Document: WT/DS285/RW Page A-1 ANNEX A FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM THE PARTIES Contents Page Annex A-1 First Written Submission by Anti gua and Barbuda (25 September 2006) – Executive Summary A-2 Annex A-2 First Written Submission by the United States (16 October 2006) – Executive Summary
Date: 25 September 2006
Document codes: WT/DS285/RW
Complainant: Antigua and Barbuda
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Canada, Taiwan, EU, Japan, Mexico, China
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. VI, VIII, XVI, XVII, XI  Services (GATS)

ANNEX A

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex A-1 First Written Submission by Anti gua and Barbuda (25 September
2006) – Executive Summary
A-2
Annex A-2 First Written Submission by the United States (16 October 2006) –
Executive Summary
A-9

ANNEX A-1

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
(25 SEPTEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. This is the executive summary of Antigua's First written submission to the Panel in
WT/DS285 United States – Measures Affecting the Cr oss-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU . This is a unique proceeding because this is the first
time that an implementing party has announced it self in compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB without having actually done anything at all.
2. In the original proceeding, three federal meas ures of the United States were found to be
contrary to the obligations of the United States under Article XVI of the GATS. The United States
argued before an arbitrator that it needed at l east 15 months to implement the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB "through legislative or other action." Over the next 15 months, the United States
took no legislative action to bring the offending measures into compliance. After the expiration of the
compliance period, the United States announced that it was in compliance based upon a statement of a
DOJ employee.
3. As a simple restatement of an argument made in the original proceeding, the DOJ Statement
cannot be considered a measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
within the meaning of DSU Article 21.5. The United States has taken no action whatsoever to comply
with the recommendations and rulings, and the thr ee federal measures found to be contrary to the
obligations of the United States continue to be in violation of the GATS without meeting the
requirements of Article XIV of the GATS. Accordingl y, Antigua requests that the Panel find that the
United States remains out of compliance with th e recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the
original proceeding and that it recommend that the DSB request the United States to bring its laws
into conformity with the obligations of the United States to Antigua under the GATS.
B. F
ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The original proceeding
4. The original Panel issued its report in which it ruled that: (i) the United States had made full
commitments in the US schedule to the cross-borde r provision of gambling and betting services; (ii)
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gaming Bu siness Act and four state laws are contrary to the
obligations of the United States to Antigua under Articles XVI:1 and XVI:2 of the GATS; and (iii) the
United States had not been able to demonstrate that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA were
(A) provisionally justified under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the GATS and (B) consistent with the
requirements of the "chapeau" of Article XIV of the GATS.
5. The United States appealed certain aspects of th e Panel report, as did Antigua. The Appellate
Body then issued its report. In the AB report, th e Appellate Body upheld most of the determinations
of the original Panel, albeit in certain circumstan ces for slightly different reasons. However, the
Appellate Body also (i) ruled that the four state laws found by the original Panel to be contrary to the
GATS had not been sufficiently discussed during the c ourse of the original proceeding to be properly
before the original Panel for evaluation; (ii) determin ed that, contrary to the conclusion of the original
Panel, the United States had provisionally justified the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA under
Article XIV(a) of the GATS; and (iii) while upholding the ruling of the original Panel that the United
States had failed to meet its burden of proof under the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS, modified
the original Panel's conclusion with respect to th e chapeau to find that the United States had not

demonstrated – in the light of the existence of the federal Interstate Horseracing Act (the "IHA") –
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA were applied consistently with the requirements of the
chapeau.
2. The Article 21.3 proceeding
6. In the arbitration proceeding to establish a reasonable period of time for implementation,
Antigua and the United States had completely different opinions on how the United States could come
into compliance. Antigua believed that the Un ited States was required to provide Antiguan service
providers with market access to consumers in the United States. The United States, however, asserted
that it needed only to clarify the relationship betw een the IHA and pre-existing federal law to come
into compliance.
7. During the arbitration process, Antigua argued the United States could come into compliance
almost immediately with respect to most of the services covered by the DSB rulings either by a
reversion back to prior policy by the Department of Justice and other governmental agencies or
through an executive order of the American president given to the Department of Justice and other
agencies of the federal government. With respect to the remaining services offered by Antiguan
service providers, Antigua expressed the belief that the United States would need to come into
compliance through legislation, which Antigua asserted could be enacted within six months.
8. The United States informed the arbitrator that it would require a period of at least 15 months
in which to accomplish implementation of the DSB rulings through legislation which would have the
effect of clarifying that relevant US federal laws entail no discrimination between foreign and
domestic service suppliers in the application of measures prohibiting remote supply of gambling and
betting services.
9. Crucially, the United States informed the arbitrator that implementation by legislation would
be pursued because "the Panel concluded that existi ng high-level administrative clarifications of the
meaning of the [IHA] were not sufficient to sust ain the US burden of proof under the chapeau of
Article XIV of the [GATS]."
10. The arbitrator awarded a period of 11 months and two weeks from the adoption of the DSB
rulings as the reasonable period of time in which the United States had to implement them.
3. The lead-up to Article 21.5
11. The reasonable period of time to comply passed on 3 April 2006 without any measures having
been adopted by the United States to implement the DSB rulings.
12. On 10 April 2006, the United States informed the DSB that, in its opinion, it was in
compliance with the DSB rulings based upon the DO J Statement that the DOJ views the existing
criminal statutes as prohibiting the interstate transm ission of bets or wagers, including wagers on
horse races. The DOJ Statement included that the De partment of Justice does not believe that the
IHA amended the existing criminal statutes. In summary, on the basis of the DOJ Statement alone,
the United States announced that it was in complian ce with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB.
13. Antigua expressed its disagreement with the United States' assertion of compliance, noting
that the DOJ Statement was in fact a restatement of one of the arguments made by the United States to
the original Panel and the Appellate Body during the course of the original proceedings. Antigua then
made recourse to DSU Article 21.5 by requesting c onsultations with the United States. Subsequent

consultations were held but did not result in a settle ment. Antigua proceeded to submit a request for
the establishment of a panel pursuant to DSU Article 21.5, and the DSB formed the Panel.
C. G
ENERAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
14. In general, DSU Article 21.5 proceedings are subject to the same basic procedures as original
panel proceedings. The complaining party establish es the scope of the proceeding, and the matter
before the Article 21.5 panel consists of the m easures at issue and the claims regarding those
measures as set forth in the request for the establishment of the panel.
15. The scope of what may be reviewed by a panel under Article 21.5 has generally been
interpreted broadly. With respect to the measures to be considered in an Article 21.5 proceeding, the
panel is not bound by the implementing party's as sessment of whether the measure is "taken to
comply" and thus within the scope of the panel's review. Further, the measures within the panel's
purview include not only acts of the implementing party but omissions as well; and even a measure
which has the effect of moving further away from compliance rather than towards it is within the
consideration of the panel.
16. A panel under Article 21.5 also has a broad mandate , not just to determine whether or not the
recommendations and rulings have been implem ented, but also to determine whether the
implementing party's measures are, in light of the circumstances at the time of investigation,
compliant with the applicable covered agreements. Because of this, the facts and evidence before an
Article 21.5 panel may well be different than those presented in the original proceedings.
17. Ultimately, the objective of a panel under Ar ticle 21.5 is to determine whether the
implementing party has come into full compliance with its obligations. An implementing party must
correct its deficient measures or remain out of comp liance. An implementing party has not come into
compliance for such periods as no measures taken to comply exist.
18. The complainant in a proceeding under Article 21.5 has the burden of proving its case to the
satisfaction of the panel. However, when the implementing party's compliance depends on meeting
the requirements of an affirmative defence, the bur den of proof is squarely on the implementing party
to establish that it has met each of the requirements of the defence.
19. The panel and Appellate Body findings constitute a final resolution of the dispute between the
parties. A party should not be given a "second chance" in an Article 21.5 proceeding.
D. T
HE UNITED STATES HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS OF
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
1. United States has done nothing responsive to the DSB rulings
20. The DSB rulings are simple and straightforwar d. The Appellate Body recommended that the
DSB request the United States to bring its three fe deral measures found to be inconsistent with the
GATS into conformity with its obligations under the GATS.
21. The United States has not adopted any legislation to implement the DSB rulings and its
assertion of compliance is based solely on the DOJ Statement – despite having stated that it would be
seeking compliance through legislation.
22. In the original proceeding, the United States e ndeavoured to convince the original Panel that
the IHA did not permit domestic remote gambling on horse racing and thus could not serve as
evidence that the three federal measures did not meet the requirements of the chapeau under

Article XIV of the GATS. The legal basis for its position was that the IHA, as a civil statute, did not
repeal the pre-existing federal criminal statutes – th e Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA – which
the United States was attempting to justify under the Article XIV chapeau.
23. The original Panel rejected the United Stat es' position and found the United States did not
demonstrate that US law precludes interstate pari-mutual wagering for horse racing over the telephone
or using other modes of electronic communication, including the Internet . The Appellate Body
agreed with the original Panel's assessment and found, therefore, that the United States had not met its
burden of proof under the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS.
24. The United States certainly has done nothing to co mply with the DSB rulings, and has in fact
done nothing at all other than reassert its old argumen ts, perhaps in the hope that it might do a better
job in meeting its burden of proof a second time round. This, clearly, the United States is not entitled
to do. The Panel report and the AB report have b een adopted by the DSB, and the United States gets
no second chance.
25. Having done nothing, the United States cannot possibly be in compliance with the DSB
rulings. While it does not require much more than common sense to come to this conclusion, it is also
arguable whether the DOJ Statement could even constitute a "measure" for purposes of WTO dispute
resolution under the GATS or – if it were a "measure" for these purposes – whether it could constitute
a "measure taken to comply" within the meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU.
26. Generally, a "measure taken to comply" contem plates something subsequent to the adoption
of DSB recommendations and rulings. In this dispute, although the DOJ Statement occurred
subsequent to the adoption of the DSB rulings, as in form and substance the DOJ Statement is
virtually identical to what was advanced in th e original proceeding, it cannot be considered a
"measure taken to comply."
2. The IHA remains discriminatory
27. The IHA allows interstate wagers, including bets placed by telephone and other electronic
media. The IHA does not, however, permit participa tion in its scheme by operators located outside of
the United States. The IHA not only authorises the placing of bets and wagers on a remote and
interstate basis, but also limits the scope of its coverage to bets and wagers placed and accepted within
the territory of the United States.
28. In 2000, a portion of the IHA was amended by Congress. The definition of "interstate
off-track wager" was amended to provide that it w as "a legal wager placed ... placed or transmitted by
an individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted by an off-track betting
system in the same or another State ...". This amendment codified into law the longstanding and
uninterrupted policy of acceptance by the United States of remote wagering by off-track and
telephone accounts.
29. The US position that the IHA does not permit interstate remote wagering on horse races is not
supported by US domestic law. Contrary to the Department of Justice, numerous commentators,
cases and opinions indicate that interstate gambling under the IHA is completely legal in the United
States. As further evidence that the Wire Act does not prohibit interstate pari-mutuel wagering
permitted by the IHA, there has never been a cr iminal prosecution of sanctioned wagering on
interstate horse racing from 1961 to the present day. Furthermore, the only reported US court case
that considered both the IHA and the Wire Act together lends strong support to the conclusion that the
IHA controls over any of the pre-existing federal criminal legislation.

30. A number of states have enacted enabling statutes that permit and govern cross-border,
interstate remote account wagering. There are currently 18 states that expressly sanction the operation
of remote account wagering services on horse and dog racing under the auspices of the IHA. These
states and their respective regulatory schemes and re lated Internet site are summarised in the chart
attached to Antigua's First written submission as Sc hedule 1. A number of the states which have
authorised the provision of remote gambling services on horse racing have made it clear that their
legislation is intended to come within the scope of the IHA.
31. There are currently over 20 domestic operato rs of remote gambling and betting services
operating in the United States under licenses issued by one or more states. The most prominent of
these operators include companies with shares li sted and publicly trading on major US stock
exchanges and companies owned by states or ot her governmental bodies. Some have been in
continuous operations for decades and not one has b een prosecuted by the Department of Justice for
their operations, whether under the Wire Act or othe rwise. The operators discussed in Antigua's
submission include: YouBet.com, TVG, XpressBet, the Racing Channel, AmericaTab, US Off-Track,
Capital OTB, NYCOTB and New Jersey Account Wagering. The se US operators offer gambling and
betting services over the Internet using the same basic method of acquiring customers, funding
wagering accounts and taking and processing bets as do service providers operating from Antigua.
32. By way of example, the process for a customer to open an account and place bets with
YouBet, a US-based remote gaming company, is virt ually identical to the same process for customers
of World Sports Exchange Ltd., an Antiguan-b ased provider of cross-border gambling and betting
services.
33. Schedule 2 to Antigua's First written submission graphically illustrates the similar nature of
wagering with both YouBet and WSE, demonstrati ng the processes gone through by a customer who
made the same bets on the same races occurring on 23 September 2006.
34. There has never been a federal prosecution of a domestic remote gambling service provider
operating under the auspices of the IHA, whether be fore or after the 2000 amendment. Further,
despite indications by the United States during the course of the original proceeding that prosecutions
of certain of these domestic operators were pending, some three years later there have still not been
any prosecutions of domestic companies offering remo te wagering in the United States in reliance on
the IHA.
35. On the other hand, there have been a number of federal prosecutions of licensed Antiguan
remote gambling service providers. In May 2006, the United States indicted two Antiguan residents
and a prominent Antiguan-based operator. The crim inal offences alleged in this indictment are
predicated on violations of the Wire Act. In July 2006, the United States indicted individuals
associated with an Antiguan-licensed operator. The offences alleged in this indictment are predicated
on purported offences of the Wire Act, Travel Act and IGBA. These prosecutions remain pending.
36. Although the United States has not adopted any legislation to bring it into compliance, since
the determination of the reasonabl e period of time in the 21.3 proceeding legislation directly
addressing the cross-border provision of gambling a nd betting services has been introduced into the
US Congress and one bill – HR 4411 – has been a dopted by the House of Representatives. HR 4411
is in many significant respects directly contra ry to the DSB rulings, clearly entrenching and
institutionalising the discrimination inherent in the application of current US law addressing
cross-border gambling and betting services.
37. Critically, HR 4411 has a number of specific ex emptions from its coverage in favour of
domestic remote gambling. First, the legislation expressly excludes from its coverage remote
gambling that occurs solely within the boundaries of a state – or "intrastate" gambling. Second, it

excludes remote gambling that occurs on Native Am erican lands within a state. HR 4411 also
contains a provision that would appear to exempt domestic, state-owned lotteries from its coverage,
and another exempting remote gambling involving fantasy leagues.
E. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XIV OF THE GATS
1. Remote gambling in the United States in addition to that under the IHA
38. The Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA ar e not couched in terms of prohibiting remote
gambling per se. Rather, each of the statutes on its face covers gambling which is cross-border in
nature–whether interstate or international. In addition to gambling under the IHA, there is currently in
the United States a considerable amount of state- sanctioned gambling which is "remote," some of
which is cross-border and some of which is not.
39. Americans are permitted to bet remotely on s ports contests, casino games and lotteries under
a number of circumstances as well. For instance, Nevada sports betting operators are authorised to
accept wagers via telephone or the Internet, provided th e punter is physically located within the state
of Nevada. Nevada sports betting service providers offer gambling services under the state interactive
wagering laws and regulations, and t oday, many of these operators offer
bet-from-anywhere-at-any-time wagering services to Nevada residents. Nevada residents can bet
from home or another convenient location with Neva da betting service providers on a wide variety of
professional or amateur sports events or races located in the United States or in a foreign jurisdiction.
40. Additionally, a number of US lotteries allo w punters to purchase lottery tickets via telephone
or post and to direct payment of winnings by tele phone and receive them by post. The Massachusetts
Lottery, for instance, offers cross-border remote lottery play. Residents or non-residents of
Massachusetts can order lottery tickets by telephone and pay for the tickets by cash, check or credit
card. As another example, Illinois residents ma y purchase lottery tickets by telephone or mail from
the Illinois Lottery using a check, credit card, or debit card.
2. The issue of "necessity" and reasonably available alternative measures
41. The party invoking a defence under Article XIV has the initial burden of proof to present a
prima facie case that its measure is "necessary" to prot ect the identified interests. At this stage of the
enquiry, the panel is to assess the evidence submitted and "weigh and balance" the various factors
applicable to the case. If the panel concludes that the party has established its prima facie case, then it
should find the measure "necessary" under Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
42. Once the measure has been found "necessary," then the burden of proof passes to the
complaining party to raise a WTO-consistent altern ative measure that the complaining party believes
the responding party could have taken to address its Article XIV concerns instead of the challenged
measures. Once an alternative is raised by the comp laining party, the burden of proof then shifts back
to the responding party to demonstrate that the proposed alternative is not "reasonably available." If it
successfully demonstrates that th e alternative is not reasonably available, then the responding party
has met the requirements of provisional justification under Article XIV of the GATS.
43. The United States' prima facie case that prohib ition of remote gambling and betting services
is "necessary" is no longer valid. In the origin al proceeding, the case of the United States under
Article XIV was predicated entirely on the "remot e/non-remote" distinction. In light of its own
sanctioned domestic remote gambli ng industry – particularly betting on horse racing – the United
States itself has clearly arrived at the conclusion th at prohibition is not "necessary" to protect citizens
from the concerns the United States has associated with remote gambling.

44. Under current circumstances, there are a number of other alternative measures reasonably
available to the United States in order to protect its residents from the concerns identified by the
United States with respect to remote gambling. The most apparent alternative measures reasonably
available to the United States are the regulatory schemes already in place in a number of states
governing the remote provision of gambling and bettin g services under the IHA. Currently, 18 states
have regulatory schemes of one kind or another governing the domestic provision of these services.
The model scheme employed in these states is c ontained in Schedule 3 of Antigua's First written
submission. Most of these states require the use of methods of electronic age, identity or location
verification and have provisions regarding suspicious transactions as well as requirements regarding
the provision of information on problem gambling resources.
45. A number of states have adopted age and iden tity verification schemes in connection with
Internet sales of tobacco products in the United St ates. These statutory schemes rely primarily on age
and location verification technologies and methods that ha ve proliferated in recent years. Some states
have statutory requirements for age and identify verification in connection with remote sales of
alcoholic beverages.
46. With the growth of electronic commerce h as come demand for effective and efficient
identification verification methods. Age, identity an d location are commonly verified by a number of
techniques that rely on information furnished by the consumer to the service provider and then
cross-referenced against proprietary and public r ecord databases. There are a number of commercial
operations currently providing these services or offering software for these purposes.
F. C
ONCLUSIONS
47. In light of the foregoing, Antigua respectfully requests that the Panel: (i) find that the United
States has not taken measures to comply with the DSB rulings; (ii) find that the Wire Act, the Travel
Act and the IGBA remain in violation of th e United States' obligations to Antigua under, inter alia,
Article XVI of the GATS without meeting the requi rements of Article XIV of the GATS; and (iii)
recommend that the DSB request the United States to bring the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
IGBA into conformity with the obligations of the United States under the GATS.

ANNEX A-2

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES
(16 OCTOBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. The issue in this proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU is a narrow one. In the underlying
proceeding, the adopted Appellate Body report, an d the adopted Panel report as modified by the
Appellate Body report, left only one unsettled issue regarding the many claims raised by Antigua and
Barbuda ("Antigua") in the underlying dispute. That issue is whether the United States can show that
three facially non-discriminatory US federal criminal statutes, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustif iable discrimination between countries, within the
meaning of the chapeau to Article XIV of the GATS, as the result of interaction with a civil statute,
the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA").
2. In the underlying proceeding, this issue regardi ng federal criminal statutes and the IHA was a
minor one, as compared to the numerous and far-reach ing claims originally advanced by Antigua in
this dispute. Based on evidence that was "limited," as the Appellate Body described it, the Panel and
Appellate Body in the underlying proceeding were not able to conclude that the United States had
assumed its burden of meeting the non-discriminati on requirement of an affirmative defence under
Article XIV of the GATS.
3. The United States will show, based on a complete examination of the evidence – including
the text of the statutes, the relevant legislative history, and specific principles of statutory construction
under US law – that the IHA in no way limits the app lication of federal criminal statutes. The United
States submits that the Panel, once it has considered all the evidence and arguments, will agree with
this conclusion. And having done so, the Panel shou ld proceed to find that the US measures at issue
are within the scope of the GATS Article XIV exception.
B. STATEMENTS OF FACTS
1. DSB recommendations and rulings
4. The issue in this dispute under Article 21.5 of the DSU is whether the United States can meet
its burden of showing – in light of and notwithstanding the existence of the Interstate Horseracing Act
– that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA) prohibit all forms
of remote gambling, and, therefore, that the prohibition embodied in those measures is applied
consistently with the requirements of the Artic le XIV chapeau. The other issues regarding the
compliance of US gambling statutes with US obligations under the GATS were decided definitively
by the Appellate Body and adopted by the Dispute Se ttlement Body ("DSB"). The last sections of the
Appellate Body report frame the issue:
"[t]he Appellate Body . . . with respect to Article XIV of the GATS, as regards
Article XIV in its entirety, modifies the Pane l's conclusion in paragraph 7.2(d) of the
Panel Report and finds, instead, that the United States has demonstrated that the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are measures
‘necessary to protect public morals or main tain public order', in accordance with
paragraph (a) of Article XIV, but that the United States has not shown, in the light of
the Interstate Horseracing Act, that the prohibitions embodied in those measures are
applied to both foreign and domestic servi ce suppliers of remote betting services for
horse racing."

2. Key statutes at issue in the dispute
(a) The Wire Act
5. The Wire Act, enacted in 1961, is a key fede ral criminal statute outlawing certain gambling
activities. In particular, the Wire Act, as relevant to bets and wagers
, prohibits a person "being
engaged in the business of betting or wagering [from] knowingly [using] a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or fore ign commerce of bets or wagers ... on any sporting
event or contest." Violation of this prohibition resu lts in fines and/or imprisonment of not more than
2 years.
6. The Wire Act has different, somewhat more complex provisions addressing the transmission
of information assisting in th e placing of bets and wagers . On the one hand, the Wire Act prohibits a
person "being engaged in the business of betting or wagering [from] knowingly [using] a wire
communication facility for the transmission in inte rstate or foreign commerce of ... information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sp orting event or contest." On the other hand, the
Wire Act exempts from that prohibition "the tran smission in interstate or foreign commerce of
information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of
information assisting in the placing of bets or wa gers on a sporting event or contest from a State or
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country
in which such betting is legal." Thus, where the placing of bets and wagers is legal in both the
jurisdiction where the event or co ntest occurs, and in the jurisdic tion where the bet is placed, then
transmission of information regarding the event or c ontest is lawful. The legislative history of the
Wire Act provides an example of how this exemption works.
"Phrased differently, the transmission of gambling information on a horserace from a
State where betting on that horserace is le gal to a State where betting on the same
horserace is legal is not within the prohib itions of the bill. ... Nothing in the
exemption, however, will permit the transmis sion of bets and wagers or money by
wire as a result of a bet or wager from or to any State whether betting is legal in that
State or not."
(b) The Interstate Horseracing Act
7. The Interstate Horseracing Act is a civil stat ute that was enacted in 1978. As noted, the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information assisting in the placing of bets and
wagers had long been lawful under the Wire Act. The IHA was enacted to address a free-rider
problem: namely, that a gambling operation in one state could earn profits by accepting bets on a
horse race in a different jurisdiction, without shari ng any of those profits with the racetrack. In the
words of one of its sponsors, "The most important fe ature of this legislation is that it establishes the
proprietary relationship of the horseracing industry: that is, the horsemen and the racetracks, over its
own races. Having established that relationship, the bill provides that interstate bets cannot be taken
on those races within a particular State without proper compensation to the industry." The statute
accomplishes its objective by giving the host State, the host racing association, and the horsemen's
group the right to bring a civil action to recove r betting revenues from out-o f-state betting operators
unless those operators had previously entered into a contractual revenue-sharing agreement with the
track.
8. The IHA is not a criminal statute, and in fact provides no role for the Federal government to
enforce the revenue-sharing purpose of the statutor y scheme. Moreover, the IHA makes no reference
to federal criminal law. And, more broadly, no provision of the statute states that the existence of an
IHA contractual arrangement serves as an exemption to any sort of federal or state law, civil or
criminal – except, of course, with respect to the IHA's own civil liability provisions.

3. Basic principles of US statutory construction
9. Although US law contains a number of principles and rules for statutory construction, three of
the most basic of those principles should be stated at the outset. First, the beginning point of statutory
construction is the plain language of the statute. Second, only
 when there is ambiguity does one need
to resort to examining the legislative history of a statute. Third, under the Skidmore doctrine, US
courts give a level of deference to an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers.
C. THE PROHIBITION EMBODIED IN THE WIRE ACT, THE TRAVEL ACT, AND THE IGBA IS APPLIED
CONSISTENTLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHAPEAU OF GATS ARTICLE XIV
10. On their face, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act ("IGBA")
meet the requirements of the chapeau of GATS Article XIV. In particular, the statutes facially meet
the requirement that "such measures are not app lied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail." The
absence of any facial discrimination in these statutes is clear: nowhere in the text of those laws are
there provisions that discriminate between countries.
11. The issue of "discrimination" in this disput e turns on whether, as Antigua argues, the IHA
exempts certain domestic – but not foreign – remote gambling from the scope of the Wire Act. If the
IHA indeed provides such an exemption, then – An tigua argues – the result would be an application
of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. Before turning to th e analysis, the United States notes that the focus of
this issue of alleged discrimination is necessarily on the Wire Act, as opposed to the Travel Act or the
IGBA. Of these three laws, it is only the Wire Ac t that defines – without reference to any other
criminal statutes – which gambling activities are illegal.
12. The IHA's plain text – which is the starting poi nt of statutory construction under US law –
makes clear that it was not intended to serve as an across-the-board permission for gambling on horse
racing. To be sure, Antigua vigorously asserts that the IHA "allows" certain activities. Remarkably,
however, Antigua never cites the specific text of the IHA
 which supposedly accomplishes such an
exemption from other civil or criminal laws. In fact, the IHA says no such thing.
13. Perhaps Antigua is attempting to rely on section 4 of the IHA. That provision states: "No
person may accept an interstate off-track wager except as provided in this Act." On its face, this
language does not indicate any intent to exempt be tting on horse races from provisions of law outside
of the IHA. And in the context of the other provi sions of the IHA, the meaning of this language is
quite clear. IHA Section 5 requires the gambling operator to enter into a revenue-sharing arrangement
with the horse track, and Section 6 gives the State or racetrack the right to bring a civil action to
recover lost revenue in the event the gambling operato r fails to enter into the contractual arrangement.
Thus, in context, what section 4 of the IHA means is that "no person may accept an interstate off-track
wager without exposure to civil liability under sec tion 6 unless the person meets the revenue-sharing
requirements of section 5."
14. Similarly, IHA Section 5 is not expressed in terms of providing an exemption from criminal
or civil statutes outside the scope of the IHA itself. Section 5 starts out "An interstate off-track wager
may be accepted by an off-track betting system only if consent is obtained from – the horse racing
association," followed by extensive conditions and provisos concerning the revenue-sharing
arrangement with the horse track. As written, and in its context within the IHA, Section 5 specifies
the requirements noted more generally in Section 4.
15. In sum, the IHA on its face does not indicate any intent to create exemptions from any state or
federal criminal laws, or from any other state or federal civil laws. For this reason, the United States

submits that it has met its burden of showing that the IHA does not exempt gambling on horse racing
from the criminal prohibitions of the Wire Act.
16. Although a legal analysis under US law need go no further, the United States will proceed to
address the additional principles of statutory construction that would apply if, as Antigua argues, there
were ambiguity in the interaction between the IHA and the Wire Act. US principles of statutory
construction include a doctrine under which a subsequent statute, even in the absence of explicit
statutory language referencing an earlier statut e, may be deemed to accomplish a "repeal by
implication" of the earlier statute. Such "repeal s by implication," however, are extraordinary, and
nothing in the IHA could amount to a repeal by implication of the Wire Act.
17. Repeals by implication are disfavoured and the inte nt of the legislation to do so must be clear
and unambiguous. As the United States Supreme Court explained:
"It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favoured.
When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if
possible. ... The intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and manifest'... .
It is not sufficient as was said by Mr. Justice Story in Wood v. United States, ... 'to
establish that subsequent laws covered some or even all of the cases provided for by
[the prior act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary'. There
must be 'a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of
the old; and even then the old law is repeal ed by implication, only, pro tanto, to the
extent of the repugnancy.'"
18. In Annex I to its First written submission, the United States has provided detailed descriptions
of four federal court cases that illustrate how US c ourts consider claims of repeal by implication.
Each of the cases in Annex I are instructive to the issue in this dispute. In each case, the court
considered regulatory schemes with some degree of ove rlap, and found that effect should be given to
both schemes and that the later-in-time statute did not result in a repeal by implication of the earlier
statute.
19. An application of US "repeal by implication" principles to the Wire Act and IHA cannot
result in a finding that the IHA resulted in a repeal by implication of the Wire Act. In particular, there
is no clear and unequivocal intent of repeal by im plication because there is (i) no repugnancy between
the statutes, and (ii) no subsequent statute that covers the field of an earlier one.
20. First, there is an absence of an y repugnancy between the two st atutes. To the contrary, as
explained above, the original legislative history of the Wire Act noted that a gambling operation in
one state could offer betting on horse races held in another state (so long as the bet or wager did not
cross state lines.) And, as noted, the IHA fits with the Wire Act by creating a civil liability scheme to
address the free-rider problem created by this type of interstate gambling on horse racing. Each
scheme has its own purpose and effect, and there is no repugnancy between the statutes. Second, in
no way could the IHA be considered to cover the entire field occupied by the Wire Act. The Wire Act
is far broader in scope than the IHA because the Wire Act is applicable to many forms of gambling,
not just wagering on horse races.
21. In sum, the IHA does not even a pproach a repeal by implication of the Wire Act. Antigua's
main argument to the contrary concerns a legislativ e change in 2000 to a single definition in the IHA.
In December 2000, Congress amended Section 3 of the IHA to revise the definition of the term
"interstate off-track wager." Antigua claims that this amendment "clarifies" that the IHA "permits"
interstate wagering on horse racing despite the Wire Act's criminal prohibition. Once again, Antigua's
argument fails to cite any language of "permiss ion" in the IHA. As explained above, no such
language exists.

22. Also, the amendment to this one definition does not change that the IHA does not repeal the
Wire Act under principles of repeal by implication. First, neither the amendment itself, nor the IHA
as amended, is "repugnant" to the Wire Act. In fact, the amendment can be seen as closing a loophole
in the implementation of the IHA's goal of enfo rcing revenue-sharing betw een betting operators and
racetracks. Before the amended definition, racet racks could bring civil enforcement suits against
betting operators that failed to e ngage in revenue sharing, but the IHA arguably was not clear with
regard to whether the horse tracks retained this right when the betting operators committed the
additional wrong of using a wire communication facilit y to transmit wagers in interstate commerce.
The IHA amendment clarifies the definition of "int erstate off-track wager" in such a way that
racetracks will not lose their civil enforcement ri ghts when betting operators transmit wagers across
state lines. In short, both the Wire Act and the IH A can continue to have their separate effects, and
there is no repugnancy between the Wire Act and the IHA as amended in 2000.
23. The 2000 IHA amendment triggers another principle of repeal by implication. Namely, the
rule that repeal by implication is disfavoured "applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal
rests solely in an Appropriations Act." The 2000 amendment was one part of a lengthy appropriations
bill that provided funding for several Federal agencies and the District of Columbia. No other part of
the statute was aimed at the regulation of gambling or horse racing.
24. The United States submits that the text of the legislation is clear, and thus that there is no need
to resort to legislative history. Nonetheless, th e legislative history does not support Antigua's view.
The report of the committee that drafted the statut ory language is considered one of the primary
sources that is examined to determine Congressional intent. The relevant committee reports for the
2000 IHA amendment indicate no intention (as Antigua argues) to "allow" new types of remote
gambling, nor to amend or repeal any criminal statutes. The committee language simply describes the
change in the definition, without any stated inten tion of amending or repealing the Wire Act or any
laws other than the IHA itself.
25. Antigua's sole argument to the contrary is based on a single floor statement by one Member of
Congress who was not a drafter of the IHA amendmen t, and who opposed its adoption. For purposes
of statutory interpretation, isolated statements of individual members of Congress do not express the
intent of Congress as a whole. Such statements ar e therefore weak evidence of congressional intent.
Given that the statements of the committee that drafted the IHA amendment expressed no similar
interpretation, the legislative history cannot be sai d to support the view that Congress as a whole had
the "clear and unambiguous" intent to accomplish a repeal by implication.
D. T
HE UNITED STATES HAS SATISFIED THE DSU ARTICLE 21.5 REQUIREMENT OF THE
EXISTENCE OF MEASURES TAKEN TO COMPLY
26. The overarching point is that compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings must
depend on the specific findings of the Appellate Body in this dispute. In particular, the Appellate
Body noted that neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body itself had found that the US measures were
out of compliance. Instead, the Appellate B ody noted that it would not overturn under DSU
Article 11 review the Panel's finding that the United States "had not shown" or "had not
demonstrated" or "did not establish" that its measures met the requirements of the Article XIV
chapeau, and thus did not establish that the measure s were entitled to an affirmative defence. The
Appellate Body explained there was only a "possib ility" of non-compliance based on a finding by the
panel that the IHA does "appear" to permit certain betting activities.
27. The United States submits that in the particular circumstances of this case – where the
responding party in the original proceeding did not meet its burden of showing that the measures at
issue satisfy the requirements of an affirmative defence – the only sensible way to apply the DSU is to
allow the statutes at issue (in this case, the Wire Act, Travel Act, and IGBA) to be the "measures

taken to comply." The US statutes are indeed measures. And as the United States has demonstrated –
at the explicit invitation of the A ppellate Body – these measures do in fact meet the requirements of
the Article XIV exception of the GATS. Thus, th ese measures "comply" with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB. The only remaining issue is whether the measures are "taken to" comply.
The phrase "taken to" is neither explicit nor self-def ining. In the circumstances of this case, this
phrase must be construed to allow for the measures at issue to be the "measures taken to comply"; if
not, the application of the DSU to such circumstances could lead to absurd results.
28. The problem is that unless the measures in di spute are the "measures taken to comply," the
responding party would be required under DSU Article 21 to enact new measures when it was already
in compliance with its obligations. The new measures could even be substantively identical
 measures,
which the responding party would then proceed to defend successfully by making the showing that the
measures met the affirmative defen ce. In short, the responding party would be forced to take
meaningless, additional action for no other purpose.
29. Similarly, the complaining party would gain nothing. The complaining party could not expect
the responding party to adopt any substantively di fferent measure, because the original measure was
already in compliance. Nor would the complaini ng party be entitled to su spend concessions. Under
Article 22, the level of suspension of concessions must be equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment. Since the measures in dispute woul d already be in compliance with the responding
party's obligations under the agreement, the level of nullification or impairment would necessarily be
zero. Thus, where the responding party has a va lid affirmative defence that did not succeed only
because of a lack of a full showing in the original proceeding, the only sensibl e result is to construe
"measure taken to comply" such that the responding party can proceed to make that showing in an
Article 21.5 proceeding.
30. Antigua presents four arguments why the United States has "done nothing responsive" to the
DSB rulings. Each of these is without merit. Firs t, Antigua argues that the United States relies solely
on a DOJ Statement noted in the April 2006 status report submitted to the DSB. To the contrary, the
showing by the United States has not relied solely on the DOJ Statement noted in the status report, nor
on DOJ Statements collectively. Such statements, however, certainly are relevant and supportive of a
finding that the US measures meet the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau. As noted above,
under the principle of Skidmore deference, US courts give a le vel of deference to an agency's
interpretation of the statute it administers.
31. Second, Antigua argues that the United States has already presented all of its arguments to the
panel and the Appellate Body, and that such arguments have been rejected. This is not, in fact, the
case. In the original proceeding, the issue of alleged discrimination arising from the IHA was not a
subject focused upon by either the panel or the part ies. It was only one of several dozens of issues
considered by the panel, and there was no way for th e panel or the parties to know that the IHA issue
would be the only issue remaining in the case afte r the Appellate Body ruling. As a result, the
Appellate Body explicitly noted that "The Panel ha d limited evidence before it, as submitted by the
parties, on which to base its conclusion." Now, at this stage of the dispute, the parties have the
opportunity to present, and the Panel to consider, complete evidence on the interaction between the
IHA and federal criminal statutes. And, the ev idence submitted by the United States concerning the
text, legislative history, and applicable principles of statutory construction was in fact not presented to
the panel in the original proceeding.
32. Third, Antigua erroneously relies on the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen for the
proposition that the United States does not get a "second chance" to pr esent its case. In EC – Bed
Linen, however, the Appellate Body's statement rega rding "second chances" was based on a situation
where the DSB had adopted a panel report finding th at the complaining party had failed to make its
case on a particular issue. In this circumstance, the alleged violation that was the subject of the

attempted "second chance" argument was not part of the DSB recommendations and rulings.
Accordingly, the complaining party had no basis fo r attempting to raise this issue again in a 21.5
proceeding in order to try to obtain a finding that the responding party somehow had not complied
with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The present case is entirely different: it involves an
affirmative defence, an explicit finding by the Appe llate Body that neither the panel nor the Appellate
Body had found that the affirmative defence did no t apply, and repeated language indicating that
compliance with the recommendations and rulings c ould be achieved by showing or demonstrating
that the affirmative defence applied.
33. Fourth, Antigua argues that the United States is not in compliance because the United States
explained in the 21.3(c) proceeding that adopting legislation as a compliance measure would require
15 months, yet no such legislation was adopted duri ng the compliance period. Antigua's argument is
a non sequitur . It is up to each Member to decide what means it chooses to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings. Legislation to clar ify the interaction between the IHA and federal
criminal statutes was a possible means – but not th e only means – for compliance. It was entirely
appropriate for the United States to seek a complia nce period that would allow for the adoption of
such legislation. The fact that such legislation was not adopted in no way changes the legal analysis
used to consider the means that the United States has actually used for compliance in this proceeding.
E. CONCLUSION
34. The United States requests that the Panel reject Antigua's claims in their entirety, and find that
the US measures taken to comply are not inconsistent with the GATS.

ANNEX B

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Contents Page
Annex B-1 Third Party Submission by the European Communities (23 October
2006) – Executive Summary
B-2
Annex B-2 Third Party Submission by Japan (23 October 2006) – Executive
Summary
B-8

ANNEX B-1

THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(23 OCTOBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. The parties' First written submissions demonstrate that the issues in dispute before the Panel
are rather limited.
2. Antigua and Barbuda ("Antigua") complains that the United States has done nothing at all to
bring itself into compliance despite having insisted earlier in the Article 21.3 phase of the proceedings
that legislative implementation was the only option, and that it needed at least 15 months for this
purpose. The United States responds that it was under no obligation to do much at all, beyond meeting
its burden of proof for an affirm ative defence under Article XIV of the GATS, which the DSB found
it had not met in the original proceeding.
3. The European Communities ("EC") submits that there are a number of issues of systemic
importance in these proceedings. They are dealt w ith in the EC's submission under the following
headings:
(a) Measures to be brought into conformity (section B)
(b) Legal Framework for Compliance Review under Article 21. 5 of the DSU (section C)
(c) Compliance Review and the Legal Effect of Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports
(Questions related to Res Judicata) (section D)
(d) Representations Made in the Article 21.3 Phase of the Proceedings (section V)
4. The EC reserves its right to make further comments on this dispute.
B. MEASURES TO BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY
5. There appears to be some disagreement betw een parties as to the precise rulings or
recommendations of the DSB in relation to the original dispute.
6. The EC would recall that both the Panel and th e Appellate Body reports in this dispute
contain findings that the United States had acted inconsistently with its obligations under the GATS.
7. In particular, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that, by maintaining the following
three measures, the United States acts inconsistently with its obligations under Article XVI:1 and sub-
paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 of the GATS: Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States
Code (the "Wire Act"); Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Travel Act"); and
Section 1955 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Illegal Gambling Business Act", or the
"IGBA").
8. Having ruled that there were inconsistencies, the Panel examined whether the measures could
be justified under the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS as an affirmative defence. The Panel
concluded that the United States had failed to ju stify its measures as "necessary" under paragraph (a)
of Article XIV, and that it had also failed to est ablish that those measures satisfy the requirements of
the chapeau.

9. The Appellate Body disagreed with the Pane l on the latter point, holding that the United
States measures in question did satisfy the "necessity " requirement. Nevertheless, in regard to the
language of chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that
the United States had not demonstrated that its measures, found to be inconsistent with Article XVI of
the GATS, satisfied the requirements of Article XI V of the GATS. Both the Panel and the Appellate
Body and found that, due to ambiguity in the rela tionship between the Wire Act, the Travel Act and
the IGBA, on the one hand, and a federal civil stat ute known as the Interstate Horseracing Act (the
"IHA") on the other hand, the United States had not sa tisfied its burden of justifying the measures at
issue under the chapeau to Article XIV of the GATS.
C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLIANCE REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU
10. Insofar as the mandate and scope of an Article 21.5 panel is concerned, the EC wishes to
emphasize the following principles, which derive from settled Appellate Body jurisprudence:
(a) The claims, arguments and factual circumstances before a compliance panel may not
necessarily be the same as those that were per tinent or relevant in the original dispute.
However, this is linked with the fact that Article 21.5 proceedings do not, as a rule,
involve the original measure, but rather a ne w and different measure that was not before
the panel.
(b) The mandate of a compliance panel needs to be interpreted broadly. Its task is not
limited to examining whether the implem entation measure fully complies with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. A compliance panel needs to consider the new
measure in its totality, including its consistency with a covered agreement.
(c) In order to fulfil its mandate a panel must be able to take full account of the factual and
legal background against which relevant measures ar e taken, so as to determine the
existence, or consistency with the covered agreements, of measures taken to comply.
11. The Appellate Body has also given clear guida nce as to how the scope of jurisdiction of a
compliance panel must be determined. It has ruled that what constitutes a "measure taken to comply"
in a given case is not determined exclusively by the implementing Member, nor by the complaining
Member, but is a matter for judicial review.
1. Measures submitted in the original proceedings as measures "taken to comply"
12. In its First written submission Antigua pro ceeds on the assumption that the United States
relies as a "measure taken to comply" on the Department of Justice statement of 5 April 2006, referred
to by the United States in its status report to the DSB of 10 April 2006. In its First written submission
the United States denies this. The United States conte nds that the legislative measures which were at
issue in the original dispute – and which were f ound inconsistent – must be regarded as measures
"taken to comply" for the purposes of this proceeding.
13. The EC has a number of observations on this US position, in addition to its submissions on
res judicata and the new "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006", which will be
discussed below.
14. The EC has major difficulties with the notion that a Member that needs to bring inconsistent
measures into conformity, could simply present the same "old" measures again in a compliance
proceeding, without showing any re levant change in these measures or in any modification of any
aspect of these measures. Compliance review involv es, as a rule, the examination of new measures
taken by the implementing party after the adoption by the DSB of rulings or recommendations. In the

EC's view, an implementing party that is not br inging any new measures before a compliance panel
must provide cogent reasons consistent with the di spute settlement system to support such a move. In
the specific legal circumstances of this case the EC would have expected the United States to provide
a reasonable explanation, consistent with the dispute legal system, of why it believes no new
legislative measures were, after all, necessary.
15. In the present case, it would appear that the only reasoning the United States provides is the
following: its affirmative defence failed to convince the Panel and the Appellate Body the first time
around because only limited evidence was presented; not ha ving been able to meet its burden of proof
in the original proceeding, the United States ar gues that it should now be permitted to present
complete evidence before the Panel on the same issu e in relation to the same measures to meet its
burden of proof the second time around. In the EC's view this line of argumentation appears at odds
with a fundamental principle governing the WTO dis pute settlement system: parties to a particular
dispute are not allowed to re-open debate on matters that must be regarded as having been finally
settled by the DSB's adoption of the panel and appellate reports in relation to the same dispute.
2. The "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006"
16. The EC submits that one of the matters for the Panel to consider for its assessment. may be
the new "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006" (the "UIGEA"). The legislative
history of this new Act shows that it is apparently closely related to earlier bills which have been
referred to by parties in their submissions.
17. The EC has the following additional observations derived from settled jurisprudence of the
Appellate Body, which may assist the Panel in its ass essment of whether it should take this new Act
into consideration. Firstly, panels have a broad mandate in matters of compliance review. They should
take full account of the factual a nd legal background against which rele vant measures are taken, so as
to determine the existence, or consistency with th e covered agreements, of measures taken to comply.
Municipal law can be treated as evidence of co mpliance or non-compliance with an implementing
Member's obligations under the covered agreements. Secondly, a panel is allowed to take into account
any measure which is closely connected with the measures which the DSB has deemed inconsistent,
even if the measure at issue was taken after the or iginal panel report. Thirdly, what is a "measure
taken to comply" in a given case is not determined exclusively by the implementing Member, nor by
the complaining Member, but is a matter for judicial review.
D. C
OMPLIANCE REVIEW AND THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ADOPTED PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY
REPORTS (QUESTIONS RELATED TO RES JUDICATA)
18. An important issue is to what extent parties may in Article 21.5 proceedings re-litigate issues
that have been ruled upon in the original proceedi ngs. In examining this issue, the Appellate Body
has been guided by Article 17.14 if the DSU, which instructs parties to the dispute to
"unconditionally" accept reports adopted by the DSB. It follows that findings and conclusions of
panel reports – amended, as the c ase may be, by Appellate Body repor ts – must be regarded as a final
resolution of the dispute between parties for the particular claim and the specific (aspect of) a measure
at issue.
19. This principle, which is sometimes referred to as the principle of res judicata , requires
identity between both the measures and claims as we ll as identity between parties. The EC points out
that in EC – Bed Linen , the Appellate Body applied this principle to hypothesis where a party had
been found not to have established a prima facie case, holding that even in such a hypothesis, that
party is not entitled to a "second chance" in an Article 21.5 proceeding.

20. In application of the above, neither party s hould be entitled to re-open the debate on issues
settled by final adjudication.
1. Submission by Antigua and Barbuda – res judicata and fresh evidence
21. The EC notes that Antigua agrees with the principl es set out above, but is also trying to re-
open debate in Section V of its First written submissi on, in relation to a particular issue on which the
Panel and the Appellate Body have ruled: on wh ether or not the United States had provisionally
justified the statutes at issue under Article XIV(a) as "measures … necessary to protect public morals
or to maintain public order". Antigua contends that this issue should be reviewed by this Panel on the
ground that there would be "significant factual developments" since the date of the panel report.
22. The EC understands Antigua's submission to mean that since the original panel report has
been rendered, new evidence has come to light whic h the original Panel did not have before it. The
new facts/evidence to Antigua refers in its First written submission do not appear to relate to any
allegedly new measure taken by the United States.
23. In the EC's view the question of whether a part y should be allowed to re-open a debate on the
basis of alleged new evidence, where no new measure has been taken, is a delicate issue. The DSU
does not contain provisions allowing for the admission of fresh evidence during the course of
proceedings. The EC points out that to the extent th at some international tribunals allow for adducing
of new evidence, and especially in the context of ap pellate proceedings, such a right is often strictly
circumscribed. Generally, the party wishing to brin g fresh evidence would need to demonstrate that
this evidence was not available at th e first instance; either because it did not exist or, if it did exist, it
could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
24. In the EC's view, it is an entirely different question however, whether in the WTO dispute
settlement system a panel under Article 21.5 DSU should be required to be open to admission of
allegedly fresh evidence. The EC sees a clear tension here with the ( res judicata) principle referred to
above: i.e., adopted reports must be regarded as a final resolution of the dispute between parties in
relation to a particular claim. At the same time, the EC acknowledges that the discovery of pertinent
fresh evidence that was not available at the first instance could possibly be regarded as an exception to
this rule, because of the broad mandate a compliance panel is entrusted with.
2. Submissions of the United States – res judicata and affirmative defences
25. The United States contends that the res judicata principle set out above is not pertinent
because it would not apply in a case where a party's argument was rejected on the ground that it did
not meet its burden of proof for an affirmative defence.
26. The EC submits that this line of argumentation s hould be rejected. The principle referred to
above, according to which adopted reports must be regarded as a final resolution of the dispute
between parties in relation to a particular claim a pplies with equal force to affirmative defences. The
distinction which the United States seeks to draw between "claims" and "affirmative defences" for the
application of the res judicata principle is unconvincing. In addition, it makes no difference for the
application of the principle, whether a complaini ng party's claim or a responding party's affirmative
defence was rejected because of failure to meet a burden of proof or for any other reason, as long as it
is established that the claim or the affirmative defence was ruled upon.
27. Further, it is of no relevance that the claim or affirmative defence would only have been
raised as a "minor" issue or at a relatively late stag e in the proceedings before the original panel, or
that the Appellate Body observed that the Panel ha d only "limited evidence" before it on this issue.
Under the DSU every party is required to bring its best case forward in the original proceedings.

28. In the EC's view its position is clearly supported, inter alia, by the Appellate Body's ruling in
EC – Bed Linen.
E. R
EPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THE ARTICLE 21.3 PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
1. Legal and systemic analysis
29. A further issue that this Panel may have to c onsider is what weight should be attached to
declarations and representations made by Members in the Article 21.3 phase of the proceedings. The
EC submits that this issue cannot be resolved without looking into the role of Article 21.3 phase of the
proceedings in the whole dispute settlement system.
30. In the EC's view, where a reasonable period h as been granted (for compliance by the Member
obligated to implement the recommendations and ruli ngs of the DSB) compliance at the expiration of
this period must be assessed also in the light of the representations made by that Member in the
Article 21.3 phase of the proceedings.
31. The dispute settlement system would be undermin ed if it the reasonable period of time were
allowed to expire without the Member having taken the course of action which lies at the basis of the
award of the reasonable period, and without the implementing Member having provided a reasonable
explanation. In the EC's view, such an approach is not only essential to preserve the integrity of the
dispute settlement system; it is also a reflection of the requirement of good faith set out in Article 3.10
of the DSU: parties need to engage in the disput e settlement procedures in good faith in an effort to
resolve the dispute.
2. Representations made by the United States in the Article 21.3 phase
32. The EC takes no issue with the general contention of the United States that a responding party
is in principle free to choose any of the various op tions that may exist to bring about compliance. In
essence, all a responding party is requi red to do under the dispute settlement system is to bring itself
into compliance.
33. However, this dispute is not about whether or not the United States was free to select a
particular method to bring itself into compliance. The question of the method of implementation of
the DSB's recommendations and rulings was alread y extensively litigated in the Article 21.3(c)
arbitral proceedings of this case. In these proceed ings the United States declared that the only option
for it was to enact fresh legislative measures, whils t firmly rejecting any suggestion that there would
any possibility of implementation by any other means.
34. The Arbitrator expressly relied on these US submissions as "particular circumstances"
relevant for the determination of the reasonable pe riod of time. It led him to determine that United
States should be granted a reasonable period of time of 11 months and 2 weeks from the date of the
adoption by the DSB of the Panel and Appellate Body reports.
35. The EC does not claim that the United States was under a legal obligation flowing from its
declarations before the Article 21.3(c) Arbitra tion proceeding to adopt new legislative measures.
However, in the particular circumstances of this case the United States should be required to provide a
reasonable explanation for why it believes that legi slative action is after all, not necessary. The only
reasoning offered by the United States in the present case is that its "old" measures were already in
compliance, and that it is allowed to have a second chance at meeting its burden of proof in relation to
the affirmative defence under Article XIV (a) of the GATS. In the EC's view this line of reasoning
cannot be regarded as a reasonable explanation; it is at odds with the res judicata principle set out
above.

F. CONCLUSIONS
36. The EC respectfully requests that the Panel ta ke account of the considerations above in
making its findings in this case. The EC submits that this Panel should confirm the Findings and
Conclusions of the original Panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report.

ANNEX B-2
THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION BY JAPAN
(23 OCTOBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. The Government of Japan would like to address two issues. The first issue is whether, for the
purposes of an Article 21.5 proceeding, a WTO Member may merely re-argue the merits of the
underlying issues before the original panel or is re quired to implement a specific new measure. The
second issue concerns the appropriate level of discr etion afforded a Member in determining what
would qualify as a "measure taken to comply".
B. "M
EASURES TAKEN TO COMPLY " FOR PURPOSES OF DSU ARTICLE 21.5 THAT THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD TAKE IN THIS DISPUTE MUST BE SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE MEASURES
SUBJECT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS OF THE DSB
2. The United States in its First written submission argues that its task in this Article 21.5
proceeding is to demonstrate that its domestic legislative scheme for the regulation of internet
gambling services, properly interpreted, is consistent with its obligations under Article XIV of the
GATS. Japan is of the view that such an approach taken by the United States is an improper attempt
to re-open the substance of the underlying disput e concerning US defences under the chapeau to
GATS Article XIV, defying the ordinary meaning a nd structure of Article 21.5, particularly the
meaning of "measures taken to comply", and the finality of the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB. Japan is further of the view that the Un ited States also unfoundedly argues that no new US
measure "taken to comply" with the DSB rulings in the underlying dispute is required because in its
view the challenged statutes are consistent with its WTO obligations. Such an assertion by the United
States cannot be justified in light of the DSB rulings adopted in the course of this dispute.
1. Ordinary meaning and structure of Article 21.5
3. The phrase "measures taken to comply with … recommendations and rulings" denotes a
measure occurring or taking effect after the issuance of the DSB rulings. Considerable WTO
jurisprudence supports this proposition. The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp , for example, has
explained that Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in pr inciple, not the original measure, but rather a
new and different measure which was not before the original panel.
4. The structure of the DSU further supports this interpretation. Under Article 19, panels and
the Appellate Body are charged with the task of determining whether challenged measures are
inconsistent with covered agreemen ts, and when such inconsistency is found, they shall recommend
that the Member concerned to bring that measure into conformity with its WTO obligations. The two-
stage substantive review process is the only mech anism prescribed in the DSU for ascertaining the
consistency of challenged measure with a Member's WTO obligations. The subsequent stages of the
dispute settlement process, under Articles 21 and 22, have limited, specified functions that lead to the
final disposition of a dispute. The Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen has also clarified that a party
should not be given a second chance in an Article 21.5 proceeding to raise anew its substantive claims
in the underlying dispute. An Article 21.5 pro ceeding should not be the forum to supplement the
arguments, defence or otherwise, which the respondi ng party was unable to complete at the original
proceeding. A defending Member is therefore clearly not allowed to re-open the substantive issues
already resolved under the Article 19 process.

2. Finality of the DSB rulings
5. The finality of adopted DSB decisions is critical to provide the "security and predictability"
and the "prompt settlement" of disputes that the di spute settlement system is designed to provide.
Further, Article 21.1 of the DSU provides that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to secure e ffective resolution of dispute". The basic rule of
finality underscored by the rele vant provisions of the DSU would be rendered meaningless if
defending Members were allowed to use the Ar ticle 21.5 compliance process to re-open the
substantive issues argued in the underlying Article 19 process. Article 17.14 of the DSU also
provides that an adopted Appellate Body report must be unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute. The US effort to re-open the underlying substantive dispute therefore violates the rule of
"unconditional acceptance".
6. Consistent with the rule of finality, the func tion of a 21.5 compliance panel is to ascertain
whether a "measure taken to comply" does in fact comply with the DSB rulings. The compliance
process does not open a door to a renewed dispute on the substance of the issues giving rise to the
recommendations and rulings. Ample WTO jurispruden ce supports the application of this principle,
which is akin to res judicata , in the current dispute. For example, in Mexico – Corn Syrup , the
Appellate Body in the 21.5 compliance proceedi ng refused to revisit rulings in the underlying
challenge because, inter alia , "Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the DSU reflect the importance to the
multilateral trading system of security, predictabil ity and the prompt settlement of disputes." The
Appellate Body has also explained in EC – Bed Linen that adopted DSB rulings must be accepted by
the parties as a final resolution to the dispute between them with respect to the particular claim and
the specific component of the measure that is the s ubject of the claim. Th e United States did not, at
the appropriate stage of the proceeding, demonstrate that it met its burden under the chapeau of GATS
Article XIV, and this fact is not "unsettled" as cl aimed by the United States. It cannot distort the
authorized scope of 21.5 compliance panel review and seek to escape from the rule of finality to
change that fact at this stage.
3. Asserted US exception to the required operation of Article 21.5 and to the finality of the
DSB rulings is without merit
7. The DSB issued specific recommendations and ruli ngs, including the finding that "the United
States has not shown, in light of the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA"), that the prohibitions
embodied in [the three federal laws] are applied to both foreign and domestic service suppliers of
remote betting services for horse racing and, therefor e, has not established that these measures satisfy
the requirements of the chapeau [of GATS Article XIV] ". In other words, the Appellate Body found
that the US statutory scheme is inconsistent with th e relevant provisions of the GATS in light of the
IHA. The United States, therefore, needs to take some type of measure to implement these specific
DSB rulings.
8. The United States purports to identify an exception to the required operation of Article 21.5
and to the rule of finality of the DSB rulings by arguing that, when the responding party has a valid
affirmative defence that did not succeed only because of a lack of a full showing in the original
proceeding, the only sensible result is to construe "measure taken to comply" to be the measure at
issue in the original proceeding so that the respondi ng party can proceed to make that showing in an
Article 21.5 proceeding.
9. This claim is however without foundation in law. First, the DSB rulings require the United
States to "bring its measures" found to be "inconsiste nt with the [GATS] into conformity with its
obligations under that Agreement." These instructions contain no ambiguity, and provide no authority
for the United States to attempt to use the Article 21.5 compliance process to augment or repeat the
arguments made, and evidence supplied, in the underlying panel and the Appellate Body proceeding.

10. Additionally, the United States claims that th is case is exceptional because the panel and the
Appellate Body in the underlying proceeding di d not explicitly find the non-applicability of the
affirmative defence. The United States interprets the language of the panel and Appellate Body
reports as indicating that "compliance with the recommendations and rulings could be achieved by
showing or demonstrating" the applicability of the affirmative GATS Article XIV defence. Even if
this is the case, for the reasons set forth above , this Article 21.5 compliance proceeding cannot
function as the forum for the United States to make such a demonstration. The legal issues
concerning GATS Article XIV in this case were fina lly resolved by the Appellate Body, and are
settled.
11. Finally, the United States claims that the questi on of alleged discriminatory application of the
US law in question was only one of many issues, and that it had no way to know that this would be
the only issue "remaining" after the Appellate B ody ruling. However, since the GATS Article XIV
defence was raised by the United States, it could not have been unaware of its burden of showing the
applicability of that defence. Evidentiary defi ciencies in the underlying case should not be permitted
to be cured at a later stage as it would seriously disturb the rule of finality crucial to the proper
functioning of the dispute settlement system.
C. A
 MEMBER HAS BROAD LATITUDE IN DETERMINI NG THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
QUALIFYING AS A "MEASURE TAKEN TO COMPLY" FOR PURPOSES OF DSU ARTICLE 21.5
12. Subsequent to the adoption of the Appellate Body report, an official of the US Department of
Justice ("DOJ") testified before the US Congress th at the Department of Justice interpreted the
existing criminal statutes as prohibiting the interstate transmission of bets or wagers, including wagers
on horse races. Antigua and Barbuda argued that th is statement does not cons titute a "measure taken
to comply" with the DSB rulings, and the United Stat es appears to agree. Japan however respectfully
disagrees with their view, if they regard the DOJ Statement as a priori excluded from being
considered as constituting a "measure taken to comply" due only to its formality as being a
"statement".1
13. The GATS itself defines the term "measure" as any measure by a Member, "whether in the
form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form." An
authoritative statement by an official of the government entity charged with administration of the
statute in question falls within that broad definiti on. Appellate Body decisions also support a broad
interpretation of the term "measure" in analogous contexts. For example, the Appellate Body in
Guatemala – Cement I stated that, "[i]n the practice established under the GATT 1947, a "measure"
may be any act of a Member, whether or not legally binding, and it can include even non-binding
administrative guidance by a government….".
14. Antigua appears to argue that the United St ates is now precluded from choosing other means
of complying with the DSB rulings, as the Unite d States requested in Article 21.3 proceeding
15 months for compliance because at that time it believe d legislation might be necessary. Japan is of
the view that the United States is not necessarily lo cked into a legislative action only due to its
intention expressed before the Arbitrator.
15. WTO Members are permitted to decide how th ey will comply with the DSB rulings. A
substantial body of WTO jurisprudence supports the proposition that the implementing Member
retains the discretion to choose its preferred met hod of implementation. No provision of the DSU

1 This view of the Government of Japan is without prejudice to any evaluation of the sufficiency of the
DOJ Statement in this particular case as a "measure taken to comply".

deprives Members of this flexibility to devise impl ementing measures as warranted by their sovereign
considerations.

ANNEX C

REBUTTALS FROM THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex C-1 Rebuttal by Antigua and Barbuda (30 October 2006) – Executive
Summary
C-2
Annex C-2 Rebuttal by the United States (13 November 2006) – Executive
Summary
C-9

ANNEX C-1

REBUTTAL BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
(30 OCTOBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. This is the executive summary of Antigua's rebuttal submission in WT/DS285 United States –
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Ga mbling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU.
2. In its First written submission, the United States highlights that it has done nothing to come
into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original proceeding.
3. In Antigua's view, the Panel should rule that, because the United States has done nothing to
come into compliance with the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB in the original proceeding,
the United States remains out of compliance with the DSB rulings. This would make unnecessary any
further evaluation of the arguments presented in this proceeding.
4. Were the Panel to go further, it would not be necessary to go much further, as the United
States is not permitted a "second chance" to persuade the Panel in an Article 21.5 proceeding that it
has met its burden of proof under the "chapeau" of Article XIV of the GATS.
5. And, finally, regardless of whether the Unite d States should be given a "second chance", it
remains clear that, as before, the United States h as failed to meet its burden of proof under the
chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS that its measur es are not applied in a discriminatory fashion or
otherwise do not constitute a disguised restriction on trade in services.
6. This submission considers each of the foregoing points in order, after correcting some of the
misstatements of law and fact contained in the First written submission of the United States in this
proceeding.
B. T
HE UNITED STATES HAS DONE NOTHING
7. The United States has done nothing to come into compliance. The United States now asserts
that the "measures taken to comply" for purposes of this proceeding are the three federal statutes ruled
contrary to the United States' obligations under the GATS in the original.
8. There being no assertion by the United States, nor any evidence, that any of the three federal
statutes have been amended, supplemented or ot herwise changed since the determination of the
reasonable period of time under Article 21.3 of the DSU, it is clear that the United States has taken no
action towards compliance. The United States therefore remains out of compliance with the DSB
rulings.
C. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT GET A "SECOND CHANCE"
1. Introduction
9. The United States takes the position that it is entitled to reargue its case under the chapeau of
Article XIV of the GATS. In doing so, the Unite d States relied on two utterly specious arguments –
first, it alleges that the original Panel and the Appellate Body did not really find that the United States
had not met its burden of proof under the ch apeau of Article XIV of the GATS and second , it asserts

that failures with respect to the establishment of affirmative defences should be treated differently
than failures of a complaining party to establish proof required of it.
2. Failure to meet the burden of proof
10. The United States now attempts to cast its failure to meet its burden of proof with respect to
the satisfaction of the chapeau as something less, or different, than what is really was – a failure of
proof. The reality is that the United States simply failed to meet its burden of proof on the affirmative
defence, and thus the defence failed.
11. In order for a defence under Article XIV to succeed, the responding party must not only
establish whether a "challenged measure falls with in the scope of one of the paragraphs of
Article XIV", but it must also prove that the "measure satisfies the requirement of the chapeau of
Article XIV." Thus, the United States' defe nce under Article XIV did not succeed, and thus the DSB
rulings – that the United States bring the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA into conformity with
its obligations under the GATS.
12. Astonishingly, the United States blames the fa ilure of its proof on the "limited evidence"
before the original Panel and the Appellate B ody, as if somehow the United States had not been
permitted to thoroughly present its evidence during the course of the original proceeding.
13. In reality, the United States is responsible for any failure to meet the burden of proof.
Despite opportunities to do so, the United States did not even discuss Article XIV until its second –
and final – written submission in the original pro ceeding. Antigua claimed that the delay of the
United States in asserting an Article XIV defence until so late in the original proceeding should have
precluded any review of the defence, but this point was contested by the United States and rejected by
the Appellate Body. In the course of contesting Antigua's position, the United States averred that it
had "provided detailed evidence and argumentation on Article XIV in its Second written submission."
At no point did the United States argue that it had been prejudiced or unable to submit sufficient
evidence. Nor did the United States ask the origin al Panel for an additional opportunity to submit
further Article XIV evidence. Under the circumstances, it is absurd for the United States to argue that
it had an inadequate opportunity to present its "complete evidence" in the original proceeding.
3. No difference between a failure of an affirmative defence and a failure of a
complainant's proof
14. Although the United States seemingly concedes that WTO jurisprudence precludes the re-
argument of a failed primary case in a proceeding u nder Article 21.5 of the DSU, the United States
nevertheless apparently argues for the limitation of this doctrine to the case-in-chief of a complaining
party. Under WTO jurisprudence, there is no distinction between the burden of proof on a
complainant to establish its case and the burden of proof on a responding party to establish an
affirmative defence.
4. The issue has been resolved
15. A party that has "failed to make its case on a par ticular issue" has done just that – and there is
no "second chance." This rule clearly applies whethe r the failure is of establishing a prima facie case
or whether the failure is of a fully considered issue.
16. To decide otherwise and give the United States an opportunity to meet its failed burden of
proof in a proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU would run "directly counter to the plain language
and structure of the DSU," opening up "a potentially endless loop."

D. T
HE BURDEN IS NOT MET
1. Introduction
17. In its First written submission, Antigua presen ted substantial evidence and argument as to
why, even were the United States entitled to reargue its case under the chapeau of Article XIV, the US
case would again fail. Not only does the IHA, on its face, expressly authorise remote gambling on an
intra- and interstate basis, but in practice the I HA has been applied to fuel a substantial domestic
sanctioned, licensed and regulated industry.
18. Ignoring the reality of its significant domestic industry and the fact that no remote gambling
service provider operating under the authority of a nd in compliance with the IHA has ever been
subject to prosecution, the United States continues to rely on its selective and haphazard "repeal by
implication" reasoning as its sole basis of proof. As Antigua has demonstrated, the United States'
position with respect to the IHA and the relationshi p between the IHA and the Wire Act is simply
wrong. And, if there was any doubt previously about the discriminatory application of US law when
it comes to remote gambling, as well as about whet her the IHA authorises domestic remote gambling
in the United States, these doubts were emphatically put to rest by the recent enactment into law of the
so-called "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006" (the "UIGEA").
2. Additional matters regarding the IHA and the Wire Act
19. The United States either mis-comprehends or mi sconstrues certain fundamental provisions of
the IHA along with the practical and actual rea lities of the present remote gambling landscape
operating in the United States by virtue of the IHA.
20. The IHA was passed by the US Congress in 1978 and was intended to "regulate interstate
commerce with respect to wagering on horseracing, in order to further horseracing and legal off-track
betting industries in the United States."
21. The IHA gives the individual 50 states the pr imary responsibility of determining what
horserace wagering can take place legally within th eir borders. The IHA also allows interstate
horserace wagering between two states provided it is legal in both the state where the bet takes place
and the state where the person placing the bet is located. This definition of interstate off-track
wagering, which was expanded and clarified by the 2000 amendment to the IHA, clearly authorises
interstate wagering via the Internet from one state to another.
22. The United States, while providing the Panel with certain of the generic rules of statutory
construction under US law, does not indicate how or why the Wire Act could allow for the
prosecution of someone operating pursuant to the IHA. It is patently absurd to suggest, as the United
States apparently does, that the IHA – with its extensive provisions regard ing interstate remote
wagering, revenue sharing and state regulation – woul d have been put in place solely to (i) provide
civil remedies for what (the United States would argue) remains criminal
 conduct and (ii) allow
racetracks to receive and share revenue from this (the United States would argue) illegal activity.
23. Despite the United States' protests to the contra ry, the IHA must and can be harmonised with
the Wire Act. In essence, what the IHA did was take one course of conduc t that had arguably been
prohibited by the Wire Act out of its coverage und er certain conditions and circumstances, while
leaving the remainder of the Wire Act's coverage completely intact. For the position taken by the
United States concerning the Wire Act to be give n effect, the entire regulatory scheme along with the
preclusion of criminal claims predicated by the Co ngress in the IHA must be ignored – or itself be
"repealed by implication." This would be comple tely contrary to US law concerning statutory
construction. The IHA was enacted later than the Wi re Act and it is far more specific than the Wire

Act. The IHA is specific to the interstate horser acing industry while the Wire Act is a generic
criminal law aimed at the transmission of gambling information. While repeal by implication is
disfavoured, it occurs when a subsequent or a mo re specific statute cannot be reconciled with an
earlier statute.
24. The conflict, if any, between the IHA, the later statute, and the Wire Act, the earlier statute,
over interstate wagering on horseracing results in a repeal by implication of the Wire Act to the extent
of the conflict. Simply put, interstate wagering on horseraci ng is not subject to the Wire Act because
the statutory scheme and Congressional intent made the participants subject to only civil liability even
for non-compliance with the IHA. US law allows for two different typ es of repeal by implication and
does not require that the later act cover the entire subject matter – just that there is an irreconcilable
conflict between portions of the applicable statutes.
25. In its submission, the United States also fundamentally misconstrues Sterling Suffolk
Racecourse Limited Partnership v. Bu rrillville Racing Association, Inc . Bizarrely, the United States
claims in its submission that Sterling somehow stands for the proposition that the IHA and the Wire
Act exist in different "spheres" of the law. Far from it, Sterling actually reinforces the proposition
that the IHA removes wagering on interstate horseracing from any possibility of prosecution under the
Wire Act or any other federal criminal law. Thus, while Antigua has identified the one actual
decision by an American court on the scope of th e interrelationship between the IHA and the Wire
Act, the United States must rely upon bare claims from a Department of Justice that has failed to bring
a single criminal action under the Wire Act against an IHA-sanctioned, licensed and regulated
operator.
3. The "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006"
26. Less than a week after Antigua filed its First written submission in this proceeding, the United
States enacted the UIGEA. The UIGEA is clearly with in the terms of reference of the Panel in this
proceeding.
27. While the UIGEA itself clearly violates the GATS in a number of respects, it is perhaps best
suited to (i) demonstrate that the IHA permits re mote gambling on horseracing in the United States by
state-sanctioned operators; (ii) demonstrate that the Congress has conceded that states and Native
American tribes can regulate remote gambling; (iii) confirm Antigua's argument that the Wire Act
does not prohibit intrastate remote gambling; and (iv) highlight the trade-discriminatory affect of the
Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA.
28. Having already criminalised the cross-border provision of gambling and betting services with
the Wire Act, the UIGEA now makes it a federal cr iminal offense for a remote gambling and betting
service provider to accept funds from or pay funds to consumers in the United States – effectively yet
another method of prohibiting the cross-border s upply of gambling and betting services from Antigua
to consumers in the United States. This violates Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2(a) and (c) of the
GATS for exactly the same reason that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA violate the GATS.
As well, criminalising "international transfers a nd payments for current transactions" involving an
activity – the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services – for which the United States has
made specific commitments in its schedule under the GATS clearly violates Article XI of the GATS.
29. Ironically, in the arbitration proceeding, the United States took the position that it would enact
legislation to in essence "clarify" that the IHA does not permit domestic remote gambling in the
United States. Given the chance to do so – in legisl ation adopted by the US Congress and signed into
law by the American president subsequent to the arbitration award in the 21.3 proceeding – the United
States has instead chosen to do the opposite

30. In the original proceeding, in response to An tigua's argument that remote gambling services
can be effectively regulated, the United States argu ed that it had determined regulation of remote
gambling was not possible. Yet Antigua has shown that the United States already
 regulates the
domestic, remote supply of gambling and betting ser vices. Sections of the UIGEA, by making
adoption of regulations that include age and lo cation verification requirements a condition of the
exclusion of intrastate and Native American remo te gambling from coverage of the legislation,
unambiguously demonstrate that – contrary to the po sition of the United States in this proceeding –
the US Congress recognises that these services can be regulated.
31. Antigua has consistently argued that nothing in the Wire Act prohibits solely intrastate remote
gambling. The UIGEA affirms the position of Antigua in this regard, clarifying that "unlawful
Internet gambling" does not include intrastate remote gambling while imposing the regulatory
requirements discussed in the preceding paragraph if the intrastate gambling is to be clearly excluded
from the scope of the new legislation.
32. Passage of the UIGEA, with its express "carve-outs" for a number of domestic remote
gambling opportunities, has made it impossible to assert that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
IGBA are applied in compliance with the chapeau of Article XI V of the GATS. Antigua cannot
supply its services to consumers under the IHA, nor by definition can Antigua provide cross-border
services on an intrastate basis or within Native Am erican lands. Rather than using a legislative
opportunity to either provide Antigua with market ac cess to US consumers or to prohibit all domestic
remote gambling, in an almost cruelly ironic act, the Congress has instead chosen to make its laws
even more discriminatory and WTO-inconsistent than they were at the adoption of the DSB rulings.
E. GOOD FAITH, THE EFFICACY OF THE DSU AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1. Introduction
33. Antigua shares the concern evid enced by the European Communities over the position of the
United States in this proceeding. Although Anti gua understands that participants in a dispute
resolution process should be entitled to use the process to the best of their ability in order to achieve
their legitimate objectives, Antigua believes that eac h Member must conduct itself in good faith, in
accordance with principles of fair play and comity , when pursuing those legitimate objectives. While
Antigua has a number of concerns about the conduc t of these proceedings by the United States, it is
particularly troubled by what has transpired with respect to compliance since the adoption of the DSB
rulings in May 2005.
34. These circumstances call into question not only th e efficacy of the dispute resolution system
under the DSU, but also whether developing co untries such as Antigua can effectively avail
themselves of the remedies ostensibly provided by the DSU when up against a developed country,
such as the United States, with comparably endless resources.
2. The requirement of good faith
35. Article 3.10 of the DSU reads in pertinent part that it "is understood that requests for
conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement pr ocedures should not be inte nded or considered as
contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, a ll Members will engage in these procedures in good
faith in an effort to resolve the dispute."
36. The Appellate Body has stated that
"Article 3.10 of the DSU commits Members of the WTO, if a dispute arises, to
engage in dispute settlement procedures "in good faith in an effort to resolve the

dispute". This is another specific manifestation of the principle of good faith which,
we have pointed out, is at once a general pr inciple of law and a principle of general
international law. This pervasive principle requires both complaining and
responding Members to comply with the requirements of the DSU (and related
requirements in other covered agreements ) in good faith. By good faith compliance,
complaining Members accord to the r esponding Members the full measure of
protection and opportunity to defend, contem plated by the letter and spirit of the
procedural rules."
3. The United States and compliance
37. Having announced that it intended to comply with the DSB rulings and would need a
reasonable period of time to do so, the United States argued in the 21.3 proceeding that it would need
at least 15 months to come into compliance with the DSB rulings by adopting legislation. The
arbitrator, clearly relying on the United States' repr esentation, awarded a reasonable period of time of
11 months and two weeks.
38. On 10 April 2006, upon expiration of the re asonable period of time, the United States
informed that it was in compliance with the DSB ruli ngs. Contrary to its assertion to this Panel in its
First written submission, the United States informed the DSB that, in its opinion, it was in compliance
with the DSB rulings based solely
 upon a purported statement of a Department of Justice employee.
39. That the United States considered the DOJ Statement its basis for "compliance" with the DSB
rulings was reinforced at a meeting of the DSB on 21 April 2006, when a representative of the United
States told the Members that in "view of the circ umstances" of the DOJ Statement, the United States
was in compliance with the DSB rulings.
40. Now, in its First written submission in this proceeding, the United St ates takes yet a third
position with respect to compliance–that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA themselves are
"compliance measures" and that the United States has been in compliance with the DSB rulings all
along.
41. This unfathomable assertion of the United States is without precedent in WTO dispute
resolution. Under the logic of the United States' current position, it was in compliance with the DSB
rulings immediately upon the rulings having been made . If that is so, then why did the United States
not simply say exactly that at the DSB meeting of 18 May 2005?
42. Antigua agrees with the general proposition that an implementing Member should retain the
right to determine how to come into compliance with recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and
further that under certain circumstances an implem enting Member may change its original opinion on
how to achieve compliance. That being the case, Antigua agrees with the European Communities
when it said that should a Member later come to the view that contrary to earlier declarations to the
DSB, enactment of fresh legislation is not lo nger necessary, the implementing Member should be
required to provide a reasonable explanation.
4. The United States position threatens the dispute resolution system
43. The circumstances of this proceeding raise into serious doubt the efficacy of the WTO dispute
resolution system, particularly where a small nation with limited resources is attempting to secure
compliance of large, developed economy such as th e United States with an adverse ruling from the
DSB. In the 17 months since the DSB adopted its recommendations and rulings in this case, the
United States has done nothing to come into co mpliance with the DSB rulings; it has refused on
repeated occasions to engage in any construc tive dialogue with Antigua towards a mutually

satisfactory resolution of the dispute; it has arrest ed, indicted and prosecuted Antiguans and Antiguan
service providers simply for providing licensed, regulated gambling and betting services to consumers
in the United States; and it has adopted a punishing, discriminatory law that has already had a
material, adverse impact upon Antigua and its citizens.
F. C
ONCLUSIONS
44. In light of the foregoing, Antigua respectfully requests that the Panel: (i) find that the United
States has not taken measures to comply with the DSB rulings; (ii) find that the Wire Act, the Travel
Act and the IGBA remain in violation of th e United States' obligations to Antigua under, inter alia,
Article XVI of the GATS without meeting the requir ements of Article XIV of the GATS; and (iii)
recommend that the DSB request the United States to br ing the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
IGBA into conformity with the obligations of the United States under the GATS.

ANNEX C-2

REBUTTAL BY THE UNITED STATES
(13 NOVEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. In its Second written submission, Antigua fails to rebut the US showing that the IHA does not
exempt domestic suppliers of betting on horse racing from the prohibitions in US criminal laws. In
fact, Antigua fails even to address the specific statut ory language, the legislative history, and the case
law governing "implied preemption" of prior legisl ative enactments. Instead, Antigua's arguments
mostly rely on circular, baseless assertions that the IHA – by its very existence – must necessarily
exclude any application of criminal law.
2. Instead of addressing the substantive issue in th is dispute, most of Antigua's arguments are
addressed to other matters. First, Antigua argues th at even if the United States has shown that its
measures meet the requirements of the Article XI V chapeau, the Panel must nonetheless find the US
measures to be out of compliance with obligations under the GATS because to do otherwise would
give the United States a "second chance." Antig ua's "second chance" theory – no matter how
adamantly Antigua demands it – is not contained in th e text of the DSU, and would not be consistent
with the goal of the DSU to achieve a "satisfactor y settlement of the matter in accordance with the
rights and obligations under [the DSU] and under the covered agreements." To the contrary, the best
means for achieving such a "satisfactory settleme nt" is for the Panel to address the remaining
substantive issue in this dispute.
3. Second, Antigua focuses on a US measure, adopted on October 13, 2006, that amends neither
the criminal laws at issue nor the IHA. The October 13 measure is not within the Panel's terms of
reference, and is not instructive as to whether th e United States has made its showing that the IHA
does not exempt domestic suppliers of betting on horse racing from the prohibitions in US criminal
laws.
B. T
HE SCOPE OF THE ISSUES IN THIS PROCEEDING IS DETERMINED BY THE DSB
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS
4. Part II of Antigua's Second written submission is devoted to what Antigua calls "corrections"
to "errors" that Antigua purports to find in th e introductory paragraph of the US First written
submission. Antigua's claims of purported errors ar e baseless. The first pa ragraph in the US First
written submission simply summarized the open issues regarding the application of Article XIV to the
US measures that remained as a result of the DSB recommendations and rulings. In order to avoid
any further such claims of "error", the United St ates will set out below the specific findings of the
Appellate Body regarding what the United States had, and had not, established with respect to
whether the US measures at issue meet the requirements of Article XIV of the GATS:
"371. We have found instead that those measures satisfy the "necessity"
requirement. We have also upheld, but only in part, the Panel's finding under the
chapeau. We explained that the only incons istency that the Pane l could have found
with the requirements of the chapeau stem s from the fact that the United States did
not demonstrate that the prohibition embodied in the measures at issue applies to both
foreign and domestic suppliers of remote gambling services , notwithstanding the
IHA – which, according to the Panel, "does appear, on its face, to permit " domestic
service suppliers to supply remote betting services for horse racing. In other words,
the United States did not establish
 that the IHA does not alter the scope of application

of the challenged measures, particularly vis-à-vis domestic suppliers of a specific
type of remote gambling services. In this respect, we wish to clarify that the Panel
did not, and we do not, make a finding as to whether the IHA does, in fact, permit
domestic suppliers to provide certain remo te betting services that would otherwise be
prohibited by the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA."

5. Based on the plain findings of the Appellate Body, the United States submits that the only
substantive issue in this proceeding is whether th e United States can "demonstrate that the prohibition
embodied in the measures at issue applies to both foreign and domestic supplie rs of remote gambling
services, notwithstanding the IHA."
C. ANTIGUA FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE IHA RESULTS IN A REPEAL BY IMPLICATION OF THE WIRE
ACT
6. In the US First written submission, the United States addressed the key substantive issue in
this proceeding – in particular, the United States showed that under basic principles of US statutory
construction, the IHA does not exempt inters tate gambling on horse racing from the criminal
prohibition set out in the Wire Act. Antigua does not rebut, and in fact hardly even acknowledges, the
explanations set out in the US First written subm ission. Instead, Antigua presents a number of
arguments and assertions that provide no further support for its position.
7. First
, Antigua cites the initial section of the IHA, titled "Congressional findings and policy."
But, contrary to Antigua's implication, the IHA's statement of "findings and policy" is entirely
consistent with the pre-existing cr iminal provisions of the Wire Act. As the United States explained
in its First written submission, the Wire Act allows for interstate transmission of information assisting
in the placing of bets and wages . As the United States further explained, the purpose of the IHA was
to prevent the free-rider problem arising when OTB parlours benefit from a horse race in another
state. To address this problem, the IHA creates a sy stem of civil liability that encourages horse tracks
and OTB parlours to enter into revenue-sharing agreements.
8. The IHA's Congressional "findings and policy" are entirely consistent with the US description
of the IHA's purpose, and the "findings and policy" in no way indicate any intention to repeal any
federal criminal laws. In particular:
(a) The finding that "the States should have the primary
 responsibility for determining
what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders ," is a general
statement concerning gambling that is cons istent with the overall approach in the
United States of permitting the States in the first instance to decide many issues of
gambling within that State.
(b) The findings note that "the Federal Govern ment should prevent interference by one
State with the gambling policies of another, and should act to protect identifiable
national interests." This finding is consistent with the continued application of and
enforcement of a statute, such as the Wire Act, which represents an "identifiable
national interest."
(c) The findings note that "in the limited area of interstate off-track wagering on horse
races, there is a need for Federal action to ensure States will continue to cooperate
with one another in the acceptance of legal interstate wagers." This statement is again
limited to activity that is "legal" under ex isting law; the statement makes no reference
of any policy to legalize any form of in terstate gambling that was prohibited under

state or federal law. It is also a reference to the free-rider problem arising from off-
track betting parlours making use of horse races in other states.
(d) Finally, the Congressional policy statement provides that "It is the policy of the
Congress in this Act to regulate interstate commerce with respect to wagering on
horseracing, in order to further the horseracing and legal off-track betting industries
in the United States." This statement is again a reference to the free-rider problem
arising from off-track betting parlours making use of horse races in other states. And,
the statement makes no reference of any policy to legalize any form of interstate
gambling that was prohibited under state or federal law.
9. Second
, after reciting the Congressional findings and policy, Antigua then jumps to the
conclusion that the IHA "allows interstate horserace wagering between two states." But, once again,
Antigua fails to cite any provision of the IH A that purportedly grants such an "allowance ." Instead,
Antigua relies only on the IHA's definition of "interstate off track wager." The definitions in the IHA
are used only in the IHA itself, and do not amend de finitions provided in the Wire Act or any other
federal statute. Moreover, nowhere in the IHA doe s the statute provide that all transactions meeting
the definition of "interstate off-track wagers" are exempt from federal criminal laws.
10. Third, Antigua relies on the following statement from the IHA's legislative history: "While
this bill provides for the regulation by the Federa l Government of interstate wagering on horseracing,
there will be no Government enforcement of the la w. Any person accepting an interstate wager other
than in conformity with the Act will inst ead be civilly liable in a private action ." Aside from the
limits on the use of legislative history in interpretin g US statutes, that statement simply reflects that
the bill being considered was limited to providing for civil liability. Nothing in this Congressional
statement indicates the bill would exempt horse racing from criminal laws or even affect any other
law. Nor could legislative history have any effect on the enforcement of existing laws.
11. Fourth, Antigua claims that "the United States does not explain how or why the Wire Act
could allow for the prosecution of someone operati ng pursuant to the IHA." Once again, this
statement assumes the conclusion Antigua seeks – that the IHA is intended to "allow" certain types of
interstate activities. To the contrary, as the United States has explained, the IHA instead provides that
certain interstate activities result in civil liability in the absence of a revenue sharing agreement.
12. Fifth, Antigua relies on an article published in the Kentucky Law Journal. This article
provides no support for Antigua's legal position. As a preliminary matter, under the US legal system,
the fact that an argument is found in a law jour nal does not grant such argument any authority or
relevance on issues of statutory construction. More over, the article merely restates the same flawed
arguments relied upon by Antigua. Furthermore, the article is written by a law student (not even a
law professor), and the student thanks a national horse racing association for its "consultation and
extensive research." In short, a student-written not e prepared with the assistance of a US horseracing
association is not a persuasive source for construing the statutes at issue.
13. Sixth, Antigua – citing the Supreme Court decision in Posadas – argues that the United States
"ignored" one of the two prongs of implied preemption analysis. Antigua's argument is puzzling – the
US First written submission cites Posadas, and clearly addresses both of the prongs of implied
preemption. As the United States explained in its First written submission, there is no "repugnancy"
(or, as Antigua prefers to call it, "irreconcilable conf lict") between the IHA and the Wire Act. Rather,
both statutes operate in pursuit of their separate po licy goals – the Wire Act prohibits interstate
transmission of wagers, but allows gambling operators and horse tracks to engage in the transmission
of information assisting in the placing of wagers . The IHA, on the other hand, imposes civil liability
on gambling operators who fail to en ter into revenue-sharing agreements with horse tracks. Despite
Antigua's vigorous and repeated assertions, the statutes are not in conflict.

14. Finally
, Antigua relies on the judicial decisions in the Sterling case. Once again, Antigua
misreads the case – nowhere does either the trial court or the Appellate Court state that the IHA
provides an exemption from the Wire Act.
15. In an attempt to salvage its RICO claim, the plaintiff in Sterling argued that the defendant's
non-compliance with the IHA somehow resulted in a criminal violation. The Appellate Court
properly denied this argument: "A ppellant tells us that the IHA ma kes a dispositive difference. But,
we do not understand how this can be true. All available evidence indicates that Congress intended the
IHA to have purely civil consequences." Thus, no where did the Appellate Court find that the IHA
provides an exemption to the Wire Act. Moreove r, the statement that the IHA has "purely civil
consequences" directly contradicts Antigua's argu ment that the IHA provides an exemption to pre-
existing criminal laws.
16. In its Second written submission, Antigua shifts its reliance to the findings of the trial court.
As an initial matter, the United States notes that An tigua has no basis for relying on a trial court
decision where the Appellate Court in the same ca se addresses the same issue. Nonetheless, an
examination of the trial court decision shows that ev en the trial court did not support Antigua's view.
The plaintiff's argument was not that the IHA provide d an exemption to the Wire Act, but instead that
the violation of the IHA removed the activity from the scope of the Wire Act's provision allowing the
interstate transmission of information assisting
 in the placing of a bet or wager. Thus, contrary to
Antigua's arguments, the trial court never even c onsidered the proposition – as advocated by Antigua
– that the IHA resulted in a repeal by implication of the Wire Act.
D. ANTIGUA HAS FAILED TO REBUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SATISFIED THE DSU
ARTICLE 21.5 REQUIREMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF MEASURES TAKEN TO COMPLY
17. None of Antigua's arguments even touch on th e fundamental procedural dilemma presented
by its position: namely, how could the dispute be sensibly resolved if a responding Member is
precluded from presenting facts in an Article 21.5 pro ceeding in order to show that WTO-consistent
measures are, in fact, WTO consistent? When the measures at issue are WTO-consistent, further
dispute settlement proceedings – such as requests fo r suspension of concessions equal to the level of
nullification and impairment (which would necessarily be nonexistent) – would be without purpose.
And, given that recommendations and rulings of th e DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements, th e responding Member would have no clear path for
responding to an Article 21.5 finding, as adopted by the DSB, that the responding Member failed to
come into compliance.
18. Under the WTO dispute settlement system, DS B recommendations and rulings "shall be
aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement in acco rdance with the rights and obligations under [the
DSU] and the covered agreements." It is in the in terest of all parties involved to determine in the
Article 21.5 proceeding whether the measures at issue are – or are not – consistent with WTO
obligations.
1. The Complaining Member and the Responding Member are in fundamentally different
positions in Article 21.5 compliance proceedings
19. Antigua asserts that if the responding Member can attempt to meet a burden of proof for an
affirmative defence in an article 21.5 proceeding, then the complaining Member must likewise be
allowed to re-argue all of its failed claims of alleged violations. Antigua's argument is wrong – it fails
to take account of the fundamentally different positions of complaining a nd responding parties under
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.

20. Under Article 21 ("Surveillance of Implemen tation and Recommendations and Rulings") and
Article 22 ("Compensation and Suspension of C oncessions") the responding Member (known as the
"Member concerned") is in a special status. It is the Member concerned, and not any other Member,
that is called upon to comply with the DSB r ecommendations and rulings. In an Article 21.5
proceeding, the issue to be examin ed is the existence or consistenc y with a covered agreement of a
measure taken to comply by the Member concerned. And it is the Member concerned that, if it fails
to comply with the recommendations and rulings, could be subject under Article 22 to the suspension
of concessions.
21. The DSB's recommendations and rulings serve as in structions to the Member concerned with
regard to what is expected of that Member duri ng the compliance period. Article 21.1 reinforces that
it is essential for the effective r esolution of disputes under the DSU that there be prompt compliance
"with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. " Likewise, Article 21.3 requires the Member
concerned to state its intentions with respect to implementation of "the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB," and provides for a reasonable period of time in which to do so. Article 22 provides for
consequences where the Member concerned has not done so. In this context, it would not be
consistent with the scope of Article 21.5 to allow a complaining party in an Article 21.5 proceeding to
present new evidence on its prior, failed claims of WTO breaches, because those failed claims would
not have been included in the DSB recommendati ons and rulings. Thus, the Member concerned
would have had no basis for making any response to such failed claims during the compliance period,
and there would be no basis for finding that the Member concerned had failed to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings based on unsuccessful claims during the initial panel proceeding.
22. Unlike the scope of original panel proceedings , the scope of Article 21.5 proceedings is
limited. And in this dispute, the DSB recommenda tions and rulings were concerned with what the
United States has or has not "established" or "dem onstrated." For these reasons, Antigua is wrong in
asserting that the complaining Member and the responding Member must be placed in the exact same
position with regard to the opportunity for presen ting new evidence on issues where the burden of
proof was not met during the initial panel proceeding.
2. As compared to the panel proceeding, the compliance Panel has before it a much more
complete factual record concerning the relationship between the IHA and the Wire Act
23. As compared to the factual record in the panel proceeding, the current panel has before it a far
more complete factual record concerning the inte rrelationship under US law between the IHA and the
Wire Act. Antigua does not appear to dispute th at the record in the current proceeding is much
enhanced; rather, Antigua argues that the Panel must not examine the issue in light of this full factual
record.
24. The fact that the Panel now has a more complete factual record on this one issue is a result of
choices that Antigua made in its presentation in th e original panel proceeding. During the original
panel proceeding, even the identity and the scope of the measures at issue was subject to much
discussion. In fact, the panel report contains at l east 25 closely-reasoned pages addressed to this one
topic. And in several passages the panel highlighted the difficulties it faced. The Panel explained, for
example, that: "Antigua has consistently stated that it is wasteful and unnecessary to identify the
various domestic legislative provisions that will need to be brought into conformity with the GATS …
As is evident from the foregoing, the Panel has en countered significant difficulty in pin-pointing the
specific measures at issue in this dispute."
25. This dispute thus presents exceptional circumstances that, as a practical matter, meant that the
United States was not even able to identify which sp ecific measures were at issue in the dispute, let
alone develop a full factual record for every possibl e measure that might have been included in the
dispute on every issue that could have arisen under the Article XIV chapeau.

3. Antigua has no basis for implying a lack of good faith on behalf of the United States
26. In Part VI of its Second written submission, Antigua indicates "concerns" about whether the
United States has acted in good faith in the compliance phase of this dispute. Those concerns can be
summarized as follows: if the three federal statutes at issue are "the measures taken to comply" under
Article 21.5, why did the United States request a compliance period rather than immediately announce
compliance during the May 2005 meeting of the DSB?
27. The answer is simple: as Antigua itself con cedes, "an implementing Member should retain
the right to determine how to come into complian ce with recommendations and rulings of the DSB,
and further under certain circumstances an implemen ting Member may change its original opinion on
how to achieve compliance." For the United Stat es to seek a legislative change was entirely
reasonable and appropriate. Antigua had already made clear that it disagreed with the United States
on issues of statutory construction, and Antigua w as also unsatisfied with prior Executive Branch
statements regarding the relationship between the IHA and the Wire Act. Thus, a legislative change –
although not the only means of compliance – was perceived as a viable option for obtaining "a
satisfactory settlement of [this] matter" and the Un ited States needed to be sure that the reasonable
period of time did not foreclose pursuing this option.
28. Moreover, legislative action was not an unrealis tic option. As Antigua noted in its First
written submission, a bill to amend the Wire Act has been pending in the US Congress this term.
Under the United States legislative system, howev er, the Executive Branch does not control the
course of legislation. When the compliance pe riod came to its conclusion in April 2006, the
legislation to amend the Wire Act had not been adopted.
29. At that point, the United States had little choice but to rely on a different means of
compliance. Given that under fundamental US legal principles the IHA cannot provide any
exemptions from federal criminal statutes, and with the Department of Justice on record as
consistently and formally adopting this position, the United States could not agree that it was out of
compliance with its WTO obligations. And with th e legislative option not having come to pass, the
United States turned to the alternative means of clarifying the relationship between the IHA and the
Wire Act – a means which involves the elaboration and explanation of US legal principles and the
legislative history of the statutes at issue.
E. T
HE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2006 IS NOT WITHIN THE
PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
30. Part V.C of Antigua's Second written submissi on is addressed to the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), wh ich was signed into law on October 13, 2006,
approximately three months after the terms of refe rence for this panel were established. The UIGEA
does not amend any of the statutes at issue (that is, the IHA, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, or the
Illegal Gambling Business Act). Instead, the UI GEA prohibits certain financial transactions
associated with activities already deemed illegal under existing state or federal laws.
31. Given that the UIGEA did not exist when the te rms of reference were established, it is not
within the Panel's terms of reference. Nor does Antigua's panel request even refer to it. Although the
panel request mentions that various forms of legisl ation were under consideration in Congress, it does
not refer to the UIGEA nor request a finding regarding the UIGEA's WTO-consistency – nor could
Antigua possibly do so – since the UIGEA did not exist as a measure until it was signed into law on
October 13 (approximately 3 months after the date of Antigua's panel request).
32. Antigua asserts that the UIGEA is within the Pa nel's terms of reference, but the assertion is
baseless. Antigua does not even cite this Panel's actual terms of reference as set out in WT/DS285/19.

Instead, Antigua cites, without explanation, the Appellate Body report in US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada). That report, however, does not address which measures are within the terms
of reference of an Article 21.5 panel. Rather, as the Appellate Body explains, "Specifically, we must
consider whether and to what extent a panel acti ng pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU may assess a
measure that the implementing Member maintains is not "taken to comply", when the complaining
Member nevertheless identifies that measure in its request for recourse to an Article 21.5 panel and
raises claims against it ." In other words, there was no disagreement as to the existence of the
measure; the only question was whether the measure was "taken to comply."
33. The present situation is entirely different. Th e question is not about whether a particular
measure is "taken to comply." The question is whether a measure not in existence at the time of panel
establishment can nonetheless somehow be within the Pane l's terms of reference. There is no dispute
that the measure did not exist when the Panel was established. Past reports have already addressed
the question of whether a measure not yet in existe nce when a panel is established can be within the
panel's terms of referenc e, and have concluded that such a me asure cannot be within the terms of
reference. The UIGEA was enacted after the da te of panel establishment and thus, unlike the
additional measure in US – Softwood Lumber IV , was not identified in the request for recourse to an
Article 21.5 panel. In sum, the UIGEA is not within the Panel's terms of reference.

ANNEX D

ORAL STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES AT THE
SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL

Contents Page
Annex D-1 Opening Statement by Antigua and Barbuda (27 November 2006) –
Executive Summary
D-2
Annex D-2 Opening Statement by the United States (27 November 2006) –
Executive Summary
D-6
Annex D-3 Closing Statement by Antigua and Barbuda (28 November 2006) D-10

ANNEX D-1

OPENING STATEMENT BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
(27 NOVEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. T
HE UNITED STATES WAS FOUND OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE GATS
1. The starting point here is that three federal st atutes were found by the Panel and the Appellate
Body to be contrary to Article XVI of the GATS. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body found that
the United States was not entitled to the affirmative defence of GATS Article XIV. That is why the
Appellate Body recommended that the DSB "request the United States to bring its measures, found in
this Report and in the Panel Report as modified by th is Report to be inconsistent with the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement."
B. THE UNITED STATES HAS DONE NOTHING
2. There is complete agreement that the United States has done nothing since the adoption of the
DSB rulings to come into compliance with them. Yet, the United States would ask this Panel to
declare the United States in compliance with the DSB rulings, based upon the exact same laws, facts
and circumstances as were present – and argued by th e United States – in the original proceeding and
rejected by both the Panel and the Appellate Body.
C. NO SECOND CHANCES
3. In the face of all contrary WTO law and jurisp rudence, the United States asserts it is entitled
to try and meet its burden of proof on the chapeau this time around. The DSU does in fact contain a
firm basis for Antigua's "second chance theory" – and that is Article 17.14 of the DSU. There is no
ambiguity in that provision. The DSB did not recommend to the United States that it do a better job
convincing the Panel and the Appellate Body a second time around. There is no
 authority supporting
the US position in this proceeding. The US pos ition, if were accepted, would make a complete
mockery and farce of the DSB and the object and pu rpose of dispute resolution at the World Trade
Organisation. Therefore, the enquiry must end here . To take it any further will be to distort the DSU
beyond all reason and set a devastating and outrage ous precedent. The United States has done nothing
at all to come into compliance with the DSB ru lings and therefore must be found to be out of
compliance with them.
D. NO "SPECIAL STATUS"
4. Antigua would like to respond to the claim of th e United States that it is somehow entitled to
"special status" in an Article 21.5 proceeding. The theory advanced by the United States is that the
responding party in a 21.5 proceeding has the sole and exclusive right to reargue its failed case before
the panel because the recommendations and rulings of the DSB only relate to the case as initially
proven by the complaining party. This twisted logic not only has no basis under the DSU or WTO
jurisprudence, but in fact is contrary to both. Ther e is nothing in Article 21 of the DSU to support this
claim by the United States for "special status."
E. EVEN A "SECOND CHANCE" THE UNITED STATES LOSES
5. Were the Panel to give the United States its "second chance," nonetheless the United States
fails. If the United States wants to revisit the issue of the IHA and the chapeau of Article XIV, then it
must at the very least be forced to revisit it in w hole, not just in selective parts. The conclusion that
the IHA permits wagering on a remote basis, is supported by the plain language of the IHA, our

evidence and discussion on the proper interpretati on of statutes in seeming conflict, legal
commentary, the courts, and the facts on the ground.
F. THE IHA/WIRE ACT ISSUE
6. The United States relies on its selective use of cases and arguments on "repeal by implication"
to attempt to prove that the IHA does not permit remote gambling. Antigua's view on this legal
analysis is different. While the United States assigns no weight to the opinion of a "mere" law student
that supports Antigua's reading of the two statut es, it glaringly overlooks a legal opinion of the
Attorney General of Maryland that expressly supports Antigua's position as well. A review of the US
submissions shows no one supporting its position on the issue. And, again, the one court case
considering the two statutes together supports Antigua 's interpretation of what the IHA allows. Under
these circumstances alone, it would be impossible to conclude that the United States had met its
burden of proof of establishing that the IHA is non-discriminatory.
G. THE REALITY
7. As we know, the United States asserted in the original proceeding that all remote gambling
was prohibited in America. That is just not true. It is obvious that a healthy, sanctioned domestic
remote gambling industry exists in the United States.
H. THE NEW LEGISLATION AND THE IHA
8. The new US legislation – the so-called "Unl awful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006" – has made it crystal clear that the IHA perm its remote gambling on horse racing in the United
States.
I. THE UNITED STATES LOSES IN A FULL REASSESSMENT OF THE CHAPEAU
9. The United States considers its "second chance" onl y open to a limited review of the IHA and
the chapeau of GATS Article XIV. Why this would be the case is a mystery. Even were the "second
chance" to be limited to a review of the chapeau, there is no reason why a full reconsideration of the
chapeau should not take place. Surely in the game of "second chances" there could be no prejudice in
allowing both sides the opportunity to supplement the eviden ce in this regard. Obviously, we believe
that a full and complete assessment of the IHA and remote gambling and betting service providers
operating under it unmistakeably establishes that sanc tioned, domestic remote gambling exists in the
United States. Furthermore, not only does the express language of the Wire Act not prohibit all
domestic remote gambling, but indeed there is c onsiderable sanctioned domestic remote gambling in
the United States now in addition to the activities under the IHA. And, particularly in light of
favoured, domestic-only carve-outs in the new federal statute, this can only be expected to continue to
grow.
10. The Wire Act does not
 prohibit remote gambling, but in fact only prohibits (or restricts)
cross-border gambling. Thus, all American states are free under the Wire Act to offer virtually
unlimited remote gambling solely within their own borders. Obviously, if the "remoteness" of the
services is their vice, the fact that the services do or do not cross a state or international border is
irrelevant. If the United States was concerned about the "remoteness" of the services, then the Wire
Act would reflect that. However, the Wire Act, on its face, absolutely does not prohibit remote
gambling that does not cross a state or international border.
11. In light of the express language of the Wire Act, the new federal legislation and ample
evidence of sanctioned, domestic remote gambling in the United States it is impossible for the United

States to assert that it enforces or applies its laws in anything but a discriminatory fashion – contrary
to its commitments under the GATS and in clear conflict with the chapeau of GATS Article XIV.
J. G
OOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
12. We feel it fair and appropriate to point out what we consider to be unfair dealings on the part
of the United States and demand that these factors be considered by the Panel in assessing the relative
merits of the parties in this proceeding. At the very least, we are owed a reasonable explanation for
the contortions of the previous year and a half. And the proffered explanation – that the WTO was
wrong and the United States was right – is per se unreasonable. The unreasonableness of the US
position is underscored by the United States' admission that from the very beginning, it simply
believed the WTO to be wrong. It further claims that it had
 been considering a legislative option, but
as the Congress never acted, it "had but little choice to rely on a different means of compliance." Yet
we observe that no legislation was ever introduced into the Congress that would have brought the
United States into compliance had it been adopted . Although, as it explained during the course of the
Article 21.3 proceeding, part of the role of the US TR is to suggest legislation to the Congress and
seek its introduction and approval, the USTR certainly did not do so in this case.
K. OTHER ISSUES
13. If the United States is to get its "second chance, " then the Panel should revisit the issue of
reasonably available alternatives. In addition to those things that we asserted in the original
proceeding – such as our own regulatory scheme, the regulatory schemes of other countries and the
willingness of our operators to use agents such as t hose used by lotteries in the United States to sign
up and qualify consumers – there are other alternatives to consider, including:
(a) Existing state regulatory schemes for remote gambling under the IHA;
(b) Other analogous regulatory schemes such as those for sales of alcoholic beverages;
and
(c) New age, identity and location technologies that are available and in use.
14. With respect to whether the new US legislation is within the Panel's terms of reference, one
need only look as far as WTO jurisprude nce – such as the panel decision in Australia – Salmon – to
conclude that it is. We did our best to anticipate whatever form the anticipat ed American legislation
might take. We monitored the legislation throug hout the process, referring to whatever was then
pending or adopted in our request for consultations, in our Panel request and then, in some detail, in
our First written submission in this proceeding. And, of course, in our Second written submission we
discussed the legislation as finally adopted and approved.
15. There are additional criteria that should be app lied by a panel to determine whether or not it
may also examine other measures. Some measures with a particularly close relationship to the
declared "measure taken to comply", and to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, may also
be susceptible to review by a panel acting under DS U Article 21.5. Determining whether this is the
case requires a panel to scrutinize these relationships, which may, depending on the particular facts,
call for an examination of the timing, nature, and ef fects of the various measures. This also requires
an Article 21.5 panel to examine the factual and le gal background against which a declared ‘measure
taken to comply' is adopted. Only then is a panel in a position to take a view as to whether there are
sufficiently close links for it to characterize such an other measur e as one "taken to comply" and,
consequently, to assess its consistency with the covered agreements in an Article 21.5 proceeding.

16. As the final legislation adopted by the American Congress, following a number of introduced
bills and permutations; as the only legislation adopted by the Congress dealing expressly with remote
gambling since the adoption of the DSB rulings; and as it is patently trade discriminatory, the new
legislation fits squarely within the doctrine so ably elucidated by the panel in Australia – Salmon.
17. The attempt of the United States to preclude cons ideration by the Panel of this legislation
because it was not described in our Panel request in its form as finally adopted should receive no
consideration here at all.
18. While it is obvious why the United States wants to exclude this regressive legislation from the
ambit of the Panel, it is very relevant, and very he lpful, in an analysis of the status of American
compliance with the DSB rulings. For if it does not hing else, this new legislation serves well to
highlight the trade discriminatory approach of th e United States when it comes to the remote supply
of gambling and betting services.
L. C
ONCLUSIONS
19. The United States has done nothing to come in to compliance with the DSB rulings. It has
used and arguably abused the WTO dispute resoluti on system to gain time and advantage in a manner
and under circumstances most certainly not anticipat ed nor contemplated by the DSU–or consistent
with the fair and prompt resolution of trade di sputes. In the meantime, it has aggressively been
prosecuting and persecuting licensed Antiguan opera tors and working hard to destroy the non-
domestic industry.
20. What a terrible precedent it would set were the US approach to prevail. Every losing party
seeking delay and advantage would simply wait for a 21.5 proceeding to re-litigate its case. Although
the United States may not like the DSB rulings in our case, the fact is that they are what they are.
What good is a system where a loser decides on its own which judgements are correct and which are
not? Neither the United States nor any other implem enting Member can cherrypick the good from the
bad. All of us, the United States included, need to bear the responsibilities associated with a fair and
transparent dispute resolution process.
21. In conclusion, we respectfully ask that Panel to find the United States has not complied with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this matter, that you find that the federal statutes at
issue remain in violation of Article XVI of the GATS without meeting the requirements of
Article XIV and that you recommend that the DSB re quest the United States to bring its laws into
conformity with its obligations under the covered agreements.

ANNEX D-2

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
(27 NOVEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The United States will address both elements of the DSU Article 21.5 disagreement: that is,
the existence
 of measures taken to co mply, and the consistency of such measures with a covered
agreement. But before doing so, the United States needs to emphasize the last part of the phrase that
sets out the matter to be covered in an Article 21.5 proceeding; namely, the measure to be examined is
the measure taken to comply with "the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB." Thus, under the
DSU, the starting point in any analysis must be the specific recommendations and rulings in the
dispute.
2. In this dispute, the recommendations and rulings are unusual, due to the combination of two
factors: (i) the limited nature of the factual record, and (ii) the fact that when an affirmative defense is
involved, the responding party has the burden of proof to show that the affirmative defense applies.
In this dispute, the Appellate Body found that th e US measures at issue provisionally fell within the
scope of an exception to Article XIV of the GATS, namely, the exception for measures "necessary to
protect public morals or maintain public order" under paragraph (a) of Article XIV.
3. The Appellate Body, quoting the original pane l, explained the serious nature of those
concerns regarding public morals and public order: "[T]he United States has legitimate specific
concerns with respect to money laundering, fraud, health and underage gambling that are specific to
the remote supply of gambling and betting services, which suggests that the measures in question are
‘necessary' within the meaning of Article XIV(a)."
4. The chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS pr ovides that when a measures falls within
Article XIV(a), "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
of such measures," subject only to the provisos set out in the chapeau. In this dispute, due to the
limited nature of the factual record, the Appellate Body finding on the Article XIV chapeau is
unusual. On the one hand, due to the limits in the factual record, the Appellate Body was not able to
conclude that with respect to one limited area involving horseracing, the United States had met its
burden of showing that the US measures at issue me t one proviso of the Article XIV chapeau. But on
the other hand, and again because the record was limite d, the Appellate Body specifically noted that it
could not
 conclude that the US measures did not meet the proviso. Since the responding party has the
burden of showing the applicability of an affirmat ive defence, the result of the Appellate Body's
finding was the issuance of recommendations and rulings with respect to measures that may, or may
not be, consistent with the covered agreements.
5. The Appellate Body found that the only rema ining issue regarding the applicability of
Article XIV is whether the US prohibition embodied in the measures at issue ap plies to both foreign
and domestic suppliers of remote gambling services, notwithstanding the Interstate Horseracing Act
("IHA"). This basic question involves a question of fact concerning US law.
6. Under US law, the starting point of statutory cons truction is the text of the statute. In this
case, nothing in the text of the IHA indicates any intention to serve as an across-the-board permission
for gambling on horse racing, nor to serve as an exemption from criminal laws. To be sure, Antigua
vigorously asserts that the IHA "allows" certain activ ities. Remarkably, however, Antigua never cites
the specific text of the IHA which supposedly accomplishes such an exemption from other civil or
criminal laws.

7. Antigua appears to place its reliance on a si ngle definition contained in the IHA. This
reliance, however, is misplaced. The definitions in the IHA are used only in the IHA itself, and do not
amend definitions provided in the Wire Act or any other federal statute. Moreover, nowhere in the
IHA does the statute provide that all transactions meeting the definition of an "interstate off-track
wager" are exempt from federal criminal laws.
8. Antigua also appears to rely on an excepti onal doctrine of US law known as "repeal by
implication." However, "repeals by implication" are extraordinary, and nothing in the IHA could
amount to a repeal by implication of the Wire Act. As the United States Supreme Court explained:
"It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeal s by implication are not favored ... . There must
be 'a positive repugnancy' between the provisions of the new law and those of the old ... ." There
simply is not, as Antigua asserts, any "repugnancy" or "irreconcilable conflict" between the Wire Act
and the IHA. To the contrary, the original legisl ative history of the Wire Act noted that a gambling
operation in one state could offer betting on horse races held in another state – so long as the bet or
wager did not cross state lines. And, the IHA fits with the Wire Act by creating a civil liability
scheme to address the free-rider problem created by this type of interstate gambling on horse racing.
Each scheme – the Wire Act's prohibition on inters tate transmission of wa gers – and the IHA's
requirement for revenue sharing agreements – ha s its own purpose and effect, and there is no
repugnancy between the statutes.
9. Finally, Antigua has relied on a legislative cha nge in 2000 to the IHA's definition of the term
"interstate off-track wager." Antigua, however, does not explain how the change in a single definition
creates a "repugnancy" between the two statutes. In fact, the amendment can be seen as closing a
loophole in the implementation of the IHA's goa l of enforcing revenue-sharing between betting
operators and racetracks.
10. Antigua's second main argument is that even if the United States has made its showing
 that
the IHA does not limit the Wire Act, Antigua must nonetheless prevail under the "existence"
requirement of DSU Article 21.5. The United States submits that in the particular circumstances of
this case, Antigua's argument is without any basis.
11. The overarching point is that compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings must
depend on the specific findings of the Appellate Body in this di spute. In this dispute, the Appellate
Body noted that neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body itself had found that the US measures were
out of compliance. The United States submits that under these unusual circumstances, it is
appropriate for the statutes at issue to be the "measures taken to comply."
12. The US view is much narrower than Antigua has painted it. The United States is not
"rearguing" any point of law or factual finding actually made by the Panel or Appellate Body; instead,
we are introducing new factual evidence to show that the US measures are, in fact, consistent with
the GATS.
13. In the circumstances of the present dispute, Article 22.5 must be construed to allow for the
measures at issue to be the "measures taken to comp ly." If not, the application of the DSU to such
circumstances could lead to absurd results. The pr oblem is that unless the measures in dispute are the
"measures taken to comply," the responding party would be required under DSU Article 21 to enact
new measures when it was already in compliance with its obligations. This result would be
inconsistent with the DSU, because Article 3.2 of the DSU explicitly provides that recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot "add to or dimini sh the rights and obligations under the covered
agreements." This fundamental principle is so importa nt that it is restated in Article 19.2 of the DSU,
covering panel and Appellate Body recommendations. So, if – as the United States believes it has
shown on a full factual record – it was entitled to ma intain the Wire Act's criminal prohibitions under
the Article XIV exception, that right cannot be di minished by any DSB recommendations and rulings.

To the contrary, the United States has that right under Article XIV both before, and after, the DSB
recommendations and rulings. The means to avoid su ch conflict with Article 3.2 is clear: in these
circumstances, the measure examin ed in the original proceeding must be the "measure taken to
comply" under DSU Article 21.5.
14. Antigua asserts that the finding in EC – Bed Linen must apply both ways: that is, if the
responding Member can attempt to meet a burden of proof for an affirmative defense in an
Article 21.5 proceeding, then the complaining Member must likewise be allowed to re-argue all of its
failed claims of alleged violations. Antigua's argu ment is wrong, because it fails to take account of
the fundamentally different positions of complain ing and responding parties under Articles 21 and 22
of the DSU. Under the DSU, it is the responding party (known as "the Member concerned"), and not
any other Member, that is called upon to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The
DSB's recommendations and rulings serve as instructi ons to the Member concerned with regard to
what is expected of that Member during the comp liance period. In this context, it would not be
consistent with the scope of Article 21.5 to allow a complaining party in an Article 21.5 proceeding to
present new evidence on its prior, failed claims of WTO breaches, because those failed claims would
not have been included in the DSB recommendations and rulings.
15. Finally, in its Second written submission, An tigua wrongly argues that the new Internet
gambling legislation enacted in October of this year , after the terms of reference for this proceeding
were established, is within the terms of reference of this proceeding. The new legislation does not
amend any of the measures at issue. Moreover, this new measure was not covered in Antigua's
recourse to Article 21.5, nor could it be, since the measure did not exist when Antigua requested this
proceeding. In these circumstan ces, the new measures cannot be within the Panel's terms of
reference.
16. Antigua's assertion to the contrary has no basis. Antigua's only explanation is a reference,
without explanation, to the Appellate Body report in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 –
 Canada), which Antigua has quoted from at length this morning. That report, however, does not
address which measures are within the terms of reference of an Article 21.5 panel. Rather, the issue
in that dispute was whether a measure that was men tioned in the request for recourse to a panel was a
measure "taken to comply" under the terms of Article 21.5.
17. The present situation is entirely different. The question is not about whether the new Internet
gambling law is a measure "taken to comply." The question is whether a measure not in existence at
the time of panel establishment can nonetheless somehow be within the Panel's terms of reference.
Past reports have already addressed the question of whether a measure not yet in existence when a
panel is established can be within the panel's terms of reference, and have concluded that such a
measure cannot be within the terms of reference.
18. At this time, the United States will also respond to two issues raised by Antigua in its opening
statement. First, Antigua calls attention to a Ma ryland Attorney General's opinion cited in a footnote
to its First written submission. This opinion suffers from the same defects as Antigua's arguments and
as the student-written note upon which Antigua relies; namely, the opinion simply asserts – without
analysis – that the very existen ce of the IHA must provide an exemption from federal criminal laws.
As the United States has explained, this is simply wrong under fundamental US principles of statutory
construction. Moreover, the opinions expressed by State officials have no role in the construction of a
federal statute.
19. Second, Antigua's opening statement calls into question the good faith of the United States.
Antigua uses phrases such as "prevarication," "intent of doing nothing," "blatant dissembling," and
"cynical attempt." There is no basis for this t ype of name calling in this dispute. During the
Article 21.3 proceeding, the United States was very clear on its view of the US law and on the means

of compliance. In particular, we explained that we viewed the US statutes as not containing any
exemption for IHA activities, and that the US measures thus met the requirements of the Article XIV
chapeau and were consistent with US GATS obl igations. The United States further sought a
reasonable period of time to allow for a legislative clarification that would show that the statutes were,
in fact, as the United States described them. The United States did not assert that legislation was the
only possible means of compliance. We also emphasized the difficulty involved in passing
legislation, including that such legislation was not in the control of USTR or the Executive Branch as
a whole. The fact that such legislation was not adopted during the reasonable period of time in no
way indicates that the United States was not acting in good faith. It simply shows – as the United
States explained in the Article 21.3 proceeding – that a clarification through legislation was indeed
difficult.

ANNEX D-3

CLOSING STATEMENT BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
(28 NOVEMBER 2006)

1. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Panel, we would like to thank you for your participation in
this process. I for one have enjoyed the sessions a nd your very insightful questions. It is always
much more enjoyable and interesting when questions are asked and dialogue engaged in. I think the
questions have done much to clarify the issues and develop the enquiry.
2. I would like to quickly review some of the impor tant points in this case, most of which we
have discussed at some length, but I think important to highlight. First
, it is our view that the deciding
issue here is simple. The United States has done nothing to comply with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB. And, having done nothi ng, must be found out of compliance. This is,
we believe, where the Panel should end its enquiry.
3. Second
, the entire remaining body of issues that have been raised here come into
consideration only should the Panel decide to give the Unite d States the "second chance" to meet its
burden of proof under GATS Article XIV. We th ink that Article 17.14 of the DSU and related
jurisprudence is absolutely clear on this matter – the United States is not entitled to a second chance.
Like the rest of us, having agreed to follow a nd be bound by this dispute resolution process, the
United States must live with the decisions, both for good and for bad.
4. We observe that this is not a case where the panel and the Appellate Body made a clearly
wrong decision and it would be inequitable for the United States have to comply with an unjust
decision. For, as we know, the United States does not prohibit remote gambling at all. What it
prohibits is all remote gambling from other countri es. And some domestic remote gambling, but in
most cases only if it crosses a state or international boundary.
5. Here I would like to add that we agree whol ly with the European Communities, Japan and
China on the issue of second chances – however we fi nd ourselves in a difficult spot here – for if the
United States can get a second chance, so indeed should we.
6. Third
, were the United States to get a second chance, it cannot limit the enquiry to the issues
it would like to focus on. At the very least, the enquiry should go to the United States burden of proof
on the entire chapeau and, as we said yesterday, there is really no logical reason why all of GATS
Article XIV should not then be on the plate. The United States wants to direct the Panel's attention
solely to the IHA and at that, solely to this "repeal by implication" issue. And while we believe that
even on this narrow issue the United States fares poorly, it is obvious why they want to do so –
because the reality of remote gambling in the Unit ed States makes their claim of no discrimination
impossible, ludicrous even.
7. Fourth, it is important to realise, as the Appella te Body noted in paragraph 349, that the
United States chapeau claim was based on the premise that it prohibits all remote gambling,
regardless of source. Fifth , although the Appellate Body clearly missed it, in fact the Wire Act itself
is facially discriminatory, completely omitting in tra-state remote gambling from its coverage. The
IHA is too, of course, only allowing states to participate in its scheme.
8. Sixth, we have shown, with overw helming and un-controverted evidence that, no matter what
the Department of Justice may say to the contrary , a significant, entrenched, state-sanctioned remote
gambling industry exists in the United States, out in the open and free from prosecution. While the
Department of Justice has told us that the lack of prosecution of operators in the United States should

not be viewed with any significance, when you consid er that the Department of Justice has seen fit to
allocate its scarce prosecutorial resources to the pro secution of Antiguan operators – including at least
two significant federal prosecutions this year alone–these statements of the Department of Justice ring
pretty hollow.
9. Seventh
, any doubt as to the discriminatory effect of America's law and practice was resolved
by the new prohibition law. Given a chance to come into compliance w ith the DSB rulings, the
American Congress chose instead to move in the opposite direction, adopting a baldly protectionist
law, further institutionalising its discrimination when it comes to remote gambling services.
10. Eighth, undoubtedly, what the United States has deci ded in this case is that it must be right
and the WTO and Antigua must be wrong. After th e Appellate Body decision, the United States had
one of two choices – grant Antiguan service providers market access or ensure that, as it had
represented to the panel and the Appellate Body, all domestic remote gambling is prohibited just as
are foreign services.
11. Ninth, the United States has done neither of these th ings. Therefore, the United States simply
remains out of compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this matter. The
United States has effectively and unjustifiably bou ght itself well over a year of additional time to
prosecute and persecute Antiguan service providers . If the United States remains committed to the
WTO and the dispute resolution system process, it is time for the United States to make serious efforts
towards compliance. We respect fully request that this Panel confirm the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in this case, and further request the United States to bring its offending laws into
compliance with the GATS.
12. Thank you very much.

ANNEX E

ORAL STATEMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES AT THE
SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL

Contents Page
Annex E-1 Oral Statement by China (28 November 2006) E-2
Annex E-2 Oral Statement by the European Communities (28 November 2006)
– Executive Summary
E-4
Annex E-3 Oral Statement by Japan (28 November 2006) – Executive
Summary
E-7

ANNEX E-1

ORAL STATEMENT BY CHINA
(28 NOVEMBER 2006)

1. Notwithstanding China did not submit a written s ubmission to the Panel, China would like to
emphasize its systematic interests in this disput e regarding whether the United States has brought its
measures into compliance with the DSB's recomme ndations and rulings as required by WTO rules,
including the disciplines mandated under the DSU.
2. To begin with, China would focus the following four issues which China believes of critical
importance for this Panel to take into consideration in these proceedings:
(a) whether the "old" measures in the original proceedings could be the "measures taken
to comply" under Article 21.5 of the DSU;
(b) whether a second chance is permitted under th e DSU and could be presented with the
defending party even in the case of affirmative defence;
(c) whether the DOJ Statement could be cons trued as "measure taken to comply" under
Article 21.5 of the DSU;
(d) whether an appropriate weight should be given to the Article 21.3 arbitration
proceeding.
3. As to the first issue, China notes that the Unite d States argues that the "old" measures, i.e. the
Wire Act, Travel Act, and IGBA , are the "measure taken to comply" under Article 21.5 of the DSU
and therefore the United States is exempted from taking any other new measures in implementing the
DSB's recommendations and rulings. China cannot ag ree in this regard. The plain language in
Article 21.5 stipulates that "measures taken to comply" should be to comply with the
recommendations and rulings. Hence, there s hould be a time sequence between the DSB's
recommendations and rulings and the "measures taken to comply". This view has also been confirmed
by the WTO jurisprudence among which the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp case ruled that "Article
21.5 proceedings involve, in principle, not the or iginal measure, but rather a new and different
measure which was not before the original panel."
4. The second issue is to some extent interrelated with the first issue. The United States thinks
that the Article XIV chapeau of GATS involves an affirmative defen ce, and since the Appellate Body
only ruled that the United States has not demons trated that the alleged measures are applied
consistently with the requirements of the chapeau of GATS Article XIV, the US views that it only
needs to meet the requirement of burden of proof in this affirmative defen ce which it has missed in
the original proceeding. The critical question here is whether a second chance is permitted under the
DSU and could be presented with the defending party even in the case of affirmative defence. In this
regard, China is of the view that the United States' argument of a second chance could not be justified.
5. In China's view, the United States could not be justified by both the plain reading of
Article 17.14 of the DSU and the WTO jurispruden ce. Article 17.14 of the DSU stipulates that an
Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DS B and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute. Both the words "shall" and "unconditionally" indicates that the discipline under Article 17.14
is of mandatory nature. China cannot see any reas on why this mandatory discipline would permit the
parties to the dispute to have a second chance to re-c laim or re-defend what has already settled by the
Appellate Body. In EC-Bed Linen (Article 21.5- India)
 case, the Appellate Body confirmed the above

understanding. However, China notes that in its Fi rst written submission, the United States submits
that Antigua erroneously relies on the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen and that since this
proceeding involves so-called "affirmative defence", the defending party should be entitled to the
privilege in taking advantage of a second chance. China cannot share such an argument. China
believes that for both parties, neither of them sh ould be required to bear the consequences of a
deficient claims or defences in the original proceedings. It would be unbalanced where the affirmative
defence is involved, the complaining party would do nothing but undertake the adverse effect as a
result of the defending party's deficiency even in the case of affirmative defence.
6. The third issue is whether the DOJ Statemen t could be construed as "measure taken to
comply" under Article 21.5 of the DSU. In both th e request for the establishment of a panel and the
First written submission, Antigua argues that th e DOJ Statement could not be a "measure" for
purposes of the DSU. By simply stating that the "old" measures in the orig inal proceeding are the
"measure taken to comply", it is interesting that the United States seems unwilling to rebut Antigua's
argument. Instead, the United States argues that it is not its position to claim that the DOJ Statement is
a separate measure, or that the United States will rely entirely on that statement to make its showing
that the IHA does not exempt gambling on horse racing from federal criminal statutes. China recalls
that the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5-Canada) ruled that what is a
"measure taken to comply" in a given case is not determined exclusively by the implementing
Member, nor by the complaining Member, but is a matter for judicial review. Therefore, China thinks
that this issue is left for this panel to make a conclusion as to whether the DOJ Statement could be
construed as "measure taken to comply" for the reas on that it is a matter for judicial review. While
China shares the view with Japan that as shown by the plain language of relevant WTO Agreements
and considerable WTO jurisprudence, Members en joy discretion to shape the "measures taken to
comply", China would like to ask this panel to be cautious in making findings on this issue. What
concerns China is that, in the event this panel c oncludes that the DOJ Statements could be "measure
taken to comply" for the purpose of Article 21.5 of DSU, could a defending party be considered as
having implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in such a way by simply putting forward
statements by administrative employees?
7. The fourth issue is a systematic and complicated one with regard to whether an appropriate
weight should be given to the Article 21.3 arbitr ation proceeding. China would like to thank the
contribution of both the panel and the parties to this dispute in making available the records during the
Article 21.3 proceeding to the third parties. It is a sy stematic issue because as an integral part of the
whole WTO dispute settlement procedure, an approp riate weight should be given to the Article 21.3
arbitration proceeding. It is a complicated issue beca use to what extent the weight should be given to
the Article 21.3 proceeding, neither the text of the DSU nor the WTO jurisprudence can provide clear
and direct guidance. Members enjoy a broad discreti on to shape the "measures taken to comply", and
China agrees that the intention or statement to act in a specific way to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings presented during the Artic le 21.3 proceeding could not be construed as
legally binding upon the implementing party. On th e other hand, the DSU also provides for the basic
principle of good faith under Article 3.10. China observes that, the implementing party could not be
regarded as in good faith by presen ting the complexity of the measure purported to be taken in order
to justify longer reasonable period of time, while after the expiration of the reasonable period, it
choose to do nothing at all. China is of the view that proper balance should be evaluated between the
discretion of an implementing member to shape the "measures taken to comply" and the principle of
good faith, and appropriate weight should be given to the Article 21.3 arbitration proceeding in this
dispute.
8. Mr. Chairman, this concludes China's oral statement. Thank you for your attention.

ANNEX E-2
ORAL STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(28 NOVEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. The EC decided to intervene in this compliance proceeding because of its systemic interest in
the DSU, and in particular in the correct interpre tation of Article 21.5 thereof. In its Third party
written submission of 23 October 2006 the EC addressed four matters arising from the parties' First
written submission. The EC confirms herewith its written submission in its entirety. In its oral
statement the EC wishes to make additional comment s relating to the four subject matters addressed
in its Third party written submission, arising from the parties' Second written submission.
2. Before doing so the EC wishes to comment on a pr ocedural matter that has recently arisen.
As far as the EC understands, the Pa nel has informed the parties of its intention to request the record
of arbitration of the Article 21.3(c) proceedings. The European Communities agrees with this request.
B. MEASURES TO BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY
3. The parties continue to disagree on the precise content of the rulings and recommendations of
the DSB in relation to the original dispute. The Un ited States holds to the view that the disputed
measures that were the subject of the original proceedings are WTO-consistent. This is obviously
closely linked with the United States' view that it can have a second try at proving its case under the
chapeau of Article XIV GATS. The EC will provide further comments on this matter shortly, in its
additional comments on questions relating to res judicata. Nevertheless, the EC finds it important to
recall from the outset that both the original panel report and the Appellate Body report unequivocally
concluded that the United States had acted inconsis tently with its obligations under the GATS (see
Appellate Body report, paras. 265; 296-299; 323-327, 368). Further, the Appellate Body
recommended that the DSB request the United States to bring its measures, fo und to be inconsistent
with the GATS, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement (para. 374).
C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLIANCE REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU
4. The parties disagree as to whether the 'Unlawfu l Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006'
comes within this Panel's scope of review. The US argument that the UIGEA is not mentioned in the
terms of reference for this Panel is not dispositiv e of this issue. As outlined in the EC's written
submission, the case law confirms that the scope of jurisdiction of a compliance panel is determined
not only through the terms of reference for the Panel, but also through Article 21.5 DSU.
D. COMPLIANCE REVIEW AND THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ADOPTED PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY
REPORTS (QUESTIONS RELATED TO RES JUDICATA)
5. Among the most important issues this Panel will have to address is whether parties are
entitled to re-litigate issues ruled upon in the original proceedings. As outlined by the EC in its written
submission, the Appellate Body has unequivocally and consistently held that as a matter of principle,
Article 21.5 proceedings cannot be used by parties to re-litigate issues that have been ruled upon in
the original proceedings and contained in reports a dopted by the DSB. The Appellate Body arrived at
this conclusion on the basis of Article 17.14 DSU, which instructs parties to "unconditionally" accept

reports adopted by the DSB. Consequently, this Pa nel should firmly decline any attempt by either
party to reopen issues that have been settled in adopted reports relating to the original proceedings.
6. In its First written submission Antigua attempte d to reopen the debate on an issue that has
been ruled upon the original proceeding and containe d in the reports adopted by the DSB: namely,
whether the United States had provisionally justifie d the three criminal law statutes at issue under the
general exception of "necessity" circumscribed in Article XIV(a) GATS. For the reasons set out in its
written submission, the EC takes the view that this Panel should decline to do so. In its Second
written submission Antigua has clarified that its qu est for a reopening of the debate on Article XIV
(a) should be viewed in conditional terms: should th is Panel allow the United States to reopen debate
on whether the prohibitions contained in the thr ee criminal law statutes at issue are applied
consistently with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV, Antigua should in turn be allowed
to make further submissions on whether the dis puted measures are justified as necessary. This
however, as Antigua concedes, this would not be sustainable in view of the res judicata principle.
The EC agrees.
7. In its written submission the EC also addresses whether Antigua could be allowed to present
fresh evidence before this compliance panel in relation to a matter ruled upon in the original
proceedings. The EC submitted that two hypotheses n eeded to be distinguished: firstly, where a new
measure was brought before the panel; secondly, wh ere no new measure is brought. In relation to the
first hypothesis the EC generally holds the view that if there is a new measure before a compliance
panel, this entails the emergence of new factual circumstances and thus a broad right to bring new
claims, arguments and factual circumstances against the new measure and all its elements. The second
hypothesis, however, presents more difficult system ic questions. As outlined in the EC's written
submission, the DSU contains no rules on the admi ssion of fresh evidence in compliance proceedings
where no new measures have been presented. Further, allowing admission of fresh evidence in such a
hypothesis may be regarded as undermining the res judicata principle.
8. In its Second written submission Antigua has now substantially softened its submission
pertaining to fresh evidence. It alludes to "cha nged circumstances and developments that justify
submission of new evidence", without, however, spelling out what these new circumstances and
developments are. There is therefore no reason, acco rding to the EC, for this Panel to take the issue
of alleged fresh evidence any further or to en ter into the systemic debate of the second
aforementioned hypothesis referred to above.
9. The United States has made various submissions in support of its position that it should in
these compliance proceedings, receive a second chan ce at attempting to meet its burden of proof
under the chapeau of Article XIV GATS.
10. The United States now contends that there is no rule in the DSU that bars a responding party
from re-litigating issues, and affirms that it would be inconsistent with the goal of the DSU, for this
Panel not to allow the United States to reargue its burden of proof under the chapeau of Article XIV
GATS. For the reasons outlined by the EC in it s written submission, the United States is clearly
wrong on the point of principle: i.e., the finality of panel and Appellate Body findings contained in
reports adopted by the DSU, which derives from Article 17.14 DSU.
11. In its First written submission the United Stat es drew an unpersuasive distinction between
"claims" and "affirmative defences" for the purposes of the application of the res judicata principle. In
its Second written submission the United States amplif ies this, contending that a complaining and a
responding Member are in fundamentally different pos itions before a compliance panel, which in its
view, has certain implications for the application of the res judicata principle. Accordingly, because
of its "special status" a responding Member should be allowed to meet its burden of proof a second
time around in these proceedings; a complaining Member , by contrast, according to the United States,

should not be allowed to reargue its case in an Article 21.5 Proceeding. For the reasons outlined by
the EC this line of argumentation must fa il. The Appellate Body's jurisprudence on res judicata is
motivated by the need to treat all parties in DSU pr oceedings on an equal footing. The EC refers in
particular to the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 96.
E. R
EPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THE ARTICLE 21.3 PHASE OF THE ORAL PROCEEDINGS
12. As outlined by the EC in its written submission, in the particular circumstances of this case
the United States should provide a cogent explanation of why it takes the view now that contrary to
earlier assertions it does not need to enact fresh legislation to comply with the DSB's rules and
recommendations. In its Second written submission the United States has now provided some
explanation, conceding that the legislative action which it had in mind "did not come to pass" and that
it therefore had little choice "but to rely on a diffe rent means of compliance". However, the EC takes
the view that this purported different means of compliance is still nothing more than an attempt by the
United States at rearguing its burden of proof under the chapeau of Article XIV GATS. The
explanation which the United States has provided in its Second written submission does not absolve it
from its obligation under the DSU to bring the WTO-inconsistent measures into conformity.
13. Apart from the res judicata principle, it is important to recall that in the original proceedings
it was confirmed that a Presidential statement attach ed to a US federal statute was insufficient to
resolve the noted ambiguity between the various acts. For this reason the United States submitted
before the Arbitrator that a Presi dential Executive Order would not be sufficient to bring its measures
into conformity. It must be doubtful therefore whet her the additional explanations provided by the
United States in its written or oral submissions before this Panel on the interaction between the
different federal statutes could provide the requisite clarification to resolve this matter.
F. C
ONCLUSION
14. This Panel should confirm the findings and conclusions of the original report, as modified by
the Appellate Body report.

ANNEX E-3

ORAL STATEMENT BY JAPAN
(28 NOVEMBER 2006) – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. Japan participates as a third party because of its systemic interest in the proper functioning of
the DSU – in particular, the proper role of Article 21.5 compliance panels, a nd would like to briefly
address, in light of the Antigua and US Second wr itten submissions, three issues concerning the role
of Article 21.5 compliance panels under the DSU:
(a) whether the DSU permits a defending Me mber a "second chance" to argue the
substance of the underlying dispute before an Article 21.5 compliance panel;
(b) whether a defending Member's "successful demonstration" before an Article 21.5
compliance panel that a challenged measure is WTO-consistent can be deemed a
"measure taken to comply," or whether some independent measure is required; and
(c) whether the new US internet gambling la w, enacted after the request for the
establishment of this Panel, is properly within the terms of reference.
B. NO "SECOND CHANCE" BEFORE THE 21.5 PANEL
2. The Appellate Body has conclusively ruled in this case that the United States failed to
discharge its burden to demonstrate that the challenged measures satisfy the requirements of the
chapeau to GATS Article XIV. The US Second written submission dismisses Antigua's argument that
the United States is not entitled to a "second chance" to argue its position on the merits before this
Article 21.5 Panel. But a precedent seems to support Antigua's position with respect to GATS
Article XIV consistency with the measures at issu e in light of the IHA. The Appellate Body
established in the EC – Bed Linen case that there is no "second chance" for a defending Member to
use the compliance phase to try to cure deficiencies in its original presentation before the panel and
Appellate Body. Consistent with the rule of fi nality, a compliance proceeding should not be the
forum to supplement the arguments on the substan tive matters that were already reviewed at the
original proceeding.
3. The plain language and structure of the DSU also support this conclusion. Each phase of the
dispute settlement process has a distinct purpose assigned by the DSU, and the text of Article 21.5
demonstrates that the purpose of compliance panels is to determine if a new measure complies with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB ("DSB rulings").
4. Japan thus respectfully submits that this Panel must identify and assess some new US
measure taken to comply with the DSB rulings. New arguments presented during the compliance
phase that attempt to reopen the underlying dispute are irrelevant.
C. A
RGUMENTS ARE NOT "MEASURES TAKEN TO COMPLY"
5. The second issue we would like to address is rela ted to the first. The United States in its
Second written submission appears to ask this Pane l to find that the United States has "successfully
demonstrated," during this compliance phase, that its domestic laws subject to the underlying DSB
rulings do meet the test in the GATS Article XI V chapeau. However, the US claimed "successful
demonstration" is an argument concerning the consistency of domestic US laws with GATS

Article XIV, hence it would not be considered a "measure taken to comply" for purposes of
Article 21.5. Both the GATS itself and WTO juri sprudence impose the minimum requirement that a
"measure" be some independent act of the Member. There is no question that Members enjoy broad
discretion in determining what type of independent measure to take in attempting to comply with DSB
rulings. The United States is therefore not necessarily locked into a legislative action, yet there must
be some independent act taken for the purpose of the Article 21.5 compliance panel. During this
phase of the proceeding, the United States has an ob ligation to clearly demonstrate how it carried out
an independent act to comply with the DSB rulings.
D. T
HE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
6. Finally, we would like to provide our view of th e Panel's terms of reference as they relate to
the new US legislation, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, which was enacted
after the Panel was established. Antigua and the United States in their Second written submissions
differ on whether this law falls under the Panel's terms of reference.
7. First, in this case, Antigua's request for the establishment of a panel referred to the proposed
legislation. Antigua cites two cases – Australia – Salmon and US – Softwood Lumber – which it
claims support its view that the new US law falls with in this Panel's terms of reference. Japan notes
that the panel in Australia-Salmon, in analyzing whether certain me asures were within its terms of
reference, applied an "adequate notice" analysis. In this analysis, the panel concluded that certain new
measures were within the terms of reference because they were so closely related to the specifically
challenged measures that Australia could reasonably be found to have received "adequate notice" of
the scope of Canada's claims. According to this analysis, it seems that the Panel would be able to
conclude that the new US law was so closely rela ted to the measures challenged by Antigua that the
United States had "adequate notice" that this comp liance proceeding encompasses it. The fact that
Antigua described the US legislative proposals in its request to establish this Panel makes this
argument even stronger.
8. Second, we would also like to direct the Panel's attention to the decision of the Article 21.5
panel in Australia – Automotive Leather . That panel examined whether it had authority to review a
measure identified by the United States in its reque st for establishment of the panel, but Australia
claimed that was not relevant. Rejecting Australia's attempt to construe the panel's terms of reference
so narrowly, the panel concluded that the ne w measure identified by the United States was
"inextricably linked" to the steps taken by Australia in response to the DSB rulings, in terms of its
timing and its nature, hence within the panel's term s of reference. The present case also seems to
concern an "inextricable linkage" between the proposed legislation referenced in Antigua's request for
the establishment of this Panel and the legislation ultimately enacted.
9. Third, the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber fully embraced and applied the
principles of Australia – Automotive Leather concerning a panel's power to determine the scope of its
own mandate in an Article 21.5 proceeding, and to ok a view that an Article 21.5 panel has broad
power to determine what measures are properly before it, and which of them, if any, achieve
compliance with DSB rulings.
10. Fourth, the United States stres ses in its Second written submi ssion that the new law is not
covered by the terms of reference because it was enac ted later than the request establishing the panel.
However, Japan notes that the relevant jurisprude nce does not necessarily mandate this conclusion.
The recent decision of the Appellate Body in EC – Customs Matters explains that there are situations
in which a panel is authorized to review measur es enacted after a panel is established where the
"essence" of the identified measure is reflected in the new measure. Further, the recent analysis by
Article 21.5 panel, such as in Australia – Salmon , suggests that the measures to be considered in the
21.5 panel proceeding should be based on the unique circumstances of each case. Timing is not

necessarily conclusive because it could be anticipated at the time of the request for establishment of
this Panel that the legislative proposals described by Antigua would soon be enacted into law.
11. Consistent with the recent analysis of the Appellate Body in EC – Customs Matters , and in
the specific context of Article 21.5, the panel in Australia-Salmon noted that measures taken after the
establishment of an Article 21.5 panel should not automatically be excluded from the panel's mandate,
and depending on the case, there may be compelli ng reasons to examine measures introduced during
the proceedings. Japan is therefore of the view th at the particular situation of each case should be
taken into account in assessing the terms of reference of the panel.

ANNEX F

REPLIES BY THE PARTIES AND THIRD PARTIES
TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL

Contents Page
Annex F-1 Replies by Antigua and Barbuda to questions posed by the Panel
(8 December 2006)
F-2
Annex F-2 Replies by the United States to questions posed by the Panel
(8 December 2006)
F-15
Annex F-3 Replies by China to questions posed by the Panel
(8 December 2006)
F-38
Annex F-4 Replies by the European Communities to questions posed by the
Panel (8 December 2006)
F-42
Annex F-5 Replies by Japan to questions posed by the Panel
(8 December 2006)
F-55

ANNEX F-1

REPLIES BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(8 DECEMBER 2006)

[Question 1 (US)]

Question 2 (ANT, US): Must "measures taken to comply" with a DSB recommendation, as used
in Article 21.5 of the DSU, be more recent than the original proceeding? Please explain in terms
of the rule of interpretation in Article 31 and, if appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, please address the following:

1. As a general proposition, there must be some
 action subsequent to the adoption of a DSB
recommendation in order for there to be a "measure taken to comply" for purposes of Article 21.5 of
the DSU. Pursuant to the general rule of interp retation provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, the terms "measures taken to comply" must be interpreted in accordance with their
ordinary meaning, in their context and in the li ght of the DSU's object and purpose. That context
includes, inter alia, the DSU's text, its preamble and, above all, the other provisions of Article 21.
Article 21 sets out a system for "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings."
The basic rationale underlying the system of Article 21 is clearly set out in its first paragraph:
"Prompt compliance with recommendations or ruling s of the DSB is essentia l in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." Article 21 further contains a number
of mechanisms to achieve that objective of compliance:
(a) If prompt compliance is "impracticable," the implementing Member can request a
reasonable period of time pursuant to Article 21.3.
(b) The DSB keeps the implementation pr ocess under surveillance pursuant to
Article 21.6, which provides that the im plementing Member must report on "its
progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings."
(c) If there is disagreement as to the existen ce or consistency of measures taken to
comply, the issue can be addressed via an Article 21.5 proceeding.
2. The system of "surveillance of implementation" of Article 21 is clearly based on the
supposition that the implementing Member must do something, namely, take one or more new
measures to comply. If the implementing Member could comply merely by referring to a measure that
already existed at the time of the original proceed ing, this would make the surveillance procedure of
Article 21 meaningless. There would be no need to request a reasonable period of time and there
would be no "implementation process" for the DSB to keep under surveillance and "progress" for the
implementing Member to report on. Because Article 21.5 of the DSU is part of this surveillance
system, the terms "measures taken to comply" must be interpreted in light of their immediate context,
which clearly points towards new measures, specifically taken to comply with the DSB
recommendation.
3. In this respect it should be noted (pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention) that the
primary objectives of the negotiators of the DSU were (i) to strengthen the dispute settlement process
and, (ii), more specifically, "the developmen t of adequate arrangements for overseeing and
monitoring of the procedures that would fac ilitate compliance with adopted recommendations."
1 This

confirms that it is a fundamental principle of the DSU that adopted recommendations must be
implemented and that the procedure of Article 21.5 is intended to decide on whether or not there has
been implementation. The procedure of Article 21. 5 is not intended to give a responding party a
"second chance" to argue that it was already in compliance at the time of the original proceeding.
4. This interpretation has been confirmed by the Appellate Body, most notably in Canada –
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) where it said:
"Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the
WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those ‘measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings' of the DSB. In our view, the phrase
‘measures taken to comply' refers to measu res which have been, or which should be,
adopted by a Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB. In principle, a measure which has been ‘taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings' of the DSB will not be the same measure as the
measure which was the subject of the original dispute, so that, in principle, there
would be two separate and distinct measures: the original measure which gave rise
to the recommendations and rulings of th e DSB, and the ‘measures taken to comply'
which are – or should be – adopted to implement those recommendations and
rulings."2

Sub-question (a): Does the word "measures" h ave the same meaning as when used in
Article 4.2 and 4.4, Article 6.2 and elsewhere of the DSU?

5. Yes. There is no basis either in the text or ot herwise for any difference in the meaning of the
word in the various places in which it is used in the DSU. Because a term must be interpreted in light
of the text of the treaty of which it forms a part, a term will normally have the same meaning when it
is used in different provisions of the same treaty. In Antigua's view that would only be different if the
treaty itself clarified that the same term is used with different meanings. In its report in this dispute the
Appellate Body clearly stated that "the DSU a nd the GATS focus on 'measures' as the subject of a
challenge in WTO dispute settlement" 3 and that a distinction has to be made between "measures" and
their effects. 4 Therefore, when assessing "the existence (…) of measures taken to comply," a
compliance panel must focus on the existence of an "instrument containing rules or norms" 5 that was
"taken to comply." A compliance panel cannot find the implementing Member to be compliant on the
basis of the effect of a measure that already existed at the time of the original proceeding.
Sub-question (b): Does the word "taken" imply a positive action? Please note that the
Spanish version reads "medidas ‘destinadas' a cumplir"

6. "Take" is a verb and in virtually every usage in the dictionary involves active, rather than
passive, activity.
6
 The word "taken" in Article 21.5 of the DS U, interpreted in light of the context of
Article 21 as a whole, implies a positive action in that it requires the implementing Member to do
something (as explained above). That interpretation is confirmed by the Spanish text which refers to

2 Appellate Body report on Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 36 (emphasis in original).
3 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 123.
4 Id., para. 122.
5 Appellate Body report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 81-82, 88.
6 "Take." Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.0.1). Random House, Inc. 05 Dec. 2006. <Dictionary.com
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/take> Of 83 different usages of "take" as a verb with an object in the
cited source, just a handful are passive, and generally invo lve the receipt of informati on, visually or otherwise,
such as "to take at his word" or to "take a joke."

measures intended to achieve compliance. This necessarily implies that the implementing Member
takes a measure, following the recommendations of the DSB.
Sub-question (c): Does the measure need to be specifically aimed at the issue addressed
by the DSB recommendation?

7. This would normally be the case. However, it may be possible – although perhaps unlikely –
that an implementing Member takes a new measure that (i) is aimed at another issue than the one
addressed by the DSB recommendation, but (ii) nevertheless has the effect of achieving compliance.
[Questions 3, 4, 5 (US)]

Question 6 (ANT, US): Article 17 of the DSU grants an opportunity for a respondent to obtain
review of aspects of a Panel report by means of an appeal. If that appeal does not succeed,
aren't the findings in the Appellate Body report then final in accordance with Article 17.14?

8. Once a panel report or an Appellate Body repor t is adopted by the DSB, under Article 17.14
of the DSU, the report is "unconditionally accepted by th e parties to the dispute." This rule has been
consistently interpreted by the Appellate Body to provide for the finality of Appellate Body reports, as
well as the finality of panel reports that are not a ppealed. Although the doctrine has been articulated
on a number of occasions
7, it has been most comprehensively delineated in EC – Bed Linen (Article
21.5 – India),8 which has been discussed in written submissions by Antigua 9 as well as the European
Communities10 and Japan.11 This doctrine has never been reject ed and continues to be relied upon by
panels operating under Article 21.5 of the DSU.12
9. As a general proposition, all judicial or other dispute resolution systems require a concept of
finality of the process at some stage. For exampl e, under United States law, a dispute in the federal
court system is finally resolved upon determ ination of the United States Supreme Court. 13 Under the
legal system of Antigua, a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council marks the final end
of a dispute.14 The need for finality in any system is w ithout real question. Article 17.14 of the DSU
incorporates this concept into dispute resolution at the WTO.

7 See, e.g., Appellate Body report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) , paras. 89-96; Appellate
Body report on Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), paras. 78-79.
8 Appellate Body report on EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 90-97.
9 First written submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda ,
WT/DS285 (25 September 2006) (the "AB First Submission"), para.32; Rebuttal submission of Antigua and
Barbuda, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda , WT/DS285 (30 October 2006) (the "AB Second
written submission"), paras. 24-28.
10 Third party submission of the European Communities, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda ,
WT/DS285 (23 October 2006), paras. 42-47.
11 Third party submission of Japan, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda , WT/DS285 (23
October 2006), paras. 7-15.
12 See, e.g. Panel report on United States – Oil Country Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina) ,
paras. 7.93-7.94.
13 U . S . C O N S T . a r t . I I I ; L . R a t n e r , Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 160 (1960).
14 Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order 1981, Chapter IX, Section 122, Para. 1.

Question 7 (ANT, US): Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a
defence is rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the
same, i.e. the defence fails?

10. This issue has been definitively r esolved by the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen (Article
21.5 – India) as well, where the question was taken square on. The Appellate Body held that there was
no difference whether a claim failed for failure to establish a prima facie case or whether it was
rejected after a full hearing.
15
[Questions 8, 9, 10 (US)]

Question 11 (ANT, US): Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body
report "shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties", absolute? For example, would it
apply where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a
report exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

11. Antigua agrees with the comments in this regard made by the representative of China at the
Panel's session with the third parties held on 28 Nove mber 2006. At that meeting, China indicated in
the context of Article 19.2 of the DSU that the provision should be viewed as a directive aimed at the
Appellate Body in conducting its re view and making its determinations, rather than some stand-alone
doctrine. Article 17.6 of the DSU is best viewed in that light as well, although Article 17.6 can also
be seen as a directive to the parties to an appeal themselves.
12. The real problem with any other approach is that who
 is to make a "determination" that (i) "a
recommendation with inconsistent w ith Article 19.2" or (ii) "a re port exceeded the scope set out in
Article 17.6?" To the extent that such a determination can be made at all, under the DSU, this
function can only be exercised by the DSB pursuant to Article 17.14. Obviously, it cannot be for a
party to a dispute to unilaterally
 determine whether a report of the Appellate Body that has been
adopted by the DSB has been determined correctly and in compliance with the DSU.
13. In a case of an Appellate Body report that was cl early wrong to such a material respect that a
party to a dispute felt the report should not be adopted by the DSB, Article 17.14 of the DSU would
appear to give the party the ability to address th e DSB on the issue and to convince the DSB not to
adopt the offending report by consensus. Although Antigua is unaware of this ever occurring since
the inception of the WTO in 1995, it does
 appear to be possible under a literal reading of
Article 17.14.
[Question 12 (US)]

Question 13 (ANT): Please refer to Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU. In your view, do these
provisions grant a special status to the im plementing Member? For example, do DSB
recommendations and the procedures for surveill ance of their implementation focus on the
respondent rather than the complainant, so th at the respondent knows what aspects of a
measure it is required to modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, and protect the
respondent from having to face a second claim with respect to the same aspect?

14. Antigua does not believe that any of these provisions (or any other DSU provision, for that
matter) accord an implementing Member any "special status." As the complaining party, and the
party entitled to the benefit of compliance, if any pa rty is entitled to "special status" logically it would
be the complaining party. One of the main con cerns of the drafters of the DSU was to ensure

15 Appellate Body report on EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 96.

effective implementation (see the response to Question 2 above). It is that
 concern that is at the basis
of provisions of Articles 19 and 21. Not some desire to protect the implementing Member.
15. That being said, there are clearly certain provisions that focus on the implementing Member,
such as Article 19.1 of the DSU and Article 21.3. Because it is the implementing Member that must
do the complying, it follows that it will be the s ubject of some focus during the compliance process.
As far as knowing "what aspects of a measure it is required to modify to comply with a DSB
recommendation," under Article 19.1 of the DSU a pane l or the Appellate Body may make a direct
suggestion as to how recommendations may be implemen ted. In practice, such suggestions are the
exception,
16 and in the rare instances where given, the panel or the Appellate Body are clear and
specific on what the recommendations are.17
16. In the vast majority of cases, implementing Members are generally left to determine
themselves how to comply with a recommendation. 18 However, as a general proposition when a
measure is found to be contrary to a Member's obligations under a covered agreement, the offending
measure is expected to be withdrawn:
"In the absence of a mutually agreed solu tion, the first objective of the dispute
settlement mechanism is usually to secure th e withdrawal of the measures concerned
if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements."19
17. This should not be difficult in most cases wh ere a measure is found inconsistent with a
covered agreement, as both the measure and the natu re of its inconsistency will be identified and
determined in the course of the proceeding, just as was the case in the original proceeding in this
matter.
18. Antigua does not see anything in the DSU, nor in any related jurisprudence, that is directed
towards protecting an implementing Member from "from having to face a second claim with respect
to the same aspect," and, were that to be the case, there is nothing in this proceeding to which such a
doctrine might be relevant.
[Questions 14 and 15 (US)]

Question 16 (ANT, US): What authority does the DSU grant the Appellate Body to extend an
invitation to a Member to demonstrate a point after the conclusion of an appeal? (US FWS §44)
How would such an invitation affect the recomm endation by the DSB? Why did the Appellate
Body not expressly suggest ways in which the U.S. could implement the recommendations?

19. Antigua submits that the DSU does not grant any such authority. Nor did the Appellate Body
extend such an "invitation" to the United States in this matter. To do so would be contrary to
Article 17.14 of the DSU, as that article clearly anti cipates that the adoption of a final report by the
DSB will result in the end of the matter–and the DS U itself does not provide for any further level of
appeal, or remand procedure, that would provide any forum for such a "demonstration." Such an
invitation would be illogical.

16 Panel report on Korea – Certain Paper, paras. 9.1-9.4.
17 S ee, e.g ., Panel report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , paras. 6.155-6.158; Panel
report on Guatemala – Cement I, para. 8.6; Panel report on US – Cotton Yarn, para. 8.5.
18 Panel report on US – Steel Plate, para. 8.8.
19 DSU Article 3.7. See also Panel report on US – FSC II (Article 21.5 – EC) , para. 7.26; Panel report
on Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, fn. 381.

20. While the Appellate Body (or the panel, for th at matter) could have suggested one or more
methods of compliance pursuant to Article 19.1 of th e DSU, neither chose to do so for reasons that
Antigua has no knowledge of.
[Questions 17 and 18 (US)]

Question 19 (ANT, US): If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a
defence would the compliance panel make its ass essment on the basis of evidence presented in
the compliance proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

21. This is a particularly hypothetical questi on, as no WTO dispute resolution case has ever
allowed a "second chance" to a respondent or to a complainant on any issue. That being said, Antigua
can see no reason why evidence from the "original go -round" should not be up for consideration as
well as new evidence under such a circumstance.
Question 20 (ANT): If a respondent had suffici ent evidence to demonstrate in a compliance
proceeding that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the
compliance panel denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would
this require a respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

22. Antigua would expect a Member under such circum stances to have raised the issue with the
DSB at the time of the adoption of the applicable Appellate Body report. In the absence of such an
action, once a report is adopted by the DSB, it has to be implemented. In the absence of
implementation, the complainant must be allowed to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 22 of
the DSU. Any "new" or "sufficient" evidence cannot lead to a modification of the original report.
Therefore, such evidence can play no role in pro ceedings under Article 21 or 22 of the DSU because
these are exclusively related to the implementa tion of the DSB recommendations resulting from the
original panel and Appellate Body proceedings.
23. If the non-implementing Member takes the view that (i) it has collected better evidence or (ii)
circumstances have changed, and it now meets th e conditions of the general exception clause, it can
discuss this with the complainant. If the complainant agrees with that analysis, it should withdraw its
suspension measures in accordance with Article 22.8 of the DSU. If the complainant does not agree
and keeps its suspension measures in place, the respondent in the original proceeding can start a new
dispute settlement case against the original complain ant for violation of Article 22.8 of the DSU (as
has happened in EC - Hormones ). The "new evidence" or the "n ew circumstances" can then be
assessed in this new dispute settlement case. This appr oach is fully compatible with Article 17.14 of
the DSU.
Question 21 (ANT): If a respondent were not entitled to a "second chance", would this be
reasonable in a hypothetical case after a comp lex original dispute that presented numerous
novel issues, especially if the dispute involved an under-resourced respondent who was
unfamiliar with WTO dispute settlement?

24. As a general proposition, disput e settlement has developed in a more formalistic way than
Antigua (and probably many other developing countries) would like to see. A good example from this
case is the fact that the original Panel and the Appe llate Body insisted that Antigua not just identify
but also comprehensively discuss hundreds of speci fic United States "measures" in a very complex
and opaque federal system of govern ment, despite the fact that th e United States had confirmed on
numerous occasions – including in front of the DSB – that it prohibited the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services from Antigua to consumer s in the United States. Another example is
the fact it was only in the report of the Appellate Body that it was clarified that, when a respondent
invokes a general exemption clause, it is the compla inant that has to put forward less restrictive

alternatives. As a minimum, parties to a legal pro ceeding should be told the rules on evidence before
or during a procedure – and not afterwards. Th ese remarks have, however, no immediate bearing on
this compliance proceeding. Rather, Antigua makes these points to demonstrat e that the problem of
the capability of under-resourced developing countries is a much broader one than the issue of giving
them a "second chance" in a compliance proceeding.
25. That being said, Antigua agrees with the Eur opean Communities in this respect, and expects
that each party to a dispute advance its best possibl e case and bear the consequences. That is truly a
hallmark of virtually every legal system, where the participants themselves bear the responsibility for
the quality and prosecution of their cases. If, as no doubt happens frequently, such a result ends in
injustice or a faulty result it is unfortunate, but to distort the dispute resolution process itself to
accommodate such a circumstance would be appalling. If a need exists to change the system, then that
is for the Members to decide and to remedy as a systemic issue.
26. Just as it is clear from Article 17.14 of the DSU that an Appellate Body report adopted by the
DSB is final and binding on the parties, it is just as clear in Article 21.5 that the role of a compliance
panel is limited to – notwithstanding how broad ma y be their scope of examination in the process –
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. To do otherwise, including to give the
implementing Member a "second chance" to establish their case-in-chief, would be manifestly outside
the scope of the compliance panel's authority.
[Question 22 (US)]

Question 23 (ANT): How does Antigua's case co ncerning the Interstate Horseracing Act relate
specifically to the Illegal Gambling Business Act? Please note that the IGBA refers to State laws
but not to other federal laws, such as the Wire Act.

27. Antigua's "case" on the Interstate Horseracing Act is simply that it permits domestic interstate
remote gambling on horse racing in the United States, as well as regulating certain aspects of
intrastate
 remote gambling on horse racing when the appli cable race takes place in another state. By
the express terms of the IHA, the activity must be lawful in each state where it takes place, so per se
the IGBA would not come into play with respect to activity coming within the scope of the IHA.
Operators who offer horse racing services under the auspices of the state laws and regulations of the
state in which they operate are immune from IG BA prosecutions, because, to establish an IGBA
violation, the government must establish as a "predicate offence" that the defendant has violated state
gambling law. In simple terms, the IHA is an in tegral component of United States federal and state
law that collectively permit domestic remote gambli ng operators to offer services without risk of
criminal prosecution under the IGBA. Antiguan ope rators who offer the same services, on the other
hand, are generally subject to prosecution under the IGBA due to the IHA's discriminatory treatment
of foreign operators.
[Questions 24 and 25 (US)]

Question 26 (ANT, US): Does the fact that statemen ts are made in the context of Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU require that they be given different weight from that accorded to any other
statements of a party concerning an issue in dispute?

28. The fact that express representations were ma de by the United States to the WTO-appointed
arbitrator, as well as to Antigua, during the course of the arbitration in this matter under Article 21.3
of the DSU should be accorded substantial weight by this Panel in a ssessing the United States'
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In particular, Articles 21.3 and 21.5
are both part of the implementation surveillance system of the DSU and accordingly, statements made
in the Article 21.3 context should be given special we ight. These are not just statements made in a

random context – rather, they are statements made in the very specific context of the implementation
surveillance system. If a WTO Member were able to change its position randomly or without
justification when going through the implementati on surveillance process, this would make the entire
process a futile exercise.
29. With this in mind, the representations should be accorded substantial weight in assessing the
claim of the United States that its original measu res have been in compliance from the beginning of
the process, without need for any further action on the part of the United States. As the United States
had conceded, as well as argued, that legislative action of some type was necessary for the United
States to comply with the DSB rulings, the fact that it now comes before this Panel having done
nothing but nonetheless asserting compliance should serve as probative evidence that the United
States is not in compliance.
30. The statements should be accorded substantial we ight by virtue of being made, and repeated,
by the United States during the course of dispute resolution proceedings. As the panel in United
States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 concluded in assessing the consequence of
representations regarding domestic law made by th e United States to the panel during the course of
the dispute:
 "We are equally satisfied, as a matter of fact, that the statements made to us were intended to
be part of the record in the full knowledge and understanding that they could, as any other
official submission, be made part of our Repor t; that they were made with the intention not
only that we rely on them but also that the EC and the third parties to the dispute as well as all
Members of the DSB – effectively all WTO Members – place reliance on them."20

31. Antigua agrees with the European Communities th at such solemn representations by a party
to a dispute cannot for ever be held to them, but if a party is to change its position it must provide a
reasonable explanation to all concerned as to why its position has changed and what its justification is.
Again, Antigua agrees with the European Communities that the American argument that it has been in
compliance all along is per se unreasonable.
[Questions 27 to 31 (US)]

Question 32: Please refer to the States' laws and regulations on account wagering "under the
auspices of the IHA" provided by Antigua (Exhibits AB-34 to AB-51), as well as State licences
to specific operators among the information on particular operators (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73).

Sub-question (a) (ANT): Do these laws and licences purport to permit wagering under
certain conditions that would otherwise violate the Wire Act, the Travel Act or the
Interstate Gambling Business Act? If so, how is this related to the operation of the
IHA?

32. This question illustrates the difficulty in sep arating United States law from practice that
Antigua has (by and large unsuccessfully) raised througho ut the course of this dispute. Indeed, this
difficulty is one of the primary reasons why Antig ua argued that the United States' own admission as
to its prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services such as those provided
from Antigua – combined with its enforcement effort s in that regard – should of itself have been
capable of assessment by the original panel in the underlying proceeding. The reality is that the text
of the United States' laws do not necessarily suppor t the United States government's interpretations of
them, nor are the laws of the various states consistent in their reference or interaction with federal law.

20 Panel report on US – Section 301, para. 7.124 (emphasis added).

33. To the extent that these state laws authorise remote gambling within state boundaries, they are
not contrary to the Wire Act or any of the other fe deral legislation. To the extent that they permit
remote gambling that crosses a state border, then they arguably might violate either the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, the IGBA or two or more of them. W ith respect to the Wire Act, the United States takes
the position that the Wire Act prohibits all betti ng that crosses a state or international border,
regardless of whether the betting is otherwise legal in both jurisdictions, and that Section 1084(b) of
the Wire Act applies only to "information" pertai ning to betting and not to actual bets or wagers
themselves.
21 Outside the context of the IHA, this pos ition is consistent with the decision of the
United States federal appellate court in the United States v. Cohen case.22
34. Thus, to the extent any of these state laws allow a bet to cross a state line, that law would be
contrary to the Wire Act under the reading given it by the United States, but for the application of the
IHA. Of the 18 states that currently allow remote gambling on horse racing, the laws of eight of them
expressly permit remote wagering under certain circum stances where the punter is located in a state
other than that in which the gambling service provider is located.
23
35. Under the view that the IHA pe rmits interstate remote wage ring as long as the conduct is
legal in both states, neither the Travel Act nor the IGBA would have application, as the conduct
would not violate state law, nor would it (in the context of the Travel Act) violate any federal law.
Sub-question (b) (ANT): Some of these laws and regulations do not refer to the IHA,
some relate to wagering not only on horseracing but also on other sports such as
greyhound racing, some allow wagers placed from foreign jurisdictions, and all apply to
intrastate wagering. To what extent th en do these laws depend on some authority
granted by the IHA?

36. As noted above, to the extent they sanction wholly-intrastate remote gambling, the state
statutes do not need the IHA to be lawful. Under the United States' reading of the Wire Act, all states
must rely on the IHA to the extent they permit the re mote wagers to cross state borders. Interestingly,
some of the state laws appear to be structured to attempt to bring themsel ves within the scope of
Section 1084(b) of the Wire Act, notwithstanding th e position of the United States and the decision of
the court in the Cohen case. For example, the California advance deposit wagering statute clearly
appears to be viewed this way, with the "entity hol ding the account" of the punter be considered to be
making the wager "pursuant to wagering instructions issued by the owner of the funds communicated
by telephone call or through other electronic media."
24 Under this approach, the IHA would arguably
not be necessary to legitimise the conduct and the wagering would not necessarily have to be limited
to horse racing contests.
[Sub-questions (c) and (d) (US)]

Question 33 (ANT, US): Does the IHA only allo w domestic suppliers to operate wagering
services on horseracing, or can foreign suppliers in some way operate under its auspices? If

21 First written submission of the United States, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda ,
WT/DS285 (16 October 2006), para. 8.
22 United States of America v. Jay Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002).
23 These states are California, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon and Wyoming.
WEST'S ANN.CAL.BUS.&PROF.CODE § 19604 [Exhibit AB-34 ]; IDAHO CODE §54-2512 [Exhibit AB-
36];KY.REV.STAT.ANN.§§230.777(2) [Exhibit AB-37 ]; LA.ADMIN.CODE tit. 35, pt. XIII, § 12003(A)
[Exhibit AB-38 ]; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 09, § 10.04.24(C)(2) [Exhibit AB-39 ]; NEV. GAM. REG. 26C.160
[Exhibit AB-41 ]; OR. ADMIN. R. 462-210-0020 to -0030 [Exhibit AB-47 ]; WYO. RULES & REG. DEP'T
COMMERCE, PC Ch. 9, § 2 [Exhibit AB-51].
24 WEST'S ANN. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 19604(b). See Exhibit AB-34.

Antiguan operators entered into revenue-sharing arrangements with racetracks, would they still
be liable to prosecution?

37. As Antigua pointed out in its First written submission,
25 the express language of the IHA
permits cross-border wagering only between states – thus, Antigua could not qualify under its terms
regardless of whether its operators entered into agreements with the tracks or not.
[Question 34 (US)]

Question 35: Regarding Youbet.com, TVG, Xp ressBet.com, Capital OTB and the other U.S.
domestic operations described by Antigua (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73):

Sub-question (a) (ANT): Do they engage in any form of wagering other than pari-
mutuel wagering on horseracing?

38. To Antigua's knowledge, of the referenced co mpanies, only one – "US Off-Track" – allows
betting on a sport other than horse racing.
26 While the favouritism shown for horse racing may be
curious, it is in the end irrelevant to the di spute in this case, where the focus is solely on the
distinction between "remote" and "non-remote" ga mbling and betting services. The United States has
acknowledged that the precise nature of the betting is not relevant.27
Sub-question (b) (ANT): Do these operators knowingly use a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or
communications entitling persons to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers? Or do they only transmit informatio n assisting in the placing of bets or wagers
that falls within the safe harbour provision of 18 U.S.C. 1084(b)?

39. Antigua does not know the answer to this questi on, but suspects that most of the operators
"knowingly use a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets or wagers" under the view that the IHA exempts their activities from the scope of Wire Act
coverage.
28 Given the reaction of the horse racing indu stry to the passage of the new United States
prohibition law, this would appear to be the case.29

25 AB First written submission, paras. 50-51.
26 Antigua has pointed out in this proceeding that there are operators, such as Stations Casino in
Nevada, that offer telephone and online remote account wa gering on professional an d amateur sporting events
[Exhibit AB-80 ]. The Stations Casino remote betting sports book service is sanctioned by Nevada law.
Moreover, like the horse race wagering companies listed in Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73, it has not been threatened
with or prosecuted for violations of federal or state criminal laws.
27 Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS285/13 (19 August 2005), para. 9.
28 YouBet.com Frequently Asked Questions [Exhibit AB-65] ("Youbet.com® is in full compliance with
all applicable state and federal laws."); see also YouBet.com 2005 Form 10-K (13 March 2006), p. 8 [ Exhibit
AB-65] ("We also accept pari-mutuel wagers from subscriber s in other states where existing state laws purport
to prohibit or restrict our ability to accept pari-mutuel wagers from such st ates. However, we believe accepting
such wagers is permitted pursuant to the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, as amended, state laws, and certain
other laws and legal principles and doctrines, includ ing those contained in the U.S. Constitution."); Magna
Entertainment Corp 2005 Form 10-K (16 March 2006), p. 42 [ Exhibit AB-67] ("In December 2000, legislation
was enacted in the United States that amends the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978. We believe that this
amendment clarifies that inter-track simulcasting, off-track betting and account wagering, as currently
conducted by the U.S. horse racing industry, are authorized under U.S. federal law.").
29 AB Second written submission, para. 56, fn. 101.

Sub-question (c) (ANT): What is Antigua's view of the legality of wagering covered by
the Wire Act that falls outside the scope of the IHA, such as wire transmission of non-
horse-racing sports betting, and non-sports betting? Is it illegal?

40. Antigua believes that the Wire Act does not a pply to non-sports gambling, and thus from a
federal law perspective, cross-border gambling on non-sports betting is not de jure prohibited. This
view is supported by federal case law. In 2002, a United States federal appellate court ruled that the
Wire Act does not apply to online casino gambling.
30 In that particular case, the plaintiffs filed a civil
suit to avoid credit card debts incurred as gambling losses at online casinos. To establish their claim,
the plaintiffs sought to establish that the online ca sino gambling violated the criminal provisions of
the Wire Act. The federal appellate court held th at the Wire Act concerns only gambling on sporting
events or contests, and did not apply to casino gaming. 31 The United States Department of Justice
disagrees with this ruling and is of the view that th e Wire Act applies to the remote provision of non-
sports gambling and betting services as well.
Sub-question (d) (ANT): If the U.S. has not prosecuted these operators, why is this due
to the existence of the IHA and not due to ot her factors, such as a liberal interpretation
of the safe harbor provision in the Wire Act, or the nature of what these operators
actually transmit by wire? How does the alleged non-prosecution of these operators
differ from the rates and patterns of prosecu tion of other potential offenders under the
Wire Act?

41. Antigua is uncertain as to why the United St ates has not prosecuted domestic operators
offering services under the auspices of the IHA. It is certainly not because of the "nature of what
these operators actually transmit by wire," because as Antigua demonstrated in its First written
submission
32 and as is apparent from accessing these sites, they operate in all material respects like a
typical Antiguan operator.
42. The non-prosecution of these operators has been offered in this proceeding by Antigua to
support its contention that the IHA authorises domestic remote gambling in the United States. Taking
collectively (i) the language of the IHA; (ii) the interpretation given to it by legal authorities and
commentators; (iii) the language in the new Unite d States prohibition legislation with respect to
"activity allowed by the IHA"; (iv) the numerous st ate legislative and regulatory schemes for remote
gambling on horse racing, a number of which expressly reference the IHA; (v) the extent of current
sanctioned remote gambling in the United States on horse racing; and (vi) the complete lack of
prosecutions of these operators, Antigua believes it is impossible for the United States to meet any
burden of proof that the IHA does not permit domestic remote gambling.
43. Further, as the language of the new federal prohibition law has demonstrated, it should now
be clear that the Wire Act does not prohibit w holly-intrastate remote gambling. As Antigua
demonstrated in its First written submission,
33 the State of Nevada has in place a regulatory scheme
for intrastate remote gambling on sports and other contests and at least one operator is currently in
business and utilising this scheme.
34 Additionally, there is significant, state-sanctioned remote
gaming in lotteries in the United States.35

30 In Re Mastercard International Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
31 313 F.3d at 262.
32 AB First written submission, paras. 89-103; Schedule 2.
33 Id., paras. 118-122.
34 Id. See Exhibit AB-80.
35 Id., paras. 123-129. See Exhibit AB-83.

44. Because the United States took the position with respect to the chapeau of Article XIV of the
GATS that the United States permitted no remote gamb ling at all, Antigua does not believe that the
legal basis for the remote gambling is as important with respect to the chapeau as is the fact of the
domestic remote gambling. In particular, Article XI V is concerned primarily about the application of
measures–Antigua's point is that in actual applicatio n, the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA are
applied in a discriminatory manner because domes tic, sanctioned remote gambling exists in the
United States. Thus, whatever it is that the federal statutes say, by prohibiting services from Antigua
and allowing domestic industry, the United States cannot possibly demonstrate compliance with the
chapeau of Article XIV.
[Sub-question (e) (US)]

[Questions 36 and 37 (US)]

Question 38: With respect to the question whether the three Federal criminal statutes at issue
are, on their face, non-discriminatory.

Sub-questions (a) (ANT, US): Did the Appella te Body have competence to make the
finding at paras. 354 and 357 of its report when this was not covered in the Panel report
or a legal interpretation developed by the Panel, and it was contested by Antigua
(original first oral statement, para. 92; original Second written submission, paras. 33-
34)?

45. As a practical matter, in light of Article 17.14 of the DSU it probably does not much matter.
However, there is no question that the panel itself made no finding that either the Wire Act, the Travel
Act or the IGBA were facially non-discriminatory
36 but that the Appellate Body did so determine. 37
Arguably, as there was no such legal finding by th e panel, under Article 17.6 the Appellate Body did
not have jurisdiction to make the conclusion on its own. However, there is also authority to the effect
that the Appellate Body has the power and authority to review such legal matters and make such legal
determinations as is necessary in order to fulfil its mandate with respect to a matter before it.38
Sub-question (b) (ANT): Does Antigua challenge the evidence that the original Panel
considered relevant to the chapeau of Article XIV of GATS in paras. 6.584 and
following of its report - which does not include the wording of the three Federal criminal
statutes on their face? Why did Antigua not raise this point at the interim review stage?
Did Antigua raise it on appeal? (Antigua SWS §9)

46. In Antigua's view the original panel should not have developed such an extensive discussion
on Article XIV in the absence of a full debate on th e issue. A full debate on this complex factual
matter was the only way in which the panel could ha ve made a fully inform ed decision. In the
absence of such a full debate, Antigua believes th at the original panel should have limited its
assessment of Article XIV to those issues that were specifically discussed by the parties. These were
indeed very limited, but the limited nature of the de bate was entirely attributable to the fact that the
United States chose not to develop its Article XIV defence in the original proceeding. Having only
raised the Article XIV defence in its final subm ission – after Antigua's final submission had been
made as well, the United States precluded the panel from making a coherent analysis of the purported

36 See Panel report on US – Gambling, paras. 6.360-3.380.
37 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 354.
38 Appellate Body report on EC– Hormones (Canada) , para. 132; Appellate Body report on US –
Gasoline, pages 22-29; Appellate Body report on Canada – Periodicals, pages 20-23.

defence.
39 In that respect, Antigua fundamentally disagreed with the approach adopted by the original
panel. Such a fundamental disagreement could not, in Antigua's opinion, be fruitfully resolved at the
interim review stage. Antigua appealed this issue to the Appellate Body but its appeal was rejected.
47. Antigua did not of course raise the issue re garding the three federal criminal statutes on
appeal because the Panel had not made a finding with respect to them being facially discriminatory or
not.
[Sub-question (c) (US)]

39 Antigua also strongly disagrees with the propos ition apparently advanced by the Appellate Body
that Antigua should have requested an extension of the original proceedings in order to adequately address the
Article XIV issues. Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, paras. 274-276. A complaining party should not
be forced into a Hobson's choice late during the course of a proceeding by a respondent's litigation tactic.

ANNEX F-2

REPLIES BY THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(8 DECEMBER 2006)

Question 1 (US): The DSB recommended that the U.S. "bring its measures into conformity"
with its obligations under the GATS. Does the U. S. consider that it has already brought its
measures into conformity, or that it did not need for certain reasons to bring its measures into
conformity? If so, what are these reasons?

1. The United States considers that its measures ar e consistent with its obligations under the
GATS, and that the United States has complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by
presenting new evidence and arguments during this pr oceeding which meet the US burden of proof to
show that the US measures meet the criteria of the Article XIV chapeau.
2. The language cited in the Panel's question – "bring its measures into conformity" – is set out
in, and required by, Article 19 of the DSU. It is im portant to view that language within the context of
the entire article:
"Article 19: Panel and Appe llate Body Recommendations

1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body c oncludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement, it shall recomme nd that the Member concerned bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the
panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations.

2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements."

3. The language about "bringing a measure into conformity" is in the same sentence, and
follows upon, a reference to what the panel or Ap pellate Body has concluded with regard to the
inconsistency found by the Panel or Appellate Body with a covered agreement. The United States
submits that what it means in a particular disput e to "bring a measure into conformity" cannot be
considered in the abstract, but must depend on th e specific circumstances of the dispute, and most
importantly the specific findings of the Panel or Appellate Body.
4. As the United States has explained in its writte n and oral submissions, in this dispute the
Appellate Body explicitly noted that it was not
 making a finding as to whether the IHA provides an
exemption from the three federal criminal statutes at issue. Rather, the Appellate Body found that the
United States had not met its burden of proving th is point, and thus had not met its burden of
establishing an affirmative defence. In this cont ext, one option for the United States to bring its
measures "into conformity" was to proceed to meet its burden of proof to show that those measures
were within the scope of the GATS Article XIV(a) exception.
Question 2 (ANT, US): Must "measures taken to comply" with a DSB recommendation, as used
in Article 21.5 of the DSU, be more recent than the original proceeding? Please explain in terms
of the rule of interpretation in Article 31 and, if appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, please address the following:

5. As the United States will elaborate in the answ ers to the subparts below, the United States
does not consider that the "measure" in the phrase "m easure taken to comply," as used in Article 21.5
of the DSU, must necessarily be more recent than the original proceeding. Article 21.5 does not itself
specify a temporal element or limitation on the date that the measure is "taken." Indeed, it is not
difficult to conceive of a number of situations in which the measure at issue in an Article 21.5
proceeding is the same as the measure at issue in the original proceeding. Some examples would be:
(a) a measure that on its own terms expires or terminates at a certain time or under certain
conditions. Where as a result the measure is no longer in existence as of the time of the
Article 21.5 proceeding, the measure will no longer be inconsistent with the DSB
recommendations and rulings, but that will not be because the measure taken to comply
was more recent than the original proceeding.
(b) a measure that is brought into consistency not through a change to the measure but due to
a change in the underlying explanation or b asis for the measure. For example, a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure for which the risk assessment was found not to have adequately
explained a particular element and is revised to comply with the SPS Agreement or an
antidumping duty for which the inconsistency was a lack of adequate explanation for
how the administering authority took evidence into account the evidence.
(c) a measure that is brought into consistency th rough an external even t, such as a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure for which an intern ational standard is adopted after the DSB
recommendations and rulings that brings th e measure into conformity with the SPS
Agreement or an actionable subsidy for which external factors have resulted in there no
longer being adverse effects.
6. Article 21.5 must be read together with DSU Article 19, which describes the
recommendations and rulings with respect to whic h the Member concerned must "comply." In
particular, Article 19 does not provide that a Memb er concerned must adopt a new measure in order
to achieve compliance. Rather, Article 19.1 states: "Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes
that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity
 with that agreement." To be sure, in many cases the
Member concerned will choose to bring its measure into conformity by adopting a new or amended
measure. (And in that case, the new or amended measure would be subsequent to the original
proceeding.) However, Article 19 leaves open the po ssibility of bringing a measure into compliance
through means other than adopting a new or amended measure. Whether this option is available to
the Member concerned in a particular dispute will depend on the specific findings of the panel and/or
Appellate Body and the particular circumstances of the case.
Sub-question (a): Does the word "measures" h ave the same meaning as when used in
Article 4.2 and 4.4, Article 6.2 and elsewhere of the DSU?

7. While the DSU does not define the word "mea sures," the United States is not aware of a
basis for believing that the term "measures" in Article 21.5 would have a different meaning than when
used in other articles of the DSU.
Sub-question (b): Does the word "taken" imply a positive action? Please note that the
Spanish version reads "medidas ‘destinadas' a cumplir"

8. The United States understands that the thrust of this question is whether phrase "taken to
comply" means something along the lines of "adopted by the Member concerned for the purpose of
compliance." The phrase "taken to comply" would incl ude this meaning, but it is not so limited. The

Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV explained its views on the ordinary meaning of the
word "taken" as used in DSU Article 21.5:
"66. In examining the meaning of ‘measure s taken to comply' in Article 21.5, we
begin with the word ‘taken'. There is a wide range of dictionary meanings of the
word ‘taken', which is the past participle of the verb ‘take'. The meanings of ‘take'
include, for example, ‘[b]ring into a specified position or relation'; ‘[s]elect or use for
a particular purpose.'"
1

9. The first definition cited by the Appellate Body "bring into a specified position or relation"
has a sense, perhaps, of the "positive action" referr ed to in the Panel's question. But the second
meaning – "select or use for a particular purpose" – is not limited to the sense of adopting a new
measure for a particular purpose. Under this latter meaning of the verb "take," a pre-existing measure
would fit within the meaning of DSU Article 21.5. In other words, under this meaning, the original
measure considered in the underlying proceeding woul d be "selected or used for a particular purpose"
– namely, the purpose of showing compliance with the recommendations and rulings.
10. One of the illustrative sentences used in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary shows
this second meaning of the term taken. That sentence is "That great genius is taken as the standard of
perfection."2 Here, the "great genius" is not in any sense actively adopted, or moved from one place
to another. Rather, the person who is the "great ge nius" is used for a particular purpose, which is to
establish a "standard of perfection." Similarly, in the context of the current dispute, the original
measure has not been newly adopted for the purpose of compliance, but rather is being used for the
particular purpose of establishing compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings.
11. The DSU used the word "taken," rather than more limiting phrases such as "measure
adopted for the purpose of achieving compliance." In fact, "take" appears to be one of the broadest
verbs in the English language, with 9 major cate gories of definitions, plus dozens of shades of
meaning within those categories.3 If the drafters of the DSU wished to have a more limited definition
of the phrase "measures taken to comp ly," they would have used language that more precisely limited
the measures to be considered under Article 21.5.
12. Moreover, as the United States has explaine d above and in its prior oral and written
submissions, the context of the phrase "measures taken to comply" must include the rest of the DSU,
including Article 3.2 and Article 19.2. First, bot h of those articles provide that the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or dimi nish rights and obligations under the covered
agreements. Those rights include the right to adopt measures that fall within the scope of the GATS
Article XIV exception. To be consistent with Ar ticle 3.2 and Article 19.2, a finding that a measure
may or may not fall within GATS Article XIV cannot require a Member to abolish or amend such a
measure. In this context, the only sensible way to read "measure taken to comply" in Article 21.5 is
for such a "measure" to include the measure examined in the original proceeding that may, or may not
be, within the scope of GATS Article XIV.
13. In addition, Article 21.5 must be read in th e context of DSU Article 19.1, which describes
the recommendations and rulings with respect to which the Member concerned must "comply."
Article 19.1, however, does not provide that a Member concerned must adopt a new measure in order
to achieve compliance. Rather, the Member concerned must bring the measure into conformity with

1 Appellate Body report on United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS257/AB/RW,
adopted 20 December 2005 (US - Softwood Lumber IV), at para. 66.
2 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), page 3207.
3 Id. at 3206-3209.

that agreement." Article 19.1 does not necessarily re quire that a new measure be adopted in order to
bring the pre-existing measure into conformity.
14. Finally, the United States notes Article 3.2 of the DSU:
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral tradin g system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provi sions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements."

15. The dispute settlement system would not be pr oviding "security and predictability" to the
multilateral trading system if Members were foreclosed for procedural reasons from establishing in an
Article 21.5 proceeding that the measures subject to the recommendations and rulings are in fact
consistent with the covered agreements. Furthermore, such an interpretation of Article 21.5 would not
serve to "preserve the rights and obligations under the covered agreements." Rather, it could, as
would be the case if Antigua prevailed on its pro cedural argument in this dispute, "add to" the
obligations of a Member by requiring it to replace or modify a measure even when that measure is
already consistent with the covered agreements, and would "diminish" the right of a Member to
maintain a measure that in fact is in accordance with the covered agreements.
Sub-question (c): Does the measure need to be specifically aimed at the issue addressed
by the DSB recommendation?

16. As explained above, the United States does not c onsider that the measure taken to comply
must be newly and specifically adopted for the pu rpose of compliance. Rather, under the ordinary
meaning of Article 21.5, in context, and in light of the object and purpose of the DSU, the original
measure may be used for the purpose of estab lishing compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.
17. Moreover, the United States notes that the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV
expressly found that a measure plainly not
 aimed at compliance nonetheless fell within the scope of a
"measure taken to comply" under DSU Article 21. Th e Appellate Body noted that: "The fact that
Article 21.5 mandates a panel to assess ‘existence' and 'consistency' tends to weigh against an
interpretation of Article 21.5 that would confine th e scope of a panel's jurisdiction to measures that
move in the direction of, or have the objective of achieving, compliance."4
Question 3 (US): Can you further elaborate on the relevance of US-Shrimp for our deliberation
with respect to "measures taken to comply"?

18. The United States respectfully refers the Panel to the US answer to Question 16 below.
Question 4 (US): What other circumstances, apart from the "unusual" situation in this dispute,
could justify treating the same measures in th e original dispute as the "measures taken to
comply"? (US oral statement, paras. 5 and 9)

19. The United States submits that no "special" jus tification is required. Instead, the United
States submits that this is allowed for under the DSU, and whether or not the original measure is the

4 Appellate Body report on US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 67 (emphasis in the original).

measure "taken to comply" will depend on the specific facts and circumstances of a particular dispute.
The United States provides examples of such circumstances in paragraph 5 above.
Question 5 (USA): Do you argue that new evidence, the presentation of new evidence or re-
arguing a defence constitute your "measure taken to comply" for the purposes of Article 21.5 of
the DSU in this dispute?

20. The United States is relying on the original measure in dispute as its "measure taken to
comply" under Article 21.5. The new evidence and arguments in the US written and oral submissions
are not "measures," but instead are the means chosen by the United States to bring its measures into
compliance by clarifying the relationship between the IHA and the three federal criminal statutes.
Question 6 (ANT, US): Article 17 of the DSU grants an opportunity for a respondent to obtain
review of aspects of a Panel report by means of an appeal. If that appeal does not succeed,
aren't the findings in the Appellate Body report then final in accordance with Article 17.14?

21. Indeed, the United States is relying in this pr oceeding on the finality of the Appellate Body
report adopted by the DSB in the original proceed ing. The Appellate Body expressly noted that due
to the limited factual record, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body was ab le to determine whether
or not the challenged US measures met the require ments of the Article XIV chapeau. The United
States is not asking the Panel to revisit this finding . Rather, the United States is requesting that the
Panel proceed to examine the issues under the Ar ticle XIV chapeau based on new evidence and
arguments not previously available to the Panel or Appellate Body.
Question 7 (ANT, US): Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a
defence is rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the
same, i.e. the defence fails?

22. The question of whether or not a Member has complied with the recommendations and
rulings in a particular dispute depends on the specific facts and circumstances of that dispute.
Accordingly, the reasoning and findings of the panel or Appellate Body must be examined closely.
Where, as here, the Appellate Body notes that an affirmative defence may or may not be available
when examined under a more complete factual reco rd, the sensible means to achieve a resolution of
the dispute is for the panel in the Article 21.5 proceeding to examine the affirmative defence under the
complete factual record.
23. This dispute does not present a situation in whic h a defence was rejected outright. It would
not be appropriate for the United States to speculate in the abstract on a hypothetical situation where a
defence is rejected outright, but certainly it could ma ke a difference, for example, if the DSB were to
have ruled that a measure did not fall within the policy purpose of "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health." Again, whethe r the Member concerned had complied would turn on
the specific facts and circumstances of the dispute.
Question 8 (US): The U.S. is arguing that even if a respondent fails to establish an affirmative
defence in the original proceeding the respondent has a right to maintain the measure that has
been found to be inconsistent with an obligation. Where does such a right stem from? How
could any right exist when the respondent has failed to establish a justification for such

24. The obligations of WTO Members (and consequently the rights of other WTO Members)
are set out in the applicable covered agreements. A Member is free to maintain any measure that is
not inconsistent with its obligations under the c overed agreements - it does not need an affirmative
"right" to be provided in the covered agreements for it to maintain that measure. In this case,

Article XIV of the GATS makes clear that the Un ited States may maintain measures necessary to
protect public morals or to maintain public order. Articles 3.2 and 19.2 explicitly provide that neither
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, nor findings of panels or the Appellate Body, can "add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
25. In this case, the United States is arguing that it does not need to modify a measure that is
already consistent with the covered agreements. The United States does not believe that there is a
right to maintain measures that are inconsistent with a covered agreement. Rather, this case involves
findings by the Appellate Body that explicitly note that the measure may, or may not be, consistent
with a covered agreement, and that the factual record was not sufficient to make such a determination.
Question 9 (US): Does the U.S. consider that me asures consistent with covered agreements can
be required to be brought into compliance?

26. Where the DSB recommendations and rulings require that a Member establish the
applicability of an affirmative defence, the Member needs to do so in order to demonstrate that, by
virtue of that affirmative defence, its measure is not inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the
covered agreements. The Interstate Horseracing Act never provided any carve outs from the three
criminal laws at issue, and thus the US measures fe ll within the scope of Article XIV of the GATS.
The United States has complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings by making a factual
showing in this proceeding that in fact the US statutes at issue meet the requirements of Article XIV.
Question 10 (US): The U.S. refers to a situation where a complaining party could not expect the
responding party to adopt any substantively di fferent measure, "because the original measure
was already in compliance". (US FWS §46) Who would have made the determination that the
original measure was already in compliance?

27. As an initial matter, the United States notes th at this sentence would be better phrased as
"because the original measure was already consistent with the covered agreements.
" This phrasing
avoids confusion between the substantive obligatio ns set out in the covered agreements, and the
provisions of the DSU that call for compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings.
28. Turning to the Panel's question, the United St ates is not asserting that there was any special,
formal "determination" that the measure is consistent with a covered agreement. Rather, in this case,
the United States – as for most WTO Members with r espect to most of their measures – believes its
criminal gambling laws to be consistent with US obligations under the GATS. In this case, the
Appellate Body found that the United States did not sufficiently establish an affirmative defence
under Article XIV of the GATS, but the Appellate Body did not find that the criminal laws, if
considered under a full factual record, failed to meet the requirements of Article XIV.
29. Furthermore, it is essential to emphasize that th e failure of the United States to establish in
the initial proceeding an affirmative defence did not turn on a disputed issue of interpretation of the
WTO Agreement . Rather, the availability of the affi rmative defence depe nded on the proper
interpretation of US domestic law.
Question 11 (ANT, US): Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body
report "shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties", absolute? For example, would it
apply where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a
report exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

30. The United States would hope that the DSB would not agree to adopt an Appellate Body
report under the circumstances described. Although it w ould not be appropriate for the United States
to comment on these hypothetical situations, the Un ited States agrees that it would be important to

bear in mind the limitations in the DSU. It is doubtful that Members intended the language in
Article 17.14 to be read to override those express li mitations, particularly since Members were careful
in Article 3.2 of the DSU to specify that DS B recommendations and rulings "cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations pr ovided in the covered agreements." 5 In any event, the United
States in this proceeding is not requesting that the Panel reconsider any factual or legal findings made
by the Appellate Body in this dispute.
Question 12 (US): Please refer to Article 17.14 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's decision in
EC - Bed Linen. In your view, are these expressions of a principle that at some point disputes
should be treated as finally settled so that po tentially endless cycles of litigation are avoided not
only with respect to claims but also with resp ect to defences and specific issues considered in
disputes, and both with respect to arguments that are rejected and those that fail for lack of
evidence?

31. The United States notes that this question contains a number of premises that are not
presented by the circumstances of this dispute. Th e Panel and Appellate Body reports cannot be said
to result in a "final settlement", because as the Ap pellate Body noted, it was not able to determine
whether or not the US measures met the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau. Moreover, nothing
in this case presents an endless cycle of litigation. To the contrary, under the procedural agreement
entered into by the United States and Antigua, should Antigua prevail in this 21.5 proceeding, it may
proceed to request authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22.2.
32. The United States is not aware of any basis for asserting that, as a general matter, a WTO
Member cannot present new evidence when it previously failed to establish a claim due to a lack of
evidence. In fact, the 21.5 proceedings in the Canada - Dairy dispute illustrate otherwise.
6 In that
case, the complaining parties' initial recourse to Ar ticle 21.5 failed due to a lack of evidence on the
cost of production of the products at issue. The complaining parties proceeded to a second recourse to
Article 21.5, during which they proceeded to support their claims through new evidence not submitted
in the first proceeding. The complaining parties prevailed in the second recourse to Article 21.5, and
the Appellate Body upheld the finding. Thus, the Canada - Dairy dispute shows that there is no basis
for viewing the Appellate Body reasoning in EC - Bed Linen or Article 17.14 as providing some
general principle precluding the introduction of new evidence when a claim previously failed due to
an absence of evidence.
33. As the United States explained in its Second written submission, EC - Bed Linen addresses a
specific question regarding the claims that a comp laining party may reargue in a 21.5 proceeding.
The Appellate Body's finding turned on the lim ited scope of a 21.5 proceeding, and not on any
purported general rule that parties are forecl osed from presenting new evidence when a claim
previously failed for lack of evidence. Indeed, nothing would have prevented India from bringing a
new regular proceeding against the measure at issue. EC - Bed Linen simply provided that the special,
expedited procedures of Article 21.5 were not ava ilable for those claims. As a result, neither EC -
Bed Linen nor Article 17.14 would stand for a principle of preventing additional litigation.
[Question 13 (ANT)]

5 And the DSU is itself a covered agreement.
6 Appellate Body report on Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation
of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States ,
WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, 11 July 2001 ( Canada Dairy 21.5 ); Appellate Body report on
Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Second Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2,
adopted 17 January 2003 (Canada Dairy 21.5 (II)).

Question 14 (US): Please refer to the following passages in the Panel and Appellate Body
reports:

• para. 6.599 of the Panel report, which states that:
"there is ambiguity as to the relationship between, on the one hand, the amendment to
the IHA and, on the other, the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act";
• para. 6.607 of the Panel report, which contains the following reference:
 "in light of the ambiguity relating to the Interstate Horseracing Act";
• and para. 368 of the Appellate Body report which states that:
"The second instance found by the Panel was based on ‘the ambiguity relating to' the
scope of application of the IHA and its relatio nship to the measures at issue. We have
upheld this finding."

Why are these findings not final?

34. The United States is not challenging these findings . These findings refer to "ambiguity" in
the federal statues; the findings
 do not include any statement – explicit or implicit – that such
ambiguity results in an inconsistency with the GATS. Indeed, some statutory ambiguity is inevitable
in any legal system, and few measures would escape scrutiny if ambiguity resulted in per se violation
of obligations under the WTO Agreement. And, desp ite this ambiguity, there is in fact a right or
wrong answer to the question of whether or not the IHA provides a carve out from federal criminal
laws.
35. The Panel and Appellate Body noted the ambiguity in the context of finding that the United
States – on the basis of the record available in the original proceeding – had failed to meet its burden
of proving an affirmative defence. And again, th is is a finding that the United States does not dispute
in this proceeding. Rather, in this pro ceeding the United States submits that it has now
 shown, based
on a more complete factual record, that the right answer to the ambiguous issue is that the IHA
provides no carve outs from the criminal laws at issue, and thus that it has successfully established its
affirmative defence under GATS Article XIV. Noth ing in the US position in any way disturbs the
finality of the findings by the Panel and Appellate Body regarding statutory ambiguity.
Question 15 (US): Please refer to para. 371 of th e Appellate Body report, last sentence, which
states that: "we wish to clarify that the Panel did not, and we do not, make a finding as to
whether the IHA does, in fact, permit domestic suppliers to provide certain remote betting
services that would other wise be prohibited by the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA".

Sub-question (a): Was this simply an expression of deference, indicating that the
Appellate Body did not presume to know the meaning of a Member's domestic law
better than the Member itself?

36. The United States does not believe that this is a correct understanding of the Appellate Body
findings. In fact, the Appellate Body did not give deference to the US understanding of its own
statute. To the contrary, the Appellate Body gave deference to the findings of the Panel in its fact-
finding under DSU Article 11.
37. Moreover, the Appellate Body's reasoning explic itly notes that it could make no definitive
finding on the US law due to the limited factual record:
"363. Thus, the Panel had before it c onflicting evidence as to the relationship
between the IHA, on the one hand, and the m easures at issue, on the other. We have
already referred to the discretion accorded to panels, as fact-finders, in the assessment

of the evidence. As the Appellate Bo dy has observed on previous occasions, "not
every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question
of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the
facts."

364. In our view, this aspect of the Unite d States' appeal essentially challenges the
Panel's failure to accord sufficient weight to the evidence submitted by the United
States with respect to the relationship under United States law between the IHA and
the measures at issue. The Panel had lim ited evidence before it, as submitted by the
parties, on which to base its conclusion . This limitation, however, could not absolve
the Panel of its responsibility to arrive at a conclusion as to the relationship between
the IHA and the prohibitions in the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. The
Panel found that the evidence provided by the United States w as not sufficiently
persuasive to conclude that, as regards wa gering on horseracing, the remote supply of
such services by domestic firms continues to be prohibited notwithstanding the plain
language of the IHA. In this light, we are not persua ded that the Panel failed to make
an objective assessment of the facts."7

38. Furthermore, in its conclusion, the Appella te Body reiterated that it was not making a
definitive finding on the correct interpretation of US la w: "In this respect, we wish to clarify that the
Panel did not, and we do not, make a finding as to whether the IHA does, in fact, permit domestic
suppliers to provide certain remote betting services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA."8
Sub-question (b): Does this sentence, clarifyi ng what the Panel and Appellate Body did
not find, affect what the Panel did find re garding "‘the ambiguity relating to' the scope
of application of the IHA and its relation ship to the measures at issue", which was
upheld by the Appellate Body?

39. As the United States explained in its response to Question 14, a finding of ambiguity is not
equivalent to a finding that the IHA does in fact provi de a carve out from the criminal laws at issue.
There is a right answer and wrong answer to that question under US law. The United States submits
that it has shown in this proceeding that the right an swer is that no carve outs exist, and thus that the
US measures do not result in discrimination under the chapeau of GATS Article XIV.
Question 16 (ANT, US): What authority does the DSU grant the Appellate Body to extend an
invitation to a Member to demonstrate a point after the conclusion of an appeal? (US FWS §44)
How would such an invitation affect the recomm endation by the DSB? Why did the Appellate
Body not expressly suggest ways in which the U.S. could implement the recommendations?

40. As the United States explained at the hearing, the United States submits that it would be a
misplaced focus to treat the phrase "invitation" (used in the first US submission) as some special test,
principle, or procedure that must be analyzed and evaluated. In using this phrase, the United States
was not intending to imply that the Appellate Body was making a specific recommendation with
respect to how the United States should bring its measures into compliance. We note that Article 19.1
of the DSU provides that panels or the Appellate Body "may" make suggestions on implementation;
we are not suggesting that the Appellate Body has done so in this case.
41. Rather, the United States was using "invitati on" as a shorthand for the following type of
reasoning commonly used in Article 21.5 proceedings: where the Appellate Body (or panel) finds a
particular aspect of a measure to be inconsistent with a covered agreement, the other side of such a

7 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 363-364 (emphasis added).
8 Id., para. 371.

finding may provide specific guidance on how the responding Member may bring its measure into
compliance.
42. The US – Shrimp dispute (referred to in Question 3 above) is an instructive example. In that
dispute, like the current one, the Appellate Body agreed with the responding party that the measure
provisionally fell under an exception – GATT Article XX(g) in US – Shrimp. However, the Appellate
Body, as in this case, found that in certain specific ways, the requi rements of the chapeau were not
met with respect to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."
43. In US – Shrimp, one aspect of this discrimination was that the Appellate Body found that the
United States had entered into negotiations with so me countries, but not with the complaining parties
in the dispute. The United States looked carefully at this finding: the other side of the finding, and
thus a means of compliance, was for the United States to enter into negotiations with the complaining
parties. The United States proceeded to enter in to such negotiations durin g the compliance period.
These negotiations were not "measures" and so they were not "measures taken to comply."
44. The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp also found that the United States, in implementing its
shrimp import ban, did not provide due process to the complaining parties. The United States looked
carefully at this finding, and proceeded to adopt new implementing guidelines that remedied the
defects in due process identified by the Appellate Body.
45. Based on the specific Appellate Body findings, the United States believed that such steps
would bring its measure into compliance, and that no changes
would be required in the statute subject
to the DSB recommendations and rulings. A complaining party in US – Shrimp was not satisfied with
the US implementation; it argued in an Article 21.5 proceeding that the United States must amend or
repeal its statute and lift the import prohibition. Th e Appellate Body agreed with the United States,
finding that the United States had complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings – without
amending the US statute – by addressing the specific aspects of discrimination previously found by
the Appellate Body in the Article XX chapeau.
46. The United States believes that the same appr oach for compliance applies to the current
dispute. Here, the Appellate B ody explicitly noted both (i) that the United States did not establish or
show that the IHA does not exempt domestic suppliers from providing certain remote betting
activities prohibited under three federal criminal stat utes, but (ii) that the Appellate Body could not
determine from the factual record whether or not the I HA in fact provided such an exemption. In this
case, the other side of the Appellate Body finding is that the United States may comply with the DSB
recommendations and rulings by showing that the IHA in fact does not provide an exemption from the
federal criminal statutes. This kind of reasoning is what the United States intended by the statement
that the Appellate Body "invited" the United St ates to demonstrate that the measures met the
requirement of the Article XIV chapeau.
Question 17 (US): The U.S. refers to a respondent required to adopt new measures when it is
already in compliance with its obligations. (U S FWS §45) Is this not true of any respondent
whose measures may well satisfy an exception but who fails to raise that exception before a
Panel? Or a respondent who does not succeed in demonstrating that its measure satisfies an
exception?

47. The United States submits that it has shown in th is proceeding that the US criminal laws fall
within the scope of GATS Article XIV, and are thus not inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States under the GATS. The United States is not aware of any past dispute in which a WTO-
consistent measure has been found in an Article 21.5 proceeding to be not in compliance with DSB
recommendations and rulings. Thus, although this qu estion is phrased in terms of "any respondent,"
the United States submits that the circumstances presented by this dispute are indeed unusual.

48. As the United States explained in its past su bmissions, this unusual situation arose due to
Antigua's choices in presenting its claim. In par ticular, because Antigua was unable or unwilling to
specify the statutes at issue, neither the Panel nor the United States were able to identify the measures
at issue until the case had reached the Interim Review stage. Consequently, neither the parties nor the
Panel were in a position to develop fully the factua l record and the argumentation with respect to how
each measure that might possibly be covered in the dispute would fit within each of the criteria set out
in GATS Article XIV.
Question 18 (US): Does the U.S. consider that an y responding party that has a valid affirmative
defence that did not succeed only because of a la ck of a full factual showing in the original
proceeding has a right to make a full factual showing of the same defence in a compliance
proceeding? What would be the systemic implicat ions of such a view? What incentive would a
respondent have to fully argue its affirmative defence before the original panel? (US oral
statement, para. 31)

49. As discussed in the response to Question 17, th ere were particular, unusual circumstances in
this dispute that prevented the United States from presenting the same level of argument and evidence
on Article XIV with respect to these measures. These circumstances should be taken into account;
they would be unlikely to occur in other dis putes (unless of course it were established that a
complaining party benefited from the same type of l ack of specificity in its claims and arguments as
were present in the original proceeding).
50. It is also important to bear in mind that there is a fundamental difference in the situations of
a complaining and responding party concerning findings that a party has failed to make a full showing
to meet its burden of proof. Where a compla ining party fails to present evidence and argument
sufficient to meet its burden of proof, that complaining party has the ability to bring a new dispute and
have an opportunity to present additional evidence a nd argumentation. The situation is different for a
responding party. The responding party is unable to bring a new proceeding and so would be denied
the opportunity to present additional evidence and argum entation to meet its burden of proof for an
affirmative defence, unless the responding party may make this fuller showing in a compliance
proceeding.
51. The United States understands that in the contex t of this question, "systemic implications"
refers to the prospect that responding Members would, as a tactical matter, de cide in future cases to
withhold factual information in support of affirmative defences until the Article 21.5 proceeding. The
United States submits that there is no basis for be lieving that such "systemic implications" would
arise.
52. The reason is simple: The respondi ng Member would obtain no benefit
 of purposely saving
evidence in support of an affirmative defence until th e Article 21.5 proceeding. To the contrary, the
responding party has a strong interest in obtaining during the original proceeding a definitive finding
as to the validity of an affirmative defence. If th e finding is affirmative (i.e., if the defence applies),
the responding Member would not be subject to fu ture proceedings. If the finding is negative, the
responding Member would be entitled to a reasona ble period of time for compliance during which it
could address the problems identified with respect to its affirmative defence.
53. In contrast, a responding Member who waited until the Article 21.5 proceeding to present a
full affirmative defence is in a far worse position. Even if it prevails on the defence, it will have
subjected itself to an additional pro ceeding. And, moreover, if it fails to establish the affirmative

defence, it faces the prospect of an immediate request for authorization to suspend concessions,
without any further reasonable period of time for compliance.
9
Question 19 (ANT, US): If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a
defence would the compliance panel make its ass essment on the basis of evidence presented in
the compliance proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

54. As in other proceedings under the DSU, the Article 21.5 panel should base its findings on
the evidence and arguments presented by the disputing parties. To the extent that evidence introduced
in the original proceeding remained relevant, the di sputing parties are of course free to incorporate or
to refer to such evidence.
[Questions 20 and 21 (ANT)]

Question 22 (US): If the U.S. is permitted to demonstrate that its measures satisfy the
requirements of the Article XIV chapeau, what is Antigua entitled to demonstrate? What would
limit the Panel's assessment to the IHA? Could the Panel's assessment include any issue as to
whether the Federal criminal statutes satisfy the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau, such
as whether they are non-discriminatory on their face?

55. As the United States explained in detail in paragraphs 28 to 31 of its Second written
submission, the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding is limited. The DSB recommendations and
rulings serve as the instructions to the Member concerned for the steps it is required to take during the
reasonable period of time in order to comply with those recommendations and rulings. If a
complaining party were entitled to reargue claims that were considered and rejected in the original
proceeding, the Member concerned could be in the untenable position of being foun d out of
compliance even though it had relied on and complied with the findings of the Panel and/or Appellate
Body. This is the basis for the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Bed Linen that complaining parties
cannot reargue failed claims in an Article 21.5 proceeding.
[Question 23 (ANT)]

Question 24 (US): Please refer to the Award of th e Arbitrator pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU which states that "the United States emphasizes that the only means of implementation
that will achieve the necessary clarification is legislative means" (para. 37) and that
"implementation will occur by legislative means" (para. 64). Can these statements in the
Award be reconciled with the US submission th at "[l]egislation to clarify the interaction
between the IHA and Wire Act was a possible means - but not the only means - for
compliance"? (US FWS §55) If the U.S. disagrees with the statements in the Award of the
Arbitrator, could it please comment on the statemen ts attributed to it in the transcript of the
Arbitrator's oral hearing on pages 31-32 ("legi slation is required") and page 34 ("we need
legislation")? Could the U.S. clarify why it referred on pages 59-60, 60-61 and 72-73 to action by
Congress - what could it have contemplated there if not legislation?

56. As the United States explained during the hear ing, the United States respectfully disagrees
with the arbitrator's characterization of the US vi ews on the possible means of implementation. First,
neither the US written submission, nor its presentations during the arbitration hearing (as reflected in

9 The United States notes that the DSB has adopted a panel report that stated that an additional
reasonable period of time may be available depending on whether a compliance panel has made a new
recommendation. See Panel report on United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations": Second
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities , WT/DS108/RW2 (30 Sep. 2005),
para. 7.44.

the transcript) support this character ization. Second, it is important to understand the context of the
arbitrator's statement within th e discussions held during the arbitration. The United States sought a
reasonable period of time that would allow fo r implementation through the adoption of new
legislation. Antigua agreed that the United States should adopt legislation, but also argued that partial
compliance with respect to "non-sports betting" co uld be achieved by Executive Order. The United
States responded that even if an Executive Orde r were a legally available possibility, this
hypothetical, partial means of compliance was not relevant because – as both parties agreed – the
arbitrator still needed to determine the reasonable peri od of time to adopt legislation. In other words,
when the United States discussed the need for legislation, this was in response to Antigua's claim that
the United States should get a shorter reasonable period of time because (according to Antigua) partial
compliance could be achieved by Executive Order.
57. Moreover, there was no discussion during the Artic le 21.3 arbitration of a legislative means
of compliance in the context of a discussion of wh ich alternative means of compliance were available
to the United States (except partial compliance thr ough an Executive Order). Thus, to the extent the
arbitrator's statement is read as suggesting that there had been a discussion of various alternative
means of compliance, and that during this discussi on the United States had dismissed all alternatives
except legislation, this is clearly a misreading. Fi nally, nowhere in the record of the arbitration does
the United States ever assert or imply that a full factual showing based on legislative history and
relevant case law would be insufficient to meet the US burden of showing that the IHA does not
create carve outs from criminal statutes.
58. With respect to the first two specific statem ents cited in the question ("legislation is
required" and "we need legislation"), the record of the arbitration clearly shows the context described
above.
59. The starting point is Antigua's written submission, which lays out Antigua's idea about
differing periods of compliance for sports and non-sports betting:
"11. Antigua submits that it is possible for the United States to comply with the
DSB recommendations and rulings (i) imme diately via presidential executive order
with respect to the provision of non-s ports related and horse racing gambling and
betting services and (ii) with respect to the provision of other sports gambling and
betting services, within six months of the adoption of the Report and the Panel Report
by the DSB via either an am endment to each of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act or the passage of new legislation that would either
repeal or supersede the Federal Trio with respect to the provision of these services
from Antiguan operators."
10

60. During the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator asks about this distinction:
11
"In your submission you draw a distincti on between 'on-sports related and hoseracing
gambling and betting services' on the one hand and 'other sports gambling and betting
services' on the other. What is the basis fo r that distinction if one looks at the Panel
and Appellate Body reports and what they have said?"

61. Antigua then describes its view of the distinc tion, without immediately tying the distinction
back to Antigua's idea of a shorter RPT for non-sports betting:
"In neither report do they really consider the different types of gambling. ...

10 Antigua Article 21.3 submission, para. 11.
11 Arbitration Transcript, page 30.

We referred to a number of discussions in our submissions that that [the distinction
between sports and non-sports gambling] is a pretty widely held belief by gambling
law commentators throughout the United States."
12

62. The United States proceeds to respond to Antigua's argument, both with respect to the
purported distinction between various types of gamb ling under federal criminal law, and with respect
to the effect that such distinction should have on the calculation of the RPT:
"I guess there are two ways of responding. The fi rst is that which we took in our statement –
that at the end of the day even if there were such a distinction, and we disagree that there is, it
is not []relevant to the ultimate decisi on here since legislation is required
 and legislation does
not really relate to any purported distinction between sports and non-sports betting."13

63. In this context, the phrase "legislation is require d" is used to rebut Antigua's claim that the
RPT is somehow affected by an alleged ability of th e United States to address non-sports betting with
an Executive Order. As shown above, Antigua exp ected the United States to adopt legislation to
address sports betting, and the above statement simp ly means that the RPT for legislation is not
affected by a purported ability to address non-sports betting through an Executive Order. In context,
this statement cannot possibly be read as an overarching assertion that the only means of compliance
available to the United States was through legislation.
64. The second phrase ("we need legislation") cited in the question is also made in this same
context. Antigua first asserts that the United Stat es can come into compliance through some sort of
administrative action with respect to non-sports betting.
"We are saying here that under the United States law as it actually exists there really
is no need to amend these other statutes with respect to non sports betting because it
simply is an administrative position of the United States government that these types
of services are prohibited as well."
14

65. The United States then responds, with a similar point as previously made.
"Again, I think our first res ponse would be that in the end you do not have to reach
the issue [of the RPT required to adopt an Executive Order or other administrative
action addressed to non sports be tting] because An tigua acknowledges
 that the
actions it is requesting us to take with regard to non sports [] betting will not by
themselves bring us into compliance, we need legislation on other matters , and
therefore, given that the actions they ar e requesting we take with regard to [] non
sports betting would require less time than th e legislation, the legislation ultimately is
what is driving the determination of the r easonable period of time, so it is an issue
that need not even be reached."15

66. Again, the US statement cannot be read as making a point about legislation versus every
other possible means of compliance. Rather, it is simply a response to Antigua's argument that the

12 Id. at 31.
13 Id. (Emphasis added).
14 Id. at 33-34.
15 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The United States notes that this sentence in the transcript twice uses the
phrase "sports and non sports", which does not make sense in context and appears to be either a transcription
error or garbling of words. This is the type of correction that would have been corrected if, as in many types of
legal proceedings, the transcript had b een subject to verification. In an y event, this in no way changes the
context of the phrase "we need legislation."

purported option of adopting administrative acti on on non-sports betting could somehow reduce the
reasonable period of time.
67. Finally, the question requests that the US cl arify why it referred on pages 59-60, 60-61 and
72-73 of the transcript to action by Congress. As explained above, the United States sought a
reasonable period of time that would allow for the adoption of a legislative clarification. Accordingly,
much of the arbitral proceeding focused on the question of how long it would take to obtain the
passage of such legislation. Nowhere in the cited passages (nor elsewhere in the US presentations to
the arbitrator), however, does the United States assert that legislation was the only means of
compliance.
Question 25 (US): The U.S. has referred to Bill HR 4777. Antigua has referred to Bill HR 4411.
What was the relationship between these Bills and the internet gambling law that was passed in
October 2006? Was there ever legislation pending that would have brought the U.S. into
compliance with the DSB recommenda tions in this dispute? (US SWS §38) Is there anything in
writing to demonstrate that such legislation was under consideration in the Congress?

68. H.R. 4777 was a bill sponsored by Representative Goodlatte. This bill would have amended
18 U.S.C. 1084 and would have prohibited the accep tance of certain forms of payment for certain
gambling activities over the Internet. H.R. 4411 was a bill sponsored by Representative Leach. As
introduced, H.R. 4411 also prohibited the acceptan ce of certain forms of payment for unlawful
Internet gambling.
69. H.R. 4411 was merged with H.R. 4777 to include the revisions to 18 U.S.C. § 1084 and the
merged bill was passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate for its consideration.
The House and Senate, in conference, revised the provisions of the merged bill and incorporated
portions of it into the Safe Port Act, Public La w 109-347, which was signed into law by the President
in October 2006.
70. The Internet gambling provisions in the Safe Port Act are referred to as the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA ), Title VIII of Public Law 109-347, and they
pertain only to the acceptance of payments for unl awful Internet gambling. Those provisions are
similar to the prohibitions contained in H.R. 4411 as introduced. This statute does not amend Section
1084. The provisions pertaining to horse racing are similar to those contained in H.R. 4411 as the bill
was passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate.
71. The horse racing provisions in H.R. 4411 (which , as noted, was an amendment to the Wire
Act) address the issue of the relationship between the IHA and the Wire Act, but the legislation as
adopted by the House did not clarify the relations hip. If the Executive Branch had achieved its goal
of obtaining a legislative clarification, this la nguage would have been modified to achieve the
clarification. Although the United States is aware that various formulations of the horse racing
provisions were discussed, it is not aware of any formally-introduced amendment other than those
described above.
Question 26 (ANT, US): Does the fact that statemen ts are made in the context of Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU require that they be given different weight from that accorded to any other
statements of a party concerning an issue in dispute?

72. Article 21.3(c) has a particular, limited purpose, and as numerous arbitrators have explained,
their role is not to discuss the particulars of a Member's implementation. The weight accorded to
statements made in the context of Article 21.3(c) proceedings should take into account the specific,
limited purpose of those proceedings. Furthermore, there is no basis for assigning any special weight

to statements made by a party during an Article 21.3 proceeding, as compared to, for example, public
statements by a party or statements made by a party to WTO committees.
73. The United States notes that statements of a party could have evidentiary value in
interpreting the factual question of the meaning or ex istence of a party's measure. However, it is hard
to see how such statements might arise in an Artic le 21.3 proceeding. And in the circumstances of
this case, the United States had no call to make any statements regarding the substantive, factual issue
of the relationship between the IHA and the thr ee criminal statutes. Rather, the Article 21.3
proceeding addressed an entirely different issue, namely, the amount of time required to obtain a
legislative clarification of that relationship.
Question 27 (US): The U.S. has referred to the "saf e harbor" provision that is available for the
transmission of information assisting in the placing of wagers (US FWS §§7-10; SWS §19) Is an
"interstate off-track wager", as defined in the IHA, a "bet or wager" or "information assisting
in the placing of wagers" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1084(a)?

74. A wager placed in one state, but not transmitted to another state, with respect to the outcome
of a race taking place in another state is a "bet or wa ger" which may be legal if authorized by the laws
of the state in which it is placed. A "pari-mutual wager . . . placed or transmitted by an individual in
one State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted by an off-track betting system in . . .
another State" is the transmission of a "bet or wa ger" and is a violation of the Wire Act. The
transmission of information relating to the formati on of a wagering pool is "information assisting in
the placement of bet[s] or wager[s]" so l ong as a wager itself is not transmitted by wire
communication in interstate or foreign commerce.
Question 28 (US): The U.S. submits that no langu age of permission exists in the IHA. (US FWS
§33) Can this be reconciled with the following la nguage of Section 5 IHA, cited in the Appellate
Body report at para. 361: "An interstate o ff-track wager may be accepted by an off-track
betting system only if consent is obtained fr om - the horse racing asso ciation" [followed by
extensive conditions and provisos] (emphasis added)

75. As the United States explained in paragraphs 20-25 of its First written submission, the IHA
contains no "language of permission" relating to criminal liability u nder United States law. To the
extent that the IHA includes any "language of pe rmission," it relates only to the allowance of the
receipt of certain bets without being subject to civ il liability under the IHA itself. It has nothing to do
with what is allowed under the criminal law of the United States. Section 4 of the IHA, 15 U.S.C. §
3003, contains the general rule impos ing liability for the acceptance of interstate off track wagers not
in accordance with the IHA. Section 5 of th e IHA, 15 U.S.C. § 3004, specifies those limited
circumstances in which wagers may be accepted on horse races. Section 6 of the IHA, 15 U.S.C. §
3005, imposes civil liability on persons accepti ng wagers on horse races without complying with
Section 5's requirements of various agreements with affected parties. Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 3006,
sets forth the parameters of any civil action for damages for non-compliance with the IHA. The IHA
must be read as a whole, and nothing in that act grants permission to transmit wagers using wire
communication facilities in interstate or foreign co mmerce, or provides an exception to the criminal
law prohibiting such transmission.
Question 29 (US): The U.S. has explained that the IHA and the Wire Act have separate effects
with respect to wagering that breaches both Acts. (US FWS §35) Please explain the separate
effects of the two Acts with respect to wagering conducted in accordance with Section 5 of the
IHA but not in accordance with the Wire Act.

76. If a person living in one state transmits, by wi re communication, a wager on a horse race to
an off-track betting facility located in another stat e and the host racing association and the off-track

betting facility have the agreements required by the IHA in place, then the host racing association will
not have a basis to file an IHA law suit against th e off-track betting facility. However, the off-track
betting facility would still be subject to prosecution fo r violating the Wire Act. What the IHA does is
to merely protect the right of the entity staging a hor se race to enjoy the receipt of all of the revenue
from their product, that is, the horse race. What the Wire Act does is punish any person who, being in
the business of betting or wagering, uses a wire communication facility for the transmission of bets or
wagers in interstate or foreign commerce or for the transmission of information assisting in the
placement of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest. However, if certain conditions which are
outlined in subsection (b) of the Wire Act exist, a person can be protected with respect to the
transmission of information assisting in the placeme nt of bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest, but he or she still may not use a wire communication facility for the transmission of the bets
or wagers themselves.
Question 30 (US): If there were a positive repugnancy between the IHA and the Wire Act
(which the U.S. does not concede), would the U.S. disagree with the rules of statutory
construction that allow more recently enacted a nd specificstatutes tocontrol or prevail to the
extent of a conflict, as described by Antigua? (Antigua FWS §§58-59)

77. The United States agrees that US law includes a judicially-created doctrine of repeal by
implication. However, the United States does not agree with Antigua's characterization of that
doctrine. A more accurate summary of the doctrine is contained in paragraphs 26-31 and Annex I of
the first US submission.
Question 31 (US): Please refer to the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
(Exhibit AB-113).

Sub-question (a): Even if this Act is not within the terms of reference of this Panel, do
you consider that it can constitute evidence relevant to the matter before the Panel?

78. The United States believes that Panels are not barred from considering evidence (including
the fact that a new measure was adopted) that comes into existence after the initiation of panel
proceedings. The United States submits, however, th at the UIGEA does not shed light on the issues
in this dispute, because the law does not amend or a lter any statutes at issue, and instead establishes a
separate enforcement mechanism aimed at particular activities already unlawful under federal or state
law.
Sub-question (b): Why does 31 U.S.C. 5362(10)(D)(i) provide that the term "unlawful
Internet gambling" shall not include any activity that is allowed under the Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978?

79. On September 29, 2006, Representative Leach , one of the original sponsors of the
legislation, submitted a statement on the Internet gambling provisions of the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 into the Congressional Record.
16 That statement, which is part of
the legislative history of the Act, provid es that Section 5362(10)(D)(I) "addresses transactions
complying with the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) which will not be considered unlawful because
the IHA only regulates legal transactions that are lawful in each state involved." Importantly, the
statute does not change what types of betting operations are "legal transactions." In order to be a
"legal transaction," the wager must be made in comp liance with both state and federal law. Since the
IHA did not repeal Section 1084, the wager must also comply with the provisions of Section 1084.

16 Statement of Representative Leach, Congression al Record, pages H8029- H8030 (Sep. 29, 2006)
(Ex. US-15.)

Sub-question (b) [continued]: What activiti es are allowed under the IHA that would
otherwise fall within the definition of the term "unlawful Internet gambling"?

80. None. The transmission in interstate or fore ign commerce of bets or wagers on horse races
using wire communication facilities, even if the speci fic agreements required by the IHA are in place,
would constitute "unlawful Internet gambling" because such transmission would violate the Wire Act,
may possibly violate other provisions of federal and state law, would therefore not constitute a "legal
wager" as required by the IHA, and thus could not be in compliance with the IHA.
Sub-question (c): What are the "existing disagreements over ho w to interpret the
relationship between the Interstate Horsera cing Act and other Federal statutes"
referred to in 31 U.S.C. 5362(10)(D)(iii)? Wh om are the disagreements between? Can
such disagreements be reconciled with the US submission to this Panel that under
fundamental principles of US law, the IHA does not provide an exemption from the
three Federal statutes? Does this indicate ambiguity in the relationship between these
laws?

81. The disagreement referred to in this "sense of Congress" provision concerns whether the
Interstate Horseracing Act repealed by implication pre-existing criminal statutes, thereby allowing the
interstate transmission of bets on horse races. The Department of Justice has publicly stated that it
does not believe that the IHA amended or repealed pre-existing criminal statutes, while the horse
racing industry believes that the IHA removes the cr iminal prohibitions relating to the interstate
transmission for bets on horse races. The disagre ements are between the Department of Justice and
those interests that wish to profit on interstate gambling on horseracing.
82. The "sense of Congress provision" is entirely cons istent with US statements concerning the
proper interpretation of US criminal statutes. The language simply notes the disagreement, it does not
take a position as to how a court would in fact constr ue the relationship between federal criminal laws
and the IHA.
83. A disagreement does not necessarily indicate an "ambiguity." Indeed, in almost every WTO
dispute there is a disagreement among Members as to how to interpret particular provisions of the
covered agreements, but this does not establish that there is an ambiguity in the drafting of those
provisions. However, as the Panel notes, the Ap pellate Body did not distur b the original Panel's
finding of an "ambiguity," and the United States is not disputing that ambiguity in this proceeding.
Rather, the United States has explained that despite any ambiguity, there is a right and wrong answer
to the question of the relationship between the IHA and the three federal criminal laws at issue. And,
based on the evidence and arguments presented in this proceeding, the United States has met its
burden of showing that the IHA does not provide exemptions from federal criminal laws.
Sub-question (d): If the US Congress does not wish to resolve any existing
disagreements over this question of interpretatio n at this stage, is the US delegation to
this Panel entitled under US law to take a definitive view on it? Is the US delegation
asking the Panel to take a definitive view on a question of interpretation that the US
Congress has chosen not to resolve?

84. The United States delegation is entitled under US law to take a definitive view on the
disagreement. The official position of the Department of Justice – the agency which is responsible for
applying federal criminal law – is that the IHA provides no exemptions from federal criminal laws.
The United States delegation submits that it has show n in this proceeding that the DOJ view of US
criminal statutes is correct under fundamental principles of US statutory construction.

85. The United States is not asking the Panel to take any "definitive view" on questions of
domestic US law that might have an y domestic effect within the Unite d States. To the contrary, the
role of this Panel is to resolve the legal and factual issues in this dispute. The key factual issue in this
dispute is whether the United States has met its burden of showing that the IHA does not result in
discriminatory carve outs from federal criminal statut es, and thus has met its burden of showing that
the US measures meet the criteria of the Article XI V chapeau. A Panel finding on this factual issue
has no effect on domestic US law.
Sub-question (e): Can the U.S. comment on the statements by the National
Thoroughbred Racing Association that " [t]he legislation contained language that
recognizes the ability of the horse racing indus try to offer account wagering under the
Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 as amended" (Exhibit AB-118) and by Youbet.com
that the "legislation ... exempts Youbet.com and other advanced deposit wagering
companies in the horse racing industry from internet gaming prohibitions"? (Exhibit
AB-120)

86. The UIGEA made no amendments to the Wire Ac t or any other federal criminal law, and
thus simply could not have the effect claimed in the above statement. As noted, however, horseracing
interests contend that the IHA provides carve outs from federal criminal law, and it is not surprising
that they would make this type of baseless claim about the UIGEA.
Question 32: Please refer to the States' laws and regulations on account wagering "under the
auspices of the IHA" provided by Antigua (Exhibits AB-34 to AB-51), as well as State licences
to specific operators among the information on particular operators (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73).

[Sub-questions (a) and (b) (ANT)]

Sub-question (c) (US): Many of these State la ws appear to authorize account wagering
by telephone and other electronic means. Ho w does this relate to the prohibition in the
Wire Act?

87. Even if a state laws would appear to aut horize account wagering by telephone or other
electronic means, they cannot override the Wire Act to the extent that they authorize transmission of
wagers by means of a wire communication facility in interstate or foreign commerce. Account
wagering, itself, is not a violation of the Wire Act or other federal law to the extent that the state does
not authorize the transmission by means of a wire communication facility in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers. If a business is accepting bets or wagers by means of a wire
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, the business is violating the Wire Act.
Sub-question (d) (US): Why do some of th ese State laws refer to the Interstate
Horseracing Act 1978?

88. The various states of the United States, being sovereign, maintain their own statutory
schemes subject only to those matters expressly reserved to the Federal Government by the
Constitution. Federal authorities are not in a pos ition to speculate on the reasons state laws are
written in any particular way. However, a state w ould naturally want to require compliance with the
IHA for legal off-track account wagering on horse r aces, that is, account wagering occurring wholly
within the state itself that does not involve the tran smission in interstate or foreign commerce of the
bets or wagers.
Question 33 (ANT, US): Does the IHA only allo w domestic suppliers to operate wagering
services on horseracing, or can foreign suppliers in some way operate under its auspices? If

Antiguan operators entered into revenue-sharing arrangements with racetracks, would they still
be liable to prosecution?

89. So far as we can determine, Antiguan gambli ng operators, or gambling operators from any
other country, would be legally able to enter into th e relevant agreements specified in the IHA in the
United States so that they could accept wagers on t hose horse races without fear of being held civilly
liable for the payment of damages to the host racing a ssociation and others under the provisions of the
IHA. However, both domestic and foreign gambli ng operators would be subject to prosecution for
violating the Wire Act if they, being in the busin ess of betting or wagering, knowingly used a wire
communication facility in interstate or foreign commerce for the transmission of bets or wagers.
Question 34 (US): Has the U.S. ever prosecut ed under the Wire Act wagering on horseracing
conducted in accordance with the IHA? If not, why not?

90. None of the federal indictments concerning Internet gambling of which we are aware
concern wagering on horseracing that was conducte d in accordance with the IHA. There is no
reporting requirement for gambling indictments and th e statistics maintained by the Executive Office
for United States Attorneys only track the number of prosecutions brought under the statute but do not
specify the types of bets or wagers. The decision of whether to bring charges in any particular case
rests on a variety of factors within the discreti on of the prosecutor, such as the availability of
resources, and prosecutorial priorities. To our knowledge, no defendant has ever raised compliance
with the IHA as a defense to a prosecution for a violation of any federal gambling statute. If such a
defence were raised, the Department of Justice believes such a defence would be legally unsuccessful.
Question 35: Regarding Youbet.com, TVG, Xp ressBet.com, Capital OTB and the other U.S.
domestic operations described by Antigua (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73):

[Sub-questions (a) to (d) (ANT)]

Sub-question (e) (US): Has the U.S. launched a criminal prosecution against any of
these operators? What is the current status of the prosecution proceedings against
Youbet.com that were pending at the time of the original dispute (WT/DS285/R, para.
6.588)?

91. The Department of Justice is unable to comme nt on the pendency of proceedings which are
not otherwise public. The Department is not aw are of any public pending prosecution of Youbet.com
or the other entities listed above.
Question 36 (US): Do the recent prosecutions of foreign operators listed in Antigua's First
written submission at paras. 106-107 concern the provision of pari-mutuel wagering on
horseracing or other wagering services or both?

92. The prosecutions listed in para graphs 106 and 107 of Antigua's First written submission are
the May 2006 indictment United States v. William Scott, et al. , No CR 05-122 (D.D.C) and the July
2006 indictment United States v. BETONSPORTS PLC, et al ., No. 4:06 CR00337 CEJ (E.D.
Missouri). The Scott indictment alleged in paragraph 6 that the defendants "unlawfully engaged in
illegal internet casino gambling and accepts informati on to facilitate betting as well as accepting bets
and wagers from persons in the United States who place bets on baseball, basketball, football, hockey
and other sports through the internet and telephone."
93. The BETONSPORTS PLC indictment alleged that the de fendants accepted "sports wagers
from gamblers in the United States" (paragraph 1) , "offered gamblers in the United States illegal
wagering on professional and college football and basketball, as well as many other professional and

amateur sporting events and contests." (paragraph 2). The overt acts allege that the company
"accepted a sports bet" but does not provide any furt her information on the type of sporting event.
The Section 1084 counts in the indictment allege the transmission of bets but do not specify the type
of bet. While the indictment does not specifically mention pari-mutual wagering, the defendants did
accept pari-mutual wagers, and such wagers are included in the indictment's reference to "other . . .
sporting events and contests."
94. The United States has recently brought sever al more prosecutions of illegal gambling
businesses that took bets on horse races as well as a variety of other sporting events. In United States
v. Arthur Gianelli, et al. , (District of Massachusetts), and United States v. Herbert David Meyers, et
al., (District of Maryland), United States-based gamb ling operations employed the services of foreign
gambling businesses to receive, record, and tabulate wagers from the United States on various
sporting events, including horse racing. In United States v. Gerard Uvari, et al. , (Southern District of
New York), United States bookmakers transmitted num erous illegal wagers on horse races interstate.
None of the defendants in these cases entered into the agreements required by the IHA or otherwise
conformed their conduct to the IHA's provisions.
Question 37 (US): Please refer to the statement of Bruce G. Ohr of the US Department of
Justice as set out in Exhibit AB-32.

Sub-question (a): Can the U.S. confirm that th is is the statement referred to in the US
April 2006 status report to the DSB (WT/DS285/15/Add.1)?

95. Yes, this is the same statement.
Sub-question (b): What is the current status of "the civil investigation relating to a
potential violation of law" to which Mr. Ohr referred?

96. The civil investigation is still pending. Beyond that the Department of Justice is unable to
make any statement about any matter which is not public.
Sub-question (c): What was the law potentially violated? Why was it a civil, rather
than a criminal, investigation? How is it relevant to the question of how the three
Federal criminal statutes at issue are applied?

97. The Department of Justice is unable to make any specific statement concerning the
investigation. The decision to proceed criminally or civilly is, under United States legal practice,
committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor based on a variety of considerations. A civil
injunctive suit would be relevant to the application of the criminal statutes because such an injunctive
action would require, among other things, a demonstra tion that the federal criminal statutes at issue
were, or were about to be, violated, and that such violation would continue into the future.
Sub-question (d): Has the US Department of Justice ever initiated a criminal
prosecution of the interstate transmission of wagers conducted in accordance with the
IHA? Can this pattern of prosecution be taken into account in ascertaining the
Department's interpretation of the statute that it administers?

98. As set forth in response to question 34, we are not aware of any federal prosecutions
concerning Internet gambling concerning the tran smission of wagers conducted in accordance with
the IHA. With regard to the second half of this qu estion, the Appellate Body in the original

proceeding found that the Panel had erred in relying on evidence of a lack of prosecution in support of
an interpretation of the federal criminal statutes.17
Sub-question (e): Hasn't the original Panel al ready considered the interpretation of the
US Department of Justice of the IHA as amended, as expressed in the Presidential
signing statement, and found it unpersuasive? (Panel report, paras. 6.597 and 6.600) Is
the interpretation given in Mr. Ohr's statement any different from that expressed in the
Presidential signing statement?

99. As the United States understands the original panel findings, the Panel found that the
Presidential signing statement was not sufficient to m eet the US burden of establishing an affirmative
defence. However, the signing statement and the testimony of Mr. Ohr are official statements
regarding the interpretation of US criminal statutes, and are cumulative evidence in support of the US
position. Moreover, under the Skidmore doctrine discussed in the first US submission, such
statements would be considered by US courts on th e issue of statutory interpretation that the Panel is
examining in this dispute.
Sub-question (f): Did the US Department of Justice strongly object to the 2000
amendment to the IHA? If so, does this affect the weight to be given now to its
interpretation of the relationship between that Act, as amended, and the Federal
criminal statutes at issue?

100. The 2000 Amendment to the Interstate Horseraci ng Act was inserted at the last minute by
Congress in an appropriations bill providing funding fo r the Department of Justice and other agencies
of government. The Department of Justice did no t learn that this amendment had been inserted until
after the bill had been passed by both houses of Congress and transmitted to the President for
signature. In sum, the Department of Justice was not afforded an opportunity to comment on the
amendment until after it had already been adopted by Congress. However, the Department's position
on the effect of the amendment with respect to federal criminal laws was made clear in the
Presidential signing statement.
Question 38: With respect to the question whether the three Federal criminal statutes at issue
are, on their face, non-discriminatory.

Sub-questions (a) (ANT, US): Did the Appella te Body have competence to make the
finding at paras. 354 and 357 of its report when this was not covered in the Panel report
or a legal interpretation developed by the Panel, and it was contested by Antigua
(original first oral statement, para. 92; original Second written submission, paras. 33-
34)?

101. Yes, the Appellate Body had competence to make this finding. In doing so, the Appellate
Body was attempting to complete the analysis in the dispute, after the Appellate Body had vacated
certain Panel findings regarding the application of th e Article XIV chapeau to the facts of this case.
The wording of the statutes was not in dispute, and the Appellate Body acted properly in applying the
legal criteria of the GATS to the undisputed facts concerning the content of the statutory language.
[Sub-question (b) (ANT)]

Sub-question (c) (US): Without prejudice to whether the Panel should review this issue,
can the U.S. elaborate on its view that the text of those laws does not contain provisions

17 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 356-357.

that discriminate between countries, when th e Wire Act refers to "interstate or foreign
commerce", but not to intrastate commerce? (US FWS §17) )

102. The source of federal jurisdiction for the federal gambling statutes at issue is the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, which allo ws Congress to pass laws only where there is an
effect on interstate or foreign commerce. The refere nce to interstate or foreign commerce in the Wire
Act is an example of the jurisdictional requirement imposed by the Constitution, and does not define
the class of individuals who may be prosecuted unde r the statute. Once this requisite effect on
interstate or foreign commerce is satisfied, the cr iminal prohibitions are a pplied equally to anyone,
without discrimination, regardless of nationality or country of origin, that violates the statute.
103. Thus, the fact that the statutes do not address intrastate commerce reflects no
"discrimination" in the operation of US federal laws, it simply reflects the US constitutional scheme
governing federal regulation of commerce. More over, the absence of a federal prohibition on
intrastate activity in no way indicates that stat e gambling statutes (which do govern intrastate
commerce) are discriminatory. For these reasons, th e Appellate Body was correct in finding that the
federal statutes were non-discriminatory on their face.

ANNEX F-3

REPLIES BY CHINA TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(8 DECEMBER 2006)

Question 1: Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that "In the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal
 of the
measures concerned if these are fo und to be inconsistent with th e provisions of any of the
covered agreements." Article 22.8 of the DSU a pplies until "such time as the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed " (emphasis added). How, in your
view, do these provisions affect the interpretatio n of the phrase "measures taken to comply" as
used in Article 21.5 of the DSU?

1. In China's view, there is no direct relati onship between these two provisions and the
interpretation of the phrase "measures taken to comply" as used in Article 21.5 of the DSU.
[Question 2 (EC)]

[Question 3 (Japan)]

Question 4: Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a defence is
rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the same, i.e. the
defence fails?

2. In China's view, whether a defence is rejected out right or is simply not established for lack of
evidence, the result is the same : the DSB will generally recommend the defending party bring its
measure into conformity with the covered agre ements, although these two different occasions under a
specific dispute may affect the reasoning in which the panel or the Appellate Body comes to its
conclusions.
Question 5: Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body report
"shall be unconditionally accepted by the partie s", absolute? For example, would it apply
where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a report
exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

3. As China mentioned in the oral statement, both the words "shall" and "unconditionally"
indicates that the disciplines under Article 17.14 is of mandatory nature. China cannot see any inherent
conflicts between the mandatory disciplines under Article 17.14 with Article 19.2 and Article 17.6 of
the DSU. Article 17.14 stipulates the disciplines on the disputed parties, while both Article 19.2 and
17.6 of the DSU provides for the obligation which should be abided by the Appellate Body.
[Question 6 (EC, Japan)]

Question 7: Please refer to Article 17.14 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's decision in EC -
Bed Linen. In your view, are these expressions of a principle that at some point disputes should
be treated as finally settled so that potentia lly endless cycles of litigation are avoided not only
with respect to claims but also with respect to defences and specific issues considered in
disputes, and both with respect to arguments that are rejected and those that fail for lack of
evidence?

4. The plain reading of Article 17.14 of the DSU and the jurisprudence made by the Appellate
Body' in EC - Bed Linen, to some extent, show the principle that disputes should be treated as finally

settled so that potentially endless cycles of litigation are avoided. This principle applies not only
claims but also to defences. Furthermore, China be lieves that this principle is the same both with
respect to arguments that are rejected and those that fail for lack of evidence. In this regard, China
would like to invite the panel to re fer to the Appellate Body report in EC - Bed Linen , in which
para. 96 states that,
"… In our view, the effect, for the parties, of findings adopted by the DSB as part of a
panel report is the same, regardless of wh ether a panel found that the complainant
failed to establish a prima facie case that the measure is inconsistent with WTO
obligations, that the Panel found that the measure is fully consistent with WTO
obligations, or that the Panel found that the measure is not consistent with WTO
obligations."
[Question 8 (EC)]

Question 9: Please refer to Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU. In your view, do these provisions
grant a special status to the implementing Member? For example, do DSB recommendations
and the procedures for surveillance of their implementation focus on the respondent rather than
the complainant, so that the respondent knows what aspects of a measure it is required to
modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, a nd protect the respondent from having to face
a second claim with respect to the same aspect?

5. Under WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is the defending party who undertakes the
obligation to implement the DSB's rulings and r ecommendations, not the complaining party. Since
Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU stipulate th e panel and Appellate Body recommendations
 and
surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings , these two provisions focus on the
implementing Member. However, whether the panel and Appellate Body will finally make
recommendations and what recommendations to be made depend on the specific circumstances of a
specific case. China sees no text of the DSU that requires the DSB recommendation should taking
into consideration whether it can help the responde nt knows what aspects of a measure it is required
to modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, and so that protect the respondent from having to
face a second claim with respect to the same aspect.
Question 10: Do you consider unusual the commen ts and clarification in the Appellate Body
report in this dispute that have been highlig hted by the U.S. (US FWS §42)? How do you
interpret these comments? Do you think that it was the intention of the Appellate Body that the
U.S. could implement by showing / demonstrating / establishing a second time what it could not
show / demonstrate / establish the first time? In what other reports has the Appellate Body
made similar comments or clarifications?

6. It is true that, the comments and clarification in the Appellate Body report in this dispute are
to some extent special, as compared with other various Appellate Body reports. China notes that the
reason is the nature of the discipline under GATS Article XIV chapeau. The burden is on the
respondent to prove it has abided by the rules. However, nothing in the Appellate Body report
indicates a clear intention by the Appellate Body that the US could implement by establishing a
second time what it could not demonstrate in the original disputes.
[Question 11 (Japan)]

Question 12: How can a Member bring a measure into conformity with its obligations when (a)
it has been found that the measure is provisionally justified under a paragraph in a general
exception provision; and (b) it has not been fo und that the measure satisfies the chapeau of the
general exception provision.

7. For a general exception provision, as WTO jurispr udence has clarified, a sub-paragraph in a
general exception provision and the chapeau of the general exception provision mandate different and
separate obligations. The panel or the Appellate Body would enter into so called "two-tiered analysis"
when dealing with such an assessm ent. In the case that a specific measure is justified by a sub-
paragraph, but fails the text under the chapeau of that provision, the defending party shall still
undertake the obligation to bring the measure into conformity with WTO rules. As to how can a
Member bring its measure into conformity, China views that it is an issue of case by case and the
implementing member enjoy discretion to shape the "measures taken to comply". Put in other way,
the implementing member may choose to remove its measure thoroughly and totally, or simply
choose to make its measure consistent with the ch apeau of the general exception provision, or take
some other actions which could implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations.
Question 13: If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a defence, would
the compliance panel make its assessment on th e basis of evidence presented in the compliance
proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

8. China notes that Article 11 of the DSU stipulates that a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an obj ective assessment of the facts of the case. Further,
Article 13 of the DSU provides the panel with th e right to seek information. In performing its
functions, a panel would have a wide scope of discretion in assessing the facts before it.
Question 14: If a respondent had sufficient evidence to demonstrate in a compliance proceeding
that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the compliance panel
denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would this require a
respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

Question 15: If a respondent were not entitled to a "second chance", would this be reasonable
after a complex original dispute that presented num erous novel issues, especially if the dispute
involved an under-resourced respondent who was unfamiliar with WTO dispute settlement?

9. [Answer to questions 14 and 15] China thinks that both questions 14 and 15 are systematic
issues for this panel in this proceeding. Howeve r, China would not provide more comments on them.
China would like to see any clarifications and conclusions by this panel.
[Question 16 (EC)]

Question 17: Does the fact that the statements a re made in the context of Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU require that they be given different weight fr om that accorded to any other statements of a
party concerning an issue in dispute? If so, what weight should they be given?

Question 18 (China): How should the "appropriat e balance" be struck between the discretion
of an implementing Member to shape the measu res taken to comply and the principle of good

10. [Answer to questions 17 and 18] As China has highlighted in its oral statement, it is a
systematic and complicated issue with regard to wh ether an appropriate weight should be given to the
Article 21.3 arbitration proceeding. China agrees that the intention or statement to act in a specific
way to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings presented during the Article 21.3
proceeding could not be construed as legally bind ing upon the implementing party. However, the
good faith principle under Article 3.10 should not be di sregarded in that the good faith principle is of
vital importance in maintaining the proper function of the dispute settlement mechanism. As to how
should the "appropriate balance" be struck between the discretion of an implementing Member to
shape the measures taken to comply and the principl e of good faith, it is not easy to provide a general

and definite answer. China would like to let this pa nel note what it concerns and is looking forward to
any clarifications and jurisdictions may be put forward by this panel on these systematic issues.

ANNEX F-4

REPLIES BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(8 DECEMBER 2006)

Question 1: Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that "In the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal
 of the
measures concerned if these are fo und to be inconsistent with th e provisions of any of the
covered agreements." Article 22.8 of the DSU a pplies until "such time as the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed " (emphasis added). How, in your
view, do these provisions affect the interpretatio n of the phrase "measures taken to comply" as
used in Article 21.5 of the DSU?

1. In the present case, both the panel and the Appe llate Body ruled that the United States had
acted inconsistently with its obligations under th e GATS. The Appellate Body confirmed the panel's
findings relating to the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA), ruling that the relationship between the IHA
and the three criminal statutes at issue in the original proceedings was ambiguous. The ambiguity
which was found to exist relates to whether remo te gambling on horse races by domestic service
providers has been exempted from the prohibitions contained in the three aforementioned criminal
statutes. The panel found and the Appe llate Body confirmed that on its face
, the IHA permitted
domestic United States service suppliers to supply remote betting services for horseracing, and that
consequently, the United States had not met the re quirements of the chapeau of Article XIV GATS.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body recommended that the DSB request the United States to bring its
measures, found to be inconsistent with the GATS, into conformity with its obligations under that
agreement (para. 374).
2. It follows from the foregoing that as a result of the adoption by the DSB of the panel and the
Appellate Body reports in relation to the original proceedings, it is incumbent on the United States to
remove the noted ambiguity in the relationship between the IHA and the three criminal federal
statutes at issue in the original proceedings. Leavi ng the representations made by the United States in
the Article 21.3 (c) Arbitration aside, under the DSU the United States, as implementing Member, is
in principle free to choose any of the various options that may exist to bring about compliance.
3. In the EC's view the objective of the "withdr awal of the measures concerned" set out in
Article 3.7 DSU will be met in relation to the present dispute when the United States takes (a)
measure(s) to comply (Article 21.5 DSU) that eliminate(s) the WTO violation. The measure(s) taken
to comply must, in accordance with the DSB's rulin gs and recommendations, consist of a removal of
the ambiguity in the relationship between the IHA and the three criminal federal statutes at issue in
the original proceedings. WTO case law confirms that the words underlined in the question do not
mean that a Member must always abrogate the dis puted legal act. What matters is that the WTO
violation is eliminated. To that end, amendments clarifying the meaning of a measure may be
sufficient.
1
Question 2 (EC): What kind of "cogent reasons" or "reasonable explanation" could entitle an
implementing party not to bring any new meas ures before a compliance panel? (European

1 Panel report on European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (15 March 2005), para. 8.5; Panel report on European
Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographi cal Indications for Agricultural Products and

4. In response, as clarified at the meeting with third parties on 28 November 2006, the European
Communities is of the view that the United States, in the circumstances of this case, and particularly
in view of the representations it made in the Article 21.3 (c) Arbitration phase, must justify the
following: why is the United States now of the view that contrary to its earlier firm assertions on this
issue, no fresh legislation needs to be enacted by it to comply with the DSB's rulings and
recommendations?
5. Any explanation given by the United States must be consistent with the DSU. For the reasons
set out in the European Communities written and oral submission it is not acceptable for the United
States to simply reaffirm before this complianc e Panel that the measures which were before the
original panel are WTO-consistent, without showi ng any relevant change in these measures or any
modification of any aspect of these measures.
2
6. It is not for the European Communities to speculate on the form of implementation the United
States' compliance measures should take. In principle, as repeated above, it is up to the United States
as implementing Member, to choose a suitable met hod of compliance. In general, compliance can
consist of legislative or non-legislative measur es. The European Communiti es notes however that the
United States in the Article 21.3 (c) Arbitration phase asserted that the only way for it to comply was
by enacting fresh legislation. 3 In addition, it was confirmed in the original proceedings that a
Presidential executive statement or executive order woul d be insufficient to resolve the ambiguity in
the relationship between the various acts.
7. The European Communities does not believe that it is incumbent upon it to suggest a cogent
explanation but hypothetically, in the particular circ umstances of this case, if there had been a recent
Supreme Court ruling that satisfactorily clarifies the interaction between the various federal statutes at
issue, and that removes the noted WTO-inconsiste nt ambiguity, this might be a possible cogent
explanation for this United States' change of mind regarding the need for enactment of fresh
legislation. A more general hypothetical exam ple could be a change of the constitutional
arrangements in a Member, giving the executive new powers to enact measures which previously
could be adopted only by the legislature.
[Question 3 (Japan)]

Question 4: Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a defence is
rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the same, i.e. the
defence fails?

8. In response, the European Communities respectfu lly refers to the observations which it made
on this question in its Third party written submission
4 and oral statement.5
9. The first point to note is that the ( res judicata) principle according to which adopted reports
must be regarded as a final resolutio n of the dispute between parties in relation to a particular (aspect
of a) claim applies with equal force to affirmativ e defences. It makes no difference for the application
of the (res judicata) principle, whether a complaining party's claim or a responding party's affirmative
defence was rejected because of failure to meet a burden of proof or for any other reason, as long as it
is established that the claim or the affirmative de fence was ruled upon. This follows clearly from the

2 EC Third party written submission, Section II, pa ras. 8-15; Section III, paras. 22-26; Section IV,
paras. 30-34, paras. 42-47; EC Third party oral statement, paras. 5, 6 & 7, 14-21.
3 EC Third party written submission, Section V, paras. 58-66
4 EC Third party written submission, Section IV (2), paras. 42-47.
5 EC Third party oral statement, paras. 15-21.

Appellate Body's ruling in Bed Linen quoted in paragraph 47 of the European Communities' oral
statement.
6
10. Further, the European Communities notes that in this particular case the Appellate Body
reviewed the circumstances under wh ich the panel considered the Un ited States' affirmative defence
under Article XIV GATS.7 As noted in the Appellate Body report, according to the United States, "the
Panel properly considered the United States' de fence under Article XIV" and emphasised that
"Antigua had sufficient opportunity to respond" to the defence after the United States invoked
Article XIV in its Second written submission to the Panel.8
11. The United States did not argue in the original proceedings that it was not offered sufficient
opportunity to present evidence in support of its affirmative defence. The European Communities
submits that the United States could not have rai sed such an argument successfully as it was the
United States itself that decided on the (late) timing of the invocation of its affirmative defence before
the panel. This was precisely the reason why Antigua appealed to the Appellate Body, claiming that
the Panel had erred in its decision to consider the United States' affirmative defence in the original
proceeding.9
12. Consequently, in the European Communities' view, there is no ground for this Article 21.5
Panel to consider the United States' argument that it was not offered sufficient opportunity to present
evidence in support of its affirmative defence. In this regard, the European Communities notes that the
Appellate Body in the original proceeding held th at for reasons of good faith and due process both the
complaining and the responding party need to put forw ard their case during the first stage of the panel
proceedings.10 More specifically, the Appellate Body held as follows:
"(….) under the standard working procedur es of panels, complaining parties should
put forward their cases - with "a full presentation of the facts on the basis of
submission of supporting evidence"- during th e first stage of panel proceedings. We
see no reason why this expectation would not apply equally to responding parties
(…);
11
Question 5: Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body report
"shall be unconditionally accepted by the partie s", absolute? For example, would it apply
where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a report
exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

13. In response, the European Communities confirms that once the DSB has adopted the panel
and the Appellate Body reports in relation to a pa rticular dispute, the principle, which finds an
expression in Article 17.14 DSU, according to whic h findings and conclusions contained in these
reports are final, is indeed, without exception.
14. Further, in the present case neither party has argued that the Appellate Body report's findings
and/or conclusions are in breach of Article 17.6 or 19.2 DSU. Th e European Communities
respectfully submits that there is no ground for such concern in this case, and that therefore this
question is entirely hypothetical. 12

6 Appellate Body report on EC-Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 96.
7 Appellate Body report, para. 114 (D) (i).
8 Appellate Body report, para. 91.
9 Appellate Body report, para. 268.
10 Appellate Body report, paras. 271, 272.
11 Appellate Body report, para.271
12 See too: the EC's response to question 14 below.

15. In addition, the European Communities does not believe it would ever be appropriate for a
21.5 panel to hold that a previously adopted panel and/or Appellate Body report in the same dispute
settlement procedure makes findings or draws conclusi ons that would be in breach of one or the other
provision of the DSU.
Question 6 (EC, Japan): Please refer to the Appe llate Body report in European Communities -
Bed Linen. Why in your view does this report mean that a responding party to a dispute cannot
use a compliance proceeding to obtain a "second chance"? (European Communities oral

16. The European Communities confirms that it is of the view that the reason why parties are not
entitled to a 'second' chance at rearguing their case in an Article 21. 5 proceeding is based on the
general principle of res judicata which finds its expression in Article 17.14 DSU. The European
Communities refers in this regard to the submissions which it made earlier,
13 and to its answer to
question 7 below.
17. While the case EC – Bed Linen specifically addressed a situation where the complaining party
tried to re-open a claim already settled, it is clear from the Appellate Body's reasoning in this case that
the principle of finality or res judicata equally applies to complaining and responding parties. In
particular in paragraph 98 of its ruling, the Appellate Body put the emphasis on the object and
purposes of the DSU which is the prompt settlement of cases in order to guarantee the effective
functioning of the WTO. 14 Its argument in that paragraph that "it would be incompatible with the
function and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system if a claim could be reasserted in
Article 21.5 proceeding after the original panel or the Appellate Body has made a finding […]"
applies with equal force to a defence that would be re-asserted on the same grounds as in the original
proceedings.
Question 7: Please refer to Article 17.14 of th e DSU and the Appellate Body's decision in
European Communities - Bed Linen. In your vi ew, are these expressions of a principle that at
some point disputes should be treated as finally settled so that potentially endless cycles of
litigation are avoided not only with respect to cl aims but also with respect to defences and
specific issues considered in disputes, and both with respect to arguments that are rejected and
those that fail for lack of evidence?

18. In response the European Communities confirms its view that the Appellate Body's ruling in
EC – Bed Linen , which is consistent with other WTO ca se law, reflects a general fundamental
principle that a matter may not be re-litigat ed once it has been judged on the merits. 15 As the
Appellate Body has confirmed, this principle finds its expression in the obligation set out in
Article 17.14 DSU for WTO Members to "uncondi tionally accept" findings contained in adopted

13 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, paras. 30-34; 42-47; EC Third party oral statement,
paras. 8-21.
14 For an emphasis on the importance of a "fair , prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes" see
also the Appellate Body on United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS/108/AB/R
(20 March 2000), para.166.
15 The European Communities has referred to this principle using the Latin expression of res judicata,
meaning "the thing has been decided". It should be noted that Japan has in is Third party submissions in these
proceedings used the notion of "finality" of adopted panel and Appellate report findings. Both res judicata and
the notion of "finality" refer to the same fundamental principle underlying domestic and international litigation,
i.e. a final judgement of a competent court is conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent litigation involving
the same cause of action.

panel and Appellate Body reports. The European Communities refers in this regard to the submissions
which it made earlier.
16
19. In relation to the present case the European Commun ities is of the view that the ruling of the
Appellate Body in EC - Bed Linen, is particularly on point, as the Appellate Body was dealing with an
appeal from an Article 21.5 compliance panel and effectively held that the res judicata principle
applies regardless of the ground on which a party failed to prevail:
"(…) In our view, the effect, for the parties, of findings adopted by the DSB as part of
a panel report is the same, regardless of whether a panel found that the complainant
failed to establish a prima facie case that the measure is inconsistent with WTO
obligations, that the Panel found that the measure is fully consistent with WTO
obligations, or that the Panel found that the measure is not consistent with WTO
obligations. A complainant that, in an orig inal proceeding, fails to establish a prima
facie case should not be given a "second ch ance" in an Article 21.5 proceeding, and
thus be treated more favourably than a comp lainant that did establish a prima facie
case but, ultimately, failed to prevail before th e original panel, with the result that the
panel did not find the challenged measure to be inconsistent with WTO obligations.
Nor should a defending party be subject to a second challenge of the measure found
not to be inconsistent with WTO obliga tions, merely because the complainant failed
to establish a prima facie case, as opposed to failing ultimately to persuade the
original panel. Once adopted by the DSB, both findings amount to a final resolution
to the issue between the parties with respect to the particular claim and the specific
aspects of the measure that are the subject of the claim."
17
Question 8 (EC, Japan): Where is the risk of a "potentially endless loop"? Is there an endless
loop where, as in this dispute, there is a procedural agreement that provides that if the
compliance panel finds against the respondent, the complainant may proceed to request
suspension of concessions under Article 22.2 of the DSU? (Japan Third party written
submission, para. 8)

20. The European Communities understands Japan's re ference to a "potentially endless loop" as
pointing to a risk of repetition of substantive arguments rather than to a risk of repetition of procedure.
The finality of a DSB ruling means that absent any fa ctual development issues are not to be re-opened
between the same parties on the same matter irrespective of the specific procedure at hand.
21. As recent experience shows, the fact of movi ng on to the next procedural stage after a
compliance panel, i.e. the authorisation of su spension of concessions, does not necessarily end the
dispute between the parties. A WTO Member f ound to have breached the WTO Agreement normally
has an interest in ending any suspension of concessions applied against it by bringing about
compliance. In any subsequent WTO litigation, th e parties would risk entering an "endless loop
debate" if they were allowed to rely on facts and arguments previ ously advanced, but rejected by a
binding panel or Appellate Body decision.
Question 9: Please refer to Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU. In your view, do these provisions
grant a special status to the implementing Member? For example, do DSB recommendations
and the procedures for surveillance of their implementation focus on the respondent rather than
the complainant, so that the respondent knows what aspects of a measure it is required to

16 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, paras. 30-34; 42-47; EC Third party oral statement,
paras. 8-21.
17 Appellate Body report on EC-Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 96.

modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, a nd protect the respondent from having to face
a second claim with respect to the same aspect?

22. In the European Communities' view, while it can be said that Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU
are specifically addressed to the responding Memb er, these provisions do not imply any "special
status" of that Member let alone any privile ged position vis-à-vis the application of the res judicata
principle. The res judicata principle applies in an equal manner to either party to a dispute. It
protects the responding Member from having to face a second claim with respect to the same aspect as
much as it protects the complaining Member from having to re-argue that same claim.
Question 10: Do you consider unusual the commen ts and clarification in the Appellate Body
report in this dispute that have been highlig hted by the U.S. (US FWS §42)? How do you
interpret these comments? Do you think that it was the intention of the Appellate Body that the
U.S. could implement by showing / demonstrating / establishing a second time what it could not
show / demonstrate / establish the first time? In what other reports has the Appellate Body
made similar comments or clarifications?

23. In response, the European Co mmunities does not believe that the language used by the
Appellate Body on which the United States seeks to rely is unusual. When the Appellate Body holds
that a party has not "shown" or "demonstrated" the Appellate Body has made a negative assessment as
to whether the arguments and evidence put forward by a particular party were sufficiently persuasive
for it to prevail. For the systemic reasons outlined by the European Communities, use of these terms
cannot be understood as inviting the party that failed to persuade the panel/Appellate Body to make its
case again before an Article 21.5 panel. U se of the phraseology "has not shown", "has not
demonstrated" is tantamount to a judgement that the party concerned "has not established".
24. In the European Communities' view the above cl early follows by analogy from the Appellate
Body's ruling in EC – Bed Linen
 18 cited in para. 47 of the European Communities' Third party written
submission, and in para. 20 above in response to qu estion 6. In the ruling in question the Appellate
Body states that the res judicata principle applies regardless of the ground on which a party failed to
prevail, emphasising that the principle applies in cases not only where the complainant "failed to
establish" a prima facie case, but also where the complainant "did establish" a prima facie case, but
ultimately "failed to prevail" or where the complain ant "ultimately" "failed to persuade the original
panel".
[Question 11 (Japan)]

Question 12: How can a Member bring a measure in to conformity with its obligations when (a)
it has been found that the measure is provisionally justified under a paragraph in a general
exception provision; and (b) it has not been fo und that the measure satisfies the chapeau of the
general exception provision.

25. As set out above in response to question 2, it is not for the European Communities as a third
party to speculate on the form of implementation the United States' compliance measures should take.
In principle, as repeated above, it is up to th e United States as implementing Member, to choose a
suitable method of compliance. In general, complia nce can consist of legislative or non-legislative
measures. Any measure taken to comply in this particular dispute must however, in any event,
remove the WTO-inconsistent ambiguity in the in teraction between the various federal statutes at
issue so as to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV GATS.

18 Appellate Body report on EC-Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 96.

26. For the reasons set out in the EC's written and oral submissions,
19 the United States cannot be
considered in compliance if it merely re-argues its point of view (rejected by the panel and the
Appellate Body reports) that there is no ambiguity in the interaction between the various federal
statutes at issue, in the absence of any relevant ch ange in the contested measure or in the absence of
any new measure having been taken.
27. As noted by the European Communities in paragraph 63 of its Third party written submission,
in the Article 21.3(c) Arbitral Award it is noted that the United States had not explained in any precise
manner how it intended to implement the recommendati ons and rulings of the DSB. However, this
lack of precision by the United States only rela ted to the question of "whether legislative
implementation would be achieved by 'confirming' or 'clarifying' the prohibitions on the remote
supply of gambling and betting services, rather than in the direction of authorizing, even in part, the
supply of such services". This was in the United Stat es' view an issue for the United States' legislator
to resolve. The lack of precision did not concern the question of whether, from the US' point of view,
legislative action was optional. This is confirme d moreover, by the Arbitrator's summary of the
grounds put forward by the United States which he accepted as "particular circumstances" for the
determination of the reasonable period of time.20
Question 13: If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a defence, would
the compliance panel make its assessment on th e basis of evidence presented in the compliance
proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

28. In response the European Communities respectfully confirms its view that for the systemic
reasons outlined by the EC, this Panel should not allow either party to re-open issues ruled upon in
reports adopted by the DSB. The European Communities makes five points in this regard.
29. A first, rather fundamental, point is that the DSU does not provide for a further instance in the
dispute settlement proceedings, whereby conclusions of the original panel, modified as the case may
be, by the Appellate Body, might after adoption by the DSB, somehow be appealed to a compliance
panel. The European Communities r espectfully recalls that under the DSU, findings of the original
panel can be appealed only once and only in relatio n to issues of law covered in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel (Article 17.6 DSU).
30. Secondly, as pointed out by the European Communities in its written submission, 21 the
Appellate Body has in US-Shrimp confirmed that the obligati on of the Appellate Body under
Article 21.5 is :
"surveillance of implementation of the r ecommendations and rulings made by the
DSB rather than a de novo review of the rulings themselves and therefore the
Appellate Body report shall be treated by th e parties to a dispute as a final resolution
of that dispute".22 (emphasis added)
31. The European Communities submits that the sa me tenet also applies to a panel in an
Article 21.5 proceeding.
32. Thirdly, as the European Communities has pointed out before, the Appellate Body
jurisprudence on the legal effect of adopted panel and Appellate report findings (i.e. that once adopted

19 EC Third party written submission, S ection III, paras. 22-26; Section IV, paras. 30-34, paras. 42-47;
EC Third party oral statement, paras. 7, 14-21.
20 EC Third party written submission, Section V, para. 63 and references contained therein.
21 EC Third party written submission, para. 31.
22 Appellate Body report on US –Shrimp (Article 21.5 –Malaysia), para. 97.

by the DSB, such findings amount to a final resolution to the issue between the parties with respect to
the particular claim and the specific aspects of the m easure that are the subject of the claim) leaves no
room for this Panel to offer either party a 'second chance'.
33. Fourthly, as the Appellate Body has emphasised 23, Article 21 DSU deals with events
"subsequent" to the DSB's adoption of recommendations and rulings in a particular dispute. Even if a
compliance panel has a broad mandate, 24 it is not the task of a compliance panel to review the rulings
and recommendations which the DSB made on the b asis of the conclusions of the panel and the
Appellate Body reports. Therefore, the task this Panel is to asses whether the United States has
implemented the rulings and recommendations of the DSB in relation to the original proceedings.
34. A fifth point is that the European Communiti es would note that the Appellate Body in the
original proceeding held that, for reasons of good faith and due process, both the complaining and the
responding party should put forward their cases with "a full presentation of the facts on the basis of
submission of supporting evidence" – during the first stage of the panel proceedings. 25
35. It was on the basis of the above considerati ons that the European Communities addressed the
question of admissibility of new evidence in co mpliance proceedings. The European Communities
suggested in its written submission and oral statemen t that a distinction should be made between two
hypotheses: first, where a new measure is brought before a compliance panel; second, where no new
measure has been taken. In relation to the first hypothesis, the European Communities generally holds
the view that if there is a new measure before a compliance panel, this entails the emergence of new
factual circumstances and thus a broad right to bring new claims, arguments and factual circumstances
against the new measure and all its elements. Th e second hypothesis however, presents more difficult
systemic questions. The European Communities is of the view that the question of whether reopening
of an issue is allowed on the basis of alleged fr esh evidence, in the absen ce of new measures, is a
delicate matter, for two main reasons: firstly, the DSU contains no provisions on admission of fresh
evidence in Article 21.5 proceedings; secondly, a llowing admission of fresh evidence where no new
measure has been presented may be regarded as undermining the res judicata principle.26
36. For the above reasons, the European Communities respectfully declines to enter into a debate
about what evidence might be admissible if either party were, contrary to the settled jurisprudence of
the Appellate Body, entitled to re-litigate any such issue.
Question 14: If a respondent had sufficient eviden ce to demonstrate in a compliance proceeding
that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the compliance panel
denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would this require a
respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

37. In response the European Commun ities respectfully refers to its answer to question 13. It
submits that it must be doubtful whether the hypothesi s that lies at the basis of this question (i.e.,
"where a respondent has sufficient evidence to demonstrate its case in a compliance proceeding") is
one that a compliance panel should contemplate under the current rules of the DSU.
38. To begin with, the European Communities woul d note that the DSU sets up a system of
binding dispute settlement for WTO members. This di spute settlement, as set out in Article 3.2 of the
DSU, is a central element in providing security and predictably of the multilateral trading system.
Article 3.7 DSU emphasises that in the absence of a mutually agreed solution the objective of the

23 Appellate Body report on US-Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 70
24 EC Third party written submission, Section III, paras. 16-19.
25 Appellate Body report, paras. 271-272.
26 EC Third party written submission, Section IV; EC Third party oral statement, paras. 8-21.

DSU is to secure the withdrawal of measures incons istent with the covered agreements. When in the
absence of a mutually agreed solution, a panel ha s been established by the DSB, Article 19 (1)
provides that in case the panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, "it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into
conformity with the agreement".
39. In the present case, it is clear that both the pa nel and the Appellate Body concluded that the
measures at issue in the original proceeding were not consistent with the US' obligations under the
GATS. Accordingly, the Appellate Body recomme nded that the DSB request the United States to
bring its measures, found to be inconsistent with the GATS, into conformity with its obligations under
that agreement (para. 374). Both the Panel and the Appellate Body report were adopted by the DSB
under Article 17.14 DSU and both parties must theref ore 'unconditionally' accept the ensuing rulings
and recommendations. The European Communities respect fully submits that this Panel is also bound
by this provision.
40. It follows that the United States is obliged to implement the rulings and recommendations of
the DSB, and that the Panel should confirm that obligation in the present proceeding.
Question 15: If a respondent were not entitled to a "second chance", would this be reasonable
after a complex original dispute that presented num erous novel issues, especially if the dispute
involved an under-resourced respondent who was unfamiliar with WTO dispute settlement?

41. In response the European Communities respectfully submits that none of the parties to this
dispute claim that they should be entitled to presen t fresh evidence in an Article 21. 5 panel on the
ground that they are or were somehow, under-resourced.
42. However on the theoretical and systemic issue referred to in this question the European
Communities has made the following observations in its written submission:
"38. In the EC's view the question of whet her a party should be allowed to re-open
a debate on the basis of alleged new evidence, where no new measure has been taken,
is a delicate issue . The first point to note is that the DSU does not contain provisions
allowing for the admission of fresh evidence during the course of proceedings . This is
in contrast to some international tribunals that have rules of procedure and evidence
on the admission for fresh evidence in the course of the proceedings, or that have
accepted this in the course of developing their case law.
39. To the extent that adducing of new ev idence is allowed, and especially in the
context of appellate proceedings in inte rnational litigation, this right is often
circumscribed by strict parameters. Gene rally, the party wishing to bring fresh
evidence would need to demonstrate that th is evidence was not available at the first
instance; either because it did not exist or, if it did exist, it could not have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
40. In the EC's view, it is an entirely different question however, whether in the
WTO dispute settlement system a panel under Article 21.5 DSU should be required to
be open to admission of allegedly fresh evidence. The European Communities sees a
clear tension here with the (res judicata) principle referred to above: i.e., adopted
reports must be regarded as a final resolution of the dispute between parties in
relation to a particular claim. At the same time, the European Communities
acknowledges that the discovery of pertinent fresh evidence that was not available at
the first instance could possibly be regarded as an exception to this rule, because of
the broad mandate a compliance panel is entrusted with.

41. In the circumstances of this case th e European Communities suggests that the
Panel may also consider that the time when the allegedly fresh evidence came to light
is relevant for this assessment (emphasis added, footnotes omitted)."27
43. Therefore, the European Communities submits that admission of fresh evidence in an
Article 21. 5 proceeding in the absence of a new meas ure taken to comply is a delicate issue, as there
are no express rules in the DSU allowing for this po ssibility; and further, because of the clear tension
with the (res judicata) principle that governs findings and conc lusions contained in adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports. Nevertheless, the Europ ean Communities has also suggested that a "due
diligence" standard may be applied in these matters including consideration of the time when the
allegedly fresh evidence came to light.
44. Finally and with regard in particular to possible resource problems of developing country
Members, the European Communities points out also that the DSU contains provisions allowing the
Panel to modify its procedures to take account of the needs of a developing country Member (e.g.,
Article 12.10 DSU). Accordingly, such a Member s hould be required to signal any possible resource
problems at the original panel stage. For the same reason, potential resource problems that allegedly
hamper a Member at making its case in relation to the original measures cannot validly be invoked for
the first time in a compliance proceeding.
Question 16 (EC): What is the authority for the proposition that "[u]nder the DSU every Party
is required to bring its best case forward in the original proceedings"? (European Communities
Third party submission, para. 46)

45. As the European Communities has pointed out be fore the Appellate Body jurisprudence on
the legal effect of adopted panel and Appellate re port findings (i.e. that once adopted by the DSB,
such findings amount to a final resolution to the issue between the parties with respect to the
particular claim and the specific aspects of the m easure that are the subject of the claim) leaves no
room for this Panel to offer either party a 'second chance'.
28
46. Further, the European Communities would note ag ain that the Appellate Body in the original
proceeding held for reasons of good faith and due process that both the complaining and the
responding party should put forward their cases with "a full presentation of the facts on the basis of
submission of supporting evidence" – during the first stage of the panel proceedings.29
47. Consequently on the basis of the foregoing principles there is no room for allowing a party to
reopen issues settled by adopted reports. Further, as the European Communities has observed too, new
arguments and evidence relating to issues dealt w ith in the original proceedings could only be
acceptable for a compliance panel if they relate to a new measure taken to comply.30
Question 17: Does the fact that the statements are made in the context of Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU require that they be given different weight fr om that accorded to any other statements of a
party concerning an issue in dispute? If so, what weight should they be given?

48. The European Communities confirms that, as ou tlined in its written submission, there are
important systemic reasons why this Panel must in its assessment of whether the United States has

27 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, paras. 38-41.
28 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, paras. 30-34; EC Third party oral statement,
paras. 11-13.
29 Appellate Body report, paras. 271-272.
30 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, pa ras. 35-41; EC Third party oral statement,
paras. 9-13.

complied with the DSB's rulings and recommendations, take into account the representations made by
the United States in the Article 21.3 (c) phase of the proceedings:
31
(a) The principle of good faith requires complain ants and respondents to engage in the
DSU procedures in good faith and in an effo rt to resolve the dispute (Article 3.10
DSU);
(b) The DSU requires "prompt compliance" w ith DSB rulings and recommendations
(Article 21.1 DSU);
(c) A reasonable period of time can only be gr anted to an implementing Member only
where "prompt compliance" is impractical (Article 21.3 DSU);
(d) Article 21.3 (c) proceedings form part of the process of multilateral surveillance of
implementation of recommendations and rulings;
(e) Representations made by an implementing Member before an Article 21.3 (c)
Arbitrator must be regarded as forming an integral part of the surveillance of
implementation following the DSB's rulings and recommendations, by analogy to the
Appellate Body's ruling in US-Softwood Lumber IV.
32
49. In the Article 21.3 (c) phase, which is a binding form of arbitration, the implementing
Member must justify why "prompt" compliance is impractical and why it needs a certain period of
time to achieve compliance. The award of a reasonable period of time has the effect of allowing the
Member to remain in violation of its WTO obligatio ns for a limited period of time and of sheltering it
from the suspension of concessions.
50. The European Communities can see no system ic reason why representations made by an
implementing Member in the Article 21.3 (c) phase of the proceedings should not be given, at the
very least, the same weight as declarations made by an implementing Member before the DSB by
analogy to the Appellate Body's ruling in US - Softwood Lumber IV .
33 The European Communities
submits that the representations made by an implementing Member in the context of an
Article 21.3 (c) arbitration are particularly releva nt to the issue at hand, i.e., the question of
compliance.
51. The foregoing does not mean that if an impl ementing Member has in the course of an
Article 21.3(c) arbitration declared that it could only achieve compliance by enacting fresh legislation,
that Member is irrevocably legally bound by this representation. As outlined before, the European
Communities does not contest that even in this phase of the DSU the implementing Member may
have valid reasons to refrain fro m using a particular method of compliance it had previously referred
to.
52. However, the purpose of an Arbitral award under Article 21.3 (c) cannot be to grant a
Member a further period of time to continue breach ing its international oblig ations under the covered
agreements.
53. If, as in the present case, the implementing Member was granted a reasonable period of time
on the sole ground that the only way for it to comply was by enacting fresh legislation, the DSU

31 EC Third party written submission, Section IV, paras. 49-54.
32 See per analogiam , Appellate Body report on US-Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5- Canada) ,
para. 70, referred to by the EC in its Third party written statement, paras. 53-54.
33 Idem.

would be undermined if that Member were allowed at the expiry of the reasonable period of time to
get away with taking no measures to comply at all, let alone legislative measures.
54. It is for that reason that the European Communiti es insists that in the particular circumstances
of this case, this Panel should require that the United States provides a cogent explanation. As
outlined again in response to question 2 above, in view of the representations it made in the
Article 21.3 (c) Arbitration phase, the United States mu st provide an explanation for why it is now of
the view that contrary to its earlier firm assertions on this issue, no fresh legislation needs to be
enacted by it to comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations. Any such explanation must be
consistent with the DSU. As set out in the European Communities' written statement and oral
submission, the European Communities does not belie ve that the United States has provided such a
cogent explanation.
55. In addition, the European Communities points out that other panels have also attached legal
significance to considered statements made before them by representatives of a Member appearing
before them, particularly in case the representations were made not in a casual manner or in the heat
of legal argument but in a "deliberative manner, for the record, repeated in writing".
56. For example, the findings of the Panel in US - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 are
particularly instructive:
"7.118 Attributing international legal signifi cance to unilateral statements made by a
State should not be done lightly and should be subject to strict conditions. Although
the legal effects we are ascribing to the US statements made to the DSB through this
Panel are of a more narrow and limited nature and reach compared to other
internationally relevant instances in whic h legal effect was given to unilateral
declarations, we have conditioned even th ese limited effects on the fulfilment of the
most stringent criteria. A sovereign State should normally not find itself legally
affected on the international plane by the casual statement of any of the numerous
representatives speaking on its behalf in today's highly interactive and inter-
dependant world nor by a representation ma de in the heat of legal argument on a
State's behalf. This, however, is very far from the case before us.
7.119 At this juncture, it is also worth r ecalling that under Article 11 of the DSU it
is our duty to "… make an objective assessment of the facts of the case … and make
such other findings as will assist the DS B in making the recommendations or in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements" (emphasis added).
7.120 As regards these statements we find, thus, as follows: (….)
7.122 The representations and statemen ts by the representatives of the US
appearing before us were solemnly made, in a deliberative manner, for the record,
repeated in writing and confirmed in the Panel's second hearing. There was nothing
casual about these statements nor were they made in the heat of argument. There was
ample opportunity to retract. Rather than re tract, the US even sought to deepen its
legal commitment in this respect.
7.123 We are satisfied that the representa tives appearing before us had full powers
to make such legal representations and th at they were acting within the authority
bestowed on them. Panel proceedings are part of the DSB dispute resolution process.
It is inconceivable except in extreme circ umstances that a panel would reject the
power of the legal representatives of a Memb er to state before a panel, and through
the panel to the DSB, the legal position of a Member as regards its domestic law read

in the light of its WTO obligations. The panel system would not function if such a
power could not be presumed.
7.124 We are equally satisfied, as a matter of fact, that the statements made to us
were intended to be part of the record in the full knowledge and understanding that
they could, as any other official submissi on, be made part of our Report; that they
were made with the intention not only that we rely on them but also that the European
Communities and the third parties to the dispute as well as all Members of the DSB –
effectively all WTO Members – place such reliance on them.
7.125 Accordingly, we find that th ese statements by the US express the
unambiguous and official position of the US representing, in a manner that can be
relied upon by all Members, an undertaking th at the discretion of the USTR has been
limited so as to prevent a determination of inconsistency before exhaustion of DSU
proceedings. (….)." (emphasis added, footnotes omitted)
34
57. The European Communities would note again that the question of the method of
implementation of the DSB's recommendations a nd rulings was extensively litigated in the
Article 21.3(c) arbitral phase of this case. As poi nted out by the European Communities in its written
submission and oral statement, before the arbitrator the United States declared that the only option for
it was to enact fresh legislative measures, and firm ly rejecting any suggestion that there would any
possibility of implementation by any other means. 35 These were not casual statements, but
representations made in a deliberative manner by au thorised representatives before an arbitrator
appointed in accordance with Article 21. 3 (c) of th e DSU. This Panel must accord such statements
appropriate weight and legal significance.

34 Panel report on United States- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , WT/DS152/R
(22 December 1999), paras. 7.115-7.125.
35 EC Third party written submission, Section V, paras. 55-66; EC Third party oral statement,
paras. 22-25.

ANNEX F-5

REPLIES BY JAPAN TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(8 DECEMBER 2006)

Question 1: Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that "In the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal
 of the
measures concerned if these are fo und to be inconsistent with th e provisions of any of the
covered agreements." Article 22.8 of the DSU a pplies until "such time as the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed " (emphasis added). How, in your
view, do these provisions affect the interpretatio n of the phrase "measures taken to comply" as
used in Article 21.5 of the DSU?

1. The phrase "measures taken to comply" used in Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") means the measures take n by the respondent to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Therefor e, the "measures taken to comply" will depend on
the specific content of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB at issue and differ in each case.
In this sense, the respondent is not necessarily requi red to "withdraw" or "remove" the whole measure
at issue provided that it is not necessary to do so for the purpose of complying with the relevant
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
[Question 2 (EC)]

Question 3 (Japan): Does Japan consider that there could ever be circumstances that would
entitle an implementing party not to rely on any new measures or any "independent act" before
a compliance panel? What is meant by an "inde pendent act"? (Japan Third party submission,
para. 4; oral statement, para. 5)

2. Japan is not aware of any circumstances that entitled an implementing party not to rely on any
new measures or any independent act in order for it to comply with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB.
3. The expression of an "independent act" in our written submission and oral statement means a
new and different measure, which itself was not at i ssue in the original panel proceeding, taken after
the adoption of the panel and the Appellate Body reports wherein the recommendations and rulings
are contained. We are of the view that the ordina ry meaning of the word "taken" and the structure of
Article 21 of the DSU suggest that "measures taken to comply" refers to measures taken subsequent to
the conclusion of the original proceedings. The Appellate Body has also indicated in United States –
Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products that "Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in
principle, not the original measure, but rather a new and different measure which was not before the
original panel." Of course, Japan does not deny implementing Member's discretion regarding how it
complies with the recommendations and rulings by taking some kind of an independent act.
Question 4: Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a defence is
rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the same, i.e. the
defence fails?

4. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB will de pend on the specific findings of a panel and
the Appellate Body in each case, including those re lating to the defense asserted by a respondent.
Where a panel or the Appellate Body find s that a complainant has established a prima facie case with
regard to its claim and the respondent fails to rebut, then the panel or the Appellate Body will find the
measure at issue to be inconsistent with a cove red agreement and will recommend the DSB to request

the respondent to bring that measure into conformity with the agreement. If a panel or the Appellate
Body finds, for another instance, that a complainant has not established a prima facie case or that it is
unable to complete its analysis due to lack of ev idence, it will issue appropriate recommendations and
rulings based on its analysis conducted in the course of the proceeding.
Question 5: Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body report
"shall be unconditionally accepted by the partie s", absolute? For example, would it apply
where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a report
exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

5. The parties to the dispute are obliged under Article 17.14 of the DSU to unconditionally
accept an Appellate Body report adopted by the DS B unless the DSB decides not to do so within a
specified period of time. Neither party is allowe d under the DSU to unilaterally refuse the acceptance
of an Appellate Body report duly adopted by the DSB, and serious procedural confusion would arise
if such an action were permitted. In any event, with respect to this cas e, DSB recommendations and
rulings do not seem to be inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU or the Appellate Body report does
not seem to have exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU.
Question 6 (EC, Japan): Please refer to the Appellate Body report in EC - Bed Linen . Why in
your view does this report mean that a respondi ng party to a dispute cannot use a compliance
proceeding to obtain a "second chance"? (EC oral statement, para. 20; Japan oral statement,
para. 2)

6. As we have stated in paragraph 10 of our written submission, the Appellate Body explained in
paragraph 93 of its report in EC-Bed Linen (21.5) that adopted rulings of the DSB "must be accepted
by the parties as a final resolution to the dispute be tween them … with respect to the particular claim
and the specific component of the measure that is subject to the claim." This statement of the
Appellate Body, in our view, means that a responding party to a dispute can not use a compliance
proceeding to obtain a "second chance". In fact , we are of the view that the report in EC-Bed Linen
(21.5) should be read to allow neither party a "second chance" at the 21.5 panel proceeding.
Question 7: Please refer to Article 17.14 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's decision in EC -
Bed Linen. In your view, are these expressions of a principle that at some point disputes should
be treated as finally settled so that potentia lly endless cycles of litigation are avoided not only
with respect to claims but also with respect to defences and specific issues considered in
disputes, and both with respect to arguments that are rejected and those that fail for lack of
evidence?

7. Article 17.14 of the DSU provides that an Appella te Body report adopted by the DSB shall be
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute. As it is clearly stated in the provision, this
obligation is imposed on both parties to the disput e. Therefore, any recommendations or rulings
contained in an Appellate Body report must be unconditionally accepted by both parties regardless of
whether such recommendations or rulings are relate d to claims, defence or arguments brought by the
complainant or the respondent.
Question 8 (EC, Japan): Where is the risk of a "potentially endless loop"? Is there an endless
loop where, as in this dispute, there is a procedural agreement that provides that if the
compliance panel finds against the respondent, the complainant may proceed to request
suspension of concessions under Article 22.2 of the DSU? (Japan Third party written
submission, para. 8)

8. The risk of a "potentially endless loop" surfaces once a party is allowed to readdress an
argument on the concluded substantive issues after th e conclusion of a panel proceeding, as the other

party would inevitably seek a fair and appropriate opportunity to counter-argue, which would then
prompt further counter-argument on the part of the ot her party. This situation would hinder prompt
settlement of a dispute for the effective functioning of the WTO, which is one of the objectives of the
dispute settlement system. There should therefore be an end to the parties' argument in sequence at
some point, and that point is at the adoption of a panel / the Appellate Body report. The existence or
inexistence of a procedural agreement providing th e complainant to proceed to request suspension of
concessions under Article 22.2 of the DSU is irreleva nt to the issue of "potentially endless loop", as
such suspension is a "temporary measure available in the event that the reco mmendations and rulings
are not implemented", as provided for in Article 22.1 of the DSU, and does not "settle" a dispute.
Question 9: Please refer to Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU. In your view, do these provisions
grant a special status to the implementing Member? For example, do DSB recommendations
and the procedures for surveillance of their implementation focus on the respondent rather than
the complainant, so that the respondent knows what aspects of a measure it is required to
modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, a nd protect the respondent from having to face
a second claim with respect to the same aspect?

9. Recommendations and rulings are directed to the implementing Member, as that Member is
requested to bring its measures found to be inconsis tent with the provision of the covered agreements
into conformity with its obligations. Therefor e, in this sense, our understanding is that the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB as well as the procedures for surveillance of their
implementation focus on the respondent rather than the complainant.
10. Indeed the recommendations and rulings usually do not require the implementing Member
any specific manner of implementation, and the implementing Member may choose a measure to
comply with the recommendations and rulings as it finds appropriate. The protection of the
respondent from facing a second claim with respect to the same aspect is however a different matter.
It is considered that the recommendations and ruli ngs of the DSB and the procedures for surveillance
of implementation thereof are not, in principle, expected to function as protection for respondent from
such a second claim.
Question 10: Do you consider unusual the commen ts and clarification in the Appellate Body
report in this dispute that have been highlig hted by the U.S. (US FWS §42)? How do you
interpret these comments? Do you think that it was the intention of the Appellate Body that the
U.S. could implement by showing / demonstrating / establishing a second time what it could not
show / demonstrate / establish the first time? In what other reports has the Appellate Body
made similar comments or clarifications?

11. In our view, the wording of paragraph 374 of the Appellate Body report is clear, and such
recommendations and rulings were made in light of the comments and clarification in the Appellate
Body report. According to the recommendations a nd rulings contained in the said paragraph of the
Appellate Body report, implementing Member is requested to bring its measures found to be
inconsistent with the GATS into conformity with its obligations under that agreement, and we do not
consider that the implementing Member was invited to show / demonstrate / establish a second time
what the implementing Member could not show / demonstrate / establish the first time during the
course of 21.5 panel proceeding without taking any new measures to comply with such
recommendations and rulings.
Question 11 (Japan): If this Article 21.5 compliance proceeding "cannot function as the forum"
for the U.S. to show or demonstrate the applicab ility of the Article XIV defence, what would be
the appropriate forum in which the U.S. could ma ke such a showing or demonstration? (Japan
Third party submission, para. 14)

12. Consistent with the rule of finality of the DSB rulings and recommendations as
aforementioned, the appropriate forum should be the original proceeding.
Question 12: How can a Member bring a measure into conformity with its obligations when (a)
it has been found that the measure is provisionally justified under a paragraph in a general
exception provision; and (b) it has not been fo und that the measure satisfies the chapeau of the
general exception provision.

13. In a situation described in this question, an implementing Member will be able to comply
with its obligations, for example, by rectifying th e element contained in the measure at issue which
has been found to be inconsistent with the chapeau.
Question 13: If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a defence, would
the compliance panel make its assessment on th e basis of evidence presented in the compliance
proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

14. We are of the view that no "second chance" should be given to either party, thus regard this
question irrelevant.
Question 14: If a respondent had sufficient evidence to demonstrate in a compliance proceeding
that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the compliance panel
denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would this require a
respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

15. Japan is of the view that, if a respondent has sufficient evidence to demonstrate, by invoking a
general exception provision, that its measures are c onsistent with the covered agreements, then it is
expected to establish a prima facie case to support its legal claim in the original course of the dispute.
When the respondent fails to establish such a prima facie case and a panel or the Appellate Body
recommends the respondent to bring its measures in conformity with the covered agreements at the
end of the original proceeding, the respondent need s to take certain measures to comply with the
recommendations in a manner which it considers appropriate.
Question 15: If a respondent were not entitled to a "second chance", would this be reasonable
after a complex original dispute that presented num erous novel issues, especially if the dispute
involved an under-resourced respondent who was unfamiliar with WTO dispute settlement?

16. The procedural fairness and the finality of th e DSB rulings are underscored in the DSU, and
the resource, the familiarity with the dispute settlement of a Member as well as the extent of
complexity of the original proceeding does not, collec tively or on its own, constitute a reason to make
exceptions to the procedures prescribed in the DSU, unless otherwise provided in the agreement. This
is in line with our argument on the issue of finality of the DSB rulings as contained in paragraphs 7 to
10 of our written submission and paragraphs 2 to 4 of our oral statement.
[Question 16 (EC)]

Question 17: Does the fact that the statements a re made in the context of Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU require that they be given different weight fr om that accorded to any other statements of a
party concerning an issue in dispute? If so, what weight should they be given?

17. The statements made in the course of arbitra tion referred to in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU
needs to be weighed and examined by the arbitrat or for the purpose of determining the reasonable
period of time for the respondent to implemen t the DSB recommendations and rulings. If this
question concerns how much weight ought to be give n to the said statements in the course of the 21.5

panel proceeding in examining the existence of th e measures taken by a respondent to comply with
the recommendations and rulings, or the consistency of such measures with the covered agreements,
Japan notes that no provision in the DSU provides that a binding effect be given to the statements
made at the arbitration so as to lock the implementing member into the intended measure referred to at
the 21.3(c) arbitration stage.

ANNEX G

COMMENTS BY THE PARTIES ON REPLIES
TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL

Contents Page
Annex G-1 Comments by Antigua and Barbuda on replies to questions posed
by the Panel (14 December 2006)
G-2
Annex G-2 Comments by the United States on replies to questions posed by the
Panel (14 December 2006)
G-31

ANNEX G-1

COMMENTS* BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ON REPLIES
TO QUESTIONS
1 POSED BY THE PANEL
(14 DECEMBER 2006)

Question 1 (US): The DSB recommended that the US "bring its measures into conformity"
with its obligations under the GATS. Does the US consider that it has already brought its
measures into conformity, or that it did not need for certain reasons to bring its measures into
conformity? If so, what are these reasons?

1. The United States considers that its measures ar e consistent with its obligations under the
GATS, and that the United States has complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by
presenting new evidence and arguments during this pr oceeding which meet the US burden of proof to
show that the US measures meet the criteria of the Article XIV chapeau.
A read of this one sentence answer highlights the fa ilure of the United States' efforts to demonstrate
compliance with the DSB Rulings, as its "complia nce" is dependent upon "presenting new evidence
and arguments" and not by any action on its part at all.

With the caveat that Antigua does not believe the United States is entitled to reargue its failed case
before this Article 21.5 compliance Panel,
2 it is important to point out that the United States has in
fact not presented "new evidence and arguments" at all – rather, every argument that have made in
this proceeding was made in the original proceed ing and rejected by the original Panel and by the
Appellate Body.3 Even the argument that the IHA did not "repeal by implication" the Wire Act was
floated and rejected in the original proceeding. A ll that the United States has done in this proceeding
is refer to a number of United States court cases, each easily distinguishab le from the situation
involving the IHA and the Wire Act, 4 to support its contention that the IHA did not "repeal by
implication" the Wire Act. Antigua of course has its own interpretation of how this doctrine should be
applied under the circumstances, and a number of cases to support its position.5

Further, as compared to the recyc ling by the United States of its old arguments with no further proof
or evidence, Antigua has shown in this proceeding:

• The clear language of the IHA itself ("... a legal wager placed or accepted in one State ...
placed or transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media
and accepted by an off-track betting system in the same or another State ...").
6

* NB: The comments made by Antigua and Barbuda on US replies appear in italics.
1 The failure of Antigua to provide a comment to any certain United States answer or response should
not be taken as acceptance of or agreemen t with the particular answer or res ponse, in whole or in part. Rather,
Antigua considers some of the answers not worthy of comment and others the subject of earlier, extensive
discussion that does not require further elaboration.
2 This very important caveat applies to the comments throughout.
3 See AB First written submission, paras. 36-41.
4 None of the cases cited by the United States has a fact pattern like that involved with the IHA and
Wire Act–the former statute clearly permitting a specific activity done in accordance with its terms that,
otherwise, would have come under the more general covera ge of the older statute. Further, none of these cases
are, in fact, "new." They are old cases that the United States simply failed or chose not to submit to the original
panel.
5 See AB First written submission, paras. 57-61; AB Second written submission, paras. 37-45.
6 Id., paras. 50, 54.

• The only specific legislative history regarding the adoption of the 2000 amendment to the IHA
("I want Members of this body to be aware t hat [the amendment] would legalize interstate
pari-mutual gambling over the Internet. Under cu rrent interpretation of the [IHA], this type
of gambling is illegal, although the Justice Departm ent has not taken steps to enforce it. This
provision would codify legality of placing wagers over the telephone or other electronic
media like the Internet.").7

• Commentary, including an opinion of a state Attorney General, supporting Antigua's reading
of the IHA.8

• Numerous state laws and regulatory schemes endorsing remote gambling under the IHA.9

• Numerous, high profile domestic operators – including operators owned by government
entities – openly and continuously offering remote gambling services in the United States.10

• Admitted complete lack of prosecution by the United States of remote gambling operators in
the United States offering services under various st ate regulatory schemes, contrasted with
significant prosecution efforts directed towards Antiguan operators.11

• The language of the new federal prohibition la w (removing from the definition of "unlawful
Internet gambling" "any activity that is allowed under the [IHA].").12

In the face of all of this evidence adduced by Antigua, it would be impossible under any reasonable
analysis to conclude that the United States had met its "burden of proof" under the chapeau of
Article XIV of the GATS.13

2. The language cited in the Panel's question – "bri ng its measures into conformity" – is set out
in, and required by, Article 19 of the DSU. It is im portant to view that language within the context of
the entire article:
"Article 19: Panel and Appe llate Body Recommendations

1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body c oncludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement, it shall recomme nd that the Member concerned bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the
panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations.

7 Id., para. 55. Note that the United States has no legislative history supporting its interpretation at all,
relying instead on the absence of any express statem ent by Congress that the amendment was intended to
"repeal" the Wire Act – something that was not, in th e event, required. See US First written submission,
paras. 38-40.
8 AB First written submission, para. 57. The United States, however, has supplied no independent
support for its interpretation.
9 Id., paras. 65-68.
10 Id., paras. 69-103.
11 Id., paras. 104-107. For the admission by the Unite d States, see Answers of the United States to
Questions from the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda , WT/DS285 (8 December 2006) (the
"US Answers"), paras. 90-91.
12 AB Second written submission, paras. 55-56.
13 The United States, predictably, takes the position that the Panel can only take its evidence with
respect to this issue, and not that of Antigua. S ee US Answers, para. 55; US Second written submission,
para. 31.

2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements."

3. The language about "bringing a measure into conformity" is in the same sentence, and follows
upon, a reference to what the panel or Appellate Body has concluded with regard to the inconsistency
found by the Panel or Appellate Body with a covered agreement. The United States submits that what
it means in a particular dispute to "bring a measur e into conformity" cannot be considered in the
abstract, but must depend on the specific circumstances of the dispute, and most importantly the
specific findings of the Panel or Appellate Body.
4. As the United States has explained in its written and oral submissions, in this dispute the
Appellate Body explicitly noted that it was not
 making a finding as to whether the IHA provides an
exemption from the three federal criminal statutes at issue. Rather, the Appellate Body found that the
United States had not met its burden of proving th is point, and thus had not met its burden of
establishing an affirmative defence. In this cont ext, one option for the United States to bring its
measures "into conformity" was to proceed to meet its burden of proof to show that those measures
were within the scope of the GATS Article XIV(a) exception.
The United States continues to make much of its assertion that "the Appella te Body explicitly noted
that it was not making a finding as to whether the IHA provides a nd exemption from the three federal
criminal statutes at issue." But the United States al so continues to ignore that it was not the burden
of the Appellate Body or the original panel to come to such a conclusion – rather, the burden of proof
was on the United States to convince the original panel and the Appellate Body that the IHA did not
provide such an exemption. As the United States failed to meet its burden of proof, there was
absolutely no need or reason for either the original panel or the Appellate Body to make any further
"finding" at all.

Question 2 (ANT, US): Must "measures taken to comply" with a DSB recommendation, as used
in Article 21.5 of the DSU, be more recent than the original proceeding? Please explain in terms
of the rule of interpretation in Article 31 and, if appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, please address the following:

5. As the United States will elaborate in the answ ers to the subparts below, the United States
does not consider that the "measure" in the phrase "m easure taken to comply," as used in Article 21.5
of the DSU, must necessarily be more recent than the original proceeding. Article 21.5 does not itself
specify a temporal element or limitation on the date that the measure is "taken." Indeed, it is not
difficult to conceive of a number of situations in which the measure at issue in an Article 21.5
proceeding is the same as the measure at issue in the original proceeding. Some examples would be:
(a) a measure that on its own terms expires or terminates at a certain time or under
certain conditions. Where as a result the measure is no longer in existence as of the
time of the Article 21.5 proceeding, the me asure will no longer be inconsistent with
the DSB recommendations and rulings, but that will not be because the measure taken
to comply was more recent than the original proceeding.
(b) a measure that is brought into consistenc y not through a change to the measure but
due to a change in the underlying explanati on or basis for the measure. For example,
a sanitary or phytosanitary measure for wh ich the risk assessment was found not to
have adequately explained a particular element and is revised to comply with the SPS
Agreement or an antidumping duty for which the inconsistency was a lack of
adequate explanation for how the administ ering authority took evidence into account
the evidence.

(c) a measure that is brought into consistenc y through an external event, such as a
sanitary or phytosanitary measure for which an international standard is adopted after
the DSB recommendations and rulings that br ings the measure into conformity with
the SPS Agreement or an actionable subsidy for which external factors have resulted
in there no longer being adverse effects.
Antigua observes that in all three of these examples, something has happened subsequent to the
original findings that has either directly changed the measure or has changed its effect. In this case,
there has been no change at all, at least no c hange that could arguably have brought the United
States into compliance with the DSB Rulings.

6. Article 21.5 must be read together with DSU Article 19, which describes the
recommendations and rulings with respect to whic h the Member concerned must "comply." In
particular, Article 19 does not provide that a Member concerned must adopt a new measure in order to
achieve compliance. Rather, Article 19.1 states: "Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that
a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned
bring the measure into conformity
 with that agreement." To be sure, in many cases the Member
concerned will choose to bring its measure into conf ormity by adopting a new or amended measure.
(And in that case, the new or amended measure would be subsequent to the original proceeding.)
However, Article 19 leaves open the possibility of bringing a measure into compliance through means
other than adopting a new or amended measure. Wh ether this option is available to the Member
concerned in a particular disput e will depend on the specific findings of the panel and/or Appellate
Body and the particular circumstances of the case.
Sub-question (a) (ANT, US): Does the word "measures" have the same meaning as
when used in Article 4.2 and 4.4, Article 6.2 and elsewhere of the DSU?

7. While the DSU does not define the word "measur es," the United States is not aware of a basis
for believing that the term "measures" in Article 21. 5 would have a different meaning than when used
in other articles of the DSU.
Sub-question (b) (ANT, US): Does the word "taken" imply a positive action? Please
note that the Spanish version reads "medidas 'destinadas' a cumplir."

8. The United States understands that the thrust of this question is whether phrase "taken to
comply" means something along the lines of "adopted by the Member concerned for the purpose of
compliance." The phrase "taken to comply" would incl ude this meaning, but it is not so limited. The
Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV explained its views on the ordinary meaning of the word
"taken" as used in DSU Article 21.5:
"66. In examining the meaning of 'measures taken to comply' in Article 21.5, we
begin with the word 'taken'. There is a wide range of dictionary meanings of the
word 'taken', which is the past participle of the verb 'take'. The meanings of 'take'
include, for example, '[b]ring into a specified position or relation'; '[s]elect or use for
a particular purpose.'"

9. The first definition cited by the Appellate Body "bring into a specified position or relation"
has a sense, perhaps, of the "positive action" referr ed to in the Panel's question. But the second
meaning – "select or use for a particular purpose" – is not limited to the sense of adopting a new
measure for a particular purpose. Under this latter meaning of the verb "take," a pre-existing measure
would fit within the meaning of DSU Article 21.5. In other words, under this meaning, the original
measure considered in the underlying proceeding woul d be "selected or used for a particular purpose"
– namely, the purpose of showing compliance with the recommendations and rulings.

10. One of the illustrative sentences used in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary shows
this second meaning of the term taken. That sentence is "That great genius is taken as the standard of
perfection." Here, the "great genius" is not in any sense actively adopted, or moved from one place to
another. Rather, the person who is the "great geni us" is used for a particular purpose, which is to
establish a "standard of perfection." Similarly, in the context of the current dispute, the original
measure has not been newly adopted for the purpose of compliance, but rather is being used for the
particular purpose of establishing compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings.
11. The DSU used the word "taken ," rather than more limiting phrases such as "measure adopted
for the purpose of achieving compliance." In fact, "t ake" appears to be one of the broadest verbs in
the English language, with 9 major categories of defi nitions, plus dozens of shades of meaning within
those categories. If the drafters of the DSU wished to have a more limite d definition of the phrase
"measures taken to comply," they would have used language that more precisely limited the measures
to be considered under Article 21.5.
12. Moreover, as the United States has explained above and in its prior oral and written
submissions, the context of the phrase "measures taken to comply" must include the rest of the DSU,
including Article 3.2 and Article 19.2. First, bot h of those articles provide that the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or dimi nish rights and obligations under the covered
agreements. Those rights include the right to adopt measures that fall within the scope of the GATS
Article XIV exception. To be consistent with Ar ticle 3.2 and Article 19.2, a finding that a measure
may or may not fall
 within GATS Article XIV cannot require a Member to abolish or amend such a
measure. In this context, the only sensible way to read "measure taken to comply" in Article 21.5 is
for such a "measure" to include the measure examined in the original proceeding that may, or may not
be, within the scope of GATS Article XIV.
Again, the United States overstates what was found by the Appellate Body. What was found was that
the three federal statutes at issue were inconsiste nt with the GATS and the United States had not
established that the statutes fell within the exception contained in Article XIV of the GATS. There was
not a "finding that a measure may or may not fall within GATS Article XIV."

13. In addition, Article 21.5 must be read in the context of DSU Article 19.1, which describes the
recommendations and rulings with respect to which the Member concerned must "comply." Article
19.1, however, does not provide that a Member concerned must adopt a new measure in order to
achieve compliance. Rather, the Member concerned must bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement." Article 19.1 does not necessarily require that a new measure be adopted in order to bring
the pre-existing measure into conformity.
14. Finally, the United States notes Article 3.2 of the DSU:
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral tradin g system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provi sions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements."

15. The dispute settlement system would not be pr oviding "security and predictability" to the
multilateral trading system if Members were foreclosed for procedural reasons from establishing in an
Article 21.5 proceeding that the measures subject to the recommendations and rulings are in fact
consistent with the covered agreements. Furthermore, such an interpretation of Article 21.5 would not
serve to "preserve the rights and obligations under the covered agreements." Rather, it could, as

would be the case if Antigua prevailed on its pro cedural argument in this dispute, "add to" the
obligations of a Member by requiring it to replace or modify a measure even when that measure is
already consistent with the covered agreements, and would "diminish" the right of a Member to
maintain a measure that in fact is in accordance with the covered agreements.
Again, the United States would apply cherry-picked pr ovisions of the DSU only to itself, in essence
saying that it will not be obtaining "security and predictability" and its "r ights and obligations under
the covered agreements" are being "add ed to" or "diminished" because, apparently, the United States
believes that its laws are WTO consistent.

What the United States is really expressing is dissatisfaction with the result of the original
proceeding. Antigua shares in the disappointment in a number of respects, such as the Appellate
Body's failure to consider Antigua's extensive evidence on reasonable alternatives; the Appellate
Body's finding that the Wire Act, the Travel Ac t and the IGBA are not facially discriminatory despite
the clear text of the statutes themselves and Antigua 's efforts throughout the original proceeding to
make it clear that none of the statutes applies to intra-state remote gambling; and the Appellate
Body's determination that the United States had met its burden of proof with respect to the
"necessary" prong of the Article XIV defence, desp ite the complete lack of independent evidence
supporting the claims of the United States.

The difference is that Antigua understands that it must accept the results, flawed as they may be,
because that is what the rules governing the resoluti on of disputes in the WTO require of it. Antigua
feels very much that some of these unwarranted determinations in the original proceeding have
"diminished" its rights under the co vered agreements. But unfortunatel y for Antigua, but of necessity
for any dispute resolution system to function, Antigua is not the final arbitrator – the Appellate Body
is.

 Sub-question (c) (ANT, US): Does the measure need to be specifically aimed at the issue
addressed by the DSB recommendation?

16. As explained above, the United States does not consider that the measure taken to comply
must be newly and specifically adopted for the pur pose of compliance. Rather, under the ordinary
meaning of Article 21.5, in context, and in light of the object and purpose of the DSU, the original
measure may be used for the purpose of estab lishing compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.
17. Moreover, the United States notes that the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV
expressly found that a measure plainly not
 aimed at compliance nonetheless fell within the scope of a
"measure taken to comply" under DSU Article 21. Th e Appellate Body noted that: "The fact that
Article 21.5 mandates a panel to assess 'existence' and 'consistency' tends to weigh against an
interpretation of Article 21.5 that would confine the scope of a panel's jurisdiction to measures that
move in the direction of, or have the objective of achieving, compliance."
Question 3 (US): Can you further elaborate on the relevance of US – Shrimp for our
deliberation with respect to "measures taken to comply"?

18. The United States respectfully refers the Panel to the US answer to Question 16 below.
Question 4 (US): What other circumstances, apart from the "unusual" situation in this dispute,
could justify treating the same measures in th e original dispute as the "measures taken to
comply"? (US oral statement, paras. 5 and 9)

19. The United States submits that no "special" jus tification is required. Instead, the United
States submits that this is allowed for under the DSU, and whether or not the original measure is the
measure "taken to comply" will depend on the specific facts and circumstances of a particular dispute.
The United States provides examples of such circumstances in paragraph 5 above.
Question 5 (US): Do you argue that new eviden ce, the presentation of new evidence or re-
arguing a defence constitute your "measure taken to comply" for the purposes of Article 21.5 of
the DSU in this dispute?

20. The United States is relying on the original m easure in dispute as its "measure taken to
comply" under Article 21.5. The new evidence and arguments in the US written and oral submissions
are not "measures," but instead are the means chosen by the United States to bring its measures into
compliance by clarifying the relationship between the IHA and the three federal criminal statutes.
Question 6 (ANT, US): Article 17 of the DSU grants an opportunity for a respondent to obtain
review of aspects of a Panel report by means of an appeal. If that appeal does not succeed,
aren't the findings in the Appellate Body report then final in accordance with Article 17.14?

21. Indeed, the United States is relying in this proceeding on the finality of the Appellate Body
report adopted by the DSB in the original proceed ing. The Appellate Body expressly noted that due
to the limited factual record, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body was ab le to determine whether
or not the challenged US measures met the require ments of the Article XIV chapeau. The United
States is not asking the Panel to revisit this finding . Rather, the United States is requesting that the
Panel proceed to examine the issues under the Ar ticle XIV chapeau based on new evidence and
arguments not previously available to the Panel or Appellate Body.
This response – ("The Appellate Body expressly noted that due to the limited factual record, neither
the Panel nor the Appellate Body was able to det ermine whether or not the challenged US measures
met the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau") – hi ghlights a consistent tactic of the United States
throughout the course of this proceeding – to rep eat something over and over again in hopes that by
sheer repetition it will gain acceptance.

What was
 found was the only finding required to be found with respect to the chapeau – that the
United States failed to meet its burden of proof.

In its answers to the Panel's questions alone, the United States uses this phrase or something much
like it, in at least ten different places.
14

Question 7 (ANT, US): Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a
defence is rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the
same, i.e. the defence fails?

22. The question of whether or not a Member has complied with the recommendations and
rulings in a particular dispute depends on the specific facts and circumstances of that dispute.
Accordingly, the reasoning and findings of the panel or Appellate Body must be examined closely.
Where, as here, the Appellate Body notes that an affirmative defence may or may not be available
when examined under a more complete factual reco rd, the sensible means to achieve a resolution of
the dispute is for the panel in the Article 21.5 proceeding to examine the affirmative defence under the
complete factual record.
See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

14 See US Answers, paras. 4, 12, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 37, 38, 46.

23. This dispute does not present a situation in which a defence was rejected outright. It would
not be appropriate for the United States to speculate in the abstract on a hypothetical situation where a
defence is rejected outright, but certainly it could ma ke a difference, for example, if the DSB were to
have ruled that a measure did not fall within the policy purpose of "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health." Again, whethe r the Member concerned had complied would turn on
the specific facts and circumstances of the dispute.
Question 8 (US): The US is arguing that even if a respondent fails to establish an affirmative
defence in the original proceeding the respondent has a right to maintain the measure that has
been found to be inconsistent with an obligation. Where does such a right stem from? How
could any right exist when the respondent has failed to establish a justification for such

24. The obligations of WTO Members (and conseque ntly the rights of other WTO Members) are
set out in the applicable covered agreements. A Memb er is free to maintain any measure that is not
inconsistent with its obligations under the covered agreements - it does not need an affirmative "right"
to be provided in the covered agreements for it to ma intain that measure. In this case, Article XIV of
the GATS makes clear that the United States may maintain measures necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public order. Articl es 3.2 and 19.2 explicitly provide that neither
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, nor findings of panels or the Appellate Body, can "add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
25. In this case, the United States is arguing that it does not need to modify a measure that is
already consistent with the covered agreements. The United States does not believe that there is a
right to maintain measures that are inconsistent with a covered agreement. Rather, this case involves
findings by the Appellate Body that explicitly note that the measure may, or may not be, consistent
with a covered agreement, and that the factual record was not sufficient to make such a determination.
See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

Question 9 (US): Does the US consider that me asures consistent with covered agreements can
be required to be brought into compliance?

26. Where the DSB recommendations and rulings require that a Member establish the
applicability of an affirmative defence, the Member needs to do so in order to demonstrate that, by
virtue of that affirmative defence, its measure is not inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the
covered agreements. The Interstate Horseracing Act never provided any carve outs from the three
criminal laws at issue, and thus the US measures fe ll within the scope of Article XIV of the GATS.
The United States has complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings by making a factual
showing in this proceeding that in fact the US statutes at issue meet the requirements of Article XIV.
Question 10 (US): The US refers to a situation where a complaining party could not expect the
responding party to adopt any substantively di fferent measure, "because the original measure
was already in compliance". (US FWS §46) Who would have made the determination that the
original measure was already in compliance?

27. As an initial matter, the United States notes th at this sentence would be better phrased as
"because the original measure was already consistent with the covered agreements.
" This phrasing
avoids confusion between the substantive obligatio ns set out in the covered agreements, and the
provisions of the DSU that call for compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings.
28. Turning to the Panel's question, the United St ates is not asserting that there was any special,
formal "determination" that the measure is consistent with a covered agreement. Rather, in this case,

the United States – as for most WTO Members with r espect to most of their measures – believes its
criminal gambling laws to be consistent with US obligations under the GATS. In this case, the
Appellate Body found that the United States did not sufficiently establish an affirmative defence
under Article XIV of the GATS, but the Appellate Body did not find that the criminal laws, if
considered under a full factual record, failed to meet the requirements of Article XIV.
See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

29. Furthermore, it is essential to emphasize that the failure of the United States to establish in the
initial proceeding an affirmative defence did not turn on a disputed issue of interpretation of the WTO
Agreement. Rather, the availability of the affirmativ e defence depended on the proper interpretation
of US domestic law.
The "availability of the affirmative defence" does not depend on the "proper interpretation of US
domestic law," but rather (at least with respect to the chapeau) whether the United States applies its
laws in a non-discriminatory fashion. As the Appellate Body actually did observe in its report:

"The focus of the chapeau, by its express terms, is on the application of a measure
already found by the Panel to be inconsiste nt with one of the obligations under the
GATS but falling within one of the paragraphs of Article XIV. By requiring that the
measure be applied in a manner that does not constitute 'arbitrary' or 'unjustifiable'
discrimination, or a 'disguised restric tion on trade in services', the chapeau serves to
ensure that Members' rights to avail th emselves of exceptions are exercised
reasonably, so as not to frustrate the rights accorded other Members by the
substantive rules of the GATS."15
What Antigua has clearly shown in th is proceeding is that in application and by their express
language as well, the three federal statutes are trade discriminatory.

Question 11 (ANT, US): Is the rule in Article 17.14 of the DSU, that an adopted Appellate Body
report "shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties", absolute? For example, would it
apply where a recommendation was inconsistent with Article 19.2 of the DSU? Or where a
report exceeded the scope set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU?

30. The United States would hope that the DSB would not agree to adopt an Appellate Body
report under the circumstances described. Although it w ould not be appropriate for the United States
to comment on these hypothetical situations, the Un ited States agrees that it would be important to
bear in mind the limitations in the DSU. It is doubtful that Members intended the language in Article
17.14 to be read to override those express limitati ons, particularly since Members were careful in
Article 3.2 of the DSU to specify that DSB recommendations and rulings "cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreem ents." In any event, the United States in this
proceeding is not
requesting that the Panel reconsider any factual or legal findings made by the
Appellate Body in this dispute.
Antigua takes issue with the last senten ce in this answer. The United States is clearly asking the
Panel to reconsider the factual and legal findings of the Appellate Body that the United States had not
established that its GATS-inconsis tent measures qualified for the special exception under Article XIV
of the GATS.

Question 12 (US): Please refer to Article 17.14 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's decision in
EC - Bed Linen. In your view, are these expressions of a principle that at some point disputes

15 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 339 (emphasis in original).

should be treated as finally settled so that po tentially endless cycles of litigation are avoided not
only with respect to claims but also with resp ect to defences and specific issues considered in
disputes, and both with respect to arguments that are rejected and those that fail for lack of
evidence?

31. The United States notes that this question contains a number of premises that are not
presented by the circumstances of this dispute. Th e Panel and Appellate Body reports cannot be said
to result in a "final settlement", because as the Ap pellate Body noted, it was not able to determine
whether or not the US measures met the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau. Moreover, nothing
in this case presents an endless cycle of litigation. To the contrary, under the procedural agreement
entered into by the United States and Antigua, should Antigua prevail in this 21.5 proceeding, it may
proceed to request authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22.2.
See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

32. The United States is not aware of any basis for asserting that, as a general matter, a WTO
Member cannot present new evidence when it previously failed to establish a claim due to a lack of
evidence. In fact, the 21.5 proceedings in the Canada - Dairy dispute illustrate otherwise. In that
case, the complaining parties' initial recourse to Ar ticle 21.5 failed due to a lack of evidence on the
cost of production of the products at issue. The complaining parties proceeded to a second recourse to
Article 21.5, during which they proceeded to support their claims through new evidence not submitted
in the first proceeding. The complaining parties prevailed in the second recourse to Article 21.5, and
the Appellate Body upheld the finding. Thus, the Canada - Dairy dispute shows that there is no basis
for viewing the Appellate Body reasoning in EC - Bed Linen or Article 17.14 as providing some
general principle precluding the introduction of new evidence when a claim previously failed due to
an absence of evidence.
33. As the United States explained in its Second written submission, EC - Bed Linen addresses a
specific question regarding the claims that a comp laining party may reargue in a 21.5 proceeding.
The Appellate Body's finding turned on the lim ited scope of a 21.5 proceeding, and not on any
purported general rule that parties are forecl osed from presenting new evidence when a claim
previously failed for lack of evidence. Indeed, nothing would have prevented India from bringing a
new regular proceeding against the measure at issue. EC - Bed Linen simply provided that the special,
expedited procedures of Article 21.5 were not ava ilable for those claims. As a result, neither EC -
Bed Linen nor Article 17.14 would stand for a principle of preventing additional litigation.
[Question 13 (ANT)]

Question 14 (US): Please refer to the following passages in the Panel and Appellate Body
reports: para. 6.599 of the Panel report, whic h states that: "there is ambiguity as to the
relationship between, on the one hand, the amendm ent to the IHA and, on the other, the Wire
Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Bu siness Act"; para. 6.607 of the Panel report,
which contains the following reference: "in light of the ambiguity relating to the Interstate
Horseracing Act" ; and para. 368 of the Appellate Body report which states that: "The second
instance found by the Panel was based on 'the ambi guity relating to' the scope of application of
the IHA and its relationship to the measures at issue. We have upheld this finding." Why are
these findings not final?

34. The United States is not challenging these findings. These findings refer to "ambiguity" in
the federal statues; the findings
 do not include any statement – explicit or implicit – that such
ambiguity results in an inconsistency with the GATS. Indeed, some statutory ambiguity is inevitable
in any legal system, and few measures would escape scrutiny if ambiguity resulted in per se violation
of obligations under the WTO Agreement. And, desp ite this ambiguity, there is in fact a right or

wrong answer to the question of whether or not the IHA provides a carve out from federal criminal
laws.
35. The Panel and Appellate Body noted the ambiguity in the context of finding that the United
States – on the basis of the record available in the original proceeding – had failed to meet its burden
of proving an affirmative defence. And again, th is is a finding that the United States does not dispute
in this proceeding. Rather, in this pro ceeding the United States submits that it has now
 shown, based
on a more complete factual record, that the right answer to the ambiguous issue is that the IHA
provides no carve outs from the criminal laws at issue, and thus that it has successfully established its
affirmative defence under GATS Article XIV. Noth ing in the US position in any way disturbs the
finality of the findings by the Panel and Appellate Body regarding statutory ambiguity.
Far from having "now shown" that the IHA does not permit remote gambling, the United States has
completely failed. See Comment to paragraph 1 above.

Question 15 (US): Please refer to para. 371 of th e Appellate Body report, last sentence, which
states that: "we wish to clarify that the Panel di d not, and we do not, make a finding as to
whether the IHA does, in fact, permit domestic suppliers to provide certain remote betting
services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA."

 Sub-question (a) (US): Was this simply an expression of deference, indicating that the
Appellate Body did not presume to know the meaning of a Member's domestic law
better than the Member itself?

36. The United States does not believe that this is a correct understanding of the Appellate Body
findings. In fact, the Appellate Body did not give deference to the US understanding of its own
statute. To the contrary, the Appellate Body gave deference to the findings of the Panel in its fact-
finding under DSU Article 11.
37. Moreover, the Appellate Body's reasoning exp licitly notes that it could make no definitive
finding on the US law due to the limited factual record:
363. Thus, the Panel had before it conf licting evidence as to the relationship
between the IHA, on the one hand, and the m easures at issue, on the other. We have
already referred to the discretion accorded to panels, as fact-finders, in the assessment
of the evidence. As the Appellate Bo dy has observed on previous occasions, "not
every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question
of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the
facts."

364. In our view, this aspect of the Unite d States' appeal essentially challenges the
Panel's failure to accord sufficient weight to the evidence submitted by the United
States with respect to the relationship under United States law between the IHA and
the measures at issue. The Panel had lim ited evidence before it, as submitted by the
parties, on which to base its conclusion . This limitation, however, could not absolve
the Panel of its responsibility to arrive at a conclusion as to the relationship between
the IHA and the prohibitions in the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. The
Panel found that the evidence provided by the United States w as not sufficiently
persuasive to conclude that, as regards wa gering on horseracing, the remote supply of
such services by domestic firms continues to be prohibited notwithstanding the plain
language of the IHA. In this light, we are not persua ded that the Panel failed to make
an objective assessment of the facts.

See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

38. Furthermore, in its conclusion, the Appella te Body reiterated that it was not making a
definitive finding on the correct interpretation of US la w: "In this respect, we wish to clarify that the
Panel did not, and we do not, make a finding as to whether the IHA does, in fact, permit domestic
suppliers to provide certain remote betting services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA."
 Sub-question (b): Does this sentence, clarifyi ng what the Panel and Appellate Body did
not find, affect what the Panel did find regarding "'the ambiguity relating to' the scope
of application of the IHA and its relation ship to the measures at issue", which was
upheld by the Appellate Body?

See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

39. As the United States explained in its response to Question 14, a finding of ambiguity is not

equivalent to a finding that the IHA does in fact provi de a carve out from the criminal laws at issue.
There is a right answer and wrong answer to that question under US law. The United States submits
that it has shown in this proceeding that the right an swer is that no carve outs exist, and thus that the
US measures do not result in discrimination under the chapeau of GATS Article XIV.
The United States' answer to Question 15 again invi tes the Panel to focus on the argument that the
Appellate Body did not find that the IHA provided a "carve out" to the three federal statutes. Antigua
would repeat that the Appellate Body did not need to come to this determination, as it was the burden
of the United States to prove that the IHA did not provide such a carve out. Given the evidence
submitted by Antigua in this pro ceeding, there can be little doubt now that the IHA indeed provides a
"carve out," both expressly in its language and practically in its application.16

Question 16 (ANT, US): What authority does the DSU grant the Appellate Body to extend an
invitation to a Member to demonstrate a point after the conclusion of an appeal? (US FWS §44)
How would such an invitation affect the recomme ndation by the DSB? Why did the Appellate
Body not expressly suggest ways in which the US could implement the recommendations?

40. As the United States explained at the hearing, the United States submits that it would be a
misplaced focus to treat the phrase "invitation" (used in the first US submission) as some special test,
principle, or procedure that must be analyzed and evaluated. In using this phrase, the United States
was not intending to imply that the Appellate Body was making a specific recommendation with
respect to how the United States should bring its measures into compliance. We note that Article 19.1
of the DSU provides that panels or the Appellate Body "may" make suggestions on implementation;
we are not suggesting that the Appellate Body has done so in this case.
41. Rather, the United States was using "invitation" as a shorthand for the following type of
reasoning commonly used in Article 21.5 proceedings: where the Appellate Body (or panel) finds a
particular aspect of a measure to be inconsistent with a covered agreement, the other side of such a
finding may provide specific guidance on how the responding Member may bring its measure into
compliance.
42. The US - Shrimp dispute (referred to in Question 3 above) is an instructive example. In that
dispute, like the current one, the Appellate Body agreed with the responding party that the measure
provisionally fell under an exception – GATT Article XX(g) in US – Shrimp. However, the Appellate

16 See Comment to answer of Question 1 above.

Body, as in this case, found that in certain specific ways, the requi rements of the chapeau were not
met with respect to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."
43. In US – Shrimp, one aspect of this discrimination was th at the Appellate Body found that the
United States had entered into negotiations with so me countries, but not with the complaining parties
in the dispute. The United States looked carefully at this finding: the other side of the finding, and
thus a means of compliance, was for the United States to enter into negotiations with the complaining
parties. The United States proceeded to enter in to such negotiations durin g the compliance period.
These negotiations were not "measures" and so they were not "measures taken to comply."
44. The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp also found that the United States, in implementing its
shrimp import ban, did not provide due process to the complaining parties. The United States looked
carefully at this finding, and proceeded to adopt new implementing guidelines that remedied the
defects in due process identified by the Appellate Body.
45. Based on the specific Appellate Body findings, th e United States believed that such steps
would bring its measure into compliance, and that no changes
would be required in the statute subject
to the DSB recommendations and rulings. A complaining party in US – Shrimp was not satisfied with
the US implementation; it argued in an Article 21.5 proceeding that the United States must amend or
repeal its statute and lift the import prohibition. Th e Appellate Body agreed with the United States,
finding that the United States had complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings – without
amending the US statute – by addressing the specific aspects of discrimination previously found by
the Appellate Body in the Article XX chapeau.
46. The United States believes that the same appr oach for compliance applies to the current
dispute. Here, the Appellate Body explicitly noted both (1) that the United States did not establish or
show that the IHA does not exempt domestic suppliers from providing certain remote betting
activities prohibited under three federal criminal stat utes, but (2) that the Appellate Body could not
determine from the factual record whether or not the I HA in fact provided such an exemption. In this
case, the other side of the Appellate Body finding is that the United States may comply with the DSB
recommendations and rulings by showing that the IHA in fact does not provide an exemption from the
federal criminal statutes. This kind of reasoning is what the United States intended by the statement
that the Appellate Body "invited" the United St ates to demonstrate that the measures met the
requirement of the Article XIV chapeau.
See Comment to paragraph 21 above.

The facts and circumstances in US – Shrimp are materially different t han those present in this case.
In US – Shrimp, the United States defence under Ar ticle XX of the GATT failed for the same basic
reason it did in this case – the United States failed to meet its burden of proof under the chapeau.
However, contrary to this case, in US – Shrimp th e United States actually did a number of things
subsequent to the adoption of the DSB recommenda tions and rulings. It not only adopted revised
guidelines for the implementatio n of the measure at issue,
17 but also took a number of serious, good
faith proactive steps to address the criticism of the panel and the Appellate Body over the United
States' failure to engage Malaysia in discussions to resolve their difficulties.18

In this
 case, the United States did nothing.

It should also be noted that the US – Shrimp ca se is an excellent example of what an Article 21.5
compliance panel should in fact do when reviewing the status of compliance – it is particularly useful

17 Appellate Body report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 3-7.
18 Id., paras. 131-133.

given the similarities between the results of the orig inal proceedings in the two cases. Contrary to the
repeated assertions of the United States in this case that the Panel must restrict its enquiry to the
letter of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the case, 19 the US – Shrimp report makes it
clear that a wide, re-examination of the entire Arti cle XIV defence is required in order to properly
assess the status of compliance.20

Were the Panel to allow the United States a "second chance" in this proceeding, then it would be
required under the US – Shrimp principles – recently reaffirmed by the Appellate Body in US –
Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada)21 – to determine whether the United States, in light of all
circumstances, has met its entire burden of proof un der Article XIV of the GATS. Not only does the
United States fail to meet its burden of proof with respect to the chapeau, but also, in light of all
evidence before the Panel, the United States has also failed to satisfy the first prong of the Article XIV
defence – "necessity."

Antigua has proven in this proceed ing, and the United States has not contradicted, the existence of a
number of state regulatory schemes for rem ote gambling services in the United States.
22 Under the
reasoning adopted by the Appellate Body in the original proceeding, 23 Antigua having identified
reasonable alternatives, the burden has shifted to the United States to demonstrate why those
alternatives are not reasonably available to it. This it has completely failed to do. Of course, it
would be impossible for the United States to argue that a regulatory scheme such as that used by a
number of states would not be "reasonably available" when such schemes are actively being used by
governmental entities in the United States today.

Question 17 (US): The US refers to a respondent required to adopt new measures when it is
already in compliance with its obligations. (U S FWS §45) Is this not true of any respondent
whose measures may well satisfy an exception but who fails to raise that exception before a
Panel? Or a respondent who does not succeed in demonstrating that its measure satisfies an
exception?

47. The United States submits that it has shown in this proceeding that the US criminal laws fall
within the scope of GATS Article XIV, and are thus not inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States under the GATS. The United States is not aware of any past dispute in which a WTO-
consistent measure has been found in an Article 21.5 proceeding to be not in compliance with DSB
recommendations and rulings. Thus, although this qu estion is phrased in terms of "any respondent,"
the United States submits that the circumstances presented by this dispute are indeed unusual.
48. As the United States explained in its past subm issions, this unusual situation arose due to
Antigua's choices in presenting its claim. In par ticular, because Antigua was unable or unwilling to
specify the statutes at issue, neither the Panel nor the United States were able to identify the measures
at issue until the case had reached the Interim Review stage. Consequently, neither the parties nor the
Panel were in a position to develop fully the factua l record and the argumentation with respect to how
each measure that might possibly be covered in the dispute would fit within each of the criteria set out
in GATS Article XIV.
Antigua finds it incredible that the United States would shoulder Antigua
 with the responsibility for
the United States failing to meet its burden of proof under Article XIV. It was the United States, and it

19 See, e.g. US First written submission, para. 42.
20 Appellate Body report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 100-106.
21 Appellate Body report on US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 61-77.
22 As Antigua demonstrated, a number of these regulatory schemes are quite similar to Antigua's own
regulatory scheme for remote gambling services. See AB First written submission, paras. 139-140.
23 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 311.

alone, that chose to delay its assertion of the Artic le XIV defence, despite Antigua having raised the
possibility of such a defence in Antigua's very First written submission. Nonetheless, it is clear from
the record that the United States resisted raising Article XIV throughout the proceeding, discussing
Article XIV issues only in its final written submission to the original panel. Despite its discussion of
Article XIV in that submission, the United States co ntinued to resist conceding that it was raising the
defence at all. Antigua recalls that at the last session of the original panel, a panel member had to
repeatedly ask the representative of the United States whether the defence was indeed being raised –
as the representative could not seem to bring himself to answer the question directly.

With respect to the claim that the United States ra ised the issue so late only because it was unclear
what "measures" it was defending, the assertion is absur d. Antigua cited the Wire Act, the Travel Act
and the IGBA in virtually every submission and statement it made in the original proceeding, from the
original request for consultations all the way to Antigua's comments to the United States' responses to
the second questions of the original panel. More precisely, those statutes were raised in the First
written submission of Antigua to the original panel, and in Antigua's comments to the United States'
request for preliminary rulings it was clear beyond di spute that all three of the federal statutes were
alleged to prohibit the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.
24

Question 18 (US): Does the US consider that any responding party that has a valid affirmative
defence that did not succeed only because of a la ck of a full factual showing in the original
proceeding has a right to make a full factual showing of the same defence in a compliance
proceeding? What would be the systemic implicat ions of such a view? What incentive would a
respondent have to fully argue its affirmative defence before the original panel? (US oral
statement, para. 31)

49. As discussed in the response to Question 17, th ere were particular, unusual circumstances in
this dispute that prevented the United States from presenting the same level of argument and evidence
on Article XIV with respect to these measures. These circumstances should be taken into account;
they would be unlikely to occur in other dis putes (unless of course it were established that a
complaining party benefitted from the same type of l ack of specificity in its claims and arguments as
were present in the original proceeding).
See Response to paragraph 48 above.

50. It is also important to bear in mind that there is a fundamental difference in the situations of a
complaining and responding party concerning findings th at a party has failed to make a full showing
to meet its burden of proof. Where a compla ining party fails to present evidence and argument
sufficient to meet its burden of proof, that complaining party has the ability to bring a new dispute and
have an opportunity to present additional evidence a nd argumentation. The situation is different for a
responding party. The responding party is unable to bring a new proceeding and so would be denied
the opportunity to present additional evidence and argum entation to meet its burden of proof for an
affirmative defence, unless the responding party may make this fuller showing in a compliance
proceeding.
As Antigua observed in its responses to the Panel' s Questions, such an aggrieved responding party
would have the opportunity to bring a new dis pute of its own under Article 22.8 of the DSU. 25 Even if

24 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Appellee Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United
States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, AB-2005-1 (1 February
2005), paras. 21-28.
25 Responses of Antigua and Barbuda to the Questions of the Panel to the Parties, United States –
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285 (8 December 2006) (the "AB Responses"), Response to Question 20.

one were to accept the baseless argument of th e United States that it alone as a responding party
should be entitled to reassert its failed case, there is no logical reason why the entire failed defence
should not be reconsidered in toto. If the United States laments the "limited" discussion and evidence
regarding Article XIV of the GATS in the original proceeding, then no doubt it would best for the
entire issue to be thoroughly discussed and considered.

51. The United States understands that in the contex t of this question, "systemic implications"
refers to the prospect that responding Members would, as a tactical matter, de cide in future cases to
withhold factual information in support of affirmative defences until the Article 21.5 proceeding. The
United States submits that there is no basis for be lieving that such "systemic implications" would
arise.
52. The reason is simple: The respondi ng Member would obtain no benefit
 of purposely saving
evidence in support of an affirmative defence until th e Article 21.5 proceeding. To the contrary, the
responding party has a strong interest in obtaining during the original proceeding a definitive finding
as to the validity of an affirmative defence. If th e finding is affirmative (i.e., if the defence applies),
the responding Member would not be subject to fu ture proceedings. If the finding is negative, the
responding Member would be entitled to a reasona ble period of time for compliance during which it
could address the problems identified with respect to its affirmative defence.
If the United States were to prevail in its argumen t, it would indeed have obtained a very significant
benefit from its purposeful delay in asserting the Arti cle XIV defence. As Antigua has stated, the late
assertion of the defence placed Antigua in a very d ifficult situation where it had to either (i) prolong
the length of the original proceeding and ask the original panel for further time to properly respond
to the defence in writing or (ii) continue on th e basis of an incomplete and unclear record in, as
happened in the original proceeding, the belief that the panel or the Appellate Body would agree that
the defence was either raised so late, or so incompletely, that the defence would fail.
26 I f t h e
responding party were allowed the sole ability to reassert and presen t evidence on its failed defence
in what is supposed to be a compliance assessmen t under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the complaining
party would be very much at a material disadvantage.

53. In contrast, a responding Member who waited until the Article 21.5 proceeding to present a
full affirmative defence is in a far worse position. Even if it prevails on the defence, it will have
subjected itself to an additional pro ceeding. And, moreover, if it fails
 to establish the affirmative
defence, it faces the prospect of an immediate request for authorization to suspend concessions,
without any further reasonable period of time for compliance.
Question 19 (ANT, US): If a respondent were entitled to a "second chance" to make out a
defence would the compliance panel make its ass essment on the basis of evidence presented in
the compliance proceeding only, or the evidence presented in the original proceeding as well?

54. As in other proceedings under the DSU, the Ar ticle 21.5 panel should base its findings on the
evidence and arguments presented by the disputing par ties. To the extent th at evidence introduced in
the original proceeding remained relevant, the disputi ng parties are of course free to incorporate or to
refer to such evidence.
[Questions 20-21 (ANT)]

Question 22 (US): If the US is permitted to demonstrate that its measures satisfy the
requirements of the Article XIV chapeau, what is Antigua entitled to demonstrate? What
would limit the Panel's assessment to the IHA? Could the Panel's assessment include any issue

26 AB Responses, Response to Question 38(b), fn. 39.

as to whether the Federal criminal statutes satisf y the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau,
such as whether they are non-discriminatory on their face?

55. As the United States explained in detail in paragraphs 28 to 31 of its Second written
submission, the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding is limited. The DSB recommendations and
rulings serve as the instructions to the Member concerned for the steps it is required to take during the
reasonable period of time in order to comply with those recommendations and rulings. If a
complaining party were entitled to reargue claims that were considered and rejected in the original
proceeding, the Member concerned could be in the untenable position of being foun d out of
compliance even though it had relied on and complied with the findings of the Panel and/or Appellate
Body. This is the basis for the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Bed Linen that complaining parties
cannot reargue failed claims in an Article 21.5 proceeding.
Antigua asserts there is no basis for what the United States says in this response. However, it should
be pointed out that many of Antigua's claims in the original proceeding were not "considered and
rejected," but, as with the Article XIV defence, found to have suffered from the failure to make a
prima facie showing. In particular, the Appella te Body, having for the first time in the US –
Gambling case assigned the burden of proof on the complaining party to establish "reasonably
available alternatives" in the context of an Artic le XIV defence, held that Antigua had "raised no
other measure that . . . could be considered an alternative to the prohibitions on remote gambling
contained in the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA."
27 Because this "failure" on the part of
Antigua to raise an alternative was not a "rejected " claim, there is nothing to distinguish this
"failure" from the failure of the United States to m eet its burden of proof under the chapeau. If the
Article XIV defence is to be reconsidered, it should be reconsidered in whole.

[Question 23 (ANT)]

Question 24 (US): Please refer to the Award of th e Arbitrator pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU which states that "the United States emphasizes that the only means of implementation
that will achieve the necessary clarification is legislative means" (para. 37) and that
"implementation will occur by legislative means" (para. 64). Can these statements in the
Award be reconciled with the US submission th at "[l]egislation to clarify the interaction
between the IHA and Wire Act was a possible means – but not the only means – for
compliance"? (US FWS §55) If the US disag rees with the statements in the Award of the
Arbitrator, could it please comment on the statemen ts attributed to it in the transcript of the
Arbitrator's oral hearing on pages 31-32 ("legi slation is required") and page 34 ("we need
legislation")? Could the US clarify why it referred on pages 59-60, 60-61 and 72-73 to action by
Congress - what could it have contemplated there if not legislation?

56. As the United States explained during the hear ing, the United States respectfully disagrees
with the arbitrator's characterization of the US vi ews on the possible means of implementation. First,
neither the US written submission, nor its presentations during the arbitration hearing (as reflected in
the transcript) support this character ization. Second, it is important to understand the context of the
arbitrator's statement within th e discussions held during the arbitration. The United States sought a
reasonable period of time that would allow fo r implementation through the adoption of new
legislation. Antigua agreed
 that the United States should adopt legislation, but also argued that partial
compliance with respect to "non-sports betting" co uld be achieved by Executive Order. The United
States responded that even if an Executive Orde r were a legally available possibility, this
hypothetical, partial means of compliance was not relevant because – as both parties agreed – the
arbitrator still needed to determine the reasonable peri od of time to adopt legislation. In other words,
when the United States discussed the need for legislation, this was in response to Antigua's claim that

27 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 326. This conclusion is simply incorrect.

the United States should get a shorter reasonable period of time because (according to Antigua) partial
compliance could be achieved by Executive Order.
The entire discussion of the United States in respon se to Question 24 is so patently untrue it bears but
little comment – the record on this issue speaks for it self. Antigua would, however, like to point out
that this assertion that the United States "discuss ed the need for legislation" only in response to
Antigua's arguments in the Article 21.3 proceed ing is particularly disingenuous, given that both
parties' submissions to the Arbitrator were due and made on the same day.

57. Moreover, there was no discussion during the Article 21.3 arbitration of a legislative means of
compliance in the context of a discussion of which alternative means of compliance were available to
the United States (except partial compliance through an Executive Order). Thus, to the extent the
arbitrator's statement is read as suggesting that there had been a discussion of various alternative
means of compliance, and that during this discussi on the United States had dismissed all alternatives
except legislation, this is clearly a misreading. Fi nally, nowhere in the record of the arbitration does
the United States ever assert or imply that a full factual showing based on legislative history and
relevant case law would be insufficient to meet the US burden of showing that the IHA does not
create carve outs from criminal statutes.
58. With respect to the first two specific statements cited in the question ("legislation is required"
and "we need legislation"), the record of the arbitration clearly shows the context described above.
59. The starting point is Antigua's written submi ssion, which lays out Antigua's idea about
differing periods of compliance for sports and non-sports betting:
"11. Antigua submits that it is possible for the United States to comply with the
DSB recommendations and rulings (i) imme diately via presidential executive order
with respect to the provision of non-s ports related and horse racing gambling and
betting services and (ii) with respect to the provision of other sports gambling and
betting services, within six months of the adoption of the Report and the Panel Report
by the DSB via either an am endment to each of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act or the passage of new legislation that would either
repeal or supersede the Federal Trio with respect to the provision of these services
from Antiguan operators."

60. During the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator asks about this distinction:
"In your submission you draw a distin ction between 'on-sports related and
horseracing gambling and betting services' on the one hand and 'other sports
gambling and betting services' on the other. Wh at is the basis for that distinction if
one looks at the Panel and Appellate Body reports and what they have said?"

61. Antigua then describes its view of the distinction, without immediately tying the distinction
back to Antigua's idea of a shorter RPT for non-sports betting:
"In neither report do they really consider the different types of gambling. . . .

We referred to a number of discussions in our submissions that that [the distinction
between sports and non-sports gambling] is a pretty widely held belief by gambling
law commentators throughout the United States."

62. The United States proceeds to respond to Antigua's argument, both with respect to the
purported distinction between various types of gamb ling under federal criminal law, and with respect
to the effect that such distinction should have on the calculation of the RPT:
"I guess there are two ways of responding. The fi rst is that which we took in our statement –
that at the end of the day even if there were such a distinction, and we disagree that there is, it
is not []relevant to the ultimate decisi on here since legislation is required
 and legislation does
not really relate to any purported distinction between sports and non-sports betting."

63. In this context, the phrase "legislation is require d" is used to rebut Antigua's claim that the
RPT is somehow affected by an alleged ability of th e United States to address non-sports betting with
an Executive Order. As shown above, Antigua exp ected the United States to adopt legislation to
address sports betting, and the above statement simp ly means that the RPT for legislation is not
affected by a purported ability to address non-sports betting through an Executive Order. In context,
this statement cannot possibly be read as an overarching assertion that the only means of compliance
available to the United States was through legislation.
64. The second phrase ("we need legislation") cited in the question is also made in this same
context. Antigua first asserts that the United Stat es can come into compliance through some sort of
administrative action with respect to non-sports betting.
"We are saying here that under the United States law as it actually exists there really
is no need to amend these other statutes with respect to non sports betting because it
simply is an administrative position of the United States government that these types
of services are prohibited as well."

65. The United States then responds, with a similar point as previously made.
"Again, I think our first res ponse would be that in the end you do not have to reach
the issue [of the RPT required to adopt an Executive Order or other administrative
action addressed to non sports be tting] because An tigua acknowledges
 that the
actions it is requesting us to take with regard to non sports [] betting will not by
themselves bring us into compliance, we need legislation on other matters , and
therefore, given that the actions they ar e requesting we take with regard to [] non
sports betting would require less time than th e legislation, the legislation ultimately is
what is driving the determination of the r easonable period of time, so it is an issue
that need not even be reached."

66. Again, the US statement cannot be read as making a point about legislation versus every other
possible means of compliance. Rather, it is simply a response to Antigua's argument that the
purported option of adopting administrative acti on on non-sports betting could somehow reduce the
reasonable period of time.
67. Finally, the question requests that the US cl arify why it referred on pages 59-60, 60-61 and
72-73 of the transcript to action by Congress. As explained above, the United States sought a
reasonable period of time that would allow for the adoption of a legislative clarification. Accordingly,
much of the arbitral proceeding focused on the question of how long it would take to obtain the
passage of such legislation. Nowhere in the cited passages (nor elsewhere in the US presentations to
the arbitrator), however, does the United States assert that legislation was the only means of
compliance.
Question 25 (US): The US has referred to Bill HR 4777. Antigua has referred to Bill HR 4411.
What was the relationship between these Bills and the internet gambling law that was passed in

October 2006? Was there ever legislation pending that would have brought the US into
compliance with the DSB recommendations in this dispute? (US SWS §38) Is there anything in
writing to demonstrate that such legislation was under consideration in the Congress?

68. H.R. 4777 was a bill sponsored by Representative Goodlatte. This bill would have amended
18 U.S.C. 1084 and would have prohibited the accep tance of certain forms of payment for certain
gambling activities over the Internet. H.R. 4411 was a bill sponsored by Representative Leach. As
introduced, H.R. 4411 also prohibited the acceptan ce of certain forms of payment for unlawful
Internet gambling.
69. H.R. 4411 was merged with H.R. 4777 to include the revisions to 18 U.S.C. § 1084 and the
merged bill was passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate for its consideration.
The House and Senate, in conference, revised the provisions of the merged bill and incorporated
portions of it into the Safe Port Act, Public La w 109-347, which was signed into law by the President
in October 2006.
70. The Internet gambling provisions in the Safe Port Act are referred to as the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), Title VIII of Public Law 109-347, and they pertain
only to the acceptance of payments for unlawful Inte rnet gambling. Those provisions are similar to
the prohibitions contained in H.R. 4411 as introduced. This statute does not amend Section 1084.
The provisions pertaining to horse racing are simi lar to those contained in H.R. 4411 as the bill was
passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate.
71. The horse racing provisions in H.R. 4411 (which, as noted, was an amendment to the Wire
Act) address the issue of the relationship between the IHA and the Wire Act, but the legislation as
adopted by the House did not clarify the relations hip. If the Executive Branch had achieved its goal
of obtaining a legislative clarification, this la nguage would have been modified to achieve the
clarification. Although the United States is aware that various formulations of the horse racing
provisions were discussed, it is not aware of any formally-introduced amendment other than those
described above.
H.R. 4411, as adopted by the United House of Repr esentatives, took much the same approach as the
final legislation did, saying that "[n]othing in this Act may be construed to prohibit any activity that is
allowed under [the IHA] . . .."
28 This would not have "clarified" the matter in the way the United
States would, apparently, have desired in the context of this dispute.

Question 26 (ANT, US): Does the fact that statemen ts are made in the context of Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU require that they be given different weight from that accorded to any other
statements of a party concerning an issue in dispute?

72. Article 21.3(c) has a particular, limited purpose, and as numerous arbitrators have explained,
their role is not to discuss the particulars of a Member's implementation. The weight accorded to
statements made in the context of Article 21.3(c) proceedings should take into account the specific,
limited purpose of those proceedings. Furthermore, there is no basis for assigning any special weight
to statements made by a party during an Article 21.3 proceeding, as compared to, for example, public
statements by a party or statements made by a party to WTO committees.
73. The United States notes that statements of a part y could have evidentiary value in interpreting
the factual question of the meaning or existence of a party's measure. However, it is hard to see how
such statements might arise in an Article 21.3 pro ceeding. And in the circumstances of this case, the
United States had no call to make any statements regarding the substantive, factual issue of the

28 HR 4411, § 105. See AB First written submission, paras. 62-64.

relationship between the IHA and the three criminal statutes. Rather, the Article 21.3 proceeding
addressed an entirely different issue, namely, the amount of time required to obtain a legislative
clarification of that relationship.
Question 27 (US): The US has referred to the "s afe harbor" provision that is available for the
transmission of information assisting in the placing of wagers (US FWS §§7-10; SWS §19) Is
an "interstate off-track wager", as defined in th e IHA, a "bet or wager" or "information
assisting in the placing of wagers" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1084(a)?

74. A wager placed in one state, but not transmitted to another state, with respect to the outcome
of a race taking place in another state is a "bet or wa ger" which may be legal if authorized by the laws
of the state in which it is placed. A "pari-mutual wager . . . placed or transmitted by an individual in
one State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted by an off-track betting system in . . .
another State" is the transmission of a "bet or wa ger" and is a violation of the Wire Act. The
transmission of information relating to the formati on of a wagering pool is "information assisting in
the placement of bet[s] or wager[s]" so l ong as a wager itself is not transmitted by wire
communication in interstate or foreign commerce.
Question 28 (US): The US submits that no langua ge of permission exists in the IHA. (US FWS
§33) Can this be reconciled with the following la nguage of Section 5 IHA, cited in the Appellate
Body report at para. 361: "An int erstate off-track wager may be accepted
 by an off-track
betting system only if consent is obtained fr om – the horse racing association" [followed by
extensive conditions and provisos] (emphasis added)

75. As the United States explained in paragraphs 20-25 of its First written submission, the IHA
contains no "language of permission" relating to criminal liability u nder United States law. To the
extent that the IHA includes any "language of pe rmission," it relates only to the allowance of the
receipt of certain bets without being subject to civ il liability under the IHA itself. It has nothing to do
with what is allowed under the criminal law of the United States. Section 4 of the IHA, 15 U.S.C. §
3003, contains the general rule impos ing liability for the acceptance of interstate off track wagers not
in accordance with the IHA. Section 5 of th e IHA, 15 U.S.C. § 3004, specifies those limited
circumstances in which wagers may be accepted on horse races. Section 6 of the IHA, 15 U.S.C. §
3005, imposes civil liability on persons accepti ng wagers on horse races without complying with
Section 5's requirements of various agreements with affected parties. Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 3006,
sets forth the parameters of any civil action for damages for non-compliance with the IHA. The IHA
must be read as a whole, and nothing in that act grants permission to transmit wagers using wire
communication facilities in interstate or foreign co mmerce, or provides an exception to the criminal
law prohibiting such transmission.
Question 29 (US): The U.S. has explained that the IHA and the Wire Act have separate effects
with respect to wagering that breaches both Acts. (US FWS §35) Please explain the separate
effects of the two Acts with respect to wagering conducted in accordance with
 Section 5 of the
IHA but not in accordance with the Wire Act.

76. If a person living in one state transmits, by wire communication, a wager on a horse race to an
off-track betting facility located in another stat e and the host racing association and the off-track
betting facility have the agreements required by the IHA in place, then the host racing association will
not have a basis to file an IHA law suit against th e off-track betting facility. However, the off-track
betting facility would still be subject to prosecution fo r violating the Wire Act. What the IHA does is
to merely protect the right of the entity staging a hor se race to enjoy the receipt of all of the revenue
from their product, that is, the horse race. What the Wire Act does is punish any person who, being in
the business of betting or wagering, uses a wire communication facility for the transmission of bets or
wagers in interstate or foreign commerce or for the transmission of information assisting in the

placement of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest. However, if certain conditions which are
outlined in subsection (b) of the Wire Act exist, a person can be protected with respect to the
transmission of information assisting in the placeme nt of bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest, but he or she still may not use a wire communication facility for the transmission of the bets
or wagers themselves.
Question 30 (US): If there were a positive repugnancy between the IHA and the Wire Act
(which the US does not concede), would the US disagree with the rules of statutory construction
that allow more recently enacted and specific statut es to control or prevail to the extent of a
conflict, as described by Antigua? (Antigua FWS §§58-59)

77. The United States agrees that US law includes a judicially-created doctrine of repeal by
implication. However, the United States does not agree with Antigua's characterization of that
doctrine. A more accurate summary of the doctrine is contained in paragraphs 26-31 and Annex I of
the first US submission.
Question 31 (US): Please refer to the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
(Exhibit AB-113).

 Sub-question (a): Even if this Act is not with in the terms of reference of this Panel, do
you consider that it can constitute evidence relevant to the matter before the Panel?

78. The United States believes that Panels are not barred from considering evidence (including
the fact that a new measure was adopted) that comes into existence after the initiation of panel
proceedings. The United States submits, however, th at the UIGEA does not shed light on the issues
in this dispute, because the law does not amend or a lter any statutes at issue, and instead establishes a
separate enforcement mechanism aimed at particular activities already unlawful under federal or state
law.
 Sub-question (b): Why does 31 U.S.C. 5362(10)(D)(i) provide that the term "unlawful
Internet gambling" shall not include any activity that is allowed under the Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978?

79. On September 29, 2006, Representative Leach, one of the original sponsors of the legislation,
submitted a statement on the Internet gambling pr ovisions of the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 into the Congressional Record . That statement, which is part of the
legislative history of the Act, provides that Section 5362(10)(D)(I) "addresses transactions complying
with the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) which will not be considered unlawful because the IHA
only regulates legal transactions that are lawful in each state involved." Importantly, the statute does
not change what types of betting operations are "l egal transactions." In order to be a "legal
transaction," the wager must be made in compliance with both state and federal law. Since the IHA
did not repeal Section 1084, the wager must also comply with the provisions of Section 1084.
 Sub-question (b) [continued]: What activi ties are allowed under the IHA that would
otherwise fall within the definition of the term "unlawful Internet gambling"?

80. None. The transmission in interstate or fore ign commerce of bets or wagers on horse races
using wire communication facilities, even if the speci fic agreements required by the IHA are in place,
would constitute "unlawful Internet gambling" because such transmission would violate the Wire Act,
may possibly violate other provisions of federal and state law, would therefore not constitute a "legal
wager" as required by the IHA, and thus could not be in compliance with the IHA.

 Sub-question (c): What are the "existing disagreements over ho w to interpret the
relationship between the Interstate Horsera cing Act and other Federal statutes"
referred to in 31 U.S.C. 5362(10)(D)(iii)? Wh om are the disagreements between? Can
such disagreements be reconciled with the US submission to this Panel that under
fundamental principles of US law, the IHA does not provide an exemption from the
three Federal statutes? Does this indicate ambiguity in the relationship between these
laws?

81. The disagreement referred to in this "sense of Congress" provision concerns whether the
Interstate Horseracing Act repealed by implication pre-existing criminal statutes, thereby allowing the
interstate transmission of bets on horse races. The Department of Justice has publicly stated that it
does not believe that the IHA amended or repealed pre-existing criminal statutes, while the horse
racing industry believes that the IHA removes the cr iminal prohibitions relating to the interstate
transmission for bets on horse races. The disagre ements are between the Department of Justice and
those interests that wish to profit on interstate gambling on horseracing.
In reality, the "disagreements" are between the United States Department of Justice, on one side, and
just about everyone else (including at least 18 state governments), on the other.

82. The "sense of Congress provision" is entirely cons istent with US statements concerning the
proper interpretation of US criminal statutes. The language simply notes the disagreement, it does not
take a position as to how a court would in fact constr ue the relationship between federal criminal laws
and the IHA.
83. A disagreement does not necessarily indicate an "a mbiguity." Indeed, in almost every WTO
dispute there is a disagreement among Members as to how to interpret particular provisions of the
covered agreements, but this does not establish that there is an ambiguity in the drafting of those
provisions. However, as the Panel notes, the Ap pellate Body did not distur b the original Panel's
finding of an "ambiguity," and the United States is not disputing that ambiguity in this proceeding.
Rather, the United States has explained that despite any ambiguity, there is a right and wrong answer
to the question of the relationship between the IHA and the three federal criminal laws at issue. And,
based on the evidence and arguments presented in this proceeding, the United States has met its
burden of showing that the IHA does not provide exemptions from federal criminal laws.
Franz Kafka would appreciate this answer. Desp ite mounds of evidence to the contrary and despite
the express refusal of the United States Congress – the actual law-making authority in the
United States – to clarify the matter in favour of the DOJ interpretation, the United States nonetheless
asserts that it "has met its burden of showing that the IHA does not provide exemptions from federal
criminal laws."

 Sub-question (d): If the US Congress do es not wish to resolve any existing
disagreements over this question of interpretatio n at this stage, is the US delegation to
this Panel entitled under US law to take a definitive view on it? Is the US delegation
asking the Panel to take a definitive view on a question of interpretation that the US
Congress has chosen not to resolve?

84. The United States delegation is entitled under US law to take a definitive view on the
disagreement. The official position of the Departme nt of Justice -- the agency which is responsible
for applying federal criminal law -- is that the IHA provides no exemptions from federal criminal
laws. The United States delegation submits that it ha s shown in this proceeding that the DOJ view of
US criminal statutes is correct under fundamental principles of US statutory construction.

85. The United States is not asking the Panel to ta ke any "definitive view" on questions of
domestic US law that might have an y domestic effect within the Unite d States. To the contrary, the
role of this Panel is to resolve the legal and factual issues in this dispute. The key factual issue in this
dispute is whether the United States has met its burden of showing that the IHA does not result in
discriminatory carve outs from federal criminal statut es, and thus has met its burden of showing that
the US measures meet the criteria of the Article XI V chapeau. A Panel finding on this factual issue
has no effect on domestic US law.
 Sub-question (e): Can the US comment on the statements by the National
Thoroughbred Racing Association that " [t]he legislation contained language that
recognizes the ability of the horse racing indus try to offer account wagering under the
Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 as amended" (Exhibit AB-118) and by Youbet.com
that the "legislation ... exempts Youbet.com and other advanced deposit wagering
companies in the horse racing industry from internet gaming prohibitions"? (Exhibit
AB-120)

86. The UIGEA made no amendments to the Wire Act or any other federal criminal law, and thus
simply could not have the effect claimed in the above statement. As noted, however, horseracing
interests contend that the IHA provides carve outs from federal criminal law, and it is not surprising
that they would make this type of baseless claim about the UIGEA.
Question 32: Please refer to the States' laws and regulations on account wagering "under the
auspices of the IHA" provided by Antigua (Exhibits AB-34 to AB-51), as well as State licences
to specific operators among the information on particular operators (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73).

 [Sub-questions (a) and (b) (ANT)]

 Sub-question (c) (USA): Many of these State la ws appear to authorize account wagering
by telephone and other electronic means. Ho w does this relate to the prohibition in the
Wire Act?

87. Even if a state laws would appear to authorize account wagering by telephone or other
electronic means, they cannot override the Wire Act to the extent that they authorize transmission of
wagers by means of a wire communication facility in interstate or foreign commerce. Account
wagering, itself, is not a violation of the Wire Act or other federal law to the extent that the state does
not authorize the transmission by means of a wire communication facility in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers. If a business is accepting bets or wagers by means of a wire
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, the business is violating the Wire Act.
The United States' answer to this question expressl y confirms the argument Antigua has made from
the beginning of this dispute – that the federal prohibitions contained in the Wire Act, the Travel Act
and the IGBA only apply if the "remote" gambling cro sses a state or international border, and do not
apply to wholly-intrastate remote gambling. As Antigua observed to the panel in the original
proceeding:

"32. In this respect the Panel should also note that, contrary to what the United
States suggests, the laws comprising th e federal ban on interstate and cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services were not put in place because interstate and
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services was considered a greater health
risk than the local supply of gambling services. The federal ban on interstate and
cross-border supply is merely intended to sa feguard the states' ability to regulate
gambling as they see fit within their borders.

33. It is particularly important to realise what United States federal law does not
do. For example:
• Federal law does not require states to regulate gambling within their borders
at all
• Federal law does not require states to pr ohibit gambling within their borders
at all
• Federal law does not prohibit telephonic, electronic, Internet or any other
forms of remote gambling from occurring within the borders of any state at
all
34. Thus, ironically (and somewhat difficu lt to reconcile with the position of the
United States that cross-border supply of gambling and betting services poses
significant health, law enforcement and other social issues that justify the United
States total prohibition), under current fed eral law every state in the United States, if
it so chose, could offer completely un regulated Internet gambling to every person
located within the borders of the state. Yet Antigua would still be unable to provide
any gambling and betting services-regulated or not-into the United States on a
cross-border basis."
29
The federal laws at issue do not prohibit remote gambling at all, just cross-border gambling.
Because Antigua can only provide remote gambling on a cross-border basis, each of those statutes is
facially discriminatory, as well as discriminatory in application.

 Sub-question (d) (USA): Why do some of these State laws refer to the Interstate
Horseracing Act 1978?

88. The various states of the United States, being sovereign, maintain their own statutory schemes
subject only to those matters expressly reserved to the Federal Government by the Constitution.
Federal authorities are not in a position to specula te on the reasons state laws are written in any
particular way. However, a state would naturally want to require compliance with the IHA for legal
off-track account wagering on horse races, that is, a ccount wagering occurring wholly within the state
itself that does not involve the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of the bets or wagers.
The last sentence of this answer is compelling evide nce of the discriminatory effect of United States
law – "account wagering occurring wholly within the state itself that does not involve the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of the bets or wagers." As the United States has based
its Article XIV defence on the basis that it prohibits all
 remote gambling and betting services, 30 the
concession made by the United States in this answ er – which is supported by the language of the
statutes themselves and legal precedent – is enough to show why the United States cannot justify its
WTO-inconsistent laws under Article XIV of the GATS.

Question 33 (ANT, US): Does the IHA only allo w domestic suppliers to operate wagering
services on horseracing, or can foreign suppliers in some way operate under its auspices? If
Antiguan operators entered into revenue-sharing arrangements with racetracks, would they still
be liable to prosecution?

29 Second written submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (9 January 2004), paras. 32-34.
30 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 350.

89. So far as we can determine, Antiguan gambli ng operators, or gambling operators from any
other country, would be legally able to enter into th e relevant agreements specified in the IHA in the
United States so that they could accept wagers on t hose horse races without fear of being held civilly
liable for the payment of damages to the host racing a ssociation and others under the provisions of the
IHA. However, both domestic and foreign gambli ng operators would be subject to prosecution for
violating the Wire Act if they, being in the busin ess of betting or wagering, knowingly used a wire
communication facility in interstate or foreign commerce for the transmission of bets or wagers.
Because Antigua does not come within the IHA's de finition of a "State" and both the punter and the
operator have to be in a "State" in order to ma ke and accept a legal remote bet or wager under the
IHA, Antigua cannot possibly come under its covera ge – whether on an intras tate or a cross-border
basis.31 Once again, however, this answer confirms that a remote wager placed on an intrastate basis
would not be prohibited.

Question 34 (US): Has the US ever prosecute d under the Wire Act wagering on horseracing
conducted in accordance with the IHA
? If not, why not?

90. None of the federal indictments concerning Inte rnet gambling of which we are aware concern
wagering on horseracing that was conducted in acco rdance with the IHA. There is no reporting
requirement for gambling indictments and the statistics maintained by the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys only track the number of prosecutions brought under the statute but do not specify
the types of bets or wagers. The decision of whet her to bring charges in any particular case rests on a
variety of factors within the discretion of the pros ecutor, such as the availability of resources, and
prosecutorial priorities. To our knowledge, no defe ndant has ever raised co mpliance with the IHA as
a defence to a prosecution for a violation of any fe deral gambling statute. If such a defence were
raised, the Department of Justice believes such a defence would be legally unsuccessful.
Question 35: Regarding Youbet.com, TVG, Xp ressBet.com, Capital OTB and the other US
domestic operations described by Antigua (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73):

 [Sub-questions (a) to (d) (ANT)]

 Sub-question (e) (US): Has the US launched a criminal prosecution against any of these
operators? What is the current status of the prosecution proceedings against
Youbet.com that were pending at the time of the original dispute (WT/DS285/R, para.
6.588)?

91. The Department of Justice is unable to comme nt on the pendency of proceedings which are
not otherwise public. The Department is not aw are of any public pending prosecution of Youbet.com
or the other entities listed above.
Question 36 (US): Do the recent prosecutions of foreign operators listed in Antigua's First
written submission at paras. 106-107 concern the provision of pari-mutual wagering on
horseracing or other wagering services or both?

92. The prosecutions listed in para graphs 106 and 107 of Antigua's First written submission are
the May 2006 indictment United States v. William Scott, et al.
, No CR 05-122 (D.D.C) and the July
2006 indictment United States v. BETONSPORTS PLC, et al. , No. 4:06 CR00337 CEJ (E.D.
Missouri). The Scott indictment alleged in paragraph 6 that the defendants "unlawfully engaged in
illegal internet casino gambling and accepts informati on to facilitate betting as well as accepting bets

31 See AB First written submission, paras. 50-51.

and wagers from persons in the United States who place bets on baseball, basketball, football, hockey
and other sports through the internet and telephone."
93. The BETONSPORTS PLC
indictment alleged that the de fendants accepted "sports wagers
from gamblers in the United States" (paragraph 1) , "offered gamblers in the United States illegal
wagering on professional and college football and basketball, as well as many other professional and
amateur sporting events and contests." (paragraph 2). The overt acts allege that the company
"accepted a sports bet" but does not provide any furt her information on the type of sporting event.
The Section 1084 counts in the indictment allege the transmission of bets but do not specify the type
of bet. While the indictment does not specifically mention pari-mutual wagering, the defendants did
accept pari-mutual wagers, and such wagers are included in the indictment's reference to "other . . .
sporting events and contests."
94. The United States has recently brought several more prosecutions of illegal gambling
businesses that took bets on horse races as well as a variety of other sporting events. In United States
v. Arthur Gianelli, et al. , (District of Massachusetts), and Unite d States v. Herbert David Meyers, et
al., (District of Maryland), United States-based gamb ling operations employed the services of foreign
gambling businesses to receive, record, and tabulate wagers from the United States on various
sporting events, including horse racing. In United States v. Gerard Uvari, et al. , (Southern District of
New York), United States bookmakers transmitted num erous illegal wagers on horse races interstate.
None of the defendants in these cases entered into the agreements required by the IHA or otherwise
conformed their conduct to the IHA's provisions.
Question 37 (US): Please refer to the statement of Bruce G. Ohr of the US Department of
Justice as set out in Exhibit AB-32.

 Sub-question (a): Can the US confirm that th is is the statement referred to in the US
April 2006 status report to the DSB (WT/DS285/15/Add.1)?

95. Yes, this is the same statement.
 Sub-question (b): What is the current status of "the civil investigation relating to a
potential violation of law" to which Mr. Ohr referred?

96. The civil investigation is still pending. Beyond that the Department of Justice is unable to
make any statement about any matter which is not public.
 Sub-question (c): What was the law potentia lly violated? Why was it a civil, rather
than a criminal, investigation? How is it relevant to the question of how the three
Federal criminal statutes at issue are applied?

97. The Department of Justice is unable to make any specific statement concerning the
investigation. The decision to proceed criminally or civilly is, under United States legal practice,
committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor based on a variety of considerations. A civil
injunctive suit would be relevant to the application of the criminal statutes because such an injunctive
action would require, among other things, a demonstra tion that the federal criminal statutes at issue
were, or were about to be, violated, and that such violation would continue into the future.
 Sub-question (d:) Has the US Department of Justice ever initiated a criminal
prosecution of the interstate transmission of wagers conducted in accordance with the
IHA? Can this pattern of prosecution be taken into account in ascertaining the
Department's interpretation of the statute that it administers?

98. As set forth in response to question 34, we are not aware of any federal prosecutions
concerning Internet gambling concerning the tran smission of wagers conducted in accordance with
the IHA. With regard to the second half of this qu estion, the Appellate Body in the original
proceeding found that the Panel had erred in relying on evidence of a lack of prosecution in support of
an interpretation of the federal criminal statutes.
This finding of the Appellate Body was based upon its opinion that there was insufficient evidence
presented in the original proceeding to place evi dence of lack of prosecutions in proper context. 32 In
this "re-evaluation" of its Article XIV defence de manded by the United States, Antigua has put this
evidence clearly in context. There have been no prosecutions of remote gambling and betting service
providers operating under the auspices of the IHA and state regulatory schemes. But there have been
prosecutions by the United States government – including two high-profile prosecutions this very year
– against remote gambling and betting service providers operating under the Antiguan regulatory
scheme.

 Sub-question (e): Hasn't the original Panel already considered the interpretation of the
US Department of Justice of the IHA as amended, as expressed in the Presidential
signing statement, and found it unpersuasive? (Panel report, paras. 6.597 and 6.600) Is
the interpretation given in Mr. Ohr's statement any different from that expressed in the
Presidential signing statement?

99. As the United States understands the original panel findings, the Panel found that the
Presidential signing statement was not sufficient to m eet the US burden of establishing an affirmative
defence. However, the signing statement and the testimony of Mr. Ohr are official statements
regarding the interpretation of US criminal statutes, and are cumulative evidence in support of the US
position. Moreover, under the Skidmore doctrine discussed in the first US submission, such
statements would be considered by US courts on th e issue of statutory interpretation that the Panel is
examining in this dispute.
 Sub-question (f): Did the US Department of Justice strongly object to the 2000
amendment to the IHA? If so, does this affect the weight to be given now to its
interpretation of the relationship between that Act, as amended, and the Federal
criminal statutes at issue?

100. The 2000 Amendment to the Interstate Horseraci ng Act was inserted at the last minute by
Congress in an appropriations bill providing funding fo r the Department of Justice and other agencies
of government. The Department of Justice did no t learn that this amendment had been inserted until
after the bill had been passed by both houses of Congress and transmitted to the President for
signature. In sum, the Department of Justice was not afforded an opportunity to comment on the
amendment until after it had already been adopted by Congress. However, the Department's position
on the effect of the amendment with respect to federal criminal laws was made clear in the
Presidential signing statement.
Question 38: With respect to the question whether the three Federal criminal statutes at issue
are, on their face, non-discriminatory.

 Sub-question (a) (ANT, US) Did the Appella te Body have competence to make the
finding at paras. 354 and 357 of its report when this was not covered in the Panel report
or a legal interpretation developed by the Panel, and it was contested by Antigua
(original first oral statement, para. 92; original Second written submission, paras. 33-
34)?

32 Appellate Body report on US – Gambling, para. 356.

101. Yes, the Appellate Body had competence to make this finding. In doing so, the Appellate
Body was attempting to complete the analysis in the dispute, after the Appellate Body had vacated
certain Panel findings regarding the application of th e Article XIV chapeau to the facts of this case.
The wording of the statutes was not in dispute, and the Appellate Body acted properly in applying the
legal criteria of the GATS to the undisputed facts concerning the content of the statutory language.
Although the Appellate Body may have had the comp etence to make the finding, unfortunately the
finding was clearly in error.

 [Sub-question (b) (ANT)]

 Sub-question (c) (US): Without prejudice to whether the Panel should review this issue,
can the US elaborate on its view that the te xt of those laws does not contain provisions
that discriminate between countries, when th e Wire Act refers to "interstate or foreign
commerce", but not to intrastate commerce? (US FWS §17)

102. The source of federal jurisdiction for the fede ral gambling statutes at issue is the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, which allo ws Congress to pass laws only where there is an
effect on interstate or foreign commerce. The refere nce to interstate or foreign commerce in the Wire
Act is an example of the jurisdictional requirement imposed by the Constitution, and does not define
the class of individuals who may be prosecuted unde r the statute. Once this requisite effect on
interstate or foreign commerce is satisfied, the cr iminal prohibitions are a pplied equally to anyone,
without discrimination, regardless of nationality or country of origin, that violates the statute.
103. Thus, the fact that the statutes do not address intrastate commerce reflects no "discrimination"
in the operation of US federal laws, it simply re flects the US constitutiona l scheme governing federal
regulation of commerce. Moreover, the absence of a federal prohibition on intrastate activity in no
way indicates that state gambling statutes (which do govern intrastate commerce) are discriminatory.
For these reasons, the Appellate Body was correct in finding that the federal statutes were non-
discriminatory on their face.
Both the GATS and the DSU are clear that they apply on a Member-to-Member basis and that the
obligations and commitments undertaken apply wi thin the applicable territories of the Members
without consideration of internal or domestic governmental distinctions.
33 Thus, from Antigua's
perspective, how the United States chooses to distribute authority between the central and regional or
state governments is not relevant. What is relevant is whether Antiguan service providers are
prohibited by United States law from offering th eir services remotely to consumers in the United
States. And this, by virtue of the Wire Act alone, they clearly are. Yet the Wire Act – as the United
States has conceded – does not prohibit the remote provision of these services on an intrastate basis.
And, as Antigua has demonstrated, a number of states have decided to allow gambling and betting
services in one form or another to be provided on a remote basis within (and in a number of cases,
without as well) their borders.34

Further, because of the Wire Act, even if every state were to pass legislation directly authorising
foreign service providers to offer services on a remote basis to their states (which of course none have
done), the services would nonetheless be illegal becau se they would constitute "interstate or foreign
commerce," within the meaning of the Wire Act. So, regardless of what state law provides, the Wire
Act ensures discriminatory treatment of foreign service providers.

33 GATS, Article I:2; Article I:3(a); DSU, Article 19.9.
34 See AB First written submission, paras. 65-129.

ANNEX G-2

COMMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES ON REPLIES
TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(14 DECEMBER 2006)

1. The United States is pleased to provide these co mments on the answers of Antigua and third
parties to questions from the Panel. The United States has reprinted below those questions of the
Panel with respect to which the United States is providing comments. With respect to many of the
questions, the United States has addressed in its own answers and prior submissions many of the
issues raised by Antigua and the third parties in thei r answers to the Panel's questions. Therefore, the
absence of a US comment on a particular questi on should not be taken as agreement with other
parties' submissions.
A. COMMENTS ON ANSWERS OF ANTIGUA TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL
Question 2 (ANT, US): Must "measures taken to comply" with a DSB recommendation, as used
in Article 21.5 of the DSU, be more recent than the original proceeding? Please explain in terms
of the rule of interpretation in Article 31 and, if appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, please address the following:

2. Antigua's position – that a Member must take one or more new measures to comply – is
unsupported by any logic and is refuted by the text of the DSU. As the United States explained in its
response to this question, DSU Article 19.1 states th at the recommendations and rulings are to be that
the "Member concerned bring the measure into conformity
 with that agreement." Although in many
cases a Member will adopt a new measure in order to bring the measure at issue into conformity, the
adoption of a new measure is not required by the DSU. Moreover, as the United States explained in
its response to this question, 1 there are a number of situations in which the measure at issue in an
Article 21.5 proceeding will be the same as the measure at issue in the original proceeding.
3. Furthermore, Antigua's reliance on the Appellate Body report in Canada – Aircraft
(Article 21.5) is misplaced. 2 In that dispute, both parties agreed that Canada had adopted a revised
aircraft assistance program in response to the DSB recommendations and rulings, and there was no
dispute regarding the existence or identity of the "measure taken to comply" under DSU Article 21.5.
Rather, the only issue in the appeal was the scope of Brazil's claims to be reviewed in the Article 21.5
proceeding regarding consistency of the new assistance program with a covered agreement. 3 Thus,
the Appellate Body had no reason to (and did not) consider any issues with regard to whether the
original measure in dispute may qualify as the "m easure taken to comply" in an Article 21.5
proceeding.
Sub-question (b): Does the word "taken" imply a positive action? Please note that the
Spanish version reads "medidas 'destinadas' a cumplir."

4. Antigua confirms that the ordinary meaning of "take" includes "a handful" of passive
meanings. Antigua errs, however, by asserting that "take" in the DSU must nonetheless be construed
in a more active sense because a greater number of di ctionary definitions are active than passive. The
point, however, is not in the rela tive number of definitions. Rather, the dictionary definitions are a

1 Answers of the United States to Questions from the Panel (US Answers), para. 5.
2 Appellate Body report on Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by
Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000 (Canada – Aircraft (21.5)).
3 Appellate Body report on Canada – Aircraft (21.5), paras. 35-42.

starting point, and Antigua agrees that this starting point includes a more passive sense. The next step
needed to construe the term "take" as used
 in Article 21.5 is to consider the context, as well as the
agreement's object and purpose. As the United States explained in its responses, when Article 21.5 is
fully analyzed, the correct answer is that the origin al measure in dispute can be the measure "taken to
comply" for purposes of Article 21.5.
Question 6 (ANT, US): Article 17 of the DSU grants an opportunity for a respondent to obtain
review of aspects of a Panel report by means of an appeal. If that appeal does not succeed,
aren't the findings in the Appellate Body report then final in accordance with Article 17.14?

5. Antigua's response draws by analogy on the pr actice of the United States Supreme Court.
Although US law is generally not instructive on th e proper interpretation of the DSU, the United
States nonetheless notes that Antigua's reliance on US legal practice does not support its position.
Antigua claims that once a dispute is considered by the US Supreme Court, the dispute is "finally
resolved" by a Supreme Court determination. This , in fact, may or may not be true, depending on the
actual findings of the Court. As often as not, the Supreme Court will resolve one or more issues of
federal law raised in the dispute, and remand to th e courts below to make the factual findings (under
the legal standard set out by the Supreme Court) ne cessary to resolve the dispute. Thus, it is simply
wrong to assert that in a dispute like the current one – where a key factual issue was not developed
and not definitively decided by any finder of fact – that an appellate level decision would result in a
"final" resolution of the dispute. To the contrary, appellate level decisions under the US legal system
determine outstanding questions of law, and the de tailed factual findings need to be examined (and
sometimes reexamined in a remand proceeding) by a trial-level court.
6. As the United States noted in its answers to questions,
4 there is in fact a better analogy – one
based on actual practice under the DSU – that is helpful in determining the meaning of DSU
Article 17.14. In the Canada – Dairy dispute, the Appellate Body initially found that the complaining
parties did not meet their burden of showing th at the Canadian measure taken to comply was
inconsistent with a covered agreem ent (the Agreement on Agriculture) . However, this determination
was not "final" in the sense used by Antigua – na mely, the finding did not "finally resolve" the
dispute. Rather, the Appellate Body findings describ ed the factual test that the complaining parties
needed to meet in order to establish that the me asure taken to comply was inconsistent with the
Agreement on Agriculture. The complaining parti es proceeded to do so in a second recourse to
Article 21.5, in which the Appellate Body upheld
 the panel's finding that the complaining parties had
succeeded in showing that Canada's measure taken to comply was inconsistent with the Agreement on
Agriculture. Thus, contrary to Antigua's argument, Article 17.14 does not result in a "final" resolution
of all factual issues in a dispute, and does not pr eclude additional proceedings in which a party may
attempt to meet its burden on a factual issue.
Question 7 (ANT, US): Does it make any difference to a DSB recommendation whether a
defence is rejected outright or is simply not established for lack of evidence? Is the result the
same, i.e. the defence fails?

7. Antigua's response erroneously relies on the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen .
5 As
the United States explained in its prior submissions, that report addressed the scope of claims that a
complaining party may raise for a second time in an Article 21.5 proceeding. The report made no
general findings on whether a disputing party may respond to an absence of complete evidence in a
prior proceeding by submitting a more complete r ecord in a subsequent proceeding. Moreover, as

4 US Answers, para. 32.
5 Appellate Body report on European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted
24 April 2003 (EC – Bed Linen).

noted above, the Canada – Dairy Article 21.5 proceeding confirmed that there is no general bar in the
DSU that prevents a party from meeting its burden of proof in a second proceeding.
Question 20 (ANT): If a respondent had suffici ent evidence to demonstrate in a compliance
proceeding that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the
compliance panel denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would
this require a respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

8. Antigua's response to this question supports th e views of the United States in two important
respects. Antigua's response states:
"If the non-implementing Memb er takes the view that (i) it has collected better
evidence or (ii) circumstances have changed, and it now meets the conditions of the
general exception clause, it can discuss this w ith the complainant. If the complainant
agrees with that analysis, it should wit hdraw its suspension measures in accordance
with Article 22.8 of the DSU. If the complainant does not agree and keeps its
suspension measures in place, the respondent in the original proceeding can start a
new dispute settlement case against the origin al complainant for violation of Article
22.8 of the DSU (as has happened in EC - Hormones ). The 'new evidence' or the
'new circumstances' can then be assessed in this new dispute settlement case. This
approach is fully compatible with Article 17.14 of the DSU."
6
9. First, by stating that the above approach is "fully compatible with Article 17.14 of the DSU,"
Antigua severely undercuts its own position that Article 17.14 prevents a disputing party from
meeting its burden on a factual issue in a second pro ceeding. Article 17.14 states that Appellate Body
reports shall be "unconditionally accepted" by parties to the disput e. Article 17.14 does not limit that
"unconditional acceptance" to Article 21.5 proceed ings, nor does it provide any exception for claims
of breaches of DSU Article 22.8. Thus, Antigua has no basis for arguing that Article 17.14 bars the
full consideration of an issue based on new evidence in an Article 21.5 proceeding, but does not bar
the full consideration of an issue in a dispute involving an alleged breach of Article 22.8.7
10. Second, Antigua suggests a procedural pathway for a full consideration of issues concerning a
measure originally found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement, and Antigua seems to concede
that such a procedure is desirable and/or required by Article 3.2 of the DSU. But, as the United States
has explained, the DSU already allows for the origin al measure to be considered in an Article 21.5
proceeding, and Antigua does not and cannot explain why its suggestion of an additional procedural
means of obtaining a full factual review of an a ffirmative defense in any way changes the proper
analysis of the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding.
11. The United States also notes the following with regard to a hypothetical proceeding under
Article 22.8: (i) it presupposes that the complaini ng party actually suspends concessions. This is a
scenario which may or may not occur, dependi ng on the findings of a possible Article 22.6
arbitration8 and on the decision of the complaining Part y to suspend concessions; (ii) the dispute

6 Responses of Antigua & Barbuda to Questions of the Panel to the Parties, 8 December 2006 (A&B
Answers), answer to question 20.
7 The United States also notes, as it did in its answers to the Panel's questions, that any discussion of
the meaning of Article 17.14 is hypothetical and not tied to any issue in dispute. The Appellate Body explicitly
noted that it could not determine whether or not the IHA created exemptions from federal criminal laws.
Therefore, in presenting new evidence on the relationshi p between the IHA and federal criminal statutes, the
United States is not in this proceeding asking the Panel to depart from any findings of the Appellate Body.
8 As the United States has previously explained, in these circumstances an Article 22.6 arbitration
should necessarily result in a finding of zero nullification and impairment, because the WTO-consistent measure
would not result in nullification or impairment of WTO benefits.

would be heard by a new panel, and not necessarily the panelists who were already familiar with the
dispute; (iii) initiating a second dispute on the exact sa me issue that could have been addressed in an
Article 21.5 proceeding, and to do so following an unnecessary Article 22.6 arbitration, would result
in a waste of time and resources for all of the parti es; (iv) the responding Member would be unfairly
subject to a suspension of concessions for its d ecision to maintain and defend a WTO-consistent
measure.
12. In sum, Antigua seems to agree with the Un ited States that where a Member concerned does
not initially meet its burden of establishing an a ffirmative defense, the DSU does not preclude the
Member concerned from seeking a full considerati on of the issue based on additional evidence.
Moreover, Antigua provides no basis, in the text of the DSU or otherwise, for believing that such a
showing cannot be made in an Article 21.5 proceed ing, and must instead be made in a new and
different dispute settlement proceeding.
Question 23 (ANT): How does Antigua's case co ncerning the Interstate Horseracing Act relate
specifically to the Illegal Gambling Business Act? Please note that the IGBA refers to State laws
but not to other federal laws, such as the Wire Act.

13. The basis of the finding that the United States h as not shown that its criminal laws meet the
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" proviso of the Article XIV chapeau is that activities under
the IHA (according to Antigua) arguably provide an ex emption to federal crimin al law. This finding
cannot apply to the IGBA. Unlike the other two federal criminal statues, the IGBA requires
 an
underlying violation of a state law. In particular, a conviction for violating the IGBA is warranted if
the minimum size and revenue/duration requirement s are proved along with a showing that the
gambling activity involved violates the laws of the state in which it is conducted .9 And, as Antigua
concedes, "by the express terms of the IHA, the activ ity must be lawful in each state where it takes
place, so per se the IGBA would not come into play with respect to activity coming within the scope
of the IHA." 10 In other words, since one condition for an IHA off-track wager is state consent, and
since the IGBA requires a violation of state law, th ere is no way under any theory that the IHA could
provide an exemption from an IGBA prosecution.
14. The fact that the Appellate Body and the original panel erroneously used the theory applied to
the Wire Act and the Travel Act in the finding on the IGBA simply shows, again, that the entire issue
of the IHA and its relation to federal law was not fully developed during the panel proceeding.
Question 32: Please refer to the States' laws and regulations on account wagering "under the
auspices of the IHA" provided by Antigua (Exhibits AB-34 to AB-51), as well as State licences
to specific operators among the information on particular operators (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73).

Sub-question (a) (ANT): Do these laws and licences purport to permit wagering under
certain conditions that would otherwise violate the Wire Act, the Travel Act or the
Interstate Gambling Business Act? If so, how is this related to the operation of the
IHA?

15. Contrary to what Antigua implies, the gamb ling activities that are contemplated under state
statutes do not affect what activities are lawful under federal gambling statutes (absent an explicit
incorporation by the federal statute of state laws, su ch as is the case with IGBA). In other words, no

9 IGBA, 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(1) (Ex. AB-3).
10 A&B Answers, answer to question 23. The "express terms" referred to by Antigua are in IHA
section 5, 15 U.S.C. 3004 (Ex. AB-4). Under that provision, consent for off-track wagers must be obtained from
the host racing association, the "hos t racing commission" (which is a stat e agency in the state where the race
occurs), and "the off-track racing commission" (which is a state agency in the state in which the bet is accepted).

state statute can "permit" – in the sense of provid ing an exemption from federal laws – any activity
that is subject to prosecution under federal criminal law. 11 Moreover, the content of any state law is
not pertinent to the statutory interpretation of the relationship between various federal laws.
Question 35: Regarding Youbet.com, TVG, Xp ressBet.com, Capital OTB and the other US
domestic operations described by Antigua (Exhibits AB-65 to AB-73):

Sub-question (d) (ANT): If the US has not prosecuted these operators, why is this due to
the existence of the IHA and not due to other factors, such as a liberal interpretation of
the safe harbor provision in the Wire Act, or the nature of what these operators actually
transmit by wire? How does the alleged no n-prosecution of these operators differ from
the rates and patterns of prosecution of other potential offenders under the Wire Act?

16. As stated in the US response to question 34, th e decision of whether to bring charges in any
particular case rests upon a variety of factors with in the discretion of the prosecutor, such as the
availability of resources, and prosecutorial priorities. To our knowledge, no defendant has ever raised
compliance with the IHA as a defense to a prosecution for a violation of any federal gambling statute.
If such a defense were raised, the United Stat es believes such a defense would be legally
unsuccessful.
17. The United States would again call attention to the Appellate Body findings on evidence
regarding numbers of prosecutions. In paragra ph 356 of its report, the Appellate Body states as
follows:
"In our view, the proper significance to be attached to isolated instances of
enforcement, or lack thereof, cannot be determined in the absence of evidence
allowing such instances to be placed in th eir proper context. Such evidence might
include evidence on the overall number of suppliers, and the patterns of enforcement,
and on reasons for particular instances of non-enforcement. Indeed, enforcement
agencies may refrain from prosecution in many instances for reasons unrelated to
discriminatory intent and without discrimin atory effect." In paragraph 357, the
Appellate Body stated that "[f]aced with limited evidence the parties put before it
with respect to enforcement, the Panel should have focused, as a matter of law, on the
wording of the measure at issue. These measures, on their face, do not discriminate
between United States and foreign supplie rs of remote gambling services. We
therefore reverse the Panel's findings, in paragraph 6.589 of the Panel report …"
B. C
OMMENTS ON ANSWERS OF THIRD PARTIES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL
Question 6 (EC, Japan): Please refer to the Appellate Body report in EC - Bed Linen . Why in
your view does this report mean that a respondi ng party to a dispute cannot use a compliance
proceeding to obtain a "second chance"? (EC oral statement, para. 20; Japan oral statement,
para. 2)

18. The EC first responds as follows: "[T]he re ason why parties are not entitled to a 'second'
chance at rearguing their case in an Art. 21. 5 proceeding is based on the general principle of res

11 The second paragraph of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

judicata which finds its expression in Art. 17.14 DSU."
12 The United States submits that this
statement is both incorrect and devoid of any practical meaning.
19. As noted, the EC assertion is simply incorrect. The Appellate Body in EC-Bed Linen – in
nearly 12 pages of analysis – fully explained its reasoning regarding why the complaining party could
not reargue a failed claim in an Article 21.5 proceeding. 13 Although the EC argued that the Appellate
Body should use principles of "res judicata", the Appellate Body did not do so. In fact, nowhere in
the report (except for the summary of the EC argument) 14 does not Appellate Body even mention " res
judicata." Instead, as was proper, the Appellate Body considered the relevant provisions of the DSU.
20. The EC statement is also devoid of any practical meaning. The term "res judicata" is not self-
defining. Indeed, under US law, for example, res judicata is a complex doctrine, with many rules and
exceptions, all of which turn on the particular fact s and circumstances of the legal proceeding. A
broad reference to the "general principle of res judicata" does not indicate whether or not a particular
claim should be considered by a tribuna l. This is best illustrated by the Canada – Dairy dispute,
which involved two Article 21.5 proceedings addressed to the same alleged inconsistency with a
provision of a covered agreement. Perhaps the EC is implying that the Appellate Body was wrong in
Canada – Dairy to hear the appeal in a second Article 21.5 proceeding. Or perhaps the EC believes
that such a proceeding was consistent with the EC's "general principles of res judicata." The EC does
not say. In short, the procedural issues in this di spute must be decided based on the provisions of the
DSU, and a reference to the "general principle of res judicata" throws no light on the issues.
21. The EC also makes a second groundless assertion:
"While the case EC – Bed Linen specifically addressed a situation where the
complaining party tried to re-open a cl aim already settled, it is clear from the
Appellate Body's reasoning in this case that the principle of finality or res judicata
equally applies to complaining and responding parties. In particular in paragraph 98
of its ruling, the Appellate Body put the emphasis on the object and purposes of the
DSU which is the prompt settlement of cases in order to guarantee the effective
functioning of the WTO."
15
22. Again, the EC assertion is groundless. Remarkably, the EC ignores most of the 12 pages of
the Appellate Body's reasoning. Much of that r easoning – contrary to the EC's assertion that the
Appellate Body relied on some general "principle of finality" – was closely tied to the particularities
of an Article 21.5 proceeding and the role of the responding Member under Articles 19, 21 and 22.
The Appellate Body started with an analysis of th e function of Article 21.5 proceedings. (Para. 79.)
The Appellate Body summarizes the findings in the US–Shrimp Article 21.5 proceeding, in which the
Appellate Body agreed with the panel that a comp laining party could not challenge an aspect of a
measure previously found to be WTO-consistent. (Para. 83.) The Appellate Body engaged in a
detailed analysis of the measures ta ken to comply by the EC in the EC-Bed Linen dispute, and on the
relationship between those measures, the original findings, and India's claim regarding the new
measures. (Paras. 84-87.) The Appellate Body distinguished two prior disputes ( Canada – Aircraft
and US – FSC) in which the complaining parties were pe rmitted to raise new claims concerning a
measure taken to comply. (Paras. 88-89.) The Appellate Body considered the meaning of DSU
Article 17.14 in the context of other DSU provisi ons relating to Article 21.5 proceedings, including
DSU Articles 19, 21, and 22. (Para. 93.) The Appe llate Body then expressed its agreement with the
panel's finding that India was barred from rearguing its failed claim. (Para. 97.)

13 EC – Bed Linen, paras. 71-99.
14 EC – Bed Linen, para. 35.

23. Finally, in its penultimate paragraph of reasoning, th e Appellate Body went on to note that its
conclusion "is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU." (Para. 98, emphasis added.)
For the EC thus to assert that the Appellate Body "put the emphasis on the object and purposes of the
DSU" simply is not correct.
24. Furthermore, the EC incorrectly implies that the general goal of "the prompt settlement of
cases" argues in favor of disallowing the presentation of new evidence in the circumstances of this
dispute. As discussed above, even Antigua rec ognizes that a responding Member must have some
procedural opportunity to present evidence to s how that a WTO-consistent measure meets the
requirements of an affirmative defense. However, it does not promote "prompt settlement" to require
– as Antigua suggests – that the responding Member make this showing in an entirely new proceeding
under DSU Article 22.8 or some other provision of the WTO Agreement.
Question 9: Please refer to Articles 19 and 21 of the DSU. In your view, do these provisions
grant a special status to the implementing Member? For example, do DSB recommendations
and the procedures for surveillance of their implementation focus on the respondent rather than
the complainant, so that the respondent knows what aspects of a measure it is required to
modify to comply with a DSB recommendation, a nd protect the respondent from having to face
a second claim with respect to the same aspect?

25. The United States notes that third parties China and Japan acknowledge that Article 21
"focuses" on the responding Member, and that the EC writes that Article 21 is "addressed to" the
responding Member. Thus, although the third parties do not adopt the term "special status," all third
parties agree (as they must) that Article 21 applies differently to the responding Member than to any
other WTO Member.
Question 11 (Japan): If this Article 21.5 compliance proceeding "cannot function as the forum"
for the US to show or demonstrate the applicab ility of the Article XIV defence, what would be
the appropriate forum in which the US could make such a showing or demonstration? (Japan
Third party submission, para. 14)

26. This question is fundamental to the central pro cedural issue in this dispute. Unfortunately,
Japan in its response has chosen not to address it.16
Question14: If a respondent had sufficient evid ence to demonstrate in a compliance proceeding
that its measures were consistent with a general exception provision but the compliance panel
denied it a "second chance" to make out such a defence, what action would this require a
respondent to take, in view of Article 3.2 of the DSU?

27. This question is similar to Question 11 above, an d thus fundamental to the central procedural
issue in this dispute. No third party has direc tly addressed it, which – again – is unfortunate. The
United States submits that this refusal to address th e fundamental procedural issue presented by this
dispute shows that the third parties have not fully thought through how the DSU must apply in the

16 Japan’s response ignores the context of the Pa nel's hypothetical, which was how the DSU should
treat a WTO-consistent measure that was found otherwise solely on the basis of the failure of the responding
party to meet its factual burden of proof. Thus, Japan' s response – "Consistent with the rule of finality of the
DSB rulings and recommendations as aforementioned, the appropriate forum should be the original
proceeding."– avoids answering the fundamental question.

context of the facts and circumstances of this dispute, and that the answers of the third parties must be
considered in this light.

ANNEX H

REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL

7 July 2006
 (06-3316)
 Original: English

UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY
OF GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES

Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda

Request for the Establishment of a Panel

 The following communication, dated 6 July 2006, from the delegation of Antigua and
Barbuda to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Bo dy, is circulated pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU.

 Antigua and Barbuda is pleased to submit this request for the establishment of a panel to the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body and to the United States of America pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of
the WorId Trade Organisation with respect to the dispute known as United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (WT/DS285).

Background

 On 21 July 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") of the WorId Trade Organization
(the "WTO") established a panel at the request of Antigua and Barbuda in this dispute ("DS285").
Both the panel and the Appellate Body in DS285 found certain measures of the United States to be
inconsistent with certain of the obligations of the United States under the WTO's General Agreement
on Trade in Services (the "GATS"). On 20 April 2005, the DSB adopted the report of the panel, as
modified by the report of the Appellate Body. The resulting DSB recommendations and rulings
include, inter alia, the recommendation that the United States bring the measures found to be
inconsistent with the GATS into conformity with its obligations under that agreement.
1

 On 6 June 2005, Antigua and Barbuda communicated a request to the DSB that the
determination of a reasonable period of time for compliance by the United States with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB be the subj ect of binding arbitration, in accordance with

1 WT/DS285/AB/R, para. 374.

Article 21.3(c) of the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (the "DSU"). On 30 June 2005, an arbitrator was appointed by the Director-General of the
WTO.

 During the course of the proceedings before the arbitrator, the United States argued that "both
the legal form of implementation and the technical complexity of the contemplated measures require a
reasonable period of time of no less than 15 months".
2 The United States took the position during the
arbitration that it intended to seek compliance w ith the DSB recommendations and rulings through
legislation.3

 On 19 August 2005, the award of the arbitrator determined that the reasonable period of time
for the United States to implement the recommend ations and rulings of the DSB in DS285 was
11 months and two weeks from 20 April 2005. This period of time expired on 3 April 2006 without
any measure being adopted by the United States.

 On 10 April 2006 the United States submitted a status report to the DSB regarding
implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings.4 The United States informed the DSB that,
in its opinion, it was in compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB based on the
following statement (the "DOJ Statement") made by a representative of the United States Department
of Justice to a subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives on 5 April 2006:

"The Department of Justice views the existing criminal statutes as prohibiting the
interstate transmission of bets or wa gers, including wagers on horse races. The
Department is currently undertaking a ci vil investigation relating to a potential
violation of law regarding this activity. We have previously stated that we do not
believe that the Interstate Horse Racing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007, amended the
existing criminal statutes.
In view of these circumstances, the Un ited States is in compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute."
 At a meeting of the DSB on 21 April 2006, th e United States informed the DSB that in light
of the DOJ Statement, it was in compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. At the
same meeting, Antigua and Barbuda expressed its disagreement with the United States' assertion of
compliance, noting that the DOJ Statement was in fact a restatement of one of the arguments made by
the United States to the panel and the Appellate Body during the course of the proceedings.

 On 23 May 2006, Antigua and Barbuda a nd the United States concluded an "Agreed
Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding Applicable to the WTO
Dispute United States –
 Measures Affecting the Cross-Bo rder Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services (WT/DS285)" (the "Agreed Procedures").

 On 8 June 2006, Antigua and Barbuda initiate d proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU,
requesting consultations with the United States. Th ese consultations were held in Washington, D.C.
on 26 June 2006, but did not result in a settlement of the dispute. Consequently, there is a
disagreement between the parties as to the existe nce or consistency with a covered agreement of
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS285, within the
meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU.

2 US – Gambling , Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, Submission of the United States of
America, para. 9.
3 Id.
4 WT/DS285/15/Add.1.

The United States Has Failed to Comply with the Recommendations and Rulings of the DSB

 Antigua and Barbuda disagrees that th e United States has complied with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS285 a nd believes that the United States remains out of
compliance with the United States' obligations un der the GATS with respect to the provision of
cross-border gambling and betting services from Antigua and Barbuda to consumers in the
United States.

 No Federal Legislation

 First, Antigua and Barbuda considers that the United States has taken no measures to comply
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In DS285, Antigua and Barbuda established the
existence of three federal statutes which serve to prohibit companies from Antigua and Barbuda from
providing cross-border gambling and betting services to consumers located in the United States in
violation of the United States' obligations under the GATS. These three federal statutes are (i) the
Wire Act of 1961,18 US.C. §1084 (the "Wire Act"); (ii) the Travel Act, 18 US.C. §1952 (the "Travel
Act"); and (iii) the Illegal Gaming Business Act, 18 US.C. §1955 (the "IGBA"). The DSB
recommended that the United States bring these three measures in conformity with its obligations
under the GATS.

 Neither during the reasonable period of time nor to date has the United States introduced,
much less passed, any legislation that would amend or effect the Wire Act, the Travel Act or the
IGBA in such a manner as to make those statutes WTO-consistent. Furthermore, two bills which have
been introduced in the current United States ' Congress – H.R. 4777 and H.R. 4411 – are expressly
contrary to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS285, as each would further
institutionalise the discriminatory effect of the th ree United States statutes. The United States has
therefore failed to bring these federal statutes into conformity with its obligations to Antigua and
Barbuda under the GATS and each statute remains contrary to Article XVI of the GATS without
meeting the requirements of Article XIV of the GATS.

 DOJ Statement not a "Measure" for Purposes of the DSU

 Second, despite having insisted to the Article 21.3( c) arbitrator that the United States would
pursue a legislative remedy to bring itself into conf ormity with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB in DS285, the United States asserted it wa s in compliance on 10 April 2006 by reference to
the DOJ Statement. However, the DOJ Statement does not constitute a "measure" for purposes of the
DSU. The DOJ Statement is nothing but an utterance of a government official without any
independent legal effect under United States law or under the GATS, the DSU or any other WTO
agreement.

 Not a "Measure Taken to Comply"

 Third, the DOJ Statement is nothing more that a restatement of the position taken by the
United States during the course ofDS285 that was ultimately found unpersuasive by both the panel
and the Appellate Body. Assuming, arguendo, that an utterance by a government employee can
constitute a "measure" for purposes of the DSU, Anti gua and Barbuda does not believe that a simple
restatement of a legal position taken by a party to a dispute during its regular course can be considered
a "measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the DSB within the meaning of
Article 21.5 of the DSU

 The United States Remains Out of Compliance with its GATS Obligations

 Fourth, regardless of whether the DOJ Statement constitutes a "measure" for purposes of the
DSU or whether it can be considered a "measure ta ken to comply" within the meaning of Article 21.5
of the DSU, the DOJ Statement does not bri ng the United States into compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS285. In this regard Antigua and Barbuda notes that,
inter alia:

 (1) As Antigua and Barbuda had observed to both the panel and the Appellate Body,
there are a number of reasonable alternative measures available to the United States other
than prohibition to address the concerns of the United States with respect to the provision of
remote gambling and betting services. Since the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body
reports by the DSB, even more alternatives have become available. Ironically, as further
discussed below each of the two bills pendi ng in the United States Congress explicitly
recognise that it is possible to address risks of remote gambling with extant technology,
fundamentally undermining the United States' defence under Article XIV of the GATS.

 (2) Since the adoption of the recommendati ons and rulings of the DSB in DS285, not
only have there been no prosecutions of or enforcement actions brought against domestic
remote gambling and betting service providers operating pursuant to the Interstate Horse
Racing Act (the "IHA"), but in fact there has been significant growth in and expansion of
domestic remote gambling and betting services generally in the United States.

 (3) The position of the United States as reflect ed in the DOJ Statement is not supported
by the bulk of United States legal authority.

 (4) Assuming the accuracy of the portion of the DOJ Statement in which it is said that
"[t]he Department is currently undertaking a civil investigation relating to a potential
violation of law regarding this activity" the reference to a civil investigation is evidence of the
discriminatory application of its laws by the United States, as licensed, regulated providers of
cross-border gambling and betting services from Antigua and Barbuda to the United States
remain subject to criminal prosecution by United States authorities
5, contrary to the
obligations of the United States under the GATS.

 Pending Legislation in the United States Congress Would Violate the GATS

 As noted above, two bills are currently pending in the United States Congress which
expressly address the provision of remote gambling and betting services. One bill was introduced into
the United States Congress on 16 February 2006 as H.R. 4777 and is entitled the "Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act" (the "Goodlatte Bill"), and another was introduced on 18 November 2005 as
H.R. 4411 and is cited as the "Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of2005" (the "Leach
Bill" and, collectively with the Goodlatte Bill, th e "Bills"). Each of the Bills is in key respects
expressly contrary to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

 Each Bill is not only non-responsive to the r ecommendations and rulings of the DSB, rather
each is in fact directly contrary to the recomme ndations and rulings in several key respects. The
Goodlatte Bill is cast as an amendment to the Wire Act, designed to expand th e coverage of the Wire
Act to most types of gambling services offered ove r the Internet, whereas the Leach Bill does not
expressly purport to prohibit any class of remote ga mbling and betting or further criminalise remote
betting per se. Rather, the Leach Bill seeks to criminalise facilitation of or participation in certain

5 On 17 May 2006, an indictment was unsealed in which the United States Department of Justice
indicted a number of companies and individuals, including the former holder of a gambling and betting license
issued by Antigua and Barbuda, for various alleged violations of United States laws, including the Wire Act,
simply by the provision of those services to consumers in the United States.

financial transactions associated with what the legi slation defines as "unlawful Internet gambling".
The Goodlatte Bill also includes prohibitions on certain financial transactions similar to those
contained in the Leach Bill in its proposed amendments to the Wire Act.

 Although addressed in slightly different ways, both the Goodlatte Bill and the Leach Bill
contain three significant exceptions from their coverage. First, both of the Bills exclude from their
coverage transactions made in accordance with the IHA, effectively removing remote betting and
gambling in accordance with the IHA from the scope of the legislation. Second, both of the Bills
specifically exclude from their coverage transactions that the Leach Bill calls "intrastate transactions",
effectively sanctioning remote gambling that occurs wholly within the borders of an American state.
Third, both of the Bills exclude from their coverage remote gambling conducted by Native American
tribes in accordance with existing federal legislation applicable to Native American gaming. Neither
of the Bills provide gambling and betting service oper ators located in Antigua and Barbuda with any
access to consumers in the United States or are in any way responsive to the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in DS285.

 The defence of the United States in DS285 unde r Article XIV of the GATS was predicated on
the notion that "remote" gambling-which the United States defined as gambling in which the bettor
and the gambling service provider or an agent are not physically in the presence of each other when a
wager is made-presents certain "risks" that are either not present or not present to a similar extent than
when gambling is not "remote". Although gambling over the Internet can be remote it is not the
exclusive mode of remote gambling. None of th e federal laws that Anti gua and Barbuda challenged
prohibit remote gambling. What they prohibit are certain forms of cross-border gambling. It was
never alleged by the United States nor was it fo und by the panel or the Appellate Body that
cross-border gambling presents any special "risks" that c ould come within the scope of Article XIV
of the GATS. Thus, while "cross-border" gambling may in most cases be "remote" it does not
however hold true that all "remote" gambling is "cross-border". Although the Appellate Body
decided that the United States had established the th ree federal statutes in question as "necessary" to
protect against "risks" associated with remote gambli ng, the failure of the United States to meet its
burden of proof under the chapeau of Article XIV resulted in the overall failure of the Article XIV
defence. The three exceptions to the coverage of the Goodlatte Bill and the Leach Bill mentioned
above only serve to highlight the chapeau failure and the discriminatory and trade restrictive
application of the three federal laws by the United States government.

Request for Establishment of a Panel

 Because there is a disagreement between the par ties as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply w ith the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
DS285, within the meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU, Antigua and Barbuda requests the
establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU, and further requests that this matter be
referred to the original panel in DS285 with the standard terms of reference under Article 7 of the
DSU.

 Antigua and Barbuda additionally respectfully requests that the panel:

 (1) find that the United States has not taken measures to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS285;

 (2) find that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA remain in violation of the
United States' obligations to Antigua and Barbuda under, inter alia, Article XVI of the GATS
without meeting the requirements of Article XIV of the GATS; and

 (3) recommend that the DSB request the United States to bring the Wire Act, the Travel
Act and the IGBA into conformity with the obligations of the United States under the GATS.

 Pursuant to the Agreed Procedures, the Un ited States has agreed to accept the establishment
of a panel at the first meeting at which this re quest for the establishment of a panel appears on the
agenda.

ANNEX I

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

1. In its proceedings the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). In addition, the following working procedures shall apply.
2. The Panel will provide the Parties and Third Par ties with a timetable for its proceedings. The
timetable may be modified by the Panel as appropriate, after having consulted the Parties.
3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The Par ties, and interested Third Parties, shall be
present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.
4. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential.
Nothing in the DSU, nor in these Working Pro cedures, precludes a Party or a Third Party from
disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential
information submitted by another Member to the Panel which that Member has designated as
confidential. As provided in Article 18.2 of the DS U, where a Party submits a confidential version of
its written submissions to the Panel, it shall al so, upon request of the other Party, provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the
public. Non-confidential summaries shall be normally submitted no later than one week after the
written submission is presented to the Panel.
5. Before the substantive meeting of the Panel with the Parties, and in accordance with the
timetable approved by the Panel, the Parties shall transmit to the Panel written submissions and
subsequently written rebuttals in which they presen t the facts of the case, their arguments and their
counter-arguments, respectively. Third Parties may transmit to the Panel written submissions after the
first written submissions of the Parties have been presented, and in accordance with the timetable
approved by the Panel.
6. All Third Parties shall be invited in writing to present their views dur ing a session of the
substantive meeting of the Panel set aside for that purpose. Third Parties may be present during the
entirety of this session.
7. At its substantive meeting with the Parties, the Panel shall ask Antigua and Barbuda to present
its case first. Subsequently, and still at the same meeting, the United States will be asked to present
its point of view. At a separate session of the same meeting set aside for that purpose, the Third
Parties will be asked to present their views thereafter. Parties will then be allowed an opportunity for
final statements, with Antigua and Barbuda presenting its statement first.
8. The Panel may at any time put questions to the Parties and to the Third Parties and ask them
for explanations either in the course of the substan tive meeting or afterwards in writing. Replies to
questions shall be submitted in writing by the dates specified by the Panel after consultation with the
Parties.
9. Each Party shall make available to the Panel and to the other Party a written version of its oral
statements, preferably at the end of the meeting wi th the Panel, and in any event not later than the
working day following the meeting. Any Third Part y that wishes to present its views shall similarly
make available to the Panel and to the Parties and other Third Parties a written version of their oral
statements, preferably at the end of the meeting wi th the Panel, and in any event not later than the
working day following the presentation. Parties and Third Parties shall provide the Panel and other

participants at the respective session with a provision al written version of their oral statements at the
time that the statements are made.
10. In the interest of full transparency, the oral pres entations shall be made in the presence of the
Parties. Moreover, each Party's written submissions, including replies to questions put by the Panel,
shall be made available to the other Party. Thir d Parties shall receive copies of the Parties' first
written submissions and rebuttals. Parties shall su bmit all factual evidence to the Panel as early as
possible and no later than in their respective rebu ttals, except with respect to evidence necessary for
purposes of answering questions. Exceptions will be granted upon a showing of good cause. In such
cases, the other Party shall be accorded a period of time for comment, as appropriate.
11. The Parties and Third Parties shall provide the Panel with an executive summary of the facts
and arguments as presented to the Panel in their wr itten submissions and oral presentations within one
week following the delivery to the Panel of the relevant submissions. The executive summaries of the
written submissions to be provided by each Party sh all not exceed 8 pages in length and the executive
summaries of the oral presentations shall not exceed 4 pages in length each. The summary to be
provided by each Third Party sh all summarize their written submission and oral presentation, and
shall not exceed 4 pages in length. The executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute
for the submissions of the Parties in the Panel's examination of the case. However, the Panel may
reproduce the executive summaries provided by the Parties and Third Parties in the arguments section
of its report, subject to any modifications deemed appropriate by the Panel. The Parties' and Third
Parties' replies to questions will be attached to the Panel report as annexes.
12. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute, and to maximize the clarity of
submissions, in particular the refe rences to exhibits submitted by Pa rties, Parties shall sequentially
number their exhibits throughout the course of the dispute. For example, exhibits submitted by
Antigua and Barbuda should be numbered AB-1, AB-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the
first submission was numbered AB-5, the first e xhibit of the next submission thus should be
numbered AB-6. Exhibits submitted by the United States should be numbered US-1, US-2, etc.
13. The Parties and Third Parties to this proceedi ng have the right to determine the composition
of their own delegations. Delega tions may include, as representativ es of the government concerned,
private counsel and advisers. The Parties and Thir d Parties shall have responsibility for all members
of their delegations and shall ensure that all members of their delegations, as well as any other
advisors consulted by a Party or Third Party, act in accordance with the rules of the DSU and the
working procedures of this Panel, particularly in re gard to confidentiality of the proceedings. Parties
shall provide a list of the participants of their de legation before or at the beginning of any meeting
with the Panel.
14. Any request for a preliminary ruling to be made by the Panel shall be submitted no later than
in a Party's first written submission. If Antigua and Barbuda requests any such ruling, the United
States shall submit its response to su ch a request in its first written submission. If the United States
requests any such ruling, Antigua and Barbuda sha ll submit its response to such a request in its
rebuttal submission. Exceptions to this procedure will be granted upon a showing of good cause.
15. Following issuance of the interim report, the Parti es shall have no less than 7 days to submit
written requests to review precise aspects of the inte rim report and to request a further meeting with
the Panel. The right to request such a meeting must be exercised no later than at the time the written
request for review is submitted. Following receipt of any written requests for review, in cases where
no further meeting with the Panel is requested, the Parties shall have the opportunity within a time-
period to be specified by the Panel to submit wr itten comments on the other Parties' written requests
for review. Such comments shall be strictly limited to commenting the other Parties' written requests
for review.

16. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:
(a) Each Party shall serve its submissions directly on the other Party. Each Party shall, in
addition, serve its first written submission an d rebuttals on Third Parties. Each Third
Party shall serve its submissions on the Parties and other Third Parties. Each Party
and Third Party shall confirm in writing, at the time it provides the submission to the
Secretariat, that copies have been served as required.
(b) The Parties and Third Parties should provide their written submissi ons to the Panel,
through the Secretariat, by 5. 00 p.m., local Geneva time, on the deadlines established
by the Panel.
(c) Parties and Third Parties shall provide the Secretariat with written copies of their oral
statements on the working day following the date of the presentation.
(d) The Parties and Third Parties shall provide th e Secretariat with ten (10) paper copies
of all their submissions as well as an "electronic" copy on a CD-ROM, diskette or as
an e-mail attachment, in a format compatible with the Secretariat's software. Paper
copies shall be delivered to the Dispute Se ttlement Registrar, Mr. Ferdinand Ferranco
(Room 2150). Electronic copies should be sent by e-mail to Mr. Ferranco at
DSregistry@wto
.org, with a copy to Ms Mireille Cossy (mireille.cossy@wto.org) and
to Mr. Matthew Kennedy (matthew.kennedy@wto.org).
(e) The Panel will provide Parties with an elect ronic version of the descriptive part, the
interim report and the final report, as well as of other documents as appropriate.
When the Panel transmits to the Parties or Third Parties both paper and electronic
versions of a document, the paper version sh all constitute the official version for the
purposes of the record of the dispute.
17. These working procedures may be modified by the Panel as appropriate, after having
consulted the Parties.

ANNEX J

LISTS OF EXHIBITS SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex J-1 List of Schedules and Exhibits submitted by Antigua and Barbuda J-2
Annex J-2 List of Exhibits submitted by the United States J-7

ANNEX J-1

LIST OF SCHEDULES AND EXHIBITS SUBMITTED BY ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Schedule No Title
AB 1. State Remote Gambling Regulatory Schemes
AB 2. Illustration of Remote Wagering at YouBet and the World Sports Exchange
AB 3. Supplementary Materials on Regulatory Alternatives

Exhibit No Title
AB 1. The Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. §§1081, 1084
AB 2. The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952
AB 3. The Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955
AB 4. The Interstate Horseracing Act, §§ 3001 to 3007
AB 5. Lewis Pub. Co. v Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)
AB 6. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27 (1981)
AB 7. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)
AB 8. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973)
AB 9. Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968)
AB 10. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)
AB 11. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965)
AB 12. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946)
AB 13. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932)
AB 14. Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331 (1896)
AB 15. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (U.S. 2006)
AB 16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
AB 17. S. Rep. No. 95-1117 (1978) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144 (Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978 Senate Report (Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee))
AB 18. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4132 (Interstate Ho rse Racing Act of 1978 Senate Report
(Commerce, Science and Transportation))
AB 19. House Conference Report 106-1005, Making Appropriations for the
Government of the District of Columb ia and Other Activities Chargeable in
Whole or in part Against Revenues of Said District for the Fiscal Year Ending
September 30, 2001, and For Other Pur poses, to accompany H.R. 4942, Sec.
629 (available at 2000 WL 1606910, *151).
AB 20. 146 Cong. Rec. H 11230, 106
th
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. (2000)
AB 21. And They're Off: The Legality of Interstate Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Its
Impact on the Thoroughbred Horse Industry, 89 Kentucky L. J. 711, 725 (2001)
AB 22. Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Opinion No. 01-015 (2001)
AB 23. Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999)
AB 24. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981).
AB 25. Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2001)
AB 26. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)
AB 27. United States v. Louwsma, 970 F.2d 797 (11
th
 Cir. 1992)
AB 28. United States v. DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208 (2
nd
 Cir. 1974).
AB 29. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)
AB 30. Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Limited Pa rtnership v. Burrillville Racing
Association, Inc., 989 F.2 1266 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1024 (1993).

Exhibit No Title
AB 31. H.R. 4411, 109
th
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess., "The Internet Gambling Prohibition and
Enforcement Act" (12 July 2006)
AB 32. Statement of Testimony of Bruce G. Ohr, Chief, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice,
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, Concerning
H.R. 4777, The "Internet Gambling Prohib ition Act" [later merged with H.R.
4111, supra], 5 April 2006
AB 33. Antonia Z. Cowan, The Global Gambling Village: Interstate and Transnational
Gambling, 7 Gambling Law Review 251 (August 2003)
AB 34. California Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: WEST'S ANN. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 19604
 Regulation: CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, §§ 2070 to 2083
AB 35. Connecticut Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-571
 Regulation: CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 12-574-F60
AB 36. Idaho Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: IDAHO CODE § 54-2512(5)
 Regulation: IDAHO ADMIN. CODE §§ 11.04.02.041 to .044 and
11.04.02.050 to .060
AB 37. Kentucky Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.378 to 230.379; 230.775 to
230.783
 Regulation: None
AB 38. Louisiana Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Regulation: LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, pt. XIII, §§ 12001 to 12014
AB 39. Maryland Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: MD. CODE ANN., BUS REG. § 11-805
 Regulation: MD. REGS. COD tit. 09, § 10.04.24
AB 40. Massachusetts Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128A § 5C
 Regulation: MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 205, §§ 6.20 to 6.26
AB 41. Nevada Remote Acc ount Wagering Laws
 Statutes: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.016425, 463.750 to 463.780,
466.155(1)(b)
 Regulation: NEV. GAM. REG. 22 (22.010 to 22.160) and 26C (§§26C.010
to 26C.220)
AB 42. New Hampshire Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 284:22 to 284:22-a
 Regulation: None
AB 43. New Jersey Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-127, 5:5-142 to 5:5-144
 Regulation: N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §§ 74 - 7.1 to 74 - 7.18
AB 44. New York Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1012
 Regulation: N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 5200.1 to 5204.17
AB 45. North Dakota Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-06.2-10.1
 Regulation: None

Exhibit No Title
AB 46. Ohio Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3769.01 to 3769.14
 Regulation: OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3769-3-32 and 3769-13-32
AB 47. Oregon Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 462.700 to 462.740.
 Regulation: OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 462-210-0010 to 462-210-0040; and R.
462-220-0010 to 462-220-0080
AB 48. Pennsylvania Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 4, § 325.218(b)-(c)
 Regulation: 58 PA. CODE §§ 169.1 to 169.5 and 58 PA. CODE §§ 187.1 to
187.4
AB 49. Virginia Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-364 to 59.1-374
 Regulation: 11 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-45-10 to 10-45-70
AB 50. Washington Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 67.16.260
 Regulation: WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 260-49-010 to 260-49-100
AB 51. Wyoming Remote Account Wagering Laws
 Statute: WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-25-102(xi) and 11-25-105(k)
 Regulation: WYO. RULES & REG. DEP'T COMMERCE, PC Ch. 9, § 2
AB 52. Arizona State Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-112 (B)
AB 53. Colorado Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-60-602(5)(b)(IV)
AB 54. Missouri Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 MO. ANN. STAT. § 313.655
AB 55. Idaho Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 IDAHO CODE § 11.04.02.050(a)-(b)
AB 56. Kentucky Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 230.777(2), § 230.779(1), and § 230.783(2)
AB 57. Louisiana Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:149.3
 LA. ADMIN. CODE ANN tit. 35, § 12003(A); § 12001; and § 10377
AB 58. Maryland Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 11-804 and § 11-804.1(a)
 MD. REGS. CODE tit. 09, § 10 .04.24(C)(2) and § 10.04.24(A)(3)
AB 59. Massachusetts Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 128C, § 2 and ch. 128A, § 5C
AB 60. Oregon Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 OR. REV. STAT. § 462.710(6)(d)
 OR. ADMIN. R. 462-220-0020(2)
AB 61. Pennsylvania Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 PA. CODE § 173.3(c), § 190.3(c), § 190.4
AB 62. Virginia Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-369; 11
 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-45-10.
AB 63. Washington Wagering Laws Under the IHA
 WASH. ADMIN. CODE 260-49-0202(6 )(c); § 260-49-010(3); § 260-49-
060(5)

Exhibit No Title
AB 64. Marc Falcone, Eric Hasler, Jason Ader, The Global Account Wagering
Industry: What Treasures Does It Hold? (January 2002, Bear Stearns Equity
Research)
AB 65. YouBet Information
AB 66. TVG: The Interactive Horseracing Network Information
AB 67. XpressBet Information
AB 68. The Racing Channel, Inc.
AB 69. AmericaTab, Ltd. Information
AB 70. US Off Track, LLC Information
AB 71. Capital District Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation ("Capital OTB")
Information
AB 72. New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation Information
AB 73. New Jersey Account Wagering Information
AB 74. World Sports Exchange License
AB 75. WWTS Indictments (May 2006)
AB 76. Department of Justice Press Release regarding BetonSports Indictments (17
July 2006)
AB 77. BetonSports Indictment (July 2006)
AB 78. Matt Richtel, "Arrest Made in Crackdown on Internet Betting," New York
Times, C1 (18 July 2006)
AB 79. Nancy Zuckerbrod, "Frist Targets In ternet Gambling," Washington Post (13
September 2006)
AB 80. Stations Casino "Sports Connection" Materials
AB 81. La Fleur's 2004 World Lottery Almanac, Lottery Fast Facts, p. 16-17.
AB 82. Massachusetts Lottery Documents
AB 83. Massachusetts Subscription Season Tickets and Winnings
AB 84. Illinois Lottery Documents
AB 85. Maine Lottery Documents
AB 86. Maryland Lottery Documents
AB 87. New Hampshire Lottery Documents
AB 88. New York Lottery Documents
AB 89. Vermont Lottery Documents
AB 90. Virginia Lottery Documents
AB 91. Michelle T. Grando, Allocating the Burden of Proof I WTO Disputes: A
Critical Analysis, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 9, No. 3
(advance publication 17 August 2006)
AB 92. United Kingdom Gambling Act 2005
AB 93. Tasmanian Gaming Control Act 1993, Pa rt 4A, Division 5 - Betting exchange
operations
AB 94. Ohio Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 95. Oregon Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 96. Idaho Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 97. Kentucky Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 98. Virginia Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 99. Washington Licenses of Account Wagering Services
AB 100. Oregon Racing Commission, Annual Performance Progress Report Executive
Summary: Time Period: Fiscal Year 2003-2004
AB 101. California Horse Racing Board, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the California
Horse Racing Board: A Summary of Fiscal Year 2004-2005 Racing in
California

Exhibit No Title
AB 102. State Age Verification Measures for Remote Cigarette Sales
 Arizona
 California
 Delaware
 Minnesota
 Rhode Island
 Texas
 Virginia
 Washington
AB 103. State Age Verification Measures for Remote Alcohol Sales
 Arizona
 California
 Michigan
 Minnesota
 Colorado
AB 104. United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-11, Social Security
Numbers: Private Sector Entities Routinely Obtain and Use SSNs, and Laws
Limit the Disclosure of Information (January 2004).
AB 105. Youth, Pornography and the Internet, Dick Thornburgh and Herbert S. Lin,
Editors, Committee to Study Tools and Strategies for Protecting Kids from
Pornography and Their Applicability to Ot her Inappropriate Internet Content ,
(2002 National Academy Press/National Research Council)
AB 106. Idology, Inc. documentation
AB 107. Choice Point documentation
AB 108. Trifuna documentation
AB 109. Verid documentation
AB 110. i-Mature documentation
AB 111. NetIdMe documentation
AB 112. Legislative Histories of the Wire Act, Travel Act and IGBA
AB 113. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347,
120 Stat. 1884, 1952- 1962 (2006) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 to 5367)
AB 114. United States v. Belt, 319 U.S. 521 (1943)
AB 115. Bobula v. United States Department of Justice, 970 F.2d 854 (6
th
 Cir. 1992)
AB 116. Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497 (1936)
AB 117. Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Limited Pa rtnership v. Burrillville Racing
Association, Inc., 802 F. Supp 662 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1266 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1024 (1993).
AB 118. National Thoroughbred Racing Associati on, Legislative Statement, "Congress
Affirms Horse Racing's Position in Internet Gaming; Legislation Passed by
Both House Early This Morning" (2 October 2006)
AB 119. American Horse Council, Press Release, "Congress Passes Internet Gambling
Prohibition Bill" (2 October 2006)
AB 120. Letter from Charles F. Champion, Chief Executive Officer of YouBet, to
company shareholders (13 October 2006)
AB 121. Patricia Campbell, "Gaming company sells out; more layoffs pending," Antigua
Sun (25 October 2006)

ANNEX J-2

LIST OF EXHIBITS SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES

Exhibit No Title
US 1. House Report No. 967, Prohibiting Transm ission of Bets, Wagers, and Related
Information by Wire Communications (Aug. 17, 1961).
US 2. Congressional Record – Senate, Intersta te Horseracing Act of 1978, 31543-62
(Sept. 26, 1978).
US 3. Richardson v. United States 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
US 4. McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 2006).
US 5. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 182 (1939).
US 6. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1980).
US 7. Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1995).
US 8. Congressional Record – House, H11187 (Oct. 25, 2000).
US 9. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
US 10. United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1991).
US 11. United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 1994).
US 12. United States v. Hansen, 566 F. Supp. 162 (D.D.C. 1983).
US 13. United States v. Vulcan Materials, 320 F. Supp. 1378 (D.N.J. 1970).
US 14. Pierpoint v. Barnes, 94 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1996).
US 15. Statement of Representative Leach, Congressional Record, pages H8029-H8030
(Sep. 29, 2006)