Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 17 September 1998
Document codes: WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: South Korea
Third parties: Canada, Mexico
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. III:2  GATT 1994

Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages

Report of the Panel

The report of the Panel on Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages is being circulated to all Members,
pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated as an unrestricted document from
17 September 1998 pursuant to the Procedures fo r the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO
Documents (WT/L/160/Rev.1). Members are reminded that in accordance with the DSU only parties
to the dispute may appeal a panel report. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the
Panel report and legal interpre tations developed by the Panel. There shall be no ex parte
communications with the Panel or Appellate B ody concerning matters under consideration by the
Panel or Appellate Body.

Note by the Secretariat
: This Panel Report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settle ment Body (DSB) within 60 days after the date of its
circulation unless a party to the dispute decides to appeal or th e DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If the Pa nel Report is
appealed to the Appellate Body, it shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB un til after the completion of the appeal. I nformation on
the current status of the Panel Report is available from the WTO Secretariat.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.1. This proceeding has been initiated by two co mplaining parties, the European Communities
and the United States.
1.2. On 2 April 1997, the European Communities re quested consultations with Korea under
Article XXII:1 of GATT and Article 4 of the Unde rstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") (). The United States (WT/DS 75/2) and Canada
6() requested to be joined in those cons ultations, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU on
17 and 21 April 1997, respectively. Korea agreed to those requests (WT/DS75/4 and WT/DS75/5).
Consultations between the European Communities a nd Korea were held in Geneva on 29 May 1997,
in which the United States and Canada participated.
1.3. On 23 May 1997, the United States requested consultations with Korea under Article XXII:1
of GATT and Article 4 of the DSU with respec t to the same matter (WT/DS84/1). Canada
(WT/DS84/2) and the European Communities (WT/ DS84/3) requested to be joined in those
consultations, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, on 29 May and 5 June 1997, respectively.
1.4. Consultations were held in Geneva on 24 June 1997, between the United States and Korea,
and the European Communities and Canada participated as third-parties. Another set of consultations
were held on 8 August 1997, to address US requests for further clarifications, but the parties were
unable to settle the dispute.
1.5. On 10 September 1997, the European Commun ities (WT/DS75/6), and the United States
(WT/DS84/4), each requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 6.1 of the DSU.
1.6. In its panel request, the European Communities claims that:
 Korea, by according a preferential tax treatment, through the Liquor Tax Law
and the Education Tax Law, to soju vis- a-vis certain alcoholic beverages falling
within HS heading 2208, has acted inc onsistently with Article III:2 of GATT
1994, therefore nullifying or impairing th e benefits accruing to the European
Communities under the GATT 1994.
1.7. In its panel request the United States claims that:
 Korea, under its general Liquor Tax Law, imposes a lower tax on the
traditional Korean distilled spirit soju th an the high taxes it applies to other
distilled spirits such as whisky, brandy , vodka, rum, gin and "ad-mixtures".
This difference in tax burden is made even more dramatic by the application of
an Education Tax.
1.8. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) agreed to th ese two requests for a panel at its meeting of
16 October 1997, establishing a single panel pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU with the following
standard terms of reference:
 "To examine, in light of the relevant pr ovisions of the covered agreements cited by
the European Communities in document WT/DS75/6 and the United States in
document WT/DS84/4, the matter referred to the DSB by the European Communities
and the United States in those documents and to make such findings as will assist the
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those
agreements".

1.9. Canada and Mexico reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third-
parties.
1.10. On 26 November 1997, the United States and th e European Communities jointly requested
the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8
of the DSU. On 5 December 1997, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows:
 Chairman: Mr. Åke Lindén
 Panelists: Professor Frédéric Jenny
 Mr. Carlos da Rocha Paranhos
1.11. The Panel had substantive meetings with th e parties on 5 and 6 March 1998, and on 21 and
22 April 1998.

II. MEASURES IN ISSUE
2.1. Korea maintains a multi-tiered taxation regime on the sale of alcoholic beverages. Under the
Liquor Tax Law of 1949, as amended, Korea creates various categories of distilled spirits, on which it
imposes different ad valorem taxes. Under the Education Ta x Law of 1982, as amended, Korea
assesses a surtax on certain of these sales, determined as a percentage of the established liquor tax.
2.2. Both the liquor tax and the education tax on al coholic beverages are imposed at the wholesale
level. The tax is payable by the manufacturer of the beverages or, in the case of imports, by the
importer. Tax liability accrues at the time of sh ipment from the factory (in the case of alcoholic
beverages made in Korea) or of withdrawal from the bonded warehouse (in the case of imported
alcoholic beverages).
A. THE LIQUOR TAX LAW
2.3. The Liquor Tax Law lays down a system of excise taxes applicable to all alcoholic beverages
(whether manufactured in Korea or imported) intend ed for consumption in Korea. The taxes applied
to the categories in dispute are in the form of ad valorem taxes.
2.4. For the purposes of assessing the tax, the valu e of imported alcoholic beverages includes
transport and insurance costs as well as the import duty imposed. In other words, the tax base for
imports is the price noted on the import declara tion when the goods are withdrawn from the bonded
warehouse (i.e., the CIF import value plus duty).1
2.5. Domestic alcoholic beverages are taxed on the value of production costs, sales costs
(including advertising), extraordinary costs, and pr ofits, i.e., the tax base is the price of the goods
when they are shipped from the production site. 2 The categories of distilled spirits established by the
Liquor Tax Law, and the applicable tax rates, are described below.
1. Categories
2.6. Liquor Tax Law divides alcoholic beverages into eleven categories, some of which are further
divided into sub-categories, and assigns to each of them a different tax rate. These categories include
"soju," "whisky," "brandy," "gener al distilled liquors" (which covers beverages such as vodka, gin,
rum and tequila), "liqueurs," and "other liquors" (to the extent that liquors falling within this category
may contain distilled spirits or liqueurs falling within any of the preceding categories). Article 3 of
the Liquor Tax Law sets forth definitions of these categories.3
(a) Soju
2.7. Article 3.6 has four sub-categories of soju. Sub-categories A and B apparently refer to
"distilled soju," while sub-categories C and D apparently refer to "diluted soju."
2.8. Article 3.6.A and 3.6.B states the legal definition of soju as:
(a) Soju may be produced from discontinuous distillation of a fermented mash developed
from the basic constituents of a starch source, yeast and water.

1 Article 19.2 of the Liquor Tax Law.
2 Presidential Decree, Article 26.
3 A translation of the relevant provisions of Article 3 is provided as US Exhibit A.

(b) Soju may be produced from discontinuous distillation as in Paragraph A above, but
during the fermentation and production pro cess other ingredients may be added as
determined by Presidential decree.
2.9. Thus paragraphs (A) and (B) describe two "types" of soju: (i) soju created by fermentation
and discontinuous distillation, but without additives; and (ii) soju created by fermentation and
discontinuous distillation and containing additives.
2.10. According to Article 3.6.A, distilled soju cannot
(a) be produced from sprouted grain;
(b) be filtered through charcoal of white birch; or
(c) be produced in a process whereby water is mixed with grain and the mash sealed for
fermentation and subsequent distillations.
2.11. The chapeau of Article 3.6 specifies that soju must have an extract content of 2% or less.
2.12. The legal definition of diluted soju in Article 3.6.C and 3.6.D is as follows soju:
(a) Soju may be produced by diluting neutral spirits with water or by adding thereto
those ingredients as determined by Presidential Decree;
(b) Soju may be produced by adding to the pr oducts produced in accord with paragraphs
A through C immediately above the product of paragraph A, when determined by
Presidential Decree, or other grain spirits as determined by Presidential Decree.
2.13. The definition of diluted soju in 3.6.C and D re lies on "neutral spirits," which is defined by
Article 3.1 of the Liquor Tax Law as follows:
(a) Neutral spirits may be produced from th e distillation of a fermented mash developed
from the basic constituents of a starch s ource and a sugar source that results in a
product that is 85 percent or more alcohol;
(b) Neutral spirits may be produced from th e distillation of ingredients containing
alcohol, resulting in a product that is 85 percent or more alcohol.
(b) Whisky, brandy, and "general distilled liquors"
2.14. Whisky, brandy and "general distilled liquors" are defined in Articles 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9,
respectively. The definitions include a 2% extract limitation that distinguishes them from liqueurs.
All three include fermentation and distillation as the manufacturing process. However, unlike the
definition for soju, they generally specify starch sources.
2.15. Article 3.7 of the Liquor Tax Law, the "whisky" category, includes all types of whisky made
totally or partly from sprouted grain and aged in wooden casks, as well as, under certain conditions,
admixtures of whisky and other spirits or ingredients.
4

4 See Article 3.7 of the Liquor Tax Law. The whisky definition includes three subparagraphs.
Paragraph (A) specifies only sprouted grains and thus addresses malt whisky. Paragraph (B) appears to broaden
the starch source to normal grain as well as sprouted and thus addresses ordinary grain whisky. Both (A) and
(B) provide for aging in wooden barrels and thus address premium brands of whisky. Paragraph (C) addresses

2.16. Article 3.8, the "brandy" category, includes all liquors distilled from a fermented mash of fruit
or fruit wine and aged in wooden casks. Subject to certain conditions, it includes also ad-mixtures of
those liquors with other spirits or ingredients.5
2.17. The category of "General Distilled Liquors" is a miscellaneous category comprising several
kinds of distilled spirits. It consists of six paragraphs.
-- Paragraph (A) specifies kaoliang-ju lees as a starch source, and the manufacturing process
includes sealing prior to fermenting and distilling; it is designed to address kaoliang-ju, which
can be imported from China.
-- Paragraph (B) specifies sugar cane, sugar beet, sugar, and/or molasses as a starch source; it
addresses rum.
-- Paragraph (C) specifies "fruits of juniper tree" as an ingredient; it addresses gin.
-- Paragraph (D) specifies filtering of the alcohol; it addresses vodka.
-- Paragraph (E) merely concerns "materials ma inly containing starch or sugar produced by
fermentation and distilla tion." It covers tequila and any distilled spirit. Its wording is the
same as that used in the first part of the definition of "neutral spirits".6
-- Paragraph (F) addresses mixed distilled drinks (e.g., gin and rum mixed drinks).
(c) Liqueurs
2.18. Article 3.10, the "liqueurs" category, covers liquors with more than 2% extract content
produced by distillation of a starch or sugar source to which ginseng juice, fruits or fruits extracts are
added.7
2.19. Article 3.11 sets forth the category of "other liquors," a residual category including all liquors
(whether fermented or distilled) not falling within any of the other categories defined by the Liquor
Tax Law.8 It includes inter alia admixtures of whisky and brandy.

premium blended whisky and/or whisky with sugars, acids, seasonings, fragrances, colouring, or carbon dioxide
added.
5 See Article 3.8 of the Liquor Tax Law.
6 See Article 3.1 of the Liquor Tax Law.
7 See Article 3.10 of the Liquor Tax Law.
8 See Article 3.11 of the Liquor Tax Law.

2. Tax rates
2.20. The Korean law imposes different ad valorem tax rates on the various categories and sub-
categories of distilled spirits. Pursuant to the defin itions, soju is given a tax rate of 35 to 50 percent,
while other distilled alcoholic beve rages are taxed at 80 to 100 percent. The applicable liquor tax
rates are:
9

Item

Ad Valorem
 Tax Rate (%)
Diluted soju 35
Distilled soju 50
Whisky 100
Brandy 100
General distilled liquors (vodka, gin, rum) 80
General distilled liquors containing whisky or brandy 100
Liqueur 50
Other liquors:
 -With 25% or more alcohol
 -With less than 25% alcohol
 -Which contain 20% or more whisky or brandy

80
70
100

B. T
HE EDUCATION TAX LAW
2.21. The Education Tax Law of 1990 is assessed as a surtax on the sale of a variety of items,
including most alcoholic beverages. For alcoholic beverages, the applicable rate is determined by
reference to another tax -- the applied liquor tax rate.10 For those assessed a liquor tax rate of 80% or
greater, the law imposes an education surtax calculated as 30% of the liquor tax imposed. 11 F o r
alcoholic beverages assessed a liquor tax rate of l ess than 80%, the law imposes an education surtax
calculated as 10% of the liquor tax imposed.

9 The applicable tax rates are set forth in Article 19.2, and Korean Taxation: 1997, § 3(b) p. 188
(Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy).
10 In addition to the liquor tax, other taxes upon which the Education Tax is levied include the Special
Excise Tax, the Per Capita Inhabitant Tax, the Regist ration Tax, the Horse Race Ta x, the Property Tax, the
Aggregate Land Tax, the Tobacco Consumption Tax, the Automobile Tax and the Transportation Tax.
11 Education Tax Law, Art. 5.

2.22. This tax structure results in a 30% surtax for imported distilled alcoholic beverages, including
whisky, brandy and general distilled liquors (vodka, rum, gin, tequila, shochu, etc.) except for imports
of Japanese shochu, which are classified for tax pur poses and taxed at 10%. Of all distilled alcoholic
beverages, only soju and liqueurs are subject to the lesser 10% surtax. Prior to 1995, soju was
exempted from the Education Tax. However, af ter negotiations between Korea and the European
Communities that Korea agreed to subject soju to the Education Tax at a rate of 10%.
2.23. The applicable rates on the categories concerned by this dispute, expressed as a percentage of
the amount payable pursuant to the Liquor Tax, is as follows:

Tax rates applied pursuant to the Education Tax Law
Product As % Liquor Tax
Diluted soju 10
Distilled soju 10
Whisky 30
Brandy 30
General distilled liquors 30
General distilled liquors containing
whisky or brandy
30
Liqueurs 10
Other Liquors:
 -more than 25% alcohol content

30
 -less than 25% alcohol content 10
 -containing whisky or brandy 30

III. FACTUAL ARGUMENTS
A. E
UROPEAN COMMUNITIES
3.1. The European Communities pro ceeds from the premise that in response to its reiterated
requests, Korea has reluctantly acced ed to make a number of changes to its liquor tax system which
have reduced (but by no means eliminated) the differ ence between the internal taxes applied to soju
and those applied to other categories of distilled liquors.
3.2. The European Communities states that as of 1 January 1991, Korea abolished the Customs
Defence Tax, which until then had been applied only to imported liquors. It further states that on the
same date, Korea also abolished the Liquor Defence Tax, which had been levied at a lower rate on
soju than on other distilled spirits and liqueurs. Further, the European Communities states that Korea
eliminated an uplift ratio of 1.0:1.1 (the so-calle d "times 1.1 multiplier") which had been applied in
order to inflate artificially the import duty paid value on which the Liquor Tax is assessed in the case
of imported beverages.
3.3. The European Communities adds that these amen dments were followed by a reduction of the
Liquor Tax rates on the category of "whisky" from 200% to 150%, and on the category of "general
distilled liquors" from 100% to 80%, both effective fro m 1 July 1991. According to the European
Communities, this decrease, however, was partia lly nullified by a simultaneous increase in the
Education Tax rates, which were raised to 30% fo r most distilled liquors other than "soju". At the
same time, the category of "soju" was divided into the sub-categories of "distilled soju" and "diluted
soju" and the rate on "distilled soju" raised from 35% to 50%.
3.4. According to the European Communities, in J une 1993, it reached an agreement with Korea
(the "1993 Agreement") whereby Korea undertook to reduce progressively over a period of two years
the liquor tax rate applicable to the "whisky" and "brandy" categories from 150% to 100%. The
European Communities asserts that Korea furthe r agreed to levy the Education Tax on both sub-
categories of soju (which had until then been ex empt from such tax) at a rate of 10% as from 1
January 199412 and to increase the tax on admixtures containing whisky or brandy (which are mainly
bottled in Korea) from 80% to 100%.
3.5. The European Communities furthe r asserts that the 1993 Agreement envisaged that a new
round of consultations would ta ke place in 1996 in order to discuss further reductions of the
remaining tax differences. According to the European Communities, as compensation for the
continued application in the meantime of much lower taxes to soju, Korea agreed to further reduce the
effectively applied import duties on whisky, brandy ot her than wine brandy (which already benefited
from a 15% applied rate), rum, gin, vodka and liqueurs (but not on soju) from 30% to 20%.
3.6. The European Communities allege that the cons ultations provided for by the 1993 Agreement
eventually took place in January 1997. Neverthele ss, according to the European Communities, Korea
did not meet the EC's request to eliminate the rema ining tax differentials so as to bring its liquor tax
system in conformity with the GATT.
The Korean market for distilled liquors
3.7. The European Communities states that the Korean market for distilled spirits and liqueurs was
virtually closed to imports until the late eighties. According to the EC's argument, until 1 January
1989, imports of distilled spirits in bulk were subject to quotas, whereas imports of distilled spirits in

12 The EC claims that Korea did not implement this commitment until 1 January 1995.

bottles were prohibited until 1 July 1989, and thereaf ter subject to quantitative restrictions until
1 January 1990.
3.8. The European Communities further argues th at, Korea applied prohibitively high import
duties: 150% until 1984; 100% until 1988; and 50 % until 1991. According to the European
Communities, until March 1990 Korea applied an impor t deposit requirement. The EC's position is
that, currently the applied import duty rate is 20% for all distilled spirits and liqueurs, except brandy
(which is subject to a 15% import duty) and soju (which is subject to a 30% import duty).13
3.9. The European Communities furt her argues that, following the elimination of the import
quotas and a substantial reduction of import duties and internal taxes, imports of distilled spirits and
liqueurs have grown steadily but still represent only around 3.5% of the market. According to the
European Communities, this share is unusually low. The European Communities is of the view that
in most other OECD countries the share of imported sprits is between 30% and 40% of the market for
distilled liquor. By comparison, the European Comm unities states that in Japan the share of imported
spirits was 8% in 1995, despite the fact that at th at time Japan applied a system of discriminatory
internal taxes similar to the one in dispute.
3.10. According to the European Communities, the Korean spirits market is overwhelmingly
dominated by soju. In 1996 sales of soju amount ed to 90 million 9L cases (810 million litres), which
represents as much as 94% of the distilled spirits market. 14 Soju's position, however, is allegedly
being eroded by growing sales of im ported spirits and liqueurs, and in particular of whisky. Over the
past few years, sales of soju have allegedly incr eased at a lower pace than the total spirits market
(between 1993 and 1994 sales of soju even decreased in absolute terms). As a result, the market share
of soju fell from 96.37 % in 1992 to 94.39 % in 1996.15
3.11. The European Communities states that imports of soju are insignificant. In 1997, Korea
allegedly imported just 1,625 litres. 16 In contrast, argues the European Communities, Korea exports
large quantities of soju. The European Communiti es further asserts that during the first eleven
months of 1996, exports of soju totalled 43 milli on litres of soju, which represents about 5% of the
Korean soju production. According to the Europ ean Communities, the main export market is Japan,
where soju is considered for customs and tax purposes as being the same product as local "shochu".
3.12. The European Communities further asserts that almo st all soju sold in Korea is diluted soju.
Distilled soju is estimated to account for just over 1% of the total sales of soju . While diluted soju is
generally an inexpensive liquor, distilled soju may fetch very high prices, similar to those paid for
imported premium brands of whisky.
3.13. The European Communities argues that, confr onted with growing sales of western-style
liquors, the manufacturers of diluted soju have been forced to address what are generally perceived by
Korean consumers as negative attributes of that liq uor as compared with the "western style" distilled
liquors: inferior quality, harsh taste, hangover effects.
3.14. According to the European Communities, this has led to the emergence of new so-called
"premium soju" brands, whose distinctive characteristi cs are a milder taste, the use of flavouring (e.g.
with honey) and/or ageing processes, and more s ophisticated packaging. The European Communities
asserts that the prices for premium soju brands are between two and three times higher than those for

13 A table summarising the recent evolution of the ta riff treatment of the products concerned by this
dispute is included in EC Annex 4.
14 EC Annex 5.
15 EC Annex 6.
16 EC Annex 7.

standard diluted soju. According to the European Co mmunities, in spite of that, sales of premium soju
are growing very rapidly. By EC estimates, in 1996 they represented 6% of soju sales and reached
10% in 1997.
3.15. The European Communities points out that whisky is the largest category of distilled spirits
after soju. Sales of whisky allegedly increased from 11 million litres in 1992 to 27 millions in 1996,
i.e. by almost 140%. As a result, the European Communities argues that the share of whisky rose
from 1.53% in 1992 to 3.14% in 1996. According to the European Communities, one of the main
reasons for this increase is the progressive reducti on in the applicable liquor tax rate from 200% in
1990 to 100% in 1996. The European Communities fu rther argues that Scotch whisky imported from
the European Communities, whether in bottles or in bulk, accounts for virtually all of the sales within
this tax category.
3.16. The European Communities further argues that th e category of brandy is still very small but
growing rapidly. The increase has allegedly been particularly remarkable in the case of cognac,
which went up from just 13,000 litres in 1992 to 193,000 litres in 1996. As in the case of whisky, the
argument goes, this increase is in part due to th e progressive reduction of the Liquor Tax rate from
150% in 1990 to 100% in 1996. Almost all brandy sold in Korea is imported, whether in bottles or in
bulk.
3.17. According to the European Communities, the cat egory of "General Distilled Liquors" is also
very small. In the EC view, unlike sales of whis ky and brandy, sales of liquors falling within this
category have stagnated and in some cases even dec lined. One of the reasons for this, according to
the European Communities is that, unlike whisky and brandy, this category has benefited only from a
marginal reduction of taxes. The European Communities alleges that. Although the liquor tax rate on
this category was lowered from 100% to 80% as from 1 July 1991, this reduction was almost totally
offset by a simultaneous increase of the app licable Education tax rate from 10% to 30%.
17 A
significant proportion of sales within this category is imported. According to estimates of the EC
industry, imports would represent approximately 20% of the sales of gin, 50% of the sales of rum and
70% of the sales of vodka.
3.18. The European Communities further alleges th at pre-mixes of distilled liquors and non-
alcoholic beverages account for a major portion of sales (95% according to the estimates of the EC
industry) within the category of "liqueurs". Acco rding to this argument, soju-based cocktails (e.g.
lemon flavoured soju, cherry flavoured soju) account fo r the vast majority of the sales of pre-mixes.
The EC view is that soju cocktails are a rela tively new product targeted at the young generation and
enjoy considerable success. According to the European Communities, during 1995 alone, sales of
soju cocktails increased by 1250%. There are no imports of soju cocktails.
3.19. In contrast, the European Communities argues that it may be estimated that as much as 90%
of the sales of "authentic" or "single item" liqueurs ar e imported. Sales of this type of "liqueurs" have
been growing off a small base at 15-20% every year and are currently estimated to represent 300,000
litres out of total market for liqueurs of 13.5 million litres.
3.20. The European Communities further argues that although no official sales figures have been
made available by the Korean Government, the EC industry estimates that while sales of whisky and
other imported liquors declined during 1997, sales of soju would have increased. As a result, the
European Communities argues, soju may have regain ed its lost share of the market. This new
development is the result of extraordinary circumstances.

17 EC Annex 2.

3.21. According to the European Communities, in th e first place, the depreciation of the Korean
won, which has made import ed liquors more expensive 18. To this, states the European Communities,
it must be added the effects of the boycotts agai nst imported products orch estrated by civic groups
and by business associations such as the Central Council of Korean Night-spots' Operators during the
first months of 1997. Finally, according to the European Communities, the financial crisis which
broke in October of last year, and the ensuing slow down in the Korean economy has made consumers
much more price conscious and further depressed the sales of imported liquors to the benefit of the
less taxed and less expensive soju.
3.22. The European Communities argues that western-st yle liquors used to be perceived by Korean
consumers as "luxury" items. According to the European Comm unities, at present the prices for
western-style liquors remain much higher than the pr ices for diluted soju. Nevertheless, according to
the European Communities, following the lifting of the import quotas and the lowering of import
duties and liquor taxes, there has been a clear trend towards lower cons umer prices, broader
availability in all sales channels and consumption patterns which are more similar to those of soju.
3.23. The European Communities concludes that the remaining tax differentials stand as an
obstacle to that trend and hinder further competition between soju and imported western-style distilled
spirits and liqueurs.
B. UNITED STATES
3.24. From the US perspective, the products concerne d by this dispute are soju, a locally produced
distilled liquor, on the one hand, and imported distilled spirits classified under the Harmonized
System (HS) heading 2208, on the other hand, 19 including spirits such as vodka, whisky, gin, rum,
brandy and liqueurs. Exports in 1996 of U.S. distilled spirits to Korea were allegedly only $1.8
million compared to an average export level in recent years of $90 million to Japan.
3.25. The United States alleges that the current tax system and the state of the Korean market grows
out of many years of protecting soju. It claims that although Korea has dismantled some of its trade
barriers to imports over the last ten years (an effort that has produced inroad s for imported spirits in
the Korean market), Korea retains two tax laws that categorises liquor products arbitrarily, and
imposes corresponding discriminatory tax rates.
3.26. The United States further alleges that Korea’s current tariff and tax regime governing the sale
of alcoholic beverages has grown out of a historica lly restrictive market for alcoholic beverages that
has shaped the Korean market as it stands today.
3.27. The United States asserts that after 1949, high tariffs, quotas and other measures were used by
the Korean government to discourage the importatio n of distilled alcoholic beverages and conserve
the country’s foreign exchange reserves. It cites, for example, that in th e 1970's Korea assessed a
duty of 150% C.I.F. on whisky imports. Until Janua ry 1989, Korea maintained quota restrictions on
bulk imports of whisky, and it prohibited the importation of bottled whisky until July 1989.
Importers were required to pay a deposit on the va lue of their imports, and the government permitted
only twelve licensed importers until 1989.

18 The average monthly exchange rate between the Korean Won and the ECU fell from 1028.35 Wons
to an ECU in January 1997 to 1616.28 wons in December 1997, i.e. by almost 60 %.
19 Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80 percent vol.; spirits,
liqueurs and other spirituous beverages; compound alcoholic preparations of a kind used for the manufacture of
beverages.

3.28. The United States further alleges that in the 198 0's, Korea began to liberalize these barriers to
distilled spirits imports by reducing applied rates on whisky. In 1982, the government reduced the
rate of duty imposed on whisky from 150% to 100% fo r products certified for use in tourist hotels. In
1984, the government extended this rate reduction to a ll whisky imports regardless of destination. In
1988 the customs duty was further cut to 50%, wher e it remained until a reduction to 40% in 1991,
followed by 30% in 1993. In 1996, Korea applied a tariff rate of 20% on whisky. Korea’s WTO
bound rate, as a result of negotiations during the Uruguay Round, descends from a base of 100% in
1995 to a final rate of 30% in 2004 in equal annual instalments.
3.29. The United States also alleg es that, following pressure from the European Communities,
Korea has also recently dismantled a number of its non-tariff barriers against distilled alcoholic
beverages. In 1988, Korea eliminated the impor t deposit requirements for small and medium sized
importers. In 1989, it reduced this deposit for large importers from 10% to 5%; increased the number
of licensed importers from 12 to 25; lifted quota restrictions on the import of bulk whisky; and
permitted the import of whisky bottled abroad for the first time, albeit subject to a quota. In 1990, the
government removed this quota, abolished the im port deposit requirement for large importers, and
removed government limitations on the number of licensed importers. In 1991, Korea allowed
foreign investment in the importation and distribution of spirits.
3.30. The thrust of the US case is that concurrent with these tariff and non-tariff measures, Korea
maintained a discriminatory system of internal tax es weighted against imported alcoholic beverages.
According to the United States, after World Wa r II, taxes on whisky and beer provided the
government with a steady and easily collected form of revenue. However, in the face of increasing
pressure, especially from the EC, Korea enacted a seri es of tax reductions on some imported distilled
alcoholic beverages. Korea allegedly decreased the liquor tax rate on whisky and brandy from 200%
to 150% in July 1991, 120% in January 1994, and 100% in January 1996.
The current Korean market for distilled liquors
3.31. The United States submits that th e Korean market for distilled alcoholic beverages, valued at
approximately 2 trillion won in 1989, has been one of the largest in Northeast Asia. However, the
United States adds that the Korean market for dis tilled spirits and liqueurs was virtually closed to
imports until the late eighties. Until 1 January 1989, imports of distilled spirits in bulk were subject to
quotas, and imports of distilled spirits in bottles we re prohibited and thereafter subject to quantitative
restrictions until 1 January 1990. Applied ta riffs were prohibitive until 1991. Currently, the
applicable import duty is 20% for all distilled spirits and liqueurs, except brandy (which is subject to a
15% import duty) and soju (which is subject to a 30% import duty).
3.32. The United States argues that in light of this background, the Korean market for alcoholic
beverages has been dominated by traditional bevera ges, such as soju, with a relatively low alcohol
content (25%) and bottled for mass consumption. In 1996 sales of soju amounted to 89.825 million
nine-litre cases (i.e., 808 million litres), which represen ts as much as 94% of the distilled spirits
market.
3.33. The United States further argues that imports of so ju into Korea are insignificant. Last year
Korea allegedly imported less than 2000 (1,625) litr es. However, Korea exports large quantities of
soju. During the first eleven months of 1996, exports of soju totalled 43 million litres, which
represents about 5% of Korean soju production. The main export market is alleged to be Japan.
3.34. According to the United States, almost all soju so ld in Korea is diluted soju. Distilled soju is
estimated to account for less than 1% of the total sales of soju. The United States claims that although
diluted soju is generally inexpensive, distilled soju can fetch very high prices, similar to those paid for
imported premium brands of whisky.

3.35. The United States asserts that in the last ten years, the Korean government’s relaxation of
several import barriers has increased the compet itiveness of the domestic market for alcoholic
beverages, even though the retail prices for Western- style liquors remain much higher than the prices
for diluted soju.
3.36. The United States argues that manufacturers of soju have addressed what are generally
perceived by Korean consumers as its negative attr ibutes compared with the imported liquors: poor
quality, bad flavour, hangover effects, etc. This has led to the emergence of a new segment of so-
called "premium soju" brands, whose distinctive characteristics are a milder taste, the use of
flavouring (e.g., with honey), and/or ageing pro cesses and more sophisticated bottle designs. The
prices for premium diluted soju brands are between two and three times higher than those for standard
diluted soju. It is estimated that sales of pr emium soju represented 6% of soju sales in 1996 and
probably reached 10% in 1997.
3.37. The United States further argues that in addition to developing new types of soju for
consumption in Korea, soju makers have also be gun to exploit the export market for soju. Exports
have risen dramatically in the last few years.
3.38. According to the United States, Korean consum ption of whisky has increased by about 30%
annually since 1994. Between 1992 and 1996, the Korean market for wh isky incr eased fro m 315
million won to 880 million won. Moreover, whisky bottled abroad makes up an increasing share of
this market, growing from 1.7% of this market in 1992 to 46.7% of the market in 1996.
3.39. However, the United States adds that although imports of distilled spirits have grown steadily,
they still represent only around 3.5% of the Korean ma rket. In most other OECD countries, the share
of imported spirits is allegedly between 30% and 40%.
C. K
OREA
3.40. According to Korea, the complainants spend considerable time arguing that Korea has a
history of protecting its soju industry. Korea st ates that no case has been brought against it for these
alleged violations. In Korea's view, therefore, these allegations are irrelevant to the case at hand, and
they should be disregarded.
3.41. Korea also notes that in the same way that the complainants wish to gloss over the differences
between the Korean and Japanese mark ets, they also wish to glo ss over the characteristics of the
Korean market and products that do not fit their line of argument. Korea notes for example, that the
complainants treat 'soju’ as one product. According to Korea, however, Korean distilled soju is very
different from what the complainants refer to as 'dilu ted' soju. In Korea's view, the latter is certainly
not a 'dilution' of the former.
3.42. Korea further argues that no Korean producer or consumer would consider distilled and
diluted soju to be substitutes. Korea further states that although the complainants mention the
existence of important differences between a 'dilu ted’ soju and 'distilled’ soju, the complainants
dismiss these differences by saying that distilled soju occupies less than 1% of the soju market.
3.43. Korea argues that, having so dismissed distilled soju, the complainants proceed to use
examples drawn from the exceptions in order to support general statements about all soju.

3.44. According to Korea, this dispute is about 'diluted’ soju, ('standard’ soju),
20 which represents
more than 99% of all 'soju' sold in Korea. Furt her, according to Korea, the question in this case is
whether Korea’s system of taxing distilled be verages discriminates against imported distilled
alcoholic beverages, to the advantage of standard soju. Of those western-type liquors, Korea argues
that the Panel must be cognisant that whisky is by far the most important, representing the greatest
proportion of all the imported distilled beverages.
3.45. Korea seeks to show that its system for the taxation of alcoholic beverages is not
discriminatory, because the products at issue in this case are simply not in competition. According to
Korea, the United States and the European Commun ities try to establish that competitive relationship
by making generalisations such as "all are dr unk with the same purposes: thirst-quenching,
socialization", that they are made from the ox ymoronic "same large variety of raw materials", by
drawing specific examples from clearly exceptional cases, or -- their last resort-- by arguing that the
products are in 'potential' competition with each other.
3.46. Korea gives a general background about alcoholic drinks. Korea states that if one travels
around the world, one will encounter a seemingly infinite variety of alcoholic beverages, many having
a long and interesting history. Korea further argues that throughout the ages, virtually every culture in
the world discovered that the natural process of de composition of certain raw materials, typically
fruits and vegetables, led to sometimes tasty results. Over time, through trial and error, the process of
creating certain alcoholic beverages has become increasingly refined.
1. Features of distilled alcoholic beverages
3.47. Korea states that within the broad category of alcoholic beverages, one can distinguish
distilled beverages. According to Korea, to make a distilled alcohol, one first starts with fermented
raw material. That fermented matter is put throu gh a process of refinement and concentration, called
distillation.21 Beverages that have been distilled are gene rally referred to as 'spirits’, and spirits are
the products at issue in this case.
3.48. Korea further states that distilled liquors can be derived from materials as varied as grain,
corn, rice, fruit, sugar cane or beets, potatoes, or tapioca. Korea asserts that the selection of raw
materials for the manufacture of distilled alcoholic beverages may be traced to different geographical,
cultural and consumer requirements and can play an important role in determining the ultimate
qualities of the finished product.
3.49. Korea notes that another distinction is sometime s drawn between 'brown’ and 'white’ spirits.
According to Korea, this distinction refers to th e production process and appearance of the beverages:
brown spirits are brown (e.g., whisky or cognac); white spirits are clear (e.g., Korean soju or gin).
Korea further states that brown spirits are generally matured in wooden casks and derive their flavour
mainly from this process and from the original distille d ingredients. White spirits are not aged before
bottling and instead rely on the addition of ingredients during the distillation process, or afterwards, to
provide their distinctive flavour. These ingredients differ from one drink to another (e.g., gin derives
its special flavour from the juniper berry).

20 There is a disagreement between the complainants and Korea on whether to use the term diluted soju
or standard soju. For purposes of clarity, we adopt the te rm diluted soju. Within the category of diluted soju are
two sub-categories of premium diluted soju and standard diluted soju. No substantive determination is implied
by this decision regarding terminology. We also note that this appears to be the terminology used by the Korean
Fair Trade Commission in the decision submitted by Korea (Attachment 1 to Korea's first submission).
21 Distillation is defined in Webster’s dictionary as 'a process that consists of driving gas or vapour
from liquids or solids by heating and condensing to liquid products. . .’

2. Consumer behaviour
3.50. Korea argues that consumer preferences for alcoholic beverages vary from country to country.
Certain countries have their own national drink. Fo r instance, argues Korea, in France, wine is the
national drink, in Germany it is beer, and in Japan it is sake. Korea adds that some national drinks are
virtually unknown in other countries. According to Korea, this is the case fo r Korean soju, which is
hardly known outside Northeast Asia and Korean communities abroad.
3.51. Korea further argues that these national drinks re flect the different cultures and traditions of
the various countries. In addition, argues Korea, the climate, food and history of a country also
determine the customs of its people and the way they drink alcoholic beverages. Thus, according to
Korea, in hot countries one drinks certain alcoholic beverages to quench one's thirst, while in cold
countries one drinks certain alcoholic beverages to keep warm. In other countries people drink
particular alcoholic beverages for mere entertai nment purposes, i.e., in bars, night clubs or posh
hotels. In other countries one drinks particular alcoholic beverages as an accompaniment to a meal.
3.52. Korea further asserts that in Fran ce, for instance, it is common to drink wine over a meal. In
Korea's view, this is because the nuanced flavour of wine complements the food French people eat.
However, with spicy food one is unlikely to order a beverage such as wine, because such food would
overwhelm wine’s subtle flavours. In Korea, the argument goes, Koreans drink soju with their spicy
food. Soju goes well with Korean barbecue and ot her Korean meals, because the drink's harshness
cuts the spiciness of the food.
3.53. Korea further argues that people can also drink alcoholic beverages either mixed, on the rocks
or straight, cold or hot or a combination of both. According to Korea, soju is never drunk mixed,
whereas whisky, vodka and Japanese shochu are drin ks which commonly are drunk both straight and
mixed.
3. Price
3.54. Korea further argues that alcoholic beverages can vary widely in price. Korea gives as an
example, a bottle of bordeaux which has allegedl y been known to fetch thousands of dollars at
auction, while a bottle of potato-based alcohol can be very cheap. In Korea's view, one of the factors
affecting the price of an alcoholic beverage is the type of raw materials used to produce it. Additional
manufacturing processes, such as ageing, increase the value and price of a product, partly because
only a selected portion of the product is suitable for ageing. Prices will also be affected by distribution
costs and margins, product image, consumer demand, etc.
4. Korean soju
3.55. Korea notes that despite their similarity in names, a sharp distinction must be drawn between
'diluted' or 'standard’ soju on the one hand, and distilled soju on the other hand. Standard soju is not a
diluted form of distilled soju.22
3.56. According to Korea, standard soju is a very common beverage, and millions of litres are sold
each year.23 Korea asserts that it is made from cheap ra w materials: joojung (ethyl alcohol), which is
drawn from fermented sweet potatoes, tapioca or co rn and distilled so as to obtain as pure an alcohol

22 Korea asserts that the word 'soju’ is a term which has become generic.
23 The exact figure for standard soju taxed volume in 1996 is 787 195 kl. (Sources: National Tax
Administration, Statistical Yearbook of National Tax 1996 (1997); Customs Administration & Korean Traders
Association, Statistical Yearbook of Trade 1996 (1997)). The exact figure for standard soju taxed volume in
1997 is 814 159 kl. (Source: National Tax Administration, not yet published.)

as possible. To make standard soju, that alcohol (j oojung) is not further distilled, but is diluted with
water, and six to seven additives are added.
24 Korea adds no further ageing or colouring is permitted
by law. Korea asserts that this drink has a relatively low alcoholic strength for a spirit: 25%.
3.57. Korea further argues that another unusual characte ristic of standard soju is that, unlike other
spirits, it is commonly consumed with meals. This is also recognised outside Korea, in areas with
important Korean communities. Korea cites as an example Santa Clara, California, where Korean
restaurants that only have a license to sell low alcohol drinks are permitted a special exemption to sell
standard soju as well. According to Korea, this is a recognition of the fact that it is customary for
Koreans to drink a distilled beverage (of 25% alcohol content) with their meals.
25
3.58. Korea argues that distilled soju, on the other hand, is an artisanal product, 26 sold in tiny
quantities (0.2% of the volume of standard soju). 27 According to Korea, distilled soju is usually made
from grain or rice. 28 Korea states that the production process is quite sophisticated, no additives are
added. By law, argues Korea, distilled soju can be aged for up to two years prior to sale. Korea also
asserts that the alcoholic strength of distilled soju is 40% to 45%, which is considerably stronger than
standard soju. Korea also argues that moreover, dist illed soju has a distinct taste, which is smoother
than standard soju. Distilled soju is 10 to 20 times mo re expensive than standard soju, pre-tax, and is
packaged in special ceramic bottles, and is often offered as a gift.
3.59. Korea states that it should be noted that the Korean liquor tax law classifies standard soju and
distilled soju separately and attaches a different ta x rate to each, 35% and 50% respectively. Korea
also notes that while the United States acknowledges that standard soju and distilled soju have the
same rate of Education Tax (10%), it fails to mention that the liquor tax on distilled soju is 50%, while
the liquor tax on standard soju is 35%. Korea also notes that another mistaken attempt at trivialising
the distinctions between distilled and standard soju is the EC assertion that the distinction in the tax
law was introduced only in 1991, and that this was in response to pressure from the European
Communities. According to Korea, the distinction was made as early as 1962.
3.60. Korea notes that in recent years certain "up-mark et" varieties of standard soju have been
introduced, which are commonly referred to as 'pre mium' soju. The composition of "premium" is
slightly different from standard soju, giving the drink a somewhat milder taste. 29 The producers
charge a higher price for this variety, up to twice the price for standard soju before tax. According to
Korea, to justify this higher price, they sometimes make exaggerated claims.

24 Sugar, citric acid, amino acid, solbitol, mineral salt, stevioside, and aspartame. These additives all
serve a particular purpose to enhance the taste of soju , i. e., sugar, to make it sweet; citric acid, to give soju a
sour taste; amino acid, to enhance its flavour and act as a sweetener, adding a seaweed-like taste; solbitol, a
form of sweetener which has a thick sweet taste; mineral salt, which acts as a catalyst to bring a change of taste
to all the additives; stevio side, which has strong light sweet taste 150 to 300 times sweeter than sugar; and
aspartame (nutrasweet), which is a chemical flavour enhancement 200 times sweeter than sugar.
25 According to Korea, 'Today, soju and a platter of barbecued meat are as inseparable in South Korea
as beer and hot dogs or margheritas and chips in the United States’, San Jose Mercury News,
http://infi.net/global/cgi-bin/sj/slwebcli_post.pl.
26 The artisans who make distilled soju are recognised as 'Human Treasures’ by Korean Governmental
Decree. Their skill is recognised as an 'Intangible Cultural Asset’. One such example (Moon Bae-Sool) is shown
in US Exhibit D.
27 The exact figure for distilled soju consumption in 1996 is 1325 kl. Source: National Tax
Administration, Statistical Yearbook of National Tax 1996 (1997).
28 The complainants state that distilled soju is made of potato or grain. Korea claims that in reality
potatoes are not used. The leading brands of distilled soju (Moon Bae-Sool and Andong Soju) are made from
grain or rice.
29 For instance, in the leading bran d of 'premium' soju, Kimsatgat, h oney replaces stevioside as one of
the seven additives.

3.61. Korea also argues that the complainants focu s on these claims to draw inferences for the
entire soju market, 30 or even to question the credibility of information Korea gave during the
consultations which took place prio r to this Panel proceeding, implying that Korea drew a false
distinction between distilled and standard soju. 31 In Korea's view, the reality is, however, that
premium soju is no more than an upgraded commodity. It is classified as standard soju in the liquor
tax law. Premium soju only represented 4.46% of standard soju sales in 1996 and 5.39% in 1997.32
5. Changes since 1990
3.62. Korea asserts that there is a strong undertone in the complainants' submissions that there has
always been something wrong with Korea’s liquor and education taxes, and under pressure from the
EC and the US, Korea finally came to recognise this . Korea further states that the complainants
suggest that the changes Korea introduced since 1990 came too slowly, and ultimately did not remove
the illegal nature of the taxes.
3.63. According to Korea, the European Communiti es and the United States have indeed gone to
great lengths to influence Korea's domestic policies in the recent past. Korea submits that in the
interest of avoiding friction with important tr ading partners and allies, Korea has tried to
accommodate US and EC demands by foregoing tax revenue. In Ko rea's view, this was not an
admission of fault.
3.64. Korea notes that the European Communities alleg es that decreases in Korea’s liquor tax were
'almost totally offset by a simultaneous increase of the applicable education tax rate’. 33 According to
Korea, the European Communities shou ld have also mentioned that at the time that the education tax
was increased from 10% to 30%, the defence tax (30% ) was repealed. Thus, in Korea's view, there
was an overall reduction in the applicable tax rate.

30 To illustrate, the 15 pages of advertisements included in the EC first submission only include two
advertisements for standard soju (about 95% of the soju market), all the rest being advertisements for premium
soju (4 to 5% of the soju market).
31 According to Korea, the EC, in support of this s uggestion, cited advertisements for a standard soju
brand which claimed that this soju was aged. However, the Korean Fair Trade Commission, in a decision of 30
November 1996, found that this claim constituted false advertising. The decision is reproduced in Attachment 1.
32 According to Korea, in 1996, total taxed volume of premium soju was 35 108 kl (including the
leading brands 'Chamnamoo' produced by Jinro, 'Kimsatgat' produced by Bohae and 'Chungsanri' produced by
Kyoungwoul). In 1997, total taxed volume was 43 873 kl (including the same brands). (Source: National Tax
Administration). The EC and US estimate, unsubstantiated, that premium soju sales represented 6% of total soju
sales in 1996 and increased to 10% in 1997 is therefore incorrect. (See EC first submission at para. 54 and US
first submission at para. 41.) Note that the total taxed volume of standard soju was 787 195 kl in 1996 and 814
159 kl in 1997.
33 EC first submission, para. 57.

3.65. Korea presents the following table that purports to show the reduced tax burden on whisky
since 1991:

 (in %) Whisky liquor
tax
Education tax Defence tax Combined
surtax burden
Combined tax
burden
 Before 1991 200 10 30 80 280
Before 1994 150 30 - 45 195
Before 1996 120 30 - 36 156
Since 1996 100 30 - 30 130

IV. CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The European Communities claims that:
(i) Korea is in breach of its obligations under GATT Article III:2, first sentence, by
applying internal taxes on imported vodka pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law and the
Education Tax which are in excess of those applied on soju; and
(ii) Korea is in breach of its obligations under Article III:2, second sentence, by applying
higher internal taxes pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax Law on
imported liquors falling within the categories of 'whisky', 'brandy', 'general distilled
liquors, 'liqueurs', and 'other liquors' (to the extent that they contain other distilled
spirits or liqueurs) than on soju, so as to afford protection to its domestic production
of soju.
4.2. The United States claims that the Korean la ws outlined above diffe rentiate among distilled
spirits on the basis of arbitrary characteristics, resulting in great disparities in the treatment of soju and
imported distilled spirits. According to the United States, at the very minimum:
(i) Korea’s application of internal taxes on vodka that exceed taxes applied to soju is
inconsistent with the first sentence of GATT Article III:2; and
(ii) Korea's application of higher internal taxes to imported distilled spirits classified
under HS heading 2208 falling within its legal categories of "whisky," "brandy,"
"general distilled liquors," "liqueurs" and "other liquors" (to the extent that they
contain other distilled spirits) afford prot ection to its domestic production of soju,
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article III:2.

V. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. P
RELIMINARY ISSUES
1. General
5.1. The complainants argue that Korea's request for preliminary rulings was not properly
formulated and it was unclear what provisions of the WTO Agreement, if any, Korea considers to
have been violated by the complainants, and that it was also unclear what precisely is the issue being
addressed by Korea to the Panel.
5.2. According to the European Communities, it is unclear whether Korea is asking the Panel to
find that the European Communities has violated ceratin procedural provisions of the DSU, or
whether it is asking the Panel to dismiss the compla int because certain procedural pre-requisites were
not fulfilled, or whether it is asking the Panel to discharge itself.
5.3. The United States was of the view was that given the scarce information provided by Korea in
Korea’s oral statement (which formed the basis of its request for preliminary rulings) it considers that
any preliminary ruling by the Panel would not be wa rranted. The United States adds that to the
extent the request for a preliminary ruling warrant s any attention, it may be addressed in the Final
Panel report.
2. Specificity of the panel requests
5.4. Korea takes issue with the specificity of the requests for a panel made by both the European
Communities and the Unites States.
5.5. Korea notes that the European Communities, in its request for a panel, has referred to a
preferential tax rate on 'soju' vis-a-vis 'certain' alcoholic beverages falling within HS heading 2208.
Korea states that the European Communities has not clarified its position even in its written
submission. Korea further notes that the European Communities claim that 'all other distilled spirits
and liqueurs' other than 'soju' falling within HS 2208 are within the purview of this dispute.
5.6. Korea states that the US' request for a panel lacks specificity as well. Korea notes that the
United States, in its request for a panel, refers to higher tax rates on 'other distilled spirits', while
specifically mentioning 'whisky, brandy, vodka, rum, gin, and ad mixtures'. Korea further notes that
the United States, in its first submission, seeks to broa den the dispute to all dist illed spirits, other than
soju, that are classified under HS 2208.
5.7. Korea argues that such vaguely worded complaints violate its rights of defence. According to
Korea, HS 2208 is a very broad tariff classificati on, which covers a wide variety of alcoholic
beverages, including non-western liquors such as kor yangu, Korean soju, Insam ju, Ogapiju, and
Japanese shochu. Korea notes that it is surprising that both complainants refer to 'western-style
liquors', yet HS 2208 also includes non-'western-style liquors'.
5.8. Korea argues that this lack of specificity of the complainants' claims is improper for two
reasons -
(i) it frustrates Korea's right of defense, which is a general principle of due process
implicit in the DSU; and

(ii) it violates a clear obligation of the DSU, wh ich is that such a request should 'identify'
the specific measures at issue, and 'presen t the problem clearly', as stipulated in
Article 6.
5.9. Korea, therefore, requests the panel to issu e a preliminary ruling, limiting the products at
issue in this dispute. Korea submits that the only imported liquors whose tax rates are to be compared
with the tax rate on the domestic soju products are: whisky, brandy, vodka, gin, and rum. According
to Korea, these are the liquors identified specifically by the United States in its request for a panel In
Korea's view, parties to a dispute cannot unilaterally alter the terms of reference by expanding, in their
first submission, on issues not previously raised.
5.10. Korea also submits that it is unable to identify which items the United States is referring to by
its reference to 'ad mixtures' in its request for a panel.
5.11. Korea also claims that the complainants have not clearly distinguished the domestic liquors
that are supposed to be more favourably taxed in Korea. Korea states, in particular, that the
complainants have not distinguished between Korea' s distilled soju, an artisanal product sold at very
high prices in tiny quantities, and subject to a 50% tax rate, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
diluted or standard soju, which is a large volume, inexpensive drink, consumed with meals and taxed
at a rate of 35%.
5.12. Korea argues that both complainants, in their re quests for a panel, have referred to one 'soju'
product, without acknowledging that there are, in reality, two different products, with two different
tax rates. Korea also states that the complainants have not recognized that one group of western-style
spirits ('liqueurs'), which they have mentioned in passing, is taxed at the same rate as distilled soju
(50%).
5.13. The European Communities argues that its panel re quest is more than sufficiently specific to
meet the minimum requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. According to the European Communities,
the mere fact that HS 22.08 covers many different t ypes of liquors is no basis to consider that it lacks
specificity.
5.14. The European Communities also rejects Korea's assertion that it has, through its first
submission, broadened the scope of its complaint as contained in the request for a panel. According
to the European Communities, its request for a pane l refers to '.. certain alcoholic beverages falling
within HS 22.08'. In the EC's view, that HS positi on does not cover only 'spirits' but also 'undentured
ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80% 'liqueurs' and 'other spirituos
beverages' not falling within any other position of chapter 22 of the HS.
5.15. The European Communities notes that its first submission refers to 'soju and all other distilled
spirits and liqueurs falling within HS 22.08. In th e EC's view, therefore, its first submission if
anything narrows rather than broadens the scope of its complaint.
5.16. The United States argues that Article 6.2 of the DS U requires, inter alia, that the request for a
panel "identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly." According to the United States, its panel request
satisfied both these requirements, and it also clearly includes all distilled spirits within HS heading
2208, as maintained in the first US submission.
5.17. The United States argues that in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU, its request for the
establishment of a panel defined the Korean measur es at issue: the general liquor tax law and the
Education Tax; and provided a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint. The United States
refers to Bananas III , where the Appellate Body allegedly no ted that this provision concerning the

legal basis requires that the request for a panel must be sufficiently specific with respect to the claims
being advanced, but need not lay out all the arguments
34 that will subsequently be made in the party’s
submission. The United States argues that with respect to its request in this dispute, the legal claim is
clear: that Korea’s taxes are higher on imported distilled spirits than on its domestic product "soju," in
violation of Article III:2 of the GATT.
5.18. The United States argues that Korea’s request that the Panel limit the proceeding to five
specific products -- whisky, brandy, vodka, rum, and gin, is equally without basis. According to the
United States, the panel request, which defines the term s of reference of the panel, refers to taxation
of "other distilled spirits" -- i.e., distilled spirits other than soju. By using the term "such as," it sets
forth the five products and "ad mixtures"
35 as examples, and not as an exclusive list. According to the
United States, the extent to which the United Stat es and European Communities establish to the Panel
that all such products are "like" or "directly compet itive or substitutable" is a matter to be determined
through the course of these proceedings, beginning w ith the first submission. The United States notes
that, under Article 7 of the DSU, the Panel may not decline to address products that are clearly within
its terms of reference, but must base its findings on the entirety of the proceeding.36
5.19. As regards the challenge of defining which soju is referred to, the European Communities
states that it regards all the varieties of soju as one product, with the necessary result that 'liqueurs' are
more heavily taxed than some soju. According to the European Communities, the question of whether
soju is or is not a single product is a substantiv e issue which cannot be decided by the panel in a
preliminary ruling.
5.20. The United States also argues that with respect to the use of the word "soju," its panel request
made it clear that the tax preference for all soju was covered, giving Korea ample objective notice that
the entire category was to be challenged. According to the United States, given the major emphasis in
Korea's first submission concerning the differences between diluted and distilled soju, it is evident
that Korea in fact did have ample notice -- suffici ent to structure its entire first submission on the
basis of alleged differences in the two kinds of soju.
3. Adequacy of consultations
5.21. Korea also submits that explicit obligations of the DSU - namely 3.3, 3.7 and 4.5 - have been
violated. Korea in effect alleg es that the complainants did not e ngage in consultations in good faith
with a view to reaching a mutual solution as envisaged by the DSU.
5.22. Korea alleges that there was no meaningful ex change of facts because the complainants
treated the consultations as a one-sided question a nd answer session, and therefore, frustrated any
reasonable chance for a settlement.

34 Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (Bananas III), adopted on 25 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 141.
35 According to the United States, ad-mixtures are generally low grade distilled spirits composed of a
percentage of high grade spirits combined with neutral spirits and water. They are taxed as "other liquors"
under Article 3.11 of the Korean Liquor Law, and are thus well within the terms of reference. For instance, in
Korea, there are many brands of ad mixes, such as Black Joker malt whisky. The alcohol in Black Joker
contains 19.9% whisky, with the other 80.1% coming from neutral spirits. The product then looks and tastes
like whisky, but is considerably cheaper. This is due to the fact that neutral spirits do not undergo any post
distillation processing, unlike whisky which must be aged in wooden barrels for two years, or more.
36 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages adopted on 1 November 1996,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R at 27; Appellate Body Report, Bananas III, paras. 145-147.

5.23. Korea considers this non-observance of specific provisions of the DSU as a "violation of the
tenets of the WTO dispute settlement system" and requests the Panel for a ruling (no indication is
made as to what relief Korea is seeking on this point).
5.24. Both complainants assert that Korea's claim w ould appear to be that they have infringed
Articles 3.3, 3.7 and 4.5 of the DSU because they did not attempt to reach a mutually acceptable
solution to the dispute in the course of the consultations that preceded the establishment of this Panel.
They note that at the first meeting with the Pane l, Korea asserted that the United States and the
European Communities have "ignored":
(i) Article 3.3 of the DSU, which provides that the "prompt settlement of disputes is
essential to the effective functioning of the WTO";
(ii) Article 3.7 of the DSU, to the extent it calls for a "mutually acceptable" and
"positive" solution; and
(iii) Article 4.5 of the DSU, which states th at in the course of consultations, Members
should attempt to "obtain satisfactory adjustment" of the matter.
5.25. The complainants refer to the panel decision in Bananas III in which it was stated
[....] Consultations are, however, a matter reserved for the parties. The DSB is not
involved; no panel is involved; and the consultations are held in the absence of the
Secretariat. In these circumstances, we are not in a position to evaluate the
consultation process in order to determine if it functioned in a particular way. While
a mutually agreed solution is to be preferre d, in some cases it is not possible for the
parties to agree upon one. In those cases, it is our view that the function of the panel
is only to ascertain that consultations, if re quired, were in fact held or, at least,
requested.
As to the EC argument that consultations must lead to an adequate explanation of the
complainants' case, we cannot agree. Consu ltations are the first step in the dispute
settlement process. While one function of th e consultations may be to clarify what
the case is about, there is nothing in the DS U that provides that a complainant cannot
request a panel unless its case is adequately explained in the consultations. The
fulfilment of such a requirement would be difficult, if not impossible for the
complainant to demonstrate if a respondent chose to claim a lack of understanding of
the case, a result which would undermine the automatic nature of the panel
establishment under the DSU. The only per-re quisite for requesting a panel is that
consultations have 'failed to settle a dispute within 60 days of receipt of the request
for consultations... Ultimately, the function of providing notice to a respondent of a
complainant's claims and arguments is serv ed by the request for the establishment of
a panel and by the complainants' submissions to that panel.
37
The complainants point out that Korea cannot dispute the fact that consultations were in fact held on
three separate occasions between itself and both the United States and the European Communities.
5.26. The complainants state that, in any event it is not true that they refused to engage in a
'meaningful exchange of facts' during the GATT Arti cle XXII consultations. They allege that it was
Korea's attitude during the consultations which prevented such exchange from taking place.

37 Panel Report on Bananas III, WT/DS27/R, paras. 7.18-7.19.

5.27. The United States further argues th at Korea’s complaints about the alleged inadequacy of the
complainants’ attempts to settle the dispute or engage in good faith consultatio ns have no bearing on
the authority of the Panel or the progress of this proceeding.
5.28. The United States asserts that Korea’s asserti on that the United States and the European
Communities failed to engage in good faith consultations is belied by the record. According to the
United States, the three parties to this dis pute (Korea, the United States and the European
Communities) held consultations on three separat e occasions over a six-week period, in which
numerous factual and legal issues were discussed, including the fact that the Korean Liquor Law
applies to all types of distilled spirits covered by HS 2208. The United States asserts that it presented
detailed factual questions to Korea and requested th at the answers be provided in writing. According
to the United States, Korea refused to reply in writing but did agree to provide oral answers. The
United States also states that Korea acknowle dged that it was in possession of a market study
commissioned by Korean producers of distilled spirits, but declined to provide a copy.
5.29. The United States asserts that with the Europ ean Communities, it requested Korean data for
1990-1996 on all distilled spirits under HS heading 2208, by both volume and value, Korea initially
stated at the 24 June consultation that it would try to provide this information. According to the
United States, however, during the consultations held on 8 August 1997, the Korean delegation
refused to provide copies of this information, stati ng that it was only for the use of its private lawyers
for defensive purposes in the event a panel proceeding was initiated.
5.30. The United States, therefore, believes that th ese events make all the more baffling Korea’s
request for a procedural ruling, given that the United States failed to obtain sufficient factual
information from Korea.
4. Confidentiality
5.31. Korea alleges that both complainants breach the confidentiality requirement of Article 4.6 of
the DSU by making reference, in their submissi ons, to information supplied by Korea during
consultations.
5.32. The European Communities argues that Korea's interpretation of Article 4.6 of the DSU is
wrong. According to the European Communities, the confidentiality requirement of Article 4.6 of the
DSU concerns parties not involved in the disput e and the public in general. The European
Communities stresses that the requirement cannot in an y way be read as referring to the panel itself.
In the EC view, Article 4.6 cannot be interpreted as a limitation on th e rights of parties at the panel
stage.
5.33. It is also the EC view that, if the interpreta tion by Korea of Article 4.6 were correct, it is
Korea which has violated Article 4.6 of the DSU by making extensive reference to the consultations
in support of its claim under Article 3.3, 3.7, and 4.5 of the DSU.
5.34. The European Communities concludes that it is not the purpose of Article 4.6 of the DSU to
limit the possibilities available to a panel to be apprised of information on the dispute before it. In the
EC's view, there can be no 'artificial wall' betw een the consultation and the panel proceeding through
which the transfer of information is blocked.
5.35. The United States considers that Korea's claim concerning a breach of confidentiality in the
U.S. and EC submission is unclear concerning the relief it requests. to the extent it alleges a violation
of the DSU, such a claim is not within the panel' s terms of reference. Moreover, according to the
Untied States, the citation in a footnote in the fi rst U.S. submission cited by Korea attempted to

highlight a factual issue concerning which there was confusion in the Korean law, a point that was
rectified by the first submission and is of no consequence as a factual or legal matter.
B. P
ANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS ON JAPAN - TAXES ON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
1. Complainants
5.36. According to the European Communities, the Korean liquor tax system at issue in this dispute
is very similar to the system in place in Japan until very recently. The European Communities argues
that, like Korea in the instant situ ation, Japan applied a much lower rate to shochu (a local distilled
liquor which, the European Commun ities consider is "like" Korean soju) than to "western-style"
distilled spirits and liqueurs which are "like" or "directly competitive or substitutable" with shochu.
5.37. The European Communities notes that the Japanese liquor tax system was found to violate
Article III:2 of GATT by the 1987 Panel Report on Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling
Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages 38 (Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I )
and again by the 1996 Panel and Appellate Body Reports on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 39
(Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II).
5.38. The European Communities concedes that, in accordance with the Panels' terms of reference,
that finding was limited to the Japanese market. In the EC view, however, this does not mean that it is
irrelevant to the present dispute. The EC view is that although there may still subsist superficial
differences between the Japanese and the Korean market, the underlying dynamics of both markets
are very similar. According to the European Co mmunities, there is no good reason why the findings
made by prior Panels with respect to the Japanese ma rket should not be considered as pertinent in the
present dispute.
5.39. The United States argues that the Korean liquor ta x system at issue in this dispute is very
similar to the system in place in Japan until very r ecently. The United States further argues that like
Korea, Japan has long protected shochu, a local distill ed liquor which, in its pure form, is identical to
Korean soju. According to the United States, un til recently, Japan applied a much lower tax rate to
shochu than to other categories of Western distilled sp irits that -are "like" or "directly competitive or
substitutable with" shochu. The United States alleg es that the structure of its law is remarkably
similar to the Korea tax law, including a broad definition for shochu from which beverages such as
those using a birch filter (i.e., vodka) are arbitrarily excepted.
5.40. According to the complainants, the main difference between the Korean liquor tax system and
the Japanese system is that in the Korean system the taxes take the form of an ad valorem duty
whereas Japan applied specific taxes. In the complainants view, fo r the purposes of this dispute,
however, this has the consequence only of rendering even more transparent the protective effects of
the Korean system as compared to those of the Japanese system. A ccording to the complainants, in
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II ,40 Japan's main line of defen ce was that while the rates on
shochu were lower, the "tax/price ratios" (i.e. the tax burden expressed as a percentage of the retail
price) for all categories were "roughly the same". In the complainants view, in the present case, since
the taxes are ad valorem, Japan's attempted defence is not available to Korea.

38 Panel Report on Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages, (Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I) adopted on 10 November 1987, BISD 34S/83.
39 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, supra.
40 Ibid. paras 4.154-4.166.

5.41. The European Communities stat es that during the consultations Korea claimed, although
without providing any supporting evidence, that cu rrent consumption patterns in Korea differ from
consumption patterns in Japan. According to th e European Communities, even if the alleged
differences were proved to be significant, they would merely reflect the fact that western-style liquors
became a mass product in Japan earli er than in Korea, to a large extent as a result of an earlier
liberalisation of imports.
5.42. The European Communities further argues that the Korean market has no inherent or
permanent characteristic which makes it so differe nt from the Japanese market as to warrant the
conclusion that the very same liquors which were found to be "substitutable and competitive" on the
Japanese market in 1987 and 1996 cannot be regarded as such in Korea. To the contrary, the EC
argument goes, the current Korean market for distilled sprits and liqueurs is in many ways reminiscent
of the Japanese market in the early eighties.
5.43. The European Communities argu es that, as in Japan one decad e before, since the early
nineties an increase in the levels of disposable in come, coupled with the lifting of import quotas and a
reduction in the applicable tariffs and internal taxe s, have led to a spectacular increase in sales of
western-style liquors on the Korean market, and in particular of whisky.
5.44. According to the European Communities, Kore an consumers, like their Japanese neighbours,
at first perceived western-style liquors as "luxury" items to be offered as gifts or to be consumed only
on special occasions and at special places. Over time, however, the argument goes, there has been,
both in Japan and in Korea, a clear trend toward s lower prices, greater availability in all sales
channels, and consumption patterns which are more similar to those of the "traditional" local liquor.
5.45. The European Communities furthe r states that there has also been a trend towards the
"internationalisation" of the local liquors, which in Korea is illustrated by the recent emergence of the
premium soju segment and in Japan by the prolif eration of whisky-like and vodka-like shochus. The
result of these two converging trends is an ever increasing degree of competition between shochu/soju
and western-style liquors.
5.46. The European Communities concludes, that give n the close resemblance between the Korean
liquor tax system and the Japanese measures at issue in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I and
II, the Panel and Appellate Body reports adopted in those disputes are particularly relevant and
should provide decisive guidance to this Panel. It is submitted by the European Communities, in
particular, that the findings of those two Panels and of the Appellate Body to the effect that vodka and
shochu/soju are "like" products and that shochu/so ju and all other distilled spirits and liqueurs are
"substitutable" and "competitive" products, are equally relevant for this dispute.
5.47. The United States also takes the position that th e development of the distilled spirits markets
in Japan and Korea are very similar. Accordi ng to the United States, since the early 1990's an
increase in the levels of disposable income, coupled with the lifting of the import restrictions and a
reduction in the applicable tariffs and internal taxe s, have led to a spectacular increase in sales of
Western-style spirits on the Korean market, in particular whisky.
5.48. The United States further asserts that, like thei r Japanese neighbours, Korean consumers at
first perceived Western-style liquors as "luxury" items to be offered as gifts or to be consumed only
on special occasions and at special places. Over time, however, there has been, both in Japan and in
Korea, a clear trend towards consumption of a ll types of distilled spirits on more and varied
occasions, and in different methods of consumption, i. e. in mixed drinks, warm, cold, etc. According
to the United States, the expanding methods and ve nues of consumption have also been aided by
greater availability of all types of spirits in all sales channels.

5.49. According to the United States, the resu lt of expanded purposes for spirits, and the
burgeoning styles of soju is an ever increasing degr ee of competition between soju and Western-style
liquors. Those trends are converging in Korea, as in Japan.
5.50. The United States also concludes that the clos e similarity between the Korean liquor tax
system and the Japanese measures at issue in the recent WTO/GATT disputes make the Panel and
Appellate Body findings in that case very pertinen t to this Panel’s examination of Korean tax
measures. In particular, the United States argues th at the findings of those two panels and of the
Appellate Body to the effect that vodka and shochu/ soju are "like" products and that shochu/soju and
all other distilled spirits are directly competitive or substitutable products are especially relevant for
this dispute.
2. Korea
5.51. Korea notes that both the United States and the European Communities demonstrate the
desire simply to superimpose the results of the 1996 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Panel on
this case. In Korea's view, the complainants attempt to equate Japan and Korea, their markets, and the
products at issue. According to Korea, they do so by asserting that soju and shochu are 'identical’,
and that the 'underlying dynamics of both [the Japanese and Korean] markets are very similar’, save
some 'superficial differences’. Korea argues that th is approach is not compatible with Article III:2
GATT.
5.52. Korea argues that Korean soju is not identical to Japanese shochu, irrespective of statements
made in the context of the Japan case, to which Ko rea was not a party. Korea cites the example from
the complainants to say that Ko rean companies are exporting soju to Japan. According to Korea,
when Korean soju is exported to Japan, it is destined for the Korean community in Japan,
41 and sold in
Korean stores and restaurants. However, argu es Korea, Korean producers exporting to Japan are
primarily aiming to capture Japanese consumers. Fo r this purpose, they export a different product, a
sort of 'Korean shochu’. These two products are taxed differently under the Japanese liquor tax law.
Korea adds that 'Korean shochu’ is not sold in Korea.
5.53. Korea further argues that despite the complain ants’ contentions, the Korean case is not a
'mirror image’ of the Japanese case, and Korea will not entertain arguments in that vein. Korea argues
that it need only point to the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II Panel report itself, which
repeatedly stresses that an Article III examinati on must be carried out on a 'case-by-case basis’, 42
noting in particular that 'consumers’ tastes and habits . . . change from country to country’.43
5.54. Korea acknowledges that the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II case sets forth the legal
framework for the application and interpretation of Article III of GATT. Korea accepts that it will
follow that framework in its analysis, but adds that when these legal rules are applied to the facts of
this case, the result is completely different than under the dissimilar set of facts of the Japanese case.
Korea and Japan: differences between their products and markets
5.55. According to Korea, the first noticeable differe nce between soju and shochu is taste. Korea
argues that Japanese shochu has a neutral taste compared to Korean soju, which is sweeter. 44

41 Korean residents in Japan numbered 699 847 persons as of June 1997.
42 Panel Report, paras. 6.21, 6.22, and 6.28 of the 1996 .
43 Panel Report, paras. 6.21.
44 Korea argues that soju contains six to seven add itives whereas shochu only has up to two (citric acid
and sugar). Korea notes that this distinction is not recogn ised in the 'test report’ by the Scotch Whisky Research
Institute, appended as EC Annex 8. Korea further notes that according to this 'test report’, Korean standard soju

Consumers easily recognise that taste difference; Koreans prefer soju and will not accept shochu as a
substitute; the Japanese feel the same way about shochu.
5.56. Secondly, according to Korea, soju is allegedly only drunk straight at a cold temperature. In
Japan, on the other hand, different consumption patte rns exist for the consumption of shochu: one can
drink it straight or mixed with warm or cold water.
45
5.57. Korea argues that these differences are so important that Korean companies attempting to sell
Korean soju in Japan have had to make a special product to appeal to the Japanese consumer. As an
example Korea refers to the Korean company Jinr o, which sells two products on the Japanese market,
Jinro Gold and Jinro Export. According to Korea, the first product is exported to Japan in very small
quantities (32 kl in 1997) with the primary purpose of targeting the Korean resi dents in Japan. This
brand is only distributed to Korean restaurants a nd Korean supermarkets in Japan. The second brand,
Jinro Export, targets Japanese consumers and represents the bulk of Jinro's exports to Japan (27 182 kl
in 1997). 46 Korea argues that it is made to suit the Japanese taste, 47 sold in differently shaped
bottles,48 at much higher prices,49 and is not available on the Korean market.
5.58. Korea also alludes to the EC contention that in Japan, soju is considered for tax purposes as
being the same product as local 'shochu’, which Korea argues is incorrect. According to Korea, when
Korean standard soju (such as Jinro Gold) is expor ted to Japan, it is treated as a 'spirit’ for tax
purposes. Only the specially-produced 'Korean shochu ’, such as Jinro Export, is treated like Japanese
shochu by the Japanese tax authorities. The tax rate fo r Korean standard soju exports is higher than
for 'Korean shochu' exports.50
5.59. Korea also argues that there are notable differe nces in the way shochu is marketed in Japan
and the way that standard soju and distilled soju ar e marketed in Korea. Shochu is marketed more
like western-type liquors that can be drunk as cocktails.
5.60. Korea further argues that Japanese shochu produ cers even make a shochu A (the standard
version) that is aged and is brown in colour, and th ey make an effort to convince consumers that there
are a plethora of similarities between brown shochu and whisky. Korea states for example, that the
leading brand of brown shochu A in Japan, Takara Legend, closely resembles whisky in colour and
packaging. Korea also asserts that in Korea, it is legally prohibited to add colour to standard soju.51
5.61. Korea contends that another important differe nce is the pricing structure of the Japanese
market. Shochu B (the distilled version) and sh ochu A are similarly priced, and are selling in
comparable volumes. This contrasts to the Korean so ju market in which distilled soju is selling in
much smaller volumes and at much higher prices than standard soju. According to Korea, in the
Japanese shochu market, shochu A and shochu B have comparable market shares, whereas in the

and Japanese standard shochu are 'like’ products (see para. 5). Thus, Korea concludes the report is not relevant
because it does not distinguish the different additives.
45 Korea argues that this difference is further illustra ted by US Exhibit I, which shows advertisements
for Japanese shochu for Japanese consumers, in which several types of uses are proposed for shochu which do
not exist for soju in Korea, i.e., shochu can be drunk warm, mixed with chilled soda or on the rocks.
46 Source: manufacturer's information. The total amount of Korean soju and 'shochu' exports to Japan in
1997, covering other manufacturers as well, was 36 478 kl (source: National Tax Administration).
47 Unlike Jinro Gold, Jinro Export contains only two additives: sugar and citric acid.
48 As is shown by US Exhibit H.
49 According to Korea, by at least a factor of 5, before Japanese taxes and charges are applied.
50 The current tax rate on standard soju and general spirits in Japan amounts to 367 188 yen/kl. The
current rate for Japanese shochu is 201 900 yen/kl.
51 Standard soju by law must have a coloration level of less than 0.1 degree. (Whisky has a higher
coloration level.)

Korean market distilled soju takes up 0.2% of the soju market and standard soju takes up 99.8% of the
market.
5.62. Korea notes that as the European Communities argued in the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II case, the prices of imported liquors and Japanes e shochu were within a relatively short
range, with the tax removed.52 Korea further notes that in contrast, as the EC experts have recognised
in this case, the pre-tax prices for imported liquors in Korea are much higher than the prices for
standard soju.53
5.63. In its rebuttal submissions, the European Co mmunities argues that Korea is understandably
anxious to escape the clear implications for this dispute of the Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages I,54 and the Panel and Appe llate Body Reports on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II.55 The EC view is that Korea unjustly a ccuses it of trying to apply mechanically the
conclusions of those reports to the present case. According to the European Communities, that is an
obvious misrepresentation of its position.
5.64. According to the European Communities, the pr esent dispute must be determined on its own
merits. The EC view, however, is that this Pane l must take into account any adopted Panel and
Appellate Body reports which are relevant to this dispute. The European Communities refers to the
Appellate Body decision in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, wherein it was stated:
Adopted Panel reports are an im portant part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered
by subsequent Panels. They create legitimate expectations among members, and, therefore
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.56
5.65. The EC position is that it has demonstrated th at the two Panel reports and the Appellate Body
report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II are particularly relevant for the present dispute
because:
(a) the tax measures are very similar;
(b) the products concerned are the same; and
(c) there is no fundamental difference be tween the Japanese market and the Korean
market.
The European Communities argues that Korea fails to refute any of those similarities.
5.66. In its rebuttal submission, the United States recalls that its first submission cited the reports of
the WTO panel and Appellate Body in the Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II case as setting forth the
applicable legal standards and factual findings co ncerning a market, tax measures and products that
are identical or analogous to those presented in this dispute. The United States argues that it has not
called for a "mechanical" application of the analysis of the Japanese market to the Korean market, as
suggested by Korea.
57

52 Panel Report, para. 4.82.
53 EC Annex 13, p.20.
54 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra.
55 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra.
56 Appellate Body Report, p. 14.
57 See Appellate Body Report., Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., at 20; see also Canada -
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , adopted on 30 July 1997, WT/DS31/AB/R, at 21; The Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate , adopted on April 3, 1950, BISD II/188; EEC - Measures on Animal Feed

5.67. According to the United States, it is well establis hed that the issue of what is a "like" or
"directly competitive or substitutable" product for pu rposes of Article III:2 must be determined on a
case-by-case basis on its own merits. However, in the US view, given the similarities of the tax
measures and products involved in the Japanese and Ko rean markets, this Panel should consider that
the conclusions of the panel concerning the produc ts, measures, and extent of competition in the
Japanese market can also be reasonably drawn with respect to the facts presented here.
5.68. The United States notes that Korea has contested any similarities between soju and shochu,
and between the Korean and Japanese markets and di sputes the US point that soju and shochu are
"identical." According to the United States, wh ile Korea understandably is entitled to dispute the
point, the source for the point made by the United States was the government of Japan, which in
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II stated that, "Essentially shochu and soju are identical
products."
58 With respect to the fundamental similar qualities of the product, Japan noted that:
These [shochu/soju] products have the following common three features: First, they
use grains or potatoes as the base material, wh ich is readily available at low cost in
this part of the world. Second, they have a relatively low alcoholic strength. . . .
Third, they are consumed directly after distillation. They do not normally undergo
further post-distillation processing.59
5.69. According to the United States, as the largest importer of Korean soju (Korean imports
account for 8 percent of Japan’s shochu A market), Japan would appear to be reasonably authoritative
regarding the objective characteristics of the products.
5.70. The United States further argues that, even usi ng the marketplace approach, the similarities
between the present Korean market and the Jap anese market make the Japan panel’s findings
analogous for purposes of this proceeding. In the US view, in both markets, Western distilled spirits
are more expensive and considered premium types of spirits compared to local shochu/soju, and in
both markets Western spirits are used for gift-givi ng more frequently than the local product, although
in this dispute, Korea has characterized distille d soju as uniquely suited to gift-giving. The
marketplace reacted similarly in Japan and Korea, as consumption of Western spirits increased with
the lifting of trade barriers and the narrowing of ta x disparities. The United States notes for instance,
that US exports of Bourbon to Japan have incr eased from 6.3 million litres in 1987 to 12.2 million
litres in 1997 due to 1989 reforms in the Japanese li quor tax, and US exports of distilled spirits to
Korea increased from 170,000 litres in 1990 to 644,000 litres in 1996 following the removal of quota
restrictions on bottled imported spirits.
5.71. The United States also notes that the evolution of the marketplace in Korea and Japan also
bears great similarity. Only a decade ago, Japanese "izakayas" (the Japanese equivalent of traditional
Korean restaurants) used to serve only shochu, sake and beer, whereas western style "snack bars"
would serve western distilled spirits, but not shochu. Today, shochu and west ern distilled spirits are
usually available at both the "izakayas" and "snack bars." Korea is beginning to resemble the
Japanese market of today, with increasing availabilit y of western spirits in traditional, casual Korean
restaurants and bars. According to the United States, Korea’s greater constraint of choice of distilled

Proteins, adopted on March 14, 1978, BISD 25S/49; Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee , adopted on
June 11, 1981, BISD 28S/102; Japan - Alcoholic Beverages I , supra; U.S. - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, adopted on June 17, 1987, BISD 34S/136.
58 Panel Report, para. 4.178. Japan also stated that "the tax legislation of the Republic of Korea
defines soju into two sub-categories of diluted soju, which is equivalent to shochu A, and 'distilled soju, which
is equivalent to shochu B, in a manner similar to Japan’s definition.’" Ibid .
59 Ibid., para. 4.175.

spirits availability in various bar and restaurant ve nues bears a closer resembla nce to Japan before its
last round of market liberalization in 1989.
5.72. The United states notes that the marketplace does reveal some differences between Korea and
Japan. The market for Western sp irits in Korea is predominantly served by one type of imported
spirit (whisky), while Japan has matured into a mark et for many types of imported spirits, with the
most recent spirit to become popular being tequila. According to the United States, Korean
consumption patterns are much more fixed in traditi onal, family-type restaurants than in Japan, where
a wider range of distilled spirits is consumed. However, most of these differences between
shochu/soju consumption in Korea and Japan are a function of market maturity and evolution of
drinking tastes and styles.
5.73. The United States further states that Korea h as conceded that it classifies both soju and
shochu in the same HS classification at the eight-dig it level -- item 2208.90.40. The fact that Korean
manufacturers may export two kinds of soju to Japan (namely, Jinro Gold and Jinro Export) does not
make these products any less similar. It is common for companies to modestly differentiate their
products in order to meet the needs of different sets of consumers -- one ve rsion for expatriates and
another, seasoned differently, to meet local tastes and customs. Korean manufacturers do the same
when they market two versions of soju in Japan. In fact the differences in the two kinds of soju
exports probably reflect Japanese laws and cost consid erations more than anything else. Most of the
additives in Korean soju are sw eeteners with varying thickening qualities (fructose, oligosaccharide
and stevioside) -- functions served by sugar in the version for Japanese consumers. Most importantly
though, these are clearly additives, as opposed to ingredients. Liquor laws around the world,
including Korea’s, recognize the distinction by placing a limit on the percentage of sugar that may be
added to a distilled spirit (on the order of 2 per cent), after which it becomes yet another competitive
product, a liqueur. At the same time, there is no requirement in Korean law to use any sweetener at
all in soju, thus making it possible for soju to cont ain no additives at all. Korea also classifies soju
and shochu identically for both tax and tariff purposes.
5.74. Furthermore, according to the United States, Ko rea’s reliance on differences in the additives
between shochu and soju as establishing that they are fundamentally different is contradicted by its
description of premium soju. Even though premium so ju differs from standard soju by its additives,
such as honey, Korea states that premium soju is “only an upgraded version of standard soju.” Why
are differences in additives critical in the context of vodka and shochu, but irrelevant with respect to
premium and standard soju? Clearly, Korea’s conclusion concerning premium soju is the legally
correct one: such additives should not be decisive in examining these products under Article III.
C. T
HE BURDEN OF PROOF
1. Korea
5.75. Korea proceeds from the premise that to prove a violation of the first sentence of Article III:2,
the Appellate Body in the Japanese Liquor Taxes case cl early stated that there are two limbs that must
be proved by the complainant. First the complainan ts must prove that the products concerned are in
fact 'like’. Secondly, the complainants must prove that the imported product was taxed in excess of
the domestic 'like’ product.
5.76. According to Korea, regarding Article III:2 second sentence, the complainants must prove
three things: first, that the imported and domestic products are directly competitive and substitutable
products, second, that foreign products are subject to tax differentials that are more than 'de minimis',
and third that tax was applied 'so as to afford protection’ to domestic production.

5.77. Korea further argues that under both the firs t sentence and second sentence, the obligation
rests on the complainant to prove all the requirement s of the respective sentences. In Korea's view,
this burden cannot be discharged by making inadmiss ible analogies to another case and another set of
facts. Korea emphasizes that the burden must be di scharged with regard to the facts of the case at
hand.
5.78. According to Korea, the Panel can make no ru ling about the tax rates of all products falling
under HS 2208 in the abstract. Therefore, the complainants must prove, on a product-by-product
basis, that the products at issue are directly competitive or substitutable, or even 'like’, products.
5.79. Korea points out that the complainants have only submitted evidence regarding a limited
number of imported alcoholic drinks falling under HS 2208: whisky, brandy, vodka, gin, and rum.
They have also mentioned by name a few othe r, though by no means all, alcoholic beverages
(liqueurs, tequila, ad mixtures, koryangju, Japanese shochu) covered by HS 2208, without providing
an intelligible argument or evidence in their regard.
60 In Korea's view, the complainants have not met
their burden of proving that these are 'like', or directly competitive or substitutable products with the
Korean sojus.
5.80. Korea submits that the complainants' principa l and theoretical argument that all distilled
spirits necessarily compete everywhere in the wo rld, because of some similarities in physical
characteristics and end use, runs counter to the controlling preceden t. This precedent, Japan – Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages II , clearly requires a concrete market anal ysis. Furthermore, to the extent the
complainants have analysed the Korean market, this analysis is demonstrably poor. Accordingly, the
complainants have not met their burden of proof; and they cannot meet their burden by quibbling with
Korea's positions.
5.81. Korea submits that it is not up to Korea to pr ove that the western-style liquors are not DCSP
or 'like' any of the Korean sojus. It is up to the complainants to show that they are. Korea does not
need to prove that there is no cross-elasticity of demand. In Korea's view, the complainants brought
this case; they ought to carry their burden of provi ng that such cross-elasticities exist. All Korea has
to do is rebut the proof brought by the complainants.61
5.82. Korea further argues that there is not much evidence in the complainants’ documents.
According to Korea, the complainants make many assertions without any attempt at evidence. Korea
further argues that, absent an intelligible argument and supporting evidence, Korea has had no way to
defend itself so that this part of the complaint also infringes a fundamental principle of due process.62
5.83. Korea therefore submits that the Panel should reject any such broad-ranging complaints out of
hand.

60 Korea argues that these products are granted only the most perfunctory mentions by the EC and the
US. They do not even figure on the comparative charts that the US and EC have provided (see, for example, EC
Annex 9, which only shows standard soju, distilled so ju, whisky, brandy, gin, and rum, and the US first
submission, table at page 20, which only shows whisky, brandy, gin, rum, vodka, soju and shochu).
61 According to the European Communities, this case is not like US - Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , adopted on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R. & WT/DS33/R . There
the defendant bore the burden of proof in invoking an exception to the GATT.
62 See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, adopted on 16
January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, at p. 33 (Korea states that due process is a principle implicit in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding).

2. Complainants
5.84. The European communities notes that Korea a lleges that it has only submitted evidence
regarding a limited number of impor ted alcoholic beverages (namely whisky, brandy, vodka, gin and
rum) and claims that the Panel should reject the EC complaint as far as other distilled spirits falling
within HS 2280 are concerned.
5.85. According to the European Comm unities, Korea’s claim is factually wrong. In the EC view,
Korea appears to have derived its list of products from Annex 9 of th e EC submission, yet that Annex
is by no means the only piece of evidence submitted by the EC in this case. Other pieces of evidence
submitted by the European Communities allegedly do cover specifically other types of distilled
spirits.
5.86. In particular, the European Communities takes issue with the proposition that, in order to
meet its burden of proof in this case, it is require d to provide specific evidence with respect to each
and every single type of distilled liquor falling within HS 2208.
5.87. The European Communities refers to Korea's a ssertion that, "if one travels around the world,
one will encounter a seemingly infinite variety of alc oholic beverages." In the EC view, even a much
shorter trip within the borders of the EC would su ffice to convince the Panel of the large variety of
distilled spirits produced in the EC.
5.88. According to the European Communities, had th e EC submitted specific evidence with regard
to each and every known type of distilled spirit manufactured in the European Communities, the Panel
would have been unnecessarily overburdened. Further, the EC view is also that in some cases it
would have been materially impossible to gather such evidence. The European Communities refers to
one of the criticisms levelled by Korea against the Dodwell study, that the respondents may have been
confused by an allegedly too complex set of questions. What, asks th e European Communities, if the
respondents had been asked to look at the prices of forty or fifty different types of western distilled
spirits instead of just seven?
5.89. The European Communities reiterates that all distilled spirits are produced according to the
same method and, as a result, share the same b asic physical characteristics. The European
Communities states that the distilled spirits for which it has submitted specific evidence are those
traded in largest volumes, both between the Europ ean Communities and Korea, and globally. They
are allegedly representative of the full spectrum of distilled spirits. According to the European
Communities, there is virtually no distilled spirit whose production process and physical
characteristics do not resemble closely those of at least one of the spirits for which the EC has
provided specific evidence.
5.90. The European Communities concludes, therefore, that if the Panel found, as it should, that
those spirits for which specifi c evidence has been submitted are "directly competitive and
substitutable" with soju, it should infer that all ot her distilled spirits falling within HS 2208 also are
"directly competitive and substitutable" with soju.
5.91. According to the European Communities, this approach has been endorsed by the Appellate
Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II. In that case, the complainants claimed that shochu
was "directly competitive or substitutable" with a ll other distilled spirits falling within HS 2208.
Nevertheless, like the complainants in this case, they submitted speci fic evidence only with respect to
a limited number of representative spirits. The Panel concluded that only certain spirits falling within
HS 2208 were "directly competitive or substitutable" with shochu. 63 According to the European

63 Panel Report, para. 7.1.

Communities, on appeal, this finding was reversed by the Appellate Body which ruled that the Panel’s
failure to incorporate in its conclusions all the li quors falling within its term s of reference (i.e. all
distilled spirits falling within 2208) was an error of law.
64
5.92. The United States noted Korea’s claim that pr oduct-specific evidence must be submitted for
every conceivable type of distilled spirit classified under Heading 2208. The United States clarified
that the Dodwell study covered the full spectrum of di stilled spirits in this dispute and those currently
being exported by the United States. While there ma y be other products of importance, such as pre-
mixed cocktails and admixtures, these are only varia tions of the products employed in the Dodwell
study. There is no distilled spirit produced in the Un ited States that is not akin to those employed in
the Dodwell study.
5.93. More importantly, argues the United States, gi ven the fundamental similarities between all
distilled spirits, it is not necessary to provide speci fic evidence, even less a market study, for every
conceivable product that might fall within HS head ing 2208. The products are all fairly highly
concentrated forms of distilled alcohol consumed for socialization and relaxation, and all markets
recognize them as being in competition. The Ko rean measures themselves group these products
together in the same law, mostly as exceptions to soju. In the Korean tax law, to the extent the
Western spirits are not designated in specific categories such as whiskey and brandy, most are lumped
in the general category of “general distilled spirits,” 65 with the same tax rate. Given Korea’s own
recognition of the similarities of the products, and the other evidence presented in this dispute that the
products in the Dodwell study are directly competitive or substitutable with soju, it is reasonable to
conclude that all imported distilled spirits are equally so. The Appellate Body in the Japan case took
precisely this approach. In the Japan case, the panel had not included all products within HS heading
2208 in its findings under Article III:2, second senten ce, having specified only whisky, brandy, rum,
gin and liqueurs. 66 The Appellate Body found the limited fi nding was in error and modified it to
include all distilled spirits in HS 2208.67
D. ARTICLE III ARGUMENTS
1. Complainants
5.94. In this sub-section, the arguments of the European Communities and the United states are
combined as the arguments of the "complainants".
(a) GATT Article III:2, first sentence
i) General
5.95. The complainants draw the attention of the Pa nel to GATT Article III:2, first sentence,
which provides that:
"The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly to like domestic
products"

64 Appellate Body Report, p. 26.
 65 Korean Liquor Tax Law, Article 3.9.
 66 Panel Report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., at para. 7.1
 67 Appellate Body Report in Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., at pp. 26, 32.

5.96. The complainants state that as confirmed by the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II,68 in order to establish whether an internal tax is applied in violation of Article
III:2, first sentence, it is necessary to make two determinations:
(i) whether the taxed imported and domestic products are "like"; and
(ii) whether the taxes applied to the importe d products are "in excess of" those applied to
the like domestic products.
5.97. According to the complainants, before maki ng those two determinations, it must be
ascertained whether the taxes in question constitute an "internal tax".
5.98. The complainants refer to the d ecision by the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, wherein the Appellate Body stated that th e general principle contained in Article III:1
informs also the first sentence of Article III:2. Nevert heless, in order to establish a violation of Article
III:2, first sentence, it is not necessary to show that the measure at issue is applied "so as to afford
protection to domestic production" separately from the above requirements.69
ii) The Liquor Tax and the Education Tax are "internal taxes"
5.99. The complainants state that the Liquor Tax and the Education Tax are levied on all distilled
spirits and liqueurs intended for consumption in Korea, whether locally manufactured or imported,
and not just "on" or "in connection" with the importa tion of distilled spirits and liqueurs. Accordingly,
in the EC view, they constitute "internal taxes" in terms of GATT Article III:2, and not "import
charges" within the purview of GATT Articles II and VIII.
iii) Vodka is "like" soju
5.100. The complainants state that GATT does not define the notion of "like product". According to
the complainants, the approach followed by previous Panels has been to examine whether products
are "like" on a case-by-case basis in light of factors such as the physical characteristics of the products
concerned, their end uses and their customs classi fication. This approach was endorsed expressly by
the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II 70 and in Canada - Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals.71
5.101. The complainants note that in the same reports the Appellate Body held that the terms "like
products" should be construed "n arrowly" for the purposes of Article III:2, first sentence 72. The
complainants further notes that "like" produc ts need not be identical in all respects 73. Thus, it has
been established by a previous Panel that in the case of alcoholic beverages:

 68 Ibid. at pp.18-19. See also Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, supra.
69 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., pp. 18-19. See also
Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Bananas III, supra., para 216.
70 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p.20.
71 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p. 21.
72 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., pp 19-20; See also
Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p.21
73 See Panel report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., para 6.21. See also the Panel
Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I , supra, para 5.5, referring to the Panel Report on United
States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , supra, para 5.11, where the Panel found that
some of the imported and domestic products, albeit not identical, were like products since they served
substantially the same uses.

[m]inor differences in taste, colour and other properties (including different alcohol contents)
do not prevent products from qualifying as like products.
74
5.102. The complainants take the position that in this instance, vodka and soju are "like" products
because they have the same physical characteristics and, consequently, are objectively apt to serve
identical end uses. Furthermore, according to th e complainants, Korean soju is the same liquor as
Japanese shochu, which has already b een found by the two Panels on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages to be "like" vodka.
(a) Soju and vodka have virtually the same physical characteristics and, therefore,
serve for the same end uses
5.103. According to the complainants, the essential characteristics of vodka and soju can be
summarised as follows:
 Table 3
 Vodka Distilled soju Diluted soju
Raw materials Potatoes, grains Potatoes, grains Neutral spirits
 Neutral spirits
Process Continuous Pot Still Continuous
Distillation distillation distillation Charcoal filtration excluded
Usual bottling strength 37.5-40% ABV 40-45% ABV 20-30% ABV
Appearance Clear Clear Clear

5.104. According to the complainants, from the above table, it emerges that the main differences
between soju and vodka are confined to the following:
(i) diluted soju is usually bottled at an alcoholic strength of 25 % ABV whereas vodka is
sold at 37.5%-40% ABV
(ii) unlike vodka, distilled soju is obtaine d by non-continuous distillation and cannot be
filtered through white birch charcoal, alt hough it can be filtere d through any other
materials.
5.105. At the request of the EC industry, the Scot ch Whisky Research Institute has conducted a
series of analyses on a sample of well known bra nds of soju and vodka, which prove that the
manufacturing processes and the physical character istics of the two liquors are nearly identical 75
According to the European Communities the analyses indicate that:
(i) all the sampled brands had been fermented from similar carbohydrate sources;
(ii) all of them had been distilled to concentrate alcohols;
(iii) none had been matured in wood post-distillation;
(iv) none contained significant levels of residue;

74 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., para 5.9.
75 See EC Annex 8

(v) none had significant levels of obscuration;
(vi) the major volatile congeners were at sim ilar levels in vodka a nd diluted soju. They
are only marginally higher in distilled soju; and
(vii) all contained similar levels of methanol.
(b) The differences between vodka and soju are the same as between vodka and
Japanese shochu
5.106. According to the complainants, the differences between vodka and soju are clearly minor and
do not prevent soju and vodka from being "like" produc ts. In the EC view, the existence of the very
same differences between vodka and Japanese s hochu did not prevent the two Panels on Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages from reaching the conclusion that t hose two liquors were "like" in the
sense of Article III:2, first sentence.
5.107. The complainants state that the average alcoho lic strength of shochu A is, as that of Korean
diluted soju, around 25%. In spite of that, notes the complainants, the two Panel Reports on Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages concluded that shochu A was like vodka. The Panel Report on Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II noted in this regard that:
"... a difference in the physical characteristics of alcoholic strength of two products did not
preclude a finding of likeness especially since alcoholic beverages are often drunk in the
diluted form..."
76
5.108. The complainants further note that like dis tilled soju, both shochu B and shochu A may not,
by law, be filtered through white birch charcoal. In addition, the complainan ts note that the Japanese
Liquor Tax Law requires that shoc hu B must be obtained through discontinuous distillation. In the
EC view, however, these differences were not an obstacle for the Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II to conclude that both types of shochu were like vodka.
(c) Korean soju is treated as shochu in Japan
5.109. As mentioned above, Korean soju is exported in large quantities to Japan , where it is treated
for all purposes as being the same product as shochu. Diluted soju corresponds to Japanese shochu A,
whereas distilled soju is the equivalent to Japanese shochu B.
5.110. The complainants note that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the Japanese
Government stated that:
"... the largest producer of shochu is either th e Republic of Korea or the People's Republic of
China ... the liquor tax legislation of the Republic of Korea defines soju in two sub-categories
of 'diluted soju', which is equi valent to shochu A, and 'distilled soju', which is equivalent to
shochu B, in a manner similar to Japan's defin ition. Essentially, shochu and soju are identical
products 77."
5.111. The complainants further note that in res ponse to these claims, the Panel "accepted the
evidence submitted by Japan according to which a shochu-like product is produced in various
countries outside Japan, including the Republic of Korea..." 78 In the US view, the similarities in the

76 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para 6.22
77 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para 4.178.
78 Ibid., para 6.35.

way Japanese shochu and Korean soju are advertised further confirm the "equivalence" of these
products.
5.112. The complainants conclude that the "likeness" of soju and shochu is further confirmed by the
results of the analytical tests conducted by the Scotch Whisky Research Institute.
79
iv) Imported vodka is taxed "in excess of" soju
5.113. The complainants argue that the prohibition of discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, first
sentence, is not conditional on a trade effects test nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard80. The
complainants refer to the Appellate Body in Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , which stated
that "even the smallest amount of 'excess' is too much"81.
5.114. The Table below is presented by the complain ants purportedly to summarise the differences
in taxation between vodka and soju. It purporte dly indicates that both the Liquor Tax and the
Education Tax are applied to vodka at a much higher ra te than to diluted soju and distilled soju. In all,
the combined tax rate applied on vodka is 1.9 times higher than the combined rate on distilled soju
and 2.7 times higher than the combined tax rate on diluted soju.
Table 4
Comparison of the tax rates on soju and vodka
 Liquor Tax Education Tax Combined Tax Rate Discrimination Index
 (As % of Liquor
 Tax Base)
Diluted soju 35 % 3.5 % 38.5 % 1.00
Distilled soju 50 % 5 % 55 % 1.43/1.00
Vodka 80 % 24 % 104 % 2.70/1.89

5.115. The complainants conclude that it is indisput able that the taxes applied to imported vodka
pursuant to both the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax Law are "in excess of" those applied to
soju.
(b) GATT Article III:2, second sentence
i) General
5.116. The complainants note that GATT Article III:2, second sentence, reads as follows:
[M]oreover, no contracting party shall otherwi se apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set
forth in paragraph I.
5.117. The complainants further note that GATT Article III:1 provides in relevant part that:
The contracting parties recognise that inte rnal taxes .... should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.

79 See EC Annex 8.
80 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 23.
81 Ibid.

5.118. The complainants further note that the Interpretative Note to Article III:2 states that:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly
taxed.
5.119. According to the complainants, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II ,82 the Appellate
Body confirmed that in order to determine whether an internal tax measure is inconsistent with Article
III:2, second sentence it is necessary to address the following three issues:
(i) whether the imported products and the dom estic products are "directly competitive or
substitutable products" which are in competition with each other;
(ii) whether the directly competitive or subs titutable imported and domestic products are
"not similarly taxed"; and
(iii) whether the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or substitutable imported
products is "applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production".
5.120. The European Communities in particular note that, in addition, it must be determined whether
the measures at issue are "internal taxes". As already discussed above in connection with the
application of Article III:2, first sentence, both the Liquor Tax and the Education Tax are internal
taxes within the meaning of Article III:2, rather than import charges within the purview of GATT
Articles II and VIII. That conclusion, in the compla inants' view, is equally valid for the purposes of
applying Article III:2, second sentence.
ii) Soju and all other distilled spirits and liqueurs are competitive and substitutable products
5.121. According to the complainants, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the Appellate
Body stated that a determination whether two pr oducts are "competitive or substitutable" must be
made on a case-by-case basis and in light of "all the relevant facts in that case".83
5.122. The complainants further argue that in the same report, the Appellate Body found that in
deciding whether two products are directly competitive or substitutable, it may be appropriate to look
not only at such matters as physical characteristi cs, end uses and customs classification but also "at
competition in the relevant markets". 84 In doing so, it is appropriate, according to the Appellate
Body, to examine the "elasticity of substitution".85
5.123. The complainants argue that it is important to note that Article III:2, second sentence is
concerned not only with differences in taxation between products wh ich are actually competitive on a
given relevant market but also with differences in taxation between products which are potentially
competitive. Indeed, according to the complainants , whereas consumer tastes and habits may differ
from one market to another, tax measures should not be used to "freeze" consumers' preference for a
domestic product. For that reason, the complainan ts argue, evidence that two products are not

82 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., p. 24; See also
Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., pp. 24-25.
83 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 25
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.

competing actually in a market at a given point in time is not a defense if the absence of actual
competition is due, at least in part, to the tax measures in dispute.
86
(a) Soju and all other distilled spirits and liqueurs have the same basic physical
characteristics and are apt for the same end uses
5.124. The complainants argue that the notion of "dir ectly competitive and substitutable" products is
broader in scope than that of "like" products. Ac cording to the complainants, two products which are
too "different" in terms of physical properties or of end uses to qualify as "like" for the purposes of
Article III:2, first sentence, may still be "competitiv e or substitutable" in the sense of Article III:2,
second sentence. The complainants note that as recently recalled by the Appellate Body in Canada -
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals 87, a case of "perfect substituta bility" would no longer fall
within the second sentence of Article III:2, but within the first sentence.
5.125. The complainants further note that the Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages I indicated that:
[t]he flexibility in the use of alcoholic drinks and their common characteristics often offered
an alternative choice for consumers leading to a competitive relationship. In the view of the
Panel there existed - even if not necessarily in respect of all the economic uses to which the
product may be put - direct competition or substitutability among the various distilled
liquors.88
5.126. According to the complainants, the basic physical properties of soju and the other categories
of liquors concerned in this dispute are essentially the same. All distilled spirits are concentrated
forms of alcohol produced by the process of distilla tion. In the complainants' view, at the point of
distillation, all spirits are nearly identical, which means that raw materials and method of distillation
have almost no impact on the final product. Post-d istillation processes such as ageing, dilution with
water or addition of flavourings , do not change the basic fact that the product sold is still a
concentrated form of alcohol.
5.127. The complainants present a table below which co mpares the key characteristics of soju and
the main types of distilled sprits at issue in this di spute. This table purports to show that all of them
have essentially the same physical characteristics. For instance, according to the complainants, the
main differences between soju and whisky, the la rgest category after soju, are limited to the
following:
(i) whisky must be made, at least in part, from sprouted grain;
(ii) whisky has an average alcoholic stre ngth of 37-40% ABV, whereas diluted soju is
generally sold at 25%ABV (in contrast, th e alcoholic strength of distilled soju is
similar to that of whisky); and
(iii) whisky must be aged in wooden casks.

86 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., para 6.28. See also Appellate
Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p.28.
87 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p. 28.
88 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., para. 5.7

DISTILLED SPIRITS – COMPARISON OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
 WHISKY BRANDY GIN RUM VODKA SOJU SHOCHU
Raw Material Grain Grapes Grain; neutral
spirits*
Sugar Cane;
Molasses
Grain; Potatoes;
neutral spirits*
Grain; Potatoes;
neutral spirits*
Grain; Potatoes;
neutral spirits*
% of Alcohol at
Distillation
†Less than 95% †Less than 95% †At or above
95%
†Less than 95% At or above 95% Not less than
85%
Not less than
85%
% of Alcohol at
Bottling
†Not less than
40%
†Not less than
40%
†Not less than
40%
†Not less than
40%
Not less than
40%
Not less than
20%
Not less than
20%
Method of
Distillation
Continuous or
Pot Still
Continuous or
Pot Still
Continuous Continuous Continuous Continuous or
Pot Still
Continuous or
Pot Still
Aged in Wooden
Casks
Yes Yes Yes/no Yes/no No Yes/no Yes/no
Color Amber Amber, Clear 1 Clear to Amber Clear to Amber Clear 2 Clear Clear to Amber
% of Alcohol 37-50 36-50 37-50 37-50 37-50 20-45 20-45
Added
Flavorings
Variety3 Peach,
Blackberry,
Cherry, Apricot,
Coffee
Spice, Lemon Spice, Lemon Currant, Lemon,
Orange
Lemon, Honey Lemon, Variety
of Fruit Flavors
Body/Taste
Intensity
Medium Medium Light to Medium Light to Me dium Light Light to medium Light to Medium

1 Examples of clear brandies include grappa, pisco
2 Addition of flavoring adds color, e.g. red/purple
3US and Canadian regulations permit the addition of flavorings; EU regulations do not
*Vodka, gin, soju and shochu may be produced from neutral spir its, which is an alcoholic spirit distilled at not less than 95% a lcohol by volume from any material of agricultural
origin.
†Based on U.S. standards of identity (Title 27 Code of Federal Regulations, part 5); EU and other countries allow bottling of brandy at 36% and vodka, gin and rum at 37.5%,
Australia allows whisky to be bottled at 37 per cent. Japan maintains no minimum alcohol requirements for these products.

5.128. The complainants argue that in practice, the above differences are even less important than
they might appear at first sight:
(i) soju can be made and is often made from the same type of cereal grains as whisky,
even if they are not sprouted;
(ii) whisky is often served on the rocks or mixed with water or other non-alcoholic
beverages and is therefore consumed at a similar strength as diluted soju;
(iii) distilled soju can and is sometimes aged for up to two years in wooden casks. Some
brands of diluted premium soju claim to be aged in oak barrels.
5.129. The complainants argue that the above differen ces are clearly not sufficient to prevent soju
and whisky from being directly "substitutable" or "competitive" products in the sense of Article III:2,
second sentence. According to the complainants, the existence of similar differences between whisky
and Japanese shochu did not preclude the 1987 and 1996 Panels on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages from finding that those liquors were in competition on the Japanese market.
89
5.130. The complainants further argue that having essentially the same basic physical properties,
soju and all the other distilled spirits and liqueurs are objectively apt to serve the same end-uses:
(i) all of them are drunk with the same purposes: thirst quenching, socialisation,
relaxation, etc.
(ii) all of them may be drunk in similar wa ys: "straight", diluted with water or other non-
alcoholic beverages or mixed with other alcoholic beverages;
(iii) all of them may be consumed before, after or during meals; and
(iv) all of them may be consumed at home or in public places such as restaurants, bars,
etc.
5.131. In the complainants' view, the above reasons alone are more than sufficient to conclude that
soju and all other distilled spirits and liqueur s are objectively "substitutable" and potentially
"competitive" in the Korean market. In addition, the complainants argue that there is conclusive
evidence that, despite the distortions introduced by the Korean liquor tax system, competition between
soju and other distilled liquors on the Korean market is not just potential but, to a significant degree,
also actual.
(b) Soju and the other distilled spirits and lique urs are sold in the same sales channels and
are promoted and advertised in a similar way
5.132. The complainants assert that the consumption of western-style liquors used to be confined to
upmarket restaurants and entertainment establishmen ts. However, the argument goes, over the past
few years western-style liquors have gained consider able distribution penetration. According to the
complainants, with the main exception of traditional Korean-style restaurants, where soju and other
traditional local liquors continue to predominate, western-style liquors are now widely available
alongside soju in most sales channels, both for on-premise and off-premise consumption.

89 See Panel Reports on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., para 5.7; and on Japan - Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., paras 6.28 to 6.32.

5.133. As evidence of the increasing availability of western-style liquors, the complainants point to a
recent survey completed by Hankook Research in May 1997 and covering more than 700 sales
outlets, which allegedly found that the leading brands of whisky were sold in a majority of outlets
within each relevant category. More specifically, the survey established that 'Imperial', 'Passport' and
'Dimple', the "three big" brands of whisky, were sold in 76%, 81% and 61%, respectively, of the
surveyed on-premise outlets and in 64%, 98 % and 85%, respectively, of the surveyed off-premise
outlets.
90
5.134. The complainants further purport to show by the photographs included in their exhibits 91 that
off-premise outlets often display soju and other dist illed sprits and liqueurs side-by-side on the same
shelves, thus providing evidence in their view, that both the retailers and the public regard them as
being in competition.
5.135. According to the complainants, the advertising of soju, and especially of premium soju, is
very similar to the advertising of western-style liquors and tends to emphasise precisely those
characteristics which are generally attributed by Ko rean consumers to western-style liquors, such as
pureness, mild taste, maturity, no-hangover effects, etc.
92
5.136. The complainants assert that likew ise, the packaging of soju, and in particular of premium
soju, is similar to the packaging of western-style spirits and liqueurs.
5.137. The complainants state that, like their Japan ese neighbours, Korean consumers at first
perceived Western-style liquors as "luxury" items to be offered as gifts or to be consumed only on
special occasions and at special places. Over ti me, however, there has been, both in Japan and in
Korea, a clear trend towards consumption of a ll types of distilled spirits on more and varied
occasions, and in different methods of consumption, i. e. in mixed drinks, warm, cold, etc. According
to the United States, the expanding methods and ve nues of consumption have also been aided by
greater availability of all types of spirits in all sales channels.
5.138. The complainants further state that, to cap italize on Korean consumer's expanded awareness,
the soju market has been creating new categories and brands of soju at a fast pace. Most of the
activity has been in the recently established premium soju segment. For example, in Korea, Bohae
Brewery first successfully used the strategy of incorporating flavoured additives such as honey to soju
in its Kim Sat Gat brand soju. Kim Sat Gat was qui ckly followed by other premium sojus that also
contained honey, or were flavoured by aging in wood.
(c) Consumers' demand for soju has been responsi ve to the changes in the price of whisky
5.139. The complainants argue that there is sta tistical evidence indicating that, despite the
competitive distortions created by Korea's liquor ta x system, demand for soju has been responsive in
the past to changes in the prices of the other categories of distilled liquors, and in particular to changes
in the price of whisky.
5.140. The complainants further argue that the app licable liquor tax rate on whisky has been
progressively lowered from 200% in 1990 to 100% in 1996. According to the complainants, during
the same period, the applicable import customs duties were lowered from 70% to 20%. These tax and
tariff changes were followed by a reduction of th e prices for whisky and a spectacular increase in
sales from 11 million litres in 1992 to 27 million litres in 1996.

90 See EC Annex 10.
91 See EC Annex 11 and US Exhibit G.
92 See the advertising materials included in EC Annex 12 and US Exhibit G.

5.141. The complainants argue that, the increase in sales of whisky took place, to a significant
extent, at the expense of soju. A ccording to the complainants, until last year sales of soju have grown
at a lower pace than overall demand for distilled spirits and liqueurs. As a result, the complainants
argue, soju lost market share, mainly to the benef it of whisky. Thus, the argument goes, whereas the
market share of soju fell from 96.37% in 1992 to 94.39% in 1996, during the same period the share of
whisky increased by a similar percentage from 1.53% to 3.14%. The complainants conclude that this
transfer of market share from soju to whisky s hows that the two liquors are in competition with each
other on the Korean market.
5.142. The complainants further explain that this tr end may have reversed itself during 1997 as a
result of the depreciation of the Korean won, the campaign of boycotts against imported products and
the financial crisis of last autumn. According to the complainants, this reversal of market trends
constitutes an additional proof of the substitutability between soju and imported western-style liquors.
(d) The Dodwell study shows that there is a significant degree of cross-price elasticity
between soju and all other distilled spirits and liqueurs
5.143. The complainants presented a document,
93 which purports to contain a copy of a study
completed on 17 July 1997 for the Confederati on of European Producers Spirits by Dodwell
Marketing Consultants Ltd in co-operation with Frank Small and Associates, Korea ("the Dodwell
study").
5.144. The complainants argue that the purpose of the Dodwell study was to test the hypothesis that
a reduction in the prices of western-style spirits and liqueurs and/or an increase in the prices of soju
following a change in the applicable liquor tax rates will lead to a relative increase in the consumption
of western-style liquors at the expense of soju.
5.145. According to the complainants, the research met hod used in the Dodwell study is the same as
that followed in the ASI study, which was cited by the Panel on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II as one of the reasons for its conclusion th at shochu and all other spirits and liqueurs
were competitive in the Japanese market.94
5.146. The complainants further state that the Dodwe ll study is based on the responses to questions
from a representative sample of 500 Korean spirits drinkers. The complainants also state that the
survey-takers showed to each respondent pictures of representative brands of soju, premium soju and
three brown spirits (standard scotch, premium scotch and cognac) and a list of prices for each, and
asked which type of beverage the respondent would most like to buy given the prices specified.
5.147. The complainants argue that initially, both th e proposed price for standard soju and the
proposed prices for the other beverages were ba sed on current representative prices on the Korean
market ("Level 1" prices). The prices for soju we re then successively increased to "Level 2" and to
"Level 3". At each of the three price levels for so ju, the prices for the other beverages were reduced
in two steps ("Level 2" and "Level 3"). Thus , the complainants argue that the respondents were
confronted with nine different price combinations . All the prices proposed to the respondents were
within the range of the price levels which could reasonably result from the elimination of the existing
differences in tax rates. The same research was ca rried out also with respect to the main types of
white spirits (gin, vodka, rum and tequila) and liqueurs.

93 See EC Annex 13.
94 See Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., paras 6.29 and 6.32

5.148. The complainants argue that the Dodwell study confirms that there is a significant degree of
cross-price elasticity between soju and brown spirits, as allegedly evidenced by the following
findings:
(i) even very small price movements gave ra ise to significant chang es in the preferences
of the respondents. For example, if the cu rrent representative price of standard soju
was increased by just 100 won (10% of the Level 1 price) and the prices for brown
liquors remained the same, the share of respondents who would buy brown liquors
instead of soju would increase by 8% from 15.2% to 16.4%;
(ii) the respondents were even more sensitive to an equivalent decrease in the price of the
brown sprits. For instance, if the price fo r a bottle of standard Scotch whisky fell
from 11,500 won (Level 1) to 10,150 won (Level 2) and the price of standard soju
remained unchanged, the share of standard Scotch whisky would increase from 7.4%
to 10% (i.e. by 35%);
(iii) the switch is most marked when the pr ice for soju increases and, simultaneously, the
prices for brown liquors decline. At current representative prices (Level 1), the share
of consumers who prefer brown spirits to so ju (including premium soju) is 15.2%. If
the price of standard soju was increased by 200 won to Level 3 and, at the same time,
the prices for brown liquors fell to Level 3, the share of brown spirits would increase
to 28.4%, i.e. by as much as 87%.
5.149. The complainants also argue that the Dodwell st udy shows that cross-price elasticity between
soju and white sprits and liqueurs is also significant. Thus, it is alleged that according to the study, if
the price of soju was increased by 200 won to Level 3 and, simultaneously, the price for white sprits
and liqueurs was reduced to Level 3, the share of consumers who would prefer white spirits and
liqueurs to soju (including premium soju) would increase from 13.8% to 23.8% (i.e. by 72 %).
iii) Soju and other distilled spirits and liqueurs are "not similarly taxed"
5.150. The complainants note that, as confirmed by the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, for two competitive or substitutable products to be deemed as "not similarly
taxed", the difference in taxation must be more than de minimis
95. The complainants further notes
that in the same report, the Appellate Body held that whether any particular tax differential is or is
not de minimis must be determined on a case-by-case basis96.
5.151. The complainants presented the following tabl e which purports to show the differences in
taxation between each of the sub-categories of soju a nd the other categories concerned in this dispute.
According to the complainants, the table evidences that diluted soju is taxed at the lowest combined
rate, whereas distilled soju is taxed at a lower co mbined rate than any other category with the only
exception of "liqueurs".

95 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra., p. 23;
96 Ibid.

Table 5

Comparison of the tax rates applied to soju
and other distilled spirits and liqueurs

 Liquor Tax Education Combined Discrimination
 r a t e ( % ) tax rate tax rate (%) Index
 (% Liquor
 Tax Base)

Diluted soju 35 3.5 38.5 1.00
Distilled Soju 50 5 55 1.43/1.00
Whisky 100 30 130 3.38/2.36
Brandy 100 30 130 3.38/2.36
General distilled spirits 80 24 104 2.70/1.89
- (containing whisky or brandy) 100 30 130 3.38/2.36
Liqueurs 50 5 55 1.43/1.00
Other Liquors
-more than 25% alcohol content 80 24 104 2.70/2.36
-less than 25% alcohol content 70 7 77 2.00/1.40
-containing whisky or brandy 100 30 130 3.38/2.36

5.152. The complainants conclude that table 5 provid es evidence that the differences in taxation are
in all cases far from being "de minimis" and, therefore, that soju is not "similarly taxed". According
to the complainants, the combined tax rate on whis ky and brandy, for instance, is 2.36 times higher
than the rate on distilled soju and 3.38 times higher than the rate on diluted soju.
iv) The differences in taxatio n are applied so as to afford protection to the domestic production
of soju
5.153. The complainants note that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body
laid down the following approach for establishing wh ether dissimilar taxation of directly competitive
or substitutable products is applied "so as to afford protection to domestic production":
we believe that an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation has been applied so
as to afford protection requires a comprehensiv e and objective analysis of the structure and
application of the measure in question on dom estic as compared to imported products. We
believe it is possible to examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a particular
measure, its structure, and its overall applica tion to ascertain whether it is applied in a way
that affords protection to domestic products.
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its
protective application can most often be discer ned from the design, architecture and revealing
structure of a measure. The very magnitude of the dissimilar taxation in a particular case may
be evidence of such protective application, ... Most often, there will other factors to be
considered as well. In conducting this inquiry, pa nels should give full consideration to all the
relevant facts and all the circumstances in any given case.
97
5.154. The complainants argue that in the present case, the following facts and circumstances
regarding the "structure of the measures " as well as its "overall application on domestic as compared

97 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 29.

to imported products" constitute irrefutable evidence that the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax
Law are applied "so as to afford protection" to Korea's domestic production of soju. For this
proposition, the complainants gives the following factors:
(i) the very magnitude of the tax differentials;
(ii) the lack of rationality of the product categorisation;
(iii) the fact that there are virtually no imports of soju;
 (iv) the fact that soju accounts for the vast majority of the Korean production of distilled
spirits and liqueurs;
 (v) the fact that almost all whisky and brandy, as well as a significant proportion of the
liquors falling within the categories of General Distilled Liquors and Liqueurs are
imported; and
 (vi) the existence of a long history of tax discrimination and protectionism.
(a) The magnitude of the tax differentials
5.155. The complainants argue that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the Appellate Body
found that the very magnitude of the difference in taxation between shochu an d other distilled spirits
and liqueurs was sufficient evidence to conclude th at the Japanese Liquor Tax Law was applied so as
to afford protection to the domestic production of shochu.
98
5.156. According to the complainants, the situation is si milar in the present dispute. It argues that
the tax differentials between soju and other distill ed spirits and liqueurs are so large that they
constitute sufficient evidence in themselves that the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax Law are
applied so as to afford protection to the domestic production of soju.
5.157. The complainants state that the tax differentials at issue in this dispute appear to be even
bigger than those taken into consideration by the Panel and the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II.99 They add that, it must be recalled that the tax differentials between soju and
other distilled spirits and liqueurs would be much larger but for the successive changes introduced by
Korea since 1990 in response to pressure from the Community.
(b) The product categorisation is arbitrary
5.158. The complainants are of the view that the Liquor Tax Law defines soju almost exclusively in
negative terms, by excluding from a very broad, cat ch-all formula any type of distilled spirits which
happen to be imported in significant quantities. Accord ing to the complainants, the lack of specificity
of the legal definition of soju is further attested by the overlap between that definition and the legal
definitions of other residual categories (e.g. the sub-category defined in Article 3.9 E of the Liquor
Tax Law). In the complainants' view, this clearly sh ows that the application of a lower rate of tax to

98 Ibid.
99 In Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the taxes in dispute were specific taxes per litre of
beverage instead of ad valorem taxes. This makes it extremely difficult to compare the tax differentials at issue
in the two cases. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, according to the complainants, in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II the differences in specific taxes translated into a difference in tax/price ratios between
shochu and whisky of between 10 % and 32 % of their retail sales price (See Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II , supra, at para 4.159). In comparison, in the present case, the tax differential between
soju and whisky may represent as much as 91.5 % of the CIF import value of whisky.

soju does not correspond to any distinguishing characte ristic of soju, but is merely aimed to afford
protection to Korea's domestic production of distilled spirits.
5.159. For instance, the complainants argue that accord ing to their respective legal definitions, the
only difference between diluted soju and gin is that the latter has juniper berries and plant flavourings
added before distillation
100. However, according to the compla inants, this obviously minor difference
entails a tax differential equivalent to more than 90% of the import CIF value of a bottle of imported
gin. In the complainants' view, this huge tax diffe rential is clearly disproportionate and can only be
explained as being aimed at affording protection to the domestic production of soju.
(c) Domestic soju is "isolated" from imports of soju
5.160. The complainants further note that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, both the Panel
and the Appellate Body noted that:
"... the combination of customs duties and internal taxation in Japan has the following impact:
on the one hand, it makes it difficult for foreign-produced shochu to penetrate the Japanese
market and, on the other, it does not guarant ee equality of competitive conditions between
shochu and the rest of 'white' and 'brown' sp irits. Thus, through a combination of high import
duties and differentiated internal taxes, Japan manages to 'isolate' domestically produced
shochu from foreign competition, be it foreign produced shochu or any other of the mentioned
white and brown spirits".
101
5.161. According to the complainants, the situation is similar in the present case. The complainants
argue that Korean soju is effectively "isolated" fro m competition from foreign soju. It is alleged that
imports of soju into Korea have always been neglig ible. It is argued that in 1997 for instance, the
imported volume of soju was just 1,625 litres, which allegedly represents barely 0.0002% of the total
soju sales in Korea. According to the complainants, therefore, it is indisputable that by favouring soju
vis-a-vis other liquors, Korea protects a "domestic production".
5.162. The complainants further argue that Korean so ju is even more "isolated" from imports of
foreign soju than Japanese shochu was from foreign shochu in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.
It is argued that in that case, Japan could point to the existence of a significant, even if small in
relative terms, flow of shochu imports (between 1-2%). In contrast, it is argued that imports of soju
into Korea are virtually non-existent.
5.163. The complainants assert that as in the case of shochu in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, one of the reasons why Korean soju is "i solated" from imports of foreign soju is the
high level of the import duties on that product. It is argued that currently, the bound rate on soju is
79% and the applied rate 30%. In co mparison, it is alleged that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, the bound and applied rates on shochu were 26.7% and 17.9%, respectively. It is
further argued that the applied import duty rate on soju (30%) is higher than the applied rate on any
other category of distilled spirits and liqueurs (15%-20%).

100 See the legal definitions of diluted soju and gin at Articles 3.1 and 3.9 C of the Liquor Tax Law,
respectively.
101 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., para. 6.35, cited by the Appellate
Body Report on the same case, supra., p. 31.

(d) Soju accounts for the vast majority of the Korean production of distilled spirits and
liqueurs
5.164. According to the complainants, it may be estimat ed that soju accounts for more than 95 % of
the Korean production of distilled spirits and liqueurs. Thus, by applying a lower tax rate to soju,
Korea is affording protection not just to its domest ic production of soju but more generally to its
entire domestic industry of distilled spirits and liqueurs.
(e) Almost all whisky and brandy sold in Korea is imported
5.165. The complainants argue that whereas imports of soju are almost non-existent, virtually all the
sales of whisky and brandy, as well as a significant proportion of the sales of white spirits and
liqueurs are imported. In the complainants' view, th is makes the Korean liquor tax system even more
protective in effect than the tax measures at issue in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I and II ,
where a majority of sales within the more taxed category of "whisky/brandy" was domestically
produced.
(f) There is a long history of tax discrimination and protectionism
5.166. The complainants further argue that the Korean soju industry has traditionally benefited from
a very high degree of protection against imports. According to this view, until 1989 the Korean
market for distilled spirits and liqueurs was almo st closed to imports through the combined
application of quantitative restrictions and dissu asive import duties. Since then, the argument
continues, Korea has been forced to lift the im port quotas and to negotiate with the complainants a
reduction of the applied customs duties as part of the 1993 Agreement. The complainants assert that
in light of Korea's past record of protectionism in this sector, it becomes evident that the measures at
issue are but a last ditch attempt by Korea to con tinue to afford protection to its domestic soju
industry against imports of western-style liquors.
5.167. The complainants respectfully request the Panel to find that:
(i) Korea is in breach of its obligations under GATT Article III:2, first sentence, by
applying internal taxes on imported vodka pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law and the
Education Tax Law which are in excess of those applied on soju; and
(ii) Korea is in breach of its obligations under GATT Article III:2, second sentence, by
applying higher internal taxes pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax
Law on imported liquors, classified under HS heading 2208, currently falling within
the categories of "whisky", "brandy", "general distilled liquors", "liqueurs" and "other
liquors" (to the extent that they contain distilled spirits or liqueurs) than on soju, so as
to afford protection to its domestic production of soju.
2. Korea
(a) General
5.168. Korea notes that in bringing this case before th e Panel, the United States and the European
Communities have called into question the validity of the Korean tax regime on alcoholic beverages,
claiming that this regime discriminates against so me imported spirits, to the benefit of a Korean
distilled alcoholic beverage called 'soju’, and in violation of Article III:2 of the GATT. Korea
concedes, as the complainants point out, that it imposes a different rate of tax on soju than it imposes
on certain imported alcoholic bevera ges. However, in Korea's view, not every difference in rates of
tax amounts to a violation of Article III:2.

5.169. Korea asserts that Article III:2 is perhaps the provision of the GATT that treads most heavily
upon national sovereignty. In Korea's view, a nati on’s taxation system is the product of a long and
intricate domestic political process. Korea argues that taxes are built up over years, and reflect
different and evolving policy goals. No country imposes a single rate of tax on all products. Korea
also notes that the GATT contains no requirement th at countries harmonise their tax systems. Korea
asserts that the fundamental purpose of Art. III:2 is to avoid protectionism.
5.170. Korea further argues that the prohibitions of Art. III:2, while honouring their anti-
protectionist purpose, must be strictly interpreted. In Korea's view, before the tax rates of imported
and domestic products can be compared, the co mpetitive relationship between these two products
must be strong, if not very strong indeed.
5.171. Korea's position is that according to Article III: 2, imported products ought not be taxed less
favourably than competing domestic products. Kore a further argues that where products are perfect
substitutes, or 'like', no difference in tax treatment can be tolerated. Where products are not 'like', but
are still 'directly competitive or substitutable', the argument continues, there is more room for tax
differences, as long as they do not have a protectionist effect.
(b) The Korean Tax System
5.172. Korea proceeds to give an explanation of its internal tax system. It states that it has 32
different types of taxes, which are largely divided in to national and local taxes. Korea further states
that like other countries, it distinguishes between direct taxes and taxes on goods and services. Unlike
some other countries in Korea the share in total ta x receipts of indirect taxes is much higher than
direct taxes.
102
5.173. Korea notes that all alcoholic beverages are subject to several taxes, such as value added tax,
liquor tax and education tax. The latter two taxes, as applied to certain imported alcoholic beverages,
are disputed in this case.
i) The Liquor Tax
5.174. Korea notes that the Liquor Tax Law was enacte d in 1949, and has been amended more than
twenty times since. An important step in the development of the Liquor Tax Law was the change
from a specific tax system to an ad valorem tax system in 1968.103 According to Korea, the reason for
this alteration was mainly that the Korean legislatur e wanted to raise taxes in proportion to the prices
of products. It is of some significance, notes Korea, in view of the allegations that Korea's taxes are
protectionist, that at the time of enactment of the Li quor Tax Law, and at the time of the change to an
ad valorem system, Korea had very little imports of liquor.
5.175. Korea notes that the parts of its Liquor Tax Law th at are relevant to this case are contained in
the general provisions and in the chapter deali ng with imposition. In the general provisions, a
description is given for each drink in such way that it sets the requirements as to the content of each of
the liquors in order to fit into the classification of the Liquor Tax. The section of the law dealing with
imposition fixes the rates which apply to each partic ular group of liquors. The descriptions in the law
determine the different applicable rates, thus, Korea concedes imposing a different tax rate on
standard soju and whisky.

102 In 1994, for instance, according to OECD methodology, the share of indirect taxes amounted to
43.4% of total tax revenue in Korea, whereas the comp arable figure for the United States was 17.9%. The
Korean figure for 1996 (predicted) is 43.7%.
103 In this respect, the Korean liquor taxe s differ from the li quor taxes at issue in Japan – Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages II, which were specific.

5.176. However, Korea argues that the complainants attempt to create the mistaken impression that
the law's very structure reveals a protectionist intent.
104 According to Korea, the reality is different.
For a long time, soju was the only spirit subject to liquor taxes. Korea notes that though the law's
definition was broad, it covered only what was known. Over time, other spirits were marketed, and as
they appeared, new tax categories were created.
5.177. Korea notes that the Liquor Tax relates to spirits and beverages containing at least 1% of
alcohol. The persons falling under the Liquor Tax are either manufacturers of alcoholic beverages
supplying from their factory, or importers. These pe rsons pay taxes on the basis of the price at the
time of delivery, when the beverages are delivered from a factory, or, when the liquors are imported,
on the basis of the CIF plus duty price.
5.178. Korea further notes that the applicable tax rate s on the alcoholic beverages are described in
the Liquor Tax Law.
105 The tax system and the applicable rates have evolved over time. The
applicable rate does not depend on the origin of the liquor. Korea presents the following rates that
purportedly apply to the distilled beverages in dispute:

Drinks Ad valorem%
Soju:
a) standard (or 'diluted') soju
b) distilled soju

35%
50%
Liqueurs106 50%
General distilled spirits107 80%
Whiskies, brandies 100%

5.179. Korea states that being a high-volume, common drink that Koreans usually consume with
meals, standard soju is in a class of its own, and so is distilled soju, being an artisanal drink, that is
unique to Korea.
5.180. Korea notes that there is also a substantial domestic production of lique urs, general distilled
spirits and, particularly, of whisky, that fall under the higher tax rates.
5.181. According to Korea, the liquor taxes are an im portant tool for the government of Korea to
raise revenue. According to the most recently ava ilable figures, liquor taxes amounted to 3.52% of
national tax revenues.108 Their share in indirect taxes represented 9.08%. The largest contributor to the
liquor taxes traditionally has been beer, which is mostly domestically produced, which accounts for
69% of the Liquor Tax revenues in 1996.

104 See EC first submission, at para. 24; US first submission, at para. 24.
105 Article 19(2).
106 Examples of 'liqueurs’ are Insam (ginseng) ju, Ogapiju, Bailey's, Grand Marnier, and Kahlua.
107 Examples of 'general distilled alcoholic spirits’ are koryangju, rum, gin, and vodka.
108 This percentage is based on figures from 1996 . In the two preceding years the revenue collected
from the liquor tax was 3.54% and 3.53%.

ii) The Education Tax
5.182. Korea states that in addition to the Liquor Tax, an education tax is levied. According to
Korea, Education Tax is an earmarked tax, meani ng that the revenues collected through the Education
Tax can only be used for the specific purpose of improving the educational system. The Liquor Tax
regime is not the only regime that has an Education Tax. Korea asserts that there are ten other
regimes to which the Education Tax is attached, such as tobacco consumption tax, property tax and
transportation tax. Likewise, taxpayers liable for th e payment of liquor taxes are also subject to the
education tax. In Korea's calculation, the revenu es generated by liquors in the education tax proceeds
amount to 12.5%.
5.183. Korea states that the tax basis for the Education Tax, as levied on payers of the liquor tax, is
the Liquor Tax corresponding to each kind of drink. The Education Tax applies as follows: alcoholic
beverages whose ad valorem tax rate is higher than 80% are subject to 30% education tax on the
amount of the Liquor Tax, and alcoholic beverages with an ad valorem tax below 80% are subject to
10% Education Tax.
5.184. Korea notes that the Education Tax is levied i rrespective of the origin of the products. The
proceeds of the Education Tax are allocated exclusively to the improvement of Korea's educational
system, notably at the mandatory education level from primary to middle school.
(c) Legal Analysis
5.185. Korea notes that the complainants argue that b ecause Korea imposes a different rate of tax on
'soju’ than the rate which is imposed upon a numbe r of alcoholic beverages, its tax system unfairly
burdens imported spirits, to the benefit of the domestic spirit 'soju’.
i) The purpose of Article III of the GATT is to prevent protectionism, not to harmonise taxes
5.186. According to Korea, Article III, perhaps more than any other provision of the GATT, steps
into a realm which is traditionally the province of national sovereignty -- the domestic tax system.
5.187. Korea notes that as each Member joins the WTO, it brings with it its individual tax system, an
intricate web of rules built up over many years reflecting a mixture of government objectives (ranging
from social policies to the need to raise revenues).
5.188. Korea further states that no Member of the WTO has the same rate of internal taxation for all
products, and the tax differences that have bu ilt up throughout the years may not always seem
completely coherent. However, the argument conti nues, it is not the role of the GATT to attempt to
render each tax system internally coherent, and nor is it the provin ce of GATT to harmonise the tax
systems of its many Members.
5.189. Korea takes note of the 1992 Panel report in United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages in which it was stated:
The purpose of Article III is not to harmoni se the internal taxes and regulations of
contracting parties, which differ from country to country.
109
In Korea's view, tax harmonisation is a sensitive ma tter even between countries that have achieved a
high level of integration, such as the member states of the European Communities.

109 Panel Report on United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages , adopted on 19

5.190. Korea further argues that it should be noted that Article III is not intended to encroach upon
the powers of WTO Members to pursue their legitimat e objectives through their tax systems. In this
regard Korea draws attention to a stat ement by the Appellate Body put in Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, in which it said:
Members of the WTO are free to pursue their own domestic goals through internal taxation or
regulation so long as they do not do so in a way that violates Article III or any of the other
commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement.
110
5.191. Korea, therefore asserts that Article III of the GATT is only meant to step into this sensitive
realm of taxation in certain narrowly circumscribed circumstances, in order to pursue a specific
objective. According to Korea, the fundamental purpo se of Article III is to avoid protectionism and to
oblige the WTO members to provide for equality of competitive conditions for imported products in
relation to domestic products. As the Appellate Body put it in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
II:
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application
of internal tax and regulatory measures. Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the
WTO to provide equality of competitive cond itions for imported products in relation to
domestic products.111
ii) The analysis required under Article III:2
5.192. Korea states that reconciling the anti-protectioni st purpose of Article III:2 with the need to
recognise each WTO Member's discretion to maintain and develop its own tax policy has not been an
easy exercise.
5.193. Korea further states that the Malt Beverages panel construed the so- called 'aims and effects'
test. Under that test, as long as the tax system introduced product distinctions for policy purposes that
were unrelated to the protection of domestic produc tion, the resulting tax differences could not violate
Article III:2.
112 According to Korea, this approach did not find favour with the Appellate Body in
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II. In Korea's view, the Appellate Body (as well as the Panel in
the first instance) ruled that the aims and effects test strayed too far from the text of Article III:2,
ignoring the distinction made between the two prohibitions contained, respectively, in the first and the
second sentence of this provision. The first sentenc e tolerates no differentiation whatsoever between
tax rates that apply to 'like' products. The second sen tence imposes constraints on tax differentials that
apply to 'directly competitive and substitutable products'.
5.194. Korea further argues that according to the Appe llate Body, the wording of the first sentence
leaves no room to inquire whether a tax rate differen tial, which applies to 'like' products, was really
introduced with protectionist 'aims and effects'. By this argument, differential tax rates applying to
'like' products violate Article III:2.
5.195. Korea argues, however, that this does not mean that the Appellate Body was insensitive to the
concerns of the WTO membership about preserving discretion to develop individual tax policies.
Korea notes that in its report, the Appellate Body took great pains to underline 'how narrow the range
of "like" products is meant to be'. 113 Korea further notes that the Appellate Body, affirming the

110 See Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 16.
111 Appellate Body Report, supra., p.16.
112 Panel Report on United States - Measures Affec ting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages , supra.,
para. 5.25.
113 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 20.

Panel,
114 also clarified that 'like' products are a subset of directly competitive and substitutable. In
Korea's view, this indicates that Article III:2 only com es into play when the products at issue are in a
particularly close relationship (they should be at least "directly competitive or substitutable"). Where
there is no relationship, or an insufficiently cl ose relationship between two products, argues Korea,
the WTO Members retain the sovereignty to impose taxes according to their own discretion.
5.196. Korea argues that the determination of whether two products are 'like’ or directly competitive
and substitutable products is based upon an overall appreciation, on a case-by-case basis, of their
qualities and their relationship. Korea refers to one general remark regardi ng both the determination
of 'like’ products and of directly competitiv e and substitutable products which was made in Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , which allegedly emphasised that a particularly appropriate test to
define whether two products are 'like’ or 'dir ectly competitive or substitutable products’ is the
'marketplace’.115 Korea notes that while noting that there might be other means to identify the broader
category of directly competitive and substitutable pr oducts, the Appellate Body upheld this reasoning,
stating that the: 'GATT 1994 is a commercial agreement, and th e WTO is concerned, after all, with
markets.' 116
5.197. Korea also states that it is useful to make some preliminary comments about the threshold
condition of Article III:2: i.e. how does one analy se whether there is a suffi ciently close competitive
relationship between the Korean sojus and the remaining imported liquors? Korea poses the question,
when are products sufficiently competitive for the purposes of comparing their tax rates under
Article III.2?
5.198. Korea argues that to answer this threshold questio n, it is useful to recall first the factors that
are relevant to establish a competitive relationship between two products and then analyse the degree
of competition that will trigger the application of Article III.2, first and second sentences.
iii) Relevant factors
5.199. According to Korea, first, one must determine whether the products at issue are at least
roughly comparable. Where potable liquids are concer ned, it makes little sense to compare soft drinks
with alcoholic beverages for example. Consumers w ho want a soft drink will not consider alcohol a
suitable alternative.
5.200. Korea further states that within the broad category of alcoholic beverages, a further
distinction can be made according to product characteristics, such as:
- Raw materials - Are products rice-based, grain-based , potato-based, tapioca-based, etc?
Which additives are used? In Kor ea's view, these elements may influe nce the taste of the beverage,
and the consumer's perception in general.
- Production process - Are the alcoholic drinks based on fermentation only, or on distillation?
Are they aged, and if so how, before being sold? According to Korea, these are factors that may
influence the final appearance and taste of the drink, but also its image in the marketplace. Ageing in
wooden casks, for instance, gives a drink an 'artisan al' image, that may make quite a difference to
consumers, even though objectively it is debatable whether more industrial production processes (e.g.,
mere storage in metal containers) result in inferior products.

114 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., supra, para. 6.22.
115 Ibid.
116 See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , Appellate Body Report, supra., p. 25. The Appellate
Body reiterated this reasoning in its more recent report in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals ,
supra, p. 28.

- Physical characteristics
 - of the finished products. Are the products similar in terms of their
appearance, the degree of alcoholic strength?
 Other notable factors determining whether two products compete revolve around price and end use.
- Price - Are the products at issue in the same price range? According to Korea, if prices differ
greatly, two seemingly similar products cannot be cons idered directly competit ive. Korea notes that
in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the complainants argued that Japanese shochu and the
imported liquors were in the same price range before tax. 117 Korea further notes that Japan does not
appear to have contested this. Korea asserts that the price differences in Korea between standard soju
and the disputed imported liquors are very considerable.
- End uses - Do consumers use these products in the same way? Do they drink a particular
drink straight or mixed; with meals, or on other occasions? Korea states that these elements were
highlighted in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I .
118 Korea argues for instance, that depending
on the food they usually eat, c onsumers will show a preference for different alcoholic drinks during
meals. In countries with a spicy food tradition, consumers may favour strong alcohol that cleans the
palate, when eating meals. In countries where sp icy food is not a tradition, consumers will by
definition have a different preference for an alcoholic drink that goes best with their national cuisine.
5.201. Korea argues that the existence, or absence, of a competitive relationship can also be gleaned
from other factors, such as the places of sale and c onsumption. According to Korea, one relevant
question in this connection is whether the disputed liquors are sold through th e same outlets, so that
consumers are actually offered a choice between them. If not, this is an indication that they are not, in
fact, competing.
iv) The degree of competition or substitutability
5.202. Korea poses the question, how strong must comp etition between two pr oducts be, before one
can speak of a directly competitive and substitutable, or even a 'like' product relationship within the
meaning of Article III:2?
5.203. Korea argues that it is good policy to give a strict reading to the terms of Article III:2. In
Korea's view, given that the WTO is an organisati on which brings together a large number of diverse
countries, and that it has no mandate to harmonise tax policies, the threshold to review taxes under
Article III:2 GATT (i.e., the competitive relationshi p between differently taxed products) is both
important and substantial.
5.204. According to Korea, for 'like' products, the competitive relationship must be very strong
indeed. Korea cites the Appellate Body report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, in which it was stated that 'like' products are 'perfect substitutes'.119
5.205. Korea argues that in relation to the examina tion of the legal obligation under Article III:2
second sentence, the existence of competitive relationship is also an essential requirement for the
determination of whether products can be determined to be directly competitive and substitutable. In
Korea's view, unlike 'like’ products, substitution does not have to be perfect between the products.
Korea asserts that the texts of Article III:2 second sen tence and its Interpretative Note require that the

117 See Panel Report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., at para. 4.82. See also the
more recent Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , Appellate Body report, at p. 30, where the
Appellate Body, in finding a directly competitive and substitutable relationship between certain imported and
domestic periodicals, approvingly cited evidence of 'considerable price competition' between the two.
118 See Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., para. 5.7.
119 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p. 31.

competitive relationship must still be strong before the products can be considered directly
competitive and substitutable. This is why the text refers to " directly competing or substitutable
products".
5.206. In Korea's view, the complainants have not shown that there is any close relationship between
the imported products and soju. Korea therefore, is of the view that they have been unable to show
actual competition on the market between the produc ts and are now trying to introduce the argument
that the absence of actual competition was due, at least in part, to the tax measures.
5.207. According to Korea, such a loose interpretation of Article III.2 runs counter to the text of the
Interpretative Note to Article III.2. This Note adds that 'only where competition was involved'
between two 'directly competitive or substitutable' products could a tax differential conceivably
amount to a violation of the second sentence of Artic le III:2. In Korea's view, this language strongly
suggests that there must be actual competition between the directly competitive or substitutable
products before their tax rates are to be compared.
5.208. Korea further argues that it is clear that in the present case the comp lainants have neither
shown that imported liquors actually compete with the Korean sojus, nor have they shown that these
liquors would directly compete with each other in th e absence of the tax differential. Korea refers to
the argument by the complainants that there is a substantial measure of price elasticity between the
Korean sojus and imported liquors. According to Kor ea, the complainants seek to argue that various
product combinations are in competition with each ot her, on the grounds that relatively small changes
in the price of soju will persuade Korean consum ers to switch to imported liquors such as whisky.
Korea notes that in support of this argument the European Communities submitted a market survey,
120
which has been endorsed by the United States.
5.209. Korea points out that given the considerable price differences (even pre-tax) and different end
uses between these liquors, the complainants' conclu sion flies in the face of common sense. Korea
adds that another study funded by the Eur opean Communities, and conducted by the same
organization but not for legal proceedings, found that "soju in particular remains unaffecetd by
imported drinks".121
5.210. Korea submits that this particular study (the 'Dodwell' study) constitutes poor evidence.
Korea puts forward the following reasons for its as sertion that the Dodwell study cannot be relied
upon as constituting evidence of product substitutability:
v) Problems in the Dodwell Report
 Internally inconsistent results
5.211. Korea expounds upon the peculiarity and problems, namely flaws in design or oddities in the
reported results. Korea mentions as an example that in chart 2, the percentage choosing soju rises
when price of soju increases from 1,100 to 1,200 won, even though all other prices are held constant.
Korea argues that this seems to imply a positivel y-sloped demand curve, which is, as the United
States noted before the Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage II case, “contrary to one of the
fundamental tenets of micro-economic theory.122 Moreover, Korea observes, the percentage choosing
premium and standard scotch rises as the price of soju rises from 1,000 to 1,100 won but falls as the

120 See EC Annex 13.
121 EC Commission, Your Guide to Exporting Food Products to Korea, Alcoholic Beverages 1997
(Sofres Report), p.22.
122 Panel Report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., at para. 4.86.

price of soju rises from 1,100 to 1,200 won. Korea notes that such odd findings are frequent: indeed,
they appear in every chart.
123
5.212. Korea argues that there is no theoretical reason why the quantity demanded of one good
should not fall as the price of a related good rises, a lthough the implication that soju and whisky, for
example, are complements in consumption, so th at a fall in the price of whisky would increase
consumption of soju, might seem to many economists implausible. Korea notes that the difficulty
with the Dodwell report is that it sometimes shows the quantity of scotch demanded rising as the price
of soju rises, and sometimes falling. Korea finds the facts reported, though curious, are less troubling
than their lack of internal consistency.
5.213. Korea suggests that consumers in actual markets are unlikely to be so random in their
responses to price changes. Kor ea concludes that the members of the Dodwell sample may have
treated the Dodwell question with less gravity than the report’s authors might like to believe.
 Standard and premium soju
5.214. Korea points to another peculiarity in the treat ment of standard and premium soju. Korea
observes that in the Dodwell report, the premium soju is offered as a choice side-by-side with
western-style spirits in the pairwise choice between white spirits and standard soju and in the pairwise
choice between brown spirits and standard soju. Thus, Korea notes, in the Dodwell “brown spirits”
test, respondents are offered a choice between scot ch, cognac and premium soju on the one hand, and
standard soju on the other; and in the white spirits test they are offered a choice between vodka, gin,
rum, tequila, liqueur, and premium soju on the one hand, and standard soju on the other.
5.215. Korea argues that grouping soju with western-type spirits rather than w ith standard soju is
eccentric, and suggests a lack of familiarity with these two soju products. According to Korea,
standard and premium soju are regarded as close subs titutes in Korea. Korea states that premium soju
is more expensive than standard soju — the “current price” of premium soju in the Dodwell report is
2,400 won as compared to 1,000 won for standard soju. Korea notes, however, that is hardly a
compelling case for putting premium soju in the same group as 20,000 won scotch or 32,000won
cognac.
124

123 In chart 1, the percentage choosing premium scotch falls as the price of soju rises from 1,100 to
1,200 won even through all other prices — including that of premium scotch—are held constant; in chart 3, the
percentage choosing premium soju falls as the price of standard soju rises from 1,100 won to 1,200 won; in
chart 4, the percentages choosing gin and tequila both fall as the price of soju rises from 1,000 won to 1,100
won; in chart 5, the percentage choosing tequila falls as the price of soju rises from 1,000 to 1,100 won, and the
percentages choosing vodka, gin and premium soju all fall as the price of soju rises from 1,100 to1,200 won;
and in chart 6, the percentages choosing liqueur and premium soju both fall as the price of soju rises from 1,000
to 1,100 won, and the percentages choosing vodka and gin both fall as the price of soju rises from 1,100 to 1,200
won.
124 According to Korea, taxation of premium soju is id entical to that of standard soju, and the natural
division between soju on the one ha nd, and western-style spirits on th e other would on its face have given
clearer results. Rejection of the natural division seems to be a major flaw is the design of the Dodwell study,
and it would be interesting to know how it came about and why it was maintained.
Korea claims that, as it is, the outcome of the stud y is blurred by interactions between standard and
premium soju, which account for much of the change reported. The firs t Dodwell results, for example, are
based on holding at current levels the price of brown and white spirits(and premium soju) while the price of
standard soju is hypothetically raised from 1000 to 1200 won. The reported result is that standard soju loses 5.2
percentage points to “brown spirits.” Three of these points, however, ar e gained by premium soju. Against
white spirits, standard soju loses 5 percentage points, but 4 are gained by premium soju.
According to Korea, if these results are treated seriously, as presumably they were by the authors of the
report, they strongly suggest that standard and premium soju are close substitutes in consumption. That finding

 Problems
5.216. Korea states that studies of the Dodwell type must be carefully designed if they are not to fall
foul of bias. Korea points out that the Dodwell re port clearly has not managed this. Korea discusses
two sources of bias and claims that either is suffi cient to eliminate the credibility of the Dodwell
Report.
Choice of respondents
5.217. Korea points out that no reason is given for the exclusion of males above the age of 49 or of
the rural population when the Dodwell report states “It was decided to select as respondents for the
research 500 Korean men in 3 Korean cities aged between 20 and 49 who have purchased soju in the
last month.”
125
5.218. Korea states that no information is provided on how and where the same was selected, or on
how its members were induced to spend their time answering the survey questions. Korea notes that
no information is given on the drinking habits of respondents — for example, where they typically
purchase alcohol, or how much they consume(alth ough questions 5-13 deal with these matters).
Korea further notes that no information is prov ided on the actual characteristics of the sample — for
example, average age, occupation, income — that would permit a check on whether the sample is even
representative of “Korean males aged between 20 and 49 who have purchased soju in the last month.”
5.219. Korea argues that the restriction and exclusi on of the rural population are not the only ones
placed on the sample. Korea indicates that p. 3 of the report announces that “additional criteria for
the respondents were whisky purchase in the last 3 months. ” Korea notes that no reason is given for
rejecting persons who have not purchased whisky in the last three months. Korea conjectures that,
possibly, the results of the study in the absence of this condition were disappointing. Korea notes that
it is certainly true that a good way to obtain a strong response to a fall in the price of whisky and a rise
in the price of soju is to select a sample of persons that drink both soju and whisky(and, of course, a
whisky purchase in the last three months and a soju purchase in the last month is consistent with a
purchase of both in the last week, day or hour).
5.220. Korea states that the effects of selection bias ar e evident, regardless of the motivation for the
additional restriction,. Korea points out that in the Dodwell sample, at current prices, 72 per cent of
respondents select soju when asked to choose betw een brown spirits and soju; and 72 per cent select
soju when asked to choose between white spirits and so ju (Korea refers to the Dodwell study, p. 6).
Korea notes, however, that the actual share of soju in consumption of distilled spirits in Korea,
however, is about 95 per cent.
5.221. Korea asserts that the discrepancy between tho se who prefer soju at current prices in the
Dodwell study and the true figure is very large
126 Korea nevertheless states that the difference

might have been expected to lead the authors of the Dodwell report to use the natural division. It is curious that
it apparently did not have that effect.
125 The Dodwell Report at p. 2.
126 The figure of 72 per cent is used by the authors of the Dodwell report (p. 6). According to Korea,
an alternative would have been to take the percentage of the sample choosing either standard or premium soju at
current prices: 84.8 per cent then choose soju and 15.2 per cent brown spirits proper when offered that pair, and
86.2 per cent choose soju and 13.8 per cent western-type white spirits of that pair. This reduces one discrepancy
between the Dodwell sample and actual market shares — the Dodwell percentage choosing brown spirits proper
fall to only five times actual market share. But it also highlights other discrepancies. In the Dodwell sample
14.85 per cent of those choosing soju opt for premium soju: in fact, premium soju takes about 4 to 5 per cent of
total soju sales. In the Dodwell sample, 13.8 per cent choose western-type white spirits, which have an actual
market share of 1.8 per cent.

between 72 per cent of the sample and 95 per cent th at choose soju in reality is likely to seriously
understate how unrepresentative the sample is. Korea attributes the discrepancy to the fact that
respondents were given a pairwise choice between so ju and brown spirits, and then a pairwise choice
between soju and white spirits. They were not offered a three-way choice between soju or brown
spirits or white spirits.
5.222. Korea acknowledges that some respondents may ch oose brown spirits rather than soju from
that pair, but soju rather than white spirits when offered that pair; while others might select white
spirits rather than soju in that pairwise offering, but soju rather than brown spirits. Offered a
three-way choice, all of those who reject soju in the pairwise choice will continue to reject soju.
Korea, however, emphasizes that those who chose wh ite spirits when offered a choice between soju
and white spirits need not be the same as tho se who choice brown spirits when offered a choice
between soju and brown spirits. Korea states that it follows that the figure of 72 per cent choosing
soju rather than brown spirits in the Dodwell samp le, and the similar percentage selecting soju rather
than white spirits, gives the highest possible perc entage of those in the sample who would have
chosen soju had they been offered a three-way choice.
5.223. Korea points out that the actual percentage choos ing soju in a three-way choice would be 72
per cent only if all those who prefer white spirits to soju also prefer brown spirits to soju and vice
versa. Korea notes that at the opposite extreme, though, if all of those choosing whisky over soju
prefer soju to white spirits; and if all of those c hoosing white spirits rather than soju prefer brown
spirits, the percentage opting for soju in a three-way choice would be 44 per cent — 28 per cent would
reject soju in favour of brown spirits, and 28 per cen t would reject soju for white spirits. Korea states
that only 72 per cent of Dodwell respondents choose soju at current prices indicates the
unrepresentative nature of the Dodwell sample: that a lower figure is avoided only by the failure to
offer a three-way choice; and that in such a choice, the number choosing soju might fall as low as 44
per cent, puts the Dodwell report into a world entirely different from that of Korean reality.
5.224. Korea argues that the Dodwell study is based upon a sample of persons who are strongly
biased towards western-type spirits, relative to the Korean population as a whole. Korea asserts that
the Dodwell sample is not a credible sample. Ko rea states that, even leaving aside other grounds for
doubt, the response to hypothetical price changes of a group so unrepresentative cannot be taken to
reflect anything of the responses of the Korean population as a whole to real price changes.
 The single choice drink
5.225. Korea indicates that the Dodwell study respondents are confronted with an either-or choice.
Korea notes that according to the Dodwell script, interviewers say: “As you can see, there are five
types of spirits and photos of typical brands of these types. Which spirit would you choose at these
prices?”
5.226. Korea states that reliable information about how different prices might change drinking
habits— that is, whether a person who is a regular so ju drinker might switch to becoming a regular
whisky drinker were the price of soju higher and the price of whisky lower — might be relevant in this

According to Korea, these discrepancies strongly suggest sample bias. The Dodwell report, though,
does not provide enough information to translate percentages of Dodwell respondents into a figure directly
comparable with actual market shares, so that it does not allow calculation of whet her the comparisons above
understate or overstate the degree of bias. One proble m is that Dodwell responden ts are asked to choose a
single bottle: in fact, drinkers are likely to consume different drinks at differ ent times. Another problem is that
those choosing soju in the Dodwell sample, for exampl e, might on average consume more soju than those
choosing whisky consume whisky. The implied market share of soju would then be more than 72 per cent. To
approach actual market shares, Dodwell soju choosers, if they drank nothing but soju, would have to consume a
volume of soju about 13 times greater than Dodwell whisky drinkers, if they drank nothing but whisky.

case. However, Korea argues, that is not what the Dodwell interviewers ask about. Korea notes that
they ask which bottle a respondent would choose at the different prices. Korea points out in the
Lexecon/Hindley Report that respondents might perf ectly naturally interpret the Dodwell questions
asking: “If you saw these prices the next time you bought a bottle of spirits, which bottle would you
choose?” Korea notes that such questions opens the po ssibility that some respondents interpreted the
hypothetical prices as a one-time offer: “If you saw these prices the next time you bought a bottle of
spirits, but knew that usual prices would be back in force the time after that, which bottle would you
buy? ” Korea emphasizes that some Dodwell respondents may simply be saying that they would try a
bottle of high-price cognac were it temporarily on offer at such a low price.
5.227. Korea argues that respondents in terpreting the question as asking “would you try a bottle of
cognac if it was offered at this price? ” are almost certainly more likely to answer affirmatively than
those interpreting the question as asking “would these prices cause you to change your drinking
habits?”. Accordingly, Korea concludes, the ambiguit y in the question almost certainly increases the
number saying they would buy a bottle of brown or white spirits at a lower price.
5.228. Korea emphasizes that there is absolutely no reason to suppose that respondents are speaking
about a change in their drinking habits — that their answers imply that if soju rose in price from 1,000
won to 1,200 won, they would switch their regular drink, during meals for instance, from soju to
cognac at 32,000 won or scotch at 20,000 won.
5.229. Korea argues that market surveys, carried out specifically for the purposes of legal
proceedings at the request of an interested party, are, of course, to be treated with caution . T h e
analysis must be rigorous, and bias must be avoide d at all cost. According to Korea, the Dodwell
study does not meet these standards. Korea sums up what it perceives to be the most glaring defects
of this study:
(i) It is not at all clear whether the sample of Korean consumers used for the analysis
was representative.
(ii) The questions posed were, in Korea' s view, ambiguous. Korea argues that the
question 'which spirit would you choose at this different price?’ for example, might
have been interpreted by respondents as asking whether they would change their habit
of drinking soju with meals and switch instead to a western-type spirit; or as the
different question of whether, at the hypothetical lower price, they would buy an
experimental bottle of a western-type drink.
(iii) Korea argues that the conclusions draw n from this study by the complainants are
fanciful. According to Korea, it does not rebut the common sense presumption that,
given the enormous price differences (even before tax) between standard soju and
western-type liquors and their different e nd uses, no appreciable number of Korean
consumers consider them to be substitutes.
127
5.230. Korea further argues that in contrast, more cr edence can be given to a study, which was not
prepared specifically for regulatory purposes, but which tries to explain in objective terms to exporters
the situation on the Korean market. Korea refers to a recent report initiated by the European
Commission recently, which stated:
Soju is consumed widely, from the young to th e old, and is the most popular traditional drink
in Korea. Soju in particular remains unaffect ed by imported alcoholic drinks. Furthermore

127 See Attachment 2 of Korea, which is a critique by Lexecon Ltd and Dr. Brian Hindley (London
School of Economics) of the Dodwell Study.

Soju, is insulated from economic downturns and maintains a loyal following of steady
consumers.
128
5.231. Korea asserts that the constant and independe nt demand for soju is not the result of any
protective government policies. Korea refers to the same EC study which notes that:
"The Korean alcohol market is no longer a mark et protected by the government with market
shares contested by local producers. In fact , it is becoming a truly global market where
multinational companies convene to compete with one another for the lucrative and promising
Korean market".129
(d) Product-by Product Analysis
5.232. Korea submits that as competitive relationshi ps differ from product to product and from
market to market, the United States and the Europ ean Communities bear the burden of proving for
each individual product combination that a 'like’ or 'directly competitive and substitutable’
relationship exists in the Korean market before they can put the applicable tax rates into question.
5.233. Korea states that, without assuming the complain ants' burden of proof, it will demonstrate the
failure of the complainants to discharge this burden in the following way:
(i) that the complainants have confused various products that are called soju.
(ii) Korean soju is a different product from Japanese shochu.
(iii) Korean standard soju is unlike distille d soju. Korea argues that these are different
products in terms of inter alia their raw materials, production process, taste, price,
place of consumption, end use, and their mark eting. Korea also submits that they are
subject to different tax rates: 35% for standard soju and 50% for distilled soju.
5.234. Korea, therefore argues that both diluted soju and distilled soju must be compared
individually to each of the imported liquors in questi on. Further, it states that although premium soju
is a variation of diluted soju, Premium's price is somewhat higher, though still far below the price of
the imported liquors. Premium soju represents only a small volume of diluted soju sales (currently,
around 5%). In the discussion below of diluted soju due account is taken, where necessary, of any of
premium's special features.
130
5.235. Korea notes that the only products that the United States and the European Communities have
alleged are 'like’ are standard soju and distilled soju and vodka. Korea states that it will therefore only
make representations about the lack of a 'like produc t’ relationship as far as vodka is concerned. In its
view, it goes without saying that Korea does not accept that any 'like product’ relationships exist in
this case.131
5.236. Korea also seeks to point out the very consid erable price differences that exist between the
imported liquors and diluted soju. According to Ko rea, the complainants recognize these differences

128Sofres Report, p.22
129 Ibid., p. 12.
130 For instance, in giving average prices of standard soju, the higher price of premium is taken into
account.
131 Korea is mindful of the fact that in the most recent Japanese liquor taxes case, a 'like' product
relationship was found to exist between one product pair: Japanese shochu and vodka. However, given the
differences between Japanese shochu and the Korean soju s, as well as the differences between the Korean and
the Japanese markets, this holding is inapplicable to the case at hand, according to Korea.

at actual market prices.
132 However, Korea argues that these pr ice differences remain considerable,
even when the disputed taxes are eliminated. Korea points out that this is shown by the complainants’
own expert study, the Dodwell Study. 133 Korea's position is that although it contests the results of the
Dodwell Study, the raw price data provided in that study appear to be genera lly correct. Korea feels
that these data are so compelling that it has not fe lt it necessary to go beyond the data set forth by the
complainants. In its view, the one exception is whisky, where, given its importance to this case,
Korea has supplemented the Dodwell data with its own figures.
5.237. In short, Korea is seeking to show that an ine xpensive local meal drink such as diluted soju is
not in direct competition with expensive western-type liquors. In the alternative, Korea is seeking to
show why the complainants have not shown that Korea's tax system meets the other criteria of
Article III:2, assuming that the Panel would still find a competitive relationship between some
products,
5.238. Korea states that contrary to what the compla inants are alleging, the so-called soju based
cocktails are not soju. According to Korea, these are sweetened mixtures, with a low alcohol
percentage (10-15%), that were introduced in 1994. They are not comparable to either standard or
distilled soju. Korea adds that to make the distinc tion, manufacturers never use the word 'soju’ in the
brand names for these products. They are classified di fferently, like liqueurs, according to the liquor
tax law. Korea points out this classification also covers such imported liqueurs as Bailey’s, Grand
Marnier, Kahlua, etc. Liqueurs are subject to a tax ra te of 50%. It is unclear to Korea what, if any,
complaint the European Communities and the United States are formulating in this respect.
5.239. Korea also argues that contrary to EC assertions, sales of soju-based cocktails did not increase
by 1250% in 1995. According to Korea, the taxe d volume of soju-based cocktails increased by 419%
in 1995, from 1,583 kl (1994) to 8,218 kl (1995), and that in 1996 sales decreased by 8% (to 7,562);
in 1997 by 22% (to 5,893) kl).
134
i) Diluted soju
Diluted soju and Whisky
5.240. Korea argues that diluted soju and whisky ar e entirely different products, regardless of the
perspective from which one looks at them. Korea points out that, firstly, the physical difference
between these two products is immediately obvious to the eye and to the palate. Even more striking,
according to Korea, are the market differences between the way that diluted soju and whisky are sold
and consumed in Korea. Korea states that the prim ary differences boil down to this: in Korea, diluted
soju is the drink one finds on the dinn er table, the drink that is consumed with meals. As such, it is an
inexpensive beverage. According to Korea, diluted soju is not drunk in bars or clubs. Whisky, by
contrast, is an expensive drink that is primarily co nsumed in high-class bars and clubs -- hardly ever
with meals.
5.241. According to Korea, these factors show that there is no actual competitive relationship
between diluted soju and whisky , and a removal of the tax differential would not create direct
competition between those two drinks either.
5.242. Korea argues that at first glance, one can see that diluted soju is a 'white’ spirit, transparent
and colourless, while whisky is a 'brown’ spirit, of a translucent golden-brown colour (an element

132 Sofres Report, at p. 53 (1997), reproduced in Attachment 3.
133 Pre-tax prices are provided in the Dodwell Study on page 20, in the column marked 'NET’. See
Attachment 4.
134 Source: National Tax Administration.

much prized by consumers). Korea adds that, d iluted soju has an alcoholic strength of 25% by
volume, while the alcoholic strength of whisky is at least 40% by volume.
5.243. As to their organoleptic qualities, Korea states that the most important types of whisky -
Scotch, Irish, Bourbon and Canadian - have in common a very typical flavour and smell. It states that
the elements that are often mentioned in connecti on with whisky are that it has a warm, smooth and
smoky flavour. According to Korea, one of the obj ectives in the production process is, as with wine,
to develop the taste and aroma imparted to the beverage as a result of the raw materials used for its
production (maize, barley, rye or malt) and its ageing in wooden casks.
5.244. Korea further argues that, on the other hand, diluted soju has quite a 'rough’ flavour and tends
to leave a stinging sensation in the mouth and throat. Korea submits that this is a function of the raw
materials of which standard soju is made and its production process. In Korea's view, the emphasis in
the production process of diluted soju is on maki ng the product as cheaply as possible, not, as with
whisky, on ageing and adding value a nd subtle flavours. That is why, according to Korea, standard
soju tends to have a 'cold’ mouth feel that makes the drink suitable for consumption with the typically
spicy Korean cuisine for which whisky is not suited. Hence, Korea concludes, as a matter of taste,
Korean consumers do not consider whisky and diluted soju as substitutes for each other.
5.245. Korea further states that diluted soju is the al coholic beverage that Koreans prefer with their
meals. It is an effective foil for the hot and spicy food Koreans prefer, and Koreans consider that it is
important to have some food when consuming diluted soju, in order to protect the stomach from the
drink’s harshness.
5.246. Korea concedes that it may seem unusual that Ko reans prefer a distilled alcoholic beverage
with their meals. Korea points out that in many cultures, particularly western ones, the alcoholic
beverage found at the table is usually a fermented beverage with a lower alcohol content, such as wine
or beer. It is in fact a western notion that distilled alcoholic beverages are not drunk with meals, but as
straight drinks or cocktails. However, Korea points out that not all cultures share this trait, and gives
as an example the Chinese, who allegedly also enjoy distilled alcoholic beverages with their meals.
Finally, Korea notes that as in most countries, whisky is not consumed with meals in Korea.
5.247. Korea argues that these differences have follo w-on effects. In conjunction with meals,
standard soju is often consumed at home, while whis ky is not. Whisky is instead consumed primarily
in high-class hotel bars, night clubs, room saloons , and karaoke bars. Dilu ted soju not only not
consumed in those places, it is not even on offer. Ko rea adds that when diluted soju is drunk away
from home, it is mainly in Korean restaurants (including barbecue houses), mobile street vendors and
inexpensive Chinese restaurants, where whisky is not normally available.
5.248. Korea therefore states that the Hankook Stud y introduced by the European Communities
135
begs the question. It allegedly shows that whisky is available in shops, hotels, danlanjujum (karaoke
bars), Japanese restaurants, cafés, bars, night-clubs and discos. According to Korea, however, it does
not show that soju is available in all of these ou tlets. Furthermore, argues Korea, it omits to mention
the outlets in which diluted soju is drunk, but wh isky is not available, such as the outlets where
Koreans typically eat (Korean restaurants, incl uding barbecue houses, mobile street vendors and
inexpensive Chinese restaurants).
5.249. Korea states that in addition to the fact that dilu ted soju is a 'meal drink’ while whisky is not,
another element which shows in a most definitive wa y that diluted soju and whisky are not directly
competitive and substitutable is their large difference in price. According to Korea, whisky is not
nearly in the same price range as standard soju.

135 EC Annex 10.

5.250. Korea asserts that in order to exclude any possibl e distortive effect from the disputed taxes, it
will only compare pre-tax prices.
136 At this level, in Korea's an alysis, striking price differences
emerge from the Dodwell Study. According to Korea, Premium Scotch whisky is 12 times the price of
diluted soju. North American whiskies are 10.8 times the price of diluted soju, and standard Scotch
whisky is 7.2 times the price of diluted soju. Even the cheapest whisky, bottled in Korea, is cited as
6.3 times the price of standard soju. 137 In Korea's view, these figures show that diluted soju and
whisky are far from being in the same price range.
5.251. To further support that point already made th rough the Dodwell data, Korea provides in the
following table, average pre-tax prices for the past three years using its own figures. Korea explains
that because these figures are calculated by dividing the total taxed value by the total taxed volume,
they show the weighted average (pre-tax) prices of whisky and diluted soju (including premium soju)
in Korea. In Korea's view, the results138 show more pronounced price differences:
(in Korean won, pre-tax) 1995 1996 1997
Standard soju (360 ml) 289.94 305.11 322.46
Whisky (360 ml) 3401.27 3582.09 4111.50
Factor of: 11.73 11.74 12.75

5.252. Korea submits that these price differences are main tained even if taxes are harmonised, either
down to the diluted soju level, or up to the whisky level. According to Korea, this is a compelling
indication that whisky and diluted soju would not be in direct competition, even if the tax differential
were eliminated.
5.253. Korea points out that this is not to say that whisky sales would not rise if the tax on whisky
were reduced. It concedes that this might well be the case, just as in the past tax rate reductions on
whisky have led to increased whisky sales. Korea poi nts out, however, that whisky would still not be
in direct competition with diluted soju. Accordi ng to Korea, their price and other differences would
remain too important and diluted soju sales would continue to develop largely independently.
139
5.254. Korea states that this observation was also made by the recent European Commission study
already cited:

136 Pre-tax prices are provided in the Dodwell Study on page 20, in the column marked 'NET’. See
Attachment 4 Korea.
137 According to Korea, it is to be noted that this is not a representative price for domestic whisky. For
some reason, the Dodwell Study has split up the domestic brands (BIK stands for 'bottled in Korea') and has
listed some of them among Premium Scotch Whisky as well. An example is the leading domestic brand
(Imperial Classic), which is an expensive brand.
138 The underlying data are set out in Attachment 5 of Korea.
139 Korea states that the complainants' allegation that in recent years diluted soju sales have been eroded
by growing sales of imported liquors is improbable. See EC first submission, at para. 51. The only thing they
show is a slight (2%) reduction in the market share of diluted soju on the total spirits market from 1992 to 1996
(EC first submission, at Annex 6). In absolute terms, however, diluted soju sales rose by almost 13% (EC first
submission, at Annex 5). During those five years, the spirits market increased in size (more than 15%); and
diluted soju sales grew somewhat more slowly than sa les of imported liquors. Increased income, the relative
maturity of the market for diluted soju, etc., are more likely explanations to explain the difference in growth rate
than any competition between whisky and diluted soju.

Soju in particular remains unaffected by im ported alcoholic drinks. Furthermore Soju, is
insulated from economic downturns and maintains a loyal following of steady consumers.140
5.255. Korea also notes that the compla inants have also not taken into account external factors such
as currency fluctuations that also have an impact on sales of imported whisky.
5.256. Accordingly, Korea concludes that it is not unde r any legal obligation, by virtue of Article
III.2 GATT, to reduce taxes on whisky to diluted soju levels (or, for that matter, to increase taxes on
standard soju to whisky levels). In Korea's view, these two products are simply not sufficiently
related on the Korean market for a tax differential to raise GATT concerns.
5.257. Korea submits that there are also other factors that contribute to the conclusion that diluted
soju and whisky are not directly competitive and substitutable. Korea cites for instance, the marketing
strategies for both drinks follow from the distin ct consumption patterns and the price aspects
described above. According to Korea, the target consumer is clearly different for both drinks and the
producers and importers market the drinks accordingly. According to Korea, diluted soju is marketed
as an everyday drink, consumed during meals, barbecues -- not in luxurious surroundings. It is
contended that these advertisements typically show Korean citizens in day-to-day clothes having
diluted soju while eating. In contrast, according to Korea, whisky is positioned as a high class luxury
drink that is meant for special occasions. The adver tising is allegedly meant to appeal to consumers
who are prepared to pay a considerable price for this privilege.141
5.258. Korea also argues that each product has its ow n branding strategy. Korea contends that no
trademark for whisky is used for sales of diluted so ju, neither is a soju trademark used for sales of
whisky. Korea states for example, that the Jinro company sells its domestic whisky under the 'Imperial
Classic' brand, whereas its diluted soju is sold as 'Jinro Gold'. In Korea's view, this is yet another
indication demonstrating that both products do not compete, and ar e not substitutable on the Korean
market.
Diluted soju and Brandy/Cognac
5.259. Korea argues that there are a myriad of differe nces between diluted soju and brandy/cognac.
Some of these differences are apparent at first gl ance. Korea contends that in their packaging,
brandies/cognacs are presented in an elegant fashi on in keeping with their distinguished character.
This makes these drinks very suitable for gifts. The same cannot be said about diluted soju, bottled in
common plastic or glass bottles and geared toward frequent consumption, rather than to occasional
consumption.
5.260. Korea further argues that another striking differe nce is in the appearance of the alcohol itself:
brandy/cognac is generally a deep golden brown colo ur and has substantial body, while standard soju
is a white clear spirit, with little body. Brandies/cogn acs have an alcohol content of at least 40%, as
opposed to diluted soju’s 25%. Further, the flavour and aroma of brandy has been much celebrated,
and described as 'velvety’ and full-bodied, with a powerful and pleasant bouquet. Part of the typical
flavour of brandies/cognacs can be attributed to the fact that they are derived from fermented fruit.
Korea also points out that in addition, brandies/cognacs undergo an important ageing process in oak
casks (e.g., in order to bear the name 'cognac’, this sp ecial brandy must be aged for at least 6 years in

140 Sofres Report, at p. 22 (1997). See Attachment 3 of Korea.
141 See Attachment 6 of Korea fo r typical Korean advertisements for diluted soju and whisky.
According to Korea, the advertisements submitted by the complainants are misleading in this regard. Many of
them are directed not to the Korean market but to foreigners (see US, Exhibit D, which is a 'Sky Shop’ duty free
advertisement offered to international airline passenger s; Exhibit F, which is an advertisement in English
published in an international industry journal; or Exhib its H and I, which are advertisements in the Japanese
language for the Japanese market).

wooden casks). It is contended that diluted soju on the other hand is most often made of tapioca, and
has a much more industrial production process with no ageing. Suffice it to say that the resulting
diluted soju has none of the refined characteristics of brandies/cognacs.
5.261. Korea further states that the price of brandy/c ognac compared to diluted soju clearly spells
out that competition between these products is improbable: pre-tax, brandy is 19.2 times as expensive
as diluted soju.
142 In Korea's view, this is certainly not 'within a relatively short range’ of prices.
5.262. Korea submits that consumers perceive bra ndies/cognac and diluted soju as completely
different products and use them in completely diffe rent ways. According to Korea, brandies are very
expensive luxury drinks, and are consumed in plac es in keeping with their stature: room saloons,
clubs, hotel bars, and other luxurious premises where standard soju is not on offer. Korea adds that
brandy/cognac would not be consumed with a meal while diluted soju is the traditional cheap Korean
drink essentially drunk during meals. It is contended that it is drunk (often in rather large quantities)
by ordinary folks in less illustrious settings than br andy, such as with a meal at home or in a family
restaurant. Korea states that a request for a gl ass of cognac such as Rémy Martin in these settings
would likely be met with incredulity.
5.263. According to Korea, these differences are furthe r reflected in the fact that the marketing
strategies of diluted soju and brandies are essentiall y different. Korea states that of all the drinks
concerned by this dispute, brandy probably has the most luxurious image, and is marketed as such, in
its packaging, advertising, the target consumer cla ss, and of course, its price range. The marketing of
diluted soju, is, as stated before, concentrated on meal consumption and is the 'common’ man’s drink.
Diluted Soju and Vodka
5.264. Korea states that vodka is the only product for which the United States and the European
Communities have claimed a 'like’ relationship w ith diluted soju. Korea raises doubts as to the
evidence brought by the complainants for alleging 'l ikeness’ of diluted soju and vodka. According to
Korea, out of six physical characteristics of vodka and diluted soju which the United States compared,
only two corroborate their point of view. Korea notes that the Panel in the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II stated that "'like products’ need not be identical in all respects". However, Korea further
notes that this statement was imme diately followed by an insistence that "the term 'like product’
should be construed narrowly…." 143
5.265. Korea states that as far as the alleged 'likeness' is concerned, it should be noted that vodka and
diluted soju do not fall under the same tariff classi fication. Vodka is allegedly classified under HS
Classification 2208.60.00, while diluted soju falls un der HS Classification 2208.90.40. Korea also
mentions that there are other differences that sugg est that there is no direct competitive relationship
between these two products. Korea states that even though the difference between standard soju and
vodka is not as striking as the differences between diluted soju and whisky , brandy, and cognac,
described above, diluted soju and vodka are not like. However, Korea points out that both diluted
soju and vodka also resemble tap water and paint thinner-- a sign, according to Korea, that
appearances can be deceptive.
5.266. Firstly, Korea states that consumers are unlikel y to treat vodka and diluted soju as substitutes
for each other in light of the price differences be tween them. Even the comparison of the pre-tax
prices of diluted soju and vodka shows that vodka is 5.7 times the price of diluted soju. 144 According

142 According to the Dodwell Study submitted by the complainants, page 20.
143 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 6.21.
144 According to the Dodwell Study, at p.20.

to Korea, if these products were truly as 'like’, in competition, or substitutable for each other, it would
be difficult to understand how such a vast price discrepancy could exist.
5.267. Korea further argues that vodka and diluted soju are not consumed in the same ways or in the
same places. In Korea's view, this follows, not only from the price difference, but also from the
difference in alcohol percentage (vodka: 40%; sta ndard soju: 25%). Korea contends that vodka is
primarily a 'mixing’ drink, and that there are even recipe books dedicated to cocktails one can make
with vodka. According to Korea vodka is mostly consumed, though at considerably lower volumes
than whisky, in room saloons, hotel bars, night club s, karaoke bars, in short, places where meals, and
standard soju, are not offered.
5.268. Korea also states that d iluted soju is drunk straight in a typical small glass and is decidedly
not a mixer. Korea contends that the outlets for diluted soju are generally eating establishments, and
they are more 'ordinary’ than those at which vodka is offered. It is contended that one can buy soju in
places like barbecue houses, restaurants, mobile st reet vendors and Chinese restaurants, while one
cannot generally buy vodka there.
5.269. Korea further states that diluted soju is a vol ume drink, which vodka is not. According to
Korea, the small volumes of vodka sold in Korea are not attributable to the tax differential. Whisky,
with a higher tax than vodka, sells at considerably larger volumes in Korea. In Korea's view, the more
likely explanation for vodka’s small sales volume is simply that Korean consumers have no particular
taste for it.
5.270. According to Korea, in light of all these diffe rences, vodka and diluted soju are certainly not
'like' products, and they are also not directly competitive and substitutable.
Diluted Soju and Gin
5.271. Korea states that even though diluted soju and gi n look alike, there is more to these products
than meets the eye. Firstly, Korea states that gi n is usually 40% alcohol while diluted soju is only
25% alcohol. Secondly, gin is derived from maize an d flavoured with certain aromatics and spices, in
particular juniper berries, which impart to gin a unique flavour and aroma, reminiscent of spices -- a
taste which is not comparable to any other liquor. By contrast, diluted soju is made with tapioca or
potatoes, and has a more harsh and neutral flavour . Korea argues that, accordingly, a consumer
desiring the specific taste of gin will not settle for so ju. Conversely, a Korean consumer interested in
soju will not turn to gin with its typical, even overbearing, taste.
5.272. Korea further states that another reason why co nsumers would not substitute gin for diluted
soju is the fact that gin is a product which is significantly more expensive than diluted soju.
According to Korea, even without taking into acc ount the disputed taxes levied on both drinks, the
price differential between the average price of d iluted soju and gin amounts to a factor of five.
145
Korea maintains that at harmonised tax rates this large price difference would remain.
5.273. Korea argues that the fact that consumers do not consider gin and diluted soju to be
substitutable for each other is borne out in the patte rns of consumption and places of sale. According
to Korea, the vast majority of diluted soju is dr unk straight, with meals. Gin on the other hand is
served as a long drink, not straight, and is not dru nk during meals. Korea contends that gin is an
'occasional’ drink in Korea, only rarely purchased on the Korean market even compared to whisky.
Compared to diluted soju consumption volumes, gin is a mere drop in the bucket, showing that in
terms of demand, gin is not a substitute for diluted soju.

145 According to the Dodwell Study submitted by the complainants, p. 20 (see Attachment 4 of Korea).

Diluted Soju and Rum
5.274. Korea states that rum comes in two varieties, light and dark , and while light rum looks like
diluted soju, dark rum does not. However, Korea st ates that both varieties of rum are very different
from standard soju. Firstly, Kor ea argues that diluted soju has an alcoholic strength of 25% by
volume, while rum is at least 38% alcohol by volume. Secondly, Korea argues that rum is distilled at
less than 96% by volume from the juice of cane sugar or molasses, specifically so that the distillate
retains the specific organoleptic characteristics imparted to it from those raw materials. Thirdly, rum
is aged. According to Korea, the result is a swee tness and a caramel flavour and smell that is smooth
and appealing. Korea notes that, on the other hand , diluted soju is made from more neutral raw
materials (tapioca, potatoes, corn), and is not ag ed. It has a 'rough’ flavour and tends to leave a
burning sensation in the mouth and throat. According to Korea, therefore, due to this difference in
taste, a consumer would not be willing to accept rum when he wants diluted soju, or vice versa.
5.275. Korea further argues that like with the othe r liquors, consumers are even less likely to
consider these two products as substitutes for each ot her in light of the difference in price between
them. Korea states that pre-tax, rum is already 6.2 times more expensive than diluted soju.
146
5.276. Korea states that in addition to, and likely because of, the physical and price differences,
diluted soju and rum are consumed in very differe nt fashions. Rum is a llegedly usually mixed as a
cocktail and sold at bars and night clubs, where dilute d soju is not even available while diluted soju is
almost exclusively drunk neat and is normally served as an accompaniment to food.
5.277. Korea argues that these differences are borne out in the marketing of both products: rum is
presented as a special and exotic beverage, intended for consumption in elegant establishments such
as those mentioned above. Diluted soju on the other hand, is the commoner’s drink, and is marketed
as such.
5.278. Korea therefore concludes that, as with gin, the disparity in the volumes of rum sold and the
volumes of diluted soju sold should be kept in mi nd. In other words, diluted soju is a commodity,
while rum is a special, 'niche’ drink.
5.279. Korea submits that it has presented a product-by-product analysis of the relationship of
diluted soju and the imported liquors at issue. Korea considers that the conclusion of this analysis is
that none of these products is in a directly comp etitive and substitutable rela tionship with any other
(and, of course, that vodka, and for that matter, none, of the imported beverages is 'like’ diluted soju).
5.280. Korea further submits that even if the Panel considers that any one of the imported products is
directly competitive and substitutable for standard soju, there is still no violation of Article III. That is
because the complainants have failed to prove, as is required under Article III:1, that the tax
differential at issue in this case is 'so as to afford protection to domestic production.’
5.281. Korea argues that, firstly, it sh ould be recalled that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, a protectionist effect was found in the combination of customs duties and the tax
differentials, which 'isolated’ Japanese shochu from competition. Korea contends that this
combination does not exist in Korea. Korea su bmits that although it levies a (GATT-compatible)
customs duty, its market for soju is not 'isolated’ at all. Korea recalls once more the recent report
published by the European Commission:
The Korean alcohol market is no longer a market protected by the government with market
shares contested by local producers. In fact , it is becoming a truly global market where

146 Ibid.

multinational companies convene to compete with one another for the lucrative and promising
Korean market.147
5.282. Korea further argues that making diluted soju basically involves mixing joojung with water,
and in Korea the vast majority (a pproximately 70%) of the joojung used to make diluted soju is
imported in a semi-finished state. Korea adds that when joojung is locally produced it is primarily
made from imported ingredients (notably tapioca). A ccording to Korea, therefore, even if the Panel
concludes that standard soju is 'protected’ by th e difference in tax, one could only say that Korea
protects one imported product at the expense of another.
5.283. Korea argues that on the other hand, if Kor ea’s diluted soju production is nevertheless
considered substantial enough to am ount to domestic production, then it must also be considered that
Korea has a domestic whisky industry as well. Ac cording to Korea, the production of whisky in
Korea is in fact similar to the production of diluted soju, in that concentrated whisky is imported, then
mixed with water and caramel, and then bottled. Korea states that this process, though it can be
described in these simple terms, does add a substantial amount in value. 148 From this perspective,
therefore, by imposing a higher tax on whisky, Kor ea has in fact been penalising its own domestic
whisky industry.
5.284. Korea also argues that the fact that there are few imports of soju (e.g., from Japan) can be
explained by commercial realities, rather than regul ation: Japanese shochu sells at prices that are
much closer to western-type liquors in Japan.
ii) Distilled Soju
5.285. Korea argues that if one could speak of a ‘soju market’, diluted soju would represent more
than 99.8% of that market, and distilled soju, 0.2%.
5.286. Korea points out that the small volume of sales of distilled soju is indicative of the fact that
distilled soju is a special artisanal product. Korea st ates that it is in fact difficult to compare a product
that is mass-marketed around the world such as the imported liquors at issue in this case to such a tiny
niche product, sold only in Korea. According to Ko rea, distilled soju is not in the same league as
these world-wide players.
5.287. Korea further states that because distilled soju is prepared with great care and in small
quantities, it is an expensive product in the price range of top-range whiskies and brandy/cognac.
This is in contrast to diluted soju which is fa r less expensive than the imported products, and falls
completely on the other end of the scale.
5.288. Korea also states that distilled soju comes in an expensive ceramic bottle and is most often
offered as a gift to friends or colleagues, to be taken home and consumed there. It is marketed as such.
Distilled Soju and Whisky
5.289. Korea argues that the differences in the appear ance of distilled soju and whisky are obvious.
Distilled soju is a ‘white’ spirit, while whisky is a brown spirit. As regards taste, whisky has a typical
flavour, described as smooth, smoky and warm. Kor ea adds that one can detect the taste and aroma
imparted to the beverage as a result of its raw materials (maize, barley, rye) and its mandatory ageing
in wooden casks for at least 3 years. Distilled soju has a full-bodied liquor with a clean aftertaste.

147 See Attachment 3 of Korea.
148 Korea understands that the cost of raw materials as a proportion of pre-tax prices can be comparable
for standard soju and domestic whisky production.

This flavour is achieved by using mainly rice or gr ain as a raw material. Ko rea states that distilled
soju can be, but need not be, aged (for a maximum of 2 years) in order to refine its flavour.
5.290. Korea also argues that distilled soju and whisky are used for very different consumer needs.
Korea states that the most common way to drink whisky in Korea is as a cocktail, on the rocks, diluted
with water or another mixer while distilled soju is almost exclusively drunk neat, that is, not diluted or
mixed.
5.291. Korea states that most whisky is sold in Korea through channels as bars, hotels, room saloons,
night clubs, karaoke bars and restaurants while dis tilled soju is a typical artisanal ‘gift’ item and as
such is mostly sold through reta il shops (and, recall, in very sma ll quantities). Korea further states
that distilled soju offered as a gift is then consumed at home, rather than in trendy bars like whisky.
5.292. Korea argues that consistent with these different patterns of consumption is a different type of
marketing: whisky, a chic drink to be sipped in swanky venues; distilled soju, a traditional product to
be offered as a gift.
Distilled Soju and Brandy/Cognac
5.293. Korea argues that as with whisky, the differe nces between distilled soju and brandy/cognac
are apparent at first glance. Brandies/cognacs are br own spirits, contrary to distilled soju which is a
clear white spirit. In addition, Korea states that brandies have more body as they are aged for a longer
period than distilled soju. As to their taste, bra ndies/cognacs have a warm and fruity taste, while the
taste of distilled soju is full-bodied with a clean aftertaste.
5.294. According to Korea, the difference in raw mate rials and production processes is the origin of
this difference in taste and appearance. Brandi es/cognacs are derived from fermented grapes, then
aged in wooden casks, generally from 3 to 12 years. Distilled soju is usually made with rice and grain,
and can only be aged for 2 years.
5.295. Korea argues that brandy/cognac is usually cons umed neat in a high-brow restaurant as a
digestif. Distilled soju, as mentioned above, is gene rally received as a gift, and therefore is consumed
at home. Further, the marketing of distilled soju is specifically geared at offering the product as a gift,
whereas brandy/cognac is more often consumed by th e glass in restaurants or high class drinking
establishments.
Distilled Soju and Vodka
5.296. Korea states that there are si milarities between distilled soju and vodka. They are both white
spirits, and they have similar degrees of alcoholic strength. However, Korea argues that, in light of
other, more important differences in price, place s of sale and consumption, end uses and marketing,
distilled soju and vodka cannot be considered as ‘like products’ or as directly competitive or
substitutable products.
5.297. Korea argues that distilled soju is a very special product that has a different flavour from
vodka. Vodka approaches ‘flavourlessness’, while the t aste of distilled soju is linked to its raw
material. Vodka and distilled soju are also not c onsumed in the same fashion or in the same places.
Due to its absence of flavour, vodka is particularly suitable for use in mixed drinks and is most often
consumed as long drink in Korea. In so far as vodka is consumed in Korea, it is mostly sold through
bars, discos, and room saloons. By contrast, distille d soju is only consumed straight. In general,
distilled soju is sold through shops as it is a typical artisanal gift item. When received as a gift,
distilled soju is subsequently consumed by the recipient at his home.

5.298. According to Korea, the above differences are reflected in the marketing of these products.
Distilled soju is marketed as a traditional beverage and an appropriate gift, while vodka is marketed as
a drink suitable for cocktails to be consumed while out on the town in the evening.
Distilled Soju and Gin
5.299. Korea states that one of the most important di fferences between distilled soju and gin is their
tastes. Gin allegedly has an immediately recogni sable flavour, which is unique and distinct, due in
particular to one of its raw materials: juniper berri es. Distilled soju is usually made of rice or grain
and is not produced with such distinctive added flavours.
5.300. Korea also states that consumers do not consume gin and distilled soju in the same way or in
the same places. The special flavour of gin is generally only appreciated as a long drink, not straight,
and is most often consumed in up-scale locations, such as bars, room saloons and comparable places.
Distilled soju, on the other hand, is always consumed straight and never mixed. Korea states that
distilled soju is a typical gift, and subsequent to r eceipt is usually consumed at home, rather than out
in bars and clubs.
5.301. Korea also states that distilled soju is market ed as a traditional Korean gift. Gin, on the other
hand, is marketed as a drink suitable for cocktails to be drunk out on the town.
Distilled Soju and Rum
5.302. Korea states that rum and distilled soju differ in price, physical characteristics, organoleptic
qualities, and are used by consumers to fill different needs. For these and other reasons distilled soju
and rum are not directly competitive and substitutable.
5.303. Korea states that rum comes in both light and dark varieties. The light rum is a clear white
spirit, and therefore could be said to resemble dis tilled soju. Dark rum however is a brown spirit, and
does not resemble distilled soju.
5.304. Korea states that both types of rum have a very different flavour from distilled soju. Rum is
distilled from the juice of cane sugar or molasses in such a way that the distillate has discernible
organoleptic characteristics deriving from those raw materials; the result is a mildness and a caramel
flavour that is smooth and appealing. Unlike rum, distilled soju is usually made of rice and is a dry
alcohol which does not have the same mild caramel flavour.
5.305. According to Korea, as a result of these differe nces, distilled soju and rum are consumed in
very different fashions. First of all, in so far as rum is consumed in Korea, the most common way to
drink rum is as a cocktail in places such as bars, hotels, and room saloons. By contrast, distilled soju is
almost exclusively drunk neat, that is, not diluted or mixed with other liquids. Korea also argues that
distilled soju is most often presented as a gift , which is bought by the giver in a shop, and
consequently drunk by the recipient at home.
Analysis of the "so as to afford protection" requirement
5.306. According to Korea, the marketing strategies of rum and standard soju reflect the different
geographical origins of the drinks. Rum is marketed as an exotic drink, which is ideally used as a
cocktail during night-time occasions. The marketing of distilled soju, on the other hand, reflects the
traditional Korean life-style (illustrated by its presen tation in special Korean ceramic bottles, often as
a set with ceramic cups).

5.307. Korea states that, as with diluted so ju, Korea has presented an explanation,
product-by-product, of why distilled soju is not ‘lik e’ vodka or directly competitive and substitutable
for any of the imported liquors involved in this case.
5.308. Korea states that even if the Panel disagrees w ith Korea’s point of view, the complainants
have still failed to make out a violation of Article III . In Korea's view, in order to prove a violation,
the complainants must show that the tax differential at issue is ‘so as to afford protection to domestic
production.’
5.309. Korea states that distilled soju is a traditional, artisanal product. It is not a mass-marketed,
international product such as the imported beverages concerned. In other words, the demand for a
product like distilled soju is specific and static -- it w ould be difficult to affect it a great deal in either
direction by altering the price, especially not to th e degree at issue in this case. Indeed, despite the
lower tax applied to distilled soju, its sales are still minuscule.
5.310. Korea wants the Panel to imagine, quod non, that it found that whisky and distilled soju were
directly competitive and substitutable products, and th at the other conditions of Article III were met.
Korea would then be forced to harmonise the tax rates on these two products. Korea submits that it
could not lower the tax rate on whisky for distille d soju, as the impact on its revenues would be too
great. Instead, it would have to raise the tax rate on distilled soju, crippling a tiny artisanal product
which is part of its heritage, with no benefit to the imported beverages.
149
5.311. According to Korea, the result of this analysis is that even if the Panel disagrees with Korea’s
arguments that distilled soju is not directly co mpetitive and substitutable to any of the imported
beverages concerned, the requirement of Article II I:1 has still not been met: the complainants have
not proved that the different tax applies ‘so as to afford protection’ to distilled soju.

149 According to Korea, in this regard, it could even be said that the special position of distilled soju for
Korea merits an exception under Article XX(f) of the GATT.

VI. REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS
A. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1. Shochu and soju
6.1. The European Communities notes that accordi ng to Korea, the only difference between
shochu and soju is that shochu contains two a dditives only (sugar and citr ic acid) whereas soju
contains four to five more additives. However, according to the European Communities, it is still
unclear whether there is a legal requirement to use any of those additional four to five additives or
whether it is simply a characteristic of certain brands.
6.2. The European Communities argues that all th e extra additives except one (mineral salt)
supposedly found in soju but not in shochu are sweete ners. Thus, the EC view is that the alleged
difference between soju and shochu appears to be not hing other than the fact that soju is somewhat
"sweeter" than shochu. The European Commun ities adds that Korea does not specify how much
"sweeter" soju must be. According to the Eur opean Communities, there appears to be no legal
requirement in Korea regarding the minimum sugar c ontent of soju. The analytical tests conducted by
the Scotch Whisky Research Institute have allegedl y revealed no trace of this supposed difference in
"sweetness" alleged by Korea.150
6.3. The European Communities further argues that at any rate, the difference alleged by Korea is
a very minor one. The European Communities asserts that Coca Cola, for example, also is slightly
sweeter in some countries than in others, so as to match different local tastes. Significantly, Korea
does not even allude to this suppo sed characteristic of so ju when it attempts to distinguish it from
vodka and other distilled spirits.
6.4. The EC view is also that Korea also implies that, unlike soju, the majority of shochu A is
frequently aged and brown coloured. According to the European Communities, over 99% of shochu
is white151 and non aged.152
6.5. The European Communities also notes Korea' s contention that, unlike soju expressly
manufactured for the Japanese market, "t rue" soju consumed by the Ko rean minority in Japan is not
treated as shochu by the Japanese authorities for customs and tax purposes. According to the
European Communities, this claim seems to be at odd s with the statements made by Japan before the
1996 Panel on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II.153 The EC view is that even if Korea’ claims
were correct, they would only go to show that Japan applied its Liquor Tax Law so as to afford
protection to its domestic production of shochu not only vis-à-vis imports of western spirits but also
vis-à-vis imports of soju.
2. The Japanese market and the Korean market
6.6. The European Communities argues that according to Korea, the main difference between the
Korean market and the Japanese market would be th at in Japan the prices of shochu and of imported
liquors are "within a relatively short range", wher eas in Korea soju is much less expensive than
imported liquors.

150 See EC Annex 8. The EC states that although Korea attempts to discredit that research by describing
it as a "partisan report", it offers no evidence to dispute the findings of that report.
151 The optical density of shochu, measured by the light of 430 nana-meter wavelength is, at the
maximum, 0.08. The usual optical density of Scotch whisky is between 0.45 and 0.70.
152 See Panel Report on, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 4.54.
153 Ibid., para. 6.35.

6.7. According to the European Co mmunities, Korea does not provide any evidence to support its
allegations regarding the Japanese market, but inst ead makes a misleading reference to an argument
made by the European Communities in the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II case.
6.8. The European Communities argues that the pri ces of shochu on the Japanese market vary
considerably. At one extreme, there is inexpensive standard shochu sold in bulky plastic bottles of 1.8
to 4 litres or even in paper packages. At the other extreme, there are premium brands sold in 0.7 litre
bottles which are generally three to four times more expensive than standard shochu.
154 According to
the European Communities, standard shochu still acc ounts for the majority of sales, like in Korea,
even though sales of premium shochu are growing rapidly. The price range for western-style spirits is
allegedly even wider than that of shochu, especially in the case of whisky and brandy.
6.9. The European Communities explains that when it argued that in Japan the pre-tax prices for
shochu and western spirits were within a relatively close range, it based itself on a comparison of the
prices for premium shochu brands, on the one hand, and standard brands of western spirits, on the
other hand 155. According to the European Communities, even on that basis, the pre-tax prices for
standard imported whisky were sometimes as much as twice the price for shochu. It was never
disputed by the EC that the prices of premium whisky or premium brandy in the Japanese market
could be many times higher than the prices of standard shochu.
6.10. The European Communities notes that like Korea in this dispute, Japan submitted to the Panel
a comparison of pre-tax weighted average prices. According to that comparison, the pre-tax price for
brandy and whisky were 13 times and 5 times highe r, respectively, than the pre-tax price for
shochu A.
156
6.11. The European Communities also notes Korea's clai m that another important difference is that
in Japan shochu A and shochu B are sold in comparable volumes and at similar prices. The EC view
is that this is correct but irrelevant. The European Communities fails to see how this difference can be
conducive to stronger competition between shochu and western spirits, as compared to soju.
6.12. Finally, the European Communities notes that Ko rea invokes differences in drinking styles.
According to Korea, soju is always drunk "strai ght", whereas shochu is drunk in other styles in
addition to "straight", such as diluted with warm water and mixed in cocktails. According to the
European Communities, this is inaccurate as far as soju is concerned. The EC view is that soju is not
always drunk straight, and in particular, it is also drunk as cocktail, as attested by the growing sales of
pre-mixes. As to the fact that shochu is drun k with warm water (i.e. in a style which is not
characteristic of any western spirit) the European Communities fails to see how this may have had the
paradoxical result of making shochu more competitive with western spirits than soju.
3. All types of soju are one and the same product
(a) Distilled and diluted soju
6.13. The European Communities notes that Korea atte mpts to create an artificial distinction
between the two basic types of so ju: distilled soju and diluted soju
157, with an obvious strategy: many
of the alleged differences which, acco rding to Korea, make soju "unlike" or "not directly competitive

154 See EC Annex 1.
155 See EC Annex 2.
156 See EC Annex 3.
157 The EC argues that "diluted soju" is a term used in the Liquor Tax Law and other official Korean
sources and not one created by the complainants, as Korea seems to imply. See, for example, the decision of the
Fair Trade Commission in Attachment 1 to Korea’s First Submission and the 1997 Korean Taxation Guide
published by the Ministry of Finance in Annex 4 to this submission.

or substitutable" with western-style liquors (includi ng in particular the differences in pricing) cannot
be substantiated when those liquors are compared to distilled soju.
6.14. According to the European Communities, Korea seems to be ready to "sacrifice" distilled soju
in order to spare diluted soju. In the EC view, that sacrifice would be more apparent than real, in view
of Korea's statement that under certain conditions the producers of distilled soju may be designated as
possessors of an "intangible cultura l asset". The European Communiti es retorts that Korea carefully
omits to say that this may entail an exemption from the Liquor Tax and the Education Tax.
158
6.15. According to the European Communities, the r eality, however, is that distilled soju and
diluted soju are but two varieties of the same product, as it should be obvious already from the fact
that the two bear the same name. The European Communities notes that many other spirits are also
produced in different types or varieties. In the case of whisky, for instance, it is possible to distinguish
between malt Scotch, grain Scotch, blended Scotch, Canadian, Irish, Bourbon, Rye, etc. According to
the European Communities, in relative terms distilled soju is no more different from diluted soju than,
for example, malt Scotch from grain Scotch.
6.16. The European Communities argues th at the distinction between distilled soju and diluted soju
was not introduced in the Liquor Tax Law until 1991. 159 In the EC view, it was a distinction created
exclusively for tax purposes as no similar distincti on is found in Korea’s tariff schedule, where all
soju is classified within a single heading with the description "soju".160
6.17. The European Communities notes th at until the 1960s, most soju sold in Korea was produced
according to the method described in the legal defin ition of "distilled soju". The origins of what the
Liquor Tax Law calls "diluted soju" go back to 1962, when, in order to cope with a severe shortage of
grains, the Korean Government adopted a series of measures to encourage the use of ethyl alcohol.
By the mid seventies, the Europ ean Communities further argues, distilled soju had given way to
diluted soju. According to th e European Communities, such sw ift transition was possible only
because, in the eyes of Korean consumers, the two varieties of soju are the same product.
6.18. The European Communities asserts that the differences between distilled soju and diluted soju
are aptly described by a decision of Korea’s Fair Trade Commission. 161 According to the first
"Established Fact" of that Decision,
"Distilled soju is made from a mix of additiv es and water blended into an alcohol solution
extracted by a method of ‘single-step’ distillation. On the other hand, ‘diluted’ soju refers to
soju made from a mix of additives, water and grain solution (or distilled soju solution - the
Liquor Tax act classifies soju as being diluted soju where the ratio of the grain solution or the
distilled soju solution amounts to 20 % or less of the total volume of alcohol) blended into an
alcohol solution extracted by a method of ‘continuous ’distillation’. Thus, the basic
difference between those two types of soju lies in whether the alcohol was extracted by means
of single-step distillation or continuous distillation."
6.19. The European Communities notes that other spirits such as whisky and brandy can also be
obtained either by single-step distillation (also referre d to as "pot still" or "discontinuous") or by

158 See the 1997 Korean Taxation Guide published by Korea’s Ministry of Finance in EC Annex 4.
159 The distinction was introduced in response to pres sure from the EC to eliminate the tax differentials
between soju and the other distilled spirits. The creation of the category of distilled soju was but a fig leave,
which allowed Korea to claim that "expensive" soju wa s no less taxed than "some" imported liquors (namely
the category of "liqueurs").
160 See EC Annex 5.
161 See Attachment 1 to First Submission of Korea.

continuous distillation. It further notes for instance, that malt Scotch whisky is produced by pot-still
distillation, while grain Scotch whisky is obtained by continuous distillation.
6.20. The European Communities argues that the close similarity of the two types of soju is attested
by the fact that distilled soju and diluted soju can be and are often blended with each other. When
distilled soju represents more than 20% of the total alcohol content, the admixture is taxed as distilled
soju and not as diluted soju. Again, a parallelism can be drawn to whis ky. The most common type of
Scotch whisky is blended whisky, which is produced by mixing malt Scotch and grain Scotch.
6.21. The European Communities further argues that th e other differences between diluted soju and
distilled soju alleged by Korea are either exaggerated or irrelevant because:
(a) there is no legal requirement to use only rice or grains for making distilled soju. In
accordance with the legal definition of di stilled soju, other raw materials containing
starch can be used as well. On the other hand, diluted soju can also be produced from
grains;
162
(b) although diluted soju cannot be aged by la w, it is perfectly legal to blend previously
aged distilled soju and neutral spirits in order to make diluted soju;
(c) as stressed by Korea at another point of its submission where it seeks to distinguish
distilled soju from whisky, "distilled soju can be, but need not be, aged";
(d) the price difference between distilled so ju and diluted soju are no larger than, for
example, the prices differences between certain types of whisky;
(e) there are also appreciable differences in taste between Premium diluted soju and
Standard diluted soju or, for example, between Scotch Whisky and Bourbon;
(f) many other spirits are produced both artisanally and industrially;
(g) there is no legal requirement regardi ng the minimum alcohol content of either
distilled or diluted soju.
(b) Premium and standard diluted soju
6.22. The European Communities reiterates that, a new segment of so-called "premium soju"
brands is emerging rapidly within the category of d iluted soju. Premium soju is characterised by a
milder taste, the use of flavourings and/ or ageing and more sophisticated packaging.
163 All this makes
premium diluted soju even more similar to western-style spirits than standard diluted soju.
6.23. The European Communities argues that Korea cannot deny that premium diluted soju is the
same product as standard diluted soju, since this is not a distinction which is reflected in Korea’s
regulations. Instead, Korea allegedly attempts to minimise the importance of premium soju by
presenting it as an exception of minor importance and then ignores it in the remainder of its
submission.

162 For instance, according to the So fres Report, the Premium Soju brand Kim Sat Gat uses rice or
barley. See the Sofres Report, p. 23.
163 See the Sofres Report, at pp. 23-24

6.24. The European Communities notes, however, that this "exception" accounts for a volume of
sales which exceeds the combined sales volume of all imported spirits. The EC claimed that premium
diluted soju may have accounted for as much as 10 percent of soju sales in 1997.
164
4. Soju and vodka are like products
 The standard for the interpretation of "like products"
6.25. The European Communities argues th at Korea seems to consider that it is sufficient to point
to the existence of any difference, however minor, between two liquors, such as for instance a vaguely
defined difference in taste, in order to excl ude a finding of "likeness" for the purposes of GATT
Article III:2, first sentence.
6.26. According to the European Communities, as clarified by the Appellate Body in Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , in Article III:2, first sentence, the notion of "like" product must be
construed "narrowly".165 Nevertheless, the EC view is that it is also a well established principle that
in order to be "like" two products need not be "equal" or "identical" in all respects. 166 The European
Communities notes that according to Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I:
[m]inor differences in taste, colour and other properties (including differences in
alcohol contents) do not prevent products from qualifying as like products.167
6.27. According to the European Communities, Ko rea’s position appears to be based on the
mistaken notion that in order to be "like" two products must be "perfectly substitutable". The
European Communities argues that contrary to Korea’s allegations , the Appellate Body has never
taken such an extreme view, and that Korea’s reasoning is a classical non sequitur . The European
Communities further argues that in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 168 the Panel
noted that a case of perfect substitutability would fall within Article III:2, first sentence, in order to
reject an argument by the defendant to the effe ct that between the products concerned there was
"imperfect substitutability" only. According to the European Communities, the Appellate Body,
however, did not thereby imply that two products must always be "perfectly substitutable" in order to
be "like". Indeed, such an interpretation would ma ke Article III:2, first sentence, inapplicable except
in cases of overt origin based discrimination between identical products.
6.28. The European Communities asserts that, in orde r to escape the implications of the two Panel
reports on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , Korea over-emphasises the importance of the

164 According to footnote No 30 of Korea’s First Submission, in 1996 the total taxed volume of
premium soju was 35,108 kl. In comparison, the total volume of imports of whisky, cognac, rum, gin and vodka
during the first eleven months of 1996 was 22,286 kl (see EC’s First Submission, Annex 7).
Also according to footnote No 30 of Korea’s First Submission, in 1997 total taxed volume of premium
soju was 43.878 kl. During the same year, the total taxed volume of "whisky" was 24.530 kl (see Attachment 5
to Korea’s First Submission, ).
There is no legal definition of "premium soju". Th e discrepancy between the market share of premium
soju estimated by the EC in its First Submission (a t para. 54) and the share mentioned by Korea may be
explained by the fact that Korea uses a narrower definition of premium soju.
165 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., pp. 19-20
166 See Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., para. 6.21. See also the
Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I , supra., at par. 5.5, referring to the Panel Report on
United States - Taxes on Petroleum and certain Imported Substances , supra at para. 5.1.1, where the Panel
found that some of the imported and domestic products, albeit not identical, were like products since they served
substantially the same uses.
167 Ibid., para. 5.9.
168 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p.28

"consumers’ tastes and habits" as one of the releva nt criteria for a "like" product determination.
According to the European Communities, that crite rion was indeed mentioned by the Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments,
169 which has been cited with appr oval by the Appellate Body in Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages170 and Canada - Certain Measures concerning Periodicals.171
6.29. The European Communities argues however, that in practice, past panels have given little
weight to "consumers’ tastes and habits" when maki ng "like product" determinations. Instead, they
have focused on objective factors such as the physi cal characteristics of the products and their end
uses. According to the European Co mmunities, the reason for that approach is that "consumers’ tastes
and habits", unlike the physical characteristics of products and their objective end uses, are influenced
by prices and, consequently, also by taxes. Allege d differences in "consumers’ tastes and habits" may
have been created, or at least "fossilised", throug h discriminatory internal taxes and cannot, therefore,
constitute a valid justification for continuing to apply those discriminatory taxes.
6.30. According to the European Communities, an example of this approach is provided by the
Panel report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II:
[E]ven though the Panel was of the view that the "likeness" of products must be examined
taking into account not only objective criteria (s uch as composition and use by consumers)
the Panel agreed with arguments submitted to it [...] that Japanese shochu (Group A) and
vodka could be considered as like products in terms of Article III:2 because they were both
white/clean spirits, made of similar raw materials, and their end uses were virtually identical
[...] Since consumer habits are variable in time and space and the aim of Article III:2 of
ensuring neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between imported and domestic
like products could not be achieve d if differential taxes could be used to crystallise consumer
preferences for traditional domestic products, th e Panel found that the traditional Japanese
habits with regard to shochu provided no reas on for not considering vodka to be a "like"
product.
172
6.31. The European Communities asserts that Korea i nvokes the fact that vodka is allegedly more
expensive than soju as one of the reasons that ma ke those two spirits "unlike". According to the
European Communities, the differences in prices be tween diluted soju and vo dka have been grossly
overstated by Korea, whereas distilled soju may, in fact, be more expensive than vodka.
6.32. The EC view is also that prices are not relevant for a "like" product determination. According
to the European Communities, prices are not one of the criteria mentioned in the Working Party on
Border Tax Adjustments. Nor are they mentioned as a relevant criterion by the Appellate Body in
Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages or Canada - Certain Measures affecting Periodicals . The EC
view is that it is not aware of any single case in which prices have been taken into account for a "like"
product determination, whether for the purposes of Article III:2, or of any of the other GATT
provisions incorporating that notion.
6.33. In fact, notes the European Communities, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the
Panel rejected in categorical terms an argument by Japan to the effect that local spirits were not "like"
imported ones because they were less expensive:
[T]he Panel was of the view that "like" products do not become "unlike" merely because of
differences in prices, which were often influe nced by external government measures (e.g.

169 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para. 18.
170 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, , supra., p. 20.
171 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., p.21.
172 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 5.7.

customs duties) and market conditions (e.g. supply and demand, sales margins). The Panel
was convinced that such an interpretation would run counter to the objective of Article III:2 to
avoid that discriminatory or protective intern al taxation of imported products would distort
price competition with domestic like or directly competitive products, for instance by creating
price and consumer categories and hardeni ng consumer preferences for traditional home
products.173
6.34. The European Communities also argues that ther e are two additional reasons for disregarding
prices when making a "like" product determination. The first reason is that Article III:2, first
sentence, purports to establish a hard-and-fast ru le. Once it is determined that two products are
sufficiently similar to be "like", it is irrefuta bly presumed that any difference in taxation between
them will afford protection to the domestic produc tion and, therefore, must be condemned. The
European Communities continues that implicit in th is presumption, there is also the assumption that
products which are sufficiently similar to be "lik e" must of necessity be "directly competitive or
substitutable". According to the EC view, Korea’ s interpretation would undermine that assumption
and require complainants to prove that products which are sufficiently similar to be "like" are also
"directly competitive and substitutable" in terms of price. The European Communities argues that if a
such view was upheld, the presumption established in the first sentence of Article III:2 would lose
much of its effectiveness and the clear textual di stinction between the first and the second sentences
of Article III:2 would become blurred.
6.35. The European Communities argues that the sec ond reason is that Korea’s reliance upon price
differences for justifying a different tax treatment is fraught with dangerous implications for the world
trade system. According to th e European Communities, the present dispute is concerned with a
situation where imported products te nd to be more expensive than the local products. Yet, if prices
were deemed relevant for a "like" product determ ination, it would be open for developed country
Members to claim that cheap imports from low co st developing country Members are too inexpensive
to be on the same market with identical local products and to impose higher taxes on those imports.
In the EC view, the mere possibility for a developi ng country Member to demonstrate before a Panel,
in respect of each single category of products, that its exports do compete in terms of price with
identical products of the importing country is likely to be an ineffective deterrent against this kind of
abuses.
(a) Vodka and diluted soju
6.36. The European Communities also argues that Korea is able to identify only one single
difference between vodka and diluted soju, namely that vodka has a higher alcohol content than
diluted soju. According to the European Communiti es, whereas diluted soju is usually bottled at an
alcoholic strength of 25%, vodka has between 37% and 40% alcohol content by volume
174.
6.37. The European Communities further not es that the two Panel Reports on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages have established that differences in alco holic content do not suffice to make two
liquors "unlike". In particular, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II concluded in unequivocal
terms that:

173 Ibid., para. 5.9 (b)
174 This difference is not reflected in the Liquor Tax Law, which sets no minimum alcohol content for
either diluted soju or vodka.

[A] difference in the physical characteristic of alcoholic st rength of two products did not
preclude a finding of likeness, especially since alcoholic beverages are often drunk in diluted
form.
175
6.38. According to the European Communities, this conclusion was not based on the observation of
the specific "tastes and habits" of the Japanese cons umers but purported to ha ve a general validity on
all markets.
6.39. The European Communities also notes that Korea, while admitting implicitly that vodka and
diluted soju are virtually identical, denies that they are "like" by pointing to differences in customs
classification, end-uses and pricing.
6.40. In the EC view, the alleged differences regard ing end uses are the same as those invoked by
Korea with respect to other spirits. They are allegedly either overstated or irrelevant.
6.41. The European Communities argues that the diffe rence in customs classification is totally
irrelevant. The European Communities notes that Korea’s tariff is based on the 1996 version of the
Harmonised System (HS). Under the previous versi on of the HS, vodka was allegedly classified into
the same basket heading as soju (HS 2208.90, "other"). In the 1996 HS classification, it was allegedly
decided to create a separate position for vodka (H S 2208.60) simply because that spirit had become
one of the most internationally traded spirits a nd not because in the meantime it had developed new
physical characteristics or end uses which made it "unlike" soju and all the other liquors falling within
HS 2208.90.
6.42. According to the European Communities, for th ese reasons, the alleged differences in prices
are also irrelevant. The EC view is that in any event, Korea grossly overstates the actual differences.
The pre-tax prices for soju shown in the Dodwe ll Study, on which Korea bases its comparison, are
prices for standard diluted soju. The pre-tax pr ices for premium diluted soju are between two and
three times higher.176 If an adjustment is made to take in to account differences in alcohol content, the
pre-tax price for a bottle of imported vodka is two to three times higher than the pre-tax price for a
bottle of premium soju.177 In the EC view, in relative terms the difference in prices between premium
diluted soju and vodka is the same as the differe nce between standard and premium diluted soju and
much less than the difference between either premium or standard diluted soju and distilled soju.
(b) Vodka and distilled soju
6.43. The European Communities asserts that it has identified two differences between distilled
soju and vodka:
(a) unlike vodka, distilled soju cannot be filt ered through white birch charcoal, although
it can be filtered through any other materials; and
(b) distilled soju must be obtaine d through non-continuous distillation.
6.44. The European Communities asserts that Korea does not even mention these two differences in
its argument. The EC view is that this confirms that, as claimed by the EC, those differences in
manufacturing process have little impact on the final characteristics of the products and do not prevent
vodka and distilled soju from being "like" products.

175 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 6.23.
176 See EC Annex 6.
177 See EC Annex 7.

6.45. The European Communities notes th at in Korea’s submission, the main difference between
distilled soju and vodka would be a difference in taste: "Vodka approaches ‘flavourlessness’, while
the taste of distilled soju is linked to its raw material".
6.46. According to the European Communities, this difference, however, is clearly minor and
cannot preclude a finding of "likeness". Once agai n, it is necessary to recall that according to Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I : "[M]inor differences in taste, co lour and other properties (including
differences in alcohol contents) do not prevent products from qualifying as like products."
178
6.47. The European Communities argues that in terms of flavour, distille d soju is no more different
from vodka than, for example, Japanese shochu B, which is also obtained by non-continuous
distillation of, inter alia, grains.
6.48. The European Communities further argues that in order to compensate for the absence of any
significant difference in physical characteristic s between distilled soju and vodka, Korea invokes
differences in end uses and marketing.
5. Soju and the other distilled spirits are directly competitive and substitutable products
(a) Standard for the interpretation of "directly competitive and substitutable"
6.49. The European Communities notes that at several points of its submission, Korea argues that
the notion of "directly competitive and substitutable products" must be applied "strictly".
6.50. According to the European Comm unities, the restrictive interpretation of the terms "directly
competitive or substitutable" advocated by Korea finds no support in the text of Article III, and that it
is refuted by the drafting history of GATT 1947 as well as by prior panel reports.
6.51. According to the European Communities, during the discussions within the Geneva
Preparatory Committee and subsequently at the Havana Conference, the delegates discussed a number
of examples of "directly competitive or substitutable products" which indicate clearly that the drafters
had in mind a rather broad interpretation of t hose terms. Those examples included apples and
oranges;179 linseed oil and tung oil; 180 synthetic rubber and natural rubber; 181 coal and fuel oil; 182 and
tramways and buses.183
6.52. The European Communities argues that past pa nels which have interpreted the notion of
"directly competitive or substitutable products" have also refrained from taking the narrow approach
advocated by Korea. The Eu ropean Communities also argues that the two Panel reports on Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages reached the conclusion that all distilled spirits were directly
competitive or substitutable products. Another exampl e, according to the Eu ropean Communities, is
provided by the Panel report on EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins , which concluded that
vegetable proteins and skimmed milk powder were "directly competitive or substitutable" products for
the purposes of applying the second sentence of Article III:5.184

178 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., para. 5.9.
179 EPCT/A/PV.9, at 7.
180 E/CONF.2/C.3/SR.11 p. 1 and Corr.2.
181 Ibid., p.3
182 E/CONF.2/C.3/SR40, at 2.
183 Ibid.
184 Panel Report on EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, supra., para. 4.3.

6.53. The European Communities also notes that Kor ea, in order to justify its restrictive
interpretation of "directly competitive or substitutabl e", argues that the purpose of Article III:2 is not
to harmonise tax policies but to avoid protectionism.
6.54. The EC view is that it would agree that the purpose of Article III:2 is to avoid protectionism,
but nevertheless takes issue with Korea’s contention that this purpose commands a "strict" reading of
the notion of "directly competitive and substitutable" product.
6.55. The European Communities notes that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , first the
Panel and then the Appellate Body concluded that the notion of "like product" must be construed
"narrowly" in the first sentence of Article III:2. According to the European Communities, this
interpretation was deemed necessary in view of the fact that, as put by one of the complainants in that
dispute, Article III:2, first sentence, is like a "guillotine": once it has been established that two
products are like, any tax differential between them is deemed prohibited, without it being necessary
to ascertain whether the tax differential is applied "so as to afford protection".
185
6.56. The European Communities notes further that in contrast, there is no indication in Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II that the notion of "directly competitive or substitutable" product
must also be construed "narrowly" or "strictly". According to the Eur opean Communities, this
reflects the different wording and structure of the second sentence of Article III:2. Unlike the first
sentence of Article III:2, the second sentence makes e xpress reference to the first paragraph of Article
III. This means, in the EC view, that in order to establish a violation of Article III:2, second sentence,
it must be determined first, as one of three separat e requirements, that the tax differential is "applied
.... so as to afford protection to domestic produc tion". According to the European Communities,
therefore, a "strict" or "narrow" reading of the terms "directly competitive or substitutable" is not
warranted in order to ensure that only protectionist measures are condemned.
6.57. The European Communities notes that in the sam e vein, Korea also argues that Article III:2
second sentence applies only where there is "act ual" competition, as opposed to "potential"
competition. According to Korea, this interpre tation is "strongly suggested" by the Interpretative
Note to Article III:2 and, in particular, by the terms ".... where competition was involved".
According to the European Commun ities, those terms, however, refe r to "competition" only, without
requiring that it must be "actual" competition. "Potential" competition is already "competition" within
the meaning of the Note.
6.58. According to the European Communities, the us e in the Interpretative Note of the terms
"competitive" (and not "competing") and substitutable (i nstead of "substitute") is a further indication
that the GATT drafters envisaged the application of Article III:2 not just in instances of "actual"
competition but also where there is "potential" comp etition. This is allegedly even clearer in the
equally authentic French and Span ish versions which refer to " .... un produit directement concurrent
 lui être directement substitué.. ." and "... un producto directamente competidor
6.59. The European Communities argues that Korea’s interpretation is also refuted by prior
Appellate Body and Panel reports which have recognised the relevance of "potential" competition for
the purposes of Article III:2.

185 The European Communities states that giving a narrow meaning to "like products" is also justified
by the inescapability of violation in case of taxation of foreign products in excess of domestic products.

6.60. The European Communities recalls that Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I stressed that
internal tax measures should not be used to "crystallise" consumer preferences for domestic
products.
186
6.61. The same view was reiterated in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II:
[t]he responsiveness of consumers to the various products offered in the market] .... may vary
from country to country, but should not be influen ced or determined by internal taxation. The
Panel noted the conclusions in the 1987 Panel Report that a tax system that discriminates
against imports has the consequence of creati ng and even freezing preferences for domestic
goods. In the Panel’s view this meant that cons umer surveys in a country with such a tax
system would likely understate the degree of potential competitiveness between substitutable
products.187
6.62. The European Communities also notes that the re levance of potential competition has also
been recognised by the Appellate Body in Canada - Certain Measures Affecting Periodicals:
[W]e are not impressed either by Canada’s argument that the market share of imported and
domestic magazines has remained remarkably cons tant over the last 30-plus years, and that
one would have expected some variation if comp etitive forces had been in play to the degree
necessary to meet the standard of "directly competitive" goods. This argument would have
weight only if Canada had not protected th e domestic production of Canadian periodicals
through, among other measures, the import prohibition of Tariff Code 9958 and the excise tax
of Part V.1 of the Excise Act.188
6.63. According to the European Communities, the relevance of potential competition for the
application of Article III:2, second sentence, flows fro m the well established principle that Article III
does not protect export volumes but expectations on the competitive relationship between imported
and domestic products. 189 Those expectations may exist even if there is no "actual" competition yet
between imported and domestic products due to protective tax measures.
6.64. The European Communities further argues that, Korea’s position would have the absurd result
of actually rewarding those Members who apply the most protectionist tax measures. If a Member
applies a tax in such a way as to completely excl ude imports of a competitive product, it would never
be possible for other Members to show that there is "actual" competition between that product and the
protected domestic product and, therefore, that such measures violate Article III:2. Meanwhile, a
Member applying a less protectionist tax measure which restricts but does not pre-empt "actual"
competition between domestic and imported goods would be found to violate Article III:2
6.65. The European Communities notes th at Korea, in support of its peculiar interpretation of
Article III:2, emphasises that this provision is pe rhaps the GATT provision "that treads most heavily

186 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I , para. 5.7. At the same paragraph, the
Panel added that:
"The increasing imports of "western-style" alcoholic beverages into Japan bore witness to this
lasting competitive relationship and to the potential products substitution through trade among
various alcoholic beverages."
187 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 6.28
188 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra., at 28.
189 See e.g. Working Party on " Brazilian Internal Taxes ", adopted 30 June 1949, II/181, 185, at para.
16; Panel Reports on United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , supra., para. 5.1.9,
United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages , supra., 271; and United States - Measures
affecting the Importation, Sale and use of Tobacco, adopted on 4 October 1994, DS44/R, paras. 99-100.

upon national sovereignty." Korea implies that si nce taxation is at the core of the Members’
sovereignty, Panels should adopt a deferential standard whenever taxes are concerned.
6.66. According to the European Communities, this argument is totally misguided. In the EC view,
it is instructive to compare the wording of Articles III:2 and III:4 of GATT. Article III:4, the general
national treatment provision, is concerned only w ith discrimination between "like products". In
contrast, Article III:2 is concerned with discrimin atory taxation not only between "like products" but
also between the larger category of "directly competitive and substitutable" products. In the EC view,
this shows that the GATT drafters were well aw are that discriminatory ta xation may be one of the
most pernicious forms of protectionism and, for th at reason, aimed to provide stricter rules with
respect to internal tax measures th an with respect to other intern al regulations, rather than the
opposite.
(b) Physical characteristics
6.67. The European Communities notes that Korea’ s submission lingers upon the differences in
physical characteristics between soju and other spirits. Korea implies that those differences are
sufficient to conclude that soju and other spirits are not "directly competitive or substitutable" with
each other.
6.68. The European Communities states that it is n ecessary to recall that two products do not have
to be similar in terms of physical characteris tics in order to be "directly substitutable and
competitive". As noted in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II,
"competition can and does exist among the produc ts that do not necessarily share the same
physical characteristics. In the Panel’s view, the decisive criterion is whether they have
common end uses..."
190
6.69. The European Communities argues that it is obvious that if two pr oducts have similar
physical characteristics, this constitutes a strong indication that they are "directly competitive or
substitutable". According to the European Communiti es, in the present case, the similarity between
soju and the other distilled spirits is such that it is a sufficient reason for the Panel to conclude that all
of them are "directly competitive or substitutable".
6.70. The European Communities does not deny th e existence of differences in physical
characteristics between soju and other spirits. A ccording to the EC view, if there were no such
differences, it would have claimed that soju and th e other distilled spirits are "like" and not simply
"competitive or substitutable".
6.71. According to the European Communities, the differences invoked by Korea are, in essence,
the same shown in EC Annex 9. In the EC view therefore, there seems to be no disagreement with
Korea as to the nature of the differences, only as to their significance.
6.72. In the EC view, those differences are relativ ely minor and do not prevent soju from being
"directly competitive or substitutable" with other di stilled spirits. Indeed, according to the European
Communities, many of the differences invoked by Ko rea, such as differences in alcohol content,
colour or flavour, would not be sufficient even to exclude a finding of "likeness".191
6.73. The EC claims its position is supported by the two Panels on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, which allegedly concluded that all dis tilled spirits were "directly competitive or

190 Panel report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 6.22.
191 Ibid., para. 5.9.

substitutable" on the Japanese market, notwithstanding their different physical characteristics. Even
if, as claimed by Korea, Japanese shochu was not "lik e" Korean soju, it rema ins that the differences
between Korean soju and the other types of distille d spirits alleged by Korea are the same as the
differences between Japanese shochu and those spirits.
(c) End uses
6.74. The European Communities notes Korea's argument that soju and the other spirits are not
used in the same way by Korean consumers and, for that reason, are not "directly competitive or
substitutable." Korea also points to differences in drinking style, drinking occasion and place of
consumption.
6.75. According to the European Communities, firs tly, Korea seems to rely on the mistaken
premise that in order to be "directly competitive or substitutable" two products must compete or
substitute each other in respect of all possibl e economic uses. According to the European
Communities, that narrow view has been rejected by the Appellate Body in Canada - Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals .
192 In that case, Canada argued that US magazines were not
"directly competitive or substitutable" with Cana dian magazines because, while they provided a
reasonable substitute as an advertising medium, they were poor substitutes as an entertainment and
communication medium. Thus, according to Canada, US and Canadian magazines were only
"imperfect substitutes". The Appellate Body dism issed this argument by pointing that a case of
"perfect substitutability" would fall within Article III: 2, first sentence and ruled that all the magazines
concerned were directly competitive or substitutable.
6.76. The European Communities furthe r argues that similarly, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages I, the Panel based its conclusion that Japan ’s Liquor Tax Law violated Article III:2,
second sentence, on the finding that there existed direct competition or substitutability among the
liquors concerned, "even if not necessarily in resp ect of all the economic uses to which the product
may be put"
193
6.77. According to the European Communities, these two reports make it very clear that in order to
establish that two products are "directly competitive or substitutable", it may be sufficient to show that
they are "directly competitive or substitutable" in respect of certain uses.
6.78. Secondly, according to the European Communities, the consumption patterns of soju and the
other spirits concerned in this dispute are much more diverse and flexible than Korea’s simplistic
presentation would suggest. According to the Eur opean Communities, Korea would have the Panel
believe that soju is always drunk straight and with meals and only at certain types of outlets, whereas
western spirits are always drunk in styles other than straight, before or after meals and at different
types of outlets. In the EC view, the reality is mu ch more complex than this black-and-white picture.
According to the European Communities, although the consumption patterns of soju and western
spirits are not identical, there is a substantial degree of overlapping and, therefore, competition
between the two categories.
6.79. The European Communities furt her argues that Korea’s submission focuses exclusively on
the most traditional consumption patterns and disr egards the rapid emergence of a new drinking

192 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra, p.28.
193 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra, para. 5.7.

culture which is increasingly comparable to that of other developed countries, especially among
young consumers.
194
6.80. Thirdly, in the EC view, consumption patterns are affected by prices, which in turn are
affected by tax differentials. It is certainly not a coincidence if in the present case the less taxed
product is consumed more often with meals 195 or if the more taxed products are more often found at
expensive outlets than at less expensive ones. According to the European Communities, it is
necessary to discern those differences which may reflect the genuine "tastes and habits" of the Korean
consumers from those which have been created or, at least, "fossilised" by discriminatory taxation.
6.81. Finally, the EC view is that Korea’s sweepi ng and categorical statements regarding the end
uses of the different types of spirits are not supported by any evidence whatsoever, even though Korea
is in possession of the necessary market surveys. A ccording to the European Communities, the Panel
should draw appropriate inferences from Korea’s refusal to disclose those surveys.
(d) Drinking styles
6.82. The first difference alleged by Korea is that soju is always drunk straight. The EC view is that
this is simply not true. The most frequent style for dr inking soju is straight. But soju is also consumed
in other styles, including mixed with other non-alco holic beverages, especially by young consumers.
This is attested by the growing sales in recent y ears of soju-based pre-mixes, of which some samples
have been provided to the Panel. For tax purposes, soju-based pre-mixes are not considered as soju
but as liqueurs. Nonetheless, the success of tho se pre-mixes proves that Korean consumers enjoy
drinking soju mixed with other beverages.196
6.83. Furthermore, western-style spirits also are consumed straight. In particular, straight is the
most frequent drinking style of brandy. Similarly, wh isky is most often consumed alone, diluted with
water or on the rocks, all of which are effectively "straight".
(e) Drinking occasion
6.84. The European Communities notes that, according to Korea, soju is consumed always with
meals. In the EC view, this is an over-simplificatio n. Soju is often, but not always, consumed with
meals. For instance, according to the European Communities, sojubangs are one of the most typical
places for drinking soju. Yet sojubangs are bars and not restaurants. In addition, it is the EC view that

194 See the Sofres Study, pp 3-7. According to the Sofres Report (at p. 4), the main changes in the
Korean drinking culture are:
 - Consumers prefer premium drinks for their taste and aroma,
 - Consumers (young generation) prefer western style atmosphere
- A drinking culture where 3 to 4 people, instead of a large group, gather to drink in moderate amounts,
- A drinking culture where people drink lightly at home with family members.
195 The EC claims that Korea defies economic logic when it states that "In Korea, standard soju is the
drink one finds on the dinner table, the drink that is consumed with meals. As such it is an inexpensive
beverage" (Korea’s First Submission, para. 130)
According to the European Communities, it seems more logical that soju has acquired the status of
"every-day meal drink" because it is inexpensive, rather than the opposite. If soju had been subjected to import
quotas and then to dissuasive import duties and very high discriminatory internal taxes, it could have never
achieved that status.
196 The Sofres Report describes this development in the following terms, at p.24:
"Also the sale of other liquors in the form of soju cocktail (lemon flavoured soju, cherry
flavoured soju, etc.) have been introduced since 1994, targeting the young generation. The
sale of soju cocktails have exploded and in July 1995, sales were up 12.5 times compared to
the same period of the previous year. This is proof of the changing consumption patterns of
Korean consumers."

soju-based cocktails are rarely consumed with meal s. On the other hand, other spirits can be and
sometimes are drunk with meals, even if admittedly less frequently than soju.
6.85. The European Communities further notes that according to Korea, the reason why Korean
consumers drink soju and no other spirit with thei r meals is because soju has a unique "harsh" (or
"rough") flavour that goes well with Korean hot and spicy food.
6.86. According to the European Communities, this "c ulinary exception" argument, however, is far
from convincing. In the EC view, the traditional t astes and habits of Korean consumers alone are not
sufficient to explain why soju is consumed more of ten with meals. Koreans do not eat hot and spicy
food all the time. Nor does all soju respond to th e "harsh/rough" description, as allegedly evidenced
by the advertisement for the soju brand Ji nro Bisun which praises itself on being "mild".
197 In the EC
view, there are other spirits which may go just as well with hot and spicy food, such as vodka or, as
pointed out by Mexico in its oral intervention be fore the Panel, tequila. Finally, the European
Communities states that the peculiarities of Korean cuisine would not explain why, according to
Korea, soju predominates in "inexpensive Chinese re staurants" but not in the rather more expensive
Japanese restaurants.
6.87. According to the European Communities, one of the main reasons why soju is more often
consumed with every-day meals than western-style spirits is simply because western-style spirits are
more expensive, to a large extent as a result of prot ective taxation. In the EC view, if western-style
spirits were taxed as soju, they would be less expe nsive and Korean consumers could afford to drink
them with meals more often.
6.88. The European Communities also notes that Ko rea does not claim that distilled soju is
consumed with meals, yet until the 1960s most so ju was distilled soju. The European Communities
asks whether this means that Koreans’ allegedly trad itional habit of drinking soju with meals did not
start until the 1960s? or rather, as it seems more plausi ble, that most Koreans cannot afford to drink
their every-day meals with the now rather expens ive distilled soju and instead tend to keep it for
special occasions and drink it in smaller doses than required to accompany a meal, just like they do
with western-style spirits?
(f) Place of consumption
6.89. The European Communities refers to Korea's cl aim that soju is typically drunk in places
where western-style spirits are not available yet, such as "Korean restaurants, mobile street vendors
and inexpensive Chinese restaurants".
6.90. The EC view is that it is true that western-style spirits still have little presence in certain types
of outlets, but that cannot be explained, as Korea pretends, simply as the result of "consumers’ tastes
and habits." In the EC view, it is surely not coin cidental that those outlets where the penetration of
western spirits remains the lowest are also the least expensive.
6.91. According to the European Comm unities, Korea’s submission totally disregards the existence
of a clear trend towards wider availability of wester n-style spirits. The EC position is that only a few
years ago, western-style spirits could be foun d only in upmarket restaurants and entertainment
establishments. Since then, as shown by the Hankook survey included in the EC First Submission,
western style-spirits have gained considerable distribution penetration and are now available at a wide
range of outlets. According to the European Co mmunities, the continued application by Korea of
protective internal taxes stands as an obstacle to that trend.

197 Attachment 6 to Korea's First Submission.

6.92. The European Communities states that in this re gard, it is instructive to compare the Korean
and Japanese markets. According to the Eur opean Communities, only a decade ago, Japanese
izakayas (the equivalent of traditional Korean restaura nts) used to serve only shochu, sake and beer,
whereas western-style snack bars would serve western drinks but not shochu. Today, shochu and
western style spirits are allegedly usually available at both izakayas and snack bars.
6.93. The European Communities further argues that it is important to note that a considerable and
growing proportion of both soju and western-style spirits is purchased for consumption at home. In
the EC view, this is totally ignored in Korea’s submission. Specifically, the EC industry estimates
that between 30 % and 35 % of western spirits and more than 20 % of soju are consumed at home.
6.94. According to the European Communities, as ev idenced by the Hankook survey, western-style
spirits are sold for home consumption through the full range of retail channels, where they compete
head-on with soju.
198 The European Communities further cl aims that as shown by the photographs
attached to its First Submission, retail establishments of different types often display soju and other
distilled spirits side-by-side on the same shelves.
(g) Gift giving
6.95. The European Communities notes that in the case of distilled soju, Korea advances the
additional argument that its main use is for gift givi ng. The EC view is that although this may be so,
western-style spirits, and in particular whisky a nd brandy, are also often offered as a gift. The
advertisements for Robbie Dhu and Johnny Walker Gift Set includes two advertisements promoting
specifically the purchase of whisky for gift-giving.199 According to the European Communities, Korea
incurs in an even more embarrassing contradictio n when, in comparing diluted soju and cognac, it
states that the latter is "very suitable for gifts."
(h) Pricing
6.96. The European Communities also not es that Korea contends that the pre-tax prices of soju are
much lower than the pre-tax prices of western style spirits. Korea alleges that, because of that price
difference, there cannot be competition between soju and western-style spirits.
6.97. The European Communities takes issue with Ko rea’s contention that it is sufficient to
compare pre-tax prices in order to exclude "any possible distortive effect from the disputed taxes."
6.98. The European Communities states fo r example, that tax differentials may affect the relative
importance of the different price segments within each tax category. The European Communities
refers to the Panel Report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, in which it was stated that one
of the consequences of a protective system of intern al taxes may be to make it more difficult for the
cheaper brands of the more heavily taxed products to enter the market. 200 The EC view is that in
Korea, this effect is attested by the fact that premium brands account for a disproportionate share of
imports,201 whereas the cheapest brands of western spir its are virtually absent. On the other hand,
lower taxes have given to soju producers an advant age to target in particular the low end of the
market.

198 Ibid.
199 Attachment 6 to Korea’s First Submission.
200 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 6.33 (d).
201 See the Sofres Report, at p. 26.

6.99. The European Communities also argues that prot ective taxes limit the sales growth of the
more heavily taxed imported categories and, as a resu lt, keep their unit costs at an artificially high
level, as compared with less taxed domestic products which are sold in much greater volumes.
6.100. In any event, according to the European Communities, absolute price differences are not of
themselves determinative of whether two products ar e "directly competitive or substitutable." In the
EC view, what really matters is the consumers’ r esponse to changes in relative prices. The Dodwell
study allegedly provides evidence of that type of response. The European Communities notes that
Korea has criticised the supposed methodological flaws of the Dodwell study, but it has not put
forward any contrary evidence showing that there is no significant degree of cross-price elasticity
between soju and western spirits.
6.101. According to the European Communities, in the present case, absolute price differences are
even less determinative in view of the nature of the products concerned. The European Communities
adds that spirits are not like cars, which are purchased by most consumers in developed countries only
once every four or five years. Spirits are c onsumable products, which can be purchased many times
over a relatively short period of time. Accordi ng to the European Communities, Korea’s argument
assumes that each Korean consumer drinks always the same type of spirit. In practice, however, most
consumers, even if they prefer a certain type of spirit, may drink also other spirits depending not only
on the occasion but also on the prevailing prices for each of them.
6.102. In the EC view, the above reasons explain why the two Panels on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages did not take into account absolute prices di fferences, even though such differences were
also substantial in the Japanese market.
202
6.103. The European Communities further argues that at any rate, the comparisons made by Korea
grossly overstate the actual price differences. Th e pre-tax prices for diluted soju shown in the
Dodwell study, on which Korea has based its price co mparisons, are prices for standard diluted soju.
The pre-tax price for premium soju is between two and three times higher. 203 In the EC view, if an
adjustment is made to take into account the diffe rences in alcohol content, the pre-tax price for a
bottle of standard whisky is about two to three times higher than the pre-tax price for a bottle of
premium soju204.
6.104. The European Communities also argues that th e differences between the pre-tax prices for
distilled soju and standard diluted soju are even larg er than the differences be tween the pre-tax prices
for standard whisky and standard diluted soju.205
6.105. The European Communities notes that as additiona l evidence, Korea submits a comparison of
the "weighted average prices" for whisky and soju . According to the European Communities, that
comparison, however, is meaningless. The prices for whisky vary enormously. Even if one considers
only mainstream brands, the prices for standard blended whisky may be as much as ten times less than
the prices for de luxe and single malt whiskies. Th e EC view is that although to a lesser extent, the
prices for soju also vary. The pre-tax prices of premium diluted soju may be two to three times higher
than the prices for standard dilu ted soju. According to Korea, pr emium soju accounts for 5 % of the

202 According to the European Communities, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I , supra., the
Panel ruled that price differences were irrelevant for a like product determination. Prices are not mentioned in
the Panel’s analysis under the second sentence of Article III:2. In Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II ,
supra., differences in prices were examined by the Panel only in connection with Japan’s argument that, because
tax/price ratios were "roughly the same", the products were not taxed "similarly" (paras. 6.33-6.34) but not for
the purposes of determining whether the products were "directly competitive or substitutable" (paras. 6.28-6.32)
203 See EC Annex 6.
204 See EC Annex 7.
205 See EC Annex 6.

total sales of diluted soju. According to the Eu ropean Communities, ther efore, as a result, the
weighted average price for all diluted soju calcula ted by Korea is virtually the same as the average
price for standard diluted soju.
i) Other alleged differences
6.106. The European Communities refers to Korea's claim that the advertising for soju is targeted at
the "common man" whereas the advertising for west ern-style spirits targets the up-market consumer.
In the EC view, the soju advertisements include d in Attachment 6 to Korea’s submission fail to
support those allegations. They do not show farmers or labourers but rather business men in shirts
and ties. According to the European Communitie s, Korea has carefully omitted to include in
Attachment 6 to its submission any example of recen t soju advertising for premium brands, which is
even more clearly targeted to the up-market Korean consumer.
206
6.107. The European Communities contends that Kor ea’s allegations regarding the differences in
advertising imply that while soju is the poor man’ s drink, whisky and other imported spirits are a
luxury drink for the most affluent classes. In the EC view, this is totally misleading, as both soju and
whisky are now widely consumed across social boundaries.207
6.108. The European Communities also notes that Korea makes the argument that the fact that some
Korean companies which sell both whisky and soju do so under different trademarks is an indication
that the two products do not compete in the same market, yet some of t hose companies use also
different brands for premium diluted soju and standard diluted soju.
6.109. According to the European Communities, even less convincing is Korea’s argument that
diluted soju does not compete with vodka, gin and rum because the latter are sold in small volumes
whereas soju is a mass volume product. In the EC view this is because only a few pages later Korea
reverses this argument without any apparent embarrassment in order to claim that distilled soju is a
"tiny niche product."
6. The Dodwell study
6.110. According to the European Communities, until th e early 1990s, western spirits were virtually
excluded from the Korean market by a combination of trade barriers. In the EC view, too few sales
figures are available to allow an econometric anal ysis of the substitution relationship between soju
and Western style spirits. This leaves a survey su ch as the Dodwell study as the only method. In the
EC view, Korea does not appear to question the ra tionale for the survey. However, as Korea has
presented a number of criticisms to the Dodwell re port, the European Communities responds to those
criticism as follows-

206 EC Annex 12.
207 The Sofres Report describes as follows the profile of the whisky drinkers (at p. 25):
Whisky, an expensive drink perceived as the drink of the upper class, was used mainly for gift
purposes and sold in upmarket restaurants and entertainment establishments. However,
whisky is widely becoming more of a drink of choice among various age groups. With market
liberalisation and overseas trav el liberalisation, many Kor eans have ready access to whisky
and it is becoming well accepted by the general public. In reflection to this trend, whisky
consumption is increasing at a rapid pace".
 According also to the Sofres Report (at p.23), in the Korean alcohol market , Soju is a very popular
product drunk by all classes.

(a) Alleged "inconsistency" of results
6.111. The European Communities notes that Korea point s to the fact that there are a number of
anomalies in the study. Notably, on a few charts there appears anomalous behaviour in terms of
slightly higher soju purchases when prices for th e soju increase. Accord ing to the European
Communities, these anomalies are far less troublesome than Korea is suggesting:
(a) Despite some unexpected sign reversals the results show very clearly and consistently
that:
(i) more people choose western spirits when the price of soju increases; and
(ii) less people choose soju when th e price of other spirits decreases.
(b) Anomalies are in practice limited to switching between western spirits. The moving
away from soju when its price increases is very robust.
(c) The anomalies affect only some 15 per cent of the observed changes in quantities.
Moreover, if one were to compare only the selection at the 1000 Won price level with
the selection at the 1200 Won price level only 5 (small) anomalies arise out of 48
possibilities.
In the EC view, this is far from being a bad result for a survey because, as Korea pointed out, it has to
be kept in mind that the survey deals with fallible human beings. A perfectly consistent result from
interviewing five hundred people cannot be expected , and would actually be highly suspicious. The
anomalies also run counter to the implicit insinuatio n that the survey results are biased by the patron
of the study.
(b) Standard vs. premium soju
6.112. The European Communities notes that the inclusio n of premium diluted soju as an object of
choice biases the results upwards. According to th e European Communities, this is not the case
because:
(a) Premium diluted soju is a close substitu te for standard diluted soju, as Korea has
acknowledged. Therefore, the inclusion of premium soju in the sample provides an
extremely useful benchmark with which it can be compared the price reaction of the
other spirits. The survey clearly establishes that the pattern of consumer choices of
premium soju and other spirits is the same. In both cases higher prices for standard
soju lead to higher consumption of altern ative drinks (whether premium soju or
others), even if the changes for wester n spirits are less pronounced. Therefore, the
inclusion of premium soju in the sample a llows to demonstrate strongly that the other
liquors in the sample are soju substitutes.
(b) The study shows quite clearly the choices made by the surveyed persons. The fact
that many people move to premium soju does not distract from the fact that many also
switch to western-style drinks.
(c) Lower prices for western drinks increase their consumption, even if the price for
premium soju is lowered at the same time.
(d) The elimination of premium soju from the choices would probably make more people
pick any of the other spirits.

(c) Choice of respondents
6.113. According to the European Communities, the cr iticisms made by Korea with respect to the
choice of respondents are also unfounded because:
(a) The survey does not intend to estimate a cross-price elasticity. It is much less
ambitious. Its purpose is solely to establish that soju and other liquors are in
competition.
(b) There is no direct link between the percentage of soju volume consumed by the
Korean population and the number of people that prefer soju as a drink. It is very
conceivable that the average soju drinker c onsumes larger quantities of soju than the
average whisky drinker consumes whisky. Therefore the differences in percentage
figures should not be over-dramatised.
(c) Even if the percentage figures for wester n style drinks were too high, Korea claims
nowhere that this would change the direc tion of change in consumer behaviour. In
fact, the criticism of the "inconsistencies" of the study implicitly acknowledges that
consumers should move away from soju as so ju becomes relatively more expensive.
This relationship is exactly what the survey attempts to show, and Korea's acceptance
of this basic tenet should be welcome.
(d) The survey cannot show that in all markets and under all conditions people react to
prices. However, it does show that at least in the (important!) market of male Korean
city dwellers between 20 and 49, the issue of price differences is important. It is a
simple question of survey economy to concentrate on those interviewees that are most
likely to give an informed answer. Furthermore, it is unquestionable that the surveyed
population group is an important market segment for spirits. It is reasonable to
assume that the established relationship also holds in other market segments.
(d) Pair-wise choices
6.114. The European Communities reiterates that the fact that the survey sample might have a higher
preference for drinking western beverages than th e Korean sales volume figures suggest is of no
consequence to the validity of the results. In th e EC view, what matters is that a cross-price
relationship is established.
6.115. The European Communities also st ates that it should be mentioned in this context that the
separate paring of brown and white liquors actually biases the reaction to price increases downwards
rather than upwards. The Europ ean Communities refers to Korea's explanation that a preference for
white liquor does not imply a preference for brown liquor over soju. A person with a preference for
brown liquor might therefore not be impressed by the rising soju prices to drink white liquor, and vice
versa. In the EC view, this means the price reaction of the survey will be underestimated.
(e) Single drink choice
6.116. The European Communities notes th at Korea claims that the phrasing of the survey question
may be ambiguous. In particular, Korea presumes th at the question could be interpreted as a unique
and non-repeated sales offer.
6.117. In the EC view, it is difficult to see why this should be the case, in particular since the
phrasing of the question belongs to the standard repert oire of market surveys. However, even if it
were interpreted thus, it is quite clear that peopl e react to price changes and choose more imported

liquors, at the expense of soju. This means clearly that the consumer interprets the liquors for choice
as substitutes.
6.118. According to the European Communities, Ko rea would have preferred a phrasing "would
these prices cause you to change your drinking hab its?" In the EC view, this question would produce
lower figures (which is actually why it is proposed). The reason for this is simply that people are less
able to make a statement about permanent behavi oural change. The European Communities add that
the proposal of Korea also sits oddly with a remark earlier on the internal consistency of the results.
6.119. In the EC view, the conclusions of the survey are quite clear: consumers are sensitive to the
relative prices of soju and other drinks and change their behaviour accordingly. This indicates very
strongly that the consumers view Western liquors a nd soju as substitutes. According to the European
Communities, Korea’s critique does not affect these conclusions.
(f) Overall
6.120. The European Communities also argued that the spirits markets have two defining
characteristics. First, spirits consumption is habitu al behaviour in that people tend to order the same
drink they ordered on a previous given occasion. Thus, behaviour changes onl y gradually. Second,
spirits are experience goods in that they must be purchased and consumed to be evaluated by
consumers. Descriptions do not suffice. Market penetration increases slowly as it is necessary to get
consumers actually to try the produc ts first. Market surveys such as the Dodwell study must be
evaluated in light of these factors.
7. The Sofres report
6.121. The European Communities notes th at Korea, while disparaging the Dodwell study, places
considerable reliance on another document commi ssioned by the European Communities and
prepared by the same market research organisation as the Dodwell study: the document entitled "Your
Guide to Exporting Food Products to Korea - Alcoholic Beverages" (the "Sofres Report").
6.122. In the EC view, although it is obvious that Korea has perused the Sofres Report for "quotable"
passages, the results of that search are rather meagre: just two short passages of two sentences each.
6.123. According to the European Communities, the Sofres report is a generic report intended to
provide a description of the current market situati on, which may serve as a guide to the EC exporters.
The Sofres report did not even attempt to address th e question tackled by the Dodwell study, namely
whether a connection can be established between the price of western-style spirits and the sales of
soju and vice-versa.
6.124. The European Communities further argues th at the Sofres Report relies on the assumption
that, not just soju and western-style spirits, but a ll alcoholic beverages are part of the same market.
For instance, market shares are calculated with respect to the entire alcoholic beverages market, which
would have been meaningless if the authors of the repor t had considered that soju and other spirits do
not compete on the same market.
6.125. The European Communities also ar gues that when the Sofres report states that "soju remains
virtually unaffected by imported alcoholic drinks " it means simply that, despite the considerable
increase in imports of whisky and other western-style liquors, soju continues to account for the vast
majority of sales of spirits. At the same time, th e use of the term "virtually" before "unaffected"
shows that the authors considered that there was actual, even if limited in terms of the volumes
concerned, competition between soju and other west ern-style spirits. In the EC view, the term
"remains" clearly indicates that the authors of the report did not regard the current predominance of

soju as a fixed and permanent feature of the Korean market but as a temporary situation which could
change in the future as a result of increased sales of western-style spirits.
8. The Trendscope survey
6.126. The Trendscope survey addresses two questions, the first of which was – "in which of the
following places have you drunk whisky/soju during the last six months."
6.127. According to the European Communities, the response to this question confirms that although
soju is still consumed more often at traditional Korean venues and whisky at western-style or
entertainment outlets, there is no rigid segregation between the two.
6.128. The European Communities further argues, that the survey show s that, contrary to Korea's
allegations, there is already a significant degree of overlap. Firstly, the European Communities
alleges that soju is also consumed in places where whisky has already established a presence. The EC
view is that 8% of respondents declared to have drunk soju at Karaoke bars , which are still the main
places for drinking whisky. Furthermore, the Eu ropean Communities states that the Trendscope
survey shows that whisky is also drunk in places where soju has traditionally been the predominant
spirit, such as Korean restaurants and bars.
6.129. The European Communities also argues that the survey confirms that home consumption at
home is one of the main end-uses for both whisky and soju. According to the European Communities,
as much as 34% of respondents declared to have drunk whisky at home whereas the percentage of
respondents who had drunk soju at home was 43%.
6.130. The second question asked to the respondents was whether they had the habit of drinking
whisky/soju with meals or without meals. Accord ing to the European Communities, the response to
this question confirms that whisky is also drunk with meals, even if less often than soju. The
European Communities clai ms that 7% of the respondents answ ered that they had the habit of
drinking whisky with meals.
6.131. The European Communities further argues the survey also shows th at, contrary to the claims
repeatedly made by Korea, soju is by no means always consumed with meals. It is the EC view that
the respondents who declared to have the habit of drinking soju with meals was just 36%.
6.132. As a complement to the second question, the r espondents were also asked whether they had
the habit of drinking whisky/soju with or without food. According to the European Communities, the
response to this question was very similar in both cases: whereas the percentage of respondents who
declared to have consumed whisky with food was 86 %, the percentage of respondent who declared to
have drunk soju with food was 97%.
6.133. The European Communities concludes that both the Nielsen study and Trendscope survey
show that despite the fact that western spirits have been virtually excluded from the Korean market
until very recently, and that western spirits remain subject to much higher taxes than soju, there is
already a significant degree of overlap as regards thei r end-uses. In the EC view, the extent of that
overlap could only increase if the tax differentials between soju and western spirits were eliminated.
9. The measures are applied "so as to afford protection to domestic production"
6.134. The European Communities argues that Korea h as not presented any meaningful argument in
order to refute the claim that the measures at issue afford protection to its domestic production.

6.135. According to the European Co mmunities, Korea’s main defen ce is that whisky bottled in
Korea from imported concentrated whisky should be considered as a domestic production. In the
alternative, Korea claims that soju produced in Korea from imported neutral spirits should be
considered as imported.
6.136. In the EC view, there is an obvious difference between those two situations. Concentrated
whisky has already all the essential characteristics of whisky and can be used only to bottle whisky. It
is imported under the same tariff heading as bottled whisky (HS 2208.30) and is subject to the same
import duties.
6.137. The European Communities further argues that in contrast, neutral spirits are a raw material
which can be used to produce a variety of alcoho lic beverages, including for example vodka and gin,
as well as other products, such as heating fuel or pharmaceutical products. Neutral spirits are
imported under a different tariff heading and are subj ect to much lower import duty than soju. In the
EC view, if Korea takes the view that soju is the same product as neutral spirits, it should explain why
it does not apply the same taxes to all liquors made from neutral spirits.
6.138. The European Communities further argues that at any rate, even if Scotch whisky bottled in
Korea had to be considered as a domestic product, soju would still account for almost all of Korea’s
domestic production of spirits. It is thus beyond question that by protecting soju, Korea protects its
domestic production of sprits.
6.139. The European Communities asserts that in this regard, it is worth recalling that the existence
of a substantial production of genui ne domestic whisky in Japan did not prevent the two Panels on
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages from concluding that Japan’s Liquor Tax Law infringed
Article III:2, second sentence.
208 Further, according to the Europ ean Communities, it is also worth
noting that almost all Japanese shochu A is made from imported neutral spirits. Yet, the two Panels
on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages had no hesitation to cons ider shochu A as a domestic
production.
6.140. The European Communities argues, therefore, that Korea’s allegation that soju is isolated
from imports by "commercial realities", rather than regulatory action has not been substantiated and is
in any event totally irrelevant. What matters is that imports of soju are and have always been
negligible and, therefore, that by favouring so ju the Korean Government can be assured that it
protects a domestic production, and a domestic production alone.
6.141. According to the European Communities, Korea’ s argument that the tax differentials cannot
be protective because the pre-tax price differentials are too large is logically flawed. If the Panel
found that the products concerned are "directly comp etitive or substitutable" despite the pre-tax price
differentials, it would follow necessarily that those price differentials are not large enough to exclude,
of themselves, the possibility that the tax differentials may afford protection to domestic production.
6.142. The European Communities also notes that Korea denies emphatically that the Liquor Tax
Law’s very structure and design reveals a protect ionist purpose, but fails to offer a minimally
reasonable explanation for the Liquor Tax Law’s many apparent inconsistencies.

208 According to the European Communities, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage I, supra., Japan
argued that the Liquor Tax Law did not afford protection to domestic production because imports of special
grade whisky accounted for merely 14.6 % of total sales of that product. This argument was disregarded by the
Panel which only took into account th e fact that the less taxed produc t (Shochu) was produced almost
exclusively in Japan. Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., paras. 3.10 (f) and 5.11.

6.143. The European Communities states for instance, that Korea attempts to explain the Liquor Tax
Law’s product categorisation by saying that, orig inally, soju was the only product subject to the
Liquor Tax Law and new tax categories were created onl y as other spirits appeared on the market. In
the EC view, this does not explain why it was consider ed necessary to add to the definition of soju a
series of exceptions, so as to exclude the most important categories of imported spirits, nor does it
explain why it was necessary to apply much higher rates on the newly created categories.
6.144. According to the European Comm unities, the closest that Korea comes to giving a coherent
explanation for the Liquor Tax Law’s apparent lack of rationality is when it states that "as tax rules
are developed, they must accommodate varying levels of taxpayer resistance" and that "in sum,
taxes are a delicate balancing act for any government." In the EC view, this means that if soju is
subject to lower taxes it is simply because soju producers have more political weight than importers of
whisky.
6.145. With respect to distilled soju, the Europ ean Communities notes that Korea advances the
argument that equalising the taxes for distilled soju and whisky would "cripple" the distilled soju
industry with no benefit to the imported bevera ges industry. According to the European
Communities, this argument, is totally irrelevant in order to determine whether the current system
"affords protection to domestic production." It is also allegedly at odds with Korea’s previous
allegation that demand for distilled soju is "specific a nd static" and that, for that reason, "it would be
difficult to affect it a great deal in either direction by altering its price".
B. UNITED
 STATES
1. General: Violation of Article III:2
6.146. The United States notes that in its first submission, it showed that Korea’s application of
preferential tax rates to soju discriminates agai nst vodka, a "like" product and against all other
distilled spirits, which are directly competitive or substitutable, in violation of Article III:2.
According to the United States, in response, Korea has principally argued that soju is a unique product
in a unique market, and that a violation of Article I II cannot be alleged in light of the differences it
cites between soju and other distilled spirits.
6.147. The United States notes that Korea, in an attemp t to assist its attempt to distinguish western
distilled spirits from soju, characterizes distilled soju as a product distinct from diluted soju in an
apparent willingness to sacrifice the tax preference fo r this "special" artisanal product that makes up
0.2% of its total soju sales. The United States argue s that the effort is to downplay the characteristics
of distilled soju that are identical to those of w estern distilled spirits, such as its alcohol content and
use of aging. According to th e United States, however, the different types of soju, however, are the
same or "like" product for all practical purposes.209
6.148. The United States asserts that in the first inst ance, the two varieties have the same name.
Both standard and distilled are clear in appearance and filtered similarly, and unlike vodka, which is
taxed at 30 percent, the Education Tax rate of distill ed and standard soju is 10 percent. The United
States adds that although distilled soju is made from discontinuous (pot still) distillation, the
distinction has minimal tangible effect on the product . Products such as whisky and brandy can be
manufactured by either continuous distillation or pot still (discontinuous) distillation. The United
States further argues that both types of soju are de rived from the same raw materials, and Korean law

209 The United States argues that it is not necessary, for purposes of Article III:2, to determine whether
a product is the same product or simply "like." The drafters obviously avoided limiting the application of the
national treatment disciplines to the "same" products for fear of definitional disagreements on the basis of minor
variations in products.

apparently does not require the use of any particular starch source such as rice; any starch source can
be used. Finally, the United States notes that, as to their packaging, whether a product is marketed as
"artisanal" or not is a reflection of the manufactu rer’s marketing savvy, rather than a fundamental
departure from the nature of the product.
6.149. The United States argues that a better perspective on Korea’s emphasis on differences
between standard and distilled soju (namely price, taste, and marketing) may be seen by comparing
with another category of alcoholic beverage such as wine. According to the United States, wines
cover a broad range of prices and qualities, yet it would be difficult to argue that a $10 table wine and
a $100 bottle of Bordeaux wine are not "like." The price difference between inexpensive and
expensive wine can vary by a factor of ten or more. The United States continues that, similar to
distilled soju, expensive wines are marketed in small volumes with dis tinctive advertising and
packaging in order to emphasize uniqueness, and might, in the opinion of some, possess more
complex bouquet and aroma than inexpensive wines.
6.150. According to the United States, therefore, varia tions in price, taste and marketing of products
with similar end uses simply offer consumers altern ative choices and do not mean they are not the
same or "like" products.
2. Violation of Article III:2, First Sentence
6.151. The United States considers that vodka is "like" soju and that, under Article III:2 first
sentence, Korea must eliminate any tax on vodka that exceeds the tax on soju. The US view is that
Korea wrongly suggests that the absence of "pe rfect substitutability," the presence of minor
differences in physical characteristics and productio n processes, differences in price, and differences
in the end-uses in a particular market prevent two products from being "like."
6.152. The United States argues that Korea’s argument th at "like" products include only those that
are "perfectly substitutable," has no basis in the te xt of Article III:2 or in Appellate Body reports,
because if products were perfectly substitutable, they would likely be identical. The United States
notes that in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , the Appellate Body noted that
perfectly substitutable products would "fall within" the scope of "like" products,
210 but that does not
mean that only perfectly substitutable products can be considered "like" products. According to the
United States, the text of Article III:2 that refers to "like" products (in French, produits similaires )
avoids the obvious tax discrimination that could result between similar products that do not share
every single characteristic and accordingly are not "perfectly substitutable."
6.153. The United States further argues that, although the Appellate Body has clarified that the term
"like" in Article III:2 must be narrowly construe d, it is well established in GATT practice that
products do not have to be identical to be considered "like" products. 211 Korea’s insistence that
minor differences such as alcohol content and add itives prevent two distilled spirits from being "like,"
runs directly counter to findings such as that in United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, in which the panel considered a low-quality style of Mississippi wine made from a special
"scuppernong" kind of grape to be "like" all other kinds of wine. 212 The United States further notes
that in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, taxes on alcoholic beverages, vodka and shochu were
considered "like" products even though vodka was filtered differently . The US view is that Korea’s

210 Appellate Body Report, p. 28.
211 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I , supra., para. 5.6 "minor differences do not prevent
products [from] qualifying as "like"); U.S. - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, supra,
(liquid hydrocarbon products although not identical were "like" crude oil and natural gas because they served
substantially same end uses).
212 BISD 39S/206, 276-77.

argument that in a few instances vodka might be made of different raw materials than soju is not
relevant if it does not affect aspects of the produc t identifiable to the consumer. According to the
United States, whatever the original starch source, it is ethyl alcohol from various sources that is used
in the production of US vodka, Korean soju a nd Japanese shochu. The production process allegedly
varies only by filtration methods and level of dilutio n with water, resulting in minimal differences in
the products produced.
6.154. The United States also argues that Korea’s attempts to distinguish vodka from soju exaggerate
the importance of the attribute. With respect to diluted soju, Korea has identified alcohol content as
an important physical difference. According to th e United States, the alcohol content of diluted soju
is bottled at about 25%, while vodka is bottled at about 40%. But the United States notes that the
WTO Japan panel conclusively rejected the notion that a difference in alcoholic strength of two
products precluded a finding of likeness, on the basi s of the simple observation that "alcoholic
beverages are often drunk in diluted form."
213
6.155. According to the United States, such a differen ce in alcohol content does not even exist with
respect to distilled soju. The United States notes that Korea, with respect to distilled soju, emphasizes
the taste. In the US view, any such difference in flavour is probably linked to the distillation process
rather than raw material, since vodka and soju are ofte n derived from the same raw materials. In this
regard, soju is no more different from vodka than Japanese shochu B, which is also obtained through a
non-continuous (pot-still) distillation process.
6.156. The United States also argues that the fact that vodka has now been placed in its own tariff
heading in Korea’s schedules (2208.60) is also irre levant. According to the United States, it was
previously in the same basket category as soju ( 2208.90), but was broken into a separate heading to
correspond to changes in the 1996 Harmonized System , which created a separat e category to reflect
the vast international trade in the product.
6.157. The United States further argues that Korea’s emphasis on consumer tastes and habits as a
dispositive factor in determining whether two products are "like" is also misplaced. According to the
United States, the original identification of this factor derives from the Report of the Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments .214 However, the United States notes that the report emphasized that the
interpretation of "like" or "similar" products "should be examined on a case-by-case basis," which
"would allow a fair assessment in each case of th e different elements that constitute a ‘similar’
product."
6.158. According to the United States, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages I and II did not consider
consumer tastes and habits to be significant in determining likeness where the market was previously
restricted. The United States further argues that a lthough the 1987 GATT panel agreed that in theory
both objective factors and "the more subjective cons umers’ viewpoint" should be considered, it chose
to disregard the "subjective" factor of "traditional Japanese habits" on the following basis:
Since consumer habits are variable in tim e and space and the aim of Article III:2 of
ensuring neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between imported and
domestic like products could not be achieved if differential taxes could be used to
crystallize consumer preferences for trad itional domestic products, the Panel found
that the traditional Japanese consumer ha bits with regard to shochu provided no
reason for not considering vodka to be a "like" product.215

213 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., para. 6.23.
214 BISD 18S/97, 102.
215 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra, para. 5.7.

6.159. The United States asserts that for the same reas ons, the same panel also disregarded Japan’s
argument that differences in prices between local shochu and imported distilled spirits could prevent a
finding of "like." According to the United States, th e panel "was of the view that ‘like’ products do
not become ‘unlike’ merely because of differences . . . in their prices, which were often influenced by
external government measures (e.g . customs duties) and market conditions ( e.g. supply and demand,
sales margins)." Further, according to the Unite d States, under the circumstances presented in the
Japan dispute (a long history of protection, as in Ko rea), the panel considered that giving any weight
to factors such as consumer traditions in a country or differences in price would run counter to the
objective of Article III:2, by "creating different prices and consumer categories and hardening
consumer preferences for traditional home products."
216 In the US view, such reasoning is equally
compelling in this dispute.
6.160. With respect to vodka, the United States argu es that Korea’s attemp t to draw a stark
distinction between vodka and soju does not correspond to the very similar physical attributes and
manufacturing processes of these products. Vodka is often made from the same grain-based neutral
spirits as soju. Although a little costlier, white birc h charcoal filtration produces virtually the same
results as using other types of charcoal filtration -- and accordingly this difference did not prevent the
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II panel from finding that vodka and shochu are “like”
products. The United States also cl aimed that it is also wrong to emphasize alcoholic strength as a
dispositive factor in selecting a distilled spirit. On ce they are prepared, many mixed drinks, such as
vodka cocktails have a lower alcohol content than stra ight soju. As determined by the panel in the
Japan case, a difference in the alcoholic strength of two products “did not preclude a finding of
likeness, especially since alcoholic beverages are often drunk in diluted form.
6.161. The United States argues that, with respect to th e taste and sensation of the products, it is not
the raw materials that are responsible for the so -called "stinging sensation" supposedly imparted by
soju. If this were true, then all spirits could and can claim a "stinging sensation in the mouth and
throat", since the raw materials are similar in many other spirits. For example, Archer Daniels
Midland Company’s grain neutral spirits are used for both soju and Smirnoff vodka (produced in the
United States). The claimed unique "cold" mouth f eel may come from the fact that soju, like vodka,
is usually refrigerated before c onsumption. Moreover, although Korea cites to “harshness” as a
unique desirable characteristic of standard so ju compared to the smoothness or mildness of
Western-style spirits, as the representative fro m the European Community pointed out, the
advertisement in its submission for Jinro Bisun, produced by Korea’s largest producer of soju
(Attachment 6), boasts how it is a "mild" one, the same way Western-style spirits are marketed.
6.162. The United States also argued that as a factual ma tter, the characterization of Korean soju as
unique is also at odds with the view of even the t op Korean soju producer Jinro. On its Internet home
page, Jinro sets out the following question: “What is Soju?” It provides the following response:
“Jinro Soju, a sort of vodka-like spirits which began life in the 13th century, is the traditional Korean
liquor. . . ”(US Exhibit Q.) Similarly, an Internet search reveals the description of soju by an
apparently French Canadian food critic as “la vodka coreene” (Korean vodka). (US Exhibit R.)
3. Violation of Article III:2, Second Sentence
6.163. The United States reiterates that Korea’s tax es on imported distilled spirits in addition to
vodka are applied so as to afford protection to dom estic production of soju, in violation of Article
III:2, second sentence. The United States notes that as set out by the Appellate Body in the Japan
case, a violation of the second sentence requires three el ements to be shown. First, the products must
be directly competitive or substitutable; second, th e products must be taxed in a way that is not
"similar"; and third, the measure must be applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.

216 Ibid., at para. 5.9.

According to the united States, Korea’s attemp ted defence has focused accordingly on the first
element, substitutability, and the vast majority of the Panel’s questions also pertain to this element.
(a) The Text
6.164. The United States argues that Korea, in attempti ng to show that soju does not compete with
imported distilled spirits, mainly relies on the argument that in order for products to be considered
"directly competitive or substitutable," the complain ing parties must show that "actual competition"
between soju and all distilled spirits is occurring on the Korean market for all end uses. In the US
view, although the complaining parties have shown actual competition and common end uses for most
of the products in question, it is also potential co mpetition with imported distilled spirits that is at
issue in this dispute. The United States adds th at Korea’s legal interpretation is belied by an
examination of the ordinary meaning of the relevant provisions, taken in their context, and in light of
their object and purpose, as required under principles of international treaty interpretation.
217
6.165. The United States argues that the overriding pur pose in Article III:2, second sentence is the
incorporation as an obligation of th e objective stated in Article III:1, that taxes should not be applied
so as to afford protection to domestic production. The interpretive note to the second sentence, that it
applies only "where competition was involved, betw een, on the one hand, the taxed product, and on
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutabl e product which was not similarly taxed" must be
read in light of this overall purpose.
6.166. According to the United States, Korea’s argum ent that competition must be actual runs
counter to the text of the interpretive note and the purpose of the central obligation. The phrase
"competition was involved" is more likely to m ean the situation where competition is presented,
rather than where competition is "currently occurring for every use," as suggested by Korea. Further,
in the US view, this interpretati on is more consistent with other terms in Article III:2, because in
addition to proscribing protective taxation between directly competitive products, the interpretive note
applies to "directly substitutable" products. 218 The United States further argues that the word
"substitutable" is one that clearly shows the a pplication of the second sentence to potential
substitution -- i.e. it means able to be substituted; it does not require a test of whether and how many
products are currently being substituted. The French text, in the US view, underscores the application
of the obligation to potentially competitive products even more clearly: "un produit qui peut lui être
directement substitué" (a product that can be directly substituted for the taxed product).
6.167. The United States further argues that the sc ope of the obligation to include potential
competition is also consistent with the obligation in Article III:4, which requires national treatment for
"like" domestic and imported products. According to the United States, the Article III:4 obligation
has long been understood to apply to regulations th at "might adversely modify the conditions of
competition" between imported and domestic products, regardless of current trade.219
6.168. The United States refers to the United States -- Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 case,
wherein it was noted that the Article III:4 obligati on "calls for effective equality of opportunities" for
imported products, rather than particular export volumes. 220 The United States further notes that the
1949 Working Party Report on Brazilian Internal Taxes takes the view that Article III:2, first sentence

217 See Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
218 According to the United States, although the English text of the interpretative note is ambiguous on
the point, the French translation appears to suggest that the word "directly" also applies to the word
"substitutable." Either way, it does not have implications for this dispute.
219 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery , adopted on 23 October, 1958,
BISD 7S/60, 64.
220 BISD 36S/345, 386-87.

applies, "whether imports from other contracting parties were substantial, small, or non-existent," and
stresses their "potentialities as exporters."
221 Similarly, concerning Article III:2 second sentence,
unless "directly competitive or substitutable" is interpreted as applying to potential competition, its
scope will be much narrower and permit the perpetua tion of unfair competitive conditions that result
from protected markets.222
6.169. The United States argues further that the appli cation of Article III:2 to potential competition
is also confirmed by GATT and WTO cases that have emphasized the distorting effect of past
restrictions in the market. Japan -- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I disregarded traditional Japanese
habits in determining that vodka and shochu were "like," emphasizi ng that they resulted from past
protection.
223 Japan -- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II similarly noted that "consumer surveys in a
country with . . . a [discriminatory] tax syst em would likely understate the degree of potential
competitiveness between substitutable products." 224 The United States also notes that the Appellate
Body in Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals had a similar response to Canada’s
arguments that static market shares over 30 years s howed a lack of "direct competition." It noted,
"this argument would have weight only if Cana da had not protected the domestic production of
Canadian periodicals through, among other measures, the import prohibition of Tariff Code 9958 and
the excise tax of Part V.1 of the Excise Act."225
6.170. The United States argues that Korea is also wrong to insist that in order to be substitutable,
products must be substitutable for all economic uses, such as consum ption in restaurants or as an
accompaniment with Korean food. According to the United States, although the GATT and WTO
panels and the Appellate Body in the Japan case praised the concept of examining uses in a given
market, as a practical matter they did not provide mu ch weight to consumer tastes and habits. In the
US view, the GATT Japan panel specifically noted that there was direct competition and
substitutability as between all the liquors in disput e "even if not necessarily in respect of all the
economic uses to which the products may be put."
226 More recently, in Canada - Measures
Concerning Periodicals , the Appellate Body specifically found that the products in question were
directly competitive or substitutable even if th ey were poor substitutes for certain purposes. 227
According to the United States, such an approach is consistent w ith other GATT panel findings, such
as the application of Article III:2 in EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins to products that were
substitutable only "under certain conditions." 228 In the US view, the products involved -- skim-milk
powder on the one hand, and oilseeds, cakes and meal s, dehydrated fodder and corn gluten feed, on
the other -- confirm the appropriate broad scope of the term "directly competitive or substitutable."
(b) Drafting History
6.171. The United States argues that the drafting history of the GATT 1947 supports the broad
textual interpretation of the scope of "directly competitive or substitutable." According to the United
States, prior to the Geneva drafting session, the te xt of what became the second sentence of Article
III:2 was not in the nature of an obligation and re ferred only to competitive products. At the Geneva
session, according to the United States, delegates di scussed the scope of the language that eventually
provided the basis for the present obligation. C oncerning which products would be compared, some

221 GATT/CP.3/42, adopted 30 June, 1949, II/181, 185.
222 The United States believes that this interpretation is all the more compelling because the second
sentence is meant to compensate for the narrow interpreta tion required of the term "lik e" in Article III:2, first
sentence, as acknowledged by the panel and Appellate Body in the Japan - Alcoholic Beverages case.
223 Japan - Taxes Alcoholic Beverages I, supra, para. 5.7.
224 Panel. Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra, para. 6.28.
225 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra, p. 28.
226 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra, para. 5.7.
227 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra, p. 28.
228 BISD 25S/49, 63-64, adopted on 14 March, 1978.

country delegates cited examples of domestic and imported products that could be "competitive" and
trigger the application of the legal obligation. These included quite broad categories of products, such
as domestic apples and imported oranges;
229 domestic linseed oil and imported tung oil; 230 and
domestic synthetic rubber and imported natural rubber.231
6.172. The United States further notes that the record discloses that no disagreement was expressed
by delegates with the breadth of these specific examples of "competitive" products, including the
reference to apples and oranges. In Havana, wh en the text of the legal obligation on national
treatment was approved, the Chairman of the Sub- committee reported "only one important change in
substance" from the Geneva text. Provisions for a negotiated elimin ation of discriminatory internal
taxes in the previous draft evolved into to their outright elimination.232
6.173. According to the United States, at that point, the term "directly competitive or substitutable"
was added in the text. After adoption of the presen t text and interpretive note, one additional question
was raised concerning examples of what might be considered "directly competitive or substitutable
products" for purposes of the interpretive note to Paragr aph 2. One delegate allegedly asked if "coal
vs. fuel oil" and "tramways vs. busses" could be c onsidered directly competitive or substitutable.
Another delegate allegedly noted the need for actua l cases in order to interpret the provision, but
opined that such products were not substitutable. A third delegate , however, allegedly stated that
decisions could not be made except in relation to a particular factual situation, but that a tax on coal in
a particular case might be designed to protect the fuel oil industry. 233 In the US view, this comports
with the Appellate Body’s finding in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II that determinations are
to be made on the basis of "all relevant facts," wh en examining each of the "number of means" for
identifying the "broader category of products that might be described as ‘directly competitive or
substitutable.’"234
6.174. The United States concludes that the examples di scussed in the drafting history show that the
comparison of internal taxes on domestically prod uced soju, on the one hand, and imported distilled
spirits, on the other, is well within the scope contemplated by the drafters. The emphasis was
obviously not on particular attributes of the produ cts such as physical characteristics, production
processes, or quality, but on the ability of the produc ts to be used in the same manner, and the extent
to which a government acted to protect a domestic product to prevent such substitution in its market.
(c) Directly competitive or substitutable
Physical characteristics
6.175. According to the United States, Korea's subm issions argue that some differences in
production processes and physical characteristics prove that soju and imported distilled spirits are not
in fact “like,” “substitutable” or “competitive” products. The United States argues that from a basic
economic perspective, however, differences in production or physical characteristics are not a priori
determinative of whether two produc ts are substitutable or directly competitive. For example, cane
sugar and artificial sweeteners ar e totally different in terms of production process and chemical
composition, yet they clearly compete directly in co ffee houses and restaurants. In order to determine
substitutability, the Panel should consider whethe r the products in question compete for consumer
spending on a category of goods. In this case, a ll spirits should be considered as in competition

229 E/PC/T/A/PV/9, p. 7.
230 E/CONF.2/C.3/SR.11, p. 1 and Corr.2.
231 E/CONF.2/C.3/SR.11, p. 3.
232 E/Conf.2/C.3/SR.40, p.1.
233 E/Conf.2/C.3/SR.40, p. 2.
234 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., at p. 25.

because they compete for consumers’ spending on va rious products within the category of alcoholic
spirits. Similar production processes, physical char acteristics, and end uses are indicative of “like”
products, but some differences in these factors do not establish that two products are not substitutable.
Another factor in determining substitutability is the extent to which consumers respond to relative
price increases in one product by increasing purchases of another. These products are likely to be
substitutes. Thus, Korea’s reliance on minor differences in the production and physical characteristics
as dispositive evidence of non-substitutability is misp laced. Furthermore, Korea greatly exaggerates
the differences between soju and imported spirits.
6.176. The United States argues that it is unlikely that two identical products would not, to some
degree, be substitutable, though they may not be perf ectly substitutable. Even physically identical
products might be packaged differently, marketed differently, or ultimately targeted at different
consumer groups, but they would non etheless remain "able" to be substituted. For example, two
identical bottles of aspirin (with the same contents, price and packaging) are perfectly substitutable,
whereas two bottles of aspirin with a different packag e size, branding, or price, but containing aspirin
of the same chemical composition are not perfectly substitutable but remain substitutable, with
demand for one being influenced by the price of the other.
6.177. According to the United States, with respect to other Western distilled spirits, the Korean
submission stresses difference in color as between whisky and soju as a factor that rules out
competition between these products. However, the United States argues that color may not only differ
as between types of spirits, but also within spirit cat egories. For instance rum, tequila and shochu all
have clear and amber versions, yet they do not b ecome different non-competing products because of
it.
6.178. According to the United States, it is also wrong to emphasize alcoholic strength as a
dispositive factor in selecting a distilled spirit. On ce they are prepared, many mixed drinks, such as
vodka cocktails have a lower alcohol content than straight soju. As determined by the panel in Japan
– Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , a difference in the alcoholic strength of two products “did not
preclude a finding of likeness, especially since alcoholic beverages are often drunk in diluted form.”
6.179. The United States agrees that flavour and arom a are important factors in selecting a distilled
spirit, but again argues that a different flavor hardly precludes substitutability between classes of
distilled spirits such as whisky, soju, vodka and ru m. Indeed, the range of flavours and aromas within
a class of spirit have as much of an impact on consumer choice as does the range of flavours and
aromas between classes of spirits. In fact, soju itself is available in different flavorings, such as
honey and wood. Under Korea’s theory, different fla vours of soft drinks such as Coke and Fanta do
not compete, but it is doubtful that anyone familiar with the market would agree.
6.180. The United States further argued that Korea’s i nvocation of so-called distinguishing physical
characteristics for other Western distilled spirits is entirely arbitrary. The United States argues that
Korea's citation of physical characteristics to distin guish soju from other Western distilled spirits are
the same characteristics that happen to distinguish various kinds of Korean soju from each other. For
example, Jinro’s promotional material for its prem ium soju brands on its Internet home page cites
factors such as a “rich smooth taste” and oak flavoring, the same factors Korea relied on in its first
submission to distinguish soju from whiskey.
235 According to the United States, Jinro’s descriptions
in fact confirm the competitive relationship between soju and Western spirits.
6.181. The United States further argues that, with respect to the taste and sensation of the products, it
is not the raw materials that are responsible for the so-called "stinging sensation" supposedly imparted
by soju. If this were true, then all spirits coul d and can claim a "stinging sensation in the mouth and

235 US Exhibit Q.

throat", since the raw materials are similar in many other spirits. For example, Archer Daniels
Midland Company’s grain neutral spirits are used for both soju and Smirnoff vodka (produced in the
United States). The claimed unique "cold" mouth f eel may come from the fact that soju, like vodka,
is usually refrigerated before c onsumption. Moreover, although Korea cites to “harshness” as a
unique desirable characteristic of standard so ju compared to the smoothness or mildness of
Western-style spirits, as the representative fro m the European Community pointed out, the
advertisement in its submission for Jinro Bisun, pr oduced by Korea’s largest producer of soju, boasts
how it is a "mild" one, the same way Western-style spirits are marketed.
6.182. The United States also challenges the Korean clai m that soju is uniquely suited to spicy food
and unlike Western spirits, is consumed exclusively during meals in Korean restaurants or at home.
According to the United States, that does not mean that Western-style spirits are not equally suitable
for such use. Other countries also have hot and spicy food, and consume distilled spirits other than
soju. For instance, in the United States, when consuming hot and spicy Mexican food, it is common
to consume tequila in the form of a Margarita. In Poland, vodka is drunk with herring. Consumers’
habits are not fixed, and can change with the intr oduction of alternative products. Indeed, in Korea a
considerable proportion of imported Western-style di stilled spirits is not cons umed in bars and posh
hotels, but at home, similar to soju. The United States says it understands that after dinner at home,
both soju and Western- style spirits are an option.
6.183. The United States argues that, as the GATT drafting history demonstrates, in order to be
directly competitive or substitutable, products need not share a majority of physical characteristics,
and a basic commonality of physical properties is suffi cient. The basic physical properties of soju and
Western distilled spirit categories ar e essentially the same: all are con centrated forms of alcohol that
are produced through distillation and used for human consumption. Their variations -- distillation
method, appearance, taste, alcoholic content, and raw material inputs -- do not create any particular
product not substitutable for the other. The 1987 Japan liquor panel did not consider the minor
variations in distilled spirits important, instead stressing the flexibility of use: “Alcoholic drinks might
be drunk straight, with water, or as mixes. . . . [T]h e flexibility in the use of alcoholic drinks and their
common characteristics often offered an alternativ e choice for consumers leading to a competitive
relationship.”
236 According to the United States, this appro ach, consistent with the consideration by
the drafters that oranges and apples are competitive, c onfirms that it is most appropriate to consider a
broad commonality of physical characteristics.
End Uses
6.184. According to the United States, in examining the current uses of distilled spirits in the Korean
market, it should be recalled that already both soju and Western-style distilled spirits are sold and
advertised side by side. In the Korean Air duty free magazine 237 (US Exhibit D), presumably catering
to both Korean and foreign travellers, Johnnie Walk er Blue Label, Johnnie Walker Gold Label and
Moon Bae-Sool soju are advertised on the same page. Moreover, as shown in the pictures in U.S.
Exhibit G, soju and Western-style spirits are sold t ogether in a range of retail establishments. In the
first picture, Cherry 15 is next to Seagram Extr a Dry Gin, and Alexander vodka is next to Korean
premium soju (aged in oak) in a convenience store. In the fourth picture, Something Special Scotch
whisky is next to Kim Sat Gat premium soju in a Seoul supermarket. The fact that these products are
sold through the same retail channels is important evidence of direct competition in the market place.
6.185. The United States argues that Korea has implied that soju, because it is less expensive, is
marketed to an entirely different group of consumers than Western spirits and therefore is not directly
competitive with Western spirits. The United States disagrees with that implication. In fact,

236 See panel Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages I, supra., at para. 5.7.
237 US Exhibit D.

according to the United States, given the greater degr ee of availability of Western spirits, it is more
likely that many Koreans will consume both soju and Western spirits, differentiating the timing,
degree and occasion of their consumption mix based on personal preferences and the relative prices of
the two products. Moreover, The United States ag rees with the representative of the European
Communities that, as shown in Attachment 6 of th e Korean submission, soju is also aimed at
businessmen in shirts and ties, and not farmers or fact ory workers. This is exactly the same group of
people Western spirits companies are targeting -- Korea’s middle and upper class professionals.
6.186. The United States also claims that Korea's na rrow approach to end uses looks at whether a
distilled spirit is consumed before, during or after a meal; as a mixed drink, with ice, or straight; and
what type of food is served at a restaurant. In f act, Korea attempts to draw strict categories where
none exists in the Korean market or any place el se US manufacturers are familiar with. Before
addressing the issue of mealtime consumption, the United States recalls recall that Korea says little
regarding other sub-categories of usage in which ev en Korea admits Western distilled spirits compete,
such as consumption in bars, after meals, and in the home, or providing as a gift. Korea, does,
however, concede in its answer to U.S. question 3, th at some standard soju will also be consumed at
home without a meal, as are western spirits.
6.187. According to the United States, Korea’s narrow approach to end use is also undermined by
the GATT drafting history citing to apples and orange s as directly competitive products. As stated by
Korea, “A member of a group of products that are re lated in consumption need not be a substitute for
all other members of the group -- just for some other members of the group.” In its second
submission Korea refers to the U.S. citation of differing end uses for apples and oranges as evidence
that such products may not be competitive or substitutable. Although it is unlikely that oranges would
be substituted as filling for apple pies, this does not preclude their substitutability for several other end
uses, such as fruit juices, fruit je llies and jams, and overall fresh fruit consumption. Differences in
product end uses may vary, but they do not erect a wall preventing substitution between differing
types products within the same category.
6.188. The United States also argues that Korea's focu s on differences in consumption within the on-
premise and off-premise market segments is not appropriate for purposes of Article III:2. On-
premise consumption covers a broad range of establishments that must be considered together for
purposes of substitutability, particularly since the availability of Western spirits has continually
expanded. In addition, in the on-premise consump tion segment, serving particular distilled spirits is
up to the discretion of the owner of the particular est ablishment. In general, establishments such as
inexpensive Korean restaurants that appeal to low- income patrons are less likely to serve expensive
high-end distilled spirits, and vice versa. However, w ith all of the variability in types of restaurants,
bars and night clubs in Korea, it is not realistic to assume distinct rigid categories with respect to
marketing and distribution of distilled spirits, and Korea has shown no support for such allegations.
6.189. The United States further argues that in the o ff-premise sector, making generalizations about
particular kinds of stores would be equally incorrect . In Korea's retail sector, virtually all types of
spirits are available in all types of establishments, yet in different proportions. For instance, a small
family-owned shop will have cases of soju availabl e and a few bottles of premium Scotch whisky on
the shelves. Conversely, upscale department stor es, such as Lotte and Shinsegae in downtown Seoul,
will carry a preponderance of imported spirits, and may only have a small display for domestically-
produced soju. The wide range of availability of imported spirits is clearly established in the
Hankook study submitted by the EC as well as photogra phs of a range of retail establishments in
which soju and Western spirits share the same st ore shelves submitted by th e United States. Korea’s
argument that such placement is unimportant b ecause in one photograph submitted by the United
States, Gillette shaving foam is also apparent, ov erlooks the fact that the shaving foam is on a
neighbouring set of shelves, not in the same group with the distilled spirits.

6.190. The United States notes that Korea's market fo r imported distilled spirits has been open for
less than a decade, and is not a mature market with respect to consumer's awareness of, and
receptivity toward, different types of spirits, their uses and places of consumption. Even though there
are some differences in the methods of consum ption compared to other countries, such as
consumption of soju with Korean meals, it is wrong to assume, that end use must be identical for all
uses under Article III:2. Given the fact that the spirits industry has been barred from the Korean
market until recently, the industry has not had the opportunity to address and capitalize on every
possible usage of its products in Korea. Howeve r, since all distilled spirits are fundamentally
interchangeable, as Western spirit products become more familiar to Korean consumers, it is expected
that methods of consumption will continue to expand.
6.191. The United States claims that with respect to on-premise consumption, Korea has also
implausibly maintained that there is no overlap be tween the types of restaurants or bars that serve
soju, and those that serve imported spirits. In fact, in its answers to U.S. question 4, Korea has
already conceded at least some potential overlap between distilled soju and Western spirits when it
recognizes that soju is offered in so-called “v ery expensive and traditional Korean and Japanese
restaurants.” Given its earlier statement that Wester n spirits are sold in Japanese restaurants, Korea
minimally acknowledges substitutability in such restaurants.
Price
6.192. With respect to Korea’s arguments on the different prices of the various products, the United
States claims that although Korea glosses over the concept of substitu tability, it does not go so far as
to claim that the existence of large pre-tax pr ice differentials precludes two products from being
substitutable. In fact, Korea acknowledges such subs titutability when it states that standard soju and
premium soju, two products with a typical price diffe rential of more than 100%, are considered “close
substitutes” in Korea.
6.193. The United States notes that the substitutability of alcoholic beverages in a wide price range
is not uncommon. Moreover, a range of prices ex ists within several product types. For example,
whisky prices can range from ten to a hundred dollars for a bottle. The Korean submission frequently
cites whisky as 11 times higher in price than soju, ignoring the price ranges within the whisky product
category. For example, pre-tax imported whisky prices (for 375 ml bottles) range from over 5,000
won for premium scotch whisky to over 3,000 w on for standard scotch whisky. Thus, at the
extremes, imported scotch whisky pre-tax prices are 7.2 to 12 times higher than standard soju, not
including domestic bottled whisky which is 6.3 tim es higher. Notably, imported standard scotch
whisky pre-tax prices are only 3.6 times higher than premium soju.
6.194. The United States further argues that price di fferences are not of themselves evidence of a
lack of actual or potential competition. Chang es in consumer purchase behaviour are dependent on
relative price changes, not absolute prices betw een competing products. Constructing a price
demarcation where products with relative prices ex ceeding a specific threshold are considered not
directly competitive or substitutable ignores the re ality that these products are arrayed along a price
continuum available to consumers in the marketplace. The availability of products across a spectrum
of prices in the Korean market attests to a commensurate range of differing consumer tastes and
preferences for distilled spirits, as well as the desire of individual consumers to vary their individual
consumption choice on the basis of occasion, place of consumption and other factors. Moreover,
purchases of distilled spirits, unlike purchases of it ems such as automobiles or homes, occur on
numerous occasions over a relatively short time frame. Consequently, at the margin, changes in
relative prices between spirits, such as soju and Western spirits, may alter some individual
consumption decisions, but not all.

6.195. Furthermore, the United States notes that Korea’ s price analysis devotes substantial attention
to comparisons of standard soju and the more upsca le whisky products, giving limited attention to the
variability of prices within spirit categories such as whisky and soju. For example, the pre-tax price
of premium soju is two to three times higher than standard soju, and in some instances distilled soju
pre-tax prices exceed those of Western spirits. In comparing soju and whisky weighted average
prices, the United States claims that Korea’s analys is failed to account for the variation of prices
among differing whisky products. Furthermore, when adjustments are made for alcoholic content,
pre-tax price differences between standard soju and Western spirits range from 3 to 6 times higher and
for premium soju, 2 to 3 times higher.
Broader substitutability of distilled spirits
6.196. The United States argues that there is evidence that Korean Consumers are not substantially
different from other consumers around the world in the ways that they form tastes for alcoholic
beverages. According to the United States, the US, EC and Korean submissions show that the
advertising for the products is similar and aimed at similar audiences. In fact, the advertisements
would not be out of place in Western magazines except for the Korean print. In addition, in Korea, as
in the rest of the world, distilled spirits are sold in stores, bars and restaurants, among other locations.
In Korea, soju and Western spirits are purchased fro m the same shelves in different retail outlets.
Thus, there is m market evidence supporting the US stat ements that all spirits should be considered as
in competition because they compete for consumers' spending on various products within the category
of alcoholic spirits.
6.197. The United States argues that Korea’s implication that all distilled spirits are not a recognized
category of competing goods is contradicted by both international and Korean practices. There is a
reason that the international convention on the Harm onized System, to which Korea is a party, has
grouped all distilled spirits, including soju, under th e same customs heading. This classification
reflects the fact that on the international scene, di stilled spirits are considered a distinct product group
that includes soju. One need only look at a r ecent issue of an industry trade journal, Drinks
International
238 which puts out a list of the top spirits brands in the world each year, to see that soju is
considered a competitor to all other distilled spirits in HS heading 2208. On page 35 of the March
1998 edition, one sees that Jinro Soju is ranked the number one spirits brand in the world.
6.198. The United States notes that Korean government itself groups imports of soju with other
distilled spirits in its implementation of the Harm onized System, and groups all alcoholic beverages
together -- soju, beer, vodka, whiskey, sake etc. -- in a single liquor tax law. In its responses to our
questions, Korea admits that sake and beer compete with soju. It is self-serving to insist that the other
products in its liquor law (such as imported distill ed spirits) do not compete, despite their being
grouped together in Korea’s own laws.
6.199. According to the United States, several othe r factors support what should be the obvious
conclusion that Korean consumers can be presumed to recognize the similarity of soju and imported
spirits. Western spirits and Korean soju are sold alongside each other in retail outlets, and their
advertisements are aimed at a similar clientele wi th similar sales pitches. The development, by
Korea’s own soju producers, of bottling operations for imported whiskey is also significant. These
producers have obviously recognized that the prod ucts compete and are taking advantage of the
distribution channels already developed for traditional soju brands.
6.200. The United States argues further that Korean manuf acturers have advertised soju in the same
international media as Western distilled spirits and s eek to take advantage of characteristics of soju
that are similar to those of Western distilled spirits . The United States refers again to a recent edition

238 US Exhibit P.

of Drinks International. Page 14 of the March 1998 issue cont ains an advertisement for Jinro Soju,
which asks potential purchasers to “experience its unique smooth taste” and boasts of its
“incomparable versatility for cocktails.” It even shows soju in a glass “on the rocks” with a lemon
slice and a maraschino cherry. Obviously, Korea’ s top soju producer, Jinro, considers soju
substitutable for Western distilled spirits and eminen tly suitable for a variety of their uses -- like
Western spirits, not only drunk straight in a shot glass, but also “on the rocks” or mixed with other
products to make cocktails.
6.201. The United States argues that Jinro’s recognition of soju’s substitutability with other spirits in
its international export markets is not reconcilabl e with the position of the Korean government in
these proceedings that soju is not “like” or “dir ectly competitive or substitutable” with any Western
distilled spirit. Overseas, Korean soju competes on a le vel playing field with all other distilled spirits,
but at home Korea rejects any notion that the products are in competition, and insists on a reading of
Article III that would protect soju through burdens ome taxes on imports. The United States considers
that this position finds no support in the letter or spirit of Article III:2.
6.202. The United States considers that there is also some empirical evidence supporting the general
notion that consumers budget for alcoholic beverages separately than other goods.
239 This study of
consumers (Alley et al. ) reveals that the consumption of alco holic beverages is separate from their
consumption of other goods. Hence, “after compen sating for income changes, consumption of other
goods is unaffected by price changes” of alcoholic beverages. 240 Furthermore, in Alley and in two
additional studies 241 there is evidence of substitutability be tween domestic and imported spirits in
Canada and Finland, respectively. Accordingly, there is further support for the conclusion that all
imported spirits compete with soju in the distilled spirits market in Korea.
Korean market developments
6.203. The United States argues that the development of the premium soju market is a most
important indicator of the fact that Western spirits directly compete and are substitutable for soju.
Soju sales increased significantly with the introd uction of premium soju, whose sales volumes have
surpassed the combined sales of all imported spirits . This development demonstrates that Korean
consumers are receptive to trying and buying newly introduced types of spirits, including those with a
higher prices. Furthermore, development of premium soju is clearly intended to move soju up market
by borrowing the cachet from imported spirits, which c ontradicts Korea’s contention that soju is only
the cheap drink of “commoners” or “ordinary folks”.
6.204. The United States argues that another developm ent in the Korean market further dispels
Korea’s notion that soju is in a market of its own: the production of flavoured soju and juice cocktails
starting in 1995. Although it may well be that much of soju is consumed as described in Korea's
submission, these market developments show that new forms, venues and usage of various distilled
spirits will continue to develop in Korea.
6.205. The United States considers that market de velopments and present conditions in Korea
directly undermine Korea’s reliance on pre-tax pr ice differentials as precluding substitutability
between soju and Western spirits. Despite comp etitive distortions created by Korea’s liquor tax

239 The United States cites A.G. Alley, D.G. Ferguson, K.G. Stuart, An Almost Ideal Demand System
for Alcoholic Beverages in British Columbia, 17 Empirical Economics 416 (1992).
240 Id. at 414.
241 The United States cites Andrikopoulos, et al., The Demand for Domestic and Imported Alcoholic
Beverages in Ontario, Canada: A Dynamic Simultaneous Equations Approach, 29 Applied Economics 945-953
(1997); Holm, Alcohol Content and Demand for Alcoholic Beverages: A System Approach, 20 Empirical
Economics 75-92 (1995).

system, demand for Western spirits, particularly whisky, has increased as the relative prices of whisky
and soju declined ( there were 100% and 250% reducti ons in the applicable liquor tax rate and import
custom duties, respectively. During this period, sales of whisky in Korea increased over 136 percent
as compared to a 13 percent increase in soju sales. These differing rates of growth in sales of whisky
and soju amidst tax and duty reductions on imports demonstrates that the products are in competition.
6.206. The United States claims that without precise data regarding Korean consumer purchasing
activity, it is virtually impossible to determine with complete certainty that product demand, in this
case whisky, is driven by factors unrelated to th e demand and price of the other product in question,
i.e. soju. However, the United States considers that several market developments suggest that
changes in market share between soju and whisky are not unrelated:
1) A noticeable slow-down in soju sales occu rred in the early 1990's as the import duties
in Korea were lowered on whisky and impor t restrictions were eliminated, propelling
increased sales of whisky and other Western spirits.
2) It was not until 1996, when a new soju pr oduct was introduced (premium soju), that
soju sales rebounded. Between 1995 and 1996, sales of soju increased by 5 percent,
exceeding the growth rate for the previous three years combined.
3) In 1997, in the midst of a sharp currenc y depreciation and economic difficulties, sales
of Western spirits, particularly whisky, declined, while soju sales actually increased.
Thus, according to the United States, the two concu rrent trends of Korean consumers trading up to
Western spirits while trading up to premium domestic soju are a strong indication of the
substitutability between Western spirits and soju.
4. The Dodwell Study
6.207. The United States argues that the results of the Dodwell study provide ample evidence that
Korean consumers treat soju and imported Western spirits as substitute products. The United States
notes first that a cross- price elasticity study might be a helpful addition to the Article III:2 analysis,
but it is not a necessary one. The emphasis on case-by -case analysis in the drafting history of Article
III, and the practice among GATT and WTO panels, make it clear that it would not be appropriate to
establish a general rule concerning the percentage shift in consumer preferences. The complaining
parties have not put forward any precise estimate, but some empirical results of studies conducted in
various national markets indicate that there is a st atistically significant trade-off between types of
spirits.
6.208. First, the United States notes that the Dodwell study was patterned after the ASI study utilised
in the Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II,
242 in which the panel stated "contained persuasive
evidence that there is significant elasticity of substitution among the products in dispute."243
6.209. According to the United States, the small anoma lies in the Dodwell study should not lead the
panel to a conclusion that the Dodwell study reflects "independent movements of independent
variables." In the US view, drawing such a c onclusion on the results of the Dodwell study is
tantamount to concluding that relative prices of soju, premium soju and imported spirits have no
impact on consumption decisions. In fact, the overall trends in the Dodwell study should lead the
Panel to the opposite conclusion: consumer preferences in the Korean market for distilled spirits are
significantly related to relative prices of soju and imported distilled spirits.

242 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II ,supra., para. 6.29.
243 Ibid., para. 6.32.

6.210. According to the United States, the anomalies pointed out by Korea are merely deviations
from what is usual, normal or expected.
244 The US argument is that a study that relies on sampling to
draw inferences about an overall population may yield results that contain some random variation, and
therefore will be susceptible to occasional anomalous results. 245 In the US view, what is important in
the Dodwell study is that the overall trend displayed in the sample responses suggests that relative
prices are a factor in consumption of distilled sp irits, and that consumers normally will substitute
imported spirits for soju as the relative price of soju rises.
6.211. According to the United States, the analysis of the Dodwell survey results as described in the
first US submission detailed the percentage cha nges in those choosing Western spirits (excluding
premium soju) as the relative price of standard soju ri ses. Therefore, the aggregate effects of nearly
all of the scenarios demonstrate that respondents increasingly choose Western spirits when faced with
higher relative prices for standard soju.
6.212. The United States notes that Korea’s critique of the Dodwell study alleges flawed results and
methodological weaknesses. Yet, despite these a ssertions, the study establishes a connection between
changes in relative prices of soju and western sp irits and purchasing behaviour. The Dodwell survey
followed the methodology of the ASI study, attempting to determine whether the typical Korean
spirits customer varies consumption preferences between soju and Western spirits as relative prices of
spirits change. In the US view, the study did not a ttempt to determine the actual shares or shifts in
market shares between spirits products, an objective that would not be relevant to this proceeding.
Rather it sought to establish whether Korean spirits consumers view the products as substitutable.
The fact that the observed percentages of survey responses do not perfectly correlate with actual soju
market shares does not undermine the study’s c onclusions, and focusing on it overlooks the study’s
objective.
6.213. The United States notes that Korea further asserts that the Dodwell study reflects a sample
bias and posed ambiguous questions. According to the United States, with respect to the survey
questions, it is unreasonable to impute confusion to the entire survey population. With respect to the
sample, inclusion of survey respondents having rece ntly purchased soju and whisky suggests that, at
least for brown spirits, respondents’ familiarity with these products runs contrary to the assertion that
the survey questions implied a one-time or experime ntal purchase. Finally, the separation of brown
and white distilled spirits does not affect the f undamental movement of respondents from standard
soju to Western spirits as standard soju’s relative price increased.
6.214. The United States also notes that Korea questioned, as did the Panel, the grouping of premium
soju with other Western distilled spirits in the Dodw ell study. According to the United States, as with
whisky (standard and premium), it was considered appropriate to establish more than one price point

244 In the US view, Korea’s critique of the Dodwell study focuses on random anomalies to the
exclusion of the underlying findings that Korean consumers view standard soju and imported spirits as substitute
products. For example, Korea’s critique highlights that in chart 1 of the Dodwell study, the percentage of
respondents choosing premium scotch falls as the price of standard soju rises from 1,100 to 1,200 won. The
critique ignores that in the same scenario a rising percentage of respondents chose standard whisky and cognac
as soju prices rose. In aggregate, the percentage choosing Western spirits in this scenario actually rose,
indicating respondents’ responsiveness to changes in the relative prices of Western brown spirits and soju.
Moreover, the aggregate trends in nearly all the s cenarios indicate increasing pe rcentages of respondents
choosing Western spirits amidst the relative rise of stan dard soju prices. In focusing narrowly on selective
inconsistencies Korea has obfuscated the underlying study results evidencing that respondents frequently choose
to substitute imported spirits for standard soju as the re lative price of these products narrowed. See First Korea
Sub., Attachment 2, at pp. 4-5.
245 In the US view, in only one of the price scenarios (medium brown spirit price levels) in the Dodwell
study did the aggregate results run counter to theory. However, it should be noted that in terms of respondents,
a net of 3 respondents choose non-Western spirits as the relative price of standard soju reached its highest level.

for diluted soju given that diluted soju products di ffered in price. Setting a price benchmark for the
soju category based on the actual prices for the higher price premium soju to the exclusion of standard
soju would have ignored the majority of the overall diluted soju market. Standard soju, due to its
market share significance, was chosen as the benchm ark for comparison. The fact that premium soju
was selected as an alternative product, alongside West ern spirits, to standard soju, and that some
respondents switched to premium soju, does not undermine the validity of the study’s conclusion.
5. The measures are applied "so as to afford protection to domestic production"
6.215. The United States does not address this issue in its rebuttal submission, but in its oral
statements argues that, with respect to this el ement of the case, the Appellate Body stated in Japan –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , the protective application of a tax can most often be discerned from
“the design, the architecture and the revealing st ructure of the measure,” which includes the very
magnitude of the dissimilar taxation.
6.216. The United States further argues that Korea has la rgely ignored this element of the analysis.
However, the Korean measures at issue do present a structure applied so as to afford protection to
domestic production. According to the United Stat es, the very large differentiation in tax rates
between imported and domestic products, on the basi s of a law that consists mainly of arbitrary
exclusions from the definition of Korea’s domestic product, soju, can only be considered protective.
Moreover, in contrast to the facts presented in the Japan case, the protection of soju in Korea can be
equated even more directly with the protection of a domestic industry. In Japan, there were
significant imports of soju from Korea (which the panel in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II
found were the same product as shochu), but in Kor ea, there have been only negligible imports of
soju -- or shochu -- from any other country.
6.217. The United States further notes that Korea makes the claim that soju cannot be considered
“domestic” production at all, because its raw materi al is often imported. According to the United
States, this assertion ignores Korea’s own legal st ructures, however. It is true that the main
ingredient for soju is ethyl alcohol, 70% of which is imported. But, unlike whisky, ethyl alcohol is a
raw material that can be used for a variety of e nd products. Ethyl alcohol is classified separately
under HS heading 2207, and the process of manufactu ring soju results in a substantial transformation
of that raw material, while any imported soju is classified under HS heading 2208. Whisky, whether
bottled or in bulk, is classified under HS heading 2208. Thus, it is plain that soju is a domestic
product, while whisky is exclusively imported.
6.218. Finally, according to the United States, Korea’s invocation of progressive social policies as a
pretext for this discrimination is unrelated to the st ructure of its law, which is drawn on the basis of
arbitrary physical characteristics and not on price of the product. While Korea may have a social
policy objective of imposing lower internal taxes on inexpensive products purchased by lower income
consumers, Article III does not permit Members to dr aw artificial product categories for tax purposes
so as to discriminate against imports and protect domestic production. According to the United
States, the same or similar arguments by Japan have been rejected in two panel proceedings.

C. KOREA
1. The Nielsen Study
6.219. Korea states at the outset that in order to re but assertions of the complainants in the Dodwell
Study and elsewhere in their submissions, it h as commissioned another study, carried out by the
company A.C. Nielsen (Nielsen study).
246
6.220. Korea states that the Nielsen study concluded that while all Korean restaurants, Chinese
restaurants and mobile street vendors sell standard soju, most cafés/western style restaurants and bars
sell whisky. The study also found that 29.3% of the respondents consumed alcoholic beverages at
home with their meals, while 81% were found to have consumed such beverages with meals at
restaurants. The study claims that diluted soju was the alcoholic beverage predominantly consumed
with meals. Drinking diluted soju with meals was most popular at Korean restaurants (73%),
followed by Japanese restaurants (18% ). According to the study, of the seven beverages offered to
the respondents, none were consumed with meals at cafés/western styl e restaurants, bars and hotel
bars. Finally, the survey found that soju is predominantly consumed straight (98.6%), while whisky is
usually consumed "on the rocks" (with ice) (63.8%).
6.221. In Korea's view, therefore, the Nielsen study substantiates its argument that there is no
demand substitutability between soju and the western-type drinks at hand in the Korean market.
2. General comments
6.222. Korea argued in its first submission and continues to maintain that a violation of Article III:2
cannot be made in the abstract. According to Kor ea, in order to begin to prove the existence of a
violation, the complainants must show that there is a ‘like’ or directly competitive or substitutable
relationship between specific products in a specifi c market. The decision as to whether two products
have such a relationship is based upon an overall appreciation of many factors, such as their physical
similarities, their end uses, price, and consumers’ tastes and habits. Two products may be similar to
some degree in some ways, and different to some degree in other ways.
6.223. Korea claims that the complainants have prefer red to discuss each relevant criterion in the
abstract and for all the products at once. Taking each criteria separately allowed them to make
generalisations about all the produc ts without addressing the specific arguments that Korea raised for
each individual product. In Korea's view, as a result of that approach, the complainants do not
provide a total view of the relationship between any particular product pair.
6.224. According to Korea, the effect of this approach is three-fold. First, it allows the complainants
to gloss over or ignore differences between products . Second, it allows them to highlight and
exaggerate the importance of exceptional cases. Third, through this approach they make it more
difficult for the Panel to have a clear overall view of any one product pair.
6.225. Korea also asserts that what the complainants lack in evidence and argument, they try to make
up for by allusions to Korea's past, its alleged protec tive measures, its lack of imports etc. According
to Korea, its past as a developing country is not at issue in this case. What is at issue is Korea's
market today. Korea refers to a neutral study funded by the EC Commission which observed that:

246 Korea claims that unlike the D odwell Study, the Nielsen Study ha s focused on factual evidence
rather than speculation. Rather than asking respondents ‘what would you do?’, it has asked them ‘what do you
do?’

The Korea market is no longer a market protect ed by the Government with market shares
contested by local producers. In fact, it is becoming a truly global market, where
multinational companies convene to compete with one another for the lucrative and promising
Korean market.
247
3. Generalisations about the Korean products
6.226. Korea notes that consistent with their contenti on that all distilled spirits are the same, the
complainants also refuse to recognise differences in the Korean spirits at issue in this case, claiming
that ‘soju’, whether it be standard or distilled, is one product.
6.227. Korea has insisted from the beginning that standard soju and distilled soju are too different for
these two products to be lumped together. Korea seeks to show that in trying to rebut this fact, the
complainants first draw support from the fact that st andard soju and distilled so ju share, in part, the
same name. According to Korea, the similarity in the names of standard soju and distilled soju is
meaningless (for example, one would not consider ‘b eer’ and ‘root beer’ to be ‘like’ or directly
competitive or substitutable on the basis of their names).
6.228. Korea further notes that the complainants then go on to argue that the physical differences
between standard soju and distilled soju are insi gnificant. However, those physical differences are
obviously enough to affect consumer behaviour, as st andard soju and distilled soju do not compete,
indeed do not have the same end uses, and are sold at vastly different prices. The complainants have
not been able to counter those arguments. In additio n, it should be noted that the distinction between
standard soju and distilled soju existed prior to th is case, that these two products fall into different tax
brackets,248 and that despite the EC’s statements to the contrary, distilled soju is not exempt from tax.
6.229. Korea states that another point made by the complainants is that the difference between
distilled and standard soju is really not important because, " they can be, and are, often blended with
each other."249 The complainants then point out that whis ky is often blended too. Korea points out
that the complainants again offer no proof whatsoev er for their allegation th at distilled and standard
soju are often blended. Accordingly, this exampl e of the reference to whisky is irrelevant to a
comparison between standard and distilled soju.
6.230. Korea refers to what it calls another ast onishing, assertion of the complainants that, ‘swift
transition’ occurred in the mid 1970s from distilled to standard soju, which and ‘was possible only
because, in the eyes of Korean consumers, the two varieties of soju are the same product’ 250 Korea
recalls that standard soju was introduced in 1962 b ecause, due to food shortages, distilled soju made
of rice could no longer be produced . Production of distilled soju only started again in 1991. If a swift
transition from one product to another following food shortages is an indication of a close relationship
between them, Korea recalls that Parisians also made a ‘ swift transition ’ from eating beef meat to
eating rat meat during the Fall of Pari s in the 1870s, due to a food shortage. 251 According to Korea,
peoples’ behaviour in times of food shortage says very little about which pr oducts consumers would
consider substitutes in normal circumstances.

247 See Sofres Report, Introduction.
248 According to Korea, while the US notes that standard soju and distilled soju have the same rate of
Education Tax (10%), they fail to mention that the liquor tax on distilled soju is 50%, while the liquor tax on
standard soju is 35%. Another mistaken attempt at trivialising the distinctions between distilled and standard
soju is the EC’s assertion that the distinction in the tax law was introduced only in 1991 (see EC written rebuttal,
at para. 34), supposedly in response to pressure from the EC. In fact, the distinction was already made in 1962.
249 See EC written rebuttal, at para. 38.
250 See EC written rebuttal, at para. 35.
251 See Horne, Alistar, The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870-71, London 1965.

6.231. Korea states that the complain ants argue that the only reason Korea wants to distinguish
between standard soju and distilled soju is because it wants to ‘sacrif ice’ distilled soju, which makes
up 0.2% of the ‘soju market’ in order to ‘spare’ standard soju. According to Korea, it has no intention
of sacrificing distilled soju. While distilled soju differs from the imported beverages in different ways
than standard soju, it still differs from them too greatly to be ‘like’ or directly competitive or
substitutable for those products.
6.232. Korea further argues that this allegation that Ko rea is willing to ‘sacrifice’ distilled soju to
‘spare’ standard soju is characteristic of another facet of the complainants’ approach to this case. In
Korea's words, where it suits them, the complainants trade their inverted telescope for a microscope,
‘zooming in’ on exceptional cases that seem to support their argument. In the same way that looking
at the situation from a great distance obscures the real ity, zooming in too closely also means that your
view is distorted.
6.233. Korea notes that the complainants allege that Korea is willing to ‘sacrifice’ distilled soju
because it only represents 0.2% of the ‘soju market’. What this highlights is the fact that the
complainants are asking the Panel to do the oppos ite: they would like to use examples drawn from
this 0.2% in order to prove a point about the other 99.8% of 'soju' sold in Korea, which is standard
soju. For example, the complainants want the Panel to ignore the substantial price differences between
standard soju and the western-style liquors at issue in this case, on the basis of the high prices of that
0.2%.
4. Actual (or potential) competition
6.234. Looking carefully at the evidence and arguments that the complainant have presented, Korea
submits that the arguments are misleading, flawed, or insufficient to meet the complainants’ burden of
proof. According to Korea, therefore, the complain ants have not established that there is a direct
competitive or substitutable relationship, actual or potential, between soju and the imported distilled
spirits that are within the scope of this dispute.
(a) Physical differences
6.235. Korea points out that there are important physical differences between the products at issue.
These differences have an impact on consumer pref erences and hence on the competitive relationship
between the products. According to Korea, the co mplainants have attempted to trivialise those
differences by looking at the products from a great distance, such that they can say that all the
products have ‘essentially the same characteristics’. In Korea's view, however, even a slight physical
difference might be enough to render two products not competitive. For example, if a consumer does
not like the taste of one particular additive, its add ition to a product will eliminate that consumer as a
potential buyer -- even if that additive does little to change the appearance or chemical composition
of the product.
6.236. Korea also points out that the complainants disp lay ignorance of the very real possibility that
two products that are ostensibly similar might not compete. For exampl e, Korea cites the US
argument that ‘under Korea’s theory, different flavours of soft drinks such as Coca-Cola and Fanta do
not compete, but it is doubtful that anyone familiar with the market would agree.’
Korea disagrees
with this. According to Korea, the director ate of the European Commission responsible for
competition law matters has more than once draw n a distinction between cola-flavoured carbonated
soft drinks and other types of soft drinks, deciding in the recent Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages
merger that the relevant market was the market for cola-flavoured carbonated soft drinks, explicitly

excluding other flavours of carbonated soft drinks.
252 National competition authorities have come to
the same conclusion.253
6.237. Korea argues that, the European Communities, in its discussion of physical differences, tries
to take consideration back to the moment of distillation, at which point, it argues, 'all spirits are nearly
identical' because ‘all of them are concentrated fo rms of alcohol.’ Korea argues that firstly, the
principal test for whether products compete is the marketplace. Spirits are not sold at the point of
distillation. Moreover, the difference in physical characteristics, starting with a difference in raw
materials, is not negated by distillation. In a ddition, there are important post-distillation processes
that also have an impact on the physical characte ristics of products. Brown spirits, for instance, are
generally matured in wooden casks and derive thei r flavour from this process, and from the original
distilled ingredients.
6.238. According to Korea, the analysis at the point of distillation is meaningless as the subsequent
addition of additives or ingredients can, and in the liquors discussed here, does, make a crucial
difference for consumers when they choose a partic ular liquor in a particular market, such as the
Korean market. Korea concludes, therefore, that although all spirits may be ‘nearly identical’ at the
point of distillation, the most casual observation cl early shows that does not mean that drinkers are
indifferent between them.
6.239. According to Korea, if physical characteristic s at the point of distillation were meaningful,
that would lead to the conclusion that products as disparate as fuel or pharmaceutical products are also
directly competitive and substitutable with, for example, vodka.254
6.240. Korea also asserts that the complainants try to use evidence about production process to make
up for the essential evidence about ma rkets that is missing from their presentations. According to
Korea, no evidence offered by the complainants shows that ‘distilled spirits’ is a group that is relevant
to consumer choice in the Korean market. Korea ask s: Why is ‘distilled spirits’ such a group rather
than ‘brown distilled spirits’ or, ‘white distilled spirits’? Why not ‘alcoholic beverages’ – spirits, wine
and beer? Why not ‘cold drinks’, alcoholic or not?
6.241. In Korea's view, any one of these might be a gr ouping relevant to consumption – or might not
be. Whether it is or not depends on the tastes and pref erences of consumers. According to Korea, the
effects of a failure to adequately research re lations between products in consumption cannot be
escaped by reference to modes of production. In pa rticular, it cannot be demonstrated that distilled
spirits is a relevant grouping for consumers on the basis that ‘having essentially the same
characteristics, soju and other distilled spirits and liqueurs are objectively apt to serve the same end
uses’.
6.242. According to Korea, a member of a group of pr oducts that are related in consumption need
not be a substitute for all other members of the group – just for some other members of the group.
Korea states that a high-end Ferrari and a low-end Renault Clio are both motor cars, and could be seen
by a person of sufficiently limited imagination as ‘having essentially the same characteristics’ (four
wheels, one engine, steering wheel) and to be ‘objec tively apt to serve the same end uses’. The fact
that both are motor cars, though, is not enough to allow deduction of elasticity of substitution between

252 Korea cites Commission Decision of 22 January 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible
with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No IV/M. 794 Coca-
Cola/Amalgamated Beverages, 1997 OJ L 218, p. 15.
253 Korea cites for example Decision no 96-D-67 of the French Conseil de la Concurrence (Competition
Council) of 29 October 1996, Coca Cola Beverages.
254 Korea alleges that the EC stated during its oral statement (p.12) that: neutral spirits are a raw
material which can be used to produce a variety of alcoholic beverages, including for example vodka and gin, as
well as other products, such as fuel or pharmaceutical products.

them. Indeed, in the case of Ferraris and Clios, it seems very likely that the elasticity in substitution
between the two products is nil: that if the price of Clios changes by 1 per cent (or 10 percent or 100
per cent), the effect on demand for Ferraris will be zero.
6.243. Likewise, according to Korea, given the notable differences between st andard soju and the
western-style liquors there is no reason to assume that there would be elasticity of substitution
between them. The complainants need to show this, but have failed to do so.
6.244. Korea also claims refers to the EC claim th at ‘according to Korea, the main difference
between soju and gin is that gin is flavoured with juniper berries.’ According to Korea it is true that
Korea argued that juniper imparts a very particular flavour to gin that some consumers do not like.
However, this was one of many differences, not l east differences in price and end use, that Korea
pointed out with respect of gin.
6.245. Korea notes, furthermore, that in interpreting th e term 'substitutable', the United States, rather
than proving that for Korean consumers a western-style liquor like whisky is directly
255 substitutable
for standard soju, despite the very considerable pr ice difference, cites the example of bottled water
and tap water, two products that ostensibly have similar physical characteristics and similar end-uses.
6.246. According to Korea, products that conceivably can be substituted for each other yield a very
broad field. Korea states for example, that on e could say that woollen sweaters and coal can be
substituted for each other. If you are cold, you could e ither put on a sweater or throw another lump of
coal on the fire. Washing machines and socks coul d be substitutable. The easier and cheaper the
availability of laundry facilities, the fewer socks a person needs in order to have a constant clean
supply. With this view of substitutability, baby carriages and wheelbarrows could be substitutable!
(b) Price
6.247. According to Korea, on the basi s of the facts provided in the complainants’ Dodwell Study, it
is apparent that there is a huge discrepancy in the pr e-tax prices of the products at issue. Korea states
that taking whisky and standard soju as an example, the Dodwell Study data shows that the ratio of
their prices varies from 6.3 to 12 times, with no overl ap in price at all. Furthermore, according to
Korea, the weighted average figures that Korea provide d in its first submission showed that whisky is
on average 11 times more expensive than standard soju. 256 Large pre-tax price differences are shown
for all the imported liquors at issue. This casts serious doubts on the existence of a directly
competitive and substitutable relationship between these products, and highlights an important
difference between this case and Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II .
6.248. Korea points out that there are enormous pre-tax price differences. Based on the figures
provided by the Dodwell study, Korea found the following pre-tax price differences:
 Standard soju v. whisky(premium) ratio of 1 to 12
 whisky(North American) ratio of 1 to 10.8
 whisky(standard scotch) ratio of 1 to 7.2
 whisky(bottled in Korea) ratio of 1 to 6.3
 brandy/cognac ratio of 1 to 19.2
 vodka ratio of 1 to 5.7
 gin ratio of 1 to 5
 rum ratio of 1 to 6.2

255 Korea maintains that the United States, the European Communities and Korea are in agreement that
the word 'directly' applies to both 'competitive' as well as to 'substitutable.
256 Korea refers to Attachment 5 to Korea’s first submission.

6.249. Korea indicates that the Dodwell study data shows that the ratio of price difference varies
from 6.3 to 12 times with no overlap in price at all. Furthermore, according to Korea, the weighted
average prices showed that whisky is 11 times more expensive than standard soju. In response to the
European Communities ’ claim that weighted average prices are “meaningless,” Korea states that a
weighted average price is an accepted means of gett ing a typical price for a product. Large pre-tax
price differences are shown for all the imported liquo rs at issue. This casts serious doubts on the
existence of a directly competitive and substitu table relationship between these products, and
highlights an important difference between this case and Japan— Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II.
6.250. Korea considers that pre-tax price differences of this magnitude must be taken into account in
discussing whether it can reasonably be argued that any of these products are “like” or directly
competitive or substitutable. Korea argues that thes e price differences refute any argument that it was
taxes that have “frozen” consumer preferences. Furthermore, argues Korea, as to directly competitive
or substitutable products, it must be addressed whethe r, in the face of these price differences prior to
the application of tax, the tax differentials at issue in this case can be said to “afford protection” to
domestic production.
6.251. Korea argues that the complainants have been unable to provide a response to the proposition
that large pre-tax price differential leads to the absence of a directly competitive or substitutable
relationship. Rather than addressing the price discr epancy between standard soju and the imported
liquors head on, the complainants attempt to divert the Panel’s attention to premium diluted soju,
which is the somewhat more expensive variety, representing some 5% of total diluted soju volume.
6.252. Korea refers to the EC argument that using pre-tax prices for the purposes of comparison does
not remove the "distortive effect from the disputed taxes", because the tax has kept low-priced imports
from entering the market. Korea remind s the parties that, unlike Japan, it has ad valorem taxes. In
Korea's view, while it might be argued that a high specific tax would keep low-cost products out of
the market, an ad valorem tax is just that – it is linked to the price of the product, and therefore, the
lower the price, the lower the tax amount.
6.253. Korea states that in determining whethe r two products are directly competitive or
substitutable products, price cannot be excluded. In Korea's view, it is obvious that when one product
is many times more expensive than another, it is difficult to argue that those two products are in
competition. Korea notes that the US and EC co mpetition authorities consider price as one of the
most relevant factors.
257 Korea also recalls that during the Panel meetings, the EC representative
stated that competition law analysis was relevant to an analysis of Article III:2.
6.254. Korea draws attention to the importance of the reasoning in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, wherein it was stated that:
the extent to which two products are co mpetitive in economics is measured by the
responsiveness of the demand for one product to the change in the demand for the other
product (cross-price elasticity of demand). Th e more sensitive demand for one product is to
changes in the price of the other product, all other things being equal, the more directly
competitive they are.258

257 Korea notes that in its written rebuttal the EC stat es that only consumers' responses to changes in
relative prices are relevant and not absolute price differ ences). In competition law, price is one of the assessed
criteria to determine whether there is competition between products. In such an analysis, prices are assessed
both in nominal and relative terms (see Commission Decision of 22 July 1992, Case No. IV/M 190 Nestle
Perrier, OJ L 356, p.1). In Korea's view, the difference in nominal terms is of such a degree that it renders
improbable any change in the consumers' responses resulting from relative price changes.
258 Panel report, para. 6.31.

6.255. Korea argues that common sense tells us that the larger the price differences between two
products, the less influence a change in the price of one will have on the demand for the other. In
Korea's view, the complainants have not been able to overcome this common sense presumption.
6.256. According to Korea, the price difference betwee n premium diluted soju and standard diluted
soju is far less important than the price differen ce between standard diluted soju and western-style
spirits. Korea claims that premiu m diluted soju is, on average, less than 80% more expensive than
standard diluted soju,
259 and the difference in price reflects th e other very small differences between
premium and standard diluted soju.
6.257. Korea also refers to an assertion by the Eur opean Communities, which in Korea's view is
unfounded: ‘western-style spirits are more expensive, to a large extent as a result of discriminatory
taxation. If western-style spirits were taxed as soju, they would be less expensive and Korean
consumers could afford to drink them with meals more often.’ Korea's argument is that western-style
spirits are indeed more expensive, but the rest of this statement does not follow.
6.258. Korea points out that using the Dodwell data provided by the EC, the pre-tax price differences
between these beverages is great. These price differe nces would thus be maintained if tax rates were
harmonised, and they are too great for it to follo w that consumers would suddenly find imported
alcoholic beverages an affordable alternative to diluted soju for meal-use, even disregarding the
matter of taste. According to Ko rea, even the European Communities cannot think that its evidence
shows that the addition of a few hundred won to the price of a bottle of diluted soju will have any
substantial effect on demand for, for example, whisky.
6.259. Korea also states that another unfounded allegati on appeared in the EC oral statement, where
it stated that:
"Tax and tariff changes were followed by a substantial reduction of prices and a
considerable increase in the sales of whis ky. This increase took place at the expense
of soju. Whereas the market share of soju fell from 96 per cent in 1992 to 94 per cent
in 1996, during the same period, whisky in creased by a similar percentage from 1.5
per cent to 3 per cent. Soju's declini ng market share in an expending market
evidences that soju and whisky are in direct competition".260
6.260. Korea states that it is probably true that if the price of whisky falls, the volume of whisky
purchased will increase. According to Korea, that the quantity of whis ky purchased is responsive to
the price of whisky, does not, however, further the EC and US case. According to Korea, they need
to show that this increase was at the expense of so ju – that the demand for soju is responsive to the
price of whisky.
6.261. Korea argues that if whisky sales increase at a greater percentage rate than soju sales, the
share of whisky in the hypothetical 'soju-whisky market' will rise, and that of soju will fall. In Korea's
view, that is entirely consistent with sales of soju rising at the same rate both before and after the
increase in the share of whisky. The increase in whisky market share and the fall in soju market share
says nothing about whether whisky grew at the expense of soju.
6.262. According to Korea, the point can be underlined by taking two goods that most people will
accept to be unrelated – say whisky and floor polish – and aggregating them into an artificial market.

259 As appears from Korea's answer to question 5 of the second set of questions from the Panel, the
weighted average price of standard diluted soju (excluding premium soju) is 306.58 won, while the weighted
average price of premium diluted soju alone is 539.70 won.
260 See EC oral statement, p. 6.

In that ‘market’, the share of whisky might rise: whisky sales might grow at a higher percentage rate
than sales of floor polish. But this does not prove or even suggest that whisky sales have grown at the
expense of floor polish sales. Indeed, since the two products are, ex hypothesi, unrelated, it is clear
that they have not.
6.263. In Korea's view, this ‘proof’ that whisky has grown at the expense of floor polish is in no way
different from the ‘proof’ offered by the European Communities and the United States that whisky has
grown at the expense of soju in the ‘whisky-soju market’. Whisky's gain of market share in the
‘whisky-soju market’ shows that sales of whisky have grown at a faster percentage rate than soju: it
shows no more and no less.
6.264. According to Korea, the arguments of the Eu ropean Communities and the United States that
market evolution in Korea supports their claim that whisky and soju are substitutes deserve no weight.
In Korea's view, sales in whisky have certainly in creased in Korea as its price fell, which is to be
expected. Korea argues that in itself that fact has no bearing on the case. What the European
Communities and the United States need to show is that the increase in sales of whisky was at the
expense of sales of soju, which in Korea's view, they have not done.
6.265. Korea argues that the complainants display an interesting approach to the alcoholic strength
of products. According to Korea, the complainan ts argue that a difference in alcoholic strength
should not be taken into account in certain instances (such as, it should not affect the determination of
whether products meet the strict ‘like’ product cr iteria). In Korea's view, the complainants only
analyze price in this way in a last-ditch attempt to deal with evidence that is very damaging to their
case. Korea further argues that the EC cannot bring itself to compare alcohol-adjusted prices of an
average standard soju price -- inst ead, it compares an atypical bottle of standard whisky to a bottle of
premium soju, and still comes out with a 2 to 3 times price difference.
6.266. Korea argues that the EC is focusing on excepti ons in describing the Korean market. When it
comes to the price of premium soju in this case, they take the most expensive premium soju brand
(Kimsatgat) as representative. The sales volume of such high-priced premium soju is minimal.
Korea further argues that he Eu ropean Communities takes inexpens ive whisky as an example, which
is atypical as well.
6.267. Korea also argues that the calculations of th e European Communities are misleading. When
taking the price per degree of alcohol based on we ighted averages, so as to obtain a representative
price, whisky is still 7.96 times the price of standa rd soju per degree of alcohol. Looking at premium
soju alone, whisky is 4.71 times the price of premium soju per degree of alcohol.
261 Again, these are
pre-tax prices.
6.268. Korea asserts that contrary to its contention in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , that
pre-tax prices were within a relatively short range , the European Communities now claims that there
were actually significant price differences in Japan, and submits figures that are supposed to show
this. According to Korea, the Eu ropean Communities even goes so far as to suggest that the Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages consciously disregarded substantial price differences.262
6.269. Korea observes that prices of western-style liquors and the Japanese shochus, once the tax is
removed, appear to be rather close, with a number of overlaps. 263 Furthermore, Korea notes that
Japan chose not to dispute the EC's contentions ab out prices and price competition. However, rather

261 Calculations based on data from the National Tax Administration.
263 See Annex 2 to EC written rebuttal.

than speculating about the evidence, and the argumen ts presented to the panel in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, Korea submits it is safer to recall the explicit finding by that panel:
(T)he Community argued that the retail prices of shochu and of the other distilled spirits and
liqueurs are within a relatively short range once the liquor taxes and the ad valorem taxes are
deducted. This, in the Community's view, confirms that all of them are, at least potentially,
competitive in terms of price.
264
6.270. Korea also notes that the Panel repeated the Community’s argument:
[t]hat, but for the discriminatory taxes imposed pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law, many
western-style liquors would be less expensive than shochu in real terms.265
6.271. According to Korea, one can only conclude th at the European Communities was describing
the facts in one way before the Jap anese liquor taxes Panel, and is now changing its story before this
Panel. In Korea's view, these two versions simply do not match. Korea asks how the European
Communities was able to say that pre-tax, prices of many western-style liquors would be less
expensive than Japanese shochu, and now say that pre-tax prices of western style liquors in Japan
were actually significantly higher than shochu?
6.272. Korea further argues that neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body in their legal findings
reflected on any significant price differences in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II . According
to Korea, it is clear from the evidence presented to th is panel that in Korea, after the removal of the
liquor taxes, none of the western-style liquors w ould become cheaper than Korean soju. On the
contrary, very substantial price differences would remain.
6.273. Korea maintains that, together with the other distinguishing factors such as end use (whisky is
not a meal drink, etc.) these price differences dem onstrate that there is no directly competitive or
substitutable relationship between the western-style drinks in dispute and standard soju.
(c) End use
6.274. Korea states that it has also shown in its subm ission that the end uses for diluted soju differ
greatly from those of the imported liquors at issue in this case. In particular, Korea states that it has
pointed out that the overwhelming use of diluted so ju is as an accompaniment to meals -- a use for
which the imported liquors are considered unsuitable and too expensive.
6.275. According to Korea, the complainants have not been able to provide an answer to this
argument. While the European Communities allege dly acknowledges that standard soju is ‘often
consumed with meals’, it argues that there are exceptions, such as sojubangs . However, meals are
served as well at sojubangs. In Korea's view, to th e extent that Koreans some times drink soju without
a meal, these are the exceptions that confirm the rule.
6.276. Korea notes that neither of the complainants has been able to demonstrate concretely that any
of the five western-style liquors in dispute are consumed with meals in Korea.
266
6.277. According to Korea, the European Communities closes its eyes to the existing differences in
end use, simply asserting that, in the case of vodka: ‘Vodka and soju are like products because they

264 Panel Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 4.82.
265 Ibid.
266 According to Korea, the EC has merely asserted that 'other spirits can be and sometimes are drunk
with meals', without providing examples and their relative importance (EC oral statement, p. 8).

have virtually the same physical characteristics and, therefore, serve for the same end uses.’
267 In
Korea's view, even if the EC assertions about ph ysical characteristics were true, the one does not
necessarily follow from the other, and the actual behaviour of customers belies the EC assertion.
6.278. Korea further argues that accordi ng to the United States, bottled water and tap water must be
directly substitutable within the meaning of Art. III.2 GATT, despite their large difference in price,
because they serve similar end uses. According to Ko rea, if one accepts that, one could start to argue
that price differences alone need not justify tax differences. That argument might seem to go against
Korea's case, although it must be recalled that Kore a's case not only relies on price differences, but
also on differences in physical characteristics (and taste), as well as differences in end use (meal drink
versus non-meal drinks).
6.279. According to Korea, consumers are not silly. If they are consistently willing to pay a much
higher price for one product, compared to a see mingly similar product, then small differences are
probably very important to them, and thus for th e market performance of these products. According
to Korea, the United States and the European Communities obviously have difficulties accepting that,
as a difference in market performance would block the application of Art. III.2.
6.280. Korea further argues that in some developing countries bottled water is safe, and tap water
may not be safe for tourists. For tourists, that ma kes quite a difference, and they will probably be
willing to pay a higher price for bottled water. Again, the US’s argument is flawed by its refusal to
look at market-specific situations. Korea asks wh ether Article III:2 GATT would prohibit developing
countries from charging a higher tax rate on bottled water than on their tap water?
6.281. Korea further argues that in developed countries as well, bottled water may in fact target an
entirely different group of consumers or have diffe rent end uses than tap water. Korea gives the
example that in Brussels parents are advised not to use tap water to prepare baby formula, as tap water
contains too many additives and residues. Parent s therefore use much more expensive and purer
bottled water. Further, according to Korea, in th e United States restaurants commonly serve pitchers
of tap water with meals. Nevertheless, quite a num ber of customers order bottled water, for reasons
such as health or taste. According to Korea, de spite their ostensible physical similarities and
capability for the same end use, these products are not substitutes at all in many countries and
markets. Korea asserts that it h as been able to ascertain that tap water and bottled water are taxed
differently, at least in the EC.268
6.282. Korea also notes the US argument that ‘end u se can differ between substitute or competing
products. For example, one would not use oranges in an apple pie . . . but these products do compete
for consumer spending on fruit purchases.’ 269 Korea notes the alleged US commitment to the idea that
consumers have a fixed budget for classes of ex penditure, for example, for fruit purchases and
distilled spirit purchases, and wonders, if this proposi tion is to be central to the US case, whether it is
going to provide any evidence in support of it.
6.283. According to Korea, even if that view of the world could be substantiated, the United States
in effect concedes, in the quotation above, that apples belong to two distinct budgetary items –
consumer spending on fresh fruit and consumer spendi ng on pie fillings. It also allegedly concedes
that oranges do not compete in the pie filling segment. In a country where the principal use for fruit is
making pies, therefore, substantial changes in the price of apples may have little or no impact on the

267 See EC oral statement, p. 3.
268 Korea states that in Belgium tap water is subject to a VAT of 6% while bottled water is subject to a
VAT of 21%.

demand for oranges. In Korea's view, this would be powerful evidence that in that particular country
apples and oranges are not directly competitive or substitutable.
6.284. In the present case, according to Korea, the end use for diluted soju with which imported
liquors do not compete, is far and away the most im portant use to which diluted soju is put: it is
typically consumed with meals, and the imported beverages are not.
270 In Korea's view, that major
difference in end use means that the products at i ssue in this case are neither ‘like’ nor directly
competitive or substitutable.
6.285. Korea adds that, rather than addressing Korea’s specific arguments about end uses, the United
States tries to divert the discussion back into ge neralities, saying ‘distilled spirits around the world are
used for socialisation, relaxation and celebration.’ The standard that the US sets for itself is much too
low. There are innumerable types of foods and dr inks that could be said to serve these general
purposes. However, that does not mean that all of those things are ‘like’ or directly competitive or
substitutable.
6.286. Korea notes that both complainants attribute the argument to Korea that in order to be directly
competitive or substitutable, products would have to share 'all' possible economic uses. According to
Korea, that is not what Korea h as been saying, but it has been refe rring to the most important end use
of each liquor. In Korea's view, it has observed that the most important end use of standard soju is
different from the most important end use of western-style liquors.
6.287. Korea reiterates that standard soju is typically a ‘meal’ drink, while the western-style liquors
at issue in this case are not drunk with meals, but rather in room salons and other high-class bars
where standard soju is not even on offer.
6.288. Korea notes that the European Communities admits that ‘soju is more often consumed with
every-day meals than western-style spirits’, but it ar gues that this is so ‘simply because western-style
spirits are more expensive’.271 According to Korea, the Europ ean Communities would like this Panel
to believe that if taxes were harmonised, Koreans w ould start drinking western-style spirits with their
meals, in spite of the fact that, whisky, for example, would still be on average 11 times more
expensive than standard soju. Korea disagrees, especia lly in light of the fact that regardless of price,
Koreans do not consider whisky to be appropriate to drink while eating.
6.289. Korea argues that, those facts being uncontested, the European Communities has then tried to
say that Korea has been exaggerating, and alleges th at Korea has claimed that soju is 'always' drunk
with meals. Korea denies claiming that, but has stat ed that the bulk of standard soju is drunk with
meals, which is its most important end use. Ko rea further alleges that the European Communities
claims that sojubangs are one of the most typical places for drinking soju, and supposedly a place
where meals are not served. In f act, according to Korea, sojubangs are an exceptional outlet and they
do serve meals. This contrasts with the end use of western-style liquors which are hardly, if ever,
drunk with meals. According to Korea, the Nielse n study which Korea attached to its written rebuttal
bears this out.
6.290. According to Korea, the complainants have not provided any evidence to dispel this important
difference in end use. One point they have made much of is that some respondents to Nielsen said that
they drank whisky with their meals. That was a ve ry small percentage indeed, and could also be a
human error. The complainants are focusing on exceptions again. The ordinary fact of life is that very
few, if any, Koreans would buy whisky to drink wi th their meals at home. They receive whisky as a
gift, and enjoy this on a special occasion that is usually not a meal.

270 According to Korea, this is shown by the Nielsen study.

6.291. Korea states that soju is not suited to penetr ate the establishments where western-style liquors
are sold. The main characteristic of soju is that it is an inexpensive meal drink. Barring exceptions,
you would not expect to find such a drink in bars . This was borne out by the Nielsen study, which
Korea submitted. In Korea's view, the complainan ts have submitted no evidence to contradict this.
The Hankook study, which they submitted earlier on the distribution patterns of liquors only refers to
whisky, and ignores soju.
272
6.292. Korea further argues that western-style liquors are not, or very rarely, found in Korean
restaurants, mobile street vendors and Chinese restaurants. These establishments always serve
standard soju. Western style liquors are found more of ten, though not always, in Japanese restaurants
(presumably as a before or after meal drink, as cust omers reported that they do not drink whisky with
Japanese meals). Japanese restaurant s always serve soju. Again, there is a notable difference in
distribution.273 Korea notes that the EC Hankook Study does not even mention restaurants.
6.293. Korea notes the recent visits of US Embassy pers onnel to Korean restaurants. According to
Korea, they are nine of the most expensive restaura nts in Seoul. The fact that Embassy officials visit
these restaurants explains, Korea su spects, why they had whisky in stock. It really says very little
about the drinking behaviour of the vast mass of the Korean population.
(d) Places of sale and consumption
6.294. One of Korea’s arguments that standard and distilled soju do not compete with imported
liquors has been that diluted soju and distilled soju are not even available in many of the outlets in
which imported liquors are consumed, notably, in room salons and other high class bars. In order to
provide the Panel with support for that proposition, Korea commissioned the Nielsen study. This
study surveyed room salons, night clubs and danl anjujums, asking which alcoholic beverages they
offered. According to Korea, in this survey, 96.7% responded that they sell whisky, while 0%
responded that they offered diluted soju.
6.295. Korea argues that, contrary to what the Eur opean Communities seems to suggest, Korea has
not argued that whisky has not ‘gained considerable distribution penetration’. Korea’s point is rather
that diluted soju and the western-spirits are not available in the same outlets, an important indicator of
a difference in end use and lack of competition. According to Korea, its emphasis has been in
particular on the fact that standard soju does not penetrate the establishments where the western-style
liquors are available.
6.296. Korea also states that it does not find persu asive the US exhibit showing, for example,
Seagram Extra Dry Gin and Alexander vodka next to Korean premium soju in a convenience store. 274
According to Korea, the same photograph shows that Gillette shaving foam is also displayed next to
these alcoholic beverages. Korea's argument is that convenience stores are pressed for shelf space.
The fact that two items are displayed next to each other would hardly be compelling evidence of a
competitive relationship in any context, but in the context of a small Korean convenience store, is
truly devoid of meaning.
(e) Consumer spending "categories"
6.297. Korea also claims that instead of the classic more detailed analysis outlined above, the United
States suggests that the Panel only needs to "consider whether the products in question compete for
consumer spending on a category of goods ." Korea further claims that the United States asserts that

272 See EC Annex 10.
273 According to Korea, these are the findings of the AC Nielsen study.
274 US Exhibit G.

"consumers in Korea, like anywhere else, budge t their spending on alcoholic beverages, and
subsequently spend that budget according to taste, prices and social occasions." Korea believes that
the United States is confusing a model of reality with reality. According to Korea, academic
researchers may find it interesting to hypothesize that consumers act as if they first decide how much
to spend on a category of goods, and then on how that amount will be divided between the goods
within the category. That academic researchers ma y find it interesting to hypothesise, however, is
very far from saying that this is how consumers have been shown to behave ‘in Korea, as elsewhere’.
6.298. According to Korea, the more important point is that the notion of a category of goods begs
the central question in this proceeding. Korea asks how the United States knows what categories are
relevant for actual consumers – in particular, for Korean consumers? In Korea's view, it presents no
evidence to underpin its conjectures. Korea adds that the United States itself seems unsure of what
the relevant category is. Korea notes that some times the United States says that it is ‘alcoholic
beverages', but at other points it is ‘alcoholic spir its.’ According to Kor ea, `alcoholic beverages’,
which includes wine and beer, is very different, especially in Korea, from ‘alcoholic spirits’.
(f) Future competition
6.299. Korea also states that the complainants suggest that the market is developing so that the
imported beverages and standard soju and di stilled soju might compete in the future.
275 Korea
considers this assertion to be speculative, at best . If the pre-tax price differences remain the same,
there is no reason to assume that future consumers will consider them to be direct substitutes.
6.300. Korea notes the US argument that, Korea’s population is changing and becoming more
‘internationally-oriented’ and it may be that in th e future the market for imported beverages will
grow. In Korea's view, however, the idea that Koreans may wish to drink more whisky does not mean
that they will abandon standard soju as the drink to accompany their meals. The growth, for example,
of the whisky market could be completely independent of the standard soju market.
6.301. Korea claims that this was ob served by the EC Guide on exports of alcoholic beverages to
Korea:
"Soju in particular remains virtually unaffected by imported alcoholic drinks.
Furthermore, soju is insulated from ec onomic downturns and maintains a loyal
following of steady consumers".
276
6.302. Korea argues that if in the future, the market does develop such that standard and distilled
soju and the imported liquors compete, then the complainants are free to resort again to WTO
proceedings. However, at the present time, the products are not competing, and that lack of
competition has not been shown to be tax-related.
5. Broad or narrow interpretation of products in dispute
6.303. Korea notes the EC argument that the GATT drafte rs aimed to provide stricter rules with
respect to internal tax measures (Article III:2) than with respect to other internal regulations (Article
III:4), rather than the opposite which is supposedly argued by Korea.
6.304. Korea further notes the EC argument that by in cluding directly competitive or substitutable in
Article III:2, the drafters intended to create strict er rules for tax discrimination than for internal

275 See for example, the EC oral statement at p. 5 and the US oral statement at para. 19 et. seq.
276 Korea cites the Sofres report, p. 22.

regulation. If not, they would have limited themselves to ‘like products’ just as in Article III:4. Korea
submits that this is as yet undecided.
6.305. Korea points out that firstly, in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , the Panel said that the
coverage of Article III:2 might or might not be identical to that of Article III:4.
277 In Korea's view,
therefore, it is not clear, as the European Comm unities claims, that the GATT drafters aimed to
provide stricter rules with respect to internal tax measures than with respect to other internal
regulations.
6.306. According to Korea, however that may be, it does not alter the fact that Article III:2 treads
heavily upon national sovereignty. Korea re fers to the Appellate Body's statement in Japan - Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages , that ’the members of the WTO have made a bargain’. 278 In Korea's view,
that bargain implies limitations on the sovereignty of the Member in exchange for benefits which they
expect to derive as a Member of the WTO.
6.307. Korea argues that in this context, WTO Memb ers agreed that Article III:2 prohibits tax
discrimination on ‘like products’ and on directly co mpetitive or substitutable products. Thus, the
language of Article III:2 expresses the concessions that the WTO members were ready to make in this
regard. In Korea's view, every concession represents a limitation of the sovereignty of the members.
A broad interpretation of the expressed restriction could threaten the carefully negotiated balance
between the restriction and the benefit which the members expected from this restriction.
6. "So as to afford protection"
6.308. Korea notes the EC statement that Korea has dealt with the ‘so as to afford protection’ matter
in a ‘perfunctory’ manner.
279 According to Korea, while it is tr ue that Korea does not spend a great
deal of time on the ‘so as to afford protection’ facet of this case, this is mainly because Korea is so
convinced that there are no ‘like’ or directly co mpetitive or substitutable relationships in this case,
such that the ‘so as’ part of this case will never be reached.
6.309. However, Korea has also argues th at taxes in this case are not ‘so as to afford protection’ --
that the price differences in this case are too great for the tax to have afforded any protection to
domestic production, in particular the production of standard soju. Korea notes that according to the
European Communities, it is illogical to men tion these price differences here: if the products
concerned are found to be directly competitiv e or substitutable 'despite the pre-tax price
differentials',280 then these price differentials are not really meaningful. In Korea's view this is not a
very compelling point, coming from party which has been arguing that price differences are not
relevant to a directly competitive or substitutable fi nding, and that it is sufficient for the Panel to look
at physical characteristics only. Thus, according to Korea, if this Panel, despite the force of
precedent, followed the EC view on directly compet itive or substitutable, the absolute differences in
pre-tax prices would be an entirely separate issue to be addressed in connection with the 'so as to
afford protection' requirement.
6.310. Because the differences in price are so larg e, Korea contends that the additional price
difference that can be attributed to the tax woul d not have any effect on consumer behaviour, and
therefore could not afford protection to a domestic industry. Korea states that apart from its dubious
appeal to logic, the European Communities does not show how the liquor taxes can afford protection,

277 Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II , supra., para. 6.20. The Appellate Body
did not take a position on this issue.
278 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, supra., p. 15.

to standard soju in particular, given the consider able differences in pre-tax prices with western-style
liquors.
6.311. Korea notes that, in contrast, th e United States has recognised the pertinence of the price
differences to this third leg of Article III:2. Wh ile it also contests the relevance of Korea’s price-
based arguments to the determination of ‘like’ or directly competitive or substitutable relationships, it
argues that ‘differences in prices . . .[are] more appropriately considered in the third element of
analysis under Article III:2: whether the taxes are applied so as to afford protection to domestic
production.’
281 However, Korea notes that the US has not addressed the price differences cited by
Korea in connection with the 'so as to afford protection' requirement.
6.312. Accordingly to Korea, it is clear that the comp lainants have not carried their burden of proof
regarding this third requirement of Article III:2 either . They would have had to show that, despite the
much higher pre-tax prices of western-style liquor s, the tax differential had protected domestic
production of standard soju.
6.313. In respect of distilled soju Korea's defence has been different, as the pre-tax prices of distilled
soju are even higher than or in about the same ra nge as western-style liquors. However, according to
Korea, the sales of this traditional, artisanal pr oduct are minimal. The complainants have not shown
how the continued presence of this product, taxed at the current rate, would hurt them.
7. Comments of Korea to the EC Trendscope survey
6.314. Korea notes that at the second substantive mee ting of the Panel, the European Communities
submitted a new consumer survey which Korea had not seen before.
6.315. Korea submits that interpretation of this survey is not easy, and that the European
Communities, by presenting the survey so late in the proceedings, has deprived Korea of the
possibility of exploring these problems by questioning specific aspects of it before the Panel.
6.316. Korea claims that some of the "Key Findings of the Consumer survey" 282 strongly support
points made by Korea by showing, for example, th e considerable degree of specialization of Korean
outlets for these products. According to Korea, the Trendscope Survey shows that soju is almost
never consumed in hotel bars, western restaurants, ca fés, room salons and night clubs, but is the drink
of choice in Korean restaurants. The survey also allegedly backs up Korea's assertions that whisky is
almost never consumed in Korean, Japanese or Chinese restaurants.
6.317. Korea states that the survey also contains results that are inconsistent with Korea's
understanding of Korean drinking habits, and is puzzl ed that 66% of Trendscope respondents claim to
drink soju "without a meal" (though only 3% "without food"); and that 86% claim to drink whisky
"with food" (though only 7% "with a meal").
6.318. Korea also notes that only 34% of those surveyed by Trendscope responded that they drank
soju with their meal. According to Korea, th e respondents might have been thinking about meals
consumed at home, where according to the Nielsen study, 29.3% of the respondents consumed diluted
soju with their meal.
6.319. Korea argues that the Trendscope result is in consistent with Kore a's understanding of the
market as far as "on-premise" consumption is concerned. Korea refers to the Nielsen study, wherein it
was found that 73% of consumers drank diluted soju with their meals in Korean restaurants.

282 Trendscope survey, Charts entitled "Key Findings of Consumer Survey".

6.320. Korea further argues that, to interpret the Tre ndscope results properly, it is necessary to know
how respondents distinguished between "meal" and "food". According to Korea, the distinction
between "food" and "meal" is vague and dependent on context in Kor ean and English. Korea recalls
that in referring to the main end use of soju as meals, it has excluded snacks.
6.321. Korea maintains that western-style liquors like whisky are not normally drunk with meals (i.e.
lunch or dinner) whereas most soju is consumed with meals.
6.322. Korea also argues that another ambiguity arises from the Trendscope Survey's use of the term
"umsik" for "food". According to Korea, the usual meaning of "umsik" in Korean is "food and drink",
and as such "umsik" can be interpreted broadly to in clude drinks as well as snacks. In Korea's view,
this ambiguity would mean that respondents who, for example, eat peanuts with their whisky may
well have answered that they drink whisky "with food".
6.323. Korea asserts that there is also an ambiguity in the definition of "with meals". Korea poses
the question whether "with meal s" was necessarily interpreted by their respondents as eating
contemporaneously with drinking, or whether it w as interpreted more libera lly to include "before
dinner" and "after dinner" meals.
6.324. Korea points out that there is also an ambigui ty in the sense that it is unclear whether the
respondents, being faced with questions about food and meals at the same time, would have
considered the questions as mutually exclusive. In Korea's view, some respondents might have
thought that the questions about "food" were intended not to include "meals", while others might have
assumed that because meals are food, then soju which is usually consumed with meals is as of
necessity consumed with food too.
6.325. Korea submits that since the complainants have submitted this survey too late, it did not have
the opportunity to pursue the ambiguities with questions through the Panel. Korea adds that this late
submission of this survey also means that there is insufficient time to evaluate its evidentiary value,
and therefore, the panel should disregard it.
D. EC
 AND US COMMENTS ON THE NIELSEN STUDY
6.326. The complainants responded to this survey , which was commissioned at the instance of
Korea, by pointing out that there were several cat egories of overlapping end-uses. They state for
example, that all Japanese restaurants served soju and 40% of them served whisky; a further 6.7%
served brandy or cognac. According to the compla inants, of the responding Western-style restaurants
and cafés, 90% served whisky and a lesser number se rved other types of western-style beverages, and
21.7% served soju.
6.327. The complainants also note that while only 1.7% of the individual respondents drank whisky
at home with meals, only 29.3% of all respondents consumed any alcoholic beverages at home with
meals. In the complainants view, the proper co mparison was that between the 1.7% and the 29.3%,
thus leaving 5.8% of all respondents who consumed alcoholic beverages at home as drinkers of
whisky with their meals.
6.328. The complainants have also questioned some of the findings of the Nielsen study, arguing that
these results are actually indications of overlapping end-uses. The complainants note that there were
almost no western-style beverages in Korea until th e last five years following changes in the duty
rates on imported distilled beverages.
6.329. The complainants argue that alcoholic beverag es, like many foods and beverages, are habit
based products. In their view, people tend to purchase what they are used to and change their tastes

only over a period of time. They must become familiar with the taste of new products and will only
make minor substitutions for the familiar product at first and more significant changes will tend to
occur over a period of time until a fairly stable rate is achieved.
6.330. According to the complainants, the trends shown in the Nielsen study, as well as the
substitutability shown in the EC market survey (the Dodwell study), show unmistakable evidence of
the beginnings of substitutability and common end-use by imports.
6.331. The United States claims that the Nielsen study al so contradicts Korea’s emphasis that soju is
only drunk straight in alleged contrast to Wester n spirits. According to the United States, survey
respondents reported that in addition to being drunk straight, standard soju is consumed mixed with
cola, cider, juice or some other manner. The resu lts confirm that even if standard soju were
predominantly consumed straight by surv ey respondents, it was not consumed only straight.
Moreover, survey respondents were asked how th ey “normally” like to drink standard soju and
whisky, and they were limited to a single response, suggesting that the reporting of multiple styles of
consumption were avoided by the design of the question.
6.332. The United States further notes that the results of the Nielsen study also run counter to the
supposedly rigid styles of whiskey consumption Ko rea paints in its submissions and first oral
statement. For example, one-third of the survey res pondents reported preferring consuming whisky
straight and a smaller percentage indicated, simila r to standard soju, a preference for whisky mixed
with cola, cider, and juice. According to the United States, with a third of respondents preferring
their whisky straight, just as Korea claims standard soju is largely consumed, it is clear that whisky
and soju consumption styles overlap significantly.
6.333. The United States further claims that the Niel sen study also directly undermines Korea’s
assertion that soju is “never drunk mixed.” Ko rea says this assertion was based on “common
knowledge,”
283 but apparently such common knowledge may not be a reliable source of information.
Korea has insisted that the burden is for the compla ining parties to show its factual assertions to be
untrue. In our view, the Nielsen study’s direct contradiction of Korea’s so-called common knowledge
places doubt on all similar unsubstantiated assertions by Korea concerning consumption in its market.
6.334. The United States asserts that, in response to th e Korean Nielsen study, the U.S. Embassy in
Korea identified nine large traditional Korean restau rants in Seoul that serve traditional Korean food
based on the common knowledge among Embassy staff. U.S. embassy employees then asked whether
the establishments served whiskey an d whether they served soju. It turned out that every single one
of these nine restaurants serves both soju and whisky. 284 The United States does not claim to have
taken a representative market survey, but such a surv ey is not necessary for the point at hand. We are
simply saying that Korea’s depiction of stratifie d end uses in different restaurants in Korea is
contradicted by a simple tour of its capital city. These observations based on simple anecdotal
evidence stand in stark contrast to the Nielsen finding that no surveyed Korean style restaurants
served whisky and soju, whether in Seoul or elsewhere . This tends to confirm that the Nielsen study
selectively sampled the restaurants known to limit th e variety of spirits, representing an additional
bias in the sampling. Moreover, the Trendscope su rvey, which the EC has described in detail earlier,
further contradicts the Nielsen results by also show ing that whisky is consumed at venues such as
Korean restaurants where soju is the main item. Additionally, the Trendscope study shows that soju,
similar to whisky, is most often enjoyed without meals.
6.335. According to the United States, even if the Pa nel were to accept these contradictions and
biases, the Nielsen survey, highlighted by the EC, su rvey in fact lends credible support to the U.S.

283 Korean response to a U.S. Question.
284 US Exhibit S.

position in this case by indicating significant overl aps in usage between soju and Western spirits.
Again, given the recent removal of barriers to entr y, it is not expected that Western spirits will be
consumed in every venue and in equal proportions to the traditional Korean spirit of soju.
Nevertheless, the survey indicates whisky is consumed with meals, whisky is served in three out of
six types of restaurants surveyed (four out of seven if you include hotel bars), and whisky and soju are
both consumed straight, or mixed with cola, cider or juice.