MEXICO – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON BEEF AND RICE
Document: Complaint with Respect to Rice Report of the Panel
Date: 6 June 2005
Document codes: WT/DS295/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: Mexico
Third parties: China, EU, Turkey
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 12.5, 12.7, 19.3, 11.9, 21.1, 21.2, 32.1, 12.1.1  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 5.8, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 11.9, 18.1, 19.3, 21.1, 21.2, 32.1  Anti-dumping

MEXICO – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
ON BEEF AND RICE

Complaint with Respect to Rice

Report of the Panel

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 16 June 2003, the Government of United States requested consultations with the Government
of Mexico pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994"), Article 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("AD Agreement"), and Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), with respect to Mexico's definitive anti-dumping
measures on beef and long-grain white rice, published in the Diario Oficial on 28 April 2000 and 5 June
2002 respectively, as well as any amendments thereto or extensions thereof and any related measures and
also with respect to certain provisions of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act and its Federal Code of Civil
Procedure.
1 Mexico and the United States held consultations on 31 July and 1 August 2003, but failed to
settle the dispute.
1.2 On 19 September 2003, the United States requested the establishment of a panel 2 pursuant to
Article 6 of the DSU, Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement, and Article 30 of the SCM Agreement. At its
meeting on 7 November 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") established a Panel in
accordance with Article 6 of the DSU to examine th e matter referred to the DSB by United States in
document At that meeting, the parties to the dispute also agreed that the Panel should
have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the United States in document , the matter referred to the DSB by the
United States in that document, and to ma ke such findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements".
1.3 On 4 February 2004, the United States requested the Director-General to determine the
composition of the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. This paragraph provides:
"If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the
establishment of a Panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or
Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by appointing the panelists
whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with any relevant
special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements
which are at issue in the dispute, after cons ulting with the parties to the dispute. The
Chairman of the DSB shall inform the Memb ers of the composition of the panel thus
formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman receives such a request".
1.4 On 13 February 2004, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
Chairman: Mr. Crawford Falconer

Members: Ms. Marta Calmon Lemme
 Ms. Enie Neri de Ross

1.5 China, the European Communities, and Turkey reserved their rights to participate in the Panel
proceedings as third parties.

1 WT/DS295/1, G/L/631, G/ADP/D50/1,G/SCM/D54/1.
2 WT/DS295/2. The United States did not include claims with respect to the anti-dumping measure on beef
in its request for the establishment of a Panel.
3 WT/DS295/3.

1.6 The Panel met with the parties on 17-18 May 2004 and on 3 August 2004. It met with the third
parties on 18 May 2004.
1.7 The Panel submitted its interim report to the parties on 11 March 2005. The Panel submitted its
final report to the parties on 25 May 2005.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 This dispute concerns the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties by Mexico on imports of
"long-grain white rice" from the United States. The United States also challenges a number of provisions
of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act and a provision of its Federal Code of Civil Procedure on an "as such"
basis.
2.2 On 2 June 2000, the Mexican Rice Council (Consejo Mexicano del Arroz, A.C. or “CMA”) filed
a petition with the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (“SECOFI”), the administrator of
Mexico’s anti-dumping law at that time
4.
2.3 The initiation of the investigation was published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación dated
11 December 2000. The investigated product was defined as "long-grain white rice". "Long-grain white
rice" is produced from paddy rice or whole rice. After drying and cleaning (and storing), paddy rice is
ground to produce whole rice with the layers of bran th at still cover the grain. Later, the whole rice is
further ground with machines to extract the bran layers through abrasion. After the bran layers have been
taken away from the grain, the rice is called regular ground white rice. Machines will then separate the
whole grains from the broken ones, and sort them out by size, thus producing various types of rice
including the "long-grain white rice".
5
2.4 The period of investigation for the purpose of the dumping determination covered the period of
1 March to 31 August 1999. For the purpose of injury examination, the Ministry of Economy (SECOFI's
successor agency that administers the Mexican anti-dumping laws) analyzed data for the same period of
1 March to 31 August for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 6. The Ministry of Economy ("Economía")
notified the initiation of the anti-dumping investigati on to the petitioners, to the Government of the
United States and to the two exporters that were specifically identified as the "exporters" in the petition,
Producers Rice Mill Inc. ("Producers Rice") and Riceland Foods Inc. ("Riceland"), providing them with a
copy of the petition and its attachments, as well as of the official questionnaire of the investigation.

2.5 Subsequent to initiation and prior to the preliminary determination, two additional exporters came
forward to ask for copies of the questionnaire: The Rice Company("Rice Company")
7 and Farmers Rice
Milling Company (“Farmers Rice”). Both compani es, together with Producers Rice and Riceland,
submitted questionnaire responses to Economía on 22 February 2001 and 6 March 2001. In addition to
the questionnaire responses, Producers Rice, Riceland, Rice Company, Farmers Rice, and the USA Rice
Federation (a trade association based in the Un ited States) made a submission commenting upon and
contesting various aspects of the petition and notice of initiation.

4 Due to a name change, the investigation was completed by the current administrator of Mexico’s anti-
dumping law, the Ministry of Economy (Secretaria de Economía or “Economía”).
5 Final Determination (Exhibit MEX-11, US-6 and US-7), paras.5 and 161. More precisely, Economia has
defined it as having the following characteristics: a) It is a graminaceous plant, of the genus Olyza, and the species
Sativa; b) Of a white crystalline color; c) With proportions Length: Width greater than 2:1; d) With characteristic
6 The data gathered by Economía, however, seemed to have covered the full 3-year period of the
investigation.
7 This company is also referred to in the Final Determination as "The Rice Corporation".

2.6 Economía published its preliminary determination on 18 July 2001. In it, Economía determined
that Riceland, Rice Company, and Farmers Rice were not dumping. As to the fourth exporter, Producers
Rice, Economía preliminarily determined that it made no sales of subject rice to Mexico during the POI.
Economía’s preliminary determination also found that there was no evidence of injury to the domestic
industry.
2.7 On 5 June 2002, Economía published its final determination. In it, Economía found no evidence
of dumping regarding Farmers Rice and Riceland and imposed a zero per cent duty to these exporters.
For the Rice Company, Economía found a 3.93 per cent margin of dumping and imposed a duty of
3.93 per cent. For the imports from the remaining US exporters, Economía imposed a duty of
10.18 per cent based on the facts available.
III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. U
NITED STATES
3.1 The United States requests that the Panel make the following findings8:
(a) Economía’s use of a POI that ended more than fifteen months prior to the initiation of the
anti-dumping investigation and nearly three years prior to the final determination is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 and Articles 1,
3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement;
(b) Economía’s limitation of its injury analysis to only six months of 1997, 1998, and 1999
is inconsistent with Mexico ’s obligations under Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5, and 6.2 of the
AD Agreement;
(c) Economía’s failure to collect the evidence on price effects and volumes that it needed to
conduct its injury analysis in an objectiv e manner is inconsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement;
(d) Economía’s failure to objectively consider whether there was a significant increase in the
volume of dumped imports or whether the dumped imports had a significant effect on
prices is inconsistent with Mexico’s ob ligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
AD Agreement;
(e) Economía’s failure to conduct an objective analysis of the relevant economic factors is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement;
(f) Economía’s inclusion of non-dumped imports in its evaluation of volume, price effects,
and the impact of the dumped imports on th e domestic industry is inconsistent with
Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement;
(g) Economía’s failure to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law with respect to its determination of injury is inconsistent with
Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement;
(h) Economía’s failure to exclude firms with anti-dumping margins of zero per cent from the
anti-dumping measure is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement;

8 United States' first written submission, para. 291. In its oral statement at the first substantive meeting
(para. 8) as well as in its second written submission (p aras. 16 and 18), the United States also made a claim on
Article VI:6(a) of GATT 1994.

(i) Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based dumping margin to the
non-shipping exporter Producers Rice is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under
Articles 6.2, 6.4, 6.8, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 of
Annex II;
(j) Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based dumping margin to the US
producers and exporters that it did not inv estigate is inconsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Articles 6.1, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, 9.5, and 12.1 of the AD Agreement and
paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II;
(k) Economía’s failure to provide sufficient information on the findings and conclusions of
fact and law and the reasons that led to the imposition of the adverse facts available-
based margin on Producers Rice and the une xamined US exporters and producers is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement;
(l) Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based margin to Producers Rice and
the unexamined US exporters and producers is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations
under Articles 1 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement;
(m) Economía’s levying of an anti-dumping duty greater than the margin of dumping is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article VI:2 of GATT 1994;
(n) Article 53 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent “as such” with Article 6.1.1 of
the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(o) Article 64 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent “as such” with Articles 6.8, 9.3,
9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, paragra phs 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement, and Articles 12.7 and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement;
(p) Article 68 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent “as such” with Articles 5.8, 9.3,
and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 11.9 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement;
(q) Article 89D of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent “as such” with Article 9.5 of
the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement;
(r) Article 93V of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent “as such” with Article 18.1 of
the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement; and
(s) Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act, and Section 366 of Mexico’s Federal
Code of Civil Procedure (“FCCP"), are inconsistent “as such” with Articles 9.3, 9.5, and
11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
3.2 The United States requests that, based on the above findings, the Panel recommend that Mexico
bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the AD Agreement, the SCM Agreement,
and GATT 1994.
B. M
EXICO
3.3 As a preliminary matter, Mexico requests that the Panel issue a preliminary ruling on the
deficiencies of the United States' panel request and decline to rule on the complaints raised in breach of

Article 4.5, 4.7 and 6.2 of the DSU or Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. Specifically, Mexico claims as
follows
9:
(a) The United States' panel request exhibits three basic deficiencies, i.e.:
(i) it does not present the problem clearly;
(ii) it does not identify a specific measure at issue; and
(iii) it raises complaints regarding matters that were not the subject of consultations.
(b) The above is contrary to DSU Articles 6.2, 4.5 and 4.7 and AD Agreement Article 17.4.
(c) Consequently, the United States' request w as filed in a manner inconsistent with
AD Agreement Article 17.5.
3.4 On the merits, Mexico requests that the Panel make the following determinations10:
 (a) In regard to the challenge raised ag ainst the measures imposed on dumped imports of
long-grain white rice:

(i) Mexico established its period of investigation without breaching its obligations
under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the
AD Agreement;
(ii) Mexico, in limiting its injury analysis to the months of March to August of
1997, 1998 and 1999, did not contravene its obligations under Articles 1, 3.1,
3.5, and 6.2 of the AD Agreement;
(iii) Mexico conducted its injury analysis in an objective manner by carrying out an
objective examination based on positive evidence of price effects and volumes,
without violating its obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 6.8 and Annex II to
the AD Agreement;
(iv) Mexico objectively considered whether there was a significant increase in the
volume of dumped imports and whether the dumped imports had a significant
effect on prices, thus acting in a manne r consistent with its obligations under
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement;
(v) Mexico conducted an objective analysis of the relevant economic factors, thus
meeting its obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement;
(vi) Mexico did not violate its obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the
AD Agreement;
(vii) Mexico provided in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all
issues of fact and law with respect to its determination of injury, thus meeting its
obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement;
(viii) Mexico, in imposing an anti-dumping measure of zero per cent, did not
contravene its obligations under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement;

9 Mexico's first written submission, para. 309.
10 Mexico's first written submission, para. 310.

(ix) Mexico, in applying a facts available-based dumping margin, did not act in a
manner inconsistent with its obligations under Articles 6.2, 6.4, 6.8, 9.4 and 9.5
of the AD Agreement and paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement;
(x) Mexico, in applying a facts available-based dumping margin to the US
producers and exporters that it did not investigate, did not violate its obligations
under Articles 6.1, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, 9.5 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement and
paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement;
(xi) Mexico provided sufficient information on its findings and conclusions of fact
and law and the reasons that led the investigating authority to impose the facts
available-based margin on Producers Rice and the unexamined US exporters
and producers, without contravening its obligations under Article 12.2 of the
AD Agreement;
(xii) Mexico, in applying a facts available-based margin to Producers Rice and the
unexamined US exporters and producers, did not violate its obligations under
Articles 1 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement; and
(xiii) Mexico did not levy an anti-dumping duty greater than the margin of dumping
calculated and hence did not contravene its obligations under Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994;
 (b) In regard to the challenge raised ag ainst the revision of the Foreign Trade Act:

(i) Article 53 of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Article 6.1.1
of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(ii) Article 64 of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 6.8,
9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement,
and Articles 12.7 and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) Article 68 of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 5.8,
9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 11.9 and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement;
(iv) Article 89D of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Article 9.5
of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement;
(v) Article 93.V of Mexico's Foreign Trad e Act is consistent as such with
Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement; and
(vi) Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico's Foreign Trade Act and Article 366 of Mexico's
Federal Code of Civil Procedure are consistent as such with Articles 9.3, 9.5 and
11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
3.5 In view of the foregoing, Mexico requests that the Panel conclude that the definitive anti-dumping
measures adopted in respect of imports of long-grain white rice from the United States and the
amendment of the Foreign Trade Act are consistent with Mexico's obligations under the AD Agreement,
in particular Articles 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 18 and Annex II; the SCM Agreement, in particular Articles 11, 12,
19, 21 and 32; and the GATT 1994, in particular Article VI.

IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1 The arguments of the parties are set forth in their written and oral submissions to the Panel, and in
their answers to questions. The parties' arguments as presented in their submissions are summarised in
this section. The summaries are based on th e executive summaries submitted by the parties. 11 The
response of the United States to Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling as well as parties' written
answers to questions from the Panel are set forth in the Annexes. (See list of annexes at page xi.)
A. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
4.2 The following are the United States' arguments in its first written submission:
1. The imposition of anti-dumping duties on US long-grain white rice
(a) Economía’s Use of a Stale Period of Investigation Breached Articles VI:2 of GATT 1994
and Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
4.3 The purpose of an anti-dumping measure is not to punish exporters for past dumping practices.
Rather, it is to “offset or prevent” dumping that is presently causing or threatening to cause material injury
to a domestic industry in the importing country. A Member is not offsetting or preventing injurious
dumping if the dumping or injury has completely ceased or never existed. Thus, in order to impose an
anti-dumping measure, the investigating authority must examine, as part of its initial investigation
pursuant to Article 5 of the AD Agreement, a period of time that is as close to the date of initiation as
practicable.
4.4 In the present case, the petitioning industry selected the POI that it wanted Economía to examine
for the dumping investigation and the evaluation of injury, and Economía accepted its request over the
objection of the US exporters and the importers. As a consequence, there was more than a fifteen-month
gap between the end of the POI (August 1999) and the initiation of the investigation (December 2000).
Economía did not even collect, much less examine, any data for that fifteen-month period. By the time
Economía issued its final determination on 5 June 2002, this gap had stretched to nearly three years.
4.5 These periods were so remote in time that the information collected by the investigating authority
was incapable of providing a basis for an objective finding of dumping, injury, and causation (as those
terms are defined and used in the AD Agreement) or a determination based on positive evidence. For
example, the more than fifteen-month gap between the end of the POI and the date of initiation (and the
nearly three-year gap between the end of the POI and the final determination) means:
• Economía’s examination of volume and price effects was not objective or based on positive
evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement;

• Economía’s examination of “all relevant economic factors” having a bearing on the state of the
domestic industry was not objective or based on positive evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and
3.4 of the AD Agreement; and

• Economía’s determination that the dumped impor ts were “causing” injury to the domestic
industry was not objective or based on positive evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the
AD Agreement.

4.6 Economía also lacked the information it needed to determine that the subject imports are
 being
dumped, and that they are the cause of present material injury (or threat) to the domestic industry
producing the like product.

11 All the footnotes in sections IV:A – IV:H are original footnotes of the parties.

4.7 Thus, the imposition of an anti-dumping measure on long-grain white rice from the United States
breached Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
(b) Economía Breached Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5, and 6.2 of the AD Agreement by Limiting Its
Examination of Injury to Only Six Months of 1997, 1998, and 1999
4.8 The petitioner in the rice investigation asked Economía to examine only the March to August time
period, because this period allegedly reflected the main import activity of the product under investigation.
 Economía agreed that imports were concentrated during that period, and consequently limited its injury
analysis to the data for March - August of each of the years at issue in its investigation (1997, 1998,
1999). Economía’s decision to conduct its analysis in this manner resulted in breaches of Articles 1, 3.1,
3.5, and 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.9 First
, Economía’s investigation of injury was not based on “positive evidence.” As the
Appellate Body stated in United States - Hot-Rolled Steel, the term “positive evidence” relates to “the
quality of the evidence that authorities may rely upon in making a determination. . . . [T]he evidence must
be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable char acter, and . . . it must be credible.” Economía’s
investigation of injury was not based on “positive evidence” for the simple reason that it failed even to
examine
 the evidence pertaining to half of the period of injury analysis.
4.10 Second, Economía’s decision to focus its investigation on only March to August of each year also
prevented its examination from being objective. To examine only those parts of the year when imports
levels are high may overlook positive developments in other parts of the year, and thus give a misleading
impression of the data relating to the condition of th e industry as a whole. But this is exactly what
Economía did.
4.11 These actions contravened Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5, and 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
(c) Economía’s Conduct of its Injury Analysis Breached Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8, 12.2, and
Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.12 Separate and apart from the breaches arising from Economía’s choice of a POI, Economía’s
conduct of its injury analysis was inconsistent with WTO rules.
4.13 First, Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement states that injury determinations must be based on
“positive evidence” and must involve an “objective examination” of the volume of the dumped imports
and their effect on prices in the domestic market fo r like products, and the consequent impact of the
imports on domestic producers of such products. By failing to actively seek out information pertinent to
these matters, Economía did not make it possible to conduct an objective examination of the injury
factors, and consequently did not base its de termination on positive evidence. Economía then
compounded its error by basing its determination on the facts available, contrary to Article 6.8 and Annex
II.
4.14 Second
, Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to consider “whether
there has been a significant increase in the dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the importing Member.” Nothing in the discussion of this issue indicates
that Economía actually considered whether there were significant absolute or relative increases in the
volume of the dumped imports. Economía’s failure to conduc t a proper examination of this issue
breached Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.15 Third
, Economía breached Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to conduct an
objective analysis of certain “relevant economic factors” that it was required to evaluate under Article 3.4.

4.16 Fourth
, Economía breached Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by focusing its injury
analysis on all imports of the investigated product from th e United States, irrespective of whether the
imports were dumped, instead of conducting an objective examination of the effect of the dumped imports
alone.
4.17 Finally, Economía failed to explain sufficiently th e findings and conclusions it reached on all
issues of law, and thus breached 12.2 of the AD Agreement.
(d) Economía’s Failure to Exclude Firms with Anti-dumping Margins of Zero per cent from
the
Anti-dumping Measure is Inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement
4.18 Economía also breached WTO rules by failing to exclude two of the firms it examined –
Farmers Rice and Riceland – from the anti-dumping measure. Farmers Rice and Riceland each had
dumping margins of zero per cent. Since neither firm was dumping, neither firm was causing any injury
to the Mexican rice industry through the “effects of dumping.” Nevertheless, Economía applied the
anti-dumping measure to both firms, and each firm re mains subject to future review and the possible
application of anti-dumping duties. By treating Fa rmers Rice and Riceland in this manner, Economía
breached Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
(e) Economía’s Application of an Adverse “Facts Available” Dumping Margin to Producers
Rice and to US Producers and Exporters that It Did Not Examine Is Inconsistent with
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 12.1, and 12.2
of the AD Agreement, and Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.19 A basic principle underlying the AD Agreement, embodied in Article 1, is that anti-dumping
measures shall be applied “only . . . pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with
the provisions of this Agreement.” The Agreement provides for conducting investigations based on the
actual data of individual interested parties, and Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement requires “as a rule” that
the authorities “shall determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer
concerned of the product under investigation.”
4.20 The sole exception provided to this rule, set forth in the second sentence of Article 6.10, arises
when the sheer number of potential interested parties is so large that making an individual determination
for each exporter or producer would be “impracti cable.” In such cases, authorities may limit their
examination, either by using statistically valid sam ples or by examining the largest percentage of the
volume of the exports which can reasonably be inv estigated. The Agreemen t then provides for the
“residual” margin (i.e., the margin assigned to the uninvestigated firms) to be based on the calculation
method set out in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement for determining the ceiling for the “all others” rate.
4.21 Economía’s conduct of the rice investigation breached these rules. Specifically, Economía
improperly:
• sent its anti-dumping questionnaire to only two co mpanies that were listed in the petition but
claimed to be investigating every producer or exporter in the United States;

• calculated individual margins of dumping for one of those companies and two others that came
forward on their own initiative and asked to be included in the investigation, but assigned an
adverse “facts available” margin taken from the petition to Producers Rice, even though that firm
demonstrated that it had no exports to Mexico during the POI; and

• treated all other exporters and producers in the United States as “uncooperative” respondents, and
assigned them an adverse facts available margin taken from the petition, even though Economía

never sent any of the affected companies a copy of the questionnaire or informed them of the
consequences that would flow from not providing the information that it never requested them to
provide.

(i) Analysis of Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10, and 9.4 of the AD Agreement, and Paragraph 1 of Annex II of
the AD Agreement
4.22 The core legal provisions implicated by this issue are Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the AD Agreement,
Articles 6.1 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement, and pa ragraph 1 of Annex II. These provisions require
investigating authorities to either individually exam ine and then calculate an individual margin of
dumping for every producer or exporter of the product in the country under investigation, or else, if the
authorities limit their examination to a subset of exporters or producers, to assign a neutral “all others”
rate to those producers and exporters that are not individually examined. An investigating authority is not
permitted to do what Economía did in the rice investigation – which was to individually investigate just a
few exporters, and then assign an adverse facts available-based margin to everyone else.
4.23 This conclusion flows from the text of Article 6.10, which requires, “as a rule,” that individual
dumping margins be established for each producer or exporter. The rule is subject to a single exception,
when the number of exporters or producers is so larg e that the determination of individual margins for
each producer or exporter would be impracticable. In such cases, and only in such cases, an investigating
authority may limit its examination to a subset of producers or exporters. Article 6.10 does not permit an
investigating authority to announce the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, send its questionnaire
to a few producers or exporters, deem every other producer or exporter in the country as also being
investigated, and apply a dumping margin based on the “facts available” to any company that does not
“appear.”
4.24 Articles 1, 5, 6.1, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8, and 9.4 of the AD Agreement, and paragraph 1 of Annex II,
provide contextual support for the conclusion that Article 6.10 does not permit investigating authorities to
take such a passive approach to their investigations.
4.25 First
, Articles 6.1 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement, a nd paragraph 1 of Annex II, provide that an
investigating authority must make known to the exporters or producers the information that is required of
them. This informs the nature of the examination to be undertaken by authorities under Article 6.10 in
determining margins: an investigating authority cannot simply wait for exporters or producers to respond
to a general notice and then apply the facts available to any firms that do not appear; rather, the authorities
must actively seek to identify individual exporters and producers, inform them of the information that is
needed, and ensure they understand the consequences of not supplying the requested information.
4.26 Second, Article 9.4 requires investigating authoriti es to assign a neutral “all others” rate to
producers and exporters that they do not individually examine. The Appellate Body has described this
rate as a “maximum limit, or ceiling” that investigating authorities “shall not exceed.”12 Inasmuch as the
calculation method in Article 9.4 does not allow the resulting margin to contain any element of the facts
available, there is no basis for an interpretation of Article 6.10 that would permit investigating authorities
to routinely assign total “facts available” margins to firms that they do not individually investigate.
4.27 Third, Articles 1, 5, 6.5, and 6.6 of the AD Agreement provide context for confirming that
Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, and paragraph 1 of Annex II, require an investigating authority to (1) actively
determine the universe of potential respondents; (2) actively send questionnaires to those producers or
exporters from which it is seeking information; and (3) either take active steps to investigate every known
producer and exporter, or else examine a representative sample and assign a neutral “all others” margin
that is not
 based on the facts available to everyone else.

12 Report of the Appellate Body, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 116.

(ii) Economía’s Application of an Adverse “Facts Available” Dumping Margin to Producers Rice
Breached Articles 6.8, 9.4, and 9.5, and Paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement
4.28 Given these requirements, Economía breached its WTO obligations by applying a margin based
on adverse “facts available” to Producers Rice. Pr oducers Rice was named in the petition and in the
Initiation Notice. The record demonstrates that Producers Rice was an “appearing party” that, with other
respondent parties, established a domicile for legal pur poses in Mexico in order to participate in the
investigation, requested an extension of time to respond to Economía’s questionnaire, provided a timely
response to that questionnaire, including arguments regarding flaws in the petition, requested and attended
a technical information meeting, participated through its representative at the public hearing, offered post-
hearing final allegations, and filed “additional remarks.” Economía, however, disregarded all of these
facts, and only took into account that Producers Rice did not export to Mexico during the six-month POI.
4.29 Under Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement, a panel that is assessing the facts of a matter before it
must determine whether the authority’s establishment of the facts was proper and whether its evaluation
of those facts was unbiased and objective. An unbiased and objective investigating authority would not
have concluded that Producers Rice had failed to appear in the rice investigation, or that the necessary
prerequisites for assigning an adverse facts available margin to Producers Rice were met. Economía’s
decision to apply adverse facts available to Producers Rice in the absence of any legitimate grounds to do
so was inconsistent with Articles 6.2, 6.8, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 of
Annex II of the AD Agreement.
4.30 In addition, Economía breached Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to disclose
to Producers Rice (and Farmers Rice, Riceland, and Rice Company) the Export Price information that the
petitioner used in calculating the adverse facts available margin in the petition.
(iii) Economía’s Application of an Adverse “Facts Available” Dumping Margin to the US Producers
and Exporters that It Did Not Examine Breached Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, 9.5, 12.1,
and Paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.31 Economía breached Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, 9.5, and 12.1 of the AD Agreement, and
paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, by individually examining only three exporters or
producers in the rice investigation and assigning an adverse facts available margin to every other producer
and exporter in the United States.
4.32 For example, Economía made no effort to investigate each exporter or producer of the subject
merchandise, choosing instead to (i) send its questionnaire to just the two firms officially designated as
exporters in the petition, (ii) investigate only those firms and two other firms that came forward on their
own, and (iii) apply an adverse, facts available-based margin to every other producer and exporter in the
United States. An objective and unbiased investigati ng authority would not have concluded that there
were only two exporters or producers of long-grai n white rice in the United States. Economía’s
establishment of the facts with respect to this matter was improper, and that by conducting its
investigation in this manner, Economía breached Article 6.10.
4.33 Similarly, Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement requires that authorities “satisfy themselves as to the
accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based.” The
petition identified only two US exporters of long-grain white rice, and Economía apparently accepted that
listing at face value (even though the petition itself relied upon data from another major exporter). Once
again, an objective and unbiased investigating authority would not have reached such a conclusion, and
Economía’s establishment of the facts with respect to this matter was improper.
4.34 Furthermore, in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body found that the calculation method set
forth in Article 9.4 for determining the ceiling for the “all others” rate precludes the use of any margins

which are calculated, even in part
, using facts available. The rate applied by Economía to US rice
exporters was not based in part on facts available, as was the case in US – Hot-Rolled Steel. It was based
entirely on facts available. Not only that, but the 10.18 per cent rate was adverse facts available – a clear
breach of Mexico’s WTO obligations.
4.35 Economía also breached Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, by using
the petition margin without corroborating the underlying information that the petitioner used to calculate
the margin. As was the case with respect to Producers Rice, there is no evidence on the record of the rice
investigation to suggest that the unexamined exporters and producers – which were never sent a copy of
Economía’s anti-dumping questionnaire – were uncooperative in any way. Moreover, as previously
explained, Economía failed to check the presumptions embodied in the petition against independent data
available during the investigation, much less to exercise “special circumspection” in its application of the
petition information to the unexamined producers and exporters.
4.36 Finally, Economía’s efforts to identify and obtain contact information for interested parties other
than those listed in the petition were inadequate. Economía failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy
of the CMA’s list of only two “known” exporters, a list that did not even include a third exporter, the
Rice Company, whose website, the content of which was attached to the petition as Annex H, describes it
as “one of the largest US exporters as regards pa ddy rice and white milled rice.” In this manner,
Economía breached Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement, which requires authorities to notify interested
parties about the initiation of an investigation.
(iv) Economía’s Failure to Provide Sufficient Information on the Findings and Conclusions of Fact
and Law and the Reasons that Led to the Imposition of the Adverse Facts Available-Based
Margin on Producers Rice and the Unexamined Exporters and Producers Breached Article 12.2
of the AD Agreement
4.37 Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement requires that th e public notice of any preliminary or final
anti-dumping determination “shall set forth, or othe rwise make available through a separate report, in
sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by
the investigating authorities.” Despite this re quirement, Economía provided only the most summary
rationale for its decision to base the margin fo r Producers Rice and the unexamined exporters and
producers on adverse facts available. Furthermore, Economía’s references to Article 54 of the Mexican
Foreign Trade Act as a supposed basis for its decision to apply a facts available margin to these firms
were unfounded.
(v) Economía’s Application of an Adverse Facts Available-Based Margin to Producers Rice and the
Unexamined Exporters and Producers Breached Articles 1 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:2 of GATT 1994
4.38 Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement states that “[t]he amount of anti-dumping duty shall not exceed
the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.” Because Economía failed to calculate the residual
margin on the basis of the neutral formula set forth in Article 9.4, the amount of the margin it assigned to
Producers Rice and the unexamined exporters and producers exceeded the margin of dumping established
under Article 2, and thus breached Article 9.3.
4.39 Article 1 of the AD Agreement provides that an anti-dumping measure shall be applied only
under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Because Economía’s conduct of the
rice investigation breached numerous other provisions of the AD Agreement, Economía also breached
Article 1.
4.40 Finally, as a result of the adverse assumptions made in assigning an adverse margin to non-
shipper Producers Rice and to the other non-examined companies in the rice investigation, the anti-

dumping duty levied on their products was “greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of
such products” which could permissibly have been calculated in accordance with the provisions of the AD
Agreement. Because the duties Mexico levied on these “all others” companies was, and continues to be,
greater in amount than the appropriate margin of dumping, Mexico violated Article VI:2 of GATT 1994.
2. Mexico's Foreign Trade Act and its FCCP – Articles 53, 64, 68, 89D, 93V, and 97 of
Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act, and Section 366 of Mexico’s FCCP, are inconsistent “as such”
with several of Mexico’s obligations under the AD and SCM Agreements
4.41 Various provisions of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act and its FCCP are inconsistent with Mexico’s
WTO obligations.
4.42 First
, Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act requires interested parties to present arguments,
information, and evidence to the investigating authorities within 28 days of the day after publication of
the initiation notice. This provision breaches Articles 6.1.1 and 12.1.1 of the AD and SCM Agreements,
respectively, by counting the time to respond from the date of initiation instead of the date of receipt, and
by preventing the investigating authorities from considering and granting extension requests.
4.43 Second
, Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is the provision of Mexican law that applies to the
calculation of individual anti-dumping and countervailing duty margins and the application of margins to
exporters and producers that are not individually examined and that do not receive individual margins.
The provision does not, however, provide for the application of a neutral “all others” margin to the
unexamined firms. Rather, Article 64 requires the investigating authorities to apply a margin based on
adverse facts available – specifically, the highest
 margin obtained from the facts available – to any firm
that does not receive an individual margin. Artic le 64 requires this outcome even for a firm, like
Producers Rice, that participates in the investigation and demonstrates that it had no exports during the
period of investigation. By requiring the investigating authorities to assign rates in this manner, Article
64 is inconsistent “as such” with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 6.8, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD
Agreement, paragraphs 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, and Articles 12.7 and 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement.
4.44 Third, Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act is the provision of Mexican law that applies to the
review of final anti-dumping and countervailing duty margins determined in investigations. By requiring
investigating authorities to conduct reviews of producers that were found not to be dumping or receiving
countervailable subsidies during the original investig ation, Article 68 is inc onsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement.
4.45 In addition, Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act also requires producers and exporters seeking
reviews of their own anti-dumping or countervailing duty margins to demonstrate that their sales during
the review period were “representative.” The im position of this “representativeness” requirement is
inconsistent as such with Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and with Article 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
4.46 Fourth
, Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act is the provision of Mexican law that implements the
expedited review provisions of the AD and SCM Agreements. By impermissibly restricting the ability of
parties to obtain such reviews, Article 89D breach es Mexico’s obligations under Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
4.47 Fifth
, Article 93V of the Foreign Trade Act provides for the application of fines on importers that
enter products subject to anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations while such investigations
are underway. This provision constitutes a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy
that is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of
the SCM Agreement.

4.48 Finally
, Article 366 of Mexico’s FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act
preclude Mexican authorities from conducting reviews of anti-dumping and countervailing duties while a
judicial review of the underlying anti-dumping or countervailing duty measure is ongoing, including a
“binational panel” review under Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement . By
requiring the Mexican authorities to reject requests for such reviews, Articles 366, 68, and 97 breach
Articles 9.3, 9.5, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
4.49 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act exacerbates the harm caused by the fact that Articles 366, 68
and 97 preclude the Mexican authorities from conducting the reviews that WTO rules require. As
previously discussed, Article 64 requires Economía to apply an adverse, facts available-based anti-
dumping or countervailing duty margin to every producer or exporter in the country subject to the
investigation, other than those few that receive individual rates, even if the firms subject to the adverse,
facts
available-based margins demonstrate that they had no shipments during the period of review or were
never even sent a questionnaire. These firms lose twice: Economía first assigns them an adverse (often
petition-based) margin that has no relation to reality but effectively locks them out of the Mexican market,
and it then denies them any review, and thus any opportunity to obtain an individual rate, over the course
of a judicial challenge that may take years.
B. F
IRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF MEXICO
4.50 The following are Mexico's arguments in its first written submission:
1. Request for a preliminary ruling
(a) Introduction
4.51 Throughout these proceedings, the United States has not shown the slightest respect for the formal
requirements governing the terms of reference of the Pa nel, affecting the latter's capacity to settle this
dispute and Mexico's rights to due process. The request for the establishment of a panel does not fulfil the
requirements laid down in Articles 4.5, 4.7 and 6.2 of the DSU, nor has the United States duly complied
with Article 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agreement. Mexico's capacity for rebuttal was also impaired by the
fact that Mexico did not receive the Spanish version of the United States' first written submission until
16 April 2004.
(b) Requirements for the request for establishment of a Panel
4.52 The Appellate Body has clarified the elements of the matter referred to the DSB,
13 specifying that
flaws in a request for the establishment of a panel cannot be subsequently be cured.14 Concepts such as
"specific measures at issue" and "legal basis" are essential for an understanding of the nature of the matter
referred to the DSB. Article 6.2 lays down the minimum requirements for a definition of a panel's terms
of reference and the precise procedural stage at which this should be done. Under Article 6.2 of the DSU,
"[i]t is not enough ... that 'the legal basis of the complaint' is summarily identified; the identification must
'present the problem clearly'".
15 In addition, a responding party is entitled to know what case it has to
answer so that it can begin preparing its defence.16

13 US – Carbon Steel, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 125.
14 EC – Bananas III, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 143.
15 Korea – Dairy, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 120.
16 Thailand – H-Beams, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 88.

(c) Deficiencies in the request for the establishment of a Panel submitted by the United States
(i) Ambiguous and vague complaints which do not present the problem clearly
4.53 First of all, the United States submits that Mexico violated Article VI of the GATT 1994;
17 this is
as ambiguous as to assert a violation of the AD and SCM Agreements as a whole. Second, the
United States alleges violations of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement
18 defining the "domestic industry", to
which the facts referred to bear no relation. Thir d, the United States argues that Mexico breached the
AD Agreement by applying the facts available to a US rice exporter,19 whereas the provisions on which
the United States relies do NOT refer to the case in question. Fifth, the United States is equally mistaken
in saying that Mexico applied the facts available in establishing the anti-dumping margins assigned to US
exporters that were not individually investigated.20 The United States attempted to correct the omission in
paragraph 40 of its first written submission.
(ii) Failure to identify a specific measure at issue
4.54 In paragraph 3 of the request for the establishment of a panel, the United States goes as far as to
claim that Mexico breached a number of Articles of the AD and SCM Agreements, on the basis of
"conversations" with a number of Mexican officials. It has been made clear that such conversations
cannot be deemed to be a measure.21 Consequently, the affirmation in the United States' request for the
establishment of a panel clearly fails to identify a specific measure at issue
4.55 If, arguendo, the above were to constitute a measure, the manner in which the United States
presents its argument would clearly constitute a failure to comply with Article 6.2 of the DSU since the
problem would be far from being presented clearly, thus denying Mexico any basis for rebuttal.
(iii) Complaints which were at no time included by the United States in its consultations with Mexico,
but which it nevertheless presents in its panel request
4.56 Pursuant to Article 4.5 of the DSU, WTO Members are under the obligation to attempt to achieve
a solution in the course of the consultations, and failure to settle the dispute during the consultations is a
precondition for entitlement to request the establishment of a panel under Article 4.7 of the DSU. In other
words, the United States is required to request consultations on all matters included in the panel request.
Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement confirms such a requirement and, according to the Appellate Body,
consultations "... provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of the dispute between
them ...".22 Thus, matters left outside the scope of the consultations could not be taken up in the panel

17 Request for the establishment of a panel (WT/DS295/2), paragraph 1(a).
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., section 1(f). The provisions in question are Ar ticles 6.6, 6.8 and 6.10, 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 and
paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
20 Ibid., section 1(g).
21 Japan – Film, Report of the Panel, paragraph 10.43. US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review ,
Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 87.
22 Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 54.

request submitted by the United States; the provisions at issue are the following:
Provisions invoked Paragraphs in the request for the establishment
of a panel not included in the consultations
AD Article 1 Paragraphs 1(a), 1(g)
AD Article 4.1 Paragraph 1(a)
AD Article 11.2 Paragraph 2(c)
AD Article 18.1 Paragraph 2(e)
Paragraph 1 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 3 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 5 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 6 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 7 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
SCM Article 12.5 Paragraph 2(b)
SCM Article 21.2 Paragraph 2(c)
SCM Article 32.1 Paragraph 2(e)
Article VI:2 of the GATT Paragraph 1(i)

4.57 Even the United States claim in paragraph 1(a) of the panel request was not the subject of
consultations with Mexico except in relation to the anti-dumping investigation on beef, as is expressly
noted in the third paragraph of the request for consultations.
4.58 Mexico had already brought up these irregularities at the DSB meeting of 2 October 2003.23
(d) Conclusion
4.59 As the responding party, Mexico has a right to due process. The request for the establishment of
a panel exhibits fundamental flaws that prevent Mexi co from preparing its defence. In view of the
foregoing, Mexico requests the Panel to issue a preliminary ruling on the deficiencies in the panel request
submitted by the United States and to refrain fro m ruling on claims brought in contravention of
Articles 4.5, 4.7 and 6.2 of the DSU and Article 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agreement.
2. Legal arguments
(a) Economía complied with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of
the AD Agreement with regard to the establishment of the Period of Investigation
4.60 Economía complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement and VI:2 of the
GATT, by correctly establishing the periods of i nvestigation (for dumping purposes) and analysis (for
determination of injury) in the anti-dumping investigation on imports of long-grain white rice originating
in the United States, as a result of an objective examination based on positive evidence.
4.61 The United States argues that the examination of volume and effects on prices, the examination of
"all relevant economic factors and indices" and the determination that the dumped imports caused injury
were neither objective nor based on positive eviden ce because of the obsolescence of the information
used. There is no provision in the AD Agreement which indicates how remote a period of investigation
should be. Consequently, Mexico did not breach Article 3.2 of the Agreement.
4.62 Economía complied with Article 3.1, 3.2 a nd 3.4 of the AD Agreement by conducting an
objective examination, based on positive evidence, of the volume of the imports, their effect on prices,
and all relevant economic factors and indices. Moreover, the final determination notes that the dumped

23 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 2 October 2003.

imports caused injury to the domestic industry during the period of analysis, so that there are no grounds
for alleging lack of information for the purposes of such a determination.
(b) Economía complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement with regard to the
establishment of the Period of Analysis
4.63 The United States argues that Economía violated Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement
in allowing the petitioner to set the period of investigation as March to August 1999 and in establishing
the months of March to August 1997, 1998 and 1999 as the period of analysis.
4.64 The periods of investigation and analysis were established correctly and Economía carried out an
objective examination based on positive evidence, maki ng sure that the parties had an opportunity to
defend their interests in accordance with Article 6.2. of the AD Agreement.
4.65 The AD Agreement does not specify in detail how the period of analysis should be included in an
anti-dumping investigation. In order to prevent distortions stemming from seasonal market fluctuations, a
comparison was made between AD Agreement Article 3.4 indicators for similar periods in 1997, 1998
and 1999. The Economía did not violate the AD Agreement in setting the period of analysis inasmuch as
the Agreement does not prohibit the comparison of periods equivalent to the period of investigation for
the purposes of injury determination.
4.66 The United States indicates that the spring/summer (S/S) (October to December) season yield of
paddy rice is greater than the fall/winter (F/W) (June-July) yield and, consequently, domestic production
of long-grain white rice is greater during the S/S season than during the F/W season. Hence, the
United States argues that, by setting the period of analysis as March to August of each year, Economía
acted in a manner inconsistent with the AD Agreement because it failed to analyse the S/S harvest period,
which is that during which, according to the United States, imports decline. The reason for setting the
period of analysis as March to August 1997, 1998 a nd 1999 was to maintain the objectivity of the
analysis. The argument that there were increases in domestic production and falls in imports of long-grain
white rice during the S/S season is without foundation insofar as domestic production of this product does
not depend on domestic production of pa ddy rice; indeed, when there is a drop in the latter domestic
producers of long-grain white rice rely on imported paddy rice. Domestic production of long-grain white
rice therefore remains virtually constant throughout the year – as was the case in 1997, 1998 and 1999.
4.67 Furthermore, the domestic producers only pr oposed March to August 1999 as the period of
investigation and, having found this period to be reasonable, Economía established it as such, without
violating the AD Agreement. As stated in paragraph 68 of the preliminary determination, moreover, the
exporters provided no evidence of the convenience to select another period of investigation.
4.68 The investigating authority established the period of analysis on the basis of previous periods
comparable to the period of investigation, wh ich does not contravene the AD Agreement. The
investigating authority's examination was objec tive and based on positive evidence, since it used
comparable information concerning the same seasonal segments.
4.69 The United States argues that, in setting the peri od of analysis, Economía acted inconsistently
with the AD Agreement because it did not examine "all relevant evidence" as required by Article 3.5 of
the AD Agreement and because, in disregarding the cl aims of exporters and importers concerning the
exclusion of information pertaining to the periods from September to February and the remoteness in time
of the period analysed, Economía did not provide an opportunity to the parties to defend their interests,
thereby infringing Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.70 The period of analysis was established without contravening the AD Agreement and all relevant
evidence was examined in the injury analysis. Since there was no infringement of Article 3.5 of the
AD Agreement, it cannot be argued that Article 6.2 was violated as a result of a breach of Article 3.5.

4.71 The investigating authority complied with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement in giving the parties
attending the public hearing an opportunity to meet with other parties having adverse interests, and the
exporting companies had a full opportunity to present their arguments in relation to the hearing, which
they did.
(c) Economía conducted its injury analysis in accordance with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8 and 12.2
and Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.72 Economía based its injury determination on positive evidence and on an objective examination of
the effect on prices, the volume of imports, the impact on domestic prices and relevant economic factors,
properly using the best information available and giving sufficient detail of its findings and conclusions
on issues of fact and law. It thus complied with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8 and 12.2 and Annex II of
the AD Agreement.
4.73 The United States argues that Economía did not carry out an objective examination of the effect
on prices inasmuch as it based its analysis on information selected by the petitioner and "did not send
questionnaires to any purchasers". In addition, it submits that Economía did not examine the import
declarations (pedimentos de importación ). The United States says that Economía made no effort to
identify exporters and importers other than those mentioned by the petitioner and thereby contravened the
AD Agreement.
4.74 An investigating authority complies with the standard laid down in Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement when: (a) It bases itself on affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible evidence; and
(b) it gathers and evaluates that evidence in good faith and fundamental fairness. Economía fulfilled those
conditions by carrying out an objective examinati on, based on positive evidence, of the volume of
imports, their effect on prices for like products and the impact on the domestic industry.
4.75 The AD Agreement does not require any particular methodology for making price comparisons
and evaluating effects on prices, but the analysis must be objective and based on positive evidence. In the
absence of specific guidelines, an investigating authority may conduct its analysis in the manner it deems
appropriate provided that it bases itself on positive evidence and makes an objective examination.
4.76 The United States argues that Economía based its analysis on information sources selected by the
petitioner in the investigation, in breach of the AD Ag reement. As the Appellate Body determined in
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , the United States failed to discharge its burden of proof in not putting
forward a clear and detailed allegation or any s upporting evidence. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Mexico submits that it did not infringe the AD Agreement.
4.77 As regards the fact that no questionnaires were sent to the purchasers, the AD Agreement contains
no provision requiring such steps to be taken in an i nvestigation, so that it is wrong to maintain that
Mexico failed to act in compliance with the AD Agreement.
4.78 As to the pedimentos, these are not available to the investigating authority nor were they supplied
by the petitioner. The investigating authority has "lists of pedimentos", which provide a variety of
information but do not show the names or domiciles of the exporting firms.
4.79 The United States further argues that Economía's collection of information for the purposes of
considering absolute and relative volumes of produc tion and consumption was not objective and that
Economía failed to conduct an objective eval uation of volume in using neither the pedimentos nor
accurate information on the importers' import volumes. Mexico repeats that although the AD Agreement
does not lay down any particular methodology for analysing the volume of imports and does not require
the investigating authority to obtain more information than that supplied by the parties, the analysis must
be carried out objectively, on the basis of positive evidence. Moreover, Economía requested information

from the exporters and importers but did not obtain an adequate response. Mexico holds that it carried out
an objective examination based on positive evidence, in accordance with the AD Agreement.
4.80 Mexico did not use the information supplied by The Rice Company because, despite being asked
to do so, the firm failed to provide data for 1997 a nd 1998. Therefore, the information it supplied for
1999 was disregarded for reasons of procedural fairness, since other appearing parties did submit data for
the entire period of analysis.
4.81 The United States indicates that Economía used the methodology proposed by the petitioners,
even though it could only identify the long-grain white rice imports corresponding to the investigated
period and cannot be extrapolated to the previous similar periods, in breach of Article 3.2. of the
AD Agreement. Mexico repeats that Article 3.2 contains no guideline whatsoever as to whether use of the
methodology proposed by the petitioner constitutes a violation of the AD Agreement. This methodology
was used from the outset, in the preliminary determination, and no objection or better proposal was made.
 Consequently, the investigating authority requested further information from the exporters and the latter
either did not respond or failed to supply the relevant information.
4.82 The United States asserts that Economía violated Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II
of the AD Agreement by basing its injury analysis on the best information available, arguing that the
reason for this is that Economía lacked accurate information on import volumes and value because it did
not send questionnaires to all exporters, importers and purchasers and failed to consult the pedimentos. In
the opinion of the United States, the investigating authority did not make the necessary effort to obtain
information from the interested parties, nor did it notify them pursuant to paragraph 1 of Annex II relating
to the use of the best information available. Th e United States accordingly concludes that none of the
requirements of Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement was met for the purposes of applying the "adverse facts
available".
4.83 There is no obligation to send questionnaires to all exporters, importers and purchasers, nor does
the AD Agreement contain any provision requiring the investigating authority actively to seek
information in an anti-dumping investigation, so that the above-mentioned argument is unfounded.
4.84 According to Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement, an investigating authority has the option to send
questionnaires to producers and foreign exporters but is under no obligation to do so, much less in respect
of all of them. In the case of purchasers, the possibility is not even contemplated in the AD Agreement,
and so there is no obligation to send questionnaires to them. Mexico complied with its obligations,
moreover, by transmitting to the United States authorities the public notice of initiation, the text of the
application for initiation of an investigation and the annexes thereto, and the questionnaire for exporters
and foreign producers.
4.85 In compliance with paragraph 1 of Annex II to the AD Agreement, the third paragraph of the
introduction on the questionnaire provided to Producers Rice and Riceland, as well as to the United
States' Embassy in Mexico, specified that if th e required information was not supplied, Economía's
determination would be based on the facts available. Accordingly, the United States' allegation that these
points were not notified to the exporters is without foundation.
4.86 The United States argues that Economía violated Article 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement by
failing to objectively consider whether there had been a significant increase in the volume (in absolute or
relative terms) of dumped imports or significant effects on prices. Mexico rejects this argument.
4.87 According to the Panel's finding in
Thailand – H-Beams, Mexico is under no obligation to make
an explicit finding as to whether the increase in dumped imports is "significant". Mexico contends that
the examination relating to the increase in total imports and dumped imports and the analysis of
significant effects on prices is dealt with, albeit not explicitly, in the final determination.

4.88 The United States submits that Economía violated Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement in
failing to conduct an objective analysis of the releva nt economic factors. It also argues that the
investigating authority did not properly evaluate inventories or market share, nor did it evaluate factors
affecting domestic prices. For the purposes of its injury analysis, Economía carried out an objective
examination in accordance with Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. As detailed in the final determination,
the analysis was properly conducte d and covered the inventories, the objective assessment of market
share, the factors affecting domestic prices and their impact on the domestic industry. All the factors
listed in Article 3.4 were reviewed in the anti-dum ping investigation and, as a result of this overall
evaluation, Economía arrived at the conclusion set forth in the final determination.
4.89 The United States argues that Economía violated Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by
including non-dumped imports in its evaluation of volume, effects on prices and the impact of dumped
imports on the domestic industry.
4.90 The final determination shows that both the " volume of imports" and the "volume of dumped
imports" were analysed and that the latter were the cause of the injury suffered by the domestic industry.
4.91 The United States also submits that Economía contravened Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement by
failing to include in sufficient detail in its final determination the findings and conclusions reached on
issues of law.
4.92 Economía considers that the final determinati on sets out in ample and sufficient detail the
findings and conclusions reached on issues of fact and law relating to dumping, injury and causal
relationship which it deemed relevant, as well as the reasons which led the investigating authority to
impose definitive measures.
(d) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is not applicable to firms with dumping margins of zero per cent
4.93 The United States argues that Economía failed to exclude firms with dumping margins equivalent
to zero per cent from the measures imposed in the final determination, contending that the investigation
should have been terminated immediately. Furthermore, it submits that, inasmuch as these firms were not
excluded from the anti-dumping measures, they remain subject to future administrative review and the
possible imposition of anti-dumping duties, which is inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
4.94 Mexico contends that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement does not apply because the investigation
resulted in a determination of dumping, injury and causal link between the two. This led Economía to
impose definitive anti-dumping measures by issuing a public notice of termination, whereby the
anti-dumping investigation was concluded. Furthermore, a zero per cent duty does not de facto constitute
an anti-dumping duty as it causes no prejudice to the exporter. As no anti-dumping duty is being charged,
it cannot be considered that a de minimis margin exists or that an anti-dumping duty in excess of the
dumping margin is being charged.
4.95 As to the claim that US exporters will be subj ect to review and the possible application of a
definitive measure, Mexico would point out that, if those exporters do not engage in dumping, such
reviews will not lead to the application of any measure. The AD Agreement does not prohibit
 a review of
exporters for which a zero per cent dumping margin h as been calculated. If the negotiators of the
Agreement had determined that such exporters should not be subject to review, they would have done so
explicitly.
4.96 Consequently, Mexico reiterates that it did not violate Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and that
this provision does not apply in this specific instan ce, given that the anti-dumping investigation ended
with the publication in the Official Journal (DOF) of the official notice of termination and a zero per cent
duty cannot actually be regarded as an anti-dumping duty.

(e) Mexico applied the facts available to Producers Rice and to the US producers and exporters that
were not investigated in a manner consistent with the AD Agreement
4.97 The United States is wrong in claiming that Econom ía applied the "adverse facts available" to
Producers Rice and to the producers and exporters which it did not examine, and that this is inconsistent
with the WTO Agreements.
4.98 This argument is entirely unfounded. The United States is seeking to impose on Mexico
obligations that are not derived from the AD Agreement or, contrary to Article 17.6 of the
AD Agreement, it rejects a priori Mexico's permissible interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement.
4.99 Mexico is not
 obliged to determine an individual dumping margin for all exporters or producers
inasmuch as Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement establish es the obligation to do so solely in respect of
known exporters, which is what Economía did. Mexico complied with the AD Agreement by issuing the
public notice of initiation and by notifying the know n exporters and the United States' Embassy in
Mexico.
4.100 Moreover, Mexico did not limit its examination to a reasonable number of exporters and was
therefore under no obligation to calculate a margin of dumping in conformity with Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement for exporters or producers that were not included in the examination.
4.101 In the case of US exporters that were not investigated individually and were not included in the
investigation and/or did not provide the information needed to calculate a margin of dumping, Economía
was obliged to apply the facts available, in accordance with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. Mexico
complied with its obligations in providing the United States' authorities with the public notice of initiation
of the investigation, the text of the application for initiation and the annexes thereto and the questionnaire
for exporters and foreign producers, and in convening all natural or legal persons that had an interest in
the investigation, through the publication of the public notice of initiation.
4.102 Likewise, Economía acted consistently with Ar ticle 6.8 of the AD Agreement in applying to
Producers Rice the facts available, because if an interested party does not participate in the investigation
or has no exports during the period of investigati on, it must be considered that it did not provide
 the
information needed to calculate a dumping margin.
4.103 Regarding the United States' claim that Mexico acted in a manner inconsistent with Annex II to
the AD Agreement, Mexico would make the following comments:
(a) Mexico acted consistently with paragra ph 3 of Annex II to the AD Agreement by
applying Article 6.8 of the Agreement to the exporting firm Producers Rice, as this firm
did not provide the information needed and there was thus no information to be taken
into account.
(b) The investigating authority acted consisten tly with paragraph 5 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement, as the exporting firm Producers Rice did not provide information that
was ideal in any respect for the purposes of calculating a dumping margin. Economía
therefore was under no obligation to take this information into account.
(c) In addition, Mexico acted consistently with paragraph 6 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement because Economía did not reject any evidence or information provided
by Producers Rice. but accepted
 that information and acted in accordance with the
provisions of the AD Agreement in calculating the dumping margin applicable.
4.104 Contrary to the United States' claim, the determinations of Economía amply and sufficiently
reflect the findings and conclusions reached by the investigating authority on the questions of dumping,

injury and their causal relationship, and include all the issues of fact and law considered relevant by
Economía. Consequently, there was no violation of the AD Agreement in that respect.
4.105 Mexico did not levy anti-dumping duties in excess of the dumping margins. The margins were
correctly calculated by Economía and the duties levied are consistent with those margins. Mexico thus
acted consistently with the GATT 1994.
(f) Complaints by the United States regarding the Foreign Trade Act
4.106 The United States challenges, as such, a number of provisions of the Foreign Trade Act and of
other legal instruments as well. Its complaints are without merit for the following reasons:
• There is no prima facie case of violation of these provisions, as such;

• the United States bases itself on misinterpretations of the Foreign Trade Act and
disregards the meaning and scope of the provisions challenged; and

• it relies on the rice investigation, which ended before the challenged provisions came into
effect, to support its claims.

4.107 According to the report of the Appellate Body in US– Carbon Steel, where the consistency of a
Member's law as such with a WTO Agreement is being challenged, the country's legislation is presumed
to be consistent until proven otherwise
. Thus, the burden of establishing prima facie that there has been a
violation as such of the WTO Agreements rests with the complaining party. The United States
consequently bears the burden of proving prima facie that Mexican legislation infringes the
WTO Agreements, but has not done so.
4.108 The United States also claims that the Mexican law is "mandatory", without analysing the
relationship between this legislati on and international agreements. According to the Appellate Body
report in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, in the event of claims brought against legislation
"as such" the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation should be analysed on a case-
specific basis and should not be applied in a "mechanistic" fashion.
4.109 Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 6.1.1 of the
AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which specify that "[e]xporters or foreign producers
receiving questionnaires ... shall be given at least 30 days for reply ...". Mexico is therefore not required
to grant this time-limit to exporters that were not sent a questionnaire . This is confirmed in the final
report of the Panel in Argentina – Poultry Anti-dumping Duties.
4.110 If the 30-day period were granted to any interested party that presented itself after the initiation of
the investigation, the ensuing delay would lead to infringement of the time-limits laid down in
Articles 5.10 of the AD Agreement and 11.11 of the SCM Agreement.
4.111 On the subject of extensions, Mexico rejects the United States' argument on the grounds that
Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act does not in any way prohibit the granting of extensions, and even in
administrative procedures extensions have been granted on request. The United States has thus failed to
make a prima facie case that this Foreign Trade Act provision is inconsistent as such with the AD and
SCM Agreements.
4.112 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent with Articles 6.8 of the AD Agreement and
12.7 of the SCM Agreement inasmuch as, if an interested party does not participate in the investigation or
had no exports during the period of investigation and consequently the exporter in question does not
provide the necessary information, the investigating aut hority may calculate its margin of dumping or

subsidization on the basis of the facts available, pursuant to Articles 6.8 of the AD Agreement and 12.7 of
the SCM Agreement.
4.113 The United States mistakenly alleges that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with
the AD Agreement because it mandates the investigating authority to impose on exporters that had no
exports during the period of investigation, or did not participate in the investigation, a margin of dumping
other than that determined in accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement, and that imposition of an
anti-dumping duty in excess of the dumping margin therefore constitutes a violation of Article 9.3 of the
AD Agreement.
4.114 It should be pointed out that Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement only applies where the
investigating authority has limited its examination to a reasonable number of interested parties, in
accordance with Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. The calculation method set out in Article 9.4 does
not apply to exporters or foreign producers which have not provided the necessary information or have
not participated in the investigation. The dumping margin for such exporters and foreign producers must
be calculated on the basis of the facts available, pursuant to Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
Consequently, a violation of Article 9.3 cannot be alleged where Article 9.4 does not apply.
4.115 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is consis tent with paragraph 3 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement because it requires the investigating authority to consider all verifiable information
. If an
exporter fails to provide the necessary information – normal value and export price in the case at hand –
then there is no verifiable information to consider.
4.116 Paragraph 5 of Annex II to the AD Agreement stipulates that the investigating authority may not
disregard the information provided by the exporter even if it is not ideal in all respects. In other words, if
it is to be taken into consideration, the information must be ideal in at least one respect. Mexico repeats
that if an exporter fails to provide the information – namely normal value and export price data – needed
to determine its margin of dumping, then there is no minimum amount of information to be considered.
4.117 Mexico rejects the United States' argument con cerning paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement, inasmuch as paragraph 1 specifies that if the interested party fails to provide the
information required, the investigating authority will be free to make determinations on the basis of the
facts available, including those contained in the application for the initiation of an investigation, and the
last sentence of paragraph 7 of the Annex provides that if an interested party does not cooperate and fails
to provide the investigating authority with relevant information, this situation may lead to a result which
is less favourable to the interested party than if the party did cooperate.
4.118 Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent "as such" with Articles 5.8, 9.3 and 11.2 of the
AD Agreement and 11.9 and 21.1 of the SCM Agreement. Articles 5 of the AD Agreement and 11 of the
SCM Agreement apply solely to investigations and not to reviews. If in the course of the investigation
sufficient evidence of dumping or subsidization is found to exist, there is no obligation whatsoever under
these Articles to refrain from conducting subsequent proceedings (such as administrative reviews),
because once the definitive measure has been imposed, Articles 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the
SCM Agreement cease to apply.
4.119 Moreover, the fact of subjecting to review exporters to which no positive margin of dumping or
subsidization was assigned in the investigation does not cause them prejudice of any kind, since it does
not entail any payment of duty. In any case, reviews carried out in respect of exporters with no positive
dumping margin are similar to those provided for in Article 9.3.1 of the AD Agreement.
4.120 The United States' interpretation of Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act is wrong inasmuch as this
provision does not impose a "representativeness" re quirement as a condition for the investigating
authority to conduct reviews such as those provided for in Articles 21.2 of the SCM Agreement and 9.3

and 11.2 of the AD Agreement. The United States will therefore have to prove, prima facie, that the
Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.
4.121 As has already been recognized in the submissions circulated in the course of the proceedings of
the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules,
24 there are no clear provisions in the Agreements as to how to
conduct administrative review and new shipper pr ocedures, and the authorities of WTO Members
therefore have discretion to establish the rules that they deem appropriate.
4.122 Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. The United States basically puts forward two
arguments: This Article applies only to producers and not to exporters; and it requires producers to
demonstrate that their exports were representative.
4.123 The first claim of the United States is without foundation because the provisions of the Foreign
Trade Act – as stipulated in Article 2 of the Act – must be applied in a manner consistent with those of the
international treaties to which Mexico is party. Mexico accordingly confines itself to applying anti-
dumping and countervailing duties as provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and in the AD and
SCM Agreements.
4.124 The second claim of the United States is also without foundation because, although Articles 9.5 of
the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement do not expressly so provide, in view of their context,
object and purpose, it is both natural and logical to request that a new shipper's volume of exports during
the review period be representative. If such were not the case, it would be impossible for the investigating
authority to make a proper price comparison, and it would be unable to meet its obligation to determine an
individual margin of dumping if the new shipper were to export one single unit of the product under
investigation.
4.125 The United States is wrong in claiming that Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act requires the
Mexican investigating authority to impose fines on importers that import goods that are like or identical to
goods subject to an anti-dumping or countervailing dut y investigation and that this constitutes a non-
permissible specific action against dumping or a subsid y, prompting it to contend that Article 93.V is
inconsistent as such with Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
4.126 First, Mexico repeats that insofar as the United States has failed to prove that Article 93.V of the
Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with the AD Agreement or the SCM Agreement, Article 93.V should be
deemed to be consistent with Mexico's WTO obliga tions, as determined by the Appellate Body in its
report on US – Carbon Steel.
4.127 Second, even if the United States had produced the relevant evidence, Mexico will demonstrate
that there is no inconsistency of any kind between Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act and the
WTO Agreements inasmuch as Article 2 of the Forei gn Trade Act stipulates that all provisions of the
Foreign Trade Act must be applied in accordance with the provisions of international treaties to which
Mexico is party.
4.128 Furthermore, Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act does not require the investigating authority to
apply its provisions but gives it discretion to impose fines. This is proved by the fact that Mexico has
never imposed such fines on WTO Members, even though this possibility has existed in the Foreign Trade
Act since 1994.

24 Submission From Canada Respecting the Agreement On Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994
(The Anti-Dumping Agreement), TN/RL/W/47, presented to the Negotiating Group on Rules on 27 January 2003 and
circulated to Members the following day.

Article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure and Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act
do not, as such, violate Articles 9.3, 9.5 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement or 19.3 and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement

4.129 The United States mistakenly argues that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act and 366
of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure (FCCP) preclude the investigating authority from conducting
reviews while a judicial review is under way, and th at this violates Articles 9.3, 9.5 and 11.2 of the
AD Agreement and 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
4.130 With regard to Article 366 of the FCCP, the United States has failed to satisfy the burden of proof
required of the claimant. This allegation should therefore not be considered further by the Panel. Indeed,
the supporting evidence adduced by the United States (Exhibit US-20) contains no reference to this
Article, and the United States has not put forward a clear and detailed allegation or produced any evidence
of its assertion.
4.131 Moreover, Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act, by considering as definitive only anti-
dumping or countervailing duties that have not been challenged under any procedure, provide legal
certainty by ensuring that there are no contradictory rulings. Mexico considers that legal certainty affords
a guarantee for exporters, who do not even have to pay any anti-dumping or countervailing duties while
the challenge procedure is under way.
4.132 Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act do not infringe Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement
inasmuch as they do not prohibit the reimbursement of duties paid in excess or state that such duties will
not be refunded, and the refund is made promptly within the time-frame specified in the AD Agreement,
once the proceedings in question have come to an end.
4.133 Moreover, Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act are not in breach of Articles 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. Th e provisions of the Foreign Trade Act neither
preclude nor prohibit such a procedure. The United States is seeking to attribute to Mexico obligations
that are not to be found in the WTO Agreements, given that the AD and SCM Agreements do not require
a new shipper review to be initiated
 immediately after an application for such a review has been made, but
specify that a new shipper review, once initiated, should be carried out promptly/expeditiously. The
United States will have to prove its assertions by establishing a prima facie case in this respect.
C. FIRST ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
4.134 The following summarizes the United States' argumen ts in its first oral opening and closing
statements:
1. Opening statement
4.135 Authorities conducting AD investigations must conduct their examinations in an objective and
unbiased manner. The authority must investigate the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped
imports, in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any party in the investigation.
Authorities “are not entitled to conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that,
as a result of the fact-finding or evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is
injured.”
4.136 Mexico did not conduct its rice investigation in an objective and unbiased manner. It allowed the
petitioner to decide which exporters and producers should be sent the anti-dumping questionnaire, and to
choose which part of the year should be examin ed for dumping and injury. When the US firm
Producers Rice demonstrated that it had no shipments of rice to Mexico during the POI, Mexico rejected
its information and based its margin on adverse facts available. And Mexico failed even to collect, much
less examine, more than a year’s worth of data th at preceded the initiation of the investigation. The

AD Agreement places obligations on Mexico, and Me xico has failed to rebut the United States'
prima facie case that it has breached them.
(a) Mexico’s use of a stale POI
4.137 With the exception of Mexico, all of the parties in this dispute agree that a Member’s discretion in
setting a POI is not boundless. The period investigated cannot be so remote in time that the information
that the authority collects is incapable of providing a basis for an objective finding of dumping, injury,
and causation. The fifteen month gap in the present case (and the three year gap between the end of the
POI and the final determination) is inconsistent with numerous provisions of the AD Agreement and the
GATT 1994.
4.138 Mexico argues that the AD Agreement creates no obligations with respect to the age of the data
that a Member may use in reaching its determinations, and that it has complete freedom to do whatever it
wants. This is not correct. The POI should end as close to the initiation date as practicable. Mexico has
pointed to nothing justifying its decision to ignore 15 months worth of recent data, let alone the three
years of data by the time of the final determination. The only rationale that Mexico provided in its notice
was that it selected the POI the petitioner wanted.
(b) Mexico limited its injury analysis to only six months of 1997, 1998, and 1999
4.139 An authority conducting an analysis of injury and causation must conduct an objective
examination, and it must base its determinations on positive evidence. Mexico’s limitation of its
investigation to only half of each of the years at issue failed to meet either of these requirements.
4.140 Mexico argues that the AD Agreement creates no obligations on this matter, that it is “entirely
free” to do whatever it wants, and that therefor e its approach was objective and based on positive
evidence. Mexico is wrong. For example, the text of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement plainly states that
an authority must examine “all relevant evidence” that is before it. Mexico has failed to explain why the
evidence for half of the POI was not “relevant.”
4.141 Mexico’s approach created distortion, because focusing an injury and causation analysis on the
period when import presence is highest cannot but create a misleading picture of the state of the domestic
industry. Mexico has no idea
 what the state of the industry was over the course of the entire POI, because
Mexico did not examine the data for half of that period.
(c) Mexico’s conduct of its injury analysis
4.142 Mexico’s examination of the injury data was fl awed in four ways. The first flaw arises from
Mexico’s failure to collect the evidence on price effects and volumes that it needed to conduct its analysis
in an objective manner, and its improper use of the facts available. Mexico argues that the AD Agreement
creates no relevant obligations. It fails, however, to explain why the approach that it chose was objective
and based on positive evidence, as Article 3.1 requires.
4.143 For example, if Mexico had sought information from purchasers of long-grain white rice, it would
have been able to directly compare the prices the purchasers paid for the domestic product and the prices
they paid for the imported product. Similarl y, Mexico could have obtained data from the pedimentos.
Furthermore, Mexico rejected accurate data that The Rice Company submitted for the year 1999, in
favour of using inaccurate data from the petitioner. In addition, Article 6.8 and Annex II do not permit an
authority to base its analysis of injury on the facts available without first making an effort to obtain the
data from the interested parties, or to use that data without first seeking to corroborate it against
independent data sources.

4.144 The second flaw arises from Mexico’s failure to objectively consider whether there was a
significant increase in the volume of dumped imports or significant price effects. Only four paragraphs of
its determination were relevant to the examination of the dumped imports, and they show that the volume

of the dumped imports declined during the three-year period of the injury analysis. And none of those
paragraphs even mention significant price effects.
4.145 The third flaw arises from Mexico’s failure to conduct an objective analysis of certain “relevant
economic factors.” Mexico’s examination of inventories and market share was not objective, and it did
not even examine “other factors affecting domestic prices.” The final flaw in Mexico’s analysis of the
injury data is that it included non-dumped imports in its evaluation of volume, price effects, and the
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.
(d) Mexico’s failure to exclude firms with AD margins of zero from the measure
4.146 Mexico ignores that the second and third sentences of Article 5.8 refer to the “margin” of
dumping being de minimis. The term “margin” refers to the “individual margin of dumping determined
for each of the investigated exporters and producers” of the investigated product. When Article 5.8 refers
to terminating when the “margin” is de minimis, it is referring to termination for individual firms. The
fourth sentence of Article 5.8 provides contextual support for this interpretation. That sentence
demonstrates that the “volume” analysis may be done on a country-wide basis. There is no such language
addressing the dumping analysis.
(e) Mexico’s application of an adverse “facts av ailable” margin to Producers Rice and to US
producers and exporters that it did not examine
4.147 Mexico investigated only the two exporters that the petitioner named in the petition and two other
firms that came forward on their own, and it applied an adverse, facts-available margin to Producers Rice
and every other exporter and producer in the Unite d States. Mexico argues that the AD Agreement
contains no obligations with respect to this topic and that it has total freedom to apply the facts available
to such firms, including “less favourable” facts av ailable from the petition. Mexico’s argument is
illogical, inconsistent with the text of the AD Agr eement, and contradictory to the findings of the
Appellate Body on this topic.
4.148 Mexico’s argument is inconsistent with the text of the AD Agreement because Mexico bases its
entire argument on a flawed interpretive approach that relies on partial citations of Articles 6.8 and 6.10,
viewed in isolation, and divorced from the broader context of the overall Agreement. Its argument is
contrary to the findings of the Appellate Body because the Appellate Body found in EC Bed Linen 21.5
that Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement “requires, ‘as a rule’, that individual dumping margins be
established for each producer or exporter.” Its interpretation is illogical because the drafters established a
detailed set of rules that were meant to ensure that unexamined firms are not unfairly prejudiced if they
are not included in an AD investigation. The idea that the drafters would have created detailed rules to
protect “known” firms, and left “unknown” firms subject to the application of adverse facts available, is
implausible at best.
4.149 The AD Agreement protects both known firms and
 unknown firms. It does this by requiring
authorities to send their questionnaire to firms that are included “in the investigation,” and by restricting
the application of margins based on the facts available to cases where a firm is sent the questionnaire, is
warned about the consequences of not responding, but nevertheless fails to provide the necessary
information. If an authority does not take these steps, then it cannot claim to be including the firm “in the
investigation,” and the firm is entitled to a neutral all other’s rate calculated in accordance with Article 9.4
of the AD Agreement.
4.150 Mexico argues that Article 9.4 only applies when the authority limits its investigation to a subset
of exporters. But Mexico did limit its investigation by choosi ng not to send its questionnaire to

The Rice Company. It also did so by failing to consult the pedimento data held by Mexican Customs,
when it chose not to reference public data that w ould have identified every producer of the subject
product in the United States, and when it chose not to ask the petitioner whether the two firms listed as
“known” exporters in the petition were truly the only
 exporters or producers that the petitioner knew of.
Mexico’s submission does not contest several of the United States' claims addressing its treatment of
Producers Rice and the unexamined firms.
(f) Claims Regarding the Foreign Trade Act and Article 366 of the FCCP
4.151 Mexico argues that treaties are self-executing under Mexican law and that it must apply its laws
in a way that is consistent with its treaties. This is beside the point if Mexico’s laws mandate

WTO-inconsistent action.
4.152 The first statutory provision at issue is Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act, which sets a
mandatory deadline of 28 working days for interested parties to respond to Mexico’s AD questionnaire,
and counts the 28 days from the date of publication of the initiation notice. Mexico argues that it would
be “illogical” to provide the full 30 days to interested parties that are not initially sent the questionnaire.
The issue for the Panel is quite clear: Is Mexico correct that Articles 6.1.1 and 12.1.1 only apply when an
authority “sends” the questionnaire to an interested party? Or is the proper interpretation that both
provisions count the 30 day deadline from the date of receipt?
4.153 The second statutory provision at issue in this dispute is Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act.
Article 64 requires Mexico to apply the highest level of facts available to firms that do not export during
the POI or that do not “appear” in its investigation. Mexico argues that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
permits a Member to apply the facts available to a party that fails to provide necessary information, and
Mexico is therefore justified in applying the facts available to firms that have no shipments during the POI
or that do not “appear” in the investigation. Mexico’s argument is based on a partial citation of a portion
of Article 6.8 without reference to any of the other provisions of the AD Agreement, including Article 6.1
and paragraph 1 of Annex II.
4.154 Mexico argues that Article 64 is not inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement because
Article 9.4 requires Members to exclude margins that are based on the facts available. Mexico misses the
point. Article 64 is inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement, because Article 64 requires
Mexico to apply
 facts available-based margins to firms that should have received a neutral “all others”
margin calculated in accordance with Article 9.4.
4.155 Mexico’s argument with respect to paragraph 1 of Annex II ignores that an authority must
“specify in detail the information required” and “ensure that the party is aware” of the consequences of
not providing the information, before it may apply the facts available. Its argument that paragraph 7 of
Annex II permits a “less favourable” result if a firm refuses to cooperate ignores that by requiring Mexico
to always
 apply the highest level of facts available, Article 64 precludes taking cooperation into account.
It does not contest that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act breaches Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement or
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
4.156 The third provision at issue is Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act, which mandates a breach of
WTO rules for two reasons: first, it requires Mexico to review firms that were found not to be dumping or
receiving subsidies; and second, it mandates that Mexico require firms seeking reviews to demonstrate
that the volume of their exports was “representative.”
4.157 Articles 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement require authorities to exclude
firms from AD and CVD measures if the authorities find that the firms are not dumping or receiving
subsidies. If a firm is excluded from the measure, then there is no basis to subject the firm to a review.
Yet Article 68 requires such reviews. Therefore, it breaches Articles 5.8 and 11.9. Moreover, a proper
textual analysis of Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement

demonstrates that a firm that meets the criteria in those provisions has a right
 to obtain a review. Since
those conditions do not include showing that impor t volumes were “representative,” Article 68 of the
Foreign Trade Act – by imposing that condition – breaches Articles 9.3, 11.2, and 21.2.
4.158 The fourth provision at issue is Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act, which mandates that firms
seeking expedited reviews demonstrate that the volume of their exports was representative. The ordinary
meaning of the text of the provisions demonstrates that a firm that meets the criteria in those provisions
has a right to obtain an expedited review. Those conditions do not include showing that import volumes
were “representative.” And Article 89D breaches Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement because it only allows producers (and not non-producing exporters) to obtain reviews.
4.159 The fifth provision is Article 93V of the Forei gn Trade Act, which requires Mexico to impose
fines on importers that import certain goods subject to an AD or CVD investigation. Article 93V is
inconsistent with Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement because it is a non-
permissible specific action against dumping. Mexico has not contested that Article 93V is “specific” to
dumping or subsidization; “against” dumping or s ubsidization; and not “in accordance with the
provisions of GATT 1994,” as interpreted by the AD and SCM Agreements. Mexico’s only defence is to
argue that it has discretion not to impose the fine. But, although Article 93V gives Mexico discretion to
determine whether the factual predicates for applying a fine exist, it mandates
 the application of a fine if
they do.
4.160 The final set of provisions at issue are Article 366 of the FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of the
Foreign Trade Act. They are inconsistent “as su ch” with the AD and SCM Agreements because they
preclude the Mexican authorities from conducting reviews of AD and CVD measures during judicial
proceedings. Article 366 states that a proceeding “sh all be suspended” pending resolution of another
matter. By precluding Mexico from conducting reviews in this manner, Article 366 is inconsistent with
Articles 9.3, 9.5, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
4.161 Mexico’s submission does not even address the United States' claim that Articles 68 and 97 of the
Foreign Trade Act breach Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. As
for the fact that Articles 68 and 97 breach Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement, Mexico asserts that those provisions allow a Member to wait as long as it likes before
initiating an expedited review, if it conducts the review promptly once it initiates. Mexico’s argument
contradicts the text of Articles 9.5 and 19.3.
4.162 Mexico does not contest that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act preclude Mexico from
conducting reviews of measures under Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement while judicial reviews of the
measures are underway. It argues instead that its approach is permissible because the duties are not
“definitive” until the judicial review is complete. Mexico is wrong on the facts.
2. Closing statement
4.163 As the United States noted in its oral statement, Mexico’s submission had failed to rebut the
United States' prima facie case that Mexico has breached its WTO obligations in numerous ways.
Mexico’s oral statement yesterday was quite similar to its written submission, and also did not rebut the
United States' prima facie case.
4.164 Because the United States' oral statement addressed the content of Mexico’s written submission,
and because Mexico’s oral statement was quite similar to its written submission, it has only a few
additional comments to make today.
4.165 The first point pertains to Mexico’s request for a preliminary ruling. The United States addressed
all of the points that Mexico raised yesterday, in the United States' written response. The United States
filed that response on 7 May. The United States would like to make one additional point, however,

pertaining to Mexico’s argument that it was prejudiced because it only received the Spanish-language
version of the United States' written submission on 16 April, a week before its written submission was
due. If there were merit to this claim, one might have expected that Mexico’s oral statement would have
set out the new arguments that Mexico did not have time to include in its written submission. Mexico has
had the
Spanish-language version of the submission of the United States for at least a month. The fact that
Mexico’s oral statement did not differ much from its written submission suggests that it was not
prejudiced by the date it received the translation of the submission of the United States.
4.166 The second point pertains to Mexico’s use of the facts available in assigning an anti-dumping
margin to Producers Rice. Mexico argued yesterday that its application of the facts available was justified
because Producers Rice had what Mexico described as an “obligation” to present the information that
Mexico needed to conduct a margin. But Producer s Rice demonstrated to Mexico that it had no
shipments during the POI. There was nothing more that Producers Rice could have given to Mexico. It is
not objective or unbiased for an authority to apply an adverse anti-dumping margin to a firm that was
unable to provide information that does not exist.
4.167 The United States would also like to address Mexico’s comment yesterday that Articles 68 and
89D of the Foreign Trade Act do not require firms seeking reviews to demonstrate that the volume of their
sales was representative. The United States is confused by Mexico’s argument. Article 68 reads: “[t]he
Party requesting a review shall satisfy Economía that the volume of exports to Mexico during the review
period is representative.” Article 89D contains vi rtually identical text. The provisions speak for
themselves.
4.168 On the issue of Article 93V of the Foreign Trade Act, Mexico argued that the application of fines
is discretionary, and that proof of this fact is that it has never, in fact, applied such a fine. This proves
nothing, because Mexico has not pointed to any case where it found that the conditions for imposing a
fine were met, and yet it decided not to impose one. The text of the provision itself is mandatory.
4.169 Finally, the United States will comment further on the Panel's questions about the
mandatory/discretionary issue, and the relevance of th at issue to Mexico’s laws, in its response to the
Panel's questions and in the United States' second written submission.
D. F
IRST ORAL STATEMENT OF MEXICO
4.170 The following summarizes Mexico's arguments in its first oral statements:
1. Preliminary ruling
(a) Ambiguities of the United States
4.171 Firstly, the fact that Mexico did not, at the preliminary stage, contest certain claims by the
United States does not mean that Mexico accepts that the United States met the formal requirements.
4.172 Mexico notes that the United States asserts that Mexico confuses what is a claim (reclamación)
with what is an argument (argumento). This is not correct. The United States' claims were not set out
clearly or simply refer to irrelevant provisions. Mexico did not suggest that the United States should have
put forward arguments in its request for the establishment of a panel.
4.173 The United States' request is ambiguous in at least three instances. Firstly, the United States is
highly ambiguous when it alleges a violation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 as it does not specifically
indicate to which paragraphs it is referring and proposes unrealistic methods to make good the omission.
Secondly, the United States refers to Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, even though this is in no way

related to the rest of the claim. Thirdly, the "narrative description" given by the United States in sections
1(g) and 1(f) of the request for the establishment of a panel has no relevance to the legal bases claimed.
(b) Damage requirement in procedural violations
4.174 The United States wrongly argues that at the curre nt stage of the proceedings (i.e. the panel
stage), Mexico has not shown how the violations caused by ambiguity have affected it. Firstly, there is no
provision laying down such a requirement. Secondly, arguendo that such a requirement existed, at the
present procedural stage it is impossible to determine the effect. Thirdly, also arguendo that a
requirement existed, the combination of factors including the ambiguities and the long delay in translating
the first written submission of the United States, had an impact on Mexico's defence.
(c) Identification of the measure
4.175 Article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure may be considered a measure. Nevertheless,
the United States does not understand the relationship among the Articles of various Mexican laws and
endeavours to remedy this by citing statements by "Mexican officials". Article 366 is a measure that
bears no relation to the anti-dumping proceedings and the United States tries to make good this error by
using statements by "Mexican officials".
4.176 Alternatively, as Mexico indicated in its written submission, in the event that the Panel rejects its
arguments the United States did not provide a brief summary of the legal bases of the complaint sufficient
to present the problem clearly.
(d) Legal bases not included in the consultations
4.177 In its request for the establishment of a panel, the United States improperly added 13 new legal
bases that were not included in its request for consu ltations. This is contrary to the provisions of
Article 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agreement. The United States argued
that the wording of Article 4.4 of the DSU allowed it to omit almost anything. A proper reading of
Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU, however, indicates that the legal bases of the complaint must be the same
in the request for consultations and in the request for a panel; the only thing that changes is the level of
specificity, not the legal basis. Following the United States' criterion would lead to absurd cases.
2. Legal arguments regarding the anti-dumping investigation into imports of United States'
long-grain white rice
4.178 Mexico emphasizes that the United States' arguments are not substantiated by the AD Agreement
and considers that the United States is trying to impose on Mexico obligations that are not covered by the
Agreement, thus violating Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement by dismissing a priori the permissible
interpretation of those provisions by Mexico.
(a) Economía complied with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5
of the AD Agreement with regard to the establishment of the Period of Investigation
4.179 Economía complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:2
of the GATT in the anti-dumping investigation into imports of long-grain white rice from the United
States by correctly establishing the periods of investigation (for dumping purposes) and analysis (for
determination of injury), as a result of an objective examination based on positive evidence.
4.180 In the request for the establishment of a panel, the United States set out arguments on Articles 1
of the AD Agreement and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 that were not the subject of consultations, violating
Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and 17.4 of the AD Agreement; therefore, its claims should be dismissed.

4.181 With regard to determination of the period of investigation, the AD Agreement does not contain
any provision establishing how remote that period should be. Since it is impossible to violate an
obligation that does not exist, Mexico did not contravene Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement in fixing that
period. Furthermore, in the course of the investigation, no exporter put forward objections or evidence
sufficient to change it.
4.182 Economía complied with Article 3.1, 3.2 a nd 3.4 of the AD Agreement by conducting an
objective examination, based on positive evidence of the volume of the imports, their effect on prices, and
relevant economic factors and indices. Moreover, the final determination indicates that during the period
analysed dumped imports caused injury to the domestic industry.
(b) Economía complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement with regard to the
establishment of the period analysed
4.183 In the request for the establishment of a panel, the United States included arguments on Articles 1
of the AD Agreement and VI of the GATT 1994 that were not the subject of consultations, thus violating
Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and 17.4 of the AD Agreement.
4.184 The periods of investigation and analysis were established correctly and Economía carried out an
objective examination based on positive evidence, maki ng sure that the parties had an opportunity to
defend their interests in accordance with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.185 The AD Agreement does not indicate how the period of analysis should be included in an
anti-dumping investigation, therefore Economía did not violate the AD Agreement, which does not
prohibit the comparison of periods equivalent to the period of investigation in order to determine injury.
In this particular case and in order to prevent dist ortion, the factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD
Agreement that related to the period of investigation were compared to similar periods in 1997 and 1998,
and this is not inconsistent with the AD Agreement.
4.186 The United States indicates that the spring/summer (October-December) season yield of paddy
rice is greater than the fall/winter (June – July) yield and, consequently, domestic production of long-
grain white rice is greater in the former than in the latter.
4.187 Mexico set the period of analysis as March to August 1997, 1998 and 1999, in order to maintain
the objectivity of the analysis. When there is a drop in domestic production of paddy rice, domestic
producers of long-grain white rice rely on imported paddy rice, so the domestic production of the product
investigated remained virtually constant in 1997, 1998 and 1999. The United States' argument is
therefore without foundation inasmuch as dom estic production of this product does not
 depend on
domestic production of paddy rice.
4.188 In the analysis of injury and the causal rela tionship with dumping, all relevant evidence was
examined and, therefore, there was no breach of Ar ticle 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Consequently, it
cannot be argued that, as a result of this violation, Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement was also violated. In
compliance with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, a public hearing was held and interested parties were
given the opportunity to meet with parties having adverse interests; moreover, the exporting companies
subsequently presented their arguments in relation to what occurred during the hearing.
(c) Economía conducted its injury analysis in accordance with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8 and 12.2
and Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.189 In its request for the establishment of a pa nel, the United States included arguments on
paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement that were not the subject of consultations,
thus violating Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and 17.4 of the AD Agreement.

4.190 Economía based its injury determination on positive evidence and on an objective examination of
the effect on prices, the volume of imports, the impact on domestic prices and relevant economic factors,
properly using the best information available and giving sufficient detail of its findings and conclusions
on issues of fact and law. It thus complied with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8 and 12.2 and Annex II of
the AD Agreement.
4.191 The investigating authority of a WTO Member complies with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement
when: (a) It bases itself on affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible evidence; and (b) it gathers and
evaluates that evidence in good faith and fundamental fairness. Economía fulfilled those conditions by
carrying out an objective examination, based on positive evidence, of the volume of imports, their effect
on prices for like products and the impact on the domestic industry.
4.192 The AD Agreement does not require any particular methodology for making price comparisons
and evaluating effects on prices, and this was recognized by the United States in paragraph 90 of its first
submission. An investigating authority may, therefore, conduct its analysis in the manner it deems
appropriate provided that it bases itself on positive evidence and makes an objective examination, as
Mexico did.
4.193 The United States does not put forward a clear and detailed allegation or any supporting evidence
regarding the information sources used by Economía to carry out its analysis, thus failing to discharge its
burden of proof, as determined by the Appellate Body in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses. Furthermore, it
is sufficient to state that, in its analysis, Mexico did not violate the AD Agreement.
4.194 In addition, the AD Agreement does not estab lish an obligation to send questionnaires to
purchasers, and the investigating authority did not consider it necessary to do so. It is therefore wrong to
maintain that Mexico failed to act in compliance with the Agreement.
4.195 With regard to the import declarations (pedimentos), it should be emphasized that these are not

available to the investigating authority. The investigating authority only has "list of pedimentos", which
do not show the names or domiciles of exporters.
4.196 Mexico also reiterates that the AD Agreement does not lay down any particular methodology for
analysing the volume of imports nor does it require the investigating authority to obtain more information
than that supplied by the parties. In this connection, Economía did request information from exporters
and importers on this particular point but did not obtain an adequate response 25, as can be seen in
Exhibit MEX-4 to the first written submission.
4.197 Mexico repeats that Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement does not say that use of the methodology
proposed by the petitioner constitutes a breach of the AD Agreement. This methodology was used from
the outset and no objection was raised by the exporte rs. Once the preliminary determination had been
issued, no objection or better or alternative proposal was made.
4.198 Furthermore, Mexico submits that there is no obligation to send questionnaires to all exporters,
importers and purchasers. Pursuant to Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement, an investigating authority may
send questionnaires to foreign producers and exporters, but is not obliged to send them to all. Mexico
complied with its obligations by transmitting to the United States' authorities the public notice of
initiation, the text of the application for initiation of an investigation and the annexes thereto, and the
questionnaire for exporters and foreign producers.
4.199 Moreover, in compliance with paragraph 1 of Annex II to the AD Agreement, as indicated in the
third paragraph of the introduction on the investigation questionnaire, Mexico did inform the interested

25 Official communications UPCI.310.01. 0623, UPCI.310.01.0631 and UPCI.310.01.0632 of
23 March 2001 (Exhibit MEX-4).

parties that, if the information required in the questionnaire was not provided, Economía's determination
would be based on the facts available. Accordingly, the United States' allegation that these points were
not notified to the exporters is without foundation.
4.200 Regarding an objective analysis of the relevant economic factors, Economía made an objective
examination in accordance with Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. The final determination contains an
analysis of all these factors; consequently, the Un ited States' allegation in this respect is without
foundation.
4.201 Furthermore, it is wrong to assert that Mexico included non-dumped imports in its evaluation of
volume, effect on prices and the impact of dumpe d imports on the domestic industry. The final
determination shows that both the "total volume of imports" and the "volume of dumped imports" were
analysed and that the latter were the cause of the injury suffered by the domestic industry.
4.202 Regarding the content of the final determination, Economía considers that it sets out in ample and
sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on issues of fact and law relating to dumping, injury
and the causal relationship which it deemed relevant, as well as the reasons which led the investigating
authority to impose definitive measures; conseque ntly, Mexico asserts that it did not violate any
provision of the AD Agreement.
(d) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is not applicable to firms with dumping margins of zero per cent
4.203 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement cannot be used in support of the argument that firms with
dumping margins of zero per cent should be excluded from the measure because the investigation resulted
in a determination of dumping, injury and their causal relationship, which led Economía to impose
definitive anti-dumping measures. Furthermore, a zero per cent duty does not constitute a de facto
anti-dumping duty as it causes no prejudice to the exporter. Since no anti-dumping duty is being charged,
it cannot be considered that a de minimis margin exists or that an anti-dumping duty in excess of the
dumping margin is being charged, as argued by the United States.
4.204 As to the claim that US exporters will be subj ect to review and the possible application of a
definitive measure, if those exporters do not engage in dumping, such reviews will not lead to the
application of any measure. The AD Agreement does not prohibit
 a review of exporters with a
zero per cent dumping margin. If the negotiators of the Agreement had determined that such exporters
should not be subject to review, they would have done so explicitly.
(e) Mexico applied the facts available to Producers Rice and to the US producers and exporters that
were not investigated in a manner consistent with the AD Agreement
4.205 In the request for the establishment of a pa nel, the United States put forward arguments
concerning Articles 1 and 9.3 and pa ragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 that were not the subject of consultations, thus violating Articles 4.5 and
4.7 of the DSU and 17.4 of the AD Agreement.
4.206 The United States' argument concerning the application of a dumping margin to US exporters on
the basis of the facts available is not substantiate d by the AD Agreement. Mexico considers that the
United States is trying to impose obligations on Mexico that are not to be found in the AD Agreement;
or, contrary to Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, it rejects a priori Mexico's permissible interpretation of
the provisions of the Agreement.
4.207 Mexico is not obliged to determine an individual dumping margin for all exporters or producers
inasmuch as Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement establis hes the obligation to do so only in respect of
known exporters, which is what Economía did.

4.208 Moreover, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement only applies when the investigating authority limits
its examination to a reasonable number of exporters or producers. Mexico did not limit its examination to
a reasonable number of exporters or producers; therefore, this Article does not apply when a dumping
margin is calculated for exporters that did not export or did not participate in the investigation.
4.209 In the case of US exporters that were not investigated individually and were never included in the
investigation and/or did not provide the necessary information, Economía was obliged to apply the facts
available, in accordance with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. Mexico acted consistently with the
AD Agreement in applying the facts available to Producers Rice, because if an interested party does not
participate in the investigation or has no exports during the period of investigation, it must be considered
that it did not provide
 the information needed to calculate a dumping margin. Article 6.8 of the
AD Agreement allows a dumping margin to be calculated on the basis of the facts available.
4.210 Mexico acted in a manner consistent with Annex II to the AD Agreement, as can be seen from the
following considerations:
(a) Mexico acted consistently with paragraph 3 of Annex II to the Agreement by applying
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement to Producers Rice as the firm did not provide the
information needed to calculate a dumping margin and there was thus no information
from the exporter to be taken into account.
(b) Economía acted consistently with paragra ph 5 of Annex II to the AD Agreement, as
Producers Rice did not provide information that was ideal in at least one respect for the
calculation of a dumping margin.
(c) In addition, Economía acted consistently with paragraph 6 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement because it did not reject any of the information provided by
Producers Rice but accepted
 it and acted in accordance with the provisions of the
AD Agreement in calculating the dumping margin applicable.
4.211 Furthermore, contrary to the United States' cl aim, the determinations of Economía amply and
sufficiently reflect the findings and conclusions reached on the dumping, injury and their causal
relationship, and include all the issues of fact and law considered relevant by Economía. Consequently,
there was no violation of the AD Agreement in that respect.
4.212 Mexico did not levy anti-dumping duties in excess of the dumping margins. The margins were
correctly calculated by Economía and the duties levied are consistent with those margins. Mexico thus
acted consistently with the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement.
3. Complaints by the United States regarding the Foreign Trade Act
4.213 According to the report of the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel , it is presumed that a
Member's legislation is consistent as such with the WTO Agreements until proven otherwise. Thus, the
burden of establishing prima facie that there has been a violation in this respect rests with the complaining
party. The United States bears the burden of proving prima facie that the Foreign Trade Act violates the
WTO Agreements, but has not done so.
4.214 The United States asserts that the Foreign Trade Act is "mandatory", without taking into account
the relationship between this legislation and international agreements. According to the Appellate Body
report in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, in the event of claims brought against legislation
"as such" the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation should be analysed on a case
specific basis and should not be applied in a "mechanistic" fashion.

4.215 Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 6.1.1 of the
AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which provide that "[e]xporters or foreign producers
receiving questionnaires
 ... shall be given at least 30 days for reply ... ". Mexico is therefore not required
to grant this time-limit to exporters that were not sent a questionnaire . This is confirmed in the final
report of the Panel in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties. On the subject of extensions, Article 53
of the Foreign Trade Act does not in any way prohibit the granting of extensions, and in administrative
procedures US exporters have been granted extensions when they so requested.
4.216 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent with Articles 6.8 of the AD Agreement and
12.7 of the SCM Agreement inasmuch as if a party do es not participate in the investigation or had no
exports during the period of investigation, and consequently does not provide the necessary normal value
and export price information, the investigating authority may calculate the relevant margin on the basis of
the facts available.
4.217 Likewise, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement only applies where the investigating authority limits
its examination to a reasonable number of interested parties, in accordance with Article 6.10 of the
AD Agreement. The calculation method set out therein does not apply to exporters or foreign producers
that have not provided the necessary information or have not participated in the investigation. It cannot
therefore be claimed ― as the United States does ― that applying Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act
means imposing an anti-dumping duty in excess of the dumping margin, in violation of Article 9.3 of the
AD Agreement.
4.218 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is consis tent with paragraph 3 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement as it requires the investigating authority to consider all verifiable information
. Thus, if an
exporter fails to provide the necessary information on the normal value and export price, then there is no
verifiable information to consider. Paragraph 5 of the Annex provides that the investigating authority
should not disregard the information provided by the exporter even if it is not ideal in all respects . In
other words, if it is to be taken into consideration, the information must be ideal in at least one respect;
therefore, if no information on the normal value and export price is provided, it cannot be taken into
account.
4.219 Mexico rejects the United States' argument con cerning paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement inasmuch as paragraph 1 specifies that if the interested party fails to provide the
information required, the investigating authority will be free to make determinations on the basis of the
facts available, including those contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation, and the
last sentence of paragraph 7 of the Annex provides that if an interested party does not cooperate and fails
to provide the investigating authority with relevant information, this could lead to a result which is less
favourable to for the interested party than if the part y did cooperate. This would occur after the said
information had been compared with that available from independent sources.
4.220 Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent "as such" with Articles 5.8, 9.3 and 11.2 of the
AD Agreement and 11.9 and 21.1 of the SCM Agreement. Articles 5 of the AD Agreement and 11 of the
SCM Agreement apply solely to investigations and not to reviews. Once the definitive measure has been
imposed, Articles 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement cease to apply. In any case,
reviews carried out in respect of exporters with no positive dumping margin are similar to those provided
in Article 9.3.1 of the AD Agreement.
4.221 The United States' interpretation of Article 68 of the Mexican Foreign Trade Act is wrong
inasmuch as this provision does not impose a "repr esentativeness" requirement as a condition for the
investigating authority to conduct reviews such as those provided for in Articles 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement and 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.222 Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. The United States basically puts forward two

arguments: this Article applies only to producers and not to exporters; and it requires foreign producers to
demonstrate that their exports were representative.
4.223 Mexico reiterates that the provisions of the Fo reign Trade Act must be applied in a manner
consistent with those of the international treaties to which Mexico is party, as stipulated in Article 2 of the
Foreign Trade Act. Thus, Mexico confines itself to applying anti-dumping and countervailing duties as
provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and in the AD and SCM Agreements.
4.224 Although Articles 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement do not expressly so
provide, in view of their context, object and purpose, it is both natural and logical to request that a new
exporter's volume of exports during the review peri od be representative. If such were not the case, it
would be impossible for the investigating authority to make a proper price comparison, and it would be
unable to meet its obligation to determine an individual margin of dumping if the new exporter were to
export one single unit of the product investigated.
4.225 Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act is consistent as such with Articles 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. The United States has failed to prove that Article 93.V
of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with the AD Agreement or the SCM Agreement. Even if the
United States had produced the relevant evidence, Mexico holds that there is no inconsistency of any kind
between Article 93.V of the Mexican law and th e WTO Agreements inasmuch as Article 2 of the
Foreign Trade Act stipulates that all of the provisi ons of the Foreign Trade Act must be applied in
accordance with the provisions of international treaties to which Mexico is party. Furthermore, Article
93.V of the Foreign Trade Act does not
 require the investigating authority to apply its provisions but
gives Economía discretion to impose fines. This is proved by the fact that Mexico has never imposed
such fines on Members of the WTO, even though this possibility has existed in the Foreign Trade Act
since 1994.
4.226 Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act and 366 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure
(FCCP) do not violate Articles 9.3, 9.5 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
4.227 With regard to Article 366 of the FCCP, the United States has failed to make a prima facie case of
violation as such of this Article; therefore, its allegation should not be considered further by the Panel.
Even in its Exhibit US-20 there is no proof that Article 366 of the FCCP was applied.
4.228 Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act, by considering as definitive only anti-dumping or
countervailing duties that have not been challenged unde r any procedure, give interested parties legal
certainty. On the one hand, the Foreign Trade Ac t allows them to guarantee the amount of the anti-
dumping duties fixed in the final determination that is subject to challenge; and on the other, it ensures
that there are no contradictory rulings by the author ities. Such legal certainty affords a guarantee for
exporters, who are not required to pay any duties while the challenge procedure is under way. Where the
ruling is in their favour, the security is annulled or the amounts already paid are refunded with interest.
4.229 Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act are not inconsistent with Article 9.3.2 of the
AD Agreement inasmuch as they do not prohibit the reimbursement of duties paid in excess. The refund
is made promptly within the time-frame specified in the AD Agreement, once the proceedings in question
have come to an end.
4.230 Moreover, Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act are not in breach of Articles 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement on the new exporter procedure inasmuch as none of the
provisions of the Foreign Trade Act precludes or expressly prohibits such a procedure. The requirement
in the AD Agreement is that a new exporter procedure, once initiated, should be carried out promptly (or
expeditiously in the words of the SCM Agreement). There is no
 requirement to initiate the new exporter
procedure immediately after an application for such a procedure has been made.

E. S
ECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
4.231 The following are the United States' arguments in its second written submission:
1. Introduction
4.232 Mexico’s imposition of an anti-dumping measure on long-grain white rice from the United States
breached numerous provisions of the AD Agreemen t and the GATT 1994. Several provisions of
Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act and its Federal Code of Civil Procedure (“FCCP”) are inconsistent with
provisions of the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement.
4.233 Mexico’s responses to the United States’ claims have barely addressed the substance of the
arguments of the United States. Instead, Mexico has mostly replied with broad assertions that the AD and
SCM Agreements create no obligations with respect to the issues that the United States has raised, and
that Mexico has freedom to do whatever it wants. Mexico is incorrect. The AD and SCM Agreements do
place obligations on Mexico, and Mexico has failed to rebut the prima facie case of the United States that
Mexico has breached these obligations.
2. Economía’s use of a stale Period of Investigation
(a) Mexico is unable to justify Economía’s use of a stale POI
4.234 The purpose of an anti-dumping investigation is to determine whether a domestic industry is
presently injured (or threatened with injury) by dumping that is presently occurring. Therefore, an
authority must seek to base its determinations of dumping and injury on a period that includes the most
recent available information. If an authority chooses instead to examine information that does not include
the most recent available information, it must be able to justify its approach and explain why its
determinations are objective, unbiased, and based on positive evidence.
4.235 Mexico’s response to the Panel’s question 2(c) has confirmed that Economía had no justification
for its decision to base its injury determination on stale data, except that it selected the POI that the
petitioner asked it to examine. It took this a pproach even though the foreign respondents and the
importers objected. Mexico has also confirmed that Economía did not seek to use a POI that ended as
close to the initiation date as practicable.
4.236 Furthermore, Mexico has not contested that Economía took no steps to update the injury
information after it initiated its investigation, with th e result that its final determination of injury was
based on data that was three to five
 years old.
4.237 Mexico’s sole defence on this issue is that it interprets the AD Agreement as placing no limits on
the age of the information that an authority may use in reaching its determinations of dumping and injury,
and that Economía is under no obligation to obtain the most recent information available when it conducts
its investigations. Mexico is wrong.
(b) An investigating authority must base its injury investigations on a period that includes the most
recent available information
4.238 Numerous provisions in the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 illustrate the need for authorities
to base their injury investigations on a period that includes the most recent available information. For
example, Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement requires an authority to base a threat determination:
on facts, and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in
circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury
must be clearly foreseen and imminent.

4.239 If an authority fails to evaluate data that includes the most recent available data, it will not be in a
position to make judgments about situations that are
 imminent; at most, it will be able to make predictions
about situations that might have been imminent at some time in the past. 26 Thus, Article 3.7 of the
AD Agreement presumes that the authority is maki ng its determination based on data that include the
most recent available information.
4.240 Similarly, Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement requires an authority to evaluate all relevant
economic factors, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, etc., and actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, etc. The term “potential” refers to the future, and implies that
the authority is evaluating data that includes information that is as current as possible.
4.241 In addition, Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 states that dumping “is to be condemned if it causes
or threatens material injury,” and Article VI:6(a) states that a contracting party may only levy an anti-
dumping duty if it finds that the dumping is such as to cause or threaten material injury (emphasis added).
 Both of these provisions imply that the injury is occurring in the present (or threatening to occur in the
near future). An objective authority will only be in a position to make determinations about the present, or
the near future, if it is examining a period that includes the most recent data available.
4.242 The necessity for an authority to consider events that happened in the past does not give an
authority free rein to choose which part of the past to consider. In the rice investigation, Economía made
no effort to collect information for the period betw een the end of the POI and the initiation of the
anti-dumping investigation or to update its data thereafter. The fifteen-month gap between the end of the
POI and the date of initiation and the nearly three-year gap between the end of the POI and the final
determination means (1) Economía’s examination of volume and price effects was not objective or based
on positive evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement; (2) Economía’s
examination of “all relevant economic factors” having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry was
not objective or based on positive evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement; and
(3) Economía’s determination that the dumped imports were “causing” injury to the domestic industry
was not objective or based on positive evidence as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
3. Economía’s limitation of its examination of injury
4.243 Economía’s decision to allow the petitioners to set the POI for its dumping analysis as March -
August 1999 and its focus on only March to August of 1997, 1998, and 1999 for its injury analysis
resulted in breaches of Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5, and 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.244 First
, the sole reason for Economía’s decision to base its dumping analysis on the March to
August time period was that the petitioner requested it to examine that period. Moreover, instead of using
a neutral approach, Economía always assumes that the POI that the petitioner suggests is appropriate; if
the foreign respondents disagree, it places the evidentiary burden on them to demonstrate that it should
use another period instead. Moreover, when the respondents in the rice investigation did
 come forward
and object to the POI, Economía summarily rejected their concerns.27 Contrary to Mexico’s assertion,
footnote 4 of the AD Agreement is not relevant, because it merely addresses the determination of whether
sales have been made below cost over an extended period of time.
4.245 Second
, the sole reason for Economía’s decision to base its injury analysis on the March to
August time period was that the petitioner requested it to examine that period. Mexico’s statement that
Economía conducted its injury analysis on the basis of the “period selected by the petitioners” speaks

26 Similarly, footnote 10 to Article 3.7 states that one situation that might support an affirmative finding of
threat of material injury is where “there is convincing reason to believe that there will be, in the near future,
substantially increased importation of the product at dumped prices.” An authority will only be in a position to make
predictions about the “near future” if it is basing those predictions on information that includes recent data.
27 See, e.g., Preliminary Determination, para. 66 (Exhibits US-14&15).

volumes. The petitioner requested Economía to examine the March to August time period specifically
because the petitioner believed imports were concentrated in that period, and Economía initiated the case
on that basis. An objective and unbiased authority would not have done so.
4.246 Third
, Mexico has rejected the idea that Economía took “seasonality” into account in making this
decision. Therefore, there are absolutely no grounds to conclude that concerns about seasonality justified
the approach that Economía took.
4.247 Fourth, Economía did collect data for every month in the three-year injury POI; it simply chose
not to examine half of that information. By contrast, a proper injury analysis looks at the evidence for the
entire POI. The fact that the non-examined half of each of the three years reflects a large portion of
domestic production makes it vital for an authority to examine evidence for the entire POI.
4.248 The Appellate Body made a similar point in US – Hot-Rolled Steel , when it found that an
authority could not objectively examine a domestic industry if it focused on just one part of that industry.
 As the Appellate Body stated:
Different parts of an industry may exhibit quite different economic performance during
any given period. Some parts may be pe rforming well, while others are performing
poorly. To examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry . . . may give a
misleading impression of the data relating to the industry as a whole, and may overlook
positive developments in other parts of the industry. Such an examination may result in
highlighting the negative data in the poorly performing part, without drawing attention to
the positive data in other parts of the industry.
4.249 In sum, “an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does not ensure a proper
evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the
requirements of ‘objectiv[ity]’ in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”
4.250 The Appellate Body’s observations are equally va lid with respect to the examination of the
entirety of the injury data relating to an industry. The economic performance of a domestic industry may
vary over the course of a year. To examine only one part of the year may overlook positive developments
in other parts of the year, and thus give a misleading impression of the data relating to the condition of the
industry as a whole. Yet this is exactly what Economía did.
4.251 Moreover, ignoring the evidence for half of each of the three years of the POI precluded
Economía from conducting an objective examination of the causal relationship between the dumped
imports and any injury to the domestic industry. Economía’s approach ensured that its examination was
not based on all relevant evidence before it, as Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement requires.
4. Economía’s conduct of its injury analysis
4.252 Economía’s injury analysis breached Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8, 12.2, and Annex II of the
AD Agreement on at least four different grounds.
4.253 Mexico’s response to the Panel’s questions further demonstrates that Economía breached
Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 6.8 of the AD Agreement, as well as Annex II, by failing to collect the information
on price effects and volumes that it needed to conduct its injury analysis in an objective manner and to
base its determinations on positive evidence.
4.254 To be specific, Mexico has confirmed that numerous types of non-subject rice entered during the
POI under tariff heading 1006.30.01 of Mexico’s tari ff schedule, and its answers demonstrate that
Economía failed properly to separate the subject imports from the non-subject imports before it conducted
its injury analysis.

4.255 Mexico argues that Economía did separate the subject imports from the non-subject imports, and
that it used several methodologies to do so. In actuality, however, the only methodology that Economía
used was the flawed procedure supplied by the petitioner. The petitioner’s methodology was based on a
flawed statistical procedure that focused on isolating imports of short-grain and medium-grain rice using
monthly average
 prices for those products in the US market, that arbitrarily assumed that any rice that
entered Mexico above a certain price had to be short-grain or medium grain and could not be long-grain
white rice, and that did not even address the question of how to separate imports of glazed rice and
parboiled rice, which were also not part of the subject product.
28 Moreover, even that analysis is applied
only to 1999. Economía simply guessed at import levels for 1997 and 1998.29 Furthermore, Mexico is
mistaken in claiming that Economía also sought to base its injury determination on information obtained
from the exporters. In actuality, Economía only sought volume and value information from Farmers Rice,
Riceland, The Rice Company, and Producers Rice.
4.256 Mexico is also mistaken in claiming that Economía sought to separate the subject imports from
the non-subject imports using information on the total volume of imports from the United States. The fact
that the import data contained both subject and non-subject merchandise in tariff heading 1006.30.01 is
what created the need to separate the two in the first place.
4.257 Finally, Mexico has confirmed that Economía ignored one reliable and neutral method that would

have allowed it to collect the information that it needed to conduct an objective examination of the injury
factors, and to base its determination on positive evidence – namely, consulting the pedimentos.
4.258 Mexico confirms that the pedimentos identify the volume and value of each import. Thus, it is
indisputable that Economía could have used the pedimentos to obtain volume and value data that would
have been specific to the subject merchandise, and substantially more accurate than the information on
which it relied.
4.259 Mexico argues that the description field in the pedimentos does not necessarily describe in
sufficient detail the product being imported, and that Economía would have needed to consult the invoices
in cases where the description was not sufficiently preci se. The invoices, however, are attached to the
pedimentos. Moreover, even if Economía had only used the pedimentos that specifically identified the
imports as long-grain white rice, it still would have had a substantial amount of precise data on volumes
and values that it could have used in its determinations.
4.260 Mexico also argues that it would have been “impractical” to consult each and every pedimento.
Even if Economía had only consulted a representative sample, however, it still would have had better data
that it could have used in performing its analyses.
4.261 In addition, Mexico confirmed that the pedimentos identified the exporter and importer for each
shipment. Thus, if Economía had consulted the pedimentos and encountered questions about the content
of a particular shipment, it could have consulted either party, confirmed the nature of the merchandise,
and ensured that it had accurate information on volumes and values. Alternatively, since the pedimentos
listed the names and addresses of the exporters and importers, Economía could have simply sent them its
questionnaire, and asked them
 to provide the necessary information. Economía failed to do so.
4.262 Finally, the Panel may wish to keep in mind the evidence that the United States submitted in
response to question 17 from the Panel, which demons trates that Mexico has been willing to use the
pedimentos to benefit domestic industries seeking the imposition of anti-dumping measures. Mexico has
gone so far as to release actual pedimentos to its domestic industry, and has allowed them to use the
pedimentos to support their allegations of dumping and injury.

28 In fact, paragraphs 229-232 of the final determination, setting out Economía’s methodology, make no
reference to any attempt to separate out glazed rice and parboiled rice.
29 See Final Determination, para. 239 (Exhibits US-6&7).

5. Economía’s failure to exclude Farmers Rice and Riceland from the measure
4.263 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires Members to exclude from anti-dumping measures firms
that are individually examined in an anti-dumping investigation and found not to be dumping. Mexico’s
failure to exclude Farmers Rice and Riceland from the anti-dumping measure on long-grain white rice
breached Article 5.8.
4.264 Mexico will impose an anti-dumping measure on every producer and exporter in the investigated
country as long as it finds at least one
 exporter to be dumping at more than de minimis levels. This
includes applying the measure to producers that are investigated and found not to be dumping. Economía
will not examine whether the weighted average margin of all exporters is greater than de minimis when it
decides to impose an anti-dumping measure.
4.265 The outcome of the rice investigation illustrates the consequences of Mexico’s approach. By
“deeming” every exporter and producer in the investigated country as being included in the investigation
and applying an adverse, facts available-based ma rgin to the unexamined exporters and producers,
Economía will almost certainly find at least one firm to be dumping in every anti-dumping investigation,
and thus it will never find a basis to terminate an investigation due to “de minimis” dumping margins.
Mexico’s interpretation of Article 5.8 reads the de minimis dumping language out of the AD Agreement.
4.266 Mexico’s interpretation of Article 5.8 fails to take into account that the second and third sentences
of Article 5.8 refer to the “margin” of dumping being de minimis. The Appellate Body has interpreted the
term “margin” in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement as referring to the “individual margin of dumping
determined for each of the investigated exporters and producers” of the investigated product. Nothing in
the text of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement suggest s that the term “margin” should be interpreted
differently in Article 5.8 than in Article 9.4.
4.267 The fourth sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides contextual support for
the view of the United States. That sentence stat es that the “volume” analysis is normally done on a
country-wide basis. The absence of similar language suggesting that the dumping analysis is to be done
on a country-wide basis supports the conclusion that the de minimis standard is to be applied on a
company-specific basis.
4.268 The EC claims that the term “country” is used in various places in the AD Agreement and the
GATT 1994, and that the concept of dumping involves a “strong connotation of a country-wide
assessment.” In actuality, however, the concept of dumping involves a strong connotation of firm-specific

assessment. Several provisions of the AD Agreement support this view.
4.269 Moreover, there is no “internal inconsistenc y” involved in terminating an anti-dumping
investigation on a firm-specific basis, and no risk that doing so will lead to “parallel” investigations. Nor
will interpreting Article 5.8 to require the exclusion of firms with zero margins of dumping require or lead
to “several company specific cases or investigations.” On the contrary, an authority can conduct a single
investigation of multiple firms, and then terminate its investigation with respect to specific firms by
excluding firms that were investigated and found not to be dumping from the measure.
6. Economía’s application of an adverse “Facts Available” dumping margin
(a) Economía should have taken steps to investigate additional exporters
4.270 Mexico has confirmed that the pedimentos identify the exporters of the subject merchandise, and
that Mexico therefore knew the identity of every
 exporter of the subject merchandise to Mexico during the
POI. Economía’s failure to review the pedimentos to obtain the contact information for the exporters or to
take any other steps to investigate more than just the two exporters that the petitioner designated in the
petition was neither objective nor unbiased.

4.271 First
, Mexico’s argument that examining the pedimentos would have caused a “significant delay”
in the initiation of the investigation is not credible. Economía only investigated dumping for March to
August 1999, so even under Mexico’s theory, reviewing the pedimentos would have taken approximately
two weeks at most. It took Economía six months to initiate the investigation; the need to spend two
weeks to gather the information it needed to contact the “known” exporters would not have dissuaded an
objective and unbiased authority.
4.272 Second, Economía could have chosen instead to take other steps to identify additional exporters.
For example, if Economía had consulted the Rice Journal, it would have obtained the names, addresses,
and phone numbers for every rice miller in the United States.
4.273 Third, Mexico mischaracterizes the arguments of the United States on this issue when it claims
that it was under no obligation to identify all of the exporters of long-grain white rice in the United States.
 The United States agrees that there is no such ob ligation. On the contrary, the second sentence of
Article 6.10 explicitly permits an authority to limit its investigation. Therefore, Economía only needed to
identify enough exporters to allow it to take either approach. An objective and unbiased administering
authority would have done so.
4.274 Fourth, Economía’s failure to conduct a proper i nvestigation of the known exporters was
particularly biased and non-objective because of the consequences for the firms that it did not individually
investigate. Economía treated every exporter or producer in the United States as being included in the
investigation. It then applied an adverse, facts available-based margin taken from the petition to any firm
that did not learn of the investigation on its own and appear at the clerk’s office in Mexico City to obtain a
copy of the questionnaire. Given the negligible consequences for the petitioner of a slight delay in
initiation, an objective and unbiased authority would have taken the necessary time to ensure that the due
process rights of the foreign respondents were adequately protected.
4.275 Finally
, Economía did not satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the petitioner’s listing of only two
exporters, as Articles 5.3 and 6.6 of the AD Agreement require. Although Economía used the listado data
to check the volume and value data that the petitione r submitted, it was not able to use that source to
confirm the identity of the exporters, and it did not check the pedimentos.
(b) Mexico is misinterpreting the relevant requirements of the AD Agreement
4.276 Economía also breached the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 by applying an adverse, facts
available-based margin taken from the petition to Producers Rice and the unexamined exporters and
producers. Mexico’s only response to the claims of the United States has been to argue that the
AD Agreement creates no obligations with respect to “unknown” exporters and producers, or exporters
that had no shipments during the POI, and that Artic le 6.8 of the AD Agreement authorized it to apply
adverse facts available to such firms. Mexico even claims that an authority only needs to consider the
exporters that are “known” to the petitioner, and not those known to itself. Mexico’s interpretation is
incorrect.
4.277 The illogic of Mexico’s interpretation can perhaps best be seen by considering the response that
the EC provided to the Panel’s question 1(A) to the EC. Like Mexico, the EC disclaims any need for an
authority to take any steps to identify exporters othe r than those listed in the petition. The EC further
argues that it would be permissible for an authority to initiate an anti-dumping investigation even if the
petitioner only identifies the exporting country, and identifies no exporters or producers at all. The EC
has also agreed with Mexico that an authority is under no obligations with respect to “unknown” exporters
or producers, and that it is permissible to apply facts available-based margins to those firms.
4.278 Thus, taken to its logical conclusion, the EC’s and Mexico’s interpretation of Articles 6.10 and
9.4 and the facts available provisions would permit an authority to initiate an investigation on the basis of
a petition that did not identify any
 “known” exporters, publish a notice of the initiation of an anti-

dumping investigation in its official journal, and then send its questionnaire to nobody
. Then, unless a
firm learned of the investigation on its own, en tered an appearance, and obtained a copy of the
questionnaire, the authorities could apply the petition margin to the entire country without having to
examine anyone . While this outcome might be expedient for the authority (and beneficial for the
petitioner), it is not consistent with the terms of the AD Agreement.
4.279 As the United States has previously discussed, Me xico’s interpretation is based on a flawed
interpretive approach that relies on partial citations of Articles 6.8 and 6.10, viewed in isolation, and
divorced from the broader context of the overall AD Agreement. Mexico’s approach is wrong. A proper
interpretive approach must take into account the entirety
 of the AD Agreement. This means Mexico must
take into account all of the provisions that the United States has identified in its submissions and
statements, and that Mexico has ignored to date.
4.280 Mexico must also explain how its interpreta tion is consistent with Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement, which permits certain exporters to receive an expedited review if they can demonstrate,
among other conditions, that they are “not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting
country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product.” (Emphasis added.) This provision
applies specifically to exporters and producers who did not export the subject merchandise to the
importing Member during the POI. Mexico includes every exporter or producer of the product in its
investigations, and it applies the anti-dumping duties on the product to all of them (either because they
receive an individual calculated rate or because they are assigned the adverse, facts available rate taken
from the petition). Therefore, because Producers Rice and the unexamined exporters and producers are all
“subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product,” they do not qualify for an expedited review under
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement. Mexico’s interpretation reads Article 9.5 out of the AD Agreement.
(c) An investigating authority may not apply a facts available margin to an exporter that was never
even sent the questionnaire
4.281 The AD Agreement prohibits an authority from applying a margin based on the facts available to
an exporter or producer that was never even sent the questionnaire. Article 6 and Annex II of the
AD Agreement are the provisions most relevant to this point. The Appellate Body has described Article 6
as an article that:
“establishes a framework of procedural and due process obligations.” Its provisions “set
out evidentiary rules that apply throughout the course of the anti-dumping investigation,
and provide also for due process rights that are enjoyed by ‘interested parties’ throughout
such an investigation.”
4.282 This “framework of procedural and due pr ocess obligations” includes Article 6.1 of the
AD Agreement, which requires investigating authorities to give interested parties “in an anti-dumping
investigation” notice of the information that they require and ample opportunity to present in writing all
evidence which the interested parties consider releva nt in respect of the investigation in question.
Moreover, the Appellate Body has emphasized that Article 6.1 creates obligations with respect to
individual exporters and producers.
4.283 Paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement then reiterates this obligation by requiring
investigating authorities to ensure that respondents receive proper notice of the rights of the investigating
authorities to use the facts available. Although Article 6.8 permits investigating authorities to apply the
facts available to firms that fail to provide necessary information, they “are not entitled to resort to best
information available in a situation where a party does not provide certain information if the authorities
failed to specify in detail the information which was required.”
4.284 Given these requirements, Economía cannot simply publish a general notice in its Diario Oficial
announcing the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, purport to be investigating every producer and

exporter in the subject country, and apply a facts available-based margin to any firms that do not come
forward on their own and enter an appearance in the proceeding. Rather, it must observe the procedural
and due process obligations that are contained in Article 6 and that it owes to interested parties throughout

the investigation. This means that if Economía is including a particular exporter “in an anti-dumping
investigation,” it must give notice to that individual exporter by sending the exporter a copy of the
questionnaire, asking it to respond, and ensuring that the exporter understands that a failure to respond
may result in the application of a margin based on the facts available. If it fails to take these steps, then it
cannot apply a facts available-based margin to that exporter.
4.285 Alternatively, an authority may choose to limit its investigation in accordance with Article 6.10 of
the AD Agreement. In that case, however, it may onl y apply a neutral “all others” rate, calculated in
accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement, to the unexamined exporters and producers.
Regardless of the approach it chooses, an authority cannot apply a facts available-based margin to an
exporter or producer that is never sent the questionnaire.
(d) Economía breached paragraph 7 of Annex II
4.286 Mexico concedes that it did not observe the re quirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II when it
applied the facts available to Producers Rice. Mexico claims that it was under no obligation to do so. It
also failed to observe paragraph 7 with respect to the unexamined exporters and producers. Similarly,
there is no evidence on the record of the rice investigation to suggest that Economía failed to take steps to
check the presumptions embodied in the petition ag ainst independent data available during the
investigation, or to exercise "special circumspec tion" in its application of the petition margin to
Producers Rice and the unexamined producers and exporters.
7. Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act and its Federal Code of Civil Procedure
4.287 Mexico has largely agreed with the United States' interpretation of the operation of the various
articles of the Foreign Trade Act and the FCCP at issue in this dispute; it has focused its defence instead
on the United States' interpretation of the relevant WTO obligations. For the most part, this defence has
been composed of broad assertions that the AD and SCM Agreements create no obligations with respect
to the matters addressed by the challenged provisions. Mexico’s arguments are wrong.
4.288 Mexico has also argued that the United States' ar guments on this issue have failed to take into
account the interrelationship between the AD and SCM Agreements and Mexico’s domestic law. The
United States has previously explained why this argument is incorrect as well.
4.289 Mexico’s replies to the Panel’s questions have also failed to rebut the United States' prima facie
case. In question 28, the Panel asks Mexico whether it would be required to amend a law in the event that
the DSB adopted a panel report finding the law to be WTO-inconsistent. Mexico fails to respond directly
to the question, stating only that it would be obligated to remove the inconsistency. It is not at all clear
what this means. The important point, however, is that the stated scenario will only arise if the Panel
finds the laws to be WTO-inconsistent. Mexico views each of the actions that the challenged provisions
require as consistent with its WTO obligations; therefore, Mexico does not, as a matter of its municipal
law, have any ability not to perform the actions the challenged provisions require.
4.290 Furthermore, because Mexico sees no conflict between its WTO obligations and the actions that
the challenged provisions require, the scenario that the Panel sets out in question 29 can also arise, if at
all, only if the Panel itself finds the laws to be WTO-inconsistent (and the Dispute Settlement Body
adopts that finding). At that point, Mexico would be in the same position as any other Member whose
laws are found to be inconsistent with WTO rules – it will need to determine what steps are necessary to
remove the inconsistency.

4.291 Similarly, Mexico states that the WTO agreements would prevail over the Foreign Trade Act in
the event that a certain provision of the law were found inconsistent with WTO rules. Again, even if this
were true, the key point is that Economía is the ad ministrator of the Foreign Trade Act, and Economía
views each of the challenged provisions as consistent with WTO rules. Therefore, in Mexico’s view,
there is no conflict, and thus there is no basis in Mexico’s municipal law for the WTO Agreement to
override any of the challenged provisions.
4.292 In reply to the Panel’s question 31, Mexico asserts that Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act does
not require an exporter to demonstrate that its volume of exports was “representative” as a sine qua non
for the initiation of a review. It states that the exporter “should” make this demonstration during the
course of the proceeding itself, however. As the United States demonstrated in its response to this same
question, Economía does in fact require exporters seeking reviews to make such a demonstration;
Economía addresses the issue in the initiation notice itself.
4.293 In any event, Mexico’s argumen t seeks to elevate form over substance. Rejecting a review
request in the course of a proceeding for a failure to demonstrate a “representative” volume of sales is
tantamount to rejecting the review at the outset. In either event, Article 68 precludes firms from obtaining
a review; therefore, it is inconsistent as such with Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and with
Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
30
4.294 Mexico’s response to the Panel’s question 33 attempts to defend Article 89D of the Foreign Trade
Act by pointing to Article 47 of its regulations . The cited provision does nothing to rebut the
United States' prima facie case that Article 89D is inconsistent “as such” with Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. Article 47 establishes rules for determining the
costs of production for trading companies. It appears in the section of Mexico’s anti-dumping regulations
that sets out the methodologies that Economía is to apply in calculating anti-dumping margins. It has
nothing to do with the question of who is entitled to obtain an expedited review, however. And even if it
did, the hierarchy of laws in Mexico is such that the regulations are subordinate to the Foreign Trade Act;
 the decree that implemented Article 89D makes clear that the regulations continue in effect only insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the decree.
4.295 Finally, Mexico seeks to convince the Panel that no issue arises from the fact that Article 366 of
Mexico’s FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act preclude Mexican authorities from
conducting reviews of anti-dumping and countervailing duties while a judicial review of the underlying
anti-dumping or countervailing duty measure is ongoing, because the interested parties may post a bond in
lieu of paying the duties themselves while the litigation is underway. The ability to post a bond does not
ameliorate the negative effects of the preclusion of reviews, or to remedy the WTO breaches that result
therefrom.
4.296 The United States previously submitted to the Panel a letter from Economía to Sun Land, a US
beef exporter that is subject to Mexico’s anti- dumping measure on certain US beef products. That
measure, imposed in July 2000, is being review ed by a “binational panel” established under
Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Economía denied Sun Land’s request
for a review on the grounds that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act preclude it from conducting
the review while the NAFTA litigation is underway. Although the binational panel recently remanded the
beef determination to Economía for further proceedings, the litigation continues today.
4.297 Anti-dumping duties are assessed against the importers, not the exporters or producers. Thus, it is
the importer, and not the exporter or producer, that has to decide whether it is willing to post a bond as
security against potential anti-dumping duties. After Mexico refused to conduct a review of Sun Land

30 Mexico makes the same assertion with respect to Article 89D of the FTA in its response to the Panel’s
Question 32. As the United States demonstrated in its response to Panel Question 32, Mexico’s arguments about
Article 89D are similarly without merit, and the Panel should reject them as well.

while the NAFTA litigation was ongoing, Sun Land’s importer informed Sun Land that it was not willing
to post a bond with respect to any of Sun Land’s b eef products that are subject to the Mexican
anti-dumping measure. In addition, Sun Land was unable to find another importer willing to post a bond.
 As a consequence of its inability to obtain a re view and post a bond, Sun Land has been effectively
locked out of the Mexican market for the products subject to the anti-dumping measure.
4.298 Thus, the preclusion of reviews causes real and substantial commercial harm to exporters that are
subject to Mexican anti-dumping measures. It also presents exporters that are subject to Economía’s
adverse, facts available-based petition margins with two mutually exclusive choices: they can seek
judicial review of the order itself, knowing that doing so will preclude them from obtaining an
administrative review that might reduce their margin, thus guaranteeing their exclusion from the market
for a period of years; or they can seek an administrative review in an effort to reduce their margin, and
thus forfeit any chance to challenge the legitimacy of the order in court.
31 Neither the AD Agreement nor
the SCM Agreement permits a Member to impose such a choice under its domestic law.
8. Mexico has failed to contest numerous US claims
4.299 Finally, Mexico has failed to date to contest – let alone rebut – numerous claims of the
United States.
F. SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF MEXICO
4.300 The following are Mexico's arguments in its second written submission:
1. Complaints relating to the anti-dumping investigation on imports of long-grain white rice
originating in the United States of America regardless of the country of provenance
(a) Introduction
4.301 Mexico hereby refutes the assertions made by the United States at the first substantive meeting of
the Panel and reaffirms the arguments put forward by Mexico in its first written submission and its oral
statement at that substantive meeting.
4.302 Mexico emphasizes that its first written submission, oral statement, replies to the questions posed
by the Panel at the first substantive meeting and rebuttal submission should be considered as a whole. It
also requests the Panel that, in view of their signifi cance, the preliminary objections raised in its first
written submission be treated on a par with the investigation itself. In this connection, the United States
once again introduces a number of arguments based on Articles that were not the subject of consultations
or included in its request for the establishment of a panel or its first submission. Mexico accordingly
requests that these arguments be dismissed.
4.303 The United States puts a tendentious interpreta tion on Mexico's arguments and misrepresents
them, while making claims based on a priori premises with no grounding in the AD Agreement and
seeking to impose on Mexico its own administrativ e practice and its own interpretation of the
AD Agreement, in breach of Article 17.6 of the Agreement.

31 In addition, if they forfeit their chance to seek judicial review and wait to seek an administrative review
instead, they run the risk that a different firm will request judicial review in the meantime. In that case, they will find
themselves with no remedy at all, because Mexico refuses to conduct administrative reviews of any firm if any other
firm is seeking judicial review.

4.304 The aforementioned points are clearly visible in the affirmations made by the United States in its
Opening Statement at the first substantive meeting and in the document entitled Answers of the
United States to Questions of the Panel in Connection with its First Substantive Meeting ("Answers").
4.305 In this document, Mexico responds to the assertions of the United States in its Opening Statement
of 17 May 2004 and to a number of the replies contained in its Answers. Since many of the United States'
arguments are a repetition of those set forth in its first submission, Mexico reiterates its position and
makes cross-references to its own first written subm ission, indicating the paragraphs in which it has
already responded to the questions raised by the United States.
4.306 The United States' arguments concerning the alleged inconsistency of the Foreign Trade Act with
the WTO Agreements are based on a single premise, which is the supposedly mandatory nature of the
Articles of the Foreign Trade Act at issue. A contrario sensu, this means that if the Articles in question
are not mandatory, then they are not in any way inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.
4.307 The United States has not established a prima facie case of violation of the WTO Agreements.
Mexico stresses that the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act are consistent with these Agreements, as its
own arguments have demonstrated.
(b) Mexico complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement and Articles VI:2
and VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 with regard to the establishment of the period of investigation
4.308 Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 was not cited in the request for consultations, the request for
the establishment of a panel or the first submission of the United States. The United States' arguments in
this respect should therefore be dismissed.
4.309 Mexico believes that a clear reading of the Article is important, because no violation of the GATT
attributable to the Mexican investigating authority can be deduced from its wording since the authority
applied an anti-dumping duty after it had determined that dumped exports from the United States were
causing injury to Mexico's domestic industry, as explained in paragraph 398 of the final determination.
4.310 Mexico (as indeed any other WTO Member) does not
 have complete freedom to do whatever it
wants and has never made any such claim. On the other hand, it does have discretion to establish the
period of investigation that it deems most appropr iate. As concerns the remoteness of the period
investigated, the circumstances of each case will dete rmine what timeframe is appropriate for the
investigation.
4.311 Mexico takes the view that it is desirable fo r the period of investigation to be as close as
practicable to the date of initiation of an anti-dumping investigation but observes that there is no provision
establishing any obligation in that regard. If the period under investigation is remote and yet adequate for
the anti-dumping investigation, it should not be rejected but should be evaluated and, as appropriate, used
for the purposes of the relevant analysis.
4.312 Mexico stresses the biased emphasis, in footnote 4 in the United States' Answers, on the fact that
it set as the period of investigation the months from March to August 1999 for two reasons: (a) because
the petitioner so requested; and (b) because the imports of long-grain white rice were concentrated in that
period. The United States attempts to make it appear as though Mexico acted in an arbitrary and
non-objective manner.
4.313 The first part of the United States' claim reiterates the statement made in the United States' first
submission, without referring to the arguments Mexico adduced in paragraphs 55, 56 and 67 of its first
written submission to show that Mexico did not breach the AD Agreement in setting the period of
investigation in the way that it did.

4.314 As regards the second part of the claim, although imports of long-grain white rice were indeed
negligibly higher over the periods March to August of 1999 and 1998 than during the rest of each year,
this was not the case in 1997, when imports from the United States were lower in that period than during
the rest of the year. Thus, imports of white ri ce from the United States increased and the comparable
periods differed slightly from the rest of each year in terms of imports. The United States' argument is
therefore without substance.
4.315 Mexico observes that in paragraph 9 of its Answers the United States misrepresents Mexico's
arguments and then directs the Panel to them as it sees fit.
4.316 As can be noted in paragraph 55 of its first written submission, Mexico did not establish the
period of investigation in order to eliminate distortions but used, as the period of injury analysis, previous
periods comparable to the period investigated . The period of investigation was not "selected" by the
investigating authority but was suggested by the petitioner and, since no one demonstrated that it was
inappropriate, the investigating authority had no objections.
4.317 The United States' assertion in paragraph 11 of its Answers should be dismissed because there is
no line of reasoning to be derived therefrom. In an y event, Mexico has already stated its reasons for
setting the period of investigation in the way that it did. The United States has failed to establish prima
facie that Mexico committed a violation in this regard.
4.318 In addition, as Mexico demonstrated in its first written submission and its response to question 13
posed by the Panel, there is no seasonality with respect to domestic production or the imports.
4.319 Furthermore, the United States did not respond to the Panel's first question regarding the use of
events that happened in the past, nor did it offer any opinion as to whether a period of investigation
covering 12-month-old data would be inconsistent with the AD Agreement. On the other hand, the
United States emphasized that it was "not arguing that there is a specific length of time beyond which the
POI becomes per se inconsistent with the AD Agreement", in contradiction to the argument developed in
its first submission in respect of the remoteness of the period of investigation. The United States having
changed its mind, it must be assumed that it is abandoning the argument set forth in its first submission.
Mexico also refers to its response to question 2 posed by the Panel. The United States' reply to this
question is that there is no consistent approach in Mexican practice with respect to the establishment of a
period of investigation. Mexico stresses that, on average, there are about 10 months between periods of
investigation and the initiation of its investigations.
4.320 In the investigations on partia lly hydrogenated fatty acid and triple-pressed stearic acid, the
periods investigated used data that were 10 months old, which demonstrates the consistency with which
Economía determines periods of investigation. On the other hand, the period did not necessarily have to
be the same in both cases, since periods of investigation should be consistent with the circumstances of
each case. When a petitioner suggests a period of inv estigation, the investigating authority therefore
determines whether or not it is appropriate.

(c) Economía complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement regarding the
establishment of the period of analysis
4.321 With regard to the comparable periods within the period of analysis, Mexico's comparison, for the
purposes of injury analysis, between the periods March-August of 1997, 1998 and 1999 was carried out in
an objective manner and on the basis of positive evid ence. Mexico reiterates that (as any other
WTO Member) it does not have complete freedom to do whatever it wants, but it does have discretion to
establish the period of analysis that it deems most appropriate, provided that it does so in a manner
consistent with the AD Agreement.

4.322 The United States held that Mexico breached Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement because Mexico
failed to consider half of the period of investigation and to explain why it was not relevant. Mexico finds
no link between the period of investigation and Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement, given that this provision
relates to the period of injury analysis. Moreover, Mexico did consider all the information relevant to the
dumping analysis within the period of investigation.
4.323 Mexico submits that the use of comparable peri ods eliminated any distortions that might have
occurred in the injury analysis.
4.324 Mexico fails to understand why the United States considers that Mexico had no idea what the
state of the industry was over the course of the period of investigation, even though it examined all the
information for the period investigated and compared it in its entirety
 with the data for previous
comparable periods within the period of analysis. Now, if the United States is referring to the fact that
Mexico had no knowledge of the state of the domes tic industry because its injury analysis did not
encompass all three years in question, Mexico directs the Panel to its replies to questions 3 and 4 of the
Panel relating to the first substantive meeting.
4.325 Mexico repeats that it complied with Article 6. 2 del AD Agreement, since it gave the parties
every opportunity to defend their interests. Th e United States is seeking to place on Mexico the
obligation to analyse information that was not part of the anti-dumping investigation.
(d) Economía conducted its injury analysis in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8
and 12.2 and Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.326 As regards the alleged breaches of Articles 3.1, 3. 2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.8 and 12.2 and Annex II of the
AD Agreement, Mexico examined the data for the entire period of investigation and not only half of the
data, since the period investigated covered the period March to August 1999.
4.327 Turning to the United States' argument concerning the failure to collect evidence on price effects
and volumes, Mexico refers to its reply on the subject in its first written submission and maintains that it
did conduct its injury analysis in an objective manne r, on the basis of positive evidence. So far, the
United States has failed to prove the contrary.
4.328 Economía does not have physical possession of the pedimentos, which are brought to the
knowledge of the investigating authority when pe titioners produce them as evidence. The fact of
requesting and awaiting the reception of such documents would delay the initiation of an investigation
even further. Hence, the investigating authority relies on the list of pedimentos.
4.329 In respect of the claim in paragraph 51 of the United States' Answers, there are cases in which the
pedimentos are produced by the petitioners, since there are agreements to that effect between certain
chambers or associations and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, as provided for in Article 144,
paragraph XXVI,32 of Mexico's Customs Law. This does not mean that the Mexican Rice Council (CMA)
concluded any such agreement or that it was under the obligation to do so.

32 "Article 144. The Ministry [SHCP] shall, in addition to the powers conferred on it under the Tax Code of
the Federation and other laws, have discretion to:

XXVI.- Release the information contained in the pedimentos to Industrial Chambers and Industry
Associations grouped in Confederations, as pr ovided in the Law of Business Chambers and
Confederations thereof, that participate with the Tax Administration Service in the Program on
Customs and Tax Control by Industrial Sector. Similarly, it may release to taxpayers information
in the pedimentos pertaining to any operations performed by them.
... ."

4.330 The United States has not demonstrated why it contends that Economía's failure to seek
information from the purchasers of the merchandise under investigation constitutes a breach of the
AD Agreement. Moreover, it points out that it did not suggest that the questionnaire be sent to all
purchasers; the opposite emerges from its first submission, however. The United States thus appears to
be seeking to partly modify its argument, which should therefore be dismissed.
4.331 The United States argues in its Opening Statement that Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement refers
only to the time frame for exporters to respond to questionnaires, and fails to mention that this time frame
applies solely to exporters that have received the questionnaire. On this matter, Mexico directs the Panel
to its first written submission.
4.332 The United States puts a tendentious interpretation on the AD Agreement, making only partial
reference to it and establishing non-existent linkages between its provisions. Mexico did not say that its
interpretation of AD Agreement Article 6.1.1 nu llified the obligation laid down in AD Agreement
Article 3.1. It established the regulatory scope of Article 6.1.1 and concluded that neither this provision
nor Article 3.1 had been breached.
4.333 Concerning the analysis of the significant increase in the volume of dumped imports and
significant price effects, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 114 to 117 of its first written submission.
4.334 The United States alleges that Mexico did not c onduct an objective analysis of certain factors
listed in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Mexico refers the Panel to its arguments in paragraphs 118 to
122 of its first submission. The United States also places on Mexico the non-existent obligation to collect
data for the period subsequent to the period of investigation. In so doing, it makes yet another baseless
allegation of violation of the AD Agreement.
4.335 As regards paragraph 37 of the United States' Opening Statement, Mexico refers the Panel to
paragraph 124 of its first written submission.
4.336 In response to paragraph 10 of the United States' Answers, Mexico refers to its written replies to
questions 3 and 4 of the Panel relating to the firs t substantive meeting, and repeats that Economía
gathered data for each month between January 1997 and December 1999.
4.337 The United States asserts that Mexico gathered no additional injury data after initiating its
investigation. According to Mexico, this is not inconsistent with the AD Agreement. In addition, this is
an argument that was not raised in the consultations or included in the panel request or the first written
submission of the United States, in violation of Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the
AD Agreement. It should therefore be dismissed.
4.338 In paragraph 12 of its Answers, the United States contends that Economía did not act in an
objective and impartial manner, because at least half of domestic production occurred during the
September-February time frame, and yet Economía set the months of March to August as the period of
investigation.
4.339 Firstly, the fact that at least half of domestic production occurred during the September to
February period does not affect the impartiality and objectiveness of the injury analysis, since the analysis
covered the same periods of each year. In other words, the comparison was not between half of domestic
production and all imports for an entire year. Secondly, the domestic producers argued that the imports
were concentrated over the months of March to August, but this occurred, to a negligible extent, only in
the years 1998 and 1999 and consequently, Economía accepted that period. In addition, no one raised any
objections or proposed any other time frame. Mexico refers the Panel to its first written submission,
which explains in detail why use of the months of March to August of each year does not contravene the
AD Agreement. The United States' argument is therefore entirely without basis.

4.340 The United States claims in its Answers that the problems arising from an examination of only
partial year data "are particularly acute when the domestic industry has production during all 12 months
of a year" and that in order to comply with Ar ticles 3.1, 3.4 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement, the
investigating authority must examine the impact of the dumping on the domestic industry over a full-year
period. The United States bases its claim on Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, which was not the subject
of consultations or included in its panel request or its first submission, in breach of Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of
the DSU and Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. Mexico accordingly requests that the claim be
dismissed.
4.341 Moreover, seasonality being irrelevant, one segment of a given year is identical in structure to any
other segment of that same year. The selection of the period has no implications in terms of
comparability. Even if seasonality were an issue, the structure would be the same for a comparison of the
same periods of each year. Thus, Mexico holds that the claim set out in paragraph 13 of the United States'
Answers is entirely without merit.
4.342 Furthermore, Mexico does not bear the burden of proving that Articles 3.2 and 3.4 of the
AD Agreement explicitly permit it to take the action it did. It is for the United States to demonstrate that
Mexico acted in a manner inconsistent with the AD Agreement. Since the United States has provided no
evidence in support of its arguments nor has it made a prima facie case, Mexico requests that its claims in
this regard be dismissed.
4.343 In paragraph 19 of its Answers, the United States says that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement
requires an investigating authority to examine the domestic industry "as a whole" or those producers that
constitute a "major proportion of total domestic production", and that because Economía examined
production for half of each year, there was no way for it to be certain that it was complying with
Article 4.1. The United States once again introduces a claim that was not the subject of consultations or
mentioned in any subsequent document, in violation of Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4
of the AD Agreement. This claim should therefore be dismissed.
4.344 Firstly, Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not provide grounds for the United States'
assertions. Article 4.1 specifies that the investigation should include every domestic producer but not that
it should encompass production for all months of the year. Secondly, the United States loses sight of
where the burden lies in asserting that there was no way for Economía to be certain that it was complying
with Article 4.1. The United States ought to produce evidence of its assertion, rather than expect Mexico
to prove that its argument is without merit. In addition to the United States' argument not being sufficient
to establish a prima facie case that Mexico violated the AD Agreement, the fact that it was not raised in
the consultations or included in any subsequent document gives Mexico cause to request that it be
dismissed.
4.345 As to the United States' argument in paragraph 20 of its Answers, Mexico refers the Panel to its
reasoning in paragraphs 84 to 88 of its first written submission.
4.346 Concerning paragraphs 21 to 23 of the United States' Answers, it should first be pointed out that
the United States once again introduces new arguments based on Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, which
was not the subject of consultations or included in any subsequent document, in breach of Articles 4.5 and
4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. Secondly, the United States makes bald assertions
with no underlying reasons. Its complaint should therefore be dismissed. Thirdly, Mexico emphasizes
that its injury analysis of economic factors and indices relating to the domestic industry involved a major
proportion of the industry at all times. The reasons for not considering the same subset of producers in
the analysis of each injury factor were that there were producers that failed to provide the appropriate data
or verifiable information, or they were no longer in operation. This is not a violation of Article 4.1 or
Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement and, as Mexico stated earlier, the United States does not adduce
evidence in support of its claim.

4.347 With respect to the United States' claim in paragraph 27 of its Answers regarding the modification
of tariff heading 1006.30.01, Mexico emphasizes that the United States yet again puts forward arguments
that were included neither in its request for consu ltations nor in any subsequent document, which is
contrary to Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. They should therefore
be dismissed.
4.348 Moreover, the modification introduced on 18 Ma y 2001 applied as of that date and was not
applicable to the earlier data. Since the information considered in the investigation on long-grain white
rice pre-dated 18 May 2001, the modification had no impact on the data considered in the investigation.
4.349 Regarding paragraph 32 of the United States' Answers, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 93
and 94 of its first written submission, in which it explains why it was unable to use the pedimentos and
demonstrates that such action is not inconsistent with the WTO Agreements. In addition, it was
impracticable to separate out the imports of long-grain white rice on the basis of the pedimentos.
4.350 It is odd that the United States should argue that, for the purpose of determining the volume of
imports of long-grain white rice, it is necessary to separate out all types of rice other than long-grain white
rice that come under the same tariff heading in order to ascertain, by process of elimination, the volume
corresponding to the imports at issue. This is impr actical, and Economía therefore considered that the
best method of identifying the volumes corresponding to long-grain white rice was to do so directly and
not by process of elimination, as stated in paragraph 231 of the determination. In view of the foregoing,
Mexico holds that the United States' arguments are no more than idle speculation.
4.351 The United States contends that the table and arguments in paragraphs 60 to 62 of Mexico's first
written submission were prepared for the purposes of this dispute. It is not true that the table does not
appear in the administrative record. The data lis ted in the table were provided by the CMA in its
application for the investigation, the responses to the notice issued by Economía and the replies to
requests for information. Since that information was not challenged, Economía regarded it as valid.
Consequently, Mexico repeats that the United States' assertions regarding the inclusion of the table in the
administrative record are irrelevant.
4.352 As to the United States' argument regarding Covadonga's prices and the fact that Economía failed
to explain the causal relationship between the dumped imports from the United States and those prices,
Mexico observes that the United States once again makes claims that were not part of the consultations or
included in subsequent documents, which is contrary to Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4
of the AD Agreement. Mexico accordingly request s the Panel to dismiss these claims. The above
notwithstanding, Mexico emphasizes that Covadonga was the only
 enterprise in the entire domestic
industry that apparently displayed "different" behaviour. As detailed in paragraph 286 of the final
determination, however, the extent of the difference was practically negligible and the industry as a whole
nevertheless recorded adverse performance.
4.353 Concerning paragraph 36 of the United States' Answers, Mexico responded that "... it is not said
that even if all the pedimentos had been available it would have been possible to determine with certainty
the total amount of imports of the subject product ... " and went on to develop a series of arguments in that
respect. The United States' claim is therefore totally unfounded. In this connection, Mexico refers to its
written reply to question 15 of the Panel in relation to the first substantive meeting.
4.354 The United States loses sight of certain aspects in its response to question 18 of the Panel asking
it to provide more information on the USA Rice Federation and to indicate the number of producers it
represents. The United States replied to both queries but in so doing added a further argument against
Mexico that was not included in the request for consultations or in any subsequent document and should
therefore be dismissed. The United States cont ends that Economía could have contacted the
USA Rice Federation to obtain information on the US firms. Had Mexico taken such a course of action, it

would have violated Article 5.5. of the AD Agreement. The United States' argument is therefore without
merit.
4.355 The United States submits that Economía looked at all imports from the United States and not just
the dumped imports in evaluating whether import levels had increased during the period of investigation,
and that it based its conclusions only on data from the exporter Farmers Rice. Paragraph 217 of the final
determination contains merely descriptive information, and it is therefore not valid to infer therefrom that
the dumped imports were not taken into account. With regard to its having considered only data from
Farmers Rice, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 205, 228, 229 and 230 of the preliminary ruling and
paragraph 270 of the final determination.
4.356 As to Economía having compared the fall in domestic prices to the fall in prices of all imports and
not just of the dumped imports, including the prices of Farmers Rice and Riceland, Mexico refers the
Panel to paragraph 269 of the final determination and paragraph 248 of the preliminary ruling.
4.357 While it is true that the share of the dumped imports did not increase in relative terms, this is not
decisive evidence for concluding that there was no in jury to the domestic industry, since the injury
analysis should be comprehensive. Furthermore, although the dumped imports did not rise in terms of
relative share, they did
 show an increase in absolute terms, as stated in paragraph 244 of the final
determination.
(e) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is not applicable to firms with margins of dumping of
zero per cent
4.358 With respect to the argument relating to Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, Mexico refers the
Panel to the considerations set out in paragraphs 131 to 137 of its first written submission.
4.359 In paragraph 41 of its Opening Statement , the United States observes that, as the WTO
Appellate Body held in paragraph 118 of its report in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the term "margin" refers to
the "individual margin of dumping determined for each of the investigated exporters and producers".
Thus, the United States argues that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement refers to termination of the
investigation for individual firms. The United States is mistaken in its interpretation. In EC – Bed Linen,
which constitutes the basis for the Appellate Body's reasoning in paragraph 118 cited above, the Appellate
Body refers to the fact that the term "margins" should reflect a comparison that is based upon examination
of all of the relevant home market and export market transactions, and that it should be calculated for each
individual firm. The Appellate Body thus describes only what the calculation of a margin of dumping
should include, without referring to the scope of the term "margin" as it appears in Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement. On the other hand, Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement speci fies that the basis for
calculating margins of dumping in accordance with AD Agreement Article 5.8 applies to each country as
a whole. Hence Article 5.8 does not establish that firms with de minimis margins of dumping should be
excluded from the measure but that the investigation is to be terminated where the investigating authority
concludes that the margin of dumping is de minimis – a determination that must be made for each country
as a whole and not on a firm-specific basis.
4.360 In view of the foregoing, there are no grounds fo r the United States to assert that certain firms
should not be subject to the measure and should be exempt from subsequent review.
(f) Mexico applied the facts available to US producers and exporters in a manner consistent with the
AD Agreement
4.361 Turning to the claim in paragraph 44 of the United States' Opening Statement, Mexico emphasizes
that it has never made the assertions attributed to it by the United States.

4.362 The statement in paragraph 46 of the United States' Opening Statement is an a priori premise
without substance. Mexico refers the Panel to the response it gave in its first written submission
concerning the Articles mentioned by the United States.
4.363 Mexico's first written submission already responds to the claim made by the United States in
paragraph 47 of its Opening Statement.
4.364 The claim in paragraph 48 of the United States' Opening Statement relies on a partial citation of
Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. On this matter, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraph 141 of its first
written submission.
4.365 The United States specifies what steps an investigating authority should supposedly take in order
to calculate a dumping margin based on the facts available and submits that if these steps are not taken the
margin should be calculated in accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. Mexico is under no
obligation to conduct its investigations in the manner indicated by the United States. On this matter,
Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 138 to 181 of its first written submission.
4.366 The United States also alleges that Mexico did limit its examination to a reasonable number of
interested parties and ought therefore to have a pplied an "all others" dumping margin calculated in
accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. The United States thus accepts by implication that
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement applies only where th e examination is limited. Consequently, if the
United States fails to demonstrate that Mexico limited its examination in accordance with Article 6.10 of
the AD Agreement, its argument should be dismissed.
4.367 The United States advances a number of reasons in support of the foregoing. On this matter,
Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 138 to 181 of its first written submission and emphasizes that none
of these "reasons" affords valid grounds for the United States' claim. Thus, since it did not limit its
examination, Mexico was under no obligation to calcu late "all others" margins in conformity with
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
4.368 As to the claim in paragraph 53 of the United States' Opening Statement, Mexico refers the Panel
to paragraphs 163, 164, 171 and 172 of its first written submission.
4.369 Lastly, in paragraph 54 of its Opening Statement, the United States submits that Mexico failed to
respond to the following complaints:
 (a) That Mexico's treatment of Producers Rice was inconsistent with paragraph 7 of Annex
II of the AD Agreement. On this point, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraph 164 of its
first written submission.

 (b) That Mexico breached Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement by failing to satisfy itself that
the list of known exporters was accurate and complete. On this point, Mexico refers the
Panel to paragraph 152 of its first written submission.

 (c) That Mexico breached Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to provide
the US exporters with the pedimentos that it gave to the Mexican industry. Mexico
insists that its first written submission must be read as a whole. In addition, paragraphs
41 and 42 of the final determination show that information was sought from the
petitioners, which sent a copy of pedimento de importación 3035 8000812 with the
corresponding invoice. Thus, the United States' claim is unfounded since the documents

it refers to are in the investigation file
33 and were available to the parties. This matter
was dealt with in paragraphs 93 and 94 of Mexico's first written submission.

 (d) That Mexico has not denied that the marg in contained in the petition was "adverse". On
this point, Mexico refers to its written answer to question 25 of the Panel in relation to
the first substantive meeting, in which Mexico stated that whether or not Producers Rice.
cooperated bears no
 relationship to the fact that a facts-available dumping margin was
calculated for that firm, since Article 6. 8 of the AD Agreement stipulates that its
provisions apply when a party does not provide the necessary information. Economía
therefore applied paragraph 1 of the Annex.

 (e) That Mexico has not denied that it breached Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement by failing
to give notice to the parties. On this point, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 155 to
157 of its first written submission.

 (f) That Mexico's determination is inconsiste nt with Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement.
Mexico answered this claim in paragraph 177 of its first written submission. Mexico
insists that it is for the United States to submit proof of its assertion in order to make a
prima facie case, rather than expect Mexico to do so in its capacity as defendant.

4.370 In its Answers, the United States raised a number of arguments that have a bearing on the issues
discussed here. Mexico responds to these arguments in the paragraphs below.
4.371 Concerning paragraphs 28 to 31 of the United States' Answers, it cannot be inferred from the
petition that the prices taken by the petitioners to calculate the normal value correspond to rice with a
higher price than that used in reckoning the export price. It is therefore incorrect to say that Economía's
intent was to increase the margin of dumping. Mo reover, Economía took the appropriate action since
there were no objections to the calculations proposed by the petitioner.
4.372 With respect to paragraphs 38 to 41 of the United States' Answers, Mexico refers to its written
answer to question 16(a) posed by the Panel in relation to the first substantive meeting.
4.373 In paragraph 39 of its Answers, the United States claims that there is no basis for limiting the
obligation to send a copy of the petition only to those exporters known to the petitioner if the
investigating authority knows of other exporters. Mexico submits that the investigating authority relies on
exporters identified by the petitioners and, if it knows no others, must send the petition to those exporters
alone.
4.374 In paragraph 41 of its Answers, the United States contends that China's interpretation (as indeed
Mexico's interpretation of Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement) is illogical because it would create an
incentive for petitioners to under-report the range of known exporters. In this connection, Article 6.1.3 of
the AD Agreement seeks to avert such a situation in laying down an obligation for the investigating
authority to send the petition to the authorities of the exporting country. For the above reasons, Mexico
holds that the United States' interpretation is entirely unfounded.
4.375 According to paragraph 42 of the United States' Answers, the issue before the Panel is whether
Mexico was bound under the AD Agreement to take cer tain steps in conducting its investigation and
whether it failed to take them. The United States evades the Panel's question without explaining the
practical effect of its assertions. The issue before the Panel is not that indicated by the United States. The
issue to be addressed is whether the AD Agreemen t sets rules on the subject, whether or not the
United States is right in its interpretation regarding the obligations of an investigating authority, whether

33 Administrative file of the anti-dumping investigation concerning long-grain white rice 07/00, confidential
version, Volume 20, Folio 0103882.

its interpretation is the only permissible one and whether Mexico acted in a manner that cannot be treated
as a permissible interpretation. Since the AD Agreement does not establish clear rules, its provisions have
to be interpreted. The United States fails to explain why Mexico's practice "is unreasonable" and when
the Panel draws its attention to the matter it merely skirts the question.
4.376 In response to the United States' arguments in paragraphs 43 to 49 of its Answers, Mexico stresses
that the United States is seeking to impose on Mexico its administrative practice and its interpretation of
various provisions of the AD Agreement, in breach of Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement.
4.377 The questionnaires can be obtained from Economía's web site, so the United States' claim in
paragraph 45 of its Answers is unfounded. Mexico emphasizes that in various investigations US exporters
have known of the investigation and have appeared before the Mexican authority. It is common practice
for officials of the United States' Embassy to forwar d notices of initiation of an investigation to their
exporters, which are not barred from participating in the investigation. The anti-dumping investigation
concerning United States' exports of bovine meat and edible offal provided evidence of this.
4.378 As to paragraph 49 of the United States' Answers, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraph 112 of its
first written submission, in which it explains why the United States' claim is unfounded.
2. Complaints relating to the Foreign Trade Act and Article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil
Procedure
(a) Article 53
4.379 As demonstrated in paragraphs 218 to 221 of Mexico's first written submission, the time-limit set
in Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement applies only to foreign
producers and/or exporters who have been sent the questionnaire, that is, those that are known.
4.380 Both the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement establish a period of 37 days for exporters or
foreign producers to reply to the questionnaires. Thus, the period allowed by the Foreign Trade Act is
longer (28 working days) than that provided by th e Agreements, meaning that the Foreign Trade Act
affords greater opportunities for defence. This was demonstrated in paragraph 228 of Mexico's first
written submission.
4.381 If the period of 37 days were granted to any interested party that presented itself after the
initiation of the investigation, the ensuing delay would entail non-observance of the time-limits prescribed
in Article 5.10 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.11 of the SCM Agreement. The above is in line with
paragraph 33 of the report of the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel.
(b) Article 64
4.382 Most of the United States' arguments challenging the provision of the Foreign Trade Act in
question are based on the allegation that Mexico has misconstrued the WTO provisions. That only goes
to show that the United States has based its argument on mere suppositions that are devoid of substance.
4.383 The United States submits that Mexico cites only part of Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement without
referring to Article 6.1 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement. Mexico cited Article 6.8 of
the AD Agreement properly and showed in paragraph 240 of its first written submission that Article 64 of
the Foreign Trade Act is consistent with the AD Agreement for the following reasons (which apply
equally to Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement):
 (a) It allows the investigating authority to calculate margins of dumping for parties that do
not provide the necessary information, as upheld by the Appellate Body in paragraph 119
of its report on US – Hot-Rolled Steel

 (b) If an interested party does not appear in the investigation or had no exports during the
period of investigation, then that exporter will not provide
 the necessary normal value
and export price data.

 (c) In such cases, the investigating authority may calculate the margin of dumping on the
basis of the facts available.
 (d) Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act thus stipulates that margins of dumping are to be
calculated on the basis of the facts availabl e for parties that do not appear in the
investigation or have no exports during the period of investigation.

4.384 Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement was not the subject of consultations, and Mexico therefore
requests the Panel to disregard it. Furthermore, the United States has not explained why it deems
Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act to be inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.
4.385 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is not inconsistent with Annex II of the AD Agreement, as
has already been demonstrated in paragraphs 246 to 252 of Mexico's first written submission.
4.386 The United States contends in paragraph 70 of its Opening Statement that Article 64 of the
Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with Article 9. 4 of the AD Agreement because it requires Mexico to
apply a margin calculated on the basis of the facts av ailable to firms that should have received an "all
others" margin. Mexico refers the Panel in this connection to paragraphs 241 to 245 of its first written
submission.
4.387 As to the allegation that Article 64 is inconsis tent with Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, the United States asserts that the investigating authority is required
to apply the highest margin of dumping to firms with no shipments and that where such firms are "deemed
to have been investigated", they are "subject to anti-dumping duties" and are not eligible for new shipper
review. The interpretation the United States puts on the above-mentioned Articles of the AD Agreement
and the SCM Agreement is absurd and contradicts its own administrative practice. If one were to accept
the United States' assertion, an "all others" margin calculated in accordance with Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement would likewise prevent firms with no shipments from applying for a new shipper review.
4.388 Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act does not prevent foreign producers or exporters that made no
shipments during the period of investigation from seeking a new shipper review, provided that they fulfil
the requirements of Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. Indeed, on
the request of a US exporter, after the revision of the Foreign Trade Act had taken effect, Mexico initiated
a new shipper review.
34
(c) Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act
4.389 In paragraph 76 of its Opening Statement , the United States cites Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement and Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement in alleging the inconsistency of Article 68 of the
Foreign Trade Act with the WTO Agreements. With regard to the United States' interpretation of Article
5.8 of the AD Agreement – particularly the scope of the word "margin" – Mexico has the following
comments. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement does not establish that firms that are not dumping must be
excluded from the measure. The Article says that th e investigation must be terminated where the
investigating authority determines that the margin of dumping is de minimis, and the margin is to be

34 Resolution accepting the application of the interested party and declaring initiation of the new shipper
procedure, pertaining to the final determination on imports of dessert apples of the varieties Red Delicious and its
mutations and Golden Delicious, currently classified under heading 0808.10.01 of the Tariff established under the
General Import and Export Duty Law, originating in the Un ited States, regardless of the country of provenance.
Published in the Official Journal of the Federation (DOF) of 21 October 2003 (Exhibit MEX-12).

determined for the country as a whole and not firm by firm, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement
and Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement. There are thus no grounds for alleging that some firms should
not be subject to the measure and are hence exempt from subsequent review.
4.390 As to the representative volumes required by Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act, and in response
to paragraphs 76 to 81 of the United States' Answers, Mexico affirms once again that representative export
volumes are not a requirement for the initiation of a review, and refers the Panel to paragraphs 262 to 266
of its first written submission.
4.391 Mexico emphasizes that the United States interprets to suit its own ends the resolution that it
offers as evidence, since nowhere does the text of the resolution
35 mention the representativeness of
import volumes as a requirement for initiation of the review. What the resolution does contain is an
analysis of import volumes derived from the fact that the review applicants supplied such information.
The dumping analysis is to be found in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the resolution.
4.392 Moreover, there is no evidence in the resolution that the application for review was rejected
because it did not fulfil the representativeness requirement. It was rejected for other reasons, which are
detailed in paragraph 95 of the resolution.
(d) Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act
4.393 According to paragraph 79 of the United States' Opening Statement, Mexico alleged that the
WTO Agreements establish no obligation in respect of the requirement to show representativeness
prescribed in Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Ac t – an argument that Mexico did not adduce.
Furthermore, the United States repeats that Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act applies only to foreign
producers and not to exporters, and that producers ar e required to demonstrate that the exports were
representative.
4.394 With regard to the first of those claims, in its Opening Statement the United States overlooks the
argument in paragraphs 268 and 269 of Mexico's first written submission, which refers to Article 2 of the
Foreign Trade Act and the fact that the Act must be considered as a whole and not
 in isolation when
determining whether or not its provisions are incons istent with the WTO Agreements. Mexico also
indicates that in the case of unfair international trade practices by WTO Members, it applies anti-dumping
and countervailing duties as provided for in Ar ticle VI of the GATT 1994 and in the AD and
SCM Agreements.
4.395 In order to disprove the United States' allegation, Mexico refers the Panel to Article 47 of the
Foreign Trade Act Regulations, which establishes how the buying cost is to be determined for exporters,
i.e. trading enterprises.
4.396 Mexico has conducted new shipper reviews both for foreign producers and for exporters on the
basis of Article 47 of the Foreign Trade Act Regulations, proof of which is the resolution initiating the
new shipper procedure concerning imports of apples from the United States,
36 paragraph 19 of which
establishes that the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act Regulations that govern ordinary procedures –
which include Article 47 mentioned above – apply to the new shipper procedure. Thus, the provisions of
the Foreign Trade Act Regulations that apply to new shipper reviews are those set forth in Titles IV and

35 Resolution declaring initiation of the review of the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed on imports of
dessert apples of the varieties Red Delicious and its mu tations and Golden Delicious, currently classified under
heading 0808.10.01 of the Tariff established under the Gene ral Import and Export Duty Law, originating in the
United States, regardless of the country of provenance. Published on 21 October 2003 in the Official Journal of the
Federation (DOF) (first section), page 16 (Exhibit MEX-13).
36 Ibid. Supra footnote 21.

VI thereof. Furthermore, paragraphs 3 and 32 of the resolution show that a new shipper review was
initiated at the request of an exporting firm, which invalidates the United States' claim.
4.397 With regard to the second claim, Mexico stresses that representativeness is a requirement not for
initiating a new shipper review but for the determination of an individual margin of dumping or subsidy,
this being for economic reasons. Thus, although Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement do not expressly so provide, given the context and the object and purpose of the
Agreements it is natural and logical to request that a new shipper's volume of exports during the review
period be representative.
4.398 Concerning paragraphs 82 to 84 of the United States' Answers, Mexico explains that paragraph 16
of the resolution initiating the above-mentioned new shipper procedure states that " … a review shall be
carried out promptly to determine the individual ma rgin of price discrimination for the exporters or
producers … provided that the said exporters or producers demonstrate that they have carried out export
operations in representative volumes … " (emphasis added). Consequently, the representative volume
requirement is for determining the individual margin of dumping and not for initiating of a new shipper
review.
(e) Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act
4.399 The United States argues in paragraphs 82 and 83 of its Opening Statement that Article 93.V of
the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent w ith the WTO Agreements because it requires the investigating
authority to apply the fines established therein. In rebuttal, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 274 to
282 of its first written submission, which specifies that in interpreting the context of Article 93.V of the
Foreign Trade Act account should be taken of Article 2 of the Foreign Trade Act, which stipulates that the
Foreign Trade Act must be applied in a manner consistent with the international treaties to which Mexico
is party.
4.400 In paragraph 84 of its Opening Statement , the United States asserts that the language of
Article 93.V is enough to show that Mexico lacks the discretionary authority to impose the fines. Mexico
refers the Panel in this connecti on to paragraphs 283 to 286 of its fi rst written submission. It should
likewise be pointed out that Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act establishes that the fines are to apply
"when ... it is deemed probable that [the imports] undermine the remedial effect of the countervailing duty
… ". Thus, Economía has discretion as to whether or not the fines are to be applied.
(f) Article 366 of the FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act
4.401 With regard to the United States' claim that Article 366 of the FCCP is inconsistent as such with
the WTO Agreements, Mexico repeats what it said in paragraph 297 of its first written submission, i.e.
that the Article does not apply directly to the subject-matter or the procedures regulated by the Foreign
Trade Act. The United States notes in this context that the very fact of attaching the text of Article 366 of
the FCCP to its first written submission is enough to demonstrate the scope and meaning of its provisions.
 On this point, Mexico refers the Panel to paragraphs 293 to 299 of Mexico's first written submission, and
note in addition that the United States must prove its claim prima facie.
4.402 In paragraph 87 of its Opening Statement, the United States observes that Mexico did not contest
the allegation that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act breach Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement
and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. Mexico wishes to clarify that its rebuttal of this claim is to be
found in paragraphs 300 to 303 of its first written submission. The United States misinterprets Mexico's
arguments. Indeed, by waiting for the duties to be c onfirmed in order to carry out a review of them,
Mexico is securing and safeguarding the interests of the parties, sparing them any possible injury. This is
borne out by the fact that applicants that challenge the final determination are not required to pay any
duties pending the resolution of their case, and are asked only for a surety to cover the duties, pursuant to
Article 98.III of the Foreign Trade Act.

4.403 As to the United States' argument in paragraph 92 of its Opening Statement, Mexico emphasizes
that although in its Semi-Annual Report Mexico reported the conclusion of an anti-dumping investigation
concerning beef with the application of "definitive duties", this does not
 imply that the duties were
confirmed. The US exporters brought challenge proceedings and accordingly provided sureties in respect
of the imports they have effected in recent years, pursuant to Article 98 of the Foreign Trade Act.
4.404 Concerning the alleged inconsistency of Artic les 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act with
Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement, Mexico reiterat es what it said in paragraph 304 of its first written
submission.
4.405 With respect to the alleged inconsistency of Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act with
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, Mexico is unaware of the
grounds for the United States' claim, since none of the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act precludes or
expressly prohibits a new shipper review from being carried out.
4.406 It should also be noted that the WTO Agreements require new shipper reviews to be carried out
promptly (AD Agreement) and expeditiously (SCM Agreement). The United States is thus attempting to
assign to Mexico obligations that are not to be found in the Agreements, since neither the AD Agreement
nor the SCM Agreement lays down an obligation to initiate
 a new shipper review as soon as it has been
applied for; what the Agreements do require is th at, once initiated, the review must be carried out
promptly and/or expeditiously.
4.407 As to paragraph 93 of the United States' Opening Statement , Articles 68 and 97 of the
Foreign Trade Act provide certainty in law and preclude conflicting court rulings by treating as definitive
only such anti-dumping or countervailing duties as have not been challenged in some procedure. Thus,
once the dispute is settled the sureties posted by the exporters will be collected, or else it may determined
that the original duty was unlawful, in which case the sureties will be returned.
G. SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
4.408 The following summarizes the United States' arguments in its second oral opening and closing
statements:
1. Opening statement
(a) Mexico’s use of a stale POI
4.409 Numerous provisions in the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 illustrate the need for authorities
to base their injury investigations on a period that includes the most recent available information. The
panel report in US – Softwood Lumber VI also supports this conclusion.
4.410 The US – Softwood Lumber VI panel stated that it must be clear from an authority’s determination
of threat of material injury that the authority h as evaluated “how the future will be different from the
immediate past, such that the situation of no present material injury will change in the imminent future to
a situation of material injury . . . .”. An authority that fails to examine data that includes the most recent
available information will not be in a position to make judgments about the immediate past. The same
can be said about findings of present injury. An authority can only make objective determinations about
the present, or the imminent future, if it is examining a period that includes the most recent available
information.
4.411 In its second submission, Mexico says it would be “preposterous” for a Member to base its
findings on information that is ten years old. Thus, Mexico apparently now concedes that an authority’s
discretion in setting a POI is not without limit. According to Mexico, the appropriateness of a particular
POI will depend on the facts of a particular case. The United States and Mexico apparently agree.

However, Mexico has pointed to nothing to justify its decision to ignore 15 months worth of recent data,
or its decision not to collect any additional injury data after the initiation of the investigation. Although
Mexico baldly asserts in its second submission that the POI in the rice investigation yielded objective
information on dumping and injury, it has provided no evidence in support of its claim.
(b) Economía limited its injury examination to six months of 1997, 1998, and 1999
4.412 Mexico claims not to understand the argument of the United States that Economía breached WTO
rules by only examining injury information for half of the POI. To clarify, Mexico breached WTO rules
by only examining half of the injury
 POI.
4.413 Mexico also seeks to rebut the United States' claims by introducing another new table. This new
table allegedly contains information on imports from the United States to Mexico on a monthly basis from
1997 through 1999. The Panel should disregard Mexico’s table.
4.414 First, the new table does not appear to be record evidence. Mexico has provided no citation to the
record for this table, or a photocopy of the page in the record where it is contained. Second, Mexico has
failed to identify the source of the data in the tabl e. Economía lacked accurate data on imports of
long-grain white rice from the United States. The petitioners’ import data included unknown quantities of
glazed and parboiled rice, as well as short-grain rice and medium-grain rice. Thus, if the information in
the table is from the petitioners’ data, there is no basis to conclude that it accurately reflects the true level
of imports of long-grain white rice during the three-year injury POI. Third, the table directly contradicts
Economía’s findings that imports were concentrated in the March to August time period. Mexico’s
complete reversal of its own position demonstrates that there was no justification for Economía’s decision
to examine only half of the injury POI.
4.415 In any event, the United States is objecting per se to Economía’s decision to limit its injury
analysis to only half of the injury POI. Mexico has conceded that seasonality was not relevant, and it is
indisputable that Economía failed to examine at least half of the domestic industry’s production over the
course of the entire injury POI. Thus, Economía’s in jury analysis would have been inconsistent with
WTO rules even if imports had not
 been concentrated in the March to August time period.
4.416 Mexico’s argument that it was acceptable to look at a “representative sample” of the data is
unfounded. Nothing in Economía’s published determinations indicates that it focused on the March to
August time period because it believed that period w as a “representative sample.” Nor are there any
findings or evidence demonstrating that the period was, in fact, representative of the year as a whole.
(c) Mexico’s conduct of its injury analysis
4.417 Mexico argues that Economía does not have access to the pedimentos. In actuality, although
Economía may not have possession of the pedimentos, it does have access to them. It simply does not
request such access, because Economía believes the AD Agreement does not require it to do so, and
because it would take too much time.
4.418 Second, Mexico notes that Economía collected information through December 1999. But even if
this is so, the fact remains that it did not consider information for any period after August 1999.
4.419 Third, Economía failed to conduct an objective examination of the domestic industry as defined
by Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement because it did not examine a consistent set of producers when it
conducted its injury analysis. Mexico justifies Ec onomía’s approach on the grounds that not all of the
domestic producers provided the requested informati on. This was the case with respect to production
volumes, sales, installed capacity, employment data, wages, and financial performance.

4.420 These reporting failures were not minor. The missing data pertained to many of the most critical
factors necessary for Economía’s injury analysis . Economía’s published determinations do not
adequately explain why the domestic industry was unable to provide the requested data. Nor is there any
indication that Economía took steps to ensure the objectivity of its injury analysis by making further
efforts to obtain it. Economía seems to have simply used the data its industry was willing to provide.
Economía’s willingness to conduct its injury analysis in this way undermined the objectivity of its injury
determination. An objective investigating authority would not permit its domestic producers to control the
injury analysis by allowing them to self-select whic h information they are willing to provide. For in
doing so, the authority makes it possible for the dom estic industry to influence the outcome of its
investigation, by having each individual producer only provide its data for factors that are indicative of
injury. In this way, the industry can ensure that the aggregate data for the “industry” will reflect injury.
4.421 Mexico tries to cast doubt on Economía’s findings about Covadonga by stating that Covadonga
“apparently” exhibited different behaviour. But Economía made these factual findings. The alleged fall
in the domestic industry’s prices was one of the primary findings underlying Mexico’s injury
determination, but the evidence demonstrates that Covadonga’s prices actually rose during the injury POI.
4.422 Mexico states that it would have breached Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement if it had contacted the
Rice Federation to obtain information on the “known” exporters. Nothing in Article 5.5 prevented
Economía from contacting the Rice Federation after
 it initiated the investigation.
4.423 Mexico argues that the dumped imports increased in absolute terms. But as paragraph 244 of the
final determination makes clear, the dumped imports actually fell over the course of the entire injury POI.
Thus, one of the primary factors underlying Economía’s injury determination was wrong.
(d) Mexico’s failure to exclude firms with AD margins of zero per cent
4.424 Mexico argues that Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement demonstrates that the Article 5.8 de minimis
calculation applies to the country as a whole. Article 3.3 has nothing to do with the dumping
determination. Article 3.3 is an injury provision that uses the definition of de minimis in Article 5.8 as a
means to establish a threshold for determining whic h countries may be cumulated for injury purposes.
The cumulation analysis is country-wide by its very nature.
4.425 Article 5.8 itself states that the margin of dumping is to be considered de minimis if the margin is
less than two per cent, “expressed as a percentage of the export price.” Export prices are inherently
firm-specific. If the drafters had intended to require termination only if the weighted average
 margin of
dumping for all of the investigated firms was de minimis, they could have said so. This is what they did
in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement, which requires authorities to calculate the all other’s rate on the basis
of the “weighted average margin of dumping” calculated for the selected exporters and producers.
4.426 Finally, if a company is investigated and found not to be dumping, there is simply no basis under
Article 1 of the AD Agreement to apply the measure to that firm.
(e) Mexico’s application of an adverse “facts available” dumping margin
4.427 Mexico’s arguments on this issue ignore that Articles 6.1 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement, and
paragraph 1 of Annex II, prohibit an authority from applying a margin based on the facts available to an
exporter or producer that was never sent the questionnaire and asked to respond.
4.428 Mexico argues that a Member is only required to apply a neutral margin under Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement when it has investig ated a sample of exporters and producers. In Mexico’s view,
Economía did not sample, so it is under no obligation to apply a neutral margin to the unexamined firms.
But Articles 6.1 and 6.8, and paragraph 1 of Annex II, contain an independent set of obligations that a
Member must always observe when it bases margins on the facts available. One of the key obligations is

that an authority that includes a particular exporter “in an anti-dumping investigation” must give notice to
that individual
 exporter, by sending the exporter a copy of the questionnaire, asking it to respond, and
ensuring that the exporter understands that a failure to respond may result in the application of a margin
based on the facts available. If an authority fails to take these steps with respect to an individual exporter
or producer, then it cannot apply a margin based on the facts available.
4.429 Mexico also argues that it met the notice requirements of paragraph 1 of Annex II by sending its
questionnaire to Producers Rice and Riceland, as well as to the Embassy of the United States. But the
AD Agreement does not permit an authority to shift the burden for providing the requisite notice to the
foreign respondents, or the foreign government. Economía did not send its questionnaire to the
uninvestigated exporters and producers; therefore, it cannot apply facts available-based margins to them.
4.430 Mexico argues that it did not “limit” its inves tigation by only sending its questionnaire to the
exporters and producers that the petitioners identifie d as such in the petition, and by not sending the
questionnaire to the Rice Company, or to the exporters and producers identified in the pedimentos, or to
the exporters or producers identified in public sources, such as the Rice Journal, because Article 6.10 only
provides a single basis for limiting an investigation. But Mexico is only half right. The only permissible
basis for limiting an investigation is where the num ber of exporters and producers is so large that
calculating individual margins would be impracticab le. Economía limited its investigation in an
impermissible way, by remaining passive and taking no steps to conduct a proper examination of all of the
known exporters and producers, or an examination of a representative sample, or the largest percentage of
the exporters who could reasonably be investigated.
4.431 Mexico responds to the United States' demonstr ation that the petition margin was adverse by
arguing that the petitioners did not inform it that the petition overstated the normal value, and thus
overstated the dumping margin. But the petitioners’ silence does not excuse Economía from its obligation
to examine the accuracy of the information, as Articles 5.3 and 6.6 of the AD Agreement require, or its
obligation to check the information in the petition against other independent sources, as paragraph 7 of
Annex II of the AD Agreement requires. Nor does it change the fact that the petition margin was
 adverse.
4.432 Finally, with respect to the claim that Economía breached Articles 6.2 and 6.4, it has become
apparent to the United States that it misunders tood the nature of the data taken from the listados. The
United States had assumed that it was public informa tion, because Mexico shared it with its domestic
industry. But the United States now believes it must be confidential information. Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of
the AD Agreement do not require a Member to disclose confidential information to interested parties. On
the other hand, if the data is confidential, the United States does not understand how Mexico justifies
sharing it with its domestic industry in the first place.
(f) Claims regarding the Foreign Trade Act and Article 366 of the FCCP
4.433 Article 53: Mexico has confirmed that Article 53 precludes Economía from providing exporters
and producers who are not initially sent the questionnaire the full 30 day response time that Article 6.1.1
of the AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement require it to provide. The proper interpretation
of the relevant WTO provisions is that any producer or exporter who receives the questionnaire is entitled
to have 30 days to reply, and that the 30 days are counted from the date of receipt, not from the date the
questionnaire is sent. Therefore, Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act breaches WTO rules.
4.434 Article 64: Mexico argues in its second submission that the United States has not explained why
Article 64 is inconsistent with Ar ticle 6.1 of the AD Agreement. Mexico is mistaken. Article 64 is
inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement because it requires Economía to apply the highest facts
available to firms that do not “appear” in the investigation, even when Economía has not complied with
Article 6.1. Mexico also argues that Article 9.4 only applies when an authority investigates a sample of
exporters or producers. But by its plain terms, Article 64 always requires Economía to apply the highest
level of facts available to exporters and producers that have no exports during the POI or that do not

“appear” in its investigations. Therefore, even if Economía were to overtly limit its investigation in
accordance with Article 6.10, Article 64 would still require
 it to apply the highest facts available to those
producers and exporters. But Article 9.4 requires an authority that has limited its investigation to apply
the neutral margin to all of the exporters or producers that are not included in the examination.
4.435 Articles 68 and 89D: Mexico argues that it is both “natural and logical” to require an exporter
seeking a review to have a representative amount of sales, because the authority would not otherwise be
able to make a proper price comparison. But a small number of export sales, even the sale of a single unit,
as long as it is a bona fide sale, is not an obstacle to calculating a margin. Moreover, Mexico concedes
that a party must demonstrate a representative volume of sales to obtain an individual margin of dumping
or subsidization under Article 89D. In addition, the United States supplied evidence in response to the
Panel’s question 31 which confirmed that Mexico requires firms seeking reviews under Article 68 to
demonstrate a representative volume of sales. Whether one characterizes it as a requirement to initiate or
conduct a review of the margin, or a requirement to obtain a new margin, Articles 68 and 89D require
exporters and producers to demonstrate a representative volume of sales.
4.436 Article 93 : Mexico has not contested the United States' demonstration that Article 93V is
(1) “specific” to dumping or subsidization; (2) “agai nst” dumping or subsidization; and (3) not “in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994,” as in terpreted by the AD and SCM Agreements.
Moreover, Mexico argues in its second submission that Article 93V is discretionary, because Economía
allegedly has discretion to decide in a particular case whether the conditions for imposing a fine are met.
But if Economía finds the conditions are met, it must impose a fine. Mexico also argues that Article 93V
is discretionary because it merely states that it “sh all be the responsibility” of Economía to punish the
infringing activity. This is equivalent to saying that the law is discretionary because Economía may
simply choose not to enforce it. As the panel stated in United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, the non-enforcement of a provision that mandates WTO-inconsistent action does not
make the provision itself discretionary.
4.437 Article 366 of the FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act: Mexico has argued
that Article 366 of the FCCP does not directly apply to the subject matter or procedures of the Foreign
Trade Act. Mexico seems to be implying that the provision is indirectly applicable. It is also telling that
Mexico has made no effort to explain why Article 366 does not apply, directly or indirectly, to the
Foreign Trade Act.
4.438 Turning next to Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act, Mexico appears to be distinguishing
between duties that are “definitive” and duties that are “binding,” and it seems to accept that a Member
imposes “definitive duties” at the time that it issues the final determination. But Articles 11.2 of the
AD Agreement and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement state that Members “shall” review the need for the
continued imposition of the duty, “upon request,” if a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the
“imposition” of the “definitive duty.” The term “i mposition of the definitive duty” refers to the
imposition of the AD or CVD measure itself. This can be seen, for example, in Article 11.1 of the AD
Agreement. Neither Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement nor Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement permits
an authority to refuse a review on the grounds that the measure is not “binding” until the end of judicial
review.
4.439 Mexico appears to argue that Articles 68 and 97 do not preclude e xpedited reviews under
AD Agreement Article 9.5 and SCM Article 19.3. Bu t Mexico stated during consultations that those
Articles did
 preclude such reviews. Moreover, Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act only permits an
exporter to request a review if the good is subject to a “final” duty. But under Article 97, only
determinations issued at the end of a judicial proceeding can be considered “final.” Therefore, Article 97
does preclude expedited reviews.

(g) Conclusion
4.440 The United States has two final points. First, Mexico argues that the Panel should disregard any
claims or arguments that do not appear in the United States' first written submission. But nothing in the
DSU suggests that a Party’s first written submission defines the scope of permissible claims and
arguments that a Party may raise over the course of a dispute. On the contrary, as the Appellate Body
found in
EC – Bananas III:
There is no requirement in the DSU or in GATT practice for arguments on all claims
relating to the matter referred to the DSB to be set out in a complaining party’s first
written submission to the panel. It is th e panel’s terms of reference, governed by
Article 7 of the DSU, which set out the claims of the complaining parties relating to the
matter referred to the DSB.
4.441 All of the claims that the United States has raised in this dispute were in the panel request. So
Mexico’s claim that the United States did not set forth certain claims in its request is wrong.
4.442 Second, the United States feels compelled to comment on language that Mexico unfortunately
chose to employ in its second written submission and the allegations of bad faith that Mexico made today.
Its allegations are inaccurate, as even a cursory review of the United States' presentations demonstrates.
But, that is not why the United States is raising this matter today. Rather, the United States' concern is
with the use by one sovereign nation of derogatory language towards another sovereign nation. Language
like this is completely inappropriate and has no place in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, as has been
recognized in the past by panels and members of the Appellate Body.
2. Closing statement
4.443 The United States has presented a prima facie case with respect to its claims. Mexico has not
rebutted that case. And all of the United States' clai ms are in the panel request, contrary to Mexico’s
assertions. For example, Mexico argued that the United States did not make a claim under Article 4.1 of
the AD Agreement, but the claim is in the panel request, as part of the first set of claims. As is a claim
under Article 1 of the AD Agreement. The United States urges the Panel to look to the papers filed in this
dispute, and what they actually say, and not just to Mexico’s arguments about them.
4.444 There was a long discussion today about the POIs that Mexico uses in its dumping cases. What
seemed clear from the discussion is that Mexico normally lets the petitioners pick the POI and then puts
the burden on the respondents to show why the suggested POI should not be used. The United States had
some of the same questions as the Panel about Mexico’s approach, so the United States did some research.
The United States included information about eight or ten Mexican investigations in the previous
responses to Panel questions. In all of those cases, in 2003, the United States found that Mexico accepted
the petitioners’ proposed POI. Moreover, the length of the POIs varied quite a bit – from six to
eighteen months. The only reason the United States was able to find for this was that those were the
lengths that the petitioners requested.
4.445 Regarding the listados, the United States believes Mexico could have done, and should have
done, what the Panel put its finger on: i.e., Mexico had the information before it on the importers’ names
and the pedimento numbers, and it should have looked at the in formation and used it to gather what it
needed to be sure it had conducted a full, vigorous investigation with all of the facts. The authorities have
an interest in a full investigation. They also could have sent injury questionnaires to the importers listed
in the listados and obtained – and then used – better volume and value data than they did.
4.446 Regarding the Foreign Trade Act provisions, the United States is challenging these provisions of
Mexico’s law as such, not as applied, so the text is the relevant evidence. There is no need for the

United States to provide examples of the application of the provisions, as Mexico suggested in its closing
statement. If Mexico wishes to provide examples of the application of the provisions to disprove the
United States' reading of the text, it can provide them, but there is no obligation on the part of the
United States to do so to meet its prima facie case in this dispute.
4.447 Finally, regarding Mexico’s continued argumen ts that the challenged legal provisions are
discretionary, Mexico is using an odd formulation of the mandatory/discretionary principle. For example,
Mexico is not claiming that, while its laws are WT O-inconsistent, Article 2 of the Foreign Trade Act
provides it the discretion to apply the laws in a WTO-consistent manner. Rather, Mexico holds steadfast
to its argument that its laws on their face are WTO-c onsistent. Thus, there is no conflict, in its view,
between what its laws require and what its WTO oblig ations require. Therefore, there is no issue of
discretion here.
4.448 In that respect, the Appellate Body’s dicta that the mandatory/discretionary principle cannot be
mechanistically applied in every dispute is relevant, because this principle is not relevant in this dispute.
Mexico’s so-called “discretionary” argument, if ta ken to its logical end, would mean that any WTO
Member with a domestic law that says that it sha ll apply its laws in a WTO-consistent manner is
essentially shielded from any and all claims that its laws are “as such” inconsistent with WTO rules,
regardless of what the laws say. This conclusion is untenable.
H. S
ECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF MEXICO
4.449 The following summarizes Mexico's arguments in its second oral statements:
4.450 Mexico observes that the United States continu es to act in bad faith, distorting Mexico's
arguments and interpreting them with bias, and atte mpting to influence the Panel's view. It likewise
persists in attempting to impose on Mexico its ow n administrative practice and interpretation of the
AD Agreement, and to lay down and impose obligations not derived from that Agreement. Furthermore,
it disregards Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement which allows that there may be more than one permissible
interpretation of some of its provisions.
4.451 The United States is required to act in good faith, according to Article 3.10 of the DSU and the
ruling set forth in the final report of the WTO Appellate Body in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), and
as prescribed by the Panel that heard the case Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties.
4.452 The United States' breaches go beyond the WTO Agreements: on numerous occasions the
United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU as well as Article 17.4 of the
AD Agreement by introducing new arguments, attempting to influence the Panel through bias,
capitalizing on its own disregard of the rules and leaving Mexico with no basis for defence. At the same
time it has attributed to Mexico assertions the latter never made and has demonstrated that it can argue
either way, depending on the end pursued – witness its proposal JOB(04)60 to the Negotiating Group on
Rules. In that document it submits that a new shi pper review should be denied to exporters failing to
show that they have exported "i n commercial quantity", which is precisely the objection it raises to
Mexico's Foreign Trade Act although the latter makes no such provision. The Panel should accordingly
dismiss the United States' claims and, above all, fi nd that the United States has acted in breach of the
principle of good faith embodied in Article 3.10 of the DSU.

1. Anti-dumping investigation on imports of long-grain white rice originating in the
United States regardless of the country of provenance
(a) Mexico Complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement and Articles VI:2
and VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 with Regard to the Establishment of the Period of Investigation
4.453 In its first written submission the United States argues that the POI is inconsistent per se because
of its remoteness. Then, in its "Answers", it denies making any such assertion only to reiterate it in its
second written submission. This lack of inconsiste ncy in the United States' position makes its claim
unclear and leaves Mexico with no basis on which to mount a defence. Mexico therefore request the
Panel to disregard these assertions.
4.454 With regard to the assertion that an anti-dumping investigation must determine whether or not a
domestic industry is injured by dumping that is o ccurring presently, Mexico refers the Panel to its
arguments in paragraphs 43 to 46 of its first written submission.
4.455 Mexico wishes to point out that the exporters a nd importers disagreed with the POI set by the
investigating authority, but produced no convincing reasons for adopting some other POI. Nor did they
propose a more suitable alternative period or submit any evidence warranting the selection of a different
period by the investigating authority.
4.456 The United States continues to introduce claims that were not brought up in consultations or in its
request for the establishment of a Panel. A case in point is Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement, relied on by
the United States to "illustrate" the fact that th e AD Agreement requires a more recent period for the
investigation than the one used by Mexico. Nothing in that Article warrants such an assumption.
4.457 Mexico emphasizes that Article VI:6(a) was neither addressed in consultations nor included in the
Panel request or the United States' first written submission. The United States' assertions in this
connection must therefore be disregarded.
4.458 Contrary to the United States' assertion, an investigating authority is not bound to gather
information between the end of the POI and the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation, or to update
the information in the course of the investigation.
4.459 It is plain from the report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed linen (21.5 – India) , cited as a
precedent by the United States, that that case is imma terial to the present dispute since it concerns the
selection of a method for determining injury and not the selection of a POI. The United States thus
concludes its pleadings with unfounded assertions based on a priori premises all of which ought, in
Mexico's opinion, to be dismissed by the Panel.
(b) Mexico Complied with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement with Regard to the
Establishment of the Period of Investigation
4.460 In response to section III of the United States' second written submission, Mexico wishes to make
the following points. First
, in determining the POI, the investigating authority examined the petitioner's
proposal and since none of the parties submitted any evidence of the need to set a different period,
accepted it. This is not the same thing as allowing the petitioner to set the POI. Secondly , seasonality
was not the element that prompted the authority to set the period examined in the way it did. Thirdly, for
the injury analysis, in the interests of a fair comp arison earlier periods comparable to the POI were set
within the period examined (period considered for injury purposes, which covers three full years), so the
petitioner did not select the period examined.
4.461 The United States cites the report of the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, in which the
Appellate Body found that the investigating authority cannot objectively examine a domestic industry by

focusing on one part of that industry. The above-mentioned report refers to a case in which the authority
based its injury analysis on a segment of the industry, which is not the case here. The rice investigation
examined the entire domestic industry during comparable periods in each year of the period examined.
Mexico accordingly deems that the United States' reasoning is unsound and that the United States fails to
make a prima facie case of breach of the Agreement.
4.462 As to the United States' arguments concerning the use of comparable periods within the period
examined, Mexico points out that for the injury analysis it compared the periods from March to August of
1997, 1998 and 1999 in an objective manner and on the basis of positive evidence. In Mexico's view, the
use of comparable periods for injury analysis eliminates any distortions that might have occurred during
the period examined.
4.463 For the foregoing reasons, Mexico is of the vi ew that the United States' pleas of breach of
Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement should be rejected.
(c) Economía Conducted its Injury Analysis in a Manner Consistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5,
6.8, 12.2 and Annex II of the AD Agreement
4.464 With regard to the failure to collect evidence regarding price effect and volume, Mexico refers the
Panel to its first written submission and underlines that it did carry out its injury analysis objectively and
on the basis of positive evidence. The United States has failed to prove prima facie that Mexico's injury
analysis lacked objectivity and was not based on positive evidence.
4.465 As to the United States contention that the investigating authority took into account non- dumped
imports in evaluating volume, price effects and the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry,
and that the injury analysis included all imports, Mexico believes that a distinction must be drawn
between "volume of imports" and "volume of dumped imports". The former comprises all imports into
Mexico and the latter is the volume of dumped imports. In the final determination the entire section on
injury analysis, particularly paragraphs 206 to 221, analyses this matter.
4.466 The United States alleges that the investigating authority's findings lacked sufficient detail. But
the final determination gives the arguments of fact and of law that Economía took as a basis. The final
determination thus meets the requirements of Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.467 Furthermore, it cannot be confirmed from Mexico 's answers to questions 10, 12 and 15 of the
Panel that different types of rice entered under the same tariff heading or that the authority did not
separate the dumped imports from the others. The information analysed by Economía predates that
modification of tariff heading 1006.30.99 (18 May 2001), and the modification applies as from the date of
into entry into force, it does not apply to the informa tion used in the rice investigation. It thus has no
repercussions for the historical data considered in the rice investigation and there is no reason to believe
that the changes of 18 May 2001 would make the rice investigation data any more precise.
4.468 According to the United States, Mexico stated that it used only one method and that Mexico's
assertion that it used several methods is wrong. Paragraph 239 of the final determination indicates that
several methods were used
 but the best was the petitioner's, and not that the petitioner's was the only
method used. Mexico also points out that it did not guess the volume of imports but estimated it using the
method indicated in paragraphs 229 and 230 of the final determination. It also wishes to clarify that in its
reply to question 12 of the Panel, it stated not that it based its determination on information from
exporters but that it took the method proposed by th e latter into account in estimating the volume of
imports of the subject product.
4.469 As required by the AD Agreement Economía sent questionnaires to known exporters and
producers, and sent notice of the initiation of an inv estigation together with the questionnaire and the
petition to the United States Embassy in Mexico.

4.470 The information supplied by two of the importers was disregarded because no public version of it
was submitted and because it was not shown to be "confidential or restricted commercial information" as
required, in breach of several provisions of the relevant law.
4.471 In its answer to question 17 of the Panel th e United States gave incorrect information.
Sometimes, petitioners submit pedimentos given that, under Article 144 section XXVI of the Customs
Law, agreements on access to information may exist between Chambers or Associations of domestic
producers and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. However, that does not mean that the individual
domestic producers or every Chamber or Association have indeed concluded an agreement of that kind,
nor that it is mandatory to conclude such agreemen ts for those Chambers or Associations or for the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.
4.472 As to the allegation that Econom ía could have identified imports of long-grain white rice by
consulting the pedimentos, and its assertion concerning the way in which imports of different types of rice
were separated out, Mexico refers the Panel to pa ragraphs 93 and 94 of its first written submission.
Furthermore, contrary to what the United States asserts, it is not possible to identify imports of long-grain
white rice separately from the pedimentos.
4.473 The conclusion the investigating authority reached on the injury analysis was the result of an
overall evaluation of all the relevant economic factors referred to in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
The United States places on Mexico a non-existent obliga tion to gather information subsequent to the
POI. Mexico finds it odd that the United States should suggest that in order to determine the volume of
imports of long-grain white rice it is necessary to separate all the different types of long-grain white rice,
which would be impracticable. The investigating authority took the view that the best method of
separating the volumes of long-grain white rice was directly and not by elimination

4.474 The United States also alleges that to dete rmine whether there was any increase in import
volumes during the POI, Economía took into account total imports from the United States and not only
dumped imports and that, moreover, it based its conclusions on the information of a single exporter.
4.475 As to the allegation that Mexico looked at the information of only one exporter, paragraph 205 of
the preliminary determination indicates that Economía requested information from all US exporters that
appeared and that the only exporter to submit full information was Farmers Rice. Moreover, the others
had thirty working days in which to enter any objections and supporting evidence but chose not to take up
the opportunity. Economía accordingly decided to maintain its finding. Mexico therefore considers that
the United States' argument is without merit.
(d) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement Is Not Appli cable to Firms with Margins of Dumping of
Zero Per Cent
4.476 With regard to the United States' assertion concerning Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, Mexico
refers the Panel to paragraphs 131 to 137 of its first written submission and enlarges below on its answer
to question 20 of the Panel.
4.477 In that answer Mexico explained that all exporters would be subject to the measure, meaning the
final determination and not the application of positive anti-dumping duties. Thus, to impose duties
Mexico must ascertain in its final determination the position of each individual exporter. This does not
mean that anti-dumping duties will be imposed on every producer and exporter investigated where at least
one has exports with a margin of dumping above de minimis. In the same answer Mexico noted: "Each
enterprise will be assigned the anti-dumping duty corresponding to its individual margin, provided that
the total volume of imports from the country in question is above the de minimis level", since it is logical
to determine an individual margin of dumping fo r each enterprise that has supplied the requisite
information during the investigation. An exporter that submits all the requisite information on normal
value and export prices will not be subject to the application of facts available. The answer ends: "Any

exporter for which the IA finds a more than zero and below de minimis margin of dumping would receive
a zero per cent duty", which does not imply the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, and Mexico therefore
takes the view that it cannot be regarded as such, strictly speaking, let alone as a breach of the AD
Agreement.
4.478 The United States submits that in its reply to question 20 Mexico asserted that in deciding to
impose an anti-dumping measure, Economía will not examine whether the weighted average margin of all
exporters is greater than de minimis , so Mexico is obviously using a firm by firm approach. The
United States is mistaken. Mexico never made such an assertion.
4.479 Furthermore, according to Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement, paragraph 118 of the report of the
Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel and paragraph 149 of the report of the Appellate Body in
US – Carbon Steel , the determination of de minimis margins of dumping under Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement must be based on each country taken as a whole.
4.480 The United States relies on paragraph 118 of the report of the Appellate Body in
US – Hot-Rolled Steel (which in turn refers to the report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen) to
argue that the word "margin" in Article 9.4 of th e AD Agreement refers to the individual margins of
dumping for each exporter or producer. As a readi ng of that paragraph shows, the United States'
interpretation is wrong. In EC – Bed Linen, the Appellate Body ruled that the term "margins" must reflect
a comparison that is based upon an examination of all the relevant home market and export market
transactions, and must be calculated for each individual firm. The Appellate Body states only what the
calculation of a dumping margin is to include, but says nothing of the scope of the word "margin" as it
appears in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
4.481 Mexico points out that the provision in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement that volume should be
assessed on the basis of the country as a whole on no account implies that this is an exception to the rule
or that the rule is a firm-by-firm approach.
4.482 It must be clearly understood that the anti-dumping investigation ends upon issuance of the final
determination, a measure from which exporters not subjected to an anti-dumping duty cannot be excluded.
The United States lacks clarity, in Mexico's view, in holding that Mexico should end the investigation in
respect of exporters whose exports were found not to have been dumped, since Mexico decides in the
final determination the anti-dumping duties that are to be imposed, and that determination likewise
decrees the end of the investigation for all exporters. Any action taken after the final determination does
not form part of the investigation, so Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement does not apply to any examination
carried out after the final determination has been issued.
4.483 For the foregoing reasons, Mexico deems the United States' assertions to be unfounded.
(e) Mexico applied the facts available to Producers Rice and to the US Producers and Exporters That
Were Not Investigated in a Manner Consistent with the AD Agreement
4.484 The United States puts forward the following new arguments:
(i) On the strength of Mexico's assertion that it would have taken 40 days to examine all the
pedimentos from 1997 to 1999, the United States submits that it would have taken Mexico only
two weeks to examine the pedimentos of 1999.

4.485 The United States' assertion is wrong. What Mexi co said was that it would have taken about
40 days to obtain
 the pedimentos – not "examine" them. The time needed by Economía to examine them
would have to be added to the 40 days.

(ii) The United States alleges that Mexico has not explained how its interpretation regarding the
application of facts available is consistent with Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement, since if all firms
are subjected to anti-dumping duties, there are no exporters able to apply for an expedited review.

4.486 The United states is mistaken. What Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement says is that there must be
no relation with other exporters or producers which are subject to anti-dumping duties, which means that
there must be no relation with exporters or produ cers examined individually and which are assigned a
positive anti-dumping duty. Besides, if the United States' reading were correct, even if Mexico were to
calculate an "all others" margin of dumping in accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement – as the
United States claims it should have done – exporters not investigated individually would not qualify for
an expedited review under Article 9.5. The United States' interpretation is at odds with its own argument
and would prevent the holding of an expedited review.
(iii) The United States submits that Mexico's answ er to question 17(c) of the Panel shows that
Economía failed to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the petitioner's list of exporters, as
Articles 5.3 and 6.6 of the AD Agreement require.

4.487 What Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement requires is an examination of the accuracy and adequacy
of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping,
injury and a causal relationship . It lays down no obligation to id entify all existing exporters. Since
Mexico used the best available information in respect of exporters that did not appear, Article 6.6 of the
AD Agreement is immaterial.
(iv) The United States contends that by not sendi ng a questionnaire to all exporters, Mexico limited its
investigation to a reasonable number of exporters, and that it had a duty to identify a reasonable number
or the largest percentage of them that could reasonably be investigated.

4.488 Mexico did not limit its examination to a reasonable number of exporters, but sent a questionnaire
to known exporters and the United States Government. Furthermore, it published a notice summoning all
exporters and interested persons. Nothing in the AD Agreement requires Mexico to act in the manner
prescribed by the United States.
(v) According to the United States, Mexico claims that it need consider only exporters known to the
petitioner and not those known to the investigating authority.

4.489 The United States is mistaken. Mexico never made such an assertion.
(vi) The United States says that " ... the EC's and Mexico's interpretation of ... would permit an
authority to initiate an investigation on the basis of a petition that did not identify any
 "known"
exporters, publish a notice of the initiation ... in its Official Journal, and ... send its questionnaire
to nobody."

4.490 Since an investigating authority cannot know all exporters and producers of all products marketed
in the world, to attempt to assign it such a task is illogical. By the same token it is logical that the
investigating authority should notify and send questionnaires to the authorities of the exporting country
and to known
 exporters and producers when it is able to dr aw on the information in the petition. It is
likewise logical to assume that the authorities woul d forward those documents to their exporters and
producers that were not notified individually. The role of the authority in the exporting country as set out
in Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement supports Mexico's interpretation. The United States' assertions are
therefore without merit.

(vii) The United States submits that nothing in th e negotiating history of the AD Agreement suggests
that the intent was to allow Members to ignore the requirements of Article 9.4 with respect to
unexamined firms.

4.491 The United States bases that argument on a false assumption that Mexico limited its examination
to a reasonable number of exporters. Regardless of the negotiating history, Article 9.4 applies only when
the authority limits its examination. Since Mexico did not do so, Article 9.4 does not apply here.
4.492 The United States further submits that Mexico calculated margins of dumping for two exporters
that came forward on their own. That assertion is wrong: the investigating authority calculated individual
dumping margins for exporters that were sent the questionnaire and to one exporter
 that came forward
spontaneously.
4.493 Economía was not bound to send the questionnaire to all United States producers and exporters,
but only to those known to the investigating authority. Mexico would stress in this context that it is
frequently the case that officials of the United States Diplomatic Representation in Mexico await notices
of initiation of an investigation and forward th em to their exporters, which are not barred from
participating in the investigation.
4.494 Furthermore, the third paragraph of the introduction to the questionnaire sent to Producers Rice
and Riceland. and to the US Embassy in Mexico shows that they were made aware, in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, that if the requisite information was not provided,
Economía would base its determination on facts ava ilable. The United States' claim is therefore
unfounded.
4.495 Besides, the questionnaires for the investigation can be obtained from Economía's website, so the
United States' contention that exporters had to go to the authority's offices in Mexico City is unfounded.
4.496 Mexico denies breaching Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement: it notified both the United States
authorities and the exporters known to Economía individually.
4.497 Mexico complied with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement in calculating the margins
of dumping on the basis of facts available.
4.498 Mexico has interpreted the AD Agreement as a w hole, taking account of the full text of every
material Article. The United States insists, citing the report of the Appellate Body in US – Wheat Gluten,
that an investigating authority must not remain "passive". In that case the Appellate Body was ruling on
the evaluation of factors to determin e the existence of material injury in an investigation concerning
safeguards, which is quite different from id entifying all exporters or producers in an anti-dumping
investigation. The argument is therefore without merit.
4.499 The United States' interpretations of the scope of rights of due process in fact go further even than
the provisions of Article 6 of the AD Agreement, which is unacceptable.
4.500 The United States contends that the investigating authority acted inconsistently with paragraph 7
of Annex II of the AD Agreement. Whether or not Producers Rice cooperated bears no relation to the
fact that the investigating authority calculated its margin of dumping on the basis of facts available, since
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement allows it to do so. The investigating authority applied not paragraph 7
but paragraph 1 of Annex II. The United States' allegation is therefore devoid of merit.

2. Complaints relating to the Foreign Trade Act and article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil
Procedure
4.501 The United States' arguments concerning the alleged inconsistency, as such, of the Foreign Trade
Act with the WTO Agreements are based on a single premise: the supposedly mandatory nature of the
articles of the Foreign Trade Act at issue. This means, contrario sensu, that if the articles at issue are not
mandatory – as Mexico has already demonstrated – then neither are they inconsistent with the
WTO Agreements.
4.502 Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account Article 2 of the Foreign Trade Act and the fact
that the Act must be considered as a whole and not
 in isolation when determining whether or not its
provisions are inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.
4.503 The United States has failed to prove that Mexican legislation is inconsistent with WTO rules. In
other words, it has not made a prima facie case of breach of those rules by Mexico. Accordingly, the
Foreign Trade Act must be deemed consistent with the WTO Agreements.
4.504 As to the allegations concerning Article 53 of the Foreign Trade Act , the time-limit set in
Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement applies only to foreign
producers and/or exporters that were sent the questionnaire, i.e. known producers or exporters. In this
respect the Foreign Trade Act allows a longer period (38 days) than the Agreements, thus affording more
opportunity for defence.
4.505 With regard to Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act, it is consistent with the AD Agreement and
the SCM Agreement, because if an interested party does not appear in the investigation and had no
exports during the POI, then that exporter will not provide the requisite information on normal value and
export price, and in that case the investigating authority may calculate its margin of dumping on the basis
of facts available.
4.506 The United States further contends that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement because it requires Mexico to apply a margin based on facts available to
firms that should have received an "all others" margin. Clearly, Article 9.4 should apply only where the
investigating authority has limited its examination to a reasonable number of interested parties in
accordance with Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement, which Economía did not do.
4.507 The United States submits that under Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act, the investigating
authority is required to apply the highest margin of dumping to firms with no shipments and that where
such firms are "deemed to have been investigated" they are "subject to anti-dumping duties" and are
therefore not eligible for new shipper review.
4.508 That interpretation contradicts even the United States' own practice. Were one to accept its
assertion, an "all others" margin calculated in accordance with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement would
likewise prevent firms with no shipments from applying for a new shipper review. Mexico repeats that
Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act is not a bar to applying for a new shipper review. In fact, at the
request of a United States exporter and after the re vision of the Foreign Trade Act had taken effect,
Mexico initiated a new shipper review, as can be seen from Exhibit MEX-12, submitted by Mexico as
evidence.
4.509 With regard as to Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act , the United States alleges that it is
inconsistent with the WTO Agreements, citing Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.9 of the
SCM Agreement. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement does not require firms that are not dumping to be
excluded from the measure. There are thus no grounds for alleging that some firms must not be subjected
to the measure and are hence exempt from subsequent review.

4.510 As to the representative volumes required by Ar ticle 68 of the Foreign Trade Act, Mexico
maintains that representative export volumes are not a requirement for initiation of a review.
4.511 Furthermore, nowhere does the resolution cite d by the United States mention representative
import volumes as a requirement for initiation of the review. Nor does it contain any evidence that the
application for review was rejected because it did not fulfil the representativeness requirement. It was
rejected in the case of some of the applicant firms for other reasons, which are detailed in paragraph 95 of
the resolution.
4.512 The United States maintains its argument that Article 89D applies only to foreign producers and
not to exporters, and that producers are required to demonstrate that their exports were representative.
4.513 As to the first of those assertions, Article 47 of the Foreign Trade Act Regulations expressly
provides that "for trading companies, the buying cost shall be taken as the cost of production ... ", which
includes exporters.
4.514 As to the second assertion, Mexico stresses that representativeness is a requirement not for
initiating a new shipper review but for determining an individual margin of dumping or subsidy. Thus,
although Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement do not expressly so
provide, it is natural and logical to demand of a new exporter that it make shipments in order for the latter
to be reviewed. The United States' interpretation perhaps derives from the f act that the United States
proposed making representativeness a requirement fo r initiation of a new shipper review in the
Negotiating Group on Rules
37 at its meeting of 12 and 13 July 2004.
4.515 With regard to the United States argument concerning the hierarchy of laws in the Mexican legal
system, Mexico points out that this subject is not among the issues covered by the Panel's terms of
reference. Only Mexican courts have the authority to interpret the manner in which Mexico's local laws
interact. Mexico accordingly deems that the United States' assertions must be dismissed.
4.516 The United States has failed to show that Article 89D of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent
with the WTO provisions. Mexico, on the other ha nd, has conducted new shipper reviews for foreign
producers and for exporters on the basis of Article 47 of the Foreign Trade Act Regulations, as shown in
Exhibit MEX-12.
4.517 The United States further asserts that Article 93.V of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with
the WTO Agreements because it requires
 the investigating authority to apply the fines established therein.
 Mexico reiterates that account must be taken of Article 2 of the Foreign Trade Act, which stipulates that
the Foreign Trade Act must be applied in a manner c onsistent with the international treaties to which
Mexico is a party.
4.518 As is plain from Article 93.V, Economía has discretion to determine whether or not the fines must
be applied. Further proof of this is that although this article has been in force since 1993, its provisions
have never been applied to any Member of the WTO.
4.519 In response to the United States' claim that Article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure
(FCCP) is inconsistent as such with the WTO Agreements, Mexico wishes to point out that US-20 – to
which the United States alludes in its reply – does not refer to Article 366 of the FCCP. As already stated,
Article 366 of the FCCP does not apply to the subject-matter or the procedures governed by the
Foreign Trade Act. Mexico maintains that the United States fails to make a prima facie case and that its
claim must be dismissed.

37 New Shipper Reviews (ADA Article 9.5), informal paper JOB(04)/60 circulated on 25 May 2004/Formal
document TN/RL/GEN/1 – TN/RL/W/156/Rev.1 circulated on 14 July 2004.

4.520 The United States asserts that Mexico failed to respond to the allegation that Articles 68 and 97
of the Foreign Trade Act offend against Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement. Mexico's arguments on the matter are to be found in paragraphs 300 to 303 of its first
submission. By waiting for the duties to be binding in order to carry out a review of them, Mexico is
securing and safeguarding the interests of the parties, sparing them any possible injury.
4.521 As to the allegation that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act are inconsistent with
Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement, Mexico maintain s what it said in paragraph 304 of its first written
submission, in which it already established that the investigating authority will return any duties paid in
excess upon conclusion of the relevant procedure. In no instance does Mexico breach the provisions of
the AD Agreement.
4.522 As to the allegation that Article 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act are inconsistent with
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, the United States lacks any
basis for its claim since no provision of the Foreign Trade Act precludes or prohibits the holding of a new
shipper review. Furthermore, the WTO Agreements require new shipper reviews, once initiated, to be
carried out promptly, according to the AD Ag reement and expeditiously, according to the
SCM Agreement, but do not require a review to be initiated
 as soon as it is applied for.
4.523 Mexico wishes to point out to the Panel that the United States' allegation that Articles 68 and 97
of the Foreign Trade Act constitute a quantitative restriction to trade is quite mistaken, since never has
there been any restriction, either de jure or de facto, on the normal conduct of the commercial transactions
of Sun Land Beef Company, Inc. or any other foreign company.

V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES38
5.1 The arguments of the third parties are set forth in their written and oral submissions to the Panel,
which are summarized below. The third parties' written answers to questions posed by the Panel are set
forth in the Annexes to this report (see list of annexes at page xi).39
A. THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CHINA
5.2 In its third party written submission, China made the following arguments:
1. Issue 1: The closeness of the Period of Investigation to the Date of Initiation
5.3 In the alleged anti-dumping investigation, Mexico’s investigating authorities established a period
of investigation (“POI”) the ending of which was fifteen months earlier than the initiation of the
investigation.
5.4 Although the AD Agreement itself does not establish any specific guidelines for determining an
appropriate POI, the Anti-Dumping Committee has i ssued a recommendation to the effect that, as a
general rule, POI shall be “ending as close to the da te of initiation as is practicable”. China does not
consider that the time lag of fifteen months between the ending of POI and the date of initiation is in
compliance with the spirit and substance of the recommendation of the Anti-Dumping Committee.
5.5 China believes that the evaluation of the closeness of the POI to the date of initiation should be
considered in the context of its purpose and function under the AD Agreement.

38 All the footnotes in sections V:A - V:F are original footnotes of the third parties.
39 The Panel posed questions only to the European Communities. No other third party responded or
commented on the questions.

5.6 The closeness of the POI is important for the investigation and the determination of the existence
of injury and dumping margin. The data collected in a remote, non-proximate POI cannot prove that the
dumped imports continue to exist at the present time, and that the level of such dumped imports “causes
or threatens to cause material injury” to a domestic industry in the importing country. In order to ensure a
fair and equitable investigation, the data collect ed within the POI shall meet the requirement of
“objectivity” and “positive evidence”, as such terms are defined in Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
China agrees with the United States’ assertion that the discretion of the investigating authorities to set the
POI “is not boundless”. As a general rule, the investigating authorities shall select the POI that is as close
to the date of initiation of the investigation as practicable.
2. Issue 2: The seasonality of the Period of Investigation
5.7 The United States alleges that Mexico’s investigating authorities examined only the March to
August time period in each year of the POI for injury analysis. Such six-month period reflected the main
import activity of the product under investigation when domestic production is at a seasonal low.
Mexico’s investigating authorities did not investigate the data in the September to February time period
when domestic production is at a seasonal high and the import of the product under investigation is,
conversely, relatively low. For the purpose of injury analysis, Mexico’s investigating authorities did not
compare the data of the seasonal high period with those of the seasonal low period. Instead, it only
compared the data of the same season, on a year-to-year basis.
5.8 China takes no position as to whether or not the methodology adopted by Mexico in this dispute,
which is to examine only an annual portion/season of the POI, as being inconsistent with its WTO
obligations. Instead, China deems it appropriate to highlight the issue of the seasonal characteristic that is
implicit in the POI stipulated for this investigation.
5.9 China believes that the investigating authorities have the discretion to consider seasonality when
establishing the POI of a specific investigation. The Anti-Dumping Committee in its recommendation,
did recognize the discretion of investigating authorities to “take account of the particular circumstances of
a given investigation, to ensure that periods of data collection are appropriate in each case”. Moreover,
the Anti-Dumping Committee further recommended that “in establishing the specific periods of data
collection in a particular investigation, investig ating authorities may, if possible, consider the
characteristics of the product in question, including seasonality and cyclicality
” (emphasis added).
5.10 China also believes that the examination of a domestic industry by the investigating authorities
from a seasonal perspective shall be conducted in an “objective” manner as required by Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement. The requirements of objectivity means that, where investigating authorities undertake an
examination of a domestic industry in one season, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, the
same industry in all other seasons, as well as examine the industry for the whole year. Or, in the
alternative, the investigating authorities should provi de a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not
necessary to examine certain seasons that have been excluded from examination.
3. Issue 3: Investigating authorities’ obligations as to evidence collection
5.11 The United States alleged in the first written submission, that Mexico’s “failure to investigate or
attempt to gather data from readily available sources” breached Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement
because Mexico failed to “identify exporters and importers other than the handful of those mentioned in
the petition”; failed to “send its anti-dumping questionnaire to exporters and importers other than the few
designated as such in the petition, or to purchasers”; failed to “consult the customs declarations”; and
failed to “seek to obtain accurate import volume information from importers”.
5.12 The United States interpreted that the requirements of “objectivity” and “positive evidence” make
it obligatory for the investigating authorities to “actively seek out information pertinent to” the
investigation, and to “investigate or attempt to ga ther data from readily available sources”. In other

words, the United States asserts that the investigating authorities are obligated to actively collect evidence
in order to fulfil the requirements of “objectivity” and “positive evidence”. China offers a different
interpretation than that of the United States with regard to the approach in order to meet the standard of
“objectivity” and “positive evidence” as set forth in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
5.13 China believes that the obligations of the inv estigating authorities with regard to evidence
collection are to give notice of information require d to all interested parties and to provide ample
opportunity to present in writing all evidence, rather than to actively collect evidence as asserted by the
United States. Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement clear ly described the obligations of the investigating
authorities as the following: “[a]ll interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice
of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence
which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.”
5.14 The scope of the obligations of the investigating authorities as to the verification of the accuracy
of the information provided by interested parties as defined in Article 6.6. of the AD Agreement is to
“satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information … upon which their findings are based.”
5.15 The requirement that the investigating authorities shall “satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of
the information provided by interested parties” was clearly described by the panel in US – DRAMS. The
panel here stated that if the investigating aut horities are obligated to ac tively seek evidence from all
sources available, it is also likely that “anti-dumping investigations would, as a consequence, become
totally unmanageable”. China concurs with the panel’s findings.
5.16 Only when the investigating authorities have to operate under “best information available” as
described in Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement that the obligations to verify the accuracy of
the information through independent sources arise “where practicable”.
5.17 In sum, China does not find in the AD Agreement a solid legal basis to support the assertion of
the United States that investigating authorities are obligated to actively seek evidence through
independent sources except under very specific circumstances.
4. Issue 4: Known exporters
5.18 The United States alleged in this dispute, that Mexico’s investigating authorities “improperly sent
its anti-dumping questionnaire to only two companies that were listed in the petition” and “made no effort
to identify exporters and importers other than the handful of those mentioned in the petition”. The
allegation raises the issue of the obligations of investigating authorities with respect to “known” exporters
for the United States has asserted that Articles 5 and 6 of the AD Agreement “require an investigating
authority to actively determine the universe of potential respondents
” and to “actively seek to identify
individual exporters and producers”. China does not agree with such assertion and interpretation.
5.19 China believes that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement expressly places the burden of identifying
“known” exporters on the petitioners by stating that a petition shall include “the identity of each known
exporter or foreign producer” of the product in question. In Article 6.1.3, the use of the definite article
“the” before “known exporters” shows that the phrase “known exporters” has been used in the previous
text of the AD Agreement. Given that both Article 5.2 and Article 6.1.3 use the same wording “known
exporter”, the “known exporters” under Article 6.1.3 refer to “each known exporter” under Article 5.2.
Therefore, the AD Agreement suggests that investig ating authorities shall rely on the petitioners to
identify “known” exporters in their petition(s).
5.20 China would submit that at the outset of the investigation, the investigating authorities shall rely
on the information in the petition to identify “known” exporters. The authorities are obligated to check
the “accuracy and adequacy” of such information and if the authorities believe that such information is
not accurate or adequate, it shall give reasonable time to the petitioners to provide further information or

satisfactory explanation. There is no legal basis in the AD Agreement for th e interpretation that the
investigating authorities are obligated to actively seek to identify “known” exporters by themselves from
available sources.
5. Issue 5: Exporters that had no export during the POI
5.21 The United States alleged that Mexico’ investigating authorities improperly calculated dumping
margin on the basis of adverse facts available for an exporter that had made no export sale during the POI
but that had fully cooperated with the investigating authorities in the investigation. The United States
asserts that a neutral “all other rate” shall be applied to such exporter because its full cooperation left no
warrant to apply adverse facts available that are stri ctly confined in Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
Furthermore, the United States stated that such exporter shall be entitled to the “new shipper” review as
provided in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement. China believes that the United States’ interpretation that an
exporter that made no export sales during the POI s hould have certain dumping margin applied to it
(whether this is the neutral “all other rate”, or the dumping margin based upon facts available) is in error.
5.22 China would base its position on the following: firstly
, an exporter that made no export sales
during the POI shall not be considered as having been dumping the products under investigation because
no dumping margin can be calculated for such exporter due to the non-existence of an applicable export
price. Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement provides that “a product is to be considered as being dumped, if
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in
the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country”
(emphasis added). An exporter that made no export sales during the POI had no export price that can be
used to compare with the normal value to calcu late dumping margin, therefore, the product under
investigation of such exporter cannot “be considered as being dumped”.
5.23 Secondly, Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement expressly requires that “no anti-dumping duties shall
be levied on imports from such exporters or pr oducers” “who have not exported the product to the
importing Member during the period of investigation”.
5.24 China believes that it is erroneous to impose any dumping margin on an exporter that made no
export sales during the POI, whether this be the neutral “all other rate” or that based upon facts available.
B. THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.25 In its third party written submission, the EC made the following arguments:
1. Stale period of investigation
5.26 Although the AD Agreement contains no express rule in the text concerning the selection of the
period of investigation, an investigating authority’s discretion in that respect is not boundless. Having
regard to the context and purpose of the relevant provisions, particularly the use of the present tense, there
is a limit on how long the period between the end of the period of investigation and the initiation of the
original investigation can be. An excessive gap would not be representative and would not be consistent
with the obligation contained in Article 3.1 AD Agreement to conduct an objective examination based on
positive evidence.
2. Use of March to August 1997, 1998 and 1999 for injury analysis
5.27 Article 3.1 AD Agreement begins with the words “A determination of injury …” (singular).
From the wording of this provision it is clear that the AD Agreement requires an investigating authority to
make one injury determination. An investig ating authority cannot, without further reasonable
explanation, make several discrete injury determina tions relating, for example, to different companies
forming part of the domestic industry, or relating to different time periods. Mexico defined the period at

issue in its
anti-dumping investigation as beginning on 1 March 1997 and ending on 30 August 1999. Thus, of its
own accord, Mexico clearly identified that period as the relevant period for making its (one) injury
determination. Having defined the period as it did, Mexico was bound to treat that period consistently
thereafter in accordance with that definition. Thus , it follows, with respect to Article 3, including
Articles 3.1 and 3.5, that Mexico had to make “a determination of injury” for that period – and not for the
various segments of that period selected by Mexico. There is nothing in the AD Agreement that provides
for an investigating authority to make more than one injury determination; to the contrary, all references
to the making of an injury determination are references to a determination of injury. Having defined the
period at issue as it did, Mexico could not subsequently take the position that some segments of that
period were no longer relevant for the purposes of comparison or assessment. Mexico was not permitted
to see the temporal characteristics of its injury investigation in one way for one purpose, and in another
way for another. Mexico had become bound by its own logic.
3. Injury analysis including non-dumped imports
5.28 Even where the AD Agreement does not require any particular methodology for the determination
of injury, the analysis conducted by an investigating authority must be objective and based on positive
evidence. Imports from companies found not to have dumped cannot be included in the evaluation of
volume, price effects and the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.
4. De minimis dumping margin
5.29 The wording of Article 5.8 AD Agreement contemplates the termination of the “investigation” in
respect of the exporting country as a whole, not with respect to individual exporters. This interpretation is
in line with the first sentence of Article 5.8 AD Agreement which requires that a complaint be rejected
and the investigation be terminated promptly in case of lack of sufficient evidence to proceed with the
case. Where the investigating authority determines a de minimis dumping margin for a specific exporter,
Article 5.8 AD Agreement requires that no duty be imposed and collected from that exporter. It does not
require the termination of the entire investigation (provided that the country-wide margin is above
de minimis). In the opinion of the European Communities, both the method used by Mexico and the
method suggested by the United States constitute permissible interpretations of the AD Agreement.
5. All others rate, facts available
(a) Irrelevance of Articles 9.4 and 10.6 of the AD Agreement
5.30 The provisions of Articles 6.10 (other than the first sentence) and 9.4 AD Agreement relate to the
situation in which exporters are known and samp ling techniques are used. Absent sampling, these
provisions are irrelevant for the determination of an anti-dumping duty.
(b) An all others rate is permissible for unknown exporters
5.31 The AD Agreement does not contain any specific rule concerning the rate or amount of duty to be
imposed on unknown exporters in the investigated country. An “all others” rate may be imposed on such
exporters - a residual country specific rate. Article 6.10 AD Agreement, first sentence, refers to “known”
exporters, and in any event contains the words “as a rule”. Contextual support for such an interpretation
may also be found in Article 2.1 AD Agreement, which defines dumping, and which refers to the product
exported from “one country to another”. Article 9.2 AD Agreement refers to the imposition of duties on
imports “from all sources”, and permits the authorities to name the supplying country if it is impractical to
name the suppliers, as it would be if they are unknown. Furthermore, Article 9.3 AD Agreement contains
rules concerning refunds. If an exporter did not appear during the original investigation, there is nothing
on the face of Article 9.3 that would prevent such exporter from requesting a periodic review or a refund

pursuant to those provisions. In any event, there being no dispute between the parties on this point, there
is no need for the Panel to make any findings in this respect.
5.32 Unknown exporters, like known exporters, are interested parties within the meaning of Article 6.8
AD Agreement. If unknown exporters do not provide necessary information within a reasonable period,
then, as in the case of known exporters, determinations may be made on the basis of the facts available.
Unknown exporters choose, following the notice of in itiation, not to appear and not to complete a
questionnaire response. It necessarily follows that th e “all others” rate may lawfully be based on the
highest rate found in respect of a known exporter, whether or not on the basis of the facts available.
(c) Meaning of known and unknown exporters
5.33 Absent any contrary indication in the written record, the European Communities considers that
exporters mentioned in the complaint or which respond to the notice of initiation may be considered to be
known. That is a reasonable basis on which to proceed, which corresponds to a permissible interpretation
of the AD Agreement. An investigating authority is not required by the AD Agreement to make further
unilateral and autonomous enquiry.
(d) Application of an all others rate to unknown producers
5.34 The same analysis, mutatis mutandis, in respect of unknown (non-exporting) producers in the
investigated country, would also be based on a pe rmissible interpretation of the AD Agreement.
Article 9.5 AD Agreement contains special rules in r espect of so-called “newcomer” or “new shipper”
reviews.
(e) Application of an all others rate to known producers
5.35 The AD Agreement also does not contain any specific rule concerning the rate or amount of duty
to be imposed on (non-exporting) producers who are known. Producers Rice was a known producer
which did not export during the investigation period. The imposition on Producers Rice of an “all others”
rate based on the facts available was consistent with the AD Agreement, for all the reasons set out above.
As explained above Articles 6.10 (other than the first sentence) and 9.4 AD Agreement relate to sampling
and are irrelevant for this specific case. Producers Rice was not excluded from a sample. It simply had
no exports. The absence of an export price precl udes the calculation of a company specific dumping
margin, but does not preclude the application of an “all others” rate. Article 9.5 AD Agreement contains
special rules in respect of so-called “newcomer” or “new shipper” reviews in order to address the situation
in which a producer without any exports and thus s ubject to the all others rate does have exports
subsequent to the period of investigation. In all the circumstances, the imposition on Producers Rice of
the same “all others” rate as that applicable to other unknown exporters and known producers, as the case
may be based on the facts available, was a reasonable basis on which to proceed.
6. As such
5.36 Further to the Report of the Appellate Body in US–Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, it is
unnecessary for a measure to be “mandatory” as opposed to “discretionary” in order for such measure to
be reviewed by a Panel for consistency with the AD Agreement.
C. T
HIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF TURKEY
5.37 In its third party written submission, Turkey made the following arguments:

1. Selection of an investigation period that ended more than fifteen months prior to the date of
initiation of the investigation
5.38 The United States submits that Mexico acted inconsistently with Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 and
Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by selecting a period for its dumping investigation
that ended more than fifteen months prior to the date of initiation of the investigation. The United States,
further contends that, those periods were so remo te in time that the information collected by the
investigating authority was incapable of providing a basis for an objective finding of dumping, injury and
causation or a determination based on positive evidence.
5.39 Turkey submits that although the AD Agreemen t does not establish any specific period of
investigation, the wording of both the AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994 leads authorities to
investigate the presence of dumping, injury and causation at the most recent time period. Thus,
authorities should not be allowed to initiate a dumpi ng investigation and examine any time period that
they believe dumping was exercised for the sake of imposing anti-dumping duties.
5.40 In this respect, Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 states that dumping is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry. The paragraph continues by the definition of dumping which is also in present tense. Likewise,
Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 states that a contrac ting party may levy on any dumped product an
anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping to offset or prevent dumping. The
other paragraphs of Article VI of GATT 1994 also follow the same trend and presents remedies for
situations that took place in the near past.
5.41 Furthermore, Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement lists the relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry that should be examined. Here one can easily notice that the
required examination should be done as to the actual and potential position of the listed factors. Also in
Article 3.5 it is clearly stated that the authorities should demonstrate that dumped imports are causing
injury to the domestic industry.
5.42 In this respect, in light of the above cited clear obligations to examine actual and potential
positions rather than past experiences, Turkey believes that even if the AD Agreement does not establish a
certain time period, an unbiased and objective authority would not establish dumping margin on the basis
of the past information that is not valid anymore.
5.43 In Turkey’s view, the period of data collection for dumping investigations should end as close to
the date of initiation as is practicable. This is also important for purposes of predictability and
transparency of the investigations and credibility of the authority’s actions.
2. Limitation of inquiry
5.44 The United States submits that Mexico’s decision to allow the petitioners to set the POI for its
dumping analysis as March-August 1999 and its subsequent decision to focus on only March to August of
1997, 1998 and 1999 for its injury analysis resulted in breaches of Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5 and 6.2 of the
AD Agreement. The United States further contends that Economía’s investigation of injury was not based
on positive evidence for simple reason that it failed even to examine the evidence pertaining to half of the
period of injury analysis. United States continued that Economía by taking this approach, made it more
likely to determine that the domestic industry was injured.”
5.45 In accordance with Article 17 of the AD Agreement, the panels are entitled to determine whether
the authorities’ establishment of the facts was prope r and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. In this respect, the Panel ma y consider here if selection of those particular
periods resulted in a solution different from what it would be if the whole one-year period were taken, in
other words what an objective and unbiased authority would do in any given investigation. In addition,

Turkey believes that seasonality is an important aspect of this investigation. The Panel may also focus on
the seasonality of the subject product and its conformity with the practice of limiting the inquiry to certain
parts of the year.
5.46 Turkey being a third party is not in a position to comment on if the results would be different if
the whole one-year period was evaluated. Yet, what Turkey would like to emphasize is that in any such
case if the authority is deviating from its normal practice it should provide the reasons for such deviation
and invite the interested parties to submit rebuttal arguments if they would consider such practice not
appropriate.
5.47 Turkey reckons that such arbitrary implementations should not be allowed as they would certainly
place question marks as regards the objectivity of the authority and the outcomes of the investigation. In
other words, authorities should not be allowed to manipulate the investigations as necessary.
3. Application of “adverse facts available” to certain companies
5.48 The United States considers that Economía’s application of an adverse “facts available” dumping
margin to Producers Rice and to US producers and exporters that it did not examine is inconsistent with
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 12.1 and 12.2 of the
AD Agreement and paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement. The United States
continues that an investigating authority is not permitted to examine individually just a few exporters and
then assign an adverse facts available based margin to everyone else.
5.49 As regards the use of facts available, Article 6.8 clearly identifies the circumstances under which
an investigating authority may resort to the “facts available”. In accordance with this Article, only if an
interested party “refuses access to” necessary information within a reasonable period, “otherwise does not
provide” necessary information within a reasonable period, or “significantly impedes the investigation”,
the investigating authority may make determinations on the basis of the facts available.
5.50 Thus, the investigating authorities shall avoid the arbitrary implementation of “facts available”
and for those companies who were not individually examined for reasons other than listed in Article 6.8
and the authority shall not calculate a margin based on facts available.
5.51 However, under certain circumstances the case may not be so straightforward. Assume a case
where the investigating authority has acted to the best of its ability in reaching all the interested parties,
that is to say he sent questionnaires to all the known exporters/producers, published a notice of initiation
and notified the government of the exporting Me mber and requested assistance to reach unknown
exporters/producers in the exporting Member. Some may here still argue that the authority did not notify
all interested parties individually and those parties should not receive facts available based margins.
5.52 Assume that in the above scenario only one exporter/producer cooperated with the authority and
responded to the questionnaire while all the other exporter/producers avoided cooperation. The only
cooperating company received de minimis dumping margin. Here, would it be still rational to argue that
those non-cooperating companies should receive the margin of the cooperating company or a neutral “all
others rate” but not a dumping margin based on facts available?
5.53 In Turkey’s view, application of facts available should be considered on a case by case basis. In
any case the investigating authorities and interested parties should fulfil their respective requirements and
bear the results of their relevant actions.
5.54 As regards the treatment of “new shippers”, th e only Article that is relevant with potential
exporters of the product concerned in the AD Agreement is Article 9.5. The purpose of this Article is to
eliminate the unfairness of punishing the newcomers with the residual duty of the original investigation
for reasons beyond their control. The Article clearly states that to request a review those exporters or

producers must show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting
country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product. This provision clarifies that the
original investigation has already finished and the duties are in place, thus it does not recognize that new
shippers can request an individual treatment during the investigation. Then the same Article continues
that the review for those companies should be initiated and carried out on an accelerated basis and no anti-
dumping duties shall be levied on imports of such exporters or producers while the review is being carried
out. That is to say, regardless of the duty placed on the company they will not be subjected to that in the
course of the investigation but may only be required to place guarantees or to withhold appraisement. In
this respect, investigating authorities are not required by the AD Agreement to carry out individual
investigations for those companies who did not export during the investigation period.
5.55 The United States further alleges that Economía failed to disclose to the exporters the export price
information, which established the basis for the de termination of the adverse facts available dumping
margin. This information involved pedimento information obtained by the CMA from the Mexican
Secretariat of Treasury. According to the United States, Economía did not include this information and
the relevant documents in the public file of the investigation. Thus, the United States asserts that
Economía, having acted as such, breached Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement.
5.56 Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement states that all interested parties shall have the right to defend
their interests in the course of the investigation. Article 6.4 requires the authorities to provide “timely
opportunities for all interested parties to see all inform ation that is relevant to the presentation of their
cases, that is not confidential (…), and that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation,
(…)”.
5.57 In view of the above requirements, Turkey believes that the authorities shall provide all interested
parties access to non-confidential information that is relevant for the parties in making their cases so that
the interested parties can use the opportunity to defend their rights, as stipulated under Article 6.2. The
authorities’ acting so will also render the investigation process more transparent and benefit all interested
parties.
4. Consistency of domestic legislation
5.58 The United States alleges that various provisions of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act and its FCCP are
inconsistent with Mexico’s WTO obligations. The United States contends that particularly the provisions
regarding time limit for responding questionnaires, fact s available, reviews, new shipper reviews and
application of fines are inconsistent with Articles 5.8, 6.1.1, 9.3, 9.5, 11.2, 12.1.1 and 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and Articles 11.9, 19.3, 21.2 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
5.59 Turkey submits that the Members being signatory to the Final Act of the Uruguay Round and the
Agreement Establishing the WTO, commit themselves to be abide by the rules and procedures of the
WTO Agreements. The presence of such commitmen t provides security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system. Members should avoid impairing or nullifying benefits accruing to other
Members by taking measures not allowed under the WTO Agreements.
5.60 In this respect, domestic Legislations of the Members designed to implement the
WTO Agreements shall be compatible with the requirements of the relevant Agreements. Otherwise, the
WTO Agreements and the multilateral system would prove unnecessary since Members might adopt
Legislations with completely different obligati ons. This would inevitably result in chaos and
unpredictability of the international environment.
5.61 As a matter of fact, Members are not precluded of having domestic Legislations. On the contrary,
the WTO Agreements put forward general principles of application and they do not generally describe the
procedures to be followed to act consistently with those principles. Thus, domestic Legislations are
especially important in those instances where they help to describe procedures and rules that should be

followed in order to be compatible with the Agr eements. However, the balance should be set. The
provisions of the domestic legislations should not create unnecessary burden for the respondents and they
should not contradict or annul the provisions of the WTO Agreements.
5. Conclusion
5.62 Turkey has serious concerns in WTO Members’ interpretation of the fulfilment of their
obligations under the AD Agreement.
5.63 To this end, Turkey believes that among others , it is very essential for sake of transparency,
fairness and appropriate functioning of this Agreement that the interested parties should not be deprived
of their rights as specified in detail in the Agreement, the authorities should abide by the provisions of the
Agreements in conducting an anti-dumping investigation in an unbiased and objective manner. Lastly,
Turkey believes that the domestic Legislation of Me mbers should be in compliance with the relevant
WTO Agreements to preserve the implementation sta ndards of measures in such areas as the area of
anti-dumping and subsidies.
D. T
HIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF CHINA
5.64 China, in its oral statement, made the following arguments:
1. Issue 1: The closeness of the Period of Investigation to the Date of Initiation
5.65 In the alleged anti-dumping investigation, Mexico’s investigating authorities established a period
of investigation (“POI”) the ending of which was fifteen months earlier than the initiation of the
investigation.
5.66 Although the AD Agreement itself does not establish any specific guidelines for determining an
appropriate POI, the Anti-Dumping Committee has i ssued a recommendation to the effect that, as a
general rule, POI shall be “ending as close to the da te of initiation as is practicable”. China does not
consider that the time lag of fifteen months between the ending of POI and the date of initiation is in
compliance with the spirit and substance of the recommendation of the Anti-Dumping Committee.
5.67 China believes that the evaluation of the closeness of the POI to the date of initiation should be
considered in the context of its purpose and function under the AD Agreement.
5.68 The closeness of the POI is important for the investigation and the determination of the existence
of injury and dumping margin. The data collected in a remote, non-proximate POI cannot prove that the
dumped imports continue to exist at the present time, and that the level of such dumped imports “causes
or threatens to cause material injury” to a domestic industry in the importing country. In order to ensure a
fair and equitable investigation, the data collect ed within the POI shall meet the requirement of
“objectivity” and “positive evidence”, as such terms are defined in Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
China agrees with the United States’ assertion that the discretion of the investigating authorities to set the
POI “is not boundless”. As a general rule, the investigating authorities shall select the POI that is as close
to the date of initiation of the investigation as practicable.
2. Issue 2: The seasonality of the Period of Investigation
5.69 The United States alleges that Mexico’s investigating authorities examined only the March to
August time period in each year of the POI for injury analysis. Such six-month period reflected the main
import activity of the product under investigation when domestic production is at a seasonal low.
Mexico’s investigating authorities did not investigate the data in the September to February time period
when domestic production is at a seasonal high and the import of the product under investigation is,
conversely, relatively low. For the purpose of injury analysis, Mexico’s investigating authorities did not

compare the data of the seasonal high period with those of the seasonal low period. Instead, it only
compared the data of the same season, on a year-to-year basis.
5.70 China takes no position as to whether or not the methodology adopted by Mexico in this dispute,
which is to examine only an annual portion/season of the POI, as being inconsistent with its WTO
obligations. Instead, China deems it appropriate to highlight the issue of the seasonal characteristic that is
implicit in the POI stipulated for this investigation.
5.71 China believes that the investigating authorities have the discretion to consider seasonality when
establishing the POI of a specific investigation. The Anti-Dumping Committee in its recommendation did
recognize the discretion of investigating authorities to “take account of the particular circumstances of a
given investigation, to ensure that periods of data collection are appropriate in each case”. Moreover, the
Anti-Dumping Committee further recommended that “in establishing the specific periods of data
collection in a particular investigation, investig ating authorities may, if possible, consider the
characteristics of the product in question, including seasonality and cyclicality
” (emphasis added).
5.72 China also believes that the examination of a domestic industry by the investigating authorities
from a seasonal perspective shall be conducted in an “objective” manner as required by Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement. The requirements of objectivity means that, where investigating authorities undertake an
examination of a domestic industry in one season, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, the
same industry in all other seasons, as well as examine the industry for the whole year. Or, in the
alternative, the investigating authorities should provi de a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not
necessary to examine certain seasons that have been excluded from examination.
3. Issue 3: Investigating authorities’ obligations as to evidence collection
5.73 The United States alleged in the first written submission, that Mexico’s “failure to investigate or
attempt to gather data from readily available sources” breached Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement
because Mexico failed to “identify exporters and importers other than the handful of those mentioned in
the petition”; failed to “send its anti-dumping questionnaire to exporters and importers other than the few
designated as such in the petition, or to purchasers”; failed to “consult the customs declarations”; and
failed to “seek to obtain accurate import volume information from importers”.
5.74 The United States interpreted that the requirements of “objectivity” and “positive evidence” make
it obligatory for the investigating authorities to “actively seek out information pertinent to” the
investigation, and to “investigate or attempt to ga ther data from readily available sources”. In other
words, the United States asserts that the investigating authorities are obligated to actively collect evidence
in order to fulfil the requirements of “objectivity” and “positive evidence”. China offers a different
interpretation than that of the United States with regard to the approach in order to meet the standard of
“objectivity” and “positive evidence” as set forth in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
5.75 China believes that the obligations of the inv estigating authorities with regard to evidence
collection are to give notice of information require d to all interested parties and to provide ample
opportunity to present in writing all evidence, rather than to actively collect evidence as asserted by the
United States. Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement clear ly described the obligations of the investigating
authorities as the following: “[a]ll interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice
of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence
which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.”
5.76 The scope of the obligations of the investigating authorities as to the verification of the accuracy
of the information provided by interested parties as defined in Article 6.6. of the AD Agreement is to
“satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information … upon which their findings are based.”

5.77 The requirement that the investigating authorities shall “satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of
the information provided by interested parties” was clearly described by the panel in US – DRAMS. The
panel here stated that if the investigating aut horities are obligated to ac tively seek evidence from all
sources available, it is also likely that “anti-dumping investigations would, as a consequence, become
totally unmanageable”. China concurs with the panel’s findings.
5.78 Only when the investigating authorities have to operate under “best information available” as
described in Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement that the obligations to verify the accuracy of
the information through independent sources arise “where practicable”.
5.79 In sum, China does not find in the AD Agreement a solid legal basis to support the assertion of
the United States that investigating authorities are obligated to actively seek evidence through
independent sources except under very specific circumstances.
4. Issue 4: Known exporters
5.80 The United States alleged in this dispute, that Mexico’s investigating authorities “improperly sent
its anti-dumping questionnaire to only two companies that were listed in the petition” and “made no effort
to identify exporters and importers other than the handful of those mentioned in the petition”. The
allegation raises the issue of the obligations of investigating authorities with respect to “known” exporters
for the United States has asserted that Articles 5 and 6 of the AD Agreement “require an investigating
authority to actively determine the universe of potential respondents
” and to “actively seek to identify
individual exporters and producers”. China does not agree with such assertion and interpretation.
5.81 China believes that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement expressly places the burden of identifying
“known” exporters on the petitioners by stating that a petition shall include “the identity of each known
exporter or foreign producer” of the product in question. In Article 6.1.3, the use of the definite article
“the” before “known exporters” shows that the phrase “known exporters” has been used in the previous
text of the AD Agreement. Given that both Article 5.2 and Article 6.1.3 use the same wording “known
exporter”, the “known exporters” under Article 6.1.3 refer to “each known exporter” under Article 5.2.
Therefore, the AD Agreement suggests that investig ating authorities shall rely on the petitioners to
identify “known” exporters in their petition(s).
5.82 China would submit that at the outset of the investigation, the investigating authorities shall rely
on the information in the petition to identify “known” exporters. The authorities are obligated to check
the “accuracy and adequacy” of such information and if the authorities believe that such information is
not accurate or adequate, it shall give reasonable time to the petitioners to provide further information or
satisfactory explanation. There is no legal basis in the AD Agreement for th e interpretation that the
investigating authorities are obligated to actively seek to identify “known” exporters by themselves from
available sources.
5. Issue 5: Exporters that had no export during the POI
5.83 The United States alleged that Mexico’ investigating authorities improperly calculated dumping
margin on the basis of adverse facts available for a exporter that had made no export sale during the POI
but that had fully cooperated with the investigating authorities in the investigation. The United States
asserts that a neutral “all other rate” shall be applied to such exporter because its full cooperation left no
warrant to apply adverse facts available that are stri ctly confined in Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
Furthermore, the United States stated that such exporter shall be entitled to the “new shipper” review as
provided in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement. China believes that the United States’ interpretation that an
exporter that made no export sales during the POI s hould have certain dumping margin applied to it
(whether this is the neutral “all other rate”, or the dumping margin based upon facts available) is in error.

5.84 China would base its position on the following: firstly
, an exporter that made no export sales
during the POI shall not be considered as having been dumping the products under investigation because
no dumping margin can be calculated for such exporter due to the non-existence of an applicable export
price. Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement provides that “a product is to be considered as being dumped, if
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in
the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country”
(emphasis added). An exporter that made no export sales during the POI had no export price that can be
used to compare with the normal value to calcu late dumping margin, therefore, the product under
investigation of such exporter cannot “be considered as being dumped”.
5.85 Secondly, Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement expressly requires that “no anti-dumping duties shall
be levied on imports from such exporters or pr oducers” “who have not exported the product to the
importing Member during the period of investigation”.
5.86 China believes that it is erroneous to impose any dumping margin on an exporter that made no
export sales during the POI, whether this be the neutral “all other rate” or that based upon facts available.
E. THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.87 EC, in its oral statement, made the following arguments:
1. Introduction
5.88 The European Communities makes this third pa rty oral submission because of its systemic
interest in the correct interpretation of the AD Agreement.
5.89 In this oral submission the European Communiti es, reacting to certain statements made by
Mexico in its first written submission and by the other third parties, will comment on the following points:
(a) the use by Mexico of a stale period of investigation, ending more than 15 months before
initiation of the investigation;
(b) the use by Mexico of three select segmented six month periods for its injury
determination;
(c) the application of an “all others” rate based on the facts available to unknown and known
exporters or producers; and
(d) Article 93V of the Mexican Foreign Trade Act.
2. Stale period of investigation
5.90 The European Communities would respectfully draw the Panel’s attention to what is essentially
consensus among the United States and all of the third parties: China; the European Communities; and
Turkey. All agree that the AD Agreement is silent on the period of time that may elapse between the end
of the investigation period and the initiation of the pr oceeding. There is no express rule in the text.
Despite this, all agree, remarkably, that it is not a permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement to
conclude that there is no limit to the period of time that may elapse. That proposition is based on context
and purpose, rather than text.
5.91 It is a proposition derived from the fact that numerous provisions of GATT 1994, Article VI and
the AD Agreement are in the present tense, or express a requirement of temporal proximity between the
regulated behaviour (dumping causing injury) and its consequences (the measures that may be adopted

under the AD Agreement); and from the numerous pr ovisions of the AD Agreement that require an
investigating authority to proceed in an objective manner, based on positive evidence.
5.92 The European Communities welcomes such an approach, it being one that validates in a balanced
manner all the relevant rules of interpretation, giving fair weight to the overall logic of the Agreement,
and the role of WTO dispute settlement. EC invites the Panel to embrace it.
3. Use of March to August 1997, 1998 and 1999 for injury analysis
5.93 On the question of the periods analysed for the purposes of the injury investigation, the
European Communities also draws the attention of the Panel to the substantial degree of consensus
between the United States and the third parties, both as to interpretative technique, and the conclusion to
be drawn on this point.
5.94 The European Communities considers that the Panel need not consider whether or not there may
be an issue of seasonality in this case, because that issue was not raised by or relied on by the
investigating authority.
5.95 Rather, the European Communities considers that the Panel may and should make findings based
on the general obligation of an investigating authority to adhere in its determinations to a coherent internal
logic. This also results from the various provisions of the AD Agreement which require an investigating
authority to proceed in an objective manner and base its findings on positive evidence. A determination
that is internally contradictory cannot be, in all respects, objective and based on positive evidence. Some
part of it must be non-objective and/or not based on positive evidence. The Appellate Body recently
reiterated this basic requirement in the EC–Bed Linen case. It applies to an injury determination with just
as much force as it applies to a dumping determination.
5.96 In this case, the Panel need do no more than find that Mexico determined it to be appropriate to
assess injury over the three year period 1997, 1998 and 1999; that in principle Mexico was thus bound by
its own logic to make its injury determinations on a consistent and objective basis in relation to that
period; and that Mexico departed from the logic it had itself established by ignoring certain events
relevant to injury assessment that took place during that three year period, without any explanation.
Mexico thus acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement.
5.97 On the question of seasonality, the European Communities would not rule out the possibility that
it may have a role to play when fixing the parameters of a single homogenous injury investigation period;
 or even that it should be taken into consideration within a period of injury investigation that extends over
more than one season. That would not mean, however, that an investigating authority would be free to
simply ignore certain events during the relevant period, without explanation.
5.98 For example, in determining whether or not the margin of dumping would be de minimis or the
volume of imports negligible for the purposes of Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement, it is highly doubtful
that an investigating authority could entirely ignore low season imports.
5.99 The same is true of the factors listed in Artic le 3.4 of the AD Agreement in relation to the
examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry, many of which by definition
have a temporal aspect, and the measurement of which could therefore be severely distorted if arbitrarily
restricted to certain sub-periods within the injury investigation period.
5.100 The same observation may be made in relation to the factors listed in Article 3.5 of the
AD Agreement, those being factors causing injury othe r than dumped imports. Events relevant to the
assessment of these factors cannot be simply ignored just because they happen to fall outside the
particular sub-period or sub-periods arbitrarily selected by the investigating authority.

5.101 These observations are confirmed if it is recalled that seasonality may affect all Members to a
greater or lesser extent. There may even be cases in which, in one season of the calendar year, Member A
exports to Member B, whilst in another season of the calendar year, Member B exports the same product
to Member A. In such a case, to look at only half the picture, could well result in a particularly distorted
view of the situation.
4. All others rate, facts available
5.102 The European Communities recalls that there is no dispute between the parties as to whether a
residual duty can be imposed on imports from unknow n exporters or known non-exporting producers.
Both parties agree that a residual duty can be imposed in both circumstances. Thus, contrary to what
China suggests in its third party submission
40, the Panel is not asked to make any findings on this
particular point. The parties disagree only on the question of how the residual duty should be established,
that is, on whether or not such a duty can be based on facts available. This is therefore the specific issue
on which the Panel is called upon to make findings in this case. The European Communities has pointed
out that nothing in the AD Agreement precludes the residual duty from being based on facts available. In
particular, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement is irrele vant to this question, being limited to the specific
circumstances in which sampling is used.
5. Fines imposed pursuant to Article 93V of the Foreign Trade Act
5.103 In so far as Article 93V of the Mexican Foreign Trade Act effectively requires the imposition of
fines for dumped or subsidised imports from WTO Members, the European Communities would support
the United States' claim that this is an impermissible specific action against dumping or subsidisation in
violation of Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. The
European Communities would also take this opportunity to recall that the United States has yet has to
bring its own legislation into conformity with th ese specific obligations of the AD Agreement and the
SCM Agreement by complying with the rulings in the US–1916 Act case and the US–Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment) case.
F. T
HIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF TURKEY
5.104 Turkey, in its oral statement, made the following arguments:
5.105 Turkey has not made submissions with respect to all matters raised before this Panel. However,
Turkey would like to remind that this should not be understood to imply that Turkey either agrees with or
objects to such interpretations of the Agreement by the parties to the dispute.
5.106 Turkey presents the four issues that it had raised in its written submission:
(a) Selection of an investigation period that ended more than fifteen months prior to the date
of initiation of the investigation;
(b) Limitation of inquiry to only certain months where imports were at their highest and
domestic production was lowest;
(c) Application of “adverse facts available” to certain companies;
(d) Consistency of domestic Legi slations with provisions of the AD Agreement and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and obligations of Members.

40 Third party written submission of China, paras. 32 to 35.

5.107 As for the first issue, that is, Economía’s selection of an investigation period that ended more than
fifteen months prior to the date of initiation of the investigation, Turkey acknowledges that the
AD Agreement does not establish any specific period of investigation. However, in Turkey's view, the
wording of both the Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994 leads the authorities to investigate the
presence of dumping, injury and causation in the most recent time period. It is Turkey's opinion that the
period of data collection for dumping investigations should end as close to the date of initiation as is
practicable to display fair results. This is also important for purposes of predictability and transparency of
the investigations and credibility of the authority’s actions.
5.108 As for the second issue on the limitation of inquiry to only certain months where imports were at
their highest and domestic production was lowest, Tu rkey would like to refer to Article 17 of the
Agreement. In accordance with the said Article, the panels are entitled to determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective. In this respect, the Panel may consider here if selection of those particular periods resulted
in a solution different from what it would be if the whole one-year period were taken, in other words what
an objective and unbiased authority would do in any given investigation. In addition, Turkey thinks that
seasonality is an important aspect of this investigation. The Panel may also focus on the seasonality of
the subject product and its conformity with the practice of limiting the inquiry to certain parts of the year.
5.109 Turkey would also like to emphasize that in case the authority is deviating from its normal
practice, it should provide the reasons for such deviation for purposes of transparency and predictability
and invite the interested parties to submit rebutta l arguments if they would consider such practice
inappropriate.
5.110 The third issue that Turkey would like to bring up is the application by Mexico of “adverse facts
available” to certain US producer/exporters. As regard s the use of facts available, Article 6.8 clearly
identifies the circumstances under which an investigating authority may resort to the “facts available”. In
accordance with this Article, only if an interested party “refuses access to” necessary information within a
reasonable period, or “otherwise does not provide” necessary information within a reasonable period, or
“significantly impedes the investigation”, the investigating authority may make determinations on the
basis of the facts available.
5.111 However, under certain circumstances the case may not be so straightforward. Assume a case
where the investigating authority has acted to the best of its ability in reaching all the interested parties,
that is to say it sent questionnaires to all the known exporters/producers, published a notice of initiation
and notified the government of the exporting Me mber and requested assistance to reach unknown
exporters/producers in the exporting Member.
5.112 Assume that in the above scenario only one exporter/producer cooperated with the authority and
responded to the questionnaire while all the other exporter/producers avoided cooperation. The only
cooperating company received de minimis dumping margin. Here, Turkey does not think that those
non-cooperating companies should receive the margin of the cooperating company or a neutral “all others
rate”. In such case, calculation of the dumping margin for the non-cooperating parties should be based on
facts available.
5.113 In Turkey's view, application of facts available should be considered on a case by case basis. In
any case the investigating authorities and interested parties should fulfil their respective requirements and
bear the results of their relevant actions.
5.114 As regards the treatment of “new shippers”, th e only Article that is relevant with potential
exporters of the product concerned in the Agreement is Article 9.5. The purpose of this Article is to
eliminate the unfairness of punishing the newcomers with the residual duty of the original investigation
for reasons beyond their control. The Article clearly states that to request a review those exporters or
producers must show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting

country which are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product. This provision clarifies that the
original investigation has already finished and the duties are in place, thus it does not recognize that new
shippers can request an individual treatment during the investigation. Then the same Article continues
that the review for those companies should be initiated and carried out on an accelerated basis and no anti-
dumping duties shall be levied on imports of such exporters or producers while the review is being carried
out. That is to say, regardless of the duty placed on the company they will not be subjected to that in the
course of the investigation but may only be required to place guarantees or to withhold appraisement. In
this respect, investigating authorities are not required by the Agreement to carry out individual
investigations for those companies who did not export during the investigation period.
5.115 The last issue Turkey would like to raise is th e consistency of domestic Legislations with the
WTO Agreements and the WTO obligations of the Members. Turkey would like to remind that its written
submission on this issue had been made before Turkey had the opportunity to examine Mexico’s
submission. Therefore, concerning this last issue, Turkey's submission did not include the views and
approach that it would like to present after having examined Mexico’s submission as well.
5.116 In this case, the United States refers to some provisions of the Mexican Foreign Trade Act that it
considers to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement. However, Mexico stated
in its submission that the challenged Legislation entered into force several months after the termination of
the investigation on imports of long-grain white rice originating in the United States. In other words, the
reformed legislation subject to challenge by the United States was not in force during the time when the
investigation was ongoing. Thus, Turkey believes that, even though the Mexican Foreign Trade Act
involves some provisions allegedly inconsistent with the aforementioned Agreements, these were
introduced after the termination of the subject investigation and should therefore be excluded from the
scope of this panel and examined independently from this proceeding.
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 On 11 March 2005, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 29 March 2005, the
United States and Mexico requested the Panel to review precise aspects of the Interim Report, in
accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU. Mexico also requested the Panel to hold a further meeting with
the parties pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU and paragraph 8 of the Panel's Working Procedures. The
meeting was held on 25 April 2005.
6.2 We have briefly outlined our treatment of the parties' requests below. Where necessary, we have
also made certain technical revisions to our Report.
A. C
OMMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES
6.3 In its comments on the Interim Report, the United States requests the Panel to make a number of
technical and typographical corrections. Where appropriate, we made such corrections to our Report.
6.4 The United States requests the Panel to amend paragraph 7.62 of the Report relating to the
Recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices in order to reflect that this
Recommendation supports the interpretation of the Panel rather than providing "useful context" for the
correct interpretation of the obligations. According to the United States, the Recommendation cannot be
considered as "context" in the very particular sen se in which that word has meaning under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and this term should, therefore, be avoided. In its comment on the
request of the United States, Mexico stated that the Recommendation is not binding and does not create
new obligations for WTO Members. We note that the United States pointed out that this is also the reason
why it would prefer to avoid the use of the term "cont ext" in this paragraph. In order to avoid any
misunderstanding, we amended our Report to state that this Recommendation provides "useful support"
for our interpretation.

6.5 With respect to paragraph 7.223 of our Report, the United States requests the Panel to amend the
Report to make sure that it is clear that the Panel findings address the consistency of Article 53 of the Act
with both Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement. We accept the
request of the United States and have amended our Report accordingly.
6.6 The United States requests the Panel to reconsider its position set out in paragraph 7.299 that the
United States failed to provide sufficient evidence that Article 97 of the Act deals with the expedited
reviews that are provided for in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
According to the United States, under Article 97 of the Act, only determinations issued at the end of a
judicial proceeding can be considered "final". Since Article 89D of the Act only permits an exporter to
request a review if the good in question is subject to a final duty, Article 97 of the Act, when read together
with Article 89D of the Act does preclude expedite d reviews and is, therefore, inconsistent with
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
6.7 We consider that we sufficiently explain our position with regard to Article 97 of the Act in our
Report. As the United States acknowledges, Article 89D of the Act is the relevant provision of the Act
addressing expedited reviews. Article 97 of the Act does not, as such, deal with expedited reviews.
Article 97 of the Act only becomes relevant due to the particular language used in Article 89D of the Act
referring to a "final duty". In our view, the United States thus failed to adduce sufficient evidence that
Article 97 of the Act, as such, is inconsistent with the obligations concerning expedited reviews set forth
in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. We do not consider that the
US comments are of such nature as to require us to reconsider our position and to amend our report. We,
therefore, reject the request of the United States in this respect.
6.8 The United States requests the Panel to amend footnote 202 of the Report dealing with Mexico's
argument that the United States should have adduced evidence of the application of the challenged
provisions of the Act. The United States requests the Panel to restate its rejection of this argument by
Mexico. According to the United States, the question of Mexican law does not implicate WTO or general
public international legal issues, but is a question of fact from the standpoint of WTO proceedings. In its
comment on the request of the United States, Mexico states that it does not consider this to be a matter of
fact and repeats its argument that the United States failed to make a prima facie case.
6.9 While we agree with the United States that the question of the meaning a WTO Member's law is a
question of fact, we note that in this footnote we are responding to an argument made by Mexico that
WTO jurisprudence required the complaining party to adduce particular evidence to prove this fact. As
we explain in footnote 202, we do not agree with Mexico that this fact is necessarily to be demonstrated in
a particular way. Neither has Mexico demonstrated that rules of general public international law provide
for such a particular evidentiary requirement. In light of the comments received, and in order to clarify
our position, we have slightly reworded this footnote.
B. C
OMMENTS BY MEXICO
1. Observations concerning the section on the anti-dumping measure imposed on imports of
long-grain white rice from the United States
6.10 Mexico requests the Panel to amend paragraph 7.52 and footnote 66 of the Report to reflect more
fully Mexico's arguments as set forth in paragraphs 44 and 45 of Mexico's First Written Submission. We
consider that for the purposes of our findings, para graph 7.52 already accurately reflected Mexico's
position. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we changed the grammar of the paragraph's
sentence relating to Mexico's view of the purpose of an anti-dumping measure so as to track Mexico's own
wording as much as possible.
6.11 Mexico requests the Panel to clarify and comple te the last part of paragraph 7.52 as Mexico
considers that the last sentence of this paragraph is not clear and overlooks what was said in paragraph 67

of Mexico's First Written Submission. The United St ates considers that the Panel accurately reflected
Mexico's statement in this respect and refers to footnote 71 of our Report. We note that the last part of
paragraph 7.52 is taken almost verbatim from paragraph 35 of Mexico's Second Written Submission. In
addition, we consider that the relevant part of th e paragraph of Mexico's First Written Submission that
Mexico wants the Panel to incorporate in the Final Report is already reflected in the penultimate sentence
of paragraph 7.52 of our Report. We, therefore, reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.12 Mexico requests the Panel to include a numbe r of paragraphs of Mexico's Second Written
Submission into paragraph 7.57 of the Report, which it considers to be incomplete and inaccurate. In
addition, according to Mexico, what the Panel refers to as a position held by Mexico is not a submission
of Mexico's but a comment on what was said by the United States in its Opening Statement at the first
substantive meeting. We note that paragraph 7.57 is part of our analysis of the arguments of the parties
which, as such, have been set forth in more detail in our Report, in "Section IV: Arguments of the
Parties" and in the relevant part of "Section VII: Findings" dealing with the arguments of the parties. In
paragraph 7.57, we highlight a pa rticularly relevant statement by Mexico. We do not consider it
necessary to include in this paragraph of our analysis a more elaborate explanation of Mexico's arguments
which are fully reflected elsewhere in the Report. We, therefore, reject Mexico's request to amend our
Report.
6.13 Mexico requests the Panel to amend paragraph 7.82 of the Report to reflect that it did not argue
that taking a six month period was the only way of avoiding distortions. Mexico also requests the Panel to
further amend paragraph 7.82 of the Report to reflect that Mexico did not state or give any indication that
by "distortions" it was referring to "certain developments which occur in the remaining six months which
perhaps undo part of the effect of the imports that entered the country during the six months that were
examined", as Mexico considers is suggested in the Report. The United States considers that the Panel
never claimed that Mexico made such a statement, but that the Panel was rather providing its own
assessment of the facts in question.
6.14 We accept Mexico's comment that it did not say that applying a six month period was the only
way of avoiding distortions, and we have amended our Report accordingly. We do not consider that we
need to make the additional amendment to paragra ph 7.82 of our Report as requested by Mexico. We
note that paragraph 7.82 contains our analysis of Mexico's arguments in defence of the time period
chosen, which has to be read in light of the fact that Mexico itself clearly indicated that seasonality was
not an issue in adopting this six month period of investigation. This statement is thus our reflection of
Mexico's explanations and not a summary of Mexico's argument, as Mexico seems to be suggesting. We
consider that we sufficiently explained in our Report our position with respect to the failure to examine
six months of each of the years of the period of inves tigation. We therefore reject Mexico's request to
amend our Report.
6.15 Mexico requests the Panel to include the necessary details in footnote 78 of the Report to show
that Mexico did not submit that "... its practise ... shows delays of sometimes six months, on other
occasions 20 months between the end of the period of investigation and the date of initiation of the
investigation, depending on the period of investigation the applicant is proposing". Mexico refers to a
more complete description of its arguments in paragraphs 43 and 44 of its Second Written Submission.
We acknowledge that, answering a question from the Panel, it was the United States, rather than Mexico,
which presented an overview of the relevant practice of Mexico with respect to the choice of the period of
investigations.
41 Mexico, in its Second Written Submission, however, did not contest the accuracy of
these data, but rather confirmed that its practice reveals that on average there are about 10 months
between the end of the period of investigation and the initiation of the investigation. In light of Mexico's
request, we have slightly amended footnote 78 of our Report in order to clarify this point.

41 US First Answers to Questions, para. 5 (question 2) . This was confirmed by the United States in its
comments on the Mexican request for interim review.

6.16 Mexico requests the Panel to amend paragraph 7.95 of the Report to more accurately reflect
Mexico's position that it considers that an investigating authority is not required to send questionnaires to
all the foreign producers and exporters. We accept Mexico's request and have amended our Report
accordingly.
6.17 Mexico comments that on four occasions in the Report, the Panel refers to a "reasonable"
investigating authority. Mexico requests the Panel to include an explanation of the term "reasonable".
While we consider that a reasonable investigating authority is in the first place an authority which
conducts an objective evaluation of the matter before it, in the sense given to the term "objective" by the
Appellate Body in inter alia the case of US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
42 we decided that such a reference to a
"reasonable" investigating authority in the paragr aphs identified by Mexico was not necessary and we
have amended our Report accordingly.
6.18 Mexico considers that paragraph 7.134 of the Report regarding Mexico's argument that it suffices
for one exporter to be found to have been dumping above the de minimis level for all exporters to be
included in the application of the measure, does not fully reflect Mexico's position. Mexico requests the
Panel to include a reference to Mexico's argument set forth in its First Written Submission that if
exporters do not engage in dumping, a review will not lead to the application of any measure - in the
sense of the imposition of a duty - and such exporters will be able to continue enjoying their right to
export without a dumping margin. The United States considers that the argument referred to by Mexico
has nothing to do with the point the Panel is making in paragraph 7.134 of the Report. We are of the view
that, in any case, such a reference as requested by Mexico is already contained in footnote 138 of our
Report. We therefore reject Mexico's request to further amend our Report.
6.19 Mexico requests the Panel to clarify footnote 142 which provides that Mexico did not argue that
an investigation has to be terminated if the country-wide dumping margin is below de minimis. Mexico
fails to understand in what way the fact that Mexico did not make this argument may affect the analysis
contained in the Panel's findings, given that it is not an issue in dispute. We note that footnote 142
implicitly refers to an argument made by the European Communities as a Third Party that the
investigation is only to be terminated if the country-wide dumping margin is below de minimis. We
consider it relevant, in light of this argument made by one of the Third Parties concerning the
interpretation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, to indicate that this possible argument was not one
made by Mexico before us. While this fact does not alter our analysis, it completes our discussion of the
arguments of the parties concerning the correct interpretation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement. We,
therefore, reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.20 Mexico considers that paragraph 7.143 of the Report which states that Mexico argues that
termination of the investigation is only required when all of the margins of dumping for all exporters or
producers are below de minimis, does not accurately reflect its position. Mexico requests the Panel to
reflect the fact that Mexico asserted in its Answer s to Questions from the Panel relating to the first

42 Appellate Body report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193:
"193. The term "objective examination" aims at a different aspect of the investigating
authorities' determination. While the term "positive evidence" focuses on the facts underpinning
and justifying the injury determination, the term "objective examination" is concerned with the
investigative process itself. The word "examination" relates, in our view, to the way in which the
evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently, evaluated; that is, it relates to the conduct
of the investigation generally. The word "obj ective", which qualifies the word "examination",
indicates essentially that the "examination" pro cess must conform to the dictates of the basic
principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. In short, an "objective examination" requires
that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased
manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in
the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an "objective examination"
recognizes that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the
investigative process."

substantive meeting that any exporter for which the authority finds a more than zero and below
de minimis margin of dumping would receive a zero per cent duty. In addition, Mexico asserts that in its
Second Written Submission it argued that the investigati on is to be terminated where the investigating
authority concludes that the margin of dumping is de minimis – a determination that must be made for
each country as a whole and not on a firm-specific basis.
6.21 We note that paragraph 7.143 of the Report contains our analysis of the various arguments of the
parties which are set forth in more detail elsewhere in the Report. We consider that the above statement
that Mexico wants us to amend or delete is b ased on Mexico's argument, which it repeated in its
comments on the Interim Report, that "it does suffice for one exporter to have been found to be dumping
above the de minimis level for all exporters to be include d in the application of the measure".
43 We,
therefore, do not agree with Mexico that its position is not accurately reflected in paragraph 7.143 of the
Report. We explain in this paragraph, and other relevant paragraphs, our interpretation of Article 5.8 of
the AD Agreement. We conclude that Article 5. 8 of the AD Agreement refers to exporter-specific
margins of dumping. We wish to add that in paragraph 7.144 we address and reject Mexico's argument
that the application of a zero per cent duty to an exporter does not constitute the application of a measure.
 We therefore see no reason to amend our Report as suggested by Mexico and reject Mexico's request in
this respect.
6.22 Mexico considers that its position is not properly reflected in footnote 144 of the Report dealing
with the alleged practical problem of an interpretation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement that could lead
to parallel investigations against the same products from the same country. Mexico requests that part of
the footnote referring to Mexico's position be deleted. In light of the fact that the argument of practicality
was mainly one made by the European Communities in its Third Party Submission, we accept Mexico's
request and have amended footnote 144 accordingly.
6.23 Mexico considers incorrect the statement of th e Panel in paragraph 7.197 of the Report that
"throughout the application the name of a third US e xporter, the 'Rice Corporation' is referred to".
Mexico points out that the only reference to that exporter in the application for initiation of an
investigation is to be found in Annex H of the application. Mexico requests the Panel to amend the Report
accordingly. In commenting on the Mexican request, the United States argues that the Panel is correct in
stating that the name of this US exporter appeared throughout the application. We note that, as rightly
pointed out by the United States, pages 23, 24 and 44 of the application and page 42 of part II of the
application clearly refer to this US exporter. We therefore reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.24 Mexico is of the view that paragraph 7.199 of the Report does not adequately reflect its position.
According to Mexico, it did not acknowledge that it would have been possible to identify all US exporters
by examining the so-called pedimentos. Mexico states that, while the pedimentos contain information on
the names of the exporters, this does not necessarily mean that all the exporters of long-grain white rice
can be identified. Mexico argues that the pediment os would allow identification only of exporters of
white rice, without any indication as to whether they exported short-grain, pre-cooked, etc. white rice,
because the product description in the pedimentos serves only to ensure that the imported product
corresponds to the tariff heading description, which covers many types of white rice. Mexico therefore
requests the Panel to amend this paragraph to more accurately reflect its position. The United States
considers that the Panel made a correct statement of fact concerning the information contained in the
pedimentos.
6.25 We note that Mexico clearly stated that the pedimentos contain information not only on the
volume and value of the imports, but also on the identity of the exporters.
44 We acknowledge Mexico's
point that the pedimentos do not always distinguish between exporters of various types of white rice. This
does not alter our view, which we have further clarified by adding a sentence to footnote 193. Mexico's

43 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 20.
44 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 15.

statement that the pedimentos included imports of all white rice, which is clearly inclusive of the subject
long grain white rice, only confirms our view. We therefore reject to make the amendment requested by
Mexico.
2. Observations concerning the section concerning the Foreign Trade Act ("the Act")
6.26 Mexico considers that footnote 202 of the Report does not accurately reflect Mexico's position.
Mexico notes that the Panel concludes in this footnote that there is no basis for a requirement to adduce
evidence in each of a party's "as such" claims of the application of the law, while Mexico had pointed to
an Appellate Body report which came to the opposite conclusion. We note that Mexico's comments do
not concern the presentation of Mexico's position, but rather that Mexico is commenting on the fact that
we did not follow it in its argumentation. As becomes clear from the conclusion in this footnote, we do
not consider that the Appellate Body report in US – Carbon Steel that Mexico has referred to actually
supports Mexico's argument. The Appellate Body stated that such evidence of inconsistent legislation
will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or legal instruments, "which
may be supported, as appropriate , by evidence of consistent application of such laws, the
pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts and the
writings of recognized scholars" (emphasis added). In our view, the Appellate Body was thus clearly not
requiring that for an "as such" claim to be successful, evidence is to be adduced of the application of the
law by the executive authorities and the domestic cour ts, in each case. We consider that our Report
sufficiently explains the basis for our findings of inconsistency of several parts of the Act. We therefore
reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.27 Mexico considers that footnote 204 of the Report concerning the impact of the direct effect of
WTO Agreements in Mexican law does not accurately reflect its position. In particular Mexico considers
that reference should be made to its argument expressed in paragraph 206 of its First Written Submission
that the Act has to be implemented as established in Article 2 of the Act in a manner congruent with the
provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Agreements it encompasses. Mexico requests the Panel
to modify its findings so that they faithfully reflect the position held by Mexico in this dispute. We note
that in footnote 204, which Mexico is referring to, as well as in paragraphs 7.224 and 7.225, we explain in
detail why we do not follow Mexico's argument with regard to the impact for our review of Mexican law
of the direct effect of the WTO Agreements in Me xican law. We consider that Mexico's position is
accurately reflected both in paragraph 7.215 as well as in the above mentioned paragraphs. We, therefore,
reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.28 Mexico considers that its argument that the AD Agreement does not require the questionnaires to
be sent to all exporters and foreign producers is not properly reflected in paragraph 7.232 of the Report as
this paragraph refers to all interested parties. Mexico requests the Panel to amend its Report to reflect
that Mexico's statement was not about all interested parties, but only about all exporters and foreign
producers. We accept Mexico's request and have amended our Report accordingly.
6.29 Mexico requests the Panel to clarify the meaning of the term "to obtain" an administrative review
in paragraph 7.253 of the Report. As became clear during the interim review meeting, Mexico's comment
seems to be that the Panel should make a distinction between the right to obtain the initiation of a review
and the right to have the duties reviewed. We consider that in paragraph 7.253 of our Report we explain
that we do not consider this to be a meaningful distinction and we reject Mexico's argument in clear terms.
We are of the view that our Report is sufficiently clear on what is meant by the terms "to obtain a
review". We, therefore, reject Mexico's request to amend our Report.
6.30 Mexico requests the Panel to amend paragraph 7.262 of the Report which discusses the scope of
Article 89D of the Act, and refers to a recent case in which a new-shipper review was initiated for a
trading house, "rather than a producer". Mexico considers that this last part of paragraph 7.262 gives the
impression that the firm in question was involved both in exporting and in producing, and that exporting

was its main activity, which is not the case. Mexico requests the Panel to delete from paragraph 7.262 the
phrase "rather than a producer". We accept Mexico' s request and have amended our Report accordingly.
6.31 Mexico further considers that paragraphs 7.262 and 7.263 of the Report should reflect the fact
that Mexico argued in its Second Written Submission that Article 47 of the Act's Regulations provides for
new-shipper reviews for non-producing enterprises, i.e. enterprises devoted solely to exportation. We
note that in these two paragraphs we describe Mexico's argument. Since it is correct that Mexico made
this argument based on Article 47 of the Act's Regulations, we accept Mexico's request and have amended
our Report accordingly. We note that in light of our findings on another aspect of Article 89D of the Act,
we do not rule on the aspects of the claim that Mexico's comments relate to.
6.32 Mexico requests the Panel to specify in paragr aph 7.67 of the Report that the argument of the
United States which is reflected in that paragraph is based on data for paddy rice rather than long-grain
white rice. We note that in paragraph 7.83 of th e Report we explicitly state that these data concern
imports of paddy rice and explain the importance we attach to these data. We therefore see no need to
amend this paragraph 7.67 dealing with the arguments of the United States in respect of its claim.
6.33 Finally, Mexico requests the Panel to make certain clerical changes to the English and Spanish
texts of the Report. We accept Mexico's request and have amended our Report accordingly.
VII. FINDINGS
7.1 This case concerns two sets of claims made by the United States regarding, on the one hand, the
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of long-grain white rice from the United States, and
on the other hand, a number of provisions of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act and its Federal Code of Civil
Procedure.

A. G
ENERAL ISSUES
1. Standard of Review
7.2 In light of the claims and arguments made by the parties in the course of these Panel proceedings,
we recall, at the outset of our examination, the standard of review we must apply to the matter before us.
7.3 Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("the DSU") 45, in isolation, sets forth the appropriate sta ndard of review for pa nels for all covered
agreements except the Anti-Dumping Agreement ("AD Agreement"). Article 11 imposes upon panels a
comprehensive obligation to make an "objective assessment of the matter", an obligation which embraces
all aspects of a panel's examination of the "matter", both factual and legal.
7.4 Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement sets forth the sp ecial standard of review applicable to anti-
dumping disputes. It provides:
“(i) in its assessment of the facts of the ma tter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;”

45 Article 11 of the DSU states: "The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements…"

“(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”
7.5 Thus, together, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement set out the standard
of review we must apply with respect to both the factual and legal aspects of our examination of the
claims and arguments raised by the parties.
46
7.6 In light of this standard of review, in examining the claims under the AD Agreement in the matter
referred to us, we must evaluate whether Mexico's measures at issue are consistent with relevant
provisions of the AD Agreement. If we find that the Mexican investigating authorities have properly
established the facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and objective manner, and that the determinations
rest upon a permissible interpretation of the relevant provisions, we will consider this measure to be
consistent with the relevant provisions of the AD Agreement. Our task is not to perform a de novo review
of the information and evidence on the record, nor to substitute our judgment for that of the Mexican
authorities, even though we might have arrived at a different determination were we examining the record
ourselves.
2. Burden of Proof
7.7 We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement
require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must
assert and prove its claim.
47 In these Panel proceedings, the Un ited States, which has challenged the
consistency of the Mexican anti-dumping measure and of certain provisions of Mexico's law, thus bears
the burden of demonstrating an inconsistency with the relevant provisions of the Agreement. We also note
that it is generally for each party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof. 48 We also recall that a
prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as
a matter of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima facie case.
B. MEXICO'S REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS
7.8 In its first submission to the Panel of 26 April 2004, Mexico requested the Panel to issue a
preliminary ruling that a number of claims made by the United States were outside the Panel's terms of
reference. At the request of the Panel, the United States submitted its comments on Mexico's request on
7 May 2004.
7.9 We first summarize the arguments of the parties before making our findings with respect to Mexico's
request for a preliminary ruling.
1. Arguments of the Parties
(a) Mexico
7.10 Mexico requests the Panel to issue a preliminar y ruling concerning alleged deficiencies in the
United States' request for establishment of a panel49 (the "US request for establishment") and to abstain from
entertaining those claims that are not consistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU or were not subject to prior

46 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 54-62.
47 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 337.
48 Ibid.
49 WT/DS295/2

consultations. In addition, Mexico considers that the US request for establishment is inconsistent with
Article 17.5 (i) of the AD Agreement.
7.11 First, Mexico submits that the US request for establishment fails to comply with Article 6.2 of the
DSU as it fails to provide a brief summary of the le gal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly. In addition, Mexico argues that one of the measures challenged by the United States was
not properly identified in the request for establishment.
7.12 In particular, Mexico argues that the following claims set forth in the request for establishment are
overly vague and unclear:
• the claim of violation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 which fails to specify which of the
paragraphs of Article VI of the GATT 1994 are alleged to have been violated;

• the claim relating to Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement concerning the definition of the domestic
industry as the United States merely refers to violations of Article 3 of the AD Agreement and
fails to explain why it considers that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement would have been violated;

• the claim relating to the use of facts available to a non-shipping exporter set forth in section 1(f)
of the request for establishment, which refers to a large number of provisions of the
AD Agreement which concern the acceptance and processing of information, and are unrelated to
whether or not an exporter has effected any exports during a specific period and the legal
consequences thereof;

• the claim relating to the use of facts available to non-appearing exporters set forth in section 1 (g)
of the request for establishment as the United States again refers to a number of provisions of the
AD Agreement which are unrelated to the situation of such exporters as well as the United States'
failure to explain why it considers that certain decisions of the Mexican Authority in this regard
were taken in an "improper manner".

7.13 In addition, in Mexico's view, the US request for establishment fails to identify Article 366 of the
Federal Code of Civil Procedure ("FCCP") as one of the challenged measures. According to Mexico, the US
request for establishment does not refer to Article 366 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, but rather only to
statements of Mexican officials concerning Artic le 366 of the FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of the
Foreign Trade Act ("the Act"). According to Mexico, the statements of certain officials, which are included
in the request for establishment, are clearly not "measures" that may be challenged before the WTO.
7.14 Furthermore, Mexico asserts that the request for establishment contains a number of claims which
were not part of the consultations in violation of Article 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU. Mexico argues that these
provisions as well as Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement require that the consultations form the basis for the
request for establishment of a panel. Therefore, Mexico submits, those provisions on which no consultations
were held should be discarded by the Panel.
50
7.15 In addition, Mexico argues that the claim concerning the alleged failure to examine all relevant
factors in the injury analysis was only discussed in the consultations concerning the anti-dumping measures
imposed on imports of beef, and was not discussed in the consultations relating to the imposition of anti-
dumping duties on rice, the subject of the current dispute settlement proceedings. As no consultations were
held on this claim, Mexico requests the Panel to discard it.
7.16 Finally, according to Mexico, as a consequence of the previously identified inconsistencies of the
request for establishment with the DSU, the United States also failed to comply with the requirement of

50 Mexico lists these provisions in para. 34 of its First Submission.

Article 17.5 of the AD Agreement to indicate how a benefit accruing to it has been nullified or impaired.
The request for establishment is therefore in Mexico's view, also inconsistent with Article 17.5 of the
AD Agreement.
7.17 Mexico claims that the prejudice it suffered from the lack of clarity in the US request for
establishment was exacerbated by the fact that, as the US submission was made in English, additional time
for the preparation of Mexico's defence was lost due to translation of the submission.
(b) United States
7.18 The United States considers that the US request for establishment of the Panel is fully consistent
with the relevant provisions of the DSU and the AD Agreement, and submits that Mexico's request should
therefore be rejected.
7.19 First, the United States argues that there is no requirement in Article 6.2 of the DSU that the request
for establishment provide a summary of the specifi c legal arguments which will be developed in the
submissions. Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the claims must be included in the panel request, but not
the arguments in support of these claims. The United States submits that its request lists the specific
provision of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 alleged to be violated and provides, in addition, a brief
textual explanation of the basis of the complaint. In particular,
• with regard to Article VI of the GATT 1994, the United States is of the view that the narrative
description which accompanies the allegation leaves no doubt as to which of the paragraphs of
Article VI of the GATT 1994 it considers to have been violated, as it focuses on the only
two paragraphs that are relevant to this dispute, paragraphs 2 and 6(a);

• with regard to Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, the United States is of the view that Mexico does
not argue that the claim should be more specific, but that it is unable to understand which of the
statements in the narrative description result in a breach of the Article invoked. The United
States is of the view that Mexico's request should be rejected because Article 6.2 of the DSU does
not require that the request contains the arguments to support the claim;

• with regard to the sections 1 (f) and (g) of the request, the United States considers that Mexico
concedes that the United States request challenged the application of facts available to the non-
shipping exporter, Producers Rice (subsection 1(f)) and to all other exporters that were not
individually examined (subsection 1(g)), but that Mexico is of the view that the United States has
not adequately explained how Mexico's use of facts available violated these provisions. The
United States argues that Article 6.2 of the DSU re quires that the claims must be made in the
request for establishment, but that there is no similar requirement that the request set forth all the
arguments in support of the claims.

7.20 In any case, the United States submits, Mexico failed to demonstrate that it was somehow prejudiced
by this alleged failure to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. The United States submits that
Mexico's assertion of prejudice is contradicted by the facts since Mexico's first written submission contains a
lengthy response to each of the challenged US claims.
7.21 In addition, the United States argues that its re quest for establishment clearly indicates that
Article 366 of the FCCP is the measure challenged, and not the statements of Mexican officials concerning
the application of this provision. This, the United States submits, is clear from the second sentence of section
3 of the US request for establishment. There is, therefore, no basis for the Mexican argument that the
United States failed to identify Article 366 of the FCCP as the "specific measure at issue".

7.22 Furthermore, the United States considers that Mexico's arguments pertaining to the alleged
inadequacy of the consultations lack merit. The United States argues that there is no requirement in the DSU
that a Member cannot include a claim in its request for establishment unless the particular claim was
discussed during consultations. The United States is of the view that consultations are not "dress rehearsals"
for the panel process requiring Members to have worked out all of their claims and positions in advance
and presenting them in consultations for the other side to practice its prepared responses.
7.23 The United States further asserts that consultations were held in respect of the US claims concerning
the examination of the injury factors by the inves tigating authority also in respect of the anti-dumping
measures imposed on imports of rice, and not just in respect of the beef investigation. More importantly,
however, the United States considers that the DSU does not contain a requirement as to the adequacy of the
consultations. The United States notes that the United States and Mexico spent two days consulting at length
on each of the specific measures at issue in this dispute, and there is therefore, no basis for Mexico's assertion
that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU with respect to consultations
over the disputed measures. The United States also rejects Mexico's argument of violation of Article 17.4 of
the AD Agreement which in the United States' view only requires that the Member requesting the
establishment of a panel "consider" that the consultations have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution.
Such was the case in this dispute, and the United States submits that Mexico's Article 17.4 of the
AD Agreement claim is thus groundless.
7.24 Finally, the United States rejects Mexico's ar guments of violation of Article 17.5 of the
AD Agreement, as the United States is of the view that Article 17.5 of the AD Agreement does not impose
an additional obligation on the complaining party.
2. Analysis
7.25 We consider that Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling raises three main issues concerning
(i) Article 6.2 of the DSU and the extent of the obligation to provide a "brief summary of the legal basis of
the complaint" in the request for establishment of a panel and to identify "the specific measure at issue"; (ii)
the relationship between the request for establishment and the scope of the consultations; and (iii) the need
to demonstrate nullification or impairment of interests in the request for establishment under Article 17.5 of
the AD Agreement. We will address each of these issues in this order.
(a) Conformity of the Request for Establishment with Article 6.2 of the DSU
7.26 Article 6.2 of the DSU concerning the request for establishment of a panel provides as follows:
"The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify th e specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly. In case the applicant requests the est ablishment of a panel with other than
standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of special
terms of reference".
7.27 According to Article 6.2 of the DSU, therefore, the request for establishment must identify the
specific measures at issue and must provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly. Mexico's request concerning Article 6.2 of the DSU relates to the absence of a
sufficient summary of the legal basis of the complaint with regard to alleged violations of Article VI of the
GATT 1994, Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement and the use of facts available in the case of non-shipping
exporters and exporters not individually investigated. In addition, Mexico argues that the request for
establishment relating to Article 366 of the FCCP failed to properly identify the specific measure at issue.
7.28 The first question before us is thus whether th e US request for establishment provided a brief
summary of the claim sufficient to present the problem clearly. In other words, the question is whether the

"brief summary" was such that Mexico knew what case it had to answer, enabling it to begin preparing its
defence.
51 This in our view does not mean that the complainant is required, in its request for
establishment, to set out the arguments in support of this claim. We consider that there is a significant
difference between the claims identified in the request for the establishment of a panel, which establish
the panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims,
which are set out and progressively clarified in the first written submissions, the rebuttal submissions and
the first and second panel meetings with the parties. 52 We recall that the purpose of the terms of
reference, apart from defining the scope of the dispute, is to serve the due process objective of notifying
the parties of the nature of the complainant's case.53
7.29 First, with respect to Mexico's arguments concerning the lack of specificity of the request with
regard to the alleged violation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, we recall that the US request for
establishment provides in relevant part as follows:
"(1) On 5 June 2002, Mexico published in the Diario Oficial its definitive
anti-dumping measure on long-grain white rice. This measure appears to be inconsistent
with the following provisions of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994:
(a) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5,
and 4.1 of the AD Agreement becau se Mexico based its injury and
causation analyses on only six months of data for each of the years
examined; failed to collect or examine recent data; failed to properly
evaluate the relevant economic factors; failed to base its determination
on a demonstration that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, causing injury within the meaning of the AD Agreement; and
failed to base its injury determinations on positive evidence or to
conduct objective examinations of the volume of dumped imports, the
effect of those imports on prices in the domestic market of like
products, and the impact of the imports on domestic producers of those
products;" (footnote omitted).
7.30 Mexico considers that it is not sufficiently clear from the request which of the many subparagraphs
of Article VI of the GATT 1994 the United States is alleging to have been violated. We recall that, while it
is so that sometimes even a mere listing of the provisions allegedly violated may suffice to comply with the
requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU to provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint,
54 this is
not always the case, and especially in case the provision alleged to have been violated, consist of various
paragraphs and subparagraphs, further specification may be required to inform the parties of the scope of the
claims in a sufficiently clear manner. In the end, what matters is whether the request provided a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case a complainant
chooses to comply with this requirement by merely listing treaty provisions without any further narrative
explanation of the problem, it is of course all important to know which of the paragraphs or subparagraphs
the complainant is referring to in case the treaty provision consist of several of such paragraphs each dealing

51 For a recent application of this approach, see Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,
52 We note that this was also the view held by the Appellate Body in the EC – Bananas case. See
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas, para. 141.
53 Appellate Body Report, United States – Carbon Steel, para. 126.
54 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124:
"There may be situations where the simple listing of the articles of the agreement or agreements involved
may, in the light of attendant circumstances, suffice to meet the standard of clarity in the statement of the legal basis
of the complaint. However, there may also be situations in which the circumstances are such that the mere listing of
treaty articles would not satisfy the standard of Article 6.2. This may be the case, for instance, where the articles
listed establish not one single, distinct obligation, but rather multiple obligations. In such a situation, the listing of
articles of an agreement, in and of itself, may fall short of the standard of Article 6.2.".

with slightly different issues. A general reference to such a multilayered treaty provision may in such
circumstances not be enough to present the problem clearly. The facts before us are somewhat different, as
the US request for establishment does more than simply listing the treaty provisions alleged to have been
violated. The United States also provides a narra tive in which it briefly explains the problem the
United States has with the challenged measure. In our view, the question before us is thus whether, the
reference to the provisions of the Agreement, together with the narrative which accompanied the listing of
these provisions, were sufficient to present the problem clearly so that the defendant was able to understand
the case against it.
7.31 While we consider that the US request for establishment could have been clearer in identifying
precisely which of the paragraphs of Article VI of the GATT 1994 the United States claims to have been
violated, we do not agree with Mexico that the request for establishment in this respect did not provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the claim sufficient to present the problem clearly. We consider that it is
important when examining the consistency of part of the request for establishment with Article 6.2 of the
DSU, not to examine parts of this request in isolation. Rather, in our view, the request must be considered as
a whole, and the different claims in the request for establishment must be read in their context.
55 In our view,
the accompanying narrative and the provisions of the AD Agreement also alleged to have been violated
make it clear that the US claims in this respect concern the determination of injury caused by dumped
imports. We agree with the United States that only a very limited number of paragraphs of Article VI of the
GATT 1994, such as paragraphs 2 and 6 (a) are in fact relevant to this matter. We therefore reject Mexico's
request in respect of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
7.32 Second, with respect to Mexico's arguments concerning Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in
section 1 (a) of the request for establishment, we note that Mexico stated that in its view the United States
focuses its arguments on violations of various provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement and that Mexico
is thus unable to determine specifically which of these facts may be considered a violation of any of the
obligations provided for in Article 4.1 of the AD Agr eement. We are of the view that the request for
establishment clearly specifies the particular provision allegedly violated and explains in sufficient detail the
legal basis of its claim. While Mexico may disa gree with the United States and may well argue that
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement which sets forth a definition of the domestic industry is not applicable or is
irrelevant in this case, this, we find, is a matter of substance and one which is to be addressed in the
submissions to the Panel. We consider that the request for establishment provides a brief summary of the
legal basis of the claim sufficient to present the problem clearly by, in addition to listing the legal basis of its
claim, providing a narrative setting forth the US allegations concerning the failure to properly identify injury
to the domestic industry. In our view, Mexico is really arguing that the United States should have provided
more ample argument as to why it considered that the Mexican investigating authority acted inconsistently
with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. As we stated earlier, the request for establishment is to set forth a
brief summary of the legal basis of the claim, not to set out the arguments in support of this claim. We wish
to emphasise that our views concerning the consistency of the request for establishment with Article 6.2 of
the DSU in no way prejudge our findings as to the merits of the US claims, nor to the relevance or lack
thereof of certain of the provisions invoked by the complainant.
7.33 Third, with regard to Mexico's arguments concerning sections 1 (f) and (g) of the US request and the
use of facts available to a non-shipping exporter, and the exporters which were not individually investigated,
we note that the US request for establishment provides as follows:
"(f) Articles 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, and paragraphs 1,
3, 5, 6, and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, by applying the facts available to a US

55 We find support for this view in statement of the Appellate Body in the US – Carbon Steel case:
"Moreover, compliance with the requirements of Article 6.2 must be determined on the merits of
each case, having considered the panel request as a whole, and in the light of attendant
circumstances." Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 127.

respondent rice exporter that was investigated and found to have no shipments during the
period of investigation;
(g) Articles 1, 6.1, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 12.1, and 12.2 of the AD Agreement,
and paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, by applying the facts
available in establishing the anti-dumping margins that it assigned to US exporters that
were not individually investigated, and by doing so in an improper manner;"
7.34 Mexico argues that it fails to see how such provisions relating to the acceptance and processing of
information are relevant to the situation of these two categories of exporters. In our view, the United States
request of establishment provides a sufficient summary of the legal basis of the US claims that facts available
were applied to determine a margin of dumping for certain categories of exporters in a manner inconsistent
with those provisions of the AD Agreement dealing with the use of best information available. Again, we
consider that the United States is not required in its request for establishment to set forth the arguments in
support of this claim. Whether the provisions alleged to have been violated are relevant and applicable is a
question we do not need to decide when reviewing the consistency of the request for establishment with
Article 6.2 of the DSU.

7.35 Finally, Mexico considers that section 3 of the request for establishment fails to identify Article 366
of the FCCP as the measure at issue. This section of the request for establishment reads as follows:

"3. Mexican officials have asserted that Article 366 of Mexico's Federal Code of Civil
Procedure and Articles 68 and 97 of the Act prevent Mexico from conducting reviews of
anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders while a judicial review of the order is
ongoing, including a "binational panel" review pursuant to Chapter Nineteen of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. These provisions appear to be inconsistent
with Articles 9.3, 9.5, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement." (emphasis added)
7.36 In our view, the request for establishment clearly refers to Article 366 of the FCCP rather than to
the statements of Mexican officials concerning its application, as the challenged measure in question. We
consider the statements to have been referred to me rely in support of the claim of inconsistency. We
therefore find that section 3 of the request for establishment specifies clearly the specific measure at issue,
and these measures are Article 366 of the FCCP and Article 68 and 97 of the Act.

7.37 In sum, we find that the request for establishment provides a summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU with regard to
the claims set forth in sections 1 (f) and (g) of the request, as well as with regard to the claim concerning
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement set forth in section 1 (a) of the
request. Finally, we find that the request for establishment specifies clearly that Article 366 of the FCCP
and Articles 68 and 97 of the Act are the specific measures at issue, and we thus reject Mexico's request in
this respect.

(b) Lack of Identity between the Request for Consultations and the Request for Establishment
7.38 Mexico asserts that the request for establishment contains a number of violations of Agreement
provisions which were not mentioned in the requ est for consultations and on which, it argues, no
consultations were held. This aspect of Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling concerns the extent to
which Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU as well as Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement provide that the
permissible scope of the request for establishment is limited by the scope of the request for consultations.

7.39 Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU provide as follows:

Article 4
Consultations
5. In the course of consultations in acco rdance with the provisions of a covered
agreement, before resorting to further action under this Understanding, Members should
attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter.

7. If the consultations fail to settle a disput e within 60 days after the date of receipt
of the request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a
panel. The complaining party may request a panel during the
60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that consultations have failed to
settle the dispute.
7.40 Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement provides:

17.4 If the Member that requested consulta tions considers that the consultations
pursuant to paragraph 3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final
action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy
definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept price undertakings, it may refer the matter to
the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). When a provisional measure has a significant
impact and the Member that requested cons ultations considers that the measure was
taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer
such matter to the DSB.
7.41 In our view, these provisions do not in any way require a complete identity between the scope of
the request for consultations and the request for establishment, nor do they, in our view, limit the scope of
the request for establishment to the exact scope of the request for consultations. While we read these
provisions to require that Members should attempt to find a mutually agreed solution on the "matter" in
dispute through consultations, this, in our view, only requires that request for consultations relate to the
same subject matter as the request for establishment of a panel.
56 In sum, and provided the request for
establishment concerns a dispute on which consultations have been requested, there is no need for the
matter (i.e. the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint) as identified in the request
for establishment to be identical to the matter on which consultations were requested.

7.42 Mexico argues that for certain of the measures challenged no consultations were held on a number
of the provisions alleged to have been violated by these measures. In particular, Mexico argued that the

56 We note that, in the past, both panels and the Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion that the scope
of the request for establishment need not be identical to the scope of the request for consultations. See e.g.
Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.4 (i); Panel report, Brazil – Aircraft , para. 7.9.
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 132:
"132. We do not believe, however, that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or paragraphs 1 to 4 of
Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, require a precise and exact identity between the specific
measures that were the subject of consultations and the specific measures identified in the request
for the establishment of a panel. As stated by the Panel, "[o]ne purpose of consultations, as set
forth in Article 4.3 of the SCM Agreement, is to 'clarify the facts of the situation', and it can be
expected that information obtained during the course of consultations may enable the complainant
to focus the scope of the matter with respect to which it seeks establishment of a panel.[...]"
(footnote omitted).

following provisions were not covered by the cons ultations but were included in the request for
establishment:

Provision invoked Paragraph in the request for
establishment of a Panel
AD Article 1 Paragraphs 1(a), 1(g)
AD Article 4.1 Paragraph 1(a)
AD Article 11.2 Paragraph 2(c)
AD Article 18.1 Paragraph 2(e)
Paragraph 1 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 3 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 5 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 6 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
Paragraph 7 of Annex II Paragraph 2(b)
SCM Article 12.5 Paragraph 2(b)
SCM Article 21.2 Paragraph 2(c)
SCM Article 32.1 Paragraph 2(e)
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 Paragraph 1(i)

7.43 In light of our finding that there is no need for a complete identity between the request for
establishment and the request for consultations, we do not consider that we would not be able to rule on
the alleged violations of the provisions mentioned by Mexico in the above table simply because they were
not mentioned in the request for consultations. In our view, the fact that certain provisions were added to
the list of alleged violations in the request for establishment compared to the request for consultations is a
consequence of the consultation process which serves the purpose of clarifying the facts of the situation
enabling the complainant to focus the scope of the matter with respect to which it seeks the establishment
of a panel. It does not mean that no consultations were held on the matter, as the only difference between
the request for consultations and the request for establishment consists of the fact that a number of closely
related legal provisions alleged to have been violated were added. The measures remained the same and
so did the legal basis for the complaint, as is ev ident from the narrative provided in the request for
establishment. In our view, consultations were thus held on the matter on which the establishment of a
Panel was requested. We therefore reject Mexico's request in this respect.

7.44 Mexico also argues that one claim concerning the failure to examine all relevant factors affecting
the domestic industry was part of the consultations concerning the investigation on imported beef, but was
not part of the consultations that took place relating to the measures imposed on imports of rice, the matter
before the panel in this case.

7.45 As a factual matter, Mexico is correct that the request for consultations limits the claim
concerning the failure to evaluate all relevant factors of Article 3.4 to the beef investigation.
57 However,
in our view, and for the same reasons as mentioned above, as long as the request for establishment
concerns a matter on which consulta tions were requested, there is no requirement that all the specific

57 The Request for Consultations (DS 295/1) reads in pertinent part as follows:
"In particular, the United States believes that the anti-dumping measures on beef and rice are
inconsistent with at least the following provisions:
Article 3 of the AD Agreement, because Mexico, inter alia, based its injury (or threat) and
causation analyses on only six months of data for each of the years examined; failed to collect or
examine recent data; failed in the beef investigation to evaluate all relevant economic factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry ; and failed to base its injury
determinations on positive evidence or to conduct objective examinations of the volume of
dumped imports, the effect of those imports on prices in the domestic market of like products, and
the impact of the imports on domestic producers of those products;" (emphasis added).

provisions alleged to have been violated in the request for establishment were also part of the
consultations. Since consultations took place in resp ect of the alleged inconsistency of the injury
determination in the rice investigation with Article 3 of the AD Agreement, it seems that the United States
was entitled to formulate its request for establishment on the basis of any combination or subset of the
legal provisions and claims relevant to the rice investigation on which consultations were held. Moreover,
we note that the request for establishment refers to the "failure to properly evaluate the relevant economic
factors" which is slightly different from the "failure to evaluate all relevant economic factors" mentioned
in the request for consultations for the beef investig ation. The failure to properly evaluate all factors
effectively relates to the failure "to base its inju ry determinations on positive evidence or to conduct
objective examinations of [.... ] the impact of the imports on domestic producers of those products" which
was explicitly part of the request for consultation both with regard to the rice and the beef investigation.
We therefore reject Mexico's request in this respect.

(c) Nullification or Impairment of Benefits under Article 17.5 of the AD Agreement
7.46 Mexico argues that the US request for establishment was inconsistent with Article 17.5 (i) of the
AD Agreement as it failed to indicate in which way the US interests were nullified or impaired by the
alleged violations.

7.47 Article 17.5 (i) of the AD Agreement provides as follows:

"17.5 The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to
examine the matter based upon:
(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a benefit
accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has been nullified or impaired,
or that the achieving of the objectives of the Agreement is being impeded, and ..."
7.48 We consider that the US request for establishm ent contains allegations of violation of the
AD Agreement which, if demonstrated, will constitute a prima facie case of nullification or impairment
under Article 3.8 of the DSU. In our view, since the US request for establishment describes the factual
and legal circumstances alleged to constitute the asser ted violations of the cited provisions of the
AD Agreement in some detail, such statements suffice to "indicate how" benefits accruing to the
United States under the AD Agreement have been nullified or impaired, as required by Article 17.5(i) of
the AD Agreement.
58 In any case, we understand Mexico to be arguing that, as a consequence of the
alleged inconsistencies of the US request for establishment with Article 6.2 of the DSU and Articles 4.5
and 4.7 of the DSU, the request for establishment is also inconsistent with Article 17.5 (i) of the
AD Agreement. In light of our findings rejecting Mexico's allegations of inconsistency, we also reject
Mexico's consequential claim of violation of Article 17.5 (i) of the AD Agreement.

3. Conclusion
7.49 For the reasons set forth above, we reject Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling that the US
request for establishment was inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU, Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU,
and Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agreement.

58 We find support for our view in the report of the Panel in the Mexico – Corn Syrup case: "In our view, a
request for establishment that alleges violations of the AD Agreement which, if demonstrated, will constitute a prima
facie case of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU, contains a sufficient allegation of nullification
or impairment for purposes of Article 17.5(i). In addition, as noted above, the request must indicate how benefits
accruing to the complaining Member are being nullified or impaired."
 Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, para. 7.28.

C. C
LAIMS RELATING TO THE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE ON RICE
1. Claims relating to the Injury determination
(a) Claim 1: Economía59’s use of a period of investigation that ended more than fifteen months
prior to the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation and nearly three years prior to the
final determination is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article VI:2 of
GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.50 The United States submits that the Mexican inves tigating authority failed to satisfy the legal
requirements for imposing an anti-dumping measure as the period of investigation used was so remote in
time that the information collected by the investigating authority (Economía) was incapable of providing a
basis for an objective finding based on positive evidence of injury and the causal link between dumped
imports and the injury to the domestic industry. In particular, the United States claims that the more than
fifteen-month gap between the end of the period of i nvestigation and the initiation of the investigation
implied that the investigating authority's examination of volume and price effects, its examination of all
relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the industry and Economía's determination that
the dumped imports were causing injury to the domestic industry was not objective nor based on positive
evidence as required by Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement respectively.
60 By imposing
AD duties in violation of the provisions of the AD Agreement, the United States submits that Economía
has also violated Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
7.51 According to the United States, the purpose of an anti-dumping measure is to offset or prevent
dumping that is presently causing or threatening to cause material injury to a domestic industry. 61
Therefore, the United States argues, an investigating authority is to base its determinations of dumping
and injury on a period that includes the most recent available information. The United States argues that
Article VI of the GATT 1994, as well as the AD Agreement require that the period of investigation should
end as closely as possible to the initiation of the inv estigation if it is to meaningfully inform the
investigating authority of dumping currently causing injury. The United States is of the view that the use
of the present tense in a number of provisions of the AD Agreement, such as Articles 2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, and
5.8 of the AD Agreement, as well as in Articles VI.1 and VI.6 (a) of the GATT 1994 support its claim that
an investigating authority must examine a period of time that is as close to the date of initiation as
practicable.
62 Therefore, the United States is of the view that a period of investigation which ends more
than 15 months prior to the initiation of the investig ation does not allow the investigating authority to
make an objective determination based on positive evidence of dumping which is causing injury.63 The
United States asserts that the Mexican investigating authority did not provide any justification based on
record evidence as to the choice of the particular period of investigation apart from the fact that this was
the period of investigation suggested by the applicants, nor did it explain why it was not possible to use
more recent data or to update the injury data during the course of the investigation.
64 The United States

59 Economía is the Mexican investigating authority.
60 US First Submission, para. 61.
62 US First Submission, para. 56. The United States considers there is support for this view in the
Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations, G/ADP/6, adopted
5 May 2000 of the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices.
63 The period of investigation ended in August 1999, while the investigation was initiated only in December
of the following year, 11 December 2000. The application had been filed in June 2000.
64 US Answers to Questions from the Panel following the First Substantive Meeting with the Parties, ("First
Answers to Questions"), paras. 3 and 7. The United States considers that the necessity for an investigating authority

therefore requests the Panel to find that Economía's use of a stale period of investigation in its anti-
dumping investigation of US long-grain white rice breached Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 of the
AD Agreement and Articles VI.2 and VI.6 (a) of the GATT 1994.
65
Mexico
7.52 Mexico asserts that Economía complied with all the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 of
the AD Agreement and made an objective determination based on positive evidence of the volume and
price effects of dumped imports, their overall impact on the domestic industry, and the causal relationship
between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. Mexico considers that the
AD Agreement does not impose any guidelines on the pe riod of data collection to be used for the
determination of dumping and injury. Mexico is of the view that the aim of an anti-dumping measure is
to offset or prevent dumping - which does not necessarily have to occur in the present – that causes or
threatens to cause injury to the domestic industry.
66 Mexico considers that the AD Agreement does not
impose any limits on the remoteness of the period of investigation.67 It is of the view that is desirable but
not mandatory for the period of investigation to be as close as practicable to the date of initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation.68 According to Mexico, only the ci rcumstances of the case can determine
what period is appropriate for the investigation and in this particular instance, Mexico considers that the
period used was suitable since it yielded objective data on dumping, injury and the causal link between
the two.69 Mexico emphasises that the period of investig ation was not "selected" by the investigating
authority, but rather that it was a period suggested by the applicant which complied with a number of
criteria,70 and that no one demonstrated that it would be in correct to maintain this period. In Mexico’s
view, it was therefore not for the investigating authority to raise any such objections either.71
(ii) Analysis
7.53 We start our analysis by recalling the undisputed facts on the record. The Mexican investigating
authority examined data for a period of investigation covering March to August 1999 for purposes of its
dumping determination, and March to August 1997, 1998, and 1999 for purposes of its injury analysis.
The investigation was initiated on 11 December 2000, 15 months after the end of the period of
investigation. Final anti-dumping measures were imposed on 5 June 2002, a little less than three years
after the end of the period of investigation. Th e United States claims that the use of a period of
investigation by the Mexican investigating authority in this case ending 15 months prior to initiation is not
consistent with the AD Agreement. The United States argues that such a "stale" period of investigation
did not provide the investigating authority with positive evidence and did not allow the authority to make
an objective determination of injury, as required by Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, as
such outdated data are uninformative of the current state of the domestic industry. According to the
United States, Mexico therefore also acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 1 of the AD Agreement
and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

to consider events that happened in the past does not give an authority free rein to choose which past to consider. US
65 US Second Submission, para. 18.
66 Mexico First Submission, para. 44. Mexico's Answers to Questions from the Panel following the Second
Substantive Meeting with the Parties ("Second Answers to Questions"), question 4.
67 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 2.
68 Mexico Second Submission, para. 23.
69 Mexico Second Submission, para. 22.
70 In its Second Answers to Questions, Mexico clarified that the investigating authority examines whether
the period suggested by the applicant a) covers at least 6 months; b) is accompanied by information and proof; c) is
the same as the period for which information with rega rd to normal value and export price is provided by the
applicant. Mexico Second Answers to Questions, Question 1.
71 Mexico Second Submission, para. 35.

7.54 We start our analysis with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement which sets forth the general
requirement for making an injury determination. It provides as follows:
3.1 A determination of injury for purpo ses of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be
based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume
of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the conse quent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.
7.55 Articles 3.1 of the AD Agreement thus requires that the injury determination be based on positive
evidence and that it involve an objective examination. In our view, positive evidence is in the first place
evidence which is material to the case at hand, in other words it is to be relevant and pertinent with respect
to the issue to be decided. It is positive which ma ke it "evidence" as opposed to unrelated facts. In
addition, it must have the characteristics of being inherently reliable and creditworthy.
72 An objective
examination, in turn, requires in our view that the investigative process establishing the facts be objective
and unbiased. We agree with what the Appellate Body stated in this respect in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel
case:
"The term "objective examination" aims at a different aspect of the investigating
authorities' determination. While the te rm "positive evidence" focuses on the facts
underpinning and justifying the injury determination, the term "objective examination" is
concerned with the investigative process itself. The word "examination" relates, in our
view, to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently,
evaluated; that is, it relates to the conduc t of the investigation generally. The word
"objective", which qualifies the word "e xamination", indicates essentially that the
"examination" process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith
and fundamental fairness."
73
7.56 The choice of the period of investigation is obvi ously crucial in this investigative process as it
determines the data that will form the basis fo r the assessment of dumping, injury and the causal
relationship between dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.
7.57 It is clear that the AD Agreement does not contain any specific and express rules concerning the
period to be used for data collection in an anti-dumping investigation. As acknowledged by Mexico, this
does not mean that the authorities' discretion in using a certain period of investigation is boundless.
Mexico considers that it would be preposterous to suggest that measures may be imposed after an
investigation which was based on data relating to a period of investigation which ended ten years ago, and
accepts that it would be desirable that the period of investigation end as closely as practicable to the date
of initiation of the investigation. While we do not n eed to decide in the abstract whether the period of
investigation always has to end as close as practicable to the date of initiation of the investigation, we are
of the view that there is necessarily an inherent r eal-time link between the investigation leading to the
imposition of measures and the data on which the investigation is based. We find strong textual support
for this view in Article VI of the GATT 1994, as well as a number of provisions of the AD Agreement:

72 We note that in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case, the Appellate Body stated that:
"The word 'positive' means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and
verifiable character, and that it must be credible." Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-rolled Steel,
para.192. (emphasis added).
73 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193.

Article VI.2 of the GATT 1994 provides that:
"In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped
product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in
respect of such product".
Article 11 of the AD Agreement similarly provides that:
"An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary
to counteract dumping which is causing injury".
In addition, Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement states that:
"It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as
set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.
[...]". (emphasis added)
7.58 We are of the view that these provisions are clear textual evidence that measures may be imposed
to offset dumping presently causing injury. The terms "offset" and "counteract" connote the concept of a
current reaction against a prevailing (i.e. existing and present) force. Thus, if an anti-dumping duty may
be imposed only to "offset" dumping, and only for "as long as necessary" to "counteract" dumping, it is
clear that this is an entitlement to act that is itself strictly conditioned on the active presence of its
reciprocal -- in this case, injurious dumping that is taking place at that time. There is therefore an inherent
real-time link between the imposition of the measure and the conditions for application of the measure,
dumping causing injury. The use of the present ten se in Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement is clear
evidence of this temporal connection between what is investigated and what needs to be demonstrated in
order to allow the imposition of measures, i.e. that dumped imports are causing injury. Of course, it is
well established that the data on the basis of which th is determination is made may be based on a past
period, known as the period of investigation. Nevertheless, because this "historical" data is being used to
draw conclusions about the current situation, it follows that the more recent data is likely to be inherently
more relevant and thus especially important to the investigation. This, as a consequence, implies that the
data considered concerning dumping, injury and the causal link should include, to the extent possible, the
most recent information, taking into account the inevitable delay caused by the need for an investigation,
as well as any practical problems of data collection in any particular case.
7.59 We find contextual support for this proposition in other provisions of the AD Agreement, such as
Article 14 dealing with anti-dumpi ng actions on behalf of a third country. Article 14.2 of the
AD Agreement provides as follows:
"14.2 Such an application [for an anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country] shall
be supported by price information to show that the imports are being dumped and by
detailed information to show that the alleged dumping is causing injury to the domestic
industry concerned in the third country. The government of the third country shall afford
all assistance to the authorities of the importing country to obtain any further information
which the latter may require." (emphasis added)
7.60 In other words, Article 14.2 of the AD Agreement provides that the evidence in an application to
start an anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country is offered to show that dumping is presently
causing injury to the domestic industry of the requesting country. If such is the case in respect of
applications for third country anti-dumping actions , it seems reasonable to conclude that a similar

temporal requirement exists when the anti-dumping proceedings relate to injury being caused to a
Member's own domestic industry.
74
7.61 The AD Agreement allows Members to re-balance the injurious situation that is created by
dumping. This implies that on the one side of the balance, there is injurious dumping, which is counter-
balanced by the anti-dumping duty. It is therefore necessary to base a determination of dumping causing
injury on data that is pertinent or relevant with re gard to the current situation, taking into account the
inevitable delay caused by the practical need to conduct an investigation. To impose anti-dumping duties
without objectively examining relevant evidence on the dumping causing injury which is on one side of
the balance would thus clearly run counter to the AD Agreement.
7.62 Finally, we note that the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices adopted a Recommendation
concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations (G/ADP/6, adopted
5 May 2000) which sets forth guidelines for determining what period or periods of data collection may be
appropriate for the examination of dumping and of injury. The Recommendation stipulates inter alia that
the period of data collection should end as close to the initiation of the investigation as possible.
75 While
we note that this Recommendation is a non-binding guide to the common understanding of Members on
appropriate implementation of the AD Agreement, and does not add new obligations, nor detract from the
existing obligations of Members under the Agreement 76, we do consider that this Recommendation

74 We consider that further contextual support can be found in the Agreement on Safeguards, and Article 2.1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards in particular. This provision allows for the imposition of safeguard measures if it has been
determined that a product is being imported into the country's territory in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. As the Appellate Body noted in the
"[...] In our view, the use of the present tense of the verb phrase "is being imported" in both
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 indicates
that it is necessary for the competent authorities to examine recent imports, and not simply trends
in imports during the past five years – or, for that matter, during any other period of several
years.
130 In our view, the phrase "is being imported" implies that the increase in imports must
have been sudden and recent.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
130 The Panel, in footnote 530 to para. 8.166 of the Panel Report, recognizes that the present tense
is being used, which it states "would seem to i ndicate that, whatever the starting-point of an
investigation period, it has to end no later than the very recent past." (emphasis added) Here, we
disagree with the Panel. We believe that the relevant investigation period should not only end in
the very recent past, the investigation period should be the recent past."
We are of the view that while there are clear differences in the conditions for imposing measures under the
AD Agreement and the Agreement on Safeguards, both an ti-dumping and safeguard measures are based on an
investigation which is to determine the existence of the cond itions for application by using a certain period of
investigation for which data will be collected. In our view, where Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement explicitly
provides that no measure may be imposed unless it has been demonstrated that a product is being imported in such
quantities, Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, read in conj unction with Article 2.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
similarly provides that no measure may be imposed unless it has been demonstrated that a product is being dumped
and that these dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.
75 The Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Da ta Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations
(G/ADP/6, adopted 5 May 2000) provides in relevant part that:
" the Committee recommends that with respect to original investigations to determine the
existence of dumping and consequent injury -
1. As a general rule:
(a) the period of data collection for dumping investigations normally should be twelve months, and in
any case no less than six months, ending as close to the date of initiation as is practicable;" (footnote omitted).

provides useful support for the correct interpretati on of the obligations found in the text of the
AD Agreement.
77
7.63 In sum, data of ten years old may well be reliable and creditworthy as to past dumping then
causing injury but such data obviously are of much less relevance to the question whether that dumping is
presently causing injury. Certainly, more recent data are more relevant to this question. As we discussed
earlier, the AD Agreement requires that the conditions for imposing anti-dumping measures, that dumped
imports are causing injury, have to be present at th e time of imposition of the measure, to the extent
practically possible. The requirement of a time-consuming and sometimes complicated investigation to
demonstrate the existence of dumping and the ensuing injury poses a practical impediment to a complete
identity in time between the imposition of the measu re and the conditions for such imposition, i.e.
dumping causing injury. Although this practical problem may lead to the situation in which any
determination of dumping causing injury has by the time of the imposition of the measure become more
of a proxy than a real time assessment of the current situation, it would, in our view, not be correct to be
led by the practical necessity to examine the past to assess the present to accept that an investigating
authority could justifiably base itself on old data to the exclusion of more recent data which was available
and usable. To the contrary, the fact that an investigation of up to 12 months may have to be conducted to
determine dumping, injury and the causal link magni fies the importance of having a period of data
collection which ends as closely as possible to the date of initiation, as by the time of the possible
imposition of the measure another 12 months may ha ve passed. We established above the textual and
contextual support in the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement for this basic proposition.
7.64 In the investigation concerning imports of long-grain white rice from the United States, the period
of investigation used by Mexico ended in August 1999. The application suggesting this particular period
of investigation March – Augus t 1999 was submitted by the domestic industry on 2 June 2000. The
investigation was initiated only six months later, on 11 December 2000. The investigating authority
accepted the period of investigation suggested by the applicants, even though at the time of initiation that
period had ended more than 15 months earlier. During the investigation, no attempt was made to update
any of the information obtained from the interested parties to reflect what had occurred in the 15 months
between the end of the period of investigation in August 1999 and the start of the investigation in
December 2000. Definitive anti-dumping measures were imposed on 5 June 2002, almost three years
after the end of the period of investigation. We note that Mexico has not argued that practical problems
necessitated this particular period of investigation, nor has Mexico ever argued that it was not possible for
practical or other reasons to update the information to cover the 15 months or part thereof from the end of
the period of investigation to the date of initiation of the investigation. As Mexico clearly stated, the
applicants proposed this particular period of investigation, and it is Mexico's general practice to accept the
proposed period of investigation.
78 Neither the investigating authority at the time of the investigation, nor
Mexico in its arguments before us provided any other reason why more recent information was not
sought. This fifteen month gap between the end of th e period of investigation and the initiation of the
investigation amounts to a relatively lengthy hiatus. A great deal could have happened – or changed –
over a fifteen month period, and there is simply no evidence on record in respect of it. A hiatus of such a
duration is, in our view, sufficiently long as to impugn the reliability of the period of investigation to
deliver, for the purposes of a determination, evidence that has the requisite pertinence or relevance (see
para. 7.55 supra). In other words, given the passage of time and the uncertainty about the factual situation

77 We note that panels in the past have also referre d to this Recommendation in their reasoning. See e.g.
Panel report, Guatemala – Cement II, para. 8.266; Panel report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, footnote 152; Panel report,
Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.287.
78 In response to the submission of data by the United States concerning Mexico's practice in this regard,
Mexico explains that its practice shows delays of sometimes 6 months, on other occasions 20 months between the
end of the period of investigation and the date of in itiation of the investigation, depending on the period of
investigation the applicant is proposing. The data subm itted by the United States, which were not contested by
Mexico, show that, on average, the period of investigation ends 10 months before the date of initiation, which is also
8 months less than was the case in the rice investigation.

in that relevant interim, the information lacks credibility and reliability, thereby failing to meet the
criterion of "positive evidence" pursuant to Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.

7.65 In light of all these considerations, we find that by choosing to base its determination of injury on
a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the initiation of the investigation,
Mexico failed to comply with the obligation set fo rth in Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement to make a
determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves an objective examination
of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumpe d imports or of the consequent impact of these
imports on domestic producers of the like product at the time measures were imposed. We therefore find
that Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsiste nt with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. As a
consequence, and in light of our finding of violati on of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement which is an
overarching provision that sets forth a Member's fundamental obligation with respect to injury
determinations,
79 we find that Mexico acted in breach of Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
when considering the volume and price effects of the dumped imports, all relevant factors affecting the
state of the industry and the causal relationship betw een dumped imports and the alleged injury to the
domestic industry, respectively. In light of these findings, we do not consider it necessary in order to
resolve this aspect of the dispute to examine the US claims of violation of Article 1of the AD Agreement
and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
(b) Claim 2: Economía’s limitation of its injury analysis to only six months of 1997, 1998, and
1999 is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 1, 3.1, 3.5, and 6.2 of the
AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.66 The United States argues that the selective use of data from only part of the year covering the
peak period of import activity does not allow an investigating authority to make an objective
determination based on positive evidence of injury caused by dumped imports, as required by Article 3.1
of the AD Agreement. According to the United States, if an authority only considers the evidence for half
of the period of investigation for the injury analysis, there is simply no way for the authority to determine
the true state of the domestic industry over the course of the entire period of investigation, and thus no
way to conclude that the authority's examination is consistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
80
7.67 The United States submits that the information on which the determination is based which ignores
half of each of the three years of the period of i nvestigation does not constitute positive evidence. In
addition, the United States submits, by ignoring the period September – February of each year, Economía
disregarded the portion of the year when domestic production of milled rice was at its seasonal high, and
import penetration at its seasonal low. 81 The United States submits that Economía agreed with the
applicants that imports were concentrated during the period March to August and consequently limited its
injury analysis to the data for March – August of each of the years at issue in the investigation.82 In any
case, and even if imports had not been concentrated in the March to August time period, the United States

79 See Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 106.
80 US First Answers to Questions, para. 20.
81 The United States asserts that Economía's findings with respect to at least two economic factors, market
share and capacity utilization, serve to illustrate the in evitable and obvious distortions that resulted from this
focussed approach. US First Submission, para. 71 – 72. The United States points to various paragraphs in Economía's
published determinations in which the authority confirms that imports were concentrated in the March – August
period. US First Answers to Questions, para. 15.
82 US First Submission, para. 67. According to the United States, this narrowed focus is evident throughout
the preliminary and the final determinations. See US First Submission, footnote 68.

is of the view that by limiting its injury analysis to only half of the period of investigation, Economía's
injury analysis is inconsistent with WTO rules.
83
7.68 According to the United States, the determination cannot be objective because the period chosen
covers only a very specific period of the year during which imports are at a high, and thus ignores the fact
that the industry might fare better during the other period of the year. The United States argues that the
requirement of making an "objective analysis" implies that "investigating authorities are not entitled to
conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that, as a result of the fact-finding or
evaluation process, they will determine that the industry is injured".
84 According to the United States, to
examine only those parts of the year when import levels are high may overlook positive developments in
other parts of the year, and thus give a misleading impression of the data relating to the condition of the
industry as a whole, in breach of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
85 The United States is of the view that
the period of investigation for injury should include all months of the year in which there is domestic
production, assuming the data is reasonably available.86
7.69 The United States further argues that Economía's disregard of six months worth of data for each
of the three years of the period of investigation is inconsistent with the requirement of Article 3.5 of the
AD Agreement to make a determination of causati on based on "all relevant evidence" before the
authorities. The United States submits that in the absence of an objective examination of all relevant
evidence, and not just of a part of the evidence relating to the March - August period, the analysis of the
causal link between the dumped imports and injury to the industry is inevitably flawed.
7.70 The United States further submits that Economía's dismissal of the concerns of exporters and
importers that participated in the investigation concerning the flawed period of investigation, prevented
them from pointing to evidence from the missing months that might have supported their views. This, the
United States argues, is inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement. Finally, the United States
argues that as a consequence of the breaches of Articl es 3.1 and 3.5, Article 1 of the AD Agreement is
also violated.
Mexico
7.71 Mexico argues that the AD Agreement does not provide for any rules on how the period of
investigation for the injury analysis should be inte grated in the anti-dumping investigation. Mexico
asserts that Economía gathered all the information available over a period of three years ("the period
analysed"), including the year covered by the "period of investigation" for dumping purposes, March –
August 1999. It then limited its comparison to stric tly comparable periods, i.e. the periods in the
preceding two years that covered exactly the same m onths as those of the "period of investigation",

83 The United States thus emphasises that it is objecting per se to Economía's decision to limit the injury
analysis to only half of the period of investigation, and not only to the fact that Economía limited its analysis to the
period when imports were concentrated. US First Answer s to Questions, para. 16 and US Oral Statement at the
Second Substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties (the "Second Oral Statement"), para. 15.
84 US First Submission, para 76 quoting from Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 196. The
United States points to the analysis of capacity utilization and performance of the industry in terms of sales revenue
as two examples of a flawed analysis. In the United States' view, the period not examined would likely have led to
higher sales revenue, since the September – February period was the time in which import volumes were low and
domestic sales volumes at their seasonal high. By ignoring these data, Economía was not able to consider whether
any recovery of sales revenue from October through Decem ber offset or overcompensated any decline in sales
revenue relating to June- July production and reflected in the March – August data. US First Submission, para. 80.
85 The United States finds support for its argument in the Appellate Body Report in the US – Hot-Rolled
Steel case in which the Appellate Body found that "an exam ination of only parts of a domestic industry does not
ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic i ndustry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the
requirements of 'objective[ity]' in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement". Appellate Body Report,
US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 206, quoted in US First Submission, para. 82.
86 US First Answers to Questions, para. 13.

thereby eliminating any possible distortions in the market under analysis.
87 In any case, Mexico argues
that the AD Agreement does not stipulate anything on the choice of the period of investigation for injury,
leaving the investigating authority with unfettered discretion to determine itself the appropriate period of
investigation for the injury analysis.
88
7.72 Mexico rejects the United States' assertion that the period March – August is the period of highest
import penetration. According to Mexico, the production of long-grain white rice is more or less constant
throughout the year, as it is independent of the production cycles of paddy rice. This is so because the long-
grain white rice producers will simply import the paddy rice during certain parts of the year, but this does not
affect their production levels.89 The US argument that production is much higher, and imports much lower,
during the second part of the year which was not examined by Economía is, therefore, in Mexico's view,
baseless.90
7.73 In addition, in Mexico’s view, since the period of investigation was not inconsistent with any
provision of the AD Agreement, there is no basis for the US argument that the injury analysis failed to
examine all relevant evidence as required by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement or that the interested parties
were not given an opportunity to defend their interests. Mexico points out that the interested parties were
given an opportunity to meet with parties with an opposing interest 91 and they were all given every
opportunity to present their views, in accordance with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement. In the absence of a
violation of any provision of the AD Agreement, there is also no basis for the US claim of a consequential
violation of Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Analysis
7.74 The claim of the United States concerns the choice of the period of investigation for the injury
analysis and the data used by the investigating authority when examining injury. The United States
argues that by ignoring part of these data, Mexico failed to base its injury analysis on positive evidence
and did not conduct an objective examination of the state of the domestic industry, as required by Article
3.1 of the AD Agreement. Moreover, the United States submits, Mexico violated Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement, as its determination of the existence of a causal link between the dumped imports and the
alleged injury to the domestic industry was not based on all relevant evidence as half of the relevant
information was ignored. Mexico on the other hand submits that the AD Agreement does not contain any
obligations with regard to the period of investigation for the determination of injury and asserts that it was
necessary to examine these particular six months of every year instead of the full year in order to ensure
that the period of the injury analysis paralleled the six month period chosen for the analysis of dumping,
so as to avoid any distortions.
7.75 We note that in its Preliminary Determination the Mexican investigating authority stated that "the
investigated period is March – August 1999 and, theref ore, the period for injury analysis is the one
between March 1997 and August 1999".
92 In response to a question from the Panel, Mexico confirmed
that "the investigating authority gathered all the information available over a period of three years,
including the year covered by the 'period of investigation'; however, it limited its comparison to strictly

87 Mexico, First Answers to Questions, answer to questi on 3. Mexico First Submission, para. 55. In its
First Submission, Mexico argued that these differences could arise from the seasonal character of the product. In its
First Answers to Questions, and its Second Submission, it clarified that seasonality was not an issue in the decision
to base the determination on the March – August period of each of the three years of the injury analysis only. See
Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 3; Mexico Second Submission, para. 39.
88 Mexico First Submission, para. 57.
89 Mexico includes a table which demonstrates that throughout each of the years examined the domestic
production levels remained stable. Mexico First Submission, para. 60.
90 Mexico adds that none of the participating expor ters presented convincing reasons why the period of
investigation was to be changed.
91 Mexico asserts that a hearing took place on 18 January 2002.
92 Preliminary Determination, para. 69. Exhibits US-14 and US-15.

comparable periods, i.e. the periods in the preceding two years that covered exactly the same months as
those of the 'period of investigation¨' [for dumping]."
93 In other words, for injury purposes, the
investigating authority analysed data for the months of March – August of three consecutive years, 1997,
1998 and 1999, and data from the period September – February of each of these years were disregarded.
7.76 The United States asserts that by doing so, Mexico breached its obligations under Article 3.1 of
the AD Agreement and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, which provide as follows:
3.1 A determination of injury for purpo ses of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be
based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume
of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the conse quent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.
3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and
the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant
evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors
other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry,
and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped
imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume
and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the
patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the
foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance
and productivity of the domestic industry.
7.77 We note, as we have done with regard to the previous claim, that the AD Agreement does not set
forth any express requirement regarding the choice of the period of investigation for the purpose of
conducting an injury analysis. We are of the view, however, that the requirement to base a determination
of injury on positive evidence and pursuant to an objective examination nevertheless imposed certain
obligations on the Mexican investigating authorities with regard to the completeness of the data used as
the basis for its determination. In this respect, we recall that in any case under the Panel's standard of
review set forth in Article 17.6 of the AD Agr eement, we are to assess whether the authority's
establishment of the facts was proper, and its evaluation unbiased and objective.
94 The question before us
is thus whether it was proper of the Mexican investig ating authority in this particular case to base its
injury determination on data covering only half of the three-year period (for which, as it happens, data
were actually gathered), and whether such a limited data set enabled the authority to make an objective
examination of injury.

93 Mexico, First Answers to Questions, question 3.
94 We note that the Appellate Body in the EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) case also linked the objective
examination requirement with the panel's standard of revi ew that requires it to examine whether the authority's
establishment of the facts was proper. The Appellate Body explained in a footnote:
"These requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 3, as well as the requirements of
Article 17.6(i), that investigating author ities establish the facts of the matter properly and
evaluate those facts in an unbiased and objective manner, are mutually supportive and
reinforcing. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, we explained in respect of Article 17.6(i) that:
… panels must assess if the establishment of the facts by the investigating authorities was proper
and if the evaluation of those facts by those authorities was unbiased and objective. (original
italics)"
Appellate Body report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), footnote 141

7.78 We consider that an objective examination of the facts starts with an objective and unbiased
investigative process. We agree with the follo wing statement of the Appellate Body in the
US - Hot-Rolled Steel case summing up the requirement to conduct an "objective examination":
"In short, an "objective examination" requires that the domestic industry, and the effects
of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the
interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation. The
duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an "objective examination" recognizes
that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the
investigative process". (footnote omitted).
95
7.79 As we stated earlier, the choice of the period of investigation is crucial in this process as it
determines the data that will form the basis for the assessment of the impact of dumping. An examination
or investigation can only be "objective" if it is based on data which provide an accurate and unbiased
picture of what it is that one is examining.
7.80 In our view, an objective examination of the effects of dumping on the state of the domestic
industry which enables the authority to conclude that dumped imports caused injury to the domestic
industry involves an analysis of trends over time of the volume and price of imports and of the state of the
domestic industry. It is only such an analysis wh ich will enable the authority to objectively gauge the
effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement,
and to assess whether the injury found to exist is caused by the dumped imports as required by Article 3.5
of the AD Agreement.
7.81 For the purposes of examining the injury to th e domestic industry, the Mexican investigating
authority collected data for three years, 1997, 1998, and 1999. There does not appear to have been any
problems in obtaining such data for this continuous period of three years. However, in its examination of
that data, it decided not to use half of the information gathered. The authority thus based its determination
on data relating to six months of each of the three y ears of the period of investigation, the months of
March to August. In our view, and absent any proper justification for doing so, such an examination on
the basis of an incomplete set of data cannot be objective, nor does the selective use of certain data for the
injury analysis constitute a proper establishment of the facts on which to base the determination.
96
7.82 We wish to note in this respect that our ruling should not be read as to imply that there could
never be any convincing and valid reasons for examining only parts of years. Mexico has not however
presented any convincing arguments to this effect, whether in its investigation or in its arguments before
us. Mexico's only argument is that it was necessary to examine only data relating to the six months from
March to August because this was also the six month period chosen for the analysis of the existence of
dumping.97 We see no a priori reason why a period of investigation on the injury analysis should be
chosen to fit the period of investigation for the dumping analysis in case the latter period of investigation
covers a period of less than 12 months. In our view, there is nothing in the AD Agreement that would
require such an approach, quite to the contrary. Mexico submits that in order to avoid distortions due to
the differences in volume of imports, sales or production during the other six months, it used for its injury
analysis a similar six month period. We do not find this to constitute a proper justification for ignoring
half of the data concerning the domestic industry. In fact, it seems that what Mexico refers to as
distortions are certain developments which occur in the remaining six months which perhaps undo part of

95 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193.
96 Our finding in this respect is made independent of the question as to the biased nature of the choice for
these specific six months chosen.
97 In its First Submission, Mexico suggested that its choice of period of investigation was justified for
reasons relating to the seasonality of the product concer ned. Mexico has not, however further developed this
argument and has subsequently clarified that seasonality was not an issue in this case. See Mexico First Answers to
Questions, question 3; Mexico Second Submission, para. 39.

the effect of the imports that entered the country dur ing the six months that were examined. This is
precisely the kind of information we consider it is necessary to examine in order for the determination to
be that of an objective and unbiased investigating authority.
7.83 In fact, we recall that the applicants suggested this particular six month period of March –
August 1999 as it reflected the period of highest import penetration.
98 The Mexican investigating
authority itself confirms this in the Preliminary Determination, stating that, in accordance with the
information provided by the applicant, "imports tend to be concentrated during the period from March to
August every year, which corresponds to the investigated period proposed by the petitioner".99 While we
acknowledge that the authority was in this quote discussing the imports of paddy rice, the raw material for
the production of the subject long-grain white rice, it clearly accepted the link made between production
of paddy rice and the imports of the final product which the applicant points out is mainly imported in the
period March – August. As the applicant claimed, during this period paddy rice is not harvested and for
that reason this period adequately reflects the import activity.
100
7.84 In our view, there are some similarities between the failure to examine part of the year for which
data were collected, and the situation discussed by the Appellate Body in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case
involving an analysis of only a segment of the domestic industry, rather than the domestic industry as a
whole. The Appellate Body found that an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does
not ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore,
satisfy the requirements of "objectiv[ity]" in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
101 We consider
that the following reasoning of the Appellate Body leading to this conclusion is equally applicable to the
situation before us in which an important part of the year in which the domestic industry was fully
operational was disregarded in the injury analysis:
"204. We have already stated that it may be highly pertinent for investigating
authorities to examine a domestic industry by part, sector or segment. However, as with
all other aspects of the evaluation of the domestic industry, Article 3.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement requires that such a sectoral examination be conducted in an
"objective" manner. In our view, this requirement means that, where investigating
authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in
principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as
well as examine the industry as a whole. Or , in the alternative, the investigating
authorities should provide a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not necessary to
examine directly or specifically the other parts of the domestic industry. Different parts
of an industry may exhibit quite differe nt economic performance during any given
period. Some parts may be performing well, while others are performing poorly. To
examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry, even if coupled with an
examination of the whole industry, may give a misleading impression of the data relating
to the industry as a whole, and may overlook positive developments in other parts of the
industry. Such an examination may result in highlighting the negative data in the poorly
performing part, without drawing attention to the positive data in other parts of the
industry. We note that the reverse may also be true – to examine only the parts of an
industry which are performing well may lead to overlooking the significance of
deteriorating performance in other parts of the industry."
102

98 Application for initiation of an anti-dumping inves tigation regarding imports of long-grain white rice
from the United States, page 34. Exhibit US–8.
99 Preliminary Determination, para. 65. Exhibits US -14 and US-15
100 Preliminary Determination, para. 64. Exhibits US-14 and US-15.
101 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 206.
102 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 204.

7.85 We find that the acceptance of a period of inv estigation proposed by the applicants because it
allegedly represented the period of highest import penetration and would thus show the most negative side
of the state of the domestic industry is not what can be expected of an objective and unbiased
investigating authority. The question whether production was in fact lower during these months or not
and whether the situation of the domestic industry was, in fact, worse during these six months or not is, in
our view, irrelevant in this respect.
7.86 In sum, we find that the injury analysis of the Mexican investigating authority in the rice
investigation which was based on data covering only six months of each of the three years examined, is
inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement as it is not based on positive evidence and does not
allow for an objective examination, as it necessarily, and without any proper justification, provides only a
part of the picture of the situation. In addition, we find that the particular choice of the limited period of
investigation in this case was not that of an unbiased and objective investigating authority as the authority
was aware of, and accepted, the fact that the period chosen reflected the highest import penetration, thus
ignoring data from a period in which it can be expected that the domestic industry was faring better.
7.87 As a consequence, we also find that Mexico acted inconsistently with Article 3.5 of the
AD Agreement as it failed to base its determination of the existence of a causal relationship between the
dumped imports and the alleged in jury to the domestic industry on all relevant evidence before the
authorities, as required by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
7.88 In light of our findings on Article 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, we do not find it necessary to
address in this context the US claim under Article 1 of the AD Agreement and Article 6.2 of the
AD Agreement. That is, having determined that the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited
Articles, and exercising the discretion implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it
necessary to examine whether the investigation which led to the inconsistent measure was consistent with
the procedural rules on providing for all interested parties a full opportunity for the defence of their
interests set forth in Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement. We do not consider that this would add anything to
our findings or would be useful in the implementation of our ruling.
(c) Claim 3: Economía’s failure to collect the evidence on price effects and volumes that it
needed to conduct its injury analysis in an objective manner is inconsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.89 The United States submits that the injury determination in as far as it concerned the volume and
price effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry was not conducted in an objective manner,
nor based on positive evidence, as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement. With regard to
the volume of dumped imports, the United States argues that Economía failed to collect the data it needed
to examine in an objective manner whether there had been a significant increase in dumped imports, as
required by Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement. In particular, Economía did not use the customs
declarations (the "pedimentos") or seek to obtain accurate import volume information from importers. In
addition, Economía rejected information from th e only company found to have been dumping (the
Rice Company)
103, and drew inferences about volumes and prices of dumped imports from the data
provided by another company for non-dumped imports. 104 Its determination of the volume of dumped

103 According to the United States, the reasons given by Economía for rejecting the information was that
such information covered only the year 1999 and not also 1997 and 1998. The United States points out that
Economía did accept however less accurate estimates preferred by the applicants even though those estimates also
pertained only to the 1999 period of analysis. US First Submission, para. 98.
104 US First Submission, para. 97.

imports was therefore not objective nor based on positive evidence, in violation of Article 3.1 and 3.2 of
the AD Agreement.
7.90 With regard to the examination of the price effects of the alleged dumped imports on the domestic
industry, the United States submits that Economía failed to even attempt to collect information it needed
to conduct a proper price analysis as required by Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement. The United States
argues that the analysis under Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement of the price effects of the dumped imports
entails a comparison of data concerning prices fo r the dumped imports on the one hand, and data
concerning prices for the domestic like product on the other hand. While the AD Agreement does not
require any particular methodology for making price comparisons and evaluating price effects, the United
States submits that Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement re quires that this analysis consist of an objective
examination based on positive evidence. According to the United States, Economía chose to rely instead
on biased information sources that the applicants had selected, and thus compared the actual sales values
reported by the domestic producers to fictitious unit values for the dumped imports that it derived using a
methodology proposed by the applicant.
105
7.91 Finally, the United States submits that Economía used facts available to determine volume and
price effects of the dumped imports and relied on secondary source information, without first having
made an effort to obtain the data from the interested parties. In addition, it used such data without first
seeking to corroborate them against independent sources, in breach of Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1 and 7
Annex II of the AD Agreement.
Mexico
7.92 Mexico submits that Economía made an objective determination based on positive evidence of the
volume of dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices, in accordance with Articles
3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement. Mexico fails to see on what basis the United States is arguing that
because Economía based its analysis partly on information provided by the applicant, Economía violated
the Agreement.
7.93 According to Mexico, the AD Agreement does not impose a particular methodology for
conducting a volume or price analysis, nor does it impose an obligation on Economía to obtain more
information than such as provided by the parties, as long as it makes an objective determination based on
positive evidence.
106 Mexico rejects the United States' suggestion that Economía should have take the
initiative to obtain and examine the pedimentos in which it could have found more ample information on
prices and sales volumes. In any case, Mexico asser ts that such pedimentos are kept by the
Customs Office, and were therefore not at the dis posal of Economía. As such documents were not
provided by the applicant either, Economía could not rely on these documents for any price and volume
information. Moreover, such pedimentos would not have enabled Economía to distinguish the subject
imports from other imports coming in under the same tariff heading.
7.94 Mexico is of the view that the mere fact that Economía accepted the methodology proposed by
the applicant for estimating import volumes is not inc onsistent with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement,
especially since the exporters concerned failed to provide the information or did not respond at all. 107

105 According to the United States, Economía did not request data from a broad range of importers of the
products, did not request sales information on the prices at which the importers made sales to their customers, nor did
it seek information from purchasers to compare the prices paid for the dumped product with the prices paid for the
domestic product. By not doing so, the United States asserts that Economía did not have accurate unit value data on
the dumped imports.
106 Mexico First Submission, para. 97.
107 Mexico takes issue with the United States' suggestion that Economía accepted from the applicant
information it rejected from the exporter. Mexico argue s that Economía used the applicant information and
methodology as the starting point but conducted further research.

Mexico submits that the information provided by the Rice Company was not accepted for reasons of
procedural equality as it only related to one of the three years of the period of investigation, while others
did provide information for all three years and similar information was requested from the Rice Company
without success. Mexico thus asserts that the determination of the volume of dumped imports and their
price effect was not inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
7.95 With regard to the United States' assertion that Economía was not allowed to apply facts available
as it did not send questionnaires to all exporters and did not consult the pedimentos, Mexico submits that
it was not required to do so by the AD Agreement. Mexico argues that there is no provision in the
AD Agreement which requires an investigating authority to actively go out and seek information as part
of an anti-dumping investigation. Mexico argu es that under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement the
investigating authority can, but is not obliged to send questionnaires to all the foreign producers and
exporters. Mexico complied with its obligations under Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement by sending the
notice of initiation and the forms for producers and exporters to the known exporters and to the US
authorities, and published the notice of initiation. Mexico argues that the only customs document that the
investigating authority had in its possession were the excerpts of the customs declarations, also known as
the "listados". As these listados did not contain th e names of exporters, no other exporters than those
mentioned in the application were known to Economía. The forms sent to the known exporters and the
US authorities clearly indicated that facts available could be used in case the required information was not
provided. In Mexico's view, Economía thus complied with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Analysis
7.96 The United States claims that Mexico failed to base the part of its injury determination relating to
the trends in the volume of dumped imports and the price effects of the dumped imports on positive
evidence as it failed to collect the information required to make an objective examination of injury based
on positive evidence, as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement. In addition the
United States argues that the use of secondary source information without having sought to obtain the
information from the interested parties is inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement and Annex II
thereto.
7.97 Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement provide as follows:
3.1 A determination of injury for purpo ses of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be
based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume
of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the conse quent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.
3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities
shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With
regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall
consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports
as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the
effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent
price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or
several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
7.98 Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement thus requires in relevant part that an injury determination is to
be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports
and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products. Article 3.2 of the
AD Agreement elaborates on these requirements by requiring the authority to consider whether there has
been a significant increase in dumped imports and whether there has been a significant price undercutting

by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether
the effect has been to depress prices or prevent price increases. It is clear from reading these two
provisions in combination that the basis for any ev aluation as to the volume of dumped imports or the
price effects of such imports has to be positive evid ence. We concur with the views expressed by the
Appellate Body in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case, that the word "positive" means that the evidence must
be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.
108 We wish to
emphasise that our task is not to perform a de novo review of the information and evidence on the record,
nor to substitute our judgment for that of the Mexican authorities. Rather we examine what the evidence
was on which the authorities based its examination and whether the determination made was the result of
an objective examination based on positive evidence. In this respect, we consider it important to recall
our standard of review under the AD Agreement as set forth in Article 17.6 (i) of the AD Agreement:
“(i) in its assessment of the facts of the ma tter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;”
7.99 In other words, if we find that the Mexican investigating authorities have properly established the
facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and objective manner, and that the determinations rest upon a
permissible interpretation of the relevant provisions, we will consider this measure to be consistent with
the relevant provisions of the AD Agreement.
7.100 The authority explains how it established the volume of dumped imports of the subject product
into Mexico in its final determination.
109 The final determination shows that the authorities were
confronted with the problem of distinguishing first the subject rice imports (i.e. "long-grain white rice")
from imports of all types of rice, and second the impor ts of the subject product that were dumped into
Mexico from those imports that entered Mexico at undumped prices. The first problem arose from the
fact that the tariff line under which subject imports of long-grain white rice were imported, 1006.30.01, at
the time of the investigation also covered other types of rice such as medium and short grain rice, as well
as glazed or parboiled rice which were not part of the investigation.
110
7.101 The investigating authority examined various methods of extracting from the total imports that
entered the country under this tariff line, those imports relating to the subject product, long-grain white
rice. The authority first examined the "method using the exporters' verifiable information". The authority
had requested information about long-grain white rice exports from each of the four companies that
participated in the investigation. One firm rep lied that it had not exported and it did not provide any
information. Two other companies, the Rice Company and Riceland were found to have submitted proper
information for the period of investigation for the dumping analysis (1999). However, for the rest of the
period of investigation (years 1997 – 1998) the authority found that only information on exports to other
countries were submitted (the case of the Rice Company) , or only a copy of a worksheet in which the
exports of the investigated product were not clearly itemized was submitted (the case of Riceland). In
sum, the authority considered that the only company to provide correct information for the whole period

108 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 192.
109 Final Determination, (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) paragraphs 206 – 261.
110 As becomes clear from, for example, para. 7 of the Notice of Initiation (Exhibit US-2):
"The petitioner also indicated that other types of white rice enter the country under tariff code
1006.30.01 of the Schedule in the General Import Ta x Law and that these types have different
characteristics from those of the product under investigation and are classified commercially in
two groups: short grain rice and medium grain ri ce. However, the tariff description in the
Schedule under the General Import Tax law is gene ral and makes no reference to this type of
classification. Thus, the customs declarations do not differentiate the type of rice that is entering
the United Mexican States."

of investigation was Farmers Rice, whose expor ts increased by 303.7 per cent in the 1998 March –
August period compared to the previous corr esponding period and by 12.3 per cent during the
investigated period in 1999 in relation to the previous comparable period.
111 The authority considered
that two of the three participating companies di d not provide accurate information for the whole
investigated period, and decided for that reason not to use the information submitted by these two
companies. Instead, it established that the vari ation observed in the case of Farmers Rice was an
acceptable indicator of the behaviour of the exports by the two other participating firms, Riceland and the
Rice Company.
7.102 We consider it important to note at this juncture that the authority found no dumping margin for
Farmers Rice, allegedly the only company that provided full information and of which the imports were
used as an indicator of the volume of dumped imports. No dumping margin was found with respect to
imports from Riceland either, a company whose expor ts the authority states represented an important
proportion of imports from the United States into Mexico under tariff line 1006.30.01.
112
7.103 For determining the volume of imports from companies other than the four participating firms, the
authority decided to use the methodology proposed by the applicant:
"229. ... [T]he Ministry found that the petitioner submitted a method that intends to
differentiate some products from others for the purpose of calculating the dumping
margin. This method is based on the confidence interval analysis. For this, the behavior
of long grain rice prices on the one hand and of the prices of short grain and medium
grain rice on the other were observed in the United States of America during the
investigated period. Thus, the medium grain and short grain rice group had a minimum
price of $0.458 U.S. dollars per kilogram and a maximum price of $0.509 dollars per
kilogram. Finally, the CMA indicated that, based on the above, presumably any
importation made at a price above 0.458 dollars per kilogram would be of rices different
from the investigated one, while those imports made at prices below such amount would
correspond to long grain rice.
230. With this information as a starting point, and as was established at paragraph 221 of
the preliminary determination, unquestioned by any of the interested parties, the Ministry
calculated the volume of imports that would correspond to these price levels, and it
subtracted the result from the total volume of imports from the United States of America
that entered into the Mexican territory under tariff section 1006.30.01 of what was then
the Tarifa de la Ley del Impuesto General de Importación during the investigated period.
The above was carried out taking the listado de pedimentos de importación of the SIC-
M, from which they eliminated those transactions with a price above $0.458 US dollars
per kilogram. In this way, the Ministry considered that the rest of the imports could
correspond to long grain white rice, which was not disproved during the
investigation."
113
7.104 In sum, the methodology proposed by the applicant was that rice imported below a certain price
level was to be treated as the subject product, long-grain white rice, while rice imported above that price
was not. The authority explained that it decided to use this methodology, even though it presented the
important shortcoming that it failed to provide accurate information on the periods prior to the period of
investigation used for dumping purposes, i.e. for the years 1997-1998.
114 While in the case of the

111 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), paras. 226 – 227.
112 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), para. 228.
113 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), paras. 229 – 230.
114 The authority made the following statement in para. 232 of the Final Determination:
"We have to point out that, when analyzing the information from which the above concepts are
inferred, the Ministry found that the price of the long grain rice in the United States of America

exporting firms that participated in the investigation, this failure to provide accurate information for the
years 1997-1998 implied that they were assumed to all have behaved in the same manner as the one
exporter that provided full and accurate data (Farme rs Rice), in applying the applicant’s method the
authority overcame this problem of lack of accurate data for the years 1997 – 1998 by simply assuming
that the level of imports of the subject product in the total imports of all types of rice during the years of
1997 and 1998 was the same as in the year 1999:
"239. [T]he Ministry decided that the best methodology in order to make this estimate
[on the volume of imports from the United States] was the one presented by the CMA
[the petitioner]; however, such methodology , as noted in paragraph 232 of this
determination, could only identify long gr ain white rice imports corresponding to the
investigated period [of 1999] and cannot be ex trapolated to previous similar periods.
Therefore, the Ministry decided it was appropr iate to consider that the investigated
imports, as they were estimated in paragraph 230 of this determination, maintained the
same participation in the total imports coming from the United States of America.[…]."
(emphasis added)
7.105 On this basis the authority established that the investigated imports increased 8.6 per cent in the
period March-August 1998 in relation to the same period in the previous year, and increased 3.4 per cent
during the dumping investigation period in relation to the previous comparable period. We recall that
with regard to the level of imports from the examined exporters, the authority found, on the basis of the
assumption that all exporters behaved in a manner sim ilar to Farmers Rice, that the exports to Mexico
from the companies that appeared in the investigation increased 303.7 per cent and 12.3 per cent in the
analyzed periods.115
7.106 The authority then addressed the second problem of separating the volume of dumped subject
imports from non-dumped subject imports, and found as follows:
"243. Article 3.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement states that it shall be considered
whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports. In order to comply with
this article the Ministry made two groups of imports:
a) The imports that will be subject to a residual dumping margin, that is the group
obtained from subtracting, from the investig ated imports, which correspond solely to
long grain white rice, the volume of exports made by the exporting companies that
participated in the investigation, and
b) The exports made by The Rice Corporation, for which a dumping margin of
3.93 per cent was established. The sum of these two data groups corresponds to the
dumped imports.
244. Based on what is set forth in the above paragraph, the Ministry observed that these
imports decreased 3.2 per cent in the pe riod March-August 1998 in relation to the
previous comparable period and increased 1. 2 per cent in the investigated period in
relation to the same period of the previous year. Thus, the Ministry concluded that the
dumped imports increased in the investigated period, in terms of articles 64(I) of the

was not always below the price of the other types of rice, as is stated in paragraph 224 of the
preliminary determination. Therefore the Ministry considers that this estimation method cannot be
used consistently during the periods previous to the investigated one". Final Determination
115 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) para. 241.

Regulations of the Foreign Trade Act, and 3.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement."
116
(emphasis added)
7.107 In other words, the authority took the total volume of imports of the subject product and
subtracted from that amount the imports from the exporters that participated in the investigation and for
which no dumping margin was found.
7.108 With regard to the analysis of the evolution of prices of the subject imports and their effects on
domestic prices, the investigating authority first concluded that the prices of dumped imports were
decreasing in the following manner:
"[A]s the price of all kinds of rice decreased during the investigated period and as the
export price of Farmers Rice Milling also decreased, it is reasonable to conclude that the
prices of the remaining imports, including the dumped imports, decreased. This argument
was not refuted by any of the parties during the proceeding."
117
7.109 In examining the effects on domestic prices, the authority reasoned as follows:
"285. The Ministry found that during the investigated period, dumped imports were
17.8 per cent below the domestic price of the previous comparable period, and
24.2 per cent below that which existed in the period March-August 1997.

294. Based on the aforementioned, the Ministry observed a decline in the prices of the
domestic products that coincided with a d ecrease in the prices of the imports from the
United States of America, dumped or not – although the prices of the dumped imports
were 6.5 per cent below the price of non-dumped imports -, as well as with the presence
of the product from Argentina.
295. Consequently, the Ministry observed th at the information that was available
during the final stage of the investigation s hows that the imports of the investigated
product were priced below the domestic product, except for the exports from
Riceland Foods, Inc., which did not have a dumping margin.
296. Therefore, the Ministry determined that, during the investigated period, the
dumped products were priced below the domestic product. It was also observed that the
price of the dumped imports was lower than the prices of the domestic products in
periods previous to the investigated period. Due to this, the Ministry determined that this
situation provoked the decline in the prices of the domestic producers. Also, the
Ministry considers that the entry during the investigated period of imports at reduced
prices from Argentina and the decline, in the same period, of the price of non-dumped
imports from the United States of America cont ributed to the decline in prices of the
merchandise produced domestically. Thus, the Ministry determined that the dumped
imports from the United States of America contributed to pressure the domestic
producers to lower their prices in the investigated period."
118
7.110 The question before us is thus whether the i nvestigating authority based its determination on
information which is affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible.119 We are of the view that the way in

116 Paras. 243 and 244 of the Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7).
117 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), para. 270.
118 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), paras. 285 and 294 - 296.
119 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 192:

which the investigating authority established the facts on the basis of which it was going to consider the
trends in volume of dumped imports was not a proper establishment of the facts, for the following
reasons.
7.111 As is clear from the authority's final determination, the volume analysis is not based on facts, but
on assumption after assumption. The methodology of the applicant which the authority decided to use is
based on the unsubstantiated assumption that rice sold below a certain price level must be long-grain
white rice. Although the authority itself concludes that this was a flawed assumption
120, it decided to use
this methodology. However, because the assumption apparently held true only for the investigated period
of the year 1999, the authority had to make another unsubstantiated assumption, which was that in fact
during the previous years the subject imports kept the same share in the total amount of imports of all
types of rice from the United States. We recall that these assumptions were used in order to establish the
trends in the volume of the imports of the subject product, long-grain white rice from the United States,
without any distinction between the dumped and the non-dumped imports.
7.112 In parallel with the applicant's methodology for the determination of the volume trends of subject
imports, the authority determined the trends in the volume of imports from the examined exporters. The
authority first rejected the information provided by two of the three exporters examined, among which the
Rice Company, the only company of these three for which a positive margin of dumping was established,
and again based its conclusion as to their volume of subject imports on an unsubstantiated assumption, i.e.
the assumption that all examined firms' export volumes showed a similar trend to that of the exporter
which provided full three year volume information, Farmers Rice. We note that no margin of dumping
was established with regard of exports from this co mpany, Farmers Rice. On the basis of all these
assumptions, the authority then determined the volume of dumped imports by subtracting all imports from
the three examined exporters from the total amount of assumed subject imports, and adding the imports
from the one examined company for which a margin for dumping was found, the Rice Company. It is
clear that the authority did not base itself on positive evidence, but on, in our view unjustified,
assumptions, and the authority has therefore failed to properly establish the facts. We do not wish to
imply by this that an authority is never allowed to complete its analysis by drawing certain inferences,
provided it offers a well reasoned explanation. Howe ver, we are of the view that the investigating
authority did not do this in this case. Actually, it appears that in making its assumptions, the investigating
authority consistently chose to make assumptions which negatively affected the exporters' interests. In
our view, the authority could just as readily have concluded the exact opposite from the facts on which it
based its assumptions. For that reason as well, we consider that the Mexican authority failed to conduct
an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports.
7.113 With regard to the basis for the authority’s finding on the price decrease of the dumped imports,
we come to much the same conclusions. We consid er that an investigating authority conducting an
objective and unbiased investigation could not have reached the conclusion that prices of dumped imports
were decreasing on the basis of the flawed analysis based on unsubstantiated assumptions made by the
Mexican investigating authority. In the stat ement on price decreases quoted above, the authority
compares three types of prices: (a) export price of all types of rice (both subject rice and non-subject
rice), (b) export price of Farmers Rice, and (c) the export price of the "remaining imports, including the
dumped imports". We recall that Farmers Rice is "the only exporter to present information related to the
entire investigated period, although this company did not have a margin of dumping"
121. Thus, the logic
of Economía is that because the price of a broader category of rice – i.e. category (a) -- declined, and
because the prices of one participating exporter of the subject product, who was not found to have been

"The term 'positive evidence' relates, in our view, to the quality of the evidence that authorities
may rely upon in making a determination. The word "positive" means, to us, that the evidence
must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible."

(emphasis added)
120 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), para. 232.
121 Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) para. 268.

dumping, decreased, the third category of rice – (c) or "dumped imports" -- is a sub-set of the first
category of rice, and this third category of rice must have declined also.
122 We do not consider this to be a
warranted assumption on the basis of the evidence in this case. Let us assume, for arguments sake, that
import of category (a) (or "all kinds of rice") represented 100 tons, and its price declined by 7 per cent.
Let us also assume that of that 100 tons, 10 tons represented "dumped imports". If the price of the latter
increased 2 per cent while the price of the rest (i.e. 90 tons) decreased by 8 per cent, the price of "all kinds
of rice" would still decrease by 7 per cent. 123 In our view, such flawed assumptions are clearly not
"positive evidence" on which an examination of the price effects of dumped imports is to be based.
7.114 We are not convinced either that an objective and unbiased investigating authority had no choice
but to base itself on the above unsubstantiated assump tions for lack of better information. The
determination of dumping and injury are the result of an investigation to be conducted in an objective and
unbiased manner. In our view, the Mexican investigating authority failed to comply with its obligation to
determine the volume of dumped imports on the basis of positive evidence and to make an objective
examination by failing to conduct a proper investigation. We consider that to conduct an "investigation"
requires a proper degree of activity on the part of the competent authorities because authorities charged
with conducting an inquiry or a study – to use the treaty language, an "investigation" – must actively seek
out pertinent information.
124 As we will discuss later in respect of the use of facts available to
unexamined exporters, we are of the view that the investigating authority failed to ensure that all
interested parties were informed of the information required of them, as the authority sent questionnaires
only to those exporters listed in the application and those that appeared subsequent to the initiation of the
investigation. It is clear that had the authorities properly informed all interested parties the authority
could reasonably be considered to have knowledge of and if it had sent questionnaires to a larger number
of exporters, more, and more accurate information could have been gathered on the volume of the subject
imports.
7.115 Moreover, it appears that very useful and valuable information which could have provided a more
accurate basis for any assessment of the volume of th e subject imports existed in the form of the
pedimentos which contained all information on volume and value of the imports, the exporting enterprise,
the importing enterprise, the duties and other taxes paid, the date of the transaction, the customs point of
entry of the goods, the tariff line under which the transaction was conducted and so forth.
125 Even though
it appears the field for entering the product description does not necessarily contain all the details of the
product covered by the pedimento, and even accepting that even if all the pedimentos had been available
it might not have been possible to determine with certainty the total amount of imports of the subject
product, such data would in any case have constituted a more objective basis of evidence for making a
reasonable estimate of the amount of dumped imports. In any case, from Mexico's answers to our
questions with regard to the pedimentos, we conc lude that in cases where the pedimento would have
simply referred to white rice without distinguishing whether the product imported was long-grain or other
white rice, it would still be possible to find the precise product description by referring to additional
documents such as the invoices issued by the exporte r, bills of lading, and so forth. While we
acknowledge that this would have required some additional work for the investigating authority we are of
the view that the authority cannot have its cake and eat it at the same time. If an authority does not send
out questionnaires to all exporters it could reasonably be expected to have knowledge of, and does not
ensure that as many exporters as possible are otherw ise informed of the information required by, for
example, requesting the assistance of the authorities of the exporting country or known industry

122 It goes without saying that one cannot assume that the price of dumped imports are cheaper than non-
dumped imports (e.g. price of Farmers Rice). Thus, we fail to see, from the explanation given in the Final
Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), how the price of Farmers Rice (i.e .category (b)) fit into Economía's logic
here.
123 10x(0.02)+90x(-0.08) = 100x(-0.07)
124 We thus concur with the view expressed by the Appellate Body in the US – Wheat Gluten case.
Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 53.
125 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 15.

associations in the exporting country, then it cannot complain about the fact that it will have to become
more active itself in gathering sufficient positive evidence on which to base its injury determination.
7.116 In sum, we find that the investigating authority's injury analysis with regard to the volume and
price effects of dumped imports was inconsistent w ith the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
AD Agreement to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the volume and price
effects of the dumped imports.
7.117 In light of our findings on Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, we do not consider it
necessary to continue our analysis of the US claim with regard to Article 6.8 and Annex II of the
AD Agreement alleged to have been violated by the Mexican investigating authority’s failure to base its
determination of the volume and price effects of dumped imports on positive evidence, and make no
findings in this respect.
(d) Claim 4: Economía’s failure to ob jectively consider whether there was a significant
increase in the volume of dumped imports or whether the dumped imports had a significant
effect on prices is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.118 According to the United States, while Economía's injury analysis included a lot of discussion of
the volume of imports, much of the discussion did not address the relevant dumped imports. Moreover,
the United States submits, the data that reflect the calculated volumes of dumped imports show that those
imports actually declined, both in absolute and relative terms during the selected three year period.
126 The
United States submits that an objective and unbiased investigating authority would not, in light of these
facts have found that there was a significant increase in dumped imports, and Economía's findings in this
case thus breached Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
7.119 The United States further argues that Economía evaluated the effect of imports on prices, but
failed to consider whether their effect was "significant" as required by Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
For that reason as well, the United States submits, Economía 's determination is inconsistent with Article
3.2 of the AD Agreement.
7.120 For these reasons, according to the United States, Economía's determination was not objective nor
based on positive evidence and thus also inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
Mexico
7.121 Mexico rejects the United States' assertion that Economía failed to make an objective
determination of a significant increase in the volume of imports and of the price effects of the dumped

126 US First Submission, para. 104. The United States refers to paras. 244, 248, 254, and 259 of the Final
Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) which deal with dumped imports. According to the United States, these
data show that the volume of dumped imports declined (para. 244), as did their share of apparent domestic
consumption (para. 248) and internal consumption (par a. 254). The volume of dumped imports in relation to
domestic production remained flat (10.2–10.7–10.1) (para. 259). See US First Submission, paras. 105 – 109.

imports. Mexico argues that the significance of th e increase is addressed in paragraphs 209-261 of the
Final Determination, albeit in an implicit manner.
127

127 Mexico First Submission, para. 116. By way of ex ample, Mexico refers to para. 212 in which it was
determined that total imports rose and para. 217 that showed that imports from the United States increased during the
period.

(ii) Analysis
7.122 In the light of our earlier findings in respect of the authority’s injury determination which we find
not to have been based on positive evidence and not to have involved an objective examination, we do not
find it necessary to address the US claim described a bove concerning the specific conclusions of the
authority based on such flawed premises. That is, having determined that the authority’s determination in
respect of injury is inconsistent with the cited provision, and exercising the discretion implicit in the
principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether certain of the conclusions
of the authority gave rise to further inconsistencies in respect of that determination.
(e) Claim 5: Economía’s failure to conduct an objective analysis of the relevant economic
factors is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the
AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.123 The United States submits that Economía failed to examine "all" relevant economic factors
affecting the industry, as required by Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. The United States refers in
particular to the failure to examine the "factors affecting domestic prices", such as the quality differences
or other factors affecting domestic prices such as brand reputation.
7.124 In addition, the United States submits that Economía's conclusions concerning some of the injury
factors examined did not correspond with the facts on the record. In particular, Economía's conclusion
that inventories increased, and market share declined are not supported by the facts on the record as found
in the final determination. The United States s ubmits that Economía's determination is therefore
inconsistent with Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, as well as Article 3.1, as it was neither objective nor
based on positive evidence.
Mexico
7.125 Mexico submits that all relevant factors ha ving a bearing on the industry were objectively
examined in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Mexico emphasises that not one
factor is determinative. With regard to the factor raised by the United States, inventories, Mexico submits
that the Final Determination shows that there was a 7.3 per cent increase, even if this was preceded by a
decrease.
128
(ii) Analysis
7.126 In the light of our earlier findings in respect of the authority’s injury determination which we find
not to have been based on positive evidence and not to have involved an objective examination, we do not
find it necessary to address the US claim described above concerning the specific aspects of this injury
determination based on such flawed premises. Th at is, having determined that the authority’s
determination in respect of injury is inconsistent with the cited provision, and exercising the discretion
implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether certain
aspects of the determination gave rise to further inconsistencies in respect of that determination.

128 Final determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7), para. 318. Similarly, Mexico asserts, market
participation was discussed in paras. 313 – 315 of the Final Determination, and the effects of imports on prices of the
like product in paras. 271 -296. Mexico First Submission, para. 121.

(f) Claim 6: Economía’s inclusion of non-dumped imports in its evaluation of volume, price
effects, and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry is inconsistent with
Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.127 The United States argues that Economía's injury and causation analysis examined the effects of all
imports from the United States, both those that Economía acknowledged were not dumped and those that
it alleged were dumped. The United States submits that Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
which govern the analysis of injury to the domes tic industry caused by dumped imports, require an
objective examination of the volume and effect of imports that are dumped to the exclusion of the volume
and effect of imports that are not dumped.
129 Although Economía noted the data computed for the
dumped imports alone, the United States argues that its examination and the final affirmative
determination show that in reaching the determination, Economía considered the volume and price effects
of all imports from the United States of long-grain white rice.
130 Therefore, the United States submits that
Economía's failure to conduct an objective examinati on of the effect of the dumped imports alone is
inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
Mexico
7.128 With regard to the United States' assertion that non-dumped imports were included in the
assessment of the volume and price effects of imports, Mexico argues that a separate analysis is present
throughout the determination of imports from the United States in general and dumped imports from the
United States in particular.
131 Mexico recalls that Economía reached the conclusion that almost
75 per cent of all imports from the United States were dumped and that this was the percentage of imports
that was causing injury.132
(ii) Analysis
7.129 In the light of our earlier findings in respect of the authority’s injury determination which we find
not to have been based on positive evidence and not to have involved an objective examination, we do not
find it necessary to address the US claim described above concerning the specific aspects of this injury
determination based on such flawed premises. Th at is, having determined that the authority’s
determination in respect of injury is inconsistent with the cited provision, and exercising the discretion
implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether certain
aspects of the determination gave rise to further inconsistencies in respect of that determination.

129 The United States finds support for its argument in Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India), para. 111 – 112.
130 The United States considers that Economía's focus on all investigated imports, and not just the dumped
imports, is most apparent in its discussion of the price effects. See US First Submission, para .120-123.
131 Mexico refers to paragraphs 206 – 221 of the Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7).
132 Mexico First Submission, para. 124.

(g) Claim 7: Economía’s failure to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law with respect to its determination of injury is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.130 The United States submits that several findings in Economía's final injury determination belie an
objective examination of volume, price effects, and impact, and are not adequately explained as
Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement requires.
133
Mexico
7.131 Mexico argues that the Final Determination sets forth in a detailed manner all considerations and
findings on fact and law concerning dumping, injury and the causal link, in accordance with Article 12.2
of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Analysis
7.132 In light of our earlier findings pursuant to Article 3 of the AD Agreement, we do not find it
necessary to address in this context the US claim unde r Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement. That is,
having determined that the measure at issue is inc onsistent with the cited Article, and exercising the
discretion implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether
the investigation which led to the inconsistent m easure was consistent with the procedural rules
concerning notification in Article 12.2 of the AD Agr eement. We do not consider that this would add
anything to our findings or would be useful in the implementation of our ruling.
2. Claims relating to the margin of dumping and the application of the measure
(a) Claim 8: Economía’s failure to exclude firms with anti-dumping margins of zero per cent
from the anti-dumping measure is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 5.8
of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.133 The United States submits that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires the termination of the
investigation in case of a margin of dumping which is below de minimis. According to the United States,
the term "margin" refers to the individual margin of dumping determined for each of the investigated
exporters or producers.
134 The United States therefore argues th at Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement
requires that an investigation against an exporter is to be terminated in case the conclusion is that the
exporter in question was not dumping. Economía found that two exporters, Farmers Rice and Riceland,
had not been dumping during the period of inves tigation, but still included them in the anti-
dumping measure. While a zero per cent anti-dumping duty was imposed with regard to these exporters,
the United States emphasises that both exporters remain subject to subsequent reviews, and the possible
application of duties in the future. The United States submits that the failure of Economía to terminate its

133 The United States mentions four examples to illustrate its point. It refers by way of example inter alia to
the failure to explain the effects of low-priced impor ts from Argentina which increased significantly during the
period of investigation. US First Submission, para. 125.
134 The United States finds support for this definition in the Appellate Body report, US – Hot –Rolled Steel,
para 118.

investigation with respect to Farmers Rice and Riceland which it found not to have been dumping violates
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
135
Mexico
7.134 Mexico is of the view that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement has not been violated as the
investigation demonstrated that imports from the United States had been dumped into Mexico above
de minimis levels, and that injury was caused by such dumping. According to Mexico, Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement does not refer to the individual inves tigation of each exporter but to the investigation
against imports from a particular country in general. Mexico considers that it suffices for one exporter to
be found to have been dumping above de minimis level for all exporters to be included in the application
of the measure, and each enterprise will be assigned the anti-dumping duty corresponding to its individual
margin provided that the total volume of imports from a particular country is above the negligible level.
136
According to Mexico, Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement specifies that the basis for calculating margins of
dumping in accordance with Article 5.8 applies to each country as a whole, and that Article 5.8 thus does
not in any way establish that firms with de minimis margins of dumping should be excluded from the
measure.137 Moreover, Mexico is of the view that a zero per cent duty level does not de facto constitute
an anti-dumping duty, as it cannot cause any disadvantage to the exporter concerned. Further, Mexico
argues that there is nothing in the AD Agreement which prohibits that exporters be submitted to a review
even if the exporters did not dump duri ng the original period of investigation. 138 If the drafters had
wanted to prohibit such reviews, they would have done so explicitly. Mexico therefore asserts that to
include Riceland and Farmers Rice in the anti-dumping measure in respect of long-grain white rice from
the United States was not inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Analysis
7.135 The United States claims that by not excluding from the definitive anti-dumping measure two US
exporters which were found to have exported at undumped prices, Mexico violated Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement, which provides as follows:
5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of in jury to justify proceeding with the case.
There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the
margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or
potential, or the injury, is negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be
de minimis if this margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export
price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the
volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than
3 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries
which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the like product in
the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per cent of imports of the
like product in the importing Member.
 139

135 The United States further notes that the investigating authority took no steps to examine whether the
weighted average margin of all exporters was greater than de minimis when it decided to impose the anti-dumping
measure. US First Answers to Questions, para. 62.
136 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 20.
137 Mexico Second Submission, para. 138.
138 Mexico asserts that in case a review demonstrates that there is no dumping, the exporter will continue to
enjoy a 0 per cent duty level.
139 In French, Article 5.8 provides in relevant part as follows:

7.136 The first sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Ag reement requires an authority to reject an
application and terminate an investigation promptly as soon as the authorities are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or injury. The second sentence requires the immediate termination
(of the investigation) in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis or
that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury is negligible. The third sentence then
continues by explaining that the margin of dumping is de minimis if it is less than 2 per cent, expressed as
a percentage of the export price. The fourth sen tence provides that the volume of dumped imports is
negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a pa rticular country is found to account for less than
3 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member.
7.137 In our view, in the AD Agreement the term "margin of dumping" refers to the individual margin
of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping. This is
evidenced by Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement whic h provides that "the authorities shall, as a rule,
determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation".
140 As the text of Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement makes clear, this
provision provides for the general rule of calculating an individual margin of dumping for each known
exporter or producer. The exception to this rule is the case in which there are too many foreign producers
or exporters so that an individual margin of dumping will only be calculated for a representative sample,
while for the other non-sampled producers or exporters, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement determines what
the maximum amount of the duty is that can be applie d to them. In sum, both the general rule and the
exception to the rule provide for the calculation of individual margins of dumping, and do not envisage
the calculation of a country-wide margin.
7.138 We examined the rest of the AD Agreement to see whether there is anything in the Agreement
that contradicts this conclusion that the term margin of dumping in the AD Agreement is company-
specific rather than country-wide. Article 8.1 of the AD Agreement concerning price undertakings as an
alternative to the imposition of an anti-dumping duty provides that proceedings may be suspended or
terminated without the imposition of provisional measures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of
satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise its prices, and stipulates that the price
increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping.
 It is clear that in this provision as well, the term margin of dumping referred to is exporter-specific, and
does not refer to the average margin of dumping fo r all exports from all producers or exporters of a
country.
7.139 Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement provides that the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not
exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. Article 2 of the AD Agreement provides a
definition of dumping and sets forth the manner in which a margin of dumping is to be established under
the AD Agreement. A number of references to the "exporter or producer under investigation" in Article 2,
for example in Article 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, and 2.3 of the AD Agreement, make explicit the generally accepted

faisant l'objet d'un dumping, ou le dommage, est négligeable.[...]"
In Spanish, Article 5.8 reads in relevant part:
importaciones reales o potenciales objeto de dumping o el daño son insignificantes, se pondrá
140 If an individual margin cannot be determined for each known exporter for practical reasons, the
Agreement allows the authorities to sample and calculate an individual margin for the sampled exporters.

understanding that Article 2 of the AD Agreement prescribes the manner in which an individual margin of
dumping for an exporter or producer under investigation is to be determined.
141
7.140 Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement requires the authorities to promptly carry out a review for the
purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting
country who have not exported the product to the importing Member during the period of investigation.
This Article as well clearly refers to individual margins of dumping. Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement
requires that the public notice of a preliminary or final determination include, inter alia, the "margins of
dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for the methodology used in the establishment
and comparison of the export price and the normal value under Article 2”. The term margins of dumping
is in this context clearly used to refer to the margins of dumping calculated for each individual exporter,
as required by Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. In other words, whenever the Agreement refers to the
determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual
exporter. In fact we note that Mexico does not appear to disagree with our understanding as it calculates
individual margins of dumping for all exporters participating in the investigation, including even those
that did not export during the period of investigation. Therefore, we are of the view that the investigation
which is to be immediately terminated under the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is
the investigation in respect of the individual exporter for which a zero or de minimis margin was
established.
7.141 We also consider relevant in this respect the fact the second sentence requires the immediate
termination of the investigation in case the margin of dumping is de minimis or the volume of dumped
imports is negligible. According to Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, negligibility is to be determined in
respect of the volume of dumped imports " from a particular country" . In short, in Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement, the margin of dumping is juxtaposed to the volume of dumped imports. While it is
expressly stipulated that the latter is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is made
with regard to the margin of dumping. This further confirms our view that the reference to the margin of
dumping in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is, as is the case in the other provisions of the AD
Agreement referred to above, a reference to the individual margin of dumping which is to be determined
on an exporter-specific basis.
142
7.142 We further find support for our reading that Artic le 5.8 of the AD Agreement in relevant part
requires the termination of the investigation in respect of an individual exporter in the Panel report in the
US – DRAMs case which also reached the conclusion that the de minimis rule in Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement concerns the question whether an individual exporter will be subject to an anti-dumping
order. The panel in that case concluded that the de minimis rule of Article 5.8 did not apply in the context
of the duty assessment procedure of Article 9.3 as had been argued by Korea in that case, and found that:
"6.90 [...]As explained above, we consider that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its
context, does not require that a Member apply the Article 5.8 de minimis test in an
Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure. In any event, there are possible logical
explanations for applying different de minimis standards in investigations and Article 9.3
duty assessment procedures. Article 5.8 requires the termination of investigations in
cases where the margin of dumping is de minimis. Thus, in the context of Article 5.8, the
function of the de minimis test is to determine whether or not an exporter is subject to an
anti-dumping order. In the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, however,
the function of any de minimis test applied by Members is to determine whether or not an
exporter should pay a duty. A de minimis test in the context of an Article 9.3 duty

141 We note that it is indeed the general practice among WTO Members, including Mexico, to calculate an
individual margin of dumping, rather than country-wide margins of dumping.
142 We note that in any case Mexico did not argue that an investigation has to be terminated if the country-
wide dumping margin is below de minimis, but rather that such an investigation does not need to be terminated as
soon as there is one exporter or producer found to have been dumping.

assessment procedure will not remove an exporter from the scope of the order. Thus, the
implications of the de minimis test required by Article 5.8, and any de minimis test that
Members choose to apply in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, differ significantly.
 Accordingly, we are not convinced that Korea's policy argument requires us to abandon
our conclusion that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its context, does not require that
a Member apply the Article 5.8 de minimis test in an Article 9.3 duty assessment
procedure." (underlining added)
143
7.143 Mexico argues that termination of the investigation is only required when all of the margins of
dumping for all exporters or producers are below de minimis. We do not find this argument convincing.
If this had been the intention of the drafters of the Agreement, they would certainly have used the plural
and would have required the immediate termination of the investigation in cases where the authorities
determine that the margins of dumping are de minimis. They did not do so. It is clear, however, that if all
of the margins of dumping are below de minimis, the overall investigation would have to be terminated
and no measures could be imposed at all. But we do not consider it justified to deduce from that the
conclusion that as long as there is one exporter found to have been dumping above de minimis levels, the
investigation can continue against all exporters or producers concerned.
7.144 Mexico submits that, even if the panel were to agree with the United States on the interpretation
of Article 5.8, Mexico's application of the AD order to the two exporters found not to have been dumping
at a zero per cent duty rates, did not really constitute the application of a measure and was fully consistent
with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement. We understand Mexico to argue that as long as Economía respects
the requirement of Article 9.3 that no duty in excess of the margin of dumping be imposed, there is
nothing in the Agreement which prohibits the inclusion of non-dumping exporters in the Anti-dumping
measure. We do not find these arguments convincing. Article 5 of the AD Agreement is entitled
“Initiation and subsequent investigation” and concerns the investigation to determine whether or not an
exporter or producer of the subject product may be subject to an anti-dumping order. We are of the view
that in this context Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires the termination of the investigation, and thus
the exclusion from the anti-dumping order of any exporter or producer with a below de minimis margin of
dumping. This, in our opinion, is the essential difference between Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and
Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement which deals with the amount of the duty to be imposed and collected,
after it has been established that a duty may be applied to the exporter or producer in question. To accept
Mexico's argument that the application of a zero per cent duty does not really constitute the imposition of
a measure as it complies with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement would moreover render Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement meaningless. Indeed, it would not be a violation of Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement to
impose a duty at 0.5 per cent if that was the margin of dumping for the exporter concerned, but doing so
would clearly be inconsistent with the requirement of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement to terminate the
investigation in case of a de minimis dumping margin. As convincingly explained by the Panel in the
US – DRAMs case, both provisions serve a different purpose and compliance with Article 9.3 of the
AD Agreement does not equal compliance with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
144

144 The EC, as a third party, argued that requiring an authority to terminate an investigation against those
exporters found not to be dumping above de minimis levels and excluding them from the measure could lead to the
need to have a parallel investigation against the same product from the same country soon after the application of the
measure, as the excluded exporters could use the imposition of the duty to start dumping into the market if the
investigating country. This would be so because no administrative or changed circumstances reviews would apply to
such exporters, once they had been excluded from the application of the measure. We do not find this scenario to be
very likely. If the exporters were able to compete in the market during the period of investigation without dumping,
and this while others were engaging in dumping practices, we do not consider that it would be necessarily so that
such exporters would start dumping their products, once an anti-dumping duty is in place, as this anti-dumping duty
has indirectly also increased their competitive position. It thus seems that it could be argued that there is actually
even less reason for them to engage in dumping than before the duty was in place. Be all that as it may, scoping out
concerns about practical consequences – whether plausible or otherwise – does not in any event constitute a basis to

7.145 In sum, we find that by not terminating the i nvestigation against two US exporters which the
authority found to have exported at undumped prices and by not excluding these two exporters from the
application of the definitive anti-dumping measure, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Claim 9: Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based dumping margin to
the non-shipping exporter Producers Rice is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under
Articles 6.2, 6.4, 6.8, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 of
Annex II
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.146 According to the United States, Economía 's decision to apply an adverse facts available margin
to the US firm Producers Rice is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement since
Economía acknowledged that this US firm, which did not export the subject product to Mexico during the
period of investigation, fully cooperated with the authorities. As Producers Rice did not refuse access to,
and did not otherwise fail to provide necessary information, nor significantly impeded the investigation,
the application of a facts available margin was incons istent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. In
addition, the United States considers that Economía failed to comply with a number of the requirements
laid down in Annex II of the AD Agreement. In particular, the United States submits that, in breach of
paragraph 3 of Annex II, Economía failed to take into account when making its determination that
Producers Rice was a fully cooperative respondent. Moreover, the United States argues, it is clear from
Annex II of the AD Agreement that Economía has to play an active role in informing the parties of the
kind of information required, as well as of the consequences of not providing the information or of not
cooperating. In the United States' view, Economía fa iled to inform Producers Rice of the fact that its
questionnaire response or the explanations and evidence provided therein were in any way unacceptable,
nor did Economía solicit any further explanations or evidence from this firm. In the absence of
compliance by Economía with this duty to inform, the determination of a dumping margin based on facts
available is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II. In addition, there was no evidence
that this producer failed to act to the best of its ability and the application of facts available was thus also
in violation of paragraph 5 of Anne x II. Finally, and in the absence of any basis to conclude that the
exporter in question failed to coope rate with Economía, the use of adverse facts available was clearly
inconsistent with pa ragraph 7 of Annex II.
145 In addition, the United States claims that Economía
breached paragraph 7 of Annex II also for another reason. According to the United States, because
Economía failed to check the presumptions embodied in the application against independent data
available during the investigation, much less to exercise "special circumspection" in its application of the
information and presumptions therein, the Mexican investigating authority breached paragraph 7 of
Annex II.146
7.147 In addition, the United States argues that by imposing a residual duty rate on this cooperative
exporter which was completely based on adverse facts available, Economía acted in a manner which is

go against the plain meaning of the text. An exporter whose dumping margin is found to be de minimis is, under the
Agreement, effectively returned to precisely the same position as an exporter which is not dumping. The Agreement
– otherwise drafted – could have provided for some differentiation of treatment as between these cases. But it does
not in fact do so. It is not our place to read into the text provisions which invent distinctions that are not in fact there.
145 The United States argues that the margin of 10.18 per cent was adverse as it was almost triple the highest
margin found for the three exporters examined and each component of the margin was based on flawed data and
unsupported assumptions that served to increase the dumping margin. US First Submission, para. 159-164.
146 According to the United States, Mexico conceded in its First Answers to Questions, answers to
question 25, that it did not observe the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II, when it applied the facts available to
Producers Rice, claiming that it was under no obligation to do so. US Second Submission, para. 83.

inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement which requires that the neutral residual duty rate for
non-investigated exporters be determined on the basis of the weighted average of the dumping margins
found to exist but with the exclusion, inter alia, of margins based on facts available. In light of the fact
that the residual duty rate applied to Producers Ri ce was on the contrary exclusively based on adverse
facts available, the United States is of the view th at Economía acted in a manner which is inconsistent
with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.148 Furthermore, the United States submits that the application of an anti-dumping duty based on
adverse facts available to an exporter which did not export during the period of investigation is
inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the AD Agreemen t which requires Economía to conduct an expedited
review in order to determine an individual margin of dumping for exporters which did not export during
the period of investigation, and which would otherw ise be covered by the neutral residual duty that
applied to the product. The United States argues that the firms seeking review under Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement when entering the export market would ha ve previously been subject to an all-others
dumping margin calculated under Article 9.4, and not as a "facts available" margin calculated under
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
147 The United States considers that the placement of Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement immediately after Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement as well as the textual link between
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and the requirement of determining an individual margin of dumping
provided for in Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement confirm its view. Moreover, the United States submits
that by considering Producers Rice to have been investigated, assigning it a facts available-based margin,
and considering it thus as an exporter subject to AD duties, Economía has precluded this firm from
receiving a review under Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement, and thus breached that provision.
7.149 Finally, the United States submits that Econom ía breached Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the
AD Agreement by failing to disclose to this exporter, Producers Rice, the export price information that
was used in the calculation of the adverse facts available margin. According to the United States, under
Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement, Economía should have made the abstract of the customs declaration
("listado"), on which the export price was based, available to Producers Rice. The United States submits
that this was information which was obviously relevant to the presentation of this firm's case, was used by
the authorities, and was not confidential. Economía's failure to provide the exporter an opportunity to
prepare presentations on the basis of this information breached Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement and as a
consequence Economía also acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
Mexico
7.150 With regard to the application of facts available to Producers Rice, Mexico submits that Article
6.8 of the AD Agreement clearly provides that in case information necessary for the calculation of the
margin is not provided, the determination may be b ased on the facts available. According to Mexico,
Producers Rice did not provide export price information which is necessary for the calculation of a
dumping margin, and the authority was thus entitled under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement to resort to
the facts available for the calculation of the margin of dumping. Since Producers Rice failed to provide
necessary information, its general cooperation in the investigation becomes irrelevant for the purpose of
applying Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
7.151 Mexico further considers that paragraph 3 of Annex II of the AD Agreement dealing with the use
of best information available was not violated eith er as no verifiable information on the export price,
which under paragraph 3 is to be taken into account, was provided by Producers Rice. Economía's
application of facts available was not inconsistent with paragraph 5 of Annex II of the AD Agreement
either, as no information was provided. With regard to the obligation of paragraph 6 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement to inform the party concerned that its information was not accepted, Mexico submits that
no violation occurred as Economía did accept all the information, but the information submitted simply

147 US First Submission, para. 172.

did not allow for the calculation of a margin.
148 Neither does Mexico consider Economía's use of facts
available to have been inconsistent with paragraph 7 of Annex II as all it did was to calculate a duty based
on the facts available including those contained in the application for initiation, in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.
7.152 In addition, Mexico argues that there is no requirement to apply the neutral rate of Article 9.4 of
the AD Agreement to the non-shipping exporter as Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement only applies in case
the authorities have limited their investigation and have sampled certain exporters. That was not the case
in the rice investigation. According to Mexi co, the AD Agreement does not regulate how the anti-
dumping duty should be calculated for exporters th at have no exports during the period of the
investigation.149 Mexico rejects the US argument that a general obligation exists to calculate a neutral all
others rate to the non-shipping exporters which could be deduced from Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement
relating to new shipper reviews. The fact that Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement comes immediately after
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement cannot be read to imply that before a new shipper review under Article
9.5 of the AD Agreement is undertaken, the margin to be applied is to be calculated in accordance with
the methodology set forth in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.153 With regard to the US claims under Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement, Mexico argues that
the information from the "listado" documents referred to by the United States was part of the investigation
file and thus available to the parties.150
(ii) Analysis
7.154 The United States claims that the investigating authority's calculation of a margin of dumping
based on the facts available for a US firm which did not export the subject product during the period of
investigation was inconsistent with the AD Agreement, as this firm responded to the questionnaire and
fully cooperated with the authority. According to the United States a "neutral" all others rate under
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement should have been calculated for this non-shipping exporter. Mexico
submits that Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement is simp ly not relevant to this situation which did not
involve the use of a sample by the investigating authority. Mexico argues that in case the authorities are
not provided with the necessary information to calculate a dumping margin, facts available under Article
6.8 of the AD Agreement may be used. In the Fi nal Determination itself, the Mexican authorities
explicitly relied on Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement, and cited to this provision as the basis for their
determination of a margin for Producers Rice.
7.155 We first deal with the United States claim that the residual duty for Producers Rice should have
been determined on the basis of the methodology described in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.156 Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement provides that:
9.4 When the authorities have limited th eir examination in accordance with the
second sentence of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any anti-dumping duty applied to imports
from exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:
(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with
respect to the selected exporters or producers or,

148 Mexico considers that Economía took account of the company's assertion that it had no exports of the
subject product during the investigation, and thus did not reject any information from this company. According to
Mexico, paragraph 6 of Annex II of the AD Agreement applies only in case the information provided is rejected by
the authority, which was not the case in the rice investigation, as no information was provided in the first place.
149 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 24.
150 Mexico, Second Submission, para. 165.

(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is
calculated on the basis of a prospective normal value, the difference
between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or
producers and the export prices of exporters or producers not
individually examined,
provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero
and de minimis margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to in
paragraph 8 of Article 6. The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values
to imports from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who has
provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation, as provided
for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.
7.157 We consider that Article 9.4 of the AD Agreem ent deals with the very specific and defined
situation of the use of a sample by the investigating authority. As the first sentence sets forth, the limits
imposed by the methodology provided for by Article 9.4 (i) and (ii) of the AD Agreement apply in case
the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 10 of
Article 6.
151 The second sentence of Article 6.10 provides that:
"[I]n cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products
involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities may
limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by
using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the
authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the
exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated".
7.158 For this particular situation, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement provides a specific methodology
with regard to the calculation of the duty for those interested parties that did not form part of the sample.
We see no requirement to apply that methodology in a case which does not involve sampling. In our
view, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement simply does not apply to any other situation.
7.159 The US argument that the placement of this provision immediately preceding Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement dealing with new shipper reviews im plies that its rules also apply to non-shipping
exporters is not convincing, as we do not find that anything can be deduced in and of itself from the
sequence of provisions in the Agreement, particular ly when the provision in question relates to an
exceptional situation, while the subsequent provisi on does not. The United States also argues that the

151 Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement reads as follows:
6.10 The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known
exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number of
exporters, producers, importers or types of produc ts involved is so large as to make such a
determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable
number of interested parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis
of information available to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage
of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.
6.10.1 Any selection of exporters, producers, im porters or types of products made under this
paragraph shall preferably be chosen in consultation with and with the consent of the exporters,
producers or importers concerned.
6.10.2 In cases where the authorities have limited their examination, as provided for in this
paragraph, they shall nevertheless determine an individual margin of dumping for any exporter or
producer not initially selected who submits the necessary information in time for that information
to be considered during the course of the investigation, except where the number of exporters or
producers is so large that individual examinations would be unduly burdensome to the authorities
and prevent the timely completion of the inves tigation. Voluntary responses shall not be
discouraged.

non-sampled interested parties and the new shippers dealt with by Article 9.5 are in a similar position and
that by analogy the same Article 9.4 methodology for the calculation of a residual duty rate should
apply.
152 We are not convinced that the text of the Agreement supports this view. In this respect, we find
particularly relevant, the absence of any cross-referencing in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement dealing
with new shippers to the calculation methodology of Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. This absence of
cross-referencing is particularly conspicuous if one were to accept, arguendo, the analogous situation of
non-sampled and non-shipping exporters. Indeed, especially in such a situation, one would expect the
drafters to have explicitly referred to Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. As on other occasions, where the
drafters intended to see obligations apply in simila r circumstances, they explicitly provided for such
cross-referencing.153 We recall in this respect that the Appellate Body also found that the absence of such
cross-referencing to obligations c ontained in other provisions is revealing of the absence of such an
obligation.154 We find that Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement does not refer to non-shipping exporters
outside a sampling situation, and that there was th erefore no obligation for the Mexican authorities to
calculate a residual duty margin for Producers Rice based on the "neutral" methodology set forth in
Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. We therefore reject the US claim in this respect.
7.160 The United States further claims that the Mexican investigating authority acted in breach of
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement when resorting to the use of facts available to calculate a duty rate for
the non-shipping exporter, Producers Rice. The United States points in particular to the full co-operation
offered by Producers Rice in responding to the questi onnaire. Mexico asserts that the authority was
entitled to base the calculation of a dumping margin for Producers Rice on the facts available provided by
the applicant and that it complied with all the requirements concerning the use of the facts available under
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement when calculating a margin of dumping for Producers Rice.
155
7.161 The Final Determination explains the treatme nt accorded to Producers Rice in the following
manner:
"Producers Rice Mill Inc. stated that it did not make any exports of the investigated
product during the investigated period, due to which the Ministry qualified it according
to the facts of which it had knowledge, which are described in paragraphs 138 to 157 of
this determination"156
7.162 The Final Determination further provides the fo llowing explanation for the particular method
used for the calculation of the dumping margin:
"For the company Producers Rice Mill, Inc., in accordance with paragraph 62 of this
determination, and the other companies th at did not appear in this phase of the
investigation, in accordance with articles 6.8 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and 54 of
the Foreign Trade Statute, the ministry calculated the dumping margin applicable to long
grain white rice based on the information submitted by the petitioner, and in accordance

152 The United States argues that both are in a similar position because the non-shipping exporter is in a way
in the same situation as the non-sampled producers in the sense that it could not provide the information necessary to
calculate a dumping margin, not because it was never asked to submit such information, as is the case with non-
sampled exporters, but because it did not export. Such non-shipping exporters should thus similarly not be
"punished" for the fact that it was not possible for the aut hority to establish an individual margin. Therefore, and
rather than applying a facts available rate, a neutral resi dual rate should apply to them, one which as Article 9.4
requires, excludes all margins established on the basis of facts available.
153 Examples of such cross-referencing of obligations in the AD Agreement can be found in Article 7.5 on
provisional measures stating that the relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed; Article 11.4 dealing with
reviews and cross-referencing to the provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure.
154 See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 69.
155 We note that both parties agree that Producers Rice is an interested party in the investigation even if it
has not exported during the period of investigation.
156 Final Determination, para. 62. Exhibits US -6 and US-7.

with the methodology that is described in the following paragraphs, and that corresponds
to paragraphs 36 to 54 of the Initial dete rmination of the anti-dumping investigation
published in the Federation Official Gazette dated December 11 2000."
157
7.163 It is clear therefore that the investigating authority considered that it was entitled under Article 6.8
of the AD Agreement to calculate a margin of dumping for Producers Rice on the basis of the facts
available. We will therefore examine whether the investigating authority complied with the obligations
set forth in Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement in this case.158
7.164 Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
6.8 In cases in which any interested pa rty refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made
on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the
application of this paragraph.
7.165 Paragraph 7 of Annex II provides as follows:
ANNEX II
BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF
ARTICLE 6
7. If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to
normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the information
supplied in the application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with
special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check
the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price
lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained
from other interested parties during the investig ation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from
the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party
than if the party did cooperate.
7.166 Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement thus allows for determinations to be made on the basis of facts
available, but only in case an interested part y "refuses access" to necessary information within a
reasonable period, or "otherwise does not provide" such information within a reasonable period, or when
it "significantly impedes" the investigation. Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement further stipulates that when
resorting to the use of facts available, the provisi ons of Annex II shall be observed. Annex II, entitled
"Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6" contains a number of obligations the
investigating authority has to comply with in order for the use of facts available in a given case to be in
accordance with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
159 The use of the term "best information" means that

157 Final determination, para. 138. Exhibits US-6 and US-7.
158 We are mindful of the fact that the AD Agreement does not expressly provide specific guidelines as to
the way in which to deal with the calculation of the rate for new shippers, and that it could be argued that Article 6.8
of the AD Agreement actually does not govern the situati on of the non-exporting party. However, in light of
Mexico's position both at the time of the investigation, and in the proceedings before us that Article 6.8 of the
AD Agreement does apply, and that the authority was co mplying with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement when
determining a margin of dumping for Producers Rice, we will examine the United States' claim on the assumption
that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement applies to this situation.
159 Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement requires that th e provisions of Annex II of the AD Agreement be
observed in the use of facts available, and the use of facts available in a manner which is inconsistent with Annex II
is thus also inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.

information has to be not simply correct or useful per se, but the most fitting or "most appropriate"
160
information available in the case at hand. Determining that something is "best" inevitably requires, in our
view, an evaluative, comparative assessment as the term "best" can only be properly applied where an
unambiguously superlative status obtains. It mean s that, for the conditions of Article 6.8 of the
AD Agreement and Annex II to be complied with, there can be no better information available to be used
in the particular circumstances. Clearly, an investigating authority can only be in a position to make that
judgement correctly if it has made an inherently comparative evaluation of the "evidence available". This
is reinforced, in our view, by the requirement in pa ragraph 3 of Annex II that all information which is
verifiable, which is appropriately submitted and supplied in a timely fashion is to be taken into account
when determinations are made. In similar vein, paragraph 5 of Annex II does not allow an authority to
disregard information, even though that information is not ideal in all respects, provided the interested
party has acted to the best of its ability. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such a conclusion is
evident from the requirement set forth in paragraph 7 of Annex II that, in case the authorities have to base
their findings on information from a secondary source they should do so with special circumspection, and
check, where practicable, the information from othe r independent sources at their disposal, such as
published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns and from the information obtained from
other interested parties during the investigation.
7.167 We recall that the non-shipping exporter, Produ cers Rice was identified by the applicant as a
"known exporter" in the application. The investigating authority sent a questionnaire to Producers Rice
requesting it to provide necessary information on normal value and export price which would enable the
authority to calculate a margin of dumping for this company. Producers Rice responded to the
questionnaire, stating that during the period of inv estigation it had not exported the subject product to
Mexico. Producers Rice did provide comments on the question of injury to the domestic industry. The
investigating authority determined that a margin b ased on the facts available was to be calculated for
Producers Rice due to the fact that it did not make any exports during the investigated period.
161
Assuming, arguendo, that an authority would be entitled to apply the facts available in the calculation of a
margin of dumping in such a situation as this, we consider that the manner in which the facts available
were used in this investigation with regard to Producers Rice was not in accordance with Article 6.8 and
Annex II of the AD Agreement. The Final Determination demonstrates that the facts available margin
was arrived at on the basis of the information containe d in the application. In effect, the explanation
provided for in the Final Determination as to the u se of the applicant's info rmation as the basis for
calculating the 10.18 per cent facts available margin is exactly the same as that given in the Notice of
Initiation.162163 We note that this margin is much higher than any margin calculated for the exporters that
were individually examined.164 In examining the record, we find no basis to consider that the authority
made any attempt to check the applicant's information against information obtained from other interested
parties or undertook the evaluative, comparative assessm ent that would have enabled the authority to
assess whether the information provided by the applicant was indeed the best information available. Nor
for that matter can it be said that it used the appli cant's information with "special circumspection" as
required by paragraph 7 of Annex II. From the reco rd we conclude that the authority relied on data
provided by the applicant in the application concerning normal value and export price, and that the record
shows no attempt to examine the applicant’s information to assess whether this information was the most
fitting or appropriate for making determinations with regard to Producers Rice. In sum, it is clear from
the record that the authority did not check the information obtained from other interested parties during

160 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 218.
161 Final Determination, para. 62. Exhibits US-6 and US-7.
162 Compare paragraphs 139 – 157 of the Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) with paragraphs
36-54 of the Notice of Initiation (Exhibits US-1 and US-2 ). Paragraph 157 of the Fina l Determination explicitly
acknowledges as much, by referring back to the above quoted paragraph 138 of the Final Determination.
163 The authority discusses how it reached the facts available margin of 10.18 % in paras. 138-156 of the
Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7).
164 We note that for two exporters no dumping margin was found, while for a third exporter a margin of
3.93 per cent was calculated.

the investigation, or used the information provide d by the applicant with special circumspection, as
required by paragraph 7 of Annex II.
7.168 For all these reasons, we find that the Mexican i nvestigating authority calculated a margin of
dumping on the basis of the facts available for Producers Rice in a manner which is not consistent with
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement, read in light of paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement. In light
of this finding we do not consider it necessary to consider the US claims under paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of
Annex II, and Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement. Nor do we consider it necessary for the resolution of the
dispute to examine the US claims concerning Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement. That is, having
determined that the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provision, and exercising the discretion
implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether the
investigation which led to the inconsistent measure was consistent with the procedural rules of Articles
6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement.
(c) Claim 10: Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based dumping margin to
the US producers and exporters that it did not investigate is inconsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Articles 6.1, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4, 9.5, and 12.1 of the AD Agreement and
paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.169 The United States considers that Mexico breached numerous provisions of the AD Agreement by
individually examining only three exporters and applying an adverse facts available margin to all other
non-investigated exporters. In particular, the United States argues that (a) Mexico failed to individually
examine all known exporters and to determine an indi vidual duty rate for all or to apply a neutral all-
others rate in case it wished to limit the number of exporters examined; and (b) Mexico wrongly applied
adverse facts available to non-examined American producers and exporters.
7.170 According to the United States, Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement requires "as a rule" that an
investigating authority establish an individual margin of dumping for each known producer or exporter,
unless the number of exporters or producers is so large that the determination of individual margins for
each producer or exporter would be impracticable. In such a case, an investigating authority may limit its
examination, and, under Article 9.4, apply a "neutral" all others rate to producers or exporters that were
not individually examined. According to the United States, Economía never even made an effort to
calculate an individual margin for each exporter or producer of the subject merchandise as required by
Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. Economía si mply sent a questionnaire to only two exporters
mentioned in the application and examined tho se two as well as two other exporters who voluntarily
appeared, assuming a lack of co-operation from all other exporters. This, the United States submits, is a
violation of Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement, as no objective and unbiased investigating authority
would have concluded that there were only two exporters or producers of long-grain white rice in the
United States. The United States submits that Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement does not permit
investigating authorities to take a passive approach to their investigations, but must either take affirmative
steps to investigate every producer or exporter or else take affirmative steps to limit their investigation by
selecting a subset of such producers or exporters.
165
7.171 Moreover, the United States considers that Economía failed to comply with Article 6.6 of the
AD Agreement which requires Economía to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information supplied by
the interested party upon which the determination is based. In the United States' view, Economía simply
accepted at face value the information in the appli cation which indicated that there were only two
exporters of the product to Mexico, even though the application itself mentioned data relating to a third

165 US First Submission, para. 140 – 141.

exporter. According to the United States, it would have sufficed for Economía to consult the customs
declarations ("pedimentos") that the Mexican customs authorities collects from importers to have been
able to identify every exporter from the United States.
7.172 In any case, the United States argues, where an investigating authority limits its investigation in
accordance with Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement, th e rate applicable to the producers and exporters
which were not individually examined should be calculated in accordance with Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement, which does not allow the use of marg ins based on facts available. The United States
considers that de facto the Mexican investigating authority limited its investigation by not sending
questionnaires to an exporter mentioned in an annex to the application, not consulting the pedimentos and
not using public data to identify all US exporters. As Economía applied a margin entirely based on facts
available to the non-examined producers and exporters , it breached Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
Finally, according to the United States, the assumption applied by Economía that all producers and
exporters are considered to have been investigated implies that no exporter or producer will be eligible for
an expedited review under Article 9.5 as this applies only to non-investigated producers and exporters.
The United States submits that by acting in this manner, Economía has breached Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement by rendering it a nullity.
7.173 In addition, the United States submits that by applying facts available to the unexamined firms
when it never sent them a copy of the anti-dumping questionnaire or took any other steps to ensure that
they had received the notice that the AD Agreement requires, Economía breached Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8
of the AD Agreement and paragraph 1 of Annex II. The United States asserts that Mexico failed to
provide the exporters and producers notice of the information which Economía required, as required by
Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement. According to the United States, Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement
establishes that an investigating authority that has decided to include a particular exporter or producer in
the anti-dumping investigation cannot simply announce that it has initiated the investigation and place the
burden on the producer or exporter to come forward and appear.
166 The United States further argues that
Economía did not give all exporters and producers a "full opportunity" to defend their interests as required
by Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement. Moreover, Mexico's application of facts available without having
specified the information which was required and without providing proper notice to the interested parties
of the rights of Economía to use facts available is a breach of Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of
the AD Agreement.167
7.174 Furthermore, the United States considers that the use of adverse facts available for the
unexamined firms in the absence of any evidence of uncooperative behaviour by any of such firms, is a
breach of Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement. Moreover, Economía failed to
apply the information contained in the application with "special circumspection" as required by paragraph
7 Annex II.
7.175 Finally, the United States argues that Economía failed to ensure that all interested parties known
to have an interest in the investigation were notified as required by Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement.
The United States submits that the Mexican investig ating authority failed to notify a third exporter
mentioned in an Annex to the application, and did not notify other US exporters or producers which could
have been identified by the authority on the basis of the customs record.
Mexico

166 US First Submission, para. 145.
167 The United States argues that Articles 1, 5, 6.5 and 6.6 of the AD Agreement provide further context for
confirming that Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10, 9.4 and paragraph 1 Annex II require an investigating authority to (1) actively
determine the universe of potential respondents; (2) actively send questionnaires to those producers or exporters from
which it is seeking information; and (3) either take active steps to investigate every known producer and exporter, or
else examine a representative sample and assign a "neutral" all other margin that is not based on the facts available to
everyone else. US First Submission, para. 151.

7.176 Mexico argues that there is no obligation under Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement to calculate an
individual margin for all exporters or producers, but only for those that are known to the authorities.
According to Mexico, the known exporters are tho se that are made known to the authorities in the
application, or that appear subsequent to the initiation of the investigation.
168 Mexico complied with this
obligation. Mexico argues that it did not limit its examination to a reasonable number of exporters, but
assigned individual margins to all the exporters and producers that participated in the investigation and
that therefore the methodology for the calculation of a neutral all others rate under Article 9.4 of the
AD Agreement is not applicable. It emphasises in this respect that it never refused to accept the
participation of any US exporter that wanted to participate in the investigation.169 Mexico submits that
inasmuch as it complied with the obligation to send questionnaires to the known exporters and to calculate
an individual dumping margin for all the exporters that submitted the necessary information to the
investigating authority, it was entitled to make final determinations for the remaining exporters on the
basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement.170 Mexico
argues that it applied paragraph 1 of Annex II which establishes clearly that if a party does not provide the
information requested, the latter will be free to make the determinations on the basis of the facts available,
including those contained in the application for initiation.
171
7.177 Mexico argues that it complied with all its obligations under Article 6 of the AD Agreement by
providing the United States authorities in Mexico172 and the two known exporters, Producers Rice173 and
Riceland174, with the public notice of initiation of the inv estigation, the text of the application for
initiation and the annexes thereto and the form for exporters and foreign producers. In addition, it
convened hearings for all natural or legal persons interested in the investigation through the publication of
the official notice of initiation published in the Official Journal (DOF) on 11 December 2000.175 Mexico
does not consider Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement to be applicable to the situation in which the margin
was based on facts available. Neither does it consider that Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement required it to
verify whether the names of the exporters mentioned in the application included all existing US exporters
but simply whether the application mentions the names of the exporters known to the applicant and
whether the firms mentioned were exporters of the subject product.176
7.178 With regard to the United States' assertion that it would have sufficed for the investigating
authority to consult the customs declarations (pedim entos) in order to have found the names of every
exporter, Mexico argues that such pedimentos were not in the hands of the investigating authority but
rather of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and that to request and receive such documents would
have seriously delayed the proceed ings (by approximately 40 days).
177 More importantly, Mexico
considers that the AD Agreement does not require the authority to obtain such pedimentos and identify all
exporters and the authority therefore did not attempt to obtain them.178

168 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 16.
170 Mexico First Submission, para. 159.
171 Mexico asserts that the third paragraph of the introduction to the questionnaires clearly stated that such
would be the case, thus complying with paragraph 1 of Annex II.
172 Official communication UPCI.310.00.3082 of 8 November 2000 (Exhibit MEX-8). and official
communication UPCI.310.00.3089 of 11 December 2000 (Exhibit MEX-9).
173 Official communication UPCI.310.00.3296 of 11 December 2000 (Exhibit MEX-6).
174 Official communication UPCI.310.00.3297 of 11 December 2000 (Exhibit MEX-7).
175 Resolution accepting the interested party's application and initiating the anti-dumping investigation on
imports of long-grain white rice, a product classified under heading 1006.30.01 of the Tariff established by the
General Import and Export Duties Law, originating in the Un ited States of America, regardless of the country of
provenance, published in the Official Journal (DOF) of 11 December 2000 (Exhibit MEX-10).
177 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 17. Mexico Second Answers to Questions, questions 5 and
10.
178 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 17.

(ii) Analysis
7.179 We recall that the application filed by th e Mexican domestic industry mentioned two US
exporters, Producers Rice and Riceland. The Mexican investigating authority initiated the investigation
and sent a notice of initiation as well as a questionnaire to the two exporters listed in the application as the
exporters known to the applicant, and to the US embassy in Mexico City. The Notice of Initiation stated
that a period of 30 days was given to any interested party to appear before the investigating authority to
submit the official investigation form which could be obtained at the clerk's office of the International
Trade Practices Unit in Mexico City.
179 Two US exporters, the Rice Company and Farmers Rice, as well
as an industry association, the USA Rice Federation, came forward out of their own initiative, and
received questionnaires. Individual margins of dumpi ng were assigned to all four US exporters that
"participated" in the investigation. For all other US exporters which did not come forward themselves,
and did not provide information, a residual margin of dumping was calculated based on the facts
available.
7.180 The United States claims that the investigating authority failed to abide by its obligation under
Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement to determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter
or producer as no efforts were undertaken by the authority to obtain knowledge of US exporters other than
those two named in the application, and the two th at came forward of their own initiative. The US
submits that the authority failed to actively identify and inform interested parties of the investigation as
required by Articles 6.1 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement. As a consequence, the US submits that the
application of facts available to calculate a margin of dumping for these uninvestigated firms is therefore
also inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreem ent. Mexico on the other hand is of the view that
Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement requires the calculation of an individual margin of dumping only with
regard to the exporters that were known to the inv estigating authority. As the authority provided the
required notification to, and calculated an individual margin of dumping for, the exporters made known to
the authority by the applicants, as well as for t hose exporters that made themselves known to the
authority, Mexico considers that it fully complied with Articles 6.1, 12.1 and 6.10 of the AD Agreement,
and its use of facts available for the non-appearing firms is thus justified under Article 6.8 of the AD
Agreement.
7.181 Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
6.10 The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for
each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases
where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so
large as to make such a determination im practicable, the authorities may limit their
examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using
samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the
authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the
exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.
6.10.1 Any selection of exporters, producers, importers or types of products made under
this paragraph shall preferably be chosen in consultation with and with the consent of the
exporters, producers or importers concerned.
6.10.2 In cases where the authorities have limited their examination, as provided for in
this paragraph, they shall nevertheless determine an individual margin of dumping for
any exporter or producer not initially selected who submits the necessary information in
time for that information to be considered during the course of the investigation, except
where the number of exporters or producers is so large that individual examinations

179 Notice of initiation, paras. 152 – 153. Exhibits US-1 and US-2.

would be unduly burdensome to the authorities and prevent the timely completion of the
investigation. Voluntary responses shall not be discouraged.
7.182 Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement thus set fort h the general rule that the authorities shall
determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation. The disagreement betw een the parties centres around the extent of active
involvement required from the authorities in identifying the foreign exporters and producers for which it
is to calculate an individual margin of dumping. In line with general rules of interpretation of customary
international law, we will examine the terms of Ar ticle 6.10 of the AD Agreement in their ordinary
meaning and in light of their context and taking into account the object and purpose of the Agreement.
7.183 The ordinary meaning of the term "known" is "learned, apprehended mentally; familiar, esp.
familiar to all, generally known or recognized. Also, identified as such"
180. In other words, "known"
exporters or producers are those which the investigating authority has learned about or has knowledge of.
 As such, the ordinary meaning of the term does not tell us whether the authority is required to take any
active steps to become aware of any foreign exporter or producer or whether, on the other hand, it suffices
for an authority to rely on the applicant to identify the exporters and to expect the interested foreign
exporters and producers to make themselves known to the authority. In order to answer this question we
examine the obligations set forth in the AD Agreement which provide the necessary context in light of
which the requirement to calculate an indivi dual margin of dumping for each known exporter and
producer has to be read.
7.184 This context is formed by th e overarching obligation to conduct an investigation and by the
specific obligations on the authority to ensure that all interested parties are informed of the information
required of them and are given the opportunity to present all evidence to support their case.
7.185 The first important obligation is the requirement expressed in Article 1 of the AD Agreement that
an anti-dumping measure shall only be applied pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement. Among others, Article 5 of the AD Agreement
entitled "Initiation and Subsequent Investigation" and Article 6 of the AD Agreement further elaborate on
the specific requirements that an investigating au thority has to comply with when conducting this
investigation. The term "to investigate" means "to search or inquire into; examine a matter systematically
or in detail; make an (official) inquiry into"
181 and an "investigator" is not surprisingly defined as "a
researcher"182. In our view, an investigating authority required to conduct an investigation in an objective
and unbiased manner has to play an active role in th e search of the information it requires in order to
make its determination. We thus concur with the view expressed by the Appellate Body, albeit in a
different context, in the US - Wheat Gluten case that:
"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word "i nvestigation" suggests that the competent
authorities should carry out a "systematic inquiry" or a "careful study" into the matter
before them. The word, therefore, suggests a proper degree of activity on the part of the
competent authorities because authorities charged with conducting an inquiry or a study
– to use the treaty language, an "investiga tion" – must actively seek out pertinent
information".
183
7.186 While it is clear that the interested parties, including the applicants, play a very important role in
the fact gathering process, the obligation of conduc ting an investigation and making a determination
remains that of the investigating authority, and not that of the interested parties. This is evidenced, for
example, by the requirement of Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement that the investigating authorities "during

180 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 1504.
181 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 1410.
182 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 1410.
183 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 53.

the course of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by
interested parties upon which its findings are based".
184
7.187 In sum, we are of the view that the term "known exporter or producer" in Article 6.10 of the
AD Agreement refers to the exporters or producers that an unbiased and objective investigating authority
properly establishing the facts would be reasonably expected to have become conversant with. Article
6.10 of the AD Agreement is a general requirement that the authority has to comply with, at the latest, at
the end of the investigation when making the determin ations. This implies that the exporters that are
known to the authorities at that point are those th at an objective and unbiased investigating authority
properly establishing the facts and conducting an ac tive investigation could have and should have
reasonably been considered to have knowledge of.
185
7.188 Clearly, the exporters that would be "known" to an investigating authority which makes little or
no effort to inform itself will be far less than tho se "known" to an authority that has been reasonably
active. Interpreted in its context, the term "known" cannot be construed in such an artificially contrived
and solipsistic manner as to become a warrant for a passive investigative approach. To do so would be to
effectively read out of the AD Agreement an importa nt aspect of the obligation of an investigating
authority regarding the conduct of an investigation.
7.189 We wish to emphasise that this does not imply th at we are of the view that an investigating
authority is required to go to the other extreme and actively identify each and every foreign exporter or
producer of the subject product. In our view, such a reading would read the term "known" out of the
Agreement's requirement to calculate an individual margin only for each "known" exporter or producer of
the subject product.
186 What is reasonable to expect of the investigating authority as far as the
identification of foreign exporters or producers goes will depend on the circumstances of each case and
the information provided by the interested parties that could assist the authority in identifying such
foreign exporters or producers.187

184 Paragraph 7 of Annex II similarly requires in case secondary source information is to be used that such
be done with "special circumspection" and that "In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics
and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation".
185 In this respect, there is an important difference with the context in which the term "known exporters" is
used in Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. In Article 5.2 (ii) of the AD Agreement, it is provided that the application
shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on inter alia "the identity of each known
exporter or foreign producer". This provision deals with the content requirements of an application and the "known"
exporters are clearly those that according to the information reasonably available to the applicant are those
exporters that are known to the applicant . In our view, as is the case for all the other information that under
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement the applicants should inform the authorities of, such as prices at which the product
in question is sold or the volume of the allegedly dum ped imports and the effects on prices, the investigating
authority cannot simply accept this information as a basi s for making its determinations, but is required through
conducting an unbiased and objective investigation to establish and evaluate the facts. This is the whole purpose of
the investigation, which as becomes clear from a number of provisions in the Agreement is the responsibility of the
investigating authority. Especially in light of the important consequences that flow from the determination of the
known exporters, it would render the requirement to conduc t an "investigation" meaningless to leave this
identification in the hands of one of the interested parties, the applicants.
186 We recall that it is a generally accepted rule of treat y interpretation that an interpreter is to give full
meaning to all the terms of the Agreement and not to adopt such an interpretation that reads certain terms out of the
Agreement. See, e.g, Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 23:
"...One of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free
to adopt a reading that would result in reduci ng whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to
redundancy or inutility."
187 We note that the Panel in the Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties case also rejected a similarly
restrictive reading of the Agreement's requirement to notify all interested parties known to have an interest in the

7.190 In addition, the AD Agreement contains a numbe r of express obligations on the investigating
authorities to inform all interested parties of the initiation of the investigation and of the information that
is required of them. Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
6.1 All interested parties in an anti-dumpi ng investigation shall be given notice of
the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing
all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.
6.1.1 Exporters or foreign producer s receiving questionnaires used in
an anti-dumping investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply.
Due consideration should be given to any request for an extension of
the 30-day period and, upon cause shown, such an extension should be
granted whenever practicable.
6.1.2 Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information,
evidence presented in writing by one interested party shall be made
available promptly to other interested parties participating in the
investigation.
6.1.3 As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities
shall provide the full text of the written application received under
paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known exporters and to the authorities of
the exporting Member and shall make it available, upon request, to
other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the
requirement for the protection of confidential information, as provided
for in paragraph 5. (footnotes omitted)
7.191 Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement thus requires that all interested parties be given notice of the
information required, which under Article 6.1.3 AD Agreement includes at least that the full text of the
application is to be provided to the known exporters. Article 12.1 AD Agreement similarly provides for a
notification requirement with regard to all interested parties known to have an interest in the investigation:

investigation under Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement. The slightly different yet similar situation before the panel in
that case concerned certain exporters which were mentioned in an annex to the petition but without an address. The
Argentine authorities were arguing that the address was not known to them and that they had asked the authorities of
the country of export for assistance which was all that was required of them under the notification requirement of
Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement. The Panel rejected this restrictive reading of the obligations incumbent on the
investigating authorities to notify all known interested parties:
"7.132 [...] We accept that there may be circumstances in which an investigating authority may
not have sufficient information to allow it to notify all interested parties known to have an interest
in an investigation. In this sense, the fact that an exporter is 'known' by the investigating authority
to have an interest in an investigation does not necessarily mean that sufficient details concerning
the exporter are 'known' to the investigating authority such that it may make the Article 12.1
notification. In other words, knowledge of an exporter's interest in an investigation does not
necessarily imply knowledge of contact details regarding that exporter. In such circumstances,
however, we consider that the nature of the Article 12.1 notification obligation is such that the
investigating authority should make all reasonable efforts to obtain the requisite contact details.
Sending a letter with only a very general request for assistance, without specifying the exporters
for which contact details are required, does not satisfy the need to make all reasonable efforts"
Panel report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para.7.132. The panel in that case also found that
there was prima facie evidence that exporters mentioned in an annex to the petition are "known" to the authorities
and should thus be notified. See Panel report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.131.

12.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient ev idence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be notified
and a public notice shall be given.
7.192 Thus, the AD Agreement makes clear that the investigation concerns not just the exporters and
producers made known to the authorities by the applicant, or that make themselves known, but relates to
all interested parties. In our view, in order to comply with inter alia the requirement to ensure that all
interested parties be given notice of the information required of them, the investigating authority when
conducting an investigation cannot remain entirely passive in the identification of the interested parties.
We consider highly relevant the fact that Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1 of the
AD Agreement require the authorities to provide the full text of the application to all known exporters as
well as notify all interested parties known to have an interest in the investigation of the initiation of the
investigation. In our view, an investigating authority complies with these obligations by informing those
interested parties it can reasonably obtain knowledge of. It clearly does not suffice for the authority to
inform only those exporters identified by the app licant, as the notification requirement applies to
interested parties known to the authority, and not simply those known to the applicant, as in Article 5.2 of
the AD Agreement. Nor would the authority in our vi ew be complying with this crucial obligation by
expecting the interested parties to make themselv es known to the authorities. It seems that the latter
approach is inherently problematic since it leaves unanswered the question how such exporters become
aware of the investigation such that they woul d come forward and make themselves known to the
authority and participate in the investigation if the authority does not first contact the interested parties
and does not first inform all interested parties known to have an interest in the investigation of the
initiation of the investigation.
7.193 We are of the view that the requirement of Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement is more than a matter
of mere procedural rectitude, but is fundamental to a correct application of inter alia Article 6.8 of the
AD Agreement which provides as follows:
6.8 In cases in which any interested pa rty refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made
on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the
application of this paragraph.
7.194 We consider that in case an interested party has not been properly notified and informed of the
information it is required to submit under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement, it cannot be argued to have
refused access to or to otherwise have withheld necessary information or to have significantly impeded
the investigation. This is evidenced also by th e requirement in paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD
Agreement which provides that:
1. As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating
authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested party,
and the manner in which that information should be structured by the interested party in
its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is aware that if information
is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to make
determinations on the basis of the facts av ailable, including those contained in the
application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.

7.195 We note that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement makes clear that the provisions of Annex II such as
the above quoted paragraph 1 have to be observed by the authority when applying facts available to make
its determinations.
188
7.196 We will therefore now turn to the facts of this case in order to determine whether the Mexican
investigating authority complied with the requireme nts of Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and 12.1 of the
AD Agreement.
7.197 We recall that the application referred to two US exporters, Producers Rice, and Riceland. The
Mexican authorities, upon initiation of the investigation, sent a copy of the application, together with the
notice of initiation, to these two exporters as well as to the US authorities in Mexico City. Questionnaires
were sent to the two US exporters mentioned in the application. The notice to the US authorities included
a form by which interested parties could make themselves known. We note that throughout the
application the name of a third US exporter, the "Rice Corporation"
189, is referred to as one of the largest
US exporters. In spite of the fact that this important exporter's name appeared from time to time, no effort
was made by the authorities to obtain more information on this exporter either from the applicants or from
the US authorities.190 However, this exporter, as well as fourth exporter not mentioned in the application,
the Farmers Rice, came forward itself and an individual margin of dumping was calculated for these two
exporters, as well as for the two exporters explicitly listed in the application.
7.198 The absence of these two exporters that came forward themselves, one of which actually appeared
on several places in the application, revealed to the authority that the list of foreign exporters or producers
was incomplete.
191 The incomplete listing in the application of the foreign exporters or producers was
also evidenced by the fact that the application stated that the subject product is produced in six states of
the United States,192 while both exporters explicitly listed as exporters known to the applicants, come from
one and the same state, Arkansas.
7.199 In addition, Annex M to the application refers to, and includes contact details for, two industry
associations in the United States, the USA Rice Council and the Rice Millers Association, stating that the
latter's members represent 97 per cent of all US milled production. As it is explicitly stated in Annex M,
while these organizations are not themselves producers of rice, they can provide general and specific
information about the rice industry in the United States. Mexico further acknowledges that it would have
been possible to identify all US exporters by examining the so-called pedimentos,193 but considers that it
was under no obligation to consult these pedimentos which were being held by the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit. Mexico does not argue that it was impossible to obtain the pedimentos, but rather that
requesting the pedimentos would have caused a delay of about 40 days.
194 Information on US exporters
seems to have been available from a number of public sources as well such as a US magazine for the rice
industry, the Rice Journal, a source men tioned in Annex S to the application. 195 This Rice Journal

188 Apart from setting forth independent obligations, we consider that the above quoted provisions also
provide further context in which to read the requirement of Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement to calculate an
individual margin of dumping for "each known exporter or producer" of the subject product.
189 The Final Determination (Exhibits US-6 and US-7) refers to the Rice Company by this name.
190 For example, Annex H to the Petition concerned information on "The Rice Company" – Exhibit US -8,
p. 44.
191 This does not necessarily mean that the information contained in the application was not sufficient to
justify the initiation of the investigation, a question we are in any case not asked to rule on.
192 These six States are Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas. See Petition,
page 10 (Exhibit US-8); Annex M to petition, Exhibit US-17.
193 This is clear from Mexico's statement that the pedimentos included imports of all white rice which is
clearly inclusive of the subject merchandise, long grain white rice. For an example of a pedimento and the kind of
information contained therein, see Exhibit US-12.
194 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 17.
195 Annex S to petition, Rice Outlook 1999, p. 6, Exhibit US-9.

contains all the names and contact details of US producers.
196 While the investigating authority notified
the US authorities of the initiation of the investigation as required by Article 6.1.3 and 12.1 of the AD
Agreement, it did not request the assistance of the authorities in identifying US exporters or producers.
We do not consider that an investigating authority is complying with its investigatory task by assuming
that the authorities of the exporting country will in form the foreign producers and exporters of the
initiation such that they can come forward and pr esent their data. The government of the exporting
Member is to be notified because, according to Article 6.11 (ii) of the AD Agreement, it is an interested
party in its own right, not because that government s hould do the work for the investigating authority.
For all of these reasons we consider that an objective and unbiased investigating authority conducting an
investigation in a reasonable manner should have made more of an effort to obtain knowledge of other US
exporters. The authority knew that the listing in the application was far from complete, and it had
sufficient information before it that would have enabled the authority to identify other US producers and
exporters. It is, in our view, the task of the inves tigating authority and not of the interested parties to
inform all interested parties of the information that is required and to conduct a proper investigation. We
are of the view that the investigating authority is not allowed to rely on the initiative of the interested
parties for the fulfilment of obligations which are really its own.
7.200 For the reason set out above, we find that the i nvestigating authority failed to comply with
Articles 6.1 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement as it failed to notify all interested parties known to have an
interest in the investigation of the initiation of the investigation and of the information required of them.
We are of the view that these violations are not to be viewed as some kind of minor or inconsequential
procedural infringement as they have important implication(s) with regard to the use of facts available
under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. As we st ated earlier, in case the authorities do not properly
notify and inform the interested parties, it is not permitted to apply the facts available to make
determinations with regard to these interested parti es. We thus conclude that by applying the facts
available in the calculation of a margin of dumping for the US exporters or producers that were known or
could reasonably have been known to the authority, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with
Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement. In light of this finding, we do not find it
necessary to examine the US argument concerning th e inconsistency of the Mexican measure with
paragraph 7 of Annex II, and do not make any ruling with regard to this aspect of the US claim.
7.201 In addition, we find that Mexico acted in breach of Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement by
remaining entirely passive in the identification of exporters or producers interested in the investigation,
and by not calculating an individual margin for dumping for each exporter or producer that was known or
should reasonably have been known to the investigating authority.
7.202 In light of our findings under Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement, we do not
consider it necessary for the resolution of the dis pute to also examine the US claims concerning
Articles 6.6, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, and do not make any findings in this respect.

196 Exhibit US -18.

(d) Claim 11: Economía’s failure to provide sufficient information on the findings and
conclusions of fact and law and the reasons that led to the imposition of the adverse facts
available-based margin on Producers Rice and the unexamined US exporters and producers
is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.203 The United States submits that Economía provide d only the most summary rationale for its
decision to base the margin of Producers Rice and the unexamined exporters and producers on adverse
facts available. Economía thus failed to provide sufficiently detailed information on all issues of fact and
law as required by Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement.
Mexico
7.204 Mexico submits that the Final Determination sets forth the findings on all issues of fact and law in
a sufficiently detailed manner.
(ii) Analysis
7.205 In light of our findings on Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement, we do not find it
necessary to address in this context the US claim unde r Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement. That is,
having determined that the measure at issue is inc onsistent with the cited Articles, and exercising the
discretion implicit in the principle of judicial economy, we do not deem it necessary to examine whether
the investigation which led to the inconsistent m easure was consistent with the procedural rules
concerning notification in Article 12.2 of the AD Agr eement. We do not consider that this would add
anything to our findings or would be useful in the implementation of our ruling.
(e) Claim 12: Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based margin to Producers
Rice and the unexamined US exporters and pr oducers is inconsistent with Mexico’s
obligations under Articles 1 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.206 The United States states that by failing to calculate the residual margin of dumping for the non-
examined exporters and Producers Rice on the basis of the neutral formula set forth in Article 9.4, the
amount of the margin assigned to those producers inevitable exceeded the margin of dumping established
under Article 2, and thus breached Article 9.3 which provides that the amount of the duty shall not exceed
the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.
7.207 In addition, by imposing duties in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement,
the United States argues, Economía also violated Article 1 which requires that measures be applied only
after an investigation conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.
Mexico
7.208 Mexico argues that Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement is not applicable and that Article 9.3 of the
AD Agreement has therefore not been violated either.

(ii) Analysis

7.209 In light of the finding made above concerning the inconsistency with Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and
12.1 of the AD Agreement, we do not find it necessary for the resolution of the dispute to address the US
claims concerning the inconsistency of the use of facts available with Articles 9.3 and 1 of the
AD Agreement. We therefore do not make any rulings in this respect.
(f) Claim 13: Economía’s levying of an anti-dumping duty greater than the margin of
dumping is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article VI:2 of GATT 1994
(i) Arguments of the Parties
United States
7.210 The United States submits that, because the duti es that Mexico levied on the "all others"
companies was greater in amount than the appropria te margin of dumping, Mexico also violated
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 which provides that a duty may be imposed which is not greater in
amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.
Mexico
7.211 In Mexico's view, since the measures taken are consistent with the AD Agreement, there can be
no consequent violation of Article VI: 2 of the GATT 1994.
(ii) Analysis
7.212 In light of the finding made above concerni ng the inconsistency of the dumping margin
calculation with Articles 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement, we do not find it necessary for the
resolution of the dispute to address this US claim concerning the inconsistency with Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994. We therefore do not make any rulings in this respect.
D. C
LAIMS CONCERNING MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE ACT AND SECTION 366 OF MEXICO'S FCCP AS
SUCH
1. Claim 14: Article 53 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent "as such" with
Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.213 The United States asserts that Article 53 of th e Act requires interested parties to present
arguments, information, and evidence to Economía within 28 days after publication of the initiation
notice. The United States submits that Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement, and its SCM counterpart,
Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement, provide that interested parties are to be given at least 30 days to
reply to questionnaires counting from the date of receipt of the questionnaire, and not counting from the
date of publication of the notice of initiation. In addition, these provisions state that an authority should,
after due consideration, grant extensions of this time period, upon cause shown, "whenever practicable".
The United States asserts that Mexico only sends questionnaires to the producers or exporters named in
the application, and listed in the notice of initiation. This implies, in the United States' view, that Article
53 of the Act will preclude Economía from providing other exporters or foreign producers which come
forward following the initiation to ask for copies of the questionnaires 30 days to respond, since the time
has started counting from the date of publication of the initiation notice and not from the time the
questionnaires were sent to these interested parties that appeared after initiation. In addition, the United

States submits that Article 53 of the Act prevents Economía from giving due consideration to extension
requests, let alone granting such requests. The United States is thus of the view that Article 53 of the Act
is inconsistent as such with Articles 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
(ii) Mexico
7.214 Mexico submits that Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the
SCM Agreement do not oblige Economía to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires with respect
to exporters that were not sent a questionnaire. Mexi co is of the view that if the 30-day period were
granted to any interested party that presented itself after the initiation of the investigation, the ensuing
delay would entail failure to observe the time-limits laid down in, and hence a violation of, Article 5.10 of
the AD Agreement and 11.11 of the SCM Agreement. Second, Mexico asserts that according to Article 3
of the Act
197, the term 28 "days" in Article 53 of the Act has to be read as "working days". Given the fact
that it is common practice in Mexico to send out the questionnaires the day following publication of the
initiation, Mexico argues that Article 53 of the Act thus actually provides for at least 38 calendar days,
which is more than Article 6.1.1 of the AD Ag reement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement
require.198 Finally, Mexico submits that nothing in Article 53 of the Act prohibits Economía from
authorizing extensions of the deadline, and sev eral exporters have successfully requested such
extensions.199 In any case, and in the event the panel should consider that the United States has provided
evidence of such an alleged prohibition based on the text of the Act, Mexico argues that Article 6.1.1 of
the AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement apply congruently to Mexican anti-dumping and
countervailing duty investigations, and the investigating authority may grant extensions on the basis of
these Articles.
7.215 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.216 The United States claim concerns Article 53 of the Act which provides as follows:
The interested parties shall submit thei r arguments, information and evidence in
conformity with the applicable legislati on, within a period of 28 days from the day
following the publication of the initiating resolution.
7.217 According to the United States, by not starting to count the 28 days for replies to questionnaires
from the date of receipt of such questionnaires but rather from the date of initiation, Article 53 of the Act
fails to provide all interested parties an equal ri ght to have 30 days to respond to questionnaires, as
required by Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement, a nd its SCM counterpart, Article 12.1.1 of the SCM
Agreement. Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement provides that
200:

197 Article 3 of the Act provides as follows: "...where this Act refers to time-limits in days these shall be
understood to mean working days and where it refers to months or years these shall be understood to mean calendar
months or years".
198 Mexico First Submission, para. 227.
199 Mexico First Submission, para. 229. Mexico does not provide specific examples.
200 Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement similarly provides that:
12.1.1 Exporters, foreign producers or interested Members receiving questionnaires used in a
countervailing duty investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply.40 Due consideration
should be given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown, such
an extension should be granted whenever practicable.

6.1.1 Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an anti-dumping
 investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply.
15 Due consideration should be
given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown, such
an extension should be granted whenever practicable.
15
As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters sha ll be counted from the date of receipt of the
questionnaire, which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the
date on which it was sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic
representative of the exporting Member or, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of
the WTO, an official representative of the exporting territory.
7.218 We are of the view that the wording of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement makes it very clear that
any exporter or foreign producer which receives a questionnaire is to be given at least 30 days for reply.
As footnote 15 adds, this time limit shall as a general rule be counted from the date of receipt of the
questionnaire, which shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it was sent.
 We do not understand the United States to consider in consistent the fact that Article 53 of the Act
provides for 28 days only, instead of the 30 days required by Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement as it
seems to acknowledge that, by virtue of Article 3 of the Act, the days referred to in the Act refer to
working days.
201 As Mexico's administrative practice is to send the questionnaires out the day following
the publication of the initiation, the parties seem to be in agreement that exporters listed in the application
and to which questionnaires are sent at the time of initiation would in fact have at least 30 calendar days
to respond, as required by Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
7.219 The United States does challenge, however, the c onsistency of Article 53 of the Act with
Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement with regard to exporters or foreign producers which were not listed in
the application as being known to the applicant and which for that reason were not sent a questionnaire at
initiation. Mexico is of the view that the 30-day period of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement only applies
to exporters or foreign producers to which a questionnaire was sent at initiation and not to those exporters
or producers that appear later in the course of the investigation. According to Mexico Article 6.1.1 of the
AD Agreement does not oblige Economía to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires with respect
to exporters which received questionnaires only after such exporters had come forward and requested
such questionnaires.
7.220 We consider that Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement clearly provides that any exporter or foreign
producer receiving a questionnaire shall be given 30 days for reply. This 30-day rule does not make a
distinction between those exporters that received a questionnaire at the time of initiation because they
happened to be known to the applican t and were thus informed of the initiation, and those that make
themselves known or the existence of which b ecomes known to the authorities and to which
questionnaires are sent following initiation. In our view, by using the date of publication of the initiation
notice as the starting point for the time period for questionnaire responses, Article 53 of the Act
effectively prevents Mexico from giving each exporter or foreign producer receiving a questionnaire 30
days to respond. For that reason we consider Article 53 of the Act to be inconsistent with the unequivocal
requirement in Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires.
202

40 As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the
questionnaire, which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the
date on which it was sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic
representatives of the exporting Member or, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of
the WTO, an official representative of the exporting territory.
201 Article 3 of the Mexican Foreign Trade Act (LCE ) speaks of "días habiles". See Mexico's First
Submission, para. 225.
202 We note that Mexico has argued that the United St ates should have adduced evidence, in each of its
claims concerning the law as such, of the application of the law by the executive authorities and its interpretation by
the domestic courts. We find no basis for such a requirement in this case. These sources may become important in

7.221 The United States also argues that Article 53 of the Act is inconsistent with the second sentence
of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement because it pr events Economía from giving due consideration to
extension requests, let alone granting such requests. Mexico submits that Article 53 of the Act does not
have this effect.
7.222 Even assuming arguendo that we were to agree with Mexico that nothing in Article 53 of the Act
prevents the authorities from granting extensions, when requested, this, in our view would not be able to
cure the original failure to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires for all exporters or foreign
producers. The first sentence of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement is categorical in requiring that 30
days be given to respond to questionnaires. The second sentence of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement
dealing with extension requests, thus refers to re quests to obtain more than the 30 days required.
Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires should not be forced to use the possibility of
requesting extensions to obtain the time period of 30 days they are entitled to, without any showing of
good cause. Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement requires Members, with regard to extension requests, to
give "due consideration" to such request, and to grant them, "whenever practicable". The language of the
first sentence of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement relating to the 30 days rule does not contain such
caveats and does not allow for any exceptions, and exporters or foreign producers should not be forced to
hope to obtain by requesting extensions a time peri od for responding to questionnaires they are in any
case entitled to.
7.223 In sum, we find that Article 53 of the Act is as such inconsistent with Article 6.1.1 of the
AD Agreement. In addition, we consider that th e requirement contained in Article 6.1.1 of the
AD Agreement to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires is identical to that of Article 12.1.1 of
the SCM Agreement. For the same reasons as set forth above, we therefore find that Article 53 of the Act
is as such also inconsistent with Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
7.224 We finally note that Mexico argues that in Mexi can law, international agreements such as the
WTO agreements are "self-executing" and automatically applicable in Mexico, and that any domestic law
has to be applied in a manner which is compatible with Mexico's international obligations.
203 While we
understand the important role given to Mexico's international commitments by providing for the direct
effect of international agreements such as the WTO Agreements in Mexican law, we do not consider that
for this reason, Mexico's laws would be shielded from any review of the consistency of these laws with
the WTO Agreements or that such laws can never be found to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.
 The fact that provision is made for the direct effect of the WTO Agreements does not automatically and
inevitably ensure a correct interpretation of the WTO Agreements, at least not in a situation where there is
also a distinct domestic legal provision which manifestly conflicts with the terms of the Agreements. In
our view, the direct effect of the WTO Agreemen ts in Mexican law may prove important in case the
domestic law leaves the authority with discretion to apply the law in a WTO consistent manner.
However, in case the domestic law which implements Mexico's international commitments with regard to
for example the AD Agreement and SCM Agreement, as does the Act, is clear and manifestly conflicts
with and effectively impairs the enjoyment of th e rights which the affected party is unconditionally

WTO jurisprudence or general public international law as the adjudicator may in certain circumstances need to
consider the interpretation of the law by domestic courts and the application by the executive authority in order to
determine the real scope and meaning of the text of the domestic law. In this case, where the United States as the
complainant has made a prima facie case that the language of the domestic law in question is on its face manifestly
WTO inconsistent, we do not consider that – absent a nything more substantive and concrete than the counter-
assertion by Mexico of its consistency – we would have to wait until a domestic law is applied and interpreted by the
domestic courts before this law could be dealt with by a WTO panel.
203 Mexico First Submission, paras. 202 - 206. Mexico asserts that this is set forth in Article 2 of the Act
which provides as follows: "The provisions of this Ac t are public policy provisions that apply throughout the
Republic, without prejudice to the provisions of the international treaties or agreements to which Mexico is party".

entitled to under the WTO Agreement, as is the case here, then the direct effect of the WTO Agreements
cannot shield the domestic law from such scrutiny by WTO panels.
204
7.225 This is especially so in case the challenged provisions do not leave any room for interpretation but
are clearly inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. Absent any contrary indication that the law does not
mean what the text of the law indicates it means, the challenged provision of the law is inconsistent with
the Agreement. In this case, Mexico has not provide d any such evidence, quite to the contrary, it has
vigorously defended its law as being consistent as such with the WTO Agreement, and has argued that the
law does not provide for 30 days to respond to qu estionnaires in case such questionnaires are sent to
exporters that appear after the initiation because this is not required by the AD Agreement. Since we find
that the AD Agreement does provide for such a right to have 30 days to respond to questionnaires for all
exporters receiving such questionnaires, we find this provision of the Act to be inconsistent as such with
Articles 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
2. Claim 15: Article 64 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent "as such" with
Articles 6.8, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, paragraphs 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Annex II of
the AD Agreement, and Articles 12.7 and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.226 The United States submits that Article 64 of the Act breaches Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement as
it does not provide for the application of a neutra l "all others " rate for unexamined exporters and
producers. According to the United States, Article 64 of the Act requires the application of the highest
margin obtained from the facts available to, inter alia , (a) firms which "failed to appear" at the
investigation because they were not properly informed and never received a questionnaire; and (b) firms
which cooperate but demonstrate that they did not export during the period of investigation. Therefore,
the United States argues, at least with regard to th ese two categories of firms Article 64 of the Act is
inconsistent as such with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.
7.227 In addition, the United States argues, Article 64 of the Act violates Articles 6.8 of the
AD Agreement, and paras. 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, which limit the applicability of
facts available to situations where information that was requested from individually examined firms was
not provided within a reasonable period of time or in case of significant impediment of the investigation.
Under Article 64 of the Act, the investigating authority is required to blindly apply the highest margin to
firms even if such firms were never informed of the information that was required of them in violation of
para. 1 of Annex II. Article 64 of the Act also applies in cases in which the firms acted to the best of their
abilities as is the case for cooperative producers who did not export during the period of investigation,
thereby violating paras. 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II. Finally by requiring the imposition of the highest margin,
the Act precludes the investigating authority from using the secondary source information "with special
circumspection" as required by paragraph 7 of Annex II, and this with regard to all categories of situations
to which Article 64 of the Act applies.

204 While Mexico is right in saying that a Member's law is assumed to be a good faith implementation of its
commitments until proven otherwise, it is therefore also correct to assume that by drafting the law the way it did,
Mexico assumingly considered it was implementing its commitments in a WTO consistent manner, and it can thus be
assumed that the executive authority will simply execute what the law requires it do without questioning the legal
validity of such obligations in light of the WTO Agreem ent. In fact to find otherwise, and taking the Mexican
argument to its logical conclusion, would imply that it does not matter at all what the law says since the
WTO Agreements have direct effect and they prevail. Such a reading which renders the domestic legal provisions
completely irrelevant cannot be correct.

7.228 For the same reasons, and because it deprives the i nvestigating authority of all discretion to
evaluate the appropriateness of using facts ava ilable for parties which were cooperative or not
individually examined, the United States submits that Article 64 also violates Article 12.7 of the
SCM Agreement. The United States submits that the Act also violates Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement requiring that duties be levied "in appropriate amounts" in each case, as nothing in the
SCM Agreement justifies a determination that the appropriate amounts of duties for parties that did not
export or were not even sent a questionnaire is necessarily the highest margin suggested by the applicant.
7.229 Finally, the United States submits that Article 64 of the Act breaches the Articles 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement and 9.5 of the AD Agreement concer ning expedited reviews. Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement provides for expedited reviews for e xporters who were not actually investigated for
reasons other than a refusal to cooperate. As uninformed producers and producers who simply did not
export during the period of investigation are deemed to have been investigated, no producer will ever be
able to claim the benefits of an expedited review and Article 64 of the Act thus renders Article 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement a nullity. Similarly, Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement provides for expedited reviews if
the producers which did not export during the period of investigation are not related to exporters subject
to the duties on the product. The United States asserts that since under Article 64 of the Act, firms that
did not export are deemed to have been investigated, such firms will never be able to request the benefit
of an expedited review under Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement, as they are not just related to exporters
subject to the duties, they are themselves subject to the duties. Article 64 of the Act thus breaches Article
9.5 of the AD Agreement as well.
7.230 Finally, the United States argues that, in light of the fact that Article 64 of the Act requires the
application of the highest margin rather than the ne utral all others rate, the Act also inevitably violates
Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement as it will lead to the imposition of duties in excess of the margin of
dumping established under Article 2 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Mexico
7.231 Mexico asserts that Article 64 of the Act which stipulates that the margin of dumping or
subsidization is to be calculated on the basis of the facts available for interested parties that do not appear
in the investigation or have no exports during the period of investigation and have therefore not provided
the necessary information is consistent with th e provisions of the AD Agreement and the SCM
Agreement. Mexico is of the view that Articles 6.8 of the AD Agreement and 12.7 of the SCM Agreement
provide for the application of facts available in case information necessary for the determination of a
margin is not provided. This is the case when expor ters do not appear in the investigation or do not
export during the period of investigation, as this im plies that the exporters will not provide the normal
value or export price information necessary for the calculation of a margin of dumping or subsidization.
7.232 In Mexico's view, Article 64 of the Act does not violate paragraphs 3 and 5 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement either as these provisions contain obligations in case information was provided, while in
the cases covered by Article 64 of the Act no information whatsoever has been received on one or more
essential elements of a margin determination. In a ddition, Mexico is of the view that there is no
obligation on the investigating authority to send questionnaires to all exporters and foreign producers and
it is therefore justified to base a determination with regard to non-participating or non-exporting interested
parties that do not provide the necessary information on the facts available, including the information
contained in the application. For this reason, Article 64 of the Act is thus also consistent with paragraphs
1 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.
7.233 According to Mexico, Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement is only applicable in case the
investigating authority has limited the number of exporters investigated to a sample and there does not
exist any obligation in the AD Agreement to calculate a neutral all others rate for non-appearing or non-
shipping exporters. Article 64 of the Act is thus not inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement
either.

7.234 Furthermore, Mexico submits that Article 64 of the Act on no grounds prevents foreign producers
or exporters that have made no shipments during the period of investigation from seeking a new shipper
review, if they comply with the requirements of Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement. Mexico refers to a request for a new shipper review granted by the authority after the
revision of the Act had taken effect in support of its argument that Article 64 of the Act does not prohibit
such reviews.
205
7.235 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.236 The US claim concerns Article 64 of the Act which reads in pertinent part as follows:
“. . . . The Ministry shall determine a countervailing duty on the basis of the highest
margin of price discrimination or subsidization obtained from the facts available, in the
following cases:
I. When the producers fail to appear at the investigation; or
II. When the producers fail to provide the information in a proper and timely
fashion, significantly impede the investigation, or supply information or evidence that is
incomplete, incorrect or does not derive from their accounts, thus preventing the
determination of an individual margin of price discrimination or subsidization; or
III. When the producers have not exporte d the product subject to investigation
during the investigation period.
The facts available shall be understood to mean those substantiated by evidence and data
provided by the interested parties or additional parties in a proper and timely fashion, and
by the information gathered by the investigating authority.”
206
7.237 We first examine the US claim concerning the inconsistency of Article 64 of the Act with
Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement, and Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. We recall that
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
6.8 In cases in which any interested pa rty refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made
on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the
application of this paragraph.
207

205 Mexico's Second Submission, para 213, footnote 12 –Exhibit MEX -12.
206 We note that the term "countervailing duty" referred to throughout the Act is used to refer to both anti-
dumping duties and countervailing duties.
207 Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement similarly provides as follows:
"In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does
not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the
basis of the facts available
."

Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement thus allows for the us e of facts available in case an interested party
(i) refuses access to, or (ii) otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or
(iii) significantly impedes the investigation. Article 64 of the Act on the other hand provides for the use of
the highest margin based on the facts available with regard to producers that (i) fail to appear (Article 64.I of
the Act); or (ii) fail to provide the information in a proper and timely fashion; or (iii) significantly impede
the investigation; or (iv) supply information or evidence that is incomplete, incorrect or does not derive from
their accounts (Article 64.II of the Act); or (v) that did not export the subject product during the period of
investigation (Article 64.III of the Act). It is clear that the first and fifth category of situations covered by
Article 64 of the Act are not expressly provided for in Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement which disciplines
and restricts the use of facts available. We will therefore first consider the US arguments concerning Article
64.II of the Act and the use of the highest facts ava ilable margin to producers which fail to provide the
information in a proper and timely fashion, significantly impede the investigation, or supply information or
evidence that is incomplete, incorrect or does not derive from their accounts, thus preventing the
determination of an individual margin of price discrimination or subsidization.
7.238 We recall that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement provides that in certain situations in which access to
necessary information is refused, such information is otherwise not provided within a reasonable period, or
the investigation is significantly impeded, the authorities may make their determinations on the basis of the
facts available. The fact gathering and evidentiary context in which Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
provides for this possibility clearly shows that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement is there to allow authorities
to continue with the investigation and make a determination, positive or negative, on the basis of the facts
that are available. The Agreement expresses a clear preference for first-hand information, but does not allow
any party to hold the authority hostage by not providing the necessary information, and thus provides that
second-best information from secondary sources may be used in certain well-defined circumstances. The use
of facts available under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement is not however intended to operate as a punishment
for those parties that do not provide such information. In fact, as paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement entitled "Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6" clearly show, all
the information provided by the parties, even if not ideal in all respects, should to the extent possible be used
by the authorities, and in case secondary source information is to be used, the authorities should do so with
special circumspection.
208 The final sentence of paragraph 7 of Annex II, in our view, only states the

In light of the almost identical wording of Artic le 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, our analysis under
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement applies to Article 12.7 SCM of the Agreement as well.
208 These paragraphs 1,3, 5 and 7 of Annex II provide as follows:
1. As soon as possible after the initiation of th e investigation, the investigating authorities
should specify in detail the information required from any interested party, and the manner in
which that information should be structured by the interested party in its response. The authorities
should also ensure that the party is aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable
time, the authorities will be free to make determinations on the basis of the facts available,
including those contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic
industry.
3. All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be
used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion, and,
where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language requested by the
authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are made. If a party does not
respond in the preferred medium or computer language but the authorities find that the
circumstances set out in paragraph 2 have been satisfied, the failure to respond in the preferred
medium or computer language should not be considered to significantly impede the investigation.
5. Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should not
justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted to the best of its
ability.
7. If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary sour ce, including the information supplied in the
application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection.
In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other
independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and

obvious that in case of non-co-operation, the result of such use of secondary source information could be less
favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate. By making it a requirement to always use the highest
margin based on the facts available Article 64 of the Act prohibits the authority from taking into account the
specific circumstances of each individual case of non-provision of information. This effectively prevents the
authority from being able to undertake the inherently comparative evaluation of this evidence available in a
case at hand that is needed to meet the requirement that the facts available to be used are the "best"
information that is available.
209 This, in our view, requires the authority to use those data which are most
appropriate and best suited to replace the missing data. Since Article 64 of the Act effectively prevents the
authorities from using the best information to replace the missing data, we find that Article 64 of the Act is
inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.210
7.239 We will now address the US claim with regard to Article 64.I of the Act concerning the use of the
highest facts available margin for producers which fail to appear. In similar vein, we consider that the use
of facts available to make determinations with regard to exporters or producers that fail to appear could as
such be permitted by Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. We wish to emphasise that this will at least be the
case if the investigating authority has first made a reasonable effort to ensure that all interested parties are
informed of the information required, and if a copy of the application and a notice of the initiation has
been sent to all exporters that an objective investigating authority can reasonably be considered to have
knowledge of, as required by Article 6.1.3 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement.211 Indeed, in case a party is
informed of the initiation, is requested to provide information or is sent a questionnaire, but does not
respond and does not take part in the investigation, we consider that Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
would clearly allow the authority to use the facts av ailable. However, and for the same reasons as set
forth above, we are of the view that a rule which provides for the use of the highest margin based on the
facts available in each case of a failure to appear is not consistent with the requirement that the facts used
to replace the missing data should be the best and most appropriate information available. To
indiscriminately require the use of the highest margin even if completely unrelated to the exporter which
failed to appear, does, in our view, not comply with this requirement. We thus find that Article 64.I of the
Act is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.

customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the
investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant
information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is
less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.
209 See para. 7.166 above.
210 This is not, in our view, inconsistent with any view that it is conceivable that in a particular case, the
"best information available" leads to use of the highest margin. What is however inconceivable is that this can be
predetermined to be always the "best information available".
211 We note that, in Mexico, the situation covered by the "failure to appear" in Article 64.I of the Act would
seem to cover also that of any interested party which, even when not requested to provide information, fails to make
itself known to the investigating authority so that it can be examined individually. We are mindful of the fact that
Article 64 of the Act was revised following the conclusion of the rice investigation and that this investigation can
thus not be considered as evidence of the application of Article 64 of the Act. Nevertheless, Mexico does not contest
that the category of "producers that fail to appear" in Article 64.I of the Act is to be understood to cover all foreign
producers or exporters that do not provide information, irrespective of the fact that no effort was undertaken by the
authority to contact such exporters and to inform them of the information required for the determination. According
to Mexico, the investigating authority is not required to take an active approach, and complies with all the
obligations under the AD Agreement by providing questionnaires to the exporters or foreign producers listed in the
application and to those that come forward out of their own initiative because they have learned about the initiation.
As we stated earlier, we are of the view, that an investigating authority which fails to ensure that all interested parties
are given notice of the information that is required of them and ample opportunity to present all evidence they
consider relevant to their case, is not entitled to make determinations on the basis of the facts available. In our view,
such exporters cannot be considered to have failed to provide necessary information, since they were never properly
informed of the information they were requested to provide.

7.240 Finally, Article 64.III of the Act requires the application of the highest margin based on the facts
available to producers which did not export during the period of investigation.
7.241 Once again, and assuming arguendo that a margin of dumping for non-shipping exporters is
governed by the terms of Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
212we are of the view that the problem with
Article 64.III of the Act consists of the indiscriminate requirement to use the highest margin based on the
facts available rather than the margin that results from the use of the best information available. In effect,
Article 64 of the Act does not simply provide for the use of facts available in order to calculate a margin
of dumping for the non-shipping exporter. It rather requires that for all non-shipping exporters, regardless
of the circumstances of the case, the highest margin found on the basis of the facts available is to be
applied to such non-shipping exporters. For the reasons set forth above, we are of the view that such a
rule that requires the authority to always apply the highest margin is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and
paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.
7.242 In sum, and for the reasons set forth above, we find that Article 64 of the Act which requires the
authority to determine "a countervailing duty on the basis of the highest margin of price discrimination or
subsidization" obtained from the facts available in the three situations described in Article 64 of the Act to
be inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreemen t and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement, and Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement.
213 In light of our findings, we do not consider it
necessary for the resolution of this dispute to make any rulings on the US claims with regard to violations
of Article 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 of the AD Agreement, and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
3. Claim 16: Article 68 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent "as such" with
Articles 5.8, 9.3, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 11.9 and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.243 The United States argues that Article 68 of the Act requires the investigating authority to conduct
reviews of final anti-dumping and countervailing measures with respect to companies that were found not
to have been dumping or not to have received count ervailable subsidies during the original period of
investigation. The United States submits that this is clearly inconsistent with the explicit requirement of
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement to terminate the investigation
immediately in case no margin of dumping or countervailable subsidy was found to exist.
7.244 In addition, the United States argues that Article 68 of the Act is inconsistent with the AD and
SCM Agreement as it requires exporters or producers requesting a review to demonstrate that the sales
during the review period were "representative", wh ile no such additional requirement for obtaining a
review exists in Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. In the view
of the United States, these provisions do not permit the introduction of such an additional requirement.
The United States therefore submits that by requiring the authority to deny a review unless a party
demonstrates that its exports were "representative", Article 68 of the Act is inconsistent as such with the
AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement.
(ii) Mexico
7.245 Mexico rejects the US allegations of inconsistency of Article 68 of the Act with Articles 5.8, 9.3
and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 11.9 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. First, Mexico argues

212 See footnote 158.
213 For the reasons given in paras. 7.224 and 7.225, we reject the Mexican defence on the basis of the direct
effect of international agreements in Mexican law.

that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement do not apply to reviews but only to
original investigations. Mexico therefore consider s that the US argument that Article 68 of the Act
violates Articles 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement in subjecting to
administrative reviews exporters for whom no margin of dumping or subsidization was determined is
without merit since the allegedly infringed Articles do not even apply in the case of reviews.
Furthermore, Mexico is of the view that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.9 of the SCM
Agreement do not require the exclusion of an exporter from the measure and therefore from being
subjected to reviews simply because no margin of dumping was established in the original investigation.
According to Mexico, Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement and 15.3 of the SCM Agreement clearly show
that an investigation is only to be terminated in case the margin of dumping calculated on a country-wide
basis rather than a firm -specific basis is below de minimis. In any case, Mexico is of the view that a
review does not imply the imposition of a duty and thus does not negatively affect the exporters
concerned. Such reviews are thus similar to t hose provided in Article 9.3.1 of the AD Agreement
concerning the determination of final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties.
7.246 Mexico further submits that Article 68 of the Act does not impose a "representativeness"
requirement as a condition for the investigating authority to conduct reviews such as those provided for in
Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement and Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement. According to
Mexico, there are no clear provisions in the AD Agreement or SCM Agreement as to the procedures for
conducting administrative reviews and new exporter reviews, and the "representativeness" requirement of
Article 68 of the Act is merely a means of ascertaining that the export volumes reported in administrative
review or new shipper reviews reflect normal volumes that are representative of the sales policies of
exporters seeking such reviews. Mexico asserts that an exporter is not required to show "representative
volume of sales" in order to obtain the initiation of a review, but that an interested party will need to
demonstrate such representativeness in order to be able to determine a margin of dumping for that
party.
214 In any case, according to Mexico, the United States fails to demonstrate that such a requirement
is a sine qua non requirement for the initiation of such reviews.215
7.247 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.248 The United States makes two claims concerning Article 68 of the Act. First, the United States
argues that by subjecting exporters for which the original investigation showed a margin of dumping or
subsidization below de minimis to administrative reviews, Article 68 of the Act is inconsistent with
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement. Second, the United States submits that
by requiring exporters requesting a review to show that their volume of sales during the review period
was representative, Article 68 of the Act is in breach of Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and
Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.

214 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 31.
215 Mexico asserts that this is clear from a recent review on imports of dessert apples from the United States
(Exhibit MEX-13).

7.249 We will first examine the US claim of violation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and
Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides as follows
216:
5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of in jury to justify proceeding with the case.
There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the
margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or
potential, or the injury, is negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be
de minimis if this margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export
price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the
volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than
3 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries
which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the like product in
the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per cent of imports of the
like product in the importing Member.
7.250 In turn, Article 68 of the Act in pertinent part provides as follows:
Final countervailing duties shall be reviewed annually at the request of a party or
ex officio by the Ministry at any time, as shall imports from producers for whom no
positive margin of price discrimination or subsidization was determined in the
investigation. . .
7.251 Article 68 of the Act thus requires the review of producers for which during the original
investigation it was determined that they had not been engaged in dumping practices or had not received
any subsidies. In our view, and for the reasons set forth above when discussing the US claims concerning
the inclusion in the Anti-dumping measures on rice of the two exporters found not to have been dumping
during the period of investigation, we find that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires the termination
of the investigation with regard to such exporters found not to ha ve been dumping above de minimis
levels, and requires that such exporters be excluded from the measures imposed. The logical consequence
of such an exclusion of producers found not to have been dumping is that they can not subsequently be
subjected to administrative or changed circumstances reviews. While we agree with Mexico that the
specific requirements concerning de minimis do not apply in the case of reviews of the duties imposed,
this does not imply that Article 68 of the Act dealing with reviews cannot be inconsistent with Article 5.8
of the AD Agreement insofar as it imposes the review of measures with regard to producers to which such
measures should not have been applied in the first place. The possibility of reviewing the zero per cent
duty margin imposed on such non-dumping exporters also reveals the important meaning of the
imposition of such a zero per cent duty which, in spite of its appearance, does not equal the termination of
the investigation as required by Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement. We therefore find that Article 68 of the
Act is as such inconsistent with Article 5. 8 of the AD Agreement. For the same reasons, mutatis
mutandis, Article 68 of the Act is in breach of Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement.
7.252 The second claim of the United States with rega rd to Article 68 of the Act concerns the
consistency with Article 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement of the

216 Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement provides as follows:
11.9 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient
evidence of either subsidization or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be
immediate termination in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis, or where the volume
of subsidized imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. For the purpose of this
paragraph, the amount of the subsidy shall be considered to be de minimis if the subsidy is less
than 1 per cent ad valorem.

"representativeness" requirement which, according to the United States, is imposed by Article 68 of the
Act. Article 68 of the Act in pertinent part reads as follows:
The party requesting a review shall satisfy the Ministry that the volume of exports to
Mexico during the review period is representative.
217
7.253 We consider that Article 68 of the Act clearly imposes as a requirement to obtain an
administrative, i.e. duty assessment review, or a changed circumstances review a showing by the party
requesting such reviews that its volume of exports to Mexico during the review period was representative.
 Article 68 of the Act, by using such mandatory wo rding that the party requesting such reviews "shall
satisfy" the Ministry leaves little to be desired in terms of clarity of what is required of a party requesting
reviews. In fact, Mexico confirmed as much in its answer to a question from the panel, when it stated that
an exporter is not required to show a representative volume of sales in order to obtain the initiation of a
review, but that "in the course of a review, an interested party will need to demonstrate such
representativeness in order to be able to determine a margin of dumping for that party".
218 In other words,
we understand Mexico to confirm that while a review may be initiated without a showing of
representativeness, the duties will not be reviewed for any party that fails to satisfy the authority that the
volume of exports during the review period was repr esentative. We do not consider meaningful the
distinction drawn by Mexico between the right to obtain the initiation of a review and the right to have the
duties reviewed, as an initiation of review without chance of success because of a failure to demonstrate
representative volume of exports is meaningless.
7.254 The question before us is thus whether such a requirement to show representative volume of
exports is consistent with Article 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
7.255 Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
9.3 The amount of the anti-dumping duty sha ll not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.
9.3.1 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis,
the determination of the final liability fo r payment of anti-dumping duties shall take
place as soon as possible, normally within 12 months, and in no case more than
18 months, after the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of the
anti-dumping duty has been made.
20 Any refund shall be made promptly and normally in
not more than 90 days following the determ ination of final liability made pursuant to
this sub-paragraph. In any case, where a refund is not made within 90 days, the
authorities shall provide an explanation if so requested.
9.3.2 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis,
provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of
the margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin of
dumping shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more than
18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly supported by evidence,
has been made by an importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty. The
refund authorized should normally be made within 90 days of the above-noted decision.
9.3.3 In determining whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made
when the export price is constructed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2,

217 See Mexico’s 2003 WTO Notification (G/ADP/N/1/MEX/1/Suppl.2), at page 9. The equivalent Spanish
realizadas a México durante el período de revisión es representativo.” Id. (Spanish) at page 10.
218 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 31.

authorities should take account of any change in normal value, any change in costs
incurred between importation and resale, and any movement in the resale price which is
duly reflected in subsequent selling prices, and should calculate the export price with no
deduction for the amount of anti-dumping duties paid when conclusive evidence of the
above is provided.
20
It is understood that the observance of the time- limits mentioned in this subparagraph and in
subparagraph 3.2 may not be possible where the product in question is subject to judicial review
proceedings.
7.256 Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement provides that:
11.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty,
where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any
interested party which submits positive in formation substantiating the need for a
review.
21 Interested parties shall have the ri ght to request the authorities to examine
whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether the
injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both.
If, as a result of the review under this para graph, the authorities determine that the
anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.219
21
A determination of final liability for paymen t of anti-dumping duties, as provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article 9, does not by itself constitute a review within the meaning of this Article.
7.257 It is clear that these provisions do not as such require a showing of representativeness of sales
volumes in order for a duty to be reviewed. With regard to duty assessment or administrative reviews
Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement clearly states that the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed
the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. Therefore, Article 9.3.2 states that provision shall
be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping. The
only condition imposed by Article 9.3.2 is that a request for refund shall be duly supported by evidence.
In our view, the "evidence" referred to in this context of determining final liability for the product relates
to the information required to determine a margin of dumping in line with Article 2 of the AD Agreement,
i.e. normal value and export price information. Article 9.3 thus does not require the exporters concerned
to first demonstrate that the sales made during the re view period were "representative" in order for the
authority to be obliged to review the duties and refund the duties paid in excess of the margin of dumping.
Neither does Article 2 of the AD Agreement provide that the number of export sales of an exporter has to
be "representative" for the authority to be able to determine a margin of dumping for this exporter. It
would in our view be inconsistent with the Agreement to refuse to refund the duties paid in excess of the
margin of dumping, because only a small number of such export sales were made. Article 9.3.2 of the
AD Agreement requires that any duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping is to be refunded, and the
number of export sales is thus completely irrelevant in this respect. We therefore conclude that no such

219 Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement similarly provides as follows:
21.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since
the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any interested party which
submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. Interested parties shall have the
right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is
necessary to offset subsidization, whether the inju ry would be likely to continue or recur if the
duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the
authorities determine that the countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated
immediately.

requirement can be imposed on the exporter when it is requesting the refund of the duties paid in excess of
the margin of dumping through an administrative review.
7.258 With regard to changed circumstances review, Article 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement
similarly does not include a requirement of "representativeness" in order for the exporter to be entitled to
request a changed circumstances review. The only requirements imposed by Article 11.2 of the
AD Agreement on the request by an exporter for such a review are that a reasonable period of time has
lapsed, and that the interested party requesting the review submits positive information substantiating the
need for a review. As the second sentence of Ar ticle 11.2 of the AD Agreement makes clear, such
positive information relates to whether the conti nued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset
dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or
both. If those conditions are met, Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement stipulates that the authorities shall
review the need for the continued imposition of the duty. In our view, Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement
thus requires an authority to review the need for the continued imposition of the duty in case these two
requirements are met.
7.259 Article 68 of the Act requires as a rule that each time an interested party is unable to show that
volume of exports during the review period was representative, such a review is to be denied. This in our
view is inconsistent with the Agreement. Under a changed circumstances review of Article 11.2 of the
AD Agreement, the authority examines whether there is continued need for the measure and whether the
duty is to be varied or removed. A situati on could be envisaged where the positive information
substantiating the need for a review that the interested party is to adduce in support of its request relates
only to its domestic sales and the normal value side of the dumping margin. A possible example could be
a case where an exporter requests a review based on an important and dramatic drop in the normal value
for the product due to a change in the cost structur e of the company for example. This will have an
obvious effect on the dumping margin and may thus warrant a review that leads to the duty being
removed or varied. The change in circumstances is unrelated to export side of the equation. An interested
party is entitled to a changed circumstances review under Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 21.2 of
the SCM Agreement, if it submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. What such
positive information relates to will depend from case to case, and such positive information does not, in
our view, necessarily include that a representative number of exports sales were made. We consider that
by requiring the authority to reject a review each time the volume of export sales was not representative,
even in cases where the change in ci rcumstances is unrelated to the export price, Article 68 of the Act
requires the authority to reject reviews in a manne r which is inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the
AD Agreement.
220
7.260 We therefore find that by imposing this additional requirement that interested parties requesting a
review are required to always satisfy the authority that the volume of the export sales was representative,
Article 68 of the Act is as such inconsistent w ith Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and,
mutatis mutandis, Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.221

220 We acknowledge that the representativeness of the export sales can in certain situations be a relevant
factor in determining whether it is appropriate to remove or vary the duty. A showing of such representativeness
may thus be requested as part of the "positive informati on substantiating the need for a review" which is to be
submitted by the interested party requesting the review. Whether that is so will depend on the circumstances of each
case. In our view, the rule of Article 68 of the Act fails to take these specific circumstances into account.
221 For the reasons set forth in paras. 7.224 and 7.225, we reject Mexico's defence based on the direct effect
of international treaties in Mexican law.

4. Claim 17: Article 89D of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent "as such" with
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.261 The United States asserts that Article 89 D of the Act restricts the ability of interested parties to
obtain expedited reviews in a manner which is incons istent with Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. According to the United States, Article 89D of the Act requires a
producer to demonstrate that the volume of exports during the review period was "representative", while
no such requirement exists in Articles 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. In
addition, under the Act such expedited reviews are available to producers only, while the AD Agreement
and the SCM Agreement provide for such reviews for both producing and non-producing exporters.
(ii) Mexico
7.262 Mexico argues that Article 89D of the Act is not inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement or Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. First, Mexico is of the view that even if
Articles 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement do not do so expressly, it is in light of
the context and purpose of these provisions only logical that the authorities require that the review be
based on a representative amount of exports, as only this will enable the authorities to conduct an
adequate price comparison. Second, Mexico asserts that although Article 89D of the Act mentions only
"producers", the text of Article 89D of the Act has to be read in combination with the WTO Agreements
themselves. Mexico asserts that Article 89D of th e Act confers a right to a new shipper review under
certain circumstances to both producers and exporters as is evidenced by the resolution initiating the new
shipper procedure concerning imports of apples from the United States, paragraphs 3 and 32 of which
show that the new shipper review was initiated at the request of an exporting firm which was a trading
enterprise.
222 Moreover, Mexico argues, Article 47 of the Act's Regulations also allows new shipper
reviews for non-producing enterprises, i.e. enterprises devoted solely to exportation.
7.263 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.264 The US claim concerns Article 89D of the Act which provides as follows:
Article 89D – Producers of goods subject to a final countervailing duty who exported no
such goods during the period under investigati on in the proceedings that gave rise to
such duty may request the Ministry to initiate a procedure for new exporters with a view
to assessing individual margins of price discrimination, provided that:
I. Their exports to the national territo ry of the goods subject to countervailing
duties were subsequent to the period under investigation in the proceedings that gave rise
to the countervailing duty. The requesting party shall satisfy the Ministry that the
volume of exports during the period of review is representative; and

222 Mexico Second Submission, para. 230. Exhibit MEX – 12.

II. They show that they are not related in any way to the producers or exporters in
the exporting country determined to be subject to a specific countervailing duty.
(emphasis added)
7.265 According to the United States Article 89D of the Act provides for a requirement of
"representativeness" that is not provided for by Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement or 19.3 of the
SCM Agreement. Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
If a product is subject to anti-dumping duties in an importing Member, the authorities
shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of
dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have
not exported the product to the importing Memb er during the period of investigation,
provided that these exporters or producers can show that they are not related to any of
the exporters or producers in the exporting country who are subject to the anti-dumping
duties on the product. Such a review shall be initiated and carried out on an accelerated
basis, compared to normal duty assessment and review proceedings in the importing
Member. No anti-dumping duties shall be le vied on imports from such exporters or
producers while the review is being carried out. The authorities may, however, withhold
appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure that, should such a review result in a
determination of dumping in respect of such producers or exporters, anti-dumping duties
can be levied retroactively to the date of the initiation of the review.
7.266 In our view, this provision clearly does not subject the right to an expedited new shipper review to
a showing of a "representative" volume of export sales as does Article 89D of the Act. Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement provides that the authorities shall promptly carry out a review, provided that the exporters
or producers who have not exported the product subject to a duty during the period of investigation can
show that they are not related to any of the e xporters or producers in the exporting country who are
subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product. In sum, in case a producer or exporter which (i) has not
exported the product to the country concerned during the period of investigation and (ii) is not related to
an exporter or producer already subject to the duty requests a new shipper review, the authority is required
to promptly carry out such a review. Article 89 D of the Act on the other hand provides that an exporter
may request an expedited review in case it (i) has not exported during the period of investigation, (ii) is
not related to an exporter or producer that is already subject to a duty, and (iii) can demonstrate that the
volume of exports during the review period is representative. We consider that to the extent that Article
89 D of the Act subjects the entitlement to a prompt review to a showing of representative volumes of
export sales, it is inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement, which does not allow an authority to
deny a request for reasons other than the two mentioned above and explicitly set forth in Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement.
7.267 Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement provides as follows:
19.3 When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a
non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be
subsidized and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have
renounced any subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the terms of this
Agreement have been accepted. Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive
countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal
to cooperate, shall be entitled to an expedite d review in order that the investigating
authorities promptly establish an individual countervailing duty rate for that exporter.
7.268 Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement thus similarly provides for the right to an expedited review of
an exporter whose exports are subject to a defin itive duty but who was not actually investigated for
reasons other than a refusal to cooperate. Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement does not subject this right

to any other conditions than the fact that the exporter's product is subject to a definitive duty and that he
was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal to cooperate. For reasons, similar to those
expressed earlier, we consider that Article 89 D of the Act is inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the SCM
Agreement as it imposes an additional requirement not provided for in Article 19.3 of the SCM
Agreement for the exporters to be entitled to an expedited review. The mandatory language of Article 89
D of the Act inevitably implies that an authority w ill reject a request for an expedited review by an
exporter whose product is subject to a countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated for a
reason other than a refusal to cooperate in case no representative volume of export sales were made during
the period of review which is inconsistent with the clear obligation in Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement
to provide for such reviews in such circumstances.
7.269 We therefore find that Article 89D of the Act is as such inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
223 In light of our findings, we do not consider it
necessary for the resolution of this dispute to consider the US arguments based on the fact that Article 89
D of the Act only talks about producers, while Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement entitles both exporters
and producers to an expedited review. In any case, we note that Mexico clarified that it is of the view that
the use of the term producers does not imply that exporters are not similarly entitled to such reviews.
224 225
5. Claim 18: Article 93V of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent "as such" with
Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.270 The United States argues that Article 93V of th e Act provides for the imposition of fines for
importers which enter products subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigations while such
investigations are underway. This, according to the United States, is a specific action against dumping or
against subsidies which is not provided for by the AD or SCM Agreement and is therefore inconsistent
with Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. The United States submits that
there is a "clear, direct and unavoidable connecti on" between the determination that the constituent
elements of dumping or subsidization exist and the imposition of a fine under Article 93V of the Act. In
the view of the United States, it is therefore a "sp ecific action" relating to dumping or subsidization,
which is "against" dumping/subsidization since it has an adverse bearing on dumping or subsidization and
creates an incentive to terminate su ch practices. As the fines envisaged under Article 93 V of the Act
constitute a "specific action against dumping/subsidi zation" which is not contemplated in the AD and
SCM Agreement, as it does not take the form of a definitive anti-dumping duty, a provisional measure or
price undertaking, Article 93V of the Act is incons istent with Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and
Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
226

223 For the reasons set forth in paras. 7.224 and 7.225, we reject Mexico's defence based on the direct effect
of international treaties in Mexican law.
224 In support of its statement, Mexico submitted a resolution initiating the new shipper procedure
concerning imports of apples from the United States, paragraph 3 and 32 of which show that the new shipper review
was initiated at the request of an exporting firm which was a trading enterprise rather than a producer of the subject
product. Mexico Second Submission, para. 230. Exhibit MEX – 12.
225 Mexico First Answers to Questions, question 33.
226 The United States refers to a detailed discussion of the meaning of a "specific action against
dumping/subsidization" in the report of the Appellate Body in the US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) case, paras.
224 -269.

(ii) Mexico
7.271 Mexico submits that the United States failed to establish any violation with the AD Agreement or
the SCM Agreement of this provision of the Mexican law which has to be read in light of Mexico's
international obligations under the WTO Agreements. In addition, the United States failed to adduce
evidence of the interpretation of this provision by the domestic courts and the doctrine, or its application
by the authorities. In the absence of such proof, the law has to be assumed to be consistent with Mexico’s
obligations under the WTO Agreements. In addition, Mexico asserts that Article 93V of the Act does not
oblige Economía to impose fines but merely authorises it to do so. Article 93V of the Act is therefore not
as such inconsistent with Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
7.272 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.273 The US claim concerns the consistency of Artic le 93 V of the Act with Articles 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Article 93V of the Act provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be the responsibility of the Ministry to punish the following infringements:
(V) Importation, once the investigation is under way, of identical or like goods in
significant quantities, as compared to total imports and domestic production, within a
relatively short period, when in the light of the timing and the volume of the imports and
other circumstances such imports are considered likely to undermine the remedial effect
of the countervailing duty: by a fine equivalent to the amount resulting from the
application of the final countervailing duty to the imports entered for up to five months
following the date of initiation of the investigation. This penalty shall only be applied
once the Ministry has issued the resolution determining the final countervailing duties . .

7.274 Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement in turn provides that:
18.1 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be
taken except in accordance with the provisi ons of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this
Agreement.
24
24
This is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as
appropriate.
7.275 Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement similarly provides as follows:
32.1 No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.56
56
This paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994,
where appropriate.
7.276 In our view, the only specific action against dumping that is in accordance with the provisions of
the GATT 1994 as interpreted by the AD Agreement are those set forth in the AD Agreement and consist

of definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional measures and price undertakings.
227 The same holds true
for specific action against a subsidy, for which the SCM Agreement provides as the only remedies the
imposition of definitive countervailing duties, provisional measures or an undertaking. It is clear
therefore that the imposition of a fine is not permitted in case it can be demonstrated that it is imposed as a
specific action against dumping or subsidization.
7.277 The important question for us to answer remain s whether Article 93V of the Act is a specific
action against dumping or subsidization such that th e imposition of fines would be inconsistent with
Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. We concur with the following view
expressed by the Appellate Body in the US – CDSOA 2000 case:
"Accordingly, a measure that may be take n only when the constituent elements of
dumping or a subsidy are present, is a "specific action" in response to dumping within
the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or a "specific action" in
response to subsidization within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. In
other words, the measure must be inextricably linked to, or have a strong correlation
with, the constituent elements of dumping or of a subsidy. Such link or correlation may,
as in the 1916 Act, be derived from the text of the measure itself."
228
7.278 In our view, the imposition of fines under Article 93V of the Act is inextricably linked to, and
strongly correlated with, a determination of dumping, as defined in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and in
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, or a determination of a subsidy, as defined in the SCM Agreement.
Article 93V of the Act provides for the possibility to impose fines in case (i) a product identical or similar
to the subject product is being imported; (ii) after the investigation has been initiated; (iii) in significant
quantities within a relatively short period of time; and (iv) such imports are likely to undermine the
remedial effect of the countervailing duty. The level of the fine is determined by the amount of the final
duty. Such fines may only be imposed following a final determination and may be applied to imports that
entered the country for up to five months following the date of initiation of the investigation. As the text
of Article 93V of the Act clearly shows, impor ters may be fined only once anti-dumping duties or
countervailing duties have been imposed, and the fi nes may be collected only pursuant to an anti-
dumping duty order or countervailing duty order. In addition, and as an anti-dumping duty order or a
countervailing duty order can be imposed only followi ng a determination of dumping or subsidization
respectively, we consider that there is a cl ear, direct and unavoidable connection between the
determination of dumping and subsidization and the imposition of fines under Article 93 V of the Act. In
sum, we consider that Article 93V of the Act fines may be imposed only following a determination that
the constituent elements of dumping or subsidization are present, and such fines therefore constitute a
"specific action" related to dumping or a subsidy within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement

227 We find support for this view in the Appellate Body Report in the US – 1916 Act case in which the
Appellate Body found that Article VI of the GATT 1994, in pa rticular Article VI:2, read in conjunction with the
AD Agreement, limits the permissible responses to dumping to definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional measures
and price undertakings:
"137. As we have concluded above, Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement apply to "specific action against dumping". Article VI, and, in particular,
Article VI:2, read in conjunction with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, limit the permissible
responses to dumping to definitive anti-dumpi ng duties, provisional measures and price
undertakings. Therefore, the 1916 Act is inconsistent with Article VI:2 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement to the extent that it provides for "specific action against dumping" in the form of civil
and criminal proceedings and penalties.
138. With the caveat that Article VI:2 must be read together with the relevant provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the Panel that:
… by providing for the imposition of fines or imprisonment or for the recovery of treble damages,
the 1916 Act violates Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. "
Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, paras. 137 – 138, footnote omitted.
228 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 239.

and of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. In addition, we find that by threatening to impose fines on
anyone importing the product subject to an anti-dumpi ng investigation, Article 93V of the Act clearly
provides for a specific action against dumping or subs idization which is not provided for in the AD or
SCM Agreement.
7.279 In fact we note that Mexico does not appear to argue the contrary but submits that Article 93V of
the Act does not require the authority to impose such fines but merely authorises it do so. We do not
consider this argument to be convincing. When a law like the Act provides that it "shall be the
responsibility of the Ministry to punish the following infringements",
229 it does more than just dividing
competences among the government, but rather stipul ates that fines are to be imposed in case the
conditions of Article 93V of the Act are met and that it is up to the Ministry of Economy responsible also
for the conduct of anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations to impose such fines.
7.280 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Article 93V of the Act is inconsistent with
Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.230 231
6. Claim 19: Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act, and Section 366 of Mexico’s
FCCP, are inconsistent "as such" with Articles 9.3, 9.5, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and
Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement
(a) Arguments of the Parties
(i) United States
7.281 The United States submits that Articles 68 and 97 of the Act, and Section 366 of Mexico’s FCCP
preclude the authorities from conducting a review of anti-dumping or countervailing duties while a
judicial review, either national or bi-national before a NAFTA panel is ongoing. This, the United States
submits, is in clear violation of the entitlement to such reviews of the duties as set forth in Articles 9.3 of
the AD Agreement on administrative reviews, 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement
on expedited reviews and 11.2 of the AD Agreem ent and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement on changed
circumstances reviews.
232

229 The Spanish original of the law reads: " Corresponde a la Secretaría sancionar las siguientes
infracciones: ...".
230 For the reasons set forth in paras. 7.224 and 7.225, we reject Mexico's defence based on the direct effect
of international treaties in Mexican law.
231 In fact we note that Article 93 V of the Act appears to be aiming to remedy a situation of injury which is
difficult to repair caused by massive imports entering the country in a relatively short period of time following the
initiation of the investigation but prior to the imposition of any measures. A very similar situation is addressed in
Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement and Article 20.6 of the SCM Agreement which allow, under certain strict
conditions, for the retroactive application of duties even pr ior to the application of provisional measures in such
cases as an exception to the general rule of non-retroactive effect of duties. The retroactive application of duties is
clearly a specific action against dumping as explicitly provided for in the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement.
In light of the fact that the fines of Article 93V of the Act operate in the same manner and its amount is limited to the
amount of the duty, such fines are obviously also a speci fic action against dumping or subsidization, but one not
provided for in the AD Agreement or the SCM Agreement, and therefore inconsistent with Article 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. In any case, and even assuming arguendo that there really
is no practical difference between the retroactive app lication of anti-dumping or countervailing duties and the
imposition of fines in an equal amount, it is clear that Article 93 V of the Act allows for the imposition of such fines
without imposing the same requirements and conditions as are set forth in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement and
Article 20.6 of the SCM Agreement. However, as no claims were made before us with regard to Article 10.6 of the
AD Agreement and Article 20.6 of the SCM Agreement, we do not need to make any rulings in this respect.
232 The United States submits as evidence of the operation of the challenged provisions of the Act a letter of
the investigating authority to a US Beef exporter in which the authority rejects this exporter's request for a review of

7.282 The United States asserts that the harm is being exacerbated by the fact that Article 64 of the Act
requires Economía to impose the highest facts available margin on all exporters that did not receive an
individual margin of dumping. This implies that exporters which requested that an individual margin of
dumping be determined through an expedited review will not only have to wait until any possible judicial
review has been finalized, but will in the meantime be confronted with duties determined on the basis of
the highest facts available margin of dumping.
(ii) Mexico
7.283 Mexico considers that the United States failed to discharge its burden of proof by not adducing
evidence on the alleged applicability of Section 366 of the FCCP to reviews of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties.
233 Furthermore, Mexico considers that Articles 68 and 97 of the Act which provide
that the duties only become definitive if no review is ongoing seek to ensure legal certainty. The rule that
no reviews will be undertaken until all legal challenges are over thus provides a guarantee for exporters
which are not obliged to pay any definitive duties until after such challenges are finalized, but may
provide a guarantee of payment until su ch time as the duty becomes definitive. 234 With regard to the
alleged inconsistency with Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement, Mexico asserts that the authority will
refund any duties paid in excess once the relevant proceedings have been completed and the duties
imposed in the investigation are regarded as being definitive, and nothing in the challenged provisions
states otherwise.
7.284 As far as new shippers are concerned, Mexico is of the view that the challenged provisions do not
preclude or expressly prohibit such new shipper reviews. In addition, Mexico considers that there is no
obligation under the AD/SCM Agreement that prohibits a Member from not initiating such a procedure
while challenge proceedings are under way. According to Mexico there is no obligation to immediately
initiate such a procedure once an a pplication has been made, but rather only to carry out such review
promptly (in the AD Agreement) or expeditiously (in the SCM Agreement), once initiated. Therefore the
provision that no review for new shippers will be in itiated until after a legal ch allenge is over, is not
inconsistent with the AD Agreement or the SCM Agreement.
7.285 Finally, Mexico submits that, in any case, by virtue of Article 133 of its Constitution, treaties such
as the WTO Agreements are self-executing and automatically applicable in Mexican law, and as Article 2
of the Act makes clear, the Act will be implemented in a manner which is congruent with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. According to Mexico, the Act thus does not mandate any WTO inconsistent
action.
(b) Analysis
7.286 The US claim concerns a challenge of Article 366 of the FCCP and Articles 68 and 97 of the Act.
Article 366 of the FCCP provide as follows:
The process will be suspended, when a decision cannot be reached until a resolution in
another matter is made, and in any other special case determined by the Law.
7.287 We recall that Article 68 of the Act reads in pertinent part:

the duties on the basis of the fact that such duties were not considered definitive as the duties had been challenged
before a bi-national NAFTA panel. Exhibit US-20.
233 Mexico considers relevant the fact that the evid ence introduced by the United States in support of its
interpretation of the operation of the challenged provisions (Exhibit US-20) does not even mention Article 366 of the
FCCP.
234 Mexico First Submission, para. 302.

Final countervailing duties shall be reviewed annually at the request of a party . . . as
shall imports from producers for whom no positive margin of price discrimination or
subsidization was determined in the investigation. . . .
7.288 Article 97 of the Act reads:
Any interested party may, in respect of the resolutions and actions referred to in
Article 94, paragraph (V), choose to reso rt to the alternative dispute settlement
mechanisms . . . . If such mechanisms are chosen:
II. Only the resolution issued by the Mini stry as a result of the decision emanating
from the alternative mechanisms shall be considered final;
7.289 The United States argues that, in case a judicial re view of the measure is requested, before a
domestic or bi-national body, the challenged provi sions require the authority to suspend all
administrative, expedited and changed circumstances reviews. In essence Mexico confirms that the
provisions operate in this manner, but argues that this does not constitute a violation of any of the
provisions alleged to have been violated. Mexico mainly argues that as long as judicial review
proceedings are ongoing, the duty has not become "definitive" and hence no reviews have to be
undertaken, as such reviews all relate to products subject to "definitive" anti-dumping or countervailing
duties. The fact that this is the way the Mexican system works is further evidenced by the letter of the
investigating authority to a US exporter of beef which was requesting a review of the anti-dumping duties,
in which the authority rejected such request and stated the following:
"in conformity with Articles 68 of the FTA and 99, 100 and 101 of the Regulation, in
order to be able to request a review it is required that the determination subject of the
review be definitive, ...
In this particular case, the final determ ination on bovine meat and edible offals,
published in the Official Journal of 28 April 2000, is not of a definitive nature, as will be
considered as final only the determination of the Secretaria which results from the
decision taken by the mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution, in conformity with
Article 97 II of the FTA".
235
7.290 The question before us is thus whether a Memb er is permitted to reject request for reviews
because of the fact that judicial review proceed ings have been initiated and for as long as such
proceedings have not been finalized. Article 68 of the Act deals with administrative as well as changed
circumstances reviews. The obligations for Members with regard to such reviews are set forth in
Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
7.291 Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement reads in pertinent part as follows:
9.3 The amount of anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.
9.3.2 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a
prospective basis, provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon
request, of any duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping. A refund
of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin of dumping shall
normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more than
18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly
supported by evidence, has been made by an importer of the product

235 We note that this translation is ours. Exhibit US-20.

subject to the anti-dumping duty. The refund authorized should
normally be made within 90 days of the above-noted decision.
7.292 Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement reads as follows:
The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any
interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review.
 Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the
continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether the injury
would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a
result, of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the anti-dumping
duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
7.293 Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement provides that:
The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any
interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review.
 Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the
continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization, whether the injury
would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a
result, of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the
countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
7.294 In sum, these provisions all require the authorities, in case a product is subject to a duty, to review
the amount of and/or need for continued imposition of such duties. Article 9.3.2 of the AD Agreement
states that provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of the
margin of dumping, and that a refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin of dumping
shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more than 18 months, after the date on which a
request for a refund, duly supported by evidence, has been made by an importer of the product subject to
the anti-dumping duty. Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement in turn states in equally unequivocal terms that
the authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, on their
own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the
definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive information
substantiating the need for a review. If, as a result, of the review under this paragraph, the authorities
determine that the anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
7.295 We are of the view that a product is subject to a duty as soon as an investigation has been
concluded and a final determination has been made deciding to impose anti-dumping or countervailing
duties. The term "duty" in the context of Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement is a clear reference to the duty that Members may impose at the end of an investigation
which has led to an affirmative determination of dumping /subsidization, injury and a causal link between
the two. Article 9 of the AD Agreement, and Article 19 of the SCM Agreement make a clear distinction
between the imposition of the duty on the one hand and collection of the duty on the other. As Article 9.1
of the AD Agreement states, the decision whether to impose anti-dumping duties and the decision whether
the amount of the duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made
by the authorities of the importing Member. Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement then deals with the next
step following imposition of the duty, as it concerns the collection of the duty. Article 9.2 of the
AD Agreement provides that when an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-
dumping duties shall be collected in the appropr iate amounts in each case. Article 9.3 of the
AD Agreement then follows up on what Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement had said about collection of the

duty in the appropriate amounts, by stating that the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the
margin of dumping. Articles 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 then further specify how this requirement is to be met in a
retrospective and a prospective system respectively. Such provisions thus deal with collection of the duty.
We thus conclude that a product is subject to a duty once the decision under Article 9.1 of the
AD Agreement to impose such a duty has been taken. Once this deci sion has been taken, the duty is
necessarily a definitive duty in the sense of the AD Agreement. A similar analysis applies,
mutatis mutandis, to Article 19 of the SCM Agreement.
7.296 We recall in this respect that the AD and SC M Agreement only provide for three permissible
specific actions against dumping or subsidization, price undertakings, provisional measures, which may
take the form of a provisional duty and which are taken for a limited period of time following a
preliminary affirmative determination, and defin itive duties. The duties imposed by an authority
following an investigation which resulted in an affirmative final determination are final or definitive anti-
dumping or countervailing duties, even if the authorities decides to collect such duties only provisionally,
and conditional upon the results of the judicial revi ew proceedings. We therefore do not agree with
Mexico that as long as a judicial review is ongoing w ith regard to the final determination, the duties
imposed are not really definitive duties but only guarantees and the product is thus not subject to a duty
during this often lengthy judicial review period. It is not because the definitive duties are only
provisionally collected that they are no longer definitive duties.
236
7.297 We find that Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement leave little to be desired for in terms of
clarity and require the review of duties and their refund or the application of such duties in an amended
amount when requested to do so, and in case certain well-defined conditions are met. In case the
conditions are met, the authority is not allowed to reject such requests for reason that the judicial review
of the measures in question is still ongoing. We therefore find that Article 68 of the Act in combination
with Article 97 of the Act are inconsistent as such with Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and
21.2 of the SCM Agreement by requiring the authority to reject requests for reviews until after the
conclusion of the judicial review proceedings.237
7.298 With regard to Article 366 of the FCCP, the pr ovision of the Mexican Federal Code of Civil
Procedure also challenged by the United States, we consider that the United States has failed to establish a
prima facie case concerning the meaning and role of the provision in anti-dumping and countervailing duty
investigations. We find that the United States has not sufficiently explained which "proceedings" this
provision refers to and failed to provide sufficient arguments concerning the context of this provision the
meaning and scope of which is not immediately clear to us. In our view, it does not suffice for a party to
discharge itself of the burden of proof by simply stating that a provision of another Member's law has a
certain effect without providing the proper context in which to read and understand this provision. While the
United States may consider it telling that Mexico has made no effort to explain why Article 366 does not
apply, directly or indirectly, to the Act
238, we consider that the United States, as the complaining party, is the
first to have failed to provide sufficient evidence of the applicability to and role played by this provision in
AD and CVD proceedings and reviews in Mexico.

236 In fact, no duties would then ever be definitive as Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement provides for refunds
in case duties have been paid in excess of the margin of dumping, which implies that the collection of the duty due is
not definitive until after such a duty assessment review period. In the case of a retrospective system final liability is
only determined through a duty assessment review covering a period following the date of the final determination
and the imposition of the duty. Although the final liability remains open during that period of time, the duties are
definitive from the date of imposition, and the product is s ubject to a duty as of the final determination of the
authority and its decision to impose duties.
237 For the reasons set forth in paras. 7.224 and 7.225, we reject Mexico's defence based on the direct effect
of international treaties in Mexican law.

7.299 We note that the United States has also challenged the consistency of these provisions of the Act
with the requirement to perform expedited reviews set forth in Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement and 19.3
of the SCM Agreement. In our view, however, the United States has provided insufficient evidence that
Article 68 of the Act,
239 or Articles 97 of the Act or 366 of the FCCP deal with such reviews. We
therefore find that the United States has failed to establish a prima facie case of violation by these
challenged provisions of the obligations with regard to expedited reviews set forth in Article 9.5 of the
AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 In the light of our findings above concerning th e determination of injury by Economía in the
investigation on imports of long-grain white rice from the United States, we conclude:
(a) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
by choosing to base its injury determinati on on a period of investigation which ended
more than fifteen months before the initiation of the investigation. We apply judicial
economy and do not make any findings on the US claim of violation of Article VI:2 of
GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement;
(b) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Ar ticles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by
limiting its injury analysis to only six months of the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. We
apply judicial economy and do not make any findings on the US claims of violation of
Articles 1 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement;
(c) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement by failing
to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the price effects and
volume of dumped imports as part of its injury analysis. We apply judicial economy and
do not make any findings on the US claims of violation of Article 6.8 and Annex II of
the AD Agreement.
8.2 Having reached the conclusions set forth above that the injury determination is inconsistent with
Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, we apply judicial economy and do not rule on the US
claims that:
(a) Economía’s failure to objectively consider whether there was a significant increase in the
volume of dumped imports or whether the dumped imports had a significant effect on
prices is inconsistent with Mexico’s ob ligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
AD Agreement;
(b) Economía’s failure to conduct an objective analysis of the relevant economic factors is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement;
(c) Economía’s inclusion of non-dumped imports in its evaluation of volume, price effects,
and the impact of the dumped imports on th e domestic industry is inconsistent with
Mexico’s obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement;
(d) Economía’s failure to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law with respect to its determination of injury is inconsistent with
Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement.

239 We note that from the discussions concerning other claims in this case, it seems that it is Article 89D of
the Act that actually deals with such expedited reviews.

8.3 In the light of the above findings concerning the dumping margin determination by Economía in
the investigation on imports of long-grain white rice from the United States, we conclude:
(a) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement by not
terminating the investigation on two US e xporters which the authority found to have
exported at undumped prices and by not excluding these two exporters from the
application of the definitive anti-dumping measure;
(b) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Artic le 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the
AD Agreement in its application of a facts available-based dumping margin to the non-
shipping exporter Producers Rice. We appl y judicial economy and do not make any
findings on the US claims of violation of Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement,
and paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of Annex II;
(c) that Mexico acted inconsistently with Artic les 6.1, 6.8, paragraph 1 of Annex II, and
Articles 6.10 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement in its application of a facts available-based
dumping margin to the US producers and exporters that it did not investigate. We apply
judicial economy and do not make any findings on the US claims of violation of
Articles 6.6, 9.4, 9.5 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.
8.4 Having reached the conclusions set forth above that Economía's dumping margin determination is
inconsistent with Articles 5.8, 6.1, 6.8, 6.10 and 12.1 of the AD Agreement, we apply judicial economy
and do not rule on the US claims that:
(a) Economía’s failure to provide sufficient information on the findings and conclusions of
fact and law and the reasons that led to the imposition of the adverse facts available-
based margin on Producers Rice and the une xamined US exporters and producers is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement;
(b) Economía’s application of an adverse facts available-based margin to Producers Rice and
the unexamined US exporters and producers is inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations
under Articles 1 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement;
(c) Economía’s levying of an anti-dumping duty greater than the margin of dumping is
inconsistent with Mexico’s obligations under Article VI:2 of GATT 1994.
8.5 In light of our findings above on the US challenges against Mexico's law as such, we conclude:
(a) that Article 53 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent as such with Article 6.1.1
of the AD Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(b) that Article 64 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent as such with Articles 6.8
and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 a nd 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, and 12.7 of the
SCM Agreement. We apply judicial economy and do not make any findings on the US
claims of violation of Articles 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 of the AD Agreement, and Article 19.3 of
the SCM Agreement;
(c) that Article 68 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent as such with Articles 5.8,
9.3, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and Articles 11.9 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement;
(d) that Article 89D of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent as such with Article 9.5
of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement;

(e) that Article 93V of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent as such with Article 18.1
of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement; and
(f) that Articles 68 and 97 of Mexico’s Foreign Trade Act are inconsistent as such with
Articles 9.3, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement,
but that the United States failed to make a prima facie case that Article 366 of the FCCP
is inconsistent with Articles 9.3, 9.5 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and 19.3 and 21.2 of
the SCM Agreement, and also that the United States failed to make a prima facie case of
violation by the challenged provisions of the Act of Articles 9.5 of the AD Agreement
and 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.
8.6 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent Mexico has
acted inconsistently with the provisions of the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement, it has nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to the United States under those Agreements.
8.7 We therefore recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request Mexico to bring its measures
into conformity with its obligations under the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement.