CHINA - ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON CERTAIN AUTOMOBILES FROM THE UNITED STATES REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 23 May 2014
Document codes: WT/DS440/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: China
Third parties: Colombia, EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Oman, Turkey, Saudi Arabia
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 5.4  Anti-dumpingArt. 11.4, 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, 22.5  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 6.9, 6.8, Annex 2, 12.2, 12.2.2, 6.5.1  Anti-dumpingArt. 12.4.1, 15.1, 16.1  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 3.1, 4.1, 3.1, 3.2  Anti-dumpingArt. 15.4  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 3.4, 3.5  Anti-dumpingArt. 15.5  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. VI  GATT 1994Art. 1  Anti-dumpingArt. 10  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

CHINA - ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
ON CERTAIN AUTOMOBILES FROM THE UNITED STATES
REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on BCI A-6
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the United States B-2
Annex B-2 Executive summary of the opening statement of the United States at the first
Panel meeting
B-9
Annex B-3 Closing statement of the United States at the first Panel meeting B-18
Annex B-4 Executive summary of the second written submission of the United States B-19
Annex B-5 Executive summary of the opening statement of the United States at the
second Panel meeting
B-29
Annex B-6 Closing statement of the United States at the second Panel meeting B-38
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF CHINA
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of China C-2
Annex C-2 Executive summary of the opening statement of China at the first Panel
meeting
C-10
Annex C-3 Closing statement of Chin a at the first Panel meeting C-18
Annex C-4 Executive summary of the second written submission of China C-20
Annex C-5 Executive summary of the opening statement of China at the second Panel
meeting
C-28
Annex C-6 Closing statement of China at the second Panel meeting C-36
ANNEX D
ARGUMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Executive summary of the third party written submission of the
European Union
D-2
Annex D-2 Executive summary of the third party written submission of Japan D-6
Annex D-3 Executive summary of the third party oral statement of Japan D-11
Annex D-4 Executive summary of the third party oral statement of Korea D-13
Annex D-5 Executive summary of the third party written submission of Saudi Arabia D-15
Annex D-6 Executive summary of the third party oral statement of Saudi Arabia D-18
Annex D-7 Executive summary of the third party written submission of Turkey D-21
Annex D-8 Executive summary of the third party oral statement of Turkey D-27

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Poultry
Anti-Dumping Duties
Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from
Brazil, WT/DS241/R, adopted 19 May 2003, DSR 2003:V, p. 1727
Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003
Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/R, adopted 22 April 1998, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS56/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, p. 1033
China – Broiler Products Panel Report, China  Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on
Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/R and Add.1, adopted
25 September 2013
China – GOES Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,
WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012
China – GOES Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WT/DS414/R
and Add.1, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body Report

China – X-Ray Equipment Panel Report, China – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security
Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WT/DS425/R and Add.1,
adopted 24 April 2013
EC – Bed Linen Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, p. 2077
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by India, WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, DSR 2003:III,
p. 965
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005,
DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Fasteners (China) Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1,
adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Salmon (Norway) Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed
Salmon from Norway, WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1,
DSR 2008:I, p. 3
Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from
Turkey, WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, DSR 2002:VII, p. 2667
EU – Footwear (China) Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear
from China, WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012

Short title Full case title and citation
Korea – Certain Paper Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from
Indonesia, WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII,
p. 10637
Korea – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels,
WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005, DSR 2005:VII, p. 2749
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice,
Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11007
Mexico – Olive Oil Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from
the European Communities, WT/DS341/R, adopted 21 October 2008,
DSR 2008:IX, p. 3179
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV,
p. 2203
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the
Philippines, WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by Appellate
Body Report WT/DS371/AB/R, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2299
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/R,
adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2741
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R,
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869
US – Countervailing Duty
Investigation on DRAMS
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea,
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted
23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 August 2001 modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR 2001:X, p. 4769
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX,
p. 4051
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Argentina, WT/DS268/RW, adopted 11 May 2007, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS268/AB/RW, DSR 2007:IX, p. 3609
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571
US – Softwood Lumber VI
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006,
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4865

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Steel Plate Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on
Steel Plate from India, WT/DS206/R and Corr.1, adopted 29 July 2002,
DSR 2002:VI, p. 2073
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
AD Anti-dumping
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994
AUVs Average unit values
BCI Business Confidential Information
BMW USA BMW Manufacturing LLC
CAAM China Association of Automobile Manufacturers
China People's Republic of China
Chrysler USA Chrysler Group LLC
CNY Chinese Yuan
CVD Countervailing duty
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
EC European Communities/ European Communities'
EU European Union/European Union's
Ford USA Ford Motor Company
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
GM USA General Motors LLC
IA Investigating authority
Honda USA Honda of America Mfg., Inc. and American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Mercedes-Benz USA Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
Mitsubishi USA Mitsubishi Motors North America Inc.
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
POI Period of Investigation
Saudi Arabia Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsid ies and Countervailing Measures
USTR Office of the United States Trade Representative
United States United States of America
US United States/United States'
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679
WTO World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by the United States
1.1. On 5 July 2012, the United States requested consultations with China pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Proc edures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("DSU"), Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"),
Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Co untervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") (to the
extent that Article 30 incorporates Article XX III of the GATT 1994), and Article 17.3 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("Anti-Dumping Agreement") with respect to the measures and claims set out below.
1
1.2. Consultations were held on 23 August 2012. No mutually agreed solution was reached.
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 17 September 2012, the United States requested the establishment of a panel pursuant
to Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
2 At its meeting on 23 October 2012, the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") established a panel pursuant to the request of the United States
in document WT/DS440/2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.3
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the United States in
document WT/DS440/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.
4
1.5. On 1 February 2013, the United States requested the Director-General to determine the
composition of the Panel, pursuant to Article 8. 7 of the DSU. On 11 February 2013, the Director-
General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Pierre Pettigrew

Members: Ms Andrea Marie Brown
 Ms Enie Neri De Ross
5

1.6. Colombia, the European Union ("EU"), India, Japan, Korea, Oman, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia ("Saudi Arabia"), and Turkey notified their interest in participating in the Panel
proceedings as third parties.
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.3.1 General
1.7. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its working procedures
6 on
28 February 2013 (amended on 16 April 2013) and timetable on 28 February 2013 (finalized on
10 March 2014).
1.8. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 25 June 2013. A session with
the third parties took place on 26 June 2013. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with
the parties on 15 October 2013. On 15 November 2013, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its
report to the parties. The Panel issued its interim report to the parties on 21 February 2014. The
Panel issued its final report to the parties on 24 March 2014.

1 WT/DS440/1.
2 WT/DS440/2.
3 WT/DSB/M/323.
4 WT/DS440/3.
5 WT/DS440/3.
6 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.

1.3.2 Working procedures concerning Business Confidential Information ("BCI")
1.9. On 28 February 2013, the Panel adopted additional working procedures concerning BCI.7
1.3.3 Additional comments of the United States following the second Panel meeting
1.10. On 15 November 2013, the United States requested the Panel's leave to submit additional
comments on China's reaction to the US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, which
the United States attached to its request letter. On 19 November 2013, China requested the Panel
to reject the US request for leave, citing the re quirement in Article 12 of the DSU that disputing
parties respect the various deadlines for written su bmissions set by the panel to a dispute. In the
alternative, China requested the Panel to grant it a reasonable period of time to provide comments
on the US additional comments.
1.11. On 20 November 2013, the Panel notified the parties that it would admit the US additional
comments into the record, and gave China until close of business on 27 November 2013 to react
to these additional comments. The Panel also adju sted the deadline for the parties' comments on
the draft descriptive part of the Panel report to accommodate this additional comment period. On
27 November 2013, China submitted its comments on the US additional comments.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1. The US claims concern various aspects of the anti-dumping ("AD") and countervailing duty
("CVD") measures imposed by China on certain automobiles from the United States with engine
displacements equal to or greater than 2500 cubic centimetres ("cc"), set forth in MOFCOM Notices
Nos. 20 and 84 of 2011, and accompanying a nnexes, as well as various aspects of the
investigations leading to the imposition of these measures.
8 N o t i c e N o . 2 0 o f 2 0 1 1 c o n t a i n s
MOFCOM's final determinations in the AD and CVD investigations of certain imports of automobiles
from the United States. In that Notice, MOFCOM found that the dumped and subsidized imports
from the United States had caused material inju ry to the domestic industry. MOFCOM determined
individual dumping margins for five of the six re spondent companies in the AD investigation. The
sixth respondent company (Ford Motor Company) did not export during the periods of
investigation ("POI"), and therefore MOFCOM did no t calculate an individual dumping margin rate
for it. Furthermore, MOFCOM determined individual CVD rates for all six respondent companies in
the CVD investigation. Despite finding dumping, subsidization, and injury, MOFCOM provisionally
determined not to levy AD or CVD rates on US automobiles as of the date of its final
determination.
9 Subsequently, MOFCOM issued Notice No. 84 of 2011, which authorized the
levying of AD and CVD rates on certain US auto mobiles effective 15 December 2011, at the rates
established in the final determination.
2.2. On 9 September 2009, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers ("CAAM"), an
association of Chinese domestic automobile manufacturers, filed a petition seeking the imposition
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of certain automobiles with an engine
capacity equal to or greater than 2000cc from the United States.
10 On 19 October 2009, the CAAM
filed an amended petition containing more industry data. 11 The original petition identified General
Motors LLC ("GM USA"), Ford Motor Company ("Ford USA") and Chrysler Group LLC ("Chrysler

7 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information, Annex A-2.
8 Announcement No. 20, 2011, of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (Exhibit
USA-01) and Appendix, "Final Determination of the People’s Republic of China concerning the Anti-dumping
and Countervailing Investigation on Imports of Certain Automobiles Originating in the United States",
5 May 2011 ("final determination")(Exhibit USA-02); Announcement No. 84, 2011, of the Ministry of Commerce
of the People’s Republic of China, 14 December 2011 (Exhibit USA-03). In connection with its first written
submission, China submitted its own English translation of the Appendix (as Exhibit CHN-07) earlier submitted
as Exhibit USA-02. The United States has not objected to the accuracy of the translation presented in Exhibit
CHN-07 (US response to Panel question No. 24). Therefor e , w e b a s e o u r a n a l y s i s o n t h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e
Appendix.
9 Notice No. 20, Exhibit USA-01, p. 2.
10 Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsi dy Investigation Application , 9 September 2009 ("original
petition")(Exhibit USA-04).
11 Petition for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigation , 19 October 2009 ("amended
petition")(Exhibit CHN-01), p. 1.

USA") as known exporters of the subject product. 12 MOFCOM initiated AD and CVD investigations
on 6 November 2009.13
2.3. In its notices of initiation, MOFCOM set the POI for the AD and CVD investigations as
1 September 2008 to 31 August 2009, and for the injury aspect of the investigations as
1 January 2006 to 30 September 2009. 14 Also in its notices of initiation, MOFCOM set a 20-day
deadline for interested parties to register to participate in the AD and CVD investigations. 15 GM
USA, Ford USA, Chrysler USA, Mercedes-Benz USA International Inc. and Daimler AG (collectively,
"Mercedes-Benz USA"), BMW Manufacturing LLC (" BMW USA"), Honda of America Mfg. Inc. and
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (collectively, "Honda USA"), and Mitsubishi North America Inc.
("Mitsubishi USA") registered as respondent companies in both investigations prior to the closing
date of 26 November 2009. The Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
registered to participate on behalf of the United States as a CVD respondent within the period for
registration.
16 MOFCOM sent these respondents AD and/or CVD questionnaires on
9 December 2009. The deadline for responses to these questionnaires was extended upon request
to 29 January 2010. All respondents except Mits ubishi USA submitted responses to MOFCOM's
questionnaires by this date.17
2.4. MOFCOM issued separate notices, also on 6 November 2009, inviting interested parties to
register to participate in its AD and CVD injury investigations.18 The CAAM registered to participate
in these investigations. 19 No other interested parties registered as domestic producers.
Concurrently with their responses to the notices of initiation, GM USA, Ford USA, Chrysler USA,
Mercedes-Benz USA, BMW USA, Honda USA, and Mi tsubishi USA registered to participate as
foreign producers and exporters in MOFCOM's injury investigations prior to the closing date of
26 November 2009 specified in the injury registration notices. 20 Mitsubishi USA subsequently
withdrew from the investigations, on 28 December 2009.21
2.5. MOFCOM issued notices of extension in both investigations on 6 November 2010. 22 On
10 March 2011, MOFCOM sent supplemental injury questionnaires to the remaining respondents.
All remaining respondents submitted their responses on time.
23 On 8 March 2011, the petitioner
applied to have the scope of the investigations amended to include only imports of certain US
automobiles of a cylinder capacity equal to or greater than 2500cc. 24 The petitioner submitted
supplementary domestic industry data on such automobiles on 21 March 2011. 25 MOFCOM
accepted the petitioner's application, and adjusted the scope of the product under investigation to
include only saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity equal to or greater than
2500cc.26

12 Original petition, Exhibit USA-04, p. 15.
13 Initiation of Antidumping Investigation into Saloon Cars and Cross-country Cars (of a Cylinder
Capacity ≥ 2000cc) Originating from the United States , MOFCOM Public Notice [2009] No. 83,
6 November 2009 ("AD notice of initiation")(Exhibit USA-06); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation
into Saloon Cars and Cross-country Cars (of a Cylinder Capacity ≥ 2000cc) Originating from the United States ,
MOFCOM Public Notice [2009] No. 84, 6 November 2009 ("CVD notice of initiation")(Exhibit USA-07).
14 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 1; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 2.
15 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4.
16 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 7-8, 10.
17 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 8-9, 11-12. As noted below, Mitsubishi USA withdrew from
the investigations. See para. 2.4 of this Report.
18 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 18-20. See AD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-02 and
CVD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-11.
19 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 18-20.
20 AD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-02, p. 1.
21 Mitsubishi Motors North America Inc. letter for quitting the anti-dumping investigation against saloon
cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc, 28 December 2009 ("Mitsubishi withdrawal letter
(AD)")(Exhibit CHN-03); Mitsubishi Motors North America Inc. letter for quitting the countervailing
investigation against saloon cars and cr oss-country cars of a cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc, 28 December 2009
("Mitsubishi withdrawal letter (CVD)")(Exhibit CHN-04).
22 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 27.
23 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 23-24.
24 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 48.
25 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 27.
26 Preliminary Determination of the People’s Republic of China concerning the Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Investigation on Imports of Certain Automobiles Originating in the United States , 2 April 2011
("preliminary determination")(Exhibit CHN-05), p. 31.

2.6. MOFCOM issued its preliminary determinatio ns on 2 April 2011. It found that the subject
product was dumped and subsidized, and that the dumped and subsidized imports caused material
injury to the domestic industry.
27 MOFCOM established the following AD and CVD rates in its
preliminary determinations:
Table 1: Preliminary Duty Rates
Respondent AD Rate (%) CVD Rate (%)
GM USA 9.9 12.9
Chrysler USA 8.8 6.2
Mercedes-Benz USA 2.7 0
BMW USA 2.0 0
Honda USA 4.4 0
"All others" 21.5 12.9
2.7. MOFCOM issued its final determinations on 5 May 2011. It found that the subject product was
dumped and subsidized, and that the dumped an d subsidized imports caused injury to the
domestic industry. 28 MOFCOM established the following AD and CVD rates in its final
determinations:
Table 2: Final Duty Rates
Respondent AD Rate (%) CVD Rate (%)
GM USA 8.9 12.9
Chrysler USA 8.8 6.2
Mercedes-Benz USA 2.7 0
BMW USA 2.0 0
Honda USA 4.1 0
Ford USA - 0
"All others" 21.5 12.9
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 United States
3.1. The United States requests that the Panel find as follows29:
a. With respect to the alleged procedural violations, that:
i. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement by fail ing to require the petitioner to provide
adequate non-confidential summaries of allegedly confidential information.

27 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 107.
28 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 170.
29 US first written submission, paras. 2-5, 176-177. The United States dropped its consequential claim
under Article VI of the GATT 1994 in its second written submission. See US second written submission, fn. 153.

ii. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articl e 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by
failing to disclose essential facts to US respondents, particularly the data and
calculations underlying their respective dumping margins.
b. With respect to MOFCOM's reasoning and conclusions for its AD determinations, that:
i. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 6.8, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2, and paragraph 1 of
Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by: (i) imposing an "all others" rate based
on facts available to producers that MOFCOM did not notify of the information
required of them, and that did not refu se to provide necessary information or
otherwise impede the dumping investigation; (ii) failing to inform the United States
and other interested parties of the essential facts under consideration that formed
the basis for the application of facts available or the margin calculation; and (iii)
failing to disclose in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all
issues of fact and law considered material by MOFCOM, or all relevant information on
matters of fact and law and reasons which led to the imposition of final measures.
c. With respect to MOFCOM's reasoning and conclusions for its CVD determinations, that:
i. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, and 22.5 of the
SCM Agreement by: (i) imposing an "all others" rate based on facts available to
producers that MOFCOM did not notify of th e information required of them, and that
did not refuse to provide necessary information or otherwise impede the CVD
investigation; (ii) failing to inform the United States and other interested parties of
the essential facts under consideration that formed the basis for this calculation; and
(iii) failing to disclose in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all
issues of fact and law considered material by MOFCOM, or all relevant information on
matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final
measures.
d. With respect to MOFCOM's reasoning and conclusions for its injury determinations, that:
i. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 16.1 of the SCM Agreement by defining the
domestic industry to include only thos e firms that supported the AD and CVD
investigations and by failing to ensure that the domestic industry, as MOFCOM
defined it, was capable of providing ample data that would ensure an accurate injury
analysis.
ii. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement because its price
effects finding was not based on positive evidence and did not involve an objective
examination, as: (i) MOFCOM's finding of parallel pricing was contradicted by record
evidence and, in any event, MOFCOM fail ed to explain the relevance of parallel
pricing; (ii) MOFCOM failed to address evidence that subject imports oversold the
domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM identified price depression;
(iii) MOFCOM failed to make needed adjustments to average unit values that it used
in its price effects analysis; (iv) MOFCOM fa iled to consider or address evidence that
the market share of domestic products incr eased along with that of subject imports;
and (v) MOFCOM's price effects analysis was compromised by its flawed domestic
industry definition.
iii. MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement because its causation
analysis was neither objective nor based on positive evidence, as: (i) MOFCOM's
causation analysis was premised on its flawed domestic industry definition and its
flawed price effects analysis; (ii) MOFCOM failed to examine evidence indicating that
subject imports took market share from non-subject imports and not from domestic
like products; (iii) MOFCOM failed to examine evidence regarding the Chinese
industry's sharp decline in productivity throughout the period of investigation; (iv)
MOFCOM failed to examine the lack of co mpetition between subject imports and the

domestic like products; (v) MOFCOM failed to examine the sharp drop in demand
during the period in which it found material injury; (vi) MOFCOM failed to examine
the effect of an increase in sales tax on larger engine vehicles during the period in
which it found material injury; and (vii) MOFCOM failed to examine the effect of
increases in average wages and employment over the period of investigation on the
domestic industry's pre-tax profits.
e. And, as a consequence of these violations, that:
i. MOFCOM's conduct in the AD investigation violated Article 1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
ii. MOFCOM's conduct in the CVD investigation violated Article 10 of the
SCM Agreement.
3.2. The United States further requests that, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel
recommend that China bring its measures in to conformity with the Anti-Dumping and
SCM Agreements.
30
3.2 China
3.3. China requests that the Panel reject the US claims, finding instead that MOFCOM's
determinations in the underlying investigations were fully consistent with China's WTO rights and
obligations.31
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties, other than in their answers to questions, are reflected in their
written submissions, oral statements or executiv e summaries thereof, provided to the Panel in
accordance with paragraph 18 of the working procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B
and C).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of the third parties, other than in their answers to questions, are reflected in
their written submissions, oral statements or ex ecutive summaries thereof, provided to the Panel
in accordance with paragraph 18 of the working procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex D).
Colombia, India and Oman did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 Introduction
6.1. On 21 February 2014, we issued our interim report to the parties. In accordance with our
working procedures, the United States submitted a written request for the review of precise
aspects of the interim report on 5 March 2014. Ch ina did not submit its written request by the
agreed deadline, citing technical communications problems between its representation in Geneva,
and Beijing. China did submit its written request for the review of precise aspects of the interim
report on 6 March 2014. On 10 March 2014, the United States requested that, given the delay in
China's submission of its written request for the review of the interim report, the Panel grant the
parties a one-day extension, until 13 March 2014, to provide comments on each other’s written
request. We granted the US request, changed th e date in our timetable for the submission of
parties' comments on each other's written request from 12 to 13 March and communicated this to
the parties on 10 March 2014. Neither party requested an additional meeting with the Panel.
6.2. In this section of our report, we explai n how we addressed the changes of a substantive
nature requested by the parties. As a result of the changes that we have made to our interim
report, the numbering of footnotes in the fina l report has changed from the interim report.

30 US first written submission, para. 178 (as modified by US second written submission, fn. 153).
31 China's first written submission, para. 272.

However, none of these changes have affected the numbering of the footnotes referred to below in
our evaluation of the parties' requests for changes to the interim report. The numbering of
paragraphs is unchanged from the interim report. We have also corrected typographical and other
non-substantive errors throughout the report, including those identified by the parties, which are
not referred to specifically below.
6.2 Parties' requests for changes to the interim report
6.3. Paragraph 7.30: China notes that the sixth sentence of this paragraph mischaracterizes
China's argument regarding the relevance of US respondents' failure to object to the non-
confidential summary of the petition in the under lying investigations to our assessment of the US
claims under Articles 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement and
requests that the sentence be deleted. Specifically, China underlines that its argument is that such
failure should impact the Panel's evaluation of th e merits of the US claims, not that it precludes
the Panel from addressing such claims. China therefore requests that this sentence be deleted. The
United States has not commented on this request by China.
6.4. Since the requested modification represents an accurate description of China's argument, we
have granted it. To this end, we have not deleted but modified the sentence cited by China and
made further modifications to paragraph 7.30 to preserve its internal coherence in light of this
change.
6.5. Paragraph 7.70: China takes issue with the description by the Panel of the issue before it in
respect of the US claim under Article 6.9 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement. China notes that in
paragraph 7.70 the Panel describes the issue before it as the adequacy of MOFCOM's disclosure
and requests the Panel to clarify that another issu e presented by this clai m is the extent of the
burden of proof on the United States as the comp laining party. The United States disagrees with
China and argues that the issue before the Panel is correctly described as whether MOFCOM's
disclosure letters contained the essential facts and that in analysing that issue the Panel devotes
considerable attention to whether the United States has made a prima facie case.
6.6. In paragraphs 7.69 and 7.70 of our report , we identify the crux of the US claim under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and note that the principal question that this claim
raises is whether or not MOFCOM disclosed essential facts to the US respondents as required under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In th e three paragraphs that follow, we analyse the
legal provision at issue and in paragraph 7.74 we note that the resolution of the issue presented
by this claim centres on burden of proof. From paragraph 7.75 onwards, we discuss the allocation
of the burden of proof in the particular circumstan ces of this dispute and come to a conclusion in
paragraph 7.86. As such, our assessment of this claim follows a logical path and correctly
describes the issue before us. In our view, it is obvious that the central element of our assessment
of the issue raised under this claim is the incidenc e of the burden of proof but the issue is whether
MOFCOM disclosed essential facts pursuant to Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We
therefore have not modified paragraph 7.70 of the report.
6.7. Paragraphs 7.72 and 7.73: China contends that the Panel's expression of agreement with
the reasoning of the panel in China – Broiler Products that the formula used by MOFCOM to
calculate dumping margins constitutes an essential fact within the meaning of Article 6.9 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement is not well explained and holds MOFCOM to a broader standard of
disclosure than that contemplated in this provision. In China's view, the Panel fails to explain how
a formula can constitute a "fact", rather than "r easoning" within the meaning of Article 6.9. The
United States asserts that China offers no basis for the Panel to modify its reasoning or findings in
these paragraphs and that therefore China's request should not be granted.
6.8. In paragraphs 7.71-7.73 of the report, we note the reasoning of previous panels, including
the panel in China – Broiler Products , with respect to what constitutes an essential fact within the
meaning of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement and express our agreement with that
reasoning. In our view, paragraph 7.72 as originally drafted explained clearly why we agree with
the reasoning of the panel in China – Broiler Products on whether or not the formula used in
dumping margin calculations constitutes an essential fact. We nevertheless modified
paragraph 7.73 to provide further clarity in this regard.

6.9. Paragraph 7.77: China disagrees with the Panel's finding that the United States satisfied its
burden of proof by submitting to the Panel MOFC OM's disclosure letter to the US government and
assertions about its understanding of the substance of MOFCOM's disclosure letters to the US
company respondents. China argues that documents other than those forming the basis for the US
claim and speculation about the contents of those documents do not suffice to discharge the
burden of proof on the United States in respect of this claim. China considers that the interim
report does not adequately explain how the burd en of proof shifted to China. For the same
reasons, China asserts that the Panel had no factual basis to make findings as to the adequacy of
MOFCOM's company-specific disclosure documents. The United States argues that China's request
should be rejected because the Panel adequately explains why the burden of proof shifted to China
and that it is unclear what review China is seeking through this request.
6.10. China's argument regarding the shifting of the burden of proof to China simply repeats the
arguments made by China throughout these procee dings and which we address in our evaluation
of the US claim. As for China's assertion that the Panel made findings regarding the adequacy of
MOFCOM's company-specific disclosures, we note that we have not made such a finding. China
does not refer to a specific part of the interim report where such a finding is made. Indeed, in
relation to the letter submitted by Mercedes-Benz USA, we note in paragraph 7.84 of the report
that "[w]hile this [letter] does not demonstrate, in itself, that the disclosure was inconsistent with
the requirements of Article 6.9, it does lend su pport to the US claim, and is unrebutted by any
evidence put forward by China." This statement shows that in finding that the United States
satisfied its burden of proof in respect of this claim, we did not make any legal conclusions
regarding the substantive adequacy of the company-specific disclosures sent by MOFCOM. We
therefore have not modified our report in this regard.
6.11. Paragraph 7.77, footnote 166: China notes our reference to the panel report in
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel regarding a responding party's obligation to provide documents in
its sole possession, including in particular para graph 6.40 of that report where the panel states
that this obligation "does not arise until the claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has
actually produced some prima facie evidence in support of its case." While China agrees with this
reasoning, it argues that in our report, we do not hold the United States to this standard. More
specifically, China contends that our report does not explain how the burden to produce company-
specific disclosure letters could have shifted to China without the United States doing its best to
provide such letters. The United States has not commented on this request by China.
6.12. In paragraph 7.77 of our report, we explai n the reasons that led us to conclude that the
United States had done its best in order to discharge its burden of proof regarding the alleged
inadequacy of the company-specific disclosures sent by MOFCOM. Specifically, we note the fact
that, in the normal course of an AD investigation, company-specific disclosures are only sent to the
companies subject to the investigation, not to th e government of the exporting Member and that
therefore it is normal for the United States not to have the actual company-specific disclosures in
its possession. Therefore, we have not made any substantive modifications to our report in this
regard. We did however add one sentence to the text of footnote 166 specifically relating the
reasoning of the panel in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel to the circumstances of this dispute.
6.13. Paragraph 7.78: China argues that the Panel's statement that the part of the record cited
by China as demonstrating that company-specific disclosure letters were in fact sent to US
respondents gives the wrong impression that China attempted before the Panel to demonstrate the
substantive adequacy of those letters. China therefore requests that this paragraph be deleted
from the report. The United States disagrees with China, arguing that China did in fact endeavour
to defend the adequacy of the company-specific di sclosure letters. In the US view, therefore, this
paragraph should not be deleted.
6.14. We accept China's representation that it did not defend the substantive adequacy of
MOFCOM's company-specific disclosure letters on the basis that the burden of proof did not shift to
it to do so. Paragraph 7.78 of our report was not meant to say otherwise. The part of the final
determination quoted in that paragraph is an element of China's argument in response to the US
claim under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent, other than its burden of proof argument.
However, because China's comment concerns the description of its own arguments in respect of
this claim, we have modified the text of this paragraph to clarify that China indeed did not argue
before the Panel that the company-specific disclosure letters sent to US respondents were
substantively in conformity with the requirements of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

6.15. Paragraphs 7.79 to 7.83: China expresses concern regarding the Panel's acceptance of
the Mercedes-Benz USA letter, submitted by the Un ited States during the second Panel meeting,
into evidence. China considers that the Panel's approach in this regard may set a precedent that
could encourage parties in future WTO panel proceedings to abuse panel flexibility by delaying the
submission of evidence that, as with the Merc edes-Benz USA letter, could have been submitted
earlier. Accordingly, China requests the Panel to clarify that circumstances may arise in which the
submission of relevant evidence at the second Panel meeting would compromise the other party's
rights of due process. China otherwise reiterates its disagreement with the Panel's finding that the
Mercedes-Benz USA letter, which is a document other than the actual disclosure letters sent by
MOFCOM to the US respondents, can constitute an adequate basis for the burden of proof to shift
to China. The United States argues that China expresses dissatisfaction with the Panel's conclusion
without offering specific suggestions on how to correct the perceived problems. In the US view, the
Panel's statements are clear and China's concerns on due process and potential adverse precedent
are misplaced. Therefore, the United States contends that China's request should be dismissed.
6.16. In our view, paragraphs 7.79-7.83 of our report make it abundantly clear that we discuss
the issue of the acceptance of the Mercedes-Benz U SA letter into evidence in light of the particular
circumstances of this dispute, and do not consid er that the same outcome would be required in
future WTO disputes, as argued by China. We nevertheless added language to paragraph 7.83 to
further clarify this. As for China's argument that the Mercedes-Benz USA letter does not suffice to
shift the burden of proof to China, this simply repeats China's argument regarding this claim,
which we thoroughly addressed in our decision. In this regard, we note that there are two types of
burdens, namely the burden of coming forward with evidence and the burden of proof. With
respect to the US claim under Article 6.9 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement, it is the former, not the
latter, burden that shifted to China in these proceedings. The United States made its claim and
came forward with some evidence to support it. While the burden of proof always rested on the
United States as the party making the claim, for the reasons that are explained as from
paragraph 7.74 of our report, we considered that the burden of coming forward with evidence
shifted to China, which burden China has failed to satisfy despite the Panel's invitation to submit
MOFCOM's company-specific disclosure letters. We therefore do not make any modification to our
report in this regard.
6.17. Paragraph 7.125 and footnote 215: The United States requests that the Panel modify
the last sentence of this paragraph to more accurately reflect its argument that the unknown US
exporters were not notified of the information required and thus cannot be said to have failed to
cooperate and that therefore MOFCOM's notification efforts were insufficient to justify the use of
facts available in the calculation of the residual duty rates. The United States also proposes to add
a portion of its response to Panel question No. 7 to footnote 215 of the report in order to give a
more precise description of its argument. China has not commented on this request by the
United States.
6.18. Given that the requested modification concerns the description of the US own arguments as
presented to the Panel and that it has a basis on the record, we have granted it and modified
paragraph 7.125 accordingly. We have also added to footnote 215 the part of the US answer to
Panel question No. 7 cited by the United States.
6.19. Paragraphs 7.136 and 7.138: China takes issue with our finding that the disparity
between the information required in the registra tion process and that subsequently requested
through exporter's questionnaires undermines th e due process rights of the parties concerned.
Specifically, China argues that MOFCOM could reasonably conclude that by not registering for
participation, the relevant US respondents convey ed to MOFCOM their decision not to provide any
information. China draws attention to our finding that MOFCOM's efforts in reaching out to the US
respondents were adequate, and contends that therefore MOFCOM could conclude that non-
registering US respondents would respond to none of MOFCOM's subsequent information requests.
China therefore requests that we modify our finding concerning the impact of MOFCOM's use of
facts available on the due process rights of the potential US respondents. China also reiterates its
point of view that a decision not to participate in an investigation is tantamount to a decision to
refuse access to relevant information within the meaning of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. China therefore disagrees with our findin g that failure to register to participate in an
investigation does not establish a legal prerequisite allowing the use of facts available in the
calculation of residual duty rates. The United St ates argues that China's request regarding these
two paragraphs amounts to re-arguing the merits of the claim and therefore should be dismissed.

6.20. These aspects of China's request merely repeat China's main argument regarding this
particular claim, which we rejected for the reasons that are explained in paragraphs 7.129-7.140
of our report. We therefore see no reason to make any modification to our report in this regard.
6.21. Paragraphs 7.281 and 7.282: China disagrees with two aspects of the Panel's finding that
MOFCOM should have inquired further into price comparability issues in the course of its price
depression analysis. First, in China's view, adjusting for price comparability is not necessary in a
price depression analysis, where an IA is not comparing prices, but rather is assessing price trends
over time. China contends that the Panel's finding goes beyond that of the Appellate Body in China
– GOES and prior panels, insofar as WTO precedent on price comparability is limited to instances
of price undercutting. Second, China submits that the Panel has applied an unduly rigid standard in
finding that MOFCOM should have known that subject imports were not "identical" to the domestic
like product. China considers that the issue is not whether the products were "identical", but rather
whether they were sufficiently similar such that adjustments for price comparability were not
needed. China refers the Panel in this regard to MOFCOM's determination that there was sufficient
competitive overlap between both baskets of goods, which in China's view obviated the need for
price adjustments. China adds that MOFCOM found no evidence that the product mix of either
basket of goods changed over time, which in its view further obviated the need for price
adjustments in MOFCOM's price depression analysis. The United States submits that China's
request repeats its arguments regarding this claim and offers no basis for the Panel to modify its
findings in these two paragraphs. China does not even request the Panel to make modifications in
this regard. The United States also argues that China mischaracterises the Panel's findings by
arguing that the Panel reasons that adjustments are needed when the goods being compared are
not identical. The United States therefore requests that China's request be rejected.
6.22. With respect to China's first comment, we have rejected China's contention that price
adjustments are only required in a price undercutting analysis, as distinct from a price depression
(or suppression) analysis. For the reasons set fort h in paragraph 7.277 and footnote 438 of our
report, we consider that the Appellate Body's findings in China – GOES on the importance of
ensuring price comparability between subject imports and the domestic like product, with which
we agree, apply as well in the context of pric e depression analyses. We also reject China's
contention, in its second comment, that price adjustments were not required in MOFCOM's
investigations, having regard to the competitive overlap between subject imports and the domestic
like product, and static product mix during the POI. Nevertheless, we have added a footnote to
paragraph 7.281 to clarify that price adjustments are not necessarily required where subject
imports and the domestic like product are identical.
6.23. Paragraph 7.288: The United States requests that the Panel modify this paragraph to
more accurately reflect its arguments. Specifically, the United States maintains that its argument
is not that subject imports took market share from Chinese producers not part of the domestic
industry as defined by MOFCOM and third country imports, as opposed to taking it from the
domestic industry. Rather, the US argument was that Chinese producers not part of the domestic
industry and third country imports gained most of the market share lost by the domestic industry,
while the market share of subject imports increa sed only very modestly. China argues that the
United States did in fact argue that subject imports took market share from Chinese producers
outside the domestic industry definition and th ird country imports and that therefore the US
request should be dismissed.
6.24. We note that the reques ted modification represents an accurate description of the US
argument as presented to the Panel. We disagree with China's contention that the United States
argued in this context that subject imports took market share from Chinese producers outside the
domestic industry definition and third country impo rts. In support of its comment, China refers to
the statement in paragraph 79 of the US opening statement at the first substantive meeting with
the Panel. That statement, however, pertains to the developments between interim 2008-interim
2009, not between 2006-2007 which is what the US request is about. We have therefore granted
the request and modified paragraph 7.288 of the report accordingly. We note that the description
of the US argument in the modified paragraph 7.2 88 is identical to that in paragraph 7.242 of our
report.
6.25. Paragraph 7.303: The United States requests that the Panel modify the penultimate
sentence of this paragraph to better describe its argument that the domestic industry lost nearly

half its market share in the 2006-2008 period. China has not commented on this modification
requested by the United States.
6.26. Given that the modification requested accura tely reflects the US argument as presented to
the Panel, we have granted it and modified the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7.303
accordingly.
6.27. Paragraph 8.3: China states that the AD and CVD measures at issue in this dispute were
terminated on 15 December 2013 and that therefore there is no basis for the Panel to make
recommendations under Article 19.1 of the DSU. In support of its request, China cites the WTO
jurisprudence on whether a panel should make re commendations regarding a measure that is no
longer in existence. On this basis, China requests that the recommendation in paragraph 8.3 of
our report be deleted. The United States notes that there is no evidence on the record of this
dispute to support China's assertion that th e AD and CVD measures at issue have been
terminated. If China's request is premised on the Panel's accepting China's assertion as new
evidence, the United States asserts that the Panel should reject the introduction of new evidence
during the interim review stage of the case. The Un ited States argues that Article 19.1 of the DSU
requires the Panel to make recommendations in these circumstances. In the view of the
United States, whether the measures at issue are still in force, whether they have been replaced
by new measures and whether any such new measures are WTO-consistent are matters that have
to be discussed by the parties to the dispute following the adoption of the Panel report by the DSB.
On this basis, the United States contends that China's request should be rejected and the Panel
should make recommendations regarding the measures that are found to be inconsistent with
China's WTO obligations.
6.28. While China argues that the AD and CVD measures at issue in this dispute were repealed on
15 December 2013, China has not brought to our attention any official documentation that would
support this contention. Therefore, as far as the official record of this dispute is concerned, we are
not in a position to find that the measures have been terminated. Hence, we have no basis to
grant China's request. We therefore dismiss China's request and maintain our recommendation, as
provided for in Article 19.1 of the DSU, that China bring its measures into conformity with its
obligations under the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 General principles regarding treaty in terpretation, the applicable standard of
review, and the burden of proof
7.1.1 Treaty interpretation
7.1. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WT O dispute settlement system serves to clarify the
existing provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law". Likewise, Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
requires panels to interpret that Agreement's provisions in accordance with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. It is generally accepted that the principles codified in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are such customary rules.
7.2. Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent also provides that if a panel finds that a
provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, it
shall uphold a measure that rests upon one of those interpretations.
7.1.2 Standard of review
7.3. Panels generally are bound by the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU, which
provides, in relevant part, that:
[a] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements.

7.4. The Appellate Body has explained that where a panel is reviewing an investigating authority's
("IA"'s) determination, the "objective assessment" standard in Article 11 of the DSU requires a
panel to review whether the authorities have prov ided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to
(i) how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (ii) how those factual
findings support the overall determination.
32 Furthermore, in addition to the obligation to conduct
an objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU, in AD disputes, Article 17.6(i) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:
in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities' establishment of the facts wa s proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned.
7.5. The Appellate Body has clarified that a panel should not conduct a de novo review of the
evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the IA. A panel must limit its examination to the
evidence that was before the IA during the course of the investigation and must take into account
all such evidence submitted by the parties to the dispute.
33 At the same time, a panel must not
simply defer to the conclusions of the IA; a panel's examination of those conclusions must be "in-
depth" and "critical and searching".34
7.1.3 Burden of proof
7.6. The general principles applicable to the al location of the burden of proof in WTO dispute
settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO Agreement must assert
and prove its claim.
35 Therefore, as the complaining party, the United States bears the burden of
demonstrating that certain aspects of the AD and CVD measures at issue are inconsistent with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body has stated that a
complaining party will satisfy its burden when it establishes a prima facie case, namely a case
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter
of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party.
36 Finally, it is generally for each party asserting a
fact to provide proof thereof.37
7.2 Whether the non-confidential summary of the petition was consistent with
Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement
7.2.1 Provisions at issue
7.7. Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement and Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement
provide:
[t]he authorities shall require [interested Members or] interested parties providing
confidential information to furnish non confidential summaries thereof. These
summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances,
such [Members or] parties may indicate that such information is not susceptible of
summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why
summarization is not possible must be provided.
38
7.2.2 Factual background
7.8. The petitioner, the CAAM, filed a single petition on behalf of Chinese producers of
automobiles requesting the initiation of both the AD and CVD investigations on

32 Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 186; US – Lamb ,
para. 103.
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 187-188.
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93.
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
36 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 98, 104.
37 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
38 The SCM Agreement includes the reference to "Members".

9 September 200939, which it amended with additional data on 19 October 2009. 40 The CAAM
submitted two versions of the petition to MOFCOM : a confidential version and a non-confidential
version. The non-confidential version includes a section entitled "Application for Confidentiality",
which contains the following statement under the heading "Non-confidential Summary":
[f]or the purpose that the interested parties of this case can learn the comprehensive
substance of the information treated as confidential, the petitioner hereby makes the
non-confidential part for the petition and annexes, in which the explanation and non-
confidential summary are provided for the information and annexes treated as
confidential. Since the confidential part of the petition involves the business
confidential information of CAAM and the do mestic industry represented by CAAM, to
whom the disclosure of the confidential information would cause a significantly
adverse effect, the petitioner hereby requests to treat it as confidential.
41
7.9. Injury data was presented in the petition in a section entitled "Impact of the Subject Product
on Domestic Industry" for the following period s: 2006, 2007, 2008, the first three quarters of
2008 ("interim 2008"), and the first three quarters of 2009 ("interim 2009"). 42 The non-
confidential version of the petition redacts information pertaining to various injury factors,
including the factors identified by the United States in its complaint.
43 Where information is
redacted, the non-confidential version of the petition states "Confidential". 44 Where confidential
information is redacted, a non-confidential summary of the redacted information is provided. It is
the adequacy of some of those summaries that is in dispute.
7.10. Each non-confidential summary contains a table in which the column or row displaying
aggregated yearly data for the domestic industry is redacted. The tables do not present this
information in the same format. In some cases, the data is presented in rows, with the POI years
identified as column headings, and in others the data is presented in columns, with the POI years
identified as row headings. These tables may contain a second column or row, depending on how
information is presented, displaying year-on-year percentage changes in the redacted data over
the POI. Each summary is followed by text describing trends in the table. Some summaries also
contain a graph showing a trend line representing the data whose X-axis (horizontal) is labelled
with yearly intervals corresponding to the POI but whose Y-axis (vertical) is unlabelled.
7.2.3 Arguments of the parties
7.2.3.1 United States
7.11. The United States argues that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 6.5.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement by failing to require the
petitioner to provide adequate non-confidential summaries of certain confidential information
submitted in the petition.
45 The United States observes that the obligation to either provide a non-
confidential summary or an explanation of why summarisation is not possible rests on the
interested party submitting the information, and not on the IA.
46 The United States contends that
MOFCOM failed to require the petitioner either to prepare adequate non-confidential summaries of
information contained in the confidential version of the petition, or to provide an explanation as to
why this information was not susceptible to summarization.
47
7.12. In assessing the conformity of the non-conf idential summaries at issue with Articles 6.5.1
and 12.4.1, the United States disagrees with Ch ina's suggestion that the obligation to provide
adequate non-confidential summaries under these provisions should be assessed in light of the
particular substantive provisions contained in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and

39 Original petition, Exhibit USA-04.
40 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01.
41 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 60.
42 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 38-52.
43 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 59.
44 See for example amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 38 (in relation to data for production capacity).
46 See for instance US first written submission, para. 39.
47 See for instance US first written submission, para. 42.

Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement, and notes that these provisions contain no cross-reference to
Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1, and vice-versa.48
7.13. The United States specifies 12 injury factors with respect to which the non-confidential
version of the petition allegedly contained inadequate summaries: sales-to-output ratio, return on
investment, salary, apparent consumption, product capacity, output, sales volume, inventory, pre-
tax profit, number of employees, productivity, and cash flow. 49 The United States alleges the
following deficiencies in the non-confidential summaries: (i) the textual explanations provided
consist of general statements addressing topics only peripherally related to the confidential
information50, (ii) the year-on-year percentage changes provided in tables lack any indication of
the significance of the changes 51, and (iii) the trend lines provided are labelled only by year, and
lack any indication of scale, without which, the United States argues, US respondents could not
form a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information.52
7.14. The United States submits that MOFCOM could have provided an average of absolute values
per year in the tables, instead of percentage changes. This would have given US respondents a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information. 53 The United States
contends in this regard that reading the percenta ge changes contained in some of the tables in
conjunction with the trend lines in the non-confid ential summaries at issue does not remedy these
inconsistencies, insofar as both elements are themselves inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and
12.4.1.54
7.15. The United States submits that insofar as China argues that non-confidential summaries of
some of the confidential information at issue can be ascertained in terms of their relationships with
other data in the non-confidential version of the petition, this would require that interested parties
infer, derive and piece together possible non-confidential summaries in a manner inconsistent with
Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
55
7.16. The United States disagrees with China's contention that MOFCOM was only obligated to
require adequate non-confidential summaries where an interested party objected to the adequacy
of such summaries in the underlying investigations. Noting that it is the IA's responsibility, not that
of opposing interested parties, to ensure that adequate non-confidential summaries accompany
any confidential information submitted by an interested party in an investigation, the United States
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t n o U S r e s p o n d e n t o bjected to the adequacy of the non-confidential
summaries in the course of these investigations is immaterial to a finding of a violation of
Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
56
7.2.3.2 China
7.17. China argues that since MOFCOM deemed the non-confidential summaries submitted by the
petitioner adequate for the purposes of Arti cle 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement, the record contains no explanation as to why the information
at issue was not susceptible to summarization.
57 China maintains in this regard that neither
Article 6.5.1 nor Article 12.4.1 sets a specific level of detail or format for non-confidential
summaries and that therefore the adequacy of non-confidential summaries must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. 58 China observes, in this respect, that Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 seek to
balance the protection of confidential information submitted to the IA by an interested party with
the need for transparency in such an investigation.59

48 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 11-12.
49 US first written submission, paras. 42-45.
50 See for instance US first written submission, para. 43.
51 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 25.a.
52 See for instance US comments on China's responses to Panel questions Nos. 25.a and 25.c.
53 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 25.a.
54 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 12.
55 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 17, 22.
56 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 7-8.
57 China's second written submission, para. 24.
58 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 39.
59 China's first written submission, para. 40.

7.18. China argues that the term "substance" in Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 should be understood in
light of the substantive obligations of Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.4
of the SCM Agreement, which require an IA to eval uate industry indicators bearing upon the state
of the domestic industry in terms of trends in the movement of various indicators, rather than
changes in the underlying absolute figures themselves. China contends that the panel in EU –
Footwear (China) followed a similar approach in evaluating the "substance" of certain confidential
information at issue in that dispute against other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
60
From this point of view, China contends that th e non-confidential summaries at issue provide a
reasonable understanding of the "substance" of relevant trends.61
7.19. China considers that the US claim ignores significant information contained in the non-
confidential version of the petition. Specifically, China argues that the United States ignores: (i)
the text62 that appear below each of the tables that the United States alleges are not adequately
summarized, (ii) the year-on-year percentage changes reported in some of these tables 63, and/or
(iii) trend lines64 representing the redacted data for the injury factors at issue under this claim. 65
China contends that the provision of year-on-year percentage changes in the tables is functionally
equivalent to the use of indices, and submits that the trend lines visually depict the percentage
changes set out in the tables.66
7.20. According to China, the non-confidential summaries of redacted domestic industry-wide
aggregated figures per year at issue were sufficiently detailed to allow interested parties a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the relevant confidential information.
67 China notes
in this regard that the US claim relates to MOFCOM's treatment of non-confidential summaries
provided in the petition, and not to MOFCOM's de cision to grant confidential treatment to the
information at issue. 68 China characterizes the US argument that MOFCOM could have requested
the petitioner to provide averages of absolute va lues per year in the non-confidential version of
the petition as circular, contending that it seeks to have MOFCOM disclose the very data for which
it granted confidential treatment.69
7.21. China submits that the non-confidential summary of the sales-to-output ratio provides more
than a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information at issue, particularly when
examined in terms of its relationship with the non-confidential summaries for apparent
consumption and inventory shifts.
70 With respect to the non-confidential summary for apparent
consumption, China adds that if viewed alongside figures for total domestic demand, found
elsewhere in the non-confidential version of the pe tition, this summary provides interested parties
with a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information within the
meaning of Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
71
7.22. Finally, China contends that if any of the respondents felt prejudiced by the alleged
inadequacies in the non-confidential version of the petition, they should have raised this concern
during the investigations at issue, which they did not. In China's view, raising this issue for the
first time before the Panel should be taken into consideration in the assessment of the merits of
the US claim.
72 China considers that the panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels came to a similar
conclusion in characterizing an argument raised by one of the parties late in the panel proceedings
as lacking in conviction.
73

60 China's second written submission, para. 16.
61 See for instance China's second written submission, paras. 14-15.
62 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 47.
63 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 57.
64 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 48.
65 China's first written submission, para. 46.
66 See for instance China's response to Panel questions Nos. 25.a and 25.b.
67 See for instance China's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 4.
68 China's first written submission, paras. 42-43.
69 By multiplying the average data by the number of domestic industry producers who provided the data
contained in the petition. See China's second written submission, paras. 25-27.
70 China's first written submission, para. 48.
71 China's first written submission, para. 55, referring to the discussion of "Demand of Domestic Market"
in the amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 55-56.
72 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 72.
73 China's second written submission, para. 30.

7.2.4 Arguments of the third parties
7.23. Japan notes that non-confidential summaries should provide a reasonable understanding of
the substance of the confidential information and argues that an IA may permit an interested party
not to submit such a non-confidential summary on ly where there is a reason that outweighs the
due process rights of other interested parties. In such exceptional circumstances, an IA must issue
a statement of reasons for non-summarization. Japan considers that general statements on non-
summarization are insufficient to meet an IA's obligation in these situations, as such statements
constitute unsupported assertions rather than a statement of reasons for the purposes of
Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement.
74
7.2.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.24. The issue before us with respect to this claim is whether the non-confidential summaries of
data concerning 12 injury factors referenced by the United States were adequate. The
United States argues that the non-confidential summaries did not meet the requirements of
Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement. China's position is
that the non-confidential version of the petition contains summaries in the form of text and tables
adjoining the redacted information, permitting a reasonable understanding of the relevant
confidential information. In order to decide this claim, we must determine whether those
summaries allowed interested parties a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
confidential information as required by Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
7.25. Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 require an IA, when granting confidential treatment to information
submitted by interested parties, to ensure that the party submitting the information provides, in
addition to the confidential information, a non-confidential summary of that information that is "in
sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information
submitted in confidence". In EC – Fasteners (China) , the Appellate Body stated that while the
sufficiency of a non-confidential summary will turn on the confidential information at issue, the
summary must be sufficiently detailed to allow a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information withheld, and allow the other parties to the investigation a meaningful opportunity to
respond and defend their interests.
75
7.26. Prior panels have found that neither general statements unsupported by evidence 76, nor the
possibility for interested parties to infer the "main point" of the confidential information from the
context surrounding redaction
77, suffice for the purposes of conforming to Articles 6.5.1 and
12.4.1. In this respect, panels have considered that an IA does not discharge its obligation to
require adequate non-confidential summaries wher e the non-confidential version of the petition
requires interested parties to "infer, derive and piece together a possible summary of the
confidential information." 78 Further, data gaps in non-confidential summaries may deprive
respondents of a "reasonable understanding" of the substance of the confidential information at
issue.
79
7.27. Recognizing that it is not always possible to summarize confidential information in non-
confidential form, Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 prov ide that, in exceptional circumstances, where
summarization of the confidential information submitted is not possible, a statement explaining the
reasons for this must be submitted by the party submitting the information. In this case, it is
undisputed that the petitioner did not assert that "exceptional circumstances" made summarization
of any of the confidential information submitted impossible, and provided no explanations in this
regard.
7.28. Before examining whether the 12 non- confidential summaries challenged by the
United States satisfy the requirements of Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1, we find it useful to discuss two
issues. First, we address China's argument that the adequacy of these summaries should be

74 Japan's third party submission, para. 6.
75 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , paras. 541-542. See also Panel Reports, China –
76 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para. 7.101.
79 Panel Report, China – GOES, paras. 7.216-7.220, 7.224.

assessed against what China contends is the "tre nds-based nature" of Article 3.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement. Second, we address China's
argument that the fact that no US respondent challenged the adequacy of these summaries during
MOFCOM's investigations should affect our assessment of the merits of the US claim.
7.29. China argues that the 12 non-confidenti al summaries should be assessed against the
"substance" required of an injury enquiry pursuant to Articles 3.4 and 15.4. We find this argument
unconvincing for three reasons. First, we note that the text of Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 does not
refer to particular substantive obligations. It merely requires the submission of non-confidential
summaries of any confidential information submitted to an IA by an interested party, unless an
explanation of why summarization is impossible is provided (and accepted by the IA). Second, the
legal basis for China's argument is not entirely clear. China cites the panel report in EU – Footwear
(China) to support its argument.
80 Yet, that panel examined the adequacy of a non-confidential
summary of price information in the form of average prices in light of Article 5.2(iii) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which requires a complainant to provide "information" on normal value and
export price.81 Articles 3.4 and 15.4, in contrast, address the obligations of an IA to assess the
consequent impact of subject imports on various industry indicators in the course of its injury
determination. We do not see anything in that panel decision which would suggest that whether a
non-confidential summary is adequate should be judged in relation to the analysis of injury
information that the IA will undertake in its investigation. Third, we note that Articles 3.4 and 15.4
provide no guidance as to how an IA is to evaluate the relevant factors in analysing injury. Thus,
although we make no finding in this regard, we see no basis for the view, underlying China's
argument, that Articles 3.4 and 15.4 in fact requir e an IA to evaluate industry indicators on the
basis of trends. Accordingly, we consider that there is no reason to conclude that non-confidential
trend information will satisfy the requirements of Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 because of the nature
of the injury analysis.
7.30. China also argues that the failure of US respondents to object to the adequacy of the non-
confidential summaries during the investigations should affect our evaluation of the merits of the
US claim. We see no legal basis for this argument. China cites the panel report in Korea –
Commercial Vessels to support this argument.
82 However, the situation in that dispute was entirely
different from the situation here. In Korea – Commercial Vessels , the panel was addressing
whether Korea's failure to object to the European Communities' use of a specified time period for
the construction of a market benchmark at an earlier stage of panel proceedings rendered Korea's
objection at a later stage of those proceedings as lacking in conviction. 83 We see nothing in this
r e p o r t w h i c h w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t a p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o a n a s p e c t o f a n A D o r C V D
investigation should affect the assessment by a WTO panel of a claim pertaining to that particular
aspect of the investigation. We thus find China's argument unconvincing, and will consider the US
claim without taking into account whether or not any objections to the non-confidential summaries
were made during the investigations.
7.2.5.1 Horizontal assessment
7.31. Turning now to the issue of adequacy of the non-confidential summaries, we note that the
12 non-confidential summaries at issue are not iden tical in form or content, although there are
certain common elements among them. Thus, each summary contains a table from which
confidential yearly industry-wide absolute values are redacted in the relevant rows or columns.
84
In addition, each summary contains at least one of the following two elements: a second column
or row in the table showing the year-on-year pe rcentage changes in the data over the period
and/or a trend line depicting the data graphically over the same period. Finally, each summary
contains some text, which in each case describes trends in the data shown in the tables and/or
trend lines with respect to the injury factor concerned.

80 China's second written submission, para. 16.
81 Panel Report, EU – Footwear (China), para. 7.730.
82 China's second written submission, para. 30.
83 In that CVD dispute, in presenting its evidence concerning the existence of a benefit to the panel, the
EC had constructed a market benchmark on the basis of data for certain periods. Korea did not originally object
the EC approach, but subsequently argued that the EC methodology was flawed. The Panel accepted the EC
approach, rejecting Korea's objection as "lack[ing] conviction". Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels ,
para. 7.272.
84 Tables do not present this information in the same format.

7.32. Given the common elements among the 12 non-confidential summaries at issue, we find it
useful to first consider whether, as a general matter, these tables, trend lines and texts can
constitute an adequate non-confidential summary of the confidential information submitted, before
evaluating the adequacy of each of the individual non-confidential summaries at issue.
7.33. The tables present data for each injury factor at issue on an annual basis for the period,
either in columns or rows. 85 The tables set out yearly industry-wide absolute values, which are in
each case redacted from the non-confidential version. Some of the tables contain an additional
column or row setting out year-on-year percentage changes in the redacted data throughout the
relevant period.86 Hence percentage changes from 2006 to 2007, from 2007 to 2008 and from
interim 2008 to interim 2009 are shown in each such table. The year-on-year percentage changes
do not indicate the significance of the changes. That is, an increase of 100%, for instance, may
represent an increase from 1 to 2 units, or an increase from 100 to 200 units in any given case.
87
7.34. China asserts that the year-on-year percentage changes are "functionally equivalent" to the
use of indices, insofar as both methods show the degree or magnitude of changes. 88 In our view,
the significance of the absolute change in the data being summarized is not a critical component of
an adequate non-confidential summary. For instance, a decline from 100,000 units to 50,000 units
produced, and a decline from 1,000,000 units to 500,000 units produced over a period, is in either
case a 50% decline in production. Knowing that th e industry's production declined by 50% during
the period is, in our view, generally sufficient to "permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confiden ce" as required by Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1,
even without knowing the significance, in absolute terms, of the change.
89 Therefore, we consider
that percentage changes such as those used in this case, are similar, in terms of the
understanding of the redacted confidential inform ation conveyed, to the use of indexing based on
year-on-year changes. In the case of indexing, an absolute value (e.g. 100) is used to represent
the information for the first year, and is shown in a table as a baseline. The data for the
subsequent years is shown as percentage changes from the baseline. Thus, an increase of 25% in
the second year would be represented by an inde x value of 125, and a decrease of 20% in the
third year would be represented by an index valu e of 100. As is the case with the percentage
changes at issue here, the significance of the changes in absolute terms is unknown in the case of
indexing.
90 We therefore find that the tables, where they set out percentage changes, give
interested parties a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information at
issue.91
7.35. The trend lines, set out below the tables, are only partially labelled: while the X-axes are
labelled with the same yearly intervals as are set out in the tables, the Y-axes are unlabelled. The

85 Compare the table for sales revenue, which lists th e years of the POI in columns, with the table for
apparent consumption, which lists these years in rows. Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 41-42.
86 In other instances, data in the tables are comple tely redacted. The table fo r apparent consumption,
further, is missing percentage change data from interim 2008 to interim 2009. We discuss this further below.
87 See for instance US response to Panel question No. 2.
88 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 57.
89 We are aware that the panel in China – Broiler Products , when faced with a similar claim from the
United States, came to a different conclusion. See Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , para. 7.63. Insofar
as the panel in China – Broiler Products considered that the absence of a baseline figure deprived interested
parties of a reasonable understanding of the magnitude of changes in a manner inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1
and 12.4.1, we respectfully disagree with that panel's reasoning for the reasons we set out above. See Panel
90 Where interested parties use a baseline value in reading these percentage changes, they are
effectively engaging in indexing base d on year-on-year changes. We note that confidential information is
sometimes summarized by reporting a ra nge of figures, which would give in terested parties a better sense of
the significance or magnitude of changes. However, neither Article 6.5.1 nor Article 12.4.1 provides any
guidance as to methods that may be used in preparing non-confidential summaries, and we see no basis on
which to conclude that any one method is either necessa rily appropriate or necessarily insufficient to allow for
an adequate non-confidential summary. Members may sp ecify a methodology which in their view will provide
for adequate non-confidential summaries, but this does not guarantee that such summaries will withstand a
challenge in WTO dispute proceedings. We certainly see no basis on which we could conclude that only one
method of summarization is required.
91 The United States appears to suggest, in its comments on China's response to Panel question
No. 25.a, that only non-confidential summaries containing averages of redacted information can be consistent
with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1. See US comments on Ch ina's response to Panel question No. 25.a. As noted
above, in footnote 90, we see no such limitation on the possible means of preparing adequate non-confidential
summaries in these provisions.

United States argues that the trend lines lack any indication of scale, without which, interested
parties could not form a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information.
China, in its written submissions, states that the trend lines graphically depict the percentage
changes shown in the tables.
7.36. We consider that the trend lines correspond to the percentage changes contained in some of
the tables at issue. However, because they ar e unlabelled on the Y-axis, it is impossible to
determine the percentage changes being depicted. Thus, no value is added to the information on
percentage changes reported in the tables.
92 We therefore find that the trend lines alone do not
allow interested parties a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential
information at issue.
7.37. The texts come after the tables and/or trend lines, and describe the trends in the data
depicted in the tables and/or trend lines for the relevant period with respect to each injury factor
at issue. The United States submits that these texts are not revealing of the contents of the
redacted information. China contends that the texts contain narrative that allowed interested
parties a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information at issue.
7.38. The texts in question typically set out in words what is shown graphically in the relevant
tables and/or trend lines. In doing so, absolute figures are redacted from the texts. In some
instances, the texts also refer to matters other than the data in the relevant table and/or the trend
line. However, these references, in most cases are in our view either irrelevant to the data or the
injury factor at issue or simply state a conclusion that subject imports are the cause of negative
trends in the data. We therefore find that, li ke the unlabelled trend lines, the texts add no
additional explanation to the tables. Accordingly, we find that the texts alone do not permit a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information at issue.
7.39. We now turn to our evaluation of the adequacy of each of the 12 non-confidential
summaries challenged by the United States. Having concluded that the additional elements relied
on by China, unlabelled trend lines and text, do not provide additional bases to permit a
reasonable understanding of the confidential information at issue, we focus on the non-confidential
tables summarizing the data for each of the 12 injury factors concerned. In doing so, we have
found it useful to group those summaries into the following two categories:
 confidential information in respect of which data in tables is redacted, but percentage
changes are provided; and
 confidential information in respect of which data in tables is redacted and no percentage
changes are provided.
7.2.5.2 Confidential information in respect of which data in tables is redacted, but
percentage changes are provided
7.40. This category includes non-confidential summaries of information concerning production
capacity, output, sales volume, inventory, pre-tax profits, number of employees, productivity,
apparent consumption, and cash flow. However, the summary for apparent consumption differs
from the other eight summaries in this category, in that the parties present additional arguments
with respect to the adequacy of this summary. We will first consider the non-confidential
summaries for production capacity, output, sales volume, inventory, pre-tax profits, number of
employees, productivity, and cash flow, before moving on to an assessment of the non-confidential
summary for apparent consumption.
7.2.5.2.1 Production capacity, output, sale s volume, inventory, pre-tax profits, number
of employees, productivity, and cash flow
7.41. The non-confidential summaries of information regarding production capacity
93, output 94,
sales volume 95, inventory 96, pre-tax profits 97, number of employees 98, productivity 99, and cash

92 We note, in this respect, China's indication that the trend lines "merely provide the interested parties
a visual illustration of the percentage changes". See China's response to Panel question No. 25.c.
93 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 38.
94 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 38-39.

flow100 all follow a similar pattern, with a table setting out year-on-year percentage changes from
2006 to 2007, 2007 to 2008, and interim 2008 to interim 2009, as well as text describing the
information therein. With the exception of the summaries of data relating to the number of
employees and cash flow, they also contain a trend line which seems to correspond to the
percentage changes in the table.
7.42. We note the US argument that MOFCOM could have provided averages of absolute values
per year, instead of year-on-year percentage changes, to provide respondents a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the confidential information.
101 We recall that the confidential
information at issue here is aggregate data pe rtaining to the domestic industry as a whole. 102 The
confidential aggregate data could be derived from average annual data simply by multiplying the
average for each year by the number of dome stic industry producers in that year. The
United States has not challenged MOFCOM's deci sion to grant confidential treatment to the
aggregate data in the petition. We find the US position, which would make possible the disclosure
of the very information treated as confidential, to be unpersuasive.
103
7.43. As stated above 104, we consider that the percentage changes shown in the tables permit a
reasonable understanding of the redacted confiden tial information, and consequently satisfy the
requirements of those provisions, fulfilling th e objective of the requirement to provide non-
confidential summaries. Although, as also stated above105, the trend lines and textual explanations
do not add to the understanding of the data in the tables, we consider that the tables, on their
own, are sufficient to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the redacted
information. We therefore conclude that the non-confidential summaries for production capacity,
output, sales volume, inventory, pre-tax profits, number of employees, productivity, and cash flow
are consistent with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
7.2.5.2.2 Apparent consumption
7.44. The non-confidential summary of data regarding apparent consumption includes two tables
showing "Changes in Market Share of the Domestic Like Product" in 2006, 2007, 2008, and interim
2009, and text describing the information therein. The first table contains a column setting out
year-on-year percentage changes in apparent consumption for the domestic industry from 2006 to
2008.
106 Percentage changes from interim 2008 to interim 2009 are redacted in this table. The
second table contains a column setting out yearly market share figures for the POI. 107 Data for
sales volume and apparent consumption are redacted from this table.
7.45. The United States argues that the non-co nfidential summary for apparent consumption is
inadequate for the reasons we have already addresse d above, but also points out that in the case
of this table, the percentage change from inte rim 2008 to interim 2009 is missing. In addition, the
United States observes that China refers to other parts of the petition to explain how a reasonable
understanding of the substance of redacted confidential information can be formed. Thus, following
China's own reasoning, the United States contends that interested parties would have to infer,
derive and piece together a possible summary of confidential information for themselves.
108 In
addition to general arguments we have already addressed, China asserts that figures for total
domestic demand are indicated elsewhere in the pe tition, and contends that the non-confidential

95 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 39-40.
96 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 44.
97 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 46-47.
98 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 48-49.
99 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 50-51.
100 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 51-52.
101 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 25.a.
102 China's response to Panel question No. 3.
103 See in this regard Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.210.
105 See paras. 7.36 and 7.38 (on the horizontal assessment of the trend lines and texts, respectively) of
this Report.
106 The table indicates that apparent consumption equals "total domestic production + total import
volume - total export volume". Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 43.
107 The table indicates that market share equals "sales volumes / apparent consumption". Amended
petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 43.
108 See for instance US second written submission, para. 22.

summary for apparent consumption, coupled with these figures, provided interested parties a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information at issue.109
7.46. We are of the view that the non-conf idential summary for apparent consumption is
inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1. While we have found that the tables, where they
contain a column or row displaying percentage changes, are generally sufficient to provide
interested parties with an understanding of the redacted information 110, in this instance,
percentage change information for the period interim 2008 to interim 2009 is not reported, despite
the corresponding information having been included in the other non-confidential summaries at
issue. There is no explanation for this omission in the case of the non-confidential summary of
data for apparent consumption. China argues that the reason for this omission was because there
was no underlying confidential data for apparent consumption for this particular period, and this
was clear from the record.
111 We find this argument unconvincing, however, as the record does not
so state. We consider that the absence of this data creates a gap in the non-confidential summary
for apparent consumption that deprived interested parties of a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the redacted information.
112 E v e n i f w e w e r e t o a c c e p t C h i n a ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t
apparent consumption data could be found elsewhere in the petition, further, we note that the
data on total domestic demand referred to by China does not cover interim 2009.
113 In any event,
we consider that a non-confidential summary that requires interested parties to connect
information from different parts of the petition in order to obtain a reasonable understanding of
the substance of the confidential information is not consistent with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
114
7.2.5.3 Confidential information in respect of which data in tables is wholly redacted,
and no percentage changes are provided
7.47. This category includes non-confidential summaries for sales-to-output ratio, return on
investment and salary. However, the summary for sales-to-output ratio differs from the other two
summaries in this category, in that the parties present additional arguments with respect to this
summary. Therefore, we will first consider the non-confidential summaries for return on
investment and salary, before moving onto an assessment of the summary for sales-to-output
ratio.
7.2.5.3.1 Return on investment and salary
7.48. The non-confidential summaries for return on investment
115 and salary 116 follow a similar
pattern. These summaries include a table setting out information concerning developments in each
injury factor in 2006, 2007, 2008, interim 2008, and interim 2009, in which percentage changes
are wholly redacted. These summaries also include a trend line which displays "changes" in each
injury factor over the POI.
117 The tables and trend lines are followed by text describing the
information in the tables.
7.49. As stated above118, partially unlabelled trend lines and text such as those provided in these
summaries are not, on their own, sufficient to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance
of the redacted information. In the absence of ad ditional information, such as that provided in

109 China's first written submission, para. 55, referri ng to the discussion of "Demand of Domestic
Market" in amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 55-56.
111 China's first written submission, fn. 47.
112 See, in this regard, Panel Report, China – GOES, paras. 7.216-7.220, 7.224.
113 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 55-56.
114 Panel Reports, China – GOES , para. 7.202; China – Broiler Products , para. 7.60. The second table
does not affect our conclusion. This table reports information on market shares. Neither it, nor the text
accompanying both tables, does anything to remedy the data gap in the table setting out year-on-year
percentage changes in apparent consumption, and thus does not add anything to the understanding of the
substance of the confidential information in question. Amended petition, Ex hibit CHN-01, p. 39. See, in this
115 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 47-48.
116 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 49-50.
117 While the trend line for return on investment does not contain the term "change" in the heading, we
note that the heading for the non-confidential summary for return on inve stment reads "Change in Rate of
Return on Investment of the Domestic Product".
118 See paras. 7.36 and 7.38 (on the horizontal assessment of the trend lines and texts, respectively) of
this Report.

other summaries by the tables showing percentage changes, we consider that these summaries
fail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information at issue.
We therefore conclude that the non-confidential summaries for return on investment and salary
are inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1.
7.2.5.3.2 Sales-to-output ratio
7.50. The non-confidential summary of confiden tial information concerning the sales-to-output
ratio includes a table from which percentage changes are wholly redacted.
119 This summary also
includes a trend line showing "Changes in the Proportion of Products Sold" over the POI. 120 The
table and trend line are followed by a text describing the information.
7.51. In addition to arguments we have already addressed above, the United States observes that
China refers interested parties to other parts of the petition to explain how a reasonable
understanding of the substance of redacted confidential information can be formed. Thus, following
China's own reasoning, interested parties would have to infer, derive and piece together a possible
summary of confidential information for themselves. 121 China asserts that the trend line and text
adequately provided interested parties with a reasonable understanding of the changes in sales-to-
output ratio over the POI, particularly when considered in terms of the relationship of data for
sales-to-output ratio with data for apparent consumption and inventory shifts.
122
7.52. We are of the view that the non-conf idential summary for sales-to-output ratio is
inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1. As stated above 123, we consider that partially labelled
trend lines and text alone are not generally sufficient to provide an adequate understanding of
confidential information, unlike a table showing ye ar-on-year percentage changes. We note that
the confidential information is redacted from the text that China relies on in this context
124, and
accordingly, it does nothing to permit a reasonable understanding of the confidential information in
question. Moreover, as we have previously found, a non-confidential summary that only provides a
reasonable understanding of confidential information if interested parties themselves connect
information from different parts of the petition is generally inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and
12.4.1.
125 Even assuming we were to accept China's position that the non-confidential summary
for sales-to-output ratio should be assessed in terms of its relationship with the non-confidential
summaries for apparent consumption and inventory, we recall that we have found above that the
non-confidential summary for apparent consumption is inconsistent with Articles 6.5.1 and
12.4.1.
126 We fail to see how considering another insufficient non-confidential summary together
with the summary at issue here would serve to permit a reasonable understanding of the
confidential information in question.
7.2.6 Conclusion
7.53. In light of the above, we conclude that the non-confidential summaries of confidential
information concerning production capacity, output, sales volume, inventory, pre-tax profits,
number of employees, productivity, and cash flow permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the confidential information at issue, and thus were consistent with Article 6.5.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement.
7.54. However, with respect to the non-confidential summaries of confidential information
concerning apparent consumption, return on investment, salary, and sales-to-output ratio, we
conclude that these do not permit a reasonable und erstanding of the substance of the confidential
information at issue, and accordingly, we find that China failed to comply with the requirements of
Articles 6.5.1 and 12.4.1 with respect to these four non-confidential summaries in the
investigations at issue.

119 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 40-41.
120 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 41.
121 See for instance US second written submission, para. 17.
122 China's first written submission, para. 48.
123 See paras. 7.36 and 7.38 (on the horizontal assessment of the trends lines and texts, respectively)
of this Report.
124 Amended petition, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 41.

7.3 Whether MOFCOM disclosed the "essential facts" as required by Article 6.9 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.3.1 Provision at issue
7.55. Article 6.9 provides:
[t]he authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests.
7.3.2 Factual background
7.56. This claim only concerns MOFCOM's AD investigation. In the investigations at issue,
MOFCOM issued final disclosure letters to the individual US respondents, as well as two final
disclosure letters to the US government, purportedly setting out the "basic facts" that would
underpin the final determination. The first letter sent to the US government set out factors upon
which MOFCOM would base its injury determinations in the final determination.
127 The second
letter sent to the US government addressed the AD and CVD rates to be set in the final
determination.128 The final disclosure letters to the US respondents other than the US government
have not been submitted as evidence in this dispute.
7.57. The second letter to the US government provides a narrative description of how MOFCOM
determined normal value, export price, and certain adjustments to normal value and export price.
This description is accompanied by a table setting out company-specific total dumping margins,
and the "all others" residual AD duty rate.
129 The company-specific data is redacted in the second
final disclosure letter to the US government, showing only the "all others" residual AD duty rate of
21.5%.
7.3.3 Arguments of the parties
7.3.3.1 United States
7.58. The United States argues that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by failing to inform the US respondents of all "essential facts" forming the
basis of its decision to apply the AD duties prior to releasing its final determination.130
7.59. The United States contends that MOFCOM should have disclosed data and calculations to US
respondents, including details of any data adjustments or manipulations, bearing upon
determinations of: (i) normal values, (ii) export prices, and (iii) costs of production.
131 The
United States considers that without the data underlying MOFCOM's calculations, the US
respondents were deprived of an understanding of basic information relating to how dumping
margins were determined. The United States adds that without the actual calculations used by
MOFCOM, these respondents could not verify the completeness and accuracy of MOFCOM's
calculations.132 T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r g u e s t h a t C h i n a ' s r e f e r e n c e t o l a n g u a g e i n M O F C O M ' s f i n a l
determination as evidence that MOFCOM disclosed essential facts to US respondents fails to
establish this as a fact, contending that the final determination is conclusory in this regard.133

127 Disclosure of Basic Facts upon which the Industry Injury Determination is based in the AD and CVD
Investigations of Some Cars Originating from the US, 15 April 2011 ("final disclosure (injury)")
(Exhibit USA 10). The Panel notes that China submitted an alternative translation of the final disclosure (injury)
as Exhibit CHN-06.
128 Disclosure of Basic Facts upon which the Dumping Margin and Ad Valorem Subsidy Rate are based in
the Final Determination of the Auto AD and CVD Investigation against the US, 18 April 2011 ("final disclosure
(AD/CVD)") (Exhibit USA-11).
129 Final disclosure (AD/CVD), Exhibit USA-11, p. 25.
130 See for instance US first written submission, para. 47.
132 See for instance US first written submission, fn. 80.
133 See for instance US second written submission, para. 28.

7.60. The United States asserts that it does not have copies of the final disclosure letters sent to
the US respondents in its possession, and contends that it is for China to submit these letters to
the Panel. The United States notes in this regard that these documents are necessarily within
China's possession, following from the normal course of an AD proceeding.
134 Noting China's
concern that submitting these letters to the Panel would result in the unauthorized release of BCI,
the United States argues that the Panel's BCI procedures adequately address such concerns. 135
The United States asks the Panel to infer from China's failure to submit the letters in this dispute
that these letters contain information unfavourable to China's position.136
7.61. At the second Panel meeting, the United States submitted into evidence a letter 137 from
Mercedes-Benz USA to MOFCOM dated 28 April 2011 which, in the US view, demonstrates that
MOFCOM failed to disclose the essential facts to the US respondents. Responding to China's
objection to the submission of this evidence afte r the first Panel meeting, the United States draws
the Panel's attention to paragraph 8 of the Panel's working procedures, which allows for the
submission of evidence after the first Panel meetin g for the purposes of rebuttal. Specifically, the
United States contends that the Mercedes Benz USA letter rebuts China's assertion that MOFCOM's
final disclosures to the US respondents disclosed essential facts within the meaning of
Article 6.9.
138
7.3.3.2 China
7.62. China contends that it is for a complaining party to provide adequate evidence and legal
argument tying alleged facts to a claim, in the absence of which the burden cannot shift to the
responding party.
139 China argues that as the United States claims that the final disclosures sent
by MOFCOM to the US respondents were incons istent with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, it is for the United States, as compla inant, to provide proof of these allegedly flawed
disclosures to the Panel. 140 China submits that the United States has not adduced any evidence
showing the alleged deficiencies in the final disclosures sent by MOFCOM to the US respondents.141
China notes in this respect that the United States has previously submitted final disclosures into
evidence in other disputes.
142
7.63. China asserts that the record contains evid ence that MOFCOM did make such disclosures of
essential facts, drawing the Panel's attention to a statement to this effect in the final
determination.
143 In China's view, data underlying dumping margin calculations may or may not
constitute essential facts, depending on their overall significance to the findings and
determinations reached by an IA. Calculations, in contrast, constitute the "consideration" of facts
for the purposes of Article 6.9, and thus, for China, fall outside the scope of Article 6.9.144
7.64. China objects to the US submission into evidence of the letter from Mercedes-Benz USA to
MOFCOM dated 28 April 2011 at the second Panel m eeting. In China's view, the timing of this
submission infringes its due process rights. In this regard, China points to paragraphs 6 and 8 of
the Panel's working procedures, which China asserts establish the rule that each party must
submit factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first Panel meeting. China contends
that the United States cannot submit this letter as a rebuttal to the contention that MOFCOM's final

134 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel questions Nos. 27.a and 27.b.
135 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 15.
136 In the view of the United States, such an adverse inference would be consistent with the position
taken by China in other disputes relating to the non-di sclosure of certain data and calculations underlying
dumping margins. See US comments on China's response to Panel questions Nos. 27.a and 27.b.
137 Mercedes-Benz comment on MOFCOM final disclosur e, Exhibit USA-20. Exhibit USA-20 contains the
original Chinese version of the letter and a partial translation in English. At our request, the United States
submitted a full English translation of the Chinese versio n as Comments of Mercedes-Benz on the U.S. Portion
of the Final Disclosure in Imported Auto AD and CVD Investigations, Exhibit USA-21. We note that Exhibit USA-
20, the original Chinese version, is dated 28 April 2011. Exhibit USA-21 is however dated 28 April 2013. We
assume "2013" is a typographical error.
138 See for instance US response to Panel question No. 28.
139 See for instance China's opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 17.
140 See for instance China's response to Panel questions Nos. 27.a and 27.b.
141 China's second written submission, para. 34.
142 China points to the proceedings in the China – Broiler Products dispute. See China's response to
Panel questions Nos. 27.a and 27.b.
143 See for instance China's response to Panel question No. 6.a.
144 China's response to Panel question No. 5.

disclosures to the US respondents contained the essential facts, as China never argued before the
Panel that the substance of those final disclosures satisfied Article 6.9. In China's view, the burden
of proof never shifted so as to require it to make such a substantive argument.145
7.3.4 Arguments of the third parties
7.65. The European Union contends that the actual data and calculations used to establish
dumping margins constitute "essential facts" within the meaning of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. The European Union observes that such data and calculations are both material to an
IA's final decision and form an important component of any final determination. 146 Further, the
European Union submits that without access to such data, affected exporters cannot check an IA's
methodology and calculations for errors. The European Union adds in this regard that even
seemingly small errors can lead to serious distortions of dumping margins.
147
7.66. Japan argues that the Article 6.9 disclosure obligation applies to facts "related to" the
existence of the dumping margin, and includes transaction-specific price and adjustment data
developed and used by an IA to establish a dumping margin.
148 In this regard, Japan notes that
disclosure of the finally-calculated normal value an d export price would be insufficient to allow an
interested party a fair opportunity to prepare and present their defence.149
7.67. Saudi Arabia observes that "essential facts", which may vary according to the factual
circumstances of a dispute, must in all cases include facts relating to the requisite elements for the
imposition of definitive measures, which necessarily include facts relating to the existence of
dumping, injury and causation.
150 Saudi Arabia submits in this regard that essential facts should
encompass not only the facts that support the fina l decision reached by the IA but also the facts
necessary to ascertain "the process of analysis and decision-making" by an IA in reaching that
decision.151
7.68. Turkey submits that the actual data and calculations used to establish dumping margins, in
addition to those facts related to injury to th e domestic industry and the causal link between
subject imports and such injury, constitute "essent ial facts" within the meaning of Article 6.9 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 152 Turkey notes that the Article 6.9 disclosure obligation, which in
most cases will include company-specific confidential information, should only be made to the
company whose confidential data forms the subject of the disclosure.153
7.3.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.69. The question before us is whether MOFCOM disclosed "essential facts" within the meaning of
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the US respondents in the AD investigation at issue.
Article 6.9 does not require the disclosure of the IA's reasoning; nor does it require the disclosure
of all facts, but rather of "essential" facts.
154 In resolving this issue, we will thus have to consider
the meaning of the term "essential facts".
7.70. Article 6.9 requires an IA to notify interested parties, before a final determination is made,
of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply
definitive measures. Article 6.9 is silent on the form that such a disclosure should take, but makes
clear that this disclosure must occur before the IA issues its final determination. 155 In the
investigation at issue, MOFCOM issued letters to US respondent companies and to the US
government which China contends disclosed the essential facts. There is no dispute that those
letters were provided prior to the final determination. Thus, the only question before us is the

145 See for instance China's comments on the US response to Panel question No. 28.
148 Japan's third party submission, para. 11.
149 Japan's third party submission, para. 13.
150 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 11.
151 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 12.
152 Turkey's third party submission, paras. 26-28.
153 Turkey's third party submission, para. 29.
154 Panel Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina) ,
para. 7.148.
155 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.797.

adequacy of the disclosure, that is, whether the contents of those letters set out the relevant
"essential facts".
7.71. In addressing this question, we recall that prior panels have found that the term "essential
facts" within the meaning of Article 6.9 refers to the body of facts essential to the determinations
that must be made by the IA before it can decide whether to apply definitive measures. In order to
apply definitive measures at the conclusion of AD investigations, an IA must find three key
elements: (i) dumping; (ii) injury; and (iii) a causal link. Therefore, the "essential facts" underlying
the findings and conclusions relating to these el ements form the basis for the decision to apply
definitive measures, and must be disclosed.
156 We also note that the panel in EC – Salmon
(Norway) stated that the "essential facts" are the:
body of facts essential to the determinations that must be made by the IA before it
can decide whether to apply definitive measures. That is, they are the facts necessary
to the process of analysis and decision-mak ing by the IA, not only those that support
the decision ultimately reached.157
7.72. What constitutes essential facts must therefore be understood in light of the content of the
findings needed to satisfy the substantive obligations with respect to the application of definitive
measures under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as we ll as the factual circumstances of each case.
In the context of assessing what data constitutes essential facts for the purposes of a dumping
determination, we recall the views of the panel in China – Broiler Products , which concluded that
such data must relate to the elements set fort h in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
including the determination of normal value and export price, the determination of constructed
normal value and constructed export price, if relevant, and the fair comparison between these
normal values and export prices.
158 The panel in China – Broiler Products further concluded that
the formula used by MOFCOM to calculate dumping margins calculations, as distinct from any
internal work product of the IA containing dumping margin calculations or mathematical
determinations, constitutes an essential fact within the meaning of Article 6.9.159
7.73. We agree with these views. Like the panel in China – Broiler Products , we consider that
knowing the formula that an IA applied in dumping calculations is as important to a foreign
exporter as knowing the domestic and export sales transactions that were taken into consideration
in that calculation.
160 In our view, a foreign exporter would be left at least partly in the dark in
terms of how dumping margins were calculated by an IA without knowing the particular formula
employed in the calculation. In this regard, we see a formula, which in our view is a fact within the
meaning of Article 6.9, as being different from the application of such a formula in a given
investigation, which represents an aspect of the IA's reasoning. We will therefore evaluate the US
claim on the basis of this distinction.
7.74. The United States asserts that essential facts were not disclosed to the US respondents in
the AD investigation underlying this dispute. In this regard, we note that there seems to be no
dispute between the parties that MOFCOM actually sent final disclosures to the US respondents. 161
Rather, the issue before us is whether these disclosures conformed to the substantive
requirements of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement. The United States contends that they
did not, and are therefore inconsistent with Article 6.9, whereas China maintains that the
United States has not made a prima facie case of a violation of Article 6.9.
7.75. It is important to note that we have not been provided with copies of the final disclosures
sent to the US respondent companies in this dispute. Those letters are presumably in China's

156 Panel Reports, Mexico – Olive Oil, para. 7.110; China – GOES, para. 7.652; China – Broiler Products,
para. 7.86.
157 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.807.
158 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.89.
159 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , paras. 7.91–7.92 (distinguishing from Panel Report, China –
X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.420).
160 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.91.
161 Evidence submitted by both part ies corroborates this. See Comments of Mercedes-Benz on the U.S.
Portion of the Final Disclosure in Imported Auto AD and CVD Investigations, Exhibit USA-21. p. 3; and final
determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 28- 30. China indicated in its response to Panel questions that MOFCOM
sent final disclosures to GM USA, Chrysler USA, Mercedes-Benz USA, BMW USA, Honda USA, and Ford USA.
See China's response to Panel question No. 6.

possession, as they were prepared by MOFCOM in the course of the AD investigation. However,
China, despite having been requested to do so by the Panel, declined to submit them in evidence,
resting on its view that the burden of proof lies with the United States, and has not been satisfied
in this regard, and that the United States has therefore failed to make a prima facie case in
support of its claim and there is nothing for China to rebut.
7.76. We recall that the general principles applicable to the allocation of the burden of proof in
WTO dispute settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO
Agreement must assert and prove its claim. It is thus clear that the United States, as complainant,
bears the burden of demonstrating the violations it alleges, both legally and as a matter of fact. 162
However, we also recall that it is generally for each party asserting a fact to provide proof
thereof.
163
7.77. Certainly, submission of the final disclosur es sent to the US respondent companies by the
United States would have allowed us to review those letters to determine whether the
United States had discharged its burden of proof in this regard. However, the United States asserts
that it does not have copies of these disclosures in its possession, an assertion which is undisputed
by China. The United States submits that this follows naturally from the normal course of an AD
investigation, in which an IA sends final disclosures (which may contain confidential information)
directly to each respondent company concerned. Indeed, based on our understanding of events,
this is what MOFCOM did in this case.
164 In these circumstances, we accept that the United States
cannot produce copies of MOFCOM’s final disclosures to the US respondent companies for our
review in this dispute.165 The United States submitted the final disclosure which was sent to the US
government as a party to the investigation. We do not believe that the United States is precluded
from making a claim in this regard. The United States appears to have based its claim on the
contents of the disclosure letters sent to the US government, and its understanding of the contents
of the disclosure letters to the US respondent companies, which are not in its possession. Thus, in
our view, the United States has made a claim based on an assertion of law and fact with respect to
the contents of the disclosure letters which is supported by facts, and which, in our view, China
must rebut in order to prevail.
166
7.78. In response to the US claim, China relies on its view that the United States failed to make a
prima facie case, and therefore there is nothing for China to rebut. China's sole affirmative
assertion with respect to this claim is that MOFCOM did in fact send final disclosures to the US
respondents as required under Article 6.9. In supp ort of this, China points to the statement in the
final determination that:
MOFCOM, the investigating authority disclosed and explained essential facts to
American Government and all respondents on the basis of which MOFCOM calculate

163 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
164 That the United States has previously submitted copies of final disclosures before other panels is, in
our view, immaterial to whether the US failure to submit the disclosures at issue in these proceedings is
justified or reasonable.
165 T h a t t h e U n i t e d S t at e s w as a b l e t o o b t ai n t hese disclosure documents from private companies in
prior panel proceedings cannot somehow bind the United St ates to do so in future disputes. We consider that
the ability of the United States to obtain copies of these documents is contingent on companies agreeing to
disclose these documents to it.
166 We note that, addressing the intersection between the parties' burden of proof and their duty to
collaborate, the panel in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel stated that "[a]nother incidental rule to the burden
of proof is the requirement for collaboration of the partie s in the presentation of the facts and evidence to the
panel and especially the role of the respondent in that process". In this context, the panel continued, "the most
important result of the rule of collaboration appears to be that the adversary is obligated to provide the
tribunal with relevant documents which are in its sole po ssession". However, in the view of the panel, "[t]his
obligation does not arise until the claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has actually produced
some prima facie evidence in suppo rt of its case". Panel Report, Argentina –Textiles and Apparel , para. 6.40.
Finally, in accepting evidence submitted by one party in the form of copies rather than the originals, which
were not in its possession, the panel observed that "[b] efore an international tribunal, parties do have a duty
to collaborate in doing their best to submit to the adjudi catory body all the evidence in their possession." Ibid.,
para. 6.58. In the circumstances of these proceedings, we see no reason to conclude that the United States
has done less than its best in order to provide the Pa nel with the evidence needed to assess the conformity
with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement of the co mpany-specific disclosure letters sent by MOFCOM to
US respondents.

[sic.] dumping margins of all companies before the final determination of this case, as
well as provided opportunities of comments and opinions to all interested parties.167
While this statement factually shows that company-specific disclosure letters were sent to the US
respondents, it does not shed light on the issue before us, namely whether or not such disclosures
were substantively consistent with the requirements of Article 6.9. In any event, we note that
China has not attempted to demonstrate to the Panel the substantive consistency of such
disclosure letters with the requirements of Article 6.9 on the basis that the burden has not shifted
to it to do so.

7.79. The United States submitted a letter from Mercedes-Benz USA to MOFCOM dated
28 April 2011 into evidence at the second Panel meeting, which the United States characterises as
rebuttal evidence to China's assertion that MOFCOM's final disclosures to the US respondents
contained the essential facts within the meaning of Article 6.9. China contends that, the
United States having failed to make a prima facie c a s e o f v i o l a t i o n , t h e b u r d e n o f m a k i n g a
substantive showing that MOFCOM's final disclosures contained essential facts within the meaning
of Article 6.9 never fell upon China. Therefore, in China's view, the Mercedes-Benz USA letter
cannot be characterized as rebuttal evidence, and may not be taken into consideration by the
Panel. We thus must resolve whether to accept this letter as evidence.
7.80. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, we consider it appropriate to accept the Mercedes-
Benz USA letter. While we acknowledge that China did not affirmatively argue that the substance
of MOFCOM's final disclosures to the US responde nts satisfied the requirements of Article 6.9,
which leaves in some question whether the letter may be characterized formally as rebuttal
evidence, we nevertheless consider the letter to be relevant to the issues before us, and therefore
should be considered, provided that doing so does not infringe on China's due process rights in this
dispute.
7.81. We note that nothing in the DSU or our working procedures precludes us from accepting
evidence after the first Panel meeting.
168 The DSU does not address the timing of submission of
evidence.169 Nor do our working procedures, which do address the timing of submission of
evidence by the parties, establish inflexible barrier s to our ability to accept evidence, even if such
evidence is not submitted in compliance with the procedures. 170 While our working procedures are
to be respected, the principal goal of those procedures is to enable us to resolve the dispute
presented to us on the basis of an objective eval uation of relevant evidence, while respecting the
due process rights of the parties involved. Thus, the particular circumstances must be considered
in deciding whether we will consider evidence which is not submitted in conformity with the normal
timeline provided for in our working procedures. Indeed, this is clear in the working procedures
themselves, which provide that, while factual evidence should be submitted no later than during
the first meeting, exceptions shall be granted upon a showing of good cause, in which case the
other party must be given an opportunity for comment. This is, in our view, the situation here.
7.82. While the Mercedes-Benz USA letter was no t submitted prior to, or even at, the first
meeting with the Panel, we recall that we made several efforts between the first and second Panel
meetings to obtain from the parties copies of MOFCOM's final disclosures to the US respondents.
The United States could not provide them, as it did not possess copies of these disclosures
171, and
China declined to do so. While this letter was submitted at our second meeting, later than provided
for in our working procedures, this was the first opportunity after it became clear that the most
relevant evidence, the final disclosures themselves, would not be produced. Indeed, it seems to us
that the letter, which is less probative than the fi nal disclosures would have been with respect to
the issue of the consistency of the final disclosures with Article 6.9, might not have been submitted
into evidence at all, but for China's refusal to submit the final disclosures to us in the course of
these proceedings.

167 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 30.
168 Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , para. 6.125 (upheld by Appellate Body Report,
Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 161).
169 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 79.
170 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 80.
171 US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 17.

7.83. Following the US submission of the Mercedes Benz USA letter, we specifically afforded China
the opportunity, after the second Panel meeting, to submit copies of MOFCOM's final disclosures to
the US respondents into evidence. This would have enabled China to rebut the letter from
Mercedes-Benz USA to MOFCOM. China declined to do so, maintaining its position that it was for
the United States as complainant to adduce this evidence. We do not consider it would be
appropriate for us to make a decision on the basis that the United States did not produce evidence
that was not in its possession. China recognizes the Panel's right under Article 13 of the DSU to
seek information from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, citing the
Appellate Body report in Japan – Agricultural Products II , China argues that the Panel should not
use this right so as to rule in favour of the United States, which China argues has failed to make a
prima facie case.
172 In our view, China's objection is misplaced. We note that the letter at issue
was not submitted by the United States in response to a request by the Panel under Article 13 of
the DSU. Rather, the United States submitted this letter at its own initiative. Having accepted this
letter into evidence, the Panel of course used it in its assessment of the US claim. Finally, China
clearly had an adequate opportunity to comment on the substance of this letter, and the US
arguments concerning it. Indeed, China made detailed arguments in this regard in its responses to
Panel questions and its comments on the US responses to Panel questions following the second
Panel meeting.
173 Thus, it is clear to us that China's due process rights have not been adversely
affected by our consideration of the letter in resolving this claim.174 Before turning to a substantive
assessment of the Mercedes-Benz USA letter, we would underline that our decision to accept this
letter into evidence is based solely on the circumstances presented in this dispute. There may well
be other cases where circumstances are different and accepting evidence submitted during a
panel's second meeting with the parties would not be appropriate.
7.84. Having accepted the Mercedes-Benz USA letter into evidence, we note that this letter shows
that Mercedes-Benz USA objected to the substance of the final disclosure to it, maintaining that it
was insufficient. The letter states in relevant part:
[f]inally, [Mercedes-Benz USA] reiterates MOFCOM did not provide sufficient
information in the final disclosure. [Mercedes-Benz USA] cannot fully understand the
related measures and methodology MOFCOM adopted in the final disclosure.
Regarding the sufficiency of the information disclosure, MOFCOM says:
“The investigating authority determines that the investigating authority has already
fully disclosed all the facts including data, source of data and detailed calculation in
the disclosure after the preliminary determination. The investigating authority does
not accept this position”.
However, the actual situation was not as described above. The insufficiency of the
information disclosure appeared most obvious in the adjustment MOFCOM made to
the indirect sales costs and profits in the calculation of China export price. This is the
most important adjustment to the data [Mercedes-Benz USA] submitted, a key factor
leading to the dumping margin. MOFCOM failed to explain in detail how it generated
the margins in the final disclosure and did not provide the calculation steps, detailed
descriptions, formulas and program language, nor did MOFCOM describe the relevant
calculation process in the final disclosure. Though [Mercedes-Benz USA] made great
efforts, MOFCOM still has not taken into account the data it provided or put forward a
detailed explanation of the information relevant to the margin calculation. Therefore,
MOFCOM did not provide meaningful disclosure to this most important adjustment
item.
175 (original emphasis)
This clearly shows that Mercedes-Benz USA was of the view that MOFCOM's final disclosure of
essential facts with respect to it was inadequate, and objected to the final disclosure on that basis,
which objection MOFCOM dismissed. While this does not demonstrate, in itself, that the disclosure

172 China's response to Panel questions Nos. 27.a and 27.
173 China's response to Panel question No. 28.
174 We note that the Appellate Body in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) found that the submission by a
complainant of evidence appended to its comments on the respondent's responses did not a priori compromise
that respondent's due process ri ghts. See Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) ,
para. 161.
175 Comments of Mercedes-Benz on the U.S. Portion of the Final Disclosure in Imported Auto AD and
CVD Investigations, Exhibit USA-21, p. 3.

was inconsistent with the requirements of Article 6. 9, it does lend support to the US claim, and is
unrebutted by any evidence put forward by China.

7.85. On the basis of the above, we find that the United States has made a prima facie case that
MOFCOM failed to disclose the essential facts to the US respondents. China has made no argument
and provided no evidence, other than the reference to the final determination, that would suggest
that MOFCOM's disclosures to the US respondents were, in fact, consistent with the requirements
of Article 6.9. In light of this, and in addition, taking account of the Mercedes-Benz USA letter, we
therefore conclude that China has failed to rebut the US prima facie case. Accordingly, we find that
the United States has shown that China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9.
176
7.3.6 Conclusion
7.86. For the reasons set forth above, we find that China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in th at MOFCOM failed to disclose essential facts to US respondents
prior to making its final determination in the AD investigation at issue.
7.4 Determination of "residual" AD and CVD rates
7.4.1 Factual background
7.87. MOFCOM initiated the AD and CVD investigations at issue on 6 November 2009. It published
AD
177 and CVD178 notices of initiation, posted them, together with the relevant registration forms,
on its website 179 and transmitted them to the US Embassy in Beijing. 180 In the notices, MOFCOM
provided basic information concerning the investigations, indicated that any interested party –
including any US exporters – that wished to participate in the investigations was required to
register with MOFCOM by 26 November 2009, and stated that failure to participate and provide the
information requested by MOFCOM could result in a determination based on facts available.
181 The
notices of initiation asked foreign exporters to provide information on the volume and value of
their exports of the subject product to China during the POI. 182 The registration forms183, attached
to the notices, also asked foreign exporters to provide contact information for their companies,
and information on the volume and value of their sales of automobiles exported to China during
the POI.
7.88. MOFCOM received AD and CVD registration forms from seven US exporters (three of which
were named in the petition): General Motors USA, Chrysler USA, Mercedes-Benz USA, BMW USA,
Honda USA, Mitsubishi and Ford USA. MOFCOM se nt AD and CVD questionnaires to these seven
respondents on 9 December 2009.
184 One of the seven, Mitsubishi, withdrew from MOFCOM's
investigations on 28 December 2009. 185 The remaining respondents submitted their responses to
the questionnaires on 15 and 29 January 2010.186
7.89. In its preliminary AD determination, MOFCOM determined the following individual dumping
margins for five of the six remaining respondent s: General Motors USA, 9.9%; Chrysler USA,
8.8%; Mercedes-Benz, 2.7%; BMW USA, 2.0%; and Honda USA, 4.4%. 187 MOFCOM also

176 Our conclusion is not based on inferences drawn from the positions purportedly taken by China, or
from the actions of the United States in other disputes relating to the non-disclosure of certain data and
calculations underlying dumping margins, which we consider immaterial to our resolution of this claim. Rather,
our conclusion is based on the facts and evidence that ha ve been put before us by th e parties in this dispute,
the requirements of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the application of general principles
regarding the allocation of the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement.
177 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06.
178 CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07.
179 See AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p.2; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4.
180 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 5.
181 See AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p.3; and CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4.
182 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4.
183 See AD registration form, Exhibit CHN-09; CVD registration form, Exhibit CHN-10.
184 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 7-12.
185 See Mitsubishi withdrawal letter (AD), Exhibit CHN-03; Mitsubishi withdrawal letter (CVD), Exhibit
CHN-04.
186 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 9.
187 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 60. MOFCOM did not determine an individual dumping
margin for Ford USA.

determined the following subsidy rates for th ese respondents: General Motors USA, 12.9%;
Chrysler USA, 6.2%; Mercedes-Benz USA, 0%; BMW USA, 0%; Honda USA, 0%, and Ford USA,
0%.
188
7.90. MOFCOM preliminarily determined a dumping margin of 21.5% for "all other" US companies,
which had not registered with MOFCOM in the AD investigation (and as a consequence, had not
filed a questionnaire response).189 The preliminary determination states that:
[w]ith regard to all other American companies, in accordance with Article 21 of Anti-
dumping Regulation , the investigating authority decides to adopt the facts already
known and the best information available, and applies the dumping margin claimed in
the petition to them.190
MOFCOM preliminarily determined a subsidy rate of 12.9% for "all other" US companies, which had
not registered with MOFCOM in the CVD investigation (and as a consequence, had not filed a
questionnaire response).191 The preliminary determination states that:
[r]egarding all other companies, in accordance with Article 21 of Countervailing
Regulation, the investigating authority decides to adopt facts available, and applied
the ad valorem subsidy rate of General Motors to them.192
7.91. In the final disclosure sent to the US government, MOFCOM redacted the respondent-
specific dumping margins and subsidy rates, and listed only the dumping margin and subsidy rate
for "all others".193 These remained unchanged from the preliminary determination.
7.92. In the final determination, MOFCOM determined lower dumping margins for two companies:
General Motors USA 8.9%; and Honda USA, 4.1%. MOFCOM made no changes to the individual
dumping margins or the individual subsidy rates determined for the other remaining
respondents.194 The dumping margins and subsidy rates determined for individual companies are
not at issue in this dispute. The "all others" dumping margin and subsidy rate were also
unchanged in MOFCOM's final determination.195
7.93. MOFCOM, noting arguments by the US govern ment with respect to the application of facts
available to determine the "all others" dumping margin and the use of such facts to determine the
dumping margin for Ford USA, stated the following in its final determination:
[a]fter the preliminary determination, the U.S. Government claimed in its comments
that, the investigating authority adopted adverse data to determine the dumping
margin of other American companies in the preliminary determination without
providing the reasons, and did not explain ho w the exporters did not cooperate in this
investigation. The U.S. Government requested the investigating authority to apply
weighted average duty rates to the companies which were not uncooperative clearly in
this investigation.
In this regard, the investigating authority finds that: before and after the initiation,
the investigating authority had informed all exporters or producers listed in the
petition, and also required the U.S. Government to inform all exporters or producers.
The public notice of initiation can also be obtained on the website of MOFCOM. After
the initiation, the investigating authority set the procedures of registration for
participating in the investigation; meanwhile, the investigating authority also issued
the investigation questionnaire to the companies filing for participating in this
investigation. Besides, the investigation questionnaire can also be obtained by public

188 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 88.
189 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 60.
190 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 59.
191 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 88.
192 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 88.
193 Final disclosure (AD/CVD), Exhibit USA-11, pp. 25, 41.
194 Since MOFCOM did not calculate an individual dump ing margin for Ford USA, this company's exports
to China were subjected to the residual duty rate of 21.5%. This, however, is not at issue in this dispute.
195 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 86, 127.

on the website of MOFCOM. The investigating authority holds that within the best of
its abilities, all exporters have obtained the opportunities to cooperate in the
investigation through the aforesaid procedures; any exporter willing to cooperate in
the investigation should have made the proper response. As to any exporter who did
not make clear response, the investigating authority may certainly and reasonably
believe that it did not have the intention of cooperation, and determined the dumping
margin in accordance with the best information available rather than the adverse
information. Therefore, the investigating authority decides not to accept the claims of
the U.S. Government and maintain its finding in the preliminary determination.
After the preliminary determination, Ford Company claimed in its comments that,
although it did not export during the POI, the investigating authority shall determine
the dumping margin for it due to its cooperation in the investigation. Upon
examination, the investigating authority holds that, the dumping margin shall be
established based on the comparison between the normal value and the export price,
and since Ford Company did not export during the POI, there was no export price for
it. Therefore, this claim has no factual and legal basis. The investigating authority
does not accept this claim. When complying with conditions, Ford Company may apply
to the investigating authority for the new exporter review in order to obtain an
individual duty rate.
196
7.94. MOFCOM, in reaffirming the "all others" subsidy rate in its final determination, noted that
the United States submitted comments on that rate, stated that it had responded to those
arguments in the dumping determination, and did not repeat that discussion.197
7.4.2 Introduction
7.95. The United States challenges the "all others" rates imposed by China in the AD and the CVD
investigations at issue in these proceedings under Articles 6.8, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2 and paragraph 1
of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, and 22.5 of the SCM
Agreement. Before addressing the parties' argument s and resolving those claims, we find it useful
to clarify the terminology we have used in referring to the duty rates at issue.
7.96. Both parties refer to the duty rates at issu e as the "all others" rate s. However, we find the
term "all others" unclear as used in this context. We note that an IA may determine various duty
rates for different exporters or foreign producers in an AD (or CVD) investigation. The general rule
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement calls for the determination of an individual duty rate for each
known foreign producer or exporter, up to the amount of the dumping margins calculated in
accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement for each of them. Some of these dumping margins may
be calculated based entirely or in part on facts available, depending on whether or not an
individual producer or exporter provided the in formation required to calculate an individual
dumping margin for it in the investigation. In addition, an IA may limit the number of individually
calculated dumping margins in certain circumstances, pursuant to Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In these cases, the IA may nonethel ess apply an AD duty to the remaining known
foreign producers or exporters, which it did no t individually examine ("unexamined exporters").
The rate that may be applied is limited by the cap calculated pursuant to Article 9.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. This rate is commonly referred to as an "all others" rate, as it applies to "all
other" producers known to the IA, but which were not individually examined.
7 . 9 7 . H o w e v e r , a n I A m a y a l s o w i s h t o d e t e r m i n e a n A D d u t y r a t e w h i c h c o u l d b e a p p l i e d t o
exporters or foreign producers that either were no t known to the IA (for whatever reason) or did
not exist at the time of the investigation, in the event that such enterprises commence exporting
the product subject to the investigation to the investigating country at a later date while a
measure is in force. It is such a duty rate that is at issue in this dispute. In these proceedings, and
in several previous disputes in which similar duty rates were considered, parties have used the
term "all others" rate to refer to the rates applic able to companies that either were not known to
the IA (for whatever reason) or did not exist at th e time of the investigation. We find the use of

196 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 83-85. We note that the final determination repeats similar
language contained in the final disclosure sent to the US government. See final disclosure (AD/CVD), Exhibit
USA-11, p. 24.
197 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 126.

the same term to refer to AD duty rates applied to groups of exporters or foreign producers in two
distinct and separate situations to be potentially confusing. Therefore, in order to avoid such
confusion, we consider it more appropriate to refer to the rate applied in situations under
Articles 6.10 and 9.4 as a "limited examination" ra te and to refer to the rate applied to exporters
that either were not known to the IA (for whatever reason) or did not exist at the time of the
investigation, which is the situation in this dispute, as a "residual duty" rate. There is no equivalent
to Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement in the SCM Agreement, so it is not clear
whether or how a "limited examination rate" would apply in a CVD context. However, the
possibility of a residual duty rate is equally likely to arise in a CVD investigation, as it did in these
investigations. Thus, for the sake of clarity and consistency, we will also use the term "residual
duty" rate in respect of the CVD rate at issue in this dispute.
7.98. We also find it useful to underline at the outset that the US claims regarding the residual AD
and CVD rates at issue do not concern the permissibility in general of imposing residual duties with
respect to exporters that either were not known to the IA (for whatever reason) or did not exist at
the time of the investigation. The United States makes no claim or argument suggesting that
residual duties are in general not allowed under the Agreements.
198 Rather, its claims concern the
way in which MOFCOM determined the residual AD and CVD rates applied in the investigations at
issue.
7.99. We agree with the general understanding of the parties that residual duty rates are
permitted in AD and CVD cases. In our view, Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, which require that IAs undertake a review for the purpose of
determining individual margins of dumping or subsidy rates for any exporters or foreign producers
in the exporting country in question that did no t export the subject product to the investigating
country during the POI, strongly support the conclu sion that residual duties are generally allowed
under both Agreements. While no duties may be levied until such reviews are carried out, these
provisions allow the authorities in the investigating country to request guarantees to ensure that,
if the review results in a determination of dumping or subsidization with respect to the new
exporter, duties can be levied retroactively to the date of initiation of the review. In the absence of
residual duties, the importing country would have no basis on which to establish a level for such
guarantees, and thus, the provisions of the Agreements in this regard would be inutile.
7.100. We also consider that residual duties serve an important policy objective, namely, ensuring
the effectiveness of anti-dumping and countervailing measures which the WTO rules allow its
Members to impose provided they determine through the appropriate investigative process that
the conditions set forth in the Anti-Dumping or the SCM Agreements are satisfied. We note that
imposing residual duties may allow an IA to preclude the circumvention of AD and CVD rates
imposed following an investigation. This is because, in the absence of residual duties, exporters
that refrained from making themselves known to the IA during an investigation, as well as those
that started exporting the subject product to the investigating country following the imposition of
duties, could access the market of that country free of AD or CVD duties, thus undermining their
effectiveness. Moreover, existing exporters may consider that there is no incentive for them to try
to cooperate with the investigating authorities of the importing country, if residual duties were not
permitted under the Agreements. Obviously, such a result would frustrate the objective of anti-
dumping and countervailing measures, to offset the injurious effects of dumped and subsidized
imports on the domestic industry in the importing country.
7.4.3 Determination of the residual AD duty ra te: Alleged violations of Articles 6.8, 6.9,
12.2 and 12.2.2 and Paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.4.3.1 Provisions at issue
7.101. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:

198 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 22:
China cannot brush off its responsibility to comply with the covered agreements. The
United States agrees that investigating authorities may exercise discretion in calculating all
others rates for unknown export ers, but as stated by the China – GOES panel, "this discretion
should not extend to acting inconsistently with the express terms of" the covered agreements."
(footnote omitted)

[i]n cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be
made on the basis of the facts available. Th e provisions of Annex II shall be observed
in the application of this paragraph.
7.102. Paragraph 1 of Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads:
[a]s soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating
authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested party,
and the manner in which that information should be structured by the interested party
in its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is aware that if
information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to
make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in
the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.
7.103. Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the disclosure of "the essential facts
under consideration". Its text is set out in preceding sections of this Report.
199
7.104. Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires public notice of "the findings and
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material" in an AD investigation as
follows:
[p]ublic notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether
affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8,
of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive
anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available
through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. All such
notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of
which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties
known to have an interest therein.
The obligation in Article 12.2 in relation to a final determination is further elaborated in
subparagraph Article 12.2.2, as follows:

[a] public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a
separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers,
and the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.
7.4.3.2 Arguments of the parties
7.4.3.2.1 United States
7.105. The United States argues that MOFCOM erre d by determining the residual AD duty rate on
the basis of facts available and thereby violated Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
paragraph 1 of its Annex II. The United States contends that following the initiation of the AD
investigation at issue, MOFCOM sent questionnaires only to the exporters that the petitioners had
identified in the petition. It did not make a further effort to identify other exporters.
200 The

200 Initially, the United States argued that MOFCOM had sent questionnaires only to the producers
identified in the petition and that it had not attempted to identify whether any other US producer of the like
product existed. It also argued that, as in the investigation underlying the China – GOES dispute, no other US
exporters of automobiles existed at the time of the AD investigation at issue here. See for instance US first

United States acknowledges that MOFCOM also no tified the US Embassy of the initiation and
requested that it notify the relevant US exporters, but argues that any notification steps that
MOFCOM may have taken in reaching out to such US exporters are irrelevant because, as a matter
of logic, the unknown US exporters were not noti fied of the information required and cannot be
said to have engaged in any of the acts identified in Article 6.8 as justifying the use of facts
available. In any event, the United States conten ds that the notification steps taken by MOFCOM
were insufficient to justify the use of facts available.
201 In this regard, the United States submits
that posting the notice of initiation on MOFCOM's website does not provide sufficient notice to an
exporter unless that exporter actively reviews that website. Second, placing the notice in a public
reading room, with no additional targeted communication, is even less likely to give adequate
notice. Third, as noted by the Appellate Body in China – GOES, an embassy is not obliged to make
its exporters aware of an investigation.
202 Whether or not US exporters other than those identified
in the petition came forward to participate in the investigation is, in the view of the United States,
beside the point because the fact remains that the residual duty rate imposed by MOFCOM did
apply to US exporters that did not register or were otherwise unknown to MOFCOM.
7.106. The United States claims that under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the pre-condition to
resort to facts available with respect to an export e r i s t o g i v e t h a t e x p o r t e r a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
provide the information required of it. Use of facts available can only be justified if the exporter
then engages in any of the behaviours set out in Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
namely refusing access to or otherwise not providing information that is necessary to the
investigation, or otherwise significantly impeding the investigation. In this investigation, no US
exporter was found to have engaged in any of these acts. In fact, the US exporters to which the
contested residual rate applied were non-existent. Hence, it was logically impossible to inform a
non-existent exporter of the information required by the IA and for that exporter to then fail to
cooperate with the IA. Therefore, argues the United States, MOFCOM's use of facts available in the
determination of the residual AD duty rate was in consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In
respect of this claim, the United States finds the reasoning of the panel in China – GOES to be
persuasive and requests that this Panel follow the same approach. The US claim under Article 6.8
and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to MOFCOM's use of facts
available in the calculation of the contested residual AD duty rate; it does not extend to MOFCOM's
choice of facts available.
203
7.107. Further, the United States argues that in applying facts available in the determination of
the contested residual AD duty rate, MOFCOM also violated certain procedural obligations set forth
in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. First, the Un ited States contends that MOFCOM violated
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to disclose the essential facts underlying the
determination of the residual AD duty rate. Spec ifically, the United States submits that MOFCOM
failed to disclose essential facts with regard to: (i) whether the US exporters refused access to
necessary information or significantly impeded the investigation; (ii) why a 21.5% residual AD
duty rate was deemed to be appropriate; and (iii) the facts underpinning and details of the
calculation of the 21.5% rate.
204 The United States notes that the MOFCOM's explanation in the
final determination was limited to a cursory explanation in one sentence, which also appeared in
its preliminary determination and the final disclosure. The lack of sufficient explanation deprived
the investigated US exporters of their right to defend their interests.
7.108. Second, the United States asserts that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 12.2 and
12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it fa iled to explain the factual and legal bases of
its decision to apply facts available in the determ ination of the residual AD duty rate. In this
regard, the United States refers to the factual and legal bases for MOFCOM's use of facts available

written submission, paras. 63-64. However, it did not pursue these arguments later in the proceedings, and
the record of the investigation clearly shows that MOFCOM did attempt to identify other US exporters and that
four additional producers registered to participate as a result.
202 US second written submission, paras. 41-43.
203 See US response to Panel question No. 32:
The United States is not asking the Panel to make findings that MOFCOM's selection of "adverse
facts available" was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement. See US
response to Panel question No. 32.

pursuant to its regulations as relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons that led
to the imposition of final measures within the meaning of Article 12.2.2.205
7.4.3.2.2 China
7.109. China acknowledges that MOFCOM determined a residual AD duty rate based on facts
available, using in this regard the 21.5% dumping margin alleged in the petition. China notes that
the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a particular methodology for the determination of
the residual rate where the IA calculates individu al margins for all foreign exporters subject to an
investigation, as it did in this case, and asserts that this "silence" gives IAs discretion in
determining residual duty rates. Given this "gap " in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, China considers
that Article 6.8 provides a logical basis for the dete rmination of residual duty rates in the situation
of this investigation.
206
7.110. China claims that in the AD investigation at issue, MOFCOM complied with the
requirements of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Annex II in using facts available in
the determination of the residual AD duty rate. It took all the reasonable steps to identify all
exporters of the subject product from the United States. The notice of initiation invited all
interested parties to register for participation in the investigation within 20 days of its publication
and specified that, in the event of non-cooperation, MOFCOM could make its determinations on the
basis of existing materials. The notice was posted on MOFCOM's website and made available in its
public reading room. MOFCOM also asked the US government to inform all US exporters of the
subject product of the initiation of the investigation. MOFCOM subsequently sent questionnaires to
the US exporters identified in the petition, and also to four additional exporters that had registered
for participation by the relevant deadline. In China's view, these steps constituted a reasonable
and comprehensive notification effort, and consequently, MOFCOM was justified in considering as
non-cooperating any US exporters that had failed to register for participation within the 20-day
period and applying a residual duty rate determin ed on the basis of facts available to any exports
f r o m s u c h e x p o r t e r s . C h i n a a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t f o u r U S e x p o r t e r s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e
identified in the petition registered for participation in the investigations at issue underlines the
adequacy of MOFCOM's notification efforts.
207
7.111. China also submits that the logic of applyi ng a residual rate determined on the basis of
facts available to non-cooperating foreign exporters is to encourage cooperation in AD
investigations. China disagrees with the reasoning of the panel in China – GOES , which, China
contends, failed to take into account MOFCOM's reasonable approach in the underlying
investigation, namely that any exporter not responding to the notice of initiation can be treated as
non-cooperating for purposes of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In China's view,
contrary to the reasoning of that panel, "an investigating authority should not be required to
conduct the futile act of continuing to solicit information from an interested party that has, upon
notification of the requirements for participation in an investigation, determined not to
cooperate."
208 China is of the view that provided an IA engages in a reasonable and
comprehensive notification effort, it can treat as non-cooperating any exporter that fails to
participate in the investigation, irrespective of whether such exporter does not exist or exists but
has chosen not to make itself known.
209 In this regard, China notes the finding by the panel in
China – Broiler Products that it would be reasonable for an IA to consider as non-cooperating
exporters that fail to make themselves known following the initiation of an investigation and to
calculate a residual duty rate on the basis of facts available for such exporters.
7.112. As far as the procedural violations alleged by the United States are concerned, China notes
t h a t t h i s c a s e i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m China – GOES . Unlike China – GOES , where the basis of the
determination of the residual rate was unclear, in the AD investigation at issue here it is
abundantly clear that the residual duty rate was based on the dumping margin alleged in the
petition. Therefore, China contends that MOFCOM's final disclosure contained, as required under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, all pe rtinent facts on which the determination of the
residual rate was based. To the extent that the United States argues that the Article 6.9 disclosure

206 China's first written submission, paras. 100-101.
207 China's second written submission, para. 44.
208 China's second written submission, para. 40.
209 China's second written submission, para. 46.

obligation also applies to the IA's reasoning, China disagrees, asserting that the obligation only
applies to facts underlying the decision on the application of definitive measures.
7.113. China also submits that the public notice given by MOFCOM in respect of the residual duty
rate complied with the requirements of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
China argues that the legal and factual bases for MOFCOM's determination of the contested
residual AD duty rate are explained on the record and reflected in MOFCOM's final determination of
which public notice was given. Specifically, China states that the final determination explains that,
following its notification efforts to US exporters, MOFCOM considered as non-cooperating those
producers that failed to register for participation and calculated a residual duty rate for them on
the basis of facts available. It also explains th at as facts available MOFCOM relied on the dumping
margin claimed in the petition. Regarding the noti ce obligation under Article 12 of the Agreement,
China sees an important difference between the facts of the investigation at issue and the
investigation subject to the China – GOES dispute. Specifically, China asserts that, unlike in the
automobiles investigation, in the GOES investigation the basis on which the residual AD duty had
been calculated was not clear. Thus, China urges the Panel not to follow the reasoning of the panel
in China – GOES with regard to this aspect of the US claim.
210
7.4.3.3 Arguments of the third parties
7.114. With regard to the US claim under Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, the European Union notes that the United States relies on the Appellate
Body report in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice and the panel report in China – GOES .
However, the European Union notes that the panel in China – GOES decided the issue on the
narrow proposition that the notice of initiation was insufficiently detailed and that it declined to
comment on the question of whether notice can ever be given publically. The European Union
notes that the United States does not explain how an IA can give notice to producers that exist but
are not known and do not make themselves known to the IA. 211 The European Union anticipates
that this Panel will follow prior decisions on this matter unless it finds cogent reasons not to do so
but notes that this would nevertheless leave the question of what an IA should do in order to
ensure public notice of investigations. In this regard, the European Union is of the view that an IA
can request the government of the exporting count ry to identify the exporters of the subject
product.
7.115. With respect to the Articles 6.9 and 12.2 aspects of the claim, the European Union agrees
with the United States that MOFCOM did not provide an adequate final disclosure or public notice
of the final determination, respectively.
7.116. Japan notes that the prerequisite to using facts available in an AD investigation is to give
the interested party concerned notice of the information requested of it and of the fact that failure
to provide that information may lead to a determination based on facts available. Hence, an IA
cannot base the dumping margin determination for a foreign exporter on facts available without
first putting the exporter on notice of the informat ion requested of it for that determination. Japan
is of the view that, as clarified by the panel in China – GOES, posting a notice in a public place or
on the internet may not necessarily satisfy this noti ce requirement. This is all the more true with
respect to exporters that did not exist during the relevant POI because such exporters cannot
possibly refuse to cooperate with the IA.
7.117. Korea divides non-investigated foreign exporters in an AD investigation into three
categories, namely, (i) those willing to participate in the investigation but which are discouraged
from doing so for reasons of impracticability; (ii) those unwilling or having no interest in
participating in the investigation, and (iii) those that are either unaware of, or non-existent at the
time of, the investigation. Korea contends that exporters in the first category should be subjected
to a duty rate calculated pursuant to Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Those in the
second category may have their margins calculated on the basis of facts available. Margins for
exporters in the third category may be calculated based on facts available if the IA made its best
efforts in notifying interested parties of the initiation of the investigation. In Korea's view,
exporters that did not exist at the time of the investigation may request a new shipper's review
under Article 9.5 of the Agreement.

210 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 56.
211 EU oral statement, para. 9.

7.118. Saudi Arabia underlines that an IA may only have recourse to facts available after notice
is given to the relevant interested party of the information required of it and the latter fails to
cooperate with the IA. It also submits that where the IA resorts to facts available to make a
certain determination, its Article 6.9 disclosure and Article 12.2 public notice should explain, inter
alia, the facts that lead the IA to resort to facts available. Further, facts available may only be
used in order to fill in the gaps in the necessary information requested of the relevant interested
party. In filling in such gaps, argues Saudi Arabia, the IA has to use the most fitting or most
appropriate facts available. In Saudi Arabia's view, facts available may not be used where the
absence of the information is directly attributable to the IA's own failure to request it.
7.119. Turkey contends that there is no rule, principle or guidance in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement regarding the imposition of a residual du ty for exporters that are not identified by the
complainant or the IA, and which did not cooperate during the investigation. In Turkey's view,
there is a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement in this regard and the lacuna should be
addressed in a way that would observe due process rights of foreign exporters while having regard
to the ultimate objective of trade remedies to protect domestic industries against unfair trade
practices. Turkey notes that the WTO jurisprudence limits an IA's discretion in resorting to facts
available in the determination of dumping margins for unknown exporters and contends that this
has the potential to seriously undermine the effectiveness of AD and CVD measures. Turkey
underlines that the issue before this Panel is whether facts available may be used in the
determination of a residual AD duty rate, not the more fundamental question of whether the
imposition of such a rate is generally permitted under the Agreement. Nonetheless, Turkey points
out that it considers the imposition of a residual AD duty rate essential for several reasons. First,
the absence of such a rate will undermine the effectiveness of AD measures. Second, without a
residual duty rate, exporters for which no individual duty has been imposed will continue to ship
the subject product to the importing country by taking advantage of the extra costs borne by
cooperating exporters. Third, non-imposition of a residual duty rate would render inutile the
provision of Article 9.5 of the Agreement regarding new shipper's reviews.
7.4.3.4 Evaluation by the Panel
7.120. The US claim before us has two aspects, namely a) the substantive aspect, under
Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the An ti-Dumping Agreement, concerning the use of
facts available in the determination of the residual AD duty at issue, and b) the procedural aspect
that alleges violations of Articles 6.9, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerning
disclosure and notice obligations in the process that lead to the imposition of the residual duty. We
will first evaluate the substantive aspect of the claim, followed by the two procedural aspects.
7.4.3.4.1 Alleged violation of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.121. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t allows an IA to base its determinations
regarding an interested party that refuses access to or otherwise fails to provide necessary
information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation on facts available.
It is clear from the text of this provision that unless the IA concludes that an interested party
refused access to or otherwise did not provide nece ssary information within a reasonable period or
significantly impeded the investigation, it cannot use facts available in its determinations
concerning that party.
7.122. Paragraph 1 of Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes two important
requirements with regard to the use of facts available. First, it requires that, after initiation, the IA
specify in detail the information required of an interested party and the manner in which that
information is to be structured. Second, it requires that the IA ensure that the interested party is
aware of the fact that if the required information is not provided within a reasonable time, the IA
may make its determinations on the basis of facts available. This ensures that a party is given the
opportunity to submit the specific information required of it before the IA may resort to facts
available.
212 The first aspect parallels the requirement set forth in Article 6.1 of the Anti-Dumping

212 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 259.

Agreement that "[a]ll interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of
the information which the authorities require [. . .]," but is more specific and detailed.213
7.123. In our view, read together, these provisio ns make it clear that an IA cannot use facts
available unless the interested party at issue has been informed of the specific information
requested of it, and of the fact that failure to provide that information may lead to a determination
based on facts available. However, there is nothing in the AD Agreement regarding how the IA is
to fulfil these requirements. The United States asserts that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with
Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II by applying facts available in the determination of the
residual AD duty rate without first giving unknown US exporters notice of the information required
of them and of the fact that failure to provide that information may lead to a determination based
on facts available. China, on the other hand, su bmits that MOFCOM adequately gave the required
notice and that therefore MOFCOM was justified in using facts available in the determination of the
residual AD duty.
7.124. The parties' disagreement is over whethe r MOFCOM's reliance on facts available in the
determination of the residual duty rate was perm issible. The United States argues that MOFCOM
acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragr aph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
by resorting to facts available in the determination of the residual AD duty rate because it did not
give the entities to which that rate would apply notice of (1) the information requested and (2) the
fact that failure to provide the requested informat ion could lead to a determination based on facts
available. China disagrees and contends that gi ven the multi-faceted approach taken by MOFCOM
to notify foreign producers and exporters of the in vestigation and the registration requirement, it
was reasonable for MOFCOM to consider as non-cooperative any US exporter that did not come
forward and register as an interested party and to determine a residual duty for such exporters on
the basis of facts available.
7.125. The facts in this case are undisputed. MOFCOM received an application for the initiation of
AD and CVD investigations on 9 September 2009, which was amended on 19 October 2009. The
application identified three US exporters of the subject automobiles, General Motors USA, Ford
USA and Chrysler USA.
214 MOFCOM initiated the investigations by publishing notices of initiation on
6 November 2009. MOFCOM individually contacted the US exporters identified in the petition of the
initiations, posted the notices of initiation on its website, and made them available in its public
reading room. In addition, on the same day, MOFCOM sent the notices of initiation and the public
version of the petition to the US Embassy in Beijing and requested that the US government
provide copies of the notices to any interested parties. The notices of initiation set forth the
procedures for registering for participation in the AD and CVD investigations, and indicated that
MOFCOM had the right to "refuse to accept relevant materials" of interested parties that failed to
register, and could "determine based on the existing materials available." Interested parties had
until 26 November 2009 to register to participate in the investigation. The United States does not
take issue with China's assertion that MOFCOM made efforts to reach out to all US exporters of the
subject product
215, and that as a result of those efforts, four additional US exporters and exporters
that were not identified in the application, Mercedes-Benz USA, BMW USA, Honda USA, and
Mitsubishi USA, came forward and registered for participation in addition to the three companies,
General Motors USA, Ford USA and Chrysler USA, named in the application.
216
7.126. MOFCOM determined a residual AD duty rate for unknown US exporters on the basis of
facts available. The record shows that MOFCOM ca lculated individual dumping margins for five US
exporters and determined a residual AD duty rate for all other US exporters. Concerning the basis
for the determination of the residual duty rate, the preliminary determination states that "[w]ith
regard to all other American companies, in accordance with Article 21 of Anti-dumping Regulation,
the investigating authority decides to adopt the facts already known and the best information

213 We note that this additional requirement, that the IA specify in detail the information that is required
before a resort to use of facts availa ble may be justified, seems reasonable, as it helps ensure that a party of
whom information is requested can make an informed decision as to its response to that request.
214 Original petition, Exhibit USA-04, p. 15.
215 US response to Panel question No. 7. Rather, th e United States contends "that the exporters and
producers subject to the all-others rates, including thos e who did not export subject product during the period
of investigation, were not notified by MOFCOM of the information required of them. These parties cannot be
said to have refused access to or failed to provide necessary information to the investigating authority, or
significantly impeded the investigation."
216 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 8. Mitsubishi subsequently withdrew from the proceedings.

available, and applies the dumping margin claimed in the petition to them." 217 The final
determination confirms the determination of the residual duty on the same basis. 218 Hence, it is
clear, MOFCOM considered the dumping margin alle ged in the petition to be facts available, and
applied it as the residual AD duty rate for all other US exporters. MOFCOM did not itself make any
calculation in determining the residual duty rate.
7.127. In order to resolve this aspect of the US claim, we need to determine whether MOFCOM, in
using facts available in the determination of the re sidual AD duty, complied with the requirements
set out in paragraph 1 of Annex II. That is, did MOFCOM specify in detail the information required
of the US respondents and inform them that, if information was not supplied within a reasonable
time, determinations could be made on the basis of facts available?
7.128. As noted, in this investigation, MOFCOM took steps to notify US respondents of the
initiation of the investigation, and requested certain information of them as part of the process of
registration. Following its publication, the notice of initiation was posted at MOFCOM's website and
made available in its public reading room. Further, MOFCOM forwarded the notice to the US
embassy in Beijing and asked that it be conveyed to the producers of the subject product in the
United States. The notice of initiation, in a section entitled "Register to Respond" states that:
[a]ny interested party involved in the anti-dumping investigation can apply to the
Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, MOFCOM for participating in the
responding within twenty days since this Announcement is published. The respondent
exporters or manufacturers shall provide the quantity and value of the Subject
Product exported to China from September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009.
219
The notice then references the Registration Form 220 which requests the same information and, in
the subsequent section entitled "Not Register to Respond", states:

[i]f any interested party fails to register with the Ministry of Commerce for responding
within the time stipulated in this Announcement, the Ministry of Commerce shall have
the right to refuse to accept relevant materials it submitted, and shall have the right
to determine based on the existing materials available.
7.129. The issue is whether the notice of initiation and the registration form sufficed for purposes
of Article 6.8 and, in particular, paragraph 1 of Annex II, to specify in detail the information
required of the US respondents such that a failure to provide the information requested in such
notice could justify resorting to facts available in determining a margin of dumping for unknown
exporters. We recall that the Agreement does not provide any guidance for how an IA is to "specify
in detail" the information it requires. While sending questionnaires to known foreign producers will
generally suffice in this regard, the situation is more complicated in the case of foreign producers
that are unknown to the IA, or which do not exist at the time of the investigation, but for whom
the IA may wish to determine a residual duty.
7.130. In our view, a residual duty rate may be determined on the basis of facts available if the
record of the investigation shows that the IA to ok all reasonable steps that might be expected
from an objective and unbiased IA to specify in detail the information requested from unknown
producers.
221 We do not preclude that such specification may be made through a public
notification.222 Indeed, it seems to us that, public notice may be one of the ways, if not the only

217 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 59.
218 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 83.
219 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2.
220 AD registration form, Exhibit CHN-09.
221 We note that although this case revolves around the question of the use of facts available to
determine a residual duty rate, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not set out any guidance for the
determination of the amount or level of such duty, althou gh as discussed above, we consider it clear that such
a duty is permitted. There may be ot her ways to determine a residual duty rate. In our view, however, the IA
must not act inconsistently with a relevant provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in making that
determination.
222 In this regard, we note that, in addressing a clai m that was almost identical to the claim before us
both factually and in terms of its legal basis, the panel in China – GOES refrained from discussing whether
notice of the information required could be given publicly. Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.386.

way, in which an IA could specify to exporters unknown to it the information required of them, as
well as inform them of the fact that if the information is not provided, determinations may be
made on the basis of facts available.
7.131. It is undisputed that, following its publicat ion, MOFCOM posted the notice of initiation on
its website and placed it in its public reading room and sent the notice to the US embassy in
Beijing to be forwarded to the US exporters of the subject product. In our view, the fact that four
additional producers that were not identified in the application, Mercedes-Benz USA, BMW USA,
Honda USA, and Mitsubishi USA, came forward and registered to participate in the investigation
confirms that public notice can be effective in reaching exporters unknown to the IA. Indeed, we
do not understand the United States to argue otherwise, as a general matter.
7.132. The United States cites the panel and Appellate Body reports in Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice in support of its contention that MOFCOM failed to comply with the requirements
of Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II. In Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , the
panel
223 and the Appellate Body 224 concluded that an IA could not resort to facts available in the
calculation of a residual duty rate without having given unknown foreign producers notice of the
information required and without giving them an opportunity to submit that information. We
agree. However, neither the panel nor the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Rice addressed the question we consider to be the crux of the issue before us – whether the steps
taken by MOFCOM to notify unknown US exporters of the initiation of the investigation, and the
information requested in that context, was sufficient for us to conclude that MOFCOM specified in
detail the information required of foreign exporters who did not participate in the investigation,
and thus did not provide the requested information, and therefore that a resort to facts available in
determining a residual duty rate for such exporters was warranted pursuant to Article 6.8 and
Annex II.
7.133. We consider that MOFCOM took the steps that could reasonably be expected from an IA to
contact the unknown exporters. Indeed, the fact that four additional US exporters came forward in
response to MOFCOM's effort suggests that the notice of initiation, together with MOFCOM's other
efforts to contact US exporters, sufficed to ensure that potentially interested parties were made
aware of the investigation and offered an opportunity to participate.
225 However, in our view, this
alone is not necessarily sufficient to justify the subsequent use of facts available, as it does not
satisfy the obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex II. What matters for purposes of this
obligation is that the IA specify in detail to the unknown exporters the information required from
them for the determination of the residual AD rate.
7.134. In this regard, we consider that, read in light of the provisions of Annex II, in particular
paragraph 1, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement allows an IA to use facts available in
order to be able to make a determination in a situation where information necessary for that
determination was requested but was not provided. In our view, it is a matter of due process, and
generally required under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, that a determination affecting an
interested party should be made on the basis of information relevant to the issue and the party. In
the case of dumping margin determinations, this means, preferably, information provided by the
party in question. However, where a party does not provide information, the Agreement makes
clear that the absence of information should not preclude the IA from making a determination.
Thus, Article 6.8 permits the use of facts ava ilable in making the necessary determination.

On the other hand, the panel in China – Broiler Products , addressing the same issue, concluded that
notice of the information required could be given publicly. Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , para. 7.303.
That panel found that MOFCOM's efforts in that investigation provided adequate notice. However, the panel did
not describe or discuss the contents of the notice it found sufficient in this regard. Panel Report, China – Broiler
Products, paras. 7.300-7.306. As discussed above, in our view, it is critical to the resolution of this issue to
consider the notification given to determine what specific information was requested in it, in light of the
determination ultimately made on the basis of facts available.
223 "[I]n case the authorities do not properly notify and inform the interested parties, it is not permitted
to apply the facts available to make determinations with regard to these interested parties." Panel Report,
Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.200.
224 " A c c o r d i n g l y , a n I A t h a t u s e s t h e f a c t s a v a i l able in the application for the initiation of the
investigation against an exporter that was not given notice of the information the investigating authority
requires, acts in a manner inconsiste nt with paragraph 1 of Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement and,
therefore, with Article 6.8 of that Agreement." Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Rice, para. 259.
225 We note that there is no claim with respect to the notice of initiation in this dispute.

However, it seems self-evident to us that, as a matter of due process, and as paragraph 1 of
Annex II provides, a party must first be given the opportunity to provide the necessary
information, before a determination can be justifiably made on the basis of facts available. For us,
this entails that, in principle, there is a para llel between the scope of the information requested
and not provided by an interested party and the scop e of facts available used by an IA in place of
the missing information to make necessary determinations.
226
7.135. In this investigation, the notice of in itiation required the respondents "to provide the
quantity and value of the Subject Product ex ported to China from September 1, 2008 to
August 31, 2009".227 The notice also referenced the registration form that foreign producers had to
fill out in order to participate in the investigation, which was available from MOFCOM's website.
Apart from general information about the company concerned, the registration form, like the
notice of initiation, only asked respondents to provide information on the quantity and value of the
subject product shipped to China during the POI.
228 Following the expiry of the deadline for
registration, MOFCOM sent a full questionnaire to the seven US exporters that had registered to
participate.229 Those questionnaires, as is generally the case, requested comprehensive
information concerning all aspects of the calculation of dumping margins from each respondent,
including information relevant to the determination of normal value and export price, as well as
any adjustments that might be appropriate. MOFCOM presumably used that information in
calculating dumping margins for the individual respondents.
230
7.136. However, for the residual duty rate, MOFCOM used the dumping margin alleged in the
petition as facts available. That allegation must have been based on a comparison of some normal
value with some export price, and may even have reflected some adjustments.231 Thus, MOFCOM's
use of the margin alleged in the petition as fact s available to determine the residual duty rate
necessarily encompassed the petition information on normal value, export price and possibly
certain adjustments. In our view, this demonstrates that the scope of facts available used by
MOFCOM was much wider than the scope of the info rmation requested in the notice of initiation
and/or the registration form. While it is true that the notice of initiation indicates that, in the event
of non-registration, determinations might be made on facts available, in our view, a request for
information concerning the identity, volume and value of exporters of the product is not a
sufficiently specific request for information to justify the determination of a dumping margin on the
basis of facts available for unknown or non-existent exporters. Such an approach in our view is
inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. A
disparity between the information requested from a producer and the determination ultimately
made on the basis of facts available undermines the due process rights of the parties concerned.
7.137. China argues that the registration form and the subsequent dumping questionnaire serve a
complementary purpose in China's anti-dumping system. A notice of initiation, which contains a
link to the registration form, is designed to reach all potential interested producers, solicit from
them certain data that is necessary for an orderly investigative process and notify them of the
consequences of a failure to register. Once the universe of registered producers is ascertained,
MOFCOM sends each of them a dumping questionna ire seeking data necessary for the calculation
of dumping margins. In China's view, non-registra tion demonstrates a failure to cooperate, and
determinations with respect to non-cooperating producers may be made on the basis of facts
available.
232 We are not persuaded by this argument.

226 However, we do not exclude the possibility that in some situations, the lack of certain information
may have consequences with respect to the reliability of other information which has been submitted and
which may therefore lead to the rejection of that info rmation. This, however, wo uld need to be explained
clearly in the IA's determination. In this regard, we note that the panel in Korea – Certain Paper found that the
Korean IA did not err in rejecting domestic sales data submitted by an Indonesian exporter involved in the
relevant investigation given that the exporter had failed to submit financial statements and accounting records
that the IA needed to verify the domestic sales data. Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper, paras. 7.57-7.72.
227 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p.2.
228 AD registration form, Exhibit CHN-09, p.2.
229 China's response to Panel question No. 29.
230 In any event, there is no claim to the contrary in this dispute.
231 We recall in this respect that Article 5.2(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that an
application contain information on normal value and export price.
232 China's response to Panel question No. 29.

7.138. First, we recall that Article 6.8 does not condition the use of facts available on a failure to
cooperate by declining to participate in an investigation. 233 Rather, it establishes that
determinations may be made based on facts available if an interested party (1) refuses access to
necessary information within a reasonable period, (2) otherwise does not provide necessary
information within a reasonable period, or (3) significantly impedes the investigation. We do not
accept that a failure to register in response to a notice of initiation necessarily establishes that any
one of these prerequisites is satisfied, unless that notice specifies in detail the information
requested from the respondents and such information is not submitted. China's position would
mean that the IA decides at the outset of the pr ocess, before dispatching dumping questionnaires
or otherwise specifying the information that will be necessary to make the determinations required
for the imposition of an AD duty, which foreign producers will be found to have refused access to
or otherwise not provided necessary information within a reasonable time, all without those
producers having been made aware of what the necessary information is.
234 Moreover, it results in
certain producers being deprived of the opportunity to provide information very early in the
investigation, without having been informed of the full extent of the information requested. In our
view, this is not acceptable under Article 6.8 and Annex II.
7.139. We are cognizant that a registration process, such as the one used by MOFCOM in this
investigation, may help ensure an orderly investigative process by allowing the IA to identify
interested parties which will participate in the investigation. There is nothing in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement that would preclude the use of such a tool to help manage the process of investigation.
H o w e v e r , t h e u s e o f s u c h a t o o l d o e s n o t r e l i e v e a n I A o f i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e
requirements of Article 6.8 and Annex II of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement. Similarly, we see
nothing to preclude an IA from using a public notice mechanism to make potential interested
parties aware of the information that will be necessary for the determinations the IA will have to
make, and of the consequences of a failure to provide that information. However, we conclude that
the notice of initiation and registration form relied upon by MOFCOM in this case were insufficient
in this respect because they did not specify in detail the information requested from the US
respondents.
235 As discussed above, the only information requested in the notice of initiation and
the registration form concerned the identity of companies, and the volume and value of their
exports to China of the subject products. This information is far from the type or scope of
information necessary for purposes of determinin g dumping margins. We do not mean to suggest
that an IA would necessarily have to publicly notify the dumping questionnaire in order to satisfy
the requirements of Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II, although such a step would obviously
be sufficient. However, at a minimum a request for information in this context would have to be
more specific as to the type and scope of the necessary information for purposes of determinations
to be made by the IA. In addition, in our view, it would be preferable if the consequences of a

233 We can easily envisage situations in which a party cooperates in an investigation in a general sense –
registers to participate at the outset, responds to qu estionnaires, takes part in the proceedings, etc. – and
nonetheless facts available are ultimately used in making determinations regarding such party. Indeed, this
situation has been the case in several disputes concerning Article 6.8 and Annex II. See Panel Reports, US –
Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 7.53, 7.61; US – Steel Plate , para. 7.40. In this respect, we note that the concept of
whether a party "cooperates" is only mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 7 of Annex II, which states
that: "if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the
authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did
cooperate." However, there is no claim under this provision in this dispute.
234 Indeed, the notice of initiation specifies that if a party fails to register at the outset, MOFCOM has the
right to refuse to accept materials th at party might seek to submit at a later stage. This reinforces our view
that the decisions made at the outset of the investigative process limit the rights of parties at subsequent
stages of the process in ways that may not be justified.
235 With respect to an identical issue, the panel in China – GOES also found that MOFCOM had acted
inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 1 of its Annex II. Panel Report, China – GOES,
para. 7.394. That panel stated: "[w]hile the notice of in itiation requested interested parties to provide some
general information at the time of registering with MOFCOM, namely "the volume and value of exports to China
from March 2008 to February 2009", MOFCOM replaced more information than this with "facts available" for
the purposes of arriving at an "all others" anti-dumping rate. Therefore, it is clear that MOFCOM should have
provided detailed notice of this further required information[.]" Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.386. By
contrast, the panel in the subsequent China – Broiler Products dispute came to the opposite conclusion and
reasoned: "[i]n our view, in the case of a failure by an interested party to provide some initial information
necessary for the determination of a producer's margin of dumping, the authority is justified in replacing other
information that it cannot collect as a result of that failure, even if it did not specifically request the other
information. Such information initially required may include the producer's contact details and information
necessary for the authority to decide on sampling." Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , fn. 501. For the
reasons explained above, we disagree with the latter point of view.

failure to provide information were made known with more specificity, for instance, that AD duty
rates may be determined based on facts available.
7.140. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that China acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its use of facts
available in the determination of the residual AD duty rate in the automobiles investigation.
7.4.3.4.2 Alleged violation of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.141. We recall that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the disclosure of
essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision on the application of
definitive measures. This obligation applies to facts, as opposed to reasoning. Further, it only
requires disclosure of facts that are "essential" and which are pertinent to the IA's consideration of
whether or not definitive measures should be applied.
236 In this regard, "essential facts" are not
limited to those that support the decision ultimately reached by the IA, but encompass all facts
necessary to the process of analysis and decision-making by the IA.237
7.142. The United States claims that China failed to disclose the essential facts underlying
MOFCOM's determination of the residual AD duty rate. Specifically, the United States submits that
MOFCOM failed to disclose essential facts under consideration with regard to: (i) whether the US
exporters refused access to necessary information or significantly impeded the investigation;
(ii) why a 21.5% residual AD duty rate was deemed to be appropriate; and (iii) details of the
calculation of the 21.5% residual duty rate. China contends that MOFCOM complied with the
disclosure requirement of Article 6.9. According to China, all pertinent facts regarding the use of
facts available in the calculation of the residual AD duty were laid out in MOFCOM's final disclosure.
7.143. In the investigation at issue, MOFCOM sent a final disclosure to the government of the
United States, which states, in relevant part:
6. Other U.S. companies (All Others)
For other U.S. companies, in accordance with Article 21 of the Antidumping
Regulations of the P.R.C., the Investigatin g Authority decided to use the available
facts and the best information available and to apply the dumping margin claimed in
the petition.
After the preliminary determination, the USG commented that in making its
preliminary determination, the Investigating Authority adopted adverse data for
determining the dumping margin for other U.S companies and failed to explain the
reasoning behind its use of adverse inferences in calculating the rate for “all other”
companies. Further, the Investigating Authority has not explained how other exporters
that would be subject to this “all-others” rate have failed to cooperate in this
investigation. The USG urges the Investigating Authority to apply the weighted
average of the rates calculated for firms that have not expressly been un-cooperative
in the investigation [.]
The Investigating Authority believes that before initiation, the Investigating Authority
notified relevant exporters and producers listed in the petition; also, it urged the USG
to notify the relevant exporters or producers. The initiation notice was publicly
available on the MOFCOM website. After initiation, the Investigating Authority set up
the registration procedure; meanwhile, it issued questionnaires to registered
respondents, which were also available on the MOFCOM website. The Investigating
Authority believes that within the best of its ability, all exporters were given sufficient
opportunities through the above mentioned procedures, and they could appropriately
respond if they were willing to cooperate with the investigation. Regarding exporters
that did not clearly respond to the investigation, the Investigating Authority could
reasonably believe they had no intention to cooperate with the investigation, so the

236 See paras. 7.69-7.71 of this Report.
237 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.807.

Investigation Authority decided their dumping margin based on best information
available, not adverse information.238
7.144. The final disclosure clearly states that MOFCOM determined the residual AD duty rate for
all other US exporters on the basis of facts availabl e and that as facts available it used the margin
claimed in the petition. The final disclosure also reflects that the US government objected to
MOFCOM's use of facts available in this regard, arguing in particular that MOFCOM had not
explained how the all other US exporters had failed to cooperate in the investigation. In response,
MOFCOM explains the steps taken in giving notice of the initiation of the investigation and states
that it was reasonable under these circumstances to deem the US exporters that had not made
themselves known to be non-cooperating, and to determine the residual AD duty rate that would
apply to their exports on the basis of facts available.
7.145. Before discussing the specific issues that, according to the United States, should have been
but were not included in the final disclosure, we would like to underline that, in our view, the
disclosure obligation under Article 6.9 applies to the facts underlying the findings actually made by
an IA during an investigation. In other words, the maximum scope of this obligation is the facts on
the record, and what is actually decided. Whether or not the IA should have made a different
decision on a given issue, or should have made a finding on an issue but did not, is a matter that
falls with the scope of the relevant substantive provisions of the Agreement establishing
obligations on IAs in the course of investigations, and not under Article 6.9. With this in mind, we
turn to the specific arguments presented by the United States in support of this claim.
7.146. First, the United States argues that the final disclosure fails to explain whether the US
exporters refused access to necessary information or significantly impeded the investigation. We
disagree. As noted above, the final disclosure ex plains the efforts made by MOFCOM following the
initiation of the investigation to contact the US exporters, states that all producers were given an
opportunity to participate in the investigation if they so wished and that therefore MOFCOM
reasonably concluded that the producers that failed to respond to MOFCOM did not wish to
cooperate in the investigation. In our view, the fi nal disclosure explains the facts on the basis of
which MOFCOM based its conclusion that unknown US exporters to have failed to cooperate in the
investigation and therefore that it would resort to facts available. Whether those facts justified
MOFCOM's decision is a substantive question we have already addressed above.
7.147. Second, the United States submits that the final disclosure does not explain why a 21.5%
residual AD duty rate was deemed to be appropriate. However, as discussed above, the Article 6.9
disclosure obligation applies to facts, and not to explanations or reasoning for the decisions based
on those facts. Whether or not a particular rate is appropriate as the level of a residual duty seems
to us to be a matter of reasoning, not fact, and thus would not come within the scope of the
obligation set forth in Article 6.9. Moreover, the United States has not argued or shown that there
were any other relevant facts on this matter th a t w e r e o r s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d b y
MOFCOM in deciding the residual rate, but that were not included in the final disclosure.
7.148. Third, the United States refers to the deta ils of the calculation of the 21.5% residual duty
rate. We note, however, that the disclosure clearly states that this duty rate was based on the
margin alleged in the petition. We asked the United States to specify what specific types of
information on the record of the investigation at issue MOFCOM should have included in its final
disclosure but did not do so. In response, the United States did not point to anything other than
the three issues discussed above.
239 Moreover, it is not clear to us that the "details of the
calculation" of a residual duty rate per se constitute facts, as opposed to reasoning or analysis,
which as noted above, do not fall within the scope of the Article 6.9 disclosure obligation. As it is
clear that MOFCOM made no calculation in this regard, simply applying the margin set out in the
petition as the residual rate, we fail to see what other facts could possibly have been relevant in
this regard and included in the final disclosure.
7.149. The United States also contends that MOFC OM's use of the margin claimed in the petition
as facts available does not suffice to fulfil China's obligations under Article 6.9. Since this meant
using information from a secondary source, argues the United States, the final disclosure should
have explained whether MOFCOM used special circumspection in using that information, as

238 Final disclosure (AD/CVD), Exhibit USA-11, p. 24.
239 US response to Panel question No. 9.

required under paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement. 240 However, whether or not MOFCOM
respected the provisions of paragraph 7 of Annex II is a question regarding the substantive
obligations for its determination, not the disclosure obligation under Article 6.9. In this regard, we
also note that the United States has not made a claim under paragraph 7 of Annex II in these
proceedings.
7.150. On this basis, we reject the US claim that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with the disclosure
obligation under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in connection with the determination
of the residual AD duty rate at issue.
7.4.3.4.3 Alleged violations of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.151. Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent sets forth the requirements regarding the
contents of the required public notices of preliminary and final determinations in general. It
provides that each such notice has to set forth in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the IA. Article 12.2.2 in turn sets out
more specific requirements for the required public notice in the case of a final affirmative
determination, reiterating that such a public notice should contain all the information required
under Article 12.2, including all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and going on
to require that it contain reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures as well as the
reasons for the acceptance or rejection of arguments or claims made by exporters and importers.
7.152. Article 12.2.2 requires that the public noti ce of an affirmative final determination, or the
separate report that may be provided instead, must contain "all relevant information" on "matters
of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures". An IA is not
required to set out in its determinations all the factual information that is before it, but rather
those facts that allow an understanding of the factual basis that led to the imposition of final
measures.
241 An IA must give a reasoned account of the factual support for the decision to impose
final measures.
7.153. The United States contends that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 12.2 and
12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to explain in the final determination the factual
and legal bases for its resort to facts available in the determination of the residual AD duty rate.
China asserts that MOFCOM's final determination explains the basis on which the residual AD duty
rate was determined. In this regard, China attaches importance to the fact that, unlike the
investigation at issue in China – GOES , where it was unclear how MOFCOM had calculated the
residual AD duty rate, in the investigation at issue here the final determination explains clearly
that the residual AD duty rate applied was the margin claimed in the petition.
242
7.154. In support of its position, China refers to MOFCOM's final determination, which states that,
as in the preliminary determination, MOFCOM "applied the dumping margin claimed in the petition"
to all other exporters, including unknown exporters. 243 The final determination also contains
MOFCOM's explanations as to why it was justified to treat the unknown US exporters as non-
cooperating and therefore to determine the residu al duty rate using the margin alleged in the
application as facts available, and MOFCOM's discussion of the arguments of parties in this regard.
7.155. As with the obligation under Article 6.9 of the Agreement, in our view, the notice
obligations set out in Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 apply to the issues of fact and law resolved by the
IA and the underlying facts on the record of the investigation. Whether or not the IA should have
resolved a particular issue of fact or law differently, or whether it failed to address a necessary
issue, is a matter that arises under the relevant substantive provisions of the Agreement
governing determinations, and not under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2.
7.156. In this case, as the excerpt in paragraph 7.93 above shows, the final determination
explains clearly the issues of fact and law considered by MOFCOM relating to the determination of
the residual AD duty rate. It states that MOFCOM determined the residual duty rate on the basis of

240 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 49-50.
241 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 164 (addressing the
corresponding provision of the SCM Agreement, Article 22.5).
242 China's first written submission, para. 124.
243 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 83.

facts available and that as facts available it used the dumping margin claimed in the petition. The
final determination also notes the US govern ment's comments on the methodology used by
MOFCOM and the latter's explanations in response. Specifically, it explains the steps taken by
MOFCOM to contact the US exporters and states th at all producers were given an opportunity to
participate in the investigation. It says that the producers that did not indicate their willingness to
participate were deemed to be non-cooperating and that a residual duty rate was determined for
them on the basis of facts available.
7.157. We asked the United States which other types of information MOFCOM should have
included in its public notice but failed to do so. In response, the United States referred to the fact
that MOFCOM failed to explain its use of facts available to determine the residual duty rate and
why the facts available were appropriate.
244 However, in our view, the final determination does
explain the issues of fact and law underlying MOFCOM's use of facts available. As for the
appropriateness of using facts available, the United States has not demonstrated that there were
issues of fact and law concerning the appropriat eness of relying on facts available which MOFCOM
failed to address in its final determination.
7.158. Therefore, we reject the US claim that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in connection with the imposition
of the residual AD duty rate at issue.
7.4.4 Determination of the residual CVD rate : Alleged violations of Articles 12.7, 12.8,
22.3, and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement
7.4.4.1 Provisions at issue
7.159. Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement sets forth the conditions under which an IA may apply
facts available in a CVD investigation. It provides:
[i]n cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or
significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations,
affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available.
7.160. Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement requires that:
[t]he authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
Members and interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form
the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure
should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests.
7.161. Articles 22.3 and 22.5 set forth the requirement to give public notice of certain actions or
determinations in a CVD investigation as follows:
22.3. Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether
affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to
Article 18, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a
definitive countervailing duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating
authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members
the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other
interested parties known to have an interest therein. . .
22.5. A public notice of conclusion or suspen sion of an investigation in the case of an
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of an undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a
separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of an

244 US response to Panel question No. 10.a.

undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in paragraph 4, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or
rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by interested Members and by the
exporters and importers.
7.4.4.2 Arguments of the parties
7.4.4.2.1 United States
7.162. The United States asserts that by using fa cts available in the calculation of the residual
CVD rate in the investigation at issue here, wi thout first informing the US exporters of the
information required of them and of the fact that failure to provide that information could lead to a
determination based on facts available, MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM
Agreement. The United States argues that MOFCOM sent anti-subsidy questionnaires only to US
exporters identified in the petition, and that it did not attempt to identify other US exporters.
245
The United States notes that the circumstances under which an IA may resort to facts available in
its determinations in a CVD investigation are cited in Article 12.7 as a) refusing access to
necessary information within a reasonable period, b) otherwise failing to provide such information
within a reasonable period, or c) significantly impeding the investigation. Since none of this was
the case in the CVD investigation at issue, MOFCOM violated Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement by
resorting to facts available in the calculation of the residual CVD rate. According to the
United States, since the US exporters other than those named in the petition were non-existent, it
was logically impossible for them to have engaged in any of the acts set forth in Article 12.7.
246
7.163. The United States also contends that MOFCOM violated two procedural obligations in the
calculation of the contested residual CVD rate. First, the United States alleges that MOFCOM acted
inconsistently with Article 12.8 of the SCM Agr eement by failing to disclose to the US exporters
essential facts under consideration concerning the calculation of the residual CVD rate. In the view
of the United States, MOFCOM's explanation in the final disclosure, which repeated what was in the
preliminary and final determinations, was cursory. It was limited to one sentence stating that, on
the basis of facts available, the IA had decided to apply the ad valorem subsidy rate calculated for
General Motors LLC to all other US exporters. Second, the United States alleges that MOFCOM
failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the determination of the residual CVD rate and thus
violated Articles 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreemen t. According to the United States, the factual
and legal bases for MOFCOM's resort to facts available in the calculation of the residual CVD rate
were relevant information on matters of fact and law within the meaning of Articles 22.3 and 22.5
and should have been explained.
7.4.4.2.2 China
7.164. China rejects the US arguments. In China's view, there is a gap in the SCM Agreement
regarding the calculation of residual CVD rates. Given this gap, Article 12.7 of the Agreement
provides a logical basis for such calculations and this is what MOFCOM did in this investigation.
Contrary to the US assertion, China maintains that MOFCOM took several steps to reach all US
exporters of automobiles. Specifically, MOFCOM posted the notice of initiation on its website and
placed it in its public reading room. The notice of initiation was also sent to the US embassy in
Beijing to be forwarded to all US exporters. The notice explained the procedure for registration to
participate in the investigation and also warned that failure to participate could result in
determinations based on facts available. These were the best efforts that MOFCOM could have
taken. Four US exporters, in addition to the th ree identified in the petition, came forward to
register following MOFCOM's notification efforts. In these circumstances, argues China, it was
reasonable for MOFCOM, and consistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, to consider all

245 As it did with respect to the AD investigation at issue (see, footnote 200 above), initially, the
United States argued that, in the CVD investigation at issue, MOFCOM had sent questionnaires only to the
producers identified in the petition and that it had not attempted to identify whether any other US producer of
the like product existed. It also argued th at, as in the investigation underlying the China – GOES dispute, no
other US exporters of automobiles existed at the time of the AD investigation at issue here. See for instance
US first written submission, paras. 86-87. However, it did not pursue these arguments later in the proceedings,
and the record of the investigation clearly shows that MOFCOM did attempt to identify other US exporters and
that four additional producers registered to participate as a result.

other US exporters as being non-cooperating and to calculate, on the basis of facts available, a
residual CVD rate that would apply to their exports to China.247
7.165. China submits that MOFCOM's disclosure of essential facts conformed to the requirements
of Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement. It disclosed all the pertinent facts that were on the record.
MOFCOM applied the 12.9% subsidy rate calculated for General Motors as the residual CVD rate,
with no adjustments and this is clear from the final disclosure. 248 To the extent the United States
argues that MOFCOM should also have disclosed its reasoning, China contends that Article 12.8
contains no such obligation.
7.166. Similarly, China contends that all the le gal and factual bases for the residual CVD rate
imposed by MOFCOM were clearly indicated on the record, consistently with Articles 22.3 and 22.5
of the SCM Agreement.
249 As explained in the final determination, MOFCOM determined the
residual CVD rate on the basis of facts available, and used as facts available the subsidy rate
calculated for General Motors which was the highest individual rate calculated.
7.4.4.3 Arguments of the third parties
7.167. The European Union argues that the status of the government of the exporting country
as an interested party is different in AD investigations compared to CVD investigations because,
unlike the Anti-Dumping Agreement which uses the term "interested parties" to refer to all
interested parties including the government of the exporting country, the SCM Agreement refers to
"interested Members" and "interested parties" as two different categories.
7.168. Further, the European Union notes that, un like an AD investigation which concerns prices
applied by private companies, in a CVD investigation the government of the exporting country is
"directly implicated in the act of subsidisation". Therefore, the WTO jurisprudence on the issue of
the determination of residual AD duties on the basis of facts available should not be directly
transposed into the SCM Agreement. One implicatio n of this would be the possibility of arguing
that in the context of a CVD investigation notice to the government of the exporting country may
serve as notice to the exporters from that country.
7.4.4.4 Evaluation by the Panel
7.169. The CVD investigation at issue was initiated and conducted simultaneously with the AD
investigation on the same product. As noted above, the facts relevant to the US claims regarding
the residual CVD rate are almost identical to the facts concerning the residual AD rate. So are the
arguments presented by the parties. The legal provisions at issue, Articles 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, and
22.5 of the SCM Agreement are virtually identical to Articles 6.8, 6.9, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, in our assessment of the US claims
regarding the residual CVD rate at issue, we will refer to the reasoning set forth above in respect
of the claims regarding the residual AD duty rate as appropriate.
7.4.4.4.1 Alleged violation of Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement
7.170. This aspect of the US claim challenges the use of facts available in the determination of the
residual CVD rate. The arguments presented by the United States, and China's counter-arguments,
are substantively the same as those made in connection with the residual AD duty rate, which we
discussed above. In short, the United States co ntends that MOFCOM erred by determining the
residual CVD rate on the basis of facts available without first giving unknown US exporters notice
of the information required of them and of the fa ct that failure to provide that information could
lead to a determination based on facts available. China points to the efforts made by MOFCOM to
contact the US exporters and argues that it was reasonable for MOFCOM to conclude that any US
exporters that failed to register for participation were non-cooperating, and therefore to determine
a residual CVD rate applicable to them on the basis of facts available. The US claim with respect to
the CVD residual duty claim raises the same issue as the claim with respect to the AD residual
duty: did MOFCOM, in using facts available in the de termination of the residual CVD rate at issue,
comply with the requirements set out in Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement?

247 China's first written submission, paras. 127-131.
248 China's first written submission, para. 133.
249 China's first written submission, para. 135.

7.171. There is one difference between this clai m and the claim regarding the residual AD duty
rate, in terms of the legal basis of the US claim. The SCM Agreement does not have a provision
analogous to Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent setting out additional requirements with
respect to the use of facts available. Thus, the United States relies on Articles 12.1 and 12.7 of the
SCM Agreement, the provisions corresponding to Articles 6.1 and 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, to establish the existence of an obligation for MOFCOM to inform the interested parties
of the information required from them, while in the AD context, the United States relied on
paragraph 1 of Annex II, in addition to Articles 6.1 and 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in this
regard.
7.172. Previous panels and the Appellate Body have concluded that the SCM Agreement
establishes the same general requirements regarding the use of facts available as the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, despite the lack of an analogue to Annex II. Thus, in Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice, the Appellate Body interpreted the provisions of the SCM Agreement regarding
the use of facts available in conjunction with th e corresponding provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In doing so, the Appellate Body noted that the SCM Agreement did not have an annex
similar to Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but concluded that this did not mean "that no
such conditions exist[ed] in the SCM Agreement."
250 On this basis, the Appellate Body concluded
that "it would be anomalous if Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement were to permit the use of "facts
available" in countervailing duty investigations in a manner markedly different from that in anti-
dumping investigations."
251 We also note that the panels in China – GOES 252 and China – Broiler
Products253 took the same approach. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the Ministerial
Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, in which Ministers underlined "the need for the consistent resolution of
disputes arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures."254
7.173. For the same reasons as set out in these reports, we consider it appropriate to interpret
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in harmony with the provisions of Article 6.8 and Annex II of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and resolve the US claims under both Agreements in a consistent
fashion. Therefore, as we did in respect of the US claim regarding the residual AD duty rate, with
regard to the present claim, we will consider whether MOFCOM specified in detail the information
required from the US exporters and informed them that, if information was not supplied within a
reasonable time, determinations could be made on the basis of facts available. This requires us to
assess whether MOFCOM took the steps necessary to contact the US exporters and whether it
informed such producers of the information requested from them for the determinations it would
make.
7.174. Given that the facts underlying the determination of the residual CVD rate, the US
arguments in support of its claim regarding th e residual CVD duty rate and China's counter-
arguments are identical to the facts, arguments and counter-arguments addressed above in
connection with the United States claim under Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, we consider it appropriate to apply the same legal reasoning, mutatis
mutandis, in resolving the US claim under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, and reach the same
conclusions.
255
7.175. On this basis, we find that the scope of facts available used by MOFCOM was greater than
the scope of the information it requested from unknown US exporters through the notice of
initiation and the CVD registration form. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM acted inconsistently
with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in determin ing the residual CVD rate on the basis of facts
available.

250 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 291.
251 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 295.
252 Panel Report, China – GOES, paras. 7.446-7.447.
253 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.355.
254 We also asked the parties their views on the implic ation of the absence of a corollary to Annex II in
the SCM Agreement. While the parties' views in this regard in no way are determinative, both responded that,
despite the absence of such an annex in the SCM Agreement, the same disciplines should apply to the use of
facts available in CVD investigations as are set forth in Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. See China's
and US responses to Panel question No. 13.
255 See paras. 7.121–7.140 of this Report.

7.4.4.4.2 Alleged violation of Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement
7.176. The United States asserts that MOFCOM ac ted inconsistently with Article 12.8 of the SCM
Agreement by failing to disclose to the US exporters essential facts under consideration concerning
the calculation of the residual CVD rate. China re sponds that MOFCOM's final disclosure conveyed
all essential facts on the record regarding the contested residual CVD rate and was therefore
consistent with Article 12.8.
7.177. The factual background of this claim is ag ain generally identical to that of the claim under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement discussed above. It is clear from the final disclosure
sent to the US government that MOFCOM relied on facts available in determining the residual CVD
rate, and used the 12.9% rate calculated for General Motors as facts available.
256 We asked the
United States to identify any other essential facts on the record that MOFCOM should have
disclosed which it failed to do so and the United States has not brought any to our attention.257
7.178. The arguments of the parties presented in respect of this claim are the same as they made
in respect of the analogous claim under Article 6. 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, we
consider it appropriate to apply the same legal reasoning, mutatis mutandis, in resolving the US
claim under Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement, and reach the same conclusions. 258 On this basis,
we reject the US claim that MOFCOM acted incons istently with Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement
in connection with the determination of the residual CVD duty rate at issue.
7.4.4.4.3 Alleged violation of Articles 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement
7.179. The United States claims that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 22.3 and 22.5 of
the SCM Agreement by failing to explain the fact ual and legal bases for its determination of the
residual CVD rate. China counters the US claim an d submits that MOFCOM's notice conveyed all
factual and legal bases of MOFCOM's determination of the residual CVD rate.
7.180. The factual background of this claim is the same as that of the US claim under
Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement, which we discussed above. It is clear
from the final determination that MOFCOM relied on facts available in the determination of the
residual CVD rate and used the 12.9% rate calculated for General Motors as facts available.
259 We
asked the United States to identify any other issues of fact or law on the record of which MOFCOM
should have addressed in the final determination but which it failed to do so and the United States
has not pointed to any.
260
7.181. The arguments of the parties presented in respect of this claim are the same as they made
in respect of the analogous claim under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Therefore, we consider it appropriate to apply the same legal reasoning, mutatis mutandis , in
resolving the US claim under Articles 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement, and reach the same
conclusions.261 On this basis, we reject the US claim that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with
Article 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement in conne ction with the determination of the residual
CVD duty rate at issue.
7.5 Whether MOFCOM properly defined the domestic industry for the purposes of its
injury determination
7.5.1 Provisions at issue
7.182. Articles 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 15.1 of the SCM Agreement both provide,
in nearly identical terms:
[a] determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on
positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the

256 Final disclosure, Exhibit USA-11, pp. 40-41.
257 US response to Panel question No. 9.
258 See paras. 7.141–7.150 of this Report.
259 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 126-127.
260 US response to Panel question No. 10.a.
261 See paras. 7.151-7.158 of this Report.

dumped [subsidized] imports and the effect of the dumped [subsidized] imports on
prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of
these imports on domestic producers of such products. (footnotes omitted)
7.183. Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides in pertinent part
262:
[f]or the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall be
interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to
those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion
of the total domestic production of those products.
7.184. Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement is substa ntively identical, albeit formatted differently,
and provides in pertinent part:
[f]or the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall, except as
provided in paragraph 2, be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a
whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.263
7.5.2 Factual background
7.185. MOFCOM published two sets of notices relating to its AD and CVD investigations on
6 November 2009, consisting of a notice of initiation and an injury registration notice for each
investigation.264 These four notices each set a 20-day deadline of 26 November 2009 for interested
parties to register to participate in the respective investigations. 265 Both investigations were
initiated upon the application of the same peti tioner, the CAAM. MOFCOM determined that the
petitioner had standing to file the petition on be half of the domestic industry. MOFCOM stated in
the notices of initiation that the companies represented by the petitioner produced more than 50%
of the domestic like product throughout the POI.266
7.186. In its notices of initiation, MOFCOM stated:
[f]or the industry injury investigation, interested parties and interested government
can register with the Industry Injury Investigation Bureau of MOFCOM ("IBII") within
20 days of the release of this Notice. The registration form to the IBII shall contain the
information of production capacity, output, inventory, and production capacity under
construction/planed [sic.] production capacity, as well as volume and value of subject
product exports to China during the POI. The "Application for Participating in the
Industry Injury Investigation of Saloon Cars and Cross-country Cars (of a cylinder
capacity ≥ 2000cc)" can be downloaded from
http://www.cacs.gov.cn/cacs/anjian/anjianshow.aspx?str1=1&articleId=62087.
267

262 Paragraphs (i) and (ii) of Article 4.1 are not at issue in this dispute.
263 "Paragraph 2" in this provision refers to Arti cle 16.2 of the SCM Agreement, which corresponds to
Article 4.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and is not at issue in this dispute.
264 See AD notice of initiation, Ex hibit USA-06; AD injury registrati on notice, Exhibit CHN-02; and CVD
notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07; CVD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-11.
265 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4.
266 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 1; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 1.
267 CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p.4. The wording of the AD notice of initiation is
substantially the same:
[a]ny interested party involved in the industry injury investigation can register with the Bureau
of Industry Injury Investigat ion, MOFCOM for responding wi thin twenty days since this
Announcement is published, and provide materials describing the productivity, output, inventory,
plans under construction and to be constructe d, quantity and value of the Subject Product
exported to China during the industry injury investigation period. The Form of Application for
Participating in the Industry Injury Investigation of the Anti-dumping Investigation of Saloon
Cars and Cross-country Cars (of a Cylinder Capacity ≥ 2000cc) is available for download in the
"Register to Respond" column on the webs ite of China Trade Re medy Information at
http://www.cacs.gov.cn.
AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2.

7.187. The injury registration notices contained the "Application for Participating in the Industry
Injury Investigation Saloon Cars and Cross-country Cars of a cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc"268. These
application forms required interested parties to supply contact details and company-specific data
on capacity, production and trade performance during the POI.
269 The petitioner was the only
domestic entity to register by the deadline of 26 November 2009.270
7.188. In its preliminary and final determinations, MOFCOM indicates that on 24 December 2009,
MOFCOM distributed a domestic producer's questionna ire to the petitioner, acting on behalf of the
domestic industry.271 MOFCOM also indicates that, prior to limiting the scope of the investigation
from the imports originally identified, certain US automobiles with engine displacements equal to
or greater than 2000cc, to certain US automobiles with engine displacements equal to or greater
than 2500cc, it verified that the CAAM continue d to represent a major proportion of the total
domestic production of the like product.
272
7.189. MOFCOM determined that the aggregate annual output of the producers represented by
the petitioner accounted for 54.16% (2006), 33.54% (2007), 33.75% (2008), 36.32% (interim
2008), and 41.94% (interim 2009) of total Chinese production of the domestic like product. 273
Accordingly, MOFCOM found that "the collective pr oduction of the like product of the aforesaid
producers constitutes a major proportion of the total production of the domestic like product"274.
7.5.3 Arguments of the parties
7.5.3.1 United States
7.190. The United States contends that MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry in the
investigations at issue failed to conform to the requirements of Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement. The United States submits that the domestic
industry as defined did not conform to these two definitional provisions because, first, it was
distorted, and second, it failed to capture a major proportion of total production of the domestic
like product. As a result of these two inconsistencies, the United States submits that MOFCOM's
domestic industry definition was inconsistent wi th Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement.
275
7.191. The United States argues that MOFCOM's do mestic industry definition was distorted in two
respects. First, the United States argues that MOFCOM, in conditioning the inclusion of domestic
producers in the domestic industry definition on a willingness to participate in MOFCOM's injury
investigations, introduced a material risk of distortion in using a process capable of leading to self-
selection among domestic producers.
276 In the US view, MOFCOM's registration requirement
reduced the data coverage that could have served as the basis for its injury analysis, thereby
creating a material risk of distorting MOFCOM's injury determination, which the United States
asserts materialized in this case. 277 The United States adds in this regard that domestic producers
posting the weakest performance would have the most to gain from a positive injury
determination, and would therefore have a greater financial incentive to register and participate in
MOFCOM's injury investigations.
278 Those domestic producers posting the strongest performance,
conversely, would have less incentive to participate in the investigations. The United States
contends that the withholding of the performa nce data of the stronger-performing producers
would, in these circumstances, skew the economic data towards an affirmative finding of injury,

268 AD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-12; CVD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-13.
269 AD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-12, p. 1; CVD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-13, p. 1.
270 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 19.
271 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, pp. 20-21; final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 21-
22.
272 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 35; final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 48-49.
273 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 132; supplemental injury submission, Exhibit CHN-08.
274 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 48.
275 The United States does not ask the Panel to find violations of Articles 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and 16.1 of the SCM Agreement, which contain the definition of the domestic industry. See US
response to Panel question No. 40.
276 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.
277 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 34-35.
278 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 35.

leading to the risk of higher duties on subject imports. 279 In allowing self-selection, the
United States submits that MOFCOM effectively delegated its investigatory function to these
domestic producers.
280
7.192. The United States likens MOFCOM's actions in this regard to those at issue in the EC –
Fasteners (China) dispute, insofar as both involved the conditioning of inclusion of domestic
producers in the domestic industry definition on a willingness to cooperate with the IA. The
United States submits that there is no substantive difference between conditioning inclusion in the
domestic industry definition on the willingness of producers to be included in the sample of the
domestic industry in EC – Fasteners (China) , and conditioning inclusion in the domestic industry
definition on the willingness of producers in the investigations at issue to participate in MOFCOM's
injury investigations.
281
7.193. The second aspect of distortion in MOFCOM 's domestic industry definition, in the US view,
arises from the fact that only eight companie s among the CAAM's allegedly broad membership
provided data for MOFCOM's investigations. 282 The United States contends that this shows self-
selection among CAAM members, resulting in a material distortion to MOFCOM's injury
determination.283
7.194. Turning to the second alleged inconsistency, the United States contends that MOFCOM's
domestic industry definition failed to capture a major proportion of total production of the domestic
like product, in excluding 60% of domestic production from its investigations. 284 In the US view,
MOFCOM should have obtained wide ranging information concerning "relevant economic factors in
order to ensure the accuracy of an investigation concerning the state of the industry and the injury
it has suffered" in order to define the domestic industry on the basis of a "relatively high
proportion of the total domestic production." The United States contends that MOFCOM, in
gathering data from a small portion of the CAAM's membership, failed to capture such a "relatively
high" proportion in this dispute.
285 Under these circumstances, the United States considers that
MOFCOM should have sought additional domestic industry data, or at least explained on the record
why it could not collect additional data in light of the particular conditions of the automobile
industry in China.286
7.195. As a result of these two alleged inconsistencies with Articles 4.1 and 16.1, the
United States argues that MOFCOM's injury determination was inconsistent with the obligation set
forth in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement that an
IA make an injury determination based on an objective examination of positive evidence.
287
7.5.3.2 China
7.196. China maintains that MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry was not distorted, and
captured sufficient domestic production to qualify as a major proportion of total domestic
production within the meaning of Articles 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 16.1 of the SCM
Agreement.
288 While China agrees with the United States that Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement ca n inform an IA's definition of the domestic
industry in the context of its injury determination, insofar as the United States argues for the
introduction of a self-standing distortion test into Articles 4.1 and 16.1, China contends that such a
test is unsupported by the language of these provisions.
289
7.197. China contends that MOFCOM provided pub lic notice inviting all domestic producers to
register and participate in MOFCOM's injury investigations. 290 This notice contained a short form

279 US first written submission, paras. 116-117.
280 US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.
281 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 61-62.
283 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.
284 See for instance US first written submission, para. 124.
285 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.
286 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 40.
287 See for instance US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 69.
288 See for instance China's first written submission, paras. 162, 169.
289 China's second written submission, para. 73.
290 China's first written submission, paras. 145-146.

that domestic producers willing to participate in the investigation had to fill out and return to
MOFCOM. In China's view, MOFCOM's registration requirement was simply meant to ensure an
orderly investigation process and did not create any disincentive for participation in the
investigations, and was thus not capable of introducing any risk of distortion in the resulting
domestic industry definition. China maintains that there is no provision in either the Anti-Dumping
or the SCM Agreement that prohibits such a registration requirement.
291 China stresses that all
Chinese domestic producers had the opportunity to register to participate in the investigations,
and that the domestic industry as defined by MO FCOM accounted for a major proportion of total
domestic production of the like product. 292 Insofar as no domestic producers other than those
represented by the petitioner in fact registered , China contends that MOFCOM took no steps to
prevent such parties from participating. 293 China adds in this regard that MOFCOM lacks legal
authority to compel interested parties to provide data. 294 Further, China contends that the non-
participation of domestic producers not members of the CAAM is not surprising, as the CAAM
represents all producers of automobiles in China.
295
7.198. China disagrees with the logic of the US contention that MOFCOM's registration
requirement favoured the domestic producers posting the weakest performance and therefore
more inclined to support the petition. China submits in this regard that it would have been equally
plausible for domestic producers opposing the petition to participate in MOFCOM's injury
investigations in order to provide data and argu ments showing that subject imports did not cause
injury to the domestic industry. Insofar as no domestic producer opposed the petition in the
underlying investigations, China submits that this non-participation cannot be attributed to any
action on MOFCOM's part, with the latter merely including data for all producers that chose to
participate.
296 China adds in this regard that, contrary to the US assertion that MOFCOM remained
passive in its investigations, the record supports China's contention that MOFCOM actively
assessed and verified the data submitted to it by the CAAM.297
7.199. Regarding the US argument likening MOFCOM's actions to those at issue in the EC –
Fasteners (China) dispute, China submits that the cases are different in two material respects.
First, China contends that in EC – Fasteners (China) , the IA affirmatively excluded 25 domestic
producers from its domestic industry definition out of a pool of 70 producers that had supplied
some information to it on the basis that those 25 producers declined to participate in a sample.
The Appellate Body found that the IA had narrowed the pool of producers whose data could have
been used for its injury determination in that case. In the investigations at issue here, China
argues that MOFCOM did not engage in such narrowing.
298 Second, the IA in EC – Fasteners
(China) relied on a 25% benchmark in concluding that the 27% of total domestic production
captured by the domestic industry it defined co nstituted a "major proportion" of total domestic
production. The Appellate Body concluded that by so doing, the IA had reduced the data coverage
on which it based its injury analysis, thereby introducing a material risk of distortion to its injury
determination. In this case, China asserts that MOFCOM applied no benchmarks in the underlying
investigations, and in fact the domestic industry it defined represented a larger percentage of total
domestic production than was the case in the EC – Fasteners (China) domestic industry
definition.
299 China submits that, by seeking to draw parallels between the issues in EC – Fasteners
(China) and MOFCOM's actions in the investigations at issue, the United States would have the
Panel apply a freestanding distortion test that is unsupported by Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement.300
7.200. China contends that the US allegation that there was self-selection within the CAAM rests
entirely on speculation.301 China objects in this regard to the comments made by the United States
on the CAAM's allegedly partial role in acting as conduit for the information submitted on behalf of
its members to MOFCOM. China adds that MOFCOM's registration form was made available to all

291 China's second written submission, para. 81.
292 China's first written submission, para. 169.
293 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 71.
294 China's first written submission, para. 151.
295 See for instance China's response to Panel questions Nos. 15.a and 15.b.
296 China's second written submission, para. 69.
297 China's response to Panel question No. 37.
298 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 74.
299 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 75.
300 See for instance China's first written submission, paras. 164, 168.
301 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 68.

CAAM members, who in turn were free to decide whether to participate. 302 China asserts that a
third of the CAAM's membership consisted of joint ventures affiliated with the US respondents that
chose as a group not to participate in these investigations.303 China suggests that this may explain
their non-participation in MOFCOM's investigations, and thus why only a subset of the CAAM's
members participated.
7.201. Regarding the second aspect of the US argument, China asserts that MOFCOM's domestic
industry definition, which included four national car makers and four joint ventures that requested
confidential treatment of their identities 304, satisfies the major proportion basis for defining the
domestic industry in the Anti -Dumping and SCM Agreements. 305 China adds in this regard that
there is no specific quantitative threshold to satisfy in relation to the major proportion basis for
defining the domestic industry.
306 China notes, further, that neither Article 4.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement nor Article 16.1 of the SC M Agreement express a preference between
defining the domestic industry as producers as a whole, or those of them accounting for a major
proportion of total domestic production.
307 Nor do these provisions require an IA to identify any
practical constraints encountered in gathering data from domestic producers not included in its
domestic industry definition, where the IA defines the domestic industry as accounting for an
allegedly low proportion of total domestic production.
308
7.202. China rejects the alleged consequential vi olations of Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreem ent put forward by the United States. China
submits in this regard that each provision of th e Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements gives rise to
distinct standards and obligations, requiring claims under each article to be assessed
independently and separately. 309 China contends in this regard that the United States bears the
initial burden of showing that MOFCOM's injury determination was inconsistent with Article 3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15 of the SCM Agreement.
310
7.5.4 Arguments of the third parties
7.203. Korea argues that a domestic industry defined on the basis of a major proportion of total
domestic production should encompass producers whose collective output represents "a relatively
high proportion that substantially reflects the total domestic production". 311 In Korea's view, such
"proportion" may be lower in investigations involving fragmented industries where collection of
industry-wide information may cause practical constraints on the IA. Korea cites the Appellate
Body report in EC – Fasteners in support of its arguments.
312
7.204. Saudi Arabia submits that, given the close nexus between a domestic industry definition
and an injury determination, the obligation to co nduct an objective examination based on positive
evidence under Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement
should also apply to the definition of the domest ic industry under Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement, respectively.313 In Saudi Arabia's view, such an
approach would ensure that the same analytical and evidentiary standards that apply to injury and
causation analyses would also apply to the definition of the domestic industry. Noting previous
Appellate Body decisions that support this proposition, Saudi Arabia invites the Panel to make an
explicit finding to this effect.
314

302 China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.
303 China's response to Panel question No. 36.a.
304 China's response to Panel question No. 15.c.
305 China's second written submission, para. 79.
306 See for instance China's comments on the US response to Panel question No. 39.
307 China's first written submission, para. 141.
308 China's second written submission, para. 80.
309 China's first written submission, para. 219.
310 China's first written submission, para. 220.
311 Korea's third party submission, paras. 6-7.
312 Korea's third party submission, para. 8.
313 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, paras. 33-34.
314 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 35.

7.5.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.205. The US claim concerns two sets of provis ions, Articles 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and 16.1 of the SCM Agreement, which set forth the definition of domestic industry for purposes of
AD and CVD investigations, and Articles 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 15.1 of the SCM
Agreement, which require an IA to base its injury determination on an objective examination of
positive evidence. The United States raises two distinct arguments under this claim: (i) MOFCOM,
in conditioning the inclusion of domestic producers in the domestic industry on a willingness to
participate in MOFCOM's injury investigations, introduced a material risk of distortion by using a
process capable of leading to self-selection among domestic producers, and which in fact led to
such self-selection among the members of the CAAM ; and (ii) the domestic industry as defined by
MOFCOM did not include producers accounting for a major proportion of total domestic production.
China's position is that neither MOFCOM nor the CAAM took any measures to exclude domestic
producers from the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM or limit their participation, and the
domestic industry defined by MOFCOM does in fact include domestic producers accounting for a
major proportion of total domestic production of the domestic like product. We will address these
arguments in turn.
7.206. Articles 4.1 and 16.1 define the domestic in dustry as either producers of the domestic like
product "as a whole", or a subset of those producers, who collectively account for a "major
proportion" of total domestic production. These provisions do not specify a hierarchy between
these different bases for defining the domestic in dustry, and thus an IA may define the domestic
industry in an investigation on either basis.
315 Neither do Articles 4.1 or 16.1 establish any
procedures or methodology for the IA in defining the domestic industry. However, it is clear that
an IA may not exclude a category of domestic prod ucers of the like product from the definition of
the domestic industry. 316 Articles 4.1 and 16.1 specify only two situations in which producers of
the like product may be excluded from the domestic industry definition, namely, where these
producers are importers, or are "related" to exporters or importers of the like product, or where a
market is fragmented or divided into a series of distinct competitive markets by the IA and
producers in each market are regarded as a separate industry. Neither of these situations is the
case in the present dispute.
7.207. When an IA defines the domestic industry as producers of the like product accounting for a
"major proportion" of total domestic production, it must ensure that the percentage of production
covered is sufficiently large to qualify as an "important, serious or significant" proportion of total
production.
317 That both the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements refer to "a" major proportion as
opposed to "the" major proportion indicates that the percentage of production deemed a "major
proportion" need not be greater than 50% of total production. We note in this respect that a panel
previously accepted 46% of total production as sufficiently "important, serious or significant" to
constitute a major proportion of total domestic production.
318 Further, the Appellate Body in
another dispute did not a priori exclude the possibility that a figure as low as 27% of total
domestic production might constitute a major proportion of total domestic production, depending
on the circumstances.
319
7.208. Moreover, we note that footnote 9 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement and footnote 45 of the
SCM Agreement provide, in identical terms:
[u]nder this Agreement the term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic
industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
Thus, it is clear that the "domestic industry" as defined under Articles 4.1 and 16.1 will form the
basis of the injury determination, which must be made consistently with Articles 3 and 15,
respectively.

315 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, paras. 7.415-7.420.
316 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 7.219.
317 Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.341.
318 Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.344.
319 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 415.

7.209. The Appellate Body, in China – GOES , explained that Articles 3.1 and 15.1 set forth "the
overarching obligations regarding the manner in which an investigating authority must conduct a
determination of injury caused by subject imports to the domestic industry."
320 The Appellate Body
considered that this general obligation informs the more detailed obligations in the remainder of
Articles 3 and 15.321 The Appellate Body in China – GOES stated that:
the term "positive evidence" relates to the quality of the evidence that an
investigating authority may rely upon in making a determination, and requires the
evidence to be affirmative, objective, verifiable, and credible. Furthermore, the
Appellate Body has found that the term "o bjective examination" requires that an
investigating authority's examination "conform to the dictates of the basic principles of
good faith and fundamental fairness", an d be conducted "in an unbiased manner,
without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties,
in the investigation".
322
7.210. Finally, we recall that in EC – Salmon (Norway), the panel considered the consequences for
an injury determination of a definition of domestic industry which was inconsistent with the
requirements of Article 4.1. The panel observed:
[i]f the EC's approach to defining domestic industry in this case resulted in an
investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the definition
set forth in Article 4.1, then it seems clear to us the EC analyzed the wrong industry in
determining the adequacy of support for the initiation of the investigation under
Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement, and in considering injury and causation under
Article 3, committing an error which is potentially fatal to the WTO-consistency of the
investigating authority's determinations on those issues.
323
The panel went on to conclude that:

the EC's approach to defining the domestic industry in this case resulted in an
investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the definition
set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Ag reement. As a consequence, the EC's
determination of support for the application under Article 5.4 was based on
information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and is therefore not consistent with
the requirements of that Article. Furthe rmore, the EC's analyses of injury and
causation were based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and are
therefore necessarily not consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.4,
and 3.5.
324
We agree with this approach, and also consider that a wrongly-defined domestic industry
necessarily leads to an injury determination that is inconsistent with the Agreements. While the
panel's findings in EC – Salmon (Norway) were in the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, its
reasoning is equally apposite to Articles 16.1 and 15 of the SCM Agreement because, as noted
above, the texts of these provisions are identical.

7.5.5.1 Whether MOFCOM's domestic industry definition was distorted
7.211. Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement require
MOFCOM to define the domestic industry in relation to domestic producers "of the like product"
325.
Prior to limiting the like product scope by revising the engine capacity parameter to certain
automobiles of a cylinder capacity equal to or greater than 2500cc, we recall that MOFCOM defined

320 Appellate Body Report, China - GOES, para. 127.
321 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 127.
322 Appellate Body Report, China - GOES, para. 126.
323 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.118.
329 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.124.
325 "Like product" is defined in Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and footnote 46 to the SCM
Agreement as:
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the
absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

the like product as "Saloon cars and Cross-country cars (of a cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc)". 326
MOFCOM concluded, in its determinations, that the Chinese saloon and cross-country cars included
i n i t s d e f i n i t i o n w e r e " l i k e " t h o s e e x p o r t e d b y t h e U S r e s p o n d e n t c o m p a n i e s , h a v i n g r e g a r d t o
"physical and chemical characteristics", "use", "sales channels", and "prices, consumers,
competitiveness or substitution".
327 It thus follows that the domestic industry in the underlying
investigations was to be defined either as producers "as a whole" of saloon cars and cross-country
cars of a cylinder capacity equal to or greater th an 2500cc, or as those producers whose output of
saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylin der capacity equal to or greater than 2500cc
constitutes a major proportion of total Chinese pr oduction of such automobiles. MOFCOM defined
its domestic industry on the latter basis in this case. Once the domestic industry is defined, on
either basis, Articles 4.1 and 16.1 allow for the exclusion of producers in only two situations,
neither of which are of relevance to the present dispute. Beyond these two situations, Articles 4.1
and 16.1 do not allow MOFCOM to exclude categories or groups of producers
328 from its domestic
industry definition.329
7.212. However, merely because certain producers were not included in the domestic industry as
defined by MOFCOM in this dispute, it does no t necessarily follow that such producers were
thereby excluded from the domestic industry defi nition. Rather, we see an important distinction
between the a priori exclusion of producers from the domestic industry, as defined pursuant to
Articles 4.1 and 16.1, and data collection problems that an IA may encounter after defining the
domestic industry.
330 While the latter scenario may raise concerns as to the consistency of the IA's
injury determination with Article 3 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15 of the SCM
Agreement, unlike the former scenario, it would not necessarily bear upon Articles 4.1 and 16.1.
We recall in this regard that Articles 4.1 and 16.1 do not establish any particular procedure or
methodology for MOFCOM to follow in defining the domestic industry. 331 Nothing in these
provisions thus precludes MOFCOM from establishing deadlines for producers to come forward to
be considered for inclusion in the domestic industry, despite that such deadlines may ultimately
prevent producers from participating in the invest igations, where they fail to make themselves
known in a timely manner.
332 In our view, further, the mere fact that the domestic industry as
defined does not include a particular proportion of producers opposing the complaint, does not
demonstrate that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 4.1 and 16.1. With this in mind, we
turn to the specific arguments with respect to this claim.
7.213. The United States argues that MOFCOM, by requiring domestic producers to register in
order to participate in the investigations, introduced a self-selection process that distorted its
injury determination in two respects. First, the United States submits that MOFCOM, by
conditioning the inclusion of domestic producers in the domestic industry definition on a
willingness to participate in the injury investigations, introduced a material risk of distortion by
using a process capable of leading to self-selection among domestic producers.
333 The
United States contends that this process created an inherent bias towards weaker-performing
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c e r s , a n d l i k e n s M O F C O M ' s a c t i o n s i n t h i s r e g a r d t o t h o s e a t i s s u e i n t h e EC –
Fasteners (China) dispute.334 Second, the United States submits that there was such self-selection
in this dispute, pursuant to which the CAAM ultimately provided data to MOFCOM from only eight
of its member producers.335 We will first turn to each alleged aspect of distortion.

326 AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2; CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 2.
327 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, pp. 29-30. The United States does not challenge
MOFCOM's like product determination, as such. The United States refers to MOFCOM's conclusion that Chinese
automobiles and subject imports overlapped competitivel y in its causation analysis, and challenges MOFCOM's
use of AUVs without adjustment in its price effects claim.
328 Or forms of the like product.
330 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), fn. 283.
332 We do not mean to suggest that such deadlines can be rigidly enforced in all instances, but in our
view, at some point in the investigation it may well become unfeasible as a practical matter for an IA to include
additional producers in the domestic industry, even if they seek to participate, and still finish the investigation
within the time limits established in Article 5. 10. See, in this regard, Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), paras. 460, 611, 613.
333 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel questions Nos. 35 and 36.c.
334 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 61-62.
335 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 34-35.

7.214. We find the US contention that MOFCOM's registration requirement introduced a material
risk of distortion, as a process capable of leadin g to self-selection among domestic producers in
the definition of the domestic industry, to be unconvincing. We note that there are multiple steps
that must be taken in AD and CVD investigations, and IAs face logistical constraints in this regard.
In previous cases, panels and the Appellate Body have concluded that an IA must be allowed some
flexibility in how it ensures an orderly conduct of its investigations, for instance by establishing
deadlines for interested parties to come forward to be considered for inclusion in the domestic
industry.
336 We consider that the same need for flex ibility justifies the use of a registration
process, which essentially requires interested parties to come forward by a deadline and make
themselves known to the IA to be considered part of the domestic industry. The mere fact that
some producers may choose not to do so, i.e., "self-select" out of coming forward, to use the US
terminology, does not, in our view, introduce a mate rial risk of distortion in the IA's process of
defining the domestic industry. In our view, merely that domestic producers might choose not to
participate does not mean that the registration requirement leads to a definition of domestic
industry inconsistent with Articles 4.1 and 16.1. Provided a registration requirement strikes an
appropriate balance between the right of interested parties to participate in an investigation, and
administrative efficiency, we see nothing in the relevant provisions that would preclude it.
7.215. In determining whether or not MOFCOM's registration requirement struck an appropriate
balance in this regard, we recall that MOFCOM issued two notices of initiation and two notices
calling for interested parties to register in the injury investigations, to which the registration forms
were appended. All four notices contained info rmation about how to contact the responsible
MOFCOM officials.
337 Further, MOFCOM placed these notices, information about the investigations,
and the registration forms themselves on its website. 338 The registration forms consisted of a
questionnaire inviting prospective registrants to submit contact details and company-specific
information on capacity, production, inventory, construction and expansion plans, and
export/import volumes and values during the POI.339 MOFCOM, in these notices, specified a 20-day
deadline for interested parties to register to participate in its investigations, expiring on
26 November 2009. 340 In our view, MOFCOM communicated its notices and forms in an open
manner, and the possibility of participation in the investigations was equally available to any
interested party.
7.216. We disagree with the US contention that MOFCOM's use of a registration requirement
created an inherent bias towards weaker-per forming domestic producers in the Chinese
automobile market, thereby leading to the imposi tion of higher duties. The data requested by
MOFCOM in the registration notices was directly related to the inquiries MOFCOM would have to
undertake in defining the domestic industry and making a determination of injury. We see nothing
in the neutral request for information that would cause domestic producers posting the strongest
performance to be more reluctant to come forward, provide this information to MOFCOM, and
register to participate. Moreover, even if such producers did choose not to participate, we do not
see how this can be attributed to the IA or the registration process.
7.217. We make two final observations in this regard. First, we note that the United States does
not assert, as a factual matter, that the eight CAAM members that provided information for
MOFCOM's investigations were weaker-performing.
341 Thus, there is no basis on which we could
conclude that the domestic industry consisting of these producers was, in fact, distorted as a result
of the registration process. Second, in the ev ent that stronger-performing producers did not
participate in the investigations, we recall that such producers received the same notice of the
investigations as the eight producers that did participate through the CAAM, and were equally
aware of the need to register in order to participate.
342 Even assuming that these producers might
have supplied information that would weigh against a finding of injury to the domestic industry, we

336 Panel Reports, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 7.219; China – Broiler Products, para. 7.428; Appellate
Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 460.
337 See AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 3; AD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-02, pp. 1-
2; and CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 5; CVD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-11, pp. 1-2.
338 China's response to Panel questions Nos. 34-35.
339 See AD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-12, p. 1; CVD injury registration form, Exhibit CHN-13,
p. 1.
340 See AD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-06, p. 2; AD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-02, p. 1;
and CVD notice of initiation, Exhibit USA-07, p. 4; CVD injury registration notice, Exhibit CHN-11, p. 1.
341 See in this regard US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 35.
342 China's response to Panel question No. 36.c.

find nothing on the record to suggest that their failure to do so was due to any action or inaction
on MOFCOM's part. We thus conclude that the United States has not shown that the use of a
registration requirement by MOFCOM introduced a ma terial risk of distortion through the use of a
process capable of leading to self-selection amon g domestic producers in MOFCOM's definition of
the domestic industry.
7.218. Regarding the US contention that MOFCOM's actions in this case are analogous to those
addressed in the EC – Fasteners (China) dispute
343, w e f i n d i t u s e f u l t o r e c a l l t h e f a c t s i n t h a t
dispute. In the underlying investigation, the IA, the EC Commission, considering it possible that it
would investigate a sample of the domestic industry, requested domestic producers to make
themselves known within a specified period and provide certain information concerning their
production and sales which could be used to determine the intended sample. 114 companies came
forward with relevant information, and the IA determined that 46 of those producers, collectively
accounting for 27% of total domestic production, constituted the domestic industry. The IA
concluded that those producers accounted for a "major proportion" of total domestic production.
The IA then selected a sample of those 46 producers, based on production volumes, as the sample
for purposes of the injury determination. The sampled producers accounted for 70% of the
production of the 46 producers constituting the domestic industry defined by the IA.
344
7.219. Before the Panel, China challenged the EC determination on several bases, arguing, inter
alia, that the IA erred in excluding from the dome stic industry producers that made themselves
known after the deadline set out in the notice of initiation and those that did not support the
petition and that 27% of total domestic production did not constitute a "major proportion" within
the meaning of Article 4.1. The Panel rejected China's claim.
7.220. On appeal, China argued, inter alia, that the Panel erred in rejecting China's claim that the
domestic industry as defined did not account for a "major proportion" of total domestic production.
The Appellate Body upheld China's appeal with respect to the major proportion issue, but rejected
the remainder of China's appeal. The Appellate Body found that the IA had relied on a 25%
benchmark in concluding that 27% of total domestic production was a major proportion. The
Appellate Body concluded that this benchmark, which was based on the standing requirement in
Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, was "wholly unrelated" to the proper interpretation of
the term "major proportion", and thus, by applying that benchmark, the IA defined a domestic
industry covering a low proportion of domestic production, significantly restricting the data
coverage for an accurate and undistorted injury determination.
345 In addition, the Appellate Body
concluded that, by defining the domestic industry on the basis of producers' willingness to be
included in the sample, the IA's approach im posed a self-selection process among domestic
producers that introduced a material risk of di stortion. The Appellate Bo dy observed that the
sample was a subset of the domestic industry, and thus the Appellate Body failed to see why
willingness to be included in the subset should affect inclusion in the wider universe of the
domestic industry.
346 Moreover, the Appellate Body noted that the IA had, in fact, identified and
obtained information from more producers than the 45 it ultimately included in the domestic
industry. The Appellate Body concluded that by including in the domestic industry only those
producers willing to be included in the sample, th e IA's approach shrank the universe of producers
whose data could have been used in making the injury determination.
347
7.221. We find the comparison between MOFCOM's actions in this dispute and those of the EC
Commission in EC – Fasteners (China) unconvincing. We see several pertinent distinctions between
the two situations in question. 348 First, unlike the EC Commission in EC – Fasteners, MOFCOM did
not apply an unrelated benchmark in determining whether the domestic industry it defined
included domestic producers accounting for a ma jor proportion of total domestic production.
Rather, MOFCOM received information from domest ic producers whose collective output ranged
between 33.54% and 54.15% of total domestic pr oduction during the POI, and then determined

343 See for instance US second written submission, paras. 61-62.
344 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 7.213-7.216.
345 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 425.
346 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427.
347 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 429.
348 See in this regard on a simila r factual pattern, Panel Report, China – Broiler Products , paras. 7.427-
7.430.

without reference to any benchmark that they accounted for a major proportion of that
production.349
7.222. Second, MOFCOM did not define the domestic industry on the basis of willingness to be
included in a sample. There was no sampling in the investigations at issue here, and thus no
question of limiting the universe of producers eligible to be included in the domestic industry on
the basis of their willingness to be included in a subset of the domestic industry. While MOFCOM
did require producers to register and submit inform ation within a 20-day deadline, it did not act in
any way to exclude any of the producers providing that information from consideration in defining
the domestic industry. In our view, this is, if anything analogous to the process of setting a
deadline by which producers were required to make themselves known, which was accepted as
reasonable by both the panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China).
350
7.223. Third, we recall our findings above that the United States has not shown that the process
used by MOFCOM to define the domestic indust ry was biased towards a category of domestic
producers.351 We thus conclude that MOFCOM's registration requirement differs materially from the
actions taken by the EC Commission in the EC – Fasteners (China) dispute.
7.224. Turning to the second alleged distortion in MOFCOM's domestic industry definition, the
United States argues that there was self-selection in this case, as a result of which the CAAM
ultimately provided data to MOFCOM from only eight of its member producers resulting in actual
distortion of the injury determination. This argument rests on speculation. The United States has
pointed to nothing on the record which suggests that the CAAM orchestrated its members'
participation in MOFCOM's investigations in any way that would make an affirmative injury
determination more likely. Moreover, while it is true that only a subset of CAAM members chose to
participate in MOFCOM's investigations, there is simply no evidence to suggest that this was
because those companies were the weakest, and that producers posting stronger results chose not
to participate for that reason. There are equally plausible other reasons which might explain the
decision of CAAM members to participate in the investigations or not.
7.225. We note that there is nothing in the text of the Anti-Dumping or SCM Agreements
establishing a methodology for defining the domestic industry in an investigation. In our view, the
possibility that weaker-performing producers in a given industry will more strongly support an AD
or CVD investigation or be more likely to participate actively is simply a reflection of the realities of
trade remedy actions. The possibility of impositi o n o f d e f i n i t i v e A D a n d / o r C V D m e a s u r e s w i l l
afford all producers relief from lower-priced imports, but producers performing less well will tend
to have a greater incentive to seek initiation of and participate in an investigation. We fail to see
how this fact, which is beyond the control of an IA, is affected by the requirement that producers
register and provide certain information in order to participate. In the same vein, the fact that
producers may choose to request and take part in an investigation by coordinating their actions
through a trade association, which can gather individual company data to send to the IA, does not
necessarily mean that a domestic industry defined as those producers is inconsistent with the
requirements of Articles 4.1 and 16.1. We recall that Articles 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and 11.4 of the SCM Agreement provide that an AD or CVD investigation may only be initiated
based on an application made "by or on behalf of" the domestic industry.
352 Further, Articles 5.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 11.4 of the SC M Agreement preclude the initiation of an
investigation where producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25% of
total production, or where producers supporting the application account for less than 50% of
production of those producers expressing an opinion. Thus, the possibility that a domestic industry
could, by self-selecting participation in the investigation obtain an AD or CVD measure which is
unjustified seems extremely unlikely. Certainly nothing in the circumstances of this case suggests
that this happened in the investigations at issue.

349 Final determination, Exhibit CH N-07, pp. 35, 48; supplemental injury submission, Exhibit CHN-08.
We note that the actual percentages of total production are not themselves specified in either document.
350 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 7.219; Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) ,
para. 460.
351 See paras. 7.211–7.216 of this Report.
352 Unless, of course, an investigation is self-initiated pursuant to either Article 5.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement or Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement.

7.226. In light of the above, we conclude that the United States has not demonstrated that the
domestic industry definition in the investigations at issue was distorted because of alleged self-
selection resulting from MOFCOM's registration requirement for participation in the investigations.
The United States has thus not established that MOFCOM's process resulted in a definition of
domestic industry in these investigations inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement. Consequently, the United States' claim that
the injury determination was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
15.1 of the SCM Agreement as a result of having been based on a wrongly-defined domestic
industry must be rejected.
7.5.5.2 Whether the domestic industry defined by MOFCOM included producers
accounting for a major proportion of total domestic production
7.227. We note that United States does not argu e that the actual percentages of total domestic
production accounted for by producers included in the domestic industry defined by MOFCOM are
insufficient on a mathematical or quantitative basis. Rather, the United States contends that that
definition was not based on a major proportion of total domestic production, because of: a)
MOFCOM's allegedly flawed process by which the domestic industry was defined, b) the relatively
low percentages of total domestic production accounted for by producers included in the domestic
industry definition, and c) MOFCOM's failure to just ify defining the domestic industry as it did in
light of the relatively low percentages in its final determination.
353
7.228. We have already rejected the US arguments with respect to the process by which MOFCOM
defined the domestic industry in the investigations at issue. 354 Accordingly, to the extent the
United States contends that this allegedly flawed process also led to a domestic industry definition
that was not based on a major proportion of total domestic production, we disagree.
7.229. We further consider that the United States has not substantiated its argument that the
percentages of total domestic production acco unted for over the POI by domestic producers
included in the industry defined by MOFCOM were low and that MOFCOM should have explained its
rationale for allowing such low percentages to reflect a major proportion of total domestic
production. We recall that producers in the domestic industry accounted for no less than 33.54%
of total domestic production during the period examined, and as much as 54.16%. In the absence
of some further explanation, we fail to see why these percentages should be considered to be low,
let alone why MOFCOM should have been required to show justification in this regard.
7.230. Before concluding, we wish to address the US reliance on EC – Fasteners (China) to
contend that MOFCOM was obliged to obtain "wide ranging information concerning the relevant
economic factors in order to ensure the accuracy of an investigation concerning the state of the
industry and the injury it has suffered", and that in order to do so, MOFCOM was obliged to define
the domestic industry so as to include domestic producers accounting for "a relatively high
proportion of the total domestic production."
355 In our view, the US argument puts the cart before
the horse. While an IA is certainly required to collect "wide ranging information concerning the
relevant economic factors in order to ensure the accuracy of an investigation concerning the state
of the industry and the injury it has suffered", before it can do so it must define the domestic
industry from whose members that information will be obtained. We fail to understand how the
need to gather such information can inform the process of defining the domestic industry, unless,
as is not the case, there is a hierarchy between the two bases for defining the domestic industry
set out in Articles 4.1 and 16.1. As discussed above, in EC – Fasteners (China) the Appellate Body
found fault with the definition of the domestic industry because the IA a priori excluded without
justification a category of domestic producers, those that did not express a willingness to be
included in a sample, from the domestic industry it defined, and relied on an inappropriate
benchmark in assessing major proportion. We do not read this decision as having implications for
the process of obtaining information concerning the domestic industry after it has been defined. As
we indicated above, while an injury determination may be found to be inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 15.1 if it is found that there is an inadequate basis of evidence to support it, such
inconsistency would not arise from failing to define the industry to include producers accounting
for a sufficiently large proportion of domestic production. A lack of sufficient evidence to support

353 US response to Panel question No. 39.
355 See for instance US response to Panel question No. 39.

an injury determination might arise as a result of data collection problems, but again, such
problems would not arise from failing to define the industry to include producers accounting for a
sufficiently large proportion of domestic production.
356 To the extent that the United States
suggests that the Appellate Body report in EC – Fasteners (China) stands for the proposition that a
domestic industry defined as producers accounting for a major proportion of total domestic
production must, in order to be consistent with Articles 4.1 and 16.1, in addition, be representative
of total domestic production, in the sense that a sample must be representative of the universe it
represents, we cannot agree. In our view, requiring an industry defined as producers accounting
for a major proportion of total domestic production to include a sufficiently large proportion to
ensure that it is representative of total domestic production would subordinate the major
proportion basis for defining the domestic industry to the total domestic production basis for
defining the domestic industry. Such subordination is without any justification or support in the
Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements. Articles 4.1 and 16.1 establish two distinct bases for defining
the domestic industry. Both are equally valid, and there is no hierarchy between them, as is clear
from the use of the conjunction "or" in the text of these provisions.
357 As we understand these
provisions, if a domestic industry is properly defined on the basis of producers accounting for a
major proportion of total domestic production, those producers then constitute the entire domestic
industry for purposes of the investigation.
358 We do not find it logical in such a situation to speak
of total domestic production as an alternative or more appropriate benchmark.
7.5.6 Conclusion
7.231. On the basis of the foregoing, we dismiss the US claim that MOFCOM's domestic industry
definition was distorted, and failed to include producers accounting for a major proportion of total
domestic production of the domestic like product, inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement. We therefore also reject the US claim
that China acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of
the SCM Agreement by basing its injury determination in the investigations at issue on a wrongly
defined domestic industry.
7.6 Whether MOFCOM's price effects analysis was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement
7.6.1 Provisions at issue
7.232. The texts of Articles 3.1 of the Anti-D umping Agreement and 15. 1 of the SCM Agreement
are set out in paragraph 7.182 above.
7.233. Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement provide
as follows:
[w]ith regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall
consider whether there has been a significant increase in [dumped/subsidized]
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
importing Member. With regard to the effect of the [dumped/subsidized] imports on
prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant
price undercutting by the [dumped/subsidized] imports as compared with the price of
a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is
otherwise to depress prices to a significan t degree or prevent price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these
factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.

357 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.416.
358 We recall in this regard the views of the panel in EC – Bed Linen , which found that, having defined
the domestic industry as a defined group of producers accounting for a major proportion of total domestic
production of the like product, the IA in that case could not then take into account, in its injury analysis, the
fact that additional domestic producers of the like product had go ne out of business during the period of
investigation, since these producers were not part of the industry defined in that case. See Panel Report, EC –
Bed Linen, para. 6.182.

7.6.2 Factual background
7.234. MOFCOM evaluated the price effects of imports for purposes of the AD and CVD
investigations in a single final determination.359 The price effects analysis in the final determination
was almost unchanged from the price effects analysis in the preliminary determination, which also
considered the price effects for both investigations. 360 In both determinations, MOFCOM analysed
trends in the average unit values ("AUVs") of subj ect imports and in the AUVs of the domestic like
product, and then compared the trends on a yearly basis for 2006, 2007, 2008, interim 2008, and
interim 2009.
7.235. The final determination concludes that, comparing the two AUVs on a yearly basis, the
price of subject imports during the POI followed th e same trend as the price of the domestic like
product. MOFCOM concluded that this parallel pricing, coupled with increases in subject import
volumes and market share, depressed domestic prices:
[a]s mentioned above, during the POI, the movement of price trends of the product
under investigation and domestic like product are consistent basically. Both of them
increased in general from 2006 to 2008, and decreased in the first three quarters of
2009. The investigation evidence indicates that, the import price of the product under
investigation decreased by 3.17% in the first three quarters of 2009 compared with
the same period of 2008, which led to that the prices of domestic like products [ sic.]
in the first three quarters of 2009 decrea sed by 10.13% compared with the same
period of 2008. It is clear that, the import prices of the product under investigation
depressed the prices of Chinese domestic like product.
In conclusion, the investigation evidence indicates that, during the POI, the import
volume of the product under investigation as well as its market shares in Chinese
domestic market increased continually. Especially at the end of the POI, the market
share of the product under investigation significantly increased and its price decreased
at the same time, which depressed the price of the domestic like product, and affected
the profitability of the domestic industry.
361
7.236. Chrysler USA submitted comments to MOFCOM in response to the almost identical price
effects analysis contained in MOFCOM's preliminary determination. 362 Chrysler USA challenged
MOFCOM's price effects analysis in light of the allegedly small market share held by subject
imports in the Chinese automobile market, and the purportedly negligible competitive overlap
between subject imports and the domestic like product. Chrysler's letter reads in relevant parts:
[t]he fact is that compared to the very large investigation rises in (1) non-subject
imports and (2) production of the types of vehicles under investigation by China's JVs,
the presence of subject imports in the Chinese market has always been minor.
Indeed, the data cited in the Preliminary Determination show that, throughout the
period of review, sales of sedans and SUVs produced by Chinese manufacturers not
included in the domestic industry and by producers in non-subject (or "third")
countries have always accounted for at least 71 per cent of total apparent domestic
consumption.
[Table 3 omitted]
More to the point, however, is the fact that MOFCOM's own data demonstrate that the
overlap of competition between subject imports and the domestic like product is
minuscule, if it exists at all. The data relied on by MOFCOM show that subject imports
oversold the domestic like product during the period of investigation, and oversold to
a far greater degree toward the end of the period of investigation.
[Table 4 omitted]

359 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 128-140.
360 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, pp. 89-101.
361 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 130-131.
362 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, pp. 91-92.

This rules out any possibility that the pricing of subject imports suppressed or
depressed prices of the domestic like product. Indeed, this large a margin of
overselling is evidence that there is no meaningful overlap of competition between
subject imports and the domestic like product.
Available information on the types of subject vehicles imported from the United States
and the like product produced in China confirms the absence of meaningful
competition between them. The automobile industry segments the subject sedans and
SUVs sold in China during the period of investigation into the following categories: (1)
Entry Level, (2) Mid Level, (3) Premium Level, and (4) Luxury Level. There were no,
i.e., zero "Entry Level" vehicles among th e subject imports at any time during the
period of investigation, and most of them (i.e., 73.6 percent in 2006, 95.8 percent in
2007, 80.5 percent in 2008, 73.3 percent in 2009, and 78.7 percent in 2010) were
"Luxury Class" vehicles. By contrast, almost all of the domestic like product saloon
cars and cross-country cars produced and sold in China during the period of
investigation – i.e., 98.7 per cent in 2006, 95.1 per cent in 2007, 96.6 per cent in
2008, 97.6 per cent in 2009 and 98.8 per cent in 2010 – were "Entry Level" vehicles.
These data disprove any claim that subject imports could have had a material effect
on sales of the much different class of sedans and SUVs produced by the domestic
industry.
363 (italic in original, underline added)
7.237. MOFCOM noted Chrysler USA's arguments, an d dismissed each of them in its discussion of
causation in the final determination.364
7.6.3 Arguments of the parties
7.6.3.1 United States
7.238. The United States contends that MOFCOM's finding of price depression in the investigations
at issue was inconsistent with Articles 3. 1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement in five respects.
7.239. First, the United States argues that MOFCOM's finding of parallel pricing is invalidated by
the record. Specifically, the United States note s that the prices of subject imports and the
domestic like product moved in opposite directions in the 2006-2007 period.
365 Further, in those
periods of the POI where the two prices moved in parallel, the rates of change in the prices of
subject imports and the domestic like product differed. 366 In the US view, these trends suggest
that the prices of subject imports and the domestic like product were not parallel at any point of
the POI.367 The United States submits that even if MOFCOM's finding of parallel pricing had a basis
in the record, MOFCOM in any event failed to explain how such parallel pricing caused price
depression. The United States submits that the qualifying language used by MOFCOM in its final
determination, that subject import and domestic like product prices were "consistent basically" and
increased "in general" falls short of such an explanation, being at a level of generality that is not
permitted by Articles 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 15.1 of the SCM Agreement.
368
7.240. Second, the United States argues that MOFCOM's price depression analysis is undermined
by the fact that prices of subject imports were hi gher than those of the domestic industry, that is,
showed overselling, through most of the POI. 369 According to the United States, MOFCOM's
conclusion that a 3% decline in subject import prices caused a 10% drop in domestic prices
becomes untenable in light of the fact that subject imports at that time were overselling the
domestic like product by wide margins.
370

363 US respondent comments on the preliminary determination, Exhibit USA-12, pp. 26-28.
364 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 155-162. We discuss causation below at section 7.7 of this
Report.
365 See for instance US first written submission, para. 135.
367 US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 51.
368 US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 77.
369 See for instance US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 71-72.
370 US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 72.

7.241. Third, the United States submits that MOFCOM erred in using annual AUVs without
adjustments in its price effects analysis. Given record evidence that "certain automobiles" is not a
homogeneous product
371, MOFCOM should have made adjustments to reflect the different grades
of subject imports and the domestic like product, or at least explained why such adjustments were
not necessary in this case.372 In this regard, the United States draws the Panel's attention to sales
data submitted by Chrysler USA to MOFCOM which shows that sales of subject imports occurred
mostly in higher-value market segments than those of the domestic like product.
373
7.242. Fourth, the United States contends that MOFCOM's reliance on an increase in the market
share of subject imports as depressing prices of the domestic industry is undermined by evidence
on the record that Chinese producers made equivalent gains in market share during the same
period.
374 In this regard, the United States notes that subject imports gained 4.68 percentage
points of market share from interim 2008 to inte rim 2009, and the domestic industry also gained
4.51 percentage points of market share during that same period.375 The United States submits that
MOFCOM failed to address this evidence, which undercuts its price depression determination. 376
The United States contends that a review of mark et share data for subject imports, the domestic
industry, Chinese producers not part of the dome stic industry as defined by MOFCOM, and third
country imports clearly shows that the domestic industry lost market share to a combination of
Chinese producers not part of the domestic indu stry and third country imports, as opposed to
subject imports.377 In the US view, this indicates that th e market share gains of subject imports
lacked "explanatory force" for the decline in domestic industry prices in this period.378
7.243. Last, the United States argues that MOFCOM's domestic industry definition compromised
its price effects analysis, insofar as MOFCOM wrongly defined the domestic industry, which
consequently resulted in a distorted injury determination. 379 The United States contends in this
regard that the pricing data obtained from a li mited segment of the domestic industry could not
provide an understanding of the explanatory force of subject imports for the price of the domestic
like product.380
7.6.3.2 China
7.244. China asserts that MOFCOM's price depressi on analysis entailed a review of price trends
through the entirety of the POI. Pursuant to this review, MOFCOM found that prices for the
domestic like product decreased as a result of a combination of increases in subject import
volumes and in market share, coupled with para llel price trends for subject imports and the
domestic like product. In China's view, the US challenge to MOFCOM's price depression
determination is largely focused on trends for one year out of a nearly four-year long POI.
381
7.245. Replying to the specific arguments raised by the United States, China first argues that
MOFCOM correctly found parallel pricing between subject imports and the domestic like product,
and based this finding on trends observed throughout the POI. 382 China acknowledges that the
prices of subject imports and the domestic indu stry moved in opposite directions from 2006 to
2007. In China's view, an IA is not required to show a "perfect correlation in prices" to support a
finding of parallel pricing. China contends that MO FCOM fully took into account differences in price
trends between subject imports and the domestic like product during the POI, as reflected by the
use, in the final determination, of the qualifiers, when it stated that prices for both baskets of
goods were "consistent basically", and had "increased in general" from 2006 to 2008.
383 China also

372 See for instance US first written submission, para. 144.
373 US first written submission, para. 142, referring to the US respondent comments on the preliminary
determination, Exhibit USA-12, Table 6, pp. 50-51.
374 See for instance US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 63-70.
375 US first written submission, para. 145, referring to the final determination, p. 62 in Exhibit USA-02
(pp. 129-130 in Exhibit CHN-07).
377 US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, paras. 66-69.
378 See for instance US second written submission, para. 85.
379 See for instance US first written submission, para. 148.
381 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 83.
382 See for instance China's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 49-51.
383 See for instance China's opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 54.

argues that the rate of change in prices were similar for subject imports and the domestic like
product in those parts of the POI where they move d in the same direction, particularly in the
interim 2009 period. 384 China also submits that MOFCOM's final determination adequately
addressed the role that parallel pricing played in MOFCOM's overall price effects analysis.385
7.246. Second, in China's view, logic dictates that higher-priced imports may depress the prices of
lower-priced domestic goods. 386 China submits in this regard that if the existence of overselling
fatally undercut a price depression or suppression analysis pursuant to the Anti-Dumping and/or
SCM Agreement, price depression or suppression could never occur without price undercutting
being present which, in China's view, reflects an incorrect interpretation of Article 3.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement.
387
7.247. Third, regarding the use of AUVs, China no tes that neither Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement nor Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement specifies a particular methodology for
comparing prices of subject imports and the domestic like product. 388 China contends that the
need to adjust AUVs in a price comparison is more appropriate in the context of a price
undercutting analysis, where an IA must compare absolute price levels to determine whether
subject import prices in fact undercut the domestic like product prices. As MOFCOM was comparing
relative price movements over time in its price depression analysis, China submits that such
adjustments were unnecessary in this case.
389 China contends in this regard that neither the Anti-
Dumping Agreement nor the SCM Agreement requires an IA to establish a 100% overlap between
subject imports and the domestic like product in a price effects analysis.
390 China submits that
MOFCOM, in the investigations at issue, performed a detailed analysis of the competitive
relationship between subject imports and the domestic like product, pursuant to which it
determined that the use of unadjusted AUVs was appropriate. 391 In China's view, MOFCOM gave
due consideration to the sales data submitted by Ch rysler USA, and correctly determined that this
data was unreliable in two respects. First, China contends that the four market segments into
which data was separated, entry, mid, luxury, and premium, were undefined. Second, China
submits that the data for total import volumes did not correspond to the data collected by
MOFCOM.
392
7.248. Fourth, China argues that the market share gained by the domestic industry in the interim
2009 period did not affect MOFCOM's analysis of market shares, which was based on trends over
the whole of the POI. 393 China submits that from 2006 to interim 2009, subject import market
share increased by 3.5 percentage points, while the market share of the domestic industry
decreased by roughly the same margin. In China's view, this shows that subject imports took
market share from the domestic industry.
394 China thus disagrees with the US contention that the
domestic industry lost market share to Chinese producers not part of the domestic industry and
third country imports. China submits in this regard that the market shares for these categories of
producers remained relatively stable throughout the POI. 395 In response to the US assertion that
MOFCOM failed to explain how market share increa ses of subject imports had "explanatory force"
for the decline in domestic industry prices in this period, China contends that MOFCOM explained
in its final determination that domestic producers only managed to gain market share by lowering
their prices in order to compete with a surge in subject imports.
396
7.249. China also points to the fact that no US respondents objected to MOFCOM's reliance on the
market share gains of subject imports when evalua t i n g t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e U S c l a i m . I n C h i n a ' s
view, that no party raised objection to MOFCOM's findings on market shares in the course of its
investigation undercuts the importance and significance that the United States now purports to

384 China's second written submission, para. 106.
385 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 105.
386 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 189.
387 China's response to Panel question No. 18.
388 China's first written submission, para. 201.
389 China's second written submission, paras. 116-120.
390 China's second written submission, para. 131.
391 See for instance China's response to Panel question No. 41.
392 See for instance China's response to Panel question No. 19.
393 See for instance China's first written submission, paras. 214-215.
394 China's second written submission, para. 114.
395 See for instance China's second written submission, paras. 111-112.
396 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 110.

attribute to it before the Panel. 397 China asks the Panel to consider this lack of objection in its
decision.
7.250. Last, China states that it has already shown in response to the US claim regarding
MOFCOM's domestic industry definition that such definition was consistent with Article 4.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement. 398 Thus, this aspect of the US
claim on price effects has no basis. China in any event contends that each provision of the Anti-
Dumping and SCM Agreements must be examined on its own, to determine whether the rights and
obligations contained therein have been violated in light of the particular facts and arguments put
forward by the parties in a given case. China thus disagrees with the US contention that a finding
of a violation of Articles 4.1 and 16.1 automatically leads to a violation of Articles 3.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement.
399
7.6.4 Arguments of the third parties
7.251. Japan emphasizes the importance of evaluating the explanatory force of subject imports
on the prices of the domestic industry in the context of a price effects analysis. 400 Noting an IA's
obligation to ensure price comparability when comparing import and domestic like product prices
in a price effects analysis, Japan submits that not all types of vehicles in a "basket" of subject
imports would necessarily be "like" all types of vehicles in a basket of domestically produced
vehicles, absent further investigation by an IA.
401 The use of AUVs to compare prices for these two
baskets, according to Japan, risks ignoring price differences, and differences stemming from
physical characteristics, usage and market perception.
402
7.252. The European Union makes arguments on two aspects of MOFCOM's price effects
analysis. First, it supports the US contention that a finding of parallel pricing, without more, is
insufficient to demonstrate the existence or direction of any causal relationship between prices of
imports and of the domestic like product.
403 The European Union emphasizes the importance of an
in-depth and fact-intensive examination of the reasons for such parallel pricing, particularly in
situations where there are breaks in the patterns of parallel pricing.404 The European Union adds in
this regard that the record in this dispute belies MOFCOM's finding of continuous parallel pricing in
the underlying investigations. 405 Second, it considers that AUVs are appropriate in investigations
involving products that are relatively homogeneous and sufficiently comparable. 406 The
European Union argues that the way MOFCOM used AUVs in its price effects analysis in this case
worked to the advantage of the US exporters, insofar as MOFCOM's price effects analysis revealed
a discernible price gap between the high-end (subject imports) and low-end (domestic like
product) segments at issue, thus giving weight to US arguments on overselling. Adjustments to
these AUVs, according to the European Union, would close this price gap and downplay the
presence of overselling.
407
7.253. Saudi Arabia makes three observations on MOFCOM's price effects analysis. First, it
emphasizes the importance of evaluating the explan atory force of subject imports on the prices of
the domestic industry in the context of a price effects analysis. 408 Second, Saudi Arabia submits
that an IA's evaluation of such explanatory fo rce must conform to the overarching principles
contained in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement,
which require an IA to rigorously "consider" the relationship between subject import prices on price
effects felt by the domestic industry. 409 Third, Saudi Arabia observes that an IA must document

398 China's first written submission, paras. 172-174.
399 China's first written submission, para. 173.
400 Japan's third party submission, paras. 25, 29.
401 Japan's third party submission, para. 27.
402 Japan's third party submission, para. 28.
408 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 37.
409 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, paras. 38-39.

key steps in its "consideration[s]" on the record, failing which interested parties would be unable
to verify whether the IA indeed "considered" material factors.410
7.6.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.254. The principal issue that this claim raises is whether MOFCOM's finding of price depression
finds sufficient basis in the information on the record to satisfy the requirements of Articles 3.1
and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement.
7.255. We note that neither Article 3.2 nor Article 15.2 impose a specific methodology on an IA in
analysing the effects of subject imports on domestic industry prices. Panels and the Appellate Body
have previously recognized the margin of discretion that an IA has in choosing a methodology for
such an analysis. However, these reports underline that this discretion is not unlimited. Articles 3.2
and 15.2 are informed by the overarching obligation of Articles 3.1 and 15.1 that an IA undertake
an "objective examination" based on "positive evidence".
411 Further, the Appellate Body stated, in
China – GOES , that in addition to a "consideration" of the existence of a type of price effect on
domestic prices, an IA's price effects analysis requires an IA to determine whether subject imports
have an "explanatory force" for such price effect(s). 412 T h i s c a l l s u p o n a n I A t o e x a m i n e t h e
relationship between subject imports and domestic prices, which cannot be done properly if the IA
confines its analysis to what is happening to domestic prices, without consideration of subject
imports and their prices. The Appellate Body observed that elements relevant to a consideration of
price undercutting may differ from those relevant to a consideration of price depression or price
suppression, such that subject imports may still have a price depressing effect, even if they do not
significantly undercut domestic prices.
413 In all cases, however, the IA may not disregard evidence
that calls into question the explanatory force of subject imports on alleged price effects to
domestic industry prices.414
7.256. In price comparisons between groups of subject imports and the like domestic goods
further, an IA must ensure price comparability between the goods whose prices are compared. A
failure to ensure price comparability is inconsistent with the requirement under Articles 3.1 and
15.1 that a determination of injury be based on positive evidence and involve an objective
examination of, inter alia, the effect of subject imports on the prices of domestic like products.
415
Thus, an IA must ensure that whatever price differentials arise from a comparison of domestic and
imported goods in "baskets" of products or sales transactions result from a type of price effects,
and not merely from differences in the composition of the two baskets being compared, absent
adjustments by the IA to control and adjust for relevant differences in product characteristics.
416
7.257. With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the specific arguments presented by
the United States in support of this claim.
7.6.5.1 Whether MOFCOM's findings on parallel pricing were supported by the evidence
7.258. The United States contends that MOFCOM's finding of parallel pricing has no basis in the
evidence on the record before the IA. Further, th e United States argues that MOFCOM failed to
demonstrate the explanatory force of the purporte d parallel pricing on the price depression found.
China argues that the record supports MOFCOM's finding of parallel pricing, and that MOFCOM also
showed the explanatory force of such parallel pr icing on the depression of domestic industry
prices.
7.259. The final determination contains the following data with respect to yearly changes in the
prices of subject imports and the domestic like product:

410 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 40.
411 Panel Reports, China – X-Ray Equipment , para. 7.41; China – Broiler Products , para. 7.474;
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 113 (discussing the related issue of the IA's
examination of the volume of imports).
412 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 136.
413 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 137.
414 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 154.
415 In the Appellate Body's view, the obligations to ensure price comparability "must be met by every
investigating authority in every injury determination". Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, paras. 200-201.
416 Panel Reports, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.65; China – Broiler Products, para. 7.483.

Table 3: Changes in AUVs (in %)417

Year 2006-2007 2007-2008 1Q-3Q 2008 – 1Q-3Q 2009
Subject imports -8.47 39.6 -3.17
Domestic like product 11.08 16.82 -10.13

7.260. MOFCOM concluded in its final determination that these changes in AUVs demonstrated the
existence of parallel pricing in the following terms:
[a]s mentioned above, during the POI, the movement of price trends of the product
under investigation and domestic like product are consistent basically. Both of them
increased in general from 2006 to 2008, and decreased in the first three quarters of
2009. The investigation evidence indicates that, the import price of the product under
investigation decreased by 3.17% in the first three quarters of 2009 compared with
the same period of 2008, which led to that the prices of domestic like products [ sic.]
in the first three quarters of 2009 decrea sed by 10.13% compared with the same
period of 2008. It is clear that, the import prices of the product under investigation
depressed the prices of Chinese domestic like product.
418 (emphasis added)
7.261. While we agree that an IA need not find a perfect correlation in prices to establish the
existence of parallel pricing between subject imports and the domestic like product, we find that
MOFCOM's analysis of the purported existence of parallel pricing fails to reflect an objective
examination based on positive evidence of the pr ices of subject imports and the domestic like
product.
7.262. The record clearly shows that from 2006 to 2007, the average unit values of subject
imports and of the domestic like product moved in different directions: the AUV of subject imports
decreased by 8.47%, while the AUV of the domestic like product rose by 11.08%.
419 This is not
discussed in the final determination at all. In our view, however, such a fact, which seems to
undermine the factual conclusion reached by the IA, should have been addressed in the IA's
determination. In the absence of any explanation as to why the divergence in AUVs observed in
the 2006-2007 period did not affect MOFCOM's final conclusion that there was a parallelism
between the prices of subject imports and the domestic industry during the POI, we cannot
conclude that MOFCOM even considered this matter, much less how it was resolved. While we do
not mean to suggest that diverging price movements between subject imports and the domestic
like product necessarily preclude a finding of parallel pricing in general, we consider that any such
finding would require some indication of the IA's reasoning in support of a conclusion of parallel
pricing in this situation. In our view, MOFCOM's use of qualifiers in the portion of its final
determination quoted above
420, upon which China relies to argue that MOFCOM took into account
the divergent trends, fails to explain how MOFCOM arrived at the conclusion that parallel pricing
existed in spite of the diverging movements in the 2006-2007 period. We consider that
interpreting these qualifiers to mean that MOFCOM took into account these diverging movements
would amount to our reading into the determination explanations that the IA did not provide.
7.263. We note that for the remainder of the POI, AUVs for subject imports and the domestic like
product moved in the same direction. AUVs for both increased from 2007 to 2008 and then
dropped from interim 2008 to interim 2009. However, while the general direction of change was
the same, the rate of change of the two AUVs was considerably different. From 2007 to 2008, the
AUVs of the domestic like product increased less than half as much as the AUVs of subject imports
(16.82% compared to 39.6%). From interim 2008 to interim 2009, the AUVs of the domestic like
product decreased almost three times as much as the AUVs of subject imports (10.17% compared
to 3.17%).
421

417 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 129-130.
418 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 130.
419 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 129-130.
420 Statements that prices of subj ect imports and the domestic like pr oduct were "consistent basically"
throughout the POI and "increased in general" from 2006 and 2008. See para. 7.260 of this Report.
421 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 129-130.

7.264. While it may not necessarily be erroneous to consider these movements to be parallel in a
general sense, Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement,
in our view, would have required a more detailed explanation of such a finding in the
circumstances of this case. We note in this respect that the definition of "parallel" generally
suggests not only movement in the same direction, but also equivalent changes;
Of lines (esp. straight ones), planes, surfaces, or concrete things, or of one in relation
to another: lying or extending alongside each other or the other and always at the
same distance apart; continuously equidistant. . . Having the same or a like course,
tendency, or purport: running on the same or similar lines: resembling something
else, or each other, throughout the whole extent: precisely similar, analogous, or
corresponding.
422
This reinforces our view that a situation of diverg ing trends during a part of the period examined
requires explanation before those trends can be characterized as "parallel". The evaluation of the
price effects of dumped or subsidized imports is an important aspect of an injury determination
and must be explained as clearly as possible in light of the facts before the IA. We would have
expected an objective and unbiased IA to take th ese two issues, the divergence in trends, and the
different rates of changes in AUVs, into account and explained why they did not affect the
conclusion reached.

7.265. In addition to the lack of supporting ex planation for MOFCOM's conclusion that there was
parallel pricing, we note that the determination and underlying record contain no explanation of
the connection between the purported existence of parallel pricing and the price depression found
to affect domestic industry prices. Although parallel pricing may form a basis for a determination
that subject imports depressed domestic like product prices
423, such a determination must explain
the role of parallel pricing in the price depression found. In the investigations at issue, MOFCOM
limited itself merely to finding the existence of parallel pricing in its final determination.424 We thus
find that MOFCOM failed to adequately explain the role of subject imports in the price depression
found to exist on the domestic market.425
7.266. Finally, we note China's argument that MOFCOM based its price depression determination
on a combination of parallel pricing, volumes and market share gains.426 Insofar as China suggests
that MOFCOM's findings on subject import volumes should stand, absent an explicit challenge by
the United States, and are alone sufficient to support its price effects determination 427, we
disagree. In this regard, we recall the Appellate Body's conclusion in China – GOES, that where an
IA relies on both subject import prices and volumes in its price effects analysis but provides no
explanation or reasoning as to whether or how the prices and volumes of subject imports
interacted to produce an effect on domestic prices, a panel may find itself unable to disentangle
the relative contribution of these price and volume effects in the IA's final determination, without
risking that it substitute its judgment for that of the IA.
428 As we are similarly unable to
disentangle the relative contributions of MOFCOM's findings on import volumes from its findings on
parallel pricing and market share gains, we find that we cannot uphold MOFCOM's price depression
determination on the basis of its findings on subject import volumes alone.
7.267. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that MOFCOM's determination that there was
price parallelism and its failure to adequately examine and explain the consequences for its finding
of price depression, fell short of the requirements of Articles 3.2 and 15.2 of the Agreements read
in light of the general obligation set forth in Articles 3.1 and 15.1 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM
Agreements, respectively.

422 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press 1993.
423 See for instance Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 210.
424 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 130-131.
425 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 136.
426 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 83.
427 China's first written submission, paras. 178-179.
428 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, paras. 220-221.

7.6.5.2 Whether MOFCOM's finding of pric e depression was warranted in light of
evidence of overselling by subject imports
7.268. The United States asserts that MOFCOM erred in finding price depression in light of
overselling by subject imports during most of the POI. 429 The United States contends that
overselling by subject imports casts doubts on MOFCOM's price depression determinations. China
disagrees that overselling margins preclude an IA from finding price depression.
7.269. MOFCOM's final determination contains the following data with respect to the yearly
average prices of subject imports and the domestic like product:
Table 4: AUVs (in CNY/Unit)430

Year 2006 2007 2008 1Q-3Q 2009
Subject imports 315,467 288,749 403,089 411,382
Domestic like
product 280,596 311,698 364,122 315,535

7.270. We observe that, with the exception of the 2007 period, the average price of subject
imports was higher than that of the domestic like product by significant margins. In 2007, subject
imports undersold the domestic like product by an average of CNY 22,949 per unit. 431 For the rest
of the POI, subject imports oversold the domestic like product, and by larger margins, in each
period: CNY 34,871 per unit in 2006, CNY 38,967 per unit in 2008 and CNY 95,847 per unit in the
interim 2009 period. The arguments by the United States and US respondents that subject imports
oversold the domestic like product during the POI thus are supported by the evidence on the
record before the IA. Indeed, China does not dispute the fact that there was overselling by subject
imports except in 2007.
7.271. We recall that the issue of overselling was brought to MOFCOM's attention by Chrysler USA
in a submission to MOFCOM following its preliminary determination.
432 MOFCOM addressed
Chrysler USA's comments in its final determination as follows:
[p]rice depression and price suppression do not require that the import price of the
product under investigation be lower than the price of the domestic like product. The
evidence indicates that since 2009, the decr ease of the import price of the product
under investigation depressed the price of the domestic like product.433
7.272. In our view, MOFCOM's final determination fails to reflect an obje ctive examination of the
evidence of overselling by the subject imports in finding price depression. Moreover, it entirely fails
to explain how MOFCOM considered that evidence, and what, if any, impact it had on MOFCOM's
reasoning. Subject imports oversold the domestic product during most of the POI. The margin of
overselling was not insignificant at any time during the POI, and in interim 2009 it was greater
than 30%. In our view, these facts do not, on their face, support a conclusion that the effect of
subject imports was price depression, and as a general matter, would tend to undermine such a
finding. We do not preclude the possibility that price depression may be found to exist in a case
where there is overselling by subject imports. However, absent analysis and explanation by the IA,
it is difficult to understand how a conclusion of price depression was reached in a situation where
prices of imports were, for the most part, significantly higher than those of the domestic like
product whose prices were purportedly being depressed during the POI.
7.273. We find that MOFCOM's assessment of the fact of overselling, brought to its attention
specifically in Chrysler USA's submission, falls short of the necessary analysis and explanation.

429 We do not understand the United States to be ar guing that the existence of overselling by subject
imports precludes a finding of price depression in general.
430 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 129-130. We note that these are not transaction prices, but
as discussed elsewhere in this Report, AUVs for the goods in question.
431 We recall that the price comparison is based on AUVs, which represent average prices.
433 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 157.

MOFCOM failed to engage with the evidence of overselling or the margins of overselling
themselves.434
7.274. As noted, we do not exclude the possibility that an IA may find the existence of price
depression in spite of overselling by subject impo rts during all or part of the POI. We do not
therefore disagree with MOFCOM's statement in th e final determination that price depression is
not, as a matter of law, contingent on a finding of price undercutting. Nevertheless, we find this
statement to be at a level of generality that fail s to explain why the overselling by subject imports
through most of the POI in the circumstances of the Chinese automobile market and industry did
not undermine MOFCOM's finding of price depression in the investigations at issue here.
7.275. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that this aspect of MOFCOM's price depression
analysis failed to reflect an objective examinatio n based on positive evidence within the meaning
of Articles 3.1 and 15.1. This resulted in a price depression analysis inconsistent with Articles 3.2
and 15.2 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively.
7.6.5.3 Whether MOFCOM's reliance on unadjusted AUVs in its price effects analysis was
justified
7.276. The United States argues that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 by using
AUVs435 in its price effects analysis without making the adjustments necessary to account for the
differences between the imported and domestic prod ucts. China is of the view that the domestic
and imported product groups were sufficiently simi lar, and that therefore the use of AUVs without
adjustments was justified.
7.277. We note that neither Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement nor Article 15.2 of the
SCM Agreement explicitly require an IA to ensure price comparability between subject imports and
the domestic like product when considering price effects. Nevertheless, the duty of an IA to
conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence pursuant to Article 3.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM Ag reement would, in our view, generally require
an IA to compare like with like in comparing prices. Indeed, this was the conclusion of both the
panel and the Appellate Body in China – GOES.
436 Insofar as China contends that the Appellate
Body's findings on the importance of ensuring price comparability are confined to situations in
which an analysis of price undercutting is undertaken 437, we disagree. In our view, the importance
of ensuring that the prices of domestic and imported products are comparable is the same
regardless of the type of price effects being considered. The Appellate Body's findings in China –
GOES, a case involving consideration of price undercutting in the context of a determination of
price depression and price suppression, support ou r view that the need to consider comparable
prices in order to undertake an objective examination of positive evidence is not limited to cases in
which a comparison of actual prices is undertaken, but applies to the consideration of price effects
in general. 438 We thus find that the an IA's obligation to ensure price comparability between
subject imports and the domestic like product is not affected by the type of price effects being
considered or found to affect domestic industry prices. In our view, this obligation arises whenever

434 Further, we cannot understand the reference to "evidence" in the last sentence quoted above as
indicating that MOFCOM took into account the overselling margins, as it is entirely unclear what MOFCOM is
referring to in this regard, and we cannot read into the determination explanations that that do not seem to be
there.
435 These AUVs are set out in Table 4 above.
436 Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.530; Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 200.
437 China's second written submission, paras. 116-120.
438 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES , para. 200. China contends that the Appellate Body's findings
should be interpreted narrowly owing to the pervasive role of price undercutting in the investigations at issue
in that dispute. However, the Appellate Body Report does not, explicitly or otherwise, limit the scope of its
findings to price undercutting. Moreover, we find the Appellate Body's reference to Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in fn. 331 revealing. Article 2.4 re quires a "fair comparison" in the context of dumping
margin calculations, with due allowance "for differences which affect price comparability, including differences
in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other
differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability." The Appellate Body's reference to the
fair comparison principles of Article 2.4, combin ed with the general nature of its findings in China – GOES , in
our view, support the conclusion that an IA's obligation to ensure meaningful price comparability also applies in
the context of a price depression or suppression analysis that is not primarily based on price undercutting.

an IA examines price effects within the meaning of Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement.439
7.278. In the investigations at issue, MOFCOM rejected arguments conc erning the comparability
of prices on the basis of its like product determination. In our view, merely finding that Chinese
automobiles are "like" the subject imported automo biles for purposes of Article 2.6 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and footnote 46 to the SCM Agreement 440, does not necessarily mean that
the AUVs of the Chinese automobiles can be appropriately compared with the AUVs of the
imported automobiles. 441 We recall in this regard that, as several panels have observed in the
context of like product, a broad basket of domestic goods may be found to be "like" a broad basket
of imported goods despite that each of the goods included in the basket of domestic goods is not
"like" each of the goods included within the scope of the product under consideration.
442 Even
granting that a like product determination may be relevant as the starting point of an assessment
of price comparability, in our view it will not always be determinative.
7.279. In this case, the record suggests that MOFCOM's like product determination was an
inadequate basis on which to conclude that the AUVs for the imported and domestic products were
comparable for two reasons. First, there was evidence before MOFCOM suggesting that the mix of
products differed between the subject imports and the domestic like product. Three US
respondents, Chrysler USA, General Motors U SA and Mercedes-Benz USA, made submissions to
MOFCOM in the course of its investigations that called into question assumptions on the
homogeneity of US and Chinese automobiles.
443 Chrysler USA's submission to MOFCOM following
the preliminary determination contained sales data showing that subject imports and Chinese
automobiles occupied different segments of the Ch inese market, which Chrysler divided into four
categories: entry, mid, premium, and luxury automobiles. 444 While MOFCOM did not accept the
substance of Chrysler USA's argument, that th ere was limited competitive overlap between the
imported US and Chinese automobiles and therefor e the imports had no effect on prices of the
domestic product, MOFCOM did not reject as a factual matter the market segmentation on which
Chrysler's argument rested.
445
7.280. Second, MOFCOM's like product determination itself acknowledges some lack of
competitive overlap between subject imports and the domestic like product. In its preliminary
determination, MOFCOM evaluated similarities be tween both baskets of goods on the basis of
"physical and chemical characteristics", "use", "sales channels", and "prices, consumers,
competitiveness or substitution", concluding as follows:
[a]ll in all, the investigating authority considers that, although the product under
investigation and the domestic products are different to some extent, but their
physical and chemical characteristics, use and sales channels are generally the same
or similar, and their prices and end users overlap partially, while perception of
consumers is usually reflected in prices. So the product under investigation and the

439 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment , para. 7.49; Appellate Body Report, China – GOES ,
para. 200.
440 We note that the United States does not challenge MOFCOM's like product determination.
441 We note that these issues arise at and relate to different stages of an investigation. Further, while a
less than complete overlap of import ed and domestic goods may not preclude a like product determination, it
may nonetheless have implications for the objectivity an d reasonableness of a price effects analysis based on
AUVs for baskets of goods.
442 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.475.
443 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, p. 33; final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 41-44.
444 US respondent comments on the preliminary determination, Exhibit USA-12, Table 6, pp. 50-51.
445 Indeed, MOFCOM concluded that Chrysler USA's data reinforced its like product determination,
stating:
Table 6 of the Evidence 1 suppl ied by Chrysler Group LLC indi cates that, both the domestic
industry (including "Chinese domestic manufacturers" and "Chinese international
manufacturers") and "the product under investigation imported from the United States" cover the
products of four categories, i.e. "entry level", "mid-level", "high level" and "the luxury level",
which further indicates that the products of the domestic industry and the product under
investigation compete with each other.
See final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, p. 158.

domestic products may substitute for each other and they are competing with each
other.446 (emphasis added)
MOFCOM reached the same conclusion in its final determination, with some additional discussion of
the revised product scope.447

7.281. In our view, the arguments by US resp ondents, coupled with MOFCOM's own analysis,
demonstrate that MOFCOM was or should have b een aware that all subject automobiles imported
from the United States were not identical to all Chinese automobiles constituting the domestic like
product. In our view, the differences between the two baskets of goods should have prompted an
objective decision-maker to make further inquiries into those differences to determine whether
they affected prices, before proceeding to undertake a price effects analysis on the basis of AUVs
for the two baskets of goods.
448 Yet, MOFCOM's final determination contains no further discussion
of differences between subject imports and the domestic like product for the purposes of a price
comparison in the context of MOFCOM's price depression analysis.
7.282. China seeks to draw a distinction between the purportedly trends-focused nature of a price
depression analysis, and the analysis of absolute values in a price undercutting analysis.
449 It is
true that the absolute levels of prices may not be compared in an analysis of price depression in
the same way as they are likely to be in the context of price undercutting. 450 It may thus be the
case that price comparability is in some instances less directly relevant in an analysis of price
depression than it is in an analysis of price undercutting. However, it seems obvious to us that
differences in the actual prices of the subject imports and the domestic like product will be
reflected in their AUVs, and may therefore affect the direction and rate of changes in those AUVs
over the POI. In this sense, the comparability of prices for subject imports and the domestic like
product may well have an impact on an analysis of price depression even when absolute values or
actual prices are not directly considered. This is likely to be the case in situations where the
imported and domestic goods are differentiated, such that the subject imports and domestic like
product are baskets of non-homogenous, albeit like, goods. In such situations, differences in AUVs
may reflect differences in the product mix, as oppo sed to differences in pricing, irrespective of
whether the analysis is based on trends or absolute values. Particularly in a case such as the
present one, where interested parties have drawn the IA's attention to this possibility in asserting
a lack of competitive overlap between subject imports and the domestic like product, we consider
that an IA fails to undertake an objective evaluation of the evidence if it does not address the
issue.
7.283. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that this aspect of MOFCOM's price depression
analysis failed to reflect an objective examinatio n based on positive evidence within the meaning
of Articles 3.1 and 15.1. This resulted in a pr ice depression analysis inconsistent with the
requirements of Articles 3.2 and 15.2 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively.
7.6.5.4 Whether MOFCOM's findings on ma rket share supported its finding of price
depression
7.284. One of the bases for MOFCOM's finding of price depression in the investigations at issue
was market share gains by subject imports at the expense of the domestic industry. The
United States disagrees with MOFCOM's conclusion that subject imports took market share from
the domestic industry, whereas China maintains that this conclusion finds a basis on the record.
7.285. MOFCOM's final determination contains the following data with respect to the market
shares of subject imports and the domestic like product:

446 Preliminary determination, Exhibit CHN-05, pp. 29-30.
447 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 44-47.
448 By this, we are not saying that price adjust ments are needed in every case where there are
differences between the subject impo rts and the domestic like product. Adjustments may not be required
where the subject product and the domestic like produc t are identical or where the IA concludes that any
differences between the two baskets of goods do not justify such adjustments. However, where there are
differences between the subject impo rts and the domestic like product it cannot simply be presumed that
prices are comparable without consideration of the specific facts and circumstances.
449 China's second written submission, paras. 116-120.
450 Although, of course, a price depr ession analysis may be based on actual price levels, which would
reflect absolute values.

Table 5: Market Shares (in %)451
Year 2006 2007 2008 1Q-3Q 2008 1Q-3Q 2009
Subject imports 9.97 10.72 10.74 8.80 13.49
Domestic like
product 18.69 10.52 9.59 10.14 14.65

7.286. MOFCOM concluded in its final determination that the development of the market shares of
subject imports and the domestic industry indi cated that subject imports were depressing
domestic industry prices as follows:
[i]n conclusion, the investigation evidence indicates that, during the POI, the import
volume of the product under investigation as well as its market shares in Chinese
domestic market increased continually. Especially at the end of the POI, the market
share of the product under investigation significantly increased and its price decreased
at the same time, which depressed the price of the domestic like product, and affected
the profitability of the domestic industry.
452
7.287. The data on the record shows that the ma rket share of the domestic industry declined
through the POI, from a high of 18.69% in 2006, to 10.52% in 2007, to a low of 9.59% in 2008,
before rising to 14.65% in the interim 2009 peri od. The market share of subject imports, in
contrast, grew from 9.97% of the market in 2006, to 10.72% in 2007, showing a low of 8.8% in
the interim 2008 period, before rising to a high of 13.49% in the interim 2009 period. Overall, the
domestic industry lost 4.04 percentage points from the start to the end of the POI. Subject
imports, in contrast, gained 3.52 percentage poin ts during this period. MOFCOM's finding that
subject imports gained, while the domestic industry lost, market share during the POI thus finds a
basis on the record. However, an increase in impo rt market share while domestic industry market
share declines is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate that this situation caused price
depression in the domestic industry.
7.288. In our view, MOFCOM failed to adequate ly explain the linkage between subject import
market share gains and its finding of price depression for two reasons. First, MOFCOM's
comparison of market shares of subject imports and the domestic industry at the beginning and
the end of the POI ignored important trends during the POI, and the role of other actors in the
Chinese market for automobiles, specifically, Chinese producers not part of the domestic industry
as defined by MOFCOM, and third country imports. It is not clear to us how MOFCOM linked the
decrease in the market share of the domestic in dustry to the increase in the market share of
subject imports to price depression. MOFCOM's conc lusion seems to rest on the premise that if
import market share increased, it must have do ne so at the expense of the domestic industry,
which reacted to the loss of market share by reducing prices. While this is not an implausible
scenario in the abstract, in this case it fails to account for the information in the record before
MOFCOM concerning other participants in the market, Chinese producers outside the domestic
industry and third country imports. The market sh are of these two groups did not remain static
during the POI, although MOFCOM makes a statement to this effect in the final determination.
453
Arguments by the United States based on record da ta indicate that subject imports gained little of
the market share lost by the domestic industry in 2007, but rather, that the domestic industry's
lost market share was gained mainly by Chinese producers not part of the domestic industry and
third country imports, as shown in the table below.

451 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 128-129, 133.
452 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 130-131.
453 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 160-162.

Table 6: Changes in Market Shares (in %)454
Year 2006 2007 2008 1Q-3Q 2008 1Q-3Q 2009
Domestic like
product 18.69 10.52 9.59 10.14 14.65
Chinese
producers not
part of the
domestic industry
14.19 21.03 15.79 15.61 14.46
Subject imports 9.97 10.72 10.74 8.80 13.49
Third country
imports 57.15 57.74 63.88 65.45 57.40

7.289. Looking at this table, we observe that the domestic industry incurred its biggest market
share loss, 8.17 percentage points, from 2006 to 2007. It is clear that in the same period, Chinese
producers outside the domestic industry re gistered their biggest market share gain,
6.84 percentage points. In this period, both subj ect imports and third country imports registered
minor market share gains. On the other hand, third country imports registered their largest
market share gains from 2007 to interim 2008, 7.71 percentage points. In this period, both
Chinese producers outside the domestic industry an d subject imports lost market share, while the
domestic industry more or less maintained its share of the market. It is true, as MOFCOM also
observes in its final determination, that from interim 2008 to interim 2009 subject imports
increased their market share. However, the domest ic industry's market share also increased, and
at a similar pace, during this same period. Therefore, in the circumstances of these investigations,
where market share levels and movements of the participants in the market varied significantly
during the course of the POI, the obligation to conduct an objective examination, set forth in
Articles 3.1 and 15.1 of the Agreements, should, in our view, have led an objective decision maker
to consider and address these variations and ch anges, and the role and impact of the other
participants in the market, before reaching its conclusions. MOFCOM failed to do this.
7.290. Second, the finding in the final determinat ion that the domestic industry had to reduce
prices in order to recover market share in the interim 2009 period does not seem to be linked to
the market share gains of subject imports and th erefore we do not see how market share changes
support the finding of price depression. MOFCOM discussed the domestic industry's market share
gain in the interim 2009 period in the following terms:
[i]n the first three quarters of 2009, although the apparent consumption of the
domestic market decreased, the domestic industry still kept increasing production and
sales, as well as the market share by improving production and operation levels and
product competitiveness. However, since the sales prices of domestic like product
decreased, the increase margin of sales revenues, the pre-tax profits and the rate of
return on investment of the domestic industry all fell sharply, and the profitability of
the domestic industry was affected badly; the investment plans and new projects of
certain domestic producers were forced to be laid aside, delayed or cancelled. In
summary, the investigating authority concludes that the domestic industry suffered
material injury.
455 (emphasis added)
7.291. In our view, this discussion does not explain the connection between the market share
gains of subject imports and the depression of domestic prices. Insofar as MOFCOM emphasises
that the market share gains of subject imports ca used a downward pressure on domestic prices
"[i]n the first three quarters of 2009", this asse ssment fails to address the domestic industry's
equivalent market share gains in this period. Under such circumstances, an objective decision

454 Based on figures contained in changes in market share, Exhibit USA-19. We note that this data is
calculated using the method indicated in fn. 182 of China's second written submission, which uses data
contained in the final determination, Exhibit CH N-07, pp. 128-129, 133, and the supplemental injury
submission, Exhibit CHN-08, p. 4.
455 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 138-139.

maker should, in our view, have explained how the market share increase of subject imports
exerted downward pressure on the domestic industry's prices at a time when the domestic
industry's market share was also increasing.
456
7.292. Finally in this regard, we disagree with China's argument that a lack of objection on this
matter by US respondents during the investigations at issue should affect our evaluation of the US
claim. We reject China's argument here on the basis of the same reasons for which we dismissed a
similar argument in relation to the US claim regarding the non-confidential version of the
petition.
457
7.293. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that MOFCOM's failure to undertake an
objective examination based on positive evidence within the meaning of Articles 3.1 and 15.1 of
the increase in subject imports' market share in finding price depression was inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 15.1, and therefore resulted in a price depression analysis inconsistent with the
requirements of Articles 3.2 and 15.2 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively.
7.6.5.5 Whether MOFCOM's do mestic industry definition resulted in a flawed price
effects analysis
7.294. The United States contends that MOFCOM's allegedly flawed domestic industry definition
also rendered its price effects analysis inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements.
China rejects the US claim regarding consequential violations stemming from the allegedly
inconsistent domestic industry definition.
7.295. We have already rejected the US claim that MOFCOM's domestic industry definition failed
to conform to Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement,
and thus resulted in a determination inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement. 458 A c c o r d i n g l y , w e a l s o r e j e c t t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e
domestic industry definition resulted in a price effects assessment inconsistent with the
requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 15.1 and 15.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
7.6.6 Conclusion
7.296. On the basis of our assessment of the parties' arguments regarding this claim, we find that
China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement as a result of MOFCOM's price effects analysis and
consequent finding of price depression in its final determination.
7.7 Whether MOFCOM's causation determinat ion was consistent with Articles 3.1 and
3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement
7.7.1 Provisions at issue
7.297. The texts of Articles 3.1 of the Anti-D umping Agreement and 15. 1 of the SCM Agreement
are set out in paragraph 7.182 above.
7.298. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement provide
as follows:
[i]t must be demonstrated that the [dum ped/subsidized] imports are, through the
effects of [dumping/subsidization], as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury
within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship
between the [dumped/subsidized] imports and the injury to the domestic industry
shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The
authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the [dumped/subsidized]

456 We note in this regard also the potential relevance of the information on overselling by subject
imports during this period, which is not addressed by MOFCOM.

imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries
caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the [dumped/subsidized]
imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume
and prices of [non-subsidized imports of the product in question/ imports not sold at
dumping prices], contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption,
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic
producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity
of the domestic industry.
7.7.2 Factual background
7.299. MOFCOM's final determination concluded that there was a causal relationship between
subject dumped and subsidized imports and the inju ry suffered by the domestic industry. In the
final determination, MOFCOM stated that the volume and market share of subject imports
"increased continuously", and particularly in the interim 2009 period, when imports from third
countries decreased by 33.63%. MOFCOM considered that, although apparent consumption
declined in the interim 2009 period, the domestic industry overcame this decline to maintain
production, sales and market share figures by "continually improving production and operation
levels as well as the product competitiveness." However, MOFCOM concluded that, in spite of these
improvements, subject imports adversely impacted th e sales prices of the domestic like product,
sales revenues, pre-tax profits, and the rate of return on investment.
7.300. MOFCOM concluded its causation analysis as follows:
[t]he investigation evidence indicates that , the United States is one of the major
sources of imports of saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity
>2500cc. During the POI, the import volume of the product under investigation
accounts for a relatively large proportion of the total import volume to China. Both the
import volume and the market share in China of the subject products increased
continuously; the price change of the subjec t imports has an important impact on the
prices of Chinese domestic like product.
In the first three quarters of 2009, contrary to the substantial drop by 32.63% of
import volume of other countries (region), the import volume of the product under
investigation increased significantly by 20.12% and its share in Chinese domestic
market increased by 4.69 percentage poin ts, while the import price decreased by
3.17% in the same time. The import price of the product under investigation
depressed the prices of Chinese domestic like product. As a result, the prices of
Chinese domestic like product decreased by 10.13% in the same time.
In the first three quarters of 2009, the dome stic industry overcame the impact of the
decrease in apparent consumption of the domestic market and maintained the
increase of production, sales and market share by continually improving production
and operation levels as well as the product competitiveness. However, because of the
effects that the import volume of the product under investigation increased and the
import prices decreased, the sales price of domestic like product, the increase margin
of the sales revenue, pre-tax profits and the rate on return of investment of the
domestic industry all fell sharply; the profitability of the domestic industry was badly
affected; the investment plan and new projects of certain domestic manufacturers
were forced to be laid aside, delayed or cancelled. The domestic industry was
materially injured.
459
7.7.3 Arguments of the parties
7.7.3.1 United States
7.301. The United States contends that MOFCOM's causation analysis in the investigations at
issue failed to conform to the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement in seven respects.

459 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 140-142.

7.302. First, the United States argues that erro rs in MOFCOM's domestic industry definition and
price effects analysis also compromised its causation analysis. 460 The United States contends that
MOFCOM's erroneous definition of the domestic industry resulted in a narrow pool of domestic
enterprises to be examined in determining whet her subject imports were causing injury to the
domestic industry. The United States adds that since MOFCOM relied heavily upon its price effects
analysis to underpin its causation analysis, it follows that flaws in the price effects analysis also
tainted MOFCOM's causation analysis.
461
7.303. Second, the United States argues that MOFCOM failed to take into account evidence on the
record that subject imports took market share aw ay from a combination of Chinese producers not
part of the domestic industry and third country imports, as opposed to the domestic industry. 462
The United States contends that this is clear from the record, particularly in the interim 2009
period when the market share of the domestic industry increased nearly as sharply as that of
subject imports. 463 The United States points out that prior to this period, the market share of
subject imports remained relatively stable, rising from 9.97% to 10.74% in the 2006-2008 period.
The United States points out that the domestic industry lost half of its market share in this period,
from 18.69% to 9.59%, and draws attention to the market share of non-subject imports and
producers not part of the domestic industry, which increased from 71.34% to 79.67% during this
same period. This, for the United States, indicates that the market share of subject imports did not
explain the injury experienced by the domestic industry.464
7.304. Third, the United States argues that MOFC OM failed to address the role of a sharp decline
in industry productivity coupled with an increase in labor costs throughout the POI. 465 In this
regard, the United States submits that producti vity fell by 25% in the 2006-2008 period, and by
33.24% in the interim 2008-interim 2009 period. Given the significance of this decline in
productivity, the United States contends that MOFCOM should have inquired into the effect of this
decline in the domestic industry's financial performance.
466
7.305. Fourth, the United States submits that MOFCOM failed to take into account arguments by
certain US respondents and evidence on the record substantiating a lack of competition between
subject imports and the domestic like product. In the US view, MOFCOM's failure to address the
lack of competitive overlap between these two baskets of goods undermines its causation
analysis.
467 The United States contends in this regard that MOFCOM erred in dismissing evidence
and arguments put forward by Chrysler USA to substantiate that there was little competitive
overlap between subject imports and the domestic li ke product, including sales data showing that
subject imports oversold the domestic like product throughout most of the POI, during which
subject imports and the domestic like product ge nerally occupied different segments of the
Chinese automobile market.
468
7.306. Fifth, the United States contends that a sharp decline (21.65%) in apparent consumption
was the likely cause of injury suffered by the domestic industry in the interim 2009 period. For the
United States, this decline in apparent consumption coincides with the only part of the POI in
which the domestic industry's prices actually declined. The United States contends that the
domestic industry ramped up production in the interim 2009 period just as demand fell sharply,
prompting it to decrease prices in order to move its excess production. In the US view, these
actions cannot be attributed to subject imports.
469 While China contends that the domestic
industry's production was a function of antici pated sales, and this sales model insulated the
domestic industry from injury caused by the decline in apparent consumption, the United States
doubts that the sudden decline in apparent consumption was in any way "anticipated" by the

460 US second written submission, paras. 100-101.
461 US first written submission, paras. 156-157.
462 See for instance US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 45.
464 US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 92-94.
465 See for instance US response to Panel question No. 21.a.
466 US comments on China's response to Panel question No. 43.
467 See for instance US opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 97-98.
468 US first written submission, paras. 165-167.
469 US opening statement, para. 100.

domestic industry.470 In the view of the United States, a decline in apparent consumption would
typically be expected to have an adverse impact on pricing in an affected market.
7.307. Sixth, the United States notes that the decline in productivity towards the end of the POI
occurred at the same time as average wages in th e domestic industry increased. In the US view,
MOFCOM failed to ensure that injury to the dome stic industry caused by these developments was
not attributed to subject imports. 471 The United States notes that "productivity of the domestic
industry" is expressly listed as a possible "other factor" causing injury to the domestic industry in
Articles 3.5 and 15.5. 472 The United States points out that MOFCOM examined certain "other
known factors" causing injury on its own initiative but failed to address this issue. While the
United States acknowledges that these factors were not specifically raised by US respondents
during the investigations, it maintains that MOFCOM's failure to consider the matter in its
causation analysis cannot be excused on that basis. The United States notes that the information
on the decline in productivity was before MOFCOM , and aggregate yearly labor productivity figures
were reported in the final determination. The United States contends that MOFCOM should have
inquired further into the decline in productivity of its own volition, referring in this regard to the
panel's findings in Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes.
473 In the US view, MOFCOM's failure to address
the domestic industry's declining productivity and increasing labor costs demonstrates a lack of
objectivity on MOFCOM's part in the choices it made of what data to examine in its causation
analysis.474
7.308. Last, the United States argues that MOFCOM failed to take into account the impact of an
increased sales tax on larger engine vehicles on the domestic industry. The United States contends
that the increased sales tax likely caused the decline in apparent consumption for the domestic like
product, given that the tax measure also reduced taxes for automobiles with smaller engines. In
the US view, MOFCOM failed to ensure that injury to the domestic industry caused by the changing
consumption patterns prompted by the tax measure was not attributed to subject imports. The
United States points in this regard to arguments submitted by Chrysler USA to MOFCOM, which
noted the regulatory aim of the increased tax – to discourage the production and sale of less fuel-
efficient and larger-engine cars. The United States argues that this should have alerted MOFCOM
to the demand-related implications of the tax measure.
475
7.7.3.2 China
7.309. China argues that by focusing on "isolate d" elements of MOFCOM's causation analysis, the
US arguments on causation run counter to the re quirements of Article 3. 5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.
476 China maintains that these provisions
require MOFCOM only to establish that subject imports were "a cause", as opposed to "the cause"
of material injury to the domestic industry. Pursuant to this standard, MOFCOM was obligated to
show that subject imports "contributed" to such material injury, which China asserts it did. 477
Further, China contends that the United States calls for an impermissible de novo review by the
Panel.478
7.310. Replying to the specific arguments raised by the United States, China first maintains that
MOFCOM's domestic industry definition and price effects analysis were consistent with Articles 3.1,
3.2 and 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Articles 15.1, 15.2 and 16.1 of the SCM
Agreement. Thus, China contends that there is no factual premise for the US arguments.
479 China
in any event asserts that each provision of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements must be
examined on its own, to determine whether the obligations contained therein have been violated in
light of the particular facts and arguments put forward by the parties in a given case. Accordingly,

470 US opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 79.
471 See for instance US response to Panel questions Nos. 21.a and 21.b.
472 US response to Panel questions Nos. 21.b and 22.a.
473 US response to Panel question No. 21.b.
474 US comments on China's response to Panel questions Nos. 44.a, 44.b and 44.c.
475 US response to Panel questions Nos. 22.a and 22.b.
476 See for instance China's first written submission, para. 221.
477 China's first written submission, para. 224.
478 China's first written submission, para. 226.
479 China's first written submission, para. 263.

China submits that it is for the United States to make a prima facie case that China breached
Articles 3.5 and 15.5.480
7.311. Second, China contends that MOFCOM co nsidered the market share developments of
Chinese producers not part of the domestic indu stry and third country imports, and determined
that they did not affect its finding of a causal relationship between subject imports and injury to
the domestic industry. 481 China submits, with respect to the market share of Chinese producers
not part of the domestic industry, that this did not change in a meaningful way during the POI,
increasing by only 1.3 percentage points from 2006 to the interim 2009 period. 482 With respect to
the market share of third country imports, China contends that MOFCOM found it to have remained
"relatively stable" throughout the POI, decreasing by less than 1 percentage point from 2006 to
the interim 2009 period. China contrasts these deve lopments with that of the market share of
subject imports, which increased by 3.5 percentage points from 2006 to the interim 2009
period.
483
7.312. Third, China submits that MOFCOM ev aluated labor productivity alongside 15 other
industry indicators over the POI, and determined that low labor costs in China were such that a
decline in labor productivity could not have played a key role in the industry's declining
performance during the POI.
484 Further, China submits that labor costs only accounted for between
4 and 9% of total costs throughout the POI. 485 In China's view, the US argument that labor costs
accounted for a large portion of the domestic industry's decline in pre-tax profits is misleading in
referring to pre-tax profit figures that had already been crippled by competition from subject
imports towards the end of the POI. China also points to the fact that per unit costs declined in the
interim 2009 period from interim 2008 levels. This, for China, indicates that the decline in pre-tax
profits was caused by subject imports, and not rising labor costs.
486
7.313. Fourth, China contends that MOFCOM evaluated the degree of competitive overlap
between subject imports and the domestic like pr oduct. China submits that MOFCOM engaged in a
comprehensive investigation into both the subject imports and the domestic product in coming to
its conclusion that the products at issue were similar, comparable and substitutable.
487 China also
recalls its arguments that MOFCOM had deemed ev idence submitted by Chrysler USA on product
grades to be unreliable, as it lacked any defi nitions for the four market segments into which
Chrysler USA segregated the data, and differences between total import volume data presented by
Chrysler USA, and import volume data gathered by MOFCOM.488
7.314. Fifth, China submits that MOFCOM fully ev aluated the decline in apparent consumption in
the interim 2009 period and determined, in spite of this negative development, that domestic
producers had managed to increase production and sales in this period. China characterises the US
argument that the domestic industry found itself caught by an unanticipated decline in apparent
consumption in the interim 2009 period as speculative and unsupported by record evidence.
489
China contends that the US arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the domestic industry's
sales model, which is premised on the production of automobiles in anticipation of sales levels, and
not the other way around. This, for China, invalidates the US contention that the domestic industry
was "ramping up" production.
490
7.315. Sixth, China submits that an IA need not examine every possible factor that may cause
injury to the domestic industry, particularly those factors that interested parties fail to raise in the
underlying investigations. 491 China notes in this regard that the list of "other known factors"
contained in Articles 3.5 and 15.5 is indicative.492 China asks the Panel to consider the fact that no

480 China's first written submission, para. 264.
481 See for instance China's second written submission, paras. 135, 139.
482 China's second written submission, para. 139.
483 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 135.
484 China's first written submission, paras. 237-238.
485 See for instance China's first written submission, fn. 256.
486 China's second written submission, paras. 146-147.
487 China's first written submission, paras. 243-244.
488 China's second written submission, para. 140.
489 China's second written submission, para. 142.
490 China's second written submission, paras. 142-143.
491 See for instance China's response to Panel question No. 22.c.
492 China's opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 68.

US respondents raised the decline in productivity in the course of MOFCOM's investigations,
asserting that this fact is relevant to the Panel's assessment of the merit of the US arguments. 493
In China's view, this precludes a finding by the Pa nel that the decline in productivity was "known"
to MOFCOM. China considers that the panel's report in Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes has no
bearing on whether or to what extent an "other factor" becomes "known" for the purposes of
Articles 3.5 and 15.5 and therefore does not suppor t the US contention that MOFCOM should have
inquired further into the decline in productivity. 494 Moreover, China asserts that since MOFCOM
concluded that labor costs in the Chinese automobile market reflected a relatively small portion of
total costs, it correctly exercised its discretion not to address this particular factor. In China's view,
MOFCOM correctly found that trends in labor productivity were not significant to its analysis of
causation.
495
7.316. Last, China characterises the US argument that MOFCOM should have evaluated the
impact of the increased sales tax on demand as a recasting of Chrysler USA's argument during the
investigation. China maintains that MOFCOM was under no obligation to anticipate the US
arguments, which are different from those that Chrysler USA actually made in the course of
MOFCOM's investigations.
496 In China's view, MOFCOM paid due attention to Chrysler USA's
arguments on the increased sales tax, which was premised on the predicate that "[t]o the extent"
MOFCOM found a decline in production and sales of the domestic like product after introduction of
the tax, it had an affirmative obligation to expl ain why this decline was caused by subject imports
over and above the tax. 497 China argues that MOFCOM correctly determined that, as production
and sales increased after the tax increase came into effect, the tax did not cause injury to the
domestic industry.
7.7.4 Arguments of the third parties
7.317. The European Union makes three arguments regarding MOFCOM's causation analysis.
First, the European Union contends that MOFCOM's determination that subject imports and the
domestic like product were in competition consists of "broad and abstract statements", and does
not reflect an objective examination based on positive evidence.
498 Second, the European Union
questions the relevance of the US assertion that subject imports took market share from non-
subject imports and not from the domestic producers. The European Union observes in this respect
that a finding of diminished profitability by MOFCOM is not necessarily in contradiction with a
simultaneous increase in the market share of domestic producers.
499 Third, the European Union
contends that MOFCOM should have attributed more weight to the non-attribution factors of
declining domestic productivity and the decline in apparent consumption, particularly as the injury
suffered by the domestic industry took the form of decreasing prices and profitability, as opposed
to lost sales.
500
7.318. Japan submits that causation within the meaning of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement must be demonstrated through the effect s of dumping as set forth in Article 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Japan submits that where an IA relies upon a flawed price effects
analysis in its causation analysis, such flaws will necessarily undermine that IA's causation
analysis.
501 With respect to the non-attribution component of Article 3.5, Japan submits that an IA
must pay particular attention to separating and distinguishing the effects of other factors from the
effects of dumped or subsidized imports.502
7.319. Noting the "necessary linkage" between an IA's analysis of price effects, volume effects
and the state of the domestic industry, Saudi Arabia argues that an IA's obligation to
"demonstrate" causation calls upon the IA to conduct a causation analysis for each factor
discussed in the injury analysis. In so doing, the IA may not rely upon "quick and overly simplistic

493 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 148.
494 China's second written submission, para. 151.
495 China's response to Panel question No. 44.c.
496 See for instance China's second written submission, para. 155.
497 China's second written submission, para. 154.
498 EU third party submission, paras. 68, 72-77.
499 EU third party submission, paras. 78-80.
500 EU third party submission, paras. 86, 91.
501 Japan's third party submission, para. 32.
502 Japan's third party submission, para. 34.

conclusions", as these are inconsistent with the language of the Agreements. 503 Saudi Arabia
otherwise submits that an IA must pay particular attention to separating and distinguishing the
effects of other factors from the effects of dumped or subsidized imports. In doing this, the IA
must issue a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of such other
factors.
504 In this regard, "other factors" include those factors clearly raised by interested parties
in the course of the underlying investigations, as well as those that the IA has otherwise become
aware of during the investigations.
505
7.7.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.320. The principal question before us is whether MOFCOM's finding of a causal link between
subject imports and injury to the domestic industry has a sufficient basis of evidence on the record
and reflects an objective examination of the eviden ce, as called for in Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.
7.321. Articles 3.5 and 15.5 require that an IA demonstrate that dumped or subsidized imports
are causing injury to the domestic industry producing the like product. Further, these provisions
require an IA to examine any "known factors" other than subject imports causing injury to the
domestic industry at the same time, and ensure that any injury caused by such other factors is not
attributed to subject imports. This is often referred to as the "non-attribution" obligation.
Articles 3.5 and 15.5 set out a non-exhaustive list of five factors that may be relevant in this
context. While these provisions are silent on the methods by which an IA is to demonstrate a
causal relationship or conduct a non-attribution analysis, such methods must comport with the
overarching obligation, in Articles 3.1 and 15.1, to make a determination of injury based on an
"objective examination" of "positive evidence".
7.322. An IA's determination of the causal relati onship between subject imports and injury to the
domestic industry must be "reasoned and adequate".
506 In making such a determination, the IA
must demonstrate a relationship of cause and effect, such that subject imports are shown to have
contributed to the injury to the domestic industry. That other factors may also have caused injury
to the domestic industry is no bar to establishing this causal relationship, provided that subject
imports have contributed to the injury. In other words, subject imports need not be "the" cause of
the injury suffered by the domestic industry, provided they are "a" cause of such injury.
507
7.323. Regarding non-attribution, whether an "other factor" was "known" to an IA will normally
turn on an evaluation of the extent to which that factor was "clearly raised" before the IA by
interested parties in the course of an investigation. An IA is under no obligation to seek out and
identify all possible other factors causing injury to the domestic industry in a given investigation.508
Moreover, the factors listed in Articles 3.5 and 15.5 do not constitute a mandatory list of factors
that must be examined by an IA in every case. 509 However, once a factor is known, the IA must
explicitly address whether that factor was a cause of injury to the domestic industry. 510 If the IA
finds it was not, it need not consider it further. However, should the IA conclude that such a
known "other factor" was causing injury, the IA mu st then "separate and distinguish" the injurious
effects of each other factor from those of the subject imports.511
7.324. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the specific arguments presented by the
United States in support of this claim.

503 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, paras. 42-44.
504 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 47.
505 Saudi Arabia's third party submission, para. 45.
506 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment , para. 7.244 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood
507 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 67.
508 See Panel Reports, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 7.273; EU – Footwear (China), para. 7.484.
509 See Panel Reports, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 7.274; Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.115.
510 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.660.
511 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 233-236.

7.7.5.1 Whether MOFCOM's domestic indust ry definition and price effects analysis
resulted in a flawed causation determination
7.325. The United States contends that MOFCOM's allegedly flawed domestic industry definition
and price effects analysis also rendered its causation analysis inconsistent with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. China rejects the US assertion of consequential
violations stemming from the allegedly inconsistent domestic industry definition and price effects
analysis.
7.326. We have rejected the US claim that MOFCOM's domestic industry definition was
inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 16.1 of the SCM
Agreement.
512 Accordingly, we reject the US argument that an erroneous domestic injury definition
led to MOFCOM's causation analysis being inconsistent with Articles 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.
7.327. However, we have concluded that MOFCOM's price effects analysis was inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM
Agreement.513 The price effects analysis represents an important element of the injury
determination in this case. In our view, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a
determination of causation consistent with the re quirements of the Articles 3 and 15 of the Anti-
Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively, in a situation where an important element of that
determination, the underlying price effects analysis, is itself inconsistent with the provisions of
those Agreements. Nothing in MOFCOM's determination or China's arguments in this dispute
suggests that the causation determination we are considering would stand on its own, without
consideration of the price effects of the subject imports.
7.328. Thus, having found violations of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement concerning MOFCOM's price effects analysis, we
conclude that MOFCOM's causation analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.
7.329. In light of this conclusion, it might be considered unnecessary to make findings on the
remaining aspects of the US causation claim. However, we consider that these arguments relate to
elements of the IA's analysis and determination that are capable of being assessed independently,
and we will therefore consider them.
514
7.7.5.2 Whether MOFCOM erred in failing to consider the market share of Chinese
producers not part of the domestic industry and third country imports in its causation
analysis
7.330. The United States contends that MOFCOM had no basis to conclude that the market share
gains of subject imports injured the domestic industry. China disagrees, and points to the fact that
the market share gained by subject imports fr om 2006 to the interim 2009 period corresponds to
the market share lost by the domestic industry over this period.
7.331. We found above, in considering the US price effects claim, that the record shows that the
domestic industry lost market share in 2007 mostly to Chinese producers not part of the domestic
industry. This data also indicates that subject imports and the domestic like product gained market
share mostly from third country imports in the interim 2009 period. 515 Thus, in our view, the
evidence before MOFCOM clearly shows that the ma rket shares of Chinese producers not part of

514 See Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway) , paras. 7.620, 7.654. Like that panel, we recall that, in
addition to making findings necessary to resolve the ma tter before it, a panel is required to "make such other
f i n d i n g s a s w i l l a s s i s t t h e D S B i n m a k i n g t h e r e c o m m e ndations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements" (Article 11 of the DSU), and that "[s]uch "other findings" could, for instance, relate to
implementation, to the extent that such findings "will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in
giving the rulings provided for in the co vered agreements". Ap pellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar, para. 331.
515 See Table 6, at p. 87 of this Report.

the domestic industry and third country import s during the POI were relevant to MOFCOM's
analysis of causation.
7.332. Yet, the final determination contains no discussion of the role of Chinese producers not
part of the domestic industry or their market share in connection with the analysis of causation. In
our view, the absence of such a discussion requires us to conclude that MOFCOM's analysis of the
causal relationship between subject imports and in jury to the domestic industry was not reasoned
and adequate.
7.333. Regarding third country imports, we note MOFCOM's statement in the final determination
that the market share of third country imports did not affect its finding of a causal relationship
between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry:
[b]esides the subject country, during the POI, the countries (regions) that exported
saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity > 2500cc to China include
also the European Union, South Korea and Japan, etc.
According to the statistical data of the Customs of the People's Republic of China,
during the POI, the export volumes to China from other countries (regions) and their
market shares in Chinese domestic market both initially increased and then
decreased. But the volume of the subject imports to China and its market share in
Chinese domestic market grew continually. Especially in the first three quarters of
2009, the volume of subject imports to Chin a significantly increased by 20.12%, of
which the ratio in the total import volume to China and the market share in China
both increased. However the import volume to China from other countries (regions)
decreased sharply by 32.63% at the same time, of which the ratio in the total import
volume to China and the market share in Chinese market both decreased. Imports
from other countries (regions) do not affect the finding of causal link in this case. 516
(emphasis added)
7.334. We recall our finding that, in circumstances where market shares varied significantly
during the POI, an IA should analyse developments throughout the entire POI. An analysis of
market share limited to consideration of starting and ending levels, would not, in our view,
constitute an objective examination of the evidence. 517 The concerns we expressed regarding
failure to objectively examine the market share ev idence in MOFCOM's price effects analysis apply
equally to MOFCOM's causation analysis. While MOFCOM concluded that the changes in the market
share of third country imports had no bearing on its finding of causation, in our view, this
conclusion reflects only consideration of the starting and ending figures, as third country imports
accounted for 57.15% of the Chinese automobile market in 2006 and 57.40% in the interim 2009
period. For this reason, we conclude that MOFCOM's finding that third country imports had no
bearing on MOFCOM's causation analysis lacks an adequate basis on the record and is not based
on an objective examination of positive evidence.
7.335. On the basis of the foregoing, we consider that MOFCOM's finding of the causal relationship
between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry was not reasoned and adequate.
7.7.5.3 Whether MOFCOM erred in failing to consider industry productivity and labor
costs in its causation analysis
7.336. The United States puts forward two lines of argument concerning declining productivity
and increasing labor costs. The United States clarified in its responses to Panel questions that the
first line of argument focuses on MOFCOM's causation analysis, while the second line of argument
focuses on MOFCOM's failure to conduct a proper non-attribution analysis.
518 We address the first
here, and the second later in this report, at section 7.7.5.5.2 below.
7.337. The United States contends that MOFCOM erred in failing to inquire into the impact of the
decline in labor productivity on the state of the domestic industry. China contends that MOFCOM

516 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 142-143.
518 US response to Panel question No. 21.a.

correctly dismissed the relevance of productivity trends, given the fact that labor costs were an
insignificant factor in the Chinese automobile industry.
7.338. The parties' arguments relate to information concerning the domestic industry's sales
volume, sales revenue, pre-tax profits, numb er of employees, average wages, and labor
productivity, which MOFCOM reported in the price effects chapter of its final determination. We
have reproduced this data in table format below.
Table 7: Labor Costs as a percentage of Total Costs519

Indicator 2006 2007 2008 1Q-3Q 2008 1Q-3Q 2009
Employment
(number of
persons)
10,143

9,110 11,063 10,584 17,857
Multiplied by
Average Wage
(CNY/person)
44,664 48,215 56,028 39,023 45,805
Equals total Labor
Cost (million
CNY)
453 439 620 413 818
Sales Revenue
(million CNY)
11072 10005 12082 9556 9717
Less Pre-Tax
Profit
(million CNY)
830 1134 1721 1523 1030
Equals Total Cost
(million CNY)
10242 8871 10361 8033 8687
Divided by Sales
Volume
39458 32098 33181 26749 30796
Equals per unit
costs (CNY)
259,567 276,372 312,257 300,310 282,082
Labor Cost as %
of Total Costs
4 5 6 5 9

7.339. We have several observations concerning this data. First, labor costs as a percentage of
total costs more than doubled throughout the PO I, from 4% in 2006 to 9% in the interim 2009
period. Second, labor costs almost doubled from interim 2008 to interim 2009. Third, per unit
costs declined from a high of CNY 312,257 in 2008 to CNY 282,082 in the interim 2009 period.
Fourth, pre-tax profit fell from a peak of CNY 1.721 billion in 2008 to CNY 1.03 billion in the
interim 2009 period. Last, the amount of the increase in labor costs from interim 2008 to interim
2009 (405 million CNY) largely corresponds to the am ount of decline in pre-tax profits in this
period (493 million CNY).
520
7.340. It seems clear to us that this data show that the domestic industry experienced increased
labor costs and decreased pre-tax profits towards the end of the POI. This coincides with the
33.24% decline in productivity reported by MOFCOM for the interim 2009 period. Under
circumstances where productivity declines sharply at the same time as labor costs almost double,
we consider that an objective and unbiased IA should have inquired further into the extent to
which the decline in productivity throughout the POI affected the domestic industry's financial
indicators. Therefore, in our view, MOFCOM shou ld have assessed the impact of the decline in
labor productivity on the state of the domestic industry. This assessment could have resulted in a
conclusion that the decline in labor productivity was insignificant, having regard to other factors.
However, in the absence of any discussion in the final determination, or elsewhere in the record,
we cannot assume that any assessment of this matter in fact occurred.
7.341. In the absence of any such assessment, we find that MOFCOM's dismissal of the relevance
of productivity trends in finding a causal relati onship between subject imports and injury to the
domestic industry was not reasoned and adequate.

519 These figures are drawn from the price effects se ction of MOFCOM's final determination. Final
determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 133-135, 136. Labor productivity figures are reported at pp. 136-137.
520 We calculate a difference of 88 million CNY.

7.7.5.4 Whether MOFCOM erred in failing to consider the alleged lack of competitive
overlap between domestic and imported automobiles in its causation analysis
7.342. The United States contends that a lack of competitive overlap between subject imports and
the domestic like product compromises MOFCOM's finding of a causal relationship. China
disagrees, and submits that MOFCOM correctly dismissed arguments in this regard, having
concluded that domestic and imported automobiles were similar, comparable and substitutable in
its determination of the like product.
7.343. We found above, in relation to the US price effects claim, that data on the record, notably
submissions by certain US respondents and MOFCOM 's own like product determination, suggest a
lack of competitive overlap between subject imports and the domestic like product.
521 On this
basis, we consider that MOFCOM should have been aware of the need to address this issue in its
analysis of causation. The finding of like product does not alone suffice to fulfil the obligation to
make a reasoned determination of causation. We can readily envisage a scenario where domestic
and imported goods are found to be "like" within the meaning of Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and/or footnote 46 to the SCM Agreem ent, but differentiation of goods within those
two categories affects the competition between them in ways that have an impact on the
assessment of causation.
7.344. We recall that Chrysler USA submitted comments to MOFCOM following its preliminary
determination, in which Chrysler challenged MOFCOM's preliminary price effects analysis in light of
the purportedly negligible competitive overlap between subject imports and the domestic like
product. In its assessment of Chrysler USA's argu ments, MOFCOM stated the following in its final
determination:
(1) In the comments on the preliminary determination, American Government,
Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors LLC all alleged that, within the POI, the import
prices of the product under investigation ar e much higher than that of the domestic
like product, which indicates that the import prices of the product under investigation
did not depress or undercut the price of the domestic like product.
Both Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors LLC alleged that, there is a great
difference between the price of the product under investigation and the price of the
domestic like product, so there is no competition between them. They argued that the
product under investigation mainly competes with the products manufactured by joint
ventures in China and “the domestic industry” which is Chinese “local automobile
companies”, is injured by the products manuf actured by the joint ventures in China.
Chrysler Group LLC also argued that, “the domestic industry” mainly produces and
sells the products of “the entry level”, while the overwhelming majority of the product
under investigation is the products of “the luxury level”, so there is no competition.

(3) The Investigating Authority Found that:

② Price is not the single criteria of finding the competition relationship between the
product under investigation and the domestic like product, and the competition
relationship between them cannot be denied just due to the price difference. The
investigating authority has conducted a comprehensive investigation on the product
under investigation and the like product manufactured in China in terms of physical
characteristics, performance, production pr ocess, product use, product substitution,
perception of consumers and producers, sales channels, prices and so on. The
investigation indicates that the two are similar and comparable, which can substitute
for and compete with each other.

④ Table 6 of the Evidence 1 supplied by Ch rysler Group LLC indicates that, both the
domestic industry (including “Chinese domestic manufacturers” and “Chinese
international manufacturers”) and “the product under investigation imported from the
United States” cover the products of four categories, i.e. “entry level”, “mid-level”,
“high level” and “the luxury level”, which further indicates that the products of the
domestic industry and the product under investigation compete with each other. 522
(emphasis added)
7.345. In our view, MOFCOM's assessment of Chrysler's arguments does not reflect an objective
examination of the evidence. MOFCOM characterise s Chrysler's argument as being that there was
"no competition" between subject imports and the domestic like product, and then dismisses the
argument on the basis of Chrysler's own data, which shows that there was some competition. In
our view, MOFCOM misconstrued Chrysler's argument. To us, Chrysler's argument seems to be
more nuanced than an assertion that there was no competition between domestic and imported
goods. We understand Chrysler to have argued that domestic and imported US automobiles
occupied largely different market segments, and thus that it was unlikely that subject imports had
"a material effect" on the state of the domestic industry.
523 Chrysler relied on sales data showing
that between 73.6 and 95.8% of subject imports sa les during the POI were in the highest market
segment, while between 96.6 and 98.8% of domestic like product sales were in the lowest market
segment, a segment in which there were no sales of subject imports during the POI. In our view,
by misconstruing Chrysler's argument, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the evidence
presented by Chrysler, and failed to provide a re asoned explanation for MOFCOM's decision to
disregard it.524
7.346. On the basis of the above, we find that MOFCOM's dismissal of the evidence presented by
Chrysler in finding a causal relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic
industry was not reasoned and adequate.
7.7.5.5 Whether MOFCOM erred in failing to properly examine known factors other than
subject imports causing injury to the domest ic industry, and failed to ensure that the
injuries caused by these other factors were not attributed to subject imports
7.7.5.5.1 Decline in apparent consumption
7.347. The United States contends that a sharp decline in apparent consumption was the likely
cause of injury to the domestic industry in the interim 2009 period, and submits that MOFCOM
erred in downplaying the relevance of this declin e. China disagrees and contends that MOFCOM's
conclusion finds a basis in the evidence of an increase in production and sales.
7.348. There is no dispute that the decline in apparent consumption was an "other factor" causing
injury.525 MOFCOM discussed the decline in apparent consumption in its final determination as
follows:
[t]he investigation evidence indicates that, during the POI, the market demand of
saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity > 2500cc in China presented
an increasing trend in general. The apparent consumption increased by 44.54% from
2006 to 2007 and increased by 13.39 from 2007 to 2008. Although it decreased by
21.65% in the first three quarters of 2009 compared with the same period of last
year, the apparent consumption of 9 months has already been close to the apparent
consumption for the whole year of 2006. Moreover, in the first three quarters of 2009,
both the production and sales of the domest ic industry increased. The change of the
apparent consumption did not cause adverse impact on the domestic industry. All in

522 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 155-158.
524 Moreover, we find it contradictory for MOFCOM to both dismiss as unreliable the evidence submitted
by Chrysler USA, and conclude that the same evidence supports MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic like
product and the subject imports comp ete. Further, we are not convinced that Chrysler USA's sales data
actually supports MOFCOM's finding of a competitive overlap between subject impo rts and the domestic like
product.
525 MOFCOM lists "Changes in Market Demand and Co nsumption Model, and Substitute Products" as an
"Other Factor" in the causation chapter of its final determination. See Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07,
p. 143.

all, the investigating authority does not find that the change of the market demand,
the change of consumption model or other substitute products has caused the injury
to the domestic industry.
526 (emphasis added)
MOFCOM thus determined that although appare nt consumption fell by 21.65% from interim 2008
to interim 2009, consumption figures in this period were nevertheless close to the 2006 level. This,
coupled with positive trends for production an d sales, led MOFCOM to dismiss the decline in
apparent consumption as a factor injuring the domestic industry.

7.349. In our view, MOFCOM's discussion of the purportedly limited impact of apparent
consumption does not follow from the evidence on the record before it, and does not present a
reasoned evaluation of that evidence. MOFCOM confined its assessment to two indicators,
production and sales, in finding that trends in apparent consumption did not cause injury to the
domestic industry. However, a decline in apparent consumption will normally lead to decreased
sales, increased inventories, and possibly lower prices, with resulting negative consequences for
the state of the domestic industry. Yet, MOFC OM did not address any of these elements, in
determining that the decline in apparent consumption was immaterial to its causation analysis.
7.350. China argues that the domestic industry's sales model insulated it from injury caused by
the decline in apparent consumption. We fail to see how the fact that the industry bases
production on anticipated sales supports the co nclusion that a sharp and significant drop in
apparent consumption did not cause the domestic industry injury. In our view, the fact that prices
declined in the interim 2009 period by 10.13% whil e production increased by 12.63% in the same
period, suggests that the sales model failed to provide the posited insulation from declining
consumption argued by China.
7.351. On this basis, we find that MOFCOM failed to properly examine whether the decline in
apparent consumption was causing injury to the do mestic industry, and failed to ensure that any
injury caused by that decline was not attributed to subject imports.
7.7.5.5.2 Increase in average wages coupled with the decline in industry productivity
7.352. The United States contends that MOFCOM failed to ensure that injury to the domestic
industry caused by the combination of an increase in average wages and decline in industry
productivity was not attributed to subject imports. China asserts that developments in these two
factors were not a "known" other factor causing injury to the domestic industry, and therefore
MOFCOM was under no obligation to conduct a non-attribution analysis in this regard.
7.353. The United States makes two arguments. First, the United States argues that MOFCOM
should have undertaken a non-attribution analysis of the increase in average wages coupled with
the decline in productivity of its own volition. The United States points out that MOFCOM did
consider other factors causing injury, and that "productivity of the domestic industry" is listed in
Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement as a possibly
relevant factor in this regard. The United States asserts that MOFCOM's failure to consider the
decline in industry productivity in relation to other factors it did examine demonstrates a lack of
objectivity in MOFCOM's choices of what data to examine in its causation analysis.
7.354. In our view, this argument rests on speculation. We recall that Articles 3.5 and 15.5 only
require an analysis of "known" other factors causing injury to the domestic industry at the same
time as imports, and makes clear that the factors listed in those provisions "may be relevant in
this respect".
527 The fact that MOFCOM may have considered other factors listed in Articles 3.5 and
15.5 as "known" other factors causing injury is immaterial to the question of whether the
combination of increase in average wages and decl ine in productivity was "known" to MOFCOM as
a factor causing injury. The fact that, as we have concluded above, MOFCOM should have
addressed industry productivity in its finding of a causal relationship between subject imports and
injury to the domestic industry does not demonstrate that MOFCOM knew or should have known
that productivity and wages together were an "other factor" causing injury to the domestic
industry. The United States has not demonstrated to us that any party made arguments before

526 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 143-144.

MOFCOM in this respect, or shown any other basis on which we could conclude that this was a
factor known to MOFCOM, and therefore should have been addressed in this context.
7.355. Second, the United States contends that the fact that no interested party drew MOFCOM's
attention to the interplay between increasing wages and declining productivity in the course of its
investigations is immaterial to the Panel's evaluation, as this was otherwise known to MOFCOM. In
the US view, MOFCOM's failure to examine wages and productivity in these circumstances is
inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.1 of the SCM
Agreement. The United States cites the panel report in Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes to support
this argument.
528 In that dispute, the panel held that the fact that no interested party raised a
challenge to the IA's use of a particular POI was immaterial to the IA's obligation under Article 3.1
to make an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence in reaching an affirmative
injury determination.
7.356. We find that this argument lacks a legal basis in the Agreements. In our view, Mexico –
Steel Pipes and Tubes concerned a situation that is entirely different to the present situation. While
the panel in Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes considered that an IA could not be passive in the
manner by which it gathers data in the course of its investigations, we see nothing in this report
which addresses how a factor becomes "known" in the context of a non-attribution analysis. Nor
do we consider that this report suggests that an IA has to evaluate factors that are not known
other factors. While this dispute is relevant to the broad scope of Article 3.1 (and thus
Article 15.1), it seems clear to us that this dispute has no bearing upon an IA's evaluation of the
universe of "known" factors within the meaning of Article 3.5 (and Article 15.5).
7.357. On this basis, we find that the United States has not shown that MOFCOM failed to
properly examine whether the increase in labor costs coupled with the decline in industry
productivity was causing injury to the domestic industry and to ensure that any injury caused by
that decline was not attributed to subject imports.
7.7.5.5.3 Increase in sales tax
7.358. The United States asserts that MOFCOM failed to assess the impact on domestic
consumption patterns of an increased sales tax on larger engine vehicles. In China's view,
MOFCOM was under no duty to undertake such an a ssessment, in replying to the specific concerns
raised by Chrysler USA in this regard.
7.359. The record shows that the increased sales tax was brought to MOFCOM's attention by
Chrysler USA as a factor potentially causing injury to the domestic industry.
529 Chrysler made the
following argument in this respect:
[o]n January 20, 2009, China lowered the vehicle tax on cars with engines up to 1.6
litres from 10 percent to 5 percent as part of a deliberate effort to encourage the
production and sales of more fuel efficient smaller engine passenger cars. The
previous September, China had sought to di scourage the production and sale of less
fuel efficient larger engine cars by raising the tax on sales of such cars from
15 percent to 25 percent for vehicles with engines over three litres, but less than four
litres, and from 20 percent to 40 percent for vehicles with engines over four litres. To
the extent MOFCOM finds a decline in the production and sales of the domestic like
product between 2008 to 2009, it has an affirmative obligation to explain why the
drop was caused by subject imports rather than the change in China's tax policies. 530
(emphasis added)
In our view, this submission argues that if the evidence shows a decline in domestic industry
production and sales between 2008 and 2009, MOFC OM should explain why such declines in sales
were caused by subject imports, and not by the tax measure.

528 US response to Panel question 21.b.
529 MOFCOM lists "Impact of Policies Such as Consum ption Tax, Purchase Tax and so on" as an "Other
Issue[. . . ] in the Investigation of Industry Injury" in the causation chapter of its final determination. See Final
determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 162-164.
530 US respondent comments on the preliminary determination, Exhibit USA-12, pp. 22-23.

7.360. MOFCOM rejected Chrysler's argument as inconsistent with the facts:
(3) The Investigating Authority Found that:
① In the preliminary determination, the investigating authority found that “in the first
three quarters of 2009, although the appa rent consumption of the domestic market
decreased, the domestic industry still maintained the increase of production and sales
through continually improving production and operation level as well as product
competitiveness”. The argument of American party, that “the production and sale of
the domestic industry decreased” in its comments on the preliminary determination, is
not consistent with the facts.
② The change of two tax policies concerning domestic automobile products mentioned
in the comments of American party on the preliminary determination, entered into
force respectively in September 2008 and January 2009. And the effects of the
policies started mainly since 2009. As mentioned above, in the first three quarters of
2009, the production and sales of domestic industry were not affected by the
aforesaid tax policies, which still maintained growth. Meanwhile, the investigating
authority notices that, in the first three quarters of 2009, the apparent consumption of
the domestic market decreased, while the import volume of the product under
investigation increased with decreased price, which aggravated the competition in the
domestic market. The data indicate that, in the first three quarters of 2009, the
import volume of the product under investigation increased greatly by 20.12%
meanwhile the price decreased by 3.17%, which caused that the sales prices of the
domestic like product decreased. The increase margin of sales revenue, the pre-tax
profits and the rate of return on investment of the domestic industry fell sharply, the
profitability of the domestic industry was badly affected, and the investment plan and
n e w p r o j e c t s o f s o m e d o m e s t i c p r o d u c e r s w e r e f o r c e d t o b e l a i d a s i d e , d e l a y e d o r
cancelled.
531 (emphasis added)
MOFCOM seems to have construed Chrysler's argument as contingent on a factual finding that
production and sales declined following the introduction of the tax measure at the beginning of
2009. Since MOFCOM did not find declines in domestic production and sales in interim 2009, it
dismissed Chrysler's conditional argument.532
7.361. Thus, it is clear that MOFCOM did address the argument raised by Chrysler USA in relation
to the increased sales tax. 533 Having found that the factual predicate for the analysis proposed by
Chrysler, a decline in production and sales, was not in fact the case, there was nothing for
MOFCOM to explain. We see no reason for MOFCOM to have gone on to consider the impact of the
increase in the sales tax, in light of its conclusion that production and sales of the domestic
industry did not decline from interim 2008 to interim 2009.
7.362. On this basis, we find that United States has not shown that MOFCOM failed to properly
examine whether the increased sales tax was causing injury to the domestic industry and failed to
ensure that any injury caused by that increased tax was not attributed to subject imports.
7.7.6 Conclusion
7.363. On the basis of our assessment of the parties' arguments regarding this claim, we find that
China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement as a result of MOFCOM's causation determination in
the two investigations at issue.

531 Final determination, Exhibit CHN-07, pp. 163-164.
532 We find this characterisation of Chrysler's argument to be of no import to the resolution of the US
claim.
533 Insofar as the United States suggests that MOFCOM should have inquired into whether the increased
sales taxes caused changes in consumption, it has failed to bring to our attention anything in the record which
would suggest a link between the decline in apparent consumption and the tax measure, such that it should
have been found to be a known other factor causing injury.

7.8 Consequential violations
7.8.1 Provisions at issue
7.364. Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads in relevant part:
[a]n anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for
in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The following provisions govern the
application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action is taken under anti-dumping
legislation or regulations.
7.365. Similarly, Article 10 of the SCM Agreement provides that:
Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a
countervailing duty on any product of the territory of any Member imported into the
territory of another Member is in accordan ce with the provisions of Article VI of
GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement. Countervailing duties may only be
imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.
7.8.2 Arguments of the parties
7.366. The United States claims that China's actions are inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.
534 The United States submits that,
insofar as the Panel finds that China acted inconsistently with any provision of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement cited in its claims above, the Panel should also find that, as a consequence of imposing
an AD measure not "in accordance with" the Anti-Dumping Agreement, China has breached
Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
535 The United States likewise contends that insofar as
the Panel finds that China violated any provision of the SCM Agreement in this dispute, the Panel
should also find a violation of Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.536
7.367. China argues that while the United States claims that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with
Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Arti cle 10 of the SCM Agreement, the United States
does not cite any specific evidence or legal argument in support of its claim. In China's view, the
U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s t h u s f a i l e d t o m a k e o u t a prima facie case regarding these consequential
claims.537
7.8.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.368. To succeed in a claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article 10 of the
SCM Agreement, a complaining Member need only establish that AD or CVD measures were
imposed, and the imposing Member acted inconsistently with one of its obligations under the
relevant Agreement.
538 We have found that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with several provisions
of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, with respect to the requirement for non-confidential
summaries of confidential information, the disclosure of essential facts, the determination of the
residual AD and CVD rates, the determination of pr ice effects, and the determination of causation.
Therefore, we also find that China has, as a consequence of these inconsistencies, acted
inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.

534 US first written submission, paras. 176-177. The United States also argued, in its first written
submission, that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994. However, the United States
dropped this argument in its second written submission. See US second written submission, fn. 153.
536 US second written submission, paras. 120-121.
537 China's first written submission, para. 266.
538 Appellate Body Reports, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 358; US –
Softwood Lumber IV, para. 143.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:
i. China acted inconsistently with Articles 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement in failing to require the submission of adequate non-
confidential summaries of confidential information contained in the petition;
ii. China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because
MOFCOM failed to disclose the essential facts under consideration which formed the
basis of its decision to impose the AD duties;
iii. China acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement with respect to the dete rmination of the residual AD duty rate
for unknown US exporters;
iv. China acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement with respect to
the determination of the residual CVD rate for unknown US exporters;
v. China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Articles 15.1 and 15.2 of the SCM Agreement in connection with MOFCOM's
analysis of price effects;
vi. China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement in connection with MOFCOM's
causation determination; and
vii. China acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 10 of the SCM Agreement as a consequence of the foregoing violations of
these Agreements.
8.2. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel further concludes as follows:
i. The United States has not established that China acted inconsistently with
Articles 6.9, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the
disclosure of the essential facts and public notice regarding MOFCOM's determination
of the residual AD duty rate for unknown US exporters;
ii. The United States has not established that China acted inconsistently with
Articles 12.8, 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Ag reement with respect to the disclosure of
the essential facts and public notice regarding MOFCOM's determination the residual
CVD rate for unknown US exporters; and
iii. The United States has not established that China acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1 and 16.1 of
the SCM Agreement in connection with MOFCOM's definition of the domestic industry.
8.3. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases wh ere there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. Thus, we conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue are
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreem ents, they have nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to the United States under those Agreemen ts. On this basis, pursuant to Article 19.1 of
the DSU, we recommend that China bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under
the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements.