INDIA – CERTAIN MEASURES RELATING TO SOLAR CELLS AND SOLAR MODULES
Document: AB-2016-3 Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 16 September 2016
Document codes: WT/DS456/AB/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: India
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Russia, Turkey, Ecuador, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. III:4  GATT 1994Art. 2.1  Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)

INDIA – CERTAIN MEASURES RELATING TO SOLAR CELLS
AND SOLAR MODULES

AB-2016-3
Report of the Appellate Body

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
c-Si crystalline silicon
DCR measures Domestic content requirements imposed under Phase I (Batch 1),
Phase I (Batch 2), and Phase II (Batch 1-A) of India's Jawaharlal
Nehru National Solar Mission
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
Electricity Act, 2003 Parliament of India, The Electricity Act, 2003 [No. 36 of 2003]
(26 May 2003) (Panel Exhibit USA-20)
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
National Action Plan on
Climate Change
Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate Change
(June 2008) (Panel Exhibit IND-2)
National Electricity Plan Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority,
National Electricity Plan, Vol. 1 – Generation (January 2012)
(Panel Exhibit IND-16)
National Electricity Policy Government of India, Ministry of Power, National Electricity Policy,
Resolution No. 23/40/2004-R&R (Vol. II) (12 February 2005)
(Panel Exhibit IND-14)
National Solar Mission,
or NSM
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission
Panel Panel is these proceedings
Panel Report Panel Report, ,
PPA power purchase agreement
PV photovoltaic
SPD solar power developer
TRIMs Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August
2010
WTO
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel Exhibit(s) Description
IND-2 Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate Change
(June 2008)
IND-3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at
New York, 9 May 1992, UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, p. 107
IND-14 Government of India, Ministry of Power, National Electricity Policy,
Resolution No. 23/40/2004-R&R (Vol. II) (12 February 2005)
IND-16 Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority,
National Electricity Plan, Vol. 1 – Generation (January 2012)
IND-28 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/288 (adopted
27 July 2012) (Rio+20 Document: "The Future We Want")
IND-35 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1992
IND-36 G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India and Others, 2013 (6) SCC 620
(excerpts)
USA-4 Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy,
Resolution No. 5/14/2008, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission
(11 January 2010)
USA-20 Parliament of India, The Electricity Act, 2003 [No. 36 of 2003]
(26 May 2003)

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Financial Services Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, WT/DS453/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Canada – Periodicals Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R
and Corr.1, adopted 30 July 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, p. 481
Canada – Renewable Energy
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR
2013:I, p. 7
Canada – Renewable Energy
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program,
WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR
2013:I, p. 237
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004,
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment
of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS276/AB/R, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2817
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted
12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – Auto Parts Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,
WT/DS339/R, Add.1 and Add.2 / WT/DS340/R, Add.1 and Add.2 /
WT/DS342/R, Add.1 and Add.2, adopted 12 January 2009, upheld
(WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R / WT/DS342/R) by Appellate
Body Reports WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR
2009:I, p. 119
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805
China – Rare Earths Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R and Add.1
/ WT/DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body
Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV,
p. 1127
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R,
adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535
Colombia – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June
2016
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR
1998:I, p. 135
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July
1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p. 7
EC – Trademarks and
Geographical Indications
(US)
Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint
by the United States, WT/DS174/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:VIII, p.
3499
EEC – Parts and Components GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports
of Parts and Components, L/6657, adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S, page 132
India – Solar Cells Panel Report, , WT/DS456/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 24 February
2016
Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 97
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January
2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, DSR 2001:I, p. 59

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3
Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks
Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, p. 43
Philippines – Distilled Spirits Appellate Body Reports, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits,
WT/DS396/AB/R / WT/DS403/AB/R, adopted 20 January 2012, DSR
2012:VIII, p. 4163
US – Carbon Steel (India) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted
19 December 2014, DSR 2014:V, p. 1727
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR
2009:III, p. 1291
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures
(China)
Panel Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/R and Add.1, adopted 22 July 2014,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS449/AB/R, DSR 2014:VIII,
p. 3175
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR
2012:I, p. 7
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR
1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, DSR
2008:II, p. 513
US – Steel Safeguards Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R,
WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R,
WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR
2003:VII, p. 3117
US – Tyres (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/AB/R,
adopted 5 October 2011, DSR 2011:IX, p. 4811

APPELLATE BODY

India, Appellant
United States, Appellee

Brazil, Third Participant
Canada, Third Participant
China, Third Participant
Ecuador, Third Participant
European Union, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Korea, Third Participant
Malaysia, Third Participant
Norway, Third Participant
Russia, Third Participant
Saudi Arabia, Third Participant
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, Third Participant
Turkey, Third Participant
AB-2016-3

Appellate Body Division:

Van den Bossche, Presiding Member
Chang, Member
Graham, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. India appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report,
 1 (Panel Report). The Panel was
established on 23 May 2014 to consider a complaint by the United States2 against certain domestic
content requirements (DCR measures) imposed by India on solar power developers (SPDs) selling
electricity to governmental agencies under its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (NSM).3 The
DCR measures at issue require that certain types of solar cells and modules used by SPDs be
made in India.4
1.2. The NSM was launched by the Central Government of India in 2010, and aims to generate
100,000 megawatts of grid-connected solar power capacity by 2022. 5 The stated objective of the
NSM is "to establish India as a global leader in solar energy, by creating the policy conditions for
its diffusion across the country as quickly as possible ."6 The NSM is being implemented in several
successive "Phases", with each phase thus far initiated being further divided into "Batches".
1.3. The DCR measures in Phase I (Batch 1), Phase I (Batch 2), and Phase II (Batch 1 -A) are
each set forth, reproduced, or otherwise reflected in a series of different documents, including the
so-called "Guidelines" and "Request for Selection " documents7, the model power purchase
agreement (PPA), and the individually executed PPAs between the relevant Indian government al
agencies8 and the SPDs.9 Each individually executed PPA sets out a guaranteed rate for a 25-year
term at which the electricity generated by the SPD will be bought by the Central Government. The

1 WT/DS456/R, 24 February 2016.
2 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States of 14 April 2014, WT/DS456/5.
3 Panel Report, para. 2.1.
4 Solar cells are photovoltaic (PV) devices that are components of solar modules, also known as solar
panels. Solar PV technology transforms sunlight directly into electricity.
5 Panel Report, para. 7.1.
6 Panel Report, para. 7.1 (quoting Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy,
Resolution No. 5/14/2008, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (11 January 2010) (Panel Exhibit USA-4),
para. 2).
7 Panel Report, para. 7.8 and fn 81 thereto.
8 Under Phase I (Batch 1) and Phase I (Batch 2), Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Limited was the agency
responsible for implementing the solar power project selection process. Under Phase II (Batch 1-A), the Solar
Energy Corporation of India was selected to perform the same functions. (Panel Report, para. 7.4)
9 Panel Report, para. 7.2.

government resells the electricity that it purchases to downstream distribution companies, which in
turn resell it to the ultimate consumer.10
1.4. The Panel, having reviewed all of the evidence provided relating to each Batch, carried out its
analysis on the understanding that, for each Batch, the measure at issue is the DCR measure
reflected or incorporated in the various documents for each Batch, read tog ether in a "holistic"
manner.11 The Panel therefore did not treat the separate documents in each Batch as distinct
measures.12
1.5. A mandatory DCR was imposed on SPDs participating in Phase I (Batch es 1 and 2) and
Phase II (Batch 1-A) of the NSM. The scope and coverage of the DCR differed, however, across the
different Batches.13 Under Phase I (Batch 1), it was mandatory for all projects based on crystalline
silicon (c-Si) technology to use c -Si modules manufactured in India, while the use of foreign c -Si
cells and foreign thin-film modules or concentrator photovoltaic (PV) cells was permitted. 14 Under
Phase I (Batch 2), it was mandatory for all projects based on c -Si technology to use c-Si cells and
modules manufactured in India, while the use of domestic or foreig n modules made from thin-film
technologies or concentrator PV cells was permitted. 15 Under Phase II (Batch 1 -A), any solar cells
and modules used by the SPDs had to be made in India, irrespective of the type of technology
used.16
1.6. The United States claimed be fore the Panel that the DCR measures imposed by India are
inconsistent with Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( GATT 1994)
and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement). The
United Sta tes further requested the Panel to recommend that India bring its measures into
conformity with its WTO obligations pursuant to Article 19.1 Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).17
1.7. India requested the Panel to find that the DCR measures at issue are not inconsistent with
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 or Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. India further requested the
Panel to find that the derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 is applicable to the
measures at issue in this dispute . In the event that the Panel were to find that the measures at
issue are inconsistent with any of the obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 or
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, India requested that the Panel determine that any such
inconsistency would be justified under Article XX(j) and/or Article XX(d) of GATT 1994.18
1.8. In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
24 February 2016, the Panel found that:
a. the DCR measures are inc onsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and
Article III:4 of the GATT 199419;

b. the DCR measures are not covered by the derogation in Article III:8(a) of the
GATT 199420; and

10 Panel Report, para. 7.2.
11 In response to India's request for a preliminary ruling on the scope of the measures at issue, the
United States confirmed that, with respect to Phase I (Batch 1), Phase I (Batch 2), and Phase II (Batch 1-A),
the measures at issue are only the specific DCRs imposed under each Batch, and do not include any other
element of the NSM. (Panel Report, para. 7.22)
12 Panel Report, paras. 7.29-7.31.
13 Panel Report, para. 7.7.
14 Panel Report, para. 7.8.
15 Panel Report, para. 7.9.
16 Panel Report, para. 7.10. Under Phase II (Batch 1-A), the SPDs could bid for a PPA "Part A" (subject
to a DCR), "Part B" (not subject to a DCR), or both. The United States challenged only the DCR measure
imposed under Part A. (Ibid.)
17 Panel Report, para. 3.1.
18 Panel Report, para. 3.2.
19 Panel Report, para. 8.2.a.
20 Panel Report, para. 8.2.a.

c. the DCR measures are not justified under the general exceptions in Artic le XX(j) or
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.21
1.9. On 20 April 2016, India notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), pursuant to Articles 16.4
and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and
certain legal in terpretations developed by the Panel and filed a Notice of Appeal 22 and an
appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 20 and Rule 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures
for Appellate Review23 (Working Procedures).
1.10. On 2 May 2016, the United States sent a l etter to the Appellate Body Division hearing this
appeal requesting an extension of the deadline for the filing of its appellee's submission in this
appeal by one day. The United States noted that its appellee's submission in another pending
appellate proc eeding, namely, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on
Large Residential Washers from Korea (DS464), was also due on 9 May 2016, i.e. the same day as
the deadline for filing its appellee's submission in the present appeal. Referring to the size of the
appeals in these two disputes, the United States indicated that its submissions may be significant
in scope. The United States also pointed to the large number of print copies of its appellee's
submissions to be prepared for the Divisions and to be served on the participants and third
participants in these two appeals. The United States therefore requested that the deadline for the
filing of the appellee's submission in this appeal be extended by one day, such that it would be due
on 10 May 2016.
1.11. On 3 May 2016, the Appellate Body Division hearing this appeal invited India and the third
parties to comment on the United States' request. No objections to the United States' request
were received by the Division. Norway submitted , that if the United States' request were granted,
the deadline for the filing of the third participants' submissions should similarly be extended to
ensure that the third participants c ould contribute in an informed and efficient manner in the
appellate proceedings.
1.12. On 4 May 2016, the Division issued a Procedural Ruling, extending the deadline for the
United States to file its appellee's submission by one day to 10 May 2016. 24 The Division
considered the reasons identified by the United States, in particular the need for th e United States
to file appellee's submissions in two separate appeal proceedings on the same day, to be relevant
factors in its assessment of "exceptional circumstances, where strict adherence to a time -period …
would result in a manifest unfairness" purs uant to Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures. The
Division also noted that neither India, nor the third parties, had raised any objections to the
United States' request. Moreover, in order to provide the third participants sufficient time to
incorporate re actions to the appellee's submission into their third participants' submissions, the
Division decided, pursuant to Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures, to extend the deadline for the
filing of the third participants' submissions and third participants' notifications to 12 May 2016.
1.13. On 10 May 2016, the United States filed an appellee's submission. 25 On 12 May 2016,
Brazil, the European Union, and Japan each filed a third participant's submission. 26 On the same
day, Canada, China, Malaysia, Norway, Russia, and Saudi Arabia notified their intention to appear
at the oral hearing as a third participant. 27 Subsequently, the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ; Ecuador; Korea; and Turkey each notified its intention to
appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.28

21 Panel Report, para. 8.2.b.
22 WT/DS456/9.
23 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
24 Contained in Annex D-1 of the Addendum to this Report (WT/DS456/AB/R/Add.1).
25 Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
26 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) and Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures.
27 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
28 On 28 June, 30 June, 30 June, and 29 June 2016, respectively, the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Ecuador; Korea; and Turkey each submitted its delegation list for the oral
hearing to the Appellate Body Secretariat and the participants and third participants in this dispute. For the
purposes of this appeal, we have interpreted these actions as notifications expressing the intention of the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Ecuador; Korea; and Turkey to attend the
oral hearing pursuant to Rule 24(4) of the Working Procedures.

1.14. By letter of 17 June 2016, the Chair of the Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB that
the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report in this appeal within the 60-day period
pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, or within the 90 -day period pursuant to the same provision.
The Chair of the Appellate Body explained that this was due to a number of factors, including the
substantial workload of the Appellate Body in 2016, scheduling difficulties arising from ove rlap in
the composition of the Divisions hearing the different appeals, the number and complexity of the
issues raised in this and concurrent appellate proceedings, together with the demands that these
concurrent appeals place on the WTO Secretariat's translation services, and the shortage of staff in
the Appellate Body Secretariat.29 By letter of 8 July 2016, the Chair of the Appellate Body informed
the Chair of the DSB that the Appellate Body Report in these proceedings would be circulated no
later than 16 September 2016.30
1.15. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 4 -5 July 2016. The participants and three of the
third participants (the European Union, Japan, and Norway) made opening and/or closing oral
statements. The participants and third participants r esponded to questions posed by the Members
of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the participants are reflected in the executive summaries of
their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.31 The Notice of Appeal and the executive
summaries of the participants' written submissions are contained, respectively, in Annexes A and B
of the Addendum to this Report.32
3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of Brazil, the Eur opean Union, and Japan, as third participants, are reflected
in the executive summaries of their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body 33, and are
contained in Annex C of the Addendum to this Report.34
4 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
4.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
a. with respect to Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding that the
DCR measures at issue in this dispute are not covered by the derogation under
Article III:8(a), and that consequently India could not rely on that provision to
exclude the application of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement to the DCR measures; and
ii. if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that the DCR measures are not
covered by the derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, then whether the
Appellate Body can complete the legal analysis and find that they satisfy the
remaining legal elements under that provision;
b. with respect to Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(j), and
under Article 11 of the DSU, in finding that solar cells and modules are not "products

29 WT/DS456/10.
30 WT/DS456/11.
31 Pursuant to the Appellate Body Communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in Appellate
Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)
32 WT/DS456/AB/R/Add.1.
33 Pursuant to the Appellate Body Communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in Appellate
Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)
34 WT/DS456/AB/R/Add.1.

in general or local short supply" in India, and that consequent ly the DCR measures
are not justified under Article XX(j); and
ii. if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that solar cells and modules are not
"products in general or local short supply" in India within the meaning of
Article XX(j), then whether th e Appellate Body can complete the legal analysis and
find that the DCR measures meet the requirements for provisional justification under
Article XX(j) and satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994; and
c. with respect to Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(d) in
finding that the DCR measures are not measures "to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the G ATT 1994]" within
the meaning of Article XX(d); and that consequently the DCR measures are not
justified under that provision; and
ii. if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that the DCR measures are not
measures "to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of [the GATT 1994]" within the meaning of Article XX(d), then
whether the Appellate Body can complete the legal analysis and find that the
DCR measures meet the requirements for provisional justification under Article XX(d)
and satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
5.1. India appeals the Panel's finding that the DCR measures are not covered by the governm ent
procurement derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 because India's government
purchases electricity , and the discrimination under the DCR measures relates to solar cells and
modules.35 India argues that the Panel acted inconsistently with it s obligations under Article 11 of
the DSU by failing to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including of India's
arguments and related evidence that: ( i) solar cells and modules are indistinguishable from solar
power generation; ( ii) sola r cells and modules can be characterized as inputs for solar power
generation; and ( iii) Article III:8(a) cannot be applied in a narrow manner that would require
direct acquisition of the product purchased in all cases. 36 India requests us to reverse the Pa nel's
finding and find that the DCR measures are covered by the derogation under Article III:8(a).37
5.2. In the event that we find that the DCR measures are covered by the government
procurement derogation under Article III:8(a), India further requests that we complete the legal
analysis of the remaining elements under this provision.38 In particular, India requests that we
reaffirm the Panel's findings that the DCR measures are laws, regulations or requirements
"governing" procurement and that the procurement un der the DCR measures is "by governmental
agencies", and that we find that the procurement under the DCR measures is of products
purchased "for governmental purposes" and "not with a view to commercial resale".39
5.3. We begin by summarizing the Panel's findings and the issues appealed. We then address the
interpretation of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, before turning to consider the Panel's analysis
as challenged by India on appeal.
5.1.1 The Panel's findings
5.4. The Panel began by reviewing the requirements set out i n the text of Article III:8(a) of the
GATT 1994 in order for a measure to be exempted from the national treatment obligations of

35 India's appellant's submission, para. 35(a).
36 India's appellant's submission, para. 35(b).
37 India's appellant's submission, para. 35(c).
38 India's appellant's submission, para. 36.
39 India's appellant's submission, paras. 61-62.

Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.40 The Panel observed that,
in addition to those factors, there is a "threshold matter" of the applicability of Article III:8(a) in
respect of the "products purchased" under the DCR measures. 41 For the Panel, this was the
"dispositive" factor of the Appellate Body's analysis in Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program , and the pertinence, or distinguishability, of the Appellate Body's findings
and reasoning in those cases was a primary issue of contention between the parties during the
Panel proceedings in the present dispute. 42 The Panel noted , in this regard , that the
Appellate Body framed the applicability of Article III:8(a) "according to whether the particular
products subject to discrimination are in a 'competitive relationship' with the products purchased
under the measures in question". 43 Recalling that the products subject to discrimination in the
present dispute are solar cells and modules originating in the United States and that India
purchases the electricity generated from solar cells and modules, rat her than the solar cells and
modules themselves, the Panel observed that "an approach paralleling that of the Appellate Body
in Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff Program would entail a comparison of
solar cells and modules with the gen erated electricity that is purchased in order to ascertain
whether these products are in a 'competitive relationship'."44
5.5. The Panel further noted that India had not argued that electricity , on the one hand, and solar
cells and modules , on the other hand, are in a competitive relationship, and had not requested
that the Panel depart from the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program . Rather, India sought to distinguish the DCR measures from the
measures at issue in those cases by submitting that the Central Government was "effectively
procuring" solar cells and modules by purchasing electricity generated from such cells and
modules.45
5.6. Regarding India's contention that Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 does not require in every
case a "competitive relationship" between the product that is procured and the product that is
discriminated against, the Panel observed that the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program referred to "consideration of inputs and processes of production"
as being potentially relevant to "[w]hat constitutes a competitive relationship between products".46
For the Panel, this reference to "inputs and processes of production" seemed to elaborate, rather
than displace, what the Appellate Body had referred to as the "competitive relationship" standard,
leaving open the possibility that a consideration of inputs and processes of production would
inform an assessment of whether the products subject to discriminat ion are "like" and/or "directly
competitive to or substitutable with the product purchased under the challenged measure". 47 The
Panel did not understand India to disagree with this proposition. 48 Instead, it understood India to
argue that, "when the Appellat e Body … referred to (and expressly declined to decide) whether
'the cover of Article III:8(a) may also extend to discrimination relating to inputs and processes of
production used in respect of products purchased by way of government procurement', it was no
longer referring to the question of '[w]hat constitutes a competitive relationship between
products', but was rather introducing the possibility of an alternative to the 'competitive
relationship' standard in a situation involving discrimination against 'inputs and processes of

40 Panel Report, para. 7.105 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Canada ‒ Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, paras. 5.57, 5.69, and 5.74).
41 Panel Report, para. 7.106.
42 Panel Report, para. 7.106.
43 Panel Report, para. 7.113.
44 Panel Report, para. 7.113.
45 Panel Report, para. 7.114 (quoting India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 26). In
particular, India argued that the fundamental characteristics of solar cells and modules in absorbing light
energy, which releases electrons and thereby generates electricity, define their integral role in solar power
generation. (Panel Report, fn 292 to para. 7.114 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 110; second written submission to the Panel, para. 19; and comments to the United States' response to
Panel Question No. 43, para. 11))
46 Panel Report, para. 7.118 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63). (emphasis added by the Panel)
47 Panel Report, para. 7.118 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63). The Panel referred to the United States' suggestion that this could be
understood to mean that, "where product A and product B are comprised of similar inputs (or manufactured
through similar processes), this might suggest that product A and product B are 'like products' or in a
competitive relationship". (Ibid., fn 300 to para. 7.118 (quoting United States' response to Panel question
No. 41, para. 4 (emphasis original)))
48 Panel Report, para. 7.118.

production'."49 The Panel, however, did not find it necessary "to resolve whether the
Appellate Body left room for an alternative to the 'competitive relationship' standard", considering
that, "[i]n applying Article III:8(a) to clo sely analogous facts that involved the purchase of
electricity and discrimination against generation equipment, the Appellate Body stated that the
derogation 'extends' to products in a 'competitive relationship' and disposed of the case on the
grounds that 'electricity' and 'generation equipment' are not in such a relationship."50
5.7. Concerning the issue of whether solar cells and modules can be characterized as "inputs" in
relation to electricity, the Panel recalled the United States' argument that India "rel ies on a factual
assumption that solar panels and modules are an input to the generation of solar power, but they
are actually capital equipment that is not consumed or incorporated in the power generated". 51
The Panel further noted the United States' posit ion that an "input" should be "incorporated into or
otherwise physically detectable" in a finished product , and India's position that it could "refer to
any resources or materials that are required to obtain a desired output". 52 The Panel considered
that the parties' disagreement turned on issues that the Appellate Body did not consider necessary
to resolve in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, and found that it was
similarly unnecessary to resolve these issues in the present dispute.53
5.8. The Panel noted that India's arguments also hinge upon whether "solar cells and modules are
integral inputs for the generation system" , as contrasted with "all other components of a PV
generation plant [that] can be classified as ancillary equipment". 54 The Panel stated that the
"generation equipment" at issue in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program
included the "exact same" products, i.e. solar cells and modules, which were used to generate
electricity purchased by the government. 55 The Panel found it noteworthy that the Appellate Body
had given "no indication of these, or any other type of equipment, being an 'input' that would be
relevant to the analysis under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, nor did it make any distinction
between inputs of an 'integral' or 'ancillary' nature ."56 Furthermore, the measures in those cases
effectively imposed a requirement to use domestically sourced "goods" or "generation equipment
and components" in order to achieve the necessary level of domestic content.57
5.9. On this basis, the Panel concluded that " Canada – Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in
Tariff Program entailed discrimination against the same 'generation equipment' that is at issue in
the present dispute, namely solar cells and modules". 58 Referring to the panel and Appellate Body
reports in those disputes, the Panel was not persuaded that India's arguments in the present case
rose to "anything more than the 'close relationship' between generation equipment and electricity
that the Appellate Body rejected as the relevant standard under Article III:8(a)" in those
proceedings.59 The Panel added that , "[t]o whatever extent Article III:8(a) applies to 'inputs'
(however that term is defined) that are not in a competitive relationship with the product

49 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
50 Panel Report, para. 7.120 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program, paras. 5.63 and 5.79, respectively).
51 Panel Report, para. 7.121 (quoting United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 17).
52 Panel Report, para. 7.121 (referring to United States' second written submission to the Panel,
para. 20; and quoting India's response to Panel question No. 42, paras. 8 and 10).
53 Panel Report, para. 7.121.
54 Panel Report, para. 7.122 (quoting India's second written submission to the Panel, para. 20
(emphasis original)).
55 Panel Report, para. 7.123.
56 Panel Report, para. 7.123.
57 Panel Report, para. 7.125 (quoting Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, para. 7.163). For the Panel, although the requirements in Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program pertained to other activities for the development and construction of facilities
that are not covered by the DCR measures in the present dispute, such other activities could not alone meet
the "Qualifying Percentages" for the Minimum Required Domestic Content Level. (Ibid.)
58 Panel Report, para. 7.126.
59 Panel Report, para. 7.128.

purchased by way of procurement, … the Appellate Body did not find such considerations germane
to its evaluation of electricity and generation equipment that included solar cells and modules."60
5.10. The Panel also addressed India's concern that , to read "proc urement" in Article III:8(a) as
requiring "direct acquisition of the product", would be an unnecessary intrusion into the nature and
exercise of government al actions relating to procurement of solar power. 61 The Panel reasoned
that it is by no means self -evident that the scenarios referred to by India 62 involving the "direct
acquisition" of solar cells and modules by governmental agencies would meet the other
requirements of Article III:8(a), notably the requirements for products to be purchased "for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the
production of goods for commercial sale".63
5.11. Having "considered the specific basis" upon which India sought to distinguish the facts and
circumstances of the present dispute , the Panel was not persuaded that the DCR measures are
"distinguishable in any relevant respect" from the measures examined by the Appellate Body in
Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program .64 Referring to the
"Appellate Body's legal interpretation of Article III:8(a) as applied to the governmental purchase of
electricity and discrimination against foreign generation equipment", the Panel thus found that "the
discrimination relating to solar cells and modules under the DCR measures is not covered by the
derogation of Article III:8(a)."65
5.1.2 India's claims on appeal
5.12. India appeals the Panel's conclusion that the DCR measures at issue are not covered by the
derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. Central to India's appeal is its cont ention that
the Panel acted inconsistently with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU because it "mechanically
applied the Appellate Body's test of competitive relationship" developed in Canada – Renewable
Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program66 and "refused to consider the facts, evidence and legal
arguments advanced by India"67 in this case.68
5.13. India presents several arguments in support of its contention. India maintains that the Panel
"ignored a fundamental basis of India's argument" that solar cells an d modules are

60 Panel Report, para. 7.128. Similarly, the Panel rejected India's argument that, since the tariff for the
power purchased under the PPAs incorporates within it the cost for the solar cells and modules, "India's
purchase of electricity generated from solar cells and modules … constitutes an effective purchase of the cells
and modules themselves", considering that the argument seemingly conflicted with India's primary argument
that "integral inputs", but not other "ancillary equipment" whose costs also may be reflected in the electricity
tariff, are "effectively procured". (Panel Report, para. 7.129 (quoting India's response to Panel question No. 41,
para. 7 (emphasis added by the Panel))
61 Panel Report, para. 7.130 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 118 and
120; and opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 29).
62 According to India, for a government to procure effectively solar cells and modules under
Article III:8(a), it would need to either purchase these products by itself and generate the electricity from
them, or purchase the products and provide them to SPDs for power generation. (Panel Report, para. 7.130
(quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 117))
63 Panel Report, para. 7.132. India also argued that "procurement" should not be interpreted to require
direct acquisition in view of the Appellate Body's statement in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program that, "if procurement was understood to refer simply to any acquisition, it would not add any
meaning to Article III:8(a) in addition to what is already expressed by the word purchased." The Panel,
however, considered that this reference is misplaced and "reverses the logic of the Appellate Body" by
subsuming the concept of "purchase" under a broader category of "procurement". (Panel Report, para. 7.133
(quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.59;
and European Union's third-party submission to the Panel, para. 40))
64 Panel Report, para. 7.135.
65 Panel Report, para. 7.135.
66 India's appellant's submission, para. 6. See also paras. 17 and 26.
67 India's appellant's submission, para. 24.
68 Thus, we understand India to argue that, in relying on the Appellate Body's finding in those disputes
and not coming to any conclusions with regard to India's claims and arguments relating to solar cells and
modules, the Panel failed "to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case, and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant provisions of the covered agreements". (India's appellant's submission,
paras. 24 and 28; and responses to questioning at the oral hearing)

"indistinguishable" from solar power generation. 69 India also submits that the Panel erred "in its
factual and legal assessment that it is not necessary to consider whether solar cells and modules
qualify as 'inputs' for solar power generation " and "in its application of the relevant tests for
consideration regarding whether or not solar cells and modules can be characterized as inputs".70
Furthermore, India alleges that the Panel erred in dismissing its arguments that sole reliance on
the "comp etitive relationship" test would unduly restrict the scope of Article III:8(a), and that
Article III:8(a) should not be interpreted to envisage direct acquisition of products purchased, in
all cases.71 Finally, India contends that the Panel erred in "reason ing that it cannot go beyond the
tests applied by the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program since India had not asked it to deviate from this reasoning"72, and thus failed to ensure "a
meaningful interpretation of Article III:8(a)".73
5.14. For its part, the United States considers that India's arguments under Article 11 of the DSU
"are without merit, because … the Panel thoroughly engaged [ with] all of the evidence and
arguments advanced by India", even though it did not ac cord "such evidence the weight India
thought it should have". 74 The United States further submits that the Panel's interpretation of
Article III:8(a) is consistent with its text and accords with the legal standard articulated by the
Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , and that the
Panel properly understood that provision as "exempting from Article III only procurements of
products directly competitive with the import subject to discrimination". 75 In the United States '
view, "[h]aving rejected the proposition that India could be understood to 'procure' solar cells and
modules without actually purchasing, acquiring, or otherwise taking custody of any solar cells and
modules, it was unnecessary for the Panel to consider or resolve the theoretical question of
whether solar cells and modules can be distinguished from solar power generation."76
5.15. We recall that Article 11 of the DSU imposes upon panels a comprehensive obligation to
make an "objective assessment of the matter", which embraces all aspects of a panel's
examination of the "matter", both factual and legal. 77 Thus, panels are required to make an
objective assessment of "the facts", the "applicability" of the covered agreements, and the
"conformity" of the measure at is sue with the covered agreements. 78 With respect to "the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements", a panel is required to
conduct an objective assessment of whether the obligations in the covered agreements, with which
an inconsi stency is claimed, are relevant and applicable to the case at hand, and whether the
measures at issue conform to, or are inconsistent with, the specific obligations provided for in
those agreements. 79 That said, a panel has the discretion "to address only t hose arguments it
deems necessary to resolve a particular claim", and "the fact that a particular argument relating to
that claim is not specifically addressed in the 'Findings' section of a panel report will not, in and of
itself, lead to the conclusion t hat that panel has failed to make the 'objective assessment of the

69 India's appellant's submission, paras. 6 and 8, respectively. In particular, India argues that
"Article III:8(a) would apply in situations where the physical form of the product purchased by the government
is not identical to the product discriminated against, when it is established that there is really no difference
between the products discriminated against (i.e. solar cells and modules) and the product purchased (i.e. solar
power)." (Ibid.)
70 India's appellant's submission, heading IIB, and para. 10, respectively. (emphasis original)
71 India's appellant's submission, paras. 21-23.
72 India's appellant's submission, heading IIE.
73 India's appellant's submission, para. 34.
74 United States' appellee's submission, para. 47.
75 United States' appellee's submission, para. 62.
76 United States' appellee's submission, para. 52. (emphasis original)
77 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.17 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54).
78 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.17 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54).
79 See Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.17. In order to make an "objective
assessment of the applicability of specific provisions of the covered agreements to a measure properly before
it", a panel must "thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in its design and in its operation, and
identify its principal characteristics". (Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 171)

matter before it' required by Article 11 of the DSU."80 Finally, a challenge to a panel's assessment
of the facts cannot be sustained simply by asserting that a panel did not agree with argu ments or
evidence that had been presented before it, but must be clearly articulated and substantiated with
specific arguments, including an explanation of why the alleged error has a bearing on the
objectivity of the panel's factual assessment.81
5.16. As noted, the Panel did not consider it necessary in the present dispute "to resolve whether
the Appellate Body left room for an alternative to the 'competitive relationship' standard, or to
decide, in the abstract, the meaning of 'inputs and processes of productio n' as used by the
Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-In Tariff Program ."82 This was
because the Panel concluded that the DCR measures at issue in this dispute are not
"distinguishable in any relevant respect from those examined b y the Appellate Body" in those
earlier disputes.83 Under Article 11 of the DSU , the Panel was required, in making an objective
assessment of the matter before it, to consider all factual and legal arguments of the parties that
were pertinent for ruling on w hether the DCR measures are covered by the derogation under
Article III:8(a). As a first step in addressing India 's challenge to the Panel's analysis , we will
examine the scope of application of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.
5.1.3 The scope of application of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
5.17. Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 provides:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use
in the production of goods for commercial sale.
5.18. We recall that Article III:8(a) sets out a derogation from the national treatment obligation
contained in Article III of the GATT 1994, exempting from that obligation certain measures that
contain rules regarding the process by which governmental agencies purchase products. The
measures within the scope of Article III:8(a) are "laws, regulations or requirements governing …
procurement", and the entity purchasing products needs to be a "governmental agency".
Furthermore, the scope of Article III:8(a) is limited to "products purchased for governmental
purposes", and "not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of
goods for commercial sale".84
5.19. As noted, a primary issue of contention between the parties in the Panel proceedings was
the pertinence of the reasoning and findings of the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program regarding the scope of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 with
respect to "products purchased". For India, the test of competitive relationship between the
product discriminated against and the product purchased " is not a single inflexible rule to be
applied in all circumstances for consideration under Article III".85 India recalls, in this regard, that
the Appellate Body explicitly noted that "[w]hether the derogation in Article III:8(a) can extend

80 Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 135. (emphasis omitted) See also Appellate Body Report,
EC – Fasteners (China), para. 511. Furthermore, with regard to a panel's evaluation of the evidence, a panel is
required to "consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure
that its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence". (Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres, para. 185 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC ‒ Hormones, paras. 132 and 133)) Within these
parameters, however, "it is generally within the discretion of the [p]anel to decide which evidence it chooses to
utilize in making findings", and the mere fact that a panel does not explicitly refer to each and every piece of
evidence in its reasoning is insufficient to support a claim of violation under Article 11 of the DSU.
(Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones, para. 135. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 442)
81 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.227 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Chile
– Price Band System (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 238; US – Steel Safeguards, para. 498; US – Tyres
(China), para. 321; and EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 499 and 500). See also Appellate Body Report, US –
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 722 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 442).
82 Panel Report, para. 7.120.
83 Panel Report, paras. 7.120 and 7.134-7.135.
84 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program,
para. 5.74.

also to discrimination [relating to inputs and processes of produ ction used in respect of products
purchased by way of procurement] is a matter we do not decide in this case."86 According to India,
this "left space for legal reasoning on the issue of inputs".87
5.20. For its part, the United States underscores that the Appella te Body has found that
"Article III:8(a) does not apply when a Member purchases one product, but discriminates against
another, different product" and, as read in conjunction with the other paragraphs of Article III,
requires that the product "subject to d iscrimination" and the "product that is purchased" by the
government must be: "(1) identical products; (2) 'like' products; or (3) products that are directly
competitive or substitutable", or, in other words, "products that are in a competitive
relationship".88 The United States argues that the Panel was properly guided in the present case by
the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article III:8(a) in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program , given that both those and the present dispute in volve measures under
which the government purchase s electricity, but discriminate s against foreign generation
equipment.89
5.21. As observed by the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program, Article III:8(a) begins with the ph rase "[t]he provisions of this Article shall not apply
to …". This introductory clause of Article III:8(a) establishes "a linkage with the remainder of
Article III", and the words "[t]he provisions of this Article" encompass the overarching principle in
Article III:1 that internal measures "should not be applied … so as to afford protection to domestic
production".90 For government procurement activities falling within its scope, Article III:8(a)
establishes a derogation from the national treatment obligatio n under Article III.91 That is why, as
the Appellate Body stated, the derogation in Article III:8(a) "becomes relevant only if there is
discriminatory treatment of foreign products that are covered by the obligations in Article III".92 In
this regard, the Appellate Body stated:
Because Article III:8(a) is a derogation from the obligations contained in other
paragraphs of Article III, … the same discriminatory treatment must be considered
both with respect to the obligations of Article III and with respect to the derogation of
Article III:8(a). Accordingly, the scope of the terms "products purchased" in
Article III:8(a) is informed by the scope of "products" referred to in the obligations set
out in other paragraphs of Article III. Article III:8(a) thus concern s, in the first
instance, the product that is subject to the discrimination.93
5.22. The coverage of Article III:8(a) thus extends to products purchased that are "like" the
products discriminated against under Article III:2 and III:4, or, in accordance with the Ad Note to
Article III:2, to products that are "directly competitive" with or "substitutable" for such products. It
is these products that the Appellate Body described as "products that are in a competitive
relationship"94, using the term "competitive relati onship" as a shorthand for delineating the scope
of "like", or "directly competitive or substitutable" 95. In other words, since "the derogation of
Article III:8(a) must be understood in relation to the obligations stipulated in Article III", the
product of foreign origin must be either "like" , or "directly competitive" with or "substitutable" for
– i.e. in a "competitive relationship" with – "the product purchased".96 We do not consider that the

86 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63.
87 India's appellant's submission, para. 4. See also para. 9 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63). (fn omitted)
88 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 38 and 42 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63).
90 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.55
(quoting Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 18, DSR 1996:I, p. 111; and referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC ‒ Asbestos, para. 93).
91 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.56.
92 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63.
93 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63.
94 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program,
paras. 5.62-5.63.
95 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program,
para. 5.74.
96 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program,
para. 5.74.

scope of a derogation can extend beyond the scope of the obligat ion from which derogation is
sought.
5.23. India submits that the Panel erred in equating India's argument that solar cells and modules
constitute "inputs" for solar power generation with th e "close relationship" standard that was used
by the panel in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program .97 In those
disputes, the panel found that "the very same equipment " was "needed and used to produce the
electricity that [was] allegedly procured" and that there was "very clearly a close relationship
between ... renewable energy generation equipment" and the product purchased (electricity).98
While the Appellate Body agreed that a "close relationship" could be relevant for a separate
element of Article III:8(a) – i.e. assessing whether a measure can be said to be "governing"
procurement of products purchased – it did not consider this dispositive of whether Article III:8(a)
applied, because the products purchased were not in a "competitive relationship" with the products
being discriminated against.99
5.24. On appe al in this dispute , India argues that the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable
Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program suggested that the scope of Article III:8(a) may extend,
in some cases, to "inputs" and "processes of production" , regardless of whether the product
subject to discrimination is in a competitive relationship with the product purchased. We disagree
with India's reading of the Appellate Body report in Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / [Canada – ]
Feed-in Tariff Program .100 The Appellate Body explici tly stated that it was not deciding whether
"the cover of Article III:8(a) may also extend to discrimination relating to inputs and processes of
production used in respect of products purchased by way of procurement ."101 This question arises
only after the p roduct subject to discrimination has been found to be like, directly competitive
with, or substitutable for – in other words, in a competitive relationship with – the product
purchased. In respect of th e latter issue, although a consideration of inputs and processes of
production may inform the question of whether the product purchased is in a competitive
relationship with the product being discriminated against, it does not displace the competitive
relationship standard. Under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, the foreign product discriminated
against must necessarily be in a competitive relationship with the product purchased by way of
procurement.
5.1.4 India's challenge to the Panel's approach to India's claims under Article III:8(a)
of the GATT 1994
5.25. India's appeal under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 hinges largely on its reading of that
provision, and in particular on what India sees as the limited scope of the competitive relationship
standard, as developed by the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program. We have rejected India's reading of Article III:8(a) above and have found that a
competitive relationship between the product discriminated against and the product purchased
must be established in all cases. We furthe r recall that India did not argue before the Panel that a
competitive relationship exists between electricity , on the one hand, and solar cells and modules ,
on the other hand, or that the government takes title or custody of solar cells and modules.102 This
is sufficient to address India's appeal to the extent that its arguments rely on the existence of an
alternative to the competitive relationship standard. However, i n order to dispose fully of the
issues raised by India on appeal, we proceed to examine India's arguments to the extent that they
relate to the approach taken by the Panel in its review of India's claims under Article III:8(a).

97 India's appellant's submission, para. 19.
98 Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 7.127.
(emphasis added)
99 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program,
paras. 5.78-5.79.
100 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63.
101 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.63.
(fn omitted) Conditions imposed in the context of government procurement relating to inputs and processes of
production of products purchased, such as conditions regarding "the environmental profile or the
environmental attributes that a particular product may incorporate … could legitimately form part of the
requirements of the product purchased that are closely related to the subject matter of the contract." Such
conditions may thus be relevant to the analysis under Article III:8(a) insofar as they can be said to be
"governing" the relevant procurement process. (Ibid., fn 499 to para. 5.63)
102 Panel Report, para. 7.114 (referring to India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 28). See also para. 7.129.

5.26. We recall that the Panel did not consider it necessary in the present dispute to resolve
whether the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program had
left room for an alternative to the "competitive relationship" standard, since , in applying
Article III:8(a) to "closely analogous" facts, the Appellate Body had disposed of the relevant issue
in those disputes on the ground that "electricity" and "generation equipment" are not in a
competitive relationship. 103 The Panel also found it unnecessary to decide the issue of whether
solar cells and modules can be characterized as "inputs" for electrici ty. The Panel noted , in this
regard, that the considerations advanced by India did not rise "to anything more than the 'close
relationship' between generation equipment and electricity that the Appellate Body rejected as the
relevant standard under Article III:8(a)" in those disputes.104 Ultimately, the Panel found:
To whatever extent Article III:8(a) applies to "inputs" (however that term is defined)
that are not in a competitive relationship with the product purchased by way of
procurement, it is evident t hat the Appellate Body did not find such considerations
germane to its evaluation of electricity and generation equipment that included solar
cells and modules. We therefore reject India's argument under Article III:8(a) that
solar cells and modules "cannot be treated as distinct from solar power" and that, "by
purchasing electricity generated from such cells and modules, [India] is effectively
procuring the cells and modules".105
5.27. The Panel focused its analysis on the issue of "how the Appellate Body's findin gs and
reasoning under Article III:8(a) should apply to the DCR measures at issue in this dispute" 106,
instead of "whether the Appellate Body left room for an alternative to the 'competitive relationship'
standard".107 The Panel's approach appears to have been prompted by the arguments of the
parties that focused on drawing parallels with, or distinctions from, Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program .108 The Panel also found that the facts in the present case were
not "distinguishable in any r elevant respect" from those before the Appellate Body in Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program.109
5.28. India submits that the Panel failed to consider "the fundamental characteristics of solar cells
and modules" and disregarded India's argument that solar cells and modules "are indistinguishable
from solar power generation" , and hence failed to make an objective assessment of the matter
before it.110 Contrary to what India appears to suggest, the Panel noted India's explanation that ,
while the government "does not take title or custody of solar cells and modules , by purchasing
electricity generated from such cells and modules, it is effectively procuring" them. 111 The Panel
observed that India's argument rests on what India considered "to be a ' key factual distinction'
with Canada – Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff Program " involving "the nature of
the products in question".112 The Panel proceeded to examine the generation equipment at issue in
Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , and explained why it considered
that those cases "entailed discrimination against the same 'generation equipment' that is at issue
in the present dispute". 113 In doing so, the Panel explicitly rejected India's argument that "solar
cells a nd modules 'cannot be treated as distinct from solar power' "114 and that, "by purchasing

103 Panel Report, para. 7.120 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.79).
104 Panel Report, para. 7.128.
106 Panel Report, para. 7.115.
107 Panel Report, para. 7.120.
108 See Panel Report, paras. 7.107-7.109 and 7.115.
109 Panel Report, para. 7.135.
110 India's appellant's submission, para. 6 and heading IIA, respectively.
111 Panel Report, para. 7.114 (quoting India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 28).
113 Panel Report, para. 7.126.
114 Panel Report, para. 7.128 (quoting India's responses to Panel questions No. 19, and No. 41, para. 7;
opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 8; and opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 28). (further text in fn omitted)

electricity generated from such cells and modules, [ the government] is effectively procuring the
cells and modules."115
5.29. The Panel also recognized the close connection betw een India's arguments that solar cells
and modules are "indistinguishable from", and/or "inputs" for , solar power generation. In
particular, the Panel noted that India had used "various formulations in its characterization of solar
cells and modules, for e xample referring to them as 'so fundamental, integral and intrinsic to
generation of electricity, they cannot be treated as distinct or separate from the purchase of
electricity itself'".116 While the Panel referred in more detail to India's argument that solar cells and
modules can be characterized as "inputs" for solar power generation, it seems to us that the Panel
sufficiently considered India's arguments and evidence regarding the fundamental characteristic s
of these products and their "indistinguishable" nature from the generation of solar power.117
5.30. In a related line of argumentation, India contends that the Panel erred by summarily
dismissing its argument that solar cells and modules can be characterized as "inputs" for solar
power generation and, in part icular, that they are " integral inputs for the generation system" as
contrasted with "all other components of a PV generation plant [that] can be classified as ancillary
equipment".118 However, the Panel observed that the "generation equipment" at issue in
Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff Program included the exact same
products, i.e. solar cells and modules, which were used to generate electricity purchased by the
government.119 The Panel further recalled that the measures at issue in Canada ‒ Renewable
Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff Program, similarly to the present case, involved a requirement
to use domestically sourced "generation equipment and components" in order to achieve the
necessary level of domestic content 120, and noted that neither the panel nor the Appellate Body in
those disputes had found any type of equipment "being an 'input' that would be relevant to the
analysis under Article III:8(a)".121
5.31. Moreover, the Panel discussed the parties' arguments over the nature of the "in tegral" and
"ancillary" inputs, and pointed to the tension between India's classification of certain equipment as
"ancillary" and its descriptions of solar power generation.122 The Panel further explained that it was
not "persuaded that the inclusion of other equipment and services under the measure in [Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program ] was of any relevance to the
Appellate Body's implicit finding that the solar cells and modules subject to the measure did not
constitute 'inputs and processes of production' for the purposes of Article III:8(a)."123 We therefore
consider that the Panel sufficiently considered this aspect of India's argumentation.
5.32. India also maintains that the Panel "selectively cited" the parties' arguments, and simply
dismissed India's arguments on the basis that the Appellate Body did not draw a distinction
between the particular categories of equipment or goods specified under the measure at issue in

115 Panel Report, para. 7.128 (quoting India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 28).
The Panel was similarly unpersuaded by India's argument that "[t]he tariff for the power purchased under the
PPAs incorporates within it the cost for the solar cells and modules", and that "India's purchase of electricity
generated from solar cells and modules therefore constitutes an effective purchase of the cells and modules
themselves." (Ibid., para. 7.129 (quoting India's response to Panel question No. 41, para. 7) (emphasis added
by the Panel))
116 Panel Report, fn 326 to para. 7.128 (quoting India's second written submission to the Panel,
para. 23).
117 See Panel Report, paras. 7.114 and 7.120-7.129.
118 Panel Report, para. 7.122 (quoting India's second written submission to the Panel, para. 20
(emphasis original)). In this regard, India pointed to the "indispensability" of solar cells and modules for the
generation of solar power and the exclusivity of their function for that purpose. (Panel Report, para. 7.122
(referring to India's second written submission to the Panel, para. 21))
119 Panel Report, para. 7.123.
120 Panel Report, para. 7.125 (quoting Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, para. 7.163).
122 See Panel Report, fn 320 to para. 7.127 (referring to India's comments on the United States'
response to Panel question No. 41-43, para. 11). The Panel observed inter alia that India's contention that
"silicon" and "silicon ingots and wafer" are "ancillary" equipment is "in tension with its descriptions of solar
energy generation", including the essentiality of "silicon" for the functioning of solar cells and modules, and
"reflective of the difficulty of drawing a distinction between 'integral' and 'ancillary' inputs" (Ibid., fn 320 to
para. 7.127)

Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program .124 Contrary to what India
suggests, the Panel recognized the parties' disagreement regarding the concept of "inputs", but
found that this disagreement "turns on issues that the Appellate Body considered it unnecessary to
resolve in Canada – Renewable Energy / Cana da – Feed-in Tariff Program ", and which the Panel
similarly considered unnecessary to resolve for the purposes of the present dispute. 125 The Panel
rightly relied on the interpretation of Article III:8(a) developed by the Appellate Body in Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , and therefore properly rejected India's
argument on the relevance of "inputs" for the analysis of the competitive relationship under
Article III:8(a).126
5.33. India also contends that the Panel erred in dismissing India 's arguments that an overly
restrictive interpretation of Article III:8(a) would result in imposing "unnecessary fetters" on
governmental actions and that the term "procurement" should not be read to require "direct
acquisition" of the product purchased in all cases. 127 India pointed in particular to its concern
regarding the consequences of reading Article III:8(a) in a manner that "would mean that for a
government to effectively procure solar cells and modules under Article III:8(a)", it would need to
purchase these products and either generate electricity from them itself, or provide them to SPDs
for power generation.128
5.34. In rejecting India's argument regarding "direct acquisition", the Panel did not consider it
evident that the scenarios proffered by India " would necessarily meet all of the requirements of
Article III:8(a)"129, notably because, "to fall within the scope of Article III:8(a), products must be
purchased 'for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to
use in th e production of goods for commercial sale'." 130 We understand the Panel to have simply
pointed out that, even if "procurement" were not read to require "direct acquisition of the
product", the competitive relationship standard is only one among other require ments under
Article III:8(a), and therefore India's concerns would not necessarily be addressed by a broader
reading of the scope of that provision.
5.35. In further support of its argument, India relied on the Appellate Body's statement in
Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff Program that, "if procurement was
understood to refer simply to any acquisition, it would not add any meaning to Article III:8(a) in
addition to what is already expressed by the word 'purchased'".131 India argued that the term
"procurement" should therefore not be read to require direct acquisition of the product in all
cases.132 The Panel rejected India's argument, noting that the conceptual distinction between
"procurement" and "purchase" made by the Appe llate Body was simply an expression of the
principle of effective treaty interpretation. 133 As noted by the Panel, the Appellate Body has
explained that "the concepts of 'procurement' and 'purchase' are not to be equated", and the term
"procurement", in Arti cle III:8(a), "refer[s] to the process pursuant to which a government
acquires products", while the concept of "purchase" relates to "the type of transaction used to put
into effect that procurement". 134 Therefore, the fact that "procurement" may refer to "t he process
of obtaining products, rather than … to an acquisition itself" does not mean that, in order to be

124 India's appellant's submission, paras. 11-14 and 16.
125 Panel Report, para. 7.121.
126 We recall, in this regard, that it was not India's argument before the Panel that electricity and solar
cells and modules are in a competitive relationship. Furthermore, it was undisputed that the government does
not take title or custody of solar cells and modules. (Panel Report, para. 7.114 (referring to India's opening
127 India's appellant's submission, paras. 21-23.
128 Panel Report, para. 7.130.
129 Panel Report, para. 7.132.
130 Panel Report, para. 7.132.
131 India's appellant's submission, para. 22 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable
Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.59).
132 See also Panel Report, para. 7.133 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.59).
133 Panel Report, para. 7.133.
134 Panel Report, para. 7.133 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –

covered under Article III:8(a), government procurement can be effectuated by means of a
contractual arrangement other than a "purchase", as India appears to suggest.135
5.36. Moreover, as we see it, in arguing that the term "procurement" should not be read to
require "direct acquisition" of a product 136, India reiterates, in essence, its argument that
Article III:8(a) should cover situations where the discrimi nation involves inputs or processes of
production, regardless of whether the product discriminated against is in a "competitive
relationship" with the product purchased. However, we recall that , in order for Article III:8(a) to
apply, the product purchased should always be in a competitive relationship with the product
discriminated against.137
5.37. India also contends that, because of its reliance on Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program, the Panel refused to consider the issue of why a sep arate consideration of
solar cells and modules from other generation equipment is necessary. 138 As we see it, in stating
that "India's consequentialist arguments do not establish that the measures at issue in this case
are distinguishable in any relevant res pect from those considered by the Appellate Body"139, the
Panel correctly found that India's arguments do not have a bearing on the proper determination of
the scope of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.140
5.38. Finally, India argues that the Panel erred in its rea soning that "India did not submit reasons
for why a different approach " than the one in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program "should be considered under the facts before the Panel", and that it could not
therefore "go beyond the test s applied by the Appellate Body" in those disputes. 141 We note that
the Panel elaborated on the issue before it, as follows:
… the arguments on the interpretation of Article III:8(a) advanced by the parties in
this case appear to be based on their opposing understandings of the Appellate Body's
findings and reasoning in Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / [Canada – ] Feed-in Tariff
Program. We are therefore not presented with the question of whether we should
deviate from the Appellate Body's findings and reasoning in that case [*]; rather, we
are presented with the question of ho w the Appellate Body's findings and reasoning
under Article III:8(a) should apply to the DCR measures at issue in this dispute.142
[*fn original]295 The present case is therefore distinguishable from other cases in which one o f
the disputing parties argued that a panel should deviate from a legal interpretation of the
covered agreements arrived at by the Appellate Body. For example, see Appellate Body Reports,
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , paras. 154 -162; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 358 -365; and
Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.55 -7.61; US – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping
Measures (China), paras. 7.311-7.317.

5.39. The cases referred to by the Panel in the footnote cited above concern the issue of whether
a panel shou ld "resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case" and
whether it can depart for "cogent reasons" from previous Appellate Body findings on the same
issue of legal interpretation. 143 As we understand it, India sought to distinguish from
Canada ‒ Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program on the facts of those cases, rather
than to have the Panel re -assess the merits of the Appellate Body's legal standard and

135 India's appellant's submission, paras. 21-23. (emphasis omitted) See also European Union's third
participant's submission, para. 36. We observe that, although the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable
Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program did not rule on the precise range of contractual arrangements that
are encompassed by the concept of "purchase", in the present case, it is India's position that the government
does not "purchase" solar cells and modules as it "does not physically acquire or take custody of the solar cells
and modules, and instead chooses to buy the solar power generated from such cells and modules". (Panel
Report, para. 7.113 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 114))
136 Panel Report, para. 7.130 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 120).
138 India's appellant's submission, para. 24.
139 Panel Report, para. 7.134.
140 See Panel Report, para. 7.130.
141 India's appellant's submission, para. 32 and heading IIE, respectively.
142 Panel Report, para. 7.115.
143 Appellate Body Report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160. (fn omitted)

reasoning.144 Contrary to what India suggests, we do not understand the Panel to have applied "as
'binding' a principle evolved by the Appellate Body", or to have disregarded India's arguments
because India did not ask "that the Panel set aside in its entirety the principle of competitive
relationship".145 Rather, as noted above, the Panel was properly guided by the Appellate Body's
clarification and application of Article III:8(a) in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, having found that India's arguments were insufficient to distinguish the facts at
issue in the present case from those before the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program.
5.1.5 Conclusion
5.40. We have found above that, under Article III:8(a), the product purchased by way of
procurement must necessarily be "like", o r "directly competitive" with or "substitutable" for – in
other words, in a "competitive relationship" with – the foreign product subject to discrimination.
Although a consideration of inputs and processes of production may inform the question of
whether t he product purchased is in a competitive relationship with the product being
discriminated against, it does not displace the competitive relationship standard. The question of
whether the cover of Article III:8(a) may also extend to discrimination relating to inputs and
processes of production used in respect of products purchased arises only after the product
purchased has been found to be in a competitive relationship with the product subject to
discrimination. Based on our review of the Panel's analysis and approach, we consider that the
Panel properly addressed India's arguments and conducted its own objective assessment of the
matter before it, including the facts of the case and whether the DCR measures are covered by the
derogation under Article III:8 (a). As we understand it, it was on the basis of its analysis of the
facts before it, including the characteristics of solar cells and modules, as well as both parties' legal
arguments, that the Panel reached its ultimate conclusion that India's arguments did "not establish
that the measures at issue in this case are distinguishable in any relevant respect from those
considered by the Appellate Body" in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program. We therefore find that the Panel was properl y guided by the Appellate Body report in
Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program in finding that the DCR measures
are not covered by the derogation under Article III:8(a).
5.41. In light of the foregoing, we reject India's claim that the Pane l acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU in assessing India's arguments regarding the scope of application of
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's findings, in
paragraphs 7.135 and 7.187 of its Report, that the DC R measures are not covered by the
derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.
5.1.6 The remaining elements under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
5.42. We recall that, apart from the applicability of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 in respect of
"products purchased", several other cumulative requirements must be met under that provision146:
(i) the measures in question are "laws, regulations or requirements governing … procurement" 147;
(ii) the procurement is "by governmental agencies" 148; ( iii) the procurement is of products
purchased "for governmental purposes"149; and (iv) the products purchased are not procured "with

144 India's responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
145 India's appellant's submission, para. 34.
146 See Panel Report, para. 7.105 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, paras. 5.57, 5.69, and 5.74), and para. 7.106.
147 With respect to this element, the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program found that Article III:8(a) requires "an articulated connection between the laws, regulations, or
requirements and the procurement, in the sense that the act of procurement is undertaken within a binding
structure of laws, regulations, or requirements." (Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.58)
148 The Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program concluded that
"governmental agency" is "an entity acting for or on behalf of government and performing governmental
functions within the competences conferred on it". (Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.61)
149 The Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program found that the
phrase "products purchased for governmental purposes" "refers to what is consumed by government or what is
provided by government to recipients in the discharge of its public functions" and that there should be "a
rational relationship between the product and the governmental function being discharged". (Appellate Body
Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.68)

a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial
sale".150 Although the Panel found that the discrimination relating to solar cells and modules under
the DCR measures is not covered by the government procurement derogation under
Article III:8(a) because of the absence of a competitive relationship between the product
purchased and the product discriminated agai nst, it considered it useful to proceed with a limited
analysis of the remaining legal elements under that provision.151 In particular, the Panel found that
the DCR measures are "laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement" of
electricity152, and that the procurement of electricity is "by governmental agencies". 153 The Panel
also summarized – but did not make legal findings regarding – the arguments of the parties and
addressed, in a limited manner, the questions of whether electricity under the D CR measures is
purchased "for governmental purposes" and "not with a view to commercial resale".154
5.43. India requests that we complete the legal analysis of the remaining elements of
Article III:8(a) described above, should we find that the DCR measures are cov ered by the
derogation under that provision. 155 In particular, India asks that we reaffirm the Panel's findings
that the DCR measures are "laws, regulations or requirements governing … procurement", and
that the procurement under the DCR measures is "by gove rnmental agencies", and that we
complete the legal analysis by ruling that the procurement is of products purchased "for
governmental purposes", and that the procurement of products is "not with a view to commercial
resale".156
5.44. We note that India's request for completion of the legal analysis is premised on the
condition that we reverse the Panel's finding that the DCR measures are not covered by the
government procurement derogation under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.157 Having upheld
this finding by the Panel, we need not, and do not, address India's further claims and related
arguments concerning the Panel 's interpretation and application of the remaining elements under
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. We express no view on the Panel's reasoning and analysis in this
regard.
5.2 Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 – "general or local short supply"
5.45. We have upheld the Panel's finding that the government procurement derogation under
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 does not cover the DCR measures at issue in the p resent case,
and therefore turn to address India's conditional appeal of the Panel's finding that the
DCR measures are not justified under the general exception in Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 for
measures "essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply ".
In this appeal, India claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(j)
and acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU. 158 Below, we summarize
the Panel's findings and the issues appealed. We then address the interpretation of Article XX(j)
before turning to consider the Panel's analysis as challenged by India on appeal.159
5.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.46. As a general matter, regarding the scope of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, India claimed
before the Panel that a situation of short supply can exist where a product that is available

150 The Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program understood the
term "commercial resale" to mean "a resale of a product at arm's length between a willing seller and a willing
buyer", and explained that this "must be assessed having regard to the entire transaction", both from the
seller's and the buyer's perspective. (Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, paras. 5.70-5.71)
151 Panel Report, para. 7.137.
152 Panel Report, para. 7.145.
153 Panel Report, para. 7.151.
154 Panel Report, paras. 7.162 and 7.186.
155 India's appellant's submission, para. 36.
156 India's appellant's submission, para. 61.
157 India's appellant's submission, para. 36.
158 India's appellant's submission, paras. 90 and 99.
159 Our analysis focuses on India's arguments as they relate to the Panel's interpretation and application
of the phrase "products in general or local short supply" in Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994. We address India's
arguments regarding whether the DCR measures are "essential" within the meaning of Article XX(j) in the final
section of this Report, where we also address India's arguments concerning whether those measures are
"necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.

internationally is nevertheless "in short supply in certain local markets" 160, and that "general or
local short supply" could exist in cir cumstances where a "product is not produced or manufactured
in a particular market".161 Specifically, in the context of the present dispute, India explained that it
did not seek to argue that Article XX(j) is "available to address any situation where a count ry's
indigenous manufacturing capacity for any product is low" .162 Rather, India argued that a
"justification for invoking Article XX(j) would need to rest on whether a measure is essential to
redress such a situation of general or local short supply" 163, which, for India, is a question "to be
examined in the context of the overall objectives of energy security and ecologically sustainable
growth for which acquisition or distribution of indigenously manufactured solar cells and modules is
essential."164 India further submitted that "sole dependence on imported solar cells and modules
brings risks associated with supply side vulnerabilities and fluctuations" 165, and that, "[i]n order to
achieve energy security, India needs to achieve domestic resilience to such risks."166
5.47. The Panel determined that "[t]he logical starting point of an assessment under Article XX(j)
is the identification of the products that are alleged to be in 'general or local short supply'" 167,
which the Panel noted that India had identified to be "solar cells and modules".168 The Panel then
interpreted the phrase "products in general or local short supply" in Article XX(j). With respect to
the notion of "short supply", the Panel considered that "the terms 'products in … short supply' …
refer to products in respect of which the quantity of available supply does not meet demand." 169
Regarding the terms "general or local" short supply, the Panel indicated that "these words relate to
the extent of the geographical area or market in which the available quantity of supply of a
product does not meet demand", such that these terms "give Article XX(j) a wide ambit, and …
cover product shortages within a region inside a country, a single country as a whole, an area
including several countries, or even global shortage of a product".170 The Panel thus concluded that
"the ordinary meaning of the terms 'products in general or local short supply' refers to a situation
in which the quantity of available supply of a product does not meet demand in the relevant
geographical area or market."171
5.48. The Panel then turned to determine whether a lack of domestic manufacturing capacity
amounts to solar cells and modules being in "general or local short supply" within the meaning of
Article XX(j). In response to India's argument that "its 'lack of manufacturing capacity of solar cells
and modules amounts to a situation of local and general short supply of solar cells and modules in
India'"172, the Panel noted that "the words 'products in general or local short supply' do not refer to
'products of national origin in general or local short supply'." 173 Unlike other provisions of the
GATT 1994, such as Article III:4 174, Articles II:1(b) and II:1(c) 175, Article XX(g) 176, and
Article XX(i)177, the Panel noted that it did not see any language in Article XX(j) tha t speaks to the
source of the products concerned, or to the question of where those products are produced. 178 The
Panel further noted that "India's interpretation of Article XX(j) would be tantamount to interpreting
the words 'products in general or local sh ort supply' … as though they meant 'products in general
or local short production'", which would amount to "a far -reaching principle that all Members are
entitled to an equitable share in the international production of products in short supply".179

160 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 41.
161 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 42.
162 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 42.
163 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 43. (emphasis original)
164 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 43.
165 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 49.
166 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 49.
167 Panel Report, para. 7.199.
168 Panel Report, paras. 7.199-7.200.
169 Panel Report, para. 7.205.
170 Panel Report, para. 7.206.
172 Panel Report, para. 7.220 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 213).
174 Article III:4 refers to "products of the territory of any Member".
175 Article II:1(b) designates "products of territories of other Members" and Article II:1(c) refers to
"products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon importation".
176 Article XX(g) speaks of "domestic production or consumption".
177 Article XX(i) refers to "restrictions on exports of domestic materials".
178 Panel Report, para. 7.223.

5.49. The Pane l also considered that, for the purposes of making a determination under
Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, "there must be some objective point of reference to serve as the
basis for an objective assessment of whether there is a 'deficiency' or 'amount lackin g' in the
'quantity' of a product that is 'available'" 180. However, "India's alternative interpretation of
Article XX(j) does not present any objective point of reference to serve as the basis for an
objective assessment of whether a product is in 'short sup ply'", given that "India ha[d] not
adequately explained what would constitute a 'lack' of domestic manufacturing capacity amounting
to a 'short supply'". 181 The Panel concluded that "the terms 'products in general or local short
supply' refer to a situation in which the quantity of available supply of a product, from all sources,
does not meet demand in a relevant geographical area or market."182
5.50. In response to what the Panel considered to be an alternative argument raised by India,
that "the risk of a disrupt ion in imports, and the risk of a resulting shortage of solar cells and
modules for Indian SPDs, makes these 'products in general or local short supply'" 183, the Panel
determined that "[t]he immediate context of the terms 'products in … short supply' does no t lend
support to the view that they cover products at risk of being in short supply." 184 The Panel further
determined that "even assuming for the sake of argument that the concept of 'products in general
or local short supply' in Article XX(j) could be inte rpreted to include products at risk of being in
short supply ", the Panel considered that "only imminent risks of such shortage would be
covered"185, which it noted that India had not established. 186 For these reasons, the Panel
concluded that the DCR measures do not involve the acquisition of "products in general or local
short supply" in India within the meaning of Article XX(j), and that they are therefore not justified
under the general exception in that provision. 187 Noting, however, that its findings involve d "novel
issues of law and legal interpretation" under Article XX(j) , and that the Appellate Body might
reverse those findings on appeal, the Panel proceeded with a limited analysis and review in order
to provide the Appellate Body with factual findings re garding whether the DCR measures are
"essential" within the meaning of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994.188
5.2.2 India's claims on appeal
5.51. India appeals the Panel's analysis and findings under Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 , and
requests us to find that the lack of manufacturing capacity of solar cells and modules in India
"amounts to a situation of local and general short supply", and that the DCR measures are
measures relating to the acquisition of such products for the purposes of Article XX(j).189 India
contends that the Panel erred in its interpretation of the phrase "products in general or local short
supply" because it did not read "'short supply' in Article XX(j) in the context of the specific terms
used in that provision, i.e., 'general or local'" , and instead adopted an "approach that interpreted
the words 'general or local' in isolation of the words 'short supply'." 190 According to India, the use
of the terms "general or local short supply" in Article XX(j) "contemplates short supply that is
distinct from situa tions that can be addressed by 'international supply'." 191 India submits that an
"interpretation that Article XX(j) cannot be applied when imports are available fundamentally veers
towards the position that only export restraints will qualify for considerati on under Article XX(j),
and not import restraints", and that, if such interpretation had been intended by the drafters, they
"would have explicitly stated this, as was done in the context of Article XI:2 of the GATT 1994".192
Regarding the question of risks associated with dependence on imports, India argues that the
Panel mischaracterized its argument as an "alternate argument" 193, adding that it did not intend

181 Panel Report, para. 7.226.
182 Panel Report, para. 7.234.
184 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
185 Panel Report, para. 7.255.
186 Panel Report, paras. 7.263-7.264.
187 Panel Report, para. 7.265. Having found that solar cells and modules are not "products in general or
local short supply" in India, the Panel did not consider it necessary to examine whether the DCR measures
involve the "acquisition or distribution" of those products. (Ibid., fn 629 to para 7.265)
188 See Panel Report, para. 7.335.
189 India's appellant's submission, para. 106.
190 India's appellant's submission, para. 73.
191 India's appellant's submission, para. 86.
192 India's appellant's submission, para. 87. (fn omitted)

"to place the concept of 'risk' as central to [its] defence, as concluded by the Panel". 194 Rather,
India "reiterates its fundamental argument that 'general or local short supply' exists in the first
place due to low domestic manufacturing" and its vulnerability "to the risks associated with
international supply and market fluctuations".195
5.52. India further al leges that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
rejecting India's arguments regarding the concept of "sufficient manufacturing capacity" and the
context in which India referred to that concept, namely , to argue that the DCR measures do not
seek to "maximize" self -sufficiency or "minimize" dependence on imports , but rather to "reduce"
the risks linked to such dependence. 196 India contends that it presented evidence of what would
constitute "sufficient manufacturing capacity" that would "enable discontinuation of the DCR
measures"197, and maintains that "India does not intend for the DCRs to be applied indefinitely".198
According to India, "[t]he Panel's refusal to take into account India's arguments" amounts to a
breach of the Panel's duties under Article 11 of the DSU. 199 India concludes by requesting us to
find that "India's lack of manufacturing capacity of solar cells and modules amounts to a situation
of local and general short supply of such products in India, and that the DCR measures ar e
measures relating to the acquisition of such products for the purposes of Article XX(j)."200
5.53. For its part, the United States requests us to uphold the Panel's findings. According to the
United States, the Panel correctly interpreted the terms "general or l ocal short supply", in their
context and in light of their object and purpose 201, and properly rejected India's argument that a
lack of domestic production can constitute a situation of "short supply" within the meaning of
Article XX(j).202 The United States s ubmits that the term "products" in Article XX(j) "is unqualified
by origin, indicating that it addresses supply of that product without respect to origin or 'source of
supply'"203, adding, by way of contrast , that other "provisions of the GATT 1994 that addr ess
products of a particular origin identify that fact explicitly", such as Article III:4, Articles II:1(b) and
II:1(c), and Article XX(i).204 The United States also disagrees with India's contention that the Panel
erred under Article 11 of the DSU in assess ing India's arguments relating to the lack of domestic
manufacturing capacity for solar cells and modules.205
5.54. We turn next to India's appeal as it relates to the Panel's interpretation of Article XX(j) of
the GATT 1994, and in particular the phrase "products in general or local short supply". We begin
by examining key aspects of the legal standard to be applied in determining whether a measure
can be provisionally justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
5.2.3 The legal standard under Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994
5.55. Article XX(j) provides, in relevant part, that nothing in the GATT 1994 shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:
essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply;
Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all
Members are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such
products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other
provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise
to them have ceased to exist.206
5.56. The Appellate Body has explained that the evaluation of a defence under Article XX of the
GATT 1994 involves a two-tiered analysis, in which a measure must firs t be provisionally justified

194 India's appellant's submission, para. 102.
195 India's appellant's submission, para. 104. (emphasis original)
196 See India's appellant's submission, paras. 91-101.
197 India's appellant's submission, para. 94.
198 India's appellant's submission, para. 94. (fn omitted)
199 India's appellant's submission, para. 99.
200 India's appellant's submission, para. 106.
201 See United States' appellee's submission, para. 88.
202 United States' appellee's submission, paras. 93-94.
203 United States' appellee's submission, para. 91.
204 United States' appellee's submission, para. 91.
205 United States' appellee's submission, para. 103.
206 Emphasis original.

under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, and then shown to be consistent with the requirements
of the chapeau of Article XX.207 This "sequence of steps" in the analysis of a claim under Article XX
reflects "not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of
Article XX of the GATT 1994".208
5.57. Regarding the first part of the analysis, it is well established that , for a responding party to
justify provisionally a measure under an Article XX exception, two elements must be shown: first,
that the measure addresses the particular interest specified in that paragraph209; and, second, that
there is a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected, which is specified
through the use of terms su ch as "necessary to" in Article XX(d), and, in the case of Article XX(j),
"essential to". 210
5.58. Since this is the first case in which the Appellate Body is called upon to interpret
Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, we review briefly our jurisprudence under the other paragraphs of
Article XX , and in particular our recent jurisprudence under Article XX(d), for the purpose of
assessing its possible relevance to Article XX(j). As to the first element of the analysis
contemplated under Article XX(d), the Appellate Body has stated that the responding party has the
burden of demonstrating that: there are "laws or regulations"; such "laws or regulations" are "not
inconsistent with the provisions of" the GATT 1994; and the measure sought to be justified is
designed "to se cure compliance" with such "laws or regulations". An examination of a defence
under Article XX(d) thus includes an initial, threshold examination of the relationship between the
challenged measure and the "laws or regulations" that are not GATT -inconsistent so as to
determine whether the former is designed "to secure compliance" with specific rules, obligations,
or requirements under the relevant provisions of such "laws or regulations". 211 If the assessment
of the design of a measure, including its content, structure, and expected operation, reveals that
the measure is "incapable" of securing compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements
under the relevant provisions of such "laws or regulations" that are not GATT -inconsistent, then
the measure cannot be justified under Article XX(d), and this would be the end of the inquiry.212
5.59. As to the second element of the analysis contemplated under Article XX(d), the
Appellate Body has stated that a determination of whether a measure is "necessary" entails a
more in-depth and holistic examination of the relationship between the inconsistent measure and
the relevant laws or regulations. This involves, in each case, a process of "weighing and balancing"
a series of factors, including: the extent to which the measure sought to be justified contributes to
the realization of the end pursued ( i.e. securing compliance with specific rules, obligations, or
requirements under the relevant provisions of "laws or regulations" that are not
GATT-inconsistent); the relative importance of the societal interest or value that the "law or
regulation" is intended to protect; and the trade -restrictiveness of the challenged measure. 213

207 See Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996:I, p. 20. See also Appellate Body
Reports, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 64; US ‒ Shrimp, paras. 119-120; and
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169.
208 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 119.
209 This would consist of "secur[ing] compliance with laws or regulations" in the case of Article XX(d),
and "acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply" in the case of Article XX(j).
210 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.202. See also Appellate Body Reports,
211 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203). See also Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles,
paras. 5.68-5.69 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203; Mexico –
Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 72; US – Shrimp, paras. 135-142; and EC – Seal Products, para. 5.144).
212 See Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126. However, as indicated by the
Appellate Body, "[a] panel must not … structure its analysis of the ['design' step] in such a way as to lead it to
truncate its analysis prematurely and thereby foreclose consideration of crucial aspects of the respondent's
defence relating to the 'necessity' analysis." (Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203))
213 See Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, paras. 5.71-5.73 and 5.77; and Korea – Various
Measures on Beef, paras. 162-164.

In most cases, a comparison between the challenged measure and reasonably available alternative
measures should then be undertaken.214
5.60. The analytical framework for the "design" and "necessity" elements of the analysis
contemplated under Article XX(d) is relevant mutatis mutandis also under Article XX(j). As with
Article XX(d), the examination of a defence under Article XX(j) would appear to include an initial,
threshold examination of the "design" of the measure at issue, including its content, structure, and
expected operation. In the case of Article XX(j), the responding party must identify the
relationship between the measure and "the acquisition or distribution of products in general or
local short supply", whereas, in the case of Article XX(d), a panel must examine the relationship
between the measure and "securing compliance" with relevant provisions of laws or regulations
that are not GATT -inconsistent.215 If the assessment of the design of a measure, including its
content, structure, and expected operation, reveals that the measure is "incapable", in the case of
Article XX(j), of addressing "the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short
supply", or, in the case of Article XX(d), "secur[ing] compliance with [relevant provisions of] laws
or regulations that are not inconsistent " with the GATT 1994 , there is no relationship that mee ts
the requirements of the "design" element. In either situation, further analysis with regard to
whether the measure is " necessary" or "essential" would not be required. 216 This is because there
can be no justification under Article XX(j) for a measure that is not "designed" to address the
"acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply", just as there can be no
justification under Article XX(d) for a measure that is not "designed" to secure compliance with
relevant provisions of laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent.217
5.61. We recall that, while the "design" and "necessity" elements may provide a useful analytical
framework for assessing whether a measure is provisionally justified under Article XX(d), they are
"conceptually distinct".218 Yet, they are related aspects of the overall inquiry to be carried out into
whether a respondent has established that the measure at issue is "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent" with the GATT 19 94219, and that
the structure of the analysis under Article XX(d) therefore does not have to follow a "rigid path".220
Thus, the way a panel organizes its examination of these elements may be influenced not only by
the measures at issue or the laws or regulati ons identified by the respondent, but also by the
manner in which the parties present their respective arguments and evidence. 221 These
considerations are equally relevant for the analysis under Article XX(j) in assessing whether a
measure is "essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply".
5.62. The participants in the present case disagree as to whether the term "essential" in
Article XX(j) introduces a more stringent legal threshold than the necessity analysis under
Article XX(d).222 The Appellate Body has explained in this regard that, in a continuum ranging from
"indispensable" to "making a contribution to", a "necessary" measure is "located significantly

214 The Appellate Body has explained that, in most cases, a panel must compare the challenged measure
and possible alternative measures that achieve an equivalent level of protection while being less trade
restrictive. (Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.74) See also Appellate Body Reports, EC –
Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 307, in turn referring to
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 166).
215 See Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126. The Appellate Body has remarked that
the objectives of, or the common interests or values protected by, the relevant law or regulation may assist in
elucidating the content of specific rules, obligations, or requirements in such law or regulation. (Appellate Body
Report, Colombia – Textiles, fn 272 to para 5.126 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial
Services, fn 495 to para. 6.203))
216 See Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126.
217 See Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.126 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203; and Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 72).
218 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.125.
219 See Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.125; and Argentina – Financial Services,
para. 6.205.
220 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.205.
221 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.205.
222 India argues, based on dictionary definitions, that the term "necessary" is a synonym for "essential",
and that the requirement that a measure be "essential" "is not limited to what is 'absolutely indispensable' but
also encompasses situations that are 'necessary'". (India's appellant's submission, para. 120) For its part, the
United States submits that "essential" suggests a "higher level of indispensability" than the term "necessary",
and that a demonstration that a measure is "essential" therefore "requires a higher threshold than proving that
a measure is merely 'necessary'". (United States' appellee's submission, para. 122)

closer to the pole of 'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution
to'".223 The word "essential" in turn is defined as "[a]bsolutely indispensable or necessary". 224 The
plain meaning of the term thus suggests that this word is located at least as close to the
"indispensable" end of the continuum as the word "necessary".
5.63. Having said this, we recall that a "necessity" analysis under Article XX(d) involves a process
of "weighing and balancing" a series of factors. We consider that the same process of weighing and
balancing is relevant in assessing whether a measure is "essential" within the meaning of
Article XX(j). In particular, we consider it relevant to assess the extent to which the measure
sought to be justified contributes to : "the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local
short supply"; the relative importance of the societal interests or values that the measure is
intended to protect; and the trade -restrictiveness of the challenged measure. In most cases, a
comparison between the challenged measure and reasonably available alternative measures
should then be undertaken.225
5.64. As noted, Article XX(j) establishes a general exception for measures "essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply". The "products" at issue are
the ones that mu st be "in … short supply" . It must therefore be established that there are
"products in general or local short supply", and that the challenged measures are "essential to the
acquisition or distribution of" such products. We also note that Article XX(j) pr ovides that
measures covered by the general exception under Article XX(j) are subject to the requirement that
they "shall be consistent with the principle that all Members are entitled to an equitable share of
the international supply of such products" 226, a nd that Members may take GATT -inconsistent
measures essential to the acquisition or distribution of products "in general or local short supply",
subject to the requirement that such measures "shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions
giving rise to t hem have ceased to exist". In light of this language in Article XX(j), we consider
that a proper interpretation of that provision, including the phrase "products in general or local
short supply", requires careful consideration of how the different terms u sed in that provision
inform one another, and should thus be holistic in nature.
5.65. Beginning with the phrase "products in … short supply", we note that this language refers
generally to products "available only in limited quantity, scarce". 227 We understand th e phrase
"products … in short supply" to refer therefore to products in respect of which there is a
"shortage", that is, a "[d]eficiency in quantity; an amount lacking". 228 This understanding is
reinforced by the fact that the French and Spanish versions of Article XX(j) refer to " pénurie" and
"penuria", respectively, which translate best as "shortage" in English.
5.66. We note that "supply" is defined as the "amount of any commodity actually produced and
available for purchase", and that, in its ordinary meaning, the word "supply" is the "correlative" of
the word "demand".229 An assessment of whether there is a "deficiency" or "amount lacking" in the
"quantity" of a product that is available would therefore appear to involve a comparison between
"supply" and "demand", such that products can be said to be "in short supply" when the "quantity"
of a product that is "available" does not meet "demand" for that product.
5.67. This brings us to the question as to the extent of the geographical area or market in which
the quantity of "available" supply of a product should be compared to demand. Article XX(j) refers,
in this regard , to products in "general or local" short supply. The dictionary definition s of "local"
include "in a particular locality or neighbourhood, esp. a town, county, etc., as opp. to the country

223 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161.
224 See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.)
(Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 865.
225 See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US
– Gambling, para. 307, in turn referring to Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 166).
226 Emphasis added.
227 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 3115. See also Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 325.
228 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 2813. See also Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 325.
229 See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.)
(Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 3118. (emphasis added)

as a whole" and "limited or peculiar to a particular place or places". 230 The word "general", in turn,
is relevantly defined as "all or nearly all of the parts of a (specified or implied) whole, as a
territory, community, organization, etc.; completely or nearly universal; not partial, particular,
local, or sectional".231 Their ordinary meanings thus suggest that the terms "general or local" refer
to a range of product shortages, which may cover shortages that occur locally, within a region, or
a territory within a country, or continuing beyond the boundaries of a particular country. In the
context of Article XX(j), however, we understand the phrase "products in general or local short
supply" to be focused on products for which a situation of short supply exists within the territory of
the Member invoking Article XX(j). This does not mean that a situation of "general" short supply
cannot extend beyond the boundaries of that territory , as long as it also occurs within that
territory. We further read the terms "general" and "local", together with the disjunctive "or", to
suggest that there is no requirement for a Member to demonstrate that the shortage extends to all
parts of its territory, but that, depending on the circumstances, it may be sufficient to demonstrate
that the existence of such a situation of shortage occurs locally , or is limited to certain parts of its
territory.
5.68. Moving on to consider whether Article XX(j) speaks to the origin of products that may be
"available" in a particular geographical area or market, we note that the phrase "products in
general or local short supply" is immediately preceded by the terms "acquisition or distribution of".
The word "acquisition" refers generally to "[t]he action of acquiring s omething"232, and
"distribution" is defined as "[t]he action of spreading or dispersing throughout a region". 233
Article XX(j) therefore contemplates measures that seek to redress situations of "short supply" by
providing for the "acquisition or distribution of" given products. By its terms, Article XX(j) does not
limit the scope of potential sources of supply to "domestic" products manufactured in a particular
country that may be "available" for purchase in a given market. Nor does it exclude the possibility
that products from sources outside a particular geographical area or market may also be
"available" to satisfy demand. In this sense, the language in A rticle XX(j), which does not speak to
the origin of products that may be "acquired" or "distributed", may be contrasted with, f or
example, Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, which refers expressly to "products of the territory of any
Member" and "like products of national origin"; and with Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 , which
refers to "domestic production or consumption".234
5.69. In determining whether products are in general or local short supply , it is relevant to
consider the quantity of products produced in the particular geographical area or market where the
alleged shortage exists. There is, however, no reason no t to give due regard to the quantity of
products that is produced in other parts of a particular country , as well as in other countries ,
provided that such quantities are "available" for purchase in the relevant geographical area or
market. Further, while an increase in manufacturing capacity or production in a particular
geographical area may lead to an increase in the total quantity of a product available for purchase
in that area, it does not follow from such increase that domestic manufacturers will nec essarily sell
their production to domestic buyers, as opposed to exporting their production by selling to buyers
abroad. An assessment of whether there is a situation of "products in general or local short supply"
should not focus exclusively on availabili ty of supply from "domestic", as opposed to foreign or
"international" sources.
5.70. Turning to consider whether there is a temporal dimension to the phrase "products in
general or local short supply", we recall that Article XX(j) stipulates that any measures t aken
under paragraph (j) "shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have
ceased to exist". We read this language in Article XX(j) to contemplate situations of "short supply"

230 Panel Report, para. 7.206 (quoting Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble,
A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 1619).
231 Panel Report, para. 7.206 (quoting Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble,
A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 1081).
232 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 20.
233 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 720.
234 We further note that Article XX(j) requires that measures to be justified under this exception "shall
be consistent with the principle that all Members are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply
of such products". This language further supports the view that an assessment of whether "products are in
general or local short supply" requires consideration of all sources of supply that may be "available" in a given
geographical area or market, and that "international supply" is not to be excluded from consideration.

that may continue over time , but are nonetheless expecte d not to last indefinitely. An analysis of
whether a respondent has identified "products in general or local short supply" is therefore not
satisfied, in our view, by considering only whether there is a mathematical difference at a single
point in time bet ween demand and the quantity of supply that is "available" for purchase in a
particular geographical area or market. Instead, Article XX(j) requires a careful scrutiny of the
relationship between supply and demand based on a holistic consideration of trends in supply and
demand as they evolve over time , as well as whether the conditions giving rise to short supply
have ceased to exist.
5.71. In light of the above, we read Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 as reflecting a balance of
different considerations to be ta ken into account when assessing whether products are "in general
or local short supply". In particular, a panel should examine the extent to which a particular
product is "available" for purchase in a particular geographical area or market, and whether thi s is
sufficient to meet demand in the relevant area or market. This analysis may, in appropriate cases,
take into account not only the level of domestic production of a particular product and the nature
of the product that is alleged to be "in general or l ocal short supply" 235, but also such factors as
the relevant product and geographic market236, potential price fluctuations in the relevant market,
the purchasing power of foreign and domestic consumers, and the role that foreign and domestic
producers play in a particular market, including the extent to which domestic producers sell their
production abroad. Due regard should be given to the total quantity of imports that may be
"available" to meet demand in a particular geographical area or market. It may thus be relevant to
consider the extent to which international supply of a product is stable and accessible, including by
examining factors such as the distance between a particular geographical area or market and
production sites, as well as the reliability o f local or transnational supply chains. Whether and
which factors are relevant will necessarily depend on the particularities of each case. Just as there
may be factors that have a bearing on "availability" of imports in a particular case, it is also
possible that, despite the existence of manufacturing capacity, domestic products are not
"available" in all parts of a particular country, or are not "available" in sufficient quantities to meet
demand. In all cases, t he responding party has the burden of demo nstrating that the quantity of
"available" supply from both domestic and international sources in the relevant geographical
market is insufficient to meet demand.
5.72. Our interpretation of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 is in consonance with the preamble of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement ), which
refers to the "optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with [Members'] respective needs and concerns at different levels
of economic development" . The different levels of economic development of Members may,
depending on the circumstances, impact the a vailability of supply of a product in a given market.
Developing countries may, for example, have less domestic production, and may be more
vulnerable to disruptions in supply than developed countries. Such factors may be relevant in
assessing the availability of a product in a particular case, and thus in assessing whether a product
is in "general or local short supply".237
5.2.4 Whether the Panel erred in finding that solar cells and modules are not products
in short supply in India
5.73. We recall that the Panel cons idered that "the terms 'products in … short supply' … refer to
products in respect of which the quantity of available supply does not meet demand." 238 The Panel
thus concluded that "the ordinary meaning of the terms 'products in general or local short supply '
refers to a situation in which the quantity of available supply of a product does not meet demand
in the relevant geographical area or market." 239 Based on its analysis of the text and context of

235 It may be relevant, for example, to consider whether the measure concerns perishable goods or
foodstuffs, or products that may be difficult to transport.
236 A consideration of factors such as product homogeneity, supply-side and demand-side substitutability
may also be relevant in order to assess properly whether there is shortage of a particular product in a given
market.
237 We recall that it must also be established that the challenged measure is "essential to the acquisition
or distribution of" such products.
238 Panel Report, para. 7.205.
239 Panel Report, para. 7.207. The Panel then confirmed its interpretation of the phrase "products in
general or local short supply" by having recourse to the negotiating history of the GATT 1994.

Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 , together with relevant juris prudence, the Panel found that "the
terms 'products in general or local short supply' refer to a situation in which the quantity of
available supply of a product, from all sources, does not meet demand in a relevant geographical
area or market" 240 and that t hey "do not refer to products in respect of which there merely is a
lack of domestic manufacturing capacity".241 The Panel added that "India ha[d] not argued that the
quantity of solar cells and modules available from all sources, i.e. both international and domestic,
is inadequate to meet the demand of Indian SPDs or other purchasers."242
5.74. As we have explained above, an assessment of whether a Member has identified "products
in general or local short supply" requires a case -by-case analysis of the relationship between
supply and demand based on a holistic consideration of all relevant factors .243 We agree with India
to the extent that it suggests that an increase in domestic manufacturing "capacity" may lead to
an increase in the total quantity of available supply of a product. However, we disagree that a lack
of "sufficient" domestic manufacturing "capacity" will necessarily constitute a product "shortage" in
a particular market, as India appears to suggest. Nor does it follow from an increase in domestic
production capacity that domestic manufacturers will necessarily sell their production to domestic
buyers, rather than exporting to buyers abroad.
5.75. This brings us to India's argument that continued dependence on imports of solar cells and
modules exposes it to risk s related to continued dependence on imports. Before the Panel, India
submitted that "[a]ny dependence on imports brings with it risks associated with supply side
vulnerabilities and fluctuations"244 and that, since "India's solar PV installations predominan tly rely
on imported cells and modules", this "exposes India to the risks of market fluctuations in
international supply".245 According to India, governmental intervention was thus "required in order
to minimize dependence on imports " and to "ensure domestic resilience in addressing any supply
side disruptions" .246 India reiterated on appeal these arguments relating to the risks associated
with continued dependence on imports of solar cells and modules.247
5.76. We understand India's arguments regarding the alleged ris ks inherent to the continued
dependence on imported solar cells and modules to relate to the issue of supply availability, and
agree that such considerations could, in principle, be relevant in assessing whether a situation of
"short supply" exists. While a consideration of potential risks of disruption in supply of a given
product may inform the question of whether a situation of "short supply" exists, we note the
Panel's finding that India "ha [d] not identified any actual disruptions in imports of solar c ells and
modules to date", and that SPDs in India ha d not "experienced an actual disruption in the supply
of affordable foreign solar cells and modules".248
5.77. We further disagree with India to the extent that it appears to assume, first, that all
imports, in and of themselves, entail supply-related risks and, in that sense, are not "available" to
meet demand 249; and, second, that such risks are intolerable , as long as a sufficient level of
domestic manufacturing capacity of solar cells and modules has not been m et, such that a
situation of "short supply" exists , as long as domestic manufacturing capacity lies below this
level.250 In any event, even assuming that there may be risks of disruption in the supply of imports
to a particular market, it may equally be the case that such risks exist in relation to domestic
production. Thus, in assessing whether products are "available" in a particular area or market,
consideration must be given to all relevant factors , such that an analysis of whether a respondent
has identi fied a situation of "short supply" is carried out on a case -by-case basis for each and
every source of supply concerned, both foreign and domestic supply.

241 Panel Report, para. 7.236.
242 Panel Report, para. 7.236.
244 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 33.
245 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 35.
246 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 35.
247 We note that India "reiterates its fundamental argument that 'general or local short supply' exists in
the first place due to low domestic manufacturing" and its vulnerability "to the risks associated with
international supply and market fluctuations". (India's appellant's submission, para. 104 (emphasis original))
248 Panel Report, para. 7.262.
249 See India's appellant's submission, para. 101.
250 See India's appellant's submission, para. 93.

5.78. We further note that, during the present dispute, India has sought to justify its
DCR measures on th e basis of the policy objectives underlying them. India has argued that the
DCR measures should be seen in light of the policy objectives of: "(i) Energy Security and
Sustainable Development; and (ii) Ecologically sustainable growth, while addressing the challenges
of climate change."251 India argues, for instance, that "[i]t is not India's case … that Article XX(j) is
an exception that would allow countries to impose import restrictions for any and all products
which it cannot produce or manufacture by itself", but that a "justification for invoking Article XX(j)
would need to rest on whether a measure is essential to redress such a situation of general or local
short supply", which relates to the "relationship between a measure and its objective of acquisiti on
or distribution of products in general or local short supply". 252 India further argue s that the
DCR measures are consistent with Article XX(j) because they "need to be examined in the context
of the overall objectives of energy security and ecologically s ustainable growth for which
acquisition or distribution of indigenously manufactured solar cells and modules is essential."253
5.79. While policy considerations such as those referred to by India may inform the nature and
extent of supply and demand, they do not r elieve the responding party invoking the exception in
Article XX(j) from the burden to demonstrate that imported products are not "available" to meet
demand and that the products at issue are "in general or local short supply".
5.80. India further contends that , under the Panel's interpretation of Article XX(j), import
restrictions could not be justified under that provision. 254 India suggests that , if the drafters had
intended this result, they "would have explicitly stated this, as was done in the context of
Article XI:2 of the GATT 1994"255, as well as Article XX(i). 256 While the Panel provided illustrations
of non -export-related measures that could presumably be justified under Article XX(j) 257, India
suggests that the examples provided by the Panel do "not address t he question of how import
restraints on the product would apply in such situations". 258 As we understand it, India suggests
that, under the Panel's interpretation of the phrase "products in general or local short supply",
measures taken to redress a situation of short supply can only take the form of export restrictions,
and, hence, that the Panel's interpretation of Article XX(j) cannot be correct.
5.81. As India correctly notes, the text of Article XI:2(a) and Article XX(i) of the GATT 1994
contain express langu age referring to export restrictions. By contrast, Article XX(j) does not
contain express language referring to either import or export restraints. The interpretation of the
phrase "products in general or local short supply" must begin with the text of Art icle XX(j) and in
light of the substantive requirements within the provision where this phrase is located. Contrary to
what India appears to suggest, a proper interpretation of the phrase "products in general or local
short supply" cannot be based merely o n textual differences or similarities between Article XX(j)
and some other provisions of the GATT 1994.
5.82. In any event, we disagree with India that it follows from the Panel's interpretation of the
phrase "products in general or local short supply" that exp ort restrictions are the only type of
measure that may be used to redress a situation of "short supply", or that it follows from this
interpretation that Article XX(j) cannot cover measures taking the form of import restrictions. The
Panel noted, for example, that, "where the quantity of available supply of a product does not meet
demand for that product in a given Member, it is conceivable that this Member might establish a
temporary monopoly in respect of the sale of that product as a measure essential to the
distribution of such products within its territory" and that such "a monopoly could be enforced and
given effect through restrictions on both the exportation and the importation by private traders of
the product concerned."259

251 Panel Report, Add.1, Annex B-3, para. 34.
252 India's appellant's submission, para. 68. (emphasis original; fn omitted)
253 India's appellant's submission, para. 68. (emphasis original; fn omitted)
254 India's appellant's submission, para. 87.
255 India's appellant's submission, para. 87. (fn omitted)
256 India's appellant's submission, para. 88.
257 See Panel Report, para. 7.230 and fn 566 thereto.
258 India's appellant's submission, para. 89.
259 Panel Report, fn 566 to para. 7.230. The Panel also suggested that, even in the absence of a
monopoly, a Member might "take other measures to control both the importation and distribution of the
product in a manner as part of a plan for the rationing of the product". (Ibid.)

5.83. Based on the foregoing, w e disagree with India to the extent that it argues that "short
supply" can be determined without regard to whether supply from all sources is sufficient to meet
demand in the relevant market. Rather, as noted, we read Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 as
reflecting a balance of different considerations to be taken into account when assessing whether
products are "in general or local short supply". This analysis may, in appropriate cases, take into
account not only the level of domestic production of a particul ar product and the nature of the
products that are alleged to be "in general or local short supply", but also such factors as the
relevant product and geographic market , potential price fluctuations in the relevant market, the
purchasing power of foreign a nd domestic consumers, and the role that foreign and domestic
producers play in a particular market, including the extent to which domestic producers sell their
production abroad. Due regard should be given to the total quantity of imports that may be
"available" to meet demand in a particular geographical area or market. Whether and which
factors are relevant will necessarily depend on the particularities of each case.
5.2.5 Whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in addressing
India's arguments and evidence regarding the domestic manufacturing capacity
5.84. India also challenges, under Article 11 of the DSU, the manner in which the Panel dealt with
India's arguments and evidence regarding the notion of "sufficient domestic manufacturing
capacity".260 India argues that the Panel erred in the assessment of India's argument and the
evidence it presented to demonstrate that it currently does not possess a "sufficient manufacturing
capacity". India states, for example, that it has explained that it "cannot afford to remain
dependent on the import of components intrinsic to solar power development … [since] [s]olar
energy is critical to [its] long -term energy security, and this cannot be achieved if India does not
have an indigenous manufacturing cap acity of solar cells and modules … [which] is necessary in
order to reduce the risks arising from complete dependence on imports of critical components."261
5.85. India argues that it submitted relevant evidence indicating "what will constitute 'sufficient
manufacturing capacity'", at which point there would no longer be a need for the DCR measures ,
since "the conditions giving rise to them [would] have ceased to exist".262 India further argues that
"the Panel's conclusion that India does not seek to maximize 'self -sufficiency' or 'self -reliance',
negates India's need for maintaining 'sufficient manufacturing capacity', is not based on an
objective assessment of facts and legal arguments presented before it … [and] goes against the
basic mandate of Article 11 of the DSU that a panel must consider all the evidence presented to it,
assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that its factual findings have a proper basis
in that evidence."263 The United States responds that "[t]he absence of an evidence-based baseline
and a reasoned comparison in India's argument prevent any conclusion as to whether a situation
of short supply existed" and that "[i]t is this legal flaw in India's interpretation that led the Panel to
reject India's Article XX(j) defense, and not a mistaken conclusion that India had neglected to
provide any estimate of the level of capacity it considered sufficient."264
5.86. We recall that the Panel found, with regard to India's arguments pertaining to the "sufficient
domestic manufacturing capacity" req uirement, that, in order to assess whether a situation of
"short supply" exists within the meaning of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 , "there must be some
objective point of reference to serve as the basis for an objective assessment of whether there is a
'deficiency' or 'amount lacking' in the 'quantity' of a product that is 'available'." 265 The Panel
determined, in this regard, that "India's alternative interpretation of Article XX(j) [did] not present
any objective point of reference to serve as the basis f or an objective assessment of whether a
product is in 'short supply' within the meaning of Article XX(j) [since] India ha[d] not adequately
explained what would constitute a 'lack' of domestic manufacturing capacity amounting to a 'short
supply' under its interpretation of Article XX(j)." 266 The Panel further found that "India ha[d] not
itself articulated what would constitute 'sufficient' manufacturing capacity for the purposes of
Article XX(j) under its alternative interpretation of this provision " and that it was "also not clear
whether India [was] arguing that it would fall under the discretion of each Member concerned to

260 India's appellant's submission, section IVA.5.
261 India's appellant's submission, para. 93(a). (fns omitted)
262 India's appellant's submission, para. 94.
263 India's appellant's submission, para. 98 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres, para. 185, in turn referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 132-133).
264 United States' appellee's submission, para. 102. (fn omitted)
266 Panel Report, para. 7.226.

determine what 'sufficient' manufacturing capacity would be, or whether the point of reference for
assessing the level of 'sufficient' m anufacturing capacity would vary from case-to-case, depending
on the policy objective being pursued." 267 The Panel thus determined that India's interpretation of
Article XX(j) is "problematic because it does not reflect an objective point of reference that c an be
used for the purpose of making an objective assessment of whether a product is in 'short supply'
within the meaning of Article XX(j)."268
5.87. As noted, a panel is required under Article 11 of the DSU to "consider all the evidence
presented to it, assess i ts credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that its factual findings
have a proper basis in that evidence" .269 At the same time, panels "are not required to accord to
factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties". 270 Moreover, "[i]t
is … unacceptable for a participant effectively to recast its arguments before the panel under the
guise of an Article 11 claim", and an appellant "must [instead] identify specific errors regarding the
objectivity of the panel's assessment".271
5.88. India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU relies for its validity on India's reading of
Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, and in particular India's contention that the existence of a situation
of "short supply" within the meaning of Article XX(j) is to be de termined exclusively by reference
to whether there is "sufficient" domestic manufacturing of a given product. The fact that India
does not agree with the conclusion the Panel reached does not mean that the Panel committed an
error amounting to a violation of Article 11 of the DSU. India is "merely" recasting its arguments
before the Panel under the guise of an Article 11 claim. We therefore reject India's claim that the
Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
5.2.6 Conclusion
5.89. We have found above th at Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 reflects a balance of different
considerations to be taken into account when assessing whether products are "in general or local
short supply". In particular, a panel should examine the extent to which a particular product is
"available" for purchase in a particular geographical area or market, and whether this is sufficient
to meet demand in the relevant area or market. This analysis may, in appropriate cases, take into
account not only the level of domestic production of a particular product and the nature of the
products that are alleged to be "in general or local short supply", but also such factors as the
relevant product and geographic al market, potential price fluctuations in the relevant market, the
purchasing power of foreign and domestic consumers, and the role that foreign and domestic
producers play in a particular market, including the extent to which domestic producers sell their
production abroad. Due regard should be given to the total quantity of imports that may be
"available" to meet demand in a particular geographical area or market. It may thus be relevant to
consider the extent to which international supply of a pr oduct is stable and accessible, by
examining factors such as the distance between a particul ar geographical area or market and
production sites, as well as the reliability of local or transnational supply chains. Whether and
which factors are relevant will necessarily depend on the particularities of each case. Just as there
may be factors that h ave a bearing on "availability" of imports in a particular case, it is also
possible that, despite the existence of manufacturing capacity, domestic products are not
"available" in all parts of a particular country, or are not "available" in sufficient qua ntities to meet
demand. In all cases, t he responding party has the burden of demonstrating that the quantity of
"available" supply from both domestic and international sources in the relevant geographical
market is insufficient to meet demand . For these re asons, we have disagreed with India to the
extent that it argues that "short supply" can be determined without regard to whether supply from
both domestic and international sources is sufficient to meet demand in the relevant market. We
have also rejected India's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
5.90. In light of our interpretation of Article XX(j), as well as the evidence and arguments
presented to the Panel, we find that India has not established that solar cells and modules are

268 Panel Report, para. 7.227.
269 Appellate Body Reports, Philippines – Distilled Spirits, para. 135 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 185, in turn referring to Appellate Body Report, EC ‒ Hormones,
paras. 132-133).
270 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 267.
271 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442.

"products in general or local short supply" in India. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's findings in
paragraph 7.265 of its Report, that solar cells and modules are not "products in general or local
short supply" in India within the meaning of Articl e XX(j) of the GATT 1994 and that the
DCR measures are therefore not justified under Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994.
5.3 Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
5.91. We have upheld the Panel's finding that the government procurement derogation under
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 is not applicable to the DCR measures at issue in the present
case.272 We have also upheld the Panel's finding that solar cells and modules are not "products in
general or local short supply" in India within the meaning of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 and
that the DCR measures are therefore not justified under that provision. 273 We turn therefore to
address India's conditional appeal of, first, the Panel's finding that India has not demonstrated that
the DCR measures are measures "to secure complian ce with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT 1994]" within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994 ; and, second, the Panel's ultimate finding that the DCR measures are not justified
under that provision.274
5.92. India claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(d) in
finding that the international instruments identified by India do not have direct effect in India and
are therefore not "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Ar ticle XX(d).275 India further argues
that the Panel erred, first, in finding that three of the domestic instruments identified by India,
namely, the National Electricity Policy 276, the National Electricity Plan 277, and the National Action
Plan on Climate Change 278, do not constitute "laws or regulations" ; and, second, by consequently
focusing its analysis on a fourth domestic instrument, namely, Section 3 of India's Electricity Act of
2003279, in isolation of these three other instruments.280 India requests that we reverse the Panel's
findings, complete the legal analysis, and find that the relevant instruments are "laws or
regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d); that the DCR measures are "necessary to secure
compliance" with these "laws or regulations"; and that they meet the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XX.281
5.93. India's appeal therefore focuses on the Panel's assessment of whether the international and
domestic instruments identified by India are "laws or regulations" within the meaning of
Article XX(d). We begin by summarizing the Panel's findings before setting out the legal standard
applicable under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 and considering the Panel's analysis as challenged
by India on appeal.
5.3.1 The Panel's findings
5.94. Before the Panel, India argued that it has the obligation "to ensure ecologically sustainable
growth while addressing India's energy security challenge, and ensuring compliance with its

274 India's Notice of Appeal, Section III, para. 1 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.284-7.333 and
7.337-7.390); appellant's submission, para. 164.
275 India's appellant's submission, paras. 166 and 170-173. India identified the following international
instruments: (i) the preamble of the WTO Agreement; (ii) the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, done at New York, 9 May 1992, UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, p. 107 (Panel Exhibit IND-3);
(iii) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1992 (Panel Exhibit IND-35); and (iv) United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/288 (adopted
27 July 2012) (Rio+20 Document: "The Future We Want") (Panel Exhibit IND-28). (See Panel Report,
paras. 7.269-7.274)
276 Government of India, Ministry of Power, National Electricity Policy, Resolution No. 23/40/2004-R&R
(Vol. II) (12 February 2005) (Panel Exhibit IND-14).
277 Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority, National Electricity Plan,
Vol. 1 – Generation (January 2012) (Panel Exhibit IND-16).
278 Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate Change (June 2008) (Panel Exhibit IND-2).
279 Parliament of India, The Electricity Act, 2003 [No. 36 of 2003] (26 May 2003) (Panel Exhibit
USA-20).
280 See India's appellant's submission, paras. 164-167 and 171. At the oral hearing, India confirmed
that it is not challenging the Panel's findings under Article 11 of the DSU.
281 India's appellant's submission, paras. 178 and 180-181.

obligations relating to climate change". 282 According to India, this obligation is "reflected in four
international instruments, and four domestic instruments" 283, and both sets of instruments qualify
as "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. India claimed that
its DCR measures "secure compliance" with these "laws or regu lations" because they "reduce the
risk of a disruption in Indian SPDs' access to a continuous and affordable supply of the solar cells
and modules needed to generate solar power". 284 India further argued that its DCR measures are
"necessary" because they are the only means it has to incentivize local manufacturing of solar cells
and modules, and thereby reduce this risk.285 The United States, for its part, argued that India had
failed to demonstrate that the DCR measures are necessary to comply with any law or regulation
for purposes of Article XX(d).286
5.95. The Panel began by examining whether the international instruments identified by India are
"laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d), before turning to consider the domestic
instruments that India had identified. The Panel explained that it would proceed in this manner
because India ha d distinguished between its "international and domestic obligations", and also
"because different issues are raised in relation to these two different groups of instruments".287
5.96. The Panel recalled that India had argued that its "international law obligations" are
embodied in the following international instruments: (i) the preamble of the WTO Agreement;
(ii) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; (iii ) the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992); and (iv) UN Resolution A/RES/66/288 (2012) ( Rio+20
Document: "The Future We Want").288
5.97. Having reviewed the relevant text of the instruments identified by India, the Panel turned to
consider whether "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) includes international
instruments, as opposed to domestic instruments. Based on its review of the Appellate Body's
reasoning and findings in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Panel recalled that the terms "laws or
regulations" in Article XX(d) refers to "rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO
Member".289 The Panel added that "[i]nternational agreements (or other sources of international
law) may constitute 'laws or regulations' only insofar as they have been incorporated, or have
'direct effect', within a Member's domestic legal system."290
5.98. Turning to examine whether the international instruments identified by India form a part of
India's domestic legal system, the Panel recalled India's position that such instruments have
"direct effect" in India because rules of international law are accommodated into India's domestic

282 Panel Report, para. 7.268 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 240; opening
statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 54; and opening statement at the second Panel meeting, para. 35).
283 Panel Report, para. 7.268. Noting that "a central issue in this case is whether the materials identified
by India are 'laws or regulations' within the meaning of Article XX(d)", the Panel explained that, in referring to
these materials as "instruments", its intention was to "adopt a nomenclature that is neutral with respect to that
issue". (Ibid., fn 635 to para. 7.268) We see merit in the Panel's approach and continue to use the term
"instruments" to refer to the materials identified by India.
284 Panel Report, para. 7.191 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 255: stating
that "[t]he DCR Measures have been designed to secure compliance with India's obligations under its law and
regulations which require it to ensure ecologically sustainable growth and sustainable development. The DCR
Measures seek to achieve this by creating a local manufacturing base for solar PV cells and modules, in order
to ensure the ability of satisfy the requirements for such cells and modules without being susceptible to the
risks of imports, such as price fluctuations, and geo-political factors").
285 Panel Report, para. 7.191 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 262: stating, in
the context of Article XX(d), that "India does not have any reasonably available alternatives to achieve its
objectives of building a domestic manufacturing base for solar cells and modules with a view to ensuring
domestic resilience to the fluctuations and uncertainties associated with imports").
286 Panel Report, para. 7.194 (referring to United States' opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
paras. 48-52).
287 Panel Report, para. 7.284.
288 See Panel Report, paras. 7.269-7.274. More specifically, India referred to: (i) the first recital of the
preamble of the WTO Agreement; (ii) Articles 3, 4(1)(b), and 4(1)(f) of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Panel Exhibit IND-3); (iii) the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992 (Panel Exhibit IND-35); and (iv) paras. 3, 4, and
127 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/288 (adopted 27 July 2012) (Rio+20 Document:
"The Future We Want") (Panel Exhibit IND-28).
289 Panel Report, paras. 7.290 and 7.293 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks, paras. 69-70 and 79). (emphasis omitted)
290 Panel Report, para. 7.293.

legal system "without express legislative sanction, provided they do not run into conflict with laws
enacted by t he Parliament". 291 The Panel also noted India's explanation that , "[u]nder the
Constitution of India, acts of the executive are not confined to areas where there is a pre -existing
law" and that such acts "extend to aspects over which the Parliament has power to enact laws".292
The Panel accepted India's explanations regarding how its domestic legal system functions. 293 The
Panel found, however, based on India's explanations, that "international law obligations are not
'automatically incorporated' into Indian law, but rather that they may possibly be acted upon and
implemented by certain domestic authorities", and that India had therefore failed to demonstrate
that the relevant international instruments have "direct effect" in India. 294 The Panel further noted
India's argument that principles of international environmental law and the concept of sustainable
development "are fundamental to the environmental and developmental governance in India" and
"that the concept of sustainable development is a part of customary in ternational law". 295 The
Panel did not , however, consider that this spoke "to the question of whether international
obligations are automatically incorporated into domestic law and have 'direct effect' in India". 296
The Panel therefore found that India had failed to demonstrate that the international instruments it
had identified can be characterized as "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) in
the present dispute.297
5.99. The Panel then turned to consider whether the domestic instruments that India had
identified qualify as "laws or regulations". The Panel recalled India's assertion that its obligation "to
ensure ecologically sustainable growth" is embodied in Section 3 of India's Electricity Act, 2003,
"read with" paragraph 5.12.1 of the National E lectricity Policy; subsection 5.2.1 of the National
Electricity Plan; and the National Action Plan on Climate Change.298
5.100. The Panel began by noting that the dictionary definitions of the terms "law" and
"regulation" make clear that they refer to "rules" 299, an d that , throughout its report in
Mexico ‒ Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body had understood "laws or regulations" to refer to
"rules".300 The Panel further noted that, b y its terms, Article XX(d) refers to "laws or regulations"
in respect of which "compliance" can be secured, and considered that, "by necessary implication,
the 'laws or regulations' referred to in Article XX(d) must therefore be rules in respect of which
conduct would, or would not, be in 'compliance'." 301 Referring to the "context" provided by the
illustrative list in Article X X(d), the Panel found this to imply that the "laws or regulations" under
Article XX(d) "must be legally enforceable". 302 Based on its analysis, the Panel concluded that the
terms "laws or regulations" in Article XX(d) refer to "legally enforceable rules of c onduct under the
domestic legal system of the WTO Member concerned, and do not include general objectives".303
5.101. In respect of the domestic instruments identified by India, the Panel began by assessing
whether Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 constitutes a "law or regulation" within the meaning
of Article XX(d). The Panel noted that the Electricity Act , 2003 "has formal characteristics that are
normally associated with a statute" , in the sense that "it contains a date of entry into force, a
section defining the terms used in the instrument" , and that it "is divided into numbered parts,
sections and subsections that consist of rules cast in binding language ".304 The Panel further
observed that Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 "appears to constitute a le gally enforceable

291 Panel Report, para. 7.285 (quoting India's response to Panel question No. 35; and first written
292 Panel Report, para. 7.295 (quoting India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 60).
The same language is reproduced in para. 7.296 (quoting India's response to Panel question No. 35).
293 Panel Report, para. 7.297.
294 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
295 Panel Report, para. 7.298 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 180, in
turn referring to Supreme Court of India, Judgment, Vellore Citizens Welfare forum v. Union of India and
Others (1996) 5 SCC 647, paras. 10-15).
296 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
297 Panel Report, paras. 7.301 and 7.333.
298 Panel Report, paras. 7.275-7.283.
299 Panel Report, para. 7.308.
300 Panel Report, para. 7.308.
301 Panel Report, para. 7.308 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks,
paras. 69-70, 75, 77, and 79).
302 Panel Report, para. 7.309.
303 Panel Report, para. 7.311.

rule of conduct under the domestic legal system of India" 305, in the sense that it "establishes the
legal basis" for the development of the National Electricity Plan and the National Electricity Policy
and "identifies the entities involved in the periodic preparation, publication, and review of the
National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan". 306 The Panel added, however, that
Section 3 "does not address the content or substance of either the National Electricity Policy or th e
National Electricity Plan, other than to state that the Policy to be prepared from time to time will
be 'based on optimal utilisation of resources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances or
materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy'."307
5.102. Drawing a contrast with Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Panel observed that the
National Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate
Change are each expressly entitled a "policy" or "plan", and that th e language of the provisions
and passages in these instruments identified by India "does not suggest the existence of any
legally enforceable rules", and is instead "hortatory, aspirational, declaratory, and at times solely
descriptive".308 The Panel further noted that India had not suggested that the National Electricity
Policy, the National Electricity Plan, or the National Action Plan on Climate Change are "legally
binding", or that they are substantively similar to legislative acts or other instruments un der its
domestic legal system. 309 The Panel saw "no reason to doubt" that these instruments were
adopted by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under the Constitution of India 310,
but did not consider this to be a decisive criterion in determining whether these instruments
qualify as "laws or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d). 311 Based on its analysis, the
Panel found that "the Electricity Act, and in particular Section 3 thereof, constitutes a 'law' for the
purposes of Article XX(d)" 312, while the other domestic instruments identified by India do not
quality as "laws or regulations" within the meaning of that provision.313
5.103. With respect to Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Panel referred to past GATT/WTO
jurisprudence, and recall ed that the phrase "to secure compliance with laws or regulations" in
Article XX(d) refers to measures "to enforce obligations under laws or regulations", and not to
measures "to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the laws and regulations". 314 The Panel,
however, saw "no link or nexus" between the DCR measures and Section 3 of the Electricity Act ,
2003.315 In particular, the Panel said it failed "to see how the DCR measures could be said to
secure compliance with the obligations in Section 3 of the Elec tricity Act, which are to periodically
prepare the National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan." 316 The Panel added that
"India ha [d] not suggested that the DCR measures are aimed at preventing the Central
Government of India or the Central Electricity Authority from acting inconsistently with their
obligations to periodically prepare the National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity
Plan."317 The Panel therefore found that India had failed to demonstrate that its DCR measures are
measures "to secure compliance" with the legal obligations in Section 3 of the
Electricity Act, 2003.318 For all these reasons, the Panel concluded that India had failed to
demonstrate that its DCR measures are provisionally justified under Article XX(d) of t he
GATT 1994.319

305 Panel Report, para. 7.312.
306 Panel Report, para. 7.327.
307 Panel Report, para. 7.276 (quoting Electricity Act, 2003 (Panel Exhibit USA-20), Section 3(1).
308 Panel Report, para. 7.313.
309 Panel Report, para. 7.314.
310 Panel Report, para. 7.317.
311 Panel Report, para. 7.317.
312 Panel Report, para. 7.312.
313 Panel Report, para. 7.318.
314 Panel Report, para. 7.330 (referring to GATT Panel Report, EEC – Parts and Components, para. 5.17;
Panel Reports, Canada – Periodicals, para. 5.9; Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 6.248;
EC ‒ Trademarks and Geographical Indications (US), para. 7.447; Mexico ‒ Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.175;
and Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.538).
315 Panel Report, para. 7.329.
317 Panel Report, para. 7.329.
318 Panel Report, para. 7.332.
319 Panel Report, para. 7.333.

5.3.2 The legal standard under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
5.104. Having recalled the Panel's analysis and findings, we turn to consider the legal standard
that applies under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Article XX(d) sets out a general exception f or
measures that are:
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Ar ticle II
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices;
5.105. Having already surveyed , in the context of our discussion on Article XX(j) of the
GATT 1994, the general analytical framework that applies under Article XX(d) 320, we turn
immediately to examine the proper interpretation of the terms "laws or regulations" in the context
of the phrase "to secure compliance with laws or regulations" in Article XX(d).
5.106. Beginning with the ordinary meaning of the terms "laws" and "regulations", we note that
the term "law" is generally understood to refer to "a rule of conduct imposed by authority" 321,
while the term "regulation" is defined as "[a] rule or principle governing behaviour or
practice; esp. such a di rective established and maintained by an authority". 322 In Mexico – Taxes
on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body said that the terms "laws or regulations" in Article XX(d) refer
to "rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member, including rul es deriving
from international agreements that have been incorporated into the domestic legal system of a
WTO Member or have direct effect according to that WTO Member's legal system." 323 As to the
illustrative list contained in Article XX(d), the Appellate Body observed that the matters listed as
examples in Article XX(d) – namely, customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies, the
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices –
involve the regulation by a government of activity undertaken by a variety of economic actors
(e.g. private firms and State enterprises), as well as by government al agencies.324 The illustrative
list contained in Article XX(d) reinforces the notion that "laws or regulations" refer to r ules of
conduct and principles governing behaviour or practice that form part of the domestic legal system
of a Member.325
5.107. Furthermore, as noted by the Appellate Body, "laws or regulations" encompass "rules
adopted by a WTO Member's legislative or executive branches of government". 326 In ascertaining
whether an alleged rule falls within the scope of "laws or regulations" for purposes of Article XX(d),
it may therefore be relevant to assess whether the rule at issue has been adopted or recognized
by an authorit y that is competent to do so under the domestic legal system of the Member
concerned.
5.108. Turning to the immediate context of the terms "laws or regulations", we note that the text
of Article XX(d) refers to "laws or regulations" in respect of which "compliance" can be "secure[d]".
The "laws or regulations" referred to in Article XX(d) must therefore be ones in respect of which
conduct would, or would not, be in "compliance ". As to the term "secure", we understand that, in
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , the App ellate Body disagreed with the panel's interpretation that
"'to secure compliance' is to be read as meaning to enforce compliance".327 The Appellate Body
explained that absolute certainty in the achievement of a measure's stated goal, as well as the use
of coercion, are not necessary components of a measure designed "to secure compliance" within
the meaning of Article XX(d).328 Instead, a measure can be said "to secure compliance" with "laws

320 See paras. 5.56-5.61. of this Report.
321 Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of the word "law"
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/106405>, accessed 23 August 2016.
322 Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of the word "regulation"
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161427>, accessed 23 August 2016. (italics original)
323 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 79.
324 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 70.
325 See Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 70.
326 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 69.
327 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, paras. 73-74 (quoting Panel Report, Mexico –
Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.175). (emphasis added)
328 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 74.

or regulations" when it seeks to secure observance of specific rules, even if the measure cannot be
guaranteed to achieve such result with absolute certainty.329
5.109. We do not consider that the scope of "laws or regulations" is limited to instruments that
are legally enforceable (including, e.g. before a court of law), or that are accompanied by penalties
and sanctions to be applied in situations of non -compliance. Instead, as we see it, the concept is
broader and may, in appropriate cases, include rules in respect of which a Member seeks to
"secure compliance", even when compliance is not coerced, for example, through the imposition of
penalties or sanctions. I n assessing whether a rule falls within the scope of "laws or regulations"
under Article XX(d), a panel should consider the degree to which an instrument containing the
alleged rule is normative in nature. It is therefore relevant for a panel to examine whether a rule is
legally enforceable, as this may demonstrate the extent to which it sets out a rule of conduct or
course of action that is to be observed within the domestic legal system of a Member. It also may
be relevant for a panel to examine whether the instrument provides for penalties or sanctions to
be applied in situations of non-compliance.
5.110. The Appellate Body has stated that a "measure can be said 'to secure compli ance' with
laws or regulations when its design reveals that it secures compliance with specific rules,
obligations, or requirements under such laws or regulations". 330 It is important, in this regard, to
distinguish between the specific rules, obligations , or requirements with respect to which a
measure seeks to secure compliance, on the one hand, and the objectives of the relevant "laws or
regulations", which may assist in "elucidating the content of specific rules, obligations, or
requirements" of the "laws or regulations", on the other hand. 331 The "more precisely" a
respondent is able to identify specific rules, obligations, or requirements contained in the relevant
"laws or regulations", the "more likely" it will be able to elucidate how and why the inconsi stent
measure secures compliance with such "laws or regulations". 332 Thus, in assessing whether an
instrument constitutes a "law or regulation" within the meaning of Article XX(d), a panel should
also consider the degree of specificity or precision with whic h the relevant instrument lays down a
particular rule of conduct or course of action within the domestic legal system of a Member, as
opposed to simply providing a legal basis for action that may be consistent with certain objectives.
5.111. In certain cases, a r espondent may be able to identify a specific provision of a single
domestic instrument that contains a given rule, obligation, or requirement with which it seeks "to
secure compliance" for purposes of Article XX(d). However, it is also possible to envisage
situations where a respondent seeks to identify a given rule, obligation, or requirement by
reference to, or deriving from, several elements or parts of one or more instruments under its
domestic legal system. In Argentina – Financial Services, the Appell ate Body acknowledged this
possibility when it said that a respondent "may choose to demonstrate that the measure is
designed and necessary to secure compliance with an obligation or obligations arising from several
laws or regulations operating together a s part of a comprehensive framework". 333 Indeed, we do
not see anything in the text of Article XX(d) that would exclude , from the scope of "laws or
regulations", rules, obligations, or requirements that are not contained in a single domestic
instrument or a provision thereof. In a given domestic legal system, several elements of one or
more instruments may function together to set out a rule of conduct or course of action. In such a
scenario, in order to understand properly the content, substance, and normati vity of a given rule,
a panel may be required to examine together the different elements of one or more instruments
identified by a respondent. Of course, insofar as a respondent seeks to rely on a rule deriving from
several instruments or parts thereof, i t would still bear the burden of establishing that the
instruments or the parts that it identifies actually set out the alleged rule.
5.112. Ultimately, a panel's scrutiny of whether a responding party has identified "laws or
regulations" within the meaning of A rticle XX(d) should focus on the specific features and
characteristics of the instruments at issue, including the alleged rules that they may contain. While
the form and title given to an instrument may shed light on its legal status and content, a
determination of whether an alleged rule falls within the scope of "laws or regulations" for

329 See Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, paras. 5.69, 5.126, and 5.131; and
Argentina ‒ Financial Services, para. 6.203.
330 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203. (emphasis added; fn omitted)
331 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, fn 495 to para. 6.203.
332 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203.
333 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, fn 505 to para. 6.208.

purposes of Article XX(d) cannot be made simply by reference to the label given to an instrument
under the domestic law of a Member.334
5.113. To sum up, in determining whether a responding party has identified a rule that falls within
the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, a panel should evaluate
and give due consideration to all the characteristics of the relevant instrument(s) and should avoid
focusing exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic. In particular, it may be relevant for a
panel to consider, among others: (i) the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to
which the instrument operates to set out a rule of condu ct or course of action that is to be
observed within the domestic legal system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity of the
relevant rule; (iii) whether the rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court of law;
(iv) whether the rule has been adopted or recognized by a competent authority possessing the
necessary powers under the domestic legal system of a Member; (v) the form and title given to
any instrument or instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system of a Member;
and (vi) the penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule.
5.114. In some cases, such as those involving a specific, legally enforceable rule under a single
provision of a domestic legislative act, determining whether a respondent has identified "laws or
regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) may be a relatively straightforward exercise. In
others, however, the assessment may be more complex. Importantly, this assessment must
always be carried out on a case -by-case basis, in light of the specific characteristics and features
of the instruments at issue, the rule alleged to exist, and the domestic legal system of the Member
concerned.
5.115. Having identified the legal standards under Article XX(d), we turn to address India's claims
on appeal, beginning with the arguments directed at the Panel's analysis of whether the domestic
instruments and the alleged rules thereunder, as identified by India, fall within the scope of "laws
or regulations" under Article XX(d). We note that the Panel adopted a d ifferent sequence,
beginning, first, by considering whether the international instruments identified by India are "laws
or regulations", before turning to the domestic instruments identified by India. We nonetheless
consider it useful to begin our assessme nt with the Panel's analysis of India's domestic
instruments, because it is in the course of this analysis that the Panel developed its interpretation
of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d).335
5.3.3 Whether the Panel erred in its assessment of the domestic instruments identified
by India
5.116. With respect to the Panel's analysis of the alleged rule set out in the domestic instruments
identified by India, India appeals the Panel's findings that India had failed to demonstrate that its
DCR measures are designed "to secure compliance with laws or regulations" within the meaning of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. As we see it, India's appeal is based on three main grounds.
5.117. First, India contends that the Panel erred under Article XX(d) in finding that the National
Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate Change do
not constitute "laws or regulations". 336 According to India, these admittedly "non -binding"
instruments are nonetheless "laws" within the meaning of Article X X(d) under India's domestic
legal system because the "legal framework in India" comprises both "binding" laws, and policies
and plans, that provide the "framework for executive action".337
5.118. Second, India disagrees with the Panel to the extent that it suggested that the phrase "to
secure compliance" limits the scope of Article XX(d) to measures that "prevent" actions that would
be "illegal" under the laws or regulations at issue.338

334 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, fn 87 to para. 87. See also
335 See Panel Report, paras. 7.306-7.311.
336 India's appellant's submission, para. 171.
337 India's appellant's submission, para. 171.
338 India's appellant's submission, para. 174 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.328 and fn 770 thereto;
and India's second written submission to the Panel, paras. 131-133).

5.119. Third, India submits that the Panel erred in examining Section 3 of India's
Electricity Act, 2003, "in isolation" from the other "non -binding" instruments it had identified ,
given that India had argued that all the domestic instruments it had identified, taken together, set
out the obligation to ensure "ecologically sustainable growth "339 and that the DCR measures are
required in order to secure compliance with this obligation. 340 India adds, in this regard , that the
fact that the instruments to which it referred "leave open flexibility for India to design its
implementation measures does not mean they constitute objectives that need not be complied
with, or that compliance with such obligations need not be secured".341
5.120. The United States responds that the fact that the domestic instruments that India had
identified lay out important and even "critical" objectives does not make them "laws or
regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d). The United States asserts that "to secure
compliance" under Article XX(d) means to "enforce" obligations under laws and regulations and not
to "ensure" the attainment of the objectives of the laws and regulations. 342 According to the
United States, India does not even attempt to argue that its DCR measures are necessary to
comply with any Indian laws or regulations "as such", but only with the objectives embod ied in the
laws identified by India. 343 Moreover, the United States recalls that the Panel considered that
Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 requires the Central Government to prepare the National
Electricity Policy , and that the DCR measures do nothing to enforce this legal requirement. 344
Noting India's argument on appeal that it did not mean to cite Section 3 on its own, but as one
element of its laws or regulations, the United States further submits that India does not directly
appeal the Panel's findings with respect to Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003.345
5.121. We address India's arguments below, beginning with India's contention that the Panel
erred in its interpretation of the terms "laws or regulations" in Article XX(d) as referring to "legally
enforceable rules of conduct under the domestic legal system" of a Member. 346 As discussed
above, a determination of whether an instrument qualifies as a "law or regulation" within the
meaning of Article XX(d) includes an assessment of whether the responding par ty has identified
specific rules, obligations, or requirements that operate with a sufficient degree of normativity
under its domestic legal system so as to set out a rule of conduct or course of action. The legal
enforceability of an instrument under the domestic legal system of a Member may be an
important, even determinative, factor in demonstrating that such an instrument operates with a
high degree of normativity within the domestic legal system of that Member. Depending on the
domestic legal system of a Member, as well as the characteristics of the instrument at issue, there
may, however, be other ways to demonstrate that an instrument operates with a sufficient degree
of normativity. Insofar as Article XX(d) is susceptible of application in respect of a wide variety of
"laws or regulations" 347, we recall that the degree of normativity of an instrument is one of the
relevant factors in assessing whether such instrument qualifies as a "law or regulation" under
Article XX(d). The Panel goes some way in ackn owledging this by stating that the diversity of
Members' domestic legal systems should be taken into account in determining whether an
instrument can be characterized as a "law or regulation" for purposes of Article XX(d).348 We,
however, disagree with the Panel to the extent that it may have suggested that the scope of "laws
or regulations" under Article XX(d) is limited to "legally enforceable rules of conduct under the
domestic legal system" of a Member.349

339 According to India, "ecologically sustainable growth" means "economic growth in an ecologically
sustainable manner". In India's view, the "concept of 'sustainable development' … encompasses within it the
concept of 'ecologically sustainable growth'". India also clarifies that "ecologically sustainable growth is
fundamental to India's strategy to address its energy security objective as well" and "they cannot be seen as
distinct from each other". (India's appellant's submission, para. 176 (referring to India's second written
submission to the Panel, paras. 138 and 140, and fn 172 thereto))
340 India's appellant's submission, para. 173.
341 India's appellant's submission, para. 173. (fn omitted)
342 United States' appellee's submission, para. 158 (referring to Panel Report, Canada ‒ Wheat Exports
and Grain Imports, para. 6.248).
343 United States' appellee's submission, para. 158.
344 United States' appellee's submission, para. 159 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.330).
345 United States' appellee's submission, para. 159.
346 Panel Report, para. 7.311. See also India's appellant's submission, paras. 171-172.
347 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162.
348 See Panel Report, fn 749 to para. 7.314.
349 Panel Report, para. 7.311.

5.122. We next consider the Panel's interpretation of the phrase "to secure compliance" in
Article XX(d). Having summarized the position of prior panels350, the present Panel "consider[ed] it
unnecessary to resolve the question of precisely what type of link or nexus would be required to
establish that the DCR measures 'secure compliance' with [Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003]",
given that the Panel saw "no link or nexus between the DCR measures and Section 3 of the
Electricity Act".351 Contrary to what India argues on appeal, we therefore do not see the Panel to
have found that "to secure compliance" in Article XX(d) restricts the scope of that provision only to
measures that "prevent" actions that would be illegal under the "laws or regulations" at issue.
5.123. We turn now to consider India's argument that the Pane l erred in its application of
Article XX(d) by examining Section 3 of India's Electricity Act , 2003 "in isolation", although India
had argued that the domestic instruments that it had identified, when considered together,
"mandate achieving ecologically su stainable growth" and that the DCR measures are required for
securing compliance with this rule.352
5.124. We recall that the Panel began its analysis by summarizing India's position as follows:
India also submits that its "domestic … obligations to ensure ecologic ally sustainable
growth while addressing India's energy security challenge, and ensuring compliance
with its obligations relating to climate change" are embodied in: (a) the Electricity Act
"read with"; (b) the National Electricity Policy; (c) the National Electricity Plan; and
(d) the National Action Plan on Climate Change.353
5.125. The Panel noted that India's defence under Article XX(d) was based on the "domestic
obligations" of India as reflected in the Electricity Act, 2003, "read with" the National Electricity
Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate Change. Subsequently,
the Panel structured its analysis in a manner whereby it assessed the relevant passages and
provisions of each of these instruments individually, in order to determine whether any of them fall
within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d). The Panel found the relevant
passages and provisions of the National Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the
National Action Plan on C limate Change to be outside the scope of "laws or regulations". By
contrast, the Panel found Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 to be a "law" within the meaning of
Article XX(d), and therefore proceeded to analyse whether the DCR measures are designed "to
secure compliance" with Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003, finding, ultimately, that this is not
the case.
5.126. The rule that India sought to identify, with respect to which the DCR measures seek to
secure compliance, is that of "ensur[ing] ecological ly sustainable growth while addressing India's
energy security challenge, and ensuring compliance with its obligations relating to climate
change".354 This rule, India alleged, is set out in the passages and provisions of the domestic
instruments that were i dentified by it, and falls within the scope of "laws or regulations" under
Article XX(d) with which compliance is sought to be secured.
5.127. As discussed above , a respondent may be able to identify a specific provision of a single
domestic instrument that conta ins a given rule, obligation, or requirement with which it seeks "to
secure compliance" for purposes of Article XX(d). However, a respondent may also identify a given
rule, obligation, or requirement by reference to, or deriving from, several elements or p arts of one
or more instruments under its domestic legal system. In the latter scenario, the respondent would
bear the burden of demonstrating that the instruments , or parts thereof, that it identifies actually
set out the rule alleged by it. Additionally, a respondent would also have to demonstrate that such
rule falls within the scope of "law s or regulation s" under Article XX(d) by reference to all the
factors that may be relevant for such an assessment. As explained above, such factors may
include, among others: (i) the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to which the

350 Panel Report, para. 7.328 (quoting GATT Panel Report, EEC – Parts and Components, para. 5.15;
and Panel Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 7.315 and fn 572 thereto, in turn citing Panel Report, Korea –
Various Measures on Beef, paras. 655 and 658).
352 India's appellant's submission, para. 173 (referring to India's response to Panel question No. 34(a);
and second written submission to the Panel, paras. 136-137).
353 Panel Report, para. 7.275 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 240).
(emphasis added)
354 Panel Report, para. 7.275 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 240).

instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or course of action that is to be observed within
the domestic legal system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity of the relevant rule;
(iii) whether the rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court of law; (iv) whether the
rule has been adopted or recognized by a competent authority possessing the necessary powers
under the domestic legal system of a Mem ber; (v) the form and title given to any instrument or
instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system of a Member; and (vi) the
penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule.
5.128. We recall that the Panel analysed each of the dom estic instruments that India had
identified to assess whether they qualif y as "law s or regulation s" within the meaning of
Article XX(d). The Panel found that, whereas the passages and provisions of the National Electricity
Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate Change are not "laws
or regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d), Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 is a "law"
for purposes of that provision. In our view, given how India presented its case allegi ng the
existence of the obligation of ensuring ecologically sustainable growth deriving from several
instruments, it may have been appropriate for the Panel to have begun by assessing whether the
passages and provisions of the domestic instruments that Ind ia had identified, when considered
together, set out the rule alleged by India. Were the Panel satisfied that India had established the
existence of such a rule, it could then have considered whether this rule embodied in the domestic
instruments identified by India qualified as a "law or regulation" under Article XX(d).
5.129. Although we acknowledge that the Panel could have carried out its analysis differently, we
do not consider that the approach outlined by us above, i.e. considering the different instrument s
together, would ultimately have led the Panel to a different conclusion as to whether the
DCR measures are measures "to secure compliance with laws or regulations" within the meaning
of Article XX(d) for the reasons set out below.355
5.130. We recall that, with r espect to the National Electricity Policy, India identified
paragraph 5.12.1 of the Policy as containing the "specific obligation" with which the DCR measures
are designed to secure compliance. 356 Paragraph 5.12.1 of the National Electricity Policy reads as
follows:
Non-conventional sources of energy being the most environment friendly there is an
urgent need to promote generation of electricity based on such sources of energy. For
this purpose, efforts need to be made to reduce the capital cost of projects b ased on
non-conventional and renewable sources of energy. Cost of energy can also be
reduced by promoting competition within such projects. At the same time, adequate
promotional measures would also have to be taken for development of technologies
and a sustained growth of these sources.357
5.131. As to the National Electricity Plan, India referred to subsection 5.2.1 of the Plan as
containing the obligation with which the DCR measures are designed to secure compliance. 358
Subsection 5.2.1 reads:
5.2.1 Sustainable Development
Sustainable Development of our country is our ultimate goal which encompasses
economic development, maintaining environmental quality and social equity. This
would also ensure that development takes place to fulfil our present needs without
compromising the needs of our future generations. The importance and relevance of
power development within the confines of Clean and Green Power is the most
essential element. Such a growth depends upon the choice of an appropriate fuel /
technology for power ge neration. Accordingly, the Plan takes into account the
development of projects based on renewable energy sources as well as other
measures and technologies promoting sustainable development of the country.

355 Panel Report, para. 7.333.
356 Panel Report, para. 7.279.
357 National Electricity Policy (Panel Exhibit IND-14), para. 5.12.1.
358 Panel Report, para. 7.281 (referring to India's response to Panel question No. 34(a)).

The foremost Low Carbon Strategy Initiative is the choice of resources for power
generation. Projects in the Plan based on Conventional Sources i.e. Hydro, Nuclear &
thermal are selected as a result of Studies carried out using Capacity Expansion
Software programmes to meet the demand as stipulated by the draft 18th EPS Report.
Power from Renewable Energy Sources has also been considered while carrying out
these studies.
The demand adopted for planning purpose is the draft 18 th EPS demand projections.
This demand is based on use of energy efficient technol ogies being used and energy
conservation measures being adopted. Therefore, the planning strategy adopted is in
accordance with low carbon strategy growth.359
5.132. Finally, with respect to the National Action Plan on Climate Change, based on the summary
provided by India, the Panel identified three excerpts from the Plan to which it understood India
was referring.360 On appeal, India does not take issue with the Panel's identification of these
excerpts. These excerpts read as follows:
Recognizing that climate change is a global challenge, India will engage actively in
multilateral negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in a
positive, constructive and forward -looking manner. Our objective will be to establish
an effective, cooperative and equit able global approach based on the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, enshrined in the
[UN Framework Convention on Climate Change]. … Finally, our approach must also be
compatible with our role as a responsible and enlightened member of the international
community, ready to make our contribution to the solution of a global challenge,
which impacts on humanity as a whole.
- - -
The National Solar Mission would promote the use of solar energy for power
generation and other applications. …
Solar based power technologies are an extremely clean form of generation with
practically no form of emissions at the point of generation. They would lead to energy
security through displacement of coal and petroleum.
- - -
Rural solar thermal applications would also be pursued under public -private
partnerships where feasible. Commensurate local manufacturing capacity to meet this
level of deployment, with necessary technology tie -ups, where desirable, would be
established. Further, the Mission would aim for local Photovoltaic (PV) production from
integrated facilities at a level of 1000 [megawatts]/annum within this time frame. It
would also aim to establish at least 1000 [megawatts] of Concentrating Solar Power
(CSP) generation capacity, again, with such technical tie -ups as essential within the
stated time frame.361
5.133. Looking at the passages and provisions of the National Electricity Policy, the National
Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate Change identified b y India, we fail to see
how these instruments, taken together, could be read to set out a "rule" to ensure ecologically
sustainable growth that India alleges.362 The National Electricity Policy states that it "aims at laying
guidelines" for the attainment of certain objectives.363 The National Electricity Plan is described as
a "reference document". 364 The National Action Plan on Climate Change "updates India's national

359 National Electricity Plan (Panel Exhibit IND-16), subsection 5.2.1, pp. 90-91.
360 Panel Report, para. 7.283.
361 National Action Plan on Climate Change (Panel Exhibit IND-2), pp. 1, 20, and 22, respectively.
362 India acknowledges that the National Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National
Action Plan on Climate Change are, in and of themselves, "non-binding legal instruments". (India's appellant's
363 National Electricity Policy (Panel Exhibit IND-14), para. 1.8.
364 National Electricity Policy (Panel Exhibit IND-14), para. 3.1.

programmes relevant to addressing climate change"; it "identifies measures that promote [India's]
development objectives, while also yielding co -benefits for addressing climate change effectively";
and it "lists specific opportunities to simultaneously advance India's development and climate
related objectives of both adaptation as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation."365 We note that
there are differences in the substantive content of the passages and provisions of these three
instruments, on the one hand, and the substance of the rule that India alleges they contain, on the
other hand. In addition, the relevant texts of these instruments, whether seen in isolation or read
together, do not set out, with a sufficient degree of normativity and specificity, a "rule" to ensure
ecologically sustainable growth, as alleged by India. Instead, we note, as did the Panel, that the
text of these passages and provisions "is hortatory, aspirational, declaratory, and at times solely
descriptive".366
5.134. We now turn to Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which reads as follows:
3. (1) The Central Government shall, from time to time, prepare the national
electricity policy and tariff policy, in consultation with the State Governments and the
[Central Electricity Authority] for development of the power system based on optimal
utilisation of resources such as coal, nat ural gas, nuclear substances or materials,
hydro and renewable sources of energy.
(2) The Central Government shall publish National Electricity Policy and tariff policy
from time to time.
(3) The Central Government may, from time to time, in consultation w ith the State
Governments and the [Central Electricity Authority], review or revise, the National
Electricity Policy and tariff policy referred to in sub-section (1).
(4) The [Central Electricity Authority] shall prepare a National Electricity Plan in
accordance with the National Electricity Policy and notify such plan once in five years:
Provided that the [Central Electricity Authority] in preparing the National Electricity
Plan shall publish the draft National Electricity Plan and invite suggestions and
objections thereon from licensees, generating companies and the public within such
time as may be prescribed:
Provided further that the [Central Electricity Authority] shall -
(a) notify the plan after obtaining the approval of the Central Government;
(b) revise the plan incorporating therein the directions, if any, given by the Central
Government while granting approval under clause (a).
(5) The [Central Electricity Authority] may review or revise the National Electricity
Plan in accordance with the National Electricity Policy.367
5.135. Section 3(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 thus stipulates that the Central Government "shall"
prepare the National Electricity Policy. Section 3(2) requires the Central Government to publish
this policy from time to time. Section 3(3) allows the Central Government to review and revise this
policy. Section 3(4) requires that the Central Electricity Authority "shall" prepare a National
Electricity Plan in accordance with the National Electricity Policy and notify such plan once in five
years. Section 3 therefore sets out the obligation, and empowers the relevant entities to
periodically prepare, publish, and review the National Electricity Policy, and the National Electricity
Plan.368 This obligation is different in content from the rule t hat India seeks to derive from Section
3 of the Electricity Act, 2003, i.e. to ensure ecologically sustainable growth while addressing

365 National Action Plan on Climate Change (Panel Exhibit IND-2), p. 13.
366 Panel Report, para. 7.313.
367 Electricity Act, 2003 (Panel Exhibit USA-20), Section 3.
368 See Panel Report, paras. 7.312 and 7.327.

India's energy security challenge, and ensuring compliance with its obligations relating to climate
change.369
5.136. While Section 3 sets out the legal basis and authority for the development of the National
Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan, it does not speak to the degree of normativity of
these instruments. Thus, for example, Section 3 does not speak to the ex tent to which these
instruments are to be observed or complied with under the domestic legal system of India .
Whereas the National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan may well have been
enacted by the authorities competent to do so under I ndia's domestic legal system, it is not clear
to us how Section 3 of the Electricity Act , 2003 would have the effect of adding to the degree of
normativity of these otherwise "non-binding" domestic instruments.
5.137. For all these reasons, we disagree with India's contention that the passages and provisions
of the domestic instruments identified by India, when read together, set out the rule "to ensure
ecologically sustainable growth while addressing India's energy security challenge, and ensuring
compliance with its obligations relating to climate change", as alleged by India.
5.3.4 Whether the Panel erred in its assessment of the international instruments
identified by India
5.138. India appeals the Panel's finding that India had failed to demonstrate that the international
instruments it had identified have "direct effect" in India, and are therefore "laws or regulations"
within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 .370 First, India submits that the Panel's
analysis was based on a "complete misunderstanding" of India' s argument s regarding the
"implementation" of legal obligations. 371 India asserts that the international instruments it had
identified have "direct effect" in India , because the executive branch of the Central Government
can take actions to "implement" or "e xecute" these international instruments without the need for
the legislature to enact a domestic law incorporating the international instruments. 372 For India, it
is because the se international instruments have "direct effect" in India that the executive is
required to take implementing action. 373 Second, India submits that the "direct effect" of the
identified international instruments under its domestic legal system is established by the fact that
"the principles of sustainable development under international environmental law have been
recognized by the Supreme Court of India to be part of the environmental and developmental
governance in India." 374 India therefore requests that we reverse the Panel's finding that the
international instruments India had identified do not fall within the scope of "laws or regulations"
under Article XX(d). India also requests that we find that , "because these instruments of
international law have a direct effect in India, … the executive needs to secure compliance with
such laws."375
5.139. The United States responds that, in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , the Appellate Body
found that an international agreement is not a "law or regulation" under Article XX(d) if a
Member's legal system calls for "domestic legislative or regulatory acts" to implement the

369 Insofar as Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003 requires that the "Central Government shall, from
time to time, prepare the national electricity policy and tariff policy … based on optimal utilisation of resources
such as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances or materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy" (emphasis
added), India agreed, at the oral hearing, with the Panel's view that the "optimal utilisation of resources such
as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances or materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy" are objectives
referenced in Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003. (See Panel Report, paras. 7.330-7.332) We also note the
Panel's finding, not challenged on appeal, that India did not put forth the argument that the DCR measures are
designed to secure compliance with the obligations under Section 3 of the Electricity Act, 2003 to periodically
prepare the National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan. The Panel also stated that it "faile[d] to
see how the DCR measures could be said to secure compliance with the obligations in Section 3 of the
Electricity Act, which are to periodically prepare the National Electricity Policy and the National Electricity Plan".
(Ibid., para. 7.329)
370 India's appellant's submission, para. 170.
371 India's appellant's submission, para. 167.
372 India's appellant's submission, paras. 167-168. According to India, legislative action to incorporate
the international instrument is required only when there is a "conflicting" domestic legislation, which is not the
case with respect to the international instruments that India has identified in this case.
373 India's appellant's submission, para. 167.
374 India's appellant's submission, para. 168 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 180 and fn 172 thereto).
375 India's appellant's submission, para. 170.

agreement.376 According to the United States, "where a 'regulatory act' intervenes, an
international agreement is not in and of itself part of a Member's laws and regulations." 377
Highlighting India's acknowledgment that the international instru ments it had identified require
executive "implementation", the United States asserts that these international instruments do not
have "direct effect" in India and are therefore outside the scope of Article XX(d), because that
provision does not distinguis h between executive or legislative action in matters of implementing
international law. 378 Moreover, the United States submits that India has failed to discharge its
burden of proof under Article XX(d), as its arguments consist of "broad generalizations abou t
Indian law, with no supporting evidence".379 With respect to the Decisions of the Supreme Court of
India that India relies upon, the United States points out that one of them merely recounts the
"history of international agreements regarding sustainable de velopment" and "provides no
guidance whatsoever on the role the referenced agreements play in Indian law". 380 The
United States also submits that India did not provide a copy of the Supreme Court Decision cited
in its first written submission to the Panel, thereby preventing an evaluation of the extent to which
it supports India's position.381
5.140. As set out above, a respondent seeking to justify an otherwise GATT -inconsistent measure
under Article XX(d) is required to establish the existence of rules that form par t of its domestic
legal system and that such rules fall within the scope of "laws or regulations" under that
provision.382 In Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , the Appellate Body stated that "the terms 'laws or
regulations' cover rules that form part of the dom estic legal system of a WTO Member, including
rules deriving from international agreements that have been incorporated into the domestic legal
system of a WTO Member or have direct effect according to that WTO Member's legal system". 383
Rules deriving from i nternational agreements may thus become part of the domestic legal system
of a Member in at least two ways. For example, Members may incorporate such rules, including
through domestic legislative or executive acts intended to implement an international
agreement384; and, certain international rules may have direct effect within the domestic legal
systems of some Members without specific domestic action to implement such rules. 385 Subject to
the domestic legal system of a Member, there may well be other ways in which international
instruments or rules can become part of that domestic legal system. An assessment of whether a
given international instrument or rule forms part of the domestic legal system of a Member must
be carried out on a case -by-case basis, in li ght of the nature of the instrument or rule and the
subject matter of the law at issue, and taking into account the functioning of the domestic legal
system of the Member in question.
5.141. We emphasize that , even if a particular international instrument can be said to form part
of the domestic legal system of a Member, this does not, in and of itself, establish the existence of
a rule, obligation, or requirement within the domestic legal system of the Member that falls within
the scope of a "law or regulation" under Article XX(d). Rather, as set out above, an assessment of
whether an instrument operates with a sufficient degree of normativity and specificity under the
domestic legal system of a Member 386 so as to set out a rule of conduct or course of action, and
thereby qualify as a "law or regulation", must be carried out on case -by-case basis, taking into

376 United States' appellee's submission, para. 155.
377 United States' appellee's submission, para. 155 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes
on Soft Drinks, para. 69).
378 United States' appellee's submission, para. 155.
379 United States' appellee's submission, para. 156.
380 United States' appellee's submission, para. 156. (fn omitted)
381 United States' appellee's submission, para. 156.
382 See supra paras. 5.106-5.114.
383 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 79. (emphasis added)
384 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para 69.
385 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, fn 148 to para. 69.
386 In the context of India's argument that the "DCR measures … have been designed to secure
compliance with India’s obligations under international law" (India's appellant's submission, para. 169), we
note that the degree of normativity of an international instrument or rule under the domestic legal system of a
Member may be different from the degree of normativity of such an instrument or rule under public
international law. Thus, for example, while the principle of pacta sunt servanda under public international law,
as codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (done at Vienna, 23 May 1969,
UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331), requires that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith", this does not mean that, in and of itself, there is a rule,
requirement, or obligation within the domestic legal system of a Member that falls within the scope of "laws or
regulations".

account all the other relevant factors relating to the instrument and the domestic legal system of
the Member.
5.142. We now turn to India's contention that the inte rnational instruments it had identified have
"direct effect" in India, and fall within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d),
because the Indian legislature "is not required to legislate on a domestic law incorporating the
international law into domestic law" before the executive branch can take action to "implement" or
"execute" the international instruments. 387 According to India, legislative action to incorporate an
international instrument is required only when there is "conflicting" dome stic legislation, which is
not the case with respect to the international instruments that India has identified in this case.388
India asserts that the very fact that the executive branch can take action to "execute" the
international instruments at issue, e .g. by enacting the DCR measures, shows that these
international instruments and rules are already a part of its domestic legal system and therefore
may be acted upon by the executive branch. 389 According to India's reading of Article XX(d),
international instruments that can be "implemented" or "executed" in the domestic legal system of
a particular Member exclusively through executive action, without any prior domestic legislative
basis, have "direct effect" within the legal system of the Member in question , form a part of that
legal system, and therefore fall within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d).
5.143. We recall that the Panel accepted India's explanation of how its domestic legal system
functions and the allocation of powers under the Constitution of India:
We have taken careful note of India's explanation of how its domestic legal system
functions. We accept India's explanation of the allocation of powers under the
Constitution of India, and we accept its explanation that the executive branch may
take implementing actions to secure compliance with India's international law
obligations under the afore -mentioned instruments. We also accept India's
explanation that the executive branch may take implementing actions without express
sanction by the legislative branch, provided those implementing actions do not run
into conflict with laws enacted by the Parliament.390
5.144. In the Panel's view, however, India's explanation suggest s that, under its domestic legal
system, either the executive or the leg islative branch, or both, as appropriate, must take
"implementing actions" to incorporate and implement India's international obligations into its
domestic legal system. 391 Given that India's explanation established that India's international law
obligations may possibly be acted upon and implemented by certain domestic authorities in India,
the Panel considered this to suggest that th ese obligations do not have "direct effect" in India. 392
The Panel also saw no basis, either in the text of Article XX(d) or in the Appellate Body's report in
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , for drawing a distinction between implementing actions taken by
the legislative branch versus implementing actions taken by the executive branch, such that the
question of whether an internation al agreement would be found to have "direct effect" for
purposes of Article XX(d) would depend on "whether the executive branch, as opposed to the
legislative branch, takes implementing measures to incorporate them into the domestic legal
system".393
5.145. Like the Panel, we see no reason to question India's explanation of the allocation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches under the Constitution of India. We also take note
of India's submission that the very fact that the executive branch can t ake action to "execute" the
international instruments or rules at issue, e.g. by enacting the DCR measures, because they are
not in conflict with domestic legislation shows that these international instruments may already
form part of its domestic legal sy stem and therefore may be acted upon by the executive

387 India's appellant's submission, para. 167.
388 India's appellant's submission, paras. 167-168. India explained before the Panel that, "[u]nder
Indian law, rules of international law are accommodated into domestic law without express legislative sanction,
provided they do not run into conflict with laws enacted by the Parliament". (Panel Report, para. 7.294
(quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 180))
389 India's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
390 Panel Report, para. 7.297.
391 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
392 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
393 Panel Report, para. 7.299 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 79).

branch.394 However, the issue of which branch of the Central G overnment has the power to
implement, execute, or otherwise give effect to an international instrument within the domestic
legal system is not , in and of itself, determinative of whether such an instrument falls within the
scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d). Rather, as explained above, whether a rule set
out in an international instrument forms part of the domestic legal system o f a Member and falls
within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d) has to be determined in light of all the
relevant factors in a given case, including the characteristics of the instrument at issue and the
features of the domestic legal system of the Member concerned.
5.146. We now turn to consider India's contention that the "direct effect" of the identified
international instruments under its domestic legal system is established by the fact that
"the principles of sustainable development under international environmental law have been
recognized by the Supreme Court of India to be part of the environmental and developmental
governance in India."395
5.147. The Panel noted India's submission that the Supreme Court of India "has held that
principles of int ernational environmental law, and the concept of sustainable development, 'are
fundamental to the environmental and developmental governance in India', and 'has also noted
that the concept of sustainable development is a part of customary international law'".396 In the
Panel's view, however, India's arguments and evidence do not speak "to the question of whether
international obligations are automatically incorporated into domestic law and have 'direct effect'
in India".397 The Panel also recalled India's openi ng statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
where India, referring to a Decision of the Supreme Court of India, explained:
The Supreme Court of India, in the context of exercise of the Central Government's
executive power of establishing a power plant, recently ruled that the decision-making
power by the executive in that case was based on the touchstone of sustainable
development and its impact on ecology following national and international
environmental principles. The principles on sustainable devel opment in that case were
inferred from the provisions of several instruments of international environmental law,
including the[United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], the principles
arrived at the other conventions concluded at the United N ations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992, including Agenda 21 and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, as well as the Rio+5 Summit of 1997, which adopted the
Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21. The court did not go into
whether or not the provisions or principles were legally binding or non -binding in
nature. It simply noted the relevance of international environmental law, as enshrined
in several legal instruments that states, in the exercise of their sovereign power, have
adhered to. It is in exercise of these powers that the policies referred to in India's
submission were formulated by the Government, including the National [Action Plan
on Climate Change], the National Electricity Policy.398
5.148. While these Decisions and observ ations by the Supreme Court may serve to highlight the
relevance of the international instruments and rules identified by India for purposes of interpreting
provisions of India's domestic law, as well as for guiding the exercise of the decision-making power
of the executive branch of the Central Government, we do not consider that this is sufficient to
demonstrate that the international instruments India identified are rules that form part of its

394 India's response to questioning at the oral hearing. See also India's appellant's submission,
para. 167: stating that "[t]he fact that the executive takes 'implementing' actions, does not mean that the
international law instrument has no direct effect. On the contrary, it is because the international law has direct
effect, that the executive wing of the government is required to take implementation action in the first place".
395 India's appellant's submission, para. 168 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 180 and fn 172 thereto). At the oral hearing, India appeared to suggest that the international
instruments it had identified can form an independent and exclusive basis for a cause of action before the
domestic courts of India. This position, however, is not supported by the Panel's findings or the Panel record.
396 Panel Report, para. 7.298 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 180, in turn
referring to Supreme Court of India, Judgment, Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others
(1996) 5 SCC 647, paras. 10-15).
397 Panel Report, para. 7.298.
398 Panel Report, fn 715 to para. 7.295 (quoting India's opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 61, in turn referring to Supreme Court of India, Decision, G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India and Others
(2013) (6) SCC 620 (Panel Exhibit IND-36 (excerpts)), paras. 161-174).

domestic legal system and fall within the scope of "laws or r egulations" under Article XX(d). To the
extent that India relies on these Decisions by the Supreme Court to reinforce its point that the
executive branch, by enacting the DCR measures, was "executing", or giving effect to, the
international instruments identified by India, we recall that the mere fact that the executive branch
takes actions in pursuance of the international instruments at issue is not sufficient, in and of
itself, to demonstrate that such international instruments fall within the scope of " laws or
regulations" under Article XX(d).
5.149. For the above reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.301 of its Report,
that India failed to demonstrate that the international instruments identified by it – namely, the
preamble of the WTO Agreeme nt, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and UN Resolution A/RES/66/288
(2012) (Rio+20 Document: "The Future We Want ") – qualify as " laws or regulations " under
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 in the present dispute.
5.3.5 Conclusion
5.150. We have found above that, in determining whether a responding party has identified a rule
that falls within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, a panel
should evaluate and give due consideration to all the characteristics of the relevant instrument(s)
and should avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic. In particular, it may
be relevant for a panel to consider, among others: (i) the degree of nor mativity of the instrument
and the extent to which the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or course of action
that is to be observed within the domestic legal system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity
of the relevant rule; (iii) whet her the rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court of
law; (iv) whether the rule has been adopted or recognized by a competent authority possessing
the necessary powers under the domestic legal system of a Member; (v) the form and title gi ven
to any instrument or instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system of a
Member; and (vi) the penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule. In some cases,
such as those involving a specific, legally enforceable rule unde r a single provision of a domestic
legislative act, determining whether a respondent has identified "laws or regulations" within the
meaning of Article XX(d) may be a relatively straightforward exercise. In other cases, however,
the assessment may be more complex. Importantly, this assessment must always be carried out
on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific characteristics and features of the instruments at
issue, the rule alleged to exist, and the domestic legal system of the Member concerned.
5.151. We recall that India has not demonstrated that the passages and provisions of the
domestic instruments it identified, when read together, set out the obligation "to ensure
ecologically sustainable growth while addressing India's energy security challenge, a nd ensuring
compliance with its obligations relating to climate change" , as alleged by India. 399 We have also
concluded that the Panel did not err in finding that India did not demonstrate that the international
instruments it had identified fall within the scope of "laws or regulations" under Article XX(d) in the
present dispute.400 Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.333 of its Report,
that India has not demonstrated that the DCR measures are measures "to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT 1994]", and the
Panel's ultimate finding, in paragraph 8.2.b of its Report, that the DCR measures are not justified
under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
5.4 "Essentiality" and " necessity" under Articles XX( j) and XX( d), and the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994
5.152. We recall the Panel's finding that the DCR measures do not involve the acquisition of
"products in general or local short supply" within the meaning of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994401,
and that India did not demonstrate that its DCR measures are measures "to secure compliance
with laws or regulations" that are not GATT -inconsistent within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the

399 See para. 5.137. of this Report. We clarify that, while such an obligation may exist under the
domestic legal system of India, our conclusion is limited to India's failure to demonstrate that the passages and
provisions of the domestic instruments identified by it set out the obligation alleged by it.
401 Panel Report, para. 7.265.

GATT 1994.402 The Panel therefore considered it unnecessary to make any additional findings as to
whether the same measures would be "essential" to the acquisition of solar cells and modules
within the meaning of Article XX(j), or "necessary" to secure compliance within the meaning of
Article XX(d).403 The Panel explained that , were it to find that the measures at issue "are not
'essential' or 'necessary'" within the meaning of those provisions, this would merely establish a
"separate and additional basis for the overall conclusion", which the Panel had already re ached,
i.e. "that the DCR measures are not justified under Articles XX(j) or XX(d)". 404 The Panel decided,
however, to continue its review and to make additional findings that may assist the Appellate Body
should it later be called upon to complete the legal analysis under either Article XX(j) or
Article XX(d).405 As the Panel pointed out, its approach is consistent with the approach that has
been taken in the past by other panels.406
5.153. With regard to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, the Panel furthe r recalled
that "India ha[d] failed to demonstrate that the DCR measures fall within the scope of
Articles XX(j) or XX(d)" and that "the arguments that India advance[d] in connection with the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX [were] essentially a r epetition of the arguments that it
present[ed] in relation to the issue of whether solar cells and modules are 'essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply' under Article XX(j), and
'necessary to secure complia nce with laws or regulations' under Article XX(d)."407 Consequently,
the Panel saw "no compelling reason to proceed with any further examination of the
DCR measures under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994", and therefore refrained from
doing so.408
5.154. We have addressed India's appeal of the Panel 's findings regarding threshold legal
elements under Articles XX(j) and XX(d) of the GATT 1994 above, and have upheld the Panel's
finding, in paragraph 7.265 of its Report, that solar cells and modules are not "p roducts in local or
general short supply" in India, within the meaning of Article XX(j), as well as the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.333 of its Report, that India did not demonstrate that the DCR measures are
measures "to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of [the GATT 1994]". We have also upheld the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 8.2.b of
its Report, that the DCR measures are not justified under either Article XX(j) or Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994.
5.155. Given these findings, we do not consider it necessary further to examine India's claims on
appeal pertaining to the Panel's "limited review and analysis" of whether the DCR measures are
"essential" to the acquisition of solar cells and modules for the purpose of Article XX(j), or whether
they are "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d). Nor do we consider it necessary to
examine India's arguments as they relate to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994.
5.5 Separate opinion of one Appellate Body Member
5.156. Having upheld the Panel's findings under Article III:8(a), Article XX(j) and Article XX(d) of
the GATT 1994, the Division hearing this appeal has determined that it is not necessary further to
address India's claims regarding the remaining legal elements under those provisions. While fully
agreeing with my colleagues in this regard, I wish to offer some remarks regarding why I consider

402 Panel Report, para. 7.333.
403 Panel Report, para. 7.334.
404 Panel Report, para. 7.334.
405 See Panel Report, para. 7.335.
406 As noted by the Panel, the Appellate Body has confirmed that, "[j]ust as a panel has the discretion to
address only those claims which must be addressed in order to dispose of the matter at issue in a dispute, so
too does a panel have the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a
particular claim". (Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 135 (emphasis original)) The Panel noted that
the "logical corollary of this proposition is that a panel has the discretion based on the circumstances of each
case to address certain claims and arguments even where it is not strictly necessary to do so to resolve the
matter at issue", and that "the Appellate Body has confirmed that panels have the discretion to make
alternative findings, including alternative factual findings." (Panel Report, fn 214 to para. 7.76 (referring to
Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 118; Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,
408 Panel Report, para. 7.390.

that it was appropriate to end our analysis, without further disposing of the other issues ra ised by
India on appeal. My remarks relate mainly to the adjudicatory function of the Appellate Body in
general, and I begin therefore by reflecting on the Appellate Body's function as contemplated
under the DSU.
5.157. Article 17.1 of the DSU describes the Appel late Body's function in broad terms: to "hear
appeals from panel cases". In particular, Article 17.12 of the DSU provides that the Appellate Body
"shall address" each of the issues raised by the parties to a dispute during an appellate
proceeding, and Article 17.6 delineates the scope of appeals as "issues of law covered in the panel
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". Thus, the Appellate Body is called upon
to review any aspect of a panel's analysis, including a panel's legal reasonin g, provided that it has
been properly raised by the parties on appeal in accordance with Article 17.6. This language in the
DSU limits the scope of appellate review to the issues raised by the parties in the context of a
given dispute. Once raised by the p arties on appeal, however, it is the legal "duty" of the
Appellate Body to "address" each of those issues.
5.158. In deciding how to "address" each of the issues raised by the parties, the Appellate Body is
guided by certain overarching principles. First, the App ellate Body, as a part of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, contributes to the objectives of the "prompt settlement" of a dispute or
"positive solution to a dispute", which are enunciated in the DSU.409 Thus, the Appellate Body may,
for example, decline to make specific findings regarding an issue raised on appeal, and "address"
the issue only to the extent necessary to ascertain that, in light of the other rulings under a
different, but related, claim on appeal that resolve the dispute, there was no need to rule on that
particular additional issue in question. 410 Whether making such an additional finding would serve
the goal of facilitating the prompt settlement and effective resolution of a dispute is a matter for
the Appellate Body to decide in light of t he particular circumstances of each case, including the
nature of, and relationship between, the relevant claims on appeal, as well as their implications for
implementation.
5.159. In addition, a necessary incident of the adjudicative function conferred upon the
Appellate Body is that it must ensure that the parties have the opportunity fully to present their
arguments and evidence, and that they enjoy "due process" throughout the appellate
proceeding.411 Thus, the need to safeguard the due process rights of the pa rties in cases where,
for example, a particular issue has not been sufficiently explored before the panel is an important
constraint on the Appellate Body's ability to rule on particular issues raised on appeal.412
5.160. That said, the Appellate Body's decision on how to "address" each of the issues on appeal
should be understood as an extension of its duty to properly exercise its adjudicative function.
Given the express language contained in Article 17.12 of the DSU, i.e. "shall address", the
Appellate Body is no t required to provide reasons as to why it adjudicates a particular issue
properly raised by the parties on appeal in accordance with Article 17.6 of the DSU. However,
when the Appellate Body considers, for example, that further findings on issues appealed are not

409 Article 3.3 of the DSU provides, in this regard, that the aim of the WTO's dispute settlement system
is the "prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or
indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member".
Article 3.4 stipulates that DSB recommendations or rulings "shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter under consideration." Article 3.7 of the DSU further states that "[t]he aim of the
dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute".
410 In US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body stated as follows: "although we recognize that there may
be cases in which it would be useful for us to review an issue, despite the fact that our ruling would not result
in rulings and recommendations by the DSB, we find no compelling reason for doing so in this case." The
Appellate Body added that an interpretation of a particular phrase in the SCM Agreement was "unnecessary for
purposes of resolving" that dispute. (Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras. 510-511) In relation
to another claim in that case, the Appellate Body stated that it failed to see how an examination of that "claim
would contribute to the 'prompt' or 'satisfactory settlement' of this matter or would contribute to 'secure a
positive solution' to this dispute." (Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 747)
411 Third parties are conferred relatively more limited rights under Article 10 of the DSU.
412 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 339, where the
Appellate Body observed that "the question of the applicability of the SCM Agreement to the export subsidies in
this dispute raises a number of complex issues" and that "in the absence of a full exploration of these issues,
completing the analysis might affect the due process rights of the participants". See also Appellate Body

necessary in order to facilitate the prompt settlement and effective resolution of the dispute, it will
explain this in its report.413
5.161. This brings me to Article 3.2 of the DSU, which provides that the "dispute settlement
system of the WTO … serves … to clarify the existing provisions of [the covered] agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law" . As the
Appellate Body has noted, there is nothing in Article 3.2 that would encourage "the Appellate Body
to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of
resolving a particular dispute." 414 The Appellate Body cannot be expected to offer interpretative
guidance regarding provisions of the covered agreements in an abstract manner beyond the scope
of what is required in a particular dispute. To do so would go beyond the Appellate Body's
adjudicatory function as contemplated under the DSU.
5.162. At the same time, WTO Members including the third parties to a dispute have a systemic
interest in receiving an Appellate Body report that properly clarifies the existing provisions of the
covered agreements. 415 Moreover, an Appellate Body report that appropriately disposes of the
matter at issue, which ultimately serves to clarify the relevan t provisions of the covered
agreement, is not only required under the DSU, it is also important in that it allows the DSB to
make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings "in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members".416
5.163. Through this separate opinion, I hope to be able to shed light on how I view the
Appellate Body's function, as well as its limits, both in the context of the present appeal, as well as
others on which I have been working with my distinguished colleagues at the Appellate Body.
6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body makes the following findings and
conclusions.
6.1 Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
6.2. With respect to the Panel's finding under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, we consider that ,
under Article III:8(a) the product purchased by way of procurement must necessarily be "like", or
"directly competitive" with or "substitutable" for – in other words, in a "competitive relationship"
with – the foreign prod uct subject to discrimination. Although a consideration of inputs and
processes of production may inform the question of whether the product purchased is in a
competitive relationship with the product being discriminated against, it does not displace the
competitive relationship standard. The question of whether the cover of Article III:8(a) may also
extend to discrimination relating to inputs and processes of production used in respect of products
purchased arises only after the product purchased has been found to be in a competitive
relationship with the product subject to discrimination. Based on our review of the Panel's analysis
and approach:
a. We find that the Panel was properly guided by the Appellate Body report in Canada –
Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program in finding that the DCR measures
are not covered by the derogation under Article III:8(a).
b. We reject India's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
assessing India's arguments regarding the scope of a pplication of Article III:8(a) of the
GATT 1994.

413 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, paras. 117-118; US – Wheat Gluten,
paras. 80-92; and Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras. 43-52. In addition, if the Appellate Body
considers that it is not in a position to complete the legal analysis as requested by a party on appeal, for
instance, due to a lack of sufficient factual findings by a panel, it will state this reason in its Report.
414 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 at 340.
415 The Appellate Body has explained, "[w]hile the application of a provision may be regarded as
confined to the context in which it takes place, the relevance of clarification contained in adopted
Appellate Body reports is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a specific case."
Appellate Body report, US ‒ Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160.
416 Article 21.1 of the DSU.

c. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.135 and 7.187 of the
Panel Report that the DCR measures are not covered by the derogation under
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 and that, therefore, the DCR measures are inconsistent
with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
6.3. India's request for completion of the legal analysis is premised on the condition that we
reverse the Panel's finding that the DCR measures are not covered by the derogation under
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. Having upheld this finding by the Panel, we need not, and do
not, address India's further claims and related arguments regarding the remaining elements under
Article III:8(a). We therefore express no view on the Panel's reasoning and analysis in this regard.
6.2 Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994
6.4. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, we consider that, in
assessing whether products are "in general or loca l short supply" within the meaning of
Article XX(j), a panel should examine the extent to which a particular product is "available" for
purchase in a particular geographical area or market, and whether this is sufficient to meet
demand in the relevant area or market. This analysis may, in appropriate cases, take into account
not only the level of domestic production of a particular product and the nature of the products
that are alleged to be "in general or local short supply", but also such factors as the relevant
product and geographic market, potential price fluctuations in the relevant market, the purchasing
power of foreign and domestic consumers, and the role that foreign and domestic producers play
in a particular market, including the extent to which domestic producers sell their production
abroad. Due regard should be given to the total quantity of imports that may be "available" to
meet demand in a particular geographical area or market. It may thus be relevant to consider the
extent to which intern ational supply of a product is stable and accessible, including by examining
factors such as the distance between a particular geographical area or market and production
sites, as well as the reliability of local or transnational supply chains. Whether and which factors
are relevant will necessarily depend on the particularities of each case. Just as there may be
factors that have a bearing on "availability" of imports in a particular case, it is also possible that,
despite the existence of manufacturing ca pacity, domestic products are not "available" in all parts
of a particular country, or are not "available" in sufficient quantities to meet demand. In all cases,
the responding party has the burden of demonstrating that the quantity of "available" supply from
both domestic and international sources in the relevant geographical market is insufficient to meet
demand.
a. We therefore disagree with India to the extent that it argues that "short supply" can be
determined without regard to whether supply from all s ources is sufficient to meet
demand in the relevant market.
b. We reject India's claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. As
we see it, India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU relies for its validity on India's
reading of Articl e XX(j), and in particular India's contention that the existence of a
situation of "short supply" within the meaning of Article XX(j) is to be determined
exclusively by reference to whether there is "sufficient" domestic manufacturing of a
given product. The fact that India does not agree with the conclusion the Panel reached
does not mean that the Panel committed an error amounting to a violation of Article 11
of the DSU.
c. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.265 of the Panel Report,
that solar cells and modules are not "products in general or local short supply" in India
within the meaning of Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994, and the Panel's ultimate finding, in
paragraph 8.2.b of its Report, that the DCR measures are not justified unde r
Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994.
6.5. Having upheld the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.265 of the Panel Report, that solar cells
and modules are not "products in local or general short supply" in India, within the meaning of
Article XX(j), we do not consider it necessary further to examine India's claims on appeal
pertaining to the Panel's "limited review and analysis" of whether India's DCR measures are
"essential" to the acquisition of solar cells and modules for the purpose of Article XX(j). Nor do we

consider it necessary to examine India's arguments as they relate to the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
6.3 Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
6.6. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, we consider that ,
in determining whether a responding party has identified a rule that falls within the scope of "laws
or regulations" under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, a panel should evaluate and give due
consideration to all the characteristics of the relevant instrument( s) and should avoid focusing
exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic. In particular, it may be relevant for a panel to
consider, among others: (i) the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to which
the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or course of action that is to be observed
within the domestic legal system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity of the relevant rule;
(iii) whether the rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court of law; (iv) whether the
rule has been adopted or recognized by a competent authority possessing the necessary powers
under the domestic legal system of a Member; (v) the form and title given to any instrument or
instruments containing the rule under th e domestic legal system of a Member; and (vi) the
penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule. Importantly, this assessment must
always be carried out on a case -by-case basis, in light of the specific characteristics and features
of the instruments at issu e, the rule alleged to exist, as well as the domestic legal system of the
Member concerned.
a. We therefore find that India has not demonstrated that the passages and provisions of
the domestic instruments identified by India, when read together, set out the rule "to
ensure ecologically sustainable growth while addressing India's energy security
challenge, and ensuring compliance with its obligations relating to climate change", as
alleged by India.
b. We find that that the Panel did not err in finding that India failed to demonstrate that the
international instruments it identified fall within the scope of "laws or regulations" under
Article XX(d) in the present dispute.
c. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.333 of the Panel Report,
that Ind ia has not demonstrated that the DCR measures are measures "to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
[the GATT 1994]", and the Panel's ultimate finding, in paragraph 8.2.b of the Panel
Report, that the DCR measures are not justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
6.7. Having upheld the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.333 of the Panel Report, that India did not
demonstrate that the DCR measures are measures "to secure compliance with laws or regulation s
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT 1994]", we do not consider it
necessary further to examine India's claims on appeal pertaining to the Panel's "limited review and
analysis" of whether the DCR measures are "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d). Nor
do we consider it necessary to examine India's arguments as they relate to the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
6.8. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request India to bring its measures, found in
this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with the TRIMs
Agreement and the GATT 1994, into conformity with its obligations under those Agreements.