CHILE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF WHEAT FLOUR FROM ARGENTINA
Document: Request for Consultations by Argentina
Date: 19 May 2009
Document codes: WT/DS393/1; G/L/887; G/ADP/D78/1
Complainant: Argentina
Respondent: Chile
Dispute stage: Consultation
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.8, 5.10, 6.1, 6.1.3, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 6.14, 7.1, 7.5, 9.2, 9.3, 12.1, 12.1.1, 12.2, 12.2.1, 18.1, 18.3, 18.4, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994Art. XVI  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

CHILE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF
WHEAT FLOUR FROM ARGENTINA

Request for Consultations by Argentina

 The following communication, dated 14 May 2009, from the delegation of Argentina to the
delegation of Chile and to the Chairman of the Di spute Settlement Body, is circulated in accordance
with Article 4.4 of the DSU.

 My authorities have instructed me to request consultations with the Government of Chile
pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994") and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement" or "AD") with respect to the
anti-dumping measures taken by the Republic of Chile on imports of wheat flour from Argentina, as
well as any amendments thereto or extensions thereof
1 and any related measure; and also with respect
to certain provisions of Law No. 18.525 2 whose text was consolidated , coordinated and rationalized
by Decree having Force of Law No. 31 of 2005 3, and the Supreme Decree of the Ministry of Finance
No. 575.4

Background

 On 11 April 2008, the Asociación de Molineros del Centro A.G. submitted a request for the
initiation of an investigation in to alleged dumping and the appli cation of a provisional anti-dumping
measure on imports of wheat flour from Argen tina. On 18 April 2008, in Session No. 302 5, the
National Commission responsible for investigating di stortions in the price of imported goods ("the
Commission") decided to initiate an investigation into possible dumping of imports of wheat flour
from Argentina.

 On 3 July 2008, the Minister of Finance, by order of the President, through Exempt Decree
No. 737
6, and taking into account Record No. 303 7 of the Commission, decided to impose a

1 Including any further determinations made pursuant to court order or remand.
2 Published in the Official Journal of 30 June 1986.
3 Published in the Boletín Oficial de la República de Chile (Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile)
of 22 April 2005.
4 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 20 August 1993.
5 Record of Session No. 302, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile on
25 April 2008.
6 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 7 July 2008.

provisional anti-dumping duty of 30.3 per cent on impor ts of wheat flour from Argentina, classified
under tariff heading 1101.0000 of the Customs Tariff.

 Finally, on 2 January 2009, the Minister of Finance, by order of the President, through
Exempt Decree No. 1
8, and taking into account Record No. 307 9 of the Commission, decided to
conclude the investigation with the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty of 30.3 per cent on
imports of wheat flour from Argentina, classified under tariff heading 1101.0000 of the Customs
Tariff.

Legal background

1. Investigation conducted, determinations made and duties imposed
 Argentina considers that the investigati on conducted by the Chilean authorities, the
determinations made and the duties imposed violat e Chile's obligations under the provisions of
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In particular, Argentina considers that the
anti-dumping measures on wheat flour from Argentina are inconsistent with, at the least, Articles 1, 2,
3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement and Annex II thereto; Article XVI of the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement"); and
Article VI of the GATT 1994, for the reasons set out below:

 Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:

• because the anti-dumping measures were not applied under the circumstances
provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 a nd pursuant to an investigation initiated
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
determine the existence of dumping by co mparing the export price of wheat flour
exported to Chile with the normal value of the like product destined for internal
consumption in Argentina;

• Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
reach a reasoned conclusion based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the
facts when they determined that domestic sales of wheat flour in Argentina did not
take place in the ordinary course of trade;

• Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities
determined that domestic sales of wheat fl our on the Argentine domestic market were
not in the ordinary course of trade and that these sales should be disregarded in
determining the normal value, without have previously determined that: (a) these
sales were made within an extended period of time; (b) in substantial quantities; and
(c) at prices which did not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable
period of time;

7 Session No. 303, held on 27 June 2008.
8 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 7 January 2009.
9 Session No. 307, held on 29 December 2008.

• Article 2.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because when constructing the normal
value the Chilean authorities did not base their determination regarding the amounts
for administrative, selling and general costs, and for profits, on actual data pertaining
to production and sales in the ordinary c ourse of trade of the like product by the
exporter or producer under investigation; and even supposing that the investigating
authority had considered that these amounts c ould not be determined on the basis of
the ordinary course of trade, the normal value was not constructed according to the
methods laid down in the list in this provision; and

• Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because a fair comparison between the
export price and the normal value was not ma de; this comparison was not made at
the same level of trade and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same
time. The Chilean authorities did not make due allowance, in this case, on its merits,
for differences which affect price comp arability, according to the indicative list
mentioned in this provision.

 Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; in particular
but not exclusively:

• Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, b ecause the Chilean authorities, when
determining the threat of material in jury, did not base themselves on positive
evidence or an objective examination of: (a ) the volume of the dumped imports and
their effect on prices in the domestic market for like products; and (b) the consequent
impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products;

• Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
consider during the investigation that ther e had not been a significant increase in
imports of wheat flour from Argentina, eith er in absolute terms or relative to
production or domestic consumption in Chile; they did not consider either that there
had not been significant price undercutting by the imports or that the effect of such
imports was not to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases,
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree;

• Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
examine the impact of the imports of wheat flour from Argentina on the Chilean
domestic industry, including an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of th is industry, including those listed in
Article 3.4 itself;

• Article 3.1, Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and paragraph 1 of
Article VI of the GATT , because the Chilean authorities did not demonstrate that,
through the effects of the alleged dumping, the imports investigated had caused or
threatened to cause injury to the Chilean domestic industry; they did not base their
determination of a causal relationship betw een the imports allegedly dumped and the
injury to the domestic industry on positive evidence or an objective examination of all
relevant evidence; they did not examin e known factors other than the allegedly
dumped imports from Argentina which at th e same time could have injured the
domestic industry, and because they attribut ed the injuries caused by these factors to
the imports of wheat flour from Argentina;

• Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
base their determination of a threat of material injury on facts but merely on
allegation, conjecture or remote possibility ; they did not undertake any examination
to show that this threat of material in jury was clearly foreseen and imminent; and
because when making the determination of threat of material injury, the Chilean
authorities did not consider the factors listed in Article 3.7 or other known factors;
and

• Article 3.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
take the special care prescribed when cons idering and deciding on the application of
anti-dumping measures in cases where there is a threat of material injury.

 Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the application referred to in
Article 5.1 of the AD did not include evidence of: (a) dumping; (b) injury within the
meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement; and (c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury;
the application for initiation submitted was based on simple assertion, unsubstantiated
by relevant evidence; and, lastly, because the application did not contain all
information reasonably available to the a pplicant in accordance with the indicative
list in Article 5.2 itself;

• Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
examine the accuracy and ade quacy of the evidence provided in the application to
determine whether there was sufficient ev idence to justify the initiation of an
investigation;

• Article 5.3 and Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean
authorities, when determining that the appli cation had been made by or on behalf of
the domestic industry, did not examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
provided, and did not base themselves on an examination of the level of support for
or opposition to the application expressed by domestic producers of the like product;
and

• Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
satisfy themselves that there was not suffi cient evidence of either dumping or of
injury to justify proceeding with the case and, therefore, did not reject the application
submitted pursuant to Article 5.1 of the AD, promptly terminating the investigation.

 Article 6 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 6.1, Article 6.1.3 and Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because
the Chilean authorities failed to give all in terested parties notice of the information
required and ample opportunity to present in writing all relevant evidence; they did
not provide the full text of the applicati on for initiation of an investigation to known
exporters; and did not give all interested parties full opportunity for the defence of
their interests;

• Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of th e information supplied by the applicants
before basing their findings on it;

• Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean
authorities made preliminary and final determinations on the basis of the facts
available without giving all exporters or producers of wheat flour in Argentina an
opportunity to submit the necessary inform ation or provide it within a reasonable
period; and because, when interpreting paragraph 8 of Article 6 of the AD , the
provisions of Annex II to the aforementioned Agreement were not observed; and

• Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
determine the individual margin of dumpi ng for each known exporter of wheat flour
investigated; as the number of exporters and producers was not so large as to make
such a determination impracticable, the authorities should not have limited their
examination to certain interested parties.

 Article 7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, b ecause when applying the provisional
measure on imports of wheat flour from Argentina: (i) this was not done pursuant to
an investigation initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, no notice was
given to all interested parties and they were not given adequate opportunities to
submit information and make comments; ( ii) a reasoned preliminary determination
was not made, on the basis of positive evidence and an objective and unbiased
evaluation of all relevant evidence, of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic
industry; and (iii) it was incorrectly judge d that the provisional measure applied for
this purpose was necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation;
and

• Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
follow the relevant provisions of Article 9, as required by this provision.

 Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities imposed
an anti-dumping duty on imports of wheat flour from Argentina without collecting
this duty in the appropriate amount; and they named the country supplying the
product, Argentina, even though it was not impracticable to name the supplier or
suppliers involved; and

• Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities
exceeded the margin of dumping by not observing the provisions of Article 2.

 Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively:

• Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not
satisfy themselves of the existence of suffici ent evidence to justify the initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation, pursuant to Article 5 of the AD; and because they did not
notify all interested parties;

• Article 12.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of
initiation of the investigation did not contai n, nor otherwise make available through a
separate report, adequate information according to the list in Article 12.1.1 itself;

• Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of the
preliminary and final determin ations did not set forth, or otherwise make available
through a separate report, in sufficient detail, the findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law by the Chilean authorities; and

• Article 12.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of the
imposition of provisional measures did not set forth, or otherwise make available
through a separate report, sufficiently de tailed explanations for the preliminary
determinations on dumping and injury; and because these notices or reports did not
contain the information prescribed in the list in Article 12.2.1.

 Article 18 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, be cause the Chilean authorities took
specific action against the alleged dumping of imports of wheat flour from Argentina
in a manner inconsistent with GATT 1994 a nd with the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
and

• Article 18.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement were not applied to this investigation, which was initiated
pursuant to an application made after the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement for Chile.

2. Chilean legislation applicable to anti-dumping procedures
 In addition to the investigation and the speci fic measures outlined above, Argentina wishes to
extend its consultations in respect of the following provisions of Law No. 18.525
10, whose text was
revised, coordinated and consolidated by th e Decree having Force of Law No. 31 of 2005 11, ("Law
No. 18.525"), and the Supreme Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 575, published in the Official
Bulletin of the Republic of Chile of 20 August 19 93 ("Decree No. 575"). These provisions appear to
be inconsistent with Chile's obligations pursu ant to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, GATT 1994 and
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement").

(i) The competence of the Chilean authorities for the imposition of anti-dumping duties
 It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Articles 8 and 9 of Law
No. 18.525 and Articles 1 and 16 of Decree No. 575: (a) regarding the application of anti-dumping
measures, Chilean legislation does not lay down an y time-limits for the final decision, leaving the
interested parties during an investigation in a situ ation of uncertainty regarding it; and (b) in their
final decision on the application of anti-dumping measures, the Chilean authorities do not appear to be
obliged to base their conclusions on the factual or legal background.

10 Published in the Official Journal of 30 June 1986.
11 Published in the Official Bulletin of the Republic of Chile of 22 April 2005.

 In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 6.14 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to proceed
expeditiously in reaching preliminary or fi nal determinations, whether affirmative or
negative, and to apply provisional or fina l measures in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 5.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that investigations
shall be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their
initiation;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which states that the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of
entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particul ar character, to ensure, no later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement; and

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

(ii) The definition of dumping and the grounds for imposing anti-dumping duties
 It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Article 8 of Law No. 18.525 and
the second and third paragraphs of Article 1 of Decree No. 575: (a) the definition of dumping
provided in Chilean legislation is not consistent with the provisi ons of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and GATT 1994, and the grounds for imposing an an ti-dumping duty include an extremely broad and
imprecise range of possibilities, going beyond the grounds for imposition of duties prescribed by
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that a product is to be
considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one
country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade,
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that the provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the
date of entry into force for the Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement; and

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

(iii) Who may initiate anti-dumping procedures
 It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Article 10 of Decree No. 575:
(a) investigations intended to determine the existe nce, degree and effect of the alleged dumping may
be initiated at the request of parties other than those authorized by the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
without their having the necessary level of support fr om domestic producers of the like product that
would allow the authority to conclude that the appl ication is considered to have been made by the
domestic industry or on its behalf; and (b) that the requirements laid down in Article 10 of Decree
No. 575 concerning the admissibility of applicati ons for initiation are not consistent with the
requirements laid down in Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 In particular, but not exclusively, this provision appears to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires that investigations to
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated
upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry, except as
provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 5;

• Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, wh ich requires that the application
contain such information as is reasonably ava ilable to the applicant on the points in
the indicative list mentioned in this provision;

• Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, wh ich requires that the application
should have the necessary degree of support from domestic producers of the like
product to enable the authority to determine that it is considered to have been made
by the domestic industry or on its behalf;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

(iv) Provisional measures
1. It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Article 22 of Decree No. 575:
(a) if the Commission determines that there is no du mping in the price of the goods investigated or
there is no injury or threat of material injury to the domestic industry, the Commission is not obliged
to request the President of the Republic that the provisional measures imposed be revoked; (b) there
is no provision whatsoever obliging the President , at the Commission's request, to revoke the
provisional measures in the circumstances referred to in the preceding sentence; (c) there is no
provision whatsoever obliging the President, under the circumstances described in sentence (a) in this
paragraph, to revoke the provisional measures immediately.

 In particular, but not exclusively, this provision appears to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 7.1(ii) , which provides that provisional measures may be applied only if a
preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent
injury to the domestic industry;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

2. It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Articles 16, 19 and 20 of Decree
No. 575: (a) the Chilean implementing authority is empowered to impose provisional measures even
before the expiry of 60 days following the date of initiation of the investigation; and (b) provisional
duties may be applied for a period exceeding that laid down in Article 7.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement inasmuch as the provisional measures may be applied up until the date on which the final
decision is taken and the investigating authority is not limited to any period of time during which it
has to take this decision.

 In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 7.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which determines that provisional
measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the
investigation;

• Article 7.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires that provisional
measures shall be applied for as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months
or, on decision of the competent authority and upon request by exporters representing
a significant percentage of the trade involv ed, for a period not exceeding six months.
When the authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower
than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may
be six and nine months respectively;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

3. It appears from Articles 19 and 21 of Decree No. 575 that the Chilean implementing authority
would be empowered to impose provisional duties w ithout having initiated an investigation pursuant
to the provisions of Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and without having given all interested
parties adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments.

 In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 7.1(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that provisional
measures may be applied only if an inves tigation has been initiated in accordance
with the provisions of Article 5 and inter ested parties have been given adequate
opportunities to submit information and make comments;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

(v) Absence of a judicial review mechanism
 An examination of Law No. 18.525 and Decree No. 575 leads to the conclusion that there are
no provisions for internal mechanisms to review administrative measures relating to administrative
determinations or examinations in respect of anti-dumping through a judicial, arbitral or
administrative body that is independent of the au thority making the determination or conducting the
examination.

 The absence of an independent review pr ocedure, in the sense described, could be
inconsistent, in particular, but not exclusively, with the following rules:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 13 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member, whose
national legislation contains provision s on anti-dumping measures, to maintain
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia,
of the prompt review of administrative ac tions relating to final determinations and
reviews of determinations within the meani ng of Article 11; it being understood that
such tribunals or procedures shall be inde pendent of the authorities responsible for
the determination or review in question;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

(vi) Failure to adapt Chile's anti-dumping regulations subsequent to the entry into force of the
WTO Agreements
 From the analysis of the inconsistencies in Chile's regulations described above and the fact
that Decree No. 575 of 1993 precedes the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for Chile,
the following may be concluded: (a) that Chile did not adopt the necessary measures to ensure that its

anti-dumping regulations are consistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement; and, consequently, (b) that the provisi ons of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as a whole,
do not apply to the investigations and reviews of existing measures.

 In particular, but not exclusively, th ese provisions appear inconsistent with:

• Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

• Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement;

• Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take
all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;

• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

 Chile's measures identified in this request also appear to nullify or impair benefits accruing to
Argentina directly or indirectly under the cited Agreements.

 For each of the measures referred to above, this request also covers any amendments,
replacements, extensions, implementing measures or other related measures.

 The Government of Argentina reserves its right to raise additional factual claims and legal
matters during the course of consultations. We l ook forward to receiving your reply to the present
request and to fixing a mutually convenient date and place for consultations.