Document: WT/DS397/R Page C-1 ANNEX C ORAL STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL OR EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF Contents Page Annex C-1 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of China at the First Meeting of the Panel C-2
Document codes: WT/DS397/R
Complainant: China
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.S.
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. 6, 9, 5, 2, 3, 4  Anti-dumpingArt. I, X:3(a), VI:1  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX C

ORAL STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES AT THE FIRST
SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL OR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF

Contents Page
Annex C-1 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of China at the First
Meeting of the Panel C-2
Annex C-2 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of the
European Union at the First Meeting of the Panel C-9
Annex C-3 Closing Statement of China at the First Meeting of the Panel C-18
Annex C-4 Closing Statement of the European Union at the First Meeting of
the Panel C-20

ANNEX C-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE OPENING STATEMENT
OF CHINA AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this dispute, China challenges two measure s: (i) Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC)
No. 384/96 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the EC, as
amended, as codified and replaced by Council Regul ation (EC) No. 1225/2009; and (ii) Council
Regulation (EC) No. 91/2009 which imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron
or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China.

2. In its First Written Submission, th e EU has raised a broad range of procedural arguments. If
these procedural deficiencies are so substantial, China fails to unde rstand why the EU did not request
such a preliminary ruling. Unfo rtunately, the absence of a request for preliminary ruling has denied
China the opportunity to reply in writing to the pro cedural objections before this first substantive
meeting. China fears that the EU's unwillingness to request a preliminary ruling is just one more
element of the EU's litigation tactics. China reca lls that procedural arguments are important where
they are invoked to ensure due process rights a nd that they should not be abused as tactical
instruments to prevent a panel from addressing the substantive issues underlying the dispute.

3. In its Oral Statement, China will address the main procedural arguments raised by the EU and
reply to the remaining procedural objections in its second written submission. Likewise, China will
not enter into a detailed refutati on of all substantive arguments but will focus on demonstrating the
fundamental errors in the EU's arguments relating to China's main claims.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING ARTICLE 9(5) OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC)
No. 384/96 OF 22 DECEMBER 1995 ON PROTECTION AGAINST DUMPED
IMPORTS FROM COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF THE EC, AS CODIFIED AND
REPLACED BY COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No. 1225/2009

4. As a preliminary remark
, China rejects the EU's allegation that there is a common
understanding that China is not yet a market economy country. Following its WTO accession, China
has gradually evolved into a market economy country . This view is shared by many WTO Members
that have granted full market economy status to China. In any case, whether China is a market
economy or a non-market economy country is not relevant in this dispute.

5. It is therefore regrettable that the EU see ms to confuse the rules governing "Market Economy
Treatment" or MET and "Individual Treatment" or IT. In the EU's anti-dumping regime, MET and IT
are completely different issues. MET relates to the question whether the domestic prices and costs of
the exporting producer in the non-market economy country can be used for determining normal
value (Article 2(7)). The provisions on IT, on th e contrary, only relate to the question whether an
individual dumping margin and duty must be calculated for the exporting producer on the basis of his
own export prices or, on the contrary, such exporting producer must be subjected to the country-wide
residual duty (Article 9(5)). China does not address the WTO consistency of the EU's rules contained
in Article 2(7) of the Basic AD Regulation which d eal with the normal value determination. China's
"as such" claim is only directed at Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation and thus only relates to the
"individual treatment" issue.

6. The EU intentionally ignores the difference between both sets of rules. Instead, it tries to
transform the limited exceptions which concern the normal value determination into a legal
justification for all forms of diffe rent treatment applied to non-market economy countries. This tactic
becomes obvious in the section entitled "background" 1, where the EU invokes Article 8 of the
Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code to support its position, contrary to the documented negotiating
history thereof, and in the EU's analysis of China's Protocol of Accession.2

7. China submits that a correct application of th e rules of treaty interpretation can only lead to
the conclusion that Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation violates inter alia Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.3
and 9.4 of the AD Agreement. Contrary to what the EU alleges, there is no rule or "codified
understanding" in the AD Agreement according to which the provisions of that Agreement would
only be applicable to market economy countries.

8. The procedural arguments
 raised by the EU against the claims made by China relating to the
first measure can be grouped into two main categor ies. The EU first submits that China's Panel
Request failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 since the Panel Request failed to present the
claims relating to Articles 6.10, 9.3 and 9.4 of the AD Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the
GATT 1994 sufficiently clearly because there is alle gedly no connection between the measure at
issue, i.e. Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation, and the WTO provisions that China claims this
measure violates.
3

9. The EU submits that Article 9(5) only deals with the issue of the imposition of anti-dumping
duties while the provisions that China claims this measu re violates deal with other issues. This issue
is however a substantive issue that has nothing to do with the procedural requirements of Article 6.2
of the DSU, which merely requires the complaining pa rty to identify in its Panel Request the specific
measure at issue and the claims so as to enable the defending party to know the problem at issue. On
the basis of China's Panel Request, the EU was ma nifestly aware of the specific measure challenged
and the legal basis for the alleged nullification or impairment of China's WTO benefits.

10. Furthermore, when submitting that the " explanation provided by China"
4 with respect to these
claims fails to plainly connect the specific measure at issue with the specific claim so that the problem
is presented clearly, the EU obviously confuses the "c laims" with the "arguments" that refer to the
explanations. While "claims" must be set out in the Panel Request in a precise manner, arguments
will necessarily be expanded upon a nd clarified progressively during the proceeding. Finally, the EU
failed to demonstrate that China' s alleged failure to "present the problem clearly" has prejudiced its
ability to defend itself.

11. The second set of procedural argum ents relate to "issues" that have been raised by China in its
First Written Submission and which were allegedly no t covered by the Panel Request. First, the EU
claims that Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 is outside the Panel's terms of reference because
the measure identified in the Panel Re quest is Council Regulation No 384/96, " as amended " while
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 does not amend but repeal Council Regulation No 384/96.
This is a purely formalistic argument which, if adopted, would seriously undermine the effectiveness
of the dispute settlement system. Since the word ing and content of the measure at issue has not
changed, the Panel has to conclude that Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 is
within its terms of reference.

1 EU FWS, para. 11 – 14.
2 EU FWS, para. 123 – 129.
3 EU FWS, para. 51.
4 EU FWS, para. 53, 56, 61, 65 and 67.

12. Second, the EU submits that China has sought to "expand the scope of the measure at issue to
cover other issues".
5 According to the EU, the measure identif ied in the Panel Request is Article 9(5)
of the Basic AD Regulation which deals only with the imposition of anti-dumping duties 6 and China's
First Written Submission "seeks to incorporate issues dealing with the calculation and determination
of individual margins within the scope of the measure at issue".7 The EU's claim appears to take issue
with the "content" of the measure at issue. Howeve r, contrary to what the EU alleges, Article 9(5)
deals not only with the imposition of anti-dumping duties but also determines whether or not an
individual dumping margin will be calculated. Ch ina's views on the scope of the measure are clear
from its Panel Request.

13. With respect to the substantive issues
 raised by the EU regarding China's challenge of
Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation, China' s comments will, for the purposes of this Oral
Statement, be limited to some observations con cerning the EU's arguments relating principally to
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the AD Agreement and Article I of the GATT 1994. The other issues will be
addressed in China's second written submission.

14. As a preliminary remark, China would like to emphasize the fundamental error in the
approach taken by the EU when interpreting the prov isions concerned. Rather than starting from the
ordinary meaning of the terms read in their contex t, the EU follows a teleological approach. China
also considers it necessary to respond to the EU statements that Article 9(5) of the Basic
AD Regulation has a much more limited scope than that claimed by China. The EU submits that
Article 9(5) deals only with the very specific issu e which refers to the imposition of definitive anti-
dumping duties and that it does not address the determination of margins of dumping which is
allegedly governed by Article 9(4) of the Basic AD Regulation. The EU's analysis is incorrect.
Whether an individual or a country-wide dumping ma rgin is determined for a particular exporting
producer is not governed by Article 9(4) but by Ar ticle 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation. The EU
actually confirms this in paragr aphs 81 of its First written Submission where it explains how anti-
dumping duties and dumping margins are determined in case of imports from non-market economy
countries. As such, Article 9(5) concerns both the determination of an individual duty and an
individual dumping margin.

15. China will now briefly elaborate on its clai ms that Article 9(5) violates several WTO
provisions. China will start with the Article 9.2 ADA
 claim. The EU seems to consider that it would
always be permissible for WTO Members to limit their examination to the exporting country as a
whole and to impose one country-wide duty. Article 9.2 would merely require that the investigating
authority name the supplier or suppliers of the pro duct concerned. Yet, the above interpretation is
wrong, inter alia because it would make no sense to require the suppliers to be named on an
individual basis if the intention was to impose a country-wide duty. The EU's interpretation of
Article 9.2 is also dangerous since it would allow investigating authorities to disregard the individual
dumping margins calculated for specific exporters as long as the duty imposed on them does not
exceed the country-wide dumping margin.

16. The EU further submits that the ordinary meaning of the word "impracticable" used in
Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement is "ineffective". However, based on the New Shorter Oxford
Dictionary
8, "impracticable" refers to something which is not feasible in practice or impossible in
practice while the word "ineffective" refers to some thing which has no effect or result. Moreover, the
EU's reference to Article 8.3 of the AD Agreemen t does not support its position either, but, on the
contrary, demonstrates the err oneous nature of the EU's interpretation. Thus, the word
"impracticable" only refers to situations in whic h the specific action is not feasible for practical

5 EU FWS, para. 77.
6 EU FWS, para. 78 – 80.
7 EU FWS, para. 79.
8 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, 3rd edition, Volume I, p.1325 and p.2317.

reasons. The typical situation where this arises is wh ere the number of exporters is too large or where
certain exporters are not known. This interpreta tion of the term "impracticable" is furthermore
confirmed by the negotiating history of the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code.

17. The EU's arguments relating to Article 6.10
 must similarly be rejected. China submits that
Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation violates Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement because it
provides specific conditions that exporting producers from non-market economy countries must fulfil
in order to receive individual treatment, i.e. an individual dumping margin and an individual duty rate.
The EU argues that the departure from the general rule contained in Article 6.10 first sentence is
permissible in situations different from the sampling scenario.
9 However, Article 6.10 expressly
limits the possibility to derogate from this general rule to this one specific case, as also confirmed by
consistent case-law.10

18. The EU further refers to the Panel's findings in Korea – Certain Paper and Norway –
Salmon
11, to argue that the terms "exporter or producer" in Article 6.10, first sentence, cannot be
interpreted strictu senso as a "company that exports" or a "company that produces" but rather in a
manner which also permits to combine separate en tities into a single supplier which is the actual
source of price discrimination, and in case of non-market economy countries, the State. 12 However,
Article 9(5) deals with a different issue than the question ex amined by the Panel in Korea – Certain
Paper, namely whether several legal entities are rela ted and should be regard ed as one exporter.
Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation is both diffe rent from and additional to the criteria used to
determine whether different legal entities should be considered as one "exporter" or "producer" for
the purposes of the dumping margin determination. The "individual treatment" test of Article 9(5)
applies in addition to the examination of whether several expor ters are related and should be treated
as a single exporter or producer. The criteria of Articl e 9(5) are also stricter than the general criteria
used by the EU investigating authorities to determin e whether distinct legal entities should be treated
as a single exporter or producer.

19. China can agree with the fi nding reached by the Panel in Korea – Certain Paper that the
terms "exporter" or "producer" in Article 6.10 do not necessarily refer to a single legal entity and that
one individual dumping margin may be determined fo r several legal companies that are found to be
related. China maintains, however, that this ma rgin still has to be "individual" for that group of
companies. However, under Article 9(5), expor ting producers from non-market economy countries
who cannot demonstrate that they fulfil the criteri a set out in that provision will be subject to the
residual country-wide dumping margin and anti-dumping duty. This is plainly inconsistent with the
requirement of Article 6.10 that the dumping margin be determined on an individual basis, no matter
whether the "exporter" or "producer" is a single legal entity or a group of companies. Also, the
country-wide dumping margin is not based on the data concerning all exporters/producers found to be
"related".

20. The EU tries to defend the use of the additiona l and stricter criteria of Article 9(5) and the
imposition of a country-wide duty where such criteria are not met by referring to the State as being
the actual producer and the source of the dumping.
13 The EU does not explain, however, why State-
owned or State-controlled companies should be treated differently from other related group
companies. Neither does the EU justify why such companies should be made subject to the higher
residual duty.
21. Finally, the obligation to impose a country -wide duty unless a company demonstrates that it
meets the IT criteria of Article 9(5), does not apply to all State-owned or State-controlled companies,

9 EU FWS, para. 142, 147 and 152.
10 See, e.g., Panel Report, Mexico – Beef and Rice, para. 7.137.
11 EU FWS, para. 144 – 147.
12 EU FWS, para. 147.
13 EU FWS, para. 153.

but only to such companies in countries classified as non-market economy countries by the EU.
There is no objective justification for this discriminatory treatment.

22. With respect to the Protocol of Accession, it does not allow any derogation as to the export
prices which must be used or from the rule that dumping margins and anti-dumping duties must be
determined on an individual basis.

23. However, the EU considers that such specifi c provision would not be required and that it is
sufficient as a legal justification that the Prot ocol of Accession contains a "common understanding
that China is not a market economy country" to make "the specific provisions" dealing with non-
market economy countries contained in the AD Agre ement applicable, namely Articles 6.10 and 9.2
of the AD Agreement.
14 This conclusion is wrong on both counts, since (i) China's Protocol of
Accession does not contain a "common understanding th at China is not a market economy country";
and (ii) neither Article 6.10 nor any provisions of Article 9 specifically address issues in connection
with non-market economy countries.

24. In conclusion, the imposition of additional an d stricter criteria for obtaining an individual
anti-dumping duty on exporting producers from China compared to the criteria applicable to exporting
producers from market economy countries has no lega l justification in the AD Agreement or in
China's Protocol of Accession.

25. Moreover, this discriminatory treatment also violates Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 . The EU
submits that no violation of Article I.1 can be found, on the basis of the lex specialis principle and
Article II:2(b) of the GATT.
15 However, this reasoning is flawed as (i) Article II:2(b) of the
GATT 1994 only relates to Article II:1 but not to Artic le I of the GATT 1994; and (ii) there is no
"conflict" of provisions within the meaning of the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the
WTO Agreement since the AD Agreement or the Pr otocol or Accession does not contain a legal
justification for treating exporters from non-market economy countries differently.

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 91/2009 OF
26 JANUARY 2009 IMPOSING A DEFINI TIVE ANTI-DUMPING DUTY ON
IMPORTS OF CERTAIN IRON AND STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA

26. China will address various aspects of its cl aims concerning the determination of the
"domestic industry ". China submits that the domestic industry determination made by the EU
violates Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in several respects.

27 First, China considers that the EU has violat ed Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement by excluding
from the definition of the "domestic industry" all producers that did not make themselves known
within 15 days as of the date of publication of the notice of initiation as well as those producers that
did not support the investigation.
16 According to the EU, Article 4.1 gives the investigating
authorities the discretion to choose the producers to be included in the "domestic industry" as long as
the producers thus selected represent a "major proportion" of the total domestic production.
17

28. This theory was expressly rejected by the Panel in EC – Salmon . The Panel stated that it is
not permissible to exclude from the outset from the "domestic industry" certain categories of
producers of the like product other than those set out in Article 4.1. Contrary to what the EU alleges,
the Panel's findings in EC – Salmon were not limited to categories of producers "which produce a

14 EU FWS, para. 127.
15 EU FWS, para. 173.
16 China FWS, para. 233-245.
17 EU FWS, para. 292-297.

particular type of the like product" but concern any category of producers of the like product other
than those set out in Article 4.1.

29. The EU did exactly what the Panel so clearly condemned. It excluded from the definition of
the "domestic industry" all producers that did not make themselves known within 15 days following
the notice of initiation as well as those producers that did not support the complaint. These exclusions
alone already introduced a bias in the "domestic industry" definition in favour of a finding of injury.

30. Second, the producers thus selected did not represent "a major proportion" of the total
domestic production of fasteners. The EU did not even check whether the producers thus selected
constituted "a major proportion" of the total domestic output. The EU automatically assumes that the
major proportion criterion is fulfilled as long as the selected producers meet the major proportion
definition in Article 5(4) of the Basic AD Regula tion which deals with the standing requirements for
the complainants. The EU thus interprets Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement as allowing it to define the
domestic industry as consisting only of producers expressly supporting the complaint as long as the
latter represent more than 25 percent of the Community production.

31. The EU tries to defend the automatic equation between the producers supporting the
complaint and the "domestic industry" by stating that meeting the 25 per cent test creates a legitimate
presumption that the producers represent a major proportion of total production.
18 Since the
producers constituting the domestic industry represente d 27 per cent of the total domestic production,
they did, according to the EU, satisfy the major proportion test of Article 4.1.

32. The EU's interpretation finds no basis in the relevant provisions when examined in the light of
the principles of treaty interpretation. In order to represent a "proportion" and thus a fortiori "a major
proportion", the domestic producers concerned must constitu te a "part", a "share" of the whole, that is
of the domestic production as a whole. In other word s, they must be representative of the whole.
This has also been underlined by the Appellate Body in US – Lamb .
19 By failing to include in the
definition of the domestic industry domestic produ cers that opposed the complaint or remained
neutral, the EU investigating authorities defined a do mestic industry that is not "representative" of the
whole and does not constitute a "proportion" of the total domestic production and a fortiori a "major
proportion" of the total domestic production.

33. The Panel in Argentina – Poultry merely takes note of the fact that the "major proportion"
requirement does not imply a precise quantitative threshold, such as 50 per cent. It states that whether
a collective output constitutes a "major proportion" is to be assessed on the basis of the
circumstances of the case.20 It is certainly incorrect to dedu ce from this that meeting the 25 per cent
threshold would automatically constitute a presumption that the "major proportion" test has been met.
The EU, however, did precisely this. It did not ex amine whether this conclusion was justified on the
basis of the circumstances of the case.

34. China submits that the circumstances in this case demonstrate that the collective output of the
45 producers allegedly representing 27 per cent does not constitute a "major proportion" of the total
domestic production. The first relevant circumst ance is the "practicability " for the investigating
authorities to include more producers in its definition of the domestic industry. In the case at hand,
the investigating authorities had identified at th e beginning of their investigation, at least,
114 producers representing 45 per cent of the total do mestic production. These producers account for
almost double the output represented by the producers finally included in the domestic industry
definition. In view of this circumstance, it is ha rdly possible to argue that 27 per cent constitutes a
"major proportion".

18 EU FWS, para. 348.
19 Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, para. 91.

35. Another circumstance that needs to be ta ken into account is the number of producers
constituting the domestic industry in relation to the total number of domestic producers. As noted by
the EU itself, there are more than 300 producers of the like product in the EU.
21 Thus, 45 producers
amount to only one sixth of this estimated total.

36. In a last-ditch effort to justify its practice, th e EU seems to argue that it is irrelevant how the
domestic industry is defined when sampling is used.22 This is obviously not correct.

37. Moreover, the determinati on of "domestic industry" also violates Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement. If the investigating authorities de fine the domestic industry by excluding from the
domestic industry producers because they oppose the complaint, they act with bias. According to
the EU, a violation of Article 4.1 would have no bearing on the obligations imposed on investigating
authorities under Article 3.1. China strongly disagr ees with this view. It is only possible to conduct
an "objective examination" of injury if the result of this examination is not predetermined by the way
the domestic industry has been defined. By excluding inter alia producers that opposed the
complaint, the EU conducted their investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that, as a
result of the fact-finding or evaluation process, th ey will determine that the domestic industry is
injured.

38. Finally, China would like to make a few co mments regarding the claims it has made with
respect to numerous violations of due process obligations by the EU. When reviewing the EU's
arguments with respect to these claims, one is stru ck by how the EU tries to avoid going into the
substance of China's claims. The EU consiste ntly claims that China has failed to make a prima facie
case because the claims are not understandable, ar e presented in a confusing way, the evidence
submitted is irrelevant or inexistent or for other obscure reasons. China believes that the real reason is
other, namely that the EU simply lacks any s ubstantive arguments and evidence to rebut China's
claims. These procedural arguments should not be allo wed to obscure the real issue before the Panel,
namely that the Chinese exporting producers were ne ver given an effective opportunity to exercise
their due process rights.

21 EU FWS, para. 322.
22 EU FWS, para. 284 and 302.

ANNEX C-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE OPENING STATEMENT
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE FIRST
MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. CHINA'S "AS SUCH" CLAIM AGAINST ARTICLE 9(5) OF COUNCIL
REGULATION NO 384/96, AS AMENDED

1. The European Union considers that the Panel' s mandate with respect to China's as such claim
is to examine the conformity of the concrete aspect s of the specific measure described by China in its
Panel Request with the relevant provisions of the covered agreements invoked by China. The specific
measure in this case, as defined by China's Panel Request, is a very concrete legislative provision, i.e.,
Article 9(5) of Council Regulation No 384/96, as amended. The concrete aspects this provision
requires or provides for are that, in case of imports from non-market economy countries: (i) an
individual anti-dumping duty shall be specified for s uppliers that can demonstrate, on the basis of
properly substantiated claims, that they fulfil the five criteria listed in that provision; and, otherwise,
(ii) the anti-dumping duty shall be specified for the supplying country concerned and not for each
supplier. The Panel is thus not
 called to examine other provision s of Council Regulation No 384/96,
as amended; any of the provisions of Council Re gulation No 1225/2009; the "individual treatment"
or "individual treatment regime or practice" of th e European Union; any matters pertaining to the
calculation or individual determination of dumping ma rgins; or any other matters different from the
one specifically identified by China in its Panel Re quest. Moreover, the European Union has already
shown that the Panel should reject most of China' s claims since, contrary to the requirements under
Article 6.2 of the DSU, China's Panel Request failed to present the problem clearly and, on substance,
the specific measure described by China in its Pa nel Request does not fall within the scope of the
obligations contained in Articles 9.2, 6.10, 9.3 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. In any event, like the third parties expressing a view on this issue,
the European Union considers that China's clai ms against Article 9(5) of Council Regulation
No 384/96, as amended, are based on a wrong unde rstanding of the relevant provisions in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994 as well as China's Protocol of Accession. In particular, China
fails to show why Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a principle to impose
individual anti-dumping duties per known exporter or pr oducer. It is rather the contrary. This
provision seems to allow for the imposition of anti-dumping duties on a country-wide basis.

2. Even assuming that Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement can be read as containing
such a principle, quod non , imposition of country-wide anti-dump ing duties is permitted in cases
where such imposition on individual basis would result in the measure being ineffective. This is
precisely the case of China as non-market economy. I ndeed, the objective of offsetting or preventing
dumping would be undermined if individual duties we re to be imposed on suppliers which do not act
sufficiently independent in their export activities fro m the State, i.e., the actual producer of the
product concerned. China's Protocol of Accessi on also provides useful context to confirm the
conclusion that, in the case of imports originating in China, anti-dumping duties can be specified on a
country-wide basis when suppliers cannot show that market economy conditions prevail with regard
to the manufacture, production and sale of the product concerned.

3. Moreover, as several panels ha ve clarified, Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
permits that a single dumping margin can be determ ined for the actual producer and the source of the
price discrimination, even if there are several exporte rs involved. This is fundamentally the situation

in non-market economy countries, where State control over the means of production and State
intervention in the economy including international trade imply that all imports are considered to
emanate from a single producer. It follows that the imposition of anti-dumping duties on a single
supplier, i.e., China, despite th e existence of several exporters which do not act independently from
the State, i.e., non-IT suppliers, is permitted by Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In this
respect, the calculation of dumping margins and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on a country-
wide basis do not differ much from a situation wher e the investigating authority is confronted with
several exporters all dependent from one single producer, which is the actual source of price
discrimination.

4. The European Union observes that China's clai ms under Articles 6.10, 9.3, 9.4 and 18.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement , Articles I:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement are entirely dependent on a finding that Article 9(5) of Council Regulation
No 384/96, as amended, "as such" infringes Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, to some
extent Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Since this is not the case, the Panel does not
need to examine those claims.

II. ARTICLE 9(5) OF COUNCIL REGULA TION NO 384/96 "AS APPLIED" IN
COUNCIL REGULATION NO 91/2009

5. The European Union observes that China's first claim is based on the assumption that the
application of Article 9(5) of Council Regulati on No 384/96, as amended, is inconsistent with
Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in all cases. Since this is not the case, the
Panel should also reject China's claim in connection to Council Regulation No 91/2009.

III. STANDING OF THE EU DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

6. The European Union would like to indicate that China has not consulted with the
European Union on this new claim in its Pa nel Request, as required by Article 4 of the DSU.
Moreover, China's Panel Request is not specific a nd does not set out the problem clearly, as required
by Article 6.2 of the DSU. The European Union also notes that Notice of Initiation 2007/C 267/11 is
not a measure at issue. In view of all these, China's claim is outside the Panel's terms of reference. In
any event, on the substance of the matter, the European Union submits that, manifestly, it did examine
the standing issue prior to initiation, thereby comp lying with Article 5.4, third sentence, of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

IV. DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

7. As a preliminary matter, it is important to r ecall the very general nature of the two provisions
that are being invoked by China. Article 4.1 sets fo rth a fairly general definition of the term domestic
industry as consisting of all producers of the domestic like product as a whole or those producers
whose collective output constitutes a major propor tion of total domestic production. The only
"obligation" to be derived from this provision is to define the domestic industry in a manner that is
consistent with this definition. Similarly general in nature is Article 3.1 which requires that the state
of the domestic industry, as defined in accordance with Article 4.1, is examined in an objective
manner and based on positive evidence, i.e., based on reliable data. China errs when it asserts that
these two very general obligations impose very speci fic obligations. The five claims of China are
clear evidence of this erroneous approach. The European Union respectfully requests the Panel to
reject all five.

8. First, China claims that the European Union was not allowed to define the domestic industry
as consisting of only those cooperating producers th at made themselves known within 15 days of
initiation of the investigation. As explained in our submission, this brief summary of the legal basis

of China's claim – which is part of the "matter" before you – is nowhere to be found in China's
Consultations Request. Since no cons ultations were held on this matte r, China's claim is not properly
before the Panel. Moreover, and on the merits, Ch ina ignores the fact that Article 4.1 defines the
domestic industry as consisting of all producers of the like product or of those producers that
represent a major proportion of total domestic production. The text of Article 4.1 does not establish a
hierarchy of preference between these two possibilities. WTO case-law has confirmed this. The EU's
determination that the domestic industry consisted of all those producers willing to cooperate and
which made themselves known within 15 days followi ng the initiation of the investigation is thus
entirely legitimate as long as these producer represented "a major proportion" of total domestic
production. Such was the case, as these producers represented 27 per cent of domestic production.
Nothing in Article 4.1 disallows the use of a 15-da y deadline for practical reasons. The EU did not
"deliberately exclude" any type of domestic produ cers, and the subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of
Article 4.1 are therefore not relevant to the situa tion at hand. The European Union wishes to clarify
one important factual point which appears to have ca used some confusion among the third parties. It
is not so that the European Union ex cluded all producers that did not support the investigation. The
views of the domestic producers were requested by the EU authorities and were relevant for the
standing determination before the initiation of the investigation. However, once the investigation
began, the domestic producers' views on the initiation became irrelevant. In the Notice of Initiation of
the investigation, the European Union simply requ ested domestic producers that wished to cooperate
in the investigation to make themselves known with in 15 days, without further enquiry as to whether
they supported or opposed the investigation. Then , the EU authorities decided to define the domestic
industry as consisting of those producers expressi ng a willingness to cooperate. In other words,
contrary to the understanding of some third par ties, no producer which made itself known within
15 days was excluded for reason of the fact that it would not support the initiation of the investigation.
Any exclusion took place merely because of the express statement by domestic producer of its will
not to cooperate in the investigation. Needless to say, if a domestic producer decides not to cooperate,
it will be impossible to obtain the relevant data duri ng the investigation. In addition, and insofar as
Article 3.1 would impose any requirements in respect of the definition of the domestic industry, quod
non, there is no basis for the argument that the mere fact that a 15-days cut off date was used for
practical reasons would require the Panel to find that the investigation was not conducted in an
unbiased or objective manner. The 15-days deadline that was used as the basis for determining the
group of producers that would constitute the domestic industry is an objective criterion that does not
favour either side. China has failed to demons trate that this limitation prevented an objective
examination of the state of the domestic industry.

9. Second, China argues that the domestic indus try as defined by the European Union does not
consist of producers producing "a major prop ortion" of domestic output since these producers
represent "only" 27 per cent of total domestic produc tion. China's interpretation of the term "a major
proportion" in Article 4.1 is in error. China argue s that "a major proportion" has to be as close as
possible to 100 per cent. The WTO case-law to wh ich China itself refers with approval clearly
disavows this erroneous interpretati on considering that "a major propor tion" is rather an "important,
serious or significant" proportion. It is clear that 27 per cent is a significant proportion of production.
China presents no arguments or evidence to contradict this conclusion in the context of the particular
circumstances of this case as it was required to do. The European Union wishes to clarify that the
legal question before the Panel is not, as some thir d parties seem to suggest, whether 25 per cent is
sufficient in all circumstances to constitute a major proportion. Indeed, the European Union considers
that a percentage that is higher than 25 per cent should legitimately be considered as constituting a
major proportion, unless there is evidence that shows that, in the particular circumstances of the case,
such a percentage is not a major proportion. In su m, the European Union requests the Panel to reject
China's claim that the EU's de finition of the domestic industry violated Article 4.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

10. Third, China argues that the domestic i ndustry was "not defined in relation to the
investigation period" and therefore violates Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China errs
both in respect of the facts on the record and in respect of the applicable law. To begin, the facts.
China refers to the October 2006 – 2007 period as the period for determination of injury while this is
actually primarily the period of investigation for dum ping as the injury trends were examined using a
longer period of time starting in 2003. The in jury data examined thus covered the period
January 2003 – October 2 007. The determination of a "major proportion" was based on data relating
to the last full year prior to initiation for which sta tistics were available, the year 2006, thus including
part of the period of investigation for dumping purpos es. Absent any evidence to the contrary, this is
an objective and entirely reasonable approach to take. And to continue, the law. Article 3.1 simply
does not impose an obligation to expressly determin e the existence of a major proportion, let alone
that it would require such a determination to be made in relation to the exact same period as the period
of investigation for dumping purposes. Article 3.1 is entirely silent on this issue and relates only to
the manner in which the data of the domestic i ndustry are to be examined (objectively) and the
reliability of the evidence that is to be examined (positive evidence). In any case, and applying for the
sake of argument the generally applicable reasonabl eness standard to the determination of "a major
proportion", it is clear that a recent and relevant pe riod was used consisting of the last full year prior
to initiation for which statistical data were availabl e, including part of the period of investigation for
dumping purposes. There is therefore no factual nor legal basis for China's claim of violation in
respect of the EU's determination of the domestic industry in the context of the investigation period.

11. Fourth, China argues that the determination of injury on the basis of a sample of domestic
producers representing 17 per cent of total domestic production violates Article 4.1 and 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement since the sampled producers do not re present a major proportion of total
domestic production. First, China fails to demonstrate that Article 4.1 imposes any obligation in
respect of sampling. Furthermore, it would not make sense to require a sample to comply with the
same "major proportion" obligation that the domestic industry itself is to comply with. As rightly
noted by Japan in its Third Party Written Submis sion, "accepting China's argument … would vitiate
the purpose of sampling". The requirement of Article 3.1 is arguably that the sampled data should be
sufficiently representative of the domestic industry as defined in accordance with Article 4.1 . That is
different from requiring that the sample be representative of the totality of the domestic producers as a
whole, as China erroneously alleges to be required. As explained in our First Written Submission, the
sample chosen was representative of the domestic in dustry both in terms of volume, types of products
and size of the producers. China's argument in re spect of the volume of total production represented
by the sampled producers is thus without merit.

12. Fifth, China argues that the European Un ion should have excluded a number of domestic
producers from the definition of the domestic industry for the simple reason that these producers were
related to producers / exporters in China and that the European Union failed to objectively examine
this relationship. However, it is clear that the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits, under certain
conditions, the authority to exclude related producers, but certainly does not require an authority to do
so. Even China accepts this. That leads to two c onclusions: first, without an "obligation" to do
something there can be no "violation"; second, it is only when the authority would want to exclude
such related producers that there exists a prior obl igation to determine in an objective manner whether
such a relationship exists and whether this relatio nship was such to cause the related producer to
behave differently. The EU authorities did not exclude any related producers and therefore no
obligation to make an objective dete rmination could have been violated. In any case, China fails to
demonstrate that the facts do not support the reasonable finding of the EU authorities that the centre of
interest of these domestic producers re mained in the European Union an d that it was therefore neither
necessary nor appropriate to exclude these producers from the scope of the domestic industry.

V. SELECTION OF THE PRODUCT CONCERNED

13. The European Union further submits that th e Panel should reject China's claim that the
European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
because it included in the scope of the product concerne d both standard and special fasteners as "like"
products despite their readily apparent differences and uses. Fundamentally, China ignores that like
product and product concerned are two distinct issues in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that there
is nothing requiring investigating authorities to carry out a likeness analysis within the product
concerned. Moreover, China ignores the fact that the measure at issue does not contain any
determination to the effect that standard fasteners ar e like special fasteners, so China is referring to a
non-existent determination. Thus, China's cl aim is based upon challenging a non-existent
determination by reference to a non-existent obligation, something which the Panel must reject.

VI. FAIR COMPARISON UNDER ARTICLE 2.4 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING
AGREEMENT

14. We now turn to China's claim under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement – the need to
conduct fair comparison between norma l value and export price. Once again, China refers to a very
"general and abstract" obligation in order to impose very specific obligations that are nowhere to be
found in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China alleges that the Europ ean Union failed to make a fair
comparison between normal value and export price because the EU authorities did not base this
comparison on the full Product Control Number ("PCN"). It is clear however that Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement does not specify the methodology to be followed in order to conduct a fair
comparison. The mere fact that the comparison was not made on the basis of the full PCN can
therefore not ipso facto constitute a violation of Article 2. 4 as erroneously argued by China.
Importantly, China misunderstands th e role and relevance of the PCNs which are merely a tool for
gathering information in a particular manner that may allow the authority to compare identical
products without the need to make any adjustments. The PCN is determined at the beginning of the
investigation when it is not even clear which elements are actually affecting price comparability. It is
thus not correct that the PCN necessarily identifies product characteristics affecting price
comparability or that, simply because the informati on was requested to be provided on the basis of a
particular PCN, the authority would be pr ecluded from adopting a different methodology for
comparing normal value and export price. What is necessarily unfair, biased, or not "even-handed"
about the fact that the comparison was not made on the basis of the full PCN? China does not seem to
have answered this question yet.

15. In respect of China's claim of lack of making adjustments for differences affecting price
comparability, it is recalled that the EU authorities complied with the obligation under Article 2.4 to
make adjustments for those differences affecting th e price comparability in this case. In particular,
the European Union ensured a fair comparison by distinguishing between products on the basis of
strength class and between standard and special fast eners. These were the two main characteristics
referred to by the Association of Chinese Exporters and Importers of Fasteners. It is thus incorrect of
China to argue that the PCN necessarily identifies the factors affecting price comparability for which
adjustments should have been made. In sum, China clearly failed to demonstrate that the
EU authorities violated their obligations under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

VII. PRICE UNDERCUTTING

16. China argues that the European Unio n violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement since the EU authorities allegedly failed to make a price undercutting comparison between
export prices and prices of dome stic producers on the basis of th e full PCN. As an important
preliminary matter, we would note that this claim wa s not part of China's Consultations Request and,
thus, this claim is outside the Panel's terms of reference. In any case, Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement does not require any particular methodology for conducting a price undercutting analysis and
China's claim that the European Union violated its obligations simply because it used a "simplified"
PCN is thus clearly without merit. Nor is it cl ear why the alleged failure to use the full PCN would
necessarily reveal a bias against Chinese exporters. The most important aspect of the price comparison
between EU fasteners and Chinese fasteners was the difference between special versus standard
fasteners. This difference was taken into account by the EU authorities. Given the "considerable
discretion" that is to be given to authorities in respect of the price undercutting analysis and taking into
consideration the fact that the more detailed methodological obligations of Article 2 on dumping cannot
simply be transposed into the provisions of Article 3, there simply is no basis for China's claim that the
price undercutting analysis was not even-handed or was biased simply because the full PCN was not
used to make this comparison. In any case, the relevant PCN characteristics were taken into
consideration as well as the important distinction between special and standard fasteners, and the EU
authorities thus clearly complied with any obligatio n of reasonableness that could be imposed in this
respect. In sum, China's claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect of
the price undercutting analysis are to be rejected.

VIII. VOLUME OF DUMPED IMPORTS

17. China argues that the European Union violat ed its obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
and 3.5 because the EU authorities fail ed to exclude the volume of tw o marginal exporters that were
found not to be dumping from its volume analysis under Article 3.2 and because the EU authorities
assumed for the purposes of that same volume anal ysis that all non-examined exporters were
dumping. The European Union requests the Panel to reject China's claim in this respect.

18. First, the European Union recalls that the tw o exporters that China claims should have been
excluded represented a totally negligible amount of exports. This marginal amount of non-dumped
imports is incapable of undermining the objectivity of the determination which remains based on
almost 100 per cent of imports. This is even more so since the actual examination is to determine
whether there exists a "significant" increase in dumped imports. The failure to exclude this marginal
amount which is simply incapable of impacting on the "significance" of the increase found to exist
cannot be the basis for a finding of violation of Artic le 3.1 and 3.2. We thus urge the Panel not to
adopt a formalistic approach but to look at what the European Union did and whether, as a whole, it
objectively determined that there existed a signifi cant increase in dumped imports when it found that
imports increased by 103 per cent. The answer to that question is and remains, yes. It is clear that if
the volume of non-dumped imports had been excluded, the outcome would have been exactly the
same, dumped imports would have been found to have significantly increased. The European Union
requests the Panel not make the same mi stake that was made by the panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
when that panel considered that to conduct this t ype of examination of whether the determination by
the authorities still stood, irrespective of the al leged error that was made, would constitute a de novo
review. The Appellate Body fau lted the panel for not having conduc ted such an examination, and
rightly so.

19. Second, China errs when it asserts that th e EU authorities were not entitled to include the
imports of all non-examined producers in the tota l volume of dumped imports. Since all of the
sampled producers were found to be dumping, th e EU authorities were entitled to conclude, by
extrapolation, that all imports from non-examined producers were equally dumped. This is precisely
one method for determining the volume of dum ped imports that the Appellate Body in EC – Bed
Linen considered to be appropriate in a sampling cont ext. All of China's claims in respect of the
volume analysis are thus to be rejected including its consequential claims under Articles 3.4 and 3.5.

IX. INJURY FACTORS UNDER ARTICLE 3.4 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

20. First, China asserts that the EU's injury de termination is flawed because the EU authorities
allegedly did not consistently use the same datase t for examining injury. But the EU authorities did
consistently use data relating only to the same domestic industry . The fact that the EU authorities
examined certain factors on the basis of data re lating to a representative sample of the domestic
industry while other factors were examined based on data relating to all producers that are part of the
domestic industry does not vitiate the objectivity of the analysis in any way. It is not because
sampling is used that it would not be permissible for an authority to base certain of its conclusions on
the more complete dataset, where available. In the words of the panel in EC – Bed Linen in respect of
an identical argument by India, to require an authority to ignore such information would be
"anomalous" and "inconsistent with the fundame ntal underlying principle that anti-dumping
investigations should be fair and that investig ating authorities should base their conclusions on an
objective evaluation of the evidence". Article 3.4 says nothing about the particular methodology to
follow in case of injury sampling. And China has ce rtainly not demonstrated that there is anything
inherently biased about this approach either. The example of market share to which China refers is
based on an inaccurate presentation of the facts as the conclusions of the EU authorities are essentially
similar, whether based on the sampled data or on the data for the industry as a whole. The situation in
this case is thus entirely different from that di scussed in the WTO case-law referred to by China
which concerned situations in which the authoriti es did not examine the domestic industry as defined
in accordance with Article 4.1 in a consistent ma nner, but used a broader or narrower approach
depending on the kind of factors examined. Such was not the case in the fasteners investigation.

21. Second, China argues that the European Un ion failed to objectively examine the factor
"profitability" and points to allegedly conflicting st atements in respect of this factor in the EU
authorities' findings. In fact, however, China is quoting selectively from the findings of the
authorities. A proper reading of Council Regulati on No 91/2009 clearly shows that the authorities
reached the reasonable and reasoned conclusion, suppor ted by the facts on the record that profitability
remained low. China effectively blames the EU au thorities for their detailed discussion of this factor
and their nuanced approach to "profitability". Ch ina is simply asking the Panel to substitute its
judgment for that of the EU authorities, something the Panel is clearly not allowed to do under
Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU.

22. Third, China argues that the European Uni on failed to conduct an objective examination of
the evidence on the record, as th e EU authorities allegedly based their injury finding on negative
developments in respect of only one of the injury factors of Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, market share. In our First Written Submission, we have explained that China's
presentation of the facts and of the relevant findings of the EU authorities is simply not accurate. It is
clear from the record that the inju ry determination was not based on only one factor. A reasonable
and reasoned determination was made in respect of all injury factors, leading the EU authorities to the
conclusion that a number of factors were negativ e when examined in the light of the significant
increase in demand: significant decrease in market share, decrease in sales volumes, low profitability,
low cash flow and return on investment and low cap acity utilisation as well as high dumping margins
were all
 examined in their proper context and were all considered to support the conclusion that the
domestic industry was suffering "injury". Once ag ain, China is simply requesting the Panel to
examine the facts on the record and to determine whether it would have reached the same conclusion
of injury as the EU authorities did. This, however , is not the role of the Panel as is clear from
Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article 11 of the DSU.

23. Fourth, China asserts that the European Uni on improperly concluded that the injury consisted
of the displacement from one market segment to anot her, while injury should be determined for the
product as a whole. However, the EU authorities did not make such a finding of market displacement,
but related its injury finding to fasteners as a whol e. The EU authorities referred to the move of the

domestic industry in the direction of a greater focus on special fasteners as an indicator of how the
industry tried to deal with the competition from the dumped imports (which were concentrated in the
standard fastener market) by moving into the special fastener market. The EU authorities' conclusion
is that in so doing the industry was able to mitig ate the negative effects of the dumped imports, but
that, in respect of the product as a whole, producers still were suffering injury. Again, it seems that
China objects to the nuanced and balanced discussion of this development by the EU authorities.

X. CAUSATION AND NON-ATTRIBUTION

24. China's claim in respect of the causation anal ysis of the EU authorities is actually limited to
the speculative assertion that if the domestic indu stry had not decided to move into the special
fastener segment it would not have lost market share. Not only does China's assertion unduly limit
the injury found to exist to a mere loss of market share, China also fails to point to any flaws in
the EU authorities' reasonable and reasoned findings in respect of the existence of a causal link
between dumped imports and consequent injury to the domestic industry.

25. In terms of the non-attribution requirement, Ch ina's allegation that the EU authorities did not
adequately distinguish the effects of other factor s such as the increase in raw material prices and the
export performance of the EU industr y is equally unsubstantiated. It is clear from the record that
the EU authorities examined the role of the increase in raw material prices but found that there did not
exist a similar direct link between the increase in ra w material prices and the loss of market share as
was found to exist in respect of the dumped imports. The time pattern did not match, the increase in
raw material prices was not specific to the EU indus try and should have affected all producers, and in
any case, under normal circumstances such price incr eases would have been passed on to consumers.
China simply disagrees with the EU authorities' asse ssment of the impact of the raw material prices
factor. However, China fails to demonstrate that the EU authorities did not provide a reasonable and
reasoned explanation of how the facts support the determination made.

26. China's claim in respect of the EU authorities' treatment of the export performance of the
domestic industry is equally without merit. Th e reasonable and reasoned conclusion of the EU
authorities was that export performance, although re latively unimportant, was very good, and that
export sales were made at prices significantly higher than domestic sales prices. Therefore, export
performance was not a source of material injury. China's unsubstantiated speculation about what
could have happened had more of the export sales b een made on the domestic market is not relevant
and is in any case contradicted by the facts on the record.

XI. CHINA'S PROCEDURAL CLAIMS

27. Of the 13 procedural claims China advances in its First Written Submission only one relating
to Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not suffer of some fundamental problem, be it
jurisdictional, presentational or both.

28. China claims that the European Un ion has breached Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement because the EU authorities granted to Chinese suppliers only 15 days to submit their claim
forms for MET and IT. China asserts that the clai m from is actually a "questionnaire" within the
meaning of Article 6.1.1 and therefore be subject to the minimum 30-days rule therein. As Japan
correctly observes in its Third Party Written Submi ssion, "an MET/IT claim form is an additional
element that is present only in the context of anti-dumping investigations concerning non-market
economy countries like China, while the overall d eadlines for investigations regarding market
economy and non-market economy countries are identical". It simply cannot be the initial
questionnaire. If all requests for information in an anti-dumping investigation were subject to the 30-
day rule in Article 6.1.1, investigating authorities would never be able to complete the investigation
within the prescribed time limits. Indeed, as the United States correctly observes in its Third Party

Written Submission, China itself does not practice wh at it preaches. The European Union considers
that the Panel should apply the same l ogic as that applied by the panel in Egypt – Rebar and reject
China's claim under Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

29. Finally, we would also like to address some other systemic observations on the relationship
between some of the relevant provisions under Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . First,
contrary to what Norway appears to imply, the European Union is not in any way trying to limit the
obligation in the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when it has expressed
caution on the relationship between Article 6.4 and 6.2. The European Union simply observes that the
text of the provisions does not provide for the suggested necessary consequential violation of
Article 6.2 if a violation of Article 6.4 would be established in a given case. The European Union
invites the Panel to be very cautious on the interp retation of the relevant provisions when confronted
with China's very general and erroneous assertions. Indeed, an example of China's broad brushed way
of presenting its claims is its position that the A ppellate Body would have already found that a
violation of Article 6.4 always leads to a violation of Article 6.2. With regard to the relationship
between Articles 6.4, 6.5 and 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Union considers that
China has fundamentally misunderstood the respectiv e scope and content of these provisions. In the
view of the European Union the most blatant misunderstanding concerns the relationship between
Articles 6.4 and 6.9. China systematically accuses the European Union of a breach of Article 6.4
because the disclosure documents or the final regulation is drafted in a certain way. The
European Union fails to understand how the draf ting of the disclosure documents or the final
regulation could possibly provide evidence of a viol ation of a provision regulating the right to have
access to information unless these documents would actually state that access to the file was denied.

ANNEX C-3

CLOSING STATEMENT OF CHINA AT THE
FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL

Mr. Chairman, the Distinguished Members of the Panel,

 During the last two days, the EU has argued that the EU's "individual treatment" regime is
somehow justified by a common understanding containe d in China's Protocol of Accession that China
is a "non-market economy". When questioned, the EU was, however, unable to point to any specific
wording in the Protocol which would confirm the existence of such an understanding which would be
common to the WTO membership. If anything, the third party interventions of this morning have
clarified that no such "common understanding" exists. This is not surprising. Paragraph 15 of China's
Protocol of Accession only deals with one very lim ited issue, namely the possibility for some WTO
members to determine normal value on the basis of data other than the domestic prices and costs in
China. Nothing more, nothing less. In the present dispute, China does not challenge this possibility
which is expressly provided for in the Protocol of Accession. It is unacceptable, however, that the EU
tries to read into this provision and, in particular , into the word "sale", a justification to ignore the
clear obligations contained in Article 6.10 and 9.2 of the AD Agreement.

 Whatever the situation may have been in the past, China can no longer be considered as a so-
called non-market economy country. In any event, this question is irrelevant since neither
Article 6.10 nor Article 9.2 distinguish between any such different categories of WTO Members.

 The EU has also tried to convince you that its injury determination was based on an objective
and unbiased analysis of the impact of the dumpe d imports on a domestic industry which had been
determined in full compliance with Article 4.1.

 China would like to point out that the EU's allegations are not supported by the evidence in
the file.

 Contrary to what the EU stated, its own doc uments confirm that it excluded those producers
which did not support the complaint from the definiti on of the domestic industry and that it did not
check whether the remaining pro ducers still constituted a major propor tion, other than verifying the
25 per cent threshold was met. We understand that , as the EU stated, these documents may not have
been phrased as precisely as they should have b een. The EU has, however, not submitted any
evidence to the contrary.

 Similarly, the facts on the file show that dur ing the investigation period used for the injury
determination imports from China increased by mo re than 100 per cent and Chinese prices undercut
the prices of the EU producers by more than 40 per cent. Yet, during the same period, the domestic
industry not only doubled its profit, the EU produ cers also increased their sales volume and sales
revenue while other injury indicators remained stable. It is true that the EU producers did not increase
their sales as rapidly as the market grew. Is it, however, reasonable to base a finding of material
injury solely on a loss of potential sales?

 The foregoing facts also raise a more fundamental question. Is it really credible that the EU
producers were able to increase their selling pri es and sales volumes if the Chinese producers offered
comparable product types at a price which was more th an 40 per cent lower? This flies in the face of
economic logic. Yet, the EU wants you to believe that the comparison for both dumping and injury

was made by comparing identical products. Ind eed, the EU has acknowledged that no adjustments
were made for differences in physical characteristi cs. In other words, no differences were found
which had an effect on price comparability.

 The EU does not provide a reasonable explana tion for the fundamental inconsistency between
its findings and economic logic. Its defence consis ts in stating that it is free to choose its own
methodology for making price comparisons. Moreove r, the EU states that China has provided no
evidence that the EU's methodology was not objectiv e or unfair. The EU itself stated in the
questionnaires sent to the Chinese exporting producer s that the information on a PCN basis was
necessary to "ensure a fair comparison" and that it would be used "to compare prices of imports from
the country concerned and prices charged by the Community industry and to compare sales data to the
cost of production". This cons titutes evidence that the PCN factor s were necessary to make a fair
comparison. Furthermore, it was only after repeat ed requests by the Chinese exporting producers and
at a very late stage in the investigation, that is , a few days before the deadline for the submission of
comments on the definitive disclosure, that some in formation on the methodology used was provided.
In fact, the criteria used to distinguish standard fro m special fasteners were ne ver clearly identified.
Neither were the Chinese exporters told which PCNs of the EU producers had been grouped together
into the newly created "product types" with which their products would be compared. The latter is
essential. As demonstrated by China in paragraph 394 of its First Written Submission, prices of PCNs
which were grouped into single "product types" by the EU may differ by 80 per cent. Such
differences are larger than the price undercutting found. These price differences are based on the only
data the Chinese producers had access to, i.e. their own data. China, however, submits that these data
are sufficient to make a prima facie case. China submits that until now, the EU has failed to provide a
satisfactory rebuttal.

 The EU has invoked on several occasions the fact that China has been unable to submit
specific evidence demonstrating that the determinations made by the EU were incorrect. With all due
respect, the EU itself has simply made it impossible for Chinese exporters to have access to most data
used by the EU in reaching its st anding, injury and dumping determination. In doing so, the EU has
violated the due process rights of the Chinese exporters and breached Articles 6.1.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.9
and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.

 China submits that its First Written Submi ssion includes the necessary evidence to make a
prima facie case. The EU, however, simply chooses to ignore such evidence. The clearest example of
this tactic is the approach taken by the EU w ith respect to the Information Document and the
disclosure documents which the EU summarily dismisses as being irrelevant for China's claims.

 Finally, China considers that the debate during the last two days has clarified that the many
procedural objections raised by the EU are purel y formalistic or factually unfounded. Moreover,
nowhere has the EU been able to shown that any of the alleged procedural violations has prejudiced
its ability to defend itself.

 This concludes our closing statement. Chin a thanks the Panel and the secretariat for their
attention and detailed questioning during this meeting. China is ready to provide any further
information and evidence you may require to bring this dispute to a satisfactory solution.

ANNEX C-4

CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL

1. The European Union would like to thank you ag ain for all your efforts. We look forward to
the next steps in the procedure in order to facilitate your tasks in the present dispute.

2. We would like to be brief in our closing stat ement and insist on some points which we believe
should be relevant for the proper assessment of the matter before you.

3. First, the European Union has engaged in these proceedings in good faith, as required by
Article 3.10 of the DSU. Contrary to China's assertion which attempts to put into doubt the good faith
of the EU in its procedural handling, we have not made "procedural allegations" to mask our measure,
avoiding any discussion on the substance of the issue. The reality is rather the contrary. Even if
China has failed to make its prima facie case in its First Written Submission, the European Union has
been more than forthcoming and has extensively pr ovided both clarification of the facts of the case
and interpretations of the legal provisions invoked by China. The so-called "procedural allegations" -
as China qualifies them - are fundamental rules unde r the DSU granting rights to the parties and
governing dispute settlement proceedings which must be respected for a proper functioning of the
multilateral trading system.

4. Second, the European Union considers that , under the Panel's Working Procedures and the
provisions of the DSU, China should have presented all the evidence and should have made its case,
at the latest, during this first hearing. However, China has mentioned that a more precise rebuttal of
the EU's arguments will be reserved only for its Second Written Submission. In this respect, the
European Union cautions the Panel to avoid maki ng the case for the complainant. Once more, we
would like to note that China not only has to rebut the arguments the European Union has provided
for in its First Written Submission – again, argume nts that we have made in good faith although we
still do not know what China's arguments are – but al so has to make its case with respect to many of
the claims included in China's Panel Request.

5. Third, on China's as such claim against Ar ticle 9(5) of Council Regulation No 384/96, as
amended, we would like to briefly elaborate on your question about any other situations where the
exception mentioned in Article 6.10 of the ADA may a pply. In this respect, in addition to the case at
hand, where it is permissible to impose a country-w ide duty in view of the existence of a single
producer, there may be cases where the authority w ould not be required unde r Article 6.10 of the
ADA to calculate individual dumping margins to known exporters or producers. For instance, a
known exporter may decide to drop its cooperation in the middle of the investigation. In that case,
that exporter would be subject to the residual country-wide duty for the non-cooperating exporters and
thus, in other words, an individual dumping margin would not be calculated for such exporter.
Another example can be mentioned for the sake of completeness. Indeed, it may occur that in a
particular case an exporter has not produced the pr oduct concerned during the Period of Investigation
but merely has exported the products of another supplie r. Such an "exporter" would be considered as
a mere trader of the product concerned and thus would be subject to the anti-dumping duty found for
the actual supplier.

6. Fourth, and since this is a matter that has received particular attention in China's oral
statement, on the question of the definition of the dom estic industry, we would like to reiterate that no
producers were "arbitrarily excluded" – as China clai ms –, but rather all producers were invited to

participate and make their willingness to particip ate known within a reasonable and objective time
period of 15 days and no producers were excluded for reason of the fact that they at one point in time
had opposed the investigation. These producers c onstituted a major, important, significant proportion
of total domestic production and China is unable to po int to any particular circumstances of this case
that would demonstrate that 27 per cent of pro duction represented by these producers was anything
other than "major". Even China in the course of this hearing has accepted that 25 per cent or even less
of production can be a major proportion for the pur poses of Article 4.1. Mr. Chairman, what more
can we add to this admission which is a far cr y from China's original position as expressed in its
First Written Submission that 27 per cent cannot be a major proportion.

 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Panel, this conc ludes our closing statement. Thank you again
for your efforts.