document with separate
conclusions pages.
24. On 4 September 2008, the European Communities filed an appellant's submission in each of
the appeals.
55 On 9 September 2008, Ecuador notified the DSB, pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU,
of its intention to appeal certain issues of law a nd legal interpretations cove red in the Ecuador Panel
Report and filed a Notice of Other Appeal 56, pursuant to Rule 23(1) and (2) of the Working
Procedures. On 15 September 2008, Ecuador filed an other appellant's submission. 57 On
22 September 2008, Ecuador, the United States, and the European Co mmunities each filed an
appellee's submission.58
25. On 22 September 2008, Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincen t and the Grenadines, and Suriname filed a joint third participants'
submission in the United States case; Belize, Do minica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Surina me filed a joint third participants' submission in
the Ecuador case; Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghan a filed a joint third participants' submission in

53WT/DS27/89 (attached as Annex I to this Report); WT/DS27/90 (attached as Annex II to this
Report).
54WT/AB/WP/5, 4 January 2005.
55Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedures.
56WT/DS27/91 (attached as Annex III to this Report).
57Pursuant to Rule 23(3) of the Working Procedures.
58Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23(4) of the Working Procedures.

the Ecuador case; Colombia filed a third participan t's submission in the Ecuador case; Japan filed a
third participant's submission in each case; Panama and Nicaragua filed a joint third participants'
submission in each case; Ecuador filed a third partic ipant's submission in the United States case; and
the United States filed a third partic ipant's submission in the Ecuador case.
59 On the same day, Brazil
and Mexico each notified the Appellate Body Secretaria t of its intention to appear at the oral hearing
as a third participant.60
26. Ecuador, the European Communities, and the United States requested, on 29 August 2008,
that the Division authorize public observation of the oral hearing. They submitted that public
observation of the oral hearing is not precluded by the DSU, the Working Procedures, or the Rules of
Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.61 The
participants expressed a preference for simultaneous closed-circuit television broadcast to a separate
room.
27. On 1 September 2008, the Division invited the third participants to comment in writing on the
participants' request to open the hearing to pu blic observation. The Division asked the third
participants to provide their views on, in partic ular, the permissibility of opening the hearing for
public observation under the DSU and the Working Procedures, and, if they so wished, on the specific
logistical arrangements proposed in the request s. Comments were received on 5 September 2008
from Colombia, on 9 September 2008 from Panama and Nicaragua, and on 10 September 2008 from
Brazil, Jamaica, and Japan. Colombia, Jamaica, Japan, Nicaragua, and Panama raised no objection to
the request of the participants. Brazil conveyed the view that the DSU expressly disallows public
hearings at the appellate stage: according to Br azil, opening the oral hearing in these proceedings to
public observation would run counter to the obligatio n of confidentiality imposed by Article 17.10 of
the DSU.
28. On 18 September 2008, the Division issued a Procedural Ruling in which it authorized the
public observation of the oral hearing and adop ted additional procedures for that purpose in
accordance with Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures .62 Notice of the opening of the hearing to
public observation and registration instructions were provided on the WTO website.

59Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
60Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
61The Rules of Conduct , as adopted by the DSB on 3 Dece mber 1996 (see WT/DSB/RC/1), are
incorporated into the Working Procedures as Annex II thereto (see WT/DSB/RC/2, WT/AB/WP/W/2).
62The Procedural Ruling is attached as Annex IV to this Report.

29. The oral hearing in these appeals was held on 16- 17 October 2008. The participants and third
participants presented oral arguments (with the exception of Mexico) and responded to questions
posed by the Division hearing the appeals. Public observation took place via simultaneous closed-
circuit television broadcast to a separate room. Pu rsuant to the additional procedures adopted by the
Division, no third participant requested that its oral statements and responses to questions remain
confidential and not be subject to public observation.
II. Arguments of the Participants and the Third Participants
A. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant
1. Article 9.3 of the DSU
30. The European Communities alleges that the Pane l acted inconsistently, in both cases, with
Article 9.3 of the DSU by failing to harmonize the timetables of the proceedings in the Ecuador and
United States cases. The European Communities requests that the Panel's failure to harmonize the
timetables, as well as the Panel's failure to provid e reasons for not harmonizing the timetables of the
two proceedings at the time the decision was taken and communicated to the parties, "be reversed".63
31. The European Communities submits that the use of the word "shall" in Article 9.3 indicates
an "absolute and unqualified" obligation for panels to harmonize timetables, which "does not allow
panels any discretion" in deciding wh ether timetables should be harmonized. 64 Further, the European
Communities maintains that the words "to the greatest extent possible" in Article 9.3 "only apply to
the provision that 'the same persons shall serve as pa nelists'" and should not be read to cover also the
obligation that "the timetable for th e panel process shall be harmonized". 65 The European
Communities asserts that conflicts of interests a nd personal reasons may prevent an individual from
serving as a panelist, and that the phrase "to the greatest extent possible" in Article 9.3 is taken into
account in this respect. However, the European Communities asserts that there are no similar reasons
that could justify the application of that phrase to the obligation to harmonize the timetables for the
panel process. Yet, the European Communities contends that, if, arguendo, the phrase "to the greatest
extent possible" did relate also to a panel's oblig ation to harmonize the timetables, the panel could
refuse to harmonize the timetables only wher e harmonization was virtually "impossible". 66 T h e
European Communities further submits that the timet ables "must absolutely be harmonized at some

63European Communities' appellant's submission, pa ra. 35 (US). See also European Communities'

stage of the proceeding", and that the phrase "to the greatest extent possible" is only meant to allow a
panel to take note of certain procedural acts that may have already been completed in one case, the
occurrence of which makes it "impossible" to harmoni ze the timetable of that case with the timetable
of another case.
67
32. In addition, the European Communities asserts that, if a panel decides not to harmonize the
timetables of two proceedings, it must provide an obj ective justification for its decision. Yet, the
European Communities maintains that the "justifications" provided by the Panel in its Reports do not
support its decision. The European Communities argues that the Panel attributed too much weight to
Ecuador's objection to harmonize the timetables there by protecting the interests of Ecuador more than
the interests of the European Communities. Fu rther, by obliging the European Communities to
provide its written submission to the United States in one proceeding before the United States had
submitted its own first written submission in the other proceeding, the Panel allowed the United States
an advantage at knowing what de fences and arguments the European Communities would use in the
latter proceeding, and thereby acted contrary to Article 12.6 of the DSU.
2. Legal Effect of the Understandings on Bananas
33. The European Communities alleges in both cases that the Panel erred in finding that Ecuador
and the United States were not precluded from in itiating Article 21.5 proceedings despite the
Understandings on Bananas they each had agreed to with the European Communities in 2001. The
European Communities refers to three reasons relie d upon by the Panel in support of its finding that
the Understandings on Bananas c ould not legally bar the complainants from bringing these
compliance proceedings.
34. The first reason given by the Panel is that th e Understandings on Bananas do not constitute in
themselves a solution, but provide only for the means, that is, a series of future steps for resolving and
settling the dispute. In this respect, the Europ ean Communities argues that Article 3 of the DSU does
not provide that only agreements recording measu res that had already been implemented should
qualify as "mutually agreed solutions ". The European Communities subm its that, rather, in virtually
every instance where the parties to a dispute reach a settlement, measures to implement that
settlement will be taken after the conclusion of the settlement.68

67European Communities' appellant's submission, pa ra. 23 (US). See also European Communities'

35. The second reason relied upon by the Panel in s upport of its finding that the Understandings
could not prevent the complainants from bringi ng these compliance pro ceedings is that the
Understandings were agreed to subsequent to the recommendations, rulings, and suggestions made by
the DSB in the original proceedings and previous compliance proceedings. In this respect, the
European Communities argues that , under the Panel's reasoning, a settlement would qualify as a
"mutually agreed solution" only if it were conc luded before the DSB made recommendations and
rulings. In the European Communities' view, nothi ng in the DSU supports such a restriction on WTO
Members to enter into mutually agreed solutions. On the co ntrary, the European Communities
submits that Articles 22.2 and 22.8 of the DSU expr essly provide for settlement agreements that can
be entered into following recommendations and rulings by the DSB.69
36. Thirdly, the Panel relied on the fact that the parties had made conflicting communications to
the DSB regarding the legal nature of the Unders tandings on Bananas after these Understandings had
been signed. The European Communities alleges that, by relying on these statements, the Panel
effectively allowed a signatory to a settlement to nullify the agreement's terms after having signed and
reaped the benefits of it, simply by refusing to make a joint notification to the DSB. Furthermore, the
European Communities argues that there is no requireme nt in the DSU for a mutu ally agreed solution
to be notified to the DSB by one party or by bo th parties jointly. According to the European
Communities, Article 3.6 of the DSU does not attach any legal significance to the complaining party's
action or inaction in the DSB when the agreement is notified.
37. In addition, the European Communities challenges the Panel's finding that the Understandings
on Bananas could preclude the complainants "from bringing [these] compliance challenge[s] only if
the Understanding[s] constitute[d] a positive solution and effective settlement to the dispute in
question" and the Panel's conclusion that this w as not the case. The European Communities argues
that the Panel introduced an erroneous limitation on the types of other legally binding arrangements
that can be enforceable in the WTO legal order. 70 According to the European Communities, there are
agreements between WTO Members that do not cons titute a positive solution and effective settlement
to a dispute, yet, they are given full legal effect by the WTO dispute settlement system. As examples
of such agreements, the Eu ropean Communities mentions, inter alia, agreements to dispense with the
DSU requirement to hold consultations before maki ng a request for the establishment of a panel,
agreements to extend the deadlines for the adoption of panel reports by the DSB, and "sequencing
agreements".71 The European Communities submits that the Panel's approach introduces uncertainty

as to the legal effects of agreements reached between WTO Members, and should therefore be
reversed.
38. The European Communities furthe r argues that the Panel erred in its interpretation and
application of the principle of good faith enshrined in Article 3.10 of the DSU. According to the
European Communities, the Panel took the erroneous view that an objection based on the principle of
good faith could be successful only if the European Communities had made out a prima facie case for
the alleged violation of Article 3.10, and also fo r "something more than mere violation" of that
provision.
72 The European Communities argues that the Pa nel did not provide any justification for its
conclusion that the European Communities had not established a prima facie case of a violation of
Article 3.10. The European Communities submits that it had presented a number of arguments to the
Panel, yet, the Panel did not provide any reasons for why it rejected those arguments. The European
Communities submits that the Panel thereby acted in consistently with its ob ligations under the DSU,
including Article 11 of the DSU. Furthermore, the European Communities criticizes the Panel for
taking the view that the principle of good faith could only be invoked as an "add-on" 73 to the violation
of another WTO rule and could not, by itself, be the source of rights and obligations of WTO
Members. The European Communities asserts that customary international law recognizes that the
principle of good faith can itself be the source of rights and obligations. 74 The European
Communities further submits that, given that the complainants have signed the Understandings on
Bananas in the present case, the application of the principle of good faith precluded them from
challenging the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in this dispute.
39. Finally, the European Communities submits that the Panel was incoherent in its reasoning
because, having found a "clear requirement for [the challenged measure] to be consistent with the
covered agreements" 75, it should then have gone on to analyze the consistency with the covered
agreements of the terms of the Understandings on Bananas and th e consistency of the European
Communities' measures with the terms of the Unde rstandings. However, according to the European
Communities, the Panel did neither.

72European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 60 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel
74European Communities' appellant's submissions, pa ra. 68 (Ecuador), para. 99 (US) (referring to
International Court of Justice, Australia v. France (Nuclear Tests Case), ICJ Reports (1974) 253, at 268).

3. Measure Taken to Comply
40. In the United States case, the European Comm unities appeals the Panel's finding that the
EC Bananas Import Regime was a "measure taken to comply" with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB in the original EC – Bananas III dispute and that, therefore, the United States had
properly brought this dispute under Article 21.5 of the DSU. The European Communities argues that
the United States' acceptance to have its retaliation rights terminated upon implementation of the tariff
quota-based import regime described in subp aragraph C.2 of the Understanding on Bananas
confirmed that the United States and the Europe an Communities agreed that this constituted
"implementation" of the original DSB recomme ndations and rulings. The European Communities
submits that "the United States' retention of the right to re-impose retaliatory measures only if the
[tariff quota-based] regime '[did] not enter into force by 1 January 2002'" 76 demonstrated the
importance placed by the United States itself on the tariff quota import regime, and further supported
the conclusion that the United States and the Eu ropean Communities had agreed that, with the
introduction of the tariff quota-based regime as the "measure taken to comply", the dispute would be
settled.
41. The European Communities presents a number of furt her arguments in support of its position.
First, the European Communities al leges that the Panel failed to take into account that there was
"no link" between the original DSB recommendations and rulings and the political decision of the
European Communities to introduce a tariff-only im port regime by 1 January 2006. The European
Communities takes issue with the Panel's finding that "the fact that the original recommendations and
rulings did not explicitly require the European Communities to bring itself into compliance
specifically through the introduction of a tariff-onl y import regime is irrelevant for establishing
whether the current [EC Bananas Import Re gime was] a measure taken to comply".
77 The European
Communities argues that a "link" exists between a measure and the DSB recommendations rulings in
the original proceedings when the introduction of the contested measure is necessary to address a
specific finding of inconsistency with the covere d agreements. Yet, the European Communities
argues that there was no finding in the original EC – Bananas III dispute that could be addressed or
implemented only through a tariff-only regime. Th erefore, the European Communities submits that
the required "link" to the DSB recommendations and rulings in EC – Bananas III was missing in the
present dispute and that the EC Bananas Import Regime was therefore not a "measure taken to
comply".

76European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 41 (US).
77European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 45 (US) (quoting US Panel Report,
para. 7.470). (emphasis added by the European Communities)

42. Secondly, the European Communities takes issue with the Panel's finding that "a key element
of the measure being reviewed and found inconsistent in the original proceedings was the preferential
treatment by the European Communities of banana imports from ACP countries" and that the
EC Bananas Import Regime at issue also "maintain[ed] a preference for ACP banana imports."
78 The
European Communities contests the Panel's conclu sion that the EC Bananas Import Regime was
"closely related" to the measure reviewed and found in consistent in the original proceedings and that
it was closely related to the original DSB recommendations and rulings adopted in 1997.
43. Thirdly, the European Communities asserts that the Panel was wrong in relying on other panel
reports concerning different parties in which th e same questions of WTO law had arisen, and on
reports issued in other proceedings between the same parties on different matters, because these
reports were not binding on the participants in th is dispute. The European Communities submits that
the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU when it took into consideration the findings
of the panel in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), including the introductory language79 of the
suggestions made by that panel, while not taking into account the suggestions themselves. Moreover,
the European Communities alleges th at the Panel was wrong in relying on statements by the panel in
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – EC) , because that panel did not make any substantive findings, and
because the report of that panel was never adopted by the DSB. In addition, the European Communities
claims that the Panel was wrong in relyi ng on the decision by the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC), because the mandate of arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU is different from
the mandate of a compliance panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
44. Finally, the European Communities contends that the Panel erroneously interpreted the Doha
Article I Waiver as supporting the conclusion that the contested measure was a "measure taken to
comply". The European Communities submits that the fact that a particular measure may need to be

78European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 47 (US) (quoting US Panel Report,
para. 7.323).
79The Panel noted that the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel provided the following introduction to its
suggestion:
"While Members remain free to choo se how they implement DSB
recommendations and rulings , it seems appropriate, after one
implementation attempt has proven to be at least partly unsuccessful, that
an Article 21.5 panel make suggestions with a view toward promptly
bringing the dispute to an end.
In light of our findings and conclusions with respect to Articles I and XIII of
GATT, the requirements of the Lomé Convention and the coverage of the
Lomé waiver, abov e, in our view, the European Communities has at least
the following options for bringing its banana import regime into conformity
with WTO rules."
(US Panel Report, para. 7.466 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , paras. 6.154
and 6.155) (emphasis added by the current Panel))

covered by a WTO waiver is irrelevant for the dete rmination of whether that measure is a "measure
taken to comply" with prior DSB recommendations and rulings.
4. Repeal of the Challenged Measure
45. In the United States case, the European Communi ties claims that, by failing to take into
consideration the repeal of the measure challenged in this dispute, the Panel failed to analyze properly
the facts of the case and thereby violated Articl es 3.4, 3.7, and 11 of the DSU. Moreover, the
European Communities submits that the Panel erred in making a recommendation to the DSB in
relation to a measure that no longer existed.
46. First, the European Communities argues that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment
of the matter before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, by failing to take into account that the
tariff quota of 775,000 mt for imports of ACP banan as ceased to exist prior to the issuance of the
US Panel Report.
80
47. Secondly, the European Communities contends that the Panel's failure to take into
consideration the repeal of the challenged measure is inconsistent with Articles 3.4 and 3.7 of the
DSU, because it fails to "achieve a satisfactory settle ment of the matter" as required by Article 3.4,
and also because it fails to "secure a positive solution to the dispute" pursuant to Article 3.7. The
European Communities further submits that the Pane l erred in declaring inadmissible the evidence
submitted by the European Communities regardi ng the adoption of EC Regulation 1528/2007, by
means of which the measure challenged in this dispute was repealed. The European Communities
asserts that the Panel did not properly distinguish between factual evidence supporting a claim and
evidence relating to the existence of the contested measure itself.
48. Thirdly, the European Communities claims th at the Panel erred in making a recommendation
with respect to a measure that had ceased to exis t by the time the Panel issued its Report. The
European Communities alleges that the Panel provi ded a "concealed" recommendation by stating that
the original DSB recommendations and rulings "remained operative".
81 The European Communities
submits that, since the tariff rate quota reserved for ACP imports was repealed by EC Regulation
1528/2007 prior to the issuance of the Panel Report, there was no recommendation that could be made
or that could "remain operative".

80European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 180 (US).
81European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 190 and 191 (US).

5. Article II of the GATT 1994

49. In the Ecuador case, the Europ ean Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the
Panel's findings that the Doha Article I Waiver "modified the Schedule of the European Communities
and extended the duration of the concession for the tariff quota beyond December 31, 2002" 82, and the
Panel's consequential finding that "the Eur opean Communities has breached Article II of the
GATT".83
50. The European Communities agrees with the Panel th at the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt in the
European Communities' Schedule of Concessions could not be read in isolation from the Annex to the
Schedule (the Bananas Framework Ag reement) and that it was subject to the terms, conditions, and
qualifications set out in the Annex. The European Communities, therefore, agrees with the Panel's
conclusion that the tariff quota concession was " unequivocally intended to expire on 31 December
2002"84, in accordance with the terms of the Banana s Framework Agreement incorporated into the
Schedule.
51. The European Communities, however, claims that the Panel erred in finding that the Doha
Article I Waiver was a "subsequent agreement" to the European Communities' Schedule, which dealt
with the provisions of the Schedule, and that th e Waiver could be interpreted as an agreement by
WTO Members "to extend the duration of the Eu ropean Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas beyond 31 December 2002". 85 The European Communities also claims that the Panel made
further errors of legal interpretation in relying on the Uruguay Round "Modalities Paper" 86 and the
European Communities' initiation of negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 as
supplementary means of interpretation.
52. The European Communities argues that the Doha Article I Waiver is not an international
agreement, but a decision of the WTO. The European Communities submits that the Panel confused a
decision taken by the Ministerial Conference pursuant to Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (the " WTO Agreement ") with an "international
agreement".87 According to the European Communities, the Doha Article I Waiver, which was
adopted by "consensus" with no Member present at the meeting formally objecting to the proposed

82European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 164 (Ecuador).
83European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 183 (Ecuador).
84European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 147 (Ecuador) (quoting Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.436).
85European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 148 (Ecuador).
86Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the
Market Access Group, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993.
87European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 151 (Ecuador).

decision, does not satisfy the conditions required by Articles 6 ff of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties 88 (the " Vienna Convention") for an international agreement to come into existence. As
such, the Doha Article I Waiver cannot be assimila ted to an international agreement, which "would
require that all parties conclude the agreemen t according to their constitutional requirements and
positively express consent to be bound by the agreement". 89 Moreover, the European Communities
contends that the concessions on trade in go ods included in WTO Memb ers' GATT Schedules can
only be modified through agreements concluded foll owing the procedures of Article XXVIII, and that
the Doha Article I Waiver is not an agreement that was reached following these procedures.
53. The European Communities claims that the Doha Article I Waiver cannot be considered a
"plurilateral agreement" because the legal basis of the Ministerial Decision refers exclusively to
Article IX of the WTO Agreement and the other WTO provisions relating to the granting of waivers.
Moreover, the Waiver "does not have any of the characteristics that 'plurilateral' agreements
consistently have". 90 The European Communities notes that the Doha Article I Waiver does not
explicitly state that it was intended to modify th e bananas concession in the European Communities'
Schedule. The European Communities points out that there has never been an example of an
"implied" agreement to modify the concessions in the Schedules of WTO Members participating in a
"plurilateral" agreement. Moreover, the European Communities highlights that none of the parties to
this dispute ever argued or even mentioned, at an y stage of the proceedings, anything similar to the
Panel's erroneous finding that the Doha Article I Waiver extended the tariff quota concession in the
European Communities' Schedule.
54. The European Communities submits that the Panel confused Article IX with Article X of the
WTO Agreement, and that the Doha Article I Waiver is not a decision amending the WTO agreements
taken pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement but, rather, a decision taken on the basis of
Article IX of the WTO Agreement , which cannot be used to am end the other WTO agreements,
including the Schedules of Concessions. Moreover, the European Communities contends that, in the
case of the Doha Article I Waiver, the procedures pr escribed by Article X for the amendment of the
WTO agreements, such as depositing an instrument of acceptance, were not followed. According to
the European Communities, this confirmed that no WTO Member ever considered the Doha Article I
Waiver to be a decision amending the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions and thereby
extending the duration of the tariff quota concession.

88Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.
89European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 152 (Ecuador).
90European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 155 (Ecuador).

55. The European Communities further argues that the Panel erred in reading into the Doha
Article I Waiver an agreement to extend the tari ff quota concession that is not there; there is no
reference in the Waiver to such an agreement, and the Waiver "do es not even mention the European
Communities' Schedule".
91 The European Communities contends that the reference in the preamble
of the Doha Article I Waiver to the tariff quota a pplying "until the entry into force of the EC tariff-
only regime" does not support the Panel's interpretation, because the preamble uses the word "noting",
which is not the same as "deciding", and because this issue is not addressed in the main body of the
Waiver. The European Communities further contends that, even if it were assumed that through the
Doha Article I Waiver it had accepted to apply the ta riff rate of €75 to 2.2 million mt of bananas from
MFN countries, nothing in the text of the Waiver established that Members intended to turn this
applied tariff rate into a bound concession in the Eu ropean Communities' Schedule. In this respect,
the European Communities notes that, while its " bound concession in the Schedule was for a quantity
of 2.2 million tons of bananas", it "applied the tariff of €75 per ton to the tariff quotas A and B, which
had a total volume of more than 2.55 million tons in 2001" 92, when the Doha Article I Waiver was
adopted.
56. Furthermore, according to the European Communities, the Panel failed to reconcile its finding
that the Doha Article I Waiver expired and " cannot extend to the [EC Bananas Import Regime]
introduced from 1 January 2006" 93 with the finding that, through the Doha Article I Waiver, WTO
Members agreed to extend the duration of the European Communities' tariff quota concessions until
the completion of the Article XXVIII negotiations.94
57. The European Communities submits that, even if the Doha Article I Waiver could be
interpreted as an agreement between WTO Memb ers extending the duration of the tariff quota
concession for MFN suppliers in the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions, the procedural
steps required to incorporate such modification into that Schedule were not comp leted. In particular,
the European Communities points out that the Panel itself confirmed that "no withdrawal or
modification of the original European Communities' schedule has so far been certified" 95 and that any

91European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 166 (Ecuador).
92European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 171 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)
93Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.200.
94European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 172 (Ecuador). The European Communities
also submits that the Panel failed to reconcile its finding that the term "the new EC Tariff regime" used in the
fifth tiret of the Annex on Bananas to the Doha Article I Waiver applies to the bananas import regime instituted
through EC Regulation 1964/2005 on 1 January 2006, with its finding that the European Communities' tariff
quota concession of 2.2 million mt at the in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt would extend beyond 1 January 2006,
because, as noted in the preamble of the Doha Article I Waiver, it would appl y "until the entry in to force of the
new EC tariff regime". (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 173 (Ecuador))
95European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 179 (Ecuador).

alleged modifications agreed through the Doha Article I Waiver "have not yet taken 'formal effect' and
are not yet ' provided in' the Schedule that Article II of th e GATT obliges the European Communities
to respect." 96 The European Communities concludes, theref ore, that its alleged failure to grant the
terms of the tariff quota to the MFN suppliers cannot constitute a violation of Article II of the GATT.
58. The European Communities submits that the Pane l erred in qualifying the Doha Article I
Waiver as a "subsequent agreement" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention,
which applies to subsequent agreements " regarding the interpretation of the treaty ".97 'The European
Communities notes that "[a]n agreement modifying the terms of the original treaty does not qualify as
a 'subsequent agreement' for purposes of Article 31(3 )(a), because such an agreement does not 'regard
the interpretation' of the terms of the original treaty; it simply changes those terms for the future."98
59. The European Communities also challenges the Panel's reliance on (i) the Uruguay Round
Modalities Paper for agricultural market access nego tiations and (ii) the initiation of negotiations
under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 by the European Communities to modify its bananas tariff
concessions, as supplementary means of interpretati on. The European Communities argues that the
Panel erred in relying on the Modalities Paper because that document expressly provides that it cannot
be invoked in dispute settlement, which was also confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Export
Subsidies on Sugar.99 The European Communities further submits that the Modalities Paper related to
the agreements concluded at the end of the Urugua y Round and, even assuming that it could be used
as supplementary means of interpretation, it c ould only be used to interpret the European
Communities' Uruguay Round Schedule and not the D oha Article I Waiver, which was adopted by
WTO Members in 2001.
60. Finally, the European Communities argues that the fact that it had initiated negotiations under
Article XXVIII does not establish that it was the co mmon intention of all WTO Members to extend
the tariff quota concession for MFN suppliers. Th e European Communities notes that negotiations
under Article XXVIII are "required" 100 even where the proposed ch anges do not affect the GATT
rights of other countries or are purely formal. Therefore, the proposed reduction by the European
Communities of its bound rates a fortiori justified the initiation of Article XXVIII negotiations,

96European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 180 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)
97European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 186 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)
98European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 187 (Ecuador). (original emphasis) (quoting
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention).
99European Communities' appellant's submission, pa ra. 194 (Ecuador) (referring to Appellate Body
Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 199).
100European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199 (Ecuador) (referring to GATT Panel
Report, EEC – Newsprint, para. 50).

considering that it was not of a purely legal form and had the potential of affecting the situation of
other WTO Members, such as th e ACP countries. Moreover, the European Communities argues that,
when it agreed with Ecuador in the Unders tanding on Bananas on negotiations pursuant to
Article XXVIII, the outcome of those negotiations was not clear, that is to say, "no one could tell
whether the new tariff rate was going to be above €
 680 euros or below".101
61. For all the above reasons, the European Commun ities requests the Appellate Body to reverse
the Panel's finding and to find, instead, that the tariff quota concession expired according to the terms
of the Bananas Framework Agreement in 2001 and has not been extended through the Doha Article I
Waiver.
6. Article XIII of the GATT 1994
(a) Suggestions pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU
62. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's findings in the
Ecuador Panel Report that "'the fact that a Member adopts a measure to implement a suggestion
pursuant to Article 19.1' does not 'prevent another Member from challenging, pursuant to Article 21.5,
the compliance of such measure with the covered agreements'" and that, "[e]ven if there was a
presumption of the legality of measures taken to implement a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1,
there is nothing in the DSU suggesting that the a lleged [il]legality of such measures could not be
reviewed by a compliance panel".
102
63. The European Communities does not argue on app eal that the EC Bananas Import Regime in
place between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2007 complied fully with the second suggestion of
the first Article 21.5 panel requested by Ecuador. However, the European Communities contends that
the Panel developed certain legal interpretations that are wrong and create systemic problems for the
proper interpretation and application of the DSU.
64. The European Communities argues that, while a panel's suggestions as to how the respondent
may put itself in compliance with the WTO rules do not have binding force for the respondent, this
does not mean that suggestions are "entirely devoid of legal significance". 103 According to the
European Communities, the consistency of a panel's suggestions with the covered agreements may be
challenged by the parties before th e Appellate Body, but, "[o]nce th e legality of the suggestions has

101European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 201 (Ecuador).
102European Communities' appellant's submission, pa ra. 80 (Ecuador) (quoti ng Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.251).
103European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 85 (Ecuador).

been established following their adoption by the DSB" , they cannot be further challenged or revisited
before an Article 21.5 panel because of the parti es' obligation to "unconditionally accept" the DSB's
recommendations and rulings "including the sugg estions contained in them, as provided in
Article 17.14 in combination with Article 16.4 of the DSU". 104 The European Communities argues
that there is nothing in the DSU that would allow a complainant to have an additional opportunity to
challenge before a compliance panel the legality of the implementing measures suggested by the
original panel.
65. The European Communities contends that, if a respondent claims that its measures challenged
before an Article 21.5 panel "were suggested by a previous panel as a means to achieve compliance
with its WTO obligations", the Article 21.5 panel must "examine whether the challenged measures are
indeed the measures suggested by the original panel", and, if it reaches this conclusion, "it should find
that they are consistent with the covere d agreements without any further analysis". 105 According to
the European Communities, in the present case, the Panel should have first confirmed the
characteristics that an import regime should have in order to satisfy the suggestions made by the first
Ecuador Article 21.5 panel in 1999 , and then examined whether the EC Bananas Import Regime had
the suggested characteristics. If the Panel found that the EC Bananas Import Regime implemented the
suggestions made in 1999, "then th e Panel should have rejected Ecua dor's claims under Article XIII
without any further analysis". 106 The European Communities conte nds further that the Panel could
have examined the consistency of the EC Bana nas Import Regime with Article XIII of the GATT
1994 only if it had concluded that that regime di d not implement the suggestions made in 1999. The
European Communities argues that the Panel e rred because it declined "to assess whether the
European Communities [had] effectively implemented any of the suggestions of the first compliance
panel requested by Ecuador" 107 in 1999 and considered that Ecua dor's disagreement was sufficient to
reject the European Communities' argument th at the EC Bananas Import Regime had the
characteristics suggested in 1999.
(b) Interpretation of Article XIII of the GATT 1994
66. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse, in both cases, the Panel's
interpretation of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 and the Panel's consequential findings in the Panel
Reports that the EC Bananas Import Regime was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and 2 of the
GATT 1994.

104European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 88 (Ecuador).
105European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
106European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 92 (Ecuador).
107European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 93 (Ecuador).

67. The European Communities argues that the Pa nel's error leads to unreasonable results.
According to the Panel, if the European Commun ities had offered to the ACP countries an unlimited
trade preference, its measure would have been consis tent with Article XIII; however, if it protected
the interests of MFN suppliers by limiting the quant ity of ACP banana imports that can benefit from
that trade preference, it would automatically br each Article XIII. According to the European
Communities, this erroneous lega l interpretation by the Panel w ould render limitations on trade
preferences offered by developed countries to developing countries under the "Enabling Clause"
108
inconsistent with Article XIII, th ereby raising doubts as to the le gality of WTO Members' Schedules
and creating legal confusion and uncertainty. The European Communities argues that this
interpretation could lead to significant constraint s in the application of the Enabling Clause.
Developed countries might choose not to grant trade preferences if the only option they have is to
grant preferences for unrestricted quantities.
68. The European Communities claims that the Pa nel developed a theory pursuant to which a
lower tariff offered to one Member becomes automa tically a "quantitative restriction" on all other
Members when it is offered in respect of only some, and not all, quantities exported by the
beneficiary. The European Communities contends th at an advantage granted to one Member is not
the same as a measure imposing a "prohibition or r estriction" on another Member, and that the notion
of "less favourable treatment" under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is not the same as the notion of
"prohibition or restriction" under Article XIII. The European Communities also argues that, if the
Panel's interpretation was correct, then any tari ff preference would qualify as a restriction under
Article XIII, because "[a]ny such preference would gran t a 'benefit' to the bene ficiary and, therefore,
would operate as a 'disadvantage' for all other coun tries, negatively affecting the quantity of products
they can export."
109 According to the Eur opean Communities, this interpretation would deprive
Article I:1 of any value.
69. The European Communities highlights "important inconsistencies" 110 in the reasoning of the
Panel under Article XIII. The European Communiti es argues that the Panel's reasoning that the ACP
preference would be a "quantitative restriction" for purposes of Article XIII even if it was unlimited in
quantity111, cannot be reconciled with the Panel's reasoning that a measure can qualify as a

108GATT 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203.
111European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 112 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel
Report, paras. 7.332 and 7.334), para. 129 (US) (referring to US Panel Report, paras. 7.679 and 7.681).

quantitative restriction under Article XIII only when it has a quantitative limit. 112 The European
Communities contends that, "[e]ither way, the Pane l has misinterpreted the notion of 'quantitative
restriction' for purposes of Article XIII of the GATT."113
70. The European Communities claims that the Pa nel erred in interpreting Article XIII as
covering an import regime where imports from all MFN suppliers are subject to a simple tariff and no
quantitative restrictions, and where there is a prefer ential tariff offered to so me Members, which is
applied only to part of the beneficiaries' imports . According to the European Communities, as there
was no restriction on the quantities that Ecuador a nd the other MFN suppliers could export to the
European Communities, Article XIII was not appli cable, because no quantitative restrictions were
imposed on the imports from the allegedly aggrie ved Member. As a consequence, the European
Communities contends that there was "no basis that would allow an examination of whether 'similar'
quantitative restrictions are also imposed on all other countries."114
71. The European Communities further argues that Article XIII does not introduce an "MFN rule"
and, accordingly, does not require the European Co mmunities to extend the tariff preference it grants
to ACP countries to all other WTO Members, whether or not this preference is subject to limitations.
The European Communities submits that the Panel mi sinterpreted and misapplied the findings of the
Appellate Body in the original EC – Bananas III proceedings. The import regime examined in the
original proceedings was very different from the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the present
proceedings: all imports were subject to tariff quot as; each group of suppliers was allocated a tariff
quota with different terms; and some countries we re allocated country-specific allocations, while
some MFN countries had access only to a general alloca tion. The report of the Appellate Body in the
original proceedings does not support extending the application of Article XIII:1 to cover situations of
simple tariff discrimination where preferential treatment is offered only to part of the beneficiaries'
exports.
72. The European Communities contends that the Panel failed to follow consistent GATT and
WTO practice that "the anti-discrimination rules of Article XIII are aimed at quantitative
discrimination, while tariff discrimination is the exclusive preserve of Article I." 115 According to the
European Communities, this practice is "concordant, common and consistent", and it, therefore, falls
within the notion of "state practice" referred to in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.116 The

112European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 112 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel

European Communities refers to several examples of waivers from Article I:1 that covered tariff
preferences granted by means of tariff quotas, wh ereby the preferential treatment was subject to
quantitative limitations.
117 The European Communities claims that this consistent practice establishes
the common understanding on the part of the GA TT Contracting Parties and WTO Members that
exclusion from a preferential tariff quota does not constitute an infringement of Article XIII.
73. Regarding Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, th e European Communiti es argues that this
provision does not apply to the European Communities' rules governing imports from Ecuador and the
United States, because these imports are subject to a simple tariff and not to any quantitative
restriction or tariff quota. According to the Eur opean Communities, the Panel failed to interpret and
apply properly Article XIII:2, which is concerned solely with qu antitative restrictions imposed on the
aggrieved Member, and not with other measures imposed on that Member such as simple tariffs. The
European Communities finds support for its argument in the title of Article XIII and in the fact that
"the four sub-paragraphs of Article XIII:2 are en tirely focused on the scope and internal distribution
of the quantitative restriction" and "do not deal with any measures that fall outside the quota, or tariff
quota".118
74. Finally, the European Communities notes that the United States has never been a banana
supplier to the European Communities and is not like ly to become a banana supplier in the future.
Therefore, the ACP preference could not be considered inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2
because, even in the absence of such preference, the United St ates' share in the European
Communities' bananas market would approach as clo sely as possible the United States' existing share,
which is zero.
(c) Nullification or Impairment with respect to Ecuador
75. The European Communities argues that the Panel rejected without any analysis its arguments
that the limit on the quantities of ACP banana impor ts that could benefit from preferential treatment
did not cause any nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Ec uador under the covered
agreements.
76. The European Communities submits that the Panel found that "'the competitive opportunities'
of some Members can be negatively affected only where there is a ' benefit' granted to some other
Members"119 and, for the Panel's reasoning to stand, "the quantity limit imposed on the ACP

117European Communities' appellant's submissions, paras. 121-128 (Ecuador), paras. 138-145 (US).
119European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 141 (Ecuador) (original emphasis) (referring to
Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.332).

preference must be both ... the element that triggere d the violation of Article XIII of the GATT and ...
the 'benefit' that could negatively affect th e 'competitive opportunities' of the MFN banana
suppliers."120 The European Communities argues that the quantity limitation imposed on the ACP
preference was not a "benefit" granted to the ACP c ountries but, rather, it was "a 'benefit' granted to
the MFN countries".121
77. The European Communities contends that this fact is not affected by the Panel's finding that
the Doha Article I Waiver had expired at the end of 2005 and, consequently, that the ACP preference
granted between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2007 was no longer consistent with Article I of the
GATT 1994. The European Communities argues that the Panel failed to explain how the limitation of
the quantities benefiting from the ACP preference "caused any new or additional nullification or
impairment to Ecuador under Article XIII of the GATT" 122 beyond the nullification or impairment
under Article I. The European Communities submits that the Panel also failed to take into
consideration that the quantity limitation had the effect of limiting the negative effects of the ACP
preference on Ecuador's "competitive opportunities" under Article I. According to the European
Communities, the Panel made a "double counting" of nullification or impairment, by counting as
nullification or impairment not only the negative e ffects caused by the ACP preference, but also "the
limitation of these negative effects through the quantity limit".123
78. The European Communities, therefore, requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's
legal interpretations and the conse quential rejection of the European Communities' argument that the
limit on the quantities of ACP bananas that could benefit from preferential treatment did not cause
any nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Ecuador under the covered agreements.
7. Nullification or Impairment with respect to the United States
79. The European Communities appeals the Panel's fi nding that, "to the extent that the [EC
Bananas Import Regime] contains measures inconsis tent with various provisions of the GATT 1994,
it has nullified or impaired benefits accrui ng to the United States under that Agreement." 124 T h e
European Communities argues that the Panel erred in finding that the United States had suffered
nullification or impairment as a result of the EC Bananas Import Regime.

120European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 142 (Ecuador).
121European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 143 (Ecuador).
122European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 144 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)
123European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 145 (Ecuador).
124US Panel Report, para. 8.12.

80. The European Communities argues that the Pane l confused the notion of "nullification or
impairment" in Article 3.8 of the DSU with the "int erest" that a complaining party must have in order
to have "standing" to commence dispute settlement proceedings.
125 According to the European
Communities, the notion of "nullification or impair ment" under Article 3.8 is the same as the notion
of "nullification or impairment" under Article 22, but it is different from the type of "interest" that a
complaining party must have in order to ha ve "standing" to commence dispute settlement
proceedings. In this respect, the European Communities argues that it was not enough for the Panel to
rely on the potential export interest of the Unite d States and the potential effects of the contested
measures on world supplies and prices of banana s to find that the United States had suffered
nullification or impairment within the meaning of Article 3.8.
81. The European Communities claims that, considering that the United States was a net importer
of bananas and was not actively involved in th e business of exporting bananas to any country, let
alone the European Communities, the trade preference for bananas originating in ACP countries could
not, and did not, deprive the United States from a ny "competitive opportunity" to export bananas to
the European Communities; nor did it change th e United States' "competitive relationship" with any
banana exporting country in the world, becau se the United States has never had a "competitive
relationship". The European Communities contends that the fact that the contested measures might
affect the value of the United States' exports in goods or services towards third countries did not
constitute "nullification or impairment" under the GATT 1994.
82. The European Communities also criticizes the Panel for relying on the findings of the
Appellate Body in the original EC – Bananas III proceedings in 1997, because the facts of the
present case are different from the facts as they existed in 1997. According to the European
Communities, the Appellate Body report in the origin al proceedings "confirm[ed] that the finding of a
'nullification or impairment' of a benefit accruing to the United States was based on the European
Communities' violation of the GATS."
126 The European Communities further recalls that the
arbitrators acting pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DS U in 1999 found that the sources of "nullification
or impairment" with respect to the United States we re: "(a) the US share of wholesale trade services
in bananas sold in the European Communities a nd (b) the US share of allocated banana import
licences from which quota rents accrue." 127 The European Communities points out that the current
proceedings do not involve any claim under the GATS and there is no longer an "inextricably

125European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 156 (US).
126European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 167 (US).
127Decision of the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 7.8.

interwoven"128 relation between the GATT 1994 and the GATS, so that none of the considerations on
which the finding of "nullification or impairment" of the United States was based in 1997 existed at
the time this Panel was established.
8. Notice of Appeal
83. Regarding the United States' allegation that th e European Communities' Notice of Appeal did
not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures, the European Communities
does not dispute that its Notice of Appeal did not identify the specific paragraphs of the US Panel
Report containing the alleged errors. The Europ ean Communities argues, however, that none of the
participants had difficulty in identifying the scope and content of the European Communities' Notice
of Appeal. Moreover, with respect to the alleged failure to list in its Notice of Appeal a claim under
Article 11 of the DSU, the European Communities argues that a violation of Article 11 is always a
means by which a panel makes an error of law or legal interpretation. Consequently, the European
Communities contends that there was no need to cite Article 11 in conjunction with every error of law
appealed in its Notice of Appeal.
129
B. Arguments of Ecuador – Appellee and Third Participant
1. Article 9.3 of the DSU
84. Ecuador submits that the Panel acted consistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU when it decided
to maintain different timetables for the United St ates case and the Ecuador case. Ecuador emphasizes
that it strongly objected when the Panel asked whether to delay the Ecuador proceedings in order to
harmonize it with the case initiated by the United States. Ecuador disagrees with the European
Communities' contention that Article 9.3 imposes an "absolute obligation to harmonize timetables". 130
Ecuador argues that the phrase "to the greatest extent possible" in Article 9.3 relates to the obligation
to compose the two separate panels of the same persons as well as to the panel's obligation to
harmonize the timetables.
85. Ecuador asserts that harmonization of the timetab les would have led to a two-month delay of
the proceedings in the Ecuador case in violation of the 90-day time period set out in Article 21.5 of
the DSU. Ecuador further submits that the Eu ropean Communities' interpretation would require
harmonization regardless of how wide the time-ga p between two cases may be, and that this could
entail significant delays in WTO dispute settlement.

128European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 169 (US).
129European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

2. Legal Effect of the Understanding on Bananas

86. Ecuador argues that the European Communities mischaracterized the Panel's findings when it
submitted that the Panel had set out three "conditions " that had to be satisfied in order for the
Understanding on Bananas to qualify as a mutually ag reed solution within the meaning of Article 3.7
of the DSU. 131 Ecuador maintains that, rather than crea ting an objectionable legal test for what
constitutes a mutually agreed solution, the Pa nel had evaluated whether the terms of the
Understanding read in their context were of a nature that could bar Ecuador from initiating
compliance proceedings. Ecuador, however, conte nds that the Understandi ng could not immunize
any steps the European Communities might have taken with respect to the reform of the EC Bananas
Import Regime from challenges before the WTO dispute settlement system.
87. Ecuador disagrees with the European Communities th at a complaining party that enters into a
bilateral settlement cannot challenge the conformity of measures taken by the implementing party if
that party claims that the measures are "accepted" under the bilateral agreement.132 Ecuador maintains
that the European Communities' c onstruction has no basis in the text of the DSU and would run
counter to Article 21.5 of the DSU, in that it woul d deny the right to initiate compliance proceedings,
which are expressly provided for in Article 21.5. Mo reover, Ecuador contends that, as all mutually
agreed solutions must be consistent with the c overed agreements, precluding a party to a settlement
agreement from challenging the agreement would nu llify the requirement of conformity of the
bilateral agreement with WTO law and render the agreement unenforceable under the DSU.
88. Ecuador further submits that the Panel was co rrect in rejecting the European Communities'
contention that the principle of good faith pr ecluded Ecuador from challenging the EC Bananas
Import Regime. Ecuador supports the Panel's st atement that Ecuador has "[n]owhere in the
Understanding ... accepted that it would forego its righ t to challenge the conformity with the covered
agreements of any measure that th e European Communities might take to implement a step set out in
the Bananas Understanding".133 Furthermore, Ecuador contends that Article 3.10 of the DSU does not
preclude initiation of dispute settlement proceedings.

131Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 14 (referring to European Communities' appellant's
submission, para. 41 (Ecuador), in turn referring to Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.76).

3. Article II of the GATT 1994
89. Ecuador supports the Panel findings that the imposition of a tariff of €176/mt by the European
Communities violated Article II of the GATT 1994, b ecause that tariff is in excess of the tariff quota
concession bound in the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions. Ecuador contends that the
European Communities' concession for bananas continue d to remain in force for two reasons: first,
the Bananas Framework Agreemen t was not intended to (nor did it) terminate the tariff quota
concession as of 31 December 2002; and, secondly, as the Panel found, the tariff quota concession
remained in effect because of its extension throug h the agreement manifested in the Doha Article I
Waiver.
90. Ecuador agrees with the Panel that "the Doha Waiver was an agreement regarding the
application of the concession, which is within the scope of Article 31(3) [of the Vienna
Convention]."
134 Moreover, according to Ecuador, "the Doha Waiver ... strongly support[s] Ecuador's
position that the Concession was never intended to expi re on account of paragraph 9 of the [Bananas
Framework Agreement]."135
91. Ecuador agrees with the Panel that "the Doha Waiver constituted an international agreement
relating to the application of the Concession." 136 Ecuador also argues that Article 31(3) of the Vienna
Convention does not prescribe formal requirements as to what may constitute a subsequent agreement,
and that a waiver of obligations is an agreement th at is binding on all Members and that alters, for the
duration of the waiver, rights and obligations for all Members. Ecuador also notes that it is irrelevant
that waivers are not adopted by consensus, becau se "even a Member who did not support a waiver
will not be able to enforce compliance with a waived rule by the Member who received the waiver."137
92. Ecuador contends that a waiver may be rega rded as an agreement extending the concession,
even if it does not meet WTO requirements and procedures for modifying a GATT tariff concession.
Ecuador argues that "the modification of the durat ion of the Concession by the Doha Waiver is, if
anything, a more transparent step than most m odifications, which may help explain why dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body have f ound that concessions cannot authorize deviations
from other WTO rules."138 Ecuador also agrees with the Panel's finding that, insofar as it modifies the
European Communities' tariff concession, "the Doha Waiver was an agreement regarding the

134Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 58. (original emphasis)

application of the concession, which is within the scope of Article 31(3) [of the Vienna
Convention]".
139
93. Ecuador believes that, although the Doha Artic le I Waiver has expired with respect to
bananas, it can nevertheless extend the tariff quota concession, because of the overall settlement
manifested in the Waiver, which also relates to the Understanding on Bananas. According to
Ecuador, the European Communities could not say "that it got its part of the bargain" and maintain its
WTO inconsistent regime until 2008, but, at the same time, "ignore the commitments with permanent
effect on which the Doha Waiver was conditioned". 140 Part of the European Communities'
commitments was to "introduce and rebind a tariff only regime that would permanently and without
the need for a waiver at least ma intain total market access for MF N suppliers, taking into account all
EC market access commitments".141
94. Ecuador argues that it had introduced evidence be fore the Panel demonstrating that all WTO
Members, including the European Communities, had uniformly acted on the basis that the tariff quota
concession was permanent. According to Ecuador, th e first time that the European Communities ever
argued or acted as if the concession had expired on 31 December 2002 was in the European
Communities' rebuttal submission in these Panel proceedings.
95. Ecuador further contends that the Panel refe rred to the Modalities Paper as a guide to the
common intentions of negotiators, not as enforceab le rules. For Ecuador, "the modalities paper
continues to operate as a guide, such as in accession negotiations"
142, and therefore it was appropriate
for the Panel to rely on it as supplementary means of interpretation. Ecuador also claims that the
Panel was right to infer from the notifications a nd initiation of Article XXVIII negotiations by the
European Communities in 2004 and in 2007 that "the EC would not have needed to invoke such
negotiations if its bound duties were 680 euros/mt, since members do not need to negotiate under
Article XXVIII to lower their bindings."143
96. Finally, Ecuador contends that the Doha Article I Waiver should be seen as an agreement that
supports Ecuador's other appeal a nd confirms Ecuador's interpretation that the tariff quota concession
was never intended to expire by virtue of paragr aph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement. In
Ecuador's view, paragraph 9, at most, was intende d to terminate those conditions of the Bananas
Framework Agreement (such as the allocation of the tariff quota among suppliers) that are not

139Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 58. (original emphasis)

included in the first six columns under the European Communities' tariff heading on bananas in its
Schedule of Concessions.
4. Article XIII of the GATT 1994
(a) Suggestions pursuant to Article 19.1 DSU
97. Ecuador responds that the Panel properly dismissed the argument by the European
Communities that the Panel could not review in th ese Article 21.5 proceedings the conformity of the
measures taken to comply, which the European Comm unities claims to have taken to implement the
suggestions made by the first Ecuador Article 21. 5 panel pursuant to Article 19.1 of DSU. For
Ecuador, the fact that the suggestions had not b een appealed does not immunize measures taken to
implement that suggestion from review under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
98. According to Ecuador, the European Commun ities' position regardi ng suggestions would
have the net effect of discouraging requests for a panel to make suggestions and would imply that a
party that gets a "suggestion" obtains immunity from a challenge under WTO rules for measures it
undertakes consistently with that suggestion. Ec uador further contends that another unacceptable
consequence would be that, if a panel made a "bro ad" suggestion, "the defending party would be free
to adopt the most protectionist and WTO-inconsistent set of measures it could contrive that would still
arguably fit within the parameters of the panel suggestion" and "would be immune from scrutiny for
compliance with WTO rules, so long as [those m easures] conformed with the contours of [the]
suggestion."144
(b) Interpretation of Article XIII of the GATT 1994
99. Ecuador requests the Appellate Body to reject the European Communities' appeal of the
Panel's interpretation of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 and the Panel's consequential findings that the
EC Bananas Import Regime was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994.
100. Ecuador submits that, in the present dispute, the prior DSB recommendations and rulings on
Article XIII continue to apply, because the EC Ba nanas Import Regime included a tariff quota. In
Ecuador's view, the Appellate Body clearly stated in EC – Bananas III that Article XIII applies
"regardless whether there are one, two or many [tariff quotas]". 145 Ecuador emphasizes that the

145Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 42 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III ,
para. 190).

European Communities' preferential tariff quota for ACP bananas constitutes a restriction on imports
of MFN bananas, which are denied access to the duty-free quota.
101. Regarding Article XIII:1, Ecuador rejects th e European Communities' argument that "the
tariff quota does not restrict, but rather helps Ec uador and the other MFN suppliers to the EC."
146
Ecuador argues that the Panel correctly found that ba nanas of MFN origin are treated less favourably
because they have no access to the zero-duty tariff quota granted for ACP bananas, and that the
preferential tariff quota granted by the European Communities to the ACP countries is inconsistent
with Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994.
102. According to Ecuador, certain previous waiver s from Article I referred to by the European
Communities do not demonstrate that there was "a common understanding that exclusion from a
preferential tariff quota is not inconsistent with Article XIII".
147 In Ecuador's view, the existence of
these waivers cannot constitute a legal basis for the Appellate Body to reverse its prior interpretation
of Article XIII, because all these waivers "were all in existence when the EC's preferential tariff
quotas were addressed by the Panel and the Appellate Body in [ EC – ] Bananas III , yet were not
deemed to affect the proper interpretation of Article XIII in accordance with the interpretive
principles of the [ Vienna Convention]".148 Ecuador further contends that the European Communities
itself received a waiver from Article XIII in order to maintain its discriminatory tariff quota reserved
for ACP bananas, showing that the most recent WT O practice revealed that it was necessary to obtain
a separate waiver for discriminatory tariff quotas.
103. Regarding Article XIII:2, Ecuador disagrees w ith the European Communities' interpretation
that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 gives rights to onl y Members that are subject to a particular tariff
quota. Ecuador emphasizes that the text of this pr ovision does not refer to restrictions on countries,
but, rather, refers to products. In any event, Ecua dor was "plainly subject to the restrictions because
the quotas exclude[d] Ecuadorian bananas altogether from the zero duty quota". 149 Ecuador submits
that the Panel's rejection of the European Commun ities' interpretation of Article XIII was consistent
with previous decisions of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III and US – Line Pipe.150

147Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 44 (refe rring to European Communities' appellant's
submission, para.129 (Ecuador)).
150Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 47 (referring to Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.367-7.370).

(c) Nullification or Impairment with respect to Ecuador
104. Ecuador takes issue with the European Communities' claim that there was no nullification and
impairment of benefits suffered by Ecuador because the tariff quota imposed by the European
Communities limited the duty-free competition from th e ACP countries. In Ecuador's view, "[t]his
argument has no merit on policy or legal grounds."
151 Ecuador argues that the alternative available to
the European Communities in order to act consistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 was not to
eliminate the tariff quota giving ACP bananas duty-free access, but, rather, "to allow Ecuador
unlimited access to the duty free quota".
152 Ecuador also submits that the European Communities
failed to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU, because
"it is well settled that such a policy argument w ould not rebut the presumption of nullification or
impairment, which is not a question of [actual] trade flows, but rather of [trade] opportunities."153
C. Arguments of the United States – Appellee and Third Participant
1. Article 9.3 of the DSU
105. The United States argues that the Panel acted with in its margin of discretion when it decided
to maintain different timetables for the United Stat es case and the Ecuador case. The United States
submits that the Panel was correct in taking into account that the present proceedings are compliance
proceedings, which, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, are supposed to be completed within
90 days. The United States disagrees with the Europ ean Communities' contention that Article 9.3 of
the DSU provides an "absolute and unqualified" 154 obligation with respect to the harmonization of
timetables. Instead, the United States contends, th e Panel's obligation was qualified by the terms
"to the greatest extent possible" in Article 9.3. In the United States' view, the Panel "carefully
considered" the request for harmonization "and reached an appropriate decision that addressed all the
procedural issues implicated by the EC's request".155
106. The United States further submits that the Panel did make adjustments to the timetable in
order to protect the due process rights of the parties. The Panel made clear that it initially intended to
harmonize the timetables, but was not able to find a better alternative to the one it adopted. The
United States maintains that, in particular, the Pa nel ensured that replies to questions and comments

154European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 20 (US) (referred to in United States' appellee's
submission, paras. 122 and 123).

on replies in the United States case were received before the issuance of the interim report in the
Ecuador case. The United States submits that this prevented the arguments of the parties from being
influenced by advance knowledge of the findings of the Panel in the Ecuador case.
156 The United
States also asserts that an appellant requesting reve rsal of a panel's ruling on matters of procedure
must demonstrate the prejudice generated by that legal ruling, and that the European Communities has
failed to do so. 157 Moreover, the United States contends that Article 9.3 does not require a panel to
provide an objective justification for its decision on a request for harmonization; nonetheless, the
Panel did in fact provide an "explanation as to why it was unable to harmonize the timetables". 158
Finally, the United States contends that, even if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding
relating to Article 9.3 of the DSU, that reversal s hould have no effect on the merits of the dispute or
the substantive findings of the Panel.
2. Legal Effect of the Understanding on Bananas
107. The United States argues that the Panel did not set out three "conditions" that every mutually
agreed solution must meet. Rather, the United States contends, the Panel explained on the basis of the
"three reasons taken together" why the Understanding did not have the effect of barring the United
States from initiating compliance proceedings.159
108. With respect to the Panel's first reason—that the Understanding provides only for the means,
that is, a series of future steps, for resolving a nd settling the dispute—the United States maintains that
the Panel merely set out the facts based on a correct reading of the terms of the Understanding. The
United States submits that the Panel did not, as th e European Communities asserts, set a "condition"
that only agreements recording measures that have already been implemented can qualify as mutually
agreed solutions.160 With respect to the Panel's second reason—that the Understanding was concluded
subsequent to recommendations, rulings, and sugges tions by the DSB—the United States argues that
the Panel did not set this as a "condition" but, rather, used it as relevant historical context for
assessing the European Communities' preliminary objection.
161 Finally, with regard to the Panel's
third reason—that the parties have made conf licting communications to the DSB concerning the
Understanding on Bananas—the United States again cont ends that the Panel had not identified that
fact as a "condition". In the United States' view, th e Panel had correctly taken into account that the

156United States' appellee's submission, para. 121 (referring to US Panel Report, para. 7.11).
159United States' appellee's submission, para. 57 (original emphasis) (referring to US Panel Report,
para. 7.107).

United States disagrees with the European Communities' characteri zation of the Understanding as a
"mutually agreed solution".162
109. The United States takes issue with the European Communities' allegation that "the Panel has
'introduce[d] an erroneous limitation on the types of other "legally binding agreements" that can be
enforceable and produce full legal effects in the WTO legal order.'
 "163 The United States submits that
the Panel did not introduce such a limitation; rather, the Panel merely found that, in the context of the
present case, the United States was not precluded from having recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
because the Understanding between the United States and the European Communities did not provide
for such a preclusion.
110. According to the United States, the European Communities' position would have the
consequence that a responding party that failed to comply with the terms of a mutually agreed
solution could claim immunity from further proceedings by virtue of the legal effect of mutually
agreed solutions, as well as from a claim under the mu tually agreed solution itself, because mutually
agreed solutions are not "covered agreements". The United States emphasizes, however, that the DSU
does not foresee such a limitation of the complainant's rights.
111. The United States also submits that the Panel di d not err in its interpretation and application
of the principle of good faith provided for in Article 3.10 of the DSU. The United States contends
that the Panel was correct in relying on past panel and Appellate Body reports when finding that there
must be something "more than mere violation" of a substantive provision of the covered agreements
before a Member may be found to have failed to act in good faith.164
112. Finally, with respect to the European Commun ities' claim pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU
that the Panel failed to provide any justification fo r rejecting its claim based on the principle of good
faith, the United States submits that, since the Eu ropean Communities' Notice of Appeal does not
contain a reference to Article 11 of the DSU, that claim is outside the scope of this appeal.165

163United States' appellee's submission, para. 65 (quoting European Communities' appellant's
submission, para. 87 (US)).
164United States' appellee's submission, para. 76 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment), para. 297; and Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.35).

3. Measure Taken to Comply

113. The United States submits that the Panel did not err in finding that the EC Bananas Import
Regime was a "measure taken to comply" w ith the DSB recommendations and rulings in EC –
Bananas III. The United States maintains that the "str ucture and language" of the Understanding on
Bananas indicate that its purpose was to commit th e European Communities to bring itself into WTO
compliance on 1 January 2006. The United States argues that the reference to the Doha Article XIII
Waiver in paragraph E of the U nderstanding demonstrates an agreement between the parties to the
Understanding that further measures beyond the inte rim tariff quota-based regime would be necessary
for the European Communities to achieve complianc e with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB in the original proceedings.
114. The United States contends that its commitment to terminate retaliation upon the introduction
of a tariff quota-based import regime under subparagraph C.2 of the Understanding did not indicate an
agreement by the United States to regard the European Communities' interim regime as the final
implementation of the original DSB recommendations and rulings. The United States asserts that it
terminated only the imposition of retaliatory duties but that the multilateral authorization to suspend
concessions had not been revoked. The United St ates maintains that a complainant may choose
whether and to what extent to make use of the WTO authorization to suspend concessions, and that,
therefore, the complainant's decision not to exer cise that right does not imply the complainant's
acceptance that the respondent's measures have become consistent with its WTO obligations.
115. The United States disagrees with the European Communities that there was no link between
the contested measure and the DSB recommendations and rulings in EC – Bananas III . The United
States submits that the European Communities ag reed through the terms of the Understanding on
Bananas to take certain interim steps culminating in a tariff-only regime by 1 January 2006. In the
United States' view, this demonstrated that a "clear link"
166 existed between the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in EC – Bananas III and the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the present
dispute.
116. According to the United States, the Panel did not err in taking into account the findings of the
panels in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) and EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – EC) , and
the decision by the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) , when assessing whether
the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the current dispute constituted a "measure taken to

comply" with the DSB recommendations and rulings in EC – Bananas III .167 The United States
points to the Appellate Body's statement in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II that "adopted panel
reports create legitimate expectations and should be taken into account when relevant".168 In addition,
the United States contends that the Panel merely used these reports as evidence of the link between
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the or iginal proceedings and the EC Bananas Import
Regime at issue in the present dispute.
117. With respect to the European Communities claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU when it relied on suggestions made by the panel in EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador), the United States argues that this claim is not properly before the Appellate
Body because it was not included in the European Communities' Notice of Appeal.
4. Repeal of the Challenged Measure
118. The United States contends that the Panel did not err in making findings with respect to
EC Regulation 1964/2005, even though that Regulat ion was repealed during the course of the Panel
proceedings. The United States submits that a comp liance panel is tasked with determining whether
measures taken to comply exist, and, when such measures exist, whether they comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 169 The United States maintains that the Panel properly
concluded that the challenged measure failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB in the original proceedings. In the United States' view, these findings were sufficient and the
Panel did not need to make a recommendation. The United States therefore requested at the interim
review stage that the Panel's recommendation be deleted from its Report.
119. With respect to the European Communities' claim under Article 11 of the DSU that the Panel
failed to assess correctly the facts of the case by not taking into account the repeal of EC Regulation
1964/2005, the United States alleges that the European Communities improperly raises this claim
because it was not included in its No tice of Appeal. In addition, th e United States maintains that the
European Communities introduced evidence regarding the repeal of EC Regulation 1964/2005 only at
the interim review stage of the Panel proceedi ngs. In the United States' view, the European
Communities thereby acted inconsistently with th e limitations regarding the introduction of new
evidence at the interim review stage as stipulated in paragraph 11 of the Pa nel's Working Procedures,

167United States' appellee's submission, para. 90 (r eferring to European Communities' appellant's
submission, paras. 53-60 (US)).
168United States' appellee's submission, para. 90 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 108).
169United States' appellee's submission, para. 113 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – FSC

and in Article 15.2 of the DSU, and affirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs
Matters.
170
5. Article II of the GATT 1994
120. The United States contends, as a third participant, that, in the event that the Appellate Body
reverses the Panel's finding that the European Communities violated Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994, the Appellate Body should also reverse the Panel's finding that the European Communities'
tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt expired by ope ration of the first sentence of paragraph 9 of
the Bananas Framework Agreement. The United St ates argues that, as a consequence, the European
Communities' applied tariff would nonetheless be in breach of the European Communities' obligations
under Article II of the GATT 1994.
121. The United States contends that paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement does not
stipulate that the concession with which the agreemen t was associated would be of a limited duration.
The United States alleges that the Panel erroneously equated the Bananas Framework Agreement with
the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt when it found that the Bananas Framework Agreement
"automatically impl[ied]"171 that the concession expired at the same time as the Bananas Framework
Agreement. The United States maintains that the tariff quota concession is set out not only in the
Bananas Framework Agreement, but also in the Eu ropean Communities' Schedule, and that, as such,
it applies to all WTO Members. The United States su bmits that the expiry of the Bananas Framework
Agreement alone could not extinguish a concession inscribed in a WTO Member's Schedule. In
support of its argument, the United States makes reference to notifications by the European
Communities pursuant to Article XXVIII:5 of th e GATT 1994 made in July 2004 and January 2005,
in which the European Communities itself referre d to the intention to withdraw "concessions" on
bananas.172 In addition, the United States maintains that , in the context of the arbitration established
under the Annex on Bananas to the Doha Article I Waiver, the European Communities proposed to
modify its "current ... WTO Commitments". 173 The United States contends that such an expression

170United States' appellee's submission, paras. 114-116 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
Selected Customs Matters, para. 259).
171United States' third participant's submission, para. 8.
172United States' third participant's submission, para. 12 (referring to Communication from the
European Communities of 15 July 2004, Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European
Communities, G/SECRET/22; and Communication from the European Communities of 31 January 2005,
Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities, Addendum, G/SECRET/22/Add.1).
See also Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 34, fourth bullet.
173United States' third participant's submission, para. 12 (quoting European Communities' written
communication of 13 May 2005 in the arbitration in EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Panel Exhibit
ECU-4), para. 9 (emphasis added by the United States omitted)).

could not have referred to what the European Communities now claims is its only concession, namely,
the €680/mt tariff rate.
122. The United States further asserts that the text of the Understanding on Bananas, as well as the
Doha Article I Waiver, provide supplementary m eans supporting the conclusion that the European
Communities' concession did not expire along with the Bananas Framework Agreement.
6. Article XIII of the GATT 1994
123. The United States submits that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of
Article XIII of the GATT 1994. In the United States' view, the European Communities' argument that
a cap on a tariff preference does not make it a tari ff quota and that the two regimes (the ACP tariff
quota and the MFN tariff) must be examined separatel y, should be rejected in these proceedings as
they have been "some four times before".174 The United States agrees with the Panel that, "[w]hile the
EC measure subject to this proceeding may be simpler than the EC's prior bananas import regimes"175,
nothing in the text of Article XIII:5 suggests that the EC Bananas Import Regime was not subject to
the disciplines of Article XIII:1 and 2. Emphasizing the use of the term "any"' in front of the term
"tariff quota" and the fact that Article XIII:5 refers to "tariff quota" in the singular, the United States
submits that Article XIII:5 does not condition the a pplicability of Article XIII only to instances in
which "all imports" of the product subject to the tariff quota are "effected through the allocation of
tariff quotas". 176 The United States also argues that the Panel properly understood and applied the
findings of the Appellate Body in the original pr oceedings: whilst the original case dealt with a
regime where all imports were "effected through the allocation of tariff quotas" 177, the Appellate
Body' reasoning in the original proceedings continues to be relevant.
124. The United States further supports the Panel's finding that the EC Bananas Import Regime
violated Article XIII:1. The United States reiter ates that the European Communities' position cannot
be reconciled with the Appellate Body's reasoning in respect of the "separate regimes" argument in
EC – Bananas III .178 The United States emphasizes the panel and Appellate Body findings in the
original proceedings that the European Comm unities' measure was a tariff quota subject to
Article XIII and that "Article XIII:1 itself cont ains a non-discrimination requirement when a tariff

176United States' appellee's submission, para. 17 (quoting European Communities' appellant's
submission, para. 135 (US)).

quota is used".
179 Therefore, according to the United Stat es, the European Communities cannot avoid
the obligations of Article XIII by carving out a port ion of its market for preferential access without
any multilateral controls over how the carve-out a ffects access into the sam e market for "like"
products from other suppliers. The United States agrees with the Panel that Article XIII:5 makes clear
that the obligation of Article XIII:1 applies to the ACP tariff quotas, even if MFN suppliers were
subject to a tariff-only regime. The United States argues that the "restriction" in the present case is
the quantitative limit on a benefit (that is, zero-dut y access) available only to the ACP countries;
given that the MFN countries "are completely deni ed access to this benefit", they are therefore
"restricted" in their access to the European Communitie s' market for bananas and clearly not "treated
equally" as the ACP countries. 180 The United States also points out that the Appellate Body found in
the original proceedings that a waiver from Article I of the GATT 1994 covering a preferential tariff
quota cannot be read to "excuse" that tariff quota from the obligations of Article XIII. Therefore, any
waiver covering preferential tariff quotas cannot establish "the common understanding on the part of
the GATT contracting parties and WTO Members that exclusion from a preferential tariff quota does
not constitute an infringement of Article XIII".181
125. Finally, the United States rejects the European Communities' argument that Article XIII:2 is
solely concerned with quantitative restrictions. The United States refers to the Appellate Body's
explanation in the original proceedings that Article XIII:2 "is logically concerned with the market for
the product and what restrictions may be applied to that market". 182 The United States concludes that
the EC Bananas Import Regime subject to this proceeding contained an import restriction in the form
of the preferential tariff quota for ACP bananas. Therefore, the European Communities was required
to follow the allocation rules set forth in Article X III:2. According to the United States, the European
Communities' argument that the preference cannot be considered inconsistent with the chapeau of
Article XIII:2 because the United States' share of trade in bananas with the European Communities,
with or without the preference, is zero, is simply a "different version of the EC's procedural argument
that the United States suffers no nullification or impairment".183

179United States' appellee's submission, paras. 22-25.
181United States' appellee's submission, para. 39 (r eferring to European Communities' appellant's
submission, para. 146 (US)).

7. Nullification or Impairment with respect to the United States
126. The United States rejects the European Communities' claim that the Panel erred in concluding
that the United States had suffered nullification or im pairment. According to the United States, it was
not the Panel who confused "standing" with "nu llification or impairment", but the European
Communities itself who "confused" the issues by argui ng that, as a threshold matter, the Panel needed
to determine whether the United States had "standing " to bring this proceeding and, if so and if it
found a violation, "whether 'there is nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to the United
States for which the European Communities can face suspension of concessions'".184
127. The United States recalls that the Appellate Body already rejected similar arguments made by
the European Communities in the or iginal proceedings. The United States argues that, considering
that these are compliance proceedings under Article 21. 5 of the DSU, the findings of the Appellate
Body in the original proceedings form the basis for the rulings and recommendations addressed to the
European Communities in this dispute.
128. Citing the Appellate Body's affirma tion of the GATT panel's reasoning in US – Superfund ,
the United States submits that a showing of adverse trade effect s is unnecessary for the purposes of
demonstrating that a breach of a GATT provision results in the nullification or impairment of
benefits.185 The United States argues that the clear brea ches of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994
obviate the need for the United States to demonstr ate affirmatively the trade effects caused by the
European Communities' banana measures. For the Un ited States, to make a finding of nullification or
impairment, it is sufficient that the United States is a producer of bananas, has a potential export
interest, and its internal market for bananas could also be affected by the effects of the European
Communities' measures on world supplies and world prices of bananas. The United States further
submits that "these realities have not changed" 186, and the Panel did not err in relying on the findings
of the panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings.
129. The United States disagrees with the European Communities that nullification or impairment
was found to exist in the original proceedings onl y because of the violations of the GATS. The
United States contends that, in the original pro ceedings, the Appellate Body clearly found that the
United States was justified to make claims under the GATT 1994. Finally, the United States submits
that the European Communities confused the issue of the existence of nullification or impairment as a

184United States' appellee's submission, para. 95 (quoting European Communities' first written
submission to the Panel).
185United States' appellee's submission, paras. 96-98 (referring to GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund,
para. 5.19).

result of a violation under Article 3.8 of the DS U with the issue of what the actual level of
nullification or impairment is under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
187
8. Notice of Appeal
130. The United States contends that the European Communities' Notice of Appeal does not satisfy
the requirements of Rule 20(2)(d)(iii) of the Working Procedures because it does not contain an
indicative list of the paragraphs of the Panel Re port containing the alleged errors, as required under
that Rule. 188 The United States further submits that compliance of the Notice of Appeal with
Rule 20(2)(d)(i) is doubtful because several paragra phs of the Notice of Appeal speak of "erroneous
findings" of the Panel without identifying wh ich findings are alleged to be erroneous. 189 The United
States requests the Appellate Body to dismiss the appeal on this basis.
131. Further, the United States maintains that the Notice of Appeal makes no mention of Article 11
of the DSU. In the event that the Appellate B ody does not dismiss the appeal in its entirety, the
United States solicits the Appellate Body to c onsider the European Communities' claims under
Article 11 as not properly before it, in keeping with the Appellate Body's treatment of this issue in a
previous appeal.190
D. Claims of Error by Ecuador – Other Appellant
1. Article II of the GATT 1994
132. Ecuador's other appeal is conditional upon the Appellate Body reversing the Panel's
conclusions under Article II of the GATT 1994 on th e basis of the issues appealed by the European
Communities. In that event, Ecuador requests the A ppellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that
the tariff quota concession of the European Comm unities on bananas was intended to expire on
31 December 2002 by virtue of paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, and to find,
instead, that the concession remains in effect, and c onsequently to uphold the Panel's conclusion that
the European Communities is applying its duty at a level inconsistent with Article II:1(b).

187United States' appellee's submission, para. 102-104 (referring to United States' response to Panel
Question 24).
189In particular, the United States takes issue with paragraph 2(a), (c), and (d) of the Notice of Appeal.
190United States' appellee's submission, para. 133 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 75).

133. Ecuador submits that there is consistent a nd overwhelming interpretative evidence that no
WTO Member (including the European Communities) has ever argued that, or acted as if, the
European Communities' concession for bananas e xpired on 31 December 2002, until the European
Communities itself made this argument in its rebuttal submission to this Panel. In Ecuador's view, the
action and inaction of WTO Members individually (including the European Communities) and
collectively could only be considered absurd if they were done with the understanding that the
concession would expire on 31 December 2002, or had expired as of that date.
191
134. Ecuador argues that the Panel's interpretation do es not give effect to all the terms of the
concession and ignores critical context. Ecuador disag rees with the Panel's characterization of the
concession as the "quota of 2.2 million mt at a bound rate of €75/mt" and that the "terms, conditions
and qualifications" that the concession is subject to is "the Bananas Framework Agreement". 192
According to Ecuador, the €75/mt duty is subject to various conditions as set out in the European
Communities' Schedule, including, but not limited to , those specified in column 7, which does not
read "terms and conditions", but "Other Terms and Conditions", thus indicating that those terms and
conditions "indicated" in the Annex are "in addition" to the terms set out in the first six columns.193
135. Ecuador disagrees with the Panel's finding that all the elements of the European Communities'
concession are restated in the Bananas Framework Agreement, pointing out that elements such as the
final tariff rate and quota quantity were not. Ecuador claims that the Panel failed to take into account
that the Appellate Body had found in the original proceedings that most of the terms and conditions
set out in the Bananas Framework Agreement we re inconsistent with the GATT 1994. Ecuador
questions the Panel's failure to attribute any signi ficance to "the nullification of the terms for which
the [Bananas Framework Agreement] provides by far the most detail". 194 Ecuador agrees with the
Panel that the concession cannot be read in isol ation from the Bananas Framework Agreement, as
contained in the Annex referred to in column 7. However, in Ecuador's view, the European
Communities' tariff quota concession is not provided in column 7 alone, and may not be read as
simply comprising the Bananas Framework Agreemen t without regard to other elements of the
concession.

191Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 5.
192Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 18 (referring to Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.424).
193Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 20. (original emphasis)
194Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 23.

136. Ecuador claims that the Panel erred in finding that the expiration of the Bananas Framework
Agreement "would automatically imply [the] expi ration of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession under the terms of its Schedule."
195 According to Ecuador, "it is legally possible ... to set a
time limit as a condition of a concession" 196 when this is done clearly, which was not the case with
paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement.
137. Ecuador argues that it is possible to give le gal effect to paragr aph 9 of the Bananas
Framework Agreement without invalidating th e entire European Communities' tariff quota
concession. According to Ecuador, a plausible interp retation of paragraph 9 would be that the other
terms and conditions set out in the Bananas Fram ework Agreement, such as the quota allocation
provisions, would expire on 31 December 2002, leaving only the €75/mt duty concession for
2.2 million mt. In support of this argument, Ecuador argues that, given the obligations of Article XIII,
Members cannot expect to retain quota allocation rights indefinitely.
138. Ecuador submits that its interpretation of th e Bananas Framework Agreement as containing a
quota allocation with a time-limit would not re duce paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework
Agreement to inutility; rather, it would "give effect to all the word s of the concession, including, but
not limited to, the [Bananas Framework Agreement] as it was incorporated" into the European
Communities' Schedule. Ecuador argues that its interpretation would also avoid the "completely
implausible"197 interpretation of the common intention of the WTO Members with regard to the
concession of 1994 until the Members extended the concession in 2002.
139. Ecuador further refers to evidence supporti ng the proposition that the concession was never
intended to expire on account of paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framew ork Agreement. In particular,
Ecuador argues that: (i) a time-limited minimum access commitment would have been directly
contrary to the Modalities Paper that guided the Ur uguay Round negotiations; (ii) the Doha Article I
Waiver was based on the premise that, and re quired that, the concession remain bound unless and
until rebound; (iii) numerous statements made by the European Communities and by arbitrators in
2005 acknowledged or were based on the continued binding character of the concession under
Article II; and (iv) the European Communities file d Article XXVIII:5 notifications, in July 2004 and
in January 2005, on the assumption that the tariff quota concession was still in force.
198 I n t h i s
respect, Ecuador notes that, in these notifications, the European Communities announced its intention

195Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 26.
196Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 27.
197Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 32.
198See Notifications, supra, footnote 172.

to withdraw concessions (in the plural). Ecuador further contends that no Member would invoke
Article XXVIII:5 procedures to lower its bound rate.199
140. Ecuador argues that the Panel's view of the object and purpose of the covered agreements
does not add any weight to the Panel's erroneous inte rpretation of the first sentence of paragraph 9 of
the Bananas Framework Agreement. According to Ecuador, the Panel read the object and purpose of
the Bananas Framework Agreement broadly and emphasized the objective therein of "promoting
security and predictability of international trade" in order to justify its conclusions regarding
paragraph 9. Ecuador contends, however, that the objectives of "expanding trade in goods and
services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements" 200, would be harmed by implying the termination of the concession.
Moreover, Ecuador argues that, in its analysis of the object and purpose of the WTO agreements in
relation to the European Communities' tariff quota c oncession, the Panel failed to consider the stated
purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture , which in its preamble states the intent of creating a
"reform process" that would enable "substantial progressive reductions" in protection over time.201
E. Arguments of the European Communities – Appellee
1. Article II of the GATT 1994
141. The European Communities contends that Ecua dor's other appeal is "conditional" and,
therefore, the Appellate Body will have to examine it only if the Appellate Body accepts the European
Communities' appeal of the Panel's findings on the pu rported effects of the Doha Article I Waiver on
the tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions.202
142. The European Communities agrees with the Pa nel's conclusion that the tariff binding on
bananas in the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions "was unequivocally intended to
expire on 31 December 2002". 203 In the European Communities' view, Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994 expressly provides that WTO Members may legally grant concessions subject to "terms,
conditions and qualifications". Mo reover, it is well settled that a time limitation in the duration of a
concession qualifies as a "term, condition or qualification". 204 For these reasons, the European

199Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 34.
200Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 29.
201Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 30. (emphasis omitted)
202European Communities' appellee's submission, para . 1 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador's other
appellant's submission, para. 38).
203European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 5 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.436).
204European Communities' appellee's submission, para . 8 (Ecuador) (referring to GATT Panel Report,
US – Sugar Waiver, para.5.8).

Communities disagrees with Ecuador that "grant[i ng] a 'time-limited access commitment for an
agricultural product' would qualify as a 'contextual s hock' and would be a 'completely implausible,
even absurd interpretation of the common intention of the WTO members.'"
205
143. The European Communities argues that it is co mmon practice for WTO Members to include
"terms, conditions and qualifications" of their concessions either in the section of "headnotes" (usually
when they apply to all concessions in the specific pa rt or section of the Schedule) or in "annexes"
(usually when they apply to a specific concession or group of concessions). The European
Communities further contends that reference to the corresponding "annex" is usually found in the
column entitled "comments" or "other terms and conditions". According to the European
Communities, all terms of a Schedule have the same legal value, irrespective of whether they are
placed under the columns of a specific section, in the "headnotes" to the section, or in the "annexes" to
the section. Therefore, the Panel was correct in concluding that the Eur opean Communities' tariff
quota concession for bananas provided in column 7 of Part I, Section I-B of the European
Communities' Schedule
206 cannot be read in isolation from the terms in the Bananas Framework
Agreement, annexed to Eur opean Communities' Schedule. 207 The European Communities further
claims that the text of the Annex clearly provided for a time limitation of the concession (that is, 31
December 2002), and that the context of the Annex also fully confirmed this interpretation of the text.
144. Contrary to Ecuador's claim, the European Co mmunities contends that the structure of WTO
Members' GATT Schedules of Concessions makes clear that Column 7 is the most appropriate place
to include the reference to "term, condition and qualification". The European Communities disagrees
with Ecuador's argument that the time limitati on should not apply to the European Communities'
Schedule because it is placed in the Annex and not on the same page of the Schedule with the
columns. In the European Communities' view, this argument should be rejected because it would
create confusion as to the legal effects of "terms, conditions or qualifications", which are not placed in
the "columns" of WTO Members' Schedules due to space constraints.
145. Moreover, the European Communities submits th at the tariff on bananas from Ecuador and
other MFN supplier countries, applied in the period between the end of 2002 and the end of 2005, was
not intended to be bound in the Schedule of Conces sions. The European Communities argues that the
more favourable tariff treatment was applied only as a consequence of the Understanding on Bananas

205European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 21 (Ecuador).
206The relevant excerpts from Part I, Section I-B of the European Communities' Schedule LXXX are
reproduced in Annex VI attached to this Report.
207European Communities' appellee's submission, pa ra. 12 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel
Report, para. 7.426).

agreed to in 2001, and that Ecuador cannot use the European Communities' good faith implementation
of the terms of the Understanding against the Eu ropean Communities and seek to transform that
applied favourable rate into a bound rate.
146. The European Communities further contends that the text and context of the Schedule could
not be modified or interpreted by the descrip tion of the European Communities' bananas import
regime in the 2005 arbitration proceedings under the Annex on Bananas to the Doha Article I Waiver,
because such proceedings took place outside the rules of the DSU and the object was not to determine
the banana concession bound in the European Comm unities' Schedule. The European Communities
submits that, the fact it engaged in negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, does
not alter the fact that the concession expired in December 2002. The European Communities argues
that Members can initiate Article XXVIII negotiations al so with the intention of lowering their tariff.
The European Communities had started Article X XVIII negotiations in order to implement its
commitments under the terms of the Understandings on Bananas agreed to with Ecuador and the
United States in 2001. Finally, the European Communities argues that the Panel could not have relied
on the Modalities Paper to interpret the Europ ean Communities' Schedule, because the Modalities
Paper itself provides that it shall "not be used as a basis for dispute settlement proceedings".208
147. The European Communities, ther efore, asks the Appellate Body to reject Ecuador's other
appeal and to uphold the Panel's finding that the tariff quota concession in the European Communities'
Schedule of Concessions expired at the end of 2002.
F. Arguments of the Third Participants
1. ACP Countries
148. Certain ACP countries (the "ACP Countries" 209) assert that the Understandings on Bananas
have put an end to the disputes on bananas and, th erefore, prevent the parties to the Understandings
from subsequently initiating compliance proceedi ngs under Article 21.5 of the DSU. The ACP
Countries further contend that these Understandings ar e binding on the parties and thus prevent them
from putting the terms of the Understandings into qu estion. The ACP Countries allege that, in both
the Ecuador and US Panel Reports, the Panel erred in its legal inte rpretation and findings concerning

208European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 30 (Ecuador) (quoting Modalities Paper, p. 1).
209In this Report, "ACP Countries" refers to the fo llowing seven countries that submitted a joint third
participants' submission in the appeal of the Ecuador Panel Report: Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname; and to these same seven countries along
with Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire that submitted a join t third participants' submission in the appeal of the
US Panel Report. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana su bmitted a separate joint third participants' submission
in the appeal of the Ecuador Panel Report.

the Understandings on Bananas. The ACP Countries submit that the methodology applied by the
Panel was not correct: in order to determine wh ether the United States was prevented from bringing
this compliance challenge, the Pa nel should have examined whethe r the Understandings constituted
mutually agreed solutions and, if not, whether they constituted legally binding agreements, and should
have analyzed the legal effects attached to th e Understanding in either case. The ACP Countries
contend that the Panel erred when it did not consider it necessary to analyze the "legal status" of the
Understandings on Bananas, and, in particular, whether they constituted mutually agreed solutions,
within the meaning of Article 3.7 of the DSU, or otherwise legally binding agreements. In the United
States case, the ACP Countries make reference to letters exchanged between the European
Communities and the United States on 29 and 30 May 2001. In the view of the ACP Countries, the
parties confirmed in these letters the "common und erstanding" of their agreement, and the United
States acknowledged having reached a mutually agreed solution with the European Communities.
210
149. The ACP Countries argue further that it was in correct for the Panel to rely on the Panel
Report in India – Autos, because the mutually agreed solution in that case did not relate to the same
matter as the dispute before the panel in India – Autos. However, the ACP Countries submit that, in
the present case, the original dispute had been settl ed by means of a mutually agreed solution, the
content of which cannot be called into question in Article 21.5 proceedings. In addition, the ACP
Countries object to the Panel's finding that the U nderstandings could preclude the complainants from
initiating Article 21.5 proceedings only if the Un derstandings constituted a "positive solution and
effective settlement" to the dispute. The ACP Coun tries submit that such a standard could not be
derived from the DSU. For the same reason, the ACP Countries disagree with the three reasons relied
upon by the Panel in its finding that the Unders tandings did not constitute an impediment for the
complainants to initiate Article 21.5 proceedings.
150. With respect to the first reason relied upon by the Panel, namely, that the Understandings on
Bananas provide only for the means, or, a series of fu ture steps, for resolving and settling the dispute,
the ACP Countries assert that mutually agreed solu tions notified to the DSB can either refer to
measures that have already been taken, or provide fo r steps still to be undertaken. In this respect, the
ACP Countries make reference to th e mutually agreed solution in Australia – Automotive Leather II
and assert that this mutually agreed solution sets out a series of elements to be undertaken in the
future.

210Third participants' submission of the ACP Countries, paras. 36 and 37 (US); Panel Exhibit EC-3.

151. Concerning the second reason, namely, that the U nderstandings were agreed to subsequent to
the recommendations, rulings, and suggestions made by the DSB in the original proceedings and
previous compliance proceedings, the ACP Countries argue that there are strong indications that
mutually agreed solutions referred to in the DSU can take place at all stages of the proceedings. In
the view of the ACP Countries, the preference ar ticulated in Article 3.7 of the DSU for mutually
agreed solutions applies generally throughout all st ages of the dispute settlement process. In that
respect, the ACP Countries draw further support fro m the title of Article 3, which is "General
Provisions".
152. With respect to the third reason, that the pa rties had made conflicti ng communications to the
DSB regarding the legal nature of the Unders tandings on Bananas after these Understandings had
been signed, the ACP Countries question the releva nce of these communications and argue that the
DSU does not require that a solution be jointly notifie d to be regarded as a mutually agreed solution.
In addition, the ACP Countries submit that the c ontent of the Understandings is more important to
determine their legal status than unilateral declarations made subsequently.
153. The ACP Countries contend that the Panel erred in both the Ecuador and US Panel Reports in
its interpretation and findings con cerning Article XIII of the GATT 1994 . In particular, they argue
that the Panel's incorrect interpretation of the te rm "restriction" led to a flawed conclusion that
Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 is applicable, when in fact the "applicable non-discrimination rule is
contained in Article I of the GATT and not in Article XIII". 211 The ACP Countries point to the
ordinary meaning and context of th e term "restriction", and submit that the existence of a restriction
"requires that a limitation be applied on the importati on of the product concerned" 212, which, under
Article XIII:1, "necessarily implies a quantitative element". 213 The ACP Countries highlight the
Panel's statement that the quantity of bananas that MFN suppliers can export is not restricted, and
submit that the Panel's interpretation of "restricti on" as including situations where a Member "is not
protected in its competitive opportunities regarding imports of like products originating from other
WTO Members, is not in line with the requirement that Article XIII only applies to 'quantitative
restrictions'".214

212Third participants' submissions of the ACP Countries, para. 54 (Ecuador), para. 51 (US). (original
emphasis)
213Third participants' submissions of the ACP Countries, para. 57 (Ecuador), para. 54 (US). (original
emphasis)

154. The ACP Countries further maintain that the Pane l failed to take into account the consistent
practice of WTO Members to impose ceilings on preferential imports and to consider them covered by
the Enabling Clause or Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. The ACP Countries contend that, if
preferential access consistent with Article I, by vi rtue of a waiver or Article XXIV, fell afoul of
Article XIII of the GATT 1994, and if this pref erential access were capped, then virtually all
preferential tariff quotas used in the context of free trade agreements would presumably be WTO-
inconsistent. In addition, the ACP Countries claim that the Panel failed to accept that Article XIII:2 is
not applicable, because the EC Bananas Import Regime did not apply any quantitative restrictions. In
respect of the US Panel Report, the ACP Countries s ubmit in the alternative that, even if the Panel's
interpretation of Article XIII:2 was correct, it woul d not be applicable to the United States as it
"[cannot] claim to have expected any market share that goes above zero in the European market".
215
155. In the Ecuador case, the ACP Countries allege that the Panel erred in finding that the
European Communities is bound by the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt at €75/mt. The ACP
Countries refer to the Panel's finding that the tari ff quota for bananas was subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the Bananas Framework Agr eement, which provided that the agreement would
expire on 31 December 2002. The ACP Countries argue that, therefore, the European Communities'
tariff quota concession for bananas had expired at the end of 2002, and that, consequently, the Panel
should have dismissed Ecuador's claim under Article II of the GATT 1994.
156. The ACP Countries also contest the Panel's inte rpretation of the Doha Article I Waiver as a
"subsequent agreement" modifying the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions. In their
view, "modification" is a concept that could not r easonably be regarded as covered by or included in
the terms "interpretation" and "application" as set forth in Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.
The ACP Countries object to the Panel's finding that the preamble of the Doha Article I Waiver
expressed the WTO Members' "common intention" that the in-quota tariff applied to bananas shall not
exceed 75€⁄mt, and that any rebinding under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 should result in at
least maintaining total market access for MFN bana na suppliers. The ACP Countries submit that this
interpretation would add obligations beyond those negotiated and accepted by the WTO Members.
157. In the United States case, the ACP Countries further submit that there is no nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to the United St ates as it does not export bananas to the European
Communities. The ACP Countries contend that, in th e original dispute, impairment was found in
relation to the European Communities' violation of its GATS commitments. However, in the present
case, GATS commitments are not at issue. The ACP Countries argue that, for the United States to

215Third participants' submission of the ACP Countries, para. 72 (US).

have suffered nullification or impairment as a re sult of a violation of the GATT 1994, the United
States would have to have an export trade in bana nas to the European Communities, which it does not
have. Therefore, the ACP Countries submit that the United States did not suffer nullification or
impairment from the EC Bananas Import Regime. The ACP Countries further argue that the United
States, in its arguments, confused the issue of nullification or impairment with the question of whether
the United States had standing.
158. At the oral hearing, Suriname argued that th e Modalities Paper could not be used as a means
to support the analysis of the ordinary meaning of the tariff quota concession for bananas because it is
not part of the European Communities' Schedul e of Concessions and, according to an express
provision in the Modalities Paper, it cannot serve as a supplementary means of interpretation in the
context of dispute settlement. Dominica contended that, if the Panel's reasoning were followed, any
cap on preferential access for the ACP Countries would also run afoul of Article XXIV:5(b) of the
GATT 1994, which precludes "more restrictive" regulations of commerce on MFN trade in the
context of the creation of a free trade agreement.
2. Brazil

159. Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures , Brazil chose not to submit a third
participant's submission. Brazil's statement at th e oral hearing focused on the legal effects of the
Understandings on Bananas and the Panel's findings with respect to Article II of the GATT 1994.
3. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana
160. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana allege th at, in the Ecuador case, the Panel failed to
properly take into account the Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001. They submit that the
Panel erred in finding that the conditions for the waiver from Article I of the GATT 1994 granted by
the Ministerial Decision on 14 November 2001 had not been met. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and
Ghana assert that the European Co mmunities had complied with the steps set out in the Annex on
Bananas to the Doha Article I Waiver.
161. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana further contend that the European Communities had
altered the level of the envisaged rebinding of the customs duty on bananas in accordance with the
decision in the arbitration proceeding pursuant to th e Annex on Bananas. They further allege that the
Panel failed to take into account a decision take n at the time of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference, according to which a regular examinati on of trade in bananas would be carried out under

the aegis of the Minister of Trade of Norway.
216 Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana contend that the
results of this monitoring process demonstrated th at market access for MFN suppliers had increased
considerably. They allege that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter by not
taking this into account.
162. According to Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gh ana, the Panel wrongly concluded that it did
not have the authority to determine whether the EC Bananas Import Regime resulted in "at least
maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers". 217 They submit that, instead, the Panel
should have examined the "trend of banana im ports coming from MFN countries occurring in 2006
and 2007 under the new regime, in comparison with t hose that had taken place within the remit of the
former regime"218 and assessed this in the light of the acces s commitments contained in the Annex to
the Doha Article I Waiver. In this respect, Came roon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana submit that banana
imports from MFN countries to the European Communities increased by 360,000 mt in 2006
compared to 2005, and by 680,000 mt in 2007 compared to 2005. 219 They further maintain that the
number of exporters from MFN countries has increa sed following the elimination of the import quota
licenses.
4. Colombia
163. Colombia argues that the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas did not
expire on 31 December 2002 and that, therefore, the EC Bananas Import Regime was inconsistent
with the European Communities' obligations under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Colombia
contends that the European Communities' Schedule provides for an indefinite 2.2 million mt tariff
quota concession for bananas that is not dependent on the Bananas Framework Agreement. However,
Colombia maintains that, while the commitments set out in the Bananas Framework Agreement
expired on 31 December 2002 pursuant to paragraph 9 of that agreement, the commitments separately
inscribed in columns 3 and 4 of the European Comm unities' Schedule did not expire on that date.
Colombia alleges that the Panel assumed that the terms of the Bananas Framework Agreement
qualified the duration of the commitments separately inscribed in columns 3 and 4.
220 According to
Colombia, if the drafters had intended to limit th e duration of the tariff quota concession for bananas,
they would have made specific reference to "conces sions inscribed in columns 3 and 4 of the EC's

216Third participants' submission of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana, para. 10 (Ecuador).
 217Third participants' submission of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana, para. 15 (Ecuador).
218Third participants' submission of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana, para. 34 (Ecuador).
219Third participants' submission of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana, para. 36 (Ecuador).
220Colombia's third participant's submission, para. 7 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel Report,
paras. 7.428-7.429).

Schedule" in paragraph 9 of th e annexed Bananas Framework Agre ement or otherwise explicitly
linked the duration of the concessions to the duration of the Bananas Framework Agreement.221
164. Colombia asserts that the Panel erred in holdi ng that Ecuador's inte rpretation would render
inutile paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement. 222 Colombia argues that the intended
effect of this paragraph was to release the European Communities from the Bananas Framework
Agreement's quota allocation commitments on 31 D ecember 2002. Colombia further asserts that
preparatory work of the GATT 1994 confirms that the European Communities is bound by an
indefinite 2.2 million mt tariff quota concession for bananas with an in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt. In
support of this argument, Colombia relies on the Modalities Paper, the draft Schedule of the European
Communities submitted in the context of the Uru guay Round negotiations, and statements by the
European Communities in the context of the arb itration established under the Annex on Bananas to
the Doha Article I Waiver. Colombia contends th at such "pronouncements" by WTO Members are to
be taken into account as subsequent "practice" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention.223
5. Japan
165. Japan agrees with the Panel's finding that the Understandings on Bananas did not preclude
Ecuador and the United States from initiating complian ce proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU. Yet, Japan takes issue with some of the underlying legal interpretations and reasoning
developed by the Panel, in particular, with the "three reasons" for which the Panel found that the
Understandings did not constitute a legal impediment for the complainants to initiate compliance
proceedings.
166. Japan supports the Panel's finding that a mutually agreed solution must be consistent with the
covered agreements. However, with respect to the Panel's finding that the Understandings on
Bananas could not bar the complainants from in itiating compliance proceedings because they were
adopted subsequent to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original proceedings, Japan
questions why the timing of the settlement should be an important factor in determining whether the
Understandings would constitute an impediment to the initiation of compliance proceedings. With
regard to the Panel's reliance on the fact that the parties made conflicting communications to the WTO
about the Understandings on Bananas, Japan considers that a party should not be allowed to declare a

221Colombia's third participant's submission, para. 8 (Ecuador).
222Colombia's third participant's submission, para. 9 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.436).
223Colombia's third participant's submission, para. 28 (Ecuador).

solution unilaterally and notify a settlement agreem ent to prevent another party from bringing a
compliance dispute. Japan contends that, unless the parties to a mutually agreed solution explicitly
relinquish their rights under the DSU in the mutually agreed solution, that solution should not be
interpreted as barring the complaining party from pursuing challenges in WTO dispute settlement.
Japan maintains that, in the context of the presen t case, the Understandings on Bananas do not have
such effect.
167. Japan further agrees with the Panel in the di spute initiated by the United States that the
EC Bananas Import Regime was a "measure taken to comply" with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB in the original proceedings and thus fell within the purview of compliance proceedings
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DS U. Japan contends that the ti ming, nature, and effect of the
EC Bananas Import Regime, as well as the fact that paragraph A of the U nderstandings on Bananas
identifies the EC Bananas Import Regime as a measur e "by which the long standing dispute over the
EC's banana import regime can be resolved", are ev idence of a "particularly close relationship" of the
EC Bananas Import regime with the ruling and recommendations of the DSB.
224
168. Finally, in the United States case, Japan further supports the Panel's rejection of the European
Communities' preliminary objection as to the standing of the United States to initiate a dispute and the
alleged lack of nullification or impa irment of benefits suffered by the United States. In this respect,
Japan maintains that the Panel correctly conclude d that the European Communities had not rebutted
the presumption in Article 3.8 of the DSU pursuant to which the EC Bananas Import Regime nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to the United States.
6. Mexico
169. Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures , Mexico chose not to submit a third
participant's submission. At the oral hearing, Mexico's comments focused on the legal effects of
mutually agreed solutions and the legal status of "suggestions" made by a panel pursuant to
Article 19.1 of the DSU.
7. Panama and Nicaragua
170. Panama and Nicaragua submit that the Panel correctly found that the ACP preferential tariff
quota violates Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994. According to Panama and Nicaragua, if
discriminatory preferential tariff quotas were permitted to escape Article XIII disciplines on the

224Japan's third participant's submission, para. 23 (US) (referring to Understanding on Bananas (US),
WT/DS27/59, G/C/W/270, para. A).

grounds that other excluded non-preferred suppliers were subject to a "different tariff rate", there
would be no limit to the trade restrictions caused by the quantitative element of preferred tariff
quotas.225
171. In relation to the Ecuador Panel Report, Panama and Nicaragua request the Appellate Body to
reject the European Communities' preliminary alle gation that the "second suggestion" of the first
Ecuador Article 21.5 panel barred the Panel in these proceedings from assessing the new European
Communities' tariff quota under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
172. Regarding Article XIII of the GATT 1994, Panama and Nicaragua disagree with the
European Communities' argument that the Panel mi sinterpreted the notion of "restriction" in
Article XIII:1. Panama and Nicaragua argue that the Panel correctly determined that an exclusive
preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP suppliers that denies all access for MFN countries
represents a "restriction" on those MFN suppliers w ithin the meaning of Article XIII:1. Panama and
Nicaragua submit that the Panel correctly found, on the basis of Article XIII:5, that Article XIII
applies to "any tariff quota", irrespective of whether a similar quantitative restriction is also applied to
other Members. In their view, this interpretation of Article XIII is consistent with the findings of the
Appellate Body in the original EC – Bananas III proceedings.
226
173. Panama and Nicaragua argue that Article XIII provides for strict non-discrimination
requirements, so that, when the European Communities applied a quan titative limit to its ACP tariff
preference, it was "very much ' obliged' to satisfy the Article XIII non-discrimination (i.e., MFN)
'rule'."227 Panama and Nicaragua also contend that there is no WTO waiver practice revealing a
"common understanding" among WTO Members that preferential tariff quotas are exempt from
Article XIII. On the contrary, they s ubmit that recent waiver practice after the EC – Bananas III case
clearly demonstrates that preferential tariff quotas re quire a waiver from Article XIII, including the
waiver requested by the European Communities for the preferential ACP tariff quota pursuant to the
Understandings on Bananas.
174. Panama and Nicaragua argue that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 applies regardless of whether
there are several tariff quotas or a single tariff quo ta to which MFN suppliers are denied access.
Panama and Nicaragua also submit that the Eu ropean Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota
violated the obligation in the chapeau of Article XIII :2 "to 'aim at a distribution of trade' in bananas

226Third participants' submissions of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 35 (Ecuador), para. 22 (US) (quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 190).

resembling the shares that would have occurred 'in th e absence of' that restriction", because it granted
a market share to ACP non-substantial suppliers that was not accorded to other suppliers.
228
Regarding Article XIII:2(d), Panama and Nicaragua contend that the European Communities could
not have made an allocation to any substantia l MFN supplier based on a "representative period"
because the European Communities' market had been subject to continuous discrimination, which
made it impossible to define a "previous representative period".229
175. In relation to the US Panel Report, Panama a nd Nicaragua contend that the Panel correctly
applied the previous findings in EC – Bananas III regarding the issues of "nullification or
impairment" and "standing". 230 Moreover, Panama and Nicaragua consider that the Panel did not
have to explain how the United States' potential export interest and internal market would be affected
because "the findings of US – Superfund ... established that a claim of no or insignificant trade effects
is irrelevant to nullification or impairment."231
176. Panama and Nicaragua also request the Appellate Body to reject the European Communities'
claim that the presumption of nullification or impairment caused by the discriminatory quantitative
limit can be considered one and the same with the nullification and impairment under Article I. In
Panama's and Nicaragua's view, the European Communities' concern of "additional or double counted
nullification or impairment" is misplaced because it "confuses [the matter of] the nullification or
impairment established by an infringement under the cover agreements with the level of nullification
or impairment separately addressed under Article 22 of the DSU" which is not at issue in the present
case.
232
177. Panama and Nicaragua support the Panel's c onclusion that the European Communities'
Schedule of Concession did not expire on 31 Decembe r 2002 (the termination date of the Bananas
Framework Agreement), but was extended unti l Article XXVIII rebinding procedures were
concluded. Panama and Nicaragua subm it that the European Communities has " never once in the
13-year history of the [EC – Bananas III] dispute" 233 claimed that its €75/mt Uruguay Round
concessions expired as of 31 December 2002. Pana ma and Nicaragua submit that to accept the

230Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 44 (US) (referring to Appellate Body
231Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 46 (US).
(original emphasis)
233Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 64 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)

European Communities' arguments would mean the application of a bound rate of €680/mt—a
concession equivalent to "a ban on all MFN access into the world's largest banana market".234
178. Panama and Nicaragua contend that the Panel co rrectly read in paragraph 9 of the Bananas
Framework Agreement that the European Commu nities' in-quota bananas concession was qualified
not only by the termination date of 31 December 2002, but also by the requirement that "[f]ull
consultations with the Latin American suppliers th at are GATT Members should start no later than in
year 2001".
235 In Panama's and Nicaragua's view, the Pa nel correctly interpreted the Doha Article I
Waiver as a subsequent agreement regarding the a pplication of the European Communities' Schedule
of Concessions in accordance with Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. Panama and Nicaragua
argue that the Vienna Convention does not require any formal decision of the parties or a "positively
express consent to be bound" 236 to an international agreement. Moreover, Panama and Nicaragua
contend that, as the Doha Article I Waiver was adopt ed by the Ministerial Conference, "the top-most
decision-making body of the WTO", it had all the authority "to take a decision by consensus regarding
the application of the consultation prerogatives of paragraph 9 of the [Bananas Framework
Agreement] so as to extend the EC's concessions until rebound prior to Tariff Only."237
179. Panama and Nicaragua support the Panel's conc lusion that "by delaying Article XXVIII
rebinding procedures ... Members were necessarily re flecting their intention to continue the EC's
existing concession until Article XXVIII re binding procedures were completed." 238 Moreover,
Panama and Nicaragua argue that, "[i]f the only c oncession to be protected by 'any rebinding' was the
prohibitive 680€/mt tariff, it would have been illogi cal for the Members to st ate that 'all EC WTO
market-access commitments' must 'at least maintai[n] total market access'"239, because a €680/mt tariff
would eliminate market access, rather than maintain it. In Panama's and Nicaragua's opinions, the text
of the Doha Article I Waiver is clear in affirm ing that the European Communities' concession is
extended until Article XXVIII procedures are concl uded, and given that the European Communities
has not concluded these procedures, "the Panel was correct in finding that the EC's Uruguay Round
concessions continue to apply."240

234Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 63 (Ecuador).
235Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 69 (Ecuador) (quoting Ecuador Panel
Report, para. 7.439).
236Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 77 (Ecuador).
237Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 78 (Ecuador). (footnote omitted)
238Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 83 (Ecuador).
239Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 84 (Ecuador).
240Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 94 (Ecuador).

180. Panama and Nicaragua also agree with Ecuador 's other appeal that, if the Appellate Body
were to consider that the Doha Article I Waiver did not extend the European Communities' tariff
quota concession, it should read the European Comm unities' Schedule of Concessions as remaining in
force beyond the expiration of the Bananas Framework Agreement. In their view, "Column 7, of
Section 1.B of the European Communities' Concession ( Other Terms and Conditions )" is intended to
mean "existing beside, further, additional".
241 Therefore, the Bananas Framework Agreement can
only supplement the current access conditions, and cannot diminish the "final" scheduled in-quota
commitments of €75/mt tariff for 2.2 million mt, identified in columns 3 and 4. 242 P a n a m a a n d
Nicaragua contend that the Bana nas Framework Agreement was a " plurilateral settlement"243 clearly
distinct from the Schedule, and that the terms of the Bananas Framework Agreement could not
terminate the concession for all WTO Members.
181. Regarding the "object and purpose" of the Eu ropean Communities' c oncession, Panama and
Nicaragua contend that the WTO's aim of "providing security and predictability" to arrangements that
substantially reduce tariffs is "destroyed" 244 if the first sentence of paragraph 9 of the Bananas
Framework Agreement is read to repeal current access with a 680 €/mt access ban. Panama and
Nicaragua submit that this argument is supported by the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture ,
which aims "at accomplishing a special 'reform process' that would enable 'substantial progressive
reductions' in protection over time."245
182. Finally, Panama and Nicaragua reject the Eur opean Communities' claim that the Panel could
not have made a recommendation regarding its tariff quota, because the measure has ceased to exist
and should be considered "settled law". Panama and Nicaragua contend that it is well settled in WTO
law that panels can make recommendations on measures at issue, or elements of those measures, that
have expired, and that, in the cases cited by th e European Communities, th e expired measures were
submitted within the proper review period.

241Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 130 (Ecuador).
242Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 130 (Ecuador).
243Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 133 (Ecuador).
244Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 142 (Ecuador).
245Third participants' submission of Panama and Nicaragua, para. 143 (Ecuador) (quoting preambles 2
and 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture). (emphasis added by Panama and Nicaragua)

III. Issues Raised in the Appeal of the Ecuador Panel Report
183. The following issues are raised in the appeal of the Panel Report, – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Ecuador (WT/DS27/RW2/ECU):
(a) with respect to procedural issues:
(i) whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU by
maintaining different timetables for the Article 21.5 proceedings between the
European Communities and Ecuador and between the European
Communities and the United States; and
(ii) whether the Panel erred in finding that Ecuador was not barred by the
Understanding on Bananas from initiating this compliance proceeding;
(b) with respect to Article XIII of the GATT 1994:
(i) whether the Panel erred in finding that, to the extent that the European
Communities argues that it has implemented a suggestion pursuant to
Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel was not prevented from conducting, under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the assessme nt requested by Ecuador; and that,
therefore, the Panel did not need to assess whether the European
Communities has effectively implemented any of the suggestions of the first
compliance panel requested by Ecuador; and
(ii) whether the Panel erred in finding that the duty-free tariff quota reserved for
bananas of ACP country origin was incons istent with Article XIII:1 and 2 of
the GATT 1994;
(c) with respect to Article II of the GATT 1994:
(i) whether the Panel erred in finding that the Doha Article I Waiver constituted
a subsequent agreement between the parties extending the tariff quota
concession for bananas listed in the European Communities' Schedule of
Concessions beyond 31 December 2002, until the rebinding of the European
Communities' tariff on bananas;

(ii) if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that the subsequent
agreement between the parties resulted in an extension of the tariff quota
concession for bananas beyond 31 December 2002 until the rebinding of the
European Communities' tariff on bananas, whether the Panel erred in finding
that the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas was
intended to expire on 31 December 2002 on account of paragraph 9 of the
Bananas Framework Agreement; and
(iii) whether the Panel erred in finding that the tariff applied by the European
Communities to MFN imports of bananas, set at €176/mt, without
consideration of the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota tariff
rate of 75€/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that provided for in
the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions, and thus inconsistent
with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994; and
(d) whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Communities, by having
maintained measures inconsistent with different provisions of the GATT 1994,
continues to nullify or impair benefits accruing to Ecuador under that Agreement.
184. We proceed to analyze these issues in the order set out above.
IV. Issues Raised in the Appeal of the US Panel Report
185. The following issues are raised in the appeal of the Panel Report, – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by the United States (WT/DS27/RW/USA):
(a) with respect to procedural issues:
(i) whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU by
maintaining different timetables for the Article 21.5 proceedings between the
European Communities and Ecuador and between the European
Communities and the United States;
(ii) whether the Panel erred in finding that the United States was not barred by
the Understanding on Bananas from initiating this compliance proceeding;

(iii) whether the Panel erred in finding that the EC Bananas Import Regime
constituted a "measure taken to comply " within the meaning of Article 21.5
of the DSU and was therefore properly before the Panel;
(iv) whether the Panel erred in making findings with respect to a measure that had
ceased to exist subsequent to the estab lishment of the Panel, but before the
Panel issued its Report; and
(v) whether the European Communities' Notice of Appeal satisfies the
requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review;
(b) with respect to Article XIII of the GATT 1994:
whether the Panel erred in finding that the duty-free tariff quota reserved for
bananas of ACP country origin was incons istent with Article XIII:1 and 2 of
the GATT 1994; and
(c) whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Communities, by having
maintained measures inconsistent with different provisions of the GATT 1994,
continues to nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under that
Agreement.
186. We proceed to analyze these issues in the order set out above.
V. Article 9.3 of the DSU – Harmonization of Timetables (Ecuador and United States)
187. We begin by addressing the question whether, by maintaining different timetables for the
Article 21.5 proceedings between the European Co mmunities and Ecuador and between the European
Communities and the United States, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU.
188. Article 9.3 of the DSU reads:
If more than one panel is established to examine the complaints
related to the same matter, to th e greatest extent possible the same
persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate panels and the
timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized.
189. Several times during the course of the Pa nel proceedings, the European Communities
requested the Panel to harmonize th e timetables of the two proceedi ngs. The Panel considered that
modifying the timetables "would have most likely involved a delay in the proceedings requested by

Ecuador".
246 Ecuador objected to any delay in the pr oceeding it had initiated, emphasizing that an
accelerated timeframe applied to Article 21.5 pro ceedings. The Panel stated that harmonizing the
timetables for the Panel processes in these cases was particularly difficult because of the two-month
period that had elapsed between the dates on which the panelists began their work in each of the
cases. The Panel noted that the WTO Director-Gen eral composed the panel requested by Ecuador on
18 June 2007, and composed the panel requested by the United States on 13 August 2007. The Panel
considered that this two-month difference betw een the disputes was significant, since compliance
proceedings, by their very nature, are intended to be brief. The Panel concluded:
... notwithstanding the Panel's in itial intention to harmonize the
timetable of both the proceedings requested by Ecuador and those
requested by the United States, the Panel was unable to find a better
alternative for the timetable that was ... adopted in these proceedings.
This despite the fact that the Panel was aware that the approved
timetable implied a considerable burden of work, peaking at
particular moments for the parties, as well as for the Panel and the
Secretariat.[*]
247
[*]As noted above, however, issuance of the interim report was delayed by
the Panel in order to ensure that replies to questions and comments on
replies in the proceedings requested by the United States had been received
by that panel, before the interim report in the current proceedings was
issued.
190. On appeal, the European Communities alleges that the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 9.3 of the DSU by failing to harmonize the timetables of the two Panel proceedings and
requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's in terpretation and application of Article 9.3. In
support of its claim, the European Communities submits that the use of the word "shall" in Article 9.3
indicates an "absolute and unqualified" obligation for panels to harmonize timetables, which "does not
allow panels any discretion" in deciding whether timetables should be harmonized.
248 The European
Communities submits that the timetables "must absolutely be harmonized at some stage of the
proceeding". In the European Communities' view, the phrase "to the greatest extent possible" is no
indication that panels have discretion, but is only meant to allow a panel to take note of certain
procedural acts that may have already been comp leted in one case, the occurrence of which makes it
"impossible" to harmonize the timetable of that case with the timetable of another case.
249 T h e
European Communities contends that it had to provi de its written submission to the United States in
one proceeding before the United States had submitte d its own first written submission in the other

246US Panel Report, para. 7.7.

proceeding, and that the United States thus ha d the advantage of knowing what defences and
arguments the European Communities would use in the latter proceeding.
191. The United States and Ecuador disagree with the European Communities' contention that
Article 9.3 provides an "absolute and unqualified" obligation.250 Instead, they contend that the Panel's
obligation is qualified by the phrase "to the greatest ex tent possible" in Article 9.3. They further
support the Panel's decision to take into account that the present proceedings are compliance
proceedings, which, pursuant to Article 21.5, should be completed within 90 days.
192. Article 9.3 may appear to be cast in the way of an obligation, but the word "harmony" is
defined as the combination or adaptation of parts, so as to form a "consistent and orderly whole". 251
Quite distinct from "synchrony", "harmony" does not re quire that elements coincide exactly in time.
Therefore, we consider that the use of the wo rd "harmonized" rather than "synchronized" in
Article 9.3 confers to panels a judgement of degree and practicality. It rests with panels to organize
the steps of the proceedings in a way that will ensure that they form a consistent and orderly whole.
Whereas the use of the word "shall" ordinarily connotes an obligation, here, while the panel must seek
to harmonize, the extent to which that is possibl e lies within its power. We do not consider that
"harmonization" requires adoption of identical timetab les in multiple proceedings. As we see it, this
provision addresses a practical concern that each timetable must be framed in the light of the other.
193. The phrase "to the greatest extent possible" in Article 9.3 lends further support to our
interpretation. This phrase introduces the main cl ause of the sentence. The phrase "to the greatest
extent possible" qualifies both elements of the main clause—the selection of the same persons as
panelists and the harmonization of the panel process es—and thus qualifies what the panel must do to
harmonize the timetables. We therefore disagree with the European Communities' reading that
Article 9.3 "does not allow panels any discretion in deciding whether the timetables should be
harmonized".252
194. Furthermore, we note that Articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the DSU confer a margin of discretion on
panels to draw up their working procedures. Ar ticle 12.1 authorizes panels to establish their own
working procedures in the event that the panel decide s, after consulting the parties, not to follow the
Working Procedures for panels set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU. Pursuant to Article 12.2, panel
procedures should provide "sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not

250United States' appellee's submission, paras. 122 and 123 (referring to European Communities'
appellant's submission, para. 23 (US)); Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 8.
251Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University
Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 1200.

unduly delaying the panel process". By virtue of this provision, panels are vested with a degree of
discretion and flexibility to take the necessary pro cedural decisions to strike a balance between
providing "high-quality panel reports" and avoiding delays in the panel process. The panel's margin
of discretion, in turn, informs our standard of review of the panels' application of its obligations under
Article 9.3.
195. As this Panel was established pursuant to Artic le 21.5 of the DSU, we consider that the
obligations of Article 9.3 must be read in the c ontext of Article 21.5, which requires a compressed
timeframe. Article 21.5 provides that a panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date
of referral of the matter to it. If an Article 21.5 pa nel considers that it cannot provide its report within
that timeframe, it must notify the DSB, specifying th e reasons for the delay together with an estimate
of the period within which it will issue its report. By contrast, Articles 12.8 and 12.9 of the DSU
prescribe that original panel proceedings "shall, as a general rule, not exceed six months" and
"should" in no case exceed nine months. We therefor e consider that Article 21.5 and, in particular,
the obligation to circulate the compliance panel report within 90 days after the date of referral of the
matter to it, frames a compliance panel's discretion.
196. The European Communities alleges that the Pane l, by obliging the European Communities to
provide its written submission to the United States in the Ecuador case before the United States had
submitted its own first written submission in the United States case, gave the United States the
advantage of knowing what defences and arguments the European Communities would use in the
United States case, and thereby acted contrary to Article 12.6 of the DSU.
253
197. We recall that the Appellate Body has previously held that a panel's exercise of discretion is
circumscribed by the due process rights of the parties to the dispute. 254 In our view, the situation
described by the European Communities may aris e under the DSU whenever a measure that is
challenged by one Member is sub sequently challenged by a second Member, and the complainant in
the latter proceeding is a third party in the earlier proceeding. We recognize that this may entail a risk
of putting the respondent in the later proceeding at a disadvantage in terms of litigation strategy.
However, in the present case, the Eu ropean Communities and, in fact, all parties were provided with
an opportunity to rebut factual and legal argument s presented by the other parties. The European
Communities does not deny that it was given an oppor tunity to respond to the United States' first
written submission, including the United States' arguments addressing the defences and arguments
made by the European Communities in earlier s ubmissions. The European Communities has not

identified specific aspects in which its procedural due process rights were infringed, resulting from the
Panel's decision to maintain separate timetables. In our view, however, the mere possibility that the
due process rights of the European Communities could have been adversely affected by the Panel's
decision to maintain separate timetables in these proc eedings is not sufficient to establish that the due
process rights of the European Communities have indeed been compromised. In the present cases, the
Panel consulted with the partie s and made efforts to adopt a single working schedule for both
proceedings. Furthermore, the Panel did take step s to harmonize the proceedings, when it delayed the
issuance of the interim report in the Ecuador case to ensure that the replies to questions and comments
on the replies in the United States case had been receiv ed by the Panel before the interim report in the
Ecuador case was issued.255
198. There is no basis for interfering with the Panel' s exercise of its power to harmonize, because
the actions of the Panel have not infringed the European Communities' due process rights. We
therefore find that the Panel did not act inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU by maintaining
different timetables in the two Article 21.5 proceedings initiated by Ecuador and the United States.
VI. Legal Effect of the Understandings on Bananas (Ecuador and United States)
199. We turn now to address the question whether the Understandings on Bananas 256, which the
European Communities concluded with the Unit ed States and with Ecuador, prevented the
complainants from initiating compliance proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU with
respect to the European Communities' regime for the importation of bananas introduced by Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 257 ("EC Regulation 1964/2005") (the
"EC Bananas Import Regime").
200. Based on Articles 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7 of the DS U, the Panel found that the Understandings on
Bananas could prevent the complainants from initiating compliance proceedings pursuant to
Article 21.5 only if these Understa ndings constituted a "positive soluti on and effective settlement to
the dispute in question". 258 The Panel found that this condition was not fulfilled for the following
three reasons taken together:

256Understanding on Bananas between the European Communities and the United States signed on
11 April 2001 (WT/DS27/59, G/C/W/270; WT/DS27/58, Enclosure 1), and Understanding on Bananas between
the European Communities and Ecuador signed on 30 April 2001 (WT/DS27/60, G/C/W/274; WT/DS27/58,
Enclosure 2).
257Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 on the tariff rates for bananas,
Official Journal of the European Union , L Series, No. 316 (2 December 2 005) 1 (Panel Exhibits ECU-1 and
US-1).

(a) the Bananas Understanding prov ides only for a means, i.e. a
series of future steps, for resolving and settling the dispute;
(b) the adoption of the Bananas Understanding was subsequent to
recommendations, rulings and suggestions by the DSB; and,
(c) parties have made conflicting communications to the WTO
concerning the Bananas Understanding.
259
201. The Panel considered that it did not need to assess whether the Understandings on Bananas
were notified appropriately under Article 3.6 of the DSU, and wh ether these Understandings were a
mutually agreed solution within the meaning of Article 3.6, and went on to find that:
... it is difficult ... to see how the Bananas Understanding could
provide a positive solution and eff ective settlement to the dispute
when, immediately following the respondent's communication of the
Understanding to the WTO, the complainant in the dispute contested
the multilateral status of the Understanding and its role in definitively
resolving the dispute.
It would seem appropriate to assume that an alleged mutually agreed
solution or legally binding agreement that could bar the complainant
from bringing a subsequent compliance dispute, would need to
provide a solution to the dispute for both parties, including in
particular for the complainant, and especially after the DSB
established the inconsistency w ith the covered agreement of
measures adopted by the respondent.
260
202. The Panel concluded that the European Co mmunities had "not succeeded in making a prima
facie case in favour of its preliminary objection", and thus rejected the European Communities'
preliminary objection.261
203. The Panel found that the Understandings on Ba nanas had to constitute a "positive solution
and effective settlement to the dispute" in or der to preclude the complainants from initiating
Article 21.5 proceedings. The European Communiti es challenges this position on appeal. According
to the European Communities, there are agreemen ts between WTO Members that do not constitute a
positive solution and effective settlement to a dispute, yet, they are given full legal effect by the WTO
dispute settlement system. As examples of such agreements, the European Communities mentions,
inter alia: agreements to dispense with the DSU require ment to hold consultations before requesting

260Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.107 and 7.108. See also US Panel Report, paras. 7.140 and 7.141.

the establishment of a panel; agreements extending the deadline for the adoption of panel reports by
the DSB; and "sequencing agreements".262
204. Furthermore, the European Communities takes issue with the thre e reasons relied upon by the
Panel in support of its finding that the Unde rstandings on Bananas could not legally bar the
complainants from bringing these compliance proceedings . The first reason given by the Panel is that
the Understandings do not in themselves constitute a so lution, but provide only for the means, that is,
a series of future steps for resolving and settling the dispute. In this respect, the European
Communities argues that Article 3 of the DSU doe s not provide that only agreements recording
measures that had already been implemented shoul d qualify as "mutually agreed solutions". The
European Communities submits that, rather, in virtua lly every instance where the parties to a dispute
reach a settlement, measures to implement that settle ment will be taken after the conclusion of the
settlement.263
205. The second reason relied upon by the Panel is th at the Understandings were agreed to
subsequent to the recommendations, rulings, and s uggestions made by the DSB in the original
proceedings and previous compliance proceedings. In the European Communities' view, nothing in
the DSU prevents WTO Members from entering in to mutually agreed solutions subsequent to
recommendations and rulings by the DSB. On the contrary, the European Communities submits that
Articles 22.2 and 22.8 of the DSU expressly provide for settlement agreements that can be entered
into following recommendations and rulings by the DSB.264
206. Thirdly, the Panel relied on the fact that the parties, after having si gned the Understandings,
made conflicting statements at the DSB meeting 265 regarding their legal nature. The European
Communities alleges that, by relying on these statem ents, the Panel effectively allowed a signatory to
a settlement to nullify the terms of the agreement af ter having signed and reaped the benefits of it,
simply by refusing to make a joint notification of settlement to the DSB. The European Communities
contends that there is no requirement in the DSU th at a mutually agreed solution must be notified to
the DSB by one party or by both parties jointly.

265Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, paras. 5 and 8.

207. Ecuador contends that the European Commun ities mischaracterized the Panel's findings as
setting out three "conditions" that had to be satis fied in order for the Understanding on Bananas
between the European Communities and Ecuador to qualify as a mutually agreed solution within the
meaning of Article 3.7 of the DSU.
266 Ecuador maintains that the European Communities'
construction of the Understanding has no basis in the text of the DSU and would run counter to
Article 21.5, as it would deny the parties to th e Understanding the right to initiate compliance
proceedings.
208. The United States argues that the Panel did not set out three "conditions" that every mutually
agreed solution must meet. Rather, the Panel explained on the basis of "three reasons taken together"
why the Understanding on Bananas between the Eu ropean Communities and the United States did not
have the effect of barring the latter from initiating this compliance proceeding. 267 With respect to the
Panel's first reason, namely, that the Understandi ng provides only for the means for resolving and
settling the dispute, the United States maintains that the Panel merely set out the facts according to the
terms of the Understanding, and did not, as the European Communities asserts, set a "condition" that
only agreements recording measures that have al ready been implemented can qualify as mutually
agreed solutions.
268 With respect to the Panel's second reason, namely, that the Understanding
postdates the DSB recommendations and rulings, the United States argues that the Panel did not set
this as a "condition" but, rather, used it as releva nt historical context for assessing the European
Communities' preliminary objection. 269 With regard to the Panel's third reason, namely, that the
parties had made conflicting statements at the DSB meeting regarding the legal nature of the
Understanding after it had been signed, the United St ates maintains that the Panel correctly took into
account the United States' disagreement with the European Communities' characterization of the
Understanding at the DSB as a "mutually agreed solution".270
209. We first address the European Communities' cha llenge to the criterion of a "positive solution
and effective settlement" to the dispute. We th en address the "three reasons" for which the Panel
considered that the Understandi ngs on Bananas did not constitute a positive solution and effective
settlement to the dispute in question. Finally, we turn to the European Communities' arguments
relating to the principle of "good faith".

266Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 14 (referring to European Communities' appellant's
submission, para. 41 (Ecuador), in turn referring to Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.76).
267United States' appellee's submission, para. 57 (original emphasis) (referring to US Panel Report,
para. 7.107).

210. At the outset, we refer to the text of Articles 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 of the DSU, which provide, in
relevant part:
(5) All solutions to matters formally raised under the
consultation and dispute settleme nt provisions of the covered
agreements, including arbitration aw ards, shall be consistent with
those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of
any objective of those agreements.
(6) Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under
the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils
and Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating
thereto.
(7) Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be
fruitful. The aim of the dispute se ttlement mechanism is to secure a
positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the
parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is
clearly to be preferred. In the ab sence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually
to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found
to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements ... .
211. In respect of the criterion of a "positive solu tion and effective settlement", the Panel relied on
Article 3.7 of the DSU. Article 3.7 states the "aim" of the dispute settlement system. It articulates a
preference for solutions that are mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements. However, nothing in Artic le 3.7 establishes a condition under which a party
would be prevented from initiating compliance proceedings or, indeed, dictates that the only kind of
settlement envisaged in that provision is one that bars recourse to compliance proceedings under
Article 21.5. Article 3.7 is not prescriptive as to the content of a mutually agreed solution, save that it
must be consistent with the covered agreements. The only express limitation referred to in Article 3.7
is that "a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be
fruitful". The Appellate Body has interpreted this phr ase to indicate that a Member is "expected to be
largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would be 'fruitful'".
271 This is also borne
out by Article 3.3, which provides that the prompt settlement of situations in which a Member, in its
own judgement, considers that a benefit accruing to it under the covered agreements is being impaired
by a measure taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.

271Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 135.

212. The term "solution" employed in Article 3.7 refers to the "act of solving a problem".
272 There
are usually different ways of solving any given problem. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, when a
panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measur e is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it
shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.
Accordingly, it is, in principle, within the Member's discretion to choose the means of implementation
and to decide in which way it will seek to achie ve compliance. The DSU thus recognizes that a
solution leading to compliance can be implemented in various ways. Similarly, a mutually agreed
solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an agreement to forego the right to initiate
compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the su spension of the right of recourse to Article 21.5
until the steps agreed upon in a mutual ly agreed solution have been implemented. Yet, this need not
always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement to a "solution" necessarily
implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the event of a
disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of a measure taken to
comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication in the agreement between the
parties of a relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the Panel's
requirement that the Understandings must constitute a "positive solution and effective settlement" to
the dispute in question to preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was not a correct
interpretation of what the DSU requires.
213. Before we assess the question whether, in the pr esent cases, the participants did in fact agree
to relinquish their right to have recourse to Artic le 21.5 proceedings, we address the "three reasons"
relied upon by the Panel as to why the Understandi ngs on Bananas did no t constitute a "positive
solution and effective settlement" to the dispute. At the outset, we note the European Communities'
allegation that the Panel established three "conditions " that an agreement between the parties had to
meet in order to qualify as a "mutually agreed solution".
273 We disagree. The Panel used the word
"reasons" and not the word "conditions", and also clear ly stated that it was looking at the particular
"dispute in question".274 In our view, it is clear from the language used by the Panel that it articulated
reasons as to why the Understandi ngs on Bananas, given their partic ular terms, did not prevent the
complainants from initiating Article 21.5 proceedi ngs, rather than establishing "conditions" an
agreement would have to fulfil in order to constitute a "mutually agreed solution".

272Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University
Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 2917.
273European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 73 (US).
274US Panel Report, para. 7.107.

214. The Panel relied on the reason that "the Ba nanas Understanding[s] provide[] only for a
means, i.e. a series of future st eps, for resolving the dispute". 275 The proper interpretation of the
Understandings is that they set out a series of step s which were intended as a precursor to the possible
conclusion of a final settlement agreement. Therefor e, we see no reason to find fault with the Panel's
reliance on this element as one reason for which it c onsidered that the parties to the Understandings
had not waived their right of recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings.
215. The second reason relied upon by the Panel in s upport of its finding that the Understandings
could not legally bar the complainants from br inging these compliance proceedings is that these
Understandings were agreed upon subsequent to the adoption of recommendations, rulings, and
suggestions by the DSB. We disagree with the Pa nel's reasoning. We see nothing in Article 3.7 or
elsewhere in the DSU that prevents parties to a dispute from reaching a settlement that would
preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings afte r the adoption of recommendations and rulings by
the DSB. In fact, Article 22.8 of the DSU sti pulates that suspension of concessions shall only be
applied until such time as a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. Thus, the DSU itself clearly
envisages the possibility of entering into mutually agreed solutions after recommendations and rulings
are made by the DSB. We do not consider that th e factor that the Unders tandings were concluded
only after the DSB made recommendations a nd rulings assists to determine whether the
Understandings precluded the parties from initiating Article 21.5 proceedings.
216. The third reason relied upon by the Panel is that the parties had made conflicting statements at
the DSB meeting as to the legal nature of the Unde rstandings after they were signed. We consider
that these statements may be taken into account wher e the interpretation of the Understandings is not
clear from the language used in its context. Howeve r, where the text of the Understandings is clear,
these statements have limited relevance, if any, for the purpose of interpreting the Understandings.
The parties' obligations must first and foremost be determined on the basis of the text of the
Understandings. In any event, ex post communications of the parties concerning the Understandings
have, at best, slight evidentiary value.
217. With this in mind, we turn to analyze of the Understandings on Bananas at issue. We
consider that the complainants could be preclude d from initiating Article 21.5 proceedings by means
of these Understandings only if the parties to th ese Understandings had, either explicitly or by
necessary implication, agreed to waive their right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the

relinquishment of rights granted by the DSU cannot be lightly assumed. Rather, the language in the
Understandings must reveal clearly that the parties intended to relinquish their rights.
276
218. The Understandings state, in paragraph A, that the parties:
... have identified the means by which the long-standing dispute over
the EC banana import regime can be resolved.
219. The identification of the means for the resolution of a dispute is an intermediate step towards
a final solution to a dispute. The mere identific ation of the means will not resolve the dispute.
Furthermore, we note the use of the term "can be resolved" in the same clause. The word "can"
expresses a possibility, but not the fina lity, of a resolution of the dispute. In our view, had the parties
to the Understandings intended to stipulate that th ey considered that the Understandings themselves
constituted the solution to this dispute, they would ha ve stated that the dispute "is" resolved, rather
than that the dispute "can" be resolved.
220. We find further support for our interpretation in the fact that all the steps identified in the
Understandings refer to a sequence of actions to be taken over a fu ture period. The Understandings
state that the European Communities "will implement" 277 and the European Communities "will
introduce".278 Consequently, Ecuador and the United St ates agreed that they "will lift [their]
reserve"279 concerning the waiver from Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 (the "Doha Article I
Waiver"280)—which was subsequently adopted by the Ministerial Conference meeting in Doha on
14 November 2001. The use of the future tense c onfirms our reading of the Understandings as a way
forward to resolving the dispute, rather than as being in itself the solution to the dispute. We wish to
clarify that an agreement that requires future pe rformance does not for that reason alone indicate that
the parties have not relinquished their right to ha ve recourse to Article 21. 5 proceedings. However,
this particular agreement does.

276In this respect, we note the International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections, Case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) , Judgment of 26 May 1961, ICJ Reports (1961) 32,
addressing the interpretation of declarations of acceptance of the compulsory ju risdiction of the Court. In order
to determine whether Thailand had recognized as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court considered
that the "sole relevant question" was whether Thailand's declaration clearly revealed such intention.
277Understandings on Bananas, para. C.
278Understandings on Bananas, para. B.
279Understandings on Bananas, para. F.
280Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference he ld in Doha, European Communities – The ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement, Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/15; WT/L/436 (attached as Annex V to
this Report; this document was also submitted as Panel Exhibits US-3 and EC-2 (Ecuador)). The Doha
Article I Waiver expired on 31 December 2007 in respect of ACP products other than bananas.

221. We disagree with the European Communitie s' assertion that paragraph G of the
Understanding involving Ecuador contains a manifesta tion of the intention of the parties to forego
their right to initiate Article 21.5 proceedings becau se it states that "[t]he EC and Ecuador consider
that this Understanding constitutes a mutually agreed so lution to the banana dispute". The text of that
clause is neutral with respect to the question of whether the solution entailed a relinquishment of the
right of recourse to compliance proceedings. It th erefore leaves the result of the above analysis
untouched, and does nothing to alter the conclusion that the Understandings on Bananas did not
contain a relinquishment of the right to initiate compliance proceedings.
222. In the light of these considerations, we conclude that the Panel erred in placing the relevance
it did on the conflicting statements of the parties at the meeting of the DSB, because, what the Panel
was required to do was to provide an interpretation of the text of the Understandings. Only once it
had done so, could it then consider conflicting statem ents to the DSB for the limited purpose of either
seeking confirmation of the Panel's interpretation, or determining the meaning because the textual
interpretation left the meaning ambiguous or led to manifestly absurd results. Having found, based on
the interpretation of the text of the Understa ndings, that these Understandings did not contain a
relinquishment of the right to initiate compliance pr oceedings, we arrive at the same conclusion as the
Panel, in paragraph 7.136 of the Ecuador Pane l Report and in paragraph 7.165 of the US Panel
Report, namely, that the complainants were not precluded from initiating these proceedings due to the
Understandings on Bananas.
223. In addition, the European Communities submits th at the Panel erred in its interpretation and
application of the principle of good faith referred to in Article 3.10 of the DSU. According to the
European Communities, the Panel took the erroneous view that an objection based on the principle of
good faith could be successful only if the European Communities had made out a prima facie case
for the alleged violation of Article 3.10, and al so for "something more than mere violation". 281 The
European Communities alleges that the Panel erred in finding that the principle of good faith could
only be invoked as an "add-on" 282 to the violation of another WTO ru le and could not by itself be the
source of rights and obligations of WTO Members.
224. Ecuador submits that the Panel was correct in rejecting the European Communities'
contention that the principle of good faith pr ecluded Ecuador from challenging the EC Bananas
Import Regime. Ecuador supports the Panel's st atement that Ecuador has "[n]owhere in the

281European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 60 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel

Understanding ... accepted that it would forego its righ t to challenge the conformity with the covered
agreements of any measure that th e European Communities might take to implement a step set out in
the Bananas Understanding".
283 Furthermore, Ecuador contends that Article 3.10 does not preclude
initiation of dispute settlement proceedings.
225. The United States submits that the Panel did not e rr in its interpretation and application of the
principle of good faith enshrined in Article 3.10. The United States contends that the Panel was
correct in relying on past panel and Appellate Body reports when finding that there must be
something "more than mere violation" of a substan tive provision of the cove red agreements before a
Member can be found to have failed to act in good faith.284
226. The Panel relied on the Appellate Body Report in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) in
support of its finding that there must be somethi ng "more than mere violation" of a substantive
provision of the covered agreements before a Member may be found to have failed to act in good
faith.285 In our view, the Panel did not consider the quotation from US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
in its proper context. In that report, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's findings that the measure
at issue was inconsistent with Article 5.4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping Agreement") and Article 11.4 of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the " SCM Agreement"). That panel
further found that the United States had not acted in good faith with respect to its obligations under
those provisions. Having reversed the pane l's finding concerning Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body was left with an accessory
finding of violation of the good faith principle. Th e Appellate Body reversed that finding and stated,
as quoted in the Panel Reports in the present case:
Nothing ... in the covered agreemen ts supports the conclusion that
simply because a WTO Member is found to have violated a
substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in good faith.
In our view, it would be necessary to prove more than mere violation
to support such a conclusion.
286
227. This finding, however, is not pertinent in the c ontext of the present appeals, because the legal
question before the Panel in the present cases is diffe rent from the legal question before the Appellate
Body in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) . While, in that case, the Appellate Body considered the

285Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.129, US Panel Report, para. 7.160 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 298).
286Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.129, US Panel Re port, para. 7.160 (referring to Appellate Body
Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 298).

principle of good faith as it relates to a substantiv e provision of the WTO agreements, the Panel in the
present cases was faced with the allegation of a l ack of good faith as a procedural impediment for a
WTO Member to initiate Article 21.5 proceedings . Although not using the term, the European
Communities, in the present cases, in fact a dvances an estoppel argument. The Appellate Body
addressed this dimension of the principle of good faith in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar:
We see little in the DSU that explicitly limits the rights of WTO
Members to bring an action; WTO Members must exercise their
"judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be
fruitful", by virtue of Article 3.7 of the DSU, and they must engage
in dispute settlement procedures in good faith, by virtue of
Article 3.10 of the DSU. This latter obligation covers, in our view,
the entire spectrum of dispute settlement, from the point of initiation
of a case through implementation. Thus, even assuming arguendo
that the principle of estoppel could apply in the WTO, its application
would fall within these narrow parameters set out in the DSU.
 287
228. We consider this to be the applicable sta ndard and therefore agree with the European
Communities that the Panel erred when it rejected the European Communities' claim on the basis that
the European Communities had not made out a prima facie case for something "more than mere
violation". The above quoted statement of the A ppellate Body relates to an allegation that the
complainants were estopped from challenging certain elements of the European Communities' sugar
regime in the original proceedings. The presen t cases, however, involve compliance proceedings
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Yet, we consider that, irrespective of the type of proceeding, if a
WTO Member has not clearly stated that it would not take legal action with respect to a certain
measure, it cannot be regarded as failing to act in good faith if it challenges that measure. In that vein,
the Appellate Body found, in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, that it was not possible to identify any
facts or statements made by the complainants ad mitting that the European Communities' measure was
WTO-consistent or promising that they woul d not take legal action against the European
Communities.
288 In the present cases, if the complainants were to be regarded as being estopped from
initiating these Article 21.5 proceedings, such estoppe l would have to attach to a representation
outside of the Understandings on Ba nanas. This, however, is not the case. Therefore, we consider
that the United States and Ecuador have not faile d to act in good faith in requesting compliance
proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5.

287Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 312.
288Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 315.

229. Making reference to Article 11 of the DSU, th e European Communities further alleges that
the Panel failed to provide any justification for rej ecting its claim based on the principle of good faith.
The United States responds that this claim is outside the scope of this appeal because the European
Communities' Notice of Appeal does not contain a refe rence to Article 11 of the DSU. We note that
the European Communities clarifie d at the oral hearing that it was not advancing a claim under
Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we make no finding in respect to that provision.
VII. Scope of Article 21.5 Proceedings – Measure Taken to Comply (United States)
230. We now turn to address the European Communitie s' appeal of the Panel's finding that the
EC Bananas Import Regime constituted a "measure taken to comply" within the meaning of
Article 21.5 of the DSU and was therefore properl y before the Panel. The European Communities
appeals this finding only in the proceeding initiated by the United States.
231. The Panel first assessed whether the EC Bananas Import Regime was a measure taken to
comply because of "a particularly cl ose relationship" to the declared measure taken to comply, that is,
the 2002-2005 bananas import regime of the Eu ropean Communities, and to the original
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
289 Thereafter, the Panel assessed whether, based on the
criteria identified by the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) , the
EC Bananas Import Regime was in itself a measure taken to comply.
232. With respect to the latter question, whether the EC Bananas Import Regime was in itself a
measure taken to comply, the Panel considered the European Communities' "attempt" to comply with
the original DSB recommendations and rulings by adopting, on 1 January 1999, Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1637/98 290 ("EC Regulation 1637/98") and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 291
("EC Regulation 2362/98"). The Panel also referred to the Decision by the Arbitrators in EC –
Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), the Panel Report in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador),
and the Panel Report in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – EC) , and concluded that it had been
established in those proceedings that the Europ ean Communities had failed to bring itself into

289US Panel Report, para. 7.314 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 77).
290Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L Series, No. 210 (28 July 1998) 28.
291Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 laying down rules for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 regarding imports of bananas into the Community,
Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series, No. 293 (28 October 1998) 32.

compliance with the original recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB in the EC –
Bananas III dispute in 1997.292
233. In its analysis, the Panel also took into account the Understanding on Bananas concluded
between the European Communities and the United States. 293 The relevant sections of this
Understanding provide as follows:
B. In accordance with Article 16(1) of Regulation No. (EEC)
404/93 (as amended by Regulation No. (EC) 216/2001), the
European Communities (EC) will introduce a Tariff Only
regime for imports of bananas no later than 1 January 2006.
C. In the interim, the EC will implement an import regime on the
basis of historical licensing as follows:
1. Effective 1 July 2001, the EC will implement an import
regime on the basis of historical licensing as set out in
Annex 1.
2. Effective as soon as possible thereafter, subject to
Council and European Parliament approval and to
adoption of the Article XIII waiver referred to in
paragraph E, the EC will implement an import regime on
the basis of historical licensing as set out in Annex 2.
The Commission will seek to obtain the implementation
of such an import regime as soon as possible.
234. The Panel considered the language of the Understanding and found, with respect to
EC Regulation 1964/2005, wh ich introduced the EC Bananas Impo rt Regime at issue in the present
dispute, that:
... the European Commun ities does not contest that EC Regulation
1964/2005 corresponds to paragraph B of the Bananas
Understanding, which provides that "In accordance with
Article 16(1) of Regulation No. (EC) 404/93 (as amended by
Regulation No. (EC) 216/2001), the European Communities
(EC) will introduce a Tariff Only regime for imports of bananas no
later than 1 January 2006."
294
235. Furthermore, the Panel relied on statements by the European Communities at the DSB
meeting held on 19 November 1999, as well as the st atus report to the DSB on 11 February 2000, in
which the European Communities propo sed a two-stage process for the reform of its banana regime,

292US Panel Report, para. 7.352.
293US Panel Report, para. 7.357 (referring to WT/DS27/58; WT/DS27/59; and WT/DS27/60).
294US Panel Report, para. 7.381.

as acknowledgements by the European Communities th at, at that time, it had not yet achieved
compliance.
295
236. In addition, the Panel assessed whether the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in this dispute
was a measure taken to comply because of "a partic ularly close relationship" to the declared measure
taken to comply, that is, the 2002-2005 bananas impo rt regime of the European Communities, and to
the original recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 296 In this respect, the Panel observed that both
the original bananas import regime and the EC Ba nanas Import Regime at issue in the present case
"maintain, in the form of one or more tariff rate quotas at a zero in-quota duty, a preferential treatment
for ACP countries in comparison with the tr eatment accorded to other WTO Members." 297 For the
Panel, these were "important similarities in the nature and effects of the import regime reviewed in the
original panel and appellate pr oceedings, and the [EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in this
dispute]".298
237. The Panel concluded that:
... in itself the [EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the current
dispute] is a measure taken to comply with the original
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the EC – Bananas III
dispute. Further, the [EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the
current dispute] is a measure taken to comply with the original
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the EC – Bananas III
dispute also on the basis of its particularly close relationship to the
alleged final measure taken to comply by the European
Communities, i.e. the 2002-2005 EC bananas import regime.
Accordingly, the Panel rejects the third preliminary objection of the
European Communities and finds that the United States has properly
brought this dispute under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
299
238. On appeal, the European Communities argues that the United States' decision to terminate the
suspension of concessions upon implementation of th e tariff quota-based import regime described in
subparagraph C.2 of the Unders tanding on Bananas confirmed that the United States and the
European Communities had agreed that the European Communities had complied with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original dispute. The European Communities submits

295US Panel Report, para. 7.353 (referring to Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 19 November 1999,
WT/DSB/M/71) and para. 7.356 (referring to EC – Bananas III , Status Report by the European Communities,
WT/DS27/51/Add.5).
296US Panel Report, para. 7.314 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 74). (text in square brackets added by the Panel)
297US Panel Report, para. 7.326.
298US Panel Report, para. 7.326.
299US Panel Report, paras. 7.531 and 7.532.

that "the United States' retention of the right to re-impose retaliatory measures only if the [tariff quota-
based] regime '[did] not enter into force by 1 January 2002'"300 demonstrated the importance placed by
the United States, itself, on the tariff quota import regime, and further supported the conclusion that
the United States and the European Communities had agreed that, with the introduction of the tariff
quota-based regime as the "measure taken to comply", the dispute would be settled.
239. In addition, the European Communities submits th at there was "no link" between the original
DSB recommendations and rulings and the political decision of the European Communities to
introduce a tariff-only import regime by 1 January 2006. The European Communities argues that a
"link" exists between a measure and the DSB recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings when the introduction of the contested measure is necessary to address a specific finding
of inconsistency with the covere d agreements. Yet, the European Communities argues that there was
no finding in the original EC – Bananas III proceedings that could be implemented only through a
tariff-only regime. Therefore, the European Communities submits that a link to the DSB
recommendations and rulings in the original proceed ings was missing in the present proceedings, and
that the EC Bananas Import Regime was therefore not a "measure taken to comply". Thus, if the
United States intended to challenge the consiste ncy with WTO law of EC Regulation 1964/2005, it
had to do so in a regular panel proceeding, not under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
240. The United States contends that its commitment to terminate retaliation upon the introduction
of a tariff quota-based import regime under subpara graph C.2 of the Unders tanding on Bananas did
not indicate an agreement by the United States to regard the European Comm unities' interim regime
as the final implementation of the original DSB recommendations and rulings. The United States
asserts that it terminated only the imposition of retaliatory duties, but that the multilateral
authorization to suspend concessions had not been revoked. The United States maintains that a
complainant may choose whether and to what exte nt to make use of the WTO authorization to
suspend concessions, and that, therefore, the complain ant's decision not to exercise that right does not
imply the complainant's acceptance that the respond ent's measures have become consistent with its
WTO obligations. In addition, the United States disagrees with the European Communities that there
was no link between the contested measure and the DSB recommendations and rulings in EC –
Bananas III. The United States submits that, instead, the European Communities agreed through the
terms of the Understanding on Bananas to take cer tain interim steps culminating in a tariff-only
regime by 1 January 2006, and that this constituted a "clear link"
301 between the recommendations and

300European Communities' appellant's submission, pa ra. 41 (US) (quoting subparagraph D.3 of the
Understanding on Bananas).

rulings of the DSB in EC – Bananas III and the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the present
dispute.
241. We begin our analysis by recalling the text of Article 21.5 of the DSU, which provides in
relevant part:
Where there is disagreement as to th e existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever
possible resort to the original panel.
242. We address, first, the legal standard articul ated by the Panel for determining whether the
EC Bananas Import Regime was a measure taken to comply, and whether it was properly before this
Panel. Thereafter, we examine whether the Panel co rrectly applied Article 21.5 to the facts of this
case when it determined that the EC Bananas Impor t Regime constituted a "measure taken to comply"
that could properly be challenged in an Article 21.5 proceeding.
243. With respect to the legal standard adopted by the Panel, we note that the Panel relied upon the
Appellate Body's finding in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) that "[s]ome measures
with a particularly close relationship to the d eclared 'measure taken to comply', and to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, may also be susceptible to review by a panel acting under
Article 21.5."
302 In its conclusion, the Panel found that the EC Bananas Import Regime was a
measure taken to comply "in itself" and also "on the basis of its particularly close relationship to the
alleged final measure taken to comply".303
244. The conclusions of the Panel derived fr om its application of the reasoning in US – Softwood
Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) . The Panel, however, failed to reflect in its reasoning that US –
Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) was not concerned with whether a measure is in itself a
measure taken to comply. That dispute concerne d the situation where, by reason of the close
relationship between the measure at issue and the de clared measure taken to comply, the measure at
issue fell within the scope of Article 21.5. It will ordinarily be necessary to consider first whether the
measure at issue is in itself a measure taken to comp ly. Only if that analysis cannot provide a clear
answer, is the analysis of US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) of application.

302US Panel Report, para. 7.310 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 77).
303US Panel Report, paras. 7.531.

245. In our view, the situation in the present case is different from the situation before the
Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) . The Appellate Body has
emphasized that the reasoning in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) concerned the
identification of closely connected m easures so as to avoid circumvention. 304 Therefore, if the
measure at issue is found to constitute in itself a measure taken to comply, it will not be necessary to
establish a "particularly close relationship" of the m easure at issue to the declared measure taken to
comply in order to subject the measure at issue to the scope of Article 21.5. Our analysis must thus
begin with the question whether the measure at is sue in this case was in itself a measure taken to
comply. In the event that the measu re at issue is found not to be in itself a measure taken to comply,
our analysis will turn to the question whether a "p articularly close relationship" exists between the
measure at issue and the declared measure taken to comply, which would warrant subjecting the
measure at issue to the scope of Article 21.5 of the DSU.
246. We, therefore, turn first to the question whet her the EC Bananas Import Regime was in itself
a measure taken to comply. We recall the European Communities' argument that, in the
Understanding on Bananas, the United States and th e European Communities ha d agreed to consider
the adoption of a tariff quota-based import regime on the basis of historical licensing, as provided in
subparagraph C.2 of the Understanding, as the final "measure taken to comply" in this dispute, and
that the dispute was resolved with the introduction of that regime.
247. Paragraph C of the Understanding provides that the import regimes foreseen therein would be
implemented by the European Communities "in the interim". An interim regime is not a final
measure. The final regime is set out in paragr aph B of the Understanding, which provides that the
European Communities would introduce a tariff-only regime for imports of bananas no later than
1 January 2006. The interim measures set out in pa ragraph C of the Understa nding would remain in
place until the tariff-only system was introduced, at the la test by 1 January 2006. It is therefore clear
from the language of the Understanding that the tari ff quota-based import regime was intended to be
of an interim nature. The Understanding sets out several consecutive st eps for the European
Communities to take in order to ach ieve compliance. Accordingly, we see no basis in the text of the
Understanding to support the position that the Unit ed States had agreed that a tariff quota-based
import regime would be the final measure taken to comply.

304Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 205, states: "The dispute in
US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) concerned the identification of closely connected measures so
as to avoid circumvention."

248. Furthermore, the European Communities mainta ins that the United States' undertaking to
terminate its imposition of increased duties in consideration of the European Communities'
implementation of the tariff quota-based import regime finally resolved the dispute between the
parties. The Panel dismissed this argument fo r the reason that Article 21.5 does not contain any
reference to the suspension of concessions. It furt her considered that the authorization to suspend
concessions confers a right, but not an obligation, to do so. On that basis, the Panel concluded that the
termination of the United States' suspension of con cessions cannot in itself be read as a waiver of the
right to bring a compliance dispute, or as an acceptance by the United States that the 2002-2005
import regime of the European Communities would constitute the final measure taken to comply.
305
249. The European Communities relies on the conduct of the United States terminating its
suspension of concessions as probative of its conten tion as to finality. Article 22.1 of the DSU
provides that suspension of concessions is a tempor ary measure "available" in the event that it has
been determined that the original DSB recommendations and rulings have not been fully implemented
by the end of the reasonable period of time. The term "available" indicates that, once suspension of
concessions is authorized, it is within the Members' discretion to exercise that authorization subject to
the conditions set out in Article 22.8. The conduct of the United States is consistent with the
Understanding being an interim measu re not finally settling the dispute. Contrary to the European
Communities' assertion, we do not consider that the conduct of the United States establishes its
acceptance of the tariff quota system introduced pursuant to subparagraph C.2 of the Understanding as
the final "measure taken to comply". The fact that the United States ceased suspending concessions in
2002 is not probative of the European Communities' case.
250. We consider next whether statements made by the United States in the context of the
suspension of concessions and subse quent termination of that suspension changes our evaluation of
the matter. In particular, we consider that the Panel was correct in taking into account the United
States' statement at the DSB meeting held on 1 Fe bruary 2002 in assessing whether the United States'
termination of the suspension of concessions could be regarded as a final solution to the dispute. The
United States explained that, upon the introduction by the European Communities of the tariff quota
on the basis of historical licensing:

305US Panel Report, paras. 7.393, 7.399, and 7.404.

[t]he United States had, therefore, terminated the suspension of
concessions in effect since 1999. The United States would continue
to work closely with the EC and other Members to address any issues
that might arise as the EC moved to a tariff-based system for bananas
and implemented the terms of the bilateral Understanding on
Bananas.
306 (footnote omitted)
251. It is clear from this statement that the Unite d States did not accept that, by introducing the
transitional tariff quota regime, the European Co mmunities had brought its bananas import regime
fully into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original EC –
Bananas III dispute. If, as the European Communities suggests, the United States had considered
that the European Communities had achieved full compliance by introducing the tariff quota pursuant
to paragraph C of the Understanding, there woul d have been no reason for the United States to
continue to work closely with the European Co mmunities and other Members to address any issues
that might arise as the EC moved to a tariff-based system for bananas. In fact, in this statement, the
United States linked its intention to "work closely w ith the EC" to its expectation that the European
Communities would "implement[] the terms of th e bilateral Understanding on Bananas". This
indicates that the United States did not consider that the European Communities had fully complied
with its obligations at the time the United Stat es decided to terminate the suspension of its
concessions. We, therefore, reject the European Communities' argument that the United States and
the European Communities had agreed to consider the introduction of the tariff quota as the final
"measure taken to comply" that would resolve this dispute.
252. We find that the Understanding on Bananas is in itself a "measure taken to comply" within the
sense of Article 21.5 of the DSU. Therefore, stri ctly speaking, we would not be required to assess
whether the EC Bananas Import Regime fell within the scope of Article 21.5 because of a
"particularly close relationship" to the declared measure taken to comply—that is, the 2002-2005
bananas import regime of the European Comm unities—and to the original recommendations and
rulings of the DSB. Nonetheless, as the Panel made findings in this respect, and given that the parties
advance several arguments relating thereto, we briefly address these additional findings.
253. First, the European Communities alleges th at there was "no link" and therefore no
"particularly close relationship" between the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
EC – Bananas III and the political decision of the European Communities to introduce a tariff-only
import regime by 1 January 2006. The European Communities argues that a link exists when the

306US Panel Report, para. 7.391 (quoting Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002,
WT/DSB/M/119, para. 8).

introduction of the challenged measure is "necessary"
307 to address a specific finding of inconsistency
with the covered agreements. Yet, in the Europ ean Communities' submission, there is no finding in
the 1997 EC – Bananas III dispute that could be complied w ith only through the introduction of a
tariff-only regime.
254. Like the Panel, we do not see why it should be relevant that the original recommendations and
rulings of the DSB did not expressly suggest th at the European Communities bring itself into
compliance specifically through the introduction of a tariff-only regime. We see no basis in the DSU
for requiring that a measure must be "necessary" to address a specific finding of inconsistency in
order for that measure to be introduced; nor does the European Commun ities identify any textual
basis for this in the DSU. WT O Members enjoy some discretion in choosing how to implement DSB
recommendations and rulings. In that vein, the chap eau of Article 21.3 of the DSU provides that "the
Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB." In US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil) , the
Appellate Body stated:
Where alternative means of implementation are available, a WTO
Member enjoys some discretion in deciding what measures to take to
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.
308
255. The Appellate Body addressed the link between the "measure taken to comply" and the
original recommendations and rulings of the DSB in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 –
Canada), US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II) , and Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.5 –
Argentina).309 The Appellate Body did not find that a link between a measure taken to comply and the
original DSB recommendations and rulings exists onl y when the measure is "necessary" to address a
specific finding of inconsistency. We therefore reject this argument of the European Communities.
256. The European Communities alleg es further that, in concluding that the EC Bananas Import
Regime at issue in the present case was closely related to the recommendations and rulings in EC –
Bananas III, the Panel overstepped the limitations imposed by its terms of reference, which confined
the scope of the Panel's review to the "specific measure at issue". 310 The European Communities
claims that the Panel thereby acted inconsistently with Articles 6.2 and 7 of the DSU. We see no error
in the Panel's reference to findi ngs of the original panel in EC – Bananas III . The Panel did not

307European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 46 (US).
308Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 202.
309Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada) , para. 68; Appellate
Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II) , para. 61; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 136.
310European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 48 (US).

reassess the measure at issue in EC – Bananas III. Instead, the Panel had regard to that measure in an
evidentiary sense for the purpose of assessing whether there was a link between the bananas import
regime reviewed in the EC – Bananas III dispute and that at issue in the present proceedings. In
doing so, the Panel did not exceed its mandate.
257. The European Communities also asserts that th e Panel was wrong in relying on the findings
of the panels in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) and EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – EC),
and on the decision by the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) , when assessing
whether the EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in the current proceedings constituted a "measure taken
to comply".311 The European Communities contends that those proceedings related to a different matter
and involved different WTO Members to those in the present proceedings. Therefore, the European
Communities contends that "the resulting report[ s] [are] not binding precedent for other disputes
between the same parties on other matters, or between different parties on the same matter even where
the same question of WTO law might arise."312
258. We note that the Panel stated that it read the "above three procedures" as an "indication" that
the European Communities' attempt to bring itself into compliance by 1 January 1999 was
unsuccessful.313 In so stating, the Panel considered the result of these three reports as evidence in the
context of its assessment of whether the EC Ba nanas Import Regime constituted a measure taken
"in the direction of , or hav[ing] the objective of achieving , compliance".314 We see no error in the
Panel's reliance on the outcome of these pro ceedings for assessing whether the European
Communities had brought itself into compliance. Th ere is no question that these previous reports and
decisions form part of a continuum of events that provide an indication that the European
Communities had not yet fully implemented the DSB' s recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings.
259. With respect to the European Communities' men tion of Article 11 of the DSU, we note that
the European Communities clarified, at the oral hearing, that it was not invoking Article 11 as the
basis of a separate claim. The European Commun ities explained that, rather, it made reference to
Article 11 of the DSU as a supporting argument in th e context of allegations of violation of other
provisions of the GATT 1994 or the DSU. We also note that Article 11 has not been listed by the

311European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 53 (US) (referring to US Panel Report,
para. 7.352).
312European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 56 (US).
313US Panel Report, para. 7.352.
314US Panel Report, para. 7.306 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV

European Communities in its Notice of Appeal. In these circumstances, we make no finding with
respect to Article 11 of the DSU.
260. For all these reasons, we find that the EC Bananas Import Re gime constituted, in itself, a
"measure taken to comply". We therefore uphold, albeit for different reasons, the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.531 of the US Panel Report, that the EC Bananas Import Regime, set out in
EC Regulation 1964/2005 a nd implementing regulations, constitute d a measure taken to comply and
was therefore properly before the Panel in these Article 21.5 proceedings.
VIII. Repeal of the Challenged Measure (United States)
261. We now address the question whether the Panel erred, in the case initiated by the United
States, in failing to take into consideration the repeal of the challenged measure.
262. Addressing a request by the European Communiti es at the interim review stage to make
several modifications to reflect the adoption of EC Regulation 1528/2007, which repealed, inter alia,
the tariff quota of 775,000 metric tonnes ("mt") est ablished through Article 1( 2) of EC Regulation
1964/2005, the Panel found:
[E]vidence submitted at this late stage by the European Communities
regarding the adoption of amendmen ts to the EC bananas import
regime is inadmissible. Furtherm ore, the Panel does not consider
that the language contained in para graph 8.3(c) of the interim report
creates any impression that the Panel is making findings regarding
aspects of the EC bananas import regime other than the preferential
tariff quota reserved for ACP bananas.
315
263. Nonetheless, the Panel modified paragraph 8.5 of the Interim Report, which read "[t]he Panel
recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body re quest the European Communities to bring the
inconsistent measures into confor mity with its obligations under the GATT 1994" to read as follows
in the Final Report:
Since the original DSB recommendati ons and rulings in this dispute
remain operative through the results of the current compliance
proceedings, the Panel makes no new recommendation.
316

315US Panel Report, para. 6.42.
316US Panel Report, para. 8.13. In contrast, the Ecuador Panel Report states, in paragraph 8.5:
The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the
European Communities to bring the inconsistent measures into conformity
with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
We note that paragraph 8.13 of the US Interim Report was identical to paragraph 8.5 of the Final Report in
the Ecuador case. However, the Panel modified this recommendation in the Final US Panel Report. (See
European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 177 and 178 (US))

264. On appeal, the European Communities conte nds that the Panel failed to take into
consideration the repeal of the contested measure, and thereby acted inconsistently with its obligation
under Article 3.4 of the DSU to "achieve[] a satisfa ctory settlement of the matter" and its obligation
under Article 3.7 of the DSU to "secure a positive solution to the dispute". 317 In this context, the
European Communities also makes re ference to Article 11 of the DSU. The European Communities
submits that the Panel did not distinguish prope rly between factual evidence supporting a claim and
evidence relating to the existence of the contest ed measure itself when it dismissed evidence
submitted by the European Communities regarding the adoption of EC Regulation 1528/2007.
265. The European Communities also claims that the Panel erred in making a recommendation
with respect to a measure that had ceased to exis t subsequent to the establishment of the Panel 318, and
alleges that the Panel provided a "concealed" recommendation by stating that the original DSB
recommendations and rulings remained operative. 319 The European Communities refers to the
Appellate Body Report in US – Certain EC Products in support of its proposition that panels cannot
make recommendations with respect to measures that have ceased to exist. The European
Communities submits that, since the 775,000 mt dut y-free tariff quota reserved for ACP imports was
repealed by EC Regulation 1528/2007 prior to the issuance of the US Panel Report, there was no
recommendation that could be made or that could "remain operative".320
266. The United States contends that the Panel did not err in making findings with respect to
EC Regulation 1964/2005, even though that Regulat ion was repealed during the course of the Panel
proceedings. The United States asserts that vari ous panels and the Appellate Body have made
recommendations with respect to expired measures. 321 With respect to th e European Communities'
reliance on the Appellate Body Report in US – Certain EC Products , the United States contends that
the measure at issue in that dispute had ceased to ex ist prior to the establishment of the panel's terms
of reference, while, in the present dispute, th e European Communities repealed EC Regulation
1964/2005 only towards the conclusion of the Panel proceedings.322

317European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 180 (US).
318European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 187 (US).
319European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 190 and 191 (US).
320European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 191 (US).
321United States' appellee's submission, para. 108 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Product , paras. 8.16 and 8.36; Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters ,
para. 310; and Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 129).

267. Turning to our analysis, we first examine the European Communities' allegation that the Panel
failed to take into consideration the repeal of th e contested measure and erred in making findings with
respect to EC Regulation 1964/200 5. The Appellate Body previously addressed the questions
whether expired measures can be subject to consulta tions and whether the "measure at issue" within
the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU can be an expired measure. The Appellate Body answered
both questions in the affirmative. In particular, with respect to the question of which measures may
be subject to consultations, the Appellate B ody referred to the phrase "measures affecting the
operation of any covered agreement" in Article 4.2 of the DSU. In this respect, the Appellate Body
found, in US – Upland Cotton , that whether or not a measure is still in force is not dispositive of
whether that measure is currently affecting the ope ration of any covered agreement, and can therefore
be subject to consultations.
323
268. The Appellate Body also rejected the notion th at an expired measure could not be a measure
that is "at issue" in terms of Article 6.2 of the DSU. The Appellate Body explained that Article 6.2
requires that measures must be "at issue", that is "in dispute" at the time the panel request is made.
Yet, the Appellate Body found that, since the term "at issue" does not shed light on whether measures
at issue must currently be in force or whether th ey can have expired, the fact that a measure has
expired is not dispositive of the question whether th e panel can address claims in respect of that
measure.
324 The Appellate Body found contextual support for rejecting the notion that an expired
measure could not be a measure "at issue" in Artic le 3.3 of the DSU, which refers to the "prompt
settlement" of certain situations that, in the ab sence of settlement, could undermine the effective
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations
of Members. The Appellate Body observed that Ar ticle 3.3 focuses not upon "existing" measures, or
measures that are "currently in force", but, rather, upon "measures taken" by a Member, which
includes measures taken in the past.
325
269. The situation in the present case is different from that in US – Upland Cotton , in that the
measure in the present appeal was still in for ce when the Panel was established and expired only
towards the end of the Panel proceedings. In US – Upland Cotton, certain measures were no longer in
force at the time of the establishment of the panel, but the continued effect of past subsidies was
claimed to still cause serious prejudice to the complain ants' interests. However, we consider that, if
the DSU does not exclude from the scope of consultations, or from the scope of panel proceedings, a
measure that was no longer in force when the dispute was initiated, then, a fortiori, a panel is not

323Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 262.
324Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras. 269-272.
325Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 264.

precluded from making findings with respect to me asures that expire during the course of the
proceedings.
270. We find further support for this interpretation in Article 7 of the DSU, which sets out the
standard terms of reference for panels. The terms of reference for a panel pursuant to Article 7 define
the scope of the dispute and the mandate of the panel. In the present case, the panel request identified,
inter alia, EC Regulation 1964/2005, and the DSB establis hed the Panel on that basis with standard
terms of reference. 326 The European Communities and the Unite d States both agreed at the outset of
the proceedings that this Regulation was the meas ure at issue included in the Panel's terms of
reference. The parties agreed that this measure was within the jurisdiction of the Panel. The DSU
nowhere provides that the jurisdiction of a panel term inates or is limited by the expiry of the measure
at issue. On the contrary, when the DSU provides for limitations on the authority of the panel in other
instances, it does so in express terms. Article 12.12 of the DSU, for example, provides that a panel's
authority lapses if the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12 months. The absence of
a similar limitation, with respect to changes to the scope of the panel's jurisdiction after the panel has
been established and the terms of reference have be en determined by the DSB, lends further support
to our interpretation that, once a panel has been est ablished and the terms of reference for the panel
have been set, the panel has the competence to make findings with respect to the measures covered by
its terms of reference. We thus consider it to be within the discretion of the panel to decide how it
takes into account subsequent modificat ions or a repeal of the measure at issue. Accordingly, panels
have made findings on expired measures in some ca ses and declined to do so in others, depending on
the particularities of the disputes before them. 327 In the present case, the European Communities has
advanced no reason, nor do we see a reason, for interfering with the Panel's exercise of that discretion.
271. We turn next to the European Communities' allegation that the Panel erred in making a
recommendation with respect to an expired measure. We recall that the Appellate Body has
distinguished the question whether a panel can make a finding concerning an expired measure from
the question whether a panel can make a recommendation relating to an expired measure. In US –
Certain EC Products , the Appellate Body reversed the pane l's decision to make a recommendation
pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU on the grounds that the panel had already found that the measure
at issue in that dispute had expired.
328 The Appellate Body confirmed, in US – Upland Cotton , that

326US Panel Report, para. 1.3.
327See, for instance, Panel Report, Wool Shirts and Blouses, para. 6.2; Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos,
para. 14.9; Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 7.126; Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes , para. 7.344; and Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Product ,
para. 7.1312.
328Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 81.

the fact that a measure has expired may affect what recommendation a panel may make, but it is not
dispositive of the question whether a panel can make findings relating to an expired measure.
329
272. In keeping with this distinction, we assess whether the Panel made a recommendation to the
DSB in the present case; and, if so, what kind of recommendation it made. We note that the Panel
stated, in paragraph 8.13 of the US Panel Report, that it "makes no new recommendation". It is not
clear what is meant by the word "new" in this contex t: it seems to relate to the fact that the original
DSB recommendations and rulings in EC – Bananas III remain operative until the European
Communities has achieved substantive compliance wi th these recommendations and rulings. While
making the allegation that the Panel made a "concealed" recommendation, the European Communities
does not specify the content of this alleged "conceal ed" recommendation. In this situation, we are
unable to discern what would be the content of this alleged "concealed" recommendation. We do not
believe that the Panel made a specific recommenda tion with respect to a measure that was no longer
in force at the time the US Panel Report was circulated.
273. Furthermore, we consider that the Panel's statement that the "original DSB recommendations
and rulings in this dispute remain operative" was not incorrect. The DSB recommendations and
rulings from the original proceedings remain in effect until the European Communities brings itself
into substantive compliance. The statement by the Pa nel does not in any way affect the legal status of
the DSB recommendations and rulings in the origin al dispute. We see no error in the Panel's
statement in paragraph 8.13 of the US Panel Report. We therefore find that the Panel did not err in
making findings with respect to a measure that had ceased to exist subsequent to the establishment of
the Panel, but before the Panel issued its Report.
274. With respect to the European Communities' reference to Article 11 of the DSU, we note that
the European Communities clarified, at the oral hearing, that it was not invoking Article 11 as the
basis of a separate claim. The European Commun ities explained that, rather, it made reference to
Article 11 of the DSU as a supporting argument in th e context of allegations of violation of other
provisions of the GATT 1994 or the DSU. We also recall that the European Communities' Notice of
Appeal makes no mention of Article 11 of the DSU. In these circumstances, we make no finding with
respect to that provision.

329Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 272.

IX. The European Communities' Notice of Appeal (United States)
275. In its appellee's submission, the United St ates contends that the European Communities'
Notice of Appeal does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(2)(d)(iii) of the Working Procedures
for Appellate Review, because it does not contain an indicative list of the paragraphs of the US Panel
Report containing the alleged errors. 330 The United States further submits that the Notice of Appeal
fails to comply with Rule 20(2)(d)(i), because seve ral paragraphs of the Notice of Appeal speak of
"erroneous findings" of the Panel without identifying which findings are alleged to be erroneous. In
particular, the United States takes issue with paragraph 2(a), (c), and (d) of the Notice of Appeal. The
United States requests that we dismiss the appeal for these reasons.
276. In addition, the United States asserts that the Notice of Appeal makes no mention of a claim
under Article 11 of the DSU. Yet, the United States notes that the European Communities' appellant's
submission contains several allegations of violatio n of Article 11 of the DSU. The United States
requests that, in any event, the Appellate Body should consider the European Communities' Article 11
claims as not properly before it.331
277. In reply, the European Communities does not dispute that its Notice of Appeal did not
identify the specific paragraphs of the US Panel Repo rt containing the alleged errors. The European
Communities argues, however, that none of the partic ipants or third participants had difficulty in
identifying the scope and content of the Notice of Appeal. Moreover, with respect to the alleged
failure to list in its Notice of Appeal a claim unde r Article 11 of the DSU, the European Communities
accepts that Article 11 of the DSU is indeed not id entified in the Notice of Appeal. However, the
European Communities clarified, at the oral hearing, that it did not invoke Article 11 as the basis of a
claim, but rather as a supporting argument.332
278. Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures provides that a Notice of Appeal shall include the
following information:
[A] brief statement of the nature of the appeal, including:
(i) identification of the alleged e rrors in the issues of law covered
in the panel report and legal in terpretations developed by the
panel;

332European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

(ii) a list of the legal provision(s ) of the covered agreements that
the panel is alleged to have erre d in interpreting or applying;
and
(iii) without prejudice to the ability of the appellant to refer to
other paragraphs of the panel report in the context of its
appeal, an indicative list of the paragraphs of the panel report
containing the alleged errors.
279. In its Notice of Appeal, the European Comm unities "seeks review" of seven "issues of law
and legal interpretations" contained in the US Panel Report. The Notice of Appeal, however, does not
provide a list of the legal provisions of the covered ag reements that the Panel is alleged to have erred
in interpreting or applying, as required by Rule 20(2)(d)(ii) of the Working Procedures. Furthermore,
the Notice of Appeal does not contain an "indica tive list of the paragraphs of the panel report
containing the alleged errors", as required under Rule 20(2)(d)(iii).
280. Rule 20(2)(d) does not stipulate what con sequences flow from a failure to meet its
requirements. In assessing the potential consequences, we are mindful of the due process function
that this Rule fulfils. The Appellate Body recognized in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain
EC Products:
… the important balance that must be maintained between the right
of Members to exercise the right of appeal meaningfully and
effectively, and the right of appellees to receive notice through the
Notice of Appeal of the findings under appeal, so that they may
exercise their right of defence effectively.
333
281. The Appellate Body stated in that case that th e requirements of Rule 20(2) "serve to ensure
that the appellee also receives notice, albeit brief, of the 'nature of the appeal' and the 'allegations of
errors' by the panel." 334 The Appellate Body held, in Japan – Apples , that "an evaluation of the
sufficiency of a Notice of Appeal must examine whether the appellee received notice therein of the
issues to be argued on appeal".335
282. In keeping with this approach, we assess, in the present case, whether the United States was
put on notice of the alleged errors of law and le gal interpretations in the US Panel Report by the
European Communities' Notice of Appeal. We fi rst address the European Communities' omission to
refer to specific paragraphs of the US Panel Report in its Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, we address
the United States' allegation that various claims by the European Communities under Article 11 of the

333Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 62.
334Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 62.

DSU are not properly before the Appellate Body b ecause they were not included in the Notice of
Appeal.
283. The European Communities' Notice of Appeal identifies seven distinct legal issues.
However, it makes no mention of any paragraph numb er of the US Panel Report to which the issues
appealed relate. Nonetheless, we consider that the United States was in a position to discern the
issues raised in the European Communities' Notice of Appeal. The European Communities has
provided a brief description of each legal issue it rais es on appeal. The fact that the United States has
provided a comprehensive appellee's submission res ponding to all the issues of which the European
Communities seeks review, suggests to us that the Un ited States was, in fact, in a position to identify
the Panel findings the European Communities is appealing, and did not suffer prejudice from the
failure of the European Communities to provide a lis t of relevant paragraphs of the US Panel Report
in its Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, we note that, in response to questioning at the oral hearing, the
United States confirmed that it was not alleging that it had been prejudiced by the absence of
paragraph numbers of the US Panel Report in th e European Communities' Notice of Appeal. We
therefore consider that, with respect to items (a)– (g) set out in paragraph 2 of the Notice of Appeal,
the United States was in the position to "know the case [it had] to meet"
336, and was thus placed on
notice of the issues raised in the European Communities' Notice of App eal. The formal defects in the
Notice of Appeal thus do not give rise to procedural detriment of the kind that would warrant the
dismissal of the European Communities' appeal. We therefore find that the deficiencies in the
European Communities' Notice of Appeal do not le ad to dismissal of the European Communities'
appeal.
284. We turn now to the United States' request that we dismiss the Europ ean Communities' claims
under Article 11 of the DSU as not properly before th e Appellate Body because such claims were not
included in the Notice of Appeal.
337 The United States submits that, while the European
Communities' Notice of Appeal nowhere contains a claim under Article 11 of the DSU, the European
Communities' appellant's submission asserts, in several places, that the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 11. Therefore, the United States requests the Appellate Body to consider the European
Communities' claims under Article 11 as not properly be fore it, consistent with the Appellate Body's
treatment of this issue in previous cases.

336Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 74.

285. The European Communities clarified, at the oral hearing, that it was not invoking Article 11
as the basis of a separate claim. The European Communities explained that, rather, it made reference
to Article 11 of the DSU as a supporting argument in the context of its claims under other provisions
of the GATT 1994 or the DSU. In our view, a party is not prevented from making reference to
Article 11 in support of an argument, and we do not find fault with the European Communities for
making various references to Artic le 11 in its appellant's submissi on. However, as no separate claim
under Article 11 of the DSU has been raised in the Notice of Appeal, and as we have not been asked
to make findings with respect to Article 11, we make no such findings.
286. For all these reasons, we reject the United States' request to dismiss the European
Communities' appeal on account of the European Communities' failure to comply with the
requirement set out in Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures . Moreover, as the European
Communities has not included claims based on Article 11 of the DSU in its Notice of Appeal, and has
clarified that it has made no separate claim based on Article 11, we make no findings in this respect.
X. Article XIII of the GATT 1994 (Ecuador and United States)
287. We turn next to the European Communities' a ppeal of the Panel's finding that the duty-free
tariff quota reserved for bananas of ACP origin fa lls within the scope of Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 and was, therefore, inconsistent with Ar ticle XIII:1, the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and
Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994.
338 As a preliminary issue, we address the European
Communities' appeal in the Ecuador case of the Pane l's finding that "the fact that a Member adopts a
measure to implement a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1 would [not] prevent another Member
from challenging, pursuant to Article 21.5, the compliance of such measure with the covered
agreements."339
288. Section A summarizes the findings made in the original proceedings and by the first
Article 21.5 panel requested by Ecuador. Section B describes the measures taken by the European
Communities to comply with the DSB's recommenda tions and rulings. The current Article 21.5
proceedings are summarized in section C. Section D provides an overview of the arguments raised on
appeal by the participants and the third participan ts. Finally, in section E, we discuss the issues
appealed.

339Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.251.

A. The Original Proceedings and the First Ecuador Article 21.5 Panel
289. In the original EC – Bananas III proceedings, the allocation of tariff quota shares under the
European Communities' bananas import regime in force at that time was found to be inconsistent with
Article XIII of the GATT 1994. This inconsistency was found not to be justified by either the
"Bananas Framework Agreement" 340 annexed to the European Communities' GATT Schedule of
Concessions, or the Agreement on Agriculture . The Appellate Body also found that the
"Lomé Waiver"341 from Article I did not justify inconsistencies with Article XIII of the GATT
1994.342 On 25 September 1997, the DSB adopted the or iginal panel and Appellate Body Reports in
EC – Bananas III and recommended that the European Communities bring its measures into
conformity with the covered agreements.343
290. The import regime introduced pursuant to EC Regulation 1637/98 maintained a tariff quota of
857,000 mt reserved for duty-free imports of banan as from traditional ACP suppliers and tariff quotas
totalling 2,553,000 mt for imports from thir d countries and non-traditional ACP suppliers. 344 Under
these tariff quotas, imports from third countries were s ubject to an in-quota duty of ECU75/mt, while
imports from ACP suppliers were duty free. Out-of-quota imports from ACP suppliers benefited from
an ECU200 preference over the out-of-quota duty applicable to imports from non-ACP suppliers.
291. On 18 December 1998, Ecuador initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
alleging that the measures taken by the Europ ean Communities failed to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. The first Article 21.5 panel requested by Ecuador found that the
measures taken to comply by the European Communiti es were inconsistent with Articles I and XIII of

340Framework Agreement on Bananas, annexed to both EC Schedule LXXX and EC Schedule CXL,
originally negotiated in 1994 by the European Communities with Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela (reproduced in Annex VII attached to this Report).
341The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, D ecision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
9 December 1994, L/7604, 19 Decembe r 1994, extended by EC – The Four th ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé,
Extension of Waiver, Decision of the WTO General Council of 14 October 1996, WT/L/186, 18 October 1996
(the "Lomé Waiver").
342The Appellate Body and the original panel also found that licence allocation procedures violated
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles II and XVII of the GATS. (Appellate Body Report, EC –
Bananas III, para. 225) The original panel and the Appellate Body found that this violation of Article I:1 was
not justified by the Lomé Waiver from Article I, because it was not required by the Lomé Convention.
343On 20 July 1998, the European Communities adopted EC Regulation 1637/98 amending EEC
Regulation 404/93 and, on 28 October 1998, adopted EC Regulation 2362/98 repealing EEC Regulation
1442/93.
344Of these 2,253,000 mt, a tariff quota of 2.2 million mt was bound in the European Communities'
Schedule and the European Communities opened an autonomous tariff quota of 353,000 mt due to the
enlargement of the European Communities in 1995.

the GATT 1994.
345 The first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel re port was not appealed and was adopted by
the DSB on 6 May 1999.346
292. The first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel made s uggestions, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the
DSU, that the European Communities could bring its measures into conformity by: (i) applying a
tariff-only system without a tariff quota that could include a preference for ACP countries covered by
a waiver or a free trade agreement consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; (ii) applying a
tariff-only system with a duty-free tariff quota for AC P countries covered by a suitable waiver; or
(iii) maintaining its bound and autonomous most -favoured nation ("MFN") tariff quotas, either
without allocating country-specific shares or by allocating such shares by agreement with all
substantive suppliers consistently with Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994. The MFN tariff quota could
be combined with the extension of duty-free treatme nt to ACP countries covered by the Lomé Waiver
from Article I of the GATT 1994 or with a duty-free tariff quota for ACP countries, provided that a
waiver from Article XIII of the GATT 1994 was obtained.
347
293. Following arbitration proceedings pursuant to Artic le 22.6 of the DSU, the United States and
Ecuador requested and obtained authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other
obligations.348
B. Measure Taken to Comply
294. Following the signing, in April 2001, of th e Understandings on Bananas between the
European Communities and Ecuador and between th e European Communities and the United States,
and the adoption, in November 2001, at the Doha Ministerial Conference of two waivers, from
Article I and from Article XIII of the GATT 1994, the European Communities further amended its
bananas import regime.

345The first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel also found that the revised licence allocation procedures were
also inconsistent with Articles II a nd XVII of the GATS. (Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
Ecuador), paras. 6.134 and 7.1)
346WT/DSB/M/61.
347Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), paras. 6.156-6.158.
348Pursuant to arbitrations on the level of suspension of concessions and other obligations in the years
1999 and 2000, the DSB authorized the United States to suspend concessions or other obligations up to an
amount of US$191.4 million per year, and Ecuador up to an amount of US$201.6 million per year. (Decision by
the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 8.1; Decision by the Arbitrators, EC –
Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 173) The United States suspended tariff concessions;
Ecuador, however, did not exercise its right to suspend concessions and other obligations under the GATT 1994,
the GATS, or the TRIPS Agreement.

295. EC Regulation 216/2001 reorganized the EC Bananas Import Regime into tariff quotas A
and B, totalling 2,553,000 mt, and tariff quota C, at the level of 850,000 mt. These three tariff quotas
were open for imports of bananas from third countri es. However, in-quota imports of ACP bananas
entered duty free and out-of-quota imports entered with a tariff preference of €300/mt over the MFN
duty specified in the European Communities' common customs tariff.
349 Imports from non-ACP
suppliers under tariff quotas A and B were subject to an in-quota duty of €75/mt and imports under
tariff quota C were subject to a duty of €300/mt. EC Regulation 216/2001 established that the
Commission, on the basis of an agreement with the WTO Members with a substantial interest in the
supply of bananas, would allocate tariff quotas A and B among supplier countries.350
296. EC Regulation 2587/2001 furt her amended the European Communities' common market
organization in order to implement Phase II of th e Understandings on Bananas for the period from
1 January 2002 to 31 December 2005. EC Regula tion 2587/2001 modified the tariff quotas in the
following ways: (i) tariff quota A of 2.2 million mt was maintained, while tariff quota B was
increased to 453,000 mt; (ii) within tariff quotas A and B, imports from third countries were subject
to a duty of €75/mt, while imports from ACP countries entered duty free; and (iii) tariff quota C,
reserved for imports from ACP countries and subject to a zero duty, was decreased to 750,000 mt.
351
Out-of-quota imports from ACP countries enjoyed a tariff preference of €300/mt over imports from
non-ACP supplier countries.352
297. Finally, on 29 November 2005, the European Communities adopted EC Regulation
1964/2005, which introduced the EC Bananas Im port Regime at issue in these Article 21.5
proceedings. The new import regime entered into force on 1 January 2006 and established a tariff-
only regime for imports from non-ACP suppliers with an MFN tariff rate of €176/mt for bananas. In
addition, it established a zero duty preferen ce for 775,000 mt of imports from ACP countries. 353 On
20 December 2007, the European Communities adopt ed EC Regulation 1528/2007, which repealed
EEC Regulation 404/93 and modified EC Regula tion 1964/2005, eliminating the 775,000 mt tariff
quota for duty-free imports from ACP countries.

349EC Regulation 216/2001, Article 18.4, as amended.
350EC Regulation 216/2001, Article 19.1, as amended.
351EC Regulation 2587/2001, Articles 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3, as amended.
352EC Regulation 2587/2001, Article 18.4, as amended.
353See supra, footnote 11.

C. The Current Article 21.5 Proceedings
298. Before the Panel, Ecuador and the United St ates (the complainants) claimed that the
EC Bananas Import Regime was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994.
354
299. The complainants argued that, notwithstanding the expiration of the Doha Article XIII
Waiver355 on 31 December 2005, the European Communiti es continued to apply a tariff quota at the
level of 775,000 mt reserved for duty-free imports from ACP countries. Imports from all other
supplier countries did not have access to the ACP duty-free tariff quota and were subject to the MFN
tariff at the level of €176/mt. 356 The complainants claimed that the European Communities' measure
was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, in that banana imports of non-ACP origin
were not "similarly restricted" as were imports of ACP bananas because non-ACP suppliers were
excluded from that duty-free tariff quota. 357 The complainants also argued that the measure was
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because it discriminated between ACP bananas and
like non-ACP bananas in the application of the tariff quota; neither did it aim at a distribution of trade
approaching as closely as possible the tariff quot a shares, which the various Members might be
expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions. 358 Finally, the complainants claimed that the
measure was inconsistent with Article XIII:2(d) because the allocation of the duty-free tariff quota,
extended exclusively to ACP suppliers, bears no relation to trading patterns in the world market or the
European Communities' market.359
300. The European Communities raised a preliminary objection in the Ecuador case. It argued that
Ecuador's claim under Article XIII should be reject ed because, in enacting the challenged measure,
the European Communities had followed a suggestion for implementation made by the first Ecuador
Article 21.5 panel, namely, "applying a tariff- only system with a duty-free tariff quota for ACP
countries covered by a suitable waiver". 360 On the substance of the Article XIII claims, the European
Communities contended that Article XIII was not a pplicable to the challenged measure because the
"cap" on the tariff preference for ACP suppliers fell within the scope of Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994.361 The European Communities also argued that the cap on duty-free imports from ACP

355Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference held in Doha, European Communities – Transitional
Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/16; WT/L/437 (Panel Exhibit US-5). Th e Doha Article XIII Waiver expired on 31 December
2005.
356Ecuador Panel Report, para.7.205; US Panel Report, paras. 7.613 and 7.614.
360Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.209.

suppliers was not a "restriction" within the mean ing of Article XIII because the cap on the tariff
preference was imposed on ACP countries and not on the non-ACP supplier countries. 362 According
to the European Communities, Article XIII did not re quire the extension to all Members of the tariff
preference granted to ACP countries. 363 In the Ecuador case, the European Communities further
argued that Ecuador could not challenge the lim it on the tariff preference for imports from ACP
countries, because this cap did not result in any nullif ication or impairment of benefits accruing to
Ecuador.364 To the contrary, the cap on duty-free im ports from ACP countries benefited non-ACP
supplier countries, including Ecuador.
301. The Panel considered, first, the preliminary objection raised by the European Communities
against Ecuador's claim under Article XIII. Accord ing to the Panel, to th e extent the European
Communities implemented the suggestion made pur suant to Article 19.1 by the first Ecuador
Article 21.5 panel, the Panel was not precluded from conducting the assessment requested by Ecuador
under Article 21.5 in these proceedings. 365 The Panel reasoned that Ecuador was not asking for an
assessment of the conformity with the covered agreements of the suggestions made by the first
Ecuador Article 21.5 panel but, rather, of the measure actually taken by the European Communities
to implement such suggestions.366 The Panel held that the conformi ty with the covered agreements of
any measure taken by a Member to implement a suggestion will depend on the actual implementation
of the suggestion by the Member in question.367 The Panel concluded that:
... once the respondent has taken the measure allegedly to implement
a suggestion under Article 19.1, to the extent that the complainant
contests the existence of such measures or their conformity with the
covered agreements, existence a nd conformity with the covered
agreements may be verified, if requested by the complainant, by a
compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5.
368
302. The Panel also noted that:
... in addressing the European Communities' first preliminary
objection, the Panel does not need to assess whether the
European Communities has effectively implemented any of the
suggestions of the first complian ce panel requested by Ecuador.
Therefore, the Panel does not need to address, in the context of the
European Communities' first prelim inary objection, whether the EC
has fulfilled the two parts of the second suggestion of that

364Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.213.
365Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.238.
366Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.228.
367Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.247.
368Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.262.

compliance panel, in particular whether the term "suitable waiver"
refers to a waiver from only Article I or also from Article XIII of the
GATT 1994.
369
303. Regarding the relationship between Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994, the Panel reasoned
that, "if there was some overlap between those two Articles, giving effect to Article XIII would not
nullify the effect of Article I". 370 The Panel also relied on the findings of the first Ecuador
Article 21.5 panel that Article XIII did not only appl y to quantitative prohibitions and restrictions, but
that Article XIII:5 subjected tariff quotas to the requirements of Article XIII.371
304. In respect of the claim under Ar ticle XIII:1, the Panel found that the duty-free tariff quota for
ACP bananas at a level of 775,000 mt represented a quantitative restriction, within the meaning of
Article XIII:1, on banana imports from non-ACP s uppliers that "cannot have access to that
quantitatively limited benefit." 372 The Panel found that imports from ACP countries were not
similarly restricted as were like imports from non-ACP suppliers. Therefore, the duty-free tariff quota
reserved for ACP countries was inconsistent with Article XIII:1.373
305. Having found that banana imports from Ecuador were "restricted" within the meaning of
Article XIII:1, the Panel also rejected, in the Ecuador case, the European Communities' argument that,
even assuming arguendo that there was a quantitative restric tion imposed on ACP countries, Ecuador
could not successfully challenge it, because this quantitative restriction imposed on ACP countries
would not result in any nullification or impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador.374
306. In respect of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, the Panel found that:
... given that MFN countries are excluded from the
European Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota, by definition,
the ACP preference cannot and does not "aim at a distribution of
trade in [bananas] approaching as closely as possible the shares
which the various [Members, including both ACP and MFN
countries] might be expected to obtain in the absence of such
restrictions".
375

369Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.265.
373Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.349 and 7.350; US Panel Report, paras. 7.697 and 7.698.
374Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.337.

The Panel thus found that, on its face, the EC Bananas Import Regime, including its ACP duty-free
tariff quota, was inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2.376
307. Finally, the Panel concluded that the ACP duty-free tariff quota, which is granted exclusively
to some WTO Members and not to others, including substantial suppliers, does not comply with the
requirements of Article XIII:2(d) because, in the ab sence of an agreement on the allocation of tariff
quota shares, it does not result in an allocation of quota shares to Members having a substantial
interest in supplying the product shares based upo n the proportions supplied by such Members during
a previous representative period.377
D. Claims and Arguments on Appeal
308. In the Ecuador case, the Europ ean Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the
Panel's finding that the adoption by a Member of a measure that implements a suggestion made by a
panel pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU does not prevent another Member from challenging, in
Article 21.5 proceedings, the consistency of that measure with the covered agreements. The European
Communities also challenges the Panel's finding that, "[e]ven if there was a presumption of the
legality of measures taken to impl ement a suggestion pursuant to Artic le 19.1, there is nothing in the
DSU suggesting that the alleged legality of such measures could not be reviewed by a compliance
panel."
378
309. In both the Ecuador and United States cases, the European Communities requests the
Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's interpretati on of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 and the Panel's
consequential findings that the EC Bananas Import Re gime was inconsistent with Article XIII:1, the
chapeau of Article XIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d). 379 In particular, the European Communities argues
that the limit on the tariff preference for ACP bananas falls within the scope of Article I:1 and does
not constitute a "quantitative restricti on" within the meaning of Article XIII. 380 M o r e o v e r , t h e
European Communities contends that the quantitative limitation applies to the preference granted to
ACP countries and is not imposed on the allege dly aggrieved Members—that is, the non-ACP
suppliers—as would be required in order for Article XIII to apply.381

378European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 80 (Ecuador) (quoting Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.251).
379European Communities' appellant's submissions, para s. 113, 130, and 134 (Ecuador), paras. 130,
147, and 151 (US).

310. In the United States case only, the European Communities emphasizes that "the United States
has never been a banana supplier to the European Communities and is not likely to become such a
banana supplier in the future."
382 For that reason, the ACP tariff pr eference could not be inconsistent
with the requirement of the chapeau of Article XIII: 2 that import restrictions aim at a distribution of
trade approaching as closely as possible the shares in the absence of the restriction. This is so
because, even in the absence of th e ACP tariff preference, the United States' share of trade in bananas
in the European Communities would be zero.383
311. In the Ecuador case, the Europ ean Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the
Panel's finding that the limit on the tariff prefer ence for imports of ACP bananas caused nullification
or impairment to Ecuador's interests under the c overed agreements; rath er, it was a benefit for
Ecuador that the ACP tariff preference was limited.384
312. Ecuador requests the Appellate Body to uphold th e Panel's finding that it could review under
Article 21.5 the conformity of the measures taken to comply by the Eur opean Communities, even
though the European Communities had taken the m easures to implement a suggestion made by the
first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel pursuant to Article 19 .1 of the DSU. Ecuador argues that "nothing in
the DSU suggests that the absence of an appeal ... of a panel['s] suggestion immunizes measures taken
to implement that suggestion from an Article 21.5 review."385
313. As to the substance of their Article XIII clai ms, Ecuador and the United States contend that
the Panel was correct to find, consistent with th e reports of earlier pane ls, arbitrators, and the
Appellate Body in this continuing dispute, that the duty-free tariff quota for ACP bananas constituted
a restriction within the meaning of Article XIII , and violated Article XIII:1, the chapeau of
Article XIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d). 386 Ecuador and the United States emphasize that Article XIII:5
makes the requirements of Article XIII applicable to any tariff quota, and that the European
Communities' duty-free tariff quota for ACP suppliers constituted a restriction on non-ACP suppliers
that were denied access to the duty-free quota.387
314. Ecuador further agrees with the Panel's rejection of the European Communities' argument that
"there was no nullification or impairment of be nefits, essentially because ... the tariff quota helped
Ecuador by limiting duty-free competition from ACP countries relative to the competition that would

382European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 153 (US).
383European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 153 (US).
384European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 146 (Ecuador).
386Ecuador's appellee's submission, paras. 41 and 42; United States' appellee's submission, para. 10.
387Ecuador's appellee's submission, para. 47; United States' appellee's submission, para. 35.

have existed if there had been no quantitative limitations." 388 Ecuador claims that "presumption of
nullification or impairment ... is not a question of trade flows, but rather of [trade] opportunities."389
315. The ACP Countries390 support the arguments made by the European Communities in relation
to Article XIII, while Panama and Nicaragua support the position of Ecuador and the United States in
this regard.391
E. Analysis of the Appealed Findings of the Panel under Article XIII of the GATT 1994
316. We begin our analysis by addressing the European Communities' appeal of the Panel's finding
regarding the European Communities' preliminary ob jection to Ecuador's claim under Article XIII of
the GATT 1994, and the issue of the legal effect of suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 of the
DSU. We then turn to the substa ntive issues appealed in relation to Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT
1994.
1. Legal Effect of Suggestions Made pu rsuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU
(Ecuador)
317. The European Communities submits that Ec uador's claim under Article XIII should be
dismissed because "Ecuador's claims are in reality a challenge on the measures suggested by the
[first Ecuador Article 21.5] Pane l, rather than on the measures actually taken by the European
Communities."392 The European Communities argues that, once a panel or an Appellate Body report,
containing suggestions made pursuant to the second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU, has been
adopted, "the consistency of the measures suggested by the original panel with the covered

390The ACP Countries (see supra, footnote 209) contend that the Panel incorrectly interpreted and
applied Article XIII:1 becau se the "applicable non-discrimination rule is contained in Article I ... not in
Article XIII". The ACP Countries subm it that a "restriction" requires a "l imitation" be applied on the imported
product, which, under Article XIII:1, "necessarily implies a quantitative element". However, the ACP Countries
maintain that the Panel failed to consider the cons istent practice of WTO Members to impose ceilings on
preferential imports as justified by the Enabling Clause or Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. According to
the ACP Countries, if limitations on preferential access fell afoul of Artic le XIII, and if preferential access
were capped, then virtually all duty-free tariff quotas used in the context of fr ee trade agreements would
presumably be WTO-inconsistent. (Third participants ' submissions of the ACP Countries, paras. 57-62
(Ecuador), paras. 54-59 (US))
391Panama and Nicaragua agree with the Panel th at the ACP duty-free tariff quota violates
Article XIII:1 and 2. Panama and Nicaragua argue that the Panel correctly determined that an exclusive duty-
free tariff quota that is reserved for ACP suppliers and denies all access for MFN suppliers represents a
"restriction" on those MFN suppliers within the meaning of Article XIII:1. Panama and Nicaragua also submit
that the European Communities' ACP duty-free tariff quota violates the requirements of the chapeau and
paragraph (d) of Article XIII:2, b ecause the European Communities' market has been subject to continuous
discrimination, which makes it impossible to define a "previous representative period". (Third participants'
submissions of Panama and Nicaragua, paras. 50-52 (Ecuador), paras. 37-39 (US))
392European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, para. 88 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)

agreement cannot be challenged by the compla ining party before an Article 21.5 panel".
393 This is so
because of that party's obligation to "unconditio nally accept", pursuant to Article 17.14 read in
combination with Article 16.4 of the DSU, the DSB's recommendations and rulings, which also
covers any suggestions contained therein.
318. The European Communities also argues that, if measures suggested by a panel or the
Appellate Body in previous proceedings are ch allenged before an Article 21.5 panel, and the
Article 21.5 panel is "satisfied th at the challenged measures are ind eed the measures suggested by the
original panel", then the Article 21.5 panel "should find that they are consistent with the covered
agreements without any further analysis."394 The European Communities contends that, in the present
proceedings, the Panel failed "to assess whethe r the European Commun ities has effectively
implemented any of the suggestions of the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador" 395, and
erroneously concluded that Ecuador's disagreement as to whether the European Communities' bananas
import regime complied with the suggestions made in 1999 was sufficient to reject the European
Communities' argument to the contrary.396
319. The Panel noted that Ecuador was asking it to assess the consistency with the covered
agreements of the measures the European Communities claims to have taken to comply with a
suggestion for implementation made by the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel, not to assess the
conformity with WTO law of the suggestion itself. 397 The Panel did not focus, as the European
Communities argues, on whether the measures taken to comply conformed to any of the suggestions
made by the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel; ra ther, the Panel examined directly whether the
EC Bananas Import Regime was consistent with th e covered agreements. The Panel distinguished
between suggestions made under Article 19.1 by a pa nel or the Appellate Body, on the one hand, and
the measures actually taken by Members to implemen t such suggestions so as to comply with the
DSB recommendations and rulings, on the other hand. The Panel noted that Article 21.5 creates an
unconditional right that any dispute resulting from "di sagreement as to the ex istence or consistency
with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" can be
decided through recourse to compliance proceedings.

393European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 88 (Ecuador). (emphasis added)
394European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
395European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 93 (Ecuador).
396European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 93 (Ecuador).
397Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.228.

320. Article 19.1 of the DSU, entitled "Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations", reads:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agre ement, it shall recommend that the
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or
Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations. (footnotes omitted)
321. Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU
regarding ways of implementation form part of pa nel or Appellate Body re ports adopted by the DSB
in previous proceedings. The DSU does not expressly address the question of the legal status of
suggestions that form part of a report adopted by the DSB, nor does it specify the legal consequences
when a Member chooses to implement DSB recomm endations and rulings by following a suggestion
for implementation. A Member may choose whether or not to follow a suggestion. The use of the
term "could" in Article 19.1 clarifies that Me mbers are not obliged to follow suggestions for
implementation.
322. Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only re fers to "measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings" and not to measures take n to comply with suggestions issued pursuant
to the second sentence of Article 19.1. This confirms that an Article 21.5 panel's power of review is
limited to the assessment of the existence or consiste ncy with the covered agreements of the measures
taken to comply with recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thus, what matters in Article 21.5
proceedings is whether the result of implemen tation—whatever means are chosen—brings about
substantive compliance with the DSB recommendati ons and rulings. As the Panel noted, the
conformity of the measures taken to comply w ith the covered agreements will depend on whether
actual implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings has been achieved by the Member
concerned.
398 Therefore, we agree with the Panel that the measures actually taken by a Member to
comply with DSB recommendations and rulings, whether or not they follow the suggestions for
implementation made in previous proceedings, are th e subject matter of the challenge in Article 21.5
proceedings.
323. We consider that suggestions ma de by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and
fully implemented, lead to compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ru lings. However, full
compliance with DSB rulings and WTO-consistency of the measures actually taken to comply cannot
be presumed simply because a Member declares that its measures taken to comply conform to a

398Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.247.

suggestion made under Article 19.1 of the DSU. As pointed out above, Article 21.5 proceedings
focus on the measure actually taken to comply, not the ways in which the Member could implement
the recommendations and rulings. Following a s uggestion does not guarantee substantive compliance
with the recommendations and rulings by the DSB. Whether such compliance has been achieved
needs to be determined through Article 21.5 proceed ings. The adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report by the DSB makes the recommendations and rulings therein binding upon the parties. As noted
earlier, such adoption by the DSB does not make suggestions for implementation binding upon the
parties (especially, where, as in this case, th e first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel made several
suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that ac tions taken to implemen t suggestions must be
presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.
324. We, therefore, agree with the Panel that Ec uador had the right to challenge before an
Article 21.5 panel the European Communities' measure taken to comply, whether or not such measure
implemented a suggestion made by an earlier pa nel or the Appellate Body. The function of
Article 21.5 proceedings is to resolve disagreement over compliance. Even if the measure taken to
comply conformed to a suggestion made, this w ould not bar Ecuador from bringing Article 21.5
proceedings to determine whether the implementin g measure achieves full compliance with the DSB
recommendations and rulings. We do not consider that, as a consequence of the DSB adoption of a
panel or Appellate Body report containing a sugges tion, the measure implementing such a suggestion
can be presumed to be WTO-consistent.
399 In our view, a DSU rule that establishes a legal
presumption of conformity should do so in clear and unambiguous terms.400 Therefore, we do not see
how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence, "i mply" a legal presumption, particularly as this
provision has to be read in the context of Artic le 21.5, which entitles Members to the review of
implementation measures in compliance proceedings.
325. Suggestions made by panels or the Appella te Body may provide useful guidance and
assistance to Members and facilitate implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings,
particularly in complex cases. However, the fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion
does not create a presumption of compliance in Article 21.5 proceedings. The fact that a Member has
chosen to follow a suggestion is part of the hi story and background of the measure at issue in
Article 21.5 proceedings, but it should not in itself pre-empt a panel's assessment of compliance under

399European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
400For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO
rules constitutes nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal
presumption of conformity with the GATT 1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for measures conforming to that
Agreement.

Article 21.5. In our view, suggestions provide gu idance, which is necessarily prospective in nature
and cannot, therefore, take account of all circumstances in which implementation may occur.
326. In these circumstances, we consider that the Panel did not err when it decided to examine
whether the EC Bananas Import Regime was consiste nt with the covered agreements, rather than
examining whether it complied with the suggestions for implementation made by the first Ecuador
Article 21.5 panel.
327. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.263 and 7.265 of the Ecuador Panel
Report, that, to the extent that the European Communities argues that it has implemented a suggestion
pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel w as not prevented from conducting, under Article 21.5
of the DSU, the assessment requested by Ecuador; and that, therefore, the Panel did not need to
assess whether the European Commun ities has effectively implemented any of the suggestions of the
first compliance panel requested by Ecuador.
2. Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 (Ecuador and United States)
328. We now turn to the European Communities' appeal of the Panel's findings that the
EC Bananas Import Regime was inconsistent with Ar ticle XIII:1, the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and
Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994.
(a) Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994
329. The European Communities argues that the Pane l misinterpreted the notion of "quantitative
restriction" in Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. According to the European Communities, the
limitation on the tariff preference for ACP suppliers do es not fall within the scope of Article XIII:1 of
the GATT 1994 because it does not constitute a "quan titative restriction" imposed on the imports of
the "aggrieved Member".401 The European Communities contends that the Panel "developed a theory
pursuant to which a lower tariff offered to one Member [—the ACP zero tariff—] becomes
automatically a 'quantitative restriction' on all other Members, provided that it is offered to only some
[—775,000 mt—], and not all, quantitie s exported by the beneficiary".402
330. The Panel found that the EC Bananas Import Regime was a "tariff-quota-based import
regime", with an in-quota zero duty reserved for 775,000 mt of ACP bananas and an out-of-quota duty
of €176/mt for ACP imports in excess of the quota and for imports from all other countries. 403

According to the Panel, the EC Bananas Impor t Regime "confer[ed] a benefit, although a
quantitatively limited one, to ACP countries, and Ec uador, like other MFN ba nana suppliers, [could
not] have access to that quantitatively limited benefit" ; and, "[b]y its very nature, such a benefit
reserved for some Members generally represents a disadvantage for other Members."
404 The Panel
concluded that, under the terms of Article XIII:1, MFN imports are not similarly restricted because
ACP suppliers have access to the duty-free tariff quota, while non-ACP suppliers are denied access to
that quota
405, and that, for the same reasons, the duty -free tariff quota fails to comply with the
allocation rules set out in Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.406
331. Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, on "Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative
Restrictions", states:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any Member on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other Member or on
the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other
Member, unless the importation of the like product of all third
countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is
similarly prohibited or restricted.
332. The chapeau Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994 provide:
In applying import restrictions to any product, Members shall aim at
a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as
possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to
obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe
the following provisions:
(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying
countries the Member applying the restrictions may seek agreement
with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other
Members having a substantial inte rest in supplying the product
concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably
practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a
substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the
proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous
representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the
product, due account being taken of any special factors which may
have affected or may be affecti ng the trade in the product. No
conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any
Member from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or
value which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made
within any prescribed period to which the quota may relate.

404Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.332. (footnote omitted) See also US Panel Report, para. 7.679.

333. Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994 reads:
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted
or maintained by any Member, and, in so far as applicable, the
principles of this Article shall also extend to export restrictions.
334. We begin our analysis by considering the re lationship between Article XI of the GATT 1994
on "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions" and Article XIII on "Non-discriminatory
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions". Article XI:1 contains a general prohibition on
quantitative restrictions. Article XI:2 provid es for exceptions to the general prohibition in
Article XI:1.
407 A quantitative restriction that is lawful by reason of an exception under Article XI:2
must nevertheless satisfy the requirements of Article XIII in respect of its non-discriminatory
administration.
335. In contrast to quantitative restrictions, tariff quotas do not fall under the prohibition in
Article XI:1 and are in principle lawful under the GATT 1994, provided that quota tariff rates are
applied consistently with Article I. Members are required, in accordance with Article II, to provide
treatment no less favourable than that bound in their Schedules of Concessions. Accordingly, in-
quota and out-of-quota tariffs must not exceed bound tariff rates, and import quantities made available
under the tariff quota must not fall short of the scheduled amount. In addition, tariff quotas are, under
the terms of Article XIII:5, made subject to the disciplines of Article XIII.
336. Article XIII has a dual function. It regul ates the non-discriminatory administration of
quantitative restrictions and also subjects the a pplication of tariff quotas to these disciplines.
Although the language of XIII:1 is facially more eas ily applied to quantitative restrictions, the text
must be interpreted so as to ensure that the provisions of Article XIII are also applied to tariff quotas.
337. We interpret Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 in the following way. Applyi ng Article XIII:1 to a
tariff quota requires that the word "restriction" be re ad as a reference to a tariff quota. Article XIII:1
is then rendered thus: no tariff quota shall be app lied by a Member on the importation of any product
of the territory of any other Member, unless the importa tion of the like product of all third countries is
similarly made subject to the tariff quota. The application of the tariff quota is thus on a product-wide
basis. The principle of non-discriminatory appli cation captured by Article XIII:1 requires that, if a
tariff quota is applied to one Member, it must be applied to all; and, consequently, the term "similarly
restricted" means, in the case of tariff quotas, that imports of like products of all third countries must
have access to, and be given an opportunity of, participation. If a Member is excluded from access to,

407We note that there are other provisions in the cove red agreements that may provide a legal basis for
the imposition of a quantitative restriction, whose application is then subject to the requirements of Article XIII.

and participation in, the tariff quota, then imports of like products from all third countries are not
"similarly restricted".
338. Article XIII:2 regulates the distribution of the tariff quota among Members. The chapeau of
Article XIII:2 requires that the tariff quota be distri buted so as to serve the aim of a distribution of
trade approaching as closely as possible the shares that various Members may be expected to obtain in
the absence of the tariff quota. In this way, all Members producing the like product are afforded
access to, and competitive opportunities under, the tariff quota in a manner that mimics their
comparative advantage vis-à-vis other Members who would participate under the quota. Thus, while
Article XIII:1 establishes a principle of non-discrim inatory access to and participation in the overall
tariff quota, the chapeau of Article XIII:2 stipulates a principle regarding the distribution of the tariff
quota in the least trade-distorting manner. The provisions of Article XIII:2(a)-(d) are specific
instances of authorized forms of allocation when a Member chooses to allocate shares of the tariff
quota. Article XIII:2(d) allows for the case wher e a quota is allocated among supplying countries,
either by way of agreement or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by allotment to Members
having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and in accordance with the
proportions supplied by those Members during a previous representative period, taking due account of
"special factors". In other words, Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive "safe harbour"; compliance with
the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) is presumed to l ead to a distribution of trade as foreseen in the
chapeau of Article XIII:2, as far as substantial suppliers are concerned.
408 It follows from this
analysis that a tariff quota is not per se unlawful because it fails to adhere to the disciplines of
Article XIII. Rather, the administration of the tari ff quota is unlawful if it is applied in a manner that
does not comply with the requirements of Article XIII.
339. We now turn to examine whether the tariff quota of 775,000 mt reserved for imports from
ACP countries was applied and administered consiste ntly with the requirements of Article XIII.
Under the EC Bananas Import Regime, the duty-free tariff quota of 775,000 mt is reserved for imports
from ACP countries; non-ACP suppliers do not have acc ess to this tariff quota. Article XIII:1, as we
have observed, articulates a principle of access to, and participation in, a tariff quota for imports of the
like product from all Members. The duty-free tariff quota reserved for ACP countries plainly
excludes non-ACP countries. By so doing, the tariff quota does not apply to, or "similarly restrict",

408If a Member allocates quota shares to Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product,
in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), it must also resp ect the requirement in the ch apeau of Article XIII:2—that
distribution of trade approach as clos ely as possible the shares that Member s may be expected to obtain in the
absence of the restriction. This is usually done by allocating a share to a general "others" category for all
suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product.

imports of like products from non-ACP countries, and thus offends the principle of access to, and
participation in, a tariff quota in Article XIII:1.
340. The tariff quota also fails to meet the requirements regarding distribution and allocation in
Article XIII:2. The exclusion of non-ACP supp liers from the tariff quota is not aimed "at a
distribution of trade ... approaching as closely as possible the shares whic h the various Members
might be expected to obtain in the absence of [the] re strictions", as required by Article XIII:2. On the
contrary, the exclusion of non-ACP suppliers is not ai med at a distribution of trade that affords access
to, and competitive opportunities under, the tariff quota to all supplying Members reflecting their
comparative advantage; nor does the exclusion of non-ACP suppliers respect the "safe harbour"
allocation requirements in Article XIII:2(d) b ased upon the representative proportions of Members
having a substantial interest in the supply of bana nas to the European Comm unities. Allocating the
entire tariff quota exclusively to ACP countries, and reserving no shares to non-ACP suppliers, cannot
be considered to be based on the respective sh ares of ACP and non-ACP supplier countries in the
European Communities' banana market. As a resu lt, the exclusion of non-ACP suppliers from the
tariff quota of 775,000 mt reserved for ACP countries is inconsistent with the requirements of
Article XIII:1, the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994. Our
conclusion is not altered by the fact that imports from non-ACP suppliers are subject to an MFN tariff
only under the EC Bananas Import Regime.
341. The European Communities argues that, for Article XIII:1 to apply to a tariff quota, it must be
shown that it imposes a "restriction" on the "aggrie ved Members", in this case, the non-ACP supplier
countries. We note that the text of Article XIII: 1 expressly refers to "prohibition or restriction"
applied "by any Member" on the importation of "any pr oduct" of the territory of "any other Member".
We reject, therefore, the European Communities' argument that, because there was no restriction on
the quantities of bananas that Ecuador and the ot her MFN countries could export to the European
Communities, "the first condition for the applica tion of Article XIII:1 (i.e., the imposition of a
quantitative restriction on the imports coming fro m the aggrieved Member) [was] not satisfied". 409
Therefore, the ACP duty-free tariff quota is subject to the requirements of Article XIII:1, regardless of
the Members upon which the restriction is imposed.

409European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 115 (Ecuador) (referring to Ecuador Panel

342. The European Communities further contends th at, "[a]n advantage granted to a different
country, is not the same as a measure imposing a 'p rohibition or restriction' on that specific WTO
Member."
410 The European Communities claims that "the notion of 'less favourable treatment' [under
Article I of the GATT 1994] is not the same as the notion of 'prohibition or restriction' under
Article XIII."411 The European Communities further argues th at "Article XIII:1 does not introduce an
MFN rule, i.e., it does not impose on a Member the obligation to extend to all Members the
preferences it grants to only some countries."412
343. We consider that the notion of "non-discrimin ation" in the application of tariffs under
Article I:1 and the notion of non-discriminatory a pplication of a "prohibition or restriction" under
Article XIII are distinct, and that Article XIII ensures that a Member applying a restriction or
prohibition does not discriminate among all other Member s. Article I:1, which applies to tariffs, and
Article XIII:1, which applies to quantitative restri ctions and tariff quotas, may apply to different
elements of a measure or import regime. Article XIII adapts the MFN-treatment principle to specific
types of measures, that is, quantitative restrictions, and, by virtue of Article XIII:5, tariff quotas.
Tariff quotas must comply with the requirements of both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the GATT
1994. This, in our view, does not make Article XIII redundant in respect of tariff quotas: if a
Member imposes differential in-quota duties on im ports of like products from different supplier
countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be imp licated; if that Member fails to give access to
or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the
requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would appl y. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I
would not provide specific guidance on how to admi nister tariff quotas in a manner that avoids
discrimination in the allocation of shares.
344. The ACP duty-free tariff quota, insofar as it grants more favourable tariff treatment and quota
allocation to ACP suppliers, falls within the scope of both provisions. We consider that the ACP
duty-free tariff quota is not a limitation on a tariff prefer ence that is subject only to Article I:1, but a
tariff quota subject also to Article XIII.
345. In our view, therefore, the preferential in-quota tari ff rate falls within the scope of Article I:1,
while the application and the distribution of the tariff quota must comply with the non-discrimination
requirements of Article XIII as well, regardless of the applicable in-quota and out-of-quota duty rates,

and regardless of which Members may be considered to be "aggrieved". This is also the case when
preferential in-quota tariff treatment is reserved for a group of Members such as the ACP countries.
346. Having said that, we note our disagreement with the Panel's overly broad interpretation of the
term "restriction" in Article XIII:1 as "[a]ny benef it accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members
presumably affect[ing] the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other Members"
considering that "[b]y its very na ture, ... a benefit reserved for some Members generally represents a
disadvantage for other Members." 413 Such a broad reading of the term "restriction" in Article XIII
would mean that even a simple tariff preference without a limitation would lead to dissimilar
restrictions within the meaning of Article XIII, thus confounding the fu nction and coverage of
Article I and Article XIII. Such an interpretati on would also ignore the fa ct that Article XIII is
concerned with the non-discriminatory administrati on of tariff quotas, and does not prohibit them as
such.
347. The European Communities also refers to p ast GATT and WTO practice of granting waivers
from Article I in order to justify duty-free tariff quotas. For the European Communities, this confirms
its argument that Article XIII is aimed at quan titative restrictions, and does not apply to tariff
discrimination, which is the purview of Article I. 414 According to the European Communities, this
"concordant, common and consistent" pr actice falls within the notion of "s tate practice" referred to in
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention , and such waiver decisions approximate the notion of
"subsequent agreements" referred to in Article 31(3)(a).415
348. Ecuador and the United States contend that the recent Doha Article XIII Waiver constitutes
the most relevant practice. Indeed, in 2001, the European Communities requested and obtained
waivers from both Articles I and XIII to cover the preferential tariff quota applicable to ACP
countries at that time. Almost all the waivers cited by the European Communities were granted
between 1948 and 1994 (only one was granted after that year, in 2000), while the Doha Article XIII

414European Communities' appellant's submissions, paras. 119 and 120 (Ecuador), paras. 136 and 137
(US).
Communities refers to, inter alia, the following waivers from Article I of the GATT 1994: the 1960 waiver
from Article I:1 granted to France "to the extent necessary to permit the Government of France to apply ... tariff
quotas to goods originating in any part of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco"; the 1966 waiver granted to
Australia, which explicitly authorized the use of tariff qu otas; the 1985 waiver from Article I:1 granted to the
United States regarding duty-free treatment for imports from Caribbean countries, which "overlapped with a
system of quotas"; and the 2000 waiver from Article I:1 granted to the European Communities to allow
duty-free or preferential treatment to products from western Balkan countries, which "included tariff quotas
on several products". (European Communities' appellant's submissions, paras. 121-128 (Ecuador), paras. 138-
145 (US))

Waiver was granted in 2001, after the Appellate Body had rendered its findings in the original
EC – Bananas III proceedings, clarifying that the Lomé Wa iver from Article I:1 could not justify
measures inconsistent with Article XIII.
416
349. We do not consider that GATT and WTO practice of granting waivers from Article I:1 and
Article XIII provide conclusive guidance on whether duty-free tariff quotas are subject to Article XIII.
However, we find the argument that the Doha Ar ticle XIII Waiver confirms the applicability of
Article XIII to duty-free tariff quotas more persuasi ve. This is so becaus e the Doha Article XIII
Waiver is related to a previous ACP duty-free tariff quota 417, and because it was adopted subsequent
to the DSB recommendations and rulings in the orig inal proceedings, which clarified the relationship
between Article I:1 and Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
350. We consider that our conclusions on Ar ticle XIII are consistent with the DSB
recommendations and rulings in the original EC – Bananas III proceedings and the first Ecuador
Article 21.5 proceedings. The panel in the origin al proceedings found that tariff quotas "are not
quantitative restrictions per se" and are permitted under GATT rules, but "Article XIII:5 makes it
clear ... that Article XIII applies to the administration of tariff quotas". 418 The Appellate Body found
that, "although Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 are both non-discrimination provisions, their
relationship is not such that a waiver from the obligations under Article I implies a waiver from the
obligations under Article XIII", and that, therefore, the Lomé Waiver from Article I did not waive the
inconsistency with Article XIII of the duty-free tariff quota applicable to ACP countries at that
time.419
351. The Appellate Body had also found that "t he non-discrimination provisions apply to all
imports of bananas, irrespective of whether a nd how a Member categorizes or subdivides these
imports for administrative or other reasons" 420 and that, therefore, the existence of separate regimes

416In its appellee's submission, the United States no tes that its most recent waiver requests for
preferential programmes covered both Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994. The United States refers to the
following waiver requests dated 22 March 2007: Council for Trade in Goods, Request for a Waiver, Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA as amended), G/C/W/508 and Rev.1; Council for Trade in Goods,
Request for a Waiver, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), G/C/W/509 and Rev.1; Council for Trade
in Goods, Request for a Waiver, An dean Trade Preference Act (ATPA as amended), G/C/W/510 and Rev.1.
(United States' appellee's submission, footnote 38 to para. 41)
417The Doha Article XIII Waiver waived Article XIII: 1 and 2 with respect to a similar duty-free tariff
quota for ACP countries under a previous bananas import regime of the European Communities. Paragraph 1 of
the Doha Article XIII Waiver states:
With respect to the EC's imports of bananas, as of 1 January 2002, and until 31 December
2005, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 are waived with respect to the
EC's separate tariff quota of 750,000 tonnes for bananas of ACP origin.
418Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) and (US), para. 7.68.
419Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 183.
420Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 190. (original emphasis)

for the importation of bananas (the duty-free tariff quota for traditional ACP bananas and the
erga omnes tariff quota regime for all other imports of bananas) did not exclude the application of the
non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994—specifically, Articles I:1 and XIII. 421 It follows, in
our view, that the applicability of Article XIII does not depend on whether the ACP duty-free tariff
quota exists side by side with other MFN tariff quot as or with an MFN tariff rate without quantitative
restriction.
352. Finally, we note that the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel found that "the reservation of the
quantity of 857,700 tonnes for traditional ACP impo rts under the revised regime [was] inconsistent
with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of GATT".
422 We agree with the Panel that the main
difference between the tariff quota regime examined by the first Ecuador Ar ticle 21.5 panel and the
EC Bananas Import Regime at issue in these pro ceedings is the level of the quantitative limit
(857,700 mt versus 775,0 00 mt on duty-free imports). 423 However, that difference is of no relevance
for the question whether Article XIII applies.
353. In conclusion, we recall that the Panel f ound that the EC Bananas Import Regime was
inconsistent with both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the GATT 1994, and that both the Doha Article I
Waiver and the Doha Article XIII Waiver had expired on 31 December 2005. We note that the
European Communities has not appealed the Pane l's findings concerning Article I:1 of the GATT
1994 and the Doha Article I Waiver, nor does it cont est that the Doha Article XIII Waiver expired on
31 December 2005. Thus, on appeal, the European Communities does not contest that the zero duty
within the ACP tariff quota is inconsistent with Ar ticle I:1 and is not covered by a suitable waiver.
Considering that by virtue of Article XIII:5 a ny tariff quota is subject to the disciplines of
Article XIII, and for the reasons explained above, we conclude that the duty-free ACP tariff quota
is also inconsistent with Article XIII:1, the chap eau of Article XIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d) of the
GATT 1994.
354. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, we uphold the Panel's findings, albeit for different
reasons, in paragraph 7.382 of the Ecuador Panel Report and paragraph 7.720 of the US Panel Report,
that the EC Bananas Import Regime, in partic ular, its duty-free tariff quota reserved for ACP
countries, was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.

421Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 191.
422Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.29.

(b) Nullification or Impairment under Article XIII:2 (United States)
355. Finally, we turn to an issue that the Europ ean Communities appeals onl y in the United States
case in relation to Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994. The European Communities argues that "the
United States has never been a banana supplier to the European Communities and is not likely to
become such a banana supplier in the future"
424, and that, therefore, the ACP tariff preference could
not be inconsistent with the chapeau of Article X III:2 because, even in its absence, the United States'
share of trade in bananas in the European Communities would be zero.425
356. The European Communities is s uggesting that the United States cannot prevail with its claim
under Article XIII because the ACP preference has no actual or potential effects on the United States'
share of trade in bananas in the European Commun ities. In our view, this argument relates to the
European Communities' more general argument th at the EC Bananas Import Regime caused no
nullification of benefits to the United States. 426 Therefore, we shall address this argument by the
European Communities below together with the br oader argument relating to the nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to the United States under the covered agreements.
(c) Nullification or Impairment under Article XIII (Ecuador)
357. The European Communities argues that the ACP preference did not cause any nullification or
impairment to Ecuador in relati on to the alleged violation of Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
According to the European Communities, "the quantity limitation imposed on the ACP preference
was not a 'benefit' granted to the ACP countries" but, to the contrary, it "was a 'benefit' granted to the
MFN countries" because, "[b]y limiting the quantities of ACP bananas that could be imported into the
European Communities at the preferential rate , the quantity limit protected the 'competitive
opportunities' of the MFN countries and caused th em less 'harm' than an unrestricted ACP
preference."427
358. The European Communities further contends that , in finding that the ACP preference was
inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994, the Panel had already found that "the ACP preference
by itself negatively affected the 'competitive opportun ities' of Ecuador and, therefore, caused
nullification or impairment under Article I of the GATT." 428 However, according to the European
Communities, "the Panel failed to explain how the limitation of the quantities that benefited from the

424European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 153 (US).
425European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 153 (US).
426European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 155 (US).
427European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 143 (Ecuador).
428European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 144 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)

ACP preference caused any new or additional nullification or impairment to Ecuador under
Article XIII of the GATT."429
359. We have concluded above that the ACP dut y-free tariff quota was inconsistent with
Article XIII of the GATT 1994 and that the denial of access to the ACP duty-free tariff quota nullified
or impaired Ecuador's benefits under the GATT 1994. However, having reached this conclusion, we
do not exclude that any nullification or impairment caused to Ecuador by the inconsistency of the
ACP duty-free tariff quota with Article XIII may co incide with the nullification or impairment
resulting from a violation of Article I:1.
360. We believe that nullification or impairment resulting from inconsistencies with Articles I:1
and XIII may coincide or overlap, and that any such overlap is relevant only to the calculation of the
total level of nullification or impairment suffe red for the purposes of negotiating compensation or
assessing the amount of nullification and impairment in an arbitration under Article 22 of the DSU.
However, we do not need to pronounce on such ques tions in these Article 21.5 proceedings. Whether
or not nullification or impairment caused by the viol ation of one provision overlap or coincide with
that caused by the violation of another provision do es not alter the fact that both infringements trigger
the presumption of nullification or impairment under Ar ticle 3.8. In any event, a demonstration that
nullification or impairment caused by the infringeme nts of distinct WTO obligations may overlap is
not sufficient to rebut the presumption in Article 3.8 of the DSU that any of these infringements
constitutes a prima facie case of nullification or impairment.
361. In sum, we do not need to decide, in this case, whether nullification or impairment to
Ecuador's interests due to the in consistency of the quota alloca tion under the ACP tariff quota with
Article XIII may coincide or overlap with that due to the inconsistency of the tariff preference with
Article I:1. In any event, our conclusion reach ed above that the application of the ACP duty-free
tariff quota was inconsistent with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 would stand.
362. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8. 4 of the Ecuador Panel Report, that
the European Communities, by maintaining measures inconsistent with different provisions of the
GATT 1994, including Article XIII, has nullified or im paired benefits accruing to Ecuador under that
Agreement.

429European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 144 (Ecuador). (original emphasis)

XI. Article II of the GATT 1994 (Ecuador)
363. We now turn to the European Communities' a ppeal of the Panel's finding that, through the
Doha Article I Waiver, WTO Members agreed to extend beyond 31 December 2002
430 the tariff quota
concession (at a level of 2.2 million mt with an in-quota rate of €75/mt) in the European
Communities' Schedule of Concessions; and the Eu ropean Communities' appeal of the Panel's
consequential finding that the tariff of €176/mt applied by the European Communities to MFN
imports of bananas is inconsistent with Article II: 1(b) of the GATT 1994 because it is in excess of its
tariff bindings on bananas.
431 We will then consider Ecuador's ot her appeal of the Panel's finding that
the European Communities' tariff quota concess ion for bananas was intended to expire on
31 December 2002432 pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Banan as Framework Agreement annexed to the
European Communities' Schedule of Concessions.
364. Section A summarizes the findings made by the Pa nel in the current Article 21.5 proceedings.
Section B presents the arguments raised on appeal by the participants and the third participants in
relation to the European Communities' appeal. In section C, we discuss th e European Communities'
claim that the Panel erred in finding that the Doha Article I Waiver modified the European
Communities' Schedule of Concessions and extende d the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt
bound at an in-quota rate of €75/mt beyond 31 December 2002.433
365. Section D presents the participant's arguments relating to Ecuador's other appeal. In
section E, we discuss Ecuador's other appeal of th e Panel's finding that the European Communities'
tariff quota concession for bananas of 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota rate of €75/mt was intended
to expire on 31 December 2002 as a result of para graph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement. 434
Finally, we consider whether the Panel erred in finding that the tariff applied by the European
Communities to MFN imports of bananas, set at €176/mt , was inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the
GATT 1994.435

430Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.492.
431Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.504.
432Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
433Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.492.
434Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
435Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.504.

A. The Current Article 21.5 Proceedings
366. Before the Panel, Ecuador claimed that the European Communities' measure, consisting of a
"tariff-rate quota with a single duty rate applicable to bananas not benefiting from the zero duty tariff-
rate quota" and applied to all ba nanas originating in Ecuador and other MFN countries, was in breach
of the European Communities' tariff binding on bananas. 436 Ecuador argued that, in particular, the
European Communities' duty of €176/mt was in consistent with the European Communities'
obligations under Article II of the GATT 1994 and the European Communities' Schedule 437, which
contained an MFN tariff quota of 2.2 million mt with an in-quota tariff rate bound at €75/mt. The
European Communities contended that the tariff rate for bananas bound in its Schedule was €680/mt,
and that the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt at the in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt had expired on
31 December 2002 in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Bananas Framework
Agreement, as annexed to the European Communities' Schedule.
367. The Panel noted that the tariff quota binding of 2.2 million mt and the in-quota tariff rate of
€75/mt in the European Communities' Schedule was s ubject to the terms and conditions "as indicated
in the Annex".
438 The Annex contained the Bananas Fram ework Agreement, which provided, in
paragraph 9, that "this agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002". The Panel also noted that
Article II:1(b) allows Members to attach "terms, co nditions or qualifications" to the tariff concessions
in their Schedules439, and that "there is nothing in the WT O Agreement that would prevent a Member
from qualifying a specific concession in its Sche dule by subjecting it to a date of expiry." 440 T h e
Panel therefore found that the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt at a bound tariff rate of €75/mt in the
European Communities' Schedule was unequivocally intended to expire on 31 December 2002.441
368. The Panel, however, went on to find that, in adopting the Doha Article I Waiver, "WTO
Members agreed to extend the duration of the European Communities' ta riff quota concession for
bananas beyond 31 December 2002" and "until the co mpletion of the Article XXVIII negotiations for
the purpose of the rebinding of the European Communities' tariff on bananas".442

436Ecuador's first written submission to the Panel, para. 33.
437Ecuador's first written submission to the Panel, para. 34.
438Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.421.
439Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.423.
440Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.429.
441Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
442Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.446.

369. The Panel considered that the Doha Article I Waiver, "as it relates to the European
Communities' WTO market-access commitments rela ting to bananas, is a 'subsequent agreement
between the parties' to the Bananas Framework Agreement (i.e., the WTO Members), regarding the
application of the provisions of the WTO ag reement as it pertains to such market access
commitments", which could not be ignored "in order to ascertain the common intentions of the WTO
Members, regarding the European Communities' WTO market access commitments relating to
bananas".
443 In this respect, the Panel found that the Doha Article I Waiver "recognizes the WTO
Members' common intention that, until the entry into force of the new European Communities' tariff-
only regime, the in-quota tariff applied to banan as 'shall not exceed 75€/mt', as well as the common
intention that any rebinding of the European Communities' tariff on bananas under GATT
Article XXVIII procedures 'should result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana
suppliers'."
444
370. The Panel also relied on supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention to confirm the conclusion it had reached "regarding the common
intention of the WTO Members ... that the Eu ropean Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas would remain in force, in its substa nce, pending any later rebinding of the European
Communities' tariff on bananas." 445 The Panel found, in particular, that the following elements
confirmed its findings on the European Communities' market access commitments on bananas: (i) the
Uruguay Round "Modalities Paper" 446 for agricultural market access negotiations "called for binding
tariff quotas in an amount and at a duty level sufficien t to permit access at least equivalent to that
existing in the base period" 447; (ii) the European Communities initiated negotiations pursuant to
Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, which were nece ssary in order to increase the tariff binding (from
the in-quota level of €75/mt) and not to reduce it (from the out-of-quota level of €680/mt) 448; and
(iii) the first award of the arbitrator acting pursua nt to the "Annex on Bananas" to the Doha Article I
Waiver described the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions as including a quota of
2.2 million mt with an in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt.449

443Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443.
444Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.444.
445Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.478.
446Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the
Market Access Group, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993.
447Ecuador's second written submission to the Panel, para. 59.
448Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.485.
449Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.491.

B. Claims and Arguments relating to the European Communities' Appeal
371. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's findings that
the Doha Article I Waiver "modified the Schedul e of the European Communities and extended the
concession for the tariff quota beyond December 31, 2002" 450, as well as the Panel's consequential
finding that "the European Communities has breached Article II of the GATT".451
372. The European Communities argues that the Pane l erred in finding that the Doha Article I
Waiver was a "subsequent agreement" relating to the tariff quota concession bound in the European
Communities' Schedule of Concessions, and that the Wa iver could be interpreted as an agreement by
WTO Members "to extend the duration of the Eu ropean Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas beyond 31 December 2002." 452 The European Communities also claims that the Panel made
further errors of legal interpretation and reas oning in relying on, as supplementary means of
interpretation, the Uruguay Roun d Modalities Paper and the fact that the European Communities
initiated tariff renegotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994.453
373. Ecuador responds that the Panel did not err in finding that the Doha Article I Waiver was a
subsequent agreement, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention 454, regarding
the application of the European Communities' conces sion, and that the Waiver confirmed or extended
the effectiveness of the concession.455
374. Ecuador submits that the Panel was correct in finding "that the Concession remains in effect
because of its extension via the agreem ent manifested in the Doha Waiver" 456 and that "the Doha
Waiver was an agreement regarding the application of the concession, which is within the scope of
Article 31(3) [of the Vienna Convention]".457 Furthermore, according to Ecuador, "the Doha Waiver
... strongly support[s] Ecuador's position that the Co ncession was never intended to expire on account
of paragraph 9 of the [Bananas Framework Agreement]."458

450European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 164 (Ecuador).
451European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 183 (Ecuador).
452European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 148 (Ecuador).
453European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 149 (Ecuador).

C. Analysis of the European Communities' Appeal
375. In this section, we address the European Commun ities' claim that the Panel erred in finding
that the Doha Article I Waiver modified the Eu ropean Communities' Schedule of Concessions and
extended the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota rate of €75/mt beyond
31 December 2002.
459
376. The Panel found that "the European Commun ities' tariff quota concession for bananas was
unequivocally intended to expire on 31 December 2002." 460 The Panel then found that the Doha
Article I Waiver, "as it relates to the European Communities' WTO market access commitments on
bananas, is a 'subsequent agreement between the par ties' ... regarding the application of the provisions
of the WTO Agreement as it pertains to such market access commitments."461 In making this finding,
the Panel noted that the Doha Article I Waiver is an agreement reached between the same parties that
agreed to incorporate the Bananas Framework Agr eement as an annex to the European Communities'
Schedule of Concessions; it is subsequent to th e Bananas Framework Agreement; and, like that
agreement, the Waiver deals with, inter alia , the European Communities' WTO market access
commitments relating to bananas.462
377. The Panel then turned to the question whether, in adopting the Doha Article I Waiver, WTO
Members had agreed to extend the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas
beyond 31 December 2002, the date the Bananas Fr amework Agreement was intended to expire. 463
The Panel concluded that the common intention of WTO Members as reflected in the text of the Doha
Article I Waiver decision was that, pending the Ar ticle XXVIII negotiations on the rebinding of the
banana tariff in the European Communities' Sc hedule, the European Communities' tariff quota
concession would continue to constitute the Eur opean Communities' bound commitments regarding
bananas.464
1. Waivers, Multilateral Interpretations, and Amendments
378. We begin by noting three different methods that Members may use to interpret or modify
WTO law provided for in the WTO Agreement : (i) waivers (Article IX:3); (ii) multilateral
interpretations (Article IX:2); and (iii) amendments (Article X). We will next consider the distinct

459Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.492.
460Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
461Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443.
462Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443.
463Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.444.
464Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.456.

roles and functions of these methods in WTO law. We will then address the Panel's finding that the
Doha Article I Waiver was a "sub sequent agreement" within the m eaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the
Vienna Convention that resulted in an extension of the tariff quota concession beyond 31 December
2002, the date when, according to paragraph 9 of the Banana Framew ork Agreement, "this
agreement" was to expire.
379. The first method identified above is a waiver. Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement allows the
Ministerial Conference to waive, in exceptional ci rcumstances and by a decision taken by at least
three fourths of WTO Members, an obligation imposed on a Member by the WTO Agreement and by
any of the multilateral agreements. Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement states:
A decision by the Ministerial Conference granting a waiver shall
state the exceptional circumstances justifying the decision, the terms
and conditions governing the application of the waiver, and the date
on which the waiver shall terminate. Any waiver granted for a period
of more than one year shall be reviewed by the Ministerial
Conference not later than one year after it is granted, and thereafter
annually until the waiver terminates. In each review, the Ministerial
Conference shall examine whether the exceptional circumstances
justifying the waiver still exist a nd whether the terms and conditions
attached to the waiver have been met. The Ministerial Conference,
on the basis of the annual review, may extend, modify or terminate
the waiver.
380. Article IX:4 requires that the decision granting the waiver state the date on which the waiver
shall terminate, thus ensuring that waivers are gr anted for limited periods of time. A waiver must
state the exceptional circumstances justifying th e decision, the terms and conditions governing the
application of the waiver, and the date it terminates. The Uruguay Round Understanding in Respect
of Waivers of Obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 describes, in
detail, the contents of a request for a waiver. Paragraph 1 of this Understanding states:
A request for a waiver or for an ex tension of an existing waiver shall
describe the measures which the Member proposes to take, the
specific policy objectives which the Member seeks to pursue and the
reasons which prevent the Member from achieving its policy
objectives by measures consistent with its obligations under
GATT 1994.
381. These provisions specify the elements that must be included in waiver requests and decisions.
The need to state the exceptional circumstances, to specify the terms and conditions governing the
application of the waiver, and to describe the specific policy objectives that a Member seeks to
pursue, make clear that a waiver is a specific and ex ceptional instrument subject to strict disciplines.
These elements do not suggest that a waiver shou ld be construed as an agreement on issues not

explicitly reflected in its terms and conditions, jus tifying circumstances, and stated policy objectives.
In the original EC – Bananas III proceedings, the Appellate Body emphasized:
Although the WTO Agreement does not provide any specific rules on
the interpretation of waivers, Article IX of the WTO Agreement and
the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 , which provide
requirements for granting and renewing waivers, stress the
exceptional nature of waivers and subject waivers to strict
disciplines. Thus, waivers should be interpreted with great care.
465
382. In our view, the function of a waiver is to relieve a Member, for a specified period of time,
from a particular obligation provided for in the cove red agreements, subject to the terms, conditions,
justifying exceptional circumstances or policy obj ectives described in the waiver decision. Its
purpose is not to modify existing provisions in the agreements, let alone create new law or add to or
amend the obligations under a covere d agreement or Schedule. Therefore, waivers are exceptional in
nature, subject to strict disciplines and should be interpreted with great care.
383. Multilateral interpretations of pr ovisions of WTO law are the ne xt method identified above.
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement sets out specific requirements for decisions that may be taken by
the Ministerial Conference or the General Council to adopt interpretations of provisions of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. Such multilateral inte rpretations are meant to clarify the meaning of
existing obligations, not to modify their content. Article IX:2 emphasizes that such interpretations
"shall not be used in a manner that would underm ine the amendment provisions in Article X". A
multilateral interpretation should al so be distinguished from a waiver, which allows a Member to
depart from an existing WTO obligation for a limited period of time. We consider that a multilateral
interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement can be likened to a subsequent
agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions pursuant to
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention , as far as the interpretation of the WTO agreements is
concerned.
384. The third method mentioned above is amendments to the WTO agreements. Article X of the
WTO Agreement sets out rules and procedures to amend the provisions in the Multilateral Trade
Agreements. Article X specifies the process and quor um required to amend particular provisions or
covered agreements. Amendments, unlike waivers, are not limited in time and create new or modify
existing rights and obligations for WTO Members. Special rules on acceptance and entry into force
apply, depending on the provisions that are be ing amended and on whether the amendment "would

465Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 185.

alter the rights and obligations of the Members". Amendments to the WTO Agreement and to a
Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1 enter into force following a formal acceptance process
pursuant to Article X:7.
385. The modification of Schedules of Concessions, wh ich are an integral part of the GATT 1994,
does not require a formal amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement , but is enacted
through a special procedure set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 or through multilateral
rounds of tariff negotiations. Purs uant to Article XXVIII, a Member may modify or withdraw a
concession annexed to the GATT 1994 by negotiation and agreement with other Members that are
"primarily concerned", and in consultation with Me mbers that have a substa ntial interest in the
concession. Article XXVIII:2 provides that, in an agreement on the renegotiation of a concession,
which may include compensatory adjustment, WTO Me mbers "shall endeavour to maintain a general
level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous c oncessions not less favourable to trade than that
provided for in this Agreement prior to such nego tiations". If an agreement cannot be reached, the
modifying Member is free to modify or withdraw the concession, while other Members that are
primarily concerned or have a substantial interest in the concession are free to withdraw substantially
equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the modifying Member.
2. Whether the Doha Article I Waiver is a "Subsequent Agreement" within the
Meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention
386. The European Communities argues that the Pane l erred in finding that the Doha Article I
Waiver "was a 'subsequent agreement', to the Eur opean Communities' Schedule, which dealt with the
provisions of the Schedule". 466 The European Communities argues th at "the Doha waiver would not
qualify as a 'subsequent agreement regarding the interp retation' of the original treaty for purposes of
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention" because, according to the Panel's own interpretation, it
does not "interpret" but "modifies" the European Communities' Schedule and extends the tariff quota
concession (that is, the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota rate of €75/mt) beyond
31 December 2002, the date on which the Bananas Framework Agreement was to expire. 467
387. We recall that Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement be tween the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.

466European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 148 (Ecuador).
467European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 191 (Ecuador).

388. We agree with the Panel that the Doha Article I Waiver was adopted by the same parties that
approved the European Communities' Schedule, including the Bananas Framework Agreement
annexed thereto. The Waiver decision was also taken subsequent to the entry into force of the
European Communities' Schedule. However, we ar e not persuaded that the Doha Article I Waiver
could qualify as a "subsequent agreement" regarding th e interpretation of the treaty or application of
its provisions within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.
389. We have considered above the differences be tween a waiver as opposed to a multilateral
interpretation and an amendment to a covered agreemen t. As noted earlier, a waiver decision relieves
a Member, for a limited period, from a particular existing obligation under the covered agreements,
subject to the terms and conditions, justifying ex ceptional circumstances, or policy objectives
described in the waiver decision. The purpose of a waiver is not to modify the interpretation or
application of existing provisions in the agreements, let alone to add to or amend the obligations under
a covered agreement or Schedule. As we discuss below, the decision to grant the Doha Article I
Waiver pursuant to Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement does not qualify as an agreement on the
interpretation or application of a treaty provision within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna
Convention.
390. We further observe that, in its commentary on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the
International Law Commission (the "ILC") describes a subsequent agreement within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention "as a further authentic element of interpretation to be
taken into account together with the context".
468 In our view, by referring to "authentic
interpretation", the ILC reads Article 31(3)(a) as refe rring to agreements bearing specifically upon the
interpretation of a treaty. In the WTO context, multilateral interpretations adopted pursuant to
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement are most akin to subsequent ag reements within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, but not waivers adopted pursuant to Articles IX:3 and 4 of
the WTO Agreement.
391. Also, for another reason, we do not believe th at the Doha Article I Waiver qualifies as a
"subsequent agreement" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention between all
WTO Members regarding the application of the tari ff quota concession in Part I, Section I-B of the
European Communities' Schedule.469 In this respect, we recall that the Panel concluded that:

468"Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th Session, Geneva, 4 May-
19 July 1966" (1966) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 172, at 221, para. 14. (emphasis added)
469Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443. The relevant excerpts from Sections I-A and I-B of Part I of the
European Communities' Schedule LXXX are reproduced in Annex VI attached to this Report.

… the Waiver, as it relates to the European Communities' WTO
market-access commitments relating to bananas, is a "subsequent
agreement between the parties" to the Bananas Framework
Agreement (i.e., the WTO Members), regarding the application of
the provisions of the WTO agreemen t as it pertains to such market
access commitments.
470 (emphasis added)
In our view, the term "application" in Article 31( 3)(a) relates to the situation where an agreement
specifies how existing rules or obligations in force are to be "applied"; the term does not connote the
creation of new or the extension of existing obligati ons that are subject to a temporal limitation and
are to expire. We find the Panel' s conclusion that the Doha Article I Waiver extended the duration of
the tariff quota concession beyond 31 December 2002, and thereby modified or changed the content
of the European Communities' Schedule, difficult to reconcile with its conclusion that the Waiver
should be considered an agreement on the application of existing commitments contained in that
Schedule. As such, we do not consider that th e Doha Article I Waiver could be regarded as an
agreement on the application of the tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.
392. Indeed, the Panel appears to have read the D oha Article I Waiver as an agreement modifying
the European Communities' Schedule, in that it wo uld provide for an extension of the tariff quota
concession beyond 31 December 2002, the expiry date of the Bananas Framework Agreement. The
Panel specifically found that "the European Co mmunities' tariff quota concession for bananas was
unequivocally intended to expire on 31 December 2002" 471 and that, "in adopting the Waiver, the
WTO Members agreed to extend the duration of the European Communities' tariff quota concession
beyond 31 December 2002". 472 This finding of the Panel means that the Panel considered that the
Waiver in fact modified the European Communities' original Schedule, rather than simply interpreted
or applied it. Therefore, by the Panel's own logic, it cannot be sustained that the Doha Article I
Waiver could be characterized as a "subsequent agre ement" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of
the Vienna Convention on the application of the market access commitments for bananas in the
European Communities' Schedule.
393. For all these reasons, we disagree with the Panel's finding that the "the Doha Waiver, as it
relates to the European Communities' WTO market -access commitments relating to bananas, is a
'subsequent agreement between the parties' to the Bananas Framework Agreement (i.e., the WTO

470Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443.
471Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
472Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.446.

Members), regarding the application of the provisions of the [ WTO Agreement] as it pertains to such
market access commitments."
473
394. We are also of the view that the Doha Article I Waiver does not constitute an amendment of
the European Communities' Schedul e adopted in accordance with the requirements and procedures of
Article X of the WTO Agreement . Extending an obligation with a temporal limitation is a
modification that "alter[s] the rights and obligations of the Members". Therefore, if implemented by
means of an amendment, Article X:3 requires that such an amendment "shall take effect for the
Members that have accepted [it] upon acceptance by tw o thirds of the Members and thereafter for
each Member upon acceptance by it". According to Article X:7, acceptance of such an amendment
requires depositing an instrument of acceptance with the Director-General of the WTO. The Doha
Article I Waiver is a decision taken by the Mini sterial Conference, which did not require formal
acceptance by the Membership as foreseen under Article X:7.
395. Moreover, while it is true that pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 Members' Schedules
of Concessions are integral parts of the covered agreements, Schedules are usually not modified by
means of an amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement: special rules and procedures
that Members are required to follow when they wish to modify their Schedules unless they enter into
tariff commitments by means of the conclusion of multilateral rounds of trade negotiations are
provided in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. In our view, if the duration of the tariff quota
concession in the European Communities' Schedule ha d to be modified or extended, negotiations
under Article XXVIII would be the proper procedure to follow.
474
3. Whether the Tariff Quota Concession in the European Communities'
Schedule was Extended by the Doha Article I Waiver
396. According to the Panel, the tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule of
Concessions was to expire under the terms of th e Bananas Framework Agreement, and the Doha
Article I Waiver extended that concession beyond th e date when the Bananas Framework Agreement
was to expire. In this section, we consider the argument by the European Communities that the Panel
erred in its interpretation of the terms and conditions in the Doha Ar ticle I Waiver when it found that,
through the Waiver, "WTO Members agreed to ex tend the duration of the European Communities'

473Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.443.
474While the European Communities has initiated Artic le XXVIII negotiations for the purpose of
introducing a tariff-only regime, these negotiations did not involve a possible extension of the tariff quota
concession beyond 31 December 2002. In any event, the renegotiations under Articles XXVIII and XXIV:6
have not been completed to date.

tariff quota concession for bananas beyond 31 December 2002". 475 The European Communities
argues that there is no reference in the Doha Article I Waiver to the European Communities' Schedule,
let alone to any agreement to extend the tariff quota concession.476
397. The Panel considered that the text of the Doha Article I Waiver reflected the common
intention of WTO Members that, pending the completi on of the Article XXVIII negotiations and until
the entry into force of a new tariff regime, the European Communities' Uruguay Round tariff quota
concession for bananas would continue to apply.
477
398. We noted above that a decision granting a waiver is an exceptional instrument. Waivers are
subject to the strict disciplines set out in Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement. We note that the Doha
Article I Waiver authorized the European Communiti es, "[s]ubject to the terms and conditions set out
[t]hereunder", to derogate, until 31 December 2007, from Article I:1 of the GATT 1994:
... to the extent necessary to permit [it] to provide preferential tariff
treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by
Article 36.3, Annex V and its Prot ocols of the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement, without being required to extend the same preferential
treatment to like products of any other member. (footnote omitted)
399. The Waiver's terms and conditions do not expr essly interpret or modify the tariff quota of
2.2 million mt bound in the European Communities' Schedule, the in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt
applicable to MFN suppliers, or the terms of th e Bananas Framework Agreem ent as annexed to the
European Communities' Schedule. The Doha Arti cle I Waiver is concerned with the zero-duty
preference for ACP suppliers, not with the tariff quo ta concession for MFN suppliers specified in the
European Communities' Schedule.
400. The reference in the recital of the preamble of the Doha Article I Waiver to tariff quotas "A"
and "B" for banana imports from MFN suppliers, and to the in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt applicable
to MFN suppliers, does not persuade us otherwi se. In fact, tariff quotas A and B add up to
2.55 million mt, which is not the same as the 2.2 mil lion mt inscribed in the European Communities'
Schedule. Moreover, the preamble recital is intro duced by the word "noting", and does not form part
of the operational section of the Waiver decision. Therefore, the reference in the preamble of the

475Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.446.
476European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 165 and 166 (Ecuador).
477Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.456.

Doha Article I Waiver to the tariff quotas relating to MFN suppliers cannot be deemed to constitute a
decision to extend the tariff quota concession beyond 31 December 2002.
478
401. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel also relied on the Annex on Bananas to the Doha
Article I Waiver, which states that, in the rebindi ng of the European Communities' tariff concession
pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, "a ll EC WTO market-access commitments relating to
bananas should be taken into account". 479 The Annex also prescribed the arbitrators' mandate to be
the determination of whether such rebinding "result[ed ] in at least maintaining total market access for
MFN banana suppliers, taking into account the above-mentioned EC commitments". 480 Finally, the
Annex on Bananas provided that "[t]he Article XXV III negotiations and the arbitration procedures
shall be concluded before the entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1 January 2006." 481
The Panel further concluded that, considering that the European Communities had not complied with

478Recital 9 of the preamble reads:
Noting that the tariff applied to bananas imported in the "A" and "B" quotas
shall not exceed 75 €/tonne until the entry into force of the new EC tariff-
only regime.
479Annex on Bananas, second tiret, reads:
No later than 10 days after the conclusion of Article XXVIII negotiations,
interested parties will be informed of the EC intentions concerning the
rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas. In the course of such consultations,
the EC will provide in formation on the methodology used for such
rebinding. In this regard, all EC WTO market-access commitments relating
to bananas should be taken into account.
480Annex on Bananas, fourth tiret, reads:
The arbitrator shall be appointed within 10 days, following the request
subject to agreement between the two parties, failing which the arbitrator
shall be appointed by the Director -General of the WTO, following
consultations with the parties, within 30 days of the arbitration request. The
mandate of the arbitrator shall be to determine, within 90 days of his
appointment, whether the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas
would result in at least maintainin g total market access for MFN banana
suppliers, taking into account the above-mentioned EC commitments.
481Annex on Bananas, fifth tiret, reads:
If the arbitrator determines that the rebinding would not result in at least
maintaining total market access for MFN suppliers, the EC shall rectify the
matter. Within 10 days of the notifi cation of the arbitration award to the
General Council, the EC will enter into consultations with those interested
parties that requested the arbitration. In the absence of a mutually
satisfactory solution, the same arbitrator will be asked to determine, within
30 days of the new arbitration request, whether the EC has rectified the
matter. The second arbitration awar d will be notified to the General
Council. If the EC has failed to rectif y the matter, this waiver shall cease to
apply to bananas upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime. The
Article XXVIII negotiations and the arbitration procedures shall be
concluded before the entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1
January 2006.

the provisions in the Annex on Bananas 482, and that Article XXVIII ne gotiations had not been
concluded, "the new EC tariff regime" had not yet entered into force.483
402. The provisions in the Annex on Bananas were aimed at ensuring, in the course of the
introduction of a tariff-only system, the rebinding of th e European Communities' tariff at a level that
would result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking into account
all the European Communities' commitments, including the size of the tariff quota and the in-quota
tariff applicable to MFN suppliers. We do not see in this provision any express or implied extension
of the tariff quota concession until the process of rebinding of a tariff-only system is completed.
Several paragraphs of the Annex on Bananas refer to the need to take into account, in the rebinding of
the European Communities' banana tariff, "all EC WTO market-access commitments relating to
bananas". However, the object of that Annex is to set out the benchmark and the arbitration process
for assessing whether the "envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas would result in at least
maintaining total market access for MFN banana supp liers". It does not provide for the extension of
the European Communities' tariff quota concession; rather, it appears to assume the continued
validity of the tariff quota concession that forms part of the existing total market access commitments
vis-à-vis MFN suppliers that a tariff rebinding by the European Communities would have to at least
maintain.
403. For these reasons, we cannot discern from the te rms and conditions, and the circumstances
identified as justification for the Doha Article I Waiver, a decision modifying the tariff quota
concession relating to imports from MFN suppliers in the European Communities' Schedule. The
focus of the Annex is clearly the preferential tariff treatment for ACP countries. We also note that no
party argued before the Panel that the Doha Artic le I Waiver, authorizing the European Communities
to provide, subject to certain te rms and conditions, preferential tari ff treatment to products of ACP
origin, extended the duration of the tariff quot a concession relating to imports from MFN supplier
countries.

482In the second award by the arbitrators acting pursuant to the Annex on Bananas attached to the Doha
Article I Waiver, the arbitrators found that the second pro posed tariff rebinding (at the level of €187/mt) by the
European Communities did not "result in at least main taining total market access for MFN banana suppliers,
taking into account the above-mentioned EC commitments " and that, therefore, the European Communities had
failed to rectify the matter in accordance with the fifth tiret of the Annex on Bananas. (Award of the Arbitrator,
EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement II, para. 127)
483Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.451 and 7.452.

404. Finally, the European Communities argues that th e Panel made contradictory statements in its
legal interpretation and reasoning. The Europ ean Communities argues that the Panel had found
earlier in its Report
484 that the Doha Article I Waiver expire d on 1 January 2006 and therefore could
not apply to the EC Bananas Import Regime, in clear contradiction with its later finding that the Doha
Article I Waiver extended the tariff quota concession beyond that date.485
405. We note that, in its reasoning regarding Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Panel stated that
the Doha Article I Waiver no longer applied to th e EC Bananas Import Regime, considering that it
had expired on 1 January 2006, because all the inte rmediate procedural steps under the Annex on
Bananas had been completed and the "new EC tariff regime" had entered into force. 486 In contrast, in
its findings under Article II of the GATT 1994, the Pa nel found that, through the same Doha Article I
Waiver, WTO Members had agreed to extend the tariff quota concession beyond 1 January 2006 and
until the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions for bananas had been rebound in
accordance with the Article XXVIII procedures.487
406. We have some difficulty understanding how th e Doha Article I Waiver could extend the
validity of a concession beyond the expiry date of the Waiver. On the one hand, the Panel stated that
the Doha Article I Waiver had expired on 1 Janua ry 2006 and could not apply to the EC Bananas
Import Regime. On the other hand, the Panel consider ed that an aspect of the Waiver still applied to
the EC Bananas Import Regime, insofar as it cont ains an agreement to extend the tariff quota
concession beyond 1 January 2006. 488 We consider that this inc oherence in the Panel's reasoning
further undermines the Panel's finding that, thr ough the Doha Article I Waiver, WTO Members
agreed to extend the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas.
407. Based on the above mentioned considerations, we are not persuaded that the terms and
conditions, exceptional circumstances, and justifica tions identified in the Doha Article I Waiver
reflect a decision by WTO Members to extend the duration of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession for bananas—that, according to the Pane l, was to expire on 31 December 2002—until the
rebinding of the European Communities' tariff concession was completed.

484Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.200 and 7.201.
485European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 172 (Ecuador).
486Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.200 and 7.201. In its appeal, the European Communities does not
challenge this finding by the Panel. The Panel had earlier found that the expression "the new EC Tariff regime"
used in the fifth tiret of the Annex on Bananas applied to EC Regulation 1964/2005. (Ecuador Panel Report,
para. 7.183)
487Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.456.
488European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 172 (Ecuador).

4. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
408. We explained above why we believe that the Panel erred in finding that the terms and
conditions in the Doha Article I Waiver reflect the common intention of WTO Members to extend the
European Communities' tariff quota concession be yond 31 December 2002 until the rebinding of its
tariff concession is completed. The Panel combined its analysis by considering supplementary means
of interpretation to confirm its reading of the D oha Article I Waiver. The Panel considered the
Modalities Paper and the Article XXVIII negotiations initiated by the European Communities. We do
not see how the consideration of supplementary means of interpretation referred to by the Panel could
change our conclusion on this issue. In this resp ect, we agree with the Panel that both the Modalities
Paper and the Article XXVIII negotiations initia ted by the European Communities do not in
themselves "provide a definitive orientation rega rding the common intention of the WTO Members,
as it pertains to the European Communities' WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas".489
5. Conclusion
409. For the above reasons, we do not consider th at the Doha Article I Waiver constituted a
"subsequent agreement" under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention regarding the interpretation
or application of the European Communities' Schedul e of Concessions. We also do not consider that
the Doha Article I Waiver constituted an agreemen t by WTO Members to extend the duration of the
European Communities' tariff quota concession for banan as, which, in the Panel's view, was to expire
on 31 December 2002. We, therefore, reverse the Panel's findings, in pa ragraphs 7.456 and 7.492 of
the Ecuador Panel Report, that the Doha Article I Waiver constituted a subsequent agreement
reflecting the common intention of WTO Member s that the European Communities' tariff quota
concession for bananas would conti nue to constitute its scheduled commitments regarding bananas,
pending the completion of the Article XXVIII nego tiations for the purpose of the rebinding of the
European Communities' tariff on bananas and the s ubsequent entry into force of a new European
Communities tariff regime.
D. Claims and Arguments relating to Ecuador's Other Appeal
410. Ecuador's other appeal is conditional upon a reve rsal of the Panel's finding that, through the
Doha Article I Waiver, WTO Members agreed to extend the tariff quota concession beyond
31 December 2002 until the rebinding of the Europ ean Communities' Schedule of Concessions for
bananas. Having reversed this finding, we now turn to consider Ecuador's other appeal.

489Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.478 and 7.488.

411. Ecuador submits that the Panel erred in finding that the expiration of the Bananas Framework
Agreement "would automatically imply [the] expi ration of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession under the terms of its Schedule".
490 Ecuador claims that paragraph 9 of the Bananas
Framework Agreement did not establish an expiration date for the entire concession as it relates to
bananas; rather, it established an expiration date only for the terms and conditions in the Bananas
Framework Agreement, other than those set out in columns 1 to 6 in the European Communities'
Schedule itself.
491
412. Ecuador therefore requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that the
European Communities' tariff quota concession was intended to expire on 31 December 2002
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement. Ecuador requests the Appellate Body
to find, instead, that the European Communities' tariff quota concession remains in effect and,
accordingly, to uphold the Panel's conclusion "that the tariff applied by the European Communities to
MFN imports of bananas set at €176/mt ... without c onsideration of the tariff quota for 2.2 million mt
bound at an in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt, [is] in excess of that set forth ... in the European
Communities' Schedule" and, consequently, inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994."
492
413. The European Communities responds that the ta riff quota of 2.2 million mt of bananas and
the in-quota tariff of €75/mt inscribed in the Euro pean Communities' Schedule were subject to the
terms, conditions, and qualificati ons set out in the Bananas Fram ework Agreement annexed to the
Schedule and, therefore, cannot be r ead in isolation from that Agreement. 493 The European
Communities agrees with the Panel's conclusion th at the tariff quota concession was unequivocally
intended to expire on 31 December 2002 in accord ance with the terms of the Bananas Framework
Agreement.494 The European Communities therefore requ ests the Appellate Body to reverse the
Panel's finding that the tariff of €176/mt is inconsistent with Article II of the GATT 1994.
E. Analysis of Ecuador's Other Appeal
1. Interpretation of the European Comm unities' Market Access Commitments
on Bananas
414. The Panel found that "all elements of the Eur opean Communities' tariff quota for bananas are
described in the Bananas Framework Agreement" and that "the European Communities' tariff quota

490Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 26.
491Ecuador's other appellant's submission, paras. 11 and 28.
492Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 4. (footnote omitted)
493European Communities' appellee's submission, paras. 12 and 13 (Ecuador).

concession for bananas must therefore be understood , under the 'terms, conditions or qualifications'
set forth ... in the Bananas Framework Agreement" a nd "cannot be read in isolation from the terms in
the Bananas Framework Agreement."495 The Panel therefore concluded:
[I]n light of the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
European Communities' Schedule, taking into account Part I,
Sections I.A (Tariffs) and I.B (Tariff quotas), and the Bananas
Framework Agreement, in their context and in the light of the treaty's
object and purpose, the European Communities' tariff quota
concession for bananas was unequivocally intended to expire on
31 December 2002.
496
415. We note that Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 states:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any
Member, which are the products of territories of other Members,
shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule
relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth
in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess
of those set forth and provided therein.
416. While it is unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member's Schedule would be limited
in time, such limitation does not appear to be precluded by the wording of Article II:1(b), which refers
to "terms, conditions or qualifications" set forth in a Member's Schedule. The parties agree in
principle that Article II:1(b) allows WTO Memb ers to subject tariff concessions to the "terms,
conditions or qualifications set forth in [their] Schedule".
497 However, the parties disagree on the
legal status of the Bananas Framework Agreemen t annexed to the European Communities' Schedule
and, in particular, on whether, and if so how, it should be read to condition the tariff quota concession
for bananas in the European Communities' Schedule.

495Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.425 and 7.426.
496Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.436.
497Ecuador argues however that, if a time-limit is att ached to a specific concession, this should be done
clearly and unequivocally. (Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 27) The only other example provided
by the Panel and cited by the European Communities in its appellee's submission of a tariff concession subject
to a "date of expiry" is the United States' tariff concession on sugar reviewed by the GATT panel in US – Sugar
Waiver. It should be noted, however, that this concession, unlike the European Communities' tariff quota
concession for bananas, was not set to expire on a fixed date, but was made dependent on the continued
existence of certain domestic legislation. The panel in US – Sugar Waiver noted that the United States'
concession on sugar was:
... subject to the condition that the bound rates "shall be effective only
during such time as Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 or substantially
equivalent legislation is in effect in the United States" and that they "shall
resume full effectiveness ... if legislation substantially equivalent to Title II
of the Sugar Act of 1948 should subsequently become effective".
(GATT Panel Report, US – Sugar Waiver , para. 2.3) We further note that the United States' concession on
sugar was subject to the existence of "Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 or substantially equivalent legislation",
making it clear that such condition applied to the concession in its entirety.

417. In GATT and WTO jurisprudence, it has been rec ognized that there are limits to the terms,
conditions, or qualifications that may be incorporat ed in a Member's Schedule of Concessions. In
EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body stated that "the ordinary meaning of the term 'concession'
suggests that a Member may yield rights and gran t benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations"
under the WTO covered agreements th rough an entry in its Schedule.
498 The GATT panel in US –
Sugar found that:
Article II gives Members the possibilit y to incorporate into the legal
framework of the General Agreem ent commitments additional to
those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such
additional commitments, not however to reduce their commitments
under other provisions of that Agreement.
499
418. Insofar as a temporal limitation does not dimi nish obligations or reduce commitments under
other provisions of the covered ag reements, scheduling a temporal limitation to a tariff concession
does not seem incompatible with the findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III and the
GATT panel in US – Sugar.
419. The following bindings in the European Communitie s' Schedule are relevant to this dispute.
Part I, Section I-A (Tariffs) of the European Communities' Schedule 500 contains a tariff binding on
bananas at the level of €680/mt. The parties agree that it would apply to out-of-quota MFN imports
and has no temporal limitation. The contested tariff quota concession (that is, the tariff quota of
2.2 million mt of bananas bound at an in-quota tariff of €75/mt) is found in Part I, Section I-B (Tariff
quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule. It reads:
Description of
product
Tariff item
number(s)
Initial quota
quantity and
in-quota
tariff rate
Final quota
quantity and
in-quota
tariff rate
Implemen-
tation period
from/to
Initial
negotiating
right
Other terms
and
conditions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fresh bananas,
other than
plantains
0803 00 12
2.200.000 t
75 ECU/t
2.200.000 t
75 ECU/t
 As indicated
in the Annex

498Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 154 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
500The relevant excerpts from Sections I-A and I-B of Part I of the European Communities' Schedule
LXXX are reproduced in Annex VII attached to this Report.

420. The Annex mentioned under "Other terms and c onditions" in column 7 contains the text of
the Bananas Framework Agreement, which reads, in relevant part:
1. The global basic tariff quota is fixed at 2.100.000 t for 1994
and at 2.200.000 t for 1995 and the following years, subject
to any increase resulting fro m the enlargement of the
Community.
2. This quota is divided up into specific quotas allocated to the
following countries:
Country Percentage of the global quota
Costa Rica 23.4
Colombia 21.0
Nicaragua 3.0
Venezuela 2.0
Dominican Republic
and other ACP concerning
non-traditional quantities 90.000 t.
Others 46.32% (1994)–46% (1995)

7. The in-quota tariff rate shall be 75 Ecus tonne.
8. The agreed system will be operational by 1 October 1994 at
the latest, without prejudice to any provisional or transitional
measures to be examined for the year 1994.
9. This agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002. Full
consultations with the Latin American suppliers that are
GATT Members should start no later than in year 2001.
 The functioning of the agreemen t will be reviewed before the
end of the third year, with full consultation of GATT Member
Latin American suppliers.
10. This agreement will be inco rporated into the Community's
Uruguay Round Schedule.
11. This agreement represents a se ttlement of the dispute between
Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and the
Community on the Community's banana regime. The parties
to this agreement will not pursue the adoption of the GATT
panel report on this issue.

421. In determining whether the tariff quota con cession at issue expired on 31 December 2002 or
remained in force, we need to examine the elements of Part I, Section I-B of the European
Communities' Schedule and the Bananas Framework Agreement annexed thereto in their entirety. All
the columns of Section I-B of the Schedule and th e paragraphs of the Bananas Framework Agreement
may provide interpretative guidance.
422. We start by noting that all terms and cond itions in the European Communities' Schedule
should be given meaning and effect, regardless of th e column in which they are inscribed, or whether
they are contained in an annex that is cross-referenced in one of the columns.
423. We observe that the global tariff quota of 2. 2 million mt and the in-quota rate of €75/mt
bound in columns 3 and 4 of Section I-B are restated in paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Bananas Framework
Agreement. In our view, meaning must be given to the fact that the tariff quota quantity and the in-
quota rate are inscribed in columns 3 and 4 of the Sc hedule and restated in paragraphs 1 and 7 of the
Bananas Framework Agreement. We are not persua ded by the conclusion that the same concession
has been stated twice with the same meaning, first in the Schedule and then in the Bananas
Framework Agreement. We consider that the Bananas Framework Agreement performs a different
function to that of the Schedule and that the Ag reement does not subsume the terms and conditions
contained in columns 3 and 4 of the Schedule. It is the "other terms and conditions" in the Bananas
Framework Agreement that should be read in the lig ht of the commitments in columns 3 and 4 of the
Schedule. The tariff quota quantity and the in-quota rate, which are committed in the Schedule, are
restated in paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Bananas Fr amework Agreement for the purpose of allocating the
tariff quota. As such, therefore, paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Bananas Framework Agreement do not
establish the tariff quota concession.
424. We further note that paragraphs 2 through 6 of the Bananas Framework Agreement deal at
length with the allocation among supplier countries of the "global basic tariff quota" identified in
paragraph 1: paragraph 2 allocates specific quota shar es to the supplier countries that were parties to
the GATT panel in EEC – Bananas II and leaves a residual allocation to "others"; paragraphs 3 and 4
specify when a country may fill its allocation with deliveries from other supp liers and how shortfalls
may be re-allocated among supplier countries; pa ragraph 5 provides that autonomous quota increases
by the European Commun ities are allocated accordin g to the same percentage shares set out in
paragraph 2, yet, suppliers with country-specific allocations may jointly request and the Commission
"shall agree to a different allocation"; and paragr aph 6 contains additional rules on the management
of the quota shares. According to paragraph 8, "[t]he agreed system will be operational by 1 October
1994"; and the first sentence of paragraph 9 follows stating that "[t]his agreement shall apply until

31 December 2002."501 Paragraph 9 further provides for consu ltations with suppliers and the review
of the agreement's functioning after three years. Paragraph 10 requires incorporation of "this
agreement" into the European Communities' Schedule. According to paragraph 11, "[t]his agreement
represents a settlement" among the parties to the EEC – Bananas II dispute.
425. Our review of these elements reveals that the Bananas Framework Agreement constitutes an
agreement on the allocation, management, and rea llocation of country-specific shares within the
"global basic tariff quota" referred to in paragraph 1. Therefore, we are of the view that the sentence
"[t]his agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002" in paragraph 9 refers to an agreement on the
allocation of shares. It does not mention the "globa l basic tariff quota", nor does it refer to the tariff
quota concession inscribed in column 4 of Part I, Section I-B of the European Communities' Schedule
under the heading " Final quota quantity and in-quota tariff rate". 502 When a critical temporal
limitation is contained in an annex to a Schedule, the fact that an "agreement" is mentioned but no
reference is made to the final tariff quota concession, is significant and must be given weight in any
interpretation. We believe that the temporary nature of the agreement referred to in paragraph 9 of the
Bananas Framework Agreement and the tariff quota concession bound in column 4 of Section I-B of
the European Communities' Schedule can both be give n meaning and effect. In our view, the tariff
quota quantity of 2.2 million mt and the in-quota tariff are bound in column 4 as "final". The Bananas
Framework Agreement, according to column 7 of the Schedule under the heading "Other terms and
conditions", concerns elements other than those inscribed in columns 3 and 4. The expiration date
and the review contemplated after three years in pa ragraph 9 relate to the allocation of shares within
the "global basic tariff quota" of 2.2 million mt as restated in paragraph 1 of the Bananas Framework
Agreement. This reading of Section I-B of the European Communities' Schedule and, specifically, of
paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement is also borne out by Article XIII:2(d) and
Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994.
426. One of the options under Article XIII:2(d) fo r tariff quota management is the allocation of
shares with the agreement of substantial supplie rs according to proportions taken from a previous
representative period, taking due account of any special factors. Ecuador points out that the country-
specific allocations and certain terms and conditi ons of quota management set out in the Bananas
Framework Agreement have become inapplicable, b ecause they were found to be inconsistent with
Article XIII:2 in the original proceedings. 503 The Panel recalled that "certain provisions of the
Bananas Framework Agreement, such as the allocation of country-specific quota shares, but not the

501Emphasis added.
502Emphasis added.
503Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 23.

Bananas Framework Agreement as a whole, were found in the original proceedings to be inconsistent
with the WTO agreements."
504 In our view, this confirms that the European Communities' bound
tariff quota concession remains in force even though certain terms and the agreement set out in the
Bananas Framework Agreement have expired. 505 This is particularly so when the relevant terms and
conditions concern elements that are distinct and severable from one another (such as the overall tariff
quota quantity and the in-quota tariff rate, on the one hand, and the allocation of the quota shares
among suppliers, on the other hand).
427. We further note that a Member seeking an a llocation agreement with supplying countries is
required under Article XIII:4 to consult with Members having a subs tantial interest in supplying the
product "regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or the base period
selected". In this respect, we recall that the original panel found that:
... although the EC reached an ag reement with all Members who
had a substantial interest in suppl ying the product at one point in
time, under the consultation provisions of Article XIII:4, the EC
would have to consider the interests of a new Member who had a
substantial interest in supplying the product if that new Member
requested it to do so. The provisions on consultations and
adjustments in Article XIII:4 mean in any event that the [Bananas
Framework Agreement] could not be invoked to justify a permanent
allocation of tariff quota shares.
506 (footnote omitted)
428. In our view, paragraph 9 of th e Bananas Framework Agreement, which set an expiry date for
the agreement at 31 December 2002, provided for consultations between the European Communities
and "Latin American suppliers that are GATT Member s" by 2001, and the review of the functioning
of the agreement within three years, reflects th e requirements of Article XIII:4, which requires
consultation with substantial supp liers, reappraisal of special factors, and an adjustment of the
allocation agreement.
429. For these reasons, we consider that the expiry date in paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework
Agreement refers only to the agreement on the allo cation of the tariff quota shares. The overall tariff
quota quantity and the in-quota tariff rate, on the one hand, and the allocation of the quota shares
among supplier countries, on the other hand, are di stinct aspects of the European Communities'
market access commitments relating to bananas. The main function and content of the Bananas
Framework Agreement is the allocation of the quota shares for a certain period of time, whereas the
tariff quota quantity and the in-quota tariff rate are set out as "initial" and "final" commitments in

504Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.425.
505Ecuador Panel Report, paras. 7.425 and 7.426.
506Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.92. (footnote omitted)

columns 3 and 4 respectively of Part I, Secti on I-B of the European Communities' Schedule and
identified as the "global basic tariff quota" in paragraph 1 of the Bananas Framework Agreement.
430. We disagree with the Panel that "the expi ration of the Bananas Framework Agreement on
31 December 2002 would automatically imply expira tion of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession under the terms of its Schedule". 507 In reaching this conclusion, we are giving full effect
to all terms and conditions contained in the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions.
However, in our view, paragraph 9 of the Banana s Framework Agreement relates to the agreement on
the allocation of quota shares set out in paragraph 2, not to the entire quota concession, and provides
that this agreement expired on 31 December 2002. We therefore consider that the tariff quota
concession for 2.2 million mt bound at the in-quota rate of €75/mt remained in force beyond
31 December 2002 until the rebinding of the Europ ean Communities' Schedule of Concessions for
bananas.
431. Ecuador argues that the Panel erred in conc luding that the object and purpose of the WTO
agreements supported its interpretation that the tariff quota concession in the European Communities'
Schedule had expired.508 The European Communities agrees with the Panel's considerations.
432. The Panel relied on the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, as
reflected in the preambles of these two Agreements. It noted that "concessions made by WTO
Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of expanding trade in goods and
services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements."509 At the same time, the Panel consid ered that "this general object and
purpose is consistent with the more specific object and purpose of Article II:1(a) and (b)." 510 I t
referred, in particular, to the "objective of promoti ng security and predictability in international trade,
through the exchange of concessions" 511, which is subject to conditions and qualifications in
Members' Schedules. According to the Panel, its finding that the tariff quota concession had expired
was consistent with the specific objective of prom oting security and predicta bility in international
trade through the exchange of concessions, becau se it gave effect to the terms and conditions
incorporated into the European Communities' Schedule, including the temporal limitation provided
for in the Bananas Framework Agreement. The Pa nel considered that the general object and purpose
of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 of expanding trade and reducing barriers to trade through

507Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.427.
508Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 29.
509Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.431.
510Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.433.
511Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.433.

the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantag eous arrangements had to be reconciled with the
specific objective of respecting scheduled concessions including the terms and conditions inscribed in
Schedules. In the Panel's view, these considera tions of the object and purpose confirmed its
interpretation that paragraph 9 of the Bananas Fr amework Agreement provided a temporal limitation
to the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas.
433. We agree with the Panel that "concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted so
as to further the general objective of expanding trade in goods and services and reducing barriers to
trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements."
512 We also
consider that the "objective of promoting security and predictability in international trade" is furthered
"through the exchange of concessions" 513, which are subject to conditions and qualifications inscribed
in Members' Schedules. However, as explained ab ove, the temporal limitation in paragraph 9 of the
Banana Framework Agreement, that "this agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002", is properly
read to relate to the agreement on the allocation of quota shares reflected in paragraph 2. In our view,
it is not consistent with the objective of promoti ng security and predictabilit y in international trade
through the exchange of concessions if terms, c onditions, and temporal limitations relating to an
agreement on quota allocation are improperly read to qualify a tariff quota concession that is bound as
the "final quota quantity and in-quota tariff rate". To the contrary, our interpretation that the tariff
quota concession bound in Part I, Sec tion I-B (that is, 2.2 million mt at an in-quota rate of €75/mt) of
the European Communities' Schedule remains in for ce is consistent with the objective of promoting
security and predictability in international trade through the exchange of concessions, and with the
objective of expanding trade and reducing barriers to trade through the negotiation of reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements.
434. We further note that the second sentence of paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework
Agreement states that "[f]ull consultations with the Latin American suppliers that are GATT Members
should start no later than in year 2001." If we assume, arguendo, that the tariff quota concession
expired on 31 December 2002 pursuant to the first sen tence of paragraph 9, this would leave MFN
suppliers with the out-of-quota tariff rate bound at €680/mt, and a commitment by the European
Communities to consult on a possible rebinding. The substantial suppliers of the European
Communities that negotiated the market access comm itments on bananas and made reciprocal tariff
concessions would remain bound by their schedul ed concessions, but would forego the tariff quota
concession for bananas they bargained for with the European Communities. If the Panel's
interpretation that paragraph 9 of the Bananas Fr amework Agreement "extinguished" the tariff quota

512Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.434.
513Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.433.

concession from Part I, Section I-B of the Europ ean Communities' Schedule were accepted, only the
out-of-quota tariff rate bound in Part I, Section I-A at a level of at €680/mt would remain, coupled
with a requirement to consult on a rebinding. In our view, this would not provide security or
predictability of tariff concessi ons and would not promote the objective of expanding trade and
reducing barriers to trade through the negotiati on of reciprocal and mutually advantageous
concessions and arrangements.
435. For these reasons, we believe that our interpre tation of the European Communities' Schedule
of Concessions and the Bananas Framework Agreem ent annexed thereto is consistent with the
objective to provide predictability and security to the multilateral trading system and to promote the
objective of expanding trade and reducing barriers to trade through "reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs."514 We consider, therefore,
that paragraph 9 of the Bananas Fr amework Agreement should not be read to affect the validity of the
European Communities' tariff quota concession inscribed in columns 3 and 4 of Part I, Section I-B of
its Schedule until the Article XXVIII negotiations have been completed, and that this is consistent
with the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement.
2. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
436. We turn next to the negotiating history of the European Communities' Uruguay Round
Schedule of Concessions and the Bananas Framework Ag reement. The Schedule, including the tariff
quota concession, is a multilaterally agreed instrume nt, which is an integral part of the GATT 1994
pursuant to Article II:7 therein. In contrast, th e Bananas Framework Agreement—incorporated into
the Schedule as "Other terms and condition" in co lumn 7—was originally a plurilateral agreement
concluded between the European Communities and four Latin American GATT Members (Colombia,
Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) as a settlement of the EEC – Bananas II dispute.
437. The final offer presented by the European Communities in the framework of the Uruguay
Round agricultural negotiations on 14 December 1993 in cluded reference to an earlier draft of the
Bananas Framework Agreement, which allocated shares of the quota also to Ecuador, Panama,
Honduras, and Guatemala (excluded from the final Bananas Framework Agreement) and provided for
the agreement to expire on 31 December 2002. The Bananas Framework Agreement in the 1993 offer
established that it would be "registered and legalized in the Uruguay Round". At the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round negotiations, GATT Members agr eed to submit "draft final Schedules" of
Concessions on agricultural and non-agricultural ma rket access by 15 February 1994. Between

514Preamble of the WTO Agreement, third recital.

15 February and 31 March 1994, "a process of verifi cation [took] place to ensure that the final
schedules duly reflected the negotiated concessions ex changed between participants and that errors
and omissions were rectified".
515
438. The "draft final Schedule" of Concessions s ubmitted by the European Communities included
a tariff quota concession for 2 million mt bound at an in-quota rate of €100/mt, without reference to
the Bananas Framework Agreement. The Eur opean Communities' draft final Schedule of
Concessions did not, therefore, contain an expiry date for the tariff quota concession. On 29 March
1994, during the verification process, the Europ ean Communities submitted a "corrigendum" to its
Schedule as regards bananas, which included refe rence to the Bananas Framework Agreement in
column 7 of Part I, Section I-B of its Schedule. This corrected version of the European Communities'
Schedule on bananas was incorporated in Schedule LXXX, which was adopted by the WTO Members
together with the results of the Uruguay Round of negotiations.
439. As noted earlier, paragraph 11 of the Bananas Framework Agreement states that it "represents
a settlement of the dispute between Colombia, Cost a Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and the Community
on the Community's banana regime". The negotiatin g history confirms that the Bananas Framework
Agreement was not originally a component of the European Communities' MFN tariff quota
concession for bananas. It was an agreement between the European Communities and a group of
banana supplying country Members, which allocated quota shares in exchange for the settlement of
the GATT dispute in EEC – Bananas II.
440. The "draft final Schedule" submitted by the European Communities, before the verification
process, included a tariff quota concession for banan as for a quantity of 2 million mt at the in-quota
rate of €100/mt, but did not contain an expiry date. We understand that the inclusion of the reference
to the Bananas Framework Agreement in the European Communities' Schedule was meant to "register
and legalize" (as stated in the draft 1993 offe r) the agreement reached between the European
Communities, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
441. Finally, we turn to consider several arguments made by Ecuador that relate to supplementary
means of interpretation in support of its pos ition that the European Communities' tariff quota
concession did not expire. Ecuador argues that: (i) a time-limited commitment would be contrary to
the Uruguay Round Modalities Paper; (ii) the Doha Article I Waiver is premised on the bound tariff
quota concession remaining in force unless and until rebound; and (iii) the European Communities

515Negotiating Group on Market Access, Meeting of 15 December 1993, Note by the Secretariat,
para. 2.

initiated twice Article XXVIII negotiations to modi fy its concessions, which have not as yet been
completed.516
442. The introduction to the Modalities Paper states th at it is "being re-issued for the purpose of
completing draft Schedules of concession and commit ments in the agricultural negotiations and for
facilitating the verification process leading to the estab lishment of formal Schedules to be annexed to
the Uruguay Round Protocol." In our view, this introductory language and the content of the
Modalities Paper make clear that it qualifies as "preparatory work of the treaty" within the meaning of
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The Modalities Paper explicitly states that it "shall not be used
as a basis for dispute settlement proceedings"; this means that it does not in itself confer on WTO
Members rights and obligations enforceable in dis pute settlement. However, this does not preclude
reference to the Modalities Paper when interpreti ng the WTO agreements and Members' Schedules of
Concessions that were prepared in accordance with these modalities.
517 Therefore, we consider that it
is not inappropriate to refer to the Modalities Pa per as supplementary means of interpretation to
confirm our interpretation of the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions and of the Bananas
Framework Agreement.
443. If the Panel's interpretation were correct, and the tariff quota concession had expired on
31 December 2002, the default tariff in the European Communities' Schedule would be the bound out-
of-quota tariff rate of €680/mt. The requirement to consult with Latin American suppliers by 2001
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framew ork Agreement would provide no guarantee that a
rebinding would be agreed and consolidated in the European Communities' Schedule by the end of
2002, let alone any certainty and predictability regardi ng the level of any such rebinding. In contrast,
the Modalities Paper, as part of the Uruguay Round tariffication process, required Members to
maintain "current access opportunities" that shoul d be "no less than average annual import quantities
for the years 1986 to 1988 (the 'reference period')." 518 As we understand it, the tariff quota of
2.2 million mt at €75/mt for bananas was meant to maintain "current access opportunities" for MFN

516Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 34.
517Regarding the use of the Modalities Paper to interpret Members' Schedules of Concessions, the panel
in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar stated:
Clearly, the so-called Modalities Paper is not a covered agreement and thus
cannot provide for WTO rights and obligations to Members. Nonetheless, it
could be relevant when interpreting the Agreement on Agriculture,
including Members' Schedules.
(Panel Reports, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 7.350 (footnotes omitted)) The Appellate Body, in that
case, confirmed the panel's findings that the Moda lities Paper was "not an agreement among WTO Members
and, by its terms, [could not] be the basis of dispute settlement", but did not rule on the relevance of the
Modalities Paper to the interpretation of Memb ers' Schedules. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies
on Sugar, para. 199 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 157))
518Modalities Paper, Annex 3, para. 11.

banana suppliers in accordance with the Modalities Paper. Moreover, the Modalities Paper does not
envisage temporal limitations to this commitment resulting from the tariffication process. However, if
the Panel's interpretation of the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions were accepted, from
31 December 2002 onwards, the Schedule woul d no longer provide for such "current access
opportunities" for bananas to be maintained.
444. We therefore consider that the Modalities Paper, as a supplementary means of interpretation,
confirms the conclusion we reached above th at the tariff quota concession in the European
Communities' Schedule did not expire on 31 Decemb er 2002 according to paragraph 9 of the Bananas
Framework Agreement, considering that the requireme nt in the Modalities Paper to maintain "current
access opportunities" is not limited in time.
445. Regarding the Doha Article I Waiver, we concluded above that th e Panel erred in finding that
the Waiver constitutes a "subsequent agreement" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna
Convention, and that it extended the tariff quota concessi on beyond 31 December 2002. It could be
argued, however, that the Doha Article I Wa iver could qualify as supplementary means of
interpretation to confirm the meaning of the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions.
519
446. The Doha Article I Waiver appears to be pr edicated on the continued application of the
European Communities' tariff quota concession beyond 31 December 2002, insofar as it states in its
preamble:
Noting that the tariff applied to bananas imported in the "A" and "B"
quotas shall not exceed 75 €/tonne until the entry into force of the
new EC tariff-only regime.
447. Furthermore, the rules and procedures set out in the Annex on Bananas presuppose the
continued existence of the tariff quota concession, inso far as they require that, in "the rebinding of the
EC tariff on bananas ... all EC WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas should be taken
into account." Indeed, the award of the arbitrator issued on 1 August 2005 pursuant to the Annex on

519We recall in this regard that, in EC – Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body stated:
We stress ... that Article 32 does not define exhaustively the supplementary
means of interpretation to which an interpreter may have recourse. It states
only that they include the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion. Thus, an interpreter has a certain flexibility
in considering relevant supplementary means in a given case so as to assist
in ascertaining the common intentions of the parties.
(Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 283)

Bananas reiterates that the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt and the in-quota tariff rate of
€75/mt continue to bind the European Communities.520
448. Therefore, in our view, the language of the Doha Article I Waiver confirms the conclusion we
reached above that the tariff quota concession has not expired and remains in force until the rebinding
process and the Article XXVIII negotiations have b een completed, and the resulting tariff rate has
been consolidated into the European Communities' Schedule.
449. Finally, Ecuador argues, its position that th e European Communities' tariff quota concession
did not expire on 31 December 2002 is further supp orted by the fact that the European Communities
initiated twice negotiations pursuant to Article X XVIII of the GATT 1994 to modify its concessions.
Ecuador argues that initiation of Article XXVIII pr ocedures would not have been necessary if the
European Communities merely intended to lower its bound rate from €680/mt. 521 The European
Communities contends that any modification of a tariff concession requires recourse to
Article XXVIII.
450. We note that Article XXVIII, entitled "Modifica tion of Schedules", states that a Member
"may ... modify or withdraw a concession", withou t specifying whether "modify" refers only to a
reduction in the scope of the concession (such as an increase in the tariff binding). The ordinary
meaning of the term "modify" appears to include both the situation in which the scope of a concession
is reduced (for example, a tariff increase) and wh en the scope is expanded (for example, a tariff
reduction). In fact, whether the proposed m odification actually constitutes a reduction or an
expansion of the concession may only become clea r in the course of the renegotiations and will
determine whether and to what extent the modify ing Member owes compensatory adjustment within
the meaning of Article XXVIII:2.
451. We also find support for the argument that an y modification of the scope of a concession
would require initiation of Article XXVIII proc edures in the Decision on the Procedures for
Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concession adopted by the GATT Ministerial
Conference on 26 March 1980. 522 These procedures identify two t ypes of changes to the authentic
texts of Schedules, which can be adopted by Memb ers by means of certification. The first are
"changes in the authentic texts of Schedules a nnexed to the General Agreement which reflect
modifications resulting from action under Article II, Article XVIII, Article XXIV, Article XXVII or

520Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, para. 13.
521Ecuador's other appellant's submission, para. 34.
522Decision of 26 March 1980, Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff
Concessions, GATT document L/4962, BISD S27/25.

Article XXVIII"
523; the second are "changes in the authen tic texts of Schedules ... made when
amendments or rearrangements which do not alter the scope of a concession are introduced in national
customs tariffs in respect of bound items".524
452. In our view, the European Communities' propo sed rebinding cannot be regarded as a change
that would not alter the scope of a concession. Thus, we consider that the European Communities had
to initiate Article XXVIII negotiations to rebind its tariff concession in its Schedule, whether it
resulted in an increase or in a reduction of the bound tariff rate. For this reason, the initiation by the
European Communities of Article XXVIII negotiations would not provide a clear indication that the
tariff quota concession had not expired and the tariff rate needed to be increased through negotiations.
We consider, therefore, that the fact that th e European Communities initiated twice Article XXVIII
negotiations to modify its concessions is not conc lusive as to whether the tariff quota concession did
not expire on 31 December 2002.
3. Conclusion
453. For all the above reasons, we conclude that the tariff quota concession of 2.2 million mt
bound at the in-quota rate of €75/mt in the Eur opean Communities' Schedule of Concessions did not
expire on 31 December 2002 and remains in for ce until the rebinding process and the Article XXVIII
negotiations have been completed, and the resulting ta riff rate has been consolidated in the European
Communities' Schedule. We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.436 of the Ecuador
Panel Report, that "the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas was unequivocally
intended to expire on 31 December 2002."
4. Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994
454. We have reversed the Panel's finding that, through the Doha Article I Waiver, WTO Members
agreed to extend the tariff quota concession for 2.2 million mt bound at the in-quota rate of €75/mt in
the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions beyond 31 December 2002. We have also
reversed the Panel's finding that the same tariff quota concession was intended to expire on
31 December 2002 in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, and found,
instead, that the European Communities' tariff quota concession remains in force until the rebinding
process and the Article XXVIII negotiations have b een completed, and the resulting tariff rate has
been consolidated in the European Communities' Schedule.

523Decision of 26 March 1980, Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff
Concessions, GATT document L/4962, BISD S27/25, para. 1.
524Decision of 26 March 1980, Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff
Concessions, GATT document L/4962, BISD S27/25, para. 2.

455. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's findings, albeit for di fferent reasons, in paragraph 7.504
of the Ecuador Panel Report, that the tariff applie d by the European Communities to MFN imports of
bananas, set at €176/mt, without consideration of the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt bound at an in-
quota tariff rate of €75/mt, is inconsistent with th e first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994,
insofar as it constitutes "an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set forth and provided for in Part I
of the European Communities' Schedule, and results in a treatment for the commerce of bananas from
MFN countries (i.e., non-ACP WTO Members) that is less favourable than that provided for in Part I
[of the] European Communities' Schedule."
XII. Nullification or Impairment (United States)
456. We now turn to the European Communities' app eal of the Panel's finding that, "to the extent
that the [EC Bananas Import Regime] contain[ed] me asures inconsistent with various provisions of
the GATT 1994, it ... nullified or impaired bene fits accruing to the United States under that
Agreement."525
457. Section A summarizes the findings made in the original proceedings. The current
Article 21.5 proceedings are summarized in section B. Section C provides an overview of the
arguments raised on appeal by the participants and the third participants. Finally, in section D, we
discuss the issues appealed.
A. The Original Proceedings
458. In the original EC – Bananas III dispute, the panel and th e Appellate Body relied on the
conclusions of the GATT panel in US – Superfund to find that proving the absence of actual trade
effects is insufficient to rebut the presumption of nu llification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the
DSU. The Appellate Body agreed with the origin al panel that "the United States is a producer of
bananas and that a potential export interest by the United States cannot be excluded", and that "the
internal market of the United States for bananas could be affected by the EC bananas regime and by
its effects on world supplies and world prices of bananas".
526 The Appellate Body therefore upheld
the original panel's findings that "the European Communities ha[d] not succeeded in rebutting the
presumption that its breaches of the GATT 1994 ... nullified or impaired the benefits of the United
States, with the modification that this finding should be limited to the United States and to the EC's
obligations under the GATT 1994".
527

525US Panel Report, para. 8.12.
526Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 251.
527Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 255(x).

B. The Current Article 21.5 Proceedings
459. In the current proceedings, the Panel addressed the European Communities' arguments that
"the preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP coun tries has no impact on the value of relevant EC
banana imports from the United States", and that the "preferential tariff quota therefore does not cause
the United States any nullification or impairment of a benefit for which the European Communities
can face suspension of concessions [under Article 22 of the DSU]".
528
460. The Panel in these proceedings relied on the findi ngs by the panel and the Appellate Body in
the original proceedings rejecting a similar claim by the European Communities that the United States
had not suffered nullification or impairment because of the inconsistencies with the GATT 1994 and
the GATS of the European Communitie s' bananas import regime at issue in the original proceedings.
The Panel also emphasized that these complian ce proceedings were conducted pursuant to
Article 21.5 and thus "[did] not occur in isolation from the original proceedings", but "form[ed] part
of a continuum of events". 529 The Panel concluded that, "[c]ons idering the link between the current
compliance proceedings and the original pro ceedings ... the European Communities has [not]
successfully rebutted the legal presumption established by Article 3.8 of the DSU that its inconsistent
measures nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under the WTO agreements".530
C. Claims and Arguments on Appeal
461. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in finding that the United States had
suffered nullification or impairment as a result of the EC Bananas Import Regime. Considering that
the United States is a net importer of bananas that di d not export bananas to any country in the world,
the preference for ACP bananas "did not deprive the United States from any 'competitive opportunity'
to export bananas towards the market of the Eu ropean Communities, nor did it change the United
States' 'competitive relationship' with any banana exporting country in the world".531
462. The United States responds that the Appellate B ody already rejected si milar arguments made
by the European Communities in the original proceedings, and that the findings of the Appellate Body
in the original proceedings form ed the basis for the rulings and recommendations addressed to the
European Communities in this proceeding. 532 The United States argues that a showing of adverse

528US Panel Report, para. 8.5.
529US Panel Report, para. 8.9 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 136).
530US Panel Report, para. 8.10.
531European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 165 (US).

trade effects is unnecessary for the purpose of de monstrating that a breach of a GATT provision
results in the nullification or impairment of benefits. 533 The United States further submits that the
clear breaches of Articles I and XIII of the GA TT 1994 obviated the need for the United States to
demonstrate affirmatively the trade effects caused by the European Communities' banana measures.534
D. The Panel's Findings under Article 3.8 of the DSU
463. The European Communities claims that the Pane l "confused the notion of 'nullification or
impairment' in Article 3.8 of the DSU with the 'interest' that a complaining party must have in order to
have 'standing' to commence dispute settlement proceedings". 535 By contrast, the "standard that needs
to be satisfied for a finding of 'nullification or impairment' under Article 3.8 is more difficult to satisfy
than the standard that needs to be satisfied for a finding of 'standing' to bring a complaint."536
464. We consider that the notion of "standing", as interpreted by the Appellate Body in the original
proceedings, is broader than the notion of "nullificati on or impairment". In ot her words, if there is
nullification or impairment, there will also be sta nding to bring a complaint. However, standing may
also exist in cases that result in no finding of nullification or impairment. In the original
EC – Bananas III proceedings, the Appellate Body found th at "a Member has broad discretion in
deciding whether to bring a case against another Me mber under the DSU", and that "a Member is
expected to be largely self-regulating in decidi ng whether any such action would be 'fruitful'". 537 The
Appellate Body further conclude d that, considering that the United States was a producer and
potential exporter of bananas, it was justif ied in bringing its claims under the GATT 1994. 538 Th e
Appellate Body then used this same argument to find that the United States had suffered nullification
or impairment of benefits.539
465. We do not believe that the Panel in the cu rrent proceedings confused the notions of
"nullification or impairment" and "standing". Indeed, the Panel addressed these issues separately,
even though the European Communitie s had presented these claims jointly. 540 In fact, in a section of

533United States' appellee's submission, paras. 96-98 (referring to GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund,
para. 5.19).
535European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 156 (US).
536European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 159 (US).
537Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 135.
538The panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings used the same argument to conclude
that the United States had "standing" to bring the case an d that it had suffered nullification or impairment of
benefits (that is, that the United States is a potential exporter of bananas to the European Communities and that
there could be effects on its internal market). However, the fact that nullification or impairment implies a higher
standard than "legal standing" does not mean that "standing" cannot be found based on such higher standard.
539Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 251.
540US Panel Report, paras. 7.17-7.22.

the US Panel Report entitled "Verification of the United States' standing to commence these
proceedings", the Panel found that the United St ates had standing to initiate the proceedings.
541 It
stated in the same section that it would turn to th e issue of nullification or impairment later in the
Report only "after having consider ed the substantive claims made, under Articles I and XIII of the
GATT 1994, by the United States against the preferences granted by the European Communities".542
466. Having found that the preferential ACP tariff quota was inconsistent with Articles I:1
and XIII, the Panel addressed the question of nullifi cation or impairment in a separate section at the
end of the US Panel Report. Relying on panel and Appellate Body find ings in the original
proceedings, the Panel found that, considering that "WTO rules are not concerned with actual trade
effects, but rather with competitive opportunities" 543, the United States, as a potential exporter of
bananas, had suffered nullification or impairment because of the Eu ropean Communities' inconsistent
measures. The Panel also referred to the statements made by the panel and th e Appellate Body in the
original proceedings that, even if the United Stat es did not have a potential export interest, "[t]he
internal market of the United St ates for bananas could be affected by the EC bananas regime by its
effects on world supplies and world prices of bananas."544
467. The European Communities claims that the Pane l erred in finding that the United States had
suffered nullification or impairment as a result of th e inconsistencies found in respect of the measures
at issue. The European Commun ities argues that, as a net importer of bananas, the United States was
"not actively involved in the business of exporting bana nas to any country in the world, let alone the
European Communities", and that, as a result, the c ontested measures "could not, and did not deprive
the United States of any competitive opportunity to export bananas towards the market of the
European Communities, nor did it change the Un ited States' 'competitive relationship' with any
banana exporting country in the world" consider ing that "the United States never had such a
'competitive relationship'".545 Moreover, the European Communities argues that the Panel "failed to
explain what could be the effect of the contested measures on the 'world supplies and prices' of
bananas and how this potential effect could resu lt in 'nullification or impairment' for the United
States."546

541US Panel Report, para. 7.35.
542US Panel Report, para. 7.37.
543US Panel Report, para. 8.7 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.50).
544Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 251 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III,
paras. 7.47-7.52).
545European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 165 (US).
546European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 161 (US).

468. We note that Article 3.8 of the DSU places the burden on the respondent of rebutting the
presumption that the inconsistent measure nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing to the complainant
under the WTO agreement concerned. Article 3.8 provides:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that
there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an
adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement,
and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.
469. In these proceedings, as in the original pro ceedings, the contested measure may not have
actual trade effects because, at present, there are no exports of bananas from the United States to the
European Communities. However, in order to determine whether the United States has suffered
nullification or impairment, "competitive opportuniti es" and, in particular, any potential export
interest of the United States must be taken into account. We do not consider that the European
Communities' argument—that, as a net importer of ba nanas, the United States could not credibly have
a "potential" interest in exporting bananas to th e European Communities—is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8. As noted by the panel and the Appellate
Body in the original proceedings, while present produ ction in the United States is minimal, it could at
any time start exporting the few bananas it produces to the European Communities. That this may be
unlikely does not disprove that the United States is a potential exporter of bananas to the European
Communities. In this respect, we recall the conclusion of the GATT panel in US – Superfund:
Article III:2, first sentence, ca nnot be interpreted to protect
expectations on export volumes; it protects expectations on the
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products. A
change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision must
consequently be regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment
of benefits accruing under the Gene ral Agreement. A demonstration
that a measure inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence, has no or
insignificant effects would therefore in the view of the Panel not be a
sufficient demonstration that the benefits accruing under that
provision had not been nullified or impaired even if such a rebuttal
were in principle permitted.
547
470. We do not consider it sufficient for the European Communities to allege that the Panel failed
to explain what could be the effect of the inconsis tent measure on the United States' internal market.
In fact, it is the European Communities that bear s the burden of rebutting the presumption that the

547Appellate Body Report in EC – Bananas III , para. 252 (referring to GATT Panel Report, US –
Superfund, para. 5.1.9.)

measure found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 nullifies or impairs benefits accruing directly
or indirectly to the United States under the covered agreements.
471. Furthermore, we recall that the DSB adopted recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings for the European Communities to br ing itself into compliance with the GATT 1994 and
the GATS. The measure at issue in these compliance proceedings was found to be in breach of the
same provisions of the covered agreements as in th e original proceedings. The Panel's mandate was
to examine whether the European Communities ha d complied with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in the original proceedings. We agree with the Panel that "[t]he arguments advanced by the
European Communities on the alleged lack of nullification or impairment have not rendered irrelevant
the considerations made by the panel and by th e Appellate Body in the course of the original
proceedings, regarding the actual and potential trade interests of the United States in the dispute".
548
472. In addition, the European Communities contends that the Panel erred in relying on the
findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in th e original proceedings "because the facts of the
present case are very different from the facts of 1997", when the finding of nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to the United States was based on the inconsistency of the European
Communities' bananas import regime in force at that time with the GATS and the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures.
549
473. We observe that, in the original proceedings, nu llification or impairment of benefits accruing
to the United States was found to result from the inconsistencies of the European Communities'
measures with certain provisions of the GATT 1994 and the GATS. As a supplier of wholesale trade
services in bananas, the United States' service supply to and in the European Communities was
directly affected by the inconsistent measures. We further note that, in the original proceedings, the
Appellate Body did not hold that the United St ates had suffered nullification or impairment
exclusively as a result of violations of the GATS. Indeed, the Appellate Body declined to reverse the
original panel's finding that the European Co mmunities' breaches of the GATT had nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to the complainants (including the United States). 550 In addition, we note
that the allocation procedures for the banana import licences at issue in the original dispute were
found to be measures affecting both trade in go ods and services, and inconsistent with both the
national and MFN treatment provisions of the GA TT 1994 and the GATS. Thus, the import licensing
procedures found to be GATT-inconsistent were also found to be discriminating against United States

548US Panel Report, para. 8.10.
549European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 167 (US).
550Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 254 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III ,
para. 7.398).

wholesale service suppliers. Therefore, the findings of nullification or impairment in the original
proceedings were not based exclusively on covere d agreements other than the GATT 1994. For these
reasons, the fact that these compliance proceedings involve only GATT 1994 claims, and are thus
narrower in scope than the original proceedings, do es not mean that the Panel should not have relied
on the findings of nullification and impairment in relation to the GATT 1994 in the original
proceedings.
474. Finally, the European Communities argues that the award in the arbitration under Article 22.6
of the DSU in 1999, involving the United States, confirmed that the only source of nullification of
impairment of benefits accruing to the United St ates in the original proceedings were the GATS-
inconsistent aspects of the measures and, in par ticular, the impact on the United States' share of
wholesale trade services sold in the European Communities and on the United States' share of
allocated banana import licences.551 We already considered above that the findings of nullification or
impairment by the Appellate Body in the original proceedings also relate d to the GATT 1994, as do
those of this compliance Panel. We do not, therefore, believe that the fact that the original
proceedings resulted in additional findings of violation of the GATS assists the European
Communities in distinguishing the current complian ce proceedings from the original proceedings and
in rebutting the presumption of nullification or impa irment with respect to the violations of the
GATT 1994 found by this Panel.
475. In making this argument, the European Commun ities refers to the Article 22.6 arbitration
involving the United States in the EC – Bananas III dispute. We agree with the arbitrators that the
question whether nullification or impairment exists w ithin the meaning of Article 3.8 of the DSU, and
the question of what level of suspension of concessi ons is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment under Article 22.6, are distinct.
552 Therefore, the question ho w the arbitrators calculated
the level of nullification or impairment under Article 22.6 arises in a different procedural context in
WTO dispute settlement. In any event, the arbi trators stated that there was "continuation of

551European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 168 (US).
552The Article 22.6 arbitrators found that:
[t]he presumption of nullification or impair ment in the case of an
infringement of a GATT provision as set forth by Article 3.8 of the DSU
cannot in and of itself be taken simultaneously as evidence proving a
particular level of nullification or impairment allegedly suffered by a
Member requesting authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22
of the DSU at a much later stage of the WTO dispute settlement system.
(Decision by the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 6.10)

nullification or impairment of US benefits under the revised EC re gime", including as a consequence
of an inconsistency with Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
553
476. For these reasons, we find that the European Communities has not succeeded in rebutting the
prima facie presumption that its breaches of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 had an adverse
impact on the United States' competitive opportuni ties as a potential exporter of bananas to the
European Communities and on the United States' inte rnal market for bananas. We recall that, under
Article 3.8 of the DSU, the burden of demonstrat ing that the United States has not suffered any
nullification or impairment of benefits rests on the European Communities.
477. Therefore, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.12 of the US Panel Report, that, "to
the extent that the [EC Bananas Import Regime] contain[ed] measures inconsistent with various
provisions of the GATT 1994, it ... nullified or im paired benefits accruing to the United States under
that Agreement".

553Decision by the Arbitrators, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 5.96-5.98.

Page ECU-161

XIII. Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU
(Ecuador)
478. In the appeal of the Panel Report, – Second R ecourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador
(WT/DS27/RW2/ECU), for the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) with respect to procedural issues:
(i) finds that the Panel did not act inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the DSU
by maintaining different timetables in the Article 21.5 proceedings between
the European Communities and Ecua dor and between the European
Communities and the United States; and
(ii) upholds the Panel's finding, albeit for differe nt reasons, in paragraph 7.136 of
the Ecuador Panel Report, that Ecuador was not barred by the Understanding
on Bananas from initiating this compliance proceeding;
(b) with respect to Article XIII of the GATT 1994:
(i) upholds the Panel's findings, in paragra phs 7.263 and 7.265 of the Ecuador
Panel Report, that, to the extent that the European Communities argues that it
has implemented a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel
was not prevented from conducting, under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the
assessment requested by Ecuador; and th at, therefore, the Panel did not need
to assess whether the European Comm unities has effectively implemented
any of the suggestions of the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador;
and
(ii) upholds
, albeit for different reasons, the Pa nel's finding, in paragraph 7.382
of the Ecuador Panel Report, that the EC Bananas Import Regime, in
particular, its duty-free tariff quota reserved for ACP countries, was
inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994;

Page ECU-162

(c) with respect to Article II of the GATT 1994:
(i) reverses
 the Panel's finding, in paragra phs 7.456 and 7.492 of the Ecuador
Panel Report, that the Doha Article I Waiver constituted a subsequent
agreement between the parties extending the tariff quota concession for
bananas listed in the European Co mmunities' Schedule of Concessions
beyond 31 December 2002, until the rebinding of the European Communities'
tariff on bananas;
(ii) reverses
 the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.436 of the Ecuador Panel Report,
that the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas was
intended to expire on 31 December 2002 on account of paragraph 9 of the
Bananas Framework Agreement; and
(iii) upholds
, albeit for different reasons, the Pa nel's findings, in paragraph 7.504
of the Ecuador Panel Report, that the tariff applied by the European
Communities to MFN imports of bananas, set at €176/mt, without
consideration of the tariff quota of 2. 2 million mt bound at an in-quota tariff
rate of 75€/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that provided for in
the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions, and thus inconsistent
with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994; and
(d) upholds
 the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.4 of the Ecuador Panel Report, that the
European Communities, by maintaining measures inconsistent with different
provisions of the GATT 1994, including Artic le XIII, has nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to Ecuador under that Agreement.
479. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the European Communities to bring
its measure, found in this Report and in the Ecuador Panel Report, as modified by this Report, to be
inconsistent with the GATT 1994, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.

Page ECU-163

Signed in the original in Geneva this 14th day of November 2008 by:

 Luiz Olavo Baptista
 Presiding Member

 _________________________ _________________________
 Shotaro Oshima David Unterhalter
 Member Member

Page USA-161

XIII. Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA
(United States)
478. In the appeal of the Panel Report, – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States
(WT/DS27/RW/USA), for the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) with respect to procedural issues:
(i) finds that the Panel did not act inconsiste ntly with Article 9.3 of the DSU by
maintaining different timetables in the Article 21.5 proceedings between the
European Communities and Ecuador and between the European
Communities and the United States;
(ii) upholds
 the Panel's finding, albeit for differe nt reasons, in paragraph 7.165 of
the US Panel Report, that the United States was not barred by the
Understanding on Bananas from initiating this compliance proceeding;
(iii) upholds
, albeit for different reasons, the Pa nel's finding, in paragraph 7.531
of the US Panel Report, that the EC Bananas Import Regime constituted a
"measure taken to comply" within th e meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU
and was therefore properly before the Panel;
(iv) finds that the Panel did not err in making findings with respect to a measure
that had ceased to exist subsequent to the establishment of the Panel, but
before the Panel issued its Report; and
(v) finds that the deficiencies in the European Communities' Notice of Appeal do
not lead to dismissal of the European Communities' appeal;
(b) with respect to Article XIII of the GATT 1994:
upholds, albeit for different reasons, the Pa nel's finding, in paragraph 7.720
of the US Panel Report, that the EC Bananas Import Regime, in particular, its
duty-free tariff quota reserved for ACP countries, was inconsistent with
Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994; and

Page USA-162

(c) upholds
 the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.12 of the US Panel Report, that to the
extent that the EC Bananas Import Regime contained measures inconsistent with
various provisions of the GATT 1994, it nullifie d or impaired benefits accruing to the
United States under that Agreement.
479. As the measure at issue in this dispute is no longer in existence, we do not make any
recommendation to the DSB pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.

Signed in the original in Geneva this 14th day of November 2008 by:

 Luiz Olavo Baptista
 Presiding Member

 _________________________ _________________________
 Shotaro Oshima David Unterhalter
 Member Member

ANNEX I

29 August 2008
 (08-4061)
 Original: English

Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador

Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 28 August 2008, from the Delegation of the European
Commission, is being circulated to Members.

Procedures for Appellate Review, the European Communities submits its Notice of Appeal on
certain issues of law and certain legal interpre tations developed by the Panel in the Report on
European Communities' regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador.
1

2. The European Communities seeks review by th e Appellate Body of the following issues of
law and legal interpretations in the Report of the Panel:

(a) The Panel's erroneous interpretation and application of Article 9.3 of the DSU;

(b) the Panel's erroneous findings concerning th e legal effects of the Understanding on
Bananas signed by Ecuador and the European Communities in 2001;

(c) the Panel's erroneous interpretation and appli cation of the principle of good faith in
WTO law;

(d) the Panel's legal errors concerning the le gal effects of the Doha waiver on the
European Communities' Schedule of Concessions;

(e) the Panel's erroneous interpretation of Article XIII of the GATT and erroneous
finding of a violation of that provision;

1WT/DS27/RW2/ECU circulated on 7 April 2008.

(f) the Panel's legal errors in considering that a limitation imposed on the quantity of
goods that can benefit from a preferential ta riff lawfully granted to certain Members
nullifies or impairs benefits accruing unde r the GATT to all other Members and the
Panel's erroneous finding that Ecuador suffe red nullification or impairment arising
from any inconsistency of the European Co mmunities' measures with Article XIII of
the GATT;

(g) the Panel's legal errors relating to the lega l effects of suggestions made by panels
pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU and the Panel's failure to examine the European
Communities' measures in the light of these suggestions.

ANNEX II

29 August 2008
 (08-4060)
 Original: English

Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States

Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 28 August 2008, from the Delegation of the European
Commission, is being circulated to Members.

Procedures for Appellate Review, the European Communities submits its Notice of Appeal on
certain issues of law and certain legal interpre tations developed by the Panel in the Report on
European Communities' regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States of America.
1

2. The European Communities seeks review by th e Appellate Body of the following issues of
law and legal interpretations in the Report of the Panel:

(a) The Panel's erroneous interpretation and application of Article 9.3 of the DSU;

(b) the Panel's erroneous finding that the ba nana import regime that the European
Communities had in place between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007 was a
"measure taken to comply" with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the
DSB in 1997;

(c) the Panel's erroneous findings concerning th e legal effects of the Understanding on
Bananas signed by the United States and the European Communities in 2001;

(d) the Panel's erroneous interpretation and appli cation of the principle of good faith in
WTO law;

1WT/DS27/RW/USA circulated on 19 May 2008.

(e) the Panel's erroneous interpretation of Ar ticle XIII of the GATT and its erroneous
finding of a violation of that provision;

(f) the Panel's erroneous finding that the United States suffered "nullification or
impairment" as a result of the banana impor t regime that the European Communities
had in place between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007;

(g) the Panel's failure to take into consideration the repeal of the contested measure.

ANNEX III

15 September 2008
 (08-4258)
 Original: English

Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador

Notification of an Other Appeal by Ecuador
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 9 Septembe r 2008, from the Delegation of Ecuador, is being
circulated to Members.

 Pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review ,
Ecuador submits this Notice of Other Appeal on cer tain issues of law covered and certain legal
interpretations developed by the Panel in the Report on: European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale an Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Ecuador.
1

 On 28 August 2008, the European Communities (EC) filed its Notice of Appeal pursuant to
Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review . The EC requested that the Appellate
Body review certain findings and conclusions of the Panel.

 If, as a result of its review of any of the matters appealed by the EC, the Appellate Body
considers that the Panel's conclusion that the EC's applied duty on bananas is inconsistent with the
first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 is not justified on the bases found by the Panel,
Ecuador appeals the following issues of law and legal interpretation in the Report of the Panel:

1Panel Report,
– Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, circulated on 7 April 2008
(the "Panel Report").

The Panel's erroneous findings (e.g. in paragraphs 7.427, 7. 436, 7.482, 7.492) concerning the
effect of the expiration clause (paragraph 9) of the Banana Framework Agreement on the
continued binding effect under Article II of the GATT 1994 of the EC's tariff quota at
75 euro/mt.

ANNEX IV

ORGANISATION MONDIALE ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL
 DU COMMERCE DEL COMERCIO

APPELLATE BODY

Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador
AB-2008-8

Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States
AB-2008-9

Procedural Ruling

1. On 29 August 2008, the Appellate Body Di vision hearing the above appeals received two
joint requests from Ecuador and the European Co mmunities, and from the United States and the
European Communities, to allow observation by th e public of the oral hearing in the appellate
proceedings.1 The participants argued that nothing in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") or the Working Procedures for Appellate Review
(the "Working Procedures") precludes the Appellate Body from authorizing public observation of the
oral hearing.

2. On 1 September 2008, we invited the third pa rticipants to comment in writing on the requests
of the participants. In particular, we asked th e third participants to provide their views on the
permissibility of opening the hearing under the DSU and the Working Procedures , and, if they so
wished, on the specific logistical arrangements pr oposed in the requests. We received comments on
5 September from Colombia, on 9 September from Panama and Nicaragua, and on 10 September from
Brazil, Jamaica, and Japan. Colombia, Jamaica, Japan, Nicaragua, and Panama expressed their
support for the request of the participants. Braz il expressed the view that the provision of the DSU
expressly disallow public hearings at the appellate stage. According to Brazil, opening the oral
hearing in these proceedings to public observati on would extrapolate the flexibility granted to
Members in Article 18.2 of the DSU and run counte r to the obligation of confidentiality imposed by
Article 17.10 of the DSU.

3. We consider it necessary that a ruling is ma de by us on the requests of the participants.
Accordingly, we make the following ruling.

4. Similar requests were made in the United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC – Hormones Dispute and Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones
Dispute appeals, in which the Appellate Body set out its reasoning for granting the requests. The
salient reasoning reflected in that case is as follows:

1The participants expressed a preference for simu ltaneous, closed-circuit television broadcast to
another room, with the broadcast being interrupted when any third participant that does not wish to make its
statement public, takes the floor.

The third participants that object to the requ est to allow public observation argue that the
confidentiality requirement in Article 17.10 is absolute and permits of no derogation. We
disagree with this interpretation because Article 17. 10 must be read in context, particularly in
relation to Article 18.2 of the DSU. The second sentence of Article 18.2 expressly provides
that "[n]othing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing
statements of its own positions to the public". Thus, under Article 18.2, the parties may
decide to forego confidentiality protection in resp ect of their statements of position. With the
exception of India, the participants and third par ticipants agreed that th e term "statements of
its own positions" in Article 18. 2 extends beyond the written subm issions referred to in the
first sentence of Article 18.2, and includes oral statements and responses to questions posed
by the Appellate Body at the oral hearing. The third sentence of Article 18.2 states that
"Members shall treat as confidential informa tion submitted by another Member to the panel
or the Appellate Body which that Member h as designated as confidential." This provision
would be redundant if Article 17.10 were interp reted to require absolute confidentiality in
respect of all elements of appellate proceedings. There would be no need to require, pursuant
to Article 18.2, that a Member designate cer tain information as confidential. The last
sentence of Article 18.2 ensures that even such designation by a Member does not put an end
to the right of another Member to make di sclosure to the public. Upon request, a Member
must provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written
submissions that it designated as confidential, which can then be disclosed to the public.
Thus, Article 18.2 provides contextual support fo r the view that the confidentiality rule in
Article 17.10 is not absolute. Otherwise, no disclosure of written submissions or other
statements would be permitted during any stage of the proceedings.

In practice, the confidentiality requirement in Article 17.10 has its limits. Notices of Appeal
and Appellate Body reports are disclosed to the public. Appellate Body reports contain
summaries of the participants' and third par ticipants' written and oral submissions and
frequently quote directly from them. Public disclosure of Appellate Body reports is an
inherent and necessary feature of our rules-b ased system of adjudication. Consequently,
under the DSU, confidentiality is relative and time-bound.

In our view, the confidentiality requirement in Article 17.10 is more properly understood as
operating in a relational manner.[*] There ar e different sets of relationships that are
implicated in appellate proceedings. Among th em are the following relationships. First, a
relationship between the partic ipants and the Appellate Body. Secondly, a relationship
between the third participants and the Appellate Body. The requirement that the proceedings
of the Appellate Body are confidential affords pr otection to these separate relationships and is
intended to safeguard the interests of the pa rticipants and third participants and the
adjudicative function of the Appellate Body, so as to foster the system of dispute settlement
under conditions of fairness, impartiality, i ndependence and integrity. In this case, the
participants have jointly requested authoriza tion to forego confidentiality protection for their
communications with the Appellate Body at the or al hearing. The request of the participants
does not extend to any communications, nor touches upon the relationship, between the third
participants and the Appellate Body. The right to confidentiality of third participants vis-à-vis
the Appellate Body is not implicated by the jo int request. The question is thus whether the
request of the participants to forego confiden tiality protection satisfies the requirements of
fairness and integrity that are the essential attr ibutes of the appellate process and define the
relationship between the Appellate Body and th e participants. If the request meets these
standards, then the Appellate Body would incline towards authorizing such a joint request.

[*]This relational view of rights and obligations of confidentiality is consistent with the approach
followed in domestic jurisdictions with respect to similar issues, such as privilege.

We note that the DSU does not specifically provide for an oral hearing at the appellate stage.
The oral hearing was instituted by the Appellate Body in its Working Procedures, which were
drawn up pursuant to Article 17.9 of the DSU. The conduct and organization of the oral
hearing falls within the authority of the Appellate Body ( compétence de la compétence )
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Working Procedures. Thus, the Appellate Body has the power to
exercise control over the conduct of the oral hearing, including authorizing the lifting of
confidentiality at the joint request of the partic ipants as long as this does not adversely affect
the rights and interests of the third participants or the integrity of the appellate process. As
we observed earlier, Article 17.10 also applies to the relationship between third participants
and the Appellate Body. Nevert heless, in our view, the thir d participants cannot invoke
Article 17.10, as it applies to their relationshi p with the Appellate Body, so as to bar the
lifting of confidentiality protection in the re lationship between the participants and the
Appellate Body. Likewise, authorizing the pa rticipants' request to forego confidentiality,
does not affect the rights of third participan ts to preserve the confidentiality of their
communications with the Appellate Body.

Some of the third participants argued that the Appellate Body is itself constrained by
Article 17.10 in its power to authorize the lifting of confidentiality. We agree that the powers
of the Appellate Body are themselves circumscrib ed in that certain aspects of confidentiality
are incapable of derogation—even by the A ppellate Body—where de rogation may undermine
the exercise and integrity of the Appellate Body 's adjudicative function. This includes the
situation contemplated in the second sentence of Article 17.10, which provides that "[t]he
reports of the Appellate Body shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the
dispute and in the light of the information provi ded and the statements made." As noted by
the participants, the confidentiality of the deliber ations is necessary to protect the integrity,
impartiality, and independence of the appellate process. In our view, such concerns do not
arise in a situation where, following a joint re quest of the participants, the Appellate Body
authorizes the lifting of the confidentiality of the participants' statements at the oral hearing.

The Appellate Body has fostered the active par ticipation of third parties in the appellate
process in drawing up the Working Procedures and in appeal practice. Article 17.4 provides
that third participants "may make written submis sions to, and be given an opportunity to be
heard by, the Appellate Body." In its Working Procedures, the Appellate Body has given full
effect to this right by providing for participation of third participants during the entirety of the
oral hearing, while third parties meet with panels only in a separate session at the first
substantive meeting. Third pa rticipants, however, are not the main parties to a dispute.
Rather, they have a systemic interest in the interpretation of the provisions of the covered
agreements that may be at issue in an appeal . Although their views on the questions of legal
interpretation that come before the Appellate Body are always valuable and thoroughly
considered, these issues of legal interpretation ar e not inherently confidential. Nor is it a
matter for the third participants to determin e how the protection of confidentiality in the
relationship between the participants and the Appe llate Body is best dealt with. In order to
sustain their objections to public observation of the oral hearing, third participants would have
to identify a specific interest in their relati onship with the Appellate Body that would be
adversely affected if we were to authorize the participants' request—in this case, we can
discern no such interests.

5. We are not persuaded that there is an y basis to depart from this reasoning.

6. The request for public observation of the oral hearing in these disputes has been made jointly
by the three participants, Ecuador, the European Communities, and the United States. As we
explained in our reasoning in
United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC –
Hormones Dispute and Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones

Dispute, the Appellate Body has the power to authori ze a joint request by the participants to lift
confidentiality, provided that this does not affect the confidentiality of the relationship between the
third participants and the Appellate Body, or impair the integrity of the appellate process. There is no
reason in this case not to authorize the requests made to us. The participants have suggested
alternative modalities that allow for public observati on of the oral hearing, while safeguarding the
confidentiality protection enjoyed by the third part icipants. The modalities include simultaneous or
delayed closed-circuit television broadcasting in a room separate from the room used for the oral
hearing. Finally, we do not see the public observation of the oral hearing, using the means described
above, as having an adverse impact on the integrity of the adjudicative functions performed by the
Appellate Body.

7. For these reasons, the Appellate Body Divisi on hearing this appeal authorizes the public
observation of the oral hearing in these proceedi ngs on the terms set out below. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, we adopt the following additional procedures for
the purposes of this appeal:

(a) The oral hearing will be open to public observation by means of simultaneous closed-
circuit television. The closed-circuit tele vision signal will be shown in a separate
room to which duly registered delegates of WTO Members and members of the
general public will have access.

(b) Oral statements and responses to questions by third participants wishing to maintain
the confidentiality of their submissions will not be subject to public observation.

(c) Any third participant that has not already done so may request that its oral statements
and responses to questions remain conf idential and not be subject to public
observation. Such requests must be received by the Appellate Body Secretariat
no later than 5:00 p.m. Geneva time on Friday, 26 September 2008

(d) An appropriate number of seats will be reserved for delegates of WTO Members in
the room where the closed-circuit broadcast will be shown.

(e) Notice of the oral hearing will be provide d to the general public through the WTO
website. WTO delegates and members of th e general public wishing to observe the
oral hearing will be required to register in advance with the WTO Secretariat.

(f) Should practical considerations not allow simultaneous broadcast of the oral hearing,
deferred showing of the video recording will be used in the alternative.

Geneva, 18 September 2008

ANNEX V

WT/MIN(01)/15
14 November 2001
 (01-5786)
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
Fourth Session
Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – THE ACP-EC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Decision of 14 November 2001

 The Ministerial Conference,

 Having regard to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article IX of the Marrak ech Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organisation (the "WTO Agreemen t"), the Guiding Principles to be followed in
considering applications for waivers adopted on 1 November 1956 (BISD 5S/25), the Understanding
in Respect to Waivers of Obligations under th e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
paragraph 3 of Article IX of the WTO Ag reement, and Decision-Making Procedures under
Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed by the General Council (WT/L/93);

 Taking note of the request of the European Communiti es (EC) and of the Governments of the
ACP States which are also WTO members (hereinaft er also the "Parties to the Agreement") for a
waiver from the obligations of the European Co mmunities under paragraph 1 of Article I of the
General Agreement with respect to the granting of preferential tariff treatment for products originating
in ACP States as required by Article 36.3, Anne x V and its Protocols of the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement (hereinafter also referred to as "the Agreement")
1;

 Considering that, in the field of trade, the provisions of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
requires preferential tariff treatment by the EC of exports of products originating in the ACP States;

 Considering that the Agreement is aimed at impr oving the standard of living and economic
development of the ACP States, including the least developed among them;

 Considering also that the preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States
as required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protoc ols of the Agreement is designed to promote the
expansion of trade and economic development of beneficiaries in a manner consistent with the
objectives of the WTO and with the trade, financia l and development needs of the beneficiaries and
not to raise undue barriers or to create undue difficulties for the trade of other members;

1As contained in documents G/C/W/187, G/C/W/204, G/C/W/254 and G/C/W/269.

 Considering that the Agreement establishes a preparatory period extending until 31 December
2007, by the end of which new trading arrangements shall be concluded between the Parties to the
Agreement;

 Considering that the trade provisions of the Agreement have been applied since 1 March 2000
on the basis of transitional measures adopted by the ACP-EC joint institutions;

 Noting the assurances given by the Parties to the Agreement that they will, upon request,
promptly enter into consultations with any interest ed member with respect to any difficulty or matter
that may arise as a result of the implementation of the preferential tariff treatment for products
originating in ACP States as required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the Agreement;

 Noting that the tariff applied to bananas importe d in the "A" and "B" quotas shall not exceed
75 €/tonne until the entry into force of the new EC tariff-only regime.

 Noting that the implementation of the preferential tariff treatment for bananas may be affected
as a result of GATT Article XXVIII negotiations;

 Noting the assurances from the Parties to the Agre ement that any re-binding of the EC tariff
on bananas under the relevant GATT Article XXVIII pr ocedures should result in at least maintaining
total market access for MFN banana suppliers a nd their willingness to accept a multilateral control on
the implementation of this commitment.

 Considering that, in light of the foregoing, the ex ceptional circumstances justifying a waiver
from paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement exist;

 Decides as follows:

1. Subject to the terms and cond itions set out hereunder, Article I, paragraph 1 of the General
Agreement shall be waived, until 31 December 2007, to the extent necessary to permit the
European Communities to provide preferential tariff treatment for products originating in
ACP States as required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement,
2 without being required to extend the same preferential treatment to like products
of any other member.

2. The Parties to the Agreement sha ll promptly notify the General Council of any changes in the
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant
provisions of the Agreement covered by this waiver.

3. The Parties to the Agreement will, upon request , promptly enter into consultations with any
interested member with respect to any difficu lty or matter that may arise as a result of the
implementation of the preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States as
required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Pr otocols of the Agreement; where a member
considers that any benefit accruing to it under the General Agreement may be or is being
impaired unduly as a result of such implementa tion, such consultations shall examine the
possibility of action for a satisfactory adjustment of the matter.

2Any reference to the Partnership Agreement in this Decision shall also include the period during
which the trade provisions of this Agreement are applie d on the basis of transitional measures adopted by the
ACP-EC joint institutions.

3bis With respect to bananas, the additional provisions in the Annex shall apply.

4. Any member which considers that the preferential tariff treatment for products originating in
ACP States as required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the Agreement is being
applied inconsistently with this waiver or that any benefit accruing to it under the General
Agreement may be or is being impaired undul y as a result of the implementation of the
preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by Article 36.3,
Annex V and its Protocols of the Agreemen t and that consultations have proved
unsatisfactory, may bring the ma tter before the General Council , which will examine it
promptly and will formulate any recommendations that they judge appropriate.

5. The Parties to the Agreement will submit to the General Council an annual report on the
implementation of the preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States as
required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the Agreement.

6. This waiver shall not preclude the right of affected members to have recourse to
Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement.

ANNEX

 The waiver would apply for ACP produc ts under the Cotonou Agreement until
31 December 2007. In the case of bananas, th e waiver will also apply until 31 December 2007,
subject to the following, which is without prejudice to rights and obligations under Article XXVIII.

- The parties to the Cotonou Agreement will in itiate consultations with Members exporting to
the EU on a MFN basis (interested parties) early enough to finalize the process of
consultations under the procedures hereby establishe d at least three months before the entry
into force of the new EC tariff only regime.

- No later than 10 days after the conclusion of Article XXVIII negotiations, interested parties
will be informed of the EC intentions concerni ng the rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas.
In the course of such consultations, the EC will provide information on the methodology used
for such rebinding. In this regard, all EC WTO market-access commitments relating to
bananas should be taken into account.

- Within 60 days of such an announcement, any such interested party may request arbitration.

- The arbitrator shall be appointed within 10 days, following the request subject to agreement
between the two parties, failing which the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Director-
General of the WTO, following consultations wi th the parties, within 30 days of the
arbitration request. The mandate of the arbitrator shall be to determine, within 90 days of his
appointment, whether the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas would result in at
least maintaining total market access for MF N banana suppliers, ta king into account the
above-mentioned EC commitments.

- If the arbitrator determines that the rebinding would not result in at least maintaining total
market access for MFN suppliers, the EC shall rectify the matter. Within 10 days of the
notification of the arbitration award to th e General Council, the EC will enter into
consultations with those interested parties that requested the arbitration. In the absence of a
mutually satisfactory solution, the same arbitrat or will be asked to determine, within 30 days
of the new arbitration request, whether the EC has rectified the matter. The second arbitration
award will be notified to the General Council. If the EC has failed to rectify the matter, this
waiver shall cease to apply to bananas upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime. The
Article XXVIII negotiations and the arbitrati on procedures shall be concluded before the
entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1 January 2006.

ANNEX VI

SCHEDULE LXXX – EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

PART I MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TARIFF
SECTION I – Agricultural Products

SECTION I - A Tariffs

(Reproduced excerpt)

Tariff item
number
Description of products Base rate
of duty
Bound rate
of duty
Implemen-
tation
period
from/to
Special
safeguard
Initial
negotiating
right
Other
duties and
charges
Comments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
080300 Bananas, including
plantains, fresh or dried:

0803001 -Fresh:
08030011 --Plantains 20.0 % 16.0 %
08030012 --Other 850 ECU/T 680 ECU/T SSG
08030090 -Dried 20.0 % 16.0 %

SECTION I - B Tariff Quotas

(Reproduced excerpt)

 Current Access Quotas
Description of product Tariff item
number(s)
Initial quota
quantity and
in-quota
tariff rate
Final quota
quantity and
in-quota
tariff rate
Implemen-
tation period
from/to
Initial
negotiating
right
Other terms and
conditions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0803 00 12 2.200.000 t 2.200.000 t Fresh bananas, other than
plantains
 75 ECU/t 75 ECU/t
As indicated in the
Annex.

ANNEX VII

ANNEX

SCHEDULE LXXX - EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON BANANAS

1. The global basic tariff quota is fixed at 2.100.000 t for 1994 and at 2.200.000 t for 1995 and
the following years, subject to any increase resulting from the enlargement of the Community.

2. This quota is divided up into specific quotas allocated to the following countries:

 Country
 Percentage of the global quota

 Costa Rica 23.4
 Colombia 21.0
 Nicaragua 3.0
 Venezuela 2.0

 Dominican Republic
 and other ACP concerning non
 traditional quantities 90.000 t.

 Others 46.32% (1994) - 46.51% (1995)

3. In case of force majeure, a country listed in paragraph 2 with a country quota, may, on the
basis of an agreement notified in advance to the Commission, fulfill all or part of its quota
with bananas originating in anot her country listed in paragraph 2. In this case, the deliveries
from the two countries concerned shall be adjusted accordingly in the following year.

4. If a banana exporting country with a country quota informs the Community that it will be
unable to deliver the quantity allocated to it, the short-fall shall be reallocated by the
Community in accordance with the same percentage shares indicated under point 2 (including
"others"). However, countries with country quotas may jointly request and the Commission
shall agree to a different allocation amongst those countries.

5. The Community shall allocate any autonomous increase in the Community quota according to
the same percentage shares as under point 2 (i ncluding "others"). However, countries with
country quotas may jointly request and the Commission shall agree to a different allocation
amongst those countries.

6. Management of the quotas, including any increase under point 5, will remain as laid down in
regulation 404/93. However, the supplying count ries with country quotas may deliver special
export certificates for up to 70% of their quota, whic h, in turn, constitute a prerequisite for the
issuance, by the Community, of certificates for the importation of bananas from said countries
by "Category A" and "Category C" operators.

 The authorization to deliver the special export certificates shall be granted by the Commission
in order to make it possible to improve regular and stable trade relations between producers
and importers and on the condition that the e xport certificates will be issued without any
discrimination among operators.

7. The in-quota tariff rate shall be 75 Ecus/tonne.

8. The agreed system will be operational by 1 October 1994 at the latest, without prejudice to
any provisional or transitional measures to be examined for the year 1994.

9. This agreement shall apply until 31 Decem ber 2002. Full consultations with the Latin
American suppliers that are GATT Members should start no later than in year 2001.

 The functioning of the agreement will be reviewed before the end of the third year, with full
consultation of GATT Member Latin American suppliers.

10. This agreement will be incorporated in to the Community's Uruguay Round Schedule.

11. This agreement represents a settlement of the dispute between Colombia, Costa Rica,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the Community on the Community's banana regime. The parties to
this agreement will not pursue the adoption of the GATT panel report on this issue.