EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – TRADE DESCRIPTION OF SARDINES AB-2002-3
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 26 September 2002
Document codes: WT/DS231/AB/R
Complainant: Peru
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, U.S.
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. I, III  GATT 1994Art. 2, 12  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)Art. XI:1  GATT 1994

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – TRADE DESCRIPTION OF SARDINES
AB-2002-3
Report of the Appellate Body

APPELLATE BODY
European Communities – Trade Description
of Sardines
European Communities, Appellant
Peru, Appellee
Canada, Third Participant
Chile, Third Participant
Ecuador, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant
Venezuela, Third Participant
AB-2002-3
Present:
Bacchus, Presiding Member
Abi-Saab, Member
Baptista, Member
I. Introduction
1. The European Communities appeals from certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the
Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (the "Panel Report"). 1
2. This dispute concerns the name under which certain species of fish may be marketed in the
European Communities. The measure at issue is Council Regulation (EEC) 2136/89 (the
"EC Regulation"), which was adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 21 June 1989
and became applicable on 1 January 1990.
 2 The EC Regulation sets forth common marketing
standards for preserved sardines.
3. Article 2 of the EC Regulation provides that:
Only products meeting the following requirements may be marketed
as preserved sardines and under the trade description referred to in
Article 7:
– they must be covered by CN codes 1604 13 10 and ex
1604 20 50;
– they must be prepared exclusively from fish of the species
"Sardina pilchardus Walbaum";
– they must be pre-packaged with any appropriate covering
medium in a hermetically sealed container;
– they must be sterilized by appropriate treatment. (emphasis
added)

1, 29 May 2002, , 10 June 2002.
2OJ No L 212, 22.07.1989, reproduced as Annex 1 to the Panel Report, pp. 79–81.

4. Sardina pilchardus Walbaum ("Sardina pilchardus "), the fish species refered to in the
EC Regulation, is found mainly around the coasts of the Eastern North Atlantic Ocean, in the
Mediterranean Sea, and in the Black Sea.
 3
5. In 1978, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the "Codex Commission"), of the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, adopted a world-wide
standard for preserved sardines and sardine-type products, which regulates matters such as
presentation, essential composition and quality factors, food additives, hygiene and handling,
labelling, sampling, examination and analyses, defects and lot acceptance. This standard,
CODEX STAN 94–1981, Rev.1–1995 ("Codex Stan 94"), covers preserved sardines or sardine-type
products prepared from the following 21 fish species:
– Sardina pilchardus
– Sardinops melanostictus, S. neopilchardus, S. ocellatus,
S. sagax[,] S. caeruleus
– Sardinella aurita, S. brasiliensis, S. maderensis, S. longiceps,
S. gibbosa
– Clupea harengus
– Sprattus sprattus
– Hyperlophus vittatus
– Nematalosa vlaminghi
– Etrumeus teres
– Ethmidium maculatum
– Engraulis anchoita, E. mordax, E. ringens
– Opisthonema oglinum .
 4
6. Section 6 of Codex Stan 94 provides as follows:
6. LABELLING
In addition to the provisions of the Codex General Standard
for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods (CODEX STAN 1-1985,
Rev. 3-1999) the following special provisions apply:
6.1 NAME OF THE FOOD
The name of the product shall be:
6.1.1 (i) "Sardines" (to be reserved exclusively for Sardina
pilchardus (Walbaum)); or

3Panel Report, para. 2.2.
4Codex Stan 94, as reproduced in Annex 2 to the Panel Report, section 2.1.1.

(ii) "X sardines" of a country, a geographic area, the
species, or the common name of the species in
accordance with the law and custom of the country in
which the product is sold, and in a manner not to
mislead the consumer.
6.1.2 The name of the packing medium shall form part of the name
of the food.
6.1.3 If the fish has been smoked or smoke flavoured, this
information shall appear on the label in close proximity to the name.
6.1.4 In addition, the label shall include other descriptive terms
that will avoid misleading or confusing the consumer. 5 (emphasis
added)
7. Peru exports preserved products prepared from Sardinops sagax sagax ("Sardinops sagax"),
one of the species of fish covered by Codex Stan 94. This species is found mainly in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean, along the coasts of Peru and Chile. 6

5We note, however, that the text of Codex Stan 94, published in the print version of the Codex
Alimentarius, presents certain differences in respect to the version used by the Panel and submitted by Peru to
the Panel as Exhibit PERU-3. Section 6 published in the print version of the Codex Alimentarius reads as
follows:
6. LABELLING
In addition to the provisions of the Codex General Standard for the
Labelling of Prepackaged Foods (CODEX STAN 1-1985, Rev. 1-1991) the
following specific provisions apply:
6.1 NAME OF THE FOOD
The name of the product shall be:
6.1.1 (i) "Sardines" (to be reserved exclusively for Sardina
pilchardus (Walbaum)); or
(ii) "X sardines" where "X" is the name of a country, a
geographic area, the species, or the common name of the
species in accordance with the law and custom of the
country in which the product is sold, and in a manner not
to mislead the consumer.
6.1.2 The name of the packing medium shall form part of the name of the
food.
6.1.3 If the fish has been smoked or smoke flavoured, this information
shall appear on the label in close proximity to the name.
6.1.4 In addition, the label shall include other descriptive terms that will
avoid misleading or confusing the consumer. (emphasis added)
(Codex Alimentarius (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2001), Volume
9A, Fish and Fishery Products, pp. 75–81)
6Panel Report, para. 2.2.

8. Sardina pilchardus and Sardinops sagax both belong to the Clupeidae family and the
Clupeinae subfamily. As their scientific name suggests, however, they belong to different genus.
Sardina pilchardus belongs to the genus Sardina, while Sardinops sagax belongs to the genus
Sardinops. 7 Additional factual aspects of this dispute are set forth in paragraphs 2.1–2.9 of the Panel
Report.
9. The Panel in this dispute was established on 24 July 2001. Before the Panel, Peru argued that
the EC Regulation is inconsistent with Articles 2.4, 2.2 and 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (the "TBT Agreement ") and Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"). 8
10. In the Panel Report circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on
29 May 2002, the Panel found that the EC Regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, and exercised judicial economy in respect of Peru's claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.1
of the TBT Agreement and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
 9 The Panel, therefore, recommended that the
Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") request the European Communities to bring its measure into
conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement. 10
11. On 25 June 2002, the European Communities notified the DSB of its intention to appeal
certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal interpretations developed by the
Panel, pursuant to Article 16.4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"), and filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Body pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the " Working Procedures "). On
27 June 2002, we received a communication from Peru requesting a Preliminary Ruling pursuant to
Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures. Peru requested that we exclude from the appeal four of the
nine points raised in the European Communities' Notice of Appeal, because these points allegedly did
not meet the requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures.
12. In a letter dated 27 June 2002, we invited the European Communities and the third parties to
submit, by 2 July 2002, written comments on the issues raised by Peru in its Request for a Preliminary
Ruling.

7Panel Report, para. 2.3.
8Ibid., para. 3.1.
9Ibid., paras. 8.1 and 7.152.
10Ibid., para. 8.3.

13. On 28 June 2002, the European Communities sent letters to the Chairman of the DSB and to
the Appellate Body, indicating its intention to withdraw the Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002,
pursuant to Rule 30 of the Working Procedures, conditionally on the right to file a new Notice of
Appeal. The European Communities filed a new Notice of Appeal on the same day.
14. In a letter dated 1 July 2002, we informed the participants and third parties that neither the
European Communities nor the third parties should file written submissions on the issues raised in the
Request for a Preliminary Ruling submitted by Peru.
15. Peru submitted a letter, dated 2 July 2002, in which it challenged the right of the European
Communities to withdraw conditionally the Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002, and to file a second
Notice of Appeal on 28 June 2002.
16. On 4 July 2002, we informed the participants and third parties that it was our intention to
conduct the appellate proceedings in conformity with the Working Schedule drawn up further to the
Notice of Appeal of 28 June 2002, without prejudice to the right of the participants and the third
participants to present in their submissions argume nts relating to the matters raised in Peru's letter
dated 2 July 2002.
17. The European Communities filed an appellant's submission on 8 July 2002.
 11 Peru filed an
appellee's submission on 23 July 2002. 12 Ecuador filed a third participant's submission on
22 July 2002. 13 Canada, Chile, the United States, and Venezuela filed third participant's submissions
on 23 July 2002. 14
18. On 23 July 2002, we received a letter from Colombia indicating that, although it would not
file a third participant's submission, it had an inte rest in attending the oral hearing in this appeal.
Colombia had participated in the proceedings before the Panel as a third party which had notified its
interest to the DSB under Article 10.2 of the DSU. By letter of 7 August 2002, we informed the
participants and third participants that we were inc lined to allow Colombia to attend the oral hearing
as a passive observer, and to notify us if they had any objection. The European Communities had no
objection to Colombia attending the oral hearing as a third participant, but did object to Colombia
attending as a passive observer. Ecuador had no objection to Colombia attending the hearing, but
found there was no legal basis to apply a passive observer status and deny them the right to attend as a

11Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedures.
12Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
13Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Working Procedures.
14Ibid.

third participant. On 9 August 2002, we informed the participants and third participants that
Colombia would be permitted to attend the oral hearing as a passive observer.
19. An amicus curiae brief was received, on 18 July 2002, from a private individual. The
Kingdom of Morocco also filed an amicus curiae brief on 22 July 2002. In a letter dated
26 July 2002, Peru objected to the acceptance and consideration of both amicus curiae briefs.
Ecuador expressed similar objections in a letter received on 2 August 2002. Canada submitted a
letter, on 26 July 2002, requesting that we decide whether or not to accept the briefs in advance of the
oral hearing.
20. By letter of 31 July 2002, the participants and third participants were informed that they
would have an opportunity to address the issues relating to the amicus curiae briefs during the oral
hearing, without prejudice to thei r legal status or to any action the we might take in connection with
these briefs.
21. The oral hearing in the appeal was held on 13 August 2002. The participants and third
participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by Members of the
Division hearing the appeal.
II. Arguments of the Participants and the Third Participants
A. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant
1. Procedural Issues
22. The European Communities argues that the prel iminary objections raised by Peru on the
adequacy of the Notice of Appeal filed by the European Communities on 25 June 2002 are now moot
and settled. The European Communities responded to this objection by Peru with its letter to the
Appellate Body of 28 June 2002 and the replacement of that Notice of Appeal with a new one of the
same day. The European Communities asserts that, in conditionally withdrawing its initial Notice of
Appeal and then filing a new Notice of Appeal, it proceeded in conformity with the DSU, the
Working Procedures and previous practice.
23. The European Communities also underscores that it proceeded expeditiously and that the
issues listed in the Notice of Appeal of 28 June 2002 were identical to those in the Notice of Appeal
of 25 June 2002. The only difference between the two Notices of Appeal is that the Notice of Appeal
of 28 June 2002 included additional information on the issues being appealed, which was provided in
response to Peru's request.

24. The European Communities asserts that it is absolutely clear that Peru's rights of defence have
not been harmed in any way by the replacement of the original Notice of Appeal with a new one and
by the new Working Schedule drawn up by the Appell ate Body. It also rejects Peru's allegation that
the European Communities was engaging in litigation tactics.
25. The European Communities states that, in any event, the objection submitted by Peru on
27 June 2002 was clearly unfounded.
2. The Characterization of the EC Regulation as a "Technical Regulation"
26. The European Communities acknowledges that the EC Regulation is a "technical regulation"
for purposes of the TBT Agreement, because it lays down product characteristics for preserved
Sardina pilchardus. The European Communities claims, however, that the Panel erred in finding that
the EC Regulation is a "technical regulation" relating to preserved Sardinops sagax.
27. According to the European Communities, the EC Regulation does not lay down product
characteristics for Sardinops sagax . The European Communities thus argues that, with respect to
Sardinops sagax , the EC Regulation does not apply to an identifiable product as required by the
Appellate Body in European Communities – Measures Affect ing Asbestos and As bestos-Containing
Products ("EC – Asbestos "). 15
28. The European Communities also argues that a name—as opposed to a label—is not a product
characteristic for purposes of the definition of a "technical regulation" in the TBT Agreement. It
explains that the requirement to state the name of a product on a label is a labelling requirement. In
its view, however, the requirement to state a certain name on a label involves not only a labelling
requirement, but also a substantive naming rule that is not subject to the TBT Agreement. The
European Communities claims that Article 2 of the EC Regulation contains such a substantive naming
requirement for preserved Sardina pilchardus and does not contain any labelling requirements for
preserved Sardinops sagax.
3. The Temporal Scope of Application of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
29. The European Communities argues that the Pane l erred in finding that Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement applies to technical regulations prepared and adopted before the TBT Agreement
entered into force, and in considering that Arti cle 2.4 applies to the maintenance of a technical
regulation and not just to its adoption. In its view, the text of Article 2.4 indicates no obligation to
reassess existing technical regulations in the light of the adoption of new international standards.

15Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001.

30. According to the European Communities, Article 2.4 applies only to the preparation and
adoption of technical regulations, not to their maintenance. The preparation and adoption of the
EC Regulation is an act that had "ceased to exist" when the obligation in Article 2.4 became effective.
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention")
 16 states that
provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any
situation which "ceased to exist" before the treaty came into effect.
31. The European Communities objects to the Panel's use of EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) ("EC – Hormones ") 17 to support its finding because the Appellate Body,
in that case, based its conclusion on the wording of Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, and 5.6 of the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS Agreement "), all of which include
the word "maintain". 18 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, however, does not include the word
"maintain".
32. The terms "use" and "as a basis for" in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and the
introductory language "where technical regulations are required" imply, according to the European
Communities, that this provision relates to the drawing up, drafting or preparation of technical
regulations. This conclusion, furthermore, is supported by the inclusion of the word "imminent" in
Article 2.4. The European Communities notes that Article 2.4 does not impose an obligation to use a
draft international standard whose completion is not imminent. It argues, therefore, that it could not
have been intended that an existing technical regulation would become inconsistent with Article 2.4
once completion of the draft international standard became "imminent", or even once the standard is
actually adopted and becomes "existing".
33. The European Communities further alleges that Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement provides
contextual support for a conclusion that is the complete opposite of that reached by the Panel.
According to the European Communities, Article 2.5 shows that when provisions of the
TBT Agreement are intended to cover the application of technical regulations, they say so explicitly.
Similar contextual support is found in Article 12.4, which uses the word "adopt", and in paragraph F
of the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, included as
Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement, which uses the word "develops". The European Communities also
rejects the Panel's conclusion that Article 2.6 of the TBT Agreement would be redundant if

16Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.
17Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I,
135.
18We note that, although the European Communities refers to Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement in its
appellant's submission, this provision does not include the word "maintain".

Article 2.4 did not apply to existing measures. The objective of Article 2.6 is the harmonization of
technical regulations. Thus, for the European Communities, it is obvious that WTO Members who
have technical regulations on a subject should be en couraged to participate in the preparation of an
international standard.
34. The European Communities, in addition, disagrees with the Panel's assertion that excluding
existing technical regulations from the scope of application of Article 2.4 would create "grandfather
rights", given that these measures would be subject to other obligations in the TBT Agreement that
do relate to their maintenance, such as Article 2.3.
4. The Characterization of Codex Stan 94 as a "Relevant International Standard"
35. The European Communities claims that the Panel erred in concluding that Codex Stan 94 is a
relevant international standard for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
36. The European Communities contends that only standards adopted by international bodies by
consensus may be considered relevant internat ional standards. According to the European
Communities, this is evident from the penultimate sentence of the Explanatory note to the definition
of "standard" in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement, which states that standards prepared by the
international standardization community are adopte d by consensus. In its view, the reference to
documents not based on consensus found in the last sentence of the Explanatory note covers
documents adopted by entities other than international bodies. The European Communities asserts
that the Panel erred in failing to verify whether Codex Stan 94 was adopted by consensus.
37. The European Communities alleges further that th e Panel erred in law when interpreting the
meaning of Codex Stan 94. According to the European Communities, the drafting history of
Codex Stan 94 demonstrates that section 6.1.1(ii) should be interpreted as allowing the common name
for the species of fish to be a possible name for the preserved "sardine-type" product, and that the
word "sardine" does not have to be part of that name.
38. The European Communities notes that the draft of Codex Stan 94 at Step 7 of the elaboration
procedures for Codex standards, listed "the common name for the species" in a subsection separate
from that which referred to the name "X sardines". It then explains that because only editorial
changes are allowed between Steps 7 and 8 of the elaboration procedures, the final text of
Codex Stan 94, which contains both "names" in the same subsection, must be interpreted as providing
that the common name of the species is an option independent from "X sardines". The European
Communities contends that the Panel's contrary reading of the standard, which does not recognize
"the common name" as separate from "X sardines", is not feasible because it would imply that an

invalid, substantive change (as opposed to an editorial one) was made to the draft standard at Step 8 of
the elaboration procedures.
39. The European Communities adds that Codex Stan 94, interpreted consistently with its drafting
history, is not a relevant international standard in this case for purposes of Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, because its scope is different from that of the EC Regulation. It explains that
Article 2 of the EC Regulation contains only a naming requirement for preserved sardines. For its
part, Codex Stan 94, correctly interpreted, includes as a naming option for preserved "sardine-type"
products the common name of the species alone, without the word "sardine".
5. Whether Codex Stan 94 was Used "As a Basis For" the EC Regulation
40. The European Communities claims that the Panel erred in concluding that Codex Stan 94 was
not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation. The European Communities argues that, despite the
finding that the term "use as a basis" does not m ean "conform to or comply with", the Panel applied
the "as a basis" test in this case in such a narrow and restrictive manner as to make it, in practice,
equivalent to the "conform to or comply with" test. In its view, the Panel erroneously considered that
to meet the "as a basis" test, almost every sing le section and sentence of Codex Stan 94 must have
been used in the technical regulation.
41. According to the European Communities, the EC Regulation covers only Sardina pilchardus
and does not regulate Sardinops sagax, nor fish of other species. The European Communities thus
argues that the relevant part of Codex Stan 94, for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, is
section 6.1.1(i), which states that the name "Sardines" is to be used exclusively for Sardina
pilchardus. According to the European Communities, section 6.1.1(i) of Codex Stan 94 is used "as a
basis for" the EC Regulation. The European Communities contends that section 6.1.1(ii) is not a
relevant part of the standard because it refers to products that are not regulated by the EC Regulation.
Therefore, it need not be used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation.
42. The European Communities also alleges that th e Panel performed an incorrect analysis to
determine whether the relevant international standard was used "as a basis for" the technical
regulation. The appropriate analysis, in its view, is not whether the European Communities used
Codex Stan 94 as the "principal constituent or fundamental principle" for the purpose of enacting the
EC Regulation, but whether there is a "rational relationship" between them on the substantive aspects
of the standard in question.
43. The European Communities explains that, pur suant to its legitimate objectives, the
EC Regulation reserves the name "sardines" for Sardina pilchardus. Given that this is expressly

foreseen in section 6.1.1(i) of Codex Stan 94, the European Communities asserts that the
EC Regulation has a substantial relationship with Codex Stan 94. The European Communities
concludes by stating that the substantial relation ship between the two documents demonstrates that
Codex Stan 94 was used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation.
6. The Question of the "Ineffectiveness or Inappropriateness" of Codex Stan 94
44. The European Communities claims that the Panel applied an incorrect burden of proof with
respect to the second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and that it erred in finding that
Codex Stan 94 is not an "ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate
objectives pursued".
45. According to the European Communities, there is no general rule-exception relationship
between the first and second parts of Article 2.4 and, therefore, there is no shift in the burden of proof
from the complainant to the respondent. The Eu ropean Communities rejects the Panel's claim that
only the respondent can spell out the objectives pursued through a regulation, explaining that the
objectives are usually described in the measure itself, as the EC Regulation demonstrates. Nor are the
Panel's concerns regarding the lack of information on the part of the complainant sufficient, in the
European Communities' view, to shift the burden to the respondent. The European Communities
explains that, in addition to the obligation on a Member to justify a measure under Article 2.5 of the
TBT Agreement, the complaining party may also enquire about a measure during consultations. The
European Communities asserts, furthermore, that the Panel's finding on the burden of proof is not
consistent with how the Appellate Body applied this burden regarding a similar provision of the
SPS Agreement in the EC – Hormones case.
46. The European Communities argues that the Panel arrived at an incorrect finding with respect
to the effectiveness or appropriateness of Codex Stan 94, because it misunderstood the objectives of
the EC Regulation. In this regard, the European Communities explains that the purpose of the
EC Regulation is to lay down marketing standards for preserved Sardina pilchardus and that the
European Communities does not pursue thereby any objectives in relation to preserved Sardinops
sagax.
47. The European Communities claims that the Panel erred in basing its conclusion regarding the
effectiveness or appropriateness of the EC Regulation on the validity of the factual assumption that
consumers in the European Communities have not always associated the term "sardines" exclusively
with Sardina pilchardus. The European Communities states that even if consumers have different
opinions with respect to what is a sardine, there may still be the possibility of confusion and the need
for measures to improve market transparency, protect consumers, and maintain product diversity.

48. The European Communities also rejects the Panel's reliance in its reasoning on whether or not
"sardines" is a common name for Sardinops sagax. According to the European Communities, even if
"sardines" were a common name for preserved Sardinops sagax, this does not change the need to
ensure that this product bears a unique name in the European Communities market.
49. The European Communities argues, finally, that the Panel erred in dismissing as irrelevant to
the question of consumer expectations the domestic legislation of the member States of the European
Communities. In its view, consumer expectations are generally based on some kind of legal
protection.
7. The Objectivity of the Assessment of Certain Facts by the Panel
50. The European Communities claims that the Panel did not conduct "an objective assessment of
the facts of the case" as required by Article 11 of the DSU. According to the European Communities,
the Panel deliberately and without motivation refused to consider facts that were brought to its
attention, although panels are obliged to examine all relevant facts and evidence presented to them by
the parties or obtained through their own initiative. In the European Communities' view, the Panel
also failed to provide an adequate and reasonable explanation for its findings. The European
Communities then refers to four specific instances where the Panel allegedly failed to discharge its
duty under Article 11 of the DSU.
51. The first instance referred to by the European Communities is the Panel's conclusion that the
Spanish and French dictionaries submitted by the European Communities supported the view that the
term "sardines" is not limited to Sardina pilchardus. The European Communities claims next that the
Panel should not have treated as evidence the lett er of the United Kingdom Consumers' Association
submitted by Peru, because it was prejudiced and contained a manifestly incorrect appreciation of
United Kingdom law.
52. As a third instance, the European Communities alleges that the Panel disregarded evidence
concerning the actual names given to "sardine-type" products in the European Communities. This
evidence consisted of tins and supermarket receipts for preserved herring, sardinellas, sprats, mackerel
and anchovies, as well as labels of preserved Sardinops sagax sold in the European Communities
under the name "Pacific Pilchards". The European Communities finally claims that the Panel erred in
refusing to ask the Codex Commission for its opinion concerning the meaning, status and validity of
Codex Stan 94.

8. The References in the Panel Report to Trade-Restrictiveness
53. The European Communities submits that the Panel erred in qualifying the EC Regulation as
trade-restrictive. It rejects the qualification and asserts that the EC Regulation is neither trade-
restrictive with respect to preserved Sardinops sagax , nor with respect to preserved Sardina
pilchardus.
54. In addition, the European Communities argues that the issue of trade-restrictiveness is not
relevant to the analysis under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and that, having exercised judicial
economy with respect to Peru's other claims, it wa s improper for the Panel to have examined this
issue.
55. The European Communities states, moreover, that Article 15.2 of the DSU does not permit
panels to make additional legal findings at the interim review stage.
9. Completing the Legal Analysis
56. The European Communities asserts that there are insufficient undisputed facts in the Panel
record for the Appellate Body to complete the lega l analysis in respect of Peru's other claims. It
further argues that Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement involve complex issues of law that,
contrary to Peru's contention, are completely different from those related to Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, and which have not been clarified by the Appellate Body or by dispute settlement
panels.
B. Arguments of Peru – Appellee
1. Procedural Issues
57. Before addressing the merits of the appeal, Peru challenges the admissibility of what it terms
is a second appeal by the European Communities—that is, the proceedings that began with the Notice
of Appeal filed by the European Communities on 28 June 2002, after withdrawing the Notice of
Appeal it had filed on 25 June 2002.
58. According to Peru, a notice of appeal cannot be withdrawn and resubmitted in revised form
without the consent of the appellee. It notes that there is nothing in the Working Procedures that
establishes the right to commence an appeal twice. Peru asserts that, although Rule 30 of the
Working Procedures makes clear that an appeal can be withdrawn at any time—which the European
Communities did through its communication of 28 June 2002—nothing in that Rule permits the
appellant to attach conditions to the withdrawal. Peru submits that if an appellant withdraws its

appeal subject to conditions, the appeal must ther efore be deemed withdrawn, irrespective of whether
or not the conditions are met.
59. Peru argues that unless the Working Procedures are strictly enforced to prevent an appellant
from commencing an appeal repeatedly or withdraw ing an appeal subject to unilaterally determined
conditions, there is immense potential for abuse and disorder in appellate review proceedings.
60. Peru also states that the facts of United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea ("US – Line Pipe ") 19, which the European
Communities cites as precedent, are distinguishable from those involved in the present dispute. It
explains that in US – Line Pipe , as well as in United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" ("US – FSC
 ") 20, the Notices of Appeal were withdrawn with the agreement of the
appellees, while in this case the European Communities adopted a unilateral approach. Moreover, in
the two previous cases, the appellants resubmitted an identical Notice of Appeal, which is not the
case in this appeal.
61. In Peru's view, the approach adopted by the European Communities in the present appeal
presupposes the existence of a fundamental procedural right that neither the DSU nor the Working
Procedures accords. Peru asserts that creating procedural rights on an ad hoc basis to address
problems caused by one WTO Member in an individual case, rather than through generally applicable
new procedures of which all Members are informed in advance, calls into question the principle of
equal treatment of all WTO Members.
62. Peru further notes that, even though the Appellate Body has ruled that the Working
Procedures should be read so as to give full meaning and effect to the right to appeal, this right is not
deprived of meaning and effect just because it can be exercised only once. Peru states, in addition,
that when the Appellate Body has addressed an issue that is not provided for in the Working
Procedures, the Appellate Body has consulted the participants and third parties. Peru asserts that, as
the Appellate Body did not consult the parties at the time that the second Notice of Appeal was filed,
it cannot be concluded that the Appellate Body has accepted the European Communities' second
appeal. Otherwise, the Appellate Body would ha ve waived Peru's procedural rights, which the
Appellate Body has no authority to do under the DSU or under its Working Procedures.

19Appellate Body Report, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002.
20Appellate Body Report, WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III, 1619.

63. Peru argues, moreover, that the circumstances of this case do not allow the Appellate Body to
rule that the procedure adopted by the European Communities can be justified under Rule 16(1) of the
Working Procedures , because that Rule does not justify the creation of procedural rights that the
DSU does not accord.
64. Peru requests, therefore, that the Appellate Body reject the European Communities' second
appeal.
65. Peru further objets to the acceptance and consideration of the amicus curiae briefs submitted
in this appeal. It states that, while it welcomes non-Member submissions where they are attached to
the submission of a WTO Member engaged in dispute settlement proceedings, the DSU makes clear
that only WTO Members can make independent subm issions to panels and to the Appellate Body.
Peru argues further that the DSU already provides conditions under which WTO Members can
participate as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings. According to Peru, accepting amicus
curiae briefs from WTO Members that did not notify their third party interest to the DSB would
be allowing a WTO Member impermissibly to circumvent the DSU.
66. Peru thus requests that the Appellate Body reject the amicus curiae briefs submitted in this
appeal.
2. The Characterization of the EC Regulation as a "Technical Regulation"
67. Peru submits that, contrary to the European Communities' contention, the EC Regulation is a
"technical regulation" that applies to identifiable products and lays down characteristics for products
marketed as sardines. Peru explains that Article 2 of the EC Regulation does not apply to any
product, but to products clearly identified as products marketed as preserved sardines . It further
claims that these clearly identified products must, according to Article 2 of the EC Regulation, have a
number of physical characteristics, including that of having been prepared exclusively from fish of the
species Sardina pilchardus . Peru asserts, therefore, that the EC Regulation lays down product
characteristics for products that are clearly identified.
68. Peru rejects the European Communities' claim that a name applied to a product is not itself a
characteristic of that product. According to Peru, Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement provides that any
document that lays down product characteristics with which compliance is mandatory is a "technical
regulation", irrespective of the purpose for which the product characteristics are laid down. In Peru's
view, a regulation that prescribes the characteristics of products marketed under a particular trade
name is, therefore, clearly a document which lays down product characteristics and hence a "technical
regulation" as defined in Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement.

69. According to Peru, the European Communities' argument on this issue is irrelevant to this
dispute. It explains that at issue in this disput e is not a "technical regulation" prescribing a particular
name for products made from Sardinops sagax , but rather that part of the EC Regulation that
requires any product marketed as sardines to be made from Sardina pilchardus. Peru submits that the
European Communities would thus not have to prescribe a specific trade name for products made
from Sardinops sagax to resolve this dispute.
3. The Temporal Scope of Application of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
70. Peru submits that the Panel correctly relied on Appellate Body rulings and on Article 28 of
the Vienna Convention in concluding that, unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place
or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect
to that party. Peru claims that the EC Regulation is a situation that has not ceased to exist and,
therefore, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is applicable to the EC Regulation.
71. Peru disagrees with the European Commun ities' allegation that Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement applies only to the preparation and adoption of technical regulations. According to
Peru, this allegation is based on a distinction between the adoption and maintenance of technical
regulations that the text of Article 2.4 does not make. Peru asserts that the obligation to use the
existing international standard as a basis for technical regulations arises according to the terms of
Article 2.4 "where technical regulations are required"—that is, in situations in which the Member
considered the adoption of a technical regulation necessary—and not when Members consider they
need to introduce technical regulations, as the European Communities alleges. Peru contends,
moreover, that the terms "use" and "as a basis for" in Article 2.4 do not imply that the obligation
under that provision arises only when a new technical regulation is drawn up, drafted or prepared.
72. Peru submits that the Panel correctly concluded that the references in other Articles of the
TBT Agreement to the application of technical regulations confirm that this Agreement was meant
to extend to existing technical regulations.
4. The Characterization of Codex Stan 94 as a "Relevant International Standard"
73. Peru states that the Panel correctly concluded that the TBT Agreement covers international
standards that are not based on consensus. Peru notes, in this regard, the last two sentences of the
Explanatory note to the definition of the term "standard" in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement. It then
asserts that the only logical and reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from these last two sentences
is that the drafters wished to note the practice of consensus-based decision-making of the international

standardization bodies, but at the same time clar ify that consensus-based decision-making was not an
absolute requirement.
74. Peru maintains that, in any event, the Codex Commission observes the principle of consensus
and followed this principle in the adoption of the C odex standard at issue in this dispute. According
to Peru, the report of the Codex Commission on the meeting at which the standard was adopted leaves
no doubt that it was adopted without a vote. Peru concludes, therefore, that by asking the Appellate
Body to rule that standards which have not been adopted by consensus are not covered by the
TBT Agreement, the European Communities is asking the Appellate Body to make a ruling on an
issue that need not be resolved to settle the present dispute.
75. In respect of the European Communities' argument that the Panel incorrectly interpreted
Codex Stan 94, Peru asserts that the European Communities mistakenly treats this alleged error as an
error in interpretation, rather than a failure to conduct an objective assessment of a fact. According to
Peru, the Codex standard is not a covered agreement within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the DSU,
nor is it a treaty or another source of international law. Peru thus contends that, like municipal law,
the Codex standard must be treated by an international tribunal as a fact to be examined, not as law to
be interpreted. Peru then states that the European Communities does not claim—and therefore does
not attempt to demonstrate—that the Panel's determination that the meaning of this standard is not
ambiguous constitutes an error in the assessment of a fact.
76. Peru argues that, even if the Appellate Body were to conclude that its task is to determine
whether the Panel's interpretation of the standard is in error, the European Communities' claim should
be rejected. In Peru's view, section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 clearly states that the name of sardines
other than Sardina pilchardus shall be "X sardines" and, therefore, the text after "X sardines" can
only be interpreted as defining what is meant by "X". Peru states, moreover, that whatever ambiguity
may result from the use of the comma in the English text of Codex Stan 94—to separate the phrase
"or the common name of the species in accordance wi th the law and custom of the country in which
the product is sold"—the French and Spanish versions of the standard, which are equally authentic,
leave no uncertainty on this point. Peru thus concludes that the Panel was correct in refraining from
basing its interpretation on the standard's drafting history. In any event, Peru submits that the drafting
history does not support the European Communities' interpretation of Codex Stan 94.
5. Whether Codex Stan 94 was Used "As a Basis For" the EC Regulation
77. Peru states that the Panel correctly interpreted and applied the term "as a basis for" in
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. It agrees with the Panel's conclusion that "basis" means "the
principal constituent of anything, the fundamental principle or theory, as of a system of knowledge".

78. Peru submits that the European Communities does not explain according to what
interpretative principle the term "as a basis for" could be given the meaning "having a substantive
rational relationship". Peru asserts that the ordinary meaning of this term is not "having a substantive
rational relationship" and it cannot be given that meaning in the light of its context and the object and
purpose of the TBT Agreement.
79. Peru contends, furthermore, that the EC Regulation would not meet the "as a basis" test even
if the terms were interpreted according to the definition submitted by the European Communities. In
Peru's view, the relevant part of Codex Stan 94 is section 6.1.1(ii) and thus, according to the European
Communities' own argument, what would need to be established is a rational and substantive
relationship between section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 and the European Communities' prohibition
against using the term "sardines" in combination with the name of a country or a geographical area or
the species or the common name. Peru asserts that there is no relationship between section 6.1.1(ii)
and that prohibition that can be described as "substantive" or "rational".
80. Peru rejects the European Communities' claim that, despite its finding that the term "use as a
basis" does not mean "conform to or comply with", the Panel applied the "as a basis" test in this case
in such a narrow and restrictive manner as to make it, in practice, equivalent to the "conform to or
comply with" test. Peru states, in response, that there is not a single element of the standard foreseen
in section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 that is reflected in the EC Regulation.
6. The Question of the "Ineffectiveness or Inappropriateness" of Codex Stan 94
81. Peru asserts that the Panel correctly articulated and applied the principle on burden of proof in
this dispute. Peru explains that the Panel appl ied the principle enunciated by the Appellate Body,
namely, that the party asserting the affirmative of a particular claim or defence has the burden of
proving its claim. It further states that the question of the distribution of the evidentiary burden
should not be considered in the abstract, but in the context of the provision at issue in the dispute.
82. According to Peru, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is expressed in the form of a positive
requirement and an exception. It explains that the second part of Article 2.4, which states "except
when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued", is not a positive requirement, but is rather
expressed in the form of an affirmative defence. This means, in Peru's view, that a Member departing
from a relevant international standard must show that the relevant international standard is not
applicable to its particular set of circumstances.

83. Peru states, additionally, that the Panel correctly considered that the second part of Article 2.4
addresses motives and facts that are privy to the Member imposing a technical regulation. Peru
argues that to accept the argument of the European Communities would be to require a complaining
party to explain that the deviation from an international standard is not necessary to pursue a
"legitimate objective", which would mean requiring a complaining party to prove a negative.
Moreover, accepting the European Communities' argument would mean, in Peru's view, that the
complaining party would have to speculate on the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by the
responding party. Peru therefore argues that it is only logical that the responding Member should
carry the burden of proving that its departure from the international standard is necessary to pursue
the "legitimate objectives".
84. Peru claims that, even if the Appellate Body were to find that the Panel incorrectly allocated
the burden of proof, Peru nevertheless adduced evidence sufficient to show that Codex Stan 94 is not
"ineffective or inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European
Communities through the EC Regulation.
7. The Objectivity of the Assessment of Certain Facts by the Panel
85. Peru submits that the Panel made "an objective assessment of the matter before it"
consistently with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU. According to Peru, to succeed in this
claim the European Communities must show, as stated in EC – Hormones 21, that the Panel was guilty
of "deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence", that there was "wilful distortion or
misrepresentation of the evidence", or that the Panel committed an "egregious error that calls into
question the good faith" of the Panel. Peru asserts that the European Communities has not shown this.
86. Peru rejects the European Communities' claim that the Panel erred in refraining from seeking
the opinion of the Codex Commission. Peru argues that Article 13.2 of the DSU leaves it to the
discretion of panels to determine whether or not to seek expert opinion in particular cases and that
Article 14.2 of the TBT Agreement gives panels discretion in deciding whether or not to establish a
technical expert group. Peru further submits that, because the English text, together with the French
and Spanish texts, remove any ambiguity or obscurity regarding the meaning of section 6.1.1(ii) of
Codex Stan 94, there was no reason for the Panel to have recourse to its drafting history or to consult
the Codex Commission on this issue.
87. Peru asserts that the Panel made proper use of dictionaries and that, in its claim on appeal, the
European Communities is mischaracterizing the Panel Report. Peru explains that it referred to several

21Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 17.

technical dictionaries to support its claim that the term "sardines" is a common term for Sardinops
sagax in the European Communities. The Panel referred to this evidence, as well as other evidence
presented by the parties, in determining whether Peru had met its burden of proof. According to Peru,
the purpose of the Panel's assessment was not, as suggested by the European Communities, to arrive
at a definitive conclusion as to the common name for Sardinops sagax in each member State of the
European Communities, but to determine whether European consumers would be misled if the trade
description of products made from Sardinops sagax comprised the word "sardines" and a
geographical qualifier. Peru therefore submits that the Panel used the dictionaries in an appropriate
manner to make this determination, consistent with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
88. Peru argues that the Panel did not ignore the evidence submitted by the European
Communities concerning the actual names given to "sardine-type" products in the European
Communities. Peru states that it is clear from paragraphs 7.125–7.129 of the Panel Report that the
Panel looked at this evidence, but disagreed with it.
89. Peru claims that the Panel properly took into account the evidence provided by the United
Kingdom Consumers' Association. Peru explains th at the Association arrived at the conclusion that
European consumers would not be misled if sardines from Europe and sardines from Peru were
distinguished by the addition of a geographical indication in the trade name and that the
EC Regulation does nothing to promote the interest s of European consumers. Contrary to the
assertion of the European Communities, Peru argues that these are factual, not legal, conclusions that
the Panel could appropriately consider as part of the wide range of evidence submitted to it on this
question. Peru therefore concludes that the European Communities has not shown that the Panel
distorted this evidence, or that it used this evidence in bad faith.
8. The References in the Panel Report to Trade-Restrictiveness
90. Peru explains that the Panel's statements on trade-restrictiveness should be considered
keeping in mind, as background, the fact that Peru requested the Panel to exercise judicial economy
with respect to its subsidiary claims, including its claim under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
Peru submits, nonetheless, that the Panel's description of the EC Regulation as trade-restrictive is
entirely accurate.
91. Peru recognizes that these statements are not necessary to the Panel's analysis under
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and, to the extent that the Panel's finding on that Article is
confirmed, requests that the Appellate Body decline to address these statements or rule that they were
not necessary or pertinent to the disposition of the issues before the Panel. If the Appellate Body does
not confirm the finding that the EC Regulation is inc onsistent with Article 2.4, Peru requests that the

Appellate Body complete the analysis with respect to Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
and, in so doing, that it consider the Panel's statements on the trade-restrictiveness of the
EC Regulation.
9. Completing the Legal Analysis
92. Peru submits that, if the Appellate Body concludes that the EC Regulation is consistent with
Article 2.4, it would be appropriate in such circumstances for the Appellate Body to complete the
Panel's analysis and resolve the dispute by making findings on those provisions of Article 2 of the
TBT Agreement on which the Panel did not make any findings. Peru explains that it asked the Panel
to exercise judicial economy in accordance with the guidance given by the Appellate Body to panels
to address only those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings. Peru then points to several cases where, after
reversing a panel's finding, the Appellate Body completed the legal analysis of those claims where the
panel had exercised judicial economy.
93. Peru states that it requested the Panel to include in the Panel Report all of the arguments and
evidence submitted to it on the legal claims not addr essed, so as to provid e the Appellate Body with
the factual basis to rule on those claims if this became necessary. Peru further asserts that the
fundamental rationale of Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is the same, so that the facts
required to rule on the consistency of a measure with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement include those
required to rule on the consistency of that measure with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of that Agreement.
94. Peru therefore requests that, if the Appell ate Body concludes that the EC Regulation is
consistent with Article 2.4, the Appellate Body complete the Panel's analysis and find that the
EC Regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.2. If the Appellate Body concludes that the
EC Regulation is consistent with Article 2.2, Peru requests the Appellate Body to complete the Panel's
analysis and find that the EC Regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
C. Arguments of the Third Participants
1. Canada
95. Canada agrees with the Panel's finding that the EC Regulation is a "technical regulation" for
the purposes of the TBT Agreement. It submits that the Panel correctly applied the Appellate Body's
reasoning in EC – Asbestos, by finding that the EC Regulation identifies a product, namely
preserved sardines, lays down product characteristics in a negative form by prohibiting fish of species
other than Sardina pilchardus to be marketed as preserved sardines, and is mandatory.

96. Canada further asserts that, pursuant to Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization , the European Communities had an obligation on
1 January 1995 to ensure the conformity of its existing technical regulations with its obligations
under, inter alia, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. Canada adds that the European Communities
failed to comply with this obligation in respect of the EC Regulation.
97. Canada also claims that the Panel correctly found that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis
for" the EC Regulation. According to Canada, the EC Regulation is not "founded or built upon" or
"supported by" Codex Stan 94, because the EC Regulation prohibits preserved sardines of species
other than Sardina pilchardus from being marketed as "sardines", regardless of whether the term
"sardine" is used in conjunction with the country, geographical area, species, or common name of the
species.
98. Canada agrees with the Panel's finding that under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the
burden rests with the European Communities, as the party asserting the affirmative of a particular
claim or defence, to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an "ineffective or inappropriate" means to
fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation. It further notes that, even if this were not the
case, Peru provided sufficient evidence and legal arguments to meet this burden.
99. According to Canada, the Panel made an "objective assessment of the matter before it".
Canada submits that in order to establish that th e Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU, the European Communities must do more than merely contend that the Panel should have
reached different factual findings than those it reached.
100. Canada further submits that the Panel's interpretation of Codex Stan 94 is correct and that it
was within the Panel's discretion to decline to consult the Codex Commission.
101. Canada disagrees with the Panel's comment that, under Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, a
regulation that is not in accordance with "relevant international standards" creates an unnecessary
obstacle to trade. Canada notes, however, that the Panel's comment played no part in its
determination that the EC Regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
102. Canada submits that, in the event that the Appellate Body finds the EC Regulation to be
consistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body has an adequate basis to
complete the legal analysis of the claims made by Peru under Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.

103. In referring to the amicus curiae briefs received in this appeal, Canada notes that there is a
lack of clear agreement among WTO Members as to the role of amicus curiae briefs in dispute
settlement. It also states that the DSU provides WTO Members with the legal right to make
submissions in a dispute, but only if they reserve their third party rights at the outset of the dispute
settlement process. Canada finally asserts that, in any event, the amicus curiae briefs should be
rejected because they are not pertinent or useful.
2. Chile
104. Chile agrees with Peru's claim that the European Communities could not conditionally
withdraw its Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002 and replace it with a new Notice of Appeal.
105. Chile also agrees with the Panel's conclusion that the EC Regulation is a "technical
regulation" for purposes of the TBT Agreement.
106. Chile states that the Panel was correct in concluding that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
applies to all technical regulations that existed prior to 1 January 1995. According to Chile, the
commitment under the TBT Agreement not to restrict trade more than necessary is a permanent and
continuous one.
107. Chile rejects the European Communities' contention that Article 2.4 applies only to the
preparation and adoption of technical regulations. Chile states that Article 2 of the TBT Agreement
is entitled "Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by Central Government
Bodies". Given the title of Article 2, Chile argues that if Article 2.4 were limited to the preparation
and adoption of technical regulations, its text would have indicated this explicitly or the provision
would have been included in a different article.
108. Chile agrees with the Panel's conclusion that Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant international
standard". Chile, nevertheless, disagrees with the Panel's interpretation of the Explanatory note to the
definition of "standard" in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement. According to Chile, the Explanatory
note provides that international standards must be based on consensus, and this was confirmed in the
Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and
Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, adopted by the WTO
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.
 22 Chile notes, however, that the European Communities
has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 was not approved by consensus.

22G/TBT/9, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 13 November 2000, Annex 4.

109. Chile submits that the Panel was correct in finding that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a
basis for" the EC Regulation. Chile explains that the EC Regulation monopolizes the term "sardines"
for Sardina pilchardus in circumstances where Codex Stan 94 provides otherwise. Chile then asserts
that, had the European Communities used Codex Stan 94 "as a basis", the European Communities
would have had to incorporate all relevant parts of it, and not only section 6.1.1(i).
110. Chile asserts that the burden of proving that Codex Stan 94 is not "ineffective or
inappropriate" rests with the European Communities , because it is impossible for the Panel or for the
other Members to prove what are the true "legitimate objectives" pursued by the Member adopting a
technical regulation. In Chile's view, the European Communities failed to meet this burden.
111. Chile requests, furthermore, that the Appellate Body reject the amicus curiae briefs received
in this appeal. Chile argues that accepting amicus curiae briefs from WTO Members who have not
notified the DSB of their interest as third parties would mean that those Members would be accorded
more favourable treatment than those accorded passive observer status in an appeal.
3. Ecuador
112. Ecuador requests clarification of the issues raised by the European Communities' conditional
withdrawal of the original Notice of Appeal and the submission of a second Notice of Appeal.
113. Ecuador submits that the EC Regulation is a "technical regulation" for purposes of the
TBT Agreement. It agrees with the Panel's finding that Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant international
standard" which must be used "as a basis for" the adoption and maintenance of the EC Regulation.
114. According to Ecuador, the Panel correctly found that Codex Stan 94 allows Members to
provide a precise trade description for preserved sardines, thereby promoting market transparency,
consumer protection, and fair competition. Ecuador further agrees with the Panel's finding that Peru
presented sufficient evidence to prove that Codex Stan 94 is neither "ineffective" nor "inappropriate"
to achieve the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the
EC Regulation.
115. Finally, Ecuador objects to the acceptance and consideration of the amicus curiae briefs
submitted in this appeal. According to Ecuador, this would accord Morocco more favourable
treatment than Colombia who was accorded passive observer status in this appeal.

4. United States
116. According to the United States, the Panel correctly found, as a factual matter, that the
EC Regulation lays down product characteristics that must be complied with in order for a product to
be labelled and sold as preserved sardines, and that one of those mandatory product characteristics is
that the fish must be of the species Sardina pilchardus . It further notes that the European
Communities has not contested that the EC Regulation is a "technical regulation", but only that it is a
"technical regulation" relating to Sardinops sagax.
117. The United States submits that, contrary to what the European Communities claims, there is
no need to prove that the EC Regulation is an explicit "technical regulation" for Sardinops sagax.
Although the EC Regulation mentions only Sardina pilchardus by name, the United States asserts
that this does not mean that the EC Regulation cannot be challenged by another Member, especially
when that Member is precluded from labelling its sardine species as "sardines" by that regulation.
118. The United States also rejects the European Communities' attempt to distinguish between
labels and names, and states that the Panel correctly noted that both labelling and naming
requirements are means of identifying a product.
119. The United States agrees with the Panel's conclusion that Article 2.4 applies to technical
regulations that were in effect when the TBT Agreement came into force. The United States submits
that the Appellate Body's reasoning in EC – Hormones
 23 regarding the temporal application of the
SPS Agreement is also relevant for interpreting Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
120. The United States further asserts that the Eu ropean Communities' allegation that Article 2.4
applies only to the drafting, drawing up or preparation of technical regulations is not supported by the
text of that provision nor by its context. In this regard, the United States argues that this provision
"follows fast" upon Article 2.3 of the TBT Agreement, which requires that technical regulations not
be maintained if they are no longer necessary or if the objectives can be attained in a less trade-
restrictive manner. This provides contextual support, according to the United States, to the conclusion
that the phrase "where technical regulations are required" in Article 2.4 can refer to existing technical
regulations that are being maintained because they are still required.
121. The United States submits that the Panel correctly found that Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant
international standard". It further states that the Panel properly rejected the European Communities'

23Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 17.

allegations that the international standard at issue does not mean what it says, or is invalid because of
drafting changes made in the course of developing the standard.
122. The United States disagrees, however, with the Panel's conclusion that international standards
do not have to be based on consensus. According to the United States, this conclusion is contrary to
the Explanatory note to the definition of "standard" in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement, which states
that international standards are based on consensus. It argues that the TBT Agreement does not
impose any obligations on an international body or system with respect to the development of
international standards. In the United States' view, the obligations set out in the TBT Agreement
apply only to WTO Members and thus do not cover the international standards referred to
in Article 2.4. The last phrase of the Explanatory note, referring to the application of the
TBT Agreement to documents not adopted by consensus, would cover instead those standards adopted
by Members even if not adopted by consensus.
123. The United States, therefore, urges the Appellate Body to modify this aspect of the Panel
Report, but clarifies that this would not invalida te the Panel's conclusion that Codex Stan 94 is a
"relevant international standard", given the Pa nel's finding that there was no evidence that
Codex Stan 94 was not based on consensus.
124. The United Sates submits that the Panel was correct in finding that the European
Communities is not using Codex Stan 94 "as a basis for" the EC Regulation. The United States
asserts that the EC Regulation is directly contrary to the international standard because Codex Stan 94
provides that a number of sardine species can be marketed with the name "sardines", appropriately
qualified, while the EC Regulation explicitly forbids such marketing.
125. The United States rejects the European Communities' allegation that the Panel effectively
required conformity or compliance with the international standard. According to the United States,
the Panel simply said that an international standard could not have been used as a basis for a technical
regulation if the technical regulation directly contradicts the standard. The United States further states
that the EC Regulation would not meet the European Communities' proposed definition for the term
"as a basis", given that the only rational relatio nship between the EC Regulation and Codex Stan 94
is that they contradict each other.
126. The United States also asserts that the Eur opean Communities is incorrect to argue that it
appropriately used relevant parts of Codex Stan 94 on the grounds that the EC Regulation is based on
that part of the standard that permits Members to reserve the name "sardine", without a qualifier, for
the species Sardina pilchardus. The United States argues that, given that the EC Regulation also

forbids the name "X sardines" for other sardine species, that part of Codex Stan 94 concerning
"X sardines" is therefore plainly a relevant part of the standard.
127. The United States claims that the Panel correctly concluded that Codex Stan 94 is not an
"ineffective or inappropriate" means for pursuing the European Communities' "legitimate objectives",
identified as market transparency, consumer protection, and fair competition, because, inter alia, this
international standard provides for conveying accurate information to the consumer concerning the
content of the product. The United States also agrees with the Panel's finding that Peru met the
burden of showing that Codex Stan 94 is not "ineffective or inappropriate".
128. The United States alleges, however, that the Panel erred in stating that Peru was not required
to meet this burden—even though it found that Peru had done so. According to the United States, this
reasoning is unnecessary to the Panel's finding and legally erroneous. In the United States' view, it is
the complaining party, not the responding party, that has the burden of presenting evidence and
arguments sufficient to make a prima facie demonstration of each claim that the measure is
inconsistent with a provision of a covered agreement. This includes the demonstration under
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement that the relevant international standards are not "ineffective or
inappropriate". The United States argues, moreover, that this burden does not shift to the responding
party because the obligation is characterized as an exception, or because the responding party asserts
that the international standard is "ineffective or inappropriate", or because the responding party may
have more information at its disposal concerning the "legitimate objectives."
129. The United States, therefore, requests the Appellate Body to modify the portion of the Panel's
reasoning dealing with the allocation of the burden of proving that relevant international standards are
an "ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued" through
the technical regulation.
130. The United States submits that the Appellate Body has the discretion to accept both amicus
curiae briefs received in this appeal, but that it need not do so because they are not pertinent or
useful.
5. Venezuela
131. Venezuela states that the Panel correctly found that the EC Regulation is a "technical
regulation". It also agrees with the Panel's finding that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies
to measures adopted before 1 January 1995, but which have not ceased to exist. According to

Venezuela, the Panel properly applied the principle set forth in Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention 24, as interpreted by the Appellate Body.
132. Venezuela agrees with the Panel's conclusion that Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant international
standard" and contends that the EC Regulation does not take into account the standard established in
Codex Stan 94.
133. Venezuela disagrees with the European Communities' assertion that Codex Stan 94, by
authorizing use of the term "sardines" for products other than Sardina pilchardus, is "ineffective or
inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of consumer protection, market transparency, and
fair competition. Venezuela also submits that Peru presented sufficient evidence and legal arguments
to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is not "ineffective or inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate
objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation.
III. Issues Raised in this Appeal
134. This appeal raises the following issues:
(a) whether the appeal is inadmissible as a result of the conditional withdrawal of the
Notice of Appeal filed on 25 June 2002, and the filing of a new Notice of Appeal on
28 June 2002;
(b) whether the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Kingdom of Morocco and a
private individual are admissible, and, if so, whether they assist us in this appeal;
(c) whether the Panel erred by finding that Council Regulation (EEC) 2136/89 (the
"EC Regulation") is a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the "TBT Agreement
 ");
(d) whether the Panel erred by finding that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to
existing measures, such as the EC Regulation;
(e) whether the Panel erred by finding that CODEX STAN 94–1981, Rev.1–1995
("Codex Stan 94") is a "relevant international standard" within the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement;

24Supra, footnote 16.

(f) whether the Panel erred by finding that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for"
the EC Regulation within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement;
(g) whether the Panel correctly interpreted and applied the second part of Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement, which allows Members not to use international standards "as a
basis for" their technical regulations "when such international standards or relevant
parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued";
(h) whether the Panel properly discharged its duty under Article 11 of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") to make
"an objective assessment of the facts of the case";
(i) whether the Panel has made a determination that the EC Regulation is trade-
restrictive, and, if so, whether the Panel erred in making such a determination; and
(j) whether we should complete the analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, or Article III:4 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"), in the event that we find that the
EC Regulation is consistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
IV. Procedural Issues
A. Admissibility of Appeal
135. We begin with the question of the admissibility of the appeal. Peru submits that the Notice of
Appeal of 25 June 2002 was withdr awn, that the withdrawal was subject to an "impermissible"
condition of filing a new notice of appeal, and that the Notice of Appeal filed on 28 June 2002 is
inadmissible because there is no right to appeal twice.
 25 The European Communities responds that it
did not appeal twice, that it withdrew the original Notice of Appeal in response to Peru's request for
additional information on the grounds of appeal, and that Peru did not suffer any prejudice as a result
of the timely filing of the new Notice of Appeal based on the same legal grounds as the original
Notice.
 26

25Peru's letter dated 2 July 2002.
26European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

136. We set out earlier in this Report 27 the sequence of events relevant to the filing by the
European Communities of a Notice of Appeal on 25 June 2002, the withdrawal of that Notice three
days later, and the filing of a replacement Notice of Appeal on 28 June 2002. Before commencing
our analysis of the admissibility of the Notice of A ppeal of 28 June 2002, we note first that Peru does
not request that we rule in this Report on Peru's Request for a Preliminary Ruling, submitted on
27 June 2002, regarding the sufficiency of paragraphs (d), (f), (g), and (h) of the European
Communities' Notice of Appeal dated 25 June 2002.
 28 Peru states in its appellee's submission that
"[t]he Division presumably considers the original Notice of Appeal to be withdrawn" 29, and Peru does
not address further the question of the insufficiency of the original Notice of Appeal. The European
Communities submits that "the preliminary objections raised by Peru on the adequacy of the Notice of
Appeal filed by the [European Communities] on 25 June 2002 is a matter that is now moot and
settled."
 30 In the light of these submissions, we need not, and, therefore, we do not decide the issues
raised in the Request for a Preliminary Ruling filed by Peru regarding the sufficiency of the Notice of
Appeal filed on 25 June 2002.
137. We turn to the claim by Peru that the Europ ean Communities was not entitled to attach a
condition to its withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal filed on 25 June 2002. Rule 30(1) of the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review (the "Working Procedures"), which governs the withdrawal of an
appeal, provides:
At any time during an appeal, the appellant may withdraw its appeal
by notifying the Appellate Body, which shall forthwith notify the
DSB.
138. This rule accords to the appellant a broad right to withdraw an appeal at any time. This right
appears, on its face, to be unfettered: an appellant is not subject to any deadline by which to withdraw
its appeal; an appellant need not provide any reason for the withdrawal; and an appellant need not
provide any notice thereof to other participants in an appeal. More significantly for this appeal, there
is nothing in the Rule prohibiting the attachment of conditions to a withdrawal. Indeed, in two
previous cases, notices of appeal were withdrawn subject to the condition that new notices would be

27Supra, paras. 11 ff.
28WT/DS231/10, 27 June 2002.

filed. 31 Nor is the right to withdraw an appeal expressly subject to the condition that no new notice be
filed on the same matter after the withdrawal.
139. However, despite this permissive language, we emphasize that the Working Procedures must
not be interpreted in a way that could undermine the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system,
for they have been drawn up pursuant to the DSU and as a means of ensuring that the dispute
settlement mechanism achieves the aim of securing a positive solution to a dispute. 32 As we have
said:
The procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to
promote … the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade
disputes. 33
140. This obligation to interpret the Working Procedures in a way that promotes the effective
resolution of disputes is complemented by the obligation of Members, set out in Article 3.10 of the
DSU, to "engage in [dispute settlement] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute."
Hence, the right to withdraw an appeal must be exercised subject to these limitations, which are
applicable generally to the dispute settlement process.
141. Peru submits that nothing in Rule 30 of the Working Procedures permits the attachment of
conditions to the withdrawal of a notice of appeal, and that, therefore, this appeal must be deemed to
have been withdrawn irrespective of whether the conditions are met. We find no support in Rule 30
for Peru's position. While it is true that nothing in the text of Rule 30(1) explicitly permits an
appellant to exercise its right subject to conditions, it is also true that nothing in the same text
prohibits an appellant from doing so. As we have just explained, in our view, the right to withdraw a
notice of appeal under Rule 30(1) is broad, subject only to the limitations we have described.
Therefore, we see no reason to interpret Rule 30 as granting a right to withdraw an appeal only if that
withdrawal is unconditional. Rather, the correct interpretation, in our view, is that Rule 30(1) permits
conditional withdrawals, unless the condition imposed undermines the "fair, prompt and effective
resolution of trade disputes", or unless the Member attaching the condition is not "engag[ing] in
[dispute settlement] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute." Therefore, it is
necessary to examine any such conditions attached to withdrawals on a case-by-case basis to

31We note that, in both previous cases, unlike in this case, the Divisions hearing those appeals and the
appellees had prior knowledge of, and agreed with, the process. (Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, supra,
footnote 20, para. 4; Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, supra, footnote 19, para. 13) Peru distinguishes
this case on that basis; however, the mere fact that there was both notice and agreement in those cases does not,
on its own, mean that such notice and agreement are required.
32DSU, Article 3.7.
33Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, supra, footnote 20, para. 166.

determine whether, in fact, the particular condition in a particular case in any way obstructs the
dispute settlement process, or in some way diminish es the rights of the appellee or other participants
in the appeal.
142. With this in mind, we examine next whether, by withdrawing the Notice of Appeal of
25 June 2002 subject to the condition of filing a replacement notice of appeal, the European
Communities has effectively undermined the "fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes"
or has not "engage[d] in [dispute settlement] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the
dispute."
143. According to the European Communities, it withdrew the Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002
after receiving Peru's Request for a Preliminary Ruli ng in order to "enlarge … the description of the
points" in paragraphs (d), (f), (g), and (h) of the original Notice and, thus, "clarify the points that Peru
considered were not clear".
 34 The European Communities maintains that the "replacement" 35 Notice
contained "no new grounds of appeal, or modified ones." 36 Moreover, the European Communities
contends that "Peru's rights of defense have not been harmed in any way by the replacement of the
original Notice of Appeal with a new one and by the new Working Schedule". 37 The European
Communities submits that it acted in a timely manner, "within the 60 days provided by the DSU [for
adoption of panel reports]" and "well in advance of any substantial exchange between the parties".
 38
144. In our view, attaching the condition to the withdrawal was not unreasonable under the
circumstances. The conditioning by the European Communities of its withdrawal of the Notice of
Appeal of 25 June 2002 on the right to file a replacement Notice of Appeal arose as a response to the
Request for a Preliminary Ruling filed by Peru. Although Peru contests the European Communities'
contention that no prejudice was suffered by Peru—arguing that Peru was "forced to address a
completely novel procedural issue and waste time on that issue that [Peru] could have used for better
purposes"
 39—we are not persuaded that the European Communities' response in any way obstructed
the process or diminished Peru's rights. Indeed, it may well have had the opposite effect. Although
the European Communities states that it thought Peru's Request for a Preliminary Ruling "to be

34European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
36European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
38European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
39Peru's response to questioning at the oral hearing.

without merit" 40, the European Communities sought to remedy the difficulty perceived by Peru, and
not to delay the proceedings further by contesting the allegations of insufficiency.
145. Moreover, the European Communities responded in a timely manner, providing the additional
information in a replacement Notice of Appeal the da y following receipt of Peru's objections to the
Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002, and only three days after filing the original Notice of Appeal. The
replacement Notice was provided well before any submissions were filed. Thus, for the reasons
explained, we find that the withdrawal of the original Notice on condition of filing a replacement
Notice was appropriate and had the effect of conditionally withdrawing the original Notice.
146. In making this finding, we are mindful of Peru's argument that allowing the withdrawal of a
notice of appeal subject to a unilaterally declared condition of the right to file a new notice of appeal,
and the filing thereafter of a new notice of appeal, creates an "immense potential for abuse and
disorder in appellate review proceedings."
 41 Peru suggests a number of examples of possible abusive
practices that could result—including the delaying of the adoption of a panel report by submitting a
new notice of appeal each time a panel report is before the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB"), the
amending of allegations of error in the light of arguments made by the appellee or of questions posed
by the Division at the oral hearing, and the attempt to have a different division selected or a different
date chosen for the oral hearing.
 42 We agree with Peru that there may be situations where the
withdrawal of an appeal on condition of refiling a new notice, and the filing thereafter of a new
notice, could be abusive and disruptive. However, in such cases, we would have the right to reject the
condition, and also to reject any filing of a new notice of appeal, on the grounds either that the
Member seeking to file such a new notice would not be engaging in dispute settlement proceedings in
good faith, or that Rule 30(1) of the Working Procedures must not be used to undermine the fair,
prompt, and effective resolution of trade disputes. We agree with Peru that the rules must be
interpreted so as to "ensure that appellate review proceedings do not become an arena for unfortunate
litigation techniques that frustrate the objectives of the DSU, and that developing countries do not
have the resources to deal with".
 43 The case before us, however, presents none of these
circumstances.
147. In addition, we believe there are circumstances that, although not constituting "abusive
practices", would be in violation of the DSU, and would, thus, compel us to disallow the conditional
withdrawal of a notice of appeal as well as the filing of a replacement notice. For example, if the

40European Communities' letter to the Appellate Body dated 28 June 2002.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., para. 51.

conditional withdrawal or the filing of a new notice were to take place after the 60-day deadline in
Article 16.4 of the DSU for adoption of panel reports, this would effectively circumvent the
requirement to file appeals within 60 days of circulation of panel reports. In such circumstances, we
would reject the conditional withdrawal and the new notice of appeal.
148. We turn now to Peru's request that we declare the Notice of Appeal of 28 June 2002
inadmissible because neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures "accord[s] an appellant the right
to appeal the same panel report twice on different grounds."
 44 In our view, this argument by Peru is
also misplaced, for we do not consider that the European Communities has in fact appealed "twice".
The European Communities maintains that it "never intended to appeal twice", and also that it
"considered that [the European Communities] only appealed once".
 45 The European Communities
contends as well that the replacement Notice contained "no new grounds of appeal, or modified
ones."
 46 Peru, for its part, states that the replacement Notice "reformulated the points to which Peru
had objected" 47 and was based on "different allegations of error" 48, but Peru does not point to any
new or modified grounds of appeal. 49
149. As we have explained, we are of the view that the conditional withdrawal of the Notice of
Appeal of 25 June 2002 was appropriate and effective, and that, therefore, the filing of a replacement
Notice on 28 June 2002 did not constitute a second appeal. Moreover, we agree with the European
Communities that the replacement Notice of Appeal contains no additional grounds of appeal, and
that it merely added information to the paragraphs in the initial Notice that Peru considered deficient.
150. Peru alleges that, in sanctioning the approach of the European Communities in this appeal, we
would be creating a procedural right for which the DSU has not provided—a right that can only be
added to the DSU through a formal amendment by the Members of the World Trade Organization (the
"WTO"). We are, however, not creating a new procedural right; we are only upholding the right to
withdraw an appeal. In addition, in admitting the replacement Notice of Appeal in this dispute, we
are, as we were in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ("US –
Shrimp"), seeking to:

45European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
46Ibid.
48Ibid., para. 48.
49Peru stated that the first Notice was "vague as to the scope of the appeal" and therefore it did not
know whether the new Notice covered the same grounds. (Peru's response to questioning at the oral hearing)

… give full meaning and effect to the right of appeal and to give a
party which regards itself aggrieved by some legal finding or
interpretation in a panel report a real and effective opportunity to
demonstrate the error in such finding or interpretation. 50
In that same Report, we added that "an appellee is, of course, always entitled to its full measure of due
process." 51 In the circumstances of this case, we believe that Peru has been accorded the full measure
of its due process rights, because the withdrawal of the original Notice and the filing of a replacement
Notice were carried out in response to objections raised by Peru, the replacement Notice was filed in a
timely manner and early in the process, and the replacement Notice contained no new or modified
grounds of appeal. Also, Peru has not demonstrated that it suffered prejudice as a result. Moreover,
Peru was given an adequate opportunity to address its concerns about the European Communities'
actions during the course of the appeal.
151. In our view, the withdrawal of the original Notice of Appeal of 25 June 2002 and its
replacement with the Notice of Appeal of 28 June 2002 was not an exercise of abusive litigation
techniques by the European Communities, but rather was an appropriate response under the
circumstances to Peru's objections regarding the original Notice of Appeal.
152. For all these reasons, we reject Peru's claims that the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal of
25 June 2002 by the European Communities cannot be subject to a condition, and that the Notice of
Appeal of 28 June 2002 by the European Communities is inadmissible.
B. Amicus Curiae Briefs
153. We turn next to the second procedural issue in this case, namely whether we may accept and
consider the amicus curiae briefs that have been submitted to us. One brief was filed by a private
individual, and the other by the Kingdom of Moro cco ("Morocco"), a Member of the WTO that did
not exercise its third party rights at the panel stage of these proceedings.
154. Peru objects to our acceptance and consideration of these unsolicited submissions. Peru
argues that, although it "welcomes non-Member submissions where they are attached to the
submission of a WTO Member engaged in dispute settlement proceedings, the DSU makes clear that
only WTO Members can make independent submissions to panels and to the Appellate Body".
 52 As
for the brief submitted by Morocco, a WTO Member, Peru contends that accepting such a brief

50Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755, para. 97.
51Ibid.
52Peru's letter dated 26 July 2002.

"would be to allow a WTO Member impermissibly to circumvent the DSU", which "establishes the
conditions under which WTO Members can participate as third parties in dispute settlement
proceedings."
 53 On this basis, Peru requests us to reject both of these briefs.
155. The European Communities does not address this issue in its written submission. In response
to our questioning at the oral hearing, however, the European Communities stated that the amicus
curiae briefs are pertinent, and that we have the discretion to accept them. Among the third
participants, Canada argues that there is a lack of clear agreement among WTO Members as to the
role of amicus curiae briefs in dispute settlement, and contends that WTO Members have a legal
right to participate in dispute settlement proceedings only if they reserve their third party rights at the
outset of the dispute settlement process. Moreover, Canada asserts that both amicus curiae briefs
should be rejected because they are not pertinent or useful. Chile and Ecuador also ask us to reject the
 amicus curiae briefs, alleging that the DSU does not permit participation by amici. The United
States is of the view that we have the authority to accept both briefs, but believes we should not
consider either of them because they are not pertinent or useful.
156. We recall that, in US – Shrimp
 54, we admitted three amicus curiae briefs that were attached
as exhibits to the appellant's submission in that appeal. We concluded that those briefs formed part of
the appellant's submission, and observed that it is fo r a participant in an appeal to determine for itself
what to include in its submission.
 55 We followed this approach in Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties
on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand –
H-Beams ") 56, and in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia ("US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) "). 57 I n
subsequent cases, amicus curiae briefs were submitted by private individuals or organizations
separately from participants' submissions. We admitted those briefs as well. 58
157. We have the authority to accept amicus curiae briefs. We enunciated this authority for the
first time in our Report in United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled

53Peru's letter dated 26 July 2002.
54Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 50.
55Ibid., para 91.
56Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams "), WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001.
57Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia ("US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) "), WT/DS58/AB/RW,
adopted 21 November 2001.
58Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , supra, footnote 15, Appellate Body Report, Thailand –
H-Beams, supra, footnote 56, Appellate Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II , WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted
7 June 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2601.

Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (" US – Lead and
Bismuth II "), where we reasoned:
In considering this matter, we first note that nothing in the DSU or
the Working Procedures specifically provides that the Appellate
Body may accept and consider submissions or briefs from sources
other than the participants and third participants in an appeal. On the
other hand, neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures explicitly
prohibit[s] acceptance or consideration of such briefs. …
[Article 17.9 59] makes clear that the Appellate Body has broad
authority to adopt procedural rules which do not conflict with any
rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered agreements.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that as long as we act consistently
with the provisions of the DSU and the covered agreements, we have
the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider
any information that we believe is pertinent and useful in an
appeal.
 60 (footnote omitted)
158. In that finding, we drew a distinction between, on the one hand, parties and third parties to a
dispute, which have a legal right to participate in panel and Appellate Body proceedings, and, on the
other hand, private individuals and organizations, which are not Members of the WTO, and which,
therefore, do not have a legal right to participate in dispute settlement proceedings. We said there:
We wish to emphasize that in the dispute settlement system of the
WTO, the DSU envisages participation in panel or Appellate Body
proceedings, as a matter of legal right, only by parties and third
parties to a dispute. And, under the DSU, only Members of the
WTO have a legal right to participate as parties or third parties in a
particular dispute. …
Individuals and organizations, which are not Members of the WTO,
have no legal right to make submissions to or to be heard by the
Appellate Body. The Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept or
consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals
or organizations, not Members of the WTO. The Appellate Body has
a legal duty to accept and consider only submissions from WTO
Members which are parties or third parties in a particular dispute. 61
(original emphasis; underlining added; footnotes omitted)

59Article 17.9 of the DSU provides as follows:
Procedures for Appellate Review
9. Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in
consultation with the Chairman of th e DSB and the Director-General, and
communicated to the Members for their information.
61Ibid., paras. 40–41.

159. We explained further in that appeal that participation by private individuals and organizations
is dependent upon our permitting such participation if we find it useful to do so. We observed that:
… we have the legal authority under the DSU to accept and consider
amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we find it pertinent and
useful to do so. In this appeal, we have not found it necessary to take
the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering our
decision. 62
We have followed this same approach in a number of subsequent appeals. 63
160. Peru conceded at the oral hearing that its "position is not exactly supported by the case law of
the Appellate Body". 64 On this, Peru is correct. Accordingly, we believe that the objections of Peru
with regard to the amicus curiae brief submitted by a private individual are unfounded. We find that
we have the authority to accept the brief filed by a private individual, and to consider it. We also find
that the brief submitted by a private individual does not assist us in this appeal.
161. We turn now to the issue of the amicus curiae brief filed by Morocco, which raises a novel
issue, as this is the first time that a WTO Member has submitted such a brief in any WTO dispute
settlement proceeding. The European Communities is of the view that we should not treat amicus
curiae briefs submitted by private individuals differently from amicus curiae briefs submitted by
WTO Members.
 65 Peru objects to our accepting Morocco's brief, arguing that such acceptance would
circumvent the rules in the DSU setting out the conditions under which WTO Members can
participate as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings.
 66 Peru refers specifically to
Articles 10.2 and 17.4 of the DSU, which provide, respectively:

62Appellate Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, supra, footnote 58, para. 42.
63The issue of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted to us by private individuals also arose in
EC – Asbestos, supra, footnote 15; Thailand – H-Beams , supra, footnote 56; and US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 –
Malaysia), supra, footnote 57.
64Peru's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
65European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
66Peru's letter dated 26 July 2002.

Article 10
2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before
a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in this
Understanding as a "third party") shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.
These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute
and shall be reflected in the panel report.
Article 17
4. Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a
panel report. Third parties which have notified the DSB of a
substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10
may make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be
heard by, the Appellate Body.
Peru asserts that, because Morocco did not notify its interest to the DSB in accordance with these
provisions, Morocco cannot be given an opportunity to be heard by us.
162. We do not agree. As we said earlier, we found in US – Lead and Bismuth II that "nothing in
the DSU or the Working Procedures specifically provides that we may accept and consider
submissions or briefs from sources other than the participants and third participants in an appeal."
 67
We also stated in that appeal that "neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures explicitly prohibit
acceptance or consideration of such briefs." 68 In so ruling, we did not distinguish between, on the
one hand, submissions from WTO Members that are not participants or third participants in a
particular appeal, and, on the other hand, submissions from non-WTO Members.
163. It is true that, unlike private individuals or organizations, WTO Members are given an explicit
right, under Articles 10.2 and 17.4 of the DSU, to participate in dispute settlement proceedings as
third parties. Thus, the question arises whether the existence of this explicit right, which is not
accorded to non-Members, justifies treating WTO Members differently from non-WTO Members in
the exercise of our authority to receive amicus curiae briefs. We do not believe that it does.

68Ibid.

164. We have been urged by the parties to this dispute not to treat Members less favourably than
non-Members with regard to participation as amicus curiae. 69 We agree. We have not. And we will
not. As we have already determined that we have the authority to receive an amicus curiae brief
from a private individual or an organization, a fortiori we are entitled to accept such a brief from a
WTO Member, provided there is no prohibition on doing so in the DSU. We find no such prohibition.
165. None of the participants in this appeal has pointed to any provision of the DSU that can be
understood as prohibiting WTO Members from participating in panel or appellate proceedings as an
amicus curiae. Nor has any participant in this appeal demonstrated how such participation would
contravene the DSU. Peru states only that the DSU provides that participation as a third party is
governed by Articles 10.2 and 17.4, and appears to draw from this a negative inference such that
Members may participate pursuant to those rules, or not at all. We have examined Articles 10.2 and
17.4, and we do not share Peru's view. Just because those provisions stipulate when a Member may
participate in a dispute settlement proceeding as a third party or third participant, does not, in our
view, lead inevitably to the conclusion that participation by a Member as an amicus curiae is
prohibited.
166. As we explained in US – Lead and Bismuth II , the DSU gives WTO Members that are
participants and third participants a legal right to participate in appellate proceedings.
 70 I n
particular, WTO Members that are third participants in an appeal have the right to make written and
oral submissions. The corollary is that we have a duty, by virtue of the DSU, to accept and consider

69European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing; Peru's response to questioning at
the oral hearing.
Ecuador and Chile argued that if we were to accept and consider an amicus curiae brief submitted by
a WTO Member that had not followed the procedures for pa rticipation as a third party or third participant, we
would be according such Member greater rights than we would a WTO Member which had followed those
procedures, but had not filed a written submission on appeal as specified in Rule 27(3) of our Working
Procedures. According to Chile and Ecuador, the Member that had not filed a written submission on appeal
would have an opportunity only to participate as a passive observer at the oral hearing, but would not be
permitted to make its views known at that hearing. Chile and Ecuador argue that, by contrast, the Member
which had filed an amicus curiae brief would have greater rights because its views would be before us. We do
not agree. A Member that has participated as a third party at the panel stage has a right to file a written
submission on appeal in accordance with Rule 24, and if it does so we would have a duty to consider it. If such
Member chooses for its own reasons not to file a written submission on appeal, our practice is to permit such
Member to attend the oral hearing. By contrast, a Member which files an amicus curiae brief is not guaranteed
that we will accept or consider the brief, and the Member will not be entitled to attend the oral hearing in any
capacity.
70Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 58, para. 40. This is subject to meeting the requirements in
Rule 27(3) of the Working Procedures, which provides that "[a]ny third participant who has filed a submission
pursuant to Rule 24 may appear to make oral arguments or presentations at the oral hearing." However, we
have on several occasions permitted third parties who have not filed a submission to attend the oral hearing as
passive observers.

these submissions from WTO Members. By contrast, participation as amici in WTO appellate
proceedings is not a legal right, and we have no duty to accept any amicus curiae brief. We may
do so, however, based on our legal authority to regulate our own procedures as stipulated in
Article 17.9 of the DSU. The fact that Morocco, as a sovereign State, has chosen not to exercise its
right to participate in this dispute by availing itself of its third-party rights at the panel stage does not,
in our opinion, undermine our legal authority under the DSU and our Working Procedures to
accept and consider the amicus curiae brief submitted by Morocco.
167. Therefore, we find that we are entitled to accept the amicus curiae brief submitted by
Morocco, and to consider it. We wish to emphasize, however, that, in accepting the brief filed by
Morocco in this appeal, we are not suggesting that each time a Member files such a brief we are
required to accept and consider it. To the contrary, acceptance of any amicus curiae brief is a matter
of discretion, which we must exercise on a case-by-case basis. We recall our statement that:
The procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to
promote … the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade
disputes.
 71
Therefore, we could exercise our discretion to reject an amicus curiae brief if, by accepting it, this
would interfere with the "fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes." This could arise, for
example, if a WTO Member were to seek to submit an amicus curiae brief at a very late stage in the
appellate proceedings, with the result that accepting the brief would impose an undue burden on other
participants.
168. Having concluded that we have the legal authority to accept the amicus curiae brief
submitted by Morocco, we now consider whether Morocco's brief assists us in this appeal.
169. Morocco's amicus curiae brief provides mainly factual information. It refers to the scientific
differences between Sardina pilchardus Walbaum ("Sardina pilchardus ") and Sardinops sagax
sagax ("Sardinops sagax"), and it also provides economic information about the Moroccan fishing
and canning industries. As Article 17.6 of the DSU limits an appeal to issues of law and legal
interpretations developed by the panel, the factual information provided in Morocco's amicus curiae
brief is not pertinent in this appeal. In addition, Morocco has alleged in its amicus curiae brief that
the measure at issue in this appeal is consistent wi th relevant international standards, including those
of the Codex Alimentarius Comm ission (the "Codex Commission"). Morocco does not elaborate on

71Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, supra, footnote 20, para. 166. In that appeal, we were not referring
in the quoted excerpt to the issue of amicus curiae briefs. The issue there related to the exercise of the right of
appeal. We nevertheless believe that our views on how to interpret the Working Procedures are of general
application and are thus pertinent to the amicus curiae issue as it arises in this case.

this allegation, and provides no support for this position. Therefore, this, too, fails to assist us in this
appeal. However, some of the legal arguments put forward by Morocco relate to Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement and to the GATT 1994. Therefore, we will consider whether these arguments are of
assistance when we consider Article 2.1 and the GATT 1994 later in this Report.
170. In sum, with the exception of the arguments relating to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
and the GATT 1994, to which we will return later, we find that Morocco's amicus curiae brief does
not assist us in this appeal.
V. The Characterization of the EC Regulation as a "Technical Regulation"
171. We now turn to whether the Panel erred by finding that the EC Regulation is a "technical
regulation" for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. We recall that we have described the
measure at issue—the EC Regulation—earlier in this Report.
 72
172. The Panel found that:
… the EC Regulation is a technical regulation as it lays down
product characteristics for preserved sardines and makes compliance
with the provisions contained therein mandatory. 73
173. The European Communities does not contest that the EC Regulation is a "technical
regulation" per se. 74 Instead, on appeal, the European Communities reiterates two arguments that the
Panel rejected. First, the European Communities argues that the product coverage of the
EC Regulation is limited to preserved Sardina pilchardus. The European Communities contends that
the EC Regulation does not regulate preserved fish made from Sardinops sagax or from any other
species, and that, accordingly, Sardinops sagax is not an identifiable product under the
EC Regulation.
 75 The European Communities concludes that, in the light of our ruling in European
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbe stos and Asbestos-C ontaining Products ("EC – Asbestos ") 76
that a "technical regulation" must apply to identifiable products, the EC Regulation is not a
"technical regulation" for Sardinops sagax. 77

72Supra, paras. 2–3.
73Panel Report, para. 7.35.
74European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 21 and 23; European Communities' statement
at the oral hearing.
75European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
76Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 15.

174. Second, the European Communities contends that a "naming" rule is distinct from a labelling
requirement. The European Communities argues that, "[t]he requirement to state a certain name on
the label … involves not only a labelling requirement but also a substantive naming rule, which is not
subject to the TBT Agreement."
 78 Thus, according to the European Communities, even if it were
determined that the EC Regulation relates to Sardinops sagax, the "naming" rule set out in Article 2
of the EC Regulation—the provision challenged by Peru—is not a product characteristic. 79 On this
basis, the European Communities argues that Article 2 of the EC Regulation—which the European
Communities contends sets out a "naming" rule and not a labelling requirement—does not meet the
definition of the term "technical regulation" provided in the TBT Agreement.
 80
175. As we explained in EC – Asbestos, whether a measure is a "technical regulation" is a
threshold issue because the outcome of this issue determines whether the TBT Agreement is
applicable. 81 If the measure before us is not a "technica l regulation", then it does not fall within the
scope of the TBT Agreement. 82 The term "technical regulation" is defined in Annex 1.1 to the
TBT Agreement as follows:
1. Technical Regulation
Document which lays down product characteristics or their
related processes and production methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a
product, process or production method.

78European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
79Article 2 of the EC Regulation reads as follows:
Only products meeting the following requirements may be marketed as
preserved sardines and under the trade description referred to in Article 7:
– they must be covered by CN codes 1604 13 10 and ex 1604 20 50;
– they must be prepared exclusively from fish of the species " Sardina
pilchardus Walbaum";
– they must be pre-packaged with any appropriate covering medium in
a hermetically sealed container;
– they must be sterilized by appropriate treatment.
80European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
82The TBT Agreement covers also "standards" and "conformity assessment procedures". However,
none of the participants has alleged that the measure at issue in this dispute is either a "standard" or a
"conformity assessment procedure".

176. We interpreted this definition in EC – Asbestos. 83 In doing so, we set out three criteria that
a document must meet to fall within the definition of "technical regulation" in the TBT Agreement.
First, the document must apply to an identifiable product or group of products. The identifiable
product or group of products need not, however, be expressly identified in the document. Second,
the document must lay down one or more characteristics of the product. These product characteristics
may be intrinsic, or they may be related to the product. They may be prescribed or imposed in either
a positive or a negative form. Third, compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory.
As we stressed in EC – Asbestos, these three criteria are derived from the wording of the definition
in Annex 1.1. At the oral hearing, both participants confirmed that they agree with these criteria for
determining whether a document is a "technical regulation" under the TBT Agreement.
 84
177. The European Communities concedes that th e EC Regulation is a "technical regulation"
per se. 85 All the same, the European Communities argues that the EC Regulation is not a "technical
regulation" for the purposes of this dispute because—in relation to Sardinops sagax —it does not
fulfil two of the criteria that a document must meet to be considered a "technical regulation" under the
TBT Agreement. 86 The European Communities' assertion that the EC Regulation does not regulate
preserved Sardinops sagax relates to the first criterion, which requires that a document apply to
identifiable products. The European Communities' argument distinguishing "naming" from labelling
requirements relates to the second criterion, which requires that a document lay down product
characteristics. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.
178. We begin with the European Communities' contention that the EC Regulation is a "technical
regulation" only for preserved Sardina pilchardus, and that preserved Sardinops sagax is not an
identifiable product under the EC Regulation.

83Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 15, paras. 66–70.
84European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing; Peru's response to questioning at
the oral hearing.
85European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
86Ibid.

179. The Panel rejected this argument because, in the Panel's view, it:
… disregards the notion that a document may prescribe or impose
product characteristics in either a positive or negative form — that is,
by inclusion or by exclusion.
 87 (footnote omitted)
The Panel then concluded that:
… by requiring the use of only the species Sardina pilchardus as
preserved sardines, the EC Regulation in effect lays down product
characteristics in a negative form, that is, by excluding other species,
such as Sardinops sagax, from being "marketed as preserved
sardines and under the trade description referred to in Article 7" of
the EC Regulation. It is for this reason that we do not accept the
European Communities' argument that the EC Regulation is not a
technical regulation for preserved Sardinops sagax . This argument
would be persuasive only if technical regulations were to lay down
product characteristics in a positive form.
 88 (emphasis added)
This excerpt from the Panel Report suggests th at the Panel examined the European Communities'
argument on this issue in the light of the second criterion, which requires that a document lay down
product characteristics. 89 In our view, the European Communities' argument, as presented on appeal,
relates rather to the first criterion: the European Communities is claiming that preserved Sardinops
sagax is not an identifiable product under the EC Regulation. 90
180. In EC – Asbestos, we made the following observations about the requirement that a
document apply to identifiable products:

87Panel Report, para. 7.44.
88Ibid., para. 7.45.
89Before examining this argument, the Panel had concluded that the EC Regulation applies to an
identifiable product because it identifies preserved sardines. (Ibid., para. 7.26)
90European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 43–47.

A "technical regulation" must, of course, be applicable to an
identifiable product, or group of products. Otherwise, enforcement
of the regulation will, in practical terms, be impossible. This
consideration also underlies the formal obligation, in Article 2.9.2 of
the TBT Agreement, for Members to notify other Members, through
the WTO Secretariat, "of the products to be covered " by a proposed
"technical regulation". (emphasis added) Clearly, compliance with
this obligation requires identification of the product coverage of a
technical regulation. However, in contrast to what the Panel
suggested, this does not mean that a "technical regulation" must
apply to " given" products which are actually named, identified or
specified in the regulation. (emphasis added) Although the
TBT Agreement clearly applies to "products" generally, nothing in
the text of that Agreement suggests that those products need be
named or otherwise expressly identified in a "technical regulation".
Moreover, there may be perfectly sound administrative reasons for
formulating a "technical regulation" in a way that does not expressly
identify products by name, but simply makes them identifiable – for
instance, through the "characteristic" that is the subject of
regulation. 91 (original emphasis; footnote omitted)
Thus, a product does not necessarily have to be mentioned explicitly in a document for that product
to be an identifiable product. Identifiable does not mean expressly identified.
181. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in failing to acknowledge that the
EC Regulation uses the term "preserved sardines" to mean—exclusively—preserved Sardina
pilchardus. 92 The European Communities is of the view that preserved Sardina pilchardus and
preserved Sardinops sagax are not like products. The European Communities reasons that preserved
Sardinops sagax can neither be an identified nor an identifiable product under the EC Regulation. 93
182. In our view, the Panel correctly found that the EC Regulation is applicable to an identified
product, and that the identified product is "preserved sardines". This is abundantly clear from a plain
reading of the EC Regulation itself. The EC Regulation is entitled "Council Regulation (EEC)
2136/89 of 21 June 1989 Laying Down Common Marketing Standards for Preserved Sardines ".
(emphasis added) Article 1, which sets forth the scope of the EC Regulation, states that "[t]his
Regulation defines the standards governing the marketing of preserved sardines in the Community."
(emphasis added) Article 2 states that "[o]nly products meeting the following requirements may be
marketed as preserved sardines". (emphasis added)

93Ibid., para. 49.

183. This alone, however, does not dispose of the European Communities' argument, as the
European Communities reproaches the Panel for failing to acknowledge that the EC Regulation
uses the term "preserved sardines" to mean—exclusively—preserved Sardina pilchardus . We
observe that the EC Regulation does not expressly identify Sardinops sagax. However, this does not
necessarily mean that Sardinops sagax is not an identifiable p r o d u c t . A s w e s t a t e d i n
EC – Asbestos, a product need not be expressly identified in the document for it to be identifiable.
 94
184. Even if we were to accept, for the sake of argument, the European Communities' contention
that the term "preserved sardines" in the EC Regulation refers exclusively to preserved Sardina
pilchardus, the EC Regulation would still be applicable to a range of identifiable products beyond
Sardina pilchardus. This is because preserved products made, for example, of Sardinops sagax are,
by virtue of the EC Regulation, prohibited from being identified and marketed under an appellation
including the term "sardines".
185. As we explained in EC – Asbestos, the requirement that a "technical regulation" be
applicable to identifiable products relates to aspects of compliance and enforcement, because it
would be impossible to comply with or enforce a "technical regulation" without knowing to what the
regulation applied. 95 As the Panel record shows, the EC Regulation has been enforced against
preserved fish products imported into Germany containing Sardinops sagax. 96 This confirms that the
EC Regulation is applicable to preserved Sardinops sagax , and demonstrates that preserved
Sardinops sagax is an identifiable product for purposes of the EC Regulation. Indeed, the European
Communities admits that the EC Regulation is applicable to Sardinops sagax, when it states in its
appellant's submission that "[t]he only legal consequence of the [EC] Regulation for preserved
Sardinops sagax is that they may not be called 'preserved sardines'." 97
186. Therefore, we reject the contention of the European Communities that preserved Sardinops
sagax is not an identifiable product under the EC Regulation.
187. Next, we examine whether the EC Regulation meets the second criterion of a "technical
regulation", which is that it must be a document th at lays down product characteristics. According to
the European Communities, Article 2 of the EC Regulation does not lay down product characteristics;

94Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, supra, footnote 15, para. 70.
95Ibid.
96Letter from German importer submitted as Exhibit PERU-13 by Peru to the Panel. Reference to this
is also found in Peru's first submission to the Panel, paras. 5–7; Peru's second submission to the Panel, para. 12;
Peru's appellee's submission, para. 60; and Peru's response to questioning at the oral hearing.

rather, it sets out a "naming" rule. The European Communities argues that, although the definition of
"technical regulation" in the TBT Agreement covers labelling requirements, it does not extend to
"naming" rules. Therefore, the European Communities asserts that Article 2 of the EC Regulation is
not a "technical regulation".
 98
188. The Panel rejected this assertion for two reasons. First, the Panel stated:
… even if it were determined that the EC Regulation does not
contain a labelling requirement, it cannot detract from our conclusion
that the EC Regulation constitutes a technical regulation because that
conclusion is based on our finding that it lays down certain product
characteristics we have already identified. A finding to the effect that
the EC Regulation does not contain a related product characteristic in
the form of a labelling requirement does not negate the existence of
other product characteristics set out in the EC Regulation.
 99
The Panel continued:
Second, we fail to see the basis on which a distinction can be drawn
between a requirement to "name" and a requirement to "label" a
product for the purposes of the TBT Agreement. … Based on the
ordinary meaning, we consider that labelling and naming
requirements are essentially "means of identification" of a product
and as such, they come within the scope of the definition of
"technical regulation".
In any event, the distinction which we have been asked to draw
between "naming" and "labelling" requirements is not supported by
the text and structure of the EC Regulation.
 100 (footnotes omitted)
189. In EC – Asbestos, we examined what it means to lay down product characteristics, and
concluded that:

98European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
99Panel Report, para. 7.39.
100Ibid., paras. 7.40–7.41.

The heart of the definition of a "technical regulation" is that a
"document" must "lay down" – that is, set forth, stipulate or provide
– "product characteristics". The word "characteristic" has a number
of synonyms that are helpful in understanding the ordinary meaning
of that word, in this context. Thus, the "characteristics" of a product
include, in our view, any objectively definable "features", "qualities",
"attributes", or other "distinguishing mark" of a product. Such
"characteristics" might relate, inter alia, to a product's composition,
size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability,
conductivity, density, or viscosity. In the definition of a "technical
regulation" in Annex 1.1, the TBT Agreement itself gives certain
examples of "product characteristics" – "terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements". These examples
indicate that "product characteristics" include, not only features and
qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related
"characteristics", such as the means of identification, the presentation
and the appearance of a product. In addition, according to the
definition in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, a "technical
regulation" may set forth the "applicable administrative provisions"
for products which have certain "characteristics". Further, we note
that the definition of a "technical regulation" provides that such a
regulation "may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements". (emphasis
added) The use here of the word "exclusively" and the disjunctive
word "or" indicates that a "technical regulation" may be confined to
laying down only one or a few "product characteristics". 101 (original
emphasis; underlining added)
Accordingly, product characteristics include not only "features and qualities intrinsic to the product",
but also those that are related to it, such as "means of identification".
190. We do not find it necessary, in this case, to decide whether the definition of "technical
regulation" in the TBT Agreement makes a distinction between "naming" and labelling. This
question is irrelevant to the issue before us. As we stated earlier, the EC Regulation expressly
identifies a product, namely "preserved sardines". Further, Article 2 of the EC Regulation provides
that, to be marketed as "preserved sardines", prod ucts must be prepared exclusively from fish of the
species Sardina pilchardus. We are of the view that this requirement—to be prepared exclusively
from fish of the species Sardina pilchardus —is a product characteristic "intrinsic to" preserved
sardines that is laid down by the EC Regulation.
 102 Thus, we agree with the Panel's finding in this
regard that:

102We observe that Article 2 of the EC Regulation lays down another intrinsic product characteristic in
requiring that only products "sterilized by appropriate treatment" may be marketed as preserved sardines.

… one product characteristic required by Article 2 of the
EC Regulation is that preserved sardines must be prepared
exclusively from fish of the species Sardina pilchardus . This
product characteristic must be met for the product to be "marketed as
preserved sardines and under the trade description referred to in
Article 7" of the EC Regulation. We consider that the requirement to
use exclusively Sardina pilchardus is a product characteristic as it
objectively defines features and qualities of preserved sardines for
the purposes of their "market[ing] as preserved sardines and under
the trade description referred to in Article 7" of the EC Regulation.
 103
191. In any event, as we said in EC – Asbestos, a "means of identification" is a product
characteristic. 104 A name clearly identifies a product; indeed, the European Communities concedes
that a name is a "means of identification". 105 As the following excerpt from the Panel Report
illustrates, the European Communities itself underscored the important role that a "name" plays as a
"means of identification" when it argued before the Panel that one of the objectives pursued by the
European Communities through the EC Regulation is to provide precise information to avoid
misleading the consumer:
The European Communities argues that the provisions of its
Regulation laying down minimum quality standards, harmonizing the
ways in which the product may be presented and regulating the
indications to be contained on the label, all serve to facilitate
comparisons between competing products. It further submits that
some of these objectives are pursued by the Regulation at issue in
conjunction with EC Directive 2000/13. The European Communities
argues that this is particularly true of the name; accurate and
precise names allow products to be compared with their true
equivalents rather than with su bstitutes and imitations whereas
inaccurate and imprecise names reduce transparency, cause
confusion, mislead the consumer, allow products to benefit from the
reputation of other different products, give rise to unfair competition
and reduce the quality and variety of products available in trade and
ultimately for the consumer.
 106 (emphasis added)

103Panel Report, para. 7.27.
105European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing. The European Communities
argues that the distinction between a labelling requirement and a "naming" rule is similar to the difference
between, on the one hand, requirements relating to markings indicating the origin of a product, and, on the other
hand, rules used to determine the origin of a product. We are not persuaded by this analogy. A "naming" rule
bears no similarity to a rule of origin. A name is a clear means of identifying a product. Furthermore, as the
facts of this case illustrate, affixing a name to the labe l of a product is a highly practical way of identifying a
product when goods are marketed. Indeed, Codex Stan 94 includes the provisions relating to the name of the
product—that is, section 6.1—within the section dealing with labelling generally.
106Panel Report, para. 4.71.

192. Before concluding on this second criterion and proceeding to the third criterion in the
definition of "technical regulation", we observe that, although the European Communities argued
before the Panel that Article 2 of the EC Regulation could not be analyzed in isolation, on appeal, the
European Communities asks us to focus our attention exclusively on whether Article 2, taken by
itself, lays down product characteristics.
 107 As the Panel correctly points out, in EC – Asbestos, we
stated that "the proper legal character of the measure at issue cannot be determined unless the measure
is examined as a whole".
 108 With this in mind, we observe that the Panel analyzed other articles of
the EC Regulation and found that that those, too, lay down product characteristics. 109
193. For all these reasons, we agree with the Panel's conclusion that the EC Regulation lays down
product characteristics.
194. The third and final criterion that a document must fulfil to meet the definition of "technical
regulation" in the TBT Agreement is that compliance must be mandatory. The European
Communities does not contest that compliance with the EC Regulation is mandatory. 110 We also find
that it is mandatory. 111
195. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.35 of the Panel Report, that the
EC Regulation is a "technical regulation" for purposes of the TBT Agreement, because it meets the
three criteria we set out in EC – Asbestos as necessary to satisfy the definition of a "technical
regulation" under the TBT Agreement.
VI. The Temporal Scope of Application of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
196. We turn now to the European Communitie s' claim that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
does not apply to pre-existing technical regulations because it deals only with the preparation and
adoption of technical regulations and not with their continued application. On this issue, we begin by
recalling that the EC Regulation and Codex Stan 94 came into effect before the entry into force of the
TBT Agreement on 1 January 1995.

107Panel Report, para. 7.31.
109The Panel referred to Articles 3–7 of the EC Regulation. (Panel Report, para. 7.28)
110European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
111Article 9 of the EC Regulation states in relevant part that "[t]his Regulation shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."

197. The Panel found that:
…the EC Regulation is a "situation or measure that did not cease to
exist" and the TBT Agreement does not reveal a contrary intention to
limit the temporal application of the TBT Agreement to measures
adopted after 1 January 1995.
Therefore, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to measures that
were adopted before 1 January 1995 but which have not ceased to
exist.
 112
198. The Panel also rejected "the European Comm unities' argument that Article 2.4 [of the
TBT Agreement ] does not apply to existing technical regulations." 113
199. The European Communities appeals this findin g. The European Communities "does not
argue that the TBT Agreement does not apply to technical regulations enacted before 1995". 114
Instead, the European Communities contends that Article 2.4 of that Agreement does not impose an
ongoing obligation on Members to reassess their existing technical regulations in the light of the
adoption of new international standards, or the revision of existing ones.
 115
200. We recall that Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the " Vienna
Convention") 116 provides that treaties generally do not apply retroactively. Article 28 provides:
Non-retroactivity of treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act
or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.
(emphasis added)
As we have said in previous disputes
 117, the interpretation principle codified in Article 28 is relevant
to the interpretation of the covered agreements.

112Panel Report, paras. 7.59–7.60.
113Ibid., para. 7.83. The Panel addressed this argument in the context of its analysis of whether
Codex Stan 94 is a relevant international standard.
114European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
115Ibid.
116Supra, footnote 16.
117Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted
20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, 167, at 179–180; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection ,
WT/DS170/AB/R, adopted 12 October 2000, paras. 71–72; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , supra,
footnote 17, para. 128.

201. In the European Communities' view, both the text and the context of Article 2.4 make plain
that the scope of application of Article 2.4 is limited to the preparation and adoption of technical
regulations, and not to their maintenance. 118 The European Communities does not contest that the
EC Regulation—which is currently in force—is an act that has not "ceased to exist". However,
according to the European Communities, the preparation and adoption of the EC Regulation are
both "acts that ceased to exist"—in the sense that they were completed—before the date of the entry
into force of the TBT Agreement. Therefore, the European Communities contends that, consistent
with Article 28 of the Vienna Convention
 119, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is not applicable to
the EC Regulation. 120
202. The text of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides as follows:
TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
Article 2
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by
Central Government Bodies
With respect to their central government bodies:
…
2.4 Where technical regulations are required and relevant
international standards exist or their completion is imminent,
Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for
their technical regulations except when such international standards
or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance
because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or
fundamental technological problems.
203. According to the European Communities, it is ev ident from the text of Article 2.4 that the
temporal scope of the provision is limited to the two stages of preparation and adoption of
technical regulations, and that the continued existence thereafter of these regulations is not governed
by that provision. The European Communities finds support for this contention in what the European
Communities sees as the time-limited nature of the terms "where technical regulations are required",

118European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 66–83.
119Supra, footnote 16.
120European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 63; European Communities' response to
questioning at the oral hearing.

"exist", "imminent", "use", and "as a basis for" in the text of Article 2.4, and also in the absence in the
text of that provision of the words "maintain" or "apply". 121
204. The Panel took a contrary view, and concluded that a textual reading does not support the
European Communities' assertion because:
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement starts with the language "where
technical regulations are required". We construe this expression to
cover technical regulations that are already in existence as it is
entirely possible that a technical regulation that is already in
existence can continue to be required. … Moreover, we note that the
first part of the sentence of Article 2.4 is in the present tense ("exist")
and not in the past tense — "[w]here technical regulations are
required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent
 ", Members are obliged to use such
international standards as a basis. This supports the view that
Members have to use relevant international standards that currently
exist or whose completion is imminent with respect to the technical
regulations that are already in existence. We do not consider that the
word "imminent", the ordinary meaning of which is "likely to happen
without delay", is intended to limit the scope of the coverage of
technical regulations to those that have yet to be adopted. Rather, the
use of the word "imminent" means that Members cannot disregard a
relevant international standard whose completion is imminent with
respect to their existing technical regulations.
 122 (original emphasis;
footnote omitted)
205. We concur with the Panel's view that the text of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement does not
support the European Communities' contention. We fail to see how the terms "where technical
regulations are required", "exist", "imminent", "u se", and "as a basis for" give any indication that
Article 2.4 applies only to the two stages of preparation and adoption of technical regulations. To
the contrary, as the Panel noted, the use of the present tense suggests a continuing obligation for
existing measures, and not one limited to regulations prepared and adopted after the TBT Agreement
entered into force. The European Communities read s Article 2.4 as if it said "where technical
regulations are in preparation or are to be adopted", which is clearly not the case. The obligation
refers to technical regulations generally and without limitations.
206. The European Communities' claim is also at odds with our reasoning in EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) ("EC – Hormones
 ") 123, which, as the Panel correctly

121European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 66–67; European Communities' response to
questioning at the oral hearing.
122Panel Report, para. 7.74.
123Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 17.

pointed out, is relevant to the issue before us. In EC – Hormones, we addressed the temporal scope
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS Agreement "),
and stated:
We agree with the Panel that the SPS Agreement would apply to
situations or measures that did not cease to exist, such as the 1981
and 1988 Directives, unless the SPS Agreement reveals a contrary
intention. We also agree with the Panel that the SPS Agreement does
not reveal such an intention. The SPS Agreement does not contain
any provision limiting the temporal application of the
SPS Agreement, or of any provision thereof, to SPS measures
adopted after 1 January 1995. In the absence of such a provision, it
cannot be assumed that central provisions of the SPS Agreement,
such as Articles 5.1 and 5.5, do not apply to measures which were
enacted before 1995 but which continue to be in force thereafter . If
the negotiators had wanted to exempt the very large group of SPS
measures in existence on 1 January 1995 from the disciplines of
provisions as important as Articles 5.1 and 5.5, it appears reasonable
to us to expect that they would have said so explicitly.
 124 (emphasis
added; footnote omitted)
207. Like the sanitary measure in EC – Hormones, the EC Regulation is currently in force. The
European Communities has conceded that the EC Regulation is an act or fact that has not "ceased to
exist". 125 Accordingly, following our reasoning in EC – Hormones, Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement applies to existing measures unless that provision "reveals a contrary intention". 126
As we have said, we see nothing in Article 2.4 wh ich would suggest that the provision does not apply
to existing measures.
208. Furthermore, like Articles 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, Article 2.4 is a "central
provision" of the TBT Agreement, and it cannot just be assumed that such a central provision does
not apply to existing measures. Again, following our reasoning in EC – Hormones, we must
conclude that, if the negotiators had wanted to exempt the very large group of existing technical
regulations from the disciplines of a provision as important as Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement,
they would have said so explicitly. 127 No such explicit exemption is found in the terms "where
technical regulations are required", "exist", "imminent", "use", or "as a basis for".

125European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
127Ibid.

209. The European Communities' argument that our ruling in EC – Hormones is not relevant to
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is not persuasive. The European Communities contends that we
based our ruling in EC – Hormones on the wording of Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, and 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement, and that all these provisions include the word "maintain". 128 The European
Communities argues that the word "maintain" implie s that a provision applies to measures already
prepared and adopted. The European Communities then notes that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
does not include the word "maintain". 129 It is true that, in EC – Hormones, we referred to
Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. But we did so as relevant context. 130 O u r
analysis there focused on the meaning of Articles 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, which, like
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, do not include the word "maintain". 131 As we have explained,
we found in that appeal that Articles 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement apply to existing measures,
despite the absence of the word "maintain". Thus , this argument by the European Communities fails
on its own logic.
210. Having considered the European Communities' arguments based on the text of Article 2.4, we
turn to examine the arguments of the European Communities that are based on the context of that
provision. The European Communities argues that Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement demonstrates
that, when a provision is intended to cover the application of technical regulations, the provision
says so explicitly. The European Communities finds similar contextual support in Article 12.4 of the
TBT Agreement, which uses the word "adopt", and in paragraph F of the Code of Good Practice for
the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, included as Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement,
which uses the word "develops".
 132
211. In discussing what it considered the relevant context of Article 2.4, the Panel looked first to
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement:

128European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 62–63; European Communities' response to
questioning at the oral hearing. We note that although the European Communities refered to Article 2.3, this
provision does not include the word "maintain".
129Ibid.; European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
131Ibid.
132European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 75–78; European Communities' statement at
the oral hearing. We note that, although the European Communities refered, in its statement at the oral hearing,
to paragraph B of the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards as
including the word "develops", this word is found in paragraph F.

There is contextual support for the interpretation that Article 2.4
applies to technical regulations that are already in existence. The
context provided by Article 2.5, which explicitly refers to Article 2.4,
speaks of "preparing, adopting or applying" a technical regulation
and is not limited to, as the European Communities claims, to
preparing and adopting. A technical regulation can only be applied if
it is already in existence. The first sentence imposes an obligation on
a Member "preparing, adopting or applying" a technical regulation
that may have a significant effect on trade of other Members to
provide the justification for that technical regulation. The second
sentence of Article 2.5 states that whenever a technical regulation is
"prepared, adopted or applied" for one of the legitimate objectives
explicitly set out in Article 2.2 and is in accordance with relevant
international standards, it is to be rebuttably presumed not to create
an unnecessary obstacle to trade. The use of the term "apply", in our
view, confirms that the requirement contained in Article 2.4 is
applicable to existing technical regulations.
 133 (original emphasis)
The Panel also looked to Article 2.6 of the TBT Agreement:
Article 2.6 provides another contextual support. It states that
Members are to participate in preparing international standards by the
international standardizing bodies for products which they have
either " adopted, or expect to adopt technical regulations." Those
Members that have in place a technical regulation for a certain
product are expected to participate in the development of a relevant
international standard. Article 2.6 would be redundant and it would
be contrary to the principle of effectiveness, which is a corollary of
the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention, if a
Member is to participate in the development of a relevant
international standard and then claim that such standard need not be
used as a basis for its technical regulation on the ground that it was
already in existence before the standard was adopted. Such
reasoning would allow Members to avoid using international
standards as a basis for their technical regulations simply by enacting
preemptive measures and thereby undermine the object and purpose
of developing international standards.
 134 (original emphasis)
212. We agree with the Panel's analysis. Thus, we find no support for the European Communities'
claim in the context of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. Rather than supporting the European
Communities' argument, Articles 2.5 and 2.6 of the TBT Agreement provide support for the
argument advanced by Peru that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement regulates measures adopted
before the date of the entry into force of the TBT Agreement. We note also that there is additional
contextual support in the title of Article 2, which reads "Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Technical Regulations by Central Government Bodies". (emphasis added) This express reference to

133Panel Report, para. 7.75.
134Ibid., para. 7.76.

the application of technical regulations in the title of Article 2 runs counter to an interpretation of
Article 2.4 that would limit its scope to the preparation and adoption of technical regulations.
213. Moreover, as general context for all the covered agreements, Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is of great significance. Article XVI:4 reads:
Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements.
This provision establishes a clear obligation for all WTO Members to ensure the conformity of their
existing laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with the obligations in the covered
agreements.
214. In our view, the European Communities' reading of Article 2.4 also flies in the face of the
object and purpose of the TBT Agreement. In several of its provisions, the TBT Agreement
recognizes the important role that international standards play in promoting harmonization and
facilitating trade. For example, Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement establishes a rebuttable
presumption that technical regulations that are in accordance with relevant international standards do
not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Article 2.6, for its part, encourages Members to participate
in international standardizing bodies with a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a
basis as possible.
215. The significant role of international standards is also underscored in the Preamble to the
TBT Agreement. The third recital of the Preamble recognizes the important contribution that
international standards can make by improving the efficiency of production and facilitating the
conduct of international trade. The eighth recital recognizes the role that international standardization
can have in the transfer of technology to developing countries. In our view, excluding existing
technical regulations from the obligations set out in Article 2.4 would undermine the important role of
international standards in furthering these objectives of the TBT Agreement. Indeed, it would go
precisely in the opposite direction.
216. For all these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.60 of the Panel Report,
that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to measures that were adopted before 1 January 1995
but which have not ceased to exist, such as the EC Regulation. We also uphold the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.83 of the Panel Report, that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to existing
technical regulations, including the EC Regulation.

VII. The Characterization of Codex Stan 94 as a "Relevant International Standard"
217. We proceed to the European Communities' claim that the Panel erred in finding that
Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant international standard" within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.
218. The Panel found that "Codex Stan 94 is a relevant international standard".
 135 The European
Communities challenges this finding for two reasons. The European Communities asserts, first, that
only standards adopted by international bodies by consensus are "relevant international standards"
under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
 136 The European Communities argues that the Panel
assumed "that Codex Stan 94 … was adopted by consensus … without undertaking positive steps to
verify the accuracy of the conflicting statemen ts made in this respect by the parties".
 137 Second, the
European Communities asserts that, even if Codex Stan 94 were considered an international standard,
it is not a " relevant international standard" because its product coverage is different from that of the
EC Regulation. The European Communities contends that the EC Regulation covers only preserved
sardines, while Codex Stan 94 covers that product as well as "sardine-type" products.
 138 W e w i l l
address each of these arguments in turn.
A. The European Communities' Argument that Consensus is Required
219. The European Communities argues that only standards that have been adopted by an
international body by consensus can be relevant for purposes of Article 2.4. The European
Communities contends that the Panel did not verify that Codex Stan 94 was not adopted by consensus,
and that, therefore, it cannot be a "relevant international standard".
 139

135Panel Report, para. 7.70.
137Ibid., para. 134.
138This argument is based on the European Communities' interpretation of Codex Stan 94, which differs
from that of the Panel. The European Communities explains that when Codex Stan 94 was in draft form, and
particularly when it was at Step 7 of the elaboration procedures of the Codex Commission, it provided three
naming options: (i) "Sardines" (to be reserved exclusively for Sardina pilchardus); (ii) "X Sardines", where
"X" is the name of a country, a geographic area, or the species; and (iii) the common name of the species. The
European Communities claims that the first two options—"Sardines" and "X Sardines"—apply to sardine
products, while the third option—the common name of the species—was envisaged as a separate option for
"sardine-type products". Given that only editorial changes are a llowed between Steps 7 and 8 of the elaboration
procedures, when the second and third options were merged, the European Communities alleges that the draft
standard at Step 7 should guide the interpretation of Codex Stan 94, even though the text approved at Step 8
includes the common name of the species in the same subsection as "X Sardines". (European Communities'
appellant's submission, paras. 135–148; European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing)
The Panel's interpretation of Codex Stan 94 focuses on its final version. The Panel is of the view that the
"common name of the species" is part of the "X Sardines" option. (See infra, paras. 235–239)
139European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

220. However, in our view, the European Communities' contention is essentially related to whether
Codex Stan 94 meets the definition of a "standard" in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement. The term
"standard", is defined in Annex 1.2 as follows:
2. Standard
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for
products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.
Explanatory note
The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products,
processes and services. This Agreement deals only with technical
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures related
to products or processes and production methods. Standards as
defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the
purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and
technical regulations as mandatory documents. Standards prepared
by the international standardization community are based on
consensus. This Agreement covers also documents that are not based
on consensus. (emphasis added)
221. The European Communities does not contest that the Codex Commission is an international
standardization body, and that it is a "recognized body" for purposes of the definition of a "standard"
in Annex 1.2.
 140 The issue before us, rather, is one of approval. The definition of a "standard" refers
to documents approved by a recognized body. Whether approval takes place by consensus, or by
other methods, is not addressed in the definition, but it is addressed in the last two sentences of the
Explanatory note.

140European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

222. The Panel interpreted the last two sentences of the Explanatory note as follows:
The first sentence reiterates the norm of the international
standardization community that standards are prepared on the basis
of consensus. The following sentence, however, acknowledges that
consensus may not always be achieved and that international
standards that were not adopted by consensus are within the scope of
the TBT Agreement.
86 This provision therefore confirms that even if
not adopted by consensus, an international standard can constitute a
relevant international standard.
86 The record does not demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 was not
adopted by consensus. In any event, we consider that this issue would have
no bearing on our determination in light of the explanatory note of
paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement which states that the
TBT Agreement covers "documents that are not based on consensus". 141
We agree with the Panel's interpretation. In our view, the text of the Explanatory note supports the
conclusion that consensus is not required for standards adopted by the international standardizing
community. The last sentence of the Explanatory note refers to "documents". The term "document"
is also used in the singular in the first sentence of the definition of a "standard". We believe that
"document(s)" must be interpreted as having the same meaning in both the definition and the
Explanatory note. The European Communities agrees.
 142 Interpreted in this way, the term
"documents" in the last sentence of the Explanatory note must refer to standards in general, and not
only to those adopted by entities other than international bodies, as the European Communities
claims.
223. Moreover, the text of the last sentence of the Explanatory note, referring to documents not
based on consensus, gives no indication whatsoever that it is departing from the subject of the
immediately preceding sentence, which deals with standards adopted by international bodies. Indeed,
the use of the word "also" in the last sentence suggests that the same subject is being addressed—
namely standards prepared by the international standardization community. Hence, the logical
assumption is that the last phrase is simply continuing in the same vein, and refers to standards
adopted by international bodies, including those not adopted by consensus.

142European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing. The United States agreed.
(United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing)

224. The Panel's interpretation, moreover, gives effect to the chapeau of Annex 1 to the
TBT Agreement, which provides:
The terms presented in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC
Guide 2:1991, General Terms and Their Definitions Concerning
Standardization and Related Activities, shall, when used in this
Agreement, have the same meaning as given in the definitions in the
said Guide …
For the purpose of this Agreement, however, the following
definitions shall apply … (emphasis added)
Thus, according to the chapeau, the terms define d in Annex 1 apply for the purposes of the
TBT Agreement only if their definitions depart from those in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 (the
"ISO/IEC Guide").
 143 This is underscored by the word "however". The definition of a "standard" in
Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement departs from that provided in the ISO/IEC Guide precisely in respect
of whether consensus is expressly required.
225. The term "standard" is defined in the ISO/IEC Guide as follows:
Document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines
or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. 144
(original emphasis)
Thus, the definition of a "standard" in the ISO/IEC Guide expressly includes a consensus requirement.
Therefore, the logical conclusion, in our view, is that the omission of a consensus requirement in the
definition of a "standard" in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement was a deliberate choice on the part of
the drafters of the TBT Agreement, and that the last two phrases of the Explanatory note were
included to give effect to this choice. Had the negotiators considered consensus to be necessary to
satisfy the definition of "standard", we believe they would have said so explicitly in the definition
itself, as is the case in the ISO/IEC Guide. Indeed, there would, in our view, have been no point in the
negotiators adding the last sentence of the Explanatory note.

143ISO/IEC Guide (6 th edition, 1991), submitted as Exhibit EC-1 to the European Communities'
appellant's submission.
144Ibid., subclause 3.2.

226. Furthermore, we observe that the Panel found that, in any event, the European Communities
did not prove that Codex Stan 94 was not adopted by consensus. Instead, the Panel found that,
"[t]he record does not demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 was not adopted by consensus". 145
227. Therefore, we uphold the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 7.90 of the Panel Report, that the
definition of a "standard" in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement does not require approval by
consensus for standards adopted by a "recognized body" of the international standardization
community. We emphasize, however, that this conclusion is relevant only for purposes of the
TBT Agreement. It is not intended to affect, in any way, the internal requirements that international
standard-setting bodies may establish for themselves for the adoption of standards within their
respective operations. In other words, the fact that we find that the TBT Agreement does not require
approval by consensus for standards adopted by the international standardization community should
not be interpreted to mean that we believe an international standardization body should not require
consensus for the adoption of its standards. That is not for us to decide.
B. The European Communities' Argument on the Product Coverage of Codex Stan 94
228. We turn now to examine the European Communities' argument that Codex Stan 94 is not a
"relevant international standard" because its product coverage is different from that of the
EC Regulation.
229. In analyzing the merits of this argument, the Panel first noted that the ordinary meaning of the
term "relevant" is "bearing upon or relating to the matter in hand; pertinent".
 146 The Panel reasoned
that, to be a "relevant international standard", Codex Stan 94 would have to bear upon, relate to, or be
pertinent to the EC Regulation.
 147 The Panel then conducted the following analysis:

145Panel Report, footnote 86 to para. 7.90. The report of the meeting of the Codex Commission where
Codex Stan 94 was adopted, which Peru submitted to the Panel, makes no mention of votes being cast before its
approval. (Report of the Twelfth Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (ALINORM
78/41), submitted as Exhibit Peru-14 by Peru to the Panel) We note that, at the oral hearing, the European
Communities and Peru agreed that the Panel's conc lusion that the record does not demonstrate that
Codex Stan 94 was not adopted by consensus is a factual finding, which is beyond the purview of appellate
review.
146Panel Report, para. 7.68, quoting Webster's New World Dictionary (William Collins & World
Publishing Co., Inc. 1976), p. 1199.
147Ibid.

The title of Codex Stan 94 is "Codex Standard for Canned Sardines
and Sardine-type Products" and the EC Regulation lays down
common marketing standards for preserved sardines. The European
Communities indicated in its response that the term "canned
sardines" and "preserved sardines" are essentially identical.
Therefore, it is apparent that both the EC Regulation and
Codex Stan 94 deal with the same product, namely preserved
sardines. The scope of Codex Stan 94 covers various species of fish,
including Sardina pilchardus which the EC Regulation covers, and
includes, inter alia, provisions on presentation (Article 2.3), packing
medium (Article 3.2), labelling, including a requirement that the
packing medium is to form part of the name of the food (Article 6),
determination of net weight (Article 7.3), foreign matter (Article 8.1)
and odour and flavour (Article 8.2). The EC Regulation contains
these corresponding provisions set out in Codex Stan 94, including
the section on labelling requirement.
 148 (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
230. We do not disagree with the Panel's interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the term
"relevant". Nor does the European Communities. 149 Instead, the European Communities argues that,
although the EC Regulation deals only with preserved sardines—understood to mean exclusively
preserved Sardina pilchardus—Codex Stan 94 also covers other preserved fish that are "sardine-
type". 150
231. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, even if we accepted that the EC Regulation
relates only to preserved Sardina pilchardus, which we do not, the fact remains that section 6.1.1(i)
of Codex Stan 94 also relates to preserved Sardina pilchardus. Therefore, Codex Stan 94 can be said
to bear upon, relate to, or be pertinent to the EC Regulation because both refer to preserved Sardina
pilchardus.
232. Second, we have already concluded that, although the EC Regulation expressly mentions only
Sardina pilchardus, it has legal consequences for other fish species that could be sold as preserved
sardines, including preserved Sardinops sagax. 151 Codex Stan 94 covers 20 fish species in addition
to Sardina pilchardus . 152 These other species also are legally affected by the exclusion in the
EC Regulation. Therefore, we conclude that Codex Stan 94 bears upon, relates to, or is pertinent to
the EC Regulation.

148Panel Report, para. 7.69.
149European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
150Ibid.
151See supra, paras. 184–185.
152The fish species covered by Codex Stan 94 are listed in section 2.1.1 thereto. ( Supra, footnote 4)
See also, supra, para. 5.

233. For all these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.70 of the Panel Report,
that Codex Stan 94 is a "relevant international standard" for purposes of Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.
VIII. Whether Codex Stan 94 Was Used "As a Basis For" the EC Regulation
234. We turn now to whether Codex Stan 94 has been used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation. It
will be recalled that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to use relevant international
standards "as a basis for" their technical regulations under certain circumstances. The Panel found
that "the relevant international standard, i.e., Codex Stan 94, was not used as a basis for the
EC Regulation".
 153 The European Communities appeals this finding.
235. The starting point of the Panel's analysis was the interpretation of section 6.1.1(ii) of
Codex Stan 94, which reads as follows:
The name of the product shall be:
…
(ii) "X sardines" of a country, a geographic area, the
species, or the common name of the species in accordance with the
law and custom of the country in which the product is sold, and in a
manner not to mislead the consumer.
236. Two interpretations of section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 were submitted to the Panel. The
European Communities argued that the phrase "th e common name of the species in accordance with
the law and custom of the country in which the product is sold", found in section 6.1.1(ii) of
Codex Stan 94, is intended as a self-standing option for "naming", independent of the formula
"X sardines", and that, under this section, "each country has the option of choosing between
'X sardines' and the common name of the species".
 154
237. For its part, Peru contended that, under section 6.1.1(ii), the species other than Sardina
pilchardus to which Codex Stan 94 refers may be marketed as "X sardines" where "X" is one of the
four following alternatives: (1) a country; (2) a geographic area; (3) the species; or (4) the common
name of the species. 155 Thus, in Peru's view, "the common name of the species" is not a stand-alone
option for naming, but rather is one of the qualifiers for naming sardines that are not Sardina

153Panel Report, para. 7.112.
154Ibid., para. 7.101. See also, supra, footnote 138, explaining why the European Communities
interprets this as a stand-alone option.
155Panel Report, para. 4.43.

pilchardus. Further, Peru argued that prohibiting the marketing in the European Communities of
Sardinops sagax imported from Peru as, for example, "Peruvian sardines" would run counter to the
first of the four options in section 6.1.1(ii).
238. The Panel was of the view that a textual reading of section 6.1.1(ii) favoured the
interpretation advocated by Peru, adding that:
We consider that paragraph 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 contains four
alternatives and each alternative envisages the use of the term
"sardines" combined with the name of a country, name of a
geographic area, name of the species or the common name of the
species in accordance with the law and custom of the country in
which the product is sold. 156
239. We agree with Peru and with the Panel that section 6.1.1(ii) permits the marketing of non-
Sardina pilchardus as "sardines" with one of four qualifiers. The French version of section 6.1.1(ii)
supports this approach. It provides:
l'espèce ou le nom commun de l'espèce en conformité des lois et
consommateur en erreur.
The French language is one official language of the Codex Commission. The French and English
versions are equally authentic. The French version is drafted in a manner that puts all four qualifiers
on an equal footing. In the French version, there is no comma after the word "espèce". The use of the
term "
 'X' désignant" to introduce the enumeration in section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 makes clear
that the common name of the species is one of the qualifiers that may be attached to the term
"sardines" when marketing preserved sardines. 157
240. With this understanding of this international standard in mind, we turn to the requirement that
relevant international standards must be used "as a basis for" technical regulations. We note that the
Panel interpreted the word "basis" to mean "the principal constituent of anything, the fundamental
principle or theory, as of a system of knowledge".
 158 In applying this interpretation of "basis" to the
measure in this dispute, the Panel contrasted its interpretation of section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 as
setting forth "four alternatives for labelling species other than Sardina pilchardus" that all "require

156Panel Report, para. 7.103.
157Our interpretation is also consistent with the English print version of section 6.1.1(ii) of
Codex Stan 94. See supra, footnote 5.
158Panel Report, para. 7.110, quoting Webster's New World Dictionary, supra, footnote 146, p. 117.

the use of the term 'sardines' with a qualification" 159, with the fact that, under the EC Regulation,
"species such as Sardinops sagax cannot be called 'sardines' even when … combined with the name
of a country, name of a geographic area, name of the species or the common name in accordance with
the law and custom of the country in which the product is sold."
 160 In the light of this contrast, the
Panel concluded that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation.
241. On appeal, the European Communities contends that the Panel erred in finding that
Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation. The European Communities submits
that the EC Regulation is "based on" Codex Stan 94 "because it used as a basis paragraph 6.1.1(i) of
the Codex standard", and because this paragraph reserves the term "sardines" exclusively for Sardina
pilchardus.
 161 According to the European Communities, the term " 'as a basis' should involve a
consideration of the texts as a whole, examining the basic structure of the domestic measure and
deciding whether the international standard has been used in its preparation and adoption."
 162 T h e
European Communities adds that, in order to determine whether a relevant international standard, or a
part of it, is used "as a basis for" a technical regulation, the criterion to apply is not, as the Panel
suggested, whether the standard is the principal constituent or the fundamental principle of the
technical regulation, but, rather, whether there is a "rational relationship" between the standard and
the technical regulation on the substantive aspects of the standard in question.
 163
242. The question before us, therefore, is the proper meaning to be attributed to the words "as a
basis for" in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. In EC – Hormones, we addressed a similar issue,
namely, the meaning of "based on" as used in Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, which provides:
Harmonization
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as
wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards , guidelines or
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for
in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. (emphasis added)

159Panel Report, para. 7.111.
160Ibid., para. 7.112.
162Ibid., para. 155.
163Ibid.

In EC – Hormones, we stated that "based on" does not mean the same thing as "conform to". 164 In
that appeal, we articulated the ordinary meaning of the term "based on", as used in Article 3.1 of the
SPS Agreement in the following terms:
A thing is commonly said to be "b ased on" another thing when the
former "stands" or is "founded" or "built" upon or "is supported by"
the latter.
150
150 L. Brown (ed.), The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on
Historical Principles (Clarendon Press), Vol. I, p. 187. 165
The Panel here referred to this conclusion in its analysis of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. In our
view, the Panel did so correctly, because our approach in EC – Hormones is also relevant for the
interpretation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. 166
243. In addition, as we stated earlier, the Panel here used the following definition to establish the
ordinary meaning of the term "basis":
The word "basis" means "the principal constituent of anything, the
fundamental principle or theory, as of a system of knowledge".90
90 [Webster's New World Dictionary , (William Collins & World
Publishing Co., Inc., 1976)], p. 117. 167
Informed by our ruling in EC – Hormones, and relying on this meaning of the term "basis", the Panel
concluded that an international standard is used "as a basis for" a technical regulation when it is used
as the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the technical
regulation. 168
244. We agree with the Panel's approach. In relying on the ordinary meaning of the term "basis",
the Panel rightly followed an approach similar to ours in determining the ordinary meaning of "based
on" in EC – Hormones. 169 In addition to the definition of "basis" in Webster's New World
Dictionary that was used by the Panel, we note, as well, the similar definitions for "basis" that are set

165Ibid., para. 163 and footnote 150 thereto.
166Panel Report, para. 7.110.
167Ibid. and footnote 90 thereto.
168Ibid., para. 7.110.
169In the present case, we do not consider it necessary to decide whether the term "as a basis", in the
context of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, has the same meaning as the term "based on", in the context of
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.

out in the The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, and also provide guidance as to the ordinary
meaning of the term:
3 [t]he main constituent. … 5 [a] thing on which anything is
constructed and by which its constitution or operation is determined;
a determining principle; a set of underlying or agreed principles.
 170
245. From these various definitions, we would highlight the similar terms "principal constituent",
"fundamental principle", "main constituent", and "determining principle"—all of which lend credence
to the conclusion that there must be a very strong and very close relationship between two things in
order to be able to say that one is "the basis for" the other.
246. The European Communities, however, seems to suggest the need for something different.
The European Communities maintains that a "rational relationship" between an international standard
and a technical regulation is sufficient to conclude that the former is used "as a basis for" the latter. 171
According to the European Communities, an examination based on the criterion of the existence of a
"rational relationship" focuses on "the qualitative aspect of the substantive relationship that should
exist between the relevant international standard and the technical regulation".
 172 I n r e s p o n s e t o
questioning at the oral hearing, the European Communities added that a "rational relationship" exists
when the technical regulation is informed in its overall scope by the international standard.
247. Yet, we see nothing in the text of Article 2.4 to support the European Communities' view, nor
has the European Communities pointed to any such support. Moreover, the European Communities
does not offer any arguments relating to the context or the object and purpose of that provision that
would support its argument that the existence of a "rational relationship" is the appropriate criterion
for determining whether something has been used "as a basis for" something else.
248. We see no need here to define in general the nature of the relationship that must exist for an
international standard to serve "as a basis for" a technical regulation. Here we need only examine this
measure to determine if it fulfils this obligation. In our view, it can certainly be said—at a
minimum—that something cannot be considered a "basis" for something else if the two are
contradictory. Therefore, under Article 2.4, if the technical regulation and the international standard
contradict each other, it cannot properly be concluded that the international standard has been used
"as a basis for" the technical regulation.

170The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 188.
172Ibid.

249. Thus, we need only determine here whether there is a contradiction between Codex Stan 94
and the EC Regulation. If there is, we are justified in concluding our analysis with that determination,
as the only appropriate conclusion from such a determination would be that the Codex Stan 94 has not
been used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation.
250. In making this determination, we note at the outset that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
provides that "Members shall use [relevant international standards], or the relevant parts of them, as
a basis for their technical regulations". (emphasis added) In our view, the phrase " relevant parts of
them" defines the appropriate focus of an analysis to determine whether a relevant international
standard has been used "as a basis for" a technica l regulation. In other words, the examination must
be limited to those parts of the relevant international standards that relate to the subject-matter of the
challenged prescriptions or requirements. In addition, the examination must be broad enough to
address all of those relevant parts; the regulating Member is not permitted to select only some of
the "relevant parts" of an international standard. If a "part" is "relevant", then it must be one of the
elements which is "a basis for" the technical regulation.
251. This dispute concerns the WTO-consistency of the requirement set out in Article 2 of the
EC Regulation that only products prepared exclusively from the species Sardina pilchardus may be
marketed in the European Communities as preserved sardines. Consequently, the "relevant parts" of
Codex Stan 94 are those elements of Codex Stan 94 that bear upon or relate to the marketing of
preserved fish products under the name "sardines". The term "relevant parts of them", as used in
Article 2.4, implies two things for the case before us. First, the determination whether Codex Stan 94
has been used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation must stem from an analysis that is limited to those
"parts" of Codex Stan 94 relating to the use of the term "sardines" for the identification and marketing
of preserved fish products. Those parts include not only sections 6.1.1(i) and 6.1.1(ii), but also
section 2.1.1 of Codex Stan 94, which sets out the various species that may be given the names
contemplated in sections 6.1.1(i) and 6.1.1(ii). Second, this analysis must address all of those
relevant provisions of Codex Stan 94, and must not ignore any one of them.
252. In response to our questioning at the oral hearing, the European Communities expressed the
view that, in order to determine whether Codex Stan 94 has been used "as a basis for" the
EC Regulation, the whole of the standard and the whole of the EC Regulation should be compared.
We disagree. We do so because there are several parts of Codex Stan 94 that are not relevant to the
use of the term "sardines" for the identification and marketing of preserved fish products. We see no
reason why this examination under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement should extend beyond Article 2
of the EC Regulation, which is the only provision of the EC Regulation whose WTO-consistency has

been challenged by Peru in this dispute. There is simply no purpose served in examining other
provisions of the EC Regulation that are irrelevant to this dispute. 173
253. As we have said, the European Communities contends that Codex Stan 94 was used "as a
basis for" the EC Regulation "because it used as a basis paragraph 6.1.1(i) of the Codex standard" 174,
which stipulates that only Sardina pilchardus may have the name "sardines", and that our
examination as to whether Codex Stan 94 has been used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation must be
limited to section 6.1.1(i).
 175 This contention stems from the European Communities' proposition that
the scope of the EC Regulation and that of Codex Stan 94 are different: the European Communities
considers that the EC Regulation lays down prescriptions and technical requirements for Sardina
pilchardus only, whereas Codex Stan 94 has a broader scope, as it also addresses other species,
namely "sardine-type" products. In the view of the European Communities, section 6.1.1(ii) is not a
"relevant part" of Codex Stan 94 for our determination of whether that standard has been used "as a
basis for" the EC Regulation, because section 6.1.1(ii) concerns species other than Sardina
pilchardus, a subject-matter the EC Regulation does not address.
254. We are not persuaded by this line of reasoning. Article 2 of the EC Regulation governs the
use of the term "sardines" for the identification and marketing of preserved fish products.
Section 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 also relates to this same subject. Therefore, section 6.1.1(ii) is a
"relevant part" of Codex Stan 94 for the purpose of determining whether Codex Stan 94 was used "as
a basis for" the EC Regulation. As we stated earlier, the analysis must address all of the parts of
Codex Stan 94 that relate to the use of the term "sardines" for the identification and the marketing of
preserved fish products, and not only to selected parts. Moreover, the European Communities'
argument that the EC Regulation does not relate to species other than Sardina pilchardus is simply
untenable. It is tantamount to saying that a regulation stipulating 16 years as the age at which one
may obtain a driver's licence, does not relate to persons that are under 16 years of age. Consequently,
contrary to what the European Communities suggests, the "as a basis for" analysis cannot be restricted
to section 6.1.1(i) of Codex Stan 94; it must, in addition, also encompass both section 6. 1.1(ii), and
section 2.1.1 of Codex Stan 94.

173The other provisions of the EC Regulation deal w ith product presentation (trimming of head, gills,
etc.; with or without bones or skin; as fillets or trunks), covering media (such as olive oil or natural juice),
arrangement in containers, colour, odour, flavour, ratio between weight or sardines after sterilization and net
weight, compliance measures and date of entry into force.
175European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

255. In the light of all this, we ask now whether there is a contradiction between the
EC Regulation and Codex Stan 94 in the use of the term "sardines" for the identification and
marketing of preserved fish products.
256. We accept the European Communities' contention that the EC Regulation contains the
prescription set out in section 6.1.1(i) of Codex Stan 94. However, as we have just explained, the
analysis must go beyond section 6.1.1(i); it must extend also to sections 6.1.1(ii) and 2.1.1 of
Codex Stan 94. And, a comparison between, on the one hand, sections 6.1.1(ii) and 2.1.1 of
Codex Stan 94 and, on the other hand, Article 2 of the EC Regulation, leads to the inevitable
conclusion that a contradiction exists between these provisions.
257. The effect of Article 2 of the EC Regulation is to prohibit preserved fish products prepared
from the 20 species of fish other than Sardina pilchardus to which Codex Stan 94 refers—including
Sardinops sagax—from being identified and marketed under the appellation "sardines", even with one
of the four qualifiers set out in the standard. Codex Stan 94, by contrast, permits the use of the term
"sardines" with any one of four qualifiers for the identification and marketing of preserved fish
products prepared from 20 species of fish other than Sardina pilchardus. Thus, the EC Regulation
and Codex Stan 94 are manifestly contradictory. To us, the existence of this contradiction confirms
that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation.
258. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the Panel, in paragraph 7.112 of the Panel Report, that
Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation within the meaning of Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement.
IX. The Question of the "Ineffectiveness or Inappropriateness" of Codex Stan 94
259. We turn now to the second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, which provides that
Members need not use international standards as a basis for their technical regulations "when such
international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued".
260. In interpreting this part of Article 2.4, the Panel, first, addressed the question of the burden of
proof, and made the following finding:

… the burden of proof rests with the European Communities, as the
party "assert[ing] the affirmative of a particular claim or defence", to
demonstrate that the international standard is an ineffective or
inappropriate means to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the
EC Regulation. 176 (footnote omitted)
261. Regarding the substance of the phrase "except when such international standards or relevant
parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives
pursued", the Panel began by examining the meaning of the terms "ineffective" and "inappropriate".
The Panel said:
Concerning the terms "ineffective" and "inappropriate", we note that
"ineffective" refers to something which is not "having the function of
accomplishing", "having a result", or "brought to bear",
91 whereas
"inappropriate" refers to something which is not "specially suitable",
"proper", or "fitting". 92 Thus, in the context of Article 2.4, an
ineffective means is a means which does not have the function of
accomplishing the legitimate objective pursued, whereas an
inappropriate means is a means which is not specially suitable for the
fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued. An inappropriate
means will not necessarily be an ineffective means and vice versa.
That is, whereas it may not be specially suitable for the fulfilment
of the legitimate objective, an inappropriate means may nevertheless
be effective in fulfilling that objective, despite its "unsuitability".
Conversely, when a relevant international standard is found to be an
effective means, it does not automatically follow that it is also an
appropriate means. The question of effectiveness bears upon the
results of the means employed, whereas the question of
appropriateness relates more to the nature of the means employed.
91 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press,
1993), p. 786.
92 Ibid., p. 103. 177 (original emphasis)
262. Second, the Panel addressed the meaning of the phrase "legitimate objectives pursued". The
Panel stated that the " 'legitimate objectives' referred to in Article 2.4 must be interpreted in the
context of Article 2.2", which provides an illustrative, open list of objectives considered
"legitimate". 178 Also, the Panel indicated that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires an
examination and a determination whether the objectives of the measure at issue are "legitimate". 179

176Panel Report, para 7.50. See also, Panel Report, paras. 7.52 and 7.114.
177Ibid., para. 7.116 and footnotes 91–92 thereto.
178Ibid., para. 7.118.
179Ibid., para. 7.122.

263. The Panel took note of the three "objectives" of the EC Regulation identified by the European
Communities, namely market transparency, consumer protection, and fair competition. 180 The Panel
also noted Peru's acknowledgement that those "objectives" are "legitimate", and the Panel saw "no
reason to disagree with the parties' assessment in this respect."
 181 During questioning at the oral
hearing, Peru confirmed that it does see these three objectives pursued by the European Communities
as "legitimate" within the meaning of Article 2.4.
264. The Panel then examined whether Codex Stan 94 is "ineffective" or "inappropriate" for the
fulfilment of the three objectives pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation in
the light of the definitions that the Panel articula ted for those two terms. The Panel noted that the
three objectives were founded on the factual prem ise that consumers in the European Communities
associate "sardines" exclusively with Sardina pilchardus. The Panel was of the view that, if this
factual premise is valid, it must be concluded that Codex Stan 94 is "ineffective or inappropriate" to
meet the "legitimate objectives" of market transparency, consumer protection, and fair competition.
In other words, if European Communities consumers associate the term "sardines" exclusively with
Sardina pilchardus, a product identified as "sardines" would have to be made exclusively of Sardina
pilchardus so as not to mislead those consumers.
 182 However, after reviewing the evidence adduced
by the parties, the Panel stated that "it has not been established that consumers in most member States
of the European Communities have always associated the common name 'sardines' exclusively with
Sardina pilchardus and that the use of 'X sardines' would therefore not enable the
European consumer to distinguish preserved Sardina pilchardus from preserved Sardinops
sagax."
 183 The Panel also found that, by establishing a precise labelling requirement "in a manner not
to mislead the consumer" 184, "Codex Stan 94 allows Members to provide [a] precise trade description
of preserved sardines which promotes market transparency so as to protect consumers and promote
fair competition."
 185 On this basis, the Panel concluded that Codex Stan 94 is not "ineffective or
inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the
EC Regulation.

180Panel Report, para. 7.123.
181Ibid., para. 7.122.
182Ibid., para. 7.123.
183Ibid., para. 7.137.
184Codex Stan 94, supra, footnote 4, section 6.1.1(ii).
185Panel Report, para. 7.133.

265. Although the Panel had assigned the burden of proof under Article 2.4 to the European
Communities—so that it was for the European Communities to prove that Codex Stan 94 was
"ineffective or inappropriate" to meet the European Communities' "legitimate objectives"—the Panel
stated that Peru had, in any event, adduced sufficient evidence and legal arguments to allow the Panel
to reach the conclusion that the standard was not "ineffective or inappropriate".
 186
266. The European Communities appeals the Panel's assignment of the burden of proof under
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. The European Communities disputes the Panel's conclusion that
the burden rests with the European Communities to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an "ineffective
or inappropriate" means to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation. The European
Communities maintains that the burden of proof rests rather with Peru, as Peru is the party claiming
that the measure at issue is inconsistent with WTO obligations.
267. The European Communities also appeals the finding of the Panel that Codex Stan 94 is not
"ineffective or inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation. In particular,
the European Communities argues that the Panel erred in founding its analysis on the factual premise
that consumers in the European Communities associate "sardines" exclusively with Sardina
pilchardus.
 187 Furthermore, the European Communities contends that the Panel erred in concluding
that the term "sardines", either by itself or when combined with the name of a country or geographic
area, is a common name for Sardinops sagax in the European Communities. The European
Communities also objects to the decision by the Panel to take this conclusion into account in its
assessment of whether consumers in the European Communities associate the term "sardines"
exclusively with Sardina pilchardus.
268. In considering these claims of the European Communities, we will address, first, the question
of the burden of proof, and, next, the substantive content of the second part of Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.
A. The Burden of Proof
269. Before the Panel, the European Communities asserted that Codex Stan 94 is "ineffective or
inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation. The Panel was of the view
that the European Communities was thus asserting the affirmative of a particular claim or defence,
and, therefore, that the burden of proof rests with the European Communities to demonstrate that

186Panel Report, para. 7.138.
187European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 176–179.

claim. 188 The Panel justified its position as follows: fi rst, it reasoned that the complainant is not in a
position to "spell out" the "legitimate objectives" pursued by a Member through a technical
regulation; and, second, it reasoned "that the assessment of whether a relevant international standard
is 'inappropriate' … may extend to considerations which are proper to the Member adopting or
applying a technical regulation."
 189
270. We recall that, in United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India, we said the following about the burden of proof:
… the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the
other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption.
In the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, precisely
how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to
establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to
measure, provision to provision, and case to case.
 190 (footnote
omitted)
271. In EC – Hormones, we stated that characterizing a treaty provision as an "exception" does
not, by itself, place the burden of proof on the respondent Member. 191 That case concerned, among
other issues, the allocation of the burden of proof under Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.
Those Articles read as follows:
Article 3
Harmonization
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as
wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for
in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.
…

188Panel Report, para. 7.50.
189Ibid., para. 7.51.
190Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 335.

3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based
on the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a
consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a
Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant
provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5. Notwithstanding
the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved
by measures based on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision
of this Agreement. (footnote omitted)
272. In EC – Hormones, the panel assigned the burden of showing that the measure there was
justified under Article 3.3 to the respondent, reasoning that Article 3.3 provides an exception to the
general obligation contained in Article 3.1. The panel there was of the view that it was the defending
party that was asserting the affirmative of that particular defence. We reversed the panel's
finding.
 192 In particular, we stated:
The general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a
complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency
with a provision of the SPS Agreement before the burden of
showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending
party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an
"exception". In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty
provision as an "exception" does not by itself justify a "stricter" or
"narrower" interpretation of that provision than would be warranted
by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words,
viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose,
or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty
interpretation.
 193 (original emphasis)
273. The Panel in this case acknowledged our finding in EC – Hormones, but concluded that it
"does not have a direct bearing" on the question of the allocation of the burden of proof under the
second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
 194 The relevant statement in the Panel Report—
found in a footnote—reads as follows:

193Ibid., para. 104.
194Panel Report, footnote 70 to para. 7.50.

We are cognizant of the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Hormones
that, in reference to Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, the
latter provision, which allows Members to establish their own level
of sanitary protection, does not constitute an exception to the general
obligation of Article 3.1, and that the burden of the complaining
party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency "is not avoided
by simply describing that provision as an 'exception'". However, we
consider that the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Hormones does
not have a direct bearing on the matter before us .
 195 (emphasis
added)
274. We disagree with the Panel's conclusion that our ruling on the issue of the burden of proof has
no "direct bearing" on this case. The Panel provides no explanation for this conclusion and, indeed,
could not have provided any plausible explanation. For there are strong conceptual similarities
between, on the one hand, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and, on the other hand, Articles 3.1
and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, and our reasoning in EC – Hormones is equally apposite for this
case. The heart of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement is a requirement that Members base their
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations.
Likewise, the heart of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is a requirement that Members use
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations. Neither of these requirements in
these two agreements is absolute. Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement permit a Member to
depart from an international standard if the Member seeks a level of protection higher than would be
achieved by the international standard, the level of protection pursued is based on a proper risk
assessment, and the international standard is not sufficient to achieve the level of protection pursued.
Thus, under the SPS Agreement, departing from an international standard is permitted in
circumstances where the international standard is in effective to achieve the objective of the measure
at issue. Likewise, under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, a Member may depart from a relevant
international standard when it would be an "ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of
the legitimate objectives pursued" by that Member through the technical regulation.
275. Given the conceptual similarities between, on the one hand, Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement and, on the other hand, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, we see no reason why the
Panel should not have relied on the principle we articulated in EC – Hormones to determine the
allocation of the burden of proof under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. In EC – Hormones, we
found that a "general rule-exception" relationship between Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement
does not exist, with the consequence that the complainant had to establish a case of inconsistency with

195Panel Report, footnote 70 to para. 7.50.

both Articles 3.1 and 3.3. 196 We reached this conclusion as a consequence of our finding there that
"Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement simply excludes from its scope of application the kinds of
situations covered by Article 3.3 of that Agreement". 197 Similarly, the circumstances envisaged in the
second part of Article 2.4 are excluded from the scope of application of the first part of Article 2.4.
Accordingly, as with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, there is no "general rule-exception"
relationship between the first and the second parts of Article 2.4. Hence, in this case, it is for Peru
—as the complaining Member seeking a ruling on the inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement of the measure applied by the European Communities—to bear the burden of
proving its claim. This burden includes establishing that Codex Stan 94 has not been used "as a basis
for" the EC Regulation, as well as establishing that Codex Stan 94 is effective and appropriate to fulfil
the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation.
276. The TBT Agreement acknowledges the right of every WTO Member to establish for itself
the objectives of its technical regulations while affording every other Member adequate opportunities
to obtain information about these objectives. That said, part of the reason why the Panel concluded
that the burden of proof under Article 2.4 is on the respondent is because, in the Panel's view, the
complainant cannot "spell out" the "legitimate objectives" of the technical regulation. In addition, the
Panel reasoned that the assessment of the appropriateness of a relevant international standard involves
considerations which are properly the province of the Member adopting or applying a technical
regulation.
 198
277. In our opinion, these two concerns are not justified. The TBT Agreement affords a
complainant adequate opportunities to obtain information about the objectives of technical regulations
or the specific considerations that may be relevant to the assessment of their appropriateness. A
complainant may obtain relevant information about a technical regulation from a respondent under
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, which establishes a compulsory mechanism requiring the
supplying of information by the regulating Member. This Article provides in relevant part:
 199
A Member preparing, adopting or applying a technical regulation
which may have a significant effect on trade of other Members shall,
upon the request of another Member, explain the justification for that
technical regulation in terms of the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 4.

197Ibid.
198Panel Report, para. 7.51.
199We note that a similar provision to Article 2.5 is found in the SPS Agreement. Article 5.8 thereof
requires a Member to provide an explanation of the reasons for its sanitary or phytosanitary measure.

278. Peru expresses doubts about the usefulness and efficacy of this obligation in the
TBT Agreement. Peru argues that a Member may not respond fully or adequately to a request for
information under Article 2.5, and that, therefore, it is inappropriate to rely on this obligation to
support assigning the burden of proof under Article 2.4 to the complainant.
 200 We are not persuaded
by this argument. We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by their treaty obligations in
good faith, as required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda articulated in Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention. 201 And, always in dispute settlement, every Member of the WTO must assume
the good faith of every other Member.
279. Another source of information for the complainant is the "enquiry point" that must be
established by the respondent under the TBT Agreement. Article 10.1 of the TBT Agreement, in
relevant part, provides as follows: 202
10.1 Each Member shall ensure that an enquiry point exists which
is able to answer all reasonable enquiries from other Members and
interested parties in other Members as well as to provide the relevant
documents regarding:
10.1.1 any technical regulations adopted or proposed within
its territory by central or local government bodies, by non-
governmental bodies which have legal power to enforce a
technical regulation, or by regional standardizing bodies of
which such bodies are members or participants;
280. Indeed, the dispute settlement process itself also provides opportunities for the complainant to
obtain the necessary information to build a case. Information can be exchanged during the
consultation phase, and additional information may well become available during the panel phase
itself. On previous occasions, we have stated that the arguments of a party "are set out and
progressively clarified in the first written submissions, the rebuttal submissions and the first and second
panel meetings with the parties"
 203, and that "[t]here is no requirement in the DSU or in GATT practice
for arguments on all claims relating to the matter re ferred to the DSB to be set out in a complaining

200Peru's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
201Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, supra, footnote 50, para. 158; Appellate Body Report, Chile –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 281,
para.74.
202Article 3 of Annex B to the SPS Agreement also requires the establishment of an "enquiry point".
203Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas ("EC – Bananas III "), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591, para. 141. See
also, Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, 9, para. 88; and Appellate Body Report, Korea –
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy "), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted
12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 3, para. 139.

party's first written submission to the panel." 204 Thus, it would not be necessary for the complainant to
have all the necessary information about the technical regulation before commencing an action under the
DSU. A complainant could collect information before and during the early stages of the panel
proceedings and, on the basis of that information, develop arguments relating to the objectives or to the
appropriateness that may be put forward during subsequent phases of the proceedings.
281. The degree of difficulty in substantiating a claim or a defence may vary according to the facts
of the case and the provision at issue. For example, on the one hand, it may be relatively
straightforward for a complainant to show that a particular measure has a text that establishes an
explicit and formal discrimination between like products and is, therefore, inconsistent with the
national treatment obligation in Article III of the GATT 1994. On the other hand, it may be more
difficult for a complainant to substantiate a claim of a violation of Article III of the GATT 1994 if the
discrimination does not flow from the letter of the legal text of the measure, but rather is a result of
the administrative practice of the domestic authorities of the respondent in applying that measure.
But, in both of those situations, the complainant must prove its claim. There is nothing in the WTO
dispute settlement system to support the notion that the allocation of the burden of proof should be
decided on the basis of a comparison between the respective difficulties that may possibly be
encountered by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a case.
282. We, therefore, reverse the finding of the Panel, in paragraph 7.52 of the Panel Report, that,
under the second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the burden rests with the European
Communities to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an "ineffective or inappropriate" means to fulfil
the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation.
Accordingly, we find that Peru bears the burden of demonstrating that Codex Stan 94 is an effective
and appropriate means to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities
through the EC Regulation.
283. We turn now to consider whether Peru effectively discharged its burden of proof under the
second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.

204Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, supra, footnote 203, para. 145.

B. Whether Codex Stan 94 is an Effective and Appropriate Means to Fulfil the
"Legitimate Objectives" Pursued by the European Communities Through the
EC Regulation
284. We recall that the second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement reads as follows:
… except when such international standards or relevant parts would
be an ineffective or inappropriat e means for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued …
Before ruling on whether Peru met its burden of proof in this case, we must address, successively, the
interpretation and the application of the second part of Article 2.4.
1. The Interpretation of the Second Part of Article 2.4
285. The interpretation of the second part of Article 2.4 raises two questions: first, the meaning of
the term "ineffective or inappropriate means"; and, second, the meaning of the term "legitimate
objectives". As to the first question, we noted ea rlier the Panel's view that the term "ineffective or
inappropriate means" refers to two questions—the question of the effectiveness of the measure and
the question of the appropriateness of the measure—and that these two questions, although closely
related, are different in nature.
 205 The Panel pointed out that the term "ineffective" "refers to
something which is not 'having the function of accomplishing', 'having a result', or 'brought to bear',
whereas [the term] 'inappropriate' refers to something which is not 'specially suitable', 'proper', or
'fitting' ". 206 The Panel also stated that:
Thus, in the context of Article 2.4, an ineffective means is a means
which does not have the function of accomplishing the legitimate
objective pursued, whereas an inappropriate means is a means which
is not specially suitable for the fulfilment of the legitimate objective
pursued. … The question of effectiveness bears upon the results of
the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates
more to the nature of the means employed. 207 (original emphasis)
We agree with the Panel's interpretation.
286. As to the second question, we are of the view that the Panel was also correct in concluding
that "the 'legitimate objectives' referred to in Article 2.4 must be interpreted in the context of
Article 2.2", which refers also to "legitimate objectives", and includes a description of what the nature

205See supra, para. 261.
206Panel Report, para. 7.116.
207Ibid.

of some such objectives can be. 208 Two implications flow from the Panel's interpretation. First, the
term "legitimate objectives" in Article 2.4, as the Panel concluded, must cover the objectives
explicitly mentioned in Article 2.2, namely: "national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the
environment." Second, given the use of the term " inter alia" in Article 2.2, the objectives covered by
the term "legitimate objectives" in Article 2.4 extend beyond the list of the objectives specifically
mentioned in Article 2.2. Furthermore, we share the view of the Panel that the second part of
Article 2.4 implies that there must be an examination and a determination on the legitimacy of the
objectives of the measure.
 209
2. The Application of the Second Part of Article 2.4
287. With respect to the application of the second part of Article 2.4, we begin by recalling that
Peru has the burden of establishing that Codex Stan 94 is an effective and appropriate means for the
fulfilment of the "legitimate objectives" pursued by the European Communities through the
EC Regulation. Those "legitimate objectives" are market transparency, consumer protection, and fair
competition. To satisfy this burden of proof, Peru must, at least, have established a prima facie case
of this claim. If Peru has succeeded in doing so, then a presumption will have been raised which the
European Communities must have rebutted in order to succeed in its defence. If Peru has established
a prima facie case, and if the European Communities has failed to rebut Peru's case effectively, then
Peru will have discharged its burden of proof under Article 2.4. In such an event, Codex Stan 94
must, consistent with the European Communities' obligation under the TBT Agreement, be used "as a
basis for" any European Communities regulation on the marketing of preserved sardines, because
Codex Stan 94 will have been shown to be both effective and appropriate to fulfil the "legitimate
objectives" pursued by the European Communities. Further, in such an event, as we have already
determined that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation, we would then have
to find as a consequence that the European Communities has acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement.
288. This being so, our task is to assess whether Peru discharged its burden of showing that
Codex Stan 94 is appropriate and effective to fulfil these same three "legitimate objectives". In the
light of our reasoning thus far, Codex Stan 94 would be effective if it had the capacity to accomplish
all three of these objectives, and it would be appropriate if it were suitable for the fulfilment of all
three of these objectives.

208Panel Report, para. 7.118.
209Ibid., para. 7.122.

289. We share the Panel's view that the terms "ineffective" and "inappropriate" have different
meanings, and that it is conceptually possible that a measure could be effective but inappropriate, or
appropriate but ineffective.
 210 This is why Peru has the burden of showing that Codex Stan 94 is both
effective and appropriate. We note, however, that, in this case, a consideration of the
appropriateness of Codex Stan 94 and a consideration of the effectiveness of Codex Stan 94 are
interrelated—as a consequence of the nature of the objectives of the EC Regulation. The capacity of a
measure to accomplish the stated objectives—its effectiveness—and the suitability of a measure for
the fulfilment of the stated objectives—its appropriateness—are both decisively influenced by the
perceptions and expectations of consumers in the European Communities relating to preserved sardine
products .
 211
290. We note that the Panel concluded that "Peru has adduced sufficient evidence and legal
arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is not ineffective or inappropriate to fulfil the legitimate
objectives pursued by the EC Regulation."
 212 We have examined the analysis which led the Panel to
this conclusion. We note, in particular, that the Panel made the factual finding that "it has not been
established that consumers in most member States of the European Communities have always
associated the common name 'sardines' exclusively with Sardina pilchardus".
 213 We also note that
the Panel gave consideration to the contentions of Peru that, under Codex Stan 94, fish from the
species Sardinops sagax bear a denomination that is distinct from that of Sardina pilchardus
 214, and
that "the very purpose of the labelling regulations set out in Codex Stan 94 for sardines of species
other than Sardina pilchardus is to ensure market transparency".
 215 We agree with the analysis
made by the Panel. Accordingly, we see no reason to interfere with the Panel's finding that Peru has
adduced sufficient evidence and legal arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 meets the legal
requirements of effectiveness and appropriateness set out in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
291. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the Panel, in paragraph 7.138 of the Panel Report, that
Peru has adduced sufficient evidence and legal arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is not
"ineffective or inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation. Our finding

210Panel Report, para. 7.116.
211We note that the Panel observed "that the European Communities has used the terms 'ineffective' and
'inappropriate' interchangeably throughout its oral and written statements." ( Ibid., footnote 93 to para. 7.117)
212Ibid., para. 7.138.
213Ibid., para. 7.137. In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the European Communities and
Peru agreed that this statement of the Panel was a factual finding.
214Ibid., para. 4.88.
215Ibid., para. 4.86.

on this issue is, however, subject to our examination of whether the Panel acted consistently with
Article 11 of the DSU. We turn to that issue now.
X. The Objectivity of the Assessment of Certain Facts by the Panel
292. We next consider whether the Panel properly discharged its duty under Article 11 of the DSU
to make an "objective assessment" of certain "facts of the case" before it. We recall that Article 11
reads as follows:
Function of Panels
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered
agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should
consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.
(emphasis added)
293. The European Communities contends that, in f our specific instances, the Panel failed to
discharge its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts of the
case. First, the European Communities submits that the Panel's treatment of the dictionary definitions
of the term "sardines" amounts to a contravention of Article 11 of the DSU.
 216 Second, the European
Communities sees a violation of Article 11 of the DSU in the way the Panel handled a letter from the
United Kingdom Consumers' Association and in the Panel's rejection of letters from other European
consumers' associations submitted by the European Communities at the interim review stage.
 217
Third, the European Communities submits that the Panel disregarded evidence in the form of tins,
supermarket receipts, and labels relating to various preserved fish and thus violated Article 11 of the
DSU.
 218 Fourth, the European Communities finds a violation of Article 11 of the DSU in the decision
of the Panel not to ask the Codex Commission "about the meaning, status and even validity of …
Codex Stan 94".
 219

216European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 216–219.
217Ibid., paras. 220–223.
218Ibid., paras. 224–226.
219Ibid., para. 227.

294. All four points were raised by the European Communities in the interim review and addressed
by the Panel at that stage of the Panel proceedings. On the use of the dictionary definitions of the
term "sardines", the Panel stated:
[W]e are of the view that the use of the dictionaries referred to by
both parties is an appropriate means to examine whether the term
"sardines", either by itself or combined with the name of a country or
geographic area, is a common name that refers to species other than
Sardina pilchardus , especially in light of the fact that the
Multilingual Illustrated Dictionary of Aquatic Animals and Plants
was published in cooperation with the European Commission and
member States of the European Communities for the purposes of,
inter alia , improving market transparency. We note that the
electronic publication, Fish Base, was also produced with the support
of the European Commission. In ma king our finding, not only did
we consider carefully dictionaries referred to by both parties but also
considered other evidence such as the regulations of several member
States of the European Communities, statements made by the
Consumers' Association and the trade description used by Canadian
exporters of Clupea harengus harengus to the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. In our weighing and balancing of the totality of
evidence before us, including the examination of the Oxford
Dictionary r e f e r r e d t o b y P e r u a n d C a n a d a a s w e l l a s t h e Grand
Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse and Diccionario de la lengua
espanola referred to by the European Communities, we were
persuaded, on balance, that the term "sardines", either by itself or
combined with the name of a country or geographic area, is a
common name in the European Communities and that the consumers
in the European Communities do not associate the term "sardines"
exclusively with Sardina pilchardus .
 220 (original emphasis;
footnotes omitted)
295. On the letter from the United Kingdom Consumers' Association, the Panel replied:
We are … mindful that we are not "required to accord to factual
evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the
parties".40 We did consider the Consumers' Association letter in
determining whether the European consumers associate the term
"sardines" exclusively with Sardina pilchardus but, as stated above,
this was not the sole basis on which we made the determination as
other evidence was considered in the overall weighing and balancing
process. We therefore do not agree with the European Communities'
argument that our approach was partial.
40 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Salmon ("Australia – Salmon "), WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted
6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, para. 267. 221

220Panel Report, para. 6.12.
221Ibid., para. 6.15 and footnote 40 thereto.

296. With respect to the letters from other European consumers' associations submitted by the
European Communities at the interim review stage, the Panel made the following statement:
The European Communities submitt ed additional evidence, i.e.,
letters it had received lately from other European consumers'
associations on the same issue. In a letter dated 11 April 2002, Peru
requested that the new evidence submitted by the European
Communities not be considered. In this regard, Peru referred to
Article 12 of the Panel's Working Procedures which did not provide
for the submission of new evidence at this stage of the Panel
proceedings. Article 12 of the Panel's Working Procedures reads as
follows: "Parties shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no
later than during the first substant ive meeting, except with respect to
evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal submissions, answers to
questions or comments on answers provided by others. Exceptions to
this procedure will be granted upon a showing of good cause. In
such cases, the other party shall be accorded a period of time for
comment, as appropriate". We are obliged to point out that Peru
submitted the letter from Consumers' Association as a part of its
rebuttal submission. In light of this, it is our view that the European
Communities should have submitted the evidence at the second
substantive meeting or at least not later than at the time it submitted
answers to the questions posed by the Panel. Further, the European
Communities did not request an extension of time-period to rebut the
letter from Consumers' Association. Nor did the European
Communities demonstrate the requisite "good cause" which must be
shown by the party submitting the new evidence. We do not consider
that the interim review stage is the appropriate time to introduce new
evidence. Therefore, we decline to consider the new evidence
submitted by the European Communities.
 222
297. Regarding the third point—the evidence regarding tins, supermarket receipts, and labels—the
Panel stated:
[T]he European Communities claimed that in paragraph 7.132 we
"completely ignor[ed] the evidence submitted by the European
Communities on the range and diversity of preserved fish products
that the European consumers could find in any European supermarket
and that responds to their expectations that each fish be called by and
marketed under its own name". Again, we did not ignore any
evidence and we took note of the fact that there is diverse range of
fish products that are available in European supermarkets. However,
we were not persuaded that the existence of diverse preserved fish
products in the European market suggested that the European
consumers associate the term "sardines" exclusively with Sardina
pilchardus. We therefore reject the European Communities'
argument that we "completely ignored" the evidence it submitted.
 223

222Panel Report, para. 6.16.
223Ibid., para. 6.18.

298. Finally, the Panel commented on its decision not to seek information from the Codex
Commission:
We recall the European Communities' statement at the Second
Substantive Meeting that "[i]f the Panel should have any doubt that
the interpretation of Article 6.1.1(ii) [of] Codex Stan 94 advanced by
the European Communities is correct and considers that it will reach
the question of the meaning of Article 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94, the
European Communities invites the Panel to ask the Codex
Alimentarius to provide its view of the meaning of this text". This
request is reflected in paragraph 4.49 of the descriptive part. In
accordance with Article 13 of the DSU, it is the right of the panel to
seek or refuse to seek information.
 32 In this regard, in EC —
Hormones, the Appellate Body stated that Article 13 of the DSU
"enable[s] panels to seek information and advice as they deem
appropriate in a particular case". 33 Also, in US — Shrimp , the
Appellate Body considered that "a panel also has the authority to
accept or reject any information or advice which it may have sought
and received, or to make some other appropriate disposition
thereof. It is particularly within the province and the authority of a
panel to determine the need for information and advice in a specific
case…".
34 In this case, we determined that there was no need to seek
information from the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
32 "Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter".
33 European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products ("EC – Hormones"), WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R,
34 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (" US – Shrimp"), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998,
DSR 1998:VII, para. 104. 224 (original emphasis and underlining)
299. The first three points raised by the European Communities relate to the task—which we have
discussed earlier—of evaluating evidence adduced in connection with the Panel's inquiry into whether
consumers in the European Communities associate the term "sardines" exclusively with Sardina
pilchardus. As we have stated in several previous appeals, panels enjoy a discretion as the trier of

facts 225; they enjoy "a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the evidence, and the weight to
be ascribed to that evidence." 226 We have also said that we will not "interfere lightly" with the Panel's
appreciation of the evidence: we will not intervene solely because we might have reached a different
factual finding from the one the panel reached; we wi ll intervene only if we are "satisfied that the
panel has exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the trier of facts, in its appreciation of the
evidence".
 227
300. In particular, we stated, in EC – Hormones, that:
Determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to
(that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and
parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the
discretion of a panel as the trier of facts.
 228
Furthermore, in Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, we indicated that:
Panels … are not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties
the same meaning and weight as do the parties. 229
Moreover, in Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, we ruled
that:

225Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R,
adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:1, 3, paras. 161–162; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra,
footnote 17, para. 132; Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Wheat Gluten from the European Communities ("US – Wheat Gluten "), WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted
19 January 2001, para. 151. See also, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998:V, 2031, paras. 131–
136; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon , WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted
6 November 1998, DRS 1998:VIII, 3327, paras. 262–267; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, 277, paras. 140–142; Appellate
Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products ,
WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 22 September 1999, DSR 1999:IV, 1763, paras. 149 and 151; and Appellate Body
Report, Korea – Dairy, supra, footnote 203, paras. 137–138.
226Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, supra, footnote 15, para. 161.
227Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, supra, footnote 225, para. 151.

… under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is charged with the mandate
to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual findings. In
carrying out this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and
consider all the evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by
one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance and probative
force of each piece thereof. … The determination of the significance
and weight properly pertaining to the evidence presented by one
party is a function of a panel's appreciation of the probative value of
all the evidence submitted by both parties considered together.
 230
In the light of the comments made by the Panel at the interim review stage, we have no reason to
believe, nor has the European Communities been able to persuade us, that the Panel did not examine
and consider all the evidence properly put before it, or that the Panel did not evaluate the relevance
and probative value of each piece of evidence. In particular, the Panel manifestly did not ignore the
evidence in the form of tins, supermarket receipts, and labels relating to various preserved fish
submitted by the European Communities, for it addressed that evidence specifically in paragraph 6.18
of the Panel Report. In addition, the Panel specifically stated that its factual finding that "it has not
been established that consumers in most member States of the European Communities have always
associated the common name 'sardines' exclusively with Sardina pilchardus"
 231 was the result of an
"overall weighing and balancing process" 232 bearing upon a plurality of pieces of evidence. On the
other points raised by the European Communities, we reiterate: the Panel enjoyed a margin of
discretion, as the trier of facts, to assess the va lue of each piece of evidence and the weight to be
ascribed to them. In our view, the Panel did not exceed the bounds of this discretion by giving some
weight to dictionary definitions, and to an extract of a letter from a United Kingdom Consumers'
Association.
 233
301. We also reject the European Communities' contention relating to the letters it submitted at the
interim review stage. The interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence.
We recall that Article 15 of the DSU governs the interim review. Article 15 permits parties, during

231Panel Report, para. 7.137.
232Ibid., para. 6.15.
233The extract of the letter from a United Kingdom Consumers' Association cited in the Panel Report is
the following:
[A] wide array of sardines were made available to European consumers for
many decades prior to the imposition of this restrictive Regulation.
(Ibid., para. 7.132, referring to Exhibit Peru-16, submitted by Peru to the Panel, p. 8)

that stage of the proceedings, to submit comments on the draft report issued by the panel 234, and to
make requests "for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report". 235 At that time, the
panel process is all but completed; it is only—in the words of Article 15—"precise aspects" of the
report that must be verified during the interim review. And this, in our vi ew, cannot properly include
an assessment of new and unanswered evidence. Therefore, we are of the view that the Panel acted
properly in refusing to take into account the new evidence during the interim review, and did not
thereby act inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
302. We also reject the European Communities' claim regarding the fourth instance of supposed
impropriety, which relates to the decision of the Panel not to seek information from the Codex
Commission. Article 13.2 of the DSU provides th at "[p]anels may seek information from any
relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter." This
provision is clearly phrased in a manner that attributes discretion to panels, and we have interpreted it
in this vein. Our statements in EC – Hormones, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (" Argentina – Textiles and Apparel
 ") 236, and US – Shrimp, all
support the conclusion that, under Article 13.2 of the DSU, panels enjoy discretion as to whether or
not to seek information from external sources. 237 In this case, the Panel evidently concluded that it
did not need to request information from the Co dex Commission, and conducted itself accordingly.

234Article 15.1 of the DSU provides:
Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the
panel shall issue the descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft
report to the parties to the dispute. Within a period of time set by the panel,
the parties shall submit their comments in writing.
235Article 15.2 of the DSU provides:
Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of comments
from the parties to the dispute, the panel shall issue an interim report to the
parties, including both the descriptive sections and the panel's findings and
conclusions. Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit a
written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report
prior to circulation of the final report to the Members. At the request of a
party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues
identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any
party within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the
final panel report and circulated promptly to the Members. (emphasis
added)
236Appellate Body Report, WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, 1003.
237In EC – Hormones, we stated that Article 13 of the DSU "enable[s] panels to seek information and
advice as they deem appropriate in a particular case". (Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 17, para. 147)
In Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, we stated that, pursuant to Article 13.2 of the DSU, "just as a panel has
the discretion to determine how to seek expert advice, so also does a panel have the discretion to determine
whether to seek information or expert advice at all". (Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 236, para. 84) In
US – Shrimp, we considered that "a pane l also has the authority to accept or reject any information or advice
which it may have sought and received, or to make some other appropriate disposition t h e r e o f . I t i s
particularly within the province and the authority of a panel to determine the need for information and advice
in a specific case". (Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 50, para. 104) (original emphasis)

We believe that, in doing so, the Panel acted within the limits of Article 13.2 of the DSU. A
contravention of the duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts of
the case cannot result from the due exercise of the discretion permitted by another provision of the
DSU, in this instance Article 13.2 of the DSU.
303. In the light of this, we reject the claim of the European Communities that the Panel did not
conduct "an objective assessment of the facts of the case", as required by Article 11 of the DSU.
XI. The References in the Panel Report to Trade-Restrictiveness
304. We now turn to the issue whether the Panel made a determination that the EC Regulation is
trade-restrictive, and, if so, whether the Panel erred in making such a determination, as contended by
the European Communities.
305. The Panel stated:
The European Communities acknowledged that it is the Regulation
which in certain member States "created" the consumer expectations
which it now considers require the maintenance of that same
Regulation. Thus, through regulatory intervention, the European
Communities consciously would have "created" consumer
expectations which now are claimed to affect the competitive
conditions of imports. If we were to accept that a WTO Member can
"create" consumer expectations and thereafter find justification for
the trade-restrictive measure which created those consumer
expectations, we would be endorsing the permissibility of "self-
justifying" regulatory trade barriers . Indeed, the danger is that
Members, by shaping consumer expectations through regulatory
intervention in the market, would be able to justify thereafter the
legitimacy of that very same regulatory intervention on the basis of
the governmentally created consumer expectations. Mindful of this
concern, we will proceed to examine whether the evidence and legal
arguments before us demonstrate that consumers in most member
States of the European Communities have always associated the
common name "sardines" exclusively with Sardina pilchardus and
that the use of "sardines" in conjunction with "Pacific", "Peruvian" or
"Sardinops sagax" would therefore not enable European consumers
to distinguish between products made from Sardinops sagax and
Sardina pilchardus.
 238 (emphasis added)

238Panel Report, para. 7.127.

At the interim review in the Panel proceedings, the European Communities asked the Panel to delete
the term "trade-restrictive" in the sixth line of paragraph 7.127 of the Panel Report. 239
306. The Panel dismissed this request in the following terms:
The European Communities argued that the question of whether the
measure at issue was trade-restrictive was an issue on which we had
exercised judicial economy and therefore should "refrain from
gratuitously qualifying the EC measure as 'trade-restrictive'". We
used the expression "trade-restrictive" as part of the legal reasoning
to state that if Members can create consumer expectations and then
justify the trade restrictive measure, we would be endorsing the
permissibility of self-justifying regulatory trade barriers. Therefore,
we were justified in using the term "trade-restrictive". Moreover, in
our examination of the EC Regulation, we were of the view that the
EC Regulation was more trade-restrictive than the relevant
international standard, i.e., Codex Stan 94. Our characterization of
the EC Regulation as such is based on the fact that the EC Regulation
prohibited the use of the term "sardines" for species other than
Sardina pilchardus whereas Codex Stan 94 would permit the use of
the term "sardines" in a qualified manner for species other than
Sardina pilchardus.
35
35 In addition, we took note of the context provided by Article 2.5
of the TBT Agreement which states that if a technical regulation is in
accordance with relevant international standards, "it shall be rebuttably
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade."
Because the EC Regulation was not in accordance with Codex Stan 94, we
considered that it created an "unnecessa ry obstacle to trade", which, in our
view, can be construed to mean more trade-restrictive than necessary
. 240
307. On appeal, the European Communities contends that—in paragraphs 7.127 and 6.11, as well
as in footnote 35, of the Panel Report—the Panel characterized the EC Regulation as trade-restrictive.
The European Communities considers "the findings of the Panel (if such they are) in paragraphs
[7.127] and 6.11 of the Panel Report to the effect that the Regulation is 'trade restrictive' or 'more
trade restrictive than the relevant international standard' should be reversed or considered moot and
without legal effect."
 241
308. In our view, the argument of the European Communities is flawed regarding paragraph 7.127.
We do not agree that the Panel characterized the EC Regulation as trade-restrictive in paragraph 7.127
of the Panel Report. In that paragraph, the Panel stated:

239Panel Report, para. 6.11.
240Ibid. and footnote 35 thereto.

If we were to accept that a WTO Member can "create" consumer
expectations and thereafter find justification for the trade-restrictive
measure which created those consumer expectations, we would be
endorsing the permissibility of "self-justifying" regulatory trade
barriers. (emphasis added)
This statement by the Panel is made in abstracto; the Panel is not making a definitive finding here
about the EC Regulation. Moreover, this statement is relevant only for the purposes of Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement, as it was part of the Panel's examination whether consumers in the European
Communities associate the term "sardines" exclusively with Sardina pilchardus. We are, therefore,
of the view that, in paragraph 7.127 of the Panel Report, the Panel did not make a determination that
the EC Regulation itself is trade-restrictive per se as that term is used in Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. Accordingly, we reject the claim of the European Communities insofar as it relates
to paragraph 7.127 of the Panel Report.
309. The Panel's statements in paragraph 6.11 and in footnote 35 of the Panel Report, however, are
of a different nature. The relevant excerpt is as follows:
Moreover, in our examination of the EC Regulation, we were of the
view that the EC Regulation was more trade-restrictive than the
relevant international standard, i.e., Codex Stan 94 . Our
characterization of the EC Regulation as such is based on the fact that
the EC Regulation prohibited the use of the term "sardines" for
species other than Sardina pilchardus whereas Codex Stan 94 would
permit the use of the term "sardines" in a qualified manner for
species other than Sardina pilchardus.
35
35 In addition, we took note of the context provided by Article 2.5
of the TBT Agreement which states that if a technical regulation is in
accordance with relevant international standards, "it shall be rebuttably
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade."
Because the EC Regulation was not in accordance with Codex Stan 94, we
considered that it cr eated an "unnecessary obstacle to trade", which, in our
view, can be construed to mean more trade-restrictive than necessary

(emphasis added)
In this paragraph, the Panel stated that the "the EC Regulation was more trade-restrictive than the
relevant international standard, i.e., Codex Stan 94." Also, in footnote 35, the Panel stated that the
EC Regulation "created an 'unnecessary obstacle to trade', which, in [its] view, can be construed to
mean more trade-restrictive than necessary." These two statements do contain determinations of the
trade-restrictive nature of the EC Regulation.
310. The only provision of the WTO Treaty on which the Panel made a ruling was Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement. We agree with the European Communities that the question whether the

EC Regulation is trade-restrictive is not relevant for the purposes of making a finding under
Article 2.4. The Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to other claims where the trade-
restrictive character of the EC Regulation might have been relevant.
 242 As a consequence, the Panel
should have refrained from making the statements quoted from paragraph 6.11 and footnote 35 of the
Panel Report. 243
311. The question whether the EC Regulation is trade-restrictive in nature could have been
relevant to a legal analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. For this reason, the Panel's
statements in paragraph 6.11 and in footnote 35 of the Panel Report on the trade-restrictive character
of the EC Regulation, to the extent that they could relate to the legal analysis under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, constitute legal interpretations within the meaning of Article 17.6 of the DSU.
Because the Panel had determined not to make legal findings under Article 2.2, we declare the two
statements in paragraph 6.11 and in footnote 35 of the Panel Report on the trade-restrictive character
of the EC Regulation moot and without legal effect.
XII. Completing the Legal Analysis
312. Peru submits that, if we conclude that the EC Regulation is consistent with Article 2.4, it
would be appropriate for us to complete the Panel's analysis and resolve the dispute by making
findings on those provisions of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement on which the Panel did not make any

242The claims where such a finding would have been relevant related to Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.
243This approach is along the lines of that which we followed in United States – Import Measures on
Certain Products from the European Communities:
Having found that the 3 March Measure is the measure at issue in this
dispute, and that the 19 April action is outside its terms of reference, the
Panel should have limited its reasoning to issues that were relevant and
pertinent to the 3 March Measure. By making statements on an issue that is
only relevant to the 19 April action, the Panel failed to follow the logic of,
and thus acted inconsistently with, its own finding on the measure at issue
in this dispute. The Panel, therefore, erroneously made statements that
relate to a measure which it had itself previously determined to be outside
its terms of reference.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel erred by making the
statements in paragraphs 6.121 to 6.126 of the Panel Report on the mandate
of arbitrators appointed under Article 22.6 of the DSU. Therefore, these
statements by the Panel have no legal effect. (original emphasis; underlining
added)
(Appellate Body Report, WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, paras. 89–90)
In that case, the irrelevance of the statements of the panel resulted from the limits of the terms of
reference, rather than from judicial economy. Nevertheless, our views to the effect that a panel should limit its
reasoning to relevant and pertinent issues, and that irrelevant statements may have no legal effect, are also
pertinent to the case before us.

findings, namely Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 244 Although Peru made a claim before
the Panel under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Peru does not ask us to complete the analysis by
addressing that provision. The European Communities objects to the completion of the analysis,
expressing the view that there are not sufficient undisputed facts in the record to do so.
 245
313. Because we have found that the EC Regulation is not consistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, the conditions to Peru's request have not been met, and, therefore, we do not think it
is necessary for us to make a finding under Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in order to
resolve this dispute. Equally, we do not think it is necessary to make a finding under Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994 in order to resolve this dispute. Therefore, we decline to make findings on
Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, or on Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
314. We indicated earlier in this Report that we would return to the question whether Morocco's
amicus curiae brief assists us in this appeal when considering the issue of completing the legal
analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994.
 246 In the light of our decision
not to complete the analysis by making findings on these provisions, we find that the legal arguments
submitted by Morocco in its amicus curiae brief on Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and on the
GATT 1994 do not assist us in this appeal.
XIII. Findings and Conclusions
315. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) finds that the condition attached to the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal of
25 June 2002 is permissible, and that the appeal of the European Communities,
commenced by the Notice of Appeal of 28 June 2002, is admissible;
(b) finds that the amicus curiae briefs submitted in this appeal are admissible but their
contents do not assist us in deciding this appeal;
(c) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.35 of the Panel Report, that the
EC Regulation is a "technical regulation" under the TBT Agreement;

245European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
246Supra, paras. 169–170.

(d) upholds the Panel's findings, in paragraph 7.60 of the Panel Report, that Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement applies to measures that were adopted before 1 January 1995 but
which have not "ceased to exist", and, in paragraph 7.83 of the Panel Report, that
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to existing technical regulations, including
the EC Regulation;
(e) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.70 of the Panel Report, that Codex Stan 94
is a "relevant international standard" under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement;
(f) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.112 of the Panel Report, that
Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC Regulation within the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement;
(g) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.52 of the Panel Report, that, under the
second part of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the burden of proof rests with
the European Communities to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an "ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued" by the
European Communities through the EC Regulation, and finds, instead, that the
burden of proof rests with Peru to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an effective and
appropriate means to fulfil those "legitimate objectives", and, upholds the Panel's
finding, in paragraph 7.138 of the Panel Report, that Peru has adduced sufficient
evidence and legal arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is not "ineffective or
inappropriate" to fulfil the "legitimate objectives" of the EC Regulation;
(h) rejects the claim of the European Communities that the Panel did not conduct "an
objective assessment of the facts of the case", as required by Article 11 of the DSU;
(i) rejects the claim of the European Communities that the Panel made a determination,
in paragraph 7.127 of the Panel Report, that the EC Regulation is trade-restrictive,
and, declares moot and without legal effect the two statements, in paragraph 6.11 and
in footnote 35 of the Panel Report, on the trade-restrictive character of the
EC Regulation; and
(j) finds it unnecessary to complete the analysis under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, or Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994.

Therefore, the Appellate Body upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.1 of the Panel Report, that
the EC Regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
316. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the European Communities to bring
the EC Regulation, as found in this Report and in the Panel Report, as modified by this Report, to be
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under that
Agreement.
Signed in the original at Geneva this 12th day of September 2002 by:

James Bacchus
Presiding Member

Georges Abi-Saab Luiz Olavo Baptista
Member Member