UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT OF 2000
Document: (ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BY CHILE) Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU DECISION BY THE ARBITRATOR
Date: 31 August 2004
Document codes: WT/DS217/ARB/CHL
Complainant: Australia, Brazil, Chile, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico, Norway
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. X:3  GATT 1994Art. 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. 32.5  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. VI:3  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade OrganizationArt. 1, 5.4  Anti-dumpingArt. 4.10, 7.9, 10, 11.4, 18, 32.1  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 8  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 18.1  Anti-dumping

UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING
AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT OF 2000

(ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BY CHILE)

Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
under Article 22.6 of the DSU

DECISION BY THE ARBITRATOR

The Decision by the Arbitrator on
(Original Complaint by Chile) – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the
DSU is being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The Decision is being circulated as an
unrestricted document from 31 August 2004 pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/452).

I. INTRODUCTION
A. INITIAL PROCEEDINGS
1.1 On 27 January 2003, the Dispute Settlement B ody (DSB) adopted the report of the Panel in
this dispute, as modified by the report of the Appellate Body.1
1.2 The findings adopted by the DSB were that the measure at issue in this case – the Continued
Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000 (hereafter "CDSOA"):2
(a) is a non-permissible specific action agai nst dumping or a subsidy, contrary to
Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 18.1 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the Ge neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(hereafter the "Anti-Dumping Agreement" ) and Article 32.1 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter the "SCM Agreement");
(b) is inconsistent with certain provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
SCM Agreement, so that the United States h as failed to comply with Article 18.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI:4
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the (hereafter
the "WTO Agreement");
(c) pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, to the exte nt that it is inconsistent with provisions
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to the complaining parties
3 under those Agreements;
1.3 On 13 June 2003, an arbitrator established under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU ruled that the
"reasonable period of time" for the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB in this case was 11 months from the da te of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body
Reports by the DSB. The United States was con sequently awarded until 27 December 2003 to bring
the CDSOA into conformity with its obligati ons under GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the SCM Agreement and the WTO Agreement.4
1.4 On 16 January 2004, Chile requested authorization from the DSB 5, under Article 22.2 of the
DSU, to suspend the application to the United St ates of concessions and other obligations under the
covered agreements by an amount to be determined each year according to the offset payments made
to affected United States producers, in the most-recent annual distribution of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties collected and assessed on products from Chile under the CDSOA.

1 Report of the Appellate Body on
(WT/DS217; WT/DS234/AB/R), (hereafter the "Appellate Body Report") and Report of the Panel on (WT/DS217; WT/DS234/R) (hereafter the "Panel
Report". Throughout this Decision, the original panel in this case will be referred to as the "Panel".
2 Enacted as part of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related
Agencies appropriations Act, 2001, Public Law 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549, 28 October 2000, sections 1001-1003.
For a description of the CDSOA, see Panel Report, paras. 2.1 to 2.7.
3 The Complaining Parties in the original procee dings were: Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European
Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Tha iland (WT/DS217), as well as Canada and Mexico
(WT/DS234).
4 WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22.
5 WT/DS217/21.

1.5 This would be done by applying, on an annual basis, an additional tariff on products from the
United States. Thus, each year, as soon as the amount of the offset payments made would be known,
Chile would notify the products subject to the additional tariff and the rate of the additional tariff.
B. R
EQUEST FOR ARBITRATION AND SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATOR
1.6 On 26 January 2004, the United Stat es submitted a communication to the DSB 6 objecting to
the level of suspension of concessions or other oblig ations under the covered agreements proposed by
Chile, claiming, inter alia, that Chile's request failed to specify the level of suspension it proposed to
implement, and was therefore an inadequate basis for an arbitrator to make the determinations
provided for in Article 22.7 of the DSU.
1.7 At the DSB meeting of 26 January 2004, Chile's request under Article 22.2 of the DSU and
the United States objection were referred to arbitration in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU.7
1.8 The arbitration was undertaken by the original panel, namely:
 Chairman: Mr Luzius Wasescha

 Members: Mr M. Maamoun Abdel-Fattah
 Mr William Falconer

1.9 On 13 February 2004, the Arbitrator held a joint organization meeting with the United States
and all the parties who requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to
Article 22.2 of the DSU
8, and in respect of which the United States had also requested arbitration.
During this meeting, the parties expressed their views on the draft timetable and working procedures
prepared by the Arbitrator covering all the arbitra tions requested. The Arbitrator adopted its working
procedures on 18 February 2004 and its timetable on 23 February 2004.9
1.10 On 19 February 2004, the United States subm itted a request for preliminary ruling from the
Arbitrator applicable to all requests for arbitration. Following consideration of the request, the
Arbitrator informed all parties on 23 February that, having regard to the issues raised in the request,
the Arbitrator deemed it more appropriate to addr ess the content of the United States' communication
of 19 February together with all the other issues and arguments that might be raised throughout the
proceedings. The Arbitrator added that parties should feel free to include comments on the
United States' request in their submissions, as they saw fit.

6 WT/DS217/27.
7 Other complaining parties in the original pro ceedings had requested authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations vis-à-vis the United States under Article 22.2 of the DSU. The United States
requested arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU with respect to each individual request. However, it
did not object to a joint review, provided the Arbitrator would issue a separate report in each case. The
complaining parties, having requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations in this case, are
hereafter referred to as the "Requesting Parties".
8 Out of the ten complaining parties in the original proceedings, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European
Communities, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico requested aut horization to suspend concessions or other obligations,
pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU.
9 The Arbitrator's working procedures are found in Appendix 3 of the DSU and in Annex A to this
Decision.

1.11 In accordance with the timetable, the Re questing Parties submitted communications
concerning the methodology supporting their request s for authorization to suspend concessions or
other obligations (hereafter the "methodology paper(s)") on 23 February.10
1.12 The United States submitted a single written submission, applicable to all its requests for
arbitration, on 12 March 2004.
1.13 All the Requesting Parties filed their written submissions on 31 March 2004.11
1.14 On 15 April 2004, the Arbitrator informed the pa rties that a single, joint substantive hearing
with all parties present would be held. However, if a party so requested and if deemed necessary by
the Arbitrator, special sessions on specific issues affecting that party might be organized, at which
only the party concerned and the United States would be allowed to express their views.
1.15 The joint substantive meeting with all parti es present was held on 19 April 2004 and written
questions were submitted to the parties on 21 Apri l 2004. The parties replied in writing on 28 April
2004 and were given until 4 May 2004 to comment on each other's replies. The Arbitrator submitted
additional questions on 28 May 2004. Parties rep lied on 7 June 2004 and were allowed to comment
on each other's replies by 14 June 2004. The Arb itrator circulated its Decisions to Members on
31 August 2004.12
C. ORDER FOLLOWED BY THE ARBITRATOR IN ITS ANALYSIS
1.16 Section II of this Decision addresses the procedur al issues raised by th e United States, in
particular the United States' claims as to lack of specificity in the requests for authorization to suspend
obligations made to the DSB, and in the methodology papers submitted by the Requesting Parties. It
also addresses the related question of the burden of proof, as applicable to these proceedings.
1.17 Pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU, our manda te is to "determine whether the level of
suspension [of concessions or other obligations] is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment." To this end, the Decision first determin es, in Section III, what may be considered to be
the correct level of nullification or impairment caus ed by the CDSOA. This course of action is in
conformity with previous arbitrations. 13 Also in line with previous arbitrations, the decision first
addresses the approach advocated by Chile for th e assessment of the level of nullification or
impairment.
1.18 Then, in Section IV, the Decision addresses the le vel of suspension of concessions or other
obligations proposed by Chile, and considers the co mpatibility with Article 22 of the DSU of: (a) a
level of suspension of oblig ations expressed as a duty rather than as a total value of trade; and (b) an
annual adjustment to the level of suspension.
1.19 Section V of the Decision contains the award of the Arbitrator. It is followed by some
concluding remarks in relation to certain wider issues raised in the course of the arbitration.

10 Brazil, Canada, the European Communities, Indi a, Japan, Korea and Mexico submitted a joint
communication. Chile submitted its own communication.
11 Brazil, the European Communities, India, Japa n, Korea and Mexico submitted a joint written
submission. Canada and Chile each submitted their own written submission.
12 Circulation to all Members was deemed to comply with the requirement of Article 22.7 of the DSU
that the DSB be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator, once it has been reached.
13 See EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 4.2:

"… as a prerequisite for ensuring equivalence between the two levels at issue we have to
determine the level of nullification or impairment."

II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A. R
EQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING
1. Summary of the United States' request
2.1 As mentioned in the previous section, on 19 Febr uary 2004, the United States filed a request
for a preliminary ruling from the Arbitrator that:
(a) a Requesting Party cannot suspend concessi ons or other obligations based on the
nullification or impairment suffered by other WTO Members; and consequently
offset payments for products other than the Requesting Parties' products that are
subject to anti-dumping or countervailing dut y orders are outside the scope of the
arbitration proceeding with respect to that Requesting Party;
(b) the Requesting Parties failed to specify the level of suspension and the level of
nullification or impairment in such a way that allows the Arbitrator to determine
equivalence; and consequently each party must provide the information necessary to
enable the Arbitrator to make the determ inations called for under the DSU in relation
to that party; and
(c) the proposition that a Requesting Party may establish a new level of suspension each
year is inconsistent with Article 22 of the DSU; and is consequently outside the scope
of the arbitration proceeding for any party requesting to proceed in that manner.
2. Analysis of the Arbitrator
2.2 On 23 February 2004, we informed the parties that, having regard to the issues raised in the
United States' request for a preliminary ruling, they would more appropriately be addressed together
with all the issues and arguments that might be ra ised throughout the pro ceedings. We added that
parties should feel free to include comments on the United States' request in their submissions, as they
saw fit.
2.3 The United States has reiterated the claims made in its request for a preliminary ruling in its
subsequent submissions. As a result, we deem it n ecessary for the clarity of our findings to describe
how we dealt with these claims.
2.4 First, we note that neither paragraph 6 nor pa ragraph 7 of Article 22 of the DSU provide for
the possibility of a preliminary ruling and there is, strictly speaking, no practice of a preliminary
ruling at the request of a party in past arbitrations.
2.5 Second, some of the issues we were asked to rule upon by the United States were intimately
linked to questions central to this dispute. We c oncluded that the relatively expeditious process of a
preliminary ruling was not appropriate to the matte rs the United States had raised. The purpose of
that process is essentially to eliminate from an arb itration issues that could not be deemed to fall
within the mandate of the Arbitrator.14
2.6 Indeed, a core issue in this arbitration is wh ether the level of nullification or impairment
suffered by the Requesting Parties can be determined on the basis of the total disbursements made by

14 We noted that addressing these issues at a preliminary stage in a manner fully respecting due process
would most probably involve an amount of time close to the time nece ssary to review the case as a whole.
Indeed, we would have had to give a sufficient amount of time to the Requesting Parties to address the United
States' claims in writing and perhaps hold a specific hearing on these issues.

the United States under the provisions of the CDSOA. This problem did not arise with respect to
Chile's request for suspension of concessions or ot her obligations, which is limited to disbursements
made in relation to duties imposed on exports from Ch ile. It is, however, one of the reasons why we
did not consider it appropriate to issue the preliminary ruling requested by the United States.
2.7 Similarly, we concluded that consideration of whether the ability to set a new level of
suspension each year is allowed under Article 22 of the DSU had to form part of our broader
assessment of the level of nullification or impairment and of the level of suspension of concessions or
other obligations. We address this question in Section IV.B.2 below.
2.8 Finally, with respect to the alleged failure of the Requesting Parties to specify the level of
suspension and the level of nullification or impair ment sufficiently to enable the Arbitrator to
determine equivalence, we note that the Unite d States did not seek an immediate ruling on the
admissibility of the Requesting Parties' requests, but rather that the Arbitrator require the Requesting
Parties to provide the necessary information in th e course of the proceedings. We recall that other
arbitrators have reminded parties that they had an obligation to provide evidence in support of their
allegations and, more generally, a dut y to cooperate with the arbitrator. 15 We assumed that all parties
would cooperate in good faith and we did not deem it necessary to make any specific request at that
stage.
2.9 As an additional consideration, we note that this particular claim of "specificity" by the
United States is essentially based on the assumption th at the approach advocated by the United States
to the determination of nullifica tion and impairment is the only co rrect one, and should have been
followed by the Requesting Parties. Since a central question in this case is whether the Requesting
Parties are entitled, under Article 22 of the DSU, to proceed on the basis of the level of nullification or
impairment and the level of suspension they prop ose, it does not seem appropriate in our opinion to
address this question as a matter for a preliminary ruling. Rather, it should be addressed as part of the
substance of the case.
2.10 This said, we note that our decision not to issu e a preliminary ruling on the particular issues
raised by the United States does not preclude us from ruling on procedural issues in the Decision.
B. S
UFFICIENT SPECIFICITY OF CHILE'S REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 22.2 OF THE DSU
1. Preliminary remarks
2.11 As mentioned above, some of the claims raised by the United States which could normally be
considered as "procedural" were essentially based on the assumption that the Requesting Parties ought
to follow the approach advocated by the United States in their assessment of the level of nullification
or impairment and of the level of suspension of c oncessions or other obligations. This is for instance
the case regarding the issue whethe r a single specific level of nullification or impairment and,
correlatively, of suspension of obligations should be provided by the Requesting Parties. This is also
the case, in our opinion, with th e United States' claim regarding the type of measure which the
Requesting Parties plan to apply, if they are a llowed to suspend concessions or other obligations. 16
We consider that such claims are more appropriately addressed as part of our review of the substance
of the case. We nonetheless found that certain aspects of these claims should be discussed separately

15 See, e.g., EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 11, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 –
Brazil), para. 2.9.
16 The United States contests in substance the intention of the Requesting Parties to impose a tariff
surcharge on a list of products to be calculated so as to generate, over a period of one year, an income equivalent
to the offset payments made in the latest annual dist ribution under the CDSOA. The United States argues that
this approach places no limit on the leve l of suspension th at will be effectively imposed and is contrary to past
practice.

to the extent that they relate to specific proce dural rights of the United States in these proceedings,
which ought to be protected.
2.12 We consider this to be the case in relation to the claim that there should be a minimum degree
of specificity supporting any request for suspension of concessions or other obligations so as to allow
the respondent in the main dispute to exercise its right to request arbitration.
17
2. Main arguments of the parties
(a) United States
2.13 The United States claims that the Requesting Pa rties have failed to specify the level of
suspension of concessions and the level of nullifi cation or impairment, both in their requests under
Article 22.2 of the DSU and subsequently in the cour se of this arbitration, in a way that enables the
Arbitrator to determine equivalence. The United Stat es presents this issue as one of specificity of the
request under Article 22.2 of the DSU and, more gene rally as a question of duty to cooperate with the
Arbitrator by providing information on the level of nullification or impairment.18
2.14 The United States contends that the Requesting Pa rties have failed to quantify either the level
of suspension or the level of nullification or im pairment. The Requesting Parties replace specific
values with general concepts and ask the Arbitrator to determine that two amounts are equivalent to
one another without knowing what those amounts are. The United States adds that the Requesting
Parties decline to provide any information on the level of suspension requested or to base their request
on trade effect.
19
2.15 The United States notes that the Requesting Parties intend to impose a yet unidentified duty to
an unspecified value of imports, thus failing to iden tify the amount of trade that would be covered by
their request. Without more information, it is impossible to "determine" the level of suspension
proposed and the actual impact of the duty on imports from the United States.20
(b) Chile
2.16 Chile considers that it clearly specified the leve l of nullification or impairment and the level
of suspension. It indicated that it was requesti ng from the DSB authorization to suspend concessions
or other obligations for an amount equivalent to the annual offset payments made to the affected
United States producers. In practice, the suspen sion would be through annual application of an
additional duty on products from the United States. The United States is the origin of the relevant
information that Chile will use to define the level of suspension. It is not a random formula chosen
arbitrarily, on the contrary, it is information regul arly published by the United States' authorities.
Chile considers that the United States contradict s itself when it claims, on the one hand, that the
Requesting Parties' requests are vague and that they have not quantified a single level of nullification
or impairment and, on the other hand, neverthel ess considers that it established that the requests
exceed the level of nullification or impairment of th e Requesting Parties' benefits. Chile believes that
the United States itself validates Chile's approach. While it is correct that Chile does not indicate the
exact suspension figure, by indicating the criteria fo r quantifying the level, Chile considers that it

17 We leave aside the question of the usefulness of a sufficiently specific request to allow the DSB to
reach an informed decision.
18 United States preliminary request, 19 February 2004, paras. 21-27.

covers the requirements sufficiently for the arbitrator to judge whether the request is "equivalent" or
not.21
3. Does Chile's request fail to meet the minimu m specificity standard applicable in an
Article 22.6 arbitration?
2.17 In EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) , the arbitrators stated that "the specificity
standards, which are well established in WTO ju risprudence under Article 6.2 of the DSU were
relevant for requests for authorization to suspe nd concessions under Article 22.2 and for requests for
referral of such matter to arbitration under Article 22.6".22 More particularly, the arbitrator considered
that:
(a) the request under Article 22.2 must set out the specific level of suspension (i.e. a level
deemed equivalent to the nullification or impairment caused by the WTO-inconsistent
measure, pursuant to Article 22.4 of the DSU); and
(b) the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under which concessions or
other obligations would be suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3 of the DSU.
2.18 The specificity issue whether requirement (a) h as been met by Chile in its request, turns on
whether the "specific level of suspension" should be expressed "in dollars and cents", i.e. monetary
terms. This in turn depends on the determination of the substantive issue before the Arbitrator of
whether the approach to nullification or impair ment proposed by Chile and the other Requesting
Parties is compatible with Article 22 of the DSU. We revert to this matter in Section III below.
2.19 With regard to requirement (b) above, we not e that Chile's request, while only referring to
suspension of concessions or other obligations "under the covered agreements", seems to
unequivocally refer to GATT 1994 and specifies the sect or concerned by the suspension (trade in
goods), to the extent that it mentions that the suspension would consist of the imposition of "an
additional tariff on products from the United States".23
2.20 The question raised by the United States includes a second dimension if one applies mutatis
mutandis to this case the standards of specificity devel oped under Article 6.2 of the DSU. This is
whether the information provided by Chile on its proposed level of suspension was such as to
prejudice the ability of the United States to defend it self (i.e., in this case, to make an informed
decision to request, or not, arbitration under Article 22.6 and to argue its case before the Arbitrator). 24
This question may be answered by reviewing the United States' submissions in these proceedings.
Having reviewed those submissions, we note that the degree of specification of the level of
suspension proposed by Chile in no way prejudiced the ability of the United States to exercise its
rights under Article 22.6.
2.21 We therefore conclude that Chile's request fo r authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligation, while it could have certainly been mo re informative, is acceptable in terms of the
minimum specificity requirement applicable to Article 22.2 requests. In this respect, we consider that
the United States did not demonstrate that either its ability to reach an informed decision to request
arbitration, or its ability to defend itself in these proceedings had been prej udiced as a result of the
way Chile's request was formulated.

21 Chile's written submission, paras. 59-62.
22 See EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) , paras. 20-29. See also EC – Hormones
(Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 16.
23 See WT/DS217/21.
24 See Appellate Body Report in Korea – Dairy, paras. 127-131.

C. B
URDEN OF PROOF
1. Main arguments of the parties
2.22 The parties have repeatedly raised the questi on of the burden of proof in these proceedings.
Chile recalls that, in accordance w ith the well-established rules on bu rden of proof in Article 22.6
arbitrations, it is for the United States to demons trate that Chile's proposal for the suspension of
concessions or other obligations is inconsistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU. This means that the
United States must submit arguments and eviden ce sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
presumption that the proposed level of suspension is not equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment sustained by Chile as a result of the CDSOA. Since the United States did not establish
that presumption, there is nothing for Chile to rebut and the Arbitrator must confirm that the level of
suspension proposed by Chile is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment sustained by
Chile as a result of the CDSOA.25
2.23 The United States acknowledges that it bears th e burden of proof in these proceedings.
However, it argues that it only has to submit eviden ce sufficient to establish a "presumption" that the
level of suspension proposed is not equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. According
to the United States, it does not bear the burden to show that the level of nullification or impairment is
"zero". By contrast, the Requesting Parties failed to substantiate their claim that the level of
nullification or impairment corresponds to th e full amount of disbursements made under the
CDSOA.26
2. Position of the Arbitrator
2.24 Since burden of proof has been extensively addressed in previous Article 22.6 arbitrations, we
need not dwell on this matter. Like the arbitrator in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) ,
we simply note the considerations of the arbitrator in EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC)
on this matter and conclude that, while it is for th e United States to prove that Chile's request for
suspension exceeds the level of nullification or impa irment, Chile must also sufficiently support its
allegations that its request meets the requirement for equivalence of Article 22.4 of the DSU.
2.25 We also note that, in EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) , the arbitrator recalled
that:
"11. The duty that rests on all parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in
presenting evidence to the arbitrators – an i ssue to be distinguished from the question
of who bears the burden of proof – is cruc ial in Article 22 arbitration proceedings.
The EC is required to submit evidence showing that the proposal is not equivalent.
However, at the same time and as soon as it can, Canada is required to come forward
with evidence explaining how it arrived at its proposal and showing why its proposal
is equivalent to the trade impairment it has suffered. Some of the evidence – such as
data on trade with third countries, export capabilities and affected exporters – may,
indeed, be in the sole possession of Canada , being the party that suffered the trade
impairment. This explains why we re quested Canada to submit a so-called
methodology paper."27
2.26 Having regard to the duty of the parties to supply evidence and, more generally, to collaborate
with the Arbitrator, and following th e approach of the arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 –

25 Chile's written submission, paras. 24-26.
26 United States oral statement, paras. 5-6.
27 See, e.g., EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 9-11.

Brazil)28 and in Canada – Export Credit and G uarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada) 29, we are of the
view that if a party makes a particular claim but fails to cooperate and provi de evidence sufficiently
supporting its claim, we may reach a conclusion on the basis of the eviden ce available, including
evidence submitted by the other party or data publicly available.
III. DETERMINATION OF THE LEVEL OF NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
A. MAIN ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
1. United States
3.1 The United States considers that the Requesting Pa rties, by arguing that a breach is itself a
nullification or impairment ignore the critical distin ction that the drafters of the WTO agreements
have drawn between, on the one hand, a breach of a WTO commitment and, on the other hand, the
economic impact that is "the result of" that breach. The United States refers to Article XXIII of
GATT 1994, but also to Article 22.8 of the DSU. 30 The United States further claims that the level of
nullification or impairment must be established on th e basis of the trade loss suffered directly by each
Requesting Party. The United States argues that an analysis of the level of nullification or impairment
must focus on the "benefit" allegedly nullified or im paired as a result of the failure of the responding
party to bring the measure at issue into confor mity with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB.31 In previous cases, arbitrators have compared the actual amount of exports affected by the
WTO-inconsistent measure to the amount of exports in a "counterfactual". 32 The difference between
the two values typically represented the level of nullification or impairment. The United States is also
of the view that the Appellate Body confirmed this approach by focusing on the "trade effect" of the
CDSOA, as a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy. A change in the
"conditions of competition" arising from a governme nt payment to producers is different from a
subsidies analysis since there has been no finding ag ainst the CDSOA as an "actionable subsidy".
The focus on trade effect is consistent with past practice in Article 22.6 arbitrations.
33 Moreover, the
level of nullification or impairment must be measured in terms of the effect the CDSOA has on
producers/exporters subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders.
3.2 The United States also cl aims that, under the Appellate Body analysis, any effect that the
CDSOA offset payments might have on competit ors that are not subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duties (i.e. other United States' produ cers and foreign producers/exporters not subject
to an anti-dumping or countervailing duty order) was not relevant to the findings of the Panel or the
Appellate Body under Article 18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article 32.1 of the
SCM Agreement. A Member cannot suffer nullification or impairment as a result of a non-permissible
specific action against dumping or against a subsidy if no order is in place and if no duties can be
collected on that Member's products. The allocati on of the total annual disbursements advocated by
the Requesting Parties shows that the Requesting Parti es have not even attempted to relate the levels
of suspension proposed to the level of nullification or impairment suffered.
3.3 In addition, the United States argues that speci al accounts relating to revoked orders should
not be considered because, in the case of revoke d orders, a link does not exist between offset
payments and an anti-dumping or countervailing duty order. When there is no anti-dumping or

28 Paras. 2.9-2.11.
29 Para. 3.76.
30 United States oral statement, paras. 7-13.
32 i.e., the situation which would exist if the responding party had brought the WTO-inconsistent
measure into conformity within the reasonable period of time (United States written submission, para. 41).

countervailing duty order in place, any payment receiv ed by an affected domestic producer in 2003
cannot nullify or impair any bene fits related to Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or
Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
34
3.4 The United States further claims that disbur sements under the CDSOA, i.e. the concrete
application of the CDSOA, are not part of the m easure found inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.
As a result, an examination of the actual dis bursements made under the CDSOA would go beyond the
terms of reference of the original disputes.35
3.5 Yet, even if one were to consider these pa yments, the United States recalls that the DSB
found that the CDSOA offset payments caused no adverse effect 36 and there is no evidence that
CDSOA offset payments have in reality affected Requesting Parties' dumped or subsidized trade.
There is no requirement under the CDSOA for how offset payments are to be used. Likewise, a
substantial share of the "qualifying expenditur es" reported reflect expenditures made after the
issuance of the anti-dumping duty finding or order or countervailing duty order, but long before the
US Congress even enacted the CDSOA. It is al so impossible for affected domestic producers to
predict whether they will receive offset payments an d, if so, how much they will receive in any given
year. Furthermore, in at least two instances, o ffset payments under the CDSOA flowed to companies
not involved in the production or sale of products covered by an anti-dumping or countervailing duty
order. Finally, offset payments represent a small fraction i.e. in most cases less than 1 per cent and in
no case more than 5 per cent of domestic producers' sales or production of the relevant product. The
United States deems it unlikely that such de minimis disbursements would have any real impact on
production and any discernible effect on trade. The United States notes in this respect that for the
purpose of Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is de minimis if it is less than 1 per cent
ad valorem.37
3.6 Finally, the United States argues that there is no bar to a finding of "zero" nullification or
impairment in an Article 22.6 proceeding. Not ev ery violation will result in a measurable level of
nullification or impairment and the United States considers that the presumption of nullification or
impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU can be rebutted before an Article 22.6 arbitrator.38
2. Chile
3.7 Chile argues that Article 3 of the DSU cont ains the general provisions which shape the
remaining provisions of the DSU and which must serv e as the basis for interpreting it. In particular,
Article 3.2 states that the dispute settlement system serves to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements . Article 3.3 adds that the prompt settlement of disputes is
essential for the maintenance of a proper balance of rights and obligations between Members. While
the suspension of concessions or other obligations is intended to induce compliance, it is compliance
alone that maintains the proper balance of rights a nd obligations affected by the measure found to be
inconsistent. According to Chile, without a disrupted balance of rights and obligation, no right arises
to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DS U. Maintaining an unlawful measure like the
CDSOA has, in itself, the effect of upsetting the ba lance of rights and obligations between the parties,
irrespective of what might be the actual trade effect on the claimant. This was the conclusion reached

34 United States written submission, paras. 57-58.
35 United States written submission, paras. 15-19.
36 United States written submission, paras. 62-65.
37 United States written submission, paras. 66-74.
38 United States written submission, paras. 75-79.

in the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) arbitration and, by analogy, it applies to the CDSOA since both
measures are as such WTO-inconsistent.39
3.8 Contrary to what is asserted by the United Stat es, an approach based on the trade effect of the
CDSOA is neither necessary in order to determin e the level of nullification or impairment, nor
required by the DSU. Chile believes that a differenc e must be drawn between two types of measures.
On the one hand, market access measures (like import prohibitions or discrimin atory internal taxes),
have an adverse effect on a Member's market acces s expectations. In those cases, nullification or
impairment can be determined by applying a test quantifying the effects of the measure on trade
flows, as was done by the arbitrators in the EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), EC –
Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) and in EC – Hormones (Article 22.6 – EC) cases. On the other
hand, with regard to other measures such as rules-re lated measures, it is not necessary to apply a trade
effect test. In those cases nullification or impairme nt is tied with the unlawful measure as such and
the benefits that were affected by the violation. Those benefits are part of the balance of rights and
obligations negotiated and accepted by WTO Members. The CDSOA is a measure of this type. It
was found to be an non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy and the
condemnation of the CDSOA also extends to all instan ces of application of that legislation. Since the
United States applies the CDSOA through annual disbursements to affected domestic producers
which are published by the United States' authorities, Chile considers that the level of nullification or
impairment actually caused by the CDSOA is to be assessed in relation to the applications of the
CDSOA, i.e. the disbursements made every year of anti-dumping and countervailing duties collected
and distributed in the immediately preceding fiscal year.40
3.9 Chile agrees with the Appellate Body findi ng that there was no need for an economic
assessment of the implications of the CDSOA sin ce the distribution of the money collected improves
the financial situation of the United States' undertakings vis-à-vis their Chilean competitors,
irrespective of the actual use of the money receive d under the CDSOA. This is why the nullification
or impairment sustained by Chile is equivalent to the offset payments for anti-dumping or
countervailing duties collected and assessed on products from Chile.41
3.10 With respect to revoked orders, Chile recalls that the Appellate Body clearly agreed with the
Panel that there was a clear, direct and unavoidable connection between the determination of dumping
and CDSOA offset payments. This connection occurs when the determination is made and, hence,
when the anti-dumping or countervailing duty accrues, and not when the amount collected is
distributed to the affected companies. In othe r words, the measure is WTO inconsistent from the
moment that right arises for the affected compan ies (i.e. when the money from the anti-dumping or
countervailing measures enters a special account in th e US Treasury. The time at which the money is
distributed to the affected companies is not the element that determines the inconsistency of the
CDSOA.
42
3.11 Chile believes that its suggested approach is the most reasonable. Chile further notes that
Article 22.6 of the DSU does not require a trade effect analysis.43

39 Chile's written submission, paras. 27-36.
40 Chile's written submission, paras. 40-45.
41 Chile's written submission, paras. 46-51.
42 Chile's written submission, paras. 52-54.

B.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARBITRATOR
1. Introduction
3.12 The approaches of the parties are – in appear ance at least – based on diametrically opposed
conceptions of "nullification or impairment". Ho wever, while the United States' approach seems to
rely largely on the practice of other arbitrations under Article 22.6 of the DSU, the approach defended
by Chile is, if one excludes the arbitrations carried out under Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement, novel in the context of Article 22.6 of the DSU.
3.13 Consistent with the practice of previous arbitrators 44, we proceed with the review of the
approach advocated by Chile. If we find it to be co mpatible with the DSU, we will proceed with a
determination of the level of nullification or impair ment on that basis. If we do not find it compatible
with the DSU, we will determine the level of nullif ication or impairment by applying a methodology
appropriate in this case.45
3.14 In order to address Chile's contention that the actual level of nullification or impairment
sustained by Chile is related to the application of the CDSOA, i.e. the disbursements made by the
United States annually in relation to anti-dumpi ng or countervailing duties levied on imports from
Chile, we will proceed with a review of the rele vant provisions of the WTO Agreement and of the
practice of previous arbitrators. We will also s ubsequently address a core issue for our determination
of the level of nullification or impairment, i.e. whether we can consider disbursements under the
CDSOA in our calculation.
2. Review of the approach proposed by Chile
(a) Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and the DSU
3.15 After careful consideration we are not persuaded that the pos ition of Chile is supported by
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 or the DSU, for the reasons stated below.
3.16 First, in order to assess Chile's position, it see ms appropriate to revisit the source of the
concept of nullification or impairment, i.e., Article XXIII of GATT 1994, on which the DSU is
based.46 Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994 provides – in relevant parts – as follows:
"If any contracting party should consider th at any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this agreement is being nullified or impaired [...] as a result of
(a) the failure of another contracting part y to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
The contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter,
make written representations or proposals to the other contracti ng party or parties
which it considers to be concerned."

44 See, e.g., Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), paras. 1.5 and 3.18.
45 EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 12.
46 See Article 3.1 of the DSU. This provision makes clear that the DSU must be applied in a manner
consistent with the principles embodied in Article XXIII of GATT 1994.

3.17 Considered in the context of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, nullification or impairment and
violation are clearly separate concepts. Article XXIII:1 basically provides that nullification or
impairment of benefits is what must be ultimately demonstrated.
47 Nullification or impairment may
essentially exist "as a result of": (a) a violation; (b ) a situation of non-violat ion; or (c) "any other
situation". Therefore, violation is not to be confused with nullification or impairment of a benefit.
3.18 We find support for this position in Article 3.8 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
"In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and
in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been
brought to rebut the charge."
3.19 A violation generates, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, a presumption of nullification or
impairment. Article 3.8 does not treat violation as a form of nullification or impairment. Article 3.8
merely exempts the party having demonstrated th e violation from also having to demonstrate
nullification or impairment. It does not modify the f undamental requirement that what is ultimately to
be demonstrated is nullification or impairment.
3.20 This is confirmed by the last sentence of Article 3.8, which provides the opportunity for the
alleged violating party to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment. If violation was
conceptually equated by Article 3.8 to nullifica tion or impairment, there would be no reason to
provide for a possibility to rebut the presumption. The theoretical possibility to rebut the presumption
established by Article 3.8 can only exist because vi olation and nullification or impairment are two
different concepts.
3.21 In fact, Article 3.8 deals with the establishment of the existence of nullification or impairment
during proceedings before a panel. It does not address the valuation or quantification of such
nullification or impairment.
3.22 One may argue, referring to the arbitrators decisions in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 –
EC) and in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) , that even though the presumption under
Article 3.8 cannot be taken as evidence of a partic ular level of nullification or impairment, that
nullification or impairment exists and cannot be "zero". Chile considers that nullification or
impairment results from the application of the measure, which affects the balance of rights and
obligations. Consequently, not only will the level of nullification or impairment always be higher
than "zero" but every application of the measure will increase that level.
3.23 We accept the view that some nullification or impairment should exist if it has not been
rebutted. However, the quantification of the leve l of nullification or impairment remains to be
established. Article 3.8 does not address how nullification or impairment should be valued.
3.24 We note that the concepts of violation and nullification or impairment are also brought
together in Articles 22.3(a) and 23.1 of the DSU.

47 Since "impediment of the attainment of an objective of th e Agreement" is not discussed in this case,
we refrain from referring to it.

3.25 Article 22.3(a) reads as follows:
"[T]he general principle is that the compla ining party should first seek to suspend
concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which
the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or
impairment."
3.26 Article 23.1 reads as follows:
"When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or
impairment of benefits unde r the covered agreements or an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to,
and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding."
3.27 We are of the view that, taken in their c ontext, including Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and
Article 3.8 of the DSU, those provisions simply deal with the principles to be applied in the
suspension of concessions or more generally in di spute resolution. They reinforce, rather than
contradict, the basic distinction between violation, on the one hand, and nullification or impairment
the result of a violation, on the other hand.
3.28 We also note that Chile's position is based on the assumption that suspension of concessions
or other obligations is, inter alia, aimed at temporarily restoring the balance of rights and obligations
that has been upset by the illegal measure. Chile's position can be understood to mean that the concept
of "benefit" in Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 a nd in the DSU should encompass the balance of
rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement.
3.29 As mentioned above, pursuant to Article XXIII of GATT 1994, nullification or impairment of
a benefit may be "the result of" a violation of a ri ght, which implies that a violation is not to be
confused with the nullification or impairment itself. Rather, the violation is the cause of a nullification
or impairment of a benefit. In other words, rights confer benefits (e.g., predictable conditions of
competition), they are not themselves benefits within the meaning of Article XXIII of GATT 1994
and the DSU.
(b) Previous arbitrations
(i) Introduction
3.30 We note that previous arbitrations (a) support our approach regarding the interpretation to be
given to the provisions relating to nullification or impairment and (b) more specifically, have
concluded that the nullification or impairment of benefits resulting fro m a violation should be
expressed in terms of trade or, in two instances, economic effects.
48
(ii) Interpretation of the provisions relating to nullification or impairment by previous arbitrators
3.31 Previous Article 22.6 arbitrators concluded, as we have, that violation and nullification or
impairment are two different concepts. The arbitrator in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC)
stated that the presumption of nullification or impairment contained in Article 3.8 of the DSU could
not, in and of itself, be taken simultaneously as evid ence proving a particular level of nullification or
impairment allegedly suffered by a Member request ing authorization to suspend concessions or other

48 See US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3) , para. 3.18 and US – 1916 Act (EC)
(Article 22.6 – US), para. 5.23.

obligations under Article 22 of the DSU. Such aut horization would only arise at a much later stage of
the dispute settlement process. The arbitrator added that:
"The review of the level of nullification or impairment by Arbitrators from the
objective benchmark foreseen by Article 22 of the DSU, is a separate process that is
independent from the finding of infringements of WTO rules by a panel or the
Appellate Body. As a result, a Member's potential interests in trade in goods or
services and its interest in a determinati on of rights and obligations under the WTO
Agreements are each sufficient to esta blish a right to pursue a WTO dispute
settlement proceeding. However, a Member 's legal interest in compliance by other
Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is entitled to obtain
authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU."
49
(iii) Consideration of benefits nullified or impaired in terms of economic or trade effect
3.32 As a preliminary observation, we note that all pa rties to these proceedings agree that the level
of nullification or impairment must, in this case, be monetarily quantifie d. Disagreement arises
regarding whether this monetary quantification has to be based on some economic effect of the
violation, or whether it can be directly based on the disbursements made under the CDSOA.
3.33 We note that the arbitrators in US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3) considered
that benefits for the purpose of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 and the DSU were of an economic
nature:
"If it is assumed, then, that copyright ho lders exploit their exclusive rights by
granting licences for the use of their works, one of the benefits which arises from
those rights consists of the licensing royalties which right holders would receive.
Thus, exclusive rights such as those set forth in Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii)
will normally translate into economic benefits for copyright holders.
In their submissions to the Arbitrators, the parties have focused on this type of benefit
accruing to copyright holders. The Arbitrators concur with the parties that, for
purposes of these arbitration proceedings, the relevant benefits are those which are
economic in nature.50 This is consistent with previous decisions of arbitrators acting
under Article 22.6 of the DSU. 51 Moreover, like the parties to this dispute, the

49 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 6.11.
50 (footnote original) This view is based on the object of th e present proceedings, which is to quantify
the economic harm suffered by the European Communities as a consequence of the continued application of
Section 110(5)(B). It does not necessarily follow that Members having recourse to Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement need to establish nullification or impairment of economic benefits accruing to them under the TRIPS
Agreement. The Arbitrators find s upport for their view in the following statement by the arbitrators in
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU : "[A] Member's potential interests in
trade in goods or services and its interest in a de termination of rights and obligations under the WTO
Agreements are each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO disput e settlement proceeding. However, a
Member's legal interest in compliance by other Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is
entitled to obtain authorization to suspend concessions un der Article 22 of the DSU." See the Decision of the
Arbitrators on European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas –
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU (hereafter "EC – Bananas
III (22.6) (US)", WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999, para. 6.10.
51 (footnote original) See, e.g., the Decisions of the Arbitrators on EC – Bananas III (22.6) (US), supra,
para. 6.12 (benefits nullified or impair ed: losses in US exports of goods and losses by US service suppliers in
services supply); European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas –

Arbitrators will proceed on the assumption th at the licensing royalties realizable by
copyright holders constitute an adequate measure of the economic benefits arising
from Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii)."
3.34 We further note that, with the exception of the arbitrations carried out under Article 4.11 of
the SCM Agreement, previous arbitrators have re lied on an approach based on the economic or trade
effect of the violation.
52 While most arbitrations have relied on the narrower concept of trade effect,
we note that both the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3) arbitrator and the US – 1916
Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) arbitrators referred to economic effects. 53 The use of direct trade effect
in most case reflects the fact that trade loss is gene rally more directly identifiable and quantifiable and
that, in such a context, arbitrators preferred to rely on verifiable figures.
3.35 In both US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3) and US – 1916 Act (EC)
(Article 22.6 – US), reliance on the broader concept of economic impact was dictated by the nature of
the measures at issue. In US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3), no actual trade took place,
but rights had been breached which conferred economic benefits to the holders of intellectual property
rights in the form of royalties. In US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) , the law at issue dealt with
the possibility of civil and/or criminal proceedings being taken against companies importing dumped
imports. Since a judicial decision or settlement under the 1916 Act did not automatically restrict
trade, the broader concept of economic effect was more appropriate.
3.36 In the present case, we note that disbursements under the CDSOA operate, in economic terms,
as subsidies that may generate im port substitution production. Consid ering that the benefit nullified
or impaired in this case corresponds to the va lue of exports from Chile "replaced" by the
United States' domestic production would be consiste nt with the approach followed by previous
arbitrators. As a result, it would be possible, in th eory, to rely on the effect of the CDSOA on Chile's
trade with the United States.
3.37 This said, our task is not to determine whet her this is the only approach acceptable under
Article 22.6 of the DSU.
54 On the contrary, it is to determin e whether the approach advocated by
Chile is compatible with the DSU.
3.38 From a review of the arbitrations which would seem to support Chile's approach, we note that
the only arbitration decisions based on the value of violation itself were those under Article 4.10 and
4.11 of the SCM Agreement.

Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,
24 March 2000, footnote 52 (benefits nullified or impair ed: losses by Ecuador of actual trade and of potential
trade opportunities in bananas and the loss of actual and potential distribution service supply); European
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Original Complaint by the United
States – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU (hereafter "EC –
Hormones (22.6) (US) "), WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999, para. 41 (b enefits nullified or impaired: foregone US
exports of hormone-treated beef and beef products); European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products ( Hormones) – Original Complaint by Canada – Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU (hereafter " EC – Hormones (22.6) (Canada) "), WT/DS48/ARB,
12 July 1999, para. 40 (benefits nullified or impaired: foregone Canadian exports of hormone-treated beef and
beef products).
52 See the list in footnote 51 above, as well as US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), para. 5.23.
53 See US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3), para. 3.18, US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 –
US), para.7.2.
54 As a matter of fact, we do not consider previous arbitrations to be constitutive of "subsequent
practice", within the meaning of that concept under public international law (see Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, Article 31.3(b)).

3.39 Even though Chile does not claim that the Requesting Parties are entitled to suspend
concessions equivalent to the full amount of di sbursements made under the CDSOA, its position
seems to be based to a large extent on th e approach followed by the arbitrator in US – FSC
(Article 22.6 – US), who concluded that "appropriate count ermeasures" under Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement could correspond to the subsidy illegally granted, irrespective of its trade effect.55
3.40 First, we note that disbursements under the CDSOA are different from the export subsidy
addressed by the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) arbitrator.
3.41 Second, we consider that the reasoning underlying the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) decision,
and the other awards under Article 4.11 of the SC M Agreement, cannot be extended to the present
case. One reason is that the mandate of arbitrators under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement is
different from that of arbitrators under Article 22.7 of the DSU. In this regard, Article 4.11 reads as
follows:
"In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Unde rstanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall
determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate."56
3.42 The US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) arbitrator expressly differentiated the situation under
Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement and that under Article 22.4 of the DSU:
"We recall that Article 22.4 of the DSU provides as follows:
'The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the
nullification or impairment.'
The drafters have explicitly set a quantitativ e benchmark to the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations that might be authorized. This is similarly reflected
in Article 22.7, which defines the arbitrators' mandate in such proceedings as follows:
'The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 … shall determine
whether the level of such suspensi on is equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment….' (footnote omitted)
As we have already noted in our analysis of the text of Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement above, there is, by contrast, no such indication of an explicit
quantitative benchmark in that provision. It should be recalled here that Articles 4.10
and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement are 'special or additional rules' under Appendix 2 of
the DSU, and that in accordance w ith Article 1.2 of the DSU, it is possible for such
rules or procedures to prevail over those of the DSU. There can be no presumption,
therefore, that the drafters intended the standard under Article 4.10 to be necessarily
coextensive with that under Article 22. 4 so that the notion of 'appropriate
countermeasures' under Article 4.10 would limit such countermeasures to an amount
'equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment' suffered by the complaining

55 See, e.g., Chile's written submission, paras. 36, 42 and footnote 20.
56 (footnote original) This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in
light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.

Member. Rather, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement use distinct language
and that difference must be given meaning."
57
3.43 Like the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) arbitrator, we consider that Article 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement is a special or additional di spute settlement provision which provides for a sui
generis approach applicable to prohi bited subsidies only. Article 4.11 instructs arbitrators to
determine "appropriate countermeasures" rather than whether the level of suspension of concessions
or other obligations is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. This would seem to leave
more discretion to arbitrators in assessing the amount of countermeasures. This was confirmed by the
arbitrator in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US):
"Thus, as we interpret Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, a Member is entitled to act
with countermeasures that properly take into account the gravity of the breach and the
nature of the upset in the balance of right s and obligations in question. This cannot
be reduced to a requirement that constrains countermeasures to trade effects, for the
reasons we have set out above."
3.44 While the arbitrator in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) did not exclude the application of a trade
effect test under Article 4.11, it would be difficult, in situations other than those relating to prohibited
subsidies, to conclude that any disbursement pursuant to an illegal measu re automatically causes
nullification or impairment at least equivalent to the total amount disbursed.
3.45 Chile also relies on the arbitrator's decision in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) in
support of its position.58 We note that the arbitrator in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) agreed
with the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) that:
"[T]he presumption of nullification or impairment, as provided in Article 3.8 of the
DSU, by no means provides evidence of the level of nullification or impairment
sustained by the Member requesting authorization to suspend obligations."59
3.46 We further note that, in that case, the arbitrat or relied on the economic impact of the measure.
The arbitrator refused to consider the "chilling effe ct" of the law as such, and it was determined that
the costs attached to any settlement or judgement under the 1916 Act – i.e., instances of application –
could be considered to correspond to the economic effect of the 1916 Act on EC companies.
3.47 Overall therefore, we conclude that the reasoni ng of previous arbitrators under Article 22.6 of
the DSU does not seem to support the approach proposed by Chile.
(c) Conclusion
3.48 We conclude from the above that Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and the DSU clearly
differentiate between two stages in WTO dispute settlement:
(a) one is the establishment of the existence of nullification or impairment by panels and
the Appellate Body. This is where Article 3.8 of the DSU plays its role by providing
that the existence of a violation creates a presumption of nullification or impairment
of a benefit; and

57 US – FSC (Article 22.6 –US), paras. 5.45-5.47.
58 See, e.g., Chile's written submission, paras. 21, 72.
59 US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), para. 5.50, emphasis in the original.

(b) a separate and subsequent process where a Member requests the authorization to
suspend concessions or other obligations a nd an arbitrator, under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, is requested to determine the level of the benefit nullified or impaired.
3.49 This implies, in our view, that no assimila tion can be made between, on the one hand, a
violation or the right breached and, on the other ha nd, the benefit nullified or impaired as a result of
that violation. Under the WTO dispute se ttlement mechanism, a violation is the precursor to
establishing the nullification or impairment of a benefit.
3.50 In that context, the benefit nullified or impair ed must necessarily be something else. In this
respect, we recall that past arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU have deemed that benefit to
correspond to the trade directly affected by the maintenance of the illegal measure.
3.51 For the reasons stated above, we reject the approach proposed by Chile in this case.
3. Reliance on specific instances of disbursements to assess nullification or impairment
(a) Main arguments of the parties
3.52 The United States claims that an examination of the actual disbursements made under the
CDSOA would go beyond the terms of reference of the original disputes. Disbursements are not part
of the "measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement" under Article 22.2 of the DSU. In
the absence of an actual finding, it is not permissi ble under the DSU to assume that any application
breaches any WTO obligation or nullifies or impairs any benefit. 60 The United States adds that, since
there are no recommendations or rulings concerning any payments made under the CDSOA, there is
certainly no recommendation or ruling about future payments – i.e., there is no legal basis for the
Arbitrator to make an award for alleged nullifi cation or impairment supposedly caused by measures
not even in existence.61
3.53 Chile argues that whenever a panel or, as appr opriate, the Appellate Body determines that a
rule is contrary to the WTO Agreement, any appli cation under that rule will be of the same nature
and, accordingly, will also be a violation. In fact , the inconsistency of the law "as such" means that
those who apply it have no room for discretion to prevent an application that breaches the obligations
assumed in the WTO. In the opinion of Chile, it see ms that the United States is seeking to re-open
this dispute when it affirms that, since the CDSOA is different from its applications, the Requesting
Parties should separately challenge each instance of application. Chile objects to this position to the
extent that the WTO adjudicating bodies have alr eady ruled on the lawfulness of the CDSOA and
have clearly found that, to the extent that the CDSO A is inconsistent with provisions of the covered
agreements, it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the Requesting Parties.62
(b) Analysis of the Arbitrator
3.54 First, we recall that the requesting parties ha ve not identified nullification or impairment
beyond that resulting from the instances of application of the CDSOA.
3.55 Second, we note that the United States raised two separate questions regarding this issue: one
is whether disbursements already made under the CD SOA can be considered by the Arbitrator, the
other one is whether future disbursements may be considered.

60 United States written submission, paras. 15-19
61 United States oral statement, paras. 39-40.
62 Chile's written submission, paras. 37-39.

3.56 At this stage, the question before us is wh ether we may take into account the economic or
trade effects resulting from the instances of appli cation of the CDSOA, give n the United States claim
that the CDSOA was challenged as such, and, had not been applied when it was first challenged.
3.57 We agree with the United States that the DSB never issued recommendations or rulings with
respect to the application of the CDSOA. We also note the arguments of the Requesting Parties that
once a measure has been found illegal, any instance of application of this measure is ipso facto illegal.
3.58 We take the view that the CDSOA mandates disbursements whenever certain conditions are
met; that these disbursements have been found by the Panel and the Appellate Body to be a core
element in their conclusion that the CDSOA violates the WTO Agreement
63, and that there is no
reason, for the purpose of assessing nullification or impairment , to exclude instances of the
application of the CDSOA from our consideration.
3.59 This approach is in line with the practice of other arbitrators. For instance, the arbitrator in US
– 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) considered that instances of application could be taken into
account in assessing nullification or impairment by a law as such.64
3.60 We also recall that, in reply to one of our questions 65, the United States referred to two cases,
US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25.3) and EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC). In
those two cases, a law had been challenged as such. Nevertheless, the arbitrators determined the level
of nullification or impairment on the basis of an anal ysis of lost royalties in the first case and lost
trade in the second case.
3.61 We fail to see any meaningful difference between the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act
(Article 25.3), the EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) arbitrations and this arbitration. In these
two cases, the arbitrators relied, for all practical purposes, on the economic result of the application of
the law. In this case, Chile requests us to re ly on disbursements made under the CDSOA to assess the
level of nullification or impairment it suffered. Th e only difference which may exist is that, under the
CDSOA, the United States' authorities are expected to implement the law through the application of a
number of administrative steps. The United St ates seems to claim that, as a result, these are
"measures" separate from the CDSOA on which no fi nding was ever made. The difference, in our
view, is a matter of degree, not of nature.
3.62 As a result, we conclude that we are entitled, for the purpose of assessing the trade effect and,
thus, the level of nullification caused by the CD SOA to Chile, to take into account instances of
application of the CDSOA.
3.63 The second question raised by the United States is addressed in Section IV.B.2 below.
4. Approach to be followed by the Arbitrator in this case
3.64 Given our conclusion that the approach advo cated by Chile is not compatible with
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and Article 22 of the DSU, and consistent with past arbitrations, it falls
to us to determine the approach we consider to be compatible.

63 See Panel Report, paras. 7.35-7.39 and 8.1; Appellate Body Report, para. 256.
64 US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), para. 7.8.
65 Reply of the United States of 28 April 2004 (paras. 11 and 12) to question 12 of the Arbitrator of
21 April 2004, which reads as follows:

"Considering its reasoning in paragraphs 15 to 19 of its written submission and more generally its
position on nullification or impairment, could the United States give an example of a situation where a law as
such would cause more than "zero" nullification or impairment?"

3.65 We do not agree with the United States that nullific ation or impairment is to be limited in all
instances to the direct trade loss resulting from the violation. We agree with the Requesting Parties
that the terms "trade effect" are found neither in Article XXIII of GATT 1994, nor in Article 22 of the
DSU. Previous arbitrators' decisions based on direct trade impact are not binding precedents.
3.66 However, as already mentioned, the "trade ef fect" approach has been regularly applied in
other Article 22.6 arbitrations and seems to be generally accepted by Members as a correct
application of Article 22 of the DSU.
3.67 On that basis, we conclude that we should a pply an approach based on determining the trade
effect, on the Requesting Parties, of the violation by the United States of its WTO obligations through
the application of the CDSOA. Indeed, while the Requesting Parties contest the view of the United
States that nullification or impairment may only be assessed in relation to the trade effect of the
challenged measure and the conclusion that the actual trade effect of the CDSOA is "zero", they have
not convincingly argued that an approach based on the trade effect of the CDSOA could not be
applicable in this case.
3.68 In selecting the methodology to be applied in determining the level of nullification or
impairment suffered by Chile in this case, we noted the importance attached by the Requesting Parties
to the view that suspension of concessions or othe r obligations is intended to induce compliance, and
the view of the Requesting Parties that this purpose should guide our determinations under
Article 22.7 of the DSU.
66
3.69 The concept of "inducing compliance" was first raised in the EC – Bananas III (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC)67 arbitration and has been referred to since in other arbitrations. However, it is not
expressly referred to in any part of the DSU and we are not persuaded that the object and purpose of
the DSU – or of the WTO Agreement – would suppor t an approach where the purpose of suspension
of concessions or other obligations pursuant to Artic le 22 would be exclusively to induce compliance.
Having regard to Articles 3.7 and 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU as part of the context of Articles 22.4
and 22.7, we cannot exclude that inducing complian ce is part of the objectives behind suspension of
concessions or other obligations, but at most it can be only one of a number of purposes in authorizing
the suspension of concessions or other obligatio ns. By relying on "inducing compliance" as the
benchmark for the selection of the most appropriate a pproach we also run the risk of losing sight of
the requirement of Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification
or impairment.
3.70 Moreover, we note from past arbitrations that, in all instances, arbitrators have quantified or
valued the benefit nullified or impaired. In the present case, both parties have also attempted to
quantify the level of nullification or impairment. Such quantification or valuation exercises show, in
our view, that even though each party relies on a radically different legal approach, the economic
rationales underlying these approaches seem to be ve ry close. We consider that, beyond the legal
argumentation of the Requesting Parties, their choice of the total disbursement made under the
CDSOA is ultimately a benchmark, which they exp ect to yield a higher level of nullification or
impairment than the more "classical" benchmark based on lost trade. All the more so as the United
States has taken the view that the level of nullifi cation or impairment caused by the CDSOA was in
fact "zero" in terms of direct trade loss. As we see it, Chile and the other Requesting Parties in effect
use the amount of disbursements under the CDSOA as simply a proxy for the conduct of an economic
analysis of the impact of the CDSOA disbursemen ts on their exports or, more generally, on the
competitive situation of the businesses concerned. U nder those circumstances, we believe that our
decision to rely on the trade effect resulting from th e violation to determine the level of nullification

66 See, e.g., Chile's written submission, paras. 27-32.
67 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – US), para. 6.3.

or impairment does not, in economic terms, significa ntly depart from the rationale of Chile and the
other Requesting Parties' approach.
3.71 We are also mindful that other arbitrators have taken a prudent approach by avoiding claims
that were "too remote", "too speculative" or "not meaningfully quantified".
68 We recall that parties
have also cautioned us against the risk of relying on overly speculative data.69
3.72 For this reason, we considered it inappropriate to try to apply a counterfactual based on a
relatively simple equation and simple parameters, as in EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), EC
– Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) or EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC). Rather ,
given the number of factors potentially influenc ing the eventual trade effect of the CDSOA
disbursements, it would be more appropriate to identify and apply an economic model reflecting those
factors and allowing us, on the basis of a clearly identifiable amount – the disbursements made under
the CDSOA – to assess the extent to which those payments could nu llify or impair benefits accruing
to the Requesting Parties.
3.73 To this end, we requested the parties to subm it data and relevant econom ic literature so as to
assess the feasibility of an economic model that w ould measure the extent to which disbursements
under the CDSOA affect exports from the Requesting Parties to the United States. 70 We are mindful
of the fact that Chile opposed the u se of an economic model in this case. 71 However, contrary to
Chile's views and on the basis of the elements ava ilable, we concluded that such a model was feasible
and produced more credible results than if we app lied the total disbursement as a proxy for the level
of nullification or impairment. Indeed, while th e model we have chosen to apply is based on a
number of assumptions, we also note that the eviden ce before us does not demonstrate that using the
total disbursement as a proxy for the level of nullification or impairment would produce a more
credible result. Our analysis is described in Section III.C below.
3.74 We recognize that, in relying on an economic m odel in this arbitration, we may be breaking
new grounds. This impression may be correct to th e extent that we base our determinations on the
results of this model. However, we note that economic modelling has already been applied in the US
– FSC (Article 22.6 – US) arbitration. We are also mindful that applying economic models in
arbitrations under Article 22.6 of the DSU may make such proceedings more complex and costlier.
We acknowledge that economic analysis requires expe rtise that may not be readily available to all
WTO Members.72 We do not believe, however, that this s hould be a reason to deprive ourselves of a
means to reach a credible result through a transp arent process in complex cases such as this one.
Rather, we see the option of using economic mode ls in Article 22.6 arbitrations as creating an
opportunity to ensure full cooperation from the parties and, hence, more precise and credible results
where the alternative may be to choose between simplistic and perhaps irreconcilable approaches.

68 See, e.g., EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 77; US – 1916 Act (EC)
(Article 22.6 – US), paras. 5.54-5.57.
69 See, e.g. United States written submission, pa ra. 40; replies from Brazil, Chile, the European
Communities, India, Japan, Korea and Mexico to the additional questions of the Arbitrator, para. 27.
70 See paras. 3.124-3.125 below.
71 See, for instance, the replies of Chile to the questions of the Arbitrator of 21 April 2004, in particular
its replies to questions 5, 6, 7 and 9.
72 See Chile's comments to the Arbitrator of 14 June 2004.

C. CALCULATION OF THE LEVEL OF NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT THROUGH AN ECONOMIC
MODEL
1. Introduction
3.75 As mentioned above, we consider that an appr opriate way to assess the trade effect of a law
operating, in economic terms, like a domestic subsidy 73 was to endeavour to establish an economic
model. This model, when applied to the facts of this case, would identify a coefficient which, when
multiplied by the amount of disbursements over a given period, would produce a figure corresponding
to a trade effect which could reasonably be deemed to correspond to the level of nullification or
impairment for that period.
3.76 We also noted that when establishing an economic model, we would need to address a
number of arguments made by the United States in relation, inter alia, to the calculation proposed by
the Requesting Parties: its own view that the level of nullification or impairment would, in fact, be
"zero"; the combined effect of offset payments and an anti-dumping or countervailing duty order; and
the effect of CDSOA payments vi s-à-vis the United States or foreign competitors not subject to
anti-dumping or countervailing duties. 74 These arguments are addressed in the relevant parts of this
section in relation to the determination of the amount of disbursements to be used in the application of
the model, together with the United States' argument s regarding the fact that the figures published by
the United States' authorities may either not be accurate or not definitive.75
2. Review of the approaches of the parties regarding economic models
(a) United States
3.77 The United States originally took the view that the trade effect of the CDSOA disbursements
can be estimated to be zero. 76 This position is grounded in the view that benefiting firms would not
expend the CDSOA disbursements to enhance their co mmercial position. Instead, the funds would be
used elsewhere. The United States did not disagre e that modelling was appropriate in this case, but
because the input to the model would be zero, the output, or conclusion about trade effects would also
necessarily be zero.
77 The United States added that even if the firms concerned did use the funds to
enhance their competitive position, there would be a de minimis effect on output and hence on trade.
In other words, the United States considered that the pass-through effect of the government transfers,
i.e. the ad valorem effect of the transfers on the recipients' prices, would be zero or close to zero.

73 We are mindful of the United States' views that the CDSOA is a subsidy not found to cause any
adverse trade effect (United States written submission, paras. 62-65). We nonetheless note that the United
States does not object to a model which would rely on the price effect of CDSOA disbursements (see, e.g.,
Exhibit US-18, p. 2).
74 See United States written submission, para. 52.
75 See United States written submission, paras. 13, 14, 26 and 27.
76 The Arbitrator asked the United States to submit a model that would justify its claim that
nullification and impairment is "zero". The United States did not submit a model in response to this question,
but outlined the basic parameters of the Armington model, which was submitted at a later stage in the
proceedings. Instead, the United States argued that a formal m odel was not required, since in its view the facts
are such that the CDSOA payments would not result in a ny increase in production. (United States replies to the
Arbitrator's questions of 21 April 2004, paras. 16-26).
77 United States replies to the Arbitrator's questions of 21 April 2004, para. 26.

3.78 However, the United States ultimately acknow ledged that modelling could actually be done
with some precision and volunteered a possible model.
78
3.79 The model proposed by the United States adopts a disaggregated approach to estimating trade
effects. Instead of treating the United States' ec onomy as a whole and estimating a single trade effect
number, it estimates the trade effect at the product level for each importer. These individual values
are then summed to obtain the total trade effect . The model proposed by the United States also
divides the countries in the world into three groups : the United States, WTO Members affected by the
CDSOA disbursements and other exporters to the Un ited States, thereby isolating the effects of the
CDSOA payments only on the WTO Members subj ect to active anti-dumping or countervailing duty
orders. The inputs required to run the model include:79
• A current market value share for each source of the products;
• An ad valorem measure of the CDSOA distribution that actually affected production;
• An estimate of the elasticity of substitutability as between products produced in the
United States and imports (the elasticity of substitution);
• An estimate of the price sensitivity of supply for each product (the elasticity of the
United States' supply, complaining party import supply, and rest-of-the-world import
supply); and
• An estimate of the market demand elasticity.

3.80 Estimates of the supply, demand and substitu tion elasticities were ta ken from various US
International Trade Commission reports. Suppl y elasticities for WTO Members with dumped or
subsidized exports into the United States were arbitrar ily set at 100 to reflect that they would not be
able to adjust the price of their product downwards.
80 Trade and production data for the model is
sourced from the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, and USITC investigations.81
3.81 The output of the model for each WTO Member affected by the CDSOA payments and each
industry is as follows:82
• "An estimate of the decrease in US domestic shipments"; and
• "An estimate of changes in foreign trade part ner exports to the United States, specifically
breaking out the gain to the individual complaining party, the exemption of whose duty
payments from CDSOA served as the basis for the particular counter factual estimation."

3.82 While the model is straightforward and b ased on the standard literature in applied
international economics, implementation of the mode l by the United States in this case was not. The
United States made a number of assumptions, which in its view were specific to the current case.
These assumptions affect the input of the model, the values of the elasticities and the treatment of
unavailable data.

78 In commenting on the view of the Requesting Parties that modelling would be "complex and
burdensome" and Chile's comment that modelling would be "tedious", the United States stated that:

"The fact that an exercise is complex, tedious, or even burdensome does not mean it can be
dispensed with."

Comments of the United States of 4 May 2004 on answers of the Requesting Parties to the questions of
the Arbitrator, para. 3.
79 Exhibit US-18.
80 Exhibit US-18.
81 Exhibit US-18
82 Exhibit US-18.

3.83 These are:
• ignoring cases that do not exceed the de minimis threshold advocated by the United States
in this arbitration;
• making certain assumptions about which payments affect production;
• making certain assumptions about the pass-through effect of payments.

3.84 The United States considers that only those payments that are above a de minimis level should
be analysed. Citing Article 6.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and Article 6.4(a) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, the United States argues that a 5 per cent de minimis threshold is appropriate.
83 I n
implementing the model, however, the United States assumes a 1 per cent de minimis level.
3.85 The United States also deducts certain payments, which it assumed did not affect
production.84
3.86 The United States further deducts payments ma de in respect of products for which the
anti-dumping or countervailing duty was revoked on the ground that the "nullification or impairment
should be measured in terms of the effect th e CDSOA has on producers/exporters subject to
antidumping or countervailing duty orders". 85 This point is further clarified in the United States'
statement that "a Member cannot suffer nullificatio n or impairment as a result of a non-permissible
specific action against dumping (or against a subsidy) if no order is in place and no duties can be
collected on that Member's products."86
3.87 Only once the industries that meet the United States' definition of de minimis are identified
and the various deductions are calculated does the United States apply its assumption of the
proportion of disbursements that affect production. Its initial argument is that the pass-through figure
should be "zero", which implies that none of the CDSOA disbursements would have an affect on
trade. The United States provides four reasons for this assumption:
• the disbursements are untied, hence there is no requirement to expand production with
these payments
87;
• there is no link between "qualifying expend itures" under the CDSOA and the expansion
of production;
• the unpredictability of the disbursements makes it difficult for beneficiary firms to rely on
the expenditures in a commercially meaningful way;
• offset payments reflect a small fraction of production, hence they cannot have a
discernable impact on trade.

3.88 However, in response to the Arbitrator's query on the validity of a zero pass-through value,
the United States indicated that a pass-throug h level of 25 per cent would be "reasonable". 88 I t
qualified this response by indicating that the econo mic literature did not point towards any specific
value. However, the United States cited a value of 75 per cent for a United States policy contingent
on export (the Domestic International Sales Cor poration programme), which was reported in an

83 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 27.
84 Citing the example of a company called Torrington, which was sold to another company (Timken)
without the payments, the United States argues that these payments should be deducted, since they do not affect
production.
85 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 23.
86 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 24.
87 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, paras. 5-7.
88 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 13.

academic study.
89 The United States also cites a study that concludes that 60 per cent of an
investment tax incentive was received by the recipients.90
3.89 The results of the United States' model as app lied according to its assumptions are outlined in
Table 1.
(b) Requesting Parties
3.90 As mentioned above, Chile objected on several o ccasions to the use of an economic model in
these proceedings. We note, however, that Chile filed a joint reply, together with the other
Requesting Parties, to the second set of questions of the Arbitrator. 91 Since we decided to proceed
with an economic model in order to assess the level of nullification or impairment in this case, we
present hereafter the views of the Requesting Parties as representative of the position of Chile in that
context.
3.91 The original position of the Requesting Parties was that modelling need not be considered by
the Arbitrator to determine the award. Inst ead, they argued that the value of the CDSOA
disbursements was a proxy for the minimum level of nullification or impairment caused by the
measure found to be illegal. The position of the Reques ting Parties is that the level of nullification or
impairment can be quantified on the basis of the va lue of the CDSOA payments; since their view is
that economic modelling of the trade effects in this case would be too difficult.
92
3.92 However, in response to a question posed by th e Arbitrator regarding whether or not a model
for estimating the trade effects that meets their crite ria exists, the Requesting Parties submitted such a
model. Their model is based on the level of CDSO A payments, a gross measure of the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported products and the ratio of US manufacturing imports to
domestic shipments of US manufacturing industries.

89 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 11.
90 United States replies to the Arbitrator's second set of questions, para. 12.
91 See replies of Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, India, Japan, Korea and Mexico to
the second set of questions of the Arbitrator, 7 June 2004.
92 According to Chile an economic model "would involve a considerable amount of tedious work, and
given the constant changes that the CDSOA involves (in terms of amounts to be distributed and companies
affected), the model would have to be periodically revised, since the assumptions and parameters will have
changed."

Table 1: Estimated Level of Nullification or Impairment Revised Pursuant to the Model Proposed by the United States

 2001 2002 2003
Country
 Model results
No production
data
adjustments
Total
nullification and
impairment
Model results
No production
data
adjustments
Total
nullification
and impairment
Model results
No production
data
adjustments
Total
nullification and
impairment
Brazil $0 $7 $7 $176,783 $0 $176,783 $124,264 $0 $124,264
Canada $342,357 $0 $342,357 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Chile $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
EC $651,736 $147,474 $799,210 $154,538 $80,620 $235,158 $119,810 $102,176 $221,986
India $0 $336 $336 $85,584 $1,083 $86,667 $46,537 $935 $47,472
Japan $1,149,255 $23,442 $1,172,697 $1,061,395 $3 9,144 $1,100,539 $1,036,507 $46,484 $1,082,991
Korea $130,631 $6,684 $137,315 $52,041 $41,121 $93,162 $65,329 $31,461 $96,790
Mexico $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $203 $203
 Total $2,273,979 $177,943 $2,451,922 $1,530,341 $161,968 $1,692,309 $1,392,447 $181,259 $1,573,706

Source: United States

3.93 The formal specification of the model proposed by the Requesting Parties, as submitted to the
Arbitrator, is:
93
Reduction in imports () ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
∆
∆
= QP
MPQP
P
P
MM
q
m
q
q
q
*** (1)

where,
M = volume of imports
∆ M = change in the volume of imports
Pm = the price of imports
Q = the volume of domestic shipments
P
q = the price of domestic goods
qP∆ = change in the price of domestic goods

3.94 The Requesting Parties further simplify this e xpression by reducing it to the following three
components:
• the elasticity of substitution (η), which is the first term and can be expressed as:
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
∆
∆
=
q
q
P
P
MM
η (2)

• the total value of the payments expressed as a margin of the price reduction on domestic
production financed by payments (S), the second term in the equation and can be expressed
as: QPS q *∆= (3)

• the ratio of the value of imports to the value of domestic shipments in the markets in question:
(R), the third term in the equation and can be expressed as ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
= QP
MPR
q
m (4)

3.95 Taken together, the model of the Requesting Parties as expressed by equation (1) can be
presented as the product of the above three variables (equations (2)-(4)).

Reduction in imports RS **η= (5)

3.96 The Requesting Parties operationalize their m odel for the year 2002 with data from public
sources. For the elasticity of substitution, they adopt the highest elasticity in the classification of
sectors used by the Global Trade Analysis Project of 5.2. 94 They argue that this is appropriate since
"the kinds of products that are typically subject to anti-dumping and countervailing duties tend to be

93 Box 1 of the joint replies of the Requesting Pa rties to the questions of the Arbitrator, dated
28 April 2004.
94 See joint replies of the Requesting Parties (excep t Chile) to the questions of the Arbitrator of
21 April 2004, para. 36.

commodities and commoditised manufactured goods th at compete under conditions much closer to
perfect competition".95 They further argue that:
"elasticities of substitution specific to the products benefiting from the CDSOA
payments would be higher than the aggreg ated average GTAP or NAIC data because
CDSOA disbursements typically relate to commodities and commoditised
manufactured products, for which preference of buyers is largely determined by price.
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged in the economic literature that the more
disaggregate the sample the higher the estimated substitution elasticity. Therefore the
Requesting Parties consider that an elastic ity drawn from the upper end of the GTAP
range (5.2) is justified as typical degree of price sensitivity".96
3.97 In addition to the homogeneity of products as implied by the assumption of commoditized
manufactured products, the Requesting Parties s ubmit that elasticity values should be taken from
long-run estimates and not short-run estimates. They note that these estimates are "on average, twice
as large as short-run elasticities".97
3.98 Data on domestic shipments are sourced fro m public sources. The Requesting Parties
estimate that in the year 2002 the ratio of imports to domestic production was 0.295.
3.99 Using total payments for 2002 of US$329 million, the Requesting Parties, therefore, conclude
that the total trade effect of the CDSOA progra mme is US$505 million. In simple terms, they
conclude that for the year 2002 the trade effect coefficient would be 1.54 times the level of
disbursements. At this point we should note that this coefficient is independent of the value of
disbursements. It depends only on the assumed valu e of the elasticity of substitution and the import
penetration ratio. Changes in either one of these values will change the overall value of the
coefficient.
3.100 We also recall that, in commenting on the m odel submitted by the Requesting Parties, the
United States observed that the Requesting Parties include the amount of all CDSOA offset payments.
This is equivalent to assuming that every CD SOA dollar disbursed by the United States under the
CDSOA would be put towards reducing the price of domestic products (i.e. pass-through effect). The
United States also notes that an aggregate measure of import penetration is used as opposed to a
measure specific to those industries where there is an incidence of CDSOA payments. In addition to
these criticisms, the United States not es that the Requesting Parties u sed the highest elasticity value
available.
3. Analysis of the Arbitrator
(a) Comparison of the models
3.101 We note at the outset that the modelling approaches of the parties differ in terms of their level
of aggregation and also in terms of their specification.
3.102 The model proposed by the Requesting Parties is aggregated and contains two terms in
addition to the level of disbursements. Certai n known elements of the CDSOA programme are not

95 Ibid.
96 Joint replies of the Requesting Parties to the second set of questions of the Arbitrator, 7 June 2004,
para. 6.
97 Comments of the Requesting Parties (except Chile) on the replies of the United States to the second
set of questions of the Arbitrator, page 14.

taken into account, such as the industry distribution of the payments and the fact that one variable in
their computation, the import penetration ratio, can vary significantly across industries.
3.103 We also note that the Requesting Parties have not explained the basis on which they chose the
highest value for the elasticity of substitution.
3.104 The model proposed by the United States, while qualitatively similar to that of the Requesting
Parties, is slightly more sophisticated. The e ffect of a CDSOA disbursement depends upon a number
of parameters beyond the elastic ity of substitution between domest ic and imported products. In
particular, the response of domestic and foreign firms to any change in the domestic price plays a role
in determining the overall trade effect.
3.105 The level of sophistication and the heavy data requirements of this model prevented the
United States from applying it at the desired level of detail. We note that of the 66 country-product-
year data points, the United States applied its model to 21 such points.
98 This indicates, roughly, that
estimation of the CDSOA disbursements could only be done for around a third of the cases. The rest
of the cases would require the use of proxy data. In our view, such a heavy reliance on proxy data
would cast doubt on the reliability of that model. Furthermore, it would seem to us that the use of
proxy data is open to the same criticisms as t hose made by the United States with respect to the
Requesting Parties' model in terms of its degree of aggregation.
3.106 Despite the differences between the parties as to the appropriate model to be used, the two
models submitted have qualitativel y similar characteristics. Both multiply an assumed level of
disbursements by a factor, or coefficient, to arri ve at the total trade effect. In the case of the
Requesting Parties, this factor is 1.54. In the case of the United States, this factor would appear to be
on a product and importer basis for each year as illustrate d in Table 2. The range of coefficients as
estimated by the United States for the seven products for which they have data is 0.27 to 1.41.
3.107 Table 2 illustrates that, with product-specific data , the aggregate trade effect coefficient could
exceed 1. At the same time, it also highlights the different effects that one could obtain at different
levels of disaggregation.

98 An estimate for a given product, in a given year for a given exporter is considered to be one
observation. There are considerably more periods of observations, however, the United States chose not to
submit the data for those observations that did not meet its assumption of de minimis effect.

Table 2: Aggregate Trade Effect Coefficient for Products Estimated by the United States

Product Exporter Year Aggregate trade
effect coefficient
Alloy magnesium Canada 2001 1.24
Ball bearings EC, Japan 2001 0.77
Ball bearings EC, Japan 2002 0.74
Ball bearings EC, Japan 2003 0.70
Pasta EC, Japan 2001 0.27
Preserved mushrooms India 2002 0.82
Preserved mushrooms India 2003 0.86
Silicon metal Brazil 2002 1.24
Silicon metal Brazil 2003 1.24
Stainless steel butt-welded pipe fittings EC, Japan, Republic of
Korea
2002 0.67
Stainless steel butt-welded pipe fittings EC, Japan, Republic of
Korea
2003 0.91
Top of the stove stainless steel cookware Republic of Korea 2001 1.39
Top of the stove stainless steel cookware Republic of Korea 2002 1.40
Top of the stove stainless steel cookware Republic of Korea 2003 1.41
Source: Estimated using data supplied by the United Stat es. The coefficient is calculated for each product,
exporter and year by dividing the estimated total reduction in trade by the value of the disbursement. The
numerator is the sum of the loss in imports of exporters under active orders and those not under active orders.

3.108 In reviewing the model proposed by the United Stat es, we note that in fact the coefficient is
specific to each industry and is independent of th e level of the disbursement. Hence, for the ball-
bearing industry the aggregate trade effects for the European Communities and Japan are identical
(Table 2). The absolute amount of the trade effect varies according to their share of exports to the
United States in the ball-bearing industry.
3.109 Thus, the differences in modelling have more to do with differences in the assumptions about
the values of the elasticities and the pass-through values used rather than with the model itself, or the
level of aggregation. For example, as illustrated by the Requesting Parties, a ceteris paribus doubling
of the elasticity of substitution can have a substantiv e impact on the overall trade effect. Similarly, an
assumption that only 50 per cent of a given CDSOA di sbursement will have an impact on output, will
necessarily reduce any estimate of the trade effect by 50 per cent.
(b) Choosing an appropriate model
3.110 The previous sections presented the appro aches to economic modelling submitted by the
parties and a number of shortcomings we identified w ith both approaches. In general, we considered
the approach of the Requesting Parties to be too aggregated, hence not specific enough to this case.
While the model specification proposed by the Unite d States is disaggregated and well specified, we
concluded that there is insufficient data to run that model with any degree of accuracy.
3.111 Our preference would have been to employ a model endorsed by all parties, and we gave
ample opportunity to the parties to try and find common ground on this ques tion. Failing this, our
preference would have been for the disaggregated mode l proposed by the United States. However, as
mentioned above, the United States failed to provide sufficient data to employ such a model, despite it
being in the United States' inter est to do so. Moreover, the United States decided to apply a
de minimis threshold for assessed trade impacts. The result was that the United States' model could
not be implemented independe ntly. This left us with the option of either accepting or rejecting the

United States' model in its entirety. Our decision is to reject the United States' model in favour of a
modified version of the model proposed by the Requesting Parties.
3.112 We have two principal reasons for taking this deci sion. The first is the lack of available data
to implement the United States' model. As we have noted before, relevant data was available for only
a third of the samples proposed by the United St ates and the United States did not provide any
indication as to whether or not additional data would be made available. Our second reason is that the
only objections the United States had about the Reques ting Parties' model concerned the value of the
parameters used in the model and the level of aggr egation. We agree with the Requesting Parties in
their assessment of the United States' view on thei r submitted model that the United States "does not
critique the economic theory supporting the model, but argues that the parame ter values used in the
model are inappropriate".
99 This implies that if due account is taken of the legitimate concern of both
sides regarding the variance in the values of the pa rameters, then the model of the Requesting Parties
could be used to estimate the trade effect of the measure in question.
3.113 A basic economic model to derive a coefficient for the trade effects of disbursements
operating as subsidies can be described as the product of four variables: the value of the subsidy, a
measure of the ad valorem price reduction caused by the CDSOA disbursements (i.e., "pass-
through"), a substitution elasticity of imports, and im port penetration. The b asic relationship of the
trade effect can be expressed as follows:
Trade effect = (value of disbursements)*[(pass-through)* (import penetration)*(elasticity of
substitution)]

3.114 The term in the square brackets can be define d as a trade effect coefficient. For a given
expenditure of CDSOA disbursements that is deemed to affect trade, the product of that expenditure
and the coefficient provides the overall trade effect.
3.115 The above expression is identical to the m odel proposed by the Requesting Parties as
presented in equation (5). 100 It differs only in the addition of a separate multiplicative term to reflect
the pass-through effect of the disbursements on produc tion. In the Requesting Parties' model, this
term was implicitly assigned a value of one. It can be rewritten as:
Reduction in imports RS ***ηα= (6)

Where, α, is a parameter which reflect the value of the pass through effect of the disbursement.

3.116 As noted earlier and as pointed out by the United States, the model as specified in
equation (5) and the variant as specified in equation (6 ) is too aggregated to take into account some of
the specific aspects of the CDSOA scheme. Char t 1 illustrates how the payments vary across
industries at the 3-digit level of the North American Industry Classification. The issue more generally
is that while the CDSOA programme is technica lly open to any sector, and hence potentially has
economy-wide effects, in practice the use of the programme, and hence the disbursements, are quite
concentrated. While 67 per cent of the CDSOA dis bursements in 2002 have been identified by the
United States as either being miscellaneous manufactur ing or non-classifiable, in fact a review of the
specific recipient industries identified allows a more precise breakout. In particular, the majority of
the disbursements to "miscellaneous manufacturing" went to producers of ball and roller bearings, and
the majority of the disbursements identified by the United States as "non-classifiable" went to

99 Requesting Parties (except Chile) comments of 14 June 2004 on the United States replies to the
second set of questions of the Arbitrator, para. 21.
100 See Box 1 of the joint replies of the Requesting Pa rties (except Chile) to questions of the Arbitrator,
dated 28 April 2004.

companies in the electronics, machinery and primary and fabricated metals industries. In addition, the
United States identifies a further 21 per cent of 2002 disbursements as going to the primary and
fabricated metal industries. The comparable figures for 2001 are 66 per cent for "miscellaneous
manufacturing and not elsewhere specified" (with a si milar distribution to that in 2002) and 20 per
cent classified as primary and fabricated metal. Ch art 1 also highlights the fact that the inter-industry
distribution of payments can also vary over time.
Chart 1: Distribution of CDSOA Disbursements by 3-Digit

North American Industry Classification, 2001-2003

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Mi
sc. manu
factu
res
n.e.s.
Primary metal Food
Fabricated metal
Chemicals
Non
 metallic min
eral
Tran
sport equ
ipment
Plastics and
 rubber Paper
Fish p
rod
ucts
Non el
ectrical machinary
Agriculture
Textiles m
ill produ
cts
Textiles and
 fabri
cs
Wo
od p
rod
ucts
Furn
iture and
 fixtu
res
Per cent of annual payment
2001
2002
2003

3.117 We account for the industry distribution variation of the CDSOA payments by calculating the
trade effects at the industry level and then aggregati ng the result. This approach is broadly similar to
the approach of the United States, which is to calculate the trade effects at th e detailed product level.
Even though this approach is a practical way to proceed, we did not use the United States approach
due to some shortcomings in the implementation of the model. The United States identified only
18 product categories out of 71 that met their criteria for a de minimis trade effect. Of these
18 categories, complete data was available for only 7 of the categories. In essence, the United States
made assumptions in addition to those required to model the trade effects in order to arrive at a result.
3.118 While it may be that, had the United States modelled all 71 industries by not introducing the
de minimis threshold, a more reliable estimate could have been put forward, we are not, however,
convinced by that argument. When the 18 categorie s analysed by the United States are multiplied by
the relevant year and the relevant requesting party, we obtain 66 country-year-product data points that
are analysed. Of these 66, complete data to r un the fully specified model proposed by the United
States was available for only 21 points. This imp lies that the United States fully specified model
could only be used for a third of the overall cases that needed to be estimated.
3.119 The approach we are adopting, while disaggreg ated compared to the Requesting Parties'
approach, but aggregated when compared to the United States' approach, has less intensive data
requirements. Instead of using the detailed product level data, we adopt the 3-digit North American
Industry Classification for our model. Therefore, eac h of the parameters of the model requires data at

that level and both parties were able to submit all the data necessary to run the model. The trade
effect expression is, therefore, applied at each industr y level for each year to estimate the trade effect
of each industry. The sum of these trade effects is then divided by the total annual disbursements for
the year to arrive at a trade effect coefficient for that year. This coefficient, by definition, is a
weighted average of the CDSOA payments.
3.120 We have also taken into account the reservati ons of the United States in adopting this
approach. The United States underlines four reser vations towards this approach: (i) the total
payments should not be used; (ii) the total price re duction should not be equivale nt to the size of the
payments; (iii) industry-specific data should be used; and (iv) greater care should be taken in choosing
appropriate elasticity values instead of arbitrarily choosing the highest value. The manner in which
these are taken into account is explained later in this section. At this point, we wish simply to recall
that the United States' reservations are with how th e model is implemented, not with the specification
of the model per se.
3.121 Our approach is not immune from data difficulti es. We are in agreement with the views of
the arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) regarding the reliability of economic modelling when
they stated that they were "mindful that the task of evaluating the trade effects of the scheme cannot
be accomplished with mathematical precision".
101 Their statement reflects the fact that there can be a
genuine debate about an appropria te model to be adopted and about the various assumptions required
to implement any particular model. We are also in agreement with them when they state that
"economic science does allow us to consider a range of possible trade effects with a certain degree of
confidence".102 We would like to make it clear that we also share the reservations expressed by the
parties to this arbitration about the degree of precisi on that may be attached to the results of economic
modelling. The next section addresses some of these concerns and also presents the various
parameters that we must consider.
3.122 However, before moving on, we would like to re iterate that, as Arbitrator, we have been
obliged to accept the intrinsic difficu lties attached to the use of an economic model. However, such
difficulties should not be confused with those resulti ng from the failure of the parties to supply data,
where those parties are generally the source of the relevant information. While the first type of
difficulty (the intrinsic difficulties attached to the use of an economic model) is one of the elements
arbitrators must consider in deciding whether to apply an economic model, the second type of
difficulty (that resulting from the failure of the par ties to supply data) should not be part of that
consideration. We therefore re main convinced that it is appropr iate to rely on the information
available when the arbitrator is of the view that an economic mode l would be the most effective way
of calculating the level of nullification or impairme nt and one or more par ties do not fully cooperate
with the arbitrator in providing data and do not s ubmit convincing reasons for not doing so. In other
words, we consider that we are expected to produ ce, at a minimum, an outcome which is robust in a
lowest common denominator sense, but which is none theless, in our opinion, a fair measure of the
level of nullification or impairment.
4. Data issues
(a) Introduction
3.123 A complete explanation of the approach we have adopted is appended as Annex B. This
section addresses the data issues related to economic modelling in this case. It discusses the value of
the payments, the pass-through effect and the elastic ity of substitution. It does not discuss import

102 Ibid.

penetration, since there is only one source for this data, the United States' Government. We therefore
used the figures provided by the United States regarding import penetration.
3.124 Another issue that needs to be addressed in advance of parameterizing the model is the
relevant market to be examined. The Requesting Parties claim that the CDSOA disbursements have
an impact on their exports to the United Stat es and also their exports to other markets. 103 Hence, in
their view, any analysis of trade effects should take into account the trade effects on the world
market.
3.125 We consider that neither the approach advocat ed by the Requesting Parties, nor the model
they proposed would allow us to assess the trade impact of CDSOA disbursements on markets outside
the United States. In our opinion, any quantification of this effect would have to heavily rely on
speculations and we recall that parties agree that we should not address effects that are too remote or
speculative. We are also of the view that, having re gard to the nature of the measure at issue, the
trade effect of any disbursement to US companies that have supported an anti-dumping or
countervailing duty investigation against imports into the United States is more likely to be on the US
market than abroad. We therefore limit our analys is to the imports into the United States that are
displaced as a result of CDSOA disbursements.
(b) Value of payments
3.126 The Requesting Parties have claimed that, when modelling the trade effects of the
disbursements, the total value of all disbursements should be used. In contrast, the United States
claims that certain deductions must be applie d prior to determining the relevant value of
disbursements for modelling purposes.
3.127 In our view, a decision on this issue is not required for modelling purposes. The reason for
this is based on the difference between the absolute trade effect and the relative trade effect of a
CDSOA disbursement. Unquestionably, a higher va lue of disbursements used to model the trade
effect will yield a higher absolute trade effect valu e. However, the model we propose is based on the
concept of a trade effect coefficient (square brackets in our expression),
104 which is independent of the
value of the disbursement.
3.128 In fact, the model proposed by the United States, the so called Armington model, has a similar
characteristic. As noted above, the United States has only furnished the Arbitrator with a fully
specified model for seven product categories. Howeve r, in cases where the model is applied in the
same industry to different WTO Members, the rela tive trade effect is always identical. Only the
absolute trade effect varies. For example, take the impact of CDSOA payments on ball bearing
imports from the European Communities and Japan in the year 2001. In both cases the aggregate
trade effect, according to the United States' model, is 0.77.
105 Similarly, for the years 2002 and 2003
the aggregate trade effects are, respectively, 0.74 and 0.7. Therefore, despite the fact that the
payments attributable to the European Communities and Japan are different, the total trade effect in
relative terms is identical.
3.129 We recall the United States' arguments that the value of disbursements should be adjusted to
take into account administrative errors, reimburse ments, revoked anti-dumping or countervailing duty
orders. We consider that we should, as a matter of transparency, rely on figures published by the

103 Joint replies of the Requesting Parties to the s econd set of written questions of the Arbitrator,
7 June 2004, paras. 13-14.
104 See para. 3.113 above.
105 Aggregate trade effects are defined as the to tal imports reduced as a result of the CDSOA
disbursements.

United States' authorities when it comes to assess the value of CDSOA disbursements. As a result,
we will disregard administrative errors that have not been corrected at the ti me of the publication of
the relevant figures.
106 Likewise, we see no reason to adjust the figures published by the
United States' authorities because reimbursements ha ve been requested but the requests have not yet
been finally settled.107
3.130 With respect to the United States' argument that disbursements relating to revoked orders
should be deducted, we note that, under the CDS OA, payments made in, say, 2004, actually
correspond to revenue collected in 2003. If an order was revoked on imports from a given Requesting
Party in 2004, this has no influence on the fact th at offset payments in 2003 corresponded to duties
collected at the time when the order was in place. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to
exclude payments made in a given year, even though in that year no duty may have been collected due
to the revocation of an existing order, if the pa yments are based on duties collected while the order
was in place. We believe this interpretation to be consistent with the Panel and Appellate Body
findings in this case.
3.131 As a result, we decide to use the amount of disbursements published by the United States,
without any adjustment.
3.132 The United States has also raised the issue of de minimis deductions. We do not have any
legal guidance as to why such deductions should be made in these proceedings. In making the
deductions, the United States referred to two prov isions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
SCM Agreement that we do not consider relevant in an arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the
DSU. Furthermore, we do not see any rationa le for making the deductions on economic grounds. The
purpose of an economic model is to estimate the trad e effect of the measure. Any result derived from
that model should then be assessed in terms of its relevance. Any methodology that a priori excludes
certain industries will automatically bias the end resu lt. In any case, assuming that the final result of
any economic model is that the total trade effe ct is 1 per cent of the value of the CDSOA
disbursement, then we do not see any grounds, lega l or economic, to round that value down to zero
and issue an award of "zero".
(c) Elasticity of substitution
3.133 The views of the parties also differ on the appr opriate value of the elasticity of substitution to
be used in modelling, although they are all in agr eement that it is possible to calculate values at the
3-digit NAIC level.108 The Requesting Parties submitted a set of elasticities at that level. The United
States did not submit these elasticities when requested , and failed to convincingly contest the validity
of the values submitted by the Requesting Parties. As a result, we used in our model the values
submitted by the Requesting Parties.
3.134 In recognition of the fact that different aggreg ation methodologies exist, we decided to vary
the elasticity values submitted by the Requesting Parties by 20 per cent. Therefore, three different
sets of simulations are performed; one using the su bmitted elasticities and one each for values that are
20 per cent lower and 20 per cent higher than these elasticities.

106 We also note the possibility that such correction may be reflected in the figures subsequently
published.
107 See United States written submission, para. 13.
108 Exhibit JR-15.

(d) Pass-through
3.135 While the concept of pass-through is generally referred to in the economic literature as the
extent to which exchange rate changes affect dom estic prices, in this case we use the concept in a
similar fashion to that used by the arbitrator in the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) case. The arbitrators
in that case noted, in the context of an export subsidy that:
"[P]ass through relates to the degree to wh ich a company uses a subsidy it receives to
lower the price of the product that it exports. At one extreme the company may
choose to apply the full amount of the subs idy to the price of its products, thereby
lowering its price. At the other, it may choose not to lower the price of the
product."
109
3.136 Therefore, pass-through, in the context of the case before us, is the extent to which a CDSOA
disbursement will be applied to reducing the price of a beneficiary firm's products. A 100 per cent
pass-through assumption implies an application of the total amount, whereas a zero assumption
implies that none will be so employed.
3.137 The United States' position that the pass-through f actor is zero is highly unrealistic. A factor
of zero would presume that no recipient of a CDSO A payment would ever use the funds in any way
that could have a price effect. While this may be the case for some firms, it would seem impossible
that it would always and inevitably be the case for al l firms, since as a basic rationale of economics,
firms are expected to use their money efficiently, an d at least some will use that money to lower their
prices.
3.138 The Requesting Parties' argument of full pass-th rough is based on the presumption that every
firm receiving CDSOA payments in every case woul d fully use those payments to finance price
reductions on the products subject to the anti-dumping or countervailing duty order in question. This
would seem to be quite unlikely in reality. In particular, while some firms may use CDSOA receipts
in this way, the progamme leaves re cipients free to use the funds as they wish. Furthermore, many or
most firms producing a product that is subject to an anti-dumping or countervailing duty order also
produce other products (often, many other products). Thus, it is possible for CDSOA benefits to be
applied to products that are not subject to orders. In addition, some recipient firms may use their
payments to train their workers, to upgrade their t echnology or machinery, or to expand their capacity
and/or production. While using the funds in these so rts of ways clearly will have supply side effects
that may have eventual consequential effects on pr ices, these price effects will be inter-temporal.
Finally, some firms may, as the United States argues, not use the funds in any way that would have
price effects.
3.139 In order to identify a suitable value for the pass-through coefficient we sought supplemental
submissions and guidance from the parties.
110 On the one hand, the United States responded that a
study of their Domestic International Sales Cor poration programme had iden tified a pass-through of
that export subsidy of 75 per cent of the payment, but expressed the belief that "a pass-through of
25 per cent is reasonable".111 This statement was not supported by any methodology or based on any
factual evidence. On the other hand, the Requesti ng Parties did not alter their position that the only
reliable pass-through is 100 per cent.
3.140 In the absence of precise information on the va lue of the pass-through, we adopt the same
approach as we adopted for the value of the elastic ity of substitution; instead of using one specific

109 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), footnote 97.
110 Second set of questions of the Arbitrator, dated 28 May 2004.
111 United States replies to the second set of questions of the Arbitrator, para. 13.

value we have used the range of 25 per cent to 100 per cent derived from the comments of the parties.
The lower point of the range is provided by the United States, whereas the 100 per cent assumption is
based, as we stated above, on the assumption that a firm has every incentive to use the funds in a
commercially meaningful way. We acknowledge that 100 per cent pass-through is, in practice, not
realistic for the reasons mentioned above, and we do not wish to give any credit to the Requesting
Parties for not having justified their position that th e pass-through is 100 per cent. However, we were
not provided with any better information allowing us to apply another percentage as the upper end of
our range and we are intuitively of the view that, if the upper end of the range is not 100 per cent, it is
probably very close to that percentage.
5. Application of the model
3.141 We now proceed to apply the model. Tabl e 3 summarizes our results for the range of
assumed elasticities of substitution and for a range of assumed pass-through values for 2001, 2002
and 2003. For each year we have 12 values, giving us 36 values in all. At the outset we note that the
range for 2003 differs from the ranges for the other tw o years. This arises due to the change in the
industry distributions for that year (see Chart 1 above). The yearly change in the industry distribution
is also one of the reasons why we use an averag e based on 2001-2003, even though the United States
was not required to bring its legislation into conf ormity with its WTO obligations until 27 December
2003.
3.142 Since our approach is based on assigning a single value of a trade effect coefficient we need a
methodology to reduce the 36 estimates to a single value. Since we have no guidance from the
literature or from the submissions of the parties, we have decided to take for each year, the average of
the middle two rows and the middle column and aver age these three values. In doing so, we obtain a
value of 0.68 for 2001, 0.78 for 2002 and 0.70 for 2003 and an overall value of 0.72.
3.143 The United States contests the right of the Reques ting Parties to "retaliate on behalf of other
Members" and we now proceed to address how this point is taken into account in our modelling. Our
core rationale is that the trade effect of the CDSOA measure can be estimated to be the nullification or
impairment that the Requesting Parties have suffe red as a result of the measure having not been
withdrawn. Based on our analysis, we have estimat ed that the trade effect coefficient of the
disbursements can be estimated to be 0.72. Th erefore, the total annual trade effect of the
disbursements, taking an average of the disbur sements over the years 2001-2003, is US$136,943,784
based on total disbursements on Requesting Par ties products of US$190,199, 701.02. Our remaining
task is to allocate this total trade effect amongst th e Requesting Parties. One possibility is to use the
aggregate share of total imports for each Request ing Party. This, however, has an obvious bias,
especially due to the industry concentration of the di sbursements as discussed earlier. More detailed
trade data could circumvent the problem of industr y concentration, but, in our view, this is also
problematic, due to the fact that the trade data w ould be biased since they reflect import values when
the anti-dumping and countervailing duties were in place.
3.144 In our view, a better measure is based on the distribution of CDSOA payments, which is in
turn based on aggregate duty collections on impor ts of products subject to anti-dumping duty or
countervailing duty orders, but which can be analysed to determine the distribution of those imports
amongst the various exporting countries. From this we may conclude that a WTO Member's share of
the total disbursements is a better indicator of th e share of their exports that will be lost in
consequence of the disbursement than the aggregat e share of imports. Therefore, we decide to
allocate the total trade effect amongst the Request ing Parties on the basis of the share of CDSOA
disbursements attributable to duties collected on their respective exports. In doing so, we note that the
level of nullification or impairment will not ex ceed, for each Requesting Party, the level of
nullification or impairment that results from the disb ursements relating to that party's exports subject
to anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders.

Table 3: Summary of Trade Effect Coefficient Values by Elasticity
and Pass-Through, 2001-2003

2001
 Elasticity values
Pass through Low Medium High
25 0.22 0.27 0.33
50 0.43 0.54 0.65
75 0.65 0.81 0.98
100 0.87 1.09 1.30
2002
 Elasticity values
Pass through Low Medium High
25 0.25 0.31 0.37
50 0.50 0.62 0.74
75 0.74 0.93 1.12
100 0.99 1.24 1.49
2003
 Elasticity values
Pass through Low Medium High
25 0.22 0.28 0.34
50 0.45 0.56 0.67
75 0.67 0.84 1.01
100 0.89 1.12 1.34

D. CONCLUSION: LEVEL OF NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
3.145 As mentioned above, the purpose of the developm ent of an economic model in this case was
to define a coefficient by which future disbur sements under the CDSOA would be multiplied to reach
a value of trade effect. In line with past arbitra tions, we consider this trade effect to represent the
level of nullification or impairment suffered by Chile.
3.146 We note that this solution is hybrid to the extent that it combines a fixed coefficient calculated
on the basis of actual disbursement patterns over a particular period of time – in this case 3 years 112,
with variable amounts of future disbursements. We also acknowledge that this coefficient is based on
past disbursements (2001-2003) which may reflect ne ither the amount nor the categories of products
which will be subject to anti-dumping or co untervailing duty orders and lead to CDSOA
disbursements in the future. We nevertheless note that this approach is consistent with past
arbitrations where representative periods where used to determine volumes and prices of exports 113 in
order to calculate levels of nullification or impairme nt and levels of suspension fixed once and for all.
It is also consistent with the practice under Ar ticle XIII of GATT 1947 an d 1994 for allocation of
quotas or tariff quotas.
3.147 As a result we conclude that: the level of nu llification or impairment in this case may be
deemed to correspond, for Chile and for a given year, to the following:

112 The reasons for using a three-year period are explained in more detail in Annex B, para. 38.
113 EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 57-61.

Amount of disbursements under CDSOA for the most recent year
114 for which data are
available relating to anti-dumping or countervaili ng duties paid on imports from Chile at that
time, as published by the United States' authorities.
multiplied by
0.72
IV. EQUIVALENCE OF THE LEVEL OF SUSPENSION OF CONCESSIONS OR
OTHER OBLIGATIONS WITH THE LEVEL OF NULLIFICATION OR
IMPAIRMENT
A. I
SSUES RAISED BY THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO THE LEVEL OF SUSPENSION OF
CONCESSIONS OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED BY CHILE
4.1 The United States has argued, in relati on to Chile's request for suspension 115, that Chile has
failed to specify the level of suspension of concessi ons or other obligations in a way that allows the
Arbitrator to determine equivalence. The United St ates also claims that other features of Chile's
request are not compatible with Article 22 of th e DSU. The United States considers that Chile's
request to collect additional duties based on o ffset payments places no limits on the level of
suspension proposed. In addition, Chile should no t be allowed to impose a variable level of
suspension each year.
4.2 We have already addressed the question of whether Chile's request was sufficiently specific in
order to allow the United States to fully exercise its rights under Article 22.6 of the DSU. Our
conclusions are found in Section II.B above.
4.3 In the previous section, we concluded that Chile's approach based on the premise that a
violation is the most prominent case of nullificatio n or impairment – thus justifying countermeasures
equivalent to the amount of disbursements under the CDSOA – was not supported by the DSU.
However, this does not ipso facto render Chile's proposed suspension invalid. The issue before us
now is to what extent Chile's request for suspension remains equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment as we have decided to determine it (i.e., in terms of trade effect). This issue is addressed
in relation to the following features of Chile's request, which are challenged by the United States:
(a) Suspension of concessions or other obligati ons expressed as an additional tariff or
duty on an undetermined quan tity of trade rather than as a suspension of concessions
and tariff surcharges on a determined value of trade; and
(b) Determination of a variable level of suspension of concessions or other obligations.
4.4 In doing so, we are mindful that, pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU, we should not examine
the nature of the concessions to be suspended.

114 We assume that the United States will continue to publish the amount of disbursements under the
CDSOA on a yearly basis.
115 Chile's request is described in paras. 1.4-1.5 above.

B. THE LEVEL OF SUSPENSION OF CONCESSIONS OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS DETERMINED BY THE
ARBITRATOR TO BE EQUIVALENT TO THE LEVEL OF NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
1. Suspension of concessions or other obligatio ns expressed as a duty on an undetermined
quantity of trade rather than as a suspension of concessions on a determined value of
trade
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) United States
4.5 The United States contests the Requesting Par ties' intention to impose additional import
duties on US products which rate will be set so as to collect, over one year, additional duties
equivalent to certain offset payments under th e CDSOA. The United States contends that the
Requesting Parties set no limits on the amount of tr ade that would be covered by their request.
Depending on the amount of duty, the impact on United States exports could exceed by many
multiples any impact that the CDSOA may have on exports from the Requesting Parties. The
Requesting Parties' suspension proposal stands in star k contrast to the proposals that arbitrators have
approved in previous Article 22.6 proceedings.
116 Since equivalence between the amount of
disbursement and the duty that the Requesting Parti es intend to collect does not, in the view of the
United States, ensure a level of suspension equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, the
United States considers that it has established a prima facie case that the level of suspension is not
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.117
(ii) Chile
4.6 Chile agrees with the United States that the effect of the tariff surcharge will be very different,
depending on the level and the product to which it applies. Nothing in the DSU compels Chile to
specify those items. Indeed, in previous cases, reque sting Members have simply indicated, by way of
information, a very broad and general list of th e goods from which they would choose those that
would be subject to the additional duty they sought to apply. Similarly, arbitrators have refrained
from ruling on the nature of the concessions or ob ligations that a requesting party proposed to
suspend.
4.7 Every year, as soon as the amount of the offset payments under the CDSOA is known, Chile
will notify the products of the United States that w ill be affected by a duty higher than the one
applied, together with the rate of the additional duty. This duty increase may be lower than the bound
tariff in cases where the bound level is higher than the applied rate and it is not necessary to exceed
the bound rate in order to maintain the equivalence set out in Article 22.4 of the DSU.118
(b) Analysis of the Arbitrator
4.8 In the approach we decided to follow in orde r to determine the level of nullification or
impairment, disbursements made under the CDSOA were only a starting point in assessing the trade
effect of the CDSOA on each Requesting Party. The figure reached as a result of the application of an
economic model by the Arbitrator is, consequently, a value of trade.

116 United States written submission, paras. 28-30.
117 United States oral statement, paras. 16-17.
118 Chile's written submission, paras.17 and 63-69.

4.9 Comparatively, Chile's proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is not based
on a value of trade but aims at equating, th rough the imposition of a special duty, the amount
disbursed by the United States under the CDSOA in relation to imports from Chile.
119
4.10 With the exception of its link with the amount of disbursements under the CDOSA, nothing in
Chile's proposal enables us to conclude at this stage that the suspension of concessions or other
obligations proposed by Chile will or will not be equi valent to the level of nullification or impairment
in terms of affected trade determined according to this Decision. We are nonetheless concerned that
the total impact on trade of an additional duty may no t only be difficult to predict in general, but also
may vary on the basis of the rate applied and the products subject to that additional duty.
4.11 We are therefore of the view that, in order for the level of suspension of concessions or other
obligations proposed by Chile to be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment determined
by this Decision:
(a) either Chile will have to take appropriate st eps to ensure that the total value of United
States trade subject to the proposed additional tariff does not exceed the total value of
trade determined to constitute the level of nullification or impairment, or
(b) if and when it submits a revised request fo r authorization to suspend concessions or
other obligations to the DSB further to th is arbitration, Chile will have to propose
other forms of suspension of concessions or obligations that are less likely to have
effects on trade exceeding the identified level of nullification or impairment in terms
of value of United States exports to Chile.
4.12 It does not fall within our mandate to recommend the suspension of specific obligations or the
adoption of specific measures by Chile. 120 We therefore refrain from taking a decision on this matter.
We nonetheless note that the imposition of a 100 per cent ad valorem duty on imports of certain
goods from the United States, as proposed by reques ting parties in other ar bitrations, would be a
relatively transparent way of addressing the concern expressed above.
2. Determination of a variable level of suspension of concessions or other obligations
(a) Main arguments of the parties
(i) United States
4.13 The United States considers that the Arbitrator should establish a single level of suspension
for each Requesting Party, and that the DSU does not permit a requesting party to alter the level of
suspension in the future. It is of the view that, in this case, it would be impossible to create a formula
that would equate allowable levels of suspension in the future to varying levels of nullification or
impairment. The level of nullification or impairment, it is argued, must be determined at the time the
matter is referred to arbitration pur suant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. Articles 22 and 23 only refer to
"the level", which is a single and definite amount. There is no basis in the DSU for multiple, varying
and indefinite "levels" of suspension. All request ing parties in prior arbitrations have requested a
single amount. Articles 22.6 and 22.7 also provide a single opportunity to adjudicate the question of
equivalence between the level of nullification or im pairment and the level of suspension. The United
States notes that, in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) , the arbitrator found that the European
Communities' right need not be frozen in time as of the date it made its request under Article 22.2 of

119 See para. 1.5 above.
120 See, e.g., EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 19. We note in this respect that no claim
was raised in relation to Article 22.3 of the DSU.

the DSU. It also note that the arbitrat or did not cite any authority other than Canada – Aircraft
Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 –Canada) , in which the arbitrator dec lined to consider future
applications of the illegal subsid y. One difference between the US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 –
US) arbitration and this case is that, as of the date of the Article 22.2 request in US – 1916 Act (EC)
(Article 22.6 – US), there was no quantifiable level of nullification or impairment. This is not the case
in these proceedings. The difference between the ch allenge of a measure "as such" rather than "as
applied" does not justify alterations in the level of suspension from year to year. Setting a single,
unalterable annual level of suspension is consistent with the text of the DSU and with past practice.121
4.14 Even if an alterable level were permitted unde r the DSU, no alteration would be appropriate
in this case. First the challenge relates to the CD SOA "as such", not to the payments made under the
CDSOA. The United States considers that it is not po ssible to specify in advance the trade effect of
the CDSOA in the future. It is not even possible to specify the level of payments under the CDSOA
given the uncertainties attached to its calculation. The United States concludes that if requesting
parties were permitted to refigure and revise their ow n level of suspension on an annual basis, these
arbitrations would generate, rather than resolve, disputes between parties.
122
(ii) Chile
4.15 Chile argues that, provided equivalence is mainta ined, the level of suspension may vary. The
text of the DSU does not prohibit variations as long as this requirement is respected. The DSU does
not establish either a period of time from which the level of nullification or impairment is to be
determined. In the case of measures restricting ma rket access, the level of suspension was fixed by
determining the level of nullification or impairment on the date of expiry of the reasonable period of
time for compliance. Arbitrators used the method of comparing the existing situation with the one
that would have existed if compliance had taken pl ace on expiry of the reasonable period of time.
Hence, a single level of nullification or impairment and, consequently, of suspension was determined.
4.16 Chile considers, however, that nullification or impairment in the case of rule-related measures
may vary, depending on the characteristics of the measure. As found by the arbitrator in the US –
1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) case with respect to the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, each application
of the CDSOA – in other words each payments to US companies – increases the level of nullification
or impairment.
4.17 Chile contests the narrow interpretation of the te rm "level" by the United States. Indeed, even
the definition proposed by the United States implies that that this term relates to a particular moment,
amount or value, and not a single and definite amount, as contended by the United States.
123
4.18 Chile adds that even though the level of su spension may not exceed the level of nullification
or impairment, it may vary owing to different circ umstances. In this case, the quantitative definition
of the level of nullification or impairment and, consequently, of the suspension, is subject to
transparent criteria known every year through information provided by the United States. If the
United States considers that the level of suspension exceeds the level of nullification or impairment, it
may always have recourse to the appropriate di spute settlement procedures, as was recalled by the
arbitrator in the US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) decision.
4.19 Chile also notes that the payments made under the CDSOA vary from year to year, depending
on the anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Fi nally, Chile expresses its surprise at the position

121 United States written submission, paras. 80-90.
123 Chile's written submission, paras. 70-74.

taken by the United States that the DSU contains an obligation to specify the products and the tariff
levels, and a prohibition on varying the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations.
124
(b) Analysis of the Arbitrator
4.20 We first address the textual arguments. While we note that Article 22.4 refers to "the level"
(singular) of nullification or impairment and to "the level" (singular) of suspension of concessions or
other obligations, we are not persuaded that these terms impose an obligation to identify a single and
enduring level of nullification or impairment. The re quirement of Article 22.4 is simply that the two
levels be equivalent. As long as the two levels are equivalent, we do not see any reason why these
levels may not be adjusted from time to time, provided such adjustments are justified and
unpredictability is not increased as a result. In f act, we see no limitation in the DSU to the possibility
of providing for a variable level of suspension if the level of nullification or impairment also varies.
4.21 Most previous arbitrators have established one single level of nullification or impairment at
the level that existed at the end of the reasonabl e period of time granted to the responding party to
bring its legislation into conformity.
125 We do not disagree that this appr oach is, in the large majority
of cases, the most appropriate. However, we do not read anything in Article 22 of the DSU that
would preclude us from following a different path if the circumstances of this case clearly required it.
4.22 The economic analysis carried out above suggest s that the value and industry distribution of
the trade impact of the CDSOA could vary widely from one year to the next, because of the numerous
factors affecting the amounts that may be disburse d, the nature of the recipients and how each
category of recipient is likely to use the monetary amounts awarded to them under the CDSOA. This
variability is, in our opinion, very different in natu re and degree from the more steady evolution of
exports recorded in other cases where counterfactuals 126 were applied, such as EC – Bananas III (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC) or EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC). In those cases, the trade loss
identified on the basis of a counterfactual was artific ially fixed once for all. In the present case, there
is an economic justification for allowing a variab le level of nullificati on or impairment and,
correlatively, a variable level of suspension of concessions or other obligations.
4.23 We are mindful of the United States' arguments that the ability to vary the level of
suspensions could make the level of countermeasures applied unpredictable from one year to the next,
and that no formula could be developed to introduc e sufficient predictability. We do not find these
arguments compelling. Indeed, the level of nullifica tion or impairment in terms of the trade effect
that we have calculated above is based on th e CDSOA, a law designed and adopted by the
United States' authorities, which disbursements are al so determined by the Unit ed States' authorities.
It should be straightforward for the United States' authorities to apply the formula developed in this
Decision to find the amount of United States trade that may be subject to the suspension of
concessions or other obligations in each following year. Any unpredictab ility ought correspondingly
to be minimal.
4.24 Moreover, in this case, the United States would cont rol the levers to make the actual level of
suspension of concessions or other obl igations go down. Indeed, in ot her arbitrations where the level
of nullification or impairment was set once and for all, the responding party could not influence the
level of countermeasures applied to its trade, unless th e requesting party agreed to modify it. In this
case, the level of suspension of concessions will automatically depend on the amount of

124 Chile's written submission, paras. 75-79.
125 See, e.g., EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) , para. 37; Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 –
Brazil), paras. 3.63-3.65; US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) , paras. 2.12-2.15; Canada – Aircraft Credits and
Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), paras. 3.67-3.73.
126 For a definition of "counterfactual", see footnote 32 above.

disbursements made under the CDSOA in a given year . If this amount decreases, so will the level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations that the Requesting Parties will be entitled to impose.
If no disbursements are made, the level of suspension will have to be "zero".
4.25 Finally, while we have expressed some re servations about the notion of "inducing
compliance", we note that variable levels coul d achieve this objective without affecting the
requirement of "equivalence" between the level of nullification or impairment and the level of
suspension under Article 22.4 of th e DSU. We have been presented with convincing evidence that, if
the CDSOA remains in force, the amount of disbursem ents is likely to increase in the coming years.
We are conscious of the fact that higher counter measures may not actually induce compliance in all
instances. However, if we were to decide on a le vel of suspension fixed once for all on the basis of
the first years of application of the CDSOA, it is possible that the level of suspension of concessions
or other obligations would become, as time goe s by, significantly less than the actual level of
nullification or impairment resulting from the continue d application of the CDSOA. In other words,
the cost of the violation for the United States could decrease. In such a case, the incentive to comply
would most probably decrease too. We believe that su ch a risk exists in the present case and justifies
that we determine a variable level of nullification or impairment and, consequently, a variable level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations.
4.26 We also consider this approach to be consiste nt with the principle of prompt and effective
resolution of disputes, contained in Article 3.3 and 3.4 of the DSU.127
4.27 Finally, like the arbitrators in EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) 128 and US – 1916 Act
(EC) (Article 22.6 – US) 129, we note that the United States may have recourse to the appropriate
dispute settlement procedures in the event that it co nsiders that the application of the suspension by
Chile exceeds, for a given period, the level of nullif ication or impairment that Chile has sustained as a
result of the violation of the United States' obligations by the CDSOA, as calculated using the formula
developed above.130
V. AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR
5.1 For the reasons set out above, we determine that, in the matter (Original Complaint by Chile) , the level of nullification or
impairment suffered by Chile in a particular year can be deemed to be equal to the total of
disbursements made under the CDSOA for the preceding year relating to anti-dumping or
countervailing duties paid on imports from Chile, multiplied by the coefficient identified in
Section III.D above.
5.2 Accordingly, we decide that the suspension by Chile of concessions or other obligations in the
form of the imposition of an additional tariff on prod ucts originating in the United States covering, on
a yearly basis, a total value of trade not exceeding, in US dollars, the amount resulting from the
following equation:
 Amount of disbursements under CDSOA for the most recent year for which data are available
relating to anti-dumping or countervailing duties paid on imports from Chile at that time, as
published by the United States' authorities.

127 See EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 38.
128 See para. 82.
129 See para. 9.2.
130 See also Panel and Appellate Body Reports on US – Certain EC Products.

multiplied by:

 0.72

would be consistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU.

5.3 In this respect, we note that Chile, each y ear, as soon as the amount of the offset payments
made is known, Chile will notify to the DSB the pr oducts subject to the additional tariff and the rate
of the additional tariff.
5.4 In that context, we suggest that Chile also no tify to the DSB, every year, the amount of trade
that will be subject to the above-mentioned measure.
5.5 Finally, we remind that Article 22.8 of the DSU provides that:
"The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only
be applied until such time as the measure f ound to be inconsiste nt with a covered
agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations
or rulings provides a solution to the nullifi cation or impairment of benefits, or a
mutually satisfactory solution is reached. …"
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
6.1 Some of the issues raised in these proceedings lead us to make the following remarks for
wider consideration.
6.2 As mentioned above, the DSU does not expressly explain the purpose behind the
authorization of the suspension of concessions or other obligations. On th e one hand, the general
obligation to comply with DSB recommendations a nd rulings seems to impl y that suspension of
concessions or other obligations is intended to induce compliance, as has been acknowledged by
previous arbitrators.
131 However, exactly what may induce comp liance is likely to vary in each case,
in the light of a number of factors including, but not limited to, the level of suspension of obligations
authorized.132
6.3 On the other hand, the requirement that the level of such suspensions remain equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment suffered by th e complaining party seems to imply that suspension
of concessions or other obligations is only a means of obtaining some form of temporary
compensation, even when the negotiation of compensations has failed.
6.4 In other words, it is not completely clear what role is to be played by the suspension of
obligations in the DSU and a large part of the c onceptual debate that took place in these proceedings
could have been avoided if a clear "object and purpose" were identified.
6.5 The WTO dispute settlement system author izes Members to challenge a law as such,
i.e. irrespective of whether it has been applied or not. The "classical" approach based on an
assessment of the trade effect of a given measure may not always contribute to the identification of
the actual level of nullification or impairment, in par ticular if no instances of application had arisen at

131 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 6.3.
132 While the value of the suspension or concessions or other obligations easily comes to mind as a
relevant factor in inducing compliance, it must also be acknowledged that the actual role of the value of such
suspension in securing compliance or no t may vary from one case to the next. In some cases, even a very high
amount of countermeasures may not achieve compliance, whereas in some others a limited amount may.

the time. This may be because the trade effect of a measure may be difficult to assess due to the lack
of verifiable figures. We are of the view that , while parties share a duty to cooperate with the
Arbitrator in the establishment of the facts, there is no reason a priori to sanction the requesting party
or the respondent if supporting figures are difficult or impossible to find. We believe that this is a
situation that has to be addressed in order to r each a decision on what may be achievable through
recourse to suspension of obligations in such cases.
6.6 In this arbitration, we have interpreted the concept of nullification or impairment, inter alia,
from the terms of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and Ar ticle 3.8 of the DSU. We believe, however,
from the extensive discussion of this concept by the parties, that the actual meaning of this provision
is disputed and needs to be addressed in the appropriate forum.
6.7 Finally, we note that an issue that arose as a consequence of following the approach whereby
each party would be granted the right to suspend oblig ations exclusively in relation to its own exports
is that there will remain disbursements under th e CDSOA in respect of goods from other Members
and non-WTO Members for which no suspension of concessions or other obligations have been
authorized.

ANNEX A

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE ARBITRATOR

 The Arbitrator will follow the normal working procedures of the DSU where relevant and as
adapted to the circumstances of the present proceedings, in accordance with the timetable it has
adopted. In this regard,--

(a) the Arbitrator will meet in closed session;
(b) the deliberations of the Arbitrator and th e documents submitted to it shall be kept
confidential. However, this is without prejudice to the parties’ disclosure of
statements of their own positions to the pub lic, in accordance with Article 18.2 of the
DSU;
(c) at any substantive meeting with the parties, the Arbitrator will ask the United States
to present orally its views first, followed by the party(ies) having requested
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations;
(d) each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Arbitrator no later than in its
written submission to the Arbitrator, except with respect to evidence necessary during
the hearing or for answers to questions. Derogations to this procedure will be granted
upon a showing of good cause, in which case th e other party(ies) shall be accorded a
period of time for comments, as appropriate;
(e) the parties shall provide an electronic copy (on a computer format compatible with
the Secretariat’s programmes) together with the printed version (6 copies) of their
submissions, including the methodology paper, on the due date. All these copies must
be filed with the Dispute Settlement Registrar, [...]. Electronic copies may be sent by
e-mail to [...]. Parties shall provide 6 c opies and an electronic version of their oral
statements during any meeting with the Ar bitrator or no later than noon on the day
following any such meeting.
(f) except as otherwise indicated in the timetable , submissions should be provided at the
latest by 5.00 p.m. on the due date so that there is a possibility to send them to the
Arbitrator on that date. As is customary, distribution of submissions to the other
party(ies) shall be made by the parties themselves;
(g) if necessary, and at any time during the proceedings, the Arbitrator may put questions
to any party to clarify any point that is unclear. Whenever appropriate, a right to
comment on the responses will be granted to the other party(ies);
(h) any material submitted shall be concise and li mited to questions of relevance in this
particular procedure.
(i) Parties have the right to determine th e composition of their own delegations.
Delegations may include, as representatives of the government concerned, private
counsel and advisers. Parties shall have responsibility for all members of their
delegations and shall ensure that all memb ers of their delegations act in accordance
with the rules of the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly in regard to
confidentiality of the proceedings. Parties sh all provide a list of the participants of
their delegation prior to, or at the beginning of, any meeting with the Arbitrator.

(j) to facilitate the maintenance of the record of the arbitration, and to maximize the
clarity of submissions and other documents, in particular the references to exhibits
submitted by parties, parties shall sequentia lly number their exhibits throughout the
course of the arbitration.

ANNEX B

METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING THE TRADE EFFECT
OF CDSOA DISBURSEMENTS

A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. Section III.C.2 of this Decision outlines the proposed approaches of the parties to estimating
the decline in imports arising from the disbursement of funds as part of the United States Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act. The purpose of th is Annex is to explain the methodology used to
calculate the values in Table 3 in the main text . Section B outlines this methodology. This is
followed, in Section C, by an explanation of the changes made to the Requesting Parties' model by the
Arbitrator in its application of this model. S ection D discusses the issue of the values to be assigned
to the various parameters. The last section presents the overall results.

B. M
ETHODOLOGY
2. The role of economic modelling of trade effects is discussed at length in the US – FSC
(Article 22.6 – US) Arbitration decision. 133 The arbitrator in that case f aced an issue similar to that
faced by us, which is the selection of an appropriate model. Its approach, however, differs from the
one we have taken, since the arbitrator decided to use, in its entirety, the model proposed by one of
the parties. In support of its decision, the arbitrator in that case pointed to the fact that the model it
used, although proposed by the European Commun ities, had actually been developed by the United
States Government to explain the trade effects of the FSC programme to the United States Congress.
Hence, the arbitrator concluded that, if the m odel was suitable for the United States Congress, it
would be suitable for the arbitration.134

3. In this case, we received two models in res ponse to our request to all parties to submit what
they viewed as suitable models to simulate the trad e impact of the CDSOA disbursements. However,
as explained in Section III.C.2, the models proposed by the Requesting Parties and the United States,
although broadly similar, differed in their level of a ggregation and, to some extent, in the variety of
parameters that estimate the counterfactual dec line in the value of imports arising from CDSOA
payments. 135 The model of the Requesting Parties relied on aggregate numbers for each of the three
parameters, whereas the model of the United Stat es calculated results at the product level for each

133 Section VI.B of WT/DS108/ARB.
134 On this point the arbitrator in the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) case states: "In this regard, the very
fact that the US Treasury report was su bmitted to Congress is, in our view, of considerable weight. That report
did suggest that it may have somewhat overstated the results. Indeed, it may not be absolutely exact.
Nonetheless, the US Treasury obviously made the judgement that, in the context of presenting the effects of the
FSC scheme to US Congress (the authors, we note, of the legislation concerned), this report, including the
modelling assumptions on which it is based, had sufficient credibility to represent a reliable reflection of the
impact of the scheme when it came to the matter of informing the US Congress on its operation and effects.
That was presumably not undertaken lightly and, at th e very least, it was presumably considered to be not
manifestly misleading." Para 6.48.
135 The US model, although based on the same basic economic framework as the model proposed by
the Requesting Parties, is specified differently, since it includes separate parameters for the supply elasticity and
the own-price elasticity of demand. It is based on Fr ancois and Hall (1997), "Partial Equilibrium Modelling" in
Francois, J. and Rennert, K. (eds.), Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook , Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. By similar framework we mean that the m echanism by which CDSOA
disbursements affect imports is the same. Imports are di splaced due to an increase in their price relative to
domestic goods sold by US firms benefiting from CDSOA disbursements.

affected WTO Member. The aggregate estimate using this approach was obtained by summing the
individual estimates for each product.

4. Despite the relative merits of the proposed models, as presented in these proceedings, each
possessed fundamental flaws that made them unworkabl e for this case. The model of the Requesting
Parties required economy wide values. Hence, a si ngle elasticity parameter was used to capture the
substitutability between domestic and imported goods. Similarly, the im port penetration value in this
model was assumed to be the economy-wide average. The difficulty with this approach is that it
ignores the substantial industry variation in CDSOA disbursements. Intuitively, one would expect the
values for the elasticity of substitution and import pe netration for industries with relatively larger
shares of CDSOA disbursements to have a greater weight in the overall number.

5. The US model, although well accepted in the lite rature, could not be applied to all products
for which there are CDSOA disbursements. This meant that, for these products, an assumption was
required to proxy the trade effect. This raised th e question whether or not the greater complexity of
the US model would be warranted if, in the end, assumptions about key parameters would have to be
made in a seemingly ad hoc fashion.

6. Furthermore, precise estimates for each of the elasticity parameters were not available.
Hence, a range of values would have been required for the own-price elasticity of demand, elasticity
of substitution and the supply elasticities of domes tic and foreign producers. As stated by the
Requesting Parties this introduces "greater parame ter shortcomings than the Requesting Parties'
proposed model".
136

7. Since it is difficult, technically, to run the US model on an independent basis we have opted
for a modified version of the model proposed by the Requesting Parties. In particular, we adjusted it
to take into account technical concerns identified by the United States. While the principal reason for
using the model of the Requesting Parties is the ease with which it can be employed, we also take note
of the fact that the United States did not criticise th e specification of the Requesting Parties' model.
Thus criticisms were focussed predominantly on the values assigned to the various parameters.
137

8. The basic model of the Requesting Parties is specified below as equation (A1). This equation
is identical to equation (5) in the main text:

Reduction in imports from CDSOA Disbursements
RS **η= (A1)

Where138,
• η is the elasticity of substitution
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
∆
∆
=
q
q
P
P
MM
η

• S is the total value of the payments expressed as a margin of the price reduction on domestic
production financed by payments and can be expressed as QPS q *∆=

136 Comments of the Requesting Parties to additional questions of the Arbitrator, para. 23.
137 "The United States does not critique the economic theory supporting the model, but argues that the
parameter values used in the model are inappropriate", Comments of the Requesting Parties to additional
138 All the variables are explained in paragraph 3.96.

• R is the ratio of the value of imports to the value of domestic shipments in the markets in
question and can be expressed as
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
= QP
MPR
q
m

9. Turning first to the specification of the model and concerns about its robustness. In the first
instance, we share the view of the United States th at one cannot be 100 per cent certain that the entire
disbursement given to a firm will be expended to reduce imports . While the economic rationale
behind a 100 per cent pass-through is strong, the mo del specification needs to be adjusted to account
for cases where the pass-through effect will be less th an 100 per cent. Accordingly, we can include a
fourth multiplicative term to equation A1 to account for less than 100 per cent pass through and re-
specify equation A1 as equation A2 (equation (6) in the main text):

Reduction in imports RS ***ηα= (A2)

Where, α is the pass-through factor and takes on a values: 0 < α < 1.

10. A value of zero for α implies no expenditure is used to reduce price, therefore the estimated
trade effect would be zero. This is the case pres ented by the United States. The opposite case,
presented by the Requesting Parties is that α takes on a value of 1, which represents a 100 per cent
pass-through.

11. The principal focus of our appr oach to analysing trade effect is the determination of a trade
effect coefficient, which is defined as a number th at can be multiplied by the applicable level of
disbursements to estimate the total trade effect. By focussing on the coefficient as the basis of our
award, it is easier to simplify and bridge the diffe rences in the models that have been proposed by the
Requesting Parties. In expression A2 above, the coefficient can be defined as the product of α, η
and R. Accordingly, equation A2 can be reduced to A3:

Reduction in imports =
β*S (A3)

Where β is the trade effect coefficient and can take on a va lue greater than or equal to zero. It is also
important to note that this coefficient does not assign specific values to the elasticity of substitution or
pass-through values. Different combinations of the values of these variables could be used to
determine a single value for β.

12. The second issue is the level at which to im plement the model. Technically, the model could
be implemented at the product level as suggested by the United States. Or, as suggested by the
Requesting Parties, implemented at the national, or aggregate level.

13. For the task at hand, there is no question that a disaggregated approach would be preferable.
The CDSOA scheme collects duties at the product le vel and disburses them to petitioning firms.
However, as pointed out by the United States, production data, which is key to implementing any
economic model, is not available for some products. If a higher degree of aggregation is used, it is
more likely that data will be available, albeit at the expense of greater precision.

14. In order to examine the feasibility of implem enting a model at a leve l of aggregation above
the product level and below the national level, we re quested the United States to provide us with data
for each of the parameters of equation A2.
139 Although the request was for the 2-digit level of the

139 Question 16 of first set of questions of the Arbitrator.

Standard Industrial Classification, the United States provided the necessary data at the 3-digit level of
the North American Industrial Classification ("NAIC"), which is more appropriate.

15. In a subsequent set of questi ons, we requested each of the parties to submit the additional data
required to run an economic model at the 3-digit level of the NAIC system.
140 In responding to these
questions, both the Requesting Parties and the Un ited States expressed concern about conducting a
counterfactual trade effects analysis at the 3-dig it NAIC level. Consequently, before proceeding we
should state and address these concerns.

16. The Requesting Parties' view was that:

"3-digit NAIC levels cannot accurately re present substitution elasticities for products
receiving CDSOA payments. The 3-digit NAIC level is not at a sufficiently
disaggregated level and covers too broad a range of products. In fact, most products
under dumping orders are specified at a hi ghly disaggregated level. The use of
aggregate estimates of substitution elasticities for disaggregated products would result
in biased results for the calculated trade effects."
141
17. They further submitted that this bias is lik ely to be downward, since the product specific
elasticities are likely to be highe r than the aggregate elasticities. 142 This assertion is substantiated
through the example of pasta. This product would be included with breakfast cereals and candy bars,
which tend to be branded produc ts. The Requesting Parties also highlighted a similar problem
associated with various categories of bearings by distinguishing between high-precision bearings used
in aircraft and those used in the automotive industries and home appliances.

18. The United States shared the same view as th e Requesting Parties that a 3-digit analysis
would necessarily be biased. They stated, "all of th e parties agree that any model based on data from
the three-digit North American Industry Classification or from the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) would result in a relatively imprecise estimat e of the effect the CDSOA has on the trade of
the Requesting Parties".
143

19. The parties have placed us in a difficult positi on with respect to choosing an appropriate level
of aggregation. We agree with the United St ates that a more product specific methodology is
preferable to an aggregate methodology. Howeve r, given that if the product-specific methodology
lacks the appropriate data, we do not see how a di saggregated methodology would be more accurate
than an aggregate methodology. Furthermore, we note that the solution of the United States for cases
where necessary data was missing was to assume the results of their analysis with available data
applied to those products for which data was not available.
144 The United States, in effect, assumes
that the analysis for one set of products could au tomatically be applied to another set of products,
which must implicitly introduce the very same sorts of biases and inaccuracies that the United States
argued against.

140 Question 1 of the second set of questions of the Arbitrator.
141 Replies of the Requesting Parties to the second set of questions of the Arbitrator.
142 Replies of the Requesting Parties to the second set of questions of the Arbitrator, para. 6.
143 Comments of the United States to replies of the Requesting Parties to the second set of questions of
the Arbitrator, para. 1.
144 See footnote 6 of US Exhibit 18. The United States adopts the same approach that we adopt, which
is to assume a trade effect coefficient. It defines the level for these products for which information is not
available by the product of the offset payments and th e ratio of the modelled trade impact for all complaining
parties in the given year and the total modelled offset payments for all complaining parties in the given year.

20. While reiterating that economic modelling is not always precise, we consider that the issue is
whether or not the broad parameters of an outc ome derived through a trade-effects analysis is
"unreasonable".
145 In this context, our assessment is that an analysis at the 3-digit level effectively
bridges the problems of a too highly aggregated model that assumes single values for each variable
and a disaggregated analysis, which does not have all the required data.

21. Therefore, the adopted approach is to estimate the trade effect, for a given year, at the 3-digit
level and then sum these values to obtain a total trade effect. 146 This total trade effect is subsequently
divided by the level of disbursements to obtain the trade effect coefficient ( β in equation A3). This is
done for each of the years 2001 through to 2003. The final value of the coefficient is then calculated
as the simple average of these three numbers. The results arising from the implementation of this
approach are explained and presented in the last section of this Annex.

C. V
ALUES ASSIGNED TO PARAMETERS
1. Pass-through
22. The positions of the parties with respect to pass-through are completely opposite. The United
States asserts that the value is zero, whereas the Requesting Parties assert that it is 100 per cent.
Section III.4(d) presents the rationale of the parties' positions and our views on the appropriate values.
In summary, we have opted for a range of pass-th rough values of between 25 and 100 per cent. We
were not persuaded by the US argument that the value should be zero. Although they identified
certain cases where firms that benefited from CD SOA disbursements did not utilize the funds, the
United States was not convincing in establishing that this would arise for every single dollar disbursed
under the CDSOA programme.147

23. Similarly, the fact that the United States was ab le to identify at least one firm that did not use
the funds to divert imports suggests that an ab solute 100 per cent pass-th rough would be unrealistic.
The problem we face, however, is that there is no evidence to suggest what the upper-bound value
might be if it is not 100 per cent. The weight of economic theory and commercial pressures point to
100 per cent, but not any other specific number. As we state in paragraph 3.140 we are intuitively of
the view that the upper end of the range would be close to 100 per cent.

2. Elasticities
24. As the parties have pointed out, the debate over the appropriate values to assign to the various
elasticities used in modelling is intense. Not only are there differences at the specific product level,
but, as the United States has pointed out, there woul d be differences about the relevant aggregation
methodology to be employed if calculations are not done at the product level.

25. The model of the Requesting Parties relies on a single elasticity value – the elasticity of
substitution. In contrast, the model of the United States employs three elasticity values in addition to
the elasticity of substitution. We agree with the Requesting Parties that any avenue to minimize the

145 See US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) para. 6.49.
146 Aggregating the individual industries to get the total value should not be confused with analysing
the effects in the United States market using general equilibrium analysis. Each estimate at the individual level
is done assuming no changes in any other industry.
147 The United States provided anecdot al evidence of a few firms that did not use the funds to expand
output on pages 30-34 of its written submission. When asked (Question 13 of the Arbitrator) to provide
additional evidence, the United States responded that it has "been unable to determine how affected domestic
producers use CDSOA payments, beyond the information provided on pages 30-34 of [its] written submission".

variance in values should be explored. In this rega rd, the model of the Requesting Parties narrows the
debate over relevant elasticity values to only the elasticity of substitution.

26. The Requesting Parties themselves acknowledge the difficulties in obtaining precise
estimates. They submitted two sets of elasticities as evidence of possible values that could be used to
model the trade effect. One set was sourced from the Global Trade Analysis Project ("GTAP") based
on the sectors within their basic model. The sec ond submitted set for the same sectors was sourced
from United States International Trade Commission ("USITC") researchers. The two sets differed
considerably (Annex Table 1). The standard GTAP range has a lower mean (2.7) than the USITC
estimates (3.1), smaller range (4 compared to 3.4), but both have the same median (2.8). The USITC
has higher values in 22 of the categories and the same value in eight of the categories.

27. In an attempt to develop a workable framewo rk for modelling, the parties were requested to
submit elasticities of substitution at the 3-digit NAIC level.
148 The Requesting Parties, while
expressing some reservations, responded positively to th is request and provided the data. The United
States did not, but stated many of the difficulties confronting any methodology to concord data from
one classification to another. It also offered to respond positively to the request, but only at a later
stage.149 As a result, we did not have any choice, but to proceed with the elasticity estimates provided
by the Requesting Parties. However, before doi ng so, we reviewed the estimates submitted by the
United States according to the product categories for which CDSOA disbursements were made. Basic
summary statistics are presented in Annex Table 1 for each of the four sets of elasticity values:
GTAP, USITC estimates of GTAP, US submitted elasticities (low, high and mid-point) by CDSOA
product categories and NAIC 3-digit industry category as submitted by the Requesting Parties.

Annex Table 1: Summary Statistics of Sets of Elasticities of Substitution

GTAP
USITC
GTAP
Requesting
Parties NAIC
US Product
Low*
US Product
Mid-Point*
US Product
High*
Mean 2.68 3.09 2.67 2.83 3.99 5.17
Median 2.8 2.80 2.8 3 4 5
Std. Deviation 0.8 1.18 0.79 0.87 0.92 1.12
Minimum 1.8 1 1.8 1 2 3
Maximum 5.2 5 5.2 5 6.5 8
Count 41 41 31 65 65 65

* Does not include values for seamless pipe and sugar, since specific values for these products were not
provided. They were only listed as "high" and "perfect" respectively.

28. The table confirms the view of the Requesti ng Parties that aggregate elasticities tend to be
lower. The first three columns reflect the va lues from the GTAP classification, including the
concorded classification into the NAIC category. The median for all three sets is 2.8 and the mean
ranges from 2.67 to 3.09. In contrast, the mean of the mid-point values of the US product elasticity
estimates is 3.99 and the median value is 4. The highest value for this category is 6.5, whereas the
highest value for the aggregated values is 6.2. In general terms the descriptive statistics of the low
category proposed by the United States corresponds to the statistics of the first three columns.

29. The table also confirms that the issue of wh at values to assign to the various elasticities of
substitution that a modeller may use is far from bei ng resolved. Our case is complicated by the fact

148 Question 1 of the additional set of questions of the Arbitrator.
149 "If the Arbitrators so request, the United States could calculate such concorded elasticity estimates
using where necessary, either simple averages or trade- weighted averages." Replie s of the United States to
additional questions of the Arbitrator, para. 2.

that, despite asking specifically for values that we could use, we only have one set of values for the
3-digit NAIC level. In order to account for measure ment error and, of course, aggregation bias, we
propose to use the Requesting Parties' set of elasticity estimates, but vary them by 20 per cent in order
to have a range of effects. That is, the calcula tions will be done using elasticity values that are both
20 per cent above the submitted elasticities and 20 pe r cent below. The figure of 20 per cent was
chosen as a conservative adjustment, given that the differences between the means of the US low and
medium and US medium and high values is approximately 25 per cent.

3. Import penetration
30. The import penetration values were calculated using data provided by the United States.
They are defined by the Requesting Parties as the "ratio of imports to domestic shipments". The latter
is defined as total shipments less exports.

31. The figures reported in the table correspond to what might intuitively be expected, with the
exception of the very high figure for fish and fish products. The reported production figures for the
years 2000 through to 2002 are respectively: US$3.5 5 billion, US$3.23 billion and US$3.09 billion.
The respective export figures were: US$2.66 billion, US$2.85 billion and US$2.8 billion. When these
figures are combined with the import figures of US$8 .12 billion, US$7.71 billion, and US$7.8 billion
for the respective years, the resulting import penetration figures are very high relative to those
calculated for the other industries.
150

150 Imports divided by the residual of production minus exports.

Annex Table 2: Import Penetration Ratios by 3-digit NAIC Industry, 2001-2003

Industry NAIC
Code 2001 2002 2003
Agricultural products 111 0.16 0.16 0.17
Livestock and livestock products 112 0.03 0.04 0.03
Fish, fresh, chilled, or frozen and other marine products 114 20.60 26.89 23.79 *
Food manufacturing 311 0.05 0.05 0.05
Beverages and tobacco products 312 0.08 0.09 0.11
Textiles and fabrics 313 0.16 0.19 0.21
Textile mill products 314 0.25 0.27 0.30
Apparel and accessories 315 1.30 1.29 1.38
Leather and allied products 316 3.34 2.64 2.55
Wood products 321 0.18 0.19 0.19
Paper 322 0.13 0.13 0.13
Printing, publishing and similar products 323 0.04 0.05 0.05
Petroleum and coal products 324 0.17 0.16 0.17
Chemicals 325 0.22 0.25 0.28
Plastics and rubber products 326 0.11 0.11 0.12
Non-metallic mineral products 327 0.15 0.16 0.18
Primary metal manufacturing 331 0.30 0.28 0.30
Fabricated metal products, n.e.s 332 0.11 0.12 0.13
Machinery, except electrical 333 0.38 0.37 0.42
Computer and electronic products 334 0.69 0.75 0.70
Electrical equipment, appliances and components 335 0.43 0.48 0.52
Transportation equipment 336 0.44 0.44 0.45
Furniture and fixtures 337 0.22 0.26 0.29
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 339 0.59 0.61 0.60
Source: Calculated from data provided by the United States. Only those industries for which there is a non-zero
CDSOA payment in any year between 2001 and 2003 are included.
 * Average of 2001 and 2002.

4. Value of disbursements
32. The data on the level of the CDSOA disburseme nts at the 3-digit NAIC level was provided by
the United States in response to a request for this information. In providing the data, the United States
noted that it was unable to classify 17 products. Th e total of these unclassified disbursements is not
insignificant and presents a problem with respect to estimating the total effect. Upon reviewing these
disbursements, it would appear that some of the paym ents could be classified into relevant categories.
However, since the United States chose not to cl assify these disbursements, we can only assume that
some information relevant to the classification of th e disbursements is not known to us. Accordingly,
these payments will be listed as "Not Elsewhere Classified" and without an NAIC code.

33. Unclassified disbursement data creates a problem of assigning values of elasticities and value
of import penetration. Our solutio n to this problem, in this case, is to assume an elasticity of
substitution of 2.8, which is the median value, and an import penetration value, which is the average
of the relevant NAIC categories for the given year.
151 In calculating the latter value, we exclude fish
and fish products, since it is clear from the da ta presented by the United States that none of the
unclassified fish products would fall under this cat egory. Furthermore, we note that the resulting

151 Relevant categories in this context are NAIC categories for which there were positive CDSOA
disbursements in any of the years 2001, 2002 or 2003.

values for each of the years are not too dissimila r from the overall value of 0.295 presented by the
Requesting Parties, which could also be used as a proxy.

D. I
MPLEMENTING THE MODEL
34. Having dealt with the specification and various parameters of the model, we turn now to its
implementation. The adopted aggregation methodology for the results at the 3-digit industry level is
similar to that of the United St ates. Each counterfactual estimat ion of the trade loss arising from
CDSOA disbursements at the 3-digit industry level is summed to obtain the total trade effect. This
total trade effect is then divided by the total CDSO A disbursements for that year to obtain a value of
the trade effect coefficient. This value, by definition, would be specific to the assumptions about the
values of the elasticities of substitution and the pass- through effect. Changes in the assumptions of
these variables will necessarily alter the final result. As explained previously, the approach with
respect to the values of the elasticities of substitutio n is to vary the values by 20 per cent below and
above the submitted values.

35. This process is repeated for each ye ar from 2001 through to 2003, assuming a value of
100 per cent pass-through. Annex Tables 3-5 present the results of these simulations. In these tables,
the relevant NAIC industry and code is presented fi rst. After this, the CDSOA disbursement for the
industry, as submitted by the United States, is liste d. The fourth column is the elasticity of
substitution followed by the market penetration variable. As indicated above, three values of
elasticities are used. The resulting tr ade effect from each of these assumptions is listed in the last
three columns as low, mid-point and high.

36. The second last row in the tables entitled "Totals" is the sum, where relevant, of all of the
preceding rows. Therefore, the simulated reducti ons are found under "Reduction in Imports". The
last row entitled "Trade Effect Coefficient" is th e value obtained by dividing the total trade effect
(from the row above) by the total CDSOA disburse ments. For 2001, these values (listed in Annex
Table 3) are 1.09 for the mid-point range, 0.87 fo r the low value and 1.30 for the high values.
Similarly, the results for 2002 and 2003 are listed in Annex Tables 4 and 5 respectively.

37. In order to adjust the simulation results fo r various assumptions of pass-through, as proposed
by the United States, we simply reduce the valu e of the disbursements. For example, for an
assumption of a 25 per cent pass-through, only 25 per cen t of the applicable disbursement is used to
calculate the trade effect. With respect to equation A3, this would imply an assumption of 0.25 for
the value of α. Annex Table 6, which is also Table 3 in the main text, presents the various results for
the different assumptions about the values of the elasticity of substitution and pass-through.

38. What remains to calculate is th e final trade coefficient. In doing so, we have decided to take a
sample average of the trade coefficients for the three years (2001-2003) . The reason for this choice is
the changing values and distribution of the payments. A broader time period is more reflective of the
value and type of distribution one could expect from the operation of the programme over time. As
stated in paragraph 3.142, we take for each year the middle two rows and the middle column and
average these three values. In doing so, we obtain 0.68 for 2001, 0.78 for 2002 and 0.70 for 2003. A
simple average of these three values is 0.72. Accordingly, the value for B in equation A3, or the trade
effect coefficient, is 0.72.

Annex Table 3: Counterfactual Trade Effect of CDSOA Disbursements
Assuming 100 per cent Pass-through by 3-digit NAIC, 2001

 Reduction in imports
(US dollars)
NAIC
Code Industry Disbursements
(US dollars) Elasticity Market
Penetration Low Mid-point High
111 Agriculture 25251.96 2.2 0.16 7111 8889 10666
114 Fish products 63576.45 2.8 20.60 2933672 3667090 4400508
311 Food 22086937.38 2.2 0.05 1943650 2429563 2915476
313 Textiles and fabrics 0 2.2 0.18 0 0 0
314 Textiles mill products 2167 3.08 2.2 0.25 9536 11920 14304
321 Wood products 0 2.8 0.18 0 0 0
322 Paper 413729.38 1.8 0.13 77450 96813 116175
325 Chemicals 5444564.42 1.9 0.22 1820662 2275828 2730994
326 Plastics and rubber 694385.83 1.9 0.11 116101 145127 174152
327 Non metallic mineral 3253 894.67 2.8 0.15 1093309 1366636 1639963
331 Primary metal 31938114.29 2.8 0.30 21462413 26828016 32193619
332 Fabricated metal 13801060.19 2.8 0.11 3400581 4250727 5100872
333 Machinery, except electrical 27551.75 2.8 0.38 23452 29315 35178
336 Transportation equipment 714537.7 5.2 0.44 1307890 1634862 1961835
337 Furniture and fixtures 0 2.8 0.22 0 0 0
339 Misc. manufactures 108862859.3 2.8 0.59 143873155 179841444 215809732
Not elsewhere classified 43853754.39 2.8 0.23 22724431 28405539 34086646
Total 231201890.8 200793413 250991767 301190120
Trade Effect Coefficient 0.87 1.09 1.30

Annex Table 4: Counterfactual Trade Effect of CDSOA Disbursements
Assuming 100 per cent Pass-through by 3-digit NAIC, 2002

 Reduction in imports
(US dollars)
NAIC
Code Industry Disbursements
(US dollars) Elasticity Market
Penetration Low Mid-point High
111 Agriculture 535685.42 2.2 0.16 150849 188561 226274
114 Fish products 261675.49 2.8 26.89 15761657 19702071 23642485
311 Food 18886033.44 2.2 0.05 1661971 2077464 2492956
313 Textiles and fabrics 0 2.2 0.19 0 0 0
314 Textiles mill products 6734 180.07 2.2 0.27 3200082 4000103 4800124
321 Wood products 0 2.8 0.19 0 0 0
322 Paper 128975.29 1.8 0.13 24144 30180 36216
325 Chemicals 5463401.14 1.9 0.25 2076092 2595116 3114139
326 Plastics and rubber 1091701.37 1.9 0.11 182532 228166 273799
327 Non metallic minera l 3564.22 2.8 0.16 1277 1597 1916
331 Primary metal 36423770.47 2.8 0.28 22844989 28556236 34267483
332 Fabricated metal 27606835.88 2.8 0.12 7420717 9275897 11131076
333 Machinery, except electrical 1970105.76 2.8 0.37 1632824 2041030 2449235
336 Transportation equipment 2094362.23 5.2 0.44 3833521 4791901 5750281
337 Furniture and fixtures 0 2.8 0.26 0 0 0
339 Misc. manufactures 168327408 2.8 0.60 226232036 282790045 339348055
 Not elsewhere classified 37935918.13 2.8 0.24 20281048 25351310 30421571
 Totals 307463616.9 305303740 381629675 457955610
 Trade Effect Coefficient 0.99 1.24 1.49

Annex Table 5: Counterfactual Trade Effect of CDSOA Disbursements
Assuming 100 per cent Pass-through by 3-digit NAIC, 2003

 Estimated Reduction in Imports
(US dollars)
NAIC
Code Disbursements
(US dollars) Elasticity Market
Penetration Low Mid-point High
111 Agriculture 417142.63 2.2 0.17 124809.1 156011 187214
114 Fish products 668638.52 2.8 23.75 35571569.3 44464462 53357354
311 Food 19378335.76 2.2 0.05 1705293.5 2131617 2557940
313 Textiles and fabrics 92126.35 2.2 0.21 34049.9 42562 51075
314 Textiles mill products 4153133 .37 2.2 0.30 2192854.4 2741068 3289282
321 Wood products 71164.16 2.8 0.19 30287.5 37859 45431
322 Paper 354593.19 1.8 0.13 66379.8 82975 99570
325 Chemicals 1185138.69 1.9 0.25 450352.7 562941 675529
326 Plastics and rubber 17779.87 1.9 0.12 3243.0 4054 4865
327 Non metallic mineral 160876. 92 2.8 0.18 64865.6 81082 97298
331 Primary metal 37658237.68 2.8 0.30 25306335.7 31632920 37959504
332 Fabricated metal 58308377.14 2.8 0.13 16979399.4 21224249 25469099
333 Machinery, except electrical 303535.69 2.8 0.42 285566.4 356958 428350
336 Transportation equipment 47777.55 5.2 0.45 89439.6 111799 134159
337 Furniture and fixtures 347.89 2.8 0.29 226.0 282 339
339 Miscellaneous manufactures 63033167.58 2.8 0.60 84716577.2 105895722 127074866
Not elsewhere classified 4397052.27 2.8 0.25 2488614.3 3110768 3732921
Totals 190247425.3 170109863.5 212637329 255164795
 Trade Effect Coefficient 0.89 1.12 1.34

Annex Table 6: Summary of Results for Various Values

for Substitution Elasticity and Pass-through, 2001-2003

2001

 Low Medium High
25 per cent 0.22 0.27 0.33
50 per cent 0.43 0.54 0.65
75 per cent 0.65 0.81 0.98
100 per cent 0.87 1.09 1.30

2002

 Low Medium High
25 per cent 0.25 0.31 0.37
50 per cent 0.50 0.62 0.74
75 per cent 0.74 0.93 1.12
100 per cent 0.99 1.24 1.49

2003

 Low Medium High
25 per cent 0.22 0.28 0.34
50 per cent 0.45 0.56 0.67
75 per cent 0.67 0.84 1.01
100 per cent 0.89 1.12 1.34