INDONESIA – SAFEGUARD ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL PRODUCTS AB-2017-6
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 15 August 2018
Document codes: WT/DS490/AB/R; WT/DS496/AB/R
Complainant: Taiwan
Respondent: Indonesia
Third parties: Australia, China, EU, India, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, Vietnam, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. XIX:1  GATT 1994Art. 3.1, 2.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(c), 4.2(b)  SafeguardsArt. I:1  GATT 1994Art. 12.2  SafeguardsArt. XIX:2  GATT 1994Art. 12.3  Safeguards

INDONESIA – SAFEGUARD ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL PRODUCTS
AB-2017-6
Report of the Appellate Body
 •

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
BCI business confidential information
Chinese Taipei's panel
request
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Chinese Taipei,

DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
General Interpretative
Note
General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement
HS harmonized system
JE Joint Exhibit
KPPI Komite Pengamanan Perdagangan Indonesia
MFN most-favoured nation
Panel Report Panel Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel
Products, , , and Add.1
Regulation 137 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia
No. 137.1/PMK.011/2014 on Imposition of a Safeguard Duty against
the Import of Flat-Rolled Products of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel, dated
7 July 2014 and promulgated on 15 July 2014
RTA regional trade agreement
S&D special and differential
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Viet Nam's panel request Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Viet Nam,
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August
2010
WTO
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Exhibit Number Short Title
(if applicable) Description
IDN-8 (both
original and
translated
versions)
JE-1 (translated
version)
Final Disclosure
Report
KPPI's Final Disclosure Report, dated March 2014
IDN-20 (translated
version)
JE-4 (both original
and translated
version)
Regulation 137 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of
Indonesia No. 137.1/PMK.011/2014 on Imposition of a
Safeguard Duty against the Import of Flat-Rolled Products
of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel, dated 7 July 2014 and
promulgated on 15 July 2014
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 515
Argentina – Import Measures Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R, adopted
26 January 2015, DSR 2015:II, p. 579
Australia – Apples Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2010,
DSR 2010:V, p. 2175
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167
Canada – Autos Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000,
DSR 2000:VI, p. 2985
Canada – Renewable Energy/
Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013,
DSR 2013:I, p. 7
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004,
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
Chile – Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October
2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)
Chile – Price Band System Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R, adopted 23 October 2002, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted
12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October
2015
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R,
adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
Colombia – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June
2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131
Dominican Republic –
Safeguard Measures
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric, WT/DS415/R, WT/DS416/R,
WT/DS417/R, WT/DS418/R, and Add.1, adopted 22 February 2012,
DSR 2012:XIII, p. 6775
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001,
DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September
1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) /
EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Ecuador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, adopted 11 December 2008, and Corr.1 /
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and Corr.1, adopted 22 December 2008,
DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7165
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p. 7
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Tariff Preferences Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2004, DSR 2004:III, p. 925
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998,
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 9
Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products
Panel Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products,
WT/DS490/R, WT/DS496/R, and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 18 August
2017
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4391
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000,
DSR 2000:I, p. 3
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV,
p. 2203
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,
p. 3779
US – Certain EC Products Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products
from the European Communities, WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001,
DSR 2001:I, p. 373
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009,
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures
(China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1,
adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII, p. 3027
US – Countervailing
Measures (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015,
DSR 2015:1, p. 7
US – Countervailing
Measures on Certain EC
Products
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning
Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted
8 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 5
US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I,
p. 55
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797
US – Lamb Panel Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled
or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177/R,
WT/DS178/R, adopted 16 May 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, DSR 2001:IX, p. 4107
US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012,
DSR 2012:I, p. 7
US – Line Pipe Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea,
WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002, DSR 2002:IV, p. 1403
US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003,
DSR 2003:I, p. 375
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998,
DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571
US – Steel Safeguards Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R,
WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R,
WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003,
DSR 2003:VII, p. 3117
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R, DSR 2012:IV, p. 2013
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

APPELLATE BODY

Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or
Steel Products

Indonesia, Appellant/Appellee
Chinese Taipei, Other Appellant/Appellee
Viet Nam, Other Appellant/Appellee

Australia, Third Participant
Chile, Third Participant
China, Third Participant
European Union, Third Participant
India, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Korea, Third Participant
Russian Federation, Third Participant
Ukraine, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

AB-2017-6

Appellate Body Division:

Zhao, Presiding Member
Servansing, Member
Van den Bossche, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Indonesia, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu
(hereinafter Chinese Taipei), and Viet Nam each appeal certain issues of law and legal
interpretations developed in the Panel Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel
Products1 (Panel Report).2 On 28 September 2015 and 28 October 2015, two panels were
established to consider complaints by, respectively, Chinese Taipei 3 and Viet Nam 4 (the
complainants)5 concerning a specific duty applied by Indonesia on imports of galvalume .6
The specific duty was imposed following an investigation initiated and conducted u nder Indonesia's
domestic safeguards legislation by Indonesia's competent authority (Komite Pengamanan
Perdagangan Indonesia, or KPPI). 7 The specific duty was adopted pursuant to
Regulation No. 137.1/PMK.011/2014 (Regulation 137) of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of
Indonesia, which entered into force on 22 July 2014. 8 The factual aspects of th is dispute are set
forth in greater detail in the Panel Report.

1 WT/DS490/R and WT/DS496/R, 18 August 2017.
2 The Panel issued its findings in the form of a single document containing common findings as well as
conclusions and recommendations with respect to the disputes initiated by Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam.
3 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Chinese Taipei, WT/DS490/2, 20 August 2015
(Chinese Taipei's panel request).
4 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Viet Nam, WT/DS496/3, 15 September 2015
(Viet Nam's panel request).
5 At its meeting on 28 October 2015, the DSB decided that the panel established at the request of
Chinese Taipei in DS490 would also examine the dispute in DS496 initiated by Viet Nam, in accordance with
Article 9.1 of the DSU. (Panel Report, para. 1.5)
6 Galvalume is defined under the specific duty as flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a
width of 600 mm or more, clad, plated, or coated with aluminium-zinc alloys, containing by weight less than
0.6% of carbon, with a thickness not exceeding 0.7 mm, under harmonized system (HS) code 7210.61.11.00.
The complainants also challenged as "measures at issue" notifications made by Indonesia to the Committee on
Safeguards, and Indonesia's alleged "failure to provide an opportunity for consultations on relevant information
related to the safeguard measure, including on the proposed measure and its date of introduction prior to the
actual imposition of the measure". (Chinese Taipei's panel request, pp. 2-3; Viet Nam's panel request,
paras. 1.5.b and 1.5.c) In this Report, reference to the "measure at issue" relates to the specific duty applied
by Indonesia on imports of galvalume.
7 Panel Report, para. 2.1; Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. I.B.a; Viet Nam's panel request,
para. 1.5.a.
8 Panel Report, para. 2.2 (referring to Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia
No. 137.1/PMK.011/2014 on Imposition of a Safeguard Duty against the Import of Flat-Rolled Products of Iron
or Non-Alloy Steel (22 July 2014) (Panel Exhibits IDN-20 and JE-4)).
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

1.2. Following consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures on 1 July
2016, and additional procedures for the protection of business confidential information (BCI) on
22 July 2016.9
1.3. Before the Panel, Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam raised several claims in relation to the specific
duty applied by Indonesia on imports of galvalume. Specifically, the complainants claimed that
Indonesia had acted inconsistently with: (i) Article XIX:1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards because KPPI failed
to demonstrate the existence of "unforeseen developments", "the effect of the [GATT] obligations",
and the "logical connection" between these two elements and the increase in import s that
allegedly caused serious injury; (ii) Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 3.1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards (and, consequently, Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on
Safeguards) because KPPI's determination of increased imports was not based on an increase in
imports that is "recent enough"; (iii) Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 3.1,
4.2(a), and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards because KPPI failed to provide a reasoned and
adequate explanation of how the facts support the determination of threat of serious injury,
including the evaluation of all relevant serious injury indicators; (iv) Article 4.1(b) of the
Agreement on Safeguards (Viet Nam only) because KPPI's finding of threat of serious injury i s
inconsistent with the definition of "threat of serious injury" under that provision;
(v) Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.2(b), and 4.2(c) of the Agreement
on Safeguards because KPPI failed to establish a causal link and to cond uct a p roper
non-attribution analysis in accordance with these provisions; and (vi) Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.2(a),
and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards because KPPI failed to observe the required
"parallelism" by applying the specific duty to a product th at is different from the product that was
the subject of its investigation, and failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation
thereof.10 The complainants further alleged that Indonesia had acted inconsistently with:
(i) Article 12.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards because Indonesia failed to provide "all pertinent
information" in the notifications of the finding of threat of serious injury and the proposal to
impose a safeguard measure to the Committee on Safeguards ; and (ii) Article XIX:2 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards because Indonesia failed to provide a
reasonable opportunity to hold prior consultations.11
1.4. The complainants additionally claimed that Indonesia acted inconsistently with Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994 because it excluded the products originating in certain countries from the scope of
application of the specific duty without according that exemption immediately and unconditionally
to like products originating in the territory of other Members, including the complainants.12
1.5. In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
18 August 2017, the Panel found that: (i) the specific duty applied by Indonesia on imports of
galvalume does not constitute a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards; and (ii) the application of the specific duty on imports of galvalume
originating in all but 120 countries is inconsistent with Indone sia's obligation to a ccord
most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment unde r Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 13 Having concluded
that the specific duty does not constitute a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel found that there was no legal basis to address the
complainants' claims under the Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT 1994 with respect to the
specific duty as a safeguard measure . Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the entirety of those
claims.14
1.6. In light of its finding that the application of the specific duty is inconsistent with
Indonesia's obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Panel recommended, pursuant to
Article 19.1 of the DSU, that Indonesia bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under
the GATT 1994.15

9 Panel Report, para. 1.9, and Annexes A-1 and A-2.
10 Panel Report, para. 3.1.a.i-vi.
11 Panel Report, para. 3.1.a.viii-ix.
12 Panel Report, paras. 3.1.a.vii and 3.1.b.
13 Panel Report, para. 8.1.
14 Panel Report, para. 8.2.
15 Panel Report, para. 8.4.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

1.7. On 28 September 2017, Indo nesia notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), pursuant to
Articles 16.4 and 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and
legal interpretations developed by the Panel, and filed a Notice of Appeal 16 and appellant's
submission pursuant to Rule 20 and Rule 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review17 (Working Procedures). On 3 October 2017, Chinese Taipei and V iet Nam each
notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of their intention to appeal certain
issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, and
each filed a Notice of Other Appeal 18 and other appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Working Procedures.
1.8. On 16 October 2017, Chinese Taipei , Viet Nam, and Indonesia each filed an appellee's
submission.19 On 19 October 2017, Australia, the European Union, and Japan each filed a
third participant's submission.20 On 4 May 2018, Chile, China, India, Korea, the Russia Federation,
Ukraine, and the United States each notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a
third participant.21
1.9. By letter dated 27 November 2017, the Chair of the Appel late Body notified the Chair of the
DSB that the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report by the end of the
60-day period pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, or within the 90 -day period pursuant to the
same provision .22 The Chair of the App ellate Body explained that this was due to a number of
factors, including the substantial workload of the Appellate Body, scheduling issues arising from
overlap in the composition of the Divisions hearing different appeals, the number and complexity
of the issues raised in this and concurrent appellate proceedings, together with the demands that
these appellate proceedings place on the WTO Secretariat's translation services, and the shortage
of staff in the Appellate Body Secretariat. By letter dated 6 July 2018, the Chair of the
Appellate Body informed the Chair of the DSB that the Report in these proceedings would be
circulated no later than 15 August 2018.23
1.10. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 8 and 9 May 2018. The participants and six of
the third participants (Australia, China, the European Union, India, Japan, and the United States)
made oral statements and responded to questions posed by the Members of the Division hearing
the appeal.
1.11. On 24 November 2017, the participants and third participants were informed that, in
accordance with Rule 15 of the Working Procedures, the Chair of the Appellate Body had notified
the Chair of the DSB of the Appellate Body's decision to authorize Appellate Body Member
Mr Peter Van den Bossche to complete the disposition of this appeal, even though his second term
of office was due to expire before the completion of these appellate proceedings.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the pa rticipants are reflected in the executive summaries of
their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.24 The Notices of Appeal and
Other Appeal, and the executive summaries of the participants' claims and arguments, are
contained in Annexes A and B to the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS490/AB/R/Add.1,

16 WT/DS490/5 and WT/DS496/6.
17 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
18 WT/DS490/6 and WT/DS496/7.
19 Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23(4) of the Working Procedures.
20 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
21 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
22 WT/DS490/7 and WT/DS496/8.
23 WT/DS490/8 and WT/DS496/9.
24 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of the third participants that filed a written submission ( Australia, the
European Union, and Japan) are reflected in the executiv e summaries of their written submissions
provided to the Appellate Body25 and are contained in Annex C to the Addendum to this Report,
WT/DS490/AB/R/Add.1, WT/DS496/AB/R/Add.1.
4 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
4.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
a. whether Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and appellant's submission comply with
Rules 20(2)(d) and 21(2)(b)(i) of the Working Procedures (raised by Chinese Taipei and
Viet Nam);
b. with respect to the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard measure:
i. whether the Panel exceeded the scope of its terms of reference or failed to carry out
an objective assessment of the matter (raised by Indonesia); and
ii. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Sa feguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 (raised by all
participants);
c. should the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not a
safeguard measure:
i. whether the Appellate Body is in a position to complete the legal analysis as to the
complainants' claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the relevant provisions
of the Agreement on Safeguards; and
ii. if so, whether Indonesia acted inconsistently with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and
Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 4. 2(c), 12.2, and 12.3 of the Agreement on
Safeguards (raised by Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam); and
d. whether the Panel erred under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that the complainants
raised a claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 against the specific du ty imposed by
Indonesia irrespective of whether it is a safeguard within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards (raised by Indonesia).
5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 Whether Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and appellant's submission comply wi th the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review
5.1. Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam each submit that Indonesia's appeal of the Panel's findings does
not sufficiently identify the alleged errors by the Panel. According to the complainants, this lack of
clarity prejudiced their ability to make a proper defence against Indonesia's claims on appeal. 26
The complainants advance several arguments to support their position.
5.2. First, the complainants take issue with Indonesia's request that the Appellate Body reverse
the Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 should it reverse the Panel's
finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard measure. 27 In the complainants' view,

25 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).
26 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, paras. 3.2 and 3.6; Viet Nam's appellee's submission,
paras. 3.10 and 3.16.
27 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.3 (referring to Indonesia's appellant's submission,
paras. 42-47); Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.12 (referring to Indonesia's appellant's submission,
para. 43).
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Indonesia did not adequately explain why a reversal of the Panel's finding that the measure at
issue is not a safeguard would automatically require reversal of the Panel's finding under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.28
5.3. Second, with respect to Indonesia's claim that the Panel acted outside its terms of reference
in finding an incon sistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the complainants argue that
Indonesia failed to explain which requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU were breached by the
Panel. For the complainants, it is unclear whether this aspect of Indonesia's appeal conce rns the
identification of the measure at issue or the legal basis of the complaint.29
5.4. Finally, with respect to the Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994,
Viet Nam argues that Indonesia did not clearly explain the relationship be tween alleged errors
regarding, on the one hand, the characterization of the measure at issue and, on the other hand,
the Panel's terms of reference.30
5.5. Based on the foregoing, the complainants request that the Appellate Body "reject Indonesia's
appeal" with respect to "allegations set out in Section [1] of Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and
paragraphs 42 to 48, 51, and 70 to 82 of Indonesia's appellant's submission" on the basis that
Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and its appellant's submission fail to comply wi th the requirements of
both Rule 20(2)(d) and Rule 21(2)(b)(i) of the Working Procedures.31
5.6. Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures provides that a Notice of Appeal shall include "a
brief statement of the nature of the appeal", including "identification of the alleged errors in the
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". 32 The
Appellate Body has explained that the requirements under Rule 20(2) "serve to ensure that the
appellee also receives notice, albeit brief, of the 'nature of the appeal' and the 'allegations of
errors' by the panel". 33 The Appellate Body has elaborated on the requirements of a Notice of
Appeal as follows:
The Working Procedures for Appellate Review enjoin the appellant to be brief in its
notice of appeal in setting out "the nature of the appeal, including the allegations of
errors". We believe that, in principle, the "nature of the appeal" and "the allegations of
errors" are sufficiently set out where the notice of appeal adequately ident ifies the
findings or legal interpretations of the Panel which are being appealed as erroneous.
The notice of appeal is not expected to contain the reasons why the appellant regards
those findings or interpretations as erroneous. The notice of appeal is no t designed to
be a summary or outline of the arguments to be made by the appellant. The legal
arguments in support of the allegations of error are, of course, to be set out and
developed in the appellant's submission.34
5.7. In previous appeals, the Appellate B ody has also cautioned that if a particular claim of error
is not raised by the appellant in the Notice of Appeal, then that claim is "not properly within the
scope of the appeal, and the Appellate Body will not make findings thereon".35
5.8. Section 1 of Indon esia's Notice of Appeal is entitled "The Panel erred in determining that
[Regulation 137] is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 because it is not a safeguard

28 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, paras. 3.3-3.4; Viet Nam's appellee's submission,
paras. 3.12-3.13.
29 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.5; Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.15.
30 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.14.
31 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.6; Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.16.
32 Rule 20(2)(d) additionally requires "a list of the legal provision(s) of the covered agreements that the
panel is alleged to have erred in interpreting or applying; and without prejudice to the ability of the appellant
to refer to other paragraphs of the panel report in the context of its appeal, an indicative list of the paragraphs
of the panel report containing the alleged errors". We do not understand Chinese Taipei or Viet Nam to raise
any objection against Indonesia's Notice of Appeal in this regard. (Chinese Taipei's appellant's submission,
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 62.
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 95. (emphasis original)
35 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 582 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 72; EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) /
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 285; Japan – Apples, paras. 124-128).
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

measure". Under that heading, Indonesia makes various claims of error in relation to t he Panel's
finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard, including the claim that "this issue is not
under the Panel's term of reference". 36 Indonesia also claims that, because the measure at issue
"is a safeguard measure, the Panel erred in finding that [the measure at issue] is inconsistent with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994" .37 Finally, Indonesia claims that the Panel erred in concluding that
the complainants made "the same claim on the basis of the same arguments against the specific
duty as a stand-alone measure."38
5.9. Indonesia's Notice of Appeal contains two additional sections, neither of which is the subject
of the request for dismissal by the complainants. In section 2 of its Notice of Appeal, Indonesia
alleges that the Panel erred in making "a f inding that is outside its term of reference" in finding
that the measure is not a safeguard measure and that the specific duty as "a stand -alone measure
(not as a safeguard measure)" is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 39 Moreover, in
section 3 of its Notice of Appeal, Indonesia claims that the Panel failed to conduct an objective
assessment under Article 11 of the DSU by assessing whether the measure at issue is a safeguard
measure.40
5.10. Based on our review of Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, we understand Indonesia's appeal to
encompass allegations of error concerning: (i) the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not
a safeguard measure; (ii) the scope of the Panel's terms of reference concerning the
characterization of the measure at iss ue; (iii) the scope of the Panel's terms of reference
concerning the claim against the specific duty as a "stand -alone measure"; and (iv) the Panel's
objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU of the characterization of the measure at issue.
Given th at these grounds of appeal are discernible in Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, we do not
consider that Indonesia failed to set out "a brief statement of the nature of the appeal" or to
provide an "identification of the alleged errors in the issues of law cove red in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel", as required under Rule 20(2)(d)(i). 41 Moreover,
inasmuch as Indonesia's appeal concerns the scope of the Panel's terms of reference, we recall
that "the issue of a panel's jurisdicti on is so fundamental that it is appropriate to consider claims
that a panel has exceeded its jurisdiction even if such claims were not raised in the Notice of
Appeal."42
5.11. Rule 21(2)(b)(i) provides that an appellant's submission shall "set out a precise state ment
of the grounds for the appeal, including the specific allegations of errors in the issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel, and the legal
arguments in support thereof". While both the Notice of Appeal and the appellant's submission
must set out the allegations of errors, "the appellant's submission must be more specific in this
regard", in that it "must be precise as to the grounds of appeal, the legal arguments which support
it, and the provisions of the covered agreements and other legal sources upon which the appellant
relies".43
5.12. As we see it, Indonesia's appellant's submission sets out more specific legal argumentation
in support of the grounds of appeal identified by Indonesia in its Notice of Appea l. In particular,
Indonesia's appellant's submission contains three sections of arguments corresponding to the
three sections of the Notice of Appeal described above. In the section of its appellant's submission
corresponding to section 1 of its Notice of Appeal44, Indonesia alleges errors relati ng to the
Panel's interpretation of Article XIX of the GATT 199445, and it further asserts that the Panel "erred

36 Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 1.
37 Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 1.
38 Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 1.
39 Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 2.
40 Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 3.
41 That said, we wish to emphasize the importance of drafting a Notice of Appeal with adequate
precision in order to reduce the risk of procedural objections and possible dismissal of a claim because it does
not comply with the requirements of Rule 20 of the Working Procedures. (Appellate Body Report,
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 686)
42 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 208. See also Appellate Body
Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 791; US – Carbon Steel, para. 123.
43 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 59.
44 This section is entitled the same as the corresponding section of the Notice of Appeal: "The Panel
erred in determining that [Regulation 137] is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 because it is not a
safeguard measure". (Indonesia's appellant's submission, heading II, p. 3)
45 Indonesia's appellant's submission, heading II.D, p. 11, and paras. 29-41.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

in finding that the application of the specific duty is inconsistent with Indonesia's obligations under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994"46 because the Panel's finding under Article I:1 was based on "the
sole reason" that the Panel had previously found the measure not to constitute a safeguard. 47
Moreover, according to Indonesia, the Panel improperly read the comp lainants' panel requests as
containing a claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 with respect to the specific duty as a "stand -
alone measure".48 Section III of Indonesia's appellant's submission focuses on the Panel's alleged
errors in making findings "outside its terms of reference"49 on whether: (i) the measure at issue is
not a safeguard measure 50; and (ii) the specific duty as a "stand -alone measure" (i.e. not as a
safeguard measure) is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 51 Finally, section IV o f
Indonesia's appellant's submission corresponds to Indonesia's claim in section 3 of its Notice of
Appeal that the Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU in
examining whether the measure at issue is a safeguard measure.52
5.13. We recognize that there is a certain degree of overlap in some of the arguments advanced
by Indonesia in its appellant's submission, particularly as to the scope of the Panel's terms of
reference concerning the Panel's finding under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.53 However, we do not
view this alone as amounting to a failure to comply with Rule 21 of the Working Procedures. In our
view, the specific criticisms raised by the complainants relate more to the merit and substance of
Indonesia's legal arguments, rather than to the procedural adequacy or admissibility of its appeal.
In raising their procedural objection, the complainants appear to take issue with the lack of clarity
in Indonesia's appeal regarding: (i) the reasons why reversal of the Panel's find ing that the
measure at issue is not a safeguard measure would automatically require reversal of the Panel's
finding under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994; and (ii) the specific legal elements of Article 6.2 of the
DSU according to which the Panel is alleged to have exceeded its terms of reference. While
criticisms of such a nature may be relevant to the substantiation of an appellant's allegations of
errors, we do not consider that such criticisms speak to the proper demarcation of the limits of
appellate rev iew. We therefore address the merits of the arguments in Indonesia's appellant's
submission in the following sections of this Report regarding the issues raised in this appeal.
5.14. In sum, we consider that Indonesia's Notice of Appeal identifies the alleged e rrors in the
issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, as
required under Rule 20(2)(d). Furthermore, as we see it, the complainants' objection under
Rule 21(2)(b)(i) is not pertinent to the scope of appella te review but rather relates to the merits
and substance of Indonesia's legal arguments . Accordingly, we decline the complainants' request
that we "reject Indonesia's appeal" with respect to "allegations set out in Section [1] of Indonesia's
Notice of Appeal and paragraphs 42 to 48, 51, and 70 to 82 of Indonesia's appellant's
submission".54
5.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that Indonesia's specific duty on imports of
galvalume is not a safeguard measure
5.15. Each participant in the se proceedings appeals the Panel's finding that Indonesia's specific
duty on imports of galvalume is not a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards. They each allege that the Panel erred in its interpretation and
application of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994. 55 For its

46 Indonesia's appellant's submission, heading II.E, p. 15.
47 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 42. On this basis, Indonesia contends that, should the
Appellate Body reverse the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard, it should also
automatically reverse its finding of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. (Ibid., para. 43)
48 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 44-48.
49 Indonesia's appellant's submission, heading III, p. 17.
50 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 63-69.
51 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 70-80.
52 Indonesia's appellant's submission, heading IV, p. 25, and paras. 95-108.
53 For example, in the section of its appellant's submission corresponding to section 1 of its Notice of
Appeal, Indonesia contests whether the panel requests in this dispute encompassed a claim under Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994 against the specific duty as a stand-alone measure. In the section of its appellant's submission
corresponding to section 2 of its Notice of Appeal on the Panel's terms of reference, Indonesia advances further
arguments relating to its allegation that the Panel's finding under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 was beyond its
terms of reference. (See Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 42-48 and 70-82)
54 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.6; Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.16.
55 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 29-41; Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission,
paras. 7-29; Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, paras. 3.5-3.60.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

part, Indonesia further contends that, by making that finding, the Panel: (i) exceeded its terms of
reference under Articles 6.2 and 7 .1 of the DSU 56; and (ii) f ailed to conduct an objective
assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.57
5.16. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of the Panel's findings.
Second, we address Indonesia's assertion s that the Panel exceeded its terms of re ference and
failed to conduct an objective assessment of the matter by ruling on the applicability of the
Agreement on Safeguards in the specific circumstances of this dispute. Third, we examine whether
the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards
and Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
5.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.17. Before the Panel, both sides maintained, " albeit for somewhat different reasons", that
Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume constitutes a safeg uard measure to which the
disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards apply. 58 In particular, Indonesia highlighted that the
measure at issue had been adopted as a result of a safeguards investigation conducted by KPPI in
accordance with Indonesia's domestic trade remedy regulations.59 The complainants, for their part,
focused on the fact that the specific duty "suspends" Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.60
5.18. The Panel considered that a "fundamental question" arose as to wh ether the measure at
issue is, indeed, a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.61 Recalling its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to undertake "an objective assessment
of the matter", including "an objective assessm ent of the applicability of the covered agreements
invoked in this dispute" 62, the Panel determined that it would have to "examine this issue for
[itself], rather than simply proceeding on the basis of the parties' concurring positions".63
5.19. The Panel noted that, under Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, "safeguard measures
… shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994". Turning
to Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, the Panel expressed the view that the "measures pr ovided
for" under that provision are "measures that suspend a GATT obligation and/or withdraw or modify
a GATT concession, in situations where, as a result of a Member's WTO commitments and
developments that were 'unforeseen' at the time that it undertook those commitments, a product
'is being imported ' into a Member's territory in 'such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly
competitive products'".64 The Panel further observed that safeguard measures " must result in the
suspension, withdrawal, or modification of a GATT obligation or concession for a particular
purpose", namely, "they must operate ' to the extent and for such a time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury '".65 Thus, in the Panel's view, a safeguard measure can be deemed
to exist only if the suspension or withdrawal relates to a GATT obligation or concession that a
Member "finds it must be temporarily released from in order to pursue a course of action
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury".66 On this basis, the Panel held:

56 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 63-69.
57 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 95-108.
58 Panel Report, para. 7.10. See also e.g. Chinese Taipei's panel request, WT/DS490/2, p. 2;
Viet Nam's panel request, WT/DS496/3, para. 1.5.b; complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 1.2-1.4; Indonesia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 21-30.
59 See e.g. Indonesia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 21-22; Panel Report, fn 84 to
para. 7.47.
60 Complainants' joint comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's second written submission to
the Panel, para. 1.6. Indonesia agreed with this view. (Indonesia's comments on complainants' joint responses
to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 7)
61 Panel Report, para. 7.10.
62 Panel Report, para. 7.10 and fn 33 thereto (quoting Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts,
para. 139; referring to Panel Reports, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.58; US – Gambling,
63 Panel Report, para. 7.10.
64 Panel Report, para. 7.13 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Footwear (EC),
paras. 93-94; Korea – Dairy, paras. 86-87). (emphasis original)
66 Panel Report, para. 7.14.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

[O]ne of the defining features of … safeguard measures … is the suspension,
withdrawal, or modification of a GATT obligation or concession that precludes a
Member from imposing a measure to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy
serious injury , in a situation where all of the conditions for the imposition of a
safeguard measure are satisfied.67
5.20. Applying this reasoning to the facts of this dispute, the Panel observed that Indonesia "has
no binding tariff obligation with respect to galvalume in its WTO Schedule of Concessions" and is,
therefore, "free to impose any amount of duty it deems appropriate" on that product, including the
specific d uty at issue in these proceedings. 68 The Panel determined, therefore, that Indonesia's
specific duty on imports of galvalume does not "suspend, withdraw, or modify Indonesia's
obligations under Article II of the GATT 1994". 69 Having made this finding, the Pa nel turned to
assess whether the measure at issue suspends any other obligation incurred by Indonesia under
the GATT 1994.
5.21. First, the Panel addressed Indonesia's argument that the measure at issue suspends "the
GATT exception under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994".70 Indonesia maintained that the imposition
of the specific duty on imports of galvalume from its regional trade agreement ( RTA) partners
suspends the tariff obligations incurred by Indonesia under the RTAs, which would have otherwise
prevented it f rom countering the increased imports. 71 The Panel disagreed with Indonesia, noting
that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 "is a permissive provision" that "does not impose any positive
obligation … either to enter into [ RTAs] or to provide a certain level of ma rket access to its [RTA]
partners through bound tariffs".72 According to the Panel, Indonesia's tariff commitments vis -à-vis
its RTA partners are obligations assumed under the respective RTAs, not the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organiz ation ( WTO Agreement).73 Therefore, the Panel concluded
that there is "no basis" to assert that the specific duty suspends "the GATT exception under
Article XXIV".74
5.22. Second, the Panel addressed the contention that the imposition of the specific duty
suspends Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Indonesia
observed that the special and differential (S&D) treatment disciplines set forth in Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards require it to exempt the 120 countries listed in Regulation 137 from the
scope of application of the specific duty. According to Indonesia, this results in a "discriminatory"
application of the measure that su spends the MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994.75
5.23. The Panel rejected Indonesia's argument. In the Panel's view, the exemption of certain
developing country Members from the application of a safeguard measure under Article 9.1 is, by
its own terms, "legally premised" on an importing Member's intention to apply a safeguard
measure.76 Recalling its prior findings that the measure at issue does not suspend Indonesia's
concessions under Article II or Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, the Pane l considered that the legal
premise for the application of Article 9.1 was not met and that, therefore, there is "no basis" for
Indonesia's invocation of Article 9.1.77 Moreover, according to the Panel, Indonesia's exemption of
the 120 countries listed in R egulation 137 from the scope of application of the specific duty is not
"necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury "78, but rather has "the sole purpose" of providing

68 Panel Report, para. 7.18 (referring to Indonesia's comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's
second written submission to the Panel, para. 7).
69 Panel Report, para. 7.18.
70 Panel Report, para. 7.19 (quoting Indonesia's comments on the complainants' joint responses to
Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 10).
71 Panel Report, para. 7.19 (referring to Indonesia's comments on the complainants' joint responses to
Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 8).
73 Panel Report, para. 7.20.
74 Panel Report, para. 7.20.
75 Panel Report, para. 7.21 (referring to Indonesia's first written submission to the Panel, para. 212;
comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 8; comments
on the complainants' joint responses to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 7).
76 Panel Report, para. 7.25.
77 Panel Report, para. 7.26.
78 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (referring to Indonesia's responses to Panel questions Nos. 51 and 52;
comments on the complainants' joint responses to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting,
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

the exempted countries with "continued access to the Indonesian galvalume market". 79 The Panel
"fail[ed] to see how a course of action that dilutes the protective impact of a safeguard measure in
order to provide S&D could result in the suspension of a Member's MFN obligations under
Article I:1 for the purpose of Article XIX:1(a)", given that "the fundamental objective of
Article XIX:1(a) is to allow Members to 'escape' their GATT obligations to the extent necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury to a domestic industry ."80 The Panel found further support in the
General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement (General Interpretative Note),
which stipulates that "[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the [GATT] 1994 and a
provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the [WTO Agreement], the provision of the other
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict". In the Panel's view, the effect of this rule is
that the discriminatory application of a safeguard measure called for in Article 9.1 "is permissible
without having to suspend the operation of Article I:1", because the former obligation "prevails as
a matter of law" over the latter.81
5.24. Based on the foregoing, the Panel found that the measure at issue does not constitute a
safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.82
5.2.2 Whether the Panel erred under Article 6.2, 7.1, or 11 of the DSU
5.2.2.1 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.25. On appeal, Indonesia takes issue with the Panel's decision to assess, on its own motion,
whether the measure at issue constitutes a safeguard measure despite the p arties' "concurring
positions" on that issue. 83 First, Indonesia maintains that the scope of the Panel's terms of
reference was determined by the complainants' panel requests. 84 Noting that the complainants'
panel requests did not contain "claims" under Arti cle 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and
Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 85, Indonesia contends that the Panel exceeded its terms of
reference under Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU by ruling on the question of whether the measure
at issue is in fact a safeguard measure within the meaning of those provisions.86 Second, according
to Indonesia, the Panel's assessment amounts to a failure to conduct an objective assessment of
the matter under Article 11 of the DSU. 87 Indonesia observes that past panels examining claims
brought under the Agreement on Safeguards have never conducted a threshold analysis regarding
the applicability of that Agreement, except where this issue had been raised by the parties to the
dispute.88
5.26. Chinese Taipei disagrees with Indonesia's cont ention that the Panel exceeded its terms of
reference by examining whether the measure at issue constitutes a safeguard measure to which
the disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards would apply. Chinese Taipei submits that Article 11
of the DSU requires a panel "to perform an objective assessment of the legal characterization of
the specific duty" at issue, "irrespective of whether the issue was raised in the panel requests or …
was ever disputed by the parties". 89 Since Chinese Taipei considers that the m easure at issue is
indeed a safeguard measure, it does not find it necessary to address the issue of whether the
Panel fulfilled its duties under Article 11 of the DSU.90

para. 10; comments on the complainants' joint responses to Panel questions Nos. 50 and 51). (emphasis
original)
80 Panel Report, para. 7.28. (emphasis original) The Panel specified that it was not expressing an
opinion on "the extent to which Article XIX:1(a) may or may not authorize an importing Member to apply a
measure on a discriminatory basis … were such discrimination considered by an importing Member to be
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury". (Ibid., fn 60 to para. 7.28 (emphasis original))
82 Panel Report, paras. 7.10 and 8.1.a.
83 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 83.
84 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 67.
85 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 64-66.
86 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 69.
87 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 84.
88 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 68, 87, 106, and 107.
89 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 4.1.
90 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 1.2.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

5.27. Viet Nam also disagrees with Indonesia's claim relating to the Panel's terms of reference,
which it sees as conflating "the question of jurisdiction addressed in Article 6.2 of the DSU" and
"the correct legal characterisation of a measure". 91 In particular, Viet Nam argues that the
identification of the specific measure at issue for purposes of the Panel's terms of reference was
not "dependent" on the legal characteri zation of that measure by the Panel. 92 However, Viet Nam
sees "certain merits" in Indonesia's contention that the Panel fell short of its duties under
Article 11 of the DSU by assessing on its own motion whether the measure at issue constitutes a
safeguard measure.93 According to Viet Nam, the issue of what constitutes a safeguard measure
for the p urposes of Article XIX:1(a) and the Agreement on Safeguards "is a question of critical
importance" for the WTO Membership at large. 94 Viet Nam complains that the Panel had ample
time and opportunity to raise that question early in the proceedings 95, but addressed it "only at a
very late stage", thereby effectively excluding the third parties from this debate.96
5.28. As third participants, China, the European Union, and the United States submit that the
Panel was entitled to examine on its own motion whether the me asure at issue constitutes a
safeguard measure. 97 China submits that a panel may, when necessary, assess the
characterization of a measure at issue before proceeding to the assessment of its conformity with
the relevant covered agreements. 98 The European Union adds that the obligation under Article 11
of the DSU to make an "objective assessment of the matter" requires a panel to examine whether
the obligations in a given covered agreement "are relevant and applicable to the case at hand" 99,
irrespective of the parties' positions 100 and the qualification of that measure under municipal
law.101 However, the European Union considers that where a panel intends to deviate
fundamentally from the parties' positions, it must give the parties ample opportunity to present
their views102 and avoid "bring[ing] up new issues at a late stage in the proceedings". 103 For its
part, the United States submits that, were a panel to defer to the parties' incorrect views as to the
applicability of a covered agreement, it would fail to make f indings as would assist the DSB in
issuing its rulings and recommendations.104
5.2.2.2 Whether the Panel exceeded its terms of reference or failed to carry out an
objective assessment of the matter
5.29. The issues raised by Indonesia on appeal hinge on the extent to whic h the Panel had a duty
to carry out an independent assessment of the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards in
order to subsequently rule on the claims raised by the complainants under that Agreement and
Article XIX of the GATT 1994. As we understand them, the allegations of error under Articles 6.2,
7.1, and 11 of the DSU that Indonesia has raised in this dispute are closely related, and we find it
useful to address them together.

91 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 4.2.
92 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.28.
93 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 5.2.
94 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 5.8.
95 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, paras. 5.10-5.12.
96 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 5.9.
97 China's opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 3; European Union's third participant's
submission, para. 13; United States' opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 4.
98 China's opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 4.
99 European Union's third participant's submission, paras. 13-14 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 4.
100 European Union's third participant's submission, paras. 16-19 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
EC – Hormones, para. 156; Chile – Price Band System, paras. 166-168; US – Certain EC Products, para. 123;
EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1128).
101 European Union's third participant's submission, paras. 20-22 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 593; Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program, para. 5.127; EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 105; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
para. 188).
102 European Union's third participant's submission, paras. 24-27 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Australia – Salmon, para. 278).
103 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 27.
104 United States' opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 4.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

5.30. We begin by recalling that a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU are
governed by the panel request(s) unless the parties agree otherwise. 105 Under Article 6.2 of the
DSU, a panel request must: (i) "identify the specific measures at issue"; and (ii) "provide a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complain t sufficient to present the problem clearly". 106 As the
Appellate Body has noted, "a claim, for the purposes of Article 6.2, refers to an allegation 'that the
respondent party has violated, or nullified or impaired the benefits arising from, an identified
provision of a particular agreement'".107 The identification of "the treaty provisions claimed to have
been violated by the respondent" is necessary if the legal basis of the complaint is to be
"presented at all".108 By contrast, Article 6.2 does not contain a r equirement that a panel request
expressly indicate the provisions governing the legal characterization of a measure for purposes of
the applicability of a given covered agreement. These provisions are not directly part of the "legal
basis of the complaint" , for they are not "claimed to have been violated by the respondent". 109
Instead, the fact that a panel request contains claims of violation under the substantive provisions
of a covered agreement logically presupposes that the complainant considers that such provisions
are applicable and relevant to the case at hand.110
5.31. We further recall that Article 11 of the DSU requires panels to undertake an "objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements".111 A panel is thus under
a duty to exami ne, as part of its "objective assessment", whether the provisions of the covered
agreements invoked by a complainant as the basis for its claims are "applicable" and "relevant" to
the case at hand. 112 Where a measure is not subject to the disciplines of a gi ven covered
agreement, a panel would commit legal error if it were to make a finding on the measure's
consistency with that agreement. 113 The examination regarding the "applicability" of certain
provisions logically precedes the assessment of a measure's "co nformity" with such provisions.
Indeed, as noted by the Appellate Body, a panel may be required to "determine whether a
measure falls within the scope of a particular provision or covered agreement before proceeding to
assess the consistency of the measure" with that provision or covered agreement.114
5.32. The Agreement on Safeguards applies to the "measures provided for in Article XIX of
GATT 1994".115 A panel's assessment of claims brought under the Agreement on Safeguards may
therefore require a threshold examination of whether the measure at issue qualifies as a safeguard
measure within the meaning of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. To the extent that the applicability of
the Agreement on Safeguards is uncontested, it may well be unnecessary for a panel to include
detailed reasoning in this regard in its report. However, contrary to what Indonesia appears to
suggest, it does not follow from this that a panel would be precluded from determining the

105 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.11; Guatemala – Cement I,
paras. 72-73; US – Carbon Steel, para. 125; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; US – Zeroing (Japan)
106 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186;
US – Carbon Steel, paras. 125-126.
107 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), para. 4.8 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 139).
108 Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy, para. 124 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186; EC – Bananas III, paras. 145 and 147;
India – Patents (US), paras. 89, 92, and 93); US – Countervailing Measures (China), para. 4.8.
109 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124. (emphasis added)
110 For instance, the Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico in US – Tuna II (Mexico)
contained claims of inconsistency with certain provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement). (See WT/DS381/4) Although that panel request did not refer expressly to Annex 1.1 to the
TBT Agreement, which sets forth the definition of a technical regulation, this did not preclude an analysis of
whether the measure at issue constituted a technical regulation for purposes of the applicability of the
Agreement. (Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico))
111 Emphasis added.
112 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.17. In so doing, a panel enjoys "a
degree of discretion to structure the order of [its] analysis" as it sees fit, provided that it proceeds "on the
basis of a properly structured analysis". (Ibid., para. 5.20 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat
113 Indeed, such a finding would not assist the DSB in making recommendations or rulings "aimed at
achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under [the DSU]
and under the covered agreements". (Article 3.4 of the DSU)
114 Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 139. (emphasis original) See also
e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, para. 119; Canada – Autos, para. 151.
115 Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

applicability of a particular covered agreement in cases where the issue has not been raised by the
parties. As the Appellate Body has consistently stated, "nothing in the DSU limits the faculty of a
panel freely to … develop its own legal reasoning – to support its own findings and conclusions on
the matter under its cons ideration".116 Indeed, the duty to conduct an "objective assessment of
the matter" may, at times, require a panel to depart from positions taken by the parties. A panel
"might well be unable to carry out an objective assessment of the matter … if in its reas oning it
had to restrict itself solely to arguments presented by the parties to the dispute" .117 Moreover, the
description of a measure proffered by a party and "the label given to [it] under municipal law" are
"not dispositive" of the proper legal character ization of that measure under the covered
agreements.118 Rather, a panel must assess that legal characterization for purposes of the
applicability of the relevant agreement on the basis of the "content and substance" of the measure
itself.119
5.33. In light of the a bove, we consider that a panel is not only entitled, but indeed required,
under Article 11 of the DSU to carry out an independent and objective assessment of the
applicability of the provisions of the covered agreements invoked by a complainant as the basis for
its claims, regardless of whether such applicability has been disputed by the parties to the dispute.
The complainants in this dispute claimed that Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume is
inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and certain substantive provisions of the Agreement
on Safeguards. Therefore, it was the Panel's duty, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, to assess
objectively whether the measure at issue constitutes a safeguard measure in order to determine
the applicability of the substantive provisions relied upon by the complainants as the basis for their
claims.
5.34. Viet Nam contends that because the Panel raised the issue of the legal characterization of
the measure at issue at a late stage of its proceedings, it improperly excluded the third parties
from the debate on such a "fundamental question" .120 In a similar vein, the European Union
maintains that the Panel's approach was "highly prejudicial to third party rights".121
5.35. While the rights of third parties in panel proceedin gs differ from, and are more limited than,
the rights of parties, Article 10.1 of the DSU requires that panels "fully" take into account the
interests of third parties. Article 10.2 of the DSU stipulates that third parties "shall have an
opportunity to be heard". Article 10.3 of the DSU provides that third parties "shall receive the
submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel". Finally, the standard
panel working procedures set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU contemp late the pos sibility that
third parties be invited to present their views during a dedicated session of the first meeting of the
panel. Beyond these "minimum guarantees", panels enjoy "discretion to grant additional
participatory rights to third parties in particular cases, as long as such 'enhanced' rights are
consistent with the provisions of the DSU and the principles of due process" .122 In order to
determine whether, in the current dispute, the Panel duly took into account the interests of the
third parties as provided for under the DSU, we find it useful to briefly review the manner in which
the issue of the legal characterization of the measure at issue arose and was brought to the
parties' and the Panel's attention during the course of the Panel proceedings.
5.36. In their first written submissions to the Panel, the parties proceeded on the assumption that
Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume is a safeguard measure. At the
first Panel meeting, the Panel asked Indonesia which of its GATT 1994 obligations the m easure at
issue is suspending. Indonesia answered that the relevant obligation is its tariff binding on

116 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 156. (emphasis added) See also e.g. Appellate Body
Reports, US – Certain EC Products, para. 123; US – Gambling, para. 280; Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.215.
117 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 156. (emphasis added) See also e.g. Appellate Body
Reports, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 74; Chile – Price Band System, paras. 166-168.
118 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 593. See also ibid., para. 586;
Appellate Body Reports, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 259; US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 56;
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, fn 87 to para. 87; Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.127.
119 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, fn 87 to para. 87.
120 Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 5.9.
121 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 29.
122 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 243.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

galvalume under Article II of the GATT 1994, which Indonesia said is 40%.123 In its written
questions to the parties following the meeting, the Panel asked Indonesia to confirm its
response.124 Indonesia replied that, contrary to its prior statement, galvalume is listed as
"unbound" in its WTO Schedule of Concessions. 125 In its second written submission to the Panel,
Indonesia asserted that "there is no explicit prohibition" in the GATT 1994 or the Agreement on
Safeguards on the imposition of safeguard measures on products for which Members "have
'unbound' commitments". 126 Based on Indon esia's clarifications, the Panel circulated a list of
questions, focusing on the implications of Indonesia not having a tariff binding on the subject
product.127 Following the second Panel meeting, the Panel continued to pursue this line of inquiry
by addressing written questions to the parties concerning the definition of a safeguard measure. 128
The parties exchanged views on these matters in their responses to the written questions and in
their comments to each other's responses.
5.37. As these exchanges suggest, t he question of the legal characterization of the measure at
issue gained prominence after the first Panel meeting. Indeed, it was only after that meeting that
Indonesia, in answering the Panel's written questions, clarified that it does not have a tariff binding
on galvalume, thereby alerting the Panel to the relevance of the issue. We understand the Panel to
have drawn the parties' attention to the issue of whether the challenged measure is subject to the
disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards as soon as the opportunity arose. That said, we find it
unfortunate that the third parties did not have a more ample opportunity to be heard on that
issue. Indeed, the Panel may have benefitted from the views of third parties sharing a systemic
interest in the identification of measures to which the WTO safeguard disciplines apply. We do not
consider, however, that the Panel exceeded the boundaries of its discretion in not providin g
third parties with further opportunity to be heard.
5.38. Based on all of the foregoing, we find that the Panel did not err under Article 6.2, 7.1, or 11
of the DSU in carrying out its own assessment of whether the measure at issue constitutes a
safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
5.2.3 Whether the Pane l erred in its interpretation and application of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994
5.2.3.1 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.39. Each of the three participants claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation and
application of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 in finding
that Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume is not a safeguard measure.
5.40. Indonesia submits that, in determining whether a measure qualifies as a safeguard
measure, it is relevant to consider "among other things, the objective and the context" of that
measure.129 Specifically, a measure "taken with the objective to prevent or remedy serious or
threat of serious injury to the domestic industry … as a result of an unfor eseen development"
constitutes a safeguard measure. 130 Indonesia stresses that Regulation 137 describes the duty
imposed thereunder as a "safeguard measure", defines its goal as addressing the "threat of serious
injury caused by [the] surge of import" of the subject product, was adopted following a
KPPI investigation "under the auspices of Article XIX [of the GATT 1994] and the Agreement on
Safeguards", and was notified to the Committee on Safeguards. 131 On this basis, Indonesia
contends that, in finding that t he measure at issue is not a safeguard measure, the Panel
improperly disregarded the stated "nature and objective" of the measure.132

123 See Panel question No. 7 following the first Panel meeting.
124 See Panel question No. 7 following the first Panel meeting.
125 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 7 following the first Panel meeting, para. 8.
126 Indonesia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 41.
127 See Panel questions prior to the second Panel meeting. The questions touched on, among other
things, the scope of GATT 1994 obligations or concessions that may be suspended, withdrawn, or modified for
a measure to be considered as a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994.
128 See Panel questions Nos. 47-52 following the second Panel meeting.
129 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 18.
130 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 18.
132 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 15.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

5.41. Moreover, in Indonesia's view, the Panel erroneously considered that the suspension of
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 cannot be invoked to justify the imposition of a safeguard measure.
Indonesia submits that Article XIX:1(a) "does not expressly limit the [GATT] obligations … that
may be suspended by invoking that provision". 133 In particular, according to Indonesia, "the
discriminatory application of a safeguard measure in accordance with Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards result[s] in the suspension of [a] Member's MFN obligations under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994". 134 Indonesia posits that "the sole purpose of the discrim inatory
application" of its specific duty "is to impose the … measure only to major exporting countries
which contributed the most to the threat of serious injury suffered by Indonesian galvalume
producers".135 Indeed, argues Indonesia, the application of th e measure to "all WTO Members
regardless of [their] import share would not be necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury".136
5.42. Further, Indonesia takes issue with the Panel's reliance on the General Interpretative Note
to exclude the suspension of Article I:1 from the scope of application of Article XIX:1(a). For
Indonesia, an interpretation of Article XIX:1(a) as encompa ssing the suspension of the
MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 does not necessarily lead to a conflict between
Article XIX:1(a) and the Agreement on Safeguards. 137 Finally, even assuming that the measure at
issue does not suspend any obligation under the GATT 1994, Indonesia takes the view that the
words "shall be free" in Article XIX:1(a) imply that a Member "has the discretion to or not to
suspend a WTO … obligation when imposing a safeguard measure".138
5.43. Chinese Taipei agrees with Indonesia that the Panel erred in finding that the measure at
issue is not a safeguard measure. According to Chinese Taipei, Article XIX:1(a) "does not provid e
any definition" of what constitutes a safeguard measure, but merely "lays down certain criteria and
conditions under which a WTO Member may legally impose" such a measure. 139 According to
Chinese Taipei, the term "safeguard measure" should be interpreted b roadly so as to encompass
"all measures taken against serious injury arising from increased imports without any limitation to
the particular type of measure".140
5.44. On this basis, Chinese Taipei takes issue with the Panel's finding that "where a measure [is]
not necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury, then such measure is not a safeguard". 141
Chinese Taipei considers that the issue of whether a safeguard measure is applied "to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary" to prevent or remedy serious injury does not constitute a
definitional aspect of a safeguard measure, but rather pertains to the legality of a safeguard
measure under the Agreement on Safegua rds.142 Thus, Chinese Taipei is of the view that, by
introducing the notion of "necessity" in its analysis of the legal characterization of the measure at
issue, the Panel improperly "subsume[d]" a "requirement[] for the legality of a safeguard
measure" into the definition of a safeguard measure. 143 In Chinese Taipei's view, the
Panel's approach would frustrate the object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards 144 and
would require Members without bound tariff commitments on certain products to impose their

133 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 17 (quoting Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard
Measures, para. 7.64).
134 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 16 (referring to Panel Report, Dominican Republic –
Safeguard Measures, paras. 7.70-7.73).
135 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 33.
136 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 34.
137 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 37 (referring to Panel Report, Dominican Republic –
Safeguard Measures, para. 7.72).
138 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 39.
139 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, para. 8.
140 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, para. 9.
141 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, para. 13 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.17, 7.26,
7.28, and 7.32). (emphasis original)
142 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, paras. 16-18 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Line Pipe, paras. 84 and 245; Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 7.183-7.184). (emphasis
omitted)
143 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, para. 13.
144 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, paras. 21-23 (quoting the second and
third preambular recitals of the Agreement on Safeguards (emphasis omitted by Chinese Taipei); referring to
Panel Report, US – Lamb, paras. 7.76 and 7.77).
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

safeguard measures in the form of import quotas, i.e. "more restrictive measures" than tariff
duties.145
5.45. Viet Nam joins Indonesia and Chinese Taipei in claiming that the Panel erred in finding that
the measure at issue is not a safeguard measure. According to Viet Nam, a safeguard measure "is
a 'suspension' of GATT obligations, or a 'withdrawal' or 'modification' of GATT concessions, which is
taken with a view to preventing or remedying serious injury to the domestic industry or threat
thereof, and facilitating the adjustment of the domestic industry". 146 Viet Nam posits that the fact
that a measure "was taken pursuant to the procedures provided for under Article XIX and the
Agreement on Safeguards" and "was notified as a safeguard measure to the Committee on
Safeguards" provides "strong evidentiary support " for a finding that the measure at issue is a
safeguard measure that seeks to prevent or remedy serious injury. 147 Viet Nam further submits
that failure to comply with the circumstances and conditions set forth i n the first part of
Article XIX:1(a) or with the requirement that a safeguard measure be applied only "to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary" to prevent or remedy serious injury would entail the
inconsistency of a safeguard measure with Artic le XIX:1(a) and the Agreement on Safeguards.
However, such inconsistency "would not put in question the nature of the measure" as a safeguard
measure.148
5.46. Viet Nam agrees with Indonesia that Article XIX:1(a) "does not expressly limit the [GATT]
obligations … that may be suspended by invoking that provision" and posits that such obligations
"must include Article I:1 of the GATT 1994".149 Indeed, argues Viet Nam, it is "beyond dispute"
that the application of the measure at issue "on a selective basis pursuant to Article 9.1" is
inconsistent with, and therefore suspends, Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under
Article I:1.150 Viet Nam recognizes that Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards "incorporates
certain elements of the non -discrimination obligation". 151 However, when read together with
Article 9.1, Article 2.2 imposes "a narrower … requirement than that established under
Article I:1".152 In Viet Nam's view, the Panel erred by "splitting the safeguard measure at issue"
into two separate components, namely "t he specific duty that applies to the non -excluded
countries" and "the exclusion from the application of that duty [of] certain developing
countries".153 According to Viet Nam, such a "bifurcated" 154 analysis led the Panel to focus solely
on the purpose of the permissive component of the measure at issue, thereby failing to address
"whether the measure as a whole was aimed to prevent or remedy serious injury". 155 In
Viet Nam's view, the exemption of certain developing countries from the application of the duty
"reinforces" the requirement under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards that safeguard
measures not be applied beyond the extent and the time necessary to prevent or remedy injury.156
5.47. Finally, Viet Nam takes issue with the Panel's reliance on the General Interpretative Note to
support its finding that the measure at issue did not suspend Article I:1. Viet Nam contends that
the Panel did not explain how the prevalence of one provision over another would entail that the
unapplied provision can be considered as not "suspended". 157 Viet Nam considers the Panel's
approach to rest on the incorrect premise that there is a "conflict" between the rule in Article 9.1
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 158 Instead, argues Viet Nam,
Article 9.1 and Article I:1 stand in a "general rule - exception relationship" and cannot, therefore,

145 Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission, para. 25. (emphasis omitted)
146 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.11. See also para. 3.24(i) and (ii). At the oral
hearing, Viet Nam clarified that, while most safeguard measures entail the suspension of a GATT obligation, it
is nonetheless possible for a Member to adopt a safeguard measure that does not result in any such
suspension.
147 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.11. See also paras. 3.22 and 3.24(iii).
148 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.15.
149 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.27 (quoting Panel Report, Dominican Republic –
Safeguard Measures, paras. 7.64, 7.71, and 7.73).
150 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.30.
151 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.31.
152 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.31. (emphasis original)
153 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.34.
154 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.34.
155 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.34. (emphasis original) See also paras. 3.35-3.37
(referring to Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.20; EC – Asbestos, para. 64).
156 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.44.
157 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.56.
158 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.50.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

be deemed to conflict with one another. 159 Moreover, given that Articles I:1 and XIX:1(a) are part
of the "same covered agreement", Viet Nam opines that the General I nterpretative Note "does not
apply".160
5.48. As a third participant, Australia submits that a safeguard measure is a measure that
"suspends a Member's obligation under the GATT 1994 or withdraws or modifies a Member's
scheduled tariff concession" with "the aim of addressing serious injury to the Member's like
domestic industry caused or threatened by a surge of imports resulting from the obligation or
concession at issue".161 According to Australia, a link exists between the "content" of the measure
(i.e. the suspen sion or modification) and its "objective" (i.e. remedying or preventing serious
injury).162 In particular, argues Australia, it is not sufficient t hat a measure suspending a
GATT obligation is taken with a view to preventing or remedying serious injury ; rather, it is the
suspension itself that must have the aim of addressing such injury. 163 Australia further contends
that while Article XIX:1(a) does not ostensibly "limit the GATT obligations that can relevantly be
suspended"164, it implicitly limits the range of such obligations to those that are "capable" of giving
rise to a situation where a product is "imported into a Member's territory in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury". 165 Australia takes
issue with the Panel's statement that the defining objective of a safeguard measure is "to pursue a
course of action necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury". 166 In Australia's view,
"considerations of necessity do not form part of the constituent elements of a safeguard
measure".167 However, Australia supports the Panel's overall conclusion that the measure at issue
does not suspend Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and
does not, therefore, qualify as a safeguard measure. 168 This is because, explains Australia, the
exemption of 120 countries from the scope of application of the duty does not pursue the objective
of preventing or remedying injury to Indonesia's industry.169
5.49. The European Union recalls that a panel's assessment of the legal characteristics of a
measure does not depend on Members' own characteri zations of that measure, but rather must be
"objective".170 In the European Union's view, the definition of a safeguard measure must "discount
the conditions" listed in Article XIX:1(a), namely "increased quantities; like/competitive product;
injury; causation".171 As a result, argues the European Union, the defining features of a safeguard
measure are the suspension of an obligation and/or the withdrawal or modification of a
concession.172 In this regard, the European Union disagrees with Indonesia that a measure that
does not suspend any GATT obligation can nevertheless be characterized as a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Article XIX:1(a).173
5.50. Japan ass erts that the Panel erred in "refrain[ing] from examining" the consistency of
Indonesia's specific duty with the substantive provisions under Article XIX:1(a) and the
Agreement on Safeguards. 174 Japan notes that because Article XIX:1(a) does not contain an
express definition of a safeguard measure, its scope of application extends to th e suspension of
"any other GATT provision" including Articles I, II, and XI thereof. 175 According to Japan, it is
sufficient that any such suspension occur and that a Member invo ke Article XIX:1(a) for a panel to
be required to undertake an examination of a measure's consistency with Article XIX:1(a) and the

159 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.53.
160 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.55. (emphasis original)
161 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 10.
162 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 11.
163 Australia's opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 9.
164 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 30.
166 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 15 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.14). (emphasis
added by Australia)
167 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 16. (emphasis omitted)
168 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 27.
169 Australia's third participant's submission, para. 39. See also paras. 40, 43, 47, and 53.
170 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 41.
171 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 45.
172 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 45.
173 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 50 (referring to Indonesia's appellant's
submission, para. 39).
174 Japan's third participant's submission, section II.
175 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 6. (emphasis omitted) See also paras. 9 and 13.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Agreement on Safeguards. 176 In particular, Japan takes the view that Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards "is concerned with the application" of a safeguard measure and "is not
relevant to the threshold issue of whether the Agreement on Safeguards applies" to a measure. 177
For Japan, the Panel's approach unduly conflates issues of applicability of the Agreement on
Safeguards with issues of legality of a safeguard measure under that Agreement. 178 India
subscribes to Japan's views on these matters.179
5.51. Finally, the United States considers that a safeguard measure may be found to exist only
when a Member has suspended a GATT obligation or withdrawn or modified a tariff concession and
asserts that it is entitled to do so under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on
Safeguards.180 The United States also emphasizes the relevance of Members' notifications to the
Committee on Safeg uards.181 In the United States' opinion, the Panel correctly found that the
measure at issue in these proceedings is not a safeguard measure. Noting the absence of a tariff
binding on galvalume in Indonesia's WTO Schedule of Concessions, the United States ar gues that
Indonesia did not explain that the effect of any GATT obligation resulted in an import situation
requiring emergency action.182
5.2.3.2 Analysis of the Panel's interpretation and application of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994
5.52. The claims and arguments raised by the participants on appeal require us to rule on the
scope of measures subject to the disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards, to the extent that
this is required to resolve this dispute. By way of backgrou nd, we recall the rather unusual
circumstances in which this question arose in the Panel proceedings. As noted by the Panel, this is
the first time in which claims of violation of the Agreement on Safeguards have been raised in a
situation where: (i) the r esponding Member conducted an investigation with a view to complying
with its obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards and imposed a duty in light of the
outcome of that investigation, despite the fact that it was entitled to raise its applied MFN duty
rate on imports of the subject product at any time and to any level, given that it has no tariff
bindings on that product under Article II of the GATT 1994; and (ii) all parties have consistently
argued that the duty at issue is a safeguard measure.183
5.53. The Appellate Body has described safeguard measures as "extraordinary remedies" that
"are imposed in the form of import restrictions" in "emergency situations", i.e. "in the absence of
any allegation of an unfair trade practice".184 As the Appellate Body has noted, the WTO disciplines
on safeguards give WTO Members "the possibility, as trade is liberalized, of resorting to an
effective remedy in an extraordinary emergency situation that … makes it necessary to protect a
domestic industry temporarily".185
5.54. Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards specifies that the "safeguard measures" are
"measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994". Article XIX is entitled "Emergency Action on
Imports of Particular Products". Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX reads as follows:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred
by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being
imported into the territory of that Member in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products, the Member shall be free, in respect
of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to preven t

176 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 7.
177 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 17. (emphasis original)
178 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 21.
179 India's opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 6.
180 United States' opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 5.
181 United States' responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
182 United States' opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 6.
184 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para. 80. See also Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy,
185 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para. 82.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession.186
5.55. A plain reading of Article XIX:1(a) suggests that the "measures provided for" in that
provision are measures that suspend a GATT obligation and/or withdraw or modify a
GATT concession, in situations where a product "is being imported" into a Member's territory in
"such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers of like or directly c ompetitive products". 187 In other words, the action
contemplated under Article XIX:1(a) consists of the suspension, in whole or in part, of a
GATT obligation or the withdrawal from or modification of a GATT concession. Absent such a
suspension, withdrawal, or modification, we fail to see how a measure could be characterized as a
safeguard measure.188
5.56. Article XIX:1(a) further indicates that the measures provided for under that provision are
those that suspend a GATT obligation or withdraw or modify a tariff con cession "to prevent or
remedy" serious injury to a Member's domestic industry caused or threatened by imports subject
to a GATT obligation or tariff concession. The use of the word "to" in this connection indicates that
the suspension of a GATT obligation or the withdrawal or modification of a GATT concession must
be designed to pursue a specific objective, namely preventing or remedying serious injury to the
Member's domestic industry. 189 Thus, for example, where a measure suspends a GATT obligation
or withdraws or modifies a tariff concession, but that suspension, withdrawal, or modification does
not have a demonstrable link to the objective of preventing or remedying injury, we do not
consider that the measure in question could be characterized as one "prov ided for" under
Article XIX.
5.57. That said, we note that Article XIX:1(a) does not expressly define the scope of measures
that fall under the WTO safeguard disciplines. Rather, whether a particular measure constitutes a
safeguard measure for purposes of WTO la w can be determined only on a case -by-case basis. In
carrying out this analysis, it is important to distinguish between the features that determine
whether a measure can be properly characterized as a safeguard measure from the conditions that
must be met in order for the measure to be consistent with the Agreement on Safeguards and the
GATT 1994. Put differently, it would be improper to conflate factors pertaining to the legal
characterization of a measure for purposes of determining the applicability of the WTO safeguard
disciplines with the substantive conditions and procedural requirements that determine the
WTO-consistency of a safeguard measure.
5.58. We further note that the text of Article XIX:1(a) does not expressly list the GATT obligations
that may be s uspended in order for a measure to qualify as a safeguard measure. While the
Appellate Body has identified Articles II:1 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 (addressing tariff
concessions and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions, respectively) as typical exa mples of
such obligations 190, it has not precluded the possibility that other GATT obligations may be
relevant to this effect. We recall, however, our understanding that, in order for a measure to
constitute a safeguard measure, the suspension of a GATT obli gation or the withdrawal or
modification of a tariff concession entailed by that measure must be designed to pursue the
objective of preventing or remedying serious injury to the Member's domestic industry. This
suggests that the range of GATT obligations that may relevantly be suspended for purposes of

186 Emphasis added.
187 Indeed, as the Appellate Body has noted, "the remedy that Article XIX:1(a) allows" to address such
circumstances "is … to 'suspend [a GATT] obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify [a GATT]
concession'". (Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 86)
188 In this regard, we disagree with Indonesia to the extent it suggests that the words "shall be free" in
the second part of Article XIX:1(a) indicate that a measure may be a safeguard measure regardless of whether
it suspends a GATT obligation. (See Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 39) As we see it, those words
simply accord to a Member the "freedom" to exercise its right to impose a safeguard measure by suspending a
GATT obligation or withdrawing or modifying a GATT concession if the conditions set out in the first part of
Article XIX:1(a) are met. (Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para. 84)
189 This reading is buttressed by the third preambular recital of the Agreement on Safeguards, which
stresses "the importance of structural adjustment" and "the need to enhance rather than limit competition in
international markets".
190 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 95.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Article XIX is limited to obligations whose suspension has a demonstrable link to the prevention or
remediation of serious injury.191
5.59. To conclude our reading of Article XIX:1(a), we note that a Member's right to suspend a
GATT obligation or to withdraw or modify a GATT concession is not unqualified. Rather, that
Member may take such emergency action only "to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary" to prevent or remedy serious injury. 192 Articles 5.1 and 7.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards equally specify , respectively, that safeguard measures shall be applied "only to the
extent" and "only for such period of time" as may be "necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury and to facilitate adjustment". We d o not consider these requirements to be relevant to the
legal characterization of a measure as a safeguard measure for purposes of determining the
applicability of the WTO safeguard disciplines. Instead, they relate to the WTO -conformity of a
safeguard measure.193
5.60. In light of the above, we consider that, in order to constitute one of the "measures provided
for in Article XIX", a measure must present certain constituent features, absent which it could not
be considered a safeguard measure. First, that measure must suspend, in whole or in part, a
GATT obligation or withdraw or modify a GATT concession. Second, the suspension, withdrawal, or
modification in question must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to the Member's
domestic industry caused or threatened by increased imports of the subject product. 194 In order to
determine whether a measure presents such features, a panel is called upon to assess the design,
structure, and expected operation of the measure as a whole. In making its independent and
objective assessment, a panel must identify all the aspects of the measure that may have a
bearing on its legal characterization, recognize which of those aspects are the most central to that
measure, and, thereby, properly determine the disciplines to whi ch the measure is subject. 195 As
part of its determination, a panel should evaluate and give due consideration to all relevant
factors, including the manner in which the measure is characterized under the domestic law of the
Member concerned, the domestic procedures that led to the adoption of the measure, and any
relevant notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards. However, no one such factor is, in
and of itself, dispositive of the question of whether the measure constitutes a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.196
5.61. With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the Panel's reading of Article XIX:1(a).
We recall that, for the Panel, "one of the defining features" of safeguard measures "is the
suspension, withdrawal, or modification of a GATT obligation or concession that precludes a
Member from imposing a measure to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury, in

191 In this respect, we note that the panel in Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures found that the
measure at issue in that dispute suspended not only an obligation under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, but
also the Dominican Republic's MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. (Panel Report,
Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, paras. 7.61-7.73 and 7.74-7.88) While the text of Article XIX:1(a)
does not expressly exclude the MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 from the scope of obligations that
may be suspended, we consider that, in order for a measure to constitute a safeguard measure, a suspension
of Article I:1 must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury.
192 Emphasis added. In addition, as the Appellate Body noted in US – Steel Safeguards, "the product
that may be subject to a safeguard measure … is, necessarily, the product that 'is being imported in such
increased quantities'". (Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 314 (emphasis original))
193 The Appellate Body has observed that such requirements, along with the other substantive
disciplines under the Agreement on Safeguards, pertain to the question of whether the right to impose a
safeguard measure has "been exercized … within the limits set out in the treaty". (Appellate Body Report,
US – Line Pipe, para. 84)
194 The Panel in this dispute also noted that the panel in Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures
expressed the view that the words "obligation" and "concession" in the second part of Article XIX:1(a) refer to
the "obligations" and "concessions" in the first part of that provision. (Panel Report, para. 7.16 (referring to
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.64)) The Panel did not find it necessary to
"make a finding on this interpretative issue". (Panel Report, para. 7.17) We, too, do not find it necessary to
address this interpretative issue in order to resolve the present dispute. Rather, our task is limited to the
question of whether a measure can constitute a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards if: (i) it does not suspend a GATT obligation or withdraw or modify a tariff
concession; or (ii) that suspension, withdrawal, or modification is not designed to prevent or remedy serious
injury.
195 Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 171.
196 Appellate Body Reports, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), paras. 586 and 593; US – Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 259; US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 56; US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, fn 87 to para. 87; Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.127.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

a situation where all of the conditions for the imposition of a safeguard measur e are satisfied".197
On appeal, all participants and a number of third participants take issue with the Panel's
approach.198 In particular, they express the view that the Panel conflated the constituent features
of a safeguard measure with the conditions for t he WTO -consistent application of a safeguard
measure in light of the procedural and substantive requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards.
5.62. We, too, find the Panel's approach to be problematic. First, the Panel appears to have
considered that, in order t o qualify as a safeguard measure, a measure must operate "to the
extent and for such a time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy … injury".199 As discussed in
paragraph 5.59. above, the issue of whether a measure is applied to the extent and for such time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury is not relevant to determining whether
that measure is a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Instead, it relates to the separate question of whether a safeguard measure is in
conformity with the procedural and substantive requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Second, the Panel seems to have suggested that in determining whether a measure is a safeguard
measure, it is relevant to consider whether it was adopted in "a situation where all of the
conditions for the imposition of a safeguard measure are satisfied ".200 However, an assessment of
whether the conditions for the imposition of a safeguard measure have been met is pertinent to
the question of whether a WTO Member has applied a safeguard measure in a WTO -consistent
manner.201 Hence, we consider that the Panel conflated the constituent feature s of a
safeguard measure with the conditions for the conformity of a safeguard measure with the
Agreement on Safeguards.
5.63. We now turn to the Panel's application of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 to the measure at issue in these proceedings, which, to recall, relates
to Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume. The Panel found that this measure does not
constitute a safeguard measure on three grounds. First, it found that, since Indonesia has no tariff
binding on galvalume in its WTO Schedule of Concessions 202, the measure at issue does not
"suspend, withdraw, or modify Indonesia's obligations under Article II of the GATT 1994". 203
Second, the Panel dismissed Indonesia's argument that the measure at issue suspend s "the
GATT exception under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994". 204 In particular, the Panel observed that
Indonesia's tariff commitments vis -à-vis its RTA partners are obligations assumed under the
respective RTAs, not the WTO Agreement205, such that there is "no basis" to assert that the
measure at issue suspends "the GATT exception under Article XXIV". 206 Third, the Panel rejected
Indonesia's assertion that the exemption of 120 countries from the scope of application of the
specific duty, which Indonesia considers to be mandated by Article 9.1, results in a discriminatory
application of the measure at issue that suspends Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 207 In particular, the Panel considered that: (i) th e application of
Article 9.1 is "legally premised" on the qualification of a measure as a safeguard, which the Panel
had already found not to be the case with the measure at issue 208; (ii) the exemption of
120 countries from the scope of application of the d uty is not "necessary to remedy or prevent

198 See e.g. Indonesia's responses to questioning at the oral hearing; Chinese Taipei's other appellant's
submission, para. 13; Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.15; Australia's third participant's
submission, para. 16; European Union's responses to questioning at the oral hearing; Japan's responses to
questioning at the oral hearing; United States' responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
199 Panel Report, para. 7.15. See also Panel Report, para. 7.13 (where the Panel stated that safeguard
measures "must result in the suspension, withdrawal, or modification of a GATT obligation or concession for a
particular purpose – that is, they must operate 'to the extent and for such a time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury'" (emphasis original)).
201 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Line Pipe, para. 84; US – Steel Safeguards, para. 264.
202 Panel Report, para. 7.18 (referring to Indonesia's comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's
second written submission to the Panel, para. 7).
203 Panel Report, para. 7.18.
204 Panel Report, para. 7.19 (quoting Indonesia's comments on the complainants' joint responses to
Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 10).
205 Panel Report, para. 7.20.
206 Panel Report, para. 7.20.
207 Panel Report, para. 7.21 (referring to Indonesia's first written submission to the Panel, para. 212;
comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 8; comments
on the complainants' joint responses to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 7).
208 Panel Report, para. 7.25.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

serious injury" 209, thereby lacking a connection with the "the fundamental objective of
Article XIX:1(a)"210; and (iii) the General Interpretative Note excludes the possibility that the
application of Article 9.1, as the legally prevailing rule, suspends a Member's obligations under
Article I:1.211 On appeal, the participants do not dispute the Panel's findings that the measure at
issue does not entail a suspension, withdrawal, or modification of Indonesia's obligations under
Articles II and XXIV. They do, however, take issue with the Panel's finding that the discriminatory
application of the measure at issue by virtue of the disciplines of Article 9.1 cannot be deemed to
suspend Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1.212
5.64. We recall that, in order to determine whether a measure constitutes a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement of Safeguards, a panel must objectively assess
the design, structure, and expected operation of the measure as a whole, identify all the aspects of
the measure that may have a bearing on its legal characterization, and recognize which aspects
are the most central to the measure. 213 In the present case , the Panel was required to ascertain
whether the suspension, withdrawal, or modification of a GATT obligation or concession entailed by
the measure at issue is designed to prevent or remedy serious injury.
5.65. We note that both Regulation 137 and the Final Disclosure Report expressly state that
Indonesia's imposition of a specific duty on imports of galvalume seeks to counter a threat of
serious injury caused by an alleged increase in imports of galvalume over the period of
investigation.214 This element of the measure at issue may well be designed to pursue the specific
objective of preventing or remedying serious injury to Indonesia's domestic industry. However, the
imposition of the specific duty does not suspend any of Indonesia's GATT obligations, nor does it
withdraw or modify any of Indonesia's GATT concessions. Th is is because, as the Panel rightly
found and no participant has contested, Indonesia "has no binding tariff obligation with respect to
galvalume in its WTO Schedule of Concessions" and is, therefore, "free to impose any amount of
duty it deems appropriate" on that product.215
5.66. Besides the imposition of the specific duty, the measure at issue provides for the exemption
of the 120 countries listed in Regulation 137 from the scope of application of that duty. By its own
terms, this exemption could be viewed as suspending Indonesia's MFN treatment obligation under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Indeed, the imposition of the duty on imports of galvalume from
some, and not all, Members results in the discriminatory application of the measure at issue, as it
departs from the obligation to "immediately and unconditionally" accord "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity" to "like products" originating in all WTO Members. We note, however, that
neither Regulation 137 nor the Final Disclosure Report indicates that t he exemption is designed to
pursue the specific objective of preventing or remedying serious injury. Before the Panel,
Indonesia confirmed that the exemption is "neither intended nor designed" for that purpose.216
5.67. On appeal, Indonesia submits that "the sole purpose of the discriminatory application" of
the specific duty "is to impose the … measure only to major exporting countries which contributed
the most to the threat of serious injury suffered by Indonesian galvalume producers". 217 According
to Indonesia, t he application of the measure to "all WTO Members regardless of [their] import
share would not be necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury". 218 Similarly, Viet Nam submits
that the selective application of the duty "reinforces" the requirement, under Ar ticle 5.1 of the

210 Panel Report, para. 7.28.
211 Panel Report, para. 7.29.
212 See e.g. Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 16; Chinese Taipei's other appellant's submission,
213 Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 171.
214 Regulation 137 (Panel Exhibits IDN-20 and JE-4), preambular recital b; Final Disclosure Report
(Panel Exhibits IDN-8 and JE-1), paras. 64-65.
215 Panel Report, para. 7.18 (referring to Indonesia's comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of
Indonesia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 7).
216 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (referring to Indonesia's responses to Panel questions Nos. 51 and 52;
comments on complainants' joint responses to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 10;
comments on complainants' joint responses to Panel questions Nos. 50 and 51). (emphasis original)
217 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 33.
218 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 34.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Agreement on Safeguards, that safeguard measures not be applied beyond the extent necessary
to prevent or remedy injury.219
5.68. We observe that neither Regulation 137 nor the Final Disclosure Report refers to the
objective of targeting the major contributors to the threat of serious injury. Instead, those
instruments expressly indicate that the exemption of 120 countries from the scope of application
of the specific duty pursues the objective of complying with the disciplines of Article 9.1 of th e
Agreement on Safeguards. 220 During the course of the Panel proceedings, Indonesia confirmed
that the exemption is aimed at complying with the requirements of Article 9.1. 221 Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that safeguard measures "shall not be applied against a
product originating in a developing country Member", provided that "its share of imports of the
product concerned … does not exceed 3 per cent" and that "developing country Members with less
than 3 per cent import share collective ly account for not more than 9 per cent of total imports of
the product concerned". The title of Article 9.1, "Developing Country Members", suggests that the
purpose of this provision is to set forth S&D treatment requirements in favour of "developing
countries whose individual exports are below a de minimis level".222 These disciplines set forth
conditions for the WTO-consistent application of safeguard measures, and they do not speak to the
question of whether a measure constitutes a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of
the WTO safeguard disciplines. In fact, the design, structure, and expected operation of the
measure at issue suggest to us that the central aspect of that measure, through which Indonesia
seeks to prevent a threat of serious injury to its domestic industry, is the imposition of the specific
duty. By contrast, the exemption of 120 countries from the scope of application of the specific duty
has the result of allowing more imports of galvalume – albeit de minimis – into Indone sia's
territory for purposes of according S&D treatment . Hence, in our view, it has not been
demonstrated in the present case that the alleged suspension of Article I:1 entailed by the
exemption is designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to Indonesia's domestic industry.223
5.69. Even assuming that, as Indonesia and Viet Nam now argue, the exemption of 120 countries
from the scope of application of the specific duty seeks to "reinforce" the "necessity" requirement
under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by targeting the major contributors to the threat
of serious injury, this does not suffice to show that the alleged suspension of Article I:1 entailed by
that exemption is designed to pursue the specific purpose of preventing or remedying serious
injury. As discussed in paragraph 5.59. above, the "necessity" requirement under Article 5.1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards does not relate to the legal c haracterization of a measure for
purposes of the applicability of the WTO safeguard disciplines, but rather pertains to a safeguard
measure's conformity with those disciplines.
5.70. Having reviewed the design, structure, and expected operation of the measure at issue,
coupled with all the relevant facts and arguments on record, we conclude that the measure does
not present the constituent features of a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of the
WTO safeguard disciplines. The imposition of the spe cific duty on galvalume may seek to prevent
or remedy serious injury to Indonesia's industry, but it does not suspend any GATT obligation or
withdraw or modify any GATT concession. While the exemption of 120 countries from the scope of
application of the s pecific duty may arguably be seen as suspending Indonesia's MFN treatment
obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, it has not been shown to be designed to prevent or
remedy serious injury to Indonesia's domestic industry. Rather, that exemption appea rs to
constitute an ancillary aspect of the measure, which is aimed at according S&D treatment to
developing countries with de minimis shares in imports of galvalume as contemplated under
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The disciplines of Artic le 9.1 set out conditions for the

219 Viet Nam's other appellant's submission, para. 3.44.
220 Final Disclosure Report (Panel Exhibits IDN-8 and JE-1), para. 66.
221 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (referring to Indonesia's responses to Panel questions Nos. 51 and 52;
comments on complainants' joint responses to Panel questions following the second Panel meeting, para. 10;
comments on complainants' joint responses to Panel questions Nos. 50 and 51). (emphasis added)
222 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para. 129. (emphasis original) Before the Panel, Indonesia
itself described the disciplines of Article 9.1 as S&D treatment requirements. (See e.g. Indonesia's first written
submission to the Panel, para. 199; response to Panel question No. 52, para. 26)
223 Like the Panel, we express no view as to whether a measure that suspends a Member's
MFN treatment obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 in order to prevent or remedy serious injury could
be found to be a safeguard measure. (See Panel Report, fn 60 to para. 7.28) However, we note that, in order
to be WTO-consistent, such a measure would have to comply with the disciplines of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the extent they are applicable, including Articles 2.2, 5, and 9.1 thereof.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

WTO-consistent application of safeguard measures and do not speak to the question of whether a
measure constitutes a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of the WTO safeguard
disciplines. Hence, we find that the measure at issue, considered in light of those of its aspects
most central to the question of legal characterization, does not constitute a measure "provided for
in Article XIX of GATT 1994".
5.71. Based on the foregoing, and despite our reservations on cer tain aspects of the Panel's
interpretation of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, expressed in paragraph 5.62. above, we
uphold the Panel's overall conclusion, in paragraphs 7.10 and 8.1.a of its Report, that the measure
at issue does not constitute a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards. Having upheld the Panel's conclusion, there is no legal basis for us to rule on the
complainants' request for completion of the legal analysis with respect to their claims under
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4. 2(a), 4.2(b), 4.2(c), 12.2, and 12.3 of
the Agreement on Safeguards.
5.3 Whether the Panel's terms of reference include a claim under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 against the specific duty as a stand-alone measure
5.72. Having upheld the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Arti cle 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, we now turn to the Panel's
finding under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 with respect to the specific duty "as a stand -alone
measure".224 We understand the Panel's reference to the specific duty as a "stand -alone measure"
to mean the specific duty irrespective of its legal characterization as a safeguard measure.225
5.73. To recall, Indonesia's specific duty excludes imports of galvalume from 120 countries, listed
in Regulation 137, from its scope of application. Indonesia's allega tion of error with respect to the
Panel's finding under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 relates to the scope of the Panel's terms of
reference, rather than to any alleged error in the Panel's substantive analysis or application of
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.226 We begin our analysis with a summary of the Panel's findings and
review of the relevant requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU, before assessing the
participants' arguments on appeal.
5.3.1 The Panel's findings
5.74. Based on its finding that the measure at issu e does not qualify as a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel did not rule on the
complainants' claims "against the specific duty, as a safeguard measure "227, under the disciplines
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
5.75. At the same time, the Panel considered that the complainants had put forward an
"alternative claim that Indonesia's application of the specific duty, as a stand-alone measure, is
inconsistent with Article I:1 of th e GATT 1994". 228 In particular, according to the Panel, the
complainants had claimed that the exclusion of the 120 countries listed in Regulation 137 from the
scope of application of the specific duty constitutes "an advantage, favour, or privilege provided in
connection with the application of customs duties that Indonesia failed to accord immediately and
unconditionally to like products originating in all WTO Members". 229 The Panel stated that the
complainants had pursued the claim "primarily as part of their complaint against the specific duty
as a safeguard measure".230 However, it took the view that the complainants had made "the same

225 See e.g. Panel Report, paras. 7.10 and 7.42.
226 As reflected in Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and appellant's submission, and confirmed at the oral
hearing, Indonesia also challenges the Panel's finding to the extent it was based on the finding that the
measure at issue is not a safeguard. As we have upheld the finding that the measure at issue is not a
safeguard, we see no need to consider further this aspect of Indonesia's appeal under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994. (See Indonesia's Notice of Appeal, section 1, p. 1; appellant's submission, paras. 42-43)
229 Panel Report, para. 7.42. (referring to complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 5.142-5.150; Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi).
(fn omitted)
230 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (referring to complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 5.142-5.150; joint response to Panel question No. 42; joint second written submission to the Panel,
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

claim on the basis of the same arguments against the specific duty as a stand-alone measure".231
In the Panel's view, Indonesia "ha[d] not contested the complainants' Article I:1 claim against the
specific duty as a stand-alone measure".232
5.76. On this basis, the Panel proceeded with its assessment of the consistency of the measure at
issue with Indonesia's obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. It agreed with the
complainants that the specific duty is a "customs duty" within the meaning of Article I:1, and that
the exclusion of imports of galvalume from the 120 countries listed in Regulation 137 constitutes
an "advantage" grante d to "like products" that is not " accorded immediately and unconditionally"
to imports of galvalume from all WTO Members.233 The Panel therefore found the application of the
specific duty on imports of galvalume to be inconsistent with Indonesia's obligation s under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.234
5.3.2 The relevant legal standard under Article 6.2 of the DSU
5.77. Article 6.2 of the DSU reads, in relevant part:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the prob lem
clearly.
5.78. Article 6.2 of the DSU sets out two principal requirements: (i) the identification of the
specific measures at issue; and (ii) the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. 235 The measure(s) and the legal basis of the
complaint – i.e. the claim(s) – constitute the "matter referred to the DSB", which forms the basis
of the panel's terms of reference. 236 In defining the scope of the dispute, the panel request serves
the function of es tablishing and delimiting the panel's jurisdiction 237, but it also fulfils a due
process objective. In the context of Article 6.2, due process consists of providing the respondent
and third parties with notice regarding the nature of the complainant's case t o enable them to
respond accordingly.238
5.79. In assessing whether a panel request is "sufficiently precise" to comply with Article 6.2,
panels must carefully scrutinize the panel request, read as a whole, and on the basis of the

paras. 2.128, 2.132, and 2.136; joint opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7.1-7.2;
joint opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7.2). (emphasis original; fn omitted)
231 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (referring to complainants' joint comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of
Indonesia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 2.2; joint response to Panel question No. 51).
(emphasis original)
233 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
234 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
235 In addition, Article 6.2 contains two further requirements: namely, that the request be made in
writing and that it indicate whether consultations were held. (See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy,
para. 120)
236 Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 639 (referring to
Appellate Body Reports, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72-73; US – Carbon Steel, para. 125;
US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 107; Australia – Apples,
237 Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186;
US – Continued Zeroing, para. 161; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 640.
238 Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186; US – Carbon Steel,
Measures, para. 5.11; Thailand – H-Beams, para. 88. However, the Appellate Body has noted that the
determination of whether due process has been respected does not necessitate a separate examination of
whether the parties suffered prejudice, considering that "[t]his due process objective [under Article 6.2] is not
constitutive of, but rather follows from, the proper establishment of a panel's jurisdiction." Thus, for example,
the fact that a respondent's ability to begin preparing its defence is not prejudiced does not ipso facto mean
that a panel request meets the requirements of Article 6.2. (Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 640; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.7)
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

language used therein. 239 Moreover, a panel must determine compliance with Article 6.2 on the
face of the panel request as it existed at the time of filing. 240 Thus, parties' subsequent
submissions and statements during the panel proceedings cannot "cure" any defects in the panel
request241, but they can be consulted to the extent that they may confirm or clarify the meaning of
the words used in the panel request. 242 The need to examine the panel request "on its face" and
"on the basis of the language used" makes the narrative in the panel request a significant part of
the assessment of whether the request provides "a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".243
5.80. The Appellate Body has explained that the reference in Article 6.2 of the DSU to the "legal
basis of the complaint" refers to the claims pertaining to a specific provision of a covered
agreement containing the obligation alleged to be violated 244, and that it is the claims, not the
arguments, that are to be set out in a panel request in a way that is sufficient to present the
problem clearly. 245 For the purposes of Article 6.2, a claim refers to an allegation that " the
respondent party has violated, or nullified or impaired the benefits arising from, an identified
provision of a particular agreement." 246 Arguments, by contrast, are statements put forth by a
complaining party "to demonstrate that the responding party's measure does indeed infringe upon
the identified treaty provision". 247 The Appellate Body has stated that the "[i]dentification of the
treaty provisions claimed to have been violated by the respondent is always necessary" and is a
"minimum prerequisite if the legal basis of the complaint is to be presented at all".248
5.81. Regarding the requirement that a complainant provide a "brief summary" that is sufficient
to "present the problem clearly", the Appellate Body has explained that a panel request must
"plainly con nect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the covered agreements
claimed to have been infringed". 249 A brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint "aims to
explain succinctly how or why the measure at issue is considered by the complaining Member to be
violating the WTO obligation in question". 250 Thus, "to the extent that a provision contains not one
single, distinct obligation, but rather multiple obligations, a panel request might need to specify
which of the obligations contained in the provision is being challenged."251
5.3.3 Analysis of the Panel's terms of reference
5.82. On appeal, Indonesia submits that the Panel erred in considering that the complainants had
made a claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 with respect to the meas ure at

239 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 142; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Measures (China), para. 4.7; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews, paras. 164 and 169; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
240 Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 787;
US – Continued Zeroing, para. 161; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China –
HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13.
241 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220; EC – Bananas III, para. 143; EC and
certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 787; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Countervailing and
242 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220; EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft, para. 642; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures
(China), para. 4.9.
243 See Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13
(referring to Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras. 230-232).
244 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130.
245 See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 153; China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
246 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 139.
247 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 139.
248 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186; EC – Bananas III, paras. 145 and 147;
India – Patents (US), paras. 89, 92, and 93).
249 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China), para. 4.8 (both quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews, para. 162).
250 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130. (emphasis original)
251 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Dairy, para. 124); EC – Fasteners (China), para. 598; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China), para. 4.8.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

issue "as a stand -alone measure", i.e. not as a safeguard measure. 252 Indonesia argues that the
complainants, in their panel requests, identified the challenged measure as "the specific duty
imposed as a safeguard measure" 253 and maintained the same c haracterization in their
second written submission to the Panel. 254 In Indonesia's view, the complainants asserted a claim
under Article I:1 against a stand-alone measure only at a "later stage" of the proceedings, namely
in their responses to Panel questions after the second meeting.255 In light of the above, Indonesia
contends that the Panel's terms of reference, as set out by the complainants' panel requests, only
covered the question of consistency with Article I:1 with respect to the specific duty as a safeguard
measure.256 Indonesia therefore claims that the Panel erred in making a finding of inconsistency
with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 with respect to a measure that was not a safeguard measure,
which was not identified in the panel requests.257
5.83. Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam emphasize that their panel requests describe the measure at
issue as "the specific duty imposed as a safeguard measure". 258 In their view, the inclusion of the
term "safeguard measure" in such description simply reflects how the measure was im posed by
Indonesia259, without conditioning the Article I:1 claim upon the legal characterization of the
measure at issue. 260 Concerning the legal basis of their complaint under Article I:1, the
complainants highlight that their panel requests describe this as being that "the specific duty
imposed by Indonesia … applies to products originating only in certain countries" and that this
"constitutes an advantage that has not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
products originating in all WTO Members".261 The complainants argue that this provides a brief
summary of the legal basis of their Article I:1 claim by connecting the specific duty to the
provision they claim to have been infringed. 262 On this basis, the complainants consider that the
claim in their panel requests under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 complied with the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU, and therefore the matter was properly within the Panel's terms of
reference.263
5.84. As a third participant, the European Union takes the view th at the complainants "conceived
their case as a case against a safeguard measure". 264 The European Union cautions against the
Panel's reliance on the complainants' subsequent submissions to conclude otherwise 265, and
considers that "the characterisation of the measure as a safeguard measure was part of the
determining parameters of the claim made by the co -complainants".266 For the European Union,
this "fundamental parameter of the claim" could not be extended by the complainants' subsequent
submissions to the Panel.267

252 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 44 and 70. (emphasis original)
253 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 45, 70, and 71 (referring to Viet Nam's panel request,
pp. 2-4; Chinese Taipei's panel request, pp. 2-4).
254 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 46 and 72 (referring to complainants' joint second written
submission to the Panel, paras. 2.128 and 2.137).
255 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 47, 74, and 75 (referring to complainants' joint response
to Panel question No. 51, paras. 1.20-1.25; joint comments on paragraphs 40 and 41 of Indonesia's
second written submission to the Panel, para. 2.2).
256 Indonesia's appellant's submission, paras. 78-79.
257 Indonesia's appellant's submission, para. 80.
258 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.11 (referring to Chinese Taipei's panel request, p. 2);
Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.26 (referring to Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.5.a). (emphasis
original)
259 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.17; Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.28.
260 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, paras. 3.13 and 3.15; Viet Nam's appellee's submission,
paras. 3.28 and 3.33.
261 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.12 (referring to Chinese Taipei's panel request, p. 3);
Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.29 (referring to Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi).
262 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.22; Viet Nam's appellee's submission,
paras. 3.30-3.31.
263 Chinese Taipei's appellee's submission, para. 3.13; Viet Nam's appellee's submission, para. 3.25.
264 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 60.
265 European Union's third participant's submission, paras. 58 and 60.
266 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 64. Therefore, the European Union submits
that the complainants' challenge was "in reality" limited to Indonesia's "wrongful application of Article 9.1 of
[the Agreement on Safeguards]" and a "consequential breach of Article I:1 of GATT 1994".
(European Union's third participant's submission, para. 63. (emphasis original))
267 European Union's third participant's submission, para. 65.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

5.85. The question raised in this appeal is whether a claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 with respect to Indonesia's specific duty on imports of galvalume "as a stand -alone
measure"268 (i.e. not as a safeguard measure) is within the scope of the Panel's terms of
reference.269 In order to assess this question, we examine whether the complainants' panel
requests properly articulated a claim that the specific duty as a stand -alone measure (i.e. not as a
safeguard measure) is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, in light of the requirements
under Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.86. Beginning with the first requirement of Article 6.2, we note that both Chinese Taipei's and
Viet Nam's panel requests identify the "measures at issue" as including "the specific duty imposed
as a safeguard measure, as a result of the investigation initiated on 19 December 2012 and
concluded by [Indonesia's investigating authority], on imports of [galvalume]". 270 In our view, this
description and presentation of the specific duty as a "measure at issue" 271 clearly identifies it as a
measure that is alleged to be causing the violation of an obligation contained in a covered
agreement.272 The identification of the specific duty in this context is not diminished or affected by
its legal characterization in connection with the particular obligations that it is alleged to violate.
Rather, in accordance with the conceptual distinction between measures and claims in a panel
request273, what is significant at this stage of the analysis under Article 6.2 is that the specific duty
is clearly singled out in the panel requests as a measure at issue. Thus, we find that the
complainants' panel requests meet the requirement under Article 6.2 to "identify the specific
measures at issue" with respect to the specific duty applied by Indonesia on imports of galvalume.
5.87. Turning to the second requirement of Article 6.2, we examine whether the language in the
complainants' panel requests sets out the "the legal basis of the complaint" under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 in a manner "sufficient to present the problem clearly". Chinese Taipei claims as
follows in its panel request:
In any event, the specific duty imposed by Indonesia is inconsistent with A rticle I:1 of
the GATT 1994 in that it applies to products originating only in certain countries, and
this constitutes an advantage that has not been accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like products originating in all WTO Members.274
5.88. Similarly, Viet Nam claims in its panel request that:
The specific duty imposed by Indonesia is inconsiste nt with Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 in that it applies to products originating only in certain countries, and this
constitutes an advantage that has not been ac corded immediately and unconditionally
to the like products originating in all WTO Members.275
5.89. Based on the above passages of their panel requests, the legal basis for a finding of
inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is that "the specific duty im posed by Indonesia …
applies to products originating only in certain countries". At the same time, both complainants set
out a prefatory comment under the section of their panel requests concerning the legal basis of
the complaint, in which each " notes tha t according to Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on
Safeguards, a Member shall not take or seek a safeguard action unless such action conforms with
the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 … applied in accordance with the Agreement on

269 We note that the participants do not contest that the Panel's terms of reference include a claim under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994; it is contested, however, whether this claim extends to the specific duty in light
of the Panel's finding that the measure at issue is not a safeguard.
270 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. I.B.a; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.5.a.
271 We recall that the complainants additionally identified as "measures at issue" the notification of the
finding of threat of serious injury caused by increased imports and of the regulation imposing the safeguard
measure, and Indonesia's failure to provide an opportunity for consultations on relevant information related to
the safeguard measure. The complainants' claims with respect to these measures are not at issue in this
appeal. (Chinese Taipei's panel request, paras. I.B.b and I.B.c; Viet Nam's panel request, paras. 1.5.b
and 1.5.c)
272 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130.
273 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 132.
274 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6.
275 Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

Safeguards".276 This comment precedes the listing of separate claims pertaining to each of the
measures at issue identified in the panel requests, including the specific duty. In this regard, both
complainants introduce their claims pertaining to the specific duty with the phrase "[w]ith respect
to the specific duty imposed as a safeguard measure", under which they list all claims under the
Agreement on Safeguards in addition to the claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 in the
passages cited above.277
5.90. As noted above, in th e particular paragraph setting out the legal basis for their complaint
under Article I:1, both complainants refer clearly to "the specific duty imposed by Indonesia". This
accords with the complainants' identification of the specific duty as a measure at i ssue. Thus, as
required by Article 6.2 of the DSU, the measure at issue has been clearly identified as the specific
duty on galvalume. In addition, the panel requests clearly set out a claim under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994. Further, the language used in the panel requests plainly connects the relevant
measure, that is, the specific duty, with the MFN treatment obligation provided under Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994 by explicitly linking the discriminatory application of that duty with the substantive
requirement under that provision that any advantage that is granted to a product be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like products originating in all WTO Members.278 The
language setting out the Article I:1 claim does not contain any reference to the characterization of
the measure or to legal arguments further substantiating the claim. Rather, the panel requests
allege that the specific duty is inconsistent with Article I:1 due to its discriminatory application
among WTO Members. Therefore, the common formulation of the relevant paragraph in both panel
requests279 appears to advance an Article I:1 claim that is not circumscribed by the specific duty's
qualification as a safeguard measure.
5.91. Notwithstanding the clear presentation of the problem in the particular paragraph at issue in
each panel request 280, the examination of whether the requirements under Article 6.2 are met
requires that a panel request be "read as a whole, and on the basis of the language used". 281 In
this light, we turn to consider the s ignificance of the fact that each panel request introduces the
claims relating to the specific duty with the phrase "[w]ith respect to the specific duty imposed as
a safeguard measure".282
5.92. We note that, before setting out the measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint,
each panel request contains a section on "background" providing information on the investigation
conducted by "Indonesia's investigating authority on safeguard measures". 283 As part of this
background, each panel request provides information concerning the initiation of the investigation,
the final determination of the relevant authority, the legal basis of the specific duty, and the
corresponding notifications by Indonesia to the Committee on Safeguards. 284 In our view, this
factual background forms part of the narrative in each panel request. 285 The "background" set out
in each panel request is reflective of the information available to the complainants "at the time of
filing"286 their panel requests. This information includes how the spec ific duty came into existence
and how it was notified to WTO Members at the Committee on Safeguards. In assessing the panel
requests as a whole, we consider that the reference to the "specific duty imposed as a safeguard
measure" is consonant with the fact ual background in the panel requests that precedes both the
identification of the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint. To the extent
this introductory phrase could be read as going beyond providing a factual background for the
imposition of the measure, we consider this language to be in the nature of arguments about the

276 Chinese Taipei's panel request, section II, opening paragraph; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.
277 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a (emphasis omitted); Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.
278 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.8. See also
e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162; Thailand – H-Beams,
para. 88.
279 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi.
280 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi.
281 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 641.
282 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a (emphasis omitted); Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.
283 Chinese Taipei's panel request, section I.A; Viet Nam's panel request, paras. 1.1-1.4.
284 Chinese Taipei's panel request, section I.A; Viet Nam's panel request, paras. 1.1-1.4.
285 Such narrative is "a significant part of the assessment of whether the request provides 'a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly'". (Appellate Body
Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
China – Raw Materials, paras. 230-232). See also Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China), paras. 4.25-4.27)
286 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 642.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

proper legal characterization of the measure at issue, that is, the specific duty. Such arguments
about legal characterization do not, and could not, for purpose s of Article 6.2, detract from the
identification of the specific duty as the measure at issue. Indeed, once the requirements of
Article 6.2 (such as the identification of the measure and the claims) are met, it forms part of the
next step of the analysis for a panel to assess, in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, whether
the provisions and covered agreements that have been invoked are indeed applicable to the
measure at issue. However, such arguments speak to the proper assessment of the applicability of
WTO provisions and agreements under Article 11 of the DSU, and they do not impose jurisdictional
limitations on the Panel's terms of reference under Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.93. Thus, we do not read the reference to the "specific duty imposed as a safeguard measure"
to connote a legal characterization of the measure at issue that narrows the scope of the claims
under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. For similar reasons, we are not persuaded that the Article I:1
claims were circumscribed by the language in the p anel requests stat ing that, "according to
Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, a Member shall not take or seek a safeguard
action unless such action conforms with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 … applied in
accordance with the Ag reement on Safeguards."287 We note that this general statement does not
identify a specific measure or a specific claim. We do not consider a general restatement of
safeguard disciplines in Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards to limit a claim brought u nder
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 to a claim exclusively challenging a safeguard measure under the
GATT 1994. Given the plain connection set out in the relevant paragraphs of each panel request
between the specific duty and the alleged violation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 288, we
understand such additional statements to have foreshadowed legal arguments to substantiate the
complainants' claims (including claims raised under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and multiple
claims under the Agreement on Safeguards). Thus, this language does not further contribute to,
nor detract from, the clear articulation of a "problem" under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 relating
to the discriminatory application of the specific duty.289 As an additional consideration, it would risk
"blurr[ing] the distinction between measures and claims"290 to interpret the panel requests as
having confined the scope of the complainants' Article I:1 claims on the basis of a legal
characterization that corresponds to contextual and background descriptions of the measure at
issue, as set out in separate sections of each panel request.
5.94. We recognize tha t the above -mentioned language in the panel requests may have
introduced some doubt as to the significance of the measure's legal characterization by having
included the Article I:1 claims under prefatory references to safeguard measures and in a list of
other claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. In this regard,
the complainants might have been more precise, for example, by more clearly structuring the
panel requests to reflect the independent legal bases of the complai nts as they relate to the
specific measures identified. Nevertheless, reading the panel requests based on the terms used
and the overall narrative therein, the complainants alleged in clear terms a violation of Article I:1
of the GATT 1994 by the specific duty. We do not consider Article 6.2 of the DSU to have required
detailed argumentation in these panel requests as to the precise scope of the violation of
Article I:1 in light of other claims raised 291, including whether that violation results from
non-conformity with the relevant disciplines on safeguard measures or the non-applicability of
those disciplines. Rather, in line with the fundamental distinction between claims and arguments, it
was to be expected that more specific argumentation would be develop ed as to the precise
contours of an alleged inconsistency and to the applicability of the agreements and provisions
invoked, in light of the defences raised and the Panel's objective assessment of the matter as
presented in the panel requests. We also recall our earlier considerations that panel requests must

287 Chinese Taipei's panel request, section II, opening paragraph; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.
288 Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6; Viet Nam's panel request, para. 1.7.a.vi.
289 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 153.
290 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 132. (emphasis original)
291 In this connection, we note certain arguments before the Panel concerning the precise scope of the
discrimination alleged to be inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. We understand these to concern
Indonesia's defence against the Article I:1 claim under the GATT 1994 based on the requirement in Article 9.1
of the Agreement on Safeguards to exclude developing country Members meeting certain conditions.
(See Indonesia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 210-219; second written submission to the Panel,
paras. 117-120; complainants' joint opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 7.2; joint response to
Panel question No. 42; joint second written submission to the Panel, paras. 2.132-2.134; joint opening
statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 7.1-7.5)
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

be read as they existed at the time of filing.292 The fact that the applicability of the WTO safeguard
disciplines to the specific duty at issue gained prominence in the course of the panel proceedings
should not be taken as a reason to reread the panel requests with the hindsight of this debate.
5.95. It is in this light that we review the complainants' arguments in their submissions to the
Panel to find confirmation of the meaning of the words used in their panel requests. Although we
have found that the panel requests clearly identified the measure at issue and the claims, we recall
that the text and content of panel requests may be confirmed based on the subsequent filings of
submissions.293 In their first written submission, the complainants framed their claim under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by arguing that "[s]ubject products originating in the … Members
listed in [Regulation 137] are exempt from the application of the specific duty. Like products
originating in the territory of Members that are not on the list are subject to the specific duty." 294
In arguing that the specific duty is a measure falling within the scope of Article I:1, the
complainants confirmed their position that the specific duty imposed by Regulation 137 on
galvalume results in "duties or charges that are imposed on those products as they enter
Indonesian territory by virtue of their importation (or on their importation)". 295 Notably, the
presentation of this argument accords with the alleg ation of inconsistency with the MFN treatment
obligation under the GATT in their panel requests by focusing on the specific duty without regard
to its qualification as a safeguard measure. Further, the complainants argued that the exemption
from the specific duty grants an "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" within the meaning of
Article I:1 without any reference to the measure's imposition or status as a safeguard measure,
stating that "[t]he exemption from the specific duty affects competitive oppo rtunities between
products imported from the exempted Members and the like products originating in other Members
that are subject to the specific duty." 296 The complainants subsequently argued in support of their
Article I:1 claim that "Indonesia exempts the subject products originati ng in the listed
120 Members ('exempted Members') from the application of the specific duty", whereas "'like'
products originating in the territory of Members that are not on the list, including the
complainants, are subject to t he specific duty."297 Finally, the complainants maintained that, "[i]n
any event, if the Panel were to consider that the suspension of Article I:1 in this dispute does not
amount to a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safe guards,
the consequence of that finding would be that the specific duty remains as a measure inconsistent
with Article I:1" of the GATT 1994.298
5.96. Read together with the panel requests, the complainants' successive submissions to the
Panel confirm that their claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 encompass alleged
discrimination between countries exempted from the scope of application of the specific duty and
countries to which such an exemption does not apply (including the complainants themselves).
The elaboration of more detailed arguments in the course of panel proceedings does not negate
the fact that a claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 with respect to the specific duty was made
with sufficient clarity in the panel requests so as to give notice o f the nature of the complainants'
case. In light of the foregoing, the formulations used in the panel requests in this dispute,
particularly in the paragraph setting out the legal basis of the complaint against the specific duty
under Article I:1 of the GA TT 1994, are sufficient in our view to articulate a claim against the
specific duty irrespective of its characterization as a non-safeguard measure.
5.97. We therefore find that the Panel did not err in concluding that the complainants properly
raised a claim un der Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 against the specific duty as a stand -alone
measure (i.e. as a non -safeguard measure). As the Panel did not err in identifying the matter
within its terms of reference, and given that Indonesia does not otherwise challenge t he Panel's
substantive analysis or findings under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, we uphold the Panel's finding
in paragraphs 7.44 and 8.1.b of its Report that the application of the specific duty on imports of

292 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 642.
293 Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 642; US – Carbon
Steel, para. 127.
294 Complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel, para. 5.133.
295 Complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel, para. 5.143.
296 Complainants' joint first written submission to the Panel, para. 5.148.
297 Complainants' joint second written submission to the Panel, para. 2.128.
298 Complainants' joint response to Panel question No. 51, para. 1.25. This latter argument accords with
Chinese Taipei's panel request stating in clear terms that the specific duty is "[i]n any event" inconsistent with
Article I:1. (Chinese Taipei's panel request, para. II.a.6)
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

galvalume originating in all but the 120 countr ies listed in Regulation 137 is inconsistent with
Indonesia's obligation to accord MFN-treatment under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body makes the following findings and
conclusions:
6.1 Whether Indonesia's Notice of Appeal and appellant 's submission comply with the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review
6.2. We consider that Indonesia's Notice of Appeal identifies the alleged errors in the issues of law
covered in the Panel Repor t and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, as required under
Rule 20(2)(d). Furthermore, as we see it, the complainants' objection under Rule 21(2)(b)(i) is not
pertinent to the scope of appellate review. Accordingly, we decline the complainants' request that
we "reject Indonesia's appeal" with respect to "allegations set out in Section [1] of Indonesia's
Notice of Appeal and paragraphs 42 to 48, 51, and 70 to 82 of Indonesia's appellant's submission".
6.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that Indone sia's specific duty on imports of
galvalume is not a safeguard measure
6.2.1 Whether the Panel erred under Article 6.2, 7.1, or 11 of the DSU
6.3. Article 11 of the DSU requires panels to examine, as part of their "objective assessment of
the matter", whether the pr ovisions of the covered agreements invoked by complainants as the
basis for their claims are applicable and relevant to the case at hand. The Agreement on
Safeguards applies to the "measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994". A panel's
assessment o f claims brought under that agreement may therefore require a threshold
examination of whether the measure at issue qualifies as a safeguard measure within the meaning
of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. A panel is not precluded from determining the applicabi lity of a
particular covered agreement in cases where the issue has not been raised by the parties. Indeed,
the duty to conduct an "objective assessment of the matter" may, at times, require a panel to
depart from the positions taken by the parties and det ermine for itself whether a measure falls
within the scope of a particular provision or covered agreement. Moreover, the description of a
measure proffered by a party and the label given to it under municipal law are not dispositive of
the proper legal characterization of that measure under the covered agreements.
6.4. The complainants in this dispute claimed that Indonesia's specific duty on imports of
galvalume is inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and certain substantive provisions of
the Agreement on Safeguards. Therefore, it was the Panel's duty, pursuant to Article 11 of the
DSU, to assess objectively whether the measure at issue constitutes a safeguard measure in order
to determine the applicability of the substantive provisions relied upon by the complainants as the
basis for their claims.
6.5. We, therefore, find that the Panel did not err under Article 6.2, 7.1, or 11 of the DSU in
carrying out its own assessment of whether the measure at issue constitutes a safeguard measure
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
6.2.2 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994
6.6. In order to constitute one of the "measures provided for in Article XIX" , a measure must
present certain constituent features, absent which it could not be considered a safeguard measure.
First, that measure must suspend, in whole or in part, a GATT obligation or withdraw or modify a
GATT concession. Second, the suspension, wi thdrawal, or modification in question must be
designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to the Member's domestic industry caused or
threatened by increased imports of the subject product. In order to determine whether a measure
presents such features, a panel is called upon to assess the design, structure, and expected
operation of the measure as a whole. In making its independent and objective assessment, a panel
must identify all the aspects of the measure that may have a bearing on its legal character ization,
recognize which of those aspects are the most central to that measure, and, thereby, properly
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

determine the disciplines to which the measure is subject. As part of its determination of whether
a measure is a safeguard measure, a panel should evalu ate and give due consideration, where
relevant, to the manner in which the measure is characterized under the domestic law of the
Member concerned, the domestic procedures that led to the adoption of the measure, and any
relevant notifications to the WTO C ommittee on Safeguards. However, none of these is, in and of
itself, dispositive of the question of whether the measure constitutes a safeguard measure within
the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
6.7. Having reviewed the design, structure, a nd expected operation of the measure at issue,
together with all the relevant facts and arguments on record, we find that this measure does not
present the constituent features of a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of the
WTO safeguard disciplines. The imposition of the specific duty on galvalume may seek to prevent
or remedy serious injury to Indonesia's industry, but it does not suspend any GATT obligation or
withdraw or modify any GATT concession. While the exemption of 120 countries f rom the scope of
application of the specific duty may arguably be seen as suspending Indonesia's MFN treatment
obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, it has not been shown to be designed to prevent or
remedy serious injury to Indonesia's domestic i ndustry. Rather, that exemption appears to
constitute an ancillary aspect of the measure, which is aimed at according S&D treatment to
developing countries with de minimis shares in imports of galvalume as contemplated under
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The disciplines of Article 9.1 set out conditions for the
WTO-consistent application of safeguard measures, and do not speak to the question of whether a
measure constitutes a safeguard measure for purposes of the applicability of the WTO safe guard
disciplines. Hence, we find that the measure at issue, considered in light of those of its aspects
most central to the issue of legal characterization, does not constitute one of the "measures
provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994".
6.8. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's overall conclusion, in paragraphs 7.10 and 8.1.a of its
Report, that the measure at issue does not constitute a safeguard measure within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Having upheld the Panel's conclusion, th ere is no legal
basis for us to rule on the complainants' request for completion of the legal analysis with respect
to their claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2(a), 4.2(b),
4.2(c), 12.2, and 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
6.3 Whether the Panel's terms of reference include a claim under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 against the specific duty as a stand-alone measure
6.9. We consider that the description and presentation of the specific duty as a "measure at issue"
in Chinese Taipei's and Viet Nam's panel requests clearly identify it as a measure that is alleged to
be causing the violation of an obligation contained in a covered agreement. W e further note that
the language used in the panel requests plainly connects the relevant measure, that is, the specific
duty, with the MFN treatment obligation provided under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by explicitly
linking the discriminatory application of that duty with the substantive requirement that any
advantage that is granted to a product be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
products originating in all WTO Members . In our view, the additional language in the panel
requests in the nature of factual background or legal argument concerning the characterization of
the measure does not narrow the claims raised under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. We further find
that the complainants' submissions to the Panel confirm that their claims of inconsistency with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 encompass alleged discrimination b etween countries exempted from
the scope of application of the specific duty and countries to which such an exemption does not
apply (including the complainants themselves). In light of the foregoing, the formulations used in
the panel requests in this dispute are sufficient in our view to articulate a claim against the specific
duty as a stand-alone measure (i.e. as a non-safeguard measure).
6.10. Accordingly, we find that the Panel did not err in concluding that the complainants properly
raised a claim under Ar ticle I:1 of the GATT 1994 against the specific duty as a stand -alone
measure. As the Panel did not err in identifying the matter within its terms of reference, and given
that Indonesia does not otherwise challenge the Panel's substantive analysis or findi ngs under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, we uphold the Panel's finding in paragraphs 7.44 and 8.1.b of its
Report that the application of the specific duty on imports of galvalume originating in all but the
120 countries listed in Regulation 137 is inconsis tent with Indon esia's obligation to a ccord
MFN treatment under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
WT/DS490/AB/R • WT/DS496/AB/R

6.4 Recommendation
6.11. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request Indonesia to bring its measure,
found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as mo dified by this Report, to be inconsistent with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.
Signed in the original in Geneva this 10th day of July 2018 by: