EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN COLD-ROLLED FLAT STEEL PRODUCTS FROM RUSSIA REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Document: REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL
Date: 15 March 2019
Document codes: WT/DS521/2
Complainant: Russia
Respondent: EU
Third parties: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.3  Anti-dumpingArt. 2.4  Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)Art. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 6.1, 6.2, 6.5.1, 6.8, 6.9, 6.13, 9.2, 9.3, 10.6, 12.2, 12.2.1, 12.2.2, 18.1, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. VI, VI:2  GATT 1994

EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN
COLD-ROLLED FLAT STEEL PRODUCTS FROM RUSSIA
REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The following communication, dated 13 March 2019, from the delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

On 27 January 2017, the Government of the Russian Federation requested consultations with the
European Union (EU) pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( "DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( "Anti-Dumping Agreement") with
respect to the anti-dumping measures imposed by the European Union on imports of certain cold -
rolled flat steel products originating in the Russian Federation ("measures at issue") pursuant to the
following:

(a) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181 of 10 February 2016
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel
products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation,1

(b) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing
a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed
on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic
of China and the Russian Federation,2

(c) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1329 of 29 July 2016 levying
the definitive anti-dumping duty on the registered imports of certain cold-rolled flat
steel products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation,3

as well as other related acts4, and the underlying investigation.

This request covers the measures set out above, as well as any and all amendments, replacements,
extensions, related and implementing measures and any act of the European Union authorities that
would affect the measures at issue. This request also concerns any and all notices, disclosures,
decisions and reports of the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union and
other European Union institutions, and any amendments thereof, produced or to be produced in the

1 OJ L 37, 12.2.2016, p. 1–39.
2 OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 1–26.
3 OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 27–42.
4 For instance, Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain cold-rolled
flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation of 14 May 2015 (OJ
C 161, 14.5.2015, p. 9-19); and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2325 of 11 December 2015
making imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the
Russian Federation subject to registration (OJ L328, 12.12.2015, p. 104-107).

future, in connection with any of the measures at issue including, but not limited to, all interim
reviews, expiry reviews and other proceedings that have taken place to date.
The Russian Federation held consultations with the European Union on 8 June 2017. These
consultations failed to settle the dispute.
The Russian Federation considers that the measures at issue are inconsistent with the European
Union's obligations under the following provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Anti -Dumping
Agreement:
1. Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European
Union failed to calculate the costs on the basis of the records kept by Public Joint Stock
Company "Novolipetsk Steel" ("NLMK"), and by Public Joint Stock Company Severstal
("Severstal") (two Russian producers under investigation, the products of which are
subject to the measures at issue), although these records were i n accordance with the
generally accepted accounting principles of the Russian Federation and reasonably
reflected the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration.

2. Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European
Union treated the majority of domestic sales of the like product of Severstal as not being
in the ordinary course of trade due to upward adjustments which artificially inflated costs
actually incurred, and this resulted in disregarding the majority of domestic sales of the
like product in the ordinary course of trade for the purpose of determination of the
normal value.

3. Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European
Union failed to determine the normal value for NLMK on the basis of the data provided
by that producer on actual sales and prices for the like product in the ordinary course of
trade when destined for consumption in the exporting country.

4. Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European
Union failed to determine the correct normal value for Severstal due to an upward
adjustment to costs of production and selling, general and administrative ( "SG&A")
costs.

5. Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed
to use a reasonable amount of SG&A costs for Severstal, and in particular:

- the European Union failed to determine SG&A costs for Severstal based on
actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade
of the like product; and
- the European Union artificially inflated the SG&A costs for the amount of
alleged difference in value resulting from the re-evaluation of long-term loans
in foreign currency, reflected in the records of Severstal as provisions for
financial losses in the statutory accounting currency (the Russian Rouble), and
considering those provisions as part of the SG&A costs.

6. Articles 2.1 and 2.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed
to properly determine the export price for NLMK although the investigating authority of
the European Union ( "investigating authority") had all the necessary and reliable data
on the actual export price of NLMK.

7. Articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed
to make a fair comparison between the export price and the normal value for Severstal.
In particular, the European Union applied an excessive downward adjustment of the
export price for reasonable SG&A costs and profit of a hypothetical unrelated importer
to the price at which the intra -group trading company of Severstal located outside the
European Union sold the product under consideration to unrelated customers in the
European Union. This resulted in exaggerating the allowance for costs incurred between
importation and resale, and for profits accruing, and led to an unfair comparison with
normal value. These violations consequentially led to improper price comparison for

NLMK, since the data used in the price comparison for Severstal were also used in
relation to NLMK.

8. Articles 6.1, 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Annex II of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement because the European Union failed to give NLMK and Severstal am ple
opportunity to present all evidence they considered relevant in respect of the
investigation, and failed to establish properly any of the grounds allowed under these
provisions in order to apply facts available to NLMK and Severstal when making its
preliminary and final determinations. In doing so, the European Union:

(a) failed to take into account all the information which was verifiable,
appropriately submitted and supplied in a timely fashion;

(b) improperly applied facts available with respect to NLMK and Severstal, among
other shortcomings, due to:

- failure to give notice to NLMK and Severstal at an appropriate stage of the
investigation of the information required by the investigating authority and of
its evolving concerns with regard to the information provided;
- failure to inform NLMK of the manner in which the requested information was
to be provided;
- failure to conduct unbiased and objective verifications at NLMK 's and
Severstal's premises in the Russian Federation;
- failure to inform NLMK f orthwith of the reasons for not accepting submitted
evidence after it was informed of new reasons for the application of Article 6.8
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by way of the provisional disclosure;
- failure to properly assess Severstal's evidence;
- failure to provide NLMK and Severstal with an opportunity to provide further
explanations within a reasonable period.

9. Articles 6.1, 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because
the European Union failed to base its findings with respect to normal value and export
price for NLMK, and normal value for Severstal on information from a secondary source
with special circumspection.

10. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because in its determination of
injury to the EU industry the European Union failed to make an objective examination
based on positive evidence of the volume of the dumped imports, of the effect of those
imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and of the consequent impact
of the dumped imports on EU producers of such products. With regard to the volume of
the dumped imports, the European Union failed to properly consider whether there had
been:

(a) significant increase in dumped imports; and

(b) significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of
a like domestic product, or whether the effect of such imports was otherwise to
depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise
would have occurred, to a significant degree.

With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices and price undercutting, among
other shortcomings, the European Union fai led to conduct an objective examination as
it did not properly take into account in its analysis the free and captive market
consumption, as well as aggregate market trends.

11. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because in the course of its i njury
determination the European Union failed to make an objective examination, based on
positive evidence, of the impact of the dumped imports on the EU industry, and failed to
make a proper evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing
on the state of the EU industry, in particular: market share, capacity and capacity
utilisation. The European Union's findings regarding a three-way assessment of the free,
captive and aggregate markets were not based on an objective examination o f the

evidence on the record. Among other shortcomings, the European Union failed to make
a proper evaluation of the overall developments, the interaction among the injury factors
and indices, and the state of the EU industry, taken together.

12. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European Union's
determination of a causal relationship between dumped imports and injury did not
involve an objective examination based on positive evidence before the investigating
authority, in particular the European Union:

(a) failed to examine properly all known factors other than the dumped imports causing
injury to the domestic industry; and

(b) failed to meet the requirement that injury caused by other known factors should not
be attributed to the dumped imports.

13. Article 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European Union
failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application
for initiation of the investigation which did not include sufficient evidence of dumping,
injury or a causal relationship to justify the initiation of the investigation. Among other
shortcomings, the European Union initiated the investigation without properly
determining whether the request contained sufficient evidence to justify its initiation,
and without having properly examined the accuracy and adequacy of the information
provided in the application which is required under items (i) and (iv) of Article 5.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.

14. Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
because the European Union failed to impose and collect duties in the appropriate
amounts in each case, and failed to assess them at an amount not exceeding the margin
of dumping that should have been e stablished in accordance with the requirements of
Article 2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. The European Union failed to name all
suppliers involved by failing to name NLMK, when this was not impracticable.

15. Articles 10.6 and 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because the European Union 's
cumulative assessment of imports from the Russian Federation and the People's Republic
of China for the purposes of imposing duties retroactively was inappropriate in light of
the conditions of competition between the imported products and like domestic products.

16. Article 10.6 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because t he European Union levied
anti-dumping duties on products which were entered f or consumption not more than
90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures, even though the
conditions for levying definitive anti-dumping duties retroactively set out in Article 10.6
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, including the condition in Article 10.6(i) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement were not met and/or not supported by sufficient evidence,
either individually or taken together.

17. Article 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because: a) the European Union failed to
require the applicant to furnish non-confidential summaries of the information submitted
in confidence; and b) where such summaries were provided, the European Union did not
ensure that they were in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence.

18. Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed to grant
NLMK and Severstal a full opportunity to defend their interests throughout the
investigation, in particular, the European Union:

(a) failed to provide timely opportunities t o NLMK and Severstal to examine the
information that was relevant to the presentation of their cases, and denied their
right to submit in time further information for the defence of their interests, including
such that would be necessary for Severstal to d efend against double -counting of
certain costs of manufacturing;

(b) failed to disclose the initial reasons for the application of facts available to NLMK in
full when the producer was still able to defend itself;

(c) made preliminary and final determinations and conducted the investigation in a way
to disregard any new or additional information from NLMK and Severstal that could
give them full opportunity to defend themselves;

(d) placed NLMK in a substantial procedural disadvantage vis -à-vis the opportunities
granted to the complaining EU producers, when it denied NLMK an opportunity to
hold a follow -up verification visit, and granted such follow -up visits to the parties
with adverse interests.

19. Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed to inform
all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which formed the basis
for the decision to impose definitive anti -dumping measures in res pect of NLMK; in
particular, the essential facts underlying the determinations of the existence of dumping
and the calculation of the margins of dumping, and those underlying the rejection of
NLMK's data in the final determinations.

20. Article 6.13 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European Union failed to take
due account of difficulties experienced by NLMK and Severstal in supplying the
information requested and to provide any practicable assistance prior to, during the on-
spot verification visits a nd thereafter. Failure by the European Union to take due
consideration of such difficulties had an adverse impact on the investigation and on the
decision of the investigating authority to apply facts available to NLMK and Severstal.

21. Articles 12.2, 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European
Union failed to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all
issues of fact and law that the investigating authority considered material, as well as all
relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the
imposition of provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties.

22. Articles 1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 as
a consequence of the above -mentioned inconsistencies with the Anti -Dumping
Agreement and the GATT 1994.
The violations stated above with regard to the measures at issue nullify or impair benefits accruing
to the Russian Federation, directly or indirectly, under the covered agreements.
Therefore, the Russian Federation respectfully requests, pursuant to A rticle 6 of the DSU and
Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, that the Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel to
examine this matter, with the standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
The Russian Federation asks that this request be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the Dispute
Settlement Body to be held on 26 March 2019.