INDONESIA – MEASURES RELATING TO RAW MATERIALS REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: Addendum
Date: 30 November 2022
Document codes: WT/DS592/R/Add.1; WT/DS592/R.
Complainant: EU
Respondent: Indonesia
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: GATT 1994  GATT 1994

INDONESIA – MEASURES RELATING TO RAW MATERIALS
REPORT OF THE PANEL
Addendum

This addendum contains Annexes A to C to the Report of the Panel to be found in document

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Business Confidential
Information 12
Annex A-3 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with
Remote Participation 15
Annex A-4 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with
Remote Participation 19
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 24
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia 34
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 49
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 52
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 56
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 59
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Republic of Korea 66
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 69
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Kingdom 71
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 73

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Business Confidential
Information 12
Annex A-3 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with Remote
Participation 15
Annex A-4 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with Remote
Participation 19

ANNEX A-1
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Adopted on 28 May 2021

General

1. (1) In this proceeding, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). In addition, the
following Working Procedures apply.
(2) The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures or adopt additional procedures
as necessary, after consultation with the parties.
Confidentiality

2. (1) In accordance with the DSU, the deliberations of the Panel shall be confidential, and the
documents submitted to it shall be treated as confidential and shall be made available to the
parties and, to the extent provided for in Article 10.3 of the DSU, to the third parties. Members
shall treat as confidential information that is submitted to the Panel which the submitting
Member has designated as confidential.
(2) In accordance with the DSU, nothing in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party
or third party from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.
(3) If a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall
also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential summary of the information
contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public. A party should endeavour
to promptly1 provide a non-confidential summary to any Member requesting it. The Panel may,
upon request, fix a time -limit within which the party should endeavour to provide such
summary.
(4) Upon request, the Panel may adopt appropriate additional procedures for the treatment
and handling of confidential information after consultation with the parties.
Submissions

3. (1) Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall
submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in
accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(2) Each party shall also submit to the Panel, before the second substantive meeting of the
Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(3) Each third party that chooses to make a written submission before the first substantive
meeting of the Panel with the parties shall do so in accordance with the timetable adopted by
the Panel.
(4) The Panel may invite the parties or third parties to make additional submissions during
the proceeding, including with respect to requests for preliminary rulings in accordance with
paragraph 4 below, and, if necessary for comments from the other party or third parties on
such additional submission.

1 Normally within 10 working days of the request.

Preliminary rulings

4. (1) If Indonesia considers that the Panel s hould make a ruling before the issuance of the
Report that certain measures or claims in the panel request or the complainant's first written
submission are not properly before the Panel, the following procedure applies. Exceptions to
this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
a. Indonesia shall submit any such request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible
opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. The
European Union shall submit its response to the request before the first substantive
meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request.
b. The Panel may issue a preliminary ruling on the issues raised in such a preliminary ruling
request before, during o r after the first substantive meeting, or the Panel may defer a
ruling on the issues raised by a preliminary ruling request until it issues its Report to the
parties.
c. If the Panel finds it appropriate to issue a preliminary ruling before the issuance of i ts
Report, the Panel may provide reasons for the ruling at the time that the ruling is made,
or subsequently in its Report.
d. Any request for such a preliminary ruling by the respondent before the first meeting, and
any subsequent submissions of the parties in relation thereto before the first meeting,
shall be served on all third parties. The Panel may provide all third parties with an
opportunity to provide comments on any such request, either in their submissions as
provided for in the timetable or separa tely. Any preliminary ruling issued by the Panel
before the first substantive meeting on whether certain measures or claims are properly
before the Panel shall be shared with all third parties.
(2) This procedure is without prejudice to the parties' right to request other types of
preliminary or procedural rulings during the proceeding, and to the procedures that the Panel
may follow with respect to such requests.
Evidence

5. (1) Each party shall submit all evidence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, or evidence
necessary for answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party.
Exceptions may be granted upon a showing of good cause.
(2) Parties seeking to provide additional evidence must make a showing of good cause. If
the new evidence is admitted, the Panel shall accord
6. (1) If the original language of an exhibit or portion thereof is not a WTO official working
language, the submitting party or third party shall simultaneously submit a translation of the
exhibit or relevant portion into the WTO official working language of the proceeding. The Panel
may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of exhibits upon a showing of
good cause.
(2) Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised as soon as possible
in writing, preferably no later than the next submission or meeting (whichever occurs earlier)
following the submission which contains the translation in que stion. Only upon a showing of
good cause may objections be raised at a later stage of the proceedings. Any objection shall
be accompanied by an explanation of the grounds for the objection and an alternative
translation.
7. (1) To facilitate the maintenanc e of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the
course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exhibit on its
cover page. Exhibits submitted by the European Union should be numbered EU -1, EU-2, etc.
Exhibits submitted by Indonesia should be numbered IDN-1, IDN-2, etc. If the last exhibit in

connection with the first submission was numbered EU -5, the first exhibit in connec tion with
the next submission thus would be numbered EU-6. If a party withdraws an exhibit or leaves
one or more exhibits intentionally blank, it should indicate this on the cover page that provides
the number of the blank exhibit.
(2) With each of its submissions, statements, and responses to questions attaching new
exhibits, a party shall provide an updated list of exhibits (in Word or Excel format).
(3) If a party submits a document that has already been submitted as an exhibit by the
other party, it should explain why it is submitting that document again, particularly if the
translation of that document differs from the one already provided (see paragraph 6(2)
above).
(4) If a party includes a hyperlink to the content of a website in a submission, and intends
that the cited content form part of the official record, the cited content of the website shall be
provided in the form of an exhibit along with the date that it was last accessed.
Editorial Guide
8. To facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its submissions
in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions (electronic copy provided).

Questions

9. The Panel may pose questions to the parties and third parties at any time, including:
a. Before any meeting, the Panel may send written questions, or a list of topics it intends
to pursue in questioning orally during a meeting. The Panel may ask different or additional
questions at the meeting.
b. The Panel may put questions to the parties and third parties orally during a meeting,
and in writing following the meeting, as provided for in paragraphs 15 and 21 below.
Substantive meetings2

10. The Panel shall meet in closed session.
11. The parties shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before
it.
12. (1) Each party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when
meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each party shall have the responsibility for all me mbers of its delegation and shall
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working
Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceeding and the
submissions of the parties and third parties.
13. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation no later than
5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) three working days before the first day of each meeting with the Panel.
14. A request for interpretation by any party should be made t o the Panel as early as possible,
preferably at the organizational stage, but no later than three weeks before the meeting, to allow
sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.

2 The deadlines for providing notice to the Panel in this section may be modified in the event of a virtual
hearing or in light of any sanitary protocols adopted for future access to the WTO premises.

15. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite the European Union to make an opening statement to present its
case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite Indonesia to present its point of view. Before
each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with
a provisional written version of its statement. If interpretation is needed, each party shall
provide additional copies for the interpreters before taking the floor.
b. Each party should avoid lengthy repetition of the arguments in its submissions. Each
party is invited to limit the duration of its opening statement to not more than 75 minutes. If
either party considers that it requires more time for its opening statement, it should inform
the Panel and the other party at least three working days before the meeting, together with
an estimate of the expected duration of its statement. The Panel will accord equal time to the
other party.
c. After the conclusion of the opening statements, the Panel shall g ive each party the
opportunity to make comments or ask the other party questions.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties.
e. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closi ng statement. The party that presented its opening statement first shall
present its closing statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel
and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its clos ing
statement, if available.
f. Following the meeting:
i. Each party shall submit a final written version of its opening statement and any
prepared closing statement no later than 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working
day following the meeting.
ii. Each party shall send in writing, within the timeframe establ ished in the timetable
adopted by the Panel or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting, any
questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iii. The Panel shall send in writing, within the timeframe established in the timetable
adopted by the Panel or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting, any
questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iv. Each party shall respond in writing to the questions from the Panel, and to any
questions posed by the other party, within the timeframe established in the timetable
adopted by the Panel or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting.
16. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted in the same
manner as the first substantive meeting with the Panel, except that Indonesia shall be given the
opportunity to present its opening statement first. The party that presented its opening statement
first shall present its closing statement first.
17. The Panel reserves the right to adopt additional working procedures governing substantive
meetings with remote participation, as necessary.

Third party session3

18. The third parties have the right to be present during the third-party session mentioned in the
next paragraph, as well as when invited by the Panel to appear before it.
19. Each third party may present its views orally during a session of the first substantive meeting
with the parties set aside for that purpose.
20. (1) Each third party shall indicate to the Panel no later than 5.00 p.m. five working days
before the third-party session, unless otherwise indicated by the Panel, whether it intends to
make a statement during this session.
(2) To ensure the availability of interpreters, the third parties shall also indicate as soon as
possible and preferably three weeks before the third -party session whether they intend to
make their statement in a WTO official working language other than English, which is the
language in which these panel pr oceedings are being conducted, and whether they would
require interpretation from English to any other WTO official working language.
21. (1) Each third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when
meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU, these Working
Procedures and any other Working Procedures adopted by the Panel, particularly with regard
to the confidentiality of the proceeding and the submissions of the parties and third parties.
(3) Each third party shall provide, no later than five working days before the third -party
session, unless otherwise indicated by the Panel, a list of members of its delegation who will
attend the session.
22. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All parties and third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the statements of the third parties. Each third party making a
statement at the third -party session shall provide the Panel and other participants with a
provisional written version of its statement before it takes the floor. If interpretation of a third
party's statement is needed, that third party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters
before taking the floor.
c. Each third party should limit the duration of its statement to 15 minutes and avoid
repetition of the arguments already in its submission. If a third party considers that it requires
more time for its statement, it should inform the Panel and the parties at least five working
days before the meeting, together with an estimate of the expected duration of its statement.
The Panel will accord equal time to all third parties for their statements.
d. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties shall be given the
opportunity to pose questions, through the Panel, to any third party for clarification on any
matter raised in that third party's submission or statement.
e. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to any third party.
f. Following the third-party session:
i. Each third party shall submit the final written version of its statement, no later
than 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working day following the meeting.

3 The deadlines for providing notice to the Panel in this section may be modified in the event of a virtual
hearing or in light of any sanitary protocols adopted for future access to the WTO premises.

ii. Each party may send in writing, within the timeframe established in the timetable
adopted by the Panel or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting, any
questions to one or more third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iii. The Panel may send in writing, within the timeframe established in the timetable
adopted by the Panel or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting, any
questions to one or more third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
iv. Each third party choosing to do so shall respond in writing to questions from the
Panel or a party, within the timeframe established in the timetable adopted by the Panel
or as adjusted by the Panel before the end of the meeting.
23. The Panel reserves the right to adopt additional working procedures governing third -party
sessions with remote participation, as necessary.
Descriptive part and executive summaries

24. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the
Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which
shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve
as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the
case.

25. Each party shall submit a single integrated executive summary of the facts and arguments as
presented to the Panel. The timing of the submission of the integrated executive summary shall be
indicated in the timetable adopted by the Panel.

26. The single integrated executive summary shall not exceed 30 pages. The Panel will accept
additional pages upon request and with good cause.

27. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary of its arguments as presented
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This
integrated executive summary may also include a summary of responses to questions. The executive
summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed ten pages. If a third-party submission
and statement do not exceed six pages in total, there is no need for a separate executive summary
of that third party's a rguments. That third party may, however, provide a separate executive
summary if it so wishes.

28. The Panel may request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts
and arguments presented in any other submissions to the Panel fo r which a deadline may not be
specified in the timetable.

Interim review

29. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.
30. If no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party ma y submit written comments
on the other party's written request for review. Such written comments shall be limited to the other
party's written request for review and shall be submitted in accordance with the timetable adopted
by the Panel.
Interim and Final Report

31. The interim report, as well as the final report before its official circulation, shall be kept strictly
confidential and shall not be disclosed.

Service of documents

32. The following procedures regarding service of documents apply to all documents submitted by
parties and third parties during the proceeding:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by submitting them via
the Disputes On -Line Registry Application (DORA) https://dora.wto.org by 5:00 p.m.
(Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. The electronic version uploaded
into DORA shall constitute the official version for the purposes of submission deadlines
and the record of the dispute. Upload of a document into DORA shall constitute service on
the Panel, the other party, and the third parties.
b. Each party and third party shall submit one paper copy of all documents it submits to the
Panel in a WTO official working language (i.e. English, French or Spanish ), including the
exhibits, with the DS Registry (office No. 2047) for the DS Registry's archive within three
working days following the electronic submission, by 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time). The DS
Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of receipt. If an exhibit is in
a format that is impractical to submit as a paper copy, then the party may submit such
exhibit in a format agreed upon with the DS Registry and the Panel Secretary. In this case,
the party should still submit a cover page with the exhibit number indicating that the
exhibit is only available in electronic format or such format agreed upon with the DS
Registry and the Panel Secretary. If, for any reason, the DS Registry office is unavailable
for the service of paper copies, the "next working day" shall mean the day that the Panel
determines for such delivery once normal operations have resumed.
c. The Panel shall provide the parties with the Descriptive Part of the Report, the Interim
Report, and the Final Report, as well as all other documents or communications issued by
the Panel during the proceeding, via DORA. In addition, the Panel shall provide to the
parties paper copies of the Descriptive Part of the Report, the Interim Report, and the
Final Report on the date that these documents are uploaded in DORA.
d. If the parties or third parties have any questions or technical difficulties relating to DORA,
they are invited to contact the DS Registry (DSRegistry@wto.org).
e. If any party or third party is unable to meet the 5:00 p.m. deadline because of technical
difficulties in uploading these documents into DORA, the party or third party concerned
shall inform the DS Registry (DSRegistry@wto.org) without delay and provide an electronic
version of all documents to be submitted to the Panel by email including any exhibits. The
email shall be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, the Panel Secretary, the other party
and, if appropriate, the third parties. The documents sent by email shall be submitted no
later than 5:30 p.m. on the due date established by the Panel. If the file size of specific
exhibits makes transmission by email impossible, or it would require more than five email
messages, owing to the number of exhibits to be filed, to transmit all of them by email,
the specific large file size exhibits, or those that cannot be attached to the first five email
messages, shall be filed with the DS Registry (office No. 2047) and provided to the other
party and, if appropriate, the third parties by no later than 9:30 a.m. the next working
day on an electronic medium acceptable to the recipient. In that case, the party or third
party concerned shall send a notification to the DS Registrar, copying the Panel Secretary,
the other party, and the third parties, as appropriate, via email, identifying the numbers
of the exhibits that cannot be transmitted by email.
f. In case any party or third party is unable to access a document filed through DORA because
of technical difficulties, it shall promptly, and in any case no later than 5:00 p.m. on the
next working day after the due date for the filing of the document, inform the DS Registrar,
the Panel Secretary, and the party or third party that filed the document, of the problem
by email and shall, if possible, identify the relevant document(s). The DS Registrar will
promptly try to identify a solution to the technical problem. In the meantime, the party or
third party that filed the document(s) shall, promptly after being informed of the problem,
provide an electronic version of the relevant document(s) to the affected party or third
party by email, with a copy to the DS Registry ( DSRegistry@wto.org) and the Panel
Secretary to allow access to the document(s) while the technical problem is being
addressed. The DS Registrar may provide an electronic version of the relevant

document(s) by email if the affected party or third party so r equests. The DS Registrar
shall in that case copy the party or third party that filed the document(s) on the email
message.
Correction of clerical errors in submissions
33. The Panel may grant leave to a party or third party to correct clerical errors in any of its
submissions (including paragraph numbering and typographical mistakes). Any such request should
identify the nature of the errors to be corrected and should be made promptly following the filing of
the submission in question.

ANNEX A-2
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES CONCERNING BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
Adopted on 28 May 2021

1. These procedures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2(4) of the Panel's working
procedures are additional to the general protect ion of confidential information set forth in
paragraph 2(1) of the Panel's working procedures and apply to any business confidential
information (BCI) that a party or a third party submits in the course of the present Panel
proceedings.
2. For the purposes of these proceedings, BCI means any information that has been designated
as such by a party or a third party submitting the information to the Panel, that is not available
in the public domain, and the release of which could reasonably be considered to caus e or
threaten to cause serious harm to the interests of the originator(s) of the information.
3. Each party and third party shall act in good faith and exercise restraint in designating
information as BCI. The Panel shall have the right to intervene in any m anner that it deems
appropriate, if it is of the view that restraint in the designation of BCI is not being exercised.
4. No person shall have access to BCI, except a member of the Panel or the WTO Secretariat 1
assigned to work on the present dispute, an em ployee of a party or a third party, an outside
advisor or an expert providing assistance to the Panel, a party, or a third party and their
clerical staff for the purposes of this dispute. A person having access to BCI shall not disclose
that information ot her than to persons authorized to have access to it pursuant to these
procedures. Any information designated as BCI shall only be used for the purposes of this
dispute. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees, outside
advisors, and experts comply with these procedures.
5. An employee of a party or a third party, an outside advisor, or an expert assisting the Panel,
a party or a third party is not permitted access to BCI if that employee, outside advisor, or
expert is an officer or employee of an enterprise, or an association of enterprises, engaged in
the production, distribution, sale, export, or import of the products affected by the measures
at issue in this dispute.
6. The party or third party submitting BCI, including referring to or quoting BCI already submitted
by another party or third party, shall mark the cover or first page, and each page of the
document containing BCI to indicate the presence of such information in any document
submitted to the Panel. Documents containing BCI should be marked as follows:
a. The cover or first page of the document shall state in bold " Contains Business
Confidential Information on pages xxxxx".
b. Each page of the document which contains BCI shall indicate in bold " Contains
Business Confidential Information" at the top of the page.
c. Where the document contains both BCI and non -BCI information, the specific BCI in
question shall be placed between double square brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]; and
d. The party or third party shall indicate tha t the document contains BCI when uploading
the document into the Dispute Online Registry Application (DORA).
7. Representatives of, and outside advisers to, each of the parties and, where relevant under
paragraphs 9 and 11, representatives of, and outside ad visers to, the third parties shall be

1 Including translators and interpreters.

notified to the Panel, other party, and third parties in a list containing the names, titles, and
employers of persons legitimately requiring access to the BCI. The list for each party is to be
first submitted at the l atest by one week before the due date of the first written submission
of the complainant. The list of each party or third party shall be subsequently amended and
re-submitted if the names, titles, or employers are changed. Parties and third parties may
give access to BCI only to outside advisers and experts providing assistance to the parties in
these proceedings and their clerical staff.
8. On the request of either party, the Panel will review whether particular confidential information
it has submitted is so sensitive that it should not be provided to the third parties, taking into
consideration the need for the third party to have access to the particular information. If the
Panel finds such information to be particularly sensitive, it will direct the party submitting the
information to provide a summary of the contents of the redacted information that will be
made available to the third parties.
9. A party or a third party submitting BCI in the form of, or as part of, an exhibit shall, in addition
to the above, so indicate by putting "BCI" next to the exhibit number (e.g. Exhibit IDN -1
(BCI)) in the Exhibit list. The party or third party shall also indicate that the exhibit contains
BCI when uploading it into DORA. If the entire content of an exhibit constitutes BCI, the cover
page and the top of each page of the exhibit shall state in bold " All of the information
included in this exhibit is Business Confidential Information" without it being necessary
to place all of the specific information in that exhibit between double brackets.
10. Any BCI that is submitted in binary -encoded form shall include the terms "Business
Confidential Information" or "BCI" in the file name. Upon uploading to DORA of a document in
binary-encoded form containing BCI, the confidentiality level for the document shall be
selected as "BCI". In addition, where applicable, the label of the storage medium shall be
clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" or "BCI".
11. If an oral statement contains BCI, the party or third party making such a statement shall
inform the Panel accordingly three working days in advance of the Panel meeting so
appropriate arrangements can be made. The Panel will ensure that only persons authorized
to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures can hear that statement. The written
versions of such oral statements submitted to the Panel shall be marked as provided for in
paragraphs 6 through 10 above.
12. If a party or a third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third
party should have been designated as BCI and objects to its submission without BCI
designation, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party,
and, where relevant, the third parties, together with the reasons for the objection. The Panel
shall address the objection, as appropriate. The same procedure should be followed if a party
or a third party considers that the other party or a third party identified as BCI information
which should not be so designated. Unless impracticable, if a party, a third party, or the Panel,
contests the non -designation or designation of information as BCI, the party ma king the
objection shall do so within five working days of the information having been submitted.
13. Any person authorized to have access to documents containing BCI under the terms of these
procedures shall store such documents, including in electronic form , so as to prevent
unauthorized access to such information.
14. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized
under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of
conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the
Members, it shall give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does
not disclose any information that the party has properly designated as BCI.
15. At the conclusion of the dispute2, and within a period to be fixed by the Panel, each party and
third party shall either return all documents (including electronic material) containing BCI,

2 Where this is defined as when (a) the Panel or Appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB, or the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Panel or the Appellate Body report; (b) the authority for the

submitted during the Panel proceedings, to the party that submitted such documents or certify
in writing to the Panel and the other parties that all such documents have been destroyed, or
otherwise protect the BCI against public disclosure, consistent with the party's obligations
under its domestic laws. The WTO Secretariat s hall have the right to retain the documents
containing BCI for the archives of the WTO.
16. Documents containing information designated as BCI form part of the official record of the
dispute for purposes of any further proceedings under the DSU. Parties seekin g to have that
information protected in a similar way in further proceedings should address such a request
to the appropriate body and should do so as early as possible so as to ensure procedures are
in place before the DS Registry transmits the record of the proceeding. When transmitting the
record, the DS Registry will indicate which documents contain BCI.
17. The Panel reserves the right, after consulting with the parties, to amend or supplement these
Additional Working Procedures concerning BCI.

establishment of the Panel lapses under Article 12.12 of the DSU; or (c) a mutually satisfactory solution is
notified to the DSB under Article 3.6 of the DSU.

ANNEX A-3
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS
WITH REMOTE PARTICIPATION
Adopted on 5 October 2021

General

1. These Additional Working Procedures set out terms for holding the substantive meetings of
the Panel remotely.

Definitions

2. For the purposes of these Additional Working Procedures:

"DORA" means the Disputes Online Registry Application.

"Host" means the designated person within the WTO Secretariat responsible for the
management of the platform for participants to take part in the meeting with the Panel.

"Participant" means any authorized person taking part in the meeting, including the
Members of the Panel, the WTO Secretariat staff involved in the dispute and the organization
of the meeting, members of the parties' and third parties' delegations, and interpreters.

"Platform" means the Cisco Webex platform.

Equipment and technical requirements

3. Each party and third party shall be responsible for ensuring that the members of its delegation
join the meeting using the designated platform and satisfy the minimum equipment and technical
requirements of the platform provider for the effective conduct of the meeting.

4. Technical questions, including the minimum equipment and technical requirement s for the
usage of the platform, will be addressed in the advance testing sessions between the host and
participants provided for in paragraph 7 below.

Technical support

5. (1) The Secretariat has limited ability to offer remote assistance during, and in advance of
the meeting. Each party and third party, therefore, is responsible for providing its own
technical support to the members of its delegation.

(2) The host will assist participants in accessing and using the platform in preparation for,
and during the course of, the meeting with the Panel. The host will prioritize assisting those
participants designated as main speakers on the delegations' lists.

Pre-meeting

Registration

6. Each party and third party shall provide to the Panel the list of the members of its delegation
on the dedicated form in Annex 1 below, no later than 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) ten working days
before the start of the meeting. The list shall indicate those participants designated as main
speakers.

Advance testing

7. The Secretariat will hold two testing sessions with participants before the substantive meeting
with the Panel. One of these sessions will be a joint session with all participants in the meeting.
These testing sessions will seek to reflect, as far as possible, the conditions of the proposed meeting.
Participants should make themselves available for the testing sessions. The Secretariat will be in
contact with the participants to set the schedule of the testing sessions in due course.

Confidentiality and security

8. The meeting shall be confidential and the rules of the DSU continue to apply during the remote
session of the meeting.

9. Each party and third party shall follow any security and confidentiality protocols set by the
Panel in advance of the meeting.

10. The participants shall connect to the meeting through a secure internet connection and shall
avoid the use of an open or public internet connection.

Conduct of the meeting

Recording

11. The Secretariat will record the meeting in its entirety. The recording of the meeting shall form
part of the panel record.

12. Any recording of the meeting or any part thereof other than that referred to in paragraph 11,
through any means, including audio or video recording, or screenshot, is prohibited.

Access to the virtual meeting

13. Participants shall access the virtual meeting in accordance with these Additional Working
Procedures.

14. (1) The host will invite participants via email to join the virtual meeting.

(2) For security reasons, ac cess to the virtual meeting will be password -protected and
limited to participants. Participants shall not forward or share the virtual meeting link or
password with unauthorized persons.

(3) Each party and third party shall ensure that only participants from its delegation access
the virtual meeting.

Advance log-on

15. (1) The virtual meeting room will be accessible 60 minutes in advance of the scheduled
start time of the meeting.

(2) To ensure that the meeting starts as scheduled, participants must login to the platform
at least 30 minutes in advance of the scheduled start time of the meeting.

(3) Participants will be placed in a virtual lobby where they will remain until the Panel is
ready to start the meeting, at which time the host will admit them to the meeting.

Document sharing

16. (1) Before each party or third party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other
participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement through DORA,
including any exhibits.

(2) Any participant wishing to share a document with the other participants during the
meeting – including via screen sharing - shall upload the document to DORA and confirm that

the other participants have received the document, before first referring to the document at
the meeting.

(3) Participants are encouraged to have DORA open to facilitate upload and download of
shared documents.

Pauses for internal coordination and consultation

17. Parties are free to internally coordinate and consult while the meeting is ongoing so long as it
is not disruptive to the proceedings, but they should be aware that the chat feature of the platform
is visible to all participants. The Panel may briefly pause a session at any time, on its own initiative
or upon request of a party, to enable any necessary internal coordination and consultation.

Participation

18. Participants who are not speaking are expected to have their microphone on mute. They may
also wish to turn off their camera to preserve bandwidth. If a participant wishes to take the floor,
they should use the "raise a hand" function in the platform. Once the chairperson gives the floor to
the participant, they should unmute their microphone and turn their camera on.

Communication breakdown

19. Each party and third party will designate a contact person who can liaise with the host during
the course of the meeting to report any technical issues that arise with respect to the platform. The
parties and third parties shall immediately notify the Panel of any technical or connectivity issues
affecting the participation of their delegation, or a member of their delegation, in the meeting. To
do so, the party or third party that experiences the technical or connectivity issue shall:

(1) if possible, immediately intervene at the meeting and briefly state the nature of the
issue experienced; or

(2) if doing so is not possible, immediately contact the host and explain the nature of the
issue experienced. The host can be contacted via the platform chat, by sending an email to
 @wto.org, or by telephone at +41 22 739 .

20. The Panel may suspend the proceedings until the technical issue is resolved or continue the
proceedings with those that are connected.

Relationship with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel or Relationship with the
adopted Working Procedures

21. These Additional Working Procedures complement the Working Procedures adopted by the
Panel, and to the extent of any conflict between the two, supersede them.

INDONESIA — MEASURES RELATING TO RAW MATERIALS (DS592)

FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH THE PANEL

DATE

DELEGATION LIST OF [MEMBER]

Full name Position / Title Email address
Phone number
where the
participant can be
reached on meeting
day
Whether the participant
plans to attend the
virtual meeting
remotely or from the
WTO premises

Using boldface, please indicate who on the above list will deliver statements or is likely to take the
floor during the meeting.

Name and contact details of the person who will liaise with the host on technical issues:

ANNEX A-4
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS
WITH REMOTE PARTICIPATION
Adopted on 5 October 2021

General

1. These Additional Working Procedures set out terms for holding the substantive meetings of
the Panel remotely.

Definitions

2. For the purposes of these Additional Working Procedures:

"DORA" means the Disputes Online Registry Application.

"Host" means the designated person within the WTO Secretariat responsible for the
management of the platform for participants to take part in the meeting with the Panel.

"Participant" means any authorized person taking part in the meeting, including the
Members of the Panel, the WTO Secretariat staff involved in the dispute and the organization
of the meeting, members of the parties' and third parties' delegations, and interpreters.

"Platform" means the Cisco Webex platform.

Equipment and technical requirements

3. Each party and third party shall be responsible for ensuring that the members of its delegation
join the meeting using the designated platform and satisfy the minimum equipment and te chnical
requirements of the platform provider for the effective conduct of the meeting.

4. Technical questions, including the minimum equipment and technical requirements for the
usage of the platform, will be addressed in the advance testing sessions bet ween the host and
participants provided for in paragraph 7 below.

Technical support

5. (1) The Secretariat has limited ability to offer remote assistance during, and in advance of
the meeting. Each party and third party, therefore, is responsible for pr oviding its own
technical support to the members of its delegation.

(2) The host will assist participants in accessing and using the platform in preparation for,
and during the course of, the meeting with the Panel. The host will prioritize assisting th ose
participants designated as main speakers on the delegations' lists.

Pre-meeting

Registration

6. Each party and third party shall provide to the Panel the list of the members of its delegation
on the dedicated form in Annex 1 below, no later than 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) ten working days
before the start of the meeting. The list shall indicate those participants designated as main
speakers.

Advance testing

7. The Secretariat will hold two testing sessions with participants before the substantive meeting
with the Panel. One of these sessions will be a joint session with all participants in the meeting.
These testing sessions will seek to reflect, as far as possible, the conditions of the proposed meeting.
Participants should make themselves ava ilable for the testing sessions. The Secretariat will be in
contact with the participants to set the schedule of the testing sessions in due course.

Confidentiality and security

8. The meeting shall be confidential and the rules of the DSU continue to apply during the remote
session of the meeting.

9. Each party and third party shall follow any security and confidentiality protocols set by the
Panel in advance of the meeting.

10. The participants shall connect to the meeting through a secure internet co nnection and shall
avoid the use of an open or public internet connection.

Conduct of the meeting

Recording

11. The Secretariat will record the meeting in its entirety. The recording of the meeting shall form
part of the panel record.

12. Any recording of the meeting or any part thereof other than that referred to in paragraph 11,
through any means, including audio or video recording, or screenshot, is prohibited.

Access to the virtual meeting

13. Participants shall access the virtual meeti ng in accordance with these Additional Working
Procedures.

14. (1) The host will invite participants via email to join the virtual meeting.

(2) For security reasons, access to the virtual meeting will be password -protected and
limited to participants. P articipants shall not forward or share the virtual meeting link or
password with unauthorized persons.

(3) Each party and third party shall ensure that only participants from its delegation access
the virtual meeting.

Advance log-on

15. (1) The virtual meeting room will be accessible 60 minutes in advance of the scheduled
start time of the meeting.

(2) To ensure that the meeting starts as scheduled, participants must login to the platform
at least 30 minutes in advance of the scheduled start time of the meeting.

(3) Participants will be placed in a virtual lobby where they will remain until the Panel is
ready to start the meeting, at which time the host will admit them to the meeting.

Document sharing

16. (1) Before each party or third party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other
participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement through DORA,
including any exhibits.

(2) Any participant wishing to share a document with the other participants during the
meeting – including via screen sharing - shall upload the document to DORA and confirm that

the other participants have received the document, before first referring to the document at
the meeting.

(3) Participants are encouraged to have DORA open to facilitate upload and download of
shared documents.

Pauses for internal coordination and consultation

17. Parties are free to internally coordinate and consult while the meeting is ongoing so long as it
is not disruptive to the proceedings, but they should be aware that the chat feature of the platform
is visible to all participants. The Panel may briefly pause a session at any time, on its own initiative
or upon request of a party, to enable any necessary internal coordination and consultation.

Participation

18. Participants who are not speaking are expected to have their microphone on mute. They may
also wish to turn off their camera to preserve bandwidth. If a participant wishes to take the floor,
they should use the "raise a hand" function in the platform. Once the chairperson gives the floor to
the participant, they should unmute their microphone and turn their camera on.

Communication breakdown

19. Each party and third party will designate a contact person who can liaise with the host during
the course of the meeting to report any technical issues that arise with respect to the platform. The
parties and third parties shall immediately notify the Panel of any technical or connectivity issues
affecting the participation of their delegation, or a me mber of their delegation, in the meeting. To
do so, the party or third party that experiences the technical or connectivity issue shall:

(1) if possible, immediately intervene at the meeting and briefly state the nature of the
issue experienced; or

(2) if doing so is not possible, immediately contact the host and explain the nature of the
issue experienced. The host can be contacted via the platform chat, by sending an email to
 @wto.org, or by telephone at +41 22 739 .

20. The Panel may suspend the proceedings until the technical issue is resolved or continue the
proceedings with those that are connected.

Relationship with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel or Relationship with the
adopted Working Procedures

21. These Additional Working Procedures complement the Working Procedures adopted by the
Panel, and to the extent of any conflict between the two, supersede them.

INDONESIA — MEASURES RELATING TO RAW MATERIALS (DS592)

THIRD-PARTY SESSION OF THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH THE PANEL

DATE

DELEGATION LIST OF [MEMBER]

Full name Position / Title Email address
Phone number
where the
participant can
be reached on
meeting day
Whether the
participant plans
to attend the
virtual meeting
remotely or from
the WTO premises

Using boldface, please indicate who on the above list will deliver statements or is likely to take the
floor during the meeting.

Name and contact details of the person who will liaise with the host on technical issues:

ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 24
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia 34

ANNEX B-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
1 INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns two measures of the Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia"), namely firstly the
export prohibition of nickel ore ("the Export Prohibition") and secondly the domestic processing
requirements on nickel ore ("the Domestic Processing Requirement" ). These measures are
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the
"GATT 1994") and Indonesia cannot advance any justification for them. Because of these
inconsistencies, Indonesia's measures nullify and impair th e benefits accruing to the
European Union, directly or indirectly, under the covered agreements.
2 THE MEASURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994
2.1 The Legal standard
2. The terms of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 show that that provision contains a broad prohibition
on export prohibitions and export restrictions. It is not necessary to quantify the limiting effect
of the measures at issue in order to demonstrate that a measure is inconsistent with the
provision.
3. Nothing in the text of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 indicates that it only captures "border
measures" and that therefore "internal measures" are excluded from its scope of application, as
Indonesia claims. On the contrar y, several aspects of the very wording of this provision show
that "internal" measures are within the scope of application of this provision.
2.2 The Export Prohibition is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
4. Indonesia has restricted the export of nickel ore since at least 2014. This measure has been
implemented through a variety of Indonesian legal instruments.
5. Currently and since January 2020, Indonesia prohibits all exports of nickel ore. In the period
Between at least 2014 and January 2020, the scope of the Export Prohibition has been adapted
at times for low-grade ore with a nickel content of less than 1,7 %, under conditions.
6. The Export Prohibition is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, as it legally prohibits
the exportation of nickel ore.
2.3 The Domestic Processing Requirement is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994
7. The Domestic Processing Requirement consists in a legal obligation imposed on all holders of
mining licences in Indonesia to process/refine nickel ore in a manner specified in the relevant
domestic Indonesian regulations, in particular MEMR Regulation 25/2018. Unprocessed nickel
ore cannot be exported.
8. The Domestic Processing Requirement is an export prohibition/restriction within the meaning of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because the legal obligation to purify and/or process raw mining
products in Indonesia prior exporting the relevant goods is designed and operates so as to
restrict the possibility to export the unpurified and unprocessed nickel ore. A legal requirement
to process nickel ore domestically – the existence of which Indonesia does not contest – is by
its very design, architecture and revealing structure an export prohibition or restriction within
the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994: such requirement automatically means that the
nickel ore in question cannot be exported anymore, as it is subject to mandatory processing.

9. Indonesia's argument that the Domestic Processing Requirement does not have a 'limiting effect'
because the temporal application of the Export Prohibition overlaps with the Domestic Processing
Requirement should be rejected: Indonesia seems to consider that the two measures at issue in
the present case (the Export Prohibition and the Domestic Processing Requirement) necessarily
have to be assessed together. This is incorrect: the subject -matter of the present dispute are
two distinct measures, and the Panel should assess them separately.
3 THE MEASURES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XI:2 (A) OF THE GATT 1994
10. The measures at issue do not meet any of the requirements of Article XI:2 (a) of the GATT 1994.
Indonesia has failed to demonstrate: (1) that there is a "critical shortage" of nickel ore; (2) that
nickel ore is an "essential product" for Indonesia; and (3) that the measures at issue are "applied
temporarily".
3.1 The measures are not designed to prevent a critical shortage of nickel ore, but
instead to develop Indonesia's processing industry
11. The measures at issue are not designed to prevent a "critical sho rtage" of nickel ore. Rather,
they are part of a long -standing Government policy aimed at assisting and promoting the
development of Indonesia's processing industry of mineral products, including nickel ore. This
is evidenced by the explicit motivation in cluded in the legal instruments through which the
measures at issue are implemented; by repeated and consistent public statements made by
high-ranking Government officials, including Indonesia's President; and by numerous
Government policy document includi ng planning documents. Moreover, an examination of the
structure and design of the measures at issue reveals that, in practice, they are incapable of
achieving the objective of preventing the alleged "critical shortage" of nickel ore. The measures
at issue cannot, and will not, limit the production of nickel ore in Indonesia. The only practical
effect of the measures at issue (and the only reason why they have been adopted) is replacing
exports of nickel ore with exports of higher added value processed products, including stainless
steel.
3.1.1 The alleged risk of shortage is too remote
12. In its first written submission Indonesia alleged that the measures seek to "prevent" a risk of
shortage at some uncertain point in the future. In later submissions, however, Indonesia appears
to be arguing that the measures at issue seek to address an existing critical shortage. Indonesia
bases this new allegation on the assertion that, according to the Maryono report, in 2020
domestic demand for nickel ore exceeded domestic production.
13. As explained by the European Union, this assertion is highly misleading. The mere fact that in
2020 the maximum theoretical processing capacity of the Indonesian smelters exceeded the
production of nickel ore does not prove the existence of a shortage of nickel ore. There are other
reasons, besides a shortage of nickel ore, which may explain why the Indonesian smelters did
not process nickel ore up to their maximum processing capacity in 2020. World demand and
consumption of stainless steel, the main final use of nickel ore, fell significantly during the first
half of 2020, largely due to the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic. This may explain why
production of nickel ore in Indonesia was slightly less in 2020 than in 2019 and, consequently,
the capacity utilization rate of the smelting facilities was lower. According to the U.S. Geological
Survey, mine production in Indonesia increased by an estimated 30% between 2020 and 2021
and was, therefore, much higher in 2021 than at any time prior to the introduction of the Export
Ban in 2019.
3.1.2 The alleged risk of shortage is not temporary
14. Furthermore, the "critical shortage" alleged by Indonesia does not stem from a temporary event
(such as a "natural disaster") that causes a "passing need". Indon esia has alleged that, in the
absence of the measures in dispute, a "critical shortage" was "likely to ensue" because
Indonesia's usable reserves "have a total lifespan of merely 6 years at current production and
consumption levels". The progressive deplet ion reserves alleged by Indonesia is not, however,
a "passing need". It is a definitive and unavoidable outcome, as long as mining continues. That

outcome cannot be "prevented" by applying export restrictions "temporarily", as required by
Article XI:2(a).
3.1.3 The alleged risk of shortage has been self -created by Indonesia through the
application of the measures at issue
15. As shown by the European Union, there is no shortage of nickel ore, whether "existing" or
"imminent". In any event, the alleged shor tage could not be regarded as "critical" because it
would be a structural and durable shortage self-created by Indonesia through the use of export
restrictions. In essence, Indonesia argues that it needs to maintain export restrictions in place
in order to ensure the future supply of a domestic processing industry created by applying those
export restrictions. Upholding that justification would be tantamount to rewarding Indonesia for
the persistent breach of one of its most fundamental WTO obligations.
3.1.4 The alleged "deficiency in quantity" is neither likely nor serious
16. Indonesia has failed to show that the alleged risk of "deficiency in quantity" of nickel ore is
sufficiently likely and grave so as to rise to the level of a "critical shortage".
17. As just explained, Indonesia's most recent allegation that there is a "current imbalance" between
supply and demand of nickel ore is entirely baseless.
18. As regards Indonesia's allegation that Indonesia's usable reserves of nickel have a total lifespan
of merely 6 years from 2019, the European Union has shown that the Maryono report
underestimates considerably Indonesia's current reserves.
19. The complete exc lusion of limonite and LGSO from the estimate of reserves over the period
2020-2026 is unwarranted.
20. The lack of CP verification might justify a reasonable downward adjustment of the reserves
reported to the Geological Agency. On the other hand, excluding entirely any reserves which do
not comply with that requirement is manifestly disproportionate in order to address the
"shortcomings" invoked by Indonesia. Moreover, it is counterproductive, as it results in an
estimate that is far less accurate and credible than the Geological Agency's estimate, which does
include those reserves.
21. Moreover, the Maryono report uses an asymmetrical methodology where supply and demand
are assessed on a different basis. Whereas the report takes into account a projected (and
massive) increase in smelter ore consumption between 2020 and 2026, it assumes that no new
reserves of nickel ore will be added during the same period. That assumption, however, is
manifestly unreasonable.
22. Indonesia's allegations of a critical shortage of nick el "in the short term" are refuted by other
evidence, including evidence supplied by Indonesia in this dispute. For example, according to
Indonesia's "Mining Guidance (2020)", published in 2020 by Indonesia's Directorate General of
Mineral and Coal, "The investment opportunity of smelter in Indonesia is very promising since
the mineral mining production is very high and the reserves availability is still abundant for a
long term".
23. Indonesia's allegations are further contradicted by the massive investments made in recent
years in additional capacity for processing nickel ore in Indonesia, including by Indonesia's state
owned enterprises.
3.2 Nickel is not an "essential product" for Indonesia
24. Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that nickel is an "essential pr oduct" within the meaning of
Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. As explained by the European Union, the relative economic
importance of the product concerned is irrelevant for the purposes of Article XI:2(a). That
provision is not designed to enable Memb ers to use export restrictions as an instrument of
industrial policy with a view to promoting the development of sectors which each Member
regards as being of particular importance to its economic development.

25. Contrary to Indonesia's assertions, there is nothing in the report of the Appellate Body in China-
Raw Materials which may lend support to Indonesia's misguided reading of the term "essential
product". The issue of whether a product can be regarded as "essential" within the meaning of
Article XI:2(a) by reason of its relative economic importance was not before the Appellate Body.
The mere fact that, as clarified by the Appellate Body, Article XI:2(a) may be invoked with
regard to a critical shortage of an exhaustible natural resource caused by extr aordinary
circumstances, such as a "natural disaster"1, does not have the implication that the "essential"
character of a product is to be determined in view of its relative economic importance.
26. Furthermore, the measures at issue do not help Indonesia's nickel ore sector. To the contrary,
they limit demand for Indonesia's nickel ore and depress prices in Indonesia's domestic market.
It is illogical to invoke the economic importance of the nickel ore sector in order to justify a
measure which is detrimental to that sector. It is even more illogical to invoke that Indonesia is
one of the largest exporters of nickel as a justification for banning those exports. As regards
other economic indicators cited by Indonesia in its second written submission, the
European Union notes that the nickel mining industry could be a larger source of government
revenue and employment in the absence of the measures at issue.
27. The measures at issue are designed to assist Indonesia's processing industry, and in particular
the stai nless steel industry. Indonesia's production of stainless steel already exceeds by far
Indonesia's present and foreseeable future domestic needs. Largely as a result of the measures
at issue, Indonesia has become one of the world's largest exporters of sta inless steel.
Furthermore, Indonesia's exports of stainless steel are projected to continue to increase
massively over the next few years. Even assuming that the relative economic importance of the
product concerned was relevant for the purposes of Article XI:2(a), none of these developments
might be regarded as "essential" within the meaning of that provision.
3.3 Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the measures are temporarily applied
3.3.1 The Legal Standard
28. It is apparent from the wording of Art. XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 that the defence which that
rule provides for only applies to measures which are "temporarily applied to prevent or relieve
critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party".
29. The very drafting of this provision shows that the limitation to measures which are "temporarily
applied" is linked to the objective pursued by the measures, namely to prevent or relieve the
critical shortages to which that provision makes reference.
30. It must be p ossible to clearly identify the temporal limitation of the measure from its design,
architecture and objective. It cannot be sufficient in this respect that the Member in question
simply alleges that the measure is temporal. Rather, objective aspects of the measure, capable
of being properly scrutinised by a panel, must indicate that the measure is only temporarily
applied.
3.3.2 The Measures at issue are not applied only temporarily
3.3.2.1 The Export Prohibition is not applied only temporarily

31. Indonesia supplies no valid argument why the Export Prohibition was adopted in order to address
a "passing need", or to face a situation which was expected to last only a limited amount of time.
On the contrary, the record before the Panel demonstrates that the Indonesian measures pursue
a different objective, and that they are not only "temporarily applied".
32. Indonesia argues that the Export Prohibition on nickel ore is applied only temporarily, because
– according to Indonesia – previous export prohibitions on nick el ore were applied only
temporarily. This argument is conceptually wrong, and it relies on an incomplete and misleading
description of the past application of export prohibitions on nickel ore.

1 Appellate Body Report, China- Export Restrictions, para. 337.

33. First, it is unpersuasive to refer to the way in which export prohibitions were applied in the past
to argue that the current export prohibition is also only applied temporarily.
34. Second, in any event, Indonesia's argument relies on a misleading description of the way in
which the export prohibition on nickel ore was applied in the past. Indonesia suggests that since
2014 the export prohibition has been in force only on an interim basis. But Indonesia's policy is
best described as a (complete) ban on nickel ore export at least since January 2014, which was
however slightly relaxed with regard to low -grade nickel ore, for limited periods of time, and
under strict conditions. Indeed, what is apparent is that Indonesia has been applying an export
prohibition on nickel ore for a significant number of years, with slight modulations of the scope
of that policy. This can hardly be seen as evidence for the proposition that the export prohibition
was only temporarily applied in the past.
35. Further, Indonesia argues that the export ban implemented by MEMR Regulation 11/2019 and
MOT Regulation 96/2019 was only in application for 14 days at the time of panel establishment.
This argument is also misguided and should be rejected.
36. The amount of time during which a measure was applied before panel establishment cannot be
a persuasive argument when determining whether that measure is only temporarily applied.
37. In any event, Indonesia's argument is based on an incorrect description of the length of
application of the Export Ban on nickel ore currently being applied by Indonesia. Indonesia
pretends that that ban has only been applied for "merely 14 days" at the time of panel
establishment.
3.3.2.2 The domestic processing requirement is not only temporarily applied

38. Indonesia's argument concerning the duration of application of the Domestic Processing
Requirement is based on the proposition that that requirement was only 'applied' in those periods
of time when no export prohibition on nickel ore was app lied. This proposition is unconvincing
as it is based on an incorrect description of the relationship between the Domestic Processing
Requirement and the Export Prohibition.
4 THE MEASURES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XX (D) OF THE GATT 1994
4.1 Introduction
39. Indonesia claims that the two measures are justified under Article XX (d) of the GATT 1994 as
they are "preventative measures" adopted to secure compliance with its "comprehensive policy
for [the] sustainable mining and mineral resource management".2
40. The European Union maintains that Indonesia has not demonstrated that the legal standard
under Article XX (d) is met and, in any event, there are less trade restrictive and reasonably
available alternatives to the highly trade restrictive measures it has applied.
4.1.1 Any "law or regulation" relied upon under Article XX (d) must be sufficiently
identified and must contain a sufficient degree of normative content
41. A party invoking Article XX (d) must, as a preliminary step, identify the "laws or re gulations"
with which it contends the measure at issue are designed (and necessary) to secure compliance.
For the purposes of Article XX (d), the term "laws or regulations" has been held to refer to "rules
that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member". As the concept of securing
compliance is central to the defence embodied in Article XX (d), the rules in question must
contain a sufficient degree of normative content. Indeed, the concept of "compliance" denotes a
link with enforceability. The Appellate Body has recognised that the broader the terms in which
a law or regulation is drafted, the more complex the task of identifying that normative content
becomes (India Solar cells, paragraph 5.110).

2 Indonesia’s first written submission, para. 145.

42. During the second substantive meeting, Indonesia clarified that the relevant laws or regulations
that it contends the challenged measures seek to secure compliance with are set out in Article s
96(c) and (d) of Law No. 4/2009 and Article 57 of Law No. 32/2009.
43. The European Union does not contest t hat Article 96 (c) and (d) of Law No. 4/2009 and
Article 57 of Law No. 32/2009 form part of the domestic legal system in Indonesia. Nor does it
contest the WTO consistency of those laws as such. However, Indonesia has not sufficiently
identify the rules or course of conduct which it claims those provisions prescribe.
44. Article 96 of Law No. 4/2009 sets out obligations that IUP and IUPK holders must implement.
These include "c. mining environment management and monitoring, including reclamation and
post-mining activities;" and "d. mineral and coal conservation efforts." These provisions are
framed in general terms and define a broad task as opposed to specific rules or a course of
conduct. Therefore, they are insufficiently specific to constitute a rule or regulation with which
compliance is to be secured within the meaning of Article XX (d).
45. Article 57 of Law No. 32/2009 provides for different means by which the "maintenance of
environment shall be conducted". This provision is formulated in very genera l terms, is
potentially extremely broad in scope and as such also lacks the requisite degree of normative
content or specificity for the purposes of Article XX (d). Moreover, whilst Indonesia asserts in
its responses to the Panel questions that Article 57 contains sustainable mining requirement
because it refers to "preservation of the function of the atmosphere", this is not substantiated.
4.2 Indonesia has not demonstrated that the measures are designed to secure
compliance with rules relating to envi ronmental protection or the management of
natural resources
46. In the event that the Panel considers Indonesia has sufficiently identified "laws or regulations"
within the meaning of Article XX (d), (quod non), Indonesia has, in any event, failed to
demonstrate that the measures at issue are designed in terms of their "content, structure and
expected operation", to secure compliance with laws or regulations aimed at environmental
protection or the conservation of natural resources. As already explained, the measures are in
fact designed to increase the added value of Indonesia's exports.
47. The European Union recalls that the Panel is not required to consider the aptitude of Article 96
and Article 57 to meet their stated environmental objectives, but rather the aptitude of the two
measures to secure "compliance" with those rules. Therefore, prior panels have found that
measures that may be consistent with or further the objectives of a law or regulation, but which
do not enforce any obligations contained therein, do not fall within the scope of Article XX (d).
In other words, even if a measure (such as a ban) has an incidental consequence on furthering
a policy objective, this is not sufficient for it to fall within the scope of Article XX (d).
4.2.1 Export Ban
48. Indonesia's arguments can be distilled down to a claim that as in the past nickel ore extraction
was export oriented and as there were documented issues of predatory mining practices in the
Sulawesi and Maluku regions , the ban on all exports is "designed" to ensure compliance with
domestic environmental standards and ensure compliance with rules relating to the conservation
of natural resources. Indonesia links this claim to a further assertion that the ban "reduces total
nickel ore production and extraction, therefore contributing to the proper enforcement of good
mining practice requirements and to the proper management of Indonesia's nickel reserves and
resources".3
49. Indonesia's arguments are misconceived and unsubstantiated.
50. Indonesia has not demonstrated that the export ban is 'designed' to secure compliance with
domestic environmental standards. The evidence it has adduced confirms that it is designed to
increase value of nickel ore.

3 Indonesia’s response to question 45.b.

51. The export ban is not 'designed' to reduce nickel ore prod uction or extraction. There is no limit
on domestic consumption or extraction. The export ban is designed to change the destination of
ore once it is extracted and increase domestic smeltering.
52. Indonesia invites the panel to presume that because there have been issues with illegal mining
in the past and because almost all ore was for export, it is the end destination of the ore which
is the driver of compliance issues. However, the compliance issues it identified relate to the
geography of Indonesia and es sentially un-particularised and vague so -called "jurisdictional"
issues. Moreover, whilst the European Union does not dispute that there is evidence of
environmental damage on the record, Indonesia has not demonstrated that this is due to the
destination of the ore as opposed to the process of mining and extraction itself.
4.2.2 Domestic Processing Requirement
53. Indonesia claims that the Domestic Processing Requirement is designed to secure compliance
with Indonesia's sustainable mining and environmental rules by (i) creating vertical integration
in the supply chain and (ii) by discouraging spot sales of nickel ore.
54. Indonesia has not demonstrated that the Domestic Processing Requirement was designed for
this purpose. Indeed, Indonesia has not demonstrated th e nexus between the "laws or
regulations" with which it is seeking to secure compliance and this measure.
55. First, there are no specific references in the legislation establishing the domestic processing
requirement to the provisions on which Indonesia reli es for the purpose of its claim under
Article XX (d).
56. Second, the documents on the record attest to the true objective of the domestic processing
requirement, namely increasing domestic smelting capacity.
4.3 Indonesia has not demonstrated that the meas ures are necessary to secure
compliance with rules relating to environmental protection or the management of
natural resources
57. Indonesia has failed to show that these specific measures are necessary within the meaning of
Article XX (d) of the GATT.
58. First, whilst the European Union does not dispute that environmental protection and the
conservation of natural mineral resources in principle constitute legitimate societal interests,
Indonesia has not shown that the actual objective pursued by the measures is to secure
compliance with rules on environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources.
Second, Indonesia has not shown that these particularly trade restrictive measures are
necessary to achieve that purported objective in the sense that t hey contribute sufficiently to
their achievement. Third, less trade restrictive alternatives are reasonably available to Indonesia
to make an equivalent contribution to the compliance objective allegedly pursued. Indeed, in
order to show that a measure is "necessary" under Article XX (d), a party relying on that
exception must do more that demonstrate that the measure is capable of contributing towards
that objective. The Panel is required to conduct a holistic assessment, taking in to account not
only the objective pursued but also the degree of trade restrictiveness and the contribution of
the measures.
4.3.1.1 Trade restrictiveness

59. The export ban is an extremely trade restrictive measure preventing all exports of all nickel ore.
This does not appear to be disputed.
60. Indonesia invites the Panel to conclude that the Domestic Processing Requirement has no
restrictive effects over the ban. As explained above, this is misconceived. The two measures fall
to be assessed separately. It is also highly trade rest rictive, preventing the export of
unprocessed nickel ore.
4.3.1.2 Contribution

61. Indonesia appears to believe that as it contends the laws and regulations on which it relies form
part of an overall mining policy, it is exonerated from the requirement to de monstrate the
contribution, in quantitative or qualitative terms that the measures may make to securing their
compliance objective. However, even if the Panel were to accept that the export ban and
domestic processing requirement are part of a general 'sus tainable' mining policy, Indonesia
must still adduce evidence showing that there is a genuine relationship of ends and means as
between the interest invoked (securing the enforcement of environmental/sustainable mining
rules) and the measures themselves. It has failed to do so.
62. Indonesia claims that the export prohibition on nickel ore demonstrably reduces the amount of
nickel extracted, which in turn mitigates the negative environmental consequences of nickel
mining and the risks of resource depletion.
63. The relevant legal question, however, is the contribution of the measures to addressing the
enforcement of the environmental/ conservation standards identified. Moreover, the claim that
there is a reduction in extraction is not substantiated.
64. Indonesia's reasoning also presupposes that such environmental effects as it has demonstrated
are caused (and will continue to be caused) by the exportation of nickel ore. However, Indonesia
has not demonstrated that the extraction of nickel ore for exports as opposed to the extraction
of nickel ore as such is responsible for the scope of the adverse environmental effects it
identified. The alleged causal link reposes on the sole basis that historically nickel ore that was
extracted from predatory mining practices was for export (as was a large proportion of all nickel
ore mined in Indonesia). This does not account for legal exports of ore.
65. Moreover, Indonesia has placed evidence on the record that demonstrates that environmental
issues continue. This indicates precisely that limiting the ultimate destination of the ore is not
apt to secure compliance with the environmental standards.
66. Indonesia relies on affidavit evidence and expert reports prepared during the course of the
proceedings to affirm that enforcement of the environmental standards has improved since the
introduction of the export ban and Domestic Processing Requirement. However, Indonesia's own
export acknowledges that in 2020, changes to enforcement structures were introduced
(centralisation), and that these changes have impacted significantly on the issuing of licences
and monitoring functions. Indonesia has never suggested that these measures are necessary to
secure compliance with rules that criminalise breaches of specific environmental standards, nor
that they are necessary to secure compliance with a prohibition on predatory mining.
67. In any event, it is not possible to assess the contribution of the measures to the compliance
objective on the basis of this evidence which does not show c ausality nor account for other
significant changes in the regulatory system.
68. As to the domestic processing requirement, Indonesia has not substantiated its claim that
compliance with the same environmental standards that were applicable previously is bett er
secured through the alleged changes to vertical integration this measure induces. Nor has it
shown that removing spot sales is a necessary means to secure compliance.
69. The long term supply contracts Indonesia refers to do not apply to the whole of the d omestic
market. The only enforcement issues Indonesia initially identified related to the remote
geography of the regions where the mines are situated. Whilst Indonesia claims that it is now
easier to check that the volumes of ore sent for domestic process ing match the authorised
quantities in the mining permits, it has not advanced any persuasive argument as to why this
type of check could not be undertaken as regards exports and hence, why this is a necessary
measure. It refers to generalised "jurisdictio nal" issues but has not shown why it is necessary
to address these though a total export ban and the Domestic Processing Requirement.
4.3.2 There are adequate less, or non-trade restrictive alternatives to the export ban
and domestic processing requirement that would achieve the alleged objective

70. Indonesia asserts that each of the two measures it identifies pursue one single objective, namely
securing compliance with the rules on environmental standards and resource conservation as
defined in the legal provisions it identifies as the relevant laws or regulations for these purposes
(Article 96 (c) and (d) of Law No.4/2009 and Article 57 of Law No.32/2009).
71. There are adequate less or non-trade restrictive measures which could equally contribute to that
alleged objective and the European Union has proposed one such alternative measure.
72. Whilst the European Union must show that its alternative would contribute equally in addressing
the compliance issues that Indonesia has identified, the European Union is not required to
identify two separate measures and nor is it required to identify an alternative measure that
applies the same regulatory approach to that in the Indonesian measures. Moreover, for the
Panel's assessment, the relevant objective is that of secu ring compliance with environmental
standards, as opposed to other effects that the Indonesian measures may allegedly have.
73. As an alternative to the complete ban on exports and the Domestic Processing Requirement, the
European Union proposes an export authorisation system, whereby exports of nickel ore would
be permitted upon production by the exporter of a document attesting that the nickel ore has
been mined in compliance with all the environmental requirements that Indonesia purports to
enforce through t hese measures. This type of export authorisation system could build on the
mechanisms introduced previously in Indonesia domestic law as CnC certification. However, it is
different to that scheme.
74. According the legislative provisions cited by Indonesia, C nC certification was afforded at the
point in time when a mining permit was issued. To the extent that it was relevant in the context
of export authorisations, this was only as a check that the permit holder had been granted this
status.
75. Under the alternative proposed by the European Union, the export authorisation system would
require a check at the point of export that each specific consignment of ore for which export
approval is sought meets the environmental standards Indonesia claims it is seeking to secure
compliance with. The same system could equally entail a check that the quantities of ore
correspond to those authorised in the RKAB.
76. Indonesia claims that the contribution of its domestic processing requirement is that it allows
this specific level of regulatory scrutiny and that it maintains control within the jurisdiction. The
European Union's alternative would be a less trade restrictive means to extend equivalent
regulatory scrutiny to the point of export – whilst maintaining the checks within I ndonesia's
jurisdiction.
77. Indonesia claims that it can only reduce extraction rates and ensure compliance with
environmental standards if it controls demand. This argument must be assessed in a context in
which it has introduced no measures to control domestic demand or consumption. To the extent
that this argument is then linked to alleged jurisdictional issues, these can, as explained above,
be resolved by imposing a check within the territory of Indonesia prior to export.
78. Whilst, the precise substantive scope of CnC certification and in particular the environmental
standards and sustainable mining requirements it encompassed, has not been fully explained or
substantiated by Indonesia, given that currently Indonesia applies a complete ban on exports of
nickel ore, rather than a system of prior export authorization, the proposed alternative is plainly
not part of the measures already applied.
4.4 Indonesia has not demonstrated that the application of the measures is consistent
with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
4.4.1 The Legal Standard
79. The chapeau imposes an additional discipline on the exception provided by Article XX of the
GATT 1994. In order to be successful in claiming that a certain measure which is inconsistent
with the disciplines of the GATT 1994 is justified by application of Article XX, the Member relying
on this exception must not only demonstrate that the specific conditions in the relevant

subparagraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX are fulfilled; but also that they comply with the chapeau,
which contains further conditions and limitations of the defence under Article XX.
80. With regard to the interpretation of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination", prior Appellate
Body jurisprudence therefore underscores the importance of examining the question of whether
the discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the stated policy objective
of the measure.
81. Concerning the correct order of analysis, it will normally be appropriate for a panel to first assess
whether the specific conditions of one of the specific exceptions listed in Article XX (a) to (j) of
the GATT 1994 are met, before turning to the disciplines set out in the chapeau, there may be
cases where the panel can properly determine whether the conditions of Article XX are fulfilled
by finding that the chapeau has not been complied with. The European Union considers that the
present case may be one of these instances and that the Panel could therefore start its analysis
by determining that the conditions of the chapeau are not met.
4.4.2 Indonesia's measures do not comply with the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994
82. Indonesia's measures clearly discriminate between foreign and domestic purchasers of nickel
ore.
83. This discrimination is also arbitrary and unjustifiable. The measures at issue cannot be reconciled
with, or be regarded as rationally related to, the alleged policy objective of the measures at
issue. Indonesia's Export Prohibition and Domestic Processing Requirement prohibit and restrict
exports, while they in no way whatsoever limit domestic consumption of nickel ore. Indeed, the
European Union has demonstrated that Indonesia tries to foster a stronger domestic use of nickel
ore. These measures cannot therefore be related to the alleged objecti ve of environmental
protection or the conservation of mineral resources insofar as they impose no limit on the
domestic use of nickel ore.
84. Indonesia's measures therefore amount to arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination within the
meaning of the chapeau. As these measures are in reality designed to shift resources to domestic
producers by resorting to means which are inconsistent with Arti cle XI:1 of the GATT 1994,
these measures can be regarded as "disguised restrictions on international trade" within the
meaning of the chapeau: Indonesia alleges in the present proceedings that the measures service
environmental concerns (and compliance with laws designed to safeguard such concerns), while
in reality the objective pursued is to strengthen domestic industry.
85. The European Union therefore considers that Indonesia has not demonstrated that its measures
comply with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.

ANNEX B-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF INDONESIA
I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the core of this dispute is access to Indonesia's nickel resources.
2. Two decades ago, the exploitation of Indonesia's nickel was relatively manageable. However,
between 2006 and 2013, Indonesia's nickel ore production increased more than seven -fold, with
dire consequences for Indonesia's environment and the sustainability of its nickel resources.
Predatory mining activities resulted in substantial environmental degradation in nickel producing
areas: deforestation, land disturbance, water and soil contami nation, and other environmental
impacts associated with export -oriented nickel mining threatened the integrity of the Indonesian
environment, and the livelihoods of indigenous people, fauna and ecosystems. Moreover, increased
nickel extraction put a strain on Indonesia's nickel reserves and increased depletion rates to
unsustainable levels. If left unchecked, nickel -mining activities in Indonesia would shortly result in
the complete depletion of Indonesia's nickel reserves, leaving behind the curse of envir onmental
destruction as a legacy for the Indonesian people.1
3. To mitigate these risks, Indonesia adopted a comprehensive policy framework to regulate
mining activities. This comprehensive mining policy comprised multiple legal instruments such as a
new basic mining law, environmental protection laws, water and forestry laws, a new resource
conservation policy, improved resource and reserves reporting mechanisms, raw material
certification, land reclamation and post -mining activities, among others. It imposes a number of
requirements on regulators and private operators alike, with the objective of promoting sustainable
mining practices and adequate management of Indonesia's mineral resources. Temporary export
moratoria succeeded in immediately curbing nickel production to sustainable levels, and in enabling
enforcement of Indonesia's comprehensive policy for mining activities. The results obtained were so
significant that Indonesia gradually relaxed the export prohibition on nickel ore over time, and
allowed Indonesian producers to resume export activities.
4. However, Indonesia is once again facing a second "gold rush" for its nickel resources. While
global and domestic demand for nickel ore as an input into steel production remains strong, demand
for nickel ore as an input to produce electric vehicle (EV) batteries is expected to explode in the next
20 years. Thus, Indonesia's nickel reserves and environment are once again at a critical juncture.
The measures that have been challenged by the European Union in this dispute are crucial elements
of Indonesia's comprehensive policy framework on sustainable mining and mineral resource
management.2
5. This dispute is one of the most systemically important disputes before the WTO dispute
settlement mechani sm to date. Stripped to its essence, this dispute concerns whether WTO
disciplines authorize developing WTO Members to use trade measures as part of a comprehensive
policy framework to manage their natural resources in a sustainable manner, to the benefit of their
economies and people.3
6. The European Union appears to consider that that the WTO Agreements have removed trade
measures from the policy -makers' toolkit, and have conferred upon developed countries an
unfettered right to the natural resources of d eveloping WTO Members. 4 Indonesia disagrees. As
stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, the covered agreements seek to expand production
of and trade in goods and services, "while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment". In furtherance of this objective, the covered agreements — and in particular the
GATT 1994 — provide developing WTO Members with sufficient policy space to use trade measures,

1 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 5-6.
2 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 9-10.
3 Indonesia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
4 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 2.

such as those at issue in this dispute, to manage their natural resources and protect the environment
in a WTO-consistent manner.5
7. The question before this Panel is whether the WTO will remain true to the terms of the original
bargain that its Members struck in 1995; whether sustainable development is something more than
an empty slogan, an aspiration; or whether, instead, WTO disciplines are sufficiently flexible to allow
developing WTO Members to overcome the "resource curse" and develop themselves economically,
while seeking to preserve and protect their natural resources and environment.6
8. The Panel must interpret the GATT 1994 in a manner that is consistent with the sustainable
development objective in the first recital of the preamble to the WTO Agre ement, and upholds the
international law principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR).7 This principle
has attained the privileged status of customary international law, and the Panel is mandated to apply
it pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention and Article 3.2 of the DSU.8 The principle
of PSNR " affords Members the opportunity to use their natural resources to promote their own
development while regulating the use of these resources to ensure sustainable development."9
9. In this dispute, the European Union invites the Panel to interpret the relevant provisions of
the GATT 1994 in a manner that would empty the principle of PSNR of its normative content. The
Panel must reject this invitation and, instead, interpret the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994
harmoniously with the principle of PSNR, as required by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.10
10. First, the principle of PSNR pleads against an interpretation of Article XI:1 under that
effectively prohibits any non-discriminatory internal domestic regulations that have indirect impacts
on competitive opportunities for exports. The corollary of such a reading is that importing countries
have an unfettered right to the natural resources of exporting countries in the form of their raw
materials. This is simply incompatible with the right of every country to exercise their permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources "in the interest of their national development
and the well-being of the people of the State concerned."11
11. Second, the principle of PSNR weighs against a reading of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994
under which measures taken to prevent or relieve a critical shortage of natural resources are
considered "incapable" of doing so simply because domestic production or consumption is not
restricted. Likewise, the principle of PSNR does not support an interpretation of Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994 under which domestic production and consumption must necessarily be restricted in
order to s ecure compliance with laws and regulations aimed at preserving the environment and
conserving natural resources. The European Union's interpretation, predicated on the proposition
that economic development and environmental and conservation efforts are somehow incompatible,
does not comport with the principle that "[e]very country has the sovereign right … freely to dispose
of its natural resources in the interest of the economic development and well -being of its own
people."12
12. Third, the principle of PSNR pleads against a reading of Article XI:2(a) under which the
relative economic importance of a product is entirely irrelevant for the purposes of that provision,
because the reference to "foodstuffs" in Article XI:2(a) purportedly implies that only products that
are "absolutely indispensable" to meet "the vital needs of the population" can be deemed "essential"
under Article XI:2(a).13 Such an interpretation would render Article XI:2(a) unavailable to prevent
critical shortages of natu ral resources that are absolutely indispensable to the economies of WTO
Members because they guarantee the livelihoods of millions of people. This is simply incongruent

5 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 3.
6 Indonesia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 8.
7 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 14.
8 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 273.
9 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.381.
10 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 278.
11 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 32 (quoting
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 14
December 1962, Exhibit IDN-131 (emphasis added)).
12 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 32 (quoting
Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964 –
Vol.I: Final Act and Report by UNCTAD, Exhibit IDN-132, p. 10).
13 European Union's second written submission, paras. 131 and 132.

with the "inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over the ir natural
resources in the interest of their national development."14
13. Fourth, the principle of PSNR is relevant to, and must be taken into account in, the
interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. In particular, it pleads against an
interpretation of the chapeau under which a distinction between foreign and domestic purchasers
constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination". The corollary of such a reading, again, is that
importing countries have an unfettered right to the natural resources of exporting countries in the
form of their raw materials, and this is simply incompatible with the right of every country to exercise
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources "in the interest of their national development."15
14. Indonesia is confident that this Panel will interpret the GATT 1994 in a manner that is
consistent with the sustainable development objective in the first recital of the preamble to the WTO
Agreement, and upholds the international law principle of PSNR. 16 The multilateral trading system
is ripe for a finding that developing Members may use trade measures for sustainability and
conservation purposes.17
II. INDONESIA'S PRELIMINARY JURISDICTIONAL CLAIM

15. In its first written submission, Indonesia raised a preliminary jurisdictional challenge under
Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU in relation to MEMR Regulations 7/2012, 11/2012, 20/2013, and
1/2014. As Indonesia explained, these measures had not been subject to consultations, and their
addition to the panel's terms of reference impermissibly expanded the temporal scope of the dispute
and changed its essence to include measures that permitted rather than prohibited the exportation
of nickel ore. Indonesia therefore requested that the Panel find that these measures are outside of
its terms of reference under Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU.18 It was not necessary for the Panel to
issue a preliminary ruling to this effect, insofar as the European Union did not appear to seek findings
of inconsistency in respect of the added measures. Subsequently, in its opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, the European Union confirmed that it only sought panel findings in relation
to the measures that currently implement the two measures at i ssue, namely, MEMR Regulations
25/2018 and 11/2019, and MOT Regulation 96/2019.19
16. Later in the proceedings, the European Union appeared to change its position, expressly
requesting the Panel to make findings in relation to MEMR Regulation 1/2014 because this legal
instrument purportedly was "still in force." 20 As Indonesia clarified, however, MEMR Regulation
1/2014 is no longer in force as subsequent MEMR Regulations have expressly revoked it. 21 The
exclusive bases for the export prohibition on nickel ore presently in place are MEMR Regulation
11/2019 and MOT Regulation 96/2019.
17. The European Union subsequently agreed that MEMR Regulation 1/2014 is no longer in force.22
Given the European Union's confirmation that it only seeks findings in relat ion to the current bases
of the export prohibition on nickel ore, it may not be necessary for the Panel to determine whether
this measure falls within its terms of reference.

14 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 35 (quoting
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2158 (XXI), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 25
November 1966, Exhibit IDN-133, p. 29 (emphasis added)).
15 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 36 (quoting
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 14
December 1962, Exhibit IDN-131 (emphasis added)).
16 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 14.
17 Indonesia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 16.
18 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 63-74.
19 European Union's opening statement, paras. 6-9.
20 European Union's response to Panel question No. 20(b), para. 32.
21 Specifically, Article 22 of MEMR Regulation 5/2017 (Exhibit IDN-33) expressly revoked MEMR
Regulation 01/2014 and implementing regulation upon its entry into force on 11 January 2017.
22 European Union's answers to Panel question No. 72, para. 21.

III. ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE DOMESTIC
PROCESSING REQUIREMENT

18. The European Union failed to establish that Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is even applicable
to the domestic processing requirement, let alone that it is inconsistent with that provision. 23
Article XI:1 applies strictly to border measures that have a limiting effect on importation or
exportation. It does not apply to internal measures.24 The Appellate Body has clarified that "border
measures apply 'by virtue of the event of importation' while, by contrast, internal measures apply
'because of an internal factor'".25 Applying this framework, the domestic processing requirement is
not a border measure because it does not apply by virtue of the exportation of nickel ore. Instead,
the domestic processing requirement is an internal measure triggered by an internal factor, namely,
the production, sale and use of nickel ore.26
19. The European Union's attempt to establish that the scope of Articl e XI:1 is not limited to
border measures is unavailing.27 First, the European Union argues that Article XI:1 "is couched in
general terms, encompassing 'prohibitions' as well as 'restrictions'", such that "the provision is
therefore a broad one and not limited to only border measures."28 However, the fact that Article XI:1
refers to "prohibitions" and "restrictions" indicates the limiting effect of the measures in question,
but says nothing about whether such "prohibitions" and "restrictions" can be made effective through
border measures, internal measures, or both, in order to fall within the scope of Article XI:1.29
20. Second, the European Union relies on the phrase "sale for export" in Article XI:1, and argues
that "the very wording of Article XI:1 … includes a business activity which would have to be
considered 'internal' … [and] this in and of itself demonstrates that that provision is not limited to
'border measures'".30 Yet, a "sale for export" cannot be characterized as an internal measure merely
because it takes place behind the border.31 Instead, the relevant question in determining whether a
measure applicable to a sale for export is a border or internal measure is what is the triggering event
for its application. If a measure applies only to sales for export, then by definition it applies by virtue,
or because of, those sales being destined for the export market. Accordingly, it is a border measure.
Conversely, if a measure applies to sales for export as well as sales for the domestic market, then
by definition it cannot be characterized as a border measure because it does not apply by virtue, or
because of, sales being destined for export. The reference to "sale for export" in Article XI:1 thus
simply confirms that this provision covers on ly border measures, in this instance measures that
apply by virtue, or because of, a sale for export.32
21. Third, the European Union wrongly relies on the exclusion of "taxes or other charges" from
the scope of Article XI:1 in support of its contention th at "the prohibition is not limited to 'border
measures'".33 The reference to "duties, taxes or other charges" in Article XI:1 excludes from the
scope of that provision measures falling within the scope of Article II of the GATT 1994, namely: (i)
ordinary customs duties under Article II:1(b), first sentence; (ii) other duties or charges under
Article II:1(b), second sentence; and (iii) border tax adjustments under Article II:2(a). The text of
Articles II:1(b) and II:2 makes clear that such measures are undoubtedly border measures, i.e.
measures imposed "on importation". Thus, the reference to "duties, taxes or other charges" in

23 Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 29-45; Indonesia's opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, paras. 15-23.
24 Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 29-39; Indonesia's comments on the European Union's
response to Panel question No. 78, paras. 12-22.
25 Indonesia's second written submission, para. 37 (quoting Appellate Body Report, China - Auto Parts,
paras. 158 and 163).
26 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 19.
27 European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 36.
28 European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 38.
29 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 13.
30 European Union's response to Panel questions No.78, para. 39.
31 Indeed, the locus of application of a measure applicable to exports is particularly unhelpful in
determining whether it constitutes a border or internal measure, because both border and internal measures
apply "before" products have left the exporting Member. If the locus of a measure's application were
dispositive of its characterization as a border or internal measure, then all measures applied to products
destined for exportation would be characterized as "internal measures", even if they did not apply due to an
internal factor but, instead, because of, or by virtue of, exportation (See Indonesia's comments on the
European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 15).
32 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, paras. 14-16.
33 European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 40.

Article XI:1 supports Indonesia's interpretation that this provision disciplines only border measures
limiting importation or exportation.34
22. This is the only reading that is consistent with the fact that Article XI:1 proscribes only
"prohibitions" or "restrictions" that are "made effective through quotas, import or export licences or
other measures". The illustrative reference to "quotas, import or export licences" in Article XI:1
imparts meaning to the "other measures" through which "prohibitions" or "restrictions" can be "made
effective" for the purposes of Article XI:1. It is beyond disp ute that "quotas, import or export
licences" are all border measures, i.e., they belong to a class of measures that are triggered by, or
apply by virtue of, importation or exportation, rather than an internal factor. Accordingly, properly
construed, Artic le XI:1 applies strictly to border measures that have a direct limiting effect on
importation or exportation.35
23. Finally, there is no basis whatsoever for the European Union's apparent contention that
internal measures affecting importation do not fall within the scope of Article XI:1, while internal
measures affecting exportation do.36 Nothing in the text of Arti cle XI:1 supports the notion that it
has an asymmetrical scope of application in relation to, on the one hand, internal measures affecting
importation and, on the other hand, internal measures affecting exportation. The existence of Ad
Article III does not change that conclusion, but rather supports it. If the framers of the GATT 1994
intended to create disciplines governing internal measures that impacted competitive opportunities
for exports, they would have done so expressly. 37 The absence of disciplin es does not give the
European Union an excuse to shoehorn measures that are not covered by Article XI:1 into it.38
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DOMESTIC PROCESSING
REQUIREMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994

24. In the alternative, even if Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is applicable to the domestic
processing requirement ( quod non ), the European Union failed to establish a violation of that
provision. As clarified by the Appellate Body, "not every condition or burden placed on importation
or exportation will be inconsistent with Article XI:1, but only those that … limit the importation or
exportation of products". 39 The European Union thus bears the burden of demonstrating that the
domestic processing requirement has a limiting effect on the exportation of nickel ore, such that it
constitutes a "restriction" within the meaning of Article XI:1. The European Union cannot discharge
this burden because the export prohibition under MEMR Regulation 11/2019 totally prohibits the
exportation of nickel ore as of 1 January 2020. Thus, there is simply no circumstance in which the
domestic processing requirement under MEMR Regulation 25/2018 can have any limiting effect on
nickel ore exports.40
25. Faced with this fact, the Eu ropean Union argues that the two measures should be assessed
separately, and speculates that the domestic processing requirement would restrict exports if
Indonesia lifted the export prohibition.41 Unfortunately for the European Union, the evidence on the
record entirely debunks its speculation. Uncontested, real -life export data on the panel record
conclusively shows that nickel ore exports actually increased substantially during the period in which

34 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 17.
35 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 78, para. 18.
36 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 79, paras. 270-272; Indonesia's closing statement at the
second meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
37 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 78, paras. 21-22.
38 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 79, paras. 270-272; Indonesia's comments on the
European Union's response to Panel question No. 79, para. 24.
39 Indonesia's second written submission, para. 46 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import
Measures, para. 5.217).
40 Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 49-52.
41 European Union’s opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 18. Indonesia agrees that
the domestic processing requirement and the export prohibition must be assessed separately. In particular, the
European Union must demonstrate that the domestic processing requirement has a limiting effect on
exportation that is separate and apart from the limiting effect of the export prohibition. This is consistent with
the Appellate Body's guidance to the effect that there must be in every case a genuine relationship between
the measure at issue and its alleged effects (Indonesia's second written submission, para. 49 (citing Appellate
Body Reports, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 96; US - Clove Cigarettes, footnote

the domestic processing requirement was in place and an export prohibition was not.42 By contrast,
there is no evidentiary foundation for any proposition that, during those periods, exports would have
been more "but for" the domestic processing requirement.43
26. Faced with the evidence that exports increased wh en the domestic processing requirement
was in effect and an export prohibition was not, the European Union then speculates that "[i]t cannot
be excluded that these exports are due to the fact that Indonesia may have fail[ed] to properly
implement its own laws".44 Contrary to the European Union's speculation, exports occurred during
the relevant period pursuant to specific legal provisions authorizing such exports. 45 These specific
legal provisions are lex specialis to, and apply regardless of, the ge neral requirement to conduct
minimum processing activities in Indonesia. 46 The uncontested export data on the Panel record
corroborates this.47 It follows that the domestic processing requirement cannot have a limiting effect
on the exportation of nickel ore. Instead, as the evidence on the record confirms, any limiting effect
on the exportation of nickel ore is solely attributable to the export prohibition.
27. In light of the above, even if Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is applicable to the domestic
processing requirement (quod non), the European Union failed to make a prima facie case that this
measure is inconsistent with Article XI:1.
V. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XI:2(A) OF THE
GATT 1994

28. Even if the Panel were to find that the European Union has discharged of its burden to establish
a violation of Article XI:1, Indonesia has demonstrated that the measures at issue are justified
under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994.
29. At the outset, contrary to what the European Union su ggests, Article XI:2(a) of the
GATT 1994 does not contemplate a threshold inquiry into whether the export restrictions or
prohibitions at issue are "capable of" preventing or relieving a critical shortage in essential products.
Article XI:2(a) only appli es to a limited universe of measures, namely, "export prohibitions or
restrictions" within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Because Article XI:2(a) is co-
extensive with Article XI:1, only measures that have a "limiting effect" on exports a re potentially
covered by Article XI:2(a). By definition, measures that have a "limiting effect" on exportation are
in principle at least "capable of" preventing or relieving a crucial deficiency in quantities. It is thus
entirely unnecessary for the Panel to separately examine, at the threshold, whether the challenged
measures are "capable of" preventing or relieving critical shortages of the essential product in
question.48
30. As explained below, Indonesia has made a prima facie case in relation to the three analytical
elements of an affirmative defence under Article XI:2(a), namely, that: (i) the measures at issue
are "temporarily applied"; (ii) a critical shortage of nickel ore is present or imminent; and (iii) nickel
ore is an "essential" product for Indonesia.
A. The Measures at Issue are Temporarily Applied

31. Indonesia has demonstrated that the measures at issue are "temporarily applied" within the
meaning of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. As clarified by the Appellate Body, the fact that a
measure does not establish a fixed time -limit in advance is not dispositive. 49 In this respect,
Article XI:2(a) covers measures "applied for a limited duration, adopted in order to bridge a passing

42 Indonesia's response to panel question No. 13, paras. 45-57; Indonesia's second written submission,
paras. 55-58; and MEMR, Excel of "Production and Sales of Nickel Ore from 2010-2020", Exhibit IDN-24.
43 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 73, paras. 230-237.
44 European Union's response to Panel question No. 77, para. 33.
45 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 77, paras. 6-11.
46 See e.g. Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 73, paras. 230-237.
47 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 29-31; Indonesia's
response to Panel question No. 73, paras. 230-237; Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 74,
paras. 238-247.
48 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 87, para. 303; Indonesia's comments on the
European Union's response to Panel question No. 87, para. 63.
49 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 331.

need, irrespective of whether or not the temporal scope of the measure is fixed in advance."50 Record
evidence demonstrates that the measures at issue are applied for a limited time, in order to bridge
a passing nickel supply shortfall for the domestic processing industry.51
32. First, the design, structure and architecture of MEMR Regulation 11/2019 expressly links the
export prohibition on nickel ore to the passing supply needs of nickel processing and refining facilities
in Indonesia. In this regard, the first preambular recital of MEMR Regulation 11/2019 provides that
it aims "to ensure the continuity of supply of nickel processing a nd refining facilities … and several
domestic nickel processing and refining facilities have been built." 52 It therefore establishes, on its
face, that the objective of the export prohibition on nickel ore is to bridge a passing need for nickel
ore stemming from an increase in domestic processing capacity.
33. Second, this is further corroborated by a contemporaneous press release in which MEMR's
Director General explains that the main rationale for MEMR Regulation 11/2019 was "limited proven
reserves … which can only supply nickel ore to smelters for 7.3 years". 53 Thus, MEMR decided to
"take some anticipatory steps so that the reserves lifespan can fulfil the economic life of smelters."54
He also expresses hope that technological developments will allow low -grade nickel processing as
inputs for batteries. 55 This contemporaneous evidence undoubtedly demonstrates that the export
restrictions on nickel ore are temporary, and have been adopted exclusively to bridge the passing
supply needs of domestic smelters given the current level of proven reserves and the state of the
technology.
34. Third, Indonesia has a consistent record of applying export moratoria on nickel ore exclusively
on a temporary basis.56 In this regard, the exportation of nickel ore was prohibited temporarily, first,
for a period of 15 days between 6 May 2012 and 21 May 2012, and second, for a period of about
three years between 11 January 2014 and 1 February 2017. Similarly, Article 46 of MEMR Regulation
25/2018 temporarily permitted the exportation of unprocessed or unrefined nickel ore despite any
minimum processing requirement imposed on domestic producers, until those exports were entirely
prohibited by MEMR Regulation 11/2019 and MOT Regulation 96/2019.57
35. Fourth and finally, the limited time -period for which the challenged measures have been in
place does not support the inference that they are somehow "permanent", as the European Union
suggests.58
36. In sum, the totality of the evidence before this Panel conclusively establishes that the
measures at issue are applied for a limited time, in order to bridge a passing need for nickel supplies
stemming from increased domestic processing capacity.
B. A Critical Shortage of Nickel Ore is Imminent and Grave

37. Turning to the critical shortage element under Article XI:2(a), Indonesia has demonstrated
that its nickel reserves are presently insufficient to meet the total production capacity of Indonesia's
existing smelters beyond 2026. Indonesia has demo nstrated further that the grave imbalance
between available nickel quantities and the needs of the domestic industry is going to be exacerbated
in the next 4 to 6 years.59
38. To put this in concrete terms, Indonesia's nickel ore consumption is projected to increase
exponentially between 2020 and 2026. This suggests that Indonesia's Competent Persons -verified
nickel ore reserves of about 1 billion wmt will only be sufficient to meet the needs of Indonesia's

50 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 331.
51 Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 71-84.
52 MEMR Regulation 11/2019, Exhibit IDN-29, p. 2. Similarly, the first recital of the preamble of MOT
Regulation 96/2019 expressly links that measure with supporting "the effectiveness of the implementation of
the export of mining commodities as processing and refining products." MOT Regulation 96/2019, Exhibit IDN-
30, p. 2.
53 Press Release from the MEMR, 2 September 2019, Exhibit IDN-92, p. 2.
54 Press Release from the MEMR, 2 September 2019, Exhibit IDN-92, p. 2.
55 Press Release from the MEMR, 2 September 2019, Exhibit IDN-92, p. 2.
56 Indonesia's second written submission, para. 78.
57 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 102.
58 Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 80-82.
59 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 48-49.

domestic industry until 2026. 60 If one includes non -Competent Persons verified reserves into
available supply inventory, quantities of nickel ore (of 2 billion wmt) will only be sufficient to meet
the needs of the domestic industry until 2030. 61 In other words, based on Indonesia's cur rent
estimate of nickel ore quantities presently available, Indonesia's domestic nickel ore market will
move into a structural deficit in 4 to 8 years' time; a period that the European Union itself appears
to recognize as inadequate to justify the large-scale investment in the construction of new processing
plants.62
39. The European Union's rebuttal of Indonesia's prima facie showing of a "critical shortage" within
the meaning of Article XI:2(a) hinges on its assertion that the Maryono report underestimates
Indonesia's nickel reserves. That assertion is simply not credible. 63 Among other things, it is belied
by the fact that the total reserves that the Maryono report estimates is actually higher than the
USGS estimate of 21 million tons. In addition, the methodology that the European Union would
conveniently have Indonesia apply to estimate its nickel reserves must be rejected if only because
it entails a substantial deviation from international standards, including the reserve reporting
standards that EU Member States themselves are required to apply in calculating mineral reserves.64
40. Contrary to the European Union's assertions, the hard data on the panel record demonstrates
a grave imbalance between Indonesia's existing nickel reserves and domestic demand, such that
there is undoubtedly a "crucial deficiency in quantities" giving rise to a "passing need" that export
restrictions seek to "bridge".65
C. Nickel Ore is Essential for Indonesia

41. Finally, Indonesia has established that nickel is a product that is "essential" for Indonesia
within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994.66 In Sulawesi and Maluku, nickel mi ning
alone accounts for between 23 and 41% of the regional GDP and represents close to 20% of all
paying jobs.67 Nationally, mining is a priority industry in its own right, accounting for 6.4% of the
GDP.68 Nickel is one of the most important mining products of Indonesia, with exports of nickel ore
and nickel-based products accounting for wholly 62% of Indonesia's exports of mining products. 69
Globally, Indonesia is the largest nickel supplier worldwide, accounting for one -third of global
production.70
42. In addition, nickel ore is a critical input for key sectors of the Indonesian economy, enabling
steel-making production, which accounts for close to 4% of the industrial GDP, 71and supporting the
construction, automotive and auto-parts sectors downstream. These sectors combined account for
20% of the Indonesian industrial GDP.72 Moreover, nickel is a critical input into Indonesia's emerging
EV battery production industry, and is indispensable for Indonesia's transition away from fossil fuels
into renewable energy, carbon emissions reduction, and economic development.73
43. The European Union does not appear to challenge the relative importance of nickel as an input
into a critical industry in Indonesia. It argues, instead, that the relative importance of ni ckel as an
input is legally irrelevant, because only foodstuffs and other products "indispensable to meet the

60 Indonesia’s second written submission, para. 99.
61 Indonesia’s second written submission, para. 98.
62 See e.g. European Union's second written submission, paras. 124-127.
63 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 102, para. 339.
64 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 52-55.
65 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 323.
66 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 41-47.
67 MEMR, Impact of Smelter Development in the Special Economic zone in Sulawesi (2015), Exhibit IDN-
61.
68 Bank Indonesia, "Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Current Prices", Indonesian Economic
and Financial Statistics (2021), 226-227, Exhibit IDN-50.
69 Indonesia's second written submission, para. 110.
70 USGS, Excel of "Nickel Reserves", Exhibit IDN-20.
71 Bank Indonesia, "Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Current Prices", Indonesian Economic
and Financial Statistics (2021), 226-227, Exhibit IDN-50.
72 Bank Indonesia, "Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Current Prices", Indonesian Economic
and Financial Statistics (2021), 226-227, Exhibit IDN-50.
73 Reuters, "Europe's EV battery strategy threatened by supply chain gaps, Eramet says" (29 October
2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/technology/europes-ev-battery-strategy-threatened-by-supply-
chain-gaps-eramet-says-2021-10-29/ (last accessed 19 March 2022), Exhibit IDN-79.

essential needs of the population" can be "essential" within the meaning of Article XI:2(a). 74The
distinction the EU seeks to draw between the "vital" and the "economic" needs of the population is
totally artificial. Products that serve as inputs into particularly important economic sectors are
obviously necessary or indispensable to meet the "vital needs" of the population, because they create
the direct and indirect jobs that provide a livelihood to millions of individuals and their families.75
44. If the panel in China - Raw Materials was prepared to find that refractory bauxite, a mere
intermediary product in the production of iron and steel, was "essential" to China under
Article XI:2(a)76, this Panel should have no difficulty in concluding that nickel is "essential" to
Indonesia.
45. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Panel should therefore conclude that the measures at
issue are temporarily applied to prevent or relieve a critical shortage of nickel, a product that is
essential for Indonesia within the meaning of Article XI:2(a). Indonesia has demonstrated that the
measures at issue are fully justified under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994.
VI. The Measures At Issue Are Justified Under Article Xx(D) of the GATT 1994

46. In the unlikely event the Panel were to conclude that the measures at issue are not justified
under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, Indonesia has demonstrated that they are, nevertheless,
justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 as measures "necessary to secure compliance with"
WTO-consistent laws or regulations. More specifically, consistent with the legal standard under
Article XX(d), Indonesia has demonstrated that: (i) the "laws or regulations" that the challenged
measure seek to secure compl iance with are consistent with the GATT 1994; (ii) the measures at
issue are "necessary" to secure such compliance; and, (iii) the challenged measures are applied in
a manner consistent with the chapeau of Article XX.77
A. Indonesia's Laws or Regulations are Consistent with the GATT 1994

47. The relevant laws and regulations that the challenged measures seek to secure compliance
with are expressed in Articles 96(c) and (d) of Law No. 4/2009, and Article 57 of Law No. 32/2009.78
These measures essentially provide that mining permit holders must implement mining environment
management and monitoring, including reclamation and post mining activities, as well as mineral
conservation efforts. These sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements are
part of Indonesia's comprehensive policy framework on mining activities. The effectiveness of this
comprehensive policy depends on the interplay among its various elements, including the challenged
measures. This factor must therefore be taken into a ccount in an assessment under Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1994, in line with the Appellate Body's recognition that "complex … environmental
problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting
measures."79
48. The European Union does not dispute the WTO-consistency of the laws identified by Indonesia
for the purposes of its affirmative defence under Article XX(d). Therefore, they must be presumed
as a matter of law to be WTO-consistent.80

74 European Union's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 35.
75 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 44.
76 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.277 and 7.340.
77 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 147 (citing Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines), para. 177).
78 Indonesia's second written submission, para. 146; Indonesia's opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, para. 66; Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 105, para. 352.
79 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 151. See also Indonesia's response to Panel
question No. 119, paras. 408-410; Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question
No. 119, paras. 108-110.
80 Panel Reports, India – Solar Cells, para. 7.321 (referring to Panel Reports, US – Gambling, para.
6.549; US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.301; Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.531 (citing Appellate
Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157)).

B. The Challenged Measures are Designed to Secure Compliance with Indonesia's
Laws and Regulations

49. At the threshold, Article XX(d) requires the Panel to ascertain whether the measures at issue
are "designed to" secure compliance with the underlying laws or regulations. This is a relatively
"undemanding" inquiry where the Panel must simply check whether the challenged measures are
"not incapable" of securing compliance with the relevant laws or regulations. 81 The measures at
issue in this dispute are manifes tly capable of securing compliance with Indonesia's sustainable
mining and mineral resource management requirements.
50. First, the export prohibition removes from the market the opportunity to sell to purchasers
that are outside of Indonesia's jurisdiction, and it also reduces the overall amount of nickel extracted.
Any measure that reduces the total production and extraction of nickel ore cannot logically be
considered as incapable of securing compliance with laws and regulations mandating the protection
of the environment and conservation of exhaustible natural resources.82
51. Second, the domestic processing requirement, in turn, promotes vertical integration in the
supply chain, induces long-term changes in the behaviour of market players, and enables regulatory
conformity to be assessed both at the supply and demand ends of the supply chain. This discourages
spot sales of nickel ore, curbs predatory mining practices, and ensures that all mining activities are
properly regulated both on the supply and demand side. Any measure operating in this way is
evidently capable of securing compliance with laws and regulations mandating the protection of the
environment and conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 83
52. The Panel should thus have little difficulty in concluding that the measures at issue are
"designed" to secure compliance with Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource
management requirements.
C. The Challenged Measures are Necessary to Secure Compliance with
Indonesia's Laws and Regulations

53. Following the well-established analytical framework under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994,
Indonesia has demonstrated that the challenged measures are "necessary" to secure compliance
with its sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements.
54. First, Indonesia demonstrated that the relevant laws further interests or values of the highest
importance.84 Second, Indonesia acknowledged that while the export prohibition on nickel ore is
trade-restrictive, the domestic processing requirement does not entai l any limiting effect on
exportation, or is at most potentially trade-restrictive.85 Third, Indonesia established that both the
export prohibition and domestic processing requirement are apt to make a material contribution to
securing compliance with Indo nesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource management
requirements.86 Fourth, Indonesia established that the alternative measure put forward by the
European Union is not reasonably available, and would not make an equivalent contribution to
Indonesia's enforcement objective at Indonesia's chosen level of protection.87
55. The element of contribution within the necessity test under Article XX(d) appears to be the
sole issue disputed between the parties.

81 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel (quoting Appellate Body Report,
India - Solar Cells, para. 5.58).
82 Indonesia' second written submission, para. 128; Indonesia's opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, paras. 68-71.
83 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 178; Indonesia's second written submission, paras. 129-
130.
84 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 183-187.
85 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 188-190.
86 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 191-217; Indonesia's second written submission, paras.
158-182; Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 72-87.
87 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 218-220; Indonesia's comments on the European Union's
response to Panel question No. 111, paras. 87-95

1. The Export Prohibition is Apt to Make a Material Contribution to Indonesia's
Enforcement Objective

56. The crux of the European Union's contention is that the measures at issue are not apt to
make a material contribution to the enforcement of Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral
resource management requirements because Indonesia does not maintain any restrictions on the
domestic production or consumption of nickel ore. This contention rests on an unsubstantiated
assertion that all nickel mining — whether for export or domestic consumption — presents the same
compliance risk profile, such that any improvement in environmental or conservation efforts after
the adoption of the challenged measures would stem from a reduction in production, rather than
improvements in enforcing regulatory conformity.88 The evidence on the panel record debunks this
assertion.
57. Indeed, the panel record is replete with evidence demonstrating that export-oriented nickel
mining presented a higher risk profile than mining for domestic consumption, and that the challenged
measures have resulted in higher regulatory conformity in Indonesia. Such evidence consists of inter
alia:
• Exhibits IDN-59 through IDN-70, which demonstrate that predatory export-oriented mining
practices have resulted in substantial regulatory non-conformity and ensuing environmental
damage in nickel producing areas such as Sulawesi and Maluku.

• Exhibit IDN-106, which demonstrates that in 2020 Indonesia was the second largest supplier
of nickel ore to China while an export prohibition was in place.

• Exhibit IDN-52, which demonstrates that domestic smelters are subject to criminal sanctions
and fines pursuant to Article 161 of Law No. 4/2009, when foreign purchasers are obviously
not subject to any sanctions as they fall outside of Indonesia's enforcement jurisdiction.

• Exhibits IDN -15 and IDN -105, which demonstrate that subsequent to the challenged
measures there was a reduction of nickel mining permit holders from 717 to 220.

• Exhibits IDN-15 and IDN -109, where Professor Rudy Sayoga explains, based on empirical
data from MEMR, that the rate of deforestation in Southeast Sulawesi decreased subsequent
to the introduction of the measures at issue. Professor Sayoga explains that, f or an
equivalent increase in nickel ore production (11M wmt), the rate of deforestation after the
imposition of the challenged measures was about one third of what it was prior to the
enactment of those measures. Professor Sayoga also demonstrates that lan d reclamation
activities increased more than 2.5 times after the introduction of the measures, which is
direct evidence of increased compliance with Article 96(c) of Law No. 4/2009.

• Exhibits IDN-110 to IDN-112, and respective annexes, which demonstrate increased criminal
and administrative enforcement subsequent to the introduction of the measures at issue.

• Exhibit IDN -113, which demonstrates why domestic smelters subject to Indonesia's
regulatory powers make every effort to conform with relevant regulatory requirements and
act to combat illegal, export-oriented mining activities.89

58. The European Union's attempt to discredit this evidence on the record is unavailing and must
be rejected. 90 The European Union has itself argued that data on the number o f enforcement
proceedings initiated "before the measures and subsequently" is " an obvious means of
substantiating" Indonesia's claims regarding the contribution of the challenged measures to their
enforcement objective.91 Indonesia has placed such data on the record. The European Union cannot
simply walk away from the standard that the European Union itself articulated in these
proceedings.92

88 European Union's second written submission, para. 268.
89 Indonesia's response to panel question No. 64, para. 199.
90 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to panel question No. 128, paras. 118-137.
91 European Union's second written submission, para. 272 (emphasis added).
92 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 115, para. 101.

59. The Panel must also reject the European Union's erroneous assertion that Indonesia is
required to show, as part of its affirmative defence under Article XX(d), that the "changes in
enforcement activity" demonstrated by the evidence on the record "are attributable exclusively to
the measures at issue."93 There is no such requirement under Article XX(d), particularly where the
challenged measures are a component of a comprehensive framework with multiple elements
interacting synergistically to achieve a policy obje ctive. Indonesia need only show a "genuine
relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued" and the challenged measures.94
60. Based on an objective assessment of the totality of evidence on the record, the Panel should
have little difficulty in finding that the export prohibition at issue is apt to make a material
contribution to securing compliance with Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource
management requirements.
2. The Domestic Processing Requirement is Apt to Make a Material Contribution to
Indonesia's Enforcement Objective

61. The domestic processing requirement is also apt to make a material contribution to securing
compliance with Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements.
This is because it promotes vertical integration in the supply chain, induces long -term changes in
the behaviour of market players, and enables regulatory conformity to be assessed at both the
supply and demand ends of the supply chain.
62. Since the adoption of the measures at issue, IUP holders are required to submit RKABs
pursuant to which they receive authorization to mine specific quantities of nickel ore per year.
Domestic smelters are required by law to purchase, utilize, process, refine or sell only nickel ore
from conforming IUP holders, and only to the extent of their maximum production capacity. For this
reason, domestic smelters are increasingly undertaking long -term supply contracts with mining
companies or vertically integrating with them. 95 Indonesian regulators c an now cross -check
production volumes with consumption data in order to verify regulatory conformity. Any active IUP
holders which are not selling the production volumes approved in their RKABs to domestic smelters
become the object of increased regulatory scrutiny, because this is a strong indication of non -
conforming mining activities, illegal exports, or both. Conversely, any domestic smelters that
purchase inputs that do not correspond to RKAB volumes of their suppliers are similarly targeted for
criminal and administrative enforcement.96
63. Such an enhanced enforcement mechanism is simply not available in respect of sales between
domestic mining companies and foreign purchasers, as Indonesia has no access to consumption data
of foreign smelters. Therefore, Indonesian regulators simply cannot cross-check production volumes
with consumption data of foreign purchasers in order to verify regulatory conformity.97
64. The evidence on the record confirms that proper regulation of both the supply and demand
ends of the supply chain has resulted in increased enforcement. Indeed, it is not by coincidence that
the number of nickel IUP holders has decreased sharply subsequent to the adoption of the measures
at issue. Deprived of the opportunity to sell their non-conforming nickel ore to foreign suppliers that
are outside of the purview of Indonesia's authorities, rogue mining companies have decided to simply
stop production and have exited the market.98

93 European Union's response to Panel question No. 115, para. 170.
94 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145. See Indonesia's comments on the
European Union's response to Panel question No. 115, paras. 96-103.
95 See Sample of Nickel Ore Sales Contract 2, Exhibit IDN-58; Sample of Nickel Ore Sales Contract 3,
Exhibit IDN-71. In addition to these contracts that were already on the record, Indonesia is also providing the
underlying contract requested by the European Union in its second written submission (See European Union’s
second written submission, para. 274, and Sample of Nickel Ore Sales Contract 4, Exhibit IDN-114). Indonesia
is also providing two further contracts demonstrating how the domestic processing requirement has fostered
vertical integration and long-terms supply arrangements in the nickel supply chain (See Sample of Nickel Ore
Sales Contract 5, Exhibit IDN-115, and Sample of Nickel Ore Sales Contract 6, Exhibit IDN-116).
96 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 84. See also Indonesia's
response to Panel question No. 70, paras. 220-228; Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response
to Panel question No. 108, paras. 81-86.
97 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 108, para. 85.
98 Indonesia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 84-87.

65. In light of the above, the domestic processing requirement is manifestly apt to make a material
contribution to Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements.
3. The Alternative Measure Put Forward by the European Union is Not Reasonably
Available and Does not Make an Equi valent Contribution to Indonesia's Enforcement
Objective

66. It was incumbent on the European Union to propose reasonably available alternative measures
that are less trade restrictive than the measures at issue, while, at the same time, "preserving for
[Indonesia] its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued."99
Yet, the European Union has simply attempted to differentiate its purported alternative measure
from Indonesia's existing "clear and clean" certification process, but has failed to do so.100
67. In any event, to the extent that t he European Union's alternative measure can be
distinguished from Indonesia's clear and clean certification process, it is only on the basis that, under
the European Union's proposed alternative, border officials would need to determine for each and
every consignment of nickel ore whether such ore has been mined in compliance with Indonesia's
sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements. 101 This actually reveals,
however, that the European Union's proposed alternative is not reasonably available to Indonesia,
and would not make an equivalent contribution to the enforcement objectives of the challenged
measures.102
68. Indonesian border officials simply cannot determine by examining a consignment of nickel ore
whether such ore has been mined in conformity with sustainable mining and mineral resource
management requirements. Sustainably mined nickel and unsustainably mined nickel look exactly
the same. The European Union's proposed alternative measure would entail significant technical,
financial and resource obstacles for Indonesia, if it were even possible at all. It is simply theoretical
in nature, far removed from the regulatory reality in Indonesia, and thus not a reasonably available
alternative measure.103
69. Indeed, any measure that is remedial in character is not a reasonably available alternative
measure that would make an equivalent contribution to the enforcement of Indonesia's sustainable
mining and mineral resource management requirements at Indonesia's chosen level of protection.
This is because, unlike the export prohibition at issue, such measures do not remove ex ante all of
the foreign demand for Indonesia's nickel ore from the market, thus rendering any export activity
illegal preventively, and alleviating the burden of verify ing conformity ex post . Moreover, any
measure that seeks to secure compliance exclusively at the point of exportation would not allow
Indonesia to regulate both the supply and demand ends of the nickel ore production chain.
70. The Panel should thus find that the European Union has failed to identify a reasonably available
alternative measure that would make an equivalent contribution to Indonesia's enforcement
objective at Indonesia's chosen level of protection. As the Appellate Body has held, governments
"may adopt preventive measures" in pursuit of legitimate policy objectives, and are not required to
adopt, instead, remedial measures that involve "prohibitive costs or substantial technical
difficulties".104
D. The Challenged Measures are Applied Consist ently with the Chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994

71. Finally, the measures at issue are applied consistently with the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994. In particular, they are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary

99 Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, para. 156.
100 Indonesia's response to Panel question No. 107, paras. 357-359; Indonesia's response to Panel
question No. 110, paras. 375-377; Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question
No. 111, paras. 87-95.
101 European Union's response to Panel question No. 111, para. 151.
102 Indonesia's comments on the European Union's response to Panel question No. 111, paras. 87-95.
103 As the Appellate Body has held, "an alternative measure may be found not to be 'reasonably
available' … where it is merely theoretical in nature" (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 308).
104 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 171.

or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.
72. Indeed, there is no differential treatment entailed by the application of challenged measures,
let alone differential treatment that can be characterized as arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
under the chapeau of Article XX. Far from reflecting any discrimination, the measures at issue do
not distinguish at all between Indonesia's trading partners. Both measures apply with equal force
regardless of the importing country concerned. Put another way, the challenged measures are
applied even -handedly because all importing countries receive the same treatment. The
European Union's arguments to the contrary proceed from a faulty legal premise, namely, that the
discrimination proscribed under the chapeau refers to discrimination between "purchasers" of nickel
ore in Indonesia and "all other purchasers".105 This argument is unpersuasive.106
73. First, there is no legal basis for the proposition that the chapeau covers discrimination between
"purchasers". Instead, the chapeau, like other provisions of the GATT 1994, covers discrimination
between and among "products" and hence producers of the product at issue. Second, the
discrimination proscribed by the chapeau is, by its own terms, limited to discrimination between
"countries where the same conditions prevail". This is clearly a reference to discrimination between
and among the trading partners of the country applying the measure at issue. In this way, the
chapeau ensures even-handed application of measures otherwise inconsistent with the GATT 1994
to all similarly situated Memb ers. Third, and finally, the Panel's analysis under the chapeau of
Article XX must focus on the element of the measures found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994
disciplines. In the present case, if the Panel were to reach the chapeau of Article XX, it is because
it has concluded that the measures are prohibited export restrictions. Hence, it is discrimination in
the treatment of exports that is the relevant inquiry, not any distinction between exports and
domestic sales. Put differently, a domestic sal e cannot be magically converted into an export sale
under the chapeau of Article XX.107
74. In any event, even if the interpretation advanced by the European Union was correct, quod
non, any alleged discrimination resulting from the application of the measu res at issue is rationally
related to their policy objective. This is because, as confirmed by evidence on the record, foreign
and domestic purchasers are not similarly placed in respect of their compliance risk profile. As such,
there is undoubtedly a rat ional relationship between the discrimination alleged by the
European Union and the enforcement objectives of the challenged measures.108
VII. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR FINDINGS

75. For all of the foregoing reasons, Indonesia respectfully requests that the Panel find that the
European Union has failed to establish that the domestic processing requirement is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
76. Alternatively, Indonesia requests that the Panel find that the challenged measures are
justified under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 as measures temporarily applied to prevent or
relieve a critical shortage of nickel, a product that is essential to Indonesia.
77. If the Panel were to conclude otherwise, then Indonesia respectfully requests that the Panel
find that the challenged measures are justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 as measures
necessary to secure compliance with Indonesia's WTO-consistent laws or regulations.

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 49
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 52
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 56
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 59
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Republic of Korea 66
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 69
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Kingdom 71
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 73

ANNEX C-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL*
1. Brazil appreciates the opportunity to present this Oral Statement as a third party in the current
proceedings.
2. In this statement, Brazil will briefly address five is sues. First, whether both challenged
measures are under the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Second, whether the challenged
measures can be considered "temporary" within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994.
Third, whether Indonesia has sufficiently specified the laws or regulations with which the challenged
measures allegedly seek to secure compliance. Fourth, whether there are alternative, less -trade
restrictive measures that could achieve equivalent results. And, finally, whether the ch allenged
measures constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" within the meaning of the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT.
Article XI of the GATT 1994
3. At the outset, Brazil deems it important that the Panel determine whether both challenged
measures – namely Indonesia's (i) export prohibition of nickel ore and its (ii) domestic processing
requirements for nickel ore – are within the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
4. In its first written submission, Indonesia claims that the EU has failed t o make a prima facie
case that the challenged domestic processing requirements introduced by Regulation 25/2018 of
Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) are inconsistent with Article XI:1 1,
because they did not demonstrate that those measures have a limiting effect on the exportation of
nickel ore.2
5. The crux of Indonesia's argument is that, due to MEMR Regulation 11/2019, which introduced
an outright ban on exports of nickel ore as from 1 st of January 2020, the domestic processing
requirements imposed by MEMR Regulation 25/2018 ceased to be a limitation on the exportation of
nickel ore, and became a regulation affecting the internal sale of this mineral, subject to Article III:4
of the GATT 1994.
6. As Brazil argued in its first written submission, the entry into force of MEMR Resolution
11/2019 is not a relevant factor in determining whether the domestic processing requirements
imposed by Indonesia entail a limitation on exports of nickel ore. 3 In Brazil's view, all challenged
measures should be examined in and of themselves in light of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. This
approach is reasonable because the domestic processing requirements and the export prohibition
impose separate export restrictions in and of themsel ves, thus creating superposed limitations on
the exports of nickel ore.
7. Moreover, accepting Indonesia's argument could lead to a situation in which the complainant
could be denied a positive solution to the dispute. In fact, if the only factor preventing M EMR
Regulation 25/2018 from being considered as imposing a limitation on exports is the existence of
MEMR Regulation 11/2019, a finding limited to the latter measure, and its subsequent withdrawal
on implementation, would simply trigger the limiting effects of the former measure.
8. As a second issue, Brazil would like to address Indonesia's claim that its measures are covered
by the exemption in Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, because they are "temporarily applied to
prevent or relieve critical shortages of […] products essential to" Indonesia.
9. In its first written submission, Indonesia refers to the Appellate Body's jurisprudence in China
– Raw Materials,4 according to which a measure may be considered temporary when it is "applied

* Brazil requested that its oral statement serves as its executive summary.
1 First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 80.
2 Ibid.
3 Brazil's First Written Submission, paras. 7-10.
4 Indonesia's First Written Submission, para. 93.

for a limited duration, adopted in order to bridge a passing need, irrespective of whether or not the
temporal scope of the measure is fixed in advance."5
10. Brazil agrees that the jurisprudence in China – Raw Materials could provide guidance in
resolving this dispute. It is true that, in that case, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel
regarding the necessity of a temporal scope fixed in advance for a measure to be considered
temporary within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. However, this did not prevent
the Appellate Body from upholding the Panel's conclusion that China had not demonstrated that the
measure in question was "temporarily applied" to prevent or relieve a "critical shortage".6
11. In fact, the Appellate Body did not disagree with the Panel 's findings that, "if there is no
possibility for an existing shortage ever to cease to exist, it will not be possible to 'relieve or prevent'
it through an export restriction applied on a temporary basis. "7 With that in mind, Brazil believes
that the Panel in this dispute should examine whether the critical shortage of nickel ore indicated by
Indonesia can be considered a "passing need", or whether, instead, it is unlikely that this shortage
will ever cease to exist. This analysis could aid the Panel in determining the applicability of Article
XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 to the challenged measures.
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
12. As a third issue, Brazil would like to discuss whether Indonesia has sufficiently specified the
laws or regulations whose compliance is secured by the challenged measures, pursuant to Article
XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
13. We recall that, in India – Solar Cells, the Appellate Body decided that, in assessing "whether
an instrument constitutes a 'law or regulation' within the meaning of Article XX(d), a panel should
also consider the degree of specificity or precision with which the relevant instrument lays down a
particular rule of conduct or course of action within the domestic legal system of a Member, as
opposed to simply providing a legal basis for action that may be consistent with certain objectives."8
14. In this context, Brazil considers that the Panel should examine whether the instruments
pointed out by Indonesia as "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) can be read to
set out specific rules, obligations or requirements to ensure the protection of the environment and
the conservation of natural resources. In Brazil's view, the specific rules, obligations, or requirements
with respect to which the challenged measures seek to secure compliance are still not entirely clear
from Indonesia's first written submission.9
15. In continuing its examination under Article XX(d), the Panel will likely conduct an analysis of
the "necessity" of the measures Indonesia seeks to justify. Such analysis entails a consideration of
whether there are alternative, less-trade restrictive measures that could achieve equivalent results
to the challenged measures. It is incumbent on the complaining party to demonstrate the existence
of such alternative measures.
16. Up to this point, the EU is yet to present alternative measures for the Panel 's appreciation.
However, in the event that such mea sures are presented in the next stages of this dispute, Brazil
encourages the Panel to consider them in light of the fact that the government of Indonesia has
specifically chosen to target exports rather than production. In our view, measures limiting domestic
sales and exports of nickel ore to that which has been produced according to sustainable mining
practices, without entailing a prohibition on exports, could be a less trade -restrictive alternative to
the measures challenged in this dispute.
17. As a final issue, Brazil would like to refer to an argument raised by Japan in its third party
submission regarding the consistency of the challenged measures with the chapeau of Article XX of
the GATT 1994.10 According to the chapeau, the measures a Member seeks to justify under Article

5 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 331.
6 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 344.
7 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 336.
8 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.110 (footnotes omitted).
9 Third Party Submission of Brazil, paras. 22-25.
10 Japan's Third Party Submission, par. 44.

XX of the GATT 1994 must not constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail" nor a "disguised restriction on international trade."
18. Therefore, in order to determine whether a measure satisfies the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XX of the GATT 1994, panels are expected to delve into the rationale presented to explain
the measures ' objectives. If there is no logical connection between the reasons given for the
challenged measures and their stated objective, one could conclude that such measures constitute
an "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on international trade."
19. With regard to the specific facts of this case, Japan rightl y points out that, in the absence of
limitations on domestic demand, an export prohibition alone bears no rational relationship with the
goal of conserving an exhaustible resource.11 In such a scenario, domestic demand would continue
to further the depleti on of exhaustible reserves, i.e. of nickel ore, and would thus undermine the
achievement of the stated objective of the measure.
20. This concludes Brazil's statement. Thank you.

11 Ibid.

ANNEX C-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA*
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Madam Chairperson, distinguished members of the Panel, Canada would like first to express
its appreciation to the Panel and the Secretariat for their work in this dispute, and for the opportunity
we have been given to express our views today.
2. This dispute concerns Indonesia's export restrictions, specifically the export prohibition of
nickel ore and domestic processing requirements with regard to certain raw materials, notably nickel
ore and iron ore, prior to them being exported.
3. Canada is an exporter of significant amount of raw materials and its companies are engaged
in raw material extraction throughout the world. In this role, Canada has a systemic interest in the
interpretation of the disciplines governing export restrictions and their justification.
4. Several policy objectives motivate restrictions on the export of strategic raw materials.
Conservation of natural resources and protection of the environment are two of them. In contrast,
policy objectives such as the protection of domestic downstream industries can also motivate export
restrictions. The balance between employing export restrictions for legitimate public policy objectives
as opposed to protectionism is reflected in the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, which i s
qualified by Article XI:2 and in the enumerated exceptions in Article XX of the GATT 1994.
5. Canada's oral statement will focus on the order of analysis and burden of proof between Article
XI:I, Article XI:2(a) and Article XX of the GATT 1994, the legal st andard under Article XI:2(a) and
the determination of necessity under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
II. THE ORDER OF ANALYSIS THAT IS REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION
OR APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
6. Article XI:2 and Article XX of the GATT 1994 are in the nature of affirmative defences. 1
Therefore, the Panel should first assess whether the measures at issue fall within the scope of, and
are inconsistent with, Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. If so, then the Panel should determine whether
the measures meet the requirements of Article XI:2(a). If the Panel finds they do not, then the Panel
should consider whether the measures are justifiable under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
7. The burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complain ing or defending, that asserts a
fact or the affirmative of a particular or defence. This means that in this case the European Union
must assert and prove its claim of a violation under Article XI:1. In turn, Indonesia, as the party
invoking provisions that are exceptions to the allegedly violated obligation bears the burden to prove
that the conditions set out in the exceptions are met.2
A. Whether the measures at issue fall within the scope of Article XI:2(a)
8. Canada agrees with Indonesia that Article XI:2(a) applies to measures that fall within the
scope of Article XI:1, that is, measures that ban or have a limiting effect on exports.3
9. In Canada's view, the issue is whether the requirements of Article XI:2(a) are met.

* Canada requested that its oral statement serves as its executive summary.
1 Panel Reports, China ‒ Raw Materials, para. 7.211, referring to Appellate Body Report, US ‒ Wool
Shirts and Blouses, p. 16.
2 Appellate Body Report, US ‒ Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 16.
3 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 90.

10. The Appellate Body examin ed the meaning of the following concepts in Article XI:2(a) ‒
"temporarily applied," "to prevent or relieve critical shortages," and "foodstuffs or other products
essential to the exporting Member."4
11. First, examining the meaning of "temporary," and its us e with the word "applied," the
Appellate Body considered that "the definitional element of 'supply[ing] a passing need' suggests
that Article XI:2(a) refers to measures that are applied in the interim."5 Further, the Appellate Body
noted the differences in scope of Article XI:2(a) and Article XX(g). Specifically, regarding Article
XI:2(a), the Appellate Body noted that the Panel had reasoned that "if there is no possibility for an
existing shortage ever to cease to exist, it will not be possible to 'relieve or prevent' it through an
export restriction applied on a temporary basis."6 Thus, the requirement for the measure to be of a
temporary nature as opposed to a long-term conservation measure is an important consideration to
keep in mind when dealing with exhaustible natural resources such as minerals.
12. Next, the Appellate Body considered that "[t]aken together, 'critical shortage' [...] refers to
those deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or
that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point." 7 Further, the Appellate Body
noted that inherent in the notion of criticality is the expectation of reaching a point in time when
conditions are no longer "critical," such that measures will no longer fulfil the requirement of
addressing a critical shortage.8 This can be contrasted with a provision such as Article XX(g), which
addresses measures relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources9 without necessarily
responding to a critical shortage or threat of a critical shortage.
13. The Appellate Body also considered the phrase "general or local short supply" in Article XX(j)
as providing relevant context for interpretation of the term "critical shortage" in Article XI:2(a). The
Appellate Body found that the reference to "short supply" in Article XX(j) had a very similar meaning
to "shortage" in Article XI:2(a). However, Article XI:2(a) includes the adjective "critical" which
suggests that the types of shortages that fall within the scope of Article XI:2(a) are more narrowly
circumscribed that those within the scope of Article XX(j). 10 Therefore, the Panel in this case will
need to consider whether the shortage or potential shortage is of a "critical" nature.
14. Finally, the shortage must relate to "foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting
member," i.e. it must relate to food "or otherwise absolutely indispensable or necessary products."11
15. In addition, the Appellate Body expla ined that Article XI:2(a) "allows Members to apply
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily in order to 'prevent or relieve' such critical shortages."
Therefore, the Appellate Body understood Article XI:2(a) "as providing a basis for measures adopted
to alleviate or reduce an existing critical shortage, as well as for preventive or anticipatory measures
adopted to pre-empt an imminent critical shortage."
16. The Appellate Body also stated that Article XI:2(a) "must be interpreted so as to give meaning
to each of the concepts in that provision," and, at the same time, it should be taken into account
that "these different concepts impart meaning to each other, and thus define the scope of Article
XI:2(a)." For example, it explained, "whether a shortage is 'critica l' may be informed by how
'essential' a particular product is." Moreover, "the characteristics of the product as well as factors
pertaining to a critical situation, may inform the duration for which a measure can be maintained in
order to bridge a passing need in conformity with Article XI:2(a)." In short, it requires a "case -by-
case analysis taking into consideration the nexus between the different elements contained in Article
XI:2(a)."12

4 Appellate Body Reports, China ‒ Raw Materials, para. 322.
5 Ibid, para. 323.
6 Appellate Body Reports, China ‒ Raw Materials, para. 336, referring to Panel Reports, China ‒ Raw
Materials, para. 7.297.
7 Appellate Body Reports, China ‒ Raw Materials, para. 324.
8 Ibid, para. 328.
9 Ibid, para. 337.
10 Ibid, para. 325.
11 Ibid, para. 326.
12 Appellate Body Reports, China ‒ Raw Materials, paras. 327-328.

17. Therefore, the Panel must consider whether Indonesia has demonstrat ed that its measures
meet the requirements of each element.
18. If, after examining the facts and arguments put forward by the disputing Members, the Panel
determines that these three elements are met, then the export ban would be justifiable pursuant to
Article XI:2(a).
19. If one or more of the three requirements under Article XI:2(a) are not met, then the Panel
should consider whether the export ban is justifiable under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
B. Whether the measures are justifiable under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
1. Indonesia submits that the measures are necessary to secure compliance
with Indonesia's laws and regulations under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
20. Turning to Indonesia's defence under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, Indonesia submits that
the measures are "necessary" because their contribution to securing compliance with those
requirements outweighs their trade-restrictiveness, in the light of the importance of the interests or
values they address.13
21. In Canada's view, Indonesia correctly explains that in order to determine whether a measure
is "necessary" under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, a panel must "assess all the relevant factors,
particularly the extent of the contribution to the achievement of a measure's objective and its trade
restrictiveness, in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake." If this analysis
yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by
comparing the measure with its possib le alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while
providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued.14
22. Indonesia refers to US – Gambling regarding reasonably available alternatives and argues that
it is incumbent upon the European Union to put forward alternative measures to rebut Indonesia's
prima facie demonstration that the export prohibition on nickel ore and the domestic processing
requirement is "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
23. Canada agrees that the first step is to determine if Indonesia has prima facie demonstrated
that the measures are necessary and if so, Canada agrees that it is incumbent on the European
Union, to put forward reasonably available alternative measures to rebut the presumption.
2. The "necessary" standard of the exception of Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994 and whether there is a reasonably alternative measure that
leads to a lesser degree of inconsistency with the rules of the GATT 1994
24. For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under
paragraph (d) of Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one designed
to "secure compliance" with laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some
provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be "necessary" to secure such compliance.15
25. We will focus on the "necessary" standard and the availability of alternative measures.
26. With respect to the "necessary" requirement, in US ‒ Gamblin g, the Appellate Body referred
to its finding in Korea ‒ Various Measures on Beef and said that determining whether a measure is
necessary involves the weighing and balancing process set out in that dispute and "begins with an
assessment of the 'relative i mportance' of the interests or values furthered by the challenged
measure." As for the two other factors, which, it noted, are not "exhaustive" as to the possible
factors to be considered, one is "the contribution of the measure to the realization of the e nds
pursued by it," and the other is "the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce."
In addition to examining these factors, it said, "[a] comparison between the challenged measure

13 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 14.
14 Ibid, paras. 218-220
15 Appellate Body Report, Korea ‒ Various Measures on Beef, para. 157.

and possible alternatives should then be undertaken, and the results of such comparison should be
considered in the light of the interests at issue." The Appellate Body then stated:
It is on the basis of this "weighing and balancing" and comparison of measures, taking
into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel determines whether a measure
is "necessary" or, alternatively, whether another, WTO-consistent measure is
"reasonably available."16
27. Canada submits that the "necessary" standard that the Appellate Body has laid out requires a
panel to look at the weighing and balancing of the specific factors and the element of reasonably
available alternative measures.
28. It is for the complaining Member, in this case the European Union, to make arguments
regarding any reasonably available alternative measures. However, should it do so, then Indonesia,
as the responding Member, would need to explain why the alternative measure or measures put
forward by the complainant were not reasonably available or did not make the same contribution as
the challenged measure.
29. On this point, Canada refers to the dispute China ‒ Rare Earths where the Panel examined on
an arguendo basis China's argument that its export duties were justified under Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994 because they were "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
30. Regarding the existence of alternative measures, China argued that the complainants had to
identify reasonably available alternative measures that would make the same contribution to the
protection of human, animal and plant life or health. In this regard, the Panel noted that all three
complainants did in fact identify alternative measures that China could or was already using at the
time, including requirements for strict compliance with environmental requirements as a condi tion
for access to the products, requirements for mines to make deposits for ecological recovery, an
increase in resource taxes, imposition of a pollution tax, and an increase in volume restrictions on
mining and production. China responded that measures a lready imposed by China were not in fact
alternatives.
31. In response, the Panel accepted that China already imposed the measures identified, but the
Panel considered that China "ha[d] not explained why it could not, as an alternative to the export
duties, increase volume restrictions and pollution controls and the resource tax, and/or the pollution
tax." In this regard, the Panel agreed with Japan that "China could increase the resource tax on ores
significantly enough to deter domestic production," but China failed to respond to this WTO -
consistent alternative. On this basis, the Panel concluded that China did not meet its burden of
demonstrating that the alternative measures put forward by the complainants were not reasonably
available to China, or did not make the same contribution as the challenged measure.17
32. The Panel should keep in mind that export restrictions are used by policymakers to respond
to a number of social, economic and political objectives. These include objectives such as
environmental protection and preservation of reserves of strategic raw materials for future use.
33. The effectiveness and the potential social benefits of export restrictions should be carefully
weighed against the distorting effects on trade that they cause and any alternativ e tools identified
that are reasonably available to policy makers.
III. CONCLUSION
34. Canada thanks the Members of the Panel for their attention. Should the Panel have any
questions, we would be pleased to respond either orally or in writing.

16 Appellate Body Report, US ‒ Gambling, paras. 304-309.
17 Panel Reports, China ‒ Rare Earths, paras. 7.180-187.

ANNEX C-3
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF INDIA*
Introductory Statements
1. Good Afternoon to the Meeting. India appreciates this opportunity to present its views on the
issues raised in this panel proceeding. India has a systemic interest in ensuring the correct legal
interpretation and application of all WTO covered agreements, including the GATT 1994.
2. India understands the EU to have challenged the MEMR Regulation 11/2019 and 96/2019 as
export prohibition measures and the MEMR Regulation 25/2018 as containing certain domestic
processing requirements that constitute an export restriction inconsistent with Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994.
3. India does not take a position on the factual issues raised in this dispute. However, India wishes
to present some views on: (i) the legal standard applicable to export restriction under
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; and (ii) the scope of the term "restriction".
I. Export Restriction under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
4. The EU appears to have c laimed that the domestic processing requirement under MEMR
Regulation 25/2018 poses a restriction on export of low concentration nickel ore because it
imposes a mandatory legal obligation to purify and/or process the raw mining products in
Indonesia before exporting the relevant goods.1 Further, the EU is understood to have claimed
that the measure restricts the possibility to export unpurified or unprocessed raw material.2
5. Indonesia has responded that the MEMR Regulation 25/2018 does not have any "limiting effect"
on the exportation of nickel ore. 3 Indonesia highlights that with the enactment of MEMR
Regulation 11/2019, a complete prohibition on the export of nickel has been imposed as of
1 January 2020, irrespective of its concentration. As a result, t he domestic processing
requirement in MEMR Regulation 25/2018 neither operates as a pre -condition for the
exportation of nickel ore, nor restricts said exports because the exportation of nickel ore is
legally prohibited in the first place.4
6. India notes th at the EU has challenged the domestic processing requirements in MEMR
Regulation 25/2018 as a standalone measure operating independently. Accordingly, if the Panel
finds that the two MEMR Regulations operate independently, it should evaluate the consistency
of the measures with Article XI:1 of the GATT independently.
7. Turning to the applicable legal standard, India notes that for a measure to be inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, it must be demonstrated that the measure falls within the scope
of the phrase 'quotas, import or export licenses or other measures', and, that the measure
constitutes a prohibition or restriction on the importation or on the exportation or sale for export
of any product5 destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
1. Scope of the term 'restriction' in Article XI:1 of GATT 1994
8. India recalls that whether a measure is a quota, import or export license or other measure
restricting import or export of products constitutes the first component in assessing the
consistency of a purported quantitative restriction.

* India requested that its oral statement serves as its executive summary.
1 EU's first written submission, para. 50.
2 Ibid.
3 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 80.
4 Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 82-83.
5 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures, paras. 5.216-5.218.

9. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines 'restriction' as a noun meaning 'a limiting condition or
measure, especially a legal one', and a mass noun meaning 'the limitation or control of someone
or something, or the state of being restricted'. 'Limiting' means 'setting or serving as a limit to
something', and in this context, a 'limit' is defined as 'a point or level beyond which something
does not or may not extend or pass' and 'a restriction on the size or amount of something
permissible or possible '. Black's Law Dictionary defines restriction as a 'limitation or
qualification'. The ordinary meaning of the term 'restriction' therefore implies that the measure
at issue must be one that:
(i) sets a point o r level beyond which exports or sales for export of a product cannot
extend; or
(ii) restricts the amount of exports or sales for export of a product that is permissible or
possible.6
Therefore, for the measure at issue in this dispute to fall within the mea ning of 'restriction', it
must quantitatively limit the exports or sales for exports of nickel ore destined for the territory
of another Member that is possible or permitted.
10. Panels have also previously found that the ordinary meaning of the term restricti on to be "a
limiting condition or measure, especially a legal one."7 It has been interpreted under Article XI:1
to mean 'a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation'.8
11. The scope of the term 'restriction' under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is not unlimited. India
recalls in the context of importation that "not every measure affecting the opportunities for
entering the market would be covered by Article XI, but only those measures that constitute a
prohibition or restriction on the importation of products, i.e. those measures which affect the
opportunities for importation itself".9
12. Moreover, every formality, or charge, does not amount to a restriction on imports that is
inconsistent with Article XI:1, GATT 1994.10 In Indonesia – Chicken (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the
panel found Brazil to not have demonstrated that the burden or cost on importers of certain
charges and formalities was of such nature and extent as to preclude or dissuade them from
requesting changes to the import documents.11
13. In order words, Article XI:1 does not cover simply any restriction or prohibition. It covers only
those conditions that are demonstrated to limit the importation or exportation of products
through the design, architecture, and structure of the measure itself, considered in its relevant
context.12 Therefore, in circumstances of de facto restriction, greater evidentiary weight would
be attached to the actual trade impact of the measure.13
14. For these reasons, India views that a wide interpretation of 'restriction' in Article XI:1 that
makes the provision applicable to any condition that may have an indirect or remote limiting
effect on trade would not be reasonable or legally sound. Furthermore, it would curtail Members'
policy space to formulate policies concerning the goods produced, manufactured or extracted
within their territories. Such an interpretation would blur the distinction between the notions of
'restriction' and other incidental barriers to trade. 14 Therefore, in this case, the Panel would
have to evaluate whether the measure presented by the EU affects export opportunities, by

6 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition, 1341.
7 Restriction, Oxford Dictionary, available at<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/restriction>
accessed on 17 November 2021.
8 Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions, para. 5.128. Also see, Appellate Body Reports, China –
Raw Materials, paras. 319-320.
9 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.261.
10 Panel Report, Indonesia – Chicken (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 7.232.
11 Ibid.
12 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217
13 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.20-11.21.
14 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.262.

way of a quantitative limitation on exports or sale for exports, in order for the measure to fall
within the scope of the term 'restriction' under Article XI:1 of the GATT.
2. The restriction must be linked to the importation or exportation of any product
15. India also wishes to address the second element of the legal standard under Article XI:1, i.e.,
the prohibition or restriction on the importation or on the exportation of any product .
Article XI:1 provides that no prohibitions or restrictions (other than duties, taxes, or other
charges) shall be instituted or maintained by any Member, on the importation or exportation of
any product. From the ordinary meaning of this provision, India notes that it is clear that the
measure must, at the very least: (i) be in the nature of a restriction on (ii) the importation or
exportation of a product.
16. In this context, India recalls that the Appellate Body, in China – Raw Materials, concluded that
Article XI covers those prohibitions and restrictions that have a limiting effect on the quantity
or amount of a product being imported or exported.15 In other words, the measure in question
must be a condition for the importation or exportation itself.16
17. In India – Autos, the Panel found that as the measure required acceptance of a so-called 'trade
balancing condition' it imposed a restriction on imports and therefore was inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The trade balancing condition effectively limited the quantity of
imports that a manufacturer was able to undertake, as the measure provided that the import
licenses would be granted to those manufacturers who undertook to comply with export
balancing requirements, i.e., a requirement to undertake a certain quantity of exports. In this
case, an importer was not free to import as many kits or components as he otherwise could
have in the absence of the limitation, because there is a finite limit to the amount of possible
exports.17 Further, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes illustrates another factor
that was evaluated to establish that the measure at issue was not a restriction or prohibition
on import or export restriction: the bond requirement in question was not enforced either at
the time or at the point of importation, and was not administered by the customs authority, but
the internal tax authorities.18
III. Conclusion
18. India adds that whether Article XI, GATT 1994 applies to the measure at issue could also be
relevant to the Panel's analysis in this dispute 19 – this could be discussed as the proceedings
progress. In sum, evaluating the consistency of the domestic processing requirement in MEMR
Regulation 25/2018 vis-à-vis Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 would require establishing that there is
a requirement in the measure at issue that has a limiting effect on the quantity of exports or
sale for exports of nickel ore, and is a condition or restriction on the exportation of nickel ore
from Indonesia.
19. India appreciates the opportunity to comment on these issues in these proceedings and hopes
that the viewpoints presented in this submission would assist the Panel in its consideration of
the issues raised in this dispute.

15 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras. 319-320.
16 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.265.
17 Panel Report, India – Autos, paras 7.318 – 7.322.
18 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, paras. 7.257 – 7.258.
19 Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.220, citing GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, para 5.14
adopted 07 February 1984, BISD 30S/140.

ANNEX C-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN
I. ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994

Prima Facie Case

1. Indonesia does not dispute that its regulations legally prohibit the exportation of nickel ore. 1
Rather, Indonesia argues that the European Union failed to make a prima facie case that the
domestic processing requirement , as applied to nickel ore, is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994.2 Specifically, Indonesia argues that the domestic processing requirement:
neither operates as a pre -condition for the exportation of nickel ore nor restricts said
exports because the exportation of nickel ore, regardl ess of concentration, is legally
prohibited in the first place.3
In other words, Indonesia asserts that the domestic processing requirement does not restrict
exportation of nickel ore because, with the enactment of MEMR Regulation 11/2019, exportation of
that ore is entirely prohibited.

2. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 provides:
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on […] the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
3. In Argentina – Import Measures , the Appellate Body explained that, in the context of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, the limitation on the importation or exportation "need not be
demonstrated by quantifying the effects of the measure at issue; rather, such limiting effects can
be demonstrated through the design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at issue
considered in its relevant context."4
4. As Japan understands it, Indonesia is not arguing that the domestic processing requirement
was repealed by MEMR Regulation 11/2019. Indeed, MEMR Regulation 11/2019 makes no mention
of repealing the legal instruments underlying the domestic processing requirement. The domestic
processing requirement appears, therefore, to remain in force.
5. Rather, Indonesia's argument is that the domestic processing r equirement has no effect on
international trade because of a separate measure – i.e., the export ban on nickel ore, regardless of
concentration. Indonesia's argument thus requires the Panel to assess the domestic processing
requirement in light of its actu al trade effect. However, as explained, the assessment under
Article XI:1 should consider the "design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure".
6. In this case, the design, structure and architecture of the domestic processing requirement is
such that all nickel ore mined in Indonesia must be processed in Indonesia. As a result of the
domestic processing requirement, unprocessed nickel ore cannot lawfully be exported from
Indonesia. Therefore, under Article XI:1, the design, structure and archi tecture of the domestic
processing requirement reveal that the measure serves to restrict the quantities of unprocessed
nickel ore that may be exported. Hence, the evidence on the design, architecture, and revealing
structure of the measure is sufficient t o make a prima facie case that the domestic processing
requirement is an export prohibition of unprocessed ores under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.

1 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 64.
2 Ibid. para. 80.
3 Ibid. para. 82.
4 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.

7. Moreover, because both measures exist independently, it is possible that the domestic
processing requirement would remain in effect if the export prohibition were to be revoked. The fact
that two measures may simultaneously restrict or prohibit exportation of the same set of goods
should not prevent the Panel from reviewing the WTO -consistency of each measure t o secure a
positive solution to the dispute.
A. Application of Article III:4

8. Indonesia further argues that, to the extent that domestic producers are subject to the
domestic processing requirement, the measure would be "a law, regulation or requirement affecting
the internal sale of nickel ore subject to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, rather than an export
restriction within the meaning of Article XI:1 thereof."5
9. Japan notes that Article XI:1 applies to restrictions maintained "on … the exportation" of
goods. In contrast, Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 provides that "[t]he products of the territory of
any [Member] imported into the territory of any other [Member] shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all [measures] affecting
their internal sale …". Because the European Union does not allege differential treatment between
products imported into Indonesia and those of national origin, Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 is not
relevant for purposes of this dispute.
10. In any case, the domestic processing requirement is a measure that applies on the exportation
of unprocessed nickel ore, as opposed to a measure affecting the internal sale of the product. This
is evident from the text of the underlying measures. For example, Article 17(1) of Regulation
25/2018 expressly makes the right to "conduct[] export activities" conditional on operators
undertaking certain processing or refining activities in Indonesia, and Article 17(2) makes the right
to sell "overseas" (i.e., for exportation) conditional on the Minister stipulating certain minimum
processing or refining thresholds. Further, Article 66 of Regu lation 7/2020 conditions the sale
"abroad" (i.e., for exportation) to "carrying out processing and/or refineries domestically".
Therefore, the plain language of the legal instruments underlying the domestic processing
requirement makes it clear that the r equirement applies to the exportation or sale for export of a
product and thus it falls within the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.
I. ARTICLE XI:2(a) OF THE GATT 1994

11. Indonesia argues that its prohibition on the exportation of nickel ore and its domestic
processing requirement, as applied to unprocessed nickel ore, are justified under Article XI:2(a) of
the GATT 1994.
12. Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 provides that Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 "shall not extend
to":
Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of
foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.
13. Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 provides an exclusion from the obligation under Article XI:1
of the GATT 1994, and the burden of proof is on the respondent to demonstrate that the conditions
of Article XI:2(a) are met.6
A. "Temporarily Applied"

14. Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 requires that the export prohibition or restriction be
"temporarily applied". In China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body determined that "temporarily"
in this context means that the measure must be "applied for a limited duration, adopted in order to
bridge a passing need, irrespective of whether or not the temporal scope of the measure is fixed in

5 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 83.
6 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.213.

advance."7 As the Appellate Body further noted, "Article XI:2(a) refers to measures that are applied
in the interim".8
15. To determine whether Indonesia's measures are "tempor arily applied", the Panel may
consider, inter alia, whether (i) the relevant laws and regulations implementing the measure indicate
that the measure is temporary and (ii) whether the measure is designed to "bridge a passing need."
16. Although a time limit need not be fixed in advance for a measure to be considered temporarily
applied9, language in the laws and regulations implementing a measure that indicates an intended
termination of the measure can help clarify whether or not a measure is temporary. At th e same
time, where a measure is frequently paused and reinitiated, this may indicate that the measure is
really intended to be permanent, subject to periodic exceptions.
17. Indonesia argues that the measures were designed to "bridge a passing need". However,
Indonesia also contends that: "[t]he measures at issue in this dispute were adopted to prevent
crucial deficiencies in nickel quantities from arising in a near future" 10; in the early 2000s, the
"expansion of Chinese industry, and in particular stainless steel manufacturing, led to an exponential
increase in global nickel demand"11; "electric vehicles and battery storage are set to take over from
stainless steel as the largest end user of nickel by 2040"; and, "demand for nickel will grow between
20-25 tim es by 2040." 12 Furthermore, Indonesia specifically argues under Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994 that the challenged measures are designed to secure compliance with its "sustainable
mining and mineral resources management" requirements.13
18. These statements an d arguments suggest that Indonesia is concerned about managing the
risk of long-term depletion of nickel, which may not be reasonably characterized as a "passing need".
19. Japan further notes that the risk of depletion of exhaustible natural resources is specifically
addressed in Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, by providing a justification for a measure with the
objective of "conservation of exhaustible natural resources". The reach, function, and requirements
of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 differ from those of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. 14 If
Article XI:2(a) were improperly construed to address the same risk of depletion of exhaustible
natural resources, Article XX(g), with its additional requirement that a measure be "made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption", would be rendered inutile.
Such an outcome would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation.15
20. Japan does not argue that the risk of a shortage of an exhaustible natural resources can never
be covered by Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. Rather, a measure addressing such risk may be
covered under Article XI:2(a) when the shortage is not of a permanent nature, but rather is one that
can be eventually relieved. In this regard, the Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials gave an
example where the shortage of exhaustible resource may be covered under Article XI:2(a), which is
when "a natu ral disaster caused a 'critical shortage' of an exhaustible natural resource, which, at
the same time, constituted a foodstuff or other essential product."16
A. "To Prevent … Critical Shortages"

21. In addition, measures excluded under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 must be "applied to
prevent or relieve critical shortages" of essential products. The Appellate Body in China – Raw
Materials found that the term "critical shortage" refers to "those deficiencies in quantity that are
crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive
stage, or a turning point."17

7 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 331.
8 Ibid. para. 323.
9 Ibid. para. 331.
10 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 107.
11 Ibid. para. 28.
12 Ibid. para. 53 (footnotes omitted).
13 See, for example, Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 10, 14, 144, and 152.
14 See Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 337.
15 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 23, DSR 1996:I, p. 3 at 21.
16 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 337.
17 Ibid. para. 324.

22. The Appellate Body also agreed with the panel in that case on the following points:
…if there is no possibility for an existing shortage ever to ce ase to exist, it will not be
possible to "relieve or prevent" it through an export restriction applied on a temporary
basis. … [i]f a measure were imposed to address a limited reserve of an exhaustible
natural resource, such measure would be imposed until the point when the resource is
fully depleted. … [t]his temporal focus seems consistent with the notion of "critical",
defined as "of the nature of, or constituting, a crisis".18
23. Thus, to determine whether an export prohibition or restriction is applied to "prevent …critical
shortages",19 a panel should take into account whether the measure is capable of preventing the
shortage of the relevant products. If the shortage is permanent, the export prohibition or restriction,
which is supposed to be temporary, cannot be applied to "prevent" a "critical shortage" under
Article XI:2(a).
24. In this case, the Panel may wish to examine the following two issues specifically in assessing
the alleged "critical shortage". First, Indonesia's measures only prohibit the exportation of nickel
ore.20 Indonesia's measures do not limit the extraction of nickel ore, nor do they limit the
consumption of nickel ore by domestic processors or refiners. Indeed, Indonesia itself has noted
that its "domestic capacity will continue to ex pand, placing increased strain on Indonesia's nickel
reserves",21 and that "Indonesia is implementing a strategic plan to expand EV battery production
in the short term and needs to secure nickel as an input into processed products (nickel sulphate)
that is used in the production of EV batteries."22 Thus, the Panel should consider whether Indonesia
has demonstrated that, in the absence of limits on extraction or domestic consumption, the
challenged measures are capable of preventing or relieving the alleged shortage.
25. Second and relatedly, the Panel should consider whether Indonesia has provided sufficient
evidence that its nickel reserves have reached a turning point necessitating the export restriction.
If so, the Panel should assess whether the "shortag e" is the result of limited reserves or the
anticipated expansion of Indonesia's installed capacity. 23 If it is the latter or such anticipated
expansion of domestic production capacity constitutes a substantial cause of the shortage, it would
be doubtful whether the measures at issue can prevent a critical shortage as long as such expansion
of domestic production capacity continues to be anticipated.
I. ARTICLE XX(d) OF THE GATT 1994
A. Subparagraph (d)

26. For a defense to succeed under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, it must be established that:
(i) the measure at issue secures compliance with "laws or regulations" that are themselves consistent
with the GATT 1994; (ii) the measure at issue is "necessary" to secure such compliance; and (iii)
the measure at issue meets the requirements set out in the chapeau of Article XX.24
27. With regard to the "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d), the Appellate Body has stated
that a "measure can be said 'to secure compliance' with laws or regulations when its design reveals
that it secures compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under such laws or
regulations" and that "[i]t is important, in this regard, to distinguish between the specific rules,
obligations, or requirements with respect to which a measure seeks to secure compliance, on the
one hand, and the objectives of the relevant 'laws or regulations', which may assist in 'elucidating

19 Indonesia does not argue that the measures at issue are to "relieve" the critical shortage (See
Indonesia's first written submission, title of Section IV.D, paras. 13, 85, 107 and 140 etc.).
20 Indonesia's export prohibition applies to the export of nickel ore, regardless of concentration, while its
domestic production requirement effectively bans the export of unprocessed nickel ore.
21 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 126.
22 Ibid. para. 138.
23 See Indonesia's first written submission, paras. 126-127.
24 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 177.

the content of specific rules, obligations, or requirements' of the 'laws o r regulations', on the other
hand."25
28. In this regard, Japan notes that the examples of such laws or regulations that are listed in
Article XX(d), namely, laws and regulations relating to "customs enforcement, the enforcement of
monopolies…, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive
practices", require specific actions or provide specific obligations, and the "compliance" therewith
can be specifically examined. These examples in Article XX(d) suggest that, in pri nciple, the
provision is contemplating a measure that is necessary to secure compliance with specific
obligations.
29. Indonesia in this case alleges that the challenged measures are designed to secure compliance
with its sustainable mining and mineral resourc es management requirements. Japan notes that
Indonesia's first written submission does not clearly identify the specific law or regulation whose
compliance is being secured through the export restriction and domestic processing requirement.
Instead, the arguments seem to be directed at showing that the challenged measures are necessary
to comply with WTO -consistent resource -management objectives. As the Appellate Body
underscored in India – Solar Cells, the "'more precisely' a respondent is able to identify specific
rules, obligations, or requirements contained in the relevant 'laws or regulations', the 'more likely'
it will be able to elucidate how and why the inconsistent measure secures compliance with such 'laws
or regulations'". Thus, the Appellate Body explained that:
in assessing whether an instrument constitutes a "law or regulation" within the
meaning of Article XX(d), a panel should also consider the degree of specificity or
precision with which the relevant instrument lays down a particular rule o f conduct
or course of action within the domestic legal system of a Member, as opposed to
simply providing a legal basis for action that may be consistent with certain
objectives.26

30. Japan recognizes that a respondent is not precluded from referring to mul tiple instruments.
However, "insofar as a respondent seeks to rely on a rule deriving from several instruments or parts
thereof, it would still bear the burden of establishing that the instruments or the parts that it
identifies actually set out the alleged rule".27
31. Indonesia describes "two … main pillars" of its comprehensive mining policy implicated by this
dispute: "the protection of Indonesia's environment through the imposition of sustainable mining
requirements, and the conservation of natural resources through the imposition of mineral resource
management requirements."28 These "pillars" are not "particular rule[s] of conduct or course[s] of
action," but are rather general objectives, and therefore are not precise laws or regulations for
assessment under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
32. Moreover, when the identified laws and regulations are not precise and thus there is
insufficient linkage between the measure at issue and such laws and regulations, it may be difficult
to establish that the measure is implemented to secure the compliance with the referred laws and
regulations. In the current case, to the extent that Indonesia identifies particular rules of conduct or
courses of action, it is not clear that such rules or courses of action are actually m andated by the
laws and regulations it references. For example, Indonesia argues that the export prohibition is
capable of "securing compliance with Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource
management insofar as it reduces total Indonesian production and extraction of nickel ore."29 Even
if the reduction of nickel ore production and extraction could, in theory, constitute a particular rule
of conduct or course of action, Indonesia does not provide a specific law or regulation that requires
the reduction of nickel ore production and extraction in Indonesia. Similarly, Indonesia argues that

25 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.110 (citing Appellate Body Report, Argentina –
26 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.110.
27 Ibid. para. 5.111.
28 Indonesia's first written submission, para. 143.
29 Ibid. para. 177.

the domestic processing requirement "curbs predatory mining practices." 30 However, Indonesia
does not provide a specific law or regulation that defines and regulates "predatory mining practices."
33. Turning to "necessity", it is well -established that the assessment of this element of Article
XX(d) involves a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors, including: the extent to which
the measure sought to be justified contributes to the reali zation of the end pursued (i.e., securing
compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under the relevant provisions of "laws
or regulations" that are not GATT -inconsistent); the relative importance of the societal interest or
value that th e "law or regulation" is intended to protect; and the trade -restrictiveness of the
challenged measure. 31 Also, in most cases, a comparison between the challenged measure and
reasonably available alternative measures should then be undertaken.32
34. With respect to the first factor, i.e., the measure's contribution, when the laws and regulations
to be complied with are less specific, it will generally be more difficult to establish the linkage
between the measure sought to be justified and the laws and regulatio ns. In such cases, a panel
must carefully scrutinize the existence and the degree of contribution. To the extent it finds that the
contribution is vague or that the degree of contribution is low, it should not find that the measure is
necessary, particula rly when the trade restrictiveness is high, such as in the case of an export
prohibition.
35. In regards to the third factor, i.e., the trade -restrictiveness of the measure, an export
restriction, and in particular an export prohibition, is highly trade -restrictive, as it directly prevents
the subject domestic goods from being traded to foreign markets and prevents foreign consumers
from accessing the subject goods produced in the territory of the Member imposing the measure.
Furthermore, with regard to reaso nably available alternative measures, the Panel may consider
whether Indonesia's concerns – about the depletion of ore reserves or predatory mining – can be
addressed more directly and effectively through non -discriminatory measures, rather than export
restrictions that are highly trade-restrictive.
36. Lastly, Japan notes with regard to the second factor, i.e., the importance of the protected
societal value, that the United States and Ukraine discuss a Member's right to determine the level
of protection with respect to the objective pursued in the context of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.33
However, even if a Member considers an objective to be of high societal interest and therefore to
require a high level of protection, the measure at issue still must be "necessary to secure compliance"
with the laws or regulations. Thus, even in such a case of high importance, if the identified laws and
regulations are not specific, it may be difficult to establish that the measure is implemented to secure
compliance with them or to establish the existence and the degree of contribution. Similarly, there
may also be reasonably available alternative measures, especially if the measures at issue are export
restrictions that are highly trade -restrictive. Indeed, there have be en prior cases in which panels
and the Appellate Body have found that a measure pursues interests of the highest importance, but
is not "necessary" under Article XX(d). For example, the Appellate Body in Colombia - Textiles found
that, even though the parties did not dispute that the fight against money laundering was a societal
interest that could be characterized as "vital and important in the highest degree", the challenged
measure was not "necessary" to secure compliance with the identified provision o f Colombia's
criminal code as there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution and the
degree of trade-restrictiveness of the measure.34
A. Chapeau

37. A measure justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 must meet the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau provides that measures must not constitute "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" or a "disguised
restriction on international trade." The analysis of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable
focuses on the cause of the discrimination, or the rationale put forward to explain its existence.

30 Ibid. para. 178.
31 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.59.
32 Ibid.
33 United States' third party submission, para. 40 and Ukraine's third party submission, para. 27.
34 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, paras. 5.144-150.

Discrimination is arbitrary or un justifiable "when the reasons given for the discrimination 'bear no
rational connection to the objective' or 'would go against that objective'".35
38. An export prohibition imposes the regulatory burden entirely on foreign demand , and places
no regulatory burden on domestic demand. In the absence of other limitations on domestic demand,
this differential treatment has no rational relationship with the objective of conserving an exhaustible
resource, particularly when domestic demand accounts, or will account, for a major part of overall
demand for the exhaustible resource . This is because domestic demand will continue to drive
extraction of the resources. Thus, it would seem difficult to justify under the chapeau an export
prohibition if it is not paired with appropriate limitations on domestic demand. In this regard, Japan
agrees with the United States that "whether or not a measure constitutes a disguised restriction on
trade must be examined in the context of the trade impacted by the mea sure, beyond just the
product directly subject to the measure at issue", and the impact of the measure to be examined
should include the impact on "the consumers and purchasers" (i.e. the demand) of the subject
product.36

35 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article. 21.5 - Mexico), para. 7.316.
36 United States' third party submission, para. 31.

ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
I. Introduction
1. The Republic of Korea ("Korea") welcomes this opportunity to present an executive summary
of its views as a third party in this dispute between the Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia") and the
European Union ("EU") over Indonesia's measures relating to raw materials.
II. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994
2. In relation to Indonesia's domestic processing requirement, the EU challenges that Indonesia's
measure constitutes a restriction of exports of the raw materials as the obligations imposed through
the measure are designed to restrict the possibility to export the unpurified and unprocessed raw
mineral products. Therefore, the EU argues that Indonesia's measure is inconsistent with Article XI:1
of the GATT 1994.1
3. Indonesia maintains that the EU has failed to make a prima facie case that the domestic
processing requirement is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Indonesia points out that
the exportation of nickel ore is legally prohibited in the first place under a separate measure. For
Indonesia, therefore, the domestic processing requirement only affects the internal sale of nickel
ore, rather than restricting the export of nickel ore within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994. Accordingly, Indonesia argues that the EU has failed to demonstrate that the domestic
processing requirement places any "limiting effect" on the export of nickel ore.2
4. Several panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the term "prohibitions or restrictions"
under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In China – Raw Materials , the Appellate Body defined
"prohibition" as a "legal ban on the trade or importation of a specified commodity" and "restriction"
as "a thing which restricts someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or
regulation, and thus refers generally to something that has a limiting effect ". The Appellate Body
further observed that Article XI of the GATT 1994 covers those prohibitions and restrictions that
have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product being imported or exported.3
5. In determining "limiting effect" set forth in China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body held in
Argentina – Import Measure s that "not every condition or burden placed on importation or
exportation will be inconsistent with Article XI, but only those that are limiting, that is, those that
limit the importation or exportation of products. Moreover, this limitation need not be demonstrated
by quantifying the effects of the measure at issue; rather, such limiting effect can be demonstrated
through the design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at issue considered in its
relevant context".4
6. The panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry also considered that an analysis under Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994 must be "based on the design of the measure and its potential to adversely affect
importation, as opposed to a standalone analysis of the actual impact of the measure on trade flows"
and "to the extent Panama were able to demonstrate a violation of Article XI:1 based on the
measure's design, structure, and architecture, the Panel is of the view that it would not be necessary
to consider trade volumes or a causal link between the measure and its effects on trade volumes".5
7. Korea agrees that in order for a measure to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994,
there need not be a proof that the measure at issue de facto exerts any quantified or even
quantifiable limiting impact on exportation or importation. Instead, it is sufficient for a complaining

1 EU's First Written Submission, paras. 50-52.
2 Indonesia's First Written Submission, paras. 77-84.
3 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, paras. 319-320.
4 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.
5 Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7.240 and 7.252.

party to demonstrate that "limiting effect" exists by virtue of the design, structure, architecture, or
other relevant construct of the measure at issue.
8. As such, while the Panel may base its assessment on a wide-range of relevant evidences such
as the express language of the legal instrument at issue or the intended effect of the measure as
manifested by the measure's design, structure, architecture, etc., among others, it need not consider
whether or to what extent the measure is adversely affecting trade flows.
III. Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994
9. In order for export prohibitions or restrictions to be justified under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT
1994, such measures must be proven to meet three requirements, namely (i) to be temporarily
applied, (ii) to prevent or relieve critical shortage, and (iii) foodstuffs or other products essential to
the exporting Member.
10. Regarding "critical shortage " of Article XI:2(a), Indonesia argues in its First Written
Submission that a surge in demand for Indonesian nickel ore has caused a dr amatic expansion of
extraction and production levels in Indonesia reaching unsustainable levels. Indonesia explains that
its reserves of high-grade saprolite ore, the only type of nickel ore with economic value, are expected
to be depleted in the coming future creating concerns of crucial deficiencies.6
11. First, Korea notes that the Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials interpreted the term
"critical shortage" as "those deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of
decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point".7
12. The Appellate Body elaborated that "critical shortage" under Article XI:2(a) is more narrowly
circumscribed than those falling within the scope of "short supply" of Article XX(j),8 implying that a
much higher standard is applied in determining "critical shortage" under Article XI:2(a). In this vein,
Korea submits that the meaning of "short supply" under Article XX(j) may also offer a threshold
guidance for the Panel's examination as to whether the circumstances at issue fall within the scope
of "critical shortage".
13. Second, Korea recalls the finding of the panel in China – Raw Materials , with which the
Appellate Body did not disagree, that "if there is no possibility for an existing shortage ever to cease
to exist, it will not be possible to relieve or prevent it through an export restriction applied on a
temporary basis".9 Relevantly, the Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials proposed an example
that "Article XI:2(a) measures could be imposed if a natural disaster caused a "critical shortage" of
an exhaustible natural resource, which, at the same time, constituted a foodstuff or other essential
product".10 This is understood to mean that a measure could be justified under Article XI:2(a) in
case of an extrinsic and transitory event that affects the supply of a certain product, rather than in
structural and permanent circumstances.
14. Indonesia stresses that its reserves of high-grade saprolite ore are expected to be depleted in
the coming future. It is worth noting that nickel ore is not a regenerating natural resource that
recovers over time if left unmined. Therefore, should the reserve s of nickel ore be depleted in the
coming future, this entails that there may be little possibility for the shortage of nickel ore to cease
to exist. It appears that the circumstance at hand is not the one that is extrinsic or transitory, but
is rather a structural and permanent one.
IV. Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
15. Indonesia claims in its First Written Submission that the measures are necessary to secure
compliance with WTO -consistent laws or regulations, namely Indonesia 's sustainable mining and

6 Indonesia's First Written Submission, paras. 104–131.
7 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 324.
8 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 325.
9 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.297.
10 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 337.

mineral resource management requirements. To that end, Indonesia demonstrates the wide -
reaching adverse impact nickel ore mining has on the environment.11
16. Indonesia concludes that the measures at issue are necessary in light of the 'weighing and
balancing' exercise as held by the Appellate Body in India – Solar Cells,12 as the interests or values
concerned are of the highest importance, and the measures make a material contribution to securing
compliance with Indonesia's laws and regulations.13
17. Certainly, Indonesia's arguments must be duly considered by the Panel. At the same time, the
Panel should also give full consideration to the degree of trade -restrictiveness of the measures at
issue in the context of conducting 'weighing and balancing' exercise under Article XX(d) of the GATT
1994.
18. In this regard, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef considered that "a
measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as
'necessary' than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects ".14 The Appellate Body also
affirmed that "a determination of whether a measure, which is not indispensable, may nevertheless
be 'necessary' within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include … the ac companying impact of the law
or regulation on imports or exports".15
19. In Korea's view, a comparative analysis needs to be undertaken between the measure at issue
and its reasonably available alternatives in order to satisfy the Appellate Body's standard. A relevant
consideration for the Panel, therefore, should be whether less restrictive alternatives that could
achieve the same or similar goal were reasonably available for Indonesia.
20. Next, in relation to the chapeau of Article XX, which stipulates that "measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail ", Indonesia claims that the measures at issue are
consistent with the requirements of the pro vision as they do not distinguish between Indonesia 's
trading partners and apply with equal force regardless of the country at issue.16
21. It is relevant to recall the finding of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp that "discrimination
could occur not only betw een different exporting Members, but also between exporting Members
and the importing Member concerned".17 That is, the principle of even-handedness applies not only
to and among Indonesia's trading partners, but also between Indonesia and its trading partners.
22. In this regard, Korea respectfully requests the Panel to consider whether the measures at
issue have any discriminating effect between all the Members concerned.
V. Conclusion
23. Korea thanks the Panel for providing an opportunity to comment on the issues raised in this
proceeding.

11 Indonesia's First Written Submission, paras. 195-205.
12 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.59.
13 Indonesia's First Written Submission, paras. 174-187.
14 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
15 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.
16 Indonesia's First Written Submission, paras. 224-228.
17 Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, para. 150.

ANNEX C-6
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF UKRAINE*
1. Dear Chair, distinguished Members of the Panel, Ukraine welcomes this opportunity to
shortly express its views on certain legal aspects in the present dispute.
2. In its Third Party Written Submission Ukraine has already provided some views and will not
repeat them today.
3. In the ongoing dispute the European Union challenges introduced by the Indonesian
authorities prohibition on export of nickel as well as domestic processing requirements in
Indonesia and argues that they are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.1
4. Indonesia in its turn justifies its actions and appeals to Article XI:2(a) and Article XX(d) of
the GATT 1994.
5. Indonesia stated that the measures at issue legally prohibits the exportation of nickel ore
and the European Union has failed to make a prima facie case that the domestic processing
requirement is inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because it has not
demonstrated that measures have a limiting effect on nickel ore trade.2
6. In Argentina – Import Measures , the Appellate Body explained that, in the context of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, the limitation on the importation or exportation "need not
be demonstrated by quantifying the effects of the measure at issue; rather, such limiting
effects can be demonstrated through the design, architecture, and revealing structure of
the measure at issue considered in its relevant context."3
7. At the same time in another case China - Raw Materials , the Appellate Body held that
Article XI:1 covers "those prohibitions and restrictions that have a limiting effect on the
quantity or amount of a product being imported or exported."4
8. Therefore, in this dispute Panel should consider whether the complainant proved any of its
claims in relation to the alleged violation of Article XI:1 of the GATT and presented a prima
facie case that the measures are not justified in terms of limiting effect on the quantity or
amount of a product being imported or exported or the complainant clearly demonstrated
limiting effect through the design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at
issue.
9. Another issue the Panel faced is whether Indonesia has demonstrate d that the export
prohibition on nickel ore and domestic processing requirement are temporarily applied to
prevent critical shortage of nickel, a product that is essential to Indonesia.
10. Alternatively, in case the Panel were to conclude that the measures at issue are not justified
under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, Indonesia then argues that such measures are
justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, as measures necessary to secure compliance
with WTO-consistent laws or regulations.
11. Ukraine won’t repeat its Third Party Written Submission but would like to provide comments
regarding the issue of specific rules, obligations, or requirements with respect to which the
measures at issue seek to secure compliance.
12. In order to conclude whether measures at issue are necessary to secure compliance with
WTO-consistent laws or regulations the Panel should examine whether Indonesia has

* Ukraine requested that its oral statement serves as its executive summary.
1 EU's First Written Submission, para 2.
2 Indonesia's First Written Submission, para. 12.
3 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.
4 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 320.

explained the relevant specific rules, obligations, or requirements with respect to which the
measures at issue seek to secure compliance.
13. Indonesia asserts that it "has adopted a comprehensive policy framework to regulate
mining activities. Such comprehensive policy imposes a number of obligations on both
regulators and economic operators, in order to ensure that the exploitation of Indonesia’s
mineral resources are conducted on the basis of good mining practices " and provided a
brief description of the relevant elements of the above policy.
14. As Indonesia stated its comprehensive policy comprises a multiplicity of laws and
regulations dealing with the protection of the environment, conservation of natural
resources, worker health and safety, mining operations safety, waste management, among
others.
15. In this regard Ukraine reiterates that each country has its right to establish and regulate
its own levels of domestic environmental protection with respect to objectives pursued and
it can be reflected not in one separate regulation but as a complex policy. Therefore, while
examining specific rules, obligations, or requirements with respect to which the measures
at issue seek to secure compliance it is also important to take into account the
comprehensive policy as a whole.
16. Ukraine hopes its considerations set out above will help the Panel when evaluating the
claims set forth in this dispute.

ANNEX C-7
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
1. An integrated executive summary of the United Kingdom's third party submission, statement
and responses to certain Panel questions is provided below.
I. Article XI:1 GATT
2. Article XI:1 has been interpreted to cover "those prohibitions and restrictions that have a
limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product b eing imported or exported ". Previous case
law has found that this limiting effect "need not be demonstrated by quantifying the effects of the
measure at issue; rather, such limiting effects can be demonstrated through the design, architecture,
and revealing structure of the measure at issue considered in its relevant context".1
3. As to the relationship between the two challenged measures, the United Kingdom submits
that the Panel should assess the WTO -consistency of each of the measures individually. The fact
that one measure prevented the application of the second measure should not preclude the Panel
from assessing the compatibility of the latter with the GATT.
II. Article XI:2(a) GATT
4. Article XI:2(a) exempts "export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting Member" from the
general prohibition on quantitative restrictions contained in Article XI:1.
5. "Temporarily Applied". The Appellate Body has interpreted "temporarily applied" to mean
a "measure applied in the interim, to provide relief in extraordinary conditio ns in order to bridge a
passing need. It must be finite, that is, applied for a limited time. [It] must be of a limited duration
and not indefinite".2
6. The United Kingdom submits that an export restriction applied to an exhaustible resource
that is intended to be maintained until the reserves of that resource have been depleted cannot be
said to be "temporarily applied", nor can it be said to be applied to "prevent or relieve a critical
shortage".
7. "Critical Shortage". The Appellate Body has interpreted "critical shortage" to mean "those
deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that
reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or turning point ". The term "shortage" "is qualified by
the adjective 'critical', which, in turn, is defined as '[o]f, pertaining to, or constituting a crisis; of
decisive importance, crucial; involving risk or suspense '".3 The United Kingdom observes that a
proposal to remove the term "critical" from the original draft of t he GATT was rejected by the
drafters.
8. In response to Panel Question 3, the United Kingdom notes that Article XI:2 does not
prescribe the cause of the "critical shortage" and therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate, for
example, that the critical shortage was caused by an exceptional and temporary exogenous event.
However, the meaning of each element of Article XI:2(a) is informed by each of the other elements
of the provision. The cause of the critical shortage may therefore be relevant when assess ing
whether the measure is being applied to "prevent or relieve " that shortage. The United Kingdom
submits that it may be difficult to demonstrate that a measure is applied to "prevent or relieve" a
critical shortage if the shortage is in fact caused or exacerbated by expanding extraction and
production capacity within the Member's domestic market.
9. "Essential". The Appellate Body has interpreted the term "essential" to mean products that
are "absolutely indispensable or necessary" to the exporting Member. Furthermore, in China - Raw

1 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.
2 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 330.
3 Appellate Body Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 324.

Materials, the Panel found that "essential" products "may include a product that is an 'input' to an
important product or industry ". However, it reiterated that this assessment "must take into
consideration the particular circumstances faced by that Member at the time that a Member applied
the restriction."4 The United Kingdom submits that access to domestic supplies of input products is
not, in and of itself, "essential" to the development of a domestic industry.
III. Article XX(d) GATT
10. Meaning of "laws or regulations". The United Kingdom notes that text of Article XX(d)
refers to "laws or regulations" in respect of which "compliance" can be "secure[d]". As to the term
"secure", in India – Solar Cells the Appellate Body found that a measure can be said to secure
compliance "with 'laws or regulations' when it seeks to secure observance of specific rules, even if
the measure cannot be guaranteed to achieve such result with absolute certainty ": the "'more
precisely' a respondent is able to identify specific rules, obligations, or requirements contained in
the relevant 'laws or regulations ', the 'more likely it will be able to elucidate how and why the
inconsistent measure secures compliance with such 'laws or regulations'".5
11. The Appellate Body also held that the "laws or regulations " must be ones with which
"compliance" is possible and consequently, a panel should consider the degree to which an
instrument containing the alleged rule is normative in nat ure, including its enforceability and the
existence of any penalties and sanctions.
12. It follows that a measure can be said "to secure compliance" with "laws or regulations" when
its design reveals that it secures compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under
such laws or regulations. The Appellate Body distinguished between the "specific rules, obligations
or requirements " contained within the "laws or regulations " and the objectives of the "laws or
regulations", and held that panels should consider the degree of specificity or precision with which
the relevant instrument lays down a particular rule of conduct or course of action within the domestic
legal system of a Member, as opposed to simply providing a legal basis for action tha t may be
consistent with certain objectives.
13. The Appellate Body concluded by setting out a non-exhaustive list of criteria that panels may
consider when considering whether the respondent has identified a rule, or rules, that fall within the
scope of "laws or regulations ", including but not limited to, the degree of normativity of the
instrument and the degree of specificity of the relevant rule.
14. Finally, the United Kingdom submits that there are systemic reasons for avoiding an
expansive interpretation of "laws or regulations". If otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures could be
justified by reference to aspirational objectives or broad policy goals, it would disturb the balance
between trade liberalisation and the right to regulate enshrined in Article XX.

4 Panel Report, China - Raw Materials, para. 7.282 (emphasis added).
5 Appellate Body Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 5.108.

ANNEX C-8
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION
I. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994
1. The European Union claims that the export prohibition of nickel ore (implemented by MEMR
Regulation 11/2019 and MOT Regulation 96/2019), and the domestic processing requirement on
nickel ore and iron ore (implemented by MEMR Regulation 25/2018) are inconsistent with Article
XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Article XI:1 by its express terms sets out that a Member shall not institute
or maintain any "prohibitions" on "the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other [Member]." The ordinary meaning of the term "prohibitions" in Article XI:1, in
its context, is a "legal ban on the trade or importation of a specified commodity".
2. Similarly, Article XI:1 by its express terms sets out that a Member shall not institute or
maintain any "restrictions" on "the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other [Member]. " The pertinent definition of "restriction" in relation to the acts of
importation or exportation is "a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation".
3. Further, Article XI:1 applies to any "restriction", including those "made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures", other than "duties, taxes, or other charges".
Accordingly, Article XI:1 bans any measure that prohibits expo rtation or constitutes a limitation on
action or a limiting condition on exportation, other than duties, taxes or other charges.
4. Indonesia argues, with respect to the domestic processing requirement, that the European
Union has not made a prima facie case because the measure does not have any "limiting effect" on
the exportation of nickel ore since the exportation "is legally prohibited in the first place " by the
export ban also at issue.
5. The text of Article XI:1, however, does not require a showing of actu al trade effects of a
measure at issue. Rather, the Panel could find a violation of Article XI:1 if the domestic processing
requirement would constitute a limitation on action or a limiting condition on exports, without a need
to show that the requirement has caused an actual decrease in exports.
6. Moreover, the European Union has challenged the export ban and the domestic processing
requirement as two separate and independent restrictions on exportation – not as a single measure
operating in combination. If the Panel agrees these measures operate independently, the Panel
should evaluate the WTO-consistency of each of the two measures independently. The Panel is not
precluded from finding a measure to be in breach of Article XI:1 simply because there is anothe r
measure whose operation may also prohibit or restrict exports
7. In summary, to the extent that the Panel finds that either of Indonesia 's measures acts as
a legal ban on exportation or constitutes a limitation on action or a limiting condition on exportation
– and do not constitute "duties, taxes, or other charges " within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994 – the measures would be inconsistent with Article XI:1.
II. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994
8. Indonesia argues that t he measures at issue are justified under Article XI:2(a) of the
GATT 1994 because they are "temporarily applied to prevent a critical shortage" of nickel, which is
"a product that is essential to Indonesia."
9. Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994 provides that A rticle XI:1 "shall not extend to . . . export
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs
or other products essential to the exporting [WTO Member] ". Therefore, the party invoking Article
XI:2(a) must demonstrate three things: that the export prohibition or restriction at issue is (1)

"temporarily applied"; (2) that it is applied "to prevent or relieve critical shortages of [a product] ";
and (3) that the product is "essential to" the responding Member.
10. First, one of the requirements of Article XI:2(a) is that the measure is "temporarily applied".
The dictionary definition of "temporarily" is "for a time (only); during a limited time ". Accordingly,
the requirement means that the measures at issue should have defined and limited time parameters,
at the very least. The United States notes that the measures at issue do not themselves appear to
specify when they would cease to be in effect, or otherwise indicate that they are being applied for
a time only or during a limited time.
11. The second requirement of Article XI:2(a) is that the restriction at issue apply to "prevent
or relieve critical shortages" of a product. Indonesia argues that the measures are applied to prevent
a critical shortage of nickel ore, which was anticipated because "the surge in demand for Indonesian
nickel ore has caused a dramatic expansion of extraction and production levels in Indonesia ". The
United States notes that the evidence Indonesia has submitted to show a "critical shortage" appears
to indicate that the anticipated shortage would have, at least in part, resulted from the increase in
nickel ore processing capacity within Indonesia. For example, Indonesia states that "[i]n the next
few years, domestic processing capa city will continue to expand, placing increased strain on
Indonesia's nickel reserves." In assessing Indonesia's "critical shortage" argument, the Panel should
take into account whether any "critical shortage" is the result of the creation of increased processing
capacity within Indonesia 's own territory. Moreover, given that Indonesia considers its processing
capacity will continue to expand, and processing capacity once introduced would generate demand
commensurate with that expanded capacity, it is unclear how an export restriction would be applied
for a limited time. Expanded capacity and resulting demand would rather suggest the measures
would be applied for an unlimited time.
12. Third, Article XI:2(a) also requires that the restriction at issue apply to "foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting [Member]". The dictionary definition of "essential" is "absolutely
indispensable or necessary". In addition, the inclusion of "foodstuffs" in Article XI:2(a) is important
context for conveying the level of importance of the product that is contemplated by this provision.
Therefore, the Panel should examine whether Indonesia has shown that nickel arises to the level of
importance that makes it absolutely indispensable or necessary to Indonesia.
13. In summary, the Panel should only find that Indonesia has shown that its measures fall
under Article XI:2(a) if Indonesia has demonstrated that the measures are "temporarily applied to
prevent . . . critical shortages of" nickel, and that it is a product "essential to" Indonesia.
III. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX(D) OF THE GATT 1994
14. Indonesia also argues that the measures at issue are justified under Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994 because they are "measures necessary to secure compliance with WTO-consistent laws
or regulations " – namely Indonesia 's "comprehensive policy framework for mining activities, in
particular sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements."
15. To establish that a measure is justified under Article XX(d), th e respondent must
demonstrate that: (1) the measure is applied consistently with the chapeau of Article XX; (2) the
measure was adopted or enforced to pursue the objective covered by the subparagraph, i.e., to
"secure[] compliance with 'laws or regulations' that are themselves consistent with the GATT 1994";
and (3) the measure must be "necessary" to the achievement of that objective, i.e., to secure such
compliance.
A. Whether the Measures Meet the Requirements Set Out in the Chapeau of
Article XX
16. Pursuant to the chapeau of Article XX, the party invoking Article XX has the burden of
showing (1) that any measure purportedly justified under an Article XX subparagraph does not
discriminate "between countries where the same conditions prevail"; (2) that such discrimination is
not "arbitrary or unjustifiable "; and (3) that the measure is not a "disguised restriction on
international trade".

17. Indonesia argues that the measures at issue are applied in a manner that is consistent with
the requirements in the chapeau of Article XX because they "do not reflect any discrimination" since
they do not "distinguish between Indonesia's trading partners"; and because the measures do not
"confer[] any direct or indirect protection to Indonesian nickel producers", but instead "disadvantage
domestic mining companies by restricting their ability to compete in foreign markets." However, the
discrimination referred to in the chapeau is not limited to distinguishing between trading partners
only, but also includes discrimination between Indonesian and foreign producers and other entities.
Second, that a measure operates to the disadvantage of domestic producers does not mean it cannot
be inconsistent with the chapeau. To the contrary, by (in Indonesia's words) "restricting their ability
to compete in foreign markets" the measure may serve as a (not very well) disguised restriction on
trade.
18. Third, and more important in the context of this dispute, Indonesia 's measures not only
prohibit the exportation of nickel ore and restrict the exportation of nickel through conditions on
processing, but also affect the consumers and purchasers of nickel that may operate in other
industries. The Panel 's examination of whether the measures constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade is not limited to the measures' impact on nickel trade or to nickel producers only,
but should include impact on international trade as a whole. For instance, nickel is an essential
component in most stainless steel, and also comprises more than 50 percent of the price for stainless
steel. Indonesia is the largest producer of nickel in the world, and therefore any measures impacting
the processing and exportation of nickel, such as those at issue in this dispute, will also have
repercussions on the production and trade of stainless steel globally. In assessing Indonesia 's
measures under the chapeau, this impact also must be considered.
B. Whether the Measures are Necessary to Secure Compliance with
GATT-Consistent Laws or Regulations
19. Under subparagraph (d) of Article XX, Indonesia must sh ow that (1) the measure was
adopted or enforced to "secure[] compliance with 'laws or regulations' that are themselves consistent
with the GATT 1994"; and (2) the measures are "necessary" to secure such compliance.
20. The first element requires an initial, t hreshold examination of the relationship between the
challenged measures and the "laws or regulations" that are not WTO-inconsistent. Indonesia must
identify what constitutes "compliance" with its identified laws and regulations and explain how the
challenged measures "secure" such compliance. Understanding which aspect(s) of the "laws and
regulations" is implicated will allow the Panel to assess whether those laws and regulations are in
fact WTO-inconsistent. Once that has been established, the Panel must assess how the challenged
measures secure compliance with the identified laws or regulations. To the extent that Indonesia 's
arguments relate to how the challenged measures support the general objectives of sustainability
and conservation, rather than comp liance with the specific laws and regulations identified by
Indonesia, those arguments might support a defense, not under Article XX(d), but under Article
XX(g) – a defense Indonesia has not raised in this dispute.
21. With respect to "necessity", the Panel mu st continue its examination of the relationship
between the measures and the objective at issue – in this case determining whether the challenged
measures are "necessary" to securing compliance with Indonesia 's identified "laws or regulations".
A panel assessing the "necessity" of a measure may look at several factors, including "the extent to
which the measure sought to be justified contributes to the realization of the end pursued" and "the
trade-restrictiveness of the challenged measure". This review would include whether any alternative
measures exist "that achieve an equivalent level of protection while being less trade restrictive" than
the challenged measure.
22. Indonesia, while acknowledging that the measures at issue are trade-restrictive, asserts that
the societal values protected by the Indonesian mining and mineral resource management laws and
regulations (i.e., environmental protection and conservation) are "values of the highest importance";
and the measures, "as part of a comprehensiv e policy, are apt to make a material contribution to
securing compliance with Indonesia 's sustainable mining and mineral resource management
requirements." Indonesia further asserts that it is incumbent upon the European Union as the
complaining Member to propose alternative measures that are reasonably available to Indonesia and
are less trade restrictive while at the same time "'preserving for [Indonesia] its right to achieve its
desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued.'" Additionally, Indonesia notes that

no available remedial measures would be able to "make an equivalent contribution to the
enforcement of Indonesia's sustainable mining and mineral resource management requirements."
23. The United States agrees that responding Membe rs maintain the right to determine their
own level of protection with respect to objectives pursued, and that it rests on the European Union
to propose reasonably available, less trade-restrictive alternatives for achieving an equivalent level
of protection. However, this burden on the European Union does not relieve Indonesia of its own
burden of demonstrating that the measures at issue are in fact necessary to the objective of securing
compliance with its identified laws or regulations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. RESPONSES TO PANEL QUESTIONS TO THIRD PARTIES
24. Response to Question 1: In this dispute, the European Union has asserted that the domestic
processing requirement is inconsistent with Article XI:1 because it establishes an indepe ndent
restriction on exportation because the holders of a mining business license may not "conduct[]
export activities " without satisfying certain processing conditions. T he European Union has
challenged the export ban and the domestic processing requirement as two individual measures and
not as a single measure operating in combination. The fact that two separate measures are in force
and apply to a product at the same time does not make them a single measure for purposes of the
Panel's analysis. Furthermore, the Panel is not precluded from finding a measure to be in breach of
Article XI:1 simply because there is another measure whose operation may also prohibit or restrict
exports.
25. Response to Question 2: Based on the dictionary definition of "temporarily," which is "for a
time (only); during a limited time ", the Panel should consider whether a measure has defined and
limited time parameters, or otherwise indicates that it is being applied for a time only or during a
limited time. Moreover, the phrase "temporarily applied" in Article XI:2(a) is linked to the following
phrase "to prevent or relieve critical shortages ", which indicates the application of the measure
should be l imited to the time a Member is pursuing those goals through the export prohibition or
restriction. As part of the analysis, the Panel should take into account whether any "critical shortage"
is the result of the creation of increased processing capacity wi thin the respondent Member 's
territory. For instance, given that Indonesia considers its nickel ore processing capacity will continue
to expand, and processing capacity once introduced would generate demand commensurate with
that expanded capacity, the Pan el may find that Indonesia 's export restrictions applied to prevent
or relieve a critical shortage of nickel ore are, in fact, unlikely to be applied for a limited time
26. Response to Question 3 : Nothing in the text of Article XI:2(a) suggests that a "critical
shortage" within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) must stem from an "exceptional and temporary
exogenous event " or exclude "a definitive and unavoidable outcome. " While the text of Article
XI:2(a) does not specifically exclude critical shortages stemming from any particular causes, the
text does require that any measures taken to address them be "temporarily applied." In the present
dispute, given that Indonesia considers its processing capacity will continue to expand, and
processing capacity once introdu ced would generate demand commensurate with that expanded
capacity, it is unclear how the challenged measures could be seen as applying for a limited time.
27. Response to Question 4: In an Article XI:2(a) analysis, the Panel must examine, on a case
by case basis, whether the respondent Member has shown that the product at issue is "essential"
within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) – i.e., that it is absolutely indispensable or necess ary to the
Member. In the course of the examination, the fact that a product is one of the input products for
an industry which the Member desires to develop can be a supporting factor for the product 's
"essentialness" to the Member. The term "essential" should only cover those products that are
"essential" within the meaning of Article XI:2(a). The inclusion of "foodstuffs" in Article XI:2(a)
conveys the level of importance of the product that is contemplated by the provision.
28. Response to Question 5: A series of export restrictions that apply for extended periods of
time with some small breaks would appear not in fact to be "temporarily applied" within the meaning
of Article XI:2(a). Were a Member allowed to avoid its obligations under Article XI:1 simply by
operationalizing an otherwise long-term export restriction through a series of formally "temporary"
measures, the narrow exception provided for in Article XI:2(a) would render the substantive
obligation in Article XI:1 meaningless.

29. Response to Question 6: Nothing in the text of Article XX suggests that an Article XX analysis
must begin with an examination under one or more Article XX subparagraphs and then proceed to
an examination of consistency with the chapeau . The chapeau and the subparagraphs are two
independent but related requirements, both of which must be satisfied for a measure to be found
justified under Article XX.
30. Response to Question 7: The text of Article XX(d) requires an initial, threshold examination
of the relationship between the challenged measures and the "laws or regulations" that are not WTO-
inconsistent. The Panel must assess how the challenged measures secure compliance with the
identified "laws or regulations". Accordingly, the respondent Member must identify what constitutes
"compliance" with its identified laws or regulations and explain how the challenged measures
"secure" such compliance. It may be difficult to demonstrate the requisite relationship between the
identified laws or regulations and the challenged measures if the identified laws or regulations merely
lay out broad policy goals without requiring specific action s because it would be less clear what
constitutes compliance with such laws or regulations.
31. Response to Question 8 : An argument that the challenged measure is "apt to produce a
material contribution" toward securing compliance with the underlying laws or regulations may not,
on its own, establish that the measure is in fact "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d).
The dictionary definition of "necessary" is "indispensable, vital, essential; requisite". Therefore, the
Panel should examine whether the respondent Member has shown that the challenged measures are
indispensable, vital, essential, and requisite for the objective of securing compliance with the
underlying laws or regulations. If the Panel finds that there is at least one reasonably availab le
alternative that achieves an equivalent level of protection while being less trade restrictive, that
would mean that the challenged measure is not in fact indispensable, vital, essential, and requisite
for achieving the respondent Member 's desired level of protection with respect to the objective
pursued.
32. Response to Question 9(a) : The text of Article XX(d) requires that any measure taken
pursuant to that provision be taken to secure compliance with WTO-consistent "laws or regulations."
In that way, the laws or regulations at issue must have some specificity and identifiability.
33. Response to Question 9(b): Under Article XX(d), the respondent Member must identify what
constitutes "compliance" with its identified laws or regulations and explain how the ch allenged
measures "secure" such compliance. If the identified laws or regulations merely lay out aspirational
or general objectives without any specific requirements – if they do not contain any "normative
content", to use the Panel 's language – it would b e difficult to determine what constitutes
"compliance" with such laws or regulations, and thus less clear how the respondent Member might
demonstrate the requisite relationship between the identified laws or regulations and the challenged
measures under Article XX(d).