RUSSIA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF RAILWAY EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF AB-2018-7
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 4 February 2020
Document codes: WT/DS499/AB/R
Complainant: Ukraine
Respondent: Russia
Third parties: Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 2.1  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)Art. I:1, III:4, X:3(a), XI:1, XIII:1  GATT 1994

RUSSIA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF RAILWAY
EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF
AB-2018-7
Report of the Appellate Body

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
ART Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport
Association Agreement Association Agreement by Ukraine with the European Union
BCI business confidential information
CU Eurasian Economic Union as established in accordance with the Treaty
on Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014 (former Customs Union
of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the
Russian Federation)
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
EAEU Treaty Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union
FBO Federal Budgetary Organization
FIRA final import risk analysis report for apples from New Zealand of
November 2006
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
MOT Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Panel Report Panel Report, Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Railway
Equipment and Parts Thereof
SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TRRs trade-related requirements
Ukraine's panel request Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine,
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review
WTO

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT*

Exhibit Number Description
RUS-23 Organization Standard СTO PC-FZT 08-2013 "Procedure of
organization and implementation of inspection control of certified
products"
RUS-62 (BCI) Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the
certified products of PJSC [BCI]
RUS-63 (BCI) Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the
certified products of PJSC [BCI]
RUS-64 (BCI) Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the
certified products of PJSC [BCI]

* BCI redacted, as indicated [BCI]. See also para. 1.13.

Exhibit Number Description
RUS-65 (BCI) Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the
certified products of PJSC [BCI]
RUS-66 (BCI) Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the
certified products of PJSC [BCI]
RUS-67 (BCI) Letter dated 23 May 2016 from [BCI] to the FBO
RUS-68 (BCI) Letter dated 13 June 2013 from [BCI] to the Deputy Minister of the
MOT
RUS-69 (BCI) Letter dated 3 December 2015 from [BCI] to the FBO
RUS-70 (BCI) Letter dated 17 February 2013 from [BCI] to the FBO
UKR-3 (Corr.) Rules of the Certification System for Federal Railway Transport.
Procedure for organizing and conducting an inspection control.
(CS FRT 12-2003)
UKR-18 (BCI) (Corr.) Letter [BCI] from PJSC [BCI] to FBO
UKR-48 (BCI) Letter from the Federal Agency for Railway Transport of the MOT to
JSC [BCI] accompanied to Protocol No. A 4-3 of 20 January 2015 of
the MOT regarding issuance by the certification authority of the CU of
the certificates of conformity for products manufactured by third
countries
UKR-49 (BCI) (Corr.) Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Federal Agency for Railway
Transport to [BCI] on validity of certificates
UKR-141 (BCI) Letter dated 10 August 2016 from the Federal Agency for Railway
Transport to JSC [BCI] on validity of certificates
UKR-151 (BCI) Act of inspection dated 23 January 2014 of certified products
produced by PJSC [BCI]
UKR-152 (BCI) Act of inspection dated 24 January 2014 of certified products
produced by PJSC [BCI]

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Import Measures Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R, adopted
26 January 2015, DSR 2015:II, p. 579
Argentina – Import Measures Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods,
WT/DS438/R and Add.1 / WT/DS444/R and Add.1 / WT/DS445/R and Add.1,
adopted 26 January 2015, as modified (WT/DS438/R) and upheld
(WT/DS444/R / WT/DS445/R) by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS438/AB/R /
WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R, DSR 2015:II, p. 783
Australia – Apples Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2010, DSR
2010:V, p. 2175
Australia – Apples Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from
New Zealand, WT/DS367/R, adopted 17 December 2010, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS367/AB/R, DSR 2010:VI, p. 2371
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand
and US II)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk
and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by New Zealand and the United States, WT/DS103/AB/RW2,
WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted 17 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 213
Canada – Periodicals Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004,
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 –Argentina)
Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted
12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October
2015, DSR 2015:IX, p. 4573
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R,
adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
Colombia – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June
2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September
1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted
27 September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9157
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted
13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3359
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p. 7

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by the United States, WT/DS316/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted 28 May
2018
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Argentina, WT/DS473/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016, DSR
2016:VI, p. 2871
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998,
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
Indonesia – Chicken Panel Report, Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken
Meat and Chicken Products, WT/DS484/R and Add.1, adopted 22 November
2017, DSR 2017:VIII, p. 3769
Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products
Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel
Products, WT/DS490/AB/R, WT/DS496/AB/R, and Add.1, adopted 27 August
2018
Japan – Agricultural
Products II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277
Japan – DRAMS (Korea) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random
Access Memories from Korea, WT/DS336/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted
17 December 2007, DSR 2007:VII, p. 2703
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR
2000:I, p. 3
Korea – Pneumatic Valves
(Japan)
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Pneumatic Valves
from Japan, WT/DS504/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 30 September 2019
Korea – Radionuclides Appellate Body Report, Korea – Import Bans, and Testing and Certification
Requirements for Radionuclides, WT/DS495/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 April
2019
Korea – Various Measures
on Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January
2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Russia – Commercial
Vehicles
Appellate Body Report, Russia – Anti-Dumping Duties on Light Commercial
Vehicles from Germany and Italy, WT/DS479/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 9 April
2018
Russia – Pigs (EU) Appellate Body Report, Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of
Live Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union,
WT/DS475/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 21 March 2017, DSR 2017:I, p. 207
Russia – Railway Equipment Panel Report, Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Railway
Equipment and Parts Thereof, WT/DS499/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO
Members 30 July 2018
Russia – Tariff Treatment Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and
Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/R, Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted
26 September 2016, DSR 2016:IV, p. 1547
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R,
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Anti-Dumping
Methodologies (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their
Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China, WT/DS471/AB/R
and Add.1, adopted 22 May 2017, DSR 2017:III, p. 1423
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,
p. 3779
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, DSR
2012:XI, p. 5751
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR
2009:III, p. 1291
US – COOL Panel Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, WT/DS384/R / WT/DS386/R, adopted 23 July 2012, as
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, DSR
2012:VI, p. 2745
US – COOL (Article 21.5 –
Canada and Mexico)
Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and
Mexico, WT/DS384/AB/RW / WT/DS386/AB/RW, adopted 29 May 2015, DSR
2015:IV, p. 1725
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures
(China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1,
adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII, p. 3027
US – Countervailing
Measures (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015, DSR
2015:I, p. 7
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX,
p. 4051
US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR
2012:I, p. 7
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, p. 589
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted
13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837
US – Tuna II (Mexico)
(Article 21.5 – Mexico)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Mexico, WT/DS381/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted 3 December 2015,
DSR 2015:X, p. 5133
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20 June
2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 9 May
2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441

APPELLATE BODY

Russia – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Railway Equipment
and Parts Thereof

Ukraine, Appellant/Appellee
Russian Federation, Other Appellant/Appellee

Canada, Third Participant
China, Third Participant
European Union, Third Participant
India, Third Participant
Indonesia, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Singapore, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

AB-2018-7

Appellate Body Division:

Graham, Presiding Member
Servansing, Member
Zhao, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Ukraine and the Russian Federation (Russia) each appeal certain issues of law and legal
interpretations developed in the Panel Report, Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Railway Equipment and Parts Thereof1 (Panel Report).
1.2. Before the Panel, Ukraine challenged certain measures allegedly taken by Russia concerning
conformity assessment procedures for railway products as they relate to suppliers from Ukraine.
Specifically, Ukraine's challenge concerned the following three categories of measures:
a. systematic prevention of Ukrainian railway products from being imported into Russia by
suspending valid certificates issued for railway products, refusing to issue new certificates
for railway products, and not recognizing certificates issued by the competent authorities
of the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union as established in accordance with
the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014 (former Customs Union of the
Republic of Belarus, the Republi c of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation) (CU) other
than Russia, which Ukraine submitted are evidenced by the instructions and decisions
listed in Annexes I, II, and III to its request for the establishment of a panel2 (systematic
import prevention);
b. the suspensions of certificates and the rejections of applications for new certificates with
regard to Ukrainian producers of railway products, as listed in Annexes I and II to the
panel request (suspensions and rejections); and
c. Russia's non-recognition of certificates issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to
Ukrainian suppliers of railway products in other CU countries found in the documents listed
in Annex III to the panel request (non-recognition of certificates).3
1.3. In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
30 July 2018, the Panel made the following findings that are relevant to this appeal:
a. with respect to Russia's request for the Panel's preliminary ruling, Russia had failed to
establish that Ukraine's panel request is inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)4;

1 WT/DS499/R, 30 July 2018.
2 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine, WT/DS499/2 (Ukraine's panel request).
3 Panel Report, para. 7.225.
4 Panel Report, paras. 7.43, 7.104, and 8.1.a.i.

b. with respect to the instructions suspending certificates:
i. Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 instructions at issue,
that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.1 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)5; and
ii. Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 instructions at issu e,
that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2, first and
second sentences, of the TBT Agreement6;
c. with respect to the decisions rejecting applications for certificates:
i. Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to the two decisions through which the
Federal Budgetary Organization (FBO) Register of Certification on the Federal Railway
Transport "returned without consideration" applications for certificates submitted by
Ukrainian producers under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, and with respect to the
decision through which the FBO "annulled" applications for certificates submitted by a
Ukrainian producer under CU Technical Regulation 003/2011, that Russia had acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement7; and
ii. Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to both decisions through which the
FBO "returned with out consideration" applications for certificates submitted by a
Ukrainian producer under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 (decision 1 insofar as it
relates to one of the products covered by application A3 and application A4, and
decision 2), and with respect to the decision through which the FBO "annulled"
applications for certificates submitted by a Ukrainian producer under CU Technical
Regulation 003/2011, that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 5.1.2, first and second sentences, of the TBT Agreement8;
d. with respect to the non-recognition of certificates issued in CU countries other than Russia:
i. the non-recognition requirement was properly before the Panel9;
ii. Ukraine had established that Russia had acted inconsistently with A rticle I:1 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)10; and
iii. Ukraine had established that Russia had acted inconsistently with Article III:4 of the
GATT 199411; and
e. with respect to the systematic import prevention, Ukraine had failed to establish its claims
of inconsistency with Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, because it had not
demonstrated the existence of the systematic import prevention.12
1.4. In addition, the Panel made a number of findings that have not been appealed. In particular:
(i) with respect to 13 out of 14 instructions suspending certificates, the Panel found that Ukraine
had established that Russia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.2.2, third obligation, of the
TBT Agreement13; (ii) with respect to one out of three decisions rejecting applications for certificates
(decision 1 insofar as it relates to applications A1 and A2 and one of the products covered by
application A3), the Panel found that Ukraine had established that Russia had acted inconsistently

5 Panel Report, paras. 7.394 and 8.1.b.i.
6 Panel Report, paras. 7.544 and 8.1.b.ii.
7 Panel Report, paras. 7.638 and 8.1.c.i.
8 Panel Report, paras. 7.728, 7.764, and 8.1.c.iii.
9 Panel Report, paras. 7.823, 7.829, and 8.1.d.i.
10 Panel Report, paras. 7.907 and 8.1.d.iv.
11 Panel Report, paras. 7.928 and 8.1.d.v.
12 Panel Report, paras. 7.995 and 8.1.e.i.
13 Panel Report, paras. 7.591 and 8.1.b.iii. For the remaining single instruction suspending certificates,
the Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish that Russia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.2.2 of
the TBT Agreement. (Ibid., paras. 7.591 and 8.1.b.iv)

with Article 5.1.2, first and second sentence s, of the TBT Agreement14; (iii) with respect to all
three decisions rejecting applications for certificates at issue, the Panel found that Ukraine had failed
to establish that Russia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.2.2, second obligation, of the
TBT Agreement15; (iv) with respect to two out of three decisions rejecting applications for certificates
at issue, the Panel found that Ukraine had established that Russia had acted inconsistently with
Article 5.2.2, third obligation, of the TBT Agreement16; (v) the Panel found that Ukraine had failed
to establish that the non-recognition requirement falls within the scope of application of Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement17; and (vi) with respect to the non -recognition of certificates issued in
CU countries other than Russia, the Panel made no findings regarding Ukraine's claims under
Articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.18
1.5. In sum, the Panel found that Russ ia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Articles 5.1.2 and 5.2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, and that
it had as a result nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Ukraine under these provisions. Pursuant
to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel thus recommended that the D ispute Settlement Body (DSB)
request that Russia bring its measures at issue into conformity with its obligations under the
TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994.19
1.6. On 27 August 2018, Ukraine notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of
its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal
interpretations developed by the Panel and filed a Notice of Appeal20 and an appellant's submission
pursuant to Rules 20 and 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review 21
(Working Procedures). On 3 September 2018, Russia notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4
and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law cover ed in the Panel Report and
certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel and filed a Notice of Other Appeal22 and an other
appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 23 of the Working Procedures . On 14 September 2018,
Ukraine and Russia each filed an ap pellee's submission. 23 On 17 September 2018, Canada, the
European Union (EU), and Japan each filed a third participant's submission.24 China, Singapore, and
the United States each notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.25
1.7. On 28 September 2018, the participants and third participants were informed that, in
accordance with Rule 15 of the Working Procedures, the Chair of the Appellate Body had notified the
Chair of the DSB of the Appellate Body's decision to authorize Appellat e Body Member
Mr Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing to complete the disposition of this appeal, to which he had
been assigned before the completion of his term of office. On 9 December 2019, the participants
and third participants were informed that, in accordance with Rule 15 of the Working Procedures,
the Chair of the Appellate Body had informed the Chair of the DSB that Thomas R. Graham would
complete the disposition of this appeal, to which he had been assigned before the completion of his
term of office and for which the oral hearing had been held before that date.26
1.8. On 24 October 2018, the Chair of the Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB that the
Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report in this appeal within the 60 -day period
pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, or within the 90 -day period pursuant to the same provision. 27

14 Panel Report, paras. 7.727 and 8.1.c.ii.
15 Panel Report, paras. 7.806 and 8.1.c.iv.
16 Panel Report, paras. 7.785 and 8.1.c.v. For the remaining single decision rejecting applications for
certificates at issue, the Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish that Russia had acted inconsistently
with Article 5.2.2, third obligation, of the TBT Agreement. (Ibid., paras. 7.785 and 8.1.c.vi)
17 Panel Report, paras. 7.885 and 8.1.d.ii.
18 Panel Report, paras. 7.826, 7.940, 8.1.d.iii, and 8.1.d.vi.
19 Panel Report, para. 8.2.
20 WT/DS499/6.
21 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
22 WT/DS499/7.
23 Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23(4) of the Working Procedures.
24 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
25 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
26 WT/DSB/79.
27 The Chair of the Appellate Body referred to the size of the Panel record and the complex issues
appealed and further noted that, in view of the backlog of appeals pending and the overlap in the composition
of all divisions resulting in part from the reduced number of Appellate Body Members, it would not be possible
for the Division to focus on the consideration of this appeal and for it to be fully staffed for some time.
(WT/DS499/8)

For the reasons explained in the letter, work on this appeal could gather pace only in June 2019. On
9 December 2019, the Chair of the Appellate Body informed the Chair of the DSB that the Report in
these proceedings would be circulated no later than 4 February 2020.28
1.9. On 13 September 2019, the Appellate Body received a communication from Ukraine requesting
that the Division extend the time -limits for opening statements at the oral hearing. On the same
day, the Division hearing the appeal invited Russia and the third participants to provide any
comments on Ukraine's request by 16 September 2019. Russia expressed support and requested
that equal opportunity be provided to both Russia and Ukraine in the event that the Division decided
to grant Ukraine's request. No comments were received from the third participants. Having
considered Ukraine's request and comments by Russia, the Division informed participants and third
participants by letter of 16 September of extended time -limits for the participants' opening
statements.
1.10. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 17 and 18 September 2019. The participants and
several third participants made oral statements and responded to questions posed by the Members
of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal.
1.11. At the oral hearing, the participants jointly requested the Division hearing the appeal to
continue treating the information designated as business confidential information (BCI) by the Panel
under its additional working procedures for the protection of BCI as confidential also on appeal. In
particular, Ukraine referred to the protection of the iden tity of individual producers, information
regarding the certificates, and the specific number of decisions at issue.29 No third participant raised
objections in connection with this request.
1.12. We recall that any additional procedures adopted by the Appellate Body to protect sensitive
information must conform to the requirement in Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures that such
procedures not be inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered agreements, and the
Working Procedures themselves.30 Moreover, in adopting such procedures, the Appellate Body must
ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the need to guard against the risk of harm
that could result from the disclosure of particularly sensitive information, on the one hand, an d the
integrity of the adjudication process, the participation rights of third participants, and the rights and
systemic interests of the WTO membership at large, on the other. 31 This means, among other
considerations, that the Appellate Body should bear in mind the need for transparency and "the
rights of third parties and other WTO Members under various provisions of the DSU", and should
ensure that the public version of its report circulated to all Members of the WTO is understandable.32
1.13. In the circumstances of the present appeal, we consider that treating the relevant information
as confidential does not unduly affect our ability to adjudicate this dispute, the participation rights
of the third participants, or the rights and interests of the WTO membership at large. We note in this
respect the absence of comments by third participants regarding the participant's joint request , as
well as the rather limited information designated as BCI. Based on the foregoing, we grant the
participants' joint request to treat the information designated as BCI by the Panel as confidential on
appeal pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures . Accordingly, this Appellate Body Report
does not contain information designated as BCI by the Panel.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the participants are reflected in the executive summaries of their
written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.33 The Notices of Appeal and Other Appeal, and

28 WT/DS499/9.
29 Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.222).
30 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 – US),
Annex D-1, Procedural Ruling of 25 October 2016, para. 10.
31 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico), para. 5.3 (referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, Annex III, Procedural Ruling of
10 August 2010, para. 15).
32 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMS (Korea), para. 279.
33 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).

the executive summaries of the participants' claims and argum ents, are contained in Annexes A
and B of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS499/AB/R/Add.1.
3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of the third participants that filed a written submission (Canada,
the European Union, and Japan) are reflected in the executive summaries of their written
submissions provided to the Appellate Body34, and are contained in Annex C of the Addendum to
this Report, WT/DS499/AB/R/Add.1.
4 ISSUES RAISED
4.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
a. in relation to the Panel's preliminary ruling (raised by Russia):
i. whether the Panel erred in finding that Russia had failed to establish that Ukraine's
panel request is inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU;
b. in relation to the Panel's findings with respect to the non-recognition of certificates issued
in CU countries other than Russia, which the Panel referred to as the third measure (raised
by Russia):
i. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding the
existence of the third measure as a general non-recognition requirement flowing from
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011;
ii. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding the
third measure capable of being challenged under the DSU as a single measure;
iii. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU in
finding that the third measure was within the Panel's terms of reference; and
iv. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in making findings
with respect to an aspect related to the third measure that it had previously found to
be outside its terms of reference;
c. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application, and acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU, in its analysis relating to the exist ence of a "comparable situation"
under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement and in finding that Ukraine failed to establish
that Russia acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.1 (raised by Ukraine);
d. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine
failed to establish that the proposed less trade -restrictive alternatives were reasonably
available, and that Russia acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2 of
the TBT Agreement (raised by Ukraine); and
e. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in its assessment of the
existence of systematic import prevention with respect to Ukraine's claims under
Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 (raised by Ukraine).
5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 Russia's claims relating to the Panel's preliminary ruling
5.1. Russia requests us to reverse the conclusion made by the Panel in its preliminary ruling, that
Russia had failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request is in consistent with Article 6.2 of the

34 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).

DSU.35 Russia alleges that , in coming to this conclusion, the Panel erred in two respects: first, in
finding that Ukraine's panel request properly linked the measures at issue with the legal basis of its
complaint36; and , second, in finding that Ukraine's panel request properly identified the third
measure at issue.37
5.2. Ukraine, for its part, requests us to uphold the conclusions made by the Panel in its preliminary
ruling.38 For Ukraine, first, the panel request links the measures at issue with the legal basis of the
complaint in a manner sufficient to present the problem clearly 39, and, second, it identified with
sufficient clarity the third measure at issue in this dispute.40
5.1.1 The Panel's findings
5.3. Russia requested a preliminary ruling from the Panel, alleging that Ukraine's panel request
failed to provide the legal basis of Ukraine's complaint, and that the panel request was thus not
sufficient to present the problem clearly, as required pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU. Russia
alleged, inter alia, that Ukraine's panel request failed to identify a link between, on the one hand,
the measures challenged by Ukraine, and the WTO obligations allegedly violated, on the other, and
that the request failed to properly identify the third measure at issue.41 Ukraine requested the Panel
to reject Russia's request. In Ukraine's view, its panel request plainly connected the measures at
issue and the relevant WTO obligations and clearly identified the third measure as required under
Article 6.2.42
5.4. The Panel issued its conclusions on Russia's request to the parties on 17 July 2017.43 The Panel
concluded that Ukraine's panel request was not inconsistent with Article 6.2, and therefore it rejected
Russia's claims in this respect. The Panel indicated that it would provide detailed reasons in support
of its conclusions at a later date, and at the latest in the Interim Report. The Panel Report contains
the Panel's detailed reasons for its conclusions on Russia's request, and the conclusions circulated
to the parties (and the third parties for information) on 17 July 2017 are also an integral part of the
Panel Report.44
5.5. First, with regard to Russia's claim that Ukraine's panel request failed to identify a link between
the measures challenged by Ukraine, on the one hand, and the WTO obligations allegedly violated,
on the other, the Panel noted that it concerned all measures and all claims identified in the panel
request.45 The Panel recalled that the Appellate Body had held that Article 6.2 of the DSU calls for
sufficient clarity with respect to the legal basis of the complaint, because a defending party is entitled
to know what case it has to answer, and what violations have been alleged so that it can begin
preparing its defence. 46 The Panel also referred to th e Appellate Body's finding that "in order to
'present the problem clearly', within the meaning of Article 6.2, a panel request must 'plainly

35 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 162(d) (referring to Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.i). In
addition, Russia requests that, as a consequence, we also reverse the Panel's conclusions relating to the
measures not properly identified in Ukraine's panel request. (Panel Report, paras. 8.1.d.iv and 8.1.d.v)
36 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 3-11 (referring, inter alia, to the Panel's finding in
para. 7.43).
37 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 12-43 (referring, inter alia, to the Panel's finding in
para. 7.104).
38 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 16, 37, 39, 69-70, and 188.
39 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 16 and 19.
40 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 45-47.
41 Panel Report, paras. 7.2, 7.11-7.12, and 7.87. In its request for a preliminary ruling, Russia raised
four additional issues with regard to Ukraine's panel request and the obligation under Article 6.2 of the DSU to
"present the problem clearly". Russia's appeal of the Panel's preliminary ruling does not extend to the Panel's
findings concerning those additional allegations of error.
42 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 28 and 47.
43 Panel Report, para. 7.6. On the same day, the Panel's conclusions were also circulated to third parties
for their information.
44 Panel Report, paras. 7.6-7.7.
45 Panel Report, para. 7.11.
46 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 88; referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 168).

connect' the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) claimed to have been infringed so that a
respondent can 'know what case it has to answer, and … begin preparing its defence'."47
5.6. The Panel then turned to examine in detail Ukraine's panel request. The Panel noted that the
panel request is structured in four sections. Section I provides an overview of the background of the
dispute. Section II describes the measures at issue. Section III describes Russia's relevant legal
framework. Section IV provides the legal basis of the complaint.48
5.7. Regarding section II of the request, the Panel observed that it contains three nar rative
paragraphs describing the measures at issue, followed by a numbered list of the measures that
includes references to Annexes I, II, and III to the panel request. The Panel further noted that this
section ends with a concluding paragraph describing the trade effects of the challenged measures.49
The Panel then briefly outlined its understanding of each of the challenged measures.50
5.8. Turning to section IV of Ukraine's panel request, the Panel noted that it begins with an
introductory paragraph that reads : "the measures described in section II are inconsistent with
[Russia's] obligations under the following provisions of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement" and
that this paragraph is followed by a list of 10 provisions, five of the TBT Agreement and five of the
GATT 1994, each of which contains a brief description of how that provision is allegedly breached.51
5.9. The Panel then examined each point of section IV of Ukraine's panel request, bearing in mind
the description of the three measures at issue in section II of the panel request, in order to determine
whether the panel request properly links the challenged measures with the 10 WTO provisions
allegedly infringed.52 The Panel Report contains a table setting out the linkages between the claims
raised by Ukraine and the measures at issue.53
5.10. Second, regarding Russia's allegation that Ukraine's panel request failed to comply with
Article 6.2 of the DSU because it lacked a proper identification of the third measure at issue 54, the
Panel began by noting that the text of Article 6.2 makes clear that a panel request must, inter alia,
identify the specific measure or measures at issue, and that measures not properly identified fall
outside a panel's terms of reference, and cannot be the subj ect of panel findings or
recommendations.55
5.11. The Panel recalled that with respect to the requirement to identify the specific measures at
issue, the Appellate Body had said that "the measures at issue must be identified with sufficient
precision so that what is referred to adjudication may be discerned from the panel request" 56, and
that a panel request will satisfy this requirement where it identifies the measure(s) at issue "with
sufficient particularity so as to indicate the nature of the measure and the gist of what is at issue".57
Furthermore, the Panel noted that "there may be circumstances in which a party describes a measure
in a more generic way, which nonetheless allows the measure to be discerned" 58, and that "[a]n
assessment of whether a complaining party has identified the specific measures at issue may depend
on the particular context in which those measures exist and operate."59 To the Panel, this suggested
that there is no single way that a challenged measure must be identified.60

47 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.39,
in turn quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.8, in
turn quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162).
48 Panel Report, para. 7.24 (referring to Ukraine's panel request).
49 Panel Report, para. 7.25 (referring to Ukraine's panel request, p. 2).
50 Panel Report, paras. 7.27-7.29.
51 Panel Report, para. 7.30 (referring to Ukraine's panel request, p. 3).
52 Panel Report, paras. 7.31-7.38.
53 Panel Report, para. 7.39, table 1.
54 Panel Report, paras. 7.2 and 7.87.
55 Panel Report, para. 7.90 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale
of Cigarettes, para. 120; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 790).
56 Panel Report, para. 7.91 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 168).
57 Panel Report, para. 7.91 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 169).
58 Panel Report, para. 7.92 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 116).
59 Panel Report, para. 7.92 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 641).
60 Panel Report, para. 7.92.

5.12. More specifically regarding the question whether the third measure had been properly
identified in Ukraine's panel request, the Panel noted that this measure was addressed in the
third narrative paragraph, the three numbered points, and Annex III and that these various
references must be read together. 61 Ultimately, the Panel concluded that Ukraine's panel request
identified the challenged measure in a manner that satisfies the requirements of Article 6.2 of the
DSU and thus rejected Russia's request to find otherwise.62
5.1.2 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.13. On appeal, Russia submits that the Panel erred in two respects: first, in finding that Ukraine's
panel request properly linked the measures at issue with the legal basis of its complaint 63; and
second, in finding that Ukraine's panel request properly identified the third measure at issue.64
5.14. Regarding the first point, Russia submits that the Panel misread the Appellate Body Reports
in China – Raw Materials. In particular, Russia takes issue with the Panel's finding that "section IV
of Ukraine's panel request contains a list of the ten WTO provisions allegedly infringed, together with
an explanation of why Ukraine deems each provision inconsistent with the measures at issue." 65
Russia alleges that section IV of the panel request at issue fails to properly connect specific
WTO obligations with the measures corresponding to them.
5.15. Furthermore, Russia draws attention to the Panel's statements that certain items in section III
of Ukraine's panel request "could relate" to or "could concern" a corresponding measure contained
in section II of the panel request. 66 For Russia, the Panel's use of "weak auxiliary verbs" reveals
that, in fact, the linkages between the measures and the legal obligations were not as clear as the
Panel found.67 Had Ukraine plainly connected the challenged measures with the provisions of the
covered agreements claimed to have been infringed, the Panel would not have needed to have
recourse to language "inappropriately leaving the room for hesitations and speculations".68
5.16. Russia further alleges that the Panel misunderstood its argument pertaining to the fact that
Ukraine eventually dropped certain claims. Russia did not seek to curtail Ukraine's right to decide
which claims to pursue in the course of the dispute. However, coupled with a lack of clarity in linking
the measures at issue with the legal obligations concerned, Ukraine's decision not to pursue certain
claims rendered unclear to Russia what the dispute was in fact about, until the time of the first
written submis sion to the Panel . While Ukraine's panel request "arguably outlines the possible
contours of the dispute, the matter brought and meant by Ukraine had not been clear [because] the
final scope largely differed from what the panel request hinted".69
5.17. Regarding the second point, namely , whether the panel request properly identified the
third measure at issue, Russia alleges on appeal that the Panel failed to review the description of
the third measure in Ukraine's panel request on its face and instead undertook a "contextual
interpretation" of it.70 Russia asserts that the Panel failed to consider in its analysis the meaning of
the third numbered point in the panel request, read on its face, and when compared with the other
two numbered points of section II of the panel request. 71 Russia notes that th e text of the first
two numbered points of the panel request refers to "certain alleged actions" by Russia, while the
third numbered point of the panel request lists certain documents, and submits that therefore the
third measure at issue covers specific documents, rather than certain alleged actions.72

61 Panel Report, para. 7.93.
62 Panel Report, para. 7.104.
63 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 3-11 (referring, inter alia, to the Panel's finding in
para. 7.43).
64 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 12-43 (referring, inter alia, to the Panel's finding in
para. 7.104).
65 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 8 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.42).
66 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 9 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.32). (emphasis original)
67 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 9.
68 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 9.
69 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 6. (emphasis original)
70 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 14.
71 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 15.
72 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 18-19.

5.18. Russia also disagrees with the Panel's statement that there is no single way in which a
challenged measure must invariably be identified. Instead, the Panel should have relied on the plain
meaning of the tex t of Ukraine's panel request and found that the third measure is Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as such, read together with the Protocol of the Ministry of Transport of the
Russian Federation (MOT) and the instructions mentioned in Annex III.73
5.19. Russia asserts that, in order to confirm the meaning of the words used in a panel request,
and as part of the assessment of whether the ability of the respondent to defend itself was
prejudiced, submissions and statements made during the course of the panel proceeding s, in
particular the first written submission of the complaining party, may be consulted. 74 Russia notes
that Ukraine described the third measure in three different manners in its first written submission
to the Panel and argues that the discrepancy in the way Ukraine referred to this measure
demonstrates that Ukraine's first written submission does not confirm the words used in its panel
request, and that the panel request is not sufficiently specific to identify the precise measure at
issue.75 In addition, Russia alleges that the Panel failed to properly consider the fact that
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, identified by Ukraine as an element of the third measure, is a
complex legal instrument. Referring to the Panel Report in Australia – Apples, Russia contends that
whenever a complex and lengthy document is challenged, a panel request shall duly contain a
reference to particular parts, sections, or issues and that Ukraine was therefore required to be more
specific in identifying what it wished to challenge before the Panel.76
5.20. Ukraine, for its part, requests us to uphold the Panel findings challenged by Russia. 77 First,
Ukraine submits that, contrary to Russia's arguments, its panel request links the measures at issue
with the legal basis of the complaint s ufficiently to present the problem clearly. 78 In particular,
section II of the panel request describes the "acts or omissions" attributable to Russia and identifies
their "sources and evidence", while section IV explains what "acts or omissions … violate what [WTO]
provisions and on what basis". 79 According to Ukraine, Russia's claim that the panel request does
not plainly connect the challenged measures to the relevant provisions is based on an incorrect
reading of section IV in isolation from the rest of the panel request. 80 Had Russia read the panel
request as a whole, it would have readily understood how the claims made relate to the relevant
WTO obligations.81
5.21. In response to Russia taking issue with the Panel's use of "weak auxiliary verbs", Ukraine
submits that the Panel's "choice of words" or use of "auxiliary verbs" is irrelevant to a determination
of whether or not the Panel committed an error of law in the interpretation and application of
Article 6.2 of the DSU. 82 Ukraine also disagrees with Russia th at the scope of the claims as
formulated in the panel request changed throughout the proceedings, and particularly in Ukraine's
first written submission.83 For Ukraine, the fact that a complainant abandons certain claims during
the course of panel proceedin gs is immaterial to the question whether that complainant's panel
request properly identifies the challenged measures and clearly connects them to the relevant
WTO obligations.84
5.22. Second, Ukraine disagrees with Russia's allegation that the panel request doe s not clearly
identify the third measure at issue in this dispute. Section II of the panel request, titled "The
measures at issue", lists not only the three measures, but also provides an explanation for each. 85
In particular, the "plain text" of the third recital clearly indicates that the third measure consists of
"the decision" of Russian authorities not to recognize the validity of conformity certificates issued to

73 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 21 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.92).
74 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 23 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
75 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 27.
76 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 33 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Apples,
para. 7.1449).
77 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 16, 37, 39, 69-70, and 188.
78 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 16 and 19.
79 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 20. See also ibid., paras. 21-22 and 27-28.
80 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 27.
81 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 28.
82 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 36.
83 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 29.
84 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 30.
85 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 45.

Ukrainian producers in other CU countries, as well as "the explanation and information on decisions
taken in that regard". 86 While defects in a panel request cannot be "cured" by a complainant's
subsequent submissions and statements, those submissions and statements can nonetheless be
considered in order to "confirm the meaning of the words" used in the panel request.87 In Ukraine's
view, its first written submission confirmed rather than altered the identification of the third measure
as it appeared in the panel request.88
5.23. Ukraine argues that contrary to what Russia alleges, the Panel properly assessed the panel
request on its face. 89 For Ukraine, Russia misunderstands the third measure as being limited to
CU Technical Regulation 001/201190, whereas in fact the measure consists of that Regulation "read
together with" Protocol No. A 4 -3 and three lett ers mentioned in Annex III to the panel request. 91
Had Ukraine intended to challenge CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 alone, it would not have
included, in the description of the specific measure at issue, a protocol and individual decisions
adopted by the MOT.
5.24. Finally, contrary to what Russia argues, for Ukraine the situation in the present case is not
similar or comparable to that in Australia – Apples. In that case, due to the complexity and length
of the legal instrument and in the absence of references to specific parts of the challenged document,
the respondent was unable to understand which specific elements of the legal instrument were at
issue; in the present case , the instruments providing the legal basis for the third measure were
clearly identified in the panel request and could therefore be discerned. 92 Ukraine further submits
that, in any event, the Appellate Body has said that the consultation process provides an opportunity
for parties to define and delimit the scope of the dispute. 93 Since, in the present case, all relevant
documents had been introduced at that stage of the proceedings, Russia could not claim on appeal
that Ukraine failed to identify particular parts of documents that were supposed to be examined and
that it was thus unclear what Ukraine was challenging.
5.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in finding in its preliminary ruling that Russia had failed
to establish that Ukraine's panel request was inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU
5.25. In addressing Russia's claim that the Panel erred in making the preliminary ruling that Russia
has failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request is inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU94, we
note that Article 6.2 provides:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the pr oblem
clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of a panel with other than
standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of
special terms of reference.
5.26. Article 6.2 of the DSU sets out two principal require ments, namely, the identification of the
specific measures at issue and the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint
sufficient to present the problem clearly.95 Russia's appeal concerns both requirements. In particular,
Russia's claim that the Panel erred in finding that Ukraine's panel request linked the measures at
issue with the legal basis of the complaint relates to the obligation to provide a brief summary of
the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In turn, Russia's claim that

86 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 46. (emphasis omitted)
87 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 48 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
para. 127, in turn referring to Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy, para. 127; Thailand – H-Beams,
para. 95).
88 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 49.
89 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 51.
90 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 54.
91 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 55. (emphasis original)
92 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 65-66.
93 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 68 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import
Measures, para. 5.10).
95 Furthermore, Article 6.2 contains the additional requirements that the request must be made in
writing and that it must indicate whether consultations were held. See also Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Dairy, para. 120.

the Panel erred in finding that the third measure had been properly identified in Ukraine's panel
request relates to the obligation to properly identify the specific measures at issue.
5.27. The Appellate Body has said that t he requirements specified in Article 6.2 are significant
because, pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU, a panel's terms of reference are governed by the request
for establishment of a panel 96, and that a panel request thus delimits the scope of a panel's
jurisdiction and serves the due process objective of notifying the respondent and third parties of the
nature of the complainant's case.97 In order to "present the problem clearly", a panel request must
plainly connect the challenged measures with the provisions of the covered agreements claimed to
have been infringed, so that the respondent party is aware of the basis for the alleged inconsistency
of the measures at issue with the covered agreements. 98 Only by such connection between the
measures and the relevant provisions can a respondent "know what case it has to answer,
and ... begin preparing its defence".99 In this vein, for instance, the panel request s in China – Raw
Materials did not present the problem clearly, because they failed to connect the different measures
with the various obligations listed therein.100
5.28. At the same time, the requirement to present the problem clearly does not entail an obligation
for the complainant to provide arguments in support of its claim.101 Rather, the "brief summary" of
the legal basis of the complaint required by Article 6.2 of the DSU aims to explain succinctly how or
why the measure at issue is considered by the complaining Member to be violating the
WTO obligation in question.102 While the identification of the treaty provision claimed to have been
violated by the respondent is "always necessary" and a "minimum prerequisite", such identification
may not be sufficient to meet the requirement of Article 6.2 depending on the particular
circumstances of a case, including the nature of the measure at issue and the manner in which it is
described in the panel request, as well as the nature of the provisions of the covered agreements
alleged to have been breached.103
5.29. The Appellate Body has further said that in order to determine whether a panel request
complies with Article 6.2, a panel must carefully scrutinize the request, read as a whole, and on the
basis of the language used therein.104 Moreover, a panel must determine compliance with Article 6.2
on the face of the panel request as it existed at the time of filing.105 Parties' subsequent submissions
and statements during the panel proceedings cannot "cure" defects in a panel request 106, but they

96 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 124.
97 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 639-640 (referring
to Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126, in turn referring to Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186). See also Appellate Body Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts,
98 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162.
99 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 88).
100 Those panel requests listed 37 legal instruments as the measures at issue, alleging that they were
inconsistent with 13 provisions of the covered agreements. However, it was unclear which allegations of error
pertained to which particular measure identified in the panel requests. (Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw
101 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.31 (quoting Appellate Body
Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.14, in turn quoting Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Dairy, para. 139). See also ibid., para. 5.125; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures
(China), para. 4.9.
102 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 130.
103 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves (Japan), para. 5.9 (quoting Appellate Body
Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.14, in turn quoting Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Dairy, para. 124).
104 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 142; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Measures (China), para. 4.7; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews, paras. 164 and 169; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
105 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.79 (referring to Appellate Body
Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 787; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 161;
US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13).
106 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.79 (referring to Appellate Body
Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220; EC – Bananas III, para. 143; EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft, para. 787; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures
(China), para. 4.9).

can be consulted to the extent that they may confirm or clarify the meaning of the words used in
the panel request.107
5.1.3.1 Linkages between measures and legal basis of the complaint
5.30. We now turn to review the Panel's analysis in its preliminary ruling regarding Article 6.2 of
the DSU. At the outset we note the Panel's observation that Ukraine's panel request was structured
in four sections: section I providing an overview of the background of the dispute; section II
describing the measures at issue; section III describing Russia's relevant legal framework; and
section IV providing the legal basis of the complaint.108 The Panel focused on sections II and IV of
Ukraine's panel request and examined, for each point of section IV of the panel request, and bearing
in mind the description of the three measures at issue in section II of the panel request, wheth er
the panel request links the challenged measures with the 10 WTO provisions allegedly infringed.109
5.31. The Panel analysed the linkages between the measures challenged by Ukraine and the
WTO provisions allegedly infringed, based on the text of the panel reques t, including by drawing
inferences, for instance, with respect to Ukraine's claims under Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. In
that respect, the Panel reasoned:
Point eight of section IV of the panel request contains Ukraine's claims under
Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. These claims concern the uniform, impartial, and
reasonable administration of laws, regulations, and decisions of a general application.
Measure one and measure three are measures of general application which could fall
under the purview of Article X:3(a). This, however, is not the case for the
three components of measure two, all of which refer to individual instances of
application. We thus consider that there is a link between Ukraine's claims under
Article X:3(a) and measures one and thr ee. We also consider that there is no link
between Ukraine's claims under Article X:3(a) and measure two.110
Thus, the Panel explained what it considered to be the linkages made in the panel request, and
ultimately summarized111 its findings in a table that set out for each measure the provision under
which Ukraine had raised a claim.
5.32. Russia takes issue with what it refers to as the Panel's use of "weak auxiliary verbs", such as
"could relate" or "could concern", and asserts that this language reveals that the linkages between
the measures and the legal obligations were not as clear as the Panel found.112 As we see it, the use
of this language is owed to the analytical approach employed by the Panel, defining, first, the
potential scope of a particular claim, and second, identifying limitations on the scope of the claim
based on the language used in the Panel request. The Panel statements identified by Russia in
connection with this argument represent intermediate st eps in the Panel's reasoning that, in
connection with other elements of the Panel's analysis, provide the basis for the Panel's conclusion
concerning linkages between the measures challenged by Ukraine and the WTO provisions allegedly
infringed. The statements identified by Russia do not describe conclusively the quality of the linkages
between the measures and the provisions at issue and thus, taken in isolation, these statements
cannot be regarded as describing the quality of these linkages.
5.33. In addition, Russia asserts that the Panel erred in failing to recognize similarities in the
deficiencies of the panel requests in the present case and in China – Raw Materials, the latter of
which had been found to be insufficient by the Appellate Body.113 We note that the Panel indeed
addressed the parallels drawn by Russia between the panel request at issue and the panel requests
in China – Raw Materials in some detail in its report. 114 However, the Panel observed significant
differences between the panel requests in the present case and in China – Raw Materials. The Panel

107 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.79 (referring to Appellate Body
Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 220; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 642;
US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.9).
108 Panel Report, paras. 7.23-7.39.
109 Panel Report, paras. 7.30-7.39.
110 Panel Report, para. 7.37.
111 Panel Report, para. 7.39, table 1.
112 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 9.
113 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 7-8.
114 Panel Report, para. 7.40.

noted that, first, the narrative paragraphs of section II of the panel requests in China – Raw Materials
referred to several distinct types of measures and included allegations of violation of 13 diffe rent
provisions of the covered agreements. Following the narrative paragraphs, the panel requests
included a list of at least 37 legal instruments that ranged from entire codes or charters to specific
administrative measures, without referring to specific sections or provisions of any of the listed
instruments. The Panel observed that the narrative paragraphs in those panel requests included a
brief description of different allegations of violation relating to different types of restraints, but they
did not link them to the myriad of legal instruments listed in the subsequent section. The Panel
contrasted this with Ukraine's panel request at issue and noted that the narrative paragraphs in
section II identify three measures at issue and provide a description that allows the nature of each
to be discerned. The Panel further explained that, in particular, the third narrative paragraph of
section II, where the non-recognition of other CU certificates is described, provides a clear indication
of the legal instrum ents concerned by that measure (e.g. CU Technical Regulation 001/2011).
Furthermore, the Panel noted that the legal instruments described in section III of the panel request
at issue were limited to nine instruments, the first five of which clearly relate to the challenged
measures described in section II, and the other four refer to the background on the legal framework
applicable to Russia's Conformity Assessment Procedures.115 In addition, the Panel noted that the
final paragraph of section III of the pane l requests in China – Raw Materials provided a list of
13 WTO provisions allegedly infringed, without indicating how any of the measures at issue caused
any of the alleged violations. The Panel noted that the narrative paragraphs of the panel request in
the present case, however, provided such explanations. 116 In particular, the Panel explained that
section IV of Ukraine's panel request contained a list of the 10 WTO provisions allegedly infringed,
together with an explanation of why Ukraine considers that the measures identified are inconsistent
with Russia's obligations.117
5.34. Accordingly, the Panel in fact engaged with Russia's argument concerning parallels between
the panel request at issue and the panel request s in China – Raw Materials. The Panel, however,
provided a detailed explanation of why it did not see sufficient similarities between the panel request
in the present case and the panel requests in China – Raw Materials. On appeal, Russia advances
essentially the same argument as before the Panel based on what it considers to be parallels between
these panel requests. Thus, rather than demonstrating an error in the Panel's application of
Article 6.2 of the DSU, Russia simply disagrees with the reasons given by the Panel for rejecting
Russia's argument of certain parallels between the panel request at issue and the panel requests in
China – Raw Materials.
5.35. In light of the above considerations, we find that the Panel did not err in its assessment of
whether Ukraine's panel request provided sufficient clarity so as to plainly connect the
WTO provisions allegedly infringed to the measures at issue.
5.1.3.2 Identification of the third measure
5.36. Next, we turn to address Russia's allegation that the Panel erred in finding that Ukraine's
panel request identified Ukraine's third measure in a manner that satisfies the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU. 118 Russia alleges that the Panel erred because it failed to review the
description of the third measure in the panel request "on its face" and instead undertook a
"contextual interpretation" of it.119
5.37. This allegation of error relates to the Panel's analysis in paragraphs 7.87 to 7.104 of the Panel
Report, in which the Panel found that the measure at issue identified in the panel request as the
third measure is the all eged requirement that Russia's authorities must not recognize certificates
issued in other CU countries if the certified railway products were not produced in a CU country.120
In particular, the Panel reasoned that "the third measure at issue is addressed in the third narrative
paragraph, the three numbered points and Annex III", and that these references must be read

115 Panel Report, para. 7.41 (referring to Ukraine's panel request, pp. 2-3).
116 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (referring to WT/DS394/7, pp. 6-9; WT/DS395/7, pp. 6-9; WT/DS398/6,
pp. 6-9).
117 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (referring to Ukraine's panel request, pp. 3-4).
118 Panel Report, para. 7.104.
119 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 14.
120 Panel Report, para. 7.103.

together.121 The Panel then addressed each of these elements and concluded that the third measure
challenged by Ukraine was the alleged requirement that Russia's authorities considered to flow from
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, pursuant to which Russia's authorities must not recognize
certificates issued to Ukrainian producers in other CU countries, if the certified products were not
produced in a CU country.122
5.38. We have set out above that, in order to determine whether a panel request complies with
Article 6.2, a panel must carefully scrutinize the request, read as a whole, and on the basis of the
language used therein.123 Moreover, a panel must determine compliance with Article 6.2 on the face
of the panel request as it existed at the time of filing.124
5.39. We observe that in the present case, the Panel began its analysis by noting which elements
of the panel request related to the third measure.125 One by one, the Panel addressed these elements
and explained its understanding of them.126 Next, the Panel addressed the various elements
"in context". We understand the Panel thus to have assessed the panel request "as a whole",
in keeping with the approach set out above.
5.40. Russia argues that the text of the first two numbered points of the panel request refers to
"certain alleged actions" by Russia, while the third numbered point of the panel request lists certain
documents.127 For Russia, such intentional differen ce in the description of the measures at issue
must be given meaning, such that the third measure at issue covers specific documents, rather than
certain alleged actions.128 Russia contends that the Panel erred in disregarding this difference in the
description of the measures at issue, and instead engaged in guessing what the complainant could
have meant. Ukraine responds that Russia is essentially requesting the Appellate Body to read the
numbered list in section IV of the panel request in isolation from the remaining part of that section,
the other sections of the request, and the text of the covered agreements. For Ukraine, the
numbered list and the explanations given in section IV, read together with the introductory
paragraph to that list, support the Panel's findings in the preliminary ruling.129
5.41. We do not see that the Panel disregarded differences in the description of the measures at
issue as alleged by Russia. A review of paragraphs 7.65 to 7.99 of the Panel Report reveals that,
with regard to each of t he three measures at issue, the Panel employed a different analytical
approach in its assessment of the relevant parts of the panel request. The first measure had been
identified by Ukraine as the "non-recognition" of certificates, and the Panel considered that to be the
first measure without further analysis. With respect to the second measure, the Panel noted that
Ukraine had referred to refusals to recognize certificates, suspension of certificates, and rejections.
The Panel then "inferred that Ukraine [ had sought] to identify these individual instructions as
separate components of measure two" .130 Concerning the third measure, the Panel noted that the
third numbered point identified CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, read together with the Protocol
of the MOT and instructions mentioned in Annex III. The Panel continued explaining that, in order
to better understand the third measure, it was instructive to look at the third narrative paragraph in
section II. The Panel observed that the relevant Russian author ities had concluded that certificates
issued in other CU countries were not valid in Russia's territory and that the products concerned
could not be imported or registered. In other words, according to Ukraine, Russia's authorities
concluded that these certificates could not be recognized.

121 Panel Report, para. 7.93 (referring to the text of section II of Ukraine's panel request as reproduced
by the Panel in para. 7.139, table 2).
122 Panel Report, paras. 7.99 and 7.103.
123 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 142; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Measures (China), para. 4.7; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews, paras. 164 and 169; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
124 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.79 (referring to Appellate Body
Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 787; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 161;
US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13).
125 Panel Report, para. 7.93.
126 Panel Report, paras. 7.94-7.98.
127 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 18.
128 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 19.
129 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 27-28.
130 Panel Report, para. 7.96.

5.42. This demonstrates that, contrary to what Russia alleges, the Panel did not disregard
differences in the description of the measures at issue. On the contrary, while the Panel noted the
content of the first measure as clear on the face of the measure, the Panel drew certain inferences
in order to determine the content of the second measure, and considered contextual elements
contained in other parts of the panel request in order to determine the content of the third measure.
5.43. Furthermore, Russia takes issue with the Panel's statement that there is no single way in
which a challenged measure must be identified, and asserts that, instead, the Panel should have
relied on the plain meaning of the text of Ukraine's panel request and found that the third measure
is Technical Regulation 001/2011 as such, read together with the Protocol of the MOT and the
instructions mentioned in Annex III.131 Ukraine disagrees with Russia that the Panel failed to
consider the language contained in the panel request on its face 132, and submits that the Panel
properly considered the panel request as a whole.
5.44. As we have set out above, it is well established that in an analysis under Article 6.2 of the
DSU, panels must scrutinize the panel request read as a whole, and on the basis of the language
used therein. 133 Russia's proposed reading of the panel request would not take account of the
description of the measure in the third narrative paragraph of section II of the panel request and it
would thus not constitute a reading "as a whole". Moreover, we agree with the Panel that the
reference to "Technical Regulation No. 001/2011 'On safety of railway rolling stock', read together
with the Protocol of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation regarding issuance by
certification authority of the Customs Union of the certificates of conformity for products
manufactured by third -countries"134 indicates that Ukraine was not challenging Technical
Regulation 001/2011 "as such", but rather a particular measure expressed in that technical
regulation when read together with the relevant Protocol of the MOT.135
5.45. Finally, Russia also alleges that the Panel failed to properly consider the fact that CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011, identified by Ukraine as an element of the third measure, is a complex legal
instrument, and that therefore Ukraine was required to specify particular parts that it wished to
challenge before the Panel. 136 In support of this argument, Russia submits that the panel in
Australia – Apples found that whenever a complex and lengthy document is challenged, a panel
request shall duly contain a reference to particular parts, sections, or issues to enable a respondent
to understand the problem clearly.
5.46. We note that the Panel assessed Ukraine's panel request , taking account of the findings by
the panel in Australia – Apples. The Panel noted that New Zealand's panel request contained a broad
reference to the measures as specified in the final import risk analysis report for apples from
New Zealand of November 2006 (FIRA) and then a list of 17 specific measures listed in the FIRA.137
The identification of the 17 items in the FIRA was found to be sufficiently precise in id entifying the
specific measures at issue, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU. 138 However, the panel in
Australia – Apples also found that, given the length and complexity of the FIRA, a broad reference
to it was insufficient as identification of a measure at issue in the sense of Article 6.2 of the DSU.139
5.47. In its analysis, the Panel noted significant differences between Ukraine's panel request in the
present dispute and New Zealand's panel request in Australia – Apples. The Panel noted that
Ukraine's panel requ est identifies the measure at issue in different parts of section II, and that it
does so with sufficient clarity to allow a reader to discern that the measure is the alleged requirement
that Russia's authorities must not recognize certificates issued in o ther CU countries if the certified
products were not produced in a CU country. The Panel further explained that Ukraine's references

131 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 21 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.92).
132 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 51.
133 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III, para. 142; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Measures (China), para. 4.7; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews, paras. 164 and 169; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
134 Ukraine's panel request, section II(3). (emphasis added)
135 Panel Report, para. 7.93.
136 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 33 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Apples,
para. 7.1449).

to CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and the Protocol of the MOT in certain parts of the panel
request seemed intended to signal the legal instruments from which the challenged measure flows.
In contrast, in Australia – Apples, New Zealand attempted to describe the measure at issue as the
FIRA, a complex and lengthy legal instrument.140
5.48. Accordingly, the Panel did engage with Russia's argument relying on the findings of the panel
in Australia – Apples. Ultimately, the Panel concluded that the features of the present panel request
of Ukraine were different from those of the panel request in Australia – Apples. Rather than
demonstrating an error in the Panel's application of Article 6.2 of the DSU, Russia disagrees with the
reasons given by the Panel for rejecting Russia's argument regarding certain parallels between the
panel request at issue and the panel request in Australia – Apples.
5.1.4 Conclusion
5.49. Russia has not established that the Panel erred in determining the scope of its terms of
reference in this dispute. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding , in paragraphs 8.1.a.i, 8.1.d.iv,
and 8.1.d.v of the Panel Report, that Russia has failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request is
inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
5.2 Russia's claims concerning the Panel's findings relating to the third measure
5.50. On appeal, Russia makes four claims regarding the Panel's fi ndings relating to the
third measure. First, Russia claims that the Panel erred under Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU
in finding that the third measure as described by the Panel was within its terms of reference. 141
Second, Russia claims that the Panel erred under Article 11 of the DSU by making findings regarding
the alleged local registration condition after it had found that aspect as it relates to the third measure
to be outside its terms of reference.142 Third, Russia claims that the Panel erred under Article 11 of
the DSU by relieving Ukraine from "the necessity of establishing a prima facie case" with respect to
the existence of the third measure as a single measure capable of being challenged under the DSU.143
Lastly, Russia claims that the Panel erre d under Article 11 of the DSU in finding that the
third measure is of a "general" character and "flows from" CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, and
that the third measure had been demonstrated to exist.144
5.51. We begin with a summary of the relevant findings by t he Panel, and Russia 's and Ukraine's
arguments on appeal. We then proceed to assess Russia's claims concerning the Panel's findings
relating to the third measure.
5.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.52. Before the Panel, Ukraine challenged the decision by the Russian authorities not to recognize
in its territory the validity of certificates issued to producers of Ukrainian railway products in other
CU countries as a measure that the Panel referred to as the third measure. 145 As evidence
establishing the existence of this measure, Ukraine submitted to the Panel certain letters issued by
the Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport (ART) as follows 146: (i) the January 2015 letter,
to which Protocol No. A 4-3 of the MOT was attached (the January 2015 letter); (ii) the letter sent
on 4 February 2016 (the February 2016 letter); and (iii) the letter of 10 August 2016 (the

140 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
141 Russia's other appellant's submission, section 3.
142 Russia's other appellant's submission, section 4.
143 Russia's other appellant's submission, section 5.
144 Russia's other appellant's submission, section 6.
145 Panel Report, para. 7.811 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 373).
See also ibid., para. 7.808.
146 Panel Report, paras. 7.811 and 7.841. See also Letter from the Federal Agency for Railway Transport
of the MOT to JSC [BCI] accompanied to Protocol No. A 4-3 of 20 January 2015 of the MOT regarding issuance
by the certification authority of the CU of the certificates of conformity for products manufactured by third
countries (Panel Exhibit UKR-48 (BCI)); Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Federal Agency for Railway
Transport to [BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-49 (BCI)); Letter dated 10 August 2016 from
the Federal Agency for Railway Transport to JSC [BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-141
(BCI)). We refer to the translated English versions of the Panel exhibits.

August 2016 letter).147 Based on these letters, Ukraine argued before the Panel that the decision
not to recognize the validity of certificates is sued to Ukrainian producers in other countries was
based on the relevant Russian authorities' interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. 148
Specifically, Ukraine argued that the relevant Russian authorities interpreted CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as setting out the following two requirements: (i) the requirement that only
products manufactured in the territory of the CU may be subject to certification under CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 (the local production condition); and (ii) the requirement that only entities
registered in the same country as the relevant certification body can apply for certification (the local
registration condition).149
5.53. In response, Russia submitted that what the panel request identified as the third measure
was CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, rather than the decision not to recognize the validity of
certificates issued to Ukrainian producers in other countries.150 Thus, Russia argued before the Panel
that the third measure challenged by Ukraine in its first written submis sion to the Panel was
"different from the measure identified in [Ukraine's] panel request" and that it was therefore outside
the Panel's terms of reference.151 On this basis, Russia also contended that its due process right to
know what case it has to defend had been prejudiced.152
5.54. The Panel considered that the issue before it was whether the third measure as described in
Ukraine's written submissions was "different from the measure that is identified in the panel
request".153 The Panel recalled that, in its preliminary ruling, it had already rejected Russia's claim
that Ukraine had failed to identify the third measure with sufficient clarity in its panel request. The
Panel noted that the third measure as described in Ukraine's panel request concerned "an alleged
requirement that Russia's authorities consider to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011". 154
Under this requirement, the Russian authorities must not recognize certificates issued to Ukrainian
producers in other CU countries, unless the local production condition and the local registration
condition are met. Concerning the local production condition, the Panel observed that the
third narrative paragraph of Ukraine's panel request specifically identifies it as a basis for Ukraine's
claim.155 Accordingly, the Panel found it "clear … from the analysis of the panel request … that any
challenge to the alleged requirement that Russia's authorities must not recognize certificates issued
in other CU countries if the certified products were not produced in a CU coun try is within [the
Panel's] terms of reference" .156 However, the Panel noted that the local registration condition was
not expressly mentioned in Ukraine's panel request. 157 The Panel took the view that the panel
request does not give adequate notice to Russia and third parties about Ukraine's claim with respect
to the local registration condition. Hence, the Panel concluded that Ukraine's claim concerning
non-recognition resulting from a failure to meet the alleged local registration condition was not within
the Panel's terms of reference.158
5.55. The Panel then turned to the alleged difference between the descriptions of the third measure
in Ukraine's panel request and in its written submissions in the context of defining the Panel's terms
of reference. The Panel noted that the description of the third measure in Ukraine's written

147 Panel Report, para. 7.841, table 7. See also Letter from the Federal Agency for Railway Transport of
the MOT to JSC [BCI] accompanied to Protocol No. A 4-3 of 20 January 2015 of the MOT regarding issuance
by the certification authority of the CU of the certificates of conformity for products manufactured by third
countries (Panel Exhibit UKR-48 (BCI)); Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Federal Agency for Railway
Transport to [BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-49 (BCI)); Letter dated 10 August 2016 from
the Federal Agency for Railway Transport to JSC [BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-141
(BCI)). The January 2015 letter (along with Protocol No. A 4-3) and the February 2016 letter were listed in
Annex III to the panel request (see Ukraine's panel request, Annex III), whereas the August 2016 letter was
submitted by Ukraine with its second written submission (see Ukraine's second written submission to the
148 Panel Report, para. 7.812.
149 Panel Report, para. 7.813 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 375-376; responses to Panel questions Nos. 23, 26, and 36).
150 Panel Report, para. 7.818.
151 Panel Report, paras. 7.809 and 7.818-7.819.
152 Panel Report, para. 7.819.
153 Panel Report, para. 7.822.
154 Panel Report, para. 7.823.
155 Panel Report, para. 7.823 (referring to Ukraine's panel request, p. 2).
157 Panel Report, para. 7.824.
158 Panel Report, para. 7.825.

submissions to the Panel was "somewhat different" from the description in the panel request. 159
However, the Panel considered that "what matters for purposes of [its] assessment of … the third
measure is not so much what terms Ukraine has employed", but rather "whether Ukraine has
demonstrated the existence of the measure that Ukraine has identified in the panel request". 160 In
this regard, the Panel noted that the reference to Russia's decision regarding the meaning and scope
of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 in Ukraine's panel request indicates that the alleged
non-recognition finds its basis in that regulation as interpreted by Russia. As such, the Panel
understood the third measure in the panel request to mean "the alleged non-recognition requirement
flowing from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011".161
5.56. Having clarified the scope of its terms of reference in relation to the third measure, the Panel
proceeded to examine whether Ukraine had demonstrated the existence of the measure the Panel
found to have been identified in the panel request. 162 Based on its analysis of the three letters
submitted by Ukraine as evidence of the existence of the third measure, the Panel found that the
Russian authorities "decided that the relevant certificates issued by Belarus' certification body were
not valid in Russia's territory".163 The Panel noted that each decision in the three letters "was based
explicitly on the provisions of CU Technical Regulation 001/2001" as interpreted by the Russian
authorities and applied to the certificates at issue, according to which a certificate cannot be validly
issued under Articles 1(1) and 6(9) of that regulation unless, respectively, the local pro duction
condition and the local registration condition are satisfied. 164 The Panel's understanding was
confirmed by two of the letters, which "explicitly state that the relevant certificates were issued by
Belarus in 'violation' of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 because Belarus had not enforced the
two requirements".165 In the Panel's view, the evidence submitted by Ukraine indicated that the
Russian authorities did not independently "decide" to establish a new general non -recognition
requirement. In stead, th e requirements flowed from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as the
Russian authorities interpreted it.166 The Panel found this to be consistent with the third measure as
described in the panel request.
5.57. The Panel rejected Russia's argument that Protocol No. A 4-3 is a non-binding document that
merely records the opinions of representatives of various Russian railway-related bodies. The Panel
considered that Protocol No. A 4-3 reveals that the competent authorities "reached a particular view
on the scope of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011" and took "decisions" and specific actions on the
certificates at issue based on that view.167 Furthermore, the Panel saw no merit in Russia's argument
that neither the MOT nor the Russian Federal ART was authorized to decide on the recognition of
certificates issued in other CU countries or to interpret CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 under
Russian law. For the Panel, t he question whether the relevant authorities had acted within their
remit under domestic law had no relevance for its analysis, which rather hinged on "what these
authorities actually did or did not do".168
5.58. Moreover, the Panel saw no merit in Russia's argument that Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters
concerned products from only two Ukrainian producers and that therefore these documents were

159 Panel Report, para. 7.827.
160 Panel Report, para. 7.828.
162 Panel Report, para. 7.829.
163 Panel Report, para. 7.846. The Russian authorities stated in the January 2015 letter and the attached
Protocol No. A 4-3 that CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 applies to products manufactured in the territory of
the CU. In the February 2016 letter and the August 2016 letter, the Russian authorities stated that
Articles 1(1) and 6(9) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 provide for the local production condition and the
local registration condition, respectively, and that certain certificates issued by the Belarusian authorities to
Ukrainian imports were in violation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. For these reasons, the Russian
authorities decided that the certificates at issue in all three letters were not valid within Russia's territory. (See
Panel Report, para. 7.841 and table 7; Letter from the Federal Agency for Railway Transport of the MOT to JSC
[BCI] accompanied to Protocol No. A 4-3 of 20 January 2015 of the MOT regarding issuance by the
certification authority of the CU of the certificates of conformity for products manufactured by third countries
(Panel Exhibit UKR-48 (BCI)); Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Federal Agency for Railway Transport to
[BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-49 (BCI)); Letter dated 10 August 2016 from the Federal
Agency for Railway Transport to JSC [BCI] on validity of certificates (Panel Exhibit UKR-141 (BCI)))
164 Panel Report, paras. 7.846-7.847.
165 Panel Report, para. 7.847.
166 Panel Report, para. 7.854.
167 Panel Report, para. 7.843.

not of general application. The Panel recalled that CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 is a regulation
of general application, and found that "[n]othing in the Protocol or the … letters" suggested that the
interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 by the Russian authorities "would not be
generally applicable and would apply only to Ukrainian products". 169 The Panel als o recalled that
Protocol No. A 4-3 "state[d] that the underlying meeting concerned 'certificates of conformity for
products manufactured by third -countries', which countries include, but are not limited to
Ukraine".170 The Panel considered these findings to support its view that the relevant documents
provided a "general interpretation" 171, whereby the Russian authorities would not recognize a
certificate issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 in another CU country unless the local
production and the local registration conditions are met.172
5.59. Russia also referred to Article 53 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU Treaty)
in support of its argument that it did not apply the local production condition. According to Russia,
this provision provides that a product that conforms to CU technical regulations must be permitted
to circulate freely across the territory of the CU. In the Panel's view, however, the letters it examined
explicitly state that the certificates issued by Belarus were issued in vi olation of CU technical
regulations. While the Panel acknowledged that there is indeed evidence that Russia had itself issued
certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to producers located in third countries, the
Panel found that there is no evid ence that Russia actually recognized a certificate issued under
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 by another CU country to producers outside the CU within the
relevant time period. The Panel thus found that Russia did not rebut Ukraine's evidence concerning
non-recognition that shows that a local production condition was enforced.173
5.60. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Panel concluded that "the third measure ha[d]
been demonstrated to exist."174 In particular, the Panel found that the relevant Russian authorities
applied "a general non -recognition requirement, which these authorities considered to flow from
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it", according to which the Russian authorities
were not to recognize certificates issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 i n other
CU countries unless the local production condition and the local registration condition were met.175
However, the Panel also noted that "the non -recognition requirement falls within the Panel's terms
of reference only to the extent that it requires n on-recognition in situations where the certified
products were not produced in a CU country."176
5.2.2 Russia's claim that the Panel erred in finding the existence of the third measure
5.2.2.1 Arguments on appeal
5.61. On appeal, Russia requests that we reverse the Panel's find ing that the third measure has
been demonstrated to exist and that the evidence on the record supports the conclusion that the
relevant Russian authorities applied a general non-recognition requirement, which these authorities
considered to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it.177 Russia submits
that, in reaching that finding, the Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment under Article 11
of the DSU.
5.62. In support of its position, Russia submits that the application of CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 is not limited to products manufactured within the CU, but that it applies
equally to products manufactured outside the CU. Furthermore, Russia contends that it had
submitted evidence to the Panel demonstrating that CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 had in fact
been applied to imports of railway products manufactured in third countries.178 Russia submits that

169 Panel Report, para. 7.850.
170 Panel Report, para. 7.850.
171 Panel Report, para. 7.850.
172 Panel Report, para. 7.853.
173 Panel Report, para. 7.856.
174 Panel Report, para. 7.861.
175 Panel Report, para. 7.861.
176 Panel Report, para. 7.862.
177 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 159 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.861).
178 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 149.

the alleged non -recognition requirement could not have flowed from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 and could not be of a general character.179
5.63. Furthermore, Russia asserts that because Ukraine's panel request referred to CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 in the description of the third measure, the Panel was required to conduct
a detailed examination of the regulation, starting with i ts text. In failing to engage sufficiently with
the text of the regulation, the Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment of the matter. 180
Russia argues that the text of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 is "origin neutral" and that it does
not contain any provision requiring Russian authorities not to recognize the certificates issued by
authorities of other CU countries for goods manufactured outside the CU. 181 According to Russia,
this was also supported by Article 53 of the EAEU Treaty, which both the Panel and Ukraine
acknowledged to require that products subject to technical regulations of the CU be put into
circulation within the whole CU without additional requirements or conformity assessment
procedures.182 Finally, Russia alleges that the Panel fai led to consider its argument that the
Russian authorities that issued the letters the Panel relied on were not competent to interpret
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011.183
5.64. Ukraine requests that we uphold the Panel's conclusion that the third measure, as descr ibed
by the Panel as a general non-recognition requirement, which the Russian authorities considered to
flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it, had been demonstrated to
exist.184 First, with respect to Russia's argument that the Pa nel erred by finding that the
third measure "flows from" CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, Ukraine disagrees with Russia that
the Panel of its own motion found that the third measure flows from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011. Ukraine submits that the relevant Russian authorities themselves interpreted
the regulation to establish the non-recognition requirement.185
5.65. With respect to Russia's argument that the Panel erred by not examining CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011, Ukraine argues that since the third measure was not CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 " per se "186, the Panel was under no obligation to examine that document
separately from Protocol No. A 4-3 and the other instruments.187 In any event, Ukraine submits that
the Panel did examine CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, albeit not in its analysis of the
third measure.188
5.66. In addition, Ukraine submits that the Panel was not required to examine whether Russia's
authorities correctly understood or had the authority under Russian law to interpret CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.189 For Ukraine, it was correct of the Panel not to engage with the question
whether or not the MOT or the Russian Federal ART was competent to interpret CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011. Rather, what mattered for the purpose of the P anel's analysis was that the
non-recognition requirement "was actually made operative in practice with respect to Ukrainian
producers as a result of the decision made by the Russian authorities".190
5.2.2.2 Analysis
5.67. As part of its objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel must
"thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in its design and in its operation, and identify its

179 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 154 and 157.
180 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 133.
181 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 148. (emphasis omitted)
182 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 151. Specifically, Russia argues that, according to
Article 53 of the EAEU Treaty, products that are subject to technical regulations of the CU are put into
circulation within the territory of the whole CU after completion of the necessary conformity assessment
procedure and that CU countries must ensure the circulation of the products that conform to CU technical
regulations within their respective territories without introducing any requirements additional to those set out
in the CU technical regulations or any additional conformity assessment procedures. (Ibid.)
183 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 155 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.851).
184 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 176-177 and 186-187.
185 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 167-168.
186 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 171.
187 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 172.
188 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 170 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.592-7.595
and 7.619).
189 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 180.
190 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 181.

principal characteristics". 191 This entails identifying " all relevant characteristics of the measure",
recognizing "which features are the most central to that measure itself", and "which are to be
accorded the most significance for purposes of characterizing the relevant [measure]". 192 Exactly
what is required for a panel to do so is bound to vary depending on the circumstances of each case,
the evidence proffered by the parties, and the nature of the measure itself.193 In this regard, panels
enjoy a margin of discretion to structure their assessment as they see fit, provided they proceed "on
the basis of a properly st ructured analysis"194, provide "reasoned and adequate explanations and
coherent reasoning"195, base their findings on a "sufficient evidentiary basis"196, treat evidence with
"even-handedness"197, and carry out a "holistic assessment" of all pertinent elements bef ore
reaching its conclusions.198
5.68. Furthermore, the Appellate Body cannot base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11
simply on the conclusion that it might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel
reached.199 It is therefore not suff icient for a participant raising a claim under Article 11 simply to
disagree with a panel. 200 In addition, the Appellate Body has stated that not every error in the
appreciation of a particular piece of evidence will rise to the level of a failure by a panel to comply
with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU. To find that a panel acted inconsistently with Article 11,
the Appellate Body would have to be satisfied that the panel's errors, taken together or singly,
undermine the objectivity of the panel's assessment of the matter before it.201
5.69. With these considerations in mind, we turn to address Russia's claim that the Panel erred
under Article 11 of the DSU in finding the existence of the third measure as a "general"
non-recognition requirement that "flows from" CU Technical Regulation 001/2011.
5.70. We first turn to Russia's argument that Ukraine's "[p]anel [r]equest specifies the matter as
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and thus it is the obligation of the Panel to examine CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011, inclu ding its content" .202 This contention appears to be based on the
proposition that the third measure consists of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as such. 203
However, as we have found above, the third measure as identified by Ukraine was the alleged
decision by the relevant Russian authorities that they will not recognize the validity of certificates
issued for Ukrainian railway products by certification bodies in other CU countries unless the products
were manufactured within the CU.204 The Panel examined the three letters submitted by Ukraine as
evidence of this measure and made a factual finding that these documents showed that the relevant
Russian authorities themselves interpreted Article 1(1) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as
imposing the non-recognition requirement based on, inter alia, the local production condition, and
applied it on Ukrainian railway imports to come to a decision not to recognize certificates issued to

191 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 586 (quoting Appellate Body
192 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 586 (quoting Appellate Body
Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 171). (emphasis original) See also e.g. Appellate Body Report,
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.156.
193 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157. See also e.g. Appellate Body Reports,
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.110.
194 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.20 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 127).
195 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), fn 618 to para. 293). See also e.g. Appellate Body Report,
Russia – Commercial Vehicles, paras. 5.76-5.77.
196 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 142.
197 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 292).
198 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.156.
199 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1317 (referring to
Appellate Body Reports, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 151; EC – Sardines, para. 299; US – Carbon Steel,
200 Appellate Body Reports, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 992; China – Rare Earths,
paras. 5.178-5.179.
201 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1318.
202 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 134. (emphasis original)
203 For example, in advancing this argument, Russia stresses that "the [p]anel [r]equest specifies the
matter as CU Technical Regulation 001/2011." (Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 134)
204 Panel Report, paras. 7.811-7.813.

these Ukrainian imports in other CU countries.205 Thus, the Panel did not interpret of its own motion
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to find that the third measure in fact "flows from" that regulation.
Rather, the Panel found, as a factual matter based on its examination of the three letters, that the
relevant Russian authorities themselves indicated CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as the source
of the third measure as Ukraine identified in its panel request.206
5.71. Next, we turn to Russia's reliance on Article 53 of the EAEU Treaty. 207 Russia contends that
this provision requires that products subject to technical regulations of the CU be put into circulation
within the whole CU without additional requirements or conformity assessment procedures. For
Russia, this demonstrates that the non -recognition requirement chall enged by Ukraine does not
exist.208 In this respect, we note that the Panel reviewed the three letters provided by Ukraine as
evidence of the third measure and found that the relevant Russian authorities decided that the
relevant certificates issued by the B elarusian certification body were not valid in Russia's territory .
This decision was expressly based on the provisions of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, which the
Russian authorities interpreted as imposing the local production condition and the local registration
condition.209 In our view, the Panel thus found that the non -recognition requirement challenged by
Ukraine did in fact exist, notwithstanding the argument by Russia that such a requirement would be
in breach of Article 53 of the EAEU Treaty. Thus , for the Panel, evidence regarding whether or not
the third measure is permitted under Article 53 of the EAEU Treaty was not probative in determining
whether the third measure existed in reality.
5.72. We now turn to Russia's assertion that the Panel did not c onsider its argument that neither
the MOT nor the Russian Federal ART had the authority to interpret CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.210 We note that the Panel indeed addressed this argument. 211 In particular,
the Panel explicitly noted Russia's argument that neither the MOT nor the Russian Federal ART had
the authority to interpret CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. 212 The Panel then recalled
Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters, and found that it is clear from these documents that the
Russian authorities reached a conclusion on the meaning and scope of certain provisions of
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and based their decisions on it.213 In the presence of evidence of
what the Russian authorities actually did according to these letters, the Panel concluded that whether
or not the relevant Russian authorities had the power to interpret CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
and whether they interpreted it correctly was not relevant to its analysis. Instead, the Panel found
that what is relevant for its analysis was what the Russian authorities actually did or did not do 214,
which the Panel discerned from Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters. From our review of the Panel's
analysis, we do not see that the Panel "did not consider" or "disregarded" Russia's arguments that
neither the MOT nor the Russian Federal ART had the authority to interpret CU Technical Regulation
001/2011. Rather, the Panel did consider these arguments in light of its finding of what the relevant
Russian authorities actually did.
5.73. In addition, we do not consider that Russia has established that the Panel erred in finding that
the competence of the MOT and the Russian Federal ART to interpret CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 is not relevant for the purpose of assessing the existence of the third measure.
We recall that the third measure at issue did not include CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 per se,
but consisted of the alleged non -recognition requirement that the relevant Russian authorities
themselves considered to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 according to their
interpretation. As such, we do not see the relevance of the competence of the relevant Russian
authorities to interpret CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 in determining whether the third measure
exists.
5.74. Finally, we turn to Russia's argument that a "general" non-recognition requirement that "flows
from" CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 did not exist because it was CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 (as opposed to the alleged non -recognition requirement) that applied to all

205 Panel Report, para. 7.847.
206 Panel Report, paras. 7.828 and 7.846-7.847.
207 See para. 5.60 above.
208 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 151.
209 Panel Report, paras. 7.846-7.847.
210 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 155.
211 Panel Report, para. 7.851.
212 Panel Report, para. 7.851.
213 Panel Report, para. 7.851.
214 Panel Report, para. 7.851.

products regardless of their location of manufacture.215 Russia's assertion is based on the evidence
of Russia's issuance of certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to producers outside the
CU territory.216 In this regard, we recall that the measure subject to the Panel's inquiry was the
non-recognition by Russia of certificates already issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to
products manufactured in other CU countries. 217 The Panel stated that the third measure at issue
concerned "only the non-recognition by Russia of certificates already issued to Ukrainian producers
under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 in other CU co untries" but "[i]t does not concern
non-certification by Russia"218, i.e. issuance of certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
by the Russian authorities. The evidence submitted by Russia, however, relates to Russia's issuance
of certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. Specifically, Russia submitted to the Panel
that it had issued certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and subsequent amendments
to producers located in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom.219 While the Panel acknowledged that "there is indeed evidence that Russia
ha[d] itself issued certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 to producers located in third
countries", it ultimately found that "there is no evidence that … Russia actually allowed registration
and importation of products produced outside the CU and covered by a certificate issued under
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 by another CU country."220 We agree with the Panel that "Russia
[had] therefore not rebutted Ukraine's evidence concerning non -recognition that shows that a
production condition was enforced" on the basis of evidence relating to the Russian authorities'
issuance of new certificates.221
5.2.2.3 Conclusion
5.75. Russia has not establis hed that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
finding that the third measure is of a "general" character and flows from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding , in paragraph 7.861 of the
Panel Report, that the third measure as a general non -recognition requirement, which the relevant
Russian authorities considered to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, had been
demonstrated to exist.
5.2.3 Russia's claim that the Panel erred by relieving Ukraine from the necessity of
establishing a prima facie case that the third measure exists as a single measure
5.2.3.1 Arguments on appeal
5.76. Russia requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that the third measure had been
demonstrated to exist. Russia asserts that the Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment under
Article 11 of the DSU by impermissibly relieving Ukraine of the duty to make a prima facie case with
respect to the existence of "a single measure composed of several different documents".222 Relying
on the Appellate Body Reports in Argentina – Import Measures, Russia submits that a complainant
challenging such a measure will "normally need to provide evidence of how the different components
operated together as part of a single measure and how a single measure exists as distinct from its
components".223 Thus, in Russia's view, Ukraine was required to make a prima facie case with
respect to the existence of the third measure as a single measure. 224 Russia contends that Ukraine
proceeded from "an unsubstantiated presumption of existence of a single measure capable of being
challenged".225 Russia also argues that the different documents identified in Ukraine's panel request,
namely, CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and the letters, have different lega l force and scope of

215 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 150.
216 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 149-150.
217 Panel Report, para. 7.829.
218 Panel Report, para. 7.829.
219 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 149 (referring to Russia's response to Panel
question No. 107).
220 Panel Report, para. 7.856.
221 Panel Report, para. 7.856.
222 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 112-113. (emphasis omitted)
223 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 108 (quoting Appellate Body Reports,
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.108).
224 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 112.
225 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 114.

application and that Ukraine was therefore required to explain how these different instruments
operated together as a single measure.226
5.77. In response, Ukraine contends that it provided sufficient evidence and arguments to establish
a prima facie case that the third measure existed as a single measure.227 According to Ukraine, the
decision not to recognize the validity of certificates issued to Ukrainian railway products by other
CU countries is found in Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters listed in Annex III to the panel request.
Ukraine contends that these documents "clearly demonstrate that the Russian Federation imposed
additional requirements", namely, the local production condition and the local registration condition,
and that the Russian authorities themselves relied on the text of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
as a source of these additional requirements. 228 Furthermore, Ukraine asserts that the instructions
mentioned in Annex III to its panel request "illustrat[e] the practical reali zation of the single
measure".229 With respect to Russia's argument based on the alleged differences in the legal force
and scope of the different documents, Ukraine contends that the decision not to accept in the
territory of Russia the validity of the conformity assessment certificates issued in other CU countries
was explicitly prescribed in the letters identified in Annex III to its panel request, irrespective of the
nature of these documents.230
5.2.3.2 Analysis
5.78. We begin by recalling that "any act or omission attr ibutable to a WTO Member can be a
measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings."231 In identifying a measure
and its characteristics, we have referred above to the standard under Article 11 of the DSU, which
requires a panel to "thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in its design and in its
operation, and identify its principal characteristics".232 Exactly what is required for a panel to do so
is bound to vary depending on the circumstances of each case.233 Panels enjoy a margin of discretion
to structure their assessment as they see fit, and they do not err under Article 11 of the DSU unless
they exceed their authority as the trier of facts.234 In terms of the question whether a complainant
has met its prima facie case to show the relevant features of the measure, a complainant need not
definitively persuade a panel of the soundness of its position. Instead, a complainant meets its
prima facie burden by presenting sufficient arguments and evidence "to raise a presumption in
favour of its claim".235
5.79. In the present case, the Panel found that Ukraine's challenge was directed at Russia's decision
not to recognize the validity of certificates issued for Ukrainian railway products by certification
bodies in other CU countries. The Panel considered Ukraine's submission that this decision can be
found in Protocol No. A 4-3 and two individual d ecisions contained in the letters listed in Annex III
to Ukraine's panel request. The Panel also understood Ukraine to argue that Russia based its alleged
decisions contained in Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters on its interpretation of CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.236 The Panel then proceeded with its own examination of the evidence to
assess the arguments and evidence put forward by Ukraine. Specifically, the Panel examined
Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters at issue, and noted that they indicate that the Russian authorities
decided that the relevant certificates issued by the Belarusian certification body were not valid in

226 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 115-116.
227 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 154 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the
Panel, paras. 351-378; second written submission to the Panel, paras. 320-381).
228 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 155 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the
Panel, para. 373).
229 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 162.
230 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 163.
231 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 171.
232 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 586 (quoting Appellate Body
233 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157. See also e.g. Appellate Body Reports,
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.110.
234 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 151.
235 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 66. See also
e.g. Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 134.
236 Panel Report, paras. 7.811-7.812 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 4, 315, 373, 377, and 398; second written submission to the Panel, para. 339).

Russia's territory.237 The documents at issue also indicated that these decisions were the result of
the Russian authorities' interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 that a certificate cannot
be validly issued under the regulation unless, inter alia, the products were manufactured within the
CU territory.238 In the Panel's view, the decisions at issue were explicitly based on C U Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as interpreted by the Russian authorities themselves.
5.80. Contrary to what Russia asserts on appeal, the Panel did not base its finding that the
third measure existed on an unsubstantiated presumption of existence of a single measure capable
of being challenged. Rather, the Panel assessed the relationships and interactions among the
different instruments at issue and confirmed that: (i) the alleged decisions not to recognize
certificates issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2 011 in other CU countries to products
manufactured outside the CU territory were contained in Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters
submitted by Ukraine as evidence; and (ii) these decisions were based on the Russian authorities'
interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. Accordingly, the Panel assessed the arguments
and evidence put forward by Ukraine in order to make a prima facie case that the third measure
existed as a single measure.
5.81. In any event, we note that Russia's claim is based on its assertion that differences in the legal
force and scope of application of the different documents proffered as evidence of a single measure
must be taken into consideration, on the basis of the panel's finding in US – COOL.239 However, we
do not see that panel's statement to stand for the proposition Russia puts forward. In particular, the
question before the panel in US – COOL was whether to treat several requirements or provisions as
a single measure or multiple measures, which is different from the question of what arguments and
evidence are required for establishing a prima facie case regarding the existence of a single measure
as we face here.240 In addition, with respect to the question whether to treat several requirements
or provisions as a single measure or multiple measures, the panel in US – COOL did not set out any
specific criteria, but stressed that the analysis requires case-specific considerations.241
5.2.3.3 Conclusion
5.82. Russia has not established that Ukraine failed to meet its prima facie burden to establish the
existence of the third measure as a single measure. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding , in
paragraph 7.861 of the Panel Report, that the third measure had been demonstrated to exist.
5.2.4 Russia's claim that the Panel erred in finding that the third measure was within its
terms of reference
5.2.4.1 Arguments on appeal
5.83. Russia requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that th e third measure, as described in the
Panel Report, fell within the Panel's terms of reference. According to Russia, the Panel acted
inconsistently with Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU by finding that the third measure, as framed by
Ukraine in its first wri tten submission to the Panel and as determined to exist by the Panel, was
within the Panel's terms of reference.242 Russia contends that, consequently, the measure assessed
by the Panel was not the third measure that was within its terms of reference, and th at the Panel
erred under Article 11 of the DSU by improperly expanding its jurisdiction, and examining and ruling
on that measure.
5.84. First, Russia argues that the descriptions of the third measure in Ukraine's written submissions
to the Panel are "different, by description, nature, coverage, and content" from the third measure
identified in its panel request.243 In this regard, Russia alleges that the Panel improperly relied on
the third narrative paragraph of section II of the panel request in its analysis of whether the third
measure described by Ukraine in its first written submission to the Panel was within t he Panel's

237 Panel Report, para. 7.846.
238 Panel Report, para. 7.847.
239 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 109 (referring to Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.50);
opening statement at the oral hearing.
242 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 44.
243 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 69.

terms of reference.244 In Russia's view, "the plain meaning of the text of the third measure indicates
that Ukraine challenged [CU] Technical Regulation No. 001/2011 as such, read together with
[Protocol No. A 4-3] and the instructions mentioned in Annex III."245 Russia notes that, in contrast,
Ukraine described the third measure in its first written submission as: "the decision of the Russian
Federation not to accept in its territory the validity of the conformity assessment certificates issued
to Ukrainian producers in other CU countries"246; "additional requirements", i.e. the local production
condition and the local registration condition247; "the conformity assessment procedures" set out in
Article 6(9) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 read together with a certain letter in Annex III248;
and "administration" of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, read together with Protocol No. A 4-3
and the decisions in Annex III to the panel request.249 To Russia, these different permutations of the
description of the third measure in Ukraine's first written submissions to the Panel constitute
separate measures.
5.85. Second, Russia argues that the Panel erred in referring to the third measure as "the alleged
non-recognition requirement flowing from CU Technical Regulation 00 1/2011".250 Moreover, Russia
alleges that the Panel referred to this measure in ways different from how it had been presented to
it by Ukraine's panel request. According to Russia, neither Ukraine's panel request nor its first written
submission to the Panel identified the third measure found to exist by the Panel. Russia contends
that the Panel's characterization of the third measure was erroneous because "[t]he Panel's
description of the measure is not how Ukraine presented its own understanding of the third measure"
in its panel request.251 As such, "the Panel's finding that it was Ukraine who had identified the third
measure [as the Panel described it] [was] clearly wrong" 252, and rather "the Panel played a
complaining party's role in 'identify[ing ] the specific measure at issue' at the later stage in the
process" by adopting a description of the measure that Ukraine did not present.253
5.86. In response, Ukraine requests us to uphold the Panel's finding that the third measure
challenged in its written submissions was within the Panel's terms of reference.254 Ukraine contends
that the Panel correctly identified the third measure by reading the list of the instruments in
section II of its panel request together with the narrative paragraphs.255 Accordingly, Ukraine insists
that its panel request "clearly and correctly identifie [d] the specific measure" at issue and met the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.256 In addition, Ukraine recalls that the Panel found that there
is no single way in which a challenged me asure must be identified.257 According to Ukraine, this is
because whether a panel request adequately identifies the specific measures at issue depends on
the particular context in which those measures exist and operate.258 In this case, Ukraine contends
that the Panel correctly considered that Ukraine's panel request sufficiently identifies the measure
at issue and met the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.259 With respect to Russia's claim under
Article 11 of the DSU, Ukraine contends that the Panel conduc ted a detailed analysis of the
arguments raised by Russia. 260 Noting that a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 cannot be
based simply on the conclusion that the Appellate Body might have reached a different factual finding
from the one that the panel reached261, Ukraine contends that Russia failed to establish that the
Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11.262

244 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 61 and 65.
245 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 77. See also ibid., para. 70.
246 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 70. (emphasis added)
247 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 71.
248 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 72.
249 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 73.
250 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 85.
251 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 87. (emphasis original)
252 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 87.
253 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 92.
254 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 121.
255 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 74.
256 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 74.
257 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 81 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.92).
258 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 80-81.
259 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 82.
260 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 84.
261 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 83 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten,
para. 151).
262 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 85.

5.87. According to Ukraine, based on a proper reading of its panel request, the third measure
identified in the panel request is Russia's " decision not to accept in its territory the validity of the
conformity assessment certificates issued to Ukrainian producers in other CU countries and not to
register such producers for operation in its territory".263 Viewed in this light, Ukraine considers that
the t hird measure identified in its panel request had not been modified in its subsequent
submissions264, and that the Panel's description of the third measure also comported with the
third measure as identified in the panel request. 265 On the basis of the foregoin g considerations,
Ukraine also requests that we dismiss Russia's claim that its due process rights were prejudiced.266
5.88. With respect to Russia's claim that different permutations of the third measure in Ukraine's
written submissions constitute different "meas ures", Ukraine first notes that the portions of the
Panel Report Russia takes issue with are merely "explaining the context of the third
measure … and … do not contain any additional meaning or definitions" of the third measure. 267
Ukraine contends that it h as not claimed that the various permutations of the third measure are
separate measures, but that they are "component parts" and "practical realization" of the third
measure.268 With respect to Russia's claim that the Panel modified the third measure from ho w it
was presented by Ukraine, Ukraine recalled that the third measure, properly read from the panel
request, is "the decision of the Russian Federation not to accept in its territory the validity of the
conformity assessment certificates issued to Ukraini an producers in other CU countries" .269 That
"decision" is contained in Protocol No. A 4-3 explicitly referred to in the panel request, and it
establishes the local production condition based on the authorities' interpretation of CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.270 Thus, Ukraine contends that the Panel's description of the third measure as
"a general non-recognition requirement which [the relevant Russian authorities] considered to flow
from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it" was correct.271
5.2.4.2 Analysis
5.89. The participants disagree as to whether the third measure Ukraine challenged, and the Panel
understood and assessed for conformity with the covered agreements , was the third measure that
Ukraine had identified in its panel request. In particular, the Panel found that the third measure
identified in the panel request is the alleged requirement that Russia's authorities must not recognize
certificates issued in other CU countries if the certified railway products were not produced in a
CU country.272 The Panel then found that the relevant Russian authorities applied a "general
non-recognition requirement, which these authorities considered to flow from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it", according to which the Russian authorities were not to
recognize certificates issued under the regulation in other CU countries if the certified products were
not produced in a CU country. 273 For its part, Russia contends that what Ukraine had identified as
the third measure in the panel request is "[CU] Technical Regulation 001/2011 … read together with
[Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters listed in Annex III to the panel request]". 274 Thus, to Russia,
neither the third measure the Panel found to exist nor the third measure challenged by Ukraine fell
within the Panel's terms of reference.
5.90. With respect to Russia's separate claim that the Panel erred in its preliminary ruling , in
section 5.1 above, we disagreed with Russia that the Panel erred in finding that the third measure
identified in Ukraine's panel request is the alleged requirement that Russia's authorities must not
recognize certificates issued in other CU countries if the certified railway products were not produced
in a CU country.275 In particular, we found that the Panel was correct in considering the panel request
as a whole, including the third narrative paragraph of section II thereof. Here, Russia claims that
the Panel acted inconsistently with Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU by finding that the third measure,

263 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 95. (emphasis original)
264 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 97.
265 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 106-107.
266 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 117-119.
267 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 115.
268 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 116.
269 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 124.
270 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 124-125.
271 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 127.
272 Panel Report, para. 7.103.
273 Panel Report, para. 7.861.
274 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 70 (quoting Ukraine's panel request, p. 2).
275 Panel Report, para. 7.103.

as described by Ukraine in its first written submission to the Panel, and as determined by the Panel,
was within the Panel's terms of reference. This claim is based on the very premise we rejected in
our analysis of Russia's claims relating to the Panel's preliminary ruling, namely, that the Panel erred
in finding the third measure to consist of a requirement that Russia's authorities must not recognize
certificates issued in other CU countries if the certified railway products were not produced in a
CU country. Having rejected that contention, we must for the same reason also reject the contention
that the Panel erred in finding that the third measure, as framed by Ukraine in its first written
submission to the Panel and as determined to exist by the Pan el, was within the Panel's terms of
reference.
5.2.4.3 Conclusion
5.91. Russia's claim regarding the terms of reference concerning the third measure is based on the
premise that the Panel erred in its preliminary ruling. We have rejected that allegation of error and
upheld the Panel's preliminary ruling. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding , in
paragraphs 7.823 and 8.1.d.i of the Panel Report, that the non -recognition requirement based on
the local production condition is properly before the Panel.
5.2.5 Russia's claim that the Panel erred by mak ing findings with respect to the alleged
registration condition
5.2.5.1 Arguments on appeal
5.92. Russia requests us to reverse the Panel's erroneous "findings" concerning the local registration
condition.276 Russia recalls that the Panel found that "[n]on -recognition resulting from a failure to
meet the alleged registration condition is … not a measure within [its] t erms of reference."
Consequently, the Panel concluded that it will "not make findings with regard to those of Ukraine's
claims about non -recognition that relate to the alleged registration condition". 277 Russia contends
that, despite this finding, the Panel continued making findings with respect to the alleged registration
condition and it took these findings into account. Russia alleges that this constitutes an error under
Article 11 of the DSU.278
5.93. Ukraine, for its part, requests us to uphold the Panel findin gs challenged by Russia. 279 In
Ukraine's view , the Panel did not exceed its mandate by referring to the local registration
condition.280
5.2.5.2 Analysis
5.94. Russia claims that the Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment of the matter before
it because it "consider[ed] the alleged [local] registration condition as if this element of the third
measure as described in Ukraine's [first written submission] had been within the Panel's terms of
reference".281 Thus, the question before us is whether the challenged paragraphs of the Panel Report
regarding the local registration condition constitute an assessment of a matter that was not before
the Panel.
5.95. Article 11 of the DSU provides that a panel should make an objective assessment of the
"matter" before it. The term "matter" is referred to in Article 7 of the DSU. The Appellate Body has
stated that "[t]he measures and the claims identified in the panel request constitute the 'matter
referred to the DSB', which serves as a basis for the panel's terms of reference under Articl e 7.1 of
the DSU."282 Article 11 of the DSU also refers to the "matter" before the panel , and it requires a

276 Russia's other appellant's submission, paras. 105-106. According to Russia, these "findings" are
contained in paragraphs 7.847, 7.849-7.850 (third and fourth sentences), 7.853-7.854, 7.861, 7.897, 7.899,
7.917, and 7.926 of the Panel Report. (Ibid., para. 106)
277 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 102 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.825).
278 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 101.
279 Ukraine's appellee's submission, para. 150.
280 Ukraine's appellee's submission, paras. 147 and 149.
281 Russia's other appellant's submission, para. 105.
282 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Radionuclides, para. 5.113 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72-73; US – Carbon Steel, para. 125; Australia – Apples, para. 416;
China – Raw Materials, para. 219).

panel to make an objective assessment of that "matter". 283 More specifically, Article 11 requires
panels to conduct an objective assessment, including a n objective assessment of the facts of the
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements. Not every error
in the appreciation of evidence will necessarily rise to the level of a failure by a panel to comply with
its duties under Article 11 of the DSU. For example, some inconsequential inaccuracies may not
necessarily constitute a violation of Article 11 of the DSU as long as they do not undermine the
remainder of the panel's analysis.284 Only those errors that are so material that, "taken together or
singly", they undermine the objectivity of the panel's assessment of the matter lead to a violation
of Article 11 of the DSU.285 The Appellate Body has also found that panels have not exceeded their
terms of reference when making certain purely descriptive comments that did not rise to the level
of legal findings or conclusions.286
5.96. With that in mind, we turn to assess whether, in considering the local registration condition,
the Panel exceeded its terms of reference and thereby acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU. Russia takes issue with the following statements made by the Panel. First, paragrap hs 7.847
and 7.849, in the section titled "Existence of the [third] measure at issue" of the Panel Report,
contain the Panel's factual examination of the three letters from Russia's Federal ART to Ukrainian
producers that Ukraine submitted as evidence. Sec ond, paragraphs 7.850 (the third and the
fourth sentences), 7.853, and 7.854 also appear in the same section , and the Panel indicated in
these paragraphs its understanding of the "non -recognition requirement" and the
Russian authorities' interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011. Third, paragraph 7.861 is
the conclusion of the "Existence of the [third] measure at issue" section, where the Panel found that
the third measure had been demonstrated to exist. Lastly, paragraphs 7.897, 7.899, 7.917,
and 7.926 appear in the sections addressing Ukraine's claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994 with respect to the third measure. More specifically, these paragraphs appear in the
context of the Panel's assessment of whether Ukrainian railway produ cts and certain other goods
are "like", and whether Russia treated Ukrainian railway products less favourably.
5.97. With respect to the first group of paragraphs in the Panel Report challenged by Russia under
this claim, namely, paragraphs 7.847 and 7.849 of the Panel Report, the Panel described the content
of Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters submitted by Ukraine as evidence of the third measure. In
paragraph 7.847, the Panel noted that the Russian authorities provided their interpretation of
Articles 1(1) and 6(9) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 in Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters.
According to this interpretation, a certificate cannot be validly issued under CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 unless the local production condition and the local registratio n condition are
met. In paragraph 7.849, the Panel continued to describe the content of Protocol No. A 4-3 and the
letters, and clarified that the reference to the local registration condition is found in only two of the
letters, but not in the Protocol.
5.98. In our view, these remarks by the Panel are descriptive comments regarding the evidence
put forward by Ukraine concerning the third measure at issue. According to the Panel's examination
of the evidence, particularly the 2016 letters, both the local product ion condition and the local
registration condition were mentioned together in each letter. In this way, the local production
condition and the local registration condition were part of the same evidence put before the Panel
by Ukraine to prove the existence of the third measure. In this context, we do not consider that the
Panel exceeded its terms of reference by merely describing the content of the evidence before it. As
noted above, by making descriptive comments about a piece of evidence, a panel does not
necessarily exceed its terms of reference, especially where such statements do not amount to legal
findings or conclusions.
5.99. We now turn to the second group of paragraphs in the Panel Report challenged by Russia
under this claim. In the third and t he fourth sentences of paragraph 7.850, the Panel addressed
Russia's argument that the letters concern products from only two Ukrainian producers and that the
letters are not of general application. In response to that argument , the Panel observed in the
third sentence that nothing in the Protocol or the letters suggests that the Russian authorities'

283 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Radionuclides, para. 5.113.
284 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, paras. 185-186.
285 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 992 (quoting Appellate Body
Reports, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 499; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1318).
See also Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 5.178-5.179.
286 Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, para. 110; US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 17,
DSR 1997:I, p. 338.

interpretation of Articles 1(1) and 6(9) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 would not be generally
applicable and would apply only to Ukrainian products. In the fourth sentence, the Panel concluded
that "the relevant documents provide a general interpretation" on the basis of its examination of
Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters. Turning next to paragraphs 7.853 and 7.854, we note that the
Panel, in paragraph 7.853, considered that Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters support its view that
the Russian authorities applied a general non -recognition requirement, which they considered to
flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it. In paragraph 7.854, the Panel
stressed that the evidence indicates that the non -recognition requirement flows from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as "interpreted" by the Russian authorities. Accordingly, the Panel found that
Ukraine's panel request correctly identified CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as the source of the
non-recognition requirement as interpreted and applied by Russia in the Protocol and the letters.
5.100. We do not see that the Panel made findings regarding the local registration condition per se
in these paragraphs. Notably, there is no mention of the local registration condition. While
paragraphs 7.853 and 7.854 refer to the "non-recognition requirement", which, based on the Panel's
examination of the evidence in preceding paragraphs, encompasses the local registration condition,
it also encompasses the local production condition, which the Panel found to be within its terms of
reference. Similarly, in paragraph 7.850, the Panel concluded that "[t]he relevant documents
provide a general interpretation ." T his interpretation includes not only the interpretation of
Article 6(9) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 that concerns the local registration condition , but
also the interpretation of Article 1(1) of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 that concerns the lo cal
production condition. In our view, the Panel considered the "non -recognition requirement" and the
interpretation of CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 provided in the documents at issue as a whole,
and extrapolated relevant features to clarify its unders tanding of the third measure at issue.
For example, in paragraph 7.853, the Panel considered that Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters show
that a general "non-recognition requirement" was applied, before concluding that "[t]he situations
in which that requirement was applied included those where a certificate had been issued in another
CU country in violation of the production condition." In paragraphs 7.850 and 7.854, the Panel
concludes that the "non-recognition requirement" flows from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 and
that the documents provide a "general" interpretation, which underpin the Panel's understanding
that the third measure is of a general character and flows from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011.287
As we see it, in the challenged paragraphs o f the Panel Report, the Panel considered evidence
concerning the local production condition and the third measure at issue, but it did not make any
findings regarding the local registration condition per se.
5.101. In paragraph 7.861, the Panel concluded that the third measure had been demonstrated to
exist. In so doing, the Panel found that the third measure consists of the non -recognition
requirement, which the Russian authorities considered to flow from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011 as they interpreted it, for products not meeting the local production condition
or the local registration condition. In this context, the Panel made reference to the local registration
condition when describing the content of the "non-recognition requirement". However, in our view,
this reference to the local registration condition is part of the Panel's reasoning for its finding
regarding the existence of the third measure. In this regard, we recall that the Panel found that the
evidence, i.e. Protocol No. A 4-3 and the letters, contained both the local production condition and
the local registration condition. As such, these documents supported t he Panel's conclusion that
Russia applied the "non -recognition requirement" encompassing both conditions, which in turn,
formed the basis of the Panel's finding that the third measure had been demonstrated to exist. Thus,
we do not find that the Panel made any "finding" regarding the local registration condition per se,
but rather that the Panel based its conclusion regarding the existence of the third measure on its
examination of the evidence before it.
5.102. Moreover, the Panel's reference to the local registr ation condition in the "Existence of the
[third] measure" section should be viewed in light of the Panel's conclusion in that section contained
in paragraph 7.862 that "the non-recognition requirement falls within the Panel's terms of reference
only to the extent that it requires non-recognition in situations where the certified products were not

287 The Panel found that the "third measure ha[d] been demonstrated to exist" on the basis that the
evidence supported the conclusion that the relevant Russian authorities "applied a general non-recognition
requirement, which these authorities considered to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 as they
interpreted it". Subsequently, the Panel clarified that the third measure within its terms of reference concerns
only the local production condition. (Panel Report, paras. 7.861-7.862)

produced in a CU country." 288 The Panel's conclusion demonstrates that it was mindful of the
limitation of its terms of reference, and in particular of the fact that its terms of reference did not
include the local registration condition. As we see it, paragraph 7.862 thus qualifies the Panel's
findings regarding the existence of the third measure in the sense that the Panel's findings concern
that measure only as far as the local production condition is concerned.
5.103. We now turn to the third group of paragraphs of the Panel Report challenged by Russia under
the claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by making "findings"
regarding the local registration condition, consisting of paragraphs 7.897, 7.899, 7.917, and 7.926
of the Panel Report. Paragraphs 7.897 and 7.899 are in the Panel's analysis of like imported products
in the context of Ukraine's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 with r espect to the
third measure. In paragraph 7.897, the Panel examined Ukraine's argument 289 that the
third measure distinguishes between products based solely on the origin of the product. The Panel
began its analysis by recalling that, under the "non-recognition requirement", the Russian authorities
would not recognize a certificate issued under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 by other
CU countries for a product manufactured in Ukraine. The Panel compared a Ukrainian product , on
the one hand, and a Belarusian and Kazakh product, on the other. In making this comparison, the
Panel assumed that the applicants in each case were registered in the country of the relevant
conformity authorities, i.e. that they satisfied the local registration condition. Based on this analysis,
the Panel concluded that the only basis for the difference in treatment between the products is where
they were produced. Consequently, the Panel found that the non -recognition requirement in some
situations draws a distinction based on the orig in of the products. In paragraph 7.899, the Panel,
based on its analysis, concluded that "the non -recognition requirement in certain situations results
in an origin-based distinction between imported railway products, [and] the likeness of the products
can be presumed."290
5.104. Paragraphs 7.917 and 7.926 of the Panel Report are found in the section containing the
Panel's analysis of the third measure with respect to Ukraine's claim under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994. In paragraph 7.917, the Panel examined whether imported and domestic products are
"like". Similarly to its analysis under Article I:1, the Panel began by recalling that under the
non-recognition requirement, the Russian authorities would not recognize a certificate issued under
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 by other CU countries for a product manufactured in Ukraine.
The Panel then compared a Ukrainian product to a Russian product. In making this comparison, the
Panel assumed that the applicants in each case were registered in the country of the relevant
conformity authorities, i.e. that they had satisfied the local registration condition. Based on this
analysis, the Panel concluded that , in certain situations, the Ukrainian products and the domestic
(Russian) products were treated differently bas ed solely on where they were produced. In
paragraph 7.926, the Panel examined whether there is "less favourable" treatment within the
meaning of Article III:4. The Panel recalled that under the non -recognition requirement, a product
produced in Ukraine and a product produced domestically (in Russia) will be treated differently in
certain situations, namely, when both products satisfy the local registration condition. Accordingly,
the Panel concluded that "the non-recognition requirement in certain situations (when the applicant
for certification is registered at the place where the certification body is also located) distorts the
conditions of competition to the detriment of that sub -category of imported products which
comprises products not produced in a CU country." Moreover, the Panel determined that the
non-recognition requirement accords "less favourable" treatment to these imported products as
compared to the like domestic products.291
5.105. In our view, these findings by the Panel concerned the third measure a s it relates to the
local production condition. Specifically, as summarized above, in these paragraphs the Panel found
that the Ukrainian products were treated differently based on where they were produced. The Panel
made no findings about the treatment based on whether an applicant company is registered in the
country of the conformity assessment authority. It is true that the Panel made remarks regarding
the local registration condition, but these were only made in order to isolate the impact of the local

288 Panel Report, para. 7.862.
289 Panel Report, para. 7.896.
290 The Panel recalled that such situations would arise where:
[T]wo imported railway products have been certified in a CU country; one was produced in the
CU, the other was produced outside the CU; and the applicant in each case was registered in the
CU country where it applied for the certificate.
(Panel Report, para. 7.899)
291 Panel Report, para. 7.926.

production condition. In other words, had the Panel not assumed that the products at issue were
comparable in all aspects other than their place of manufacture, the Panel could not render a finding
regarding the impact of the local production condition. Thus, we consider that these remarks do not
constitute findings per se, but that the Panel was describing aspects of its comparative analysis.
Therefore, we do not consider these remarks regarding the local registration condition to be an
assessment or "finding" regarding the local registration condition per se.
5.2.5.3 Conclusion
5.106. The Panel's statements challenged by Russia as constituting "findings" concerning the local
registration condition were either merely descriptive statements or concerned the third measure
within the Panel's terms of reference. Consequently, we find that Russia has failed to establish that
the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by continuing to make findings with respect
to a matter that was not within its terms of reference.
5.3 Ukraine's claim under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
5.107. We now turn to Ukraine's claim that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement and failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before
it pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine failed to establish that Russia had acted
inconsistently with Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. Ukraine requests us to reverse the Panel's
conclusions in paragraphs 8.1.b.i and 8.1.c.i of the Panel Report.292
5.3.1 The Panel's findings
5.108. The Panel noted that Articl e 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement establishes obligations to provide
national treatment and most -favoured nation treatment with regard to access for suppliers from
other Members to covered conformity assessment procedures of importing Members. 293 In the
Panel's v iew, an importing Member acts inconsistently with Article 5.1.1 if three elements are
established: (i) the suppliers of another Member that have been granted less favourable access are
suppliers of products that are "like" the products of domestic supplier s or suppliers from any other
country that have been granted more favourable access; (ii) the importing Member (through the
preparation, adoption, or application of a covered conformity assessment procedure) "grants access"
for suppliers of products from a nother Member "under conditions less favourable" than those
accorded to suppliers of domestic products or products from any other country; and (iii) the
importing Member grants access under conditions less favourable for suppliers of like products "in a
comparable situation".294
5.109. Regarding the first element, the Panel considered that the same criteria that are applied for
determining whether products are "like" in the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement are
applicable in the context of Article 5.1.1.295 With respect to the phrase "conditions no less
favourable", the Panel observed that differential access conditions would be relevant under
Article 5.1.1 if they modified the conditions of competition, or competitive opportunities, among
relevant suppliers of like products to the detriment of suppliers of the complaining Member. 296 The
Panel recalled that Ukraine challenged not the preparation or adoption of a conformity assessment
procedure (i.e. not a conformity assessment procedure as such), but the application of a conformity
assessment procedure to particular Ukrainian suppliers (i.e. individual instances of application of the
procedure).297 According to the Panel, in the case of such challenge, less favourable access
conditions exist "where the importing Member denies or limits the right or possibility of a supplier of
another Member to have conformity assessment activities undertaken under the rules of the
applicable conformity assessment procedure, either in respect of the entire conformity assessment
procedure or any of its relevant parts, but does not deny or limit the right or possibility of access of
another supplier of a like product from the importing Member or any other country."298

292 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 175 and 258.
293 Panel Report, para. 7.248.
294 Panel Report, para. 7.251.
295 Panel Report, para. 7.254.
296 Panel Report, para. 7.260.
297 Panel Report, para. 7.261.
298 Panel Report, para. 7.261.

5.110. Furthermore, the Panel took account of the fact that , unlike in Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, the text of Article 5.1.1 qualifies the non-discrimination obligations by including the
phrase "in a comparable situation". 299 In the Panel's view, this phrase "confirms that Article 5.1.1
permits differential access conditions where they concern situations that are not comparable", and
"preserves a degree of flexibility for the importing Member to design and apply its conformity
assessment procedures in a situation -appropriate manner". 300 The Panel was therefore no t
persuaded that there is a need to import into Article 5.1.1 the test developed by the Appellate Body
for determining the existence of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.301
5.111. With regard to the interpretation of the term "in a c omparable situation", the Panel noted
that it "qualifies the preceding part of the first sentence of Article 5.1.1, that is, the requirement to
grant access under no less favourable conditions".302 The Panel considered that "this phrase warrants
a comparison of differential conditions of access with a view to determining whether the less
favourable conditions of access are being granted despite the situation being comparable." 303 For
the Panel, the relevant context for assessing whether a situation is comparabl e, such that no less
favourable access conditions must be granted, is that of assessing conformity under the rules of the
procedure and conducting conformity assessment activities. Referring to the definition of conformity
assessment procedures in Annex 1.3 to the TBT Agreement, the Panel concluded that "aspects of a
situation that have a bearing on, for instance, the ability of the importing Member to undertake such
activities under the rules of the procedure with adequate confidence would, in principle, seem to be
relevant", and that "the relevant aspects of a situation would include aspects specific to the suppliers
who are claimed to have been granted access under less favourable conditions or to the location of
the suppliers' facilities."304
5.112. Turning to th e application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to the 14 instructions
through which the FBO suspended valid certificates of conformity held by Ukrainian producers of
railway products, the Panel considered that Ukraine "has the burden of demonstrating that Russia
applied its conformity assessment procedure for railway products so as to grant access for suppliers
of like products originating in Ukraine under conditions less favourable than those accorded to
suppliers of like Russian products or like products from other countries, in a comparable situation".305
For the purpose of examining the elements necessary to demonstrate an inconsistency with
Article 5.1.1, the Panel assumed that the relevant Ukrainian suppliers are suppliers of railway
products "like" those of the Russian and other foreign suppliers that Ukraine alleges to enjoy better
access conditions.306
5.113. With respect to the question whether Russia granted access for specific suppliers of products
from another Member under conditions less favourable, the Panel considered that the inspection
controls at issue fell within the definition of "conformity assessment procedures" in Annex 1.3 to the
TBT Agreement.307 The evidence before the Panel demonstrated that, through the 14 instructions,
the FBO suspended valid certificates held by the five affected suppliers of Ukrainian railway products
with the reason that the conditions for inspection control were not present at the time of issuance
of the corresponding instruction, and therefore "did not grant the affe cted suppliers of Ukrainian
railway products access to inspection control, which is part of Russia's conformity assessment
procedure for railway products". 308 At the same time, the FBO granted suppliers of Russian and
European railway products access to such inspection control. 309 For the Panel, this difference
modified the conditions of competition for access to Russia's conformity assessment procedure for
railway products to the detriment of each of the affected Ukrainian suppliers.310 The Panel thus found
that "Russia, by issuing the 14 challenged instructions, applied its conformity assessment procedure

299 Panel Report, para. 7.271.
300 Panel Report, para. 7.272.
301 Panel Report, para. 7.273.
303 Panel Report, para. 7.282.
304 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
305 Panel Report, paras. 7.286-7.287.
306 Panel Report, para. 7.292.
307 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
308 Panel Report, para. 7.301.
309 Panel Report, para. 7.302.
310 Panel Report, para. 7.305.

so as to grant access for the relevant suppliers of Ukrainian railway products under conditions less
favourable than those accorded to suppliers of Russian and European railway products."311
5.114. Concerning the question whether Ukrainian suppliers and those from other Members are
"in a comparable situation", the Panel took the view that "conducting an objective assessment of
the matter entails reviewing the explanation s provided both in the challenged instructions and by
Russia in these proceedings" on the basis of the evidence on the record.312 In its overall assessment
of the evidence on the record, the Panel underscored that while importing Members should not lightly
be allowed to invoke an inability to carry out parts of their conformity assessment procedure, as this
could undermine market -access commitments, inspections are often carried out abroad by
government officials of the importing Member and in some situations their life or health may be at
risk.313 For the Panel, in the specific circumstances of the dispute, "the importing Member in applying
Article 5.1.1 may confront the need to weigh and balance the interests of suppliers of products
originating in the territories of other Members in an assessment of conformity against its interest in
safeguarding the life or health of its employees when undertaking conformity assessment activities,
such as inspections, abroad."314
5.115. Based on the evidence before it, the Panel cons idered that the FBO could be justifiably
concerned about the life or health of any employees that it sent to Ukraine to carry out inspections.
Specifically, the Panel took the view that the situation "during the relevant time-period was marked
by instabili ty and unpredictability, and this was also reflected in the travel advice that Russia's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued for the benefit of its own citizens".315 In sum, the Panel found that,
"during the relevant time-period, the FBO did not act outside it s margin of discretion by balancing
the interests of Ukrainian suppliers and FBO employees and then erring on the side of ensuring the
safety of the latter and determining that the conditions for carrying out inspection control in Ukraine
were not satisfied."316 The Panel therefore stated that, "in this instance related to risks to life and
health of FBO inspectors, over the time -frame examined above, the situation in Ukraine was not
comparable to other countries."317 On this basis, the Panel concluded that, "between April 2014 and
December 2016, Ukrainian suppliers of railway products were denied no less favourable access in a
situation that was not comparable to the situation in which Russia granted access to suppliers of
Russian railway products and suppliers of railway products from other countries."318
5.3.2 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.116. On appeal, Ukraine requests us to reverse the Panel's conclusions that Ukraine failed to
establish that Russia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement.319 In
Ukraine's view, the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the phrase "in a comparable
situation" in Article 5.1.1 by failing to elaborate on what exactly has to be compared. Specifically,
Ukraine considers that the Panel provided a very limited interpretation of the phrase "in a comparable
situation" and did not clarify whether an assessment of the situation of a country as a whole or that
of the relevant suppliers is required. 320 Ukraine also argues that, in applying this provision to the
facts of the case, the Panel focused on the risk to life or health of Russian inspectors, rather than on
aspects specific to the suppliers at issue or the location of the suppliers' facilities. 321 Furthermore,
Ukraine takes issue with an analogy the Panel made between the objective of conformity assessment
procedures under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, on the one hand, and the legitimate objective
of protecting human life or health under Article 2.2 of that agreement, on the other. According to
Ukraine, the phrase "a comparable situation" may not be understood as a basis for an importing
Member to act for the protection of the interests recognized in the sixth recital of the preamble of

311 Panel Report, para. 7.306.
312 Panel Report, para. 7.314.
313 Panel Report, paras. 7.374-7.375.
314 Panel Report, para. 7.376.
315 Panel Report, para. 7.380.
316 Panel Report, para. 7.384.
317 Panel Report, para. 7.387.
318 Panel Report, para. 7.387.
319 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 175 and 258 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.387,
7.393-7.394, 8.1.b.i, and 8.1.c.i).
320 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 236 and 257. See also Ukraine's opening statement at the
oral hearing, para. 4.
321 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 247-248 and 255 (referring to Panel Report,
paras. 7.283-7.284).

the TBT Agreement without the protection of those interests being directly linked to the situation of
the suppliers subject to the measures at issue with respect to conditions of access to the conformity
assessment procedure.322
5.117. Ukraine further submits that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter
in its analysis of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement by failing to: (i) accurately determine adequate
burden of proof; (ii) apply the correct standard of review; and (iii) conduct an objective assessment
of Russia's evidence concerning the security situation in Ukraine in its examination of whether Russia
granted to Ukrainian suppliers' access under less favourable conditions in a comparable situation.
5.118. In response, Russia requests us to uphold the Panel's conclusions under Article 5.1.1.323
Russia submits that the Panel correctly interpreted and applied the term "in a comparable situation"
under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement.324 In particular, Russia argues that the "supplier-specific"
assessment of comparability suggested by Ukraine is an excessively literal reading of Article 5.1.1.
In Russia's view, the negotiating history of Article 5.1.1 strongly suggests that it is the situations in
particular countries that should be compared and not those of particular suppliers. 325 Russia
considers that, having stated th at "whether a situation is comparable must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis"326 and having scrutinized the evidence on the record in its totality, the Panel
arrived at the correct conclusion that "in this instance related to risks to life and health of
FBO inspectors … the situation in Ukraine was not comparable to [that in] other countries." 327
Regarding the allegation that the Panel erred in drawing an analogy of legitimate objective under
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Russia points out that Ukraine di d not refer to particular
paragraphs of the Panel Report where the Panel based its decision on the similarity between
Articles 2.2 and 5.1.1.328 In addition, according to Russia, such an analogy is not inferable implicitly
from the Panel's reasoning, insofar as the link between those two provisions in the analysis is too
remote to consider that the Panel applied the legitimate objective under Article 2.2 to Article 5.1.1
by analogy.329
5.3.3 The Panel's interpretation of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
5.119. Article 5.1 of the TBT Agreement provides, in relevant part:
Article 5
Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Central Government Bodies
5.1 Members shall ensure that, in cases where a positive assurance of conformity with
technical regulations or standards is req uired, their central government bodies apply
the following provisions to products originating in the territories of other Members:
5.1.1 conformity assessment procedures are prepared, adopted and applied so
as to grant access for suppliers of like products originating in the territories of
other Members under conditions no less favourable than those accorded to
suppliers of like products of national origin or originating in any other country, in
a comparable situation; access entails suppliers' right to an assessment of
conformity under the rules of the procedure, including, when foreseen by this
procedure, the possibility to have conformity assessment activities undertaken at
the site of facilities and to receive the mark of the system[.]

322 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 252-254. See also Ukraine's opening statement at the oral
hearing, para. 20.
323 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 218 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.387, 8.1.b.i,
and 8.1.c.i).
324 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 203.
325 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 213 (referring to Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 240
and 242).
328 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 210.
329 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 211.

5.120. The title of Article 5 of the TBT Agreement indicates that the provision relates to procedures
for the assessment of conformity. Obligations therein apply with respect to a Member's "central
government bodies" where the Member requires "a positive assurance of conformity" with technical
regulations or standards. Conformity assessment procedures are defined in Annex 1.3 to the
TBT Agreement as "[a]ny procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant
requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled". Pursuant to the explanatory note to
Annex 1.3, conformity assessment procedures "include, inter alia, procedures for sampling, testing
and inspection; evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity; registration, accreditation and
approval as well as their combinations".
5.121. Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement consists of two clauses. Its first clause establishes a
national treatment obligation and a most -favoured nation treatment obligation regarding the
conditions of access to an assessment of co nformity to suppliers of like products. In particular, the
first clause of Article 5.1.1 specifies that conformity assessment procedures are to be prepared,
adopted, and applied so as to grant access for suppliers of like products originating in the territories
of other Members under conditions no less favourable than those accorded to suppliers of like
products of national origin or originating in any other country, in a comparable situation. Article 5.1.1
covers the preparation, adoption, and application of conformity assessment procedures. In turn, the
second clause defines "access" for purposes of the obligations in Article 5.1.1 as entailing "suppliers'
right to an assessment of conformity under the rules of the procedure, including, when foreseen by
this procedure, the possibility to have conformity assessment activities undertaken at the site of
facilities and to receive the mark of the system".
5.122. In contrast to other non -discrimination obligations, such as Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the obligations under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
attach to the suppliers of products as opposed to the product itself. At the same time, Article 5.1
stipulates that all provisions contained in Article 5 shall apply "to product s" originating in the
territories of other Members. Thus, while it is the suppliers that should be granted access to
conformity assessment under Article 5.1.1, it is the products that receive "a positive assurance of
conformity with technical regulations o r standards". Moreover, the fact that the adjective "like"
attaches to the noun "products" and not to "suppliers" makes clear that the "likeness" requirement
in Article 5.1.1 relates to the products. Indeed, the "likeness" of the products at issue is centr al in
defining the scope of the non -discrimination obligations under Article 5.1.1, such that there is no
obligation to grant access to conformity assessment under no less favourable conditions, if the
products being supplied are not "like". In other words, the products at issue must be in a competitive
relationship in the marketplace. Accordingly, the determination of likeness under Article 5.1.1
involves "a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and
among the products at issue".330
5.123. As the second clause of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement makes clear, the focus of the
non-discrimination obligations under Article 5.1.1 is on the conditions for access to a conformity
assessment granted to suppliers, i.e. on the factors or circumstances under which the opportunity
to benefit from conformity assessment is accorded to those suppliers. Article 5.1.1 prohibits the
granting of access to conformity assessment under less favourable conditions for suppliers of like
products originating in the territories of other Members, as compared to suppliers of like products of
national origin or originating in any other country.331 It thus requires an assessment of whether the
conditions for access to conformity assessment granted by the regu lating Member to suppliers of
domestic or third-country products modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of suppliers
of like imported products.332
5.124. In addition, the national treatment and most -favoured nation treatment obligations in
Article 5.1.1 are qualified by the phrase "in a comparable situation". The word "comparable" is
defined as "[a]ble to be compared, capable of comparison". 333 Two things can be considered to be
comparable "when there are sufficient similarities between the things that are compared as to make

330 See, for Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 120.
331 Similarly to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, Article 5.1.1 extends the non-discrimination requirement to
granting access under conditions no less favourable between suppliers from a WTO Member and suppliers of
like products from "any other country".
332 See, for Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 137.
333 Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of "comparable",
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37424.

that comparison worthy or meaningful". 334 Turning to the word "situation", we recall that the
obligations under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement concern the conditions for granting access to
conformity assessment for suppliers of like products. Thus, even though the word "situation" could
potentially encompass a large number of factors on the basis of which a comparison could be made,
the factors relevant for purposes of establishing the existence of a "comparable situation" under
Article 5.1.1 would be those with a bearing on the conditions for granting access to conformity
assessment in a particular case.335 Moreover, the second clause of Article 5.1.1 describes access as
"suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the rule s of the procedure ".336 Since this
procedure sets out the conditions for access to conformity assessment in a particular case, its rules
will also be relevant for defining the universe of situations to be compared.
5.125. Being placed at the end of the first claus e of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement and
separated by a comma from the rest of the clause, the words "in a comparable situation" relate to
the entire phrase "so as to grant access for suppliers … under conditions no less favourable", and
not only to the phrase "in any other country" or the "suppliers of like products". Thus, "in a
comparable situation" is not limited to qualifying only the suppliers or countries from which the like
products originate, rather it qualifies the entire requirement to grant a ccess to suppliers of like
products under no less favourable conditions. This indicates that whether a situation is "comparable"
for purposes of Article 5.1.1 should be assessed in relation to the measure at issue granting access
to conformity assessment to suppliers of like products and in light of the particular circumstances of
each case. In addition, we consider that the function of conformity assessment procedures, which is
to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards a re fulfilled, as
indicated in Annex 1.3 to the TBT Agreement, provides some guidance for the determination of a
"comparable situation".337 In light of this function, factors that impact the ability of Members to make
a determination that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled may be
relevant in the inquiry of "a comparable situation".
5.126. We further note that the obligations under Article 5.1.1 concern "access for suppliers of like
products"338 to conformity assessment. Moreover, the second clause of Article 5.1.1 defines "access"
as "suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity".339 It is therefore the suppliers of like products
that are entitled to an assessment of conformity under the rules of the procedure and under
conditions no less favourable. The second clause of Article 5.1.1 further specifies that this includes,
when foreseen by the conformity assessment procedure at issue, "the possibility to have conformity
assessment activities undertaken at the site of facilities and to receive the mark of the system". This
language in the second clause of Article 5.1.1 reaffirms the provision's focus on the suppliers and
the modalities of their right of access to conformity assessment. The focus on the situation of
suppliers in Article 5.1.1 is different from provisions containing similar language, for instance the
reference to "countries where the same conditions prevail" in the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994, and "Members where identical o r similar conditions prevail" in Article 2.3 of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), both of
which qualify requirements that measures do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination. Whereas the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 relates to "countries" and
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement to "Members", Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement specifically

334 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 476.
335 In the context of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body similarly observed
that while the term "conditions" could "potentially encompass a number of circumstances facing a country", in
the specific context in which that term appears in the chapeau "only 'conditions' that are relevant for the
purpose of establishing arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the light of the specific character of the
measure at issue and the circumstances of a particular case should be considered". (Appellate Body Reports,
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.299 (italics original; bold omitted))
336 Emphasis added.
337 We note that, differently from technical regulations or standards, which may pursue various
legitimate objectives, the function of conformity assessment procedures is to ensure that the underlying
technical regulations or standards are complied with. That the function of conformity assessment procedures is
limited to ensuring compliance is also confirmed by Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, which requires that
conformity assessment procedures not be more strict or applied more strictly than is necessary "to give the
importing Member adequate confidence that products conform with the applicable technical regulations or
standards".
338 Emphasis added.
339 Emphasis added.

refers to "suppliers". 340 The text of Article 5.1.1 therefore makes clear that comp arability of the
situations has to be assessed by reference to the "suppliers", and thus takes account of the fact that
conditions of access to conformity assessment may vary within a country.
5.127. We note Russia's view that the negotiating history of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
suggests that it is the situations in particular countries that should be compared and not the
suppliers.341 Specifically, Russia points out that the initial drafts of Article 5.1.1 did not contain the
qualifying phrase "in a compa rable situation", which was introduced later in the negotiations and
specifically after the words "in any other country".342 This, according to Russia, "reveals the intention
of the drafter [s] to qualify and narrow down the scope of application of the no les s favourable
treatment provisions" of Article 5.1.1343, and implies that "it is the situations in particular countries
that should be compared and not the suppliers." 344 We agree with Russia that the phrase "in a
comparable situation" in Article 5.1.1 qualifies the scope of the obligations in that provision to accord
no less favourable conditions of access to conformity assessment. However, the introduction of this
phrase as a qualification of the obligations under Article 5.1.1 does not suggest an analysis of
comparability on a country -wide or supplier-specific basis. As observed above, we understand the
phrase "in a comparable situation", inserted after the comma in the first clause of Article 5.1.1, to
limit the scope of the non -discrimination obligations by requiring an assessment of factors relating
to the suppliers of like products, for purposes of determining whether access has been granted under
conditions no less favourable. Therefore, while factors relating to an entire country may be relevant
in determining the existence of a "comparable situation", the text of Article 5.1.1 makes clear that
such country-wide factors have to affect the specific suppliers at issue. In our view, had the intention
of the drafters been to mandate an assessment of a "comparable situation" by reference only to the
situation in a country, to the exclusion of the situation of suppliers, they would not have inserted
the comma in the text of the first clause of Article 5.1.1. Therefore, while the "comparable situation"
analysis ma y rely on country -wide factors, such factors would ultimately have to apply to the
suppliers at issue, in order to be relevant to the question whether "access for suppliers of like
products"345 has been granted under conditions less favourable.
5.128. In light of the above, the assessment of whether access is granted under conditions no less
favourable "in a comparable situation" within the meaning of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
should focus on factors with a bearing on the conditions for granting access to conformity assessment
in that specific case and the ability of the regulating Member to ensure compliance with the
requirements in the underlying technical regulation or standard. In a particular case, such an
assessment may involve the analysis of various factors, including the rules of the conformity
assessment procedure; whether its preparation, adoption, or application is challenged; the nature
of the products at issue; and the situation in a particular country or supplier. Nevertheless, the
relevant factors for determining the existence of a "comparable situation" should ultimately relate
to the Member's ability to make a positive assurance of conformity with respect to the specific
suppliers of like products at issue, such that if no comparable situati on existed for these suppliers,
the obligation to grant non-discriminatory access to conformity assessment would not apply to them.
In all instances, this analysis has to be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the measure at issue
and the particular circumstances of the case.
5.129. We now turn to review the Panel's analysis under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. With
respect to the Panel's interpretation, Ukraine argues that the Panel failed to elaborate on what
exactly has to be compared for purposes of interpreting the phrase "in a comparable situation" in
Article 5.1.1. Specifically, Ukraine considers that the Panel provided a very limited interpretation of
the phrase and did not clarify whether an assessment of the situation of a country as a whole or that
of the relevant suppliers is required.346

340 We further note that, while Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement imposes affirmative obligations on
Members with respect to conformity assessment procedures, Article XX of the GATT 1994 establishes
exceptions to obligations under the GATT 1994.
341 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 213 (referring to Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 240
and 242).
342 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 158-159. (fn omitted)
343 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 159.
344 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 160.
345 Emphasis added.
346 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 236 and 257. See also Ukraine's opening statement at the
oral hearing, para. 4.

5.130. The Panel began its analysis by noting that Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement establishes
obligations to provide national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment with regard to access
for suppliers from other Members to covered conformity assessment procedures of importing
Members.347 Regarding the "like products" analysis, the Panel observed that the text of Article 5.1.1
defines the product scope of the non-discrimination obligations and considered that the same criteria
that are applied for determining whether products are "like" in the context of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement are applicable in the context of Article 5.1.1.348 With regard to whether the importing
Member grants access for suppliers under conditions less favourable, the Panel noted that differential
access conditions would be relevant under Article 5.1.1 if they modified the conditions of
competition, or competitive opportunities, among relevant suppliers of like products to the detriment
of suppliers of the complaining Member. 349 The Panel recalled that Ukraine challenged only the
application of a conformity assessment procedure to particular Ukrainian suppliers, and not the
procedure as such. 350 Thus, according to the Panel, less favourable ac cess conditions would exist
"where the importing Member denies or limits the right or possibility of a supplier of another Member
to have conformity assessment activities undertaken under the rules of the applicable conformity
assessment procedure, either in respect of the entire conformity assessment procedure or any of its
relevant parts, but does not deny or limit the right or possibility of access of another supplier of a
like product from the importing Member or any other country".351
5.131. Finally, the Panel noted that the phrase "in a comparable situation" qualifies the preceding
part of the first clause of Article 5.1.1, and therefore "warrants a comparison of differential conditions
of access with a view to determining whether the less favourable condition s of access are being
granted despite the situation being comparable".352 With respect to the relevant factors that render
a situation comparable or not, the Panel observed the second clause of Article 5.1.1 makes clear
that the relevant context of the phras e is that of assessing conformity under the rules of the
procedure and conducting conformity assessment activities. The Panel also considered the context
of Articles 5.1.2 and 5.2.7 of and Annex 1.3 to the TBT Agreement. Accordingly, for the Panel,
"aspects of a situation that have a bearing on, for instance, the ability of the importing Member to
undertake such activities under the rules of the procedure with adequate confidence would, in
principle, seem to be relevant." In the Panel's view, "the relevant aspects of a situation would include
aspects specific to the suppliers who are claimed to have been granted access under less favourable
conditions or to the location of the suppliers' facilities." The Panel concluded that, "[i]n all events,
whether a situation is comparable must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and in the light of the
relevant rules of the conformity assessment procedure and other evidence on record."353
5.132. We begin by noting that the Panel's understanding of "like products" and "access … under
conditions no less favourable" is consonant with our interpretation above. Specifically, as observed,
even though the obligation under Article 5.1.1 attaches to the suppliers of products as opposed to
the product itself, the "likeness" of the products at issue is central in defining the scope of the
non-discrimination obligations under Article 5.1.1. Accordingly, the determination of likeness under
Article 5.1.1, similarly to that under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, involves a determination of the nature and extent of a competitive relationship
between and among the products at issue. We also noted that Article 5.1.1 requires an assessment
of whether the conditions for access to conformity assessment granted by the regulating Member to
suppliers of domestic or third-country products modify the conditions of competition to the detriment
of suppliers of like imported products.354
5.133. The Panel's finding that the phrase "in a comparable situation" contains a qualification of the
obligation to grant access to conformity assessment procedures to suppliers under conditions no less
favourable355 is also in line with our interpretation of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel
correctly recognized that, in determining whether a situation is comparable, such that no less
favourable access conditions must be granted, "it is necessary to identify relevant factors that render

347 Panel Report, para. 7.248.
348 Panel Report, para. 7.254.
349 Panel Report, para. 7.260.
350 Panel Report, para. 7.261.
351 Panel Report, para. 7.261.
352 Panel Report, para. 7.282.
353 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
354 See, for Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 137.
355 Panel Report, para. 7.282.

a situation comparable or not ."356 As the Panel observed, the relev ant context for such an
assessment is that of assessing conformity under the rules of the procedure and conducting
conformity assessment activities.357 Above we similarly found that, even though the word "situation"
could potentially encompass a large number of factors on the basis of which a comparison could be
made, the factors relevant for purposes of establishing the existence of a "comparable situation"
would be those with a bearing on the conditions for granting access to conformity assessment in a
particular case. The Panel further noted that relevant factors would include the ability of the
importing Member to undertake conformity assessment activities under the rules of the procedure
with adequate confidence. Indeed, in light of the function of confor mity assessment procedures to
ensure that the underlying technical regulation or standard is complied with, factors that may impact
the ability of the importing Member to make such a determination would be relevant in the inquiry
of "a comparable situation ". We also agree with the Panel that the relevant aspects of a situation
would include "aspects specific to the suppliers who are claimed to have been granted access under
less favourable conditions or to the location of the suppliers' facilities".358 In our analysis above, we
similarly concluded that under Article 5.1.1 it is the suppliers of like products that are entitled to an
assessment of conformity under the rules of the procedure and under conditions no less favourable.
5.134. Ukraine argues that "if the situation of suppliers in one country presents common elements
and is not 'totally' different from the situation of suppliers in another country, they are to be regarded
as 'comparable' under Article 5.1.1."359 In this regard, Ukraine relies on the Appellate Body's
statement made in the context of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.360 In our view, in stating that
"[i]f the situations proposed to be examined are totally different from one another, they would not
be rationally comparable" 361, the Appellate Body was n ot addressing what constitutes a
"comparable" situation, but rather explaining when it would not be possible to begin examining
whether two different situations are comparable. It does not follow from this statement that
situations that are not totally different are necessarily comparable. Moreover, the term "comparable
situation" in Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement is not the same as the term "different situations" in
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.362
5.135. In light of the above, it appears that, in its inte rpretation of Article 5.1.1 of the
TBT Agreement, the Panel outlined a number of factors that may be relevant in determining the
existence of a "comparable situation", and in particular recognized the relevance of factors specific
to the suppliers at issue . Furthermore, the Panel correctly concluded that whether a situation is
comparable must be assessed on a case -by-case basis and in light of the relevant rules of the
conformity assessment procedure and other evidence on the record. 363 In our view, the Panel thus
adequately set out the interpretative framework of Article 5.1.1, and we do not see that, in its
interpretation of Article 5.1.1, the Panel "completely followed the lead" of the respondent's
arguments364 or "made [an] incomplete conclusion concerning 'in a comparable situation'".365
5.136. In sum, we do not consider that the Panel erred in its interpretation of the phrase "in a
comparable situation" in Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement by failing to elaborate on what has to
be compared in establishing the existence of a comparable situation.

357 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
358 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
360 In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body observed that "[t]he situations exhibiting differing levels of
protection cannot … be compared unless they are comparable, that is, unless they present some common
element or elements sufficient to render them comparable", and that "[i]f the situations proposed to be
examined are totally different from one another, they would not be rationally comparable and the differences in
levels of protection cannot be examined for arbitrariness." (Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 217
(emphasis original))
361 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 217. (emphasis original)
362 The first sentence of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement provides that "[w]ith the objective of
achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."
363 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
364 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 255.
365 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 257.

5.3.4 The Panel's application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
5.137. Ukraine argues that in its analysis the Panel relied on general considerations regarding the
political or internal security situation in Ukraine that had no bearing on the situation of the relevant
suppliers whose certificates were suspended or rejected.366 Ukraine specifically takes issue with the
focus of the Panel assessment on the risk to life or health of Russian inspectors, rather than on
aspects specific to t he suppliers at issue or the location of the suppliers' facilities. 367 In Ukraine's
view, the Panel should have compared the situations of the specific suppliers whose certificates were
suspended or applications rejected by the FBO with the situations of sup pliers of like products
originating in Russia and other countries, as opposed to accepting the relevance of general
considerations regarding the security situation in Ukraine that had no bearing on the situation of the
relevant suppliers.368 Furthermore, Ukraine takes issue with an analogy the Panel made between
the function of conformity assessment procedures under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, on the
one hand, and the legitimate objective of protecting human life and health under Article 2.2 of
that agreement, on the other. According to Ukraine, the phrase "a comparable situation" may not
be understood as a basis for an importing Member to act for the protection of the interests recognized
in the sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement unless the protection of those interests is
directly linked to the situation of the suppliers subject to the measures at issue.369
5.138. The Panel examined the reasons provided by Russia in support of its view that the situation
of suppliers of Ukrainian railway products was not comparable to that of suppliers of Russian railway
products and of suppliers of railway products from other countries. 370 In particular, the Panel
reviewed the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in support of their assertions
regarding the existence of uncertainty with respect to the safety and security of FBO employees
travelling to Ukraine to conduct inspections, namely: (i) incidents in several places in Ukraine and
anti-Russian sentiment; (ii) Russian citizens visiting Ukraine between 2013 and 2016; (iii) report of
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR Report); (iv) visits
to Ukraine by inspectors from other countries between 2014 and 2017; (v) Russia's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs travel advice on Ukraine; (vi) declaration from FBO employees refusing to visit
Ukraine; and (vii) communications from Ukrainian producers to the FBO offering enhanced security
conditions.371 Following its review of individual pieces of evidence, the Panel undertook an overall
assessment of the evidence, and ultimately found that "in this instance related to risks to life and
health of FBO inspectors, over the time -frame examined above, the situation in Ukraine was not
comparable to other countries."372
5.139. Above, we found that the question under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement is whether
"access for suppliers of like products" has been granted under conditions less favourable and that
"access" is defined as "suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity ".373 Since it is the suppliers
of like products that are entitled to access to an assessment of conformity under no less favourable
conditions and even though factors that more generally apply to an entire country may be relevant
to the inquiry of whether a "comparable situation" exists, such factors should ultimately pertain to
or affect the specific suppliers of like products to which the conditions for access to conformity
assessment granted by the importing Member relate. With these considerations in mind, we turn to
the Panel's application of Article 5.1.1 to the facts of the present case.
5.140. We observe that, while in its interpretation of Article 5.1.1 the Panel clearly stated that the
relevant aspects of a situation would include aspects specific to the s uppliers who are claimed to
have been granted access under less favourable conditions or to the location of the suppliers'

366 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 247-248 and 255. See also Ukraine's opening statement at
the oral hearing, para. 8.
367 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 247-248.
368 Ukraine's opening statement at the oral hearing, para. 8.
369 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 252-254. See also Ukraine's opening statement at the oral
hearing, para. 20.
370 Panel Report, para. 7.314.
371 Panel Report, section 7.3.2.2.4.2. The Panel further considered Russia's arguments regarding the
existence of restrictions on Russian citizens entering Ukraine (i.e. automatic prosecution in Ukraine of Russian
citizens who visited Crimea after April 2014 and restriction on the entry to Ukraine of Russian male citizens
aged between 16 and 60). (Ibid., section 7.3.2.2.4.3) However, the Panel found that the evidence before it did
not confirm the existence of such restrictions. (Ibid., paras. 7.361 and 7.369)
372 Panel Report, para. 7.387.
373 Emphasis added.

facilities374, in its assessment of the evidence on the record the Panel made only limited references
to relevant factors relating to t he specific suppliers at issue, such as the location of the suppliers'
facilities. Importantly, while the Panel focused its analysis on the security situation in Ukraine in
general, it did not assess the evidence on the record with a view to determining ho w the security
situation related to the specific suppliers at issue. In fact, only in examining the set of press articles
reflecting incidents in several places in Ukraine and anti-Russian sentiment did the Panel refer to the
regions of the relevant suppliers.375 However, even in that context, and in drawing conclusions from
the evidence in the press articles, the Panel did not clearly distinguish between incidents in the
regions where the relevant suppliers were located and incidents in other regions. 376 The rest of the
Panel's analysis was based on the existence of security concerns and anti -Russian sentiment in
Ukraine in general and not in the specific regions where the relevant suppliers were located.377 Thus,
in applying Article 5.1.1 to the facts of the cas e and in examining factors relevant for establishing
the existence of a "comparable situation" in the particular circumstances at issue, the Panel did not
in fact focus, as it stated in its interpretation, on "aspects specific to the suppliers who are clai med
to have been granted access under less favourable conditions or to the location of the suppliers'
facilities" and relied instead on information on the record concerning the general security situation
in Ukraine.378
5.141. As we see it, evidence concerning an entire country may provide a basis for concluding that
a conformity assessment procedure cannot be conducted in any part of the country, e.g. when its
entire territory is affected by a natural disaster or an armed conflict that has an impact on the
situation of specific suppliers. Evidence of risk for the security of governmental employees, as
opposed to actual incidents relating to the security of those employees, may also be probative in
this regard. However, as noted above, the language in Article 5.1.1 makes clear that comparability
of the situations has to be assessed by reference to the "suppliers", thus taking account of the fact
that conditions of access to conformity assessment may vary within a country. Therefore, the
existence of a "comparable situation" must be established on the basis of evidence pertaining to the
specific suppliers of like products to which the conditions for access to conformity assessment
granted by the importing Member relate. In the present case, we do not see that, in making this
assessment, the Panel sufficiently considered the situation of the specific suppliers at issue or the
regions where the relevant suppliers were located or provided an explanation as to how the evidence
on the record concerning the existence of securi ty concerns and anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine
in general related to these regions and suppliers.
5.142. Furthermore, in its overall assessment of the evidence, the Panel referred to the importance
of protecting human life and health and noted that "responsiv e and responsible governments can
and may take such vital interests of their citizens into account when determining whether their
government officials can carry out inspections abroad."379 Notably, the Panel observed that:
[I]n the specific circumstances of a dispute such as ours, the importing Member in
applying Article 5.1.1 may confront the need to weigh and balance the interests of
suppliers of products originating in the territories of other Members in an assessment
of conformity against its interest in safeguarding the life or health of its employees when
undertaking conformity assessment activities, such as inspections, abroad. As noted,
the protection of human life and health is a vital interest. However, there must be a
rational relationship between t he need to protect the life and health of inspectors
travelling abroad and the situation prevailing in the country where inspections are to be
carried out. In our view, the importing Member in principle benefits from a margin of
discretion in carrying out such a weighing and balancing of interests, as appropriate to
the circumstances, which include the importance of the interests at stake.380
5.143. We note that the Panel recognized the necessity of "a rational relationship between the need
to protect the life and h ealth of inspectors travelling abroad and the situation prevailing in the
country where inspections are to be carried out".381 As we understand it, the Panel therefore did not

374 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
375 See Panel Report, paras. 7.329-7.331 and 7.335.
376 Panel Report, para. 7.336.
377 See Panel Report, paras. 7.337-7.356.
378 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
379 Panel Report, para. 7.375.
381 Panel Report, para. 7.376.

rely on the protection of human life and health as a legitimate objective relevant under Article 5.1.1
in general, but rather considered this objective to be a relevant factor to determine the existence of
a "comparable situation" in the circumstances of the present case, to the extent that it had a bearing
on this situation. As noted a bove, under Article 5.1.1, the relevant factors for purposes of
establishing the existence of a "comparable situation" are those relating to the conditions for
granting "access" to conformity assessment for specific suppliers of like products, i.e. suppliers' right
to an assessment of conformity under the rules of the procedure. Furthermore, factors that impact
the ability of Members to make a determination that relevant requirements in technical regulations
or standards are fulfilled, thereby ensuring comp liance with these requirements, would be of
relevance in the inquiry. In the present dispute, Ukraine challenged only the application of Russia's
conformity assessment procedure. Under these procedures annual on -site inspections were to be
conducted, in or der to ensure the continued compliance of imported railway products with the
relevant Russian technical regulations. In these circumstances, the ability of Russian inspectors to
make a determination that the requirements in the technical regulation are ful filled by way of
conducting an on -site inspection, and thus to ensure access for suppliers of Ukrainian railway
products to this part of Russia's conformity assessment procedure, could be affected by the security
situation in Ukraine.
5.144. At the same time, we have concerns with the Panel's approach to assessing the existence of
a "comparable situation" in the circumstances of this case. The question before the Panel was
whether a comparable situation existed in the present dispute. The existence of a "comparable
situation" may depend on a number of factors specific to the measure at issue and the circumstances
of the case. Notably, such factors should have a bearing on the conditions for granting access to
conformity assessment in a particular case and should pe rtain to or affect the specific suppliers of
like products to which these conditions relate. It follows that the interest of safeguarding the life and
health of governmental employees can only constitute a pertinent consideration for purposes of
establishing the existence of a "comparable situation" to the extent that it also relates to the situation
applicable to the suppliers at issue.
5.145. Moreover, we disagree with the Panel's conclusion that there was a need to "weigh and
balance" the market access interests of suppliers of products originating in the territories of other
Members against the interest of safeguarding the life and health of governmental employees.382 The
Panel also took into account the restrictiveness of the measure by noting that "the FBO in this dispute
opted for suspensions rather than the stricter withdrawals or cancellation of the relevant certificates
of conformity."383 While such a balancing test may be appropriate in assessing whether a measure
is more trade -restrictive than necessary under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, this is not the
question under Article 5.1.1. Nor do we see a basis for the Panel's statement that the impo rting
Member benefits from a "margin of discretion" in carrying out such a weighing and balancing of
interests of suppliers and employees. 384 We do agree that a threat to the life and health of
governmental employees in performing part of the conformity asse ssment procedure can be a
relevant factor in comparing the situations for purposes of Article 5.1.1 in a particular case. We
further accept that the impossibility for governmental employees to carry out a part of a conformity
assessment procedure, such as on-site inspections abroad, due to a risk for the security of those
employees may not require evidence of actual incidents. Nevertheless, the existence of a
"comparable situation" should be established objectively and based on evidence pertaining to the
suppliers at issue. Therefore, the question before the Panel was whether, in light of all evidence on
the record, the security situation in Ukraine as it applied to the relevant suppliers of Ukrainian railway
products affected the conditions of granting acce ss to conformity assessment to those suppliers,
such that the situations relating to those suppliers and to suppliers in other countries could no longer
be considered comparable.
5.146. By focusing in its analysis on whether the FBO acted "outside its margin of discretion by
balancing the interests of Ukrainian suppliers and FBO employees" 385, the Panel failed to consider
how the interest of safeguarding the life and health of FBO employees related to the suppliers of
Ukrainian railway products at issue, and thus f ailed to address the question whether the security
situation in Ukraine, as it related to the suppliers at issue, was comparable to the security situation
in other countries and suppliers. For instance, while the Panel recognized that "[i]t is not clear th at

382 See Panel Report, paras. 7.376 and 7.383.
383 Panel Report, para. 7.383.
384 Panel Report, paras. 7.376 and 7.383-7.384.
385 Panel Report, para. 7.384.

FBO employees were necessarily likely to go to places where protests or demonstrations were held
or where civil unrest erupted", the Panel also considered that "the situation during the relevant
time-period was marked by instability and unpredictability."386 Notably, the Panel held that "[f]rom
the FBO's vantage point, it was therefore not readily apparent whether a given area of the country
was sufficiently safe, or would remain so, to proceed with an inspection visit."387 Thus, in assessing
the existence o f a "comparable situation", the Panel apparently "balanced" the evidence on the
record concerning the objective existence of security concerns and anti-Russian sentiment generally
in Ukraine, on the one hand, and the perception of the importing Member as to the existence of such
concerns and sentiment, on the other. As noted, however, such weighing and balancing has no basis
in the language of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement.
5.147. In the same vein, in stating that it seemed "reasonable that FBO employees, an d the
FBO's management, could reach the same conclusion" as the Russian citizens deciding not to travel
to Ukraine 388, and that the FBO's decision to consider the possible risk of sending government
officials to Ukraine did not appear "unreasonable in the sp ecific circumstances and time-frame"389,
the Panel examined the existence of a comparable situation not through the perspective of the
suppliers of Ukrainian railway products concerned but through that of the Russian government. This
is also how we understand the Panel's ultimate conclusion that "during the relevant time-period, the
FBO did not act outside its margin of discretion by balancing the interests of Ukrainian suppliers and
FBO employees and then erring on the side of ensuring the safety of the latter and determining that
the conditions for carrying out inspection control in Ukraine were not satisfied." 390 By giving
prominence to the FBO's discretion, rather than examining whether and how the evidence on the
record was relevant to the specific supplier s' situation, the Panel failed in applying Article 5.1.1 to
the facts of the case, and, specifically, it failed to examine the existence of a "comparable situation"
on the basis of objective evidence that sufficiently pertained to the specific suppliers at issue,
namely, the suppliers to which the conditions for access to conformity assessment granted by the
importing Member relate. Rather, the Panel relied on general "uncertainty" about the security
situation of Russian citizens in Ukraine to make the far -reaching conclusion that Ukraine's entire
territory was unsafe for purposes of conducting on -site inspections regarding all suppliers at issue
and over the entire relevant time period of April 2014 to December 2016.
5.148. Finally, we observe that the Panel's err or in applying the correct legal framework for
examining the existence of a "comparable situation" is also reflected in the Panel's reliance on
evidence that was either of a general nature and did not relate to the existence of security concerns
and anti-Russian sentiment in the specific regions where the relevant suppliers were located (such
as statistics concerning the number of Russian citizens visiting Ukraine between 2013 and 2016391),
or reflected the situation in regions other than those of the supplie rs (such as Russia's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs travel advice on Ukraine392). Moreover, some of the evidence relied on by the Panel
(e.g. the OHCHR Report393) explicitly referred to the armed conflict as confined to the Donbass and
Crimea regions of Ukraine, i.e. regions different from the ones where the relevant suppliers were
located. The Panel nevertheless considered this evidence to be relevant for its analysis of comparable
situation, without explaining how it related to the regions where the suppliers at issue were located.
Rather, the Panel specifically observed that officials from Belarus, the European Union, India,
Kazakhstan, and Pakistan travelled to Ukraine "despite the above -noted evidence of unrest, rallies
and protests in various parts of Ukraine, and despite the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine".394 The
Panel thus recognized that the security situation in Ukraine posed danger for the life and health of
only Russian governmental employees, to the extent that evidence on the record demonstrated the
existence of anti-Russian sentiment. In these circumstances, it was of particular importance for the
Panel to analyse the comparability of situations with respect to the specific suppliers of Ukrainian
railway products at issue, in order to be in a positio n to answer the question whether the security
situation in certain regions of Ukraine, coupled with the existence of anti-Russian sentiment in those
same regions and over the period between 2014 and 2016, resulted in the absence of a "comparable

386 Panel Report, para. 7.380.
388 Panel Report, para. 7.381.
389 Panel Report, para. 7.382.
390 Panel Report, para. 7.384.
391 Panel Report, paras. 7.337-7.339.
392 Panel Report, paras. 7.346-7.350.
393 Panel Report, paras. 7.340-7.342.
394 Panel Report, para. 7.345.

situation" with respect to suppliers located in those regions and for purposes of conducting on -site
inspections by Russian FBO employees over the relevant period.395
5.149. In light of the above, the Panel erred in its application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
to the facts of the present case in finding that, between April 2014 and December 2016, Ukrainian
suppliers of railway products were denied no less favourable access in a situation that was not
comparable to the situation in which Russia granted access to suppliers of Russian railway products
and suppliers of railway products from other countries.
5.3.5 Completion of the legal analysis
5.150. The Appellate Body has completed the legal analysis with a view to facilitating the prompt
settlement and effective resolution of dis putes where the factual findings by the panel 396 and/or
undisputed facts on the panel record397 provided a sufficient factual foundation for doing so.398
5.151. In the present case, Ukraine has not requested us to complete the legal analysis.
Furthermore, as noted above, the focus of the Panel's assessment was on evidence concerning the
existence of security concerns and anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine in general, rather than on how
this evidence related to the regions where the relevant suppliers were located. Therefore, the Panel
did not conduct an assessment as to how the evidence on the record, taken individually or together,
relates to the security situation in Ukraine as it applied to relevant suppliers of Ukrainian railway
products. Consequently, there are no specific factual findings relating to these suppliers, which would
be required for a completion of the legal analysis and thus we cannot rely on the factual findings
made by the Panel, in order to complete the legal analysis. Specifically, we are not in a position to
assess whether the security situation in Ukraine affected the conditions of granting access to
conformity assessment for the specific suppliers at issue over the relevant period, such that it was
no longer comparable to the situation applicable to other countries and suppliers of like products.
Additionally, it appears that the relevance and weight to be given to certain pieces of evidence is
contested between the participants. In these circumstances, we do not consider that we have before
us sufficient factual findings by the Panel or undisputed facts on the Panel record on which we can
rely in completing the legal analysis.
5.3.6 Whether the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU
5.152. Having found that the Panel erred in its application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to
the facts of the present case in finding that the situation in Ukraine was not comparable to other
countries, there is no need to further examine Ukraine's claim that the Panel failed to make an
objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU with respect to the same finding.
5.3.7 Conclusion
5.153. Under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, the assessment of whether access is granted
under conditions no less fa vourable "in a comparable situation" should focus on factors having a

395 We note that at the oral hearing Ukraine raised concerns with respect to the relevant time period the
Panel chose for its assessment of evidence on the record. In Ukraine's view, since the dates of the
14 instructions suspending certificates were between April 2014 and August 2015, the Panel should not have
extended this period until the date of the Panel's establishment on 16 December 2016. The Panel explained its
decision with the fact that there was no evidence before it that up until the date of the Panel's establishment
the FBO issued instructions determining that the conditions for suspending certificates were no longer present.
(Panel Report, para. 7.377) In our view, independently of the precise time period, the Panel had to establish
whether the situation concerning the relevant producers of Ukrainian railway products was or was not
comparable to the situation concerning producers of other countries both: (i) at the time the suspensions were
made; and (ii) in the period following the suspensions.
396 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Periodicals, p. 24, DSR 1997:I, p. 469; Australia – Salmon,
paras. 117-119; US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 1250.
397 Appellate Body Reports, US – Lamb, paras. 150 and 172; US – Section 211 Appropriations Act,
paras. 343-345; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1178; US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), paras. 1250-1251.
398 Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.30; US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China),
para. 5.146; Russia – Pigs (EU), para. 5.141; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 5.745.

bearing on the conditions for granting access to conformity assessment to suppliers of like products
and the ability of the regulating Member to ensure compliance with the requirements i n the
underlying technical regulation or standard. Thus, factors relevant to the inquiry of whether a
"comparable situation" exists have to affect the specific suppliers to which the conditions for access
to conformity assessment granted by the importing Member relate.
5.154. We consider that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the phrase "in a comparable
situation" in Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. However, in examining factors relevant for
establishing the existence of a "comparable situation" in the particular circumstances of this case,
the Panel relied too much on information concerning the security situation in Ukraine generally, and
did not focus sufficiently on aspects specific to the suppliers who are claimed to have been granted
access under less favourable conditions or to the location of the suppliers' facilities. We therefore
find that the Panel erred in its application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to the facts of the
present case in finding that, between April 2014 and December 2016, Ukrainian suppliers of railway
products were denied no less favourable access in a situation that was not comparable to the
situation in which Russia granted access to suppliers of Russian railway products and suppliers of
railway products from othe r countries. For the same reasons, we find that the Panel erred in its
application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to the facts of the present case in finding that less
favourable access conditions were granted to Ukrainian suppliers of railway produ cts in a situation
that was not comparable also in the context of the two decisions through which the FBO rejected
applications submitted by Ukrainian suppliers under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
(i.e. decisions 1 and 2).
5.155. Consequently, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.394 and 8.1.b.i of the Panel
Report, that Ukraine failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 challenged instructions
suspending certificates, that Russia acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.1 of
the TBT Agreement.
5.156. We also reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.638 and 8.1.c.i of the Panel Report,
that Ukraine failed to establish, with respect to the two decisions through which the FBO "returned
without consideration" applications for ce rtificates submitted by Ukrainian producers under
CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, i.e. decisions 1 and 2, that Russia acted inconsistently with its
obligations under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement.
5.4 Ukraine's claim under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement
5.157. We now turn to Ukraine's claim that the Panel erred in making an objective assessment of
the matter before it pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine had failed to establish
that the proposed less trade-restrictive alternatives were reasonably available, and that Russia acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement. Ukraine requests us to
reverse the conclusions in paragraphs 8.1.b.ii and 8.1.c.iii of the Panel Report and find that the Panel
failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before it under Article 11 of the DSU in finding
that Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 instructions, that Russia had
acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.399 In Ukraine's
view, the Panel's assessment of the facts in this respect "lack[s] objectivity, adequate reasoning and
explanations, and [is] not impartial", and the Panel accepted Russia's "unsubstantiated
assertions".400
5.4.1 The Panel's findings
5.158. The Panel began by setting out its interpretation of Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement. The
Panel observed that Article 5.1.2 stipulates, in its first sentence, a general obligation not to prepare,
adopt, or apply conformity assessment procedures with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. In turn, an example of a situation where an
inconsistency with that general obligation would arise is set out in the second sentence of
Article 5.1.2.401 With respec t to the first sentence, the Panel concluded that the reference in
Article 5.1.2 to "unnecessary obstacles to international trade" refers to the notion of "necessity" 402

399 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 177 and 226.
400 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 190.
401 Panel Report, para. 7.402.
402 Panel Report, para. 7.412.

and in that respect bears certain similarity with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. At the same time,
Article 5.1.2 and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement differ with respect to the relationship between
the first and the second sentences of these two provisions. Specifically, in the Panel's view, unlike
Article 2.2, the second sentence of Article 5.1.2 does not qualify the terms of the first sentence. The
Panel thus concluded that a finding of inconsistency with the first sentence of Article 5.1.2 may rest
entirely on findings made with respect to the second sentence of Article 5.1.2.403
5.159. With respect to the second sentence of Article 5.1.2, the Panel examined the similarities and
differences between that provision and the second sentence of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
The Panel considered that both provisions concern the notion of "necessity", and thus found it useful
to consider the Appellate Body's findings relating to the second sentence of Article 2.2.404 The Panel
further noted that, while the second sentence of Article 2.2 uses the phrase "necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective", the second sentence of Article 5.1.2 uses the phrase "necessary to give the
importing Member adequate confidence that the products conform with the applicable technical
regulations or standards". In the Panel's view, this textual difference indicates that the second
sentence of Article 5.1.2 is limited to the objective of giving the importing Member adequate
confidence of conformity.405
5.160. Furthermore, the Panel noted that the second sentence of Article 2.2 refers to the concept
of "trade restrictiveness", while Article 5.1.2 refers to the concepts of strictness or strict
application.406 As the Panel saw it, a conformity assessment procedure that is more trade-restrictive
(or is applied in a more trade -restrictive manner) than necessary, would constitute a conformity
assessment procedure that is more strict (or applied more strictly) than necessary. However, the
Panel reasoned, there may be other ways (not involving the restriction of trade per se) in which a
conformity assessment procedure could be more strict, or could be applied more strictly, than
necessary and could thus fail to comply with the second sentence of Article 5.1.2.407
5.161. The Panel explained that, based on these considerations, it would undertake a holistic
weighing and balancing of the following factors to determine whether Russia applies its conformity
assessment procedure consistently with the second sentence of Article 5.1.2: (i) the contribution of
Russia's application of its conformity assessment procedure to the objective of giving Russia
adequate confidence that Ukrainian railway products conform with the relevant technical regulations;
(ii) the strictness of the manner in which Russia applies its conformity assessment procedure; and
(iii) the "nature and gravity" of the risks that non -conformity would create. The Panel stated that,
moreover, it would compare the manner of applying the procedure chosen by Russia again st the
alternative manners of applying Russia's conformity assessment procedure suggested by Ukraine,
except if the manner of applying the procedure chosen by Russia does not contribute to giving Russia
adequate confidence of conformity.408
5.162. With respect to the burden of proof, the Panel considered how the Appellate Body and a
previous panel had allocated the burden of proof under Article 2.2.409 Specifically, in the Panel's
view, identification of a less strict manner of application alone is not a sufficient basis for a panel to
find that the importing Member's manner of applying its conformity assessment procedure is more
strict than necessary to give that Member adequate confidence of conformity.410 The Panel therefore
considered that a complaining party raisin g an alternative manner of applying a conformity
assessment procedure needs to make a prima facie case that such an alternative manner of
application: (i) is less strict; (ii) makes an equivalent contribution to the objective of providing the
importing Mem ber adequate confidence of conformity; and (iii) is reasonably available to the
importing Member.411
5.163. The Panel considered that the suspension of certificates, as Russia's chosen manner of
applying its conformity assessment procedure, contributes substantiall y to the objective of giving
Russia adequate confidence of continued conformity of the Ukrainian railway products covered by

403 Panel Report, para. 7.413.
404 Panel Report, para. 7.418.
405 Panel Report, para. 7.420.
406 Panel Report, para. 7.422.
407 Panel Report, para. 7.422.
408 Panel Report, para. 7.423.
409 Panel Report, para. 7.428.
410 Panel Report, para. 7.432.
411 Panel Report, para. 7.433.

the 14 suspended certificates. 412 Furthermore, the Panel found the suspension of certificates
substantially restricts trade, and can be considered as a strict manner of application, albeit
withdrawal of certificates would be an even stricter manner. 413 Finally, in the Panel's view,
non-conforming railway products may lead to accidents such as train derailments, which , in turn,
may cause great harm to human, animal, and plant life or health. The Panel considered that, in view
of the products concerned (certain railway rolling stock, railroad switches, other railroad equipment,
and parts thereof covered by the suspended certificates), the consequences of a failure of any such
products, due to non -conformity with the underlying technical regulations, could reasonably be
expected to create substantial risks to human, animal, and plant life or health, as well as to the
environment.414
5.164. With respec t to the first alternative identified by Ukraine, for Russian authorities to
communicate with Ukrainian producers, the Panel considered that the alternative had an uncertain
outcome and could theoretically lead to a situation that would allow the conformit y assessment
procedure to continue, just as it could lead to a situation where it would not continue and certificates
would be suspended.415 Furthermore, the Panel noted that the Ukrainian producers' letters to the
FBO, offering private security arrangements with a view to allowing inspections to proceed, did not
remove the FBO's concerns about sending inspectors to conduct inspections in Ukraine and the
certificates remained suspended. 416 Finally, the Panel observed that Ukraine did not elaborate on
why it was not reasonable for the FBO to consider that the arrangements for conducting inspection
control in Ukraine that had been proposed by Ukrainian producers were not satisfactory or sufficient,
and whether, under Russia's domestic law, the FBO could delay susp ending certificates of products
whose continued conformity could not be verified.417 Accordingly, the Panel found that Ukraine had
not established that communicating with the relevant five Ukrainian producers is a less strict manner
of applying Russia's conformity assessment procedure that would have been reasonably available to
Russia.418
5.165. With respect to the second alternative identified by Ukraine, entrusting inspections in
Ukraine to the competent authorities of Kazakhstan or Belarus, the Panel noted that it was not
self-evident that the FBO has the power to entrust foreign government authorities to carry out tasks
entrusted to it. Moreover, the Panel observed that Ukraine had not provided any evidence of prior
instances of the FBO entrusting certification bodies in other countries with the conduct of inspections
abroad, and thus considered that Ukraine had not met its burden to establish that this alternative is
available to Russia. 419 Accordingly, the Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish that
entrusting the competent authorities of Belarus and Kazakhstan with the conduct of inspections in
Ukraine is a less strict manner of applying Russia's conformity assessment procedure that would
have been reasonably available to Russia.420
5.166. With respect to the thir d alternative identified by Ukraine, accrediting non -Russian experts
or organizations to conduct inspections in Ukraine, the Panel understood that Ukraine referred to
the possibility of appointing experts, provided for in Article 10 of Certification System for Federal
Railway Transport ( CS FRT 01-96).421 However, for the Panel, it was not clear that this provision
provides for the possibility of accrediting non-Russian experts to conduct on-site inspections. While
Article 10 did not specify the nationality that accredited experts must have, Ukraine had not provided
any evidence to indicate that non-Russian experts had been accredited. The Panel further noted that
the system in place is one where experts seek accreditation and does not contemplate that the

412 Panel Report, para. 7.450.
413 Panel Report, paras. 7.453-7.454.
414 Panel Report, para. 7.457.
415 Panel Report, para. 7.468. In this regard, the Panel referred to the Appellate Body Report in
US – Gambling, in which the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that, before imposing a
WTO-inconsistent measure, the responding party could have entered into consultations with the complaining
party to find alternatives. The Appellate Body noted that negotiations are by definition a process, the results of
which are uncertain. (Ibid., para. 7.467 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 315-317
and 321))
416 Panel Report, para. 7.468 (referring to Letter [BCI] from PJSC [BCI] to FBO (Panel Exhibit UKR-18
(BCI))).
417 Panel Report, para. 7.469.
418 Panel Report, para. 7.470.
419 Panel Report, para. 7.474.
420 Panel Report, para. 7.476.
421 Panel Report, paras. 7.477 and 7.480.

Ministry approaches experts and issues them accreditation certificates and licences. 422 There was
also no evidence on the record to indicate that, at the time that the 14 instructions suspending
certificates were issued, there were non -Russian experts qualified to conduct inspection control in
Ukraine with valid Russian accreditation certificates. Finally, the Panel observed that there was also
no evidence of prior instances of the FBO using accredited experts to conduct inspections abroad.423
Accordingly, the Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish that accrediting non-Russian experts
or organizations is a less strict manner of applying Russia's conformity assessment procedure that
would have been reasonably available to Russia.424
5.167. With respect to the fourth alternative identified by Ukraine, conducting off-site inspections,
the Panel observed that the main point of contention between the parties was whether, under
Article 7.4.1 of the Organization Standard СTO PC-FZT 08-2013 " Procedure of organization and
implementation of inspection control of certified products " (PC-FZT 08-2013) (Panel Exhibit
RUS-23), which stipulates conditions for the conduct of off -site inspection, the FBO was precluded
from conducting off-site inspections for the railway products affected by the 14 suspensions.425 The
parties referred to only two of the conditions in Article 7.4.1, namely, that there be: (i) absence of
facts of non -conformity during the previous inspection control; and (ii) absence of consumer
complaints as to the quality of certified products.426 With respect to the first of those two conditions,
the Panel understood it to mean that an off-site inspection is excluded only for products with respect
to which a non-conformity concerning these products or their related production processes had been
identified in the most recent inspection control covering these products.427
5.168. Turning to the availability of off-site inspections with respect to railway products covered by
the 14 suspended certificates, the Panel considered that, in the circumstances of the case, it was for
Ukraine to submit evidence of absence of non-conformities and consumer complaints. In the Panel's
view, Article 7.4.1 was contained in a legal instrument either available publicly or upon request, the
producers received an "inspection act" that indicates the results of the inspection, and the FBO would
provide information about consumer complaints to the affected producers. Alternatively, the Panel
noted that Ukraine could demonstrate that it undertook reasonabl e efforts to obtain information
from Russia regarding any non-conformities during the previous inspection control or any consumer
complaints, with an explanation as to why the information could not be obtained. However, Ukraine
had not done so for most of the railway products covered by the suspended certificates.428 The Panel
then examined the relevant certificates of each Ukrainian producer that the FBO suspended through
each of the instructions at issue. 429 In sum, the Panel concluded that Ukraine had not es tablished,
with respect to any of the suspended certificates covered by the challenged 14 instructions, that
off-site inspection was available under Article 7.4.1.430
5.169. Based on the above, the Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to
each of the 14 instructions at issue, that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.431
5.4.2 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.170. On appeal, Ukraine requests us to reverse the conclusions in paragraphs 8.1.b.ii and 8.1.c.iii
of the Panel Report that Ukraine had failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 instructions,
that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.432

422 Panel Report, para. 7.480.
423 Panel Report, para. 7.480.
424 Panel Report, para. 7.482.
425 Panel Report, para. 7.496.
426 Panel Report, paras. 7.499 and 7.501.
427 Panel Report, para. 7.513. The other possibilities considered by the Panel were to read the condition
at issue as: (i) covering non-conformities identified in the immediately prior inspection control concerning any
railway product of the producer, including railway products not covered by the upcoming inspection control;
(ii) applying to a non-conformity identified in the most recent inspection control for any of the railway products
covered by the upcoming inspection control (which may not be the most recent inspection control of the
relevant producer); and (iii) applying also to non-conformities relating to the production process rather than to
the specific products produced. (Ibid., paras. 7.509-7.512)
428 Panel Report, para. 7.519.
429 Panel Report, paras. 7.520-7.534.
430 Panel Report, para. 7.535.
431 Panel Report, para. 7.544.
432 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 177 and 226.

In Ukraine's view, the Panel's assessment of facts in this respect "lack[s] objectivity, adequate
reasoning and explanations , and [is] not impartial", and the Panel accepted Russia's
"unsubstantiated assertions".433
5.171. In particular, regarding the first alternative of "additional communications with the relevant
Ukrainian producers", Ukraine recalls that the burden of proof rests on the party, whether
complaining or defending, that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. In this
respect, Ukraine takes issue with the Panel's allocation of burden of proof and asserts that the Panel
ignored the fact that the respondent bears the burden to rebut the complainant's case as to the
reasonable availability of a particular alternative.434 In Ukraine's view, the Panel "made the case" for
Russia435 and failed to comply with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU by "making findings despite
the absence of adequate rebuttal of the respondent".436 In addition, according to Ukraine, the Panel
allocated a very high burden of proof to Ukraine and expected Ukraine to prove the negative, e.g. by
finding that Ukraine failed to elaborate on why it was not reasonable for the FBO to consider that
the arrangements for conducting inspection control in Ukraine, which had been proposed by
Ukrainian producers, were not satisfactory or sufficient.437
5.172. With respect to the second alternative of "entrusting inspections in Ukraine to the competent
authorities of Kazakhstan or Belarus", Ukraine asserts that the possibility of this alternative does not
seem to be excluded, given the unified legal system, in particular the legal framework for technical
regulations and conformity assessment procedures, that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia have
under the Treaty on the Establishment of the Common Customs Territory and the Formation of a
Customs Union.438 Furthermore, Ukraine submits that, in finding that Ukraine has failed to provide
evidence of prior instances of the FBO entrusting certification bodies in other countries with
inspections abroad, the Panel placed on Ukraine an excessive burden of proof.439 In Ukraine's view,
the Panel erred in making findings despite the lack of a rebuttal by Russia with respect to the second
alternative measure proposed by Ukraine.440
5.173. With respect to the third alternative of "accrediting non-Russian experts or organizations to
conduct inspections in Ukraine", Ukraine recalls the Panel's finding that it is not clear whether
Article 10 of CS FRT 01-96 provides for the possibility of accrediting non-Russian experts to conduct
on-site inspections. Ukraine contends t hat because Article 10 does not specify that accredited
experts must have a certain nationality, the Panel erred in requiring Ukraine to provide evidence
that non-Russian experts have been accredited in the past.441 In addition, Ukraine alleges that the
Panel erred in discharging Russia from its burden of proof by concluding that there was no evidence
to indicate that there were non-Russian experts qualified to conduct such inspections.442
5.174. With respect to the fourth alternative of "conducting off -site inspections", Ukraine alleges
that the Panel erred in finding that it was for Ukraine to submit evidence that the two conditions for
off-site inspections under Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08 -2013 were met, namely , evidence of the
absence of non-conformities and of consumer complaints concerning the railway products covered
by the suspended certificates.443 In addition, Ukraine points out that the Panel's understanding that
"PC-FZT 08-2013 was available, whether publicly or upon request", contradicted its previous finding
that the legal instrument was "not published officially". 444 Ukraine also refers to the lack of
explanation by Russian authorities to Ukrainian producers as to the reasons for refusing off -site
inspections.445

433 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 190.
434 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 195.
435 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 195.
436 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 198.
437 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 199 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.469).
438 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 203-204 and 206.
439 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 209.
440 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 210.
441 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 212 and 216.
442 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 215 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.480).
443 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 221 and 224.
444 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 220 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.494 and 7.519).
445 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 222.

5.175. For its part, Russia requests us to uphold the P anel's findings in paragraphs 8.1.b.ii
and 8.1.c.iii of the Panel Report.446 As a preliminary point, Russia submits that Ukraine did not
meaningfully address the Panel's findings set out in paragraph 8.1.c.iii of its Report, insofar as
Ukraine simply alleged that its assertions with respect to rejections of certificates are similar to those
it raises concerning suspension of certificates.447 In Russia's view, a mere assertion is insufficient to
establish a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.
5.176. With respect to th e first alternative of "additional communications with the relevant
Ukrainian producers", Russia argues that the Panel correctly rejected the alternative proposed by
Ukraine.448 In Russia's view, Ukraine attempts to substitute the obligation of the complaina nt to
"establish the prima facie case" with the obligation of a party to "prove the fact it relies on" and shift
its burden of proof to Russia.449 Russia submits that under Article 5.1.2, the obligation to determine
the reasonable availability of a less trade-restrictive measure is part of establishing the prima facie
case and does not qualify as an exception. Therefore, in order to establish a prima facie case, Ukraine
bears the burden to prove all elements of Article 5.1.2. Russia further asserts that Ukrai ne
acknowledged its burden of proof as a complainant but did not provide sufficient arguments
regarding the reasonable availability of the alternative, thus failing to establish a prima facie case.450
Alternatively, Russia asserts that if the Appellate Body were to find that Ukraine had in fact
established a prima facie case, Russia had succeeded in rebutting that prima facie case before the
Panel.451
5.177. With respect to the second alternative of "entrusting inspections in Ukraine to the competent
authorities of Kazakhstan or Belarus", Russia submits that Ukraine's argument that the Panel ignored
the lack of rebuttal from Russia is without merit. 452 Russia points out that Ukraine did not provide
any reference to CU documents, other legal instruments, or facts showing availability of such an
alternative in the course of the Panel proceedings. Russia therefore considers this suggested
alternative to be a mere theoretical assumption. Russia points out that the theoretical "possibility"
to entrust foreign government author ities to carry out inspections and a "reasonably available
alternative" under Article 5.1.2 are two completely different concepts. 453 According to Russia,
Ukraine tries to combine two factually different scenarios, namely , Russia's trust in the results of
assessments conducted by other CU member officials and the possibility for Russia to require such
member officials to conduct assessments on its behalf.
5.178. With respect to the third alternative of "accrediting non-Russian experts or organizations to
conduct inspections in Ukraine", Russia submits that the Panel objectively assessed Ukraine's
argument, and correctly examined the scope and meaning of Article 10 of CS FRT 01-96.454 Russia
reiterates that Ukraine bears the burden to demonstrate the availability of the alternative but failed
to provide evidence in support of its position. In addition, Russia submits that the Panel's conclusion
with respect to this alternative measure rests on three separate factual findings, and thus the Panel's
conclusion would stand even if the principle asserted by Ukraine were found to apply.455
5.179. With respect to the fourth alternative of "conducting off -site inspections", Russia submits
that, contrary to Ukraine's assertion, the evidence provided by Russia during the Panel proceedings
is relevant. 456 With respect to the publishing of PC-FZT 08-2013, Russia highlights the Panel's
conclusion that "access and even publication by third parties is possible and that the standard is not
a confidential internal document", and recalls that Ukraine did not object to the public availability of
the document during the Panel's proceedings. 457 In response to Ukraine's argument that Russian
authorities did not explain to Ukrainian producers the reasons for refusing to con duct off -site

446 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 86.
447 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 89.
448 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 105.
449 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 92.
450 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 97-98 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.468-7.469).
451 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 103 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.464).
452 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 115.
453 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 113.
454 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 119.
455 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 123.
456 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 127.
457 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 129.

inspections, Russia asserts that while that may be relevant in relation to Article 5.2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, which is not appealed here, it is not a pertinent consideration under Article 5.1.2.458
5.4.3 Whether the Panel failed to make an objectiv e assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU with respect to the fourth alternative measure
5.180. Ukraine takes issue with the Panel's allocation of the burden of proof under Article 5.1.2 of
the TBT Agreement, and in particular with the Panel's findin g that Ukraine failed to establish that
each proposed less trade -restrictive alternative is reasonably available to Russia. 459 We therefore
begin our analysis by examining the proper allocation of the burden of proof under Article 5.1.2 in
light of the asses sment to be conducted under this provision, namely , determining whether
conformity assessment procedures are more strict or applied more strictly than necessary to give
the importing Member adequate confidence of conformity. We then turn to assess whether, in the
circumstances of the present case, the Panel failed to make an objective assessment under Article 11
of the DSU in its allocation of the burden of proof when examining the alternative measures proposed
by Ukraine.
5.181. The text of Article 5.1 of the TBT Agreement provides, in relevant part:
Article 5
Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Central Government Bodies
5.1 Members shall ensure that, in cases where a positive assurance of conformity with
technical regulations or standards is required, the ir central government bodies apply
the following provisions to products originating in the territories of other Members:
…
5.1.2 conformity assessment procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied with a
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. This
means, inter alia, that conformity assessment procedures shall not be more strict or be
applied more strictly than is necessary to give the importing Member adequate
confidence that products conform with the applicable technical regulations or standards,
taking account of the risks non-conformity would create.
5.182. The first sentence of Article 5.1.2 requires WTO Members to ensure that conformity
assessment procedures are not prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or with the effect of,
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Pursuant to the second sentence, "[t]his
means, inter alia, that conformity assessment procedures shall not be more strict or be applied more
strictly than is necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence that products conform
with the applicable technical regulations or standards, taking account of the risks non -conformity
would create". While the first sentence requires that the conformity assessment procedures not
create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade", the second sentence specifies that conformity
assessment procedures "shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly than is necessary".
5.183. Both sentences of Article 5.1.2 thus refer to the notion o f "necessity". The Appellate Body
has previously noted that the word "necessary" refers to a range of degrees of necessity, depending
on the connection in which it is used. 460 In this vein, we consider that "necessity" in the first and
second sentences of Article 5.1.2 has to be determined in the specific context of this provision. What
constitutes an "unnecessary obstacle to international trade" is further informed by the second
sentence of Article 5.1.2. The qualification "[t]his means" at the beginning of the second sentence,
followed by the conjunction "inter alia", indicates that the second sentence describes a situation in
which a conformity assessment procedure is prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or with
the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Since the second sentence

458 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 130.
459 See Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 194, 202, 214, and 221.
460 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 318 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161).

specifies the meaning of the term "unnecessary" in the first sentence, it provides useful context for
understanding how the notion of "necessity" in Article 5.1.2 as a whole should be interpreted.
5.184. Under the second sentence, whether a procedure is "more strict" or is "applied more strictly
than is necessary" has to be assessed in relation to whether it gives the importing Member "adequate
confidence" that products conform with the applicable techni cal regulations or standards. In our
view, this phrase points to the function of conformity assessment procedures, which is to ensure
compliance with the requirements of a technical regulation or standard. Moreover, "the risks
non-conformity would create" shall be taken account of. What gives the importing Member "adequate
confidence" that certain products comply with a technical regulation or standard may vary depending
on the measure at issue and the circumstances of the case. Whether the conformity asses sment
procedure is more strict or applied more strictly than necessary under the second sentence of
Article 5.1.2 has to be assessed against its contribution to this function of giving adequate confidence
that products comply with the underlying technical regulation or standard. Furthermore, the risks
that non-conformity with a particular technical regulation or standard would create also depend on
the objective pursued by the particular technical regulation or standard. In that sense, the objective
of the technical regulation or standard may have relevance in the analysis of trade restrictiveness
of the conformity assessment procedure.
5.185. In the panel proceedings, both parties and the Panel considered that Article 2.2 provides
relevant context for the interpr etation of Article 5.1.2.461 We note similarities in the language of
Articles 2.2 and 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.462 Specifically, the first sentences of Articles 2.2
and 5.1.2 contain an obligation for WTO Members not to "prepare[], adopt[] or appl[y]" techni cal
regulations or conformity assessment procedures respectively "with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade". At the same time, there are relevant
differences in the texts of these provisions. For instance, while the second sentence of Article 2.2
refers to "trade-restrictive", the second sentence of Article 5.1.2 refers to "more strict" or "applied
more strictly". Moreover, the function of conformity assessment procedures expressed in the second
sentence of Article 5.1.2 is to give "adequate confidence" that products conform with the applicable
technical regulation or standard. By contrast, the third sentence of Article 2.2 refers to a list of
indicative legitimate objectives that technical regulations could fulfil. As we see it, both Articles 2.2
and 5.1.2 set out obligations for WTO Members not to create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade with regard to technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, respectively, and
identify certain factors to be considered in a necessity analysis. In particular, the factors relevant to
the analysis under Article 2.2 include the legitimate objective of the technical regulation, its trade
restrictiveness, and the risks non -fulfilment of the objective wo uld create. Under Article 5.1.2,
relevant factors include the function of the conformity assessment procedure, its strictness, and the
risks non-conformity with the underlying technical regulation or standard would create.463
5.186. Based on these considerations, the existence of an "unnecessary obstacle[] to international
trade" under the first and second sentences of Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, read together,
may be established on the basis of an analysis of the following factors: (i) whether the conformity
assessment procedure provides adequate confidence of conformity with the underlying technical
regulation or standard; (ii) the strictness of the conformity assessment procedure or of the way in
which it is applied; and (iii) the nature of the risks and the gravity of the consequences that would
arise from non-conformity with the technical regulation or standard. While the function of conformity
assessment procedures is to ensure compliance with the underlying technical regulation or standard,

461 Panel Report, paras. 7.406-7.413.
462 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides: "Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create."
463 The Appellate Body has stated that an assessment of whether a technical regulation is "more
trade-restrictive than necessary" within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement involves an evaluation
of a number of factors. A panel should begin by considering factors that include: (i) the degree of contribution
made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the trade restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from non-fulfilment of the
objective(s) pursued by the Member through the measure. In most cases, a comparison of the challenged
measure and possible alternative measures should be undertaken. In particular, it may be relevant for the
purpose of this comparison to consider whether the proposed alternative is less trade-restrictive, whether it
would make an equivalent contribution to the relevant legitimate objective (taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create), and whether it is reasonably available. (Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico), para. 322)

the legitimate objective of this regulation or standard would also be relevant in determining the
nature of the risks and the gravity of the consequences that would arise from non -conformity.
Similarly to Article 2.2, the use of the comparative "more … than" in the s econd sentence of
Article 5.1.2 suggests that the existence of an "unnecessary obstacle[] to international trade" in the
first sentence may be ascertained on the basis of a comparative analysis of the above factors. 464
Thus, in order to establish that a conformity assessment procedure is more strict than necessary, it
may be compared to possible alternative procedures. In this respect, panels should examine whether
such alternative measures are reasonably available, are less strict or applied less strictly, and provide
an equivalent contribution to giving the importing Member adequate confidence that products
conform with the applicable technical regulations or standards. This analysis ultimately involves a
holistic weighing and balancing of all relevant facto rs with respect to the challenged conformity
assessment procedure and in comparison with proposed alternative measures.465
5.187. With respect to the burden of proof in establishing the existence of an "unnecessary
obstacle[] to international trade" under Article 5.1.2, we note that the Appellate Body has held that
as a general matter the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending,
that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient
to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, which
will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.466 In addition, precisely how
much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will
necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.467
5.188. The Appellate Body has said that, thus, the burden of proof with respect to a particular
WTO provision "cannot be understood in isolation from the overarching logic of that provision, and
the function which it is designed to serve". 468 In this regard, similarly to Article 2.2, the burden to
make a prima facie case under Article 5.1.2 is on the complainant. By contrast in except ions
employing the concept of necessity, such as Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the burden of proof with respect to the "necessity"
of the measure is on the respondent. 469 In order to show th at a conformity assessment procedure
or its application is inconsistent with Article 5.1.2, the complainant must establish that the
challenged measure creates an unnecessary obstacle to international trade on the basis of the first
or second sentences of t hat provision. Under the second sentence, the complainant must present
evidence and arguments sufficient to establish that the challenged conformity assessment procedure
is more strict or applied more strictly than necessary to give the importing Member ad equate
confidence that products conform with the applicable technical regulations or standards, taking
account of the risks non-conformity would create. In making its prima facie case, a complainant may
also seek to identify a possible alternative measure that is less strict or applied less strictly, makes
an equivalent contribution to the objective of ensuring adequate confidence, and is reasonably
available.470 It is then for the respondent to rebut the complainant's prima facie case, by presenting
evidence and arguments showing that the challenged conformity assessment procedure is not more
strict or applied more strictly than necessary by demonstrating, for example, that the alternative
measure identified by the complainant is not, in fact, reasonably available, is not less strict or applied
less strictly, or does not make an equivalent contribution to the objective of ensuring adequate
confidence.
5.189. We further recall that the burden of proof with respect to a particular WTO provision "cannot
be understood in isolation from the overarching logic of that provision, and the function which it is
designed to serve".471 In this regard, the Appellate Body has observed that while Article XX of the
GATT 1994 provides for exceptions, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement contains positive obligations,
and this difference must be taken into account in the allocation of the burden of proof imposed on
respondents and complainants under the respective provisions. 472 Since under Article 5.1.2 of the
TBT Agreement the burden is on the complainant to establish the elements of a breach of a positive
obligation, we consider that the allocation of the burden of proof for complainants and respondents

464 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 320.
465 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.211.
466 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, p. 335.
467 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, p. 335.
468 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 286. (emphasis omitted)
469 See Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.328.
470 See, for Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 323.
471 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 286. (emphasis omitted)
472 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.333.

under this provision should be guided by similar considerations to the one under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. Specifically, as noted, while under Article XX of the GATT 1994 a respondent must
establish that the alternative measure identified by the complainant is ultimately not reasonably
available to the respondent, under Article 2.2 of t he TBT Agreement a complainant must make a
prima facie case that its proposed alternative measure is reasonably available. In any event, the
fact that alternative measures serve as "conceptual tool[s]" in the assessment of the trade
restrictiveness of a me asure also informs the nature and amount of evidence required. 473 In
particular, such alternative measures are of a hypothetical nature for purposes of a necessity
analysis, because they do not (yet) exist, or at least not in the particular form proposed by the
complainant. Thus, complainants cannot be expected to provide complete and exhaustive
descriptions of the alternative measures they propose.474 Taking into account that the specific details
of implementation may depend on the capacity and particular circ umstances of the implementing
Member in question, it would appear incongruous to expect a complainant to provide detailed
information on how a proposed alternative would be implemented by the respondent in practice, and
precise and comprehensive estimates of the cost that such implementation would entail. 475
Therefore, once a complainant has established prima facie that a proposed alternative is reasonably
available, it would then be for the respondent to adduce specific evidence as to why the
implementation of this alternative would be actually impracticable, for instance because it is
associated with prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties.
5.190. With these considerations in mind, we turn to Ukraine's claim that the Panel failed to make
an objective assessment of the matter before it pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in finding that
there were no less trade -restrictive alternatives available to Russia within the meaning of
Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, and that Ukraine had failed to establish that Russia acted
inconsistently with its obligations under that provision. 476 We recall that, before the Panel, Ukraine
put forward four alternative measures: (i) additional communications with the relevant Ukrainian
producers; (ii) entrusting on -site insp ections in Ukraine to the competent authorities from
Kazakhstan and Belarus; (iii) accrediting non-Russian inspectors, either experts or organizations, to
conduct inspections in Ukraine; and (iv) off-site inspections.477 We begin our analysis with Ukraine's
claim, which takes issue with the Panel's allocation of the burden of proof under the alternative
consisting in the possibility for the FBO to conduct off-site inspections.
5.191. Before the Panel, Ukraine argued that the conducting of off -site inspections by th e FBO in
Ukraine, a possibility that already existed in Russia's legislation, would be a less trade -restrictive
alternative measure. On appeal, Ukraine submits that the Panel erred in finding that it was for
Ukraine to submit evidence of compliance with th e statutory requirements for conducting such
off-site inspections as an alternative to on -site inspections, namely , absence of non -conformities
and consumer complaints for the railway products covered by the suspended certificates at issue in
this case.478 In Ukraine's view, the Panel placed an excessive burden of proof on Ukraine and failed
to make an objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU. 479 Ukraine also argues that the
Russian authorities did not explain to the Ukrainian producers the reasons for their refusal to conduct
the off-site inspections, and the inspection control acts during previous inspections were vague.480
5.192. We recall that, before the Panel, Ukraine argued that Russia could have made use of off-site
inspections instead of suspending certificates due to the impossibility of conducting on-site
inspection control. In Ukraine's view, this alternative measure was reasonably available to Russia
because off-site inspections were explicitly provided for in Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12-2003.481 For its
part, Russia submitted that off-site inspections could be conducted only if the conditions set out in
Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08 -2013 were satisfied. 482 In particular, the disagreement between the
parties was whether two of the conditions in Article 7.4.1 of PC-FZT 08-2013, absence of facts of

473 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.334.
474 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.334.
475 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.338.
476 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 176.
477 Panel Report, para. 7.459.
478 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 221.
479 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 221 and 224.
480 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 222 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.519 and 7.521).
481 Panel Report, para. 7.484 (referring to Rules of the Certification System for Federal Railway
Transport. Procedure for organizing and conducting an inspection control. (CS FRT 12-2003) (Panel Exhibit
UKR-3)).
482 Panel Report, para. 7.487 (referring to PC-FZT 08-2013 (Panel Exhibit RUS-23)).

non-conformity during the previous inspection control and absence of consumer complaints as to
the quality of certified products, were fulfilled with respect to the railway pro ducts affected by the
14 suspensions at issue.483 As the Panel explained, while "Ukraine advanced arguments in relation
to the availability of off-site inspections, first under Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12-2003, and later, once
Russia had referred to Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08 -2013, under Article 7.4.1"484, Russia provided
evidence "to rebut Ukraine's assertions as to the availability of off-site inspections".485
5.193. The Panel considered that it was for Ukraine to submit evidence of absence of
non-conformities and consu mer complaints with respect to the products covered by the
14 suspensions at issue. In the Panel's view, Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08-2013 was contained in a
legal instrument either available publicly or upon request, the producers received from the FBO an
"inspection act" that indicates the results of the inspection, and the FBO would provide information
about consumer complaints to the affected producers. The Panel further noted that, for most relevant
railway products, Ukraine did not demonstrate that it u ndertook reasonable efforts to obtain
information from Russia regarding any non -conformities, with an explanation as to why the
information could not be obtained. 486 Having examined the relevant certificates of each Ukrainian
producer that the FBO suspended through each of the instructions at issue 487, the Panel concluded
that Ukraine had not established, with respect to any of the suspended certificates covered by the
14 challenged instructions, that off-site inspection was available under Article 7.4.1.488
5.194. We note that, for the Panel, in those instances where the evidence on the record did not
unequivocally establish that both relevant conditions under Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08-2013 were
complied with, Ukraine had failed to demonstrate that off-site inspections were reasonably available
for the railway products covered by the relevant instructions. 489 The question before us is whether
the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter by erroneously placing the burden
of proof on Ukraine to adduce evidence as to whether the conditions under Article 7.4.1 were
satisfied with respect to the railway products covered by the suspended certificates at issue, as part
of Ukraine's prima facie case that the alternative was "reasonably available".
5.195. We recall that, in making its prima facie case that a conformity assessment procedure is
"prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade" under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, a complainant may seek to identify a
possible alternative measure. As noted above, it is therefore the com plainant's burden to establish
that such an alternative measure is less trade -restrictive, makes an equivalent contribution to the
relevant objective, and is reasonably available. At the same time, considering that proposed
alternative measures serve as "conceptual tools", and taking into account that the specific details of
implementation of such measures may depend on the particular circumstances of the implementing
Member in question, a complainant under Article 5.1.2 cannot be expected to provide detail ed
information on how a proposed alternative would be implemented by the respondent in practice.
Instead, once a complainant has established prima facie that a proposed alternative is reasonably
available, it is for the respondent to adduce evidence and ar guments, in order to rebut the

483 Panel Report, paras. 7.499 and 7.501.
484 Panel Report, para. 7.516. See also Panel Report, paras. 7.484 (referring to Rules of the Certification
System for Federal Railway Transport. Procedure for organizing and conducting an inspection control.
(CS FRT 12-2003) (Panel Exhibit UKR-3)) and 7.488 (referring to Ukraine's second submission to the Panel,
paras. 215-219 and 221-227; opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 63).
485 Panel Report, para. 7.517. Russia submitted evidence of non-conformities or consumer complaints
for some of the 73 certificates suspended through the 14 instructions, and Ukraine submitted evidence of
previous inspection controls in relation to some of the remaining suspended certificates. (Panel Report,
para. 7.518. See also ibid., para. 7.516 (referring to evidence provided by Ukraine, including inspection acts of
certified products (Act of inspection dated 23 January 2014 of certified products produced by PJSC [BCI]
(Panel Exhibit UKR-151 (BCI)); Act of inspection dated 24 January 2014 of certified products produced by PJSC
[BCI] (Panel Exhibit UKR-152 (BCI))); evidence provided by Russia, including documents of the FBO providing
for inconsistencies of certified products (Documents of the FBO providing for the inconsistencies of the certified
products of PJSC [BCI] (Panel Exhibits RUS-62 (BCI), RUS-63 (BCI), RUS-64 (BCI), RUS-65 (BCI), and
RUS-66 (BCI)); Letter dated 23 May 2016 from [BCI] to the FBO (Panel Exhibit RUS-67 (BCI)); Letter dated
13 June 2013 from [BCI] to the Deputy Minister of the MOT (Panel Exhibit RUS-68 (BCI)); Letter dated
3 December 2015 from [BCI] to the FBO (Panel Exhibit RUS-69 (BCI)); Letter dated 17 February 2013 from
[BCI] to the FBO (Panel Exhibit RUS-70 (BCI)))))
486 Panel Report, para. 7.519.
487 Panel Report, paras. 7.520-7.534.
488 Panel Report, para. 7.535.
489 See Panel Report, paras. 7.521-7.534.

complainant's prima facie case, by demonstrating, for example, that the alternative measure is not
reasonably available and that its implementation would be impracticable, inter alia , because
implementation costs would be pro hibitive or the alternative would entail substantial technical
difficulties or undue burden for the Member in question.
5.196. As noted above, in the present case, Ukraine initially argued that Russia could have made
use of off -site inspections pursuant to Artic le 5.3 of CS FRT 12 -2003.490 Russia confirmed the
availability of this measure under its legislation, albeit subject to the conditions set out in
Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08-2013.491 In response to Russia invoking Article 7.4.1, Ukraine further
contended that Russia failed to provide evidence that the FBO examined the conditions laid down in
Article 7.4.1 as regards the certificates suspended through the 14 instructions challenged by
Ukraine, before deciding that off -site inspections were not available. 492 We observe that Ukraine
challenged only the application of Russia's conformity assessment procedure to the certificates at
issue, rather than the procedure itself. It was therefore possible for Ukraine to identify an alternative
measure that coincides with an instrument that already existed under Russia's legislative framework.
At the same time, alternative measures need not be already present in the legislation of the
responding Member, even when a conformity assessment procedure is challenged as applied, and
not as such. Indeed, the role of alternative measures is to assist in determining whether a conformity
assessment measure taken by a Member is more strict or applied more strictly than is necessary to
ensure conformity under Article 5.1.2, and not to positive ly establish that the conditions set out
under national law for applying a different measure may have been present. We also note the
Appellate Body's observation, in the context of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, that the nature
and degree of evidence re quired to establish a prima facie case of "reasonable availability" of
proposed alternative measures should be informed by the fact that "alternative measures are of a
hypothetical nature" and "do not yet exist in the Member in question, or at least not in the particular
form proposed by the complainant".493 Above, we took the view that a similar burden of proof applies
with regard to the assessment of alternative measures under Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.
5.197. The purpose of this relational analysis unde r Article 5.1.2 is therefore to compare the
measure at issue and an alternative measure, or their respective applications, in terms of strictness
and the degree of contribution to the achievement of the objective to give adequate confidence of
conformity. Such comparison cannot be carried out with an alternative measure that is merely
theoretical in nature, because, for instance, the implementing Member is not capable of taking it, or
because it imposes an undue burden on that Member. At the same time, the comparison of the
challenged measure with a hypothetical alternative measure remains at a conceptual level. Thus,
the fact that a measure with the same or similar content as the proposed alternative already exists
in the legislative framework of the respon dent Member does not change the function of the
alternative measure as a "conceptual tool" in the necessity analysis. Therefore, as part of making a
prima facie case, the complainant should provide sufficient indication that the proposed alternative
would be reasonably available to the implementing Member, for instance by showing that the costs
of the proposed alternatives would not be a priori prohibitive, and that potential technical difficulties
associated with their implementation would not be of such a substantial nature that they would
render the proposed alternatives merely theoretical in nature. The burden would then shift to the
respondent to submit evidence substantiating that the proposed alternative measures were indeed
merely theoretical in natu re, or entailed an undue burden, for instance, because they involved
prohibitively high costs or would entail substantial technical difficulties.494
5.198. In the present case, even though the alternative proposed by Ukraine coincided with a
measure that already existed in Russia's legislation, the alternative remained hypothetical in nature,
insofar as it had not yet been used by Russia with respect to the suspensions at issue. The
comparison between the measure actually taken by Russia and this alternative measure therefore
had to be undertaken at a conceptual level for purposes of making a prima facie case as to whether
the alternative was reasonably available to Russia. The Panel by contrast considered that "it was for
Ukraine to submit evidence of absence of non-conformities and consumer complaints concerning the

490 Panel Report, para. 7.483 (referring to Rules of the Certification System for Federal Railway
Transport. Procedure for organizing and conducting an inspection control. (CS FRT 12-2003) (Panel Exhibit
UKR-3)).
491 Panel Report, para. 7.487 (referring to PC-FZT 08-2013 (Panel Exhibit RUS-23)).
492 Panel Report, para. 7.488.
493 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.328.
494 See Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.339.

railway products covered by the suspended certificates." 495 It appears that, because the proposed
alternative coincided with a measure foreseen in Russia's legislation, the Panel took the view that
the burden was on Ukraine to adduce evidence that the conditions attached to the measure, as it
existed under Russia's law, would have been met, if the measure were to have been applied to each
of the suspensions at issue. However, as observed above, the nature a nd degree of evidence
required to establish the reasonable availability of proposed alternative measures do not change
simply because such measures coincide with an instrument foreseen in the legislation of the
importing Member. Instead, the burden of proo f continues to be informed by the "hypothetical
nature" of the alternative measure. Thus, in making the choice to identify an alternative that
coincides with an instrument in existence under Russia's legislative framework, Ukraine was not
required to demonstrate, for purposes of showing that the alternative was prima facie reasonably
available, whether the measure described in Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12 -2003 and Article 7.4.1 of
PC-FZT 08-2013 could have applied in the specific instances related to the suspensions of certificates
at issue. In our view, the Panel's analysis conflated two distinct concepts: the alternative measure
proposed by Ukraine and the measure in existence under Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12 -2003 and
Article 7.4.1 of PC-FZT 08-2013.
5.199. Specifically, the question before the Panel under Article 5.1.2 was whether a less strict
manner of application of this procedure existed, other than the suspension of certificates, which
would also make an equivalent contribution to the objective of providing Russia with adequate
confidence that Ukrainian railway products conformed with Russia's technical regulations, and which
would be reasonably available to Russia. In this regard, the Panel had to assess whether the
possibility of conducting off -site inspections u nder requirements such as those in Article 7.4.1 of
PC-FZT 08-2013 constitutes a reasonably available less strict manner of application. Accordingly, for
purposes of establishing reasonable availability, the Panel had to assess whether the alternative, as
described by Ukraine, was not merely theoretical in nature and a priori did not entail any undue
burden for Russia. The Panel should have then turned to examine whether Russia had submitted
evidence rebutting Ukraine's prima facie case by adducing specific evidence and arguments as to
why, in the circumstances of this case, the alternative measure was not in fact reasonably available.
The Panel, however, did not address the question whether the description of the measure provided
by Ukraine was sufficient t o demonstrate prima facie that Russia would not be incapable of taking
such an alternative measure. Indeed, the Panel should have considered the implications of the fact
that the proposed measure already existed as a possible alternative to on-site inspections in Russia's
legislation and the extent to which this fact in itself demonstrated that the measure was prima facie
reasonably available, as opposed to merely theoretical. Instead, the Panel reasoned that, because
information on the absence of non-conformities and consumer complaints was in principle available
to Ukraine, it was for Ukraine to submit evidence relating to the application of these conditions to
the products covered by the suspensions at issue. 496 The availability of certain information to
Ukraine, as well as the issue of whether "it undertook reasonable efforts to obtain [this] information
from Russia"497, is, however, distinct from the issue of which Member bears the burden of proof with
respect to the application of the conditions in Article 7.4.1.
5.200. In light of the above, we do not see that, for purposes of establishing the reasonable
availability of the alternative measure consisting in the conduct of off -site inspections, it was
necessary for Ukraine to provide information about the complian ce with the two requirements of
Article 7.4.1, namely, the absence of non -conformities and consumer complaints, with respect to
the railway products covered by the suspensions at issue. However, the majority of the Panel's
findings that Ukraine failed to demonstrate the availability of off-site inspections under Article 7.4.1
for the railway products covered by instructions 1 to 14 are based on the absence of evidence on
record regarding non-conformities and consumer complaints concerning these products.498 This was
so even in those cases where it remained unclear whether evidence on inconsistencies related to the
products at issue499 or where evidence showed no non -conformities in the most recent inspection
control but there was no evidence of consumer complain ts with respect to the same products. 500
Therefore, the burden of proof that the Panel placed on Ukraine went beyond what Ukraine was
required to establish in making a prima facie case that a hypothetical measure, such as the measure

495 Panel Report, para. 7.519.
496 Panel Report, para. 7.519.
497 Panel Report, para. 7.519.
498 Panel Report, paras. 7.521-7.534.
499 Panel Report, paras. 7.521, 7.523, and 7.527-7.528.
500 Panel Report, para. 7.524.

provided for in Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12-2003 and Article 7.4.1 of PC-FZT 08-2013, would have been
reasonably available to Russia in the circumstances of the case.
5.201. In sum, we consider that by placing the burden of proof on Ukraine to provide evidence as
to the existence of the tw o conditions under Article 7.4.1 of PC -FZT 08 -2013 in all individual
instances in the present case and for purposes of establishing that the proposed alternative measure
was reasonably available, the Panel erred in its allocation of the burden of proof under Article 5.1.2
of the TBT Agreement with respect to the 14 instructions suspending certificates in the present
proceedings.
5.202. We recall that Ukraine also requests us to reverse the Panel's findings in paragraph 8.1.c.iii
of the Panel Report regarding the FBO's rejections of applications for new certificates by Ukrainian
producers of railway products. 501 Russia submits that Ukraine did not meaningfully address the
Panel's findings set out in paragraph 8.1.c.iii, insofar as Ukraine simply alleged that its asser tions
with respect to rejections of certificates are similar to those it raised concerning suspension of
certificates.502 In Russia's view, a mere assertion is not enough to prove a violation of Article 11 of
the DSU.503 We note that on appeal Ukraine has not put forward separate arguments relating to the
Panel's finding concerning the rejections of certificates. Therefore, Ukraine has not substantiated its
request for reversal. We further observe that Ukraine's claim before the Panel concerning these
rejections was based on a different legislative framework, namely , CU Technical
Regulations 001/2011, 002/2011, and 003/2011. 504 Moreover, the relevant alternative measure
proposed by Ukraine in this context was different, in that it concerned the availability of off -site
testing of samples for applications submitted under scheme 3c in Annex 6 to CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.505 Most importantly, with respect to the burden of proof, the Panel found as
follows:
[T]here is no evidence on record that the FBO's practice of permitting off-site testing of
samples under the conditions set out in Article 7.4.1 when processing application s
concerning railway products produced in series under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
has been officially published or is publicly known or available. Nor is there evidence that
the FBO informed the producers elsewhere in Ukraine who were applying for ne w
certificates under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011 that off-site testing of samples was
a possibility.506
5.203. In these circumstances, the Panel considered that Ukraine did not need to demonstrate, as
part of substantiating its claim that off-site sampling is a less strict manner of application reasonably
available to Russia, that the conditions set out in Article 7.4.1 were satisfied in the case of the
applications submitted pursuant to scheme 3c.507 Taking into account the Panel's conclusion and in
the absence of any substantiation by Ukraine, we do not consider that our findings with respect to
the Panel's allocation of the burden of proof in the context of Ukraine's claim regarding the
suspensions of certificates would have an implication for its analysis rega rding the rejections of
applications for new certificates. Thus, Ukraine has not established that the Panel failed to make an
objective assessment in its allocation of the burden of proof in this respect.
5.4.4 Completion of the legal analysis
5.204. We now turn to assess whether we are in a position to complete the legal analysis and find
whether Russia has acted inconsistently with Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement. In order to do so,
we consider whether we have sufficient factual findings by the Panel and undisputed facts on the
Panel record to find that the alternative manner of applying the conformity assessment procedures:
(i) is less strict; (ii) makes an equivalent contribution to the objective of providing the importing
Member with adequate confidence of confor mity; and (iii) is reasonably available to the importing
Member.

501 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 226.
502 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 89.
503 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 89.
504 Panel Report, para. 7.592.
505 Panel Report, paras. 7.688 and 7.691.
506 Panel Report, para. 7.697.
507 Panel Report, para. 7.699.

5.205. With respect to the alternative measure consisting in the conduct of off-site inspections, the
Panel found that Ukraine had failed to establish that conducting off -site inspection control was
reasonably available under Article 7.4.1 of PC-FZT 08-2013. As we found above, the Panel erred in
finding that Ukraine had to demonstrate that no non-conformities and consumer complaints existed
pursuant to the requirements of Article 7.4.1 of PC-FZT 08-2013 with respect to the railway products
covered by the suspensions at issue. By focusing its assessment on whether Ukraine put forward
evidence as to the compliance of these products with the requirements of Article 7.4.1 in each
individual case, the Pane l did not conduct an analysis of whether Ukraine's own description of the
alternative measure was sufficient to make a prima facie case as to its reasonable availability. The
Panel also did not assess whether the proposed alternative manner of application is less strict and
makes an equivalent contribution to the objective of providing Russia with adequate confidence of
conformity. In the absence of such an analysis by the Panel, we do not have sufficient factual findings
on which to base our completion of the legal analysis. Furthermore, the relevance of a number of
pieces of evidence is disputed by the parties. 508 Finally, in weighing and balancing the factors
relevant to the existence of an "unnecessary obstacle[] to international trade" under Article 5.1.2 of
the TBT Agreement, the Panel gave prominence to its finding that Ukraine failed to demonstrate that
there were less strict manners of applying Russia's conformity assessment procedure that were
available to the FBO under the applicable conformity asses sment procedure. 509 In light of our
reversal of the Panel's finding as to the burden of proof in assessing the reasonable availability of
the alternative proposed by Ukraine, we cannot rely on the Panel's weighing and balancing analysis.
Therefore, given the absence of sufficient factual findings by the Panel and undisputed facts on the
Panel record, we are not in a position to conduct an overall assessment of whether Russia applied
its conformity assessment procedure more strictly than necessary within the meaning of Article 5.1.2
of the TBT Agreement.
5.4.5 Whether the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU with respect to the other alternative measures
5.206. We now turn to consider whether, with respect to the other three alternative measures, the
Panel failed to conduct an objective assessment of the matter. We recall our finding that, in
determining the existence of reasonably available less trade-restrictive alternative measures under
Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, it is for the complainant to make a prima facie case that the
proposed alternative is reasonably available to the respondent. In establishing such a prima facie
case and considering that proposed alternative measures serve as "conceptual tools", a complainant
cannot be expected to provide detailed information on how a proposed alternative would be
implemented by the respondent in practice. The complainant would nevertheless have to provide
sufficient indications that the proposed alternative does not a priori impose an undue burden on the
respondent, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties, and is not merely
theoretical in nature.510
5.207. We first address the alternative consisting in the FBO accrediting non -Russian experts or
organizations to conduct inspections in Ukraine under its accreditation rules and in particular
Article 10 of CS FRT 01-96.511 Unlike the Panel, we do not consider that it was Ukraine's burden to
put forward evidence as to why it may have been impracticable for Russia t o implement this
procedure in practice, for instance because the Ministry could not itself approach experts and issue
them with accreditation certificates, and there were no non -Russian experts qualified to conduct
inspection control at the time of the suspensions.512 As noted above, even if Ukraine made the choice
to refer to an alternative that was already present in Russia's legislative framework, Ukraine was
not required to demonstrate, for purposes of showing that the alternative was prima facie reasonably
available, that the requirements of the existing measure in Russia's legislation were fulfilled in the
specific instances related to the suspensions of certificates. At the same time, we note that, unlike
the alternative consisting in the conduct of off-site inspections, Article 10 of CS FRT 01-96 does not
specifically outline this alternative, but simply contains no language as to the nationality that an
FBO expert must have. Thus, Article 10 does not speak to the reasonable availability of Ukraine's
proposed measure. Furthermore, the mere reference to the theoretical possibility of appointing

508 See e.g. Panel Report, paras. 7.521, 7.523, and 7.527-7.528.
509 Panel Report, para. 7.539.
510 See, for Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL
511 Panel Report, paras. 7.477 and 7.480.
512 Panel Report, para. 7.480.

experts of other nationalities due to the absence of any provision to the contrary does not lay out in
sufficient detail an alternative manner of application of Ru ssia's conformity assessment procedure
allowing the Panel to assess whether a priori the measure would impose an undue burden on the
respondent, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties. In our view, by stating that
"it is not clear that [Article 10 of CS FRT 01-96] provides for the possibility of accrediting non-Russian
experts to conduct on -site inspections", the Panel recognized that Ukraine's description of the
alternative measure was not precise enough to establish that this alte rnative was reasonably
available to Russia. In light of the above, we agree with the Panel that, by merely referring to
Russia's rules governing the suspension of certificates and arguing that those rules "do not preclude
the accreditation of non-Russian experts, because they do not prescribe the nationality of the experts
who can be used"513, Ukraine did not meet its burden with respect to the reasonable availability of
this alternative.
5.208. Second, we turn to the alternative measure consisting in the FBO entrusting inspections with
respect to Ukrainian railway products to the competent authorities in Kazakhstan or Belarus under
the rules of the existing CU. We do not see that the mere existence of a customs union with a unified
legal framework for technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures 514 necessarily
translates into the possibility for one of the customs union's members to entrust competent
authorities of another sovereign member with the conduct of inspections in the context of such
common rules. While the FBO could have made such a request for assistance, its outcome would
have been uncertain. We therefore agree with the Panel's conclusion that it is not self-evident "that
the FBO has the power to entrust foreign government authorities to carry out tasks entrusted to
it".515 Moreover, as we see it, there is a difference between the competent authority's power to
recognize a certificate issued by another authority and the power of that authority to entrust other
competent authorities with the task of performing inspections. 516 Since the power to recognize a
certificate issued by another authority does not necessarily entail the power to entrust that authority
with the carrying out of an inspection, we do not consider that the Panel erred in concluding that
Ukraine failed to make a prima facie case with respect to the reasonable availability of this
alternative.
5.209. Third, we address the alternative measure consisting in the FBO communicating with the
relevant Ukrainian producers in order to create conditions for the carrying out of on-site inspections.
In our view, the Panel correctly concluded that the communications between the FBO and the
Ukrainian producers have an uncertain outcome and could not in themselves constitute a reasonably
available alternative measure capable of comparison with the challenged suspensions. 517 Indeed,
such communications "could theoretically lead to a situation that would allow the conformity
assessment procedure to continue, just as it could lead to a situation where the conformity
assessment procedure would not continue and certificates would be suspended".518 Furthermore, we
note that Ukraine did not elaborate on the substance of the proposed private security arrangements
and therefore on why such arrangements could be considered a reasonably available alternative to
the suspensions of certificates. We therefore agree with the Panel that Ukraine did not establish that
its proposed alternative is reasonably available.
5.4.6 Conclusion
5.210. Ukraine was not required to demonstrate, for purpose s of showing that the proposed
alternative measure consisting in the conduct of off -site inspections was prima facie reasonably
available, whether the measure described in Article 5.3 of CS FRT 12-2003 and Article 7.4.1 of
PC-FZT 08-2013 could have applied in the specific instances related to the suspensions of certificates
at issue. However, the Panel reasoned that, because information on the absence of non-conformities
and consumer complaints was in principle available to Ukraine, it was for Ukraine to submit evidence
relating to the application of these conditions to the products covered by the suspensions at issue.
We therefore find that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter befor e it

513 Panel Report, para. 7.478.
514 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 203-205.
515 Panel Report, para. 7.474.
516 See Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 208 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.927-7.928).
517 In reaching these conclusions, the Panel relied on the Appellate Body's reasoning in US – Gambling
that consultations are by definition a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable of
comparison with the measures at issue in that case. (Panel Report, para. 7.467 (referring to Appellate Body
Report, US – Gambling, para. 317))
518 Panel Report, para. 7.468.

under Article 11 of the DSU in allocating the burden of proof under Article 5.1.2 of the
TBT Agreement in its analysis of this alternative measure. We also find that Ukraine failed to
establish that the Panel erred in making an objective assessment of the matter before it pursuant
to Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine failed to establish that the other three proposed
alternatives were reasonably available.
5.211. Consequently, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.544 and 8.1.b.ii of the
Panel Report, that Ukraine failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 instructions suspending
certificates, that Russia has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2, first and
second sentences, of the TBT Agreement.
5.5 Ukraine's claim concerning the existence of systematic import prevention
5.212. Ukraine requests us to reverse the Panel's finding in paragraph 8.1.e of its Report that,
because it did not demonstrate the existence of systematic import prevention of railway products
into Russia in the form of an unwritten measure, Ukraine failed to establish its claims of inconsistency
with Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. Ukraine asserts that the Panel failed to make
an objective assessment of the matter before it when examining the existence of systematic import
prevention by applying an incorrect standard of review and wrongly allocating the burden of proof.519
5.5.1 The Panel's findings
5.213. Before the Panel, Ukraine claimed that Russia maintained a measure consisting of the
systematic prevention of Ukrainian railway products from being imported into Russia by means of:
(i) suspending valid certificates held by Ukrainian producers; (ii) refusing to issue new certificates;
and (iii) not recognizing certificates issued by other CU countries. Ukraine alleged that this measure
was inconsistent with Russia's obligations under Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994.520
The Panel noted that, to establish the existence of an unwritten measure, a complaining party must
provide evidence demonstrating: (i) that the measure is attributable to the responding party; (ii) the
precise content of the measure; and (iii) other elements arising from the manner in which the
complaining party described or characterized the measure. 521 The Panel added that a complaining
party may also have to demonstrate how the different components of the measure operate together
as part of a single measure and how such single measure exists as distinct from its components.
Furthermore, the Panel noted that the evidentiary threshold for proving the existence of an unwritten
measure is high.522 The Panel further observed that a complaining party seeking to demonstrate the
systematic nature of a measure must demonstrate that such measure is aimed at achieving a
particular policy or result and is done according to a system, plan, or organized method or effort.523
The systematic nature of a measure could be demonstrated, for instance, by proving that the
measure is applied to economic operators in a broad variety of different sectors as part of an
organized effort, or coordinated and implemented at the highest levels of government.524
5.214. On the basis of the foregoing observations, the Panel went on to examine evidence of the
existence of the measure. The Panel noted that the evidence submitted by Ukraine consisted of:
(i) three components of the alleged measure (suspensions of certificates, rejections of certificates,
and non-recognition of certificates issued in other CU countries); and (ii) trade and economic data
concerning the decline in the imports of Ukrainian railway products into Russia and in Ukraine's share
of Russia's imports of railway products.525
5.215. The Panel began by determining whether the three individual components establish the
existence of this measure and i ts systematic nature. With respect to the first component, namely ,
the suspension of certificates, the Panel found that the evidence concerning the 14 instructions
through which the FBO suspended valid certificates did not support the conclusion that the

519 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 22-23 and 60.
520 Panel Report, para. 7.941.
521 Panel Report, para. 7.946.
522 Panel Report, para. 7.946 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures,
paras. 5.104 and 5.108; US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198; Panel Reports, Indonesia – Chicken, paras. 7.616
and 7.656; Russia – Tariff Treatment, paras. 7.283, 7.338, and 7.341).
523 Panel Report, para. 7.947.
524 Panel Report, para. 7.947 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures,
para. 5.142; Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, paras. 7.302-7.311).
525 Panel Report, para. 7.989.

FBO adopted these instructions with the aim of preventing importation of Ukrainian railway products.
Rather, the FBO adopted those instructions because its inability to conduct inspections in Ukraine
due to the situation there prevented the FBO from having adequate confidence about the products'
conformity with the releva nt technical requirements. 526 With respect to the second component,
namely, the rejection of certificates, the Panel recalled that the FBO had valid grounds to reject
many of the applications for certificates submitted by Ukrainian producers under CU Technical
Regulations 001/2011 and 003/2011.527 Furthermore, the Panel noted that its findings, that in the
case of two applications and one product subject to another application the FBO rejected applications
unjustifiably and contrary to Russia's obligations under Article 5.1.2, rest on the lack of evidence on
the record regarding past non-conformities or consumer complaints involving the producers at issue.
With respect to the third component, namely , the non-recognition of certificates issued in other
CU countries, the Panel considered that the facts surrounding the application of the non-recognition
requirement are in principle consistent with Ukraine's allegation regarding Russia's prevention of the
importation of Ukrainian products. 528 However, in the Panel's vi ew, the fact that one of the
three elements of the alleged systematic import prevention unjustifiably restricts access to the
Russian market was not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of systematic prevention of imports
of Ukrainian products as an independent measure.529 According to the Panel, there was no indication
that the combined effect of these distinct measures was the reason for applying each of them.530
5.216. The Panel then proceeded to the examination of additional evidence submitted by Ukraine
in support of the systematic nature of the measure. Regarding Ukraine's evidence relating to the
substantial repetition of suspensions of certificates and rejections of new applications for
certification, the Panel noted that this evidence showed the number of certificates accepted rather
than repetition with regard to rejections of new applications from August 2014.531 In the Panel's
view, although the evidence showed repetition with regard to suspensions of valid certificates since
2014, such evidence was not, by itself, probative of the existence of the measure or of its systematic
nature as Russia had justified reasons for such suspensions. The Panel also found no evidentiary
basis for the proposition that the FBO should have suspended more certificates also in the case of
producers from the other countries identified in the table, but did not. 532 Overall, the Panel did not
consider that the differences in the number of certificates held, suspended, and applications rejected,
concerning producers from different co untries, established the existence of the alleged systematic
import prevention.533
5.217. Next, the Panel addressed Ukraine's submission that the systematic nature of the measure
can be evidenced through a "set of trade restrictive measures" adopted by Russia follo wing the
conclusion of the Association Agreement by Ukraine with the European Union (Association
Agreement).534 The Panel agreed that the media articles presented by Ukraine point to tensions in
the bilateral relationship in connection with the negotiation a nd conclusion by Ukraine of the
Association Agreement, and also refer to trade action that Russian authorities might take or did take
against Ukraine in response. Ultimately, however, the evidence presented to the Panel did not
demonstrate that Russia adopted a plan or decided to embark on an organized effort to prevent the
importation into Russia of Ukrainian products in general or Ukrainian railway products in particular.
Moreover, for the Panel, even if trade-restrictive measures were taken with regard to some Ukrainian
products, this did not necessarily mean that such measures were taken also with regard to Ukrainian
railway products.535
5.218. Overall, with respect to the components of the measure and its systematic nature, the Panel
concluded that the evidence submitted by Ukraine did not establish that the three elements have
been designed, structured, or operated in combination so as to constitute a separate measure with
the aim of systematic prevention. 536 Nor did the evidence establish that those elements for m part
of a plan or coordinated effort directed at attaining the aim of preventing the importation of Ukrainian

526 Panel Report, para. 7.959.
527 Panel Report, para. 7.960.
528 Panel Report, paras. 7.962-7.963.
529 Panel Report, para. 7.964.
530 Panel Report, para. 7.965.
531 Panel Report, para. 7.969.
532 Panel Report, para. 7.970.
533 Panel Report, para. 7.972.
534 Panel Report, paras. 7.967 and 7.973.
535 Panel Report, para. 7.974.
536 Panel Report, para. 7.990.

railway products into Russia.537 Finally, according to the Panel, the trade and other economic data
submitted by Ukraine also did not establish th e existence of the alleged systematic import
prevention.538
5.5.2 Claims and arguments on appeal
5.219. On appeal, Ukraine asserts that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the
matter before it when examining the existence of systematic import prevention by applying an
incorrect standard of review and wrongly allocating the burden of proof. Specifically, Ukraine submits
that Russia systematically prevented the importation of railway products from Ukraine by suspending
conformity certificates, rejecting the application for new certificates, and refusing the recognition of
existing certificates. Ukraine explains that some of these decisions were challenged on an individual
basis and that the individual decisions formed part of the evidence showing the existence of the
measure at issue.539 Ukraine contends that, following the implementation of the measures, exports
of railway products from Ukraine to Russia, which had reached USD 1.7 billion in 2013, decreased
to USD 600 million in 2014 and to only USD 110 million in 2015. For Ukraine, such a drastic drop in
exports cannot be justified by anything but an artificial intervention in the traditional and ordinary
course of trade.540
5.220. Ukraine alleges that the Panel failed to conduct a holistic assessment of al l the evidence
before it, thus failing to meet the standard of Article 11 of the DSU.541 Ukraine agrees with the Panel
that in order to demonstrate the existence of an unwritten measure the complainant had to provide
evidence demonstrating: (i) that the meas ure is attributable to the respondent; (ii) the precise
content of the measure; and (iii) other elements arising from the manner in which the complainant
described the measure, such as the nature or operation of the measure. 542 However, for Ukraine,
the Panel failed to properly apply this legal standard to the facts of the present case, because it did
not consider relevant evidence submitted by Ukraine and did not provide explicit conclusions with
regard to the existence of an unwritten measure, before contin uing its assessment of specific
elements of that measure. Ukraine argues that the order of analysis was of paramount importance
in this case, and that by adopting an incorrect order of analysis, the Panel failed to comply with its
duty to make an objective assessment of the matter.543
5.221. Regarding the Panel's analysis of the systematic nature of the measure, Ukraine recalls that
the Panel rejected its arguments concerning the "repetition of suspensions and rejections" of
certificates and the "set of trade restr ictive measures" and concluded that the evidence failed to
demonstrate the existence of the measure or its systematic nature or an organized effort of Russia
to prevent Ukrainian imports.544 Ukraine contends that the Panel erred in setting a very high burden
of proof for Ukraine, because such an organized effort was not prescribed in any particular law or
regulation.545 Finally, Ukraine alleges that the Panel erred in reviewing individual measures in
isolation from each other and failed to consider evidence in its totality.546
5.222. With respect to its allegation that the Panel erred in the allocation of the burden of proof,
Ukraine takes issue with a finding made by the Panel in the context of its analysis under Article 5.1.2,
namely, that "there is no evidence on record that would allow [the Panel] to either accept or reject
Russia's explanation" that it granted applications for certificates of producers located in the eastern
regions of Ukraine because no inconsistencies had been identified with regard to the products at
issue in the course of the previous inspections, and thus the conditions for off -site testing or
inspection were satisfied. 547 Ukraine notes that the Panel's finding of inconsistency under
Article 5.1.2 rested on the lack of evidence regarding past non-conformities or consumer complaints
in the case of the rejections of certificates, and that Russia's evidence of absence of non-conformities

537 Panel Report, para. 7.991.
538 Panel Report, para. 7.992.
539 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 30.
540 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 31 (referring to Panel Report, para. 2.2).
541 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 34.
542 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 35 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.946-7.947).
543 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 36-37.
544 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 39-40 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.972-7.973
and 7.976).
545 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 40.
546 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 43.
547 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 48-50 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.960).

post-dated the date of issuance of the certificates for producers in the eastern regions .548 Ukraine
highlights that this consideration did not preclude the Panel from coming to the conclusion that there
was no evidence on the record that would allow it to either accept or reject Russia's explanation.549
By making such conclusions, the Panel, in Ukraine's view, failed to ma ke an objective assessment
by releasing Russia from its burden of proof and placing an unreasonable burden of proof on
Ukraine.550
5.223. Furthermore, Ukraine alleges that the Panel erred in the application of the burden of proof
when assessing evidence relating t o the substantial repetition of suspensions and rejections of
certificates.551 For Ukraine, the Panel erred in concluding that "Russia in the case of the challenged
suspensions had justified reasons for suspending certificates concerning Ukrainian producers" ,
without providing reasoning for its conclusion that Russia "justified" the reasons for suspending
these certificates.552 In addition, Ukraine takes issue with the Panel's conclusion that it did not have
an "evidentiary basis on which to infer that the FBO should have suspended more certificates also
in the case of producers from the other countries identified in the table, but did not".553 In Ukraine's
view, even though it was for Russia to prove that the FBO should have suspended more certificates
also in the case of producers from other countries, the Panel did not require it to do so. 554 Finally,
Ukraine draws attention to the fact that the Panel repeatedly indicated in its analysis that there was
not enough evidence to rule on the matter before it.555 Ukraine submits that the Panel should have
sought information from relevant sources pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU in order to gather the
information necessary to make an objective assessment of the matter before it.556
5.224. Russia requests us to uphold the Panel's findings with respect to the existence of the alleged
systematic import prevention.557 Russia considers that the Panel did not err in its examination of the
existence of the alleged systematic import prevention as an unwritten measure. 558 Russia recalls
that the Panel, after considering Ukraine's claims with respect to each of the individual components
of the measure, only found the existence of inconsistency with respect to one out of three
components. In Russia's view, even though the Panel had all th e reasons to stop its analysis there
and find that the alleged measure did not exist, it went on to examine other arguments and evidence
presented by Ukraine. Russia therefore disagrees with Ukraine that the Panel failed to examine
information presented by Ukraine in accordance with the established standard of review. 559 In
response to the importance of order of analysis asserted by Ukraine, Russia points out that neither
Article 11 of the DSU nor WTO jurisprudence requires panels to follow a particular seque nce of
analysis.560 Russia asserts that, in any event, the Panel would have reached a negative conclusion
as to the existence of the measure at issue, even if the Panel had followed the sequence in
paragraph 7.946 of its Report.561 In addition, Russia points to the Panel's finding that Ukraine failed
to demonstrate how the three components operate as a single measure and form part of a
coordinated effort to prevent the importation of Ukrainian railway products into Russia. 562 Thus, in
Russia's view, the Panel would have lacked a basis for concluding that Ukraine made a prima facie
case with respect to the existence of the alleged systematic import prevention, even if the Panel had
found all three components of the measure to be inconsistent.563
5.225. Furthermore, regarding Ukraine's argument that the alleged systematic import prevention
was part of a set of trade -restrictive measures adopted by Russia in response to Ukraine's
negotiation and conclusion of the Association Agreement, Russia submits that the Panel carefully
examined the statements of Russia's officials provided by Ukraine and correctly concluded that the

548 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 50 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.960).
549 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 51-52 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.960).
550 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 51.
551 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 54 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.969-7.972).
554 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 55.
555 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 56 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.377, 7.480,
7.521-7.524, 7.675, 7.711, 7.960, 7.962, and 7.970).
556 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 56 and 58.
557 Russia's appellee's submission, section 2.2.
558 Russia's appellee's submission, sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2.
559 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 22.
560 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 23.
561 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 25.
562 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 26 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.990-7.991).
563 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 27.

presented evidence failed to demonstrate an "organized effort" on the part of Russia. 564 Further,
Russia observes that Ukraine referred to measures imposed by Russia on "other products" as
evidence of Russia restricting the importation of Ukrainian "railway products".565 With respect to the
allegedly high burden of proof the Panel placed on Ukraine, Russia points out that the allocation of
the burden of proof is n ot to be determined on the basis of a comparison between the respective
difficulties parties may encounter in collecting information to prove the case. 566 Moreover, with
respect to the Panel's conclusion that the differences in the number of certificates held, suspended,
and applications rejected, concerning producers from different countries, fail to establish the
existence of the alleged systematic import prevention, Russia submits that the Panel carefully
reviewed the evidence but found no evidence to support Ukraine's arguments.567
5.226. With respect to the burden of proof, Russia submits that Ukraine failed to establish that the
Panel did not objectively assess the alleged systematic prevention. 568 Russia submits that Ukraine
failed to prove the existence of the first and second components of the alleged systematic
prevention, namely, the suspension and rejection of applications.569 In Russia's view, it is clear from
paragraph 7.960 of the Panel Report that the Panel examined all the evidence submitted by the
parties and concluded that it was not persuaded that the applications unjustifiably rejected by the
FBO were proof that the FBO used its powers with the aim or as part of a plan directed at preventing
the importation of Ukrainian railway products into Russia. 570 Russia further contends that Ukraine
does not allege specific errors with respect to the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.965 of its Report
that "the mere fact that the non -recognition requirement has been applied alongside the (for the
most part) justified suspensions and rejections, which also had the effect of preventing imports of
Ukrainian products, does not mean that these distinct measures in fact form a single, coherent
measure with a common aim of preventing imports of Ukrainian products th rough any means
possible."571
5.227. Regarding the Panel's application of the burden of proof, Russia submits that the Panel
examined all the evidence submitted by Ukraine and that it did not "consider that the differences in
the number of certificates held, suspe nded, and applications rejected, concerning producers from
different countries[,] establish[] the existence of the alleged systematic import prevention" .572
According to Russia, if Ukraine wished to substantiate the allegation that there were indeed reasons
for the FBO to suspend the certificates issued to third -country producers, it was up to Ukraine to
substantiate such allegation, which it failed to do .573 Regarding Ukraine's allegation that the Panel
failed to have recourse to Article 13 of the DSU, Russia contends that the Panel was precluded from
using its authority under Article 13 in order "to rule in favour of a complaining party which has not
established a prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims asserted by it". 574
Therefore, Russia submits that the Panel acted consistently with Article 11 of the DSU by abstaining
from requesting information under Article 13 of the DSU.575
5.228. Finally, Russia submits that if the Appellate Body were to agree with Ukraine's arguments
and find that the Pan el erred under Article 11 of the DSU, the overall conclusion of the Panel
regarding Ukraine's failure to demonstrate the existence of the alleged systematic prevention in
paragraphs 7.993-7.995 and 8.1.e of its Report nonetheless stands, because this concl usion was
based on Panel findings that Ukraine did not appeal. 576 In Russia's view, the Panel Report confirms
that after the examination of each of Ukraine's arguments and evidence, the Panel found no support
for Ukraine's position as to the existence of the alleged systematic prevention.577 Regarding the
Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.965 of its Report, Russia reiterates its position that Ukraine does

564 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 34 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.973-7.974).
565 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 39.
566 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 40 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 281).
567 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 45.
568 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 85.
569 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 54-55 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.595 and 7.960).
571 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 63-64.
573 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 69.
574 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 71 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural
Products II, para. 129).
575 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 72.
576 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 74 and 84.
577 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 76.

not claim specific errors with respect to this conclusion and therefore agrees with the Panel as to the
absence of indication that the combined effect of the individual measures is the reason for applying
each of them.578 Furthermore, Russia submits that Ukraine does not appeal the Panel's conclusions
in paragraphs 7.984, 7.987, and 7.988 in which the Panel made a factual finding that trade and
other economic data did not support Ukraine's position on the existence of the alleged systematic
import prevention.579
5.5.3 Whether the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter under
Article 11 of the DSU
5.229. Ukraine takes issue with the Panel's allocation of the burden of proof and assessment of the
evidence in its analysis of the existence and systematic nature of the alleged unwritten measure.580
Specifically, Ukraine considers that the Panel erred in characte rizing the measure at issue as
comprising only specific decisions suspending certificates, rejecting applications for new certificates,
and not recognizing certificates from other CU countries that were separately challenged on an
individual basis by Ukrai ne. Ukraine contends that the individual decisions were only part of the
evidence of the unwritten measure, and that the Panel erred in finding that the existence of the
alleged unwritten measure was conditional on the WTO-inconsistency of these decisions. In Ukraine's
view, this led the Panel to review the individual measures in isolation from one another and
prevented it from assessing whether systematic import prevention existed on the basis of all
evidence before it.581
5.230. We recall that, before the Panel, U kraine claimed that Russia maintains, since mid -2014,
systematic prevention of importation of Ukrainian railway products by means of: (i) suspending valid
certificates held by Ukrainian producers ; (ii) refusing to issue new certificates ; and (iii) not
recognizing certificates issued by other CU countries, and that this practice is inconsistent with
Russia's obligations under Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994.582 The Panel noted that
"to demonstrate the existence of an unwritten measure, a complaining party must provide evidence
demonstrating (a) that the measure is attributable to the responding party; (b) the precise content
of the measure; and (c) other elements arising from the manner in which the complaining party
described or characterized t he measure." In the Panel's view, such other elements could include
"demonstrating the specific nature of the measure, i.e., whether it is of general and prospective
application or of a different nature" and "how the different components of the measure ope rate
together as part of a single measure and how such single measure exists as distinct from its
components".583 The Panel further observed that "a complaining party seeking to demonstrate the
systematic nature of a measure must demonstrate that such measur e is aimed at achieving a
particular policy or result and is done according to a system, plan, or organized method or effort."584
5.231. In its analysis, the Panel first turned to assess whether the instructions through which the
FBO suspended valid certificates, t he decisions through which the FBO rejected applications for
certificates, and the non -recognition requirement applied by Russia's authorities, which it had
separately examined in the previous sections of its Report (suspensions, rejections, and
non-recognition), were evidence of the existence of this measure and of its systematic nature.585 In
this respect, the Panel found that "the mere fact that the non -recognition requirement has been
applied alongside the (for the most part) justified suspensions and rej ections, which also had the
effect of preventing imports of Ukrainian products, does not mean that these distinct measures in
fact form a single, coherent measure with a common aim of preventing imports of Ukrainian products
through any means possible."586 Turning to the additional evidence submitted by Ukraine, the Panel
found that neither the figures demonstrating substantial repetition in the suspensions and rejections

578 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 78 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.965).
579 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 80-83.
580 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 34-40 and 48-55.
581 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 42-43.
582 Panel Report, para. 7.941 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 187-188).
583 Panel Report, para. 7.946 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures,
paras. 5.104 and 5.108; US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198; Panel Reports, Indonesia – Chicken, paras. 7.616
and 7.656; Russia – Tariff Treatment, paras. 7.283, 7.338, and 7.341).
584 Panel Report, para. 7.947 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures,
para. 5.142; Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, paras. 7.302-7.311).
585 Panel Report, para. 7.957.
586 Panel Report, para. 7.965.

of certificates, nor the media articles evidencing that the alleged systematic import pr evention was
part of a set of trade-restrictive measures adopted by Russia, established the existence of a plan or
organized effort to prevent importation.587 Finally, the Panel analysed certain import trade data that
Ukraine claimed supported the existence of the alleged systematic import prevention.588 Overall, the
Panel considered that Ukraine had failed to demonstrate that Russia systematically prevented the
importation of Ukrainian railway products into Russia.589
5.232. At the outset, we recall that, in principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member
can be challenged as a measure under the WTO dispute settlement system.590 The measure at issue
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings may include either "acts setting forth rules or norms that
are intended to have general and prospective application", such as legislation, or "particular acts
applied only to a specific situation", such as an administrative decision to impose anti -dumping
duties on certain imports.591 In US – Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body recognized that an "as such"
challenge can, in principle, be brought against a measure that is not expressed in the form of a
written document, and there is nothing in the covered agreements or in WTO jurisprudence to
suggest that a measure must be in written form.592 The Appellate Body emphasized, however, that
"a panel must not lightly assume the existence of a 'rule or norm' constituting a measure of general
and prospective application, especially when it is not expressed in the form of a written
document."593
5.233. In Argentina – Import Measures, the Appellate Body further elaborated on the standard for
establishing the existence of an unwritten measure and in particular observed that "the constituent
elements that must be substantiated with evidence and arguments in order to prove the existence
of a measure challenged will be informed by how such measure is described or characterized by the
complainant."594 In particular, the Appellate Body considered that, depending on the characteristics
of the measure challenged, other elements in addition to attribution to a WTO Member and precise
content may need to be substantiated to prove its existence. For instance, a complainant challenging
a single measure composed of several different instruments will normally need to provide evidence
of how the different components operate together as part of a single measure and how a single
measure exists as distinct from its components.595
5.234. In contrast to a written measure, the existence of unwritten measures cannot be established
by submitting to a panel the text of a legal instrument. Instead, the existence and content of an
unwritten measure must be established based on other, often circum stantial, evidence and
arguments. Moreover, the specific measure challenged and the way in which it is described or
characterized by a complainant will inform the kind of evidence a complainant is required to submit
and the elements that it must establish, in order to determine the existence of the challenged
measure. A complainant seeking to prove the existence of an unwritten measure will invariably be
required to establish the attribution of that measure to a Member and its precise content. Moreover,
additional elements may need to be established.596 For instance, in Argentina – Import Measures,
the complainants challenged the existence of a single measure consisting of a combination of one or
more of the five trade -related requirements (TRRs) in pursuance of a specific policy objective.

587 Panel Report, paras. 7.972 and 7.974.
588 Panel Report, para. 7.975.
589 Panel Report, para. 7.993.
590 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81.
591 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 82. Thus, whereas a
claim against a measure "as such" concerns a rule or norm intended to have general and prospective
application, a claim against a measure "as applied" targets the application of a measure in specific instances.
592 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 194.
593 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 196.
594 In US – Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body explained that, when an unwritten measure is challenged
"as such", the complainant must clearly establish that the alleged "rule or norm" is attributable to the
responding Member, its precise content, and that it has general and prospective application. (Appellate Body
Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198) In Argentina – Import Measures, the Appellate Body clarified that "the
notion of measure of general and prospective application" cannot be considered as setting forth a general legal
standard. Specifically, "[w]hen an unwritten measure that is not a rule or norm is challenged in WTO dispute
settlement, a complainant need not demonstrate its existence based on the same criteria that apply when rules
or norms of general and prospective application are challenged." (Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import
Measures, para. 5.107)
595 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.108.
596 In this regard, panels need not "apply rigid legal standards or criteria … based on the nature of the
challenge". (Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.110)

Therefore, as part of its examination of the precise content of the TRRs measure, the panel was
required to assess whether the measure was composed of the five individual elements identified by
the complainants, and whether the individual TRRs applied and operated as part of a single measure
in furtherance of an underlying policy of "managed trade" with the specific objectives of substituting
imports and reducing trade deficits.597
5.235. The appropriate order of analysis in a given dispute will depend on the characteristics of the
measure at issue, as described by the complainant, as well as the arguments and evidence on the
record. It may also depend on which elements are the focus of contention between the disputing
parties, and which, if any, are conceded or undisputed between the parties.598 In any event, panels
enjoy a margin of discretion to structure their assessment as they see fit, provided they proceed "on
the basis of a properly structured analysis" 599, provide "reasoned and adequate explanations and
coherent reasoning"600, and base their findings on a "sufficient evidentiary basis" .601 Accordingly,
panels are afforded a certain degree of latitude to tailor the sequence and order of analysis, which,
however, is informed by the specific claims, measures, facts, and arguments at issue.602 Therefore,
an appellant challenging the sequence and order of analysis adopted by a panel in a given case must
demonstrate why, by following a particular sequence, the panel committed an error in the specific
circumstances of the case at hand. It is not sufficient for an appellant merely to claim that a panel
erred by deviating from a certain sequence and order of analysis in the abstract.603
5.236. With respect to Ukraine's argument that the Panel erred by failing to make conclusions with
regard to the existence of an unwritten measure before assessing specific elements of that
measure604, we observe that the Panel in fact took note of the precise content of the alleged measure
and listed its constituent elem ents, including Ukraine's characterization of the measure as "an
overarching unwritten measure" that comprises several components and results in the "systematic
prevention" of importation of Ukrainian products into Russia. 605 Furthermore, it appears logical, in
light of the characteristics of the measure as described by Ukraine, that the Panel's subsequent
analysis was focused on examining the existence of a single measure and its systematic nature.
Thus, in the circumstances of this case, as part of its assessment of the existence of the unwritten
measure, the Panel had to examine evidence relating to the constituent components of the measure,
as well as to the way in which the different components interact, in order to achieve a particular
objective.606
5.237. Next, we turn to review the Panel's analysis regarding the existence of the alleged unwritten
measure at issue. As noted, the Panel separately assessed the instructions suspending certificates,
the decisions rejecting applications for certificates, and the non-recognition requirement applied by
Russia's authorities, which Ukraine had challenged on an individual basis and which the Panel had
separately examined in the prior sections of its Report. 607 As the Panel acknowledged, the specific
suspension instructions and rejection decisions were only part of the instances of suspensions and
rejections on which Ukraine relied as evidence demonstrating the existence of an unwritten
measure.608 Despite this fact, the Panel considered it necessary to separately examine the
suspensions, rejections, and non-recognitions challenged by Ukraine on an individual basis. In doing
so, the Panel focused its assessment on whether these three elements of the alleged measure had
already been found to be inconsistent with Article s 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement in the
Panel's prior analysis. Thus, the Panel concluded that "the fact that one of the three elements of the
alleged systematic import prevention ", namely, the non-recognition of certificates issued in other

597 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, paras. 5.124-5.126.
598 See, for Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL
599 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.20 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 127).
600 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), fn 618 to para. 293.
601 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 142.
602 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.206 (referring to
Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145; EC – Seal Products, para. 5.211).
603 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.206.
604 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 36.
605 Panel Report, para. 7.956.
606 See Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.108.
607 Panel Report, para. 7.958.

CU countries, "unjustifiably restricts access to the Russian market is not sufficient to demonstrate
the existence of systematic prevention of imports of Ukrainian products as an independent
measure."609 The Panel also affirmed that "it is only if the circumstances justifying these decisions
disappeared and they were nonetheless maintained or such decisions were nonetheless adopted in
respect of new applications, that the issue would arise whether those measures form part of
comprehensive systematic import prevention that covers both the recognition of certificates issued
in other CU countries and issuance of certificates in Russia." 610 In this regard, Ukraine argues that
the Panel examined the indiv idual components of the alleged unwritten measure in isolation from
one another and did not assess the existence of systematic import prevention on the basis of all
evidence before it. 611 The question therefore arises whether, in examining the existence of t he
alleged systematic prevention measure based on the consistency of its components with the
TBT Agreement, the Panel properly assessed the existence of the overarching measure as an issue
separate from the consistency of its elements with the covered agreements.
5.238. We observe in this regard that Ukraine's own description of the measure presupposed the
need to focus on the rationale underlying the individual instances of suspensions, rejections, and
non-recognition of certificates. Thus, Ukraine argued that "U krainian producers have been denied,
or have been unable to use, certificates for reasons other than the lack of conformity with the
relevant technical regulations."612 In Ukraine's view, Russia, "through an organized effort", "put in
place all means possible to prevent imports of Ukrainian railway products into Russia".613 Thus, the
content of the measure, as described by Ukraine, required a finding that the individual elements of
the measure are parts of an organized effort or policy with the objective of " systematic import
prevention", as opposed to separate instances of instructions and decisions taken for reasons relating
to the possibility of assessing conformity with the relevant technical regulations. The discussion
before the Panel focused precisely on whether the suspensions and rejections were made for reasons
related to achieving positive assurance of conformity, or instead for reasons related to import
prevention. Thus, Russia argued that the reason for suspending and rejecting certificates of
Ukrainian producers was that the requirements of the relevant Russian technical regulations were
not satisfied, i.e. it was impossible to carry out the inspection control in full due to the security
situation in Ukraine, and therefore there was no "organised effort" by Russia to prevent imports from
Ukraine.614 By contrast, Ukraine contended that, as demonstrated by the inconsistency of the
instructions and decisions challenged on an individual basis, the objective of the suspensions and
rejections was not to verify conformity of Ukrainian railway products but to prevent imports of such
products into Russia.615
5.239. We recall that "a complainant challenging a single measure composed of several different
instruments will normally need to provide evidence of how the differe nt components operate
together as part of a single measure and how a single measure exists as distinct from its
components."616 In the present case, it was therefore Ukraine's burden to establish that the separate
instances of suspensions, rejections, and no n-recognition functioned together and formed a single
overarching measure, distinct from its parts, in pursuance of an import prevention policy.
5.240. In this context, it appears to us that the rationale behind the suspensions and rejections
constituted an important factor for determining whether the components of the alleged overarching

609 Panel Report, para. 7.964.
610 Panel Report, para. 7.964.
611 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 43.
612 Panel Report, para. 7.950 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 147;
second written submission to the Panel, paras. 13 and 18; opening statement at the second Panel meeting,
paras. 30 and 38-39; response to Panel question No. 143). (emphasis added)
613 Panel Report, para. 7.951 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 132-141 and 150-159; second written submission to the Panel, paras. 19-20 and 38-56; opening
statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 40). (emphasis added)
614 Russia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 22-24; second written submission to the Panel,
paras. 34-35.
615 Ukraine's second written submission to the Panel, para. 20.
616 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.108 (referring to Panel Reports,
US – COOL, para. 7.50). In Argentina – Import Measures, the panel found that "the combined application and
operation of the individual TRRs is an important part of the TRRs measure with distinct content", "the content
of the single measure consists of the combined operation of the individual TRRs as one of the tools that
Argentina uses to implement the 'managed trade' policy", and "[t]his content is distinct both from that of each
TRR – which, taken individually, may not be apt to implement the 'managed trade' policy – and from the
content of the 'managed trade' policy itself." (Ibid., para. 5.130)

measure operated together as part of a single measure. Specifically, this rationale related to the
impossibility for the FBO to assess conformity of Ukrainian railway products with the relevant Russian
technical regulations due to the security situation in Ukraine, and thus to the absence of a
comparable situation under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. If this were the case, there would
be no common policy or plan connecting t he various suspensions and rejections, such that they
operate together as part of one measure, and thus no proof that "the FBO used its powers with the
aim or as part of a plan directed at preventing the importation of Ukrainian railway products into
Russia."617 Instead, each of these individual measures would be based on a separate and
independent rationale, namely , the impossibility, in each particular instance, to complete the
required steps in the conformity assessment procedure. This is how we understand the Panel's
statement that "the fact that one of the three elements of the alleged systematic import
prevention … unjustifiably restricts access to the Russian market is not sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of systematic prevention of imports of Ukrainian products as an independent measure."618
We consider that the Panel's language referring to the consistency or inconsistency of the
suspensions and rejections was somewhat imprecise. However, as we see it, the Panel was in fact
concerned with the rati onale behind such decisions, which would reveal the relationship between
them and thus the existence of a common plan. By contrast, a finding of inconsistency under
Article 5.1.1 would imply that the concerns about the security situation in Ukraine and the safety for
FBO inspectors did not constitute a valid justification for the suspensions and rejections at issue.
The question would thus arise as to whether there was a different rationale behind the instructions
suspending certificates and decisions rejec ting applications for new certificates, including the
rationale of preventing imports. As the Panel observed, "it is only if the circumstances justifying
these decisions disappeared and they were nonetheless maintained or such decisions were
nonetheless ad opted in respect of new applications, that the issue would arise whether those
measures form part of a comprehensive systematic import prevention that covers both the
recognition of certificates issued in other CU countries and issuance of certificates in Russia."619
Thus, while it may seem that the Panel's reasoning does not properly distinguish between existence
and consistency of the alleged measure, we consider that in fact the Panel considered the consistency
of components of the measures only insofar as the justification underlying their consistency would
lead to the conclusion that these decisions were taken independently from one another and not as
part of a common plan. In turn, finding no evidence of a common plan or organized effort to prevent
the importation into Russia of Ukrainian railway products would suggest no overarching unwritten
measure of systematic import prevention existed in the present case.
5.241. When the Panel's focus on the consistency or inconsistency of the suspensions and rejections
challenged on an individual basis with certain provisions of the TBT Agreement is seen in context of
the broader objective of its analysis, it is clear that the rationale behind the enacting of the individual
measures was crucial for finding the existence o f "a single, coherent measure with a common aim
of preventing imports of Ukrainian products through any means possible". 620 Specifically, the fact
that this rationale related to the absence of conditions in Ukraine to conduct part of the conformity
assessment procedure spoke against Ukraine's argument that there was a common import
prevention objective behind these individual measures. This also explains the Panel's initial focus on
the challenged measures only, for which there was already evidence on the rec ord relating to the
rationale for taking them. In the same vein, by stating that the substantial repetition in the number
of suspensions was not probative of the measure's existence due to the absence of evidence
regarding the rationale behind such suspensions, the Panel in our view considered that such statistics
themselves did not reveal the existence of an aim to achieve a particular policy or result, thereby
proving the existence and systematic nature of an unwritten overarching measure.
5.242. Therefore, in our view, the Panel's focus on the rationale underlying the instructions and
decisions formed an important part of its analysis as to the existence of the unwritten measure in
the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, we note that the alleged measure, as described
by Ukraine, contains in itself an element of inconsistency. Thus, if the suspensions, rejections, and
non-recognition operate together with an underlying "systematic import prevention" rationale, such
an overarching "import prevention" measure would very likely be found to be inconsistent under the
GATT 1994. We recall that determining the existence of an alleged unwritten measure and assessing
the consistency of this measure or its components with the covered agreements remain separate

617 Panel Report, para. 7.960.
618 Panel Report, para. 7.964.
619 Panel Report, para. 7.964.
620 Panel Report, para. 7.965.

steps. At the same time, the specific measure challenged and the way in which it is described or
characterized by a complainant will inform the kind of evidence a complainant is required to submit
and the elements that it must establish, in order to determi ne the existence of the challenged
measure. In the circumstances of the present case, because Ukraine's description of the measure
incorporated the term "import prevention" and because most individual components of the measure
were found by the Panel to ha ve a rationale different from "import prevention", the Panel's task of
assessing the question of existence of the measure separately from the question of its consistency
was rendered particularly difficult. Moreover, as noted above, it was not the Panel's logic that,
because the components of the measure were not inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, the
overarching measure could not exist. Rather, in the presence of valid justifications explaining why
the individual suspensions and rejections were made and relating to concerns about the safety of
FBO inspectors, there was no basis for a finding that the different parts of the alleged measure
operated together as a single measure distinct from its components. For instance, even if all
certificates of Ukrainian railway equipment were suspended or rejected due to the impossibility to
conduct off-site inspections, that would not translate into an organized effort to prevent importation,
unless the impossibility to conduct such inspections was only a pretext and a different unifying
rationale existed. In other words, the Panel simply did not consider that Ukraine presented sufficient
evidence revealing the existence of a common plan aimed at import prevention behind the
components of the alleged overarching measure.
5.243. Moreover, while Ukraine relied extensively on the panel and the Appellate Body's rationale
for determining the existence of an unwritten measure in Argentina – Import Measures, the alleged
measure at issue in the present case is different. Unlike the European Union in Argentina – Import
Measures, here Ukraine challenged part of the unwritten measure's com ponents on an individual
basis. In this context, the task of the Panel was to determine whether an interaction existed between
these individual components, such that they in combination functioned in a manner distinct from
their individual operation. Thus, the Panel's understanding of the content and operation of the
components on an individual basis, including the rationale underlying their enacting, formed part of
its analysis as to whether the different components operated together as a single measure aimed at
achieving a particular policy. In Argentina – Import Measures, there was also "extensive evidence
on the [p]anel record showing that the TRRs measure implements the 'managed trade' policy, and
that this policy has been announced in public statements and speeches and on government websites
by high-ranking Argentine Government officials, including the President, the Minister of Industry,
and the Secretary of Trade".621 This evidence suggested that "these TRRs are interlinked and operate
together as part of a single measure and will continue to be imposed in the future unless and until
the policy is repealed or modified." 622 Differently, in the present case, the Panel found that the
evidence presented by Ukraine regarding the "set of trade restrictive measur es" did not establish
the existence of an underlying policy behind the suspensions and rejections. In particular, the Panel
considered that "[t]he media articles that Ukraine has presented point to tensions in the bilateral
relationship in connection with the negotiation and conclusion by Ukraine of [the] Association
Agreement", and "refer to trade action that Russian authorities might take or did take against
Ukraine in response".623 However, ultimately, the evidence did not demonstrate that "Russia adopted
a plan or decided to embark on an organized effort to prevent the importation into Russia of
Ukrainian products in general or Ukrainian railway products in particular", and "even if
trade-restrictive measures were taken with regard to some Ukrainian produc ts, this does not
necessarily mean that such measures were taken also with regard to Ukrainian railway products."624
5.244. In this regard, Ukraine submits that the Panel allocated an excessive burden of proof on
Ukraine in establishing the existence of the measur e, in particular due to its unwritten nature. 625
Ukraine relies on the panel's findings in Argentina – Import Measures, in which the panel disagreed
with Argentina's contention that journalistic material cannot be "considered to have any probative

621 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.131.
622 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.131 (referring to Panel Reports,
Argentina – Import Measures, paras. 6.162 and 6.230).
623 Panel Report, para. 7.974.
624 Panel Report, para. 7.974.
625 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 40.

value" in ascertaining the existence of an unwritten measure.626 However, as we see it, rather than
questioning the credibility of the media articles provided by Ukraine as a source of information, the
Panel did not consider them specific enough to establish the exis tence and systematic nature of an
alleged systematic prevention measure applicable to Ukrainian railway equipment.
5.245. The Panel's conclusion with respect to the media articles presented by Ukraine also
demonstrates that the Panel's finding as to the existence of the alleged unwritten measure was not
based only on its assessment of the rationale behind the suspensions and rejections. Furthermore,
the Panel analysed certain import trade data which, in Ukraine's view, supported the existence of
the alleged syste matic import prevention. 627 The Panel concluded that "[t]he evidence does not
demonstrate that the cause of the decrease in Ukraine's imports and import share in Russia was
more likely than not the alleged existence of a systematic prevention of imports by Russia", and that
"there is evidence on record suggesting that there are other causes that could explain the decrease
of imports of Ukrainian railway products into Russia."628 On appeal, Ukraine does not take issue with
this part of the Panel's analysis and c onclusions, which was also independent from the Panel's
assessment of the rationale behind the suspensions and rejections.
5.246. Thus, in making its ultimate finding that Ukraine failed to demonstrate that Russia
systematically prevented the importation of Ukrainian railway products into Russia, the Panel relied
on the following conclusions:
[T]he evidence on record does not establish that the three elements of the alleged
systematic import prevention (suspension of certificates, rejection of certificates, and
the general non -recognition of certificates issued in other CU countries) have been
designed, structured, or operated in combination so as to constitute a separate measure
with the aim of systematically preventing imports of Ukrainian railway products into
Russia.
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that those elements form part of a plan or
coordinated effort directed at attaining the aim of prev enting the importation of
Ukrainian railway products into Russia.
Finally, the trade and other economic data submitted by Ukraine also does not establish
the existence of the alleged systematic import prevention . The evidence does not
demonstrate that the cause of the decrease in Ukraine's imports and import share in
Russia was more likely than not the alleged existence of a systematic prevention of
imports by Russia. Rather, we consider that there is evidence on record suggesting that
there are other causes that could explain the decrease of imports of Ukrainian railway
products into Russia.629
5.247. In examining the design, structure, and operation of the three elements of the alleged
measure, including Ukraine's argument as to the substantial repetition of suspensions and rejections,
the Panel focused on the existence of evidence regarding the rationale behind the suspensions of
certificates, rejections of applications for new certificates, and the non -recognition requirement. In
this respect, we took the view that it was not unreasonable for the Panel to rely on such evidence in
determining the existence of a common policy or plan of import prevention connecting the various
components of the alleged measure, as opposed to a finding that each of those components w as
based on the impossibility to complete the required steps in the conformity assessment procedure.
Moreover, as noted, the Panel's ultimate finding did not rely only on that logic. Notably, the
assessment of Ukraine's argument about the "set of trade res trictive measures", as well as the

626 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 41 (quoting Panel Reports, Argentina – Import Measures,
paras. 6.70-6.71). Ukraine highlights the panel's statements that "[n]ewspapers or magazine articles … can be
useful sources of information, particularly when dealing with unwritten measures and when corroborating facts
asserted through other forms of evidence", and that "[a] panel must assess the credibility and persuasiveness
of newspapers or magazine articles submitted as evidence, taking into account that the articles may reflect
personal opinions, and assess the information contained in those articles contrasting it with the other evidence
on the record." (Ibid.)
627 Panel Report, paras. 7.975-7.988.
628 Panel Report, para. 7.992.
629 Panel Report, paras. 7.990-7.992. (emphasis added)

import trade data submitted by Ukraine, also led the Panel to conclude that there was no sufficient
evidence demonstrating the existence of the alleged systematic import prevention.
5.248. Finally, we recall that, in reviewing a panel's assessment of the measure at issue, the
Appellate Body "will not lightly interfere" with the panel's factual findings, including those concerning
"how a municipal law has been applied, the opinions of experts, administrative practice, or
pronouncements of domestic courts". 630 Instead, for a claim under Article 11 to succeed, the
Appellate Body must be satisfied that the panel "has exceeded its authority as trier of facts". 631 In
the present case, the Panel thoroughly examined both parties' evidence, assessed the credibility of
that evidence, and reached its findings on this basis. For its part, Ukraine does not explain how a
different approach by the Panel to examining the evidence on the record would have led to a different
conclusion.
5.249. In sum, given the characteristics of the alleged unwritten measure, as presented by Ukraine,
and the Panel's assessment of the evidence on the record, we do not consider that the Panel erred
in its objective assessment of the matter before it under Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine
failed to demonstrate that Russia systematically prevented the importation of Ukrainian railway
products into Russia.
5.5.4 Conclusion
5.250. The Panel properly considered whether the individual components of the alleged unwritten
measure form part of a common plan to prevent imports of Ukrainian products into Russia. The Panel
also did not err in taking into consideration the rationale underlying these individual suspensions
and rejections.
5.251. We therefore find that Ukraine has not established that the Panel failed to make an objective
assessment of the matter before it under Article 11 of the DSU in finding that Ukraine failed to
demonstrate that Russia systematically prevented the importation of Ukrainian railway products into
Russia.
6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body makes the following findings and
conclusions:
6.1 The Panel's preliminary ruling
6.2. Russia has not established that the Panel erred in determining the scope of its terms of
reference in this dispute.
a. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.1.a.i, 8.1.d.iv, and 8.1.d.v of the
Panel Report, that Russia has failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request is inconsistent
with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
6.2 The third measure as a "general" non-recognition requirement
6.3. Russia has not established that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
finding that the third measure is of a " general" character and flows from CU Technical
Regulation 001/2011.
a. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.861 of the Panel Report, that the
third measure as a general non -recognition requirement, which the relevant Russi an

630 Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 177. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Reports, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 151; US – Carbon Steel, para. 142; US – Upland Cotton,
para. 399.
631 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 713. See also e.g.
Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 151.

authorities considered to flow from CU Technical Regulation 001/2011, had been
demonstrated to exist.
6.3 The third measure as a single measure
6.4. Russia has not established that Ukraine failed to meet its prima facie burden to establish the
existence of the third measure as a single measure.
a. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.861 of the Panel Report, that the
third measure had been demonstrated to exist.
6.4 The third measure and the Panel's terms of reference
6.5. Russia's claim regarding the terms of reference concerning the third measure is based on the
premise that the Panel erred in its preliminary ruling. We have rejected that allegation of error and
upheld the Panel's preliminary ruling.
a. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding , in paragraph s 7.823 and 8.1.d.i of the
Panel Report, that the non -recognition requirement based on the local production
condition is properly before the Panel.
6.5 The third measure and the local registration condition
6.6. The Panel's statements challenged by Russia as constituting "findings" concerning the local
registration condition were either merely descriptive statements or concerned the third measure
within the Panel's terms of reference.
a. Consequently, we find that Russia has failed to establish that the Panel acted inconsistently
with Article 11 of the DSU by continuing to make findings with respect to a matter that
was not within its terms of reference.
6.6 Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement
6.7. Under Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, the assessment of whether access is granted under
conditions no less favourable "in a comparable situation" should focus on factors having a bearing
on the conditions for granting access to conformity assessment to suppliers of like products and the
ability of the regulating Member to ensure compliance with the requirements in the underlying
technical regulation or standard. Thus, factors relevant to the inquiry of whether a "comparable
situation" exists have to affect the specific suppliers to which the conditions for access to conformity
assessment granted by the importing Member relate.
6.8. We consider that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the phrase "in a comparable
situation" in Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. However, i n examinin g factors relevant for
establishing the existence of a "comparable situation" in the particular circumstances of this case,
the Panel relied too much on information concerning the security situation in Ukraine generally, and
did not focus sufficiently on aspects specific to the suppliers who are claimed to have been granted
access under less favourable conditions or to the location of the suppliers' facilities. We therefore
find that the Panel erred in its application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to the facts of the
present case in finding that, between April 2014 and December 2016, Ukrainian suppliers of railway
products were denied no less favourable access in a situation that was not comparable to the
situation in which Russia granted access to s uppliers of Russian railway products and suppliers of
railway products from other countries. For the same reasons, we find that the Panel erred in its
application of Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement to the facts of the present case in finding that less
favourable access conditions were granted to Ukrainian suppliers of railway products in a situation
that was not comparable also in the context of the two decisions through which the FBO rejected
applications submitted by Ukrainian suppliers under CU Technical Regulation 001/2011
(i.e. decisions 1 and 2).
a. Consequently, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.394 and 8.1.b.i of the Panel
Report, that Ukraine failed to establish, with respect to each of the 14 challenged