Document: WT/DS46/RW/2 Page A-1 ANNEX A SUBMISSIONS OF CANADA Contents Page Annex A-1 First submission of Canada A-2 Annex A-2 Rebuttal submission of Canada A-23 Annex A-3 Oral statement of Canada A-43 Annex A-4 Responses by Canada to Questions of the Panel A-55 Annex A-5 Canada's Comments on Brazil's Responses to Questions of the Panel A-66
Document codes: WT/DS46/RW/2
Complainant: Canada
Respondent: Brazil
Third parties: Australia, EU, South Korea, U.S.
Dispute stage: Retaliation & Arbitration
Agreements cited: Art. XVI  GATT 1994Art. 3, 27  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

ANNEX A
SUBMISSIONS OF CANADA
Contents Page
Annex A-1 First submission of Canada A-2
Annex A-2 Rebuttal submission of Canada A-23
Annex A-3 Oral statement of Canada A-43
Annex A-4 Responses by Canada to Questions of the Panel A-55
Annex A-5 Canada's Comments on Brazil's Responses to Questions of the Panel A-66

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The issue in this proceeding is whether certain revisions, made on 6 December 2000 to
Brazil’s Programa de Financiamento às Exportações (PROEX)1 bring PROEX into conformity with
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the findings and the
recommendations of the Panel, as modified by the Appellate Body, and adopted by the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) in Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft ( PROEX).
2 B r a z i l
contends that they do. Canada’s position is that they do not.
2. This is the second time that Brazil has claimed that it has complied with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB and the second time that Canada has sought recourse to Article 21.5 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in this dispute. Brazil made the same claim in respect of
previous modifications to the original PROEX program made in response to the 20 August 1999 DSB
rulings.
3. In its Report of 28 April 2000, this same Panel found that payments in respect of regional
aircraft under modifications to PROEX made as of 19 November 1999 ("PROEX II") are export
subsidies prohibited by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement and that, accordingly, Brazil had failed to
implement the recommendation of the DSB to withdraw its export subsidies for regional aircraft
under PROEX within 90 days. 3 On appeal by Brazil, the Appellate Body, in its Report of
21 July 2000, upheld the Panel’s conclusions. 4
4. Canada has brought this proceeding because there is, again, a disagreement as to the
consistency with the SCM Agreement of measures ta ken by Brazil that purport to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
5. Brazil considers that by limiting its interest rate buy-down payments under PROEX to the
Commercial Interest Reference Rate ("CIRR") established under the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits
(the "OECD Arrangement"), it has brought PROEX into compliance with the SCM Agreement.
However, as Canada will show, payments made under the latest revisions to PROEX continue to be
prohibited subsidies under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement. Contrary to Brazil’s claims, these
prohibited subsidies cannot be sheltered under an a contrario exception allegedly found in Item (k) of
Annex I to the SCM Agreement because no such exception exists. Even if such an exception does
exist, Brazil’s PROEX payments do not qualify for it because they are not "payments" within the
meaning of Item (k) and because they secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
II. FACTS
6. The revisions at issue are set out in the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) Resolution No. 2799 of
6 December 2000. Resolution 2799 is entitled: "Redefining the rules applicable to transactions under
the interest rate equalization system of the Export Financing Program – PROEX".
5

1 "Redefining the rules applicable to transactions under the interest rate equalization system of the
Export Financing Program – PROEX," Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) Resolution No. 002799
(6 December 2000) [hereinafter "Resolution 2799"]. (Exhibit CDA-1)
2 WT/DS46/R and WT/DS46/AB/R, Reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body, adopted
20 August 1999.
3 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS46/RW, 28 April 2000, para. 6.106 [hereinafter "Article 21.5 Panel Report"].
4 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/RW, para. 82 [hereinafter "Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report"].
5 Resolution 2799, supra note 1.

7. Resolution 2799 makes only one material revision to the PROEX II program that has already
been found to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreem ent: it provides that interest rate buy-downs
offered under PROEX shall be established "in accordance with the Commercial Interest Reference
Rate (CIRR), published each month by the OECD, fo r the respective currency and financing term of
the transaction."6 In all other material respects, PROEX remains unchanged. Canada will refer to the
PROEX program as revised by Resolution 2799 as "PROEX III".
8. By virtue of Article 10 of Resolution 2799, PROEX III applies to all transactions approved by
the Committee on Export Credits (the "Committee") on or after 6 December 2000, the date it was
published in the official gazette. In the light of Brazil’s constant position that it cannot affect prior
commitments, it is reasonable to infer that PROE X III does not modify commitments made before
6 December 2000. Moreover, nothing in Resolution 2799 indicates that it has a retroactive effect.
9. Other than the requirement that interest rate buy-downs shall be "in accordance with" the
CIRR, the basic elements of the PROEX program found by the original Panel and confirmed in the
Article 21.5 Panel Report,7 remain the same under PROEX III:
(a) PROEX payments continue to be grants from the Brazilian National Treasury to buy
down commercial interest rates freely negotiated by the borrower;
(b) the program is still administered by the Committee; and
(c) the interest rate buy-down payments made under PROEX are still being provided at
the time of export of the aircraft in the form of non-interest bearing National Treasury
Bonds (Notas do Tesouro Nacional – Série I) referred to as NTN-I bonds. These are
denominated in Brazilian Reals indexed to the United States dollar.
10. Under PROEX III, the length of the financing term continues to determine the percentage of
the interest rate buy-down and the maximum specified term continues to be 10 years as set out in
BCB Newsletter No. 2881 of 19 November 1999. 8 However, the Committee retains its authority to
extend the length of the financing term beyond ten years – as it did consistently, as found by the Panel
in the first Article 21.5 proceedings. 9 PROEX payments also continue to be applied to financing
covering 100 percent of the value of the exported aircraft.10
11. In the weeks before Resolution 2799 was made operational, Brazil’s then Foreign Minister,
Luis Felipe Lampreia confirmed how Brazil intends to apply PROEX III. He said:

6 The English translation of Article 1 of the Resolution reads as follows:
Article 1: In financing transactions for the export of goods and services, as well as of computer
programs ("software") referred to in Law No. 9609 of February 19, 1998, the National Treasury may grant to the
financing or refinancing party, as the case may be, equalization sufficient to make the financial charges
consistent with those prevailing in the international market.
Paragraph 1: In financing for the export of aircraft for regional aviation, interest rate equalization shall
be established transaction by transaction, at levels that may differ depending on the characteristics of each
transaction, in accordance with the Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR), published each month by the
OECD, for the respective currency and financing term of the transaction.
Paragraph 2: Equalization is fixed and limited, for its entire duration, to the percentages established by
the Central Bank of Brazil.
7 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Report of the Panel, WT/DS46/R, adopted
20 August 1999,.paras. 2.2-2.6 [hereinafter "Original Panel Report"]; Article 21.5 Panel Report, paras. 2.1-2.6.
8 "Establishing maximum percentages for the tax rate equalization system under the Export Financing
Program – PROEX," Banco Central do Brasil Newsletter No. 002881, 19 November 1999. (Exhibit CDA-2)
9 As the Panel found, "the most frequent waiver has been to extend the length of the financing term
from 10 to 15 years. (Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 2.4).
10 See Original Panel Report, paras. 4.162-4.163 and 7.91.

For us, the interest rate is the OECD rate, the coverage is 100% and there are no
limits on the length of terms.11
12. In effect, the only discipline that Resolution 2799 imposes on PROEX payments is that they
must be "in accordance with the CIRR". At the 12 December 2000 meeting of the DSB, Brazilian
officials stated that this wording prohibits buy-downs to interest rates below the relevant CIRR, 12
although clearly the phrasing "in accordance with" imposes no such explicit discipline.
13. According to Resolution 2799, the CIRR "limitation" is based on the applicable CIRR "for the
respective currency and financing term of the transaction " [emphasis added]. 13 The wording of the
Resolution recognises that the currency and financing term of the transaction will determine the
applicable CIRR. Under the OECD Arrangement, the maximum term allowable for CIRR financing
in the regional aircraft sector is ten years.14 There is no applicable CIRR for a financing term of more
than ten years. However, Brazil has clearly indicated that it will impose "no limits on the length of
terms".
15 This statement and the financing term of the market for regional aircraft transactions, which
typically is fifteen years or more, cannot be reconciled with the Resolution. In effect, the CIRR
"limitation" in Resolution 2799 is meaningless.
III. THE JURISDICTION OF THIS PANEL UNDER ARTICLE 21.5
14. Under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Panel must determine whether a measure taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is consistent with a covered agreement.16
15. In the context of this proceeding, the Panel must determine whether, as a result of the
modifications made by Resolution 2799, PROEX III is consistent with Brazil’s obligations under
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement to neither grant nor maintain such subsidies and
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to withdraw the prohibited subsidy. As demonstrated below,
PROEX III does not comply with these obligations.
16. This dispute has been ongoing since 1998, when Canada successfully challenged the original
PROEX program ("PROEX I") as a prohibited export subsidy. This Panel, in the original proceeding,
found that interest equalisation payments made under PROEX I for the benefit of purchasers of
exported Brazilian regional aircraft were subsidies contingent upon export performance. The Panel
further found that these subsidies were not covered by any exceptions or affirmative defences under
the SCM Agreement and were therefore prohibited in accordance with Article 3 of that Agreement.
The Appellate Body upheld these findings. The Panel recommended that Brazil withdraw these
prohibited export subsidies within ninety days of the adoption of its report by the DSB, that is, by
18 November 1999. Brazil still has not done so.
17. In its 28 April 2000 Report, this Panel also found that by continuing to issue NTN-I bonds
pursuant to letters of commitment issued under PR OEX I as it existed before 18 November 1999,

11 M.L. Abbott, "Bombardier’s partnership in the country does not change negotiations with Canada"
Valor Econômico (30 October 2000). (Exhibit CDA-3)
12 Statement by Brazil: DSB Meeting of 12 December 2000: Agenda Item 3: Brazil – Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft : Implementation of the recommendations of the DSB [hereinafter "Brazil’s
12 December 2000 DSB Statement"]. (Exhibit CDA-4)
14 OECD, The Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (Paris: OECD,
1998), Annex III, Part 2, Article 21. (Exhibit CDA-5)
15 Supra note 11.
16 Article 21.5 states, in relevant part:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these
dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. …

Brazil was continuing to grant subsidies contingent upon export performance within the meaning of
Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 17 Brazil also appealed, unsuccessfully, this conclusion of the
Panel in the first Article 21.5 proceeding.
18. Since 18 November 1999, despite the adopted findings of the Panel as upheld by the
Appellate Body in the original Article 21.5 proceedings, Brazil has continued to make illegal subsidy
payments on aircraft delivered after 18 November 1999 pursuant to commitments made under
PROEX I and II both before and after 18 November 1999. In response to this ongoing non-
compliance, Canada sought and obtained from the DSB authorization to impose certain
countermeasures against Brazil.
19. Therefore, this second Article 21.5 proceeding is to consider only whether PROEX III is
consistent with the SCM Agreement. Regardless of the outcome of this proceeding, so long as Brazil
continues to make payments under PROEX I and II, it will remain non-compliant with the DSB’s
recommendation that it withdraw its prohibited export subsidies.
IV. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
20. In the following section, Canada presents evidence that payments under PROEX III on
exports of regional aircraft continue to be prohibited export subsidies. In so doing, Canada has met its
legal and evidential burden in this proceeding. The burden now shifts to Brazil to establish the three
requisite elements of its alleged affirmative defence.
18 Brazil needs to prove:
(i) that the first paragraph of Item (k) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement gives rise to an
a contrario exception; and that PROEX payments qualify for this alleged exception
in that:
(ii) the PROEX payments are the payment by governments of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits; and
(iii) the PROEX payments are not used to secure a material advantage in the field of
export credit terms.
21. Although the shifting of the burden to Brazil obviates the need for Canada to address the three
elements of the alleged defence that Brazil has implied that it will rely on, 19 Canada will show in this
submission that Brazil cannot establish any of these elements.
22. It is evident that in an effort to continue pr oviding illegal export subsidies, Brazil intends to
exploit any alleged ambiguity and any judicial economy exercised by the Panel and the Appellate
Body in this dispute. In the circumstances, it is e ssential that the Panel issue detailed findings on all
three elements of Brazil’s defence in order to facilitate the effective resolution of this dispute.20

17 Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 6.17.
18 Before the Original Panel, Brazil explicitly acknowledged that its alleged Item (k) exception
constituted an affirmative defence and that the burden of establishing the defence was on Brazil: Original Panel
Report, at para. 7.17. As in the previous Article 21.5 proceeding in this dispute, the burden of proof lies with
Brazil in that it is using Item (k) to make an affirmative claim in its defence. Article 21.5 Appellate Body
Report, para. 66; United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India ,
WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, p. 16.
19 Brazil’s 12 December 2000 DSB Statement, supra note 12.
20 As articulated by the Appellate Body, a panel has to address those claims on which a finding is
necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficient ly precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow
for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings and the effective resolution of the
dispute: Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon , WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted

V. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. PROEX III PAYMENTS CONTINUE TO BE PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES UNDER ARTICLES 1 AND 3
OF THE SCM AGREEMENT
23. As has been confirmed twice before by bot h the Panel and the Appellate Body, PROEX
payments continue to involve a direct transfer of funds from the Government of Brazil that confers a
benefit.
21 Accordingly, PROEX III involves "subsidies" within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement. The subsidies are de jure contingent upon export performance within the meaning of
Article 3.1(a) of that Agreement. Accordingly, they are prohibited under Articles 3.1 and 3.2.
24. It is implicit in Brazil’s statement to the DSB on 12 December 2000, which is grounded in
Brazil’s alleged Item (k) exception, that Brazil c ontinues to acknowledge that PROEX subsidies are
prohibited export subsidies. 22 Nevertheless, Brazil has changed nothing about PROEX except the
maximum interest rate buy-down. This presumably is the basis for Brazil’s contention that since
6 December, PROEX "fully conforms to WTO disciplines".
23 This contention appears to be based
entirely on the revisions in Resolution 2799 that provide that PROEX interest rate buy-downs shall be
established "in accordance with" the CIRR, 24 and on Brazil’s belief that this qualifies PROEX for an
a contrario exception under its theory of Item (k) and its PROEX program.
25. Thus, at the 12 December 2000 meeting of the DSB, at which Brazil announced that
Resolution 2799 was "operational", Brazil stated that it:
… chose to revise PROEX so as not to allow for payments that result in interest rates
below the relevant CIRR. Furthermor e, the Committee on Export Credits (CCEx)
will approve equalization for regional aircraft financing having as a benchmark the
financing conditions existing in the international market. With these parameters,
PROEX has been brought into full confor mity with Brazil's obligations under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the GATT 1994.
25
B. BRAZIL CANNOT ESTABLISH AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENCE
26. Brazil appears to be contending that by requiring its interest rate buy-down payments under
PROEX to be made "in accordance with the CIRR", it has sheltered PROEX III under an alleged a
contrario exception in the first paragraph of Item (k) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement.
27. In accordance with the prior findings of this Panel and the Appellate Body, in order for Brazil
to escape the prohibition in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, it must establish that:
(i) The first paragraph of Item (k) of Annex I is an a contrario exception; and that
PROEX payments qualify for that exception because:

6 November 1998, para. 223; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Wheat Gluten from
The European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001, para. 180.
21 The nature of PROEX equalization payments as prohibited export subsidies was discussed in the
Original Panel Report at para. 7.13. This nature has not changed.
22 Brazil acknowledged that PROEX equalization payments were prohibited export subsidies under
both PROEX I (see para. 7.12 of the Original Panel Report) and PROEX II (see para. 6.7 of the Article 21.5
Panel Report).
23 Statement by Brazil: DSB Meeting of 16 February 2001: Agenda Item II: Brazil – Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft, para. 3. (Exhibit CDA-6)
25 Brazil’s 12 December 2000 DSB statement, supra note 12.

(ii) PROEX payments are the "payment by [governments] of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits"; and
(iii) PROEX payments are not "used to secure a material advantage in the field of export
credit terms".26
28. As demonstrated below, Brazil cannot establish any of these elements. Accordingly,
payments made pursuant to PROEX III are prohibited export subsidies under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement.
1. The First Paragraph of Item (K) Cannot Be Interpreted As An A Contrario Exception
(a) The Nature of Brazil’s A Contrario Argument
29. The foundation of Brazil’s position appears to be that the first paragraph of Item (k) of the
Illustrative List under Annex I can be interpreted a contrario sensu to create an exception to the
prohibition in Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement for measures that in some respect fall outside of the
description of the export subsidy illustrated in the first paragraph of Item (k).27
30. In the past, Brazil has argued that its otherwise prohibited PROEX export subsidies are
exempt from the obligations of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement because it considered that the first
paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List creates an exception a contrario for practices similar to
those described in the first paragraph but which do not meet all of the terms of that description.
31. Brazil has argued further, that various iterations of PROEX meet the terms of this alleged
exception because PROEX provided, in Brazil’s view, the type of payments that are discussed in Item
(k) first paragraph, but that these payments, according to Brazil, did not secure a material advantage in
the field of export credit terms.
32. In the context of the PROEX case, Brazil infers from the text of the first paragraph of
Item (k), which refers only to export credits and payments used to secure a material advantage, that
when such activities are not used to secure a material advantage, they are not
 export subsidies that are
subject to the prohibition in Article 3.1.
(b) The Applicable Rules of Treaty Interpretation
(i) The A Contrario Maxim Cannot Be Applied Automatically
33. The a contrario exception is another way of referring to one of the maxims of statutory and
treaty interpretation, that is, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one thing is to exclude
another).28 Its basic rationale is as follows: given what has been expressly set out in a text, it is
plausible to infer that the drafters intended to exclude similar things that are not expressly mentioned.
34. The argument is based on the expectation that if the drafters had meant to include a similar or
related thing within the ambit of a treaty provision, they would have referred to that thing expressly.
The failure to mention such a thing then become s a basis for inferring that it was deliberately
excluded.

27 " A contrario sensu" means "on the other hand; in the opposite sense". (Black’s Law Dictionary ,
7th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999), p. 23. (Exhibit CDA-7))
28 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 400 [hereinafter "McNair"].
(Exhibit CDA-8)

35. So-called canons or maxims of interpretation, such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius or
the a contrario approach, are not automatic in their application. They have not attained the status of
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, although they are sometimes referred to
in the decisions of international tribunals.29
36. The International Law Commission’s final recommendations about the interpretation of
treaties make it clear that the application of any given maxim depends upon discretion and will not be
suitable in all cases:
Their suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations which
have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the document; the particular
arrangement of the words and sentences, their relation to each other and to other parts
of the document, the general nature and subject-matter of the document, the
circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. Even when a possible occasion for their
application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but depends on the
conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of
the case. In other words, recourse to many of these principles is discretionary rather
than obligatory … .
30
37. Thus, the a contrario reasoning advocated by Brazil is not of universal application. In fact, in
the form of expressio unius est exclusio alterius , the a contrario approach can be an unreliable tool
and must be used with caution. In The Law of Treaties, Lord McNair gave warnings as to the possible
misapplication of this maxim:
That there is a substantial element of truth in this maxim is obvious …. But, like
other maxims, it must be regarded as a ‘valuable servant’ and not allowed to become
a ‘dangerous master’, and must be applied with caution.
31
38. He cited an English case to the effect that:
The exclusio [ i.e., the thing not expressly mentioned] is often the result of
inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its
application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to
inconsistency or injustice".
32
39. Accordingly, whether a provision gives rise to an a contrario interpretation depends very
much upon the context of the provision being interpreted. Brazil’s contention that Item (k) should be
interpreted as containing an implicit a contrario exception must therefore be examined, like any other
claim as to the interpretation of a treaty provision, in accordance with those rules of treaty
interpretation that, having attained the status of customary international law, are automatic in their
application.
(ii) The General Rule Of Interpretation In Article 31 of the Vienna Convention And The Principle
Of Effectiveness

29 G.G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points," (1951) 28 B.Y.I.L. 1.; and Sir G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points,"
(1957) 33 B.Y.I.L. 203. (Exhibits CDA-9 and CDA-10)
30 "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session" (U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev. 1) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966 , vol. II, Part II (New York, 1966) (UN
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.I), p. 218. (Exhibit CDA-11)
31 McNair, supra note 28, p. 400.
32 Ibid., quoting Colquhoun v. Brooks, 21 Q.B.D. 52, p. 65.

40. It is well established that the starting point for interpreting a WTO agreement or a provision
such as Item (k), is the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention").33
41. According to the general rule, treaty interpreta tion begins with a careful reading of the text.
Treaty terms must be given their ordinary meaning unless the text indicates that a term is intended to
have a special meaning. The ordinary meaning of a term is determined in the context of the treaty and
in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose.
42. The Appellate Body has also recognized th at the principle of effectiveness in the
interpretation of treaties ( ut res magis valeat quam pereat ) is a fundamental tenet of treaty
interpretation flowing from this general rule.
34 The principle of effectiveness requires that a treaty
interpreter:
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free
to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a
treaty to redundancy or inutility.35
43. The Appellate Body has elaborated upon this principle, stating that:
(i) It is the duty of any treaty interpreter to read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a
way that gives meaning to all of them harmoniously;
(ii) An important corollary of this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a
whole, and, in particular, its sections and parts should be read as a whole; and
(iii) All of the provisions of a treaty must be given meaning and legal effect.36

33 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted
20 May 1996, pp. 16-17 [hereinafter United States – Gasoline]. Article 3.2 of the WTO’s Understanding on the
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) requires WTO Agreements (including the
SCM Agreement) to be interpreted in accordance with "cus tomary rules of interpretation of public international
law". These rules are set out in the Vienna Convention. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accord ance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty;
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
[….]
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
34 United States – Gasoline, p. 23; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R;
WT/DS810/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, p. 11; Brazil – Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft , Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 179, note 110
[hereinafter "Original Appellate Body Report"]; Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, paras. 80-82 [hereinafter Korea – Dairy
Safeguards].
35 Ibid., para. 80.
36 Ibid., paras. 81-82. [emphasis in the original].

44. The principle of effectiveness is particularly relevant to the interpretation of the first
paragraph of Item (k). To the extent that the paragraph is open to two interpretations – i.e., it does or
does not offer an a contrario exception – the interpretation that gives meaning and legal effect to all
of the applicable provisions of the SCM Agreement must be adopted. As the following analysis
demonstrates, this is achieved only if Item (k) is interpreted as not offering an a contrario exception.
(c) The Applicable Provisions of the SCM Agreement
45. In addition to Annex I, the applicable provisions of the SCM Agreement are the prohibition in
Article 3 and the corresponding footnotes. These read as follows:
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies,
within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact
4, whether solely or as one of several
other conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5;
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in
paragraph 1.
Footnote 4: This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a
subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in
fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.
Footnote 5: Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall
not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement.
46. These provisions provide important context for the interpretation of Item (k). Moreover,
Item (k) must not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive these provisions of meaning.
(i) Footnote 5
47. Footnote 5 is particularly important to the analysis of Brazil’s claim that its export subsidies
are permitted by Item (k), because footnote 5 recognizes that Annex I contains certain exceptions to
the prohibition in Article 3. Brazil’s claim can have no basis outside of footnote 5. As an explicit
exclusionary clause, footnote 5 precludes the possibility of relying on an implied exclusion based on
an alleged a contrario exception independent of footnote 5. The Panel recognized this in its original
Article 21.5 Report where it stated:
If we were to conclude that the Illustrative List by implication gave rise to
"permitted" measures beyond those allowed by footnote, we would be calling into
serious question the raison d’être of footnote 5.
37
48. That is, if simply by identifying certain types of measures as prohibited export subsidies, the
Illustrative List could be said implicitly to allow other subsidies, footnote 5 would be redundant. The
principle of effectiveness precludes this result. Accordingly, Brazil’s legal argument that an a
contrario exception exists in the first paragraph of Item (k) must somehow be grounded in footnote 5.

37 Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 6.41. Moreover, the Article 21.5 Panel Report stated, at para. 5.3,
that "footnote 5 controls the interpretation of item (k) with respect to when the Illustrative List can be used to
demonstrate that a measure is not a prohibited subsidy".

49. In its Report in the previous Article 21.5 proceeding, the Appellate Body, in obiter dictum
stated that it would have been prepared to find that Brazil’s PROEX II payments were justified under
Item (k) if Brazil could have demonstrated that those payments satisfied the other two elements again
at issue here (which it could not). However, it also stated that:
… we wish to emphasize that we are not interpreting footnote 5 of the SCM
Agreement, and we do not opine on the scope of footnote 5, or on the meaning of any
other items in the Illustrative List.38
50. In Canada’s view, it is impossible to reach a conclusion as to the existence of an a contrario
exception without interpreting the language of footnote 5. Along with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement, footnote 5 and the other items in the I llustrative List constitute the immediate context of
Item (k). In accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention any full analysis of the meaning of
Item (k) requires that it be considered.
51. For the purpose of assessing the existence of an alleged a contrario exception in Item (k)
based on footnote 5, the key phrase in footnote 5 is "measures referred to in Annex I as not
constituting export subsidies". In order to make out the existence of such an exception, Brazil must
establish that a measure impliedly excluded from the list of illustrations in Annex I is a measure
"referred to in Annex I as not constituting" an export subsidy. It cannot do so. The ordinary meaning
of footnote 5 does not support such an interpretation.
52. A measure impliedly excluded from the Illustrative List is not a measure "referred to" in it.
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary offers as the most relevant definition of "refer": "direct to
a fact, event, etc., by drawing attention to it."
39 The usual synonyms for "referred to" – "mentioned,
cited, named" – also involve a positive reference to something by means of words or other symbols.40
53. In legal instruments, matters are referred to by words. If something must be "referred to" in a
written text, the thing must be named or described in words set out in the text. Otherwise the thing
would not be referred to in the text. Since a text consists of expressed language, a reference in a text
must equally consist of expressed language. The Appellate Body recognized this in United States –
Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" where it described footnote 5 as applying "where the
Illustrative List indicates that a measure is not a prohibited export subsidy".41
54. Footnote 5 does not require that the words "is not an export subsidy" be used in the
Illustrative List. Rather, it requires positive authorizing language in Annex I that a measure is not
being categorized as a prohibited subsidy. 42 To find otherwise would nullify the meaning and legal
effect of the phrase "referred to in" and, therefore, would be inconsistent with the principle of
effectiveness as articulated by the Appellate Body.

39 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), p. 2520 ("refer"). (Exhibit CDA-12)
40 Oxford Thesaurus: An A-Z Dictionary of Synonyms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 384 ("refer).
(Exhibit CDA-13)
41 WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, para. 93. [emphasis altered]
42 There are four such statements in Annex I. The second paragraph of Item (k) contains an explicit
statement that certain practices shall not be considered a prohibited export subsidy. In three other instances,
footnote 59 to Item (e), Item (h) an d Item (i), the Annex includes affirmat ive statements authorizing the use of
certain measures without explicitly stating that they do not constitute export subsidies. These statements
provide contextual support for Canada’s position that the words "measures referred to in Annex I as not
constituting export subsidies" in footnote 5 means measures for which there are positive statements in Annex I
to indicate that such measures are not export subsidies.

55. Seen in the light of the ordinary meaning of footnote 5, Brazil’s contention that its PROEX
payments are permitted, a contrario, because they are not referred to in Item (k) creates an absurdity.
It is this absence of reference from which Brazil infers that its measure is impliedly excluded from the
prohibition in Article 3. However, in order to fall within footnote 5, Brazil’s measure must be
referred to in Item (k). Brazil cannot have it both ways.
(ii) The Illustrative List
56. The Illustrative List is illustrative only. That is, it is not an exhaustive list of those measures
that are prohibited export subsidies. This is confirmed by the plain language of Article 3.1(a), which
prohibits subsidies contingent upon export performance " including those illustrated in Annex I."
[emphasis added]
57. It was also confirmed by the Panel in Canada – Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry .
The Panel found that:
it is … reasonable, in our view, to consider that the Illustrative List may be of some
utility in informing the notion of export contingency in certain precise situations. We
find it difficult to accept, however, that the practices identified in the Illustrative List
represent a circumscription … of the conditions under which a subsidy is deemed to
be contingent upon export performance. Indeed, the use of the words "including" and
"illustrated" makes it clear that, while all practices identified in the Illustrative List
are subsidies contingent upon export performance, there may be other practices not
identified in the Illustrative List that are also subsidies contingent upon export
performance.
43
58. The Panel’s finding confirms that the analysis of whether a given practice falls within the
terms of an item in the Illustrative List is not determinative of whether it constitutes a subsidy
contingent upon export performance. In other words, the Illustrative List only covers a subset of
export subsidies to which the general prohibition applies.
59. In the case of a non-exhaustive illustrative list, an a contrario interpretation or the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not applicable. While the Illustrative List defines a part of a
whole – that is, examples of export subsidies – it does not prescribe a special rule to be applied only to
the examples mentioned. On the contrary, save for measures covered by footnote 5, pursuant to
Article 3.1(a) the rule applicable to the whole – the prohibition of export subsidies – is also applicable
to the part of the whole mentioned on the Illustrative List.
60. Since no special rule is defined for the Illustrative List, there is no basis to infer that
unmentioned export subsidies are subject to a different rule. An a contrario interpretation is not
possible, because unmentioned export subsidies are covered by the same rule as the expressly
mentioned export subsidies.
61. Accordingly, when Item (k) is considered in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the relevant terms of the SCM Agreement in their context, it is clear that Brazil’s a contrario
interpretation is unsustainable.
2. PROEX Payments Are Not The "Payment By [Governments] Of All Or Part Of The
Costs Incurred By Exporters Or Financial Institutions In Obtaining Credits"
62. Item (k) of the Illustrative List does not allow for an a contrario exception. Even if it did, to
qualify for it Brazil would have to show that its payments under PROEX III are of a type covered by

43 WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19 June 2000, para. 10.196.

the first paragraph of Item (k) but not "used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit
terms".
63. Item (k) specifically relates to only two types of practices to which the "material advantage"
clause applies: (i) export credits granted by governments or certain government-controlled institutions
at below their own cost of funds; and (ii) paymen ts by governments of "all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits".
64. Throughout this dispute, Brazil has argued that its PROEX export subsidies are of the latter
type. It has contended that they are payments by the Government of Brazil of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters (Embraer) or financial institutions in obtaining credits.44
65. Brazil’s contention was considered by this Panel in the previous Article 21.5 proceeding. The
Panel rejected Brazil’s argument.45 The Appellate Body subsequently declared the Panel’s findings to
be "moot" because it had already found that Brazil had failed to show that the PROEX payments were
not used to secure a material advantage.46 Nevertheless, the Panel’s findings were clearly correct.
66. The Panel found as follows:
It will be recalled that item (k) refers to the payment by governments of "all or part of
the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits". In
interpreting this provision, we must of course start with its ordinary meaning. In this
respect, we note first the use of the word "credits" in the plural. It seems clear in
context that the word "credits" refers to "export credits" as used earlier in the
paragraph. Second, the costs involved are those relating to obtaining export credits,
and not costs relating to providing them.
Read in light of the foregoing considerations, we do not believe that PROEX
payments can be said to constitute "the payment by [a government] of all or part of
the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining export credits".
Brazil's argument equates the cost for a financial institution of raising capital with the
cost of "obtaining [export] credits". While the financial institutions involved in
financing PROEX-supported transactions certainly provide export credits, they
cannot be seen as obtaining such credits. Further, if the drafters had intended to refer
to payments related to a financial institution's cost of borrowing, the first part of the
first sentence of item (k) demonstrates that they knew how to do so. In short, we do
not agree that payments to a lender that amount to interest rate support can reasonably
be understood to be payments of all or part of the costs of obtaining export credits.
Even if we did agree that the provision of export credits at below a financial
institution's cost of borrowing entailed a "cost incurred by … financial institutions in
obtaining credits", we are unconvinced that PROEX payments necessarily serve to
reimburse such below-cost-of-borrowing export credits. In this respect, we note that
Brazil's argument focused on the fact that Embraer and Brazilian financial institutions
had a high cost of borrowing as a result of "Brazil risk". As Canada points out,
however, Embraer does not itself provide export credit financing, and the financial
institutions receiving PROEX payments are not necessarily Brazilian financial
institutions. Rather, they are in many cases leading international financial institutions
unhampered by "Brazil risk". Thus, there is no basis for us to conclude, nor even to

44 Original Panel Report, para. 4.76.
45 Article 21.5 Panel Report, paras. 6.69-6.73.

hypothesise, that the financial institutions in question are providing export credits at
below their cost of funds.47
67. As the Panel noted, the ordinary meaning and context of the "payment" clause in the first
paragraph of Item (k) makes clear that the costs referred to are those relating to obtaining export
credits and not those relating to providing them. The first part of the first paragraph of Item (k) refers
to the cost incurred by a government in granting export credits at rates below its own borrowing cost.
The second part of the paragraph refers to a situation where a government covers the same cost
incurred by a financial institution or an exporter.
68. PROEX payments do not reimburse an exporter or a financial institution for the costs it incurs
in "obtaining" export credits. Instead, they buy down commercially negotiated interest rates for a
purchaser of exported goods to below market rates. As such, they are not "payments" within the
meaning of the second part of the first paragraph of Item (k).
69. Accordingly, PROEX payments would not qualify for any a contrario exception under
Item (k), even if such an exception existed.
3. PROEX Payments Are "Used To Secure A Material Advantage In The Field Of Export
Credit Terms"
70. The third element that Brazil would have to demonstrate in order to qualify for its alleged a
contrario exception under Item (k) is that PROEX payments are not "used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms". Brazil has been unable to demonstrate this in any of the
prior proceedings in this dispute. However, it now claims that it has revised PROEX by way of
Resolution 2799 "so as not to allow for the payments that result in interest rates below the relevant
CIRR" and that this is sufficient to establish the third element.
48
71. It is very much open to question whether the words of Resolution 2799, which provide that
PROEX III buy-downs are to be "in accordance with" the relevant CIRR for the respective currency
and financing term of the transaction, actually prohibit buy-downs to below the CIRR as Brazil
claims. As noted, the typical financing term for regional aircraft transactions exceeds the 10-year
CIRR term. That is, there is no CIRR for the financing term used most often for regional aircraft.
72. Even if for the sake of argument there were a relevant CIRR and the words of
Resolution 2799 did prohibit buy-downs below that rate, it is readily demonstrated that, contrary to
Brazil’s assertions, PROEX III payments provide a "material advantage" as that term should be
interpreted in accordance with the SCM Agreement and the relevant panel and Appellate Body
findings.
(a) PROEX III Confers a Material Advantage When Compared to Rates Available to Borrowers
in the Commercial Marketplace
73. Because PROEX III is constructed as a buy-down of interest rates that have already been
freely negotiated by Embraer’s customers in the market, the resulting net interest rates will necessarily
be below market rates. The Appellate Body has stated that the existence of a "material advantage"
depends on where the government interest rate "stands in relation to the range of commercial rates
available."49 The range of commercial rates available must be interpreted to refer to the commercial
rates that are actually available to the borrower in question. The Appellate Body has acknowledged

47 Article 21.5 Panel Report, paras 6.71 to 6.73. [emphasis in original]
48 Brazil’s 12 December 2000 DSB Statement, supra note 12.
49 Original Appellate Body Report, para. 182. [emphasis added].

that "the commercial interest rate with respect to a loan in any given currency varies according to the
length of maturity as well as the creditworthiness of the borrower."50
74. Given that PROEX III interest rates are necessarily below the market rates available to the
borrower in question, and therefore provide an "advantage," the only question is whether the PROEX
rates are sufficiently below market to be consid ered as providing a "material" advantage. The
ordinary meaning of "advantage" is "a more favorable or improved position" or a "superior position".
51 The ordinary meaning of "material" is "serious, important; of consequence." 52 "Material" is also
defined as referring to evidence or facts which are "significant, influential, esp. to the extent of
determining a cause, affecting a judgement, etc."53
75. Therefore, a "material advantage" occurs if PROEX III provides a "more favorable" or
"superior" position relative to the commercial rate s available to the borrower in question, and that
improvement is "important" in nature. Alternatively, a "material" advantage occurs where the
improvement provided by PROEX III is "significant", especially to the extent of affecting a
judgement or determining a cause, i.e. influencing the aircraft purchaser’s selection of aircraft.
76. Canada has submitted affidavits from airlines and a financial institution indicating that a
reduction in interest rates of as little as 25 basis points can have a material impact on a purchaser’s
choice of aircraft.
 54
77. Assuming that PROEX III buys down the interest rate to the CIRR, it will almost always
confer an advantage of more than 25 basis points compared to the commercial rates available to
borrowers under similar terms and conditions. The extent to which the CIRR is divorced from market
terms is illustrated by comparing the U.S. dollar CIRR (the CIRR rate for terms in excess of 8.5 years
is set at a fixed margin of 100 basis points over the 7-year U.S. Treasury bond) with the actual all-in
borrowing rates paid by fixed-rate airline borrowers.
78. As shown in the annexed Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Market Update (the "MSDW Report")
the airline with the best credit rating (i.e., lowest risk) is American, whose debt currently trades
between 135 to 200 basis points above Treasury rates.
55 That is, even at the lowest end of the lowest
risk airline, the 135 basis point spread is still 35 basis points higher than a rate achieved at CIRR
alone.
79. The spread between the CIRR and market rates is higher – in some cases far higher – for
other, less creditworthy airlines. As the MSDW Re port shows, the spread paid by an airline above
U.S. Treasury rates can range up to 500 basis points. Thus, even comparing PROEX III to market
rates – without taking into consideration other terms and conditions – PROEX confers a material
advantage.
80. However, other terms and conditions must also be taken into account. By its express
wording, a material advantage under Item (k) is "in the field of export credit terms". Accordingly, the
determination of whether a material advantage exists must be based on a consideration of those
"export credit terms" and not simply based on a comparison of interest rates.

50 Ibid. [emphasis added].
51 Ibid., para. 177.
52 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), pp. 1713-1714 ("material"). See also Black’s Law Dictionary , 7 th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999),
p. 991 ("material"). (Exhibits CDA-14 and CDA-15)
53 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ("material"), supra note 51.
54 Affidavits from Tyrolean Airways (2 February 2000); Augsburg Airways (1 February 2000);
Comair, Inc. (2 February 2000); and CIBC World Markets (2 February 2000). (Exhibit CDA-16)
55 "EETC Market Update: Monthly Update: Airlines" (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Fixed Income
Research, North America, Investment Grade Credit – Industrials) 10 February 2001, p. 13. (Exhibit CDA-17)

81. The Appellate Body identified as "terms and conditions of export credit transactions in the
marketplace" the following: "the product involved, th e size or volume of the transaction, the type of
export credit practice, the duration of the repayment term, the type of interest (fixed or floating) used,
and when the transaction is concluded."56 As this Panel noted:
In its ordinary meaning, the field of export credit terms would refer to items directly
related to export credits, such as interest rates, grace periods, transaction costs,
maturities and the like. We consider that this interpretation is supported contextually
be item (k) itself, which refers to a loan’s "maturity and other credit terms".57
82. If these terms and conditions are considered, as they must be under the express terms of the
SCM Agreement and prior rulings in this case, they further demonstrate the material advantage
provided by PROEX III. As noted previously, th e PROEX III repayment period is "unlimited" and
the financed amount may be up to 100 percent of the value of the aircraft. 58 In contrast, the American
Airlines spread is based on a loan-to-asset value of only 47% and an average life of roughly 10 years,
both of which significantly reduce the risk to the point where the credit is rated as Investment Grade.
83. The significantly longer maturities, and higher loan-to-asset value available under PROEX III
would require significantly higher rates in the commercial marketplace. The fact that PROEX III
rates are actually lower than commercial rates available to borrowers, despite having significantly
longer maturities and higher loan-to-asset values, demonstrates that the program confers a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms.
(b) The CIRR Alone Is Not Determinative of Material Advantage
84. Nevertheless, Brazil appears to be claiming that it can establish that PROEX payments do not
secure a material advantage so long as they do not buy down interest rates below the CIRR rate. This
flies in the face of the very nature of PROEX as a below-market buy-down scheme. Moreover, in
advancing this argument, Brazil has misinterpreted the guidance of the Appellate Body.
85. In its Report in the previous Article 21.5 proceeding, the Appellate Body stated:
To establish that subsidies under the revised PROEX are not "used to secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms", Brazil must prove either: that
the net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or above the relevant CIRR, the
specific "market benchmark" we identified in the original dispute as an "appropriate"
basis for comparison; or, that an alternative "market benchmark", other than the
CIRR, is appropriate, and that the net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or
above this alternative "market benchmark."
59
86. Brazil has seized on this statement and cited it as the basis for its contention that PROEX III
is in conformity with its WTO obligations.60 Its position appears to be that as long as net interest rates
under PROEX III will be at or above the relevant CIRR, payments under PROEX III do not secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms. This is incorrect for several reasons.
87. First, as discussed above, the express terms of the SCM Agreement, as well as the prior
findings of the Appellate Body and this Panel, demonstrate that the existence of a "material
advantage" must be determined with regard to the field of export credit terms, rather than solely with

57 Original Panel Report, para. 7.28.
58 See Valor Econômico (30 October 2000), supra note 11.
60 Brazil’s 12 December 2000 DSB Statement, supra note 12.

respect to the interest rate comparison. Thus, to th e extent that the CIRR is a "benchmark", that is, a
"point of reference" 61 against which something may be compared, one must still look at the field of
export credit terms in order to determine whether a "payment", within the m eaning of Item (k) first
paragraph, is used to secure a material advantage.
88. In other words, a CIRR benchmark cannot be conclusive on the issue of material advantage
because it does not (as interpreted by Brazil in its PROEX III program) take into account the other
aspects of the transaction, ( i.e. maturity, the loan-to-asset value or minimum cash payment to be
made, etc.) and the creditworthiness of the borrower.
89. Thus, while the CIRR may be relevant evidence to determine or assess whether a payment is
used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms, it cannot, in and of itself, be
determinative.
90. That the CIRR alone is not determinative of a material advantage is confirmed by the rules of
treaty interpretation. To find that the CIRR alone is determinative of a material advantage would
reduce paragraph 2 of Item (k) to redundancy or inutility. No WTO Member would have any
incentive to conform their export credit practices to the CIRR and the other requirements of the
OECD Arrangement in order to shelter their export subsidies; they could achieve the same result by
conforming their practices to the CIRR alone under paragraph 1. Such a result would be contrary to
the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties ( ut res magis valeat quam pereat ) as
articulated by the Appellate Body.
 62
91. Second, an approach that treated the CIRR as conclusive on the issue of material advantage
would disregard the Appellate Body’s clear ruling that the CIRR may not reflect the rates available in
the marketplace, in which case it may be disregarded as a standard in favor of actual market rates.
The Appellate Body held that even where an interest rate was below the CIRR, a defending Member
could demonstrate that its program did not confer a material advantage, by relying on an alternative
"market benchmark."
63
92. The Appellate Body’s decision with respect to below-CIRR rates was premised on its
recognition that in certain circumstances, "the CIRR does not, in fact, reflect the rates available in the
marketplace."
64 Thus, the Appellate Body recognized that the role of the CIRR was to serve as a
proxy for the rates available in the marketplace. Where the CIRR is not an adequate proxy for market
rates – as it is not, as discussed above – then an alternative market benchmark must be used. Brazil is
wrong in interpreting the Appellate Body’s statement as authorizing Brazil to make the CIRR
determinative of the existence of a material advantage. The Appellate Body was merely indicating
that the CIRR constitutes evidence that is relevant to that consideration.
93. Third, Brazil’s reference to a CIRR interest rate divorced from the terms and conditions on
which that rate depends is untenable and contrary to the findings of the Appellate Body. While the
Appellate Body has found that the CIRR is an appropriate "market benchmark" for determining
whether "payments" within the first paragraph of Item (k) are used to secure a material advantage, it
did so because the CIRR is the interest rate reference point under the OECD Arrangement. 65 As the
Appellate Body explained:

61 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), p. 212 ("benchmark"). (Exhibit CDA-18)
62 Korea – Dairy Safeguards, para. 80.
64 Ibid.
65 Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, para. 61, citing the Original Appellate Body Report, para. 181.

… the OECD Arrangement can be appropriately viewed as one example of an
international undertaking providing a specific market benchmark by which to assess
whether payments by governments, coming within the provisions of item (k), are
‘used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms’.66
94. The CIRR is an interest rate that has been constructed within the context of the OECD
Arrangement. Under that Arrangement, the CIRR can only be offered when the other disciplines of
the Arrangement are respected. As the Appellate Body noted:
… a participant in the OECD Arrangement can always offer borrowers officially-
supported export credits if, besides respecting the CIRR, it also respects the other
"repayment terms and conditions" of the OECD Arrangement (see Introduction,
OECD Arrangement).67
95. Thus, the CIRR is only reflective of the market by virtue of its application within the
framework of the OECD Arrangement, which requires that participants respect, in addition to the
CIRR, other repayment terms and conditions. The CIRR has meaning and relevance as a benchmark
only when considered as part of this "package" of terms and conditions. As noted in the OECD
Arrangement, this package includes minimum premium benchmarks, the minimum cash payments to
be made ( i.e. loan-to-asset value) and maximum repayment terms. 68 Unless these other terms and
conditions are respected, the CIRR is not representative of any market and is not an "appropriate"
benchmark.
96. It therefore is clear, that when the Appellate Body referred to the CIRR as a appropriate
benchmark by which to assess whether payments are used to secure a material advantage in the field
of export credit terms, it could not have been referring to the CIRR stripped of the other terms and
conditions set out in the OECD Arrangement from which it is derived. As a matter of treaty
interpretation, the other requirements of the OECD Arrangement are essential context for
understanding the relevance of the CIRR as a "market benchmark".
97. Accordingly, simply by limiting interest rate buy-downs to the CIRR, Brazil cannot
demonstrate that PROEX III does not secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
VI. FINDINGS REQUESTED
98. For the foregoing reasons, Canada requests that the Panel find that conditional commitments
as of 6 December 2000 to pay PROEX subsidies on the export of Brazilian regional aircraft pursuant
to PROEX III are subsidies contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement, and that Brazil has failed to implement measures that would bring the
PROEX export subsidy program into compliance wi th the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
and Articles 4.7 and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
99. Canada further requests that the Panel make detailed findings in respect of all three elements
of Brazil’s affirmative defence. Canada requests that the Panel find that:
(a) there is no a contrario exception under Item (k) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement;
(b) PROEX payments are not payments of the type covered by the first paragraph of
Item (k); and

66 Original Appellate Body Report , para. 181, also cited in the Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report,
para. 61.
67 Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, para. 62, n. 68.
68 OECD Arrangement, supra note 14, Introduction, p. 4.

(c) PROEX payments are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit
terms.

TABLE OF EXHIBITS
CDA-1. "Redefining the rules appl icable to transactions under the interest rate equalization
system of the Export Financing Program – PROEX," Central Bank of Brazil (BCB)
Resolution No. 002799 (6 December 2000).
CDA-2. "Establishing maximum percentages for the tax rate equalization system under the
Export Financing Program – PROEX," Banco Central do Brasil Newsletter
No. 002881, 19 November 1999.
CDA-3. M.L. Abbott, "Bombardie r’s partnership in the country does not change negotiations
with Canada" Valor Econômico (30 October 2000).
CDA-4. Statement by Brazil: DSB Meeting of 12 December 2000: Agenda Item 3: Brazil –
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft : Implementation of the recommendations
of the DSB.
CDA-5. OECD, The Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits
(Paris: OECD, 1998).
CDA-6. Statement by Brazil: DSB Meeting of 16 February 2001: Agenda Item II: Brazil –
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft.
CDA-7. Black’s Law Dictionary , 7
th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999), p. 23
("a contrario sensu").
CDA-8. Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 399-410.
CDA-9. G.G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points," (1951) 28 B.Y.I.L. 1.
CDA-10. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points," (1957) 33 B.Y.I.L.
203.
CDA-11. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session"
(U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966 ,
vol. II, Part II (New York, 1966) (UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.I), pp.217-223.
CDA-12. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 2 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 2520 ("refer").
CDA-13. Oxford Thesaurus: An A-Z Dictionary of Synonyms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991),
p. 384 ("refer").
CDA-14. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 1 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1713-1714 ("material").
CDA-15. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7
th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999), p. 991 ("material").
CDA-16. Affidavits from Tyrolean Airways (2 February 2000); Augsburg Airways (1 February
2000); Comair, Inc. (2 February 2000); and CIBC World Markets (2 February 2000).

CDA-17. "EETC Market Update: Monthly Update: Airlines" (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
Fixed Income Research, North America, Investment Grade Credit – Industrials)
10 February 2001.
CDA-18. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 1 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 212 ("benchmark").

Note: Certain exhibits to this submission contain business confidential information, the disclosure of
which to non-government persons including those directly or indirectly involved in the aircraft
industry would prejudice private commercial inte rests. These exhibits have been designated
"Confidential", in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In its 16 March 2001 First Submission, Brazil offers three main arguments in defence of its
export subsidy practices. First, it asserts that PROEX III payments on exports of regional aircraft no
longer constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Second, it contends in the alternative that PROEX III
payments, as subsidies, now comply with the interest rate provisions of the OECD's Arrangement on
Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (the "Arrangement")
1 and are therefore eligible for
the "safe haven" of the second paragraph of Item (k) to Annex I of the SCM Agreement. Brazil also
asserts that, although the version of the OECD Arrangement now in force dates from 1998, the
relevant version for the purposes of the second paragraph of Item (k) should be the 1992 version.
Third, Brazil argues in the further alternative that PROEX III payments are not used to secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms and therefore qualify for an alleged a contrario
exception under the first paragraph of Item (k).
2. Nowhere does Brazil describe in its First Submission how PROEX III is currently
administered with respect to exports of regional aircraft. As Canada will demonstrate, it appears that
in addition to the traditional method of administering PROEX (i.e. as interest rate buy-down payments
on financing negotiated in the commercial market), PROEX III is now offered in conjunction with, or
as part of, export financing packages provided by Brazil's development bank, the Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (BNDES). In addition, Brazilian export subsidies for regional
aircraft may be completely subsumed in BNDE S financing in such a way that the PROEX III
payments are hidden. These latter approaches to the administration of PROEX provide a benefit that
is no different from that provided under the traditional approach to administering PROEX I and II.
3. In this submission, Canada will demonstrate that, as a matter of fact and of law, each of
Brazil's three defences for PROEX III must be rejected, whether PROEX is implemented as
traditional interest rate buy-down payments or in conjunction with BNDES financing. As Canada will
demonstrate, PROEX III financing support on exports of regional aircraft continue to amount to
subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement that are contingent upon export
performance within the meaning of Article 3 of that Agreement.
2
4. Brazil's first defence, that PROEX III support does not confer a "benefit" within the meaning
of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement is without merit. Whether or not PROEX III support is
consistent with the commercial interest reference rate ("CIRR") or the OECD Arrangement does not
go to the legal question of whether a benefit is conferred. Thus, Brazil has not rebutted the prima
facie case presented in Canada's First Submission, that PROEX III financing support continues to be a

1 OECD, The Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (Paris: OECD, 1998,
1992) [hereinafter "1998 OECD Arrangement" and "1992 OECD Arrangement" respectively]. Canada has filed
the relevant sections of the 1998 OECD Arrangement as Exhibit CDA-5. Brazil has filed the 1998 OECD
Arrangement as Exhibit Bra-9 and the 1992 OECD Arrangement as Exhibit Bra-7.
2 In this submission, Canada uses the term "PROEX III financing support" or "PROEX III support" to
encompass both the traditional PROEX payments and the other forms of support offered by Brazil as described
in paragraph 2 of this submission.

prohibited export subsidy because it consists of cash payments to a recipient to buy down further the
interest rate available to that recipient in the marketplace.3
5. Canada will also demonstrate that Brazil has not met its burden of proof with respect to the
two affirmative defences it attempts to invoke. With respect to the second paragraph of Item (k), the
legal argument and evidence put forward by Brazil does not establish compliance with either the 1998
or the 1992 versions of the OECD Arrangement. Rather, the evidence presented by both Brazil and
Canada is to the contrary. As Brazil acknowledges, for financing support for regional aircraft to
conform to the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement, it must be limited to terms of no
more than 10 years and to coverage not exceeding 85 percent of the value of the aircraft. Brazil has
not established that PROEX III financing support is limited to these terms. On that basis alone, Brazil
has not established that PROEX III can benefit from the "safe haven" of the second paragraph of
Item (k). Nor has Brazil demonstrated compliance with the other requirements of the OECD
Arrangement.
6. Canada will show that, contrary to Brazil's further assertion, the 1998 version of the OECD
Arrangement is indeed the applicable one under the second paragraph of Item (k). However,
irrespective of which version of the OECD Arrangement applies, PROEX III is not in compliance.
7. With respect to paragraph 1 of Item (k), Brazil's submission does not respond to the
arguments set out in Canada's First Submission, let alone establish a prima facie case for the
application of the alleged exception. In this submission, Canada highlights the legal and factual flaws
in the limited arguments presented by Brazil.
II. PROEX III CONFERS A BENEFIT AND IS A SUBSIDY WITHIN THE MEANING
OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT
8. Brazil's claim that PROEX III is not an e xport subsidy is based on its contention that
PROEX III does not confer a "benefit". This c ontention is based on two arguments. First, Brazil
argues that to the extent that PROEX III buys down to the CIRR interest rate, the payments do not
confer a benefit.
4 Second, Brazil argues that to the extent that PROEX III conforms more broadly to
the interest rates provisions of the OECD arrangement, it does not confer a benefit.5
A. PROEX III C ONFERS A B ENEFIT EVEN IF IT COMPLIES WITH A CIRR O R THE OECD
ARRANGEMENT
9. With respect to both arguments, Brazil is mi sconstruing the legal significance of compliance
with the CIRR or the OECD Arrangement. Such compliance is legally relevant only to the extent that
paragraph 2 of Item (k) or the alleged a contrario exception in paragraph 1 of Item (k) is invoked.
Upon successful invocation, compliance does not mean that a benefit within the meaning of Article 1
has not been conferred. Rather, it means that the prohibitions in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement may
not apply. As noted by the Arbitrators in the proceeding in this dispute under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, the fact that an export subsidy is justified under Item (k) "does not mean that it is no longer a
subsidy. It simply means that it is not a prohibited subsidy".
6 [emphasis in the original]
10. Brazil's arguments at paragraphs 11 through 15 of its First Submission conflate the meaning
of "benefit" in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement with the concepts of "material advantage" in

3 First Written Submission of Canada, 2 March 2001, paras. 9 and 73 [hereinafter "Canada's First
Submission"].
4 First Submission of Brazil, 16 March 2001, para. 11 [hereinafter "Brazil's First Submission"].
5 Id., para. 15.
6 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement , WT/DS46/ARB, a dopted 12 December 2000,
para. 3.39.

paragraph 1 of Item (k) and compliance with the OECD Arrangement in paragraph 2 of Item (k). All
references by the Appellate Body to CIRR have been in the context of determining whether payments
under PROEX I and II were used to "secure a material advantage". 7 The Appellate Body has
recognized that the meaning of "material advantage" in Item (k) is legally distinct from the existence
of a "benefit" under Article 1.8 Brazil fails to recognize this critical distinction.
11. The applicable legal test for the existence of a "benefit" is set out in the Appellate Body
Report in Canada – Aircraft .9 The Appellate Body found that a benefit is provided to a recipient
where a financial contribution makes the recipient better off than it would otherwise have been absent
that contribution.10 According to the Appellate Body:
the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether
a "benefit" has been "conferred", because the trade-distorting potential of a "financial
contribution" can be identified by determining whether the recipient has received a
"financial contribution" on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient
in the market.
11
12. As Canada noted in its First Submission, PROEX III, like its predecessor schemes, is
constructed as a buy-down of interest rates that have already been freely negotiated by the recipients –
Embraer's customers – in the marketplace. 12 Accordingly, any buy-down below those freely
negotiated rates will necessarily result in net interest rates on terms more favourable than those
available to Embraer's customers in the market. Thus, PROEX III, like its predecessor schemes,
necessarily confers a benefit. If Embraer's cust omers could achieve financing in the marketplace at
rates equivalent to those achieved by PROEX buy-downs, there would be no need for PROEX.
13. In the Article 22.6 proceeding in this dispute, Canada presented evidence that, contrary to
Brazil's previous assertions, Brazil also offers direct financing for its regional aircraft through
BNDES. Canada quoted from page 12 of Embraer's Preliminary Prospectus, which stated:
In addition to the PROEX program, we rely on the BNDES-exim program, also a
government-sponsored financing program, to assist customers with financing. This
program provides our customers with direct financing for Brazilian exports of goods
and services. At March 31, 2000, approximately 51.1% of our backlog (in terms of
value) was subject to financing by the BNDES-exim program.
13
14. The same reasoning that applies to traditi onal PROEX buy-downs also applies to PROEX III
payments that are administered in conjunction with BNDES financing or to BNDES financing that
has completely subsumed PROEX III. It is appa rent that the BNDES financing being offered in
conjunction with PROEX III is being offered at the interest rate floor designated for PROEX III – i.e.,

7 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 61 [hereinafter "Article 21.5
Appellate Body Report"].
8 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/R,
adopted 20 August 1999, para. 179 [hereinafter "Original Appellate Body Report"].
9 Canada – Measures Affecting th e Export of Civilian Aircraft , Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999 [hereinafter "Canada – Aircraft, Appellate Body Report].
10 Id., para. 157.
11 Id.; see also United States – Imposition of Counterva iling Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom , Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 67-68.
13 Canada's Answers to the Questions to the Parties, 24 July 2000, p. 11. The Prospectus uses a 57.5%
figure at p. 77.

the CIRR.14 To the extent that PROEX III allows for the buy-down of BNDES financing to this level,
or that BNDES is subsuming and offering PR OEX financing support, Embraer customers are
receiving financing at rates that would not be achi evable either in the commercial market or from
BNDES in the absence of PROEX III support.
15. Thus, PROEX III financial contributions confer a "benefit" under Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement. They are therefore a subsidy. Brazil has not disputed that PROEX III is also contingent
on export performance. Accordingly, PROEX III is a prohibited export subsidy within the meaning of
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. The burden lies with Brazil to prove that PROEX III support meets
the conditions of the safe haven in the second paragraph of Item (k) or the alleged exception in the
first paragraph (as well as to demonstrate that such an exception exists at all). It cannot do so.
B. EVEN AT CIRR, PROEX III CONFERS A BENEFIT
16. At paragraphs 11-14 of its First Submission, Braz il argues that the CIRR is representative of
market rates and sometimes is above prevailing market rates. In certain circumstances Brazil may be
correct. However, this observation in no way establishes that PROEX III financing support does not
confer a benefit.
17. Canada has already explained why PROEX III, by its very design, confers a benefit. Even if
this were not the case, PROEX III does not avoid conferring a benefit by establishing the CIRR as an
interest rate floor. Canada demonstrated in its First Submission that the CIRR alone, divorced from
the other terms and conditions of the OECD Arrangement such as the ten-year term limit and the limit
on financing to 85 percent of the value of the contract, in no way reflects market realities.
15 Brazil has
not rebutted Canada's evidence and submissions on this point. Moreover, at paragraphs 87 to 90 of
this Submission Canada demonstrates that, under current market circumstances, the CIRR is
substantially below the commercial interest rates available to regional airlines for the purchase or
lease of regional aircraft.
III. BRAZIL'S REVISED POSITION ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF ITEM (K) OF THE
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST
18. In its First Submission, Brazil substantially revises its position on paragraph 2 of Item (k) of
the Illustrative List. Brazil did not invoke the second paragraph of Item (k) in the PROEX I
proceeding because, in its own words to the Appellate Body "it 'has concluded that conformity to the
OECD provisions is too expensive'".
16 It was silent on the second paragraph of Item (k) in the
PROEX II proceeding. Brazil now claims that it "has complied with Canada's stated wishes and
conformed PROEX to the interest rate provisions of the Arrangement, as required by the second
paragraph of Item (k)" and goes so far as to suggest in the conclusion of its First Submission that
"[t]he sole issue before this Panel is whether the regulations governing PROEX conform to the
relevant provisions of the Arrangement".
17
19. Had Brazil actually brought its export subsid y practices into conformity with the relevant
provisions of the OECD Arrangem ent as it now claims, this long-standing dispute would have been
largely resolved. Unfortunately, as described in this section, there are strong reasons to doubt Brazil's

14 Declaration of Ian Darnley, dated 21 March 2001 [her einafter "Darnley Declaration"]. (Confidential
Exhibit CDA-19)
15 Canada's First Submission, paras. 77-83 and 94-95.

claim. Moreover, because Brazil's claim is in the nature of an affirmative defence, Brazil bears the
burden of proof.18
A. BRAZIL'S POSITION IS CONTRARY TO ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS
20. Other than in its First Submission, Brazil has never once contended that it had conformed its
measures to the OECD Arrangement, or that it would do so in the future. On the contrary, it has
consistently maintained that it would not do so. Brazil has insisted that it will not abide by the
provisions of the OECD Arrangement in public statements by its officials, in its statements to the
DSB and in every one of the six consultation and negotiation sessions that Canada and Brazil have
held since the release of the original Brazil – Aircraft Article 21.5 Panel Report in May 2000.
19
21. Thus, for example, as reported in the 31 August 2000 edition of the daily Correio Braziliense,
Brazil's chief negotiator in this dispute, Ambassador José Alfredo Gra Ηa Lima, described Brazil's
position as follows:
"We will only change the interest rates, for this was determined by WTO
regulations." … . "However, we have no obligation before the WTO to change other
aspects such as terms and the coverage of lending. This will not be done. That is the
government's position."
20
22. Later, when, in an effort to reach a negotiated settlement, Canada met with Brazil in Rio de
Janeiro on 28 and 29 November 2000, just days before Brazil's PROEX III measures came into force,
Brazil again refused to consider adjusting the PROEX scheme so as to abide by the interest rate
provisions of the OECD Arrangement.
23. In fact, Brazil never did make the changes it now claims to have made. On 7 December 2000,
the day after the relevant amendments to PROEX took effect, Valor Económico , Brazil's national
daily business newspaper reported:
However, resolution 2.799 from the Central Bank, which set the new rules, follows
very closely the Brazilian interpretation of the final decision by the WTO dispute
resolution system. This fact raises doubts about a possible Canadian retreat. That is to
say, the text changes only equalization conditions, so that the final interest rate of
financing should not be set below CIRR, which is set on a monthly basis by the
OECD. Until December 14
th, this rate will be set at 6.84%.
The broader requests presented by Canada during negotiations were discarded. The
Canadian government requested that the financing terms of Embraer's sales be limited
to ten years and that equalization covered up to 85% of the amount financed.21
24. In January 2001, when Canada requested this Article 21.5 proceeding, Brazil's Gazeta
Mercantil reported:
The new PROEX takes as a reference for interest equalization the CIRR, (OECD's
basic rate), whereas beforehand the reference was Libor plus 0.2%. With the

18 See Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, para. 66; United States – Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, p. 16.
19 These consultations took place in May 2000, in New York; in June 2000, in Geneva; in July 2000 in
Montreal; in August 2000 in Sao Paulo; in September 2000 in New York and in November 2000, in Rio de
Janeiro.
20 "Tough Agreement with Canada," Correio Braziliense (31 August 2000). (Exhibit CDA-20)
21 D.C. Marin, "Government changes PROEX interest rates," Valor Económico (7 December 2000).
(Exhibit CDA-21)

adjustment, rates will never be set below CIRR. The Brazilian position is that this
eliminates export subsidisation. Ottawa, however, says that the program will only be
compatible with the rules if it reduces financing from 15 to 10 years and places a
limit of 85% of the amount of sales, instead of the current 100% coverage. "These are
OECD rules, and we are not going to accept them," Brazilian authorities reacted.22
25. Similarly, at neither of the DSB meetings at which Canada requested this Article 21.5
proceeding did Brazil state that it had conformed its measures to the OECD Arrangement. Instead, it
claimed that it could comply by limiting its interest rate buy-downs to the CIRR alone. It then
complained that Canada's position "would require Brazil to strictly adhere to OECD Consensus
regulations that would severely and unfairly tilt the playing field against the Brazilian exporter".23
26. The question therefore, is not, as Brazil would have it, why Canada has again sought recourse
to this Article 21.5 proceeding. The real question is why Brazil has until its First Submission been so
reluctant to admit to a course of action that, if actually taken by 6 December as it now claims, would
have largely resolved this dispute. The answer is that despite its claims, Brazil has not changed
PROEX to comply with the OECD Arrangement. This conclusion is further supported by the
statement of Brazil's own Foreign Minister Lampreia that: "For us, the interest rate is the OECD rate,
the coverage is 100% and there are no limits on the length of terms."
24
B. BRAZIL HAS ALREADY BEEN FOUND TO WAIVE ITS PROEX "REQUIREMENTS"
27. The second reason to doubt Brazil's claim that PROEX III conforms to the interest rate
provisions of the OECD Arrangement is that Brazil has previously been found to waive the
requirements that it now contends limit the terms of the financing it can offer. Brazil now claims that
the maximum length of the financing term under PROEX III is 10 years, as required by Article 21 of
Annex IV to the OECD Arrangement.
25 Brazil relies for this claim on the Central Bank of Brazil
(BCB) Circular 2881 of 19 November 1999 and th e 21 December 1999 Directive 374 of the Ministry
of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade.
28. However, Brazil made the same claim on the basis of the same documents in the original
Article 21.5 proceeding. That claim has already been rejected. Thus, in its 14 February 2000
response to Question 6 from this Panel in the original Article 21.5 proceeding Brazil acknowledged
that, notwithstanding Circular Letter 2881, the 10-year term "was waived, and continues to be waived,
however, for regional jet aircraft."
29. Accordingly, as Canada noted in its First Submission, this Panel found that, despite
Circular 2881, the Committee on Export Credits, which administers PROEX:
… has the authority to waive some of the published PROEX guidelines. In the case of
regional aircraft, the most frequent waiver has been to extend the length of the
financing term from ten to fifteen years.
26
30. Similarly, Brazil claims that it conforms with Article 3 of the OECD Arrangement, which
restricts export financing to 85 percent of the value of the export contract.27 Brazil bases this claim on

22 A. Moreira and F. Paraguassu, "Canada requests condemnation of the new PROEX in the WTO,"
Gazeta Mercantil (20 January 2001). (Exhibit CDA-22)
23 Statement by Brazil: DSB Meeting of 01 February 2001: Agenda Item 7. (Exhibit CDA-23)
24 M.L. Abbott, "Bombardier's partnership in the country does not change negotiations with Canada"
Valor Econômico (30 October 2000). (Exhibit CDA-3)
25 Brazil's First Submission, para. 47. Brazil refers to the 1992 version of the Arrangement. Article 21
is found in Annex III to the 1998 version.
26 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS46/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 2.4 [hereinafter "Article 21.5 Panel Report"].

Article 5 of Directive 374.28 However, Directive 374, which dates from 21 December 1999, is clearly
not a measure taken to revise PROEX in the light of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
stemming from the original Article 21.5 proceedings. Not only does it predate those
recommendations and rulings, but, as already noted, it applied to PROEX II.
31. Minister Lampreia's statement, previously cited, also appears to confirm that the Committee's
waivers, both as to the term of financing and the percentage of the contract value financed, have
continued since 1999 and to the present day.
C. PROEX III F INANCING SUPPORT OFFERED BY BRAZIL DEPARTS FROM THE OECD
ARRANGEMENT
32. The third reason for doubting Brazil's claim of conformity with the interest rate provisions of
the OECD Arrangement is the available evidence of the export financing for regional aircraft that has
been offered by Brazil and that would be covered under PROEX III.
33. In recent negotiations to sell regional jet aircraft to Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation,
Embraer offered financing through BNDE S at a rate equivalent to the CIRR 29 Although Brazil's
initial offer predated the changes to PROEX, negotiations by Bombardier and Embraer continued past
6 December 2000. Accordingly, had Air Wisconsin accepted Embraer's offer, the financing support
would have been governed by the 6 December 2000 changes to PROEX.
34. In response to Brazil's offer of financing support to Air Wisconsin, Canada, through its
Export Development Corporation, proposed a comparable financing package for Air Wisconsin to
acquire Bombardier regional jets. The Bombardier financing would have a term of 16.5 years, an
interest rate equivalent to the CIRR and would cover up to 78 percent of the aircraft purchase price.
As described in Exhibit CDA-24, Air Wisconsin has confirmed that the financing proposed by
Bombardier is no more favourable than that offered by Embraer. 30 Although Air Wisconsin indicates
in CDA-24 that it cannot offer further details due to confidentiality commitments to Embraer, the only
reasonable inference that can be drawn from Air Wisconsin's statement is that the financing offered by
Brazil through Embraer, is at, or very close to, a 16.5 year term.
35. Similarly, Fairchild Dornier, an aircraft manufacturer, has received information that in
November 2000 during negotiations for a sale of regi onal jets to a South African airline, SA Airlink
Embraer offered PROEX financing support for a period of 15 years31 Embraer announced that sale on
14 December 2000, one week after the modifications made to PROEX in Resolution 2799. 32
Fairchild Dornier's information is substantially corroborated by the report froma Bonbardier sales
executive, submitted as Confidential Exhibit CDA-XX.
33
36. On the basis of all of the available evidence, it appears that either PROEX III itself does not
conform to the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement, or that Brazil is using another

27 Again, this is the 1992 version of the OECD Arrangement. The same requirement is found in Article
7 of the 1998 version.
29 Darnley Declaration. (Confidential Exhibit CDA-19)
30 Letter from W.P. Jordan, Executive Vice President, Administration and General Counsel, United
Express, operated by Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation, to A. Sulzenko, Assistant Deputy Minister, Industry
and Science Policy, dated 20 March 2001. (Exhibit CDA-24)
31 Letter from Fairchild Dornier, dated 22 March 2001. (Confidential Exhibit CDA-25)
32 "SA Airlink Selects the ERJ 135 and Purchases 70 Units," Embraer Press Release, 14 December
2000, available on the Embraer website at http://www.embraer.com/english/imprensa/index.htm. (Exhibit
CDA-26)
33 Declaration of Hormuzd Irani, dated 21 March 2001. (Confidential Exhibit CDA-27)

export subsidy mechanism, apart from or in conjunction with PROEX, to offer regional aircraft
financing on terms that depart from the OECD Arrangement.
37. In the light of the foregoing evidence, Brazil has failed to meet its burden of proving that it is
in conformity with the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement. If, however, this Panel
chooses to seek additional information from Brazil, Canada asks that the Panel request from Brazil the
specific terms of its offers of export financing for transactions involving Embraer regional aircraft in
the months leading up to and following the 6 December 2000 revisions to the PROEX program. The
relevant information would include the percentage of the interest rate buy-down, the resulting net
interest rate, the term of the financing and percentage of the value of the aircraft covered by the
financing and whether the financing has been offered under PROEX alone or in conjunction with
BNDES.
38. If the Panel seeks this information and Brazil does not provide it, Canada asks that the Panel
infer that the measures under which Brazil continues to offer export subsidies for regional aircraft do
not qualify for the "safe haven" under the second paragraph of Item (k) and that accordingly, Brazil
has failed to bring its measures into conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and
with Article 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
34
IV. BRAZIL HAS OTHERWISE FAILED TO SHOW THAT PROEX MEETS THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K)
39. In its First Submission, Brazil appears to place its greatest faith in its second principal
argument: that PROEX III qualifies for the "safe ha ven" in the second paragraph of Item (k) because
Brazil has revised its PROEX III practices to bring them into conformity with the OECD
Arrangement.
40. Brazil contends that, although PROEX III is a prohibited subsidy, it nevertheless meets the
conditions of the second paragraph of Item (k) in Annex I of the SCM Agreement. Brazil further
contends that the 1992 version of the OECD Arrangement – instead of the 1998 version – should be
used as the yardstick to judge its alleged "conformity" with the "interest rates provisions" as specified
in the Item (k), second paragraph, exception.
41. As Canada has already demonstrated, Brazil's measures do not conform to two of the key
requirements of the OECD Arrangement: that export subsidies be limited to terms of ten years and
that financing cover no more than 85 percent of the value of the goods financed. As these
requirements are common to both the 1992 and the 1998 versions of the OECD Arrangement, Brazil's
measures do not conform to the OECD Arrangemen t regardless of whether the 1998 version or the
1992 version is relevant for the purposes of the Item (k), second paragraph, exception.
42. Nevertheless, in the following sections, Canada will demonstrate in detail why PROEX III is
not in conformity with the other "interest rates provisions" of either the 1998 or the 1992 versions of
the OECD Arrangement. Although the issue is moot in this proceeding, Canada will also demonstrate
that the 1998 Arrangement is the relevant one for the purposes of the exception in Item (k), second
paragraph.
A. PROEX III IS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTEREST RATE PROVISIONS OF THE 1998
OECD ARRANGEMENT
43. To meet the conditions of the Item (k), second paragraph exception, Brazil must prove that its
measures conform to every element of the exception. The Article 21.5 Panel in the Canada - Aircraft

34 The authority of a panel to draw adverse inferences has been recognized by the Appellate Body in
Canada – Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, paras. 202-03.

dispute,35 after a thorough analysis, defined what it means to be "in conformity with" the "interest
rates provisions" of the Arrangement, and therefore what is required to claim the exception. Although
"interest rate provisions" arguably has a broader meaning than that given to it by the Panel in Canada
– Aircraft, at a minimum, the interest rate provisions to which PROEX III must conform are those
identified by the Canada - Aircraft Panel, namely the "applicable provisions of Articles 7-10 and
12-26 of the Arrangement; and of Articles 18-24 and Articles 27-29(a)-(c) of Annex III". 36
44. PROEX III fails to meet each and every requirement. Thus, Brazil cannot claim the
exception. Moreover, even if the "interest rates provisions" were limited to those identified by
Brazil,37 PROEX III fails to meet those provisions. Accordingly, Brazil's claim to the exception in
Item (k), second paragraph, must fail.
45. Brazil claims that PROEX III is "in conformity with" all of the "interest rates provisions" in
the OECD Arrangement, as defined by the Article 21.5 Panel in Canada - Aircraft.38 However, Brazil
offers no evidence to support its claim other than Resolution 2799 itself. Nor does its argument even
mention most of the interest rate provisions in the Arrangement. Brazil mentions Articles 7 and 15 of
the main text of the Arrangement and Articles 21, 22 and 29(a) of Annex III. 39 It completely
disregards Articles 8, 9, 12-14 and 16-26 of the main text and Articles 18-20, 23, 24, 27-28 and 29(b)
and (c) of Annex III.
46. Certain of these provisions are very significant and affect the very structure of the transaction,
e.g., Article 13 entitled Repayment of Principal requires the "principal sum" to "be repaid in equal and
regular instalments". This is not the same as a normal amortization where, although the payment
amount stays the same, the principal and interest portions vary over the life of the repayment
schedule. Article 13 requires the principal portion of each payment to be the same over the life of the
repayment schedule. This provision eliminates balloon payments – a common tool used to make
financing proposals more attractive.
47. Another provision of importance is Article 29(a)-(c) of Annex III on spare parts. Contrary to
Brazil's claim, spare parts often comprise a significant portion of any given transaction.
40 Article 6 of
Directive 374 allows for financing of up to 20 percent for spare parts, 41 whereas Article 29(a) of the
Arrangement limits financing for spare parts to a ma ximum of 15 percent of the aircraft price for the
first five aircraft and to 10 percent for the sixth and subsequent aircraft. Thus, the limit in Directive
374 explicitly exceeds that in the OECD Arrangement. Moreover, Brazil regularly uses its discretion
to waive the limits on PROEX.
48. Even using Brazil's own interpretation of the "interest rates provisions", 42 Brazil offers no
evidence of conformity with Articles 16-19 of the main text. Therefore, PROEX III is not "in
conformity with" the "interest rates provisions" of the 1998 Arrangement. Its claim to the exception
in Item (k), second paragraph, must fail.

35 Canada – Measures Affecting the Expor t of Civilian Aircraft: Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of
the DSU , Report of the Panel, WT/DS70/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, [hereinafter " Canada – Aircraft ,
Article 21.5 Panel Report"].
36 See id., para. 5.147.
37 1998 OECD Arrangement, supra note 1, Articles 15-19 and Annex III, Article 22 as listed in Brazil's
First Submission, para. 52.
39 Id., paras. 54-59.
40 Declaration of George Stevens, dated 20 March 2001, pp. 3 and 4. (Confidential Exhibit CDA-28)
42 Id., para 52.

B. PROEX III I S NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTEREST RATE PROVISIONS OF THE 1992
OECD ARRANGEMENT
49. Even if the 1992 Arrangement is used, PROEX III fails to meet the conditions of the
exception in Item (k), second paragraph. Comparing the 1992 Arrangement to the findings of the
Canada 21.5 Panel results in the following 1992 Arrangement provisions: Articles 3-7 of the main
text, Articles 9, 17-22, 24 and 25 of Annex IV, and several definitions in Annex V. The 1992
Arrangement has no counterparts for the 1998 Arrangement's Articles 18-24 of the main text and
Articles 27 (portions on used aircraft and service contracts), 28 and 29(b) and (c) in Annex III.
50. As Canada has already demonstrated, PROE X III does not conform to two of the key
requirements of both the 1998 and 1992 versions of the Arrangement: that export subsidies be limited
to terms of ten years and that financing cover no more than 85 percent of the value of the goods
financed. This non- conformity in 1992 Arrangement terms corresponds to Article 21 of Annex IV
and Article 3 of the main text, respectively. Thus, even using Brazil's limited definition of "interest
rates provisions", i.e., Article 5 of the main text and Article 21 of Annex IV,
43 PROEX III is not "in
conformity with" the "interest rates provisions" of the 1992 Arrangement.
51. Once again, besides a bald assertion that "PROEX III conforms with the corresponding
interest rates provisions",44 Brazil provides no evidence of conformity other than Resolution 2799. As
previously noted, however, the nominal limitations in Resolution 2799 are the same as have been
examined in every WTO proceeding in this dispute. Those nominal limitations have no meaning
since Brazil demonstrably has the authority and continually uses the authority to waive these limits on
terms and amounts financed. There is nothing to suggest that the waivers are not continuing under
PROEX III.
52. Therefore, PROEX III is not "in conformity w ith" the "interest rates provisions" of the 1992
Arrangement. Its claim to the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, must fail.
C. THE 1998 VERSION OF THE OECD ARRANGEMENT, NOT THE 1992 VERSION, IS RELEVANT
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K)
53. Brazil's claim that the 1992 version of the OECD Arrangement is the relevant one relies on a
textual interpretation of the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, that is untenable. The starting
point for interpreting the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, is the general rule of interpretation
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention").45

43 Id., para. 40.
44 Id.
45 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted
20 May 1996, pp. 16-17. Article 3.2 of the WTO's Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) requires WTO Agreements (including the SCM Agreement) to be interpreted in
accordance with "customary rules of interpretation of pub lic international law". These rules are set out in the
Vienna Convention. ..Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion
with the conclusion of the treaty;

54. According to the general rule, treaty interpreta tion begins with a careful reading of the text.
Treaty terms must be given their ordinary meaning unless the text indicates that a term is intended to
have a special meaning. The ordinary meaning of a term is determined in the context of the treaty and
in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. Given that Item (k), second paragraph, creates an
exception to the SCM Agreement, it must be interpreted in the context of the SCM Agreement.
1. Brazil's Interpretation Rewrites The Item (k) Exception
55. The exception in Item (k), second paragraph, reads as follows:
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on
official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement
are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted
by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates
provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in
conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited
by this Agreement.
56. The text at issue is "successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original
Members". Brazil's argument relies on the phrase "has been". Using Brazil's logic, the text "has
been" focuses on the past – i.e., 1 January 1995 – not the "time regarded as present".
46
57. In its ordinary meaning, the phrase "has been" will always be in the present perfect tense
because, e.g., an agreement or resolution, must be adopted – in the present – before it can take effect.
The phrase requires a determination, at the time of the consideration of the application of Item (k) to a
specific set of fact, whether there is a successor arrangement which "has", in the present, "been
adopted."
58. This interpretation is confirmed by the context of the term "has been." For instance, under
Brazil's approach, the phrase "if a Member is a party to an international undertaking" in Item (k)
would only apply to Members who were parties to the OECD Arrangement as of 1 January 1995,
excluding Members such as the Republic of Korea who have become parties since then. Simply
stated, the Panel must determine whether a successor undertaking currently "has been adopted", not
whether a successor undertaking had been adopted as of 1 January 1995.
59. Furthermore, the 1998 Arrangement is clearly a "successor undertaking" to the 1979
Arrangement. In its ordinary meaning, "successor" modifies "undertaking" and refers to "a … thing
which succeeds another in … function"
47 or "one who replaces or follows another". 48 I t is fo rward
looking. The 1998 Arrangement "succeeds … in … function" and "replace[d]" the 1992
Arrangement, which in turn succeeded the 1979 Arrangement.
60. Moreover, Brazil's argument would lead one to believe that it was the entire original
Membership of the WTO that adopted the 1992 Arrangement as of 1 January 1995. However, the text
does not state this. The text refers to a: "successor undertaking which has been adopted by those
original Members" (emphasis added). The word "original" is important because it links back to the

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
[….]
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
46 See Brazil's First Submission, para. 20.
47 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), p. 3128 ("successor"). (Exhibit CDA-29)
48 Black's Law Dictionary , 7 th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999), p. 1446 ("successor"). (Exhibit
CDA-30)

"twelve original Members" earlier in the text. The linkage makes it clear that "those original
Members" are the "twelve original Members" that were parties to an international undertaking, i.e.,
the OECD Arrangement, as of 1 January 1979. The text "adopted by those original Members" refers
to Members that are also parties to the OECD Arrangement – not the entire original Membership of
the WTO. It is only the Members that are parties to the OECD Arrangement that could adopt a
successor undertaking of the Arrangement. The text recognizes this fact. This further reinforces that
the ordinary meaning of the text refers to the 1998 Arrangement.
61. Brazil's quotation of the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, in paragraph 17 of its First
Submission omits the word "original" from the text of "those original Members". Without the word
"original", "those Members" could be referring to "Members to this Agreement" which is what Brazil
would lead the Panel to believe. At a minimum, this omission – in conjunction with its argument
implying that the word "original" refers to the entire original WTO Membership
49 – is misleading.
62. In addition, the text at issue should be understood as a reference to an evolving system of
disciplines on officially supported export credits. As the drafters were no doubt aware, the OECD
Arrangement is not static or frozen in time. It has developed since its inception and continues to do
so. 50 This process of development had occurred many times before 1 January 1995, e.g., in 1987,
1991 and 1994. 51 The drafters could hardly have been unaware of such developments prior to
1 January 1995 when they drafted the language "successor undertaking which has been adopted by
those original Members". On the contrary, the text specifically contemplates on-going evolution.
63. Finally, the text of the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, in the Illustrative List, tracks
the text of the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code (the "GATT text"). The GATT text states:
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking on
official export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to this Agreement
are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted
by those original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates
provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in
conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited
by this Agreement.
52
64. Since the original OECD Arrangement was formed in 1978 53 – and no changes were made
until 198154 – language that refers to a "successor undertaking" in 1979 must necessarily be forward
looking. Brazil's retrospective interpretation does not reconcile with the 1979 GATT text because, in
1979, there was no "successor undertaking" to the 1978 Arrangement. Under Brazil's approach, the
term "successor undertaking" in the 1979 GATT text would have no meaning. Thus, the 1979 GATT
text supports the forward-looking interpretation of "successor undertaking" in the exception of
Item (k), second paragraph, and provides further evidence that the drafters provided for the on-going
evolution of the OECD Arrangement.

49 Brazil, in paras. 20-22 of its First Submission, creates the implication by not using the word "those"
in its argument when it uses the phrase "adopted' by the original Members". The text reads "adopted by those
original Members". See Item (k), second paragraph, of Annex I of the SCM Agreement [emphasis added].
50 The OECD Arrangement was created in 1978. See The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements
and Challenges 1978-1998 (Paris: OECD, 1998), pp. 9 and 20-21 [hereinafter The Export Credit Arrangement].
(Exhibit CDA-31)
51 See id., pp. 18-20.
52 See "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies," Annex I to the Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("the Subsidies
Code") in The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements (Geneva: GATT, August 1996). (Exhibit CDA-32)
53 See The Export Credit Arrangement, supra note 50, p. 9.
54 See The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998 (Paris: OECD, 1998),
p. 24. (Exhibit CDA-33)

65. Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the text "successor undertaking which has been adopted
by those original Members" is the most recent ve rsion that has been adopted by the OECD, i.e., the
1998 Arrangement.
2. The Drafters Could Have Referred To The 1992 Arrangement But Did Not
66. The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO
Agreement") took effect on 1 January 1995, three years after the 1992 version of the Arrangement. If
the drafters intended the 1992 Arrangement to apply, they simply could have said so. Instead, the
drafters crafted the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, to ensure that all Members knew that the
exception was not frozen in time. As Canada has shown, the text specifically contemplates that the
Arrangement will evolve.
3. The Canada-Aircraft Article 21.5 Panel Used The 1998 Arrangement In Its Analysis Of
The Exception In Item (k) Second Paragraph
67. Although Brazil did not argue the relevance of a particular version of the OECD Arrangement
in the Article 21.5 proceeding in Canada – Aircraft , the Panel in that proceeding conducted a
thorough analysis of the exception in Item (k), second paragraph, using the 1998 version of the
Arrangement. The Panel was of the view that the text "successor undertaking" meant that the
Arrangement had evolved and that it could evolve further. The Panel made numerous references to
"successor undertakings" including past and future changes to the Arrangement.
55 Brazil did not
challenge the Panel's interpretation in the Article 21.5 proceeding.
V. PROEX III DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR AN ALLEGED A CONTRARIO EXCEPTION
UNDER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K)
68. In order to succeed in its alleged defence under paragraph 1 of Item (k) of the Illustrative List,
Brazil must at a minimum present a prima facie case with respect to each element of its alleged
defence. It has not done so.
A. ITEM (K) FIRST PARAGRAPH DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN A CONTRARIO INTERPRETATION
69. Brazil has failed to present a prima facie case with respect to the first element of its alleged
exception – i.e., that an alleged a contrario exception exists in the first paragraph of Item (k). Brazil
simply asserts without legal authority that an a contrario interpretation of the first paragraph of
Item (k) is "required" and that the failure to permit an a contrario interpretation "effectively would
render the material advantage clause inutile, contrary to the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law."56
70. Brazil also notes in paragraph 66 of its submission that the Appellate Body "appears to take
the view" that the first paragraph of Item (k) should be read a contrario to permit a subsidy that does
not confer a material advantage. Nowhere does Brazil respond to Canada's arguments that the first
paragraph of Item (k) does not give rise to such an a contrario interpretation.
57
71. This Panel addressed Brazil's first assertion in the original Article 21.5 proceeding. It found
that the first paragraph of Item (k) allows for the identification of certain export credits and payments
that are considered per se prohibited export subsidies, and for which an independent showing of

55 Canada – Aircraft, Article 21.5 Panel Report, note 69, note 71, para. 5.85, note 85, and note 91.
57 Canada's First Submission, paras. 29-61.

subsidy and export contingency is, therefore, not necessary. 58 It properly found that such an
interpretation did not render the first paragraph of Item (k) ineffective.59
72. With respect to Brazil's reference to the obiter dictum of the Appellate Body, as discussed in
Canada's First Submission, the statement was made without interpreting footnote 5. 60 In Canada's
view, it is impossible to reach a conclusion as to the existence of an a contrario exception in the first
paragraph of Item (k) without interpreting the language of footnote 5. 61 Brazil fails to explain how,
applying the relevant principles of treaty interpretation to Article 3.1, footnote 5 and the Illustrative
List, a measure impliedly excluded from the illustrations (i.e., not referred to) in Annex I can be a
measure "referred to in Annex I as not constituting an export subsidy".
73. Footnote 5 excludes the possibility of implied exceptions to the prohibition on export
subsidies. Footnote 5 makes it clear that the only exceptions to Article 3.1 are those measures
referred to as not constituting export subsidies in Annex I. Brazil's argument is based on the absence
of reference to export credits or payments that do not confer a material advantage in the first
paragraph of Item (k). Clearly, a thing cannot be refe rred to by failing to refer to it. There is simply
no way to treat the absence of reference to a measure as a reference to that measure.
74. Accordingly, Brazil's position on the a contrario interpretation of the first paragraph of
Item (k) is without merit.
B. PROEX III P
AYMENTS ARE NOT PAYMENTS OF THE COSTS INCURRED IN OBTAINING
CREDITS
75. In order to discharge its burden to establish that PROEX III support is the "payment … of all
or part of the costs incurred by exporters or fina ncial institutions in obtaining credits" within the
meaning of the first paragraph of Item (k), Brazil re verts to arguments it presented to the Panel in the
original 21.5 proceeding.62 However, Brazil's arguments have already been rejected by the Panel in
that proceeding.
76. Brazil has offered no new arguments sufficient to establish that payments under PROEX III
constitute the type of payment contemplated by the first paragraph of Item (k). Nor has it offered any
arguments that would call into question the Panel's interpretation of the "payment" clause or its
finding that PROEX payments are not payments of the costs incurred by exporters or financial
institutions in obtaining credits, within the meaning of the clause.
77. Having failed to establish that PROEX III support is of the type covered by the first paragraph
of Item (k), Brazil has failed to establish that PROEX III would qualify for its alleged a contrario
exception under Item (k) first paragraph even if such an exception existed.
C. PROEX III S
UPPORT IS USED TO SECURE A MATERIAL ADVANTAGE
78. Even if a proper interpretation of Item (k) did allow for Brazil's alleged a contrario exception
and even if support under PROEX III did amount to the "payment … of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits", Brazil has not presented a prima
facie case that PROEX III is not "used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit
terms".

58 Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 6.42.
59 Id.
61 Id., para. 50.
62 Brazil's First Submission, paras. 67-71.

79. In its First Submission, Brazil does not respond to the detailed argument presented by Canada
in its First Submission. 63 Brazil simply cites the statement of the Appellate Body that "to establish
that PROEX payments are not used to secure a material advantage, Brazil must prove either that the
net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or above the relevant CIRR … or, that an alternative
market benchmark is appropriate" [emphasis in original]. 64 Brazil then contends that since
PROEX III stipulates that the net interest rates must be at or above the relevant CIRR, no material
advantage is being provided.65
80. Brazil's argument ignores an important qualification established by the Appellate Body,
namely that CIRR may not always accurately reflect the marketplace and therefore cannot be
conclusive evidence of the absence of material advantage. The Appellate Body stated:
The CIRR is a constructed interest rate for a particular currency, at a particular time,
that does not always necessarily reflect the actual state of the credit markets. Where
the CIRR does not, in fact, reflect the rates available in the marketplace, we believe
that a Member should be able, in principle, to rely on evidence from the marketplace
itself in order to establish an alternative "market benchmark", on which it might rely
in one or more transactions. Thus, the CIRR is not, necessarily, the sole "market
benchmark" that may be used to determine whether a payment "is used to secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms", within the meaning of Item (k)
of the Illustrative List.
66 [emphasis in original]
81. As set out in Canada's First Submission, the CIRR is not a determinative benchmark. 67 The
Appellate Body made this clear in the above- noted quotation and when it stated that "[t]he
Article 21.5 Panel correctly concluded from our Report in Brazil – Aircraft that 'the CIRR was not
intended as the exclusive and immutable benchmark applicable in all cases'".68
82. In ascertaining whether CIRR is an "appropriate" benchmark in a particular transaction or
transactions, the issue is whether CIRR "reflect[s] the rates available in the marketplace". 69 T h i s
determination turns on whether the CIRR rate is in fact equivalent to the rates available in the
marketplace for "comparable" transactions.
83. In the original Article 21.5 proceeding, the Appellate Body stated that in "identifying an
'appropriate' 'market benchmark' below the CIRR, a WTO Member must show that the 'benchmark' on
which it relies is based on evidence from relevant, comparable transactions in the marketplace"
[emphasis added].70
84. Clearly, the terms and conditions of export financing transactions affect their comparability
and the chosen benchmark must be comparable to the transaction(s) in question. Thus, where the
CIRR rate varies from the rates available in comparable transactions in the marketplace, it is not an
appropriate benchmark for the purposes of determining whether a "material advantage in the field of
export credit terms" has been secured.
85. Beyond the issue of the interest rate itself, the export credit terms that must be considered in
ascertaining whether export credit transactions are "comparable" have been, in part, articulated by the
Appellate Body in the previous proceedings in this dispute and by this Panel in the original

63 See Canada's First Submission, paras. 73-97.
65 Id.
67 Canada's First Submission, paras. 84-97.
69 Id., para. 64.
70 Id., para. 74.

proceeding. The Appellate Body stated that "the terms and conditions of export credit transactions in
the marketplace vary considerably, depending on the circumstances of a particular export credit
transaction, such as the product involved, the size or volume of the transaction, the type of export
credit practice, the duration of the repayment term, the type of interest rate (fixed or floating) used,
and when the transaction is concluded".71
86. Further, the Appellate Body has acknowledged that "the commercial interest rate with respect
to a loan in any given currency varies accordin g to the length of maturity as well as the
creditworthiness of the borrower". 72 This Panel stated that "in its ordinary meaning, the field of
export credit terms would refer to items directly relate d to export credits such as interest rates, grace
periods, transaction costs, maturities and the like".73
87. CIRR is not an appropriate benchmark for assessing whether PROEX III payments "secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit term s" with respect to transactions involving regional
aircraft because the CIRR rate usually varies significantly from the rates available in comparable
transactions in the marketplace.
88. As discussed in paragraphs 78-79 of Canada 's First Submission, the financing spreads
required from airlines purchasing regional aircraft (as shown in the MSDW Report in Exhibit
CDA-17) far exceed the spread incorporated in th e U.S. dollar CIRR (a 100 basis point spread over
the appropriate U.S. Treasury average). The spreads shown in the MSDW Report are for Enhanced
Equipment Trust Certificates (EETCs). EETCs are a secured form of financing that feature a number
of tranches with a varying level of priority claim over the aircraft. Each tranche will carry a rating that
reflects the seniority of the claim on the aircraft as well as other credit enhancements that are designed
to reduce risk. 74 As a result of these risk-reducing attributes, EETCs are tranches are usually rated
well above the airline’s unsecured debt rating. This enables the airlines (particularly those with lower
credit ratings) to achieve lower overall debt pricing on aircraft financing. The initial loan-to-value
ratios for the higher-rated EETC tranches are usually well below 70 percent of the initial fair market
value, further reducing the risk profile associated with EETCs when compared to PROEX III
support.75 In its First Submission, Canada refers to an American Airlines EETC tranche trading at
135 basis points above U.S. Treasury rates. As the highest-rated EETC tranche for one of the highest
rated U.S. airlines, this EETC tranche is a conservative relative benchmark when compared against
the spreads required for financing regional aircraft, yet it is still 35 basis points higher than a rate
achieved by the CIRR alone. A lender will certainl y provide a borrower a material advantage if, by
offering financing at the CIRR, it is permitted to offer a less credit-worthy borrower the same low
interest rate as a more credit-worthy borrower.
89. The terms associated with the CIRR also va ry significantly from the terms available in
comparable transactions for regional aircraft. For example, the maximum term for the CIRR is ten
years while the prevailing terms for financing regional aircraft are in the 15 year range. 76 Given the
relationship between term and risk (the longer the term the higher the required spread), 77 a ten year
CIRR rate cannot be a market benchmark for 15 year loans, nor is it comparable to financing
prevailing in the regional aircraft market.

71 Id., para. 73.
73 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Report of the Panel, WT/DS46/R, adopted
20 August 1999, para. 7.28.
74 See discussion in Standard & Poor's Structured Finance, Aircraft Securitizaton Criteria, (New York:
Standard & Poor's, 1999), pp. 3-22. (Exhibit CDA-34)
75 MSDW Report, (Exhibit CDA-17), p. 13. At page 15 of the Standard & Poor's Report, it is stated
that for every 5 percent reduction in loan-to-value, credit ratings increase one notch.
76 See also the CIT Presentation, supra note 76, p. 21, which evidences terms of up to 18 years.
77 F.J. Fabozzi and T.D. Fabozzi, eds, The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities , 4th ed. (Burr Ridge,
Illinois: Irwin, 1995), pp. 780 and 803-804. (Exhibit CDA-37)

90. Thus, it is clear that the CIRR is not an appropriate benchmark for transactions involving
regional aircraft, as it very rarely reflects accurately the rates available in the marketplace. In this
light, simply revising PROEX to set a floor based on the CIRR does not enable Brazil to establish a
prima facie case that PROEX III payments do not secure a material advantage in the field of export
credit terms.78
VI. CONCLUSION
91. Canada requests that the Panel find that PROEX III financing support, whether on its own or
administered in conjunction with BNDES financing, is a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3 of
the SCM Agreement. Canada further requests that the Panel find that PROEX support does not
qualify for the "safe haven" in the second paragraph of Item (k) in Annex I to the SCM Agreement;
that there is no a contrario exception under the first paragraph of Item (k); and that even if there were,
PROEX support would not qualify for it. Canada requ ests that the Panel find accordingly that Brazil
has failed to implement measures that would brin g it into compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.

78 However, as noted earlier in this submission, Canada agrees that if Brazil brings its export subsidy
practices into conformity with the relevant provisions of the OECD Arrangement, leaving aside the matter of
Brazil's ongoing non-compliance by continuing to grant prohibited subsidies under PROEX I and II, this long-
standing dispute would be resolved.

TABLE OF EXHIBITS
CDA-19. Declaration of Ian Darnley, dated 21 March 2001. ∗
CDA-20. "Acordo com Canadá estámuito difí cil" ("Tough Agreement with Canada") Correio
Braziliense (31 August 2000) (Portuguese and English versions).
CDA-21. D.C. Marin, "Governo altera os juros do Proex" ("Government changes Proex interest
rates") Valor Económico (7 December 2000) (Portuguese and English versions).
CDA-22. A. Moreira and F. Paraguassu, "Canadá pede condenação do novo Proex na OMC"
("Canada requests condemnation of the new Proex in the WTO") Gazeta Mercantil
(20 January 2001) (Portuguese and English versions).
CDA-23. Statement by Brazil: DSB Meetin g of 01 February 2001: Agenda Item 7.
CDA-24. Letter from W.P. Jordan, Executive Vice President, Administration and General
Counsel, United Express, operated by Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation, to
A. Sulzenko, Assistant Deputy Minister, Industry and Science Policy, dated
20 March 2001.
CDA-25. Letter from Fairchild Dornier, dated 22 March 2001. *
CDA-26. "SA Airlink Selects the ERJ 135 and Purchases 70 Units," Embraer Press Release,
14 December 2000, available on the Embraer website at
http://www.embraer.com/english/imprensa/index.htm.
CDA-27. Declaration of Hormuzd Irani, dated 21 March 2001. *
CDA-28. Declaration of George Stevens, dated 20 March 2001. *
CDA-29. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , v. 2 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 3128 ("successor").
CDA-30 Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1999), p. 1446 ("successor").
CDA-31. The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998 (Paris:
OECD, 1998), pp. 9-11 and 17-21.
CDA-32 "Illustrative List of Export Subsidie s," Annex I to the Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("the Subsidies Code") in The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements
(Geneva: GATT, August 1996).
CDA-33 The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998 (Paris:
OECD, 1998), pp. 24-25.

∗ Exhibits CDA-19, CDA-25, CDA-27, and CDA-28 are designated as "CONFIDENTIAL" pursuant to
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Appendix 3 - Working
Procedures, para. 3; and Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Second Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU (WT/DS46), Working Procedures for the Panel, para. 3.

CDA-34. Standard & Poor's Structured Finance, Aircraft Securitizaton Criteria , (New York:
Standard & Poor's, 1999), pp. 3-22, available at www.standardandpoors.com/
ResourceCenter/RatingsCriteria/StructuredFinance/articles/pdf/critairw.pdf.
CDA-35. "CIT Structured Finance," Presentation to Aircraft Finance and Commercial Aviation
Forum (February 2001).
CDA-36. Spread of Industrial Index over US CIRR Rate for Repayment Terms in Excess of
8.5 Years.
CDA-37. F.J. Fabozzi and T.D. Fabozzi, eds, The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, 4th ed.
(Burr Ridge, Illinois: Irwin, 1995), pages 780, 793-796, and 803-804.

to the CIRR. Brazil has done nothing else to change the terms of its PROEX program since it was last
found to be a prohibited export subsidy.
3. Brazil nevertheless claims that the revised PROEX scheme, PROEX III, is no longer a
prohibited export subsidy. Alternatively, Brazil claims that even were it a prohibited export subsidy,
PROEX III should be exempted from the disciplines of the SCM Agreement. According to Brazil,
PROEX III qualifies for the so-called "safe haven" in the second paragraph of Item (k) of Annex 1 to
the SCM Agreement. And if not there, Brazil asks this Panel to grant PROEX III a clean bill of health
under an alleged a contrario exception in the first paragraph of Item (k).
4. In Canada's view, the single change that Brazil has made to its PROEX scheme fails to bring
it into conformity with its WTO obligations. The only consistency in the arguments that Brazil has
raised in its defence is Brazil's indefensible strategy of "buying time" while it continues to buy market
share for Embraer.
5. In response, Canada has done two things. First, it has commenced this Article 21.5
proceeding to address Brazil's claim of conformity. Second, to limit the opportunity for Brazil to buy
further market share while this proceeding runs its course, Canada has countered financing terms
offered by Brazil to the Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation by committing to provide equivalent
financing, which would be offered through its Export Development Corporation.
6. In a separate proceeding, Brazil has called Canada's responsive commitment to do what Brazil
is doing an illegal subsidy. We would be pardoned for considering that this indicates the real value of
Brazil's claim of legality for PROEX III.
7. More fundamentally, Brazil's arguments fly in the face of the previous findings of law by this
Panel, other panels and the Appellate Body and th e overwhelming factual record. Brazil's arguments
cannot be supported.
II. BENEFIT
8. First, Brazil contends that Canada has failed to establish that its PROEX III payments are
prohibited subsidies. It asserts that its PROEX III payments are not subsidies at all because they do
not confer a benefit.
A. C
ANADA HAS SATISFIED ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING PROEX III PAYMENTS ARE PROHIBITED
SUBSIDIES
9. Brazil argues that Canada has the burden of proving that payments under PROEX III continue
to be prohibited export subsidies. Brazil cites the Report of the Appellate Body in Chile – Alcoholic
Beverages for the proposition that "PROEX III enjoys a presumption of compliance". It argues that
the factual findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body on PROEX I and II are not relevant to a
compliance assessment of PROEX III and that Canada has not otherwise presented sufficient evidence
to discharge its burden
1
10. At paragraph 20 of its First Submission, Canada has acknowledged that it bears the burden to
establish that PROEX III continues to be a prohibited export subsidy. To meet this burden, Canada
must present a prima facie case: (a) that PROEX III financing support is a financial contribution; (b)
that it confers a benefit; and (c) that the subsidy is contingent upon export performance.
11. However, contrary to Brazil's claim, the statement of the Appellate Body in Chile – Alcoholic
Beverages does not provide authority for a "presumption of compliance". Rather, the Appellate Body

1 Second Submission of Brazil, 23 March 2001, paras. 9-10.

found, in essence, that there should not be a presumption that a new measure is non-compliant simply
because the measure it replaces was non-compliant. Chile – Alcoholic Beverages in no way modifies
the burden of proof that applies to Canada in this case.
12. Brazil also contends that the factual findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body with
respect to PROEX I and II are "irrelevant" to a compliance assessment of PROEX III. Brazil offers
no basis for this assertion. The Appellate Body has made it clear that evidence relating to predecessor
programs could be relevant to an Article 21.5 proceeding where the relevance of the evidence has
been demonstrated by the complaining party
2
13. The findings of the original Panel and Article 21.5 Panel referred to in footnotes 7, 9, 10, 21
and 22 and paragraph 23 of Canada's First Submission pertain to attributes of PROEX that have not
been revised in PROEX III. PROEX payments still are grants to buy down commercial interest rates
freely negotiated by the borrower. PROEX is still administered by the Committee, which retains the
authority to waive all guidelines. PROEX payments to reduce the interest paid by a purchaser still are
being provided in the form of NTN-I bonds.
14. Moreover, Brazil does not dispute that, just like its predecessors, PROEX III allows an
aircraft purchaser to seek the best export credit terms available in the market, whether from a
Brazilian or foreign financial institution, and then to receive a buy-down of that interest rate in the
amount of the PROEX III payments.
15. Brazil contends that certain legal instruments, namely Central Bank of Brazil Circular 2881
and Directive 374, constrain the use of PROEX III. However, these instruments likewise applied to
PROEX II. In the original Article 21.5 proceeding this Panel found that these instruments in no way
constrained the terms on which Brazil could offer PROEX support. For Brazil to now simply assert
again that these instruments constrain the terms on which Brazil can offer PROEX does not make it
so.
16. The Panel's findings clearly remain relevant to whether PROEX III is consistent with the
SCM Agreement. Moreover, they are corroborated by the other evidence that Canada has presented
to the Panel.
17. In the legal arguments and evidence presented in paragraphs 23-25 of its First Submission and
paragraphs 8-17 of its Rebuttal Submission, Canada has met the burden of proof that PROEX III
subsidies are prohibited export subsidies. On its face and in practice, PROEX III support amounts to a
financial contribution that confers a benefit. It therefore is a subsidy. It is de jure contingent upon
export performance, something Brazil has not contested. Therefore, it is a prohibited export subsidy.
Canada's argument applies equally whether PROEX III is provided alone or in conjunction with
BNDES direct financing.
B. E
VEN AT A CIRR FLOOR, PROEX III CONFERS A BENEFIT
18. At paragraph 13 of its Second Submission, Brazil argues that because PROEX III ostensibly
establishes an interest rate floor based on the CIRR, this means that it confers no "benefit". Brazil
also argues that prior statements by Canada regarding the relationship between the CIRR and
commercial rates contradict Canada's position before this Panel that PROEX III continues to confer a
benefit.
19. An examination of Canada's prior statements exposes Brazil's misrepresentation of Canada's
position. Contrary to Brazil's contention, Canada never stated that it would not have brought this case

2 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of
the DSU, Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS70/AB/RW), para. 50.

if PROEX simply matched OECD rates and did not comply with the other relevant terms of the
OECD Arrangement. In the passage to which Br azil refers, Canada was discussing the material
advantage conferred by BNDES financing at interest rates above a LIBOR rate or the CIRR when
combined with PROEX buy-downs of that rate to a still lower level. Canada indicated that it would
not have brought this case if the combined effect of PROEX and BNDES was simply to achieve a rate
above LIBOR or the CIRR
3 This does not mean that Canada considers that buy-downs to the CIRR
alone do not confer a benefit.
20. Canada has recognized, at paragraphs 16 and 17 of its Rebuttal Submission, that in certain
circumstances the CIRR may be representative of, or even above, market rates. However, this does
not establish that PROEX III does not confer a benefit. As Canada demonstrated in its First
Submission, the CIRR alone, divorced from the ot her terms of the OECD Arrangement, does not
reflect market realities4 Moreover, as Canada demonstrated in its Rebuttal Submission, the CIRR is
substantially below market rates available to regional airlines for the purchase or lease of regional
aircraft5
21. Finally, Brazil has offered nothing to refute the most obvious evidence that PROEX III
confers a benefit: PROEX III is offered to purcha ser/borrowers to buy down interest rates that they
have already negotiated in the commercial market place. The resulting bought down interest rates,
even at the CIRR, therefore must be below-market rates. This Panel has already recognized this. At
footnote 47 to its Report in the original Article 21.5 proceeding, it stated: "…PROEX payments by
definition allow a purchaser/borrower to obtain export credits at interest rates lower than it could
obtain in the market with respect to the transaction in question".
22. There can be no doubt that, even at the CIRR, PROEX III confers a benefit. If it did not, it
would serve no purpose.
III. BRAZIL'S REVISED POSITION ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF ITEM (K) OF THE
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST
23. Brazil contends that even if PROEX III is a prohibited export subsidy, it nevertheless
qualifies for the "safe haven" in the second paragraph of Item (k).
24. Since Brazil's claim amounts to an affirmative defence, it bears the burden of proof and must
demonstrate that its measures meet all of the conditions of the second paragraph of Item (k) to claim
the exception6 Those conditions are, at a minimum, those specified by the Canada-Aircraft Article
21.5 Panel Report7
25. Brazil notes in its Second Submission that Canada did not address the second paragraph of
Item (k) in its First Submission. There is good reason for this. In this entire dispute, Brazil had never
raised it as a defence. Now, by changing PROEX to ostensibly use the CIRR rate, and by changing
nothing else, Brazil claims that PROEX III all of a sudden is "in conformity with" the "interest rates
provisions". This is simply not the case.

3 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Canada's Second Oral Submission to the Panel,
para. 109.
4 Canada's First Written Submission, 2 March 2001, paras. 77-83 and 94-95.
5 Rebuttal Submission of Canada, 23 March 2001, paras. 87-90.
6 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
(WT/DS46/AB/RW), para. 66.
7 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of
the DSU, Report of the Panel, (WT/DS70/RW), at para. 5.147.

26. Specifically Brazil is asking this Panel to consider PROEX III to be "in conformity with" the
"interest rates provisions" of the OECD Arrangement. When you consider Brazil's claim, recall the
following:
• Brazil's claim flies in the face of its numerous public statements that it would not conform its
measures to the OECD Arrangement;
• Brazil's claim ignores the fact that Brazil routinely waives any disciplines that its measures
supposedly impose;
• Brazil's claim is at odds with the evidence from two recent cases that indicate that non-
conforming terms were recently offered by Brazil through Embraer; and
• Brazil's claim ignores – and provides no evidence of "conformity" with – the vast majority of
"interest rates provisions" as defined by the Canada-Aircraft, Article 21.5 Panel Report.
A. BRAZIL'S POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS DELAYING STRATEGY
27. Senior Brazilian officials have repeatedly stated that Brazil will not abide by the provisions of
the OECD Arrangement in public statements, in statements to the DSU and in every one of the six
negotiation and consultation sessions held between Canada and Brazil since the release of the original
Brazil – Aircraft Article 21.5 Panel Report. Those statements are in Canada 's written submissions.
We do not need to repeat them.
28. Brazil's new position – claiming conformity with the second paragraph of Item (k) – would
require a complete reversal of policy. This alleged reversal makes sense in the context of a delaying
strategy. From the beginning, Brazil's strategy has been to delay implementation as long as possible
while buying market share at whatever cost.
29. One article in a Brazilian newspaper described the strategy as follows: "[b]ut the major
victory of the MFA refers to the fact that it was able to extend the dispute with Canada for almost four
years. Meanwhile, Embraer became one of the biggest aircraft manufacturer[s] in the world. Today,
the company has half of the world market for small aircraft (with up to 70 seats). In order to extend
negotiations as much as possible, the MFA contra cted big advocacy companies abroad specialized in
international trade.8
30. As Canada stated in its Rebuttal Submission, if Brazil had indicated its intention to be "in
conformity with" the "interest rates provisions" duri ng the months of negotiations, and then followed
that up with legitimate disciplines, this dispute would largely be resolved9 Instead, Brazil has refused
to bring PROEX III into conformity and used the negotiations as a delaying tactic.
31. Two weeks ago, Canada put Brazil's claim of c onformity with the OECD provisions to the
test. On 22 March, Canada sent a letter by fax to Brazil's chief negotiator in this dispute. The letter
states that: "[a] written commitment by Brazil that it has limited its export financing for regional
aircraft to conform to the interest rate provisio ns of the OECD Arrangement would go a long way
towards resolving this dispute. If Brazil is pr epared to provide this commitment, Canada would

8 Guilherme Barros, "Canada can retaliate against Brazil by US$1.3 billion" Folha de Sao Paulo
(22 August 2000) (Exhibit CDA-38).
9 At para. 19.

propose the suspension of all current dispute settlement proceedings … and the resumption of
negotiations…. 10 Canada has not received a response.
B. BRAZIL HAS ALREADY BEEN FOUND TO WAIVE ITS PROEX "REQUIREMENTS"
32. Not only do Brazil's public statements point to non-conformity with the OECD Arrangement,
but, as Canada noted at paragraph 28 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil has admitted to waiving so-
called requirements that on their face might appear to limit the terms of the financing it can offer.
33. Brazil claims that Circular 2881 and Directive 374 limit the maximum length of the financing
term to 10 years and the maximum percentage for interest rate equalization to 85% of the export value
of the sale.
34. In the case of Circular 2881, Brazil is repeating an argument that was rejected by this very
Panel in the previous Article 21.5 proceeding
11 Directive 374 applied to PROEX II and has not, to
Canada's knowledge, been revised for PROEX III. These documents did not impose any disciplines
on PROEX II. Nor do they impose any disciplines on PROEX III.
C. PROEX III F
INANCING SUPPORT OFFERED BY BRAZIL DEPARTS FROM THE OECD
ARRANGEMENT
35. Brazil's actual practice confirms its non-conformity with the "interest rates provisions" of the
OECD Arrangement. In two recent cases, detailed in Canada's Rebuttal Submission, Brazil offered
financing support through Embraer that was not "in conformity with" the "interest rates provisions" of
the OECD Arrangement.
36. Brazil itself seems to believe that its measures do not conform to the interest rates provisions
of the OECD Arrangement - for it offers no evid ence of conformity. Although Brazil contends that
its measures conform to either the 1998 or 1992 version of the Arrangement, it fails to even mention
most of the 1998 articles. And with respect to the 1992 version, Canada has demonstrated that
Brazil's measures do not even meet Brazil's own limited definition of interest rates provisions –
specifically the 10 year term limitation.
D. T
HE 1998 V ERSION OF THE OECD A RRANGEMENT IS RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSES OF
THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K)
37. Brazil also claims that it is the 1992 version of the OECD Arrangement that is relevant to this
Panel's enquiry. This is clearly at odds with the ordinary meaning of the second paragraph of Item
(k). Brazil argues that the phrase referring to an international undertaking which "has been" adopted,
refers to a "'time regarded as present' when the text became effective on 1 January 1995." This is not
so. The ordinary meaning of the phrase requires a determination of whether a successor arrangement
"has", in the present, "been adopted". With re spect to PROEX III, this means that the 1998 OECD
Arrangement applies. The U.S. and the European Communities support Canada in this
interpretation
12
38. Brazil further claims that interpreting Item (k) second paragraph to include post-1995
successor undertakings of the Arrangement would effectively result in an amendment, by a sub-group

10 Letter from C. Carriere, Director General, General Trade Policy Bureau, Canada's Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to Ambassador J.A. Graca Lima, Undersecretary General for
Integration, Economic Affairs and Foreign Trade, Braz il's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 21 March 2001
(Exhibit CDA-39).
11 At para. 2.4.
12 See Third Party Submission of the United States, 23 March 2001, paras. 4 – 10; and Third Party
Submission by the European Communities, 23 March 2001, paras. 15 – 23.

of Members, of the SCM Agreement. Again, Brazil's interpretation is erroneous. The text "successor
undertaking" specifically contemplates that the Arrangement would evolve over time. The Canada –
Aircraft Article 21.5 Panel shared this view. Moreover, this evolution is fair: it is exactly what
Members accepted when they agreed to the WTO Agreements. Again, the U.S. and the European
Communities support Canada in this conclusion13
39. Finally, it should be noted that since the WTO Agreement post-dates the 1992 Arrangement
by three years, the drafters could have simply referred to the 1992 Arrangement if they had intended
that it apply regardless of future changes. The use of the language in the second paragraph of Item (k)
indicates the opposite – that the drafters knew that future changes to the Arrangement would occur
and that they intended for those changes to apply when a Member claimed the second paragraph "safe
haven".
IV. PROEX III DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR AN ALLEGED A CONTRARIO EXCEPTION
UNDER ITEM (K), FIRST PARAGRAPH
40. Canada has already explained at length in its previous submissions why the first paragraph of
Item (k) cannot be read as creating an a contrario exception and why, even if it could, PROEX III
would not qualify. Still, a few contentions in Brazil's Second Submission call for a response.
A. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K) DOES NOT SUPPORT AN A CONTRARIO EXCEPTION
41. At paragraph 19 of its Second Submission, Brazil contends that the Panel must give meaning
and effect to the material advantage clause in the first paragraph of Item (k). It then contends that the
"ordinary, straightforward meaning" of the material advantage clause is that payments that are used to
secure a material advantage are prohibited subsidies, whereas payments that are not so used are not
prohibited. It argues that logically, the drafters of Item (k) intended that payments that did not secure
a material advantage would not be proscribed.
42. The more straightforward reading of Item (k) is that payments that do not secure a material
advantage are not per se prohibited export subsidies on the Illustrative List but may nevertheless be
prohibited export subsidies. The language in the first paragraph of Item (k) distinguishes between
payments that are used to secure a material advantage and those that are not. However, it does not
follow that the ordinary meaning of the material advantage clause is the a contrario meaning that
Brazil proposes. Nor is Brazil's interpretation required to give meaning and effect to the clause.
43. Instead, the ordinary meaning of the distinction created by the clause is that measures that
secure a material advantage are to be considered per se prohibited subsidies, (as they are included on
the Illustrative List of such subsidies), without regard to the tests set out in Articles 1 or 3.1 of the
SCM Agreement. By contrast, if a measure does not secure a material advantage, it is not one of the
per se prohibited subsidies on the Illustrative List, but that does not mean that it is not a prohibited
subsidy. It is still a prohibited subsidy if the complaining Member establishes that it is a subsidy
under Article 1 and contingent upon export performance under Article 3.1. This is a far more
"straightforward" interpretation of the terms of the SCM Agreement, in their context, than that
advocated by Brazil.
44. Nor, contrary to Brazil's assertion at paragraph 23 of its Second Submission, has Canada
suggested that the material advantage clause is the result of inadvertence. The English case to which
Lord McNair referred in The Law of Treaties stands for the principle that the a contrario maxim
should be applied carefully, with due regard to context, and is not automatic in its application, a point

13 See Third Party Submission of the United States, 23 March 2001, paras. 8 – 10; and Third Party
Submission by the European Communities, 23 March 2001, paras. 24 – 33.

with which Brazil seems to agree 14 In the present case, there are compelling reasons why Item (k)
should not be interpreted a contrario . These reasons have nothing to do with inadvertence and
everything to do with the context of Item (k) in the SCM Agreement.
45. Before turning to this context, Canada first notes that in the same paragraph of its Second
Submission in which Brazil confuses Canada's reference to Lord McNair's text, Brazil also cites
paragraph 20 of the original Report of the Appellate Body in this dispute for the proposition that the
"material advantage" clause was deliberately added to "restrict the definition of this type of export
subsidy to instances where a ‘material advantage' has been secured."
46. However, paragraph 20 of the original Appellate Body Report does not support the
proposition for which Brazil has cited it. Paragraph 20 is in the section of the Report entitled
"Arguments of the Participants and the Third Participants, Claims of Error by Brazil – Appellant". It
is not a finding by the Appellate Body but rather, a description of Brazil's arguments.
47. In fact, the Appellate Body never made findings regarding the history of the first paragraph of
Item (k) and the object and purpose of the "material advantage" clause. Moreover, there is no
evidence to establish, or even suggest, that the material advantage clause was added to "restrict the
definition of this type of export subsidy to instances where a ‘material advantage' has been secured".
48. The material advantage clause restricts the types of export subsidies that are "illustrated" in
the Illustrative List. It does not – and cannot – circumscribe the conditions under which a subsidy is
contingent upon export performance through the application of Articles 1 and 3.
49. In the eight or so paragraphs that follow paragraph 23 in its Second Submission, Brazil seeks
to find support for its a contrario position in the negotiating history of Item (k). Brazil refers to the
negotiating history to demonstrate that the material advantage clause was not added inadvertently, a
claim that Canada has not made. Brazil's approach to the "material advantage" clause is wrong and its
arguments regarding the negotiating history are misplaced because they ignore Articles 1 and 3 and
footnote 5, three provisions of the SCM Agreement that were not part of the Tokyo Round Code.
These provisions provide the critical context for the interpretation of Item (k) first paragraph.
50. As Canada noted in paragraph 47 of its First Submission, footnote 5 recognizes that Annex I
contains certain exceptions to the general prohib ition in Article 3. Footnote 5 is an explicit
exclusionary clause. Brazil would interpret the I llustrative List to implicitly allow certain export
subsidies a contrario simply because it identifies other types of measures as prohibited export
subsidies. However, as this Panel recognized in its Report in the Article 21.5 proceeding, this would
make footnote 5 redundant
15
51. Brazil challenges Canada's characterization of footnote 5 as an explicit exclusionary clause
because it does not contain the word "expressly". Brazil argues that Canada's position means that the
word "expressly" should be read into footnote 5. It also argues that the Panel, in the original Article
21.5 proceeding, noted that the word "expressly" was dropped from an earlier draft of the language of
footnote 5, which apparently broadened its meaning
16
52. According to Brazil, because footnote 5 does not contain the word "expressly", as in
"Measures expressly referred to in Annex I as not constituting exports subsidies shall not be
prohibited…", footnote 5 is not meaningful context for the interpretation of Item (k) in Annex I.
Brazil's arguments parallel an argument advanced by the United States and rejected by the Panel in

15 At para. 6.41.

the original Article 21.5 proceeding17 Brazil's arguments misconstrue both Canada's position and the
finding of the Panel in its Article 21.5 Report.
53. In Canada's view, it was necessary for the drafters to remove the word "expressly" from
footnote 5 because Annex I includes only one express reference to measures "not constituting export
subsidies ". That reference is in the second paragraph of Item (k), which provides that an export
credit practice which is in conformity with the interest rate provisions of a relevant undertaking "shall
not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement".
54. However, Annex I also includes affirmative statements that authorize the use of certain
measures without explicitly stating that the measures do not constitute export subsidies. These
statements are found in Item (h) and Item (i) and in footnote 59 to Item (e) of the Illustrative List.
Had the drafters used the word "expressly" in footnote 5, it would have nullified the legal effect of
these latter statements.
55. Canada's position is that in footnote 5, the "measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting
export subsidies" are measures for which there is positive authorization in Annex I that a measure is
not being categorized as a prohibited subsidy. Canada's position is consistent with the relevant
finding of the Panel in the Article 21.5 proceeding:
… the Illustrative List contains – and already contained at the time of Cartland III
and IV – a number of provisions that include affirmative statements that arguably
represent authorizations to use certain measures. The language of Cartland III
("expressly referred to") could have precluded asserting that footnote 5 applied to any
of these provisions, and it may be that the purpose of the modification was to rectify
this situation. If on the other hand the intention of the drafters in changing footnote 5
had been to extend the scope of that footnote to cover situations where the Illustrative
List merely referred to things that were export subsidies, they might have been
expected to modify the structure of the second part of the footnote, and not merely
delete the word "expressly"18
56. The Panel's findings support Canada's position. By removing the word "expressly" from the
text of footnote 5 the drafters avoided a reading of the Illustrative List that would have prevented
Members from taking measures that were affirmatively authorized but were not expressly deemed not
to be prohibited export subsidies. Far from making footnote 5 too vague to be useful in interpreting
Annex I, by removing "expressly" the drafters clarified that under footnote 5 the measures
affirmatively referred to in Annex I are not prohibited subsidies. Having done so, there is no reason
why the drafters would have intended, as Brazil would have it, that subsidies also should not be
prohibited when the are not referred to in Item (k).
57. At paragraph 36 of its Second Submission, Brazil argues that Canada' s interpretation of
footnote 5 is undermined by item (i) of the Illustrative List, because Item (i) must also be interpreted a
contrario. Brazil's explanation of Item (i) omits important aspects of the provision and it ignores the
relationship between the items in the Illustrative List and other relevant provisions in the SCM
Agreement and the GATT 1994. Item (i) demonstrates why Canada's approach to interpreting the
Illustrative List within its context is the correct approach.
58. Brazil's a contrario approach focuses exclusively on the introductory language of Item (i). It
ignores the relevant contextual elements of the provision. By its own terms, Item (i) must be
interpreted in accordance with the guidelines in Annexes II and III of the SCM Agreement. By virtue
of footnote 1 to the SCM Agreement, "in accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT

17 At para. 6.40.
18 Para. 6.40.

1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the…
remission of duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy".
59. Thus, the non-excessive remission of import charges, to the extent that such charges are
"duties" within the meaning of footnote 1, is not a subsidy. Contrary to Brazil's assertion, the
negotiators could not have drafted Item (i) with a period or full stop after the word "charges" because
it would have created an inconsistency with footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement.
60. Accordingly, it is not by reading Item (i) a contrario that one can determine that non-
excessive remission does not amount to a prohibited export subsidy, but by referring to the other
provisions of the SCM Agreement that clearly establish that such remissions do not amount to a
subsidy. Standing alone, Item (i) would provide merely that non-excessive remission is not per se
prohibited, i.e., that non-excessive remission is not illustrated on the Illustrative List. The same is true
of Item (k).
B. PROEX III P
AYMENTS ARE NOT "PAYMENTS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF ITEM (K)
61. The first paragraph of Item (k) refers to the payment of the costs incurred by exporters or
financial institutions in obtaining export credits. In the original Article 21.5 proceeding, this Panel
found, correctly in Canada's view, that PROEX paymen ts do not cover the cost incurred by financial
institutions or exporters in obtaining export credits. It found that interest-rate buy-downs for
purchasers of Embraer aircraft are not payments of a lender's cost of obtaining export credits. It found
further that even if the provision of export credits at below the cost of borrowing was a cost incurred
in obtaining credits, PROEX payments, being paid to foreign banks, did not necessarily serve to
reimburse these costs
19
62. Brazil argues that PROEX payments do fit the definition of payments in the first paragraph of
Item (k) and suggests that if they do not, Canada has failed to explain the kind of payments that are
contemplated in that paragraph.
63. Canada has consistently argued that "payments" in the first paragraph of Item (k) refers to
situations where an exporter or a financial instituti on incurs costs by obtaining credits at rates higher
than those at which it lends to a purchaser, and a government pays for all or part of this difference 20
PROEX payments are not payments to cover the costs incurred by exporters or Brazilian financial
institutions in raising funds used for financing purchases. They are simply cash grants made for the
benefit of purchasers of Brazilian exported regional aircraft. Therefore they do not fit within the first
paragraph of Item (k).
64. PROEX payments are available to purchasers even when, as in many cases, they finance their
purchases outside Brazil and through non-Brazilian financial institutions. In such instances, any
"payments" by Brazil do not cover the cost incurred by a financial institution or an exporter in
"obtaining credits". Moreover, even if financing is offered by Brazilian financial institutions, PROEX
payments are made to reduce interest rates below market rates, rather than to reimburse an exporter or
a financial institution for costs incurred in obtaining credits. There is no evidence that PROEX
payments reimburse an exporter or a financial institution for anything.
65. Canada notes that the United States, in its third party submission, has taken the position that
PROEX interest rate buy-downs constitute "payment s" within the meaning of the first paragraph of

19 At paras. 6.71-6.73.
20 See e.g. Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of
the DSU, Report of the Panel, at para. 6.70.

Item (k). The United States acknowledges that there is very little guidance on the interpretation of the
"payment clause". However, it contends that the intent of the clause is to reduce the risk to the
exporter or the financial institution lending money to a borrower. The United States also
acknowledges that interest rate buy-downs do not constitute a direct payment but argues that they
reduce the risk incurred by the exporter or financial institution and therefore fall within what it
considers to be the scope of the clause
21
66. The interpretation of the payment clause suggested by the United States is inconsistent with
the plain meaning of the terms in the first paragraph of Item (k). As noted by this Panel, the second
part of the first paragraph of Item (k) refers only to payments made to cover the cost incurred in
obtaining export credits. An interpreter is not free to read into the provision language to include any
measure that might reduce the risks that exporters or the financial institutions incur in lending money.
Interpreting the clause to cover costs not incurred in obtaining export credits would render
meaningless the words "payment… of… costs… incurr ed in obtaining credits". It would mean that
the first paragraph of Item (k) would extend to such other costs as loan guarantees. This would
considerably expand the category of export subsidies that are per se prohibited under Item (k).
C. PROEX III S
ECURES A MATERIAL ADVANTAGE
67. Canada has explained in its First and Rebuttal Submissions, why PROEX III confers a
material advantage. Canada has shown, with reference to the commercial marketplace, why PROEX
III confers an advantage that is clearly material 22 Simply put interest rates that PROEX III makes
available even to higher-rated aircraft purchasers are significantly lower than the rates available to the
highest-rated purchasers using low-risk secured debt instruments to finance their purchases. A
fortiori, the same is true of PROEX III support for lower-rated aircraft purchasers.
68. Canada has also demonstrated why the CIRR alone, stripped of the other disciplines of the
OECD Arrangement and independent of the characte ristics of applicable commercial transactions
including the creditworthiness of the borrower, is not representative of any market and cannot be
considered an appropriate benchmark23
69. Accordingly, even if the first paragraph of Item (k) did give rise to an a contrario exception –
which it does not – and even if PROEX III payments were payments within the meaning of that
paragraph – which they are not – PROEX III paym ents would still not qualify for the exception
because they secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
V. CONCLUSION
70. In this, the third proceeding to determine whether Brazil's PROEX scheme is consistent with
its WTO obligations, Brazil has resorted to repeating arguments that have been previously rejected by
this Panel and the Appellate Body, or to taking posit ions that are entirely at odds with the facts, or
both.
71. Brazil's approach brings to mind an old story, in which Abraham Lincoln is asked, "If you call
a horse' s tail a leg, how many legs does the horse have?". Mr. Lincoln's answer was, of course,
"Four. Calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg. It is still a tail."

21 Third Party Submission of the United States, paras. 19-20.
22 E.g. First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 73-83.
23 E.g. First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 84-97.

72. Brazil can claim that PROEX III does not confer a benefit. It can claim that it qualifies for
the safe haven in the second paragraph of Item (k). And it can claim that it qualifies for an alleged
a contrario exception in the first paragraph of Item (k). But claiming that it is so cannot make it so
when the law and the facts show otherwise.
73. The latest version of Brazil's PROEX scheme is still a prohibited export subsidy. Canada
requests that this Panel find accordingly.

ANNEX A-4
RESPONSES BY CANADA TO QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL
(17 April 2001)
For Canada
Q15. Please explain precisely what measures you are challenging in these proceedings. Is it
the legal framework of PROEX III in so far as it relates to financing the export of regional
aircraft, i.e. PROEX III as such? Or payments under PROEX III?
1. As noted in Canada's oral response to this question, Brazil claims in its First Submission that
by amending PROEX through BCB 2799, it has brought PROEX into conformity with the SCM
Agreement. Brazil claims that by virtue of this amendment, PROEX III payments are no longer
prohibited export subsidies. Canada disagrees. Canada is challenging the PROEX III scheme in so
far as it relates to the financing of exports of regional aircraft because, however it is delivered,
1 it
enables Brazil to continue to grant prohibited export subsidies. It is also challenging PROEX III
payments made in support of regional aircraft exports. Payments under PROEX III remain prohibited
export subsidies. Accordingly, Brazil has failed to comply with the reco mmendations and rulings of
the DSB.
2. The situation is akin to that described by the Panel in its Report in the original (PROEX I)
proceeding:
… we understand Canada to be challenging not only specific payments, but more
generally the practice involving PROEX payments relating to exported Brazilian
regional aircraft … In order to analyse this contention, we are required to go beyond
an examination of individual PROEX payments that have been identified and look
more generally at the nature and operation of the PROEX interest rate equalization
scheme which governs the payment of the alleged export subsidies".2
Q16. Canada cites Article 13 of the 1998 OECD Arrangement regarding repayment
schedules. Article 13(a) however uses the term "normally". Please comment.
1. Article 13(a) defines the minimum repayment schedule that is expected for transactions that
comply with the disciplines of the Arrangement. The term "normally" refers to the possibility that
one may wish to establish a different repayment schedule under special circumstances, as envisaged in
paragraph (c) of the same article. In that event, paragraph (c) requires that the appropriate notification
procedures be followed (detailed in Article 49(a)2) of the Arrangement).
2. However, it is important to note that this flexibility does not apply to the timing of the first
instalment of principal, which must be made at or before 6 months from the starting point of credit (as
defined in Article 9) regardless of the repayment schedule. The term "normally" only qualifies the
reference to "equal and regular instalments not less frequently than every six months". It does not
qualify the "first instalment" language. This in terpretation is confirmed by the context of this
provision within the Arrangement, namely by the "No Derogation Engagement" of Article 27(a).

1 See Canada's Rebuttal Submission, para. 2.
2 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Report of the Panel, WT/DS46/R, adopted
20 August 1999,.para. 7.2.

3. Thus, the unlimited grace period allowed under Article 2 of Brazil's Directive 374 enables the
Export Credit Committee to approve transactions that would not respect Article 13(a) of the
Arrangement by approving transaction in which the fi rst payment of principal is made more than six
months after the starting point of credit.
Q17. Do you agree that PROEX III payments a re "interest rate support" within the meaning
of the 1998 OECD Arrangement? If not, why not?
1. The 1998 OECD Arrangement does not define "interest rate support". However, interest rate
support practices of the Participants to the Arrangement have the following characteristics:
• The level of support is determined in relation to the interest rate prevailing in the market at
the time when support is established;
• The amount paid by the government varies according to the difference between the short-term
interest rate that prevails in the market during the period over which the financing is provided
and the level at which the interest rate was fixed for the borrower. Theoretically the payment
is therefore a two-way flow because there may be times at which the market rate will be
below the rate at which support was fixed, which would require the financial institution to pay
back part of the support; and
• Credit risk insurance or a guarantee is provided in association with interest rate support to
limit the risk of non-repayment from the borrower because this risk is not covered by pure
interest rate support. Participants provide credit risk insurance or guarantees in conjunction
with interest support to cover that risk. This is done through the addition of a risk premium to
the interest rate and the Arrangement defines minimum premium benchmarks to ensure that
credit risk is appropriately covered.
2. Whether or not PROEX III payments are "interest rate support" within the meaning of the
1998 OECD Arrangement, they do not conform with the interest rates provisions of the 1998 OECD
arrangement and are significantly different from the interest rate support practices of the Participants:
• The level of buy-down provided by PROEX is divo rced from the interest rate that prevails in
the market when the transaction is approved. In fact, BCB Newsletter No. 2881
3 indicates
Brazil's intention to provide the maximum buy-down possible (2.5%) in cases where the term
of the loan is over 9 years;
• PROEX III buy-downs constitute a one-way flow from the government to the lending
institution, instead of the two-way flow associated with interest rate equalisation; and
• As previously mentioned, interest rate support does not cover the credit risk associated with a
transaction. The lender therefore remains subject to the risk of non-payment by the borrower.
Even if interest rate support is provided by a government, it is difficult to see why a lender
would agree to extend a fixed rate loan without the possibility to cover itself for the credit risk
it is taking, in particular if the transaction involves a fair amount of risk.
Q18. Canada contends that the "CIRR is not an appropriate benchmark … with respect to
transactions involving regional aircraft because the CIRR rate usually varies significantly from
the rates available in comparable transactio ns in the marketplace" (Canada's rebuttal
submission, para. 87). Is Canada asserting that the Appellate Body was not aware of the
financing spreads required from airlines purchasin g regional aircraft when it stated, in its

3 See Exhibit CDA-2.

Article 21.5 report in Brazil – Aircraft, that Brazil , to discharge its burden of establishing that
under the revised PROEX subsidies were not used to secure a material advantage, had to prove
"either: that the net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or above the relevant CIRR
… or …"? (para. 67) If so, what is the basis for this assertion?
1. No. In this proceeding, Canada has challenged Brazil's selection of the CIRR as an
appropriate benchmark. In the previous proceeding s in this dispute, the Appellate Body did not have
to pronounce on the "appropriateness" of the CIRR as a generalized benchmark because Brazil failed
to make a prima facie case that the interest rates under PROEX I or PROEX II were at or above the
relevant CIRR or some other benchmark.
2. While Canada cannot speak for the Appellate Body, Canada believes that the Appellate Body
made clear that it considered the CIRR relevant because the Appellate Body thought that the CIRR
was a market benchmark, not because the CIRR had an y independent legal status. In Canada's view,
the Appellate Body did not intend the CIRR to be a conclusive generalized benchmark if it were not a
market benchmark. In its Report in the original proceeding, the Appellate Body recognized that:
"[t]he fact that a particular net interest rate is below the relevant CIRR is a positive indication that the
government payment in that case has been ‘used to secure a material advantage in the field of export
credit terms'". [underlining added]4
3. However, the Appellate Body also stated that: "[i]n any given case, whether or not a
government payment is used to secure a material advantage … may well depend on where the net
interest rate applicable to the particular transaction at issue in that case stands in relation to the range
of commercial rates available."5
4. Moreover, in its Report in the first Article 21.5 proceeding in this dispute, the Appellate Body
acknowledged that "the CIRR was not intended as the exclusive and immutable benchmark applicable
in all cases".
6 This statement was in response to evidence that in some instances the market may be
below the CIRR.
5. Canada has presented detailed argument and evidence before this Panel at paragraphs 84 to 97
of its First Submission and at paragraphs 78 to 90 of its Rebuttal Submission demonstrating that CIRR
is not an appropriate benchmark in regional aircraft transactions because it does not appropriately
reflect the rates at which regional aircraft financing is generally offered in the commercial
marketplace.
6. The CIRR interest rate in most cases will be well below commercial rates available for
regional aircraft transactions. For example, as demonstrated in paragraph 88 of Canada's Rebuttal
Submission, the CIRR is 35 basis points lower than a rate achieved by the highest-rated EETC tranche
for one of the highest rated U.S. airlines (American Airlines). Canada also demonstrated, at
paragraphs 76-77 of its First Submission and in Exhibit CDA-16, that buy-downs in interest rates to
the CIRR would confer a material advantage in favour of Brazilian regional aircraft exports.
7. Furthermore, such an advantage would exist even without taking into account the other "terms
and conditions of export credit transactions in the marketplace", to use the Appellate Body's words.
7
As Canada has shown, for example at paragr aphs 80-83 of its First Submission, PROEX III buy-

4 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/R,
adopted 20 August 1999, para. 182.
5 Ibid.
6 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS46/AB/RW, para. 63.
7 Ibid., para. 73.

downs to the CIRR, divorced from these other terms and conditions, are even less reflective of
regional aircraft financing in the commercial marketplace.
8. In the light of this evidence, Brazil cannot, by allegedly limiting PROEX III buy-downs to the
CIRR, establish a prima facie case that PROEX financing does not secure a material advantage.
Q19. How can Canada's assertion that a be nchmark other than CIRR "must be used" in
cases where "the CIRR rate is not an adequate proxy for market rates" (Canada's first written
submission, para. 92; emphasis added) be reconciled with the Appellate Body's statement, in its
Article 21.5 report in Brazil – Aircraft, that, where the CIRR does not reflect the rates available
in the marketplace, a Member "should be able, in principle, to rely on evidence from the
marketplace itself in order to establish an alternative 'market benchmark'" (para. 64; emphasis
added)?
1. Canada's position is consistent with the Appellate Body's statement. In accordance with
paragraph 64 of the Appellate Body's Report, a Member, in that case a defending Member, may rely
on evidence from the marketplace to demonstrate to a panel, as the trier of fact, that the CIRR is not
an appropriate generalized benchmark in the circumstances, and that an alternative benchmark is
appropriate.
2. It cannot be that this right to demonstrate that the CIRR is not an appropriate benchmark
accrues only to a party complained against. In this proceeding, Canada, as the complaining party, has
demonstrated that the CIRR is not an appropriate generalized market benchmark because it does not
generally reflect the rates available in the commercial marketplace for the financing of regional
aircraft. The burden remains on Brazil, as the party asserting an affirmative defence, to establish an
alternative generalized benchmark that is appropriate. It has not done so.
Q20. Can it be inferred from paras. 67 and 73 of the Appellate Body's Article 21.5 report in
Brazil – Aircraft that the CIRR is a generalized market benchmark applicable to all export
credit transactions relating to regional aircraft? If not, why not?
1. No. In paragraphs 67 and 73 of its Article 21.5 Report, the Appellate Body was considering
the CIRR as a generalized market benchmark. The CIRR can be a generalized market benchmark an
applicable to all export credit transactions relating to regional aircraft only if, as a general matter, it
accurately reflects market rates for such transactions. As discussed, supra, in Canada's response to
Question 18 and in Canada's Rebuttal Submission at paragraph 80, the Appellate Body recognized
this. It did not intend the CIRR to be used as a benchmark if it did not accurately reflect the market
and it acknowledged that CIRR might not do so. Canada has demonstrated that the CIRR does not do
so.
For both parties
Q21. On the assumption that the second paragra ph of item (k) provides for an exception to
the first paragraph thereof, would a Member invoking the second paragraph need to establish
(i) that its internal law allows it to act in conformity with the interest rates provisions of the
relevant OECD Arrangement or (ii) that its internal law requires it to act in conformity with the
aforementioned interest rates provisions? If (ii) is correct, how does this view fit with the
traditional distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation in the GATT/WTO?
1. The traditional distinction in GATT and WTO jurisprudence between mandatory and
discretionary legislation, at least until the Panel report in United States – Section 301 , was that only
legislation mandating a WTO inconsistency or prec luding consistency could, as such, violate WTO

provisions.8 In the traditional view, it was not sufficient for a complaining Member to show that the
impugned measure might allow the Member complained against to violate its WTO obligations but
rather, that it the measure required, or would require, the Member to violate its obligations in at least
some circumstances.
2. This distinction addressed the question of what a complaining Member had to show in
challenging legislation, order to establish a violation of WTO obligations. The distinction did not
address the question of what a Member complained against must show in order to establish an
affirmative defence. It therefore is not applicable to the question of what a Member must do in order
to invoke the second paragraph of Item (k) as an affirmative defence.
3. A Member invoking the second paragraph of Item (k) must establish that its challenged
actions are in conformity with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement. A
demonstration that the Member's internal law allows it to act in conformity with the interest rates
provisions of the OECD Arrangem ent would be insufficient. The Member would not have met its
burden of establishing its affirmative defence, because it would not have shown that its actions are in
conformity with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement. Given the presumption that
a Member will act in accordance with its domestic legal requirements, one way for a Member to meet
its burden would be to show that its internal law requires it to act in conformity with the interest rates
provisions of the OECD Arrangement.
4. In the present case, Brazil has not met its burden of establishing its affirmative defence. It has
not shown that its internal law mandates that it act in conformity with the interest rates provisions of
the relevant OECD Arrangement. Nor has it established, through other authoritative actions, that it is
bound by the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement.
5. Canada has established that PROEX III does not even address, let alone require conformity
with, all of the interest rates provisions of Arrangement (regardless of which version of the
Arrangement is the relevant one). Brazil has claimed that, in addition to the CIRR, it conforms to two
of the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement, namely the maximum length of the
financing term and the loan-to-value limitation. However, as Canada showed at paragraphs 27 to 30
of its Rebuttal Submission, the documents on which Brazil relies for this contention were in effect
under PROEX II, during which period Brazil routinely waived these terms for regional aircraft
financing. Furthermore, as noted in Canada's response to Question 32, Directive 374 on its face
allows Brazil to offer financing on payment terms that exceed the 10 year limit in the OECD
Arrangement. In the course of the oral hearing in this proceeding, Brazil admitted that it retained the
power to waive these two terms. Moreover, Brazil offered no assurances that it would not continue to
do so, nor could it have credibly done so, given the array of public statements by Brazilian officials
that Brazil will not comply with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement.
9
6. In addition, at paragraphs 32-36 of its Rebuttal Submission, Canada submitted uncontroverted
evidence that PROEX financing support has been offered on terms inconsistent with the interest rates
provisions of the OECD Arrangement in the period since PROEX III took effect.
7. In the face of the evidence against it, Brazil ha s failed to show that PROEX III, however it is
delivered, is in conformity with the interest rate s provisions of the OECD Arrangement. It cannot
meet its burden, regardless of any distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation.
8. Even if the mandatory/discretionary distinction were relevant to an affirmative defence,
Brazil would need to demonstrate that it is mandating to conform to the interest rates provisions of the

8 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000,
fn. 675.
9 See Canada's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 20-26.

relevant OECD Arrangement. However, as descri bed in the preceding paragraphs, Brazil has stated
publicly that it will not comply with the interest rates provisions, and there is unrebutted evidence that
it has not complied. Finally, there is a well-established history of Brazil's non-compliance under the
same instruments that it is now asserting establish its compliance. In these circumstances, there is no
basis for finding that Brazil has brought its measures into compliance with its obligations in this
dispute.
Q22. The Panel in United States – Section 301 (WT/DS152/R, para. 7.96) found legislation
presumptively inconsistent with the WTO Ag reement in a case where legislation provided
discretion to act in a WTO-inconsistent manner. Do the findings of this Panel on this issue have
any relevance to this dispute? Please elaborate?
1. As Canada noted in its answer to Question 21, the mandatory/discretionary distinction is not
relevant in the present proceeding. Nevertheless, assuming that the findings of the Section 301 panel
on the mandatory/discretionary issue are correct, they are supportive of Canada's position in this
dispute. As the question notes, the Section 301 panel found legislation to be presumptively
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement in a case where legislation provided discretion to act in a
WTO-inconsistent manner.
2. In addition, the Section 301 panel found, at paragraph 7.96 of its Report, that where
legislation is WTO-inconsistent on its face, the fact that a Member can demonstrate that its
implementing legislation allows for an application that is consistent with the Member's obligations
may not be sufficient to demonstrate that the legislation is in fact consistent with those obligations.
However in the present proceeding, Brazil has not even shown that its implementing legislation
allows for an application that is consistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.
Q23. What relevance, if any, does the langua ge of Article 3.2 to the SCM Agreement ("A
Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidie s referred to in paragraph 1") have to the
consideration of PROEX III in this dispute?
1. With respect to the implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, Brazil's
obligation is to withdraw its prohibited export subsidies. At a minimum, this means that Brazil must
stop granting or maintaining such subsidies as required under Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
Even if Brazil had not actually granted additional prohibited export subsidies under PROEX III, the
PROEX III scheme is the legal framework that enables Brazil to continue to grant illegal subsidies.
By maintaining the PROEX III scheme, Brazil has failed to stop granting or maintaining prohibited
exports subsidies and remains non-compliant with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.
Q24. Please discuss how, if at all, the concept of minimum premiums as reflected in Article 20
of the 1998 OECD Arrangement applies to interest rate support. Why is interest rate support
not identified in Article 20 of the 19 98 OECD Arrangement? Are minimum premium
benchmarks under the 1998 OECD Arrangement available to non-Participants?
1. When export credits are provided, the final inte rest rate charged to the borrower is composed
of at least two elements: the basic interest rate and a risk premium. Premiums are charged to cover
the risk of non-payment by the borrower, i.e., the credit risk.
2. Interest rate support is not mentioned in Article 20 because its provision does not remove the
risk of non-repayment by the borrower for the lending institution. This risk can only be assumed
when a government provides interest rate support in association with a guarantee or insurance in
respect of the credit risk.
3. To ensure that risk is appropriately covered and that a level playing field is established, the
Participants to the Arrangement have defined minimum premium benchmarks. Currently, these

benchmarks are not available to non-Participants. Canada supports their disclosure, but any decision
to release them requires the consensus of the Participants.
Q25. Please state clearly for the Panel your view regarding which provisions of the 1992 and
1998 Arrangement are "interest rates provisions" within the meaning of the second paragraph
of item (k).
1. The following sets out Canada's view of which provisions are pertinent to regional aircraft
financing in the 1998 text of the OECD Arrangemen t would constitute "interest rates provisions"
within the meaning of Item (k) of Annex I of the SCM Agreement. The provisions described below
affect what the interest rate and the amount of interest payable will be in a given transaction. Within
limits, variations of certain of these provisions are permitted under the terms of the Arrangement.
Canada notes that provisions in the Arrangement that are pertinent to sectors other than regional
aircraft have not been listed. This list is thus without prejudice to Canada's position as far as other
sectors are concerned. While Canada has not listed definitional provisions of the Arrangement, those
provisions apply to the provisions listed below.
• Article 2: Scope of Application
This article restricts the scope of the Arrangement to officially supported export credits with
repayment terms of two years or more, and to official support in the form of tied aid.
10
• Article 3: Special Sectoral Applications and Exclusions
This article sets out the applicability of special guid elines to certain specific sectors. The guidelines
applicable to the aircraft sector provide that in cases where provisions in the Sector Understanding on
Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (Annex III) correspond with provisions in the Arrangement, the
provisions of the Sector Understanding prevail.
The relevant provisions in the Sector Understanding are Articles 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of Annex III,
Part 2, which covers new aircraft, and Articles 28 , 29, 30 and 31 of Annex III, Part 3, which covers
used aircraft, spare engines, spare parts, maintenance and service contracts.
• Article 7: Cash Payments
This article requires providers of official support to require purchasers of goods and services to make
cash payments of a minimum of 15% of the export contract value of the goods or services, at or
before the starting point of a credit (defined in Article 9 of the Arrangement).
• Article 9: Starting Point of Credit
This article requires that the repayment term begin by the actual date of delivery. However,
depending on the complexity of the underlying export contract, other dates may be applicable.
• Article 10: Maximum Repayment Term
This article sets out the maximum term for repayment of the export credit, which can be either five
years (with a possible extension to eight and a half), or ten years, depending on whether the recipient
country is classified as a Category I or Category II country. (The category of country is determined
by World Bank data based on GNP per capita).

10 Tied aid support is not permitted for civilian aircraft, except for humanitarian purposes (Annex III,
Article 24).

• Article 13: Repayment of Principal
This article requires that the principle sum of the export credit is normally to be repaid in equal, and at
least semi-annual instalments. It also permits equal, blended payments of principal and interest in the
case of leases. Within limits, variations are allowed.
• Article 14: Payment of Interest
This article requires payments of interest to be made in at least semi-annual instalments during the
repayment term. Within limits, variations are allowed.
• Article 15: Minimum Interest Rates
This article requires providers of official financing support to apply minimum interest rates, or the
relevant Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CI RRs), and sets out the principles by which CIRRs
are established.
• Article 16: Construction of CIRRs
This article requires CIRRs to be set at a fixed margin of 100 basis points above their respective base
rates. For most OECD Participants, the base rates are the yields of government bonds with terms that
roughly correspond to the average life of the loan.
• Article 17: Application of CIRRs
This article provides that CIRRs can be held for 120 days at an additional cost of 20 basis points.
When official financing support is provided for floating rate loans (rather than on a CIRR basis), the
Participants must not grant the borrower the option of choosing the lower of CIRR or the short-term
market rate throughout the life of the loan.
• Article 19: Official Support for Cosmetic Interest Rates
This article forbids the offering of artificially reduced interest rates, which give the borrower the
illusion of obtaining more favourable financing terms than are envisaged under the Agreement.
• Article 21. A): "Premium shall be risk based."
Paragraph a) of Article 21 requires that premiums be risk-based. This is understood to mean that
premiums must "not [be] inadequate to cover l ong term operating costs and losses" (as provided in
Article 22.a)).
• Article 26: Validity Period for Export Credits
This article imposes a limit of six months on the length of time offers can remain outstanding for
acceptance by the buyer/borrower.
• Article 29: Matching
This article permits the offering of terms and conditions that are outside of the Arrangement's rules,
but only if such terms and conditions are matching another governments' offer with terms and
conditions that are outside of the Arrangement's rules.

• The 1992 text of the Arrangement
The interest rate provisions of the 1992 text of the Arrangement that correspond to those listed above
are Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7(a), 9(d), 11 of the main text including the related definitions; Annex VIII; and
Articles 21, 23, 24, 26 of Chapter II of Annex IV, as well as note 6 to that Annex.
Additional Question for Canada
Q31. Please indicate which group(s) or indivi dual(s), other than those identified in your
delegation list, have (had) access to Brazil's su bmissions (including exhibits) and/or statements
(including exhibits) in these proceedings. Sp ecifically, have employees or representatives of
Canadian regional aircraft manufacturers been given access to such materials? If so, please
explain the basis on which you believe that you were entitled to do so under the DSU and the
Panel's Working Procedures.
1. Canada has not given access to Brazil's submissions (including exhibits) and/or statements
(including exhibits) in these proceedings to any employees of Canadian regional aircraft
manufacturers. Canada has shared these documents with members of a private law firm retained by a
Canadian regional aircraft manufacturer. These individuals have served as advisors to the
Government of Canada and are subject to a confidentiality agreement whereby they are not to disclose
documents such as those to which the question refers, including to their client. Moreover, they would
not receive any business confidential information had Brazil filed any in this proceeding.
2. As Canada noted in its statement on confidentiality to the Panel, Paragraph 13 of the Working
Procedures provides in relevant part:
The parties and third parties shall have responsibility for all members of their
delegations and shall ensure that all members of their delegations, as well as any
other advisors consulted by a party or third party , act in accordance with the rules of
the DSU and the working procedures of this Panel, particularly in regard to the
confidentiality of the proceedings.
3. Paragraph 13 recognizes that parties may consult advisors who are not members of their
delegations. The only reason why parties should have the responsibility for these advisors in regard to
the confidentiality of the proceedings is because a party may share submissions and other documents
with these advisors. The Appellate Body confirmed this at paragraph 141 of its Report in the original
Canada – Aircraft proceeding, where it recognized that: "a Member's obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of these proceedings extends also to the individuals whom that Member selects to act
as its representatives, counsel and consultants."

4. The Panel in Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages also recognized this when it stated in its
Report:
We note that written submissions of the parties which contain confidential
information may, in some cases, be provided to non-government advisors who are not
members of an official delegation at a panel meeting. The duty of confidentiality
extends … to all such advisors regardless of whether they are designated as members
of delegations and appear at a panel meeting.
11
5. For Brazil to suggest that its submissions may not be shared with a party's advisors who are
not on its "delegation" is therefore wrong as a matter of law.
Brazil's position is also entirely arbitrary. According to the Appellate Body, it is for a WTO Member
to decide who should represent it as members of its delegation.
12 Although the Appellate Body
confined this finding to representation at appellate hearings, there is no logical reason why it should
not be extended to other proceedings, and in practice it has been, as the composition of Brazil's
delegation at the oral hearing in this proceeding attests. If parties could be deprived of the
opportunity to share opposing parties' submissions with those persons most knowledgeable about the
trade at issue because they were not "on their delegation", parties would protect their ability to make a
full response by greatly expanding their delegations, as is their right.
Additional Question for Both Parties
Q32. With respect to Brazil exhibit 3, please co nfirm the accuracy of the English translation
of Article 3, paragraph 2 of Directive 3.74. In particular, is the phrase "may be extended to" an
accurate translation of "poderà ser ampliado, para até?
1. In Canada's view, the phrase "may be extended to" is not an accurate translation of the
Portuguese original, "poderá ser ampliado para até ". According to the Canadian Government's
Multilingual Translation Directorate, an accurate translation of Paragraph 2 of Article 3 is:
The term for the equalization payment, mentioned in the annex hereto, may be
extended for a maximum of ninety-six months, depending on the unit value of the
good at the place of shipment, in accordance with the following schedule: [emphasis
added]
2. The difference between "extended for a maximum of ninety-six months" and "extended to a
maximum of ninety-six months" is significant. The former makes clear that the extension is in
addition to the term indicated in the annex to Directive 374. The latter could be read to mean that the
total term, including an extension, is ninety-six months.
3. Canada's is the only logical translation given the structure of Article 3. Article 3, paragraph 1
provides that the term cannot be greater than (I) the term that was agreed by the exporter (i.e.
negotiated in the sales contract) and (II) the maximum term indicated in the annex to Directive 374
under the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 (i.e. the schedule indicating an extension for a
maximum of ninety-six months for goods valued in excess of US $130 thousand) and Article 4. The
maximum term for payments for regional aircraft indicated in the annex (per NCM Heading 8802) is
120 months. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of Article 3 cannot be read as limiting financing payments to a
total of ninety-six months without creating a conflict with the annex.

11 WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 February 1999. para. 10.32.
12 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ,
WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, para. 10.

4. In that regional aircraft can be presumed to have a value in excess of US$130 thousand, the
maximum term for financing payments for regional aircraft in accordance with Directive 374 appears
to be 120 months in accordance with the annex which may be extended by an additional 96 months in
accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3. The total term may therefore be up to 218 months, or
18 years.

ANNEX A-5
CANADA'S COMMENTS ON BRAZIL'S RESPONSES
TO QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL
(20 April 2001)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this submission, Canada offers comments on certain aspects of Brazil's responses to the
Panel's questions. In the interest of brevity and because Canada has addressed many of the issues
discussed in Brazil's responses in its previous submissions, this submission does not specifically
address each response or each element of a response. To this end, Canada relies on its previous
submissions. The absence of comments should not be construed as concurrence with a particular
response.
II. GENERAL COMMENTS ON BRAZIL'S RESPONSES
1. Brazil's responses to the Panel's questions confirm that PROEX III financing support is a
prohibited export subsidy under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement, and does not qualify for the
safe haven of the second paragraph of Item (k).
2. While there are obvious inconsistencies among individual Brazilian responses to the Panel's
questions, taken together, Brazil appears to be asserting that PROEX III payments are subject to two
alternative limitations, either one of which, in Brazil's view, automatically assures conformity with the
SCM Agreement in all circumstances. However, because PROEX III offers the most favourable of
the terms indicated by the market, or the OECD Arrangement, or some combination of the two, it
does not ensure conformity with either standard and therefore does not comply with the SCM
Agreement. (See Canada's comment on Brazil's response to question 14, below).
3. The first alternative asserted by Brazil seems to be that, regardless of the creditworthiness of
the borrower, PROEX III could be provided such that the interest rate to the purchaser is at the CIRR.
Brazil seeks to justify such payments, even if they result in the borrower obtaining terms more
favorable than those available to the buyer on the market, on grounds that Brazil considers that such
terms conform with the exception in the second paragraph of Item (k). Brazil asserts this defense in
its response to Questions 14 (e) and (g). However, as Canada has shown, these terms do not conform
with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement.
4. Alternatively, Brazil acknowledges that PROEX III can be provided without regard to the
CIRR pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2799, which provides that the Committee
administering PROEX shall "have as a reference th e financing terms practiced in the international
market" when "analyzing received requests for eligibility". Brazil acknowledges that this provision
enables the Committee to depart from all of the notional limitations under PROEX III – the CIRR, the
ten year term, and the 85 percent financing limit. However, Brazil asserts that "having as reference"
the financing terms practiced in the international market means that the Committee must "conform to
the financing terms of the international market" when it departs from these limits.
5. Brazil argues that when it has "as reference" the international market, even when the rate is
below CIRR and on more favorable terms than under the OECD Arrangement, there is no benefit and
thus no subsidy. Brazil does not explain in its responses: (a) how a "reference" to market terms means
a requirement to conform with market terms; (b ) what it means by the financing terms of the
international market; (c) in what sense this precludes the Committee from providing terms to the
borrower more favorable than those available to the borrower on the market; or (d) how the

Committee will make this determination. This broad authority is insufficient to demonstrate that
PROEX III precludes the Comm ittee from conferring a "benefit" within the meaning of Article 1 of
the SCM. Moreover, as Canada has shown, PROEX III confers a benefit per se.
6. In response to Questions 2 and 3, Brazil also seems to try to imply that the only subsidy is to
the financial institution, not the exported product. However, Brazil's response to Question 4 appears
to concede that Brazilian aircraft exports, and not just financial institutions, benefit from these
subsidies. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that a country would grant a subsidy simply to benefit
foreign banks.
III. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC RESPONSES
Question 1
1. Brazil's response confirms that the PROEX program has not undergone any revision other
than that achieved through BCB Resolution 2799. In its response, Brazil simply re-iterates arguments
it has already presented to the Panel regarding the interpretation of Resolution 2799. Canada has
responded to those arguments in its prior submissions.
2. In its response, Brazil contends that Article 8, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2799 restricts the
provision of PROEX III to terms that are "consistent with the terms practiced in the international
market". However, as discussed in Canada's general comments above, Article 8, paragraph 2 does
nothing of the sort.
3. Even if Article 8, paragraph 2 did operate as the sort of discipline that Brazil contends it does,
restricting the provision of PROEX III payments "consistent with the terms practiced in the
international market" is meaningless given the very nature of PROEX payments. As discussed by
Canada in its prior submissions, the financing that an Embraer customer would receive from a third-
party lender prior to, or in the absence of, PR OEX buy-downs is already on market terms. The
addition of PROEX III in such circumstances is a per se departure from market terms. Canada
discusses this in additional detail in its comments on Brazil's response to Questions 2 and 3.
Questions 2 and 3
1. In its response to Questions 2 and 3, Brazil alleges, on the basis of certain hypothetical
situations, that PROEX III does not entail a per se departure from market terms, and by implication,
that there are situations in which PROEX III does not confer a benefit on the purchaser of regional
aircraft. Brazil's response is flawed for several reasons:
Brazil Ignores the Character of PROEX Buy-Downs
2. First, the response ignores the fundamental character of PROEX III as well as the character of
its predecessor programs as interest rate buy-downs. In and of itself, PROEX III, like PROEX I, is
not an export financing program whereby a principal amount is loaned to the recipient conditional on
the repayment of the principal plus interest in accordance with the terms of the financing. As stated in
paragraph 3 of Canada's First Submission, PROEX pa yments are direct transfers of funds. They do
not have to be paid back. This attribute of PROEX has not changed in PROEX III. PROEX
payments are essentially grants. Thus, unlike the case of financing, it is not necessary to compare the
terms of PROEX payments to market benchmarks in order to determine whether a benefit has been
conferred. Such payments per se confer a benefit (equal to the amount of the payment) irrespective of
how the payments are used by the recipient.
Brazil's Hypotheticals Are Irrelevant

3. Second, even if Brazil were correct that reference must be made to market benchmarks in
order to ascertain the existence of a benefit, Brazil has admitted that under PROEX III it can in any
case subsidize interest rates down to the CIRR without regard to the rates being offered by
commercial banks. Alternatively, it can "have as reference" the terms practiced in the international
market. Neither of those approaches involves limiting the amount of PROEX payments to the
difference between what a borrower could obtain elsewhere in the market and the rate at its preferred
bank.
Under Brazil's Hypotheticals a Benefit Is Conferred
4. Third, even if the situations identified by Brazil did exist, they would result in a benefit being
conferred. The SCM Agreement does not restrict the meaning of "benefit" to a benefit that is purely
financial. According to the Appellate Body, a "benefit" exists where the financial contribution makes
the recipient "better off" than it would otherwise have been, compared to the marketplace.
1 T h e
purchaser would benefit from a greater choice of banks to handle the transaction than would have
been available in the marketplace – what Brazil describes in its first hypothetical situations as "added
convenience" for the Embraer purchaser. Finally, in all of the situations described by Brazil, the use
of PROEX III would result in Embraer winning a sale that it would not otherwise have received in the
marketplace. While PROEX III takes the form of payments to the customer's lending bank, Brazil
cannot dispute that Embraer is a beneficiary of the program. The fact that PROEX payments are
conditional on the purchase of Brazilian aircraft would be illogical if the purpose of PROEX was
simply to assist banks in Brazil and in foreign countries.
5. Furthermore, contrary to Brazil's contention it is simply not the case that in Brazil's first and
second hypothetical situations, PROEX would not "place the buyer in any better situation."
According to Brazil, if a potential purchaser of regional jets wished to use a Chinese or Brazilian bank
for its financing, that bank would be able to of fer financing at eight percent with PROEX support, if
the purchaser acquired Embraer aircraft. However, Brazil's example ignores that if the same potential
purchaser wished to finance a purchase of Canadian aircraft through the same banks (the buyer's
preference according to the examples), that purchaser would face a higher interest rate (specified in
the second example as ten percent). If a buyer does in fact prefer a Chinese or Brazilian bank,
PROEX III therefore would give Embraer a commercial advantage. In both examples, Brazil
contends that the resulting terms would be no better than those available in the "international"
marketplace, which Brazil defines as certain large lenders outside of China and Brazil. However, this
is a semantic sleight-of-hand. The question refers to the terms available in the "commercial"
marketplace. The terms otherwise available in the commercial marketplace include those that would
be offered by the purchaser's preferred banks in the absence of PROEX buy-downs.
6. Brazil's third hypothetical situation is either not plausible or is a restatement of the first
situation. Aircraft financing is made available based on the buyer's credit. If the buyer were able to
obtain international financial institution financing at eight percent for the purchase of aircraft from
another manufacturer, that buyer could obtain the same financing from that institution for the
purchase of Embraer aircraft. There would be no need for PROEX buy-downs to enable Embraer to
offer financing at the same rate. If the issue is whether a Brazilian bank could offer financing at the
same rate as an international bank, the situation is no different than in the first hypothetical.
Question 4
1. As noted in Canada's comments on Brazil's re sponse to Questions 2 and 3, PROEX III confers
benefits on Embraer aircraft, the purchasers of Embraer aircraft and financial institutions. Brazil's
response to Question 4 seems to imply, incorrectly, that these are mutually exclusive. However, the

1 See Canada – Measures Affecting th e Export of Civilian Aircraft , Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 157.

fact that PROEX may benefit foreign banks does not affect or determine whether PROEX confers
benefits on Embraer aircraft and their purchasers. In fact, Brazil's response also appears to concede
what experience has shown: that PROEX subsidiz es exported Embraer aircraft, not just lending
institutions.
Question 6
1. In the light of Brazil's ongoing failure to co mply with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB in respect of PROEX I and II transactions, it is questionable that the Brazilian Executive has the
duty under domestic law to comply with Brazil's WTO obligations. Even if it were the case that the
Executive were required to comply with Brazil's WTO obligations as it interprets them, this would
offer no more indication of the conformity of PROEX III with Brazil's WTO obligations than it did
with respect to PROEX I or PROEX II.
Question 7
1. Brazil contends that PROEX III "addresses the way in which it will, as a matter of law,
comply with its WTO obligations." As Canada has shown throughout its submissions in this
proceeding, PROEX III does nothing of the sort. Saying it does not make it so.
2. Brazil claims in its response that it meets the "ensure" standard because PROEX III
(allegedly) contains specific requirements that are consistent with the OECD Arrangement criteria.
Brazil apparently does not contend that it has "ensured" that PROEX III will not confer a benefit, and
thus, seems to concede that it is in violation of its obligations under the SCM Agreement unless the
Panel finds that PROEX III "ensure[s] that financing under its terms qualifies for the safe haven of the
second paragraph of item (k)."
3. However, as Canada demonstrated in its Rebuttal Submission, PROEX III ensures no such
thing. PROEX III does not even address many of the interest rates provisions of the OECD
Arrangement. Therefore, contrary to Brazil's assertion, PROEX III does not demonstrate that Brazil
"will, as a matter of law, comply with its WTO obligations."
4. In its responses to subsequent questions, Brazil acknowledges that it can decide not to comply
with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement, and instead provide financing on other
terms "having as reference the financing terms practi ced in the international market". As Canada has
explained in its comments on Brazil's previous responses, this vague language imposes no disciplines
on the terms that Brazil can offer under PROEX III.
Question 8
1. On page 12, paragraph (a), Brazil admits that it can depart from the 85 percent loan to value
requirement pursuant to the authority in Article 8.2 of the Resolution "when interest rate support is
provided on terms consistent with the international market" (i.e., the loan to value ratio prevailing in
the market exceeds 85 percent). It justifies this departure on the basis that PROEX III would not
confer a benefit in such circumstances.
2. In Canada's view, this is further evidence that PROEX III does not comply with the interest
rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement. As to Brazil's position that PROEX III would not confer
a benefit in such circumstances, as noted in Canada's comments on Brazil's response to Questions 2
and 3, PROEX III per se confers a benefit in all circumstances.
3. In part (c) of its response, Brazil does not deny that the newspaper reports submitted by
Canada accurately report the statements of Foreign Minister Lampreia and Ambassador Graca Lima.
Instead, Brazil argues that these statements "do not provide evidence of what PROEX III actually

requires." However, given the broad discretion available to the Brazilian Executive when
administering PROEX III, statements of how Brazil intends to interpret its law are important to this
case. In particular, these statements demonstrate Brazil's intention not to comply with the interest
rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement. When considered in the context of the historical
application of PROEX and the fact that the most recent amendments to PROEX have not curtailed the
discretionary authority of the Brazilian Executive, the probative value of these statements cannot be
denied. Brazil has offered nothing to suggest that it will follow its own criteria under PROEX III any
more than it followed the same criteria under ea rlier versions of PROEX, when they had the same
status in Brazilian law.
Question 9
1. In parts (a) and (c) of its response, Brazil states that under Article 8, paragraph 2, it may only
depart from the eligibility criteria in PROEX III "when interest rate support is provided on terms
consistent with the international market". As Canada explained in its general comments and
elsewhere, the wording of Article 8, paragraph 2 does not impose any such limitation. However, even
if it did, this would mean that Brazil would depart from the ten year maximum when the duration of
financing prevailing in the market exceeds 10 years. Again, Brazil claims justification for this
departure on the basis that PROEX III would not confer a benefit in such circumstances.
2. However, as noted in Canada's comments on Brazil's response to Questions 2 and 3,
PROEX III per se confers a benefit in all circumstances. In the light of Canada's evidence that the
prevailing terms for financing regional aircraft significantly exceeds 10 years, Brazil's admission that
it will waive the 10 year requirement in such circumstances is fatal to its argument that PROEX III
complies with the interest rates provisions of the OECD Arrangement and therefore can benefit from
the safe haven in the second paragraph of Item (k).
Question 10
1. Even if Brazil has not yet committed to PROEX III financing, this does not assist Brazil in
establishing compliance. Since PROEX III per se confers prohibited export subsidies that are not
saved by any exceptions in the SCM Agreement, it remains inconsistent with a covered agreement
within the meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU.
Question 11
1. With respect to PROEX III's alleged conformity with the specified Articles of the 1998
OECD Arrangement, Canada notes the following:
2. Article 21 of Annex III, which specifies Maximum Repayment Terms for all new aircraft
except large aircraft, prevails over Articles 12 and 10 of the main text due to Article 3, also of the
main text. PROEX III is inconsistent with Article 21 of Annex III in that it allows for a repayment
term in excess of 10 years for regional jet aircraft as Brazil has admitted in its answer to Question 9(a)
of the Panel and elsewhere. Furthermore, in Brazil's view the "interest rates provisions" do not
include Article 21 (or, inter alia , Article 7 of the main text, i.e., requiring cash payments of a
minimum of 15% of the export contract value – see Brazil's answer to Question 25 of the Panel).
Therefore, Brazil can ignore these Articles and, in its view, still qualify for the safe haven of the
second paragraph of Item (k). This is confirmed by Brazil's answer to Question 14(g) of the Panel
where Brazil states that it "may approve financing at a net interest rate equal to the CIRR and still
qualify for the safe haven … ." Such a position is erroneous. This requirement is one of the
numerous requirements that must be complied with in order for Brazil to invoke the safe haven of the
second paragraph of Item (k).

3. Brazil provides incomplete, inaccurate or misleading descriptions of several of the Articles
when comparing them to PROEX III:
• Article 13 requires much more than "repayment of principle in regular instalments not less
than six months in frequency." Brazil omits that the instalments of principal should normally
be equal and that the first instalment shall be made no later than six months after the starting
point of credit. The unlimited grace period allowed under Article 2 of Directive 374 is
inconsistent with Article 13 in that it allo ws transactions in which the first payment of
principal is made more than six months after the starting point of the credit.
• Article 14 requires much more than "payment of interest on a six-monthly basis." Article 14
specifies that interest shall not normally be capitalized during the repayment period and that
the first instalment must be made no later than six months after the starting point of credit.
Also, it states that interest excludes: any pa yment by way of premium or other charge for
insuring or guaranteeing supplier credits or financial credits; any other payment by way of
banking fees or commissions relating to the export credit other than regular bank charges; and
withholding taxes. To the extent that PROEX III is used to buy-down risk premiums, Brazil
would not be providing interest rate suppor t as envisaged by the 1998 OECD Arrangement
(assuming, arguendo, that PROEX III payments are interest rate support).
• Brazil claims that Articles 16 and 17 govern the calculation of the CIRR. This is not the case
– Article 17 covers how a country applies the CIRR for a specific transaction and not how it
is calculated. Article 17 contains important conditions on how to define the interest rate that
is appropriate for a given transaction. It states that the interest rate applying to a specific
transaction shall not be fixed for a period longer than 120 days; that if the terms of official
financing support are fixed before the contract is signed, a margin of 20 basis points must be
added to the CIRR; and that the lender cannot offer the option of the lower of either the CIRR
(at the time of the original contract) or the sh ort-term market rate throughout the life of the
loan if it is providing a floating rate loan.
Brazil has offered no evidence of conformity with Article 17 and instead attempts to distance
PROEX III on the irrelevant basis of non-Particip ant status. Whether or not a Member is a
Participant to the Arrangement is irrelevant to how Article 17 is applied. Given the expansive
discretion under PROEX III that is admittedly used on a routine basis, it can only be expected
that Brazil would use this discretion in applying Article 17 and waive the 20 basis point
margin if it were to apply. A bald statement "that the net interest rate for a PROEX-supported
transaction may not be below the CIRR" is w holly insufficient to prove that PROEX III
conforms with Article 17. (By the use of the word "may", it appears that Brazil could even
use its discretion to go below the CIRR.)
4. Contrary to Brazil's claim, Articles 18 and 19 on Cosmetic Interest Rates are relevant to
PROEX III – if PROEX III payments are "interest rate support" within the meaning of the 1998
Arrangement. Article 19(b) states that "official financing support" cannot be offered at a cosmetic
interest rate. "Interest rate support" is one of the means that is referred to as "official financing
support", as confirmed by the fourth paragraph of the Introduction to the 1998 OECD Arrangement
and the first sentence of Article 15 on Minimum Interest Rates. If PROEX III payments are "interest
rate support" within the meaning of the 1998 Arrangement, Articles 18 and 19 are relevant to
PROEX III because the payments would constitute "official financing support".
5. Brazil cannot claim that PROEX III is in conformity with Article 19 of Annex III on the sole
basis that PROEX III "requires a minimum interest rate of the CIRR." Article 19 of Annex III states
that "[the provisions of this Chapter represent the most generous terms that Participants may offer

when providing official support." [emphasis added] . Respecting the CIRR alone, as Brazil claims, is
insufficient to conform with Article 19 of Annex III.
6. As the regional aircraft market matures, it is possible that Brazil could be in a position to
market used aircraft in the future. Therefore, Articles 27 and 28 of Annex III would be relevant to
PROEX III despite Brazil's claim of irrelevancy. Should Brazil decide to provide PROEX III buy-
downs for used aircraft in the future, Brazil must re spect these articles to be in conformity with the
interest rates provisions of the 1998 OECD Arrangement.
Question 13
1. In practice, the administration of PROEX III on a case-by-case basis is no different from the
administration of PROEX II. As described at paragraph 2.3 of the Article 21.5 Panel Report, the
resolution establishing PROEX II stated that: "equalisation rates shall be established on a case by case
basis and at levels that may be differential, preferably based on the United States Treasury Bond 10-
year rate, plus an additional spread of 0.2% per annum, to be reviewed periodically in accordance
with market practices."
2. Thus, the character of PROEX has not been changed. PROEX remains nothing more than a
pure grant in the form of an interest rate buy-down. As before, the Committee retains broad discretion
to determine the terms of the grant.
Question 14
1. Brazil admits in part (g) of its response to this question that the individual terms (e.g. net
interest rate, loan-to-value ratio, financing term, etc.) under which PROEX III is offered, are the more
favourable of those indicated by the market or the CIRR. It is not limited by the requirements of the
OECD Arrangement. Under PROEX III, the net interest rate offered may be the lowest (i.e. the
CIRR) and the loan-to-value ratio and financing term may be the highest (i.e., the market). In such
circumstances, PROEX III does not comply with either the market or the OECD Arrangement. This
admission therefore undercuts what appear to be Brazil's alternative assertions, as described above
under General Comments.
2. This was the factual situation facing Canada in the Air Wisconsin transaction, where as an
inducement to purchase Embraer aircraft, Air Wisconsin was offered a net interest rate at the CIRR
for a maturity term exceeding 10 years. Brazil's response to Question 1 from Canada that it has "not
received an application for interest rate support for sales by Embraer to Air Wisconsin and has not
approved any support for this transaction" does not answer the question of whether PROEX III was
offered in conjunction with that transaction.
3. Canada also notes that parts (a) and (c) of Brazil's responses contradict its response to
Questions 2 and 3. Brazil claims in part (a) that the term "international market" refers "to the market
in which the product for which PROEX support is requested competes." This would mean, for
example, that in a sale by Embraer to a Chinese airline, the relevant "financing terms practiced in the
international market" would be those practiced in China. However, according to Brazil's second
examples in response to Questions 2 and 3, PROEX III is used, inter alia, to buy down interest rates
to below those available in China.
4. In part (c) of its response, Brazil asserts that the financing terms practiced in the "international
market" refers to "the terms that would be available for a comparable transaction for that buyer in the
commercial marketplace." PROEX III does not say this. Moreover, as Canada has noted in its
comments on Brazil's response to Questions 2 and 3, in that response Brazil defined the
"international" marketplace as certain large lenders outside of the market where its subsidized aircraft
are being sold.

5. Thus, not only does Brazil offer no assurances that the interpretation of PROEX III that it
advances in response to Question 14 will be followed in practice by the Committee when
administering PROEX III, but this interpretation is contradicted by its previous responses.
6. As Canada notes in its General Comments, Brazil asserts in part (e) of its response, that the
phrase "shall have as reference" "prevents the Committee from approving financing on terms more
favorable than those prevailing in the international market." However, PROEX III does not say this.
Rather, it only requires the Committee to have the international market as a "reference." If Brazil has
a more restrictive intention, then it needs to revise PROEX again.
7. In this regard, Brazil's argument in part (i) of its response is beside the point. Brazil
emphasizes that Article 8, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2799 uses the mandatory verb "shall". However,
all that is mandated is that the Committee "shall" use the international market as a "reference".
PROEX III does not require the Comm ittee to ensure that any PROEX support does not provide a
benefit compared to the terms otherwise available to the particular buyer. Moreover, given that the
Committee can go below the market (see Brazil's responses to 14(e) and (g)), this is clearly not a
meaningful limitation.
8. Finally, Brazil's response to part (f) of the question assumes that CIRR is an "appropriate"
benchmark in all circumstances, including when financing terms exceed those of the OECD
Arrangement. Clearly, as demonstrated by Canada, this assumption cannot be supported.
Furthermore, in suggesting that the "Committee would have to consider any proposal for financing
that deviated from the CIRR," even when another term greatly exceeds the OECD Arrangement (e.g.
a 15 year financing term), Brazil implies that the CIRR is not an interest rate "floor", but a "ceiling".
Brazil confirms this in its response to part (g) of the question, where it admits that the Committee may
approve financing at the CIRR even when financing terms practiced in the international market would
indicate an above-CIRR rate.
Question 21
1. Brazil contends (1) that PROEX requires conformity with the SCM Agreement, and (2) even
if it does not, it gives the Committee discretion to act in conformity with the SCM Agreement, i.e. it
does not require a violation of the SCM Agreement.
2. As Canada has demonstrated, the authority granted to the Committee under PROEX III does
not require conformity with the SCM Agreement an y more than it did under PROEX I or II. On the
contrary, PROEX III payments necessarily involve a financial contribution by a government, which
confers a benefit. They therefore are subsidies. PROEX III payments are contingent upon export
performance. They therefore are prohibited export subsidies.
3. In an Article 21.5 proceeding, the complaining Member satisfies its burden if it establishes a
prima facie case that the defending Member has not complied with its WTO obligations. The
evidence submitted by Canada satisfies this burde n. Once the complaining Member has satisfied its
burden, it is for the defending Member to establish that it is complying with its obligations. In this
context, it is not sufficient for the defe nding Member to demonstrate that it has discretion to comply
with its obligations. Such discretion does not overcome the existing prima facie case of non-
compliance, particularly when, as in the present case, the defending Member has admitted that it will
use that discretion in a non-compliant manner, it has done so in the past, and there is evidence that it
continues to do so. Instead, the defending Member must show that it is required to comply with its
obligations, in order to overcome the existing prima facie case.
4. None of the GATT cases cited by Brazil on the mandatory/discretionary distinction involved
a situation where the complaining Member had already established a prima facie case that the
defending Member's measures violated its obligations. In the absence of such a prima facie case,

those GATT panels required the complaining member to show that the defending Member was
mandated to violate its GATT obligations. Brazil also attempts to analogize the present proceeding to
its challenge of Canada's programs in Canada – Aircraft . However, the analogy fails. Those
programs involved direct financing. As discussed in Canada's comments on Brazil's response to
Questions 2 and 3, PROEX III per se confers a subsidy, unlike direct financing which only confers a
subsidy in circumstances where the terms of the financing are more favourable than those available
for comparable financing in the market.
Question 25
1. In its answer to Question 25, Brazil argues for a narrow interpretation of "interest rates
provisions". In response, Canada notes the following:
2. The most logical interpretation of the term "interest rates provisions" includes all provisions
that affect what the interest rate and the amount of interest payable will be in a given regional aircraft
transaction. This interpretation of "interest rates provisions" flows from the plain meaning of the
words. The text of the second paragraph of Item (k) refers to "interest rates provisions" and not
simply to "interest rate". Thus, it must refer to more provisions than those that only affect the interest
rate itself.
3. If the term "interest rates provisions" were applied to those provisions that only affect the
interest rate itself, the benefit of the exception in the second paragraph of Item (k) would be extended
to financing transactions that apply the CIRR but that do not abide by any of the other Arrangement
disciplines – specifically those provisions that affect the amount of interest payable in a given regional
aircraft transaction. A financing transaction that applied a naked interest rate alone – one that is
divorced from the other terms and conditions that affect the amount of interest payable, and are
generally a part of any financing transaction – could easily circumvent the minimum interest rate rule
found in Article 15 of the 1998 OECD Arrangement. Using the CIRR alone would therefore result in
allowing transactions that had effective interest rates below the CIRR to qualify for the second
paragraph of Item (k). Any discipline that Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement provide for export
subsidies would be completely negated. The export subsidy floodgates would be opened.
IV. QUESTIONS FROM CANADA TO BRAZIL
Question 1
1. Brazil does not indicate whether PROEX III was "offered" in the transaction nor does it
acknowledge seeking Embraer's consent to waiving the confidentiality commitments.
Question 2
1. Again, Brazil does not answer the question, which was motivated by the evidence, as
described in Canada's Rebuttal Submission, that Brazil is granting PROEX III subsidies in
conjunction with or subsumed into BNDES financing.