EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA
Document: Request for Consultations by China
Date: 4 August 2009
Document codes: WT/DS397/1; G/L/891; G/ADP/D79/1
Complainant: China
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.S.
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. 6, 9, 5, 2, 3, 4  Anti-dumpingArt. I, X:3(a), VI:1  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA

Request for Consultations by China

 The following communication, dated 31 July 2009, from the delegation of China to the
delegation of the European Communities and to th e Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is
circulated in accordance with Article 4.4 of the DSU.

 My authorities have instructed me to request consultations with the European Communities
(the "EC") pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"), Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (the "GATT 1994"), and Article 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "AD Agreement") with respect to, but not
necessarily limited to, the following EC measures:

(a) Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995
1, as
amended, on protection against dumped im ports from countries not members of the
European Community (the "Basic AD Regulation");
(b) Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's
Republic of China
2;
 These measures appear to be inconsistent with the EC's obligations under the provisions of
the GATT 1994, the AD Agreement and the Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China
("China") which is an integral part of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the .

1. Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation provides that in case of imports from non-market
economy countries, the duty shall be specified fo r the supplying country concerned and not for each
supplier and that an individual duty will only be sp ecified for exporters that demonstrate that they
fulfil the criteria listed in that provision. China considers that Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation
is inconsistent, as such, with the EC's obligations under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization; Articles VI:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994;
Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 12.2.2 and 18.4 of th e AD Agreement, since these provisions require an
individual margin and duty to be determined and specified for each known exporter or producer.

1 OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, pp. 1-20.
2 OJ L 29, 31.1.2009, p. 1.

Furthermore, the criteria listed in Article 9(5) to obtain an individual duty are unreasonable and not
objective. Moreover, by imposing these conditions only to imports from, allegedly, non-market
economy countries, the EC's measure is also discriminatory and thus contrary to Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994.

2. China considers that the EC's imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of certain iron or
steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China is inconsistent with the EC's obligations
under Articles VI and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994; Articles 1, 2.1, 2.2. 2.4, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1,
5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.10, 9.2, 9.4 and 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement as well as Part I, paragraph 15 of
China's Protocol of Accession.

 (i) The EC imposed a countrywide duty on th e sole basis that Ch ina is a non-market
economy country and exempted from this duty only those few Chinese exporters that
were able to meet the so-called "Indiv idual Treatment" criteria, thereby acting
inconsistently with Articles 2, 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement;

 (ii) The EC granted only 15 days to Chinese exporters to submit their written reply to the
Market Economy Treatment and Individual Treatment questionnaires contrary to the
obligation provided for in Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Part I, paragraph 15
of China's Accession Protocol;

 (iii) The EC initiated the AD investigation with the support of producers accounting for
only 27 per cent of the total domestic pr oduction, rendering the said investigation
inconsistent with Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement;

 (iv) The EC wrongly included, in the scope of the product under consideration, both
standard and special fasteners as "like" products, despite their readily apparent
differences and uses, thereby acting inconsis tently with the provision of Article 2.1,
as interpreted by Article 2.6, of the AD Agreement;

 (v) The EC did not take into considerati on all appropriate adjustments affecting price
comparability, in particular, by failing to make a product comparison on the basis of
the full product control number, thereby acti ng inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the
AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994;

 (vi) The EC based its injury determina tion on data from EC producers accounting for only
27 per cent of the estimated total EC pr oduction of the product concerned in 2006,
thereby acting inconsistently with Articles 3 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement;

 (vii) The EC failed to determine which proportion of the total domestic production was
represented by the EC producers in relation to which the injury determination was
made throughout the investigation period, thereby acting inconsistently with
Articles 3 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement;

 (viii) The EC conducted the injury determinat ion on the basis of a sample of EC producers
accounting for only 17.5 per cent of the total EC production of the product at issue in
2006, thereby acting inconsistently with Articles 3 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement;

 (ix) The EC failed to exclude from the scope of the domestic industry EC producers that
are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly

dumped product, thereby acting inconsiste ntly with Articles 3 and 4.1 of the
AD Agreement;

 (x) The EC failed to exclude from the vol ume of imports, for injury determination
purposes, non-dumped imports, thereby acting in consistently with Article 3.1 and 3.2
of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994;

 (xi) The injury determination failed to be based on positive evidence and to involve an
objective examination since, in analyzing the economic factors and indices, the EC
disregarded the multiple positive trends and figures shown by most factors and
focused its decision on the sole factor that showed a negative trend, i.e. market share,
thereby acting inconsistently with Arti cle 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994;

 (xii) The EC failed to weigh, properly and reasonably, factors other than the alleged
dumped imports in its examination of inju ry and causation, in particular, imports
from third countries, increasing costs of raw materials, and export performance of the
EC community, thereby acting contrary to Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement;

 (xiii) The EC disclosed the "Assessment of Market Economy Treatment Claims by nine
producers in the PRC"(DG TRADE/H3/D(2008)), containing relevant confidential
information which pertains to diffe rent Chinese producers, thereby acting
inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement;

 (xiv) The EC failed to provide the opportunity to the interested parties to see all relevant
information including, but not limited to, the identity of the applicants, non-
confidential summaries of the questionnaire responses of EC producers, data
concerning the normal value in the analogue country and information on the
adjustments for differences affecti ng price comparability, thereby acting
inconsistently with Article 6.2, 6.4 a nd 6.5 of the AD Agreement and Part I,
paragraph 15 of China's Protocol of Accession.

3. The EC's measures also appear to nullify or im pair the benefits accruing to China directly or
indirectly under the cited agreements.

4. China reserves its right to raise a dditional factual matters and legal claims during the course
of the consultations.

5. China looks forward to receiving your reply to the present request and to fixing a mutually
convenient date and venue for consultations.