INDIA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 14 October 2014
Document codes: WT/DS430/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: India
Third parties: China, Colombia, Ecuador, EU, Guatemala, Japan, Vietnam, Argentina, Australia, Brazil
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 7, Annex B  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)Art. XI  GATT 1994

INDIA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION
OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures for the protection of strictly confidential
information
A-9
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
UNITED STATES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the United States B-2
Annex B-2 Executive summary of the opening an d closing oral statements of the
United States at the first substantive meeting of the Panel
B-8
Annex B-3 Executive summary of the second written submission of the United States B-12
Annex B-4 Executive summary of the opening an d closing oral statements of the
United States at the second substantive meeting of the Panel
B-21
INDIA
Contents Page
Annex B-5 Executive summary of the first written submission of India B-27
Annex B-6 Executive summary of the opening and closing oral statements of India at the
first substantive meeting of the Panel
B-35
Annex B-7 Executive summary of the second written submission of India B-39
Annex B-8 Executive summary of the opening and closing oral statements of India at the
second substantive meeting of the Panel
B-44
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Argentina C-2
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia C-4
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil C-7
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union C-9
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Guatemala C-14
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan C-17

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Australia – Apples Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2010,
DSR 2010:V, p. 2175
Australia – Apples Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from
New Zealand, WT/DS367/R, adopted 17 December 2010, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS367/AB/R, DSR 2010:VI, p. 2371
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII,
p. 3327
Australia – Salmon Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS18/AB/R, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3407
Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS18/RW, adopted
20 March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, p. 2031
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R,
adopted 20 March 1997, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS22/AB/R,
DSR 1997:I, p. 189
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV,
p. 1527
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p. 1649
Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1377
Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443
Canada – Continued
Suspension
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008,
DSR 2008:XIV, p. 5373
Canada – Continued
Suspension
Panel Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC –
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/R and Add.1 to Add.7, adopted
14 November 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS321/AB/R,
DSR 2008:XV, p. 5757
Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand
and US)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk
and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by New Zealand and the United States, WT/DS103/AB/RW,
WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted 18 December 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6829
Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand
and US)
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the
Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New
Zealand and the United States, WT/DS103/RW, WT/DS113/RW, adopted
18 December 2001, as reversed by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6865
Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents
Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/R / WT/DS426/R / and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013,
as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R
Chile – Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted
23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)
Chile – Price Band System Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating
to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R, adopted 23 October 2002, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p. 261
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R / WT/DS395/R / WT/DS398/R / Add.1 / and Corr.1,
adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII,
p. 3501
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted
19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425
EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products
Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R /
WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006,
DSR 2006:III, p. 847
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted
5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Asbestos Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted
5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R,
DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted
25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU,
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:III, p. 1085
EC – Bananas III (Guatemala
and Honduras)
Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras,
WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, adopted 25 September 1997, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 695
EC – Bananas III (Mexico) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX,
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 803

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Bananas III (US) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States,
WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 943
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Hormones (Canada) Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, adopted
13 February 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:II, p. 235
EC – Hormones (US) Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted
13 February 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, p. 699
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII,
p. 3359
EC – Sardines Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 October 2002, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS231/AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3451
EC – Seal Products Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R / WT/DS401/R and Add.1,
adopted 18 June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R
EC – Selected Customs Matters Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Selected Customs Matters Panel Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/R, adopted 11 December 2006, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS315/AB/R, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3915
EC – Tariff Preferences Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R,
adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, p. 925
EC – Tariff Preferences Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, adopted 20 April 2004,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III,
p. 1009
EC and certain member States
– Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
EC and certain member States
– Large Civil Aircraft
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted
1 June 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R,
DSR 2011:II, p. 685
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted
25 November 1998, DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
Guatemala – Cement I Panel Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland
Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/R, adopted 25 November 1998, as reversed
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS60/AB/R, DSR 1998:IX, p. 3797
India – Autos Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS146/AB/R, WT/DS175/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V,
p. 1821
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V,
p. 1827

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 9
India – Patents (US) Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, Complaint by the United States, WT/DS50/R, adopted
16 January 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS50/AB/R,
DSR 1998:I, p. 41
Japan – Agricultural Products II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277
Japan – Agricultural Products II Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/R, adopted 19 March 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS76/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 315
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX,
p. 4391
Japan – Apples Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/R, adopted 10 December 2003, upheld by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS245/AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4481
Japan – Apples
(Article 21.5 – US)
Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS245/RW,
adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 7911
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p. 1179
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000,
DSR 2000:I, p. 3
Korea – Dairy Panel Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products, WT/DS98/R and Corr.1, adopted 12 January 2000, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS98/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, p. 49
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted
10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R,
DSR 2001:I, p. 59
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on
Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011,
DSR 2011:IV, p. 2203
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from
the Philippines, WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS371/AB/R, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2299
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2741
Turkey – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999,
DSR 1999:VI, p. 2345
Turkey – Textiles Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/DS34/R, adopted 19 November 1999, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, p. 2363

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,
p. 3779
US – Carbon Steel Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS213/AB/R, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3833
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012,
DSR 2012:XI, p. 5751
US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, adopted 24 April 2012, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS406/AB/R, DSR 2012:XI, p. 5865
US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted
14 November 2008, DSR 2008:X, p. 3507
US – Continued Suspension Panel Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R and Add.1 to Add.7, adopted
14 November 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/AB/R,
DSR 2008:XI, p. 3891
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application
of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009,
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
US – Continued Zeroing Panel Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R, adopted 19 February 2009, as modified
as Appellate Body Report WT/DS350/AB/R, DSR 2009:III, p. 1481
US – Countervailing Measures
on Certain EC Products
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning
Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R,
adopted 8 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 5
US – Countervailing Measures
on Certain EC Products
Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain
Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/R, adopted 8 January
2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS212/AB/R, DSR 2003:I,
p. 73
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted
20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII,
p. 5797
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 3
US – Gasoline Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 29
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted
23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 August 2001 modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR 2001:X, p. 4769
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted
27 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 375

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R, adopted 27 January 2003, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, DSR 2003:II,
p. 489
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews
Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/R and Corr.1,
adopted 17 December 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS268/AB/R, DSR 2004:VIII, p. 3421
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry
from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 1909
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II,
p. 589
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/R, adopted 1 February 2002, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS176/AB/R, DSR 2002:II, p. 683
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998,
DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Shrimp Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2821
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted
13 June 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R,
DSR 2012:IV, p. 2013
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 22.6 – US I)
Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton –
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU
and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1,
31 August 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3871
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1,
adopted 11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/RW, adopted 11 June 2009,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VII,
p. 3117
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset
Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan, WT/DS322/RW,
adopted 31 August 2009, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS322/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3553

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation Description
AI Avian Influenza
ALOP Appropriate Level of Protection
CBEC Central Board of Excise and Customs
Code Commission OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission
DAHD Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying, and Fisheries
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, or High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza
HPNAI Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza
IVPI Intravenous Pathogenicity Index
Livestock Act Live-Stock Importation Act 1898 (9 of 1898)
Livestock Amendment Act Live-Stock Importation (Amendment) Act 2001 (No. 28 of 2001)
LPAI Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza
LPNAI Low Pathogenicity Notifiable Avian Influenza
NAI Notifiable Avian Influenza
NAP 2012 National Action Plan 2012
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health
Prevention of Diseases Act Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contagious Disease in Animals Act 2009
SCI Strictly Confidential Information
SIP Sanitary Import Permit
S.O. Statutory Order
SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
SPS Committee's
Transparency Procedures
Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the
SPS Agreement (Article 7)
Guidelines Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Terrestrial Code OIE Terrestri al Animal Health Code
The Guide User's Guide to the Terrestrial Code
USDA United States Depa rtment of Agriculture
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by the United States
1.1. On 6 March 2012, the United States requested consultations with India pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedur es Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
Article 11 of the Agreement on the Applicatio n of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement), and Article XXII of the Ge neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994) with respect to the measures and claims set out below.
1
1.2. Consultations were held on 16 and 17 April 2012. Those consultations were unsuccessful in
resolving this dispute.2
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 11 May 2012, the United States requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to
Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
3 At its
meeting on 25 June 2012, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the
request of the United States in document WT/DS430/3, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.
4
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant pr ovisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the United States in
document WT/DS430/3 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5
1.5. On 7 February 2013, the United States re quested the Director-General to determine the
composition of the panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU.
1.6. On 18 February 2013, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Stuart Harbinson

Members: Ms Delilah Cabb
 M r D i d r i k T ø n s e t h

1.7. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Union, Guatemala,
Japan, and Viet Nam notified their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third
parties.
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.3.1 General
1.8. After consultation with the partie s, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures
6 and
timetables7 on 15 March 2013. Following the Panel's decision to consult with the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and individual scientific experts, and after consultation with
the parties, the Panel adopted its revised timetable on 20 September 2013.
1.9. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 24 and 25 July 2013. A session
with the third parties took place on 24 July 2013. The Panel held a second substantive meeting
with the parties on 18 December 2013.

1 United States' request for consultations (WT/DS430/1).
2 United States' request for the establishment of a panel (WT/DS430/3).
3 United States' request for the establishment of a panel.
4 WT/DSB/M/318.
5 Constitution of the Panel (WT/DS430/4).
6 Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.
7 The Panel adopted two separate timetables. The first timetable included steps covering the Panel's
possible consultation with experts. The second timetable did not.

1.10. On 14 March 2014, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The
Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 23 May 2014. The Panel issued its Final Report to
the parties on 18 July 2014.
1.3.2 Additional Working Procedures for the Protection of Strictly Confidential
Information (SCI)
1.11. On 29 May 2013, India requested the Panel to adopt additional working procedures to
protect SCI to be included in India's first written submission, which was due to be filed on
31 May 2013.
1.12. On 30 May 2013, the United States provided its comments on India's request for additional
working procedures, pursuant to the Panel's invitation to do so. On 31 May 2013, India provided
supplementary comments in support of its request for additional working procedures, pursuant to
the Panel's invitation to do so.
1.13. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted Additional Working Procedures for the
Protection of Strictly Confidential Information on 1 July 2013.
8
1.3.3 Preliminary ruling requests
1.3.3.1 India's first request for a preliminary ruling
1.14. On 4 March 2013, India submitted to the Panel a request for preliminary ruling concerning
the consistency of the United States' request for the establishment of a panel (panel request) with
Article 6.2 of the DSU.
1.15. On 10 April 2013, further to the Panel's invitation, the United States responded to India's
preliminary ruling request in its first written submission.
9 On 17 April 2013, Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, the European Union, and Guatemala provided comments on India's preliminary ruling
request, pursuant to the Panel's invitation to all third parties to do so.10
1.16. The Panel issued its preliminary ruling to the parties, with a copy to the third parties, on
22 May 2013. After consulting the parties, the Panel requested the Chairman of the DSB to
circulate its preliminary ruling to all WTO Members. The Panel further decided that the preliminary
ruling of 22 May 2013 would become an integral part of the Panel's Final Report, subject to any
changes that would be necessary in the light of comments received from the parties during the
interim review. The Panel's preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 was circulated on 28 June 2013.
11
1.3.3.2 India's second request for a preliminary ruling
1.17. On 31 May 2013, as part of its first written submission, India submitted to the Panel a
second request for a preliminary ruling concerning the consistency of the United States'
panel request with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
12
1.18. On 19 June 2013, upon the Panel's invitation, the United States responded to India's second
preliminary ruling request. Following the Panel's invitation to all third parties, on 26 June 2013,
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, and Guatemala provided comments on India's
second preliminary ruling request in their third-party written submissions.
1.19. The Panel's reasoning and findings on India's second preliminary ruling request are set out
in section 7.1.2 below.

8 Panel's Additional Working Procedures for the Protection of Strictly Confidential Information in
Annex A-2.
9 United States' first written submission, paras. 204-235.
10 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, and Guatemala's respective comments on India's
request for a preliminary ruling, 17 April 2013.
11 Communication from the Panel ("preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 ") (WT/DS430/5).
12 India's first written submission, paras. 66-106.

1.3.4 Experts' consultation process
1.3.4.1 Panel's decision to consult with experts
1.20. On 21 June 2013, the Panel sent a series of questions to the parties, inviting their
comments on whether the Panel should seek advice from experts and international organizations.
On 28 June 2013, the United States provided its responses to the Panel questions. On the same
date, India suggested that the Panel evaluate the need to engage experts after the conclusion of
the first substantive meeting, scheduled for 24 and 25 July 2013.
1.21. On 5 July 2013, the Panel invited India to re spond to the Panel's questions to the parties of
21 June 2013, and invited the United States to provide any additional comments to its responses
of 28 June 2013. On 11 July 2013, India responded to the Panel's questions to the parties
regarding whether the Panel should seek advice from experts and international organizations.
1.22. On 24 July 2013, at the first substantive meeting, the United States provided comments to
India's responses of 11 July 2013. On 26 July 2013, India reacted in writing to the United States'
written comments, upon invitation from the Panel to do so.
13
1.23. Following further consultations with the Parties and third parties 14, the Panel decided on
10 September 2013 to seek advice from experts and international organizations, albeit in a limited
manner. In this regard, the Panel decided to conduct:
a. a written consultation with the OIE on the interpretation of the OIE's Terrestrial Animal
Health Code (Terrestrial Code); and
b. a written and oral consultation with two individual experts
15 on the avian influenza (AI)
surveillance regime with particular respect to India's domestic measures and its disease
situation.
1.3.4.2 Panel's selection of individual experts
1.24. On 10 September 2013, the Panel informed the parties that it would contact the OIE, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) for names of
potential individual experts.
1.25. The Panel also invited the parties to agree on individual experts and to provide the names to
the Panel. On 30 September 2013, the parties informed the Panel that they were unable to agree
on individual experts to be consulted by the Panel.
1.26. On 11 September 2013, the Panel requested the OIE, FAO and WHO to provide names and
contact details of individual experts on AI surveillance whom the Panel could consult regarding
evidence submitted by the parties on India's surveillance regime for low pathogenicity avian
influenza (LPAI), as well as on India's domestic disease situation. The Panel invited these
international organizations to provide non-confidential curricula vitae of those experts they
identified, where available.

13 The United States considered that an expert consultation process was not necessary for the present
dispute. However, in the event that the Panel decided to consult experts, the United States proposed that the
Panel consult the OIE on the proper interpretation of the Terrestrial Code and individual scientific experts on
the scientific aspects of India's domestic AI surveillance regime. India also considered an expert consultation
process to be unnecessary in the present dispute. However, in the event that the Panel decided to consult
experts, India proposed that the Panel consult only individual experts, and not international organizations.
14 These further consultations were held at the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties on
24 and 25 July 2013, and at the session of the Panel with the third parties, on 24 July 2013. Additionally, the
Panel invited the parties and the third parties to comment in their responses to the Panel's questions following
the first substantive meeting on whether the Panel should consult with experts. The third parties' responses
and the parties' responses were received on 2 and 3 September 2013 respectively.
15 Following receipt of the curricula vitae, lists of publications and other relevant documentation
pertaining to potential experts, the Panel decided to select three and not two individual experts
(para. 1.29 below).

1.27. The Panel received names and contact information of potential individual experts from all
three international organizations. On 7 October 2013, the Panel sent to the parties a consolidated
list of names of experts, along with the available relevant accompanying documentation. The Panel
sent additional relevant accompanying documentation concerning the potential experts to the
parties on 9 and 15 October 2013.
1.28. On 15 and 17 October 2013, the parties submitted their respective comments on the
potential experts.
1.29. On 21 October 2013, the Panel informed the parties of its decision to consult the following
experts: Professor Ian Brown
16, Dr Nick Honhold17, and Dr Astrid Tripodi.18
1.30. On 24 October 2013, Dr Astrid Tripodi informed the Panel that she was no longer available
to assist the Panel in these proceedings. On 25 Oc tober 2013, the Panel informed the parties of its
decision to consult Dr Yi Guan19 in the place of Dr Astrid Tripodi.
1.3.4.3 Panel's questions to the OIE and to the individual experts
1.31. On 10 September 2013, the Panel sought the parties' input in the preparation of its
questions to the OIE and to the individual experts. The Panel invited the parties to provide the
Panel with up to a dozen potential questions to be addressed to the OIE concerning the
interpretation of the Terrestrial Code, and to the individual experts on the AI surveillance regime
(India's domestic measures and disease situation). On 1 October 2013, the parties submitted to
the Panel their potential questions to the OIE and to the individual experts.
1.32. On 18 October 2013, the Panel sent its questions to the OIE, taking into account the
questions submitted by the parties. On 15 November 2013, the OIE submitted its written
responses to the Panel's questions.
1.33. On 24 October 2013, the Panel sent its questions to two of the individual experts,
Professor Ian Brown and Dr Nick Honhold, taking into account the questions submitted by the
parties. On 25 October 2013, following the Panel's de cision to consult with Dr Yi Guan in the place
of Dr Astrid Tripodi, as described in paragraph 1.30 above, the Panel sent its questions to
Dr Yi Guan. On 12, 14, and 15 November 2013, Dr Nick Honhold, Dr Yi Guan, and
Professor Ian Brown respectively submitted their written responses to the Panel's questions to the
individual experts.
1.34. On 28 November 2013, the parties submitted their comments on the OIE's and individual
experts' responses to the Panel's questions. On the same date, the Panel sent the parties'
comments to the three individual experts.
1.3.4.4 Panel's meeting with the experts and the parties
1.35. In preparation for the Panel's meeting with the experts and the parties, the Panel provided
the parties with an opportunity to submit advance questions, through the Panel, to the experts. On
3 December 2013, the parties submitted to the Panel advance questions for the experts. On
4 December 2013, the Panel sent the parties' advance questions to the experts.
1.36. The Panel held a meeting with the experts and the parties on 16 December 2013.

16 Professor Ian Brown is Director of the International Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza in the
United Kingdom, which is the EU Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease. He is also
the present head of the Avian Virology and Mammalian Influenza workgroup.
17 Dr Nick Honhold is a veterinary epidemiologist, currently working as an independent consultant.
18 Dr Astrid Tripodi is a consultant, currently working as Coordinator, Technical Cooperation Programme
for avian influenza A (H7N9), at the FAO.
19 Dr Yi Guan is Director of the State Key Laboratory of Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of
Hong Kong, and Co-Director of the H5N1 Reference Laboratory under the WHO. Dr Guan is also Daniel C K Yu
Endowed Professor of Virology at the School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, University of
Hong Kong, China.

1.37. On 21 January 2014, the Panel sent a transcript of the meeting with the experts and the
parties to the individual experts with a reques t for the experts to verify that the transcript
accurately reflected the information they provided . Following receipt of the experts' comments on
the transcript and having made the adjustments requested by the experts, the Panel sent the
transcript to the parties on 30 January 2014, for verification of their interventions. Following
receipt of the parties' comments on the transcript, and having made the adjustments requested by
the United States20, the Panel sent a final version of the transcript to the experts and the parties
on 12 February 2014.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 Introduction
2.1. This dispute concerns measures that India imposes on the importation of various agricultural
products because of concerns related to AI.
2.2. In this section of the Report, the Panel wi ll describe the disease, the measures at issue as
identified in the United States' panel request, an d the broader factual context of the dispute. This
includes a description of India's notifications of its AI measures to the WTO Secretariat, India's
measures affecting importation of agricultural products other than the measures at issue in this
dispute, India's AI measures affecting domestic agricultural products, the parties' domestic disease
situations, and the Terrestrial Code.
2.3. The Panel notes that the parties disagree on a number of factual issues. To the extent that it
is necessary for the Panel to resolve those disputed factual issues, it will do so in its Findings.
2.2 The disease at issue: AI
2.2.1 General background
2.4. The term "influenza" originally referred to epidemics of acute, rapidly spreading fevers of
humans caused by viruses in the family Orthomyxoviridae.
21 Today, such viruses are recognized as
causing a significant number of natural infections and diseases, usually of the upper respiratory
tract, in humans, horses, domestic pigs, various bird species, and, sporadically, in mink and a
variety of marine mammals.
22
2.5. Generally, influenza viruses are divided into types A, B and C according to their antigenic
characteristics. Only viruses of the "type influenza A" are known to infect birds. 23 In fact, birds are
the "natural reservoir" of influenza A viruses and consequently, many of these viruses are simply
known as AI viruses.
24
2.6. AI, also commonly known as "avian flu" or "bird flu", is described by the WHO as "an
infectious viral disease of birds (especially wild water fowl such as ducks and geese), often causing
no apparent signs of illness". According to the WH O, AI viruses can sometimes spread to domestic
poultry and cause large-scale outbreaks of serious disease. Some of these AI viruses have also

20 India did not request for any adjustments to be made to the transcript. India's communication to the
Panel of 6 February 2014.
21 D. Swayne and D. Halvorson, "Influenza", in Y. Saif, A. Fadly, J. Glisson, L. McDougald, L. Nolan, and
D. Swayne (eds.), Diseases of Poultry (Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 12th ed.) (Swayne & Halvorson),
(Exhibit US-6), p. 153. WHO, "Influenza", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/topics/influenza/en/>.
22 Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 153.
23 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. FAO, "What is avian influenza?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html> (Exhibit US-28); E. Spackman, "A Brief Introduction to the
Avian Influenza Virus", in E. Spackman (ed.), Avian Influenza Virus, (Humana Press, 2008) (Spackman),
(Exhibit US-8), p. 1; A. Osterhau, V. Munster, & R. Fouchier, "Epidemiology of Avian Influenza", in H.-D. Klenk,
M. Matrosovich, and J. Stech, Avian Influenza, (Karger, 2008) (Osterhau) (Exhibit US-9), p. 1
24 FAO, "Avian Flu is …", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/background.html>. D. Causey and S. V. Edwards, "Ecology of Avian
Influenza Virus in Birds", Journal of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 197 Supp. 1 (2008) (Exhibit US-14) (Causey &
Edwards), p. S29.

been reported to cross the species barrier and cause disease or subclinical infections in humans
and other mammals.25
2.2.2 Typology
2.7. AI has a variety of subtypes which are cla ssified according to the two components that make
up the virus – haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidas e (N). H is a protein found on the surface of
influenza viruses which is responsible for binding the virus to the cell that is being infected; N is
also a protein found on the surface of influenza viruses. To date, 16 H and nine N subtypes of
AI virus have been identified, giving rise to hundre ds of variations on the "HxNy" combination. In
fact, according to the OIE, new influenza viruses are constantly emerging as a result of genetic
mutation and re-assortment.
26
2.8. All AI subtypes are classified as belonging to one of two groups according to their
pathogenicity, i.e. their ability to cause disease in birds: (i) highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI); and (ii) LPAI.27
2.2.2.1 HPAI
2.9. HPAI is an extremely infectious, systemic viral disease of poultry that produces high mortality
and necrobiotic, haemorrhagic or inflammatory lesions in multiple visceral organs, the brain and
skin.
28 The use of the term "highly pathogenic" implies that the virus is highly virulent for chickens
and has been demonstrated to meet one or more of the following three criteria:
a. any influenza virus that is lethal for six, seven or eight out of eight (>75%) four- to six-
week-old susceptible chickens within ten days following intravenous inoculation with
0.2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free, infectious allantoic fluid;
b. any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in a), but has an amino acid sequence
at the H cleavage site that is compatible with HPAI viruses;
c. any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills one to five of eight
inoculated chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin.
29
2.10. All naturally occurring HPAI viruses identified to date have been H5 or H7 subtypes. 30 HPAI
viruses are therefore currently defined as H5 and H7 viruses that cause 75% or higher mortality

25 WHO, "Avian Influenza", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html>.
26 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. FAO, "Avian Flu is …", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/background.html>; D. Swayne, "Epidemiology of Avian Influenza in
Agricultural and Other Man-Made Systems," in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008),
(Swayne, Epidemiology), (Exhibit US-13), p. 62; Causey & Edwards, (Exhibit US-14), p. S30; Centre for
Disease Control and Prevention, "Avian Influenza (Bird Flu): Influenza Viruses" (Nov. 18, 2005) (CDC, Avian
Influenza), (Exhibit US-16), pp. 1-2.
27 In 1981, at the first International Symposium on AI, the terminology "highly pathogenic avian
influenza" was adopted as the official designation for the highly virulent form of AI. "High pathogenicity" is an
equivalent grammatical variant to "highly pathogenic" and can be used interchangeably. In 2002, at the fifth
International Symposium on AI, the terminology "low pathogenicity" was adopted as the official designation for
low virulence AI. Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 153; H.-D. Klenk, M. Matrosovich and J. Stech,
"Avian Influenza: Molecular Mechanisms of Pathogenesis and Host Range," in T. Mettenleiter and F. Sobrino
(eds.) Animal Viruses: Molecular Biology (Caister Academic Press, 2008) (Klenk & Matrosovich), (Exhibit US-5),
p. 256.
28 D. Swayne & D. Suarez, "Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza", Revue Scientifique et Technique de
L'Office International des Epizooties, Vol. 19 No. 1 (2000) (Swayne & Suarez), (Exhibit US-19), p. 463.
29 Swayne & Suarez, (Exhibit US-19), p. 464. FAO, "Epidemiology of Avian Influenza", accessed
17 January 2014, <http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/clinical.html> (Exhibit US-12); and WHO, "Avian Influenza
Fact Sheet", accessed 28 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html> .
30 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3; FAO, "Epidemiology of Avian Influenza", accessed
17 January 2014, <http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/clinical.html> (Exhibit US-12).

after experimental infection of chickens and that have a polybasic H cleavage site. All other AI
viruses that do not meet any of these criteria are classified as LPAI.31
2.2.2.2 LPAI
2.11. LPAI is the official designation for low virulence AI, i.e. any AI viruses that do not meet the
criteria for HPAI.
32 M o s t o f t h e H 5 a n d H 7 s u b t y p e s o f A I v i r u s e s a r e b e l i e v e d t o b e L P A I .33
Infection with LPAI may be asymptomatic 34 or have very mild symp toms, e.g. birds may suffer
ruffled feathers, reduced egg production, or mild effects on the respiratory system. 35 Therefore,
infections with LPAI may pass unnoticed.36
2.12. LPAI viruses are endemic to various species of wild birds and found in more than 100
different wild bird species of more than 25 different families. Wild birds, and in particular wild
aquatic birds such as ducks, geese and gulls, are the "princip[al] reservoirs" for LPAI viruses.
37
2.2.3 AI viruses notifiable to the OIE
2.13. The OIE requires that its members notify the OIE of any occurrence of HPAI and of certain
types of LPAI in their territories. The 21 st edition of the Terrestrial Code defines "notifiable avian
influenza" (NAI) as "an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the H5 or H7
subtypes or by any AI virus with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 (or as
an alternative at least 75 percent mortality)". 38 This covers both high pathogenic notifiable avian
influenza (HPNAI) and low pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI).
2.14. The Terrestrial Code defines HPNAI as follows:
HPNAI viruses have an IVPI in six-week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an
alternative, cause at least 75 percent mortality in four-to eight-week-old chickens
infected intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have an IVPI of greater than
1.2 or cause less than 75 percent mortality in an intravenous lethality test should be
sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are present at the
cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if the amino acid motif is similar
to that observed for other HPNAI isolates, the isolate being tested should be
considered as HPNAI.
39
2.15. LPNAI is defined in the Terrestrial Code as "all influenza A viruses of H5 and H7 subtype that
are not HPNAI viruses."40

31 Klenk & Matrosovich, (Exhibit US-5), p. 258.
32 Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 153.
33 D. Suarez, "Influenza A Virus", in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008)
(Suarez), (Exhibit US-10), p. 11. FAO, "What is avian influenza?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#1> (Exhibit US-28).
34 OIE "What is Avian Influenza?", accessed 28 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AI-EN.pdf> (Exhibit US-23).
35 OIE "What is Avian Influenza?", accessed 28 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AI-EN.pdf> (Exhibit US-23).
36 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. I. Capua and C. Terregino, "Clinical Traits and Pathology of
Avian Influenza Infections, Guidelines for Farm Visit and Differential Diagnosis," in I. Capua & D. Alexander
(eds) Avian Influenza And Newcastle Disease: A Field and Laboratory Guide (Springer, 2009) (Capua &
Terregino), (Exhibit US-27), p. 49; Spackman, (Exhibit US-8), p. 3; Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood,
(Exhibit US-18), p. 91-92; D. Swayne, "The Global Nature of Avian Influenza", in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian
Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) (Swayne, Global Nature), (Exhibit US-21), p. 128; FAO, "What is avian
influenza?", accessed 17 January 2014, <http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html> (Exhibit US-28).
37 Osterhau, (Exhibit US-9), p. 2. OIE's response to Panel question No. 3; Swayne, Epidemiology,
(Exhibit US-13), p. 63; R. Fouchier & V. Munster, "Epidemiology of Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses in
Wild Birds", Revue Scientifique et Technique de L'Office International des Epizooties, Vol. 28 No. 1 (2009)
(Fouchier & V.J. Munster), (Exhibit US-22), p. 49.
38 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), Article 10.4.1.2. The Panel refers to the authentic text in English of the
21st edition of the Terrestrial Code provided by the OIE further to the request by the Panel.
39 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), Article 10.4.1.2(a).
40 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), Article 10.4.1.2(b).

2.2.4 Transmission of AI
2.16. AI viruses are transmitted by direct cont act between infected and susceptible birds, or
indirect contact through aerosol droplets or exposure to virus-contaminated materials, trays or the
surface of eggs.
41 Faeces, in particular, contain large amounts of the virus, and faecal-oral
transmission is the predominant means of spread in wild bird reservoirs. 42 Humans may facilitate
transmission of AI viruses through movement of dead infected birds and use of contaminated
equipment. Moreover, turkeys can be infected by ce rtain AI virus subtypes of swine origin either
from pigs directly, or via infected humans. 43 With respect to HPAI viruses, the high virus levels in
tissues mean that consumption of carcasses by birds can also be a route for transmission. 44
2.17. Wild birds may also play a major role in the initial introduction of AI viruses in domestic
poultry. However, once AI is established or adapte d in poultry, wild birds have had a very limited
role in secondary dissemination. 45 Indeed, according to the OIE, scientific investigations indicate
that the wild bird reservoir is the original sour ce of H5/H7 LPAI viruses and that these viruses,
circulating in poultry, give rise to HPAI viruses. In general, the longer that an H5 or H7 LPAI virus
is allowed to circulate in poultry, particularly in areas of high poultry density, the greater the
chances that an HPAI virus will emerge.46
2.18. According to the FAO, it is therefore "unlikely that wild birds play a major role in spreading
[AI] in poultry after its initial introduction". 47 The spreading, or wider distribution of the disease,
takes place within flocks or sizeable numbers of poultry and is influenced more by production and
marketing practices. 48 The Asian lineage of H5N1 HPAI virus however constitutes an exception,
since it is generally accepted that this HPAI virus may be carried by wild birds and transmitted into
poultry directly from such birds without mutation from LPAI.49
2.19. While AI is primarily a disease affecting birds, it can also affect other animals. The virus is
known to have occurred in cats and related animals such as leopards, tigers, ferrets, stone
martens, dogs and pigs. According to the FAO, it is thought that these other animals contract the
disease through eating raw infected birds.50
2.20. Similarly, although most AI viruses do not cause disease in humans, some are zoonotic,
meaning that they can infect humans and cause disease. 51 However, transmission between

41 Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 166; Canadian Food Inspection Agency, "Fact Sheet – Avian
Influenza" (Exhibit US-20), p. 2; David E. Swayne and Collen Thomas, "Trade and Food Safety Aspects for
Avian Influenza Viruses," AVIAN INFLUENZA, Ed. David E. Swayne (2008) (Swayne & Thomas),
(Exhibit US-31), p. 502; FAO, "How is avian influenza transmitted?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#7> (Exhibit US-28).
42 FAO, "How is avian influenza transmitted?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#7> (Exhibit US-28). Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6),
p. 165; Centre for Food Security & Public Health, "High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza", (CFSPH),
(Exhibit US-32), p. 3.
43 Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 166.
44 FAO, "How is avian influenza transmitted?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#7> (Exhibit US-28). Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6),
p. 165; CFSPH, (Exhibit US-32), p. 3.
45 Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6), p. 166.
46 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3; Suarez, (Exhibit US-10), p. 11; D. Swayne, "Avian Influenza
Control Strategies", in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) (Swayne, Control
Strategies), (Exhibit US-24), p. 288.
47 FAO, "What part do wild birds play in the spread of avian influenza?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#C1> (Exhibit US-28).
48 FAO, "What part do wild birds play in the spread of avian influenza?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#C1> (Exhibit US-28).
49 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No 2; OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. Swayne,
Control Strategies, (Exhibit US-24), p. 288; WHO, "Do migratory birds spread highly pathogenic avian
influenza viruses to poultry?", accessed 17 January 2014,
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/micro/avian/en/index1.html>.
50 FAO, "Avian Flu is ...", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/background.html>.
51 WHO, "Avian influenza in humans", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/en/> (Exhibit US-36); WHO, "Human
infection with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus – update", accessed 30 March 2014,
<http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_07_20/en/index.html> (Exhibit IND 130).

humans appears to have occurred only on very rare, exceptional occasions and in nearly all
reported cases of human infection with AI viruses there has been a close association with infected
birds or infective carcasses.
52 Generally, serious complications or fatal cases in humans have been
reported in cases of infection with certain strains of HPAI viruses. Nonetheless, there have been
outbreaks of LPNAI (H7N9) in China resulting in fatalities and illness to humans. 53 In most other
cases, illness from infection with LPAI viruses has been clinically mild and has ranged from focal
mild signs and symptoms (e.g., conjunctivitis) to more acute systemic illness (fever and upper
respiratory trace disease) with full recovery.
54
2.21. One of the most well-known examples of transmission to humans is the HPAI subtype
H5N1 virus present in poultry in certain parts of Asia and northeast Africa, which has caused
human disease and deaths since 1997. According to the OIE, cases of human illness and death
associated with H5N1 infection fuelled concerns in the past decade that the H5N1 AI virus could
potentially cause a global influenza pandemic in humans.
55 The WHO and the OIE observe that
other AI subtypes, including H7N7 , H7N9 and H9N2, have also infected people. Some of these
infections have been very severe and a few have resulted in deaths, but most infections have been
mild or even subclinical in humans.56
2.3 The measures at issue
2.22. The measures at issue in this dispute are India's AI measures, which are those measures
that "prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India from those countries
reporting [NAI]".
57 India maintains its AI measures through, inter alia , the following legal
instruments:
a. the Live-Stock Importation Act 1898 (9 of 1898) (Livestock Act) 58 published on
12 August 1898, as amended by the Live-Stock Importation (Amendment) Act 2001
(No. 28 of 2001) (Livestock Amendment Act)
59, and published in the Gazette of India on
29 August 2001; and
b. S.O. 1663(E), issued by India's Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying, and
Fisheries (DAHD) pursuant to the Livestock Act and published in the Gazette of India on
19 July 2011.
2.3.1 Livestock Act
2.23. The Livestock Act was enacted "to make better provision for the regulation of the import
live-stock which is liable to be affected by infectious or contagious disorders".
60 This Act "extends
to the whole of India".61
2.24. The Livestock Act includes in its definition of "infectious or contagious disorders" any disease
or disorder which may be specified by the Centra l Government by notification in the Official

52 D. Alexander, "Orthomyxoviridae – Avian Influenza", in D. Alexander (ed.) Poultry Diseases,
(Saunders El Sevier, 2008, 6th ed.) (Alexander), (Exhibit US-11), p. 331.
53 WHO, "Human infection with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus – update", accessed 30 March 2014,
<http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_07_20/en/index.html> (Exhibit IND 130).
54 N. Cox & T. Uyeki, "Public Health Implications of Avian Influenza Viruses", in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian
Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) (Cox & Uyeki), (Exhibit US-37), p. 462.
55 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. FAO, "Avian Flu is ...", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/background.html>.
56 WHO, "Avian influenza in humans", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/en/> (Exhibit US-36); OIE,
"Questions and Answers on influenza A(H7N9)", accessed 17 January 2014, <http://www.oie.int/en/for-the-
media/press-releases/detail/article/questions-and-answers-on-influenza-ah7n9/>.
57 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013. A summary of the findings is included in section 7.1.1 below.
58 Live-Stock Importation Act, Act No. 9 of 1898, (Livestock Act), (Exhibit US-114).
59 Live-Stock Importation (Amendment) Act, No. 28 of 2001, (Livestock Amendment Act),
(Exhibit US-115).
60 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Preamble.
61 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Section 1(2).

Gazette.62 Further, for the purposes of the Livestock Act, "live-stock" includes any animal which
may be specified by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.63
2.25. The Livestock Act empowers the Central Government to regulate, restrict, or prohibit, in
such manner as it may think fit, the import into India of any livestock which may be liable to be
affected by infectious or contagious disorders. In particular, Section 3 of the Livestock Act
provides, in relevant part:
Power to regulate importation of live-stock. – (1) The Central Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, regulate, restrict or prohibit in such manner and
to such extent as it may think fit, [the import] into [India] or any specified place
therein, any live-stock which may be liable to be affected by infectious or contagious
disorders, and of any fodder, dung, stable-litter, clothing harness or fittings
appertaining to live-stock or that may have been in contact therewith. (footnotes
omitted)
2.26. The Livestock Amendment Act, which came into force on 5 July 2001, amended the
Livestock Act. In particular, it expanded the scope of the Livestock Act to cover not only livestock
but also "live-stock products".
64 These livestock products include "meat and meat products of all
kinds including fresh, chilled and frozen meat, tissu e, organs of poultry, pig, sheep, goat, egg and
egg powder" as well as "any other animal product which may be specified by the Central
Government by notification in the Official Gazette".65
2.27. Furthermore, the Livestock Amendment Act introduced an additional provision regarding the
Central Government's powers to regulate imports. Accordingly, Section 3A of the Livestock Act as
amended, provides:
The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, regulate, restrict
or prohibit in such manner and to such extent as it may think fit, the import into the
territories to which this Act extends, of any live-stock product which may be liable to
affect human or animal health.66
2.28. The DAHD is the department of India's Central Government that is tasked with the role,
described in Sections 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act, of regulating the importation of livestock and
livestock products into India. It is noteworthy that a notification under Section 3 or Section 3A of
the Livestock Act operates as if it has been issued under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 and
becomes a customs notification.
67 Such notifications are delegated legislation, the form of which is
prescribed by the parent statute. Notifications are typically legislative in character; they are
assigned with an S.O.68 number and published in the Official Gazette of India.
2.29. Once the DAHD publishes a notification, it informs other departments of the government
such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of Revenue, and the Central Board of
Excise and Customs (CBEC) through office memorand a of the promulgation of the notification. In
this way, the CBEC does not re-issue a notification already issued by the DAHD regarding
regulation of imports of livestock products. Howeve r, the notification issued by the DAHD may be
disseminated as a circular or instruction (issued under Section 151A of the Customs Act) to field
officers at all ports. Further, the CBEC may issue circulars where clarifications regarding the
implementation of a notification are deemed necessary.
69

62 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Section 2(a).
63 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Section 2(b).
64 Livestock Amendment Act, (Exhibit US-115), Section 2.
65 Livestock Amendment Act, (Exhibit US-115), Section 3.
66 Livestock Amendment Act, (Exhibit US-115), Section 5.
67 India's response to Panel question No. 20(a); Exhibits US-114, Section 3(2); and US-115, Section 4.
Customs Act 1962, accessed on 20 January 2014, <http://www.cbec.gov.in/customs/cs-act/custom-act-
1962.pdf>.
68 S.O. stands for "statutory order" (para. 2.30 below).
69 India's response to Panel question No. 20(a). Customs Act 1962, accessed on 20 January 2014,
<http://www.cbec.gov.in/customs/cs-act/custom-act-1962.pdf>.

2.3.2 S.O. 1663(E)
2.30. S.O. 1663(E) was issued by the DAHD in exer cise of powers conferred by the Livestock Act.
It was published in the Gazette of India on 19 July 2011 and came into effect on that same date.
According to India, although the abbreviation "S.O." generally refers to "statutory order",
S.O. 1663(E) "is in fact in the nature of a notification".
70 It was notified to the SPS Committee on
11 October 2011.71
2.31. S.O. 1663(E) begins with a chapeau, which reads (in relevant part):72
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 and Section 3A of
the Livestock Importation Act, 1898 (9 of 1898), and in supercession of the
notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department of
Animal Husbandry, Dairy and Fisheries) pub lished in the Gazette of India, …, except
as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supercession, the Central
Government hereby prohibits, with effect from the date of publication of this
notification in the Official Gazette, namely:
2.32. Paragraph (1) of S.O. 1663(E) provides:
(i) the import into India from all countries in view of Notifiable Avian Influenza
(both Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza and Low Pathogenic Notifiable
Avian Influenza), of wild birds except those reared and bred in captivity;
(ii) the import into India from the countries reporting Notifiable Avian Influenza
(both Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza and Low Pathogenic Notifiable
Avian Influenza), the following livestock products, namely:
(a) domestic and wild birds (including poultry and captive birds);
(b) day old chicks, ducks, turkeys, and other newly hatched avian species;
(c) un-processed meat and meat products from Avian species, including
domesticated, wild birds and poultry;
(d) hatching eggs;
(e) egg and egg products (except Specific Pathogen Free eggs);
(f) un-processed feathers;
(g) live pigs;
(h) pathological material and biological products from birds;
(i) products of animal origin (from birds) intended for use in animal feeding or for
agricultural or industrial use; and
(j) semen of domestic and wild birds including poultry:
Provided that the Central Government may allow the import of processed poultry meat
after satisfactory conformity assessment of the exporting country.
2.33. Paragraph (2) of S.O. 1663(E) refers to products with respect to which the import
prohibition in paragraph (1) does not apply:
The prohibition specified in paragraph (1) shall not be applicable to the import of –

70 India's response to Panel question No. 20(c).
71 G/SPS/N/IND/73.
72 Annex-A to India's request for a preliminary ruling and Exhibit US-80.

(i) processed pet food containing ingredients of meat and meat products from birds
intended for use in animal feeding.
(ii) the import of pathological materials and biological products for use in research
purposes exclusively used by the National Referral Laboratories.
2.4 Factual context
2.4.1 India's notifications of its AI measures to the WTO Secretariat
2.34. The table below provides information regarding measures India notified to the
WTO Secretariat as affecting the importation of agricultural products into India because of
concerns related to AI.73
WTO
document
symbol

Legal
Instrument
Date of
entry into
force
Date of
submission
to the WTO
Date of
distribution
by the WTO
Description of content
IND/10 S.O. 801(E)/F
No. 109-
6/2001
17/08/2001 22/03/2002 11/04/2002 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the imports of
domestic/wild birds and
their products … from China
(including Hong Kong),
Honduras, Italy, Laos,
Pakistan and any other
country reporting the
outbreak of Avian
Influenza."
IND/13 S.O. 155(E)/F
No. 109-
3/2004
03/02/2004 12/03/2004 17/03/2004 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the imports of
domestic/wild birds and
their products … from all
countries in wake of
outbreak of Avian
Influenza."
IND/13/Add.1 S.O. 800(E) 07/07/2004 05/08/2004 12/08/2004 "Exempts from prohibition,
with effect from the date of
publication of this
notification, import into
India from such countries
which have been declared
free from Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (Fowl
Plague) as per Office of
International Epizo[o]tics
(OIE) guidelines, the
livestock product, namely,
'Hatching eggs (only Specific
pathogen free chicken and
duck hatching eggs)'."
IND/14 S.O. 899(E)/F
No. 109-
16/2004
06/08/2004 24/08/2004 26/08/2004 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the imports of the
[certain] livestock and their
products from … countries
reporting the outbreak of
Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza. Also prohibits the
import of the [certain]
livestock and their products
… except processed meat
…."

73 The text of the notifications, as well as dates of their submission to, and distribution by, the WTO
Secretariat are accessible from the SPS Information Management System (SPS IMS) at http://spsims.wto.org.

WTO
document
symbol

Legal
Instrument
Date of
entry into
force
Date of
submission
to the WTO
Date of
distribution
by the WTO
Description of content
IND/17 S.O. 175(E)/F
No. 109-
16/2004
07/02/2005 17/02/2005 18/02/2005 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the import of
[certain] livestock and their
products … from countries
reporting the outbreak of
Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza. And also prohibits
the import of [certain]
livestock and their products
… except processed meat
from all countries."
IND/31 S.O.
1104(E)/F
No. 109-
16/2004
and
S.O.
1112(E)/F No
109-16/2004
06/08/2005 12/08/2005 16/08/2005 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the import of
[certain] livestock and their
products … from countries
reporting the outbreak of
Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza. Also prohibits the
import of [certain] livestock
and their products … except
live poultry … and …
unprocessed meat from
avian species including wild
birds except that of poultry
from all countries."
IND/46 S.O. 1256(E) 03/08/2006 09/08/2006 11/08/2005 "Prohibits, for a period of six
months, the import of
[certain] livestock and their
products … from countries
reporting the outbreak of
Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza. And also prohibits
the import of [certain]
livestock and their products
… from all countries."
IND/46/Add.1 Includes the
text but not
the name of
S.O. 102(E)
Not provided
in the
notification.
In
IND/46/Add.
2 specified
as
02/02/2007
15/02/2007 19/02/2007 "1. … [P]rohibits … the
import into India from all
countries in view of Avian
Influenza (both Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza
and Low Pathogenic Avian
Influenza), [of certain] …
livestock and livestock
products.
2. Further … prohibits also
the import into India from
the countries reporting
Avian Influenza (both Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza
and Low Pathogenic Avian
Influenza), [of certain] …
livestock and livestock
products.
3. The prohibition shall be in
force for a period of six
months…."

WTO
document
symbol

Legal
Instrument
Date of
entry into
force
Date of
submission
to the WTO
Date of
distribution
by the WTO
Description of content
IND/46/Add.2 S.O. 367(E)/F
No. 109-
16/2004
14/03/2007 03/04/2007 17/04/2007 "This regulation … is an
amendment to the earlier
Gazette Notification No.
S.O.102 (E) dated 2
February 2007… Through
this amendment, prohibition
shall not be applicable to
import into India of dried
processed pet food
containing the ingredient of
meat and meat products
from avian species, pig and
product of animal origin
(from birds) intended for
use in animal feeding from
the countries reporting
Avian Influenza (both Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza
and Low Pathogenic Avian
Influenza)."
IND/46/Add.3 Amendment of
S.O. 102(E)
(no other
reference
provided).
Not provided 05/07/2007 11/07/2007 "… [A]mends the notification
… S.O. 102, dated 2
February, 2007, as follows:
In the said notification, for
item number (vii) the
following item shall be
substituted, namely,
"(vii) live pig and pig
products (including pig
bristles)."
IND/46/Add.4 Not provided Not provided 24/08/2007 27/08/2007 "The Central Government of
India is extending, for a
period of six months, the
prohibition to import the
products referred to in
notifications
G/SPS/N/IND/46/Add.1 and
Add.3."
IND/46/Add.5 Not provided Not provided 12/02/2008 15/02/2008 "The Central Government of
India is extending, for a
period of six months, the
prohibition to import the
products referred to in
notifications

dated 19 February 2007,
Add.3 dated 11 July 2007
and Add.4 dated 27 August
2007. Through this
amendment, the ban on
processed pig bristles has
been lifted."

WTO
document
symbol

Legal
Instrument
Date of
entry into
force
Date of
submission
to the WTO
Date of
distribution
by the WTO
Description of content
IND/46/Add.6 The
notification
provides an
internet link to
S.O. 1892(E)
74
30/07/2008
(according
to the text of
S.O. 1892
(E))
11/08/2008 12/08/2008 "The Central Government of
India is extending, for a
period of six months, the
prohibition to import the
products referred to in
notifications
G/SPS/N/IND/46/Add.1 of
19 February 2007, Add.3 of
11 July 2007, Add.4 of 27
August 2007 and Add.5 of
February 2008. Through
this amendment certain
changes have been brought
in."
IND/46/Add.7 The internet
link is
provided to
S.O. 419(E)75
9/02/2009
(according
to the text of
S.O. 419
(E))
27/03/2009 31/03/2009 "The Central Government of
India is extending, for a
period of six months, the
prohibition to import the
products referred to in
notifications
G/SPS/N/IND/46/Add.1 of
19 February 2007, Add.3 of
11 July 2007, Add.4 of 27
August 2007, Add.5 of 15
February 2008 and Add.6 of
12 August 2008. Through
this amendment certain
changes have been brought
in."
IND/73 S.O.
1663(E)/F No
109-21/2007
19/07/2011 07/10/2011 11/10/2011 "Prohibits the import of
[certain] livestock and their
products … from countries
reporting avian influenza
(both highly pathogenic
notifiable avian influenza
and low pathogenic
notifiable avian influenza)
and also prohibits the import
of wild birds except those
reared and bred in captivity
from all countries."

2.4.2 India's other measures affecting importation of agricultural products
2.4.2.1 S.O. 655(E)
2.35. S.O. 655(E), issued by the DAHD in exerci se of powers conferred by Section 3A of the
Livestock Act, applies to the import of all livestock into India. It was published in the Gazette of
India on 9 July 2001 and came into effect on that same date. 76 S.O. 655(E) was notified to the
WTO SPS Committee on 11 April 2002.77
2.36. S.O. 655(E) begins with the following paragraph:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Sect ion 3A of the Live-stock Importation Act,
1898 (9 of 1898), the Central Government hereby restricts, with effect from the date

74 The link provided is <http://dahd.nic.in/flu/gazetteofindiajul310708.pdf>.
75 The link provided is <http://dahd.nic.in/flu/gazetteofindia9Feb2009.pdf>.
76 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibits US-116 and IND-18).
77 G/SPS/N/IND/9.

of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, the import into India of all
live-stock products, including –
(i) meat and meat products of all kinds including fresh, chilled and frozen meat ,
tissue or organs of poultry, pig, sheep, goat;
(ii) egg and egg powder;
(iii) milk and milk products;
(iv) bovine, ovine and caprine embryos, ova or semen; and
(v) pet food products of animal origin.
78
2.37. The Schedule to S.O. 655(E) entitled "Procedure for import of livestock products into India"
provides that "[n]o live-stock product shall be imported into India without a valid sanitary import
permit [SIP] issued under clause (3)".
79 Clause (3) prescribes the conditions that must be satisfied
before the DAHD issues a SIP. 80 Among these conditions is that "the import permit shall lay down
specific conditions that will have to be fulfilled in respect of the consignment, including pre-
shipment certifications and quarantine checks."
81
2.4.2.2 Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade
2.38. As was described in paragraph 2.29 above, once the DAHD publishes a notification, it
informs other government departments of the promulgation of that notification through office
memoranda.82 Among these is Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade 83 that "enclose[s] a
copy of Notification No. S.O. 1663(E) dated 19th July, 2011 banning the import of poultry and
poultry products from countries reporting Avian Influenza".
84
2.39. The DAHD sent this office memorandum on 2 August 2011 to several other central
government and state departments. It is entitled "Notification on ban on import of poultry and
poultry products from the countries due to Notifiable Avian Influenza (both Highly Pathogenic
Notifiable Avian Influenza and Low Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza) – Regarding".
85
2.40. The memorandum refers to the earlier issued S.O. 2976(E), dated 16 December 2010,
which had been valid for six months from the date of publication or until such time as it was
reviewed (whichever was earlier). Accordingly, the memorandum confirmed that S.O. 2976(E) had
been reviewed and the DAHD had decided to continue, through S.O. 1663(E), the ban on import
from countries reporting AI (both HPAI and LPAI).
86
2.4.3 India's AI measures affecting domestic agricultural products
2.4.3.1 The Prevention and Control of Infe ctious and Contagious Disease in Animals
Act 2009 (Prevention of Diseases Act)
2.41. The Prevention of Diseases Act gained assent on 20 March 2009.87 It provides for:
[T]he prevention, control and eradication of infectious and contagious diseases
affecting animals, for prevention of outbreak or spreading of such diseases from one

78 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), first paragraph.
79 S.O. 655(E) further states that "[t]he import of these livestock products into India is allowed only
against a sanitary import permit (SIP) issued by the DAHD as per the procedure set out in the Schedule
annexed to S.O. 655(E)". S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), para. 2.
80 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), Schedule, paras. (1) and (3).
81 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), Schedule, para. (3)(iv). India's response to Panel question No. 19(a).
82 India's first written submission, para. 26; India's response to Panel question No. 20(b).
83 Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade (Exhibit IND-17).
84 Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade (Exhibit IND-17), para. 1.
85 Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade (Exhibit IND-17), para. 1.
86 Office Memorandum No. 109-21/2007-Trade (Exhibit IND-17), para. 2.
87 Prevention of Disease Act, Central Act No. 27 of 2009, (Prevention of Diseases Act), (Exhibit IND-46).

State to another, and to meet the international obligations of India for facilitating
import and export of animals and anim al products and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.88
2.42. The Prevention of Diseases Act contains provisions governing, inter alia, the appointment of
veterinary officers, reporting of scheduled dise ases, disease control and eradication measures,
notification of controlled and disease-free areas, and vaccination. The Act includes a Schedule of
diseases containing 12 categories including avian diseases.
89 Among the covered avian diseases
are "highly pathogenic avian influenza and low pathogenic avian influenza in poultry".90
2.4.3.2 The National Action Plan of 2012 (NAP 2012)
2.43. In 2006, "[i]n view of a threat of global outbreak of AI and a pprehensions of a human
pandemic"
91, the DAHD prepared a national action plan (NAP) to deal with "any eventuality". 92
Further to successive outbreaks of AI in 2008 and 2009, the NAP was revised in 2012, "taking into
account the new experiences, the lessons learnt from the past and the contemporary scientific
information."93 The NAP 2012 was issued pursuant to the Prevention of Diseases Act.94
2.44. The NAP 2012 is comprised of five chapters. Chapter I explains India's states of
preparedness against AI outbreaks and AI survei llance. Chapter II prescribes the actions to be
taken if an outbreak of AI is suspected. Chapter III describes the actions required in the event of
an outbreak of the disease. Chapter IV discu sses the post-operation surveillance and the
declaration of freedom from AI. Finally, Chapter V identifies the persons to handle NAI infected
poultry and includes information on biosafety and biosecurity measures.
2.4.4 Parties' domestic disease situations
2.4.4.1 The United States
2.45. The United States has not notified to the OIE an outbreak of HPAI in the United States since
2004.
95
2.46. Since January 2006, the United States notified to the OIE occurrences of LPAI in poultry in
the United States.96
2.4.4.2 India
2.47. From the end of 2003 to 12 March 2013, In dia notified to the OIE 95 outbreaks of HPAI
(subtype H5N1) in poultry in India.97
2.48. India has never notified to the OIE an occurrence of LPAI in poultry in India.

88 Prevention of Diseases Act, (Exhibit IND-46), p. 1.
89 Prevention of Diseases Act, (Exhibit IND-46), Schedule, Section (f), p. 18.
90 Prevention of Diseases Act, (Exhibit IND-46), Schedule, Section (f)(9), p. 18.
91 National Action Plan of 2012, (NAP 2012), (Exhibit US-90), p.1.
92 National Action Plan of 2012, (NAP 2012), (Exhibit US-90), p.1.India's first written submission,
para. 74; National Action Plan of 2006, (NAP 2006), (Exhibit US-89).
93 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), p.1.
94 India's first written submission, para. 40. The NAP 2012 does not expressly state that it is issued
pursuant to the Prevention of Diseases Act. However, the NAP 2012 does refer in some provisions to the
Prevention of Diseases Act, including Articles I.2.2(iii) and I.6.
95 OIE, "Detailed country (ies) disease incidence", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail>.
96 OIE, "Disease timelines", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/Diseasetimelines>.
97 Table on Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (subtype H5N1) in poultry notified to the
OIE * from the end of 2003 to 12 March 2013, accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/graph_avian_influenza/graph
s_HPAI_12_03_2013.pdf>. United States' first written submission, para. 47.

2.4.5 The Terrestrial Code
2.4.5.1 The OIE and its mandate
2.49. The OIE is an intergovernmental organiza tion founded on 25 January 1924 in response to
the need to fight animal diseases at a global level. The OIE is tasked with improving animal health
worldwide.
98 A total of 178 countries, including the United States and India, are members of this
organization.99
2.50. One of the missions of the OIE is the esta blishment of health standards for international
trade in animals and animal products. Annex A( 3)(b) of the SPS Agreement indicates that the
international standards for animal health and zoonoses are those developed under the auspices of
the OIE. In this respect, the OIE develops international standards to deal with aspects of
SPS measures as they relate to animal health including, but not limited to, their effect on human
health. One such set of standards, which includes recommendations relating to AI, is embodied in
the Terrestrial Code.
100
2.4.5.2 History of the Terrestrial Code
2.51. The recommendations contained in the Terrestrial Code are the result of the continuous
work since 1960 of one of the OIE's Specialist Commissions, the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
Standards Commission (the Code Commission). This Code Commission draws upon the expertise
of internationally renowned specialists to prepare draft texts for new articles of the
Terrestrial Code or to revise existing articles in the light of advances in veterinary science.
101
2.52. The first edition of the Terrestrial Code was published in 1968. The Terrestrial Code is
reviewed on an annual basis, with new editions adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates of
OIE members each year in May. The latest edition was adopted in May 2013.102
2.4.5.3 Objectives of the Terrestrial Code
2.53. The aim of the Terrestrial Code is to set international "standards for the improvement of
terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterina ry public health worldwide, including through
standards for safe international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and bees) and their
products".
103 These standards consist of health measures based on the latest available scientific
evidence104, which should be used by the veterinary authorities 105 of importing and exporting

98 The OIE has six main missions:
 To ensure transparency in the global animal disease situation;
 To collect, analyse and disseminate veterinary scientific information;
 To provide expertise and encourage international solidarity in the control of animal diseases;
 Within its mandate under the WTO SPS Agreement, to safeguard world trade by publishing
health standards for international trade in animals and animal products;
 To improve the legal framework and resources of national Veterinary Services; and
 To provide a better guarantee of food of animal origin and to promote animal welfare through a
science-based approach.
WTO, "The WTO and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_oie_e.htm>.
99 OIE, "About us", accessed 17 January 2014, <http://www.oie.int/about-us>.
100 OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 17 January 2014, <http://www.oie.int/international-
standard-setting/terrestrial-code>.
101 OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 17 January 2014, <http://www.oie.int/international-
standard-setting/terrestrial-code>. OIE's response to Panel question No. 3.
102 At the time of promulgation of S.O. 1663(E), the 20th edition of the Terrestrial Code, adopted in
May 2011, was in force. The edition of the Terrestrial Code in force at the time of the establishment of the
panel was the 21
st, adopted in May 2012. The edition of the Terrestrial Code currently in force is the 22nd,
adopted in May 2013. The determination of the relevant edition of the Terrestrial Code for the purpose of the
present dispute is discussed by the Panel in section 7.4.2.2.1.2 below.
103 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code (21st edition), para. 1.
104 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code (21st edition), para. 4.
105 According to the Glossary of the Terrestrial Code (21st edition) the term "Veterinary Authority" is
defined as "the Governmental Authority of an OIE Member, comprising veterinarians, other professionals and
para-professionals, having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of

countries to, inter alia , prevent the transfer of agents pathogenic to terrestrial animals and/or
humans via international trade in terrestrial animals and terrestrial animal products, while avoiding
unjustified sanitary barriers to trade.
106 In sum, the Terrestrial Code aspires to assure sanitary
safety of international trade in terrestrial animals while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to
trade.107
2.54. The Terrestrial Code includes a User's Guide (the Guide) to facilitate veterinary authorities'
understanding and application of the recommendations included in the Code.108 The Guide explains
that the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code are designed to prevent the disease in question
from being introduced into the importing country, taking into account the nature of the commodity
and the animal health status of the exporting country. The Guide proclaims that, correctly applied,
these recommendations provide for trade in animals and animal products to take place with an
optimal level of animal health security, based on the most up-to-date scientific information and
available techniques.
109
2.55. The Guide also clarifies that the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code make reference
only to the animal health situation in the exporting country, and assume that the disease is either
not present in the importing country or is the subject of a control or eradication programme. 110
According to the Guide, importing countries should n o t im p o s e m e a s u r e s in r e s p e c t o f d is e a s es
that occur in the importing country and that are not subject to official control or eradication
programmes.111
2.56. Further reference to the role of the Terrestri al Code (and other OIE standards) in relation to
safe trade is contained in the OIE's publication entitled "Rights and Obligations of OIE Members",
which states:
The standards in the Codes are designed to facilitate safe international trade. The
Codes are reference documents for use by veterinary authorities, aquatic animal
health authorities, those responsible for maki ng decisions on the import and export of
animals and their products, and all those involved in international trade. Correctly
applied, OIE standards provide for trade in animals and animal products to take place
with an optimal level of animal health security, based on the most up to date scientific
information and available techniques. The application of the OIE standards is the best
means of avoiding disagreements, disputes and other problems in international
trade.
112
2.4.5.4 Structure of the Terrestrial Code
2.57. The 21st edition of the Terrestrial Code, adopted in May 2012, commences with a Foreword
and the Guide. It also includes a Glossary wi th definitions of the key terms used in the
Terrestrial Code. The main text of the Terrestrial Code is divided into two volumes; each volume
contains sections, which are further divided into chapters containing a number of articles.
2.58. Volume I, entitled "General provisions", contains horizontal standards that apply to a wide
range of species, production sectors and diseases, organized into seven Sections. For instance, this

animal health and welfare measures, international veterinary certification and other standards and
recommendations in the Terrestrial Code in the whole territory".
106 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code (21st edition), para. 1.
107 OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 4 November 2013,
<http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/>. OIE's response to Panel question
No. 7(a).
108 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), User's Guide, para. A.1. OIE's response to Panel question No. 2.
109 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), User's Guide, para. A.2.
110 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), User's Guide, para. A.3.
111 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), User's Guide, para. C.3(a). OIE's response to Panel question No. 7(a).
Rights and Obligations of OIE Members, Section 1.3, accessed 23 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/Legal_rights_and_obligatio
ns/A_Rights_and_obligations_April_2013.pdf>.
112 OIE's response to Panel question No. 7(a). Rights and Obligations of OIE Members, accessed
23 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/Legal_rights_and_obligatio
ns/A_Rights_and_obligations_April_2013.pdf>.

volume includes rules on animal disease diagnosis, surveillance and notification (Section 1), risk
analysis (Section 2), quality of veterinary services (Section 3), disease prevention and control
(Section 4), trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification (Section 5).
2.59. Volume II, entitled "Recommendations applicable to OIE Listed diseases and other diseases
of importance to international trade"
113, contains standards applicable to specific diseases,
including the recommendations regarding disease surveillance and zoning and
compartmentalization. The recommendations in each of the disease chapters in Volume II of the
Terrestrial Code are "designed to prevent the disease in question being introduced into the
importing country, taking into account the nature of the commodity and the animal health status
of the exporting country".
114 This volume is organized into 15 Sections. Section 10, entitled
"Aves", deals with diseases of avian species. Chapter 10.4 is specifically devoted to "Infection with
viruses of notifiable avian influenza".
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. The United States requests that the Panel find that India's measures are inconsistent with
India's obligations under the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement. 115 In particular, in its
panel request116, the United States asserts that India's measures are inconsistent with India's
commitments and obligations under the following provisions of the SPS Agreement and the
GATT 1994:
a. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures are not applied only to
the extent necessary to protect human or animal life or health; because they are not
based upon scientific principles; and because they are maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence. Further, India's measures are not provisional measures within the
scope of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement;
b. Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate between Members where similar conditions prevail, including between
India's own territory and that of other Member s. Further, India has applied its measures
in a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade;
c. Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement because India's measures are not based on the
relevant international standards, guidelines, or recommendations of the OIE, nor are
they in accordance with Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement;
d. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures, which are not based on
the relevant international standards, are no t based upon an assessment, as appropriate
to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal, or plant life or health, taking into
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations;
e. Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement because, in failing to make an assessment of risks as
appropriate to the circumstances, India failed to take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; the prevalence of different types
of avian influenza; the existence of NAI-free areas and HPNAI-free areas; relevant
ecological and environmental conditions; and other potential options besides those
imposed by its measures;
f. Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because Indi a is maintaining arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in its appropriate levels of sanitary protection in different situations, and
these distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade;

113 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines "listed disease" in Article 1.2.3. as the list of
transmissible diseases agreed by the World Assembly of OIE Delegates and set out in Chapter 1.2 of the
Terrestrial Code (21
st edition), entitled "Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations on the
OIE List".
114 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), User's Guide, para. A.2. OIE's response to Panel question No. 2.
115 United States' first written submission, para. 236.
116 United States' request for the establishment of a panel.

g. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures are more trade-restrictive
than required to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary protection;
h. Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures are not adapted to the
sanitary characteristics of the area from which United States imports originated.
Furthermore, in failing to assess the sanitary characteristics of particular areas from
which United States imports originated, India has not taken into account disease-free
areas or areas of low disease prevalence, or the existence of eradication or control
programs. Moreover, India has not taken into account the relevant guidelines of the OIE
in assessing the sanitary characteristics of a region;
i. Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement because India's AI measures do not recognize disease-
free areas or areas of low disease prevalence;
j. Article 7 of the SPS Agreement, and Annex B, paragraphs 2 and 5(a)-(d) of the
SPS Agreement, because, inter alia , India has not provided the information on its
AI measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B, and to the extent any
notification was made, it was not made until well after these measures entered into
force. India's failure to comply with Annex B, paragraph 5 is not justified by any urgent
problem of health protection that has arisen or threatened to arise for India, and that
India has in any event failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph 6 of Annex B
of the SPS Agreement; and
k. Article XI of the GATT 1994 because India's measures constitute import prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges.
3.2. The United States further requests, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the Panel
recommend that India bring its measures into conformity with its WTO obligations.
117
3.3. India requests that "the Panel should find India's measure to be consistent with the
SPS Agreement and GATT 1994". 118 India further requests the Panel to "dismiss claims made by
the United States against India's measure under these Agreements".119
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflecte d in their executive summaries, provided to the
Panel in accordance with paragraph 33 of th e Working Procedures adopted by the Panel
(Annexes B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7 and B-8).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Guatemala, and Japan are
reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 34 of the Working
Procedures adopted by the Panel (Annexes C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5 and C-6). China, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Viet Nam did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1. On 23 May 2014, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 6 June 2014, the
United States and India each submitted written requests for the review of the Interim Report.
Neither party requested an interim review meeting. On 20 June 2014, both parties submitted
comments on each other's requests for review.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this Section of the Panel Report sets out the
Panel's response to the parties' requests for review of precise aspects of the Report made at the
interim review stage. The Panel modified aspects of its Report in the light of the parties' comments
where it considered it appropriate, as explaine d below. In addition, the Panel also corrected a

117 United States' first written submission, para. 236.
118 India's first written submission, para. 277.
119 India's first written submission, para. 277.

number of typographical and other non-substantive errors throughout the Report, including those
identified by the parties. References to sections and paragraph numbers in this Section relate to
the Interim Report, except as otherwise noted.
6.1 The purpose and scope of the interim review
6.3. Before addressing the parties' individual requests for the review of our Interim Report, the
Panel notes that a significant number of India's comments are of a general nature and address
entire sections, rather than precise aspects, of the Interim Report.
120 We also note that many of
India's comments concerning paragraphs of the Interim Report contain requests for the insertion
into the Report of lengthy recitations of the arguments and evidence submitted by India in the
course of the proceedings.
121
6.4. In this respect, the United States contends that India's interim review comments go "far
beyond seeking review of precise aspects of the [I]nterim [R]eport". According to the
United States, India "submits extensive rhetoric and demands [that] the Panel treat India's
assertions as facts that must be incorporated throughout the [F]inal [R]eport", "makes general
comments on the Panel's reasoning", and "tries to reargue various points, without making any
precise comments on specific findings in the [R]eport". The United States further argues that "a
panel report does not need to summarize, let alon e reiterate, and explicitly respond to each and
every argument or piece of evidence put forward by a party".
122 The United States expresses
substantial concerns with India's suggestion that – at the interim review stage – a party should be
allowed to redraft and reframe its arguments and have them included in the interim report.
6.5. The Panel observes that Article 15.2 of the DSU, and paragraph 35 of the Panel's Working
Procedures, provide parties with an opportunity to request the Panel "to review precise aspects of
the interim report". Previous panels have declined to expand the scope of interim review beyond
that provided for in Article 15.2 and have accordingly circumscribed their review to address only
those comments that relate to "precise aspects" of the interim report.
123 Previous panels have also
noted that it is not appropriate to re-open, at the interim review stage, arguments already put
before a panel.124
6.6. In keeping with our understanding of Ar ticle 15.2 of the DSU and consistent with the
approach adopted by previous panels, we will re view our Interim Report only in light of the
comments made by the parties which relate to "precise aspects" of the Interim Report.
6.7. Regarding India's comments asking us to insert into the Report lengthy recitations of its
arguments and evidence, we note that the Appellate Body has explained that panels need not refer
explicitly to every argument made, or each piece of evidence adduced, by the parties. 125 We thus
have the discretion to address explicitly in our reasoning only the arguments and evidence we
deem necessary to resolve a particular claim and support the reasoning we are required to
provide.126 We consider it unnecessary to include in our Report the recitations of arguments and
evidence re-submitted by India in the paragraphs listed in footnote 121 above.
6.8. We also note that India, in reference to paragraph 7.266 of our Interim Report, submits that
the Panel has failed to make an objective assessment by not taking into consideration the
Appellate Body's jurisprudence from EC – Hormones and the wording of Article 3 of the
SPS Agreement. India does not suggest any particul ar language that the Panel should include in

120 In particular, this concerns India's interim review comments with respect to Sections 7.4.2, 7.5.3.2,
7.5.4.2, 7.6.4, 7.7 and 7.8.2 of the Interim Report.
121 Specifically, India's comments on paragraphs 7.7, 7.178, 7.181, 7.186, 7.191, 7.197, 7.233, 7.236,
7.237, 7.238, 7.240, 7.248, 7.250, 7.251, 7.254, 7.262, 7.270, 7.277, 7.294, 7.313, 7.324, 7.326, 7.327,
7.375, 7.416, 7.431, 7.453, 7.493, and 7.639.
122 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, paras. 1 and 5.
123 Panel Reports, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 5.2; Australia – Salmon, para. 7.3; Japan –
Suspension, paras. 6.16-6.17; and US – Continued Suspension, paras. 6.17-6.18.
124 Panel Reports, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para. 6.2; and US – Poultry (China), para. 6.32.
125 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Poultry, para. 135; Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.288.

that paragraph. The United States disagrees with India's comments and notes that this paragraph
does not reference EC – Hormones. The Panel considers that India's comment on paragraph 7.266
does not qualify as a request to review precise aspects of our Interim Report in terms of
Article 15.2 of the DSU. In any event, the Pane l observes that the previous paragraph, i.e.
paragraph 7.265, takes into account both the Appellate Body's jurisprudence from EC – Hormones
and the wording of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement.
6.2 Factual aspects
6.9. We note that India puts forward a number of requests for review of the language in Section 2
("Factual aspects") of the Interim Report, which replicate comments submitted by India at the
stage of review of the Descriptive Part. Nonetheless, we proceed to examine India's comments
below.
6.10. Regarding paragraph 2.11, India submits that the Panel's description of LPAI does not
accurately reflect the current scientific evidence available with respect to the systemic spread of
the LPAI virus. India requests that the Panel incl ude text referring to a study in which researchers
were allegedly able to demonstrate that certain LPAI viruses can cause systemic infection and can
spread to internal organs of birds.
127 The United States objects to India's request because it has
contested this factual assertion. The Panel notes that Section 2 of the Report covers only those
facts on which the parties agree. In light of the parties' disagreement regarding the replication of
LPAI viruses, the Panel declines to make the change suggested by India.
6.11. Regarding paragraph 2.16, India submits that the Panel has not described the possibility of
the transmission of the AI virus in view of the ev idence provided by India and suggests additional
language concerning (i) the transmission of AI viruses through contaminated materials,
equipment, trays and the surface of eggs; and (ii) the possibility of cross-contamination of other
carcasses with LPNAI viruses during commercial processing of infected or contaminated carcasses.
The United States responds that some of the language suggested by India concerning the
transmission of AI viruses is already reflected in paragraph 2.16 and objects to the insertion of
further language on cross-contamination arguing that "India is trying to present its subjective
contentions as established facts".
128 The Panel notes that the language of paragraph 2.16 refers to
the transmission of AI viruses through "exposure to virus-contaminated materials, trays or surface
of eggs". With respect to the additional language on cross-contamination suggested by India, the
Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India because it refers to facts that are
contested by the parties.
6.12. Regarding paragraph 2.20, India argues that the Panel's description does not completely
reflect the possibility of the transmission of the AI virus in view of the evidence provided by India.
India therefore requests the addition of language that describes the zoonotic aspect of the LPNAI
virus and the occurrence of an LPNAI virus in China (H7N9) that "resulted in major human
fatality".
129 The United States objects to India's request and argues that India neither explains why
this information is relevant, nor provides reputable scientific authority to support its argument.
The Panel observes that in support of its suggestion, India refers to its response to Panel question
No. 4(a) citing Exhibit IND-130 with the information obtained from the official website of the WHO.
The Panel agrees with India insofar as paragraph 2.20 does not fully address instances in which
LPAI has caused complications or fatalities in humans. In fact, the Panel had referred to this
Exhibit in its findings (paragraph 7.151). Accordingly, the Panel decides to reword paragraph 2.20,
modify footnote 51 and add a new footnote 53, as follows:
Similarly, although most AI viruses do not cause disease in humans, some are
zoonotic, meaning that they can infect humans and cause disease.
[51] However,
transmission between humans appears to have occurred only on very rare,
exceptional occasions and in nearly all reported cases of human infection with AI
viruses there has been a close association with infected birds or infective carcasses.[52]
Generally, serious complications or fatal cases in humans have been reported only in
cases of infection with certain strains of HPAI viruses. Nonetheless, there have been

127 Post et al., "Systemic distribution of different low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in
chicken", Virology Journal, Vol. 10(23) (2013) (Exhibit IND-68).
128 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 11.
129 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 3.

outbreaks of LPNAI (H7N9) in China resu lting in fatalities and illness to humans. [53] In
most other cases, Iillness from infection with LPAI viruses has been clinically mild and
has ranged from focal mild signs and symptoms (e.g., conjunctivitis) to more acute
systemic illness (fever and upper respiratory trace disease) with full recovery.[54]
Footnote 51: WHO, "Avian influenza in humans", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/en/> (Exhibit US-36);
WHO, "Human infection with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus – update", accessed 30 March 2014,
<http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_07_20/en/index.html> (Exhibit IND-130).
New footnote 53: WHO, "Human infection with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus – update",
accessed 30 March 2014, < http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_07_20/en/index.html>
(Exhibit IND-130).
6.13. Regarding paragraph 2.53, India requests that the Panel include certain quotations from
Article 5.1.1 of Chapter 5.1 of the Terrestrial Code in order to reflect India's arguments concerning
the objectives of the Terrestrial Code. The United States opposes India's request and submits that,
because the interpretation of the Terrestrial Code is a matter of dispute between the parties, "any
substantive interpretations on disputed aspects of the [Terrestrial] Code belongs in the Panel's
Findings, not the descriptive part of the [R]eport". 130 The Panel observes that Section 2.4.5.3 of
the Interim Report, commencing with paragraph 2.53, addresses the objectives of the Terrestrial
Code as reflected in its Foreword and its User's Guide. Chapter 5.1 of the Terrestrial Code deals
with "[g]eneral obligations related to certificatio n". The Panel is of the view that the context of
paragraph 2.53 does not support the incorporation of quotations from Chapter 5.1 of the
Terrestrial Code.
6.14. Regarding paragraph 2.55, India requests that the Panel delete the first sentence and
replace it with certain extracts from Section C of the User's Guide. The United States objects to
India's request and reiterates that the descriptive part of the Report is not the appropriate place in
which to incorporate parties' argumentation. The Panel considers that a quote from the
User's Guide does not constitute parties' arguments. Nevertheless, we note that India does not
explain why we should delete the first sentence of paragraph 2.55 or why the insertion of extracts
from Section C of the User's Guide dealing with international veterinary health certificates is
relevant in the context of paragraph 2.55. The Panel is of the view that paragraph 2.55 accurately
summarizes the objectives of the Terrestrial Code. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make
the changes suggested by India.
6.3 Preliminary Issues
6.15. Regarding paragraph 7.4, the United States submits that the Panel did not include the text
of its "first preliminary ruling" and instead incorporated that ruling by reference. The United States
submits that the inclusion of "both preliminary rulings" is appropriate to afford the parties the
opportunity to comment on those findings and would be helpful for WTO Members and others
reading the Panel's report. The United States suggests that, in the alternative, the Panel could
append the preliminary ruling to the Report as an annex. India does not address the United States'
suggestion. The Panel is not persuaded by the arguments presented by the United States. The
reasons for the Panel's approach are clearly set out in paragraph 7.4 of the Report. Accordingly,
the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.16. Regarding paragraph 7.7, India requests that the Panel add a sentence from India's first
written submission in which India explains its understanding of the United States' claim under
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. The United Stat es opposes India's request and submits that the
Panel correctly notes the Article 2.3 claim raised by the United States. The Panel is of the view that
paragraph 7.7 accurately summarizes the arguments of India and therefore declines to make the
changes suggested by India.

130 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 13.

6.4 Whether India's AI measures are SPS measures within the scope of the
SPS Agreement
6.17. Regarding paragraphs 7.151 and 7.152, India requests the addition of information about the
recent occurrence of an LPNAI virus in China (H7N9) which, according to India, "resulted in major
human fatality".131 The United States objects to India's request and argues that (i) the information
suggested by India does not change the Panel's analysis; (ii) India's AI measures could not have
taken into account events post-dating the enactment of the measures; and (iii) India's proposal is
supported only by its own response to a Panel question. The Panel notes that it has added
pertinent information about the occurrence of H7N9 LPNAI in China to paragraph 2.20 of the
descriptive part of its Report. In addition, the Panel recalls that paragraphs 7.151 and 7.152 of the
Interim Report concern the issue of whether India's AI measures are SPS measures. In both
paragraphs, the Panel found that India's AI measures are aimed at protecting, inter alia, human
life or health from the risks related to AI viruses. We consider the addition of the information
suggested by India would not alter or benefit the Panel's analysis. The Panel thus declines to make
the changes suggested by India.
6.5 Whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement
6.18. Regarding paragraphs 7.163 and 7.165, India requests that the Panel make a number of
changes to the arguments of the United States summarized therein on the basis that the
United States "differentiated between the HPNAI and the LPNAI", and "[t]he same has not been
correctly mentioned in the Interim Report".
132 The United States opposes India's request and
submits that the paragraphs as currently drafted are correct statements concerning the
United States' position. The Panel is of the view that paragraphs 7.163 and 7.165 accurately
reflect the arguments of the United States and th erefore declines to make the changes suggested
by India.
6.19. Regarding paragraph 7.171, India requests that the Panel clarify the submission of the
United States that, according to the Terrestrial Code, "the exporting status of a territory is simply
a factor to be taken into account in ensuring that the specific recommendation is tailored to
achieve the appropriate level of protection".
133 The United States objects to India's request on the
basis that India does not specify the revision it seeks, but summarily states that the referenced
sentence is unclear. The Panel is of the view that paragraph 7.171 correctly summarizes the
arguments of the United States. Accordingly, the Panel declines India's request.
6.20. Regarding paragraph 7.178, India requests that the Panel include India's arguments that
the United States' claim under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement is limited to eggs and fresh meat
of poultry. India also submits that the Interim Report "does not correctly mention many of the
arguments made by India"
134 and thus requests that the Panel include after paragraph 7.178 nine
additional paragraphs that reproduce India's ar guments from its written submissions and oral
statements. The United States opposes India's re quests. Concerning the first suggestion made by
India, the United States submits that the change is unwarranted because the Panel addresses
India's arguments that the United States' claims were limited to fresh meat and eggs in
paragraphs 7.184, 7.193, 7.277 and 7.278 of the Interim Report. The United States argues that
India has not suggested that the Panel is incorrect or that substantive findings would be affected
or even clarified by the inclusion of the proposed text. Concerning the second suggestion made by
India, the United States argues that (i) these comments go beyond seeking interim review; (ii) the
present description in the Panel Report is adequate and correct; (iii) there is no requirement for a
panel report to repeat every argument that a party makes in a dispute; (iv) these arguments in
many instances appears to be irrelevant or undefined with respect to the issues in this dispute;
and (v) these arguments are disorganized and repetitive. With regard to India's request
concerning the scope of the United States' claim under Article 3.1, the Panel notes that India's
arguments are reflected in paragraph 7.184. The Panel considers that paragraph 7.178 accurately
summarizes India's arguments. We also refer to our decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these
reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.

131 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 7.
132 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, pp. 5-6.
133 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 8.
134 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 8.

6.21. Regarding paragraph 7.181, India submits that its argument with respect to the
interpretation of the Terrestrial Code as a treaty has not been addressed and thus requests that
the Panel include seven additional paragraphs after paragraph 7.181 that reflect India's arguments
from its written submissions and oral statements. The United States does not specifically address
India's request. However, in the context of its comment on India's suggestions for
paragraph 7.178, the United States submits that India has not explained why it is necessary to
determine whether the Terrestrial Code is a treaty and how this would change the Panel's analysis.
The Panel considers that paragraph 7.181 adequately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel
also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make
the changes suggested by India.
6.22. Regarding paragraph 7.186, India asserts that it responded in its submissions to the
United States' argument concerning the explicit prohibitions contained in the Terrestrial Code.
India submits that this response "has not been correctly mentioned in the [I]nterim [R]eport"
135,
and requests that the Panel include four addition al paragraphs after paragraph 7.186 that reflect
India's arguments from its written submissions and oral statements. The United States does not
specifically address India's request. The Panel considers that paragraph 7.186 adequately
summarizes India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For
these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.23. Regarding paragraph 7.191, India asserts that it responded in its submission to the
United States' argument that "importing from zones/compartments is condition[ed] on the
fulfillment [sic] of certain obligation[s] under the SPS Agreement". India argues that this "has not
been correctly mentioned in the [I]nterim [R]eport".
136 India therefore requests that the Panel add
to paragraph 7.191 three additional sentences that reflect certain arguments from India's first
written submission. The United States opposes In dia's request and submits that India does not
explain why this Section of the Panel Report should recite this argument, noting that such a
recitation in this Section of the Report "would be off point and confusing".
137 The Panel considers
that paragraph 7.191 adequately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its
decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by India.
6.24. Regarding paragraph 7.193, India submits that "the Panel has not examined whether the
United States has raised specific claims with respect to each poultry product and how India's
measure for each of such poultry product does not conform/based on the [Terrestrial] Code". 138
The United States disagrees with India and submit s that in Sections 7.4.2.2.3 and 7.4.2.2.4, the
Panel makes the appropriate examination, including by explicitly considering each of the products
referenced in S.O. 1663(E) with respect to the Terrestrial Code. The Panel refers to
paragraph 7.193 and observes that the scope of the products at issue is addressed expressly
therein, as well as by cross-reference to the Panel's Preliminary Ruling of 22 May 2013.
6.25. Regarding paragraph 7.197, India requests that the Panel add several sentences
summarising India's arguments with respect to the interpretation of Article 3 of the
SPS Agreement. The United States objects to In dia's request and submits that India does not
explain the basis for its request. The United States also notes that this paragraph (and those that
immediately follow) contains the Panel's application of the Appellate Body's findings, such that
there is no reason for or benefit to incorporation into this paragraph of a description of India's
arguments. The Panel observes that paragraph 7.197 constitutes part of the Panel's analysis of
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. India's arguments with respect to the United States' claim under
Article 3.1 are appropriately summarized in Section 7.4.1.2. Accordingly, the Panel declines to
make the changes suggested by India.
6.26. Regarding paragraph 7.205, India requests that the Panel add a number of sentences that
would appear to criticize the Panel's interpre tation and analysis under Article 3 of the
SPS Agreement and its use of the panel and Appellate Body reports in EC – Hormones and the
Appellate Body report in EC – Sardines . The United States opposes India's request and submits
that the reasoning cited by the Panel is directly on point. The Panel considers that the context of

135 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 15.
136 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 16.
137 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 33.
138 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 17.

paragraph 7.205 does not support the incorporation of the language proposed by India.
Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the suggested changes.
6.27. Regarding paragraph 7.233, India submits that its arguments with respect to the
interpretation of the Terrestrial Code "have not been correctly mentioned" 139 by the Panel. India
thus requests that the Panel add a number of sentences to paragraph 7.233 which reflect certain
of India's arguments in its written submissions and oral statements. The United States objects to
India's request and argues that "[n]ot only is a lengthy recitation regarding India's views
unnecessary, but the precise language proffered by India go well beyond India's own arguments
regarding the [Terrestrial] Code and delves into what it views as being the position of the
United States and the OIE".
140 The Panel considers that paragraph 7.233 adequately summarizes
India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its de cision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons,
the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.28. Regarding paragraph 7.236, India requests that the Panel add eleven paragraphs in order to
correctly reflect its arguments with respect to the interpretation of Article 10.4.1.10 of the
Terrestrial Code. The United States opposes India's request and submits that such addition is
unnecessary in order to properly capture India's argument, and that the proposed text does not
clarify or assist in better understanding the subsequent findings made by the Panel. The Panel
considers that paragraph 7.236 accurately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel also refers to
its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these re asons, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by India.
6.29. Regarding paragraphs 7.237 and 7.238, India requests that the Panel add respectively three
and four paragraphs in order to correctly reflec t India's arguments in response to the opinions
expressed by the OIE concerning the interpretation of Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code and
concerning whether restrictions recommended by Te rrestrial Code are explicitly provided therein.
The United States opposes India's request and submits that India has not specified where the
Panel incorrectly reflected India's arguments, or how these additions would resolve any supposed
misstatements. The Panel notes that paragraphs 7.237 and 7.238 describe the clarifications
provided by the OIE with respect to the interpreta tion of Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code
and not the comments of the parties in this rega rd. The Panel observes that India's disagreement
with the opinion of the OIE is evident in the paragraphs preceding paragraphs 7.237 and 7.238.
The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel does not
find it appropriate to include India's proposed additional language and thus declines to make the
changes suggested by India.
6.30. Regarding paragraph 7.240, India requests that the Panel add a number of sentences to the
end of the paragraph in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to its
understanding of the product-specific recommendation in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. The
United States opposes India's request and argues that India fails to explain why these additional
sentences are necessary, and that India ignores that the Panel has recounted India's arguments
on these points through the proposed additions in paragraphs 7.183 and 7.185. The Panel
observes that paragraph 7.240 is intended to briefly describe India's arguments with respect to the
product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. Other arguments made
by India in this regard are summarized in Section 7.4.1.2. Accordingly, the Panel declines to make
the changes suggested by India.
6.31. Regarding paragraph 7.248, India requests that the Panel delete two sentences and replace
them with three paragraphs in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to the
product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. The United States
objects to India's request and submits that the Pa nel's description of India's position is correct,
and notes that the existing language simply restates India's position from the preceding
paragraph, which quotes or directly tracks the la nguage in India's submissions. The United States
adds that "the revisions India proposes go far beyond the precise point that the Panel is
paraphrasing from the preceding paragraph".
141 The Panel considers that paragraph 7.248
summarizes the element of India's argument that is relevant to the discussion in that Section of
the Interim Report. Other relevant arguments made by India in that regard are accurately

139 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 18.
140 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 41.
141 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 46.

summarized in Section 7.4.1.2. Accordingly, the Pa nel declines to make the changes suggested by
India.
6.32. Regarding paragraph 7.250, India submit s that the summary of the opinion of the OIE
provided in the paragraph "does not mention the comments of India on the OIE's opinion".142 India
therefore requests that the Panel include five additional paragraphs after paragraph 7.250
summarizing India's comments on the responses of the OIE and the individual experts. The
United States opposes India's request and argues that the Panel is not required to include India's
arguments whenever it makes reference to the OIE in its analysis. The Panel notes that
paragraph 7.250 sets out the OIE's interpretation of Article 10.4.19 of the Terrestrial Code and not
the comments of the parties. The Panel also notes that the summary of India's arguments
provided in the paragraphs preceding paragrap hs 7.250 illu strates India's disa greement with the
OIE. The Panel therefore declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.33. Regarding paragraph 7.251
143, the United States suggests the inclusion of a statement to
make clear that the Panel has made its own assessment of the meaning of the Terrestrial Code.
India disagrees and submits that the Panel has not undertaken a "review and assessment of the
Terrestrial Code". India argues that it "had provided significant material and references to other
chapters of the [Terrestrial] Code explaining why the [United States'] argument and OIE's
agreement with the same was misleading".
144 According to India, the Panel did not consider these
arguments. The Panel observes that paragraph 7. 251 provides that the Panel "examined the text
of each of the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4" and that paragraph 7.252
describes the Panel's understanding of the relevant product-specific recommendations. In our
view, it is evident from the text and the context of these paragraphs that the Panel has made its
own assessment regarding the meaning of the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4
of the Terrestrial Code. Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the
United States.
6.34. Regarding paragraph 7.251, India requests that the Panel include eight additional
paragraphs in order to correctly reflect India's arguments regarding the OIE's interpretation of the
product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. The United States does
not respond to India's request. The Panel notes that neither paragraph 7.251 nor the subsequent
paragraphs in that Section are intended to serve the purpose of summarizing the parties'
arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the
Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.35. Regarding paragraph 7.252, India submits that the Panel has not analysed India's
arguments regarding Article 10.4.5 of the Terrestrial Code. India requests that the Panel address
these arguments in its analysis. The United States opposes India's request and submits that it fails
to see what changes India seeks in the Interim Report. The United States also points out that India
does not cite the specific submission in which this argument is made, or otherwise explains the
value of this argument in the context of paragrap h 7.252. The Panel agrees with the United States
and further notes that paragraph 7.252 contains the Panel's analysis of the product-specific
recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and is not intended to serve the purpose
of addressing the parties' arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above.
For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.36. Regarding paragraphs 7.254 and 7.262, In dia requests that the Panel add a number of
sentences at the end of these paragraphs in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with
respect to zones and compartments as referred to in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. The
United States opposes India's request on the basis that "India requests the inclusion of an
irrelevant argument".
145 The Panel notes that India's arguments with respect to zones and
compartments are already summarized in paragraph 7.191 of the Interim Report. The Panel also
refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the
changes suggested by India. Regarding paragrap h 7.269, India submits that the Panel's reliance
on EC – Sardines is "misconstrued" because "the decision was made in the context of a different
agreement"; namely, the TBT Agreement, "while on the same issue guidance is already

142 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 25.
143 The United States erroneously refers to 7.521.
144 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 10.
145 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 55.

available"146 in the Appellate Body's report in EC – Hormones. The United States does not respond
to India's request. The Panel observes that the Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Sardines is relevant
in the present dispute for the reasons explained in paragraph 7.269 of the Interim Report.
6.37. Regarding paragraph 7.270, India requests that the Panel add several sentences in order to
correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to zones and compartments as referred to in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. The United States opposes India's request for the same
reasons it noted with respect to paragraphs 7.191, 7.525, and 7.262. The Panel notes that India's
arguments with respect to zones and compartmen ts are already summarized in paragraph 7.191
of the Interim Report. Moreover, the Panel observes that paragraph 7.270 is not intended to serve
the purpose of summarizing the parties' arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in
paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by
India.
6.6 Whether India's AI measures are inconsis tent with Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
6.38. Regarding paragraph 7.277, India requests that the Panel add one paragraph after
paragraph 7.277 in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to the order of
analysis under Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. The United States opposes India's
request and submits that this paragraph is drafted in a manner that accurately captures the
United States' claims and the order of analysis decided upon by the Panel. The Panel notes that
paragraph 7.277 is not directed to the parties' arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in
paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by
India.
6.39. Regarding paragraph 7.294, India submits that the Panel has not correctly summarized its
arguments with respect to Article 5.1 of the SP S Agreement. India therefore requests that the
Panel include two additional paragraphs after paragraph 7.294 that reflect certain paragraphs of
India's first written submission. The United States objects to India's request and submits that the
Panel has accurately captured India's response to the United States' claims under Articles 5.1 and
5.2 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel is of the view that paragraph 7.294 accurately summarizes
India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its de cision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons,
the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.40. Regarding paragraph 7.313, India submits that this paragraph does not correctly reflect
India's arguments regarding the Australian risk a ssessment. India requests that the Panel add to
paragraph 7.313 several corrections and additional sentences related to Australia's risk
assessment. The United States opposes India's request and submits that the Interim Report
correctly notes that India did not argue that its measures are based on the Australian risk
assessment. The Panel considers that paragraph 7.313 accurately summarizes India's arguments.
The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines
to make the changes suggested by India.
6.41. Regarding paragraphs 7.324, 7.326 and 7.327, India submits that these paragraphs do not
correctly reflect India's arguments regarding Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. India requests that
the Panel add a number of sentences and / or paragraphs to each paragraph summarizing certain
of India's arguments from its written submissions. The United States objects to India's request and
submits that India's proposed inclusions are not relevant to the Panel's analysis or findings in the
subsequent paragraphs. The Panel is of the view that paragraphs 7.324, 7.326 and 7.327
accurately reflect India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above.
For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.7 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the
SPS Agreement
6.42. Regarding paragraph 7.372, India requests that the Panel add two sentences in order to
correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to its assertion that LPNAI is exotic to India. The
United States opposes India's request on the basis that the first proposed addition amounts to an

146 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 31.

oversimplification and incomplete presentation of the United States' arguments, and that the
second proposed addition does not accurately describe India's arguments. The Panel considers that
paragraph 7.372 accurately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in
paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by
India.
6.43. Regarding paragraph 7.375, India requests that the Panel add three paragraphs after that
paragraph in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to India's AI status and the
study by Pawar et al. The United States oppose s India's request and submits that the proposed
additions are unnecessary. The United States also submits that India had the opportunity to
summarize its arguments in executive summaries, which are included as an annex to the Interim
Report. The Panel is of the view that paragraph 7.375 accurately summarizes India's arguments.
The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines
to make the changes suggested by India.
6.44. Regarding paragraph 7.406, the United States observes that this paragraph states that the
NAP 2006 was promulgated pursuant to the Preventi on and Control of Infe ctious and Contagious
Disease in Animals Act, 2009. The United States notes that the Act post-dates the NAP 2006 by
three years. Accordingly, the United States sugg ests that the reference to the Prevention and
Control of Infectious and Contagious Disease in Animals Act, 2009 be removed. India disagrees
with the United States' suggestion and submits that the NAP 2012 was issued pursuant to the
Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contag ious Disease in Animals Act, 2009. India thus
proposes that the paragraph be modified such that the paragraph makes clear that the NAP 2012
was issued pursuant to this Act. The Panel agrees with India and modifies paragraph 7.406 as
follows:
The NAP was first issued in 2006 by India' s DAHD pursuant to the Prevention and
Control of Infectious and Contagious Disease in Animals Act 2009. [726] A revised
version was issued in 2012 (NAP 2012) pursuant to the Prevention and Control of
Infectious and Contagious Disease in Animals Act, 2009.[727]
6.45. Regarding paragraphs 7.412 to 7.425, India asserts that the Panel did not take into account
India's argument regarding the role of migratory flyways in introducing infections in poultry, and
regarding surveillance in wild and migratory birds. India requests that the Panel address these
arguments in its final report. The United States opposes India's request and submits that
arguments mentioned by India are irrelevant because the cited paragraphs deal with the adequacy
of India's surveillance regime. The Panel consider s that the arguments mentioned by India are not
relevant in the context of the cited paragraphs. The Panel also refers to its decision in
paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by
India.
6.46. Regarding paragraph 7.416, India requests that the Panel add two paragraphs after that
paragraph in order to correctly reflect India's arguments with respect to the opinions of the Panel's
individual experts concerning India's AI surveillance regime. The United States objects to India's
request and submits that India is seeking to have the paragraphs included in the middle of text
setting out the Panel's analysis, not in the portion of the Panel Report reciting the parties'
arguments, with the effect that these statemen ts would "be interpreted as conclusions of the
Panel, not as arguments of India".
147 The Panel notes that neither paragraph 7.416 nor the
subsequent paragraphs in that Section are intended to serve the purpose of summarizing the
parties' arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these
reasons, the Panel declines to adopt India's proposal.
6.47. Regarding paragraphs 7.417 and 7.418, the United States requests that the Panel clarify
and provide additional support for the Panel's assessment of whether India's domestic surveillance
regime is capable of reliably detecting LPNAI beca use, in the United States' view, this is a key
factual issue in this dispute. As an example, the United States proposes to include three
paragraphs setting out additional findings betw een paragraphs 7.417 and 7.418. India objects to
the United States' request and disagrees with the content of the United States' proposal on the
basis that they are "not consistent in view of the evidence at hand".
148 The Panel is of the view

147 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 71.
148 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 3.

that its analysis of whether India's surveillance regime is adequate to detect LPNAI is sufficient and
does not require further clarification. The Panel thus declines to make the changes suggested by
the United States.
6.48. Regarding paragraph 7.418, the United States submits that while India's exhibits illustrate
its surveillance regime, they do not "describe" that regime, and the regime is described in the NAP
2012. The United States therefore proposes that the word "describe" be replaced with the word
"illustrate". India does not respond to the United States proposal. The Panel has decided to accept
the proposed modification of the text in paragraph 7.418, and has thus replaced the word
"describe" with the word "illustrate".
6.49. Regarding paragraph 7.423, the United States requests that the Panel indicate more clearly
that it made its own assessment of whether India's domestic surveillance regime is capable of
reliably detecting LPNAI, by stating that the Panel "has reviewed the evidence and has come to the
same conclusion as the three individual experts".
149 India disagrees with the United States'
suggestion and argues that the sentence as propos ed by the United States is highly misleading,
because "[w]hether the Panel agrees with the individual experts and in what aspects should be left
to the judgment of the Panel and not to the complaining party". 150 The Panel observes that
paragraph 7.423 provides that "we cannot conclude, on the basis of the evidence before us, that
the surveillance regime that exists under India's NAP 2012 is adequate to reliably detect LPNAI".
In our view, it is evident from the text and the context of this paragraph that the Panel has made
its assessment, based on the evidence before it, as to whether India's domestic surveillance
regime is capable of reliably detecting LPNAI. We are also not persuaded that the mere statement
that the Panel has made its own review and assessment of evidence would have added clarity to
the Panel's analysis in this regard. Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested
by the United States.
6.50. Regarding paragraphs 7.430 to 7.436, India submits that the Panel's analysis does not take
into account the argument of India that a numbe r of countries take domestic control measures
similar to those maintained by India which are, according to India, "also permitted by the
[Terrestrial] Code".
151 The United States submits that the Panel does not need to set out these
arguments, because "[a]n objective assessment of the evidence [does] not require consideration
of arguments, such as this, that are legally irrelevant".
152 The Panel considers that the arguments
mentioned by India are not relevant in the contex t of the cited paragraphs. The Panel also refers
to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by India.
6.51. Regarding paragraph 7.431, India suggests that the Panel change the order in which India's
arguments appear in order to correctly reflect those arguments. The United States submits that
India's arguments, as summarized in paragraph 7.431, "accurately capture[] the order of India's
arguments in paragraphs 210-212 of India's First Written Submission".
153 The Panel considers that
paragraph 7.431 accurately summarizes India's ar guments and therefore declines to make the
changes suggested by India.
6.52. Regarding paragraph 7.433, the United States suggests the addition of a sentence in order
to highlight that the statements of Indian officials confirm that there is no avenue available for a
Member notifying NAI to demonstrate that certai n exports of its products do not pose an NAI-
related risk. India opposes the United States' suggestion and submits that the proposed statement
"is misleading as the Panel has not relied on th e statements made by the Indian officials to
ascertain that S.O. 1663 provides for prohibition". 154 The Panel does not consider that the
sentence proposed by the United States is useful in the context of paragraph 7.433. Accordingly,
the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.

149 United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 8.
150 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 4.
151 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 40.
152 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 74.
153 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 75.
154 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 5.

6.53. Regarding paragraph 7.434, the United States suggests adding language at the end of the
paragraph to show that "India has categorically refused" 155 to engage in efforts to assess the
measures applied by its trading partners that aim to address AI outbreaks within their territories.
India objects to the United States' suggestion and submits that the proposed statement "is
misleading and factually incorrect as the United States has not provided any evidence as per which
the United States has communicated the details of its control and containment procedure to India
and subsequently had asked India to evaluate the same".
156 The Panel is of the view that the
sentence proposed by the United States is not useful in the context of paragraph 7.434.
Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.54. Regarding paragraphs 7.444 and 7.445, the United States suggests amendments to make
clearer that the Panel has made its own assessment of the evidence concerning the opinions of the
individual experts. India disagrees with the Un ited States' suggestions and submits that the
proposed modifications "are highly misleading", and that "[w]hether the Panel agrees with the
individual experts and in what aspects should be left to the judgment of the Panel and not to the
complaining party".157 The Panel observes that paragraphs 7.444 and 7.445 contain the Panel's
summary of the experts' views. The Panel's own conclusions, based on its assessment and on the
experts' views as summarized Section 7.6.4.2.1.2, are contained in paragraphs 7.454 and 7.455.
Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.55. Regarding paragraph 7.453, India requests that the Panel add several sentences in order to
correctly reflect its arguments with respect to the opinions of Professor Brown and Dr Guan
concerning the study by Pawar et al. The United States opposes India's request and submits that
paragraph 7.453 does not set out the arguments made by India, and therefore it would be
inappropriate to include a listing of India's arguments in this paragraph. The United States adds
that India's proposed language is phrased in a mann er that could lead it to be interpreted as part
of the Panel's assessments, rather than argument by India. The Panel does not consider that
paragraph 7.453 is the appropriate place to include the parties' arguments. The Panel also refers
to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by India.
6.56. Regarding paragraph 7.454, the United States suggests the addition of one sentence to this
paragraph in order to make clearer that the Panel has made its own assessment of the evidence
submitted by India and the opinions of the in dividual experts. India disagrees with the
United States suggestion and submits that the pr oposed modifications "are highly misleading".
According to India, "[w]hether the Panel agrees with the individual experts and in what aspects
should be left to the judgment of the Panel and not to the complaining party".
158 The Panel is of
the view that the text and context of paragrap h 7.454 indicate that the Panel has reached its
conclusions based on the evidence before it. Acco rdingly, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by the United States.
6.57. Regarding paragraph 7.457, the United States suggests certain revisions to the first three
sentences in order to make clearer that the Panel has made its own assessment of the evidence.
The United States further proposes that the Panel insert a new paragraph after paragraph 7.457,
which provides that "India's imposition of LPNAI-based import prohibitions would constitute
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination even if LPNAI were exotic to India". The United States
submits that such "findings" would assist the Appe llate Body in the event of appellate review "by
setting out further the Panel's analysis".
159 India objects to the United States' suggestion and
argues that the proposed changes "add[] a new aspect to the analysis of the Panel in the [I]nterim
[R]eport which was not there earlier", and that th is "cannot be proposed by the complaining party
as it is the prerogative of the Panel to decide how to base its findings in the [I]nterim [R]eport". 160
The Panel is of the view that it is evident from the text and the context of paragraph 7.457 that
the Panel has reached its conclusion based on the evidence before it. The Panel also considers that
the additional findings proposed by the United St ates are not necessary for the Panel to discharge
its obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, or to assist the DSB to

155 United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 10.
156 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 6.
157 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 6.
158 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 7.
159 United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 14.
160 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 8.

make the recommendations or rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Accordingly, the
Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.58. Regarding paragraph 7.460, the United States submits that the discussion of the
relationship between elements of claims under Ar ticle 5.5 and Article 2.3 in this paragraph is
unnecessary to the Panel's analysis. The United States also posits that the Panel's discussion could
give rise to confusion about whether the presence or absence of arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in ALOPs for purposes of Article 5.5 has necessary consequences for an analysis of
whether similar conditions prevail or there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
products for purposes of Article 2.3. For the United States, the Panel's analysis appears to
overstate the definitiveness with which the panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada)
treated dissimilarities in disease status when considering similarity of conditions for the purpose of
Article 2.3. The United States suggests making certain revisions to the text of paragraph 7 in order
to address this. India disagrees with the United States' suggestion and argues that it is contrary to
the observation of the panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) and "misstates that
panel's position entirely". According to India, "[t] he United States would like the Panel to ignore
the significance of the absence of a disease and its relevance to the disease status of a particular
country" as highlighted by the Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) panel, "which clearly
amounts to an erroneous understanding of the panel's ruling in that case".
161 The Panel disagrees
with the United States' interpretation of paragraph 7.460. As noted in that paragraph, the Panel is
concerned with whether factors considered in an analysis under Article 5.5 can also be considered
in an analysis under Article 2.3. As also noted in that paragraph, the Panel is concerned with what
may constitute a relevant "condition" for the purp ose of Article 2.3. For these reasons, the Panel
does not share the United States' concern and thus declines to adopt the changes proposed by the
United States.
6.59. Regarding paragraph 7.467, the United States suggests that the panel report in Australia –
Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) should not be read as categorically as the first sentence of this
paragraph would suggest, and that this sentence is unnecessary. According to the United States, if
the relevant disease is present only in one regi on of a country (such as, in the case of the
United States, Hawaii), then similar or identical conditions may well prevail between the rest of the
country and the other Member. Accordingly, the United States suggests making certain revisions
to the text of paragraph 7.467. India disagrees with the United States' suggestion and submits
that "the United States has not taken this line of argument till date and thus cannot be allowed to
argue the same now". According to India, the United States confuses the difference in disease
situation of two countries as required for an anal ysis under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement with
maintaining zones/compartment for the purpose of trade under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement,
which are "two different obligations and each is independent of the other and addresses different
issues".
162 The Panel agrees with the United States in that the presence of a disease in one
country, but its absence in another, will not always mean that identical or similar conditions do not
exist between those countries. The Panel does not agree, however, that the sentence to which the
United States refers is unnecessary. The Panel therefore makes the following adjustment to the
first sentence of paragraph 7.467:
We agree with India that the panel report in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 –
Canada) supports the notion that if the relevant disease is present in one country but
not in another, this may be an indication that identical or similar conditions will do not
exist in the event that the relevant disease is present in one country but not in
another.
6.60. Regarding footnote 838, the United States suggests that the Panel distinguish the
conclusion of the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon on the additional basis that "there is simply
no double-counting involved in the Panel's analysis". 163 India opposes the United States'
suggestion and submits that it is "factually incorr ect". According to India, it is incorrect "[t]o
suggest that the breach of Article 2.3 is also a breach of Article 5.5" 164 of the SPS Agreement. The
Panel is of the view that the change suggested by the United States is not necessary in the context
of this footnote.

161 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, pp. 8-9.
162 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 9.
163 United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 19.
164 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, pp. 9-10.

6.61. Regarding paragraph 7.477, the United States requests that the Panel replace "poultry
products" with "agricultural products" in the second sentence of the paragraph to make clear that
this statement is referring to all products covered by India's AI measures. India does not object
the United States' request, but proposes clarifying the statement by referring to "agricultural
products as covered under S.O. 1663(E)". The Panel observes that the purpose of this passage is
to recall the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.457 of the Interim Report, namely, that "the
discrimination India maintains, through its AI measures, against foreign products on account of
LPNAI is arbitrary and unjustifiable contrary to Ar ticle 2.3 of the SPS Agreement". In light of the
relationship between these paragraphs, the Panel amends the second sentence of paragraph 7.477
as follows:
We recall our finding in paragraph 7.457 that India's AI measures arbitrarily and
unjustifiably discriminate against foreign poultry products.
6.8 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Article 5.6 and, consequently,
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
6.62. Regarding paragraph 7.493, India requests that the Panel add several sentences in order to
correctly reflect its arguments that the United States' claim under Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement is limited to eggs and fresh meat of poultry from countries notifying LPNAI. The
United States opposes India's request for the reasons identified in the United States' comments on
India's requests for review of paragraphs 7.17 8 and 7.193. The Panel considers that paragraph
7.493 accurately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel also refers to its decision in
paragraph 6.7 above, and its Preliminary Ruling of 22 May 2013. For these reasons, the Panel
declines to make the changes suggested by India.
6.63. Regarding paragraph 7.580, the United States requests that the Panel make two changes to
this paragraph. First, the United States requests the deletion of the sentence in which the Panel
interprets the OIE's explanation that its standards facilitate "safe trade" as meaning trade
undertaken pursuant to those standards is "free from risk". The United States expresses concern
that this statement implies that the OIE's recommendations embody a level of zero risk. Second,
the United States suggests clarifying that the Terrestrial Code provides that this safe level of trade
is achieved irrespective of the AI status of the exporting country. India objects to the
United States' request and submits that the "argument of the United States is misleading".
According to India, "there are only few reco mmendation as per which the AI status of the
exporting country is not relevant. For all other recommendations, the status of the exporting
country is relevant and the same is also affirmed through Article 5.1.1.2 of the … Terrestrial
Code".
165 The Panel does not share the United States' concern regarding potential
misinterpretation of this passage and declin es to make the changes suggested by the
United States.
6.9 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the
SPS Agreement
6.64. Regarding paragraph 7.626, the United States requests that the Panel add language from its
submissions in which the United States highlighted statements by Indian officials that India would
not consider applying its AI measures to only some parts of an exporting country. India disagrees
with the United States' suggestion and submits that it "is misleading as the Panel has not relied on
the statements made by the Indian official s to ascertain that S.O. 1663 provides for
prohibition".166 The Panel observes that the United States' arguments are summarized in
paragraphs 7.621 and 7.622. The Panel considers that paragraph 7.626 accurately summarizes the
United States' arguments and thus declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.65. Regarding paragraph 7.639, India requests that the Panel add one paragraph after
paragraph 7.639 in order to correctly reflect its arguments with respect to its stated ALOP and its
assertion that "should an exporting country make a proposal for zones/compartments, the same
would be considered by the Central Government pursuant to Section 3 and 3A of the Livestock
Act".
167 The United States opposes India's request and submits that India had the opportunity to

165 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 11.
166 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 11.
167 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 42.

summarize its arguments in executive summaries, which are included as an annex to the Interim
Report. The United States also submits that India's proposed paragraph contains its arguments in
response to the United States' point, on which the Panel did not rely in the Interim Report. The
Panel is of the view that paragraph 7.639 accu rately summarizes India's arguments. The Panel
also refers to its decision in paragraph 6.7 above. For these reasons, the Panel declines to make
the changes suggested by India.
6.66. Regarding paragraph 7.675, the United States notes that this paragraph's description of
Article 6.1 may include statements that are more categorical than necessary to support the Panel's
conclusions, and that could give rise to misinterpretation. The United States submits that in some
circumstances, a Member may be able to satisfy its obligations under Article 6.1 by adapting a
measure that has already been taken in light of information supplied by an exporting Member. The
United States therefore suggests a number of revi sions to the text of paragraph 7.675. India
disagrees with the United States' suggestion and submits that the proposed deletion removes the
reasoning of the Panel behind its conclusion. The Panel observes that its reasoning in paragraph
7.675 is based on the wording of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel also notes that its
observations in paragraph 7.675 are appropriately qualified by the language of paragraph 7.676,
in which the Panel discusses the relationship between Article 6.1 and the provision of information
by an exporter pursuant to Article 6.3. Accord ingly, the Panel declines to make the changes
suggested by the United States.
6.67. Regarding paragraph 7.693, the United States requests that the Panel add that the
United States' made arguments based both on the phrasing of the measure and statements of
Indian officials. India objects to the United States' request and submits that the proposed
"statement is misleading as the Panel has not relied on the statements made by the Indian officials
to ascertain that S.O. 1663 provides for prohibition".
168 The Panel notes that the United States'
arguments regarding the comments of Indian officials are described in footnote 1165. The Panel
therefore declines the United States' request.
6.68. Regarding paragraph 7.704, the United States notes that the final sentence of this
paragraph may go further than necessary to support the Panel's conclusion, which could give rise
to misinterpretation. The United States proposes certain revisions in order to avoid a suggestion
that there are no aspects of the obligation in the first sentence of Article 6.1, "including the
obligation to recognize specific disease free areas", which could be accomplished by means of a
separate measure. India disagrees with the United States' proposal and submits that "the Panel's
original language is germane to its finding of what amounts to recognizing the concept of
regionalization".
169 The Panel observes that its analysis in paragraph 7.704 is based on the
wording of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreemen t. Moreover, the Panel does not share the
United States' view that its analysis suggests that "there are no aspects of the obligation in the
first sentence of Article 6.1 … which could be accomplished by means of a separate measure".
170
Accordingly, the Panel declines to make the changes suggested by the United States.
6.69. Regarding paragraph 7.705, India requests that the Panel delete the reference in the third
sentence to India not disputing in substance the evidence referred to in the paragraph. India
submits that in its second written submission, it disputed the portrayal of its statement made on
zoning at the OIE and explained that this statemen t was made only with reference to wild life and
its epidemiological role in the spread of disease. The United States objects to India's request and
submits that paragraph 7.705 accurately characterizes India's arguments. The United States notes
that India's argument is addressed in the next sentence. The Panel notes that paragraph 7.705
contains the description of India's statement re garding zoning. The Panel is of the view that
paragraph 7.705 accurately summarizes India's ar guments and therefore declines to make the
changes suggested by India.
6.70. Regarding paragraph 7.707, India requests that the Panel replace "India's AI measures"
with "S.O. 1663(E)" in order to correctly reflect India's arguments. The United States opposes
India's request and submits that paragraph 7.707 "i s not one that recites arguments by India, but
is instead one setting forth a conclusion of the Panel".
171 The United States argues that the

168 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 11.
169 India's comments on United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 11.
170 United States' comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 28.
171 United States' comments on India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 82.

proposed addition is contrary to the Panel's definition of the measures at issue in this dispute. The
Panel agrees that paragraph 7.707 does not concern the recitation of the parties' arguments. The
Panel also recalls its findings in its Preliminary Ruling of 22 May 2013 that the measures at issue
are India's AI measures, which include those meas ures that prohibit the importation of various
agricultural products into India from those countries reporting NAI. Accordingly, the Panel declines
to make the changes suggested by India.
6.71. Regarding paragraph 7.715, India comments that the Panel in its analysis has come to the
conclusion that the Livestock Act "provides a scope to the Indian authorities to recognize the
disease and pest free concepts", while S.O. 1663(E) "rather than recognizing the same, prohibit[s]
it". India interprets this to mean that "that the violation in the opinion of the Panel is due to
S.O. 1663(E) and not due to the Livestock Act. India thus requests the Panel "to clearly specify
that the Indian measure which has led to the violation is S.O. 1663(E)".
172 The United States
objects to India's request and submits that India's AI measures, as a whole, breach Articles 6.1
and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, in the United States view, it was proper for the Panel
to refer to "India's AI measures" in paragraph 7.715 and in the other paragraphs of
Section 7.9.2.6. The Panel's findings in paragraph 7.715 and in the other paragraphs of Section
7.9.2.6 concern India's AI measures as a whole and not only S.O. 1663(E). Accordingly, the Panel
declines to make the changes suggested by India.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Preliminary Issues
7.1.1 First request for a preliminary ruling by India
7.1. On 4 March 2013, India submitted to the Panel a request for a preliminary ruling concerning
the consistency of the United States' panel request with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
173
7.2. On 22 May 2013, the Panel issued a preliminary ruling to the parties and third parties. After
consulting the parties to the dispute, the Panel decided to inform the DSB of the content of its
preliminary ruling. The ruling was circulated on 28 June 2013 as document WT/DS430/5.
7.3. In its preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, the Panel made the following findings:
4.1 The Panel preliminarily concludes as follows:
a. the panel request is sufficiently precise in identifying S.O. 1663(E) as a
specific measure at issue as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU, insofar as
S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of various agricultural products
into India from those countries reporting NAI (both HPNAI and LPNAI);
b. the listing of the products prohibited by S.O. 1663(E) in paragraph 3 of
the panel request together with the reference to "these products"
immediately following that listing do not suggest that the United States
intended to limit its challenge to those products;
c. the word "orders" included in the panel request does not render the
panel request inconsistent with the specificity requirement of Article 6.2
of the DSU, and it does not prejudice the ability of India to defend itself;
d. under the circumstances, there can be no uncertainty on India's part at
this stage of the proceedings as to whether the United States is
challenging measures that were not in force as of the date of the
panel request. The United States is challenging only the measures that
were in force as of the date of the panel request, namely 11 May 2012;
and

172 India's comments on the Interim Report of the Panel, p. 43.
173 Details on the procedural aspects can be found in section 1.3.

e. the panel request has not failed to provide a brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly in respect
of the claims under Articles 2.3, 5.5 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
4.2 The Panel declines to provide a preliminary ruling at this time with respect to
certain matters raised by India. Specifically, the Panel considers that:
a. in the circumstances of the present case, it is premature and indeed
unnecessary to make a determination in the abstract, at this preliminary
stage, as to precisely which measures fall within the Panel's terms of
reference by virtue of the inclusion of the terms "related measures, or
implementing measures" in the panel request. The Panel will revisit this
issue in the course of these proceedings should a relevant challenge
arise; and
b. it is premature for us to make a determination, in the abstract, as to
whether any "orders" not specifically listed in the panel request fall within
the Panel's terms of reference. The Panel will revisit this issue in the
course of these proceedings should a relevant challenge arise.
4 . 3 F i n a l l y , w e n o t e t h a t t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y r u l i n g w i l l b e c o m e a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e
Panel's final report, subject to any changes that may be necessary in the light of
comments received from the parties during the interim review.
7.4. Further to paragraph 4.3 of our preliminar y ruling of 22 May 2013, the Panel confirms that
this ruling, as set forth in document WT/DS430/5, forms an integral part of the present findings.
In line with the approach adopted by the panels in EC – Seal Products
174 and Canada – Renewable
Energy / Feed-In Tariff Programme 175, and for efficiency purposes, we have decided not to
reproduce in its entirety our previously circulat ed preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 and instead
incorporates it by reference into the present Report. Accordingly, we reproduce only those
excerpts from our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 that we find to be indispensable to complete
the analysis on the issues listed in paragraph 4.2 of our preliminary ruling, in respect of which the
Panel declined to rule on a preliminary basis. These issues are addressed in section 7.1.2 below.
7.1.2 Second request for a preliminary ruling by India
7.1.2.1 Introduction
7.5. On 31 May 2013, as part of its first written submission, India submitted to the Panel a second
request for a preliminary ruling concerning the consistency of the United States' panel request with
Article 6.2 of the DSU.
176 Specifically, India argued that the United States, in its first written
submission, raised claims concerning (i) India's NAP 2012, and (ii) health certificate requirements
for products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to (1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E), notwithstanding the fact
that none of these measures was mentioned in the panel request.177
7.6. The Panel's reasoning and findings on Indi a's second preliminary ruling request are set out
below.
7.1.2.2 Arguments of the parties
7.1.2.2.1 India
7.7. India challenges the adequacy of the Unit ed States' panel request on the basis that the
United States did not identify the NAP 2012 as a meas ure at issue. To India, this deficiency arises
in the context of the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, in which the
United States asserts that India does not apply similar AI controls with respect to like domestic

174 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 1.21.
175 Panel Report, Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Program, para. 6.7.
176 Details on the procedural aspects are found in section 1.3.
177 India's first written submission, paras. 67-68.

products and their internal movement within India. 178 India argues that, as the object of the
United States' claim is the discrimination caused by the different measures applied to imported
and domestic products respectively, the United States has to "necessarily adduce and impugn such
of India's measures which it believes are the cause of this arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination".
179
7.8. India argues that "the statutory basis for th is alleged discrimination is not S.O. 1663(E), it is
the [NAP]".180 India points out that S.O. 1663(E) does not regulate control measures to be taken
domestically during an outbreak of NAI and hence is not either directly or indirectly capable of
violating Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 181 In India's view, by failing to identify the NAP 2012,
the United States has failed to identify the measure that is alleged to be causing the violation of
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, and has theref ore failed to discharge its obligations under
Article 6.2 of the DSU.
182
7.9. India further argues that the United States cannot rely on the reference to "related and
implementing measures" in its panel request to in corporate the NAP 2012 within its panel request.
According to India, the NAP 2012 is not related to, nor does it implement, S.O. 1663(E) as the
NAP 2012 is promulgated under the Prevention of Diseases Act and therefore has a different
"sphere of activity".183
7.10. India argues that, while Panels have held that "attendant circumstances" may be examined
to determine whether the respondent had received adequate notice that an unnamed measure is
within a panel's terms of reference 184, no attendant circumstances exist that might otherwise
justify the United States' failure to identify the NAP 2012 in its panel request. India infers from the
United States' questions during consultations, and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
publications, that it was aware of the NAP 2006. India also referred the United States to the DAHD
website such that it might obtain up-to-date information on relevant Indian measures.
185
Moreover, India argues that the United States' description of the measures at issue cannot be read
as describing the "substantive nature" of the NAP 2012. 186 India notes that it is "doubly prejudiced
because it has had to engage its already finite resources in making assumptions about the nature
and scope of claims, which has seriously affected it s ability to prepare its defence in a meaningful
way".187
7.11. India concludes its arguments regarding the NAP 2012 by contending that the United States'
panel request is "severely deficient" and has violat ed India's due process right to know what case
it has to answer in respect of the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. For
these reasons, India asserts that the NAP 2012 "should be outside the Panel's terms of reference
and claims under Article 2.3 in this respect should also be set aside as being outside the
jurisdiction of this Panel".
188
7.12. With regard to the health certificate requirements for products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a)
to (j) of S.O. 1663(E), India argues that they are not measures at issue. According to India, the
United States has erroneously classified this requirement as a measure that implements
S.O. 1663(E), whereas it emerges from SIPs which are issued under a separate notification,
namely, S.O. 655(E). Indeed, according to India, the health certificates "are entirely unrelated to
S.O. 1663(E)".
189

178 India's first written submission, para. 70.
179 India's first written submission, para. 73.
180 India's first written submission, para. 78; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 55.
181 India's first written submission, para. 78.
182 India's first written submission, paras. 76 and 79.
183 India's first written submission, para. 86.
184 India's first written submission, para. 90 (citing Panel Report, China – Audiovisual Products,
185 India's first written submission, para. 90.
186 India's first written submission, para. 93.
187 India's first written submission, para. 95.
188 India's first written submission, para. 94.
189 India's first written submission, para. 96.

7.13. India explains that S.O. 655(E) was promulgated under Section 3A of the Livestock Act and
restricts trade in livestock products by requiring that an importer make an application for a SIP
prior to importation of poultry products. For India, this is a condition of importation and is distinct
from the prohibition on the importation of products from countries reporting NAI that exists under
S.O. 1663(E).
190
7.14. India also points out that each consignment of poultry products must be accompanied by a
health certificate containing an attestation by the official veterinarian of the exporting country that
sanitary requirements have been met. One of thes e requirements is a declaration of the HPNAI or
LPNAI status of the exporting country. 191 India argues that this is distinct from S.O. 1663(E),
which is implemented by customs and quarantine officials rather than through certification
requirements.
192 Thus, argues India, the health certificates are not subsidiary or closely related to
S.O. 1663(E) and cannot be termed as implementing measures.193
7.15. India argues further that the measures cannot be deemed as being related simply because
they are both implemented under the Livestock Act. In India's view, the fact that the measures
have the same delegating instrument is insufficient to put India on notice of the specific measures
at issue.194 India argues that a panel must not only consider whether "overarching legislation" has
been identified, but also the extent to which the respondent was put on notice of the various
delegated instruments challenged by the complainant.195
7.16. Finally, India argues that there are no ci rcumstances that might excuse the United States'
failure to adequately identify the measures. The United States had constructive notice of India's
measures, given that the measures are on the DAHD website, were discussed with the
United States during consultations, and feature in a 2009 report by the USDA.
196
7.1.2.2.2 United States
7.17. The United States asserts that India has not understood its arguments under Article 2.3 of
the SPS Agreement. The United States argues that it challenges only those measures that prohibit
the importation of various agricultural products into India, and that it has at no stage challenged
the SPS-consistency of measures applied to domestic products.
197 The United States contends that
references to the NAP 2012 "help establish that th e measures India applies to imported products
breach Article 2.3" 198, and therefore constitute evidence that S.O. 1663(E) is inconsistent with
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. The United States argues that India has erroneously conflated
such evidence with the measure at issue itself.
199
7.18. The United States also states that, even though it is not challenging the NAP 2012, and was
not required to reference India's avian influenza related controls with respect to domestic products
and their internal movement within India, the United States' panel request referenced India's avian
influenza related controls for like domestic products. Specifically, the United States cites its
request for the establishment of a panel, in which it states:
For example, while India applies the avian influenza measures at issue here to
imported products, India does not apply similar avian influenza related controls with
respect to like domestic products and their internal movement within India.200
7.19. The United States therefore argues that it is implausible to assert that India was not aware
that the content of its internal controls might play a role in this dispute, or that India is prejudiced
by its inclusion in the terms of reference.201

190 India's first written submission, para. 97.
191 India's first written submission, para. 98.
192 India's first written submission, para. 99.
193 India's first written submission, para. 100.
194 India's first written submission, para. 101.
195 India's first written submission, para. 102.
196 India's first written submission, para. 104.
197 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 5.
198 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 6.
199 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 7.
200 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.

7.20. The United States argues that, in short, India was put on notice when the United States
submitted its panel request that, in arguing that In dia's import prohibitions breach Article 2.3, the
United States would make reference to India's AI-r elated controls with respect to like domestic
products and their internal movement within India.202
7.21. As regards the health certificates, the United States makes reference to the Panel's
determination in its preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, that the measures at issue are those that
prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India from those countries reporting
NAI.
203 For the United States, the health certificates for products listed in paragraph (1)(ii) of
S.O. 1663(E) are within the Panel's terms of refe rence because they implement this prohibition.
Specifically, the United States argues that while veterinary certificates must accompany every
consignment of the enumerated livestock products, a certification that an exporting country is AI-
free can only be provided if the veterinarian in the exporting country can truthfully attest to the
e x t e n t o f A I - f r e e d o m i n t h a t c o u n t r y . I n t h i s s e n s e , t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e
prohibition in the event that certification cannot be obtained, such that the requirement is,
according to the United States, a measure that relates to or implements the prohibition under
S.O. 1663(E).
204 As a result of this relationship, the United States argues, it is "of no relevance
that India's general requirement that importers of certain agricultural products present a certificate
with each shipment" stems from S.O. 655(E), rather than S.O. 1663(E) itself. 205 The United States
adds that India cannot plausibly contend that its requirement of a certification that the exporting
country has a specified AI status as a condition for permitting importation of a product is "so
unrelated to its Notification prohibiting import of the products from countries reporting NAI" that it
could have lacked notice that these required attestations would be at issue in this dispute.
206
7.22. Further, the United States points to the fact that the panel request states India's import
prohibitions are maintained through the Livestock Act and orders implementing the Livestock Act
(which includes S.O. 1663(E)), as well as related and implementing measures. The United States
points out that India acknowledges that S.O. 655(E) is a notification promulgated under the
Livestock Act, and refers to India's statement that "[t]he requirement to provide a health
certificate with every consignment of livestock products emerges from sanitary import permits
which are issued under … S.O. 655(E)".
207 On this basis, the United States argues that S.O. 655(E)
was identified in the panel request through the reference to "orders issued by [the DAHD]
pursuant to the Livestock Act".
208
7.1.2.3 Arguments of the third parties
7.23. Of the third parties in this dispute, only Australia, Brazil and the European Union provided
submissions regarding India's second request for a preliminary ruling.
7.1.2.3.1 Australia
7.24. Australia observes that the measures challenged by the United States in this dispute are not
India's domestic measures, but rather India's international measures, such as those enacted under
S.O. 1663(E). Australia thus agrees with the United States that the NAP 2012 "is being used as a
comparison for the purposes of allegedly demonstrating the elements of Article 2.3, rather than as
the object of the claim",209 and thus did not need to be included in the panel request.
7.1.2.3.2 Brazil
7.25. Regarding the NAP 2012, Brazil argues that in a national treatment dispute, the measure at
issue should be the legislation that affords less favourable treatment to the imported products.

201 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.
202 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 9.
203 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 11.
204 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 12.
205 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 13.
206 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 14.
207 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 15 (citing India's
first written submission, para. 95).
208 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 15.
209 Australia's third-party written submission, para. 20.

This is irrespective of those measures applied internally, such that in a national treatment dispute
regarding an import ban, it is the import ban itself that constitutes the measure at issue. 210 Brazil
argues further that it would be contrary to Appellate Body jurisprudence to interpret "measure at
issue" in Article 6.2 of the DSU in light of the obligation under which the measure is being
challenged. A panel request should not be deemed deficient because it does not cite measures
(other than that which is said to be WTO-inconsistent) that fall within the scope of a panel's
analysis.
211 In the present dispute, therefore, the me asures at issue are those that prohibit
importation of products from countries reporting NAI, and the NAP 2012 "will serve as a
comparison for the Panel's substantive analysis and should not be excluded from its terms of
reference".
212
7.26. Concerning the health certificates, Brazil agrees with the United States insofar as the health
certificates constitute a "related or implementing measure" within the Panel's terms of reference.
For Brazil, the fact that "[t]he objective of the Livestock Act is to regulate, permit or prohibit the
trade in livestock products" means that in a disp ute regarding "prohibitions", export requirements
"have a strong link to the questioned measure".
213
7.1.2.3.3 The European Union
7.27. Regarding the NAP 2012, the European Union asserts that it "agrees" that the United States'
panel request makes reference to "similar avian influenza related controls with respect to like
domestic products and their internal movement within India".
214
7.28. With respect to the health certificate requirements, the European Union states that it "also
considers that the health certificate requirements are 'implementing and related measures' given
the particular circumstances of this case".215
7.1.2.4 Analysis by the Panel
7.1.2.4.1 Introduction
7.29. India's second preliminary ruling request raises two separate issues. The first issue is
whether India's NAP 2012 ought to have been expressly identified in the panel request. The
second issue concerns the health certificates for the products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to
(1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E) and, in particular, whether they are measures at issue in this dispute.
7.30. Before discussing each of these issues, we commence by examining the legal provision at
issue.
7.1.2.4.2 The legal provision at issue
7.31. Article 6.2 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly.
7.32. As explained in our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013
216, Article 6.2 of the DSU serves a
"pivotal function" in WTO dispute settlement and sets out "two key requirements" that a
complainant must satisfy in its panel request, namely, the identification of the specific measures at
issue, and the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint, i.e. the claims,

210 Brazil's third-party written submission, para. 6.
211 Brazil's third-party written submission, paras. 7-9.
212 Brazil's third-party written submission, para. 10.
213 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 11.
214 European Union's third-party written submission, para. 13.
215 European Union's third-party written submission, para. 13.
216 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.2-3.7.

which is sufficient to present the problem clearly.217 India's second request for a preliminary ruling
challenges the United States' panel request in resp ect of both of these requirements of Article 6.2
of the DSU.
7.33. We now proceed to examine whether In dia's NAP 2012 ought to have been expressly
identified in the panel request.
7.1.2.4.3 Whether India's NAP 2012 ought to have been expressly identified in the
panel request
7.34. India alleges that the United States failed to identify the NAP 2012 as a specific measure at
issue in its panel request, contrary to the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Specifically, India
argues that "the statutory basis for this alleged discrimination is not S.O. 1663(E), it is the
[NAP]".
218 India points out that S.O. 1663(E) does not regulate control measures to be taken
domestically during an outbreak of NAI and hence is not either directly or indirectly capable of
violating Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 219 India thus argues that the United States was
required to identify the NAP 2012 in its panel request, given that the NAP 2012 is the measure
allegedly causing the violation of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 220 As the NAP 2012 is not
specifically mentioned in the panel request, India contends that the United States' panel request is
"severely deficient" and has violated India's due pr ocess right to know what case it has to answer
in respect of the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
221 For these
reasons, India asserts that the NAP 2012 "should be outside the Panel's terms of reference and
claims under Article 2.3 in this respect should also be set aside as being outside the jurisdiction of
this Panel".
222
7.35. In response, the United States rejects India's characterization of its claim under Article 2.3
of the SPS Agreement. The United States argues that it challenges only those measures that
prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India.
223 According to the
United States, references to the NAP 2012 establis h evidence upon which to base the comparison
of the respective treatment of imported and domestic products for the purpose of demonstrating
that AI-related controls applied to imports violate Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
224
7.36. In order to answer the question whethe r India's NAP 2012 ought to have been expressly
identified in the panel request, we need to first examine whether the NAP 2012 is a measure at
issue in this dispute. If we find that it is not, we will then proceed to consider whether the
United States should nevertheless have identified the NAP 2012 in its panel request.
7.1.2.4.3.1 Whether the NAP 2012 is a measure at issue in this dispute
7.37. We note at the outset that the United States explained that "at no point has [it] asserted
that the NAP breaches the SPS Agreement or the GATT 1994, nor has the United States requested
for a recommendation from the Panel that the NAP be brought into conformity with these
agreements".
225
7.38. The United States' assertion corresponds to the wording of its panel request insofar as the
description of the measures at issue is concer ned. The panel request by its terms challenges
measures "that India imposes on the importation of various agricultural products from the
United States purportedly because of concerns relating to avian influenza".
226 The panel request
then states that "India's avian influenza measures prohibit the importation of various agricultural
products into India from those countries reporting [NAI] (both [HPNAI] and [LPNAI])". 227 We recall

217 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 219. Article 6.2 of the DSU also requires that
the panel request be in writing and indicate whether consultations were held.
218 India's first written submission, para. 78.
219 India's first written submission, para. 78.
220 India's first written submission, paras. 72-74 and 78.
221 India's first written submission, para. 94.
222 India's first written submission, para. 94.
223 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 5-6.
224 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 6.
225 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 5.
226 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 1.
227 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 1.

our determination in our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 that this description "delimits the scope
of the measures the United States seeks to challenge in this dispute". 228 It follows that measures
not covered by this description do not constitute measures at issue in this dispute.
7.39. As described in section 2.4.3.2 above, th e NAP 2012 was issued pursuant to the Prevention
of Diseases Act229 and "is a domestic measure which has no effect on imports". 230 Furthermore, as
the United States points out, it has not requested a recommendation from the Panel that the
NAP 2012 be brought into conformity with the SPS Agreement or the GATT 1994.
231
7.40. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the NAP 2012 falls outside the scope of the
measures at issue in this dispute, i.e. "India's [AI] measures [that] prohibit the importation of
various agricultural products into India from those countries reporting [NAI]".
232
7.1.2.4.3.2 Whether the Unit ed States should have identified the NAP 2012 in its
panel request irrespective of the fact that it is not a measure at issue
7.41. Having concluded that the NAP 2012 is not a measure at issue in this dispute, we proceed to
examine whether the United States should nevertheless have identified the NAP 2012 in its panel
request.
7.42. We recall that, in India's view, while the object of the United States' discrimination
challenge under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement is the NAP 2012233, this measure is not identified
in the panel request and is first referred to in the United States' first written submission. 234
According to India, it was "imperative for the United States to identify with sufficient precision in
its panel request, 'the object of the challenge' or the 'direct target' of the 'relevant obligation'
which is alleged to be violated".
235 As a result of this alleged deficiency in the panel request, India
requests the Panel to dismiss the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 236
The United States, in disagreeing with India, aver s that India "mistakes evidence that can be used
to establish an element of a claim with the measure that is the object of the challenge".237
7.43. We note that the United States identifies the NAP 2012 as setting out India's response to
domestic AI detections 238, and describes the operation of the NAP 2012. 239 This submission is
within the context of the United States' claim that India's treatment of domestic products in the
event of an AI outbreak discriminates against imported products, such that India has acted
inconsistently with Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 240 O n t h i s b a s i s , w e a g r e e w i t h t h e
United States insofar as it characterizes its references to the NAP 2012 as argumentation in the
context of its claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.44. Having concluded that the NAP 2012 is not a measure at issue, but rather is a measure
used by the United States in its argumentation of its claim, we next examine whether a
complainant must identify, in its panel request, a measure used in argumentation or as evidence in
seeking to prove a claim.
7.45. As far as the identification of measures is concerned, Article 6.2 of the DSU explicitly
requires that a complaining Member identify th e measure(s) at issue. There is no explicit
requirement in Article 6.2 to identify other measures. Nevertheless, as mentioned in
paragraph 7.32 above, there is a second element in Article 6.2; namely, the requirement that the
complaining Member provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint, i.e. the claims,
sufficient to present the problem clearly. We sha ll therefore examine whether this second element

229 India's first written submission, para. 40.
230 India's first written submission, para. 82.
231 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 5.
232 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 1.
233 India's first written submission, para. 72.
234 India's first written submission, para. 74.
235 India's first written submission, para. 78.
236 India's first written submission, para. 94.
237 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 7.
238 United States first written submission, para. 168.
239 United States first written submission, paras. 168-171.
240 United States first written submission, paras. 160-184.

requires a complaining party to identify in its panel request measures other than the measures at
issue. Specifically, we consider whether, in the co ntext of this case, Article 6.2 operates such that
the United States was required to identify the NAP 2012 in its panel request irrespective of the fact
that it is not a measure at issue, given that it sought to rely on the NAP 2012 in its legal
argumentation regarding Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.46. Regarding this second element of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body in Korea –
Dairy observed that Article 6.2 "demands only a summary – and it may be a brief one", of the
legal basis of the complaint, and that the summa ry be sufficient to present the problem clearly. 241
The Appellate Body has further clarified that, in order to present the problem clearly, a
panel request must "plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the
covered agreements claimed to have been infringed"
242, and should "explain how or why the
measure at issue is considered by the complaining Member to be violating the WTO obligation in
question".243 With this guidance in mind, we turn to examine the United States' panel request to
consider whether it provides a summary, be it a brief one or not, of the legal basis of the
complaint under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement in a manner that presents the problem clearly.
7.47. The United States' panel request describes the claim under Article 2.3 as follows:
India's measures have adversely affected exports of these products from the
United States to India. The United States considers that India's measures are
inconsistent with India's commitments and obligations under the following provisions
of the SPS Agreement
…
2. Article 2.3 because India's avian influenza measures arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where similar conditions
prevail, including between India's own territory and that of other
Members. For example, while India a pplies the avian influenza measures
at issue here to imported products, India does not apply similar avian
influenza related controls with respect to like domestic products and their
internal movement within India. Further, India has applied its measures in
a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.
244
7.48. The panel request thus identifies the challenged measures as India's AI measures, the scope
of which, as described in paragraph 7.38 above, is limited to the measures that prohibit the
importation of various agricultural products into India from those countries reporting NAI. The
panel request then "plainly connects" India's AI measures to Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement,
which the United States claims has been infringed by the challenged measures.
7.49. The question remains whether, in spite of "plainly connecting" Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement to India's AI measures, the panel request should have identified the NAP 2012 "in
order to present the problem clearly". Or, alternatively, as the United States argues, the
references to the NAP 2012 seek to serve as evidence for its discrimination claim under
Article 2.3
245, and thus they should rather be characterized as forming part of the argumentation
of the claim, in which case they need not be iden tified in the panel request in order to present the
problem clearly.
7.50. Central to this debate is the distinction between claims and arguments, which the
Appellate Body has explored on numerous occasion s. The Appellate Body has explained that the
term "claim" refers to "a claim that the responde nt party has violated, or nullified or impaired the
benefits arising from, an identified provision of a particular agreement" 246, whereas the term

241 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 120.
242 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 220 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162).
243 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 226 (citing Appellate Body Report, EC –
Selected Customs Matters, para. 130). (emphasis original)
244 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.
245 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 6.
246 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 139.

"arguments" are the "arguments adduced by a complaining party to demonstrate that the
responding party's measure does indeed infringe upon the identified treaty provision". 247 The
Appellate Body has emphasized that Article 6. 2 of the DSU requires that the claims, but not the
arguments, be set out in a panel request in a way that is sufficient to present the problem
clearly.248 In our view, the identification of a domestic measure as evidence for the purpose of
demonstrating discrimination between imported and domestic products pertains to the
argumentation of the discrimination claim, as opposed to constituting a distinct claim.
7.51. Past panels have had a similar understanding of this distinction between claims and
argumentation when addressing claims of discrimination under the SPS Agreement, particularly in
respect of challenges under Article 5.5. For instance, in Australia – Salmon, the panel compared
Australia's measures prohibiting the importation of "fresh, chilled or frozen salmon" challenged by
Canada in its panel request
249 with Australia's treatment of other products that were known to
carry the diseases against which Australia's measures were said to protect. 250 These measures
were not expressly mentioned in Canada's panel request in respect of its claim under Article 5.5 of
the SPS Agreement.251 The panel nonetheless considered these respective forms of treatment in
order to determine whether there were "different situations" 252, and whether distinctions in the
level of treatment were "arbitrary or unjustifiable" 253 for the purpose of its analysis under
Article 5.5.254 Similarly, in US – Poultry (China), the panel compared the United States' measures
affecting imports of poultry products from China 255 with the measures applied to poultry products
from other WTO Members. 256 As was the case with Australia – Salmon , the other measures were
not expressly mentioned in China's panel request in respect of its claim under Article 5.5. 257
However, the panel considered these measures in determining whether the measure at issue
created a distinction in ALOPs in different yet comparable situations 258, and whether the ALOPs
were arbitrarily or unjustifiably different. 259 Thus, the panels in both these cases considered the
treatment afforded under each of the respective instruments (that is, the measure at issue, and
the other measure under discussion) to determine whether the complaining party had
substantiated their claim under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
7.52. In the same vein, past panels and the Appellate Body have compared domestic measures to
challenged measures affecting imported products for the purpose of examining discrimination
claims under the GATT 1994 without requiring that the complaining party identify those domestic
measures in its panel request.
260
7.53. Like previous panels and the Appellate Body, we are of the view that a measure to which a
party refers solely for the purpose of making a comparison with a challenged measure in respect of
a discrimination claim may serve as evidence in the argumentation in support of that claim, and
does not in itself constitute a measure that must be identified in a panel request by virtue of
Article 6.2 of the DSU.

247 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 139.
248 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 143; India – Patents (US), para. 88; Korea – Dairy,
para. 139; Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 121; and EC – Selected Customs
Matters, para. 153.
249 Canada's request for the establishment of a panel (WT/DS18/2).
250 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 8.103-8.160.
251 Canada's request for the establishment of a panel.
253 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 8.119 and 8.133.
255 China's request for the establishment of a panel (WT/DS392/2), para. 4.
256 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.233-7.235.
257 China's request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3, para. 12.
258 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.225-7.254.
259 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.255-7.269.
260 For instance, in US – Gasoline, the panel and the Appellate Body compared the United States' legal
regimes for foreign and domestic gasoline. However, the panel request did not cite the measures affecting the
domestic products as measures at issue for the purpose of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Panel Report, US – Gasoline,
paras. 6.5-6.16; and Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 25-29; Venezuela's request for the
establishment of a panel, WT/DS2/2. Likewise, in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the dual retail system for
foreign and domestic beef products in Korea was at issue and the panel requests did not identify the measures
affecting the domestic products as measures at issue. Panel Report, Korea – Beef, paras. 616-677; and
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, paras. 130-185. United States' request for the establishment of a panel,
WT/DS161/5; Australia's request for the establishment of a panel, WT/DS169/5.

7.54. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the NAP 2012 is not a measure at issue.
Furthermore, we conclude that the United States' description of its claim under Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement "plainly connect[s] the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the covered
agreements claimed to have been infringed".
261 W e a l s o f i n d t h a t , h a v i n g m a d e t h i s p l a i n
connection between Article 2.3 and India's AI measures, the United States was not under an
additional obligation to cite in its panel request the measure – the NAP 2012 – that formed the
basis of a comparison between the treatment afforded to like domestic products and the treatment
afforded to imported products under India's AI measures. The Panel considers that reading such
an obligation into the text of Article 6.2 of the DSU would blur the line between the claim and the
arguments in support of such claim, and would be inconsistent with the Appellate Body
jurisprudence referred to above.
7.55. The Panel therefore declines India's reques t that the United States' claim under Article 2.3
of the SPS Agreement be set aside on the basis that it is outside the jurisdiction of this Panel.
7.1.2.4.4 Whether the health certificates are measures at issue in this dispute
7.56. We turn now to examine the second issue put forward by India in its second request for a
preliminary ruling, namely its allegation that the United States failed to identify the health
certificate requirements for products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to (1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E) as
measures at issue in this dispute as they were not explicitly mentioned in its panel request. In
particular, India argues that the United Stat es used the term "related and implementing
measures" to bring within the Panel's terms of reference new measures that are entirely unrelated
to S.O. 1663(E).
262 According to India, the health certificates neither "implement the prohibition"
in S.O. 1663(E) 263, nor can they "legitimately be termed" measures related to those explicitly
identified in the panel request.264
7.57. The United States provides two main arguments in response to India's challenge. First, the
United States maintains that the health certificates are related to, and implement, the import
prohibition in S.O. 1663(E), because an exporter who is unable to obtain a certification that the
exporting country is NAI-free will be unable to export their products into the Indian market, thus
giving effect to the import prohibition.
265 Second, the United States argues that the reference in
the panel request to "orders issued by [the DAHD] pursuant to the Livestock Act" is sufficient to
bring the health certificates within the scope of the terms of reference. This is because S.O. 655(E)
is a notification issued pursuant to the Livestock Act, and because S.O. 655(E) requires the
fulfilment of the conditions in a SIP, among which is the completion of a health certificate.
266
7.58. Accordingly, we proceed to first examine whether the health certificates, although not
explicitly mentioned in the panel request, are "related measures, or implementing measures"
within the meaning of the panel request and on that basis constitute measures at issue in this
dispute. If this is not the case, we will proceed to address whether the reference in the
panel request to "orders issued by [the DAHD] pursuant to the Livestock Act" is sufficient to bring
S.O. 655(E), and the health certificates issued thereunder, within the scope of the Panel's terms of
reference.
7.59. Before addressing these two points, we find it useful to recall and expand upon the
description of S.O. 655(E) and the health certif icates issued thereunder, which we provide in
section 2.4.2.1 above.

261 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 220 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162).
262 India's first written submission, para. 96.
263 India's first written submission, para. 100.
264 India's first written submission, para. 101.
265 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 12 and 13.
266 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 15.

7.1.2.4.4.1 S.O. 655(E) and the health certificates issued thereunder
7.60. We recall that S.O. 655(E) was issued by the DAHD in exercise of powers conferred by
Section 3A of the Livestock Act. It was published in the Gazette of India on 9 July 2001 and came
into effect on that same date.
267 S.O. 655(E) is still in force.268
7.61. S.O. 655(E) states, under the heading "Notification":
S.O. 655 (E) - In exercise of the powers co nferred by Section 3A of the Live-stock
Importation Act, 1898 (9 of 1898), the Central Government hereby restricts, with
effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, the import
into India of all live-stock products, including -
(i) meat and meat products of all kinds including fresh, chilled and frozen meat ,
tissue or organs of poultry, pig, sheep, goat;
(ii) egg and egg powder;
(iii) milk and milk products;
(iv) bovine, ovine and caprine embryos, ova or semen; and
(v) pet food products of animal origin.
2. The import of these products shall be allowed only against a sanitary import permit
to be issued by this Department as per the procedure laid down in the Schedule
annexed to this notification – [.]
7.62. S.O. 655(E) therefore restricts, with effect from the date of publication, the importation into
India of "all live-stock products".
269 S.O. 655(E) does not, on its face, contain an explicit reference
to NAI or AI, or to any procedures that relate specifically to NAI or AI. Furthermore, S.O. 655(E)
does not prohibit the importation of any livestock products; rather, it envisages the importation of
livestock products subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions. Specifically, the Schedule to
S.O. 655(E) entitled "Procedure for import of livestock products into India" provides that no
livestock product shall be imported into India without a valid SIP issued under the conditions
specified in Clause (3).
270 Among the conditions in Clause 3, Clause 3(iv) states that "the import
permit shall lay down specific conditions that will have to be fulfilled in respect of the consignment,
including pre-shipment certifications and quarantine checks". 271 These pre-shipment certifications
are what both parties have referred to as health certificates or veterinary certificates.
7.63. The Panel observes that there is no standard form of health certificate annexed to
S.O. 655(E). In response to a question from the Panel, India clarified that there is no separate
legal instrument governing which information must be included in the health certificate. 272 Both
the United States and India have provided a number of health certificates and, in India's case,
SIPs, which we proceed to review below.
7.64. We commence with the health certificates provided by the United States. All five certificates
consist of blank forms, each having the words "veter inary certificate" as part of its title. The blank
certificates provided by the United States relate to the importation into India of captive birds
(other than poultry)
273, "chicken/quail meat" 274, "duck meat" 275, "hatching eggs" 276, and "turkey

267 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116, Exhibit IND-18). S.O. 655(E) was notified to the WTO on 11 April
2002. G/SPS/N/IND/9, (Exhibit IND-60).
268 India's response to Panel question Nos. 17(a) and (b).
269 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), first paragraph.
270 S.O. 655(E) further states that "[t]he import of these livestock products into India is allowed only
against a sanitary import permit (SIP) issued by the DAHD as per the procedure set out in the Schedule
annexed to S.O. 655(E)". S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), para. 2.
271 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116), Schedule, para. (3)(iv). India's response to Panel question No. 19(a).
272 India's response to Panel question No. 19(a).
273 Exhibit US-55
274 Exhibit US-52.

meat".277 The United States cites the DAHD website as the source for all these blank health
certificates (except that for duck meat).278
7.65. As the United States correctly points out 279, each of these health certificates includes a
requirement that a veterinarian attest to the particular AI status of the exporting country.
Notwithstanding this similarity, we observe that the certificates are otherwise not uniform and, in
fact, vary according to the product to which each certificate relates. For example, each form
requires that the official veterinarian certify that the product being exported originates from a
facility that has been free from particular diseases for a period of 12 months; however, the
relevant diseases depend on the product in question. In addition to the attestation of the exporting
country's AI-status, the respective requirements of the health certificates provided by the
United States, based on the product in question, are as follows:
Product Requirement
Chicken /
Quail Meat
The official veterinarian must certify that ( inter alia) the consignment comes from birds that
were kept in an establishment where the incidence of the following diseases has not been
reported during the last year:

New Castle Disease, Marek's disease, Avian Mycoplasmosis, Haemorrhagic
enteritis and Infectious synovitis/sinusitis, Avian chlamydiosis, Fowl typhoid,
Avian infectious bronchitis, Avian infectious laryngotracheitis, Fowl cholera and
Salmonella enteritidis Salmonella typhimurium, Avian Leucosis J virus
infections, Inclusion body hepatitis ([ ]Hydropericardium), Infectious bursal
disease, Pullorum disease, Avian tuberc ulosis, Fowl pox, Egg drop syndrome,
Avian encephalomyelitis and Chicken anaemia virus.
280
Turkey Meat The official veterinarian must certify that ( inter alia) the consignment comes from birds that
were kept in an establishment that has not reported during the last year:

New Castle Disease, Marek's disease, Avian Mycoplasmosis, Haemorrhagic
enteritis and Infectious synovitis/sinusitis, Avian chlamydiosis, Fowl typhoid,
Avian infectious bronchitis, Avian infectious laryngotracheitis, Fowl cholera and
Salmonella enteritidis Salmonella typhimurium and Avian Leucosis J virus
infections, Inclusion body hepatitis ([ ]Hydropericardium) and Chicken anaemia
virus.281
Hatching eggs
of chicken,
turkey and
other avian
species
The official veterinarian must certify that ( inter alia) the eggs are drawn from an
establishment where:

New Castle disease (Ranikhet disease), Infectious Bursal Disease (Gumboro
disease), Marek's disease, Mycoplasmosis ( M. gallisepticum ), Fowl typhoid
(Salmonella gallinarum ), Pullorum disease ( Salmonella pullorum ), Fowl Pox,
Avian Infectious Bronchitis, Avian infectious larynogtracheitis, Avian
Tuberculosis, Psittacosis-ornithosis (Avian Chlamydiosis), Fowl cholera
(Pasteurellosis), Salmonella enteritidis, West Nile Virus, Salmonella
typhimurum, Egg drop synd rome, Avian encephalomyelitis, Avian leucosis J.
Virus, Chickenanaemia and inclusion bo dy hepatitis infection have not been
reported for the past 12 months.
282

275 Exhibit US-71.
276 Exhibit US-54.
277 Exhibit US-53.
278 United States' first written submission, footnotes 92-95.
279 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 12.
280 Exhibit US-52.
281 Exhibit US-53.
282 Exhibit US-54.

Product Requirement
Captive birds
other than
poultry
The official veterinarian must certify that (inter alia):

[T]the birds come from an establishment or hatchery where [] Newcastle
disease (Ranikhet disease) , Mycoplasmosis (M. gallisepticum), Fowl typhoid
(Salmonella gallinarum), Fowl pox, Avian infectious laryngotrachitis, Avian
tuberculosis, Psittacosis-Ornithosis, Fowl cholera (Pasturellosis), Avian
encephalomyelitis, Avian circovirus infection Avian J virus, African Nile virus and
Inclusion body hepatitis have been re ported since [the] past 12 months and
have been tested and found negative against these diseases 30 days prior to
export.283
Duck meat The official veterinarian must certify that ( inter alia) the consignment comes from birds that
were kept in an establishment where the incidence of the following diseases has not been
reported during the last year:

Duck Plague, Avian Leucosis J virus, New Castle Disease, Marek's disease,
Avian Mycoplasmosis, Avian chlamydiosis, Fowl typhoid, Avian infectious
bronchitis, Avian infectious laryngotracheitis, Fowl cholera and Salmonella
enteritidis, Salmonella typhimurium, Inclusion body hepatitis
(Hydropericardium) and Chicken anaemia virus.
284

7.66. We note that none of the blank certificates provided by the United States covers all the
products listed in paragraphs 1(ii)(a) to (j) of S.O. 1663(E).
7.67. For its part, India provided the Panel with 13 samples of SIPs that are accompanied by a
number of health certificate forms that are actual SIPs issued in 2011 and 2012 to exporters based
in a number of WTO Members. 285 The text of all of these SIPs appears to be identical save for the
specific identification of each exporter and its respective products.286 All of these SIPs also include,
as annexes, at least one blank form labelled as a "veterinary certificate", the precise number of
which is dependent on the number of different types of commodity being imported.
7.68. As was the case for the blank certificate forms provided by the United States, the blank
veterinary certificates provided by India are not identical. Relevantly, while each of these health
certificates provided by India requires an official veterinarian to make an "attestation of
wholesomeness", the attestations regarding AI differ among the certificates. For instance, with
respect to the health certificates for chicken or quail meat, duck meat, and turkey meat, an official
veterinarian is required to certify, inter alia, that the "country is free from [AI]".
287 Conversely,
while the health certificates relating to the importation of pork require an official veterinarian to
certify that the "country is free" from a variety of diseases affecting pigs, there is no equivalent
requirement to certify that the "country is free from [AI]".
288 In addition, the health certificates
relating to goose meat differ between themselves. In one such certificate, an official veterinarian is
required to certify, inter alia, that the "country is free from [AI]". 289 In another, the veterinarian is
required to certify that the "country is free from HPAI".290
7.69. Similarly to the blank certificate forms provided by the United States, the applicable
certificate depends on the product to be imported; thus, India provided health certificates 291
concerning the importation into India of "chicken/quail meat" 292, "duck meat"293, "goose meat"294,

283 Exhibit US-55.
284 Exhibit US-71.
285 These products are sourced from several WTO Members including France, Italy, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Spain, and Thailand. India's first written submission, paras. 29-33.
286 Exhibits IND-20, IND-21, IND-25, IND-27, IND-28, IND-29, IND-30, IND-31, IND-32, IND-33,
IND-34, IND-35.
287 Exhibits IND-20, IND-21, IND-23, IND-25, IND-27, IND-28, IND-29, IND-31, IND-32, IND-33,
IND-34, and IND-35, Veterinary certificates, para. 5(a).
288 Exhibits IND-25, IND-29, IND-30, IND-32, and IND-33.
289 Exhibit IND-27, para. 5(a).
290 Exhibit IND-31, para. 5(a).
291 We note that India did not provide SIPs annexing health certificates for hatching eggs of chicken,
turkey and other avian species, or for captive birds other than poultry, as did the United States.
292 Exhibits IND-29, IND-32, IND-33, and IND-34.
293 Exhibits IND-23, IND-27, IND-28, IND-31, and IND-35.
294 Exhibits IND-27 and IND-31.

"pork"295, and "turkey meat". 296 As with the certificates provided by the United States, the
required certifications depend on the product(s) in the consignment. We note that the health
certificates for the importation of chicken/qua il meat, turkey meat and duck meat require the
veterinarian in the exporting country to make the same certifications as those provided by the
United States and described in paragraph 7.65 above.
297 In addition to this description, we note
that the requirements for goose meat (other than the exporting country's AI status) and pork298 as
per the certificates provided by India, are as follows:
Product Requirement
Goose meat The official veterinarian to certify that the consignment comes from birds that were kept in an
establishment that has not, in the preceding year, reported the incidence of:

Duck Plague, Avian Leucosis J virus, New Castle Disease, Marek's disease,
Avian Mycoplasmosis, Avian chlamydiosis, Fowl typhoid, Avian infectious
bronchitis, Avian infectious laryngotracheitis, Fowl cholera and Salmonella
enteritidis, Salmonella typhimurium, Inclusion body hepatitis
(Hydropericardium) and Chicken anaemia virus.
299
Pork The official veterinarian must certify that the consignment comes from animals that were kept
in an establishment that in the previous two years has not reported:

Enterovirus encephalomyelitis, Transmissible gastro-enteritis, Porcine
Reproductive/Respiratory Syndrome, Tr ichinellosis, Tuberculosis, Porcine
Brucellosis, Anthrax, Atrophic Rhinitis and Leptospirosis.300

7.70. Notably, none of the health certificates provided by India covers all the products listed in
paragraphs 1(ii)(a) to (j) of S.O. 1663(E).
7.71. We note that India informed the Panel that India granted SIPs, dated 6 January 2011, for
imports of unprocessed turkey meat from the United States which was being consigned through
the United Arab Emirates, and that the United Stat es was free of NAI on the date of approval of
those SIPs. India provided two SIPs in support of that submission.
301 However, the United States
contests this and avers that "there appears to be no evidence to support the assertion that India
has issued SIPs to the United States or U.S. producers or that any shipments took place". 302 In
relation to the SIPs cited by India, the United States submits that these SIPs relate to products
that were actually exported from the United Arab Emirates. 303 The United States adds that it does
not believe that any United States producers "made any exports of turkey meat to India in 2011 or
since"304, and emphasizes that it is unaware of any [United States] exporters requesting SIPs from
India.305 The United States also provided to the Panel data from World Trade Atlas (which,
according to the United States, collects data from official sources) 306 that indicates that, in 2011,
India imported turkey meat only from the United Arab Emirates, Spain and Belgium, and that in
2012 India only imported turkey meat from Belgium.307
7.72. The Panel reviewed the two SIPs that India alleges were issued to United States exporters,
and observes that both permit the importation of products from the United Arab Emirates. The
Panel also reviewed the data provided by the United States and agrees with the United States that
they indicate that, in 2011, India imported turkey meat from the United Arab Emirates, Spain and

295 Exhibits IND-25, IND-29, IND-30, IND-32, and IND-33.
296 Exhibits IND-20, IND-21, IND-23, and IND-25.
297 Exhibits IND-20, IND-21, IND-23, IND-25, IND-27, IND-28, IND-29, IND-31, IND-32, IND-33,
IND-34, IND-35. This is with the exception of Exhibit IND-23, in relation to duck meat, which requires
certification identical to that required for chicken meat in Exhibits US-52, IND-29, IND-32, IND-33, IND-34.
298 The United States did not provide health certificates for goose meat or pork.
299 Exhibits IND-27 and IND-31.
300 Exhibits IND-25, IND-29, IND-30, IND-32 and IND-33.
301 India's first written submission, para. 29 (citing Exhibits IND-20 and IND-21).
302 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).
303 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).
304 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(b).
305 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(c).
306 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).
307 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).

Belgium and that, in 2012, India imported turkey meat from Belgium. 308 India has not contested
the validity or content of these data. Therefore, on the basis of this evidence, we conclude that
none of the SIPs provided by India concerns a United States exporter. We also conclude that,
during 2011 and 2012, India did not import any turkey meat from the United States.
7.1.2.4.4.2 Whether the heal th certificates are "related measures, or implementing
measures" at issue
7.73. Bearing the above facts in mind, we proc eed to examine whether the health certificates,
although not explicitly mentioned in the panel request, are "related measures, or implementing
measures" within the meaning of the panel request and are thus measures at issue in this dispute.
7.74. In making its second request for a preliminary ruling, India accepts that unnamed measures
can fall within the scope of a Panel's terms of reference
309, as long as such measures are
subsidiary or closely related to the measures enumerated in the panel request. 310 For India, this is
not the case for the health certificates; India submits that they "are entirely unrelated to
S.O. 1663(E)"
311 and are therefore outside the scope of what is acceptable under Article 6.2. India
contends that this is because S.O. 1663(E) and the health certificates do not deal with the same
subject matter. 312 In its view, S.O. 655(E) does not prohibit the importation of livestock or
livestock products mentioned in S.O. 1663(E); 313 instead S.O. 655(E) requires an importer to
apply for a SIP before exporting to India, and each export consignment must be accompanied by a
health certificate which includes information on the disease status of the exporting country that
must be certified by the official veterinarian.
314 Thus, according to India, "if a country is free from
HPNAI or LPNAI, the health certificate for poultry products would nonetheless require that this fact
is confirmed".315
7.75. The United States disagrees and claims that the requirement that the veterinary certificates
accompany shipments of certain products and attest that the exporting country has a particular AI
status "falls squarely within the Panel's terms of reference", because it "implements AI-based
import prohibitions".316 According to the United States, this requirement in the health certificates
"serves to prevent imports from a country whose AI status precludes its veterinarians from
truthfully making the required attestation". 317 Thus, the United States considers that requiring
certification that the exporting country has a particular AI status is not a distinct subject matter
from India's import prohibition. For the United States, it is "of no relevance that India's general
requirement that importers of certain agricultur al products present a certificate with each
shipment" stems from S.O. 655(E), rather than S.O. 1663(E) itself.
318 Rather, the United States
views S.O. 655(E) and the health certificates issued thereunder as tools for enforcing that very
prohibition, such that they qualify as "related or implementing" measures.
319 The United States
adds that these required attestations under the health certificates "relate to and implement the AI-
based import prohibitions reflected in S.O. 1663(E)".320
7.76. It is undisputed that the United States' panel request does not explicitly mention
S.O. 655(E), or the health certificates issued thereunder. 321 The debate before us rather focuses
on whether, in spite of having not been identified in the panel request, the health certificates are
measures at issue in this dispute by virtue of falling within the language "as well as amendments,
related measures, or implementing measures in forc e as of the date of this request" in the panel

308 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).
309 India's first written submission, para. 84.
310 India's first written submission, paras. 84 and 100.
311 India's first written submission, para. 96.
312 India's first written submission, para. 101.
313 India's first written submission, para. 97.
314 India's first written submission, para. 98.
315 India's first written submission, para. 98.
316 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 12.
317 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 12.
318 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 13.
319 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 12.
320 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 13.
321 The first mention by the United States of the health certificates appears in its first written submission
in the context of the United States' discussion on regionalization. United States' first written submission,
para. 63. The United States thereafter makes several references to the health certificates. United States' first
written submission, paras. 72 and 92.

request.322 Indeed, according to the United States, the health certificates "relate to and implement
the AI-based import prohibitions reflected in S.O. 1663(E)". 323 The answer to the question of
whether the health certificates are related or implementing measures lies in discerning the
relationship, if any, between S.O. 1663(E) and the health certificates.
7.77. As we discussed in our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, past panels and the
Appellate Body have accepted that a measure not explicitly mentioned in a panel request can still
constitute a measure at issue in the context of a particular dispute.
324 Indeed, it is not the explicit
mention of a measure in a panel request that sets the limits of what constitutes a measure at
issue. Rather, as the Appellate Body stated in US – Carbon Steel , "compliance with the
requirements of Article 6.2 must be determined on the merits of each case, having considered the
panel request as a whole, and in the light of attendant circumstances". 325 Therefore, the reference
to related or implementing measures in a panel request must likewise be assessed in the light of
the circumstances of each particular case.
7.78. The panel in Japan – Film emphasized that an unnamed measure may fall within the scope
of a panel's terms of reference under Article 6.2, provided that it has a clear relationship to a
measure that is specifically described so that it can be said to be included in the measures at
issue. For that panel, whose report was not appealed, the requirements of Article 6.2 would be
met where a measure is subsidiary or so closely related to a measure specifically identified that
the responding party can reasonably be found to have received adequate notice of the scope of the
claims asserted by the complaining party. The panel stressed that two key elements – close
relationship and notice – are inter-related, and therefore, "only if a 'measure' is subsidiary or
closely related to a specifically identified 'measure' will notice be adequate".
326 With regard to this
notion of subsidiarity, the pane l referred by way of an example to a scenario in which a basic
framework law dealing with a narrow subject matter that provides for implementing measures,
and said that, in that example, a panel request that refers to "implementing measures" may
therefore be sufficiently precise to bring thos e implementing measures within the terms of
reference.327
7.79. The panel in US – Carbon Steel agreed with the reasoning of the panel in Japan – Film and
applied the same "adequate notice" standard to conclude that the expedited review procedure
concerned was not a "measure" that was "subsidiary" or "closely related" to "any of the measures
specifically identified".
328 This was also the case with the panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5
– Canada), which also used "adequate notice" as the standard for determining whether certain
unnamed measures were within the panel's terms of reference. That panel found that the measure
in question was "so closely related to [the measures specified in the panel request] that Australia
can reasonably be found to have received adeq uate notice of the scope of the complainant's
claims".
329
7.80. We concur with the panels in Japan – Film , US – Carbon Steel , and Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada) that the applicable standard when examining the conformity of a panel
request with Article 6.2 of the DSU is whether the respondent has received adequate notice,
particularly with regard to the inclusion of unnamed measures within a panel's terms of reference.
7.81. Although not in connection with Article 6. 2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body has used the
same "adequate notice" standard articulated by these panels in the context of determining the
c o n f o r m i t y o f a M e m b e r ' s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h Article 16.4 of the DSU and Rule 20(2) of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review. Relevantly, the Appellate Body has found that "[the]
requirements under Rule 20(2) serve to ensure that the appellee also receives notice, albeit brief,
of the 'nature of the appeal' and the 'allegations of errors' by the panel".330

322 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 1.
323 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 13.
324 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.42 and 3.43.
325 Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel, para. 127.
328 Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 8.11.
329 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.10, subpara. 27.
330 Appellate Body Report, EC – Countervailing Duties on Certain EC Products, para. 62. In that case,
the Appellate Body determined, at paragraph 67, that the explicit language used by the United States in its

7.82. In our view, this reasoning is probative of the more general observation, similarly suggested
by the panels referred to above in the context of Article 6.2 of the DSU, that the applicable
standard in WTO dispute settlement for determining whether a panel or the Appellate Body is
properly vested with the jurisdiction to make the assessment in question is contingent upon,
inter alia, whether the responding Member in a dispute has received adequate notice of the claim
that has been raised. This is consistent with the due process objective of notifying the respondent
and third parties of the nature of the complainant's case
331, which we discussed in our preliminary
ruling of 22 May 2013.332 We recall the Appellate Body's statement that due process is an essential
feature of the WTO dispute settlement system 333, and we agree that due process is intrinsically
connected to, inter alia, the rights of parties to be afforded an adequate opportunity to pursue
their claims and make out their defences.334
7.83. Accordingly, we consider that, in order to establish whether the health certificates are
"related or implementing measures" vis-à-vis S.O. 1663(E), we need to determine whether the
United States' panel request provided India wi th adequate notice of the inclusion of the
health certificates issued under S.O. 655(E) within the Panel's terms of reference. In doing so, we
bear in mind that notice will be adequate if the health certificates are subsidiary to, or are in a
sufficiently close relationship with, S.O. 1663(E).
7.84. We thus proceed to examine the relationship, if any, between S.O. 655(E) and the health
certificates issued thereunder, and S.O. 1663(E) on the basis of the evidence before us.
335
7.85. On its face, S.O. 655(E) is a notification issued by the DAHD pursuant to Section 3A of the
Livestock Act.336 S.O. 1663(E) is also a notification issued by the DAHD pursuant to Sections 3 and
3A of the Livestock Act. 337 We recall that the Livestock Act provides broad powers to the Central
Government to regulate the importation of all livestock products. Indeed, both S.O. 1663(E) and
S.O. 655(E) are instruments that regulate the importation of livestock products. In our view, that
both notifications are issued pursuant to th e Livestock Act creates a relationship between
S.O. 1663(E) and S.O. 655(E). Whether this relationship is sufficient to consider S.O. 655(E) and
more importantly, the health certificates issued thereunder, as measures that are subsidiary to, or
are in a sufficiently close relationship with S.O. 1663(E), is a different matter. To us, the fact that
the two notifications are both issued pursuant to the Livestock Act does not in itself amount to
having a relationship which can be qualified as sufficiently close; nor does it mean that one
notification is necessarily subsidiary to the other. More specifically, we consider that, were this
relationship considered sufficiently close on its ow n, it would imply that every notification issued
pursuant to Sections 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act could also fall within our terms of reference. We
do not consider that this is compatible with the due process objective of ensuring that India
receives adequate notice of the claim it must answer. Moreover, though both notifications are
issued pursuant to the Livestock Act, thereby indicating that they are subsidiary to it, this is not
probative of there being any relationship of subsidiarity between the two notifications themselves.
7.86. With this in mind, we continue our analysis by considering the timing of the respective
measures. We observe that S.O. 655(E) pre-dates S.O. 1663(E) by approximately ten years. We
also observe that both of them are in force at the time of writing this Report.

notice of appeal was such that it had provided adequate notice to the European Communities of the scope of
the appeal. Conversely, in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body rejected the United States'
assertion that the reference in its notice of appeal to the panel's failure to properly interpret Article 18.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement "plainly covers" a claim that the Panel
exceeded its terms of reference. The Appellate Body said that "[g]eneric statements such as that relied upon
by the United States cannot serve to give the appellees adequate notice that they will be required to defend
against a claim that the Panel exceeded its terms of reference". Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), para. 200. (emphasis added)
331 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126.
333 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, para. 433.
334 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 147.
335 A detailed description of S.O. 1663(E) can be found in section 2.3.2 above. The description of
S.O. 655(E), the SIPs and the health certificates thereunder can be found in section 7.1.2.4.4.1 above.
336 Exhibit US-116; India's first written submission, paras. 23 and 25.
337 Exhibit US-80.

7.87. Considering the wording of the measures, we note that although S.O. 655(E) restricts the
importation into India of all livestock products, it does not, on its face, prohibit the importation of
any livestock products. Furthermore, as it app lies to "all" livestock products, the scope of
S.O. 655(E) is broader than, and therefore includes, the products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to
(1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E).338
7.88. We recall that the health certificates are annexed to the SIPs issued pursuant to
S.O. 655(E). If we examine the SIPs provided by India, we note that, although not annexed to
S.O. 655(E) or its Schedule, there appears to be a standard form of SIP which is adjusted
according to the product(s) in each consignment, based on the specific conditions applying to the
consignment at issue. 339 We also note that, on the basis of the evidence before us, there is no
single health certificate that applies to all livestock products uniformly. Rather, each health
certificate is customized depending on the specific product to be imported, to reflect the specific
conditions that apply to the consignment identified in any given SIP, pursuant to Clause 3(iv) of
S.O. 655(E). Indeed, as is the case with the SIPs provided by India in Exhibits IND-25, IND-27,
IND-29, IND-31, IND-32, and IND-33, there may be more than one health certificate issued in
respect of one single SIP when the consignment includes more than one livestock product. Each
health certificate will thus reflect the specific conditions that apply to the respective livestock
product.
7.89. On the basis of the evidence before us, we can conclude that there is no standard health
certificate that applies specifically to all the products listed in paragraphs 1(ii)(a) to (j) of
S.O. 1663(E).
7.90. Continuing with our examination, we observe that the text of S.O. 1663(E) makes no
reference to S.O. 655(E), to the SIP, to a health certificate, or to an attestation from a
veterinarian regarding an exporting country's NAI status. Likewise, the text of S.O. 655(E) does
not contain any explicit reference to S.O. 1663(E). This is also the case for the SIPs and the health
certificates attached to them, as provided by India, as well as the blank health certificates
provided by the United States.
7.91. The above leads us to conclude that an analysis of the various instruments on their face
does not show a sufficiently close relationship or a relationship of subsidiarity between those
instruments. However, our inquiry does not end here. We must examine whether we can discern
from the manner in which these instruments operate a relationship that may, nonetheless, be
qualified as "sufficiently close" or "subsidiary", in particular with respect to AI. In doing so, we will
examine whether, as argued by the United States , the health certificates implement the import
prohibition imposed by S.O. 1663(E) because of concerns related to AI.
7.92. As we observed above, S.O. 1663(E) contains an express prohibition by the Indian
government on the importation of a number of livestock products because of concerns related to
AI. We observe that S.O. 1663(E) does not make explicit provision for the enforcement or
implementation of the import prohibition reflected therein. Nonetheless, as we described in
section 2.3.2 above, S.O. 1663(E) is a notification issued by the DAHD pursuant to the
Livestock Act. Such a notification operates as if it has been issued under Section 11 of the
Customs Act 1962, and becomes a customs notification.
340 Such notifications empower customs
officials to implement the Act according to those orders, instructions and directions that are issued
to them by the CBEC.341 Therefore, although there is no language relating to its implementation in
S.O. 1663(E) itself, the relationship between S.O. 1663(E) and the Customs Act is such that the
prohibition is implemented by customs authorities acting pursuant to the Customs Act. The same
would be the case for S.O. 655(E) as it is also a notification issued by the DAHD pursuant to the
Livestock Act.342

338 These products are described in detail in para. 2.32 above.
339 Exhibits IND-20, IND-21, IND-25, IND-27, IND-28, IND-29, IND-30, IND-31, IND-32, IND-33,
IND-34, IND-35.
340 India's response to Panel question No. 20(a); Exhibits US-114, Section 3(2); and US-115, Section 4.
Customs Act 1962, accessed on 20 January 2014, <http://www.cbec.gov.in/customs/cs-act/custom-act-
1962.pdf>.
341 Customs Act 1962, Section 151A. India's response to question no 20(a).
342 India's response to Panel question No. 20(a).

7.93. However, the modus operandi o f b o t h n o t i f i c a t i o n s i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t . I n d e e d , w e r e c a l l
India's repeated submission that the NAI status of an exporting country is a condition of entry for
the products enumerated in S.O. 1663(E). 343 Significantly, S.O. 1663(E) is a prohibitive measure,
and contains the threshold requirement that an exporting country be NAI-free as a precursor to
any importation of the products enumerated in S.O. 1663(E). By contrast, S.O. 655(E) contains no
explicit reference to a prohibition because of concerns of NAI, or to any procedures that relate
specifically to AI. Rather, S.O. 655(E) governs the procedures for the importation of all livestock
products into India, including the importation of products that are the subject of this dispute.
7.94. We understand this to mean that a country , the products of which are prohibited through
the operation of S.O. 1663(E), cannot access the procedures prescribed under S.O. 655(E)
(including the health certificates). In other words, it is only once an exporting country satisfies the
threshold condition of entry in S.O. 1663(E) that S.O. 655(E) becomes operational with respect to
the products in S.O. 1663(E) from that particular country, and that the exporting country would
have cause to complete and provide a health certificate. To this extent, we are persuaded by
India's argument that "S.O. 655(E) and the sanitary certificates are relevant only if the product
originates from a NAI[-]free country because it is only when the product originates from a
NAI[-]free country [that the product can] be imported and be accompanied with a veterinary
certificate".
344
7.95. Not only is there no sufficiently close or subsidiary relationship between S.O. 1663(E) and
S.O. 655(E) in terms of implementing India's concerns related to AI, but, in fact, there is no scope
for the application of S.O. 655(E) (including the re quirement to provide a health certificate) if a
product, and the country from which the product is exported, fail to satisfy the condition of entry
in S.O. 1663(E). Put another way, S.O. 655(E) is inapplicable in circumstances where a product is
blocked by India's prohibition in S.O. 1663(E) on imports of products from countries reporting AI.
7.96. There is a sequence to the operation of the respective measures that manifests through the
condition of entry. A country must necessarily be excluded from the scope of the prohibition in
S.O. 1663(E) – that is, it must be AI-free – in order for its exporters to be subject to the specific
procedures laid out in S.O. 655(E), among which is the provision of a health certificate with each
consignment of products (the content of which depends on the specific product(s) being exported).
Conversely, given that a country blocked by S. O. 1663(E) on account of NAI, such as the
United States in this present dispute, cannot access S.O. 655(E), the situation would not arise
where exporters in the United States (or any other country notifying AI) would be subjected to the
requirement to provide a health certificate pursuant to S.O. 655(E). The prohibition would operate
to prevent importation of all products listed in pa ragraphs 1(ii)(a) to (j) of S.O. 1663(E), such that
there would be no consignment of those same products to which the exporter to India could attach
a health certificate.
7.97. We recall that India informed the Panel that its authorities had granted SIPs to
United States exporters in respect to unprocessed turkey meat in 2011. However, as discussed in
paragraphs 7.70 and 7.72 above we reviewed the evidence provided by India and concluded that
the SIPs provided by India were issued to expo rters in the United Arab Emirates. As we also
discussed, the United States presented data that appear to disprove India's argument, as no
imports of unprocessed turkey meat into India from the United States are recorded for 2011 or
2012. Given the evidence before us, we thus agree with the United States' contention that "there
appears to be no evidence to support the assertion that India has issued SIPs to the United States
or U.S. producers or that any shipments took place".
345 Accordingly, the Panel understands that,
up until the date of the panel request, India had no t actively applied the health certificates as a
tool to effect the prohibition on the importation of various agricultural products into India from the
United States due to AI-related concerns.
7.98. On the basis of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the health certificates are
subsidiary to, or in a sufficiently close relationsh ip with, S.O. 1663(E), to have provided India with
adequate notice of the inclusion of these health ce rtificates as "related measures, or implementing
measures". Accordingly, we find that the health certificates that accompany a SIP and that are

343 For instance, India's response to Panel question No. 17(b).
344 India's response to Panel question No. 17(b); India's closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 6.
345 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a).

issued pursuant to S.O. 655(E) are not "related to" or "implementing" the import prohibition
reflected in S.O. 1663(E) and, therefore, are not measures at issue in this dispute.
7.1.2.4.4.3 Whether S.O. 655(E) and the health certificates qualified as "orders issued
by [the DAHD] pursuant to the Livestock Act"
7.99. We now proceed to the second question, namely whether the reference in the panel request
to "orders issued by [the DAHD] pursuant to the Livestock Act" is sufficient to bring the health
certificates issued thereunder within the scope of the Panel's terms of reference. The United States
argues that the reference in the panel request to "orders issued by [the DAHD] pursuant to the
Livestock Act" is sufficient because S.O. 655(E) is a notification issued pursuant to the
Livestock Act, and because S.O. 655(E) requires the fulfilment of the conditions in a SIP, among
which is the completion of a health certificate.
346 The United States also considers it appropriate
for the Panel, in reviewing India's second request for a preliminary ruling, to keep in mind India's
alleged failure to respond to the United States' request pursuant to Article 5.8 of the
SPS Agreement for a statement of the measures through which India maintains import restrictions
on account of AI.
347 India does not respond specifically to the United States' argument regarding
the inclusion of the health certificates through the reference in the panel request to "orders".
7.100. As we emphasized in our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, fulfilment of the requirements
of Article 6.2 of the DSU are "not a mere formality".348 In addition to forming the basis of a panel's
terms of reference, a panel requ est serves the due process objective of notifying the respondent
and third parties of the nature of the complainant's case. Moreover, due process considerations
inform the inquiry into the sufficiency of the panel request in that the request must serve to allow
the respondent to "begin" preparing its defence.
349 Given this significant role of the panel request,
we must scrutinize it carefully to ensure that it complies not only with the letter but also the spirit
of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
350
7.101. Bearing this in mind, the Panel recalls that in our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 we
addressed, inter alia, India's complaint that the use of the term "orders" in the plural renders the
panel request unclear, in contravention of Article 6.2 of the DSU.351 In responding to this challenge
by India, the United States explained that it us e d t h e p l u r a l f o r m o f t h e w o r d " o r d e r s " i n t h e
panel request "to ensure that it captured new, replacement, or additional orders or notifications in
force as of the time of which the United States was not aware".
352 The United States added that
this inclusive terminology was particularly necessary in the present case given India's failure to
respond to the United States' request pursuant to Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement for a
statement of the measures through which India maintains import restrictions on account of AI.353
7.102. We noted in paragraph 7.60 above that S.O. 655(E) was issued by the DAHD and
published in the Gazette of India on 9 July 2001, and therefore predates S.O. 1663(E) by ten
years.354 Therefore, S.O. 655(E) cannot be said to be a "new" or a "replacement" measure in
relation to S.O. 1663(E). Furthermore, S.O. 655(E) was notified to the WTO on 11 April 2002. 355
This notification was circulated to all WTO Me mbers. In addition, as India points out, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was aware of and made reference to S.O. 655(E)

346 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 15.
347 United States' response to India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 16. United States'
first written submission, para. 212, footnote 299; and preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, para. 3.61.
348 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, para. 3.2 (citing Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials,
paras. 219, 220 and 233 (citing Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22; US – Carbon
Steel, paras. 125 and 126; Australia – Apples, para. 416; Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; US –
Continued Zeroing, para. 160; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 107; and EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 786)).
349 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, para. 3.3 (citing Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams,
para. 88).
350 Panel Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 7.143 (citing Appellate Body
351 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, Section 3.2.5.
352 United States' first written submission, para. 218, footnote 299. Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013,
para. 3.61.
353 United States' first written submission, para. 218, footnote 299; and United States' response to
India's second request for a preliminary ruling, para. 16. Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, para. 3.61.
354 S.O. 655(E), (Exhibit US-116, Exhibit IND-18).
355 G/SPS/N/IND/9, 11 April 2002, (Exhibit IND-60).

in a report published prior to the initiation of this dispute. 356 Under the circumstances, the Panel is
not persuaded that S.O. 655(E) was an "additional or der or notification in force as of the time of
which the United States was not aware". Simply put, not referring specifically to S.O. 655(E) and
relying instead on bringing it within the panel request through the reference to "orders" does not
square with the United States' explanation for its use of the word "orders" in plural.
7.103. For the above reasons, the Panel finds that the health certificates that accompany a SIP
and that are issued pursuant to S.O. 655(E) do not qualify as "orders issued by [the DAHD]
pursuant to the Livestock Act" within the meanin g of the panel request and therefore they are not
measures at issue in this dispute.
7.1.2.5 Conclusion
7.104. With respect to India's allegations in its second request for a preliminary ruling that the
panel request fails to comply with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Panel concludes
as follows:
a. the NAP 2012, being a measure that applies only to India's domestic agricultural
products, falls outside the previously delimited scope of "India's [AI] measures [that]
prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India from those countries
reporting NAI", and, therefore, is not a me asure at issue in this dispute within the
meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU;
b. the health certificates that accompany a SIP and that are issued pursuant to S.O. 655(E)
are not "related to" or "implementing" the import prohibition reflected in S.O. 1663(E)
and, therefore, are not measures at issue in this dispute;
c. the health certificates that accompany a SIP and that are issued pursuant to S.O. 655(E)
do not qualify as "orders issued by [the DAHD ] pursuant to the Livestock Act" within the
meaning of the panel request and, therefore, are not measures at issue in this dispute.
7.105. The Panel further finds that, having plainly connected Article 2.3 and India's AI measures,
the United States was not under an additional obligation to identify the NAP 2012 in its
panel request and thus India's request that the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement be set aside as outside the jurisdiction of the Panel is denied.
7.1.3 Other preliminary issues
7.106. As indicated in paragraph 7.3 above, the Pa nel determined, at the time of issuance of its
preliminary ruling on 22 May 2013, that it was premature to decide in the abstract certain issues
raised by India in its first preliminary ruling request. Having received all submissions from the
parties and having completed our examination in this dispute, we are now in a position to respond
to India's request for a ruling on these items, to which we turn below.
7.1.3.1 Whether the "related measures" and "implementing measures" mentioned in
the panel request are included in the Panel's terms of reference
7.107. We recall that, in its first preliminary ruling request, India alleged that the United States
failed to identify the specific measures at issue in its panel request, contrary to the requirements
of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Specifically, India requested that the Panel find that the United States'
reference in its panel request to the term "related measures, or implementing measures" fell short
of the requirement of specificity in Article 6.2 of the DSU.
357 We refer to Section 3.2.4 of our
preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 for an account of the parties' arguments and the Panel's review
of the text of the panel request, the applicable legal provision, and its interpretation by prior
panels and the Appellate Body.

356 India's first written submission, para. 104; and USDA Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN)
Report, 7 May 2009, (USDA GAIN Report), (Exhibit IND-61), p. 2.
357 India's request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 29-31 and 34.

7.108. We also recall our earlier findings as follows:
3.50 Thus, the Panel considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, it is
premature and indeed unnecessary to make a determination in the abstract, at this
preliminary stage, as to precisely which measures fall within the Panel's terms of
reference by virtue of the inclusion of the terms "related measures, or implementing
measures" in the panel request. The Panel will revisit this issue in the course of these
proceedings should a relevant challenge arise.
358
3.51 This is not to say, however, that the panel request is not sufficiently precise to
meet the requirements of Article 6.2 simply by virtue of the inclusion of the terms
"related measures, or implementing measures". As we have explained above, the
panel request makes clear that the measures at issue in this case are the avian
influenza measures that prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into
India from those countries reporting NAI. Whether a particular "related" or
"implementing" measure (i.e., one not specifically mentioned in the panel request)
may be included within the panel's terms of reference is a matter that can be
addressed in the course of these proceedings as the need arises.
7.109. The Panel thus postponed its decision to later in the proceedings "should a relevant
challenge arise". With the exception of the argumentation concerning the health certificates, which
we examined in section 7.1.2.4.4 above, the United States has not put forward any challenge
concerning potentially "related measures, or implementing measures in force as of the date of [the
panel] request" in the course of the proceedings. Accordingly, as the condition for addressing this
issue has not arisen in the course of these proceedings, we need not rule on this issue.
7.1.3.2 Implication of the use of the word "orders" in the plural in the panel request
7.110. We recall that, in its first preliminary ruling request, India alleged that the use of the word
"orders" in the panel request created uncertainty, given that S.O. 1663(E) is a notification, not an
order, issued by the DAHD pursuant to Section 3 and Section 3A of the Livestock Act.
359 India
further alleged that the use of the word "orders" in the plural renders the panel request unclear as
to the types of notifications that the United States seeks to implicate in its panel request.360
7.111. We refer to Section 3.2.5 of our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 for an account of the
parties' arguments and the Panel's review of the text of the panel request 361, the applicable legal
provision, and its interpretation by prior panels and the Appellate Body.
7.112. In our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, we examined whether, by using the word
"orders" instead of "notifications" in identifying the legal instruments issued by the DAHD pursuant
to the Livestock Act, the United States would ha ve created uncertainty for India. Our examination
of the corresponding text of the panel request lead us to conclude that "the word 'orders' included
in the panel request does not render the panel request inconsistent with the specificity
requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU, and it do es not prejudice the ability of India to defend
itself".
362 This conclusion is further reinforced by India's response to a question from the Panel at
the first substantive meeting on what the acrony m "S.O." stands for; according to India, the
abbreviation "S.O." refers to "statutory order".363

358 (footnote original) The Panel notes that the United States has referred to "attendant circumstances"
that, in its view, would justify the inclusion of related and implementing measures that are currently not
specifically listed in the panel request (United States' first written submission, paras. 201 and 208, citing
Exhibit US-4). Given the Panel's decision not to make a preliminary decision in the abstract on whether specific
related or implementing measures form part of its terms of reference, the Panel sees no need to address this
argument here.
359 India's request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 36 and 37.
360 India's request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 29 and 35.
361 The relevant text in the panel request reads as follows:
– orders issued by India's Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying, and Fisheries
("DAHD") pursuant to the Livestock Act, most recently S.O. 1663(E), which was published
in the Gazette of India on July 19, 2011
363 India's response to Panel question No. 20(c).

7.113. We then examined India's additional allega tion that the use of the word "orders" in the
plural renders the panel request unclear as to the types of notifications that the United States
seeks to implicate in its panel request.
364 We recall that the United States responded to this
argument by explaining that its panel request refers to the word "orders" in the plural "to ensure
that it captured new, replacement, or additional or ders or notifications in force as of that time of
which the United States was not aware".365 We found as follows:
3.62 We echo our reasoning in Section 7.1.3.2 above on the use of the term "related
measures, or implementing measures" and conclude that it is premature for us to make a
determination, in the abstract, as to whether any "orders" not specifically listed in the
panel request fall within the Panel's terms of reference. The Panel will revisit this issue in the
course of these proceedings should a relevant challenge arise.

7.114. The Panel thus postponed its decision to later in the proceedings "should a relevant
challenge arise". The United States did not put forward during these proceedings any challenge
concerning any "new, replacement, or additional" orders in force at the time of the panel request
"of which the United States was not aware". Therefore, as the condition for addressing this issue
has not arisen in the course of these proceedings, we need not rule on it.
7.2 Order of analysis
7.115. Before commencing our analysis of the United States' legal claims, we first consider the
order of our analysis.
7.116. In its panel request, the United States puts forward claims under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1,
5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement
366, as well as under Article XI:1
of the GATT 1994. 367 When responding to the United States' claim pursuant to Article 3.1 of the
SPS Agreement, India invokes Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.368 Additionally, in response to the
United States' claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2, India raises Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.117. A question before us is whether there is a particular sequencing of the legal claims that
should be followed in examining the United States' claims and India's response. The United States
raised claims under both the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994, but did not indicate that its
Article XI claim under the GATT 1994 is made in the alternative to its SPS claims. Hence, our first
step is to decide whether to commence our analysis by examining the claims under the
SPS Agreement, or the claim under the GATT 1994. The parties have not argued for any particular
order of analysis in this regard. However, the United States discussed its claims under the
SPS Agreement before addressing its claim under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
369 Furthermore,
India's response to this latter claim is that its AI measures are consistent with the SPS Agreement
and therefore are presumed to be consistent with the GATT 1994.370
7.118. In determining the order in which we examine the various provisions at issue, we concur
with the panel in India – Autos that it is important to first consider "if a particular order is
compelled by principles of valid interpretative methodology, which, if not followed, might
constitute an error of law".371 Moreover, we observe that the order we choose may have an impact
on the potential for us to apply judicial economy in making our determinations in this case.372
7.119. We recall that, in EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body identified the test to be applied in
determining the order of analysis where two or more provisions from different covered Agreements
appear a priori to apply to the measure in question. The Appellate Body concluded that the

364 India's request for a preliminary ruling, para. 29.
365 United States' first written submission, para. 212, footnote 299.
366 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, pp. 2-3, paras. 1-10.
367 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3, para. 11.
368 India's first written submission, para. 141.
369 United States' first written submission, para. 203; United States' second written submission,
para. 126.
370 India's first written submission, para. 141.

provision from the Agreement that "deals specifically, and in detail" with the measures at issue
should be analysed first.373
7.120. In EC – Hormones, where claims under both the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement were
raised by the complainant, the panel, in a finding not reviewed by the Appellate Body, determined
that the SPS Agreement should be examined first because it "specifically addresses the type of
measure in dispute".374 This approach was also followed by the panels in Australia – Salmon375, EC
– Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products376, and US – Poultry (China).377
7.121. The order of analysis of the claims before us, therefore, hinges upon whether we find that
the measures at issue in this dispute are SPS measures. In such a case, the SPS Agreement would
be lex specialis as it would "deal specifically, and in detail" with the type of measures at issue, i.e.
SPS measures. Should we find that India's AI measures are SPS measures subject to the
disciplines of the SPS Agreement, we would then need to decide the order of analysis for the
numerous claims under the SPS Agreement raised by the United States.
7.122. India urges the Panel to commence with an examination of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement
on the grounds that its AI measures conform to the relevant international standard.
378 The
United States does not put forward a preferred order of analysis for its claims under the
SPS Agreement, although it commenced its argumentation in its first written submission with its
claims under Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SP S Agreement, and its second written submission
with argumentation regarding Article 3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.123. We understand from the Appellate Body Report in US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC)
that panels are not bound by the order of claims made by the complainant. As the Appellate Body
said, "in fulfilling its duties under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel may depart from the sequential
order suggested by the complaining party, in particular, when this is required by the correct
interpretation or application of the legal provisions at issue".
379
7.124. We are not inclined to follow the order used by the United States in its first written
submission, which would entail commencing our analysis by looking into the risk assessment
provisions, i.e. Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. The present case suggests a
different approach, for it is th e first time that a respondent, in response to a claim under
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement that its measures are not "based on" the relevant international
standard, argues that its measures "conform to" that international standard, within the meaning of
Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. Article 3.2 embodies a presumption of consistency with the
remainder of the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. This means that, were the Panel to find that
India's AI measures "conform to" an international standard within the meaning of Article 3.2 of the
SPS Agreement, India's AI measures will be presumed to be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994 identified in our terms of reference, obviating
any further analysis on our part.
7.125. In the light of these considerations, we will commence our analysis by determining
whether India's AI measures are SPS measures wi thin the scope of the SPS Agreement. If they
are, we will proceed to examine the United States' claims under Article 3.1, including India's

373 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 204.
374 Panel Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 8.41-8.42.
375 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.39, Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.16 (in the context
of the TBT Agreement).
376 Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1679.
377 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.68. This panel drew guidance from Article 2.4 of the
SPS Agreement, which provides that SPS measures that conform to the provisions of the SPS Agreement shall
be presumed to be in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994 which relate to the use of
SPS measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b). Article XX(b) had been raised as a defence by the
complainant in that dispute. In US – Continued Suspension, the panel stated that the reference to presumption
in Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement is intended to address potentially conflicting interpretations between two
provisions. Panel Report, US – Continued Suspension, para. 7.327, footnote 471.
378 India's first written submission, para. 107. India further argues that if the Panel were to find that its
measure is not consistent with Article 3, the Panel should look at Articles 2 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. In
India's view, only after having examined those provisions can the Panel examine the claims under Articles 5
and 6. India's first written submission, paras. 110-111.
379 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 277.

contention that its measures are presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement as a whole by
virtue of Article 3.2. In the event that we conclude that India's measures do not benefit from the
presumption of consistency set out in Article 3.2, our next step will be to examine the
United States' claims under Articles 5.1, 5.2 an d 2.2 of the SPS Agreement to establish whether
India's SPS measures are based on a risk assessment and are thus based on scientific principles
and are not maintained without sufficient scientifi c evidence. We will then proceed to examine the
United States' claim of discrimination under Article 2.3, along with the United States' alternative
claim under Article 5.5. Thereafter, the Panel will examine the claims under Article 5.6, which the
United States argues would result in a separate consequential breach of Article 2.2. We will then
examine the United States' claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2, as well as India's reliance on
Article 6.3. Finally, the Panel will examine the United States' claims under Article 7 and Annex B.
7.126. Once we have concluded our examination of the United States' claims under the
SPS Agreement, we will turn to the United States' claim under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
7.3 Whether India's AI measures are SPS measures within the scope of the
SPS Agreement
7.3.1 Arguments of the parties
7.3.1.1 United States
7.127. The United States claims that India's AI measures are SPS measures subject to the
disciplines of the SPS Agreement because (i) they fa ll within the definition of an SPS measure in
Annex A(1)(a) through (c) of the SPS Agreement, and (ii) they affect international trade by
imposing import prohibitions.
380
7.128. For the United States, "India's measures, both on their face and as described by India
itself, have ostensible purposes corresponding to those in subparagraphs (a) through (c)" of
Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement. The United States submits that India's Livestock Act, which
India invokes as the authority for its import prohibitions, authorizes India's central government to
regulate, restrict, or prohibit the import of "any live-stock product, which may be liable to affect
human or animal health".
381
7.129. The United States further argues that th e notifications made by India to the WTO provide
additional confirmation regarding the objectives of India's measures. In this respect, the
United States observes that India notified its most recent publication of AI import prohibitions,
S.O. 1663(E), to the SPS Committee, and in the notification form ticked the following under the
heading "Objective and rationale": (1) food safety, (2) animal health, and (3) to protect humans
from animal/plant pest or disease. The United States further explains that, under the same
heading, India included a narrative explanation of S.O. 1663(E)'s "objective and rationale" as
follows: "[t]o ensure food safety and protect do mestic and wild birds from avian influenza (both
from [HPNAI] and [LPAI])".
382 The United States indicates that in the same notification, under the
heading "Nature of the urgent problem(s) and reason for urgent action", India writes that the
reason for the urgent action was "to prevent the ingress of this virus to protect human health as
well as health of poultry in India". 383 For the United States, such measures are SPS measures
under the terms of Annex A(1)(a) through (c) of the SPS Agreement.384
7.130. Finally, asserting that India's measures constitute an import ban and relying on a
statement of the panel in EC – Hormones, the United States contends that "[i]t cannot be
contested tha[t] an import ban affects international trade".385

380 United States' first written submission, paras. 101-102.
381 United States' first written submission, para. 101.
382 United States' first written submission, para. 101.
383 United States' response to Panel question No. 11.
384 United States' first written submission, para. 101; United States' response to Panel question No. 11.
385 United States' first written submission, para. 102.

7.3.1.2 India
7.131. India agrees that its AI measures are SPS measures subject to the disciplines of the
SPS Agreement. India asserts that S.O. 1663( E) was notified to the WTO pursuant to
Annex A(1)(a) through (c) of the SPS Agreement. India adds that the Livestock Act is an
SPS measure as it can be classified under Annex A(1)(a) through (c). 386 Furthermore, India
acknowledges that both the Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E) affect international trade within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SPS Agreement.387
7.3.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.3.2.1 Introduction
7.132. As we detailed in section 7.2 above, the United States has raised claims under the
SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. As discussed, we intend to commence our analysis by
addressing the United States' claims under the SPS Agreement because this Agreement
"specifically addresses the type of measure in dispute".
388 A threshold issue in our examination of
these claims is therefore whether India's AI measures are SPS measures subject to the disciplines
of the SPS Agreement.
7.133. At the outset, we note that both parties agree that India's AI measures are SPS measures
subject to the disciplines set out in the SPS Agreement. In particular, the parties agree that India's
AI measures are SPS measures falling within the definitions provided in Annex A(1)(a) through (c)
of the SPS Agreement. Nevertheless, bearing in mi nd our duty, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU,
to make an objective assessment of the applicabi lity of the relevant covered agreements, we will
proceed to examine whether we agree with the parties on this threshold issue.
7.134. We commence by examining the legal provision at issue.
7.3.2.2 The legal provision at issue
7.135. Article 1 of the SPS Agreement sets out the scope of application of the Agreement as
follows:
1. This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may,
directly or indirectly, affect international trade. Such measures shall be developed and
applied in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A shall
apply.
7.136. We concur with prior panels that Article 1 of the SPS Agreement identifies two
requirements that "need to be fulfilled" for the SPS Agreement to apply, namely, that (i) the
measure at issue is an SPS measure and thus falls within one or more of the definitions provided
in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement; and (ii) the measure at issue directly or indirectly affects
international trade.
389 The Panel will thus consider in turn whether India's AI measures comply
with both requirements.
7.3.2.3 Whether India's AI measures are SP S measures within the definitions provided
in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement
7.137. We turn first to examine whether India's AI measures fall within one or more of the
definitions provided in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agr eement. In doing so, we recall that both parties

386 India's response to Panel question No. 14.
387 India's response to Panel question No. 14.
388 Panel Reports, EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.45; and EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.42.
389 Panel Reports, EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.39; EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.36; EC –
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2554; and US – Poultry (China), para. 7.82.

agree that India's measures are SPS measures falling within the definitions provided in
Annex A(1)(a) through (c).390
7.138. Annex A391 bears the title "Definitions". Annex A(1), in relevant part, defines
SPS measures as follows:
1. Sanitary or phytosanitary measure – Any measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member
from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests,
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof,
or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests;
…
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations,
requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and
production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures;
quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport
of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and
methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related
to food safety.
7.139. The Appellate Body in Australia – Apples considered that a fundamental element of the
definition of "SPS measures" in Annex A(1) is that such a measure must be one applied to protect
at least one of the listed interests or to prevent or limit specified damage.
392 The Appellate Body
further found that "the word 'applied' points to the application of the measure and, thus, suggests
that the relationship of the measure and one of the objectives listed in Annex A(1) must be
manifest in the measure itself or otherwise evident from the circumstances related to the
application of the measure".
393 This led the Appellate Body to conclude that "the purpose of a
measure is to be ascertained on the basis of objective considerations".394
7.140. Regarding the second sentence of paragraph 1, beginning with "Sanitary or phytosanitary
measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures …", the
Appellate Body in Australia – Apples also explained that the list of instruments included therein
"serves to illustrate, through a set of concrete examples, the different types of measures that,
when they exhibit the appropriate nexus to on e of the specified purposes, will constitute
SPS measures and, accordingly, be subject to the disciplines set out in the [SPS Agreement]".
395
7.141. We first consider whether India's AI measures fall within the scope of the list of
instruments in the second sentence of Annex A(1). We recall that India's AI measures are
maintained through the Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E). Both legal instruments thus qualify as
either "laws", "decrees" or "regulations" listed in the second sentence of Annex A.
7.142. As explained by the Appellate Body, these measures need also to "exhibit the appropriate
nexus to one of the specified purposes" in Annex A( 1) in order to be subject to the disciplines of

390 The Panel agrees with the parties that the definition in Annex A(1)(d) does not apply in this dispute.
391 We recall that Article 1.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that "[f]or the purposes of [the
SPS] Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A shall apply".
392 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 172.
393 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 172.
394 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 172.
395 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 176.

the SPS Agreement. Therefore, we turn to consider whether this nexus exists (be it manifest either
in the measure itself, or otherwise evident from the circumstances related to the application of the
measure) with the Livestock Act and in S.O. 1663(E).
7.143. The Livestock Act "extends to the whole of India"
396, and was enacted "to make better
provision for the regulation of the importation of live-stock which is liable to be affected by
infectious or contagious disorders".397 In particular, Section 3A of the Livestock Act provides:
The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, regulate, restrict
or prohibit in such manner and to such extent as it may think fit, the import into the
territories to which this Act extends, of any live-stock product which may be liable to
affect human or animal health.
398
7.144. It is apparent from the text of Section 3A of the Livestock Act that it concerns the
regulation of imports that may affect human or animal health, although Section 3A makes no
specific mention of AI.
7.145. S.O. 1663(E) was issued by the DAHD in th e exercise of powers conferred by Sections 3
and 3A of the Livestock Act.399 S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of various livestock products
from countries reporting NAI. 400 As mentioned by the United States, in its notification of
S.O. 1663(E) to the SPS Committee, India ticked the following boxes under the heading "Objective
and rationale": "food safety", "animal health", an d " p r o t e c t h u m a n s f r o m a n i m a l / p l a n t p e s t o r
disease". India also provided the following narrative explanation under that same heading: "[t]o
ensure food safety and protect domestic and wild birds from [AI] (both from [HPNAI] and [LPAI])".
In addition, under the heading "Nature of the urgent problem(s) and reason for urgent action",
India further specified: "[u]rgent action has been taken to prevent the ingress of this virus to
protect human health as well as health of poultry in India".
401
7.146. The purpose of S.O. 1663(E), on its face, and as notified by India to the SPS Committee, is
purportedly to protect human and animal health from the ingress of AI and to ensure food safety.
Furthermore, while there is nothing on the face of the Livestock Act to indicate that it regulates
imports that may affect human or animal health specifically because of AI, it is evident that
Section 3A of the Livestock Act has been applied, through S.O. 1663(E), specifically with a view to
p r o t e c t i n g h u m a n a n d a n i m a l h e a l t h f r o m t h e i n g r e s s o f A I a n d t o e n s u r e f o o d s a f e t y . T h e s e
purported objectives fall squarely within the de finitions in Annex A(1)(a) through (c). Moreover,
the nexus between the measure and these objectives is manifest – in the case of S.O. 1663(E), in
the measure itself and, in the case of the Live stock Act, in the circumstances surrounding its
application.
7.147. The Panel proceeds to consider whether these purported objectives bring India's
AI measures within the scope of Annex A(1)(a) through (c) of the SPS Agreement.
7.148. As indicated above, both parties consider that the Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E) fall
within the definitions provided in Annex A(1)(a) through (c). This means that, if the parties are
correct, India's AI measures would serve more than one of the purposes enumerated in
Annex A(1). We recall that the Appellate Body has explained that an SPS measure must be one
applied to protect "at least one of the listed interests" set out in Annex A(1).
402 We understand this
to mean that SPS measures may be applied to protect more than one of the listed purposes in
Annex A(1).403

396 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Section 1(2).
397 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Preamble.
398 Livestock Amendment Act, (Exhibit US-115), Section 5.
399 Section 2.3.2 above.
400 Section 2.3.2 above.
401 G/SPS/N/IND/73.
402 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 172.
403 This was also the view of the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.
Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.285, explaining that the potential
adverse effects covered by Annex A(1)(a) may also fall within the scope of other subparagraphs of Annex A(1).

7.149. There is no debate as to whether AI is a "disease". Indeed, both parties agree on this
point. As explained in section 2.2.1 above, AI, "flu" or "bird flu", is described by the WHO as "an
infectious viral disease of birds often causing no apparent signs of illness".
404 The OIE405 describes
AI as "a highly contagious viral disease affecting several species of food producing birds". 406
Similarly, AI is identified in the Terrestrial Code as one of the "listed diseases" recognised by the
OIE.407 NAI, as depicted in section 2.2.3 above, is a subset of AI; it encompasses the types of AI
(i.e. HPNAI and LPNAI), the presence of which must be notified to the OIE. In the light of these
agreed definitions, we accept that AI, which enco mpasses its notifiable form, is a "disease" within
the meaning of Annex A(1)(a) and (c) of the SPS Agreement.
7.150. Annex A(1)(a) also requires that the measure concern the protection of animal life or
health from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of, inter alia , diseases. As
explained in section 2.2.4 above, AI is a dise ase transmissible to and among animals; India's
AI measures may therefore be said to be applied to protect animal life or health from a disease
within the scope of Annex A(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement.
7.151. We turn next to Annex A(1)(c), which concerns the protection of human life or health and
specifically refers to risks arising from diseases "carried by animals". The ordinary meaning of
"carry" is to "bear from one place to another, convey, transport".
408 We recall that birds are the
"natural reservoir" of AI. 409 Therefore, birds can be said to carry AI. We further recall that AI
viruses are transmitted by direct contact between infected and susceptible birds or indirect contact
through aerosol droplets or exposure to virus-contaminated objects.
410 Additionally, as described
in section 2.2.4 above, although AI is a disease carried by animals, it is transmissible to humans
(i.e. it is a zoonosis). 411 According to the WHO, some AI viruses have been reported to cross the
species barrier and cause disease or subclinical infections in humans and other mammals. 412 Both
parties as well as the OIE provided the Panel with information supporting the possibility of
transmission of AI, and particularly NAI, from animals (particularly poultry) to humans. 413 This
information also illustrates that NAI poses a danger to human life and health once the human is
infected with an NAI virus. In the light of this evidence and these considerations, we conclude that
some strains of NAI are transmissible to humans and, therefore, that AI is a disease that is carried
by animals and transmissible to humans, thus posing a danger to human life and health. This leads

404 WHO, "Avian Influenza", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html>.
405 According to Annex A(3)(b) of the SPS Agreement, the international standards for animal health and
zoonoses are those developed under the auspices of the OIE and that one such set of standards, which
includes recommendations relating to NAI, is embodied in the Terrestrial Code. The Terrestrial Code defines
"disease" as the "clinical and/or pathological manifestation of infection", while referring to "infection" as "the
entry and development or multiplication of an infectious agent in the body of humans or animals". Glossary of
the Terrestrial Code, pp. 3 and 6.
406 OIE, "About AI", access 6 March 2014, <http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/web-portal-
on-avian-influenza/about-ai/>.
407 Terrestrial Code (21st edition), Article 1.2.3.6.
408 Online Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 25 February 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28252?rskey=tMzpMj&result=3#eid>.
409 FAO, "Avian Flu is …", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/background.html>; Causey & Edwards, (Exhibit US-14), p. S29.
410 FAO, "How is avian influenza transmitted?", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/qanda.html#7>, (Exhibit US-28); Swayne & Halvorson, (Exhibit US-6),
p. 165; CFSPH, (Exhibit US-32), p. 3.
411 The OIE defines a zoonosis as "any disease or infection which is naturally transmissible from animals
to humans". Glossary of the Terrestrial Code, p. 13.
412 WHO, "Avian Influenza", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html>; WHO, "Avian influenza in
humans", accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/en/> (Exhibit US-36).
413 United States' first written submission, paras. 41-45; India's response to Panel question No. 4(a) and
No. 4(b); OIE's response to Panel question No. 3; Cox & Uyeki, (Exhibit US-37), pp. 454-455; Swayne, Control
Strategies, (Exhibit US-24), p. 294; D. Swayne and C. Thomas, "Trade and Food Safety Aspects for Avian
Influenza Viruses", in D. Swayne (ed.) Avian Influenza (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) (Swayne & Thomas)
(Exhibit US-31), p. 501; G. Neumann, T. Horimoto, Y. Kawaoka, "Reverse Genetics of Viruses – Applications in
Research and Vaccine Design", in H.-D. Klenk, M. Matrosovich, and J. Stech, Avian Influenza, (Karger, 2008)
(Exhibit US-38). FAO-OIE-WHO Technical Update: Current evolution of avian influenza H5N1 viruses
(September 7, 2011) (Exhibit US-41); and WHO, "Human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus –
update", accessed 30 March 2014, <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_07_20/en/index.html>
(Exhibit IND-130).

us to conclude that India's AI measures are applied to protect human life or health from a disease
carried by animals within the meaning of Annex A(1)(c) of the SPS Agreement.
7.152. Finally, we turn to Annex A(1)(b), which does not refer to "diseases". Rather, this provision
concerns the protection of human or animal life or health from risks arising from "additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms" that may be present in "foods, beverages or
feedstuffs". It is our understanding that AI viruses may be characterized as "disease-causing
organisms". Indeed, as described in section 2.2.2 above, AI viruses may cause disease, the
likelihood of which is contingent on whether the virus strain in question is HPAI or LPAI. Whereas
HPAI viruses are extremely infectious and lead to necrobiotic, haemorrhagic or inflammatory
lesions in multiple visceral organs, the brain and skin of infected birds
414, LPAI viruses may be
asymptomatic or have very mild symptoms, including ruffled feathers, reduced egg production, or
mild effects on the respiratory system. 415 In addition, LPAI viruses can mutate into HPAI viruses,
which, as noted above, cause more severe forms of the disease. Accordingly, we understand that
AI viruses may cause disease. We therefore believe that India's measures may be classed as those
that are applied to protect against risks arising from disease-causing organisms within the scope of
Annex A(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement.
7.153. We note that Annex A(1)(a) also addresses the protection of animal life or health from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of, inter alia, disease-causing organisms.
Accordingly, measures applied to protect against risk s from AI viruses also fall within the scope of
Annex A(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement on this basis.
7.154. On the basis of the foregoing, the Panel concludes that India's AI measures are measures
applied for the protection of animal and human life or health from risks arising from the entry and
spread of AI as well as from risks of AI viruse s in food and feedstuffs. The Panel therefore finds
that India's AI measures are SPS measures fallin g within the definitions in Annex A(1)(a) through
(c) of the SPS Agreement.
7.3.2.4 Whether India's AI measures directly or indirectly affect international trade
7.155. The Panel will now consider the second requirement of Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement
identified in paragraph 7.136 above; namely, whether India's measures directly or indirectly affect
international trade.
7.156. Both parties are in agreement that India's AI measures directly affect international trade.
In particular, the United States refers to the finding of the panel in EC – Hormones and argues that
because India's measures prohibit the importation of the relevant products from the United States,
"[i]t cannot be contested tha[t] an import ban affects international trade". 416 Furthermore, India
acknowledges that both the Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E) affect international trade within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SPS Agreement.417
7.157. We agree with the approach of the panel in EC – Hormones cited by the United States and
consider that an import ban such as the one imposed by India's AI measures affects international
trade.418 Indeed, an import ban is, by its very nature, intended to affect international trade.
7.158. Consequently, the Panel concludes that India's AI measures, being those measures that
"prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India from those countries reporting
[NAI]"
419 directly affect international trade.

414 Swayne & Suarez, (Exhibit US-19), p. 463.
415 OIE "What is Avian Influenza?", accessed 28 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AI-EN.pdf>, (Exhibit US-23),
p. 3.
416 United States' first written submission, para. 102.
417 India's response to Panel question No. 14.
419 Panel's Preliminary Ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.33-3.34 and 4.1a.

7.3.3 Conclusion
7.159. Having determined that India's AI measures fall within the definitions set out in
Annex A(1)(a) through (c) of the SPS Agreement, that they qualify as either "laws", "decrees" or
"regulations" listed in the second sentence of Anne x A(1), and that they affect international trade,
the Panel finds that India's AI measures are SPS measures subject to the disciplines of the
SPS Agreement.
7.160. We therefore proceed to examine the Unit ed States' claims under the SPS Agreement and
commence with the claim pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
7.4 Whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement
7.4.1 Arguments of the parties
7.4.1.1 United States
7.161. The United States claims that India's AI measures are inconsistent with India's obligations
under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement because they are not "based on" the relevant international
standards, guidelines, or recommendations of the OIE, nor are they in accordance with Article 3.3
of the SPS Agreement.
420
7.162. The United States submits that Article 3.1 imposes a positive obligation on a Member to
base its measures on international standards unless the Member's measure is justified through
another provision of the SPS Agreement. 421 According to the United States, both parties to this
dispute agree that the relevant standard is the Terrestrial Code adopted by the OIE. 422 The
United States contends that India's measures are not based on the Terrestrial Code. 423 The
United States observes that "[w]hereas the OIE's recommendations provide that various products
can be in fact imported with the proper control measures, India has chosen to ban those products
outright".424 Moreover, for the United States, while the OIE encourages countries to consider
principles such as regionalization – i.e. limiting the territory to which a measure need be applied –
India categorically rejects this consideration.425
7.163. The United States submits that a defining characteristic of the Terrestrial Code is that it
distinguishes between HPNAI and LPNAI with respect to trade. The United States argues that
India's measures deny such a distinction and impose a complete ban for certain products
"regardless of whether the country is reporting HPNAI and LPNAI". 426 The United States further
explains that the Terrestrial Code allows trade to occur from countries reporting LPNAI – and even
HPNAI – with respect to a particular product if the appropriate control measure is applied. It
contends that "[f]or every product banned by India, there is either an applicable OIE
recommendation explaining how trade can be facilitated or no recommendation at all". 427
According to the United States, "[a]t no point in the [Terrestrial] Code is there any suggestion that
the relevant product should be categorically prohibited from trade". 428 The United States observes
that "[i]n short, the [Terrestrial] Code allows trade; India's measures do not".429
7.164. The United States notes that to "base something on" is defined as to "use as the
foundation for". 430 It also asserts that whether or not a particular measure is "based on" an
international standard is necessarily a case-by-case evaluation. According to the United States, for
a measure to be "based on" a standard in the Te rrestrial Code, "the measure must adopt the basic

420 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.
421 United States' first written submission, para. 127.
422 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 2 and 5.
423 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
424 United States' first written submission, para. 12.
425 United States' first written submission, para. 12.
426 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
427 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
428 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
429 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
430 United States' response to Panel question No. 30 (referring to Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 110
(Exhibit US-139)).

structure of the recommendation, and not contain elements that contradict the standard". 431
According to the United States, given the facts of this dispute, India's measures are so inconsistent
with the Terrestrial Code that under no possible interpretation of "based on" could India's measure
be seen to meet the condition in Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
432
7.165. The United States observes that India's assertion that its measures are based on
international standards is flawed because India is not pointing to actual recommendations that its
measures embody.
433 For the United States, there is no basis in the Terrestrial Code or in the
record of the dispute to support any argument th at India's measures are based on international
standards. First, India has not "adopted" any re commendations of the Terrestrial Code. Second,
India's measures either prohibit products for which there is no recommendation in the
Terrestrial Code, such as live pigs, or prohibit the importation of products that the
recommendation explicitly provides can be imported. Accordingly, the United States submits that
"India's measures, at best, are either unsupported by the [Terrestrial] Code's recommendations or
in outright contravention of them", and "[u]nder these circumstances, India cannot claim that its
measures are based on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations in accordance
with Article 3.1".
434
7.166. As regards India's defence under Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, the United States avers
that an examination of the plain text of the Terrestrial Code in comparison to India's measures
shows that India's measures do not conform to the Code. India's measures prohibit the
importation of products because of concerns relating to AI, while the Terrestrial Code provides that
these same products can, in fact, be safely imported.
435
7.167. The United States points out that according to Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, "a
Member's standards that conform to the applicable international standards enjoy a presumption of
consistency with the SPS Agreement". For the United States, central to this provision is the use of
the term "conform", which in the light of the Appellate Body's findings in EC – Hormones means
that the Member's measure must match the international standard "completely".
436 According to
the United States, a WTO Member that "picks and chooses" those standards and recommendations
it prefers is not entitled to the presumption. Th e United States submits that as India's measures
are not consistent with, let alone conforming to, the Terrestrial Code, India is unable to invoke
Article 3.2 as a defence to the United States' claims.
437
7.168. The United States asserts that India's measures amount to a "fundamental departure"
from the Terrestrial Code, as the relevant recommendations in the Code do not support import
prohibitions, but actually provide that the products can be safely imported with the proper
precautions or control measures.
438 Moreover, the United States points out that for two products
subject to India's measures, namely, (1) live pigs and (2) pathological material and biological
products from birds, there are no relevant international standards; and thus for those products
India has no basis to make a claim of conformity with international standards under Article 3.2.
439
7.169. The United States refers to India's assertion that the Terrestrial Code contains alternate
recommendations offering different levels of protection, and submits that nothing in the
Terrestrial Code's text supports that proposition. For the United States, "[e]ssentially, India
suggests that the Code constitutes a menu from which countries can pick a recommendation based
on their particular [appropriate level of protection (ALOP)]".
440 According to the United States, this
is not how the Code works, as the provision that applies to a situation hinges on the disease status
of the exporting country and the product that is being exported.
441

431 United States' response to Panel question No. 30.
432 United States' response to Panel question No. 30.
433 United States' second written submission, para. 30.
434 United States' second written submission, para. 31.
435 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5.
436 United States' first written submission, para. 108 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
Hormones, paras. 170-171).
437 United States' first written submission, para. 108.
438 United States' second written submission, para. 10.
439 United States' second written submission, para. 10, footnote 6.
440 United States' closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
441 United States' closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.

7.170. According to the United States, India interprets a recommendation not to impose import
prohibitions on account of detections of NAI in wild birds as somehow affirmatively recommending
bans on imports of poultry products.
442 The United States maintains that "[w]here the [Terrestrial]
Code recommends prohibitions, it explicitly so provides ", as it does with respect to avian
chlamydiosis.443
7.171. The United States also explains that the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code "are
designed to achieve a single, consistent appropriate level of protection, i.e., an optimal level of
animal health security ".444 Moreover, the United States maintains, the exporting status of a
territory is simply a factor to be taken into account in ensuring that the specific recommendation is
tailored to achieve that appropriate level of protec tion. The United States claims that the structure
of these recommendations are such that they often allow for trade to continue if the status of the
exporting territory changes, by ensuring that an alternative recommendation can take into account
the new situation.
445 For the United States, India's assertion that the Terrestrial Code seeks to
achieve different ALOPs is at odds with the OIE's own guidance regarding the use of the Code.446
7.172. According to the United States, India alleges: (i) that the Terrestrial Code recognizes
India's prerogative to set its own ALOP; (ii) that the "exporting status of a country" is an ALOP;
and (iii) that the admonition in a particular recommendation, Article 10.4.1.10, not to impose
import prohibitions in poultry products on account of NAI detections in wild birds "somehow also
means a ban should be undertaken when NAI is detected in poultry".
447
7.173. The United States notes that with respect to India's first assertion, it generally is not the
role of an international standard-setting organi zation to predetermine a Member's chosen ALOP,
and nothing in the Terrestrial Code indicates otherwise. Rather, as recognized in the
SPS Agreement, each Member has the right to set its own ALOP. 448 That right, however, is
accompanied by an obligation, and where a Member chooses measures that achieve a higher ALOP
than that achieved by the international standard, the Member has the obligation to ensure that the
measure is supported by scientific evidence. Accord ing to the United States, the User's Guide to
the Terrestrial Code supports this approach in stating that "[w]here the conditions are more
restrictive [than those recommended by the Terrestrial Code], they should be based on a scientific
risk analysis conducted in accordance with OIE recommendations".449
7.174. For the second assertion, the United States claims that India does not explain how it can
be reconciled with the specific text in the Terrestrial Code. Referring to Articles 10.4.7 and 10.4.8
of the Code, the United States highlights that it is clear that the "exporting status" of a country,
India's so-called "condition of entry", is not an AL OP (as India claims), but rather a factor to be
taken into account in applying any measure. 450 The United States further points to Article 10.4.19
of the Terrestrial Code, applicable to the importation of fresh meat of poultry, to illustrate that the
Code foresees instances where the relevant recommendation recognizes that the status of the
exporting country is irrelevant with respect to the safe importation of a particular product.
451
7.175. With respect to India's third assertion, that Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code
supports the imposition of a ban, the United States claims that India cannot reconcile its position
with the text of the recommendation. First, there is no language in Article 10.4.1.10 suggesting
that countries should impose import prohibitions on account of NAI detections in poultry. Second,
according to the United States, it is also legally untenable for India to pick only certain aspects of
OIE recommendations and successfully invoke Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.
452
7.176. The United States adds that India's failure to establish that its measures conform to the
Terrestrial Code also establishes that India has not based its measures on international standards,

442 United States' closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
443 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 13. (emphasis original)
444 United States' second written submission, para. 16. (emphasis original)
445 United States' second written submission, para. 16.
446 United States' second written submission, para. 12.
447 United States' second written submission, para. 17.
448 United States' second written submission, para. 18.
449 United States' second written submission, para. 18.
450 United States' second written submission, para. 19.
451 United States' second written submission, para. 20.
452 United States' second written submission, para. 21.

thereby breaching Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. Specifically, "because India's arguments rely
only on Article [10.4.1.10] of the [Terrestrial] Co de – and because India's interpretation of that
provision cannot be sustained … - India has no basis for any assertion that its measures are based
on the Code".
453
7.177. The United States further argues that India cannot avail itself of the provisions of
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement because it lacks a risk assessment. For the United States, "[a]s
India lacks a risk assessment consistent with Article 5.1 and 5.2, it cannot invoke Article 3.3 and is
thus in breach of Article 3.1".454 In addition, the United States submits that even absent the failure
to conduct a risk assessment, India would be unable to invoke Article 3.3 as a result of its ALOP.455
With reference to India's NAP, the United States explains that, viewed together with the minimal
restrictions on movement of domestic products that India imposes following domestic HPAI
outbreaks, it is clear that measures based on th e OIE international standard would achieve India's
ALOP.456
7.4.1.2 India
7.178. India maintains that its AI measures are in conformity with the Te rrestrial Code pursuant
to Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement 457 and that, therefore, its measures are presumed to be
consistent with the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994.458
7.179. In particular, India argues that the OIE re cognizes the prerogative of every Member to set
its own level of protection.459 In India's view, the "condition of entry" an importing country chooses
is a decision to be made by the importing count ry alone and the Terrestrial Code provides full
flexibility to an importing country to structure its regime in the manner it deems appropriate.
Hence, India argues, "some countries may determine that their appropriate level of protection is
met when they import from HPNAI-free compartments even though the exporting country itself is
experiencing several HPNAI outbreaks in other pa rts of the country". India submits that "[t]his
would result in an import ban on poultry prod ucts from all parts of the country except the
recognized compartment when the exporting co untry reports HPNAI. Others may require the
country to be free from both LPNAI and HPNAI wh ich would result in an import ban on poultry
products from the exporting country when it noti fies HPNAI or LPNAI" while "still others may
import only from compartments free from NAI even though the country itself is reporting
outbreaks of LPNAI in areas outside the compartm ent". According to India, "[t]he OIE does not
stipulate what level of freedom a country must seek from the exporting country". India submits
that the OIE "leaves that choice to the importing country but only recommends sanitary conditions
which should be fulfilled by the consignment and which should further be attested to by the
veterinary authority of the exporting country".
460
7.180. India further asserts that, "for all poultry products in one way or another", the standard
prescribed in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code provides a recommendation for a "condition of
entry". And, depending upon an importing country's ALOP, it could "condition the entry" of the
specific poultry commodity upon any one of the conditions of entry provided for in the standard.
Therefore, depending on the "condition of entry" opted for, poultry products may be allowed from
all of the country or some parts of the country. India thus concludes that, pursuant to the
Terrestrial Code, "the ban may extend to all of the country or some parts of the country".
461
7.181. India posits that Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code reinforces the understanding that
depending on the importing country's ALOP, if the exporting country notifies either HPNAI or LPNAI
the importing country may ban imports. 462 According to India, the standard clearly states that if
there is a notification of HPAI and LPAI in birds other than poultry including wild birds, OIE

453 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 14.
454 United States' first written submission, para. 129.
455 United States' first written submission, para. 130.
456 United States' first written submission, para. 131.
457 India's first written submission, paras. 111 and 136.
458 India's first written submission, para. 141.
459 India's first written submission, para. 117; India's second written submission, para. 25.
460 India's first written submission, para. 119; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 19.
461 India's first written submission, para. 120.
462 India's first written submission, para. 120.

members should not impose an immediate ban on trade in poultry commodities. India further
argues that "[t]he standard thus stipulates that if a country notifies HPAI and LPAI in poultry,
Member countries can impose [an] immediate ban on trade in poultry commodities depending on
the condition of entry they have selected based on the level of protection they have deemed
appropriate".
463
7.182. India thus maintains that, according to the Terrestrial Code, a country may implement one
of the "conditions of entry" reflected in the recommendations or it may choose not to condition
entry at all. That is, the country may choose not to suspend imports in case of either HPNAI or
LPNAI, in which case, all it may require is that the consignment is accompanied with a health
certificate as recommended by the OIE. Or, a Member may implement one of the "conditions of
entry" and further may choose to implement or not to implement all of the recommendations on
the health certificates.
464
7.183. India further avers that the OIE recommendations contain two risk mitigation conditions.
The first suggests that "the product must originate in a free country". The second "requires that
the export consignment is additionally accompanied by a veterinary certificate certifying that the
export consignment has been rendered risk free through the application of additional control
measures".465 Both conditions ensure that trade in animals takes place with "an optimal level of
animal health security".466 According to India, insisting that the origin of a product be ignored and
that India apply only the control measures or veterinary certificate requirements will not ensure an
optimal level of health security as there is always a danger of disease introduction in the absence
of the application of both risk mitigation conditions.
467
7.184. India submits that the United States "has adduced claims starting with Article[s] 5.1 and
5.2 and 2.2 specifically alleging that as far as fresh meat of poultry and eggs are concerned there
is no scientific basis to maintain a temporary import suspension of the type maintained by
S.O. 1663(E)". For India, "by limiting its arguments of India's alleged violation under Article[s]
5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 to eggs and fresh meat of poultry, the United States ipso facto accepts that India
is in compliance with the [Terrestrial] Code as far as other products under S.O. 1663(E) are
concerned".468 India thus claims that the "United States['] arguments on deviations from the
[Terrestrial] Code where the United States believes India should have conducted a risk assessment
are limited to eggs and fresh meat of poultry".
469
7.185. For example, as regards hatching eggs of poultry, and in reference to Articles 10.4.1.10,
10.4.10 and 10.4.11 of the Terrestrial Code 470, India argues that a country may condition the
entry of hatching eggs of poultry either by importing from a NAI-free country, zone or
compartment or from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment, according to the level of
protection it deems appropriate. Thus, for India, clause 1(ii)(d) of S.O. 1663(E), which prohibits
the importation of hatching eggs of poultry fr om countries reporting NAI (HPNAI or LPNAI),
"conforms to 10.4.1.10 and Article 10.4.10 as it em bodies the standards and converts it into a
municipal standard".
471
7.186. Responding to the United States argument that the Terrestrial Code does not recommend
imposing a ban on imports on account of LPNAI, In dia submits that "[t]his statement is limited as
far as LPNAI is concerned".472 India further deduces that the United States' position changes when
it comes to HPNAI, for the United States believes that a ban is justified against countries that
report HPNAI in poultry. India alleges that this is particularly evident in the discussion on eggs and
fresh meat of poultry. According to India, the evidence relied upon by the United States confirms

463 India's first written submission, para. 125.
464 India's first written submission, para. 133.
465 India's second written submission, para. 19.
466 India's second written submission, para. 19.
467 India's second written submission, para. 20.
468 India's first written submission, para. 137.
469 India's first written submission, paras. 137 and 135, footnote 180; India's second written
submission, para. 41.
470 India's first written submission, para. 138. There is a similar illustration with respect to
Articles 10.4.13 and 10.4.14 of the Terrestrial Code that contain recommendations for imports of eggs for
human consumption in India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 17-21.
471 India's first written submission, para. 138.
472 India's second written submission, para. 6.

that imposing bans on countries reporting HPNAI is legitimate and, as a matter of policy, the
United States prohibits imports from countries declaring HPNAI (such as India) and the restriction
is imposed on a permanent basis.
473
7.187. India contends that these statements ma de by the United States establish the latter's
belief that the origin of poultry is an important factor for purposes of trade sanctions, such that if
the poultry originates from a country that is not free from HPNAI, the importing country may
restrict its import. For India, this resonates wi th its repeated submissions that HPNAI or NAI-
freedom requirements in every product-specific re commendation is the first of the risk mitigation
conditions (termed as a "condition of entry" by India) contained in the Terrestrial Code, which if
not fulfilled entitles the importing country to prohibit imports from such country.
474 India views the
distinction made by the United States with respect to HPNAI and LPNAI as surprising because the
Terrestrial Code nowhere recommends imposing a ba n on account of HPNAI, yet the United States
is of the opinion that the very same Code permits a ban on account of HPNAI, but does not permit
a ban on account of LPNAI.
475
7.188. India asserts that it has provided subs tantive arguments in support of its claim that
clauses 1(ii)(c), (d) and (e) of S.O. 1663(E) conform to the product-specific recommendations in
the Terrestrial Code (i.e. Articles 10.4.19, 10.4.10, 10.4.13 and 10.4.15 and with
Article 10.4.1.10). India also maintains that S.O. 1663(E) pertains to the first risk mitigation
condition in the product-specific recommendations, and hence product-specific measures
applicable to eggs and fresh meat of poultry contained in S.O. 1663(E) should be evaluated for
their conformity with the relevant standard, i.e. the "condition of entry" contained in each
standard.
476
7.189. India further submits that its AI measures are "based on" the Terrestrial Code and are
consistent with Article 3.1 "on the same grounds as mentioned under the claim under Article 3.2 of
the SPS Agreement".477 India submits that this is so because "[a] measure that conforms to and
incorporates an international standard is of course 'based' on such standard". 478 Moreover, for
India, even if the Panel were to find that India' s measures do not conform to the Terrestrial Code,
they are nevertheless based on the Code.479
7.190. According to India, an SPS measure can be found to be "based" on the international
standard if it adopts a part of the international standard or is supported by the international
standard. India avers that "[i]n such a scenario, the part of the domestic measure which adopts
the international standard should have the presumption of 'conforming' to the international
standard and be presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement", while "[t]hat part of the
domestic measure which does not adopt the international standard should be justified under other
provisions of the SPS Agreement".
480
7.191. In addition, India contests the United States' argument whereby "India's measure violated
Article 3.1 by not importing imports from zones or compartments". 481 India argues that the
Terrestrial Code and the SPS Agreement both perm it a country to determine its ALOP. In India's
view, the Terrestrial Code permits countries to condition the entry of a poultry product upon the
exporting country being free from both HPNAI an d LPNAI, and importing countries therefore may
"enforce measures which implement NAI country , zone, compartment freedom or HPNAI country,
zone, compartment freedom".
482

473 India's second written submission, para. 7.
474 India's second written submission, para. 8.
475 India's second written submission, para. 9.
476 India's second written submission, para. 35.
477 India's first written submission, para. 146.
478 India's first written submission, para. 115.
479 India's first written submission, paras. 143 and 146. We note that India presents this argument on
an "arguendo" basis and "[a]ssuming but not conceding, India's measure is not in conformity with the
[Terrestrial] Code".
480 India's first written submission, para. 145.
481 India's first written submission, para. 142.
482 India's first written submission, para. 142.

7.4.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.4.2.1 Introduction
7.192. The question before the Panel is whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, as claimed by the United States. In particular, the Panel must
assess whether India's AI measures are "based on" a relevant international standard, guideline, or
recommendation pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
483 In response, India argues that
its AI measures "conform to" the Terrestrial Code and that, accordingly, their consistency with
both the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994 is to be presumed pursuant to Article 3.2 of the
SPS Agreement.484
7.193. Before proceeding to examine the United States' claim, we note India's assertion that the
"United States' arguments on deviations from the [Terrestrial] Code where the United States
believes India should have conducted a risk asse ssment are limited to eggs and fresh meat of
poultry".485 We recall our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, which, as stipulated in paragraph 7.4
above, forms an integral part of the present findin gs. In particular, we refer to our finding that the
ten categories of products listed in S.O. 1663(E) and the United States' panel request fall within
the scope of this dispute. 486 Furthermore, the United States has confirmed to the Panel that its
claims, including that pursuant to Article 3.1, concern all the products listed in S.O. 1663(E). 487
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by India's su bmission that the United States' claim under
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement pertains only to fresh meat of poultry and eggs.
7.194. We commence our analysis by examining the legal provision at issue in order to ascertain
the applicable legal test.
7.4.2.2 The legal provisions at issue
7.195. Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Harmonization", reads, in relevant part 488, as
follows:
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as
otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards,
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant
provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved
by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.
2
Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or

483 The United States also argued that India cannot avail itself of the provisions of Article 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement because it lacks a risk assessment in violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement
(United States' first written submission, para. 129). We do not address these arguments in our analysis
because India does not invoke Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.
484 India's first written submission, para. 141.
485 India's first written submission, para. 137; India's first written submission, para. 135, footnote 180;
India's second written submission, para. 41.
486 WT/DS430/5, paras. 3.27-3.30, 3.37, 3.92-3.93 and 3.140.
487 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(e).
488 Article 3 includes two additional paragraphs: Article 3.4, which provides that "Members shall play a
full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary
bodies"; and Article 3.5, which reads that the WTO SPS Committee "shall develop a procedure to monitor the
process of international harmonization and coordinate efforts in this regard with the relevant international
organizations". These paragraphs are not at issue in the present dispute.

phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures
based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be
inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.
(footnote original) 2 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Arti cle 3, there is a scientific justification
if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant
international standards, guidelines or reco mmendations are not sufficient to achieve its
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
7.196. The first three paragraphs of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement set out the obligation of
Members to harmonize 489 their SPS measures by either basing them on or conforming them to
international standards, while leaving open some leeway for departing from those standards,
subject to consistency with the remainder of the SPS Agreement.
7.197. The interplay of these three paragraphs, including whether a measure is "based on" or
"conform[s] to" an international standard, is highly relevant to the present dispute. The
Appellate Body explained in EC – Hormones the relationship between these paragraphs as follows:
Under Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may decide to promulgate an
SPS measure that conforms to an international standard. Such a measure would
embody the international standard completely and, for practical purposes, converts it
into a municipal standard. Such a measure enjoys the benefit of a presumption (albeit
a rebuttable one) that it is consistent with the relevant provisions of the
SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994.
Under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may choose to establish an
SPS measure that is based on the existing relevant international standard, guideline
or recommendation. Such a measure may ad opt some, not necessarily all, of the
elements of the international standard. The Member imposing this measure does not
benefit from the presumption of consistency set up in Article 3.2; but, as earlier
observed, the Member is not penalized by exemption of a complaining Member from
the normal burden of showing a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 3.1 or
any other relevant Article of the SPS Agreement or of the GATT 1994.
Under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may decide to set for itself a level
of protection different from that implicit in the international standard, and to
implement or embody that level of protection in a measure not "based on" the
international standard. The Member's appropriate level of protection may be higher
than that implied in the international standard. The right of a Member to determine its
own appropriate level of sanitary protection is an important right.
490
7.198. The Appellate Body thus defined three separate scenarios. The first scenario is where a
Member adopts an SPS measure that embodies an international standard completely and thus
"conforms to" such standard, as provided in Article 3.2. In that case, the conforming SPS measure
benefits from a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the SPS Agreement and the
GATT 1994.
7.199. The second scenario is where the SPS measure adopts some, but not all, of the elements
of that standard. In this case, the SPS measure would not "conform to" the standard but rather
would be "based on" it, as provided in Article 3.1. The SPS measure would thus not benefit from

489 In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body explained that:
In generalized terms, the object and purpose of Article 3 is to promote the harmonization of the
SPS measures of Members on as wide a basis as possible, while recognizing and safeguarding, at
the same time, the right and duty of Members to protect the life and health of their people. The
ultimate goal of the harmonization of SPS measures is to prevent the use of such measures for
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members or as a disguised restriction on
international trade, without preventing Members from adopting or enforcing measures which are
both 'necessary to protect' human life or health and 'based on scientific principles', and without
requiring them to change their appropriate level of protection.
Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 177.
490 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 170-172.

the above presumption of compliance but, as clarif ied by the Appellate Body, the burden of proof
would still lie on a complainant to make a prima facie case of violation of Article 3.1.
7.200. Finally, as a third scenario, a Member may decide to deviate from the recommendations of
an international standard and adopt an SPS measure which results in a higher level of protection
than the one prescribed in the standard, as provided in Article 3.3. In this case, the Member must
ensure that its measure is consistent with the other relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement.
This would entail, for instance, the need to base the SPS measure on science, including having a
risk assessment in accordance with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.
7.201. The Appellate Body has clarified that there is no "general rule – exception" relationship
between the three relevant paragraphs of Article 3. Accordingly, these three alternative scenarios
are equally available to WTO Members.
491
7.202. In EC – Hormones , the Appellate Body defined the terms "based on" and "conform to" as
forming concentric circles. It found that "[a] measure that 'conforms to' and incorporates a …
standard is, of course, 'based on' that standard".
492 A measure that is "based on" a standard may
not necessarily "conform to" that same standard, as some elements of the standard may not be
present in the measure at issue. Indeed, while it may be sufficient to adopt only some of the
elements of an international standard for the meas ure to be "based on" such standard, Article 3.2
requires that an SPS measure embodies the standa r d c o m p l e t e l y t o b e s a i d t o " c o n f o r m t o " i t .
Hence, the language in Article 3.1 whereby an SPS measure may be "based on" an international
standard establishes a less rigorous threshold than that contemplated in Article 3.2 ("conform to").
We understand this to mean that failure to meet the "based on" threshold in Article 3.1 would also
result in not meeting the more rigorous "conform to" threshold in Article 3.2.
7.203. With this approach in mind, we proceed to examine India's AI measures. As noted above,
India claims that its AI measures conform to an international standard and hence it relies on
Article 3.2. Given that the "based on" threshold in Article 3.1 is lower than the "conform to"
threshold in Article 3.2, we will examine first whether India's AI measures meet the lower
threshold. If they do, we will then proceed to ex amine whether they meet the higher threshold. If
India's AI measures do not meet the lower threshold, it will not be necessary to examine whether
the measures meet the higher threshold, for it would be clear that they do not.
7.4.2.2.1 Whether India's AI measures are based on an international standard pursuant
to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement
7.204. In order to ascertain whether India's AI measures are based on an international standard
pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, we need to establish whether a relevant
international standard exists for AI. If the answer is in the affirmative, we will proceed to examine
the meaning and the scope of the relevant recommendations of that international standard, and
whether India's AI measures are "based on" these recommendations within the meaning of
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
7.4.2.2.1.1 Whether an international standard for AI exists
7.205. In determining whether an international standard for AI exists, we concur with the panels'
reasoning in EC – Hormones that, in establishing whether or not a Member has an obligation to
base its SPS measure on international standards in accordance with Article 3.1, a panel need only
determine whether such standard exists; we do not need to consider the levels of protection or
types of SPS measures recommended by the standa rd, the consensus behind it, or its adoption
process.
493

491 The Appellate Body explained that "this right of a Member to establish its own level of sanitary
protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is an autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a
'general obligation' under Article 3.1". (emphasis original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 172.
492 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 163.
493 Panel Reports, EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.72; and EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.69.

7.4.2.2.1.2 The Terrestrial Code as the relevant international standard for AI
7.206. In the present case, both parties agree that the relevant international standard in this
dispute is the Terrestrial Code. 494 As explained by the Appellate Body in US/Canada – Continued
Suspension, "[t]he relevant 'international standards, guidelines or recommendations' that are
referred to in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 are those set by the international organizations listed in
Annex A, paragraph 3 of the SPS Agreement"495, which includes the OIE as the relevant standard-
setting organization for matters of animal health and zoonoses. 496 As described in section 2.4.5.1
above, the OIE develops international standards to deal with aspects of SPS measures as they
relate to animal health including, but not limited to, their effects on human health. One such set of
standards, which includes recommendations relating to AI, is embodied in the Terrestrial Code.
The Terrestrial Code and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, is, as confirmed by the OIE
497, the
only international standard for AI. 498 We therefore endorse the parties' view that the relevant
international standard for the purpose of this dispute is the Terrestrial Code.
7.4.2.2.1.3 The relevant edition of the Terrestrial Code for the purpose of this dispute
7.207. As described in section 2.4.5.2 above, the Terrestrial Code is reviewed on an annual basis;
new editions are adopted by the World Assembly of the Delegates of OIE members each year in
May, and become publicly available in June or July of the same year. Accordingly, given the facts
in this dispute and the parties' arguments, there are three editions that may be of relevance for
the purposes of this dispute, namely (i) the 20
th edition, adopted in May 2011, which was
the edition of the Terrestrial Code in force at the time of adoption of S.O. 1663(E) on 19 July
2011; (ii) the 21 st edition, adopted in May 2012, which was the edition of the Terrestrial Code in
force at the time of the establishment of this Panel on 25 June 2012; and (iii) the 22 nd edition,
adopted in May 2013, which is the edition of the Terrestrial Code in force during the deliberations
of this Panel. Each of these editions, and most particularly the 22
nd edition499, differs to a certain
extent in the language and structure of the recommendations in Chapter 10.4.500
7.208. The question arises regarding which of th ese editions we should consider as being the
relevant international standard for the purpose of this dispute. The Panel sought the parties' views
in this respect. The United States is of the view that the relevant edition is the 21st edition because
it was the edition in force at the time of the establishment of the Panel. 501 Whilst not objecting to

494 For instance, United States' first written submission, paras. 127-128; United States' opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 2 and 5; India's first written submission, paras. 114,
119-123 and 136.
495 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 693.
496 Annex A(3)(b) of the SPS Agreement provides that "for animal health and zoonoses, the standards,
guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics". The
International Office of Epizootics is now known as the World Animal Health Organization although it kept its
historical French acronym, OIE. More information about the OIE can be found in section 2.4.5.1 above.
497 OIE's response to Panel question No. 6.
498 The Terrestrial Code is a complex document. It consists of two volumes, numerous sections and
several chapters. Not all of the recommendations provided in the Code are relevant to India's AI measures.
Chapter 10.4 in Volume II of the Terrestrial Code, entitled "Infection with viruses of notifiable avian influenza",
addresses the management of health risks associated with infection caused by NAI viruses and provides
product-specific recommendations in this regard. Thus, as far as India's AI measures are concerned, the
recommendations provided in Chapter 10.4 are directly relevant.
499 OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 31 March 2014, <http://www.oie.int/international-
standard-setting/terrestrial-code>.
500 For instance, Article 10.4.1.1, concerning notifications, is only present in the 21st edition and no
equivalent provision appears in the 20th and 22nd editions. Another example is the use of the term "NAI" in both
the 20th and 21st editions, while the 22nd edition only refers to AI. Nevertheless, the OIE confirmed that the
modifications introduced in the 22nd edition did not result in any significant changes to the requirements. OIE's
response to Panel question No. 3.
501 In its first written submission, the United States referred to the 21st edition of the Terrestrial Code,
formally adopted by the World Assembly of the Delegates of the OIE members in 2012, which was the
latest edition at that time of the establishment of the Panel. However, also in its first written submission, the
United States relied on the Glossary of the 19
th edition of the Terrestrial Code (adopted in 2010 with respect to
the meanings of certain terms. During the first substantive meeting, in response to a question from the Panel,
the United States clarified that the first written submission had erroneously referred to the glossary of the
19th edition of the Terrestrial Code. The United States requested the Panel to refer only to the 21st edition of
the Terrestrial Code as the relevant international standard because that edition was in force at the time of
establishment of the Panel. United States' response to Panel question No. 10(a); United States' first written

the Panel referring exclusively to the 21 st edition for the purposes of the present dispute, India
pointed out that the edition of the Terrestrial Code that was in force at the time of adoption of
S.O. 1663(E) was the 20
th edition.502
7.209. We note that, to date, no panel or Appellate Body report has specifically addressed the
issue of the relevant edition of an international standard for the purposes of assessing claims
raised under the SPS Agreement. In examin ing the existing jurisprudence under the
SPS Agreement, we note that SPS measures are to be reviewed in the light of the latest available
scientific evidence and not judged in the light of the scientific evidence available at the time of
their adoption if this has become obsolete. For instance, the panel in Japan – Apples urged parties
not to lose sight of the purpose of a risk assessment as the basis for regulatory action and hence
the need for this assessment to be renewed in view of new scientific evidence.
503
7.210. We believe that, in the circumstances of this case, the same principle may be applied to
the determination of the relevant edition of the international standard. Similarly to the panel in
Japan – Apples , in our view, it is appropriate for the Panel to examine the United States' claim
under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement in the light of the edition of the Terrestrial Code that
reflects the latest science. As explained by the OI E, the Terrestrial Code is updated on an annual
basis to reflect any changes in available scientific evidence. As the OIE describes, the various
bodies of the OIE collaborate closely with each other "to ensure the recommendations contained in
the Terrestrial Code are based upon the latest scientific information".
504 The Code Commission
draws upon the expertise of internationally reno wned specialists to prepare draft texts for new
articles of the Terrestrial Code or to revise existing articles " in the light of advances in veterinary
science".505 Accordingly, the latest edition of the Terrestrial Code, the 22 nd edition, is the edition
that reflects the latest science at the time of making these findings, as included in the Interim
Report of the Panel.
7.211. However, we must bear in mind that any changes to the 21
st edition that were reflected in
the 22 nd edition were not known by the parties at the time of establishment of the Panel.
Moreover, were the panel process to be delayed for any number of reasons, including where the
complainant requested suspension for a matter of months under Article 12.12 of the DSU, it is
possible that the 23 rd edition would be current at the time our findings are issued, and that the
science could have changed from what it is to day. In our view, to determine that the prism
through which the respondent's measure will be judged is, in effect, a moving target would offend
the fundamental principle of due process as the complainant and the respondent have a right to
know with some certainty the standard against which the measures will be assessed in this panel
process. In other words, the scope of this disp ute cannot expand or contract depending upon the
science that informs the Terrestrial Code as the dispute moves through its various procedural
steps. Under the circumstances, we believe that th is Panel should determine which edition reflects

submission, para. 3, footnote 6, para. 62, footnote 90 (referring to Chapters 4.3, 4.4 and 10.4 of the
21st edition of the Terrestrial Code in Exhibits US-1, US-50, US-51), para. 4, footnote 7 (referring to the
Glossary of the 19th edition of the Terrestrial Code in Exhibit US-2).
502 In its first written submission, India referred to the 21st edition of the Terrestrial Code. For instance,
India's first written submission, para. 3, footnote 5, and para. 20, footnote 30 (referring to Exhibits US-1 and
US-50). During the first substantive meeting, in response to a question from the Panel, India responded that
"[t]he OIE Terrestrial Code which was in effect when S.O. 1663(E) was promulgated was the 20th Edition of the
Terrestrial Code including the Glossary. But the United States has referred to Chapter 10.4 of the 21st edition.
India has no objection to reliance on the 21st as the relevant international standard for trade in poultry
commodities from NAI countries". India's response to Panel question No. 10(a).
503 The panel reasoned as follows:
One must not lose sight of the purpose of a risk assessment, which is to serve as a basis for
regulatory actions. If the scientific evidence evolves, this may be an indication that the risk
assessment should be reviewed or a new assessment undertaken. It would be also legally
inconsistent to require, on the one hand, that phytosanitary measures not be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence pursuant to Article 2.2 while, on the other hand, accepting that risk
assessments not be renewed in the face of new scientific evidence.
504 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3.
505 OIE's response to Panel question No. 3. (emphasis added)

the latest science at a point in time that would not only allow the complainant to make its case,
but would also avail the respondent of the opportunity to defend itself.506
7.212. We recall that the panel request sets our terms of reference and thus informs the
respondent of the case to which it must respond. 507 With this in mind, we should identify the
edition of the Terrestrial Code in force at the time of the establishment of the Panel.
7.213. The edition that was in force at the ti me of the establishment of this Panel is the
21st edition adopted in May 2012. Therefore, we determine that relevant edition of the
Terrestrial Code for the purpose of our examination of the United States' claim pursuant to
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement is the 21st edition of the Terrestrial Code.
7.4.2.2.2 Whether the Terrestrial Code provides AI recommendations for all the
products covered by India's AI measures
7.214. We now proceed to examine the United States' contention that the Terrestrial Code does
not include recommendations related to AI for all of the products covered by India's AI measures.
7.215. According to the United States, the Terrestrial Code does not apply to two of the categories
of products listed in S.O. 1663(E), namely, (i) live pigs and (ii) pathological material and biological
products from birds. For the United States, there are no relevant international standards applicable
to these two categories of products and thus India has no basis to make a claim of conformity with
international standards under Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement in respect of these products.
508
7.216. India responds that its assertion that India's measures are in conformity with the
Terrestrial Code is limited to standards pertaining to eggs and fresh meat of poultry as "it is
evident that the United States claims pertain only to these products".
509 As explained in
paragraph 7.193 above, further to our preliminary ruling of May 2013, we are not persuaded that
the United States' claim under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement pertains only to fresh meat of
poultry and eggs.
7.217. We recall that the products covered by S.O. 1663(E) are the following:
(a) domestic and wild birds (including poultry and captive birds);
(b) day old chicks, ducks, turkey, and other newly hatched avian species;
(c) un-processed meat and meat products from avian species, including domesticated,
wild birds and poultry;

506 This view sits comfortably with long-standing jurisprudence whereby due process demands that the
measure at issue is not turned into a "moving target" through constant legislative or regulatory changes. We
recall the Appellate Body's oft-cited statement in Chile – Price Band System that "generally speaking, the
demands of due process are such that a complaining party should not have to adjust its pleadings throughout
dispute settlement proceedings in order to deal with a disputed measure as a 'moving target'". Appellate Body
Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 144. We also find useful guidance in the approach adopted by the
panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, when considering the requirement under Article 5.1
of the SPS Agreement that a risk assessment be "appropriate to the circumstances". In that dispute, the panel
decided that it would conduct its analysis by examining the circumstances that existed at the time of
establishment of the panel. The panel reasoned:
What matters is that the relevant risk assessment was appropriate to the circumstances existing
at the time this Panel was established. In the light of this, in our analysis of whether there are
risk assessments on which individual safeguard measures were based at the relevant time, we
will consider assessments which were carried out before these measures were adopted as well as
assessments which were carried out after these measures were adopted.
Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.3034.

507 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, paras. 219, 220 and 233 (referring to Appellate Body
Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22; US – Carbon Steel, paras. 125 and 126; Australia – Apples,
para. 416; Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; US – Zeroing
(Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 107; and EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 786);
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 88.
508 United States' second written submission, para. 10, footnote 6.
509 India's first written submission, para. 135, footnote 180, and para. 137; India's second written
submission, para. 41.

(d) hatching eggs;
(e) eggs and egg products (except Specific Pathogen Free eggs);
(f) un-processed feathers;
(g) live pigs;
(h) pathological material and biological products from birds;
(i) products of animal origin (from birds) intended for use in animal feeding or for
agricultural or industrial use; and
(j) semen of domestic and wild birds including poultry.
510
7.218. With respect to "pathological material and biological products from birds", although
paragraph (1)(ii)(h) above prohibits their importation, paragraph (2)(ii) of S.O. 1663(E) exempts
from the prohibition "the import of pathological materials and biological products for use in
research purposes exclusively used by the National Referral Laboratories". Accordingly,
S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of "pathological material and biological products from birds"
that are not exclusively used by the National Referral Laboratories for research purposes.
7.219. In response to the Panel's questions, the OIE confirmed that "[a]ll standards for avian
influenza relating to products are in Chapter 10.4" of the Terrestrial Code.
511 Specifically, the OIE
confirmed that Chapter 10.4 includes specific recommendations on the health measures that
should be applied due to concerns related to AI when importing the following products:
a. live poultry (as defined) in Article 10.4.5
b. live birds other than poultry (Article 10.4.6)
c. day-old live poultry (Articles 10.4.7 and 10.4.8)
d. day-old live birds other than poultry (Article 10.4.9)
e. hatching eggs of poultry (Articles 10.4.10 and 10.4.11)
f. hatching eggs of birds other than poultry (Article 10.4.12)
g. eggs for human consumption (Articles 10.4.13 and 10.4.14)
h. egg products (Article 10.4.15)
i. poultry semen (Articles 10.4.16 and 10.4.17)
j. semen of birds other than poultry (Article 10.4.18)
k. fresh meat of poultry (Article 10.4.19)
l. meat products of poultry (Article 10.4.20)
m. products of poultry origin other than feather meal and poultry meal, intended
for use in animal feeding, or for agricultural or industrial use (Article 10.4.21)
n. feathers and down of poultry (Article 10.4.22)
o. feathers and down of birds other than poultry (Article 10.4.23)

510 Annex-A to India's request for a preliminary ruling and Exhibit US-80.
511 OIE's response to Panel question No. 6.

p. feather meal and poultry meal (Article 10.4.24).512
7.220. Comparing this list of products with the product coverage of S.O. 1663(E), we observe that
the list of products in Chapter 10.4 includes eigh t of the ten categories of products listed in
S.O. 1663(E). The two categories included in S.O. 1663(E) but not in the list of products covered
by Chapter 10.4 are "live pigs" and "pathological material and biological products from birds".
7.221. The OIE confirmed that Chapter 10.4 cont ains no product specif ic recommendations for
live pigs. 513 The OIE clarified that the Terrestrial Code does not include specific
AI recommendations with respect to the importation of pigs "because even if they can be infected,
they have been found not to play a significant epidemiological role in avian influenza". 514 On the
basis of the evidence before us, the Panel understands that there is no relevant international
standard for AI that would cover live pigs. Accordingly, we agree with the United States that there
is no relevant international standard for AI applicable to live pigs.
7.222. Likewise, the OIE confirmed that Chapter 10.4 contains no product specific
AI recommendations for "pathological material and biological products from birds".
515 The OIE
explained that this is because the risk presented by these products is covered by Chapter 5.8 of
the Terrestrial Code entitled "International transfer and laboratory containment of animal
pathogens".
516 Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code deals with the international transfer and
laboratory containment of animal pathogens, pathological materials or organisms carrying the
pathogens. For instance, Article 5.8.4.1 provides the recommendations with respect to the
importation of any animal pathogen, pathological material or organisms carrying the pathogen,
which "should be permitted only under an import licence issued by the relevant authority". The
Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines "pathological material" as "samples obtained from live or
dead animals, containing or suspected of containing infectious or parasitic agents, to be sent to a
laboratory". We do not see any reference to "biolo gical products" in Chapter 5.8. Nor is this term
defined in the Glossary.
7.223. Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code does not contain any reference to AI or to NAI, and
thus does not deal specifically with the international transfer or laboratory containment of AI
pathogens or pathological materials from birds. Hence, as the OIE explained, Chapter 5.8 does not
specifically address AI. Nevertheless, we will ex amine whether Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code
could be considered as the relevant international standard for pathological materials of birds for
the purpose of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.224. The recommendations in Chapter 5.8 speak, inter alia , of laboratory containment of
pathological materials. In fact, the definition of pathological materials in the Glossary refers to
these materials being destined for laboratories. We note that the exception to the import
prohibition in paragraph (2)(ii) of S.O. 1663(E) is with regard to pathological materials destined
for "National Reference Laboratories". Hence, India exempts from the import prohibition
pathological materials destined for those laborato ries. Given the absence of evidence before us,
however, we are not in a position to determine whether this exception in paragraph (2)(ii) of
S.O. 1663(E) corresponds to the recommendations of Chapter 5.8. Indeed, we have no
information concerning how this exception is implemented. For instance, we do not know, nor has
it been explained to us, whether there is a licensing system in place that corresponds to that
described in Article 5.8.4.1 of the Terrestrial Code. The lack of information on the record is
consistent with the absence of argumentation by the parties on this matter, even in the face of the
Panel's queries about the product scope of Chapter 10.4 compared with that of S.O. 1663(E).
517
India had the opportunity to respond to the United States' contention that there is no relevant
international standard for these materials; it did not do so. The Panel gave India the opportunity to
comment on the OIE's responses to the Panel's questions in this regard. India did not avail itself of
this opportunity.

512 OIE's response to Panel question No. 5.
513 OIE's response to Panel question No. 5.
514 OIE's response to Panel question No. 6.
515 OIE's response to Panel question No. 5.
516 OIE's response to Panel question No. 6.
517 For instance, Panel question Nos. 6, 28(a), 28(b), 28(c).

7.225. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that there is no product-specific
recommendation in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code for pathological materials. Furthermore,
even in the event that Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code could be considered as the relevant
international standard in respect of pathological materials for birds for the purpose of Article 3 of
the SPS Agreement, we do not have sufficient evidence on the record to allow us to carry out an
examination as to whether India's AI measures in respect of pathological materials from birds are
based on the recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code.
7.226. In addition to pathological materials, S.O. 1663(E) also prohibits "biological products from
birds" and exempts those destined for National Reference Laboratories. The Panel has not been
able to discern the meaning of this term in the context of S.O. 1663(E). As mentioned in
paragraph 7.222 above, Chapter 5.8 does not contain any reference to biological products.
Accordingly, bearing in mind the absence of evid ence before us, we conclude that there is no
product-specific recommendation in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code on biological products
from birds. Furthermore, in the event that Chapte r 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code could be considered
as the relevant international standard in respect of biological products from birds for the purpose
of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, we do not have sufficient evidence on the record to determine
whether India's AI measures in respect of biological products from birds are based on the
recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the Terrestrial Code.
7.227. In the light of the above, the Panel finds that there is no relevant international standard
related to AI for live pigs. We further find that that there is no product-specific recommendation in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code for "pathologica l material and biological products from birds",
and that we do not have sufficient evidence on the record to determine whether India's
AI measures in respect of these products are based on the recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the
Terrestrial Code. The immediate consequence of these findings is that the provisions of Article 3.1
and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement do not apply to India's AI measures in respect of these products, as
there is no relevant standard on which those measures could be based or to which they could
conform. We shall therefore examine India's NAI-based import prohibition regarding live pigs and
"pathological material and biological products from birds" (except as provided in paragraph (2)(ii)
of S.O. 1663(E)) under the United States' claims relating to the need for scientific justification for
India's AI measures, in particular, under Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
7.4.2.2.3 Product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code
7.228. Having established the product coverage of the Terrestrial Code for the purpose of this
dispute, namely eight out of the ten categories of products listed in S.O. 1663(E), we proceed to
examine in detail each of the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 as they relate to
each of the eight categories of products in S.O. 1663(E) that are covered by the standard.
7.229. We observe first that the product-specific recommendations for each of the relevant
products are found in Articles 10.4.5 to 10.4.24 of the Terrestrial Code. In general, the content of
these product-specific recommendations depends on the type of product concerned, as well as the
disease status of the place of origin. In this respect, the recommendations may vary depending
upon whether the importation takes place from a country, zone or compartment that is NAI-free or
HPNAI-free. In some instances, the disease status of the place of origin is irrelevant (in which case
the Terrestrial Code uses the language "regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin").
7.230. The table below reproduces each of the relevant product-specific recommendations
contained in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code on a product-by-product basis:

S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(a): domestic and wild birds518 (including poultry519 and captive birds520)
Article 10.4.5
Recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
For live poultry (other than day-old poultry)
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the poultry showed no clinical sign of NAI on the day of shipment;
2) the poultry were kept in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for at least
the past 21 days;
3) the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers;
4) if the poultry have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the
Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the
certificate.
Article 10.4.6
Recommendations for the importation of live birds other than poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) on the day of shipment, the birds showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered
NAI in poultry;
2) the birds were kept in isolation approved by the Vete rinary Services since they we re hatched or for at least
the 21 days prior to shipment and showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered
NAI in poultry during the isolation period;
3) a statistically valid sample of the birds, selected in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.4.29., was
subjected to a diagnostic te st within 14 days prior to shipment to demonstrate freedom from infection with a
virus which would be considered NAI in poultry;
4) the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers;
5) if the birds have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the
Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the
certificate.
S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(b): day old chicks 521, ducks, turkey, and other newly hatched avian
species
Article 10.4.7
Recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
For day-old live poultry
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the poultry were kept in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched;
2) the poultry were derived from pa rent flocks which had been kept in a NAI-free country, zone or
compartment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
3) the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers;
4) if the poultry or the parent flocks have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with
the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have
been attached to the certificate.
Article 10.4.8
Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
For day-old live poultry
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the poultry were kept in a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched;
2) the poultry were derived from pare nt flocks which had been kept in a NAI-free establishment for at least 21
days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
3) the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers;
4) if the poultry or the parent flocks have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with
the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have
been attached to the certificate.

518 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "wild animal" as "an animal that has a
phenotype unaffected by human selection and lives independent of direct human supervision or control".
519 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "poultry" as "all domesticated birds, including
backyard poultry, used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other
commercial products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as
fighting cocks used for any purpose. Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons
referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions,
competitions or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be
poultry".
520 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "captive wild animal" as "an animal that has a
phenotype not significantly affected by human selection but that is captive or otherwise lives under direct
human supervision or control, including zoo animals and pets".
521 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "day-old birds" as "birds aged not more than
72 hours after hatching".

Article 10.4.9
Recommendations for the importation of day-old live birds other than poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) on the day of shipment, the birds showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered
NAI in poultry;
2) the birds were hatched and kept in isolation approved by the Veterinary Services;
3) the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnostic test at the time of the collection of the eggs to
demonstrate freedom from infection with NAIV;
4) the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers;
5) if the birds or parent flocks ha ve been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the
provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been
attached to the certificate.
S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(c): un-processed meat 522 and meat products 523 from avian species,
including domesticated, wild birds and poultry
Article 10.4.19
Recommendations for importation from either a NAI or HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
For fresh meat of poultry
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that
the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from poultry:
1) which have been kept in a country, zone or compartment free from HPNAI since they were hatched or for at
least the past 21 days;
2) which have been slaughte red in an approved abattoir in a coun try, zone or compartment free from HPNAI
and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2. and have been
found free of any signs suggestive of NAI.
Article 10.4.20
Recommendations for the importation of meat products of poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the commodity is derived from fresh meat which meet the requirements of Article 10.4.19.; or
2) the commodity has been processed to ensure th e destruction of NAI virus in accordance with
Article 10.4.26.;
AND
3) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.
S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(d): hatching eggs524
Article 10.4.10
Recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
For hatching eggs of poultry
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the eggs came from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment;
2) the eggs were derived from parent flocks which had been kept in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
3) the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized packaging materials;
4) if the parent flocks have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of
the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to
the certificate.
Article 10.4.11
Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
For hatching eggs of poultry
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the eggs came from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment;
2) the eggs were derived from parent flocks which had been kept in a NAI-free establishment for at least 21
days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
3) the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
4) the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized packaging materials;
5) if the parent flocks have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of
the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to
the certificate.

522 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "meat" as "all edible parts of an animal". The
term "fresh meat" is defined as "meat that has not been subjected to any treatment irreversibly modifying its
organoleptic and physicochemical characteristics. This includes frozen meat, chilled meat, minced meat and
mechanically recovered meat".
523 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "meat products" as "meat that has been
subjected to a treatment irreversibly modifying its organoleptic and physicochemical characteristics".
524 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "hatching eggs" as "fertilised bird eggs,
suitable for incubation and hatching".

Article 10.4.12
Recommendations for the importation of hatching eggs from birds other than poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnost ic test seven days prior to and at the time of the
collection of the eggs to demonstrate freedom from infection with NAIV;
2) the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
3) the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized packaging materials;
4) if the parent flocks have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of
the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to
the certificate.
S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(e): eggs and egg products (except specific pathogen free eggs)
Article 10.4.13
Recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
For eggs for human consumption
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the eggs were produced and packed in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment;
2) the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized packaging materials.
Article 10.4.14
Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
For eggs for human consumption
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the eggs were produced and packed in a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment;
2) the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
3) the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized packaging materials.
Article 10.4.15
Recommendations for importation of egg products of poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) the commodity is derived from eggs which meet the requirements of Articles 10.4.13. or 10.4.14.; or
2) the commodity has been processed to ensure th e destruction of NAI virus in accordance with
Article 10.4.25.;
AND
3) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.
Article 10.4.22
Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) these commodities originated from poultry as described in Article 10.4.19. and were processed in a NAI-free
country, zone or compartment; or
2) these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study);
AND
3) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.
Article 10.4.23
Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of birds other than poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study); and
2) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.
Article 10.4.24
Recommendations for the importation of feather meal and poultry meal
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) these commodities were processed in a NAI-free coun try, zone or compartment from poultry which were
kept in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter
or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter; or
2) these commodities have been processed either:
a) with moist heat at a minimum temperature of 118ºC for minimum of 40 minutes; or
b) with a continuous hydrolysing process under at least 3.79 bar of pressure with steam at a minimum
temperature of 122ºC for a minimum of 15 minutes; or
c) with an alternative rendering process that ensures that the internal temperature throughout the product
reaches at least 74ºC;
AND
3) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(i): products of animal origin (from birds) intended for use in animal
feeding or for agricultural or industrial use
Article 10.4.21
Recommendations for the importation of products of poultry origin, other than feather meal and
poultry meal, intended for use in animal feeding, or for agricultural or industrial use
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that:
1) these commodities were processed in a NAI-free coun try, zone or compartment from poultry which were
kept in a NAI-free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter
or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter; or
2) these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study);
AND
3) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.
S.O. 1663(E), para. (1)(ii)(j): semen of domestic and wild birds including poultry
Article 10.4.16
Recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment
For poultry semen
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that
the donor poultry:
1) showed no clinical sign of NAI on the day of semen collection;
2) were kept in a NAI-free country, zo ne or compartment for at least the 21 days prior to and at the time of
semen collection.
Article 10.4.17
Recommendations for the importation from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
For poultry semen
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that
the donor poultry:
1) showed no clinical sign of HPNAI on the day of semen collection;
2) were kept in a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment for at least the 21 days prior to and at the time of
semen collection.
Article 10.4.18
Recommendations for the importation of semen of birds other than poultry
Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, Ve terinary Authorities should require the presentation of
an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor birds:
1) were kept in isolation approved by the Veterinary Services for at least the 21 days prior to semen collection;
2) showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered NAI in poultry during the
isolation period;
3) were tested within 14 days prior to semen collection and shown to be free of NAI infection.

7.4.2.2.4 How to read Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code
7.231. In this particular case, the parties have diametrically opposed understandings of how
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code should be re ad. There are two principal issues of contention,
namely (i) whether Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code envisages the imposition of import
prohibitions because of concerns relating to AI; and (ii) the interpretation of the references to
zones and compartments in Chapter 10.4.
7.232. Both issues are of the utmost importance because the conclusions we reach in respect of
them will guide us in our analysis of whether India's AI measures are based on the
Terrestrial Code, and in particular Chapter 10.4. We examine each issue in turn.
7.4.2.2.4.1 Whether Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code envisages the imposition of
import prohibitions because of concerns relating to AI
7.233. As stated above, the parties have opposite views on whether Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code envisages the imposition of import prohibitions because of concerns relating to AI.
On the one hand, the United States is of the view that the text of Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code "illustrates that under the relevant international standard, import of products from
countries reporting LPNAI should be allowed"
525; in addition, the choice of a relevant
recommendation from the Code must depend on the NAI status of an exporting country, zone or
compartment.526 On the other hand, India postulates that the recommendations in Chapter 10.4

525 United States' opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 6.
526 United States' opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 5-7;
United States' first written submission, paras. 55-61 and 128.

"are structured in a manner wherein each recommendation contains a 'condition of entry'" 527, thus
allowing an importing country to choose whether to require NAI-freedom or HPNAI-freedom; and
whether to extend such a requirement to an entire exporting country, or only to the zones or
compartments from which imported products originate.
528 India also posits that the standard
provided in Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code "stipulates that if a country notifies HPAI and
LPAI in poultry, Member countries can impose an immediate ban on trade in poultry commodities
depending on the condition of entry they have sele cted based on the level of protection they have
deemed appropriate".
529
7.234. The arguments of the parties appear to raise separate though related issues; first, whether
Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code envisages, ei ther explicitly or implicitly, the imposition of
an import prohibition; and second, whether the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4
of the Terrestrial Code envisage, either explicitly or implicitly, the imposition of import
prohibitions. We thus proceed to address these two issues.
(i) Whether Article 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code envisages the imposition of an
import prohibition
7.235. As mentioned, the parties express divergent views regarding the interpretation of
Article 10.4.1.10 which reads as follows:
A Member should not impose immediate bans on the trade in poultry commodities in
response to a notification, according to Article 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Code, of
infection with HPAI and LPAI virus in birds other than poultry, including wild birds.
7.236. The United States submits that "this provision is notable because it addresses a situation
that should not arise". The United States explains that this provision provides that notification of
HPAI and LPAI in birds other than poultry should not be a basis to impose bans. However, it
maintains, Article 10.4.1.1 "does not require a country to notify anything other than LPNAI
outbreaks in poultry".
530 As has been noted above, India puts forward an a contrario reading of
this provision whereby countries can ban trade in poultry in the circumstances not explicitly
covered by Article 10.4.1.10; i.e. in circumstances other than infection with the HPAI and LPAI
virus in birds other than poultry, including wild birds.
531
7.237. Following a question from the Panel, the OIE clarified that "[t]he intention of
Article 10.4.1.10 was to discourage Member countries from imposing bans on trade in poultry". 532
The OIE also explained that the reasoning behind Article 10.4.1.10 was highlighted in the report of
the March 2008 meeting of the Code Commission as follows:
The Code Commission confirmed that the rationale for the current definition [of
poultry] is to encourage reporting of HPAI in all species and, at the same time, to
discourage Members from introducing trade measures in response to findings in wild
birds and other birds that are not considered to be part of the commercial sector.
The Code Commission agrees with the comments of Members that noted the potential
importance of avian species kept in backyard flocks and for hobby purposes in the
epidemiology of avian influenza. This is the reason for requiring reporting of HPAI in
such species. However, findings in pet or wild birds (which are not defined as poultry
according to the current definition) should not be the rationale for introducing trade
bans on the commercial sector. If Members responded to such findings by imposing
trade bans, the OIE considers that this would be a serious disincentive to transparency

527 India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 16.
528 India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 16-18 and 25-30;
India's first written submission, paras. 136-142.
529 India's first written submission, para. 125.
530 United States' first written submission, para. 51; United States' opening statement at the first
substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 11 and 13; United States' second written submission, para. 21.
531 India's first written submission, para. 131; India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting
of the Panel, paras. 20, 25 and 30; India's response to Panel question No. 29(b); India's second written
submission, para. 53.
532 OIE's response to Panel question No. 10(a).

in reporting. It is important to encourage reporting of infection in all avian species and
the Code Commission considers that the best way to do this is to maintain the current
definition of poultry.
533
7.238. The explanations provided by the OIE reso nate with the argument of the United States
that "[w]here the [Terrestrial] Code recommends prohibitions, it explicitly so provides". 534 We
recall that, in response to a question from the Panel, the OIE agreed with this statement and noted
that indeed "any restrictions recommended would be explicitly provided in the Terrestrial Code
chapters, including in Chapter 10.4".
535
7.239. Accordingly, on the basis of the wording of Article 10.4.1.10 as well as the explanations
p r o v i d e d b y t h e O I E , w e f i n d n o b a s i s f o r t h e a contrario interpretation of Article 10.4.1.10
advocated by India. We therefore conclude that Ar ticle 10.4.1.10 of the Terrestrial Code does not
envisage the imposition of an import prohibition with respect to poultry products.
(ii) Whether the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code envisage the imposition of import prohibitions
7.240. We now proceed to examine whether the product-specific recommendations in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code envisage, either explicitly or implicitly, the imposition of
import prohibitions. As before, the parties have divergent views. On the one hand, the
United States submits that the product-specific recommendations provided in Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code illustrate that the importation of products from countries reporting LPNAI should
be allowed; in addition, the choice of a relevant recommendation from the Terrestrial Code must
depend on the NAI status of an exporting country, zone or compartment.
536 India, on the other
hand, is of the view that each product-specific recommendation in Chapter 10.4 contains a
"condition of entry", thus allowing an importing country to choose whether to require NAI-freedom
or HPNAI-freedom.537
7.241. To understand the positions of the part ies, we examine two concrete examples of
recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and the respective manner in which the
parties understand them. The text of the relevant recommendations is included in the table in
paragraph 7.230 above.
7.242. First, Chapter 10.4 contains three provisions that include recommendations concerning the
importation of eggs for human consumption. These vary according to the NAI status of the
country, region or compartment of origin, namely: imports from a NAI-free country, zone or
compartment (Article 10.4.13); a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment (Article 10.4.14); and
recommendations regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin (Article 10.4.15).
538 We
note that the wording of Articles 10.4.13 and 10.4.14 is quite similar, except for the references to
NAI and HPNAI, and the presence of the additional conditions in Article 10.4.14 (that is, "the eggs
have had their surfaces sanitized").
7.243. The United States interprets these recommendations as meaning that eggs for human
consumption can be imported from either an HPNAI or NAI-free country, and "[t]he Code simply
requires a veterinary certificate, for both NAI and HPNAI-free territories, that certain control

533 OIE's response to Panel question No. 10(a) (quoting the Report of the meeting of the OIE Terrestrial
Animal Health Standards Commission, 76 SG/12/CS1 B, OIE, Paris, 10-14 March 2008).
534 United States' opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 13. As an
example, the United States refers to Article 10.1.2 of the Terrestrial Code as providing the recommendations
with respect to avian chlamydiosis, which reads as follows:
Veterinary Authorities of countries free from avian chlamydiosis may prohibit importation or transit
through their territory, from countries considered infected with avian chlamydiosis, of birds of the
Psittacidae family.
535 OIE's response to Panel question No. 16.
536 United States' opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 5-7;
United States' first written submission, paras. 55-61 and 128.
537 India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 16-18, 25-30; and
India's first written submission, paras. 136-142.
538 The text of Articles 10.4.13 to 10.4.15 of the Terrestrial Code is provided in the table in para. 7.230
above.

measures were in fact applied".539 According to the United States, "[t]hese recommendations are a
clear example of the scientific evidence being a pplied rationally to ensure safety and permit
trade".540 In its view, LPAI viruses do not transmit to the inside of poultry eggs, and therefore
there is no need to prohibit these products from a territory that only has LPAI. Instead, it argues,
the appropriate precaution is to ensure sanitization of the surface of eggs because that may be the
only potential vehicle that might have any virus on it.541
7.244. India disagrees with the United States' interpretation and argues that both Articles 10.4.13
and 10.4.14 specify "conditions of entry" for the relevant products. According to India, "[w]hile the
condition of entry for eggs under Article 10.4.13 is 'NAI-free country, zone or compartment', the
condition of entry for eggs under Article 10.4.14 is '[HP]NAI-free country, zone or
compartment'".
542 Therefore, in India's view, "a countr y may condition the entry of eggs for
human consumption either by importing from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment or from a
HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment, acco rding to the level of protection it deems
appropriate".543 Furthermore, India explains that clause (1) of Article 10.4.15 provides that egg
products be derived from eggs which meet the requirements of Articles 10.4.13 or 10.4.14.
Accordingly, "in the final analysis an egg product should be derived from an egg which itself should
fulfil the condition of entry specified in Article 10.4.13 or Article 10.4.14".
544
7.245. A second example refers to the two provisions in Chapter 10.4 including recommendations
with respect to the importation of fresh meat of poultry. As was the case with the eggs for human
consumption, the recommendations depend on the NAI status of the country, zone or
compartment of origin, i.e. a NAI or HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment (Article 10.4.19)
while other recommendations apply regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin
(Article 10.4.20).
545
7.246. The United States submits with regard to Article 10.4.19 that "[a]s LPAI viruses do not
replicate to poultry meat, the recommendation rightly focuses on ensuring that the source bird has
not been in a HPNAI territory or at least outside it for the relevant incubation period (21 days)".
According to the United States, "[i]f so, and the bi rd is slaughtered appropriately with the proper
inspection, then a certificate attesting as much is sufficient to allow trade".
546 Furthermore, the
United States notes that with respect to poultry meat and meat products, Articles 10.4.19 and
10.4.20 respectively provide "the exact same re commendation regardless of whether the territory
is classified as NAI or HPNAI-free".
547 Accordingly, the Unites States observes that it "fails to see
how even India can claim that the [Terrestrial] Code recommends disparate treatment – let alone
a ban – or holds out NAI-free as achieving a higher level of protection". 548 Finally, the
United States asserts that both Articles 10.4.19 and 10.4.3 of the Terrestrial Code explicitly
indicate that in case of LPNAI infections, poultry meat may be kept for slaughter and
consumption.549
7.247. India, in contrast, asserts that Article 10.4.19 "suggests, fresh meat of poultry can be
imported from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment or from a HPNAI-free country, zone or
compartment according to the level of protection a country deems appropriate". 550 Based on its

539 United States' first written submission, para. 57.
540 United States' first written submission, para. 58.
541 United States' first written submission, para. 58; United States' response to Panel question No. 7.
542 India's first written submission, para. 119(A).
543 India's first written submission, para. 139. India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting
of the Panel, paras. 17-18; India's response to Panel question No. 29(b); and India's second written
submission, para. 35.
544 India's first written submission, para. 139.
545 The text of Articles 10.4.19 and 10.4.20 of the Terrestrial Code is provided in the table in
para. 7.230 above.
546 United States' first written submission, para. 59.
547 United States' response to Panel question No. 7.
548 United States' response to Panel question No. 7; United States' second written submission, para. 20.
549 United States' response to Panel question No. 38. We note that Article 10.4.3.2 of the
Terrestrial Code provides that "[i]n the case of LPNAI infections, poultry may be kept for slaughter for human
consumption subject to conditions specified in Article 10.4.19".
550 India's first written submission, para. 140.

determined ALOP, India has chosen to require country freedom from NAI (both HPNAI and LPNAI),
which is reflected in S.O. 1663(E).551
7.248. Both examples distinctly illustrate the pa rties' divergent interpretations of the product-
specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4. In e ssence, while the United States interprets the
recommendations as providing for the conditions for safe trade according to the NAI status of the
exporting country, zone or compartment, India interprets the reference to that status as a
"condition of entry" which it is allowed to choose. Thus, if it chooses to impose NAI country
freedom as a "condition of entry", the other recommendations applicable, for instance, to a HPNAI-
free country (region or compartment) or "regardless of the NAI status" of the country, would not
apply to India.
7.249. Given these opposing understandings, the Panel asked the OIE for guidance on how its
own standard must be interpreted. The OIE explained that Chapter 10.4 provides risk mitigation
measures that can be relied upon to prevent the introduction of AI via the importation of
commodities from countries not free from LPNAI.
552 According to the OIE, recommendations in
Chapter 10.4 provide that "even if an exporting country is not free of [LPNAI], importation can
take place from country, zone or compartment that is free from infection with [HPAI]". 553
Particularly, the OIE explained that when an expo rting country reports LPNAI in poultry, it cannot
be considered as a country that is free from NAI. It may, however, be considered as a country that
is free from HPNAI. Furthermore, the OIE stressed that "[t]he Terrestrial Code recommends
measures for the continuation of trade in poultry products notwithstanding a finding of infection
with a[n LPAI] virus".
554 The OIE explained that there are several Articles in Chapter 10.4 dealing
with trade from countries that are free from HPNAI (but not free from NAI), including Articles
10.4.8 (day-old live poultry), 10.4.11 (poultry hatching eggs), 10.4.14 (eggs for human
consumption) and 10.4.17 (poultry semen).
555
7.250. The OIE pointed out that, in the case of fresh poultry meat, Article 10.4.19 contains the
same recommendations for importation from a NAI-free country, zone or compartment, as from an
HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment. According to the OIE, the rationale for these provisions
is that when chickens are infected with an HPNAI virus, because of the systemic nature of the
infection, the virus can be found in virtually all parts of the body, whereas infection with LPNAI
results in virus presence only during the acute phase of infection and limited to the respiratory and
alimentary tracts with no systemic involvement. Thus, fresh meat should originate from an HPNAI-
free country, zone or compartment, but can originate from an LPNAI infected one, as long as
derived from animals inspected and showing no si gns of disease. The requirement for ante- and
post-mortem inspection in an approved abattoir is intended to detect birds in the acute infectious
phase – hence the requirement for freedom from any signs suggestive of AI. As advised by the
OIE, "the Terrestrial Code establishes measures that are proportional to risk, with the objective of
facilitating safe trade and avoiding unjustifiable trade barriers".
556
7.251. Hence, it appears to us that the OIE agrees with the approach to the interpretation of the
product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code advocated by the
United States. We recall that the OIE agreed with the statement of the United States that where
the Terrestrial Code recommends prohibitions, it explicitly so provides.
557 Indeed, we do not find
any recommendations for import prohibitions in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. We have
examined the text of each of the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 outlined in the
table in paragraph 7.230 above and we find no basis for the interpretation of the product-specific
recommendations advocated by India.
7.252. We have found a number of product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 that
envisage allowing the importation of relevant poultry products from countries reporting LPNAI or
even regardless of the countries' NAI status, provid ed that appropriate risk mitigation conditions

551 India's first written submission, para. 140; India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting
of the Panel, para. 30; India's response to Panel question No. 29(b); India's second written submission,
para. 35.
552 OIE's response to Panel question No. 12.
553 OIE's response to Panel question No. 17(a). (emphasis original)
554 OIE's response to Panel question No. 14(b).
555 OIE's response to Panel question No. 11(c).
556 OIE's response to Panel question No. 11(c).
557 OIE's response to Panel question No. 16.

are fulfilled. In particular, Articles 10.4.8 (day-old live poultry), 10.4.11 (hatching eggs of poultry),
10.4.14 (eggs for human consumption), 10.4.17 (poultry semen) and 10.4.19 (fresh meat of
poultry) provide for the risk mitigation conditions necessary for the importation of the products
concerned from a HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment, which by definition might not be
LPNAI-free. Articles 10.4.6 (live birds other than poultry), 10.4.9 (day-old live birds other than
poultry), 10.4.12 (hatching eggs from birds other than poultry), 10.4.15 (egg products of poultry),
10.4.18 (semen of birds other than poultry), 10.4.20 (meat products of poultry), 10.4.21
(products of poultry origin, other than feather meal and poultry meal, intended for use in animal
feeding, or for agricultural or industrial us e), 10.4.22 (feathers and down of poultry), 10.4.23
(feathers and down of birds other than poultry) and 10.4.24 (feather meal and poultry meal)
contain the risk mitigation conditions for the importation of the products concerned regardless of
the NAI status of the country of origin.
558
7.253. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclu de that the product-specific recommendations in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial do not envisage, eith er explicitly or implicitly, the imposition of
import prohibitions with respect to poultry products.
7.4.2.2.4.2 The interpretation of the references to zones and compartments in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code
7.254. Another issue of contention between the pa rties that touches upon the interpretation of
Chapter 10.4 is whether it envisages that countries can choose whether to import only from NAI or
HPNAI-free countries or also from zones and compartments. On the one hand, the United States
argues that the OIE encourages countries to consider principles such as regionalization, i.e.
limiting the territory to which a measure need be applied.
559 According to the United States,
India's country-wide application of its AI-based import ban is not based on the Terrestrial Code
recommendations, which provide for the application of AI-related trade restrictions at the zone or
compartment level when appropriate surveillance, control, and biosecurity measures are in
place.
560 India, on the other hand, is of the view that the recommendations in Chapter 10.4 "are
structured in a manner wherein each recommendation contains a 'condition of entry'" 561, thus
allowing an importing country to choose whether to require NAI-freedom or HPNAI-freedom, and
whether to extend such a requirement to an entire exporting country, or only to its zones or
compartments.
562
7.255. We proceed to examine Chapter 10.4 on its face to determine whether it envisages that
countries can choose whether to import only from NAI or HPNAI-free countries or also from zones
and compartments. We note that the text of Chapter 10.4 speaks often of "zones" 563 and
"compartments".564 We also note that the parties have argued about "regionalization" in
connection with these terms. In this context, Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, which we examine in
section 7.9 below, refers to "Adaptation to Regional Conditions". The OIE clarified that, for the
purposes of the Terrestrial Code, "zoning" an d "regionalisation" have the same meaning and
explained that Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the Terrestrial Code set out the general principles of
"zoning" and "compartmentalisation".
565
7.256. Examining the various provisions in Chapter 10.4 on their face, we observe that
Articles 10.4.2 to 10.4.4 of the Terrestrial Code recognize in general terms the possibility of

558 The text of the relevant Articles of Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code is provided in the table in
para. 7.230 above.
559 United States' first written submission, paras. 12 and 49.
560 United States' first written submission, para. 156.
561 India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 16.
562 India's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 16-18 and 25-30;
India's first written submission, paras. 136-142.
563 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "zone/region" as "a clearly defined part of a
territory containing an animal subpopulation with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease for
which required surveillance, control and biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose of
international trade".
564 The Glossary of the Terrestrial Code defines the term "compartment" as "an animal subpopulation
contained in one or more establishments under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct
health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for which required surveillance, control and
biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose of international trade".
565 OIE's response to Panel question No. 18(a).

differentiating the NAI status of a country, zone or compartment based on certain criteria. These
criteria are provided for in Article 10.4.2, which reads as follows:
Determination of the NAI status of a country, zone or compartment
The NAI status of a country, a zone or a compartment can be determined on the basis
of the following criteria:
1) NAI is notifiable in the whole country, an on-going NAI awareness programme is in
place, and all notified suspect occurrences of NAI are subjected to field and, where
applicable, laboratory investigations;
2) appropriate surveillance is in place to demonstrate the presence of infection in the
absence of clinical signs in poultry, and the risk posed by birds other than poultry; this
may be achieved through a NAI surveillance programme in accordance with Articles
10.4.27. to 10.4.33.;
3) consideration of all epidemiological factors for NAI occurrence and their historical
perspective.
7.257. Articles 10.4.3 and 10.4.4 further reflect this possibility by providing the conditions that
must be met for a country, zone or compartment to be considered either "NAI-free" and "HPNAI-
free", respectively:
Article 10.4.3
NAI-free country, zone or compartment
A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from NAI when it has been
shown that neither HPNAI nor LPNAI infection in poultry has been present in the
country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, based on surveillance in
accordance with Articles 10.4.27. to 10.4.33.
If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or compartment,
NAI-free status can be regained:
1) In the case of HPNAI infections, three months after a stamping-out policy
(including disinfection of all affected establishments) is applied, providing that
surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27. to 10.4.33. has been carried out
during that three-month period.
2) In the case of LPNAI infections, poultry may be kept for slaughter for human
consumption subject to conditions specified in Article 10.4.19. or a stamping-out
policy may be applied; in either case, three months after the disinfection of all
affected establishments, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles
10.4.27. to 10.4.33. has been carried out during that three-month period.
Article 10.4.4
HPNAI-free country, zone or compartment
A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from HPNAI when:
1) it has been shown that HPNAI infection in poultry has not been present in the
country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, although its LPNAI status may
be unknown; or
2) when, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27. to 10.4.33., it
does not meet the criteria for freedom from NAI but any NAI virus detected has not
been identified as HPNAI virus.

The surveillance may need to be adapted to parts of the country or existing zones or
compartments depending on historical or ge ographical factors, industry structure,
population data, or proximity to recent outbreaks.
If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or compartment,
HPNAI-free status can be regained thr ee months after a stamping-out policy
(including disinfection of all affected establishments) is applied, providing that
surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27. to 10.4.33. has been carried out
during that three-month period.
7.258. In addition to these general provisions, we also observe that Chapter 10.4 includes
numerous product-specific recommendations foreseeing the measures to be applied by importing
countries depending on the NAI status of the country, zone or compartment from which the
products originate. For instance, Articles 10.4.5 (l ive poultry (other than day-old poultry)), 10.4.7
(day-old live poultry), 10.4.10 (hatching eggs of poultry), 10.4.13 (eggs for human consumption),
10.4.16 (poultry semen) and 10.4.19 (fresh meat of poultry) provide that the importation of the
products concerned may take place not only from a NAI-free country, but also from a NAI-free
zone or compartment. In addition, Articles 10.4.8 (day-old live poultry), 10.4.11 (hatching eggs of
poultry), 10.4.14 (eggs for human consumption), 10.4.17 (poultry semen) and 10.4.19 (fresh
meat of poultry) provide that the importation of the products concerned may take place not only
from a HPNAI-free country, but also from a HPNAI-free zone or compartment, which would mean a
zone or compartment which is not necessarily free from LPNAI.
566
7.259. In our view, the text of Chapter 10.4 indicates that the recommendations contained
therein are not only intended for country-wide purposes; rather, they are intended to also apply to
zones and compartments.
7.260. As with other matters pertaining to the interpretation of the Terrestrial Code, we consulted
the OIE, which explained that "[z]oning and comp artmentalisation are concepts promoted by the
OIE, both to prevent and control diseases and to allow safe trade from countries not free". 567 The
OIE clarified that these concepts "are in general applicable to all listed diseases" 568, which means
that they also apply in the case of NAI. The OIE further explained how the concepts of zoning and
compartmentalization work in connection with NAI as follows:
In the case of AI, where the entry of the disease agent into a country or zone cannot
be prevented with complete efficiency, due to the role of wild birds in disseminating
infection, compartmentalisation based on biosecurity can be applied as a trade
facilitating measure. The aim is to seek recognition between trading partners that the
measures applied to protect the compartment are sufficiently robust, so that even if
avian influenza were to occur in the country, the sub population within the
compartment (which should be approved before any outbreak) would remain free, and
therefore eligible for trade based on measures that apply to a population that is free
of infection.
569
7.261. Having been informed of the parties' positions, the OIE affirmed that the requirements of
an importing country should take into consideration the zoning and compartmentalization
principles applied according to the relevant chapte rs in the Terrestrial Code. Nonetheless, if the
affected country, i.e. the exporting country, does not apply zoning to reduce the size of the
affected population, then the measures recommended in the Code for a particular product should
be applied for the entire country.
570
7.262. It appears to us that the application by an importing country of the product-specific
recommendations to zones or compartments presupposes that the exporting country has
established such zones or compartments within its territory according to the Terrestrial Code. To
this end, if an exporting country establishes zo nes or compartments, Chapter 10.4 envisages that

566 The text of the relevant Articles of Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code is provided in the table in
para. 7.230 above.
567 OIE's response to Panel question No. 2.
568 OIE's response to Panel question No. 14(b).
569 OIE's response to Panel question No. 2.
570 OIE's response to Panel question No. 19(b).

the importing country allow the importation from those zones and compartments subject to the
product-specific recommendations contained therein, which vary depending on the NAI status of
that zone or compartment. We understand this to mean that Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code
envisages that importing countries, when adopting and applying their AI measures, should at least
recognize that even if an exporting country may not be entirely NAI or HPNAI-free, it may have
zones or compartments that are NAI or HPNAI-free.
7.263. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the Terrestrial Code envisages that
AI measures allow for the possibility of importing from NAI or HPNAI-free zones and
compartments; and not only from NAI or HPNAI-free countries.
7.4.2.2.5 Whether India's AI measur es are based on Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code
7.264. We now examine whether India's AI measures are "based on" the Terrestrial Code, and, in
particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof.
7.265. As described in section 7.4.2.2 above, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones explained
that, to be "based on" an international standard , a measure "may adopt some, not necessarily all,
of the elements of the international standard".
571 The Appellate Body also referred to the ordinary
meaning of the term "based on" in Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement and observed that "[a] thing
is commonly said to be 'based on' another thing when the former 'stands' or is 'founded' or 'built'
upon or 'is supported by' the latter 572".573 The Appellate Body however did not expound further as
to which and how many elements of an international standard must be adopted for an
SPS measure to be considered to be "based on" th e standard within the meaning of Article 3.1 of
the SPS Agreement.
7.266. We recall that, in EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body, when interpreting the obligation in
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to use international standards "as a basis" for technical
regulations
574, considered its approach to the interpretation of the term "based on" in the context
of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as relevant for the interpretation of "as a basis" in
Article 2.4.575 We think that the reverse approach is also viable. Hence, we shall guide ourselves
by the Appellate Body's findings in EC – Sardines, where appropriate.
7.267. We note that, in EC – Sardines , after citing several dictionary definitions, the
Appellate Body highlighted the following similar terms in clarifying the ordinary meaning of the
term "basis": "principal constituent", "fundamental principle", "main constituent", and
"determining principle".576 The Appellate Body then concluded that "there must be a very strong
and very close relationship between two things in order to be able to say that one is 'the basis for'
the other".577
7.268. The Appellate Body further observed:
We see no need here to define in general the nature of the relationship that must
exist for an international standard to serve "as a basis for" a technical regulation. Here
we need only examine this measure to determine if it fulfils this obligation. In our
view, it can certainly be said—at a minimum—that something cannot be considered a
"basis" for something else if the two are contradictory. Therefore, under Article 2.4, if
the technical regulation and the international standard contradict each other, it cannot

571 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 171.
572 (footnote original) L. Brown (ed.), The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles
(Clarendon Press), Vol. I, p. 187.
573 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 163.
574 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 242-244.
575 The Appellate Body explained that its "approach in EC – Hormones is also relevant for the
interpretation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement". Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 242. We also
note, nevertheless, that the Appellate Body did not consider it necessary to decide in that case whether the
term "as a basis", in the context of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, has the same meaning as the term
"based on", in the context of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines,
footnote 169.
576 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 243-245.
577 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 245.

properly be concluded that the internationa l standard has been used "as a basis for"
the technical regulation.578
7.269. The Appellate Body's reasoning is useful for our interpretation of the term "based on" in
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. Extrapolating from this reasoning for our purposes in this
dispute, it seems to us equally viable to say that where an SPS measure and the relevant
international standard contradict each other, it cannot properly be concluded that the SPS measure
is "based on" that international standard.
7.270. We have found that India's interpretative approach, whereby Chapter 10.4 would allow an
importing country to choose as a "condition of en try" the NAI-free status of the exporting country
and apply that condition only on a country-wide basis, runs contrary to Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code. Specifically, in sections 7.4.2.2.4.1 and 7.4.2.2.4.2 above, we found that
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code does not envisage the imposition of import prohibitions with
respect to poultry products, and that it does envisage that AI measures allow for the possibility of
importing from NAI or HPNAI-free zones and compartments; and not only from NAI or HPNAI-free
countries. As explained in paragraphs 7.252 and 7.258 above, a number of product-specific
recommendations in Chapter 10.4 envisage the importation of relevant poultry products from
countries, zones or compartments reporting LPNAI or even regardless of the country NAI status,
provided that appropriate risk mitigation conditions are fulfilled.
7.271. We recall that India's AI measures are those "that prohibit the importation of certain
agricultural products from countries reporting NAI" and that they are maintained through the
Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E). In particular, S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of the
relevant products from countries reporting NAI, thus not allowing importation from NAI or HPNAI-
free zones or compartments, in contradiction with the product-specific recommendations of
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code. Also in contradiction with Chapter 10.4, S.O. 1663(E)
prohibits the importation of the relevant products from non-NAI-free countries, zones or
compartments. We thus agree with the United States that India's AI measures amount to a
"fundamental departure" from the Terrestrial Code.
579
7.272. Accordingly, because India's AI measures and Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code
contradict each other, it cannot properly be concluded that India's AI measures are "based on" the
relevant international standard.
7.273. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that India's AI measures are not "based on" the
relevant international standard, the Terrestrial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof,
within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
7.4.2.2.6 Conclusion on the United Stat es' claim pursuant to Article 3.1 of the
SPS Agreement
7.274. Having concluded that India's AI measures are not "based on" the relevant international
standard, the Terrestrial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, the Panel finds that India's
AI measures are inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
7.4.2.3 Whether India's AI measures "confo rm to" the Terrestrial Code pursuant to
Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement
7.275. Having found that India's AI measures ar e not "based on" the Terrestrial Code and, in
particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, within the mean ing of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, and in
line with our reasoning in paragraph 7.202 above, we conclude that India's AI measures also do
not "conform to" the Terrestrial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, within the meaning
of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. India therefore is not entitled to benefit from the presumption
of consistency of its AI measures with the other relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement and of
the GATT 1994.

578 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 248. (emphasis original)
579 United States' second written submission, para. 10.

7.5 Whether India's AI measures are inconsis tent with Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.5.1 Introduction
7.276. The United States claims that, by fail ing to undertake a risk assessment, India has
breached Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.
580 The United States further claims that the
failure to conduct a risk assessment resulted in a breach of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.581
7.277. Before commencing the legal analysis of these provisions, we note India's assertion that
"[t]he United States claims pursuant to Article[s] 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 are limited to fresh meat of
poultry and eggs". 582 According to India, the United States has "not adduced arguments or
evidence concerning India's measure with respect to pigs in its claim under Article 2.2, 5.1
and 5.2".
583
7.278. We recall our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, which, as explained in paragraph 7.4
above, forms an integral part of the present findings, to the effect that the ten categories of
products listed in S.O. 1663(E) and the United States' panel request fall within the scope of this
dispute.
584 In line with those findings, we are not persuaded by India's submission that the
United States' claims under Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement pertain only to fresh
meat of poultry and eggs.
7.279. In addition, we recall our findings in sections 7.4.2.2.5 and 7.4.2.2.6 above that India's
AI measures are not based on the Terrestrial Code and that, as explained in section 7.4.2.3 above,
they do not conform to the Terrestrial Code. Accordingly, India cannot rely on the alleged
conformity of its AI's measures to the Terrestrial Code in order to justify a presumption of
consistency of those measures with the remainder of the SPS Agreement, including Articles 2.2,
5.1 and 5.2. Furthermore, as found in section 7.4.2.2.2 above, such a defence would not apply in
respect of live pigs as these are not covered by Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and, to our
knowledge, there is no other relevant international standard for AI applicable to live pigs. We also
refer to our findings in section 7.4.2.2.2 above that there is no product-specific recommendation in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code for "pathologica l material and biological products from birds",
and that we do not have sufficient evidence on record to determine whether India's AI measures in
respect of these products are based on the recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the
Terrestrial Code.
7.280. With this in mind, we proceed to examine the United States' claims under Articles 5.1, 5.2
and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. We begin by considering the relationship between these provisions.
7.5.2 Relationship between Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
7.281. Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement deal with the scientific foundation of
SPS measures
585 and are intimately related. While Articl es 5.1 and 5.2 concern risk assessments,
Article 2.2 refers to scientific principles and sufficient scientific evidence. Prior panels have found
that Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement directly inform each other because Article 5.2
sheds light on the elements that are of releva nce in the assessment of risks as foreseen in
Article 5.1.
586 Furthermore, the Appellate Body has explained that Article 5.1 constitutes "a specific
application of the basic obligations contained in Article 2.2" of the SPS Agreement 587, and that
Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1 because "the elements that define the basic obligation set out in

580 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2; United States' first written submission,
para. 17.
581 United States' first written submission, para. 124. The United States further avers that India may not
invoke Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement in order to avoid its obligations under Articles 5.1 and 5.2
(United States' first written submission, para. 125). As India has not presented a defence under Article 5.7, the
Panel finds it unnecessary to make any determinations in respect of this provision.
582 India's response to Panel question No. 60.
583 India's response to Panel question No. 60.
584 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.27-3.30, 3.37, 3.92-3.93, 3.140.
585 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.167.

Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1".588 The Appellate Body advises that "Articles 2.2 and 5.1
should constantly be read together".589
7.282. The relationship between these three provis ions has led panels and the Appellate Body to
conclude that, when an SPS measure is not based on a risk assessment conducted according to
the requirements in Article 5.1 and 5.2, "this measure can be presumed, more generally, not to be
based on scientific principles or to be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence". 590 In
practical terms, this means that a violation of Ar ticles 5.1 and 5.2 entails a violation of the more
general Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. 591 Nonetheless, the opposite is not always the case due
to the broader scope of Article 2.2; indeed, not all instances of violation of Article 2.2 entail a
violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.2.592
7.283. Bearing in mind the relationship between these provisions and in line with the approach
followed by prior panels and the Appellate Body, we will first examine the United States' claims
under Articles 5.1 and 5.2, before proceeding to the broader claim under Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement.
7.5.3 Whether India's AI measures are inco nsistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.5.3.1 Arguments of the parties
7.5.3.1.1 United States
7.284. According to the United States, the relevant international standard, the Terrestrial Code,
contains specific science-based recommendations for addressing the risks posed by AI. Since
India's measures do not conform to the international standard, India had an obligation to
undertake a risk assessment and base its measures on that risk assessment, which it has not
done. Accordingly, the United States contends, In dia, "by failing to undertake a risk assessment,
has breached several WTO obligations, including Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement".
593
7.285. The United States submits that during the first substantive meeting, India sought to
debate the science of AI transmission and to discuss the risks associated with AI. In the
United States' view, while the science it has submitted refutes India's contentions, the more
important point is that these scientific questions are not relevant in the present dispute. For the
United States, what is relevant under the SPS Agreement is that India's measures are not based
on the Terrestrial Code, and that India has not conducted a risk assessment.
594 For the
United States "[f]undamentally, a risk assessment is not an exercise to gather evidence to fit a
pre-ordained conclusion, but rather an impartia l, scientific exercise to determine whether a
measure should be adopted to protect against a particular risk".595
7.286. The United States contends that Article 5.1 requires that an appropriate risk assessment
"tak[e] into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations".596 The OIE has promulgated standards regarding risk assessment both in the
Terrestrial Code (Chapter 2.1) and in its Handbook on Import Risk Analysis. Accordingly, for the
United States, a proper risk assessment for AI under the SPS Agreement would, at a minimum,
consider and address the OIE's risk assessment techniques.597

588 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 180.
590 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.52; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 137.
591 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 137-138; Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon,
para. 8.52; Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.85 and 7.161; EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, paras. 7.3396 and 7.3399; US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.168 and 7.203–7.204; and
Australia – Apples, paras. 7.212 and 7.905.
592 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 137-138; Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon,
593 United States' first written submission, para. 17.
594 United States' closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4.
595 United States' first written submission, para. 110.
596 United States' first written submission, para. 111.
597 United States' first written submission, para. 111.

7.287. The United States avers that India, in its most recent notification to the WTO, explained
why it enacted its measures: (i) "to ensure food safety and protect domestic and wild birds from
AI (both HPNAI and LPNAI)"; and (ii) "urgent action has been taken to prevent the ingress of this
virus to protect human health as well as health of poultry in India".
598 Since "India has stated that
its measures were adopted to address risks associated with both diseases and food safety, the
SPS Agreement obliges India to base its measures on both types of risk assessment – a Pest Risk
Assessment and a Food Safety Risk Assessment".
599 Despite this, the United States alleges, India
lacks a risk assessment on which it bases its measures and "India's measures are not based on a
risk assessment in contravention of Article 5.1". 600 The United States adds that without a risk
assessment, India could not have taken into account the factors noted in Article 5.2, thereby
breaching that provision as well.
601
7.288. The United States recalls that at the June 2010 SPS Committee meeting, India asserted
that "India conducted a detailed risk analysis for the importation of animal and animal products, by
a committee of experts, based on the existing global situation of AI, available scientific literature
and the OIE standards".
602 At the October 2010 SPS Committee Meeting, India provided a
document to the United States and the European Union entitled "India's Risk Assessment on Avian
Influenza for imposing ban on import of poultry and poultry products from Avian Influenza positive
countries" (Summary Document).603 The summary report of the meeting indicates that "India had
provided its risk assessment on [AI] directly to the United States, and was willing to share it with
other Members upon request".
604
7.289. According to the United States, at an SPS Committee meeting following the one held in
October 2010, the United States and other Members criticized the Summary Document as
inconsistent with the appropriate standards for a risk assessment. The United States explains that
India noted at the time that what it had provided "was not the final risk assessment document,
which would take some time".
605 In September 2011, the United States requested the OIE to
review the document provided by India. A review was conducted that noted, inter alia, that the
document "is unstructured and repetitive", "[i]ts reasoning is unclear and it is poorly supported by
reference to scientific literature", and that "India's risk assessment fails to evaluate the likelihood
of the risks arising".606
7.290. The United States elaborates that at a subsequent SPS Committee meeting, it asked that
the OIE be given the floor in order to summarize its findings on India's document. According to the
United States, India objected and noted that "[i]n October 2010, India had provided a summary
report on an informal basis to the European Union and the United States". India further "clarified
that the document had also been provided to th e OIE on an informal basis, and that it was a
summary document, not a full risk assessment".
607
7.291. The United States submits that "India's position regarding this document has changed in
the past", and "India's more recent pronouncements are that the Summary Document is in fact
not intended to serve as its risk assessment". 608 The United States adds that it addresses the
Summary Document "[i]n the interest of complete ness". However, in the event that India asserts
in this proceeding that the document qualifies as a risk assessment, the United States contends
that the Summary Document fails to satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement.609
7.292. In its second written submission, the United States posits that India's only response to the
United States' claims involving the absence of a risk assessment is that the "non-existence of a
risk assessment is of no consequence when India's measure is in conformity with the [Terrestrial]

598 United States' first written submission, para. 112.
599 United States' first written submission, para. 112.
600 United States' first written submission, para. 113.
601 United States' first written submission, para. 113.
602 United States' first written submission, para. 80 (referring to [G/SPS/R/58, para. 40]).
603 United States' first written submission, para. 81 (referring to Exhibit US-110).
604 United States' first written submission, para. 81 (referring to G/SPS/R/61, para. 27).
605 United States' first written submission, para. 82 (referring to G/SPS/R/63, paras. 64-67).
606 United States' first written submission, para. 83.
607 United States' first written submission, para. 84 (referring to G/SPS/R/64, para. 85).
608 United States' first written submission, para. 114.
609 United States' first written submission, paras. 114-123; and United States' second written
submission, para. 35.

Code".610 However, the United States considers that it has demonstrated that India's measures
neither "conform to" nor are "based on" the Terrest rial Code. Accordingly, if the Panel finds that
India's measures are not in conformity with the Te rrestrial Code, then the United States requests
the Panel to find that India's measures are in breach of India's obligations under Articles 5.1, 5.2,
and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.611
7.293. In addition, the United States conten ds that both the Panel and the United States
"pursued every possible avenue for obtaining information from India on any other document that
might serve as a risk assessment". Specifically, (i) requests have been made to India in the
SPS Committee meetings 612; (ii) the United States requested in January 2012 pursuant to
Article 5.8 that India indicate if its measures were based on a risk assessment and if so, to provide
a copy
613; (iii) the Panel sought clarification from India at the first substantive meeting; and (iv)
the Panel requested India in question No. 31 to confirm whether India's AI measures are based on
a risk assessment, and if so, to provide it to the Panel. According to the United States, despite all
of these inquiries, India never identified any risk assessment.
614
7.5.3.1.2 India
7.294. India's position is that "SPS measures which imbibe the relevant international standards"
would be deemed to be based on scientific princi ples and sufficient scientific evidence, such that
further justification for adoption of the internatio nal standard by a Member is neither required nor
necessary. India is therefore "surprised" that "despite this understanding, the United States seeks
from India a risk assessment as a further justification that its measure is based on science".
615
7.295. India states that "it was always [its] understanding that having adopted an OIE
recommendation, it was not required to further conduct a risk assessment". 616 India elaborates
that "[i]t is evident that when a Member bases its SPS measures on an international standard it is
not required to further conduct a risk assessmen t under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement as the
international standard itself fulfils the requirement of being based on scientific principles and not
being maintained without sufficient scientific evidence".
617 In India's view, the "non-existence of a
risk assessment is of no consequence when India's measure is in conformity with the [Terrestrial]
Code".618 India asserts that the United States' argument concerning the inconsistency of India's
measures with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 "misrepresents the correct position concerning the requirement
of conducting a risk assessment".619
7.296. India explains that "where there are in ternational standards, the WTO members should
preferably base their domestic sanitary measure on such international standards, in casu , the
[Terrestrial] Code". However, when there are no international standards or if the domestic sanitary
measure adopts a higher level of protection, then the WTO Member in question is required to
justify its domestic sanitary measure through a ri sk assessment. For India, in the light of the
above, it is clear that it is not required to conduct a risk assessment, "as it[s] measures for eggs
and fresh meat of poultry under S.O. 1663(E) conform with the [Terrestrial] Code".
620
7.297. Moreover, India asserts that the scientifi c evidence it submitted to justify an import
suspension on fresh meat of poultry and eggs from LPNAI countries clearly establishes the risk in
trade from these commodities and "fulfils the re quirement of not maintaining its measure without
sufficient scientific evidence under Article 2.2 and India is under no obligation to conduct a

610 United States' second written submission, para. 34 (citing India's opening statement at the first
611 United States' second written submission, para. 34.
612 United States' second written submission, para. 35 (referring to United States first written
submission, para. 80).
613 United States' second written submission, para. 35 (referring to Exhibit US-4).
614 United States' second written submission, para. 35.
615 India's first written submission, paras. 2-3.
616 India's first written submission, para. 7.
617 India's first written submission, paras. 165; and India's response to Panel question No. 60.
618 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4.
619 India's first written submission, para. 184.
620 India's response to Panel question No. 31.

separate risk assessment in this instance". Theref ore, according to India, the "United States' claim
under Article[s] 5.1 and 5.2 should be dismissed".621
7.298. With respect to the Summary Document referred to by the United States, India
acknowledges that in October 2010, pursuant to bilateral talks between the two countries, India
informally provided a document that contained a brief summary of scientific material which India
believed formed the basis of the OIE recommendation and hence also the justification behind
India's measure. India mentioned in the Summary Document the specific OIE recommendation
which it believed was applicable in the instant case. India stresses that "[t]his document was
provided informally and in good faith only to the United States and the European Communities and
India categorically stated that this was not Indi a's risk assessment and should not be treated as
one".
622
7.299. India asserts that "[i]n breach of the trust reposed by India in the United States, it
together with the European Union specifically sought an opinion from the OIE whether the
document qualified as a risk assessment". India avers that it "had not sought OIE's opinion on the
matter and shared the document with the OIE only for information purposes". 623 In India's view,
"[t]he OIE does not have a separate mandate to assess, judge or comment on the existence or
content of a Member's risk assessment". None theless, "in disregard of its mandate and
overstepping its position as an observer at SPS Committee meetings, the OIE took to the floor and
proceeded to opine on the document stating that it was severely deficient in many aspects".624
7.300. India acknowledges that the OIE in its "critical review" of India's Summary Document
stated that the document "does not conform to the OIE's definition of a risk assessment" and also
"accuses India of plagiarism for allegedly quoting from a New Zealand risk assessment without
mentioning the source". 625 India contends that it had not relied on the New Zealand risk
assessment and the OIE reviewer failed to notice that the scientific authorities behind the facts
mentioned in India's Summary Document were listed in the end notes.626
7.301. According to India, the OIE reviewer "further failed to note that the New Zealand risk
assessment which was conducted in 1999 (when the concept of LPNAI occurrences in poultry was
not yet recognized by the OIE) was outdated compared to a far more recent risk assessment
conducted by Australia in 2008". India then posits that "[t]he Australian risk assessment
categorically concludes that fresh meat of poultry from countries such as USA which notified LPNAI
should not be imported".
627
7.5.3.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.5.3.2.1 Introduction
7.302. The issue before the Panel is whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Articles 5.1
and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. In particular, the Un ited States claims that India did not undertake
a risk assessment and failed to ensure that its AI measures are based on a risk assessment in
violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
628 The United States further claims that without a
risk assessment, India could not have taken into account available scientific evidence and the
other factors noted in Article 5.2, thereby breaching that provision as well.629
7.303. India responds that its measures conform to the Terrestrial Code and therefore the "non-
existence of a risk assessment is of no conseque nce when India's measure is in conformity with
the [Terrestrial] Code".630

621 India's first written submission, para. 186.
622 India's first written submission, para. 7.
623 India's first written submission, para. 8.
624 India's first written submission, para. 8.
625 India's first written submission, para. 9.
626 India's first written submission, para. 9.
627 India's first written submission, para. 9.
628 United States' first written submission, paras. 17 and 113.
629 United States' first written submission, para. 113.
630 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4.

7.304. As explained in paragraph 7.279 above, we have found that India's AI measures are not
based on, and therefore do not conform to, the Terre strial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4
thereof. Accordingly, India cannot rely on the a lleged conformity of its AI's measures to the
Terrestrial Code in order to justify a presumpt ion of consistency of those measures with the
remainder of the SPS Agreement, including Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2.
7.305. We now proceed to examine the legal provisions at issue to ascertain the applicable legal
test.
7.5.3.2.2 The legal provisions at issue
7.306. The first two paragraphs of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement read as follows:
1. Members shall ensure that their sanita ry or phytosanitary measures are based
on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal
or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by
the relevant international organizations.
2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling
and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or
disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine
or other treatment.
7.307. We concur with the approach adopted by the panel in US – Poultry (China) and thus
consider that an analysis under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement consists of answering two
fundamental questions: first, whether India has a risk assessment, appropriate to the
circumstances, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant
international organizations and the elements listed in Article 5.2; and second, if that is the case,
whether India's AI measures are based on that risk assessment.
631
7.308. In Australia – Apples, the Appellate Body observed that Article 5.2 requires a risk assessor
to take into account the available scientific evidence, together with other factors. The
Appellate Body explained that whether a risk assessor has taken into account the available
scientific evidence in accordance with Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement and whether its risk
assessment is a proper risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) "must be
determined by assessing the relationship betwee n the conclusions of the risk assessor and the
relevant available scientific evidence".
632
7.5.3.2.3 Whether India has a risk asse ssment pursuant to Article 5.1 of the
SPS Agreement
7.309. The first question we must answer under our analysis of the United States' claim pursuant
to Article 5.1 is whether India has a risk assessment. As noted above, the United States claims
that India lacks a risk assessment on which to base its measures 633, while India responds that
because its measures conform to the Terrestrial Code, "the non-existence of a risk assessment is
of no consequence".634
7.310. In order to establish whether India has a risk assessment, we commence by looking at the
definition of "risk assessment" in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement, which reads:
Risk assessment – The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the
sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated

631 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.173. We note that a similar approach was adopted by the
panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, para. 7.3019.
632 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 208.
633 United States' first written submission, para. 113.
634 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4; India's first written submission,
para. 185.

potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for
adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.
7.311. In reference to the above definition, the Appellate Body has described the term
"risk assessment" as "a process characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and
analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts and opinions".
635
7.312. We need to establish whether India has a risk assessment that falls within the definition
provided in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement. Further to the United States' contention that India
has not undertaken a risk assessment, and since India had not come forward with one, the Panel
asked India to clarify whether it has a risk assessment for its AI measures and, if so, to provide it
to the Panel.
636 India did not do so, responding that it was "not required to conduct a risk
assessment for measures which conform to the international standards".637
7.313. We note that India argued that "[t]he Australian risk assessment categorically concludes
that fresh meat of poultry from countries such as USA which notified LPNAI should not be
imported".638 Nevertheless, leaving aside Australia's submission to this Panel, which did not concur
with India's assertion 639, India did not contend before us that its AI measures are based on
Australia's risk assessment.
7.314. The United States draws the Panel's attention to the Summary Document 640 which India
provided at the WTO SPS Committee meeting in October 2010, and maintains that it does not
constitute a risk assessment within the meaning of Articles 5.1, 5.2 and Annex A(4) of the
SPS Agreement.
641 India acknowledges that in October 2010, pursuant to bilateral talks between
the two countries, India informally provided a document that contained a brief summary of
scientific material which India believed formed the basis of the OIE recommendation and hence
also the justification behind India's measure. Nevertheless, India submits that the Summary
Documents is not India's risk assessment.
642
7.315. Having found that India's AI measures are not based on, and therefore do not conform to,
the Terrestrial Code and, in particular Chapter 10.4 thereof, such that a risk assessment is
required in this case, and having considered the submissions of the parties on the existence of a
risk assessment, we turn to our own examinatio n of whether India has a risk assessment that
meets the definition provided in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement.
7.316. It seems to us that the only document before us that could constitute such an assessment
is the Summary Document. We observe that, although this Summary Document is entitled "India's
Risk Assessment on Avian Influenza for imposing ban on import of poultry and poultry products
from Avian Influenza positive countries", India submits that "[t]his document was provided
informally and in good faith only to the United States and the European Communities" and that
"this was not India's risk assessment and should not be treated as one".
643 We accept India's
assertion that it did not intend for it to serve as a risk assessment. We also note that, as India
asserts, the document is but a "brief summary of scientific material". In the light of these
assessments and descriptions of the Summary Docu ment, we are not satisfied that it meets the
definition set out in Annex A(4), nor that it meets the Appellate Body's description of "a process
characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis, that is, a mode of
studying and sorting out facts and opinions".
7.317. On the basis of the evidence and argument before us, the Panel concludes that India does
not have a risk assessment within the meaning of Annex A(4) and as required by Article 5.1 of the
SPS Agreement in respect of its AI measures.

635 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 207 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada –
Continued Suspension, paras. 527; and EC – Hormones, para. 187).
636 Panel question Nos. 31 and 59.
637 India's response to Panel question Nos. 31 and 59.
638 India's first written submission, para. 9.
639 Australia's third-party written submission, para. 15.
641 United States' first written submission, paras. 81-84 and 114-123.
642 India's first written submission, para. 7; India's second written submission, para. 85.
643 India's first written submission, para. 7; India's second written submission, para. 85.

7.5.3.2.4 Conclusion on the United States ' claims under Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.318. In the absence of a risk assessment, we do not find it necessary to continue our analysis
under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. We therefore find that India's AI measures are
inconsistent with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because they are not based on a risk
assessment, appropriate to the circumstances, taking into account risk assessment techniques
developed by the relevant international organizations.
7.319. Having concluded that India's AI measures are not based on a risk assessment, it is not
possible to examine whether India could have take n into account in the assessment of risks the
factors set out in Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel also finds that, in the absence of a
risk assessment, India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement
because they are not based on a risk assessment that takes into account the factors set forth in
Article 5.2.
7.5.4 Whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.5.4.1 Arguments of the parties
7.5.4.1.1 United States
7.320. The United States claims that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 because
they are not applied only to the extent necessary to protect human or animal life or health, are not
based upon scientific principles, and are maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.
644
7.321. The United States submits that Article 2.2 sets forth fundamental obligations applicable to
all SPS measures, including that measures be based on scientific principles and sufficient scientific
evidence. In the United States' view, Articles 5.1 and 5.2 serve as a specific application of these
basic principles by requiring Members to undertake a risk assessment. Citing the Appellate Body,
the United States points out that the relationship between these provisions "is that a proper risk
assessment is a constituent component of ensuring measures are based on scientific principles and
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence".
645
7.322. The United States proceeds to argue that because of this relationship, a finding that
Articles 5.1 or 5.2 has been breached means that a violation of Article 2.2 has occurred as well.
According to the United States, in the absence of any risk assessment, and thus, in the absence of
sufficient scientific evidence supporting India's measures, India is also in breach of Article 2.2. The
United States submits in addition that India's imposition of a ban on the identified avian products
is not maintained with sufficient scientific evidence because there is no scientific evidence that
these products may not be safely traded under any circumstances. The United States holds the
view that the scientific evidence establishes that the LPAI virus is not present in poultry meat or
inside eggs and LPAI cannot be transmitted through these products.
646
7.323. The United States asserts that "India's measures are maintained without scientific
evidence because the measures impose import prohibitions on products that scientific evidence
indicates can be safely imported with the proper precautions, specifically products from countries
reporting only LPNAI".
647 The United States refers to the findings of the panel in Japan – Apples to
point out that the critical question is whether th ere is an adequate relationship between India's
import prohibitions on account of LPNAI and the relevant scientific evidence. 648 After reviewing the

644 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.
645 United States' first written submission, para. 124 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Australia –
Salmon, paras. 137 and 138).
646 United States' first written submission, para. 124.
647 United States' second written submission, para. 36.
648 United States' second written submission, para. 37 (citing Panel Report, Japan – Apples,
para. 8.102).

evidence provided by India, the United States concludes that "[i]n short, India cannot show that
its measures have any relationship to the scientific evidence, let alone an adequate one".649
7.5.4.1.2 India
7.324. India believes the United States "failed in its burden to present a prima facie case" of
violation of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
650 According to India, in any event, its measures are
in conformity with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.651 India bases its argument on three different
grounds: (i) India's measures conform to or are based on international standards, which fulfils the
requirement of being based on scientific principles and not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence; (ii) other countries maintain similar import restrictions upon occurrence of NAI, proving
that the risk is well founded; and (iii) existing scientific literature supports measures maintained
by India.
652
7.325. On the first ground, India contends that it submitted detailed arguments on why its
measures are in conformity with the Terrestrial Code . In India's view, if the Panel finds this to be
the case, India's measures will be presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement, including
Articles 2 and 5.653
7.326. Regarding the second ground, India asserts that import bans upon an occurrence of LPNAI
are being implemented by several countries. For India "[t]his clearly establishes that several OIE
and WTO Members perceive a real risk in trade of fresh meat of poultry and eggs from countries
reporting LPNAI". 654 India argues that since the Terrestrial Code permits importing countries to
seek country-wide freedom from the exporting count ry, importing countries are well within their
rights to impose bans on these commodities from exporting countries upon a notification of LPNAI.
India further explains that it imposes a temporary import prohibition which is lifted once the
exporting country declares freedom; and "[e]xceptions to the country-wide ban are implemented if
the exporting country proves it[s] [biosecurity] to the importing country and a formal agreement
in this regard is reached between both countri es as recommended by the [Terrestrial] Code".
According to India, "Member State implementation of the [Terrestrial] Code reinforces India's
claim that the OIE permits the imposition of temporary import suspensions on a country-wide
basis from countries reporting LPNAI because of a risk perceived in trade in such commodities".655
7.327. Finally, with respect to the third ground, India relies on several scientific reports to support
its argument that those scientific reports clearly outline the risk of trade in unprocessed meat and
eggs from LPAI reporting countries. India asserts that its measures "seek to address a risk of
transmission of a disease not currently present in India by temporarily suspending imports of
these products from LPNAI countries".
656 According to India, its measures are based on scientific
principles and are not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.657
7.5.4.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.5.4.2.1 Introduction
7.328. The issue before the Panel is whether India's AI measures are based on scientific principles
and are not maintained without sufficient scientifi c evidence as required by Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement. The United States claims that a fi nding that Article 5.1 or 5.2 has been breached
also means a violation of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
658 India disagrees and asserts that its
AI measures are in conformity with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.659

649 United States' second written submission, para. 48. (emphasis original)
650 India's first written submission, para. 158.
651 India's first written submission, para. 159.
652 India's first written submission, para. 161.
653 India's first written submission, para. 166.
654 India's first written submission, para. 174.
655 India's first written submission, para. 174.
656 India's first written submission, para. 182.
657 India's first written submission, para. 182.
658 United States' first written submission, para. 124.
659 India's first written submission, paras. 161-162.

7.329. We commence our analysis by examining the legal provision at issue.
7.5.4.2.2 The legal provision at issue
7.330. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.
7.331. Article 2.2 requires inter alia that SPS measures be based on scientific principles and not
be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. As explained in paragraph 7.282 above, where
an SPS measure is not based on a risk assessmen t as required by Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
SPS Agreement, this measure is presumed not to be based on scientific principles and to be
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, in contravention of Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement.
660
7.5.4.2.3 Conclusion on the United Stat es' claim pursuant to Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.332. Having found in paragraphs 7.318 and 7.319 above that India's AI measures are not based
on a risk assessment and are inconsistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, we
further find that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement,
because they are not based on scientific principles and are maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence.
7.5.5 Conclusion on the United States' claims pursuant to Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.333. The Panel finds that, in the absence of a risk assessment, India's AI measures are
inconsistent with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because they are not based on a risk
assessment, appropriate to the circumstances, taking into account risk assessment techniques
developed by the relevant international organizations. The Panel further finds that India's
AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement because they are not based on
a risk assessment that takes into account the factors set forth in Article 5.2.
7.334. In the light of our findings of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement,
the Panel also finds that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement, because they are not based on sc ientific principles and are maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence.
7.6 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the
SPS Agreement
7.6.1 Introduction
7.335. The Panel will now consider whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Articles 2.3
661 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
7.336. At the outset, the Panel observes that while, in its panel request, the United States
articulates its claims under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 as distinct and separate claims 662, in its

660 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 138; Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon,
para. 8.52; Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.85 and 7.161; EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, paras. 7.3396 and 7.3399; US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.168 and 7.203–7.204; and
Australia – Apples, paras. 7.212 and 7.905.
661 We recall that the Panel has already determined in section 7.1.2.4.3 above that the United States'
description in its panel request of its claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement meets the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU. Accordingly, the Panel has declined India's request that the United States' claim under
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement be set aside on the basis that it is outside the jurisdiction of this Panel.
662 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, paras. 2 and 6.

submissions, the United States elaborates on those claims collectively; that is, the United States
argues that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3, before arguing its "alternative"663
claim under Article 5.5. Specifically, the United States first addresses the claim under Article 2.3,
arguing that India breaches the obligations in both the first and second sentences of Article 2.3.
664
Thereafter, the United States contends that "to the extent that transmission of avian influenza
through domestically-produced products and through foreign products are viewed as distinct
situations, then India has breached Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement".
665 According to the
United States, that breach of Article 5.5 would result in a consequential breach of Article 2.3. 666
Nevertheless, the United States asserts, first and foremost, that "India's measures are more
properly analysed under Article 2.3 than under Article 5.5".
667
7.337. Before we proceed to examine each of the United States' claims, we must therefore first
determine the relationship between these two provisions and decide the order of our analysis of
the United States' claims under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
7.6.2 Relationship between Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement
7.338. Article 2.3 obliges Members to ensure that their SPS measures do not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including
between their own territory and that of other Me mbers. Article 2.3 also prohibits Members from
applying their SPS measures in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade. Article 5.5 in relevant part requires Members to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in the levels of protection they consider to be appropriate in different situations, if such
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
7.339. There is a notable similarity in the language of the two provisions, with certain words or
modified versions thereof appearing in both provisions, such as "discriminate", "arbitrary or
unjustifiable", and "disguised restriction on international trade". In the light of these similarities,
the Appellate Body has remarked that "[w]hen read together with Article 2.3, Article 5.5 may be
seen to be marking out and elaborating a particular route leading to the same destination set out
in Article 2.3".
668 In Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body elaborated on the relationship between
Articles 2.3 and 5.5 and considered that a finding of violation of Article 5.5 necessarily implies a
violation of Article 2.3:
We recall that the third – and decisive – element of Article 5.5 … requires a finding
that the SPS measure which embodies arbitrary or unjustifiable restrictions in levels of
protection results in "discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade".
Therefore, a finding of violation of Article 5.5 will necessarily imply a violation of
Article 2.3, first sentence, or Article 2.3, second sentence. Discrimination "between
Members, including their own territory and that of others Members" within the
meaning of Article 2.3, first sentence, can be established by following the complex and
indirect route worked out and elaborated by Article 5.5. However, it is clear that this
route is not the only route leading to a finding that an SPS measure constitutes
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination according to Article 2.3, first sentence.
Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the sense of Article 2.3, first sentence, can
be found to exist without any examination under Article 5.5.
669
7.340. On the basis of this relationship, panels faced with two claims under Articles 2.3 and 5.5
have typically adopted the approach of examining the claim under Article 5.5 before turning to the
claim under Article 2.3. Indeed, in some recent disputes in which a claim under Article 2.3 was

663 United States' first written submission, Section VIII.H.
664 United States' first written submission, paras. 160-184.
665 United States' first written submission, para. 186; and United States' response to Panel
question No. 33.
666 United States' first written submission, paras. 185-189.
667 United States' response to Panel question No. 33.
668 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 212.
669 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 252; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.318.

made, it was argued, not as an independent claim, but rather as a consequential breach of the
alleged breach in Article 5.5.670
7.341. The United States has not presented its claim in this order. As described in
paragraph 7.336 above, the United States has ordere d its analysis such that its primary claim is
under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement and, in the "alternative" 671, under Article 5.5 of the
SPS Agreement. The United States elaborates that India's measures are "properly analysed" under
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
672 However, the United States also argues that a finding by the
Panel that transmission of AI in imported products and transmission of AI in domestic products
amount to "different situations" for the purpose of Article 5.5 should lead the Panel to find that
India's measures are inconsistent with Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because India maintains
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection that it considers appropriate for
imported and domestic agricultural products with respect to AI risks.
673 The United States also
argues that this should lead to a consequential finding that India's measures are inconsistent with
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
674
7.342. India argues that, in the event that its measures are found to be inconsistent with Article 3
of the SPS Agreement, then the Panel should address the United States' claims under Articles 2.2
and 2.3 before addressing the United States' various claims under Article 5 (including under
Article 5.5).
675 India therefore does not contest the United States' request that we consider the
latter's claim under Article 2.3 before Article 5.5.
7.343. Although the United States argues that this claim is most appropriately considered under
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel recalls that, according to the Appellate Body, a panel
may depart from the sequential order suggested by the complaining party when this is required in
the light of the correct interpretation or application of the legal provisions at issue. 676 Therefore,
we are not bound by the sequence proposed by the United States.
7.344. We note that Article 2.3 is of a more general character than Article 5.5. A violation of
Article 2.3 will not necessarily imply a violation of Article 5.5 677, and arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination in the sense of Article 2.3, first sentence, can be found to exist without any
examination under Article 5.5.678 On this basis, we are of the view that it is not necessary that a
complaining Member pursue its claim via Article 5.5 and, subsequently, Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement, in order to substantiate a claim of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under
the SPS Agreement. Therefore, we also consider th at the correct interpretation or application of
Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement does not require that we depart from the order of
analysis suggested by the United States and not contested by India.
7.345. In addition, and as we have observed in paragraph 7.341 above, the United States has not
presented its claim under Article 2.3 as a consequence of an inconsistency with Article 5.5. Indeed,
the United States' primary claim is independent of any allegation that India's AI measures are
inconsistent with Article 5.5. Moreover, India has responded to the United States' arguments in
this same order. Given that it is not necessary for a complaining Member to pursue its claim via
Article 5.5 and, subsequently, Article 2.3, we think it logical that our analysis reflects the manner
in which the parties have presented their arguments.
7.346. Furthermore, given the manner in which the United States has presented its arguments,
we are concerned that our adoption of an alternative order of analysis may limit the
Appellate Body's ability to review our decision, if it is requested to do so. Specifically, if we
commence with Article 5.5, and find that India's AI measures are inconsistent with that provision

670 Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 - Canada), paras. 7.112-7.114; EC – Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1446-7.1448, 7.1765-7.1766 and 7.3405-7.3406; US – Poultry
(China), paras. 7.318-7.319; and Australia – Apples, para. 7.1095.
671 United States' first written submission, Section VIII.H.
672 United States' response to Panel question No. 33.
673 United States' response to Panel question No. 33.
674 United States' first written submission, para. 186.
675 India's first written submission, para. 111.
676 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 277.
678 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 252; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.318.

and also, as a consequence, with Article 2.3, we will not assess the factual and legal arguments
made by the United States in relation to whether India's AI measures breach Article 2.3
independently of any inconsistency with Article 5.5. Failure to do so would mean that there would
not be sufficient factual findings on the record for the Appellate Body to complete our analysis (if it
were asked to do so).
679
7.347. In the light of the above, we will adopt the order of analysis suggested by the
United States and commence by considering the United States' claim that India's AI measures
result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement. If we find that India's AI measures do violate Article 2.3, we will consider the
United States' alternative, separate claim that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.5
of the SPS Agreement.
7.6.3 Whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement
7.6.3.1 Arguments of the parties
7.6.3.1.1 The United States
7.348. The United States argues that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement and, in the alternative, Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, to the extent that India
can be said to be maintaining different ALOPs. It is the view of the United States that "when it
comes to regulating its trade in its own products on account of AI, India takes a diametrically
different approach from that which it applies to imported products".
680 India's measures therefore
serve, not as a buffer against AI, but as a means of arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminating
against imported products and applying a disguised restriction on trade. In so doing, India
breaches Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.681
7.349. The United States believes that Article 2.3 and Article 5.5 provide two different conceptual
frameworks through which India's discriminatory practices could be analysed. The United States
believes that it is most appropriate to view India as having enacted measures that discriminate
between India and other Members in responding to th e risk of transmission of NAI in the products
covered by S.O. 1663(E), and accordingly to view India as having breached Article 2.3, first
sentence. Likewise, the United States believes that it is more appropriate to consider India as
having one ALOP for LPNAI (reflected in its dome stic surveillance and control measures), than
distinct ALOPs with respect to transmission of LPNAI through foreign and domestic products.
682
7.350. With regard to Article 2.3 itself, the United States argues that Article 2.3, first sentence,
prohibits SPS measures that arbitrarily and unjus tifiably discriminate between Members, whether
between two different exporting Members that ship the same product to the Member imposing the
measure, or between the Member imposing the measure and another Member. The United States
relies on the panel's finding in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) to argue that a breach of
Article 2.3, first sentence, exists if:
a. the measure discriminates between the territories of Members other than the Member
imposing the measure, or between the territory of the Member imposing the measure
and that of another Member;
b. the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and

679 We note that "[i]t is well settled that the Appellate Body will be in a position to complete the legal
analysis if it has before it sufficient factual findings of the panel or undisputed facts on the panel record".
Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 278 (citing Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-
Rolled Steel, para. 235; Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 98; and US – Section 211
Appropriations Act, para. 343).
680 United States' first written submission, para. 160.
681 United States' first written submission, para. 160.
682 United States' response to Panel question No. 33.

c. identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members compared.683
7.351. The United States alleges that India ar bitrarily and unjustifiably discriminates against
imported products in the treatment of those prod ucts following an AI outbreak somewhere in the
exporting country. In so doing, India breaches Article 2.3, first sentence.684
7.352. The United States argues that India maintains two different "forms" 685 of discrimination
that are inconsistent with Article 2.3, first sentence. First, the United States argues that under
S.O. 1663(E), if there is an NAI outbreak anywhe re in the exporting country, the covered product
is not permitted to be imported into India. By contrast, under India's domestic AI-control regime,
domestic products may still be sold in India following an NAI outbreak within India, so long as the
product originates outside a zone within 10 km of NAI detection.
686
7.353. The United States argues that India's NAP calls for detections of AI in India to result in no
restrictions or conditions of the movement of products originating outside the 10 km area
surrounding the detection. By contrast, India's me asures treat imported products differently and
less favourably. The import ban is imposed on products from anywhere in a country where there
has been even a single detection of AI. India offers no justification for this disparate treatment of
imported products and therefore India's measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against
imported products.
687 India therefore applies one set of rules to domestic products and another
less favourable set for identical imported products. The United States contends that this difference
in treatment has no SPS justification. In sum, India's measures breach Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement by arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminating against imported products.
688
7.354. The United States asserts that India's measures also arbitrarily and unjustifiably
discriminate against imported products with respect to HPAI. It makes no sense for India to say
that, whereas it will allow trade of domestic products from areas only 10.1 kilometres from an
HPAI detection, its lack of knowledge of what happens in other countries prevents it from even
considering whether other countries' surveillance and control systems are strong enough to
contain outbreaks in those countries. If India thinks that it can control NAI, even in HPAI form,
Article 2.3 requires it to at least admit the possibility that products from other countries with NAI
detections can be safely traded in the same way that Indian products are traded following an HPAI
outbreak there.
689
7.355. Further, the United States regards as incorrect India's claim that the United States is
arguing that India should be required to cull its entire poultry flock in response to an NAI
outbreak.690 The United States clarifies that it is seeking changes in the measures that India
applies to imported products – the products at issue in this dispute – not the measures that India
applies to domestic products. Rather than suggesting that India should cull its poultry flocks, the
United States has explained that the SPS Agreem ent requires India to apply AI measures with
respect to imported products on a similar basis as for domestic products. In particular, India
should not apply bans on trade in products following LPNAI detections; and following HPNAI
outbreaks, India should restrict trade in products only if those products are from affected zones or
compartments – just as India applies its measures for containment of AI outbreaks in domestic
flocks only to products from small and defined areas.
691
7.356. The United States nonetheless notes that India's remarks regarding culling India's
domestic poultry flock are telling, as they reveal that India appears to view culling this poultry
flock in response to an NAI outbreak as the domestic equivalent of the measures (complete import

683 United States' first written submission, para. 164.
684 United States' first written submission, para. 166.
685 United States' first written submission, Sections VIII.G(2)(a) and VIII.G(2)(b).
686 United States' first written submission, paras. 167-170; United States' second written submission,
para. 82.
687 United States' first written submission, para. 171.
688 United States' first written submission, para. 173.
689 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 21.
690 United States' response to Panel question No. 34 (referring to India's first written submission,
para. 209).
691 United States' response to Panel question No. 34.

bans) that it has imposed with respect to imported products following NAI detections in their
country of origin.692
7.357. According to the United States, India's differential treatment of imported products and
domestic products is not a function of any differences in conditions prevailing in India and other
countries, or in countries' measures or procedures for control of AI.693
7.358. The second form of discrimination alleged by the United States relates to the imposition of
bans on imported products on account of LPNAI. According to the United States, India's measures
unjustifiably discriminate against imported products by banning them from India following
detections of LPAI in the exporting country, while India does not even maintain surveillance
requirements that would result in detection of LPNAI cases occurring in India's domestic poultry
flocks.
694
7.359. The United States notes that India has never notified LPNAI to the OIE, and that India
represents that it has never had the disease. Citing its own veterinary experts, the United States
argues that this is implausible, and that in fact India does not require use of surveillance
procedures that would effectively detect LPNAI.
695 India's contrasting LPNAI-based import ban thus
constitutes unjustifiable discrimination in brea ch of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. The
United States elaborates that according to India's surveillance regime, sampling only "may" be
conducted on flocks, and that virological testing should occur "where possible", though it is not
required.696 Instead, the principal frontline method of detecting AI appears to be visual
observation; however, LPAI (including LPNAI) is typically asymptomatic or causes only mild
respiratory disease or decreased egg production. Any illness caused is unlikely to be different from
that caused by other diseases and unlikely to strike a poultry producer as an unusual event
requiring reporting of possible AI. Relying on visual observation of "unusual sickness" in birds,
India's system therefore is not conducive to successful detection of LPNAI.
 697
7.360. To further support its assertion that LPNAI is present in India, the United States submits as
an exhibit a study by Pawar et al. noting the detection of H5 and H7 antibodies in domestic ducks
in India, from which the United States discerns that an infection has at some point been present in
the birds in which the antibodies were detected.
698 The more crucial point, according to the
United States, is that India does not have in place a system for reliably detecting LPNAI. Without a
valid detection system, India is not in fact applying measures to contain LPNAI when it occurs in
India. The United States avers that India does not dispute that it has no mandatory requirement
for the conduct of random laboratory tests in a pparently healthy flocks for LPNAI, even though
LPNAI's lack of symptoms makes visual observat ion inadequate for its detection. Even India's
claim that it conducts routine laboratory and clinical surveillance is unsupported by the document
that it cites; that is, merely a list of the numbers of samples tested by its national AI reference
laboratory during a given period. In fact, notwithstanding LPNAI's lack of symptoms, India's AI
Action Plan provides that States should not forward samples for testing to regional diagnostic
laboratories, or India's national diagnostic laboratory, except where there is unusual sickness or
mortality raising suspicion of AI.
699
7.361. The United States argues that India attempts to respond to arguments about the
inadequacy of its surveillance for LPNAI by argu ing strenuously that LPNAI is exotic to India;
however, according to the United States, such responses miss the point. India's imposition of
import bans based on LPNAI detections in exporting Members discriminates against imports not
because LPNAI incidents have occurred in India, but because India's surveillance for LPNAI is
inadequate, resulting in a situation where controls on trade in domestic products due to domestic
LPNAI will not be imposed. Indeed, the evidence that India has put forward with respect to its

692 United States' response to Panel question No. 34; United States' second written submission,
para. 85.
693 United States' first written submission, para. 172.
694 United States' first written submission, para. 174.
695 United States' first written submission, para. 176; United States' second written submission,
para. 86.
696 United States' first written submission, para. 177.
697 United States' first written submission, para. 178.
698 United States' second written submission, para. 91.
699 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 19.

surveillance programmes does not suggest that th ey are of a type capable of reliably detecting
LPNAI.700
7.362. In relation to India's claims that LPNAI is exotic to India, the United States rejects the
contention that South Asia is unique with respect to LPNAI, and states that India has offered no
evidence that this is the case.701 The United States refers in particular to LPAI carried by wild birds
in numerous South Asian countries, which can carry and spread the LPAI virus to domestic Indian
poultry. Moreover, the large number of H5N1 HPAI outbreaks occurring in India's poultry
population would simply serve as an indicator of the high level of interaction occurring between the
wild birds and domestic poultry populations, and thus of the likelihood of transmission of H5 or H7
LPAI from wild birds to domestic poultry in India – thereby producing LPNAI.
702 The United States
also argues that India's assertion that LPNAI is exotic to India cannot justify India's argument that
subjecting imports to AI measures more stringent than those applied to domestic products is
justified.703
7.363. According to the United States, India's measures merely serve to exclude imports from
countries like the United States that do have in place the surveillance mechanisms necessary to
detect, and subsequently contain, LPNAI. 704 For the United States, what this means in practice is
that while India relies on the detection of LPAI to ban the sale of products, India in fact applies
LPAI-based bans only to imported products. India has failed to put in place measures that would
effectively detect LPAI, so India is not taking the "steps necessary to restrict domestic products on
account of LPAI". India's imposition of a ban on specified imports following LPAI detections in the
exporting country therefore constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in breach of the
first sentence of Article 2.3.
705
7.364. Further, the United States notes that India seeks to protect against risks posed by AI, but
the risks presented by foreign and domestic products in relation to LPAI are the same. There is no
justification for imposing different measures on products presenting the same risk. Ironically, the
countries that face import prohibitions under India's measures because they have reported LPAI
are likely to have better conditions than India with respect to LPNAI risk.
706 The United States
elaborates that while India is almost certain to have regular LPNAI cases that go undetected, the
countries facing product restrictions are those that have the capacity to detect LPNAI and that
therefore are able to take steps to contain the LPNAI.
707 This is not a situation where an importing
Member has no need to worry about domestic spread of a disease because it exists only in another
part of the world. Here, India itself believes that it is a country with significant risk for domestic
LPNAI incidents. Indeed, India purports that it does have surveillance and control measures for
NAI. India cannot plausibly claim, in this circumstance, that its domestic conditions are so
dissimilar from conditions in the rest of the world that a lack of effective domestic surveillance and
control measures, alongside measures for imported products far more stringent than
recommended by OIE guidelines, simply reflect differences in disease conditions between India
and elsewhere.
708
7.365. In relation to Article 2.3, second sentence, the United States argues that a variety of facts,
taken together, indicate that India's measures amount to a disguised restriction on international
trade.
709 Most significant of these is India's application of drastically more stringent measures to
foreign products than to domestic products, which demonstrates that, under the guise of
SPS measures, India has drawn an arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction between products that
present the same risk.
710

700 United States' second written submission, paras. 87 and 95.
701 United States' second written submission, para. 89.
702 United States' second written submission, paras. 88-92.
703 United States' second written submission, paras. 104-109.
704 United States' first written submission, paras. 175-176.
705 United States' first written submission, para. 180.
706 United States' first written submission, para. 181.
707 United States' first written submission, para. 181.
708 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 23.
709 United States' first written submission, para. 182; United States' second written submission,
para. 110.
710 United States' first written submission, para. 182.

7.366. The United States argues that this is supported by additional relevant facts, including
India's shifting position on whether its measures are justified by OIE guidelines or a risk
assessment; and India's failure, in the end, to o ffer either a risk assessment or scientific evidence
that would justify LPAI-based import bans or India's application of AI measures to entire countries,
without any possibility for recognition of zones, regions or compartments with distinct AI status.
Moreover, the United States argues that the mann er in which India conducted its aborted attempt
to construct a risk assessment further demonstrates that India's measure is a trade restriction, not
an attempt to prevent the spread of avian influenza. The United States elaborates that, in
response to numerous inquiries in the SPS Committee about the justification for its AI measures,
in October 2010 India provided to the United States, and offered to circulate to SPS Committee
delegates, a document entitled "India's Risk Assessment on Avian Influenza for imposing ban on
import of poultry and poultry products from Avian Influenza positive countries". At the time, India
asserted that this was a risk assessment justifying its measures, although India later clarified to
the SPS Committee that this was not in fact a finalized risk assessment.
711
7.367. The United States notes that these considerations are similar to those that the panel in
Australia – Salmon considered to be "warning signals" and "additional factors" indicating a
disguised restriction in the context of the claim under Article 5.5 in that dispute. 712 The
Appellate Body upheld consideration of the "warning signals" and "additional factors" identified by
the Australia – Salmon panel.713
7.6.3.1.2 India
7.368. India responds by arguing that the stat utory basis for the alleged discrimination is not
S.O. 1663(E), but the National Action Plan. Indi a argues that S.O. 1663(E) does not regulate
control measures to be taken domestically during an outbreak of NAI and hence is not either
directly or indirectly capable of violating the obligation invoked.
714 India contends that NAP 2012 is
not a measure at issue because it was not identified either by name or by virtue of a narrative in
the panel request. On that count alone, the claim under Article 2.3 should be rejected.715
7.369. Regarding Article 2.3, first sentence, India asserts that panels have found that three
elements are required in order to establish a violation of Article 2.3, first sentence, which are
cumulative in nature: (i) that the measure discrim inates between the territories of Members other
than the Member imposing the measure, or between the territory of the Member imposing the
measure and that of another Member; (ii) that th e discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and
(iii) that identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members concerned.
716
7.370. India argues that "identical or similar conditions" do not exist in either of the situations
identified by the United States as constituting ar bitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. Turning to
the first form of discrimination alleged by the United States, India states that the United States
makes a "simplistic argument that while India places a country-wide ban on imports from an
exporting country that notifies either HPNAI or LP NAI, when faced with an HPNAI outbreak in its
own territory, India applies control measures limited to 10 km surrounding the epicentre of the
outbreak.
717 India clarifies that it does not maintain a permanent ban against a country that has
notified either an HPNAI or LPNAI outbreak. The ba n is lifted once the exporting country notifies
freedom from the disease to the OIE. According to India, this has been amply demonstrated by the
granting of SIPs for imports of poultry products from countries that have reported freedom from
NAI to the OIE.718

711 United States' first written submission, para. 182; United States' second written submission,
paras. 111-112.
712 United States' second written submission, para. 111 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Salmon,
paras. 8.149-8.151).
713 United States' second written submission, para. 111 (referring to Appellate body Report, Australia –
Salmon, paras. 159-178).
714 India's first written submission, para. 78.
715 India's first written submission, para. 189.
716 India's first written submission, para. 192; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 39.
717 India's first written submission, para. 194.
718 India's first written submission, para. 195.

7.371. India also argues that the risks associat ed with a domestic outbreak of AI are highly
distinct from situations in which it is an importer attempting to ensure that infected imports from
countries experiencing NAI do not enter its territory. India argues that these situations involve
different risks – in domestic outbreaks, the epicentre of the disease is known and identified and
the risk is one of further spread, whereas with imports control measures are required to prevent
agents of disease transmission entering a count ry and being dispersed through internal commerce
and trade. Hence, "the measures that a country takes in these two situations would quite naturally
and logically be different" and "it cannot be expected that a country would take identical measures
to tackle both situations".
719 Similarly, India argues that in the event of a domestic outbreak, a
country which experiences an outbreak of NAI is best suited to contain it and can deploy its
resources to areas most urgently in need of disease containment measures. This is distinct, alleges
India, from circumstances in which India is importing products, as it cannot exercise control over
containment and disinfection methods applied by exporting countries and therefore it cannot be
expected to certify the health and safety of imported products that are potential agents of NAI
transmission. India "must gather information on an exporting country's surveillance and control
mechanisms to satisfy itself that such measures are strong enough to contain outbreaks in those
countries".
720 Therefore, internal control regimes for NAI cannot be compared with measures
applied to prevent imports of products that are potential agents of disease transmission, meaning
that the two situations the United States compares are neither identical nor similar.721
7.372. Turning to the second form of discriminat ion alleged by the United States, India argues
that the United States' conjecturing regarding the presence of LPNAI in India "is solely to divert
the Panel's attention from what is fundamentally a distinction between the situation prevailing in
the United States which has experienced outbreaks of LPNAI and India which has only experienced
outbreaks of the more serious HPNAI". India submit s that LPNAI is exotic to India and "India has
to date neither detected, despite routine surv eillance, nor experienced outbreaks of LPNAI". 722
Furthermore, India asserts that it carries out routine laboratory as well as clinical surveillance in
both poultry as well as wild birds to detect NAI, which are undertaken by several departments
within the Government of India and State governments. According to India, the United States
simply ignores all of these surveillance activities carried out by India and makes unsubstantiated
allegations.
723 The OIE provides that countries may take trade-related measures to prevent ingress
of a disease that is exotic to it.724
7.373. India also clarifies that routine surveillance is carried out irrespective of suspicion of an
outbreak of AI and on an ongoing basis across the territory of India as prescribed under the
Terrestrial Code. The High Security Animal Diseases Laboratory (HSADL), the diagnostic laboratory
dedicated to this purpose, prepares weekly updates on the samples tested for AI.
725 Additionally,
India states that it undertakes targeted surveillance in specific areas such as live/wet-markets and
around international land borders.
726 These are areas under a heightened risk of avian influenza
infection due to their proximity to wild bird populations and India maintains constant vigilance by
undertaking targeted surveillance in these areas. 727 In the past, India has also undertaken
targeted surveillance when unusual mortality was noticed in wild birds.728
7.374. In re-emphasizing that India has not experienced LPAI in poultry, and that the disease is
exotic to India, India refers to the Panel in Australia – Salmon, in which "the Panel clearly held that
'identical or similar conditions' could not be said to exist between Canada and Australia because in
that case one of the disease[s] was endemic to Australia whereas [the] disease of concern with
respect to salmon was not present or was exotic to Australia". 729 India argues that, likewise, there
is a substantial difference in the disease status of the United States and India – while the

719 India's first written submission, para. 196; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 41.
720 India's second written submission, para. 84 (referring to United States' opening statement at the first
721 India's first written submission, para. 199.
722 India's first written submission, para. 201.
723 India's first written submission, para. 205.
724 India's first written submission, para. 206.
725 India's response to Panel question No. 23.
726 India's response to Panel question No. 23 (referring to Exhibit US-90).
727 India's response to Panel question No. 23 (referring to Exhibit IND-117).
728 India's response to Panel question No. 23 (referring to Exhibit IND-47).
729 India's first written submission, para. 207. (emphasis original)

United States has experienced outbreaks of LPNA I, India has not and the disease is exotic to
India.730
7.375. India notes that the Pawar et al. study submitted by the United States to substantiate its
claim that India cannot ban products from countries reporting LPNAI because LPNAI occurs in India
(but its surveillance system is not capable of detecting the disease), is insufficient evidence
because nothing in the study indicates that the anti bodies to H7 were low pathogenic. India states
that the conclusion derived by the European Unio n and the United States (that LPNAI occurs in
India but its surveillance system is not capable of detecting it) was drawn without any basis and is
pure conjecture.731
7.376. Moreover, India argues that "mere discr imination or in other words, a formalistic
distinction between measures does not suffice for purposes of Article 2.3". 732 India relies on the
Appellate Body's finding in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres to contend that an enquiry whether
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should focus on the cause of the discrimination or the
rationale put forward to explain its existence.
733 India explains that the United States is suggesting
"that India apply similar measures in the event of a domestic outbreak of NAI as it does for
imports. This is a highly illogical suggestion because the United States essentially requires India to
cull or destroy its entire poultry population and further completely put a stop to poultry trade in
the country".
734 Citing the logistical difficulty and administrative burden that this would impose on
India, India argues that this comparison is inappropriate.735
7.377. Instead, India argues that there is a clear rationale for the difference in measures that
India takes to control a domestic outbreak as opposed to measures to prevent ingress of a disease
into India. India notes that most countries take measures to control domestic outbreaks of NAI
that are very similar to those taken by India, including the establishment of zones; culling of
poultry in the high risk zone; surveillance in a buffer zone around this high risk zone; restrictions
on outbound and inbound trade in poultry products from this high risk zone; and resumption of
trade after disinfection of all affected premises and surveillance. India notes that none of these
countries undertakes culling of all poultry within its boundaries or puts a nationwide ban on the
sale of poultry products.
736
7.378. India argues that panels have held that measures must be examined in the "specific
context of the relevant risks" posed by the two situations to determine if there is any justification
for the distinction in sanitary measures.
737 India repeats that the risks posed in these situations
are different – "[i]n one situation, a country needs to take such measures as would prevent the
spread and further establishment of a disease wh ereas in another situation a country would need
to take such measures as would prevent ingress or entry of a disease into its territory". 738 In the
context of LPNAI, India argues that the OIE stat es that Members may impose bans from countries
on account of notifications of a disease which is exotic to the Member imposing the prohibition,
and also refers to the panel in Australia – Salmon to argue that the risks relating to diseases
present in a Member are different from those relating to diseases that are exotic
739, and reiterates
that LPNAI is exotic to India. 740 In Australia – Salmon the Panel held that substantial difference in
disease status between countries renders the two countries as not being placed in an identical or
similar situation. Likewise, there is substantial difference in disease status between the
United States and India. While the United States has experienced outbreaks of LPNAI, India has

730 India's first written submission, para. 207.
731 India's second written submission, paras. 80-81 (referring to Exhibit US-122; United States' opening
statement at the first substantive meeting, para. 19; and European Union's third party statement, para. 11).
732 India's first written submission, para. 208; and India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 44.
733 India's first written submission, para. 208.
734 India's first written submission, para. 209; India's second written submission, para. 83
735 India's first written submission, para. 209.
736 India's first written submission, para. 210; India's second written submission, para. 83.
737 India's first written submission, para. 211 (citing Panel Reports, US – Poultry , para. 7.262; and
Australia-Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) , para. 7.93); India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 45.
738 India's first written submission, para. 211.
739 India's first written submission, para. 213; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
740 India's first written submission, para. 214.

not and the disease is exotic to India. In cont rast, India has experienced several HPNAI outbreaks
for which it has taken rigorous domestic containment measures.741
7.379. India adds that an LPNAI infection is more dangerous than an HPNAI infection because it is
asymptomatic and is capable of causing silent asymptomatic infections in all poultry populations it
infects, thus potentially infecting large populations of poultry across vast areas of the country.
Moreover, introduction of LPNAI into a developing country such as India would have "unimaginable
consequences"
742, because HPNAI is much easier to contain and control than LPNAI. 743 Moreover,
the danger from LPNAI is due to its ability to mutate into HPNAI, which adds a new level of
uncertainty because it cannot be ascertained when the virus will mutate and become highly
pathogenic.
744
7.380. Regarding Article 2.3, second sentence, India objects to the "ambiguous" nature of the
claim and the lack of clarity with respect to the product specific measures that the United States
believes are being applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade.
745 In its claim under Article 2.3, first sentence, the United States adduced two
situations which it believes result in arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. India argues that it
is not clear whether the United States adduces the same fact situations as the basis for its claim
under Article 2.3, second sentence. However, by specifically mentioning India's country-wide
prohibition from LPNAI reporting countries, India infers that the United States limits the scope of
its objections under Article 2.3, second sentence, to this specific fact situation. India also states
that it is clear that the United States is not challenging India's prohibition from HPNAI-notifying
countries under Article 2.3, second sentence.
746
7.381. India argues that none of the facts mentioned in the United States' claim under Article 2.3,
second sentence, establishes that India is applying its SPS measures in a manner that would
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. First, regarding whether products carry the
same risk, India contends that the facts underlying this assertion are not stated with any level of
precision. However, India explains that there is clear justification for maintaining an import
prohibition from countries reporting LPNAI as the disease is not present in India and is thus exotic
to India. Moreover, India says that the risks to a country from ingress of an exotic disease cannot
be compared with the risk posed by an already ex isting disease. By suggesting that India should
take similar measures in both situations is illogical and is not supported by the OIE Code or by the
practice of several other countries that take similar measures in such situations.
747
7.382. Moreover, in relation to the United States' argument regarding India's "shifting position" on
whether its measures are justified by OIE guidelines or a risk assessment, India argues that it has
always maintained that its measures are based on the Terrestrial Code. India stresses that it has
clarified this to the United States on a number of o ccasions, and also that it has clearly said that it
did not contend that the summary document was a risk assessment.
748 India argues that the
United States' reliance on the panel's ruling in Australia – Salmon to draw a parallel with the
events surrounding India's decision to provide a summary document to the European Union and
the United States is misplaced. 749 India recalls that in Australia – Salmon , there was a "rather
substantial change in conclusions" between the 1995 and the 1996 risk reports and Australia was
unable to explain the reasons for the change. 750 India elaborates further, arguing that it has not
shifted positions on whether a risk assessment was required of it, and that it was always India's
understanding that, having adopted an OIE reco mmendation, it was not required to further
conduct a risk assessment. India does note, however, that it did provide a brief summary of
scientific material which India believed formed the basis of the OIE recommendation and hence

741 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 43.
742 India's first written submission, para. 214.
743 India's first written submission, para. 214; India's response to Panel question No. 4.
744 India's response to Panel question No. 4.
745 India's first written submission, para. 215; and India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 46.
746 India's first written submission, para. 216.
747 India's first written submission, para. 217.
748 India's first written submission, para. 218.
749 India's second written submission, para. 85.
750 India's second written submission, para. 85 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Salmon,
para. 8.154).

also the justification behind India's measure.751 India also notes that there has been no substantial
change in India's measures since 2010. India refers to the panel's findings in EC – Asbestos to
explain that the key to understanding what is covered by 'disguised restriction on international
trade' is not so much the word 'restriction', but the word 'disguised'.
752
7.383. India relies on the panel's findings in EC – Asbestos to argue that the natural consequence
of prohibiting a given product cannot in itself lead to the conclusion that the measure has a
protectionist aim. Thus a prohibition on imports of poultry products from countries reporting LPNAI
cannot constitute a disguised restriction on international trade, particularly when the disease is not
present in India.
753
7.384. India asserts that none of the facts taken in dividually or collectively establishes that India
is disguising the true intent behind the measure; the United States has simply placed certain facts
before the Panel but has not explained how they amount to a "disguised" restriction on trade.754
7.6.4 Analysis by the Panel
7.6.4.1 Introduction
7.385. The issue before the Panel is whether India has acted inconsistently with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement because (i) its AI measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where similar conditions prevail, including between India's own territory and that of
other Members and (ii) it has applied its measures in a manner that constitutes a disguised
restriction on international trade.
7.386. We will begin our analysis by considering the legal provision at issue.
7.6.4.2 The legal provision at issue
7.387. Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate be tween Members where identical or similar
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
7.388. The Appellate Body has clarified that Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement contains two
primary obligations
755, each of which corresponds to one of the sentences of Article 2.3. The first
obligation is contained in the first sentence: "Members shall ensure that their sanitary and
phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where
identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other
Members". The second obligation is contained in the second sentence: "Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade". We will examine whether India's AI measures meet each of these obligations.
7.6.4.2.1 Article 2.3, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement
7.389. We proceed to examine whether India's AI measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between
India and that of other Members. We concur with the panel's analysis in Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada) , which identified three cumulative elements that must necessarily be
established to find a violation of Article 2.3, first sentence. The panel stated:
[T]hree elements, cumulative in nature, are required for a violation of this provision:

751 India's second written submission, para. 85.
752 India's second written submission, para. 86 (referring to India's first written submission, para. 220).
753 India's first written submission, para. 222.
754 India's second written submission, para. 86.
755 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 252.

(1) the measure discriminates between the territories of Members other than the
Member imposing the measure, or between the territory of the Member
imposing the measure and that of another Member;
(2) the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and
(3) identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members
compared.
756
7.390. Before proceeding to examine these thr ee elements, we observe that the United States
constructs its arguments under Article 2.3, first sentence, on the basis of its allegations of two
"forms"757 of discrimination. First, the United States challenges the fact that India maintains a total
ban on imported products compared with a ban on domestic products only within a limited 10 km
zone.
758 Second, the United States challenges the imposition of bans on imported products on
account of LPNAI, while India does not even maintain surveillance requirements that would result
in detection of LPNAI.759 We will address separately each of the three elements of Article 2.3, first
sentence, and each with regard to the two forms of discrimination alleged by the United States.
7.6.4.2.1.1 First element: Wh ether India's AI measures discriminate against imported
products
7.391. To satisfy the first element of Article 2.3, first sentence, the United States must establish
that India's AI measures discriminate against imported products.760
7.392. As mentioned above, the United States argues that India maintains two "forms" of
discrimination. The first form derives from the fa ct that, under S.O. 1663(E), if there is an NAI
outbreak anywhere in the exporting country, the importation of the covered product into India is
prohibited.761 In contrast, the United States refers to the fact that India's NAP 2012 permits the
sale of domestic products in India following an outbreak of NAI, provided that the product
originates outside a zone within 10 km of the location where NAI is detected. 762 The second form
of discrimination, according to the United States, derives from the fact that India prohibits the
importation of the covered products if LPNAI is detected in the exporting country, whereas India
does not maintain surveillance sufficient to detect LPNAI in India's domestic poultry.763
7.393. India's primary argument in response is to contend that the Panel is barred from referring
to the NAP 2012 because it is not one of the measures challenged in the panel request. We recall
our findings in section 7.1.2.4.3 above that the United States was not under an obligation to
identify the NAP 2012 in its panel request, and is entitled to refer to it for the purpose of its
argumentation under Article 2.3.
764
7.394. In the alternative, India argues that the Panel's inquiry vis-à-vis the first form of
discrimination should be to consider whether there is a legitimate cause or rationale for the alleged
discrimination.765 India argues that the risks associated with imported and domestic products are
entirely different because, in a domestic outbreak, the epicentre of the disease is known and
identified and the risk is one of further spread beyond the originally infected area, whereas

756 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.111.
757 United States' first written submission, Sections VIII.G.2(a) and VIII.G.2(b).
758 United States' first written submission, Section VIII.G.2(a).
759 United States' first written submission, Section VIII.G.2(b).
760 We note that the first element Article 2.3, first sentence, contains both a national treatment
obligation and a most-favoured nation obligation. The United States has not made any arguments that India's
AI measures breach the most-favoured nation obligation.
761 United States' first written submission, para. 167.
762 United States' first written submission, para. 167.
763 United States' first written submission, para. 174.
764 We also recall that the Panel has already determined in section 7.1.2.4.3 above that the
United States' description in its panel request of its claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement meets the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Accordingly, the Panel has declined India's request that the
United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement be set aside on the basis that it is outside the
jurisdiction of this Panel.
765 India's first written submission, para. 208 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres, para. 226; Australia – Salmon, para. 251; and Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.260-7.261).

infected imports require control measures because agents of disease transmission could enter a
country and could be dispersed over a large area through internal commerce and trade.766
7.395. In relation to the second form of discrimination, India does not make arguments in relation
to whether or not its AI measures are discriminatory per se; however, India stresses that LPNAI is
exotic to India and the conditions that exist in India cannot be said to be identical or similar to
those in countries reporting LPNAI.767
7.396. As we discussed in section 7.6.2 above, parties in previous cases have invoked Article 2.3
as a consequential breach of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. 768 As a result, there is little
jurisprudence to guide our understanding of Article 2.3, specifically with regard to the meaning of
"discrimination".
7.397. With this in mind, the Panel recalls that the word "discrimination" has been interpreted in
the context of other provisions of the covered agreements, and in particular the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994.
7.398. The chapeau of Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construe d to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures [enacted for the purposes listed in the
subparagraphs of Article XX.]
7.399. The Appellate Body has elaborated on the meaning of "discrimination" in this context as
resulting "not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but
also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting
countries".
769
7.400. We note that the language of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement is similar to that of the
chapeau to Article XX. 770 Both provisions speak of "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" discrimination,
and a comparison between conditions prevailing in different "countries" (in the context of
Article XX) or "Members" (in the context of Article 2.3). We also note that the last recital of the
preamble to the SPS Agreement states that the SPS Agreement "elaborate[s] rules for the
application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of [SPS] measures, in particular
the provisions of Article XX(b)", which includes the chapeau. Given the similarities between these
provisions and the reference to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in the preamble of the
SPS Agreement, we consider it appropriate to interpret "discrimination" in Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement in a manner similar to that whic h the Appellate Body adopted in the context of
Article XX of the GATT 1994.
771 Hence, in the context of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, we
consider that discrimination may result not only (i) when Members in which the same conditions
prevail (including between the territory of the Me mber imposing the measure, and that of other
Members) are treated differently, but also (ii) where the application of the measure at issue does

766 India's first written submission, para. 196.
767 India's first written submission, paras. 201-207.
768 Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.112-7.114; EC – Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1446-7.1448, 7.1765-7.1766 and 7.3405-7.3406; US – Poultry
(China), paras. 7.318-7.319; and Australia – Apples, para. 7.1095.
769 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165.
770 We observe, however, that Article XX of the GATT 1994 refers to the manner in which measures "are
applied", whereas Article 2.3, first sentence, requires only that Members ensure that their SPS measures do
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail,
including between their own territory and that of other Members. Our analysis under Article 2.3, first sentence,
will therefore not focus on the manner in which the measures at issue are applied.
771 The word "discrimination" has been given different meanings depending on the context in which that
word appears. In light of these differences in context, the Panel considers these cases to be of limited
assistance. For example, in the context of the TRIPs Agreement, Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents, para. 7.94. In the context of the Enabling Clause, Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences,
paras. 142-174.

not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions
prevailing in the exporting country.772
7.401. We will therefore begin by considering whether India's AI measures treat imported
products differently from the manner in which they treat Indian products. We will make this
assessment in relation to each of the forms of discrimination alleged by the United States.
7.402. We note that a comparison of this kind presupposes that identical or similar conditions
apply across India and other Members (and in particular those Members from which imported
products originate). However, as discussed in paragraph 7.389 above, the comparison between
the conditions that apply will constitute the thir d element of our analysis under Article 2.3, first
sentence. We must therefore assume that the conditions that apply are the same for the purpose
of our discrimination analysis under the first element of Article 2.3, first sentence; if we find that
discrimination does exist, that finding will be confirmed if we find, as part of our subsequent
analysis, that identical or similar conditions do in fact exist across India and other Members.
(i) First "form" of discrimination alleged by the United States
7.403. We begin by considering the first form of discrimination alleged by the United States and,
specifically, how products from the United States and India are treated respectively.
(a) India's treatment of imported products
7.404. Regarding India's AI measures, and the manner in which India treats other WTO Members,
we recall our explanation in section 2.3 above that India maintains these measures through the
Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E). We recall further that Section 3 of the Livestock Act permits the
central government to (in relevant part) regulate, restrict or prohibit the import into India of any
livestock that may be liable to be affected by infectious or contagious disorders.
773 Section 3A of
the Livestock Act permits the central government to regulate, restrict or prohibit the import into
India of any livestock product which may be liable to affect human or animal health.
774
S.O. 1663(E) was issued by the DAHD in exercise of powers conferred by the Livestock Act, and
prohibits the importation of wild birds (except those reared and bred in captivity) 775, and those
products enumerated in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to (1)(ii)(j) "from the countries reporting [NAI] (both
[HPNAI] and [LPNAI])". 776 These products are specified in paragraph 2.32 above. S.O. 1663(E)
does not specify the duration over which the import prohibition remains in place. However, India
submits that "the measure is only applicable to countries which report outbreaks of … (NAI) to the
OIE and becomes inapplicable when countries report freedom from NAI to the OIE".
777 Put another
way, "when a country declares freedom after cullin g (or slaughter), disinfection and surveillance,
which generally takes three months as recommended by the OIE, the country is no longer
considered to be 'reporting [NAI]' and imports from such countries are permitted".
778 Thus, we
understand that the import prohibition under S.O. 1663(E) remains in place until a country
otherwise prohibited by S.O. 1663(E) declares NAI-freedom to the OIE.
(b) India's treatment of domestic products
7.405. Regarding the manner in which India treats domestic products after an outbreak of AI, we
note that the United States refers to the NAP 2012 as the measure that governs the treatment
afforded within the territory of India.
779 We must therefore consider the treatment afforded under
the NAP 2012.780

772 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165.
773 Livestock Act, (Exhibit US-114), Section 3.
774 Livestock Amendment Act, (Exhibit US-115), Section 5. As discussed in paras. 2.23-2.27 above,
Section 5 of the Livestock Amendment Act amended the Livestock Act through the introduction of addition
provisions, including Section 3A.
775 S.O. 1663(E) (Exhibit US-80), paragraph 1(i).
776 S.O. 1663(E) (Exhibit US-80), paragraphs 1(ii)(a)-1(ii)(j).
777 India's first written submission, para. 24.
778 India's first written submission, para. 24.
779 India's first written submission, paras. 163-184.
780 We recall India's argument that the "statutory basis" for the alleged discrimination in this dispute is
the NAP 2012. India's first written submission, para. 78. India argues that the NAP 2012 is not a measure at

7.406. The NAP was first issued in 2006 by India's DAHD. 781 A revised version was issued in 2012
(NAP 2012) pursuant to the Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contagious Disease in
Animals Act, 2009.
782
7.407. The NAP 2012 comprises five chapters: Chapter I advises India's states on preparedness
against AI outbreaks; Chapter II indicates the ac tions to be taken if an outbreak of AI is
suspected; Chapter III describes the actions required in the event of an outbreak of the disease;
Chapter IV discusses the post-operation surveillan ce and the declaration of freedom from AI; and
Chapter V identifies persons who will handle NAI- infected poultry and advises on biosafety and
biosecurity measures. The Panel has carefully reviewed these chapters and, bearing in mind the
United States' allegation that the first "form" of discrimination relates specifically to treatment in
light of the detection of AI, will proceed to cons ider the relevant provisions of the NAP 2012 which
relate to the treatment afforded in the case of a confirmed outbreak of AI within India.
7.408. Where investigations under Chapter II of the NAP 2012 lead to a confirmation of an
outbreak of AI, the provisions of Chapter III co me into effect. According to Section III.3 of
Chapter III, after an NAI outbreak occurs, India's authorities designate "[t]he area within one km
from the site of confirmed NAI" as the "infected zo ne". The rest of the area within 10 km from the
site is designated as the "surveillance zone", which "should act as a buffer-zone between the
infected area and the disease-free area".
783
7.409. Section III.5 (entitled "Absolute Ban on Mo vement of Poultry") bans movement of live
birds to and from the infected area. 784 Section III.6 785 (entitled "Closure of Poultry and Egg
Markets[ ]/ Shops") orders the closure of poultry and egg markets or shops within the 10 km
surveillance zone. 786 Shops and markets dealing with poultry products and eggs within the
surveillance zone "shall remain closed till completion of culling and sanitization operations". After
the completion of these operations, "inward trade of eggs and processed poultry / products shall
be allowed within the surveillance zone without any outward movement of poultry".
787
Section III.8 (entitled "Restriction of Movement of Persons & Vehicles") imposes restrictions on the
movement of persons and vehicles into and from the surveillance zone.
788 Section III.6 (entitled
"Depopulation of Birds in the Infected Zone") calls for the "stamp[ing] out" of live poultry birds
within the infected zone.789 Section III.8 (entitled "Clean-up and Disinfection") sets out procedures
for the subsequent destruction of contaminated materials and disinfection of premises. 790
Subsection III.8.5 (Entitled "Sealing of the Disi nfected Premises and Issue of Sanitization
Certificate) provides that, after the culling and di sinfection of the relevant premises have been
completed, "the premises are to be sealed and a sa nitization certificate issued by the State Animal
Health authorities stating that culling has been carried out and the areas ha[ve] been cleaned and
disinfected as per [the] Action Plan". 791 This in effect marks the end of the control operation.
Thereafter, under Chapter IV, "post-operation surveillance" is to be carried out for three
months.
792 During these three months, "[t]he areas where birds were culled will be repeatedly
disinfected by fumigation (indoors) or sprays (open place) at every 15 days during 3 months of
surveillance". 793 Restocking of poultry to the infected zone will not commence until one month

issue and, on that basis, the United States' claim under Article 2.3 "should be rejected". India's first written
submission, para. 189. However, in section 7.1.2.4.3, we concluded that the NAP 2012 is not a measure at
issue, and that the United States was not under an obligation to cite in its panel request the NAP 2012 for the
purpose of a comparison between the treatment afforded to like domestic products and the treatment afforded
to imported products under India's AI measures.
781 NAP 2006 (Exhibit US-89).
782 NAP 2012 (Exhibit US-90); India's first written submission, para. 40.
783 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.3, pp. 13-14.
784 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.5, p. 14.
785 We note the confusion with the numbering of Sections in the NAP 2012. For example, there are at
least two Sections numbered III.6 and at least three Sections numbered III.8. For this reason, we describe
each relevant section by number and by title.
786 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.6, p. 15.
787 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.6, p. 15.
788 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.8, p. 15
789 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.6, p. 15.
790 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.8, p. 17.
791 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection III.8.5, p. 19.
792 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Chapter IV, p. 19.
793 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection III.8.5, p. 19.

after the issuance of the Sanitization Certificate. 794 Under Section IV.2 (entitled "Freedom from
Disease"), if there is no other outbreak within the surveillance zone and no positive samples are
collected from the post operation surveillance tests for three months after the issuance of the
Sanitization Certificate, disease-free status can be declared.
795
(c) Comparing India's treatment of imported and domestic products
7.410. We make the following comments on the basis of this description of S.O. 1663(E) and
NAP 2012. First, we observe that S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of all the products
enumerated in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to (1)(ii)(j) from a given exporting country in the event that
the country notifies NAI (either HPNAI or LPNAI) within its territory. This prohibition remains in
place until the country in question declares NAI-freedom to the OIE. India's NAP 2012, in contrast,
restricts the movement of poultry products within India in the event of an outbreak of NAI.
Specifically, a ban on the movement of poultry into, and from, the infected area is put in place.
"Inward trade" of products within 10 km of the surveillance zone once culling and sanitization
operations are complete is permitted, although "outward movement" of poultry is not permitted
until disease-free status is declared.
796
7.411. India's AI measures exclude from India all products listed in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to
(1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E) that come from the territory of an exporting country if that country
notifies NAI. That is, products originating in countries that notify NAI to the OIE are prohibited
from entering India. They are necessarily also prohibited from being transported, sold or marketed
within India. Conversely, the regime applied in the case of NAI outbreaks within India limits the
movement of those poultry products that originate in the affected territory to within 10 km of the
site of the infection (i.e. those within the surveill ance zone). There are no restrictions on Indian
products from outside the surveillance zone. These contrasting limitations on the movement and
sale of poultry products within India are probative of the fact that S.O. 1663(E) and the NAP 2012
treat differently the products of India and of other WTO Members (in this case, the United States)
in the event of an outbreak of NAI. Consistent with our interpretation of "discrimination" under
Article 2.3, we conclude that India's AI measures treat imported products differently from
domestic products, and are therefore discriminatory.
(ii) Second "form" of discriminati on alleged by the United States
7.412. We will now consider the second "form" of discrimination claimed by the United States; i.e.
whether India prohibits the importation of products on account of LPNAI while it does not maintain
surveillance requirements that would result in th e detection of LPNAI occurring in India's domestic
poultry flocks.
797 More specifically, the United States submits that India's surveillance regime is not
mandatory, and that the principal means of detection is visual observation. 798 According to the
United States, the effect of this is that "in practice … while India relies on the detection of LPAI to
ban the sale of products, India in fact applies LPAI-based bans only to imported products because
India has failed to put in place measures that would effectively detect LPAI, and so India is not
taking steps necessary to restrict domestic products on account of LPAI".
799
7.413. In response, India argues that LPAI is exotic to India, and that it nonetheless maintains
surveillance of poultry and wild birds in order to detect NAI. 800 Specifically, India argues that it
maintains "random clinical" surveillance, "random laboratory" surveillance, and "targeted"
surveillance in order to detect NAI within its territory. 801 In summary, India claims that the
United States' submission is based on a "flawe d understanding of India's NAP 2012 and the on-
going laboratory and clinical surveillance activities being undertaken throughout [India]".802

794 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Section III.5, p. 14.
795 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection IV.3, p.21.
796 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection III.6, p. 15.
797 United States first written submission, para. 174.
798 United States first written submission, paras. 176-178.
799 United States first written submission, para. 179.
800 India's first written submission, paras. 204-207.
801 India's first written submission, paras. 43-51.
802 India's first written submission, para. 201.

7.414. In order to determine whether India discriminates against other WTO Members (including
the United States) because it maintains an import prohibition on products coming from countries
that have notified LPNAI, while not maintaining adequate surveillance to detect LPAI within its
territory (and therefore not taking steps necessary to restrict domestic products on account of
LPAI), we must first analyse India's surveillance regime for LPAI, as described in the NAP 2012.
7.415. Chapter 1 of the NAP 2012 is entitled "General Preparedness against Avian [I]nfluenza".
Section I.2 is entitled "Surveillance: It is very important and there is a serious need to remain
alert and prepared".
803 This Section prescribes rules on surveillance on account of AI, which "must
include both poultry and migratory birds". 804 In particular, the NAP 2012 provides that
AI surveillance includes "Routine Surveillance" and "Arrangements for Immediate reporting of
Unusual Sickness and Mortality in Birds".
805
7.416. Regarding "routine surveillance", the NAP 2012 "advises" India's state governments to
"develop routine surveillance plans by taking a block as a geographical unit, and together with
Department of Forest taking into account" factors related to the population and movement of
poultry and wild birds.
806 Subsection I.2.1 of Chapter I elaborates on "routine surveillance" as
including "[p]hysical/clinical" surveillance and "[v]irological testing of cloacal and tracheal swabs in
poultry and wild birds where possible".
807 Subsection I.2.1 "advises" India's state governments to
develop routine surveillance plans "by taking a block as a geographical unit, and taking into
account appropriate factors related to population and density of poultry in each block (both in
backyard and commercial establishments); the flyways of migratory-birds; live-bird markets
including wet-markets; the existence of wildlife sanctuaries, national-parks, and water-bodies
visited by migratory and wild birds; the areas ad jacent to international land-borders, especially
those affected with AI; and interstate borders with the AI affected States".
808 Section I.3 of the
NAP 2012 stipulates in that "[t]he States[]UTs must distinguish at their level between unusual
sickness[]mortality and normal incidences of sickness and mortality in poultry". 809 Paragraph (i)
further provides that "[o]nly in case of unusual sickness [] mortality raising suspicion of AI,
forward the samples immediately either to respective Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory or
directly to [High Security Animal Diseases Laboratory]".
810 Paragraph (ii) of Section I.3 provides
that "[r]epresentative[]random sampling may be do ne from an area [] farm. Samples from four
(4) birds consisting of at least one cloacal swab, one tracheal-swab and one serum-sample from
affected farm[]backyard poultry[]duck units should be collected".
7.417. From this description, the Panel understands that India maintains a surveillance regime for
AI through the NAP 2012. We turn now to consider whether this surveillance regime is adequate to
detect LPNAI.
7.418. The Panel asked the individual experts whether India's surveillance activities would reliably
detect LPNAI in poultry. In response to a written question from the Panel on this issue, Dr Honhold
reviewed the exhibits on which India relies to describe its current regime for domestic AI
surveillance, and for its assertion that the regime can detect AI. Dr Honhold concluded that "[i]n
summary, no evidence was found [to] support a conclusion that India is conducting surveillance
activities that would reliably detect LPNAI in poultry".
811 Professor Brown stated that "[t]he
evidence does not support a conclusion that India is conducting surveillance activities that would
reliably detect LPNAI in poultry", and that "other approaches … are required for coherent reliable
detection of LPNAI and applied at national and regional level to assure absence of infection in all
production sectors".
812 Dr Guan responded succinctly with "[n]o".813
7.419. All three experts reiterated their views du ring the Panel's meeting with the experts in the
presence of the parties. Dr Honhold stated that "the surveillance system isn't strong enough to

803 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
804 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
805 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
806 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
807 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
808 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.2.1.
809 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.3.(i).
810 NAP 2012, (Exhibit US-90), Subsection I.3.(i).
811 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 5.
812 Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 5.
813 Dr Guan's response to Panel question No. 5.

say" whether there is LPAI or LPNAI in India. 814 He further stated that, while India did provide
exhibits that demonstrate that there is "some degree of surveillance system", there is "no
evidence that it is an adequate surveillance system". 815 Although Dr Honhold did note that "India
has clearly demonstrated that on occasions its surveillance system does detect LPAI viruses", he
attributed this to "passive surveillance, as oppo sed to … active surveillance", leading him to query
whether LPAI detection was a matter of "luck [or] chance".816
7.420. Dr Guan said that "there are no data to show that the Indian colleagues have conducted
long-term surveillance in healthy poultry, or that maybe looks like healthy poultry; there is not this
kind of data". 817 Dr Guan added that existing surveillance "is response surveillance, not … long
term … monitoring activity to prevent the [disease] coming". 818 Dr Guan also said that "the current
surveillance system in India is not fully mature".819
7.421. Professor Brown said that:
I've seen nothing in the documents, and I apologise if I have overlooked it, that
clearly tells me the demography of poultry production in India, where it's located, the
poultry type, the number of holdings containing the poultry, and how they're selected
for surveillance, actively, at what frequency, and by region. I would expect to see
under a national plan a clear structure laid out. I haven't seen any evidence of that …
I would suggest [that] the absence of a clear plan … [does] not suggest to me that it
is structured, and therefore [does] not meet the requirements for showing LPNAI-
freedom.
820
7.422. Professor Brown also said that "[the expe rts] don't see any evidence that there is an
evolving programme that is informed by scientific evidence".821
7.423. It is clear to us that all three individual experts are in agreement that India does not have
in place a surveillance system capable of re liably detecting LPNAI. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude, on the basis of the evidence before us, that the surveillance regime that exists under
India's NAP 2012 is adequate to reliably detect LPNAI. In the light of this conclusion, we turn now
to consider whether the fact that India maintains an import prohibition against products originating
in countries that notify NAI, and in particular LPNAI, while not maintaining adequate surveillance
mechanisms for the detection of LPNAI, amounts to discrimination within the meaning of
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.424. In our view, the answer is straightforward. India prohibits imports of products enumerated
in paragraphs (1)(ii)(a) to (1)(ii)(j) of S.O. 1663(E) from WTO Members who notify LPNAI to the
OIE. In contrast, India does not have in place a surveillance system capable of reliably detecting
that same risk within its territory, and, therefore, India is not in a position to systematically
impose LPNAI-based restrictions on the products covered by S.O. 1663(E) within its territory.
Therefore, India treats domestic and imported pr oducts differently with respect to the risk of
LPNAI, depending on whether that risk originates within India or in another Member.
7.425. Having concluded that India's AI measures discriminate between India and other Members,
we will consider the second element of Article 2.3, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement.
7.6.4.2.1.2 Second element: whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable
7.426. To satisfy the second element of the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, the
United States must demonstrate that the manner in which India's AI measures discriminate
between the territory of India and the territory of other Members is arbitrary or unjustifiable.

814 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.216.
815 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.260.
816 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.308.
817 Dr Guan, Transcript, para. 1.73
818 Dr Guan, Transcript, para. 1.83.
819 Dr Guan, Transcript, para. 1.345.
820 Professor Brown, Transcript, paras. 1.275-1.276.
821 Professor Brown, Transcript, para. 1.286.

7.427. As was the case with the word "discriminate" 822, there is a lack of jurisprudence in the
specific context of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agr eement regarding the interpretation of the words
"arbitrarily or unjustifiably". However, we recall our observation that the similarity of the language
used in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement and Article XX of the GATT 1994 renders the
interpretation of "arbitrary or unjustifiably" in the latter context of some utility in understanding
the meaning of those same words in the context of Article 2.3. We will therefore be guided, where
appropriate, by the Appellate Body's interpretation of these terms in the context of Article XX of
the GATT 1994.
7.428. The Appellate Body has summarized its own jurisprudence in relation to the chapeau of
Article XX and concluded that an analysis of whether the application of a measure results in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the cause of the discrimination, or the
rationale put forward to explain its existence.
823 More specifically, the Appellate Body said that:
[T]here is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally
justified under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner
"between countries where the same conditio ns prevail", and when the reasons given
for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the
purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective. The
assessment of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in
the light of the objective of the measur e. … Accordingly, we have difficulty
understanding how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of
Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pursuit
of or would go against the objective that was provisionally found to justify a measure
under a paragraph of Article XX.
824
7.429. The Panel therefore considers that th e meaning of "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" within the context of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement involves a consideration of
the "cause" or "rationale" put forward to explain the discrimination in question, and whether there
is a "rational connection" between the reasons given for the discriminatory treatment and the
objective of the measure. In the context of the present dispute, having found that India's
AI measures discriminate between domestic and imported products on the two separate grounds
discussed above, our analysis will focus on the rationale that India has put forward to explain each
of the forms of discrimination caused by its measures.
(i) First "form" of discrimination alleged by the United States
7.430. We turn to the first form of discriminatio n alleged by the United States. The United States
notes first that India has not provided a justification for its disparate treatment of imported
products as compared with domestic products, and also that India's differential treatment of
imported products is not a function of any difference in the conditions prevailing in India and other
countries, or in countries' measures or procedures for AI control.
825
7.431. India, for its part, argues that the discrimination is not arbitrary or unjustifiable given that
a number of countries take domestic control measures that are similar to those maintained in
India.
826 Moreover, India argues that the risks pres ented by the two situations are different
because the epicentre of a domestic outbreak is kn own and the risk is one of spread beyond this
initial area of infection, whereas in the absence of import restrictions, imports can cause agents of
disease transmission to enter a country and be dispersed widely through internal commerce. In
this sense, India distinguishes between measures to prevent the spread and further establishment
of a disease with measures to prevent ingress of a disease into its territory.
827
7.432. As discussed above, we consider that jurisprudence developed in the context of the
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 is relevant to our interpretation of "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" within the contex t of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. More

822 Paras. 7.396-7.400 above.
823 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 226.
824 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 227. (footnotes omitted)
825 United States' first written submission, paras. 171-172.
826 India's first written submission, para. 210.
827 India's first written submission, para. 211.

specifically, we find the Appellate Body's observations in US – Shrimp to be useful in this analysis.
In that case, the United States maintained a ban on the importation of shrimp from countries that
did not require commercial shrimp trawlers to us e devices that would prevent sea turtles from
being caught in nets (so-called "Turtle Excluder Devices", or "TEDs").
828 The Appellate Body cited
several reasons for finding that the United States' ban amounted to unjustifiable discrimination,
including that the United States did not permit imports of shrimp harvested in a manner
comparable in effectiveness to that required under the United States' measures, solely because the
shrimp in question originated in waters of countries not certified under the United States
measure.
829 Furthermore, the Appellate Body observ ed that the application of the measure
required other WTO Members to adopt a regulatory programme that was essentially the same as
that applied to United States vessels. In assessing this fact, the Appellate Body said that
unjustifiable discrimination may exist within the meaning of the chapeau when a measure is
applied in a "rigid and unbending" manner across Members without any regard for differences
between those Members.
830
7.433. The Panel considers this reasoning to be of assistance in the present case for the following
reasons. As India implies, there may be asymmetries in the risks presented by the importation of
poultry products from countries notifying NAI, as compared with the risks associated with domestic
outbreaks of NAI. Furthermore, such asymmetrie s may manifest themselves in the ability of
authorities within India to control the spread of these respective risks within India. However, the
Panel cannot identify in India's AI measures any mechanism that takes account of instances in
which such asymmetries do not exist. Specifically, India's AI measures do not account for the
possibility that an exporting country (be it the United States or otherwise) that notifies NAI may be
able to demonstrate that its exports of poultry products do not pose an NAI-related risk. India's
AI measures prohibit the importation of the products listed in paragraphs (ii)(a)-(j) of
S.O. 1663(E) from exporting countries upon notification of NAI by the exporting country to the
OIE, irrespective of whether all or some of the exports of products from that country are, for
whatever reason, not affected by NAI. Such reas ons may be natural, regulatory, or otherwise;
regardless, there is no scope in India's AI measures to allow for any differences between Members,
if and where they exist, that may have some bearing on the risk associated with the products in
question.
7.434. In this same regard, we note that India's AI measures do not pay any regard to the
possibility that an exporting country maintains measures that will contain and/or control the
spread of NAI within its territory. In this way, India's measures do not take account of the fact that
different conditions may prevail in an exporting country that affect the likelihood that NAI will
infect consignments of exported poultry. In this regard, India asserts that it "cannot exercise
control over containment and disinfection methods applied by exporting countries and therefore it
cannot be expected to certify the health and safety of imported products which are potential
agents of NAI transmission".
831 However, it is not synonymous with this assertion that there do not
exist measures that are effective in addressing the spread of NAI. India's AI measures do not allow
for the recognition of measures that may be so effective, and therefore do not take account of the
possibility that such measures may exist in an exporting country. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on the record that India, in light of its inability to "exercise control over containment and
disinfection methods applied by exporting countries", has engaged in good faith efforts to assess
the measures applied by its trading partners with the aim of addressing NAI outbreaks within their
territory.
832
7.435. For these reasons, we consider that India has failed to take into account differences that
may exist between and among WTO Members from which India imports the products enumerated
in paragraphs (ii)(a)-(j) of S.O. 1663(E), specif ically with regard to circumstances in which
imported products do not pose a risk even th ough they originate in a NAI-reporting country.
Indeed, India's AI measures represent a "rigid and unbending" requirement and do not exhibit any

828 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 3-5.
829 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165.
830 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 163.
831 India's first written submission, para. 199.
832 In this regard, we note that the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp was critical of the failure of the
United States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the United States, "in
serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for
the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp
exports of those other Members". Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 166.

flexibility with regard to such differences among exporting countries. This does not "connect with"
the rationale India has put forward to explain this form of discrimination (namely, that the risk
associated with foreign outbreaks of NAI is always different from that associated with domestic
outbreaks), because India's AI measures do not account for circumstances in which there is no risk
associated with a foreign outbreak.
7.436. For this reason, the Panel finds that India's treatment of foreign poultry products amounts
to unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
(ii) Second "form" of discriminati on alleged by the United States
7.437. The Panel will now consider whether the second form of discrimination is arbitrary or
unjustifiable within the meaning of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.438. In this regard, the United States submits th at the risks in relation to Indian products and
foreign products are the same in relation to AI, and that there is no basis for imposing differential
treatment upon these products. The United States argues that, in practice, India's AI measures
ban only imported products because it has failed to implement measures that would effectively
detect LPAI, and therefore does not restrict domestic products on account of LPAI.
833
7.439. India argues that LPNAI is exotic to India and that India has neither detected nor
experienced outbreaks of LPNAI. It asserts that th at the risk associated with the introduction of
LPNAI means that "India is fully justified in pr ohibiting imports of poultry and poultry products
from countries upon a declaration of LPNAI".834
7.440. In order to determine whether the discriminatory treatment maintained by India through
the application of different standards to foreign and Indian products, respectively, is arbitrary or
unjustifiable, we will focus on the cause of the discrimination we found in paragraph 7.424 above
and the rationale put forward by India to explain its existence.835
7.441. As discussed, India's explanation for the differential treatment it applies to products that
originate in countries that have notified LPNAI is that LPNAI is exotic to India836, and that a disease
exotic to a territory "is cause for greater concern in terms of risk of introduction and potential
impact".
837 The Panel will therefore consider whether LPNAI is indeed exotic to India.
7.442. In doing so, we recall the Appellate Body's statement that the burden of proof under the
SPS Agreement is such that the initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a
prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of
the defending party. When that prima facie c a s e i s m a d e , t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f m o v e s t o t h e
defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency.
838 In Japan –
Apples, the Appellate Body clarified that this does not mean that the complainant is responsible for
proving all facts in a given dispute, but instead th at the responding party must prove the case it
seeks to make in response. 839 Thus, the Appellate Body distinguished between a complainant's
burden of establishing a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of a covered agreement,
and the principle that the party that asserts a fact is responsible for providing proof thereof. 840 In
that case, the Appellate Body determined that Ja pan was responsible for providing proof of those
factual allegations it adduced in response to the United States' prima facie case.841 Indeed, "it was
not for the United States to provide proof of the facts asserted by Japan". 842 With this in mind, we
make the preliminary observation that India has the burden of proving that LPNAI is exotic to
India.

833 United States' first written submission, para. 181.
834 India's first written submission, para. 214.
835 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 226.
836 India's first written submission, paras. 213-214; India's second written submission, para. 82.
837 India's second written submission, para. 82.
838 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 98.
839 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 154.
840 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 157.
841 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, paras. 155-156.
842 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 157.

7.443. The Panel sought the advice of the experts in this regard, in order to help it evaluate the
parties' arguments and the evidence supporting the presence, or lack thereof, of LPNAI in India.
Specifically, the Panel asked (i) whether the evidence provided by India 843 supports India's
statement that LPNAI is exotic to poultry in India; (ii) whether it is plausible that a country that
has experienced multiple H5N1 HPNAI outbreaks, such as India, is free from LPNAI; and (iii)
whether anything can be inferred about the LPNAI situation in India from a study, submitted by
the United States, in which H5 and H7 antibodies were found in ducks in India (the Pawar et al.
study). We summarize the comments of each of the three experts in relation to each of these
questions. We also note relevant comments from the individual experts made at the Panel's
meeting with the experts.
(a) Whether the evidence provided by India supports India's statement
that LPNAI is exotic to poultry in India
7.444. In response to the question whether LPNAI is exotic to India, Dr Honhold stated that
"[t]here is no a priori reason to believe that India is free from H5 and H7 LPNAI avian influenza
viruses. Avian influenza A viruses are ubiquitous in several wild water bird families and in
particular in the Anatidae (largely ducks) … [and] India has substantial populations of both
resident and migratory wild water birds". 844 Dr Honhold observed that LPNAI viruses have been
isolated in at least two south Asian countries (Pakistan and Sri Lanka), which "tends to contradict"
India' statement that South Asia has a unique ecology845 and that this is the reason that LPNAI has
not been detected. 846 Dr Honhold observed further that othe r LPAI viruses are found in domestic
poultry (such as H9N2 and H4N6), which indicates that LPAI is present in India 847, and that LPNAI
(which is a subset of LPAI) does not behave any differently with regard to its survival in the
environment, transmission between wild birds, or transmission to or within domestic poultry.
Dr Honhold noted that "[a]bsence can never be 10 0% proven in practice". Referring to Exhibits
IND-7 to IND-14, which India cited in support of its contention that India is LPNAI-free
848,
Dr Honhold stated that none of these exhibits ha s any direct relevance to the question. Referring
to the annual report of the Indian veterinary research institute for 2011-12 849, Dr Honhold noted
that this refers only to H5N1 and H9N2 and, without more, it is not possible to assess the
presumption therein that only these virus types were isolated. In sum, Dr Honhold stated that it is
not possible from the information available in the ex hibits to draw the conclusion that LPNAI is not
present in, or exotic to, India, as the details given are insufficient to allow the depth of analysis
required to assess the reliability of the lack of a positive finding of LPNAI.
850
7.445. In response to the question whether LPNAI is exotic to India, Dr Guan succinctly stated
"not really". Dr Guan noted that it "is correct that India has not reported any avian influenza
activities in poultry, which are associated with LPAI H5 or H7 viruses", but also that no systematic
influenza surveillance has been conducted in India. 851 At the Panel's meeting with the experts,
Dr Guan observed that "any country [that] has domestic ducks as a population … [has] a chance
[of getting] LPNAI … [n]o country can say 100% that [it is] H5 or H7 [LPAI] free if [it has]
ducks".852
7.446. Professor Brown noted that LPNAI was not the precursor to the H5N1 HPNAI detected in
India. However, Professor Brown also stated that the United States' assertion that LPAI viruses
may also be introduced from wild birds that occur in abundance in regions of poultry production "is
not unfounded", and that potential carriage of these viruses and introduction into poultry could
result in the emergence of LPNAI (and these could also mutate to HPAI). Professor Brown

843 The Panel's question asked that the experts consider the evidence provided by India, including
Exhibits IND-7 to IND-15.
844 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 1.
845 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 1 (citing India first written submission, paras. 15
and 49).
846 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 1 (citing Exhibit US-148).
847 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 1 (citing Exhibits IND-15 and US-122).
848 India's first written submission, paras. 12-15 (and footnotes thereto).
849 Exhibit IND-15.
850 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 1.
851 Dr Guan's response to Panel question No. 1.
852 Dr Guan, Transcript, para. 1.222.

therefore concluded that the risk posed by birds in fected with both H5 and H7 LPAI "is not without
foundation".853
(b) Whether it is plausible that a co untry that has experienced multiple
H5N1 HPNAI outbreaks, such as India, is free from LPNAI
7.447. In response to the question whether it is plausible that a country that has experienced
multiple H5N1 HPNAI outbreaks is free from LPNAI, Dr Honhold stated that the question assumes a
link between the occurrence of HPNAI H5N1 and LPNA I, but that this is not a safe assumption and
so "the occurrence or not of H5N1 HPNAI does not affect the plausibility of LPNAI-freedom". 854
Dr Honhold reviewed several exhibits 855 and concluded that "none of the documents give any
evidence either way to the linkage of the occurre nce of HPAI H5N1 and LPNAI as addressed in the
question". After further explanation, Dr Honhold summarized that "whilst the lack of a finding of
LPNAI, which is introduced by the same mechanism as H5N1 in the first instance, in the presence
of the number of introductions of H5N1 by wild birds is perhaps improbable, it is not impossible or
implausible. Disease introduction is a random unpredictable event and is by no means
inevitable".
856 Moreover, at the Panel's meeting with the experts, Dr Honhold observed that "the
attempt to create this linkage between the [H5N1 HPAI outbreaks and LPNAI] does not take into
account the unique nature of the epidemiology of H5N1 HPAI" 857, and that "H5N1 has been unique
in whilst it did arise from local precursors many years ago in Guangdong in Southern China, it has
proven able, unlike other HPAI viruses, to spread and maintain over very long distances. So its
presence in India doesn't indicate a precursor was present of any LPNAI".
858
7.448. Dr Guan responded as follows:
Any countries have chances to detect or isolate LPNAI H5 or H7 viruses if influenza
surveillance is conducted in aquatic birds, such as migratory ducks. Both subtypes are
not rare in most regions of the world. The Northeast of India is located in the Central
Asia Migratory flyway, and harbours lots of migratory aquatic birds. Amongst these
birds, LPNAI viruses should be easily detect ed. However, no such kind of findings has
been reported.859
7.449. At the Panel's meeting with the experts, Dr Guan noted that India "did a good job to detect
each of the outbreak episodes in the border region since … 2008, [such that it is] possible
scientifically [that] the virus [was repeatedly intr oduced] into India, but that the precursor [LPNAI
is] not in India".
860 Professor Brown endorsed this view 861, and also said that "these cases are
clearly not related to LPNAI, and … we would all accept that … H5N1 HPNAI is completely
different".862
7.450. Professor Brown noted that certain evidence 863 was not appropriate for the detection of
LPNAI, and noted the lack of detail regarding th e system for the detection of LPNAI that "may
partially be in place". Professor Brown concluded by noting the inadequacy of the sampling frame
to detect a level of infection that would be typical of LPNAI in the absence of clinical presentation
in susceptible poultry species.
864

853 Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 1.
854 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 2.
855 The question invited the experts to consider, for the purpose of this question, the exhibits submitted
by the parties including Exhibits US-89, US-90, US-92, US-106, US-122, US-143, US-144, US-145, IND-47,
IND-115 and IND-117.
856 Dr. Honhold's response to Panel question No. 2.
857 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.40.
858 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.41.
859 Dr Guan's response to Panel question No. 2.
860 Dr Guan, Transcript, para. 1.198.
861 Professor Brown, Transcript, para. 1.200.
862 Professor Brown, Transcript, para. 1.220.
863 Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 2 (referring to Exhibit IND-115).
864 Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 2.

(c) Whether anything can be inferred about LPNAI in India from the Pawar
et al. study's conclusion regarding H5 and H7 antibodies in ducks
7.451. Dr Honhold observed that the Pawar et al. study 865 was "undertaken in a limited area of
India… [and] the districts sampled were specific ally chosen as being those where outbreaks of
HPAI H5N1 had occurred". He stated that "[c]onclusions about the whole country cannot be drawn
from this one paper". Thus, while it "presents strong evidence for antibodies to H7 LPAI avian
influenza viruses in domestic poultry indicating exposure to the virus … [which] would indicate that
this virus had been present at some time in the re cent past in domestic poultry[, the] finding of
only serological evidence rather than virus isolation does not constitute an event reportable to the
OIE and does not indicate the current circulation of LPNAI viruses but it does not rule it out".
866 At
the Panel's meeting with the experts, Dr Honhold spoke of the Pawar et al. study and said that it
was never intended as anything else other than a piece of research, and that "some caution should
be placed on over analysing it" because "[the] findings of the study are really preliminary" and
"[are] not definitive".
867
7.452. Dr Guan stated the prevalent rate of LPNAI viruses may be low in India as there is a very
small population of domestic ducks. He concluded by noting that LPNAI could be said to be very
rare, but one "cannot say there is no[ne]".868
7.453. Professor Brown responded that the Pawar et al. study demonstrated presence of H7 in
ducks and that in the absence of clinical signs it is "quite plausible" that this would have been
L P N A I . H o w e v e r , h e a d d e d t h a t " [ t ] h e p r e s e n c e o f a n t i b o d i e s o f c o u r s e d o e s n o t e x c l u s i v e l y
confirm the presence of infection but it does indicate that at some time in that animal's life it has
had an exposure to an H7 virus". Professor Brown also noted that "the testing itself was not
robustly conducted in accord with the [i]nternational standard".
869 At the Panel's meeting with the
experts, Professor Brown said of the Pawar et al. study that, absent fo llow-up sampling, "you
cannot be confident about what those results are telling you".870
(d) Conclusion on the presence of LPNAI in India
7.454. In light of the above comments from the Panel's experts, we conclude that there is
insufficient evidence on the record to support a finding that LPNAI is exotic to India. In reaching
this conclusion, we take particular account of the experts' observations that the documents
submitted by India to support the assertion that LPNAI is exotic to India do not support this
contention. Furthermore, without prejudice to this conclusion, we recall our statement in
paragraph 7.423 above, that all three individual ex perts have affirmed that the evidence on the
record concerning India's surveillance regime indicates that it is not adequate to reliably detect
LPNAI. This conclusion also detracts from India's argument that LPNAI is exotic to India. Indeed,
as Dr Honhold observed, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".
871 Therefore, without a
suitable surveillance system capable of reliably detecting LPNAI, it is difficult for India to maintain
its assertion that LPNAI does not exist.
7.455. In making this conclusion, we stress that we are not making a finding on whether or not
LPNAI is exotic to India. We limit our conclusion to a determination whether the assertion that
LPNAI is exotic to India is supported by the facts and the evidence before us.
(e) Conclusions on arbitrary or unjusti fiable discrimination for the second
"form" of discrimination
7.456. In the light of our conclusion that we cannot determine whether or not LPNAI is exotic to
India, the Panel can complete its assessment of the parties' respective arguments regarding
whether the discrimination maintained in India's AI measures is arbitrary or unjustifiable.

865 Exhibit US-122.
866 Dr Honhold's response to Panel question No. 3.
867 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.44.
868 Dr Guan's response to Panel question No. 3.
869 Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 3.
870 Professor Brown, Transcript, para. 1.171.
871 Dr Honhold, Transcript, para. 1.132.

7.457. We recall our discussion of the burd en of proof under the SPS Agreement in
paragraph 7.441 above, and stress in particular th at India bears the burden proving those facts
that it asserts872; namely that LPNAI is exotic to India. As we have explained, the three individual
experts have unanimously affirmed that there is no basis on the record of this dispute to support
this conclusion. Moreover, the experts have concluded that India does not maintain a regime for
the surveillance of AI that could reliably detect LPNAI. We cannot, therefore, conclude that India
has proven that LPNAI is exotic to India, as it asserts. Accordingly, considering that the alleged
absence of LPNAI in India constitutes the rationale for India's refutation of the United States'
argument that India unjustifiably treats imported products differently from domestic products, we
find that India has not rebutted the United States' prima facie case of arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination. In other words, India has no t satisfied the requirement set out by the
Appellate Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres that there must be a "rational connection" between the
reasons given for the discriminatory application of the measure and the objective of the measure.
We therefore find that the discrimination India maintains, through its AI measures, against foreign
products on account of LPNAI is arbitrary and unjustifiable contrary to Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement.
873
7.6.4.2.1.3 Third element: whether identical or similar conditions prevail
7.458. As we explained above, the third elemen t that a complainant must prove in order to
demonstrate that a measure is inconsistent with Article 2.3, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement
is that identical or similar conditions prevail. Once again, we will consider whether identical or
similar conditions exist in the context of each of the "forms" of discrimination alleged by the
United States.
7.459. The meaning of "identical or similar conditions" was discussed by the panel in Australia –
Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) . In that dispute, Canada claimed that Australia's import
requirements for salmonids from Canada were discriminatory because Australia applied no internal
control measures on the movement of dead Australian fish. The panel found that Canada had not
demonstrated that distinctions in Australia's ALOPs were arbitrary or unjustifiable in the context of
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because the panel's experts considered the differential treatment
in question to be scientifically justified
874, and because the risk associated with imported salmonids
was greater than for dead fish because the disease associated with salmonids was not present in
Australia.
875 The panel found that these facts indicated, in addition to a violation of Article 5.5 of
the SPS Agreement, that Canada had not demonstrated that Australia's discrimination against
salmonids was arbitrary or unjustifiable within the meaning of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
7.460. Of particular note for our analysis is the panel's reliance in that case on the same factors
used in its Article 5.5 analysis of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination to inform its analysis of
whether "identical or similar conditions" existed for the purpose of the analysis under the third
element of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. In th at case, the panel referred in this respect to the
"substantial difference in disease status" between Canada and Australia that was relevant to its
Article 5.5 analysis and concluded, as it had with respect to Article 5.5, that there was no violation
of the third element of Article 2.3.
876 Accordingly, the Panel understands that the same facts that
inform whether or not discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable may also inform whether or not
identical or similar conditions prevail. The Panel also understands from that panel's interpretation
and application of Article 2.3 that the relevant "conditions", for the purpose of a given analysis,
may be the presence of a disease within a territory (and the concomitant risk associated with that
disease). On the basis of this understanding, th e Panel will now consider whether identical or
similar conditions prevail with regard to each of the "forms" of discrimination alleged by the
United States.

872 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 157.
873 In reaching this conclusion, we note that we have not examined whether India's argument that
LPNAI is exotic to India would nonetheless have been sufficient to justify the difference in treatment afforded
to domestic and foreign products, respectively, in the event that India had been able to discharge its burden of
proof.
874 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.92-93.
875 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.93.
876 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.113-7.114.

(i) First "form" of discrimination alleged by the United States
7.461. In the context of the first form of discrim ination, the United States argues that India's
differential treatment of imported products and domestic products is not a function of any
difference in conditions prevailing in India and other countries, or in countries' measures or
procedures for control of AI.
877
7.462. India submits that the detection of AI within India is distinct from when it attempts to
prevent the entry of infected products into its territory via importation.878 Specifically, India argues
that the epicentre of an outbreak is known in th e case of a domestic outbreak, and so the risk
relates to containment of the risk to the contaminated area. With imports, India argues, in the
absence of control measures, the disease coul d enter the country and be dispersed through
internal trade.
879 India maintains that these situations are "highly distinct".880
7.463. The Panel observes that India's AI measures prohibit the importation of certain agricultural
products from countries reporting NAI. The Panel considers that the relevant "conditions" in this
analysis refer to the presence of NAI in India or another Member. Under conditions where NAI is
present in a country other than India (and is notified to the OIE), India's AI measures apply. Thus
when NAI is present in an exporting country, India applies an import prohibition. Under conditions
where NAI is present in India, the relevant prov isions of the NAP 2012 apply, allowing movement
and trade outside the surveillance zone. Unlike in the situation between Canada and Australia
referred to above, this is not a case of a "subst antial difference in disease status" between India
and the United States justifying different treatmen t. In this dispute, the measures in question
address the same condition – the presence of NAI – and they do so differently. In other words,
here the conditions are binary – NAI is present in a country, or it is not – such that once the
condition of the presence of NAI exists, the cond itions are identical or similar, no matter where
they are. That is not to say that the disease situation of India is identical or similar to the disease
situation of the United States – India has frequent outbreaks of HPNAI and no notifications of
LPNAI, whereas the United States is free of HPNAI and occasionally notifies LPNAI.
Notwithstanding this observation, for the purpose of this analysis, the relevant condition for our
analysis under the third element of Article 2.3 is the presence of NAI in India or another Member
because that is the relevant distinction that triggers the import prohibition imposed by India's
AI measures.
7.464. In sum, we consider that the relevant conditions are identical or similar between India and
other countries (including the United States) for the purpose of the third element of Article 2.3 of
the SPS Agreement.
(ii) Second "form" of discriminati on alleged by the United States
7.465. In the context of the second form of discr imination, the United States argues that India
seeks to protect against risks posed by AI, bu t the risks presented by foreign and domestic
products in relation to LPAI are the same, and there is no justification for imposing different
measures on products presenting the same risks.
881
7.466. India argues that the panel report in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) supports
its contention that the presence of a disease in one country, and its absence in another such that
there is a "substantial difference in disease status", means that two countries (in this case, India
and the United States) are not in identical of similar situations.
882
7.467. We agree with India that the panel report in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada)
supports the notion that if the relevant disease is present in one country but not in another, this
may be an indication that identical or similar conditions do not exist. 883 However, as discussed in
paragraphs 7.437–7.457 above, India has not discharged its burden of proving the fact that it

877 United States' first written submission, para. 172.
878 India's first written submission, para. 196.
879 India's first written submission, para. 196.
880 India's first written submission, para. 196.
881 United States' first written submission, para. 181.
882 India's first written submission, para. 207.
883 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 - Canada), paras. 7.92-7.93, 7.103, 7.113.

contends; namely, that LPNAI is exotic to India. We also reiterate our conclusion that India does
not maintain surveillance that is adequate to de tect LPNAI, notwithstanding the existence (or lack
thereof) of LPNAI within its territory. Therefore, there is no foundation upon which to base an
application of the reasoning of the panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada).
7.468. The Panel recalls its discussion in paragraph 7.460 above, and the Panel's understanding
that the presence of a disease, or lack thereof, can be considered both in relation to whether
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable, and in relation to whether identical or similar conditions
prevail. As explained above, we consider that this reasoning is relevant to the present analysis,
insofar as it demonstrates that similar factors can be considered for the purposes of determining
both whether a measure discriminates in a manner that is arbitrary or unjustifiable, and whether
identical or similar conditions prevail as that phrase is used in Article 2.3.
7.469. On that basis, the Panel observes that the risk against which India is protecting (in the
context of the second form of discrimination alleged by the United States) is LPNAI. There is no
evidence before the Panel to suggest that the risks associated with LPNAI are in any way different
on the basis of the origin of the relevant product. Thus, India is protecting against an identical or
similar risk when it takes measures to protect against LPNAI, regardless of whether the relevant
product originates in India or the United States or somewhere else.
7.470. We therefore find, based on the evidence before us, that the risks against which India is
protecting constitute conditions that are similar in India and other Members (including the
United States).
7.471. We also recall that, in paragraph 7.402 above, we stated that our analysis of whether or
not discrimination exists in this case would assume sameness for that purpose, and that if
discrimination does exist, that finding will be confirmed if we find that identical or similar
conditions do in fact exist across India and other Members. Having found that similar conditions do
exist, we confirm our finding that India's AI measures discriminate between imported and
domestic products.
7.6.4.2.1.4 Conclusion on Article 2.3, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement
7.472. In light of the foregoing, having establis hed the three cumulative elements of Article 2.3,
first sentence, the Panel finds that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3, first
sentence, of the SPS Agreement because they ar bitrarily and unjustifiably discriminate between
India and other Members in which the same or similar conditions prevail.
7.6.4.2.2 Article 2.3, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement
7.473. The United States argues that India's AI measures amount to a disguised restriction on
international trade. According to the United States, a series of factors are relevant in this regard,
namely, India's application of "drastically more stringent measures to foreign products than to
domestic products"
884, but also India's shifting position on whether its measures are justified by
OIE guidelines or a risk assessment, and India's fa ilure to provide a risk assessment or scientific
evidence that would justify LPAI-based import bans.885
7.474. In response, India argues the United States' submission does not support a conclusion that
its AI measures constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. India contends that there
is clear justification for its measures because LPNAI is exotic to India, and the risks posed by
ingress of an exotic disease cannot be compared with the risk associated with an existing
disease.
886 Moreover, India argues that it has always maintained that its measures are based on
the Terrestrial Code, and that India has not shifted its position on whether a risk assessment was
required of it.887

884 United States' first written submission, para. 182.
885 United States' first written submission, para. 182; United States' second written submission,
paras. 111-112.
886 India's first written submission, para. 217.
887 India's first written submission, paras. 218-219; India's second written submission, paras. 85-86.

7.475. The Panel observes that the phrase "disgu ised restriction on international trade" has not
been interpreted by a panel or the Appellate Body in the context of Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement. However, the Appellate Body has made observations regarding what factors
might indicate that a Member maintains a disguised restriction on international trade within the
context of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
888 In Australia – Salmon , the Appellate Body was
asked to review a series of factors taken into account by the panel in determining that distinctions
in levels of protection amounted to a disguised restriction on international trade. The
Appellate Body stated that a finding that an SPS measure is not based on risk assessment,
including instances in which there was no risk assessment at all, is a strong indication that the
measure "is not really concerned with the protection of human, animal or plant life or health but is
instead a trade restrictive measure taken in the guise of an SPS measure, i.e., a 'disguised
restriction on international trade'".
889 The Appellate Body also said that, where a panel has doubts
regarding whether a responding Member applies similarly strict standards to the internal
movement of products associated with a risk within its territory as it does to imports of those
products, that may be considered a factor to be taken into account when determining whether
distinctions in levels of protection amount to a disguised restriction on international trade (albeit
such doubts would not be conclusive in this regard).
890
7.476. We recall our discussion in paragraph 7.400 above regarding the similarity between
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement and the chapeau to Article XX of the GATT 1994 and the utility in
interpreting Article 2.3 of rulings interpreting Arti cle XX. We observe that both provisions prohibit
the application of measures that would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. In
the context of Article XX, the Appellate Body note d that "arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable
discrimination", and "disguised restriction on international trade" impart meaning to one
another.
891 The Appellate Body has said that "'disguised restriction', whatever else it covers, may
properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in
international trade taken under the guise of a meas ure formally within the terms of an exception
listed in Article XX".892 Consistently with our observations in paragraph 7.400 above, regarding the
similarities between Article XX of the GATT 19 94 and Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, we
consider that, in the context of the latter provision, "disguised restriction on international trade"
may similarly be read to encompass measures that constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.
893
7.477. Based on this understanding of "disguised restriction on international trade", the Panel
makes the following observations. We recall our finding in paragraph 7.457 that India's
AI measures arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminate against foreign products. We note that an

888 Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement requires (in relevant part) that "each Member shall avoid arbitrary
or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of sanitary or phytosanitary protection] it considers to be appropriate
in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade". We also note that a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.5 can be presumed to imply a violation of the
more general obligation in Article 2.3. Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.109, and Appellate Body
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 178.
889 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 166.
890 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 174-176.
891 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 25.
892 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 25.
893 The Panel is mindful of the discussion by the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon regarding the
assessment of "disguised restriction on international trade". The panel in that case based its finding that
Australia's distinction in ALOPs amounted to a disguised restriction on international trade on several "warning
signals" and "additional factors". The panel considered the first warning signal was the arbitrary or unjustifiable
character of the differences in levels of protection maintained by Australia. Panel Report, Australia – Salmon,
para. 8.149. The panel considered as an "additional factor" that "the concept of 'disguised restriction on
international trade' in Article 5.5 includes, among other things, restrictions constituting arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between certain products". Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.153. On
appeal, the Appellate Body stated that this factor should be excluded from the examination of whether a
disguised restriction on international trade existed under Article 5.5 on the basis that this additional factor was
"not different from the first warning signal, and should not be taken into account as a separate factor in the
determination of whether an SPS measure results in a 'disguised restriction on international trade'".
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 169. In the present dispute, we consider that this reasoning
can be distinguished on the basis that we have not made any findings under Article 5.5 regarding whether
India maintains arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions regarding the level of protection it considers to be
appropriate. We therefore do not think we are precluded from considering arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination as an independent factor in our analysis of whether India's AI measures are a disguised
restriction on international trade.

element of the analysis that led to this finding was our observation that India does not apply
similar standards to the internal movement of products associated with the risk of AI as it does to
imports of those products. We also recall our find ings in sections 7.4.2.2 and 7.4.2.3 above that
India's AI measures and the recommendations of Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code contradict
each other and that, accordingly, India's measures are not based on and thus do not conform to
the Terrestrial Code, in particular Chapter 10. 4 thereof. Furthermore, we have found in
sections 7.5.3.2.3 and 7.5.3.2.4 above that India has not conducted a risk assessment upon which
to base its AI measures. In the light of the Appellate Body's explanation above as to what
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade, we consider that all of these findings,
taken together, support a finding that India's AI measures are applied in a manner that constitutes
a disguised restriction on international trade.
7.6.4.2.2.1 Conclusion on Article 2.3, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement
7.478. We therefore find that India's AI meas ures are applied in a manner that constitutes a
disguised restriction on international trade, and are therefore inconsistent with Article 2.3, second
sentence, of the SPS Agreement.
7.6.5 Conclusion on the United States ' claim pursuant to Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement
7.479. On the basis of the foregoing, the Panel concludes that India's AI measures are
inconsistent with Article 2.3, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement because they arbitrarily and
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail. We also
find that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3, second sentence, because they are
applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.
7.7 Conclusion on the United States' altern ative claim pursuant to Article 5.5 of the
SPS Agreement
7.480. We recall our discussion in section 7.6.2 above, in which we observed that the
United States believes India's measures are properly analysed under Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement
894, and therefore that its claim under Ar ticle 5.5 of the SPS Agreement is an
"alternative" claim.895
7.481. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement, the Panel is of the view that it need not consider the United States' alternative
claim under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
7.8 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Article 5.6 and, consequently,
with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
7.8.1 Arguments of the parties
7.8.1.1 United States
7.482. The United States claims that India has breached Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement
because India's AI measures are more trade-restrictive than required to achieve its ALOP.
896
According to the United States, because the Terrest rial Code is a reasonably available alternative
that exceeds India's ALOP and is less trade-restrictive, India breached Article 5.6. 897 The
United States further claims that a finding by the Panel that India has acted inconsistently with
Article 5.6 would result in consequential breach of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
898
7.483. The United States suggests that the Panel follow the order of analysis adopted by the
panels in Australia – Apples and Australia – Salmon and first examine whether there is a measure

894 United States' response to Panel question No. 33.
895 United States' first written submission, Section VIII.H.
896 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
897 United States' first written submission, paras. 17 and 133; United States' second written submission,
para. 50.
898 United States' first written submission, para. 141.

that achieves the Member's ALOP, then establish that the measure is reasonably available, and
finally, determine whether the reasonably available alternative is significantly less trade-
restrictive. The United States submits that this approach is appropriate in this case because
resolution of this issue, particularly if the Panel finds that India's ALOP is low as the United States
suggests, should facilitate review of the subseque nt elements. In particular, the United States
notes that it should not be difficult to ascertain whether the Terrestrial Code recommendations are
available (since numerous countries already practice them) and are less trade-restrictive than
outright import prohibitions.
899
7.484. According to the United States, there is a clear, scientifically based alternative to India's
AI measures that is reasonably available, name ly, measures based on the Terrestrial Code. The
United States argues that this alternative is technically feasible because the Terrestrial Code is
developed and used the world over. Additionally, the Terrestrial Code was formulated through the
expertise of veterinary authorities around the world who are "familiar with real world
practicalities".
900 In response to India's assertion that the Terrestrial Code recommendations are
not reasonably available because they would require India to place "full faith" in the exporting
country's attestations, the United States submits that it "is not arguing that India is not entitled to
conduct customs measures, but that there are alternatives to an outright ban and that the
recommendations in the [Terrestrial] Code constitute precisely such an alternative".
901 Moreover,
the United States argues that, rather than requiring Members to accept imports " carte blanche"902,
the Terrestrial Code requires the exporting count ry, as per Article 10.4.30, to provide evidence
that it maintains an effective surveillance programme. For the United States, this information can
confirm that the territory has the status – e.g. HPNAI-free or LPNAI-free – that it purports to have.
In addition, Article 10.4.31 requires further evid ence after an outbreak to establish that the
country, zone, or compartment has regained freedom from NAI or HPNAI. 903 The United States
asserts that India is currently placing "full faith" in the word of exporting countries by relying on a
country's self-notification to the OIE to ascertain if such country is free of NAI. If India is willing to
accept attestations from a country that its surveillance has not detected NAI, then it cannot
contend that relying on OIE-compliant veterinary certificates is somehow less reliable.904
7.485. The United States adds that adoption of the Terrestrial Code's "prescriptions" poses no
economic barrier to India, because the Terrestrial Code provides for the application of control
measures by the exporting country. Thus, the expense of control measures is not incurred by an
importing country such as India. The United States considers unpersuasive India's contention that
it would bear a burden in reviewing the veterinary certificates that the Terrestrial Code
recommends that it accept. This is because India already requires SIPs in which the veterinary
authority in the exporting country must attest to a variety of conditions. Adoption of measures
based on the Terrestrial Code would simply mean that Indian officials, instead of reviewing
certificates for the conditions they currently require – such as country-wide freedom from NAI –
would instead confirm that the conditions of the Terrestrial Code have been satisfied.
905 The
United States underscores that the Terrestrial Code recommendations present no additional
burden given that India already requires veterinary certificates for imports; the "key distinction is
simply what is being attested to".
906
7.486. The United States observes that India does not refer to an Indian government document in
discussing the United States' controlled marketing system, but rather to an article submitted by
the United States with its first written submission, which discusses US control measures.
Accordingly, the United States argues, it does not appear that India had any concerns with the
United States' controlled marketing system until this dispute arose. The United States then
explains its controlled marketing system as follow s. In the United States, LPNAI infection can be
resolved through two methods. First, the affected flock can be "stamped out", which means that it
is culled and disinfection procedures are implem ented. Alternatively, and used less frequently,
there is controlled marketing, which is governed by a regulation issued by the United States
Animal Health and Plant Inspection Service. Unde r controlled marketing, the flock is contained for

899 United States' response to Panel question No. 40.
900 United States' first written submission, para. 134.
901 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.
902 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.
903 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.
904 United States' second written submission, paras. 60-61.
905 United States' first written submission, para. 135.
906 United States' second written submission, para. 59.

21 days. As noted in Article 10.4.1.4 of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period for avian
influenza is 21 days. Accordingly, the time period is intended to ensure that the infection has
subsided. Then, seven days before the flock is slaughtered, the flock is retested. Only if the test
results confirm no infection can the poultry proceed to slaughter. The United States notes that
Articles 10.4.3 and 10.4.19 of the Terrestrial Code explicitly provide that in case of LPNAI
infections, poultry may be kept for slaughter and that "the United States is allowing these products
to be served to its own citizens".
907
7.487. The United States contends that, although India has not stated its ALOP, after an
examination of its domestic surveillance and control measures, India's ALOP "appears to be quite
low". For the United States, assuming arguendo that India's ALOP is extremely high – to prevent
any infection by LPNAI subtypes – the control measures in the Terrestrial Code are sufficient to
achieve it.
908 In response to India's assertion that the United States failed to properly identify
India's ALOP, the United States submits that as India is the Member maintaining the measures at
issue, the burden is on India to clarify its ALOP with respect to AI. In addition, the United States
highlights that India has failed to respond to its information request, which was made pursuant to
Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement.
909 Moreover, the United States contends that India's description
of its ALOP as set forth in its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties
and in its response to Panel question No. 35, does not qualify under the definition of ALOP
provided in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement. The United States relies on the Appellate Body's
report in Australia – Salmon to clarify the relationship between an ALOP and an SPS measure, and
to explain that importing Members are obliged to determine their ALOP. 910 Since India has failed to
do so, the United States argues that its only alternative is to infer the ALOP from examination of
India's measures. In this context, the United States reiterates that India's ALOP is relatively
modest with respect to HPNAI and negligible when it comes to LPNAI, since surveillance is unlikely
to detect it.
911
7.488. The United States reiterates that the product-specific recommendations and those with
respect to zoning and compartmentalization set forth in the Terrestrial Code would achieve India's
ALOP. In its view, not only would the achieved AL OP be higher than the one inferred from India's
domestic measures, it would be sufficiently high to achieve whatever ALOP India could "choose
from", since such recommendations are designed to preclude the disease from entering the
importing country.
912
7.489. The United States explains its assertions on this point as follows. First, India's ban extends
to products such as poultry meat and eggs that are not vehicles for LPAI transmission. The virus is
not found in those products. Accordingly, abse nt contamination – which the Terrestrial Code
confirms – they will no t transmit the disease.
913 Second, the Terrestrial Code's provision for
containment of AI, through zoning and compartmentalization and trade in products originating
outside the area where AI was detected, is consistent with India's measures with respect to
domestic products, which impose controls and restrictions on movement of products only within a
limited area following an AI outbreak. The United States explains that the establishment of a zone
or compartment in accordance with the Terrestrial Code necessarily entails the establishment of
surveillance, control, and biosecurity measures to ensure that trade in products from outside the
zone or compartment is safe, and allows for the application of distinct requirements (or no
requirements) for products from outside the zone or compartment.
914 Third, in the United States'
view, the control measures have proven effective over an extended period of time. According to
the United States, it is one of the world's largest exporters of poultry commodities. Yet, there is no
evidence that any country has suffered LPNAI – or HPNAI – infections as a result of United States
exports. For the United States, the prescriptions of the Terrestrial Code have thus proven, in real
world conditions, more than sufficient to prevent transmission of LPNAI.915

907 United States' response to Panel question No. 38.
908 United States' first written submission, para. 136.
909 United States' second written submission, para. 52.
910 United States' second written submission, paras. 53-54.
911 United States' second written submission, para. 55.
912 United States' second written submission, paras. 56-58.
913 United States' first written submission, para. 137.
914 United States' first written submission, para. 138.
915 United States' first written submission, para. 139.

7.490. The United States posits further that, as the "[Terrestrial] Code allows for trade from
countries reporting outbreaks of LPNAI – and India's measures do not – the [Terrestrial] Code is
inherently less trade[-]restrictive".
916 Additionally, the Terrestrial Code "recognizes that zoning can
be an appropriate method to control for [AI] risks". 917 In contrast, India rejects any consideration
of regional conditions and would impose a country-wide ban even if the outbreak were
geographically isolated and thousands of ki lometres away from the exporting facility. 918 The
United States highlights that prohibiting trade for any amount of time is obviously more trade-
restrictive than allowing trade, and that this principle applies to zoning as well; containment
measures should be applied in the areas where th ey are necessary instead of being applied to the
whole country.919
7.491. The United States contends that in Australia – Apples, the Appellate Body determined that
a breach of Article 5.6 may result in a consequential breach of Article 2.2. 920 According to the
United States, a finding under Article 5.6 necessitates a determination that a viable alternative
measure that achieves a Member's ALOP exists and is less trade-restrictive than the responding
Member's measure. The United States suggests that Articles 5.6 and 2.2 contain "similar
obligations"
921, and that "[t]he existence of such an alternative measure – and the concomitant
finding that the Member has declined to adopt it – may lead to the conclusion … that a Member
has adopted a measure that is applied to a greater extent than necessary and is accordingly
inconsistent with Article 2.2 as well". 922 For the United States, this indicates that Article 5.6 is
actually a specific application of Article 2.2.923
7.492. The United States further argues that the case in question supports its interpretation of the
relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.6. In its view, because application of the
Terrestrial Code will achieve India's ALOP, the import prohibition that India currently has in place
exceeds what is necessary to achieve India's ALOP, meaning that India's breach of Article 5.6 also
results in a breach of Article 2.2.
924
7.8.1.2 India
7.493. India responds that, were the Panel to find that India's import "suspension" on eggs and
fresh meat of poultry from countries reporting LPNAI conforms to the Terrestrial Code, such finding
would necessarily also result in a finding of consistency with Article 5.6.
925 In any event, India
submits that the United States' claim under Articl e 5.6 "is not only highly deficient for want of
arguments and evidence fulfilling the three cumula tive elements of Article 5.6, but is also
inherently devoid of any merit on account of the identification of an incorrect ALOP".926
7.494. Referring to the panel report in Australia – Salmon, India argues that a complainant must
satisfy a three-pronged test to establish a violation of Article 5.6 by examining whether there is an
alternative SPS measure that: (i) is reasonably available taking into account technical and
economic feasibility; (ii) achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection; and (iii) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.927
7.495. India recalls that the panels in Australia – Salmon 928, Australia – Apples 929, and US –
Poultry (China)930 recommended that, while all three elements prescribed under Article 5.6 are

916 United States' first written submission, para. 140.
917 United States' first written submission, para. 140.
918 United States' first written submission, para. 140.
919 United States' second written submission, para. 62.
920 United States' first written submission, para. 141.
921 United States' second written submission, para. 64.
922 United States' first written submission, para. 141.
923 United States' second written submission, para. 64.
924 United States' second written submission, para. 65.
925 India's first written submission, para. 239.
926 India's first written submission, para. 236 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Apples,
927 India's first written submission, para. 236 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Salmon,
para. 8.167).
928 India's response to Panel question No. 40.

cumulative in nature, the Panel must first approach its analysis by identifying the second element,
i.e. the ALOP implicit in the measure under cha llenge and the ALOP achieved by the alternative
measure proposed. India agrees with this guidance as it must first and foremost be established
that the alternative measure fulfils India's ALOP; that is, an alternative measure suggested by the
United States would need to ensure the same ALOP as the import prohibition currently does.931
7.496. India considers that the United States "is asking the Panel to compare the trade[-
]restrictiveness of S.O. 1663(E) with the ALOP it believes should apply, rather than the level of
protection which is reflected in S.O. 1663(E) itself". 932 Referring to the panel's finding in US –
Poultry (China), India concludes that the United States has not established that the two alternative
measures it has proposed achieve India's ALOP.933
7.497. According to India, the United States has identified the "wrong ALOP" because it refers to
India's domestic surveillance and control measures instead of the measure being challenged,
namely S.O. 1663(E). India submits that "[i]n an y event, as previously explained in India's
rebuttal to the Article 2.3 claim, India's domestic surveillance and control measures as reflected in
the NAP 2012 are not SPS measures within the meaning of Article 1 of the SPS Agreement
because they do not directly or indirectly affect international trade". India's view is that the
identification of the wrong ALOP leads to a fatal error in the US analysis and strikes "at the very
root of the United States allegation under Article 5.6".
934 India adds that the level of protection that
a Member deems appropriate to protect human, animal or plant life or health is a decision to be
made by the Member itself and not by any other WTO Member or international organization.935 It is
the importing Member's prerogative to choose its own ALOP. 936 India argues that the
United States, having identified an "obviously" in correct ALOP, still bears the burden of proof to
establish a prima facie case of inconsistency under Article 5.6.937
7.498. India explains that the Panel in US – Poultry (China) declined to enter into a speculative
exercise as to what ALOP a Member must adopt. It stated categorically that the ALOP is a
prerogative of the Member maintaining the measure and the alternative measure must be one that
fulfils this ALOP. The complaining Member does not fulfil its burden merely by suggesting an
alternative ALOP. 938 In India's view, the Panel should determine if the alternative measure is
significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested, and it should ascertain
whether it is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility.
939 Further,
relying on the Appellate Body's findings in Australia – Apples and Australia – Salmon , India adds
that "if any of these elements is not fulfilled, the measure in dispute would be consistent with
Article 5.6. Thus, if there is no alternative measure available, taking into account technical and
economic feasibility, or if the alternative measure does not achieve the Member's [ALOP], or if it is
not significantly less trade-restrictive, the measure in dispute would be consistent with
Article 5.6".
940
7.499. India contends that the United States does not identify with any level of clarity the specific
alternative measure which it believes fulfils the cumulative requirements under Article 5.6. The
United States simply refers to the alternate measure "ambivalently" as "control measures in the

929 India's response to Panel question No. 40 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Apples,
para. 7.1107).
930 India's response to Panel question No. 40 (referring to Panel Report, US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.333).
931 India's response to Panel question No. 40 (referring to Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II,
paras. 8.78-8.82).
932 India's first written submission, para. 253.
933 India's first written submission, para. 254.
934 India's first written submission, para. 241; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 51.
935 India's first written submission, para. 242 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon,
936 India's first written submission, para. 242 (referring to Panel Report, US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.333).
937 India's first written submission, para. 242.
938 India's response to Panel question No. 40 (referring to Panel Report, US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.333).
939 India's response to Panel question No. 40.
940 India's first written submission, para. 236 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Apples,

Terrestrial Code".941 For instance, the United States does not specify which particular product
specific standard the United States believes constitutes the alternative significantly less restrictive
measure that India could adopt. India argues that "Chapter 10.4.1 of the Terrestrial Code contains
several different standards which lay down guidelines for trade in various products on account of
[AI]". Furthermore, "[a]ll of the standards are recommendatory in nature in that they permit a
country to adopt a specific standard based on its ALOP … [T]he United States does not explain why
some or all of the standards achieve India's ALOP, are reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility and are significantly less restrictive to trade".
942 In effect, India
contends that the United States has not fu lfilled its burden of proof to establish a prima facie case
of a violation of Article 5.6 by India.943
7.500. India surmises that, as the alternative meas ure is not clearly identified, the United States
may be suggesting as alternative measures: (1) "unrestricted trade in fresh meat of poultry and
eggs from LPNAI countries"; and (2) "trade of fresh meat of poultry and eggs from recognized
zones and compartments from a LPNAI country".
944 For "unrestricted trade", India interprets this
suggestion to be that, even during active outbreak s, India must import from an infected country
purely on the strength of its veterinary certificate. India argues that it is obvious that this
"reasonably available alternative measure" actually requires India to ignore the explicitly provided
"condition of entry" in the Terrestrial Code. India submits that the United States is asking the
Panel to require India to ignore portions of the Terrestrial Code so that its trade flow remains
unimpeded, irrespective of the biological consequences this may have for India as an importing
country.
945 With regard to the second alternative measure (namely, "trade of fresh meat of poultry
and eggs from recognized zones and compartments from a LPNAI country") 946, India notes that it
is not clear whether the United States considers this as an appropriate alternative measure.
According to India, the United States does not sa y so in clear terms. It only suggests that the
Terrestrial Code's standards on zoning and compartmentalisation "need to be kept in mind".
947
7.501. India contends that the proposed alternative measures do not in any event fulfil India's
ALOP. India reiterates that LPNAI is not present in India and is exotic to it. It further states that,
contrary to the United States' submission, eggs an d fresh meat of poultry present an identifiable
risk of transmitting an LPNAI infection. By adopting S.O. 1663(E), India seeks to prevent the
ingress and establishment of an exotic disease and it is precisely the risk of transmission of that
disease that necessitates application of appropriate controls on trade in the commodities from
LPNAI infected countries.
948
7.502. India notes that "the Terrestrial Code exp licitly recognizes the importing country's right to
seek NAI country freedom from the exporting country before the poultry commodities in question
may be imported".949 Moreover, it allows an immediate prohibition on trade in these products from
a country reporting LPNAI.950 According to India, despite the existence of an international standard
which not only recognizes the right of an impo rting country to impose an immediate ban on
imports of eggs and meat from countries notifying LPNAI, but also further enables an importing
country to require NAI-freedom on a country-wide basis, the United States claims that it is India's
obligation to adopt a more lenient approach. It states that India should eschew international
standards and must instead permit the trade in eggs and fresh meat of poultry even from a
country which is experiencing an active LPNAI outbreak. The overall level of risk associated with
unrestricted trade in these commodities does not fulfil India's ALOP, which is to prevent ingress of
an exotic disease through products that are clearl y identified as risk factors even by the OIE.

941 India's first written submission, paras. 237 and 243; and India's opening statement at the first
942 India's first written submission, para. 238.
943 India's first written submission, para. 238.
944 India's first written submission, para. 244; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 52.
945 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 52.
946 India's first written submission, para. 248.
947 India's first written submission, para. 249.
948 India's first written submission, paras. 245 and 247.
949 India's first written submission, para. 246.
950 India's first written submission, para. 245.

Unrestricted trade presents exactly the type of risk of introduction of LPNAI which S.O. 1663(E)
guards against.951
7.503. India also argues that when India as a member of the OIE has determined that its ALOP is
country freedom from NAI as clearly reflected in the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code, a
reading which restricts the right of India to seek NAI country freedom in favour of only HPNAI
country freedom is untenable as it undermines India's sovereign right to determine its ALOP.952
7.504. With regard to the second alternative measure, i.e. trade of fresh meat of poultry and eggs
from recognized zones and compartments from a country with LPNAI, India notes that the
United States' claim is deficient because of reliance on a faulty ALOP, which was derived from
India's domestic containment measures in the NAP 2012. India's ALOP for trade in poultry
commodities from countries reporting LPNAI (a disease which is exotic to India) is achieved
through S.O. 1663(E) and not the NAP 2012.
953
7.505. Furthermore, India argues, the United States misreads the OIE's standards on zoning and
compartmentalization. Zoning or compartmentalization can only be given effect if the exporting
country provides necessary evidence thereof and objectively demonstrates to the importing
Member that such zones or compartments are free from NAI. According to India, "[i]mporting
Members are under no obligation to suo moto recognise zones or compartments in the absence of
either a request or documents provided to this effect by the exporting country. It is only when the
[biosecurity] of such zones or compartments is verified and established and an agreement reached
between the importing and exporting countries that the importing country is under an obligation to
permit trade from such recognised zones or comp artments during an avian influenza outbreak".
The high level of biosecurity that is required of zones or compartments is to ensure that products
originating in such zones or compartments are safe for trade despite an outbreak in other parts of
the country.
954
7.506. India observes that it has indicated to the United States that it is willing to consider trade
from compartments; yet, to date, the United States has neither made a request to India nor
submitted relevant documentation evidencing establishment of biosecure compartments. In India's
view, without an explicit recognition by India of compartments in the United States, India is under
no obligation to apply the principle of regionalization for imports of poultry products from the
United States. Moreover, in the absence of an arra ngement with India, this option is not feasible
either.
955 According to India, unless the biosecurity area of the zone or the compartment is shown
to be first established by the United States and th en further verified by India, it would not be a
reasonably available alternative measure, as it would be unclear if such zone or compartment
ensures the same level of protection as the import prohibition currently does. 956 In the absence of
affirmative documentation establishing the safety of products from disease free areas, India
argues, India is under no obligation to permit trade in poultry commodities from certain areas of
the United States every time the United States notifies LPNAI. This alternative will certainly not
achieve India's ALOP.
957
7.507. India argues that the United States has also proposed two additional measures based on
the Terrestrial Code – "control measures or vete rinary certificate requirements prescribed under
Chapter 10.4 of the OIE Code" 958, and that India "require exporting countries to provide evidence
that they maintain effective surveillance programs". 959 Addressing the first of these proposals,
India argues that it is not reasonably available because veterinary certificate requirements would
not meet India's ALOP. India claims the United States has suggested an alternative ALOP which
India ought to apply with respect to imports. India relies on US – Poultry (China) to argue that the
ALOP is a prerogative of the Member maintainin g the measure and the alternative measure must
be one that fulfils this ALOP. The complaining Member does not fulfil its burden merely by

951 India's first written submission, para. 248.
952 India's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
953 India's first written submission, para. 250; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 51.
954 India's first written submission, para. 251.
955 India's first written submission, para. 255.
956 India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 53.
957 India's first written submission, para. 252.
958 India's second written submission, para. 89.
959 India's second written submission, para. 93.

suggesting an alternative ALOP. 960 Regarding veterinary certificates, India submits that these are
not technically and economically feasible. According to India, such feasibility (of the alternative)
must be viewed with respect to India's capacity to handle the volume of imports that will result if it
does not restrict imports during an active outbreak. India refers to the panel report in Australia –
Apples and points out that as the volume increases, so does the probability that a given biological
event may occur, increasing the chances that th e r e l e v a n t p e s t w i l l g a i n e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e
importing country.
961
7.508. In response to the United States' second additional proposal that India require evidence
from exporting countries that they maintain an effective surveillance programme 962, India states
that this alternative is neither technically and economically feasible nor significantly less restrictive
to trade. India contends that the United States is suggesting that India gather information on
exporting countries' surveillance systems and es tablish if such systems are adequate. This
alternative is not technically and economically feasible given its current human resources working
in veterinary and scientific matters.
963
7.509. India also states that it currently permits trade to commence after a three-month period
following an outbreak, as recommended by the OIE. India contends that a suggestion that "India
follow Article 10.4.30 and 10.4.31 and grant access to an exporting country after efficacy of a
country's surveillance program is determined essentially amounts to suggesting that India prohibit
imports from all countries and then allow access after intensive verification process of countries'
surveillance systems. India believes this altern ative could extend the period of an import ban
beyond three months until such time as it gains confidence in an exporting country's surveillance.
Under the circumstances, the suggested measure does not appear to be a significantly less trade[-
]restrictive alternative".
964
7.510. In response to the United States' assertion that the scope of reference of the dispute
extends to all products referred to in S.O. 1663(E), India submits that merely impugning the
entirety of a measure does not result in raising claims with respect to all products in the absence
of evidence and argument concerning the same. Furthermore, India acknowledges that although
the Panel has decided that the entirety of S.O. 1663(E) is within its terms of reference, the
United States provided arguments on apparent violations by India under the SPS Agreement only
with respect to eggs and meat, as is evident from various passages of the United States'
submissions.
965 Based on this argument, India claims that: (a) the United States' replies to the
Panel's questions confirm that its Article 5.6 claim is limited to eggs and fresh meat of poultry from
countries declaring LPNAI 966; and (b) while responding to the Panel on the manner in which the
Terrestrial Code should be read, the United Stat es provides illustrative examples relating to
importation of eggs.967
7.511. India posits that the United States has failed to establish that the alternative measures are
significantly less trade-restrictive than the me asures adopted by India. For India, "[t]he
United States is required to explain and demons trate how the alternative measures would involve
significantly increased market access to India than S.O. 1663(E)". 968 Instead, the United States
simply stated that "as the Terrestrial Code allows for trade from countries reporting outbreaks of
LPNAI – and India's measures do not – the Terrestrial Code is inherently less trade[-]restrictive".
969
7.512. India submits that "the Panel should note that import suspension of products under
S.O. 1663(E) from countries reporting LPNAI is on ly until such time as the country declares
freedom. This usually takes 3 months from disinfection". 970 India further argues that "[t]rade from
the country can commence once the country declares freedom [and that, therefore] [t]he
United States has not established how the alternative measure is significantly less restrictive to

960 India's second written submission, para. 90.
961 India's second written submission, para. 91.
962 India's second written submission, paras. 93-94.
963 India's second written submission, paras. 93-94.
964 India's second written submission, para. 95.
965 India's second written submission, paras. 97-100.
966 United States' second written submission, para. 101.
967 United States' second written submission, para. 102.
968 India's first written submission, para. 256.
969 India's first written submission, para. 256.
970 India's first written submission, para. 256.

trade than the limited 3 month import suspensi on currently applied in accordance with the
Terrestrial Code".971
7.513. In response to the United States' consequential claim under Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement, India rejects this claim as "unsub stantiated". India says that the passage from
the Appellate Body Report in Australia – Apples upon which the United States relies does not
support its argument. Indeed, India argues that th e Appellate Body noted similarities between the
Articles but "explicitly stated that such similarity cannot lead to the assumption that a violation of
Article 5.6 will in all cases lead to a violation of Article 2.2". 972 Moreover, India asserts that
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 make no reference to one another and that the United States has failed to
provide a "cogent reason" for linking the two provisions.
973
7.8.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.8.2.1 Introduction
7.514. The question before the Panel is whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, as claimed by the United States. In particular, the Panel must
assess whether India's AI measures are more trade-restrictive than required to achieve India's
ALOP, taking into account technical and economic feasibility. If we find India's AI measures to be
inconsistent with Article 5.6, the Panel is also asked to conclude that, as a consequence, India's
AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
7.515. We first address the United States' claim under Article 5.6, and, in case of a finding of
inconsistency, then consider the United States' consequential claim under Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement.
7.516. Before commencing the legal analysis of Article 5.6, we note India's assertion that the
United States' claims under Articles 5.6 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement are limited to fresh meat of
poultry and eggs from countries notifying LPNAI.
974 India maintains that the United States has not
challenged S.O. 1663(E) in relation to the import prohibition of any of the products listed in
S.O. 1663(E) on account of HPNAI. 975 We recall our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, which, as
stipulated in paragraph 7.4 above, forms an integral part of the present findings. In particular, we
refer to our finding that the ten categories of products listed in S.O. 1663(E) and the
United States' panel request fall within the scope of this dispute.976 Furthermore, the United States
has confirmed to the Panel that its claims, including those pursuant to Articles 5.6 and 2.2,
concern all the products listed in S.O. 1663(E).
977 Accordingly, we are not persuaded by
India's submission that the United States' claim under Articles 5.6 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
pertains only to fresh meat of poultry and eggs.
7.517. In addition, we recall our findings in sections 7.4.2.2.5 and 7.4.2.2.6 above that India's
AI measures are not based on the Terrestrial Code and that, as explained in section 7.4.2.3 above,
they do not conform to the Terrestrial Code. Therefore, India cannot rely on the alleged conformity
of its AI's measures to the Terrestrial Code in order to justify a presumption of consistency of
those measures with the remainder of the SPS Agreement, including Articles 5.6 and 2.2.
Furthermore, as found in section 7.4.2.2.2 above, such defence would not apply in respect of live
pigs as these are not covered by Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and, to our knowledge, there
is no other relevant international standard for AI applicable to live pigs. We also refer to our
findings in section 7.4.2.2.2 above that there is no product-specific recommendation in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code for "pathologica l material and biological products from birds",
and that we do not have sufficient evidence on record to determine whether India's AI measures in
respect of these products are based on the recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the
Terrestrial Code.

971 India's first written submission, para. 256.
972 India's first written submission, para. 257.
973 India's first written submission, para. 258; India's opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 28.
974 India's first written submission, para. 237; India's second written submission, para. 89.
975 India's first written submission, para. 237; India's second written submission, para. 89.
976 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.27-3.30, 3.37, 3.92-3.93 and 3.140.
977 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(e).

7.8.2.2 Whether India's AI measures ar e inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement
7.518. The Panel will begin its analysis under Article 5.6 by setting out the text of the legal
provision at issue.
7.8.2.2.1 The legal provision at issue
7.519. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement states:
Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or maintaining
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more
trade-restrictive than required to achiev e their appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.
3
(footnote original) 3 For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more
trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into
account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.

7.520. The phrase "appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection", i.e. the ALOP, is
defined in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement as:
The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or
phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its
territory.
NOTE: Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the "acceptable level of risk".

7.521. In Australia – Salmon , the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, and footnote 3 thereto, estab lish three cumulative elements that must be
satisfied in order to establish a violation of Article 5.6. Specifically, the Appellate Body found that:
The three elements of [the] test under Article 5.6 are that there is an SPS measure
which:
(1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility;
(2) achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
(ALOP); and
(3) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.
978
7.522. The Appellate Body explained that these three elements are "cumulative in the sense that,
to establish inconsistency with Article 5.6, all of them have to be met". 979 This means that, "[i]f
any of these elements is not fulfilled, the measure in dispute would be consistent with
Article 5.6".980
7.523. We note that both parties acknowledge that a claim under Article 5.6 requires the
satisfaction of this three-pronged test. 981 Moreover, the parties have suggested that the Panel
proceed by examining first the second element of the test, i.e. whether the alternative measure

978 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 194.
980 The Appellate Body concluded: "Thus, if there is no alternative measure available, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility, or if the alternative measure does not achieve the Member's
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, or if it is not significantly less trade-restrictive, the
measure in dispute would be consistent with Article 5.6". Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon,
981 United States' first written submission, para. 133; India's first written submission, para. 236.

would achieve India's ALOP.982 A review of the existing jurisprudence shows that no panel, nor the
Appellate Body, has commented definitively on a singular approach to the order in which an
analysis of the three elements under Article 5.6 must take place. Indeed, different approaches
have been taken in past disputes.
983
7.524. In line with the Appellate Body's reasoning in Australia – Salmon , if the alternative
measure fails to meet any of the three elements of Article 5.6, India's AI measures would be
consistent with Article 5.6.
984 Hence, the order of the analysis would not have an impact on the
result. In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, we have decided to analyse the
elements under Article 5.6 in the order in which they have been described by the Appellate Body.
7.525. Whatever the approach, the Appellate Bo dy has stressed that it is the complaining
Member, in this case the United States, that bears the burden of proof of establishing a prima facie
case that there is an alternative measure that meets all three elements under Article 5.6. 985 In the
present case, the Panel notes that the identification by the United States of an alternative measure
has been a point of disagreement between the parties. Specifically, India has advanced various
arguments that call into question whether the United States has actually identified reasonably
available alternative SPS measures and, if so, which precise alternative measures the
United States has proposed.
986 Accordingly, a necessary step in our analysis, before entering into
the study of each of the three elements of Article 5.6, is to establish whether the United States has
indeed identified one or more alternative measures for the purposes of this provision.
7.8.2.2.2 Whether the United States has identified one or more alternative measures
7.526. The United States argues that it proposes measures based on the Terrestrial Code as the
alternative measures for the purposes of Article 5.6. 987 It elaborates that there is a
recommendation in the Terrestrial Code that provides for safe importation of each of the products
India bans.
988 The United States cites as examples Article 10.4.19 (which recommends requiring
veterinary certificates attesting to the conditions in which poultry was kept and slaughtered as well
as ante- and post-mortem inspections) and Article 10.4.14 (regarding the certification of eggs for
human consumption from an HPNAI-free country) of the Terrestrial Code. 989 It also notes that the
Terrestrial Code requires, per Article 10.4.30, that an exporting country declaring freedom from
NAI or HPNAI for the country, zone or compartment provide evidence that it maintains an effective
surveillance programme.990
7.527. India first argues that the United States has not identified "with any level of clarity the
specific alternative measure which it believes fulfils the cumulative requirements under
Article 5.6".991 In particular, India argues that the Unit ed States does not identify the product-
specific standard that it suggests India should adopt992, but instead states "perfunctorily" that "the
Terrestrial Code is reasonably available", or refe rs to "control measures in the Terrestrial Code"
without explaining the "controls" to which it refers. 993 India therefore submits that it "is forced to
assume" that the United States is "suggesting … (i) unrestricted trade in fresh meat of poultry and

982 India's response to Panel question No. 39; United States' response to Panel question No. 40.
983 For instance, both the panel and the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon took a sequential
approach; the panel in Japan – Agricultural Products II considered the first and third elements before turning
to the second element; the compliance panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) examined the
second element first – as it was "the most controversial" element of Article 5.6 – and then turned to the other
elements. This was also the order of analysis chosen by the panel in Australia – Apples at the request of
Australia. The panel in US – Poultry (China) was silent on the issue because it refrained from ruling on this
claim. Respectively, Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 8.167-8.183; Appellate Body Report, Australia –
Salmon, paras. 194-213; Panel Reports, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 8.72-8.104; Australia –
Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.127; Australia – Apples, para. 7.1107; and US – Poultry (China),
para. 7.337.
985 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 126.
986 India's first written submission, paras. 237-243; India's second written submission, paras. 88-94.
987 United States' first written submission, para. 134; United States response to Panel question No. 37.
988 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.
989 United States' response to Panel question No. 37
990 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.
991 India's first written submission, para. 237.
992 India's first written submission, para. 238.
993 India's first written submission, para. 243.

eggs from LPNAI countries (ii) trade of fresh meat of poultry and eggs from recognized zones and
compartments from a LPNAI country".994
7.528. In its later submissions, India argues that the United States suggested two additional
alternatives. According to India, the United States' reference to the recommendations in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code amounts to one alternative measure. 995 The second
alternative proposed by the United States is th at India require exporting countries to provide
evidence that those exporting countries maintain effective surveillance programmes in order to
confirm their NAI status.996
7.529. Our task under these circumstances is to determine whether the United States has
identified one or more alternatives to India's AI measures. We observe that, in its various
submissions, the United States referred to "measures based on the Terrestrial Code" and to "the
Terrestrial Code" as reasonably available alternatives to a prohibition on the importation of
products from countries reporting NAI.
997 The United States asserted that "for almost all of the
products India bans, there is a specific recommendation in the Terrestrial Code that provides for
safe importation". 998 In particular, the United States identifies the recommendations in
Chapter 10.4 that correspond to the products cove red by S.O. 1663(E) (to the extent that those
products are within the scope of Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code) in table format 999, which is
reproduced below:
S.O. 1663: Bans from all countries reporting NAI
(including LPNAI and HPNAI) Alternative OIE Code Recommendation
domestic and wild birds (inc luding poultry and captive
birds);
Articles 10.4.5 and 10.4.6
day old chicks, ducks, turkey, and other newly hatched
avian species;
Articles 10.4.7 and 10.4.8
un-processed meat and meat pr oducts from Avian species,
including domesticated, wild birds and poultry;
Articles 10.4.19 and 10.4.20
hatching eggs; Articles 10.4.10, 10.4.11, and 10.4.12
eggs and egg products (except Specific Pathogen Free
eggs);
Articles 10.4.13, 10.4.14, and 10.4.15
un-processed feathers; Article 10.4.22 and Article 10.4.23
products of animal origin (from birds) intended for use in
animal feeding or for agricultural or industrial use; and
Article[] 10.4.21
semen of domestic and wild birds including poultry. Articles 10.4.17 and 10.4.18

7.530. The United States also highlighted specific articles of Chapter 10.4 to provide examples of
measures that India can implement as alternatives to an import prohibition. For instance, it refers
to the recommendations for fresh poultry meat in Article 10.4.19, which provides that "a
veterinary certificate should be provided that attests that poultry from which the meat was derived
has been kept in a country, zone, or compartment free from HPNAI since they were hatched or at
least 21 days and have been slaughtered and subject to inspection". It also refers to
Article 10.4.14, which provides that "eggs for human consumption from an HPNAI-free country
require[] a certificate attesting they produced or packed in an HPNAI-free territory, have had
surface sanitation, and are transported in new and appropriately sanitized materials".
1000

994 India's first written submission, para. 244. The Panel notes that India's first written submission does
not separate these two alternatives with the words "and" or "or", such that it is not clear whether India
submits that the United States has proposed one or both of these alternatives.
995 India's second written submission, para. 89.
996 India's second written submission, para. 93.
997 United States' first written submission, para. 134; United States response to Panel question No. 37;
United States' second written submission, paras. 50 and 59-61.
998 For instance, United States' response to Panel question No. 36; United States' second written
submission, paras. 59-61 (with regard to the availability of zoning, in the context of "[t]he recommendation in
the Terrestrial Code [being] reasonably available").
999 United States' second written submission, para. 57.
1000 United States' response to Panel question No. 37.

7.531. In addition, the United States submits that the Terrestrial Code recommends zoning and
compartmentalization, and refers to Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the Terrestrial Code to support this
argument. It explains that "a Member rather than apply its trade measures broadly against a
country as a whole can apply them simply to an affected area without unnecessarily disturbing
trade elsewhere".
1001
7.532. We consider that the cumulative effect of these submissions is that the United States is
proposing that India base its AI measures on the Terrestrial Code, and in particular, the
recommendations in Chapter 10.4 specifically highlighted by the United States. Accordingly, we do
not agree with India that the proposed alternative measures lack clarity. We conclude that the
United States has identified measures based on the Terrestrial Code as a reasonably available
alternative to India's AI measures for the purposes of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
7.533. In relation to live pigs as well as pathological material and biological products from birds,
we note our finding in section 7.4.2.2.2 above that Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code does not
include product-specific recommendations regarding these products. The United States has not
suggested any alternative measures other than the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code as
discussed above. For this reason, we conclude that the United States has not proposed any
alternative measure in relation to live pigs and pathological material and biological products from
birds for the purposes of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
7.534. We now proceed to examine whether measures based on the recommendations of the
Terrestrial Code identified by the United States meet the three cumulative elements of Article 5.6
of the SPS Agreement.
7.8.2.2.3 Whether measures based on the re commendations in the Terrestrial Code are
reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility
7.535. The first element of Article 5.6 of the SP S Agreement that we will consider is whether
SPS measures based on the recommendations in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code are
reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.
7.536. The United States argues that measures based on the Terrestrial Code's recommendations
are economically feasible because the Terrestrial Code is developed and used around the world,
and because its formulation benefits from the expertise of veterinary authorities from around the
world.
1002 The United States explains that the control measures envisaged in the Terrestrial Code
must be applied by the exporting Member. Moreov er, to the extent that the Terrestrial Code
requires OIE members to review veterinary certificates, the United States argues that this is
feasible on the basis that authorities in India already review the attestations made pursuant to
each SIP.
1003 The United States adds that the worldwide use of the recommendations in the
Terrestrial Code is indicative of their technical feasibility. 1004 In response to India's argument that
it does not have capacity to handle the volume of imports that would result if it does not restrict
imports during an active outbreak, the United Stat es observes that "[t]his is interesting because
India claims that it allows imports if countries are free from NAI for three months".
1005
7.537. India's submission, as the Panel understands it, rejects the United States' assertion that its
proposed alternative measures are technically and economically feasible for India because the
provisions of the Terrestrial Code shift responsi bility for the Code's application to exporting
countries.
1006 In India's view, real world risks "encompass risks related to failures in inspection,
risk of contamination in transport and risks of incorrect certification among others", as well as the
fact that poultry and poultry products from areas reporting LPNAI may be traded under the
controlled marketing system.
1007 India submits that determining whether an exporting country's
surveillance system is adequate is not technically or economically feasible given "current

1001 United States' second written submission, para. 58.
1002 United States' first written submission, para. 134.
1003 United States' first written submission, para. 135.
1004 United States' second written submission, para. 50.
1005 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring to India's
first written submission, paras. 29-33 and 195).
1006 India's first written submission, para. 255; United States' first written submission, para. 135.
1007 India's first written submission, para. 255.

veterinary and scientific human resource[s]". 1008 Furthermore, India indicates that it is not
prepared to put "full faith" in the United States' attestations regarding AI and to import products
without implementing other controls.
1009
7.538. In addition, India argues that requiring veterinary certificates as recommended in the
Terrestrial Code is not technically and economically feasible because India does not have the
capacity to handle the volume of imports that will result if it does not restrict imports during an
active outbreak.
1010 This is so because India has quarantine facilities only at six ports and it would
have to significantly enhance capacity at those ports in order to verify the sanitary condition of
each consignment of imports from NAI-reporting countries.1011
7.539. Concerning trade in products from recognized zones, India also argues that such trade is
not feasible because "without an explicit recognition by India of compartments in the
United States, India is under no obligation to apply the principle of regionalization for imports of
poultry products from the United States". 1012 We will address this last argument below at
section 7.9 below, in the context of our findings in relation to Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
7.540. In Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US) the panel, with respect to the element of technical
and economic feasibility, reasoned that a panel must determine "whether the alternative measure
would constitute an option reasonably available taking into account technical and economic
feasibility in the real world", and that "the risk of incorrect enforcement is part of the technical
feasibility of a measure".
1013 We concur with this approach.
7.541. The Panel observes that India currently makes use of exporting countries' own declarations
regarding their AI-status in several different contexts. For instance, India notes that it "relies on a
country's self-notification to the OIE to ascertain if a country is free of NAI". 1014 Moreover, as
discussed in section 7.1.2.4.4 above, each consignment of poultry products must, pursuant to
S.O. 655(E), be accompanied by a health certificate that contains sanitary requirements to which
the official veterinarian in the exporting country must attest including, most relevantly, and
depending on the conditions applicable to the products in a given consignment, a declaration of
the HPNAI or LPNAI status of the exporting country.
1015 Indeed, as India states, "if a country is
free from HPNAI or LPNAI, the health certificate for poultry products would nonetheless require
that this fact is confirmed".1016
7.542. Based on this evidence, it is clear to the Panel that India already makes use of attestations
from an exporting country for the purpose of determining, or confirming, that the exporting
country has not detected NAI within its territory. Moreover, implicit in India's reliance on such
attestations is an assumption on India's part that domestic surveillance and control in the
exporting country is adequate to substantiate an attestation made by the official veterinarian. The
Panel cannot identify any argument from India that establishes why attestations made pursuant to
the measures envisaged by the Terrestrial Code's recommendations are of lesser quality or
reliability than those that India currently requir es of exporting countries. Furthermore, India's
mistrust of certifications to be issued by the United States' authorities is not substantiated with
evidence. We find no support for India's statements that attestations by veterinary authorities in
the United States carry risks related to failures in inspection, risk of contamination in transport and

1008 India's second written submission, para. 94.
1009 India's first written submission, para. 255.
1010 India's second written submission, para. 90.
1011 India's second written submission, paras. 91-92.
1012 India's first written submission, para. 255.
1013 Panel Reports, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), para. 8.171; and, Australia – Apples,
para. 7.1334.
1014 India's response to Panel question No. 21.
1015 India's first written submission, para. 98.
1016 India's first written submission, para. 98. While a health certificate may require that a country
"confirm" its HPNAI or LPNAI status, the Panel reiterates its conclusion in section 7.1.2.4.4 that the health
certificates that accompany a SIP and that are issued pursuant to S.O. 655(E) are not "related to" or
"implementing" the import prohibition reflected in S.O. 1663(E) and, therefore, are not measures at issue in
this dispute.

risks of incorrect certification, "among others" 1017, that are higher or different from those
associated with attestations by veterinary authorities pursuant to S.O. 655(E).
7.543. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Indi a's argument that reliance on the exporting
country's veterinary certificates is not technically and economically feasible because India does not
have the capacity to handle the volume of imports that will result if it does not restrict imports
during an active outbreak. 1018 We do not find this argument convincing. Indeed, as noted by the
United States1019, India submits that it "does not maintain a permanent ban on poultry and poultry
products from NAI[-]reporting countries" 1020 and that the import prohibition "is lifted once the
exporting country notifies freedom from [NAI] to the OIE". 1021 This suggests that India does have
the capacity to respond to increases in imports that are contingent on circumstances, such as the
NAI status of an exporting country, that are outs ide India's control. We see no reason, and India
has not persuaded us, as to why India could not utilize this capacity to handle an increase of
imports were the ban to be lifted. In addition, if a WTO Member could justify an import ban on the
basis that it is less administratively burdensome than an alternative measure and therefore the
alternative measure is not feasible, this would render meaningless the requirement in Article 5.6
that a Member ensure that its SPS measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to
achieve the ALOP.
7.544. We note that India cites the Panel report in Australia – Apples as support for its argument
in respect of its capacity to handle imports during an outbreak.
1022 In our view, India's contention
is not supported by this reference because the passage India relied upon does not address
whether an alternative measure was technically and economically feasible, but rather the
likelihood of the introduction of the relevant pests.
7.545. Nor has India persuaded us that those alleged risks would be magnified because
contaminated poultry in the United States are not exterminated but instead domestically traded
under the United States' controlled marketing system. India asserted that the controlled marketing
system makes the risk that contaminated products will enter its territory all the more possible
1023
and suggests that it is for the United States to substantiate the safety of these products. 1024 We
disagree. The Appellate Body has been clear that it is not the burden of one party to prove the
facts asserted by another.1025
7.546. On the basis of the foregoing, the Panel concludes that measures based on the
recommendations of the Terrestrial Code are technically and economically feasible, and reasonably
available alternatives to India's AI measures. Acco rdingly, the alternative measures identified by
the United States fulfil the first element of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. We now proceed to
examine whether those measures also fulfil the second element.
7.8.2.2.4 Whether measures based on the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code
achieve India's ALOP
7.547. The second element in the test under Arti cle 5.6 of the SPS Agreement refers to whether
the alternative measures – in this case, the SPS measures based on the recommendations in the
Terrestrial Code – achieve India's ALOP.
7.548. The Appellate Body has provided guidance concerning the analysis that a panel must
conduct when assessing whether a proposed reason ably available alternative achieves a Member's
ALOP under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement:

1017 India's first written submission, para. 255.
1018 India's second written submission, para. 91.
1019 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring to India's
first written submission, paras. 29-33 and 195).
1020 India's first written submission, para. 33.
1021 India's first written submission, para. 195.
1022 India's second written submission, para. 91 (citing Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.504).
1023 India's first written submission, para. 255.
1024 India's first written submission, para. 255.
1025 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 157.

Under Article 5.6, in order to assess whether a significantly less trade-restrictive
alternative measure that would meet the appropriate level of protection is available,
we consider that a panel must identify both the level of protection that the importing
Member has set as its appropriate level, and the level of protection that would be
achieved by the alternative measure put forth by the complainant. Thereupon the
panel will be able to make the requisite comparison between the level of protection
that would be achieved by the alternative measure and the importing Member's
appropriate level of protection. If the level of protection achieved by the proposed
alternative meets or exceeds the appropriate level of protection, then (assuming that
the other two conditions in Article 5.6 are met) the importing Member's SPS measure
is more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve its desired level of protection.
1026
7.549. We accordingly undertake three related and consecutive tasks, namely (i) identification of
India's ALOP, (ii) identification of the level of protection that would be achieved by the
SPS measures based on the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code, and (iii) comparison
between the level of protection that would be ac hieved by the alternative measures and India's
ALOP.
7.8.2.2.4.1 Identification of India's ALOP
7.550. Concerning our first task, we recall that the phrase "appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection", i.e. the ALOP, is defined in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement as "[t]he
level of protection deemed appropriate by the Me mber establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory". The note to
Annex A(5) states that "[m]any Members otherwise refer to this concept as the "'acceptable level
of risk'". The Appellate Body clarified in Australia – Apples that a Member's ALOP is "equated" with
a Member's acceptable level of risk.
1027
7.551. In Australia – Salmon , the Appellate Body stressed that the determination of the ALOP "is
a prerogative of the Member concerned" 1028, and that neither a panel nor the Appellate Body may
substitute its own reasoning for an ALOP expressed consistently by a Member. 1029 The
Appellate Body further observed that, while there is no explicit provision which obliges
WTO Members to determine their ALOP, such an obligation is nonetheless implied in, inter alia,
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. 1030 The Appellate Body explained that, although a Member's
ALOP need not be determined in quantitative te rms, the ALOP cannot be determined "with such
vagueness or equivocation that the application of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement,
such as Article 5.6, becomes impossible".1031
7.552. Although in the specific context of the Australia – Salmon dispute, the Appellate Body
considered that Australia had determined its ALOP "with sufficient precision to apply
Article 5.6"1032, the Appellate Body did envisage circumstances in which a Member does not
determine its ALOP, or does so with insufficient precision. 1033 In such circumstances, the
Appellate Body conceded that a panel may "estab lish" the Member's ALOP "on the basis of the
level of protection reflected in the SPS measure actually applied". 1034 The Appellate Body,
however, cautioned panels against substituting th eir own reasoning about the level of protection
implied in a measure for the ALOP that is explicitly specified by the Member itself.1035
7.553. We agree with India that it is the prerogative of every Member to determine its own
ALOP.1036 At the same time, in order for us to carry out an assessment of the United States' claims

1026 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 344.
1027 SPS Agreement, Annex A(5); Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 369.
1028 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 199 (emphasis original); and US – Continued
Suspension, para. 523.
1029 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 199.
1030 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 205.
1031 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 206; and US – Continued Suspension, para. 523.
1032 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 207.
1033 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 207.
1034 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 207.
1035 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 197-199.
1036India's first written submission, paras. 117 and 242; India's opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 19.

under the SPS Agreement, we must nonetheless identify India's ALOP. 1037 We have examined
India's written and oral submissions and identified a number of statements in which India alludes
to an ALOP. For instance, in its first written submission, India states that its ALOP "is to prevent
ingress of an exotic disease through products that are clearly identified as risk factors even by the
OIE".1038 Similarly, India argued in response to questions from the Panel that "India's level of
protection as reflected in S.O. 1663(E) is to prevent ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI from disease
notifying countries through imports of products that are clearly identified as risk factors even by
the OIE". 1039 India also argues that its " current level of protection is achieved by maintaining
import restrictions against countries notifying HPNAI or LPNAI … [t]his is reflected in
S.O. 1663(E)".1040 In its closing statement at the first substantive meeting, India said that "[w]hen
India as a member of the OIE has determined that its ALOP is country freedom from NAI as clearly
reflected in the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code, a reading which restricts the right of
I n d i a t o s e e k N A I c o u n t r y f r e e d o m i n f a v o u r o f o n l y H P N A I c o u n t r y f r e e d o m i s u n t e n a b l e a s i t
undermines India's sovereign right to determine its ALOP".
1041
7.554. From this survey, the Panel discerns that India has stated two ALOPs for its AI measures.
The first is the "prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI". India adds that this stated ALOP would
be "reflected in" and "achieved by" S.O. 1663(E). India's second stated ALOP is "country freedom
from NAI".
7.555. The United States submits that, notwithstanding the fact that India has referred to the
"prevention of ingress" and "NAI-freedom" as its ALOPs, India has failed to specify its ALOP.
1042 To
the United States, neither are true ALOPs – the first is an "objective or characterization of India's
measure", and the latter is "simply the status of an exporting territory under the
Terrestrial Code".1043 The United States argues that India's failure to identify its ALOP means that
the ALOP must be inferred based on the record of evidence 1044, and that India's ALOP can be
discerned from the NAP 2012, thereby indicating that India's ALOP is "quite low" 1045 or "relatively
modest with respect to HPNAI and negligible with respect to LPNAI since surveillance is unlikely to
detect it".
1046
7.556. In addressing the question of whether India has determined an ALOP for its AI measures,
we need to examine whether India has determined its ALOP within the meaning of the definition of
"appropriate level of protection" or "acceptable level of risk" in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement.
We also need to determine whether it has defined its ALOP "with sufficient precision to apply
Article 5.6"1047; that is, without "such vagueness or equivocation that the application of the
relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6, becomes impossible". 1048 Since we
have discerned that India has put forward two diff erent ALOPs, we shall examine each of them in
turn.
(i) India's ALOP as "prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI"
7.557. The first ALOP stated by India is the "prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI". We recall
that the United States argues that such a statement is not an ALOP but rather an "objective or
characterization of India's measure". We will therefore consider in greater detail the definition of
"appropriate level of protection" in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement, which provides that "[t]he
level of protection deemed appropriate by the Me mber establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory". We recall that a
Member's ALOP is equated to its acceptable level of risk.
1049

1037 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 344.
1038 India's first written submission, para. 248. (emphasis added)
1039 India's response to Panel question Nos. 35(a), No 35(c), and No 62(a). (emphasis added)
1040 India's response to Panel question No. 62(b). (emphasis added)
1041 India's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3. (emphasis added)
1042 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
1043 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
1044 United States' second written submission, para. 55.
1045 United States' first written submission, para. 136.
1046 United States' second written submission, para. 55.
1047 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 207.
1048 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 206; and US – Continued Suspension, para. 523.
1049 SPS Agreement, Annex A(5); Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 369.

7.558. We note that the Appellate Body discussed the meaning of this provision in terms of the
meaning of "risk", and therefore the relationship between the meaning of ALOP or acceptable level
of risk and the definition of "risk" in "risk assessment" in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement.
1050
7.559. In the particular circumstances of this case, given that India has stated that its ALOP is
"prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI", we consider that we should also examine the meaning
of the word "level" in "appropriate level of protection" and "acceptable level of risk".
7.560. The word "level" has a very large number of dictionary meanings. 1051 H o w e v e r , a s t h e
Appellate Body has noted, "dictionary meanin gs leave many interpretive questions open" 1052, as
"they typically aim to catalogue all meanings of words – be those meanings common or rare,
universal or specialized".1053 Our task is therefore to understand which of those meanings is to be
attributed to the word as used in its context.1054
7.561. For this reason, we consider the ordinary meanings of the adjectives that qualify the
meaning of "level" – namely, "appropriate" and "a cceptable". The ordinary meaning of the word
"appropriate" is "attached or belonging to as an attribute, quality or right; peculiar to; inherent,
characteristic; specially suitable for or to; proper, fitting". 1055 These definitions suggest that the
adjective "appropriate" conveys the notion of something being "adapted" or "suited" to the
particular situation at hand.
1056 The ordinary meaning of the word "acceptable" is "[w]orth
accepting; likely to be accepted; pleasing, welcome; tolerable". 1057 With these definitions in mind,
we consider that the adjectives "appropriate" and "acceptable" in Annex A(5) have a relative
effect, which demarcates the distinction between the "level" that is, or is not, tolerable or suitable
or adapted.
7.562. In the light of this understanding, and fu rther to a survey of the many definitions of
"level"
1058, we consider that the appropriate definition in the present context is "a position (on a
real or imaginary) scale in respect of amount, intensity, extent, etc.; a relative … amount or
value".1059 Notwithstanding the fact that a Member's ALOP or acceptable level of risk need not be
expressed in quantitative terms 1060, we consider that an ALOP or acceptable level of risk will
express a certain threshold that denotes the positi o n o f t h e r e l e v a n t M e m b e r i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e
intensity, extent, or relative amount of protection or risk that the Member deems to be tolerable or
suitable.
7.563. In drawing this conclusion, we are co gnizant of the prerogative of all Members to
determine their own ALOP. 1061 Though we are not circumscribing this prerogative, it is our role in
this dispute to interpret the definition of ALOP or acceptable level of risk in Annex A(5), and assess
whether India's stated ALOP falls within the scope of this definition. We note that our

1050 For example, in Australia – Apples, the Appellate Body said the concept of ALOP or acceptable level
of risk is informed by the meaning of "risk" in the phrase "risk assessment" in Annex A(4), such that the "risk"
associated with a pest or disease may encompass "consequences". Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples,
para. 405. Similarly, in EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body isolated and defined the specific risk in that
dispute, namely "the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of the residues of those hormones found in meat
derived from cattle to which the hormones had been administered for growth promotion purposes". The
Appellate Body therefore understood the risk in that case as including the "carcinogenic or genotoxic potential"
of the hormone residues, indicating that the meaning of "risk" can also incorporate the "potential" element
within the definition of "risk assessment" in Annex A(4). Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 200.
1051 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, pp. 1586-1587.
1053 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 164.
1054 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 167.
1055 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, p. 106.
1056 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US I), para. 4.46.
1057 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, p. 13.
1058 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, pp. 1586-1587.
1059Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, p. 1587.
1060 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 206; and US – Continued Suspension, para. 523.
1061 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 199; and Appellate Body Report, US – Continued
Suspension, para. 523.

interpretation of ALOP or acceptable level of risk is consistent with the variety of ALOPs and
acceptable levels of risk that have been assessed by prior panels and the Appellate Body.1062
7.564. Bearing this in mind, we turn to consider whether India's stated ALOP – namely, the
"prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI" – is an ALOP within the meaning of Annex A(5).
7.565. As concluded above, an ALOP or acceptable level of risk will express a certain threshold
that denotes the position of the relevant Member in relation to the intensity, extent, or relative
amount of protection or risk that the Member deems to be tolerable or suitable. We cannot discern
from India's characterization of its ALOP as "prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI" the
intensity, or extent, or amount of protection or risk that India will tolerate or that it considers
suitable. Put differently, India has made no comment regarding its tolerance towards NAI. Though
India has noted on numerous occasions that it seeks to "prevent ingress" of NAI, we do not think
that this alone is sufficient to meet the definition in Annex A(5). Specifically, we think it axiomatic
o f a n S P S m e a s u r e t h a t i t b e d i r e c t e d t o t h e " prevention" of the materialization of sanitary or
phytosanitary risks, notwithstanding the fact that determination of the level of protection is an
element in the decision-making process that lo gically precedes, and is separate from, the
establishment or maintenance of the SPS measure.
1063 We do not consider that this, on its own, is
synonymous with a description of the level of protection that a Member considers suitable, nor the
level of risk that a Member deems tolerable. Indeed, we are of the view that in order to be
sufficiently precise, a Member's statement of its ALOP, or its acceptable level of risk, must at least
satisfy the definition in Annex A(5). Therefore, we are not persuaded that India's statement
satisfies this standard.
7.566. Rather than substitute our own reasoning for India's express statements
1064 with regard to
its ALOP or acceptable level of risk, we will instead examine the record of evidence (including the
measures at issue) in order to determine whether India has provided information that allows us to
understand India's ALOP with any greater precision.
7.567. S.O. 1663(E) is an import prohibition. The Appellate Body noted in Australia – Salmon that
an import prohibition is "undisputedly a 'zero-risk level' of protection".
1065 We consider this to
elaborate on India's statement that its ALOP is the "prevention of ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI".
However, we must consider whether this is dispositive of India maintaining a zero-risk level of
protection against the ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI.
7.568. We note India's statement that its "current level of protection is achieved by [and] is
reflected in S.O. 1663(E)".
1066 In the circumstances of this case and in the light of the
particularities of India's AI situation and the manner in which AI is transmitted, we express doubt
as to whether S.O. 1663(E) achieves a zero-risk level of protection. For instance, from the end of
2003 to 12 March 2013, India notified to the OIE 95 outbreaks of HPAI (subtype H5N1) in poultry

1062 For example, in Australia – Salmon, Australia defined its ALOP as "a high or 'very conservative' level
of sanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to 'very low levels', 'while not based on a zero-risk approach'".
Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.107. Though the Appellate Body considered this to be sufficiently
precise, the compliance panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) noted "parenthetically[] that a
more explicit and in particular a quantitative expression of a Member's ALOP would greatly facilitate the
consideration of compliance with not only Article 5.6 but with other provisions of the SPS Agreement as well".
Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7129. In Japan – Agricultural Products, in
relation to Japan's requirements relating to testing and demonstration of quarantine efficacy, the Panel found
that Japan's ALOP was reflected in its requirement that quarantine treatment had to achieve "complete
mortality in large-scale tests on a minimum of 30,000 coddling moths". Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural
Products II, paras. 8.11 and 8.82. This finding was not appealed. However, before the compliance panel Japan
argued that its ALOP was "the level of protection that provides a security level which will not compromise
Japan's status as a fire blight-free country through commercial shipment of fresh apple fruit, in the absence of
illicit acts". Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), para. 8.190. In Australia – Apples, the
Appellate Body found that Australia's ALOP was "providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero". Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples,
para. 385.
1063 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 203.
1064 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 199.
1065 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 197.
1066 India's response to Panel question No. 62(b).

in India.1067 As explained by Dr Honhold, "[i]t is accepted that HPAI H5N1 is introduced directly by
wild birds … HPAI H5N1 in India has been concentrated in West Bengal … and given the high levels
of infection in Western Bangladesh and the porous nature of the border it cannot be ruled out that
at least some infection is spread from that region".
1068 India is aware of the risks posed by such
movement.1069 We also note that the three individual experts were unable to conclude that LPNAI
is exotic to India due, inter alia, to the fact that LPNAI can be transmitted by wild birds. 1070 More
generally, the OIE notes that a zero risk importation policy may require total prohibition on all
imports or the imposition of measures that are disproportionately onerous given the actual level of
risk, and that even such approaches would not be sufficient to eliminate all risk (because, for
example, of natural incursions).1071
7.569. While we stress that we make no comme nt on whether WTO Members can adopt a zero-
level of protection in general, in casu we observe that the particularities of India's AI situation and
the manner in which AI is transmitted, leads us to doubt that an import ban can achieve a zero-
risk level of protection with regard to AI. This is because the disease is transmitted not only
through commercial channels of trade, but also by wild birds and informal and illicit trade.
7.570. With this in mind, given the particularities of India's AI situation and the manner in which
AI is transmitted (of which India is aware), we conclude that India has not adopted a zero-risk
level of protection against AI. Rather, mindful of the fact that India's ALOP is "achieved by" and
"reflected in S.O. 1663(E)"
1072, we conclude that India's ALOP is very high or very conservative.
We consider that this formulation of India's ALOP is consistent with India's statement that its ALOP
is achieved by S.O. 1663(E), as well as the partic ularities of India's AI situation and the manner in
which AI is transmitted. We also consider that this formulation of India's ALOP is sufficiently
precise to enable the application of the SPS Agreement (including the provisions of Article 5.6).
7.571. For these reasons, we conclude that India's statement that its ALOP is the "prevention of
ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI" is, on its own, insufficient to satisfy the definition of ALOP or
acceptable level of risk in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement. Taking into account India's
arguments during this dispute, as well as the nature of India's AI measures, and the particular
circumstances of the risk in this case, we conc l u d e t h a t I n d i a ' s A L O P i s v e r y h i g h o r v e r y
conservative.
(ii) India's ALOP as "co untry freedom from NAI"
7.572. We follow the same process to examine whether India's statement that its ALOP is
"country freedom from NAI" constitutes an ALOP within the definition of ALOP in Annex A(5) of the
SPS Agreement. Significantly, India's statement (taken in full) is that "[w]hen India as a member
of the OIE has determined that its ALOP is country freedom from NAI as clearly reflected in the
recommendations of the Terrestrial Code a reading which restricts the right of India to seek NAI
country freedom in favour of only HPNAI country freedom is untenable as it undermines India's
sovereign right to determine its ALOP".
1073 The Panel notes that this statement by India is in the
context of its more general argument that India's AI measures represent a condition of entry for
poultry products entering India, namely, that poultry products originate from a country that is free
of NAI.

1067 See table on Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (subtype H5N1) in poultry notified to
the OIE * from the end of 2003 to 12 March 2013, accessed 17 January 2014,
<http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/graph_avian_influenza/graph
s_HPAI_12_03_2013.pdf>.
1068 For example, India's first written submission, paras. 15 and 203.
1069 For example, India's first written submission, paras. 15 and 203.
1070 For example, in para. 7.446, Professor Brown noted that LPAI could be introduced by wild birds, and
that this carriage could lead to LPNAI. Professor Brown's response to Panel question No. 1. Moreover, as noted
in para. 7.447, Dr Honhold summarized that "whilst the lack of a finding of LPNAI, which is introduced by the
same mechanism as H5N1 in the first instance, in the presence of the number of introductions of H5N1 by wild
birds is perhaps improbable, it is not impossible or implausible". Dr. Honhold's response to Panel question
No. 2. In recalling these statements, we also stress our conclusion in para. 7.455 that we make no finding on
whether or not LPNAI is exotic to India.
1071 OIE's response to Panel question No. 8(d).
1072 India's response to Panel question No. 62(b).
1073 India's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.

7.573. The Panel understands that this statement by India refers to the fact that it is only
prepared to accept products that originate in NAI-free countries. That is, India seeks country-wide
NAI-freedom from its trading partners.
7.574. The Panel does not consider that this statement represents India's ALOP. We recall the
Appellate Body's explanation that an ALOP represents an objective that logically precedes the
establishment or decision on the maintenance of a measure.
1074 We do not consider that India's
objective is the NAI-freedom of its trading partners; rather, India's objective relates to its own
AI status, which it purportedly achieves through S.O. 1663(E), which prohibits importation of the
products listed therein if the exporting country is not NAI-free. Furthermore, we have concluded in
section 7.3 above that the measures at issue are SPS measures within the meaning of
Annex A(1)(a)-(c), an element of which is that the SPS measures are measures applied to protect
against the enumerated risks "within the territory of Member".
1075 For these reasons, the Panel
does not consider India's statement that its ALOP is "country freedom from NAI", made in the
context of its condition of entry, truly reflects India's ALOP. Rather, we interpret India as saying
that its ALOP can only be met by products that originate in NAI-free countries, not by products
from countries that are only HPNAI-free, where LPNAI may exist.
(iii) Conclusion on India's ALOP
7.575. We therefore conclude that India's ALOP for its AI measures is very high, or very
conservative.
7.8.2.2.4.2 Identification of the level of protection that would be achieved by
alternative measures based on the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code
7.576. Having established that India's ALOP for its AI measures is very high, or very conservative,
we proceed to the next task, i.e. to determine th e level of protection that would be achieved by
the adoption of measures based on the Terrestrial Code's recommendations.
7.577. We begin this task by considering the leve l of protection reflected in the recommendations
of the Terrestrial Code. In this regard, the Panel ob serves that the OIE, in response to questioning
by the Panel, stated that "[t]he Terrestrial Code does not contain specific or general
recommendations about the level of protection provided by the recommendations in disease
chapters or other Code texts, nor does it contain recommendations on how OIE Members should
go about setting their [ALOP]".
1076 Notwithstanding this observation, the Panel notes the OIE's
comment that "[a]ll measures recommended by the OIE provide for safe trade in animals and
animal products, based on the most up to date scientific information and available techniques" 1077
and more specifically that "the Terrestrial Code establishes measures that are proportional to risk,
with the objective of facilitating safe trade and avoiding unjustifiable trade barriers".
1078
7.578. Furthermore, we observe that paragraph A.2 of the User's Guide to the Terrestrial Code
states that:
The recommendations in each of the disease chapters in Volume II of the [OIE] Code
are designed to prevent the disease in question being introduced into the importing
country, taking into account the nature of the commodity and the animal health status
of the exporting country. Correctly applied, OIE recommendations provide for trade in
animals and animal products to take place with an optimal level of animal health
security, based on the most up to date scientific information and available
techniques.
1079
7.579. We also note that, according to the Foreword to the Terrestrial Code, the
recommendations in the Code "should be used" to prevent the transfer of disease "via international

1074 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 200.
1075 Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement.
1076 OIE's response to Panel question No. 8(a)-(c).
1077 OIE's response to Panel question No. 17(a). (emphasis added)
1078 OIE's response to Panel question No. 11. (emphasis added)
1079 User's Guide, para. A.2; United States' second written submission, para. 56.

trade".1080 Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code includes the recommendations aimed specifically at
preventing the ingress of NAI into the importing country, thus ensuring safe trade.
7.580. The Panel takes particular note of the OIE's multiple references to the fact that
OIE standards and guidelines, and in particular the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code,
facilitate "safe trade". 1081 We understand "safe" to mean "free from risk". 1082 Moreover, we recall
that the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code, if correctly applied, provide for trade in animals
and animal products to take place with an "optimal level" of animal health security, based on the
most up to date scientific information and available techniques.
1083 Furthermore, the
recommendations in Chapter 10.4 specifically address the measures necessary to ensure safe
trade because of concerns of AI. Indeed, "the application of measures that comply with the
provisions in Chapter 10.4 can be relied upon to avoid the introduction of [AI] into an importing
country".
1084
7.581. In summary, we are of the view that the Terrestrial Code, and in particular Chapter 10.4
thereof, provides for an optimal level of security, under which safe trade may be facilitated in
order to prevent AI from being introduced into an importing country.
7.8.2.2.4.3 Comparing India's ALOPs with th e level of protection of the alternative
measures
7.582. We will now compare India's ALOP for its AI measures, which is very high or very
conservative, with the level of protection that would be achieved by measures based on the
recommendations of the Terrestrial Code, and in particular Chapter 10.4 thereof, which are
designed to achieve an optimal level of security. We understand that "optimal" means "best, most
favourable, [especially] under a particular set of circumstances; optimum".
1085 In our view,
measures based on the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code would achieve a level of
protection that is at least as high as India's "very high" or "very conservative" level of protection.
7.583. We are mindful of the Appellate Body's concerns about the need for the alternative
measures to be based on science for a complainant to satisfy its burden of proof that its proposed
alternative measure would meet the ALOP under Article 5.6.
1086 In this respect, the Appellate Body
has noted that the evidence required to establish a presumption that the alternative measure
would meet the responding Member's ALOP will necessarily vary from measure to measure and
from case to case, but that a "panel's assessment of whether this burden has been met is a matter
of legal characterization and not a scientific assessment of risk that must conform to the first three
paragraphs of Article 5".
1087
7.584. The Panel understands from the Appellate Body's reasoning that, in order to discharge its
burden of proof under the second element of Article 5.6, the United States' assertion that its
alternative measure satisfies India's ALOP must be based on evidence that demonstrates that its

1080 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code (21st edition), first paragraph. OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health
Code", accessed 4 November 2013, <http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/>.
1081 OIE's response to Panel question Nos. 2, 7(b), 8(a)-(c), 11, 17(a).
1082 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2646.
1083 User's Guide, para. A.2; United States' second written submission, para. 56.
1084 OIE's response to Panel question No. 17(b).
1085 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2014.
1086 The Appellate Body explained:
The objective of ensuring protection against risks to human, animal or plant life or health is key
to SPS measures, to a Member's appropriate level of protection, and to the SPS Agreement as a
whole. Furthermore, the basic obligations set out in Article 2—which inform the more specific
obligations in Article 5—include the stipulation in Article 2.2 that SPS measures must be based
on scientific principles and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. This implies that
evidence demonstrating that a proposed alternative measure takes adequate account of these
key characteristics of SPS measures will necessarily form part of a complainant's attempt to
prove that a contested SPS measure fails to meet the requirements of Article 5.6. In our view,
this is also reinforced by the important role that science plays throughout the SPS Agreement in
maintaining "the delicate and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the
shared, but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting
the life and health of human beings.
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 364.
1087 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 366.

alternative takes adequate account of scientific principles and the requirement that SPS measures
are not maintained without sufficient scientific ev idence. We will therefore consider whether the
alternative measures proposed by the United States – measures based on the recommendations in
the Terrestrial Code – satisfy this standard.
7.585. We observe that the OIE's Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission bears
responsibility for the development of the recommend ations contained in the Terrestrial Code. This
Commission draws upon the expertise of internationally renowned specialists to prepare draft texts
for new articles of the Terrestrial Code or revise existing articles in the light of advances in
veterinary science.
1088 The resulting standard consists of health measures based on the latest
available scientific evidence 1089, which should be used by the veterinary authorities of importing
and exporting countries to, inter alia , prevent the transfer of agents pathogenic to terrestrial
animals and/or humans via international trade in terrestrial animals and terrestrial animal
products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade. 1090 We believe that these
circumstances are sufficient to characterize the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code as taking
into account scientific principles, and therefore we believe that measures based on these
recommendations are capable of satisfying the requ irements of the second element of Article 5.6
of the SPS Agreement.
7.586. Taken together, the Panel concludes that the above analysis indicates that the
United States' proposal that India's measures be based on the Terrestrial Code discharges its
burden of identifying an alternative measure that is based on scientific principles and is supported
by sufficient scientific evidence. Moreover, we believe that this proposed alternative would achieve
India's ALOP.
7.8.2.2.5 Whether the measures based on th e Terrestrial Code are significantly less
trade-restrictive
7.587. Having concluded on the first two elements of Article 5.6, we now proceed to examine the
third and last element of this provision: whether the United States has demonstrated that the
measures based on the Terrestrial Code's recommendations are significantly less restrictive to
trade than India's AI measures.
7.588. The United States argues that the Terrestrial Code is significantly less trade-restrictive
than India's AI measures because the Terrestrial Code allows for trade with countries that report
NAI, whereas India's measures do not.
1091 The United States describes India's measures as "vastly
more trade[-]restrictive than required to achieve the level of protection reflected in the regime
applicable to its domestic products". 1092 The United States argues that, "[a]dditionally, the
Terrestrial Code recognizes that zoning can be an appropriate method to control for avian influenza
risks" whereas India imposes a country-wide ban even if the outbreak of LPNAI is geographically
isolated from the exporting facility. 1093 Thus, according to the United States, whereas India's
measures cause country-wide trade disruptions, the Terrestrial Code limits trade measures to the
affected areas.1094
7.589. In response, India argues that the United States' submission does not demonstrate how its
alternative measure is significantly less trade-restrictive. India argues that the United States must
demonstrate how the alternative measures "would involve significantly increased market access to
India than S.O. 1663(E)".
1095 India argues that the United States has not done so given that
S.O. 1663(E) only suspends imports from countries reporting LPNAI until such time as that country
declares freedom, which usually takes three months from disinfection.
1096 India asserts that the

1088 OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 4 November 2013,
<http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code>. This is also reflected in the User's Guide.
1089 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code, fourth paragraph.
1090 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code, first paragraph. OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code", accessed 4
November 2013, <http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/>.
1091 United States' first written submission, para. 140.
1092 United States' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7.
1093 United States' first written submission, para. 140.
1094 United States' second written submission, para. 50.
1095 India's first written submission, para. 256.
1096 India's first written submission, para. 256.

United States has not shown that its alternative would bring about a recommencement of trade
within three months. 1097 With specific reference to Articles 10.4.30 and 10.4.31 of the
Terrestrial Code (which discuss the provision of evidence regarding surveillance programs), India
argues that this would require India to "prohibit imports from all countries and then allow access
after [an] intensive verification process of countries' surveillance systems", which could extend the
period of an import ban beyond [three] months owing to the time taken to "gain[] confidence in an
exporting country's surveillance".
1098
7.590. The Panel recalls that India's AI measures are those that "prohibit" the importation of
certain agricultural products from countries reporting NAI. We concur with the panel in Australia –
Salmon that any measure imposing conditions upon importation, even if stringent, "would still be
significantly less restrictive to trade than an outright prohibition".1099
7.591. With this observation in mind, the Panel proceeds to consider whether measures based on
the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code are significantly less restrictive to trade than the
outright prohibition in India's AI measures.
7.592. We recall that the Terrestrial Code has the objective of setting international "standards for
the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide,
including through standards for safe international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and
bees) and their products".
1100 As described above, the User's Guide to the Terrestrial Code
provides that "[c]orrectly applied, OIE recommendations provide for trade in animals and animal
products to take place with an optimal level of animal health security, based on the most up to
date scientific information and available techniques".
1101
7.593. With particular regard to Chapter 10.4, in relation to infection with NAI viruses, the OIE
explains that even if an exporting country is not free of LPAI, importation of certain products can
take place from a country, zone or compartment that is free from infection with HPAI.
1102 This is
reflected in those articles of the Code which provide specifically for importation from an HPNAI-free
country, zone or compartment (for instance, Article 10.4.14 (regarding eggs for human
consumption), Article 10.4.17 (regarding poultry semen), Article 10.4.19 (regarding fresh meat of
poultry)).
7.594. With regard to zoning and compartmentalization in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the
Terrestrial Code, and in the product-specific recommendations in Chapter 10.4 (to which the
United States refers)
1103, the OIE explains that "[z]oning and compartmentalisation are concepts
promoted by the OIE, both to prevent and control diseases and to allow safe trade from countries
[that are] not [disease] free". 1104 This is reflected in Article 4.3.1 of the Code, and the procedures
for the definition, establishment and application of zones or compartments are elaborated in the
remainder of Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the Code.
7.595. This analysis, and our analysis in section 7.4.2.2.4.1 above in relation to Article 3 of the
SPS Agreement, show that the Terrestrial Code, an d in particular Chapter 10.4 thereof, does not
envisage, either explicitly or implicitly, the imposition of import prohibitions with respect to poultry
products. Rather, the Terrestrial Code identifies conditions under which products may be safely
traded even if their country of origin is affected by NAI.

1097 India's first written submission, para. 256.
1098 India's second written submission, para. 95.
1099 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.182. We note that the panel also observed that the
products it imported subject to conditions proposed under the alternatives would have been capable of serving
a greater variety of uses than those products that had been treated in the manner required by the Australian
measure. We also note that, though the Appellate Body overturned elements of the Panel's report on the basis
that the Panel based its analysis on an incorrect identification of the measure at issue, the Appellate Body did
not reverse this reasoning. Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 90-105.
1100 Foreword to the Terrestrial Code, first paragraph.
1102 OIE's response to Panel question No. 17(a).
1103 United States' second written submission, paras. 57-58 and footnote 90.
1104 OIE's response to Panel question No. 2.

7.596. The Panel therefore concludes that the alternative proposed by the United States, namely
that India base its measures on the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code, is significantly less
restrictive to trade than India's AI measures with respect to the products covered by Chapter 10.4.
7.8.2.2.6 Conclusion on the United States' claim under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement
7.597. We have found that the United States identified measures based on the Terrestrial Code as
a reasonably available alternative to India's AI measures for the products that are within the scope
of Chapter 10.4. We have also found that the alternative is technically and economically feasible,
would achieve India's ALOP, and is significantly less restrictive to trade than India's AI measures.
Therefore, we conclude that the United States has demonstrated that India's AI measures are
significantly more trade-restrictive than required to achieve India's ALOP, in respect of these
products. Accordingly, we find that India's AI me asures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, with respect to the products covered by Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code.
1105
7.8.2.3 Whether India's AI measures ar e inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement as a consequence of their be ing inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement
7.8.2.3.1 Introduction
7.598. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 with respect to the
products covered by Chapter 10.4, the Panel will now consider whether, as the United States
claims, India's breach of Article 5.6 results in a consequential breach of Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement.
7.599. We begin our analysis by setting out the legal provision at issue.
7.8.2.3.2 The legal provision at issue
7.600. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that:
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.
7.601. The Appellate Body in Australia – Apples examined the relationship between Article 2.2 and
the provisions of Article 5, including 5.6, as follows:
The Appellate Body has observed that Articl e 2.2 "informs", "impart[s] meaning to",
and "is made operative in", other provisions of the SPS Agreement, including certain
of the more specific obligations set out in Article 5, which is entitled "Assessment of
Risk and Determination of the Appropriat e Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary
Protection". Thus, in EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body stated that "Articles 2.2 and
5.1 should constantly be read together. Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1: the elements
that define the basic obligation set out in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1".
The same type of relationship exists between Articles 2.2 and 5.2 and between
Articles 2.2 and 5.6. In this connection, we take particular note of the similarities
between the requirement in Article 2.2 that Members apply their SPS measures "only
to the extent necessary to protect", an d the requirement in Article 5.6 that
SPS measures be "no more trade-restrictive than required to achieve" the relevant
objectives.
1106
7.602. We note that, although the United States has argued that the Appellate Body in Australia –
Apples suggested that a breach of Article 5.6 may result in a consequential breach of

1105 We refer to our findings in section 7.4.2.2.2, that there are no product specific recommendations for
live pigs and pathological and biological materials in Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and accordingly that
the United States has not proposed an alternative to S.O. 1663(E) in relation to these products.
1106 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 339 (footnotes omitted).

Article 2.21107, the Appellate Body declined, in that case, to determine conclusively whether a
violation of Article 5.6 will be presumed to imply a violation of Article 2.2 in a manner similar to
the relationship between Article 2.2 and Articles 5.1 and 5.2.
1108 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body
did say in Australia – Salmon that "[t]he establishment or maintenance of an SPS measure which
implies or reflects a higher level of protection than the appropriate level of protection determined
by an importing Member, could constitute a violation of the necessity requirement of
Article 2.2".
1109
7.603. From the above findings of the Appellate Body, the Panel understands that Articles 2.2 and
5.6 should constantly be read together, and that the basic concept in Article 2.2 imparts meaning
to Article 5.6. Moreover, a finding that a Member has enacted a measure that reflects a higher
level of protection than that Member's ALOP may imply a violation of Article 2.2.
7.604. However, this observation alone is not sufficient to address the United States' argument
regarding the relationship between Article 2.2 and 5.6 in its entirety.
7.605. The United States' submission is that a violation of Article 5.6 necessitates a determination
that a reasonably available less trade-restrictive measure would achieve the responding Member's
ALOP, and that this determination "may lead to the conclusion that a Member has adopted a
measure that is applied to a greater extent than necessary" and is accordingly inconsistent
Article 2.2.
1110 In our view, the crux of the United St ates' submission, and of the relationship
between Articles 5.6 and 2.2, relates to the exte nt to which "necessity" in Article 2.2 may be
understood in light of the substance of the more specific obligation in Article 5.6.
7.606. In addressing this question, the Panel w ill first consider the meaning of necessity in
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. To this end, the Panel notes the presence of the principle of
"necessity" elsewhere in the covered agreements . For example, Article XX of the GATT 1994
permits certain measures that are "necessary" for the protection of the values set out in the
subparagraphs of Article XX. 1111 Article XIV of the GATS makes provision for certain "necessary"
measures, using very similar language. 1112 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides (in relevant
part) that:

1107 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 340.
1108 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 340.
1109 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 213, footnote 99.
1110 United States' first written submission, para. 141.
1111 Article XX provides, in relevant part, that:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:

(a) necessary to protect public morals;

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

…

(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement[.]

1112 In relevant part, Article XIV of GATS states that:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:

(a) necessary to protect public mora ls or to maintain public order;

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. For this purpose, technical regulation s shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create.
7.607. The Panel will now consider whether the meaning of "necessity" in these various provisions
can provide any guidance with respect to the meaning of necessity in Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement and, moreover, the relationsh ip between Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement.
7.608. We turn first to consider the meaning of necessity in the context of Article XX of the
GATT 1994. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the Appellate Body said of "necessary" in
Article XX of the GATT 1994 that the term can be understood as existing on a continuum, at one
end of which lies "indispensable", and at the other lies "making a contribution to".
1113 The
Appellate Body considered that a "'necessary' measure" is located significantly closer to the pole of
"indispensable" than to the opposite pole of simply "making a contribution to". 1114 In Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body indicated that an analysis of necessity requires a panel to
consider 'relevant factors', including "the importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent
of the contribution to the achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade
restrictiveness".1115 According to the Appellate Body, a panel may, on this basis, reach a
preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, in which case that conclusion "must be
confirmed by comparing the measure with possible alternatives[] which may be less trade
restrictive while providing an equivalent contri bution to the achievement of the objective".
1116 The
Appellate Body added that this comparison should be carried out in the light of the importance of
the interests or values at stake.
1117
7.609. We also note that, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , the Appellate Body cited with approval its
report in US – Gambling, which used this analysis in its interpretation of "necessity" in the context
of Article XVI(a) of the GATS. 1118 In that case, the Appellate Body said that "necessity" is to be
determined by weighing and balancing "the contribution of the measure to the realization of the
ends pursued by it" and the "restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce", and by
a comparison between the challenged measure and possible alternatives, considered in light of the
importance of the interests at stake.
1119
7.610. Turning to consider Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body has observed
that the sentences in Article 2.2 are linked by the notion of "necessity", and that "necessity" in this
context requires a "relational analysis of the trad e-restrictiveness of the technical regulation, the
degree of contribution that it makes to the achi evement of a legitimate objective, and the risks

(c necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:

(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a
default on services contracts;

(ii) the protection of the privacy of indi viduals in relation to the processing and
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records
and accounts;

(iii) safety [.]

1113 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161. The Appellate Body has also
noted this comment in the context of its interpretation of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Appellate Body
Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), footnote 642.
1114 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161.
1115 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 178.
1116 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 178.
1117 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 178.
1118 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 306-307. This approach has also been endorsed and
applied in subsequent cases. For example, Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products, para. 242.
1119 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 306-307.

non-fulfilment would create". 1120 Moreover, referring to the words "more … than" in Article 2.2,
and citing its comments in the context of Article XX of GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the GATS, the
Appellate Body observed that an analysis under Article 2.2 "would involve a comparison of the
trade-restrictiveness and the degree of achievement of the objective by the measure at issue with
that of possible alternative measures that may be reasonably available and less trade restrictive
than the challenged measure, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create". 1121 Indeed,
comparison with reasonably available alternatives is a "conceptual tool" which may assist in
ascertaining whether a challenged measure is more trade-restrictive than necessary.1122
7.611. We note that there are some differences in the text of, in particular, Article XX of the
GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the GATS (on one hand) and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement (on
the other). We also note that the Appellate Body has relied on language that appears in Article 2.2
of the TBT Agreement (for example, "more … than", or "taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create") in formulating its interpretation of "necessity" in that provision. Notwithstanding
these differences, there are common elements to th e interpretation of each of these provisions.
Specifically, an analysis under each provision involves consideration of the trade-restrictiveness of
the measure, the contribution the measure make to the objective in question, and a comparison
with alternative measures that may be less trade-restrictive.
7.612. Turning to the SPS Agreement, the Panel is particularly mindful of the resonance of these
common elements of "necessity" in Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article XIV of the GATS, and
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, with the elemen ts that must be demonstrated under Article 5.6
of the SPS Agreement.
7.613. The Appellate Body's interpretation of each of these provisions is probative of the
relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5. 6 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body's
interpretation of "necessity" in the respective contexts discussed above accords to a substantial
degree with the requirements of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Just as an analysis of
"necessity" in Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Ar ticle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement involves an
assessment of a measure's trade-restrictiveness, the contribution of a measure to its purported
objective, and whether that contribution may be made by a less trade-restrictive alternative,
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement requires a Panel to identify whether there is a reasonably
available alternative SPS measure that would achieve a Member's ALOP while also being
significantly less trade-restrictive.
1123 That the elements of Article 5.6 so closely resemble the
elements of "necessity" indicates to the Panel that the specific obligation in Article 5.6 elaborates
on the notion of "necessity" in the SPS Agreemen t and therefore on the more general obligation in
Article 2.2 in the manner suggested by the Appellate Body in Australia – Apples.
7.614. Furthermore, based on this finding, and considering the fact that Article 2.2 is "made
operative in" the specific obligations in Article 5 1124, and that Article 2.2 and Article 5.6 should be
constantly read together 1125, we consider that a finding that a measure is inconsistent with
Article 5.6 may lead to a presumption that the same measure is inconsistent with the obligation in
Article 2.2 to ensure that an SPS measure is a pplied only to the extent necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.
7.615. Such a presumption arises in the present case as a result of our findings in
section 7.8.2.2.6 above. We note that India has not made arguments regarding why its measures
are not inconsistent with Article 2.2, having limited its argument to the relationship between
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, we find that India has not adduced
arguments to rebut a presumption that, as its measures are more trade-restrictive than required
to achieve India's ALOP, those measures are also applied beyond the extent necessary to protect
human and animal life or health. Therefore, having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent
with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, we find that India's AI measures are consequentially
inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreem ent because they are applied beyond the extent
necessary to protect human and animal life or health.

1120 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 318.
1121 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 320.
1122 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 320.
1123 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 194.
1124 Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 674.
1125 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 339.

7.8.3 Overall conclusion on the United Stat es' claims under Articles 5.6 and 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.616. The Panel therefore finds that India's AI me asures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement because they are significantly more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
India's ALOP, with respect to the products covered by Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code.
7.617. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, we find that India's AI measures are consequentially inconsistent with Article 2.2
of the SPS Agreement because they are applied beyond the extent necessary to protect human
and animal life or health.
7.9 Whether India's AI measures are incons istent with Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.9.1 Arguments of the parties
7.9.1.1 United States
7.618. The United States puts forward two separate claims under each of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of
the SPS Agreement. With respect to Article 6.1, the United States claims that India's AI measures
are inconsistent with Article 6.1, first sentence , because they are not adapted to the sanitary
characteristics of the area from which the imports originated, and they are inconsistent with
Article 6.1, second sentence, because, in failing to assess the sanitary characteristics of particular
areas from which imports originate, India has not taken into account disease-free areas, areas of
low disease prevalence, the existence of an erad ication or control programme, or the relevant
OIE guidelines.
1126 With respect to Article 6.2, the United States claims that India's AI measures
are inconsistent with Article 6.2, first sentence because they do not recognize the concept of
disease-free areas or areas of low disease prevalence 1127, and they are inconsistent with
Article 6.2, second sentence because, by precluding the recognition of disease-free areas with
respect to AI, India's measures preclude it from determining AI-free areas based on the factors
explicitly mentioned in Article 6.2, second sentence.1128
7.619. The United States submits that India's measures explicitly ban poultry from all parts of a
country whenever NAI is detected anywhere in that country, noting that the wording of the
measures "leaves no room for deviation". 1129 According to the United States, this precludes the
application of AI restrictions on a regionalized basis as provided for in the Terrestrial Code and as
required under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
1130
7.620. The United States further argues that India's AI measures preclude India from taking
regional conditions (SPS characteristics) into account, as these measures explicitly require a ban
on covered imports from all parts of a country whenever there is a detection of HPAI or LPNAI
anywhere in the country.
1131
7.621. The United States maintains that it "has not been silent over the years" about the need for
India to apply its AI measures on a less-than-country-wide basis. According to the United States, it
requested India to do so as early as 2007 and that over the years, India has refused. 1132 In 2007,

1126 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1127 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3. United States' first written submission,
para. 153; United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 28.
1128 United States' first written submission, para. 154.
1129 United States' first written submission, para. 142.
1130 United States' first written submission, para. 142.
1131 United States' first written submission, para. 145. Moreover, the United States contends that India's
requirement that official veterinarians certify that the entire exporting country is disease-free for a particular
consignment of poultry meat is also contrary to India's obligations under Article 6.1, as this requirement is not
adapted to the characteristics of the area from which the product originated, but rather relates to the country
of exportation as a whole (United States' first written submission, para. 147). We recall our finding in
section 7.1.2.4.4 above that these health certificates are not within our terms of reference. Therefore, we will
not address this specific argument.
1132 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring to
Exhibit US-120).

India told the United States' Foreign Agricultural Service that it would "insist on country freedom"
and that its conditions for import are "uniform". 1133 The United States also emphasizes that India
has been asked at numerous meetings of the WTO SPS Committee, by the United States and other
Members, to regionalize its AI-related import restriction.
1134 However, India has refused to alter its
requirement for country-level certification on the grounds that the requirement is "uniform", and
that it has a "uniform" policy of requiring country-level certification. Moreover, according to the
United States, at the May 2012 meeting of the OIE, India criticized Chapter 10.4 of the
Terrestrial Code, asserting that, for India, "the concept of zoning looked irrelevant as far as [AI]
was concerned".
1135
7.622. The United States refers to a document issued in 2010 and provided in Exhibit IND-121
which says that India was "[[............................................ SCI ..................................
.....................]]".1136. The United States submits that India, however, has provided no indication
of how that debate might be resolved, or wh en it might be concluded. Moreover, for the
United States, the responses in that document to the various requests from the United States to
consider the applicability of the concept of zoning and compartmentalization to different products
in accordance with the Terrestrial Code revealed "a definite unwillingness" to conclude at that time
that the concept applied to NAI. 1137 For example, the United States argues, India responded to a
2007 complaint of the United States that India's re quirement of certification that the country of
export is free from HPAI for shipment of processe d poultry products is not OIE-consistent with the
remark that"[[................................................................... SCI .........................................
......................................................................]]".1138
7.623. With respect to the second sentence of Article 6.1, the United States argues that, in failing
to adapt its measures the sanitary characteristics of particular US areas from which imports
originate, India did not take into account disease-free areas, areas of low disease prevalence, the
existence of an eradication or control programme, or the relevant OIE guidelines, in assessing the
sanitary characteristics of a region.
1139 The United States explains that by banning products from
areas thousands of kilometres from an AI detection, India appears not to have taken account of
"the level of prevalence" of AI in those areas. Moreover, by banning imports from all parts of an
exporting country, India also does not appear to have accounted for "the existence of [an AI]
eradication or control program" that an exporting country uses to limit the spread of AI once it has
been detected.
1140
7.624. In addition, the United States asserts that India has not taken into account the relevant
international standard, Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code, which provides for the application of
AI-related trade restrictions at the zone or compartment level when appropriate surveillance,
control, and biosecurity measures are in place. According to the United States, in its chapter on AI,
the Terrestrial Code lays out surveillance requirements for "Members declaring freedom from NAI
or HPNAI for [a] country, zone or compartment" and for "[c]ountries, zones or compartments
declaring that they have regained freedom from NAI or HPNAI following an outbreak", as well as
standards for when a "country, zone or compartment may be considered" HPNAI-free or
NAI-free.
1141

1133 United States' second written submission, para. 69 (referring to Exhibit US-124).
1134 United States' first written submission, para. 148; United States' opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 29; United States' second written submission, para. 71; G/SPS/R/63
G/SPS/R/59 (Exhibit US-84), para. 39; G/SPS/R/58 (Exhibit US-85), para. 38; G/SPS/R/56 (Exhibit US-86),
1135 United States' first written submission, para. 148; United States' opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring to OIE, 80th General Session FR (Exhibit US-88), para. 231).
1136 United States' second written submission, para. 70 (quoting Exhibit IND-121 [[contains SCI]]);
United States' response to Panel question No. 48 (quoting Exhibit IND-121 [[contains SCI]]).
1137 United States' second written submission, para. 70 (referring to Exhibit IND-121); United States'
response to Panel question No. 48.
1138 United States' second written submission, para. 70 (quoting Exhibit IND-121 [[contains SCI]]);
United States' response to Panel question No. 48 (quoting Exhibit IND-121 [[contains SCI]].
1139 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1140 United States' first written submission, para. 150.
1141 United States' first written submission, para. 151 (referring to Articles 10.4.3, 10.4.4, 10.4.30 and
10.4.31 of the Terrestrial Code (Exhibit US-1)).

7.625. The United States argues that the Terrestr ial Code's discussion of AI-related requirements
that a country may permissibly impose in connection with the importation of different products
also shows that AI is a disease for which it is appropriate to consider the SPS characteristics of a
region in establishing SPS measures. For each product, the recommended requirements apply
either a) "for importation from an HPNAI-free country, zone, or compartment", b) "for importation
from an NAI-free country, zone, or compartment", or c) "[r]egardless of the NAI status of the
country of origin". Thus, for the United States, it is clear in the Terrestrial Code that AI-related
requirements should be applied on a zo ne or compartmental basis where possible.
1142 Accordingly,
the United States concludes that neither Article 6.1 nor the Terrestrial Code permits India to refuse
categorically to apply its AI measures to areas smaller than countries.
1143
7.626. The United States also claims that India's AI measures are inconsistent with the first
sentence of Article 6.2 because they do not recognize the concept of disease-free areas or areas of
low disease prevalence. 1144 The United States notes that India's measures explicitly preclude
recognition of such areas upon notification of a detection of NAI anywhere in the territory of a
Member.1145
7.627. The United States contends that by precluding the recognition of disease-free areas with
respect to AI, India's measures preclude it from determining AI-free areas based on the factors
explicitly mentioned in the second sentence of Article 6.2, which include geography, ecosystems,
epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of SPS controls. In the United States' view, by
doing so, India violates the second sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.1146
7.628. The United States further submits that, contrary to what India posits, Article 6.3 is not
applicable to the present dispute. The United Stat es emphasizes that it is not arguing that India
needs to recognize specific pest- or disease-free areas, or areas of low pest or disease prevalence
in the United States, in the absence of a request and supporting documentation. According to the
United States, "[t]he issue here is even more basic" - India needs to ensure that its measures are
adapted to the SPS characteristics of an area, and to agree that it will consider individual
applications for regional treatment".
1147 The United States argues that unwillingness to even
"recognize the concept[] of … disease free areas" with respect to AI is what places India in breach
of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. Similarly, by refusing to recognize the possibility that an NAI
incident anywhere in a large country like the United States may not warrant a ban on all products
from the entire country, India is not ensuring that its measures "are adapted to the sanitary …
characteristics of the area[s]" from which products originate, in violation of Article 6.1.
1148
7.629. Moreover, according to the United States, the texts of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 make clear that
these provisions impose obligations that exist independently of any request consistent with
Article 6.3 to recognize any specific pest- or disease-free areas. 1149 The United States also notes
that at the first meeting of the Panel, and in its responses to the Panel's follow-up questions, India
for the first time claimed that its 1898 Livestock Act gives it the power to recognize zones and
compartments. In particular, India pointed to broa d provisions that delegate to India's Central
Government the power to "restrict or prohibit, in such manner and to such extent as it may think
fit, the import" into India of livestock and livestock products. For the United States, these
provisions do not modify the measures at issue in the dispute so as to enable India to recognize
the concept of disease-free areas, nor do they themselves reflect the concepts of pest- or disease-
free areas. Rather, they appear to be nothing more than broad grants of authority to the Central
Government of India to promulgate import prohibitions or restrictions.
1150

1142 United States' first written submission, para. 152; United States' second written submission,
para. 81.
1143 United States' second written submission, paras. 77-80.
1144 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1145 United States' first written submission, para. 153; United States' opening statement at the first
1146 United States' first written submission, para. 154.
1147 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 31; United States'
response to Panel question No. 42(b).
1148 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 32.
1149 United States' second written submission, para. 67.
1150 United States' second written submission, paras. 73-74.

7.630. Finally, the United States submits that India's failure to comply with the obligations in
Article 6 is confirmed not just by the text of In dia's measures and India's responses to requests
from other Members to consider regionalization, but also by India's failure to follow the steps
outlined by the SPS Committee for the consideration of applications to recognize specific areas as
disease-free in its "Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6 of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" (Guidelines). According to
the United States, India has never published any information explaining the basis for recognition of
disease-free areas with respect to LPNAI or HPAI, a description of any process that would be used
to evaluate a request for recognition of such an area, the information that India would need to
evaluate such a request, or a contact point for such requests. Moreover, according to the
United States, contrary to the provisions of the Guidelines, "India rather than commencing
discussions to clarify its process to recognize the areas and requesting information that it might
need to evaluate specific areas, expressed a categorical unwillingness to apply the concepts in
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement with respect to AI".
1151
7.9.1.2 India
7.631. India submits that it "fails to see meri t" in the United States' claim of violation of
Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. 1152 India acknowledges that guidelines developed by
international organizations for recognition of pest- or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or
disease prevalence shall be taken into account for the purpose of recognition of such areas
pursuant to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement. Indi a also agrees with the United States that the
relevant guidelines in this respect are the standards provided in the Terrestrial Code.
1153
7.632. India argues that the language of the Terrestrial Code "clearly does not support the claim
that in order to fulfil the obligation under Article 6.1, the importing country must recognize only
zones". According to India, to the contrary, the Terrestrial Code as well as Article 6.1 of the
SPS Agreement allow importing countries to decide whether to recognize zones or compartments,
based on factors such as the level of prevalence of a specific pest or disease, and the relevance of
zones and compartments. For India, such a decision is based on the level of protection that a
particular importing country deems appropriate.
1154 India submits that it has communicated to the
United States its readiness to consider compartments for the purpose of international trade.
However, according to India, the United States has neither made a formal request to India for
information and for recognition of a specific pest- or disease-free area, nor responded to India's
suggestion with a counter proposal to take this process forward.
1155
7.633. India further argues that Article 6.3 is critical to understanding Members' obligations under
Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement becaus e these provisions do not operate independently
of Article 6.3 and do not impose any obligation up on the importing country in the absence of the
triggering steps under Article 6.3. 1156 India argues that Article 6.3 places the burden upon the
exporting country to initiate the proposal to recognize zoning or compartmentalization and to
provide necessary evidence demonstrating that the proposed pest-/disease-free areas or areas of
low pest/disease prevalence exhibit adequate biosecurity measures as may be necessary to
achieve the importing country's ALOP.
1157 In support of its argument, India refers to the
Terrestrial Code arguing that, according to its recommendations on zoning and
compartmentalization, "the onus is firmly placed on the exporting country". 1158 India submits that,
in order to gain recognition of a pest-/disease-fre e area or area of low pest/disease prevalence
under Article 6, it is the obligation of the United States "to establish a disease free zone or
compartment, document and make public the exis tence of such zone or compartment, provide
adequate and detailed documentation to India that its concerns of [biosecurity] are met (as well as
provide a biosecurity plan) and establish through documentation that the zone or compartment

1151 United States' second written submission, paras. 75-77 (referring to G/SPS/48, paras. 4 and 13);
United States' response to Panel question No. 42(a).
1152 India's first written submission, para. 270.
1153 India's first written submission, para. 260.
1154 India's first written submission, para. 262.
1155 India's first written submission, para. 263 (referring to Exhibits IND-121 and IND-122).
1156 India's first written submission, paras. 264 and 270; India's opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 33.
1157 India's first written submission, para. 265.
1158 India's first written submission, paras. 266-267 (referring to Articles 4.3.1, 5.3.7.1 and 5.3.7.2 of
the Terrestrial Code); India's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 34-35.

involves control and surveillance measures including animal identification and traceability
requirements".1159
7.634. According to India, the United States has not initiated a bilateral mechanism, i.e. the
presentation of a proposal to India for recognition of disease-free zones or compartments.
Moreover, India argues that the United States do es not maintain publicly available information
regarding disease-free zones or compartments within its territory and does not highlight the
biosecurity measures undertaken in order to reassure importing countries of the NAI-free status of
its products from such zones or compartments.
1160 India therefore submits that, "[s]ince the
United States has not fulfilled its obligation under Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement and
Chapter 4.3 of the [Terrestrial] Code, India is under no obligation to unilaterally recognize zones or
compartments within the United States".
1161
7.635. In addition, India asserts that by presenting a claim under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement,
the United States implicitly acknowledged that there is a scientific basis or rationale for imposing a
prohibition on poultry products listed in S.O. 1663(E) from countries reporting HPNAI or LPNAI. 1162
According to India, by making a claim under Article 6, the United States concedes that in the
absence of a recognized zone or compartment, an importing country can continue to seek
country-wide freedom on trade in poultry commo dities from both HPNAI and LPNAI reporting
countries.
1163
7.636. India submits that "[i]t is abundantly clear that the United States does not maintain either
zones or compartments as required under Chapter[s] 4.3 and 4.4 of the [Terrestrial] Code and as
required under Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement". Therefore, according to India, the claim that it is
in violation of its obligation to recognize zones or compartments under Article 6 and the
Terrestrial Code "is absurd when the United States maintains no zones or compartments which
India could have considered".
1164 For India, the United States insists that regionalization requires
the importing Member to engage in an informatio n gathering exercise on an exporting Member's
disease surveillance and control measures to ensure itself that imports do not pose a level of risk
greater than the ALOP established. Thus, it ar gues, the "United States is reading into the
SPS Agreement and the [Terrestrial] Code an obligation upon the exporting country which these
Agreements do not impose".1165
7.637. With respect to the recognition of the "c oncept" of the relevant areas under Article 6.2,
India submits that nowhere in the text of Ar ticle 6 does the SPS Agreement impose on the
importing Member an obligation to implement a domestic law which spells out that the country will
recognize zones or compartments. India maintains that the obligation is to "recognize the concept"
of regionalization and a Member is said to recognize the concept of zones/compartments when it
accepts and evaluates proposals that are put forward by the exporting Member. The obligation
under Article 6.2 is therefore distinct from th e obligation to implement laws or provide for
domestic frameworks in order to give effect to a country's obligations under the WTO Agreements.
According to India, if the obligation under Article 6.2 were to implement a domestic law, Members
could keep their trading partners waiting for several years with the excuse that their law on this
subject was being formulated, and surely that is not the intent of Article 6.2. For India, "[a]
combined reading of Article[s] 6.3 and 6.2 make s it evident that once an exporting country
provides relevant information, it is the obligation of the importing country to give due regard to
this proposal and to evaluate it".
1166
7.638. India submits that the United States cites the SPS Committee Guidelines to suggest that it
was first and foremost India's obligation to implement a law informing trading partners about the
basis on which India would consider applications for zones or compartments. According to India,
"[e]qually the Article 6 Guidelines also recogniz e the 'sovereign right' of Members 'to determine

1159 India's first written submission, para. 268; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 37.
1160 India's first written submission, para. 269; India's response to Panel question No. 43(b).
1161 India's first written submission, para. 274; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 37; India's response to Panel question Nos. 45(b) and 45(c).
1162 India's first written submission, para. 271.
1163 India's first written submission, para. 271.
1164 India's second written submission, para. 55.
1165 India's second written submission, para. 59.
1166 India's second written submission, paras. 61-64; India's response to Panel question No. 43(b).

their own processes for the evaluation of requests for recognition of pest or disease free areas or
areas of low disease prevalence'". 1167 Moreover, India argues that, "[m]ore importantly, Article 6
of the Guidelines recognizes that the commencemen t of the recognition of pest disease free areas
begins with the exporting Member requesting information about an importing Member's
requirements and procedures".1168 For India, the Guidelines highlight that regardless of whether a
law recognizing zones exits, an exporting Member can initiate the process and seek information on
how its application may be processed. India posits that it has not received proposals for
regionalization; neither has it received enquiries on its laws and procedure that India might adopt
to recognize an exporting country's zones or compartments. Had India received proposals or
enquiries on its laws and rejected such queries or not evaluated proposals, it could be claimed that
India does not recognize the "concept" of zones or compartments.
1169
7.639. India explains that Sections 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act provide the government with the
legislative framework within which to recognize zones or compartments. Should a country make a
proposal, "the same would be considered by the Central Government and if approved such zones
or compartments would be recognized by the issuan ce of a notification under [S]ection 3 or 3A as
the case may be". According to India, "even if the United States were confused or uncertain about
India's legislation it should not have deterred the United States from presenting a proposal
highlighting zones or compartments it has maintained and requesting that these zones or
compartments be recognized". India submits that it "has not received proposals for regionalization
from the United States or for that matter, from any other country".
1170
7.640. India also submits that the United States cannot allude to other Members' comments
regarding regionalization at the SPS Committee meetings as support for its contention regarding
India's refusal to accept regionalization. According to India, it maintained at all these meetings
that its measure was compliant with the Terrestrial Code and "the same can be bilaterally
discussed with the United States and European Union".
1171 India further points out that the
statement made by India on zoning at the OIE and relied upon by the United States was only with
reference to wildlife and its epidemiological role in spread of the disease.1172
7.641. India observes that the evidence does no t establish that the United States provided a
proposal for recognition of zones. According to India, the correspondence submitted by the
United States is inadequate and does not establish that the United States made a substantive
request and provided India with any material sufficient for India to commence evaluating its claim
for regionalization.
1173 India submits that the United States in all its correspondence has not
identified areas for which it sought disease free status from India, and it has failed to provide any
technical literature/documentation to substantiate its claims. India notes that, to the contrary, the
letters cited contain a comment on India's measure but provide no information on the
United States' poultry industry or level of biosecurity maintained against AI. India asserts that "the
exhibits relied upon by the United States do not reflect the quality of information or documentary
evidence incumbent on a exporting member requesting the recognition of disease free
zones/area".
1174
7.9.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.9.2.1 Introduction
7.642. The issue before the Panel is whether India's AI measures are inconsistent with Articles 6.1
and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. In particular, the United States claims that India's AI measures are
inconsistent with Article 6.1, first sentence, because they are not adapted to the sanitary
characteristics of the area from which the United States' imports originated, and with Article 6.1,
second sentence, because, in failing to assess the sanitary characteristics of particular US areas

1167 India's second written submission, para. 65.
1168 India's second written submission, para. 66.
1169 India's second written submission, para. 67.
1170 India's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibit IND-121); India's response to Panel
question Nos. 43(a) and 66(b).
1171 India's second written submission, para. 73 (referring to Exhibits US-81, US-82, US-83, US-84, US-
85, US-86, and US-87).
1172 India's second written submission, para. 73 (referring to Exhibit US-80).
1173 India's second written submission, para. 74.
1174 India's second written submission, para. 79.

from which imports originate, India did not take into account disease-free areas, areas of low
disease prevalence, the existence of an eradication or control programme, or the relevant
OIE guidelines, in assessing the sanitary characteristics of a region.
1175
7.643. With respect to Article 6.2, the United States claims that India's AI measures are
inconsistent with its first sentence because they do not recognize the concept of disease-free areas
or areas of low disease prevalence 1176, and with its second sentence because, by precluding the
recognition of disease-free areas with respect to AI, India's measures preclude it from determining
AI-free areas based on the factors explicitly mentioned in Article 6.2, second sentence.1177
7.644. In response, India relies on Article 6.3 to contend that Articles 6.1 and 6.2 do not operate
independently of Article 6.3 and do not impose any obligation upon the importing Member in the
absence of the "triggering steps" under Article 6.3.
1178 Accordingly, India argues that since the
United States has not undertaken the obligations of an exporting Member prescribed in Article 6.3,
India's obligations under Articles 6.1 and 6.2 have not been triggered.1179
7.645. We note that this is the first dispute in which claims under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement
have been raised. We commence by examining the legal provisions at issue to determine the
applicable legal test and decide the order of our analysis.
7.9.2.2 The legal provisions at issue
7.646. The text of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Adaptation to Regional Conditions,
Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence", reads as
follows:
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted
to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area – whether all of a country,
part of a country, or all or parts of several countries – from which the product
originated and to which the product is destined. In assessing the sanitary or
phytosanitary characteristics of a region, Members shall take into account, inter alia,
the level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests, the existence of eradication or
control programmes, and appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be developed
by the relevant international organizations.
2. Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free
areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence. Determination of such areas shall
be based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and
the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls.
3. Exporting Members claiming that areas within their territories are pest- or
disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence shall provide the
necessary evidence thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing
Member that such areas are, and are likely to remain, pest- or disease-free areas or
areas of low pest or disease prevalence, respectively. For this purpose, reasonable
access shall be given, upon request, to the importing Member for inspection, testing
and other relevant procedures.
7.647. We recall that in addressing the United States' claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2, India
relies on Article 6.3 to contend that the United States has not yet undertaken the obligations of
exporting Members prescribed therein and, as such, India's obligations under Articles 6.1 and 6.2

1175 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1176 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3. United States' first written submission,
para. 153; United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 28.
1177 United States' first written submission, para. 154.
1178 India's first written submission, para. 270; India's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 33.
1179 India's first written submission, paras. 264-270.

have not yet been triggered.1180 The United States disagrees with India and argues that Article 6.3
is not applicable to the present dispute.1181
7.648. In the light of this disagreement between the parties, our first task is to determine the
relationship between the three paragraphs of Article 6 and, in particular, whether the obligations in
Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement are contingent upon whether an exporting Member has
discharged the steps provided for in Article 6.3. Th e outcome of our assessment in this regard will
determine the order of our analysis.
7.9.2.3 The relationship between the paragraphs of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement
7.649. The United States submits that "Article 6.1 lays out a general obligation to account for the
[SPS] characteristics of an area", while Article 6. 2 addresses a specific aspect of that obligation,
i.e. the obligation of Members to recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas or areas of
low pest or disease prevalence. According to the United States, "[b]oth provisions, however,
require Members to respond to differences in conditions". 1182 The United States asserts that
Article 6.3 applies once the importing Member has ensured that it recognizes the concepts of pest-
and disease-free areas and areas of low pest and disease prevalence.1183
7.650. The United States further argues that "each paragraph [of Article 6] provides context for
the other, and Article 6 must be read so that it works as a coherent whole, while the language in
each of the three paragraphs is respected". 1184 According to the United States, a breach of
Article 6.1 can arise not only from an importing Member's adoption of measures that fail to take
into account relevant differences in the SPS characteristics of different areas, but also from a
failure to recognize particular disease-free areas where an exporting Member has made the
necessary demonstration that an area is disease-free. For the United States, Article 6.2 requires
recognition of the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease
prevalence and "[a] breach occurs when the im porting Member does not recognize the concept".
Once the importing Member recognizes these concepts, as applied to the relevant pest or disease,
the burden falls on the exporting Member that is seeking recognition of its pest- or disease-free
areas. According to the United States, the obligations in Article 6.3 can be relevant in the context
of Article 6.1, but in general they will be relevant only for those instances where a complaining
party is claiming that the importing Member failed to recognize a particular area as having the
requisite disease-free or pest-free or low prevalence characteristics.
1185
7.651. By contrast, India posits that Article 6.1 "lays down broad principles which must be
evaluated before an importing country implements SPS measures".1186 For India, Article 6.2 is only
one aspect of this principle and "pertains to a scenario where a specific area is to be recognized as
disease free or as an area or low disease prevalen ce". India submits that Article 6.3 clarifies that
when an exporting country requires an area to be recognized, it shall provide evidence and
objectively demonstrate to the importing country that the claimed area is likely to remain pest- or
disease-free or an area of low pest or disease pr evalence. In the event that the exporting country
is able to objectively demonstrate that the area is, and is likely to remain, disease- or pest-free, or
is likely to remain as an area of low pest or disease prevalence, and the importing country has had
an opportunity to "inspect and test the bio-secu rity claims made by the exporting country and
found it to be sufficient"
1187, then the importing Member modifies its measure and recognizes such
pest- or disease-free area or area of low pest or disease prevalence. India thus argues that any
adaptation of a SPS measure to recognize another country's pest- or disease-free area "is
contingent on such other country providing information and evidence to this effect".
1188
7.652. In India's understanding, the requirements of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 are triggered only when
an exporting Member complies with Article 6.3. Indi a argues that in light of the explicit obligation

1180 India's first written submission, paras. 269-279.
1181 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 31; United States'
response to Panel question No. 42(b).
1182 United States' response to Panel question No. 45(a).
1183 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 45(b) and 45(c).
1184 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 45(b) and 45(c).
1185 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 45(b) and 45(c).
1186 India's response to Panel question No. 45(a).
1187 India's response to Panel question No. 45(a).
1188 India's response to Panel question No. 45(b).

on the exporting country to provide evidence and objectively demonstrate to the importing country
that the area for which recognition is sought is pest- or disease-free or is an area of low pest or
disease prevalence, "the importing country [carries] no obligation to modify its measure
unilaterally based merely on a claim being made to this effect by the exporting country".
1189
7.653. We turn now to consider the subparagraphs of Article 6 in order to determine the
relationship between them.
7.654. We begin with Article 6.1, first sentence, which reads:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted to
the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area – whether all of a country,
part of a country, or all or parts of several countries – from which the product
originated and to which the product is destined.
7.655. We note that this provision refers to the term "area" generically and does not specify the
types of areas to which it applies.
7.656. Article 6.1, second sentence, reads:
In assessing the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of a region, Members shall
take into account, inter alia, the level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests, the
existence of eradication or control programmes, and appropriate criteria or guidelines
which may be developed by the relevant international organizations.
7.657. Article 6.1, second sentence, presupposes that Members undertake an assessment of the
SPS characteristics of a region and enumerates a list of factors that shall be taken into account by
Members in undertaking such assessment. The use of the words " inter alia" indicates that this is a
non-exhaustive list. We note that, unlike the firs t sentence of Article 6.1, this second sentence
uses the term "region" instead of "area".
7.658. Next, Article 6.2, first sentence, provides that:
Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and
areas of low pest or disease prevalence.
7.659. This provision refers to the recognition of the concepts of two specific types of areas, i.e.
"pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence".
7.660. We find the definition of "pest- or disease-free area" in Annex A(6) of the SPS Agreement
as follows:
An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several
countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific pest or
disease does not occur.
NOTE: A pest- or disease-free area may surround, be surrounded by, or be adjacent
to an area - whether within part of a country or in a geographic region which includes
parts of or all of several countries - in which a specific pest or disease is known to
occur but is subject to regional control measures such as the establishment of
protection, surveillance and buffer zones which will confine or eradicate the pest or
disease in question.
7.661. The definition of "area of low pest or disease prevalence" is reflected in Annex A(7) of the
SPS Agreement as:
An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several
countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific pest or

1189 India's response to Panel question No. 45(b).

disease occurs at low levels and which is subject to effective surveillance, control or
eradication measures.
7.662. Article 6.2, second sentence, provides a list of factors on which to base a determination
whether an area is pest- or disease-free or is an area of low pest or disease prevalence as follows:
Determination of such areas shall be based on factors such as geography,
ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or
phytosanitary controls.
7.663. The use of the words "such as" indicates that this is a non-exhaustive list of factors.
7.664. Finally, Article 6.3 stipulates that ex porting Members must provide evidence to the
importing Member to demonstrate that its areas are pest- or disease-free or are areas of low pest
or disease prevalence:
Exporting Members claiming that areas within their territories are pest- or disease-
free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence shall provide the necessary
evidence thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing Member that
such areas are, and are likely to remain, pest- or disease-free areas or areas of low
pest or disease prevalence, respectively.
7.665. Article 6 does not provide an explicit in dication of the manner in which its subparagraphs
interact with one another. We proceed to dete rmine whether Article 6, or the subparagraphs
thereof, suggest any kind of hierarchy or sequence to be followed in order to give proper effect to
their terms.
7.666. Focussing initially on Articles 6.1 and 6.2, we observe that both paragraphs include two
separate sentences. The first sentence of each pa ragraph stipulates distinct actions required of a
Member. The second sentence of each paragraph elaborates the manner in which Members must
perform the actions described in the first sentence. We proceed to examine both paragraphs.
7.667. While Article 6.1, first sentence, speaks of the need to "ensure" that SPS measures are
"adapted" to the SPS characteristics of the relevant areas, Article 6.2, first sentence, requires that
Members "recognize" the concepts of pest- or dise ase-free areas and areas of low pest or disease
prevalence.
7.668. The ordinary meaning of the word "e nsure" is "make certain the occurrence of".
1190 The
word "adapted" is the adjective form or the past tense of the verb "adapt", which means "[t]o
make … suitable or fit for a purpose, or conformable to specified conditions, standards, or
requirements; … to make suitable for a new purpose or to a different context or environment".
1191
The ordinary meaning of "recognize", referred to by the Appellate Body in the context of its
interpretation of Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement, is "[a]cknowledge the existence, legality, or
validity of, [especially] by formal approval or sanction; accord notice or attention to; treat as
worthy of consideration".1192
7.669. In the light of these definitions, we make the preliminary observation that the use of
different wording in these subparagraphs suggests that the paragraphs are intended to have
distinctive effects. Whereas the obligation to ensure that SPS measures are "adapted" in
Article 6.1, first sentence, denotes that a Member must make certain of its measures' suitability (in
this case, suitable for the SPS characteristics of the area), Article 6.2, first sentence, requires that
a Member make a particular acknowledgement (in th is case, of the concepts of "pest- or disease-
free areas" and "areas of low pest or disease prevalence").

1190 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. I, p. 840.
1191 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 23 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/2110?rskey=4XPehN&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid>.
1192 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 361 (referring to the definition provided in the
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007)).

7.670. That these respective sentences refer to different subjects ("SPS measures" in Article 6.1,
and the "concepts" of "pest- or disease-free areas" and "areas of low pest or disease prevalence"
in Article 6.2) is also of significance in terms of their import. Article 6.1, first sentence, requires
Members to ensure that its SPS measures are suitable for the SPS characteristics of an area.
Notwithstanding the fact that "pest- or disease-free areas" and "areas of low pest or disease
prevalence" are defined, respectively, in Annex A(6) and A(7) of the SPS Agreement, the Panel
notes that, in the context of the first sentence of Article 6.2, these terms are referred to as
concepts for the purpose of that provision. A concept is an "abstract idea"
1193 or "an idea of a class
of objects; a general notion or idea". 1194 Hence, Article 6.2, first sentence, requires Members to
acknowledge particular abstract ideas. We consider that "recognizing" a "concept" is a less exigent
obligation than that of "ensuring" that a measure is "adapted" to the SPS characteristics of an area
from which a product originated and to which it is destined.
7.671. We further observe that Article 6.2, first sentence, includes the words "in particular".
Reading these words together with the title of Article 6 ("Adaptation to Regional Conditions,
Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence "), we consider
that pest- or disease-free areas, and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, are a subset of all
types of areas covered by Article 6. Article 6.2, first sentence, requires the recognition of the
concepts of these types of areas – that this sent ence deals specifically with these types of areas
indicates to us that the words "in particular" address these "particular" types of areas, but not that
Article 6.2 is a particularization of any other part of Article 6.
7.672. We make these observations in the light of what we view as a logical continuum that
underpins the manner in which a Member develops and maintains its SPS measures. In other
words, we conceive that the "adaptation" of a Member's SPS measures to the SPS characteristics
of particular "areas" presupposes that a Member has first "recognized" the concept of such areas.
Article 6.2 requires the recognition of certain types of areas, namely, "pest- or disease-free areas"
and "areas of low pest or disease prevalence". We have difficulty seeing how a WTO Member could
ensure that its SPS measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of distinct areas within the
meaning of Article 6.1, first sentence, if the Member has not "recognized" the "concepts" of
specific types of areas identified in Article 6.2 in the first place.
7.673. We recall that India submits that Article 6 places the burden upon the exporting country to
initiate the proposal to recognize areas and pr ovide documentary evidence that the proposed
disease-free area or area of low disease prevalence exhibits adequate biosecurity measures to
achieve the importing country's ALOP.
1195 Under India's interpretation, a Member's duty to adapt
its SPS measures would arise only after those meas ures have entered into force and an exporting
Member makes a fully-documented request under Article 6.3.
7.674. Article 6.3 refers to a situation that is distinct from those in Articles 6.1 and 6.2. It is
addressed not to Members generally, as are the first two paragraphs of Article 6, but to exporting
Members that claim to have areas within their territory that are pest- or disease-free areas or
areas of low pest or disease prevalence. Article 6.3 puts the onus on these Members to prove such
claims to importing Members. This paragraph is not directly linked to the first two paragraphs of
A r t i c l e 6 , o r t o w h a t W T O M e m b e r s m u s t d o g enerally with respect to adapting measures to
SPS characteristics of certain areas, or in particular to recognizing specific area concepts.
7.675. As we have observed, Article 6.1, first sentence, provides that Members "shall ensure" that
their SPS measures "are adapted" to the SPS characteristics of the area from which the product
originated and to which it is destined. A plain reading of Article 6.1, first sentence, makes clear
that it creates a free-standing obligation. There is no conditional language linking the obligation to
Article 6.3, to an extraneous event such as the request of an exporting Member to recognize an
area, or to any other event or situation. We further note that the language of Article 6.1, first
sentence, is framed in the present tense ("are adapted"), which leads us to consider that the
adaptation of the measure to the SPS characteristics of the area is an element of the SPS measure
as such , which the implementing Member must ensure. Thus our reading is contrary to India's

1193 The Oxford Dictionaries Online, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/concept?q=concept>.
1194 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38130?rskey=vaS8sT&result=1#eid>.
1195 India's first written submission, para. 267.

submission, in which it argues that adaptation involves an ex post facto "modification"1196 of the
SPS measure pursuant to an exporting Member's request. We do not see how an SPS measure can
be "adapted" to the SPS characteristics of an area where that adaptation occurs only after a
measure is taken pursuant to a specific request for recognition made by an exporting Member. To
us, this wording of Article 6.1, first sentence, negates India's argument.
7.676. We acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, a link may be made between the
information required for the assessment of SPS characteristics envisaged by Article 6.1, second
sentence, and the obligation of an exporting Member to provide "the necessary evidence" under
Article 6.3, first sentence, that an area within its territory is pest- or disease-free or is an area of
low pest or disease prevalence. According to Article 6.3, if an importing Member receives a request
for the recognition of a particular disease-free area in an exporting Member pursuant to
Article 6.3, first sentence, an exporting Member that claims that an area within its territory is a
pest- or disease-free area must "provide the necessary evidence" to the importing Member in
support of that contention. Article 6.3 does not specify what that "necessary evidence" would be.
However, Article 6.1, second sentence, provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that a Member
could consider in assessing the SPS characteristics of the area in question. Thus although
Article 6.1 may inform the inquiry that an importing Member may conduct in order to determine
whether an exporting Member has "objectively demonstrated" that there is an area within its
territory that is pest- or disease-free or is an area of low pest or disease prevalence, there is
nothing in the language of either provision that requires this particular approach.
7.677. What is also clear is that, logically, the importing Member must have already recognized in
its SPS measures the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease
prevalence, as required under Article 6.2, in order for it to receive and consider a request for
recognition under Article 6.3. To us, the recognition of the concepts of such areas must necessarily
precede a request for recognition of a specific area within the territory of an exporting Member.
7.678. In sum, we consider that the obligations in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 are not triggered by an
exporting Member submitting a claim to an impo rting Member under Article 6.3. Rather, these
provisions establish obligations on all WTO Member s with respect to their SPS measures, not just
those that have received a request from an exporting Member for recognition of an area under
Article 6.3.
7.679. To support our reading of Article 6, we note that other provisions in the SPS Agreement
that foresee an interaction between the importin g and exporting Members, such as Article 4,
explicitly condition the importing Member's actions upon an action by the exporting Member. For
example, Article 4.1 requires Members to accept other Members' SPS measures as equivalent to
their own under certain circumstances, and Article 4.2 requires Members to enter into
consultations "upon request" with the aim of achieving agreements on recognition of such
equivalence. Articles 6.1 and 6.2 in contrast create free-standing obligations rather than
obligations contingent upon a request from a Member claiming that areas within its territory are
pest- or disease-free, pursuant to Article 6.3. Our understanding of the relationship between the
paragraphs of Article 6 is further supported by the "Guidelines
" adopted by the SPS Committee.1197
For instance, the Guidelines provide that "[i]mporting Members should publish the basis for
recognition of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence and a
description of the general process used, including the information generally required to evaluate
such requests and a contact point responsible for requests for recognition of pest- or disease-free

1196 India's response to Panel question No. 45(b).
1197 G/SPS/48, 16 May 2008. We note that according to paragraph 2 of the Guidelines, they "do not add
to nor detract from the existing rights and obligations of Members under the [SPS] Agreement nor any other
WTO Agreement", and "do not provide any legal interpretation or modification to the [SPS] Agreement itself".
Nevertheless, we consider the Guidelines to be informative in our consideration of how to approach Article 6
because they expand on the Members' own understanding of how the provisions of Article 6 are to be
implemented. This was the approach followed by the panel in US – Poultry (China), which referred to the
SPS Committee "Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures" (G/SPS/19/rev. 2, dated 23 July 2004) and considered that this decision
"expands on the Members' own understanding of how Article 4 relates to the rest of the SPS Agreement and
how it is to be implemented". Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.136. More recently, the panel in US –
Clove Cigarettes indicated that it "find[s] further guidance and support for our interpretation in a
recommendation from the TBT Committee regarding the timing of notifications". Panel Report, US – Clove
Cigarettes, para. 7.537.

areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence". 1198 The Guidelines also envisage that a typical
administrative step for recognition of an exporting Member's pest- or disease-free areas or areas
of low pest or disease prevalence is that the exporting Member may request information about an
importing Member's requirements and procedures prior to formally requesting recognition of such
an area or at the time it requests such recognition. This presumes that the regime regulating the
recognition of specific areas already exists.
1199
7.680. For the reasons explained above, our und erstanding of the interplay between the three
paragraphs of Article 6 is that Members must adapt their SPS measures to the SPS characteristics
of an area from which goods originate or to which they are destined and, logically, they must
already have recognized as per Article 6.2 the "concepts" of pest- or disease-free areas and areas
of low pest or disease prevalence in order to do so. The steps in Article 6.3 are directed at
exporting Members and presuppose that an import ing Member from which they seek recognition
that an area in its territory is pest- or disease-fr ee or is an area of low pest or disease prevalence,
is in compliance with its obligations under Articles 6.1 and 6.2. We thus conclude that the
obligations in Articles 6.1 and Article 6.2 are not triggered by an invocation of Article 6.3, as
argued by India.
7.681. Having determined our approach to interpreting the three provisions of Article 6, we turn
now to the United States' argument that India, "by banning products from areas thousands of
kilometers from an AI detection" and thereb y failing to adapt its AI measures to the
SPS characteristics of areas in the United States contrary to Article 6.1, first sentence, also
breached Article 6.1 second sentence because it appears "not to have taken account of 'the level
of prevalence' (i.e., the lack of prevalence) of AI in those areas", and "does not appear to have
accounted for 'the existence of [an AI] eradicatio n or control program' that an exporting country
u s e s t o l i m i t t h e s p r e a d o f A I o n c e i t h a s b e e n d e t e c t e d " .
1200 The Panel understands the
United States' submission to indicate that, in its view, India has acted inconsistently with
Article 6.1, second sentence, as a result of the fact that its AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 6.1, first sentence.
7.682. As we explained above, the two sentences of Article 6.1 use different terminology: while
Article 6.1, first sentence, refers to the SPS ch aracteristics of an "area", Article 6.1, second
sentence, speaks of the SPS characteristics of a "region".
7.683. The United States submits that the use of the term "area" in Article 6.1, first sentence, and
the use of the term "region" in Article 6.1, seco nd sentence, was "intentional", and that the terms
have different meanings. For the United States, "a n 'area' need not have any particular size or
defining features. By contrast, a 'region' would be a larger area that could have distinguishing
natural characteristics".
1201 India has not provided views on the difference between the terms.
7.684. The ordinary meaning of the term "area" is "[a] particular extent of surface, [especially] of
the earth's surface; a space, region, tract". 1202 The broad scope of the term "area" is also evident
from the text of Article 6.1, first sentence, itself, which provides that the "area" may comprise "all
of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries". The term "region" means "[a]
land; a country; any large portion of the earth's surface considered as defined or distinguished
from adjacent areas in some way, as by culture, government, topography, climate, fauna or
flora".
1203 Although these terms do not have an identical meaning, we consider that their meaning
is sufficiently similar to warrant a conclusion that the assessment of a region envisaged by
Article 6.1, second sentence, relates to the adap tation of measures to the area referred to in
Article 6.1, first sentence.
7.685. This interpretation leads us to a preliminary conclusion that a failure to ensure that
SPS measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of an area for the purpose of Article 6.1, first

1198 G/SPS/48, para. 4.
1199 G/SPS/48, para. 20.
1200 United States' first written submission, para. 150.
1201 United States' response to Panel question No. 46.
1202 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/10505?redirectedFrom=area#eid>.
1203 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161281?redirectedFrom=region#eid>.

sentence, may warrant a concomitant finding that the Member has not taken into account the
factors in Article 6.1, second sentence, in assessing the SPS characteristics of a region.
7.686. The United States also argued that India's measures are contrary to Article 6.2, second
sentence, because, by precluding recognition of disease-free areas with respect to AI, India's
measures preclude it from determining AI-free ar eas based on the factors listed in Article 6.2,
second sentence.1204
7.687. Article 6.2, second sentence, refers to "such areas". We interpret this to refer to the types
of areas referred to in Article 6.2, first sentence, namely pest- or disease-free areas and areas of
low pest or disease prevalence. Article 6.2, second sentence stipulates that the "determination" of
these areas shall be "based on" the factors listed therein – namely, factors "such as geography,
ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and th e effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary
controls". The ordinary meaning of the verb "determine" is "[t]o set bounds to; to bound,
limit".
1205 We thus understand Article 6.2, second sentence, to mean that the boundaries or scope
of the areas referred to in Article 6.2, first sent ence, are to be determined on the basis of the
factors mentioned therein.
7.688. We are of the view that a requirement to "determine" the boundaries of the pest- or
disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence referred to in Article 6.2, first
sentence, presupposes the "recognition" of the "concepts" of those areas, as required by
Article 6.2, first sentence. We cannot see how a Member could fail or refuse to recognize the
concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, contrary to
Article 6.2, first sentence, while also "determining" those areas based on the factors listed in
Article 6.2, second sentence. In other words, if a Member is to determine a pest- or disease-free
area or area of low pest or disease prevalence based on the factors listed in Article 6.2, second
sentence, we are persuaded that such Member must necessarily recognize the concept of those
areas.
7.689. We therefore interpret Article 6.2 such that a finding that a Member has failed to recognize
the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence as required
by Article 6.2, first sentence, leads inevitably to a finding that such Member also has failed to
determine those areas based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological
surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls.
7.690. Having regard to our approach to the interplay of the three paragraphs of Article 6
explained above, we consider it appropriate to begin our analysis of the consistency of India's
AI measures with Article 6 by focusing on Articl e 6.2, first sentence. As indicated, we do not
consider that a Member can, logically, ensure that its SPS measures are adapted to the
SPS characteristics of an area without first recognizing the concept of areas (and, in particular for
Article 6.2, "pest- or disease-free areas" and "are as of low pest or disease prevalence"). For this
reason, we will consider first whether India has "recognized" the "concepts" of "disease-free areas"
and "areas of low disease prevalence" in relation to AI. If we determine that India has not
recognized these concepts, this will lead to a finding that India has not ensured that its
AI measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of those areas pursuant to Article 6.1, first
sentence.
7.691. Conversely, if we find that India has recognized the concepts of disease-free areas and
areas of low disease prevalence, we must consider whether India has ensured that its AI measures
are adapted to the SPS characteristics of the relevant areas and whether it took into account
relevant factors when assessing the SPS characteristics of a region, in a manner consistent with
Article 6.1.
7.692. From the outset, we recall that in section 7.3.2.3 above we found that AI is a disease.
1206
When examining the consistency of India's AI measures with Articles 6.1 and 6.2, we will bear in
mind that although the definitions in Annex A(6) and Annex A(7) refer both to pests and diseases,

1204 United States' first written submission, para. 154.
1205 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 29 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51244?redirectedFrom=determine#eid>.
1206 As we stated in footnote 390 above, the Panel agrees with the parties that the definition in
Annex A(1)(d) does not apply in this dispute.

we circumscribe our analysis to focus on disease on the basis that we are not dealing with a pest
in this dispute.
7.9.2.4 Whether India's AI measures ar e inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.693. The United States claims that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.2 because
they do not recognize disease-free areas or areas of low disease prevalence. 1207 In particular, the
United States submits that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.2, first sentence,
which requires Members to recognize the concept of disease-free areas. The United States avers
that India's measures explicitly preclude recognition of such areas upon notification of a detection
of NAI anywhere in the territory of a Member.
1208 The United States further claims that India's
AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.2, second sentence, because, by precluding the
recognition of disease-free areas with respect to AI, India's measures also preclude it from
determining AI-free areas based on the factors explicitly mentioned in Article 6.2, second
sentence.
1209
7.694. India responds that "[n]owhere in the text of Article 6 does the SPS Agreement impose on
the importing Member an obligation to implement a domestic law which spells out that the country
will recognize zones or compartments". India maintains that the obligation is to "recognize the
concept" of the areas, and a Member is said to recognize the concept of zones or compartments
when it accepts and evaluates proposals that ar e put forward by the exporting Member. For India
therefore, "[t]he obligation under Article 6.2 is distinct from the obligation to implement laws or
provide for domestic frameworks in order to give effect to a country's obligations under the WTO
Agreements".
1210 India further submits that Sections 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act provide the
government with the legislative framework within which to recognize zones or compartments.
Should a country make a proposal, it affirms, "the same would be considered by the Central
Government and if approved such zones or compar tments would be recognized by the issuance of
a notification under [S]ection 3 or 3A as the ca se may be". According to India, "even if the
United States were confused or uncertain about In dia's legislation it should not have deterred the
United States from presenting a proposal highlighting zones or compartments it has maintained
and requesting that these zones or compartments be recognized". India explains that it "has not
received proposals for regionalization from the United States or for that matter, from any other
country".
1211
7.695. We recall that under the first sentence of Article 6.2 WTO Members "shall … recognize the
concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and area s of low pest or disease prevalence". This
provision therefore imposes the obligation to recognize the "concepts". As explained in
paragraph 7.670 above, the term concept is defined as an "abstract idea" 1212 or "an idea of a class
of objects, a general notion or idea". 1213 This means that Members are required to recognize the
idea or notion of pest- or disease-free areas an d areas of low pest or disease prevalence in the
abstract; the obligation under Article 6.2, first sentence, is not linked to specific areas of a given
exporting Member.
7.696. We note that the text of Article 6.2 does not explain in which particular way WTO Members
are to recognize the concepts of the areas referre d to therein. The parties disagree on what the
recognition of these concepts entails in practical terms with respect to the importing Member, i.e.
what an importing Member must accomplish in order to "recognize" the "concepts" of pest- or
disease-free areas and areas of low pest or diseas e prevalence. The United States contends that
Article 6.2 does not refer to "measures" and thus does not require that a Member reflect its

1207 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1208 United States' first written submission, para. 153; United States' opening statement at the first
1209 United States' first written submission, para. 154.
1210 India's second written submission, paras. 61-62; India's response to Panel question Nos. 43(b)
and 66(a).
1211 India's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibit IND-121); India's response to Panel
question Nos. 43(a) and 66(b).
1212 The Oxford Dictionaries Online, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/concept?q=concept>.
1213 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 10 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38130?rskey=vaS8sT&result=1#eid>.

recognition of the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease
prevalence through any particular normative basis in its measures. According to the United States,
the application of those concepts may depend on the particular SPS risks, appropriate level of
protection, and measures involved. However, the United States submits that "in light of the
particular facts in this dispute, the Panel does not need to make a finding on the question of
whether a Member can comply with Article 6.2 in the absence of an explicit, pre-existing normative
basis in its domestic law since India's measures and attendant circumstances demonstrate that
India does not recognize the concept of 'disease-free area' in the context of its AI measure despite
the evidence that this concept does in fact apply to AI".
1214
7.697. As noted above, India responds that "[n]owhere in the text of Article 6 does the
SPS Agreement impose on the importing Member an obligation to implement a domestic law which
spells out that the country will recognize zone s or compartments". According to India, the
obligation is to "recognize the concept" of the areas; and a Member is said to recognize the
concept of zones or compartments when it accepts and evaluates proposals that are put forward
by the exporting Member. 1215 According to India, "[t]he obligation under Article 6 is not
accomplished by engaging in a procedural formality laying down the normative basis for
regionalization but is accomplished by a more substantive engagement with an exporting
Member's proposal for regionalization". India argues that "[i]t is through the process of considering
and evaluating the proposal [that] a Member [can] be said to be giving full force and effect to the
substantive obligations under Article 6".
1216
7.698. We recall our discussion of the word "recognize" in paragraph 7.668 above, and in
particular our conclusion that the word means to "[a]cknowledge the existence, legality, or
validity of [especially] by formal approval or sanction; accord notice or attention to; treat as
worthy of consideration ". This definition, however, does not clarify whether the recognition of the
concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence must be done
explicitly, and if so, whether it should be done in writing through a legislative or administrative act.
In our view, the format of such recognition will depend on the circumstances of each particular
case. Given the text of Article 6.2, we do not think that it is the prerogative of this Panel to
prescribe to India or any other Member the manner in which it should "recognize" the concepts of
pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence. However, in our view, to
comply with Article 6.2, SPS measures adopted by WTO Members must at a minimum not deny or
contradict the recognition of the concepts of such areas when these concepts are relevant with
respect to the disease at issue.
1217
7.699. We will therefore consider whether India's AI measures deny or contradict the recognition
of the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence with respect to the
disease at issue. We recall that India's AI measures are those measures that "prohibit the
importation of various agricultural products from India from those countries reporting [NAI]"
1218,
and that they are maintained through the Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E). We proceed to examine
whether each of these measures denies or contradicts the recognition of the concepts of disease-
free areas and areas of low disease prevalence.
7.700. We commence with the Livestock Act. This Act empowers the Central Government of India
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit, in such manner as it may think fit, the import into India of any
livestock which may be liable to be affected by infectious or contagious disorders. The Livestock
Act is silent on the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence. Indeed, we
have found no explicit reference to the possibility of recognising areas, zones, compartments or
equivalent in the text of this Act.

1214 United States' response to Panel question No. 66.
1215 India's second written submission, paras. 61-62; India's response to Panel question Nos. 43(b)
and 66(a).
1216 India's response to Panel question No. 66(b).
1217 We note that the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease
prevalence are not relevant with respect to all pests or diseases. Indeed, for certain pests and diseases, the
Terrestrial Code does not recommend regionalization. For instance, as noted by the United States, in relation to
avian chlamydiosis, Article 10.1.2 of the Terrestrial Code provides "Veterinary Authorities of countries free from
avian chlamydiosis may prohibit importation or transit through their territory, from countries considered
infected with avian chlamydiosis, of birds of the Psittacidae family". United States' opening statement at the
first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 13.

7.701. India has argued that Sections 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act provide the government with
the legislative framework for the recognition of the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas. 1219 We
observe that these provisions refer to the gene ral powers of the government to regulate any
aspect of the importation of livestock. As is the case with the remainder of the Livestock Act,
Sections 3 and 3A are silent on the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease
prevalence. We accept that there is broad discret ion inherent in the general powers conferred by
Sections 3 and 3A; such broad discretion might en compass a very considerable range of activity.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence on the record of this dispute that the Indian Central
Government has used its discretion to either recognize, or deny or contradict the recognition of,
the concept of these areas. These considerations allow us to conclude that the Livestock Act may
empower India's authorities to recognize the co ncepts of disease-free areas and areas of low
disease prevalence, notwithstanding the fact that this discretion has not been exercised for this
purpose.
7.702. We next examine S.O. 1663(E), which was issued pursuant to Sections 3 and 3A of the
Livestock Act. We recall that S.O. 1663(E) prohibits the importation of certain agricultural products
from countries reporting NAI. S.O. 1663(E) thus prohibits the importation of the products
enumerated therein on a country-wide basis. Ther e is nothing on the face of S.O. 1663(E) that
allows for the recognition of disease-free areas and/or areas of low disease prevalence within a
country that notifies NAI to the OIE. Hence, we cannot conclude that S.O. 1663(E) recognizes the
concept of these areas either explicitly or implicitly. Rather, S.O. 1663(E) reflects the opposite: by
imposing a prohibition on a country-wide basis, it contradicts the requirement to recognize the
concept of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence.
7.703. We note that, in response to a question from the Panel at its second substantive meeting,
India stated that it recognizes the concept of di sease-free areas. Although we appreciate India's
assertion, we cannot, without more evidence, pr operly carry out our duty as fact-finder and
determine that India recognizes the concept of disease-free areas. In the absence of any
substantiating evidence to support that assertion, we are unable to overcome the clear and
unequivocal language to the contrary as reflected on the face of a measure at issue (that is,
S.O. 1663(E)).
7.704. We also note that India has argued that adaptation within the meaning of Article 6.1, first
sentence, involves an ex post facto "modification"
1220 of the SPS measure pursuant to an exporting
Member's request. India submits that, were an exporting country to propose to India the
recognition of zones or compartments within its territory, "such zones or compartments would be
recognized by the issuance of a notification under Section 3 and 3A of the Livestock Act, 1898 as
may be relevant". According to India, the United States could have, but did not, present a proposal
highlighting zones or compartments it has maintained and request that these zones or
compartments be recognized. India maintains that it "has not received proposals for
regionalization from the United States or for that matter, from any other country".
1221 In line with
our reasoning above, we do not see how India's AI measures can be "adapted" to the
SPS characteristics of an area as the present tense entails if that adaptation can only occur only
after the entry into force of the measures and through the issuance of a new separate
SPS measure.
7.705. We further note that the United States has submitted a number of documents concerning
various exchanges with the Indian authorities wherein India consistently informs the United States
that its policy is "country freedom".
1222 While some of these documents refer to exchanges that

1219 India's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibit IND-121); India's response to Panel
question Nos. 43(a) and 66(b).
1220 India's response to Panel question No. 45(b).
1221 India's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibit IND-121); India's response to Panel
question Nos. 43(a) and 66(b).
1222 In particular, the United States submits that in 2007, India told the United States' Foreign
Agricultural Service that it would "insist on country freedom" with respect to AI and that its conditions for
import are "uniform". Moreover, the United States avers that in 2007, it complained about India's requirement
that an exporting country certify that it is country-free of HPAI for shipments of processed poultry products on
the basis that it is not consistent with the Terrestrial Code. The United States submits that India's response
was that "[t]he conditions are uniformly applicable for all countries. Other countries exporting to India are
complying with this requirement. Hence, no change in the condition is contemplated". The United States also
submits that India has been asked by other Members, including the United States, to regionalize its AI-related

occurred before the entry into force of S.O. 1663(E), we note that the United States maintains
that, at the May 2012 meeting of the OIE, India criticized Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and
asserted that, for India, "the concept of zoning looked irrelevant as far as [AI] was concerned".
1223
India has not disputed this evidence in substance, but it asserts that the evidence does not
establish that the United States provided a proposal for recognition of its zones or
compartments.1224 India further points out that the statement made by India on zoning at the OIE
and relied upon by the United States was only with reference to wild life and its epidemiological
role in the spread of the disease.1225 We take note of these exchanges but we do not consider that
we can base our conclusion only on a report of a meeting of the OIE, the context of which the
parties do not agree.1226
7.706. .As concluded above, although the Livestock Act may empower India's authorities to
recognize the concepts of these areas, it is neut ral on the subject and there is no evidence that
this has ever been done. Furthermore, S.O. 1663(E) rather than recognizing the concept of these
areas, reflects the opposite: by imposing a prohib ition on a country-wide basis, it contradicts the
requirement to recognize the concept of disease- free areas and areas of low disease prevalence.
Taken together, we conclude that India's AI measures do not recognize the concept of disease-free
areas and areas of low disease prevalence with respect to AI.
7.707. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that, by failing to recognize the concepts of disease-
free areas and areas of low disease prevalence, India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 6.2, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement.
7.708. We turn now to the United States' claim that India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 6.2, second sentence.
1227 As we discussed in paragraph 7.689 above, we interpret
Article 6.2 such that our finding that India's AI measures fail to recognize the concept of
disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence leads inevitably to a finding that India has
also failed to determine those areas based on the factors listed in Article 6.2, second sentence.
Consequently, we find that India's AI measures are also inconsistent with Article 6.2, second
sentence.
7.9.2.5 Whether India's AI measures ar e inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the
SPS Agreement
7.709. We recall that in paragraph 7.690 above, we explained that if we were to determine that
India has not recognized the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence as
required by Article 6.2, first sentence, we would find that India has not ensured that its
AI measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of the area from which products originate or to
which they are destined pursuant to Article 6.1, first sentence. Having found that India failed to
recognize the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence, we
consequentially find that India's AI measures are not adapted to the SPS characteristics of such
areas and thus are inconsistent with Article 6.1, first sentence.

import restriction at numerous meetings of the WTO SPS Committee. However, it argues, India has explained
its refusal to alter its requirement for country-level certification on the grounds that the requirement is
"uniform", and that it has a "uniform" policy of requiring country-level certification. United States' first written
submission, para. 148; United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring
to Exhibit US-120). United States' second written submission, para. 69 (referring to Exhibit US-124), para. 71.
G/SPS/R/63 (Exhibit US-81), para. 64; G/SPS/R/62 (Exhibit US-82), para. 37; G/SPS/R/61 (Exhibit US-83),
para. 26; G/SPS/R/59 (Exhibit US-84), para. 39; G/SPS/R/58 (Exhibit US-85), para. 38; G/SPS/R/56
1223 United States' first written submission, para. 148; United States' opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 29 (referring to OIE, 80th General Session FR (Exhibit US-88), para. 231).
1224 India's second written submission, para. 74.
1225 India's second written submission, para. 73 (referring to Exhibit US-80). We note that this Exhibit
includes the text of S.O. 1663(E).
1226 We note that the Appellate Body in US/Canada – Continued Suspension found that statements by
Members at the DSB "are not intended to have legal effects and do not have the legal status of a definitive
determination in themselves. Rather, they are views expressed by Members and should not be considered to
prejudice Members' position in the context of a dispute". Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued
Suspension, paras. 398-399. Considering the Appellate Body's view on statements made at the DSB, a body
established under Article 2 of the DSU, we do not think that we can ascribe greater legal value to statements
by Members in the context of other international organizations.
1227 United States' first written submission, para. 154.

7.710. We also explained in paragraph 7.685 above that a Member's failure to ensure that its
SPS measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of an area for the purpose of Article 6.1, first
sentence, may warrant a concomitant finding that the Member has not taken into account the
factors in Article 6.1, second sentence, in assessing the SPS characteristics of a region.
7.711. To our knowledge, India has not conducte d the assessment of the SPS characteristics of a
region as envisaged in Article 6.1, second sentence. We acknowledge India's argument that the
obligation under Article 6.1 would have been triggered only if the United States had complied with
the "steps" in Article 6.3. As discussed in paragraph 7.676 above, under certain circumstances, a
link may be made between the information requ ired for the assessment of SPS characteristics
envisaged by Article 6.1, second sentence, and th e obligation of an exporting Member to provide
"the necessary evidence" under Article 6.3, first sent ence, that an area within its territory is pest-
or disease-free or is an area of low pest or disease prevalence. Although Article 6.1 may inform
the inquiry that an importing Member may conduct in order to determine whether an exporting
Member has "objectively demonstrated" that there is an area within its territory that is pest- or
disease-free or is an area of low pest or diseas e prevalence, there is nothing in the language of
either provision that requires this particular approach.
7.712. Accordingly, having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.1, first
sentence, and that India has not undertaken the assessment envisaged by Article 6.1, second
sentence, we find that India's AI measures are also inconsistent with Article 6.1, second sentence,
because India has not taken into account factors including those specified in Article 6.1, second
sentence.
7.9.2.6 Conclusion on the United States' clai ms pursuant to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the
SPS Agreement
7.713. The Panel therefore finds that by failing to recognize the concepts of disease-free areas
and areas of low disease prevalence, India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.2, first
sentence, of the SPS Agreement. Consequentially, we find that India's AI measures are also
inconsistent with Article 6.2, second sentence, because the failure to recognize the concepts of
disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence renders impossible a determination of such
areas based on the factors enumerated in Article 6.2, second sentence.
7.714. Having found that India's AI measures fail to recognize the concepts of disease-free areas
and areas of low disease prevalence, we consequentially find that India's AI measures are
therefore not adapted to the SPS characteristics of the areas from which products originate and to
which they are destined and thus are inconsistent with Article 6.1, first sentence.
7.715. Furthermore, having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.1, first
sentence, and that India has not undertaken the assessment envisaged by Article 6.1, second
sentence, we find that India's AI measures are also inconsistent with Article 6.1, second sentence,
because India has not taken into account factors including those specified in Article 6.1, second
sentence.
7.10 Whether India has acted inconsistent ly with Article 7 and Annex B of the
SPS Agreement
7.10.1 Arguments of the parties
7.10.1.1 United States
7.716. The United States claims that India has acted inconsistently with Article 7 of the
SPS Agreement, Annex B(2) an d Annex B(5)(a) through (d)
1228 because it has not provided the
information on its AI measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B. In particular, the
United States claims that India did not notify its AI measures until well after these measures had
entered into force, to the extent any notificati on was made whatsoever, despite the fact that
India's avian influenza measures are "not substantially the same as the content of an international

1228 As we discuss in para. 7.791 below, the United States has not made any arguments concerning its
claim under Annex B(5)(c) in its written or oral submissions.

standard, guideline, or recommendation" and "h ave a significant effect on trade of other
Members." The United States further claims that In dia failed to notify other Members, through the
Secretariat, of the products to be covered by the measures along with the "objective and
rationale" of the measures, "at an early stage" where amendments could be introduced and
comments taken into account. In addition, the United States claims that India failed to identify the
parts of its AI measures "which in substance deviate from international standards, guidelines, or
recommendations." The United States also claims that India failed to publish its AI measures "at
an early stage in such manner to enable interested Members to become acquainted with the
proposal." Finally, the United States claims that India also failed to "allow a reasonable interval"
between the publication of its measures and their entry into force. For the United States, India's
failure to comply with Annex B(5) is not justified by any "urgent problem of health protection" that
has arisen or threatened to arise for India, and India has in any event failed to comply with the
requirements of Annex B(6) related to such urgent situations.
1229
7.717. According to the United States, India did no t notify its AI measures until well after these
measures had entered into force. The United States contends that India's failure to abide by the
notification and publication-related requirements of the SPS Agreement has made it more difficult
for WTO Members to understand and assess India's measures.
1230 The United States explains that
the conditions of Annex B(5) of the SPS Agreemen t are met in the present case because "India's
measures do not correspond to the OIE guidelines"; and "by imposing a ban that precludes
members from shipping covered products to India, the measures clearly have a significant impact
on international trade".
1231
7.718. The United States points out that Annex B(5)(b) requires that notifications occur "when
amendments can still be introduced". Moreover, for the United States, the reference in
Annex B(5)(b) to the provision of information about the "proposed regulation" and use of the
future tense in requiring notification of the products "to be covered" make it clear that the
notification must occur before the measure takes effect.
1232 The United States avers that India has
habitually notified its AI measures "after they have gone into effect and without any indication of
their objective or rationale" 1233 and, in some instances, India appears to have failed entirely to
notify its AI measures.1234
7.719. According to the United States, by failing to notify properly measures changing the scope
of and extending the term of its AI restrictions befo re they go into effect, and by failing to include
in its notices information on the objective and rationale of the measures, India has "again-and-
again" acted inconsistently with Article 7 and Annex B(5)(b) of the SPS Agreement.1235
7.720. The United States further contends that "Ind ia's failure to publish its measures properly, if
at all, has resulted in additional breaches of Article 7 and Annex B". First, India has acted
inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) because all of India's AI measures took effect on the date of
publication, thereby preventing other Members from becoming acquainted with the proposal to
introduce a particular regulation.
1236 Second, according to the United States, because India did not
publish a notice of any proposed regulation for any of its AI measures, India did not allow a
reasonable time for comments and thus acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d) – a provision
closely related to Annex B(5)(a).
1237

1229 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p.3.
1230 United States' first written submission, para. 190.
1231 United States' first written submission, para. 191. United States' second written submission,
paras. 122-123.
1232 United States' first written submission, para. 192.
1233 United States' first written submission, para. 194. The documents which, according to the
United States, have been notified after their entry into force are: S.O. 102(E) (Exhibit US-73), S.O. 1311(E),
S.O. 228(E) (Exhibit US-74), S.O. 1892(E) (Exhibit US-75), S.O. 419(E) (Exhibit US-76) and S.O. 1663(E)
(Exhibit US-80).
1234 United States' first written submission, para. 194. The documents which, according to the
United States, have not been notified are: S.O. 2208(E) (Exhibit US-77), S.O. 616(E) (Exhibit US-78) and
S.O. 2976(E) (Exhibit US-79).
1235 United States' first written submission, para. 194.
1236 United States' first written submission, para. 195.
1237 United States' first written submission, para. 196.

7.721. Likewise, in the United States' view, India failed to comply with Annex B(2) because it "has
never provided for any interval of time between pu blication of the Notifications at issue and their
entry into force".1238
7.722. In addition, the United States points out that India's notifications imposing a ban for a
period of six months were not always renewed with in six months of when India issued its previous
notification. For the United States, this means that, during the "gap periods", India's import
restrictions constituted an unpublished SPS meas ure and, by maintaining an unpublished LPAI-
based import ban, India breached the provisions of Article 7, Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a), (b)
and (d).
1239 The United States claims that, by maintaining an unpublished LPAI-based import ban,
India breached Annex B(2) because it did not allow a reasonable interval between the publication
of its extension of the import ban and its entry into force. For the United States, this is evident
because during the "gap periods", "India entirely failed to publish the fact that the ban would be
continuing". The United States also claims that Annex B(5)(a) has been breached because "India
did not publish notice at an early stage or even after these unwritten extensions took effect,
thereby preventing producers from taking the extension of the measures into account when
making production decisions".
1240 The United States further submits that India has also breached
the notification requirement in Article 7 and Annex B(5)(b) by failing to provide an "early stage"
notification that the ban on imports from countries notifying LPAI would be extended beyond the
previously scheduled expiration date. Ultimately, according to the United States, India's
unpublished LPAI-based import ban breached Annex B(5)(d) as well because India failed to "allow
reasonable time for other Members to make comments in writing".
1241
7.723. The United States further argues that India's failure to comply with Annex B(5) is not
justified by Annex B(6)(a) because no urgent problem of health protection has arisen or
threatened to arise for India in relation to AI. In any event, the United States argues, India has
not complied with the requirement of Annex B(6)(a) to "immediately notif[y] other Members,
through the Secretariat, of the particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief
indication of the objective and the rationale of th e regulation, including the nature of the urgent
problem(s)". This is because "India frequently provided either no notification to the WTO or
delayed notification of its Notifications—including S.O. 1663(E), which India did not notify to the
WTO for almost three months after it was issued".
1242
7.724. The United States also points out that at no point in this proceeding has India attempted to
argue that S.O. 1663(E) or any predecessor instrument implementing India's AI measures meets
the requirements set out in Annex B(6) to exempt a Member from the requirements of
Annex B(5).
1243
7.725. The United States observes that India's only response to the claims under Article 7 and
Annex B is that its measures conform to international standards. The United States reiterates that
India's measures do not conform to international standards
1244 and points out that, in any event,
compliance with Annex B(2) does not hinge on conformity with international standards.1245
7.10.1.2 India
7.726. India responds to these allegations by asserting that the United States' claim is
"misplaced".
1246 According to India, pursuant to the chapeau of Annex B(5), the obligations under
that paragraph arise only when there are no international standards or the content of the measure
is not the same as the content of the standard. India argues that since S.O. 1663(E) conforms to

1238 United States' first written submission, para. 197.
1239 United States' first written submission, para. 198.
1240 United States' first written submission, para. 199.
1241 United States' first written submission, para. 200.
1242 United States' first written submission, para. 201.
1243 United States' second written submission, para. 124.
1244 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34.
1245 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34; United States' second
written submission, para. 121.
1246 India's first written submission, para. 276.

the Terrestrial Code, which constitutes the releva nt international standard in this case, the
obligations under Annex B(5)(a), (b) and (d) are not applicable to India.1247
7.727. In addition, India asserts that it notified S.O. 1663(E) as an emergency measure pursuant
to Annex B(6), which was promulgated in response to concerns of human and animal health
security from NAI reporting countries.1248
7.10.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.10.2.1 Introduction
7.728. The issue before the Panel is whether India has acted inconsistently with Article 7,
Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a) through (d) of the SPS Agreement because it did not provide
information on its AI measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B. This claim covers a
number of obligations allegedly violated by India. In particular, we need to establish whether, as
the United States claims, India has acted inconsistently with:
a. Annex B(5)(a), because it failed to publish its AI measures at an early stage in such
manner to enable interested Members to become acquainted with the proposal;
b. Annex B(5)(b), because it failed to notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the
products to be covered by the measures along with the objective and rationale of the
measures, at an early stage where amendments could be introduced and comments
taken in to account;
c. Annex B(5)(c), because it failed to identify the parts of its AI measures which in
substance deviate from international standards, guidelines, or recommendations
1249;
d. Annex B(5)(d), because India did not allow a reasonable time for comments1250; and
e. Annex B(2), because it failed to allow a reasonable interval between the publication of its
measures and their entry into force.1251
7.729. India responds that the United States' claims are "misplaced" because, pursuant to the
chapeau of Annex B(5), the obligations under that paragraph arise only when there are no
international standards or the content of the measure is not the same as the content of the
standard. For India, the obligations under Annex B( 5) of the SPS Agreement are not applicable to
India because S.O. 1663(E) conforms to the Terrestrial Code, which constitutes the relevant
international standard in this case.
1252 In addition, India contends that it has notified S.O. 1663(E)
as an emergency measure pursuant to Annex B(6), which was promulgated in response to
concerns of human and animal health security from NAI reporting countries.
1253
7.730. Hence we must determine whether India's interpretation of Annex B(5) is correct, and if it
is, whether its measures conform to the relevant international standard. We must also decide
whether India was entitled to rely on Annex B(6) in the circumstances of this case.
7.731. Regarding India's interpretation of Annex B(5), we recall our findings in sections 7.4.2.2.5
and 7.4.2.2.6 above that India's AI measures are not based on the Terrestrial Code and that, as
explained in section 7.4.2.3 above, they do not conform to the Terrestrial Code. Therefore, India
cannot rely on the alleged conformity of its AI measures to the Terrestrial Code in order to justify
a presumption of consistency of those measures with the remainder of the SPS Agreement,
including Article 7 and Annex B.

1247 India's first written submission, para. 276; India's response to Panel question Nos. 51-53.
1248 India's response to Panel question Nos. 50 and 68.
1249 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p.3.
1250 United States' first written submission, para. 196.
1251 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p.3.
1252 India's first written submission, para. 276.
1253 India's response to Panel question Nos. 50 and 68.

7.732. Another preliminary issue regards our terms of reference and the scope of the measures
concerned by the United States' claim under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement. In its
panel request, the United States claims that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 7 and
Annex B for a number of reasons. Later, in its submissions to this Panel, the United States outlines
a number of instances in which India has "habitually" notified certain AI measures after they have
gone into effect, as well as some instances where "India appears to have failed entirely to notify
the measures".
1254 When describing these instances, the United States refers to several measures
adopted by India prior to S.O. 1663(E) and imposing an LPAI-based import ban on a temporary
basis or amending the ban. 1255 The United States thus refers to measures other than the
Livestock Act and S.O. 1663(E). We understand that these other measures pre-date S.O. 1663(E)
and were not in force at the time of the United States' panel request, i.e. 11 May 2012.
7.733. We recall our preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013 which, as explained in paragraph 7.4
above, forms an integral part of the present findings. In particular, we found that India's
AI measures are those measures that "prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into
India from those countries reporting [NAI]", which are maintained through the Livestock Act and
S.O. 1663(E).
1256 We also found that the United States is challenging only the measures that were
in force as of the date of the panel request, i.e. 11 May 2012. 1257 Accordingly, those measures
referred to by the United States when arguing its claim under Article 7 and Annex B, which were
not in force at the time of the panel request, do not constitute India's AI measures for the purpose
of the present dispute. We shall therefore refrain from examining the arguments of the
United States which relate to those other meas ures because they fall outside our terms of
reference.
7.734. Having made these preliminary observations, we now proceed to examine the legal
provisions at issue to ascertain the applicable legal test.
7.10.2.2 The legal provisions at issue
7.735. Article 7 of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Transparency", reads as follows:
Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall
provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with
the provisions of Annex B.
7.736. Article 7 refers to Annex B of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Transparency of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Regulations", which reads in relevant part:
Publication of regulations
…
2. Except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a reasonable interval
between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and its entry into
force in order to allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in
developing country Members, to adapt thei r products and methods of production to
the requirements of the importing Member.
…

1254 United States' first written submission, para. 194.
1255 These are S.O. 102(E) dated February 2, 2007 (Exhibit US-73); S.O. 1311(E) dated August 1, 2007;
S.O. 1859(E) dated November 1, 2007 (Exhibit US-113); S.O. 228(E) dated January 31, 2008 (Exhibit US-74);
S.O. 1892(E) dated July 30, 2008 (Exhibit US-75); S.O. 419(E) dated February 9, 2009 (Exhibit US-76);
S.O. 2208(E) dated August 28, 2009 (Exhibit US-77); S.O. 616(E) dated March 18, 2010 (Exhibit US-78);
S.O. 2976(E) dated December 10, 2010 (Exhibit US-79). United States' first written submission, para. 194.
1256 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.33-3.34, and 4.1a.
1257 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.64-3.65, 3.66f and 4.1d.

Notification procedures
5. Whenever an international standard, guideline or recommendation does not
exist or the content of a proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulation is not
substantially the same as the content of an international standard, guideline or
recommendation, and if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other
Members, Members shall:
(a) publish a notice at an early stage in such a manner as to enable
interested Members to become acquainted with the proposal to introduce a
particular regulation;
(b) notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products to be
covered by the regulation together with a brief indication of the objective and
rationale of the proposed regulation. Such notifications shall take place at an
early stage, when amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into
account;
(c) provide upon request to other Members copies of the proposed regulation
and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate from
international standards, guidelines or recommendations;
(d) without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to make
comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take the
comments and the results of the discussions into account.
6. However, where urgent problems of health protection arise or threaten to arise
for a Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 5 of
this Annex as it finds necessary, provided that the Member:
(a) immediately notifies other Members, through the Secretariat, of the
particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the
objective and the rationale of the regulati on, including the nature of the urgent
problem(s);
(b) provides, upon request, copies of the regulation to other Members;
(c) allows other Members to make comments in writing, discusses these
comments upon request, and takes the comments and the results of the
discussions into account.
7.737. We observe that Article 7 and Annex B are entitled "Transparency" and "Transparency of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations", respectively. This means that the transparency
provisions of Annex B apply only to measures that qualify as "SPS regulations". A threshold issue
before us therefore is whether India's AI measures are "SPS regulations" within the scope of
Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
7.738. The term "SPS regulations" is defined in the footnote to Annex B(1) as "[SPS] measures
such as laws, decrees or ordinances which are applicable generally". The Appellate Body in Japan –
Agricultural Products II clarified that the footnote to Annex B(1) includes an illustrative list of
instruments, as indicated by the words "such as". This list is therefore not exhaustive. The
Appellate Body explained that the scope of the term "SPS regulation" also includes, in addition to
"laws, decrees or ordinances", other instruments which are "applicable generally" and are "similar
in character" to the instruments explicitly referre d to in the illustrative list of the footnote to
Annex B(1).
1258

1258 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 105. The Appellate Body further
explained that:
The object and purpose of paragraph 1 of Annex B is "to enable interested Members to become
acquainted with" the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations adopted or maintained by other
Members and thus to enhance transparency regarding these measures. In our opinion, the scope

7.739. We recall that India's AI measures are maintained through the Livestock Act and
S.O. 1663(E).1259 We also recall that, when considering whether India's measures are
SPS measures subject to the disciplines set out in the SPS Agreement, we found that both legal
instruments qualify as either "laws", "decrees" or "regulations" within the terms of the second
sentence of Annex A(1).
1260 In our view, irrespective of the actual designation of the legal
instruments through which India's AI measures are maintained, both instruments qualify as "laws,
decrees or ordinances" or, at the very least, legal instruments of general application within the
terms of the footnote to Annex B(1). Accordingly, we conclude that India's AI measures constitute
"SPS regulations" for the purpose of Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
7.740. Given the number of provisions under which the United States pursues this claim, we
consider it pertinent to address the relationship between Article 7 and Annex B in order to consider
the bearing this may have on the order of our analysis.
7.10.2.3 Relationship between Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement
7.741. Article 7 of the SPS Agreement requires Me mbers to notify changes in their SPS measures
and to provide information on their SPS measures "in accordance with the provisions of Annex B".
Therefore, Article 7 must be read together with the provisions of Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
The intertwined nature of the relationship between Article 7 and Annex B has led prior panels and
the Appellate Body to find that an inconsistency with the provisions of Annex B results in an
inconsistency with Article 7
1261, and that a failure to prove a violation of Annex B results in the
same failure regarding Article 7 .1262 Accordingly, in line with prior jurisprudence, we proceed with
our examination by looking into the United States' claims under Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
7.742. In this respect, the United States suggests that we follow a particular order of analysis.
The United States advises us to commence by considering its claims pursuant to Annex B(5)(a)
and (b) prior to considering its claim under Annex B(5)(d), on the grounds that this path would
likely be the most efficient because India's failure to allow reasonable time for comments as
required by Annex B(5)(d) follows from India's failure to publish any advance notice of its
regulations or to provide any advance notice to other Members of covered products. The
United States proposes that we then consider its claim under Annex B(2) because, if we were to
establish that India published no notice of S.O. 1663(E) before its entry into force in breach of
Annex (5)(a), "little further analysis will be required" to conclude that India breached its obligation
to allow a reasonable interval between the publication of the SPS regulation and its entry into force
pursuant to Annex B(2).
1263
7.743. India refrains from suggesting any particular order of analysis; rather, India argues that it
had notified S.O. 1663(E) as an emergency measure pursuant to Annex B(6) and therefore, "the
obligations under paragraph[s] 5(a), 5(b) and 5(d) are inapplicable to India".1264
7.744. We thus turn to consider the relationship between Annex B(2), Annex B(5) and Annex B(6)
of the SPS Agreement.
7.745. Annex B(2) obliges Members to "allow a reasonable interval between the publication of a
sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and its entry into force". We consider that this obligation
should be understood in the context of the immediately preceding Annex B(1), which obliges
Members to "ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which have been adopted are
published promptly in such a manner as to enable interested Members to become acquainted with
them". We therefore understand that those measur es that are the subject of the obligation to

of application of the publication requirement of paragraph 1 of Annex B should be interpreted in
the light of the object and purpose of this provision.
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 106.
1259 Preliminary ruling of 22 May 2013, paras. 3.33-3.34, and 4.1a.
1260 Paras. 7.140-7.141 above.
1261 Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.116; and Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Agricultural Products II, para. 108.
1262 Panel Reports, Japan – Apples, para. 8.327; and EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
para. 7.1777.
1263 United States' response to Panel question No. 51.
1264 India's response to Panel question No. 51.

publish in Annex B(2) are those measures that have been "adopted", but have not yet entered into
force.
7.746. Annex B(5), in contrast, explicitly refers to "proposed" SPS regulations. We observe that
Annex B(6) allows Members to omit such of the steps enumerated in Annex B(5) in the event of
"urgent problems of health protection" or a threat thereof, provided certain conditions are met.
Specifically, Annex B(6)(c) speaks of "allow[ing] … Members to make comments in writing,
discuss[] these comments upon request, and tak[e] the comments and the results of the
discussions into account". The actions described in Annex B(6)(c) would take place while the
SPS regulation is still in draft form such that amendments can be introduced and comments taken
into account.
1265 Put differently, we understand that Annex B(5) and Annex B(6) apply while an
SPS regulation remains a "proposal", but prior to it being "adopted", at which point Annex B(2)
would apply.
7.747. We further observe that the language in Annex B(5) and Annex B(6) is similar to that in
Articles 2.91266 and 2.10 1267 of the TBT Agreement. Under the circumstances, we consider it
appropriate to develop our understanding of the relationship between Annex B(5) and Annex B(6)
of the SPS Agreement with the relationship between Articles 2.9 and 2.10 of the TBT Agreement in
mind. We note that the panel in US – Clove Cigarettes examined the relationship between
Articles 2.9 and 2.10 of the TBT Agreement and was of the view that "the fact that Article 2.10 of
the TBT Agreement only applies when a Member is departing from the general obligations
established in Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement enta ils that these two provisions have two distinct
and separate scopes".
1268 The panel thus decided to commence its analysis with Article 2.10 (the

1265 This was also the understanding of the panel in US – Clove Cigarettes when interpreting
Articles 2.9.2 and 2.9.3 of the TBT Agreement, which provide for similar obligations in respect of technical
regulations. The panel concluded that these provisions were only applicable to "'proposed technical
regulations', i.e., technical regulations which are still in draft form and thus … amendments can still be
introduced and comments taken into account". Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.545.
1266 Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement reads as follows:
Whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content of a proposed
technical regulation is not in accordance with the technical content of relevant international
standards, and if the technical regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other
Members, Members shall:

2.9.1 publish a notice in a publ ication at an early appropriate stage, in such a manner as
to enable interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with it, that they
propose to introduce a particular technical regulation;

2.9.2 notify other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be covered by the
proposed technical regulation, together with a brief indication of its objective and
rationale. Such notifications shall take place at an early appropriate stage, when
amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into account;

2.9.3 upon request, provide to other Member s particulars or copies of the proposed
technical regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate
from relevant international standards;

2.9.4 without discrimination, allow reason able time for other Members to make
comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written
comments and the results of these discussions into account.
1267 Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions in the lead-in to paragraph 9, where urgent problems of safety, health,
environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise for a Member, that
Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 9 as it finds necessary, provided
that the Member, upon adoption of a technical regulation, shall:

2.10.1 notify immediately other Members through the Secretariat of the particular
technical regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and
the rationale of the technical regulation, including the nature of the urgent problems;

2.10.2 upon request, provide other Members with copies of the technical regulation;

2.10.3 without discrimination, allow other Members to present their comments in writing,
discuss these comments upon request, and take these written comments and the results
of these discussions into account.
1268 The panel in US – Clove Cigarettes said:

equivalent provision to Annex B(6)) and, provided the conditions of urgency described in this
provision were not fulfilled, it would then proc eed with the examination of the claims under
Article 2.9 (the equivalent provision to Annex B(5)). 1269 Given the similarity of the language of the
provisions examined by that panel and those before us now, we believe this approach also makes
sense for the conduct of our analysis of Annex B(5) and Annex B(6).
7.748. On the basis of foregoing, the Panel decides to commence with the first paragraph of
Annex B at issue in these proceedings, i.e. Annex B(2). The next paragraph at issue is Annex B(5).
Nonetheless, given that Annex B(6) allows Members to omit such of the steps enumerated in
Annex B(5) in the event of "urgent problems of health protection" or a threat thereof, and our
decision to follow the analytical approach adopted by the panel in US – Clove Cigarettes , we will
move next to examine whether those circumstances referred to in Annex B(6) exist in this dispute.
The outcome of our examination under Annex B(6) will determine whether India was permitted to
omit steps enumerated in Annex B(5). If we find that there are no urgent problems of health
protection or a threat thereof, we will then proceed with our assessment under Annex B(5).
7.10.2.4 Whether India has acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) of the SPS Agreement
7.749. The United States claims that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) on two grounds:
first, India failed to comply with Annex B(2) because it "has never provided for any interval of time
between publication of the Notifications at issue and their entry into force"
1270; and, second,
India's notifications imposing a ban for a period of six months were not always renewed within six
months of when India issued its previous notifi cation. For the United States, this means that,
during the "gap periods", India's import restrict ions constituted an unpublished SPS measure, and
by maintaining an unpublished LPAI-based import ban, India breached, inter alia, Annex B(2).
1271
7.750. We refer to our conclusion in paragraph 7.733 above that, when examining the
United States' claims under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement, we will consider only
those of India's measures that are part of our te rms of reference. For the purpose of this claim,
the relevant measure is S.O. 1663(E), which was published in the Gazette of India on 19 July 2011
and came into effect on that same date.
1272 Hence, the United States' argumentation concerning
unpublished SPS measures (which are not within our terms of reference) is not part of our analysis
with respect to the United States' claim pursuant to Annex B(2). We thus proceed to examine
whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) because it failed to allow a reasonable interval
between the publication of S.O. 1663(E) and its entry into force.
7.751. We recall that Annex B(2) reads as follows:
2. Except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a reasonable interval
between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and its entry into
force in order to allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in
developing country Members, to adapt thei r products and methods of production to
the requirements of the importing Member.
7.752. Consequently, except in urgent circumstances, Annex B(2) obliges Members to allow a
"reasonable interval" between the publication of an SPS regulation and its entry into force.
Annex B(2) also specifies the reason such an interval is needed: "to allow time for producers in

We note that the obligations under Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement are only applicable when a
Member omitted the steps enumerated in Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement because "urgent
problems of safety, health, environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to
arise". In our view, the fact that Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement only applies when a Member
is departing from the general obligations established in Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement entails
that these two provisions have two distinct and separate scopes. Indeed, we see no situation in
which a WTO Member's actions would fall within the scope of both obligations at the same time.
Either the Member in question follows the general requirements under Article 2.9 of the TBT
Agreement, or it decides to omit those requirements owing to any of the listed "urgent problems"
described in Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement.
Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.502.
1269 Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.503
1270 United States' first written submission, para. 197.
1271 United States' first written submission, paras. 198-199.
1272 Section 2.3.2 above.

exporting Members to adapt their products or meth ods of production to the requirements of the
importing Member".
7.753. We observe that the opening words of Annex B(2) indicate that the obligation to allow a
reasonable interval between publication and entry into force applies "except in urgent
circumstances". A preliminary question therefore is whether the obligation in Annex B(2) is
inapplicable to the circumstances of this case du e to the existence of urgent circumstances with
respect to S.O. 1663(E).
7.754. The United States argues that the "urgen t circumstances" foreseen in Annex B(2) did not
exist in this case. It maintains that, from 2007 up to and including the promulgation of
S.O. 1663(E), India was issuing notifications that, with or without slight modification, merely
renewed similar or identical notifications with set expiration dates. In its view, because these
expiration dates were known from the time that the expiring notification was promulgated, the
need for a new notification can hardly be considered an "urgent circumstance" that would justify
the lack of any interval between the dates of publication and entry into force.
1273
7.755. India has not alleged any urgent circumstances in this respect. Indeed, although India
argued that S.O. 1663(E) was notified as an emergency measure, it did so in respect of
Annex B(6) which, as explained in paragraph 7.746 above, is concerned with the publication
obligations of Members in respect of "proposed" regulations (in this case, the draft S.O. 1663(E)).
As explained in paragraph 7.745 above, the "urgent circumstances" in Annex B(2) concern
adopted regulations (in this case, the already adopted S.O. 1663(E)).
7.756. We observe that India's notification of S.O. 1663(E) was circulated by the WTO Secretariat
to Members on 11 October 2011, after being notifi ed by India to the Secretariat on 7 October
2011.
1274 This notification occurred well after S.O. 1663(E) entered into force on 19 July 2011.
Moreover, the evidence on the record shows that , from 2007 up to and including the promulgation
of S.O. 1663(E), India submitted several successive notifications to the WTO concerning similar AI-
related import regulations.1275 We find it difficult to accept that, given the evidence on the record,
there were "urgent circumstances" of the kind foreseen in Annex B(2). India has not made any
arguments to the contrary.
7.757. Accordingly, given the evidence on the reco rd and in the absence of a rebuttal by India,
the Panel concludes that there were no "urgent circumstances" within the meaning of Annex B(2)
that would have permitted India to bypass the obligation to allow a reasonable interval between
publication and the entry into force of S.O. 1663(E).
7.758. Our next step is to establish whether India "allow[ed] a reasonable interval" between the
publication of S.O. 1663(E) and its entry into force. It is undisputed by the parties that
S.O. 1663(E) was published in the Gazette of Indi a on 19 July 2011 and came into effect on that
same date. Clearly, India did not allow any interval at all between publication and entry into force.
7.759. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) of
the SPS Agreement because it failed to allow a reasonable interval between the publication of
S.O. 1663(E) and its entry into force and no urgent circumstances existed that would have
permitted India to bypass such obligation.
7.10.2.5 Whether India can rely upon Annex B(6) of the SPS Agreement to omit steps in
Annex B(5)
7.760. India asserts that it notified S.O. 1663(E) as an emergency measure pursuant to
Annex B(6), which was promulgated in response to concerns of human and animal health security
from NAI reporting countries.
1276 According to the United States, however, "[a]t no point in this
proceeding … has India attempted to argue that S.O. 1663(E) [–] or any predecessor instrument

1273 United States' response to Panel question No. 52.
1274 G/SPS/N/IND/73.
1275 United States' response to Panel question No. 52.
1276 India's response to Panel question Nos. 50 and 68.

implementing India's AI measures [–] in fact meets the requirements set out in [Annex B(6)] to
exempt a Member from the requirements of paragraph 5".1277
7.761. We commence by recalling the text of Annex B(6), which reads as follows:
6. However, where urgent problems of health protection arise or threaten to arise
for a Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 5 of
this Annex as it finds necessary, provided that the Member:
(a) immediately notifies other Members, through the Secretariat, of the
particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the
objective and the rationale of the regulati on, including the nature of the urgent
problem(s);
(b) provides, upon request, copies of the regulation to other Members;
(c) allows other Members to make comments in writing, discusses these
comments upon request, and takes the comments and the results of the
discussions into account.
7.762. The chapeau of Annex B(6) allows a Member to omit steps prescribed in Annex B(5) in
respect of a proposed SPS regulation "where urgent problems of health protection arise or
threaten to arise for a Member". Annex B(6) imposes three additional conditions that must be met
for a Member to take advantage of this exceptional approach, namely: (a) to notify immediately
other Members, through the Secretariat, of that particular regulation and the products covered,
with a brief indication of the objective and the rationale of the regulation, including the nature of
the urgent problem(s); (b) to provide, upon request, copies of the regulation to other Members;
and (c) to allow other Members to make comments in writing, and to discuss these comments
upon request and take the comments and the results of the discussions into account. A plain
reading of Annex B(6) makes it clear that the condition in the chapeau and the three additional
conditions set forth in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are cumulative, such that all four conditions
must be met before a Member may take advantage of Annex B(6).
7.763. India asserts that it notified S.O. 1663(E) as an emergency measure pursuant to
Annex B(6) of the SPS Agreement. However, Indi a has not adduced any evidence to support its
assertion that S.O. 1663(E) was adopted under the circumstances foreseen in the chapeau of
Annex B(6), namely the presence of "urgent problems of health protection" or a threat thereof. As
we said in paragraph 7.756 above, India's notification of S.O. 1663(E) was circulated by the
WTO Secretariat to WTO Members on 11 October 2011, after being notified to the Secretariat by
India on 7 October 2011.
1278 This notification occurred well after S.O. 1663(E) entered into force
on 19 July 2011. We note that the Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency
Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7) ("SPS Committee's Transparency Procedures")
adopted by the SPS Committee provides that "[t]he late notification of a measure already in force
does not in and of itself constitute sufficient reason for the use of the emergency format".
1279
Moreover, as we have explained, the evidence on the record shows that, from 2007 up to and
including the promulgation of S.O. 1663(E), India submitted several successive notifications to the
WTO concerning similar AI-related import regulations. 1280 Under such circumstances, the
notification in 2011 could not have been made "where urgent problems of health protection
[arose] or threaten[ed] to arise," as required in the chapeau of Annex B(6). Nor has India made
any compelling arguments to persuade us otherwis e. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the
condition prescribed in the chapeau of Annex B(6) was not present with respect to S.O. 1663(E) at
the time of its proposal.
7.764. Since the condition in the chapeau has not been met, we do not need to inquire into the
three additional conditions of Annex B(6). In an y event, India has not provided any evidence to
the Panel with a view to proving that the three additional conditions in Annex B(6) had been met.

1277 United States' second written submission, para. 124.
1278 G/SPS/N/IND/73.
1279 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para. 15.
1280 United States' response to Panel question No. 52.

7.765. Accordingly, we find that India cannot rely upon Annex B(6) of the SPS Agreement to
justify omitting the steps enumerated in Annex B(5). We therefore proceed to examine whether,
as claimed by the United States, India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) through (d) of the
SPS Agreement.
7.10.2.6 Whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) through (d) of the
SPS Agreement
7.10.2.6.1 Introduction
7.766. The United States claims that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) through (d) of
the SPS Agreement. According to the United States , India's AI measures are not substantially the
same as the content of an international standard, guideline, or recommendation and they have a
significant effect on the trade of other Members.
1281 Consequently, India is required to provide
information on its AI measures in accordance with the requirements of Annex B. India did not
provide this information and, therefore, it has acted inconsistently with its SPS obligations in
Annex B(5)(a) though (d).
7.767. India argues that the obligations in the relevant paragraphs of Annex B(5) do not apply to
India because, pursuant to the chapeau of Annex B(5), the obligations under that paragraph arise
only when there are no international standards or the content of the measure is not the same as
the content of the standard. India maintains that S.O. 1663(E) conforms to the Terrestrial Code,
which constitutes the relevant international standard in this case, with the result that the
obligations under Annex B(5)(a) through (d) do not apply to India.
1282
7.768. We observe that India's defence under Annex B(5) hinges entirely on its contention that
the conditions specified in the chapeau of Annex B(5) are not fulfilled. We thus shall commence
our analysis under Annex B(5) by examining whether the conditions specified in the chapeau of
Annex B(5) are satisfied in the present dispute. We recall that, as explained in paragraph 7.746
above, Annex B(5) explicitly refers to "propose d" regulations. Accordingly, given our terms of
reference, we examine the United States' claims under Annex B(5)(a) through (d) with respect to
the draft S.O. 1663(E).
7.10.2.6.2 Whether the conditions specified in the chapeau of Annex B(5) are satisfied
7.769. The United States submits that, according to its chapeau, Annex B(5) applies (i) where a
relevant international standard does not exist or the content of the proposed SPS regulation is not
substantially the same as the content of an international standard, guideline or recommendation;
and (ii) if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other Members. For the
United States, both these conditions are met in the present case because "India's measures do not
correspond to the OIE guidelines" and "by imposing a ban that precludes members from shipping
covered products to India, the measures clearly have a significant impact on international
trade".
1283
7.770. India responds that the conditions of the chapeau of Annex B(5) are not fulfilled because
international standards and guidelines do exist in the present case in the form of the
Terrestrial Code, and S.O. 1663(E) conforms to the Code.1284
7.771. We recall that the text of the chapeau of Annex B(5) reads as follows:
5. Whenever an international standard, guideline or recommendation does not
exist or the content of a proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulation is not
substantially the same as the content of an international standard, guideline or
recommendation, and if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other
Members, Members shall:

1281 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3; United States' first written submission,
para. 20.
1282 India's first written submission, para. 276; India's response to Panel question Nos. 51-53.
1283 United States' first written submission, para. 191; United States' second written submission,
paras. 122-123.
1284 India's first written submission, para. 276.

7.772. The panel in Japan – Apples noted with respect to Annex B(5) of the SPS Agreement that it
"foresees the notification of SPS regulations if a number of conditions are cumulatively met", i.e.:
(a) where a relevant international standard does not exist or the content
of the proposed measure is not substantially the same as the content of
an international standard, guideline or recommendation, and
(b) if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other
Members.1285
7.773. In the present case, the second condition, i.e. whether the regulation may have a
significant effect on trade of other Members, is not disputed. We recall that, when examining
whether India's AI measures are SPS measures within the disciplines set out in the
SPS Agreement, we concluded that they affect international trade. The c hapeau of Annex B(5)
qualifies the effect on trade as "significant". We note that the ordinary meaning of the term
significant is "sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy; consequential,
influential".
1286 In our view, S.O. 1663(E), an outright prohibition on the importation of the listed
agricultural products into India from countries reporting NAI constitutes the most restrictive
measure a Member could take with respect to trade. Under the circumstances, we conclude that
S.O. 1663(E) has an effect on trade that is "significant".
7.774. Concerning the first condition – "a relevant international standard … does not exist or the
content of the proposed measure is not substantially the same as the content of an international
standard" – we found in section 7.4.2.2.1.2 above that there is a relevant international standard
for most of the products covered by S.O. 1663(E), wh ich is the Terrestrial Code and, in particular
Chapter 10.4 thereof. We further found that India's AI measures are not "based on", nor do they
"conform to", the relevant international standard. For the purpose of the chapeau of Annex B(5),
however, the analysis is different – the inquiry is whether the content of the proposed
SPS regulation "is not substantially the same" as the content of the relevant international
standard.
1287 We must therefore assess whether the content of S.O. 1663(E) "is not substantially
the same" as the content of the Terrestrial Code.
7.775. The United States submits that the dictionary defines "substantially" as "[e]ssentially,
intrinsically," and "[i]n essentials, to all intents and purposes, in the main." 1288 The United States
also points out that when interpreting the phrase "substantially the same" as used in Article XXIV
of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body has expl ained that "something closely approximating
'sameness' is required".
1289 Accordingly, in the United States' view, the requirements of
Annex B(5) apply when a Member's regulation is "not essentially the same as an international
standard".
1290
7.776. The United States contends that, in the present case, there is no need for the Panel to
elucidate criteria for evaluating whether measures are "substantially the same" as international
standards for the purposes of Annex B(5).
1291 For the United States, India's measures provide for
trade bans following detections of LPNAI, while the relevant international standards do not provide
for trade bans following LPNAI detections. Accordingly, in the United States' view, India's
measures are "fundamentally in contradiction to, and not at all the same as, the relevant
international standards".
1292 Moreover, the United States adds that with respect to live pigs

1286 The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed 16 April 2014,
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/179569?redirectedFrom=significant#eid>.
1287 The SPS Committee's Transparency Procedures encourage Members to notify all regulations that are
based on, conform to, or are substantially the same as an international standard, guideline or recommendation
if they are expected to have a significant effect on trade of other Members. G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para. 8.
1288 United States' response to Panel question No. 53 (referring to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
p. 3124 (Exhibit US-140)).
1289 United States' response to Panel question No. 53 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Turkey –
Textiles, para. 50).
1290 United States' response to Panel question No. 53; United States' second written submission,
para. 123.
1291 United States' response to Panel question No. 53.
1292 United States' response to Panel question No. 53; United States' second written submission,
para. 123.

covered by S.O. 1663(E), there is no international standard for AI to which India's measures could
be compared.1293
7.777. India notes that Annex B(5) does not use the word "conform to" but requires that the
content of a measure be "substantially the same" as an international standard. According to India,
this in any case "covers a situation such as the present one where S.O. 1663(E) contains
measures concerning products for which international guidelines exist as well as products for which
there are no international guidelines".
1294 Since its measures concerning poultry products
contained in S.O. 1663(E) conform to the Terrestrial Code, S.O. 1663(E) is also "substantially the
same" as the relevant international standard.1295
7.778. There is no jurisprudence that addresses the meaning of "substantially the same" in the
context of the chapeau of Annex B(5). In Turkey – Textiles , the Appellate Body agreed with the
panel in that the terms "substantially the same" used in Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) of the GATT 1994
offer a certain degree of "flexibility". 1296 However, the Appellate Body cautioned that this
"flexibility" is limited and that "[i]t must not be forgotten that the word 'substantially' qualifies the
words 'the same'. Therefore, in our view, someth ing closely approximating 'sameness' is required
by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii)."1297
7.779. We think it appropriate to follow the guidan ce of the Appellate Body in its interpretation of
the terms "substantially the same". Although th e Appellate Body was considering the meaning of
those terms as they appear in Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) of the GATT 1994 and not as used in the
provision before us, its analysis is nevertheless apt for our purposes. The focus of the
Appellate Body's inquiry was on the word "substantially" and its qualification of the word "same".
We, too, must determine how "substantially" modi fies the word "same". Therefore, we adopt the
Appellate Body's approach and consider for our purposes that "substantially the same" means that
"something closely approximating 'sameness' is required".
7.780. In the circumstances of the present case, it is not necessary for us to develop criteria for
evaluating whether the content of S.O. 1663(E) is "substantially the same" as the content of the
Terrestrial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 th ereof, within the meaning of Annex B(5) of the
SPS Agreement. It appears to us that, for the content of an SPS regulation to be "substantially the
same" as the content of an international standard, the former must be at least "based on" the
latter according to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
7.781. In this regard, we recall our findings in sections 7.4.2.2.5 and 7.4.2.2.6 above that India's
AI measures are not based on the Terrestrial Code and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, and
that, as explained in section 7.4.2.3 above, they do not conform to the Terrestrial Code and, in
particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof. Moreover, as we have found in section 7.4.2.2.2 above, live pigs
are not covered by the recommendations in Chap ter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code and, to our
knowledge, there is no other relevant international standard for AI applicable to live pigs. We also
refer to our findings in section 7.4.2.2.2 above that there is no product-specific recommendation in
Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code for "pathologica l material and biological products from birds",
and that we do not have sufficient evidence on record to determine whether India's AI measures in
respect of these products are based on the recommendations of Chapter 5.8 of the
Terrestrial Code. In the light of these findings, it is not possible to conclude that there is
"something closely approximating'sameness' is required" between S.O. 1663(E) and the
Terrestrial Code and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof.
7.782. Accordingly, we conclude that the content of S.O. 1663(E) is not "substantially the same"
as the content of the Terrestrial Code, and in pa rticular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, within the meaning
of Annex B(5) of the SPS Agreement. As the conditions specified in the chapeau of Annex B(5) are
satisfied, we proceed to examine whether India has acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a)
through (d).

1293 United States' second written submission, para. 123.
1294 India's response to Panel question No. 53.
1295 India's response to Panel question No. 53.
1296 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 50.
1297 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 50.

7.10.2.6.3 Whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a)
7.783. The United States claims that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) of the
SPS Agreement because India failed to publish a notice of a proposed regulation at an early stage
so as to enable Members to become acquainted with the proposal.
1298
7.784. India does not contest that it has not published a notice about S.O. 1663(E) "at an early
stage", when it was proposed, contrary to the requirement of Annex B(5)(a). Accordingly, in the
absence of the evidence to the contrary from Indi a, the Panel finds that India acted inconsistently
with Annex B(5)(a) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to publish a notice "at an early stage"
about the "proposed" S.O. 1663(E).
7.10.2.6.4 Whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(b)
7.785. The United States claims that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(b) because it has
"habitually" notified its AI measures "after they have gone into effect and without any indication of
their objective or rationale".
1299
7.786. Annex B(5)(b) of the SPS Agreement requires WTO Members to notify other Members,
through the WTO Secretariat, "of the products to be covered by the measures together with a brief
indication of the objective and rationale of th e proposed regulation". Annex B(5)(b) further
provides that "[s]uch notification shall take place at an early stage, when amendments can still be
introduced and comments taken into account".
7.787. The United States argues that the language of Annex B(5)(b), namely the requirement
that notifications occur "when amendments can still be introduced", as well as the reference to
provision of information about the "proposed regulation", and use of the future tense in requiring
notification of the products "to be covered", clearly indicates that the notification must occur
before the measure takes effect.
1300
7.788. As discussed in paragraph 7.746 above, we agree with the United States that
Annex B(5)(b) concerns the notification of a "proposed" regulation and thus notification must occur
at least before that regulation enters into force, so that amendments can still be introduced and
comments taken into account. We note that the SPS Committee's Transparency Procedures
1301
support our understanding that the notification obligation in Annex B(5)(b) concerns proposed
regulations, as it recommends that the notification takes place once a draft of the complete text of
a regulation is available. These procedures also recommend allowing a 60-day comment period
that starts on the date the notification is circulated to Members.
1302
7.789. We observe that India did notify S.O. 1663(E) to the WTO Secretariat on 7 October
2011.1303 India's notification was circulated by the Secretariat to WTO Members on 11 October
2011.1304 This notification occurred well after S.O. 1663(E) entered into force on 19 July 2011.
Therefore, the notification did not concern a "p roposed" SPS regulation; rather, it concerned a
regulation already in force.
7.790. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary provided by India, the Panel finds
that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(b) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to notify
other Members through the WTO Secretariat, "at an early stage", of the "proposed" S.O. 1663(E).

1298 United States' first written submission, para. 199.
1299 United States' first written submission, para. 194.
1300 United States' first written submission, para. 192.
1301 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para. 2.
1302 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para. 13. The WTO Secretariat's Annual Overview of the Implementation of the
Transparency Provisions of the SPS Agreement from 20 October 2013 contains an analysis of the notifications
issued during the period from 15 September 2012 until 15 September 2013. During this period, 76% of regular
(i.e. non-emergency) notifications provided a comment period. G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.6, para. 3.26.
1303 Section 2.4.1 above.
1304 G/SPS/N/IND/73.

7.10.2.6.5 Whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(c)
7.791. In its panel request, the United States claimed that India acted inconsistently with
Annex B(5)(a) to (5)(d) because it failed to, inter alia, identify the parts of its AI measures which,
in substance, deviate from international standards, guidelines or recommendations.
1305 We note,
however, that the United States has not submitted any arguments on its claim under
Annex B(5)(c) in any of its written or oral submissions. When asked by the Panel whether it was
pursuing this claim, the United States responded that it has not separately articulated a breach by
India of Annex B(5)(c) in its submissions because India's breaches of Annex B(5)(a) and (b) left
the United States unaware of India's AI measures until they became final, thereby preventing the
United States from requesting copies of th em when they remained in non-final form.
1306 India
responded that its AI measures conform to the Terrestrial Code.1307
7.792. In the absence of argumentation, the Panel concludes that the United States failed to
make a prima facie case of violation of Annex B(5)(c) by India. Accordingly, the Panel declines to
make a finding with respect to the Unites States' claim pursuant to Annex B(5)(c).
7.10.2.6.6 Whether India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d)
7.793. The United States claims that, because India did not publish a notice of any proposed
regulation for any of its AI measures, India did not allow a reasonable time for comments and thus
acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d). 1308 The United States also points out that provisions of
Annex B(5)(d) appear to be closely related to An nex B(5)(a), as the requirement concerning the
early stage of publication serves to enable Members to offer the comments envisioned in
Annex B(5)(d).
1309
7.794. Pursuant to Annex B(5)(d) of the SPS Agreement, Members, with respect to their proposed
SPS regulations, shall "without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to make
comments in writing, discuss these comments up on request, and take the comments and the
results of the discussions into account".
1310
7.795. We note that the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products considered that
the requirements of paragraph (d) of Annex B(5) are closely related to other paragraphs of
Annex B(5). In particular, the panel reasoned that when a proposed regulation has not been
published at an early stage, as required in Annex B(5)(a) and brought to the attention of other
Members through the notification required in Annex B(5)(b), and copies provided upon request as
established in Annex B(5)(c), "it is difficult to imagine how an interested Member would gain
sufficient knowledge of the content of the proposed regulation to be able to avail itself of the
opportunity to submit comments as foreseen in [Annex B(5)(d)]".
1311 We concur with this
understanding. Indeed, as we have found above, In dia did not publish a notice "at an early stage"
about S.O. 1663(E) when this measure was at the proposal stage. Furthermore, India did not
notify other Members through the WTO Secretariat, "at an early stage", of S.O. 1663(E) when this
measure was at the proposal stage. Accordingly, we find it difficult to imagine how the
United States would gain sufficient knowledge of the content of the proposed S.O. 1663(E) to be
able to avail itself of the opportunity to submit comments as foreseen in Annex B(5)(d).
7.796. Accordingly, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary provided by India, the Panel
finds that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d) of the SPS Agreement because it has not
allowed "reasonable time" for other Members to make comments on the "proposed" S.O. 1663(E).

1305 United States' request for the establishment of a panel, p. 3.
1306 United States' response to Panel question No. 49.
1307 India's first written submission, para. 276.
1308 United States' first written submission, para. 196.
1309 United States' first written submission, para. 196.
1310 The SPS Committee's Transparency Procedures recommend that Members should normally allow a
period of at least 60 calendar days for comments, except proposed measures that facilitate trade and those
which are substantially the same as an international standard, guideline or recommendation. G/SPS/7/Rev.3,
para. 13.
1311 Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.47.

7.10.2.7 Whether India acted inconsistently with Article 7
7.797. We recall that, in paragraph 7.741 above, we concluded that an inconsistency with the
provisions of Annex B results in an inconsistenc y with Article 7. Having found that India acted
inconsistently with the provisions of Annex B(2) an d Annex B(5)(a), (b) and (d), we also find that
India acted inconsistently with Article 7.
7.10.3 Conclusions on the United States' claims pursuant to Article 7 and Annex B
7.798. The Panel therefore finds that:
a. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to
allow a reasonable interval between the publication of S.O. 1663(E) and its entry into
force;
b. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to
publish a notice "at an early stage" about the "proposed" S.O. 1663(E);
c. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(b) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to
notify other Members through the WTO Secretariat, "at an early stage", of the
"proposed" S.O. 1663(E);
d. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d) of the SPS Agreement because it did not
allow "reasonable time" for other Members to make comments on the "proposed"
S.O. 1663(E).
7.799. The Panel also finds that India cannot rely upon Annex B(6) of the SPS Agreement to
justify omitting steps enumerated in Annex B(5). The Panel further declines to rule on the
Unites States' claim pursuant to Annex B(5)(c).
7.800. Finally, having found that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a),
(b) and (d), we also find that India acted inconsistently with Article 7 of the SPS Agreement.
7.11 Whether India's measures are inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT 1994
7.11.1 Arguments of the parties
7.11.1.1 United States
7.801. The United States argues that India has breached Article XI of the GATT 1994 because its
measures constitute import prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other
charges.
1312 According to the United States, India's measures are clearly import prohibitions and,
because they are not justified under the SPS Agreem ent, they are inconsistent with Article XI of
the GATT 1994.1313
7.11.1.2 India
7.802. India responds that the conformity of a measure with international standards lends a
presumption of consistency of that measure with the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. India
thus contends that because it has established that its measure conforms to the Terrestrial Code,
the measure is presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. Hence, it
argues, the United States' claim under Article XI of the GATT 1994 "is not sustainable".1314

1312 United States' first written submission, para. 21.
1313 United States' first written submission, para. 203; United States' second written submission,
para. 126.
1314 India's first written submission, para. 141.

7.11.2 Analysis by the Panel
7.803. We recall our findings above that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Articles 3.1,
5.1, 5.2, 2.2, 2.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, and 7, as well as Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a), (b) and (d) of
the SPS Agreement. In the light of these findings of inconsistency, we consider it appropriate to
exercise judicial economy over the United States' claim under Article XI of the GATT 1994.
1315
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1. As described in greater detail above, the Panel finds that:
a. In respect of India's first request for a preliminary ruling:
i. the panel request is sufficiently precise in identifying S.O. 1663(E) as a specific
measure at issue as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU, insofar as S.O. 1663(E)
prohibits the importation of various agricultural products into India from those
countries reporting NAI (both HPNAI and LPNAI);
ii. the listing of the products prohibited by S.O. 1663(E) in paragraph 3 of the
panel request together with the reference to "these products" immediately following
that listing do not suggest that the United States intended to limit its challenge to
those products;
iii. the word "orders" included in the panel request does not render the panel request
inconsistent with the specificity requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU, and it does not
prejudice the ability of India to defend itself;
iv. under the circumstances, there can be no unc ertainty on India's part as to whether
the United States is challenging measures that were not in force as of the date of the
panel request. The United States is challenging only the measures that were in force
as of the date of the panel request, namely 11 May 2012; and
v. the panel request did not fail to provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly in respect of the claims under
Articles 2.3, 5.5 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
b. In respect of India's second request for a preliminary ruling:
i. the NAP 2012, being a measure that applies only to India's domestic agricultural
products, falls outside the previously delimited scope of "India's [AI] measures [that]
prohibit the importation of various agricultural products into India from those
countries reporting NAI", and, therefore, is not a measure at issue in this dispute
within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU;
ii. the health certificates that accompany a SIP and that are issued pursuant to
S.O. 655(E) are not "related to" or "implementing" the import prohibition reflected in
S.O. 1663(E) and, therefore, are not measures at issue in this dispute;
iii. the health certificates that accompany a SIP and that are issued pursuant to
S.O. 655(E) do not qualify as "orders issued by [the DAHD] pursuant to the Livestock
Act" within the meaning of the panel requ est and, therefore, are not measures at
issue in this dispute;
iv. having plainly connected Article 2.3 and India's AI measures, the United States was
not under an additional obligation to identify the NAP 2012 in its panel request and

1315 We note that this approach has also been adopted by previous panels when addressing a claim
under the GATT 1994, having already made a finding of inconsistency with provisions of the SPS Agreement.
For example, Panel Reports, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.272; EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.275;
Australia – Salmon, para. 8.185; Japan – Apples, para. 8.328; and EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, paras. 7.3422 and 7.3429.

thus India's request that the United States' claim under Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement be set aside as outside the jurisdiction of the Panel is denied.
c. In respect of the United States' claims pursuant to the SPS Agreement:
i. India's AI measures are SPS measures subject to the disciplines of the
SPS Agreement;
ii. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement because
they are not "based on" the relevant international standard, the Terrestrial Code,
and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof. India is not entitled to benefit from the
presumption of consistency of its AI measures with the other relevant provisions of
the SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994 because India's AI measures do not
"conform to" the Terrestrial Code, and, in particular, Chapter 10.4 thereof, within the
meaning of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement;
iii. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because
they are not based on a risk assessment, appropriate to the circumstances, taking
into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations;
iv. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement because
they are not based on a risk assessment that takes into account the factors set forth
in Article 5.2;
v. In the light of our findings of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
SPS Agreement, India's AI measures are also inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement because they are not based on scientific principles and are
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence;
vi. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3, first sentence, of the
SPS Agreement because they arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail. India's AI measures are also
inconsistent with Article 2.3, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement because they
are applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised restriction on international
trade;
vii. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement because
they are significantly more trade-restrictiv e than required to achieve India's ALOP,
with respect to the products covered by Chapter 10.4 of the Terrestrial Code;
viii. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, India's AI measures are consequentially inconsistent with Article 2.2
of the SPS Agreement because they are a pplied beyond the extent necessary to
protect human and animal life or health;
ix. India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 6.2, first sentence, of the
SPS Agreement because they fail to recognize the concepts of disease-free areas and
areas of low disease prevalence. Consequentially, India's AI measures are also
inconsistent with Article 6.2, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement because the
failure to recognize the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease
prevalence renders impossible a determination of such areas based on the factors
enumerated in Article 6.2, second sentence;
x. Having found that India's AI measures fail to recognize the concepts of disease-free
areas and areas of low disease prevalence, India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 6.1, first sentence, of the SPS Agreement because they are therefore not
adapted to the SPS characteristics of the areas from which products originate and to
which they are destined. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with
Article 6.1, first sentence, and that India has not undertaken the assessment
envisaged by Article 6.1, second sentence, India's AI measures are also inconsistent

with Article 6.1, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement because India has not taken
into account factors including those specified in Article 6.1, second sentence.
xi. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) of the SPS Agreement because it failed to
allow a reasonable interval between the publication of S.O. 1663(E) and its entry into
force;
xii. India cannot rely upon Annex B(6) of the SPS Agreement to justify omitting steps
enumerated in Annex B(5) of the SPS Agreement because the condition prescribed in
the chapeau of Annex B(6) was not present with respect to S.O. 1663(E) at the time
of its proposal;
xiii. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(a) of the SPS Agreement because it failed
to publish a notice "at an early stage" about the "proposed" S.O. 1663(E);
xiv. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(b) of the SPS Agreement because it failed
to notify other Members through the WTO Se cretariat, "at an early stage", of the
"proposed" S.O. 1663(E);
xv. India acted inconsistently with Annex B(5)(d) of the SPS Agreement because it did
not allow "reasonable time" for other Members to make comments on the "proposed"
S.O. 1663(E);
xvi. Having found that India acted inconsistently with Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a), (b)
and (d), India also acted inconsistently with Article 7 of the SPS Agreement.
8.2. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement, the Panel declines to rule on the United States' alternative claim under Article 5.5
of the SPS Agreement.
8.3. The Panel also declines to rule on the Unites States' claim pursuant to Annex B(5)(c) of the
SPS Agreement because the United States failed to make a prima facie case of violation thereof.
8.4. Having found that India's AI measures are inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 2.2, 2.3,
5.6, 6.1, 6.2, and 7 as well as Annex B(2) and Annex B(5)(a), (b) and (d) of the SPS Agreement,
the Panel further declines to rule on the United States' claim under Article XI of the GATT 1994.
8.5. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the
extent that India has acted inconsistently with the specified provisions of the SPS Agreement, it
has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States under that agreement.
8.6. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having found that India acted inconsistently with its
obligations under Articles 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 2.2, 2.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2 and 7, as well as Annex B(2) and
Annex B(5)(a), (b) and (d) of the SPS Agreement, we recommend that the DSB request India to
bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.