ARGENTINA – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON POULTRY FROM BRAZIL
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 22 April 2003
Document codes: WT/DS241/R
Complainant: Brazil
Respondent: Argentina
Third parties: Canada, Chile, EU, Guatemala, Paraguay, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

ARGENTINA – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES
ON POULTRY FROM BRAZIL
Report of the Panel
The report of the Panel on is being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated as an
unrestricted document from 22 April 2003 pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/160/Rev.1). Members are reminded that in accordance with
the DSU only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report. An appeal shall be limited to issues of
law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. There shall be no
ex parte communications with the Panel or Appellate Body concerning matters under consideration by
the Panel or Appellate Body.
Note by the Secretariat : This Panel Report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within
60 days after the date of its circulation unless a party to the dispute decides to appeal or the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the report. If the Panel Report is appealed to the Appellate Body, it shall not be
considered for adoption by the DSB until after the completion of the appeal. Information on the current status
of the Panel Report is available from the WTO Secretariat.

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 7 November 2001, Brazil requested consultations with Argentina pursuant to Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the " DSU"),
Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"), Article 17 of
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(the " AD Agreement "), including Article 17.4 thereof, and Article 19 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 (the "Agreement on Customs Valuation") concerning the
Argentine anti-dumping measures imposed in respect of imports of poultry from Brazil. 1 Argentina
and Brazil held consultations on 10 December 2001, but failed to settle the dispute.
1.2 On 19 November 2001, the European Communities requested, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the
DSU, to be joined in the consultations.2
1.3 On 25 February 2002, Brazil requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article XXII
of the GATT 1994, Article 17 of the AD Agreement and Article 6 of the DSU.3
1.4 At its meeting on 17 April 2002, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") established this
Panel in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU to examine the matter referred to the DSB by Brazil in
document WT/DS241/3. At that meeting, the parties to the dispute also agreed that the Panel should
have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by Brazil in document WT/DS241/3, the matter referred by Brazil to the DSB in that
document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."
1.5 On 17 June 2002, Brazil requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the
Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. This paragraph provides:
"If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the
establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council
or Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by appointing the
panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with
any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or
covered agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties
to the dispute. The Chairman of the DSB shall inform the Members of the
composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the
Chairman receives such a request".
1.6 On 27 June 2002, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
4
Chairman: Mr. Harsha V. Singh
Members: Ms. Enie Neri de Ross
Mr. Michael Mulgrew

1 WT/DS241/1.
2 WT/DS241/2.
3 WT/DS241/3.
4 WT/DS241/4.

1.7 Canada, Chile, the European Communities, Guatemala, Paraguay and the United States
reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.8 The Panel met with the parties on 25-26 September 2002 and 26 November 2002. It met with
the third parties on 26 September 2002.
1.9 The Panel submitted its interim report to the parties on 25 February 2003. The Panel
submitted its final report to the parties on 8 April 2003.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 This dispute concerns the imposition by Argentina of anti-dumping measures on imports of
poultry from Brazil.
2.2 On 2 September 1997, the Centro de Empresas Procesadoras Avícolas (the “CEPA”) filed an
application for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation with the Under-Secretariat for Foreign
Trade (the “SSCE”), which subsequently became the Under-Secretariat for Industry, Trade and
Mining (the "SSICM"). CEPA alleged that imports of poultry from Brazil into Argentina were taking
place at dumped prices and that these imports represented a threat of material injury to the domestic
industry.5 On 23 September 1997, the National Foreign Trade Commission (the "CNCE") issued an
opinion regarding the representativeness of the domestic industry and, on 21 November 1997, the
SSCE accepted the application presented by CEPA.
2.3 On 7 January 1998, the Department of Unfair Trading Practices and Safeguards (the
"APCDS"), which subsequently became the Directorate of Unfair Competition (the "DCD"),
concluded in its Report on the Feasibility of Initiating an Investigation (the "Report of
7 January 1998") that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiating an investigation. 6
On that same date, the CNCE determined in Reco rd No. 405 that there was not sufficient evidence of
injury or threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation. 7 On 17 February 1998, CEPA
presented new and updated information to the Secretariat for Industry, Trade and Mining (the
“SICyM”).8 On 18 June 1998, the General Directorate for Legal Affairs (the "DGAJ") of the Ministry
of the Economy and Public Works and Services (the "MEyOSP"), at the request of the then Under-
Secretariat for Foreign Trade, determined that "… in view of the fact that the information submitted
by … CEPA … was not evaluated by the National Foreign Trade Commission when ruling on injury
to the domestic industry in Record No. 405/98, this Directorate-General considers that before
proceeding any further, the said National Commission should be asked to intervene once again in
order to rule on the items submitted …". 9 Following an examination of the new evidence submitted
by CEPA, the CNCE determined in Record No. 464 of 22 September 1998 that there was sufficient
evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation.10
2.4 On 20 January 1999, the Secretary for Industry, Trade and Mining (the "Secretary") decided
to initiate the anti-dumping investigation concerning poultry from Brazil. 11 A Notice of Initiation of
the anti-dumping investigation was published in the Official Bulletin on 25 January 1999.
2.5 The CNCE and the DCD sent, on 10 and 16 February 1999, respectively, letters to five
Brazilian exporters (i.e., Sadia S.A. (“Sadia”), Av ipal S.A. Avicultura e Agropecuaria (“Avipal”),

5 Exhibit BRA-1.
6 Exhibit BRA-2.
7 Exhibit BRA-3.
8 Exhibit BRA-4.
9 Exhibit BRA-5.
10 Exhibit BRA-6.
11 Exhibit BRA-7.

Frigorífico Nicolini Ltda. (“Nicolini”), Seara Alimentos S.A. (“Seara”), and Frangosul S.A. Agro
Avícola Industrial (“Frangosul”)) inter alia notifying them of the initiation of the investigation.12
2.6 On 28 June 1999, the CNCE issued its prelim inary affirmative injury determination. 13 On
6 August 1999, the DCD issued its preliminary affirmative dumping determination. 14 On
20 August 1999, the SSCE issued its preliminary affirmative determination on causal link between the
allegedly dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. 15 No provisional measures were
imposed.
2.7 On 15 September 1999, various Brazilian exporters, namely Cooperativa Central de
Laticínios do Paraná (“CCLP”), Cooperativa Central Oeste Catarinense Ltda. (“Catarinense”),
Chapecó Cia. Industrial (“Chapecó”), Cia. Minuano de Alimentos (“Minuano”), Perdigão
Agroindustrial (“Perdigão”), and Comaves Industria e Comércio de Alimentos Ltda. (“Comaves”),
were contacted by the DCD, and were provided with the same questionnaire sent by the DCD to other
exporters on 16 February 1999.16
2.8 On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued its final affirmative injury determination. 17 T h e
DCD issued its final affirmative dumping determination on 23 June 2000. 18 The dumping margins
found for Sadia, Avipal and all other exporters were 14.91 per cent, 15.48 per cent and 8.19 per cent,
respectively. No dumping margin was found with regard to Nicolini and Seara. On 17 July 2000, the
SSICM issued its final affirmative determination of causal link between the dumped imports and the
injury to the domestic industry.
19
2.9 Based upon the final dumping, injury and causal link determinations, the Ministry of
Economics (the "ME"), formerly the MEyOSP, issued Resolution No. 574 of 21 July 2000, imposing
definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of poultry from Brazil for a period of three years. 20
Such measures took the form of specific anti-dumping duties to be collected as the absolute difference
between the f.o.b. price invoiced in any one shipment and a designated “minimum export price” also
fixed in f.o.b. terms, to be applied whenever the former price was lower than the latter. A “minimum
export price” of US$0.92 per kilogram was established for Sadia, and US$0.98 per kilogram for
Avipal and all other exporters. No measures we re imposed on the Brazilian exporters Nicolini and
Seara because they were found not to be exporting poultry at dumped prices. Resolution No. 574 was
published in the Official Bulletin of 24 July 2000.
2.10 On 30 August 2000, in conformity with Articl e 2 of the MERCOSUR Protocol of Brasilia,
Brazil requested the initiation of direct negotiations with Argentina on Resolution No. 574. On
24 January 2001, Brazil gave notice of its intention to initiate the arbitral proceedings provided for in
Article 7 of the Protocol of Brasilia. A MERCO SUR Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal made its award on
21 May 2001. In accordance with Article 22 of the Protocol of Brasilia, following the award, the
Arbitral Tribunal issued a clarification thereof on 18 June 2001.

12 Exhibits BRA-8 and BRA-9.
13 Exhibit BRA-10.
14 Exhibit BRA-11.
15 Exhibit BRA-12.
16 Exhibit BRA-13.
17 Exhibit BRA-14.
18 Exhibit BRA-15.
19 Exhibit BRA-16.
20 Exhibit BRA-17.

III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BRAZIL
3.1 In its first written submission, Brazil requested that the Panel:
(a) find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement as per the claims
below:
• Petitioner’s application presented a calculation to adjust normal value in view of
alleged physical characteristic differences between poultry sold to Argentina and
poultry sold in Brazil. The application did not offer relevant evidence of such
differences contrary to the requirement set out in Article 5.2 (Claim 1). By
accepting petitioner’s adjustment calculation, Argentina failed to examine the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence presented in the application pursuant to
Article 5.3 (Claim 2), and to reject the application as provided in Article 5.8
(Claim 3);
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 (Claim 4) by establishing export
prices based only on export transactions with prices below normal value;
• Petitioner’s application presented export price and normal value data for different
periods. Specifically, the application presented normal value data for only one
day in 1997 (30 June 1997), which cannot be considered relevant evidence to
establish normal value pursuant to Article 5.2 (Claim 5). By calculating a
dumping margin by making a comparison between export price and normal value
in respect of sales that were not made at as nearly as possible the same time and
by establishing normal value for only one day in 1997, Argentina failed to
examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application as
required by Article 5.3 (Claim 6), and to reject the application pursuant to
Article 5.8 (Claim 7);
• By comparing different periods of data collected for dumping and injury,
Argentina incorrectly examined the ev idence provided in the application,
violating Article 5.3 (Claim 8);
• Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 5.7 (Claim 9) by not considering,
in the determination whether or not to initiate the investigation, the data collected
for dumping simultaneously with the data collected for injury;
• Argentina failed to notify seven Brazilian exporters when it was satisfied that
there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the anti-dumping
investigation. By not notifying these exporters when the investigation was
initiated, Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.1 (Claim 10);
• Argentina failed to give the seven Brazilian exporters at least 30 days to reply to
the dumping questionnaires provided by the DCD in a prima facie violation of
Article 6.1.1 (Claim 11). Moreover, the CNCE never notified these seven
exporters and never provided them with the injury questionnaire;
• Argentina also failed to promptly make available to the seven Brazilian exporters
evidence presented in writing by the other interested parties involved in the
investigation, in violation of Article 6.1.2 (Claim 12);

• By failing to give the seven exporters the required time to respond to the
questionnaires and not promptly making available to these exporters the evidence
presented in writing by the other interested parties involved in the investigation,
Argentina did not give these exporters full opportunity for the defence of their
interests as required by Article 6.2 (Claim 13);
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.3 (Claim 14) by not providing the
text of the written application to the Brazilian exporters and to the Government of
Brazil as soon as the investigation was initiated;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 15) by
disregarding the responses submitted by Brazilian exporters with respect to the
description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil, and resorting to the
normal value adjustment calculation provided by petitioner in the application;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 12.2.2 (Claim 16) by failing to
adequately explain in the final determination its decision to disregard the
information provided by the exporters regarding the product description and to
use instead the normal value adjustment proposed by petitioner;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 17) by
disregarding the export price data provided by the Brazilian exporters, and
resorting to the export price information provided by the Argentinean Livestock
Directorate of the Secretariat for Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 12.2.2 (Claim 18) by failing to
adequately explain in the final determination its decision to disregard the export
price data provided by the Brazilian exporters, and to resort to the export price
data provided by the Argentinean Livestock Directorate of the Secretariat for
Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 19) by
disregarding all normal value information submitted by two Brazilian exporters,
and resorting to the information provided by petitioner;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 12.2.2 (Claim 20) by failing to
adequately explain in the final determination its decision to disregard all normal
value information submitted by two Brazilian exporters, and to resort to the
information provided by petitioner;
• Argentina failed to inform the Brazilian exporters of the essential facts under
consideration which formed the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures, thereby preventing the Brazilian exporters from adequately defending
their interests, contrary to the requirement set forth in Article 6.9 (Claim 21);
• Argentina failed to establish individual margins of dumping for two Brazilian
exporters, as required by Article 6.10 (Claim 22);
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 23) by not making due
allowance for differences in freight in the normal value established for two
Brazilian exporters;

• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 24) by not making due
allowance for differences in taxation, freight and financial cost in the normal
value established for all other exporters;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 25) by incorrectly making
allowances to normal value based on alleged physical characteristic differences
between the product sold in Brazil and Argentina;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 26) by imposing an
unreasonable burden of proof on three Brazilian exporters by not determining the
dumping period of investigation and, thus, allowing these exporters to submit
dumping information for the years 1996 through 1999, when the dumping period
of investigation was later determined as from January 1998 through
January 1999;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 (Claim 27) by establishing a
dumping margin based on an incorrect comparison between the export price and
the normal value for two Brazilian exporters. Argentina established normal value
based only on internal market transactions for which invoices were presented,
instead of determining normal value based on all the reported transactions in the
internal market for the period. The DCD established the margins of dumping for
these two Brazilian exporters on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average
statistical sample of normal value with a weighted average of prices of all
comparable export transactions;
• Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 9.2 (Claim 28) and Article 9.3
(Claim 29) by imposing a variable anti- dumping duty that can exceed the margin
of dumping established in the final determination;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 12.2.2 (Claim 30) by failing to
provide how the “minimum export price” was established in the determination to
impose definitive anti-dumping duties;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 (Claim 31) by failing to reject the
application and promptly terminate the investigation, as soon as the CNCE
determined in Record No. 405 that there was insufficient evidence of injury or
threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation;
• By using different periods to evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices
listed in Article 3.4, Argentina failed to make a final injury determination based
on positive evidence and involving an ob jective examination as provided for in
Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 (Claim 32);
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 12.2.2 (Claim 33) by failing to
explain in the final determination why the CNCE examined the relevant
economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 based on different periods;
• The injury analysis in the final determin ation did not exclude the imports of two
Brazilian exporters, even though the DCD considered that these were not
“dumped imports”. By not excluding the imports of these two Brazilian
exporters from the “dumped imports”, the CNCE did not properly consider the
volume of the “dumped imports”, the effect of the “dumped imports” on prices,

and the impact of the “dumped imports” on the domestic industry, as provided for
in Articles 3.2 (Claim 34) and 3.4 (Claim 36). The flawed evaluation of the
“dumped imports” indicates that the final injury determination was not based on
positive evidence and did not involve an objective examination as required by
Article 3.1 (Claim 35);
• By not excluding the imports from these two Brazilian exporters from the
“dumped imports”, Argentina failed to properly consider injury as prescribed in
Article 3.1, and, consequently, did not properly demonstrate the causal link
between the “dumped imports” and the injury to the domestic industry as
provided for in Article 3.5 (Claim 37);
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Articles 3.4 (Claim 38) and 3.1 (Claim 39) by
failing to evaluate all the relevant economic factors and indices listed in
Article 3.4;
• Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 40) by failing to
adequately provide and consider in the final determination the evaluation of all
relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4;
• Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 (Claim 41) by considering that
46 per cent constituted the major proportion of the total domestic production of
poultry in Argentina and, thus, qualified as the domestic industry; and
• By determining dumping, injury and causal link inconsistently with the
provisions of the AD Agreement , Argentina has acted inconsistently with
Article VI of GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
(b) recommend that the DSB request Argentina to bring these actions into conformity
with GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement;
(c) suggest ways in which Argentina could implement the Panel’s recommendations, as
provided in Article 19.1 of the DSU; and
(d) suggest that, in light of the numerous outcome-decisive violations of the AD
Agreement that Argentina immediately repeal Resolution No. 574/2000 imposing
definitive anti-dumping duties on eviscerated poultry from Brazil.
21
B. ARGENTINA
3.2 In its first written submission, Argentina requested that the Panel:
(a) refrain from ruling on the forty-one claims of inconsistency with various provisions
of the AD Agreement submitted by Brazil.
If the Panel should decide not to accede to the above request, Argentina requested that the
Panel:
(b) reject Brazil's claims that Resolution No. 574/2000 of the Ministry of the Economy
of Argentina is inconsistent with:

21 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 549 and 550.

• Articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement;
• Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement;
• Articles 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.2 and 6.8, and paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 of
Annex II, and Articles 6.9 and 6.10 of the AD Agreement;
• Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement;
• Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement;
• Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement;
• Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement;
• Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.
(c) reject the request for the immediate repeal of Resolution No. 574/2000 imposing
definitive anti-dumping duties.22
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1 The arguments of the parties, as contained in their submissions to the Panel, are attached as
Annexes (see List of Annexes, page vi).
4.2 The parties' answers to questions both from the Panel and from the other party, and their
comments on each other's answers, are also attached as Annexes (see List of Annexes, page vi).
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1 The arguments of the third parties, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, Guatemala,
Paraguay and the United States, are set out in their submissions to the Panel and are attached to this
Report as Annexes. The third parties' answers to the Panel's questions are also attached as Annexes
(see List of Annexes, page vi).
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 The Panel issued the draft descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its report to the
parties on 20 December 2002 in accordance with Article 15.1 of the DSU. Both parties offered
written comments on the draft descriptive sections on 13 January 2003. The Panel noted all these
comments and amended the draft descriptive part where appropriate. The Panel issued its Interim
Report to the parties on 25 February 2003 in accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU. On
11 March 2003, both parties requested that the Panel review precise aspects of the Interim Report.
Neither of the parties requested an interim review meeting. On 18 March 2003, both parties
submitted written comments on the other party's written requests for interim review. The Panel
carefully reviewed the arguments made, and addresses them below, in accordance with Article 15.3 of
the DSU.
23
A. PREVIOUS MERCOSUR PROCEEDINGS
6.2 Argentina asked the Panel to include a reference to the prior MERCOSUR proceedings in
Section II (Factual Aspects) of the Report. Brazil asked the Panel to reject this request. Having
considered carefully the arguments of the partie s, we have included a reference to the prior
MERCOSUR proceedings in Section II (Factual Aspects) of the Report.

22 Argentina's first written submission, para. 322.
23 Section VI of this Report entitled "Interim Review" therefore forms part of the findings of the final
panel report, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU.

6.3 Concerning paragraphs 7.35 and 7.36 of the Interim Report (paras 7.35 and 7.36 of the final
Report), Argentina referred to the Appellate Body report in United States – Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations"24 to invoke a "principle of good faith with respect to the objective
presentation of the facts of a dispute".25 We note that the Appellate Body in that case was referring to
the requirement for both complaining and responding Members "to comply with the requirements of
the DSU (and related requirements in other covered agreements) in good faith". 26 However, since
Argentina has not argued that Brazil failed to comply with any requirements of the DSU (or related
requirements in other covered agreements) in bringing these proceedings, good faith compliance with
those requirements is not an issue in the pr esent case. The Appellate Body report in US – FSC is
therefore not relevant in the present case.
6.4 Argentina made a number of comments regarding paragraphs 7.38 and 7.39 (paras. 7.38 and
7.39 of the final Report). However, we saw nothing in Argentina's comments that caused us to make
any changes to the Report.
6.5 In light of an issue raised by Argentina, we have deleted footnote 52 of the Interim Report.
6.6 Concerning para. 7.41 of the Interim Report (p ara. 7.41 of the final Report), Argentina
asserted that the MERCOSUR ruling should be ta ken into account "for the purposes of interpretation
of the current dispute" (emphasis in original). However, Argentina still failed to point to any element
of the MERCOSUR ruling that would require the Panel to interpret specific provisions of the WTO
agreements in a particular way. Argentina effectively wanted the Panel to "interpret" the WTO
agreements in such a way that it follows the MERCOSUR ruling and finds against Brazil. This,
however, would go beyond the mere interpretation of specific WTO provisions: it would be
tantamount to requiring the Panel to rule in a particular way. This argument was already addressed in
B. C
LAIM 10
6.7 Brazil made a number of comments regarding the scope of the Panel's findings under this
Claim. In particular, Brazil asserted that our findings should include Catarinense. We have amended
our findings to resolve the issues raised by these comments.
C. CLAIM 11
6.8 Brazil asserts that the Panel erred by stating in the Interim Report that Brazil initially claimed
that Penabranca was notified by the DCD on 15 September 1999 and that only at a subsequent stage
did Brazil assert that there was no evidence on the record indicating that the DCD ever contacted or
notified the exporter Penabranca of the investigation. Brazil refers to footnotes 18 and 78 of Brazil’s
first written submission which provide that “from the documents of the investigation to which Brazil
had access to, Brazil was not able to find the DCD’s notification to the Brazilian exporter
Penabranca”. As a result, we made changes to our characterization of Brazil's presentation of
evidence regarding Penabranca.
6.9 Argentina disagrees with certain views expressed by the Panel in para. 7.143 of the Interim
Report. First, we understand Argentina to argue that the requests for information sent to certain
Brazilian exporters on 15 September 1999 cannot be considered to be "questionnaire[s]" within the
meaning of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement. Although we slightly amended para. 7.143 of the

24 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" ("US –
FSC "), WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000.
25 Argentina's comments to the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 5.

Interim Report, this does not affect our conclusion that those requests were "questionnaires" within
the meaning of Article 6.1.1. We also understand Argentina to argue that it never stated "that the total
time-period for the [reply of] questionnaire responses was 30 days including the extension." 27 As a
result, we made changes in respect of paras. 7.144 and 7.145 of the Interim Report. The
abovementioned changes resulted in the bulk of paras 7.143, 7.144 and 7.145 of the Interim Report
being deleted. The remnants of these paragraphs are set forth in para. 7.140 of the final Report.
D. C
LAIM 13
6.10 Brazil identified an inconsistency in the Interim Report between the scope of the Panel's
Article 6.2 findings and the Panel's treatment of Penabranca under other claims. We have addressed
this inconsistency by modifying the Panel's treatment of Penabranca in Claims 10, 11 and 12.
6.11 Brazil also raised general concerns regarding the Panel's treatment of one of its Article 6.2
claims. Upon close inspection of Brazil's Request for Establishment of a panel, we find that the
specific Article 6.2 claim at issue falls outside our terms of reference. We have modified our findings
accordingly.
E. C
LAIM 17
6.12 Argentina points to an inconsistency in the Pa nel's review of the DCD's treatment of data
submitted by Catarinense in the context of Claims 17 and 19 (paras. 7.189 and 7.190 of the Interim
Report / paras 7.187 and 7.188 of the final Report). Argentina asserts that, to the extent that the Panel
found that the DCD was entitled to reject Catarinense's normal value data because it had failed to
comply with an accreditation obligation, the Panel should also find that the DCD was entitled to reject
Catarinense's export price data for the same reason. Brazil, on the other hand, requests us to affirm
the conclusion in para. 7.190 of the Interim Report (para. 7.188 of the final Report).
6.13 We have examined carefully Argentina's comments, and agree that Catarinense's failure to
comply with the relevant accreditation obligation should cause us to reject both Claims 17 and 19
regarding that exporter. We have amended our findings regarding Claim 17 accordingly (see
6.14 Brazil requested us to verify whether the investigating authority had requested Catarinense to
provide the information to have authorized lega l status / accreditation. We consider that the
correspondence referred to by Brazil in Exhibit BRA-27 shows that the DCD informed Catarinense of
the need to comply with certain domestic procedures set forth in Law No. 19,549 and Decrees
No. 1759/72 and 1883/91.
28 Brazil further asserts that Argentina's argument that Catarinense's export
data was disregarded because of lack of accreditation constitutes ex post rationalization.29 We do not
agree with Brazil. In this regard, we note that the Report of 4 January 2000 30 and the Final

27 Argentina's comments to the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 17.
28 Brazil also claimed that Catarinense was not informed that this was the reason why its questionnaire
response was being rejected, contrary to para. 6 of Annex II. We note, however, that Brazil did not invoke
Annex II, para. 6, in the context of Claim 17 during the Panel proceedings (see paras 282 – 290 of Brazil's first
written submission).
29 We understand Brazil to make such request with respect to Claims 17 and 19. (Brazil's comments to
Argentina's request for review of the Interim Report, para. 32) We consider that this is a comment which Brazil
should have raised in its own request for review of the Interim Report, which Brazil did not do. We consider
that for this reason alone we are precluded from examining it. In any case, we note that in para. 6.14 supra we
state that the Report of 4 January 2000 and the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination contain statements
that the investigating authority informed Catarinense of the requirements under Law 19,549 and
Decrees 1759/72 and 1883/91 with respect to submissions to the Administration.
30 Exhibit BRA-28, p. 2795.

Affirmative Dumping Determination 31 contain statements that the investigating authority informed
Catarinense of the requirements under Law 19,549 and Decrees 1759/72 and 1883/91 with respect to
submissions to the Administration.
6.15 Brazil argues that, by using the export price found for all other exporters instead of the
individual export price found for Catarinense, the authority failed to use special circumspection in
basing its export price findings on a secondary source of information. We note that Argentina did not
determine an individual margin of dumping for Catarinense (contrary to Article 6.10 of the AD
Agreement (Claim 22)). Since Argentina was not entitled to use an "all other exporters" rate for
Catarinense, we see no need to consider whether or not Argentina exercised special circumspection in
doing so.
F. C
LAIM 21
6.16 Brazil requests the Panel to reverse its findings in para. 7.231 of the Interim Report
(para. 7.229 of the final Report). Brazil bases such request on the fact that a party needs to know what
information is not ultimately going to be used in the final determination by the investigating authority
in order to provide reasons and arguments in its defence. 32 However, we see nothing in Brazil's
comments that would cause us to change our interpretation of the plain meaning of Article 6.9 of the
AD Agreement.
G. CLAIM 22
6.17 Argentina asserts that none of the paragraphs of Annex II to the AD Agreement establishes an
obligation to determine an individual margin of dumping in cases in which the exporters have not
cooperated in the investigation. For this reason, Argentina asserts that, when an investigating
authority must resort to applying the rules of Annex II owing to lack of cooperation on the part of the
interested party, the general rule laid down by Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement no longer applies. In
particular, Argentina asserts that the general rule imposed by Article 6.10 does not apply to
Catarinense, an exporter which was found by the Panel not to have accredited legal status in the
context of the investigation before the Argentine au thorities. With respect to Argentina's comments,
Brazil asserts that the fact that an exporter has not submitted the relevant and appropriate information
to establish normal value and export price does not exclude the authority’s obligation under
Article 6.10 to calculate an individual margin of dumping.
6.18 We fully addressed the relationship between Articles 6.10, on the one hand, and 6.8 and
Annex II to the AD Agreement , on the other, in paras. 7.217 and 7.218 of the Interim Report
(paras. 7.215 and 7.216 of the final Report). We see nothing in Argentina's comments that would
cause us to amend our findings and conclusion with respect to this claim.
H. C
LAIM 27
6.19 Argentina made a number of comments regarding the Panel's findings under Claim 27. In
short, Argentina accepts the Panel's finding "with respect to the obligation to consider all of the
transactions carried out in the ordinary course of trade to calculate the normal value", but challenges
the Panel's finding of violation. Argentina submits that all the relevant domestic transactions are
considered if a statistically valid sample is used.
6.20 Although there may be circumstances where an investigating authority may find it useful to
use statistically valid samples of domestic sales transactions for the purpose of establishing normal

31 Exhibit BRA-15, p. 3025.
32 Brazil's comments to the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 44.

value, such sampling is not envisaged by the plain meaning of Article 2.4.2, read in light of
Article 2.2.1. Accordingly, we see no reason to change our findings on this matter.
I. CLAIMS 28 - 30
6.21 With respect to Claims 28 – 30, Brazil stated that it was not claiming that variable anti-
dumping duties were per se inconsistent with Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement. We have
amended our report accordingly.
6.22 Brazil also made other arguments in support of its Claims 28 – 30. While these additional
arguments resulted in some minor changes to the Panel's reasoning, the findings and conclusions of
the Panel remain unchanged.
6.23 We note that Brazil seeks to suggest that our findings would enable a Member to "calculate a
dumping margin in the investigation and apply any duty it saw fit". 33 This is plainly not the case,
since the amount of duty to be collected must never exceed the relevant margin of dumping. The fact
that the Panel finds that variable anti-dumping duties need not be limited to the margin of dumping
established in the investigation does not mean that a Member may apply any variable anti-dumping
duty it sees fit.
VII. FINDINGS
7.1 This case raises issues concerning the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation on poultry
from Brazil, the conduct of that investigation, and the imposition of final measures. Before
addressing Brazil's claims, we shall first examine two preliminary issues raised in these proceedings,
and then consider a number of general issues relevant to these proceedings.
A.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
7.2 Argentina has raised two preliminary issues. 34 The first concerns the disclosure of written
statements under Article 18.2 of the DSU. The second concerns earlier MERCOSUR dispute
settlement proceedings regarding the anti-dumping measure at issue.
1. Disclosure of Written Statements – Article 18.2 of the DSU
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.3 By letter dated 8 August 2002, Brazil informed the Panel that it had received a request from a
non-party Member for a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submission that
could be disclosed to the public. Brazil informed the Panel that it had classified as non-confidential
the volume containing the text of its first submission, while the four volumes containing the exhibits
to the first submission would be treated as confidential. Brazil stated that it would make the first
(non-confidential) volume of its first written submission available to the public, after providing
Argentina an opportunity to indicate whether that volume should be revised to exclude any
information deemed to be confidential.

33 Brazil's comments to the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 73.
34 Argentina could be understood to have raised an additional preliminary issue, concerning standard of
review, in paras. 9-15 of Section II.1 of its first written submission. Unlike the two preliminary issues which we
do address, however, there is no request for a ruling on that additional issue in the pleadings set forth in
Section IV of Argentina's submission (Section IV only requests a ruling in respect of paras. 23-25 of Section II,
which do not pertain to the issue raised in Section II.1). Accordingly, we consider that Argentina has not
requested any ruling in respect of the comments on standard of review set forth in paras. 9-15 of Section II.1 of
its first written submission.

7.4 By letter dated 15 August, Argentina objected to Brazil's decision to make the entirety of its
first written submission (excluding exhibits) available to the public. Argentina submitted that a
Member is only entitled by Article 18.2 of the DSU to disclose written statements of its positions. It
is not entitled to disclose the entirety of its written submissions to the panel, since such submissions
should remain confidential. According to Argentina, Article 18.2 of the DSU draws a clear distinction
between "written submissions" and position "statements". Argentina did not allege that any of the
information that Brazil proposed to make available was confidential.
7.5 On 21 August 2002, Brazil informed the Panel that it had made its first written submission
(excluding those volumes containing exhibits) available to the public. Brazil noted that Argentina had
not raised any issues regarding the confidentiality of information that Brazil had initially proposed to
make available. Regarding the interpretation of Article 18.2 of the DSU, Brazil asserted inter alia that
the DSU does not define the limit or scope, length, shape, form, or content of "statements" that may
be disclosed by a party to a dispute. Brazil asserted that in the present case the relevant "statements"
were identical to Brazil's first written submission minus exhibits.
7.6 On 23 August 2002, Canada submitted that Argentina's interpretation of Article 18.2 of the
DSU was inconsistent with the spirit of transparency informing the operations of the WTO and the
dispute settlement mechanism. Canada also asserted inter alia that Argentina's distinction between
"written submission" and "statement" was formalistic, since a Member may consider that the most
authoritative "statement" of its position in a WTO dispute was to be found in its written submissions.
7.7 On 27 August 2002, Argentina asserted that "if the Panel understands that the terms 'written
submissions' and 'statements' in Article 18.2 of the DSU have the same meaning, Argentina would be
ready to accept such interpretation". On the same date, Argentina asked the Panel to express its
"view" on this matter.
7.8 On 9 September 2002, in its third party submission, the United States requested that the Panel
decline to provide views on the proper interpretation of Article 18.2 of the DSU. The United States
argued inter alia that Article 18.2 of the DSU falls outside the Panel's terms of reference, and that the
Panel would effectively be providing an interpretati on of that provision, contrary to the exclusive
authority of the Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (" WTO Agreement ") to interpret that
Agreement.
7.9 On 26 September 2002, during the Panel's first substantive meeting with the parties,
Argentina stated that it did not oppose Brazil's right to make its first written submission available to
the public. However, Argentina considered that Brazil should not have made its first written
submission available to the public so early in the Panel proceedings. Argentina asserted that,
consistent with paragraph 11 of the Panel's working procedures (whereby the parties' submissions
shall be included in the Panel report), Brazil's first written submission should only have been made
public once the Panel's report was published.
7.10 Following Argentina's statement during the Pane l's first substantive meeting with the parties,
the Panel put the following question to Argentina:
"Argentina stated at this morning's meeting that it was not opposed, as a matter of
principle, to Brazil having made its first written submission available to the public.
Instead, Argentina was concerned with the timing of Brazil's action. Does this mean
that Argentina accepts that a Member may make its written submissions to a panel
available to the public at some point in time without infringing Article 18.2 of the
DSU? Would Brazil violate DSU Articl e 18.2 if it made its written submissions
available to the public after the Panel issued its final report?"

7.11 Argentina replied "Yes, following the provisions of the Article 18.2 of the DSU" to the first
part of the Panel's question, and "No" to the second part thereof. 35
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.12 Before addressing the substance of the prelimin ary issue raised by Argentina, we shall first
examine the US argument that we should decline to rule on the matter raised by Argentina. By virtue
of Article 1.1 of the DSU, the provisions of the DSU apply to all WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, subject to certain special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement
identified in Appendix 2 to the DSU. The provisions of the DSU therefore apply in all cases, whether
or not they are mentioned in a Member's request for establishment of a panel. Indeed, we are not
being asked to rule on whether a measure identified in the request for establishment is consistent with
Article 18.2 of the DSU. Rather, we are being asked to make such rulings in respect of Article 18.2 of
the DSU as are necessary to manage procedural aspects of these proceedings. By ruling in respect of
Article 18.2 of the DSU, we are simply acting in conformity with Article 1.1 of the DSU.
36 We are
not purporting to make an interpretation within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.
Accordingly, we reject the US argument that the Panel should decline to rule on the matter raised by
Argentina.
7.13 This issue concerns Article 18.2 of the DSU, which provides that:
"Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as
confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this
Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its
own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information
submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member
has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a
Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its
written submissions that could be disclosed to the public."
7.14 On substance, we agree with Canada that Argentina's interpretation
37 of Article 18.2 of the
DSU results in a formalistic distinction between the terms "written submission" and "statement". In
doing so, Argentina negates that a party's written submissions to a panel necessarily contain
statements of that party's positions. In our view, the first two sentences of Article 18.2 of the DSU
should not be read in formalistic isolation of one another. Read together, and in context of one
another, the first two sentences of Article 18.2 of the DSU mean that while one party shall not
disclose the submissions of another party, each party is entitled to disclose statements of its own
positions, subject to the confidentiality requirement set forth in the third sentence of Article 18.2 of
the DSU. We recall that a party's written submissions to a panel necessarily contain statements of that
party's positions. In our view, therefore, disclosi ng submissions to a panel is one way for a party to
disclose statements of its positions. If a party chooses to make public the totality of the statements of
its own position contained in its written submission, it is entitled to do so, provided the confidentiality
requirement of the third sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU is respected. Since Argentina has not

35 Argentina replied by fax on 22 October 2002.
36 We note that other panels have similarly made rulings on procedural matters under the DSU. For
example, the panel in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) ruled on third party access to rebuttal submissions in light of
Article 10.3 of the DSU (Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities ("US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) "),
WT/DS108/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, Section VI.A). Alt hough the substance of that panel's ruling was
reversed by the Appellate Body, the ability of the panel to make rulings in respect of Article 10.3 of the DSU
was not challenged. (Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) , WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted
29 January 2002, para. 252)
37 We are referring to the arguments set forth in Argentina's submission of 15 August 2002.

argued that Brazil violated its confidentiality obligation, we do not consider that Brazil's decision to
disclose the entirety of the statements of position contained in its first written submission to the Panel
(excluding exhibits) was inconsistent with Article 18.2 of the DSU.38
7.15 Furthermore, we note that, by the time of our first substantive meeting with the parties,
Argentina was no longer arguing that Brazil was not entitled to make the entirety of its written
submissions to the Panel available to the public during the Panel proceedings. Implicitly, therefore,
Argentina ultimately agreed that Brazil was entitled to make its written submission available to the
public pursuant to Article 18.2 of the DSU. Although Argentina argued that Brazil should not have
done so until after publication of the Panel's report, we find no basis for this argument in Article 18.2
of the DSU. Article 18.2 sets no temporal limits on Members' rights and obligations under that
provision. Nor do we find any basis for this argument in paragraph 11 of the Panel's Working
Procedures, which concerns the preparation of the descriptive part of the Panel's report.
39 We see
nothing in this provision which would impose any limits on rights accruing to Members under
Article 18.2 of the DSU.
7.16 In conclusion, we do not consider that Brazil's decision to disclose the entirety of the
statements of position contained in its first written submission to the Panel (excluding exhibits) was
inconsistent with Article 18.2 of the DSU.
2. Previous Mercosur Proceedings
7.17 Argentina has raised a preliminary issue concerning the fact that, prior to bringing WTO
dispute settlement proceedings against Argentina's anti-dumping measure, Brazil had challenged that
measure before a MERCOSUR Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribun al. Argentina requests that, in light of the
prior MERCOSUR proceedings, the Panel refrain from ruling on the claims raised by Brazil in the
present WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In the alternative, Argentina asserts that the Panel
should be bound by the ruling of the MERCOSUR Tribunal.
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.18 Argentina considers that Brazil's conduct in bringing the dispute successively before different
fora, first MERCOSUR and then the WTO, constitutes a legal approach that is contrary to the
principle of good faith and which, in the case at issue, warrants invocation of the principle of estoppel.
Argentina is not invoking the principle of res judicata. In the alternative, Argentina submits that in
view of the relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between parties pursuant to
Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"),
40 in the light
of Article 3.2 of the DSU the Panel cannot disregard, in its consideration and substantiation of the
present case brought by Brazil, the precedents set by the proceedings in the framework of
MERCOSUR.

38 In support of its position, Brazil also relied on the last sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU. Since we
reject the preliminary issue raised by Argentina on the basis of the first two sentences of Article 18.2 of the
DSU, there is no need for us to consider arguments pertaining to the last sentence of that provision.
39 Paragraph 11 of the Panel's Working Procedures provides that "[t]he descriptive part of the Panel's
report will include the procedural and factual background to the present dispute. There will be no description of
the main arguments of the parties and third parties as such. Instead, the Panel will attach the parties'
submissions (including first and second written submissions, written versions of the first and second oral
statements, and each parties' replies to questions from the other party and from the Panel) to its report. Upon
request of a party, specific portions of a submission desi gnated by that party as confidential at the time of its
submission will not be included in the submission attached to the Panel's report."
40 Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.

7.19 Argentina asserts that, in the framework of MERCOSUR, it is a standing practice for all
parties – including Brazil – to accept the obligations deriving from the legislative framework in force,
including the MERCOSUR Treaty of Asunción and the Protocol of Brasilia. In Argentina's view, a
State party is not acting in good faith if it first has recourse to the mechanism of the integration
process to settle its dispute with another State party and then, dissatisfied with the outcome, files the
same complaint within a different framework, making matters worse by omitting any reference to the
previous procedure and its outcome.
7.20 Argentina asserts that the essential elements of estoppel are "(i) a statement of fact which is
clear and unambiguous; (ii) this statement must be voluntary, unconditional, and authorized;
(iii) there must be reliance in good faith upon the statement … to the advantage of the party making
the statement".
41 Argentina submits that Brazil's previous conduct with respect to the acceptance of
awards, confirmed by the signature of the Protocol of Olivos, invalidates the complaint against
Argentina that Brazil is now trying to substantiate on the basis of the DSU. Argentina submits that
there is no provision or rule that prohibits a WTO panel from examining, and where it deems
appropriate applying, the principle of estoppel. Argentina asserts that estoppel is a principle of
international law and, according to the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline , there is "a measure of
recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international
law."
42 Argentina asserts that WTO panels are called upon to apply public international law to settle
the disputes brought before them, and that previous panels have addressed the principle of estoppel.
7.21 Argentina's alternative argument is based on Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention .
Argentina submits that Article 3.2 of the DSU provides a rule of interpretation for the Panel, and
WTO legal practice has confirmed that rule by referring to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention. Argentina asserts that, in accordance with Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, the
interpretation of a treaty must take account of all relevant rules of international law applicable
between the parties at the time of implementation. In Argentina's view, the regulatory framework of
MERCOSUR and the legal consequences deriving from the implementation of the Protocol of Brasilia
by the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal in the case at issue are relevant rules of public international law
within the meaning of Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention , such that the Panel is bound by
earlier MERCOSUR rulings regarding the measure at issue.
7.22 Brazil submits that the principle of estoppel is not applicable in the present case, in part
because the dispute before the MERCOSUR Tribunal was grounded on a different legal basis from
the dispute before this Panel. In any event, Brazil asserts that the principle of estoppel means that “a
party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of other party who was
entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.”
43 As noted by the panel in EEC (Member
States) – Bananas I , “estoppel could only result from the express, or in exceptional cases implied,
consent of such parties or of the CONTRACTING PARTIES”.44 According to Brazil, the simple fact
that it had brought a similar dispute to the ME RCOSUR Tribunal does not represent that Brazil has
consented not to bring the current dispute before the WTO, especially when the dispute before this
Panel is based on a different legal basis than the dispute brought before the MERCOSUR Tribunal.
Brazil asserts that the MERCOSUR Protocol of Olivos on Dispute Settlement, signed on
18 February 2002, cannot be raised here as an implicit or express consent by Brazil to refrain from
bringing the present case to the WTO dispute settlement, again because the object of the earlier
MERCOSUR proceedings was different from the object of the present WTO proceedings.

41 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 641.
42 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ("US –
Gasoline "), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 20, DSR 1996:I, 29.
43 Black’s Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co., 1990), p. 551.
44 Panel Report, EEC – Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas (" EEC (Member States) –
Bananas I "), 3 June 1993, unadopted, DS32/R.

Furthermore, the Protocol of Olivos does not appl y to disputes that have already been concluded
under the Protocol of Brasilia.
7.23 Regarding Argentina's reference to Article 3.2 of the DSU, Brazil asserts that Article 3.2 deals
exclusively with the clarification of the existing provisions of the WTO agreements and does not
provide that a previous ruling by an international tribunal constrains a WTO panel’s interpretation of a
WTO agreement. In fact, Article 3.2 requires a WTO panel to consider a claim brought by a Member
with respect to a violation of a covered agreement in order to preserve that Member’s rights under that
agreement.
7.24 Furthermore, Brazil notes that contrary to Argentina’s allegations, Brazil has not engaged in
an abusive exercise of its rights under the WTO agreements
45, nor has its conduct been contrary to
good faith by not mentioning in the first submission the ruling by the MERCOSUR Tribunal.46 Brazil
did not refer to that ruling simply because it believ ed that it had no relevance to this case, since the
claims currently before the Panel are not the same as the claims that were before the MERCOSUR
Tribunal.
7.25 Chile, as a third party, asserts that Brazil is entitled to bring the present case before the WTO
because the issues raised are different from the issues previously raised in MERCOSUR dispute
settlement proceedings.
7.26 The European Communities, as a third party, asserts that Article 3.2 of the DSU is not
relevant to these proceedings, since it is concerned exclusively with the interpretation of the WTO
agreements, and not with the sources of WTO law. The European Communities submits that it is
difficult to see how the interpretation of the pr ovisions of MERCOSUR law made by the Ad Hoc
Arbitral Tribunal could become relevant, in accordance with the rules laid down in Articles 31 and 32
of the Vienna Convention, for the interpretation of the provisions of the AD Agreement at issue in this
dispute.
7.27 The European Communities does not consider it necessary to take a position on the issue of
whether a Member would abuse its right to a panel under the DSU and, hence, act inconsistently with
Article 3.10 if it were to request the establishment of a panel in violation of the principle of estoppel.
47
Indeed, this Panel need not reach this issue because , in any event, Brazil’s conduct is not contrary to
that principle. As noted by the panel in EEC (Member States) – Bananas I , estoppel can only “result
from the express, or in exceptional cases implied consent of the complaining parties”. 48 T h e f a c t s
alleged by Argentina are not sufficient to concl ude that Brazil has “consented”, whether explicitly or
implicitly, not to bring this dispute before the WTO. The Protocol of Brasilia contains no provision
which limits in any manner the right of the parties to request a panel under the WTO agreements with
respect to a measure that has already been the subject of a dispute under that Protocol. 49 Thus, the

45 Argentina's first written submission, para. 23.
46 Id., para. 16.
47 The European Communities notes that the panel in India – Autos suggested that a Member may be
estopped from requesting the establishment of a panel with respect to a matter which has been the subject of a
mutually agreed solution. (Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector ("India – Autos
 "),
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, footnote 364)
48 Panel Report, EEC (Member States) – Bananas I , supra, note 44, para 361. See also Panel Report,
Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico ("Guatemala –
Cement II "), WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, footnote 791: “it is clear that not any silence can be
considered to constitute consent”.
49 Unlike the more recent Protocol of Olivos on Dispute Settlement, which provides in its Article 1.2
that:

mere fact that Brazil requested first the establishment of an Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal under the
Protocol of Brasilia does not amount to a renuncia tion by Brazil to bring a dispute settlement action
under the WTO agreements. Similarly, the mere fact that Brazil did not consider it necessary to take
dispute settlement action under the WTO agreements following the arbitration rulings issued in a
number of other cases cited by Argentina cannot be construed as an implicit renunciation by Brazil to
its right under the WTO agreements to take such action in this case.
7.28 Paraguay, as a third party, considers that, in accordance with the general principles of public
international law, this case is res judicata because it has already been brought under the dispute
settlement procedure established within the framework of MERCOSUR, and under the Brasilia
Protocol in particular. In this regard, Article 21
50 of the Brasilia Protocol clearly establishes the
unappealable and binding nature of awards rendered by the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal, which are
deemed to be res judicata – a principle that should prevail in addressing this case.
7.29 Paraguay also refers to the MERCOSUR Protocol of Olivos which, although not yet in force,
allows MERCOSUR members to choose the forum in which they wish disputes to be settled, with the
restriction constituted by the exclusion clause, which stipulates that once a procedure has been
initiated in one forum, this precludes resorting to any of the other forums provided for in the Protocol.
7.30 The United States, as a third party, asserts that the MERCOSUR dispute settlement rules are
not within the Panel’s terms of reference. Article 7.1 of the DSU makes quite clear that a Panel’s role
in a dispute is to make findings in light of the relevant provisions of the “covered agreements” at
issue. The Protocol of Brasilia is not a covered agreement, and Argentina has not claimed that
Brazil’s actions with respect to the Protocol breach any provision of a covered agreement. Rather,
Argentina’s claim appears to be that Brazil’s actions could be considered to be inconsistent with the
terms of the Protocol. A claim of a breach of the Protocol is not within this Panel’s terms of
reference, and there are no grounds for the Panel to consider this matter. Argentina may, however, be
able to pursue that claim under the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system.
7.31 Furthermore, the United States submits that Argentina's reliance on the principle of estoppel
appears to relate to Brazil’s obligations under MERCOSUR rather than to any provision of the DSU

puedan también ser sometidas al sistema de solución de controversias de la Organización
Mundial de Comercio o de otros esquemas pref erenciales de comercio de que sean parte
individualmente los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, podrán someterse a uno u otro foro a
Una vez iniciado un procedimiento de solución de controversias de acuerdo al párrafo
respecto del mismo objeto …"
The Protocol of Olivos was signed on 18 February 2002 and has not entered into force yet. According
to the European Communities, the question might be raised whether the request for the establishment of the
panel made by Brazil on 25 February 2002, i.e., after the signature of the Protocol of Olivos, was consistent with
Brazil’s obligation under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention not to defeat the object and purpose of a signed
treaty prior to its entry into force. However, Article 50 of the Protocol of Olivos appears to suggest that it does
not apply to disputes already decided in accordance with the Protocol of Brasilia.
50 Article 21 reads as follows:
"1. The decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be appealed, and are binding on the
State Parties to the controversies from the moment the respective notification is
received and will be deemed by them to have the effect of res judicata.
 2. The decisions should be complied with within a time-limit of fifteen (15) days, unless
the Arbitral Tribunal fixes a different time-limit."

or the other covered agreements. As a result, the matter is not within the Panel’s terms of reference
and the Panel has no basis for making the requested finding. The United States also disagrees with
Argentina that the Panel may apply what Argentina calls the principle of estoppel. The fact that
Argentina cites to no textual basis for its request reflects the fact that Members have not consented to
provide for the application of any such principle of estoppel in WTO dispute settlement. The term
estoppel appears nowhere in the text nor does Argentina cite to any provision which in substance
provides Argentina the type of defence it asserts. The United States also notes that the lack of any
textual basis is reflected in the fact that no panel to date has applied a principle of estoppel.
Moreover, there is no basis for attempting to import into WTO dispute settlement proceedings legal
concepts with no grounding in the DSU. The lack of any textual basis is further emphasized by the
lack of consistent description of the concept when panels have had occasion to discuss estoppel in the
past. In EEC (Member States) – Bananas I , for example, the panel stated that estoppel can only
“result from the express, or in exceptional cases implied, consent of the complaining parties.”
51 In EC
– Asbestos and Guatemala – Cement II, by contrast, the panels stated that estoppel is relevant when a
party “reasonably relies” on the assurances of another party, and then suffers negative consequences
resulting from a change in the other party’s position. 52 According to the US, these inconsistencies
illustrate the dangers of seeking to identify purportedly agreed-upon legal concepts beyond the only
source all Members have agreed to – the text of the DSU itself.
7.32 Finally, the United States asserts that Argentina’s citation of Article 3.2 of the DSU in support
of its position is misplaced. By its plain terms, Article 3.2 is limited to the rules of interpretation
used to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO agreements. Argentina’s request that the Panel
refuse to consider Brazil’s claims does not present an issue of the proper interpretation of a provision
of the WTO agreements.
(b) Evaluation by the panel
7.33 This preliminary issue concerns the principles of good faith and estoppel. It also relates to
Article 3.2 of the DSU and Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention.
53
7.34 Argentina asserts that Brazil failed to act in good faith by first challenging Argentina's anti-
dumping measure before a MERCOSUR Ad Hoc Tribunal and then, having lost that case, initiating
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the same measure. For the following reasons, however,
we find that the preconditions for a finding that Brazil failed to act in good faith are not met.
7.35 The Appellate Body recently stated in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ) that "there is a basis
for a dispute settlement panel to determine, in an appropriate case, whether a Member has not acted in
good faith."54 There are circumstances, therefore, in which a panel could find that a Member had
failed to act in good faith. It is clear to us, however, that such findings should not be made lightly. In
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment
 ) the Appellate Body found that:

51 See Third Party Submission of the European Communities, citing Panel Report, EEC (Member
States) – Bananas I, supra, note 44, para. 361.
52 The United States refers to the Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products ("EC – Asbestos "), WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 8.60 (citations omitted); Panel Report,
Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, paras. 8.23-24. The United Stat es asserts that one could also argue that
these panels are describing the concept of “detrimental reliance.”
53 Argentina has made it clear that it is not invoking the principle of res judicata . Even though
Paraguay considers this principle relevant to these pro ceedings, Paraguay, as a third party, does not have the
right to determine the scope of any preliminary issues to be examined by us.
54 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 ("US –
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)"), WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003, para. 297.

"Nothing, however, in the covered agreemen ts supports the conclusion that simply
because a WTO Member is found to have violated a substantive treaty provision, it
has therefore not acted in good faith. In our view, it would be necessary to prove
more than mere violation to support such a conclusion."55
7.36 On the basis of the abovementioned Appellate B ody finding, we consider that two conditions
must be satisfied before a Member may be found to have failed to act in good faith. First, the
Member must have violated a substantive provision of the WTO agreements. Second, there must be
something "more than mere violation". With regard to the first condition, Argentina has not alleged
that Brazil violated any substantive provision of the WTO agreements in bringing the present case.
Thus, even without examining the second condition, there is no basis for us to find that Brazil violated
the principle of good faith in bringing the present proceedings before the WTO.
7.37 Argentina has also argued that Brazil is estopped from pursuing the present WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. Argentina asserts that the principle of estoppel applies in circumstances
where (i) a statement of fact which is clear and unambiguous, and which (ii) is voluntary,
unconditional, and authorized, is (iii) relied on in good faith. We asked Argentina to explain exactly
how it considers that these three conditions are satisfied in this case. In particular, we asked
Argentina to identify the relevant "statement of fact" made by Brazil, and to describe how Argentina
had relied on it in good faith.
56 Argentina replied:
"Firstly, Argentina considers that Brazil's conduct in successively filing its case and
activating dispute settlement proceedings in different fora, first in MERCOSUR and
then in the WTO – particularly in view of the precedents described in Argentina's first
written submission 1, i.e. recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism under the
Protocol of Brasilia to settle conflicts with other MERCOSUR States parties and
compliance with the content and scope of the arbitral awards in all of the disputes –
provides statements of fact which meet the requirement of being clear, unambiguous,
voluntary, unconditional and authorized, the essential elements of estoppel under the
definition provided in paragraph 13 of Argentina's submission.
In paragraph 20 of its rebuttal submission2, Argentina sets out the elements which are
present in the current dispute brought by Brazil before the WTO. Among these
elements, the last sentence of subparagraph (iii) of paragraph 20 states that:
"Consequently Brazil's previous conduct with respect to the acceptance of awards,
confirmed by the signature of the Protocol of Olivos, invalidates the complaint
against Argentina that Brazil is now trying to substantiate on the basis of the DSU."
Moreover, the fact that Brazil signed the Protocol of Olivos on 18 February 2002 – by
which it expressly accepted the choice of forum clause – and then, seven days later,
on 25 February 2002, requested the establishment of a Panel in the current dispute,

55 Id., para. 298.
56 Question 66 from the Panel reads: "Regarding para. 13 of Argentina's second submission ("ASS"),
what was the "statement of fact" (point I) allegedly made by Brazil? Please explain how Argentina relied in
good faith upon that alleged statement (point III)".

displays a clear contradiction in its conduct, in which Argentina had had full
confidence, both countries being member States of MERCOSUR; and Argentina is
now suffering the negative impact of this change of position. 3 This fact was also
raised in the submissions of the EC4 and Paraguay5 as third parties."57
Executive through Decree 2091/02 of 18 October 2002 and published in Official Bulletin of
the Republic of Argentina No. 30,008 of 21 October 2002.
4 Third party submission of the European Communities, 9 September 2002,
paragraph 17 and footnote 17.
5 Third party submission of Paraguay, 9 September 2002, paragraph 8.
7.38 We do not consider Argentina's response sufficient to establish that the three conditions it
identified for the application of the principle of estoppel are fulfilled in the present case. 58 Regarding
the first condition identified by Argentina, we do not consider that Brazil has made a clear and
unambiguous statement to the effect that, havi ng brought a case under the MERCOSUR dispute
settlement framework, it would not subsequently re sort to WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In
this regard, we note that the panel in EEC (Member States) – Bananas I found that estoppel can only
“result from the express, or in exceptional ca ses implied consent of the complaining parties”. 59 We
agree. There is no evidence on the record that Brazil made an express statement that it would not
bring WTO dispute settlement proceedings in respect of measures previously challenged through
MERCOSUR. Nor does the record indicate exceptional circumstances requiring us to imply any such
statement. In particular, the fact that Brazil chose not to invoke its WTO dispute settlement rights
after previous MERCOSUR dispute settlement procee dings does not, in our view, mean that Brazil
implicitly waived its rights under the DSU. This is especially because the Protocol of Brasilia, under
which previous MERCOSUR cases had been brough t by Brazil, imposes no restrictions on Brazil's
right to bring subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceedings in respect of the same measure. We
note that Brazil signed the Protocol of Olivos in February 2002. Article 1 of the Protocol of Olivos
provides that once a party decides to bring a case under either the MERCOSUR or WTO dispute
settlement forums, that party may not bring a subsequent case regarding the same subject-matter in
the other forum. The Protocol of Olivos, however, does not change our assessment, since that
Protocol has not yet entered into force, and in any event it does not apply in respect of disputes
already decided in accordance with the MERCOSUR Protocol of Brasilia.
60 Indeed, the fact that
parties to MERCOSUR saw the need to introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to us that they
recognised that (in the absence of such Protocol) a MERCOSUR dispute settlement proceeding could
be followed by a WTO dispute settlement proceeding in respect of the same measure.

57 Argentina's reply to Question 66 from the Panel.
58 The United States has argued that there is no basis for a WTO panel to apply the principle of
estoppel. Since we find that the conditions identified by Argentina for the application of the principle of
estoppel are not present, we do not consider it necessary to determine whether or not we would have had the
authority to apply the principle of estoppel if the releva nt conditions had been satisfied. Nor do we consider it
necessary to determine whether the three conditions propos ed by Argentina are sufficient for the application of
that proposal.
59 Panel Report, EEC (Member States) – Bananas I , supra, note 44, para 361. See also Panel Report,
Guatemala – Cement II , supra, note 48, footnote 791: “it is clear that not any silence can be considered to
constitute consent”.
60 Article 50 of the Protocol of Olivos provides that "disputes underway initiated in accordance with the
Protocol of Brasilia will continue to be exclusively governed by that Protocol until the dispute has been
concluded".

7.39 Regarding the third condition, we note that Argentina failed to quote the entirety of the
relevant author's text. Quoted in full, the third condition reads "there must be reliance in good faith
upon the statement either to the detriment of the part y so relying on the statement or to the advantage
of the party making the statement". 61 Citing the same author, another panel has asserted that
"[e]stoppel is premised on the view that where one party has been induced to act in reliance on the
assurances of another party, in such a way that it would be prejudiced were the other party later to
change its position, such a change in position is 'estopped', that is precluded". 62 In our view, merely
being inconvenienced by alleged statements by Brazil is not sufficient for Argentina to demonstrate
that it was induced to act in reliance of such alleged statements. There is nothing on the record to
suggest to us that Argentina actively relied in g ood faith on any statement made by Brazil, either to
the advantage of Brazil or to the disadvantage of Argentina. There is nothing on the record to suggest
that Argentina would have acted any differently had Brazil not made the alleged statement that it
would not bring the present WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In its abovementioned response to
Question 66, which was specifically addressing this issue, Argentina simply stated that it "is now
suffering the negative impact of [Brazil's] change of position" (regarding its earlier practice of not
pursuing WTO cases following MERCOSUR rulings in respect of the same subject-matter), without
explaining further the nature of that "negative impact". Argentina's vague assertion regarding
"negative impact" is not sufficient to demonstrate th at it was induced to act in reliance on the alleged
statement by Brazil, and that it is now suffering the negative consequences of the alleged change in
Brazil's position. For these reasons, we reject Argentina's claim that Brazil is estopped from pursuing
the present WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
7.40 Argentina argues in the alternative that if the Pa nel finds that Brazil is entitled to bring the
present WTO dispute settlement proceedings, th en the Panel is bound by the earlier MERCOSUR
ruling on the measure at issue in this case. Argentina asserts that the earlier MERCOSUR ruling is
part of the normative framework to be applied by the Panel as a result of Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna
Convention, whereby "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties" shall be taken into account for the purpose of treaty interpretation. Argentina asserts that the
provisions of the Vienna Convention are applicable in the present proceedings by virtue of Article 3.2
of the DSU, which provides that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to clarify the existing
provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law".
7.41 We note that Article 3.2 of the DSU is concerned with international rules of treaty
interpretation. Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention is similarly concerned with treaty
interpretation. However, Argentina has not sought to rely on any law providing that, in respect of
relations between Argentina and Brazil, the WTO agreements should be interpreted in a particular
way. In particular, Argentina has not relied on any statement or finding in the MERCOSUR Tribunal
ruling to suggest that we should interpret specific provisions of the WTO agreements in a particular
way. Rather than concerning itself with the interpretation of the WTO agreements, Argentina actually
argues that the earlier MERCOSUR Tribunal ruling requi res us to rule in a particular way. In other
words, Argentina would have us apply the relevant WTO provisions in a particular way, rather than
interpret them in a particular way. However, there is no basis in Article 3.2 of the DSU, or any other
provision, to suggest that we are bound to rule in a particular way, or apply the relevant WTO
provisions in a particular way. We note that we are not even bound to follow rulings contained in
adopted WTO panel reports 63, so we see no reason at all why we should be bound by the rulings of

61 See footnote 41 supra.
62 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48 , para. 8.23.
63 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II "), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, p. 14,
DSR 1996:I, 125.

non-WTO dispute settlement bodies. Accordingly, we reject Argentina's alternative arguments
regarding Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention.64
7.42 In light of the above, we decline Argentina' s request that, in light of the prior MERCOSUR
proceedings, the Panel refrain from ruling on the claims raised by Brazil in the present WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. We also decline Argentina's alternative request that we consider ourselves
bound by the ruling of the MERCOSUR Tribunal.
B.
GENERAL ISSUES
1. Standard of Review
7.43 Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement sets forth the special standard of review applicable to anti-
dumping disputes. With regard to factual issues, Article 17.6(i) provides:
“in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;” (emphasis
added)
7.44 Assuming that we conclude that the establishment of the facts with regard to a particular
claim in this case was proper, we then may consider whether, based on the evidence before the
Argentine authorities at the time of the determin ation, an unbiased and objective investigating
authority evaluating that evidence could have reached the conclusions that the Argentine authorities
reached on the matter in question.65
7.45 Article 17.6(i) requires us to assess the facts to determine whether the investigating
authorities' own establishment of the facts was proper, and to assess the investigating authorities' own
evaluation of those facts to determine if it was unbiased and objective. What is clear from this is that
we are precluded from establishing facts and evaluating them for ourselves – that is, we may not
engage in de novo review. However, this does not limit our examination of the matters in dispute, but
only the manner in which we conduct that examination. In this regard, we keep in mind that
Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement establishes that we are to examine the matter based upon "the
facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the
importing Member."
7.46 With respect to questions of the interpretation of the AD Agreement, Article 17.6(ii) provides:
“the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with

64 Even if Argentina had relied on the MERCOSUR Tribunal ruling to argue that particular provisions
of the WTO Agreement should be interpreted in a particul ar way, it is not entirely clear that Article 31.3(c) of
the Vienna Convention would apply. In particular, it is not clear to us that a rule applicable between only
several WTO Members would constitute a relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between
the "parties".
65 We note that this is the same standard as that applied by the panels in United States – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea ("US – Stainless
Steel "), WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001; and Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose
Corn Syrup, ("Mexico – Corn Syrup"), WT/DS132/R and Corr.1, adopted 24 February 2000.

the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations .”
(emphasis added)
7.47 Article 17.6(ii) requires us to apply the customary rules of interpretation of treaties, which are
reflected in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides
that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance wi th the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. This is no different from the task of
all panels in interpreting the text of the WTO agreements pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU. What
Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement adds is an instruction that, if this process of treaty interpretation
leads us to the conclusion that the interpretation of the provision in question put forward by the
defending party is permissible, we shall find the measure in conformity if it is based on that
permissible interpretation.
7.48 Finally, as mentioned below, Argentina has presented arguments before us in support of the
investigating authorities' decisions which we could not find on the record of the investigation before
us. This raises the question of whether ex post rationalization should be taken into account in order to
assess Argentina's compliance with the provisions of the AD Agreement. We note that the Argentina
– Ceramic Tiles panel expressed its view that:
"Under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement we are to determine whether the DCD
established the facts properly and whether the evaluation performed by the DCD was
unbiased and objective. In other words, we are asked to review the evaluation of the
DCD made at the time of the determination as set forth in a public notice or in any
other document of a public or confidential nature. We do not believe that, as a panel
reviewing the evaluation of the investigating authority, we are to take into
consideration any arguments and reasons that did not form part of the evaluation
process of the investigating authority, but instead are ex post facto justifications
which were not provided at the time the determination was made."
66 (emphasis in
original, footnote not included)
7.49 We agree with the approach followed by that panel. Thus, we do not believe that, as a panel
reviewing the evaluation of the investigating auth ority, we are to take into consideration any
arguments and reasons that are not demonstrated to have formed part of the evaluation process of the
investigating authority.
2. Burden of Proof
7.50 In WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the burd en of proof rests with the party that asserts
the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.67 The complaining party must therefore make a prima
facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO agreements, which the respondent must
refute.68 In these Panel proceedings, we thus observe that it is for Brazil, which has challenged the

66 Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from
Italy ("Argentina – Ceramic Tiles "), WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November 2001, para. 6.27.
67 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India (" US – Wool Shirts and Blouses") , WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997,
DSR 1997:I, 323, p. 337 et seq.
68 We note the statement of the Appellate Body in Korea – Dairy that: “We find no provision in the
DSU or in the Agreement on Safeguards that requires a Panel to make an explicit ruling on whether the
complainant has established a prima facie case of vi olation before a panel may proceed to examine the
respondent’s defence and evidence.” (Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy"), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 145)
The Appellate Body confirmed this view in Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams
 "), WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted

consistency of Argentina's measure, to bear the burden of demonstrating that the measure is not
consistent with the relevant provisions of the AD Agreement . We also note, however, that it is
generally for each party asserting a fact, whether complainant or respondent, to provide proof
thereof.69 In this respect, therefore, it is also for Argentina to provide evidence for the facts which it
asserts. We also recall that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by
the other party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima
facie case. The role of the Panel is not to make the case for either party, but it may pose questions to
the parties “in order to clarify and distil the legal arguments”. 70 In addition, we consider that both
parties generally have a duty to cooperate in the proceedings in order to assist us in fulfilling our
mandate, through the provision of relevant information.71 We must draw inferences on the basis of all
of the relevant facts of record, including, for example, where a party refuses to provide relevant
information.72
C. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION / A LLEGED PROCEDURAL
VIOLATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION
1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Justify Initiation of the Investigation – Claims 2, 4, 6 and 8
7.51 These claims concern the investigating authority's decision that there was sufficient evidence
under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement to justify initiating an investigation on imports of poultry from
Brazil. Since the investigating authority's decision to initiate was based on the information contained
in the application, Brazil's claims are concerne d with the investigating authority's treatment of
information contained in that application.
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) Claim 2
7.52 Brazil claims that there was not sufficient ev idence for the investigating authority to have
made an adjustment to normal value to reflect alleged differences in physical characteristics between
the poultry sold in Argentina and Brazil respectively. Brazil asserts that there was not sufficient
evidence to support the applicant's claim that poultry sold in Brazil differed from that sold in
Argentina because the former included head and feet whereas the latter did not. Brazil also argues
that the applicant did not demonstrate that the alleged difference in physical characteristics affected
price comparability. Finally, Brazil asserts that there was no evidence to support the accuracy and
adequacy of the yield rates used by the investigating authority at the time of initiation to calculate the
amount of the adjustment for the alleged differences in physical characteristics.
7.53 Argentina rejects Brazil's claim on the basis of the finding of the panel in Guatemala –
Cement I
73 that "the quantum and quality of evidence to be required of an investigating authority prior

5 April 2001, para. 134: “In our view a panel is not required to make a separate and specific finding in each and
every instance that a party has met its burden of proof in respect of a particular claim, or that a party has
rebutted a prima facie case.”
69 See footnote 67, supra.
70 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, supra, note 68, para. 136.
71 Appellate Body Report , Canada – Measures Affecting the Ex port of Civilian Aircraft ("Canada –
Aircraft"), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1377, para. 190.
72 Id., para. 203; Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Wheat Gluten from the European Communities ("US – Wheat Gluten "), WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted
19 January 2001, paras. 173-174.
73 Panel Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico
("Guatemala – Cement I "), WT/DS60/R, adopted 25 November 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS60/AB/R, DSR 1998:IX, 3797.

to initiation of an investigation would necessarily have to be less than that required of that authority at
the time of making a final determination". Argentina asserts that the investigating authority made the
adjustment on the basis of evidence submitted by the applicant in the form of information published
by JOX Assessoria Agropecuaria S/C Ltda. ("JOX"), a Brazilian consulting firm specialized in the
farming sector, regarding sales of poultry in São Paulo. According to Argentina, the JOX information
indicated that chilled poultry was sold in São Paulo with head and feet. Argentina states that JOX is a
specialized publication reflecting the state of the São Paulo market, and that São Paulo is a large
urban centre which reflects domestic consumption patterns throughout Brazil.
(ii) Claim 4
7.54 Brazil claims that the investigating authority excluded export prices that were above the
normal value, and established the export price for purposes of initiation based only on those
transactions that were below the normal value. In the view of Brazil, by doing so, the investigating
authority incorrectly established the export price and, consequently, made a skewed comparison of the
export price with the normal value, in establishing the margin of dumping. Brazil asserts that an
investigating authority should decide whether or not to initiate on the basis of all the evidence
presented in the application. Brazil argues that, under Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement ,
investigating authorities are required to compar e the weighted average normal value with the
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions, and not only those export
transactions for which prices are below the normal value. The methodology used by the investigating
authority resulted in the establishment of an incorrect export price and in an unfair comparison
between the export price and the normal value, contrary to the requirements in Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2.
Finally, Brazil asserts that Argentina’s decision to initiate the investigation pursuant to this method
was based on a biased and non-objective evaluation of the facts before it.
7.55 Argentina asserts that the investigating aut hority analysed the import transactions in an
attempt to determine which of them corresponded closest to the product under investigation.
Argentina asserts that the investigating authority did so for the sole purpose of calculating the most
appropriate and comparable export price possible at the pre-initiation stage. In other words,
Argentina claims that it only excluded those export transactions which were not "like" the product
under investigation. Furthermore, Argentina asserts that the investigating authority worked out an
average of the appropriate transactions, without in fact making any selection which might distort the
difference between the export price and the normal value. According to Argentina, the Report of
7 January 1998 contains the margins of dumping established on the basis of the average price of
export transactions to Argentina involving the product under investigation.
(iii) Claim 6
7.56 Brazil asserts that the Argentine authorities determined normal value for the purpose of
initiation on the basis of information for one day only, while export price data covered several
months. Brazil argues that Article 5.3, read in conjunction with Article 2.4, requires that a fair
comparison be made between the export price and the normal value in respect of sales made at as
nearly as possible the same time. Brazil asserts that, had the investigating authority examined the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application, it would have required the
petitioner to provide normal value data for the entire period under analysis in order to correctly make
a fair comparison with export prices for the same period. In addition, Brazil asserts that the
investigating authority went beyond the scope of the data provided in the application and extended the
period for the export transactions, in order to establish the export price. This, in the view of Brazil,
clearly indicates that the investigating authority did not rely on the information provided in the
application to determine that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the
investigation. Brazil concludes that, by not accura tely examining the evidence in the application and

by adding export price information not provided in the application to determine the initiation of the
investigation, Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
7.57 Argentina asserts that Article 5.3 does not impose any requirements in respect of the time-
periods for which export price and normal value data must be available. Argentina alleges that the
investigating authority acted consistently with Article 2.4. Argentina contends that the basis for
comparison was established in the light of the evidence reasonably available to the applicant and
submitted in the application. Argentina argues that the investigating authority should not be expected
to meet a standard in respect of the examination required by Article 5.3 similar to the standard
required once the investigation has been initiated.
(iv) Claim 8
7.58 Brazil argues that, due to the different data collection periods for dumping and injury used in
the application, the investigating authority could not have found that there was sufficient evidence of
causal link between the dumped imports on June 1997 and the threat of injury on June 1998. Brazil
argues that, in order to verify that there was threat of injury from dumped imports, the dumping data
collected and analyzed should have been extended until June 1998.
7.59 Argentina argues that the investigating authority should not be expected to meet a standard in
respect of the examination required by Article 5.3 similar to the standard required once the
investigation has been initiated.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.60 These claims raise the issue of whether or not the investigating authority complied with the
requirements of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, as interpreted in light of Article 2, when deciding to
initiate its investigation on the basis of the information contained in the application. In addressing this
issue, we shall adopt an approach similar to that of previous panels which have examined claims
under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
74 Thus, in accordance with our standard of review, we shall
determine whether or not an objective and unbiased investigating authority, looking at the facts before
it, could properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causal
link to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. In making this determination,
Article 5.3 requires the investigating authority to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
in the application. Clearly, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence is relevant to the investigating
authority's determination whether there is suffic ient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation. However, it is not merely the fact of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence per se
which is the legal standard under Article 5.3, but the sufficiency of that evidence. In analysing the
sufficiency of evidence, we agree with a previous panel that statements and assertions unsubstantiated
by any evidence do not constitute sufficient evidence within the meaning of Article 5.3.75
7.61 Although Brazil's claims are based on Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, they also raise issues
regarding the relationship between Article 5.3 and other provisions of the AD Agreement, especially
Article 2 thereof.76 We note that this issue was addressed by the panel in Guatemala – Cement II in
the following terms:

74 Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup , supra, note 65, paras. 7.91-7.110; Panel Report, Guatemala –
Cement II, supra, note 48, paras. 8.29-8.58.
75 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, paras. 8.51-8.53.
76 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 102-104 (Claim 4); para. 132 (Claim 6); and paras. 149 and
155 (Claim 8).

“although there is no express reference to evidence of dumping in Article 5.3,
evidence on the three elements necessary for the imposition of an anti-dumping
measure may be inferred into Article 5.3 by way of Article 5.2. In other words,
Article 5.2 requires that the application contain sufficient evidence on dumping,
injury and causation, while Article 5.3 requires the investigating authority to satisfy
itself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to determine that it is sufficient
to justify initiation. Thus, reading Article 5.3 in the context of Article 5.2, the
evidence mentioned in Article 5.3 must be evidence of dumping, injury and
causation. We further observe that the only clarification of the term "dumping" in the
AD Agreement is that contained in Article 2. In consequence, in order to determine
that there is sufficient evidence of dumping, the investigating authority cannot
entirely disregard the elements that configure the existence of this practice as outlined
in Article 2. This analysis is done not with a view to making a determination that
Article 2 has been violated through the initiation of an investigation, but rather to
provide guidance in our review of the Ministry's determination that there was
sufficient evidence of dumping to warrant an investigation. We do not of course
mean to suggest that an investigating auth ority must have before it at the time it
initiates an investigation evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 of the
quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final
determination. An anti-dumping investigation is a process where certainty on the
existence of all the elements necessary in order to adopt a measure is reached
gradually as the investigation moves forward. However, the evidence must be such
that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could determine that there was
sufficient evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 to justify initiation of
an investigation.
794”77
However, the evidence must be such that an un biased and objective investigating authority could
determine that there was sufficient evidence of dum ping within the meaning of Article 2 to justify
initiation of an investigation.
7.63 With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the examination of the claims put forward
by Brazil.

77 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.35.

(i) Claim 2
7.64 The primary issue raised by Claim 2 is whether or not there was sufficient evidence before the
investigating authority at the time of initiation to warrant an adjustment for differences in physical
characteristics between the eviscerated poultry sold in Argentina and that sold in Brazil. This issue
goes to the heart of the claim that there was insu fficient evidence to justify initiation, since the
investigating authority would not have found dumping had it not made the adjustment for the alleged
differences in physical characteristics. Brazil's claim also challenges the investigating authority's
conclusion regarding the amount of the adjustment made.
7.65 We recall that, in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping, the
investigating authority cannot entirely disregard th e elements that configure the existence of this
practice as outlined in Article 2. In a claim concerning adjustments, paragraph 4 of Article 2 is of
particular relevance. Article 2.4 provides in relevant part:
“A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This
comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level,
and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance
shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in (…) physical characteristics...”
7.66 We further note that the issue before us is not whether Argentina was required to make an
adjustment for differences in physical characteristics in deciding to initiate, but whether it was
entitled to do so.
7.67 We turn now to the examination of Brazil's first argument. Brazil claims that the normal
value data contained in the application only related to sales in São Paulo. According to Brazil, even if
that data indicated that poultry was sold in São Paulo with head and feet, that did not mean that
poultry was sold throughout Brazil with head and feet. Argentina asserts that São Paulo is a large
urban centre, and that sales in São Paulo are therefore representative of consumption patterns
throughout Brazil. Brazil does not deny that São Paulo is a large urban centre. We recall that, at the
time of initiation, an investigating authority is not required to possess evidence of dumping of the
quantity (or quality) that it would need to support a preliminary or final determination. In our view, it
is sufficient for an investigating authority to base its decision to initiate on evidence concerning
domestic sales in a major market of the exporting country subject to the investigation, without
necessarily having data for sales throughout that country.
7.68 Brazil also argues that the investigating authority incorrectly accepted a statement by JOX
(attached to the application) as evidence that poultry sold in São Paulo contained head and feet. We
have examined the relevant statement, and find th at it clearly indicates that the JOX domestic price
data provided by the applicant, and relied on by the investigating authority at the time of initiation,
concerned poultry sold in São Paulo with head and feet. Since Brazil has not disputed Argentina's
assertion that JOX was a specialized publication reflecting the state of the São Paulo market, we see
no reason why the investigating authority was not entitled to rely on the JOX statement.
7.69 Brazil further argues that the investigating auth ority did not have sufficient evidence that the
alleged differences in physical characteristics affected price comparability. This issue is closely
linked to Brazil's claim against the amount of the ad justment made by the investigating authority. In
light of our finding on that claim below, we do not consider it necessary to rule on Brazil's argument
concerning the lack of evidence on price comparability.

7.70 Regarding the amount of the adjustment, Brazil notes that the 9.09 per cent adjustment made
by the investigating authority at the time of initiation was calculated on the basis of yield rates 78 set
forth in the application. The applicant stated that the yield rate for poultry sold (with head and feet) in
Brazil was 88 per cent, whereas the yield rate for poultry sold in Argentina (without head and feet)
was 80 per cent. Brazil asserts that the applicant failed to submit any evidence in support of those
yield rates. In response to Question 5 from the Panel, Argentina stated that the evidence supporting
the use of 88 and 80 per cent yield rates was contained in a JOX report included in the application.
 79
However, upon close examination we find that the relevant JOX report does not contain any such
evidence. Indeed, the JOX report makes no reference to yield rates whatsoever.
7.71 In response to an additional question from the Panel, Argentina asserted that:
"The adjustment made by the implementing authority for the differences between the
poultry sold in Brazil and poultry sold in Argentina was included by the applicant
when submitting the application, and applied by the authority as from the initiation of
the investigation on the understanding that the said information was what was
reasonably available to the applicant, that it was reasonable and that the implementing
authority did not have knowledge of any elements to suggest that it should not be
considered. Having evaluated the said information, the authority did not consider that
it was necessary to request additional information in that respect in view of the
standards applicable to the information to be considered at that stage of the
investigation."
80
7.72 This suggests that, according to Argentina, the investigating authority was entitled to make an
adjustment on the basis of the yield rate informatio n included in the application simply because the
information "was reasonable and … the implementing authority did not have knowledge of any
elements to suggest that it should not be considered." We cannot accept this approach because, as we
noted above, statements and assertions unsubstantiated by any evidence do not constitute sufficient
evidence within the meaning of Article 5.3. In light of the lack of evidence to support the yield rates
included in the application, and consequently the adjustment to be made, we fail to see how an
unbiased and objective investigating authority could have considered the yield rate information
available at the time of initiation adequate to support a 9.09 per cent adjustment to normal value.

78 The yield rate refers to the amount of eviscerated poultry obtained from live poultry. According to
the applicant, out of 1 kg of live poultry sold in Brazil (including head and feet), 880 gm of eviscerated poultry
is obtained (including giblets (heart, stomach, neck and liv er), head and feet). This amounts to a yield rate of
88 per cent. According to the applicant, the yield rate for poultry exported to Argentina was less, because sales
to Argentina did not include head and feet. Thus, out of 1 kg of live poultry exported to Argentina, only 800 gm
of eviscerated poultry (including giblets, but no head or feet) is obtained. This gives a yield rate of 80 per cent
for poultry exported to Argentina.
79 It appeared from Argentina's reply to Question 6 of the Panel that supporting information for the
adjustment could be found in a publication by Aves & Ovos, included in the application. However, in its reply
to Question 68 of the Panel, Argentina asserts that that publication does not provide any information with
respect to the 9.09 per cent adjustment carried out. We also take into account the following reply of Argentina:
"as far as normal value is concerned, the evidence considered was the JOX publication of
30 June 1997 accompanying the application, there being no additional requests by the
implementing authority in that respect." (Argentina's reply to Question 9 of the Panel)
This statement confirms our finding that the APCDS did not have at the time of initiation any other
evidence supporting the application other than that examined by us. We recall that we examined the application
and did not find any evidence in it supporting the alleged yield rates of eviscerated poultry.
80 Argentina's reply to Question 11(a) of the Panel.

7.73 In light of the above, we find that the investigating authority did not have adequate
information at the time of initiation to make an adjustment to normal value of 9.09 per cent.
Accordingly, although we have rejected Brazil's arguments regarding the adequacy of the evidence
concerning the need for an adjustment to normal value to reflect differences in physical characteristics
between the poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina respectively, we uphold Brazil's claim regarding the
adequacy of the information concerning the amount of that adjustment. We therefore find that
Argentina violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by determining that it had sufficient evidence of
dumping to initiate an investigation, because its determination of dumping was based on an
adjustment to normal value for which it did not have adequate evidence.
81
(ii) Claim 4
7.74 Brazil asserts that the investigating authority only took into account export prices less than
normal value when calculating the margin of dumping for the purpose of initiation. Brazil submits
that this methodology was not in conformity with Article 5.3, read in conjunction with Article 2.4.2 of
the AD Agreement.
7.75 At the time of initiation, the APCDS calculated four margins of dumping.
82 In its first written
submission, Argentina stated that the decision to initiate was based on the second margin of dumping
calculated by the APCDS, and that the three rema ining margins were used for additional analysis. 83
In response to part of Question 18 from the Panel, Argentina stated that "[t]he period used to
determine the f.o.b. export price in this case was January to June 1997 and August 1997." Since this
was the period covered by the second margin of dumping calculated by the APCDS, this would
confirm Argentina's statement that the decision to initiate was based on the second of the four margins
calculated by the APCDS. Accordingly, for the purpose of analysing Brazil's claim, we shall focus on
the second margin of dumping calculated by the APCDS, since this was the margin on which the
decision to initiate the investigation was based.
7.76 The starting point for the APCDS calculation of the second margin of dumping was the
totality of export transactions recorded in official import statistics for the period January to June 1997
and August 1997. As a first step, the investigating authority discarded export transactions which did
not concern products "like" the product under investigation.
84 Second, the investigating authority
excluded those export transactions with a price th at was higher than or equal to the normal value
(USD/Kg. 1.044). 85 Third, a weighted average export price was calculated using only those
transactions with a price lower than the normal value. Accordingly, the weighted average export price
was not based on the totality of comparable export transactions.
7.77 In examining the compatibility of this me thodology with Article 5.3, read in light of
Article 2.4.2, we note the following statement by the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen:
"By 'zeroing' the 'negative dumping margins', the European Communities, therefore,
did not take fully into account the entirety of the prices of some export transactions,
namely, those export transactions involvin g models of cotton-type bed linen where
'negative dumping margins' were found. Instead, the European Communities treated
those export prices as if they were less than what they were. This, in turn, inflated the
result from the calculation of the margin of dumping. Thus, the European Communities

81 We note Brazil's assertion that there would have been no margin of dumping had the relevant
adjustment not been made. (Brazil's reply to Question 3 of the Panel)
82 Exhibit BRA-2, p. 12 and 13.
83 Argentina's first written submission, para. 80.
84 Argentina's reply to Question 19 of the Panel.
85 Argentina's reply to Question 11(b) of the Panel.

did not establish 'the existence of margins of dumping' for cotton-type bed linen on the
basis of a comparison of the weighted average normal value with the weighted average
of prices of all comparable export transactions – that is, for all transactions involving
 all models or types of the product under investigation. Furthermore, we are also of the
view that a comparison between export price and normal value that does not take fully
into account the prices of all comparable export transactions – such as the practice of
'zeroing' at issue in this dispute – is not a 'fair comparison' between export price and
normal value, as required by Article 2.4 and by Article 2.4.2."86 (emphasis in original)
7.78 We agree with the Appellate Body's analysis. We note that the Appellate Body was primarily
addressing the practice of "zeroing". The practice adopted by Argentina in the present case is more
egregious than zeroing, because it does not mere ly fix the value of comparisons involving certain
export transactions at zero, but totally excludes certain export prices from the weighted average, so
that the weighted average export price used by the investigating authority is even lower than it would
be through zeroing. We are in no doubt that, if zeroing is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, then
Argentina's practice of totally disregarding certain export transactions would also be inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2 because it does not compare the weig hted average normal value with the weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions. In our view, the use of such a practice would
not allow an objective and impartial investigating authority to properly conclude that there was
sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation.
7.79 Argentina asserts that the methodology used by the APCDS has also been used by other WTO
Members.87 Even assuming for the sake of argument that Argentina is correct, this argument is
nevertheless irrelevant. In this dispute, we must determine the conformity of Argentina's
methodology (and not that of other WTO Members) in light of the relevant provisions of the AD
Agreement.
7.80 Argentina also argues that "[w]hat is required [at the time of initiation] is the knowledge that
there have been transactions involving dumping which justify, from that point of view, the initiation
of an investigation."
88 We understand Argentina to argue that, in order to initiate, an investigating
authority need only satisfy itself that there has been some dumping, in the sense that certain
transactions were dumped. We disagree. We recall that, "in order to determine whether or not there
is sufficient evidence of dumping for the purpose of initiation, an investigating authority cannot
entirely disregard the elements that configure the existence of [dumping] outlined in Article 2". 89 A
determination of dumping should be made in respect of the product as a whole, for a given period, and
not for individual transactions concerning that product. An investigating authority therefore cannot
disregard export transactions at the time of initiation simply because they are equal to or greater than
normal value. Disregarding such transactions does not provide a proper basis for determining whether
or not there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation.
7.81 In light of the above, we find that Argentina violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by
initiating its investigation without a proper basis to conclude that there was sufficient evidence of
dumping to justify initiation.

86 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India ("EC – Bed Linen "), WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, para. 55.
87 See footnote 85, supra.
88 Ibid.
89 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.35.

(iii) Claim 6
7.82 The APCDS established the normal value on the basis of a JOX publication setting forth the
prices of poultry for one day – 30 June 1997 – while the export price covered a period of several
months in 1997.90 The issue before us is whether a comparison between a normal value for one day
and an export price for a period of several months constitutes a proper basis for determining whether
or not there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation.
7.83 We recall that, in order to determine that ther e is sufficient evidence of dumping, the
investigating authority cannot entirely disregard th e elements that configure the existence of that
practice as outlined in Article 2. In particular, we note that Article 2.4 requires that a fair comparison
be made between the export price and the normal value in respect of sales "made at as nearly as
possible the same time". In interpreting the term "made at as nearly as possible the same time" in the
context of Article 2.4, we consider it useful to refer to the following finding of the US – Stainless
Steel panel:
"we consider that, in the context of weighted average to weighted average comparisons,
the requirement that a comparison be made between sales made at as nearly as possible
the same time requires as a general matter that the periods on the basis of which the
weighted average normal value and the weig hted average export price are calculated
must be the same." (emphasis in original)
91
7.84 The above finding concerns a definitive determination of a margin of dumping, while the
present claim concerns a pre-initiation determination of sufficient evidence of dumping. At the time
of initiation an investigating authority does not need to be in possession of the same quantity and
quality of evidence that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination of
dumping. However, since evidence of the same type is required upon initiation as for a preliminary or
final determination, in our view there should be a substantial degree of overlap in the periods
considered in order for the comparison of normal value and export price to be fair within the meaning
of Article 2.4. We consider however that Article 5.3, read in light of Article 2.4, cannot be interpreted
to require that data on normal value and export price cover identical periods of time. Otherwise, the
quantity of evidence of dumping required upon initiation would be the same as that required for a
preliminary or final determination of dumping. Thus, we consider that an investigating authority
might comply with the requirements in Article 5.3 even though the periods chosen for the comparison
of a weighted average normal value and a weighted average export price are not identical.
7.85 For a product such as eviscerated poultry, in respect of which there are many transactions
taking place on a daily basis, we are not persuaded that domestic sales data for one day provides
sufficient overlap with export price data for several months for the purpose of Article 5.3. Argentina
asserts that the domestic price for one day was indicative of the trend in prices of poultry sold in São
Paulo over a longer period of time. If that ha d been true, the use of normal value for one day may
well have been consistent with Article 5.3. However, Argentina has not pointed to any evidence in
the record suggesting that the inve stigating authority actually considered normal value evidence for
one day to be indicative of the trend in domestic poultry prices. Furthermore, we note that the
evidence relied on by Argentina (to claim that price data for one day was indicative of a trend in

90 We note that the APCDS calculated four different margins of dumping based on four different export
prices. We also observe that the determination of the existence of sufficient evidence on dumping was based on
a comparison between the normal value for 30 June 1997 and the export price for the period January to
June 1997 and August 1997, as discussed in para. 7.75 supra. Bearing this in mind, under this claim we will
examine whether a comparison between information on normal value for 30 June 1997 and data for export price
for January to June 1997 and August 1997 meets the requirements of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement.
91 Panel Report, US – Stainless Steel, supra, note 65, para. 6.121.

prices) related to live, and not eviscerated, poultry. 92 Although Argentina argued in these proceedings
that stability in the pricing of an input (live poult ry) would result in stability in the pricing of the
finished product (eviscerated poultry), it has failed to identify any evidence to suggest that, at the time
of initiation, the investigating authority considered that stable pricing for live poultry would lead to
stable pricing for eviscerated poultry. Accordingly, Argentina's argument must be rejected.
7.86 We therefore uphold Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement
by initiating the investigation without sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation.
(iv) Claim 8
7.87 Brazil argues that the periods used for the purpose of the dumping and injury determinations
at the time of initiation did not coincide and, hence, a causal link could not have properly been
established.
7.88 We are of the view that it would only be necessary for us to examine this claim if the
investigating authority had had sufficient evidence of dumping and injury – the two elements needed
to carry out the causal link determination – to justify the initiation of the investigation against
eviscerated poultry from Brazil. However, we recall that in our view the investigating authority did
not have sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of that investigation. Having reached
this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to examine Brazil's claim concerning causation.
(c) Conclusion
7.89 For the reasons set forth above, we find that Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3
of the AD Agreement by determining that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the
initiation of an investigation.
2. Sufficiency of the Application – Claims 1 and 5
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) Claim 1
7.90 Brazil asserts that Argentina violated Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement by initiating its
investigation on the basis of an application that did not meet the requirements of that provision.
Brazil asserts that Article 5.2 requires that an application include "evidence" of dumping, injury and
the causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Brazil further asserts that
an allegation or information provided in the application, without supporting documentation, does not
qualify as evidence under Article 5.2. In the view of Brazil, the application which led to the initiation
of the investigation against eviscerated poultry from Brazil did not contain evidence to support an
adjustment for physical characteristics claimed by the applicant. Brazil acknowledges that the
application contained a JOX report dated 30 June 1997, which allegedly supported the applicant's
request for an adjustment. Brazil identifies several problems with the JOX report. Brazil argues that
that report does not constitute evidence that justifies the adjustment. Brazil also asserts that no
evidence was presented showing that price comparability would be affected and that the yield rate
proposed by the petitioner was justified.

92 See Argentina's reply to Question 12 of the Panel: "the right-hand margin of the text [of the Report
of JOX of 30 June 1997] contains CEPA's translation of the following words: " … production on the parallel
market within São Paulo is sharply lower, so that the price remains on very firm ground…". In other words, the
quotation did not vary much, but rather remained stable." (emphasis added)

7.91 Argentina asserts that the applicant provided all of the necessary evidence with respect to the
normal value and the export price as well as the relevant evidence for the adjustments needed in order
to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export value. Argentina also asserts that
the applicant supplied, with its application, the documentation that was available to it. Argentina also
contends that the applicant for the initiation of an investigation is not required to prove beyond all
doubt the existence of dumping, injury and causal link, since the final determination of these elements
is the responsibility of the investigating authority. With regard to the adjustment issue, Argentina
asserts that the applicant submitted the JOX repo rt with information regarding domestic prices of
eviscerated poultry in Brazil. In the view of Argentina, the evidence provided is a representative
value taken from a specialized publication for a given period. Bearing in mind that the JOX report
mentioned that eviscerated poultry was sold in Brazil with head and feet and that poultry exported to
Argentina did not contain head and feet, Argentina concluded that it was necessary to make an
adjustment for physical characteristic differences.
7.92 Brazil agrees with Argentina that the quantum and quality of evidence required prior to
initiation has to be necessarily less than that required for a final determination. However, Brazil
asserts that relevant evidence of the "type" needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to
make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the quality and quantity is less.
(ii) Claim 5
7.93 Brazil argues that the data presented by the petitioner in the application, and used to calculate
the dumping margin, was inconsistent with Article 5.2 in two ways. First, Brazil asserts that, because
the normal value and the export price information provided were for transactions which were not
made at as nearly as possible the same time, the application failed to include sufficient evidence of
dumping as required in Article 5.2. Because in the view of Brazil the timing of the sales transactions
may have implications in respect of the comparability of prices of export and home market
transactions, it argues that the establishment of normal value based on one single day (30 June 1997)
cannot be used as a parameter for a fair comparis on with the export price determined for two periods
of time with more than thirty days each (one for January through June 1997 and the other for
August 1997), neither of which included the one day used to establish the normal value. Second,
Brazil argues that normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997 was reasonably available to the
petitioner in view of the fact that on 26 July 1999 it provided updated information on normal value for
the period 1998 through January 1999.
7.94 Apart from the general comments referred to in para. 7.91 supra, Argentina asserts that
Article 5.2 does not require the applicant to provide evidence of normal value in respect of the entire
period for which evidence of export value was provided. In the view of Argentina, it is clear and
reasonable that the quantity and quality of information available to the applicant on prices in the
market of the exporting country should not be the same as for the export price.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.95 We recall that we have concluded that the APCDS's determination that there was sufficient
evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation was inconsistent with Article 5.3. For
this reason, we do not consider it necessary to rule on Brazil's Article 5.2 claims regarding the
sufficiency of the application.
7.96 Although we do not consider it necessary to make findings on Brazil's Article 5.2 claims, we
do note that the parties' submissions raised the issue of the extent – if any – to which Article 5.2
imposes obligations on Members, as opposed to applicants. We therefore asked the parties for their
views on this matter. Brazil replied:

"Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an application to include
evidence of dumping, injury and causal link. Specifically, the application must
contain information required in items (i) through (iv) of Article 5.2. We cannot
presume from the language in Article 5.2 that these obligations are imposed on the
applicant. Relevant part of Article 5.2 provides that:
“(...) Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot
be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this
paragraph.(...)”. (emphasis added)
The consideration of sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the paragraph
in Article 5.2 is made by the investigating authority and not by the applicant. After
all, the applicant is not the one to consider whether the evidence it submitted in the
application is sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 5.2.
Furthermore, the WTO and its Agreements provide for obligations and rights of
Members of the WTO. Consequently, the Anti-Dumping Agreement also imposes
obligations on Members of the WTO and not on specific interested parties in an
investigation. We cannot, therefore, infer that the obligations under Article 5.2 are
obligations of the applicant and not the investigating authority.
Under Article 5.2 of the Agreement, the investigating authority must check the
application to see whether the information required by that Article is present in the
application. In order for an investigating authority to accept an application it must
consider whether information and evidence in the application is sufficient to meet the
requirements set forth in items (i) through (iv) of Article 5.2. At a subsequent stage,
and once the application has be considered and accepted by the authority as meeting
the requirements in Article 5.2, Article 5.3 of the Agreement imposes another
obligation on the investigating authority. This obligation is the examination of the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine
whether it is sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation." 93 (emphasis in
original)
7.97 Argentina replied:
"It is Argentina's understanding that the Agreement imposes obligations on Members.
In principle, Article 5.2 imposes an obligation on Members with respect to the
information that is required to be provided with the application for the initiation of an
investigation. In other words, Article 5.2 lays down the requirements governing what
the sector wishing to file an application for the initiation of an investigation must
provide with its application."
94
7.98 Thus, both parties agree that Article 5.2 imposes obligations on Members. Without ruling on
this matter, we do not exclude the possibility that Article 5.2 could oblige Members to verify that
applications contain evidence, and not mere assertion, of dumping, injury, and causal link. In
particular, in cases where applicants propose adjustments to normal value, Article 5.2 could oblige
Members to verify that such adjustments are supported by evidence, rather than mere assertion. A
consequence of this obligation may be that applications not meeting the requirements of Article 5.2

93 Brazil's reply to Question 2 of the Panel.
94 Argentina's reply to Question 2 of the Panel.

are rejected. Although Members may choose to correct any deficiencies in an application, 95 they are
not obliged to do so.
3. Failure to Reject the Application – Claims 3, 7 and 31
7.99 These claims are made under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement. Claims 3 and 7 concern the
issue of whether or not the application should have been rejected for lack of sufficient evidence of
dumping. Claim 31 concerns the issue of whether or not the application should have been rejected for
lack of sufficient evidence of injury.
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) Claims 3 and 7
7.100 In Claims 3 and 7, Brazil contends that the application contained no substantial evidence to
support the APCDS's adjustment for differences in phys ical characteristics, or the yield rate used to
make that adjustment. Nor did it contain sufficient evidence to establish normal value. In view of
that, Brazil argues that the application should have been rejected because there was insufficient
evidence of dumping to justify proceeding with the investigation. According to Brazil, failure to
reject the application constituted a violation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
7.101 Argentina asserts that, since the applicant had provided all of the documentation available to
it and the documentation was examined for accuracy and adequacy by the investigating authority,
there was no reason for the implementing authority to reject the application.
(ii) Claim 31
7.102 Brazil asserts that the CNCE issued a determ ination (Record No. 405) dated 7 January 1998
to the effect that the application contained insufficient evidence of injury to justify the initiation of an
investigation. Brazil submits that, in accordance with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement , the
application should have been rejected at that time, because that was the point when the investigating
authority was "satisfied" that there was not sufficient evidence of injury to justify proceeding with the
case.
7.103 Argentina asserts that, following the CNCE de termination contained in Record No. 405, the
applicant submitted new evidence. Argentina points to Article 60 of the Regulations to the National
Law on Administrative Procedures which stipulates that the competent body shall intervene once
again in proceedings if any new developments occur or come to its knowledge. Argentina also points
to an opinion from the Legal Department of the MEyOSP which stated that, before proceeding any
further, the Secretary should ask the CNCE to intervene once again in order to rule on the sufficiency
(from the perspective of injury) of the new information submitted by the applicant. In light of the
above, Argentina concludes that the Argentine authorities would not have acted in conformity with
internal law if they had rejected the application following the CNCE determination in Record
No. 405 and, hence, had not examined the new evidence submitted by the applicant on
17 February 1998. In addition, Argentina asserts that, apart from being contrary to domestic
administrative law, the rejection of the application and closing of the file in January 1998 (pursuant to
the conclusions set forth in Record No. 405) would have adversely affected the individual rights of the
applicant with all of the administrative consequences that such an act would entail.

95 Panel Report, "Guatemala – Cement I, supra, note 73, para. 7.53.

(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.104 We begin by analysing Claim 31.
(i) Claim 31
7.105 In order to resolve Claim 31, we must determine whether, following CNCE's 7 January 1998
conclusion in Record No. 405 that there was not sufficient evidence of injury to justify the initiation
of the investigation, the application should have been rejected.
7.106 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement reads in relevant part as follows:
"An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case."
7.107 Argentina operates a bifurcated anti-dumping system, as explained in more detail in
para. 7.122 infra. Thus, while the DCD (formerly the APCDS) investigates issues of dumping, the
CNCE investigates issues of injury. This division of labour applies both at the time of the (pre-
initiation) review of the application, and during any subsequent investigation. Although only the
Secretary has the authority to decide whether or not to initiate an investigation,
96 the Secretary cannot
decide to initiate an investigation if either the CNCE or the DCD/APCD S have found that there is
insufficient evidence of injury or dumping, respectively, to justify the initiation of an investigation. In
the case at hand, the CNCE issued Record No. 405 on 7 January 1998 to the effect that the application
did not contain sufficient evidence of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.
97 The CNCE's
determination was received by the Secretary on 9 January 1998. 98 We recall that, faced with a
negative assessment of the application by the CNCE, the Secretary is precluded from initiating an
investigation. Accordingly, from the time that the Secretary received the CNCE's negative assessment
of the application, the Secretary should have been satisfied that there was not sufficient evidence on
injury to justify proceeding with the case.99 Thus, in accordance with Article 5.8, the Secretary should
have rejected the application "as soon as" it re ceived CNCE Record No. 405 dated 7 January 1998.
Rather than doing so, however, the Secretary kept the file open, subsequently deciding to initiate the
investigation following the submission of additional information by the applicant. The Secretary
therefore failed to meet the requirements of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
7.108 Argentina argues that rejection of the application "as soon as" the CNCE's negative
assessment was received would have been contrary to domestic administrative law, and would have
adversely affected the individual rights of the applicant, with all of the administrative consequences
that such an act would entail.
100 This does not affect our conclusion that Argentina acted
inconsistently with Article 5.8 in this case. We consider that a WTO Member's domestic law does
not excuse that Member from fulfilling its obligations under the WTO agreements. In acceding to the
WTO, Argentina undertook to be bound by the rules contained in the AD Agreement, and our mandate
is to review Argentina's compliance with those rules. Any failure to respect Article 5.8 may not be
justified on the basis of inconsistent provisions of domestic law. Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement explicitly provides that each Member "shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements". We note

96 Argentina's reply to Question 70 of the Panel.
97 Exhibit BRA-3.
98 See supra, note 96.
99 There is no evidence on the record that the Secretary sought additional information from the
applicant at this stage, or even that the Secretary would have had the authority to do so.
100 Argentina's reply to Question 16 of the Panel.

that a similar view was expressed by the Guatemala – Cement II panel.101 Regarding Argentina's
comment that rejection of the application in January 1998 would have adversely affected the
individual rights of the applicant, we note that there is nothing in the AD Agreement that would have
prevented the applicant from filing an additional application after rejection of its original application.
For this reason, we reject the argument that the individual rights of the applicant would have been
negatively affected by the rejection of the application in January 1998.
7.109 In light of the above, we find that, by failing to reject the application "as soon as" the negative
assessment from the CNCE was received, the Secretary violated Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Claims 3 and 7
7.110 Brazil's Claims 3 and 7 are dependent on a finding of violation under Claims 1, 2, 5 and 6. In
other words, Brazil asserts that, if the investigating authorities' treatment of the application and
decision to initiate constitute violations of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement, then it should
never have initiated the investigation in the firs t place, and should instead have rejected the
application in accordance with Article 5.8.
7.111 We recall that we have concluded in para. 7.89 supra that Argentina violated Article 5.3 of
the AD Agreement by determining that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the
initiation of an investigation. Since the factual basis for Claims 3 and 7 is identical to that for
Claims 2 and 6, and since we have already found that those factual circumstances constitute a
violation of Article 5.3, it is not necessary to address Brazil's Claims 3 and 7.
(c) Conclusion
7.112 In light of the above, we find that Argentina acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 5.8 in failing to reject the application "as soon as" the Secretary received the CNCE's negative
assessment (in the form of record No. 405) on 9 January 1998.
4. Simultaneous Examination of the Evidence and Failure to Reject the Application –
Claim 9
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.113 Brazil asserts that the time-periods covered by data used for the purpose of examining
whether there was sufficient evidence of dumping and injury to justify the initiation of the
investigation were different. Brazil alleges that while the period covered to establish sufficient
evidence of dumping included portions of 1996 and 1997, the period taken into account to establish
sufficient evidence of injury ended in June 1998. In the view of Brazil, the use of different data
collection periods for dumping and injury in the decision to initiate the investigation was inconsistent
with Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement in two ways. First, Brazil asserts that the collection period for
dumping should have been extended to include all of the period considered for injury purposes, i.e.,
until June 1998. In the view of Brazil, the fact that different periods were considered indicates that
the dumping and injury evidence was not considered simultaneously in the decision whether or not to
initiate the investigation. Second, Brazil asserts that Argentina failed to comply with Article 5.7 by
not considering the evidence of both dumping and injury simultaneously in the same decision to
initiate the investigation. Brazil argues that the APCDS determined that there was sufficient evidence
of dumping in its report of 7 January 1998. Brazil asserts that the CNCE determined that there was
sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation on 22 September 1998, following its
review of additional information submitted by the applicant. In the view of Brazil, this shows that the

101 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.83.

evidence of injury was considered more than eigh t months after the dumping evidence, in breach of
Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement. Brazil argues that, for Argentina to have met the requirement in
Article 5.7, a new dumping determination taking into account the additional dumping information
presented by the applicant on 17 February 1998 should have occurred on 22 September 1998, the date
when the CNCE decided that there was sufficient evidence of threat of material injury.
7.114 Argentina argues that the fact that the dates of the reports in which the APCDS and the CNCE
found sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury are different does not mean that, at the
moment of deciding on the initiation of the investigation, the Argentine authorities did not consider
simultaneously the evidence of dumping and injury.
7.115 The United States, as a third party, argues that Brazil's argument is based on a
misinterpretation of the term "simultaneously" as this term is used in Article 5.7. In the view of the
United States, when viewed in context, the term "s imultaneously" in Article 5.7 is linked to the term
"considered", not the term "evidence". Thus, in the view of the United States, the obligation in
Article 5.7 is to consider the evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously (for example, in
concurrent investigations), not to consider evidence of dumping and injury collected from
simultaneous (or identical) time-periods.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.116 The issue before us is whether Argentina violated Article 5.7 by not considering
simultaneously evidence of both dumping and injury in the decision whether or not to initiate an
investigation. Brazil raises two main arguments in support of its claim. First, the periods covered by
data used to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of dumping and injury to justify the
initiation of the anti-dumping investigation were different. Second, Brazil argues that the requirement
of Article 5.7 could not have been met because the Argentine authorities considered evidence of
injury and dumping at different times.
7.117 Article 5.7 provides in relevant part:
"The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in
the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation…"
7.118 In our view, Article 5.7 imposes a procedural obligation on the investigating authority to
examine the evidence before it of dumping and injury simultaneously, rather than sequentially, inter
alia in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation. We are of the view that Article 5.7 is
not concerned with the substance of the decision to initiate an investigation, which is dealt with in
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. We note that a previous panel has expressed a similar view on this
matter.
102
7.119 We turn to Brazil's first argument. Brazil asserts that the periods covered by data used to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence of dum ping and injury to justify the initiation of the
investigation were different. In other words, Brazil seems to argue that Article 5.7 requires a Member
to ensure that its investigating authorities consider evidence of dumping and injury from simultaneous
time-periods. We disagree with Brazil's interpretation. Consistent with our view expressed in
para. 7.118 supra, we recall that Article 5.7 imposes only a procedural obligation on the part of the
authorities of the importing Member. We do not consider that Article 5.7 imposes obligations of a

102 The panel in Guatemala – Cement II expressed its view that "Article 5.7 requires the investigating
authority to examine the evidence before it on dumping and injury simultaneously, rather than sequentially" and
that "the fulfilment of this requirement is [not] conditioned in any way on the substantive nature of that
evidence." (emphasis added) (Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.67)

substantive nature. In essence, Brazil argues that evidence of dumping and injury must cover
simultaneous periods. We consider that this argument concerns the substantive nature of the evidence
considered by the authorities in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, rather than the
timing of the consideration itself. Brazil's argument therefore falls outside the scope of the obligation
contained in Article 5.7. We therefore reject Brazil's first argument.
7.120 The second argument put forward by Brazil is that the requirement of Article 5.7 could not
have been met because the Argentine authorities considered evidence of injury and dumping at
different times. We recall that the CNCE initially found in January 1998 that the application did not
contain sufficient evidence of injury, whereas the APCDS found that it did contain sufficient evidence
of dumping. As a result of the CNCE's determination, the applicant submitted additional, updated
evidence of both dumping and injury in February 1998. While the Secretary referred the additional,
updated evidence of injury to the CNCE, it did not refer the additional, updated evidence of dumping
to the APCDS. Thus, when the CNCE found in September 1998 that the additional, updated evidence
of injury was sufficient to justify initiation, that finding was based on more recent data than the
ACPDS's January 1998 determination (based on dumpin g data contained in the original application)
that there was sufficient evidence of dumping. Since Brazil's argument concerns the timing of the
consideration of evidence of dumping and injury, it is in principle covered by the scope of the
procedural obligation contained in Article 5.7. We must now determine whether or not Argentina
complied with that obligation. In addressing this issue, we shall first determine what constitutes "the
decision whether or not to initiate an investigation", and then examine whether evidence of dumping
and injury was simultaneously considered in that decision.
7.121 Brazil argues that there were in fact two decisions for the purposes of Article 5.7: one by the
APCDS in January 1998, and another by the CNCE in September 1998. Argentina argues that there
was only one decision whether or not to initiate the investigation, and that it was taken by the
Secretary on 20 January 1999.
103 Argentina acknowledges that this decision is based on the
determinations on dumping and injury received by the Secretary from the APCDS and the CNCE,
respectively. At the outset, we consider that "the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation"
must be a decision that occurs before, or at the same time as, the moment of initiation of an
investigation, because the purpose of the decision is to determine whether or not to initiate an
investigation. We further note that Article 5.7 uses the term "decision" in singular form rather than
plural. We believe that this means that there is normally one decision in which the relevant authority
of the importing Member determines whether or not to initiate an investigation. We consider that it is
only in this decision, and not in other decisions, that the relevant investigating authority must
simultaneously consider the evidence of dumping and injury.
7.122 Having said that, we must examine the relevant facts of the present dispute. Brazil's argument
is that the requirement of Article 5.7 could not have been met because the Argentine authorities
considered evidence of injury and dumping at different times. In order to understand how the
Argentine system works, we posed various questions to Argentina.
104 Argentina explained that it has
a bifurcated system, in which the APCDS – currently the DCD – and the CNCE examine dumping
and injury, respectively. Consistent with this separation, at the pre-initiation stage those two agencies
examine separately the evidence available and determine whether there is sufficient evidence of
dumping and injury, respectively, to justify the initiation of an investigation. These separate
determinations are sent by both agencies to the authority in charge of deciding whether or not to
initiate an investigation, which is the Secretary. Taking into account the explanations received from
the parties, it is clear to us that the Secretary is the authority entitled to decide whether or not to
initiate an anti-dumping investigation in Argentina. In this regard, we note that Article 37 of Decree
No. 2121/94 provides in relevant part "the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade and the National

103 Exhibit BRA-7.
104 Questions 15, 22 and 23.

Commission for Foreign Trade (…) shall submit their conclusions to the Secretary for Foreign Trade for
a decision on the opening of the investigation to be taken...".105 Brazil acknowledges that "the MEOSP
[is] the authority that issued the decision to initiate the investigation." 106 If the MEyOSP – through
the Secretary – is the authority entrusted to decide whether or not to initiate an investigation, then it is
with respect to the Secretary's decision whether or not to initiate an investigation against poultry from
Brazil that the evidence of dumping and injury should have been considered simultaneously. Brazil's
argument that the requirement of Article 5.7 could not have been met because the APCDS and the
CNCE considered evidence of injury and dumping at different times must therefore be rejected,
because the APCDS and CNCE's determinations were not subject to the requirements of Article 5.7.
Provided the Secretary, who is the relevant authority, considered the evidence of dumping and injury
simultaneously in his decision to initiate, the requirement of Article 5.7 is met. Brazil has not argued
that the Secretary failed to meet this requirement.
7.123 Finally, Brazil argued that, for Argentina to have met the requirement in Article 5.7, a new
dumping determination taking into account the updated information presented by the applicant in
February 1998 should have been made on 22 September 1998 (which was the date on which the
CNCE issued its determination regarding the addi tional injury data submitted by the applicant in
February 1998).
107 We do not agree with Brazil. We recall that Article 5.7 does not impose
obligations of a substantive nature. To the extent that this argument concerns the substance of the
decision, it must therefore be rejected. Nevertheless, even if that argument were of a procedural
nature, we recall that the Secretary is the authority entrusted to decide whether or not to initiate an
investigation and hence it is the Secretary's decision – and not that of the CNCE or the APCDS – that
must be considered the "decision whether or not to initiate an investigation" within the meaning of
Article 5.7. In light of the above, we find that Argentina did not violate Article 5.7 of the AD
Agreement simply because the APCDS and CNCE determinations on dumping and injury,
respectively, were issued at different times.
(c) Conclusion
7.124 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina acted inconsistently with
Article 5.7 by not considering, in the decision whether or not to initiate the investigation, the evidence
of dumping and injury simultaneously.
5. Failure to Notify Known Exporters – Claim 10
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.125 Brazil asserts that Article 12.1 requires that, in addition to a public notice, a notification (to
certain interested parties and the exporting Member) be given when the authorities are satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. The public notice was given
when Resolution No. 11 was issued announcing the initiation of the investigation on 25 January 1999.
Brazil asserts that it was notified of the initiation on 1 February 1999. Five Brazilian exporters
(Avipal, Frangosul, Nicolini, Sadia, and Seara) were also notified of the initiation through
communications from the CNCE and the DCD date d 10 and 16 February 1999, respectively. Brazil
asserts that another group of seven exporters (Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano,
Penabranca and Perdigão) were only notified of the initiation of the investigation in September 1999,
even though at least five of those seven expo rters were known to the CNCE and the APCDS in
January 1999. In this regard, Brazil notes that the Report of 7 January 1999 listed ten Brazilian

105 Document notified by Argentina and available in the WTO website (http://www.wto.org) under
reference G/ADP/N/1/ARG/1 / G/SCM/N/1/ARG/1.
106 Brazil's reply to Question 22 by the Panel.
107 Ibid.

exporters, including Catarinense, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano and Perdigão. Brazil argues that the
September 1999 notification to these seven exporters did not comply with the requirement under
Article 12.1 because it was not made "when the authorities [were] satisfied that there [was] sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation".
7.126 Argentina asserts that Resolution No. 11 initiating the investigation was published in the
Official Bulletin on 25 January 1999. Argentina asserts that it notified Brazil of the initiation of the
investigation through a Note dated 1 February 1999 addressed to the Mission of Brazil in Argentina.
In this communication, Argentina requested the cooperation of the Brazilian authorities "in
identifying the interested producers/exporters in th at investigation." Argentina asserts that the DCD
notified the exporters Avipal, Frangosul, Nicolini, Sadia and Seara of the initiation of the
investigation on 16 February 1999. Argentina asserts further that, through the questionnaire response
of an importer dated 21 April 1999, it learned of the interest of seven other Brazilian exporters in the
investigation. These exporters were Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Penabranca
and Perdigão. Argentina asserts that the importer requested that the Argentine authorities contact
those exporters. As a result of this request , the DCD contacted Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó,
Comaves, Minuano and Perdigão on 15 September 1999 and requested information from them.
Argentina argues that the investigating authority satisfied the Article 12.1 requirement of public
notice and notification to interested parties (exporter or foreign producer) known to have an interest,
such as the Government of Brazil, and that it would have been impossible to notify parties whose
interest in the investigation was not known. Argentina asserts that it requested the assistance of the
Government of Brazil in informing potential intere sted parties of the initiation of the investigation.
Argentina argues that notification must be given to those parties that are considered interested within
the meaning of Article 6.11, and that are known and identified in such a way as to make such
notification possible and identified as interested parties. Regarding Brazil's statement that Argentina
implicitly acknowledged that it knew of certain exporters by listing them in the Report of
7 January 1998, Argentina stated that those exporters had not been sufficiently identified to allow the
relevant questionnaires to be sent to them.
7.127 Brazil asserts that Article 12.1 imposes the obligation to notify interested parties on the
investigating authorities of the importing Member, and not the authorities of the exporting Member.
Brazil notes that Argentina tries to share this obligation with Brazil when it states that it notified the
Brazilian authorities and requested their cooperation to identify the producers and exporters. Brazil
asserts that it never received any communication from the Argentine authorities requesting such
information concerning the five specific exporters identified in the Report of 7 January 1998. Brazil
further argues that Argentina's argument that the authority must notify only those parties that consider
themselves interested in the investigation, within the meaning of Article 6.1.1, is untenable. Brazil
asks how a party can present itself as an interested party if it does not even know that an investigation
has been initiated? In the view of Brazil, that is exactly why Article 12.1 requires the authority to
notify interested parties known to them.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.128 The issue before us is whether or not Argentina complied with its notification obligations
under Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement in respect of Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves,
Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão. As always, we start with the relevant provision in the AD
Agreement, which in this case is Article 12.1. This provides in relevant part:
"When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be
notified..."

7.129 Article 12.1 requires the authorities of the importing Member to notify the initiation of an
investigation to the WTO Member or Members the products of which are subject to such
investigation. Article 12.1 also requires those authorities to notify "other interested parties known to
the investigating authorities to have an interest" in the investigation. As far as the timing of the
notification is concerned, Article 12.1 provides that the notification shall take place when the
authorities of the importing Member are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5.
7.130 In addressing this issue, we must first establish whether or not the relevant exporters were
"interested parties" in the meaning of Article 12.1. If they were, we must then examine whether or
not their interest was known to the investigating authority.
7.131 The phrase "interested parties" is defined in Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement. We consider
that it is appropriate to be guided by the definition set forth in Article 6.11 since that definition is
expressly provided for the purposes of the AD Agreement as a whole, including therefore Article 12.1.
According to Article 6.11(i), exporters or foreign producers of a product subject to investigation
constitute "interested parties". In an attachment to CEPA's application of 2 September 1997, a table
sourced from the Associação Paulista de Avicultura listed Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves,
Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão as exporters to Argentina of whole poultry.
108 Accordingly, based
on the evidence before it at the time of initiation, there is a prima facie case that those exporters were
"interested parties" within the meaning of Article 6.11 and, therefore, Article 12.1. By definition,
"interested parties" necessarily have an interest in the investigation. The evidence before the
investigating authority at the time of initiation further establishes prima facie that those exporters'
interest was known to the investigating authority, since those exporters were expressly identified in
that evidence. There is therefore prima facie evidence that those exporters were "interested parties
known to the investigating authorities to have an interest" in the investigation. Accordingly, there is a
prima facie case that those exporters should have been notified in accordance with Article 12.1.
7.132 Argentina asserts that it was not able to notify those exporters because the requisite contact
details were not available to its authorities. In support, Argentina refers to a letter dated
1 February 1999 to the Brazilian Embassy in Argentina, in which the authorities requested Brazil's
cooperation "in identifying the interested producers/exporters in this investigation and providing them
with the attached requests for information, in order that they should supply the Argentine Government
with the details requested on the product under investigation".
109 In our view, this letter does not
support Argentina's argument that it could not make an Article 12.1 notification to the above-
mentioned exporters because it did not have the requisite contact details. Instead, this letter
demonstrates to us that the Argentine authorities failed to treat the above-mentioned exporters as
"known … to have an interest" in the investigation. If it had treated them thus, the letter would have
specifically identified those exporters, and specifically requested contact details for them. Instead, the
letter contained only a general request for assistance, without any reference to the specific exporters at
issue. We accept that there may be circumstances in which an investigating authority may not have
sufficient information to allow it to notify all in terested parties known to have an interest in an
investigation. In this sense, the fact that an exporter is "known" by the investigating authority to have
an interest in an investigation does not necessarily mean that sufficient details concerning the exporter
are "known" to the investigating authority such that it may make the Article 12.1 notification. In
other words, knowledge of an exporter's interest in an investigation does not necessarily imply
knowledge of contact details regarding that exporte r. In such circumstances, however, we consider
that the nature of the Article 12.1 notification obli gation is such that the investigating authority
should make all reasonable efforts to obtain the requisite contact details. Sending a letter with only a

108 Exhibit BRA-1, p. 190.
109 Exhibit ARG-III, p. 729-730.

very general request for assistance, without specifying the exporters for which contact details are
required, does not satisfy the need to make all reasonable efforts.
7.133 Argentina also submits that "the initiation of an investigation is a general administrative
procedure and published as such in the Official Journal, which constitutes sufficient notification of
general scope".110 In other words, Argentina suggests that, by fulfilling the requirement to publish a
notice of initiation of an investigation, it has fulfilled the obligation to notify. We do not agree.
Article 12.1 clearly imposes two separate obligations, one to notify and another to give public notice.
These separate obligations must both be fulfilled in any given investigation. We therefore reject
Argentina's argument.
7.134 We have concluded that Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Penabranca and
Perdigão should have been notified in accordance with Article 12.1. Although questionnaires were
sent to some of these exporters on 15 September 1999, we do not understand Argentina to argue that
this communication constitutes notification for the purpose of Article 12.1. In any event, we are of
the view that a communication made approximately eight months after initiation would not satisfy the
requirements of Article 12.1. Article 12.1 provides that notification must be made "when" the
authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation. The word "when" is
defined inter alia as “as soon as”.
111 Thus, Article 12.1 requires notification as soon as the authorities
are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation. A notification made approximately 8
months after initiation clearly does not satisfy this requirement of expediency.
(c) Conclusion
7.135 In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina violated Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement
by failing to notify Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão of the
initiation of the investigation.
6. Failure to Give 30 Days to Reply to the Questionnaire / Failure to Provide the Injury
Questionnaire – Claim 11
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.136 Brazil alleges that Argentina violated Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement because (i) the
investigating authority gave CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Perdigão and
Penabranca only 20 days to reply to the questionnaire and (ii) these exporters never received the
injury questionnaire issued by the CNCE.
7.137 Argentina acknowledges that the DCD contacted certain Brazilian exporters on
15 September 1999.
112 In these communications, the DCD requested those Brazilian exporters to
submit evidence on, inter alia , sales prices in the domestic market, export prices and costs. 113
Argentina asserts that the DCD sent the questionnaire forms for the sole purpose of responding
adequately to the general requirements and enabling exporters to attach any other information that
they considered important.114 According to Argentina, only one of those seven exporters, Catarinense,
provided a reply to the questionnaire. Argentina alleges that it not only granted the Brazilian

110 Argentina's first written submission, para. 167.
111 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1595.
112 Argentina's first written submission, paras. 127, 133, and 134.
113 Argentina's reply to Question 28 of the Panel.
114 Ibid.

exporters a period of more than 30 days to reply to the questionnaires, but also acceded to their
requests for extension by granting them whenever practicable.115
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.138 This claim concerns communications allegedly sent to the following seven exporters: CCLP,
Catarinense, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão. There are two issues before us.
First, we will have to determine whether the DCD failed to give certain specific Brazilian exporters 30
days to reply to the dumping questionnaire it sent to them.
116 The second issue before us concerns
whether the CNCE's injury questionnaire should also have been sent to the seven exporters identified
by Brazil.
7.139 We start our analysis of the first issue by examining the text of Article 6.1.1 of the AD
Agreement:
"Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an anti-dumping
investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply. Due consideration should be
given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown,
such an extension should be granted whenever practicable." (footnote in original
omitted)
7.140 On its face, Article 6.1.1 is straightforward. In accordance with the first sentence of that
provision, exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an anti-dumping
investigation must be given at least 30 days for reply. Since the second sentence of Article 6.1.1
envisages extensions of the 30-day period provided for in the first sentence of Article 6.1.1, that 30-
day period is an absolute minimum that must be granted to exporters from the outset. In other words,
any extension is in addition to the initial (minimum) 30-day period provided for in the first sentence.
7.141 Brazil claims that the requests for information that Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves,
Minuano and Perdigão received on 15 September 1999 constitute questionnaires falling within the
scope of Article 6.1.1, and that there was a violation of that provision because the exporters were only
provided 20 days to respond to those questionnaires. Argentina does not deny that on
15 September 1999 it requested information from thos e exporters. According to Argentina, the
information requested "consisted, inter alia, of sales prices in the domestic market, export prices and
costs."117 Nor does Argentina deny that it sent those exporters a copy of the questionnaire sent out to
other exporters / foreign producers at the beginning of its investigation. Argentina asserts that it did
so "for the sole purpose of responding adequately to the general requirements and enabling exporters
to attach any other information that they considered important." 118 Only one of the exporters
contacted on 15 September 1999 responded to the DCD's request for information. That exporter did
so by responding to the 11 sections of the questionnaire attached to the DCD's request for
information. That exporter therefore clearly understood that it had been asked to respond to the

115 Argentina's first written submission, para. 134.
116 With respect to Penabranca, Brazil asserted that this exporter was notified by the DCD on
15 September 1999 and was given 20 days to reply to the questionnaire. However, Brazil asserted that from the
documents of the investigation to which it had access, it was unable to find the DCD's notification to
Penabranca. Brazil therefore failed to provide copies of any documentation sent by the Argentine authorities to
Penabranca. We recall that, being the complainant, Brazil is obliged to present a prima facie case of violation.
Brazil has not shown us – nor referred us to – any document on the record which proves that Penabranca was
given only 20 days to reply to the questionnaire. Thus, we consider that Brazil has not presented a prima facie
case that the DCD failed to give Penabranca at least 30 days to respond to the DCD's dumping questionnaire.
117 Argentina's reply to Question 28 of the Panel.
118 Argentina's reply to Question 28 of the Panel. See also Exhibit BRA-13, and Sections VII.3.1 to
VII.3.6 of Exhibit BRA-15.

DCD's questionnaire. In these circumstances, we c onsider that the requests for information sent to
Brazilian exporters on 15 September 1999 were in the form of "questionnaire[s]" within the meaning
of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
7.142 With respect to the time given to CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, and
Perdigão to reply to the questionnaires, we should note that there is some uncertainty regarding
Argentina's argument on this issue. On the one hand, in response to Question 31 from the Panel,
Argentina stated that "[e]xporters have a right to the 30 days, and the 30 days are granted. The
alternative examined by the Panel of initially granting a lesser period and then increasing the number
of days to 30 does not reflect the system applied by Argentina. What the Argentine authority stated
was that in addition to the 30 days, it granted the requested extensions. It is understood that the time-
limits granted for responding to the requests should be in keeping with the nature and complexity of
those requests. Thus, the initial 30-day period for replying in full to the basic investigation
questionnaire at the outset is appropriate." On the other hand, the communications sent to those
Brazilian exporters show that they were given 20 days to send their replies to the investigating
authority.
119 This has not been denied by Argentina. Based on the facts before us, we are therefore in
no doubt that the DCD only allowed an initial period of 20 days for the relevant questionnaire
responses.
7.143 Argentina also argues that the period allowed for the relevant questionnaire responses was
sufficient for the purpose of Article 6.1.1 because only one of the exporters contacted by the DCD on
15 September 1999 (i.e., Catarinense) replied to the questionnaire; the others either did not export the
product concerned to Argentina (i.e., CCLP and Chapecó) or did not show an interest in the
investigation and did not submit any information (i.e., Comaves, Minuano, and Perdigão). 120 We fail
to see the relevance of this fact. The requirement in the first sentence of Article 6.1.1 is that exporters
or producers shall be given at least 30 days to reply to the questionnaire, irrespective of whether or not
they actually choose to do so.
7.144 Since the DCD failed to allow the exporters contacted on 15 September 1999 an initial period
of at least 30 days to respond to the questionnaires sent by the DCD, Argentina failed to comply with
the requirement set forth in the first sentence of Article 6.1.1.
7.145 The second question before us is whether or not Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement required
the CNCE to send its injury questionnaire to the seven exporters identified by Brazil. 121 We read the
first sentence of Article 6.1.1 to mean that if questionnaires are sent to exporters or foreign producers,
they shall be given at least 30 days for reply. The first sentence of that Article does not, however,
address which questionnaires should be sent to exporters or foreign producers. Accordingly, the
failure to send a particular questionnaire to exporters or foreign producers does not constitute a
violation of Article 6.1.1.
7.146 Finally, Argentina asserts that Brazil did not challenge in the course of the investigation the
circumstances which form the basis of the claim before us.122 However, the fact that an argument was
not raised in the context of the investigation, in particular an argument relating to a violation of a
procedural provision in the AD Agreement, does not preclude a party from raising it at a later stage in

119 Exhibit BRA-13.
120 Argentina's first written submission, para. 133 and Argentina's second oral statement, para. 41.
121 We note that, in para. 212 of its first written submission, Brazil asserts that '[t]he CNCE never
notified these seven exporters of the investigation…' However, we do not understand that Brazil is claiming
that Argentina acted in violation of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement on the basis that the CNCE never notified
the initiation of the investigation to those seven exporters. In our view, any such claim would be unfounded as
Article 6.1.1 is clearly not a provision concerned with the notification of the initiation of an investigation.
122 Argentina's first written submission, para. 136 and Argentina's second oral statement, para. 44.

a WTO panel proceeding. 123 We note that Argentina has not argued that this issue is not properly
before us, or that it falls outside our terms of reference.
(c) Conclusion
7.147 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Argentina violated Article 6.1.1 of the AD
Agreement because it failed to give Catarinense, CCLP, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, and Perdigão
at least 30 days to reply to the DCD's dumping questionnaire. We further conclude that Argentina did
not violate Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement by not sending the CNCE's injury questionnaire to the
exporters identified by Brazil.
7. Failure to Make Evidence Available Promptly to Certain Brazilian Exporters –
Claim 12
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.148 Brazil alleges that, because the DCD and the CNCE did not inform Catarinense, CCLP,
Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão of the initiation of the investigation and of
the need to submit responses, those seven exporters did not have evidence that was presented in
writing by other interested parties made promptly available to them. In the view of Brazil, evidence
could not be made readily or i mmediately available to these exporters if they were notified to
participate eight months after the investigation had been initiated and after a preliminary
determination of dumping, injury and causal link had been made. Brazil further argues that
companies that are aware of an ongoing investigation qualify as "interested parties participating in the
investigation", even if they do not show an inte rest in the investigation. Brazil asserts that
Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão and Penabranca were not aware of the
ongoing investigation until they were notified by the authorities, eight months after it had been
initiated.
7.149 Argentina replies that the DCD and the CNCE met the requirement in Article 6.1.2 because
they promptly made available to the interested parties participating in the investigation evidence
presented in writing by other interested parties. Argentina asserts that the DCD and the CNCE could
hardly have made available evidence presented in writing by the other interested parties participating
in the investigation to the seven Brazilian exporters if those exporters were not part of the
investigation. Argentina's obligation was to make available promptly to the other interested parties
participating in the investigation evidence presen ted in writing by one interested party, which
Argentina asserts the DCD and the CNCE did.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.150 The issue before us is whether the investigatin g authorities were required to make available
evidence presented by other interested parties to Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano,
Penabranca and Perdigão.

123 In this regard, we note that an argument similar to that raised by Argentina before us was examined
by two GATT panels, namely US – Norwegian Salmon AD and US – Norwegian Salmon CVD . In both cases,
the panels did not find any basis to refuse to consid er a claim by a signatory in dispute settlement merely
because the subject matter of the claim had not been raised before the investigating authorities under domestic
law. (Panel Report, Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from
Norway ("US – Norwegian Salmon AD
 "), adopted 27 April 1994, BISD 41S/I/229, para. 349 and Panel Report,
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (" US –
Norwegian Salmon CVD "), adopted 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/II/576, paras. 218)

7.151 Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement reads as follows:
"Subject to the requirement to protect c onfidential information, evidence presented in
writing by one interested party shall be ma de available promptly to other interested
parties participating in the investigation." (emphasis added)
7.152 We understand Article 6.1.2 to impose an obligation on investigating authorities to make
evidence available promptly to other interested parties participating in the investigation.
7.153 We note that Article 6.1.2 does not refer to "interested parties" but to "interested parties
participating in the investigation." Thus, the te rm "interested parties" is qualified by the term
"participating".124 In our view, had the drafters intended to extend the obligation imposed by
Article 6.1.2 to all interested parties as defined in Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement, they would not
have included the term "participating". We must first determine what the ordinary meaning of the
term "participating" is. We note that Article 6.1.2 uses the term "parties participating in the
investigation." The ordinary meaning of the term “participate” is "share or take part (in)".
125 This
definition of the term "participating" suggests to us that, in order to participate in an investigation, a
party must undertake some action. 126 In our view, the mere knowledge by an interested party of an
ongoing investigation does not make that party an interested party "participating in the investigation"
within the meaning of Article 6.1.2 unless it actively takes part in the investigation. Thus, we have to
examine in light of the record before us whethe r the exporters identified by Brazil were actively
taking part in the investigation. In this regard, Brazil asserts that those exporters were not even aware
of the investigation until they were contacted by the DCD on 15 September 1999. 127 We consider
that, if they were not even aware of the investigation, they could not possibly have participated in that
investigation within the meaning of Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement .128 Since the relevant
exporters were not "participating" in the investigation, the investigating authority was not required to
promptly make evidence presented in writing by other interested parties available to them.

124 Bearing in mind the text of Article 6.1.2, we cannot agree with an interpretation of Article 6.1.2
which ignores the term "participating in the investigation."
125 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 996.
126 For the purposes of Article 6.1.2, we are of the view that the term "interested parties" should be
interpreted in light of Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement . Thus, we find that the term "interested parties" in
Article 6.1.2 includes "an exporter or foreign producer (…) of a product subject to investigation", such as the
Brazilian exporters Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão.
127 "Brazil reaffirms that the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão,
Comaves and PenaBranca were not aware of the ongoing investigation until they were notified by the
authorities, eight months after it had been initiated." (emphasis in original) (Brazil's reply to Question 32 of the
Panel) We recall that Brazil has failed to produce an y evidence that Penabranca was contacted by the DCD on
15 September 1999 (see note 116 above). However, this is not relevant to the issue of whether or not
Penabranca was participating in the investigation.
128 Brazil argues that, if an investigating authority fails to notify a foreign producer or an exporter of
the initiation of the investigation, the requirement set forth in Article 6.1.2 cannot possibly be met. We disagree,
since the beneficiaries of the obligation in Article 6.1.2 are different from the beneficiaries of the obligation in
Article 12.1. Whereas Article 6.1.2 applies in respect of interested parties "participating in the investigation",
Article 12.1 applies in respect of interested parties "known to the investigating authorities to have an interest" in
the investigation. Thus, a violation of Article 12.1 does not automatically entail a violation of Article 6.1.2.
The fact that interested parties were not participating in the investigation because they were not notified of the
initiation of the investigation does not change the fact that the beneficiaries of the obligations in Articles 12.1
and 6.1.2 are different. We consider that the Brazilian exporters were not aware of the investigation because
they had not been notified in accordance with Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement . We recall that separate
findings have been reached under Claim 10 in para. 7.135 supra with respect to this matter.

(c) Conclusion
7.154 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 6.1.2 by
failing to promptly make available to Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca
and Perdigão evidence presented in writing by other interested parties involved in the investigation.
8. Interested Party's Right to Defend Its Interests – Claim 13
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.155 Brazil argues that Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca and
Perdigão did not have a full opportunity to defend their interests in violation of Article 6.2 of the AD
Agreement. Brazil asserts that those exporters were only given 20 days to reply to the questionnaire,
in breach of Article 6.1.1. Brazil further asserts that the CNCE did not notify those exporters of the
initiation of the investigation, nor provide them with injury questionnaires. Finally, Brazil argues
that, since those exporters were not notified of the investigation and of the need to submit replies to
the questionnaire until eight months after the initiation of the investigation, evidence presented by
other interested parties was not made available promptly to them.
7.156 Argentina replies that, once the investigation had started, Argentina made available the
documentation relating to the proceedings at issue to interested parties such as the exporters and the
Brazilian authorities. Argentina asserts that author ized interested parties could consult the file and
obtain a copy thereof at all times. Any other party that considered itself as having an interest therein
could present itself at the offices of the investigating authority with a request to consult the file.
Regarding the issue of sending the notification of the initiation to certain exporters on
15 September 1999, Argentina argues that the obligation to give public notice and to notify the
interested parties applies only to parties known to have an interest in the investigation. Argentina
asserts that it would have been impossible to notify parties whose interest therein was not known. In
this regard, Argentina asserts that the investigating authority notified the Government of Brazil of the
initiation of the investigation and requested its cooperation in order to identify the interested
producers/exporters. Argentina asserts that the Brazilian authorities did not inform the investigating
authority of the alleged interest of the exporters which were notified on 15 September 1999 and
whose right of defence was, according to Brazil, impaired. Argentina concludes that the way in which
the investigating authorities provided access to the proceedings for interested parties clearly did not in
any way impair the right of access to the records and even less the right of defence.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.157 Brazil has raised three claims under Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement. One claim concerns the
alleged failure by the CNCE to notify certain exporters and provide them with the injury questionnaire
sent to other exporters. Upon close examination, we find that there is no reference to this claim in
Brazil's Request for Establishment of this Panel.
129 Accordingly, this claim falls outside our terms of
reference.

129 The relevant part of Brazil's Request for Es tablishment (document WT/DS241/3, Section B.4)
provides:
"The DCD failed to give the legally required time for some of the exporters to respond to the
questionnaires. The DCD also failed to promptly make available to these Brazilian exporters,
evidence presented in writing by other interested parties. By not giving these exporters
sufficient time to respond to the questionnaires and by not promptly making available the
evidence presented by other interested parties, the DCD did not give these exporters full

7.158 With regard to the two Article 6.2 claims that are within our terms of reference, the issue
before us is whether Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão did
not have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests because (a) the DCD did not give them at
least 30 days to reply to the dumping questionn aire, and (b) the DCD and the CNCE did not make
available promptly to them evidence presented by other interested parties.
7.159 Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement provides in relevant part:
"Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defence of their interests."
7.160 The parties agree that, while Article 6.2 clearly imposes a general duty on investigating
authorities to ensure that interested parties have a full opportunity throughout an anti-dumping
investigation for the defence of their interests, it provides no specific guidance as to what steps
investigating authorities must take in practice.130 We agree.131 We also agree with previous panels 132
and the Appellate Body 133 in that we do not consider it necessary for us to address claims under
Article 6.2 when we have already made findings concerning the conduct allegedly violating
Article 6.2 under other, more specific provisions of the AD Agreement.
7.161 Accordingly, we shall only consider Brazil's claims under Article 6.2 to the extent that we
have not made findings regarding the factual situation at issue under other provisions of the AD
Agreement which specifically address that situation. Regarding Brazil's argument that the DCD did
not give CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Comaves, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão at least 30 days
to reply the dumping questionnaire, we reca ll that we made findings under Article 6.1.1. 134 We have
also made findings regarding Brazil's contention th at the DCD and the CNCE did not make available
promptly to Catarinense, CCLP, Comaves, Chapecó, Minuano, Penabranca and Perdigão evidence
presented by other interested parties under Article 6.1.2.
135 Accordingly, we have already made
findings regarding the factual situations forming the basis of Brazil's Article 6.2 claims under other
provisions of the AD Agreement which specifically address those factual situations.
(c) Conclusion
7.162 For the foregoing reasons, we consider that it is not necessary for us to make separate findings
with respect to Brazil's Article 6.2 claims.

opportunity to defend their interests in this investigation, thereby violating Articles 6.1.1,
6.1.2 and 6.2." (emphasis in original)
130 Brazil's first written submission, para. 222 and Argentina's first written submission, para. 150.
131 We note that a similar view was expressed by the Guatemala – Cement II panel. (Panel Report,
Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.162)
132 See e.g., Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II , supra, note 48, para. 8.162 and Panel Report,
United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – Complaint by the European Communities ("US – 1916 Act (EC) "),
WT/DS136/R and Corr.1, adopted 26 September 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, para. 6.76.
133 The Appellate Body stated in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) that "[a]lthough Article X:3(a) of the
GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement both apply, the Panel, in our view, should have applied
the Licensing Agreement first, since this agreement deals specifically, and in detail, with the administration of
import licensing procedures." (Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Complaint by Ecuador ("EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) "), WT/DS27/AB/R,
134 See paras. 7.138-7.146 supra.
135 See paras. 7.150-7.153 supra.

9. Failure to Provide the Full Text of the Written Application in a Timely Manner – Claim
14
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.163 Brazil argues that the investigating authority failed to provide the text of the application to the
exporters and to the Government of Brazil, thus making it impossible for the exporters to prepare
arguments in the defence of their interests and to devise a strategy to defend against the allegations
made by petitioner in the application. Brazil argues that the requirement under Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement with respect to known exporters and authorities of the exporting Member cannot be met by
simply making the application available to the exporters and to the authorities of the exporting
Member. In the view of Brazil, that requirement can only be met if the investigating authority
actively provides the full text of the written application to the exporting Member and to the exporters
involved in the investigation. Brazil asserts that its interpretation of the obligation imposed by
Article 6.1.3 is confirmed by the fact that the same provision requires that the text of the application
be "made available" to "other interested parties involved." In the view of Brazil, if the requirement
imposed on the investigating authority was to be understood as being the same for the exporters and
exporting Member as that for other interested parties, there would be no need for the use of different
language in Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement. Brazil also argues that, even if "provide" had to be
interpreted as "make available", the investigating authority would have violated Article 6.1.3 because
the notification that the full text of the written application was available was not sent "as soon as an
investigation has been initiated."
7.164 Argentina replies that Article 6.1.3 does not require an investigating authority "enviar", i.e., to
"send", the full text of the application but "facilitar" , i.e., to "provide", it to the known exporters and
to the authorities of the exporting Member. Argentina asserts that, once the investigation was
initiated, it made the records of the proceedings available to authorized interested parties. In so doing,
Argentina states that it met the requirement set forth in Article 6.1.3. Argentina asserts that,
considering that the Brazilian authorities were notified on 1 February 1999 and the notice of initiation
of the investigation against poultry from Brazil was published in the Official Bulletin on
25 January 1999, the notification to the Government of Brazil took place five working days after the
date of initiation of the investigation.
7.165 Brazil asserts that the word "facilitar" in the Spanish version of Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement should be understood to mean "proporcionar o entregar", a definition which is entirely
compatible with that of the verb to "provide" in the English version of the AD Agreement.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.166 The issue before us concerns the interpre tation of the obligation imposed by the term
"provide" in the first sentence of Article 6.1.3.
7.167 The text of Article 6.1.3 reads as follows:
"As soon as an investigation has been init iated, the authorities shall provide the full
text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known
exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available,
upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the
requirement for the protection of confid ential information, as provided for in
paragraph 5." (footnote in original omitted)
7.168 The obligation in Article 6.1.3 is clear. Subject to the proviso of protection of confidential
information, investigating authorities must provide the text of the written application to the known

exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member. They must also make it available , upon
request, to other interested parties. This obligation applies as soon as the investigation has been
initiated.
7.169 Argentina is of the view that it satisfied its "obligation [under Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement] by making the records of the proceedings available to authorized interested parties."136 In
the view of Argentina, the term " facilitar" means "to permit access to a thing or element that is of
interest to the other party". 137 In other words, in the view of Argentina the verb to "provide" in
Article 6.1.3 has the meaning of permitting access to a th ing or element that is of interest to the other
party. We note that the term "provide" is defined as, inter alia, "supply; furnish".138 "Provide" might
consequently be understood as supply or furnish the text of the application. Bearing this definition in
mind, we consider that the term "provide" would require a positive action on the part of the
investigating authority akin to that of furnishing or supplying something (i.e., the full text of the
application) to someone (i.e., known exporters and authorities of the exporting Member). Therefore,
we cannot agree with Argentina that the term "provide" in the English text of the AD Agreement or
"facilitar" in its Spanish text can be interpreted as meaning "permitting access". In our view, an
investigating authority cannot comply with the obligation to "provide the (…) application (…) to the
known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member" simply by permitting them access to
that application.
7.170 Our interpretation is confirmed by the words chosen by the drafters of Article 6.1.3. In this
regard, we note that Article 6.1.3 provides for two different obligations, depending on the party
concerned. Article 6.1.3 provides that the full text of the written application must be provided to the
known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member . With respect to other interested
parties involved, that provision imposes the obligation on the investigating authority to make the
application available to those other interested parties. In our view, with the use of different verbs in
the first sentence of Article 6.1.3, "provide" on the one hand and "make available" on the other, the
drafters intended to impose different obligations on investigating authorities depending on the party
concerned. The first obligation requires a positive action on the part of the investigating authority,
while the second envisages only a passive act.
7.171 Argentina argues further that it understands the term "facilitar" in the Spanish text of
Article 6.1.3, on the basis of the accepted meaning in Spanish, as meaning to permit access to a thing
or element that is of interest to the other party.
139 "Facilitar" is defined inter alia as "proporcionar o
entregar", i.e. to "give". 140 The term "facilitar" in the Spanish text might therefore be understood to
require giving the full text of the written application to the known exporters and to the authorities of
the exporting Member. This is consistent with our conclusion of the meaning of the term "provide" in
the English text of the AD Agreement. This conclusion is again confirmed by the choice of the words
of the drafters in the Spanish text of Article 6.1.3. We found that the obligation imposed on the
investigating authority with respect to known expo rters and the authorities of the exporting countries
is to "facilitar" the full text of the application. By contrast, regarding other interested parties involved,
disposición de las otras partes interesadas intervinientes que lo soliciten", i.e., the authorities shall
make it [the full text of the application] availabl e, upon request, to other interested parties involved.
An analysis of the Spanish text of Article 6.1.3 therefore does not support Argentina's position. For
this reason, the argument of Argentina must fail.

136 Argentina's first written submission, paras. 164 and 165.
137 Reply of Argentina to Question 37 of the Panel.
138 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1102.
139 Argentina's reply to Question 37 of the Panel.
140 Diccionario de la Lengua Española (Espasa Calpe, 1992), p. 943.

7.172 We must next examine whether Argentina actively "provided" the full text of the application
to the known exporters and the Brazilian authorities. Brazil asserts that the investigating authority
never provided known Brazilian exporters and the Brazilian authorities the full text of the
application.141 Argentina asserts that "[t]he Argentine authorities satisfied that obligation by making
the records of the proceedings availabl e to authorized interested parties." 142 Through this statement,
Argentina acknowledges that the investigating authority merely made the full text of the written
application available to the known exporters and to the Brazilian authorities. This, however, does not
meet the requirement to actively "provide" the written application in the sense of Article 6.1.3.
Finally, we examined the record of the investigation as presented to us. 143 We found no indication
that the Argentine authorities provided the text of the application to known exporters and the
authorities of Brazil. We consider therefore that Argentina did not provide the full text of the
application to the known Brazilian exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member.
(c) Conclusion
7.173 Having determined that Argentina did not actively provide the full text of the written
application to known Brazilian exporters and to the Brazilian authorities, we find that Argentina acted
inconsistently with its obligation under Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement.
10. Use of Facts Available – Claims 15, 17 and 19
7.174 These claims concern the DCD's use of "facts available" within the meaning of Article 6.8 of
the AD Agreement, and relate to the DCD's rejection of certain data submitted by exporters.

141 Brazil's first written submission, para. 230. See also, Brazil's replies to Questions 34, 35 and 36
from the Panel.
142 Argentina's first written submission, para. 164. In the same vein, para. 165 reads as follows:
'Once the investigation had started, Argentina made available to the interested parties – inter
alia the exporters, importers and the authorities of the country concerned – the documentation
relating to the proceedings at i ssue. Authorized interested parties could thus consult the file
and obtain a copy thereof at all times, that is, not only of the application itself but also of all
the other records on file.' (emphasis added)
143 In particular, we examined a communication dated 1 February 1999 sent by the DCD to the Mission
of Brazil in Argentina (Exhibit ARG-III) as well as communications sent by the CNCE and the DCD to the
Brazilian exporters Avipal, Frangosul, Nicolini, Sadi a and Seara on 10 and 16 February 1999, respectively
(Exhibits BRA-8 and BRA-9). Even if these communications had enclosed the full text of the written
application, which they did not, Argentina would have been found to have acted in violation of Article 6.1.3 of
the AD Agreement because, with regard to those five known exporters , Argentina would have failed to provide
the full text of the application as soon as the investigation had been initiated, as mandated by Article 6.1.3 of the
AD Agreement . We note that the communications were sent more than 15 days after the publication of the
initiation of the investigation in the Official Bulletin (25 January 1999). We agree with the view expressed by
the Guatemala – Cement II panel that:
"given the nature of the obligation in Article 6.1.3 [the] sending (…) of the application even 8
days after the initiation of investigation is not adequate to fulfill the requirement that it be
done "as soon as an investigation has been initiated."" (Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II ,
supra, note 48, para. 8.104)

(b) Arguments of the parties
(i) Claim 15
7.175 Brazil challenges the DCD's determination that there were differences in the physical
characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina respectively, despite Avipal, Frangosul and
Sadia informing the DCD through their questionnaire responses that poultry sold to Argentina was
identical to the poultry sold in Brazil. Brazil asserts that Catarinense only reported a difference in
respect of broiler poultry, in the sense that its broiler poultry sold in Argentina did not contain head
and feet, while its broiler poultry sold in Brazil contained head but not feet. Brazil asserts that the
relevant information was submitted by the exporters within a reasonable period and that the DCD did
not question the exporters on that information. Brazil alleges that the questionnaire did not specify
that information on the product description required supporting documentation. In addition, Brazil
asserts that, throughout the investigation, the DCD never requested any supporting information in
order to verify the product description reported by those exporters.
7.176 Argentina asserts that it based its findings on all information which was verifiable and
appropriately submitted. Argentina acknowledges that the exporters and the Brazilian authorities
commented on the justification of the adjustment for physical characteristic differences. However,
Argentina asserts that those arguments were unsubstantiated by technical data. Argentina also
contends that the appropriateness of the adjustment is further demonstrated by the fact that those
comments do not question the need for such adjustment. Argentina also acknowledges that the DCD
received comments concerning the incidence of freezing and/or chilling at the time of determining the
normal value for the product concerned. However, Argentina alleges that those comments were not
supported with evidence either.
7.177 Brazil refers to the Argentina – Ceramic Tiles panel finding that an investigating authority
may not disregard information and resort to facts available on the grounds that a party has failed to
provide sufficient supporting documentation in respect of information provided unless the
investigating authority has clearly requested that the party provide such supporting documentation.
Reading the general instructions in the questionnaire, Brazil does not believe that the DCD provided
sufficient information on the precise supporting documentation that it expected to receive from the
exporters regarding product description / product differences. Brazil also asserts that submitting
supporting documentation for all the information provided in the questionnaire response would
impose an unreasonable burden on the exporters and make it impossible for them to reply within the
30-day period.
(ii) Claim 17
7.178 This claim concerns the DCD's rejection of export price data reported by four exporters.
Brazil asserts that Avipal, Catarinense, Frangosul and Sadia submitted information on export price in
their questionnaire responses. Brazil contends that the last two companies submitted export price data
for individual export transactions, with respective invoices. In so doing, Brazil argues that the four
exporters have provided information to the best of their abilities and have never refused to cooperate
with the investigating authority. In spite of the above, Brazil asserts that information on export prices
submitted by those exporters was rejected and information from the Secretariat for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food was used instead as a source to determine their export prices.
7.179 Argentina states that each time the parties supplied the information in the prescribed timely
and appropriate fashion, the information was used. Argentina further asserts that the DCD had to
resort to other sources of information in cases where any aspect of those requirements had not been
met. With respect to Catarinense and Frangosul, Argentina asserts that the information was not used
simply because, in Frangosul's case, the data provided was insufficient and was submitted after the

deadline that would have permitted its use had expired 144 and, in Catarinense's case, because the data
was insufficient.145
7.180 According to Brazil, Argentina "explains, for th e first time, that the information provided by
Frangosul and Catarinense was not used simply because in Frangosul’s case the information
submitted was insufficient and outside the deadline, and in the case of Catarinense because the
information was considered insufficient." Brazil also asserts that this explanation given by Argentina
seems to contradict Argentina's own response th at Frangosul provided supporting documentation for
the export prices reported in the investigation.
(iii) Claim 19
7.181 This claim concerns the DCD's decision not to use normal value submitted by two exporters.
Brazil asserts that information required in order to determine normal value was submitted by
Catarinense and Frangosul. However, it was not used by the DCD. To the extent that Argentina may
argue that the information was not received within the deadlines established by the authority, Brazil
asserts that a reasonable period will not be commensurate with the pre-established deadlines if the
investigating authority has not acted in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. In this regard,
Brazil asserts that Frangosul was subject to ‘an excessive burden’ in having to present dumping data
from 1996 to 1999. Brazil also notes that Frangosul in vited the investigating authority to verify the
information in its response. Brazil contends that the late reply to the questionnaire by Catarinense
was due to the fact that it was notified of the existence of the investigation approximately eight
months after its initiation. Brazil also takes issue with the fact that the normal value used instead was
for chilled poultry with head and feet. This in the view of Brazil was wrong because Catarinense and
Frangosul had reported to have sold the product in the domestic market without head and feet.
7.182 Argentina asserts that the DCD analysed and ex amined all the information before it that was
consistent with the principles enshrined in the AD Agreement , i.e., information that was properly
provided within the required time-frame and was accompanied by proper evidence. Argentina alleges
that, as was pointed out in the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination, the data received from
Catarinense was presented on aggregate basis, without any supporting documentation. Moreover,
Argentina asserts that Catarinense did not have authorized legal status. Regarding Frangosul,
Argentina asserts that this exporter never presented any supporting documentation for domestic sales
and that its final submission arrived beyond the deadline for analysing the information.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
(i) Claim 15
7.183 We note that the facts relating to Claim 15 are substantially identical to those which form the
basis of our finding in respect of Claim 25. Since we concluded under Claim 25 that those facts gave
rise to a violation of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, it is not necessary for us to rule on those same
facts in the context of Claim 15.
(ii) Claim 17
7.184 The issue before us is whether the DCD was entitled to disregard export price data submitted
by Avipal, Catarinense, Frangosul and Sadia. With respect to Catarinense, we find at paras. 7.190-
7.193 below that the DCD was entitled to reject normal value data submitted by that exporter because
it had failed to comply with an accreditation obl igation. For the same reason, we find that the DCD

144 Argentina's first written submission, paras. 187-200.
145 Id., para. 203.

was also entitled to reject the export price data submitted by that exporter. We therefore reject
Brazil's Claim 17 in respect of Catarinense.
7.185 With regard to the DCD's treatment of the export price data submitted by Avipal, Frangosul
and Sadia, we first note that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement governs the use by an investigating
authority in an anti-dumping investigation of the “facts available”. That Article provides as follows:
"In case any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide,
necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be
made on the basis of facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in
the application of this paragraph."
7.186 Paragraphs 5 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement are also relevant to our examination of
this claim. They provide as follows:
"5. Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should
not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted to
the best of its ability.
(…)
7. If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary sour ce, including the information supplied in
the application for the initiation of the in vestigation, they should do so with special
circumspection. In such cases, the author ities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price
lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained
from other interested parties during the inves tigation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld
from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the
party than if the party did cooperate."
7.187 In examining the record before us, we find that Avipal, Frangosul and Sadia did submit
information on export prices. 146 Argentina asserts that it was justified in disregarding information
which was not submitted in a timely manner, or in the appropriate fashion. 147 Argentina also argued
during these proceedings that "[t]he implementing authority obviously cannot examine claims put
forward by the parties without supporting documentation that can be verified." 148 We asked
Argentina to prove that the investigating authority based its rejection of the relevant export price data
on these reasons. Argentina replied that the explanation could be found in the Report of
4 January 2000 and in the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination, without pointing to any
particular statement therein.
149 We therefore examined these documents, in particular Sections V.3
(Submissions made by Foreign Companies), VII.3 (A nalysis of the Submissions made by Brazilian
Exporting Companies after the Initiation of the Investigation) and VIII.2 (Elements for the
Determination of the f.o.b. Export Price) thereof. We could not find in any of those sections
references to any of the reasons provided by Argentina which could justify the DCD's decision to

146 Exhibit BRA-15, Sections V.3.1 (Sadia), V. 3.2 (Avipal), V.3.5 (Frangosul) and VII.3.2
(Catarinense).
147 We note that, in particular, Argentina asserts that Frangosul's export data was insufficient and was
submitted after the deadline.
148 Argentina's first written submission, para. 178. See also Argentina's second written submission,
paras. 54-56.
149 Argentina's reply to Question 40 of the Panel.

disregard the export price data received from Avipal, Frangosul and Sadia. 150 I n l i g h t o f t h e s e
circumstances, we consider that Argentina's arguments concerning the reasons why the DCD rejected
the export price data submitted by Avipal, Frangosul and Sadia constitute ex post rationalization
which we should not take into account for the purpose of determining whether the Argentine
authorities complied with their obligations under Article 6.8.151
7.188 In light of the above, we uphold Brazil's claim th at Argentina violated Article 6.8 in rejecting
the export price data submitted by Avipal, Frangosul and Sadia.
(iii) Claim 19
7.189 This claim concerns the DCD's rejection of normal value data submitted by Catarinense and
Frangosul.
• Catarinense
7.190 Based on the record before us, we note that Catarinense was contacted by the DCD on
15 September 1999. Argentina acknowledges that it sent Catarinense a copy of the original
questionnaire, to which Catarinense replied on 3 November 1999. Brazil asserts that information on
normal value submitted by Catarinense should have been used as a basis for the determination of the
normal value for this exporter. Argentina argues that the DCD was justified in disregarding data
submitted by Catarinense because (a) this exporter had not accredited itself in accordance with
domestic legislation,
152 and (b) information on domestic prices was submitted in aggregated form and
without supporting documentation.153
7.191 We will examine first Argentina's argument that Catarinense had not accredited itself in
accordance with domestic legislation. Argentina argues that, in accordance with Law No. 19,549 on
Administrative Procedures, a company must have authorized legal status in order to appear before the

150 The only reason that we could find in the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination for the
rejection of the exporters' data and the use of data prov ided by the Livestock Directorate of the Secretariat for
Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food instead is that the DCD considered it appropriate to determine the
f.o.b. export price based on information from the Livestock Directorate because it came from the most detailed
and complete source. (Exhibit BRA-15, Section VIII.2.3) We do not consider that such a justification or
reasoning provided by the DCD is sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 6.8. In particular, such
reasoning does not indicate that the relevant exporters significantly impeded the investigation. Nor does it
indicate that the relevant exporters refused access to, or otherwise did not provide, necessary information within
a reasonable period.
151 In the same vein, we note that the panel in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles found when examining a
claim raised under Article 6.8:
"(…) Under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement we are to determine whether the DCD
established the facts properly and whether the evaluation performed by the DCD was unbiased
and objective. In other words, we are asked to review the evaluation of the DCD made at the
time of the determination as set forth in a public notice or in any other document of a public or
confidential nature. We do not believe that, as a panel reviewing the evaluation of the
investigating authority, we are to take into consideration any arguments and reasons that did
not form part of the evaluation process of the investigating authority, but instead are ex post
facto justifications which were not provided at the time the determination was made."
(emphasis in original, footnote not included) (Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, supra,
note 66, para. 6.27)
152 Argentina's first written submission, para. 202.
153 Id., para. 189.

DCD.154 We note that the DCD informed that exporter that it had to have authorized legal status in
conformity with Law No. 19,549 on 8 November 1999. 155 There is no evidence on the record to
suggest that Catarinense pursued this matter with the DCD, or made any other attempt to comply with
the accreditation obligation. The issue before us is therefore whether the DCD was justified in
disregarding data submitted by Catarinense on the basis that it did not have authorized legal status.
We do not find any provision in the AD Agreement which expressly disallows an investigating
authority from imposing basic procedural requirements such as accreditation. We observe that
paragraph 3 of Annex II to the AD Agreement provides that "[a]ll information which is (…)
appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties (…)
should be taken into account when determinations are made." We consider that the reference to the
terms "appropriately submitted" is designed to cover inter alia information which is submitted in
accordance with relevant procedural provisions of WTO Members' domestic laws. In our view,
paragraph 3 of Annex II to the AD Agreement can be interpreted to mean that information not
"appropriately submitted" in accordance with relevant procedural provisions of WTO Members'
domestic laws may be disregarded. In the circumstances of this case, we consider that information
submitted by Catarinense was not "appropriately submitted" within the meaning of paragraph 3 of
Annex II to the AD Agreement because Catarinense had not complied with Argentina's accreditation
requirements. Accordingly, the DCD was entitled to reject that information.
7.192 Citing a finding of the Guatemala – Cement II panel, Brazil argues that the DCD did not act
in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner with respect to Catarinense. We disagree, since the
DCD explicitly reminded Catarinense of the need to comply with the accreditation requirement.
Brazil also refers to paragraphs 5 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement in support of its claim.
However, we fail to see how Catarinense could be said to have "acted to the best of its ability"
(Annex II, paragraph 5), since it failed to respond in any way to the DCD's letter of 8 November 1999.
Nor do we see the relevance of paragraph 7 of Annex II, since Brazil has failed to explain how the
exercise of "special circumspection" by the DCD would have remedied the fact that Catarinense failed
to comply with Argentina's accreditation requirement.
7.193 Nor can we agree with Brazil that normal value data provided by Catarinense was more
accurate than the normal value data provided by the applicant on account of the particular product
characteristics. In our view, once data from the exporter cannot be used in accordance with
Article 6.8 and Annex II to the AD Agreement, an investigating authority is entitled to use information
from other sources, including the applicant. The fact that, as argued by Brazil, information supplied
by the applicant on normal value concerns a product (poultry with head and feet) which is not
identical to that exported by Catarinense (poultry without head and feet) in our view does not impede
the investigating authority's use of the applicant's information as long as a fair comparison is made.
Brazil has not argued under this claim that the comparison was not fair. For this reason, we must
reject Brazil's argument.
• Frangosul
7.194 We note that Frangosul was first contacted by the DCD on 16 February 1999. This exporter
submitted a reply to the questionnaire on 27 April 1999, after the deadline initially provided by the
DCD. With respect to normal value, Frangosul submitted information on sales in the domestic market
corresponding to years 1996, 1997, 1998 and the first three months of 1999, reported on a monthly
basis.
156 On 12 July 1999, the DCD requested documentation supporting sales made in the domestic
market. On 19 August 1999, Frangosul replied that it was not possible to send copies of all invoices.

154 Exhibits ARG-XIII and BRA-28, p. 2795.
155 Exhibit ARG-XIII.
156 There is no indication that, at that point in ti me, Frangosul informed the DCD that the high number
of invoices impeded it to submit more detailed information and supporting documentation.

Frangosul referred to the list of invoices already provided in its questionnaire response. On
12 October 1999, the DCD requested Frangosul to submit a list of invoices covering all transactions in
the domestic market during the period of investigation. 157 In this communication, it is stated that the
list of invoices submitted in the questionnaire response was incomplete. Frangosul failed to respond
within the applicable deadline. 158 On 18 November 1999, the DCD renewed its request. 159 T h e
required list was submitted by Frangosul on 30 December 1999, outside the second deadline
established in DCD's communication of 18 November 1999.160
7.195 Brazil asserts that Frangosul did submit the information "within a reasonable period". In
support of its claim, Brazil cites the following portion of the US – Hot-Rolled Steel panel report:
"The AD Agreement establishes that facts available may be used if necessary
information is not provided within a reasonable period. What is a “reasonable
period” will not, in all instances be commensurate with pre-established deadlines set
out in general regulations. We recognize that in the interest of orderly administration
investigating authorities do, and indeed must establish deadlines. However, a rigid
adherence to such deadlines does not in all cases suffice as the basis for a conclusion
that information was not submitted within a reasonable period and consequently that
facts available may be applied.”
161
7.196 In light of this report, Brazil asserts that "Article 6.8 suggests a degree of flexibility by
authorities that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case." (emphasis in
original)162 We agree with Brazil. However, in examinin g the facts in this case we are of the view
that Frangosul did not submit "the necessary information within a reasonable period". 163 F i r s t , w e
note that there is no indication on the record that Frangosul informed the DCD of the difficulties of
submitting documentary evidence regarding all domestic transactions until approximately seven
months after the initiation of the investigation (19 August 1999). Other exporters, namely Avipal,
Nicolini, Sadia and Seara, instead informed the investigating authority of such difficulties much
earlier in the investigation.
164 We consider that Frangosul could and should have been aware of that
problem much before 19 August 1999, and hence should have informed the DCD much before that
date. Brazil argues that what is a "reasonable period" for the submission of data to an investigating
authority will not, in all instances, be commensurate with pre-established deadlines set out in general
regulations. We agree. However, we recall that the AD Agreement imposes a deadline for the
conclusion of an investigation in Article 5.10. We consider that, if an investigation is to be completed
in conformity with the timefram e provided for in Article 5.10, deadlines are indeed necessary, as
recognized by the US – Hot-Rolled Steel panel. In the case at stake, we note that a complete list of all
domestic sales transactions was requested on 12 October 1999. As no reply was received within the

157 Argentina's first written submission, para. 197 and Brazil's reply to Question 41 of the Panel.
158 We note Argentina's argument that, in the absence of a specific deadline being contained in the
communication sent to Frangosul, the general deadline provided for in Law No. 19,549 applies. Thus, the
deadline for the submission of the information requested through that communication was 10 days.
159 See supra note 157.
160 Exhibit ARG-XXX.
161 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan ("US – Hot-Rolled Steel "), WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 August 2001 as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS184/AB/R, at para. 7.54. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings with respect to
Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement . (Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 240)
162 Brazil's reply to Question 41 of the Panel.
163 We note that Brazil has not argued before us that the information requested by the DCD was not
"necessary" within the meaning of Article 6.8. We consider that it was, as the determination of the normal value
depended on it.
164 Exhibit BRA-28, ps. 2773 (Sadia), 2777 (Avipal), 2781 (Nicolini) and 2783 (Seara).

deadline provided, the DCD sent a reminder on 18 November 1999. Again, we note that the response
was not provided within the second deadline set by the DCD. As Brazil acknowledges, the response
to the 12 October request was finally submitted to the DCD on 30 December 1999, 165 i.e., more than
two months after that list had been requested. Brazil asserts before us that "Frangosul had to go back
and collect specific information for the period January 1998 through January 1999, which sometimes
meant manually having to search the many invoices (over 320.000) to find the information requested
by the authority." To the extent that Brazil's argument is that, following the DCD's request of
12 October 1999, Frangosul had informed the DCD that it could not submit the data requested by that
authority due to the large number of domestic sales transactions involved, we consider that Brazil's
argument shall be rejected because we have not found any indication on the record before us that
Frangosul made that argument in response to the DCD's request of 12 October. However, we note
that an argument similar to that raised by Brazil before us is contained in a Frangosul communication
sent in response to a DCD request dated 12 July 1999 in which the investigating authority requested
Frangosul to submit "supporting documentation for all the sales transactions in the domestic
market…". 166 (emphasis added) Taking this into account, we consider that the statement of Frangosul
referred to by Brazil relates to another (previous) request of the DCD regarding the submission of
supporting documentation , and not the DCD's 12 October request for a list of domestic sales
transactions. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the statement referred to by Brazil is
contained in a document which predates the DCD' s request of 12 October 1999. Hence, we consider
that the argument presented by Brazil before us does not justify Frangosul's belated submission of the
list of domestic sales transactions. As Brazil has not presented any other justification for that belated
submission, and bearing in mind all the circumstances of this particular case, we are of the view that
Frangosul did not submit necessary information within a "reasonable period" as set forth in
Article 6.8. For the same reasons, we find that the information was not supplied "in a timely fashion"
within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Annex II.
7.197 As in the case of Catarinense, Brazil refers to paragraphs 5 and 7 of Annex II in support of its
claim. Bearing in mind the facts as described in para. 7.196 supra, in particular Frangosul's belated
reply to the DCD's request of 12 October 1999, we cannot consider that Frangosul acted to the best of
its ability in the sense of Annex II, paragraph 5. Nor do we see how "special circumspection" in the
sense of Annex II, paragraph 7, would have required the DCD to accept Frangosul's normal value data
given the circumstances set forth above. Brazil argues that the normal value data provided by
Frangosul was more accurate than the normal value data provided by the applicant on account of the
particular product characteristics. An identical argument has been examined in para. 7.193 supra
concerning Catarinense. For the reasons set forth in that paragraph, we also reject this argument.
(d) Conclusion
7.198 For the foregoing reasons, we uphold Brazil's Claim 17 that Argentina violated Article 6.8 in
rejecting the export price data submitted by Avipal, Frangosul and Sadia. We reject Brazil's Claim 19
that Argentina violated Article 6.8, and paragraphs 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement by not
using the normal value data reported by Catarinense and Frangosul. We make no findings in respect
of Brazil's Claim 15.
11. Failure to Provide a Public Notice of Conclusion of an Investigation – Claims 16, 18 and
20
7.199 These claims raise issues under Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement. They concern alleged
omissions from Argentina's public notice of conclusion of the investigation.

165 See supra, note 162.
166 Ibid.

(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) Claim 16
7.200 According to Brazil, Article 12.2.2 mandates that a public notice of conclusion of the
investigation contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information
on matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures. In the
view of Brazil, the established margins of dumping as well as a full explanation of the reasons for the
methodology used in their establishment and comparison of normal value and export price are
considered as relevant information. In spite of this obligation, Brazil asserts that the DCD provided
no explanation of why it made an adjustment to normal value for differences in the physical
characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and th at sold in Argentina, even though the product
description provided by certain exporters indicated that such differences did not exist.
7.201 Argentina argues that the Report of 4 January 2000 and the Final Affirmative Dumping
Determination, "throughout the text and under different headings," dealt in detail with each of the
exporters' submissions in order to reach a reasoned conclusion as to the investigating authority's
motives for excluding submissions that lacked sufficient supporting documentation or were made
after the deadline had expired.
(ii) Claim 18
7.202 Brazil asserts that, contrary to Article 12.2.2, the public notice of conclusion contained no
explanation of why the investigating authority did not establish export price based on the information
provided by Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense.
7.203 As in the case of Claim 16, Argentina argues that the Report of 4 January 2000 and the Final
Affirmative Dumping Determination, "throughout th e text and under different headings," dealt in
detail with each of the exporters' submissions in order to reach a reasoned conclusion as to the
investigating authority's motives for excluding submissions that lacked sufficient supporting
documentation or were made after the deadline had expired.
(iii) Claim 20
7.204 Brazil claims that the public notice of conclusion did not adequately explain why the DCD
did not use normal value submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense.
7.205 Similar to Claim 16, Argentina argues that the Report of 4 January 2000 and the Final
Affirmative Dumping Determination, "throughout th e text and under different headings," dealt in
detail with each of the exporters' submissions in order to reach a reasoned conclusion as to the
investigating authority's motives for excluding submissions that lacked sufficient supporting
documentation or were made after the deadline had expired.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.206 In examining similar claims, the Guatemala – Cement II panel expressed its view that:
"the issue of Guatemala's compliance with the transparency obligations deriving from
its decision to impose definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of cement from
Mexico would only be relevant if the decision to impose the measure itself had been
consistent with the AD Agreement. Therefore, having found that Guatemala
infringed the substantive provisions of the AD Agreement in their decision to impose
an anti-dumping measure in this case, we consider that it is not necessary for us to

rule on whether Guatemala complied with its transparency obligations under
Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 with respect to the imposition of a measure already found not
to be consistent with Guatemala's WTO obligations."167
7.207 We agree with that panel. In our view, it is not necessary to determine whether a Member
complied with the transparency requirements of Article 12.2.2 in imposing an anti-dumping measure
if that measure has already been found to violate various substantive provisions of the AD Agreement.
Since we have already found that Argentina's anti-dumping measure is inconsistent with various
substantive provisions of the AD Agreement, it is not necessary for us to determine whether or not
Argentina complied with the transparency requirements of Article 12.2.2 in imposing that measure.
(c) Conclusion
7.208 For the foregoing reasons, we do not consider it necessary to make any findings on
Claims 16, 18 and 20.
12. Calculation of an Individual Margin of Dumping – Claim 22
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.209 Brazil asserts that the investigating authority did not calculate individual dumping margins for
Catarinense and Frangosul in spite of the fact that these companies submitted data on normal value
and export price within a reasonable period of time. Brazil asserts that the investigating authority did
not provide an explanation, either in the final determination or in any other document on the record of
the investigation, as to why, in this case, it did not determine an individual dumping margin for
Catarinense and Frangosul. In the view of Brazil, by failing to determine an individual margin of
dumping for those two exporters, and by applying instead the dumping rate for “all others”, Argentina
acted inconsistently with the general rule set forth in Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement.
7.210 Argentina disagrees with Brazil’s presentation of the facts. With respect to Catarinense,
Argentina submits that, as stated in the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination, the data received
from the exporter was presented on an aggregate basis, without any supporting documentation.
According to Argentina, Catarinense failed to pr ovide information on sales in the Brazilian market.
Argentina asserts that the only supporting documentation that Catarinense submitted was a list of
invoices for exports to Argentina. In the case of Frangosul, Argentina asserts that several
notifications were sent to the exporter with a request to provide the lists of Notas fiscales (invoices),
in order to establish a statistical sample. Argentina asserts that a reminder was sent to the exporter on
18 November 1999. According to Argentina, two diskettes containing data with respect to domestic
sales, without supporting documentation, arrived after the expiry of the deadline. Argentina notes
that, in the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination, the DCD stated that:
"Finally, we stress that in the case of the companies Catarinense Limitada, Frangosul,
Comave [sic], Da Granja Agroi, Sadia Concordia, Minuano De Alimentos, Acaua
Industria, Felipe Avicola, Agroi, Veneto, Chapeco and Litoral Alimen [sic], the
implementing authority did not have sufficient additional information or supporting
documentation to enable it to reach an individual final determination of the margin of
dumping."
168
7.211 Brazil notes that the DCD also disregarded the export price data submitted by the exporters
Sadia and Avipal. Nevertheless, it still calculated individual margins of dumping for those two

167 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.291.
168 Argentina's reply to Question 44 of the Panel and Exhibit BRA-15.

exporters. Brazil fails to see the reason why the DCD proceeded differently with respect to the
information provided by Frangosul and Catarinense. Brazil further asserts that the fact that an
exporter has not submitted the relevant and appropriate information to establish normal value and
export price does not exclude the authority’s obligation under Article 6.10 to calculate an individual
margin of dumping for that exporter.169
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.212 The issue before us is whether, in light of the facts in this dispute, Article 6.10 of the AD
Agreement required the DCD to determine separate dumping margins for the exporters Catarinense
and Frangosul.
7.213 Article 6.10 provides in relevant part:
"The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each
known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.” (emphasis
added)
7.214 We agree with the view expressed by the Argentina – Ceramic Tiles panel that Article 6.10,
first sentence, imposes a general obligation on investigating authorities to calculate individual margins
of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.170
7.215 Argentina argues that, for the requirement of Article 6.10 to apply, the exporter or producer
concerned should supply the documentation needed to determine an individual margin of dumping. 171
We see no such obligation in the text of Article 6.10. In our view, Article 6.10 is purely procedural in
nature, in the sense that it imposes a procedural obligation on the investigating agency to determine
individual margins of dumping for each known ex porter or producer concerned of the product under
investigation. Article 6.10 is not concerned with substantive issues concerning the determination of
individual margins, such as the availability of the relevant data. Such issues are addressed by
provisions such as Articles 2 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement. In this regard, we note that the Argentina
– Ceramic Tiles panel found that:
"the provisions of Article 2 concerning the determination of dumping and Article 6.8
AD Agreement concerning facts available are intended to allow the investigating
authority to complete the data with rega rd to a particular exporter in order to
determine a dumping margin in case the information provided is unreliable or
necessary information is simply not provided. It is precisely because of Articles 2
and 6.8, among others, that it will remain possible to determine an individual margin
of dumping for each exporter on the basis of facts."
172
7.216 We agree. The fact that an investigating authority does not receive any information from an
exporter, or only receives partial information, or information that is not usable or is unreliable, should
not prevent the calculation of an individual margin of dumping for that exporter, since the substantive
provisions in the AD Agreement referred to in para. 7.215 supra expressly allow investigating
authorities to complete the data with regard to a particular exporter in order to determine a dumping
margin in case the information provided is unreliable or necessary information is simply not provided.
We therefore reject Argentina's argument that "a condition for the determination of an individual

169 Brazil's second oral statement, para. 59 and Brazil's reply to Question 90 of the Panel.
170 Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, supra, note 66, para. 6.89.
171 Argentina's reply to Question 97 of the Panel.
172 Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, supra, note 66, footnote 96.

margin of dumping for each exporter is that the exporter should (…) supply the documentation needed
to reach such a determination."173
(c) Conclusion
7.217 In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina violated Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement
by not determining an individual margin of dumping for Catarinense and Frangosul.
13. Essential Facts – Claim 21
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.218 Brazil claims that Argentina violated Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement by failing to inform all
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which formed the basis of the decision that
a definitive anti-dumping duty should be applied. In particular, Brazil argues that the investigating
authority failed to inform interested parties that certain domestic and export sales price data was not
going to be used for the purpose of establishing normal value and export price. Brazil also asserts that
the investigating authority failed to inform interest ed parties of the reasons why that information was
not used.
7.219 Argentina asserts that, through the DCD's Report of 4 January 2000, the investigating
authority informed the parties of all the essential facts on which it intended to base its final decision.
7.220 The European Communities, as a third party, does not take a position on whether, under the
facts of this case, the measure is consistent with Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement. The European
Communities argues that Article 6.9 entails a positive action by the investigating authorities, and
requires the authorities to actively disclose those essential facts on which the decision whether to
apply definitive measures is based. Referring to the Guatemala – Cement II panel, the European
Communities asserts that mere access to the file is not sufficient, unless the file contains a disclosure
document specifically prepared by the authorities which clearly identifies the "essential facts".
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.221 This claim raises the issue of whether certain alleged "essential facts" identified by Brazil
should have been disclosed to interested parties pursuant to Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement.
7.222 Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement reads as follows:
"The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties
of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether
to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for
the parties to defend their interests."
7.223 The first sentence of Article 6.9 therefore imposes the obligation on investigating authorities
to inform interested parties of the essential facts which form the basis for the decision whether to apply
definitive measures. We emphasise that the Article 6.9 obligation applies only in respect of (1)
"essential facts" which (2) form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. In our
view, facts which do not form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures cannot be
considered to be "essential facts" within the meaning of Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement.
174

173 See supra, note 171.
174 In examining this issue, we took into account, and agree with, the following finding of the
Guatemala – Cement II panel:

7.224 Brazil claims that Argentina violated Article 6.9 by failing to inform interested parties of the
"essential fact" that certain normal value and export price data reported by the exporters was not going
to be used in the final determination. In our view, however, the fact that certain normal value or
export price data is not going to be relied on in making a final determination is not a fact which forms
the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. While we accept that the normal value
and export price data ultimately used in the final determination are essential facts which form the basis
for the decision whether to apply definitive measures, the fact that certain normal value and export price
data is not going to be used is not. In this regard, the fact that interested parties may not have been
informed that certain normal value and export price data was not going to be used in the final
determination should perhaps have been addressed by Brazil in the context of Article 6.8 of the AD
Agreement.
7.225 Brazil also claims that Argentina violated Article 6.9 by failing to inform interested parties of
the reasons why the investigating authority failed to use certain domestic and export sales price data
reported by exporters. In our view, however, the failure to inform an interested party of a reason does
not equate to failure to inform an interested party of an essential fact. The word "fact" is defined inter
alia as "a thing that is known to have occurred, to exist or to be true", whereas a "reason" is a "motive,
cause or justification". 175 We do not believe that the ordinary meaning of the word "fact" would
support a conclusion that Article 6.9, when using the term "fact", refers not only to "facts" in the sense
of "things which are known to have occurred, to exist or to be true", but also to "motives, causes or
justifications".
7.226 Brazil asserted in response to Question 95 from the Panel that:
"It is important to note that the term “facts” is also present in Article 17.6(i) of the
Agreement. According to Article 17.6(i), “in its assessment of the facts of the matter,
the panel shall determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was
proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective (...)”.
Under that Article, “facts” is not merely the data established and evaluated by the
authority but also the reasoning supporting a certain conclusion in establishing a fact.
Accordingly, we understand that in Article 6.9 the phrase “essential facts” covers the
data collected and the reasoning supporting a certain conclusion made by an authority
in establishing the facts. The conclusion made by an authority relates to the
authority’s establishment of the facts. For example, it is not sufficient for an
authority to simply state that it has disregarded the normal value submitted by a
certain exporter based on Article 6.8 of the Agreement. The authority must inform
the reasons why certain information was disregarded pursuant to Article 6.8."
(emphasis in original)
7.227 We do not consider that this response supports Brazil's claim. First, Article 17.6(i) of the AD
Agreement distinguishes between (1) the establishment of facts and (2) the evaluation of facts. In our
view, a reason is part of the evaluation of a fact, and not the fact itself. Second, we agree with Brazil
that an investigating authority must inform intere sted parties why certain information is disregarded.

"An interested party will not know whether a particular fact is "important" or not unless the
investigating authority has explicitly identified it as one of the "essential facts" which form the
basis of the authority's decision whether to impose definitive measures." (Panel Report,
Guatemala – Cement II, supra, note 48, para. 8.229)
175 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 482.

However, as Brazil itself notes in the last two sentences cited above, that obligation is found in
Article 6.8 (through Annex II, para. 6),176 and not in Article 6.9.
7.228 Brazil also relies on the Argentina – Ceramic Tiles panel in support of its claim. 177 W e
consider that our conclusion is entirely compatible with the finding of the Argentina – Ceramic Tiles
panel. In our view, that panel concluded that fact ual information – rather than reasoning – represents
the "essential facts" which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. In
particular, that panel found that "petitioner and secondary source information, rather than exporters'
information, represented (with respect to the exis tence of dumping) the essential facts which formed
the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures". 178 This shows clearly that that panel
defined "essential facts" in terms of factual information, rather than reasoning.
7.229 We recall that the scope of the obligation set forth in Article 6.9 is limited to (1) "essential facts"
which (2) form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Since some of the
elements identified by Brazil are not "essential facts", and the remainder are facts which do not "form
the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures", we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina
failed to inform interested parties of "the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the
decision whether to apply definitive measures".
(c) Conclusion
7.230 In light of the foregoing, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina has violated Article 6.9 of the
AD Agreement.
D. CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND FINAL AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION
1. Failure to Make an Adjustment for Freight Costs – Claim 23
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.231 Brazil's Claim 23 concerns the DCD's failure to make freight cost adjustments to the normal
value of both Sadia and Avipal. Brazil claims that Argentina violated Article 2.4 of the AD
Agreement because the DCD failed to adjust Sadia and Avipal's normal value for freight costs
reported by those exporters. Brazil asserts that the freight cost adjustment was claimed by Sadia in
Annex VIII, Section C of its questionnaire response of 20 April 1999. Brazil asserts that Avipal
claimed a freight cost adjustment in its supplementary questionnaire response dated
21 December 1999.
7.232 Argentina asserts that the DCD did not make the freight adjustment requested by Sadia
because the adjustment was not sufficiently proven. In particular, freight costs were not stipulated in
the sample invoices submitted by the exporter, nor otherwise properly documented. Instead, Sadia
merely submitted a figure representing average freight costs over an extended period of time, rather

176 Para. 6 of Annex II provides as follows:
"If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith of
the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations within a
reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. If the
explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for the
rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published determinations."
177 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 346-348.
178 Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, supra, note 66, para. 6.127.

than transaction-by-transaction freight costs. In this regard, Argentina provided the following
response to Question 81 from the Panel:
"Argentina reaffirms what it said in paragraphs 210 and 211 of its first written
submission. Indeed, Sadia replied to the questionnaire item concerning internal
freight, but never provided any supporting documentation for that item. Nor do the
invoices submitted provide any indication of the percentage and/or amount of the
adjustment to be made.
In other words, although in Annex X Sadia provided a US$/Ton value to be
discounted for freight, and also did so in Annex VIII – Sales in the domestic market –
these values were presented in annualized form without any supporting
documentation that would have enabled the authority to verify whether they
corresponded to the reality and hence carry out the said adjustment.
In this connection, a " nota fiscal" (invoice) from SADIA has been provided showing
clearly that the box corresponding to cost of freight does not contain any figure at all.
And the box corresponding to " frete por conta " contains the indication "1", which
corresponds to "emitente".
The kind of supporting documentation to which we refer in this case would be, for
example, a contract between Sadia and a shipping company or any other
documentation from the company which clearly indicates the amount to be
discounted for freight. We insist that the " notas fiscales", which did not reveal the
indicative amount of the requested adjustment, were the only documentation on hand.
(…)"
7.233 Argentina asserts that Avipal’s request for a freight cost adjustment was made too late in the
proceedings, was not accompanied by supporting documentation, and was not provided with the
proper Spanish translation.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.234 Brazil's claim concerns the DCD's failure to make freight cost adjustments to the normal
value of both Sadia and Avipal. Brazil's claim is based on Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, which
provides in relevant part that:
"A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels
of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability." (footnote omitted)
7.235 As noted by the panel in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, "Article 2.4 places the obligation on the
investigating authority to make due allowance, in each case on its merits, for differences which affect
price comparability…".
179 Argentina has not argued that it would not have been appropriate in
principle to make the adjustment for freight costs. This is entirely reasonable, since it seems to us that
under normal circumstances there is an obvious inc onsistency with Article 2.4 if an investigating

179 Id., para. 6.113.

authority compares f.o.b. export prices with "delivered" domestic prices, because such a comparison
would not be made at the same level of trade. We shall now examine the reasons why, according to
Argentina, the DCD was entitled not to make the freight cost adjustment.
7.236 Regarding Sadia, Argentina asserts that it was entitled not to adjust for freight costs because
Sadia reported its freight costs on an annualized basis, without supporting documentation. We see
nothing in the DCD's questionnaire that would exclude specific forms of reporting, including
“annualization”. Nor has Argentina identified anything in the questionnaire that would exclude such
reporting. Since the questionnaire did not exclude “annualized” reporting, and since there is nothing
on the record to explain why "annualized" reporting might be considered unreasonable, the fact that
Sadia reported freight costs on an "annualized" basis is not sufficient reason for the DCD not to make
any freight cost adjustment.
7.237 Regarding Argentina's argument that Sadia failed to submit supporting documentation for any
freight cost adjustment, the Panel asked Argentina to "indicate precisely (page number, paragraph
number, line number) where the investigating authority explained the reason for rejecting Sadia's
request in its final determination, or in any other document prepared by the investigating authority at
the time of its determination".
180 Argentina replied that "[t]he relevant explanation can be found in
Section VIII.1.3.3.1 of the Report on Action Taken. In that report, the DCD identified the
information that it would use for the determination of normal value, which did not include any
adjustment for freight." In reviewing the relevant section of the DCD's final determination, we find
no reference to Sadia's alleged failure to provide supporting documentation. Argentina's explanation
is therefore ex post rationalization which we are bound to ignore in examining this claim. Although
Argentina's reply to Question 82 seems to suggest that the absence of documentary evidence should
be inferred from the fact that the DCD failed to make the freight cost adjustment requested by Sadia,
there is no basis for us to make any such inference. There could be a any number of reasons why the
DCD failed to make the adjustment requested by Sadia, and the purpose of this claim is to determine
whether or not the DCD was entitled to do so.
7.238 In any event, we note that in response to Question 81 from the Panel, Argentina
acknowledged
181 that at least one sales invoice supplied by Sadia referred to freight charged to
"emitente", i.e., the supplier. 182 Thus, Sadia had supplied some documentary evidence in support of
its request for a freight cost adjustment, since the relevant invoice clearly indicated that freight costs
were incurred by the supplier, i.e., Sadia, and not the customer. In light of the requirement in
Article 2.4 that investigating authorities make due allowance, in each case on its merits, for
differences which affect price comparability, we consider that this documentary evidence should have
caused the DCD to seek further clarification from Sadia on this issue. The documentary evidence was
in any event sufficient to prevent the DCD from concluding that Sadia had failed to provide any
supporting evidence for its freight cost adjustment. On the contrary, there was documentary evidence
on the record indicating that Sadia did incur freight costs in respect of domestic sales. We are
therefore not persuaded by Argentina's justification for not accepting Sadia's request for a freight cost
adjustment.
7.239 Regarding Avipal, Argentina submits that its request for a freight cost adjustment was
rejected because it was not supported by documentary evidence, was not fully translated into Spanish,
and was tardy. Concerning the issues of translation and tardiness, we find no reference to such
considerations in the DCD's final determination. Nor has Argentina provided us with any evidence
from the time of the DCD's determination to sugge st that such factors caused the DCD to reject
Avipal's request for a freight cost adjustment. In the absence of such evidence, Argentina's arguments

180 Question 82 from the Panel.
181 See para. 7.232 supra.
182 See Exhibit BRA-29, p. 6.

concerning translation and tardiness constitute ex post rationalization, and therefore provide no basis
for us to decide on the issue before us. Concerning the absence of supporting documentation, we note
that the first paragraph of page 65 of the Final Affirmative Dumping Determination indicates that the
DCD only made those adjustments which it could verify. We understand this to be an assertion by the
DCD that it would only make those adjustments for which it had supporting documentation. In
examining the substance of Brazil's claim, we find that there is nothing on the record to suggest that
Avipal had supplied any documentary evidence in support of its request for a freight cost adjustment.
There is therefore a clear distinction between the factual circumstances surrounding the freight cost
adjustment requests made by Sadia and Avipal.
183 Accordingly, we find that the DCD was entitled to
reject the freight cost adjustment requested by Avipal.
(c) Conclusion
7.240 To conclude, we find that the DCD acted in violation of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by
failing to make the freight cost adjustment to normal value requested by Sadia.
2. Failure to Make Various Adjustments for Differences Reported by JOX – Claim 24
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.241 This claim concerns the DCD's use of domestic sales data obtained from JOX for the purpose
of establishing normal value for certain Brazilian exporters. Brazil claims that Argentina violated
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement because the DCD compared the JOX data (normal value) with export
price without adjusting for differences reported by JOX in respect of tax, finance costs, sales
commission and freight costs.
7.242 During the course of these proceedings, Argentina made two arguments in defence of the
DCD's decision not to make the requested adjustments to normal value. First, Argentina asserted that
the JOX domestic sales data was not adjusted to ensure that normal value and export price were
compared at the same level of trade. If the adjustments had been made, the comparison would have
been – improperly – between an ex-factory price for the normal value and an f.o.b. export price,
because there was no identical information on the deductions to be made from the export price of the
goods. Second, Argentina submitted that details of the relevant adjustments were submitted by JOX
in Portuguese, whereas the Law No. 19,549 on Administrative Procedures and Article 28 of
Implementing Decree No. 1759/72 provide that foreig n-language submissions to the investigating
authority must be translated into Spanish by a registered translator.
7.243 Regarding Argentina's level-of-trade argument, Brazil asserts that even the use of an f.o.b.
normal value (i.e., at the same level of trade as the f.o.b. export price) would have required
adjustments / deductions for differences in tax and finance costs, because the f.o.b. export price does
not include taxes and finance costs.
184
7.244 Regarding the submission of data by JOX in Portuguese, Brazil asserts that the relevant
information was submitted by JOX in response to a request made by the DCD, and not by the
Brazilian exporters or petitioner.185 JOX is a private entity, not related to the Brazilian Government or
any of the Brazilian exporters subject to the investigation. Thus, JOX did not constitute an "interested
part[y]" within the meaning of Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement , and was therefore under no

183 Furthermore, Avipal's request was made very late in the proceedings, on 21 December 1999 (even
though its initial questionnaire response was submitted in April 1999), thereby limiting the time available for the
DCD to revert to Avipal on this issue.
184 See Brazil's reply to Question 93 from the Panel.
185 See Brazil's comments on Argentina's reply to Question 85 from the Panel.

obligation to respond to the Argentinean authorities, much less to provide a translation of its response
in Spanish.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.245 As noted above, Argentina has submitted two arguments (i.e., level of trade and language) in
support of the DCD's decision not to make certain adjustments to the JOX data used to establish
normal value for certain exporters. There is no evidence before us to suggest that the first argument,
concerning level of trade, was relied on by the DCD at the time of its decision. That argument
therefore constitutes ex post rationalization which we are unable to consider.
7.246 Regarding the choice of language by JOX, we note that the JOX data first became relevant to
the investigation because it was relied on by the applicant for the purpose of establishing normal value
in its application. The DCD subsequently had recourse to the JOX data for the purpose of
establishing normal value for certain exporters when it determined that those exporters had not
submitted domestic sales data sufficient for the purpose of establishing normal value. The DCD
requested clarification from JOX regarding the possible need for adjustments on 25 June 1999.
Although the official language of the DCD's inve stigation was Spanish, JOX replied to the DCD in
Portuguese (reply received by the DCD on 3 August 1999). JOX informed the DCD that the JOX
domestic sales data available to the DCD included various sales taxes (14.65 per cent in total), finance
costs (depending on sales terms), sales commissions (0.5 to 1 per cent) and freight costs (depending
on geographic location).
7.247 We note, therefore, that JOX only presented details regarding adjustments to the relevant
sales data in response to a request from the DCD. JOX did not have any interest in the proceedings.
There is nothing on the record before us to suggest that JOX was an "interested part[y]" within the
meaning of Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement . Nor is there any evidence that JOX sought to
participate in the DCD's investigation as an interest ed party. In such circumstances, we fail to see
why Brazilian exporters should be penalized (because the non-adjusted normal value would have led
to a higher margin of dumping) by JOX's failure to submit the relevant information in Spanish, or by
the DCD's failure to procure its own translation of that information. The DCD was seeking the
information from JOX because the DCD was going to use the JOX data as the basis for normal value,
and because it was aware of the likely need to make adjustments to the JOX data. The fact that JOX,
which was not an interested party, and not itself taking part in the investigation, failed to respond in
Spanish does not absolve the DCD from its obligations under Article 2.4. To the extent that the DCD
was seeking clarification from JOX for its own purposes, we consider that the onus was on the DCD
to procure its own Spanish translation of JOX's submission.
7.248 We also note that, as demonstrated inter alia in respect of Claim 25 below, the DCD relied in
part on the same JOX document – in Portuguese – to increase normal value to reflect alleged
differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and that sold in Argentina.
186 To
the extent that the DCD was able to rely on JOX's Portuguese document to make an upward
adjustment to normal value, we see no reason why the DCD was similarly not able to rely on the same
JOX document to make other, downward adjustments to normal value. Such conduct is not indicative
of the actions of an objective and impartial investigating authority.

186 The DCD also relied on a second JOX document submitted by the applicant, which had been
translated from Portuguese into Spanish.

(c) Conclusion
7.249 In light of the above, we find that the Argentine investigating authority violated Article 2.4 of
the AD Agreement by failing to make adjustments when comparing the export price with normal value
established on the basis of JOX domestic sales data.
3. Differences in Physical Characteristics Justifying an Adjustment – Claim 25
7.250 This claim concerns a 9.09 per cent upward adjustment of normal value made by the DCD to
reflect alleged differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and poultry exported
to Argentina. The DCD found that poultry was sold in Brazil with head and feet, whereas poultry was
exported to Argentina without head and feet. The DCD concluded that the yield rate (per kg) for
poultry sold in Brazil was therefore higher than that for poultry exported to Argentina. Since the
alleged difference in yield rates was 9.09 per cent, the DCD increased normal value by that margin.
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.251 Brazil claims that the 9.09 per cent adjustment was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD
Agreement because, for the most part, there is no difference between poultry sold in Brazil and
poultry exported to Argentina. According to Brazil, most exporters / producers sell in both markets
eviscerated poultry without head and feet. Brazil submits that this fact was evident from the
questionnaire responses submitted by exporters: Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul indicated in their
questionnaire responses that they sold the same poultry in Argentina and Brazil, whereas Catarinense
reported differences in respect of broiler (but not griller) poultry only. Catarinense reported that
broilers were sold in Brazil without the feet but with the head, whereas broilers exported to Argentina
had neither head nor feet.
7.252 Argentina asserts that the Brazilian exporters did not expressly deny the need for an
adjustment for differences in physical characteristics during the investigation (although Argentina
acknowledges that the exporters criticized the amount of the adjustment). Argentina also asserts that
it received evidence from JOX to the effect that poult ry was sold with head and feet in Brazil. In
particular, a note from JOX received on 3 August 1999 reads: "Except otherwise stated, refrigerated
chicken sold in São Paulo includes feet and head. The price of (refrigerated chicken without feet and
head) should be 10 per cent higher".
187
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.253 This claim concerns the DCD's decision to increase all exporters' normal values by 9.09 per
cent to reflect alleged differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and
Argentina respectively.188 Since Brazil does not dispute that such an adjustment would have been
necessary if indeed there had been differences between poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina
respectively, we shall resolve this issue by ex amining whether or not the DCD properly found that
such differences existed.
7.254 As a starting-point, we note that the DCD's record contained evidence to the effect that there
were differences between poultry sold in Brazil and poultry exported to Argentina. The DCD was in
possession of a document from JOX (received 3 August 1999) indicating that certain poultry sold in

187 Exhibit BRA-32.
188 Unlike the similar claim under Article 5.3 (Claim 2), Brazil's Claim 25 only challenges the need for
– but not the amount of – the adjustment made by the DCD during the course of the investigation.

Brazil included head and feet. 189 In that document, JOX stated that "[e]xcept otherwise stated,
refrigerated chicken sold in Sao Paulo includes feet and head".
7.255 However, there was also evidence on the record indicating that at least certain exporters sold
an identical product in both Brazil and Argentina. In particular, Section A, Annex II, of Sadia's
questionnaire responses (i.e., both the original and supplemental responses) described the product sold
in both Brazil and Argentina in identical terms (namely "whole poultry with giblets").
190 The product
description in the equivalent section of Avipal's questionnaire response 191 also did not distinguish
between domestic and export sales. Both these exporters' questionnaire responses suggested,
therefore, that they sold the same product in both Brazil and Argentina.
7.256 Section A, Annex II, of Frangosul's original que stionnaire response also drew no distinction
between domestic and export products. 192 Furthermore, Frangosul's supplementary questionnaire
response included a product brochure stating that both broiler and griller poultry did not contain head
or feet. Thus, Frangosul's questionnaire response not only indicated that it sold the same products in
Brazil and Argentina, but also demonstrated that those products did not include head and feet.
7.257 Only one exporter, Catarinense, reported any difference between the products sold in Brazil
and Argentina. Catarinense's questionnaire response reported that broilers sold in Brazil included
head but not feet, whereas broilers exported to Argentina contained neither head nor feet.
7.258 Furthermore, we note that the Government of Brazil objected to the DCD's adjustment for
differences in physical characteristics in a letter dated 19 January 2000.
193 Brazil stated that the
adjustment was "absurd", since poultry was sold in the same condition in Brazil as it was in
Argentina.
7.259 In light of the above, we are of the view that the record did not provide sufficient basis for the
DCD to conclude that there were differences in the physical characteristics of all poultry sold in
Brazil and Argentina respectively. Only one exporter's questionnaire response suggested that some
form of adjustment may be necessary. Other exporters' questionnaire responses indicated that the
same product was sold in both Brazil and Argentina. Despite the possibility of an adjustment alluded
to in the above-mentioned JOX document, the substance of the exporters' questionnaire responses,
and the observations of the Government of Brazil, should have precluded an objective and impartial
investigating authority from concluding, on the basis of the JOX document alone, that there were
differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina respectively. At the
very least, the conflicting evidence should have caused the DCD to pursue this matter further with the
exporters.
(c) Conclusion
7.260 For the above reasons, we find that the DCD violated Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by
increasing all exporters' normal values by 9.09 per cent to reflect alleged differences in the physical
characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina.

189 See supra, note 187.
190 Exhibit BRA-22.
191 Exhibit BRA-23.
192 Exhibit BRA-24.
193 Letter from the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine authorities (Exhibit BRA-39).

4. Period of Collection of Dumping Data – Claim 26
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.261 Brazil asserts that the DCD violated Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement because it did not
inform exporters of the period of investigation for dumping until nine months after initiation of the
investigation, during which time exporters were faced with the unreasonable burden of submitting
domestic and export sales data for 1996-1998 and the months of 1999 for which data was available.
7.262 Argentina asserts that the AD Agreement does not regulate the period for which dumping data
may be collected. Argentina denies that the DCD imposed an unreasonable burden on exporters by
requesting an excessive amount of data. Indeed, Argentina submits that it calculated normal value on
the basis of a limited sample of invoices precisely so that exporters would not need to produce a large
volume of invoices.
7.263 The European Communities submits that Brazil's claim is not covered by the scope of
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. The European Communities asserts that, as recently recalled by the
panel report in Egypt – Steel Rebar, Article 2.4 is concerned exclusively with the comparison between
the normal value and the export price.
194 It does not apply to the determination of the normal value
and the export price. The European Communities suggests that the relevant provisions of the AD
Agreement for examining the issue raised by Brazil are Article 6.1 and the first paragraph of Annex II.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.264 This claim concerns the fixing of the period of investigation by the investigating authority. It
does not concern the comparison between normal value and export price. We recall the finding by the
panel in Egypt – Steel Rebar that:
"In short, Article 2.4 in its entirety, including its burden of proof requirement, has to
do with ensuring a fair comparison, through various adjustments as appropriate, of
export price and normal value."195
7.265 The report of the Egypt – Steel Rebar panel was adopted during the course of these Panel
proceedings. We agree with that panel's finding that Article 2.4 imposes obligations in respect of the
comparison between normal value and export price. In our view, Article 2.4 does not impose
obligations in respect of the fixing of the period of investigation by the investigating authority, which
is the object of Brazil's Claim 26.
(c) Conclusion
7.266 In light of the above, we reject Brazil's Claim 26.
5. Sampling of Domestic Sales Transactions – Claim 27
7.267 This claim concerns the comparison methodology used by the DCD to calculate margins of
dumping for Sadia and Avipal.

194 Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey ("Egypt – Steel
Rebar "), WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, para. 7.335.
195 Ibid.

(a) Arguments of the parties
7.268 Brazil claims that the DCD acted in violation of Article 2.4.2 because, although Sadia and
Avipal reported all relevant domestic sales transactions, the DCD did not take into account all
domestic sales when comparing the weighted average normal value with the weighted average export
price. In other words, Brazil claims that the DCD violated Article 2.4.2 by comparing the weighted
average export price with only a weighted average statistical sample of normal value.
7.269 Argentina asserts that the sample of domestic sales transactions used by the DCD for the
purpose of establishing a weighted average normal value was statistically valid, and based on
documentation provided by the exporters.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.270 Article 2.4.2 provides that:
"Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual
export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or
transaction-to-transaction comparison."
7.271 Article 2.4.2 provides that an investigating authority should normally calculate a margin of
dumping by comparing normal value and export price either on a weighted average basis, or
transaction-to-transaction. In the event that a weighted average comparison is used, Article 2.4.2
provides for the comparison of "a weighted average normal value" with a weighted average of prices
of all comparable export transactions. Brazil claims that Argentina violated Article 2.4.2 because,
instead of calculating weighted average normal values for Sadia and Avipal on the basis of all of those
exporters' domestic sales transactions, the DCD calculated weighted averages of a statistical sample of
the domestic transactions reported by them. This raises the issue of whether or not a Member must
include all domestic sales transactions when establishing "a weighted average normal value" for the
purpose of Article 2.4.2.
196
7.272 In examining what is meant by "a weighted average normal value", we attach particular
importance to the meaning of the term "normal value". We note that Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement
refers to normal value as "the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product
when destined for consumption in the exporting country". Article 2.1 therefore defines normal value
in terms of domestic sales transactions in the exporting Member (although Article 2.2 provides that
alternative methods to establish normal value may be used in certain circumstances). 197 Article 2.1

196 We note that the panel in Egypt – Steel Rebar found that Article 2.4 "has to do with ensuring a fair
comparison (…) of export price and normal value. Thus, we find that it does not apply to the investigating
authority's establishment of normal value as such…" (see footnote 194 supra). Although we examine the present
issue in light of the provisions of Article 2 governing the establishment of normal value, we are not examining
the establishment of normal value per se . Rather, we are examining the weighted average normal value
established by the investigating authority for the purpose of comparison with the weighted average export price.
197 These methods are not relevant in the present proceedings, since the DCD established normal value
on the basis of domestic sales transactions.

does not specify, however, whether or not all domestic sales transactions need be included. This issue
is addressed by Article 2.2.1, which sets out the conditions to be met before domestic sales may be
treated as not in "the ordinary course of trade", and therefore excluded for the purpose of establishing
normal value in accordance with Article 2.1. Article 2.2.1 states that domestic sales "may be
disregarded in determining normal value only if" the relevant conditions are met. We understand
these provisions to mean that there are only specific circumstances in which domestic sales
transactions may be excluded from normal value. We consider that these provisions constitute
relevant context for interpreting the phrase "a weighted average normal value", since they indicate
that "a weighted average normal value" is a weighted average of all domestic sales other than those
which may be disregarded pursuant to Article 2.2.1 of the AD Agreement.
7.273 We do not consider that our interpretation is undermined by the fact that Article 2.4.2 refers
to a weighted average normal value, and not the weighted average normal value. In our view, use of
the word "a" simply means that there are various ways of establishing a weighted average. 198 It does
not mean that there are various ways of establishing normal value.
7.274 Nor do we consider that our interpretation is undermined simply by the fact that Article 2.4.2
does not refer to weighted average normal value in terms of all domestic transactions, whereas for the
purpose of weighted average export price Article 2.4.2 specifies that prices of all comparable export
transactions shall be included. We believe that the strict rules in Article 2 regarding the determination
of normal value require that, in the usual case,
199 normal value should be established by reference to
all domestic sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade. There would be no need to
stipulate the circumstances in which domestic transactions may be excluded from normal value if
there were no general obligation to otherwise include all domestic transactions in normal value.
7.275 In the present case, the DCD established weighted average normal values on the basis of
statistical samples of domestic sales transactions. The DCD did not establish weighted average
normal values on the basis of all domestic sales transactions other than those it was entitled to exclude
under Article 2.2.1.
(c) Conclusion
7.276 In light of the above, we find that the DCD acted in violation of Article 2.4.2 by failing to
compare the weighted average export price with a proper weighted average normal value.
6. Injury Determination – Claim 32
7.277 This claim concerns the consistency of the CNCE's injury determination with Articles 3.1, 3.4
and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.278 Brazil claims that the CNCE's injury determination was inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement because it reviewed certain injury factors on the basis of January 96 – December 98
data, but other injury factors on the basis of January 96 – June 99 data. In other words, some injury
factors were analysed in light of 1999 data, whereas others were not. Brazil submits that a violation
of Article 3.1 necessarily gives rise to a violation of Articles 3.4 and 3.5. Brazil also argues that
Argentina violated Article 3.5 because the period of review for dumping ended in January 1999,

198 "Weighted average" is defined as "an average in taking which each component is multiplied by a
factor chosen to give it its proper importance" (h ttp://www.oed.com). The weighted average may vary,
therefore, depending on the factor chosen.
199 That is to say, in the case where normal value is based on domestic transactions.

whereas the period of review for injury ended in June 1999. According to Brazil, the investigating
authority should not have attributed injury found to exist in June 1999 to dumped imports from
January 1999.
7.279 Argentina asserts that the CNCE took 1999 injury data into account because the investigation
was initiated on the basis of a threat of injury, and an investigation of an alleged threat of injury
requires the examination of the most recent data possible. Argentina also asserts that the existence of
a voluntary agreement between "the parties" between October 1998 and March 1999 meant that it was
necessary to analyse imports without the effects produced by that agreement, so the analysis was
extended until June 1999.
7.280 In addition, Argentina provided the following response to Question 87 from the Panel:
"Lines 1 to 6 in the second paragraph of Section V (State of the Domestic Industry) of
Record No. 576 of 23 December 1999, whic h appears in CNCE File No. 43/1997
(folio 7313), clearly state that:
"The 'period under analysis' corresponds to the period from
January 1996 to December 1998. For certain variables, such as
domestic production, prices, imports, national exports and apparent
consumption, data is included for the first half of 1999. Data for
1995 is provided for reference purposes. Variations for the first half
of 1999 are against the same period for the previous year." (emphasis
added)
Nevertheless, Argentina reiterates what it stated in its two previous submissions, and
for a better understanding of the overall context, we repeat our reply that:
"First of all, there is no obligation to analyse any indicator outside the
period established by the authorities as the investigation period.
In accordance with international practice in certain countries,
Argentina considered a number of variables accessible to the public
in order to double check the trends observed during the investigation
period. If we were to insist on the constant updating of all indicators
during the investigation, as Brazil seems to suggest in this case, the
investigation would be endless. We repeat that this is not the
objective of the AD Agreement, nor is it the practice of those
countries which, like Argentina, examine certain relevant indicators
of reference data."
It should be noted that the determination of threat of injury was based on the period
from January 1996 to December 1998, and the other data, as stated in previous replies
and in the Record in question, was used for reference purposes."
200
7.281 Brazil provided the following comments on Argentina's response:
"In responding to the Panel’s question, Argentina fails to provide where the
investigating authority explained why it looked at 1999 data for only certain injury
factors and not others. The passage referred to by Argentina clearly states that the
data corresponding to the year 1995 is used by way of reference. However, that same

200 See Argentina's reply to Question 87 of the Panel.

passage does not provide that the data corresponding to the first semester of 1999 is
used by way of reference. What that passage provides is that the data for the
variables national production, prices, imports, national exports and apparent
consumption corresponding to the first semester of 1999 were included in the period
of injury analysis. Had the authority intended to use the data for the first semester of
1999 merely as reference, the authority would have clearly stated this in the final
determination, just as it did with the data for the year 1995. In this investigation, the
Argentinean authority considered a certain period of injury analysis for the factors
production, prices, imports, exports and apparent consumption and considered
another period of injury analysis for the remaining Article 3.4 factors." (emphasis in
original, footnotes omitted)
201
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.282 Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 provide that:
"3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be
based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the
volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on
domestic producers of such products.
3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential
decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin
of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry."
7.283 Argentina does not deny that the CNCE only re viewed 1999 data for certain injury factors.
Article 3.1 requires an "objective" examination of injury. In our view, there is a prima facie case that
an investigating authority fails to conduct an "objec tive" examination if it examines different injury
factors using different periods. Such a prima facie case may be rebutted if the investigating authority
demonstrates that the use of different periods is justifiable on the basis of objective grounds (because,
for example, data for more recent periods was not available for certain injury factors). Since the

201 See Brazil's comments to Argentina's reply to Question 87 of the Panel.

CNCE only examined 1999 data for certain injury factors, we find prima facie that the CNCE failed
to conduct an objective examination of injury. We shall now consider whether or not Argentina has
rebutted that prima facie case.
7.284 Argentina asserted in reply to Panel Question 87 that 1999 data was used for certain injury
factors to "double check the trends". However, although the final determination refers to 1995 data
being used for "reference purposes", it does not refer to 1999 data being used for this purpose.
Argentina also argued before the Panel that the CNCE needed to review 1999 data because it was
examining the existence of a threat of injury. However, there is nothing in the CNCE's final
determination, or any evidence on the record, to suggest that these explanations constitute anything
other than ex post rationalization which we are precluded from taking into consideration. In any
event, even if there were good reasons for the CN CE to review injury data for 1999, this does not
explain why the CNCE considered 1999 data for certain injury factors only, and not all of them.
Argentina has failed to provide any justification as to why 1999 data was only used for certain, but not
all, injury factors. Although Argentina's response to Question 87 from the Panel could perhaps be
understood to mean that 1999 data was only available for certain injury factors ("Argentina
considered a number of variables accessible to the public"), no such explanation was contained in the
CNCE's final injury determination, or in any othe r document on the record before us. Furthermore,
the fact that 1999 data for the remaining injury factors may not have been available to the public does
not necessarily mean that such data was not available to the investigating authority. Accordingly,
Argentina has failed to rebut the presumption th at the CNCE conducted a subjective examination of
the relevant injury factors.
7.285 In light of the above, we find that the CNCE acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement by only examining 1999 data for certain injury factors.
7.286 Brazil asserts that the abovementioned violation of Article 3.1 would also constitute a
violation of Articles 3.4 and 3.5. In this respect, Brazil appears to consider that Articles 3.4 and 3.5
also require investigating authorities to conduct an objective examination of injury and causation.
That part of Brazil’s Claim 32 concerning an alleged violation of Article 3.4 is based on exactly the
same facts underpinning our finding of violation of Article 3.1. According to the logic of Brazil’s
claim, therefore, if Argentina were to bring its measure into conformity with Article 3.1, it would also
bring its measure into conformity with Article 3.4. Accordingly, there is no need for us to examine
that part of Claim 32 concerning Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.287 That part of Claim 32 concerning Article 3.5 is not based on the same facts as Brazil’s
arguments concerning Articles 3.1 and 3.4. It is therefore necessary for us to address Brazil’s
arguments concerning Article 3.5. Brazil’s arguments relate to the fact that the periods of review used
for the separate dumping and injury determinations did not end at the same point in time. We note,
however, that there is nothing in the AD Agreement to suggest that the periods of review for dumping
and injury must necessarily end at the same point in time. Indeed, since there may be a time-lag
between the entry of dumped imports and the injury caused by them, it may not be appropriate to use
identical periods of review for the dumping and injury analyses in all cases. Furthermore, we note
that the issue of periods of review has been examined by the Anti-Dumping Committee. It has issued
a recommendation to the effect that, as a general rule, "the period of data collection for injury
investigations normally should be at least three years, unless a party from whom data is being
gathered has existed for a lesser period, and should include the entirety of the period of data
collection for the dumping investigation " (emphasis added).
202 It would appear, therefore, that the
period of review for injury need only "include" th e entirety of the period of review for dumping.

202 Recommendation concerning the periods of data collection for anti-dumping investigations,
G/ADP/6, adopted by the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices on 5 May 2000.

There is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Committee's recommendation to suggest that it should not
exceed (in the sense of including more recent data) the period of review for dumping.203
(c) Conclusion
7.288 For the above reasons, we uphold Brazil’s Claim 32 in respect of the violation of Article 3.1
of the AD Agreement . We make no findings in respect of Article 3.4, and we reject that part of
Brazil's Claim 32 based on Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
7. Failure to Explain Why the CNCE Examined 1999 Data for Certain Injury Factors but
Not Others – Claim 33
7.289 Brazil's Claim 33, concerning Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement , is based on the same
factual circumstances as the preceding Claim 32.
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.290 Brazil submits that Argentina violated Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement because the
CNCE's final determination on injury did not expl ain why the CNCE examined 1999 data for certain
injury factors but not for others.
7.291 Argentina submits that all relevant information was made public through published
resolutions, and was available in the record to interested parties.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.292 In essence, Brazil claims that a violation of Article 12.2.2 follows automatically from the
abovementioned violation of Article 3.1 (Claim 32). In other words, just as the CNCE violated
Article 3.1 by failing to explain why it considered 1999 data for some factors but not for others, so the
absence of any such explanation in the final determination constitutes a violation of Article 12.2.2 of
the AD Agreement.
7.293 We note that two adopted panel reports have already examined the application of the
procedural provisions of Article 12.2.2 to factual circumstances which have already been found to be
in violation of substantive provisions of the AD Agreement.204 Those panels found that it was not
necessary to make findings under Article 12.2.2 in such circumstances. We agree with those panels.
If the CNCE's injury determination was substantively inconsistent with the relevant legal obligations,
the adequacy of the public notice of the CNCE’s findings on injury is immaterial.
(c) Conclusion
7.294 For the above reasons, we do not consider it necessary to examine Brazil's Claim 33.
8. Failure to Exclude the Effect of Non-Dumped Imports in the Injury Determination –
Claims 34 – 37
7.295 These claims concern the meaning of the term "dumped imports" in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and
3.5 of the AD Agreement.

203 We note that even when different periods of review are applied in respect of dumping and injury,
there is still an obligation under Article 3.5 to establish a causal link between the injury and dumped imports.
204 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II , supra, note 48, para. 8.291 and Panel Report, European
Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India ("EC – Bed Linen "),
WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS141/AB/R, para. 6.259.

(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.296 Brazil claims that Argentina violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by
including the effect of non-dumped imports in its injury determination. These non-dumped imports
were exported / produced by Nicolini and Seara, which were found by the DCD not to be dumping.
According to Brazil, Article 3 only allows Memb ers to take into account the injurious effects of
dumped imports.
7.297 Argentina submits that, when analysing causal link, the CNCE did take into account the fact
that imports from Nicolini and Seara were not dumped. The average f.o.b. prices of these enterprises
were substantially higher than the prices of other exports found to have dumped. Furthermore, the
volume of imports from Nicolini and Seara came nowhere close to the levels reached by the majority
of exports from Brazil throughout the period analysed by the CNCE. The CNCE found that price was
the decisive factor on the market, and that the decrease in domestic prices throughout the period of
investigation was caused by the price of dumped imports. Had the CNCE excluded imports from
Nicolini and Seara, the average f.o.b. price of imports taken into account by the CNCE would have
been even lower, thereby accentuating the causal link between imports and injury to the domestic
industry. In this regard, Argentina submitted evidence to the Panel showing that in 1997 and 1998 the
average f.o.b. prices of imports from Nicolini and Seara were 13 per cent higher than the other
imports investigated. In addition, the fact that imports from Nicolini and Seara did not have the major
share in any year during the period investigated by the CNCE implied that no radical changes could
be expected in the volume and share of the other imports investigated. Imports from exporters /
producers found to have dumped represented the majority of imports, rising in 1998 to almost
40,000 tonnes compared with 56,000 tonnes for total imports from Brazil, and with the volume of
dumped imports increasing more rapidly than the volume of total imports in 1998. Consequently, the
share of dumped imports in apparent consumption rose, displacing domestic sales of the like domestic
product.
7.298 The European Communities opposed Brazil's interpretation of Article 3. The European
Communities suggested that an anti-dumping investiga tion is country-specific, rather than exporter-
specific, so that once certain imports from an exporting country are found to be dumped, an
investigating authority is entitled to treat all imports from that country as dumped.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.299 Brazil's claims are based on Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Brazil asserts
that the CNCE violated these provisions by including the effects of non-dumped imports (i.e., imports
from exporters / foreign producers found by the DCD not to have dumped) in its injury analysis. In
examining these claims, we must first determine whether or not the term "dumped imports" in the
relevant provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement excludes imports from producers / exporters
found not to have dumped. If it does, we must determine whether or not the CNCE excluded non-
dumped imports from Nicolini and Seara when making its final determination on injury.
7.300 We consider that a determination of dumping is made with reference to a product from a
particular producer/exporter. If a particular producer/exporter has been found not to have dumped,
then we see no basis for including that producer/exporter's imports in the category of "dumped
imports". We note that the term "dumped imports" was interpreted by the panel in EC – Bed Linen ,
and by the subsequent panel reviewing India's recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU regarding the EC's
implementation of the results of the original proceeding.

7.301 The EC – Bed Linen panel found that "all imports from any producer/exporter found to be
dumping may be considered as dumped imports for purposes of injury analysis". 205 Although this
finding does not resolve the issue of whether imports from producers / exporters found not to be
dumping may be considered as "dumped imports", that panel observed that
"It is possible that a calculation conducted consistently with the AD Agreement
would lead to the conclusion that one or another Indian producer should be attributed
a zero or de minimis margin of dumping. In such a case, it is our view that the
imports attributable to such a producer/exporter may not be considered as "dumped"
for purposes of injury analysis."206
7.302 In the implementation proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the panel "agree[d]
fully"207 with the preceding observation of the EC – Bed Linen panel, and in turn found that:
"the question of which imports are to be considered dumped is readily answered –
'dumped imports' are all imports attributable to producers or exporters for which a
margin of dumping greater than de minimis is calculated. This was the decision of
the original Panel in this dispute, rejectin g the argument that the imports attributable
to a single producer found to be dumping should be divided into two categories –
'dumped' and 'not-dumped' sales transactions."208
7.303 We agree with the findings of the EC – Bed Linen and the EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 –
India) panels, and with the abovementioned observation by the EC – Bed Linen panel. On the basis of
the ordinary meaning of the text, we find that the term "dumped imports" refers to all imports
attributable to producers or exporters for which a margin of dumping greater than de minimis has been
calculated. The term "dumped imports" excludes imports from producers / exporters found in the
course of the investigation not to have dumped.
7.304 We recall that the DCD found that imports from Nicolini and Seara were not dumped. Our
finding regarding the meaning of the term "dumpe d imports" therefore means that the CNCE should
have excluded imports from Nicolini and Seara when examining the potentially injurious effects of
"dumped imports" on the domestic industry. We shall now examine whether or not the CNCE did so.
7.305 There is nothing on the record before us or in the CNCE's final injury determination to
suggest that the CNCE excluded imports from Nicolini and Seara from its injury analysis. Indeed, it
would have been unlikely that CNCE could have excluded Nicolini and Seara's imports (by virtue of
their being non-dumped) since the CNCE's injury determination preceded by six months the DCD's
determination that Nicolini and Seara were not du mping. In other words, the CNCE could not have
excluded imports from Nicolini and Seara from its injury analysis, since it did not know at the time of
its injury analysis that imports from those exporters / producers were not dumped.
7.306 Furthermore, Argentina has not argued that imports from Nicolini and Seara were excluded
from the CNCE's injury analysis. Rather, Argentina has focused on the effects of the inclusion of
Nicolini and Seara imports in the CNCE's injury an alysis, suggesting that the finding of injury would
have been aggravated had those imports been excluded because the average f.o.b. price of imports
would have decreased. While Argentina made arguments to the Panel regarding average f.o.b. import

205 Id., para. 6.137.
206 Id., para. 6.138.
207 Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India ("EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) "),
WT/DS141/RW, 29 November 2002 (reports of the panel and Appellate Body not yet adopted), para. 6.131.
208 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), supra, note 207, para. 6.133.

prices excluding imports from Nicolini and Seara, it failed to identify anything in the record to the
effect that the CNCE considered such arguments during its injury analysis. The same is true of
Argentina's arguments to the Panel regarding the Nicolini and Seara's share of total imports. Thus,
even if such arguments were relevant for the purpose of determining whether or not relevant imports
from Nicolini and Seara were excluded from the CNCE's injury analysis – a fact of which we are not
at all convinced – such arguments constitute ex post rationalization which we are bound not to
consider. In any event, we consider that, consistent with a proper interpretation of the term "dumped
imports", imports from Nicolini and Seara should have been excluded outright from the CNCE's
injury analysis. It is clear from the record that CNCE failed to do this.
(c) Conclusion
7.307 In light of the above, we find that the CNCE violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD
Agreement by including imports from Nicolini and Seara in its injury analysis, even though such
imports had been found by the DCD to be non-dumped.
9. Failure to Examine Each of the Injury Fact ors and Indices Having a Bearing on the
State of the Domestic Industry – Claims 38 - 40
7.308 These claims concern the issue of whether or not the CNCE examined each of the injury
factors set forth in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Brazil submits that the CNCE failed to do so,
thereby violating Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.309 Brazil submits that the CNCE violated Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to
examine each of the injury factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry
set forth in Article 3.4. In particular, Brazil asse rts that the CNCE failed to examine actual and
potential decline in productivity, factors affecting domestic prices, the magnitude of the margin of
dumping, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, growth, the ability to raise capital or
investments. Brazil further asserts that failure to address each of the Article 3.4 injury factors also
constitutes a violation of the public notice requirement set forth in Article 12.2.2 because not all of the
Article 3.4 injury factors were referred to or evaluated in the CNCE's injury determination.
7.310 Argentina submits that the CNCE did evaluate the injury factors identified by Brazil.
Argentina refers to the inclusion of factors relating to productivity in the CNCE's injury
determination, and provides a summary of the characteristics of the Argentine poultry market, of
factors affecting domestic prices, and the effects of the margin of dumping. Argentina also explains
why the CNCE did not need to analyse cash flow and the ability to raise capital, claiming that it
correctly focused on liquidity and the "break-even point" instead.
7.311 The United States asserts that a violation of Article 3.4 would not necessarily constitute a
violation of Article 12.2.2, since Article 12.2.2 only requires publication of findings and conclusions
on issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. Thus, if certain
Article 3.4 factors are not material to a given case, they need not be included in the Article 12.2.2
publication, as long as the lack of materiality is at least implicitly apparent from the final
determination.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.312 We shall first examine Brazil's Claim 38, concerning the application of Article 3.4 of the AD
Agreement. We shall then examine Claims 39 and 40, concerning Articles 3.1 and 12.2.2,
respectively.

7.313 Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement provides that:
"The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization
of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance."
7.314 It is well-established in WTO dispute settlement proceedings that an investigating authority
must analyse each of the factors enumerated in Article 3.4. We note that both the EC – Bed Linen
panel, and the Mexico – Corn Syrup panel to which it referred, have found that Article 3.4 is a
mandatory provision, that every Article 3.4 factor must be considered, and that the nature of the
investigating authority's consideration must be apparent.
209 We agree, and shall now examine whether
or not the CNCE complied with these requirements in respect of the specific Article 3.4 factors
identified by Brazil, namely actual and potential decline in productivity, factors affecting domestic
prices, the magnitude of the margin of dumping, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,
growth, and the ability to raise capital or investments.
(i) Productivity
7.315 Argentina asserts that the CNCE made a numbe r of considerations regarding productivity,
including the following statement in the CNCE's final injury determination:
"Generally speaking, the relative stability of the number of employees in spite of the
increases in production would indicate higher physical labour productivity, probably
due to the above-mentioned introduction of new technology."
210
7.316 In our view, this statement is sufficient to demonstrate that the CNCE considered
productivity, and found that productivity increased as a result of the introduction of new technology.
This statement alone, therefore, is sufficient for the purposes of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
211
Accordingly, we reject Brazil's claim that the CNCE failed to consider productivity.
(ii) Factors affecting domestic prices
7.317 Argentina asserts that the CNCE considered factors affecting domestic prices by analysing the
trend in the price index for substitute products, mainly red meat, as well as the general level of
activity and price indexes in the most important relevant sectors. In this regard, Argentina provided
the following response to part of Question 59 from the Panel:
"Regarding the fact that Brazil fails to find an evaluation of other factors affecting the
price of whole eviscerated poultry during the investigation period, we note that this
evaluation appears both in CNCE Record No. 576 and in the Technical Report.
Indeed, regarding the evolution of the price of a substitute product – red meat – the

209 See Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, supra, note 204, para. 6.159, and Panel Report, Mexico – Corn
Syrup, supra, note 65, para. 7.128.
210 Exhibit BRA-14, Record No. 576, page 13.
211 For this reason, we do not consider it necessary to conduct a detailed examination of the other
instances in which Argentina claims that the CNCE considered productivity. We note, however, that in some
instances Argentina has pointed to CNCE statements on production, which is not the same as productivity.

said Record states the following: "An econometric exercise was conducted which
showed that for the period from January 1995 to June 1999, the price of the product
on the domestic market depended on the volume of imports for the previous month,
the price of the imported product and the price of bovine meat. The inclusion of the
price of maize in the mentioned model did not produce satisfactory results, indicating
that the considerable variability of the price of whole eviscerated poultry does not
coincide with the price of maize. Nevertheless, both variables showed similar
patterns … " [Record No. 576, pages 24 and 25]. This analysis was based on the
elements set forth in the Technical Report at folios 7371/2 and 7491/507. CNCE
Record No. 576 also refers to the analysis of the evolution of the general level of
activity, stating that "[t]he economic recession did not particularly affect the
consumption of whole eviscerated poultry, which continued to increase (in 1998 it
increased by 14 per cent)." [Record No. 57 6, page 25] Finally, with respect to
relative prices, CNCE Record No. 576 stat es that "…with regard to the price of
industrial goods taken as a whole and of bovine meat - represented respectively by
the Wholesale Industrial Price Index for Manufactured Goods and the simple average
of the consumer price indices for fresh bovine meat, front and hind cuts - followed
the same trend as the sales revenue described above, although in the case of bovine
meat, the annual variations reflected a stronger decrease in 1998 as a result of the
increase in the price of bovine meat recorded that year." [Record No. 576, page 14]
The above analysis was supported by the information provided in the Technical
Report, in particular Table No. 16 at fo lio 7474 and the description at folio 7410.
Regarding Table No. 16 of the Technical Report, Argentina notes that according to
Brazil it contains only the average sales revenue for poultry, when in fact it also
provides the relative prices mentioned above."
212
7.318 In addition, Argentina provided the following response to Question 88 from the Panel
regarding Table 16 of Record No. 576:
"Table No. 16, which belongs to Technica l Report GEGE/1TDF No. 03/99 and is an
integral part of Record No. 576, provides the average sales revenue for one kilogram
of eviscerated poultry, fresh or chilled, and the relative prices of the comparable
product, with regard to the price of industrial goods taken as a whole and of bovine
meat – represented respectively by the Wholesale Industrial Price Index for
Manufactured Goods and the simple average of the consumer price indices for fresh
bovine meat, front and hind cuts.
The comparison made with respect to the Wholesale Industrial Price Index for
Manufactured Goods was based on the need to assess whether the price of the product
in question was following the same trend as the other manufactured goods.
With regard to the second index, Argentina has traditionally been a consumer of red
meat, so that it was considered appropriate to use this index to analyse the impact of
variations in that product on poultry meat as from a certain degree of substitution
between bovine meat and poultry meat.
As can be seen from the table, the two relative prices analysed followed the same
trend as average sales revenue for the product in question, although in the case of the
price in relation to the simple average for bovine meat the annual variations reflected
a stronger decrease in 1998 as a result of the increase in the price of bovine meat
recorded that year. Indeed, as indicated in the Market Chapter of Technical Report

212 See Argentina's reply to Question 59 of the Panel.

GEGE/ITDF No. 03/99, Section VI.5 (Recent evolution of the market), folio 7371,
paragraph 3: "During 1998 there was a further increase in the demand for poultry as
a result of the substitution effect following the sharp increases in the price of bovine
meat, which reached its peak in the middle of 1998. No decline in the consumption
of poultry was recorded following the subsequent fall in the price of bovine meat.
This because the market perception is that the price of poultry is so low that it is even
pushing the price of bovine meat downwards".
Consequently Article 3.4 was clearly taken into consideration where it provides that
"[t]he examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including … factors affecting domestic
prices …".
213
7.319 In our view, the above extracts from the CN CE's final determination on injury (Record
No. 576 and the accompanying Technical Report) clearly indicate that the CNCE did consider factors
affecting domestic prices, by considering the trend in poultry prices relative to the trend in the price of
substitute products. Accordingly, we reject Brazil's claim that the CNCE failed to consider factors
affecting domestic prices.
(iii) Magnitude of the margin of dumping
7.320 The only arguments made by Argentina conc erning the CNCE's consideration of the
magnitude of the margin of dumping for the purpose of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement are contained
in the following two paragraphs taken from Argentina's first written submission:
"In a situation where, in addition to th e factors already explained regarding the
characteristics of the Argentine market, there is a fixed exchange rate and a recession,
the impact of unfair practices such as dumping can be felt all the more strongly, even
with relatively small margins. This is particularly true when commodities are the
reference product and the price variable is the essential factor in competition.
Consequently, bearing in mind the above explanations concerning Brazil's potential to
generate surpluses under conditions of unfair competition, margins of 8-14 per cent
are significant and were evaluated thus by the investigating authority because of their
potential impact on Argentine production."214
7.321 We note that Argentina has failed to indicate where such arguments are set forth in the
CNCE's Record No. 576, or to point us to any ot her document in which the CNCE is alleged to have
considered such arguments. Such arguments therefore constitute ex post rationalization which we are
precluded from taking into account. In any event, we note that Argentina's reference to dumping
margins of 8 – 14 per cent concerns the margins calculated by the applicant in its application. They
are not the margins calculated by the DCD dur ing the investigation. Furthermore, the CNCE
completed its injury analysis (on 23 December 1999) six months before the DCD completed its
dumping investigation (on 23 June 2000), so we do not see how the CNCE could have taken the
magnitude of the margin of dumping into account in its injury analysis.
7.322 For the above reasons, we uphold Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 3.4 of the AD
Agreement because the CNCE failed to consider the magnitude of the margin of dumping in its
analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.

213 See Argentina's reply to Question 88 of the Panel.
214 See Argentina's first written submission, paras. 294-295.

(iv) Actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, growth, ability to raise capital, or
investments
7.323 Argentina's most detailed arguments concerning the CNCE's alleged analysis of cash flow,
growth, the ability to raise capital and investments were contained in its first written submission:
"A few words, to begin with, on the terms of financing for companies in Argentina,
where the capital market has never been an important source, apart from occasional
exceptions such as occurred in the 1990s, a fact which is to a large extent reflected in
the accounting legislation.
At the legislative level, pursuant to Article 299 of Law No. 19550, companies are
obliged to submit a "Statement of the Origin and Utilization of Funds" which, unlike
the cash flow statement within the strict meaning of financial accounting, is not a
detailed breakdown of the cash flow situation but simply a synthetic description of
the elements that have led to increases or decreases in funds. These headings,
therefore, in no way allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding cash flow trends.
Taking account of the above, the indicators which make it possible to undertake such
an analysis in terms of the reference variable would be liquidity and the breakeven
point, which were analysed in a consistent manner in the Technical Report attached to
Record No. 576.
Lastly, in relation to paragraph 296 above and the financing mechanisms in this
sector, none of the applicants is quoted on the stock exchange or has utilized the
capital market, so that irrespective of the rules in force, the cash-flow analysis
requirement is not relevant and cannot be met."
215
7.324 Argentina therefore argues that, because of the particular statutory and market circumstances
in which Argentine poultry producers operate, certain Article 3.4 factors were not relevant to the state
of the domestic industry. However, we find no reference to this explanation in any of the
documentation prepared by or for CNCE (i.e., neither in the CNCE's final injury determination nor in
the Technical Report attached thereto). For this reason, we are bound to treat these arguments as ex
post rationalization that we are precluded from taking into account. Leaving such arguments aside,
there is nothing on the record to suggest to us that the CNCE considered cash flow, growth, ability to
raise capital, or investments. Furthermore, we recall that both the Mexico – Corn Syrup and EC – Bed
Linen panels found that that "while the authorities may determine that some factors are not relevant or
do not weigh significantly in the decision, the auth orities may not simply disregard such factors, but
must explain their conclusion as to the lack of relevance or significance of such factors." 216 We agree
with that finding, and note that there is nothing on the record to suggest that the CNCE excluded those
factors because it had found that such factors were not relevant or did not weigh significantly in its
decision on injury. We therefore find that the CNCE failed to consider these factors, in violation of
Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.325 In Claim 39, Brazil argues that our finding in the preceding paragraph that Argentina violated
Article 3.4 should necessarily lead us to conclude that Argentina also violated Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement. Argentina does not respond to this argument. In our view, there is an obvious connection
between paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 3. Article 3.1(b) requires "an objective examination of … the
consequent impact of the[] imports on domestic producers" of the relevant products. Article 3.4

215 Ibid., paras. 296-299.
216 See Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, supra, note 204, para. 6.162, and Panel Report, Mexico – Corn
Syrup, supra, note 65, para. 7.129.

provides that "[t]he examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the industry …". We consider that "[t]he examination of the impact of dumped imports"
referred to in Article 3.4 is precisely the same "objective examination of … the consequent impact of
the[] imports" referred to in Article 3.1(b). Thus, to the extent that a Member failed to conduct a
proper "examination of the impact of dumped imports" for the purpose of Article 3.4, that Member
also failed to conduct an "objective examination of … the consequent impact of the[] imports" within
the meaning of Article 3.1(b). Accordingly, since we have found that Argentina violated Article 3.4
of the AD Agreement, we also find that Argentina violated Article 3.1(b) thereof.
7.326 Brazil further claims (Claim 40) that a violation of Article 3.4 would automatically violate the
procedural requirements of Article 12.2.2. As noted above in respect of Claim 33, once the CNCE's
injury determination is found to be inconsistent with the relevant legal requirements, findings
concerning the adequacy of the CNCE's notice become immaterial.
217 Accordingly, it is neither
necessary nor appropriate for us to examine this claim.
(c) Conclusion
7.327 For the above reasons, we find that Argentina violated Articles 3.1(b) and 3.4 by failing to
evaluate all of the economic factors and indices enumerated in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. We
do not consider it necessary to address Brazil's Claim 40.
10. Domestic Industry – Claim 41
7.328 This claim concerns the definition of the term "domestic industry" contained in Article 4.1 of
the AD Agreement.
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.329 Brazil notes that Article 4.1 defines the term "domestic industry" as referring to the domestic
producers as a whole of the like products or to thos e of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes "a major proportion" of the total domestic production of those products. Brazil submits
that the reference in Article 4.1 to "a major proportion" means "the majority", or the greater part in
relation to the whole (i.e., 50+ per cent). Brazil submits that Argentina violated Article 4.1 because
the CNCE defined the domestic industry as – and co llected injury data for – those producers whose
collective output constitutes 46 per cent – and therefore less than the majority – of total domestic
production.
7.330 Argentina argues that Article 4.1 deliberately failed to define exactly what is meant by "a
major proportion". Argentina denies that "a major proportion" must be greater than 50 per cent, and
notes that the practice of other Members supports Argentina's interpretation.
7.331 The United States asserts that Article 4.1 merely contains a definition of "domestic industry",
and does not impose any obligation on Members. The United States also asserts that "a major
proportion" does not necessarily mean "the majority", but may also mean "unusually important,
serious, or significant". The United States further argues that the drafters of the AD Agreement were
quite explicit when they intended to impose a majority requirement for a particular obligation, such as
the 50 per cent standing requirement in Article 5.4.
7.332 According to the European Communities, the phrase "major proportion" does not mean the
majority of the domestic production, but rather an important part thereof, which may be less than

217 See para. 7.293 supra.

50 per cent. The European Communities relies on the same definition of "major proportion" as does
the United States. The European Communities also notes that Article 4.1 refers to "a" major
proportion, and not "the" major proportion, suggesting that there may be more than one major
proportion.
7.333 The European Communities further asserts that its interpretation is supported by Article 5.4,
which provides that an investigation shall not be initiated unless the authorities determine that the
application has been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry”. Article 5.4 goes on to state
that:
"[t]he application shall be considered to have been made 'by or on behalf of the
domestic industry' if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective
output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product
produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or
opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when
domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per
cent of the total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry."
7.334 The European Communities asserts that, in accordance with Article 5.4, an application may
be considered to have been made “on behalf of the domestic industry” even if the producers which
support it represent less than 50 per cent of the domestic production. The term “domestic industry”
has the same meaning throughout the AD Agreement. If a number of producers which accounts for
less than 50 per cent of the domestic production may, in certain circumstances, be considered to
constitute “a major proportion” of the domestic production for the purposes of Article 5.4, then the
same should be true also for the purposes of the other provisions of the AD Agreement. Moreover, it
would be illogical to allow the opening of an investigation on the basis of an application filed by
producers which represent less than 50 per cent of the domestic production only to conclude
subsequently that the injury suffered by those producers does not, by reason of the percentage of the
domestic production accounted by those producers, amount to injury to the “domestic industry”.
7.335 The European Communities also argues that, even if "a major proportion" does mean the
majority (i.e., 50+ per cent), this does not necessarily mean that an investigating authority's injury
determination must evaluate data concerning the majority of domestic producers. In the first place, if
a domestic producer which is part of the domestic industry fails to co-operate in the investigation, as
indeed happened in the case under consideration, the authorities may, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6.8 and Annex II, resort to “facts available” in order to establish whether such
producer has been injured. For that purpose, the relevant “facts available” may include the data
collected from other producers which have co-operated in the investigation. Second, when assessing
the state of the domestic industry, the authorities may resort to sampling techniques. In other words,
the investigating authorities may consider that data for some domestic producers are representative of
the state of the whole of the domestic industry. The possibility to use sampling techniques is
expressly envisaged in Article 6.10 with respect to the dumping determination. There is no reason
why similar sampling techniques should not be allowed also for the purposes of the injury
determination, subject to the general requirement of Article 3.1 that the determination of injury must
be based on “positive evidence” and involve an “objective examination” of the relevant facts.
7.336 Brazil rejects the US argument that Article 4.1 does not impose any obligation on Members.
Brazil submits that Article 4.1 requires Members to interpret the term "domestic industry"
consistently with the definition set forth in that provision. Brazil also rejects the EC argument
concerning the Article 5.4 standing requirements, on the basis that nothing in Article 5.4 equates
"producers expressly supporting the application" to the "domestic industry".

(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.337 Article 4.1 provides in relevant part:
"For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall be interpreted
as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of
them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the
total domestic production of those products …"
7.338 We must first determine whether or not Article 4.1 imposes any obligation on Members, i.e.,
whether or not Argentina could be found to have acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 (as opposed to
any other provision of the AD Agreement) by using a definition of "domestic industry" other than that
prescribed by Article 4.1. We note that Article 4.1 provides that the term "domestic industry" "shall"
be interpreted in a specific manner. In our view, this imposes an express obligation on Members to
interpret the term "domestic industry" in that specif ied manner. Thus, if a Member were to interpret
the term differently in the context of an anti-dum ping investigation, that Member would violate the
obligation set forth in Article 4.1.
7.339 Having found that Article 4.1 does contain an obligation that Argentina could potentially have
violated, we must now determine whether or not it did so by defining the "domestic industry" as
producers of 46 per cent of total domestic production. In particular, we must consider whether or not
the phrase "a major proportion" means that the "domestic industry" must include domestic producers
whose collective output constitutes the majority, i.e., 50+ per cent, of domestic total production.
218
7.340 Regarding the ordinary meaning of the phrase "major proportion", Brazil asserts that the term
"major proportion" is synonymous with "major part", which in turn is defined as "the majority". 219
Brazil submits that "the majority" is understood to mean "the greater number or part". Brazil submits
that 46 per cent of total domestic production cannot be considered as the greater part of 100 per cent
of total domestic production. The European Communities and the United States assert that the word
"major" does not necessarily mean "majority", but may also mean "unusually important, serious, or
significant".220,221
7.341 In considering these different dictionary definitions, we note that the word “major” is also
defined as "important, serious, or significant". 222 Accordingly, an interpretation that defines the
domestic industry in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of
total domestic production is permissible. 223 Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the

218 We note that this claim is not concerned with the issue of whether an investigating authority may
immediately define the "domestic industry" in terms of domestic producers "whose collective output of the
products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production", without first seeking to include in the
"domestic industry" all domestic producers as a whole of like products.
219 Brazil relies on The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995).
220 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1993).
221 The EC also argued that its interpretation was supported by Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement. We
are not convinced by this argument, because the Article 5. 4 standard relates to the standing of applicants, and
not the definition of the domestic industry. Furthermore, Article 5.4 does not mean that the application is
necessarily filed "by" the domestic industry if it is supported by domestic producers accounting for 25 per cent
of domestic production. In such a case, one cannot exclude the possibility that the application was merely filed
"on behalf of" – rather than "by" – the domestic industry. It is illogical to suggest that an application could have
been filed both "by" and "on behalf of" a single domestic industry. Thus, domestic producers accounting for
25 per cent of domestic production do not necessarily constitute the "domestic industry", contrary to the view
expressed by the EC.
222 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 822.
223 We recall that, in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement , if an interpretation is
"permissible", then we are compelled to accept it.

Spanish version of Article 4.1, which refers to producers representing "una proporción importante" of
domestic production. Furthermore, Article 4.1 does not define the "domestic industry" in terms of
producers of the major proportion of total domestic production. Instead, Article 4.1 refers to
producers of a major proportion of total domestic production. If Article 4.1 had referred to the major
proportion, the requirement would clearly have been to define the "domestic industry" as producers
constituting 50+ per cent of total domestic production.
224 However, the reference to a major
proportion suggests that there may be more than one "major proportion" for the purpose of defining
"domestic industry". In the event of multiple "major proportions", it is inconceivable that each
individual "major proportion" could – or must – exceed 50 per cent. This therefore supports our
finding that it is permissible to define the "domestic industry" in terms of domestic producers of an
important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production. For these reasons, we find
that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not require Members to define the "domestic industry" in
terms of domestic producers representing the majority, or 50+ per cent, of total domestic production.
7.342 There is nothing on the record to suggest that, in the circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of
total domestic production is not an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic
production. Accordingly, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 4.1 of the AD
Agreement by defining "domestic industry" in terms of domestic producers representing 46 per cent of
total domestic production.
7.343 Finally, Brazil has argued that if the AD Agreement provides no specific benchmark for what
would constitute a major proportion of total domestic production, then the investigating authorities are
under the obligation to expressly elucidate how they found that a percentage lower than 50 per cent
could be considered a major proportion.
225 However, we see no basis for any such obligation in
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.
(c) Conclusion
7.344 In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina did not violate Article 4.1 by defining
domestic industry in terms of domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic
production.
11. Imposition of Variable Duties – Claims 28 - 30
7.345 The present case concerns the imposition through Resolution No. 574/2000 of variable anti-
dumping duties on poultry from Brazil. Claims 28-30 are concerned primarily with the consistency of
variable anti-dumping duties with Article 9 of the AD Agreement.
(a) Arguments of the parties / third parties
7.346 Brazil claims that Argentina violated Articles 9.2 and 9.3 by imposing a variable anti-
dumping duty that can exceed the margin of dumping established by the DCD during its investigation,
and that can therefore be collected in "inappropriate" amounts (Claims 28 and 29). This is because
the duty is based on the difference between the invoiced f.o.b. price and a "minimum export price"
calculated for each exporter found to have dumped and, depending on the amount of the invoiced
f.o.b. price for a given import transaction, this difference (and therefore the resultant duty) can
sometimes exceed the margin of dumping calculated for the relevant exporter during the investigation.
Brazil submits that anti-dumping duties shall not exceed the margin of dumping established during the
investigation (in accordance with Article 2 of the AD Agreement). Brazil’s argument is based on the

224 If Article 4.1 had referred to "the" major propor tion, we may have been required to accept Brazil's
interpretation of Article 4.1.
225 Brazil's first oral statement, para. 87.

reference in Article 9.3 to “the margin of dumping as established under Article 2”. Brazil asserts that
the only provision of Article 2 concerning the establishment of a margin of dumping is Article 2.4.2,
which refers to the margin of dumping established “during the investigation phase”. According to
Brazil, therefore, the “margin of dumping” referred to in Article 9.3 must be the margin of dumping
established “during the investigation phase”. According to Brazil, the “minimum export price”
determined in Resolution No. 574/2000 does not qualify as a dumping margin established under
Article 2, since it does not reflect the normal value and export price as provided by the exporters and
examined by the investigating authority in the in vestigation. Brazil asserts that a Member may not
assume that the normal value established during the investigation remains unchanged at some future
point in time when duties are collected. Brazil submits that market circumstances leading to a change
in export price are also likely to lead to a change in normal value. Brazil also asserts that Argentina
violated Article 12.2.2 because it failed to explain in its decision to impose an anti-dumping duty how
and why it established the "minimum export prices" (Claim 30).
7.347 Argentina submits that the AD Agreement does not regulate the type of anti-dumping duties
that Members may impose. Argentina asserts that Members have in practice imposed three different
types of duty: fixed ad valorem duties, fixed specific duties, and variable duties. Argentina asserts
that, when duties are imposed prospectively (as Argentina has done), Article 9.3.2 provides for the
refund of duties collected in excess of the margin of dumping. Argentina notes that no refund has
been requested by Brazilian exporters, so no duty has been collected in excess of the margin of
dumping. Argentina also asserts that it imposed a variable duty precisely to ensure that the amount of
duty would not exceed the margin of dumping: if export prices became aligned with normal value, no
duty would be collected. Argentina further submits that even the use of fixed ad valorem duties –
which Brazil would have had Argentina impose – can sometimes cause duties to exceed the margin of
dumping, because the actual margin of dumping may be lower than that established during the
investigation. Argentina asserts that it complied with Article 12.2.2 because the various published
determinations referred to submissions made by exporters, and because all essential facts were
disclosed to interested parties.
7.348 Canada would have the Panel reject Brazil's claim. Regarding the relationship between
Articles 9.2 and 9.3, Canada asserts that an amount of duty permitted under Article 9.3 is
"appropriate" for the purpose of Article 9.2. Canada rejects Brazil's argument that a duty must not
exceed the margin of dumping established during the investigation. According to Canada, nothing
limits the relevant margin of dumping to a static amount found during the period of investigation.
Canada asserts that Brazil's approach would undermine the object and purpose of the AD Agreement
and GATT Article VI, which is to provide a mechanism to address unfair trade situations where
products are sold at prices below their normal value. In particular, Brazil's approach would allow
exporters to dump (after imposition of an anti-dumping measure) at even greater margins than they
did during the course of the investigation, without the importing Member being able to impose a level
of duty in excess of the margin of dumping found during the investigation. Canada asserts that this
undermining of the object and purpose of the AD Agreement and GATT Article VI would be
prevented if Members were entitled to impose duties commensurate with the margin of dumping
prevailing at the time the duties are collected. According to Canada, while Members may choose to
apply a rate of duty equal to the margin of dumping found in the original investigation, nothing in
Article 9.3 compels them to do so.
7.349 The European Communities asserts that the margin of dumping referred to in Article 9.3 need
not necessarily be that calculated during the investigation. The European Communities notes that
Article 9.3 permits the collection of duties on a retrospective basis, which necessarily entails the
calculation of a margin of dumping outside the original period of investigation. The European
Communities submits that Brazil's claim would mean that the application of variable anti-dumping
duties, or the application of any kind of specific duties, is per se inconsistent with Article 9.2. The
European Communities disagrees with Brazil since, with the exception of checking for a de minimis

margin of dumping under Article 5.8, the AD Agreement does not require that dumping margins be
expressed as a percentage of the export price. Nor does it prescribe any particular type of duties.
7.350 The European Communities submits that the collection of variable duties equal to the
difference between the normal value established for the investigation period and the export prices of
the shipments made after the imposition of the duties is expressly contemplated in Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement . Article 9.4 (ii) lays down rules to calculate the “all-others” rate where the duties
applied to the exporters included in the sample are calculated on the basis of prospective normal
values. It presupposes, therefore, that the use of such prospective normal values is not inconsistent
per se with the AD Agreement, including with Articles 9.2 and 9.3.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.351 We shall first consider Brazil's Claims 28 and 29, which are based on paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 9 of the AD Agreement, respectively. According to those provisions:
"9.2 When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such
anti-dumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a
non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be
dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which price
undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted. (…)
9.3 The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping
as established under Article 2."
7.352 Sub-paragraphs 1 – 3 of Article 9.3 provide that:
"9.3.1 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective
basis, the determination of the final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties shall
take place as soon as possible, normally within 12 months, and in no case more than
18 months, after the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of
the anti-dumping duty has been made. Any refund shall be made promptly and
normally in not more than 90 days following the determination of final liability made
pursuant to this sub-paragraph. In any case, where a refund is not made within
90 days, the authorities shall provide an explanation if so requested.
9.3.2 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis,
provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess
of the margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual
margin of dumping shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more
than 18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly supported by
evidence, has been made by an importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping
duty. The refund authorized should normally be made within 90 days of the
above-noted decision.
9.3.3 In determining whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made
when the export price is constructed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2,
authorities should take account of any change in normal value, any change in costs
incurred between importation and resale, and any movement in the resale price which
is duly reflected in subsequent selling prices, and should calculate the export price
with no deduction for the amount of anti-dumping duties paid when conclusive
evidence of the above is provided." (footnote omitted)

7.353 In examining Brazil’s claims, we also consider it necessary to have regard to Article 9.4 of
the AD Agreement, which provides that:
"9.4 When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the
second sentence of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any anti-dumping duty applied to
imports from exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:
(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the
selected exporters or producers or,
(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the
basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted
average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export
prices of exporters or producers not individually examined,
provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero
and de minimis margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to
in paragraph 8 of Article 6. The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal
values to imports from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who
has provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation, as
provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6."
7.354 We begin by examining Brazil's claim that the variable anti-dumping duties at issue are
inconsistent with Article 9.3 because they are collected by reference to a margin of dumping
established at the time of collection (i.e., the difference between a "minimum export price", or
reference normal value, and actual export price). Brazil claims that duties must not exceed the margin
of dumping established during the investigation. Brazil asserts that "[f]rom the moment the anti-
dumping duty is imposed until a review of the imposition of that duty is made, the only margin of
dumping available, calculated pursuant to Article 2, is the margin assessed in the investigation, found
in the final determination, and informed to all interested parties through a public notice, as provided in
Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement."226
7.355 In addressing this claim, we note that nothing in the AD Agreement explicitly identifies the
form that anti-dumping duties must take. In particular, nothing in the AD Agreement explicitly
prohibits the use of variable anti-dumping duties. Brazil's Claim 29 is based on Article 9.3 of the AD
Agreement. As the title of Article 9 of the AD Agreement suggests, Article 9.3 is a provision
concerning the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties. Article 9.3 provides that a duty may
not be collected in excess of the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. The modalities for
ensuring compliance with this obligation are set forth in sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 9.3, each
of which addresses duty assessment and the reimbursement of excess duties. The primary focus of
Article 9.3, read together with sub-paragraphs 1-3, is to ensure that final anti-dumping duties shall not
be assessed in excess of the relevant margin of dumping, and to provide for duty refund in cases
where excessive anti-dumping duties would otherwise be collected. Our understanding that
Article 9.3 is concerned primarily with duty assessment is confirmed by the fact that the broadly
equivalent provision in the SCM Agreement (i.e., Article 19.4) refers to the “lev[ying]” of duties, and
footnote 51 to that provision states that “'levy' shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or
collection of a duty or tax” (emphasis added).
227 When viewed in this light, it is not obvious that – as

226 Brazil's second written submission, para. 127.
227 The Tokyo Round AD Agreement is also instructive, since Article 8.3 of that Agreement stated
"[t]he amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.
Therefore, if subsequent to the application of the anti-dumping duty it is found that the duty so collected
exceeds the actual dumping margin, the amount in excess of the margin shall be reimbursed as quickly as

Brazil effectively argues – Article 9.3 prohibits variable anti-dumping duties by ensuring that anti-
dumping duties do not exceed the margin of dumping established during “the investigation phase”
pursuant to Article 2.4.2. Neither the ordinary meaning of Article 9.3, nor its context (i.e., sub-
paragraphs 1-3), supports that view. If Article 9.3 were designed to prohibit the use of variable
customs duties, presumably that prohibition would have been clearly spelled out.
7.356 Brazil relies on Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement to support its argument that anti-dumping
duties may not exceed the margin of dumping established during the investigation. Article 2.4.2
provides in relevant part that "the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase
shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by comparison of normal value
and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis." Brazil asserts that because Article 9.3 refers
to the margin of dumping "as established under Article 2", and because the only provision of Article 2
governing the establishment of a margin of dumping is the abovementioned extract from Article 2.4.2,
which refers to the “investigation phase”, the margin of dumping relevant for the purpose of
Article 9.3 is that established "during the investigation phase". Brazil submits that the margin of
dumping is established based on the information collected and examined during the investigation and,
in that sense, dumping margins are restricted to the investigation period, as set out in Article 2.4.2 of
the AD Agreement.
7.357 We consider that Brazil's principal argument misinterprets the reference to "margin of
dumping" in Article 9.3. Based on that language, Brazil focuses entirely on Article 2.4.2, and the
reference to the "investigation phase" in that provision. However, Article 9.3 does not refer to the
margin of dumping established "under Article 2.4.2", but to the margin of dumping established "under
Article 2". In our view, this means simply that, when ensuring that the amount of the duty does not
exceed the margin of dumping, a Member should have reference to the methodology set out in
Article 2. This is entirely consistent with the introductory clause of Article 2, which sets forth a
definition of dumping "for the purpose of this Agreement …". In fact, it would not be possible to
establish a margin of dumping without reference to the various elements of Article 2. For example, it
would not be possible to establish a margin of dumping without determining normal value, as
provided in Article 2.2, or without making relevant adjustments to ensure a fair comparison, as
provided in Article 2.4. Thus, the fact that Article 2.4.2, uniquely among the provisions of Article 2,
relates to the establishment of the margin of dumping "during the investigation phase" is not
determinative of the issue before us, since other provisions of Article 2 do not contain that
limitation.
228
7.358 Our view that Brazil misinterprets the reference to “margin of dumping” in Article 9.3 is
supported by the fact that the first sentence of Article 8.3 of the Tokyo Round AD Agreement also
referred to "the margin of dumping as established under Article 2", even though there was no
equivalent of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in the Tokyo Round AD Agreement . Under the
Tokyo Round AD Agreement, therefore, the reference to the "margin of dumping as established under
Article 2" must have meant the provisions of Article 2 generally. We see no reason why the same
does not remain true of the equivalent provision of the AD Agreement . If the drafters of the AD

possible" (emphasis added). This provision clearly demonstrates that the general requirement that anti-dumping
duties shall not exceed the margin of dumping is concerned with duty assessment.
228 Taken literally, Brazil's argument concerning Article 2.4.2 would mean that Article 2.4.2 is the only
provision of Article 2 that applies in the context of Artic le 9.3. This is because Brazil notes that Article 9.3
refers to the "margin of dumping as established under Article 2", and that Article 2.4.2 is the only provision of
Article 2 that refers to the establishment of a "margin of dumping". We cannot accept such an approach,
however, since it would mean that the provisions of Article 2 governing sales not made in the ordinary course of
trade and fair comparisons etc. would not apply in the co ntext of Article 9.3. Although Brazil has asserted that
its argument should not be understood in this way (Brazil's second written submission, para. 136), this is the
inevitable result of Brazil attaching such prominence to the words "margin of dumping" in Article 9.3.

Agreement had intended to refer exclusively to Article 2.4.2 in the context of Article 9.3, the latter
provision would have stated that "the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of
dumping as established under Article 2.4.2". This is not what Article 9.3 says.
7.359 Brazil’s interpretation is also contradicted by the immediate context of Article 9.3. In
particular, by interpreting Article 9.3 to mean that anti-dumping duties may not be collected in excess
of the margin of dumping established during the initial investigation, Brazil misunderstands the
significance of Article 9.4(ii) of the AD Agreement, which refers to circumstances "where the liability
for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the basis of a prospective normal value". In our
view, Article 9.4(ii) is describing the use of variable anti-dumping duties, which are calculated by
comparing actual (i.e., at the time of collection) export price with a prospective normal value. Since
Article 9.4(ii) expressly envisages the imposition of variable anti-dumping duties, there is no basis for
us to find that Argentina's recourse to variable duties (calculated on the basis of "minimum export
prices" used as prospective normal values) is necessarily inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the AD
Agreement.
229
7.360 We note Brazil's argument that Article 9.4(ii) "refers to cases where duties are assessed on a
retrospective basis".230 However, we see no basis for concluding that retrospective duty assessment
involves the use of a prospective normal value. To the contrary, retrospective duty assessment
involves the use of an actual normal value established at the time of duty assessment.
7.361 Further contextual support for our approach to Article 9.3 is found in Article 9.3.1, which
envisages the collection of anti-dumping duties on a retrospective basis. By definition, the
retrospective collection of duties presupposes the calculation of dumping margins on the basis of
information for individual shipments or for time-periods outside of the initial investigation period.
Furthermore, in emphasising the importance of the margin of dumping established during the
investigation, we consider that Brazil has diminished the contextual importance of the refund
mechanism provided for in respect of prospective anti-dumping duties. The first sentence of
Article 9.3.2 provides that "[w]hen the amount of th e anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective
basis, provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of the
margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin of dumping shall
normally take place within 12 months …" (emphasis added). Thus, Article 9.3.2 provides for a refund
of anti-dumping duties collected in excess of the actual margin of dumping. The word "actual" is
defined inter alia as "existing now; current". 231 Accordingly, we understand that the Article 9.3.2
refund mechanism would include refunds of anti-d umping duties paid in excess of the margin of
dumping prevailing at the time the duty is collected. This therefore further undermines Brazil's
argument that the only margin of dumping relevant until such time that there is an Article 11.2 review
is the margin established during the investigation. If the basis for duty refund is the margin of
dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection, we see no reason why a Member should not use the
same basis for duty collection. Brazil has noted that refunds do not imply modification of the duty,
and are only available if requested by the importer.232 While these points may be correct, they do not
change the fact that the refund mechanism operates by reference to the margin of dumping prevailing

229 We note that the measure at issue calculates anti-dumping duty liability by comparing actual export
price with a "minimum export price", which is slightly lower than the normal value established during the
investigation. Accordingly, it may not be entirely appropriate to state that the Argentine collection mechanism
involves the use of a prospective "normal value". It does, however, involve the use of a prospective reference
price, which in our view is sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 9.4(ii). To conclude otherwise would
elevate form over substance, since it would mean that the collection of variable duties calculated by reference to
a prospective normal value is permitted, whereas the collection of lower duties by reference to a reference price
lower than the normal value established during the investigation is not.
230 Brazil's second written submission, para. 149.
231 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 14.
232 Brazil's second written submission, para. 141.

at the time of duty collection. It is this aspect of the refund mechanism that renders it contextually
relevant to the issue before us. Accordingly, we see no reason why it is not permissible 233 for a
Member to levy anti-dumping duties on the basis of the actual margin of dumping prevailing at the
time of duty collection.
7.362 Brazil also asserts that Argentina was not entitled to collect duties on the basis that the normal
value calculated during the investigation remained constant thereafter, without considering any
possible changes in the prices in the internal mark et. According to Brazil, it is not unlikely that
changes in market conditions or exporter’s improvement in productivity create a situation where the
price of the product, in the internal market and the export market, is reduced. In other words, if there
is a change in export price, there may also be a change in normal value. Again, we disagree. First,
because we have already noted that Article 9.4(ii) refers to the use of a prospective normal value.
Second, because even fixed ad valorem duties collected on a prospective basis are collected on the
assumption that both normal value and export price (and therefore the margin of dumping) established
in the investigation will not change. In any event, a properly designed variable duty system would
include a refund mechanism consistent with Article 9.3.2, and would provide for an Article 11.2
changed circumstances review.
7.363 Finally, in support of its argument that the margin of dumping referred to in Article 9.3 is that
established during the period of investigation, Brazil asked what would be the purpose of establishing
a margin of dumping in the initial investigation if that margin did not circumscribe the amount of
duties that could subsequently be collected.
234 Without intending to provide a comprehensive
response to this question, we note that, in accordance with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, there
shall be immediate termination of an investigation if the margin of dumping is de minimis .
Accordingly, one of the principal reasons for establ ishing a margin of dumping in the investigation is
to ensure compliance with Article 5.8.
7.364 For the above reasons, we find that the variable anti-dumping duties at issue are not
inconsistent with Article 9.3 simply because they are collected by reference to a margin of dumping
established at the time of collection (i.e., the difference between a "minimum export price", or
reference normal value, and actual export price). 235 Since Brazil has not argued that any of the anti-
dumping duties actually collected by the Argentine authorities exceeded the margin of dumping
(prevailing at the time of duty collection), we reject Brazil's Claim 29.
7.365 Turning to Brazils' Claim 28, which is based on Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement, we note that
Canada has asserted that an anti-dumping duty that is in conformity with Article 9.3 is necessarily
"appropriate" within the meaning of Article 9.2. Brazil agrees with this approach, arguing that "a
violation of Article 9.2 is entirely dependent on a violation of Article 9.3".236 We note that Article 9.3
contains a specific obligation regarding the amount of anti-dumping duty to be imposed, whereas
Article 9.2 employs far more general language in referring to the collection of duties in “appropriate”
amounts. In particular, Article 9.2 provides no guidance on what an "appropriate" amount of duty
may be in a given case. In the absence of any other guidance regarding the appropriateness of the
amount of anti-dumping duties, it would appear reasonable to conclude that an anti-dumping duty
meeting the requirements of Article 9.3 (i.e., not exceeding the margin of dumping) would be
"appropriate" within the meaning of Article 9.2. Since we have already found that Argentina’s
variable anti-dumping duties are not inconsistent with Article 9.3, and since Brazil has not adduced

233 We use this term with particular regard to the Article 17.6(ii) standard of review.
234 Brazil's second written submission, para. 133.
235 The scope of this finding is of course limited to the circumstances of the case at hand, which
concerns initial duty imposition, and not Article 9.3.2 refund or Article 11 review proceedings.
236 Brazil's second written submission, para. 124.

any additional evidence to the effect that the amount of the anti-dumping duties was not "appropriate",
we reject Brazil's Claim 28.
7.366 Brazil further claims (Claim 30) that Argentina violated Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement
because Resolution No. 574/2000 failed to explain how Argentina calculated the "minimum export
prices". In our view, once an anti-dumping measure is found to be inconsistent with the substantive
provisions of the AD Agreement , findings concerning the adequacy of the DCD's notice become
immaterial.
237 Accordingly, since we have found that Resolution No. 574/2000 is inconsistent with
various substantive provisions of the AD Agreement, it is not necessary for us to examine this claim.
(c) Conclusion
7.367 In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina did not violate Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the
AD Agreement by imposing variable anti-dumping duties. In addition, we conclude that it is not
necessary for us to examine Brazil's Claim 30.
E. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI OF GATT 1994 AND ARTICLE 1 OF THE AD AGREEMENT
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.368 Brazil considers that Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994
and Article 1 of the AD Agreement, which only permit anti-dumping measures to be applied under the
circumstances provided for in Article VI and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in
accordance with the AD Agreement. Brazil asserts that, because the claims set forth in Section III.A
supra of this report indicate the violation of various provisions under the AD Agreement, Article VI of
the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement are consequently violated.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.369 In examining this issue, we note that a panel "need only address those issues which must be
addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute."
238 We note that Brazil's claims under
Article 1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994, are dependent claims, in the sense that
they depend entirely on findings that Argentina has violated other provisions of the AD Agreement.
There would be no basis to Brazil's claims under Article 1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of
GATT 1994, if Argentina were not found to have violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. In
light of the dependent nature of Brazil's claims under Article 1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI
of GATT 1994, we see no useful purpose to deciding them. 239 In particular, deciding such dependent
claims will provide no additional guidance as to the steps to be undertaken by Argentina in order to
implement our recommendation regarding the violations on which they are dependent.
(c) Conclusion
7.370 In light of the foregoing, we consider it unnecessary to examine Brazil's claims under
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement.

237 See para. 7.293 supra.
238 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra, note 67, p. 19.
239 We note that a similar approach was followed by the panels Guatemala – Cement II (Panel Report,
Guatemala – Cement II , supra, note 48, para. 8.296) and US – DRAMS (Panel Report, United States – Anti-
Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from
Korea ("US – DRAMS "), WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:II, 521, para. 6.92).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 In light of our findings above, we conclude that:
(a) Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations under:
(i) Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by determining that there was sufficient
evidence of dumping to initiate an investigation (Claims 2, 4 and 6);
(ii) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement by failing to reject the application and
promptly terminate the investigation, as soon as the authorities concerned
were satisfied that there was not sufficient evidence of injury or threat thereof
to justify the initiation of the investigation (Claim 31);
(iii) Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement by failing to notify several exporters
known to the investigating authority to have an interest in the investigation
when that authority was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify
the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation (Claim 10);
(iv) Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement by failing to give several exporters at least
30 days to reply to the dumping questionnaires provided by the investigating
authority (Claim 11);
(v) Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement by not providing the text of the written
application to the known exporters and to the Government of Brazil as soon
as the investigation was initiated (Claim 14);
(vi) Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement by disregarding the export
price data submitted by certain exporters (Claim 17);
(vii) Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement by failing to establish individual margins
of dumping for two exporters (Claim 22);
(viii) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by not making due allowance for differences
in freight costs in the normal value established for an exporter (Claim 23);
(ix) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by not making due allowance for differences
in taxation, freight and financial costs in the normal value established for
several exporters (Claim 24);
(x) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by increasing all exporters' normal values by
9.09 per cent to reflect alleged differences in the physical characteristics of
poultry sold in Argentina and Brazil (Claim 25);
(xi) Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement by establishing a dumping margin for two
exporters on the basis of an inaccurate weighted average normal value
(Claim 27);
(xii) Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement by failing to make an objective examination
of injury when using different periods to evaluate the relevant economic
factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 (Claim 32);

(xiii) Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by including non-dumped
imports from two exporters in its injury analysis (Claims 34-37); and
(xiv) Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to evaluate all the
relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 (Claims 38 and
39).
(b) Argentina has not acted inconsistently with its obligations under:
(i) Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement by not considering simultaneously, in the
determination whether or not to initiate the investigation, the evidence of
both dumping and injury (Claim 9);
(ii) Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement in not making available promptly to
certain Brazilian exporters evidence presented in writing by the other
interested parties involved in the investigation (Claim 12);
(iii) Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement by disregarding normal value
data submitted by two exporters (Claim 19);
(iv) Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement by not informing the exporters of the
essential facts under consideration which formed the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures (Claim 21);
(v) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in fixing the period of investigation for
dumping (Claim 26);
(vi) Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement by collecting variable anti-dumping
duties on the basis of "minimum export prices" (Claims 28 and 29);
(vii) Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement by defining the domestic industry in terms
of domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic production
of poultry in Argentina (Claim 41).
(c) We have concluded that it is not necessary for us to make findings in respect of
Brazil's Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 30, 33, and 40. We also consider it
unnecessary to examine Brazil's claims under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and
Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
B. NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
8.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Acco rdingly, we conclude that to the extent Argentina
has acted inconsistently with the provisions of the AD Agreement, it has nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to Brazil under that Agreement.
C. RECOMMENDATION
8.3 Brazil requests that we exercise our discretion under Article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest ways
in which Argentina could implement our recommendation. Specifically, Brazil requests us to suggest
that Argentina repeal Resolution No. 574/2000 imposing definitive anti-dumping measures on

eviscerated poultry from Brazil "in light of the numerous outcome-decisive violations of the AD
Agreement."240
8.4 In considering Brazil's request, we first recall that Article 19.1 of the DSU provides in
relevant part that:
"When a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or
Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement
the recommendations". (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
8.5 Therefore, by virtue of Article 19.1 of the DSU, panels have discretion ("may") to suggest
ways in which a Member could implement the relevant recommendation. Clearly, however, a panel is
not required to make a suggestion should it not deem it appropriate to do so.
8.6 We have determined that Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations under the AD
Agreement in its imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of eviscerated poultry from Brazil. We
have found these violations to be of a fundamental nature and pervasive.
8.7 In light of the nature and extent of the violations in this case, we do not perceive how
Argentina could properly implement our recommendation without revoking the anti-dumping measure
at issue in this dispute. Accordingly, we suggest that Argentina repeal Resolution No. 574/2000
imposing definitive anti-dumping measures on eviscerated poultry from Brazil.