ARGENTINA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS AB-2014-9
Document: Reports of the Appellate Body Note: The Appellate Body is issuing these Reports in the form of a single document constituting three separate Appellate Body Reports: WT/DS438/AB/R; WT/DS444/AB/R; and WT/DS445/AB/R. The cover page, preliminary pages, sections 1 through 5, and the annexes are common to all Reports. The page header throughout the document bears the three document symbols WT/DS438/AB/R; WT/DS444/AB/R; and WT/DS445/AB/R, with the following exceptions: section 6 on pages EU-128 and EU-129, which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS438/AB/R; section 6 on page US-130, which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS444/AB/R; and section 6 on pages JPN-131 and JPN-132, which bears the document symbol fo r and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS445/AB/R.
Date: 15 January 2015
Document codes: WT/DS438/AB/R; WT/DS444/AB/R; WT/DS445/AB/R; WT/DS438/AB/R; WT/DS444/AB/R; WT/DS445/AB/R.; WT/DS438/AB/R; WT/DS444/AB/R; WT/DS445/AB/R
Complainant: EU
Respondent: Argentina
Third parties: Australia, Canada, China, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. X:1, X:3, XI:1  GATT 1994Art. 1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5(f)  Import LicensingArt. III:4  GATT 1994

ARGENTINA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS
AB-2014-9
Reports of the Appellate Body
Note:

The Appellate Body is issuing these Reports in the form of a single document constituting three
separate Appellate Body Reports: ; ; and The
cover page, preliminary pages, sections 1 through 5, and the annexes are common to all Reports.
The page header throughout the document bears the three document symbols ;
; and , with the following exceptions: section 6 on pages EU-128
and EU-129, which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions
and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report ; section 6 on page US-130,
which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and
recommendation in the Appellate Body Report ; and section 6 on pages JPN-131
and JPN-132, which bears the document symbol fo r and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions
and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report
 • •

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE REPORTS
Abbreviation Description
AFIP Federal Public Revenue Administration ( Administración Federal de
Ingresos Públicos)
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
CBD customs bond directive
CIs Certificados de Importación
complainants European Union, United States, and Japan
DJAI Advance Sworn Import Declaration (Declaración Jurada Anticipada de
Importación)
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
EU Panel Report Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods,
EU Panel Request Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,

First Preliminary Ruling First Preliminary Ruling of the Panel of 16 September 2013,
reproduced in Annex D-1 to the Panel Reports, WT/DS438/R/Add.1 /
WT/DS444/R/Add.1 / WT/DS445/R/Add.1
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Import Licensing
Agreement
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
Japan Panel Report Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods, WT/DS445/R
Japan Panel Request Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, WT/DS445/10
LA/MSF launch aid/member State financing
Panel Reports Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods, WT/DS438/R / WT/DS444/R / WT/DS445/R
PEI 2020 Ministry of Industry of Argentina, Argentina's Industrial Strategic Plan
2020 (Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020) (Panel Exhibits ARG-51 and
JE-749)
SCI Secretariat of Domestic Trade ( Secretaría de Comercio Interior)
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Second Preliminary Ruling Second Preliminar y Ruling of the Panel of 20 November 2013,
reproduced in Annex D-2 to the Panel Reports, WT/DS438/R/Add.1 /
WT/DS444/R/Add.1 / WT/DS445/R/Add.1
SIM system MARIA information system (Sistema Informático MARIA)
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises
SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TRRs trade-related requirements
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Abbreviation Description
TRRs measure a combination of one or more TRRs constituting a single unwritten
measure
US Panel Request Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,

US Panel Report Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods, WT/DS444/R
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, 23 May
WCO World Customs Organization
WCO SAFE Framework World Customs Organization's SAFE Framework of Standards to
Secure and Facilitate Global Trade
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August
2010
WTO World Trade Organization
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

CASES CITED IN THESE REPORTS
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 515
Argentina – Hides and
Leather
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and
Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February
2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 1779
Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1161
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p. 1649
Canada – Provincial Liquor
Boards (EEC)
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks
by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988,
BISD 35S, p. 37
Canada – Provincial Liquor
Boards (US)
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, DS17/R, adopted
18 February 1992, BISD 39S, p. 27
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004,
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R / WT/DS395/R / WT/DS398/R / Add.1 and Corr.1,
adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII,
p. 3501
Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425
EC – Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Products
Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R /
Add.1 to Add.9 and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III, p. 847
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September
1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Bananas III Panel Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), WT/DS27/R/ECU (Ecuador) /
WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND (Guatemala and Honduras) /
WT/DS27/R/MEX (Mexico) / WT/DS27/R/USA (US), adopted 25 September
1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II,
p. 695 to DSR 1997:III, p. 1085
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005,
DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July
1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, as
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685
EEC – Minimum Import Prices GATT Panel Report, EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences
and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, L/4687,
adopted 18 October 1978, BISD 25S, p. 68
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V,
p. 1827
India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 9
India – Quantitative
Restrictions
Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999,
upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V, p. 1799
Indonesia – Autos Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1 and
Corr.2, adopted 23 July 1998, and Corr.3 and Corr.4, DSR 1998:VI, p. 2201
Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 97
Japan – Apples Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/R, adopted 10 December 2003, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS245/AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4481
Japan – Semi-Conductors GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309, adopted
4 May 1988, BISD 35S, p. 116
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000,
DSR 2000:I, p. 3
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, DSR 2001:I, p. 59
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose
Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001,
DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6675
US – 1916 Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000,
DSR 2000:X, p. 4793
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R,
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, DSR 2011:VI, p. 3143
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,
p. 3779
US – Carbon Steel (India)

Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted
19 December 2014
US – Certain EC Products Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products
from the European Communities, WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001,
DSR 2001:I, p. 373
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009,
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
US – COOL Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July
2012, DSR 2012:V, p. 2449
US – COOL Panel Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, WT/DS384/R / WT/DS386/R, adopted 23 July 2012, as modified
by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, DSR 2012:VI,
p. 2745
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Countervailing Measures
(China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R, circulated to WTO Members
18 December 2014 [adoption pending]
US – Customs Bond Directive Panel Report, United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise
Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties, WT/DS345/R, adopted
1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS343/AB/R /
WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VIII, p. 2925
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 3
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Orange Juice (Brazil) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other
Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil,
WT/DS382/R, adopted 17 June 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3753
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Shrimp (Thailand) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand,
WT/DS343/R, adopted 1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VII, p. 2539
US – Shrimp (Thailand) /
US – Customs Bond Directive
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from
Thailand / United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to
Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties, WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R,
adopted 1 August 2008, DSR 2008:VII, p. 2385 / DSR 2008:VIII, p. 2773
US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from
Viet Nam, WT/DS404/R, adopted 2 September 2011, DSR 2011:X, p. 5301
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted
13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted
13 June 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R, DSR
2012:IV, p. 2013
US – Underwear Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted 25 February 1997,
DSR 1997:I, p. 11
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3
US – Upland Cotton Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R,
Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by Appellate
Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p. 299
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted
20 June 2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted
9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417
US – Zeroing (EC) Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/R, adopted 9 May 2006,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/R, DSR 2006:II, p. 521
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

unwritten measure (TRRs measure)10; and (ii) the procedure through which Argentina requires an
Advance Sworn Import Declaration ( Declaración Jurada Anticipada de Importación ) (DJAI) for any
imports for consumption in Argentina.11
1.3. The complainants identified the following five TRRs: (i) to export a certain value of goods
from Argentina related to the value of imports; (ii) to limit the volume of imports and/or reduce
their price; (iii) to refrain from repatriating funds from Argentina to another country; (iv) to make
or increase investments in Argentina (including in production facilities); and/or (v) to incorporate
local content into domestically produced goods.
12
1.4. According to the complainants, the single TRRs measure:
a. consists of a combination of one or more of the five identified TRRs;
b. is an unwritten measure that is not stipulated in any published law, regulation, or
administrative act, but is instead either reflected in agreements signed between specific
economic operators and the Argentine Government, or contained in letters addressed by
economic operators to the Argentine Government;
c. is imposed on economic operators in Argentina as a condition to import or to obtain
certain benefits;
d. is enforced by withholding permission to import through, inter alia, the DJAI procedure;
and
e. is imposed by the Argentine Government with the objective of eliminating trade deficits
and increasing import substitution.
13
1.5. The European Union claimed before the Panel that the TRRs are inconsistent with Argentina's
obligations under Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994), as well as under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994. The European Union also claimed, in
the alternative, that the application of one or more TRRs in certain specific instances is
inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under Article XI:1 and/or Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
14
The United States, for its part, claimed that the TRRs are inconsistent with Argentina's obligations
under Articles XI:1 and X:1 of the GATT 1994.
15 Japan claimed that the TRRs are inconsistent with
Argentina's obligations under Articles XI:1, III:4, and X:1 of the GATT 1994, in each of the
following three respects: (i) the TRRs as an unwritten rule or norm as such; (ii) the TRRs as an
unwritten practice or policy, as confirmed by the systematic application of the measure; and

10 EU Panel Request, pp. 3-4; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, pp. 3-4; Panel Reports,
paras. 6.126-6.128. The complainants referred to these trade-related requirements (TRRs) in their panel
requests and in some parts of their submissions as "Restrictive Trade-Related Requirements" or "RTRRs". For
uniformity, we refer to these as TRRs, individually, and as the TRRs measure, collectively.
11 Panel Reports, para. 6.364. The European Union, the United States, and Japan originally identified a
third measure, the imposition of non-automatic import licences (Licencias No Automáticas de Importación) by
requiring import certificates (Certificados de Importación) (CIs) as a condition for the importation of goods.
(EU Panel Request, pp. 2-3; US Panel Request, pp. 3-4; Japan Panel Request, pp. 2-3) However, in their first
written submissions to the Panel, the complainants indicated that they were no longer pursuing their claims
against the CI requirement because, on 25 January 2013, the Argentine Government had repealed the various
resolutions containing the CI regime. (European Union's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 15
and 16; United States' first written submission to the Panel, fn 6 to para. 7, and para. 17; Japan's first written
submission to the Panel, fn 34 to para. 15)
12 Panel Reports, para. 6.121 (referring to EU Panel request, p. 3; US Panel Request, p. 4; and Japan
Panel Request, p. 3).
13 Panel Reports, para. 6.125.
14 Panel Reports, para. 2.1.b (referring to European Union's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 22, 328, 385, and 491; and response to Panel question No. 1).
15 Panel Reports, para. 2.3.b (referring to United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 3
and 211; and second written submission to the Panel, paras. 5 and 128).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

(iii) the application of the TRRs in particular instances, as identified in the complainants'
submissions.16
1.6. With respect to the DJAI procedure, this measure was implemented by Argentina's Federal
Public Revenue Administration ( Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos ) (AFIP) on
5 January 2012 by means of AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012. 17 With the exception of certain
limited cases, Argentina requires importers to file a DJAI through which they provide necessary
information prior to the issuance of an order form, purchase order, or other similar document
necessary for the purchase of items from abroad that are destined for consumption in Argentina.
18
1.7. The European Union claimed before the Panel that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Argentina's obligations under Articles XI:1, X:1, and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, as well as under
Articles 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.6, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5(f) of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
(Import Licensing Agreement).
19 For its part, the United States claimed that the DJAI procedure is
inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under Articles XI:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, as well
as under Articles 1.4(a), 1.6, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5(f), 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 of the Import Licensing
Agreement.
20 Japan claimed that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Argentina's obligations
under Articles XI:1, X:3(a), and X:1 of the GATT 1994, as well as under Articles 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.6,
3.2, 3.3, 3.5(f), 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 of the Import Licensing Agreement.
21
1.8. In response, Argentina requested the Panel to reject the complainants' claims on the
following grounds:
a. the DJAI is a customs formality established in accordance with Article VIII of the
GATT 1994 and the World Customs Organizati on's (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (WCO SAFE Framework). Alternatively, the
complainants failed to establish that the DJAI procedure is a quantitative restriction
under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, or is in breach of Articles X:3(a) and X:1 of the
GATT 1994
22;
b. the DJAI is not an import licence. Even if it were, it is a procedure used for customs
purposes, and is, therefore, not within the scope of the Import Licensing Agreement.
Alternatively, the complainants have failed to establish that the DJAI is in breach of the
Import Licensing Agreement23; and
c. the TRRs are outside the Panel's terms of reference, and the complainants failed to
prove the existence of an unwritten "overarc hing" measure of general and prospective
application that would support their claims against the TRRs.24

16 Panel Reports, para. 2.4.b (referring to Japan's first written submission to the Panel, para. 218;
second written submission to the Panel, paras. 7, 20, and 134; and responses to Panel questions Nos. 2
and 44).
17 AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012 is contained in Panel Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6.
18 Panel Reports, para. 6.364.
19 Panel Reports, para. 2.1.a (referring to European Union's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 21 and 491).
20 Panel Reports, para. 2.3.a (referring to United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 3
and 211; and second written submission to the Panel, para. 128).
21 Panel Reports, para. 2.4.a (referring to Japan's first written submission to the Panel, para. 218;
second written submission to the Panel, paras. 7, 39, and 134; and response to Panel question No. 3).
22 Panel Reports, para. 2.5.a (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 14,
18, 21, 164, 191, 195, 196-217, 257, 263, and 313-359; opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
paras. 52-61 and 74-83; responses to Panel questions Nos. 21, 34, and 40; second written submission to the
Panel, paras. 125-161, 199, 200, and 202-206; opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 47-61;
and closing statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 7).
23 Panel Reports, para. 2.5.b (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 268,
269, and 273-296; opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 62-73; second written submission to
the Panel, paras. 162 and 165-201; opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 62-77; and closing
statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 8 and 9).
24 Panel Reports, para. 2.5.c (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 15
and 113-146; opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 40 and 42-48; second written submission to
the Panel, paras. 72-117; opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 13-45; and closing
statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 3-6).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

1.9. In its first written submission to the Panel, Argentina challenged the identification of the TRRs
as a measure at issue in accordance with Articl es 6.2 and 7.1 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and requested the Panel to issue a
preliminary ruling that such measure was outside its terms of reference. Argentina argued that the
complainants' requests for consultations did not identify any measures or claims in relation to the
TRRs, and the subsequent identification of thes e TRRs in the complainants' requests for the
establishment of a panel impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute.
25 In addition, Argentina
claimed that the unwritten "overarching measure" described in the Request for the Establishment
of a Panel by the European Union (EU Panel Request) was outside the Panel's terms of reference
because none of the complainants' requests for consultations referred to it.
26 Lastly, Argentina
contended that, although all three complainants ha d raised claims against the TRRs "as applied",
only the EU Panel Request identified the specific TRRs that were the object of such claims. 27 In
Argentina's view, the inclusion in the EU Panel Request of a list of instances of application of the
TRRs was an impermissible departure from its request for consultations, which did not identify at
least some of these specific instances of application that were the object of its claims.
28
1.10. The Panel issued a preliminary ruling on 16 September 2013 29 (First Preliminary Ruling),
just before the first Panel meeting. 30 I n t h i s R u l i n g , w h i c h f o r m s a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e P a n e l
Reports31, the Panel found that:
a. the TRRs were identified by the complainants as a measure at issue in their respective
requests for consultations, their inclusion in the panel requests was not inappropriate,
and these measures are within the Panel's terms of reference; and
b. the characterization of the TRRs as a single "overarching measure" in the complainants'
panel requests did not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute.
32
1.11. The Panel did not consider it necessary or appropriate to rule on Argentina's argument
regarding the alleged non-identification of the complainants' "as applied" claims. Instead, the
Panel decided to consider this matter further in the course of the proceedings.33
1.12. The Panel sought the views of the parties regarding the circulation of the First Preliminary
Ruling to Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).34 While the complainants expressed no
objection35, Argentina did not agree with such circulation. 36 The third parties, however, were
provided with copies of the First Preliminary Ruling.37
1.13. During the Panel's first meeting with the parties, Argentina requested the Panel to resolve
two outstanding issues concerning the Panel's terms of reference, namely: (i) Japan's and the
United States' "as applied" claims; and (ii) the European Union's 23 specific instances of

25 Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 112-146 and 360.
26 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 2.3 (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 135 and 136).
27 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 2.4 (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 129-134 and 138).
28 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 2.4 (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 133).
29 The First Preliminary Ruling is reproduced in Annex D-1 to the Panel Reports, WT/DS438/R/Add.1 /
WT/DS444/R/Add.1 / WT/DS445/R/Add.1, pp. D-2 to D-13.
30 Argentina requested the Panel to issue a preliminary ruling "preferably after the First Substantive
Meeting of the Panel with the Parties". (First Preliminary Ruling, para. 1.1 (quoting Argentina's first written
submission to the Panel, para. 146)) The European Union and Japan contended that Argentina's request was
untimely, considering that Argentina should have raised its concerns regarding the requests for consultations
at an earlier stage. Thus, the European Union and Japan requested the Panel to rule on Argentina's request as
soon as possible, and before the date of the first Panel meeting. (First Preliminary Ruling, paras. 2.6-2.8)
31 Panel Reports, paras. 1.36 and 6.15; First Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.3.
33 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.42.
35 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 1.7 (referring to complainants' joint e-mail communication to the
36 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 1.7 (referring to Argentina's e-mail communication to the Panel,
19 September 2013); Panel Reports, para. 1.35.
37 Panel Reports, para. 6.15.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

application of the TRRs. 38 Thus, on 20 November 2013, the Panel issued its Second Preliminary
Ruling39 following the second written submissions, bu t before the second Panel meeting. In its
Second Preliminary Ruling, which forms an integral part of the Panel Reports 40, the Panel found
that:
a. the complainants' panel requests properly identified the alleged TRRs as measures at
issue in these disputes, and these measures are part of the Panel's terms of reference;
and
b. the 23 measures described by the European Union in section 4.2.4 of its first written
submission to the Panel as "specific instances" of application of the alleged TRRs do not
constitute "measures at issue" in these disputes.
41
1.14. The Panel again invited the parties to expr ess their views regarding the circulation of the
two Preliminary Rulings. The complainants submitted a joint communication expressing no
objection thereto 42, but Argentina once more objected to the circulation of both preliminary
rulings.43
1.15. During the Panel proceedings, the Panel considered several procedural issues. First was
Canada's request for enhanced third party rights 44, which the Panel declined. 45 Second was the
parties' request for the adoption of additional procedures for the protection of business confidential
information46, which were not adopted. 47 Finally was the issue of consultations with the WCO for
clarification of certain aspects relating to the WCO SAFE Framework.48
1.16. The Panel Reports were circulated to WTO Members on 22 August 2014. In each of the
Panel Reports, with respect to the TRRs measure, the Panel found that:
a. the complainants properly identified the alleged TRRs in their requests for consultations
as well as in their panel requests and that, therefore, these actions are part of the
Panel's terms of reference
49;
b. the characterization of the TRRs as a single measure in the complainants' panel requests
did not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute50;

38 Second Preliminary Ruling, paras. 2.3-2.5.
39 The Second Preliminary Ruling is reproduced in Annex D-2 to the Panel Reports, WT/DS438/R/Add.1 /
WT/DS444/R/Add.1 / WT/DS445/R/Add.1, pp. D-14 to D-28.
40 Panel Reports, paras. 1.36 and 6.15; Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 5.2.
42 Panel Reports, para. 1.36 (referring to the complainants' joint e-mail communication to the Panel,
26 November 2013).
43 Panel Reports, para. 1.36 (referring to Argentina's e-mail communication to the Panel,
26 November 2013).
44 Canada requested enhanced third party rights to: (i) receive copies of all submissions and statements
of the parties preceding the issuance of the Panel's interim report; and (ii) be present for the entirety of all
substantive meetings of the Panel with the parties. (Panel Reports, para. 1.23)
45 The Panel reasoned that Canada failed to explain, among other things, why the matter at issue would
have a significant economic or trade policy effect for Canada that is different from that of other WTO Members,
and why the third party rights provided for in the DSU would not be sufficient for its interests to be fully taken
46 Panel Reports, para. 1.25.
47 The Panel decided not to adopt its proposed special proceedings in view of the fact that none of the
parties supported their adoption. The United States, Japan, and Argentina expressed concerns about the
proposed special procedures, their consistency with the DSU, and their systemic implications. (Panel Reports,
paras. 1.29 and 1.30)
48 On 26 November 2013, the Panel sent a communication with a list of questions to the WCO. On
2 December 2013, the WCO responded to the Panel, and the Panel invited the parties to express their views
thereon. On 14 January 2014, the Panel received the parties' comments as part of their responses to the Panel
questions after the second Panel meeting. (Panel Reports, para. 1.38)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

c. the Argentine authorities' imposition on econ omic operators of one or more of the five
TRRs identified by the complainants as a condition to import or to obtain certain benefits
operates as a single measure (TRRs measure) attributable to Argentina
51;
d. the TRRs measure constitutes a restriction on the importation of goods and is thus
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 199452; and
e. an additional finding under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 regarding the TRRs measure
was not necessary or useful in resolving the matter at issue; accordingly, the Panel
refrained from making any findings with respect to this claim.53
1.17. Additionally, in the EU and Japan Panel Reports, the Panel ruled that:
a. the 23 measures described by the European Union in section 4.2.4 of its first written
submission as "specific instances" of application of the TRRs were not precisely identified
in the EU Panel Request as measures at issue; accordingly, those 23 measures did not
constitute "measures at issue" in the present dispute54; and
b. the TRRs measure, with respect to its local content requirement, modifies the conditions
of competition in the Argentine market, so that imported products are granted less
favourable treatment than like domestic products; accordingly, the TRRs measure, with
respect to its local content requirement, is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994.
55
1.18. Further, in the Japan Panel Report with respect to Japan's "as such" claims against the
TRRs measure, the Panel held that:
Having found that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994, as well as with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 with respect to the local
content requirement, and that the TRRs measure is of general and prospective
application, the TRRs measure is also inconsistent with the above-mentioned
provisions "as such".
56
1.19. In each of the Panel Reports, with respect to the DJAI procedure, the Panel found that:
a. the DJAI procedure, irrespective of whether it constitutes an import licence, constitutes a
restriction on the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 199457;
b. having found that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994,
an additional finding under the same provision regarding the DJAI procedure considered
as an import licence was not necessary or useful in resolving the matter at issue;
accordingly, the Panel refrained from making any findings with respect to this claim58;
c. having found that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with the substantive obligation
prescribed by Article XI:1 of the GATT 199 4, the question of whether Argentina had
administered the DJAI procedure in a manner inconsistent with Article X:3(a) of the
GATT 1994 or with Articles 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.6, and 3.5(f) of the Import Licensing

54 We note that the Panel included this finding in the Conclusions and Recommendations section of the
Japan Panel Report notwithstanding that, in its comments on the Interim Reports, Japan requested the Panel to
delete this finding from the Conclusions and Recommendations with respect to DS445 "as it does not relate to
Japan's Complaint". (Comments by the Government of Japan on the Panel's Interim Reports (DS438/444/445),
4 June 2014, Appendix 1, p. 23 (referring to para. 7.9.c of the Interim Reports))
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Agreement was irrelevant for the resolution of this dispute; accordingly, the Panel
refrained from making any findings in respect of these claims59;
d. having found that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with the substantive obligation
prescribed by Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, an additional finding regarding the same
measure under Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement was not
necessary or useful in resolving the matter at issue; accordingly, the Panel refrained
from making any findings in respect of this particular claim
60; and
e. having found that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with the substantive obligation
prescribed by Article XI:1 of the GATT 199 4, the question of whether Argentina had
failed to notify the DJAI procedure in a manner inconsistent with Article 1.4(a), 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, or 5.4 of the Import Licensing Agreement was irrelevant for the resolution of this
dispute; accordingly, the Panel refrained from making any findings in respect of these
particular claims.
61
1.20. As for the claims under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 concerning the DJAI procedure, the
Panel ruled that an additional finding under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 regarding the DJAI
procedure was not necessary or useful in resolving the matter at issue. Thus, the Panel refrained
from making any findings with respect to this claim.
62
1.21. In each Panel Report, the Panel found that, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, Argentina
has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the European Union, the United States, and Japan,
respectively, under that Agreement to the extent that Argentina has acted inconsistently with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
63 The Panel also found that, to the extent that Argentina has acted
inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Argentina has nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to the European Union and Japan, respectively, under that Agreement.64
1.22. In each Panel Report, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommended that
Argentina bring the inconsistent measures into conformity with its obligations under the
GATT 1994.65
1.23. On 26 September 2014, Argentina notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), pursuant to
Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the
Panel Reports and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel, and filed a Notice of
Appeal
66 and an appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 20 and Rule 21, respectively, of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review 67 (Working Procedures). On 1 October 2014, the
European Union and Japan each notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of
its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered, and certain legal interpretations developed by
the Panel, in, respectively, the EU Panel Report (WT/DS438/R) and the Japan Panel Report
(WT/DS445/R) and each filed a Notice of Other Appeal
68 and an other appellant's submission
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Working Procedures . On 14 October 2014, the European Union, the
United States, and Japan each filed an appellee's submission. 69 On the same day, Argentina filed
an appellee's submission in DS438 and DS445.70 On 17 October 2014, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu each filed a third

62 Panel Reports, paras. 6.488 and 6.489. The Panel's finding in this regard is included in the EU Panel
Report as paragraph 7.2.c, but not does not figure in the corresponding section of the Japan Panel Report. In
the Interim Reports, the Panel included its decision to exercise judicial economy in respect of the Article X:1
claim in respect of the DJAI procedure in the Conclusions and Recommendations section relating to both the
complaint by the European Union and the complaint by Japan.
66 WT/DS438/15 / WT/DS444/14 / WT/DS445/14 (attached as Annex 1 to these Reports).
67 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
68 WT/DS438/16 (attached as Annex 2 to these Reports); WT/DS445/15 (attached as Annex 3 to these
Reports).
69 Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
70 Pursuant to Rule 23(4) of the Working Procedures.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

participant's submission.71 On the same day, Canada, China, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Israel,
Korea, Norway, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States 72 each notified its intention to appear at
the oral hearing as a third participant. 73 On 29 October 2014, Switzerland also notified the
Secretariat of its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.74
1.24. On 29 September 2014, before the Working Schedule in this appeal had been
communicated to the participants and third participants, the Appellate Body received a letter from
Japan requesting that the oral hearing not be scheduled between 3-5 November 2014 on account
of a scheduling conflict of a key member of its litigation team during this period. On the same day,
the Appellate Body invited the participants and th ird participants to comment on Japan's request.
On 1 October 2014, Argentina, the European Union, and the United States submitted their
comments. Though none of the participants ob jected to Japan's request, Argentina and the
European Union each indicated their own schedu ling constraints and requested that the oral
hearing not be held on 27-31 October and 11-12 November 2014, respectively. For its part, the
United States expressed a preference for the oral hearing to be held within 45 days of the date of
filing of the Notice of Appeal, and noted that an oral hearing scheduled after 21 November 2014
would cause a scheduling conflict for its lead counsel. On 3 October 2014, the Appellate Body
Division hearing this appeal issued a Procedural Ruling
75 denying Japan's request. The Division
explained that, in its draft Working Schedule, drawn up prior to the receipt of Japan's request, the
oral hearing had been scheduled to take place on 3-4 November 2014, and that such scheduling
was coordinated with the working schedules in the two other proceedings also before the
Appellate Body, namely, the appeals in US – Carbon Steel (India) (DS436) and US –
Countervailing Measures (China) (DS437). The overlap in the dates of the three working
schedules, and in the composition of the Divisions hearing these three appeals, left the Appellate
Body with limited choices for scheduling the oral hearings as well as its internal deliberations in
this appeal. For these reasons, and taking into consideration the concerns expressed by the other
participants over alternative dates for the oral hearing, the Division considered itself unable to
accommodate Japan's request.
1.25. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 3-4 November 2014. The participants each
made an opening oral statement.
76 Seven of the third participants (Australia, Canada, Korea,
Norway, Saudi Arabia, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and
Turkey) made opening oral statements. The part icipants and third participants responded to
questions posed by the Members of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THIRD PARTICIPANTS
2.1 Claims of error by Argentina – Appellant
2.1.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.1. Argentina appeals the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 4.1.b of its First Preliminary Ruling,
that the unwritten "overarching" TRRs measure wa s within its terms of reference. Argentina
submits that this finding by the Panel is incons istent with Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU.
Argentina thus requests the Appellate Body to reverse that finding, as well as the Panel's
conclusions, in paragraphs 7.1.b, 7.5.b, and 7.9. b of the Panel Reports, and to conclude that the
unwritten "overarching" TRRs measure was outside the Panel's terms of reference.
77 Argentina
puts forward two main arguments in support of it s appeal, namely: (i) none of the complainants'

71 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
72 In DS438 and DS445.
73 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
74 Switzerland submitted its delegation list for the oral hearing to the Appellate Body Secretariat and the
participants and third participants in this dispute. For the purposes of this appeal, we have interpreted this
action as a notification expressing Switzerland's intention to attend the oral hearing pursuant to Rule 24(4) of
the Working Procedures.
75 Attached as Annex 4 to these Reports.
76 Argentina made a single opening statement as appellant in DS438, DS444, and DS445 and as
appellee in DS438 and DS445. The European Union made a single opening statement as other appellant and
appellee in DS438, and Japan made a single opening statement as other appellant and appellee in DS445. The
United States made a single opening statement as appellee in DS444 and as a third participant in DS438 and
DS445.
77 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 15.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

consultations requests identified the unwritten "overarching" measure or their broad claims in
respect of the TRRs 78; and (ii) the inclusion of the "overarching" TRRs measure, as well as the
"as such" or "equally expansive" claims against this alleged measure, in the complainants' panel
requests impermissibly expanded the scope of these disputes or changed its essence.
79
2.2. Argentina argues that the complainants did not identify in their consultations requests an
unwritten "overarching measure", or any "as such" or other "equally expansive" claims in respect
of the TRRs.80 Each of the complainants' request for consultations identifies the Declaración Jurada
Anticipada de Importación (DJAI) and Certificados de Importación (import certificates) (CIs) as
"measures" maintained through specific "legal instruments", which are identified in annexes to the
consultations requests.
81 While Argentina acknowledges that the requests for consultations
reference certain "commitments" allegedly required by Argentina for importers to undertake,
Argentina stresses that the discussion of these "commitments" contains no reference to
"measures" that might be subject to challenge or to any "legal instruments" providing for such
measures.
82 Moreover, there is no annex similar to those provided for the DJAI and CIs identifying
any relevant "legal instruments" for these "commitments". In Argentina's view, the phrase
"[t]hese measures" in the final two descriptive paragraphs of the consultations requests can only
be read as pertaining to the DJAI and the CIs, and not to the TRRs.
83 Thus, the "commitments"
language could, at most, suggest that the complainants were challenging, on an "as applied" basis,
specific "statements" or "agreements" between Argentina and importers to "limit imports" or
"increase the local content of products manufactured in Argentina", but cannot possibly encompass
an "as such" or "equally expansive" challenge to an unwritten "overarching" TRRs measure.
84
2.3. Argentina further contends that the Panel erred in concluding that the complainants' addition
of the "overarching measure" in relation to the TRRs did not impermissibly expand the scope of the
dispute or change its essence. The Panel relied on the "similarities" between the language used in
the complainants' consultations requests to describe each of the "commitments" and the language
used in their panel requests to describe the five "requirements". However, such similarities have
"no bearing" on the issue of whether the complainants had identified in their consultations
requests a "single unwritten measure" with "distinct normative content".
85 Argentina maintains
that the Panel's analysis could, at most, support a conclusion that each of the "commitments"
constituted a "measure at issue", but not that the complainants had also identified a "single
unwritten measure" subject to challenge.
86 Moreover, citing EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft as regards the required clarity in identifying unwritten measures in the panel request,
Argentina asserts that "it is difficult to imagine that a responding party would not, at the very
least, be entitled to notice in a consultations request that such a measure was potentially subject
to challenge in the dispute."
87
2.4. In addition, Argentina argues that the complainants' claims against the unwritten
"overarching measure" were in the nature of "as such" or "other equally expansive" claims. While
none of the complainants actually used the phrase "as such" in their panel requests, Argentina
understood that all the complainants were bringing "as such" claims or something akin thereto.
"As such" challenges are serious challenges, and complainants should be expected to provide a
respondents with notice of such broad claims in their requests for consultations.
88 This was
precisely the conclusion of the panel in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) ,
where the complainant identified an "as such" challenge against a rule or norm of general
application in its panel request, even though its request for consultations had only included
individual instances of application of that rule of general application. The panel in that dispute
found that, although the measure of general application was "closely related" to the measures in
the consultations request, such "close relation ship" did not outweigh the fact that the panel

78 Argentina's appellant's submission, heading II.C and para. 23.
79 Argentina's appellant's submission, headings II.D and II.D.2.
80 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 22.
81 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 25.
82 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 26 and 27.
83 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 30.
84 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 28.
85 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 43. (emphasis omitted)
87 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 47 (referring to Argentina's first written submission to the
Panel, para. 140).
88 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 52 and 53.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

request introduced a "wholly new type of measure" and added "as such" claims to the "as applied"
challenges.89 Thus, the panel in that dispute found the measure of general application to be
outside its terms of reference. Argentina argues that the complainants' expansion of the scope of
these disputes was "far more evident" than in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
(China), considering that the unwritten "overarching measure" in the complainants' panel requests
"bears no relationship" to the measures identified in their consultations requests.90
2.5. Lastly, Argentina contends that the Panel failed to address the nature of the complainants'
claims against the "overarching" measure, leading the Panel wrongly to conclude that the addition
of this new measure did not expand the scope of these disputes. For Argentina, this constitutes an
independent reason for the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that the unwritten
"overarching" TRRs measure was within its terms of reference.
91
2.1.2 Identification of the single unwritten TRRs measure
2.6. Argentina claims that the Panel erred in fi nding that the complainants had established that
the alleged TRRs measure exists or operates as a single measure, and consequently that such
measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Argentina also claims that
the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to conduct an objective
assessment of the matter when assessing Japan's "as such" claims against the alleged TRRs
measure. Argentina therefore requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's conclusions, in
paragraphs 7.1.d and e, 7.5.c and d, and 7.9.d and e of its Reports, that the alleged TRRs
measure operates as a single measure that is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; in
paragraphs 7.1.f and 7.9.f, that the alleged TRRs measure is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994; and, in paragraph 7.9.h, that the alleged TRRs measure is "as such" inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
2.1.2.1 The joint claims against the single TRRs measure
2.7. Argentina requests the Appellate Body to declare moot and of no legal effect the Panel's
findings, in paragraphs 6.221 through 6.231 of its Reports, concerning the operation of the alleged
TRRs as a single measure and, consequently, to reverse the Panel's ultimate finding that the
complainants established that the TRRs measure exists or "operates as a single measure
(TRRs measure)" that is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
92
2.8. Argentina observes that the three complainants identified in their respective panel requests,
as specific measures at issue, certain TRRs pursuant to which Argentina allegedly required
economic operators to undertake certain actions with a view to pursuing Argentina's stated policy
objectives of elimination of trade balance deficits and import substitution. The three complainants
later confirmed in their submissions before the Panel that they were challenging these TRRs as a
single overarching measure. Argentina points out that all of the complainants' panel requests
suggest that the complainants were challenging the overarching TRRs measure outside of "any
application thereof"
93, and considers it evident from the content of the complainants' submissions
that each of the complainants had, in effect, advanced "as such" claims in respect of the alleged
TRRs measure.
2.9. In Argentina's view, each of the complainants challenged the alleged TRRs measure as an
unwritten "rule", "norm", or "measure" of general and prospective application, pursuant to which
the importation of goods into Argentina is prospectively conditioned upon a number of alleged
unwritten "requirements". The Appellate Body has explained that "as such" claims are challenges
against measures that have "general and prospective application", whereby a complainant asserts
that a Member's conduct is WTO-inconsistent, "not only in a particular instance that has occurred,
but in future situations as well", and seeks ex ante to prevent that Member from engaging in that

89 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 55 (quoting Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), para. 14.36).
90 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 56.
91 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 58.
92 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 136.
93 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 78 and 79.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

conduct.94 To Argentina, this is precisely the nature of the complainants' "joint claims" in respect
of the alleged TRRs measure.
2.10. For this reason, Argentina submits that the Panel wrongly treated the complainants'
statements that they were not pursuing "as such" claims as dispositive in relation to the Panel's
evaluation of those claims. The Panel's focus on terminology, rather than on the nature of the
alleged TRRs measure and the prospective relief sought by the complainants, led it to apply an
inappropriate legal standard in relation to the complainants' claims. Argentina considers that,
regardless of the manner in which the complainants may choose to characterize their claims, the
central inquiry is whether, " in substance ", the complainants have challenged a measure with
normative content that is separate and distinct from any individual instances of application.
95
2.11. In US – Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body stated that, in order to support a finding as to the
existence of an unwritten measure of general and prospective application, the complainant must
clearly establish, through arguments and supporting evidence, at least that the alleged "rule or
norm" is attributable to the responding Member, its precise content, and that it has general and
prospective application. Argentina asserts that the Panel was under an obligation to apply the legal
standard articulated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) , given the purported normative
character of the alleged unwritten TRRs measure and the prospective nature of the findings sought
by the complainants. The Panel, however, considered that the legal standard in US – Zeroing (EC)
applies only in the case of "as such" challenges to unwritten measures, and then "apparently" only
when a complainant " expressly characterizes its claim as 'as such'".
96 It is "undisputed" that, in
assessing the complainants' joint claims, the Pane l did not examine the "general and prospective"
elements of the TRRs measure prior to concluding that such measure "exists". For Argentina,
"[t]he Panel's failure in this regard irreparably taints its conclusion that the complainants had
succeeded in demonstrating that the alleged TRRs measure is an unwritten rule or norm that
regulates the prospective importation of goods (or the concession of certain benefits) in
Argentina."
97
2.12. Argentina submits that, having failed to apply the relevant legal standard, the Panel
erroneously ascertained the existence of the alleged TRRs measure on the basis of the legal
standard articulated by the panels in US – COOL, US – Tuna II (Mexico) , and Japan – Apples. The
panels in those disputes addressed only the appropriateness of assessing the WTO-consistency of
multiple written measures, whose existence was undisputed, " as if they were a single measure".
98
It follows, according to Argentina, that the Panel erred in determining that the complainants had
established the existence of the alleged TRRs measure on the basis of the legal standard set out in
those three disputes. In Argentina's estimation, this legal error resulted in the determination, on
the part of the Panel, "that the alleged TRRs meas ure supposedly 'exists' on the basis of criteria
that bear no relationship whatsoever to those that were applicable under the legal standard
articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) to ascertain the existence of unwritten measures of general and
prospective application."
99
2.13. Argentina further submits that, having uncri tically accepted the complainants' description of
the content of each alleged TRR, the Panel th en sought to determine whether the alleged
individual TRRs apply and operate in a combined manner and as part of a single measure. The
Panel undertook that inquiry by reviewing three factors: (i) the manner in which the complainants
have presented their claims in respect of the measures; (ii) the respondent's position; and (iii) the
manner in which the TRRs operate and are related to each other, in order to determine whether
they can be considered to be autonomous or in dependent. In Argentina's view, none of these
factors says anything about whether the alleged TRRs measure is attributable to Argentina, its
precise content, or, most importantly, whether it has general and prospective application. As a
result of this legal error, the Panel effectively presumed at the outset of its analysis the very
purpose of its inquiry: i.e. that the alleged TRRs measure exists. For Argentina, the Panel could
only have determined that the alleged TRRs measure exists if it was satisfied that the
complainants had put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it is attributable to

94 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 86 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 172 (emphasis original)).
95 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 117. (emphasis original)
96 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 65. (emphasis original)
97 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 119. (fn omitted)
98 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 121. (emphasis added)
99 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 126.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Argentina, its precise content, and that it has general and prospective application. Argentina
argues that, without such findings, there was no basis for the Panel to conclude that the alleged
TRRs measure "exists".
2.1.2.2 Article 11 of the DSU – The Panel's finding on Japan's "as such" claims against
the single TRRs measure
2.14. Argentina argues that the Panel further acted inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 of
the DSU to conduct an objective assessment of the matter when assessing Japan's "as such"
claims against the alleged TRRs measure and, ther efore, respectfully requests the Appellate Body
to reverse the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.9.h of the Japan Panel Report that the alleged
TRRs measure is "as such" inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
2.15. Argentina submits that, after having erroneously concluded and made findings against the
alleged TRRs measure on the basis of an inapposite legal standard, the Panel addressed Japan's
separate "as such" claims against the same measure based on the legal standard articulated by
the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) . Nevertheless, in Argentina's view, the Panel found that
Japan had established the existence of the alle ged TRRs measure without properly examining
whether and to what extent Japan had adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate the alleged
measure's precise content, or its general and prospective application. Argentina claims that the
Panel acted inconsistently with its duties to conduct an objective assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU in assessing Japan's separate "as such" claims against the alleged TRRs
measure.
2.16. Argentina considers that, contrary to the complainants' assertions, it cannot be the case
that an unwritten measure that may include one or more of five, and possibly more, constituent
components, some of which have yet to be specified at all, has precise content. According to
Argentina, the complainants' characterization of the measure at issue was so broad and
amorphous as to encompass any content that the complainants cared to attribute to it – the
antithesis of what the term "precise" means. Moreover, Argentina contends that, even accepting
the complainants' characterization of the evid ence with respect to the alleged individual
"requirements" comprising the single TRRs measure, at face value, the most that such evidence
could possibly demonstrate is a series of discrete "one-off" actions relating to a limited number of
individual economic operators, in a limited number of sectors, the particular content of which
varied widely, and with nothing resembling the ge neral and prospective application characteristic
of a rule or norm. Argentina submits that the complainants' overarching TRRs "mega-measure"
simply does not exist.
100
2.17. Furthermore, Argentina considers that there was no credible basis for the Panel to conclude
that the complainants had demonstrated that the alleged overarching TRRs measure has "general
and prospective application" as that term is commonly understood and as it has been interpreted
by panels and the Appellate Body in the "zeroing" disputes, EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products , and EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft . The complainants
asserted that the evidence on which they relied demonstrated the existence of an unwritten
measure with "precise content", whose "systematic application" is both general and prospective.
However, Argentina contends that this would be the case only if the terms used were rendered
meaningless.
2.18. Argentina argues that the Panel "lightly assumed" the precise content of the alleged TRRs
measure. For this reason, the Panel's analysis falls far below the minimum threshold required for
an objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.
101 In Argentina's view, the
Panel uncritically accepted the complainants' characterization of the content of the alleged TRRs
measure; failed to examine the record evidence in an even-handed manner; failed to ensure that
its findings were properly based on the record evidence; and failed to provide a sufficiently
reasoned and adequate explanation for its findings concerning the precise content of the alleged
TRRs measure.
2.19. First, Argentina argues that the fact that the complainants' task was rendered more difficult
because they decided to challenge a series of unwritten measures as a single "overarching" TRRs

100 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 151.
101 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 168.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

measure, which is also unwritten, cannot serve as a basis to absolve them from demonstrating the
content of the alleged TRRs measure with the requir ed degree of precision. In order to establish
that the alleged TRRs measure exists, the complainants were under an obligation to demonstrate
the existence of the individual requirements an d that the alleged TRRs measure has normative
content that is distinct from any of the indivi dual requirements that allegedly constitute it.
Argentina underlines that the complainants failed in this crucial respect.
2.20. Second, Argentina submits that the Panel's assertion that the "available evidence provide[d]
it with sufficient elements to establish the exis tence and the precise content" of the TRRs measure
was unsubstantiated and did not provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for establishing the precise
content of the TRRs measure.
102 Argentina stresses that the Panel's analysis of the "precise
content" of the alleged TRRs measure does not contain a single citation to evidence on the Panel
record, or any cross-reference to earlier sections of the Panel Reports. Argentina presumes that
the Panel's cryptic reference to the "available evid ence" refers to the earlier section of the Panel
Reports in which it concluded that the TRRs measure exists or "operates as a single measure".
However, because the Panel made that determination on the basis of an incorrect legal standard, it
failed to analyse or determine whether the alleged TRRs measure has precise content under the
standard articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) for determining the existence of an unwritten norm of
general and prospective application.
2.21. Third, Argentina argues that the Panel's re asoning in support of its finding that the alleged
TRRs measure has general application fails to reflect an objective assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU. By the complainants' acknowledgement, the alleged TRRs measure does not
apply to all imports, to all importers, or to all economic operators who utilize imported items for
manufacture in Argentina. Indeed, it is precisely because the complainants were unable to
establish the "general" application of the alleged TRRs measure that the Panel was forced to accept
the unprecedented notion that an unwritten measure may have general application merely
because it "could affect any economic sector" or "can apply to any economic operator".
103 Such an
understanding is not only directly contrary to the ordinary meaning of the term "general", but also
would fundamentally alter the legal standard set forth in US – Zeroing (EC) , such that an
unwritten measure would be deemed to exist merely if it had "the potential to be generally
applicable".104
2.22. Finally, Argentina argues that the Panel's re asoning in support of its finding that the alleged
TRRs measure has prospective application fails to reflect an objective assessment of the matter
and is insufficient to meet the evidentiary thresh old required to establish that the alleged TRRs
measure has prospective application. Argentina notes that the Panel cited only a single piece of
evidence, Panel Exhibit JE-759, in support of its conclusion that the alleged TRRs measure
implements a "deliberate policy". 105 This exhibit contains an interview with Argentina's former
Secretary of Internal Trade, in which he stated th at the policy of "managed trade" would continue
to be applied in the future pursuant to instructions from the President of Argentina. In Argentina's
view, the above-mentioned evidence reflects, at most, the uncontroversial fact that the
Government of Argentina pursues re-industrialization and import substitution policies. These
macroeconomic objectives are common to many WT O Members, and generic references to them
do not suffice to establish that they are implemented through a WTO-inconsistent unwritten rule or
norm of general and prospective application.
2.23. For the above-mentioned reasons, Argentina claims that the Panel "lightly assumed" the
existence of the alleged TRRs measure, thereby acti ng inconsistently with its duty to conduct an
objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.
106

103 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 191 (quoting Panel Reports, paras. 6.334 and 6.335).
104 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 192. (emphasis original)
105 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 197 and 198.
106 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 201.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.1.3 The DJAI procedure: Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.24. Argentina requests the Appellate Body: (i) to modify or reverse the Panel's findings
concerning the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 107; (ii) to modify the Panel's reasoning 108,
and find that import formalities and requirements can only be found to be inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 when it is demonstrated that: (a) the formality or requirement limits
the quantity or amount of imports to a material degree that is separate and independent of the
trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or requirement
implements; and (b) this separate and independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the
effect that would ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature; and (iii) to
reverse the Panel's finding that, because the DJAI procedure is not "automatic", it is inconsistent
with Article XI:1.
109
2.25. Argentina contends that the DJAI procedure is an "import formality or requirement" subject
to Article VIII of the GATT 1994, which cannot be evaluated as a potentially prohibited
"quantitative restriction" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. This is because the respective
scopes of application of Articles VIII and XI are mutually exclusive to ensure that Members are
allowed to maintain the types of import formalit ies and requirements that Article VIII expressly
contemplates. Argentina contends that, at a minimum, a harmonious interpretation of Articles VIII
and XI must identify when an Article VIII import formality or requirement becomes an Article XI:1
"restriction".
2.1.3.1 The scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
2.26. Argentina requests the Appellate Body to modify or reverse certain aspects of the Panel's
findings concerning the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994. Although the Panel did not make an
ultimate finding as to the applicability of Article VIII to the DJAI procedure, Argentina appeals
certain statements made by the Panel in its discussion of whether the DJAI procedure can be
considered an import formality or requirement under Article VIII. These statements reflect legal
error and appear to have influenced the Panel's conclusions regarding the relationship between
Article VIII and Article XI of the GATT 1994, and the Panel's examination of the DJAI procedure
under the latter provision.
2.27. Argentina refers, in particular, to two statements in paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports:
(i) "a DJAI in exit status is a necessary pre-requisite for importing goods into Argentina"; and
(ii) the DJAI procedure is "a procedure by which Argentina determines the right to import." The
clear implication of these statements, as well as of paragraph 6.433 as a whole, is that the Panel
considered any import procedure that is a "necessary pre-requisite for importing goods", or by
which a Member "determines the right to import", to be outside the scope of Article VIII. This is
particularly apparent in the last two sentence s of paragraph 6.433, where the Panel expressly
contrasts a procedure that is "directed at a mere observance of forms" with "a procedure by which
Argentina determines the right [to] import". In Argentina's view, the Panel clearly considered only
the former to fall within the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
2.28. Referring to examples such as inspection requirements for goods that pose a sanitary or
phytosanitary risk, and ordinary import documentation requirements, Argentina contends that the
fulfilment of formalities or requirements will often constitute a "pre-requisite for importing goods"
or a procedure by which a Member "determines the right to import". Yet, such formalities and
requirements imposed in connection with importation are not, as the Panel implied, outside the
scope of Article VIII of the GA TT 1994. The Panel's erroneous interpretation appears to have
resulted, at least in part, from its focus on the ordinary meaning of only the term "formality". Had
the Panel also considered the term "requirement", it would have been apparent that procedures
that constitute a "necessary pre-requisite for importing goods", or by which an importing Member
"determines the right to import" are "requirements" within the scope of Article VIII. Argentina
cautions that the Panel's statements regarding th e scope of Article VIII reflect an incorrect legal
interpretation and, if left uncorrected, will create confusion and uncertainty concerning the
interpretation and application of this provision.

107 Argentina refers to paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports.
108 Argentina refers to paragraphs 6.435-6.445 of the Panel Reports.
109 Argentina refers to paragraphs 6.474 and 6.479 of the Panel Reports, paragraph 7.2.a of the EU
Panel Report, paragraph 7.6.a of the US Panel Report, and paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.1.3.2 The relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.29. Argentina requests the Appellate Body to modify the Panel's reasoning, in
paragraphs 6.435-6.445 of the Panel Reports, and find that the Panel should have followed an
approach similar to the one that Argentina proposes. Argentina claims that the Panel erred in not
establishing and applying a proper analytical framework for distinguishing between the scope and
disciplines of Article VIII of the GATT 1994, on the one hand, and the scope and disciplines of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, on the other hand. In particular, the Panel erred in its interpretation
and application of Article XI:1 because it failed to recognize that an import formality or
requirement could have some degree of trade-restrict ing effect that is an ordinary incident of the
formality or requirement itself, and which does not render it inconsistent with Article XI:1.
2.30. For Argentina, the Panel's understanding of the relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1
of the GATT 1994 leaves no room for an evaluation of whether an import formality or requirement
has independent trade-restricting effects and, if so, whether those effects are ordinarily associated
with a formality or requirement of that nature. The Panel's reasoning creates the possibility that a
type of measure that Members are allowed to adopt and maintain under Article VIII would be
prohibited per se under Article XI:1. In Argentina's view, this is not a harmonious interpretation of
these two provisions of the GATT 1994 for the following reasons.
2.31. First, Argentina considers that Article VIII already contemplates that import formalities and
requirements can have trade-restricting effects because it acknowledges "the need for minimizing
the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying
import and export documentation requirements". Thus, Argentina argues that the drafters of
Article VIII were aware that formalities and requir ements are potentially an impediment to trade,
at least to some degree.
2.32. Second, Argentina argues that a harmonious interpretation of Articles VIII and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 would require, at a minimum, some means of distinguishing between the
trade-restricting effect of the formality or requirem ent itself and the trade-restricting effect of any
substantive rule of importation that the measure implements. Argentina proposes that, for an
import formality or requirement to be found to constitute an Article XI:1 restriction, in its own
right, then it must be shown that: (i) the formalit y or requirement limits the quantity of imports to
a material degree that is independent of the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of
importation that the formality or requirement implements; and (ii) this independent
trade-restricting effect is greater than the effect that would ordinarily be associated with a
formality or requirement of its nature. This approach reconciles the Article XI prohibition with the
fact that import formalities and requirements are both "necessary and expressly contemplated" by
Article VIII. Argentina finds support for its propos ed approach in the reasoning employed by the
panels in Korea – Various Measures on Beef
110 and China – Raw Materials .111 In assessing the
consistency of the licensing procedures at issue with Article XI:1, the panels in those disputes
framed the relevant inquiry as whether the procedure had trade-restricting effects that were
"independent" of, and "additional" to, the "underlying measure" that the procedure was used to
implement.
2.33. Argentina states that its proposed framework is similar to the approach used in the final text
of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, which is meant to "clarify and improve relevant aspects"
of, inter alia , Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
112 Article 10.1.1(c) of the Agreement on Trade
Facilitation recognizes that import formalities and requirements can restrict trade independently of
any underlying rule of importation that the formality or requirement implements. 113 The fact that
import formalities and requirements can have certain types of trade-restricting effects does not
render them "restrictions" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. However, Argentina contends that,
due to the Panel's broad interpretation of the scope of Article XI:1, even measures that are the

110 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 225 (quoting Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on
Beef, para. 782).
111 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 226 (quoting Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials,
para. 7.917).
112 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 229 and 230 (quoting the Agreement on Trade Facilitation
(WT/L/931, 15 July 2014), third preambular paragraph, and referring to Article 10 thereof, entitled "Formalities
Connected with Importation, Exportation and Transit").
113 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 231. Argentina contends that "the underlying rule" is
referred to in Article 10.1.1(c) of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation as the "policy objective". (Ibid.)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

least trade-restrictive in the sense of Article 10.1.1(c) of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation could
constitute Article XI:1 "restrictions". Moreover, left undisturbed, the Panel's incomplete reasoning
would have implications for the interpretation of that Agreement, if and when it enters into force.
2.1.3.3 The application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
2.34. Argentina claims that the Panel erred in finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because it is not "automatic". The Panel appears to have concluded
that any import formality or requirement that is "a necessary condition to import goods" and that
is not "automatic" is, necessarily, a restriction under Article XI:1. Argentina seeks reversal of this
specific basis as one of the four independent bases for the Panel's finding in paragraph 6.474 of
the Panel Reports, and ultimate conclusion in paragraph 6.479 of the Panel Reports,
paragraph 7.2.a of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.6.a of the US Panel Report, and
paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report, that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1. Even assuming that an evaluation under Article XI:1 is possible, it cannot be the case
that an import formality or requirement is an Article XI:1 restriction merely because it is not
"automatic".
2.35. Argentina contends that the Import Licens ing Agreement, the subject-matter of which is a
subset of the subject-matter of Article VIII of the GATT 1994, provides relevant context for the
interpretation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1 994. Although the Import Licensing Agreement
contemplates that some types of licensing procedures are not "automatic", it cannot be understood
to suggest that "non-automatic" import licensing procedures are per se inconsistent with
Article XI:1. In particular, Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement distinguishes between the
potential trade-restricting effects of the procedure and of the underlying rule of importation that
the procedure implements. To interpret Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 as prohibiting non-automatic
import licensing procedures per se would conflict with Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing
Agreement. In Argentina's view, this conflict is av oided by recognizing that an import procedure is
not an Article XI:1 restriction merely because it is not "automatic".
2.2 Arguments of the European Union – Appellee
2.2.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.36. The European Union requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's finding that the
European Union's challenge to the TRRs as a "single overarching measure" was within the Panel's
terms of reference. The European Union maintains th at it was not required to identify the TRRs in
its consultations request with the same degree of detail as in its panel request. The
European Union also submits that the Panel was correct in saying that the challenge against the
TRRs either as a "single unwritten overarching measure", or when viewed as separate measures,
did not change the essence of the dispute because the characterization of the TRRs as a "single
overarching measure" in the panel requests was nothing more than an enunciation in different
terms of the same claims as set out in the consultations requests.
2.37. In the European Union's view, Argentina wrongly seeks to have the standard to identify
"as such" claims in panel requests apply equally to consultations requests. The European Union
contends that it was not required to identify the TRRs measure, as well as the manner in which it
intended to bring its claims, in its consultations request with the same degree of detail as in its
panel request. A comparison between Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU shows that the language of
Article 6.2 is stricter, considering that the panel re quest serves to "delimit the jurisdiction of the
panel".
114 In contrast, consultations are "the first step in the WTO dispute settlement process" that
provide parties the opportunity to "define and de limit the scope of the dispute between them" and
"clarify the facts of the situation".115
2.38. Moreover, echoing previous Appellate Body jurisprudence, the European Union contends
that "[p]recise and exact identity" in the identi fication of the measures at issue between the
consultations request and the panel request is not necessary, as long as the "essence of the

114 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64.
115 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64 (quoting, respectively, Appellate Body Reports,
US – Upland Cotton, para. 293; Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 54; and Brazil – Aircraft,
para. 131).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

challenged measure had not changed". 116 The consultations process allegedly helped the
European Union to have "a deeper knowledge of the measures at issue as well as Argentina's
position on them".
117 In turn, this allowed the European Union to shape its panel request in
accordance with the requirements of Article 6.2. The European Union clarifies that its panel
request neither characterized its claim against the single TRRs measure "as such", nor requested
an "as such" finding against that measure. Rather, the EU Panel Request described the elements of
the unwritten measure and explained why they ar e inconsistent with the covered agreements
either when viewed as a single overarching TRRs measure, or as separate measures, i.e. the
specific instances of application of the TRRs on particular economic operators.
2.39. With respect to Argentina's assertion that the unwritten "overarching measure" identified in
the complainants' panel requests "bears no relationship" to the measures referred to in their
consultations requests,
 the European Union argues that the single TRRs measure is composed of
one or several of the TRRs listed in the consulta tions requests, and is equally based on the policy
objectives mentioned therein. The relationship between the measures in the consultations requests
and those in the EU Panel Request was "manifestly obvious". 118 Therefore, the European Union
maintains that its panel request does not introduce "new" measures that were not already
mentioned in its consultations request.
119
2.40. In this regard, the European Union compares the language of its consultations request with
that of its panel request. On the one hand, its consultations request identifies as measures at issue
TRRs "in the form of specific types of commitments which restrict imports and discriminate
between imported and domestic goods with a view to advancing the Argentinean Government's
stated policies of re-industrialization, import substitution and elimination of trade balance
deficits".
120 On the other hand, the EU Panel Request identifies the TRRs "as an overarching
measure having the same characteristics as those described in the consultations requests and
pursuing the same policy objectives". 121 Annex III to the EU Panel Request also lists as separate
measures some instances of application of specific TRRs imposed on individual economic
operators, with these separate measures having the "same characteristics" as those described in
its consultations request. Thus, the measures identified in its consultations request are not "legally
distinct" from those identified in its panel request.
122 The European Union concludes that its
reference to the TRRs as an "overarching measure" did not expand the scope of the dispute or
change its essence. Rather, the description of the TRRs as an "overarching measure" was meant to
identify, in conformity with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the "measure at issue" that formed part of the
Panel's terms of reference, as well as to specify the "manner in which the European Union was
framing its case".
123
2.2.2 Identification of the single unwritten TRRs measure
2.41. The European Union argues that Argentina's claim that the Panel erred in finding that the
single TRRs measure exists is unfounded and should be rejected by the Appellate Body. First, the
European Union argues that the fact that the Panel split its analysis of whether the TRRs measure
has precise content and general and prospective application does not amount to a reversible error,
because the Panel recalled its earlier findings in assessing the general and prospective application
of the measure. Second, with respect to Japan's "a s such" findings, Argentina's allegation of error
under Article 11 of the DSU should be rejected given the Panel's detailed, objective, and balanced
assessment of the arguments and evidence on the record. In the light of the above, the
European Union requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's claim of error.
2.2.2.1 The joint claims against the single TRRs measure
2.42. As to Argentina's argument that the complainants' claims were all "as such" or something
akin to "as such" claims, the European Union submits that the "as such" and "as applied"

116 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Mexico –
Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 137).
117 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64.
118 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 63.
119 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 75.
120 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 92.
121 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 93.
122 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 93.
123 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 94.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

distinction is a "heuristic device" that does not define exhaustively the types of measures that may
be subject to challenge in WTO dispute settl ement. Moreover, the "as such"/"as applied"
distinction is not foreseen in the text of the covered agreements, and there is no legal requirement
to indicate expressly that a Member challenges a measure "as such". The European Union states
that it did not rely on the "as such"/"as applied" distinction to frame its case against the TRRs as a
single overarching measure or against the 23 separate measures where Argentina has imposed
TRRs on specific economic operators. In fact, the European Union notes that the terms "as such",
"as applied", and "application" do not appear in its panel request, nor does the term "as such"
appear in its first written submission to the Panel. Indeed, the European Union considers that such
a characterization or "label" would have been confusing, as the European Union was not
challenging, either "as such" or "as applied", the single TRRs measure or each of the TRRs
individually.
2.43. In addition, the European Union points out that, in paragraphs 112 through 115 of its
second written submission to the Panel, it argu ed and showed that the single TRRs measure has
general and prospective application. The Europe an Union also argued and showed that the
imposition of TRRs on economic operators is not, as Argentina argued, limited to one-off unrelated
cases. Rather, the imposition of TRRs is part of a systemic approach adopted by Argentina to
prohibit or restrict the importation of products and/or the use of imported products in Argentina
with a view to achieving its trade-balancing and import-substitution objectives. The single TRRs
measure was shown to be "overarching", "all-embraci ng", or "in extended use" in Argentina, since
it applies to a wide range of situations, and thus, it is "general" in its application.
124 The
European Union considers that it also proved that such a systemic approach has become the "rule"
for companies doing business in Argentina, and that such a "rule" applies or would likely apply in
the future, insofar as Argentina continues pursuing its trade-balancing and import-substitution
objectives. Thus, the European Union showed th at the single TRRs measure has general and
prospective application.
2.44. As to Argentina's argument that the Panel erred by failing to apply the legal standard
articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) to determine whether an unwritten "rule or norm" of general and
prospective application exists, the European Union contends that the Panel implicitly followed the
analytical steps in US – Zeroing (EC) when making findings about the single TRRs measure with
respect to the complainants' joint claims. The European Union considers that the Panel Reports
would be clearer had the Panel explicitly examined the issue of whether the single TRRs measure
also has general and prospective application as part of its analysis of these joint claims in
section 6.2.2.2 of its Reports. Ne vertheless, the fact that the Panel split its analysis does not
amount to a reversible error. The European Union understands that the Panel's analysis of the
general and prospective application of the measure at issue, in its examination of Japan's request
for "as such" findings in two subsequent sections of the Reports (6.2.3.4.2.3 and 6.2.3.4.2.4),
should be read together with its determinations on the joint claims in section 6.2.2.2. The
numerous cross-references in the sections addressing Japan's "as such" claims to findings made in
previous sections, and mainly to findings contai ned in section 6.2.2.2, show that the Panel's
analysis of the general and prospective application of the single TRRs measure was not exclusively
contained in the subsequent sections of its Reports addressing Japan's "as such" claims. In the
European Union's view, section 6.2.2.2 addressing the joint claims and the two subsequent
sections (6.2.3.4.2.3 and 6.2.3.4.2.4) of the Pa nel Reports addressing Japan's "as such" claims
should be read together.
2.45. With respect to the general application of the single TRRs measure, the European Union
points out that, in considering Japan's request for "as such" findings, the Panel found in
paragraphs 6.334 and 6.335 of its Reports that the single TRRs measure has general application.
In making those findings, the Panel explicitly referred to its observations in four prior paragraphs
of its Reports (6.157, 6.158, 6.229, and 6.230) that the measure: (i) affects a wide range of
sectors; (ii) could affect any economic sector because trade in any good may contribute to
achieving a trade balance and import substitution; (iii) is not limited to a single import or importer
pursuant to the "managed trade" policy instituted by high-ranking Argentine officials; and (iv) has
the flexibility to be adapted to the specific characteristics of any economic operator. These
paragraphs and substantive elements were also cited by the Panel in section 6.2.2.2 of its Reports.

124 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 124.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.46. With respect to the prospective application of the single TRRs measure, the Panel also found
in paragraphs 6.338 through 6.341 of its Reports that the single TRRs measure has prospective
application on several additional bases. The Panel made an explicit reference to paragraph 6.230
in section 6.2.2.2 to support its findings. Moreover, the Panel made relevant findings in
paragraphs 6.221 and 6.230 concerning, respectively, evidence of the repeated imposition of TRRs
by Argentina "at least since 2009", and the existe nce of the "managed trade" policy. Therefore,
section 6.2.2.2 also contains findings that the single TRRs measure has prospective application.
For the above-mentioned reasons, the European Union considers that section 6.2.2.2 of the Panel
Reports should not be read in complete isolation from the rest of the Reports.
2.47. Thus, the European Union submits that the Panel did not err in section 6.2.2.2 of its Reports
by declining to follow explicitly the analytical steps mentioned by the Appellate Body in
US – Zeroing (EC) . Rather, the Panel examined the precise content of the single TRRs measure
and found, although not so explicitly as later on in its Reports, that the single TRRs measure also
has general and prospective application. The European Union considers that this is no different
from the substantive inquiry that the Appellate Body said in US – Zeroing (EC) should be
undertaken by a panel when examining a challenge against an unwritten "rule or norm"
constituting a measure of general and prospective application.
2.48. The European Union concludes that, in th e present case, the Panel found that the single
TRRs measure is attributable to Argentina, determined the content of the single TRRs measure,
and also found in section 6.2.2.2 of its Report s that the measure has general and prospective
application. Consequently, the European Union submits that the Panel did not make a reversible
error. Nevertheless, should the Appellate Body ag ree with Argentina and consider that the Panel
made a reversible error, the European Union requests the Appellate Body to complete the analysis
on the basis of the uncontested facts on the record, as well as the Panel's findings (in particular, in
sections 6.2.3.4.2.3 and 6.2.3.4.2.4), and to find that the single TRRs measure has general and
prospective application. Because Argentina has not contested the Panel's findings that the single
TRRs measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the European Union
requests the Appellate Body to uphold those ultimate findings.
2.2.2.2 Article 11 of the DSU – The Panel's finding on Japan's "as such" claims against
the single TRRs measure
2.49. While Argentina's arguments under Article 11 of the DSU address the Panel's finding
regarding Japan's explicit "as such" challenge to the single TRRs measure, the European Union
considers it appropriate to address those allegations as well, as it may affect the manner in which
the Appellate Body were to complete the analysis in this case. Moreover, those findings are, in
essence, a recollection of what the Panel had already found in the previous sections.
2.50. The European Union argues that, for a claim under Article 11 of the DSU to succeed, the
Appellate Body must be satisfied that a panel exceeded its authority as the initial trier of facts. In
addition, a participant must identify specific errors regarding the objectivity of the panel's
assessment. A participant claiming that a panel disregarded certain evidence must also explain
why the evidence is so material to its case that the panel's failure to address such evidence has a
bearing on the objectivity of the panel's factual assessment. According to the European Union,
Argentina has failed to meet this standard with respect to its allegations that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 in finding that Japan had established the precise content and general
and prospective application of the single TRRs measure. The European Union considers that the
Panel went into detail in the preceding sections of its Reports to determine the precise content of
the TRRs measure in an objective and balanced assessment of the arguments and evidence on the
record, which Argentina failed to contest.
2.51. The European Union "strongly disagrees" with Argentina's assertion that the complainants
failed to specify with sufficient precision the content of the single TRRs measure.
125 Rather, in
addressing Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel determined the precise content and general and
prospective application of the single TRRs measure based on the arguments and evidence on the
record which, as the Panel also noted, Argentina had failed to rebut. The European Union contends
that, when reading the report in its totality, the Panel did not "lightly assume" the content of the

125 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 147.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

single TRRs measure. Moreover, Argentina fails to point out evidence on the record to rebut the
Panel's findings, beyond indicating that the totality of the evidence indicates otherwise.
2.52. As regards Argentina's argument that, with respect to the precise content of the single TRRs
measure, the alleged measure was "amorphous and ill-defined" because the list of TRRs was
non-exhaustive and because the complainants did not put forward the same elements of the single
TRRs measure, the European Union agrees wi th the Panel that "one of the purported
characteristics of the challenged measure is precisely its lack of transparency and the broad
discretion that the authorities have in its implementation." 126 Thus, requiring a perfect match, as
Argentina would have the Appellate Body do, could affect the right of WTO Members to bring a
challenge against such a measure under Article 11 of the DSU. In any event, Argentina's
contention is inapposite because the single TRRs measure found to exist by the Panel is almost a
perfect match with the measure as described by the European Union.
2.53. As for Argentina's argument that the complainants were under an obligation to demonstrate
that the single TRRs measure has normative content that is distinct from any of the individual
"requirements" that allegedly constitute it, the European Union considers that they did just that.
The imposition of one TRR, as a measure, is "manifestly unlike" a measure that permits Argentina
to choose the most suitable requirement to be imposed on economic operators in order to achieve
its stated policy objectives.
127 For the European Union, this is precisely why the Panel examined
the complainants' allegations that the TRRs work as part of a single measure and properly found
the existence of such a single TRRs measure.
2.54. With respect to Argentina's claim that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of
the matter because there was insufficient evidence for the Panel to make a finding regarding the
general application of the TRRs measure, the European Union first observes that Argentina
incorrectly raises an Article 11 allegation of error. In reality, Argentina is questioning the legal
interpretation followed by the Panel in determining that the single TRRs measure has general
application. Second, the European Union agrees with the Panel, particularly in its reliance upon
Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 as context, that a measure need not apply in all cases in order for it
to have general application. To this extent, the European Union considers that Argentina
disregards an important feature of the single TRRs measure: its "flexibility and versatility".
128 As
the Panel found, the discretion embedded in the essence of the single TRRs measure should not be
an obstacle to finding that the measure has general application. Therefore, the European Union
submits that Argentina's argument should be rejected.
2.55. As to the prospective application of the TRRs measure, the European Union recalls that
Argentina questions the Panel's reliance on one exhi bit containing the statement of a high-ranking
official that the policy of "managed trade" would continue to be applied in the future as per the
instructions from the President of Argentina. Contrary to what Argentina asserts, however, the
Panel did not rely merely on that one exhibit to show the existence of a "deliberate 'policy'" in this
case. For example, in paragraphs 6.161 and 6.162 of its Reports, the Panel referred to the
existence of the "managed trade" policy as evid enced in numerous official documents and in the
totality of the evidence. Thus, the Panel properly supported its findings on the basis of the
evidence on the record. Moreover, the 29 agreements signed between economic operators and the
Argentine authorities, as well as the commitments provided by many economic operators, all
require a prospective course of action.
2.56. Finally, the European Union submits that th e Panel properly supported its findings on the
basis of the evidence on the record, none of which was contested by Argentina, and that Argentina
failed to refer to evidence on the record showing that the Panel was biased or committed a
material error when finding that the single TRRs measure has a precise content and general and
prospective application. Moreover, Argentina's clai m under Article 11 of the DSU appears to be an
attempt at recasting the same arguments that Argentina made with respect to its precedent claims
of error, something the Appellate Body has explic itly ruled is not the function of a claim under
Article 11 of the DSU. In view of the foregoing, the European Union requests the Appellate Body to
reject Argentina's claim of error.

127 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 154.
128 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 159.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.2.3 The DJAI procedure: Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.57. The European Union requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's claim on appeal and
to uphold the Panel's finding that the DJAI procedure restricts imports and is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The European Union considers that: (i) the Panel did not imply that
the DJAI procedure fell outside of the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 merely because it is a
prerequisite for importing goods; (ii) Argentina's analytical framework is not applicable to these
disputes; and (iii) the Panel considered that the DJAI procedure is not "automatic" in the sense
that the authorities may decide to withhold authorization to import even when all the prescribed
formal requirements are met.
2.2.3.1 The scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
2.58. The European Union contends that Argentina's appeal is based on a mischaracterization of
the Panel's reasoning, given that the Panel did not imply that the DJAI procedure fell outside of the
scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 merely beca use it is a prerequisite for importing goods.
Rather, the assertion that a DJAI is a prerequisite for importing goods was just the starting point
for the Panel's analysis, and must be read together with the detailed analysis in paragraphs 6.459
through 6.474 of the Panel Reports, where the Panel found that participating agencies have broad
discretion to enter and lift observations, and that such discretion is sometimes used to impose
TRRs. These findings evidence that the DJAI procedure operates, in essence, as a discretionary
system of authorization of imports by which the Argentine authorities decide on an ad hoc basis
whether to grant the right to import to each applicant on the basis of criteria not specified in
advance. Thus, the European Union requests the Appellate Body to reject this claim of error and to
confirm the Panel's finding that the aspects of the DJAI procedure challenged by the complainants
under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 fall outside the scope of Article VIII.
2.59. Additionally, in the European Union's view, the Panel's analysis focused on the term
"formalities" because, before the Panel, Argentina consistently characterized the DJAI procedure as
a customs or import formality. Argentina now focuses on "requirements" in Article VIII:4 of the
GATT 1994. This does not, however, call into question the Panel's findings that the DJAI procedure
is not subject to Article VIII of the GATT 1994, because not every import requirement is subject to
Article VIII. Article VIII:4 purports to define the scope of Article VIII without prescribing any
obligations. Articles VIII:1(c) and VIII:3 refer to "documentation requirements" and "procedural
requirements", respectively. The European Union argues that, as no other provision refers to
"requirements", it must be concluded that Article VIII:4 refers exclusively to documentation or
procedural requirements.
2.2.3.2 The relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.60. The European Union asserts that Argentina's analytical framework is not applicable to these
disputes. Argentina's proposed framework seeks to determine whether an Article VIII formality or
requirement constitutes a "restriction" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. However, the
complainants' claims were not concerned with those elements of the DJAI procedure that are
formalities or procedural requirements, but with the DJAI's discretionary system of authorization of
imports. In the European Union's view, as the discretionary system is not a mere formality or
procedural requirement, it falls outside the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
2.61. According to the European Union, even assuming arguendo that Argentina's framework
were legally correct, the Panel would not have erred by not applying it. As the Panel found that the
challenged aspects of the DJAI procedure were no t a mere formality subject to Article VIII of the
GATT 1994, there was no need to apply such fram ework. Moreover, although the first step of
Argentina's proposed framework calls for distinguishing the trade-restricting effects of the
"formalities" from those of the underlying "substantive rule of importation", it is impossible to
separate and distinguish between the trade-restricting effects of the DJAI's formalities or
requirements and those of any underlying conditions or criteria because the latter are unknown.
The European Union submits that the panel reports in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and
China – Raw Materials are inapposite to these disputes, because the relevant restrictive effects
identified by the Panel do not result from the administration of a quota or other underlying
substantive import rule; rather, they result from a self-standing discretionary system for
authorizing imports.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.62. As to the second step of Argentina's framework, which calls for an assessment of whether
the trade-restricting effects of a formality or requirement exceed those ordinarily associated with a
formality or requirement of that nature, the European Union contends that it implies a dualistic
approach to Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, with a stricter standard for import formalities and
requirements. This approach has no basis in the text of Article XI:1 and is not necessary to ensure
a "harmonious" interpretation of Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, or of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 10.1.1(c) of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Argentina overlooks that,
in some cases, formalities or requirements may be equivalent to those applied by Members with
respect to the marketing of domestic products (e.g. those related to conformity assessment
procedures or sanitary inspection) and, as such, fall outside of the scope of Article XI:1.
129 In the
European Union's view, Argentina further ignores that, in other cases, formalities and
requirements will be justified under the exceptions to Article XI:1, including Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994.
2.2.3.3 The application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
2.63. According to the European Union, the Panel considered that the approval of a DJAI was not
"automatic" in the sense that the authorities may decide not to put a DJAI "in exit status" even
when the DJAI has been timely filed and meets all the formal requirements prescribed by the DJAI
procedure. It is undeniable that the non-approval of a DJAI may have a limiting effect on imports,
and Argentina's claim is based on its own preconceived ideas about what should be the proper
scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, rather th an on the terms of that provision. Thus, the
European Union requests the Appellate Body to reject this claim and uphold the Panel's finding.
2.64. The European Union submits that Argentina's preconceptions are based on mistaken
assumptions for the following reasons. First, the DJAI procedure is not a mere "formality" or
"procedural requirement", but, instead, a discret ionary system for authorizing imports. Second,
Argentina is incorrect that the Panel's interpretation implies that most import formalities or
requirements would be prohibited by Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. As already explained,
formalities or requirements enforced at the border that are equivalent to those applied with
respect to the marketing of domestic products fall outside the scope of Article XI:1, and other
formalities and requirements may be permitted under other WTO provisions, notably Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1994. Third, the Panel's interpretation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 does not
render ineffective Article 3 of the Import Licensin g Agreement because a conflict arises only where
it is impossible to comply simultaneously with both obligations.
2.3 Arguments of the United States – Appellee
2.3.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.65. The United States requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's arguments that the
TRRs measure is outside the scope of these disputes, and uphold the Panel's findings in its First
Preliminary Ruling.
130 The United States argues that the Panel was correct in finding that the
United States identified the TRRs measure in its consultations request in "substantially similar
terms" as in its panel request, and that, as a result, the latter did not expand the scope of the
dispute.
131
2.66. The United States highlights the difference between the language of Article 4.4 and that of
Article 6.2 of the DSU. While both the consultati ons request and the panel request must identify
the "measure at issue", the standard for a pane l request requires more precision, i.e. the
identification of the "specific" measure. The Ap pellate Body has previously considered that the
difference in the language of these two provisions does not require a " precise and exact identity "
between the specific measures that were the subject of consultations and the specific measures
identified in the panel request, as long as the "essence" of the measures has not changed.
132 The
specificity required in the consultations requests of the identification of the measure at issue is less
than that required in the panel request. This is especially so in the case of unwritten measures,

129 In this regard, the European Union refers to Ad Article III of the GATT 1994.
130 United States' appellee's submission, para. 50.
131 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 24 and 26.
132 United States' appellee's submission, para. 28 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft,
para. 132 (emphasis original); and Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 137).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

considering that the complainant may have incomplete information as regards the "content and
operation" of the measure at issue prior to consultations. Consequently, the complainant may be
unable to identify the " specific measure" at that time, as Article 6.2 will subsequently require it to
do in its panel request.
133 The United States argues that, since its consultations request identified
the TRRs in "substantially similar terms" as its panel request, the TRRs measure fell within the
Panel's terms of reference.134
2.67. The United States also contends that its consultations request identified the TRRs in a
manner that does not indicate that the TRRs measure relates only to the application of the DJAI
and CI requirements, or that it excludes any claims related to the TRRs. Its consultations request
cannot be read as encompassing only " individual written commitments" imposed on and
undertaken by importers, considering that its cons ultations request did not identify any individual
instances of application of the requirement to undertake certain commitments.
135 A comparison
between the United States' consultations request and its panel request shows that the latter
identifies the same measure at issue, albeit with greater specificity. Such specificity includes a
confirmation that the TRRs are not published, and that economic operators normally submit a
statement or conclude an agreement with Argentina. For the United States, the fact that its
consultations request does not contain any reference to "legal instruments" or "measures" does
not support Argentina's interpretation that the TRRs measure was not identified in its consultations
request. Given that there are no legal instruments through which Argentina imposes the TRRs
measure, there was no reason for the United States to include "legal instruments" or any annex
similar to how its consultations request presente d the DJAI and CI requirements, which were the
only measures implemented through written instruments.
2.68. The United States argues that the Panel correctly found that the United States did not
impermissibly expand the scope of the dispute in its panel request. The Panel considered the
impact of the alleged "reformulation" of the TRRs measure, and found that, regardless of whether
the TRRs measure is considered as part of the DJAI or CI requirements or as a separate measure,
the complainants' claims with respect thereto would be the same. The United States also cites the
Panel's finding that "the characterization of the [TRRs] as a single 'overarching measure' in the
complainants' panel requests seems to be nothing more than an enunciation in different terms of
the complainants' same claims set out in the request[s] for consultations", and this "reformulation"
does not per se expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute.
136 In the United States'
view, even assuming that its consultations request had identified the TRRs measure only as a
component of either the DJAI or CI requirements , its consultations request and its panel request
still pertain to the same subject-matter and disput e. The United States argues that, consequently,
it could validly bring the same "expansive" claim irrespective of the characterization of the
measure at issue.137
2.69. The United States contrasts these disputes with US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties (China), in which the consultations request identified individual instances of application of a
measure, while the panel request identified a rule or norm of general application as a measure at
issue. In these disputes, the consultations requests did not identify individual instances of
application of the TRRs measure. Instead, both the consultations requests and the panel requests
identified the same measure and brought the same claims. Therefore, the United States asserts
that, unlike the panel request in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), there is no
expansion in the nature of the legal claims against the TRRs measure in these disputes.
2.3.2 Identification of the single unwritten TRRs measure
2.70. The United States requests the Appellate Body to reject all of Argentina's claims on appeal,
and to uphold the Panel's findings. The United States considers that Argentina has failed to
confront and discuss the actual content of the co mplainants' evidence on the TRRs, which shows
systematic and sustained efforts by Argentina to use TRRs to force businesses to act in accordance
with Argentina's trade policy objectives, including import substitution and reducing or eliminating
trade deficits. The evidence also shows that the imposition of TRRs on businesses has not been a

133 United States' appellee's submission, para. 45. (emphasis original)
134 United States' appellee's submission, para. 29.
135 United States' appellee's submission, para. 37. (emphasis original)
136 United States' appellee's submission, para. 47 (quoting First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.33).
137 United States' appellee's submission, para. 48.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

series of one-off decisions, but is the result of a measure that Argentine officials maintain but
never put in writing. The United States further considers that, in addition to relying upon
statements by top Argentine officials, the Pane l examined and discussed the evidence concerning
each of the five identified TRRs. Having comple ted that analysis, the Panel concluded that "the
requirements constitute different elements that contribute in different combinations and degrees …
towards the realization of the common policy objectives that guide Argentina's 'managed trade'
policy".
138 In the view of the United States, the ev idence overwhelmingly supports the Panel's
conclusion that Argentina maintains the TRRs me asure, and it strongly undermines Argentina's
contentions that there could be any question about the validity of the Panel's findings that the
measure is attributable to Argentina, well-defined, and of general and prospective effect.
2.71. In this context, the United States considers that Argentina's claims on appeal that the Panel
erred in finding that the single TRRs measure exists and in failing to apply the legal standard
articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) are misplaced.
2.72. With respect to Japan's "as such" findings, the United States considers that Argentina has
failed to meet the high standard for establishing that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11
of the DSU.
2.3.2.1 The joint claims against the single TRRs measure
2.73. The United States characterizes Argentina's claims that the Panel applied an incorrect legal
standard in assessing the existence of the TRRs measure as without merit. The complainants met
their burden to provide sufficient evidence for the Panel to determine that the TRRs measure
exists. Although it is likely that, in most cases, a greater volume of evidence is necessary to
demonstrate the existence of an unwritten measure, the United States considers that such
likelihood does not mean that there is a higher standard of proof or that a party must do more
than present sufficient evidence to raise a pres umption of the existence of a measure, merely
because the measure is unwritten.
2.74. The United States also contends that there is no basis for Argentina's argument that the
Panel erred by failing to require the complainants to demonstrate that the TRRs measure has
general and prospective application. In particular, the United States considers Argentina's reliance
on the Appellate Body report in US – Zeroing (EC) and the panel report in EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft to support the existence of a high er standard of proof for unwritten
measures to be misplaced. The Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) considered whether the
"zeroing methodology" could be challenged "as such" as a "rule or norm". In these disputes,
however, the measure being challenged is not a "rule or norm" as that term was used by the
Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) ; rather, the measure takes the form of a decision by
Argentina to impose the TRRs. Moreover, the Appellate Body in EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft considered that it is not necessarily the case that a complainant must
demonstrate the existence of a rule or norm of general and prospective application to show that a
measure exists.
139
2.75. The United States considers that the facts in these disputes and the analysis that should be
followed are quite similar to those that were before the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products . That panel concluded that the question with respect to the existence of an
unwritten measure is the same as that related to any fact asserted by a Member in the course of
dispute settlement procedures: i.e. whether the ev idence supports the complainants' assertion.
Moreover, the evidence presented in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products is very
similar to that presented to the Panel here. The United States posits that, like in EC – Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products , the evidence here more than sufficed to support the Panel's
finding that the TRRs measure exists and is susceptible to challenge in the WTO dispute settlement
process.
2.76. As to Argentina's argument that the Panel improperly substituted a standard articulated by
the panel in US – COOL for a standard applicable to the identification of an unwritten measure, the
United States reiterates that there is no separate legal standard applicable to the identification of

139 United States' appellee's submission, para. 133 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 794).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

an unwritten measure. The Panel not only considered the three factors highlighted by the panel in
US – COOL , but also concluded that the evidence de monstrated the existence of each of the
individual TRRs. The Panel then found that the re quirements were imposed according to the single
measure identified in the complainants' panel requests.
2.77. The United States considers that, even though it did not need to, the Panel did make the
factual findings that Argentina thinks the Panel needed to make in order to permit a challenge to
its unwritten measure. In applying the legal standard relied upon by Argentina – i.e. relying on the
same evidence presented by the United States – to Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel explicitly
considered whether the measure's precise content had been established with sufficient precision,
and whether the measure has general and prospective effect. Accordingly, for the United States,
there would be no basis on which to reverse the Panel's findings even if the Appellate Body were to
determine that the Panel needed to apply the standard proposed by Argentina.
2.78. In addition, the United States considers both "illogical and untenable" Argentina's argument
that the Panel's failure to apply the legal standard articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) resulted in an
improper presumption that a single TRRs measure exists.
140 To support its argument, Argentina
refers to the Panel's statement that "[t]he fact that the TRRs can be imposed separately does not
mean that a single global measure does not exist."
141 However, Argentina's argument rests on its
selective quotation of the Panel Reports without taking account of the Panel's statement that, "[i]f
the Argentine Government imposed five requirements at once on a specific economic operator, this
would not make the TRRs measure in that particular case any more 'global' as compared to a TRRs
measure that consisted of a single requirement."
142 In the view of the United States, the Panel did
not presume the existence of the TRRs measure; rather, it undertook a lengthy evaluation of
whether Argentina was imposing each of the TRRs, and whether those requirements were imposed
under a single measure.
2.79. Finally, the United States considers that the Panel was not "simply asserting the single TRRs
measure into existence" when it explained that the TRRs constitute different elements that
contribute in different combinations and degrees toward the realization of common policy
objectives that guide Argentina's "managed trade" policy.
143 Rather, in the view of the
United States, the Panel was highlighting the obvious: the fact that the TRRs contribute in different
combinations and degrees to the objectives of Argentina's "managed trade" policy constitutes a
powerful reason to consider them to be components of a single measure.
2.80. The United States considers that the volu minous record evidence, painstakingly examined
and discussed by the Panel in its Reports, was fully consistent with the above-mentioned findings,
and demonstrates overwhelmingly that the TRRs do function together to advance common policy
objectives, and are often employed in tandem with respect to particular companies or industries.
2.3.2.2 Article 11 of the DSU – The Panel's finding on Japan's "as such" claims against
the single TRRs measure
2.81. The United States considers Argentina's claims under Article 11 of the DSU to be without
merit. Contrary to established Appellate Body jurisprudence, Argentina is recasting its arguments
before the Panel under the guise of an Article 11 claim and attempting to circumvent the fact-
finding authority of the Panel by citing to the "particular rigour" that is necessary to find the
existence of an unwritten norm or rule.
144 The United States asserts that, before the Panel and
now on appeal, Argentina has failed to confront the substantial evidence on the record.
2.82. With respect to Argentina's allegations of e rror as to the Panel's evaluation of the evidence
on the content and general and prospective nature of its measure, the United States submits that
the Panel fulfilled its obligation to "consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility,

140 United States' appellee's submission, para. 145.
143 United States' appellee's submission, para. 149 (quoting Argentina's appellant's submission,
144 United States' appellee's submission, para. 159 (referring to Argentina's appellant's submission,
para. 141, in turn quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

determine its weight, and ensure that its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence". 145
Using the voluminous evidence on the record , the Panel explored in detail whether the
complainants had established evidence of the TRRs measure and its contours. The Panel then
returned to that content in its separate consideration of Japan's "as such" claim, which was based
on the same evidence as that supporting the United States' claim. In doing so, the United States
submits, the Panel did not need to repeat its earlier discussion of all the evidence showing the
content of the TRRs measure.
2.83. The United States considers that the TRRs measure had precise content and was not
amorphous or ill-defined. As the United States explained to the Panel, pursuant to the TRRs
measure, "Argentine officials require, as a prior condition for importation, commitments to export
a certain dollar value of goods; reduce the volume or value of imports; incorporate local content
into products; make or increase investments in Argentina; and/or refrain from repatriating
profits."
146 Furthermore, the Panel properly understood that requiring the level of detail Argentina
considers necessary "could make it almost impossible in practice to challenge [unwritten]
measures".147 Argentina considers that the discretionary and non-transparent nature of the TRRs
measure immunizes it from challenge in the WTO dispute settlement process, but the
United States contends that the Panel properly recognized that this cannot be the case.
2.84. The United States further disputes Argentina's assertion that the Appellate Body report in
US – Zeroing (EC) set out a standard for identifying the precise content of an unwritten measure.
Argentina has never indicated what it thinks this standard is, and the Appellate Body did not set
forth any separate standard for establishing the content of unwritten measures for purposes of an
"as such" challenge. Rather, the Appellate Body simp ly considered a variety of pieces of evidence
that were indicative of the content of the measur e, before concluding that the evidence on the
record was sufficient to identify its precise content. In the United States' estimation, that is
precisely what the Panel did: it painstakingly es tablished the content of each individual TRR and
the way that the TRRs operate together as a single measure to support Argentina's import
substitution policies.
2.85. The United States submits that Argentina's allegations that the Panel erred in finding that
the TRRs measure is of general application are without merit. The Panel explained that panels in
disputes under Article X of the GATT 1994 have interpreted the term "general application" to refer
to measures applicable to "an unidentified number of economic operators" or "a range of situations
or cases", as opposed to measures addressed to a single company or applied to a single shipment,
and correctly observed that the panel in China – Raw Materials c o n s i d e r e d t o b e o f g e n e r a l
application a measure that had the potential to affect trade and traders.
148 Thus, in the
United States' view, the Panel properly rejected Argentina's argument that only measures
applicable to all cases are measures of general application.
2.86. The United States also submits that Argentina's argument that the Panel failed to make an
objective assessment when finding that the measure has prospective effect is equally without
merit. Citing US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) , Argentina appears to suggest that the Panel should not
have found prospective effect because the TRRs measure is not applied in all cases. However,
nothing about the panel's decision in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) suggests such a requirement.
Rather, that panel was clear that a variety of types of evidence are relevant to whether a measure
is prospective. Argentina's suggestion that a measure giving discretion to officials cannot be found
to be prospective not only "flies in the face " of an ordinary understanding of the term
"prospective", but also would lead to the "absurd" result, in the view of the United States, that
Members could insulate their measures from challenge by making them discretionary.
149
2.87. Finally, as to Argentina's argument that the Panel found that the TRRs measure has
prospective effect because it has been applied re peatedly, the United States contends that the
Panel did not find the measure to be prospective solely on the basis of mere repeated application.

145 United States' appellee's submission, para. 164 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated
Tyres, para. 185 (fn omitted)).
146 United States' appellee's submission, para. 171 (quoting United States' opening statement at the
second Panel meeting, para. 73).
149 United States' appellee's submission, para. 184.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Rather, the Panel observed that the TRRs measure has been applied for several years, and that
the measure can be applied to any sector or econ omic operator. The Panel further highlighted that
the policy of "managed trade" or "trade administration," which the TRRs measure is part of and
implements, is publically announced and, crucially, that Argentina's Secretary of Domestic Trade
has been explicit that this policy will continue . The Panel then explained that evidence on the
record suggests that these commitments will continue to be required unless and until the policy is
repealed or modified. The United States considers that the Panel's conclusion that the measure will
continue to be applied in the absence of a future policy change is the only logical conclusion to be
drawn from the evidence.
2.88. Based on the foregoing, the United States requests the Appellate Body to reject all of
Argentina's claims on appeal, and uphold the Panel's findings.
2.3.3 The DJAI procedure: Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.89. The United States submits that the Pane l correctly found that: (i) Article VIII of the
GATT 1994 does not limit the scope of application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; (ii) Members
may not exclude a restriction from scrutiny under Article XI:1 merely by characterizing it as a
procedural, rather than a substantive, measure; and (iii) the DJAI procedure is a non-automatic
trade restriction inconsistent with Article XI:1. For the United States, Argentina's arguments on
appeal must be rejected because they depend up on assuming that conflicts exist where they do
not and upon imputing concepts and terms into treaty provisions when there is no basis to do so.
2.3.3.1 The scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
2.90. The United States submits that Argentina's argument on formalities and requirements is
misplaced in the context of the DJAI procedure. The Panel did not describe the DJAI procedure as
a documentation requirement within the scope of Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994. Instead, the
Panel concluded that the DJAI procedure is not a "mere formality", but rather a procedure by
which Argentina determines the right to import. According to the United States, approval of a DJAI
can be withheld for non-transparent and discretionary reasons.
2.3.3.2 The relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.91. The United States puts forward several reas ons to demonstrate: (i) that Article VIII of the
GATT 1994 does not limit the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; and (ii) that a restriction
cannot escape scrutiny under Article XI merely by being characterized as an Article VIII "formality"
or "requirement". First, the question of whether or not "formalities" or "requirements" are included
or excluded from the scope of Article XI:1 is not directly relevant. According to the United States,
this is because its claim under Article XI is not focused on "formalities", but rather on the fact that
the DJAI procedure is non-transparent and discretionary.
2.92. Second, the United States contends that the texts of Articles VIII and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 do not support the conclusion that they are mutually exclusive, or that Article XI:1
could not apply to "formalities" or "requirements". Principles of treaty interpretation neither
require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation
into a treaty of concepts that were not intended . As the Appellate Body has repeatedly stated, and
as the Panel recognized, in the light of the principle of effective treaty interpretation, all WTO
provisions should be interpreted harmoniously and cumulatively whenever possible. Article VIII
cannot serve as a derogation from Article XI:1 simply by labelling a restriction as a "formality" or
"requirement". The primary subparagraph relied on by Argentina, namely Article VIII:1(c) of the
GATT 1994, contains hortatory language covering only "documentation requirements", and does
not create an exception to Article XI:1. In the United States' view, accepting Argentina's argument
would result in the DJAI procedure being subject to no WTO discipline.
2.93. Finally, the United States submits that Argentina's reliance on the text of the Agreement on
Trade Facilitation is misplaced. That Agreement does not have interpretative value for
understanding the obligations under Article XI of the GATT 1994 because it does not constitute a
subsequent agreement of the parties on the interp retation of that provision. In any event, the
United States argues there is no conflict between Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and the
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Agreement on Trade Facilitation, and, as explai ned above, it is not possible to read into
Article XI:1 concepts not present therein.
2.94. In addition, the United States submits that a Member may not shield a trade restriction from
scrutiny under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 merely by characterizing it as a procedural, rather
than a substantive, measure. Regardless of whether it is "substantive" or "procedural", the DJAI
procedure is a discretionary restriction, independent from any other measure, because importers
cannot import goods until the DJAI is approved, and such approval can be withheld by unidentified
Argentine agencies on the basis of undisclosed reasons for indeterminate time periods. The DJAI
procedure constitutes a non-automatic restriction. Article XI:1 applies to all restrictions, whether
or not characterized as "procedural" or "substan tive" in nature. The relevant WTO jurisprudence
does not support the conclusion that a Member may exclude procedural measures from scrutiny
under Article XI:1. Past panels have recognized that discretionary trade restrictions that do not
implement any other restrictions, such as a quota, are, on their face, inconsistent with
Article XI:1.
150 As in India – Quantitative Restrictions , the DJAI procedure is a discretionary trade
restriction independent from any other measure, and does not specify criteria governing the
exercise of discretion. In this context, the United States considers that Argentina's proposed
analytical framework is inapposite, because the DJ AI procedure is a discretionary restriction that,
on its face, does not implement a separate WTO-consistent restriction.
2.3.3.3 The application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
2.95. The United States disagrees with Argentina' s claim that the Panel erred in concluding that
the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because of its non-automatic
nature for the following reasons. First, the United States emphasizes the narrow nature of this part
of Argentina's appeal, and that Argentina has not contested any of the three other elements relied
upon by the Panel in support of its finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1.
2.96. Second, the United States contends that the DJAI procedure is a non-automatic trade
restriction because it is a highly discretionary and non-transparent restriction. The Panel found
that the Argentine authorities have discretion to grant or deny DJAI applications for undisclosed
reasons and on grounds that are unrelated to the information that importers are required to
provide in their DJAIs. Thus, even if an importer complies with all formal DJAI requirements,
authorities are free to deny the application on unspecified grounds.
2.97. Third, the United States submits that evid ence on the record demonstrates that Argentine
authorities frequently exercise their discretion to withhold approval to import, often without
explaining the reasons for "observations". Even after an importer has satisfied all additional
demands, authorities may choose not to approve the DJAI application. In the United States' view,
this evidence reflects the lack of accountability and transparency resulting from the wide discretion
to restrict imports.
2.98. Fourth, the United States submits that th e extended delays in the approval of the DJAI
applications that have been observed are a relevant factor in concluding that the DJAI process is a
non-automatic trade restriction. The United States cites evidence in the Panel record of extended
delays that commonly arise in connection with the DJAI procedure, and recalls that GATT panels
made a connection between the timing of application approvals and whether or not a license
requirement constitutes an Article XI restriction, using the terms "non-automatic" and "automatic".
2.99. Finally, the United States submits that Argentina's reliance on the Import Licensing
Agreement is misplaced because there is no conf lict between Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement. More over, the DJAI procedure fails to qualify as an
automatic licensing measure, and the chapeau to Ar ticle 2.2(a) of the Import Licensing Agreement
refers to the trade-restricting effects of licensing procedures that do not qualify as "automatic". In
the United States' view, Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement is also inapplicable to these
disputes, because that provision anticipates that there is a separate, WTO-consistent restriction
imposed through licensing procedures, but the DJAI procedure is itself a trade restriction.

150 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 76-80 (referring to Panel Reports, India – Quantitative
Restrictions; China – Raw Materials; and Korea – Various Measures on Beef).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.4 Arguments of Japan – Appellee
2.4.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.100. Japan requests the Appellate Body to dism iss Argentina's claims of error, and underlines
that there is no basis for the reversal of the Panel's finding that the TRRs measure was within its
terms of reference. Japan asserts, first, that the Panel did not err in rejecting Argentina's claim
that the TRRs measure was not properly identified in the complainants' consultations requests and,
second, that the subsequent inclusion of the TRRs measure in the complainants' panel requests did
not expand the scope of these disputes.
151
2.101. Japan maintains that, although its consultations request did not explicitly use the term
"TRR" or "TRRs measure", there is no question that this was precisely what it referred to when it
stated that "Argentina often requires importers of goods to undertake certain commitments".
Argentina itself admitted, which the Panel acknow ledged, that the term "commitments" identified
in the consultations requests pertain to the "commitments" that Argentina allegedly requires
importers to undertake that are separate from th e DJAI and CIs. This set of "commitments", in
turn, is precisely what the complainants refer to as the TRRs measure in their panel requests.
Thus, by identifying the TRRs measure plainly and succinctly in its consultations request as one of
the measures about which to consult Argentina, Japan satisfied its obligations under the DSU, and
the Panel correctly found the same.
2.102. In addition, Japan refers to Argentina's argument that the "commitments" language could,
at most, be read to suggest that the complainan ts would be making an "as applied" claim, and
"cannot possibly encompass an 'as such' or equally broad challenge".
152 Japan asserts that this
contention is inconsistent with the statement in the consultations request that "Argentina often
requires the importers of goods to undertake cert ain commitments". This clause suggests that the
subject of consultations between the parties was precisely Argentina's requirement for companies
to undertake commitments, in addition to the individual commitments themselves. Nothing in the
consultations request indicates that Argentina's requirements for companies to undertake
commitments would be outside the scope of the dispute. Consequently, a reading of Japan's
consultations request does not support Argentina's narrow interpretation that Japan exclusively
put forward an "as applied" challenge.
2.103. Further, Japan points out that Argentina's concerns hinge on the fact that the consultations
requests did not explicitly identify: (i) the TRRs "commitments" or "requirements" as an
"overarching" or "single measure"; or (ii) the cl aims as "as such" or "as applied" challenges.
However, nothing in the DSU suggests that any kind of specific reference to the "type of challenge"
(i.e. "as such" and/or "as applied") or the "nature of the measures" that are alleged to have
violated a Member's WTO commitments (i.e. whether these are single or multiple individual
measures) needs to be included in the consultations request.
153 Citing prior Appellate Body
jurisprudence, Japan underscores that consultations help complainants to define the scope of their
challenges and the nature of the measures at issue. Thus, the Appellate Body has, in the past,
upheld "as such" challenges even where the request for consultations did not specifically indicate
that the claim would be an "as such" claim.
2.104. Japan emphasizes the similarity between its consultations request and its panel request,
both of which identify the "Argentine requirement for importers to undertake certain actions", and
classify these actions into "the open list of five categories". As between its consultations request
and its panel request, there are only two "potentially relevant differences", namely: (i) its panel
request used the term "Restrictive Trade Related Requirements" to describe the specific measure
at issue, while its consultations request did not; and (ii) its panel request stated that the TRRs
measure "and any application thereof" are inconsistent with Argentina's WTO obligations.
154 The
Panel took account of this evidence and nevertheless found, in the light of the striking similarity in
the two documents, that Japan's consultations re quest and panel request identify the same TRRs
measure, and that the "nature" and the "scope" of the measure were the same in both documents.

151 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 44.
152 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 29 (quoting Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 28).
153 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 37.
154 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 30.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Hence, the Panel correctly found that Japan's panel request did not impermissibly expand the
scope of the dispute or change its essence.
2.105. Moreover, while Argentina anchors its claims on US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties (China) , Japan emphasizes that the present disputes do not resemble that case. The
findings in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) were based on the principle that
the identification of specific instances of application of measures in a consultations request does
not automatically permit the inclusion of a separate "general authority or legal basis" for those
specific instances of application.
155 Thus, that dispute does not stand for the proposition that all
"as such" claims must be explicitly identified in the consultations request. Unlike the factual
circumstances in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , the complainants in these
disputes did not identify in their panel requests a new and separate "general authority or legal
basis". Instead, the consultations requests and the panel requests identify the same requirements
that compose the measure at issue, and the absence of the words "as such" in the consultations
requests is immaterial.
2.106. Finally, Japan underscores that it is clear from Argentina's first written submission to the
Panel and request for a preliminary ruling that Argentina was in fact well aware of the case against
which it had to defend itself. Hence, Argentina was not prejudiced by what it now claims to be an
omission from the complainants' consultations requests.
2.4.2 Identification of the single unwritten TRRs measure
2.107. Japan requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's claim that the Panel erred in failing
to apply the correct legal standard to ascertain the existence of the single TRRs measure. Japan
also requests the Appellate Body to uphold, without modification, the Panel's findings at
paragraphs 7.9.d through f of the Panel Reports. In addition, for the sake of completeness, and to
avoid any future confusion in the implementation stage and to ensure the effective resolution of
these disputes, Japan requests the Appellate Body to confirm that both of the "as applied" findings
sought by Japan were addressed by the Panel's findings on the joint claims by the three
complainants at paragraphs 6.265, 6.295, 7.9.e, and 7.9.f of the Panel Reports. To the extent
needed, Japan requests the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis.
2.108. Japan also rejects Argentina's claim that the Panel failed to meet its obligations under
Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Japan had established the precise content and general and
prospective application of the TRRs measure in its challenge against the TRRs measure "as such",
and requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's appeal and uphold the Panel's findings on
Japan's "as such" claims.
2.4.2.1 The joint claims against the single TRRs measure
2.109. Japan claims that the Panel applied the correct legal standard in finding that the TRRs
measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. For Japan, the findings on
the joint claims by the three complainants were not "as such" findings, but were related to the
existence and operation of the single TRRs measure. For this reason, the Panel was correct not to
apply the legal standard articulated in US – Zeroing (EC) in making these findings. In addition,
Japan considers that, when the Panel reached its "as such" findings, the Panel applied precisely the
legal framework that Argentina says it should have applied. In Japan's view, it is quite clear that
the findings on the joint claims by the three complainants cover " the application or operation of
the single TRRs measure, both systematically and in individual instances".
156
2.110. In Japan's view, Argentina's entire argument is based on "the false premise" that the
Panel's findings on the joint claims by the three complainants were "as such" findings. 157 Japan
cautions, however, that a careful review of the Panel's findings confirms that these were not "as
such" findings. First, the Panel made separate "as such" findings in addressing Japan's "as such"
claims. By refraining from using the term "as such" for its findings on the joint claims, the Panel
made it clear that these findings were not "as such" findings. Second, the Panel referred to EC and

155 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 41 (quoting Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), paras. 14.38 and 14.39).
156 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 45. (emphasis original)
157 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 48.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , in which the Appellate Body stated that a
determination that a measure has general and prospective application is not essential in all
challenges against unwritten measures, but only if a challenge is against the measure "as such".
158
2.111. For Japan, this point demonstrates the Panel's intention to reserve its analysis of the
general and prospective character of the TRRs measure for the "as such" analysis while proceeding
with the "single measure" analysis – exactly as it did in addressing the joint claims. Moreover,
though it did not explicitly say so, the Panel appe ared to respond to both types of "as applied"
findings requested by Japan – i.e. broad "as applied" findings and findings against the TRRs
measure in each and every instance of its application – in addressing the joint claims. By contrast,
the Panel then dealt with Japan's separate "as such" challenge. Japan adds that the Panel was
correct not to treat its broad "as applied" claims together with the claims of the other
complainants' "as such" claims. Japan emphasizes, in this connection, that the mere fact that
claims would result in prospective compliance obligations, or that they are not only about specific
instances, does not mean that the claim itself is an "as such" claim or that "general and
prospective" application must be shown.
2.112. In the light of the above, Japan contends that Argentina has failed to engage with any of
the clear textual evidence showing that the Panel's findings on the joint claims were not findings
on "as such" claims. Moreover, Argentina does not explain why, in its view, these findings were
supposedly "indistinguishable" from the findings on Japan's "as such" claims, even though, in
Japan's view, the Panel clearly distinguished thes e two separate sets of findings. Although the
Panel's findings on Japan's "as such" claims could be read to rely on – and somehow incorporate –
the Panel's earlier findings on the joint claims, Japan considers that the Panel's findings on the
joint claims nonetheless stand on their own and led to the separate and independent conclusion
that the "single" TRRs measure exists.
2.113. From a systemic point of view, Japan considers that, if unwritten measures could be
challenged only on the basis of the "as such" criteria outlined in US – Zeroing (EC) , then the
requirements for challenging an unwritten measure would effectively be more stringent than for a
written measure. In Japan's view, this would have the effect of, inter alia, encouraging
WTO-inconsistent behaviour via unwritten rather than written measures.
2.114. Finally, Japan notes that Argentina argues that: (i) the Panel erred because, instead of the
legal standard in US – Zeroing (EC) , it applied the legal standard in US – COOL , Japan – Apples ,
and US – Tuna II (Mexico) ; (ii) the latter three cases should be distinguished from the current
case in that they addressed written underlying measures; and (iii) by applying the legal standard
from these three cases, the Panel erred because it essentially applied the analysis "backwards".
159
2.115. Japan considers that these three arguments must fail for several key reasons. Argentina's
first argument appears to confuse two separate and distinct concepts that the Panel discusses in
separate parts of its Reports: (i) whether there is evidence of the existence of a single measure as
described by the complainants; and, if so, (ii) whether there is evidence that this measure has
general and prospective application. Japan contends that Argentina's second argument is
"obviously incorrect": the Panel cited the three above-mentioned disputes to assess whether to
examine certain instruments as one single measure or separate measures, but only after
determining, on the basis of individual instances of the TRRs measure's application, that the
individual TRRs exist.
160 With respect to Argentina's third argument, Japan points out that the
Panel applied the US – Zeroing (EC) legal standard to reach its "as such" findings against the TRRs
measure. Even assuming arguendo that Argentina's reading of the Panel Reports were correct –
i.e. that the findings on the joint claims should in fact be understood to be tacitly "as such" or that
a finding of "general and prospective nature" was otherwise required – Argentina's appeal would
still fail, because the Panel subsequently revi ewed the evidence concerning the general and
prospective nature of application of the measure, and found it compelling. Accordingly, the
Appellate Body could simply rely on those findings to uphold the Panel's findings and/or complete
the legal analysis.

158 Panel Reports, para. 6.42 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft, para. 792).
159 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 65.
160 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 67.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.4.2.2 Article 11 of the DSU – The Panel's finding on Japan's "as such" claims against
the single TRRs measure
2.116. Japan requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's claims under Article 11 of the DSU
and to uphold the Panel's "as such" findings. In Japan's view, Argentina fails to identify any
legitimate basis upon which to question the objectivity of the Panel's finding. Japan considers that
Argentina has failed both to provide the Pane l with requested evidence and to dispute the
existence of the "managed trade" policy. Moreover , Argentina has not provided any evidence that
the "managed trade" policy or the TRRs will not be applicable in the future. Japan considers that
these factors, alone or in combination with the arguments and evidence submitted by the
complainants, constitute a more than adequate ba sis for the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's
findings and to reject Argentina's claims on appeal.
2.117. Referring to Argentina's claims that the Panel failed to meet its obligations under Article 11
of the DSU in finding that Japan, in its "as such" claim, had established the precise content and
general and prospective application of the TRRs measure, Japan underlines that the Appellate Body
has found repeatedly that it is the province of panels as the triers of fact to weigh and balance the
evidence, and that the Appellate Body will only in terfere with the panel's discretion in the case of
an "egregious error that calls into question the good faith of a panel", in violation of "due process
of law or natural justice".
161 For Japan, then, unless Argentina can establish that there is an
egregious error in the Panel's findings, Argentina's appeal should be rejected and the Panel's
findings should be upheld. Moreover, the Article 11 standard is the same regardless of whether a
claim is "as such" or otherwise, and regardless of whether the measure is written or unwritten.
Even though Argentina states that particular rigour is required on the part of a panel to support a
conclusion of the existence of a "rule or norm" that is not expressed in the form of a written
document, this statement cannot be interpreted to result in a more stringent application of
Article 11 of the DSU, or in an evidentiary threshol d that is so high as to be nearly impossible to
meet.
2.118. Japan considers that the Panel found that the complainants had submitted sufficient
evidence to establish the content of the TRRs measure with enough precision so as to allow the
Panel to evaluate the measure's WTO-consistency. Any imprecisions in the contours of the TRRs
measure challenged by the complainants were due to Argentina's own refusal to provide
information requested by the Panel. Japan stresses that, if Argentina believes that "flexibility and
versatility" were in fact not essential elements of the TRRs measure, then it should have provided
the Panel with evidence to that effect.
162
2.119. Japan contests Argentina's claims that the Panel "lightly assumed" the content of the TRRs
measure, and that its analysis, therefore, falls below the minimum threshold required for an
objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU. Argentina considers that the
"alleged 'overarching' TRRs measure invented by the complainants for the purposes of these
disputes is amorphous and ill-defined, and its content cannot be identified with the requisite
degree of precision."
163 For Japan, however, Argentina's argument wrongly assumes that
"flexibility and versatility" can never be features of measures susceptible to "as such" challenges,
and that, if it is unclear exactly how Argentina enforces the TRR in any particular circumstance,
then the content of the TRRs measure cannot be established precisely.
2.120. Japan cautions that accepting Argentina's "excessively demanding" standard for precision
would encourage other Members to adopt similarly non-transparent measures so as to keep them
hidden from WTO scrutiny.164 Moreover, such standard has no basis in the covered agreements or
in prior panel or Appellate Body reports. Rather, panels and the Appellate Body have
acknowledged that, when a challenge is brought against an unwritten measure, the existence and
the precise contours of the alleged measure may not always be certain or crystal clear. In this
light, Japan agrees with the Panel that the "precise content" element of an "as such" analysis turns
on whether, "based on the available evidence, both a panel and the respondent party have a clear

161 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 76 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones, para. 133;
and Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 195).
162 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 88.
163 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 89 (quoting Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 172).
(emphasis added by Japan)
164 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 90.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

understanding of the components and the operation of the challenged measure." 165 Japan submits
that, as the Panel found, the complainants met this standard by demonstrating that the TRRs
measure consists of the Argentine authorities' impo sition on economic operators of one or more of
five specific trade-related requirements as a condition to import goods into Argentina.
2.121. Japan challenges Argentina's claim that the Panel's findings regarding the general
application of the TRRs measure lacked a sufficient basis in the evidence to support that the TRRs
measure applies to all imports, all importers, and all economic operators that utilize imported
items for manufacture in Argentina. Japan considers that a measure need not apply in all cases in
order to be "general". Japan refers, in this regard, to US – Underwear, in which the Appellate Body
stated that the term "general" in Article X of the GATT 1994 should be understood as covering
"Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures
imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens".
166 Japan also points to dictionary definitions
that, in its view, confirm that the ordinary meaning of "general" is more akin to "typically" or "in
most instances" than to "always" or "without any exception". In Japan's view, Argentina stakes its
view on a definition of the term "general" that is not consistent with either the ordinary meaning of
this term or prior panel and Appellate Body inte rpretations thereof. The Panel applied the correct
standard of "general" application to the facts and acted within the scope of its discretion in finding
that "the TRRs measure can apply to any economic operator, regardless of the sector in which it
operates and its size".
167 Japan notes that, in any event, "even when the TRRs measure may not
be applied in each and every single instance in the precise same way, it is certainly always
'applicable', in the sense that importers can, at any time, be asked to make TRRs commitments
and 'comply' with the measure, as described and found in the Panel Report."
168
2.122. In addition, Japan considers that Argentina's arguments on the "prospective" element of
the analysis do not identify any error at all, let alone an error that rises to the level required for a
finding of inconsistency with Article 11 of the DSU. Rather, Argentina attempts to draw a narrow
factual distinction between the facts of US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) and those of these disputes.
Nevertheless, in Japan's view, Argentina ignores the fact that, while the panel in US – Shrimp
(Viet Nam) was asked to make findings against a measure on the basis of only four instances of its
application, the Panel in this case identified hundreds of instances over several years as from
2009.
2.123. Japan rejects Argentina's insinuation that the Panel did not cite sufficient evidence in
finding that the TRRs measure applies prospectivel y. In particular, Argentina states: "[T]he Panel
only cited a single piece of evidence, Panel Exhibi t JE-759, in support of its conclusion that the
alleged TRRs measure implements a 'deliberate policy'."
169 Japan considers that, in making this
argument, Argentina is asking the Appellate Body to second-guess the Panel's weighing of factual
evidence. Moreover, according to Japan, Argentina's carefully worded criticism ignores the Panel's
description of Exhibit JE-759 as an "example" of the available evidence showing the prospective
character of the measure, and the Panel's cross-references to paragraphs 6.230, 6.334, and 6.335
of its Reports, which in turn discuss other evidence and cross-refer to still further evidence
regarding the deliberate and therefore prospective character of the TRRs measure.
2.124. Japan also points out that Argentina fell short with respect to its duty to cooperate under
Article 13 of the DSU and cannot be allowed to hold that against the complainants. Argentina itself
has not at any point disputed the existence of th e "managed trade" policy, provided any evidence
that the TRRs are one-off individual requirements , or provided any evidence that the "managed
trade" policy or the TRRs will not be applicable in the future. Alone or in combination with the
arguments and evidence submitted by complainants, Japan considers this to be a more than
adequate basis for the Panel's findings and for the Appellate Body to uphold them and reject
Argentina's claims on appeal.

166 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 96 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, p. 21,
DSR 1997:I, p. 29).
168 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 99 (referring to Panel Reports, para. 6.335).
169 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 103 (quoting Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 197).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.4.3 The DJAI procedure: Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.125. Japan requests the Appellate Body to reject Argentina's claims of error, and affirm all of
the Panel's findings and reasoning in connection with the DJAI procedure. Japan submits that
Argentina fails to identify any error in the Panel's reasoning, and that, even if Argentina's
arguments were correct, they would not justify Argentina's requests, because the DJAI procedure
is not a mere import formality, but rather a restriction under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
2.4.3.1 The scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
2.126. Japan submits that the Panel's finding that the DJAI procedure is "not a mere [customs]
formality" was based on an objective assessment of undisputed facts and their legal relevance, in
accordance with Article 11 of the DSU.
170 Japan contends that the inconsistency with Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994 results from the import-restricting na ture of the DJAI procedure itself, rather than
any finding as to whether customs formalities are covered by Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
2.4.3.2 The relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2.127. Japan points out that Argentina does not appear to have appealed the Panel's finding that
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 applies to the DJAI procedure irrespective of Article VIII of the
GATT 1994 – i.e. that these provisions "are not mutually exclusive".
171 Japan also asserts that
Argentina's DJAI-related arguments assume that the DJAI procedure does not itself have
trade-restricting effects inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. If this unsupported factual
assumption is dropped, the Panel's findings must be upheld. Japan emphasizes that the Panel's
findings of inconsistency with Article XI:1 were based on the import-restricting nature of the DJAI
procedure itself, and that Argentina has not appealed the Panel's factual findings to this effect.
2.128. In Japan's view, Argentina's argument concerning the status of import formalities and
requirements under Article VIII of the GATT 1994 and its relationship to Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 is without merit in these disputes, even assuming that import formalities and
requirements are inherently WTO-consistent if they restrict trade as an "ordinary incident" of the
formality or requirement itself. This is because the DJAI procedure, whether it is a customs
formality or not, has trade-restricting effects beyond the level of any ordinary incident of
restrictions associated with the formality or requirement itself.
2.129. With respect to Argentina's proposed framework, Japan submits that this has no textual
basis in the GATT 1994, and would require reading words into the text of the Agreement which are
simply not there. Even if Article VIII were an affi rmative defence, the burden of proof should fall
on the respondent, rather than on the complainant. Moreover, according to Japan, Argentina did
not argue before the Panel that the DJAI procedure should have been separated into substantive
rules or measures, on the one hand, and "mere formalities", on the other hand.
2.130. Japan considers that a harmonious interpretation can easily be achieved without reading
unstated amendments into the text of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. First, Article VIII:1(a) of the
GATT 1994 imposes an affirmative obligation not to impose formalities and requirements of a
certain kind, rather than an affirmative defence or a carve-out from other WTO obligations. This
interpretation is confirmed by the context of Ar ticle VIII, because, where the treaty drafters
intended to insert carve-outs from other Articl es of the GATT 1994, they did so explicitly. In
addition, the negotiating history of Article VIII supports Japan's understanding, because, while the
negotiators ensured that the coverage of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 would not overlap with that
of Article III of the GATT 1994, they chose not to do the same with respect to Article XI of the
GATT 1994.
172 The obligations under Article VIII:1(c) are hortatory, and do not recognize that
formalities and requirements per se will necessarily have trade-restricting effects. Any
trade-restricting effect of formalities or requirements is proscribed under Article XI:1. Second,
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 already serves as the appropriate affirmative defence for import
formalities with legitimate trade-restricting effects. Thus, Japan considers that it would, in fact, be

170 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 134 (referring to Panel Reports, paras. 6.460-6.474).
171 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 106 (referring to Panel Reports, para. 6.474). (emphasis
original)
172 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 120 (referring to Havana Reports, p. 76, para. 35 (Panel
Exhibit JE-772)).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

inconsistent with the very structure of the GATT 1994 if Article VIII were interpreted to provide for
additional exceptions or carve-outs.
2.131. Finally, Japan considers that the panel reports in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and
China – Raw Materials , relied on by Argentina, stand only for the proposition that, to be
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, a challenged measure must itself have
trade-restricting effects, and the effects caused by other measures, including an underlying
measure (if any), should not be attributed to th at measure at issue. In Japan's view, the fact
pattern in India – Quantitative Restrictions is more similar to the current disputes, because, in that
dispute, the discretionary licensing system consti tuted the restriction on imports, and, in the
current disputes, the DJAI procedure itself (rathe r than an additional or independent measure)
constitutes the restriction on imports.173
2.4.3.3 The application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
2.132. Japan considers that, even under the legal framework advanced by Argentina, Argentina's
arguments in relation to the DJAI procedure are in sufficient to justify Argentina's request that the
Appellate Body reverse the Panel's findings at paragraph 6.479 of the Panel Reports,
paragraph 7.2.a of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.6.a of the US Panel Report, and
paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report.
174
2.133. Japan submits that Argentina fails to sh ow that the Panel erred in citing the DJAI
procedure's non-automatic character as one of four independent bases for finding it to be
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 for the following reasons.
2.134. First, Japan considers that the Panel's ultimate findings could still be upheld on the basis of
the other three independent bases for the Panel's finding of inconsistency that are not challenged
by Argentina on appeal.
2.135. Second, in Japan's view, non-automaticity alone, if understood not just as a "delay", but as
the possibility that imports may never occur is, by definition, enough for a finding of inconsistency
with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The non-automa ticity of the DJAI procedure lies in the fact
that, in order to transition to "exit" status, a DJAI must have either no observation, or, if one is
entered, it must be lifted by the Argentine ag ency concerned. Unlike with automatic import
licences, there is no pro forma step or set of steps to ensure that the licence will be granted.
Accordingly, Japan submits that the Panel's finding that non-automaticity contributes to the
DJAI procedure's WTO-inconsistency does not imply that all licences causing a delay in importation
are necessarily inconsistent with Article XI:1.
2.136. Third, Japan considers that Argentina incorrectly conflates inconsistency with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 with inconsistency with WTO law as a whole. The Panel's finding that
non-automaticity contributes to an inconsistency with Article XI:1 does not somehow imply that
non-automatic import licences are necessarily WTO-inconsistent. Japan notes, for example, that a
non-automatic import licensing procedure can be inconsistent with Article XI:1, but fall under an
exception, such as Article XX of the GATT 1994, and therefore be GATT-consistent.
2.137. Finally, Japan notes that Argentina's refe rences to the Agreemen t on Trade Facilitation
cannot serve as an interpretative tool, because this agreement was under negotiation as of the
establishment of the Panel. In any event, Japan considers that Argentina has failed to demonstrate
that the negotiating text is inconsistent with Japan's interpretation of the relationship between
Articles VIII and XI of the GATT 1994, or should change the findings of the Panel in this regard.

173 Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 126 and 127 (referring to Panel Report, Korea – Various
Measures on Beef, para. 782).
174 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 111 (referring to Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 243).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.5 Claims of error by the European Union – Other appellant
2.5.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.138. The European Union appeals the Panel's finding that the 23 measures described by the
European Union in its first written submission to the Panel as "specific instances" of application of
the TRRs were not clearly identified in the EU Pane l Request and did not, therefore, fall within the
Panel's terms of reference. The European Union requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's
finding in paragraph 7.1.c of the EU Panel Report, and to find instead that the 23 measures in
question fell within the Panel's terms of reference as "measures at issue".
175
2.139. The European Union recalls that, in order to ensure compliance with both the letter and the
spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU, a panel must determine whether a panel request is sufficiently
clear on the basis of an objective examination of th e request as a whole, as it existed at the time
of filing, on the basis of the language used ther ein, and in the light of attendant circumstances.
176
A measure may be identified either by its form or by its substance, and "the identification of a
measure within the meaning of Article 6.2 need be framed only with sufficient particularity so as to
indicate the nature of the measure and the gist of what is at issue". 177 The European Union further
highlights the Appellate Body's finding that, "so long as each measure is discernable in the panel
request, the complaining party is not required to identify in its panel request each challenged
measure independently from other measures in order to comply with the specificity requirement in
Article 6.2 of the DSU".
178
2.140. The European Union argues that the Panel erred in finding that the 23 specific instances of
application of the TRRs described in section 4.2.4 of the European Union's first written submission
to the Panel were not precisely identified and did not constitute "measures at issue". The language
of the EU Panel Request shows that the European Union was not only challenging the existence of
an overarching measure, but also challenging separately several actions taken by Argentina that
are of the same nature as those described under the overarching measure. Annex III to the
EU Panel Request lists 29 instances when Argentina imposed certain TRRs that share the same
characteristics as the five requirements described as part of the overarching measure. For each of
these 29 instances of application, Annex III to the EU Panel Request contains a reference to the
relevant press release, which describes the measures at issue in terms of the entity or entities
concerned, the date and the nature of the requ irements imposed by the Argentine Government,
and the commitments that the entity or entities undertook. The European Union asserts that the
Panel erred in concluding that it was not possible to identify the specific measures at issue from
the information contained in the title of the press release as well as its content.
2.141. In this regard, the European Union gives th e example of Case 4, the article with the title
"La comercializadora de Porsche acordó compensar importaciones con exportaciones de vinos y
aceites" ("Porsche importer agrees to offset imports wi th exports of wine an d oil"), and explains
that this press release clearly describes the on e-to-one requirement imposed by Argentina on
Porsche, as announced on 30 March 2011. The one-to-one requirement shown in Case 4
corresponds to the requirement to balance imports with exports described in the first paragraph of
section 3 of its panel request. Thus, the European Union contends that, on the basis of an
objective examination of the EU Panel Request, the 23 specific instances of application of TRRs
were identified with sufficient particularity to make each measure at issue discernible from its
panel request.
2.142. The European Union also raises a conditional appeal. If the Appellate Body were to reverse
or otherwise declare moot and of no legal effect any of the Panel's findings that, first, the
TRRs measure exists, and, second, the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of
the GATT 1994, then the European Union requests the Appellate Body to complete the legal

175 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 23.
176 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 11 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Korea – Dairy, paras. 124-127; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; and US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China), para. 4.8).
177 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 12 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
US – Continued Zeroing, para. 169).
178 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 12 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
US – Continued Zeroing, para. 170).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

analysis and find that Argentina violated Article XI:1 and/or Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 in each
of the 23 specific instances described in the European Union's first written submission to the Panel.
To this end, the European Union states that there are sufficient factual findings by the Panel and
uncontested facts on the record to allow the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis.
2.6 Arguments of Argentina – Appellee
2.6.1 The Panel's terms of reference
2.143. Argentina does not take a position on the merits of the European Union's other appeal
concerning the 23 specific instances of application of TRRs in its first written submission to the
Panel. However, Argentina requested the Appe llate Body to explore the merits of the
European Union's arguments during the oral hearing. Nevertheless, Argentina recalls that, before
the Panel, Argentina argued that the 29 separate measures included in the EU Panel Request were
outside the Panel's terms of reference, because those separate measures had not been identified
in the European Union's consultations request. The Panel, however, did not address this argument.
If the Appellate Body were to reverse the Pane l's ultimate finding in paragraph 7.1.c of the
EU Panel Report, then Argentina requests the Appellate Body to find that the 23 measures
described in the European Union's first written submission were outside the Panel's terms of
reference, because the addition of these 23 specific instances of application impermissibly
expanded the scope of the dispute.
2.144. Argentina points to the Appellate Body's explanation of the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU, in particular: that, in determining whether a panel request is sufficiently precise under
Article 6.2, a panel must "scrutinize carefully the panel request, read as a whole, on the basis of
the language used"; that a panel's terms of reference must be determined on the basis of a panel
request as it existed at the time of filing; and that "a party's submissions during panel proceedings
cannot cure a defect in a panel request."
179
2.145. According to Argentina, the European Union's sole argument in support of its assertion that
the EU Panel Request identified the 23 measures described in the European Union's first written
submission to the Panel with sufficient particularity rests on an appendix to its other appellant's
submission. In this appendix, the European Union links each of the 23 instances of application of
the TRRs listed in Annex III to the EU Panel Request to information contained in the
European Union's first written submission. Argentina argues that, regardless of whether this
appendix is admissible at the appellate stage, the European Union appears to be belatedly
supplementing the description of the measures at issue set out in its panel request by providing
further explanation in its first written submission. In Argentina's view, this appendix appears to
support the Panel's finding that the panel request was deficient on its face, considering that the
identification of these 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs as measures was discernable
only from the information appearing in the European Union's first written submission.
2.146. Despite not taking a position on the merits of the European Union's other appeal,
Argentina maintains that the addition in the EU Panel Request of the specific instances of
application of the alleged TRRs as separate measures at issue impermissibly expanded the scope
of the dispute on the ground that these measures were not identified in the European Union's
consultations request. The European Union's consultations request identified only the DJAI and the
CIs as measures. The consultations request did not contain any reference to unwritten measures
or legal instruments that secured compliance with the alleged "commitments" on which the
issuance of DJAIs and CIs are conditioned. Argentin a contends that the non-identification of these
specific instances in the European Union's consultations request would have been an independent
basis for the Panel to find that these measures fe ll outside its terms of reference. Thus, Argentina
states that, even if the Appellate Body were to reverse the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.c of the
EU Panel Report, and find that the 23 instances of application of the TRRs are "specific measures
at issue" under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the addi tion of these 29 specific instances impermissibly

179 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 14 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 641 and 642, and referring to Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III,
paras. 142 and 143; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
paras. 164 and 169; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 161; and US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 108).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

expanded the scope of the dispute for not having been properly identified by the European Union
in its request for consultations.
2.7 Claims of error by Japan – Other appellant
2.7.1 The Panel's exercise of judicial econ omy on Japan's claim under Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994
2.147. Japan requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's decision to apply judicial
economy with respect to Japan's claim that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Article X:1 of
the GATT 1994. According to Japan, the Panel acted inconsistently with Articles 3.4, 3.7, 7.2,
and/or 11 of the DSU by exercising judicial ec onomy on this claim because the scope and content
of Article X:1 is distinct from the scope and content of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994,
and compliance with a finding under the latter provisions would not necessarily result in
compliance with a finding under Article X:1. Japan further requests the Appellate Body to complete
the legal analysis and find that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under
Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.
2.148. Japan argues that panels must address all claims on which a finding is necessary in order
to ensure the effective resolution of disputes. In particular, panels must not exercise judicial
economy with respect to provisions whose "scope and content" are different from those under
which findings are made, because doing so prevents an effective resolution of the dispute.
180 In
this dispute, the "scope and content" of Articl e X:1, which relates to the administration of
measures, is different from the "scope and content" of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994,
which relate to the substantive content of measures. It follows for Japan that it was necessary for
the Panel to have addressed Japan's Article X:1 claim against the TRRs measure.
181
2.149. In addition, according to Japan, the use of judicial economy would fail to ensure effective
resolution of disputes where actions that would result in compliance with one finding would not
necessarily result in compliance with another finding. Argentina's compliance obligations under
Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 require Argentina to achieve a greater degree of transparency with
respect to the measure and, by extension, Argentina's compliance steps. Article X:1 transparency
obligations are particularly important in the circumstances of this dispute. Japan submits that,
given the opaque and non-transparent nature of the current TRRs measure, without its publication,
it may be unclear to economic operators whether, when, and how the TRRs measure has been fully
removed or rectified.
182
2.150. Finally, Japan contends that the Appellate Body is able to complete the legal analysis and
find that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, on the basis of
undisputed facts and the Panel's findings. In particular, Japan refers to the Panel's findings that
the TRRs measure is unwritten, has general application, and constitutes an import restriction on
goods.
2.8 Arguments of Argentina – Appellee
2.8.1 The Panel's exercise of judicial econ omy on Japan's claim under Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994
2.151. Argentina requests the Appellate Body to reject Japan's appeal of the Panel's decision to
exercise judicial economy with respect to its claim that the alleged TRRs measure is inconsistent
with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994. Japan fails to explain why the Panel's findings under Article XI:1
led to a partial resolution of this dispute and fails to demonstrate that the Panel exceeded the
bounds of its discretion in exercising judicial econ omy in relation to this claim. Japan appears to
rely on the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Poultry that Article X of the GATT 1994 "relates to the
publication and administration" of measures, rather than to their "substantive content". Yet,
Argentina submits that this was precisely the juri sprudence reviewed by the Panel in reaching the

180 Japan's other appellant's submission, para. 12 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico), para. 405).
181 Japan's other appellant's submission, paras. 4, 9, and 13 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
EC – Poultry, para. 115).
182 Japan's opening statement at the oral hearing; Japan's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

conclusion that additional findings under Article X:1 were neither necessary nor useful to resolve
the matter at issue.183
2.152. Argentina also considers that Japan's reliance on the Appellate Body's findings in
US – Tuna II (Mexico) is misplaced because all "laws, regulations, judicial decisions and
administrative rulings" subject to Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 fall within the scope of "other
measures" covered by Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 , and the contents of these provisions overlap
substantively. Moreover, Japan is incorrect in arguing that a panel will exercise false judicial
economy whenever the "scope and content" of the relevant legal provisions is not the same.
Finally, Argentina submits that Japan fails to explain why the Panel's decision to exercise judicial
economy amounted to an inconsistency with Articl e 11 of the DSU, and how this claim is distinct
from Japan's claims under Articles 3.4, 3.7, and 7.2 of the DSU.
184
2.9 Arguments of the third participants
2.9.1 Australia
2.153. Australia supports the Panel's finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In Australia's view, as the Panel found that Articles VIII and XI of
the GATT 1994 are not mutually exclusive, the Panel was not required to focus on the factual issue
of whether the DJAI procedure falls within the sco pe of Article VIII, because it would not exclude
per se the applicability of Article XI:1 to the measure at issue.
2.154. In addition, Australia disagrees with Argentina's contention that the Panel found that any
import procedure that is a necessary pre-requisite for importing goods or by which a Member
determines the right to import would be outs ide the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
Australia submits that the Panel: (i) did not treat the issue of whether the DJAI procedure fell
within Article VIII as being a determinative issue; (ii) found that the DJAI procedure was not
merely an import formality under Article VIII; and (iii) did not make a general statement referring
to any import procedure, as suggested by Argentina, but rather limited its findings to the DJAI
procedure.
2.155. Finally, Australia disagrees with Argentin a's argument that Article VIII of the GATT 1994
expressly acknowledges the right of Members or the necessity to maintain import formalities and
requirements. Although Article VIII:1(c) refers to government imposition of fees and formalities,
this provision recognizes, for example, the need for minimizing their incidence and complexity. In
conclusion, Australia disagrees with Argentina's argument that Article VIII can be invoked to
prevent a measure from being assessed under Article XI of the GATT 1994.
2.9.2 Canada
2.156. At the oral hearing, Canada argued th at the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because it has a limiting effect on imports, due to the broad
discretion that agencies have to enter and lift observations, as well as the uncertainty created by
conditioning the right to import on the fulfilment of unidentified requirements. It is the element of
discretion that makes the DJAI non-automatic. For Canada, Argentina is incorrect in suggesting
that the appropriate legal test to determine whether the DJAI procedure is a restriction under
Article XI:1 is whether it restricts trade independ ent of, and in addition to, the restriction of the
underlying measure. This is because, unlike in China – Raw Materials and Korea – Various
Measures on Beef , the DJAI procedure is not used to administer quotas; rather, the restriction is
the DJAI procedure itself. Canada considers that the Panel was correct to analyse the DJAI
procedure on its own and conclude that this measure is a discretionary non-automatic restriction
that does not implement a separate underlying WTO-consistent restrictive measure.

183 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 22 (referring to Panel Reports, para. 6.303, in turn quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 115).
184 Argentina's appellee's submission, paras. 24-26 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), para. 442).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

2.9.3 Korea
2.157. At the oral hearing, Korea expressed conc ern over the recent increase in requests for
preliminary rulings in panel proceedings and, in particular, that such requests may be initiated as a
litigation tactic with the purpose of delaying the proceedings. Clear guidance by the Appellate Body
on the meaning of the term "measure" – including with respect to unwritten measures – is timely
and necessary. Korea submitted that the term "mea sure" in the DSU has a scope that is broader
than particular laws or regulations of a Member and encompasses any conduct by a Member that
has caused or will cause impairment of another Member's benefits. Article 6.2 of the DSU provides
a safeguard to prevent complainants from abusing this broad understanding of "measures" when it
requires identification of the specific measures at issue and a brief summary of the legal basis
sufficient to present the problem clearly. In these disputes, although the TRRs are unwritten, they
constitute a single overarching measure that falls within the Panel's terms of reference. Finally,
Korea noted that, given the limited and prospective effects of WTO remedies, "as such" rulings can
result in particularly effective remedies where the respondent attempts to adopt revisions of its
original measures over the course of dispute settlement proceedings.
2.9.4 Norway
2.158. At the oral hearing, Norway agreed with the Panel's finding that Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 cannot be read as a priori excluding import formalities and procedures from its scope,
as this would read into provisions words that are not there. Rather than assuming that Articles VIII
and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 are mutually exclusive, it should be assumed that they apply in a
cumulative and harmonious manner. Moreover, Article VIII does not impose any specific
obligations with respect to measures other than fees and charges, and some penalties; and
Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994 is of hortatory character. Thus, if Articles VIII and XI:1 were
considered as mutually exclusive, there would be no WTO discipline for import formalities and
requirements with a trade-restrictive effect. In addition, Argentina's proposed analytical framework
has no basis in the text of Article XI:1, as this provision does not distinguish between different
categories of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, but applies generally to prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes, and other charges. Norway also contended that the
proposed framework does not find support in WTO jurisprudence, because the panel reports relied
on by Argentina simply confirm that the challenged measure itself must have trade-restricting
effects, and that effects caused by other meas ures, including underlying measures, should not
necessarily be attributed to such a measure.
2.9.5 Saudi Arabia
2.159. Saudi Arabia takes no position either on the merits of the claims by the parties to these
disputes or on the WTO-consistency of the measures at issue. With respect to the interpretation of
Article XI of the GATT 1994, Saudi Arabia submits that, in contrast to Articles I and III of the
GATT 1994, Article XI does not address discrimination and thus does not contemplate any broader
legal standard that may relate to protection of "competitive opportunities". Rather, the scope of
Article XI is limited to those prohibitions and restrictions that have a limiting effect on the quantity
of a product being imported or exported. Saudi Arabia argues that the title of Article XI informs its
content. Disregarding the express "quantitative" element of Article XI would be contrary to the rule
that an interpreter may not reduce any part of a treaty text to redundancy or inutility.
185
2.160. Additionally, Saudi Arabia submits that automatic licensing systems are permitted by
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because they do not impose any quantitative import or export
restrictions. Non-automatic licensing systems themselves are not per se inconsistent with
Article XI:1. In particular, non-automatic licensing systems are consistent with Article XI so long as
they "make effective" permitted restrictions including duties, taxes or other charges and do not
create limiting effects on import or export quantities that are additional to those caused by the
imposition of the permissible restriction and beyond what is necessary to administer the underlying
measure. Article 3 of the Import Licensing Agreem ent supports the permissibility of non-automatic
licensing systems under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In Saudi Arabia's view, if non-automatic
licensing were per se inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT 1994, there would be no reason to

185 Saudi Arabia's third participant's submission, para. 9 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, paras. 11 and 12; and US – Gasoline, para. 23).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

establish specific standards for non-automatic import licensing under the Import Licensing
Agreement.
2.161. With respect to the evidentiary burden for unwritten measures, Saudi Arabia submits that
a complainant must satisfy both the evidentiary and the legal burden of proof with respect to each
element of each claim regardless of whether the measure is written or unwritten. The evidence
necessary to demonstrate that a measure is inconsistent with a WTO provision must be sufficient
to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and
obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure
with that provision. Saudi Arabia submits that the complexity of a measure, or its combination with
other measures, does not diminish the complainant's burden of proof.
2.9.6 The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu
2.162. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiw an, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu concurs with the
Panel's finding that the TRRs identified by the complainants as a measure at issue in their requests
for consultations are within the Panel's terms of reference. The descriptions of the TRRs measure
in the complainants' panel requests are substantially similar to the descriptions of the actions in
the complainants' requests for consultations because they bear the same "essence" in terms of
their purpose, application and effect. Additiona lly, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu contends that the explicit reference to a specific "overarching" TRRs
measure in the panel requests would not have altered Argentina's understanding of the
complainants' challenges to its import requirements.
2.163. Moreover, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu agrees
with the Panel's finding that Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 refers to import and export prohibitions
or restrictions in general. The DJAI procedure, whether characterized as "procedural" or
"substantive", still imposes a prohibition and restriction on trade, and cannot a priori be excluded
from examination under Article XI:1. Thus, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu disagrees that Article XI:1 applies only to "substantive" rules of importation.
2.9.7 Turkey
2.164. At the oral hearing, Turkey stated that th ere is no evidence in the Panel Reports indicating
that the Panel considered the DJAI procedure to fall outside the scope of Article VIII of the
GATT 1994. Rather, the Panel underlined that even if it is assumed that Article VIII applies to the
DJAI procedure, there is nothing that excludes per se the applicability of Article XI of the
GATT 1994. For Turkey, it is natural that every Me mber has the right to adopt some formalities or
requirements to ensure that certain policy objectives are met, and that every formality and
requirement has some level of restrictive effect. However, a systemic restriction on the essence of
the right to import cannot be considered within this category. It is not incorrect to focus on
Article XI to examine the trade restrictiveness of measures such as the DJAI procedure.
Furthermore, Articles VIII and XI cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive, and the fact that the
DJAI procedure is "permitted" under Article VIII does not prevent its evaluation under Article XI.
Finally, Turkey considers that, in the current disputes, the DJAI procedure has restrictive aspects
of its own, independent of the TRRs measure.
3 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
3.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
a. with respect to the Panel's terms of reference:
i. whether the Panel erred in finding that the identification of the single or
"overarching" trade-related requirements (TRRs) measure in the complainants' panel
requests did not expand the scope of the dispute or change its essence, and that,
consequently, the single or "overarching" TRRs measure was within the Panel's terms
of reference (raised by Argentina); and
ii. with respect to DS438 only, whether the Panel erred in finding that the 23 specific
instances of application of the TRRs identified in section 4.2.4 of the
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

European Union's first written submission were not identified in the EU Panel Request
as measures at issue and, thus, do not constitute measures at issue in this dispute
(raised by the European Union);
b. with respect to the single TRRs measure:
i. whether, in addressing the three complainants' "joint claims"
186 against the
TRRs measure, the Panel applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing whether
the TRRs measure exists and, for that reason, erred in finding that the Argentine
authorities' imposition of TRRs on economic operators as a condition to import or
receive certain benefits operates as a single measure (the TRRs measure)
attributable to Argentina (raised by Argentina);
ii. whether, as a consequence of the above, the Panel erred in finding that the
TRRs measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 (raised
by Argentina);
iii. with respect to DS445 only, whether, in addressing Japan's "as such" claims against
the alleged single TRRs measure, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU in finding that Japan had established the precise content and the general and
prospective application of that measure and, if so, whether, as a consequence, the
Panel erred in finding that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Articles XI:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994 (raised by Argentina); and
iv. with respect to DS445 only, whether the Panel erred in exercising judicial economy
with respect to Japan's claim under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 (raised by Japan);
and
c. with respect to the Advanced Sworn Import Declaration ( Declaración Jurada Anticipada
de Importación) (DJAI) procedure:
i. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XI:1, as well as of Article VIII,
of the GATT 1994 and, more specifically, whether the Panel erred:
 in failing to distinguish between the scope and disciplines of Article VIII of the
GATT 1994, on the one hand, and Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, on the other
hand (raised by Argentina); and
 in its assessment of the scope of appl ication of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
(raised by Argentina);
ii. whether the Panel erred in its application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the
DJAI procedure and, more specifically, in concluding that, because obtaining a
DJAI in "exit" status is not "automatic", the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 (raised by Argentina); and
iii. whether, as a consequence of the above, the Panel erred in finding that the DJAI
procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 (raised by Argentina).
4 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEASURES AT ISSUE
4.1. Before turning to the issues of law and legal interpretation raised in this appeal, and without
prejudice to their merits, we provide an overview of the measures at issue in these disputes, as
identified in the Panel Reports. We begin with the trade-related requirements (TRRs) and their
application and operation as the TRRs measure. Then, we identify how the Panel described the

WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

DJAI procedure.187 For a more complete description of the Panel's understanding of the scope and
content of these measures, reference should be had to the Panel Reports.
4.1 The trade-related requirements (TRRs) and the TRRs measure
4.2. In certain instances, economic operators in Argentina are not allowed to import goods unless
they achieve either a trade balance or an export surplus. To achieve these objectives, economic
operators must commit to undertaking certain actions, which the Panel referred to as TRRs.
188
4.3. The TRRs are not stipulated in any published law, regulation, or administrative act 189; rather,
they are, in some cases, reflected in agreements signed between specific economic operators and
the Argentine Government, and, in other cases, contained in letters addressed by economic
operators to the Argentine Government.
190 The Panel requested that the parties provide copies of
specific agreements and letters identified by the complainants, however, the complainants
provided the Panel with copies of only a few letters addressed to the Argentine Government by
economic operators191, as well as a certification by a notary public attesting to having been shown
four agreements signed between Argentine Government officials and private entities. 192 Argentina
did not dispute the existence of the specific agreements identified by the complainants. 193 Rather,
Argentina responded to the Panel's request by explaining that it was under no obligation to make
the case for the complainants and that the agreements were unnecessary for the resolution of the
disputes.
194 The Panel rejected Argentina's explanation, considering that it was incumbent upon
Argentina to provide copies of the requested agreements and letters pursuant to Article 13 of the
DSU. Moreover, the Panel considered that Argentina was in the best position to provide copies of
the requested evidence.
195 Thus, the Panel drew inferences from Argentina's refusal to provide
copies of the agreements and letters in its possession.196
4.4. In addition to these inferences, the Panel reached its conclusions as to the existence and
nature of the TRRs imposed by the Argentine Gove rnment on the basis of extensive evidence on

187 The Panel observed that the DJAI procedure has served to implement certain TRRs in some cases.
(Panel Reports, paras. 6.154, 6.163, and 6.395) Nevertheless, the complainants challenged the DJAI procedure
and the TRRs measure as separate measures. (Ibid., para. 6.154 (referring to European Union's response to
Panel question No. 10; United States' responses to Panel questions Nos. 9 and 10; and Japan's response to
Panel question No. 10)) The European Union, the United States, and Japan originally identified a third
measure, the imposition of non-automatic import licences (Licencias No Automáticas de Importación) by
requiring import certificates (Certificados de Importación) (CIs) as a condition for the importation of goods.
(EU Panel Request, pp. 2-3; US Panel Request, pp. 3-4; Japan Panel Request, pp. 2-3) However, in their first
written submissions to the Panel, the complainants indicated that they were no longer pursuing their claims
against the CI requirement because, on 25 January 2013, the Argentine Government had repealed the various
resolutions containing the CI regime. (European Union's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 15
and 16; United States' first written submission to the Panel, fn 6 to para. 7, and para. 17; Japan's first written
submission to the Panel, fn 34 to para. 15)
189 Panel Reports, para. 6.157.
190 Panel Reports, paras. 6.119 and 6.156. There is evidence on the record of the existence of at least
29 agreements signed between the Argentine Government and the following economic operators: (i) the
Asociación de Fábricas Argentinas Terminales de Electrónica (Afarte) and the Cámara Argentina de Industrias
Electrónicas, Electromecánicas y Luminotécnicas (Cadieel); (ii) General Motors; (iii) AGCO; (iv) Renault Trucks
Argentina; (v) Claas; (vi) Mercedes Benz; (vii) Volkswagen; (viii) Alfa Romeo; (ix) Porsche;
(x) Peugeot-Citroën; (xi) Fiat; (xii) Hyundai; (xiii) Ford; (xiv) KIA; (xv) Nissan; (xvi) Renault; (xvii) Chery;
(xviii) Alfacar (Mitsubishi); (xix) Ditecar (Volvo, Jaguar, and Land Rover); (xx) Volvo Trucks; (xxi) Tatsa;
(xxii) Indumotora Argentina (Subaru); (xxiii) BMW; (xxiv) Pirelli; (xxv) Thermodyne Vial; (xxvi) supermarkets;
(xxvii) the Cámara Argentina de Publicaciones; (xxviii) the Cámara Argentina del Libro; and
(xxix) representatives of the automobile and autoparts industry.
191 Panel Reports, para. 6.57 (referring to: (i) the letter from Company X to the Secretary of Domestic
Trade, 3 April 2012 (Panel Exhibit JE-304); (ii) the e-mail communication from Company X to the Secretary of
Domestic Trade, 11 April 2012 (Panel Exhibit JE-305); and (iii) the letter from the Argentine meat and pork
industry to the Secretary of Domestic Trade, 7 May 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-441 and EU-127)). See also fn 344
to para. 6.164.
192 Panel Reports, para. 6.57 (referring to Brechbul & Rodriguez Notaires, Notarial certification,
13 June 2013 (Panel Exhibits JE-328 and EU-14)).
193 Panel Reports, para. 6.164 (referring to Argentina's responses to Panel questions Nos. 63-92,
para. 20).
194 Panel Reports, para. 6.48.
195 Panel Reports, paras. 6.58 and 6.59.
196 Panel Reports, paras. 6.155 and 6.165.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

the record.197 This evidence includes copies of domestic laws, regulations, and policy documents;
communications addressed to Argentine officials by private companies; statements by Argentine
officials and notes posted on government websites; articles in newspapers and magazines,
published mostly in Argentina; statements by company officials; and data from industry
surveys.
198
4.5. The Panel found that the evidence on the re cord demonstrates the existence of the following
five types of actions that the Argentine Governme nt requires of economic operators (individual
TRRs): (i) to export goods from Argentina of a value equivalent to or greater than the value of the
operator's imports (one-to-one requirement); (ii) to limit the volume of imports and/or reduce
their price (import reduction requirement); (iii) to incorporate a minimum level of local content
into goods produced in Argentina (local content requirement); (iv) to make or increase
investments in Argentina, including in production facilities (investment requirement); and/or (v) to
refrain from repatriating funds from Argentina to another country (non-repatriation
requirement).
199
4.6. First, under the one-to-one requirement, as a condition to import, the Argentine Government
requires economic operators to compensate imports annually with exports of at least the same
value. There are three main ways for an economic operator to increase its exports to comply with
this requirement: (i) to use an exporter as an intermediary to sell products to a buyer in a third
country (exportation " por cuenta y orden "); (ii) to export directly Argentine products that the
economic operator (or any other company) produces; or (iii) to conclude an agreement with an
exporter so that the exporter's transactions may be considered as the economic operator's own
transactions.
200 In this context, the Panel referred to ev idence showing that, to comply with the
requirement to export, companies have engaged in activities unrelated to their respective business
activities.
201 For example, the Panel referred to an agreement reached between the
Argentine Government and the automobile manufacturer Hyundai in which the latter reportedly
committed to exporting peanuts, wine, biodiesel, an d soy flour from Argentina, valued collectively
at more than US$157 million.202
4.7. Second, under the import reduction requirement, economic operators are required to limit
their imports, either in volume or in value. This requirement is often imposed in combination with
other TRRs, such as the one-to-one requirement or the local content requirement.
203 In certain
instances, compliance with these commitments constitutes a condition for operators to import
goods into Argentina.204 Supermarket chains, automobile and motorcycle producers and importers,
producers of pork products, and producers of el ectronic and office equipment have all committed
to restricting their imports into Argentina. 205 For example, the Panel referred to evidence showing
that, in December 2013, electronic and office equipment producers reportedly signed an
agreement with the Argentine Government to reduce their imports in the first quarter of 2014 by
20% as compared to the previous year.
206
4.8. Third, under the local content requirement, the Argentine Government requires certain
economic operators to reach a higher level of local content in their products by substituting

197 Panel Reports, paras. 6.155 and 6.165.
198 Panel Reports, paras. 6.64, 6.165, and 6.223.
199 Panel Reports, para. 6.221.
200 Panel Reports, para. 6.167. Typically, the Argentine Government gives economic operators a
specified period, such as one year, to achieve a trade balance through compliance with the one-to-one
requirement. If the economic operator does not achieve the required level of exports within the specified
period, it can either limit its imports or, alternatively, make an irrevocable investment in the local operations of
the firm, in the form of a contribution to its capital, to compensate for the value of imports. (Ibid., para. 6.172)
201 Panel Reports, para. 6.262. For instance, companies from the motorcycle sector exported grape juice
and wine; tyre producers exported honey; and clothing brands exported wool. (Ibid.)
202 See Panel Reports, fn 357 to para. 6.169 (referring to News item: Prensa Argentina, "Car producer
Hyundai agrees to offset its trade balance", 13 June 2011 (Panel Exhibit JE-86)). In this agreement, Hyundai
also reportedly made an irrevocable capital contribution of US$8 million to the local operations of the firm, to
facilitate the export of biodiesel. (Ibid.)
203 Panel Reports, para. 6.186.
204 Panel Reports, para. 6.195.
205 Panel Reports, para. 6.187.
206 Panel Reports, para. 6.194 (referring to News item: Prensa Argentina, "Giorgi agreed with electronic
and automotive industries to reduce foreign currency for exports by 20%", 11 December 2013 (Panel
Exhibit JE-827)).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

imports with products that are produced or could be produced in Argentina. 207 The Panel referred
to evidence on the record showing that th e Argentine Government has presented import
substitution as a State policy that it is systematically implementing in order to reindustrialize the
country. The Argentine Government has implemen ted this policy of import substitution by
requiring importers to engage in import substitution plans and by granting tax incentives and soft
loans to economic operators that achieve a certain level of local content.
208 For example, the Panel
referred to evidence reporting that, since February 2011, the Argentine Government has asked
producers of agricultural machinery to increase their local production and to submit import
substitution plans to incorporate more domestically produced agro-parts into their final products.
In undertaking these import substitution plans, producers of agricultural machinery have become
eligible for soft loans granted, for example, by the Banco Nación.
209
4.9. Fourth, under the investment requirement, the Argentine Government requires certain
companies to make or increase investments in Argentina as a condition to import. 210 The
investment requirement is typically imposed in combination with either the one-to-one
requirement or the local content requiremen t, and not as a stand-alone requirement. 211 When
used in combination with the one-to-one requirement, the Argentine Government requires
economic operators to undertake investments in the form of irrevocable capital contributions when
their level of imports exceeds that of their exports.
212 When used in combination with the local
content requirement, the Argentine Government requires certain economic operators to undertake
investments to commence manufacturing processes in Argentina, or to increase or improve
manufacturing capacity.
213 For instance, the Panel referred to evidence on the record reporting
that the automobile manufacturer Renault committed to make a capital contribution to its plant in
Córdoba to enable production of a new model of automobile destined primarily for export.214
4.10. Finally, under the non-repatriation requirement, the Argentine Government has requested
companies to refrain from transferring profits abroad. 215 According to the Panel, while there was
no evidence on the record to suggest that the non-repatriation requirement is imposed by the
Argentine Government in and of itself as a condition to import, there was evidence to suggest that
a commitment to refrain from repatriating profits has been imposed in conjunction with either the
one-to-one requirement or the local content requirement.
216 These combinations are found in
agreements between the Argentine Government and several truck manufacturers, car

207 Panel Reports, para. 6.196.
208 Panel Reports, para. 6.279 (referring to Ministry of Industry of Argentina, Argentina's Industrial
Strategic Plan 2020 (Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020), 4 October 2011 (Panel Exhibits ARG-51 and JE-749)
(PEI 2020), p. 33; Argentina's responses to Panel questions Nos. 57 and 58; News item: Prensa Argentina,
"Agricultural machinery manufactured in the country must have 40-50% of national parts", 23 May 2013
(Panel Exhibits JE–550 and EU-236); and Office of the President, "Inauguration of a new plant of Fiat Argentina
in Córdoba: Speech by the President of Argentina", 4 June 2013 (Panel Exhibits JE-794 and EU-444)). The
Argentine Government has referred to its policy of import substitution in speeches made by high-level
Argentine officials, including the President of Argentina, as well as in Argentina's PEI 2020. (Ibid., para. 6.197)
According to the President, the final objective of the Government is to substitute domestically around 45% of
imports. (Ibid., para. 6.197 (referring to Office of the President, Presentation of the Strategic Industrial Plan
2020, Speech by the President, 4 October 2011 (Panel Exhibits JE-517 and EU-203); and PEI 2020, p. 38))
209 Panel Reports, para. 6.202. For agricultural machinery, the goal was to achieve integration of local
content of 55-60% in 2013. (Ibid.)
210 Panel Reports, para. 6.208.
211 Panel Reports, paras. 6.208 and 6.259.
212 Panel Reports, para. 6.209 (referring to News items: Página12, "On the way to reinvest profits",
18 November 2011 (Panel Exhibits JE-620 and EU-306); Prensa Argentina, "An automobile company may
compensate by exporting", 25 March 2011 (Panel Exhibits JE-1, JE-398, and EU-84); and Prensa Argentina,
"Car manufacturer KIA also pledged to even out its trade balance", 15 June 2011 (Panel Exhibit JE-87)).
213 Panel Reports, para. 6.209 (referring to News items: Ministry of Industry, "Argentina substituted
imports amounting to US$4 billion in the first semester of the year", 23 August 2011 (Panel Exhibit JE-252);
Prensa Argentina, "Car producer Hyundai agrees to offset its trade balance", 13 June 2011 (Panel Exhibit
JE-86); Prensa Argentina, "Fiat: Another automaker agrees to ensure trade balance", 5 May 2011 (Panel
Exhibits JE-88, JE-528, and EU-214); and Office of the President, Announcement of New Investments in GM:
Speech by the President, 15 November 2011 (Panel Exhibit JE-244)).
214 See Panel Reports, fn 481 to para. 6.210 (referring to News item: Prensa Argentina, "Renault,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Volvo also signed a plan to achieve a trade surplus in 2012", 5 August 2011 (Panel
Exhibit JE-90)). Renault undertook to make a capital contribution of US$175 million, and by way of its capital
contribution and the production of the new model of automobile, Renault pledged to achieve a trade surplus of
US$231 million by 2012. (Ibid.)
215 Panel Reports, paras. 6.214 and 6.215.
216 Panel Reports, paras. 6.214 and 6.259.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

manufacturers, agricultural machinery manufacturers, and mining companies. 217 For instance, the
Panel referred to evidence of an agreement be tween the agricultural machinery manufacturer
Claas and the Argentine Government in which the former pledged not to transfer profits abroad
between 2011 and 2014.
218 This commitment was reportedly made together with commitments to
invest US$60 million to expand two of its manufacturing plants, to increase local content in
combine harvester models to 55% by 2013, and to increase production of harvesters to 800 units
by 2015, of which 600 would be exported.
219
4.11. The Argentine Government informs economic operators individually of the trade-related
commitment or commitments they should undertake, depending upon the specific circumstances
of each operator.
220 Moreover, the Argentine Government has stated that it monitors the
implementation of the commitments undertaken by economic operators.221
4.12. Before the Panel, the complainants explained that they did not seek separate
determinations with regard to each TRR because, in their view, "there is only one measure at
issue".
222 The complainants affirmed that the TRRs measure: (i) consists of "a combination of one
or more of the five identified [TRRs]"; (ii) is an unwritten measure "not stipulated in any published
law or regulation"; (iii) is "imposed on economic operators in Argentina as a condition to import or
to obtain certain benefits"; (iv) is "enforced, inter alia, through the DJAI requirement"; and (v) is
"imposed by the Argentine Government with the objective of eliminating trade deficits and
increasing import substitution".
223 The complainants also affirm ed that, to meet these TRRs,
"economic operators normally either submit a statement or conclude an agreement with Argentina
setting out the actions they will take."
224
4.13. The Panel determined that, since at least 2009, the Argentine Government has required a
variety of importers and other economic operators, irrespective of size or domicile 225, to undertake
one or more of the five TRRs as a condition to import goods or to obtain certain benefits. 226 The
five TRRs operate in combination with one another, as part of the TRRs measure, such that more
than one TRR often has been imposed at a gi ven time on a specific economic operator. 227 Because
the TRRs measure is unwritten, and the combination of requirements imposed by Argentina varies
amongst economic operators without regard to any known criteria, there is no certainty as to:
(i) which TRRs will be imposed; (ii) when an economic operator will be required to comply with
them; or (iii) whether the TRRs will be imposed as a temporary or permanent measure.
228 The
combination of requirements imposed on individual economic operators at a given time "seems to
depend on the features of the operator and on the contribution of the requirement to the
attainment of Argentina's policy of … substituti ng imports and reducing or eliminating trade
deficits".229
4.14. High-ranking Argentine Government officials have announced in public statements and
speeches a policy of "managed trade" ( comercio administrado) with the objectives of, inter alia,
substituting imports for domestically produced goods and reducing or eliminating trade deficits. 230
According to the Panel, the TRRs constitute different elements that contribute in different
combinations and degrees toward the realization of the objectives that guide the "managed trade"
policy.
231 The TRRs have been applied to a wide range of economic sectors 232, such as foodstuffs,

217 Panel Reports, para. 6.214.
218 See Panel Reports, fn 504 to para. 6.214 (referring to News item: Prensa Argentina, "Three
metallurgical companies committed investments and will not transfer profits", 28 December 2011 (Panel
Exhibit JE-209)).
219 Ibid.
220 Panel Reports, para. 6.157.
221 Panel Reports, para. 6.160.
226 Panel Reports, paras. 6.155 and 6.221.
227 Panel Reports, paras. 6.225 and 6.231.
228 Panel Reports, para. 6.260.
229 Panel Reports, para. 6.225. The Panel referred to statements made by Argentine officials that
confirm that TRRs are imposed according to the particular situation of economic operators. (Ibid., para. 6.226)
230 Panel Reports, para. 6.119.
231 Panel Reports, paras. 6.119 and 6.228.
232 Panel Reports, para. 6.340.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

automobiles, motorcycles, mining equipment, electronic and office products, agricultural
machinery, medicines, publications, and clothing. 233 In the Panel's view, Argentina's imposition of
the TRRs measure constitutes repeated actions, coordinated by the highest authorities of the
Argentine Government, including the President, the Minister of Industry, and the Secretary of
Trade.234 These authorities have announced this policy in public statements and speeches, as well
as on government websites 235, which suggest that the TRRs will continue to be imposed until the
"managed trade" policy is repealed or modified.236
4.2 Advanced Sworn Import Declaration (DJAI) procedure
4.15. We turn now to the Panel's identification of the second measure at issue in these disputes:
the Advanced Sworn Import Declaration ( Declaración Jurada Anticipada de Importación ) (DJAI)
procedure. Argentina's Federal Public Revenue Administration ( Administración Federal de Ingresos
Públicos) (AFIP) implemented the DJAI procedure by means of AFIP General
Resolution 3252/2012237, which entered into force on 1 February 2012. 238 The DJAI procedure
requires almost all prospective importers of goods into Argentina to file a DJAI prior to
importation.239 As part of the DJAI, importers are required to submit specific information. 240 If the
Argentine Government finds the information to be satisfactory, the DJAI may be approved. 241 In
certain instances, however, agencies of the Argentine Government may require prospective
importers to provide additional information and/ or to undertake export commitments or other

233 Panel Reports, para. 6.158. These sectors correspond to at least six of the 11 industrial sectors
addressed in the PEI 2020, which was published in 2011. The 11 industrial sectors are: (i) foodstuffs;
(ii) automobile and autoparts; (iii) capital goods; (iv) leather, shoes, and other leather goods; (v) agricultural
machinery; (vi) construction material; (vii) medicines; (viii) forestry industry; (ix) chemical and petrochemical;
(x) software; and (xi) textiles. (Ibid., fn 333 to para. 6.158 (referring to PEI 2020, pp. 42-43)) The PEI 2020
sets out the economic objectives, or "macroeconomic guidelines", to be achieved in Argentina's "managed
trade" policy. (Ibid., paras. 6.161 and 6.162) The TRRs imposed by the Argentine Government appear to align
with three of the five economic objectives set out in the PEI 2020: (i) protection of the domestic market and
import substitution; (ii) increased exports; and (iii) promotion of productive investment. (Ibid., para. 6.161
(referring to PEI 2020, pp. 33-35))
234 Panel Reports, para. 6.340.
235 Panel Reports, paras. 6.230 and 6.340.
236 Panel Reports, paras. 6.230 and 6.341. The Panel referred to a statement by the Argentine Secretary
of Domestic Trade in late 2013 that the policy of "managed trade" would continue to be applied in the future as
per the instructions of the President of Argentina. (Ibid., paras. 6.162, 6.230, and 6.341 (referring to News
item: Prensa Argentina, "Moreno confirmed that policy of trade administration will continue as per presidential
instructions", 3 November 2013 (Panel Exhibit JE-759)))
237 Panel Reports, para. 6.365 (referring to AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012, 5 January 2012 (Panel
Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6)).
238 Panel Reports, para. 6.365 (referring to Article 9 of AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012,
5 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6)). On 5 January 2012, the AFIP implemented the DJAI
procedure. (Ibid. (referring to Article 1 of AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012, 5 January 2012 (Panel
Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6)))
239 Panel Reports, para. 6.364. The DJAI must be filed before the importation takes place and prior to
the issuance of purchase orders or similar documents. (Ibid., paras. 6.364 and 6.368 (referring to Article 2 of
AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012, 5 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6); and Article 91(1),
Law 22,415, Customs Code, 2 March 1981 (Panel Exhibit ARG-3))) Importers are not required to file a DJAI in
the following cases: (i) imports under the re-importation regime; (ii) importation or exportation to compensate
for deficient merchandise; (iii) donations; (iv) samples; (v) diplomatic exemptions; (vi) merchandise with duty
and tax exemptions; (vii) postal shipments; (viii) courier shipments; and (ix) imports by the Secretary General
of the Presidency. (Ibid., fn 721 to para. 6.364)
240 Panel Reports, para. 6.364 (referring to Article 2 of AFIP General Resolution 3252/2012,
5 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-15 and ARG-6); and Article 91(1), Law 22,415, Customs Code,
2 March 1981 (Panel Exhibit ARG-3)).
241 See Panel Reports, para. 6.407.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

commitments relating to the TRRs as a condition for obtaining approval of the DJAI. 242 Importation
into Argentina of goods covered by a DJAI is not authorized until the DJAI is approved.243
4.16. The Panel's understanding of the DJAI procedure is set out in more detail below. The Panel
inferred certain features of the DJAI procedure fr om the manner in which the measure operates in
practice, and noted that not all such details are spelled out in the relevant laws and regulations.244
4.17. To initiate the DJAI procedure, a declarant must file a DJAI through AFIP's electronic portal,
known as the MARIA information system ( Sistema Informático MARIA) (SIM), or the SIM system.
To be processed, the DJAI must contain the following information: (i) name and taxpayer
identification code of the importer or customs broker, where applicable; (ii) customs office of
registration; (iii) quantity, codes, capacity, and type of containers; (iv) total and per-item "free on
board" (f.o.b.) value, and corresponding currency; (v) tariff classification; (vi) type and quantity of
marketing units; (vii) condition of the merchandise; (viii) country of origin; (ix) approximate
shipping and arrival dates; and (x) name of the declarant.
245 Once the DJAI has been formally
entered into the SIM system, it attains "registered" ( oficializada) status. 246 The DJAI may then
pass through several of the following statuses ( estados): (i) "observed" ( observada); (ii) "exit"
(salida); (iii) "cancelled" (cancelada); and (iv) "voided" (anulada).247
4.18. In principle, as from the date that the DJAI attains "registered" status, the importer has
180 days to complete the DJAI procedure succ essfully and import authorized goods into
Argentina.248 Once a DJAI is registered, the AFIP and a number of government agencies that have
signed accession agreements with the AFIP 249 may review the information entered into the
SIM system and enter "observations" on that specific DJAI. 250 The DJAI procedure does not permit
importers to know which agency may review and enter observations on a DJAI. 251 Four agencies
currently participate in the DJAI procedure. 252 A participating agency may enter an observation
when it considers that the information provided by the prospective importer is "insufficient, faulty,
or incomplete" to demonstrate compliance with the requirements under the domestic legislation
that the agency administers, although no legal instruments contain the specific criteria that the
relevant agency may apply in order to enter observations.
253 A participating agency has 72 hours
after the registration of a DJAI to enter an obse rvation, unless otherwise provided in its accession

242 Panel Reports, paras. 6.163, 6.382, and 6.395.
243 To import goods into Argentina, an importer must attain a DJAI in "exit" status. (Panel Reports,
paras. 6.364 and 6.407) As explained below, a DJAI attains "exit" status if: (i) no government agency requests
that an importer provide supplementary information and/or undertake a trade-related commitment within the
specified time period; or (ii) in the event that a government agency makes such a request, the importer
provides the requested information and/or undertakes the trade-related commitment. (See ibid., paras. 6.382,
6.395, and 6.407) Once a DJAI attains "exit" status, it can be converted automatically into a customs clearance
procedure, and the goods covered by the DJAI may clear customs. (Ibid., para. 6.408) For additional details in
this regard, see paras. 4.19-4.21 of these Reports.
244 Panel Reports, para. 6.367.
245 Panel Reports, para. 6.368. A declarant may provide additional information concerning the means of
transport, the identity of the seller, the value of freight and insurance, and any adjustments to be included or
deducted from the customs value. (Ibid., para. 6.369)
246 Panel Reports, para. 6.372.
247 Panel Reports, para. 6.370.
248 Panel Reports, para. 6.372 (referring to Argentina's response to Panel question No. 119).
249 The accession agreements signed between the AFIP and the participating agencies have not been
published or otherwise made available to traders. The model accession agreement set out by AFIP General
Resolution 3256/2012 does not specify the scope of the operations that can be reviewed and observed by the
relevant agency, the additional information that the agency may request from importers, or the timeframe for
the acceding agency to enter observations on a DJAI application. (Panel Reports, paras. 6.373 and 6.382)
250 Panel Reports, para. 6.373.
251 Panel Reports, para. 6.377.
252 The following agencies participate in the DJAI procedure: (i) the Federal Public Revenue
Administration (AFIP); (ii) the Secretariat of Domestic Trade (Secretaría de Comercio Interior) (SCI); (iii) the
National Drugs, Food, and Medical Technology Administration (Administración Nacional de Medicamentos,
Alimentos, y Tecnología Médica) (ANMAT); and (iv) and the Planning Secretariat for the Prevention of Drug
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

agreement or by statute.254 In the case of observations made by the AFIP's Directorate-General of
Revenue, the reason for an observation is communi cated through the SIM system. In the case of
observations made by other agencies, the precise reason for an observation and the additional
documents or information required to lift the observation are not communicated through the SIM
system.
255
4.19. If a government agency enters an observation, the DJAI will move to "observed" status.
Goods covered by a DJAI in "observed" status cannot be imported into Argentina. 256 If a DJAI
moves to "observed" status, prospective importers must: (i) identify the agency that entered the
observation; (ii) contact such agency in order to be informed of the supplementary documents or
information that must be provided; and ( iii) provide the supplementary documents or
information.257 A single DJAI may be "observed" by any of the participating agencies, and where
multiple agencies enter observations, the importer must consult with each agency separately.
A DJAI will leave "observed" status, and proceed to "exit" status, only after all observations have
been lifted by the relevant agency or agencies.258
4.20. Of the four agencies that currently participate in the DJAI procedure, the Secretariat of
Domestic Trade ( Secretaría de Comercio Interior ) (SCI) is of particular relevance to these
disputes.259 According to the preamble of SCI Resolution 1/2012, it is "necessary" for the SCI to
have access to the information provided in the DJAI procedure "[to perform] analyses aimed at
preventing negative effects on the domestic market, since the qualitative and/or quantitative
importance of imports to be made has the effect of impacting domestic trade".
260 To this extent,
the SCI is entitled to enter observations relating to the importation of any type of product to verify
a priori whether the importer or declarant has complied with specified Argentine laws.261 Moreover,
the SCI has 15 working days following regist ration of the DJAI to enter observations. 262 The
SCI "systematically"263 imposes on importers requirements that are neither set out in any laws nor

254 The 72-hour period may be extended up to ten calendar days where the specific jurisdiction of the
implementing agency justifies it. (Panel Reports, para. 6.381 (referring to Article 2 of AFIP General
Resolution 3255/2012, 20 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-16 and ARG-7))) As explained below, longer periods
are accorded to the Secretariat of Domestic Trade.
255 Panel Reports, para. 6.383. Before the Panel, Argentina stated that "[o]nce the importer/customs
broker contacts the agency, he is informed of the reasons for the observation and given details of the
supplementary information needed to conduct the risk assessment". (Ibid., fn 777 to para. 6.383; Argentina's
response to Panel question No. 22 (emphasis omitted))
256 Panel Reports, para. 6.382.
257 Panel Reports, para. 6.382.
258 Panel Reports, para. 6.380.
259 While the SCI has not signed an accession agreement with the AFIP, the SCI participates in the
DJAI procedure on the basis of SCI Resolution 1/2012, which predates AFIP General Resolution 3256/2012.
(Panel Reports, para. 6.375) By Decree 2136/2013 of 12 December 2013, the SCI has been replaced by the
Secretariat of Trade (Secretaría de Comercio). The competence to intervene in the DJAI procedure previously
held by the SCI is now exercised by the Secretariat of Trade. (Ibid., fn 791 to heading 6.3.2.4.3 (referring to
Argentina's response to Panel questions after the second Panel meeting, 14 January 2014))
260 Panel Reports, para. 6.389 (quoting third recital at preamble, SCI Resolution 1/2012,
11 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-41 and ARG-15)). These negative effects include "breaches of the law
governing domestic trade", for which the SCI is the implementing authority. (Ibid., para. 6.391)
261 Panel Reports, paras. 6.390 and 6.391 (referring to Article 2 of SCI Resolution 1/2012,
11 January 2012 (Panel Exhibits JE-41 and ARG-15); Argentina's response to Panel question No. 23 (including
Annex 4); and Argentina's response to Panel question No. 3.4 posed orally at the first Panel meeting).
262 Panel Reports, para. 6.381 (referring to Article 2 of SCI Resolution 1/2012, 11 January 2012 (Panel
Exhibits JE-41 and ARG-15)).
263 The Panel referred to evidence on the record to this effect, including: (i) reports prepared by market
intelligence entities or by an export promotion office to inform their clients or affiliated members of the
information and requirements imposed by the SCI; (ii) letters of companies addressed to the SCI;
(iii) company reports; (iv) press articles; (v) interviews and public statements by the Secretary of Domestic
Trade; (vi) news items; (vii) a debate; (viii) information notes; (ix) industry newsletters; (x) slides from the
Argentine Chamber of Commerce; (xi) a newspaper article; (xii) a market study; (xiii) reports, one of which
was issued by the Argentine Chamber of Commerce; and (xiv) a letter and an e-mail communication from
Company X to the Secretary of Domestic Trade. (Panel Reports, fn 803 to para. 6.393 and fn 806 to
para. 6.395)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

indicated in official publications explaining the operation of the DJAI procedure.264 As a condition to
lift observations on DJAIs, in certain instances, the SCI has also required prospective importers to
increase exports, to begin exporting, or to commit to other TRRs
265 so as to achieve a trade
balance.266
4.21. A DJAI will proceed to "exit" status if no government agency enters an observation within
the prescribed time period, or if all observations made by agencies are lifted within 180 calendar
days from registration.
267 A DJAI in "exit" status can be converted automatically into a customs
clearance procedure.268 To initiate the customs clearance procedure, an importer must re-access
the SIM system and formally request the importatio n of goods. The DJAI will proceed to "voided"
status if an importer withdraws its DJAI, an observation is not lifted, or a DJAI in "exit" status is
not used either within 180 calendar days from registration or after the extension period.
269 Once
the DJAI has been used – i.e. the goods have cleared customs – the DJAI will enter into
"cancelled" status.270
4.22. The Panel made no specific findings regarding the extent to which private companies in
Argentina are subject to observations and affected by TRRs in the DJAI procedure.271 The Panel did
note, however, that some prospective importers have successfully challenged the entry of
observations by the SCI in certain DJAI procedures before Argentine courts.
272

264 Panel Reports, para. 6.393. Such requirements include, but are not limited to, providing the
following: (i) a formal letter addressed to the Secretary of Domestic Trade, bearing the company's letterhead
and signed by the highest authority of the company or a legal representative, and reporting the company's
estimates of total imports and exports, in US dollars, for the ongoing year; (ii) a price list of all goods traded in
the domestic market (not only of those to be imported), which shall be provided in hard copy and CD; and
(iii) a spread sheet (also called "request note" or nota de pedido) containing the following data per item:
(a) description of the product; (b) quantity; (c) unit of measure; (d) price per unit; (e) total price; (f) origin;
(g) tariff classification; (h) expected date of shipping from exporting country; and (i) expected date of arrival
in Argentina. (Ibid.) The complainants submitted documents prepared by market intelligence entities or by an
export promotion office informing clients or affiliated members of the information and requirements imposed
by the SCI whenever this agency enters observations on DJAIs. (Ibid., para. 6.104)
265 Panel Reports, para. 6.163.
266 Panel Reports, para. 6.395. The evidence cited by the Panel in support of this statement is listed in
fn 806 to para. 6.395 of the Panel Reports, as well as fn 263 of these Reports.
267 See Panel Reports, para. 6.407. This 180-day period may be extended for an additional 180 calendar
days. (Ibid.)
268 Panel Reports, para. 6.408. To clear customs, an importer must provide, inter alia, the clearance
declaration (confirming the data provided through the DJAI). (Ibid.)
269 Panel Reports, para. 6.410.
270 Panel Reports, para. 6.411.
271 Before the Panel, the complainants produced data from surveys to serve as evidence of the extent to
which private companies in Argentina are subjected to the TRRs and observations in the DJAI procedure.
(Panel Reports, paras. 6.93) For example, the European Union referred to a survey, dated August 2012 and
commissioned by the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina (AmCham Argentina). The European Union
argued that this survey showed that 44% of companies subject to SCI observations had presented
commitments of "compensation" to the Argentine Government. (Ibid., para. 6.94 (referring to
European Union's first written submission to the Panel, para. 63)) For its part, Japan referred to a survey,
dated March 2012, and also commissioned by AmCham Argentina, of "more than 100 companies members of
AmCham Argentina" in different manufacturing sectors. In Japan's view, this survey confirms that DJAIs are
regularly not approved: only 42.8% of DJAIs transitioned to "exit" or "cancelled" status. (Ibid., paras. 6.93
and 6.95 (referring to Japan's first written submission to the Panel, para. 30)) The Panel noted, however, that
the data from these surveys "are not, and do not purport to be, scientific" and were not used to try to
demonstrate that a certain percentage of firms in Argentina are affected by TRRs or by delays or rejections of
their DJAIs. The Panel considered that the surveys "serve as background information illustrating the impact of
the DJAI requirement and the alleged TRRs on specific companies", but that they have "limited value" for
reaching general conclusions about the operation of the measure. (Ibid.)
272 Prospective importers have challenged, in Argentine courts, DJAI procedures in which observations
made by the SCI impeded import operations. The domestic courts concluded that the challenged
DJAI procedures had: (i) unreasonably delayed the approval of DJAIs beyond the time-limits in the legislation;
(ii) made it impossible for applicants to move the procedure forward inasmuch as observations are neither
produced in hard copy nor communicated through the website portal; and (iii) affected the applicants' right of
defence inasmuch as the circumstances give rise to a prohibition on the import operation, without valid legal
grounds. (Panel Reports, para. 6.384)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.1.1 Argentina's appeal
5.1. Argentina appeals the Panel's ruling that the single or "overarching" TRRs measure fell
within the Panel's terms of reference. Argentina claims that, in so ruling, the Panel acted
inconsistently with Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU. According to Argentina, the complainants'
requests for consultations did not identify a single or "overarching" TRRs measure.
273 Therefore,
the addition of a single TRRs measure as a measure at issue in their panel requests expanded the
scope of the dispute or changed its essence. 274 Thus, Argentina requests us to reverse the Panel's
conclusion, in paragraph 4.1.b of its First Prel iminary Ruling, and in paragraph 7.1.b of the
EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.5.b of the US Pane l Report, and paragraph 7.9.b of the Japan Panel
Report, that the characterization of the TRRs measure as a single measure in the complainants'
panel requests did not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute, and was, therefore,
within the Panel's terms of reference.275
5.1.1.1 Background
5.2. In its first written submission to the Panel, Argentina requested a preliminary ruling on the
following issues: (i) whether the TRRs were identified by the complainants as measures at issue in
their requests for consultations; (ii) whether the reference to the alleged TRRs as a broad
unwritten "overarching" measure in the complainants' panel requests "expanded the scope" or
"changed the essence" of the dispute; and (iii) wh ether the complainants identified, either in their
requests for consultations or in their panel requests, the measures subject to their claims against
the alleged TRRs "as applied".
276
5.3. The Panel issued two preliminary rulings. 277 In its First Preliminary Ruling, the Panel ruled
that: (i) the complainants' requests for consultations identified the TRRs as measures at issue;
therefore, the inclusion of the TRRs in their panel requests was not inappropriate and these
measures fell within the Panel's terms of reference; and (ii) the characterization of the TRRs as a
single "overarching" measure in the complainants' panel requests did not expand the scope or
change the essence of the dispute.
278 The Panel did not consider it necessary or appropriate to
issue a ruling with respect to whether the complainants' "as applied" claims were outside its terms
of reference at that time, and instead decided to address this issue during the course of the
proceedings.
279
5.4. During the first Panel meeting, Argentina expressed regret at what it considered to be the
Panel's "hasty decision" in the First Preliminary Ruling, and concern over the Panel's decision to
defer a ruling on some of the jurisdictional objections.
280 Argentina requested the Panel to resolve
the outstanding issues concerning the Panel's terms of reference.281 The Panel subsequently issued
its Second Preliminary Ruling, in which it ruled that: (i) the complainants' panel requests properly
identified the TRRs as measures at issue, and that the TRRs, therefore, formed part of the Panel's
terms of reference; and (ii) the 23 measures described by the European Union in section 4.2.4 of
its first written submission to the Panel as "specific instances" of application of the TRRs do not
constitute "measures at issue".
282 With respect to Japan's claims, the Panel noted that Japan had
clarified that the same measure is the object of both its "as applied" and its "as such" claims, and
explained that the complainants would have the bu rden of presenting arguments and evidence in

273 For purposes of our analysis in this section of the Reports, we use the terms "single TRRs measure"
and "single or 'overarching' TRRs measure" interchangeably, in order to distinguish the TRRs measure from the
individual TRRs.
274 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 22.
275 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 15 and 58.
276 Panel Reports, para. 6.12.
277 The Panel's First and Second Preliminary Rulings are attached as Annexes D-1 and D-2, respectively,
to the Panel Reports.
278 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.1.
279 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.42.
280 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 1.8.
281 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 1.8.
282 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 5.1.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

the course of the proceedings to show the nature and characteristics of the challenged measure.283
The Panel found it sufficient at that stage to find that the complainants' identification of the TRRs
met the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
284 In so finding, the Panel also observed that there
was no indication either that Argentina's ability to defend itself had been prejudiced, or that any
other Member's ability to understand the nature of the dispute had been impaired by the manner
in which the TRRs were described in the panel requests.285
5.1.1.2 Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU
5.5. We begin by discussing the language and func tions of Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU. Next,
we compare the texts of the consultations requests and the panel requests. Thereafter, we
examine whether the identification of the TRRs measure as a single or "overarching" measure in
the complainants' panel requests expanded the sco pe of the dispute or changed its essence, as
compared to their consultations requests.
5.6. The Appellate Body held in Brazil – Aircraft that "Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU … set forth a
process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be held,
before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel."
286 Each of these
provisions requires a complainant to identify the measure(s) that it is challenging. However, the
requirement that applies to consultations requests is not phrased in identical terms to the
requirement that applies to panel requests.
5.7. Article 4.4 of the DSU reads:
All such requests for consultations shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant
Councils and Committees by the Member which requests consultations. Any request
for consultations shall be submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the
request, including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal
basis for the complaint.
5.8. Article 6.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly.
5.9. Thus, while a consultations request must id entify the "measure at issue", a panel request
must identify the " specific measure at issue". This difference in the language between Articles 4.4
and 6.2 makes it clear that, in identifying the measure at issue, greater specificity is required in a
panel request than in a consultations request.
5.10. This difference in the degree of specificity with which a measure at issue must be identified
reflects, and is in keeping with, the underlying distinction between the consultations process and
the panel process themselves. The request for consultations must provide the reasons why
consultations are sought, including the identification of the measure at issue and an indication of
the legal basis of the complaint. The consultations process is "the first step in the WTO dispute
settlement process", and provides parties the oppo rtunity to "define and delimit the scope of the
dispute".
287 Parties to consultations "exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses
of their respective cases, narrow the scope of th e differences between them and, in many cases,
reach a mutually agreed solution" 288, or otherwise refine the contours of the dispute to be
subsequently set out in the panel request. 289 Consultations may lead to the narrowing or
reformulation of a complaint to the extent that the "measure at issue" and the "legal basis"

283 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.25.
284 Second Preliminary Ruling, paras. 4.25 and 4.26.
285 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.27.
286 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 131.
287 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Mexico –
288 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 54.
289 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 138.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

identified in the panel request may be "expected to be shaped by, and thereby constitute a natural
evolution of, the consultations process".290
5.11. According to Article 7 of the DSU, a panel's terms of reference are governed by the request
for the establishment of a panel, unless the parties agree otherwise. Under Article 6.2, the request
for the establishment of a panel must identify the "specific measure at issue", which, together with
the "legal basis of the complaint", constitutes the "matter referred to the DSB" that forms the
basis of the panel's terms of reference.
291 The panel request thus defines the scope of the dispute
and serves to establish and delimit the panel's jurisdiction. 292 Not only does Article 6.2 serve this
"crucial function" of establishing and defining a pa nel's jurisdiction, but it also fulfils a due process
objective by providing the respondent and potential third parties notice regarding the
complainant's case in order to enable them to respond accordingly.
293
5.12. While it is the panel request, and not th e consultations request, that governs a panel's
terms of reference, consultations – as well as the request that triggers and precedes them –
nevertheless play an important role in defining the scope of the dispute.
294 The conduct of
consultations, as well as the ability of the parties to engage fully therein, is directly affected by the
content of the consultations request. It is this document that informs the respondent, and the
WTO membership, of the nature and object of the challenge raised by the complainant, and
enables the respondent to prepare for the consultations themselves. The effectiveness of
consultations and the opportunity provided for the parties to reach a mutually agreeable solution
to the dispute will be compromised if the consultations request fails to identify the measures at
issue, as required by Article 4.4 of the DSU. At the same time, the requirement under Article 4.4
to identify the measure at issue cannot be too onerous at this initial step in the proceedings. This
is because "the claims that are made and the fa cts that are established during consultations do
much to shape the substance and the scope of the subsequent panel proceedings."
295 The
contribution that consultations can make to the refinement of the dispute, in turn, makes it
"especially necessary" for parties to be fully forthcoming during this phase of the WTO dispute
settlement process.
296 We also consider that, as is the case with panel requests, the determination
of whether a consultations request meets the requirements of the DSU is one that must be made
"on a case-by-case basis, considering the particular context in which the measures exist and
operate."
297
5.13. Given the relationship between, and the difference in the language and functions of,
Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body has explained that a " precise and exact
identity between the specific measures that were the subject of consultations and the specific
measures identified in the request for the establishment of a panel" is not required. 298 Indeed, the
Appellate Body has cautioned against imposing "too rigid a standard" of identity between the
scope of the request for consultations and the requ est for the establishment of a panel, as this
would substitute the consultations request for the panel request. 299 This would also undermine the
stipulation in Article 7 of the DSU that, unless the parties agree otherwise, it is the request for the
establishment of a panel that governs the panel' s terms of reference. Thus, provided that a
complainant does not "expand the scope" 300 or change the "essence" of the dispute 301 in its panel
request as compared to its consultations request, the contents of that panel request will determine
the panel's terms of reference. In this connection, it is well established that a WTO dispute
consists of "the matter referred to the DSB", which in turn comprises the specific measure(s) at

290 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 138.
291 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6.
292 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing Measures (China), para. 4.6; and
US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6.
293 Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing Measures (China), paras. 4.6 and 4.10;
US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.7. As the Appellate Body held in
EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, "[t]his due process objective is not constitutive of, but
rather flows from, the proper establishment of a panel's jurisdiction." (Appellate Body Report, EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 640)
294 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 293.
295 Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 94.
296 Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 94.
297 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.9.
298 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 132. (emphasis original)
299 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293.
300 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293.
301 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 137 and 138.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the claims).302 Accordingly, when a party alleges that
a panel request has impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute or changed its essence,
ascertaining whether this is so involves scrutiniz ing the extent to which the identified measure at
issue and/or the legal claims have evolved or changed from the consultations request to the panel
request. With respect to the measure at issue, in particular, even if such measure is identified with
sufficient precision in a panel request, it may nevertheless fall outside the panel's terms of
reference if that measure was not referred to in the request for consultations, and is separate and
legally distinct from the measures that were identified therein.
303
5.14. In US – Upland Cotton , for example, the United States argued that the panel's terms of
reference did not encompass export credit guarantees to any products other than upland cotton.
According to the United States, since the reference to export credit guarantees in Brazil's request
for consultations pertained to upland cotton, this limited the scope of the products in respect of
which the United States' export credit guarantee programmes could be challenged to upland cotton
alone.
304 The panel and the Appellate Body, however, disagreed. They observed that, while one
paragraph of the consultations request referred to export credit guarantees to upland cotton
without explicitly mentioning all eligible agricultural commodities, when viewed as a whole, the
language of the consultations request provided a sufficient basis for considering that the request
covered export credit guarantees to eligible agricultural commodities including, but not limited to,
upland cotton. 305 Therefore, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ruling that "export credit
guarantees to facilitate the export of United States upland cotton, and other eligible agricultural
commodities … [were] within its terms of reference". 306
5.15. In comparison, in US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive , India's request
for consultations referred to a number of legal instruments constituting the Amended Customs
Bond Directive (CBD), while its panel request iden tified these, along with additional statutory
(Section 1623 of the US Tariff Act of 1930) and regulatory (Section 113.13 of the US Code of
Federal Regulations) provisions, as measures at issue. India claimed that, although its
consultations request did not refer to these additional statutory and regulatory provisions, they
were nevertheless within the panel's terms of reference, as it is the panel request that defines the
panel's mandate.
307 The panel disagreed and held that "[a] panel's terms of reference will include
the specific measure identified in the panel request, but that measure should have been identified
in the consultations request 'to some degree that is less than "specific"'."
308 Comparing the request
for consultations with the panel request, the panel concluded that the Amended CBD, on the one
hand, and Section 1623 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 and Section 113.13 of the US Code of Federal
Regulations, on the other hand, were separate and legally distinct measures.
309 Because the latter
two provisions were not identified in India's request for consultations, they could not form part of
the panel's terms of reference. The Appellate Body upheld the panel's ruling that, since the two
additional provisions identified by India in its panel request were "separate and legally distinct"
from the Amended CBD identified in India's consul tations request, the scope of the dispute would
have been expanded by their inclusion in the panel's terms of reference.310
5.16. Having examined the language and functions of Article 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU, as well as
the relevant jurisprudence, we reiterate that both provisions require the identification of the
measure at issue, albeit with a higher degree of specificity in a panel request than in a
consultations request. Considering that consultations facilitate the exchange of information among
the parties to allow them to either reach a mutually agreed solution or refine the contours of the
dispute, the measures and claims identified in a panel request may constitute a natural evolution
of the consultations process. Thus, there is no n eed for a "precise and exact identity" between the

302 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6.
303 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Certain EC Products, paras. 69-78 and 82; and US – Shrimp
(Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 295.
304 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 290.
305 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 291.
306 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 294. (emphasis added)
307 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 287.
308 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 288 (quoting
Panel Report, US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.181).
309 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, paras. 288, 289,
and 294.
310 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, paras. 295 and 296.
See also Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 82.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

measures identified in the consultations request and the specific measure identified in the panel
request, provided that the latter does not expand the scope of the dispute or change its essence.
The determination of whether the identification of the "specific measure at issue" in the panel
request expanded the scope or changed the essence of the dispute must be made on a
case-by-case basis.
5.1.1.3 Identification of the single TRRs measure as a "measure at issue"
5.17. Argentina appeals the Panel's conclusion in its First Preliminary Ruling that the unwritten
"overarching" TRRs measure was within its terms of reference.311 While Argentina does not dispute
that the language used to describe the "commitments" in the complainants' consultations requests
is the same as that used to describe the individual TRRs in their panel requests
312, Argentina
nevertheless argues that the "commitments" do not refer to any measures that might be subject
to challenge, as these pertain only to the DJAI and the Certificados de Importación (CIs). 313
Further, Argentina contends that, despite the similarity in the language between the
"commitments" and the individual TRRs, the dist inction it draws is between the individual
"commitments" mentioned in the complainants' consultations requests and the single or
"overarching" TRRs measure identified in their panel requests.
314 In Argentina's view, the
"overarching" measure is in the nature of a new measure that impermissibly expanded the scope
of the dispute.315
5.18. In response, the complainants argue th at they were not required to identify the
TRRs measure in their consultations requests with the same degree of specificity as in their panel
requests, owing to the fact that Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU do not require a "precise and exact
identity" between the two requests.
316 The complainants add that the "close identity" 317 or "nearly
identical" language318 of, or substantial similarity 319 between, the consultations requests and the
panel requests show that there was neither an ex pansion in the scope of the dispute nor a change
in its essence.320
5.19. As the Panel indicated, the complainants id entified the measures at issue in their requests
for consultations "in almost identical terms". 321 We reproduce below the relevant portions of the
complainants' consultations requests. Square brackets indicate where the language of the three
consultations requests differs:
Argentina often requires the importers of goods to undertake certain commitments,
including, inter alia, to limit their imports, to balance them with exports, to make or
increase their investments in production facilities in Argentina, to increase the local
content of [ European Union : the products they manufacture] [ United States and
Japan: products manufactured in Argentina] [United States: (and thereby discriminate
against imported products), to refrain from transferring revenue or other funds abroad
and/or to control the price of imported goods.] [ European Union and Japan : , not to
transfer benefits abroad and/or to control their prices.]
[European Union: The issuance of LAPIs, CIs and CL Cs and the approval of DJAIs is
being systematically delayed or refused by the Argentinean authorities on
non-transparent grounds. Often the Argentinean authorities make the issuance of

311 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 9.
312 Argentina's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
313 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 27 and 30.
314 Argentina's response to questioning at the oral hearing; Argentina's appellant's submission,
paras. 43 and 44.
315 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 12.
316 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64; United States' appellee's submission, paras. 28,
41, 43, 45, and 46; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 18, 20, 21, and 37.
317 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 63 (quoting First Preliminary Ruling,
paras. 3.20-3.24).
318 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 32.
319 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 6, 24, 29, 31, and 39-41.
320 European Union's appellee's submission, heading 2.4.2 and paras. 63, 92, 93, and 94; United States'
appellee's submission, paras. 6, 24, 29, and 47; Japan's appellee's submission, para. 32.
321 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.18.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

LAPIs, CIs and CLC and the approval of DJIA conditional upon the importers
undertaking to comply with the trade restrictive commitments mentioned above.]
[United States and Japan : The issuance of CIs and the approval of DJAIs are being
systematically delayed or refused by the Argentinean authorities on non-transparent
grounds. The Argentinean authorities often make the issuance of CIs and the approval
of DJAIs conditional upon the importers undertaking to comply with the
above-mentioned trade-restrictive commitments.]
These measures restrict imports of goods and discriminate between imported and
d o m e s t i c g o o d s . T h e y d o n o t a p p e a r t o be related to the implementation of any
measure justified under the WTO Agreement, but instead [ Japan: are] [United States:
appear to be] aimed at advancing [ European Union and Japan : the Argentinean
Government's] [ United States : Argentina's] stated policies of re-industrialization,
import substitution and elimination of trade balance deficits.
The legal [ United States and Japan : instruments] [ European Union : measures]
through which Argentina [ European Union and Japan : imposes these restrictions]
[United States: maintains these measures] include, but are not limited to, the legal
instruments listed in the Annexes, as well as any amendments, replacements,
extensions, implementing measures or related measures.
322
5.20. The complainants' panel requests have similar content. In all three panel requests, section I
identifies the DJAI procedure as a measure at issue, section II identifies the CIs as a measure at
issue, and section III is entitled "Restrictive Tr ade-Related Requirements". The relevant parts of
section III of the complainants' panel requests are set out below, indicating in square brackets
where they differ:
Separately and/or in combination with the [ European Union and Japan : above]
measures described in Sections I and II, Argentina requires economic operators to
undertake certain actions with a view to pursuing Argentina's stated policy objectives
of elimination of trade balance deficits and import substitution. Those actions include
to: (1) export a certain value of goods from Argentina related to the value of imports;
(2) limit the volume of imports and/or reduce their price; (3) refrain from repatriating
funds from Argentina to another country; (4) make or increase investments in
Argentina (including in productions facilities); and/or (5) incorporate local content into
domestically produced goods.
These requirements are not stipulated in any published law or regulation. To satisfy
these requirements, economic operators no rmally either submit a statement or
conclude an agreement with Argentina setting out the actions they will take. Argentina
enforces these [ United States and Japan : commitments] [ European Union :
requirements] by withholding permission to import, inter alia , by withholding the
issuance of DJAI or CI approvals.
[European Union : The European Union considers that these requirements, when
viewed as an overarching measure aiming at eliminating trade balance deficits and/or
substituting imports by domestic products, as well as when viewed as separate
measures in each of the instances listed in Annex III, and whether analysed
separately or together with the measures described in Sections I and II, are
inconsistent with the following …]
[[The United States] [Japan] considers that whether analyzed separately or together
with the measures described in Sections I and II, these requirements and any
application thereof, are inconsistent with the following provisions … .]
323
5.21. Comparing the language of the complainants' requests for consultations and their panel
requests, we consider the following to be evident from both sets of documents. Each consultations

322 European Union's request for consultations, pp. 1-2. See also United States' request for
consultations, pp. 1-2; and Japan's request for consultations, pp. 1-2.
323 EU Panel Request, pp. 3-4. See also US Panel Request, p. 4; and Japan Panel Request, pp. 3-4.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

request, and each panel request, identifies three categories of measures: the DJAI procedure, the
CIs, and the TRRs. With respect to the TRRs, the consultations requests and the panel requests
identify the same five "commitments" or "requirements". Specifically, Argentina requires the
importers of goods to undertake certain "commitments" (consultations requests) or "requires
economic operators to undertake certain actions" (panel requests) including: (i) to limit imports;
(ii) to balance imports with exports by exporting a certain value of goods related to the value of
imports; (iii) to refrain from repatriating funds or benefits abroad; (iv) to make or increase
investments in Argentina; and/or (v) to increase local content of products manufactured in
Argentina.
324
5.22. Both sets of requests describe these five "commitments" or "requirements" as being "trade
restrictive". While the consultations requests use the term "trade restrictive commitments" 325, the
panel requests each contain a separate heading entitled "Restrictive Trade Related
Requirements".326
5.23. All of the requests describe these "commitments" or "requirements" as being imposed
pursuant to Argentina's "stated policies" or "policy objectives" of "import substitution" and the
"elimination of trade deficits". The consultation s requests state that these "commitments", along
with the DJAI and non-automatic licences, such as the CIs, are "aimed at advancing the
Argentinean Government's 327 stated policies of re-industrialization, import substitution and
elimination of trade balance deficits". 328 The panel requests, meanwhile, explain that Argentina
imposes these "requirements" with a view to pursuing its "stated policy objectives of elimination of
trade balance deficits and import substitution".
329
5.24. Both sets of requests identify a relation ship between the "commitments" or "requirements",
on the one hand, and the CIs and the DJAI, on the other hand. The consultations requests provide
that the issuance of the CIs and the approval of the DJAI are made "conditional upon the
importers undertaking to comply" with these "commitments".
330 The panel requests state that
"Argentina enforces these [requirements 331] by withholding permission to import, inter alia, by
withholding the issuance of DJAI or CI approvals."332
5.25. Aside from the similarities shared by th e complainants' consultations requests and panel
requests, we also note some apparent differenc es. Whereas all the complainants' consultations
requests refer to individual "commitments", the EU Panel Request uses the description "when
viewed as an overarching measure … as well as when viewed as separate measures in each of the
instances listed in Annex III"
333, and the US Panel Request and Japan Panel Request use the
phrase "whether analyzed separately or together with [the DJAI procedure and the CIs], these
requirements, and any application thereof".334
5.26. Like the Panel 335, we see a high degree of similarity in the language and content of the
consultations requests and the panel requests. There is no dispute that the complainants'
consultations requests contain no explicit refere nce to a single or "overarching" TRRs measure.
However, as we have previously explained, ther e is no need for a "precise and exact identity"
between the consultations request and the panel requ est, provided that there is no expansion in
the scope of the dispute or a change in its essence. A panel request must identify the " specific

324 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1; EU Panel Request, p. 3; United States' request for
consultations, p. 1; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan's request for consultations, p. 1; Japan Panel Request, p. 3.
325 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1; United States' request for consultations, p. 1;
Japan's request for consultations, p. 1.
326 EU Panel Request, p. 3; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 3.
327 The United States' request for consultations states: "aimed at advancing Argentina's stated
policies …".
328 European Union's request for consultations, p. 2; United States' request for consultations, p. 2;
Japan's request for consultations, p. 1.
329 EU Panel Request, p. 3; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 3.
330 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1; United States' request for consultations, p. 1;
Japan's request for consultations, p. 1.
331 The EU Panel Request uses the term "requirements", while the US Panel Request and the Japan
Panel Request use the term "commitments".
332 EU Panel Request, p. 3; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 4.
333 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
334 US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 4.
335 First Preliminary Ruling, paras. 3.19-3.24 and 3.28.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

measure at issue"336 in a manner that is sufficiently precise, as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU,
and that does not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute. In our view, the
language identifying the single TRRs measure in the panel requests can be considered to have
evolved from, and to be a more elaborate versio n of, the language identifying the "commitments"
in the consultations requests. We, therefore, agree with the Panel that the description of the TRRs
as a single or "overarching" measure is only an "enunciation in different terms" of the same
measures identified in the complainants' consultations requests, and that "nothing in this
reformulation … per se expands that scope or changes the essence of the dispute".
337
5.27. Argentina argues that the similarity in th e language of the consultations requests and the
panel requests, specifically in the identification of "commitments" in the former and "requirements"
in the latter, has "no bearing" on whether the consultations requests identified a measure "with its
own distinct normative content".
338 In Argentina's opinion, instead of suggesting the existence of
an "overarching" measure, the reference to "commitments" in the complainants' consultations
requests could, at most, be understood as a challenge, on an "as applied" basis, against specific
"statements" or "agreements" between the Argentine Government and importers.
339 We disagree
with Argentina.
5.28. Comparing the consultations requests and the panel requests, we consider it true that the
panel requests contain additional language not a ppearing in the consultations requests, i.e. the
EU Panel Request's "overarching measure" and "when viewed as separate measures in each of the
instances listed in Annex III" 340, and the US Panel Request's and Japan Panel Request's "whether
analyzed separately or together with [the DJAI procedure and the CIs], these requirements, and
any application thereof". 341 Yet, the mere existence of this additional language, alone, does not
mean that the language identifying the single TRRs measure in the panel requests cannot be
considered to have evolved from the language identifying the "commitments" in the consultations
requests. We see nothing in the language of the consultations requests that precludes the
identification of a single or "overarching" TRRs measure in the panel requests or suggests that only
specific applications thereof may be identified as specific measures at issue. To the contrary, there
is language in the consultations requests that suggests that the challenge raised is not limited to
specific instances of application of the TRRs. Specifically, the complainants' consultations requests
state that Argentina " often requires" importers to undertake five "commitments", which are the
same five "requirements" identified in the panel requests.
342 Further, the consultations requests
state that the measures identified therein (i.e. the DJAI procedure, the CIs, and the
"commitments") are aimed at advancing Argentina's "stated policies" of "import substitution" and
"elimination of trade balance deficits".
343 Lastly, the consultations requests state that the "legal
measures through which Argentina imposes these restrictions include, but are not limited to , the
legal instruments listed in the Annexes". 344 T o u s , r a t h e r t h a n l i m i t i n g t h e m e a s u r e s a t i s s u e
identified in the panel requests to those that are challenged "as applied", the foregoing language
of the consultations requests may reasonably be read as establishing a basis from which the
complainants could legitimately elaborate their description of the measure at issue as the single or
"overarching" TRRs measure in their panel requests.
5.29. In our view, describing the TRRs as a single or "overarching" measure in the panel requests
reflects a more precise enunciation of the measure than in the consultations requests. This is
consistent with the more exacting requirement in Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the "specific
measure at issue". We consider that the identification in the panel requests of the single or
"overarching" TRRs measure may reasonably be considered to be an evolution or a further

336 Emphasis added.
337 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.33.
338 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 43.
339 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 28.
340 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
341 US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 4.
342 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1; United States' request for consultations, p. 1;
Japan's request for consultations, p. 1. (emphasis added)
343 European Union's request for consultations, p. 2; United States' request for consultations, p. 2;
Japan's request for consultations, p. 1. The panel requests use the phrase "stated policy objectives". (EU Panel
Request, p. 3; US Panel Request, p. 4; Japan Panel Request, p. 3)
344 European Union's request for consultations, p. 2. (emphasis added) See also United States' request
for consultations, p. 2; and Japan's request for consultations, p. 2.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

elaboration of the language of the consultations requests, possibly achieved through and shaped
by the consultations process.345
5.30. Our examination of the language of the complainants' consultations requests and panel
requests shows that, while the panel requests identified the TRRs measure with a greater degree
of specificity than the consultations requests, th e manner in which this was done did not expand
the scope of the dispute or change its essence. Rather, the essence of the TRRs measure was
identified in the consultations requests, and the additional language of the panel requests,
including the identification of the single or "overarching" TRRs measure, can be said to have
evolved from the language of the consultations requests. We thus agree with the Panel that the
complainants' panel requests reflect a permissible reformulation of the measure at issue that did
not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute.
346 Therefore, we see no error in the
Panel's finding, in paragraphs 3.33 and 4.1.b of the First Preliminary Ruling 347, that the
characterization of the TRRs measure as a single or "overarching" measure in the complainants'
panel requests did not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute.
5.31. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.1.b of the
EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.5.b of the US Pane l Report, and paragraph 7.9.b of the Japan Panel
Report, that "[t]he characterization of the [TRRs] as a single measure in the complainants' panel
requests did not expand the scope or change the essence of the dispute". 348 Consequently,
we find that the single or "overarching" TRRs measure was within the Panel's terms of reference.
5.1.2 The European Union's other appeal
5.32. The European Union appeals the Panel's finding that the 23 measures described by the
European Union in its first written submission to the Panel as "specific instances" of application of
the TRRs were not clearly identified in the EU Pane l Request and did not, therefore, fall within the
Panel's terms of reference. According to the European Union, its panel request identified these
measures with "sufficient particularity" in conformity with Article 6.2 of the DSU 349, and the Panel
erred in finding otherwise. The European Union thus requests us to reverse the Panel's finding in
paragraph 7.1.c of the EU Panel Report, and to find instead that the 23 measures in question fell
within the Panel's terms of reference as "measures at issue". 350 The European Union also makes a
conditional request for completion of the analysis. Should we reverse or otherwise declare moot
the Panel's findings as to the existence of the TRRs measure and its inconsistency with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Euro pean Union requests us to complete the legal
analysis and find that Argentina acted inconsistently with Articles XI:1 and/or III:4 of the
GATT 1994 in each of these 23 specific instances.
351
5.1.2.1 Background
5.33. In its request for consultations, the Europe an Union alleged that Argentina "often requires"
importers to undertake "certain commitments", including: (i) to limit their imports; (ii) to balance
them with exports; (iii) to make or increase their investments in production facilities in Argentina;
(iv) to increase the local content of the products they manufacture in Argentina; and/or (v) not to
transfer benefits abroad and/or control their prices.
352 Subsequently, in its panel request, the
European Union identified as specific measures at issue "Restrictive Trade Related Requirements",
which consist of the same "commitments" it referred to in its consultations request. The
European Union stated that its challenge is with respect to these requirements "when viewed as an
overarching measure".
353 The European Union also challenged as separate measures each of the
instances of application of the TRRs listed in Annex III to its panel request. 354 Annex III lists
29 "Instances of restrictive trade-related requirements affecting products originating in the

345 First Preliminary Ruling, paras. 3.31 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping
346 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.33.
347 See also Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.32.
348 See also First Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.1.b.
349 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 21.
350 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 23.
351 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 24.
352 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1.
353 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
354 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

European Union". For each item on the list, Annex III provides the title of a press release or news
article, the date of its publication, and the webs ite where it may be accessed. The European Union
later narrowed down these 29 instances to only 23 cases in section 4.2.4 of its first written
submission to the Panel, and explained that it i s c h a l l e n g i n g a s s e p a r a t e m e a s u r e s t h e s e
23 specific instances where Argentina has applied one or more of the TRRs to particular economic
operators.
355
5.34. As we have previously discussed, the Panel issued two preliminary rulings. 356 In its First
Preliminary Ruling, the Panel declined to rule on whether the complainants' claims that Argentina
alleged to be "as applied" were included in its terms of reference, and decided instead to consider
these in the course of the proceedings.
357 During the Panel's first substantive meeting with the
parties, Argentina requested the Panel to resolve immediately two outstanding issues concerning
its terms of reference, including the European Union's identification as separate measures of 23
specific instances of application of the TRRs. 358 In its Second Preliminary Ruling, the Panel
addressed this request and ruled that the 23 "specific instances" of application of the TRRs
described in the European Union's first written submission do not constitute "measures at issue" in
DS438 (complaint by the European Union). 359 According to the Panel, a reader of the EU Panel
Request would have had to visit the websites identified in Annex III, read the 29 articles or press
releases, deduce from each what the European Union challenges as specific measures at issue, and
thereafter resort to the European Union's first written submission to discern the "specific instances
of application of the [TRRs]" being challenged as 23 individual measures.
360 In the Panel's view, a
panel request that requires a reader to access information from a website and deduce what the
challenged measures are from that information cannot be said to be "sufficiently precise" in
conformity with Article 6.2 of the DSU. 361 Thus, the Panel found that, on its face, Annex III to the
EU Panel Request did not identify any "specific measures at issue".362
5.35. The European Union appeals the findings of the Panel that the 23 specific instances of
application of the TRRs were not precisely identified and do not constitute measures at issue in this
dispute. The European Union argues that the language of its panel request shows that it is not only
challenging the existence of an overarching measure, but also challenging separately several
actions taken by Argentina that are of the same nature as those described under the overarching
measure.
363 Specifically, the European Union explains that Annex III to the EU Panel Request lists
29 instances where Argentina imposed certain TRRs that share the same characteristics as the five
requirements described as part of the overarching measure. 364 For each of these 29 instances,
Annex III provides the title of, and the website link containing, the relevant press release that
describes the measure at issue in terms of the en tity or entities concerned, the date and the
nature of the requirements imposed by the Argentine Government, and the commitments that the
entity or entities undertook.
365 Thus, the European Union asserts that the Panel erred in concluding
that it was not possible to identify the specific measures at issue from the information contained in
the title of each press release, as well as its content.366
5.36. In response, Argentina refrains from taking a position on the merits of the European Union's
other appeal.367 Instead, Argentina contends that the iden tification of the 29 specific instances of
application of the TRRs in Annex III to the EU Panel Request impermissibly expanded the scope of
the dispute since the measures were not identified in the European Union's request for
consultations.368 Thus, should we reverse the Panel's findings and rule that the specific instances
of application of the TRRs were identified as "specific measures at issue" in the EU Panel Request,

355 European Union's first written submission to the Panel, section 4.2.4 and para. 385.
356 The First and Second Preliminary Rulings are attached as Annexes D-1 and D-2, respectively, to the
Panel Reports.
357 First Preliminary Ruling, para. 3.42.
358 Second Preliminary Ruling, paras. 2.3 and 2.5.
360 Second Preliminary Ruling, paras. 4.35 and 4.36.
361 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.37.
362 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.37.
363 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 15.
364 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 16.
365 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 17.
366 European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 18.
367 Argentina's appellee's submission, paras. 14 and 16.
368 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 13.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

then Argentina requests us to find that the addition of these "new measures" impermissibly
expanded the scope of the dispute, and that they were, for this reason, outside the Panel's terms
of reference.
369
5.37. We begin by recalling the jurisprudence on Article 6.2 of the DSU as regards the
identification of the specific measures at issue. Next, we examine whether the 23 specific instances
of application of the TRRs were identified as measures at issue in the EU Panel Request.
Thereafter, we address the issue of whether the id entification of the 23 measures in the EU Panel
Request expanded the scope of the dispute, as compared to its consultations request. Finally, we
discuss the European Union's conditional request for completion of the legal analysis.
5.1.2.2 Article 6.2 of the DSU
5.38. The relevant portion of Article 6.2 of the DSU reads:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly.
5.39. Article 6.2 has two distinct requirements, namely: (i) the identification of the specific
measures at issue; and (ii) the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint. As
the Appellate Body has held in previous disputes , these two requirements constitute the "matter
referred to the DSB", which forms the basis of a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the
DSU.
370 Article 6.2 defines the scope of the dispute between the parties, thereby establishing and
delimiting the panel's jurisdiction and serving the due process objective of notifying the
respondent and third parties of the nature of the case. 371 Moreover, in order to "present the
problem clearly", within the meaning of Article 6. 2, a panel request must "plainly connect" the
challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) claimed to have been infringed so that a respondent
can "know what case it has to answer, and … begin preparing its defence". 372
5.40. With respect to the requirement under Article 6.2 to identify the specific measure at issue,
the Appellate Body explained in EC – Selected Customs Matters that the "specific measure" is the
"object of the challenge, namely, the measure that is alleged to be causing the violation of an
obligation contained in a covered agreement". 373 Thus, the "measure at issue" referred to in
Article 6.2 is "what is being challenged by the complaining Member".374
5.41. Further, in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , the Appellate Body
explained that the determination of whether a panel request is "sufficiently precise" requires
scrutiny of the panel request "as a whole, and on the basis of the language used". 375 The issue of
whether the panel request identifies the "specific measure at issue" may depend on the particular
context in which those measures exist and oper ate, and may require examining the extent to
which those measures are capable of being precisely identified.376
5.42. A panel request's compliance with the re quirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU must be
demonstrated on its face as it existed at the time of its filing. Consequently, any defects in the
panel request cannot be "cured" by the subsequent submissions of the parties. 377 Nevertheless,
subsequent submissions, such as the complaining party's first written submission, may be

369 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 17.
370 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6.
371 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), paras. 4.6 and 4.7.
372 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.8 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162).
373 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130.
374 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130. (emphasis original)
375 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 641. (fns omitted)
376 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220.
377 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.9.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

consulted to the extent that they may confirm or clarify the meaning of the words used in the
panel request.378
5.1.2.3 Identification of the measures at issue
5.43. In its panel request, the European Union challenges the TRRs not only as an "overarching"
measure, but also "when viewed as separate measures in each of the instances listed in
Annex III".
379 Annex III to the EU Panel Request bears the heading "Instances of restrictive trade
related requirements affecting products originating in the European Union", and lists the titles
of 29 news articles and press releases, includin g the date of their publication and the website
addresses where they may be accessed.
5.44. For example, the first two of the 29 inst ances of application listed in Annex III read as
follows:
1. "GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO REDUCE VE HICLE IMPORTS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES
BY 20%", MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, 10 DECEMBER 2010
http://www.prensa.argentina.ar/2010/12/10/14694-el-gobierno-busca-reducir-en-un-
20-la-importacion-de-vehiculos-de-terceros-paises.php

2. "RENAULT TRUCKS TELLS GOVERNMENT IT WILL INCREASE ITS EXPORTS",
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, 7 FEBRUARY 2011
http://www.prensa.argentina.ar/2012/02/07/27966-renault-trucks-anuncio-al-gobierno
5.45. Footnote 1 to Annex III states that the list of measures set out in the Annex "has the
exclusive purpose of identifying measures … and should not be understood as an exhaustive list of
evidence available with respect to the specific instances of restrictive trade related
requirements".
380
5.46. In ruling that the EU Panel Request does not identify the 23 instances of application of the
TRRs as "measures at issue" in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Panel explained:
A panel request that requires a reader to access information from a website and
deduce from that information what the challenged measures are, cannot be said to be
"sufficiently precise" in identifying the specific measures at issue for the purpose of
Article 6.2 of the DSU: it is not sufficient for the panel to ascertain its terms of
reference; it does not serve the due process objective of notifying the respondent of
the nature of the complainant's case with respect to the specific measure; and it may
impair the ability of any other WTO Member to understand the nature of the dispute
and determine whether it has any substantial interest in the matter. The list provided
by the European Union in Annex III of its panel request may contain information that
may become relevant in the course of the proceedings in order to demonstrate the
nature and existence of the measures describ ed by the European Union. However, on
its face, the list provided by the European Union in Annex III of its panel request does
not identify any "specific measures at issue".
381
5.47. Nothing in the above reasoning suggests that the Panel itself took account of the contents of
the information found at the websites identified in Annex III to the EU Panel Request. Rather, in
finding that the EU Panel Request, "on its face", does not identify any specific instance of
application of TRRs as a measure, the Panel seemed to have considered that accessing the
websites listed in Annex III and seeking to deduce what the challenged measures are from the
information found at such sites would necessarily involve going beyond an examination of the
panel request "on its face", and that this would be improper.

378 Appellate Body Reports, US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China), para. 4.9.
379 EU Panel Request, p. 4; European Union's other appellant's submission, para. 15.
380 EU Panel Request, fn 1 to Annex III.
381 Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.37. (fns omitted)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.48. We recall that the determination of whether a panel request satisfies the requirements of
Articles 6.2 of the DSU must be based on an exam ination of the panel request on its face as it
existed at the time of its filing. 382 The term "on its face", however, must not be so strictly
construed as to preclude automatically reference to sources that are identified in its text, but the
contents of which are accessible outside the panel request document itself.
5.49. It is common practice, for example, for panel requests identifying legislation, regulations, or
other similar instruments as measures at issue to provide information that enables the respondent
and potential third parties to access the text of the measures themselves, rather than to copy the
entire text of these instruments into the body of the panel requests, or to attach them as annexes.
Such information may consist of the title, date of enactment or entry into force, the official number
of the law or regulation, and the citation to the government regulatory bulletin in which it was
published.
5.50. Indeed, this is the approach followed in Annex I to the EU Panel Request, which lists, in a
brief fashion, the legal instruments that make up the DJAI procedure. In our view, this method of
identifying the measure at issue is not materially different from succinctly identifying various
pieces of legislation by providing links to the go vernment websites where such legislation could be
accessed. This manner of identification would not necessarily mean that these pieces of legislation
were not identified as specific measures at issu e in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU. By
providing a reference to a website in the panel request, the contents of such website may be
permissibly examined in order to ascertain whether the measure at issue is identified with
sufficient precision in the panel request.
5.51. Understanding the need to scrutinize a panel request "on its face" as limiting the
examination of that request to the words appearing in the document would, in our view, be too
formalistic an approach. It could, moreover, encourage complainants to incorporate entire texts of
identified measures into the body of their pane l requests. So long as a panel request seeks to
identify the specific measure at issue through reference to a source where that measure's contents
may readily be found and accessed, such contents may be the subject of scrutiny in assessing
whether that request identifies the specific measures at issue within the meaning of, and in
conformity with, Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.52. At the same time, we do not mean to suggest that the identification of measures at issue by
simple reference to external sources will always su ffice to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU. This is something that must be determ ined on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind
whether the specific measures at issue can be discerned from the panel request. A complainant
whose panel request simply refers to external sources runs the risk that such request may fall
short of the requirements of Article 6.2.
383 We observe, in this connection, that the contents of
webpages may not always be static. Moreover, a complainant may encounter more difficulty
complying with Article 6.2 where its panel request refers to press releases or news articles about
measures, rather than to the contents of the me asures themselves. Yet, in circumstances where a
complainant is confronted with measures that are, for example, unwritten, unpublished, or
otherwise publicly inaccessible, reference to such secondary sources may be the only available
means of identifying the measure at issue.
5.53. In this dispute, in addition to providing the titles of the press releases and news articles,
their dates of publication, and the websites where they may be accessed, it might have been more
prudent for the European Union to also have provided a brief summary of the main elements of
the measure discussed in each press release or news article, for example, by referring to the
specific TRRs imposed, and the particular economic operators concerned. Nevertheless, as we have
explained, the fact that the European Union opted merely to refer to the titles of the press releases
or news articles, and to the websites where they may be found does not automatically take their
contents outside the ambit of the examination re quired for determining whether the panel request
identified the 23 instances of application of the TRRs as specific measures at issue. We also note
that, in this dispute, Argentina did not contest the contents of the websites listed in Annex III to
the EU Panel Request, raise any concern as to the accessibility of the individual website links, or
question whether the contents of these websites may have changed.

382 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.9.
383 See Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.31.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.54. We recall that the Panel found that th e EU Panel Request does not identify any of
the 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs as specific measure at issue simply on the
grounds that a reader of that panel request would have had to access information from a website
and to deduce therefrom the challenged measures. In the circumstances of this dispute, and for
the reasons set out above, we are of the view that the Panel could not properly have reached such
a finding without first examining these press releases and news articles and explaining why their
contents, read in conjunction with the main te xt of the EU Panel Request, did not identify
the 23 measures in a manner that is sufficiently precise.
5.55. Accordingly, we find that the Panel erred in finding that the EU Panel Request does not
satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DS U with respect to the 23 specific instances of
application of the TRRs. We, therefore, reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.1.c of the
EU Panel Report, that "[t]he 23 measures described by the European Union in section 4.2.4 of its
first written submission as 'specific instances' of application of alleged [TRRs] were not precisely
identified in the European Union's panel request as measures at issue", and that "accordingly,
those 23 measures do not constitute 'measures at issue' in the present dispute".
384
5.1.2.4 The 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs as measures at issue
5.56. Having found that the Panel erred in findin g that the 23 instances of application of the TRRs
do not constitute measures at issue in this dispute, we now turn to assess whether the EU Panel
Request identified each of the specific instances of application of the TRRs as measures at issue in
conformity with Article 6.2 of the DSU. We re call that, in its first written submission, the
European Union chose to pursue only 23 of the 29 instances originally identified in its panel
request. Hence, we will focus on these 23 instance s of application of the TRRs by examining the
contents of the relevant press releases and news reports.
5.57. In reviewing each press release and news report, we must determine whether the relevant
contents, when read together with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, identify the specific
instance of application of the TRRs to particular economic operators, that is, whether the specific
measure at issue subject to challenge by the Europe an Union is discernible from such content. Our
task is to ascertain whether these 23 measures were identified with sufficient precision by the
European Union in its panel request as to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU and,
therefore, formed part of the Panel's terms of reference.
385 In our determination, we will consider
the contents of each press release and news article listed in Annex III to the EU Panel Request to
ascertain whether it specifically identifies the involvement of the Argentine Government, the
economic operator, sector, or industry concerned, and the particular TRR(s) imposed. In doing so,
we bear in mind the narrative of the EU Panel Request, which reads in relevant part:
Separately and/or in combination with the above measures described in Sections I
and II, Argentina requires economic operators to undertake certain actions with a
view to pursuing Argentina's stated policy objectives of elimination of trade balance
deficits and import substitution. Those actions include to: (1) export a certain value of
goods from Argentina related to the value of imports; (2) limit the volume of imports
and/or reduce their price; (3) refrain from repatriating funds from Argentina to
another country; (4) make or increase investments in Argentina (including in
production facilities); and/or (5) incorporate local content into domestically produced
goods.
…
The European Union considers that these requirements, … when viewed as separate
measures in each of the instances listed in Annex III, … are inconsistent with the
following

384 See also Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 5.1.b.
385 We note that, during the Panel proceedings, Argentina stated that it "has not denied or called into
question the existence" of the specific agreements between the Argentine Government and the economic
operators, of which the Panel requested copies. (Panel Reports, paras. 6.46, 6.64, and 6.164 (quoting
Argentina's responses to Panel questions Nos. 63-92, para. 20); see also paras. 6.155 and 6.165)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

 Article III:4 of GATT 1994, to the extent that Argentina requires
domestic producers to increase local content and/or limit imports to an
amount related to the volume or value of local products that they
export.
 …
 Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, because the measure prohibits or
restricts the importation of goods.
386
Case 1: "Renault Trucks tells Govern ment it will increase its exports"387
5.58. This press release, dated 7 February 2011, states that the Argentine Government concluded
an agreement on the same date with Renault Tr ucks Argentina, whereby the latter undertook to
reverse its trade deficit and increase its exports by US$47 million to achieve a trade balance of
US$0.7 million. Renault also pledged to invest up to US$4 million, including a commitment to
make investments in car parts manufacturers Dana and Tassarolli, allowing them to develop new
products not only to supply Renault, but also to increase their own exports. According to the
Minister of Industry, the investments by Renault would "reinforce local car parts manufacturers so
that a large number of parts made here are produced and integrated into the vehicles
manufactured in Argentina". This press release further states that Fate Argentina was to start
supplying tyres, previously imported from Brazil, for Renault trucks sold in Argentina and Uruguay.
In our view, these statements, read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request,
show the imposition of the one-to-one, investment, and import substitution requirements on
Renault Trucks Argentina.
Case 2: "Boudou speaks of success of import substitution policy"
388
5.59. This press release, dated 18 March 2011, quotes Argentina's Minister of the Economy as
saying that a commitment by Volkswagen to reduce its trade deficit "demonstrates the success of
the policy of import substitution". The press rele ase explains that the Minister of the Economy,
Minister of Industry, and the Secretary of Dome stic Trade approved and endorsed Volkswagen's
business plan providing for an increase in export s to achieve a trade surplus of US$538 million.
The reduction of Volkswagen's trade deficit and ac hievement of the goal to keep a trade surplus
are said to "work on the basis of incorporating small and medium local suppliers in the auto part
chain". Volkswagen's business plan is reported to have "a strong export bias" since the company
promised to eliminate its US$816 million trade deficit and committed to achieving a surplus of
US$538 million. The company also undertook to meet the requirement imposed by the
Argentine Government to achieve a one-to-one ratio within one year. In our view, these
statements, read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, show the imposition of
the import substitution and one-to-one requirements on Volkswagen.
Case 3: "Porsche importer agrees to offs et imports with exports of wine and oil"
389
5.60. This press release, dated 30 March 2011, states that the Minister of Industry, Minister of the
Economy, and the Secretary of Domestic Trade approved an agreement with the firm that imports
Porsche vehicles into Argentina to balance its trade. This export plan would offset the firm's
imports with exports of non-automotive products "linked with other activities that the group is
developing in Argentina", such as wine and olive products. Argentina's vehicle importers and
manufacturers are also said to be allowed to import the same amount as they export, and to have
been given a year to achieve this one-to-one ratio. In our view, this press release, read together
with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, de monstrates the imposition of the one-to-one
requirement on Argentina's importer of Porsche vehicles.

386 EU Panel Request, pp. 3-4.
387 Listed as Item 2 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-103.
388 Listed as Item 3 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-80.
389 Listed as Item 4 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-81.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Case 4: "Automaker ple dges to balance its trade"390
5.61. This press release, dated 6 April 2011, states that the Argentine Government and
Mercedes Benz entered into an agreement on the same date for the latter to even out its trade
balance by committing to increase its exports and substitute locally produced auto parts for
imports. The press release also states that, according to the Minister of Industry, Argentina's
vehicle importers and manufacturers would be able to import the same amount as they export,
and were given one year within which to achieve this one-to-one ratio. Finally, the press release
explains that Mercedes Benz would resume the production of trucks in Argentina by making an
investment of US$53 million. In our view, these statements, read in conjunction with the narrative
of the EU Panel Request, show the imposition of the import substitution, one-to-one, and
investment requirements on Mercedes Benz.
Case 5: "Peugeot agrees with the government to improve its trade balance"
391
5.62. This press release, dated 17 November 2011, states that PSA Peugeot-Citroën signed on the
same date an agreement with the Argentine Government aimed at improving the company's trade
balance from a deficit of US$290 million to a surp lus of US$85 million. This agreement between
Argentina and Peugeot includes an undertaking for the latter not to transfer any dividends abroad.
The press release also reports the launch of the new model Peugeot 308, which required a
US$55 million investment, has local parts and components equivalent to 60% of its value, and has
a local plant as its exclusive platform throughout the region. Peugeot is also said to be developing
a new project for a completely new model with a total investment of US$110 million. In our view,
these statements, read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, demonstrate the
imposition on Peugeot of the one-to-one, investment, and import substitution requirements.
Case 6: "Five car producers have signed agreements with the Government to
contribute US$2.2 billion to the balance of trade"
392
5.63. This press release, dated 20 April 2011, reports that the Argentine Government signed
agreements on the same date with Peugeot-Citroën and Centro Milano, the importer of
Alfa Romeo, for these companies to increase their exports. These agreements follow those already
concluded with Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, and Por sche. The agreements are in the nature of an
import-export programme to enable the two companie s to reverse their trade deficit. Specifically,
the agreements will result in Peugeot increa sing its automobile exports by more than
US$600 million and in Alfa Romeo's exports exc eeding US$11 million for the first time. The
representatives of Alfa Romeo stated that the company would make a new investment of
US$2.5 million to install a new biodiesel plant that would generate exports worth approximately
US$11.5 million in 2012 and would create a trade surplus. In our view, this press release, read in
conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Re quest, shows the imposition of the one-to-one
requirement on Peugeot and Alfa Romeo.
Case 7: "General Motors committed to evening out its trade in 2012"
393
5.64. This press release, dated 2 May 2011, states that the Argentine Government signed on the
same date an agreement with General Motors Argentina, pursuant to which the latter undertook to
even out its trade in 2012. First, General Motors committed to improve its trade balance by
substituting domestic products for imports in the amount of more than US$150 million, and
continuing to work out local sourcing stra tegies with its Argentine suppliers. Second,
General Motors undertook to invest US$154 million in order to increase the output of some of its
vehicle models, increase its exports, generate 600 new jobs in Argentina, and develop local
suppliers by continuing with its local inputs plan. Third, the press release reports that the
agreement signed with General Motors is the sixth of those concluded with vehicle manufacturers.

390 Listed as Item 5 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-5.
391 Listed as Item 14 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-245.
392 Listed as Item 6 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-85.
393 Listed as Item 7 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-86.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

All these firms committed to increasing their investments and exports in response to the
one-to-one requirement imposed by the Minister of Industry and the Secretary of Domestic Trade
at the beginning of 2011. In our view, it is eviden t from these statements, read together with the
narrative of the EU Panel Request, that import substitution, investment, and one-to-one
requirements were imposed on General Motors.
Case 8: "Fiat, another car manufacturer to sign an undertaking with the government to
balance its trade"394
5.65. This press release, dated 5 May 2011, states that the Argentine Government signed an
agreement with Fiat Argentina to even out the company's trade balance. First, Fiat is said to have
agreed to invest more than US$1.2 billion to produce a new car model and agricultural machinery.
The launch of the new car model involves a US$813 million investment. Second, the Ministry of
I n d u s t r y i s q u o t e d a s s a y i n g t h a t F i a t i s r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e c o m m i t m e n t r e q u i r e d b y t h e
Argentine Government to even out the company's trade balance by significantly increasing its
exports and maintaining its 2010 import levels by having local content in its new model,
substituting imports by producing harvesters, tractors, and engines through Case New Holland,
and increasing exports of trucks made by Iveco. Fiat's 2012 model is said to have 50% local
content in Argentina. Third, Fiat undertook to export US$1.5 billion in 2010 and US$2 billion
in 2012, resulting in replacing the previous year's deficit of US$500 million with a surplus of
US$340 million the following year. In our view, this press release, read in conjunction with the
narrative of the EU Panel Request, demonstrates the imposition of the investment, import
substitution, and one-to-one requirements on Fiat.
Case 9: "Ford will export more and import less"
395
5.66. This press release, dated 23 May 2011, details the agreement signed on the same date
between the Argentine Government and Ford, in which the latter committed to exporting more and
importing less in order to eliminate the trade deficit that it had in the previous year in the amount
of US$250 million. Specifically, Ford undertook to increase its exports by 70%, and not to increase
imports by more than 30% to reverse its trade balance deficit. Further, according to the
representatives of Ford, the company will achiev e a trade balance surplus of US$90 million as a
result of, among other factors, the generation of more added value through the local assembly of
engines that have previously been imported in th e finished state. In our view, the press release,
read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, shows the imposition of the one-
to-one and import substitution requirements on Ford.
Case 10: "Renault, Mitsubishi, Nissan and Vo lvo have also signed a plan to achieve
a trade surplus in 2012"396
5.67. This press release, dated 5 August 2011, indicates that the Argentine Government signed
agreements on the same date with four automoti ve companies, i.e. Renault Argentina, Alfacar
(importer of Mitsubishi), Ditecar (importer of Volvo, Jaguar, and Land Rover), and Nissan. In these
agreements, the companies committed to offsetting their imports in 2011 and reducing the deficits
they had in 2010 to achieve a trade balance surplus in 2012. Renault undertook to inject capital
and produce a new economy car model intended mainly for export. Nissan is reported to have also
committed to inject capital and export soya meal, soya oil, and biodiesel through third companies,
and to incorporate gradually manufactured products from regional economies to even out its trade
balance. Mitsubishi is said to have committed to export animal feed, peanuts, and premium
mineral water, while Ditecar is to export to Chile through third-company intermediaries. In our
view, these statements in the press release, read together with the narrative of the EU Panel
Request, demonstrate the imposition of the one-to-one, investment, and import substitution
requirements on Renault, Alfacar, Ditecar, and Nissan.

394 Listed as Item 8 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-88.
395 Listed as Item 9 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-95.
396 Listed as Item 10 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-90.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Case 11: "Ministry of Industry announces th at BMW will balance imports and exports in
2012"397
5.68. This press release, dated 13 October 2011, states that the Argentine Government and BMW
Group Argentina signed on the same date an import substitution plan whereby the latter
committed to balance its exports and imports in 2012. BMW is also said to have undertaken to
develop in Argentina automotive components for export, as well as leather upholstery for its cars,
and milled rice. Thus, in our view, this press releas e, read in conjunction with the narrative of the
EU Panel Request, demonstrates the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on BMW.
Case 12: "Publishing companies agree to restore trade balance"
398
5.69. This press release, dated 31 October 2011, reports the signing of an agreement between
the Argentine Government and the Cámara Argentina de Publicaciones, which consists of
46 publishers. This agreement is said to provide th at each of these publishing companies will have
to achieve a balance in their imports and export s. In our view, this press release, read in
conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Re quest, shows the imposition of the one-to-one
requirement on the publishing industry.
Case 13: "Giorgi and Moreno sign agreement with booksellers to offset their imports"399
5.70. This press release, dated 11 November 2011, states that the Argentine Government
concluded an agreement with representatives of the Cámara Argentina del Libro, which is
composed of 550 small and medium-sized enterprise s (SMEs) involved in printing, publishing, and
bookselling. Under this agreement, the members of the Cámara Argentina del Libro undertook to
even out their trade balances by the end of 2012 by offsetting imports with exports, and
promoting domestic printing. In our view, this press release, read together with the narrative of
the EU Panel Request, shows the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on the printing,
publishing, and bookselling industry.
Case 14: "Scania tells the President it will invest US$40 million in Argentina"
400
5.71. This press release, dated 21 November 2011, reports that Scania met with the
Argentine President and the Minister of Industry on the same date and that Scania expressed its
planned investment in the amount of US$40 million for its truck gearbox plant in Tucumán,
Argentina, and its undertaking to capitalize its profits for 2010. According to the Ministry of
Industry, Scania's commitments to capitalize it s profits in the amount of US$56.8 million and
reinvest them are within the context of the Argentine Government's demand for auto
manufacturers to even out their trade balances. Scania is reported to have also committed to
increase its production capacity and exports, generate jobs, and develop and increase purchases
from local suppliers, as well as reinvest its profits in Argentina. Through these and its
US$40 million investment, Scania is to aim for a reversal of its trade balance and the achievement
of a trade surplus of US$40 million in 2012. In our view, it is evident from these statements, read
in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, that the one-to-one and investment
requirements were imposed on Scania.
Case 15: "Radio: 'Pirelli to export an additional US$100 million in honey'"
401
5.72. This news article, dated 10 March 2012, reports an announcement by the Minister of
Agriculture that Pirelli, which imports tyres valued at US$100 million, undertook to export an
additional US$100 million worth of honey in order to be allowed to import US$110 million, or 10%

397 Listed as Item 11 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-92.
398 Listed as Item 12 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-129.
399 Listed as Item 13 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-133.
400 Listed as Item 15 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-101.
401 Listed as Item 20 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-364.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

more of its usual imports. This statement, in our view, read together with the narrative of the
EU Panel Request, suffices to show the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on Pirelli.
Case 16: "No more imports of ham from Spain and Italy" 402
5.73. This news article, dated 9 May 2012, reports that the Secretary of Domestic Trade approved
an agreement with pork meat producers, including the Argentine Pork Producers Association and
the Argentine Council of Producers, limiting the importation into Argentina of finished ham
products, including those from Spain and Italy. Pursuant to the agreement, the relevant
companies would not import more than 80% of the amount of pork "pulp" and bacon they
imported in 2011, and would not import finished pork products like Spanish ham so as to promote
Argentinean ham. The member companies of these chambers also committed not to import more
cow tripe, and instead to give priority to local tripe. Companies in the pork meat sector also
committed to export the equivalent of what they import and to present a list of prices of their
products. This news article, read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request,
demonstrates the imposition of the import re duction and one-to-one requirements on pork
producers.
C a s e 1 7 : " G o p r a y t o ' S a i n t M o r e n o ' : i n an unprecedented drive, Moreno blocks the
entry of Bibles into Argentina"
403
5.74. This news article, dated 22 November 2011, reports that around 100,000 bibles and other
religious materials were held up in Argentine customs by the Secretary of Domestic Trade. The
Argentine Government is said to have acknowledged setting up a barrier to limit entry of literature
produced abroad in order to discourage imports and promote domestic printing. Subsequently, the
Argentine Government concluded an agreement with the Cámara Argentina de Publicaciones and
the Cámara Argentina del Libro, which undertook to even out their trade balances. By the end of
2012, the companies in the publishing sector are required to export local products to be able to
import materials from abroad. In our view, this news article, read in conjunction with the narrative
of the EU Panel Request, shows the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on companies in the
publishing sector.
Case 18: "More controls over the entry of medicines and demands to even out the trade
balance"
404
5.75. This news article, dated 12 October 2012, reports the differing lengths of time it takes to
obtain authorization for the importation of medicines into Argentina depending on whether or not
the laboratory seeking to import has achieved a trade balance. The time period to obtain this
authorization is usually 48 hours. However, if th e laboratory imports more than it exports, then
this time period can extend up to 60 days. If the laboratory's trade is in balance or it seeks to
import raw materials for processing in Argentin a, then the 48-hour period is observed. The
Secretariat of Domestic Trade requires laboratories to submit a balance sheet every six months,
and it is on this basis that the agency determin es the procedures to be followed for importing
medicines. The Ministry of Industry and the Secretariat of Domestic Trade are said to impose these
measures in order to discourage the importation of finished products. In our view, it is evident
from this news article, read together with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, that the
one-to-one requirement is imposed on laboratories and/or producers of medicines.
Case 19: "Airoldi to start up a biod iesel plant so it can go on importing"
405
5.76. This news article, dated 7 March 2012, discusses how Airoldi/Air Computers, whose
business relies on the importation of parts for assembling information technology devices, decided
to accelerate the bringing into operation of its biodiesel, crushing, and refining plants in Alvear,

402 Listed as Item 23 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-189.
403 Listed as Item 16 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-375.
404 Listed as Item 18 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-379.
405 Listed as Item 19 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-124.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Argentina, so as to balance its trade. The article reports that Air Computers was forced to seek
alternatives, and thus decided to bring these plants into operation in order to comply with the
requirement of the Secretariat of Domestic Trade to keep foreign purchases on an even level with
shipments abroad. In order to offset its import s while awaiting the oper ation of these plants,
Airoldi/Air Computers formed alliances with companies that produce food for humans and animals
from the soya paste that it produces, with the intention of exporting these food products. This
news article, read in conjunction with the narrati ve of the EU Panel Request, shows the imposition
of the one-to-one requirement on Airoldi/Air Computers.
Case 20: "Zanella plans to restor e its balance by exporting food"
406
5.77. This news article, dated 5 April 2012, states that Zanella, which manufactures motorcycles
and runs motorcycle and spare parts distribution centres, made an agreement with the
Argentine Government to even out the company's trade balance. Similar to what has been done by
various companies in different sectors, Zanella also made a commitment to the Ministry of
Industry that it would offset the value of its impo rts with the export of value-added products. It is
reported that Zanella plans to comply with this agreement by exporting food and wine. In our
view, this news article, read in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Panel Request,
demonstrates the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on Zanella.
Case 21: "More multinationals form partnershi ps with wineries to be able to import"
407
5.78. This news article, dated 8 July 2012, reports that, for importers obliged to sign agreements
to offset their imports with exports in equal propor tions, this could translate to promising deals for
Argentine wineries, which are the most sought-after partners of multinational companies operating
in Argentina. Thus, new partnership agreements, which have been approved by the Secretary of
Domestic Trade, have been concluded between Sa msung and La Rural, and Indesit and Norton in
order to offset, in equal proportions, the imports of Samsung and Indesit with exports of wine.
La Rural and Norton are wineries in Argentina. This news article, in our view, read in conjunction
with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, shows the imposition of the one-to-one requirement on
Samsung and Indesit.
Case 22: "SMEs on wheels" 408
5.79. This news article, dated 26 July 2012, reports that the Argentine Government held a
meeting with tyre firm Michelin and a group of more than 100 SMEs to promote the export of
various domestic products to Michelin's subsidiaries by organizing a trade mission to France. This
is said to be a consequence of the requirement imposed by the Secretary of Domestic Trade to
offset imports with exports. The Secretary of Domestic Trade is also reported to have sent a
message to importing businessmen that they must contribute to the generation of foreign
exchange, whether through association with domestic exporters, capital injections, or import
substitution. Since Michelin does business in tyres, tourist guides, and various articles, including
footwear, textiles, clothing and other accessories, the participants in the meeting ranged from
domestic suppliers of raw materials for tyres and auto-part companies to toy and clothing
manufacturers. Michelin is said to intend to preselect the Argentine suppliers that show promise of
selling directly to its parent company. These st atements, in our view, read together with the
narrative of the EU Panel Request, demonstrate that Michelin committed to undertaking the
one-to-one and import substitution requirements.
Case 23: "Zegna helps to export wool and reopens"
409
5.80. This news article, dated 2 August 2012, reveals that Ermenegildo Zegna closed its flagship
store in Buenos Aires for two months because of a shortage of merchandise. It was able to reopen

406 Listed as Item 21 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-401.
407 Listed as Item 22 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-121.
408 Listed as Item 24 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit EU-403.
409 Listed as Item 25 of Annex III to the EU Panel Request; text subsequently submitted to the Panel as
Exhibit JE-158.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

its store after being authorized to import its garments again subsequent to its submission to the
Argentine Government of an export project. The company concluded an agreement with an
Argentine wool producer to facilitate its exports to companies in Switzerland and Italy, and thereby
satisfy the Argentine Government's request to offset its imports with exports in order for
Ermenegildo Zegna to obtain a licence to start importing again. In our view, this news article, read
in conjunction with the narrative of the EU Pane l Request, demonstrates the imposition of the
one-to-one requirement on Ermenegildo Zegna.
Summary of the analysis of the 23 specific instances of application
5.81. Based on the above observations, we consider the 23 specific instances of application of the
TRRs that are the object of the European Union's claims to be discernible from the press releases
and news articles. The contents of each press release and news article listed in Annex III provide
the following information: (i) the involvement of the Argentine Government; (ii) the particular
economic operator, sector, or industry concerned; and (iii) the specific TRR(s) allegedly imposed.
The press releases and news articles, each of wh ich consists of only one or two pages, read
together with the narrative of the EU Panel Request, present these key details with sufficient
clarity so as to enable a reader to discern the specific measures at issue. It follows that, unlike the
Panel, we consider that the EU Panel Request did identify the specific measures at issue in this
dispute consistently with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.82. Moreover, we are satisfied that the EU Panel Request complies with the requirement of
Article 6.2 of the DSU "to present the problem clearly" by plainly connecting
410 the 23 specific
instances of application of the TRRs with its legal claims, i.e. Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994. We recall that, as set out above, the EU Panel Request includes the following
narrative:
The European Union considers that these requirements, … when viewed as separate
measures in each of the instances listed in Annex III, … are inconsistent with the
following
 Article III:4 of GATT 1994, to the extent that Argentina requires
domestic producers to increase local content and/or limit imports to an
amount related to the volume or value of local products that they
export.
 …
 Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, because the measure prohibits or
restricts the importation of goods.
411
5.83. While the EU Panel Request identifies the 23 specific instances as separate measures and
indicates specific provisions of the GATT 1994 as the legal basis, we do not find it difficult to make
a plain connection between the measures at issue and the claims in the light of the narrative
provided in the EU Panel Request. In particular, the above narrative in the EU Panel Request
provides context to the measures at issue and legal claims in a way that enables a reader to
ascertain the connection between the two. The EU Panel Request identifies, as TRRs, requirements
to export a certain value of goods related to the value of imports, to limit the volume of imports,
to refrain from repatriating funds abroad, to make or increase investments in Argentina, or to
incorporate local content into domestically produced goods. The information found on the websites
listed in Annex III to the EU Panel Request identifies, inter alia, the particular TRR(s) imposed on
specific economic operators. Furthermore, the narrative of the EU Panel Request states that the
specific instances of application of the TRRs are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to
the extent that Argentina requires domestic producers to increase local content and/or limit
imports to the value of exports, and with Article XI :1 to the extent that the measures prohibit or
restrict importation. Therefore, the EU Panel Request narrative is sufficiently clear to enable a

410 Appellate Body Reports, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162; US – Gambling,
para. 141; China – Raw Materials, para. 220; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China),
para. 4.8.
411 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

reader to ascertain which of the specific instances of application of the TRRs the European Union
alleged to be inconsistent with Article III:4 and/or Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
5.84. Based on the above reasons, we find that the EU Panel Request identifies as measures at
issue the 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs in a manner that is sufficiently precise so
as to conform to the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.1.2.5 Whether the 23 measures expanded the scope of the dispute
5.85. We now turn to Argentina's argument that the European Union's inclusion of
these 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs in its panel request impermissibly expanded
the scope of the dispute, as these 23 specific instances were not identified in the European Union's
request for consultations. In Argentina's view, this would have been an independent basis for the
Panel to conclude that these 23 specific instances are outside its terms of reference.
412
5.86. In its consultations request, the European Union stated that Argentina "often requires"
importers to undertake "certain commitments". 413 Thereafter, in its panel request, the
European Union identified as specific measures at issue "Restrictive Trade Related Requirements"
that reflect the same "commitments" it previously referred to in its consultations request. 414 The
EU Panel Request alleges that these requirements, "when viewed as an overarching measure … as
well as when viewed as separate measures in each of the instances listed in Annex III" are
inconsistent with Argentina's WTO obligations.
415 Annex III to the EU Panel Request then lists
"Instances of restrictive trade-related requirements affecting products originating in the
European Union", providing the titles of 29 press releases and news articles, the dates on which
they were published, and the websites where they may be accessed.
5.87. We recall our previous discussion that, base d on the language and functions of Articles 4.4
and 6.2 of the DSU, greater specificity is required in identifying the measure at issue in a panel
request than in a consultations request. Specifica lly, Article 4.4 requires th e identification of the
"measure at issue", while Article 6.2 requires the identification of the " specific measure at
issue".
416 Thus, there is no need for a " precise and exact identity " between the consultations
request and the panel request417, provided that the complainant do es not expand the scope of the
dispute418 or change its essence.419
5.88. In assessing whether the European Union's identification in its panel request of
the 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs impermissibly expanded the scope of the
dispute, the Appellate Body's ruling in US – Continued Zeroing provides useful guidance. In that
dispute, the European Communities' panel requ est identified 14 anti-dumping duty review
determinations that were not specifically identified by name or case number in its consultations
request. The United States argued that these 14 anti-dumping duty review determinations fell
outside the panel's terms of reference because the consultations request did not refer to them.
420
The Appellate Body observed that, "in addition to the zeroing methodology, the European
Communities challenge[d] the 'outcome of the administrative reviews', the 'imposition of definitive
duties', and 'the continuation of the anti-dumping [ duty]' resulting from the proceedings listed in
the annexes" to the request for consultations. 421 The Appellate Body ruled that "the measures
subject to the European Communities' challenge en compass[ed] the anti-dumping duties resulting
from the proceedings identified in the consultations request, in which the zeroing methodology was
allegedly used".422 Further, the Appellate Body noted that "the 14 additional measures identified in
the panel request pertain[ed] to the same anti-dumping duties that [were] included in the
consultations request". Since the 14 measures "relate[d] to the same duties identified in the

412 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 13.
413 European Union's request for consultations, p. 1.
414 EU Panel Request, p. 3.
415 EU Panel Request, p. 4.
416 Emphasis added.
417 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 132. (emphasis original)
418 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293.
419 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 137 and 138.
420 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 223. (fn omitted)
421 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 226. (emphasis original)
422 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 226.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

consultations request" 423, the Appellate Body held that they were within the panel's terms of
reference.424
5.89. As explained in the previous subsection of these Reports 425, the European Union's
consultations request enumerates five "commitments" that Argentina "often requires" importers of
goods to undertake. The instances listed by the European Union in Annex III to its panel request,
in turn, appear to be specific instances of application of these "commitments". Thus, the language
of the European Union's consultations request encompasses the specific instances of application
identified in the EU Panel Request. Alternativel y, these specific instances could reasonably be
viewed as having evolved from these "commitments". Consequently, the identification of these
23 measures in the EU Panel Request did not amount to an expansion in the scope or a change in
the essence of the dispute, but may rather be considered as a permissible refinement or
reformulation of the complaint following the consultations process. Thus, we do not find any merit
in Argentina's contention that the specific instances of application of the TRRs identified in
Annex III to the EU Panel Request impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute or changed its
essence and were, therefore, outside the Panel's terms of reference.
5.1.2.6 The European Union's conditional appeal
5.90. The European Union makes a conditional appeal, stating that its request for completion of
the legal analysis depends on us reversing or otherwise declaring moot and with no legal effect the
Panel's findings that: (i) the TRRs measure exists; and (ii) the TRRs measure is inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. For re asons explained in the succeeding sections, we
hold that the triggering conditions for the European Union's conditional request for the completion
of the analysis are not met. Therefore, we refrain from completing the legal analysis with respect
to the consistency or inconsistency of the 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs with
Article XI:1 and/or Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
5.1.2.7 Overall conclusion on the European Union's other appeal
5.91. For all of the reasons set out above, we find that the Panel erred in failing to consider the
information found in the sources listed in Annex III to the EU Panel Request in assessing whether
the EU Panel Request satisfied the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU with respect to the
23 specific instances of application of the TRRs. In consequence, we reverse the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.1.c of the EU Panel Report, that these specific instances "were not precisely identified
in the European Union's panel request as measures at issue" and that, "accordingly, those
23 measures do not constitute 'measures at issue' in the present dispute". 426 Based on our own
reading of the contents of the relevant press releases and news articles listed in Annex III to the
EU Panel Request, when read in conjunction with the narrative provided in the text of the EU Panel
Request itself, we find that the 23 instances of application of the TRRs were identified as "specific
measures at issue" in a manner that is sufficiently precise as to conform to the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU, and were thus within the Panel's terms of reference. Finally, we find it
unnecessary to rule on the European Union's request for completion of the legal analysis, as the
conditions on which its request is premised are not met.
5.2 Identification of the single unwritten TRRs measure
5.2.1 Introduction
5.92. We now turn to Argentina's appeal of the Panel's findings that the TRRs measure is
inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
427 Argentina claims that the Panel erred
in finding that the complainants had established that a TRRs measure exists and that it is
inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. In particular, Argentina claims that the
Panel failed to apply the correct legal standard in ascertaining the existence of the alleged TRRs
measure in its evaluation of the claims by the three complainants against the TRRs measure that
the Panel assessed jointly ("joint claims"), and that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11

423 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 228.
424 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 236.
425 See e.g. para. 5.21 of these Reports.
426 See also Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 5.1.b.
427 The Panel's explanation of the TRRs measure is summarized above in section 4.1 of these Reports.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

of the DSU in its evaluation of Japan's separate "as such" claims against the same alleged
measure. Argentina, therefore, requests us to reverse the Panel's conclusions that the TRRs
measure operates as a single measure and that it is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994, as well as the Panel's finding that this measure is "as such" inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
5.93. We address, first, Argentina's claim that the Panel applied the incorrect legal standard in
evaluating the complainants' joint claims against the TRRs measure. Second, we address
Argentina's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in its evaluation of
Japan's "as such" claims against that measure.
5.2.2 The joint claims against the TRRs measure
5.94. Argentina argues that the Panel erred in failing to apply the correct legal standard in
evaluating whether the complainants had proven the existence of a single unwritten TRRs
measure. For Argentina, it was evident that the complainants had, in effect, raised "as such"
claims against the TRRs measure. Thus, the Panel should have applied the legal standard
articulated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) in assessing these joint claims, and
determined whether the measure is attributable to Argentina, as well as its precise content, and its
general and prospective application. Instead, acco rding to Argentina, having wrongly accepted the
complainants' own characterization of the joint cl aims as not being "as such", the Panel presumed
the existence of the TRRs measure and proceeded to apply an erroneous legal standard. This legal
standard was the one articulated by the panel in US – COOL to ascertain whether multiple
measures can be assessed for WTO-consistency as a single measure, rather than as individual
measures.
428
5.95. On appeal, the three complainants maintain that their claims, which the Panel addressed
jointly, were not "as such" claims and that, therefore, the Panel did not err in not applying the
legal standard formulated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC).429
5.96. As a preliminary matter, we note that none of the three complainants characterized its
claims against the TRRs measure as being "as such" or "as applied" in its panel request. Moreover,
both the European Union and the United States maintained throughout the proceedings before the
Panel that their claims against the TRRs measure were not "as such" claims.430 In the course of the
Panel proceedings, Japan clarified that it was seeking findings from the Panel against the TRRs
measure "as such", "as applied", and "as an unwritten practice or policy, as confirmed by the
systematic application of the measure".
431
5.97. The Panel divided its evaluation of the claims raised against the TRRs measure into two
parts. In the first part of its analysis, the Panel decided to address the claims by the
European Union and the United States together with Japan's claims against the TRRs measure "as
an unwritten practice or policy, as confirmed by the systematic application of the measure". 432
Having grouped these claims together for the purpose of its analysis, the Panel assessed them
separately from Japan's "as such" claims against the same measure. In subsequently addressing
Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel referred to the claims by the three complainants that it had
addressed earlier as the "joint claims". The Pane l recognized that the joint claims were brought
against an unwritten measure, but it did not affirm atively characterize the nature of the challenge
that it considered these claims represented. The Panel did not treat the joint claims as falling in
the category of "as such" claims challenging a rule or norm of general and prospective application,
or in the category of "as applied" claims, challenging instances of specific application of the TRRs
measure. The Panel reasoned that, because these claims were not "as such" claims, it would need
to determine whether the measure is attributable to Argentina and its exact content, but not

428 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 112 and 113.
429 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 122; United States' appellee's submission, para. 133;
Japan's appellee's submission, para. 45.
430 The European Union made separate claims against 23 instances of application of the TRRs measure,
which the Panel considered to be outside its terms of reference.
431 Panel Reports, para. 6.136 (referring to Japan's second written submission to the Panel, para. 20).
432 Panel Reports, para. 6.136 (referring to Japan's second written submission to the Panel, para. 20).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

whether the measure has general and prospective application. 433 Moreover, because the
complainants had challenged the TRRs as a single measure, the Panel stated that it would
determine whether the individual TRRs applied and operated in a combined manner and as part of
a single measure.
434
5.98. The Panel then explained that, in respect of the joint claims, it would establish: (i) whether
the five TRRs imposed by Argentina apply and operate as part of a single measure; (ii) the content
of the single measure; and (iii) whether the measure is attributable to Argentina. The Panel stated
that, in its separate assessment of Japan's "as such" claims, it would also determine whether the
TRRs measure has general and prospective application.
435
5.2.2.1 Ascertaining the existence of an unwritten measure
5.99. In raising its claim on appeal that the Panel applied the wrong legal standard, Argentina
does not refer to any provision in the DSU or in other covered agreements, but, rather, to the legal
standard articulated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) for the assessment of unwritten
measures of general and prospective application. 436 In US – Zeroing (EC) , the Appellate Body
considered whether the "zeroing methodology" constituted a "measure" within the meaning of
Article 3.3 of the DSU that could be challenged in WTO dispute settlement.437 Thus, we understand
that, in invoking the ruling of the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC), Argentina is relying on the
Appellate Body's interpretation of the concept of "measure" in Article 3.3 of the DSU in that
dispute.
5.100. We recall that Article 3.3 of the DSU states that the dispute settlement system addresses
"situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under
the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member". 438 In
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body considered that this phrase in
Article 3.3 of the DSU "identifies the relevant nexus, for purposes of dispute settlement
proceedings, between the 'measure' and a 'Member'". 439 In that dispute, the Appellate Body
further noted that, "[i]n principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a
measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings" and that "[t]he acts or
omissions that are so attributable are, in the usual case, the acts or omissions of the organs of the
state, including those of the executive branch."
440
5.101. It is well established that instruments of a Member containing rules or norms can be
challenged "as such" in WTO dispute settlement, independently of whether or how those rules or
norms are applied in particular instances. 441 In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the
Appellate Body explained that allowing "as such" claims against measures embodying rules or
norms serves the purpose of preventing future disp utes by allowing the root of WTO-inconsistent
behaviour to be eliminated, thus avoiding a multiplicity of litigation against instances of application
of measures.
442
5.102. However, in US – Continued Zeroing , the Appellate Body considered that the distinction
between "as such" and "as applied" claims neither governs the definition of a measure for
purposes of WTO dispute settlement, nor defines exhaustively the types of measures that are
susceptible to challenge. Rather, this distinction was developed in the jurisprudence as an
analytical tool to facilitate the understanding of the nature of a measure at issue. A measure need

433 Panel Reports, paras. 6.42 and 6.220. Nonetheless, as we consider further below, the Panel found, in
addressing Japan's "as such" claims in a subsequent section of its Reports, that the TRRs measure has general
and prospective application.
434 Panel Reports, para. 6.219.
435 Panel Reports, paras. 6.42, 6.219, and 6.220.
436 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 64.
437 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 187.
438 Emphasis added.
439 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81.
440 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81. (fns omitted) This,
however, does not exclude that the acts or omissions of regional or local governments, or even the actions of
private entities, could be attributed to a Member in particular circumstances.
441 Indeed, the case law articulating and applying the practice of allowing measures to be challenged
"as such" forms part of the GATT acquis. (Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, para. 61)
442 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 82.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

not fit squarely within one of these two categories, that is, either as a rule or norm of general and
prospective application, or as an individual application of a rule or norm, in order to be susceptible
to challenge in WTO dispute settlement.
443
5.103. We observe that the distinction between "as such" and "as applied" claims is typically
employed in conjunction with claims against norms or rules of general and prospective application,
such as those contained in legislation. Legislation prescribing such rules or norms can be
challenged "as such". Alternatively, or additional ly, a complainant may raise an "as applied" claim
against one or more instances of application of the same legislation. The same, however, may not
be true for other types of "measures" that are also attributable to a Member, and can thus be
challenged in WTO dispute settlement. Rules and norms of general and prospective application are
only one category of "measures" that can be ch allenged in WTO dispute settlement, which, as
explained above, include any act or omission that is attributable to a Member.
5.104. In US – Zeroing (EC) , the Appellate Body considered a challenge against the "zeroing
methodology" as an unwritten "'rule or norm ' that constitutes a measure of general and
prospective application".
444 The Appellate Body stated that, when bringing an "as such" challenge
against a "rule or norm", a complaining party must clearly establish that the alleged "rule or norm"
is attributable to the responding Member, its precise content, and that it has general and
prospective application.
445 We observe that, in every WTO dispute, a complainant must establish
that the measure it challenges is attributable to the respondent, as well as the precise content of
that challenged measure, to the extent that such content is the object of the claims raised. In
US – Zeroing (EC) , the additional features of general and prospective application were relevant to
the type of measure identified by the complainant, that is, the zeroing methodology as a rule or
norm. Proving the existence of other measures that are also challengeable in WTO dispute
settlement may require a complainant to demonstrate, in addition to attribution and precise
content, other elements, depending on the particular characteristics or nature of the measure
being challenged.
5.105. In another dispute related to zeroing, the Appellate Body considered that the measure at
issue was neither the zeroing methodology as a rule or norm of general and prospective
application, nor the discrete applications of the zeroing methodology in particular
determinations.
446 Rather, the Appellate Body considered that the measure at issue was ongoing
conduct that consisted of the continued use of the zeroing methodology in successive proceedings
by which duties in each of 18 cases were maintained.447 Therefore, in that dispute, establishing the
measure at issue did not require evidence that it had general and prospective application, but,
rather, evidence of the use of the zeroing methodology, as ongoing conduct, with respect to duties
resulting from each of the 18 anti-dumping duty orders at issue.
5.106. In EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , the Appellate Body considered a
challenge against another type of measure that did no t fit into the category of "rule or norm" or of
"application" thereof. Specifically, the Appellate Body considered a challenge by the United States
against a subsidy programme not as a rule or norm of general and prospective application and
distinct from the individual grants provided under the programme.
448 While the Appellate Body
ultimately considered that the measure challenged in that dispute fell outside the panel's terms of

443 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 179.
444 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198.
445 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198.
446 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 181.
447 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 181.
448 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 794. In that
dispute, the United States claimed that the "systematic and coordinated" provision of "launch aid" or "member
State financing" (LA/MSF) by France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom for the development of various
models of Airbus large civil aircraft demonstrated the existence of an unwritten LA/MSF "Programme", distinct
from the individual grants of LA/MSF, which constituted a specific subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1
and 2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). (Ibid., paras. 778
and 780) The United States did not challenge the unwritten LA/MSF Programme as a rule or norm of general
and prospective application or an application thereof, but as "a concerted and coherent approach – that is, a
'program' or 'ongoing conduct' – designed to contribute to the long-term competitiveness of Airbus" and as "a
repeated course of action by responding Members". (Ibid., para. 793 (quoting United States' other appellant's
submission, paras. 70 and 71)) The Appellate Body found, however, that the alleged LA/MSF Programme was
not within the Panel's terms of reference because it was not identified in the request for the establishment of a
panel, as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. (Ibid., para. 795)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

reference, it recalled its ruling in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review that, "[i]n
principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for
purposes of dispute settlement proceedings", and noted that the scope of measures that can be
challenged in WTO dispute settlement is broad. As a general proposition, the Appellate Body did
not exclude the possibility that "concerted action or practice" could be susceptible to challenge in
WTO dispute settlement, and considered that a co mplainant would not necessarily be required to
demonstrate the existence of a rule or norm of general and prospective application in order to
show that such a measure exists.
449
5.107. In the light of the above, we consider that the notion of measure of general and
prospective application as reflected in the finding of the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC)
cannot be considered as setting forth a general legal standard for proving the existence of any
unwritten measure that is challenged in WTO dispute settlement. Rather, in US – Zeroing (EC), the
Appellate Body set out certain criteria that should assist panels in determining whether a
complainant has proven the existence of a measure consisting of a rule or norm of general and
prospective application. When an unwritten measure that is not a rule or norm is challenged in
WTO dispute settlement, a complainant need not demonstrate its existence based on the same
criteria that apply when rules or norms of general and prospective application are challenged. For
example, in US – Continued Zeroing , the Appellate Body saw "no reason to exclude ongoing
conduct that consists of the use of the zero ing methodology from challenge in WTO dispute
settlement".
450
5.108. In any event, the constituent elements that must be substantiated with evidence and
arguments in order to prove the existence of a measure challenged will be informed by how such
measure is described or characterized by the complainant. Depending on the characteristics of the
measure challenged, other elements in addition to attribution to a WTO Member and precise
content may need to be substantiated to prove its existence. For instance, a complainant
challenging a single measure composed of severa l different instruments will normally need to
provide evidence of how the different components operate together as part of a single measure
and how a single measure exists as distinct from its components.
451 A complainant that is
challenging a measure characterized as "ongoing conduct" would need to provide evidence of its
repeated application, and of the likelihood that such conduct will continue.
452
5.109. As noted above, the distinction between "as such" and "as applied" claims does not govern
the definition of the measures that can be ch allenged in WTO dispute settlement. We also
emphasize that the distinction between rules or norms of general and prospective application and
their individual applications does not define exha ustively the types of measure that are subject to
WTO dispute settlement. These distinctions are not always useful or appropriate to define the
elements that must be substantiated for purposes of proving the existence and nature of a
measure at issue. In this respect, we recall th at the "measures" that may be the object of
WTO dispute settlement extend to any act or omission that is attributable to a WTO Member. This
broad concept of measures is not limited merely to rules or norms of general and prospective
application and their individual applications.
5.110. A complainant seeking to prove the existence of an unwritten measure is not required to
categorize its challenge as either "as such" or "as applied". When tasked with assessing a
challenge against an unwritten measure, a panel is also not always required to apply rigid legal
standards or criteria that are based on the "as such" or the "as applied" nature of the challenge.
Rather, the specific measure challenged and how it is described or characterized by a complainant
will determine the kind of evidence a complainant is required to submit and the elements that it
must prove in order to establish the existence of the measure challenged. A complainant seeking

449 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 794.
450 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 181.
451 The Panel referred to the panel in US – COOL, which, in assessing whether to examine certain
instruments as one single measure or individual separate measures, summarized the main factors considered
by previous panels and the Appellate Body in relation to this question as follows:
(i) the manner in which the complainant presented its claim(s) in respect of the concerned
instruments; (ii) the respondent's position; and (iii) the legal status of the requirements or
instrument(s), including the operation of, and the relationship between, the requirements or
instruments, namely whether a certain requirement or instrument has autonomous status.
452 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 191.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

to prove the existence of an unwritten measure will invariably be required to prove the attribution
of that measure to a Member and its precise content. Depending on the specific measure
challenged and how it is described or characterized by a complainant, however, other elements
may need to be proven.
5.111. In the light of the above, we do not consider, as Argentina argues, that the Panel
committed an error simply because it did not apply the criteria formulated by the Appellate Body in
US – Zeroing (EC) for purposes of proving the existence of an unwritten measure that is
challenged "as such" in WTO dispute settlement. Whether the Panel committed an error in
ascertaining the existence of the TRRs measure should be assessed on the basis of whether the
complainants identified and substantiated the re levant constituent elements of the type of
measure they were challenging.
5.2.2.2 The complainants' characterization of the measure at issue
5.112. Bearing in mind that the elements a panel needs to review in ascertaining the existence of
an unwritten measure will depend on the specific measure challenged and how it is described and
characterized by the complainant, rather than on the type of challenge (i.e. "as such" or
"as applied"), we now turn to consider how th e complainants characterized the TRRs measure
before the Panel. Thereafter, we consider how th e Panel assessed the constituent elements of the
measure at issue in order to evaluate whether such a measure exists.
5.113. The European Union considered that the TRRs "are not isolated cases, but an overarching
measure applied to a wide range of situations, [which] has become the 'rule' for companies doing
business in Argentina" and that "[s]uch a 'rule' will apply or will likely apply in the future in
Argentina, insofar as Argentina continues pursuing its trade balancing and import substitution
objectives."
453 According to the European Union, the impo sition of TRRs on economic operators "is
part of a systemic approach adopted by Argentina to prohibit or restrict the importation of
products and/or the use of imported products in Argentina with a view to achieving its trade
balancing and import substitution objectives".454
5.114. Japan considered that the TRRs measure "is not merely five independent requirements",
but rather "a comprehensive and general measure and consistent practice that restricts imports by
imposing a practical threshold on importers an d limits competitive opportunities of imports
vis-à-vis the situation in the absence of the [TRRs]." 455 According to Japan, instances of the
application of the TRRs "are not one-off instances of WTO-inconsistent action, but rather instances
of systematic application of a broader measure that applies both generally and prospectively". 456
Moreover, Japan maintains that the TRRs measure is "the product of a subset of Argentina's
economic policies and one of the instruments that Argentina has been using to pursue such
policies, but [it] is not identical to them".
457
5.115. The United States described the TRRs me asure as an "extant decision" by high-level
Argentine officials "to require commitments of importers to export a certain dollar value of goods,
reduce the volume or value of imports, incorporate local content into products, make or increase
investments in Argentina and/or refrain from repatriating profits, as a prior condition for
permission to import goods"
458, which "applies until it is withdrawn".459
5.116. The above descriptions by the complainants of the TRRs measure point to a measure
having certain attributes of generality and prospe ctiveness. Nevertheless, we observe that these
descriptions fall short of characterizing the measure as a "norm or rule" of general and prospective
application. The Panel also considered that, in their joint claims, the complainants were not
challenging the TRRs measure "as such" as a rule or norm.
460 I n t h i s r e s p e c t , w e n o t e t h e
clarification made by the United States on appeal that the measure being challenged is not a "rule

453 European Union's second written submission to the Panel, para. 114.
454 European Union's second written submission to the Panel, para. 116.
455 Japan's second written submission to the Panel, para. 113.
456 Japan's second written submission to the Panel, para. 101.
457 Japan's second written submission to the Panel, para. 112.
458 United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 111.
459 United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 116.
460 Panel Reports, para. 6.153.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

or norm" as that term was used by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC).461 These descriptions
are thus consistent with the complainants' choice not to characterize their joint claims against the
TRRs measure as "as such" claims challenging a "norm or rule" of general and prospective
application.
462
5.117. Nevertheless, the complainants' descriptions of the challenged TRRs measure reveal their
understanding of the defining characteristics of that measure. Although the terminology each
complainant used differs to some extent, in our view, the constituent elements of the TRRs
measure as described by the complainants appear to be as follows: (i) an unwritten measure in
the form of a decision by the Argentine authorities; (ii) a single measure that is composed of
several individual elements imposed in pursuit of the objectives of import substitution and trade
deficit reduction; (iii) a measure that has systematic application; and (iv) a measure that has
present and continued application. All these cons tituent elements serve to define the type of
measure that is the object of the complainants' joint challenge.
5.118. The Panel was required to assess whether the complainants were able to demonstrate the
existence of the TRRs measure by reviewing whet her the evidence and arguments they presented
on the constituent elements of the alleged TRRs measure were sufficient to prove the existence of
the measure at issue. The Panel was not required, as Argentina argues, to test the complainants'
evidence and arguments on the TRRs measure agai nst an assumed legal standard or to employ
the criteria that are pertinent for purposes of establishing the existence of a measure that is
challenged "as such". Thus, by reviewing the Panel's findings evaluating the evidence and
arguments regarding the constituent elements of the alleged TRRs measure as challenged by the
complainants, we will be able to determine whether the Panel erred in concluding that the
complainants had demonstrated the existence of the TRRs measure.
5.2.2.3 The Panel's evaluation of the TRRs measure
5.119. Having considered how each of the complainants characterized the measure it was
challenging, we now turn to consider how the Panel assessed the constituent elements of the
alleged TRRs measure in the light of the eviden ce and arguments submitted by the complainants,
and how it reached the conclusion that the complainants had demonstrated the existence of the
TRRs measure. In doing so, we address those elements that, based on the complainants'
descriptions, appear to be the constituent elemen ts of the alleged TRRs measure. We address,
first, the attribution of the measure to the Government of Argentina and the precise content of the
TRRs. Second, we review the Panel's analysis of the TRRs measure's systematic, present, and
continued application. In our analysis, we also consider the relationship between the TRRs
measure and the objectives of import substitution and trade deficit reduction underlying
Argentina's policy of "managed trade".
5.120. We observe that, on appeal, Argentina does not directly challenge the Panel's identification
and explanation of the content of the individual TRRs. Argentina submits that, having uncritically
accepted the complainants' description of the cont ent of each alleged TRR, the Panel then sought
to determine whether the alleged individual TRRs applied and operated in a combined manner and
as part of a single measure. However, according to Argentina, none of the factors reviewed by the
Panel says anything about whether the alleged TRRs measure was attributable to Argentina, its
precise content, or, most importantly, whether it had general and prospective application.
463
Argentina claims that, as a result of this legal error, the Panel effectively presumed at the outset of
its analysis that the alleged TRRs measure exists before having assessed whether the alleged TRRs
measure is attributable to Argentina, its precise content, and whether it has general and
prospective application.
464
5.121. With respect to attribution, we observe that the Panel stated that Argentina did not dispute
the attribution of the TRRs measure to Argentina.465

461 United States' appellee's submission, para. 133.
462 As explained above, Japan alone did raise an "as such" claim against the TRRs measure, which the
Panel assessed separately from its evaluation of the "joint claims".
463 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 128.
464 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 129.
465 Panel Reports, para. 6.230.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.122. Turning to the precise content of the TRRs measure, we understand that Argentina raises
two related objections to the Panel's findings. Firs t, Argentina claims that, having failed to apply
the legal standard from US – Zeroing (EC) for the identification of an unwritten measure
challenged "as such" in WTO dispute settlement, the Panel erred because it relied on the legal
standard in US – COOL for a panel's collective assessment of challenges against multiple written
measures and considered whether the individual TRRs operate together as a single measure – thus
presuming that the TRRs measure existed – before analysing its content.
466 Second, Argentina
claims that the Panel erred because it "asserted the single TRRs measure into existence" without
any evidence that the different TRRs form a single measure with "different normative content"
than each of its alleged constituent elements.
467
5.123. The complainants respond that there is no separate legal standard applicable to the
identification of an unwritten measure 468, and that the Panel examined the precise content of the
TRRs measure, even if it did not follow explicitly the analytical steps mentioned by the
Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) .
469 Moreover, in their view, Argentina is confusing separate
and distinct standards. Japan submits that the Panel applied the legal standard under US – COOL
to determine the existence of a single measure and not as an alternative to the US – Zeroing (EC)
standard of whether a measure has general and prospective application.470
5.124. We recall that, before the Panel, the complainants challenged the existence of a single
measure consisting of a combination of one or more of the five TRRs. 471 In our view, the Panel did
not err in evaluating, as part of its analysis of the measure at issue, whether and how the
individual TRRs operate together as part of a single measure. The allegation that the TRRs
measure is composed of several different elements concerns a specific characteristic of the
measure that the Panel was required to assess in order to come to a determination as to the
existence of the TRRs measure. As part of its examination of the precise content of the TRRs
measure, the Panel was also required to evaluate whether the individual TRRs apply and operate
as part of a single measure.
5.125. The Panel started its analysis of the existence of the single measure stating that it would
"first assess whether there is evidence of th e existence of the TRRs". The Panel noted the
importance of this step, considering that the measure was unwritten.
472 Accordingly, the Panel
determined whether the evidence available demo nstrated the existence of each of the five
individual TRRs identified by the complainants. 473 The Panel considered that Argentina imposed a
combination of these TRRs on economic operator s and that more than one TRR had been imposed
at a given time. Having found that there was evidence that Argentina imposed the five TRRs, the
Panel considered whether these requirements apply and operate together as part of a single
measure.
5.126. Having set out its understanding of the content and operation of the individual TRRs, the
Panel then devoted the next subsection of its Reports to its analysis of the content of the TRRs
measure. It is true that this subsection of the Panel Reports is brief.
474 Yet, the Panel analysed
how the individual TRRs operate together in fu rtherance of an underlying policy of "managed
trade" with the specific objectives of substituting imports and reducing trade deficits. Importantly,
the Panel's analysis of the existence of the TRRs measure has to be understood as part of a holistic
analysis, and cannot be read in isolation from other parts of its Reports, including the analysis that
immediately preceded it. Significantly, the Pane l summarized its understanding of the content of
the TRRs measure in paragraph 6.119 of the Panel Reports. While this paragraph is included in the
section of the Reports in which the Panel addressed the treatment of evidence, we consider that in
it the Panel already provided a comprehensive explanation of its understanding of the TRRs
measure. Moreover, the Panel explained that its "conclusions", as set out in paragraph 6.119, were
based on, inter alia, the specific facts discussed in the section of its Reports dealing with the TRRs,
and that "each of these conclusions [would] be de scribed and developed" in that section of its

466 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 126 and 130.
467 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 133.
468 United States' appellee's submission, para. 138.
469 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 137.
470 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 66.
471 Panel Reports, para. 6.139.
472 Panel Reports, para. 6.138.
473 Panel Reports, paras. 6.145 and 6.155-6.216.
474 Panel Reports, paras. 6.217-6.231.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Reports.475 The overall conclusions that the Panel outlined in paragraph 6.119, based on its holistic
examination of all the evidence, are the following:
… First, high-ranking Argentine Government officials have announced in public
statements and speeches a policy of so-called "managed trade" ( comercio
administrado), with the objectives of substituting imports for domestically-produced
goods and reducing or eliminating trade deficits. Second, since at least 2009 the
Argentine Government has imposed a combination of TRRs on prospective importers
as a condition to import or to receive certain benefits. Third, these TRRs have been
imposed on importers covering a broad range of sectors such as foodstuffs,
automobiles, motorcycles, mining equipment, electronic and office products,
agricultural machinery, medicines, publications, and clothing. Fourth, the TRRs are in
some cases reflected in agreements signed between specific economic operators and
the Argentine Government and in other cases contained in letters addressed by
economic operators to the Argentine Government. Fifth, the Argentine Government
has on occasion required compliance with TRRs as a condition for lifting observations
entered into DJAI applications. Sixth, statements made by high-ranking Argentine
Government officials, including the President, the Minister of Industry and the
Secretary of Trade, suggest that the TRRs seek to implement the policy of so-called
"managed trade" explained above.
476
5.127. Subsequently, in turning to its analysis of the TRRs measure, the Panel summed up its
analysis, starting with the section on the treatment of evidence and the subsection devoted to the
individual TRRs, considering that the single measure "would consist of Argentina's imposition of
one or more TRRs on economic operators as a condition to import goods or to obtain certain
benefits".
477 The Panel had determined previously that various economic operators, irrespective of
size and domicile, have been affected by the TRRs, and that the TRRs are not imposed equally on
all economic operators or importers. 478 Rather, the combination of TRRs imposed on individual
economic operators seems to depend on "the featur es of the operator and on the contribution of
the requirement to the attainment of Argentina's policy of substituting imports and reducing or
eliminating trade deficits".479 The Panel had also noted that statements made by Argentine officials
confirm that the TRRs are imposed according to the particular situation of economic operators 480,
and that certain statements also confirm that the Argentine Government monitors the
implementation of the commitments undertaken by economic operators.481
5.128. The Panel began it analysis of the conten t of the TRRs measure, in paragraph 6.221 of its
Reports, by noting that in the preceding sections it had "found evidence … that, at least
since 2009, Argentina has required from importers and other economic operators to undertake one
or more of [five] trade-related commitments, as a condition to import goods or to obtain certain
benefits".
482 Moreover, in paragraph 6.223, the Panel clarified that "the determination of the
existence and content of the individual TRRs was the first step in determining the existence and
content of a single measure (the TRRs measure)."483
5.129. Subsequently, in paragraph 6.228 of the Panel Reports, the Panel outlined its
understanding of how the TRRs apply and operate together as part of a single measure. The Panel
found that the TRRs "constitute different elements that contribute in different combinations and
degrees – as part of a single measure – towards the realization of common policy objectives that
guide Argentina's 'managed trade' policy, i.e. substituting imports and reducing trade deficits".
484
The Panel had stated earlier in its Reports that the TRRs imposed by the Argentine Government
seem to be in line with three of the five economic objectives or "macroeconomic guidelines" set

475 Panel Reports, para. 6.120.
477 Panel Reports, para. 6.219.
478 Panel Reports, para. 6.159.
479 Panel Reports, para. 6.225.
480 Panel Reports, para. 6.226.
481 Panel Reports, para. 6.160.
482 Panel Reports, para. 6.221.
483 Panel Reports, para. 6.223.
484 Panel Reports, para. 6.228.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

out in Argentina's Industrial Strategic Plan 2020 ( Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020 )485 (PEI 2020):
(i) protection of the domestic market and import substitution; (ii) increase of exports; and
(iii) promotion of productive investment. 486 In the Panel's view, it is within the context of these
economic objectives that the Argentine Governme nt has proclaimed its "managed trade" policy,
elements of which appear to have been part of the productive model developed in Argentina since
2003.487 Given the contribution of the TRRs toward the realization of common policy objectives,
the Panel considered that an individual consider ation of the TRRs would not capture some of the
main features of the TRRs measure, namely, its flexibility and versatility.488
5.130. In our view, the Panel's analysis of the content of the TRRs measure, including the analysis
of how the individual components of the single measure apply and operate together as part of that
whole, cannot be separated and considered in isolation from the Panel's detailed analysis of the
contents of the individual TRRs in the precedin g subsubsection of its Reports. We understand the
Panel to say that the combined application and operation of the individual TRRs is an important
part of the TRRs measure with distinct content. In particular, we understand the Panel to conclude
that the precise content of the TRRs measure coin cides neither with the content of the individual
TRRs nor with that of the "managed trade" policy or its underlying objectives (import substitution
and deficit reduction). Rather, the content of the single measure consists of the combined
operation of the individual TRRs as one of the tools that Argentina uses to implement the
"managed trade" policy. This content is distinct both from that of each TRR – which, taken
individually, may not be apt to implement the "managed trade" policy – and from the content of
the "managed trade" policy itself. We further observe that Argentina's managed trade policy
encompasses elements other than those objectives that the Panel identified as relevant to the
TRRs measure, and, in any event, we do not understand the Panel to have treated Argentina's
"managed trade" policy itself as a measure at issue in these disputes.
5.131. The Panel referred to extensive evidence on the Panel record showing that the TRRs
measure implements the "managed trade" policy, and that this policy has been announced in
public statements and speeches and on government websites by high-ranking Argentine
Government officials, including the President, the Minister of Industry, and the Secretary of Trade.
High-ranking Argentine officials have also referred to the imposition of TRRs on specific companies
and sectors. As the Panel explained, this eviden ce suggests that these TRRs are interlinked and
operate together as part of a single measure and will continue to be imposed in the future unless
and until the policy is repealed or modified.
489
5.132. In our view, more extensive reasoning wo uld have enhanced the clarity of the Panel's
approach to the determination of the content of th e TRRs measure as distinct from the individual
TRRs. In particular, the Panel could have explaine d more precisely why it was persuaded that the
assessment of how the individual TRRs apply and operate together also revealed the content of the
TRRs measure as an overarching measure wh ose constituent elements are connected or
interlinked by virtue of the underlying policy of "managed trade" as distinct from the content of the
individual TRRs. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that a thorough reading of all relevant parts of
the Panel Reports taken together reveals the Pane l's approach to establishing the existence and
the precise content of the TRRs measure.
5.133. In the light of the above, we do not co nsider that the Panel committed an error in first
assessing the content of the individual TRRs and then conducting an analysis of how the individual
TRRs apply and operate together as part of a single measure and of the associated content of such
a single measure. In particular, we are not persuaded, as Argentina contends, that the Panel
presumed the existence of the TRRs measure because it determined first how the individual TRRs
operate as part of a single measure before addressing the precise content and the question of
attribution of such a single measure. Rather, we consider that the Panel conducted a holistic
analysis of how the individual TRRs operate as part of a single measure and of the content of such

485 Ministry of Industry of Argentina, Argentina's Industrial Strategic Plan 2020 (Plan Estratégico
Industrial 2020), 4 October 2011 (Panel Exhibits ARG-51 and JE-749).
486 Panel Reports, para. 6.161.
487 Panel Reports, para. 6.162.
488 Panel Reports, para. 6.228.
489 Panel Reports, para. 6.230. For example, in an official press release issued in late 2013, the
Argentine Secretary of Domestic Trade remarked that the policy of "managed trade" would continue to be
applied in the future as per the instructions from the President of Argentina. (Ibid., paras. 6.162 and 6.230)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

a single measure. As we see it, the combined operation of the individual TRRs is a defining
element of the content of the TRRs measure.
5.134. Having determined that the Panel did not err in its assessment of the precise content of
the TRRs measure and its attribution to the Argentine Government, we now turn to considering
other elements of the alleged TRRs measure that the Panel was required to assess in order to
establish whether it exists.
5.135. As explained, Argentina further contends that, under the relevant legal standard applied in
US – Zeroing (EC) , the Panel should have established that the TRRs measure has general and
prospective application. Yet, according to Argentina, "it is undisputed that the Panel did not
examine the 'general and prospective' elements of this standard prior to concluding that the TRRs
measure 'exists' in respect of the complainants' 'joint claims'". According to Argentina, "the Panel's
failure in this regard irreparably taints its conclusion that the complainants had succeeded in
demonstrating that the alleged TRRs measure is an unwritten rule or norm".
490 Before the Panel,
Argentina had claimed that the most that the evidence of the TRRs presented by the complainants
could possibly demonstrate is a series of discrete "one-off" actions relating to a limited number of
individual "economic operators", in a limited number of sectors, whose particular content varied
widely, and with nothing resembling the general and prospective application one would expect to
find in a rule or norm.
491
5.136. The complainants respond that, even if th ey had not characterized their joint claims as
"as such" claims, the Panel did, in fact, also find that the TRRs measure has general and
prospective application.
492 Moreover, the complainants contend that, even assuming arguendo that
the Panel did not determine the general and prospective application of the TRRs measure in that
section of its Reports containing the Panel's assessment of the joint claims, it explicitly did so in
the section of the Panel Reports containing the Panel's assessment of the "as such" claims by
Japan.
493
5.137. We note that it is true that, in evaluating the joint claims, the Panel expressed the view
that it was not required to make a finding regarding whether the TRRs measure has general and
prospective application, considering that the complainants had not challenged this measure "as
such" as a rule or norm. 494 Early in its analysis, the Panel distinguished the legal standard or
criteria that apply in challenges against a measure "as such" from the same that applies when
other challenges are raised. Before embarking on its analysis of the TRRs measure, the Panel
clarified that, in order to prove the existence of an unwritten measure, the complainants would
have had to prove that it is attributable to Argentina and its precise content. However, the Panel
also pointed out that, only if the complainants had requested findings against the TRRs measure
"as such", would they also have had to prove that it has general and prospective application.
495 In
expressing this view, the Panel referred to the finding in EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft. In that dispute, the Appellate Body stated that it did not "consider that a complainant
would necessarily be required to demonstrate the existence of a rule or norm of general and
prospective application in order to show" that a measure consisting in a concerted action or
practice exists.
496
5.138. We do not see that these statements by the Panel amount to legal error, as alleged by
Argentina. We have already observed that, in their joint claims, the complainants are not
challenging the TRRs measure as an unwritten rule or norm of general and prospective application,
but as an unwritten measure that has certain characteristics, including systematic and continued
application. In this respect, we also note the argument made by the United States on appeal that
the measure being challenged is not a "rule or norm" as that term was used by the Appellate Body

490 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 119.
491 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 149 (referring to Argentina's second written submission to
the Panel, para. 106).
492 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 139.
493 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 70; United States' appellee's submission, para. 141.
494 Panel Reports, paras. 6.219 and 6.220. The Panel, however, addressed separately Japan's "as such"
claims against the TRRs measure.
495 Panel Reports, para. 6.42.
496 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 794.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

in US – Zeroing (EC) , but rather a measure taking the form of a decision by Argentina to impose
the TRRs497, which "applies until it is withdrawn".498
5.139. As explained above, given the nature of the TRRs measure as challenged by the
complainants with their joint claims, we are not persuaded that they were required to demonstrate
the existence of the TRRs measure based on the cr iteria formulated by the Appellate Body in
US – Zeroing (EC) and, in particular, that it has general and prospective application. Rather, the
complainants had to provide evidence and arguments to demonstrate the existence of the
measure challenged, and specifically a measure that , as they contended, is applied systematically
and will continue to be applied in the future.
5.140. Moreover, although the Panel considered that it did not need to rule formally on whether
the TRRs measure has general and prospective application as a rule or norm, the Panel
nevertheless evaluated certain characteristics of the TRRs measure, such as its systematic
application and its continued and future existence, as identified by the complainants in their
submissions regarding the measure at issue.
5.141. Regarding the systematic application of the TRRs measure, the Panel found that the
TRRs measure seeks to implement a policy announced by high-ranking Argentine Government
officials
499, and that the TRRs measure is not limited to a single import or a single importer, but is
part of a policy implemented by the Argentine Government.500 The Panel made these findings in its
analysis of the individual TRRs. However, it relied on them by inserting cross-references to these
findings in its later analysis of the content and operation of the TRRs measure. In its analysis of
the TRRs measure, the Panel also found that, as part of a single measure, the TRRs are imposed in
combination on economic operators in different sectors and that the TRRs measure nevertheless
remains a single measure regardless of the number of TRRs imposed in a specific case because, in
all instances of application, it implies the imposition of one of more requirements.
501 Finally, the
Panel found that Argentina had not provided evidence to support its assertion that the TRRs can,
at most, be characterized as "a series of individual one-off and isolated actions that concern a
limited number of individual economic operators in a limited number of sectors, whose content
varies considerably and lacks anything resembling general and specific application".
502
5.142. As discussed further below, the Panel subsequently relied on these same findings to
determine that the TRRs measure has "general" app lication as a rule or norm when it addressed
Japan's "as such" claims. It seems to us that, in the context of the joint claims, the Panel's
findings show that the TRRs measure has systematic application as opposed to sporadic, unrelated
applications of individual TRRs. The systematic nature of the unwritten TRRs measure is evidenced
by and manifested in the fact that TRRs are applied to economic operators in a broad variety of
different sectors as part of an organized effort, coordinated and implemented at the highest levels
of government, and aimed at achieving import substitution and reduction of trade deficit within the
framework of the "managed trade" policy.
5.143. Regarding the present and continued application of the TRRs measure, the Panel found
that the evidence suggests that the TRRs will continue to be imposed "until and unless the policy is
repealed or modified", and cited a statement by the Argentine Secretary of Domestic Trade that
the policy of "managed trade" will continue to be applied in the future as per the instructions from
the President of Argentina.
503 As discussed further below, this same evidence and reasoning was
used by the Panel to support its findings regarding the TRRs measure's prospective nature in its
analysis of Japan's "as such" claims. It seems to us that the Panel's findings in the context of its
analysis of the joint claims show that the TRRs measure has present and continued application, in
the sense that it is currently applied and it will continue to be applied in the future until the
underlying policy is modified or withdrawn.

497 United States' appellee's submission, para. 133.
498 United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 116.
499 See Panel Reports, para. 6.230.
500 See Panel Reports, paras. 6.157 and 6.158.
501 Panel Reports, paras. 6.225 and 6.227.
502 Panel Reports, para. 6.116. See also paras. 6.229 and 6.334.
503 Panel Reports, para. 6.230 (referring to Panel Exhibit JE-759).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.144. With respect to the continued application of a measure, we recall that the panel in
US – Orange Juice (Brazil) – which examined a challenge against zeroing as "on-going conduct",
as opposed to a rule or norm of general and prospective application – found that "on-going
conduct may be simply described as conduct that is currently taking place and is likely to continue
in the future".
504 That panel interpreted the Appellate Body's definition of "on-going" conduct in
US – Continued Zeroing as entailing the likely prospective operation of the measure at issue, but
not necessarily as absolute certainty that the conduct would occur in the future.505
5.145. Given that, in the joint claims, the complainants did not challenge the TRRs measure as a
rule or norm of general and prospective application, as noted above, the Panel was not required to
examine the same criteria formulated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) . Instead, the
Panel correctly examined the relevant constituen t elements of the measure subject to the joint
claims and determined, based on the evidence an d arguments the complainants presented, that
the TRRs measure has systematic application and will continue to be applied until it is modified or
withdrawn by the Argentine authorities and the Government ceases to apply it. Finally, we observe
that, while Argentina claims on appeal that, in the context of Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel
acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding that the TRRs measure has general and
prospective application, Argentina does not directly challenge the Panel's findings that the TRRs
measure has systematic and continued application.
5.146. We consider, therefore, that, in assessing the joint claims, the Panel correctly found that
the complainants had demonstrated the existence of a TRRs measure, which is composed, in
particular, of several individual TRRs operating together in an interlinked fashion as part of a single
measure in pursuit of the objectives of import substitution and trade deficit reduction. The Panel
also found that the TRRs measure has systematic application, as it applies to economic operators
in a broad variety of different sectors, and that it has present and continued application, in the
sense that it currently applies and it will continue to be applied in the future until the underlying
policy ceases to apply. We do not consider that, as Argentina contends, the Panel applied the
wrong legal standard for determining the existence of the measure at issue.
5.2.2.4 Conclusions
5.147. In the light of all of the above, we are not persuaded that, in addressing the joint claims
against the TRRs measure, the Panel erred in its choice of the legal standard or criteria that it used
to determine whether such measure exists.
5.148. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.231 of the Panel Reports,
paragraph 7.1.d of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.5.c of the US Panel Report, and
paragraph 7.9.d of the Japan Panel Report, in respect of the joint claims by the three complainants
that the Argentine authorities' imposition on economic operators of one or more of the five
requirements identified by the complainants as a condition to import or to obtain certain benefits,
operates as a single measure (the TRRs measure) attributable to Argentina.
5.149. As a consequence, we also uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.265 of the Panel
Reports, paragraph 7.1.e of the EU Panel Report , paragraph 7.5.d of the US Panel Report, and
paragraph 7.9.e of the Japan Panel Report, that the TRRs measure, consisting of the Argentine
authorities' imposition of one or more of the five requirements identified by the complainants as a
condition to import, constitutes a restriction on the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent
with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; as well as the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.295 of the Panel
Reports, that "the TRRs measure, with respect to the local content requirement, is inconsistent
with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994" because it "modifies the conditions of competition in the
Argentine market to the detriment of imported products" so that "imported products are granted
less favourable treatment than like domestic products".
506
5.150. In reaching this conclusion, we would like to clarify that we do not understand the Panel to
have ruled on individual TRRs beyond the five that were specifically identified as forming part of

504 Panel Report, US – Orange Juice (Brazil), para. 7.176. (emphasis original)
505 Panel Report, US – Orange Juice (Brazil), para. 7.175.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

the TRRs measure, or to have ruled on the individual TRRs in isolation 507, that is, separately from
their imposition as a condition to import or to receive certain benefits. We also endorse the Panel's
statement that "nothing in the Panel's rulings calls into question the ability of WTO Members to
pursue their development policies, such as those identified by Argentina, in a manner consistent
with the overall objectives stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement and their commitments
under the WTO agreements".
508
5.2.3 Article 11 of the DSU – Japan's "as such" claims
5.151. Argentina claims that, in addressing Japan's "as such" claims against the TRRs measure,
the Panel acted inconsistently with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU because it found that
Japan had established the existence of the TRRs measure without properly examining whether
Japan had presented sufficient evidence of its "precise content" and of its "general and prospective
application".
509 Argentina requests us to reverse the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 7.9.h of the
Japan Panel Report, that the alleged TRRs measure is "as such" inconsistent with Articles XI:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994. The complainants
510 argue that Argentina fails to identify any
legitimate basis to question the Panel's objectivity and instead simply attempts to recast the same
arguments that it has made with respect to its claim of error against the Panel's findings on the
joint claims
511, and/or to second-guess the Panel's weighing of factual evidence. 512 The
complainants also stress that Argentina refused to provide evidence to the Panel and failed to
confront the evidence before the Panel and on appeal. Thus, they contend that Argentina should
not be allowed to hold this against the complainants in a claim under Article 11 of the DSU.
513
5.152. We recall that, having ruled in response to the joint claims by the three complainants that
the TRRs measure exists and that it is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994,
the Panel turned to consider whether the same TRRs measure is also inconsistent "as such" with
the same provisions. This approach by the Panel generates some confusion, considering that the
Panel had previously made findings on the same T R R s m e a s u r e , e v e n i f n o t a s a r u l e o r n o r m
having general and prospective application, but as a measure with several constituent elements,
including systematic and continued application. In reaching its "as such" findings, the Panel limited
its analysis to an examination of whether the TRRs measure is a measure of general and
prospective application that can be challenged "as such". In fact, the Panel had already found that
the same TRRs measure as challenged in the joint claims is inconsistent with Articles XI:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
5.153. Although the Panel made separate findings with respect to the joint claims and with
respect to Japan's "as such" claims, we consider that its analysis of the TRRs measure and of its
constituent elements must be understood in a holistic fashion. In reaching the conclusion that the
TRRs measure is a norm of general and prospective application in its evaluation of Japan's
"as such" claims, the Panel relied on virtually the same evidence that it had used in its evaluation
of the joint claims to determine the existence of the TRRs measure as a measure with several

507 In this regard, the Panel noted that the investment and the non-repatriation requirements have not
been imposed on economic operators as stand-alone requirements, but only in combination with the one-to-
one requirement and the local content requirement. (Panel Reports, paras. 6.208, 6.214, and 6.259)
508 Panel Reports, para. 6.8.
509 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 138.
510 We observe that, while the Panel's findings on the TRRs measure "as such" concern only Japan, the
European Union and the United States have also submitted extensive arguments on appeal rejecting
Argentina's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. The European Union and the
United States regard Argentina's appeal under Article 11 of the DSU as recasting its arguments before the
Panel on the TRRs measure "under the guise of" an Article 11 claim. (European Union's appellee's submission,
para. 144; United States' appellee's submission, para. 158) Moreover, both the European Union and the
United States argue on appeal that, if the Appellate Body were to agree with Argentina that the Panel erred in
deciding on the joint claims because it did not determine the general and prospective application of the
measure, the Panel did make findings on the general and prospective application of the same measure for the
purposes of Japan's "as such" claims and that these can be relied upon to preserve the findings that the TRRs
measure exists and is inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. (European Union's appellee's
511 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 144; United States' appellee's submission, para. 158;
Japan's appellee's submission, para. 78.
512 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 102; United States' appellee's submission, para. 159.
513 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 144; United States' appellee's submission, para. 156;
Japan's appellee's submission, para. 104.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

constituent elements, including systematic and continued application. Moreover, the Panel's
reasoning on the general and prospective application of the TRRs measure in addressing the "as
such" claims does not add to its reasoning behind its earlier findings on the same measure as
challenged in the joint claims. In other words, the Panel considered that virtually the same
evidence and arguments that demonstrated that the TRRs measure exists as the single measure
challenged under the joint claims were also sufficient to demonstrate that the same measure also
exists as a rule or norm having general and prospective application.
5.154. In the light of the above, we are uncertain as to why the Panel considered additional and
separate findings on Japan's "as such" claims against the TRRs measure to be useful or relevant,
given that it had already found the same TRRs measure to exist and to be inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 in response to the joint claims. We do not see what the
findings entitled "as such" add in substance to the Panel's analysis that led it to reach its
conclusions on the joint claims against the TRRs measure.
5.155. The present situation is, however, different from a situation in which a panel may need to
make separate "as applied" and "as such" findings, if claims are brought against a rule or norm of
general and prospective application "as such" and "a s applied". We do not consider that, in this
dispute, the joint claims by the three complainan ts could be regarded as falling into either
categories of "as such" or "as applied" claims. Rather, the Panel approached the joint claims based
on how the three complainants had described and characterized the TRRs measure in their
challenges, that is, as a measure with specific constituent elements, rather than as a rule or norm
of general and prospective application.
5.156. As noted above, both sets of Panel findings (in respect of the joint claims and in respect of
Japan's "as such" claims) were made with respect to the same underlying TRRs measure, with the
same constituent elements in substance. Both sets of findings were based on virtually the same
evidence and supported by virtually the same reasoning. This raises the question of whether there
would be any meaningful difference in the compliance obligations that would flow from these two
sets of Panel findings, were they to be adopted by the DSB.
5.157. We thus consider the Panel's "as such" findings on the TRRs measure to amount in
substance to no more than the findings the Panel had already made in respect of the TRRs
measure as challenged under the joint claims. Nevertheless, bearing this in mind together with the
fact that the Panel conducted a holistic analysis of the TRRs measure and of its constituent
elements, we turn to address Argentina's claim under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.2.3.1 The evidentiary difficulties confronted by the Panel
5.158. Before turning to our consideration of Argentina's claims that the Panel's findings on the
precise content and the general and prospectiv e application of the TRRs measure lacked a
sufficient evidentiary basis, we consider it necessary to recall the Panel's finding that Argentina
refused to provide information, which the Panel explicitly requested, and which Argentina did not
deny was in its possession. In particular, Argentina refused to provide any of the agreements
between specific economic operators and the Gove rnment of Argentina, or letters by economic
operators to the Government of Argentina, cont aining the trade-related commitments undertaken
by such economic operators as a condition to import into Argentina.
514
5.159. In previous disputes, the Appellate Body has held that "the refusal by a Member to provide
information requested of it undermines seriously the ability of a panel to make an objective
assessment of the facts and the matter, as required by Article 11 of the DSU", and that, as part of
its objective assessment of the facts under Articl e 11 of the DSU, a panel is entitled to draw
adverse inferences from a party's refusal to provide information.
515 Therefore, "[w]here a party
refuses to provide information requested by a panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU, that refusal will
be one of the relevant facts of record, and indeed an important fact, to be taken into account in
determining the appropriate inference to be drawn".516

514 Panel Reports, paras. 6.43-6.55.
515 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, paras. 172 and 173.
516 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 174.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.160. The Panel observed that Argentina did not deny that it was in possession of these
documents, but refused to provide them to the Panel, notwithstanding an explicit request from the
Panel that it do so.517 We note that the TRRs are unwritten and that they are not contained in any
law, regulation, or administrative act. Thus, the primary source of direct evidence of the content
and nature of the TRRs would appear to be th e agreements between the economic operators and
the Argentine Government and the letters addressed by economic operators to the Government.
The Panel acknowledged that it had limited direct evidence, due to the lack of cooperation or
inability of the parties to provide documentation
518, and also drew inferences from Argentina's
refusal to provide evidence. 519 Had the Panel been provided with the documents it requested, it
m i g h t h a v e b e e n a b l e t o r e l y u p o n a m o r e r o b u s t e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s t o s u p p o r t i t s f i n d i n g s
regarding the content of the measure, and its general and prospective application. The Panel
nevertheless supported its findings with the evidence available, together with the inferences that it
drew from Argentina's refusal to provide the relevant agreements and letters. Argentina has not,
on appeal, challenged either the Panel's finding th at Argentina refused to provide evidence or the
Panel's consequential decision to draw inferences from such refusal in reaching its findings.
5.161. In the light of the above, we are of the view that our consideration of Argentina's claims on
appeal under Article 11 of the DSU cannot ignore that Argentina bore at least some responsibility
for the evidentiary difficulties faced by the Panel.
5.2.3.2 The precise content of the TRRs measure
5.162. Regarding the "precise content" of the measure, Argentina contends that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU because it uncritically accepted the complainants'
characterization of the content of the alleged TRRs measure and failed to ensure that its findings
were based on the record evidence and supported by sufficient reasoning.
520 Argentina claims that
the alleged "overarching" TRRs measure is invented by the complainants, is amorphous and
ill-defined, and that its contents cannot be iden tified with the requisite degree of precision. 521
According to Argentina, the Panel made an "unsubst antiated assertion" that the available evidence
provided it with sufficient elements to estab lish the existence and precise content of the TRRs
measure, but in fact the Panel's analysis does not contain a single citation to the evidence on the
panel record.522
5.163. The Panel's findings on the precise content of the TRRs measure that Argentina challenges
under Article 11 of the DSU are those made with regard to Japan's "as such" claims against the
TRRs measure in paragraphs 6.323 through 6.327 of the Panel Reports. However, the Panel had
already made findings on the precise content of the same TRRs measure earlier as part of its
analysis of the complainants' joint claims in paragraphs 6.221 through 6.231 of the Reports.
523
Thus, in stating that the Panel's analysis does not contain a single citation to record evidence,
Argentina disregards that the Panel had already made findings on the precise content of the same
TRRs measure in an earlier section of its Reports.
5.164. In the section of its Reports addressing the complainants' joint claims, the Panel reached
its findings on the precise content of the individual TRRs and of the TRRs measure based on
extensive evidence produced by the complainan ts, the substance of which Argentina did not
dispute.
524 Such evidence concerns the content of the individual TRRs, as well as their operation as
a single measure. The Panel made clear that its findings in the different subsections of its Reports
should be understood as parts of a holistic approach when it summarized the main factual findings
that underpin its subsequent analysis of the TRRs and the TRRs measure. The Panel stated that "it
ha[d] examined the information available and ha[d] assessed all the evidence in a holistic manner

517 Panel Reports, paras. 6.46 and 6.117.
518 Panel Reports, para. 6.64.
519 Panel Reports, para. 6.116. The Panel further observed that Argentina did not dispute the basic facts
concerning the existence and operation of the TRRs, and failed to produce evidence to dispute the facts
asserted by the complainants. (Ibid.)
520 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 184.
521 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 172.
522 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 181.
523 Moreover, as we have considered above, the Panel's findings on the precise content of the single
measure must be understood in the context and in reference to the Panel's earlier analysis of the evidence
concerning the individual TRRs and the TRRs measure. (See paras. 5.126-5.130 of these Reports)
524 Panel Reports, para. 6.116.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

in order to reach its conclusions" and that, as a result, it "[was] persuaded on the basis of the
totality of the evidence of the … general facts, as well as of the specific facts that are discussed in
sections 6.2 and 6.3 below".525 Section 6.2 of the Panel Report contains the entirety of the Panel's
findings on the TRRs measure, including those in response to the joint claims by the three
complainants and those in response to the "as such" claims by Japan.
5.165. In addressing Argentina's appeal of the Panel's findings on the TRRs measure, we have
explained the Panel's identification of the content of the TRRs measure that it found to exist in
assessing the joint claims. In addressing the precise content of the TRRs measure in that part of
its Reports, the Panel stated that its "examination of the existence, nature, and characteristics of
the individual TRRs was based on evidence such as copies of domestic laws, regulations, and policy
documents; communications addressed to Argentine officials by private companies; statements by
Argentine officials and notes posted on websit es of the Argentine Government; articles in
newspapers and specialized publications; and statements by company officials".
526 Explaining why
the individual TRRs constitute a single measure, the Panel considered "that the requirements
constitute different elements that contribute in different combinations and degrees … towards the
realization of common policy objectives that guide Argentina's 'managed trade' policy,
i.e. substituting imports and reducing or eliminating trade deficits".
527
5.166. In its analysis of Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel did not reproduce the extensive
analysis of the content of the individual TRRs and of the TRRs measure that it had performed in
addressing the joint claims. Rather, the Panel added a few additional considerations concerning the
content of the TRRs measure. The Panel cautioned that requesting an extremely high level of detail
in the definition of the content of an unwritten measure would make it almost impossible to
challenge such type of measure in practice. For the Panel, what is crucial is that, based on the
available evidence, both a panel and the responding party have a clear understanding of the
components and the operation of the challenged measure.
528 Moreover, the Panel considered that
the fact that the list of TRRs provided by the European Union and Japan was non-exhaustive was
not an obstacle to considering the measure as one composed of several requirements.
529 In our
view, these are additional considerations, which the Panel made in its assessment of the precise
content of the TRRs measure. They cannot be ta ken as a self-standing assessment of the precise
content of the TRRs measure. Rather, it is clear th at they must be read together with the Panel's
earlier analysis of the precise content of the same TRRs measure.
5.167. As the European Union notes on appeal, the Panel's analysis of the precise content of the
TRRs measure in respect of Japan's "as such" claims would have benefited from an explicit
cross-reference to its earlier findings on the content of the TRRs and of the TRRs measure in
respect of the joint claims.
530 Nevertheless, we observe that, in laying out its general approach to
the analysis of the unwritten measure, the Panel stated that it would first address whether the
TRRs operate together as a single measure, and then, in considering the "as such" claims against
the same measure, whether the TRRs measure has, in addition, general and prospective
application.
531 In doing so, the Panel adopted a unified approach to the analysis of the TRRs
measure, whereby the analysis of the precise content of the measure was common to the two sets
of findings, while the analysis of the general and prospective application of the measure was
limited to the section on the "as such" findings. Therefore, when the Panel turned to consider
Japan's "as such" claims against the TRRs measure, the Panel was clearly relying on its earlier
findings on the precise content of the TRRs measure as challenged under the joint claims, having
already devoted a significant part of its Reports to discussing evidence of the content of each
individual TRR and of the TRRs measure.

525 The Panel refers to, inter alia, the imposition of TRRs on prospective importers covering a broad
range of sectors as a condition to import or to receive certain benefits and to the statements made by
high-ranking Argentine Government officials suggesting that the TRRs seek to implement the "managed trade"
policy with the objectives of substituting imports for domestically produced goods and reducing or eliminating
526 Panel Reports, para. 6.223.
527 Panel Reports, para. 6.228.
528 Panel Reports, para. 6.325.
529 Panel Reports, para. 6.326.
530 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 148.
531 Panel Reports, paras. 6.219 and 6.220.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.168. In sum, by arguing that the Panel failed to ensure that its findings on the precise content
of the TRRs measure were based on the record evidence and sufficiently supported with adequate
reasoning, Argentina reads the Panel's findings on Japan's "as such" claims against the TRRs
measure in isolation from the Panel's earlier identification and explanation of the same TRRs
measure, and disregards that, in response to the joint claims, the Panel had already made findings
on the precise content of that same measure, wh ich were based on record evidence. In our view,
the Panel adopted a unified approach to its anal ysis of the TRRs measure, meaning that its
analysis of Japan's "as such" claims cannot be read in isolation from its earlier findings on the
TRRs measure.
5.169. Therefore, we reject Argentina's argument that the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU because its findings on the precise content of the TRRs measure were neither
based on the record evidence nor supported by sufficient and adequate reasoning.
5.2.3.3 The general and prospective application of the TRRs measure
5.170. Argentina also contends that the Panel violated Article 11 of the DSU because it failed to
ensure that its findings concerning the general and prospective application of the alleged TRRs
measure were based on record evidence and supp orted by reasoned and adequate explanations
and coherent reasoning.
532 We recall that we have considered above that the Panel conducted a
holistic analysis of all the claims against the TRRs measure and that its findings on Japan's
"as such" claims do not appear to differ in substance from the findings that it made in respect of
the TRRs measure as challenged under the joint claims, even though the respective analyses were
conducted in different subsections of the Panel Re ports. Bearing these considerations in mind, we
turn to address Argentina's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
making its "as such" findings.
5.171. Argentina argues that the complainants fa iled to establish that the alleged TRRs measure
is "general" in its application within the ordinary meaning of this term, considering that, by their
own acknowledgement, the TRRs measure does not apply to all imports, to all importers, or to all
economic operators.
533
5.172. We have explained above that the TRRs measure is composed of several requirements
that, as the Panel found, "contribute in different combinations and degrees … towards the
realization of common policy objectives".
534 Therefore, by definition , the TRRs measure cannot
apply in the same manner to all imports, importers, or economic operators. Neither the TRRs
measure nor the individual TRRs were designed to apply to specific individuals or companies, but
potentially affect an unidentified number of economic operators. The multiplicity and flexibility of
the TRRs and the fact that the list is non-exhaustive gives to the TRRs measure a very broad scope
of application, which, as we have explained ab ove, supports the Panel's finding that the TRRs
measure has systematic application.
5.173. More fundamentally, however, we are of the view that Argentina's claim that the Panel
erred in determining that the TRRs measure has ge neral application is not concerned with whether
the Panel made an objective assessment consistent with Article 11 of the DSU. We recall that, in
previous disputes, the Appellate Body has held that "[i]t is … unacceptable for a participant
effectively to recast its arguments before the panel under the guise of an Article 11 claim" and that
"a participant must identify specific errors regarding the objectivity of the panel's assessment".
535
The Appellate Body also held that "a claim that a panel failed to comply with its duties under
Article 11 of the DSU must stand on its own, and should not be made merely as a 'subsidiary
argument' in support of a claim that the panel erred in its application of a WTO provision."
536
5.174. It seems to us that, by arguing that the complainants failed to establish that the alleged
TRRs measure is "general" in its application within the ordinary meaning of this term, Argentina is
questioning the legal standard or criteria applie d by the Panel in finding that the TRRs measure
has "general" application, rather than the objectivity of the Panel's assessment of the facts under

532 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 199.
533 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 189.
534 Panel Reports, para. 6.228.
535 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442.
536 Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, para. 301.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Article 11 of the DSU. Indeed, in contending that the TRRs measure cannot be considered to have
general application because it does not apply to all imports, to all importers, or to all economic
operators, Argentina is taking issue with the Pane l's interpretation and application of the concept
of "general application", rather than with the Panel's treatment of the evidence showing how the
TRRs are applied, or the Panel's reasoning on th e basis of that evidence. We, therefore, do not
consider that Argentina's claim that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TRRs measure
has "general" application is properly raised under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.175. Argentina also claims that the Panel's finding that the alleged TRRs measure has
prospective application lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis.
537 Argentina notes that the Panel cited
only one single piece of evidence, Exhibit JE-759, in support of its conclusion that the alleged TRRs
measure implements a deliberate policy, and that this exhibit does not suffice to establish that
such policies are implemented through an unwritten measure of general and prospective
application that is WTO-inconsistent.538
5.176. Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, a single piece of evidence may
constitute sufficient proof that a measure has prospective application. As the trier of facts, a panel
can exercise its discretion in selecting the evidence it relies upon to establish certain facts. It is
only when it exceeds such discretion in weighing the evidence that an Article 11 violation can be
found. In previous disputes, the Appellate Body has also considered that not every error in the
appreciation of a particular piece of evidence will rise to the level of a failure by the panel to
comply with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU
539, and that for an Article 11 claim to succeed a
party must explain why the evidence is so material to its case that the panel's failure to address
such evidence has a bearing on the objectivity of the panel's factual assessment. 540 Thus, even
assuming that the Panel relied only on Exhibit JE-759 to support its findings that the TRRs
measure is prospective in nature, this does not, in our view, in and of itself constitute a violation of
Article 11 of the DSU.
5.177. We recall that Exhibit JE-759 contains an interview with Argentina's Secretary of Domestic
Trade stating that the policy of "managed trade" would continue to be applied in the future
pursuant to instructions from the President of Arge ntina. This evidence was relevant to the Panel's
understanding of the specific constituent elements of the TRRs measure, namely, its present and
continued application, as well as the objectives that it pursues (import substitution and trade
balancing) and the policy of managed trade underlying these objectives.
5.178. Furthermore, and as the complainants point out, the Panel did not rely exclusively on
Exhibit JE-759 to determine that the TRRs measure has prospective application.
541 In this part of
its analysis of Japan's "as such" claims, the Panel explicitly cross-referenced its earlier findings
that the TRRs measure reflects a "deliberate policy", as it constitutes repeated actions, coordinated
and publicly announced by the highest authorities.542
5.179. Finally, turning to Argentina's allegation that the Panel failed to provide coherent reasoning
in its findings concerning the general and pros pective application of the TRRs measure, the
Appellate Body has found that internally incoherent reasoning by a panel may amount to a failure
to make an objective assessment.
543 In this dispute, Argentina argues that the Panel failed to base
its findings on the TRRs measure on record evidence and failed to support these findings with
sufficient and adequate reasoning. However, Argent ina does not elaborate any specific allegations

537 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 195.
538 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 198.
539 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 133.
540 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 499.
541 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 162; United States' appellee's submission,
paras. 188-190; Japan's appellee's submission, para. 103.
542 Panel Reports, para. 6.340 (referring to ibid., paras. 6.230, 6.334, and 6.335). The European Union
also points out that the Panel referred to evidence of agreements signed between economic operators and the
Argentine authorities, as well as the commitments provided in letters by many economic operators, all of which
require a prospective course of action. (European Union's appellee's submission, para. 162)
543 In US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the Appellate Body found that the panel had acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU because its treatment of the evidence submitted by the parties lacked
even-handedness, and its reasoning was internally incoherent. In particular, the Appellate Body found that the
panel had treated competing evidence submitted by the parties inconsistently. (Appellate Body Report,
US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 292)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

or examples of incoherence or contradictions in the Panel's reasoning. Nor does Argentina point to
any lack of even-handedness in the Panel's evalua tion of the evidence. Indeed, Argentina did not
present competing evidence to the Panel, and hard ly engaged with the evidence presented by the
complainants. In the light of the above, we consider that Argentina has not established that the
Panel's reasoning in the context of the findings concerning the general and prospective application
of the TRRs measure is incoherent, much less that any such deficiency amounted to a failure to
make an objective assessment of the matter.
5.180. In the light of the above, we do not consider that Argentina has established that the Panel
failed to ensure that its findings concerning the general and prospective application of the alleged
TRRs measure were based on record evidence and were supported by reasoned and adequate
explanations and coherent reasoning. Therefore we do not consider that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
5.181. Nevertheless, in dismissing Argentina's claim under Article 11 of the DSU, we do not wish
to be seen as endorsing the Panel's additional findings on Japan's "as such" claims against the
TRRs measure. As set out above, we see the Panel's "as such" findings on the TRRs measure as
amounting in substance to no more than the findings the Panel had already made in respect of the
TRRs measure as challenged under the joint claims.
5.182. We wish to underline that we understand the Panel, in purporting to find that the TRRs
measure has "general application", in fact to have found nothing other than that the TRRs measure
has "systematic application". Similarly, we understand the Panel, in purporting to find that the
TRRs measure has "prospective application", to ha ve found no more than that the TRRs measure
will continue to be applied in the future. Thus, we do not understand the Panel's finding in its
analysis of Japan's "as such" claims that the TRRs measure has "prospective application" as
implying anything more than it had already found in its analysis of the element of "continued
application" under the joint claims. Moreover, nothing in the Panel's reasoning indicates that it
considered the TRRs measure to have the same leve l of security and predictability of continuation
into the future typically associated with rules or norms.
5.183. In this connection, we also observe that, at the outset of its analysis of Japan's "as such"
claims, the Panel identified what it considered to be relevant jurisprudence relating to the
assessment of "as such" claims, in particular with respect to unwritten measures.
544 The excerpts
cited by the Panel referred to such claims being brought as challenges to "rules or norms … of
general and prospective application". In the remainder of its analysis of Japan's "as such" claims,
the Panel focused solely on analysing the content of the TRRs measure and on whether it has
general and prospective application. The Panel did not further refer to, much less examine,
whether the TRRs measure embodies or creates "rules or norms". Although rules and norms
typically have general and prospective applicatio n, these two characteristics are not necessarily
the only ones exhibited by rules and norms. Th e Panel did not inquire whether the TRRs measure
possesses other types of attributes that characterize "rules or norms" and never affirmatively
stated that it viewed the TRRs measure as embody ing rules or norms. For all of these reasons, we
are puzzled as to why the Panel separately addressed Japan's "as such" claims against the TRRs
measure, particularly given the analysis that it had already completed, and the findings that it had
already made, namely that the TRRs measure exists and is inconsistent with Articles III:4 and XI:1
of the GATT 1994.
5.2.3.4 Conclusion
5.184. For the foregoing reasons, we do not consider that Argentina has established that the
Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter in making its "as such" findings.
545
Accordingly, we find that Argentina has not established that the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU.

544 Panel Reports, paras. 6.315-6.319.
545 As discussed earlier in these Reports, we emphasize again that we consider that the Panel's
"as such" findings actually amount in substance to no more than the findings it made in respect of the TRRs
measure challenged under the joint claims.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.2.4 The Panel's exercise of judicial econ omy on Japan's claim under Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994
5.185. We turn now to Japan's claim on appeal that the Panel erred in exercising judicial economy
with respect to Japan's claim against the TRRs measure under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994. Japan
requests that we reverse the Panel's decision to apply judicial economy and that we complete the
analysis and find that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under
Article X:1.
546 According to Japan, the Panel acted inconsistently with Articles 3.4, 3.7, 7.2,
and/or 11 of the DSU by exercising judicial economy on this claim because the "scope and
content" of Article X:1 is distinct from the "scope and content" of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994, and compliance with a finding under the latter provisions would not necessarily result
in compliance with a finding under Article X:1.
547 Argentina requests us to reject Japan's claim,
arguing that Japan fails to demonstrate why the Panel's findings under Article XI:1 alone lead to a
partial resolution of this dispute.548
5.186. We recall that, after having found the TRRs measure to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994, the Panel stated that:
[a]n additional finding regarding the same measure under Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994 is not necessary or useful in resolving the matter at issue. Accordingly,
guided by the principle of judicial economy, the Panel refrains from making any
findings with respect to this particular claim.549
5.187. At the interim review stage, Japan and the United States requested the Panel to refrain
from exercising judicial economy with respect to their claims under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994
against, inter alia, the TRRs measure. 550 Argentina objected to these requests, stating that Japan
and the United States had not explained why th e Panel's findings under Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 would lead to a partial resolution of this dispute.551
5.188. The Panel responded that:
… in the light of the Panel's findings regarding the TRRs measure …, additional findings
regarding the same measure[] under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 were not necessary
or useful in resolving the matter at issue. Moreover, given the Panel's findings that the
TRRs measure … constitute[s] restrictions on the importation of goods and [is] thus
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, as well as the Panel's finding in the
complaint brought by Japan that the TRRs measure, with respect to its local content
requirement, is inconsistent with Articl e III:4 of the GATT 1994, whether Argentina
published its measures in a manner consistent with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 was
no longer relevant for purposes of resolving this dispute.
552
5.189. The question before us is whether this exercise of judicial economy was proper. The proper
exercise of judicial economy is linked to the aim of securing "a positive solution to a dispute", as
reflected in Article 3.7 of the DSU, as well as to the duty imposed on panels by Article 11 of the
DSU to "make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements".
553
5.190. The Appellate Body has explained that the principle of judicial economy "allows a panel to
refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various
provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve
the dispute."554 Thus, panels need address only those claims "which must be addressed in order to

546 Japan's other appellant's submission, paras. 3, 9, and 17.
547 Japan's other appellant's submission, paras. 3, 4, and 13.
548 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 22.
549 Panel Reports, para. 6.305.
550 Panel Reports, paras. 5.9 and 5.10.
551 Panel Reports, para. 5.11.
552 Panel Reports, para. 5.12.
553 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 331.
554 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. (emphasis original)
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

resolve the matter in issue in the dispute" 555, and panels "may refrain from ruling on every claim
as long as it does not lead to a 'partial resolution of the matter'." 556 Nonetheless, the
Appellate Body has cautioned that "[t]o provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue
would be false judicial economy", and that "[a] panel has to address those claims on which a
finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and
rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings
'in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.'"
557
5.191. Thus, in order to succeed in its claim on appeal, Japan must show that the Panel provided
only a "partial resolution of the matter at issue" or that an additional finding with respect to
Japan's claim under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 "is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance"
558 by
Argentina with those recommendations and rulings.
5.192. Japan argues that panels may not exercise judicial economy with respect to provisions
whose "scope and content" are different from those under which findings are made, as this would
prevent an effective resolution of the dispute. Japan relies on the Appellate Body report in
US – Tuna II (Mexico) to support its position. 559 Japan contends that, in this dispute, the "scope
and content" of Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, whic h relates to the administration of measures, is
different from the "scope and content" of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, which relate to
the substantive content of measures. It follows, for Japan, that the Panel was required to address
Japan's Article X:1 claim against the TRRs measure.
560
5.193. Argentina considers that Japan's reliance on the Appellate Body's findings in US – Tuna II
(Mexico) is misplaced because, in Argentina's view, the "scope and content" of Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994 overlaps with the "scope and content" of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. 561
In addition, Argentina argues that Japan is inco rrect in arguing that a panel engages in false
judicial economy every time that the "scope and content" of the legal provision on which it declines
to rule is not the same as the "scope and content" of the legal provision on which it does rule.562
5.194. In our view, the fact that two provisions ha ve a different "scope and content" does not, in
and of itself, imply that a panel must addre ss each and every claim under those provisions.

555 Appellate Body Reports, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19, DSR 1997:I, p. 340; US – Tuna II
(Mexico), para. 403.
556 Appellate Body Reports, US – Upland Cotton, para. 732; US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 404.
557 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 223. (fns omitted) For instance, in
Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body considered that the fact that the panel made findings concerning a
violation of Article 5.1 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement) with respect to certain Canadian salmon, without findings under Articles 5.5 and 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, would not enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to
allow for compliance by Australia with its obligations under the SPS Agreement. (Ibid., para. 224) The
Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, explaining that findings under
Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture were not sufficient to "fully resolve" that dispute because, by
declining to rule on the claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, that panel precluded the possibility of a
remedy being made available, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, in the event of a finding of
inconsistency under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar,
para. 335)
558 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 223. See also Appellate Body Reports, EC – Export
Subsidies on Sugar, paras. 322 and 331; Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133; US – Upland
Cotton, para. 732; and Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.93.
559 Japan's other appellant's submission, para. 12 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico), para. 405).
560 Japan's other appellant's submission, paras. 4, 9, and 13 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
EC – Poultry, para. 115).
561 Argentina's appellee's submission, para. 23. Argentina argues that the entire universe of "laws,
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings" subject to Article X:1 falls within the scope of "other
measures" covered by Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and that the content of these provisions substantially
overlap. (Ibid., para. 24)
562 Argentina recalls that, in US – Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body concluded that, having made
findings of inconsistency under Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), the panel in that dispute did not err in
refraining from making additional findings under Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Yet, in
Argentina's view, the "scope and content" of those provisions are unequivocally distinct. (Argentina's appellee's
submission, para. 25 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 250))
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Indeed, if this were so, then only in the rarest of circumstances would a panel be able to exercise
judicial economy on a claim. As the Appellate Body has explained in previous disputes, what
should guide panels in their decision to exercise judicial economy is the need to address all of
those claims whose resolution is necessary to resolve the dispute so as to avoid a partial resolution
of the dispute.
5.195. We note that there is a key difference between the situation in the present dispute and the
situation that was before the Appellate Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico) . In this dispute, the Panel
made a finding of inconsistency under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, before exercising judicial
economy with respect to a claim under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994. In contrast, in US – Tuna II
(Mexico), the panel made no finding of inconsistency under Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), before exercising judicial economy with respect to
claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. We recognize that, in US – Tuna II (Mexico),
the Appellate Body disagreed with the panel that the obligations under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994, on the one hand, and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, on the other hand, were
"substantially the same". This was, however, not the basis for the Appellate Body's ruling against
the panel's exercise of judicial economy. Rather , after recalling that panels need address only
"those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently
precise recommendations and rulings" 563, the Appellate Body concluded that the panel had not
made sufficient findings and, for that reason, had exercised "false judicial economy".564
5.196. Japan also contends that the exercise of judicial economy would fail to ensure the effective
resolution of disputes where compliance obligations arising from different claims are not identical
and actions that would result in compliance with one finding would not necessarily result in
compliance with the other finding. 565 Japan argues that its "Article X:1 claim is aimed at making
Argentina undertake implementing actions in a transparent manner, which is different from and
could go beyond what is required by implementing actions under Articles XI:1 and III:4 claims." 566
Japan adds that the transparency obligations und er Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 are particularly
important in the circumstances of this dispute. Japan contends that, given the opaque and
non-transparent nature of the TRRs measur e, without the publication of the current
GATT-inconsistent TRRs measure, it may be uncle ar to economic operators whether, when, and
how the TRRs measure has been fully removed or rectified.567
5.197. We note some ambiguity in Japan's arguments, which may be understood to refer to the
publication of: (i) any implementing measures that may be adopted by Argentina to bring the
TRRs measure into conformity with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994; or (ii) the current
GATT-inconsistent TRRs measure.
5.198. We disagree with Japan's argument to the extent that it may be understood as suggesting
that a finding under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 is necessary to ensure that Argentina is subject
to an obligation to publish promptly any implemen ting measures that may be adopted to bring the
TRRs measure into conformity with the GATT 1994. In our view, the obligation to publish promptly
any new or modified laws of general application does not stem from the implementation of a
finding of inconsistency of the current TRRs measure with Article X:1. Rather, for any new or
modified implementing measures that fall within the scope of Article X:1, the publication obligation
stems from Article X:1 itself. While the implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings under
Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 may require changes to the TRRs measure in order for
Argentina to bring itself into compliance with those provisions, compliance with a finding of
inconsistency under Article X:1 would lead only to publication of the existing measure.
5.199. We note that Japan's arguments may also be understood to refer to the publication of the
current GATT-inconsistent TRRs measure. Japan co ntends that accepting the Panel's exercise of
judicial economy would fail to ensure effective resolution of the dispute, considering that the
compliance obligations arising from findings under Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, on the
one hand, and under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, on the other hand, are not identical. We recall,

563 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 403 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Australia – Salmon, para. 223).
564 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 405.
565 Japan's other appellant's submission, para. 14.
566 Japan's other appellant's submission, para. 4.
567 Japan's opening statement at the oral hearing; Japan's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

in this connection, that the Panel considered that, given its findings of inconsistency with
Articles III:4 and XI:1, the issue of "whether Argentina published its measures in a manner
consistent with Article X:1 … was no longer relevant for purposes of resolving this dispute."
568
5.200. The Panel recommended that the DSB request Argentina to bring the TRRs measure into
conformity with its obligations under Ar ticles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. 569 Argentina might
have different ways to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB to bring the TRRs
measure into conformity with the GATT 1994. Japa n argues that, absent publication of the TRRs
measure, it may be unclear to economic operators whether, when, and how the TRRs measure has
been fully removed or rectified.
570 However, to the extent that Argentina will have to modify or
withdraw the TRRs measure to comply with the recommendations under Articles III:4 and XI:1,
the TRRs measure – in its current form and with its current content – will cease to exist.
Accordingly, we fail to understand how the publication of this WTO-inconsistent measure would
contribute to securing a positive solution to this dispute.
5.201. Finally, Japan suggests that the publication of the current TRRs measure is necessary for
Japan and economic operators to verify Argentina's compliance with the obligations under
Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In this re spect, we consider that the elaboration of the
content of the current TRRs measure, set out in some detail in the Panel Reports, will assist the
complainants, other Members, and interested econ omic operators in assessing Argentina's actions
to bring the TRRs measure into conformity with Argentina's obligations under the GATT 1994.
5.202. In the light of the above, we do not consider that Japan has demonstrated that requiring
Argentina to publish the current GATT-inconsistent TRRs measure is necessary to secure a positive
solution to this dispute. Although it could have been useful if the Panel had elaborated upon its
reasoning for considering that the publication of the TRRs measure was "no longer relevant", we
are not persuaded that the Panel's exercise of judicial economy with respect to Japan's claim under
Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 against the TRRs measure provides only a "partial resolution of the
matter at issue". Nonetheless, we recall that, purs uant to Article X:1, all trade-related measures,
including unwritten measures, constituting "[l]laws, regulations, judicial decisions and
administrative rulings of general application" that are made effective by a Member and that pertain
to the subject-matters identified in the first senten ce of Article X:1 "shall be published promptly in
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them."
5.203. For the above reasons, we find that Japan has not established that the Panel erred, in
paragraph 6.305 of the Panel Reports and paragraph 7.9.g of the Japan Panel Report, in exercising
judicial economy on Japan's claim that the TRRs measure is inconsistent with Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994. Given that we have not found that the Panel's exercise of judicial economy at issue
was improper, we also reject Japan's request that we complete the analysis and find that the TRRs
measure is inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.
5.2.5 Overall conclusions on the TRRs measure
5.204. In the light of all of the above, we find that, in addressing the joint claims by the three
complainants against the TRRs measure, the Panel correctly established the existence of a TRRs
measure, composed of several interlinked individual TRRs and exhibiting several characteristics, in
particular its systematic and continued application. In doing so, the Panel did not err in the criteria
that it used to determine whether such measure exists. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's
finding, in paragraph 6.231 of the Panel Reports, paragraph 7.1.d of the EU Panel Report,
paragraph 7.5.c of the US Panel Report, and paragraph 7.9.d of the Japan Panel Report, that "the
Argentine authorities' imposition on economic operators of one or more of the five requirements
identified by the complainants as a condition to import or to obtain certain benefits, operates as a
single measure (the TRRs measure) attributable to Argentina".
5.205. As a consequence, we also uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.265 of the
Panel Reports, paragraph 7.1.e of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.5.d of the US Panel Report,
and paragraph 7.9.e of the Japan Panel Report, "that the TRRs measure, consisting of the
Argentine authorities' imposition of one or more of the five requirements identified by the

568 Panel Reports, para. 5.12.
569 Japan Panel Report, para. 7.12.
570 Japan's opening statement at the oral hearing; Japan's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

complainants as a condition to import, constitutes a restriction on the importation of goods and is
thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994", as well as the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 6.295 of the Panel Reports, that "the TRRs measure, with respect to the local content
requirement, is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994" because it "modifies the
conditions of competition in the Argentine market to the detriment of imported products" so that
"imported products are granted less favourable treatment than like domestic products".
5.206. We also find that Argentina has not established that, in addressing Japan's "as such"
claims, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, and that Japan has not
established that the Panel erred in exercising ju dicial economy, in paragraph 6.305 of the Panel
Reports and paragraph 7.9.g of the Japan Panel Report, on Japan's claim that the TRRs measure is
inconsistent with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.
5.3 The DJAI procedure: Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
5.3.1 Introduction
5.207. We now turn to Argentina's appeal in connection with the DJAI procedure.
571 Argentina
raises three claims of error in connection with the Panel's analysis of whether the DJAI procedure
is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Argentina contends that the Panel erred in its
assessment of the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 and, in particular, in allegedly suggesting
that this provision does not encompass import pr ocedures that are a "necessary pre-requisite for
importing goods".
572 In addition, Argentina contends that the Panel failed to establish and apply a
proper analytical framework for distinguishing be tween the scope and disciplines of Article VIII of
the GATT 1994, on the one hand, and Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, on the other hand. 573 Finally,
Argentina claims that the Panel erred in concluding that, because the approval of a DJAI is not
"automatic", the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1. 574 Argentina contends that the
mere fact that an import formality or requirement does not result in the "automatic" importation of
goods does not render it a restriction under Article XI:1.575
5.208. Thus, Argentina requests us: (i) to modify or reverse the Panel's findings, in
paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports, concerning the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994;
(ii) to modify the Panel's reasoning in paragraphs 6.435 through 6.445 of the Panel Reports, and
to find that import formalities and requirements can only be found to be inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 where it is demonstrated that: (a) the formality or requirement
limits the quantity or amount of imports to a ma terial degree that is separate and independent of
the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or requirement
implements; and (b) this separate and independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the
effect that would ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature; and (iii) to
reverse the Panel's finding in paragraph 6.474 of the Panel Reports, as well as the Panel's ultimate
finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
576
5.209. Before examining Argentina's claims, we summarize pertinent aspects of the Panel's
interpretation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. We then set out our understanding of certain
issues relating to the interpretation of discrete elements of Article XI:1. Thereafter, we examine
Argentina's claims of error in respect of the Panel' s interpretation of Article XI:1 and the scope of
Article VIII. In the last part of this section, we summarize the Panel's findings regarding the
application of Article XI:1 to the DJAI procedure, and we then examine Argentina's claim that the
Panel erred in concluding that, because the approval of a DJAI is not "automatic", the DJAI
procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1.

571 The Panel's explanation of the DJAI procedure is summarized above in section 4.2 of these Reports.
572 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 206.
573 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 206.
574 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 206.
575 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 239.
576 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 219, 223, 236, 242, and 243.3. With respect to the
Panel's ultimate finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, Argentina
refers to paragraph 6.479 of the Panel Reports, paragraph 7.2.a of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.6.a of the
US Panel Report, and paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.3.2 The Panel's findings in connection with the interpretation of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994
5.210. Before the Panel, the complainants claime d that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because it constitutes a restriction on the importation of products.577
Argentina responded that the DJAI procedure is not subject to the disciplines of Article XI:1.
According to Argentina, the DJAI procedure is used as a customs risk assessment tool by which
Argentina assesses and manages the risk of non- compliance with Argentina's customs laws and
regulations prior to customs clearance, and was adopted in line with the World Customs
Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade
(WCO SAFE Framework).
578 As such, Argentina contended that the DJAI procedure is a formality or
requirement imposed in connection with importatio n subject to Article VIII of the GATT 1994. For
Argentina, because Articles VIII and XI:1 have mutually exclusive scopes of application, the
DJAI procedure is subject to only the former of these two provisions.579
5.211. In examining this claim and addressing Argentina's defence, the Panel began by briefly
examining Article VIII of the GA TT 1994 and the question of whether the DJAI procedure is a
customs risk assessment tool. Based on the respon ses that the WCO Secretariat provided to the
questions that had been put to it 580, the Panel expressed doubt as to whether the DJAI procedure
is used as a customs risk assessment tool. 581 The Panel also expressed the view that the
DJAI procedure "is not a mere formality imposed by Argentina in connection with the importation
of goods".
582 The Panel observed, nevertheless, that, even assuming that the DJAI procedure were
a customs or import formality subject to Articl e VIII, the Panel would still need to determine
whether this fact would exclude per se the applicability of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The Panel
then turned to the interpretation of Article XI:1 to examine whether customs or import procedures
or formalities that fall within the scope of Article VIII are excluded from the scope of
Article XI:1.
583
5.212. The Panel set out its understanding of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 in different sections of
the Panel Reports. 584 The Panel noted that Article XI:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to
institute or maintain import or export prohibitions or restrictions 585, and does not distinguish
between different categories of prohibitions or restrictions.586 The Panel understood the expression
"or other measures" in Article XI:1 to mean that th is provision covers all measures that constitute
prohibitions or restrictions other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes, or other
charges.587 In addition, the Panel took the view that the term "restriction" is defined as a limiting
condition that has restrictive effects on importation. 588 The Panel considered, however, that "not
any condition placed on importation is inconsistent with Article XI, but only those that have a
limiting effect on imports". 589 According to the Panel, the expression "on … importation" in
Article XI:1 means a restriction "with regard to" or "in connection with" the importation of the
product.
590 Finally, the Panel understood that it is not necessary to establish actual, quantifiable,

577 Panel Reports, paras. 6.413, 6.415, 6.416, and 6.418.
578 Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 191-193, 214, and 239-261; Panel Reports,
para. 6.427.
579 Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 155, 176-179, and 299; Panel Reports,
paras. 6.419, 6.425, and 6.427.
580 Panel Reports, paras. 1.37, 1.38, and 6.428.
581 Panel Reports, para. 6.430.
582 Panel Reports, para. 6.433.
583 Panel Reports, paras. 6.434 and 6.444.
584 The Panel examined Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 in the context of: (i) its analysis of the claims
against the TRRs measure at paragraphs 6.243 and 6.264 of the Panel Reports; (ii) its analysis of the
relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 at paragraphs 6.435-6.443 of the Panel Reports;
and (iii) its analysis of the claims against the DJAI procedure at paragraphs 6.449-6.478 of the Panel Reports.
585 Panel Reports, paras. 6.440 and 6.449.
586 Panel Reports, para. 6.435.
587 Panel Reports, paras. 6.246, 6.248, 6.435, 6.440, 6.442, and 6.450 (referring to Panel Report,
Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.17; and GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 104).
588 Panel Reports, paras. 6.251, 6.254, and 6.452 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw
Materials, para. 319; and Panel Reports, India – Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 5.128 and 5.129; and
India – Autos, paras. 7.265, 7.269, and 7.270).
589 Panel Reports, para. 6.253 (referring to Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.917).
590 Panel Reports, para. 6.458 (quoting Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.257; and referring to Panel
Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.261).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

negative effects on the overall level of imports to find that a measure is inconsistent with
Article XI:1. Rather, to determine whether a measure imposes a "limiting condition" on imports, a
panel must examine the design and structure of the measure at issue.
591
5.213. In addressing Argentina's specific defence to the claims under Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 against the DJAI procedure, the Panel opined that Article VIII customs or import
procedures or formalities are not excluded per se from the scope of application of Article XI:1 592,
and that Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 do not impose mutually exclusive obligations. 593
In the Panel's view, the consistency of an import or customs formality or requirement could be
assessed under either Article VIII or Article XI:1, or under both provisions.594
5.3.3 Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
5.214. Argentina's appeal calls for us to consider certain issues relating to the interpretation of
discrete elements of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 . In order to situate these elements properly
within their broader context, we begin by setting out relevant aspects of our understanding of
Article XI.
5.215. Article XI of the GATT 1994 provides, in relevant part:
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures,
shall be instituted or maintained by any Member on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other Member or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other Member.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Ar ticle shall not extend to the following: …
5.216. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 lays down a general obligation to eliminate quantitative
restrictions. It prohibits Members to institute or maintain prohibitions or restrictions other than
duties, taxes, or other charges, on the importation, exportation, or sale for export of any product
destined for another Member.
5.217. In China – Raw Materials , the Appellate Body observed that the term "prohibition" is
defined as a "legal ban on the trade or importation of a specified commodity".
595 In that dispute,
the Appellate Body also referred to the term "restriction" as "[a] thing which restricts someone or
something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation" and, thus, generally, as
something that has a limiting effect.
596 The use of the word "quantitative" in the title of Article XI
of the GATT 1994 informs the interpretation of the words "restriction" and "prohibition" in
Article XI:1, suggesting that the coverage of Article XI includes those prohibitions and restrictions
that limit the quantity or amount of a product being imported or exported.
597 This provision,
however, does not cover simply any restriction or prohibition. Rather, Article XI:1 refers to
prohibitions or restrictions "on the importation … or on the exportation or sale for export". Thus, in
our view, not every condition or burden placed on importation or exportation will be inconsistent
with Article XI, but only those that are limiting, that is, those that limit the importation or

591 Panel Reports, paras. 6.264, 6.451, and 6.476 (referring to Panel Reports, Argentina – Hides and
Leather, para. 11.20; Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7.240 and 7.252; and China – Raw Materials,
paras. 7.915 and 7.1081).
592 Panel Reports, paras. 6.435, 6.439, and 6.444.
593 Panel Reports, paras. 6.436-6.439 and 6.443.
594 Panel Reports, para. 6.443.
595 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 319 (quoting Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 2363).
596 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 319 (quoting Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 2553).
597 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 320.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

exportation of products.598 Moreover, this limitation need not be demonstrated by quantifying the
effects of the measure at issue; rather, such li miting effects can be demonstrated through the
design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at issue considered in its relevant
context.
5.218. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 prohibits prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes,
or other charges "made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures".
The Appellate Body has described the word "effective", when relating to a legal instrument, as "in
operation at a given time".
599 We note that the definition of the term "effective" also includes
something "[t]hat is concerned in the production of an event or condition". 600 Moreover, the
Appellate Body has described the words "made effective", when used in connection with
governmental measures, as something that may re fer to a measure being "operative", "in force",
or as having "come into effect".
601 In Article XI:1, the expression "made effective through"
precedes the terms "quotas, import or export licences or other measures". This suggests to us that
the scope of Article XI:1 covers measures through which a prohibition or restriction is produced or
becomes operative.
602
5.219. As noted by the Panel, while the term "or other measures" suggests a broad coverage 603,
the scope of application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is not unfettered. Article XI:1 itself
explicitly excludes "duties, taxes and other charges" from its scope of application. Article XI:2 of
the GATT 1994 further restricts the scope of applic ation of Article XI:1 by providing that the
provisions of Article XI:1 shall not extend to the areas listed in Article XI:2.604
5.220. We acknowledge that certain provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Articles XII, XIV, XV,
XVIII, XX, and XXI, permit a Member, in certain sp ecified circumstances, to be excused from its
obligations under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. 605 In these provisions, express reference is made
to the relationship of each provision with the obligations contained in Article XI:1 606 or with the
obligations under the GATT 1994 more generally.607 This is not to say that provisions not explicitly

598 We note that our understanding of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is supported by two provisions of
the Import Licensing Agreement that suggest that certain import licensing procedures may result in some
burden without themselves having trade-restrictive effects on imports. Footnote 4 of the Import Licensing
Agreement provides that "import licensing procedures requiring a security which have no restrictive effects on
imports are to be considered as falling within the scope of [Article 2]", which deals with automatic import
licensing. In addition, Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement provides that, while "[n]on-automatic
licensing shall not have trade-restrictive … effects on im ports additional to those caused by the imposition of
the restriction", such procedures "shall be no more administratively burdensome than absolutely necessary to
administer the measure."
599 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 356 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 9th edn,
B.A. Garner (ed.) (West Group, 2009), p. 592).
600 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 799. (emphasis original)
601 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 20, DSR 1996:I, p. 19 (quoting The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary on Historical Principles, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 786).
602 Our understanding of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is supported by the wording of the first sentence
of Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement, which provides that "[n]on-automatic licensing shall not have
trade-restrictive or -distortive effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the
restriction." (emphasis added) In our view, the first sentence of Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement
also suggests an examination of whether a restriction is produced or caused through the measure at issue
itself, which seems to support our understanding of the relevant part of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
603 See Panel Reports, paras. 6.246, 6.435, and 6.450.
604 Article XI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides, in relevant part, that the provisions of Article XI:1 shall not
extend to the following:
(a) Export prohibitions or restrict ions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages
of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or
regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international
trade;
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form,*
necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate: …
605 See Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 73.
606 See e.g. Article XII:1 of the GATT 1994, which authorizes certain restrictions to safeguard the
balance of payments, and starts with the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article XI".
607 See e.g. Article XV:9 of the GATT 1994, which provides that nothing in the GATT 1994 shall preclude
the use by Members of the exchange restrictions or controls defined therein.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

referring to the obligations contained in Article XI:1, or to the obligations under the GATT 1994
more generally, do not contain elements that are relevant to their relationship with, and the
interpretation of, Article XI:1.
5.221. We note that, even for those measures th at are expressly excluded or excused from the
obligations contained in Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, this is only the case to the extent that
those measures satisfy all of the conditions specified for such treatment. For example, the scope of
certain exclusions or exceptions is circumscribed with the imposition of certain conditions, often
with reference to the concept of "necessity".
608 When a measure imposes a restriction or
prohibition on the importation of goods, and such restriction or prohibition exceeds what is
"necessary" for the authorized objective, or departs from the specified conditions, then such
restriction or prohibition will violate the obligation contained in Article XI:1.
609
5.222. With this understanding in mind, we turn to consider the arguments made by Argentina on
appeal that Article VIII of the GATT 1994 creates, or operates as a form of, derogation or
carve-out from the scope of the obligations under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
5.3.4 Argentina's claim that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994
5.223. Turning to Argentina's appeal, we begin with its claim that the Panel erred in its
interpretation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 by failing to establish and apply a "proper analytical
framework" for distinguishing between the scope and disciplines of Article VIII of the GATT 1994,
on the one hand, and the scope and disciplines of Article XI:1, on the other hand. 610 Argentina
requests us to modify the Panel's reasoning in paragraphs 6.435 through 6.445 of the Panel
Reports, and to find that import formalities and re quirements can be found to be inconsistent with
Article XI:1 only where it is demonstrated that: (i) the formality or requirement limits the quantity
or amount of imports to a material degree that is separate and independent of the trade-restricting
effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or requirement implements; and
(ii) this separate and independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the effect that would
ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature.
611
5.224. We begin by noting the limited scope of Argentina's challenge to the Panel's interpretation
of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Argentina allege s that the Panel failed to recognize that an
import formality or requirement could have some degree of trade-restricting effect that is "an
ordinary incident of the formality or requirement itself" and that does not render the formality or
requirement inconsistent with Article XI:1.
612 Argentina does not appeal any other specific
elements or intermediary findings of the Panel's interpretation of Article XI:1.
5.225. Argentina makes two main arguments. First, Argentina argues that the scope of application
of Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 are mutually exclusive. Second, Argentina argues that a
harmonious interpretation of Articles VIII and XI:1 would require, at a minimum, some means of
distinguishing the trade-restrictive effect of a formality or requirement itself from the

608 See e.g. Articles XI:2(b), XI:2(c), XII:2(a), XIV:5(a), XV:9, and XX of the GATT 1994.
609 In this regard, we note the following statement by the 1954-1955 Review Working Party on
"Quantitative Restrictions":
The Working Party … [considered th at it] might be useful … to re affirm that the maintenance or
the application of a restriction which went beyond what would be "necessary" to achieve the
objects defined in paragraph 2(b) or 2(c) of Article XI would be inconsistent with the provisions
of that Article. This is made clear in the text of these provisions by the use of the word
"necessary". Restrictions related to the application of standards or regulations for the
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade which go beyond what
is necessary for the application of those standards or regulations and thus have an unduly
restrictive effect on trade, would clearly be inconsistent with Article XI.
(GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, updated 6th edn (WTO, 1995), pp. 326-327 and
fn 55 thereto (quoting WTO document L/332/Rev.1 and Addenda, adopted on 2, 4, and 5 March 1955,
BISD 3S/170, pp. 189-190, para. 67))
We also note that Article XII:2(b) of the GATT 1994 provides that Members "shall eliminate the
restrictions when conditions would no longer justify their institution or maintenance under [subparagraph (a)]."
610 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 206.
611 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 223, 236, and 243.3.
612 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 232 and 234.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

trade-restrictive effect of any substantive rule of importation that the measure implements. We
examine each of these arguments below.
5.226. Argentina argues that Articles VIII and XI of the GATT 1994 "must be interpreted as
mutually exclusive in their respective spheres of application in order to ensure that Members are
allowed to maintain the types of import formalit ies and requirements that Article VIII expressly
contemplates."613 Argentina notes that "Article VIII expressly acknowledges the right of Members
to maintain import formalities and requirements" and "recognizes the necessity of these
measures", whereas Article XI categorically prohibits any type of measure that falls within its
scope.614 Argentina contends that, by acknowledging "the need for minimizing the incidence and
complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export
documentation requirements", the drafters of Arti cle VIII were aware that import formalities and
requirements are potentially an impedime nt to trade, at least to some degree. 615 In Argentina's
view, if such effects rendered the measure a prohibited quantitative restriction under Article XI,
then Members would be unable to maintain import formalities and requirements even though
Article VIII recognizes the necessity of these measures.
616
5.227. The complainants argue that Articles V III and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 apply cumulatively
where import formalities or requirements regulate the importation of products. 617 The
United States also submits that Article VIII does not limit the scope of Article XI of the GATT 1994,
and that a restriction cannot escape scrutiny under the latter provision merely by being
characterized as an Article VIII formality or requirement.
618 Japan and the United States also
contend that Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994 contains hortatory language and does not create
an exception to Article XI:1. 619 Finally, Japan notes that, where the treaty drafters intended to
insert derogations from other Articles of the GATT 1994, they did so explicitly.620
5.228. We recall that the Panel only briefly ex amined Article VIII:4 of the GATT 1994, and the
meaning of the term "formality" in this provision. 621 Without further examination of Article VIII of
the GATT 1994, the Panel considered that, even assuming that the DJAI procedure were a customs
or import formality subject to Article VIII, an exam ination of the applicability of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 would still be required. On this basis, the Panel turned to the interpretation of
Article XI:1.622 Given Argentina's argument that the scope of application of Articles VIII and XI:1
are mutually exclusive, we consider it necessary to examine Article VIII in greater detail. Thus, we
turn first to Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
5.229. We note that Article VIII of the GATT 1994 provides, in relevant part:
Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation[]
1. ( a) All fees and charges of whatever char acter (other than import and export
duties and other than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by Members on
or in connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the
approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to
domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.
 ( b) The Members recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of
fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a).

613 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 205.
614 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 221.
615 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 221.
616 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 221.
617 European Union's response to questioning at the oral hearing; United States' appellee's submission,
paras. 58-60; Japan's appellee's submission, para. 122.
618 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 59, 60, and 65.
619 United States' appellee's submission, para. 66; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 117 and 121.
620 Japan's appellee's submission, para. 119.
621 See Panel Reports, paras. 6.431 and 6.432. Subsequently, the Panel restated the disciplines
contained in Article VIII of the GATT 1994. See ibid., para. 6.441.
622 Panel Reports, paras. 6.434 and 6.435.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

 ( c) The Members also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and
complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import
and export documentation requirements.[]
2. A Member shall, upon request by another Member or by the Ministerial
Conference, review the operation of its la ws and regulations in the light of the
provisions of this Article.
3. No Member shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs
regulations or procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any
omission or mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and
obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than
necessary to serve merely as a warning.
4. The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and
requirements imposed by governmental authorities in connection with importation and
exportation, including those relating to:
(a) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates;
(b) quantitative restrictions;
(c) licensing;
(d) exchange control;
(e) statistical services;
(f) documents, documentation and certification;
(g) analysis and inspection; and
(h) quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.
5.230. We consider that Article VIII of the GATT 1994 imposes three clear obligations on
Members. First, Article VIII:1(a) provides that all fees and charges, other than import and export
duties and internal taxes under Article III of th e GATT 1994, shall be limited in amount to the
approximate cost of services rendered, and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic
production or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes. Second, Article VIII:2 provides
that, upon request, a Member shall review the oper ation of its laws and regulations in the light of
Article VIII. Finally, Article VIII:3 provides that, inter alia, no Member shall impose substantial
penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements.
5.231. By contrast, Articles VIII:1(b) and VIII:1(c) do not appear to us to impose mandatory
obligations. Rather, in dealing, respectively, with (i) fees and charges and (ii) formalities and
documentation requirements, the language of these two provisions is more hortatory in nature.
Unlike the provisions discussed above, neither of these two subparagraphs uses the mandatory
verb "shall". Instead, Members "recognize the need" to do something. Nor do these provisions
speak of a prohibition. Instead, they refer to "reducing", "minimizing", "simplifying", and
"decreasing" the number, diversity, and complexity of fees, charges, formalities, and
documentation requirements. Article VIII:1(c), in particular, provides that Members recognize the
need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for
decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirements.
5.232. Finally, Article VIII:4 outlines the scope of Article VIII, setting forth that the provisions of
Article VIII shall extend to fees, charges, formal ities, and requirements imposed by governmental
authorities in connection with importation and exportation. Article VIII:4 also provides an
illustrative list of the types of measures to which these fees, charges, formalities, and
requirements may relate.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.233. Argentina's argument relies on the langua ge in Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994. We do
not necessarily disagree with Argentina that the reference, in Article VIII:1(c), to the "need for
minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and
simplifying import and export documentation requirements" implies a recognition by Members that
import formalities and requirements can have trade-restricting effects, at least to some degree.
623
We also accept that Article VIII:1(c) constitutes context for the interpretation of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994, and for what amounts to a restriction on importation within the meaning of the latter
provision. Yet, such language does not suffice to establish the type of carve-out or derogation from
Article XI:1 that Argentina seems to envisage for formalities and requirements referred to in
Article VIII of the GATT 1994. To the contra ry, the general and hortatory language of
Article VIII:1(c) stands in contrast to, for exam ple, the language of Article VIII:1(a) of the
GATT 1994. The mandatory language used in Articl e VIII:1(a) makes clear that fees and charges
imposed in connection with importation will be consistent with the obligation set down in that
provision only when such fees and charges meet the specific conditions prescribed therein, that is,
when they are limited in amount to the approx imate cost of services rendered and do not
represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports for fiscal purposes.
5.234. The language of Article VIII:1(c) of the GA TT 1994 differs from that of Article VIII:1(a) of
the GATT 1994 in another important respect. Article VIII:1(a) explicitly excludes from the scope of
its application import duties (covered by Article II of the GATT 1994
624), export duties, and taxes
falling within the scope of Article III of the GATT 1994. In contrast, Article VIII:1(c) does not
contain express language identifying its relationship with other provisions of the GATT 1994.
5.235. Similarly, the language of Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994 also stands in opposition to
that of other provisions of the GATT 1994 that ex clude or excuse measures from the obligation
under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. As prev iously explained, where the GATT 1994 permits
Members to adopt a particular type of restrict ion on the importation of goods, the relevant
provisions typically refer to the relationship with the obligations contained in Article XI:1 or the
obligations under the GATT 1994 more generally. In this connection, Argentina has not identified
any language in Article VIII or Article XI:1 that somehow authorizes Members to apply import
formalities and requirements that amount to restrictions on the importation of goods.
625
5.236. Lastly, to the extent that Argentina's argument may imply the existence of a conflict
between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, Argentina has identified no specific obligation or
language in Article VIII that allegedly conflicts with the general obligation in Article XI:1 to
eliminate quantitative restrictions. Nor has Argentina explained its understanding of such a
conflict.
626 As the Appellate Body has held in previous disputes, and as noted by the Panel 627, the
provisions of the WTO covered agreements should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent
manner, giving meaning to all applicable provisions harmoniously.628
5.237. For all of these reasons, we agree with the Panel that formalities or requirements under
Article VIII of the GATT 1994 are not excluded per se from the scope of application of Article XI:1
of the GATT 1994, and that their consistency co uld be assessed under either Article VIII or

623 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 221.
624 Article II of the GATT 1994, which concerns the imposition of import duties, also contains language
elucidating the relationship between the scope of coverage of the obligations thereunder and of those in
Article VIII of the GATT 1994. Article II:2(c) of the GATT 1994 provides that nothing in Article II shall prevent
a Member from imposing at any time on the importation of any product "fees or other charges commensurate
with the cost of services rendered".
625 We recall that, as noted above, there are no explicit cross-references concerning the general
relationship between "prohibitions or restrictions" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and "formalities" or
"requirements" under Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
626 We note that past panels have taken different views on the notion of conflict in international law.
(See e.g. Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.159; and Indonesia – Autos, fn 649 to para. 14.28)
627 Panel Reports, para. 6.437.
628 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.123; US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties (China), para. 570; and US – Upland Cotton, para. 549 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 81 and fn 72 thereto, in turn referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Korea – Dairy, para. 81; US – Gasoline, p. 23, DSR 1996:I, p. 21; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 12,
DSR 1996:I, p. 106; and India – Patents (US), para. 45).
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

Article XI:1, or under both provisions. 629 Thus, we reject Argentina's argument that Articles VIII
and XI:1 have mutually exclusive spheres of application.
5.238. We turn now to Argentina's second argument. Argentina argues that a harmonious
interpretation of Articles VIII and XI:1 of th e GATT 1994 would require, at a minimum, some
means of distinguishing the trade-restrictive effect of a formality or requirement itself from the
trade-restrictive effect of any substantive rule of importation that the measure implements. 630 In
Argentina's view, this harmonious interpretation must provide a basis for identifying the point at
which an Article VIII import formality or requirement becomes a prohibited "quantitative
restriction" under Article XI:1. 631 Argentina proposes that, for an import formality or requirement
to be found to constitute an Article XI:1 restrictio n, in its own right, then it must be shown that:
(i) the formality or requirement limits the quanti ty of imports to a material degree that is
independent of the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality
or requirement implements; and (ii) this independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the
effect that would ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature.
632
Argentina purports to find support for its proposed approach in the reasoning employed by the
panels in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and China – Raw Materials.633
5.239. The complainants contend that Argentina's analytical framework is not applicable to these
disputes because, while the framework is intended to determine whether an import formality or
requirement constitutes a restriction under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, the complainants' claims
do not concern import formalities or requirements. Rather, the complainants' claims concern the
DJAI's discretionary system of authorization of imports that, on its face, does not implement a
separate WTO-consistent restriction.
634 The European Union and Japan also argue that Argentina's
proposed analytical framework has no textual basis in the GATT 1994. 635 Finally, the complainants
submit that the panel reports in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and China – Raw Materials do
not support Argentina's proposed analytical framework, and stand only for the proposition that, for
purposes of Article XI:1, the challenged measures themselves, as opposed to any underlying
restriction such as a quota, must restrict the importation of products.
636
5.240. At the outset, we note that Argentina has not identified a specific legal basis for its
analytical framework to determine whether an import formality or requirement constitutes a
"restriction" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Argentina does not point to the text of either
Article XI:1 or Article VIII of the GATT 1994 as support for its proposed analytical framework.
Moreover, despite Argentina's contention to the contrary
637, Argentina's two-step proposal is not
set out in or implied by the reasoning employed by the panels in Korea – Various Measures on
Beef and China – Raw Materials. Rather, as argued by the complainants, these panel reports stand
for the proposition that, for purposes of Article XI:1, the challenged measures themselves must

629 Panel Reports, paras. 6.435, 6.439, 6.443, and 6.444.
630 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 222.
631 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 205. We also note Argentina's argument that it would be
unnecessary for Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994 to recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and
complexity of certain formalities and for decreasing and simplifying certain documentation requirements if such
characteristics were prohibited per se under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. (Argentina's appellant's submission,
para. 221; response to questioning at the oral hearing)
632 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 223.
633 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 225 and 226 (quoting Panel Reports, Korea – Various
634 European Union's appellee's submission, paras. 177, 181, 188, and 189; United States' appellee's
submission, paras. 57 and 81; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 112 and 124.
635 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 192; Japan's appellee's submission, para. 116.
636 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 191; United States' appellee's submission,
paras. 77-80; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 126 and 127.
637 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 224-226 (quoting Panel Reports, Korea – Various
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

limit the importation of products, and the limitation caused by other measures should not be
attributed to them.638
5.241. We further observe that some of the arguments raised by Argentina in this part of its
appeal seem to suggest that the Panel's reasoning implies that any measure falling within the
scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 would be prohibited per se u n d e r A r t i c l e X I : 1 o f t h e
GATT 1994.639 We do not see that the Panel made any such suggestion. Indeed, as explained
above, in setting out its understanding of Article XI:1, the Panel expressed the view that "not any
condition placed on importation is inconsistent with Article XI, but only those that have a limiting
effect on imports". 640 In making this statement, the Panel agreed with and quoted from two
previous panel reports, in which the panels also took the view that conditions or prerequisites
placed on importation would be prohibited under Article XI:1 only where they have a limiting effect
on importation.
641 Indeed, Argentina itself invokes the reasoning from one of those panel reports –
China – Raw Materials – in support of its position. Accordingly, it is clear to us that the Panel did
not, as Argentina suggests, consider that any me asure that constitutes a fee or formality falling
within the scope of Article VIII would necessarily be inconsistent with Article XI:1.
5.242. Argentina's appeal calls for us to examine whether and under what circumstances
measures that qualify as "formalities" or "requirements" under Article VIII of the GATT 1994 may
constitute "restrictions" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. As we have explained above, not
every condition or burden placed on importation or exportation will be prohibited by Article XI, but
only those that are limiting, that is, those that limit the importation or exportation of products.
5.243. Formalities and requirements connected to importation that fall within the scope of
application of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 typically involve the use of documentary and
procedural tools to collect, process, and verify information in connection with the importation of
products. Such import formalities and requiremen ts will often entail a certain burden on the
importation of products. At the same time, such formalities and requirements are, at least to some
extent, a routine aspect of international trade. Compliance with such formalities and requirements
enables trade to occur within a Member's specific regulatory framework. In our view, not every
burden associated with an import formality or requirement will entail inconsistency with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Instead, only those that have a limiting effect on the importation of
products will do so.
5.244. Argentina requests us to find that the Panel should have followed an analytical framework
similar to the one that Argentina proposes.
642 The first step of Argentina's proposed analytical
framework would require a finding concerning whether an import formality or requirement limits
the importation of products independently of any substantive restriction that such formality or
requirement may implement. As explained above, Argentina purports to find support for its
proposed approach in the reasoning employed by the panels in Korea – Various Measures on Beef
and China – Raw Materials .
643 In our view, these panel reports stand for the proposition that, for

638 We recall that the panel in Korea – Various Measures on Beef did not agree with the United States'
claim that a discretionary licensing system, used in conjunction with a quantitative restriction, necessarily
provides some additional level of restriction over and above the inherent restriction on access created through
the imposition of a quantitative restriction. Ultimately, the panel exercised judicial economy on the
United States' claim. (See Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 782 and 785) Similarly, the
panel in China – Raw Materials concluded that import and export licences, including those granted only upon
meeting a certain prerequisite, may be, but are not necessarily, permissible under Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994. For that panel, the key issue was whether the licensing system is designed and operates such that,
by its nature, it does not have a restrictive or limiting effect on importation or exportation. (Panel Reports,
China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.917 and 7.918)
639 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 234.
640 Panel Reports, para. 6.253.
641 Panel Reports, paras. 6.252-6.254 (quoting Panel Reports, India – Autos, para. 7.270; and
China – Raw Materials, para. 7.917).
642 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 236. As previously described, Argentina proposes that, for
an import formality or requirement to be found to constitute an Article XI:1 restriction, in its own right, it must
be shown that: (i) the formality or requirement limits the quantity of imports to a material degree that is
independent of the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or
requirement implements; and (ii) this independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the effect that would
ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature. (Ibid., para. 223)
643 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 224-226 (quoting Panel Reports, Korea – Various
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

purposes of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, the challenged measures themselves must limit the
importation of products, and the limitation caused by other measures should not be attributed to
them.
644 Moreover, as noted by Argentina, this prop osed approach has some similarity with the
one implied in the first sentence of Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement, which provides
that "[n]on-automatic licensing shall not have trade-restrictive or -distortive effects on imports
additional to those caused by the imposition of the restriction." 645 Without necessarily accepting
Argentina's suggestion that such an analysis is mandated as the first part of a two-step approach,
we observe that, in any event, this analysis is consistent with the understanding of Article XI:1
that we have set out above. As we have explaine d, Article XI:1 covers measures through which a
prohibition or restriction is produced or becomes operative. If an import formality or requirement
does not itself limit the importation of products independently of the limiting effects of another
restriction, then such import formality or requirement cannot be said to produce the limiting effect
and, thus, it will not amount to a "restriction" captured by the prohibition in Article XI:1.
5.245. The second step in Argentina's proposed analytical framework would require a finding
concerning whether any "independent trade-restricting effect" of an import formality or
requirement is greater than the effect that would ordinarily be associated with a formality or
requirement of its nature. Such an inquiry would, according to Argentina, provide a basis for
identifying the point at which an import formality or requirement covered by Article VIII of the
GATT 1994 becomes a prohibited "quantitative restriction" under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
646
Argentina neither identifies any textual basis for this proposed analytical step, nor provides any
illustration of how this abstract and general legal test might be undertaken in practice. We are not
persuaded that this element of Argentina's proposed analytical framework is useful or necessary.
Rather, as explained above, we consider that the analysis under Article XI:1 must be done on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the import formality or requirement at issue and the
relevant facts of the case. In the context of import formalities or requirements, Article XI:1
requires an examination of whether those measures themselves produce a limiting effect on
imports.
5.246. For the reasons set out above, we find that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 by failing to esta blish and apply a "proper analytical framework" for
distinguishing between the scope and disciplines of Article VIII of the GATT 1994, on the one hand,
and the scope and disciplines of Article XI:1, on the other hand. Consequently, we reject
Argentina's request that we modify the Panel's reasoning in paragraphs 6.435 through 6.445 of
the Panel Reports, and that we find that the Panel erred in failing to adopt a two-step analytical
framework similar to the one that Argentina proposes.
5.3.5 Argentina's claim that the Panel erred in its assessment of the scope of
application of Article VIII of the GATT 1994
5.247. We now turn to Argentina's request that we modify or reverse certain aspects of the
Panel's findings in paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports.
647 We note that Argentina appeals only
the statements in paragraph 6.433 made by the Panel in its discussion of whether the DJAI
procedure can be considered an import formality or requirement under Article VIII of the
GATT 1994.
648 Argentina does not appeal the Panel's findings with respect to the operation of the
DJAI procedure, or the Panel's characterization of the DJAI procedure in the light of the Panel's
understanding of the WCO SAFE Framework.649 Argentina also accepts that the Panel did not make
an ultimate finding as to the applicability of Article VIII to the DJAI procedure. 650 Nonetheless,
Argentina contends that the statements in paragraph 6.433, in particular that a DJAI in "exit"
status is a necessary prerequisite for importation and that the DJAI procedure determines the right

644 See Panel Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 782; and China – Raw Materials,
paras. 7.917 and 7.918.
645 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 241.
646 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 205. We note that it is also implicit in the first step of
Argentina's proposed analytical framework that, for Argentina, the point at which an import formality or
requirement becomes a restriction is when it limits the quantity of imports to a "material degree" that is
independent of the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or
requirement implements. (Ibid., para. 223)
647 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 219.
648 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 208-210.
649 Panel Reports, paras. 6.428 and 6.430.
650 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 208, 209, and 218.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

to import, reflect legal error. 651 Argentina's challenge focuses on the alleged implications of the
statements made in paragraph 6.433 as regards th e scope of application of Article VIII. Argentina
considers that the Panel's understanding of th e scope of Article VIII influenced the Panel's
conclusions: (i) regarding the relationship between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994; and
(ii) that any import formality or requirement that does not result in the "automatic" importation of
goods is necessarily inconsistent with Article XI. Argentina submits that, if left uncorrected, these
statements will create confusion and uncertainty concerning the interpretation and application of
Article VIII.
652
5.248. The complainants argue that the Panel did not find that the DJAI procedure falls outside
the scope of application of Article VIII of the GA TT 1994 simply because it is a prerequisite for
importing goods.653 Rather, according to the complainants, the assertion that the DJAI procedure
is a prerequisite for importing goods was just the starting point for the Panel's analysis. The
complainants submit that this assertion must be read together with the detailed analysis in
paragraphs 6.459 through 6.474 of the Panel Reports, where the Panel found that the
DJAI procedure operates as a discretionary syst em of authorization of imports by which the
Argentine authorities decide on an ad hoc basis whether to grant the right to import to each
applicant on the basis of criteria not specified in advance.
654
5.249. We recall that, before the Panel, Argentina argued that the DJAI procedure is a customs
risk assessment tool and, as such, a formalit y or requirement imposed in connection with
importation subject to Article VIII of the GATT 1994. 655 In addressing Argentina's argument, and
after having sought the assistance and expertise of the WCO Secretariat, the Panel expressed the
view that certain important elements of the DJAI procedure are not consonant with the type of
customs risk assessment tool envisaged under the WCO SAFE Framework.656 In addition, the Panel
briefly examined the scope of application of Arti cle VIII and the meaning of the term "formality".
According to the Panel, "[i]n the context of Article VIII …, a formality can be considered to include
all requirements that, although in appearance dire cted at a mere observance of forms, must be
usually observed in connection with the importation or the exportation of goods."657
5.250. Thereafter, the Panel made the following statements in paragraph 6.433 of the Panel
Reports:
Even if the Panel were to accept that the DJAI procedure is used by AFIP as a
"customs risk assessment tool", that is not the only manner in which the
DJAI procedure is used. The Panel has noted that a DJAI in exit status is a necessary
pre-requisite for importing goods into Argentina. It has also noted that a DJAI
application may be subject to "observations" that will prevent the application from
proceeding to exit status. In such case, the prospective importer will have to contact
the agencies concerned and provide the info rmation that may be required. In some
cases, the prospective importer may have to undertake certain trade-related
commitments as a condition for the agency to lift the observation and to complete the
DJAI procedure. Accordingly, the DJAI procedure is not directed at a mere observance
of forms; it is not a mere formality imposed by Argentina in connection with the

651 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 209-212.
652 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 218.
653 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 174; United States' appellee's submission, para. 57;
Japan's appellee's submission, para. 112.
654 European Union's appellee's submission, paras. 175 and 176; United States' appellee's submission,
para. 57; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 112, 127, and 134.
655 Argentina's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 191 and 263; Panel Reports, paras. 6.419,
6.425, and 6.427.
656 In particular, the Panel noted that: (i) the risks that Argentina seeks to prevent – breaches of
internal laws and regulations governing domestic economic affairs, public health, and the quality of products –
are not directly related to terrorism-related risks; (ii) the type of information requested by Argentina when a
DJAI is "observed" is unrelated to information listed in the WCO SAFE Framework; and (iii) the time at which
prospective importers are required to submit information, i.e. prior to the issuance of purchase orders, means
that such information would not be useful to assess risks pursuant to the WCO SAFE Framework, which
suggests that customs should not require information for maritime cargo to be submitted more than 24 hours
before loading at port of departure. (See Panel Reports, para. 6.430)
657 Panel Reports, para. 6.432.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

importation of goods. Rather, it is a procedure by which Argentina determines the
right to import.658
5.251. Argentina challenges this reasoning by the Panel. Argentina takes issue, in particular, with
the following two statements: (i) "a DJAI in exit status is a necessary pre-requisite for importing
goods into Argentina"; and (ii) "the DJAI procedure … is not a mere formality imposed by
Argentina in connection with the importation of goods … [r]ather, it is a procedure by which
Argentina determines the right to import." Argentina argues that the "clear implication" of these
statements, and of paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports as a whole, is that "the Panel considered
any import procedure that is a 'necessary pre-requisite for importing goods' or by which a Member
'determines the right to import' to be outsid e the scope of Article VIII" of the GATT 1994.
659 As
further evidence that this was the Panel's view, Argentina points to the Panel's contrasting of a
procedure "directed at a mere observance of forms" with "a procedure by which Argentina
determines the right to import", and its alleged implication that only the former falls within the
scope of application of Article VIII.
660
5.252. Before engaging with these arguments raised by Argentina, we consider it useful to make
certain preliminary observations. First, we highlight that certain aspects of Argentina's
argumentation seem to rest on assumptions that do not correspond, in fact, to the approach taken
by the Panel, as set out in its Reports. In part icular, Argentina argues that the DJAI procedure
consists exclusively of customs or import formalities. The Panel, however, did not seem to share
this view. Indeed, the Panel expressed the view that the DJAI procedure is not a "mere formality"
imposed by Argentina in connection with the importation of goods.
661 As explained below, we
understand the Panel to have taken the view that, even if certain characteristics of the
DJAI procedure correspond to import formalities, other characteristics of the DJAI procedure do
not. Yet the Panel did not clearly express a view on either which elements of the DJAI procedure
correspond to which types of measures, or whethe r individual elements of the DJAI procedure
could be assessed separately. To some extent, the Panel's reticence to do so may be attributable
to the way in which the parties presented their arguments. That is, none of the parties sought to
separate and distinguish the different elements composing the DJAI procedure, including any of
those possibly relating to import licensing procedures, underlying measures restricting the
importation of goods, the discretion granted to certain Argentine agencies, particular formalities or
requirements in connection with importation, or the TRRs measure. Rather, the complainants
challenged the DJAI procedure as something other than a customs or import formality, and
Argentina defended the DJAI procedure as a customs or import formality.
662 Possibly due to this
difference in the positions of the parties, the Panel did not clearly outline its understanding of the
nature of the DJAI procedure, or its component elements. Indeed, in several places in its Reports,
the Panel seems to have structured its analysis so as to avoid doing so.
5.253. For example, when setting out the order of its analysis in respect of the DJAI procedure,
the Panel decided to "first consider whether the DJAI is a customs formality imposed in connection
with importation subject to Article VIII of the GATT 1994 and, if so, whether Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 and the Import Licensing Agreement are not applicable".
663 Yet, after assessing the
scope of Article VIII, the Panel made no clear ruling in this regard, and instead decided to proceed
to examine the DJAI procedure under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 "irrespective of whether the
DJAI procedure is considered to be a customs or import formality subject to the obligations
contained in Article VIII".
664 Subsequently, the Panel declined to opine on whether or not the DJAI

658 Panel Reports, para. 6.433.
659 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 211.
660 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 211.
661 Panel Reports, para. 6.433.
662 The complainants submit that their claims under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 against the DJAI
procedure were not concerned with the import formalities or procedural requirements of the DJAI procedure,
i.e. whether the DJAI must be submitted electronically or using particular forms. Rather, according to the
complainants, their Article XI:1 claims concern the discretionary system of the DJAI procedure.
(European Union's appellee's submission, para. 181; United States' appellee's submission, para. 57; Japan's
appellee's submission, paras. 112, 127, and 134)
663 Panel Reports, para. 6.357. With respect to the claims under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and those
under the Import Licensing Agreement, the Panel decided to "commence its analysis with the complainants'
claims under Article XI:1 … since this is the only provision among the ones raised by the complainants that
deals with trade measures of a substantive nature". (Ibid., para. 6.361)
664 Panel Reports, para. 6.444.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

procedure is an import licensing procedure, and proceeded to assess the consistency of the
DJAI procedure with Article XI:1 "irrespective of whether it constitutes an import licence". 665 That
the Panel took such an approach did not, in ou r view, contribute either to the clarity of its
reasoning, or to a clear understanding of the relationship between different obligations under the
GATT 1994 and the Import Licensing Agreement. 666 Nevertheless, no party has challenged the
Panel's approach on appeal.
5.254. Returning, therefore, to Argentina's arguments on appeal, we turn to examine the
implications that, according to Argentina, arise from the reasoning of the Panel in paragraph 6.433
of the Panel Reports. First, we examine whether this paragraph implies something about "any
import procedures". Second, we examine whether this paragraph implies that an import procedure
that is a "necessary pre-requisite for importing goods" is outside the scope of Article VIII of the
GATT 1994. Finally, we consider whether an "import procedure by which a Member determines the
right to import" is outside the scope of Article VIII.
5.255. It is clear to us that paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports is concerned solely with the
DJAI procedure. In other words, the Panel did not se t out, in this paragraph, general principles or
legal tests to be applied to import measures generally. All but two sentences in this paragraph
refer explicitly to the DJAI or the DJAI procedure. The fourth sentence in paragraph 6.433
provides: "In such case, the prospective importer will have to contact the agencies concerned and
provide the information that may be required." "[S]uch case" is explained by the previous
sentence: a DJAI application which contains an "observation". Thus, in substance, the fourth
sentence also refers to the DJAI procedure. The last sentence in paragraph 6.433 provides:
"Rather, it is a procedure by which Argentina determines the right to import." The subject of this
sentence – i.e. "it" – is identified by the previous sentence: the DJAI procedure. Once more, it is
clear that this sentence refers, in substance, to the DJAI procedure.
5.256. We now examine whether paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports implies that an import
procedure that is a necessary pre-requisite for importing goods is outside the scope of Article VIII
of the GATT 1994. The second sentence in paragraph 6.433 provides: "The Panel has noted that a
DJAI in exit status is a necessary pre-requisite for importing goods into Argentina." In our view,
the Panel refers here to its earlier examination of the DJAI procedure, where it concluded that an
importer must attain a DJAI in "exit" status to import goods into Argentina.
667 We see nothing in
paragraph 6.433 suggesting that import procedures that are a necessary pre-requisite for the
importation of goods are excluded from the scope of Article VIII.
5.257. In addition, the immediately preceding paragraph of the Panel Reports contradicts
Argentina's view that paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports implies that import procedures that
are a necessary pre-requisite for the importation of goods are excluded from the scope of
Article VIII of the GATT 1994. We note that, in pa ragraph 6.432 of the Panel Reports, the Panel
examined the meaning of "formality" in the context of Article VIII, and concluded that "a formality
can be considered to include all requirements th at, although in appearance directed at a mere
observance of forms, must be usually observed in connection with the importation of the
exportation of goods." In our view, " requirements" that "must be usually observed" in connection
with the importation of goods can be said to include procedures that are a necessary pre-requisite

665 Panel Reports, para. 6.479.
666 Similarly to these disputes, the complainants in EC – Bananas made claims under provisions of the
GATT 1994 and the Import Licensing Agreement. In that case, the Appellate Body considered that a panel
should apply first the agreement that "deals specifically, and in detail," with the matter at issue.
(Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 204) As the Panel's decision to start its examination with the
claims under Article XI:1 is not appealed, we neither endorse nor reject the Panel's approach in this regard.
(See Panel Reports, paras. 6.358-6.361 and 6.448) In addition, we recall that the Panel examined the
consistency of the DJAI procedure with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, irrespective of whether the DJAI
procedure constitutes an import licensing procedure, and subsequently refrained from making any findings
under the Import Licensing Agreement. (Ibid., paras. 6.479, 6.505, 6.511, 6.517, 6.523, 6.529, 6.535, 6.540,
and 6.543) As the Panel's approach, in this regard, is not appealed, we neither endorse nor reject it. Moreover,
since the Panel made no finding as to the consistency of the DJAI procedure with the Import Licensing
Agreement, we do not opine on the general relationship between the GATT 1994 and the Import Licensing
Agreement.
667 Panel Reports, paras. 6.364 and 6.407-6.409.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

for the importation of goods.668 Thus, to the extent that paragraph 6.433 implies something about
import procedures in general, when this paragraph is read together with paragraph 6.432, it
implies that the Panel considered that import procedures that are a necessary pre-requisite for the
importation of goods fall within the scope of application of Article VIII.
5.258. Finally, we examine whether paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports implies that an import
procedure by which a Member determines the right to import is outside the scope of Article VIII of
the GATT 1994. At the end of paragraph 6.433, the Panel concluded that "the DJAI procedure is
not directed at a mere observance of forms; it is not a mere formality imposed by Argentina in
connection with the importation of goods … [r]ather, it is a procedure by which Argentina
determines the right to import." In our view, these sentences may imply that procedures by which
a Member determines the right to import are not mere formalities in connection with importation
within the meaning of Article VIII. Ultimately, however, this implication does not support
Argentina's claim of error.
5.259. In our view, a statement that a procedure is not a mere formality does not necessarily
imply that such procedure is not a f o r m a l i t y . W h i l e t h i s m a y b e o n e w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e
statement, the use of the word "mere" seems to us to suggest, instead, that such procedure is
something more than a formality – i.e. that it goes beyond a formality. Understanding the Panel's
statement in this way is, moreover, entirely consistent with the approach and reasoning of the
Panel as set out in the paragraphs that precede and follow paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports.
In the context of the DJAI procedure, the Panel's statement suggests that, while it did not exclude
that certain elements of the DJAI procedure constitute formalities, it considered that other
elements of the DJAI procedure go beyond import formalities. As noted above, moreover, the
parties never sought to separate and distinguish the different elements composing the
DJAI procedure.
5.260. In addition, we note that paragraph 6.434 of the Panel Reports starts with the phrase
"[e]ven assuming ad arguendo that the DJAI procedure is a customs or import formality, subject
to Article VIII of the GATT 1994". As from this point, the Panel conducted its analysis on the basis
of an assumption that the DJAI procedure falls within the scope of Article VIII. Thus, the Panel
cannot be understood to have implied that the DJAI procedure falls outside the scope of
Article VIII of the GATT 1994.
669
5.261. As a final matter, we recall Argentina's concern that the Panel's understanding of the scope
of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 influenced the Pa nel's conclusions: (i) regarding the relationship
between Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994; and (ii) that any import formality or requirement
that does not result in the "automatic" importation of goods is necessarily inconsistent with
Article XI.
5.262. We are not persuaded that any possible implication from paragraph 6.433 of the Panel
Reports, as explained above, influenced the Panel's conclusion regarding the relationship between
Articles VIII and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. We recall that the Panel considered that the obligations
contained in Articles VIII and XI:1 apply harmoniously and cumulatively, rather than on a mutually
exclusive basis.
670 The Panel concluded that the consistency of an import or customs formality or
requirement could be assessed under either Article VIII or Article XI:1, or under both provisions.671
Thus, the question of whether or not paragraph 6.433 implies that certain elements of an import
procedure by which a Member determines the right to import fall outside the scope of application
of Article VIII becomes less relevant. Given that the obligations in Articles VIII and XI:1 apply
cumulatively, such import procedure, or at least certain of its elements, may well be subject to
both provisions.

668 Emphasis added. We do not consider that the use of the term "usually" in the definition provided by
the Panel detracts from this conclusion. Although the Panel did not explain why it included the term "usually" in
the dictionary meaning of the word "formality", we understand it intended to mean "typically" or "generally". In
any event, we consider that a "requirement" already implies something that is required or necessary, and thus
must be observed.
669 We also recall that, as Argentina accepts, the Panel did not make an ultimate finding as to the
applicability of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure. (See Argentina's appellant's submission,
paras. 208, 209, and 218)
670 Panel Reports, para. 6.438.
671 Panel Reports, para. 6.443.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

5.263. We are equally unpersuaded by Argentina's final assertion that the implications from
paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports influenced the Panel's alleged conclusion "that any import
formality or requirement that does not result in the 'automatic' importation of goods is necessarily
inconsistent with Article XI."
672 This is particularly because, as explained in more detail in the
following subsection, we do not find error in the Panel's reference to the obtaining of a DJAI in
"exit" status as being not "automatic". Thus, we need not further consider this argument of
Argentina here.
5.264. For the reasons set out above, we disagree with Argentina's understanding of the
implications of paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports. Thus, we reject Argentina's request that we
modify or reverse the Panel's findings in paragraph 6.433.
5.3.6 Application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
5.265. Having addressed Argentina's claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and in its assessment of the scope of Article VIII of the GATT 1994,
we now direct our attention to Argentina's claim that the Panel erred in its application of the legal
standard under Article XI:1 to the DJAI procedure. We first summarize the Panel's findings in
connection with the application of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and we then examine Argentina's
claim that the Panel erred in concluding that, because the approval of a DJAI is not "automatic",
the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1.
5.3.6.1 The Panel's findings in connection wi th the application of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
5.266. The Panel first recalled certain elements of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and noted that
measures that had been found, in prior disputes, to constitute "restrictions" prohibited under this
provision include measures that, inter alia : (i) limited market access for imports
673; (ii) created
uncertainties674; (iii) conditioned the right to import on trade balancing requirements 675; and
(iv) made importation prohibitively costly. 676 The Panel then stated that it would examine the
DJAI procedure in the light of the lega l background that it had identified. 677 In doing so, the Panel
seems to have structured its analysis in parallel with the four above-mentioned types of
restrictions.
5.267. First, the Panel considered whether the DJAI procedure limits the access of imports into
the Argentine market. The Panel noted that a DJAI will attain "exit" status if either: (i) no
Argentine agency enters an observation within a ce rtain time period; or (ii) the relevant agency
has lifted any observation entered into a DJAI after the prospective importer provided the
information or took any other action requested by the agency. The Panel concluded:
Accordingly, on its face the DJAI procedure affects the opportunities for the
importation of goods into Argentina. The requirement to obtain a DJAI in exit status is
a necessary condition to import goods into Argentina in most cases. The attainment of
such status is not automatic. This results in a restriction on the access of imports into
the Argentine market.
678
5.268. Second, the Panel evaluated whether the DJAI procedure created uncertainty for an
applicant's ability to import. The Panel noted that the relevant Argentine legislation does not
identify all the agencies that may intervene in th e DJAI procedure, the complete list of information
that must be provided or may be required, or the specific criteria on which the agencies may enter

672 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 218.
673 Panel Reports, fn 903 to para. 6.454 (referring to GATT Panel Reports, Canada – Provincial Liquor
Boards (EEC), paras. 4.24 and 4.25; Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.6; and EEC – Minimum
Import Prices, para. 4.9).
674 Panel Reports, fn 904 to para. 6.454 (referring to Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.948
and 7.957).
675 Panel Reports, fn 906 to para. 6.454 (referring to Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.277).
676 Panel Reports, fn 905 to para. 6.454 (referring to Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
paras. 7.370-7.372).
677 Panel Reports, para. 6.459.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

and lift observations.679 The Panel considered that the broad discretion that participating agencies
have to enter and lift observations, coupled with the lack of clarity as to the agencies participating
and the fact that a DJAI in "exit" status is a necessary condition to import goods, creates
uncertainty as to the applicant's ability to import goods into Argentina and has a limiting effect on
the importation of goods.
680
5.269. Third, the Panel considered the role of the SCI in the DJAI procedure and the requirements
that it imposes on importers as a condition to lift observations. The Panel noted that the SCI often
requires prospective importers to submit documents that are unrelated to the importation and, in
certain cases, to commit to increase exports as a condition to lifting its observations. 681 The Panel
noted that the export commitment required by the SCI has two effects: (i) it makes the declarants'
right to import conditional upon their commitment to increase their exports; and (ii) it limits the
value of goods that can be imported to the value of their exports. In the Panel's view, the export
commitment creates an additional restriction on importation, as importers are not free to import as
much as they desire without regard to their export performance.
682
5.270. Lastly, the Panel examined whether the DJAI procedure increases transaction costs for
importers. The Panel considered that the expo rt commitment required by the SCI imposes a
significant burden on importers that is unrelated to their normal importing activity. This, in turn,
results in higher import costs, making importation "prohibitively costly", thus restricting
importation.683
5.271. On the basis of the above, the Panel stated, in paragraph 6.474 of its Reports:
In sum, the Panel finds that the DJAI procedure has a limiting effect on imports, and
thus constitutes an import restriction, because it: (a) restricts market access for
imported products to Argentina as obtaining a DJAI in exit status is not automatic;
(b) creates uncertainty as to an applicant's ability to import; (c) does not allow
companies to import as much as they desire or need without regard to their export
performance; and, (d) imposes a significant burden on importers that is unrelated to
their normal importing activity.
5.3.6.2 Argentina's claim that the Panel erre d in its application of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure
5.272. Argentina claims that the Panel erred in finding that, because the attainment of a DJAI in
"exit" status is not "automatic", the DJAI proc edure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994. Argentina seeks reversal of this specific basis for the Panel's finding in
paragraph 6.474 of the Panel Reports. Argentina also requests us to reverse the Panel's ultimate
finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1.
684
5.273. We again note the limited scope of this claim of error by Argentina. Argentina takes issue
only with the part of the Panel's reasoning leading to its intermediate finding that the
DJAI procedure is not "automatic". Argentina does not appeal the Panel's decision to start its
examination with the claims under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 instead of those under the Import
Licensing Agreement.
685 Argentina also does not appeal the Panel's findings with respect to the
description and operation of the DJAI procedure within Argentina's legal framework. Finally,
Argentina does not question the remaining three intermediate findings – i.e. regarding uncertainty,

679 Panel Reports, paras. 6.462-6.466.
680 Panel Reports, paras. 6.467 and 6.469. The Panel also explicitly linked the uncertainty associated
with the DJAI procedure to the uncertainty that characterized the process for the review of export licence
restrictions in China – Raw Materials, as both create uncertainty by conditioning an applicant's ability to either
export or import upon compliance with an unidentified number of requirements. (Ibid., para. 6.468)
681 Panel Reports, paras. 6.470-6.472.
682 Panel Reports, para. 6.472.
683 Panel Reports, para. 6.473.
684 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 239, 242, and 243.3. With respect to the Panel's ultimate
finding that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, Argentina refers to
paragraph 6.479 of the Panel Reports, paragraph 7.2.a of the EU Panel Report, paragraph 7.6.a of the
US Panel Report, and paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report.
685 We note that none of the participants has appealed or called into question the Panel's exercise of
judicial economy with respect to the claims against the DJAI procedure under the Import Licensing Agreement.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

export commitments, and making importation prohibitively costly – made by the Panel and relied
upon in support of its ultimate finding of inconsistency with Article XI:1.686
5.274. Argentina argues that "in the context of the Panel's overall analysis … it appears to have
been the Panel's conclusion that any import formality or requirement that is 'a necessary condition
to import goods' and that is not 'automatically' obtained is, necessarily, a prohibited 'quantitative
restriction' under Article XI:1." 687 For Argentina, even assuming that an evaluation of import
formalities or requirements under Article XI:1 is possible, it cannot be the case that an import
formality or requirement is an Article XI:1 restriction merely because it is not "automatic". 688
Argentina contends that this conclusion is su pported by the context provided by the Import
Licensing Agreement. Argentina refers, in partic ular, to Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing
Agreement, which, according to Argentina, distinguishes between the potential trade-restricting
effects of a licensing procedure and those of the underlying rule of importation that the procedure
implements. Argentina argues that to interpret Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 as prohibiting
non-automatic import licensing procedures per se would conflict with Article 3.2 of the Import
Licensing Agreement. In Argentina's view, this conflict is avoided by recognizing that an import
procedure is not an Article XI:1 restriction merely because it is not "automatic".
689
5.275. The complainants contend that the Panel considered that the approval of DJAIs is not
"automatic" in the sense that the DJAI procedure is a highly discretionary and non-transparent
procedure whereby, even if an importer complie s with all formal DJAI requirements, Argentine
authorities are free to deny the application on unspecified grounds. 690 The United States recalls
that the Panel found that Argentine authorities have discretion to grant or deny DJAIs for
undisclosed reasons and on grounds that are unrelated to the information that importers are
required to provide in their DJAIs. 691 The European Union adds that it is undisputed that the
non-approval of a DJAI may have a limiting effect on imports. 692 Finally, the complainants argue
that Argentina's reliance on the Import Licensing Agreement is misplaced because there is no
conflict between Article XI:1 of the GATT 1 994 and Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing
Agreement.693 In the United States' view, Argentina's reliance on Article 3.2 of the Import
Licensing Agreement is misplaced because that provision anticipates that there is a separate,
WTO-consistent restriction imposed through licensing procedures, whereas, in these disputes, the
DJAI procedure is itself a trade restriction.
694
5.276. We do not see that the Panel's use of the term "automatic" in connection with the
DJAI procedure carries the import or significance that Argentina seeks to attribute to it. As
acknowledged by Argentina695, the Panel did not elaborate on what it meant by "automatic" when
it stated that the attainment of a DJAI in "exit" status is not "automatic". 696 Nonetheless,
Argentina argues that the Panel's finding suggests that "any import formality or requirement that
is 'a necessary condition to import goods' and that is not 'automatically' obtained is, necessarily, a
prohibited 'quantitative restriction' under Article XI:1."
697 For Argentina, the Panel's finding, if left
undisturbed, would have significant repercussions because it would mean that a formality or
requirement – including those related to non-automatic import licensing procedures regulated
under Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreemen t – would be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994 merely because it is not "automatic".
698 In Argentina's view, this cannot be the

686 In this regard, see United States' appellee's submission, paras. 52 and 53; and Japan's appellee's
submission, para. 129.
687 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 238.
688 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 239.
689 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 241.
690 European Union's appellee's submission, paras. 201 and 203; United States' appellee's submission,
paras. 93-97; Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 127, 130, and 131.
692 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 202.
693 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 205; United States' appellee's submission, paras. 103
and 106; Japan's appellee's submission, para. 132.
694 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 103 and 106.
695 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 238.
696 Panel Reports, para. 6.461.
697 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 238.
698 Argentina's appellant's submission, paras. 239 and 241.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

case.699 Moreover, the Panel's finding directly conflicts with Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing
Agreement.700
5.277. Argentina appears to understand the term "automatic" in the same sense as that word is
used in connection with import licensing proced ures in the Import Licensing Agreement. In our
view, however, the Panel's finding that the attainment of a DJAI in "exit" status is not "automatic"
does not, and was not intended to, refer to the definition of "automaticity" in Article 2 of the
Import Licensing Agreement.
5.278. We recall that the Panel made no findings as to whether the DJAI procedure qualifies as an
"import licensing procedure" within the meaning of the Import Licensing Agreement. In fact, the
Panel concluded that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
"irrespective of whether it constitutes an import licence".
701 Given this finding of inconsistency, the
Panel subsequently refrained from making any find ings with respect to the complainants' claims
under the provisions of the Import Licensing Agreement, including those under Articles 3.2
and 3.5(f) thereof.
702
5.279. As explained above, none of the parties sought to separate and distinguish the different
elements that compose the DJAI procedure, including any of those possibly relating to import
licensing procedures. Even though aspects of the DJAI procedure may resemble an import
licensing procedure
703, it was not these characteristics of the DJAI procedure that were the target
of the complainants' claims704 under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Rather, the main focus of their
claims was the discretionary elements involved in the entering and lifting of observations. 705
Moreover, as further explained below, the Panel's finding that the attainment of a DJAI in "exit"
status is not "automatic" did not address the features of the DJAI procedure that arguably
resemble import licensing procedures within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing
Agreement.
5.280. We note that one of the dictionary definitions of "automatic" is "[o]ccurring as a necessary
consequence; … taking effect without further process in set circumstances". 706 The Panel's
reasoning leading up to its statement that the attainment of a DJAI in "exit" status is not
"automatic" seems consistent with this meaning of "automatic". We also note that the Panel
identified the specific features of the operation of the DJAI procedure that are responsible for the
fact that attaining "exit" status is not a "necessary consequence" of initiating the DJAI procedure.
5.281. When the relevant passage in paragraph 6.461 of the Panel Reports is read in the light of
the preceding and subsequent paragraphs, the meanin g of the term "not 'automatic'", as intended

699 Argentina contends that many types of import formalities and requirements involve some amount of
delay so that relevant authorities may determine conformity with domestic legislation. (Argentina's appellant's
submission, para. 239)
700 Argentina's appellant's submission, para. 241.
701 Panel Reports, para. 6.479.
702 Panel Reports, paras. 6.505, 6.511, 6.517, 6.523, 6.529, 6.535, 6.540, and 6.543.
703 Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing Agreement provides: "For the purpose of this Agreement, import
licensing is defined as administrative procedures used for the operation of import licensing regimes requiring
the submission of an application or other documentation (other than that required for customs purposes) to the
relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into the customs territory of the importing
Member." (fn omitted)
704 Before the Panel, with respect to their claims under the Import Licensing Agreement, the
complainants argued that the DJAI procedure is an import licensing procedure within the meaning of Article 1.1
of the Import Licensing Agreement. The European Union contended that "the DJAI system is an import
licensing system, because it is a set of administrative procedures which involves the submission of an
application and other documentation, other than those required for customs purposes, as a prior condition for
importation into Argentina." (European Union's first written submission to the Panel, para. 281) Similarly, the
United States argued that the DJAI procedure requires an importer to submit an electronic application, and
obtain an approval by relevant Argentine agencies, as a prior condition for import, and that the DJAI procedure
is not required for customs purposes. (United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 124 and 125)
Japan argued that the DJAI procedure requires the submission of an application, other than that required for
customs purposes, as prior condition for importation. (Japan's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 163
and 166)
705 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 181; United States' appellee's submission, para. 57;
Japan's appellee's submission, paras. 112 and 127.
706 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 157.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

by the Panel, becomes clear. In paragraph 6.460 of its Reports, the Panel explained that a DJAI in
"exit" status is necessary for clearing customs. In addition, the Panel stated:
A DJAI will attain exit status if either: (a) no agency of the Argentine Government
enters an observation within the prescribed time period; or, (b) when an agency has
entered an observation on a DJAI, the observation is lifted by the agency concerned
following information provided by and/or ac tion taken by the declarant or prospective
importer.707
5.282. In paragraphs 6.462 through 6.469 of the Panel Reports, the Panel examined the
discretionary nature of the DJAI procedure. Af ter examining Argentina's statements and legal
framework relating to the conditions that importers must fulfil to have observations lifted, the
Panel stated:
These statements imply that (a) the information or documents to be provided to
secure a DJAI in exit status depend on sh ortcomings detected by the relevant agency
in a particular case which may be unrelated to the information requested from the
declarant when filing a DJAI application; and (b) the discretion granted to
participating agencies to lift observations is as broad as that accorded on them to
enter observations.
708
5.283. The Panel also explained that the discr etion to enter and lift observations creates
uncertainty for importers of goods. These importers are unable to anticipate the agencies that may
intervene in the specific DJAI procedure, the requirements that should be met, or the complete list
of documents that must be provided to attain a DJAI in "exit" status and, hence, to secure their
right to import.709 On this basis, the Panel concluded:
[T]he fact that a DJAI in exit status is a necessary condition to import goods, coupled
with the lack of clarity as to who the participating agencies are and the absence of
specific criteria that they can apply to exercise their discretion has a limiting effect on
the importation of goods. Participating agencies have a broad discretion to enter and
lift observations on a DJAI, which may result in an interruption of the
DJAI procedure.
710
5.284. Thus, in our view, the Panel's reference, in paragraph 6.461 of the Panel Reports, to the
attainment of a DJAI in "exit" status as being not "automatic" is a reference both to the direct
connection between the DJAI procedure and the righ t to import, and to the discretionary control
exercised by Argentine agencies in deciding when and subject to what conditions "exit" status can
be attained.
711
5.285. Accordingly, we accept neither Argentina's understanding of what the Panel meant in using
the word "automatic" in paragraph 6.461 of the Pa nel Reports, nor the implication that Argentina
draws from the Panel's statements to the effect that attaining a DJAI in "exit" status is not
"automatic". We are, therefore, not persuaded th at the Panel committed reversible error in this
part of its reasoning or in reaching this intermediate finding. Moreover, Argentina has not

707 Panel Reports, para. 6.460.
709 Panel Reports, para. 6.467.
710 Panel Reports, para. 6.469.
711 We also disagree with Argentina's suggestion that the Panel's interpretation of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 implies a conflict with Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement. (Argentina's appellant's
submission, paras. 240 and 241) We recall that the Panel took the view that the term "restriction" in
Article XI:1 is defined as a limiting condition that has restrictive effects on importation. (Panel Reports,
paras. 6.251, 6.254, and 6.452 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 319; and
Panel Reports, India – Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 5.128 and 5.129; and India – Autos, paras. 7.265,
7.269, and 7.270)) Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement provides that "[n]on-automatic licensing
shall not have trade-restrictive or -distortive effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of
the restriction." (emphasis added) If, consistent with the first sentence of Article 3.2 of the Import Licensing
Agreement, a non-automatic licensing procedure itself has no trade-restrictive effects on imports, this would
appear to support – rather than conflict with – a conclusion that such non-automatic licensing procedure has
no restrictive effects on importation. This conclusion, however, can only be made on a case-by-case basis in
the light of all relevant facts.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

challenged the remaining elements relied upon by the Panel in support of its ultimate finding that
the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Thus, Argentina has not
established that the Panel erred in finding that the DJAI procedure has limiting effects on imports,
or in characterizing it as an import restriction within the meaning of Article XI:1.
5.286. For the reasons set out above, we disagree with Argentina's understanding of the Panel's
use of the term "automatic" in paragraph 6.461 of the Panel Reports. Instead, we find that the
Panel did not err in considering that the fact that attaining "exit" status – and thus the right to
import – is not "automatic" under the DJAI proced ure is an element supporting its finding that the
DJAI procedure constitutes an import restriction. Accordingly, we reject Argentina's request that
we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.474 of the Panel Reports, that the DJAI procedure is
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because the DJAI procedure "restricts market
access for imported products to Argentina as obtaining a DJAI in exit status is not automatic".
5.3.7 Overall conclusions on the DJAI procedure
5.287. In the light of all of the above, we find that the Panel did not err in failing to adopt a
two-step analytical framework similar to the one that Argentina proposes for interpreting
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In addition, we disagree with Argentina's understanding of the
implications of paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Reports as regards the scope of application of
Article VIII of the GATT 1994. Finally, we also disagree with Argentina's understanding of the
Panel's use of the term "automatic" in paragraph 6.461 of the Panel Reports. Accordingly,
we find that Argentina has not established that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XI:1,
or Article VIII, of the GATT 1994, or in its application of Article XI:1 to the DJAI procedure.
5.288. For the above reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.479 of the Panel
Reports, paragraph 7.2.a of the EU Panel Report , paragraph 7.6.a of the US Panel Report, and
paragraph 7.10.a of the Japan Panel Report, that the DJAI procedure "constitutes a restriction on
the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994".

- EU-128 -

6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT IN DS438
6.1. In the appeal of the Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods
(WT/DS438/R) (EU Panel Report), for the reasons set out in section 5.1 of this Report, with
respect to the Panel's terms of reference, the Appellate Body:
a. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.b that "[t]he characterization of the [TRRs]
as a single measure in the complainants' panel requests did not expand the scope or
change the essence of the dispute" 1; and, consequently, finds that the TRRs measure
was within the Panel's terms of reference; and
b. with respect to the Panel's finding regarding the 23 specific instances of application of
the TRRs identified in section 4.2.4 of the European Union's first written submission:
i. reverses the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.c that these 23 specific instances of
application of the TRRs were not precisel y identified in the EU Panel Request as
measures at issue, and thus do not constitute measures at issue in this dispute2;
ii. finds, instead, that the EU Panel Request identified the 23 specific instances of
application of the TRRs as "specific measures at issue" in conformity with Article 6.2
of the DSU, and that these measures are, therefore, within the Panel's terms of
reference; and
iii. finds it unnecessary to rule on the European Union's request for completion of the
analysis with respect to the 23 specific instances of application of the TRRs as
measures at issue, as the conditions on which such request is premised are not met.
6.2. For the reasons set out in section 5.2 of th is Report, with respect to the TRRs measure, the
Appellate Body:
a. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.d that "[t]he Argentine authorities'
imposition on economic operators of one or more of the five trade-related requirements
identified by the complainants as a condition to import or to obtain certain benefits,
operates as a single measure (the TRRs measure) attributable to Argentina" 3; and, as a
consequence,
b. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.e that "[t]he TRRs measure constitutes a
restriction on the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994"4; and also
c. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1.f that "[t]he TRRs measure, with respect to
its local content requirement" is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because
it "modifies the conditions of competition in the Argentine market, so that imported
products are granted less favourable treatment than like domestic products".
5
6.3. For the reasons set out in section 5.3 of this Report, with respect to the DJAI procedure, the
Appellate Body:
a. finds that Argentina has not established that the Panel erred in its interpretation of
Article XI:1, or Article VIII, of the GATT 1994;
b. finds that Argentina has not established that the Panel erred in its application of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure; and, as a consequence,

1 See also Panel Reports, para. 6.14; and First Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.1.b.
2 See also Panel Reports, para. 6.14; and Second Preliminary Ruling, para. 5.1.b.

- JPN-131 -

6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT IN DS445
6.1. In the appeal of the Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods
(WT/DS445/R) (Japan Panel Report), for the reasons set out in section 5.1.1 of this Report, with
respect to the Panel's terms of reference, the Appellate Body:
a. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.9.b that "[t]he characterization of the [TRRs]
as a single measure in the complainants' panel requests did not expand the scope or
change the essence of the dispute" 1; and, consequently, finds that the TRRs measure
was within the Panel's terms of reference.
6.2. For the reasons set out in section 5.2 of th is Report, with respect to the TRRs measure, the
Appellate Body:
a. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.9.d that "[t]he Argentine authorities'
imposition on economic operators of one or more of the five trade-related requirements
identified by the complainants as a condition to import or to obtain certain benefits,
operates as a single measure (the TRRs measure) attributable to Argentina"
2; and, as a
consequence,
b. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.9.e that "[t]he TRRs measure constitutes a
restriction on the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994"3; and also
c. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.9.f that "[t]he TRRs measure, with respect to
its local content requirement" is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because
it "modifies the conditions of competition in the Argentine market, so that imported
products are granted less favourable treatment than like domestic products"4;
d. finds that Argentina has not established that, in assessing Japan's "as such" claims, the
Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU; and
e. finds that Japan has not established that the Panel erred, in paragraph 7.9.g of the
Japan Panel Report 5, in exercising judicial economy on Japan's claim that the TRRs
measure is inconsistent with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.
6.3. For the reasons set out in section 5.3 of this Report, with respect to the DJAI procedure, the
Appellate Body:
a. finds that Argentina has not established that the Panel erred in its interpretation of
Article XI:1, or Article VIII, of the GATT 1994;
b. finds that Argentina has not established that the Panel erred in its application of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 to the DJAI procedure; and, as a consequence,
c. upholds the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.10.a that the DJAI procedure "constitutes a
restriction on the importation of goods and is thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994".6
6.4. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request Argentina to bring its measures found
in this Report, and in the Japan Panel Report as upheld by this Report, to be inconsistent with the
GATT 1994 into conformity with that Agreement.

1 See also Panel Reports, para. 6.14; and First Preliminary Ruling, para. 4.1.b.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

ANNEX 1

29 September 2014
(14-5434) Page: 1/3
 Original: English

ARGENTINA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS
NOTIFICATION OF AN APPEAL BY ARGENTINA
UNDER ARTICLE 16.4 AND ARTICLE 17 OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES
AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (DSU),
AND UNDER RULE 20(1) OF THE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
 The following notification, dated 26 September 2014, from the Delegation of Argentina, is
being circulated to Members.

Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods (WT/DS438/444/445) ("Panel Report").
2. The measures at issue are the Declaración Jurada Anticipada de Importación ("DJAI") and
the alleged "Trade-Related Requirements" ("TRRs") measure.
3. The issues that Argentina raises in this appeal relate to the Panel's findings and conclusions
in respect of the Panel's terms of reference under the DSU, as well as the Panel's findings and
conclusions with respect to the consistency of the challenged measures with various provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994").
4. Pursuant to Rules 20(1) and 21(1) of the Working Procedures, Argentina files this Notice of
Appeal together with its Appellant's Submission with the Appellate Body Secretariat.
5. Pursuant to Rule 20(2)(d)(iii) of the Working Pr ocedures, this Notice of Appeal provides an
indicative list of the paragraphs of the Panel Repo rt containing the alleged errors of law and legal
interpretation by the Panel, without prejudice to Ar gentina's ability to rely on other paragraphs of
the Panel Report in its appeal.
I. REVIEW OF THE PANEL'S FINDINGS REGARDING THE PANEL'S TERMS OF
REFERENCE
6. Argentina seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel's finding that the alleged "TRRs"
measure was within its terms of reference. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation
include:
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

 The Panel erred by relying on its prior "conclusion" that the alleged "TRRs" measure was
"explicitly identified as a measure at issue" in the complainants' consultations requests;1
 The Panel erred by failing to consider Argentina's argument that the complainants'
introduction in their panel requests of "as such" or equally broad claims with respect to
the alleged "TRRs" measure impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute.2
7. For these reasons, Argentina requests that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's conclusion
in paragraph 4.1(b) of the Preliminary Ruling by the Panel (16 September 2013), in which the
Panel concluded that "[t]he characterization of the RTRRs as a single 'overarching measure' in the
complainants' panel requests does not expand th e scope or change the essence of the dispute." 3
Argentina requests that the Appellate Body also reverse the Panel's ultimate conclusions to this
effect in paragraphs 7.1(b), 7.5(b), and 7.9(b) of the Panel Report.
8. Argentina requests that the Appellate Body find, instead, that the complainants' introduction
of the alleged "TRRs" measure in their panel requests did expand the scope or change the essence
of the dispute, and that the alleged measure was therefore outside of the Panel's terms of
reference.
II. REVIEW OF THE PANEL'S FINDINGS UN DER ARTICLES III:4 AND XI:1 OF THE
GATT 1994 AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE ALLEGED "TRRS" MEASURE
9. Argentina seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel's findings that the alleged "TRRs"
measure is inconsistent with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, as well as the Panel's
separate findings that the alleged "TRRs" measure is inconsistent "as such" with Articles XI:1 and
III:4 of the GATT 1994. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation include:
 The Panel erred in failing to apply the correct legal standard to ascertain the existence of
the alleged "TRRs measure";
4
 The Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to conduct an
objective assessment of the matter when assessing Japan's "as such" claims against the
alleged "TRRs measure".5
10. Argentina therefore respectfully requests that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's finding
that the complainants had established that the alleged "TRRs measure" existed or "operate[d] as a
single measure",6 as well as the Panel's findings that the alleged measure was inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. 7 Accordingly, Argentina respectfully requests that the
Appellate Body reverse the Panel's ultimate conclusions to this effect in paragraphs 7.1(d)-(f),
7.5(c)-(d), and 7.9(d)-(f) of the Panel Report.
11. Argentina also respectfully requests that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's ultimate
conclusion in paragraph 7.9(h) that the alleged "TRRs measure" is "as such" inconsistent with
Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
III. REVIEW OF THE PANEL'S FINDINGS UN DER ARTICLES VIII AND XI OF THE
GATT 1994 AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE DJAI
12. Argentina seeks review by the Appellate Body certain limited aspects of the Panel's findings
and conclusions in respect the interpretation and application of Articles VIII and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 as they pertain to the DJAI. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation include:

2 Panel Report, Annex D.1, paras. 3.29-3.33.
3 Panel Report, Annex D.1, para. 4.1(b).
4 Panel Report, paras. 6.138-6.231.
5 Panel Report, paras. 6.315-6.343.
6 Panel Report, para. 6.231.
7 Panel Report, paras. 6.265, 6.295, 6.343.
WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

 The Panel erred in its assessment of the scope of Article VIII, and in particular in its
implication that Article VIII does not encompass import procedures that are a "necessary
pre-requisite for importing goods";
8
 The Panel erred in not establishing and applying a proper analytical framework for
distinguishing between the scope and disciplines of Article VIII, on the one hand, and the
scope and disciplines of Article XI:1, on the other;9 and,
 The Panel erred in its conclusion that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1
based on its finding that the approval of a DJAI application is not "automatic".10
13. For these reasons, Argentina requests that the Appellate Body modify or reverse the Panel's
findings in paragraph 6.433 of the Panel Report implying that any import procedure that is a
"necessary pre-requisite for importing goods" or by which a Member "determines the right to
import" to be outside the scope of Article VIII.
14. Argentina respectfully requests the Appellate Body to modify the Panel's reasoning in
paragraphs 6.435 to 6.445 of the Panel Report and to find that, to the extent that import
formalities and requirements can be examined under Article XI:1 at all, a finding of inconsistency
would require the complaining Member to prove that: (1) the formality or requirement at issue
limits the quantity or amount of imports to a ma terial degree that is separate and independent of
the trade-restricting effect of any substantive rule of importation that the formality or requirement
implements; and (2) this separate and independent trade-restricting effect is greater than the
effect that would ordinarily be associated with a formality or requirement of its nature.
15. Argentina respectfully requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding in
paragraph 6.474 of the Panel Report that the DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994 on the grounds that the attainment of a DJAI in exit status is not "automatic".
Argentina also requests that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's ultimate conclusion that the
DJAI procedure is inconsistent with Article XI:1, as set forth in paragraphs 6.479, 7.2(a), 7.6(a)
and 7.10(a) of the Panel Report.

WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

ANNEX 2

2 October 2014
(14-5540) Page: 1/1
 Original: English

ARGENTINA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS
NOTIFICATION OF AN OTHER APPEAL BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
UNDER ARTICLE 16.4 AND ARTICLE 17 OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES
AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (DSU),
AND UNDER RULE 23(1) OF THE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
The following notification, dated 1 October 2014, fr om the Delegation of the European Union, is
being circulated to Members.

Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Rule 23 of the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review, the European Union hereby notifies its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain
issues of law and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel in Argentina – Measures
Affecting the Importation of Goods (WT/DS438/R) (Panel Report).
2. The European Union submits that the Panel made an error in applying Article 6.2 of the DSU
when determining its terms of reference in this case. Specifically, The European Union submits
that the Panel erred when finding that the 23 measures described by the European Union in
Section 4.2.4 of its first written submission as "s pecific instances" of application of alleged RTRRs
were not precisely identified in the EU's Panel Request as measures at issue and that, accordingly,
those 23 measures did not constitute "measures at issue" in the present dispute.1 Those measures
were clearly identified on substance in the EU's Panel Request in accordance with the requirements
under Article 6.2 of the DSU. Thus, they were "measures at issue" in this dispute and the Panel
should have examined them accordingly.
3. Moreover, as a conditional appeal, should the Appellate Body agree with Argentina's appeal
in this case and, thus, reverse or otherwise modify any of the Panel's findings that the TTR
measure exists and that was inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the
European Union requests the Appellate Body to complete the analysis and find that Argentina
violated Articles XI:1 and/or III:4 of the GATT 1994 in each of the 23 specific measures described
by the European Union in Section 4.2.4 of its first written submission.

WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

ANNEX 3

2 October 2014
(14-5541) Page: 1/1
 Original: English

ARGENTINA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS
NOTIFICATION OF AN OTHER APPEAL BY JAPAN
UNDER ARTICLE 16.4 AND ARTICLE 17 OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES
AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (DSU),
AND UNDER RULE 23(1) OF THE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
The following notification, dated 1 October 2014, from the Delegation of Japan, is being circulated
to Members.

Pursuant to Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Rule 23 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review ,
Japan hereby notifies its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in
the Panel Report in Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods (WT/DS445/R) and
certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel in this dispute.

The Panel Report was based on a meticulous and objective review of the extensive factual record
before it, as well as sound legal reasoning. Ja pan appeals only one limited aspect of the Panel
Report, in accordance with Rule 23(2)(c)(ii) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review . In
particular, Japan submits that the Panel erred by ex ercising false judicial economy with respect to
Japan's claim against the TRRs measure under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, as reflected at
paragraphs 6.305 and 7.9(g) of its Report. This ex ercise of judicial economy was false because it
would prevent an "effective resolution" of this dispute. In declining to address Japan's claim under
Article X:1, the Panel falsely applied judicial economy and acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Articles 3.4, 3.7, 7.2, and/or 11 of the DS U. Japan therefore respectfully requests that the
Appellate Body reverse the Panel's exercise of judicial economy in this regard and complete the
analysis to find that Argentina administers the TRRs measure in a manner that is inconsistent with
its obligations under Article X:1.

WT/DS438/AB/R • WT/DS444/AB/R • WT/DS445/AB/R

ANNEX 4
The following communication, dated 3 October 2014, was sent to all participants and third
participants in this appeal.

On 29 September 2014, the Appellate Body received a letter from Japan requesting that the
oral hearing in this appeal not be scheduled during the period of 3-5 November 2014 due to a
scheduling conflict of a key member of Japan's litigation team.

Also on 29 September 2014, the Division hearing this appeal wrote to the other participants
and to the third participants soliciting their views on Japan's request. On 1 October 2014,
comments were received from Argentina, the European Union, and the United States.

In their comments, none of the other participants objected to Japan's request. However,
Argentina and the European Union each indicate d their own scheduling constraints and requested
that the oral hearing not be held on certain other dates (27-31 October and 11-12 November,
respectively). The United States did not object to Japan's request, but expressed a preference that
the oral hearing not be unduly delayed to a date more than 45 days after the date of the Notice of
Appeal, and noted that an oral hearing after 21 November 2014 would cause a scheduling conflict
for its lead counsel.

In the draft Working Schedule for this appeal drawn up prior to the receipt of Japan's letter
of 29 September 2014, the Appellate Body had scheduled the oral hearing in this appeal to take
place on 3-4 November 2014. The scheduling of the oral hearing in this appeal was coordinated
with the working schedules of the Appellate Body in the two other proceedings that are also
currently before the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel (India) (DS436) and US – Countervailing
Measures (China) (DS437). The overlap in the dates of the three working schedules, and in the
composition of the Divisions hearing these three appeals, left the Appellate Body with limited
choices for scheduling the oral hearings as well as its internal deliberations in these appeals.

In the light of the above-mentioned scheduling constraints, and taking into consideration the
concerns expressed by the other participants over alternative dates for the oral hearing, the
Division regrets that it is not in a position to accommodate Japan's request.

The oral hearing in this appeal is therefore scheduled for 3-4 November 2014. Please find
enclosed a revised Working Schedule for appeal that includes these dates for the oral hearing.