Document: WT/DS268/R Page E-1 ANNEX E QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Contents Page Annex E-1 Answers of Argentina to Questions of the Panel – First Meeting  E-2 Annex E-2 Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel – First Meeting E-18 Annex E-3 Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel – First
Date: 8 January 2004
Document codes: WT/DS268/R
Complainant: Argentina
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: China, EU, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 18, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. VI, X  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX E

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Contents Page
Annex E-1 Answers of Argentina to Questions of the Panel – First Meeting E-2
Annex E-2 Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel – First
Meeting
E-18
Annex E-3 Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel – First
Meeting (revised version)1
E-43
Annex E-4 Answers of the United States to Questions of Argentina – First
Meeting
E-68
Annex E-5 Answers of the United States to Questions of Argentina – First
Meeting (revised version)2
E-75
Annex E-6 Question of the European Communities to the United States –
Third Parties Session
E-82
Annex E-7 Answers of Mexico to Questions of Argentina – Third Parties
Session
E-83
Annex E-8 Answers of Argentina to Questions of the Panel – Second Meeting E-85
Annex E-9 Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel – Second
Meeting
E-93
Annex E-10 Answers of the United Stat es to Questions from Argentina –
Second Meeting
E-107
Annex E-11 Comments of Argentina on the United States' Closing Statement
and the United States' Responses to the Panel's and Argentina's
Questions – Second Meeting
E-117
Annex E-12 Comments of the United States on Argentina's Responses to
Questions from the Panel – Second Meeting
E-133

1 Pursuant to the explanations provided by the United States at the beginning of the second substantive
meeting of the Panel with parties, the United States provided a revised version of its written answers to the
questions of the Panel in connection with the first substantive meeting of the Panel with parties. In this revised
version, the full text of paragraph 14 of the original document dated 8 January 2004, as well as similar sentences
found in paragraph 17 (the penultimate sentence), paragraph 41 (the second sentence), and paragraph 44 (the
latter part of the third sentence) were deleted.
2 Pursuant to the explanations provided by the United States at the beginning of the second substantive
meeting of the Panel with parties, the United States provided a revised version of its written answers to the
questions of Argentina in connection with the first substantive meeting of the Panel with parties. In this revised
version, edits were made to paragraph 14 of the original document dated 8 January.

ANNEX E-1

ANSWERS OF ARGENTINA TO QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL –
FIRST MEETING

EXPEDITED REVIEWS/WAIVER PROVISIONS

ARGENTINA

1. Is Argentina basing its "as such" claim regarding expedited reviews/waiver provisions
of the US law also on the provisions of US law regarding the adequacy of responses to the notice
of initiation, i.e. the 50 per cent rule? Please clarify.

Argentina’s Response:

 First, Argentina clarifies that it is not challe nging the expedited review provisions, 19 USC. §
1675(c)(3)(B) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(1)(ii), “as such.” Rather, Argentina chose to limit its
challenge to the expedited review provisions “as applied” in the sunset review of OCTG from
Argentina (see Argentina’s First Submission, section VII.C).

 With respect to Argentina’s challenge to the waiver provisions (19 USC. § 1675(c)(4) and 19
C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii)), Argentina has challeng ed these provisions “as such” and “as applied”
(see Argentina’s First Submission, sections VII.A and C). The “as such” claim is not based on the US
adequacy provision, 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A), although the adequacy provision is relevant to
the waiver claim. Specifically, the adequacy provis ion is relevant to the me chanics of the “deemed”
waiver under 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii), because, pursuant to the deemed waiver provision, the
Department will deem a respondent to waive its participation where it receives no response or an
incomplete response to a notice of initiation. In addition, the Department has treated a response that is
“inadequate” by virtue of 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(1)( ii)(A) (which contains the 50 per cent rule) as a
waiver of participation in a sunset review, whic h is what the Department’s Issues and Decision
Memorandum said that the Department did to Siderca in this case. (A RG-51, at 4-5) (See also, e.g.,
Issues and Decision Memorandum for Seamless Pipe from Argentina, Brazil, Germany, and Italy
(31 October 2000) at 3, 5 (deeming the “inadequate” response from an Italian respondent to constitute
a waiver)(ARG-63, Tab 212); Issues and Decision Memorandum for Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel
Plate from Belgium (March 29, 2000) at 2-3, 5 (deeming the “inadequate” responses from two
respondent interested parties to constitute waivers of participation)(ARG-63, Tab 82))

 The waiver provisions are inconsistent with Ar ticles 11.3, 6.1, and 6.2, because they preclude
the Department from conducting a “review” and making a “determination” of the likelihood of
dumping, and because they deny respondent interested parties the opportunity to present evidence and
defend their interests. The fact that the United States now claims that the waiver provisions are
limited to a “company-specific” finding does not (a) reflect what is set forth in the Issues and
Decision Memorandum in this case, and (b) excuse the violation of Articles 11.3, 6.1, and 6.2. In
certain circumstances, such as those present in this case, company-specific waivers inevitably lead
directly to an “order-wide” likelihood determination.

BOTH PARTIES

15.
(a) Does the cross-reference in Article 11.4 of the Agreement incorporate all
provisions of Article 6 in Article 11.3? Does the same cross-reference also
incorporate Annex II in Article 11.3?

Argentina’s Response:

 The cross-reference in Article 11.4 expressly incorporates all provisi ons of Article 6 into
Article 11.3. Article 11.4 states that “[t]he provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure
shall apply to any review carried out under this Ar ticle[,]” without any limiting language. (Emphasis
added.) As the Appellate Body determined in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , however, certain
provisions of Article 6 – while incorporated into Ar ticle 11.3 by virtue of Article 11.4 – may not be
relevant to all sunset reviews conducted unde r Article 11.3. (See Appellate Body Report, Sunset
Review of Steel from Japan, DS244, para. 155.) Argentina submits that the provisions of Article 6 for
which it has brought claims in the instant dispute – Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.8, 6.9, and Annex II – are
relevant to sunset reviews under Article 11.3, and therefore apply to Article 11.3 reviews.

 The cross-reference in Article 11.4 to Article 6 incorporates Annex II. Article 11.4 expressly
incorporates all provisions of Article 6 into Article 11.3, including Article 6.8. Article 6.8, in turn,
instructs that the “provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.”
Accordingly, by virtue of the cross-reference in Article 11.4, Annex II applies to sunset reviews under
Article 11.3.

 (b) If you are of the view that the cross-reference in Article 11.4 makes article 6.1 of
the Agreement applicable to sunset reviews, does Article 6.1 – together with its
subparagraphs- require that the investigating authority send
 questionnaires to
exporters in sunset reviews?

Argentina’s Response:

 As recognized by the Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , Article 6.1
applies to sunset reviews under Article 11.3 by virtue of the cross-reference contained in Article 11.4.
(See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , DS244, para. 152.) Argentina does
not argue, however, that Article 6.1 – together with its subparagraphs – requires that the investigating
authority send questionnaires to exporters in all sunset reviews under Article 11.3. Under
Article 11.3, however, the “[investigating] authorities have a duty to seek out relevant information” in
sunset reviews. ( Id. at para. 199) Sending questionnaires would be one way for the authorities to
discharge this obligation, but Argentina does not believe that it is the only way.

 In the sunset review before this Panel, Argentina’s claim does not depend on the
Department’s failure to send questionnaires. However, Argentina does contend that the Department
failed to satisfy its obligation to conduct a “revie w,” undertake a “rigorous examination” and make a
“determination” or, as the Appellate Body recently stated, to “seek out relevant information and to
evaluate it in an objective manner.” (Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan ,
DS244, para. 199).

 Part of the obligation in Article 6.1 requires that “[a]ll interested parties in an anti-dumping
investigation shall be given notice of the information which the authorities require . . . .” In this case,
the Department considered that there could be ot her Argentine exporters and that the existence and
non-response of these exporters could influence the type of sunset proceeding that the Department
would conduct. The Department had an obligation to seek out the information it required and to do so
consistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 Therefore, while Article 6.1 may not require that the investigating authority issue
questionnaires to exporters in a sunset review, the au thority may be obligated to do so in a particular
sunset review in order to ensure that it makes the likelihood determination on a “sufficient factual
basis,” as required by Article 11.3. (Panel Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , DS244,
para. 7.177). A “sufficient factual basis” is required by the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 In the absence of evidence – whether submitted by the parties or gathered by the authority –
of likely dumping, the authorities must terminate an anti-dumping measure.

 (c) What significance, if any, should be gi ven to the use of the word "investigation"
in paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II, and to the use of the word "should" rather
than "shall" in all of its paragraphs?

Argentina’s Response:

 In addressing the applicability of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II to sunset reviews under
Article 11.3, the use of the word “investigation” in these paragraphs should not be assigned any
particular significance. As explained above, the cross-reference in Article 11.4 expressly incorporates
Annex II into Article 11.3. Theref ore, paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II apply to sunset reviews under
Article 11.3. Moreover, the Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan stated that
Article 11.3 reviews are investigatory in nature. ( See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel
from Japan, DS244, para. 111 (“This language in Article 11.3 makes clear that it envisages a process
combining both investigatory and adjudicatory aspects.”)) Thus, the use of the word “investigation”
in paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II should not be interpreted as indication that these provisions do not
apply to Article 11.3 reviews. That the Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan found
that Article 6.1 applies to Article 11.3 reviews despit e that provision’s use of the term “investigation”
provides further support for this conclusion. (See id. at para. 152)

 The use of “should” rather than “shall” in Annex II is also not significant. In Steel Plate from
India, the Panel held that, despite the use of the wo rd “should,” the provisions of Annex II are
mandatory:

We note that there is disagreement between the parties as to whether the provisions of
Annex II, which are largely phrased in the conditional tense (“should”) are
mandatory. We consider that Article 6.8 itself answers this question. Article 6.8
explicitly provides that “The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the
application of this paragraph” (emphasis added). In our view, the use of the word
“shall” in this context establishes that th e provisions of Annex II are mandatory.
Indeed, this would seem a necessary conclusion. The alternative reading would mean
that investigating authorities are required (“shall”) to apply provisions which are not
themselves required, an interpretation that makes no sense. Moreover, the provisions
of Annex II, while worded in the conditional , give specific guidance to investigating
authorities regarding certain aspects of their determinations which, without more,
clearly establish the operational requirements. Thus, we consider that the provisions
of Annex II are mandatory, not because of the wording of those provisions
themselves, but because of the obligation to observe them set out in Article 6.8.
(Panel Report, Steel Plate from India, DS206, para. 7.56; see also Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic
Tiles, DS189, paras. 6.74, 6.79-6.80 (treating the provisions of Annex II as mandatory obligations).

 Given the mandatory language of Article 6.8, Argentina considers that there can be little
question that the obligations of Article 6, and speci fically 6.8 and Annex II, apply in sunset reviews,
and that they reflect obligations of the Members.

16. In this sunset review, did Siderca attemp t to submit additional evidence to the DOC
after its substantive response to the notice of initiation? If so, how did the DOC respond to such
attempts?

Argentina’s Response:

 Siderca did not attempt to submit additional ev idence to the Department after its substantive
response to the notice of initiation. Having submitted a “complete substantive response” that met all
of the Department’s regulatory requirements and ha ving offered to cooperate fully in the sunset
review, under Article 6.1, 6.8 and Annex II, it was the Department’s obligation to “specify in detail
the information required” from Siderca in order fo r the Department to undertake a review and make
the required determination under Article 11.3. Siderca could not reasonably be expected to know that
any additional information was nece ssary in order to have the Department undertake a meaningful
review and make a substantive likelihood determination. The Department determined that Siderca’s
response was inadequate, however, and never requested any additional information from Siderca.

 Once the decision to expedite had been taken, that meant that the Department’s likelihood
determination was pre-ordained – likely dumping – for the non-responding respondents accounting
for 100 per cent of the Argentine exports and for Siderca.

 In addition, although the Department’s sunset regulations afford respondents the opportunity
to comment on the adequacy determination, these comments “may not include any new factual
information or evidence . . . .” (19 C.F.R. § 351.309(e)). Consequently, Siderca did not comment on
the Department’s adequacy determination, because the regulation precluded it from submitting any
new evidence with respect to that determination.

17. What is the significance of the word "may" in section 1675(c)(3)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930?

Argentina’s Response:

 Through the use of the word “may,” section 167 5(c)(3)(B) authorizes the Department and the
Commission to make their respective likelihood determinations without further investigation on the
basis of the facts available (which in the Department’s consistent practice is limited to the existence of
any one of the three checklist criteria prescribed by the SAA and Sunset Policy Bulletin ), where
interested party responses to the notice of initiation are inadequate. Argentina takes this opportunity
to reiterate that it has not challenged this provisio n of US law “as such” (please refer to Argentina’s
response to question 1).

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE
OF DUMPING

ARGENTINA

18. The Panel notes Argentina's assertion in paragraph 189 of its first written submission
that the reporting by the DOC of the original dumping margin to the ITC as the likely margin
violated Articles 2 and 11.3 of the Agreement. Please explain whether Argentina submits that
the original dumping margins can not be used at all in sunset reviews, or whether they can not
establish the sole basis of investigating authorities' sunset determinations.

Argentina’s Response:

 Argentina’s view is that the original dumping margins can be considered as one of the many
factors by the authority in making the likelihood of dumping determination. In Argentina’s view,
original dumping margins cannot establish the sole basis – or event the preponderant basis – for a
determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. The original dumping
determination alone simply cannot constitute a suff icient basis upon which the authority can make a
determination that dumping would be likely to conti nue or recur upon expiry of the duty. Indeed, the
very fact that there is a sunset review means that there was a dumping margin from the original
investigation. It follows that if the original dumping margin were to be given decisive weight, then
the authorities would always make a determinatio n that dumping would be likely. Nor can the
original dumping margin coupled with consider ation of import volumes – with no more – be
considered sufficient for purposes of the likelihoo d determination. Yet this is precisely what the
Department does when it applies the checklist cr iteria in the SAA and Section II.A.3 of the Sunset
Policy Bulletin.

 The SAA and the Sunset Policy Bulletin limit the Department’s so-called likelihood
“analysis” solely to a consideration of: (1) the existence of dumping margins from the original
investigation and subsequent administrative reviews; (2) whether imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after issuance of the order; and (3) whether dumping was eliminated after imposition of the
order and import volumes declined significantly. As the Appellate Body recently explained in Sunset
Review of Steel from Japan , however, the issue is not whether dumping margins and import volumes
might be relevant, but “whether Section II.A.3 goes further and instructs USDOC to attach decisive or
preponderant weight to these two factors in every case.” (DS244, para. 176)(emphasis added).

 In Argentina’s view, these factors are not merely disproportionately weighted in Department
sunset reviews; they are the sole factors relied on by the Department, and hence preordain the result of
an affirmative likelihood determination in all De partment sunset reviews in which the domestic
industry participates. The Appellate Body explained that it did not believe that either factor (dumping
margins or import volumes) could always be pres umed to constitute sufficient evidence of likely
dumping:

We would have difficulty accepting that dumping margins and import volumes are
always “highly probative” in a sunset review by USDOC if this means that either or
both of these factors are presumed, by themselves, to constitute sufficient evidence
that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping. Such a presumption might have some validity when dumping has continued
since the duty was imposed (as in the first sc enario identified in Section II.A.3 of the
Sunset Policy Bulletin ), particularly when such dumping has continued with
significant margins and import volumes. Ho wever, the second and third scenarios in
Section II.A.3 relate to the situation where there is no dumping (either because
imports ceased or because dumping was eliminated after the duty was imposed). The
cessation of imports in the second scenario and the decline in import volumes in the
third scenario could well have been cau sed or reinforced by changes in the
competitive conditions of the market-place or strategies of exporters, rather than by
the imposition of the duty alone. Therefore, a case-specific analysis of the factors
behind a cessation of imports or a decline in import volumes (when dumping is
eliminated) will be necessary to determine that dumping will recur if the duty is
terminated. (DS244, para. 177)
 The Appellate Body’s statement applies directly to this case. Imports stopped, or at the very
least were significantly less, after the imposition of the anti-dumping measure. And there was no
evidence of continued dumping during the life of the anti-dumping measure. Thus, the Department
could not simply presume that, because the Departme nt calculated a 1.36 per cent dumping margin in

the original investigation (based on the practice of zeroing), dumping would be likely to continue. As
demonstrated in Argentina’s First and Second Submissions, without zeroing, there would be no
dumping margin. (See Argentina’s First Submission, para. 189, Exhibit ARG-52; Argentina’s Second
Submission, paras. 138-145, Exhibits ARG-66A & B)

19. The Panel notes Argentina's arguments in paragraphs 181, 189 and 192 of its first
written submission regarding the DOC's alleged use of the zeroed-out dumping margin in the
instant sunset review. Is Argentina arguin g that the DOC zeroed-out the likely dumping
margin in this sunset review, or, is it arguing that the use of the originally zeroed-out margin
rendered the DOC's likelihood determinations WTO- inconsistent? If the latter, please explain
whether in your view the original dumping margin in question, alone or together with some
other facts, constituted the basis of the DOC's likelihood determinations in this sunset review?

Argentina’s Response:

 Argentina considers that the Department’s appl ication of the waiver provisions resulted in a
mandatory determination of likely dumping in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.

 Assuming arguendo that waiver was not applied to either Siderca or to Argentina in this case,
Argentina’s view is that the Department identif ied only two facts in its likelihood of dumping
determination: (1) the dumping margin of 1.36 per cent from the original investigation; and (2) the
decline in import volumes (See Issues and Decision Memorandum at 5 (ARG-51)).

 With respect to the dumping margin from the original investigation, in the words of the
Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , this is precisely one of those cases where
zeroing affects not only the degree of the dumping margin, but also changes the outcome of no
dumping (within the meaning of Article 2) to one of du mping. (DS244, para. 135) It is clear that in
calculating the dumping margin during the original investigation, the Department employed the
practice of zeroing negative margins. This can be seen clearly by Exhibit ARG-52 to Argentina’s
First Submission, and the further supporting information submitted with Argentina’s Second
Submission. This evidence shows that, without th e zeroing of negative margins, the results of the
Department’s calculations in the original investigation would have been a negative
 4.35 per cent.
Argentina’s position is that the De partment’s reliance on the 1.36 per cent margin from the original
investigation (a margin calculated on the basis of zeroing) and the decline in import volume as the
sole factors in rendering its determination that dum ping would be likely to continue was inconsistent
with US WTO obligations.

 In addition, Argentina takes the position that the Department’s reporting of the 1.36 per cent
margin to the Commission violates Articles 11.3 and Article 2. Even tho ugh Article 11.3 may not
require an authority to calculate a dumping margin or report a margin of dumping in connection with
the likelihood determination, once an authority undertak es to either calculate a margin or rely on a
margin for purposes of the likelihood of injury dete rmination, or report a “likely” margin of dumping
for use in the likelihood of injury analysis, then the authority must act consistently with the
requirements of Article 2 ( See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , DS244,
para. 130).

20. The Panel notes Argentina's arguments in paragraphs 124-147 of its first written
submission regarding the alleged irrefutable presumption under US law/practice regarding
likelihood determinations in sunset reviews. Please respond to the following questions:

 (a) Is Argentina basing its claim on the US law or the DOC's practice in sunset
reviews, or both?

Argentina’s Response:

 Both. Argentina is challenging US law as such. To support its as such challenge to US law,
Argentina is relying on the text of the instruments, as well as the Department’s consistent practice in
applying these instruments, in determining the mean ing of US law. In add ition, Argentina is also
challenging as a separate claim the Department’s consistent practice as such.

 The US statute, the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA), and the Sunset Policy Bulletin
(SPB), operating together, establish a presumption in favour of finding likely dumping. This WTO-
inconsistent presumption is demonstrated in the Depa rtment’s consistent practice in all sunset reviews
in which the domestic industry participates. In deed, the Department relies exclusively on the
authority of the statute, the SAA and the SPB in making its likelihood “determinations.”

 As noted in Section VII.B of Argentina’s First Submission, 19 USC. §§ 1675(c) and 1675a(c)
establish the statutory standard for determining the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping. The SAA clarifies this standard by outlining the instances in which the Department should
determine that dumping is likely to continue or recur. The SPB provides further direction to the
Department as to the three factors that it will rely on and the weight that should be given to those
factors in deciding whether termination of the order would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping.

 To understand how these three instruments function, and the cumulative effect they have in
establishing the WTO-inconsistent presumption, they need to be read together. Indeed, it should be
emphasized that in drafting these three instruments, the United States intended for them to operate in a
complementary manner in sunset reviews.

 In the end, the SPB is a distillation of the statute and the SAA, and establishes the criteria
forming the presumption that no respondent party has ever been able to refute.

 (b) If Argentina is basing its claim on the US law, please identify the legal
instruments [e.g. the Statute, the Regulations, the SPB, the Statement of
Administrative Action ("SAA") etc.] that constitute the basis of Argentina's as
such claim? In particular, please indicate, if any, the provisions in the US
statute that contains the alleged irrefutable presumption of likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Argentina’s Response:

 The legal instruments establishing the presum ption are those set out in Argentina’s Panel
Request, and explained in Argentina’s First Submission. They are: 19 USC. §§ 1675(c) and 1675a(c),
the SAA (particularly pages 888 to 890) and the SPB (particularly Section II.A.3).

 19 USC. § 1675a(c)(1) requires the Department to consider “(A) the weighted average
dumping margins determined in the investigations and subsequent reviews, and (B) the volume of
imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the anti-
dumping duty order or the acceptance of the suspension agreement.”

 The referenced portions of the SAA, in turn, outline the many instances in which, under US
law, the Department will determ ine – based solely on the factors of dumping margins and import
volumes – that dumping is likely to continue or recur:

[The Bill] establishes standards for dete rmining the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Under section [1675a(c)(1)], Commerce will examine the
relationship between dumping margins, or the absence of margins, and the volume of
imports of the subject merchandise, comparing the periods before and after the
issuance of an order or the acceptance of a suspension agreement. For example,
declining import volumes accompanied by the continued existence of dumping
margins after the issuance of an order may provide a strong indication that, absent an
order, dumping would be likely to continue, because the evidence would indicate that
the exporter needs to dump to sell at pre- order volumes. If imports cease after the
order is issued, it is reasonable to assume that the exporters could not sell in the
United States without dumping and that, to re nter the US market, they would have to
resume dumping.

The Administration believes that existence of dumping margins after the order, or the
cessation of imports after the order , is highly probative of the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, it is reasonable to assume that dumping would
continue if the discipline were removed. . . .
[T]he existence of zero or de minimis dumping margins at any time while the order
was in effect shall not in itself require Commerce to determine that there is no
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping . Exporters may have ceased
dumping because of the existence of an orde r or suspension agreement. Therefore,
the present absence of dumping is not necessarily indicative of how exporters would
behave in the absence of the order or agreement. (SAA at 889-890)(emphasis added)
 Under Section II.A.3 of the SPB, the Departme nt “normally will” determine that dumping is
likely to continue or recur where:

(a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis [(i.e., above 0.5 per cent)] after the
issuance of the order or the suspension agreement, as applicable;
(b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after the issuance of the order or the
suspension agreement, as applicable; or
(c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order or the suspension agreement,
as applicable, and import volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly.
 The provisions of the statute, the SAA, and SPB – when read together – establish the
presumption of likely dumping. The operation of this presumption can be seen through the consistent
practice of the Department. These provisions (as ev idenced by the practice) make clear that the sole
factors dispositive for the likelihood of dumping determination are (1) the existence of dumping
margins from the original investigation and subsequent administrative reviews; (2) whether imports of
the subject merchandise ceased after issuance of the order; and (3) whether dumping was eliminated
after imposition of the order and import volumes declined significantly. ( See US Department of
Commerce Sunset Reviews, ARG-63 and ARG-64)

BOTH PARTIES

 (c) Please explain how you identify "p ractice" and how you distinguish practice
from law? In light of the WTO jurispr udence, please explain your views as to
whether practice as such is challengeable under WTO law or not.

Argentina’s Response:

 For present purposes, Argentina would note that a “law” provides the legislative or regulatory
framework within which a Member may implement its WTO obligations, while a “practice” may refer
to the actual application of such laws or regulati ons by the administering authorities. There is no
question that laws, regulations, administrative procedures, and practices are all subject to WTO
dispute settlement proceedings.

 This point was made forcefully by the Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan
(DS244).

 The Appellate Body began its analysis by aski ng itself this question: “does the type of
instrument itself – be it a law, regulation, procedure, practice, or something else – govern whether it
may be subject to WTO dispute settlement?” (Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from
Japan, DS244, para. 78)(emphasis added) It went on to answer this question by noting that:

In the practice under the GATT, most of the measures subject, as such, to dispute
settlement, were legislation. We nevertheless observed in Guatemala – Cement I
that, in fact, a broad range of measures could be submitted, as such, to dispute
settlement:
In the practice established under the GATT 1947, a “measure” may
be any act of a Member, whether or not legally binding, and it can
include even non-binding administrative guidance by a government
(see Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors , adopted 4 May 1988, BISD
35S/116).
The provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement setting forth a legal basis for matters
to be referred to consultations and thus to di spute settlement, are also cast broadly. . ..
There is no threshold requirem ent, in Article 17.3, that the measure in question be of
a certain type. (Id. at paras. 85-86)(footnote omitted)
 The Appellate Body added that Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement demonstrated
that, “[t]aken as a whole, the phrase ‘laws, regulat ions and administrative procedures’ seems to us to
encompass the entire body of generally applicable ru les, norms and standards adopted by Members in
connection with the conduct of anti-dumping proceedings. If some of these types of measure could
not, as such, be subject to dispute settlement un der the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent, it would frustrate
the obligation of ‘conformity’ set forth in Article 18.4.” (Id. at para. 87)

 This analysis led the Appellate Body to conclude that:

[T]here is no basis, either in the practic e of the GATT and the WTO generally or in
the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for finding that only certain types of
measure can, as such, be challenged in dispute settlement proceedings under the Anti-

 It therefore found that the Panel erred in law when it found that the SPB, as such, could not be
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it is not a mandatory legal instrument. ( Id. at
para. 100)

 The Appellate Body’s decision in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan is consistent with the
Appellate Body decision in US – Countervailing Measures . As noted in Argentina’s First
Submission, in that case the Appellate Body treat ed practice – specifically, a practice of the US
Department of Commerce – as a measure for the purp oses of WTO dispute settlement. It noted that
“[t]he European Communities challenges the administrative practice followed by the USDOC when
examining whether a ‘benefit’ continues to exist following a change in ownership. This administrative
practice is called the ‘same person’ method.” (Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing
Measures, DS212, para. 86)(emphasis added) After finding this practice to be WTO-inconsistent, the
Appellate Body recommended to the DSB that it re quest the United States “to bring its measures and
administrative practice (the “same person” method) . . . into co nformity with its obligations . . . .”
(Id. at para. 162)

 As a result of these two unambiguous Appellate Body decisions, there is no doubt that
practice is “challengeable under WTO law.”

 (d) What, in your view, is the relations hip between “practice” on the one hand and
“the SPB” and “the SAA” on the other? Could the SPB and the SAA be
considered as legal instruments that embody the US practice with regard to
sunset reviews?

Argentina’s Response:

 As indicated above, the statute, the SAA and the SPB must be read together, not separately,
for the purposes of assessing whether the United States has implemented its obligations under
Article 11.3 of the Agreement.

 The SAA, by its own terms, represents “an authoritative expression by the Administration
concerning its views regarding the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round agreements,
both for purposes of US international obligations and domestic law . . . . Moreover, since this
Statement will be approved by the Congress at the time it implements the Uruguay Round
agreements, the interpretations of those agreements included in this Statement carry particular
authority.” (SAA at 656)

 As the Appellate Body noted, the SPB “forms part of the overall framework within which
‘sunset’ reviews of anti-dumping or countervaili ng duties are conducted in the United States.”
(Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, DS244, para. 73)

 Argentina would not agree, however, that “t he SPB and the SAA [could] be considered as
legal instruments that embody the US practice with regard to sunset reviews.” These instruments pre-
date even the first US sunset review. Rather, th e statute, the SAA, and the SPB, operating together,
provide the basic framework for sunset reviews and establish a presumption in favour of affirmative
findings that dumping is likely to continue or recu r. The Department applies these instruments in its
practice, which practice has been consistent in find ing a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping (based on the three SAA/SPB criteria) in ev ery case in which domestic industry participates
in the sunset review.

21. Do Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement apply to sunset reviews? If your response is in the
affirmative, do these articles apply to sunset re views in the same manner in which they apply to
original investigations, or in a different manner? Please elaborate on the basis of the provisions
of the Agreement and the relevant WTO case law.

Argentina’s Response:

 Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement apply to sunset reviews.

 As noted in Argentina’s First Submission, Artic le 2.1 defines dumping “[f]or the purpose of
this Agreement.” Any possible doubt about this issue was resolved definitively by the Appellate
Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan:

We agree with Japan that the words “[f] or the purpose of this Agreement” in
Article 2.1 indicate that this provision de scribes the circumstances in which a product
is to be considered as being dumped for purposes of the entire Anti-Dumping
Agreement, including Article 11.3 . This interpretation is supported by the fact that
Article 11.3 does not indicate, either expressl y or by implication, that “dumping” has
a different meaning in the context of sunset reviews than in the rest of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Theref ore, Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 suggest that the question for investigating authorities,
in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review pursuant to Article 11.3, is
whether the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping of the product subject to the duty (t hat is, to the introduction of that product
into the commerce of the importing country at less than its normal value). (Appellate
Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , DS244, para. 109)(emphasis
added))
 Argentina’s First Submission also demonstrated that Article 3 applies to reviews conducted
under Article 11, essentially for the same textual reasons as those advanced under Article 2.

 As indicated above, Article 2.1 defined dumping “for the purpose of this Agreement.”
Similarly, footnote 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement uses a virtually identical formulation, defining
injury “under this Agreement.” Although the Appellate Body was not called upon to pronounce
whether footnote 9 defined injury for all purposes of the Agreement, including Article 11.3, the same
principles it enunciated with respect to Article 2 apply equally to Article 3.

 Indeed, as noted in Argentina’s First Submission, this was the approach taken by the Panel in
Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, which stated footnote 9:

[S]eems to demonstrate that the term “injury” as it appears throughout the Anti-
Dumping Agreement – including Article 11 – is to be construed in accordance with
this footnote, unless otherwise specified. This would seem to support the view that
the provisions of Article 3 concerning inju ry may be generally applicable throughout
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and are not lim ited in application to investigations.
Article 11 does not seem to explicitly specify otherwise in the case of sunset reviews.
(Panel Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, DS244, para. 7.99)
 Argentina also recalls the statement of the Appellate Body in H-Beams from Poland that “the
obligations in Article 3.1 apply to all injury determinations undertak en by Members.” (Appellate
Body Report, H-Beams from Poland, DS122, para. 114)

 Thus, it is clear that both Article 2 and Article 3 apply to sunset review determinations under
Article 11.3.

22. The Panel notes Argentina's statements in paragraphs 132, 184, 190 and 192 of its first
written submission. In your view, does Arti cle 11.3 require an investigating authority to
calculate the likely dumping margin in a sunset review? If your response is in the negative, does
Article 11.3 at least require some kind of comparison between the future export price and the
future normal value? Please explain on the basis of the relevant provisions in the Agreement.

Argentina’s Response:

 In Argentina’s view, Article 11.3 does not require an investigating authority to calculate the
likely dumping margin in a sunset review. If, how ever, the authority relies on a dumping margin as a
basis for its likelihood determination or calculates or reports the likely dumping margin in a sunset
review, then that margin must conform to the disciplines of Article 2. (Appellate Body Report, Sunset
Review of Steel from Japan, DS244, para. 127).

 Article 11.3 does not necessarily require a compar ison between the future export price and the
future normal value, although this information would certainly be relevant to the likelihood of
dumping determination.

 The essential point is that the authority mu st terminate the measure unless it develops a
sufficient evidentiary basis to support the conclusion that dumping is likely to continue or recur.
What the authority may not do is continue the measur e without a sufficient factual basis to establish
that dumping is likely to continue or recur. If th e authority cannot establish such evidence, the order
must be terminated.

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE
OF INJURY

ARGENTINA

25. The Panel notes Argentina's assertion in paragraph 273 of its first written submission
that the statutory provisions under US law that require the ITC to inquire whether the
revocation of a measure is likely to lead to co ntinuation or recurrence of injury within a
reasonably foreseeable time are inconsistent with Articles 3.7 and 3.8 of the Agreement. Is
Argentina arguing that Articles 3.7 and 3.8 apply to sunset reviews and therefore add to the
substantive obligations of investigating authoritie s in sunset reviews? If so, please cite the
provisions of the Agreement that can support this assertion. Or, is Argentina citing these two
articles as a side argument without asserting that they are directly applicable to sunset reviews?
Please elaborate.

Argentina’s Response:

 The likelihood of injury analysis under Ar ticle 11.3 necessarily entails elements of
Articles 3.7 and 3.8. Article 3 defines “injury” as that term is used throughout the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Thus, an authority’s determination u nder Article 11.3 of whether “injury” would be
likely to continue or recur must satisfy the requirement s of Article 3. Footnote 9 states: “Under this
Agreement the term ‘injury’ shall, unless otherwise sp ecified, be taken to mean material injury to a
domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.” The Appellate Body used the SCM Agreem ent’s equivalent of this very footnote as an
illustration of how the injury concept applies throughout the Agreement, including in sunset reviews.
(See Appellate Body Report, Steel from Germany, DS213, para. 69 n.59.)

 Article 11.3 provides that the relevant time fr ame for the likelihood of injury determination is
at the “expiry of the duty.” This time period does not equal “reasonably foreseeable time.”
Moreover, that the Article 11.3 in quiry relates to termination of the duty being “likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence” does not mean the time frame has no parameters.

 Argentina agrees with the United States that the prospective nature of the injury determination
under Article 11.3 creates certain similarities with the threat of injury analysis. Threat of injury
determinations are governed by Article 3.7, which provides that such determinations must be “based
on facts and not merely on allegatio n, conjecture or remote possibility. ” Article 3.7 also requires the
circumstances under which injury would occur to be imminent. US law does not define, nor has the
Commission articulated, what constitutes “a reasonabl y foreseeable time.” The complete discretion
of the Commission in making its determinations as to whether injury is likely to continue or recur
conflicts with the requirements of the Anti-Dumpin g Agreement. Speculation by an investigating
authority about market conditions se veral years into the future is in consistent with Article 11.3 and
Article 3. Similarly, US law imposes an obligati on on the Commission inconsistent with the mandate
of Article 3.8, which provides that, “[w]ith respect to cases where injury is threatened by dumped
imports, the application of anti-dumping measures shall be considered and decided with special care.”

 The challenged provisions of US law are inco nsistent with the temporal requirements of
Articles 11.3, 3.7, and 3.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and their treatment of future injury
determinations. By extending the period of time outward (with no limitations) within which the
Commission must consider whether domestic producer s might be injured, the statutory provisions fail
to satisfy the “likely” analysis mandated by Articles 11.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, and 3.8 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

CUMULATION

BOTH PARTIES

26. Would cumulation be generally allowed (i.e. both in original investigations and reviews)
in the absence of Article 3.3 of the Agreement? What provision, if any, of the Agreement would
cumulation violate in the absence of Article 3.3? In other words, in your view, is Article 3.3 an
authorization for the use of cumulation, or, is it rather a provision that imposes certain
restrictions on the use of cumulation in investigations? Please elaborate on the basis of the
relevant provisions of the Agreement.

Argentina’s Response:

 Cumulation was not previously subject to disciplines under the GATT. The WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement addressed cumulation for the fi rst time, and authorized the use of cumulation
only in certain circumstances. Article 3.3 provides a very limited exception for the use of cumulation,
and then only under specified conditions. First, cumulation is limited to “anti-dumping
investigations.” In Steel from Ge rmany, the Appellate Body ruled that the use of “investigation” in
Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement indicated that the de minimis rule of that provision did not extend
beyond the original investigation to sunset reviews. ( See Appellate Body Report, Steel from
Germany, DS213, paras. 68-69, 92). Accordingly, the use of “investigations” in Article 3.3 must
similarly limit the conditioned application of cumulation to original investigations, and not to sunset
reviews under Article 11.3. Second, its use is further confined to those investigations “where imports
of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations.”
Third, only if the first two criteria are satisfied , can the authority in an investigation “cumulatively
assess the effects of such imports,” and even then “only if” the authority makes additional findings,
including: 1) that “the margin of dumping establis hed in relation to the imports from each country is
more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5;” and 2) that “the volume of imports from
each country is not negligible.” Finally, the auth orities must also determine whether “a cumulative

assessment of the effects of th e imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the like domestic product.”

 Article 11.3 provides a good example of a provision that would be violated if a cumulative
injury assessment were undertaken in a sunset re view. The specific reference in the text of
Article 11.3 to “an anti-dumping duty” is singular and not plural, which on its face refers to one
measure, and not multiple anti-dumping measures. Indeed, as the Appellate Body explained in Sunset
Review of Steel from Japan:

The United States argues that the meaning of the word “duty” in Article 11.3 is
explained in Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which “makes clear that the
definitive duty is imposed on a product-specific (i.e., order-wide) basis, not a
company-specific basis.” As the United Stat es points out, Article 9.2 refers to the
imposition of “an anti-dumping duty . . . in respect of any product”, rather than the
imposition of a duty in respect of individua l exporters or producers. We agree that
this reference in Article 9.2 informs the inte rpretation of Article 11.3. We also note
that Article 9.2 allows inve stigating authorities, in imposing a duty in respect of a
product, to “name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned” or, in certain
circumstances, “the supplying country co ncerned.” This suggests that authorities
may use a single order to impose a “duty”, even though the amount of the duty
imposed on each exporter or producer may vary . Therefore, Article 9.2 confirms our
initial view that Article 11.3 does not requi re investigating authorities to make their
likelihood determination on a company-specific basis. (Appellate Body Report,
Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, DS244, para. 150)(footnotes omitted)
 This passage also confirms that the use of duty in the singular means that the duty subject to
review in Article 11.3 is a single measure, and not multiple measures.

 Moreover, in addition to the text of Article 11.3, the text of Article 3.3 makes clear that
cumulation is permitted only in investigations. There is no cross-reference in Article 3.3 to
Article 11.3. Nor is there any ex plicit cross-reference to either cu mulation or to Article 3.3 in the
immediate context of Article 11 (i.e., Articles 11.1 , 11.2, 11.4, or 11.5) or in the broader context of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

 Finally, the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Steel from Germany suggests that it
understands that the injury analysis in a sunset revi ew is not conducted on a cumulated basis: “Thus,
in our view, the terms ‘subsidization’ and ‘injury’ each have an independent meaning in the SCM
Agreement which is not derived by reference to the other. It is unlikely that very low levels of
subsidization could be demonstrated to cause ‘material’ injury.” (Appellate Body Report, Steel from
Germany, DS213, para. 81) Such a statement would be true only where the injury analysis is not
conducted on a cumulated basis.

OTHER

ARGENTINA

28. In paragraph 40 of Argentina's oral st atement, Argentina referred to the statement of
the Appellate Body in US-Carbon Steel that "while it would be diffic ult for a single case to serve
as conclusive evidence of the Department’s prac tice as such violating US WTO obligations, a
comprehensive examination of all US sunset reviews and an analysis of the methodology used by
the Department in those reviews might provide such an evidentiary basis." Is Argentina
arguing that the consistent
 use of a specific methodology could amount to a measure in law
which can be challenged in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding?

Argentina’s Response:

 Yes. Argentina takes the position that the consistent use of a specific methodology (i.e.,
consistent practice) can be challenged as such. ( See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel
from Japan, DS244, paras. 85-87; see also Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures ,
DS212, paras. 150, 151, 162)) Argentina believes that the Appellate Body’s report in US – Carbon
Steel further supports the conclusion that consistent practice may be challenged as such. ( See
Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, DS213, para. 148).

Additional Note referred to the questions posed by the European Communities:

 By letter to the Chairman dated 11 December 2003, the European Communities submitted a
written version of the questions posed at the 10 December meeting.

 The written questions attached to the European Communities’ letter to the Chairman indicate
that the questions are directed only to the United States. Therefore, at this stage, Argentina limits
itself to the following general comment on the questi on, in line with the explanation provided in
Argentina’s First and Second Submissions.

 At the outset, Argentina understands that the series of questions posed by the European
Communities addresses both the specific issue of “zeroing” in sunset reviews, and the broader issue of
whether the substantive requirements of “dumping” contained in Article 2 apply to an Article 11.3
determination of whether “dumping” is likely to continue or recur.

 Both the specific issue and the broader issue have been addressed by the Appellate Body in
Steel from Japan.

 With respect to the specific issue, the A ppellate Body held that, “should investigating
authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in making their likelihood determination, the
calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4.” (Id. at para. 127; see also
id. at 130) Also, the Appellate Body reaffirmed its holding in EC – Bed Linen that use of a zeroing
methodology tends to impermissibly inflate the dumping margin, and is thus inconsistent with
Article 2.4’s requirement to make a “fair comparis on” between the export price and normal value.
(See Appellate Body Report, Steel from Japan, paras. 134-135) Therefore, in making a determination
of likely dumping, the reliance on – or calculation of – a margin based on the practice of zeroing is
inconsistent with Article 11.3.

 With respect to the broader issue, the Appellate Body held that the substantive requirements
of Article 2 apply to sunset reviews under Article 11.3. ( See Appellate Body Report, Steel from
Japan, para. 128 (“It follows that we disagree with th e Panel’s view that the disciplines in Article 2
regarding the calculation of dumping margins do not apply to the likelihood determination to be made
in a sunset review under Article 11.3.”)

 As a result, Argentina believes th at the Appellate Body decision in Steel from Japan resolves
the “zeroing” issue presented by Argentina in this di spute. By relying on the 1.36 per cent margin
calculated in the original investigation as the evidentiary basis for its determination that dumping was
likely to continue, the Department had an obligation to ensure that the 1.36 per cent margin was in
fact evidence of “dumping” as defined in Article 11.3 and Article 2. If the Panel finds that the
1.36 per cent margin was based on a calculation that is not consistent with Article 2.4, then the
Department could not rely upon this margin as evidence that dumping was likely to continue or recur.
If the Department did rely upon this margin, then its decision is inconsistent with Article 11.3.

 The information submitted in Exhibit ARG-52 demonstrates that the anti-dumping margin
relied upon by the United States in this sunset review was calculated in a manner that is not consistent
with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The additional details being provided in
section II.C.3.b of Argentina’s Second Written Submission provide further proof that the 1.36 per cent
margin was calculated in a manner inconsistent wi th Article 2.4, and therefore could not be relied
upon in an Article 11.3 review as evidence that dumping was likely to continue or recur.

ANNEX E-2

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS
OF THE PANEL – FIRST MEETING

8 January 2004

EXPEDITED REVIEWS/WAIVER PROVISIONS

Q2. Please respond to the following questions regarding "expedited sunset reviews" under
the US law?

 (a) In what circumstances does the DOC decide to conduct an expedited sunset
review? More specifically, does the US law require or allow the DOC to conduct
an expedited sunset review in cases where there is an affirmative or deemed
waiver as well? Or, are expedited reviews limited only to cases where the
respondent interested parties' substantive response to the notice of initiation is
found inadequate because their share in the total imports falls below the
50 per cent threshold prescribed under US law?

1. The US Department of Commerce (Comme rce) decides whether to conduct a full or
expedited sunset review based on a two-part procedure. First, Commerce solicits substantive
responses from interested parties after publication of the notice of initiation of the review in the
Federal Register
.1 Respondent interested pa rties, which include foreign exporters and governments, 2
have several options: They may (1) file a substantive response; (2) elect to waive their rights to
participate in the review ("affirmative waiver"); or (3) refuse to provide a substantive response. 3
Commerce will determine whether each response receiv ed is "complete" per the criteria set forth in
the regulations. 4 No response, or an inco mplete substantive response, is considered a waiver
("deemed waiver").5 Parties waiving their rights to participat e in the review are considered likely to
dump (a company-specific likelihood finding).6

2. Second, taking into account all of the responses received as part of the first step, including
deemed and affirmative waivers, Commerce normally evaluates whether the exporters submitting
complete substantive responses account for 50 per ce nt of the total imports of subject merchandise to
the United States over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of the review ("50 per cent
threshold").
7 If the responses do not meet the 50 per cent threshold, Commerce will normally conduct
an expedited review to make an order-wide determination of the likelihood of continuing or recurring
dumping (an order-wide likelihood determination).8

3. The likelihood finding with regard to one company under the first step is not dispositive of
the results of the order-wide likelihood determination under the second step. Even if Commerce finds
that dumping is likely with regard to one company, Commerce still must decide whether to conduct a
full or expedited review to dete rmine order-wide likelihood. The decision whether to expedite
depends on the other respondent interested party responses.

1 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
2 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC. 1677(9).
3 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d) (Exhibit ARG-3).
4 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3)(ii) (Exhibit ARG-3).
5 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(2)(iii) (Exhibit ARG-3).
6 Section 751(c)(4) of the Tariff Act (19 USC. 1675(c)(4)) (Exhibit ARG-1).
7 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A) (Exhibit ARG-3).
8 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C) (Exhibit ARG-3).

4. (Please note that the 50 per cent threshold is not dispositive. Commerce may take other
factors into account and has conducted several fu ll sunset reviews under the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws in which the aggregate response did not represent more than 50 per cent of
imports. Most of these involved analyses of subsidization where the relevant government’s
participation is essential given the nature of the sunset review in the countervailing duty context. In at
least one case, however, Commerce conducted a full sunset review in an anti-dumping case in which
the aggregate response to the notice of initiation did not represent more than 50 per cent of imports for
the five year period. In Pineapple from Thailand , the only respondent interested party to file a
complete substantive response did not represent more than 50 per cent of the imports during the five
year period preceding the sunset review.
9 Commerce nonetheless conducted a full sunset review
because the respondent interested party was a signifi cant exporter of the subject merchandise, was a
respondent in the original investigation, represented nearly 50 per cent of the imports during the five
year period (on average), and acco unted for more than 50 per cent of the imports for the two years
preceding the sunset review.)

 (b) The Panel notes that the provisions relating to a deemed waiver, i.e. the
presumption that a respondent interested party that submits an incomplete
substantive response is deemed to have waived its right to participate, are found
in the Regulations only. This matter does not seem to be dealt with under the
Tariff Act. Would the United States agree that the only provisions of the US law
relating to deemed waivers are contained in the Regulations?

5. Yes.

 (c) If the DOC carries out an expedited suns et review in cases of an affirmative or
deemed waiver as well, please explain whether there are any differences in the
procedural rules that apply to these two sets of expedited sunset reviews, i.e.
expedited reviews that result from a waiver and those that result from the
submission of an inadequate response.

6. There is only one "type" of expedited review.

7. There is no difference in the treatment of a respondent interested party in an expedited sunset
review conducted by Commerce whether that particul ar party waives its right to participate pursuant
to an election (section 751(C)(4)(A)) or is deemed to have waived because it failed to respond or its
substantive response to the notice of initiation was found to be inadequate.
10

 (d) Please explain the differences, if any, between expedited and full sunset reviews
regarding the procedural rules that are followed by the DOC. Please explain for
instance whether interested parties, especially the foreign exporters, in expedited
sunset reviews have the right to submit evidence in addition to, and apart from,
their response to the notice of initiation; whether they have the right to request a
hearing; and whether the DOC issues a final disclosure as stated in Article 6.9 of
the Agreement. Please respond in detail by referring to the relevant provisions
of the US law in conjunction with Article 6 and Annex II of the Agreement.

9 See Preliminary Results of Full Sunset Review; Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand , 65 Fed. Reg.
58509 (29 September 2000).
10 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(2)(ii) (Exhibit ARG-3).

8. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset has confirmed that Article 11.3 does not prescribe the
methodology – or methodologies – that Members may use in conducting sunset reviews.
11
Article 11.4 ensures that the general procedural and evidentiary provisions of Article 6 apply in sunset
reviews to give respondent interested parties basic due process. Expedited reviews are consistent with
Article 11.3 and Article 6 as incorporated therein.

9. Whether the sunset review is full or expedited, Commerce’s Sunset Regulations provide the
due process and evidentiary requirements found in Article 6. Specifically:

 (a) Section 351.218(d)(3) provides that inte rested parties will have 30 days from the
notice of initiation of the review to su bmit complete substant ive responses. In
addition to identifying information that is required of interested parties,
section 351.218(d)(3)(iv)(B) provides that parties may provide "any other relevant
information or argument that the party would like [Commerce] to consider."
(Emphasis added.)

 (b) Section 351.218(d)(4) affords interested parties the opportunity to rebut evidence and
argument submitted in other parties’ substantive responses within five days of the
submission of those responses.

 (c) In cases where Commerce finds that the aggregate response to the notice of initiation
from the respondent interested partie s is inadequate, section 351.309(e) of
Commerce’s Sunset Regulations affords interested parties the opportunity to
comment on whether an expedited review is appropriate.

10. Therefore, Commerce’s regulations expressly provide parties – in both full and expedited
reviews – with multiple opportunities to provide Co mmerce with any relevant information, to rebut
any relevant information and argument submitte d by other parties, and to comment on the
appropriateness of conducting an expe dited review even when the substantive responses have been
inadequate. Section 351.308(f)(2) of Commerce’s Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce
normally will consider the substantive submissions – not just the complete ones – of all interested
parties in making the order-wide likelihood determination in an expedited sunset review.

11. The differences between a full and an expedite d sunset review are timing (the final sunset
determination in an expedited sunset review is i ssued 120 days after the no tice of initiation, rather
than the full sunset review’s 240 days)
12 and the fact that case briefs are not filed in an expedited case.
Because as a rule hearings are tied to the contents of the case briefs, 13 hearings are generally not held
in an expedited proceeding. It should be noted that the deadline for the submission of factual
information is the same for both an expedited and a full sunset review proceeding and normally is no
later than the deadline for the submission of the interested party rebuttal briefs.14

12. Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be informed of the essential facts. This requirement
does not impose a particular means of disclosure. The United States has established an investigative
and review process that allows interested parties to presented with all of the facts as they are presented
to the authority, as well as arguments made about these facts.15

11 United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan , WT/DS244/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 15 December 2003 (" Japan Sunset"),
paras 149 and 158.
12 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(ii)(2), 19 C.F.R. 351.218(f)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
13 19 C.F.R. 351.310(c) (Exhibit US-27).
14 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(4) (Exhibit ARG-3).
15 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy ,
WT/DS189/R, Report of the Panel, adopted 28 September 2001 ("Ceramic Floor Tiles"), para 6.125.

13. Consistent with paragraph 1 of Annex II, th e Commerce regulations set forth in detail the
requirements for the submission of a complete substan tive response and specify that interested parties
may submit other information. 16 The regulations also make clear that respondent interested parties
have 30 days to provide a complete substantive response 17 and if the collective responses are
considered inadequate, an expedited review will normally be conducted and facts available used. 18
Consistent with paragraphs 5 and 6, Commerce does not require the information provided to be ideal;
as noted above, parties are provided the opportunit y to explain why they cannot provide particular
information. Further, all evidence or informati on is accepted, even for incomplete substantive
responses, pursuant to section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.

 (e) Please explain whether exporters who submitted an incomplete response to the
notice of initiation of a sunset review, and therefore are deemed to have waived
their right to participate under Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset
Regulations, have the right to submit ev idence in addition to, and apart from,
their response to the notice of initiation; whether they have the right to request
a hearing; and whether the DOC issues a fi nal disclosure as stated in Article 6.9
of the Agreement. Please respond in detail by referring to the relevant
provisions of the US law in conjunction with Article 6 and Annex II of the
Agreement.

14. Commerce has never found a substantive response to be incomplete.

15. If an exporter in fact submitted an incomplete substantive response – a hypothetical situation
– that exporter would be deemed to have waived its right to participate in the sunset review, pursuant
to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii). Therefore, the exporter would not have the right to submit additional
evidence or request a hearing.

16. The US sunset review proc edures meet Article 6 requirem ents. A notice of initiation is
published in the Federal Register, respondent interested parties have 30 days to provide a complete
substantive response and any other information th ey wish to provide, they are afforded the
opportunity to respond to the adequacy determination (if they provided a complete substantive
response),
19 and even if facts available is applied, th e information in both incomplete and complete
responses is taken into account.20

17. The sunset review procedures conform to the norms in Annex II. For example, the
information required from respondent interested part ies in a substantive response is set forth in the
regulations and therefore precedes the notice of initiation, providing greater rights than those
suggested under paragraph 1 of Annex II. Similarly, the regulations make clear that facts available
may be used if information is not supplied within a reasonable time. Article 5 suggests that all
information should be accepted and that author ities should not disregard any properly submitted,
verifiable information. As noted above, even when expedited reviews are conducted and facts
available are used, Commerce will consider the in formation provided in complete and incomplete
substantive responses. Additionally, as noted above, Commerce has never made a finding that a
substantive submission was incomple te. Similarly, even though a respondent interested party’s
incomplete submission w ill preclude it from participating fu rther, the evidence and information
contained therein will be used at a minimum as part of facts available, if facts available is applied.
21

16 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(iv) (Exhibit ARG-3).
17 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
18 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(ii)(C)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).
19 19 C.F.R. 351.309(e) (Exhibit US-27).
20 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).
21 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

18. Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be informed of the essential facts. This requirement
does not impose a particular means of disclosure. The United States has established an investigative
and review process that allows interested parties to be presented with all of the facts as they are
presented to the authority, as well as arguments made about these facts.
22

Q3. The Panel notes that under US law the effect of failure to submit a complete substantive
response is a deemed waiver, in which case the DOC is directed to find likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping. The ef fect of submitting an inadequate substantive
response, however, seems to be the DOC's resort to facts available. In the latter case, will the
DOC also find likelihood without further investigat ion? In other words, is there a difference
between these two effects? Is it correct to state that the DOC is directed to find likelihood as a
matter of US law only in the case of an incomplete substantive response, or does that also apply
to complete but inadequate substantive responses?

19. As noted above, the assessment of likelihood may occur twice in a sunset review, but with
different implications. First, a respondent interested party’s waiv er of participation, deemed or
affirmative, will lead to a finding with regard to that party
 that the party is likely to continue to dump
(or that dumping by that party will recur). Comm erce will subsequently determine whether dumping
is likely to continue or recur on an order-wide basis , i.e., taking into account the activities of all the
companies that export the subject merchandise, including information provided in substantive
responses. In other words, one company’s failure to submit a complete substantive response results in
a finding of likelihood with respect to that company, and not on an order-wide basis; Commerce could
still, in light of other submissions and facts on the record, conclude that there is no order-wide
likelihood of dumping.

Q4. The Panel notes that Section 1675(c)(4) of the Tariff Act of 1930 reads:

 "(B) Effect of waiver

In a review in which an interested party waives its participation
pursuant to this paragraph, the administering authority shall
conclude that revocation of the order or termination of the
investigation would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping or a count ervailable subsidy (as the case
may be) with respect to that interested party." 23 (emphasis
added)
 (a) Does this provision mean that the DOC will make no substantive analysis but
will automatically determine that there is a likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of dumping? How does the United States explain it in light of the
obligation to determine under Article 11.3? In other words, is it the view of the
United States that not carrying out any substantive determination in cases of an
affirmative or deemed waiver discharges the investigating authority from its
obligation to make a likelihood determination under Article 11.3?

20. No. As noted above, the assessment of like lihood may occur twice in a sunset review. The
statute requires a finding of company-specific
 likelihood in the case of an affirmative waiver but does
not mandate a determination of order-wide likelihood. Commerce will take the waiver into account
for purposes of the 50 per cent threshold.

22 Ceramic Floor Tiles, para 6.125.
23 19 USC. § 1675(c)(4) (Exhibit ARG-1 at 1152).

21. Article 11.3 does not mandate a particular methodology for Members conducting sunset
reviews. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset concluded that Members are free to structure sunset
review proceedings as they wish, provided those proceedings are consistent with the obligations of
Article 6. 24 Thus, the "determination" referenced ther ein need not be made with respect to each
company subject to the order; instead, for the United States, the determination is made for the order as
a whole.

22. The United States does not believe that its sunset reviews result in "not carrying out any
substantive determination in cases of an affirmative or deemed waiver." The application of facts
available, which includes information provided by the parties in their substantive responses, even if
incomplete, assures that the determination is based on the facts on the administrative record, including
prior dumping determinations (such as administrativ e reviews), as well as any information the parties
wish to make available. It bears rep eating that parties are entitled to include any relevant information
in their substantive responses, and not just the information set forth under section 351.218(d)(ii). As a
result, Commerce does make a substantive determin ation, and the sunset review procedures of the
United States conform to the limited requirements of Article 11.3.

 (b) For instance, in a case of a waiver, does the US law preclude the DOC from
evaluating, as part of its likelihood de termination, imports statistics and the
results of administrative reviews – if any-- or any other piece of information that
might be available to the DOC or that might have been submitted by the
domestic interested parties?

23. The United States wishes to reiterate that a waiver does not result in an order-wide
 likelihood
determination. Regardless of whether a company has waived its right to participate, with regard to the
order-wide likelihood determination, Commerce is authoriz ed to take into account facts available,
including the information in the substantive resp onses (whether complete or incomplete) if an
expedited review is conducted. Notably, respondent interested parties are entitled to include any
relevant information in those responses. Add itionally, Commerce may consider information from
prior determinations (such as administrative reviews) in assessing order-wide likelihood.

 (c) Hypothetically, in a sunset review where all of the interested foreign exporters
submitted incomplete responses to the notice of initiation, would the
above-quoted section of the Tariff Act require that the DOC find likelihood of
continuation without considering the information contained in these incomplete
responses? Please elaborate by referring to the relevant provisions of the US
law.

24. No. As noted above, there is a difference between a company-specific likelihood finding and
an order-wide likelihood determination. The Tariff Act requires a company-specific likelihood
finding when that company has elected to waive pa rticipation. However, the Tariff Act does not
mandate a particular order-wide likelihood determination.

25. If all of the respondent interested parties submitted incomplete resp onses, the regulations
provide that Commerce will normally consider th e collective response to be inadequate, and
Commerce will normally proceed to an e xpedited review and use facts available. 25 In using facts
available, Commerce will consider all of the info rmation provided in the incomplete responses and
information from prior proceedings to reach the order-wide likelihood determination.26

24 Japan Sunset, paras. 156-57.
25 Section 351.218(d)(ii)(C)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).
26 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

Q5. The Panel notes that Section 1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that when
an interested party waives its participation in a sunset review, the DOC will find likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping with respect to that interested party
. The Panel also
notes that Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset Regulations state that failure to submit
a complete substantive response to the notice of initiation of sunset review will be deemed a
waiver of that exporter's right to participate in that suns et review. Finally, the Panel notes the
United States' statement in paragraph 235 of it s first written submission that the DOC carries
out its likelihood determinations in sunset reviews on an order-wide basis.

 (a) The United States mentions in footnote 250 of its first written submission that
the Sunset Policy Bulletin ("SPB") requires the DOC to make its likelihood
determinations on an order-wide basis. Please specify whether there is any other
provision in any other legal instruments under US law (e.g. the Statute or the
Regulations) which requires that likelih ood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping determinations in sunset reviews be carried out on an order-wide basis.

26. Footnote 250 is a citation to the statement in the text that an "adequate" number of responses
is normally required. 27 Footnote 250 does not state that the SPB requires Commerce to make its
likelihood determinations on an order-wide basis.

27. Section 751(c)(1)(A) of the Act provides the Commerce shall conduct a sunset review of an
anti-dumping duty order
 five years after publication of the anti-dumping duty order. The SAA, as the
authoritative interpretive tool for the statute, make s it clear that section 751(c) requires Commerce to
make the sunset determination on an order-wide basis.

 (b) Given the US statement in paragraph 23 5 of its first written submission that the
DOC is required to carry out its likelih ood determinations in sunset reviews on
an order-wide basis, what meaning should be given to the language "with
respect to that interested party" in Section 1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930? If the US law requires that the DOC make its sunset determinations on an
order-wide basis, what happens when on e of the exporters waives its right to
participate or fails to submit a comple te response, which seems to lead to a
deemed-waiver? Would the statutory provision that mandates a positive finding
with regard to the waiving exporter also determine the overall likelihood
determination to be made for the country concerned on an order-wide basis?

28. No; neither section 751(c)(4)(B) nor any other provision of US law or regulation mandates an
order-wide affirmative likelihood determination in a sunset review based on the waiver of a single
exporter.

 (c) Suppose that exporter A, one of th e exporters involved in a sunset review
initiated against country X, submits an incomplete response to the notice of
initiation and therefore is deemed to have waived its right to participate
pursuant to Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset Regulations. Would
the DOC have to find likelihood for country X on an order-wide basis because it
has to find likelihood as a matter of la w for exporter A submitting incomplete
response? In other words, would the affirmative finding with regard to exporter
A also determine the overall order-wide determination for country X in this
case? Please elaborate by referring to the relevant provisions under the US law.

29. No. As noted above, Commerce may make a company-specific
 likelihood finding and will
subsequently make an order-wide likelihood determination. If an expedited review is conducted and

27 First Written Submission of the United States, para. 235.

facts available are used, then the regulations provide that all of the factual information on the record
will be applied in making the order-wide determination, including info rmation from incomplete and
complete substantive responses. 28 Thus, US law does not mandate that a likelihood finding with
respect to one company result in a likelihood determination for the entire order.

 (d) If your response to question (c) is in the negative, please explain whether a
negative finding for country X on an order-wide basis would violate Section
1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 , which requires that the DOC make a
positive determination for exporter A wh ich submitted an incomplete response
to the notice of initiation?

30. No violation of 751(c)(4)(B) or any other provision of US law would result. The statute
requires only that likelihood be found with respec t to the company that waived; it does not mandate
that likelihood be found on an order-wide basis. As noted above, Commerce, even if using facts
available, will consider information from prior proceedings and from all substantive responses,
complete or otherwise.

Q6. The Panel notes that section 351.308(f) of the DOC's Regulations sets out the facts to be
used by the DOC when applying facts available in a sunset review.

 (a) Does this section define or limit the scope of facts available in sunset reviews? In
other words, does this section allow the DOC to consider facts other than those
set out therein when using facts available in a sunset review? Please respond in
detail by referring to the relevant provisi ons of the US law in conjunction with
Article 6 and Annex II of the Agreement.

31. Section 751(c)(3)(B) provides that Commerce w ill base its final sunset determination on the
facts available if the order-wide response from respondent interested parties, in the aggregate, is found
to be inadequate. Section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations provides that, when Commerce is
making the final sunset determination on the basis of the facts available, Commerce normally will rely
upon prior agency determinations and information fr om the interested party substantive responses.
The latter may include any information the respondent interested party considers relevant to the
proceedings.

32. Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement provides that "[i]n cases which any in terested party refuses
access to, or otherwise does not provide, nece ssary information" a Member may make its
determination on the basis of "facts available." In an expedited sunset review, respondent interested
parties representing more than 50 per cent of the imports of the subject merchandise have
affirmatively waived participation, filed an incomplete substantive response, or have failed to respond
to the notice of initiation in any respect. In this context, Commerce normally uses the facts available
to make its final sunset determination because th e respondent interested parties have collectively
failed to provide the necessary information. Nevertheless, paragraph 3 of Annex II to the AD
Agreement provides that, when applying the facts available pursuant to Article 6.8, all properly
submitted, verifiable information should be taken into account when the determination at issue is
made. Section 351.308(f)(2) provides for consideration of this information when submitted in an
interested party’s substantive response, whether that substantive response is complete or incomplete.

 (b) What is the significance of the word "normally" in this section?

33. Section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations states that Commerce normally will base its
final sunset determination on prior agency dete rminations and the information submitted in the
parties’ substantive responses. The use of the word "normally" in section 351.308(f) provides

28 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

Commerce with the discretion to find that the factual circumstances in a particular case warrant
Commerce’s reliance on other or additional inform ation when making the final order-wide sunset
determination.

 (c) What is the legal significance of the cro ss-reference in Section 351.308(f) of the
Regulations to 752(b) and 752(c) of the Act? Given that the Statute does not
have any provision about the inadequacy of substantive responses, does this
cross-reference suggest that the provisions of Section 351.308(f) of the
Regulations apply only in cases of an affirmative or deemed waiver, but not in
cases where the substantive response is complete but inadequate because the
exporters' share is below 50 per cent? Please respond in conjunction with the
statements of the United States in paragraphs 156 and 170 of its first submission.

34. As noted above, there are two steps in assess ing whether to conduct a full or expedited sunset
review. The first is to evaluate whether the subs tantive responses (there may well be more than one
exporter, for example) to the notice of initiation ar e complete or whether parties have waived their
right to participate in the proceedings. These decisi ons are then folded into the second step, which is
to determine whether the complete substantive responses represent 50 per cent of imports. Then, if
Commerce decides to proceed with an expedited review, Commerce normally
 will apply facts
available, as described in Section 351.308(f). Thus, it is entirely po ssible that there will be waivers
and complete substantive responses in one proceeding, both of which are taken into account in
determining whether to expedite and, correspondingly, use facts available.

35. The cross-reference to sections 752(b) and 75 2(c) of the Act is found in section 351.308(f)
because these statutory provisions contain the ma ndatory elements Commerce "shall" consider in
making an order-wide likelihood determination a sunset review . Commerce will consider any
additional information in the parties’ substantive response in light of the statutory requirements
contained in sections 752(b) and 752(c) when making the final sunset determination.

 (d) Please explain whether in a sunset review where the respondent interested
party/parties account for less than 50 per cent of total exports of the subject
product into the US market the DOC wo uld take into account the information
and evidence submitted by the respondent in terested parties in their substantive
responses to the notice of initiation of the sunset review? If so, explain why
Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Regulations provides that the DOC would
base its determinations on facts available in such cases. In other words, if the
DOC is to take into account evidence submitted by the resp ondent interested
parties to the notice of initiation no matter what their share in the total exports
of the subject product into the US market is, why is it that the Regulations direct
the DOC to resort to facts available if the respondent's share falls below
50 per cent?

36. In a sunset review in which the respondent interested party or parties do not meet the
50 per cent threshold, and Commerce has made a determination that the aggregate response to the
notice of initiation was inadequate, Commerce wo uld consider the information and evidence
submitted by the respondent interested parties in their substantive responses when making the final
sunset determination in accordance with section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.

Q7.
 (a) Please explain the significance of the la nguage "without further investigation" in
Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the DOC' s Regulations. What does it imply?
Does it mean that the DOC will not accept any submission of evidence by foreign
exporters in expedited sunset reviews in addition to their responses considered to

be inadequate? Or does it imply th at the evidence submitted by interested
parties will not be evaluated or otherwise tested?

37. Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce will
normally
 base its final sunset determination on "the fa cts available" without further investigation in a
case where the aggregate respondent interested parties is inadequate. However, Commerce may
exercise its discretion and conduct further investigation. 29 The use of the language "without further
investigation" of section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) pr ovides that Commerce is not required to request
additional information.

38. Commerce normally
 will not accept additional submissi ons from any interested party,
whether domestic or respondent, after that interested party’s substantive submission is found to be
"incomplete." Nevertheless, any information subm itted by an interested party in its substantive
response is considered by Commerce when Commer ce makes the final determination in an expedited
sunset review, even in cases where that substantive response was found to be "incomplete."30

 (b) More generally, would it be correct to state that in terms of procedural rules, the
only difference between a statutory finding of likelihood in a case of waiver and
an expedited review in cases where the res ponse is found to be inadequate is the
fact that in the latter case the DOC will consider th e information submitted by
the foreign exporter in its complete substantive response to the notice of
initiation?

39. Commerce will consider all information on the administrative record of the sunset
proceeding, including information in the substantive responses and rebuttal responses of the domestic
interested parties, prior agency determinations, an d any other information received by Commerce, as
well as the information submitted by foreign intere sted parties in their substantive and rebuttal
responses.31 If a respondent interested party submitted a statement of waiver, then, obviously, there
would be no information from that party to consider.

Q8. The Panel notes the following provision in Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's
Sunset Regulations:

"(iii) No response
 from an interested party. The Secretary will
consider the failure by a respondent interested party to file a
complete substantive response to a notice of initiation under
paragraph (d)(3) of this section as a waiver of participation in a
sunset review before the Department."32 (emphasis added)
 (a) Please explain the relationship be tween the terms "no response" and "a
complete substantive response" as used in this section. Does this provision mean
that submission of an incomplete response by an interested party is deemed as
no response under US law? Does this provision treat an incomplete response as
no response at all not withstanding how minimal the lacking portion of this
response may be? Or, does it treat these two cases differently? Is there a waiver
when the exporter fails to respond at all, or also when the exporter submits its
response but the response doesn't contain all required information?

29 See SAA at 879-880 (Exhibit US-11).
30 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).
31 See section 351.318(f)(1) of the Sunset Regulations (Exhibit US-27) (definition of "the facts
available").
32 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).

40. When a respondent interested party submits an incomplete substantive response, Commerce
will find that the incomplete response is the equivalent of no response from that respondent interested
party for the purposes of determining likelihood on a company-specific basis.

41. Commerce does not reject incomplete submissions per se. In fact, Commerce has never
rejected a submission as incomplete. The evaluation concerning the completeness of a substantive
response depends on the individual circumst ances and is done on a case-by-case basis.
33 In addition,
Commerce has general authority to waive deadlines for good cause, unless expressly precluded by
statute.34 Therefore, if a response were incomplete, Commerce could extend the 30 day deadline to
permit the respondent interested party to complete the submission.

42. There is a deemed waiver when an exporter submits either an incomplete substantive response
or no response at all. Neverthe less, the information submitted in an incomplete substantive response
will be considered by Commerce when making the final sunset determination.

Q9. The Panel notes the statement of the United States in paragraph 242 of its first written
submission that:

"A determination that the aggregate response to the notice of
initiation is inadequate can be based on the respondent interested
parties electing waiver, or failing to respond, or in providing
inadequate substantive responses, or on any combination of these
scenarios."
(a) Please explain whether the 50 per cent test is the sole basis for a determination of
inadequacy, or whether, as the United States points out in the above-quoted
paragraph, the respondents' response can be deemed inadequate in cases where
there is an affirmative or deemed waiv er, but the share of the cooperating
respondents in total imports is above 50 per cent.

43. The term "inadequate" in the quoted part of the submission in fact refers to the completeness

of the each substantive response submitted in response to the notice of initiation, rather than the
adequacy of the aggregate responses.

44. The 50 per cent threshold is the normal
 basis for determining whether Commerce will
conduct an full sunset review or a expedited suns et review. However, as noted above, Commerce has
made an exception where the respondent interest ed party provided information indicating that
complete substantive responses not meeting the 50 per cent threshold were nevertheless adequate.
Commerce has not made a finding of inadequacy when the complete substantive responses met the
50 per cent threshold, nor has Commerce ever found a substantive response to be incomplete.
Therefore, if a sufficie nt number of respondent interested parties (or just one, if it meets the
50 per cent threshold) simply adhere to the criter ia set forth in the regulations, they can virtually
ensure that a full review will be conducted. In other words, in practical terms it is up to the
respondent interested parties to decide whether they want a full or expedited review.

 (b) Please explain whether there have been cases where an inadequacy decision was
based on the interested party's electing waiver, or failing to respond, rather than
its share in total imports.

33 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3) and Pr eamble, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13518 (Exhibit US-3)
(Commerce may consider incomplete company-specific substantive response to be complete or adequate where
that interested party is unable to report the required information and provides explanation).
34 19 C.F.R. 351.302(b) (Exhibit US-3).

45. The election of waiver and the adequacy assessment are two distinct procedures. An
affirmative or deemed waiver does not automatically result in a finding that the substantive responses
were inadequate. Instead, Co mmerce will normally assess whether the complete substantive
responses to the notice of initiation are sufficient to meet the 50 per cent threshold. Other exporters
meeting the 50 per cent threshold may have file d complete substantive responses, or may have
submitted information sufficient to allow Commerce to conduct a full sunset review.

46. More specifically, if a respondent interested party submits a substantive response to the notice
of initiation that does contain all the information required by section 351.218(d)(3) of the Sunset
Regulations, then it has submitted a "complete" substantiv e response. If a respondent interested party
submits a substantive response to the notice of initiation that does not contain all the information
required by section 351.218(d)(3), then "normally" that party w ill be considered to have submitted an
"incomplete" substantive response. Likewise, if a respondent interested party affirmatively waives its
right to participate or fails to respond to the notice of initiation, then its response is also considered
"incomplete".

47. Once Commerce has determined which company-specific substantive responses are
"complete," Commence then normally applies the 50 per cent threshold to the total import volumes
represented by all the respondent interested part ies who filed a complete or adequate company-
specific substantive response to determine whether th e aggregate response to the notice of initiation is
"adequate." Commerce then uses the results to determine whether to conduct a full or expedited
sunset review.

 (c) More generally, please explain whet her under US sunset reviews law, "an
affirmative or deemed waiver" and "an inadequate response" are two situations
that are mutually exclusive. In other wo rds, would it be accurate to state that
under US law, certain circumstances lead exclusively to an affirmative or
deemed waiver and some others exclusively to an inadequate response?

48. No; the existence of deemed or affirmative wa ivers is included in th e consideration of the
50 per cent threshold to assess the adequacy of the aggregate substantive responses. For example, one
exporter may have waived its right to participate, while another will have filed a complete substantive
submission. If the latter meets the 50 per cent threshold or provides information as to why the
50 per cent threshold is not appropriate, then Co mmerce could find that the complete substantive
responses were adequate
, and therefore a full review would normally be conducted.

Q10. The Panel notes the US statement in paragraph 162 of its first written submission:

"[T]hat the United States may afford parties expanded
opportunities to submit evidence and argument in a full sunset
review is a matter of US policy, not an obligation under the AD
Agreement, and is not grounds to find fault with the evidentiary
and procedural rules governing expedited sunset reviews."
 (a) In the view of the United States, does Article 6 apply to sunset reviews in its
entirety? Or, are there some provisions in this article that may not be applicable
in the context of sunset reviews? Please respond in conjunction with the
provisions of Article 11.4, especially the language "regarding evidence and
procedure" contained therein.

49. Article 11.4 of the AD Agreement stipulates that the Article 6 provisions "regarding evidence
and procedure" shall apply to reviews under Article 11. Thus, not all of the provisions of Article 6 are
applicable to Article 11 reviews; rather, only the provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and

procedure are so applicable. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset recently confirmed that Article 11.3
does not prescribe substantive rules for the administration of sunset reviews.
35

 (b) If it is the view of the United States that Article 6 – either entirely or partially-
applies to sunset reviews, where in Arti cle 6 or elsewhere in the Agreement does
the United States find support for its proposition that giving interested parties
expanded procedural rights in full sunset reviews compared with expedited
sunset reviews is not WTO-inconsistent?

50. As noted above, the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset confirmed that Article 11.3 does not
prescribe the methodology Members may use in conducting sunset reviews. Therefore, unless the US
sunset review procedures are in conflict with Article 6 or Artic le 11.3, these procedures are permitted
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement prohibits the United
States from giving parties expanded procedural righ ts in full sunset reviews compared with expedited
sunset reviews. The United States notes that the parties themselves effectiv ely decide whether they
want "expanded procedural rights."

Q11. The Panel notes the following part of the DOC's Issues and Decision Memorandum in
the instant sunset review:

"In the instant sunset reviews, the Department did not receive an
adequate response from respondent interested parties. Pursuant
to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations, this
constitutes a waiver of participation ."36
 Is the Panel to understand that the DOC deemed Siderca to have waived its right to
participate in this sunset review? If so, on what basis under US law? If your response is in the
negative, please explain what meaning the Panel should give to this sentence.

51. No; Commerce found that Siderca had filed a complete substantive response and,
consequently, would not have been found to have waiv ed its right to participat e in the sunset review
proceeding.
37 The Decision Memorandum for the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina includes
the final sunset determinations for the sunset reviews of OCTG from Italy, Japan and Korea also. In
each of these other three sunset reviews, respondent interested parties failed to respond to the notice
of initiation in any respect. Therefore, the above quoted passage is a reference to the failure of the
respondent interested parties in the sunset reviews of OCTG from Italy, Japan, and Korea.

52. The Issues and Decision Memorandum demonstrates that Commerce made two findings –
that Siderca had filed a complete substantive respon se and that no other respondent interested party
had filed a substantive response in any of the sunset reviews covered by the Decision Memorandum.38

Q12. The Panel notes the argument of the United States, in paragraph 237 of its first written
submission, that "Siderca did not avail itself of the opportunities made available by the Sunset
Regulations for such defence in an expedited sunset review."

35 Japan Sunset, para 123.
36 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Sunset Reviews of the AD Orders on Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Korea (Dept’s Comm., 31 Oct. 2000) (final results) (" Decision
Memorandum") (Exhibit ARG-51 at 5).
37 See Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit ARG-51) and Adequacy of Responde nt Interested Party
Response to the Notice of Initiation, A-357-810 (Dept’s Comm., 22 August 2000) ("Adequacy Memorandum")
at 1-2 (Exhibit ARG-50).
38 Decision Memorandum at 3-4 (Exhibit ARG-51).

 (a) Please explain at which point(s) of ti me during the instant sunset review Siderca
was given further opportunities to defend itself under US law but failed to do so.

53. Siderca had a number of opportunities to subm it argument and information in support of its
rights in the expedited sunset review of OCTG from Argentina. First, when a respondent interested
party files a substantive response, one of the re quirements of section 351.218(d)(3) is a statement
from the submitter regarding the likely effects of revocation which includes any information,
argument, and reasons supporting the statement. Siderca’s entire claim in this regard was that
Commerce should apply the de minimis standard found in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and, as a
consequence, should revoke the order. In additi on, section 351.218(d)(3)(iv)(B) provides interested
parties the opportunity to submit any other releva nt information or argument the interested party
would like considered in the sunset review. Siderca made no other arguments or submission of
factual information.
39

54. Second, each interested party is afforded the opportunity to submit a response in rebuttal (a
"rebuttal response"), pursuant to section 351.218(d)(3)(vi)(4) of the Sunset Regulations, to challenge
any argument or information contained in the substa ntive responses of the other interested parties.
Siderca did not file any rebuttal response despite the fact that the domestic interested parties had made
allegations, supported by st atistics, that there were shipments of Argentine OCTG in four of the five
years preceding the sunset review. Siderca did not challenge these statistics or any other information
in the domestic interested parties substantive re sponses, although it was provided the opportunity to
do so.

55. Finally, as discussed in the US first wr itten submission and in the US answers above,
Commerce determines whether to conduct a full or e xpedited sunset review based on the adequacy of
the aggregate response to the notice of initiati on. In making this determination, Commerce
determines whether the imports from the responde nt interested parties who filed a complete
substantive response, on an aggregate basis, represent more than 50 per cent of the imports of the
subject merchandise during the five years preceding the sunset review. Commerce then issues an
Adequacy Memorandum which announces the decision and the factual bases underlying the decision.
This determination is subject to challenge by the in terested parties, pursuant to section 351.309(e) of
the Sunset Regulations.

56. Commerce issued its adequacy determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina
and based the determination on the import statistics provided by the domestic interested parties after
verifying them using the ITC Trade Database.
40 (Commerce re-verified the import statistics for the
final sunset determination using Commerce’s Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics; see Decision
Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51)). Siderca di d not challenge Commerce’s adequacy
determination, as it had the right to do pursuant to section 351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations.

57. At no time did Siderca provide any statements or assertions that it would not dump in the
future if the order were revoked, offer any explan ations why it had ceased shipments of the subject
merchandise after imposition of the duty, or submit any allegations that information submitted in the
sunset review proceeding of OCTG from Argentina wa s inaccurate or incorrect. In this proceeding,
the First Written Submission of Argentina implies that Siderca was the only producer of OCTG in
Argentina during the sunset review and that Side rca’s lack of shipments contradicts the data
indicating that Argentine OCTG was in fact exported to the United States during the period of review.
Siderca made similar statements in its complete su bstantive response to the notice of initiation.
However, there is a second Argentine producer of OCTG: Ac indar. The United States has conducted
administrative reviews of Acindar since 2001, and as recently as 19 March 2003, Commerce found

39 See Siderca’s Substantive Response at 2-3 (Exhibit ARG-57).
40 See Adequacy Memorandum at (Exhibit ARG-50).

Acindar to have a dumping margin of 60.73 per cent.
41 Moreover, it is the understanding of the
United States that Acindar produces welded OCTG, whereas Siderca produces seamless OCTG (both
are covered by the anti-dumping order). It is not be yond the realm of possibility that Siderca did not
challenge the import statistics used during the sunset review because it was aware that another
Argentine producer had begun to ship OCTG to the United States during the period of review and that
Commerce’s adequacy finding based on the 50 per cent threshold was in fact accurate.

58. To permit Argentina to raise factual issues now that neither it nor Siderca raised during the
underlying sunset review would permit respondent interested parties to manipulate the system.
Consistent with the general principles in Article 6, the United States afforded all Argentine exporters
– and the Argentine government – the opportunity to present sufficient information to warrant a full
sunset review. Siderca and Argentina declined to do so.

59. Therefore, in spite of Argentina’s compla int, Commerce’s likelihood determination was in
fact correct , as evidenced by the dumping margin found with regard to Acindar after the sunset
review.

 (b) Which provisions of the DOC's Regulati ons, or other relevant legal instruments
under US law, give interested exporters the right to defend their interests?
Please respond in conjunction with the la nguage "without further investigation"
in section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of th e DOC's Regulations. What meaning
should be given to this provision if the Regulations give interested exporters the
right to defend their interests?

60. Please see US Answer to Question 7(a) above.

61. Section 751(c)(3)(B) provides that Commerce w ill base its final sunset determination on the
facts available if the aggregate response from responden t interested parties, in the aggregate, is found
to be inadequate. Section 35 1.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce
"normally" will issue a final determinati on in a sunset revi ew "without further
 investigation" when
insufficient interest in participation is demonstrated by the interested parties. The provision for a final
sunset determination "without further investigation" is intended to expedite the sunset review process.
Nevertheless, Commerce has the discretion not to expedite and, even in cases where the sunset review
is expedited, interested parties who supplied complete su bstantive responses may still submit rebuttal
responses, a challenge to Commerce’s adequacy determination, and have the right to supply any
argument and information that interested party wishes Commerce to consider in the sunset review.

Q13.
 (a) What was the amount of exports of th e subject product by Argentine exporters
other than Siderca during the five-year period of application of this measure?
Who were the exporters that made such exports? What was the source of these
statistics?

62. The domestic interested parties submitted im port statistics in their substantive responses
indicating that there were imports of the subject merchandise into the United States in each year,
except 1996, from the imposition of the order until the sunset review.
42 These statistics show that
there were approximately 45,000 ne t tons prior to the initiation of the original investigation,
26,000 net tons entered during the investigation, and an average of less than 900 net tons in each year
from the imposition of the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina until the sunset review.

41 Notice of Final Results and Rescission in Part of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review; Oil
Country Tubular Goods, Other Than Drill Pipe, from Argentina, 68 Fed. Reg. 13262, 13263 (19 March 2003).
42 See Exhibit US-23.

63. The domestic interested partie s supplied import statistics concerning imports of OCTG for the
five year period prior to the sunset review. 43 These statistics were verified during the sunset review
by using two independent sources: (1) ITC Trad e Database; and (2) Commerce’s Census Bureau
IM-145 import data.44

64. Also, through administrative review procedures, the United States has identified Acindar as
another Argentine producer of OCTG, and one that may have shipped OCTG to the United States
during the period of review, as described above.

 (b) The Panel notes Argentina's assertio n in paragraph 43 of its first oral
submission that the DOC's determination that there were exports of the subject
product from Argentina into the United States during the period of imposition of
the measure at issue was flawed because the DOC incorrectly recorded
non-consumption entries as consumption en tries. Please explain whether the so
called "non-consumption entries" are those products in transit which are not
destined for ultimate consumption in the United States?

65. First, the panel should be aware Siderca did not raise this issue during the underlying sunset
review. Second, as detailed below, Argentina’s assertion concerning the nature of these shipments
and their effect on the accuracy of the import sta tistics used in the sunset review is significantly
exaggerated.

66. In order to assist the Panel, however, we provide an accurate reiteration of the facts on this
issue. During the five year period, there were fo ur administrative reviews initiated for Siderca at the
request of domestic interested par ties. Commerce terminated each of these administrative reviews
because Commerce determined that there were no consumption entries of OCTG from Argentina
exported by Siderca
 during these periods.

67. In the administrative review initiated for the period 25 June 1995 – 31 July 1996, Commerce
found that, although there were entries of Arge ntine OCTG during the period, there were no
consumption entries of OCTG made by Siderca and, consequently, Commerce terminated the
administrative review for Siderca. 45 Domestic interested parties claimed that Siderca made seven
shipments of OCTG during the period that were not included in the import statistics. Commerce
determined that six of the shipments were FTZ or TIB entries destined for re-export. For the seventh
entry, "Siderca surmised that this shipment of [Argentine OCTG] involved parties other than itself." 46
The US Customs Service verified that there were no shipments of OCTG made by Siderca during the
period under review. There was no assertion ma de by Siderca nor did Commerce find in this
administrative review that the import statistics contained an error or errors.

68. In the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1996 – 31 July 1997, Commerce
found that the one entry directly attributed to Si derca was destined for re-export and, consequently,
Commerce terminated the administrative review for Siderca" 47 There was no finding that there were
no consumption entries of OCTG made during the period. The only finding was that there were no
entries of OCTG during the period under review exported by Siderca and that the one entry reportedly
made by Siderca was in error.

43 See Exhibit US-23.
44 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (Exhibit ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit
ARG-51), respectively.
45 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 18747, 18748 (April 17, 1998) (Exhibit ARG-29).
46 62 Fed. Reg. at 18748 (Exhibit ARG-29).
47 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 49089, 49090 (September 14, 1998) (Exhibit ARG-36).

69. In the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1997 – 31 July 1998, Commerce
found that the one shipment of Argentine OCTG made during the period was entered for consumption
in the United States, but that the shipment was not exported by Siderca.
48 Consequently, Commerce
terminated the administrative review for Siderca.

70. Finally, in the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1998 – 31 July 1999,
Commerce found that there were no entries of OC TG made by Siderca and, consequently, Commerce
terminated the administrative review for Siderca. 49 There was no finding that there were no
consumption entries of OCTG made during the period. In fact, Commerce determined that there was
at least one entry of OCTG for consumption made during the period, but that Siderca was not the
exporter.

71. Therefore, in the administrative proceeding covering the 1996-1997 period, Commerce
determined that there was a minor error concerning one entry in the statistical reporting of the import
statistics and, in the administrative review covering the 1998-1999 period, there was an undetermined
amount of mechanical tubing misclassified as OCTG, but at least one entry of OCTG for
consumption. Again, the Panel should note that Siderca did not raise this issue in either its
substantive response or by filing a challenge to Commerce’s adequacy determ ination in the sunset
review where it could have been addressed in the cont ext of the sunset proceeding and not for the first
time before this Panel.

 (c) Did the United States base its adequa cy determination in the instant sunset
review on these statistics?

72. Yes, as verified by the statistics compile d in the ITC’s Trade Database and Commerce’s
Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics.
50

Q14. Is there a legal basis for the 50 per cent threshold that determines the adequacy of the
foreign exporter's response to the questionnaire in a sunset review?

73. Section 752(c)(3) of the Act leaves to Commerce’s discretion the choice of methodology for
determining when the response from interested parties to the notice of initiation is "adequate" for the
purposes of conducting a full sunset review.
51 Consequently, Commerce promulgated section
351.218(e)(1)(ii) of the Sunset Regulations to codify the 50 per cent threshold to give effect to section
752(c)(3) of the Act.52

74. The context of sunset reviews is important in understanding the 50 per cent threshold. While
an original investigation requires a factual asse ssment of dumping, a sunset review requires a
counterfactual finding of "likelihood" of future dumping when a finding of dumping has already been
made. Article 11.3 does not prescribe the methodology for conducting sunset reviews; instead, it
requires that parties be given genera l procedural and evidentiary rights in accordance with Article 6.
The Anti-Dumping Agreement does no t require Members to expend resources to unearth information
that is being withheld.

48 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 64 Fed. Reg. 4069, 4070 (27 January 1999) (Exhibit ARG-38).
49 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 65 Fed. Reg. 8948 (23 February 2000) (Exhibit ARG-43).
50 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (Exhibit ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit
ARG-51), respectively.
51 See SAA at 880 (Exhibit ARG-5) (in many cases, some but not all parties will respond; nevertheless,
where parties demonstrate a "sufficient willingness to participate," the agency will conduct a full sunset review).
52 See Preamble, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13518 (Exhibit US-3).

Q15.
 (a) Does the cross-reference in Article 11.4 of the Agreement incorporate all
provisions of Article 6 in Article 11.3? Does the same cross-reference also
incorporate Annex II in Article 11.3?

75. No, the cross-reference in Article 11.4 specifically incorporates only those provisions of
Article 6 regarding "evidence and procedure." Please see the answer to Question 10(a) above.

76. The reference in Article 6 to Annex II incorp orates Annex II into Article 11.3. However,
Annex II is only applicable to the same extent as Article 6.

 (b) If you are of the view that the cross-reference in Article 11.4 makes article 6.1 of
the Agreement applicable to sunset reviews, does Article 6.1 – together with its
subparagraphs – require that the investigating authority send
 questionnaires to
exporters in sunset reviews?

77. No. Article 6.1 requires that interested pa rties be given notice of the information the
authorities require in respect of the investigation in question. It does not require that a "questionnaire"
be sent. Commerce published its "sunset questionna ire" and made the reportin g requirements part of
its regulations.53

 (c) What significance, if any, should be gi ven to the use of the word "investigation"
in paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II, and to the use of the word "should" rather
than "shall" in all of its paragraphs?

78. The use of the word "investigation" means that the obligations contained in Annex II are
limited to original investigations . The cross-reference in Article 11.4 concerning the application
Article 6 to sunset reviews makes the obligations of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure and,
consequently, the obligations in Annex II regarding evidence and procedure applicable in sunset
reviews also. The use of the word "should" indicates that the requirement is directory or
recommended, rather than mandatory.

Q16. In this sunset review, did Siderca attempt to submit additional evidence to the DOC
after its substantive response to the notice of initiation? If so, how did the DOC respond to such
attempts?

79. No.

Q17. What is the significance of the word "may" in section 1675(c)(3)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930?

80. The use of the word "may" means that Comme rce has the discretion no t to base the final
sunset determination on "the facts available" if Commerce determines that other information is more
appropriate. In other words, Commerce is not bound by the statute to use "the facts available" in
every case where there is an inadequate response to the notice of initiation.

53 See section 351.218(d) (Exhibit US-3).

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE
OF DUMPING

Q20. The Panel notes Argentina's arguments in paragraphs 124-147 of its first written
submission regarding the alleged irrefutable presumption under US law/practice regarding
likelihood determinations in sunset reviews. Please respond to the following questions [. . .]

 (c) Please explain how you identify "pra ctice" and how you distinguish practice
from law? In light of the WTO jurispr udence, please explain your views as to
whether practice as such is challengeable under WTO law or not.

81. A Commerce administrative practice is ne ither a "measure" within the meaning of the
relevant WTO agreements, nor a "mandatory" measure within the meaning of the
mandatory/discretionary distinction. A "measure" – which can give rise to an independent violation
of WTO obligations – must constitute an instrument with a functional life of its own – i.e., it must do
something concrete, independently of any other instrume nts. It is well-established that a "practice" is
not a measure. 54 Indeed, a practice under US law consists of nothing more than individual
applications of the US AD law in the context of sunset reviews. While Commerce, like many other
administrative agencies in the United States, uses th e term "practice" to refer collectively to its past
precedent, "practice" has neithe r a "functional life of its own" nor operates "independently of any
other instruments" because the term only refers to individual applications of the US statute and
regulations.55 In contrast to the US statute and regulati ons, which clearly function as "measures", no
general, a priori conclusions about the conduct of sunset re views under US law can be drawn from an
examination of "practice."

82. Moreover, even if "practice" could be cons idered a measure (and the United States’ position
is that it cannot), in order for any measure, as su ch, to be found WTO-inconsistent, the measure must
be "mandatory", i.e., it must require WTO-inconsis tent action or preclude WTO-consistent action.
The Appellate Body and several Panels have explained the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary measures. A Member may challenge, and a WTO panel may find against, a measure as
such only if the measure "mandates" action that is inconsistent with WTO obligations, or "precludes"
action that is WTO-consistent.56 In accordance with the normal WTO rules on the allocation of the
burden of proof, it is up to the complaining party to demonstrate that the challenged measure
mandates WTO-inconsistent action or precludes WTO-consistent action. 57 "Practice" is not binding
on Commerce, and, under US administrative law, Commerce may depart from its precedent in any
particular case, so long as it explains the reasons for doing so. Therefore, this "practice" does not
mandate WTO-inconsistent action or preclude WTO-consistent action.

54 See, e.g., United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, Report of
the Panel, adopted 29 June 2001 ("US Export Restraints").
55 Japan’s definition of "practice" does not comport with its status in US law. Japan describes practice
as "administrative procedures", which it defines as "a detailed guideline that the administrating [sic] authority
follows when implementing certain statutes and regulations." Japan's First Submission, para. 8. We define
"administrative procedures" and "guidelines" in our answer to Question 82.
56 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel , para. 162; United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
("1916 Act"), WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, paras. 88-9; Appellate Body
Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted
2 February 2002, para. 259; see also US – Export Restraints , paras. 8.77-9; Panel Report, United States –
Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, adopted 30 August 2002, para. 6.22.
57 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 5.50.

 (d) What, in your view, is the relationship between "practice" on the one hand and
"the SPB" and "the SAA" on the ot her? Could the SPB and the SAA be
considered as legal instruments that embody the US practice with regard to
sunset reviews?

83. Neither the SAA nor the Sunset Policy Bulletin can be challenged as independent violations
of the AD Agreement because they do not mandate or preclude actions subject to the AD Agreement.
The SAA is a type of legislative history which, und er US law, provides au thoritative interpretative
guidance in respect of the statute. Thus, the SAA operates only in conjunction with (and as an
interpretive tool for) the US anti-dumping statut e, and cannot be independently challenged as
WTO-inconsistent.

84. Nor can the Sunset Policy Bulletin be challenged independently as a violation of WTO
obligations. Under US law, the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a non-binding statement, providing
Commerce’s general understanding of sunset-related issues not explicitly addressed by the statute and
regulations.
58 In this regard, the Sunset Policy Bulletin has a legal status comparable to that of agency
precedent: Commerce may depart from its policy bulletin in any particular case, so long as it explains
the reasons for doing so.59 The Sunset Policy Bulletin does nothing more than provide Commerce and
the public with a guide as to how Commerce may inte rpret and apply the statute and its regulations in
individual cases. Absent application in a particular case, and in conjunction with US sunset laws and
regulations, the Sunset Policy Bulletin does not "do something concrete" for which it could be subject
to independent legal challenge under the WTO agreements.

Q21. Do Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement apply to sunset reviews? If your response is in the
affirmative, do these articles apply to sunset re views in the same manner in which they apply to
original investigations, or in a different manner? Please elaborate on the basis of the provisions
of the Agreement and the relevant WTO case law.

85. No. In a sunset review, Commerce is anal yzing whether dumping is likely to continue or
recur in the absence of the discipline of the duty . An analysis of the likelihood of dumping under
Article 11.3 does not require a determination of th e magnitude of the margin of dumping because the
amount of dumping is not relevant to the issue of whether dumping will continue or recur if the
discipline is removed. In other words, the is sue in an Article 11.3 sunset review is not how much the
exporters may dump in the future, but simply whether they will dump in the future if the order were to
be revoked. Given that there is no obligation under Article 11.3 to calculate a margin of dumping, the
provisions of Article 2 relevant to the calculation of a margin of dumping are not applicable to sunset
reviews. Indeed, the Appellate Body in Japan Steel Sunset concluded that the investigating authority
is not required to calculate dumping margins in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review
under Article 11.3.
60

86. The United States explained its position that Article 3 does not apply to sunset reviews in
paragraphs 287-302, 304-307, 344- 346, and 348-354 of its first written submission, and in its second
written submission in paragraph 44 et seq.

58 Sunset Policy Bulletin , 63 FR at 18871 ("This policy bulletin proposes guidance regarding the
conduct of sunset reviews. As described below, the proposed policies are intended to complement the
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions by providing guidance on methodological or analytical issues not
explicitly addressed by the statute and regulations.") (emphasis added) (Exhibit ARG-35).
59 As a matter of US administrative law, Commerce practice cannot be binding because Commerce is
not obliged to follow its own precedent so long as it explains departures from such precedent. Thus, as a matter
of law, Commerce practice cannot transform a discretionary measure into a mandatory measure.
60 See Japan Sunset, paras. 123-124, 155.

Q22. The Panel notes Argentina's statements in paragraphs 132, 184, 190 and 192 of its first
written submission. In your view, does Arti cle 11.3 require an investigating authority to
calculate the likely dumping margin in a sunset review? If your response is in the negative, does
Article 11.3 at least require some kind of comparison between the future export price and the
future normal value? Please explain on the basis of the relevant provisions in the Agreement.

87. No.
61

Q23. The Panel notes that the DOC's Issues a nd Decision Memorandum in the instant sunset
review mentions that it was determined that dumping continued over the life of the measure in
question and that the margin of dumping did not decline in the same period. Please explain the
factual basis of that determination, in particul ar, please indicate whether the DOC calculated a
dumping margin for Siderca or any other Arge ntine exporter after the imposition of the
original measure.

88. As noted above, the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset confirmed that Article 11.3 does not
require the calculation of a dumping margin. Commerce did not calculate a dumping margin in the
sunset review for Siderca or any other Argentine exporter of OCTG during the five years preceding
the sunset review because Siderca had ceased shipping to the United States during that time. In the
sunset review, Commerce found that dumping continued to exist during the five years preceding the
sunset review because there were shipments of Arge ntine OCTG during four of those five years and
dumping duties were assessed on those same imports.
62 (In a subsequent administrative review,
Commerce found a dumping margin of 60.73 per cent for Acindar, an Argentine producer of OCTG
that the United States believes began to ship OCTG to the United States in 1997.)63

Q24. What was the factual basis of the DOC's likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping determination in this sunset review? What factual information was collected by the
DOC and from what sources?

89. Commerce found that dumping was likely to continue or recur based on the existence of
dumping and the continued depressed import volumes since the imposition of the OCTG order.
64
Both the domestic interested parties and Siderca supplied complete substantive responses which
contained the factual information required by section 351.218(d)(3) of the Sunset Regulations . In
addition, domestic interested parties each suppli ed Argentine OCTG import statistics in their
substantive responses, which indicated that Siderc a was not the only exporter of Argentina OCTG to
the United States. 65 Commerce used both the ITC Trade Database and the Commerce’s Census
Bureau statistics to verify the OCTG import statistics submitted by the domestic interested parties.66

CUMULATION

Q26. Would cumulation be generally allowed (i.e. both in original investigations and reviews)
in the absence of Article 3.3 of the Agreement? What provision, if any, of the Agreement would
cumulation violate in the absence of Article 3.3? In other words, in your view, is Article 3.3 an
authorization for the use of cumulation, or, is it rather a provision that imposes certain
restrictions on the use of cumulation in investigations? Please elaborate on the basis of the
relevant provisions of the Agreement.

61 See US Answer to Panel Question 21 and Japan Sunset, paras. 123-124, 155.
62 See Decision Memorandum at 5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
63 Notice of Final Results and Rescission in Part of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review; Oil
Country Tubular Goods, Other Than Drill Pipe, from Argentina, 68 Fed. Reg. 13262, 13263 (19 March 2003).
64 See Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
65 See Exhibit US-23.
66 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).

90. In the view of the United States, cumulation is generally allowed in both investigations and
reviews. Article 3.3 is a provision that imposes certain restrictions on the use of cumulation in
investigations, but not in reviews.

91. Nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement prevents a Member from cumulating imports. In
the absence of a restriction, the measure is permissible and must be found to be in conformity with the
Agreement. This is particularly true for sunset reviews, for which no methodology is prescribed.67

92. The United States notes that cumulation in anti-dumping investigations was a widespread
practice among GATT contracting parties prior to th e adoption of Article 3.3 in the Uruguay Round,
even though the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code was sile nt on the subject. If the negotiators of the
Uruguay Round had intended to limit the practice of cumulation to investigations, it seems unlikely
that they would have made no mention of the subject in Article 11.3.

REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS

Q27. The Panel notes the statement of the Un ited States in paragraph 52 of its oral
submission that it was prejudiced in its right to defend itself in these proceedings because of the
alleged defects in Argentina's panel request. Plea se explain in what ways the United States was
prejudiced with respect to each alleged inconsiste ncy that the United States is raising in its
request for preliminary rulings.

93. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Disputes ("DSU") provides
carefully-established procedures to ensure that all parties to the proceeding are afforded due process.
These procedures include deadlines calibrated to ensure that the proceeding moves expeditiously
while providing parties adequate time to prepare its defence. The lack of due process in the early part
of the proceeding, if not cured, is of particul ar concern because it risks tainting the remaining
proceeding.

94. The violation in question is Argentina’s failu re pursuant to DSU Article 6.2 to "provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complain t sufficient to present the problem clearly."
Argentina’ s failure to do so initially, and its failure to cure the defect, deprived the United States of
the opportunity to prepare defence; the United States did not know the legal basis of Argentina’s
specific claims. From panel establishment th rough panel selection through preparation of
submissions, the United States has not been afforded the full measure of due process required under
the DSU, compromising its ability to research the is sues at hand, assign personnel, etc. As the
Appellate Body has explained, "A defending party is entitled to know what case it has to answer, and
what violations have been alleged so that it can begi n preparing its defence . . . . This requirement of
due process is fundamental to ensuring a fair and orderly conduct of dispute settlement
proceedings."
68 Indeed, "it is a corollary of the due proc ess objective inherent in Article 6.2 that a
complaining party, as the party in control the draftin g of a panel request, should bear the risk of any
lack of precision in the panel request."69

67 Japan Sunset, para. 123.
68 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Section of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel H-Beams
from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body adopted 28 September 2000, para. 88.
69 Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276,
Preliminary Ruling on the Panel’s jurisdiction under Article 6.2 of the DSU, 25 June 2003, para. 25.

OTHER

Q29. During the five-year period of imposition of the anti-dumping duty at issue in this case,
did any exporter other than Siderca ask for an administrative review for its own duty?

95. During the five years preceding the sunset review, no exporter or producer of Argentine
OCTG requested an administrative review of its assi gned margin of dumping, including Siderca. As
explained in the US answer to question 13(b) from the Panel, the domestic interested parties requested
administrative reviews of Siderca for each of three periods (1995-1996; 1996-1997; 1997-1998) prior
to the sunset review. These administrative review s were terminated after Commerce determined, for
each of the relevant periods, that Siderca had no imports of OCTG for consumption in the United
States. Notably, since the sunset review, another Argentina exporter of OCTG has participated in an
administrative review.

Q30. The United States argues that certain US legal instruments such as the SPB cited by
Argentina is not a measure that can be ch allenged as such under the WTO Agreements.
70
Please provide the Panel with detailed in formation regarding the legal status and
interrelationships, if any, of the following instruments under US law, and in particular whether
they are mandatory or discretionary. In particular, in light of the relevant WTO dispute
settlement reports, the Panel would like to know whether each of these instruments have an
operational life of their own under US law, and whether the DOC and the ITC are required to
follow their provisions in sunset reviews.

 (i) Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended by the URAA).

96. The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the statute or "the Act") is US law. Commerce is bound
by the statute – e.g., there is no higher law except for the US Constitution. Consequently, the statute
has an operational life of its own.
71 Many of the provisions in the statute are mandatory, although
certain provisions are discretionary.

 (ii) Statement of Administrative Action,

97. The SAA was prepared and submitted with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. The
function of the SAA is set forth in the SAA itself, as follows:

This Statement describes significan t administrative actions proposed
to implement the Uruguay Round agreements. In addition,
incorporated into this Statement are two other statements required
under section 1103: (1) an explanation of how the implementing bill
and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law;
and (2) a statement setting forth the reasons why the implementing
bill and proposed administrative ac tion are necessary or appropriate
to carry out the Uruguay Round agreements.
As is the case with earlier Statements of Administrative Action
submitted to the Congress in connection with fast-track bills, this
Statement represents an authoritative expression by the
Administration concerning its view s regarding the interpretation and
application of the Uruguay Round agreements, both for purposes of
US international obligations and domestic law. Furthermore, the
Administration understands that it is the expectation of the Congress

70 See, e.g., First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 193-195.
71 US – Export Restraints para. 8.91.

that future Administrations will ob serve and apply the interpretations
and commitments set out in this Statement. Moreover, since this
Statement will be approved by the Congress at the time it implements
the Uruguay Round agreements, the interpretations of those
agreements included in this Statement carry particular authority.72
98. In other words, the SAA is a type of legislative history. In the United States, legislative
history is often considered for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of a statute, but cannot change the
meaning of, or override, the statute to which it rela tes. It provides auth oritative interpretative
guidance in respect of the statute. The status granted to the SAA under the US system, however, is
only in respect to its interpretive authority vis à vis the statute. Thus, the SAA operates only in
conjunction with (and as an interp retive tool for) the US anti-dumping statute has no operational life
of its own.73 In addition, the SAA is not mandatory.

 (iii) Sunset Regulations (Both the DOC's and the ITC's regulations), and

99. These regulations are US law. The regulat ions contain both mandatory and discretionary
directives. The regulations have force and effect of law and must be followed where the language of
the specific provision leaves no discretion. The regulations, however, have provisions that provide for
the exercise of discretion by the applicable decision-maker. The regulations are issued in accordance
with US federal agency rule-making procedures an d are accorded controlling weight by US courts
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.74 Thus, the regulations have
an independent operational life of their own.75

 (iv) Sunset Review Policy Bulletin.

100. Under US law, the Sunset Policy Bulletin is considered a non-binding statement, providing
Commerce’s general understanding of sunset-related issues not explicitly addressed by the statute and
regulations.76 In this regard, the Sunset Policy Bulletin has a legal status comparable to that of agency
precedent. As with its administrative precedent, Commerce may depart from its policy bulletin in any
particular case, so long as it e xplains the reasons for doing so. 77 The Sunset Policy Bulletin does
nothing more than provide Commerce and the public with guidance as to how Commerce may
interpret and apply the statute and its re gulations in individual cases. The Sunset Policy Bulletin does
not "do something concrete" for which it could be subject to independent le gal challenge under the
WTO agreements.

72 SAA, page 656 (Exhibit US-11). The reference to "section 1103" is to section 1103 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("1988 Act"). Among other things, the 1988 Act provided the
Administration with fast-track negotiating authority with respect to the Uruguay Round.
73 US Export Restraints, paras. 8.98 - 8.100.
74 See, e.g., Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc. , 467 US 837, 842, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778-845 (1984).
75 US Export Restraints, paras. 8108 - 8.113.
76 Sunset Policy Bulletin , 63 FR at 18871 ("This policy bulletin proposes guidance regarding the
conduct of sunset reviews. As described below, the proposed policies are intended to complement the
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions by providing guidance on methodological or analytical issues not
explicitly addressed by the statute and regulations.") (Emphasis added) (Exhibit ARG-35).
77 As a matter of US administrative law, Commerce practice cannot be binding in the sense that
Commerce is not obliged to follow its own precedent so long as it explains departures from such precedent.
Thus, as a matter of law, Commerce practice cannot transform a discretionary measure into a mandatory
measure.

Q31.
 (a) Are "the SPB" and "t he SAA" binding legal instruments under the US law?

101. No.

 (b) If not, please explain the legal status of these two legal instruments under the US
law and the purpose of having them?

102. Please see our responses to questions 30(ii) and 30(iv), as well as 20(d).

 (c) Can the US administration depart from the provisions of the SAA and the SPB
without formally amending them?

103. Both the SAA and the Sunset Policy Bulletin are forms of guidance and are not mandatory.
Consequently, it is inapposite to discuss the SAA or the Sunset Policy Bulletin in terms of "departing"
from them.

 (d) Have the SAA and the SPB ever been amended?

104. No. There is no mechanism for amending the SAA.

ANNEX E-3

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS
OF THE PANEL – FIRST MEETING (REVISED VERSION)

27 February 2004

EXPEDITED REVIEWS/WAIVER PROVISIONS

Q2. Please respond to the following questions regarding "expedited sunset reviews" under
the US law?

 (a) In what circumstances does the DOC decide to conduct an expedited sunset
review? More specifically, does the US law require or allow the DOC to conduct
an expedited sunset review in cases wh ere there is an affirmative or deemed
waiver as well? Or, are expedited reviews limited only to cases where the
respondent interested parties' substantive response to the notice of initiation is
found inadequate because their share in the total imports falls below the
50 per cent threshold prescribed under US law?

1. The US Department of Commerce (Comme rce) decides whether to conduct a full or
expedited sunset review based on a two-part procedure. First, Commerce solicits substantive
responses from interested parties after publication of the notice of initiation of the review in the
Federal Register
.1 Respondent interested pa rties, which include foreign exporters and governments, 2
have several options: They may (1) file a substantive response; (2) elect to waive their rights to
participate in the review ("affirmative waiver"); or (3) refuse to provide a substantive response. 3
Commerce will determine whether each response receiv ed is "complete" per the criteria set forth in
the regulations. 4 No response, or an inco mplete substantive response, is considered a waiver
("deemed waiver").5 Parties waiving their rights to participat e in the review are considered likely to
dump (a company-specific likelihood finding).6

2. Second, taking into account all of the responses received as part of the first step, including
deemed and affirmative waivers, Commerce normally evaluates whether the exporters submitting
complete substantive responses account for 50 per ce nt of the total imports of subject merchandise to
the United States over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of the review ("50 per cent
threshold").
7 If the responses do not meet the 50 per cent threshold, Commerce will normally conduct
an expedited review to make an order-wide determination of the likelihood of continuing or recurring
dumping (an order-wide likelihood determination).8

3. The likelihood finding with regard to one company under the first step is not dispositive of
the results of the order-wide likelihood determination under the second step. Even if Commerce finds
that dumping is likely with regard to one company, Commerce still must decide whether to conduct a

1 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
2 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC. 1677(9).
3 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d) (Exhibit ARG-3).
4 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3)(ii) (Exhibit ARG-3).
5 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(2)(iii) (Exhibit ARG-3).
6 Section 751(c)(4) of the Tariff Act (19 USC. 1675(c)(4)) (Exhibit ARG-1).
7 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A) (Exhibit ARG-3).
8 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C) (Exhibit ARG-3).

full or expedited review to dete rmine order-wide likelihood. The decision whether to expedite
depends on the other respondent interested party responses.

4. (Please note that the 50 per cent threshold is not dispositive. Commerce may take other
factors into account and has conducted several fu ll sunset reviews under the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws in which the aggregate response did not represent more than 50 per cent of
imports. Most of these involved analyses of subsidization where the relevant government’s
participation is essential given the nature of the sunset review in the countervailing duty context. In at
least one case, however, Commerce conducted a full sunset review in an anti-dumping case in which
the aggregate response to the notice of initiation did not represent more than 50 per cent of imports for
the five year period. In Pineapple from Thailand , the only respondent interested party to file a
complete substantive response did not represent more than 50 per cent of the imports during the five
year period preceding the sunset review.
9 Commerce nonetheless conducted a full sunset review
because the respondent interested party was a signifi cant exporter of the subject merchandise, was a
respondent in the original investigation, represented nearly 50 per cent of the imports during the five
year period (on average), and acco unted for more than 50 per cent of the imports for the two years
preceding the sunset review.)

 (b) The Panel notes that the provisions relating to a deemed waiver, i.e. the
presumption that a respondent interested party that submits an incomplete
substantive response is deemed to have waived its right to participate, are found
in the Regulations only. This matter does not seem to be dealt with under the
Tariff Act. Would the United States agree that the only provisions of the US law
relating to deemed waivers are contained in the Regulations?

5. Yes.

 (c) If the DOC carries out an expedited suns et review in cases of an affirmative or
deemed waiver as well, please explain whether there are any differences in the
procedural rules that apply to these two sets of expedited sunset reviews, i.e.
expedited reviews that result from a waiver and those that result from the
submission of an inadequate response.

6. There is only one "type" of expedited review.

7. There is no difference in the treatment of a re spondent interested party in an expedited sunset
review conducted by Commerce whether that particul ar party waives its right to participate pursuant
to an election (section 751(C)(4)(A)) or is deemed to have waived because it failed to respond or its
substantive response to the notice of initiation was found to be inadequate.
10

 (d) Please explain the differences, if any, between expedited and full sunset reviews
regarding the procedural rules that are fo llowed by the DOC. Please explain for
instance whether interested parties, especially the foreign exporters, in expedited
sunset reviews have the right to submit evidence in addition to, and apart from,
their response to the notice of initiation; whether they have the right to request a
hearing; and whether the DOC issues a final disclosure as stated in Article 6.9 of
the Agreement. Please respond in detail by referring to the relevant provisions
of the US law in conjunction with Article 6 and Annex II of the Agreement.

9 See Preliminary Results of Full Sunset Review; Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand , 65 Fed. Reg.
58509 (29 September 2000).
10 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(2)(ii) (Exhibit ARG-3).

8. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset has confirmed that Article 11.3 does not prescribe the
methodology – or methodologies – that Members may use in conducting sunset reviews. 11
Article 11.4 ensures that the general procedural and evidentiary provisions of Article 6 apply in sunset
reviews to give respondent interested parties basic due process. Expedited reviews are consistent with
Article 11.3 and Article 6 as incorporated therein.

9. Whether the sunset review is full or expedited, Commerce’s Sunset Regulations provide the
due process and evidentiary requirements found in Article 6. Specifically:

 (a) Section 351.218(d)(3) provides that inte rested parties will have 30 days from the
notice of initiation of the review to su bmit complete substant ive responses. In
addition to identifying information that is required of interested parties,
section 351.218(d)(3)(iv)(B) provides that parties may provide "any other relevant
information or argument that the party would like [Commerce] to consider."
(Emphasis added.)

 (b) Section 351.218(d)(4) affords interested parties the opportunity to rebut evidence and
argument submitted in other parties’ substantive responses within five days of the
submission of those responses.

 (c) In cases where Commerce finds that the aggregate response to the notice of initiation
from the respondent interested partie s is inadequate, section 351.309(e) of
Commerce’s Sunset Regulations affords interested parties the opportunity to
comment on whether an expedited review is appropriate.

10. Therefore, Commerce’s regulations expressly provide parties – in both full and expedited
reviews – with multiple opportunities to provide Co mmerce with any relevant information, to rebut
any relevant information and argument submitte d by other parties, and to comment on the
appropriateness of conducting an expe dited review even when the substantive responses have been
inadequate. Section 351.308(f)(2) of Commerce’s Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce
normally will consider the substantive submissions – not just the complete ones – of all interested
parties in making the order-wide likelihood determination in an expedited sunset review.

11. The differences between a full and an expedite d sunset review are timing (the final sunset
determination in an expedited sunset review is i ssued 120 days after the no tice of initiation, rather
than the full sunset review’s 240 days)
12 and the fact that case briefs are not filed in an expedited case.
Because as a rule hearings are tied to the contents of the case briefs, 13 hearings are generally not held
in an expedited proceeding. It should be noted that the deadline for the submission of factual
information is the same for both an expedited and a full sunset review proceeding and normally is no
later than the deadline for the submission of the interested party rebuttal briefs.14

12. Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be informed of the essential facts. This requirement
does not impose a particular means of disclosure. The United States has established an investigative
and review process that allows interested parties to presented with all of the facts as they are presented
to the authority, as well as arguments made about these facts.15

11 United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan , WT/DS244/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 15 December 2003 (" Japan Sunset"),
paras 149 and 158.
12 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(ii)(2), 19 C.F.R. 351.218(f)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
13 19 C.F.R. 351.310(c) (Exhibit US-27).
14 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(4) (Exhibit ARG-3).
15 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy ,
WT/DS189/R, Report of the Panel, adopted 28 September 2001 ("Ceramic Floor Tiles"), para 6.125.

13. Consistent with paragraph 1 of Annex II, th e Commerce regulations set forth in detail the
requirements for the submission of a complete substan tive response and specify that interested parties
may submit other information.
16 The regulations also make clear that respondent interested parties
have 30 days to provide a complete substantive response 17 and if the collective responses are
considered inadequate, an expedited review will normally be conducted and facts available used. 18
Consistent with paragraphs 5 and 6, Commerce does not require the information provided to be ideal;
as noted above, parties are provided the opportunit y to explain why they cannot provide particular
information. Further, all evidence or informati on is accepted, even for incomplete substantive
responses, pursuant to section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.

 (e) Please explain whether exporters who submitted an incomplete response to the
notice of initiation of a sunset review, and therefore are deemed to have waived
their right to participate under Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset
Regulations, have the right to submit ev idence in addition to, and apart from,
their response to the notice of initiation; whether they have the right to request
a hearing; and whether the DOC issues a fi nal disclosure as stated in Article 6.9
of the Agreement. Please respond in detail by referring to the relevant
provisions of the US law in conjunction with Article 6 and Annex II of the
Agreement.

14.

15. If an exporter in fact submitted an incomplete substantive response – a hypothetical situation
– that exporter would be deemed to have waived its right to participate in the sunset review, pursuant
to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii). Therefore, the exporter would not have the right to submit additional
evidence or request a hearing.

16. The US sunset review proc edures meet Article 6 requirem ents. A notice of initiation is
published in the Federal Register, respondent interested parties have 30 days to provide a complete
substantive response and any other information th ey wish to provide, they are afforded the
opportunity to respond to the adequacy determination (if they provided a complete substantive
response),
19 and even if facts available is applied, th e information in both incomplete and complete
responses is taken into account.20

17. The sunset review procedures conform to the norms in Annex II. For example, the
information required from respondent interested part ies in a substantive response is set forth in the
regulations and therefore precedes the notice of initiation, providing greater rights than those
suggested under paragraph 1 of Annex II. Similarly, the regulations make clear that facts available
may be used if information is not supplied within a reasonable time. Article 5 suggests that all
information should be accepted and that author ities should not disregard any properly submitted,
verifiable information. As noted above, even when expedited reviews are conducted and facts
available are used, Commerce will consider the in formation provided in complete and incomplete
substantive responses. Similarly, even though a re spondent interested party’s incomplete submission
will preclude it from participating further, the evidence and information contained therein will be used
at a minimum as part of facts available, if facts available is applied.
21

16 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(iv) (Exhibit ARG-3).
17 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3).
18 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e)(ii)(C)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).
19 19 C.F.R. 351.309(e) (Exhibit US-27).
20 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).
21 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

18. Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be informed of the essential facts. This requirement
does not impose a particular means of disclosure. The United States has established an investigative
and review process that allows interested parties to be presented with all of the facts as they are
presented to the authority, as well as arguments made about these facts.22

Q3. The Panel notes that under US law the effect of failure to submit a complete substantive
response is a deemed waiver, in which case the DOC is directed to find likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping. The ef fect of submitting an inadequate substantive
response, however, seems to be the DOC's resort to facts available. In the latter case, will the
DOC also find likelihood without further investigat ion? In other words, is there a difference
between these two effects? Is it correct to state that the DOC is directed to find likelihood as a
matter of US law only in the case of an incomplete substantive response, or does that also apply
to complete but inadequate substantive responses?

19. As noted above, the assessment of likelihood may occur twice in a sunset review, but with
different implications. First, a respondent interested party’s waiv er of participation, deemed or
affirmative, will lead to a finding with regard to that party that the party is likely to continue to dump
(or that dumping by that party will recur). Comm erce will subsequently determine whether dumping
is likely to continue or recur on an order-wide basis , i.e., taking into account the activities of all the
companies that export the subject merchandise, including information provided in substantive
responses. In other words, one company’s failure to submit a complete substantive response results in
a finding of likelihood with respect to that company, and not on an order-wide basis; Commerce could
still, in light of other submissions and facts on the record, conclude that there is no order-wide
likelihood of dumping.

Q4. The Panel notes that Section 1675(c)(4) of the Tariff Act of 1930 reads:

 "(B) Effect of waiver

In a review in which an interested party waives its participation
pursuant to this paragraph, the administering authority shall
conclude that revocation of the order or termination of the
investigation would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case
may be) with respect to that interested party." 23 (emphasis
added)
 (a) Does this provision mean that the DOC will make no substantive analysis but
will automatically determine that there is a likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of dumping? How does the United States explain it in light of the
obligation to determine under Article 11.3? In other words, is it the view of the
United States that not carrying out any substantive determination in cases of an
affirmative or deemed waiver discharges the investigating authority from its
obligation to make a likelihood determination under Article 11.3?

20. No. As noted above, the assessment of like lihood may occur twice in a sunset review. The
statute requires a finding of company-specific
 likelihood in the case of an affirmative waiver but does
not mandate a determination of order-wide likelihood. Commerce will take the waiver into account
for purposes of the 50 per cent threshold.

22 Ceramic Floor Tiles, para 6.125.
23 19 USC. § 1675(c)(4) (Exhibit ARG-1 at 1152).

21. Article 11.3 does not mandate a particular methodology for Members conducting sunset
reviews. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset concluded that Members are free to structure sunset
review proceedings as they wish, provided those proceedings are consistent with the obligations of
Article 6.
24 Thus, the "determination" referenced ther ein need not be made with respect to each
company subject to the order; instead, for the United States, the determination is made for the order as
a whole.

22. The United States does not believe that its sunset reviews result in "not carrying out any
substantive determination in cases of an affirmative or deemed waiver." The application of facts
available, which includes information provided by the parties in their substantive responses, even if
incomplete, assures that the determination is based on the facts on the administrative record, including
prior dumping determinations (such as administrativ e reviews), as well as any information the parties
wish to make available. It bears rep eating that parties are entitled to include any relevant information
in their substantive responses, and not just the information set forth under section 351.218(d)(ii). As a
result, Commerce does make a substantive determin ation, and the sunset review procedures of the
United States conform to the limited requirements of Article 11.3.

 (b) For instance, in a case of a waiver, does the US law preclude the DOC from
evaluating, as part of its likelihood de termination, imports statistics and the
results of administrative reviews – if any-- or any other piece of information that
might be available to the DOC or that might have been submitted by the
domestic interested parties?

23. The United States wishes to reiterate that a waiver does not result in an order-wide
 likelihood
determination. Regardless of whether a company has waived its right to participate, with regard to the
order-wide likelihood determination, Commerce is authoriz ed to take into account facts available,
including the information in the substantive resp onses (whether complete or incomplete) if an
expedited review is conducted. Notably, respondent interested parties are entitled to include any
relevant information in those responses. Add itionally, Commerce may consider information from
prior determinations (such as administrative reviews) in assessing order-wide likelihood.

 (c) Hypothetically, in a sunset review where all of the interested foreign exporters
submitted incomplete responses to the notice of initiation, would the
above-quoted section of the Tariff Act require that the DOC find likelihood of
continuation without considering the information contained in these incomplete
responses? Please elaborate by referring to the relevant provisions of the US
law.

24. No. As noted above, there is a difference between a company-specific likelihood finding and
an order-wide likelihood determination. The Tariff Act requires a company-specific likelihood
finding when that company has elected to waive pa rticipation. However, the Tariff Act does not
mandate a particular order-wide likelihood determination.

25. If all of the respondent interested parties submitted incomplete resp onses, the regulations
provide that Commerce will normally consider th e collective response to be inadequate, and
Commerce will normally proceed to an e xpedited review and use facts available. 25 In using facts
available, Commerce will consider all of the info rmation provided in the incomplete responses and
information from prior proceedings to reach the order-wide likelihood determination.26

24 Japan Sunset, paras. 156-57.
25 Section 351.218(d)(ii)(C)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).
26 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

Q5. The Panel notes that Section 1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that when
an interested party waives its participation in a sunset review, the DOC will find likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping with respect to that interested party . The Panel also
notes that Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset Regulations state that failure to submit
a complete substantive response to the notice of initiation of sunset review will be deemed a
waiver of that exporter's right to participate in that suns et review. Finally, the Panel notes the
United States' statement in paragraph 235 of it s first written submission that the DOC carries
out its likelihood determinations in sunset reviews on an order-wide basis.

 (a) The United States mentions in footnote 250 of its first written submission that
the Sunset Policy Bulletin ("SPB") requires the DOC to make its likelihood
determinations on an order-wide basis. Please specify whether there is any other
provision in any other legal instruments under US law (e.g. the Statute or the
Regulations) which requires that likelih ood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping determinations in sunset reviews be carried out on an order-wide basis.

26. Footnote 250 is a citation to the statement in the text that an "adequate" number of responses
is normally required. 27 Footnote 250 does not state that the SPB requires Commerce to make its
likelihood determinations on an order-wide basis.

27. Section 751(c)(1)(A) of the Act provides the Commerce shall conduct a sunset review of an
anti-dumping duty order
 five years after publication of the anti-dumping duty order. The SAA, as the
authoritative interpretive tool for the statute, make s it clear that section 751(c) requires Commerce to
make the sunset determination on an order-wide basis.

 (b) Given the US statement in paragraph 23 5 of its first written submission that the
DOC is required to carry out its likelih ood determinations in sunset reviews on
an order-wide basis, what meaning should be given to the language "with
respect to that interested party" in Section 1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930? If the US law requires that the DOC make its sunset determinations on an
order-wide basis, what happens when one of the exporters waives its right to
participate or fails to submit a comple te response, which seems to lead to a
deemed-waiver? Would the statutory provision that mandates a positive finding
with regard to the waiving exporter also determine the overall likelihood
determination to be made for the country concerned on an order-wide basis?

28. No; neither section 751(c)(4)(B) nor any other provision of US law or regulation mandates an
order-wide affirmative likelihood determination in a sunset review based on the waiver of a single
exporter.

 (c) Suppose that exporter A, one of th e exporters involved in a sunset review
initiated against country X, submits an incomplete response to the notice of
initiation and therefore is deemed to have waived its right to participate
pursuant to Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's Sunset Regulations. Would
the DOC have to find likelihood for country X on an order-wide basis because it
has to find likelihood as a matter of la w for exporter A submitting incomplete
response? In other words, would the affirmative finding with regard to exporter
A also determine the overall order-wide determination for country X in this
case? Please elaborate by referring to the relevant provisions under the US law.

29. No. As noted above, Commerce may make a company-specific
 likelihood finding and will
subsequently make an order-wide likelihood determination. If an expedited review is conducted and

27 First Written Submission of the United States, para. 235.

facts available are used, then the regulations provide that all of the factual information on the record
will be applied in making the order-wide
 determination, including info rmation from incomplete and
complete substantive responses. 28 Thus, US law does not mandate that a likelihood finding with
respect to one company result in a likelihood determination for the entire order.

 (d) If your response to question (c) is in the negative, please explain whether a
negative finding for country X on an order-wide basis would violate Section
1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, which requires that the DOC make a
positive determination for exporter A wh ich submitted an incomplete response
to the notice of initiation?

30. No violation of 751(c)(4)(B) or any other provision of US law would result. The statute
requires only that likelihood be found with respect to the company that waived; it does not mandate
that likelihood be found on an order-wide basis. As noted above, Commerce, even if using facts
available, will consider information from prior proceedings and from all substantive responses,
complete or otherwise.

Q6. The Panel notes that section 351.308(f) of the DOC's Regulations sets out the facts to be
used by the DOC when applying facts available in a sunset review.

 (a) Does this section define or limit the scope of facts available in sunset reviews? In
other words, does this section allow the DOC to consider facts other than those
set out therein when using facts available in a sunset review? Please respond in
detail by referring to the relevant provisi ons of the US law in conjunction with
Article 6 and Annex II of the Agreement.

31. Section 751(c)(3)(B) provides that Commerce w ill base its final sunset determination on the
facts available if the order-wide response from respondent interested parties, in the aggregate, is found
to be inadequate. Section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations provides that, when Commerce is
making the final sunset determination on the basis of the facts available, Commerce normally will rely
upon prior agency determinations and information fr om the interested party substantive responses.
The latter may include any information the respondent interested party considers relevant to the
proceedings.

32. Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement provides that "[i]n cases which any in terested party refuses
access to, or otherwise does not provide, nece ssary information" a Member may make its
determination on the basis of "facts available." In an expedited sunset review, respondent interested
parties representing more than 50 per cent of the imports of the subject merchandise have
affirmatively waived participation, filed an incomplete substantive response, or have failed to respond
to the notice of initiation in any respect. In this context, Commerce normally uses the facts available
to make its final sunset determination because th e respondent interested parties have collectively
failed to provide the necessary information. Nevertheless, paragraph 3 of Annex II to the AD
Agreement provides that, when applying the facts available pursuant to Article 6.8, all properly
submitted, verifiable information should be taken into account when the determination at issue is
made. Section 351.308(f)(2) provides for consideration of this information when submitted in an
interested party’s substantive response, whether that substantive response is complete or incomplete.

 (b) What is the significance of the word "normally" in this section?

33. Section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations states that Commerce normally will base its
final sunset determination on prior agency dete rminations and the information submitted in the
parties’ substantive responses. The use of the word "normally" in section 351.308(f) provides

28 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).

Commerce with the discretion to find that the factual circumstances in a particular case warrant
Commerce’s reliance on other or additional inform ation when making the final order-wide sunset
determination.

 (c) What is the legal significance of the cro ss-reference in Section 351.308(f) of the
Regulations to 752(b) and 752(c) of the Act? Given that the Statute does not
have any provision about the inadequacy of substantive responses, does this
cross-reference suggest that the provisions of Section 351.308(f) of the
Regulations apply only in cases of an affirmative or deemed waiver, but not in
cases where the substantive response is complete but inadequate because the
exporters' share is below 50 per cent? Please respond in conjunction with the
statements of the United States in paragraphs 156 and 170 of its first submission.

34. As noted above, there are two steps in assess ing whether to conduct a full or expedited sunset
review. The first is to evaluate whether the subs tantive responses (there may well be more than one
exporter, for example) to the notice of initiation ar e complete or whether parties have waived their
right to participate in the proceedings. These decisi ons are then folded into the second step, which is
to determine whether the complete substantive responses represent 50 per cent of imports. Then, if
Commerce decides to proceed with an expedited review, Commerce normally
 will apply facts
available, as described in Section 351.308(f). Thus, it is entirely po ssible that there will be waivers
and complete substantive responses in one proceedi ng, both of which are taken into account in
determining whether to expedite and, correspondingly, use facts available.

35. The cross-reference to sections 752(b) and 75 2(c) of the Act is found in section 351.308(f)
because these statutory provisions contain the ma ndatory elements Commerce "shall" consider in
making an order-wide likelihood determination a sunset review . Commerce will consider any
additional information in the parties’ substantive response in light of the statutory requirements
contained in sections 752(b) and 752(c) when making the final sunset determination.

 (d) Please explain whether in a sunset review where the respondent interested
party/parties account for less than 50 per cent of total exports of the subject
product into the US market the DOC wo uld take into account the information
and evidence submitted by the respondent interested parties in their substantive
responses to the notice of initiation of the sunset review? If so, explain why
Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Regulations provides that the DOC would
base its determinations on facts available in such cases. In other words, if the
DOC is to take into account evidence submitted by the resp ondent interested
parties to the notice of initiation no matter what their share in the total exports
of the subject product into the US market is, why is it that the Regulations direct
the DOC to resort to facts available if the respondent's share falls below
50 per cent?

36. In a sunset review in which the respondent interested party or parties do not meet the
50 per cent threshold, and Commerce has made a determination that the aggregate response to the
notice of initiation was inadequate, Commerce wo uld consider the information and evidence
submitted by the respondent interested parties in their substantive responses when making the final
sunset determination in accordance with section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.

Q7.
 (a) Please explain the significance of the la nguage "without further investigation" in
Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the DOC' s Regulations. What does it imply?
Does it mean that the DOC will not accept any submission of evidence by foreign
exporters in expedited sunset reviews in addition to their responses considered to

be inadequate? Or does it imply th at the evidence submitted by interested
parties will not be evaluated or otherwise tested?

37. Section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce will
normally
 base its final sunset determination on "the fa cts available" without further investigation in a
case where the aggregate respondent interested parties is inadequate. However, Commerce may
exercise its discretion and conduct further investigation. 29 The use of the language "without further
investigation" of section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) pr ovides that Commerce is not required to request
additional information.

38. Commerce normally
 will not accept additional submissi ons from any interested party,
whether domestic or respondent, after that interested party’s substantive submission is found to be
"incomplete." Nevertheless, any information subm itted by an interested party in its substantive
response is considered by Commerce when Commer ce makes the final determination in an expedited
sunset review, even in cases where that substantive response was found to be "incomplete."30

 (b) More generally, would it be correct to stat e that in terms of procedural rules, the
only difference between a statutory finding of likelihood in a case of waiver and
an expedited review in cases where the res ponse is found to be inadequate is the
fact that in the latter case the DOC will consider th e information submitted by
the foreign exporter in its complete substantive response to the notice of
initiation?

39. Commerce will consider all information on the administrative record of the sunset
proceeding, including information in the substantive responses and rebuttal responses of the domestic
interested parties, prior agency determinations, an d any other information received by Commerce, as
well as the information submitted by foreign intere sted parties in their substantive and rebuttal
responses.31 If a respondent interested party submitted a statement of waiver, then, obviously, there
would be no information from that party to consider.

Q8. The Panel notes the following provision in Section 351.218(d)(2) (iii) of the DOC's
Sunset Regulations:

"(iii) No response
 from an interested party. The Secretary will
consider the failure by a respondent interested party to file a
complete substantive response to a notice of initiation under
paragraph (d)(3) of this section as a waiver of participation in a
sunset review before the Department."32 (emphasis added)
 (a) Please explain the relationship be tween the terms "no response" and "a
complete substantive response" as used in this section. Does this provision mean
that submission of an incomplete response by an interested party is deemed as
no response under US law? Does this provision treat an incomplete response as
no response at all not withstanding how minimal the lacking portion of this
response may be? Or, does it treat these two cases differently? Is there a waiver
when the exporter fails to respond at all, or also when the exporter submits its
response but the response doesn't contain all required information?

29 See SAA at 879-880 (Exhibit US-11).
30 19 C.F.R. 351.308(f)(2) (Exhibit US-27).
31 See section 351.318(f)(1) of the Sunset Regulations (Exhibit US-27) (definition of "the facts
available").
32 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2) (Exhibit ARG-3).

40. When a respondent interested party submits an incomplete substantive response, Commerce
will find that the incomplete response is the equivalent of no response from that respondent interested
party for the purposes of determining likelihood on a company-specific basis.

41. Commerce does not reject incomplete submissions per se. The evaluation concerning the
completeness of a substantive response depends on the individual circumstances and is done on a
case-by-case basis.33 In addition, Commerce has general auth ority to waive deadlines for good cause,
unless expressly precluded by statute. 34 Therefore, if a response were incomplete, Commerce could
extend the 30 day deadline to permit the respondent interested party to complete the submission.

42. There is a deemed waiver when an exporter submits either an incomplete substantive response
or no response at all. Neverthe less, the information submitted in an incomplete substantive response
will be considered by Commerce when making the final sunset determination.

Q9. The Panel notes the statement of the United States in paragraph 242 of its first written
submission that:

"A determination that the aggregate response to the notice of
initiation is inadequate can be based on the respondent interested
parties electing waiver, or failing to respond, or in providing
inadequate substantive responses, or on any combination of these
scenarios."
(a) Please explain whether the 50 per cent test is the sole basis for a determination of
inadequacy, or whether, as the United States points out in the above-quoted
paragraph, the respondents' response can be deemed inadequate in cases where
there is an affirmative or deemed waiv er, but the share of the cooperating
respondents in total imports is above 50 per cent.

43. The term "inadequate" in the quoted part of the submission in fact refers to the completeness

of the each substantive response submitted in response to the notice of initiation, rather than the
adequacy of the aggregate responses.

44. The 50 per cent threshold is the normal
 basis for determining whether Commerce will
conduct an full sunset review or a expedited suns et review. However, as noted above, Commerce has
made an exception where the respondent interest ed party provided information indicating that
complete substantive responses not meeting the 50 per cent threshold were nevertheless adequate.
Commerce has not made a finding of inadequacy when the complete substantive responses met the
50 per cent threshold. Therefore, if a sufficient number of respondent interested parties (or just one, if
it meets the 50 per cent threshold) simply adhere to the criteria set forth in the regulations, they can
virtually ensure that a full review will be conducted. In other words, in practical terms it is up to the
respondent interested parties to decide whether they want a full or expedited review.

 (b) Please explain whether there have been cases where an inadequacy decision was
based on the interested party's electing waiver, or failing to respond, rather than
its share in total imports.

45. The election of waiver and the adequacy assessment are two distinct procedures. An
affirmative or deemed waiver does not automatically result in a finding that the substantive responses

33 See 19 C.F.R. 351.218(d)(3) (Exhibit ARG-3) and Pr eamble, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13518 (Exhibit US-3)
(Commerce may consider incomplete company-specific substantive response to be complete or adequate where
that interested party is unable to report the required information and provides explanation).
34 19 C.F.R. 351.302(b) (Exhibit US-3).

were inadequate. Instead, Co mmerce will normally assess whether the complete substantive
responses to the notice of initiation are sufficient to meet the 50 per cent threshold. Other exporters
meeting the 50 per cent threshold may have file d complete substantive responses, or may have
submitted information sufficient to allow Commerce to conduct a full sunset review.

46. More specifically, if a respondent interested party submits a substantive response to the notice
of initiation that does contain
 all the information required by section 351.218(d)(3) of the Sunset
Regulations, then it has submitted a "complete" substantiv e response. If a respondent interested party
submits a substantive response to the notice of initiation that does not contain all the information
required by section 351.218(d)(3), then "normally" that party w ill be considered to have submitted an
"incomplete" substantive response. Likewise, if a respondent interested party affirmatively waives its
right to participate or fails to respond to the notice of initiation, then its response is also considered
"incomplete".

47. Once Commerce has determined which company-specific substantive responses are
"complete," Commence then normally applies the 50 per cent threshold to the total import volumes
represented by all the respondent interested part ies who filed a complete or adequate company-
specific substantive response to determine whether th e aggregate response to the notice of initiation is
"adequate." Commerce then uses the results to determine whether to conduct a full or expedited
sunset review.

 (c) More generally, please explain whet her under US sunset reviews law, "an
affirmative or deemed waiver" and "an inadequate response" are two situations
that are mutually exclusive. In other wo rds, would it be accurate to state that
under US law, certain circumstances lead exclusively to an affirmative or
deemed waiver and some others exclusively to an inadequate response?

48. No; the existence of deemed or affirmative waivers is included in the consideration of the
50 per cent threshold to assess the adequacy of the aggregate substantive responses. For example, one
exporter may have waived its right to participate, while another will have filed a complete substantive
submission. If the latter meets the 50 per cent threshold or provides information as to why the
50 per cent threshold is not appropriate, then Co mmerce could find that the complete substantive
responses were adequate, and therefore a full review would normally be conducted.

Q10. The Panel notes the US statement in paragraph 162 of its first written submission:

"[T]hat the United States may afford parties expanded
opportunities to submit evidence and argument in a full sunset
review is a matter of US policy, not an obligation under the AD
Agreement, and is not grounds to find fault with the evidentiary
and procedural rules governing expedited sunset reviews."
 (a) In the view of the United States, does Article 6 apply to sunset reviews in its
entirety? Or, are there some provisions in this article that may not be applicable
in the context of sunset reviews? Please respond in conjunction with the
provisions of Article 11.4, especially the language "regarding evidence and
procedure" contained therein.

49. Article 11.4 of the AD Agreement stipulates that the Article 6 provisions "regarding evidence
and procedure" shall apply to reviews under Article 11. Thus, not all of the provisions of Article 6 are
applicable to Article 11 reviews; rather, only the provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and

procedure are so applicable. The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset recently confirmed that Article 11.3
does not prescribe substantive rules for the administration of sunset reviews.35

 (b) If it is the view of the United States that Article 6 – either entirely or partially-
applies to sunset reviews, where in Arti cle 6 or elsewhere in the Agreement does
the United States find support for its proposition that giving interested parties
expanded procedural rights in full sunset reviews compared with expedited
sunset reviews is not WTO-inconsistent?

50. As noted above, the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset confirmed that Article 11.3 does not
prescribe the methodology Members may use in conducting sunset reviews. Therefore, unless the US
sunset review procedures are in conflict with Article 6 or Artic le 11.3, these procedures are permitted
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement prohibits the United
States from giving parties expanded procedural righ ts in full sunset reviews compared with expedited
sunset reviews. The United States notes that the parties themselves effectiv ely decide whether they
want "expanded procedural rights."

Q11. The Panel notes the following part of the DOC's Issues and Decision Memorandum in
the instant sunset review:

"In the instant sunset reviews, the Department did not receive an
adequate response from respondent interested parties. Pursuant
to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations, this
constitutes a waiver of participation ."36
 Is the Panel to understand that the DOC deem ed Siderca to have waived its right to
participate in this sunset review? If so, on what basis under US law? If your response is in the
negative, please explain what meaning the Panel should give to this sentence.

51. No; Commerce found that Siderca had filed a complete substantive response and,
consequently, would not have been found to have waiv ed its right to participat e in the sunset review
proceeding.
37 The Decision Memorandum for the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina includes
the final sunset determinations for the sunset reviews of OCTG from Italy, Japan and Korea also. In
each of these other three sunset reviews, respondent interested parties failed to respond to the notice
of initiation in any respect. Therefore, the above quoted passage is a reference to the failure of the
respondent interested parties in the sunset reviews of OCTG from Italy, Japan, and Korea.

52. The Issues and Decision Memorandum demonstrates that Commerce made two findings –
that Siderca had filed a complete substantive respon se and that no other respondent interested party
had filed a substantive response in any of the sunset reviews covered by the Decision Memorandum.38

Q12. The Panel notes the argument of the United States, in paragraph 237 of its first written
submission, that "Siderca did not avail itself of the opportunities made available by the Sunset
Regulations for such defence in an expedited sunset review."

35 Japan Sunset, para 123.
36 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Sunset Reviews of the AD Orders on Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Korea (Dept’s Comm., 31 Oct. 2000) (final results) (" Decision
Memorandum") (Exhibit ARG-51 at 5).
37 See Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit ARG-51) and Adequacy of Responde nt Interested Party
Response to the Notice of Initiation, A-357-810 (Dept’s Comm., 22 August 2000) ("Adequacy Memorandum")
at 1-2 (Exhibit ARG-50).
38 Decision Memorandum at 3-4 (Exhibit ARG-51).

 (a) Please explain at which point(s) of ti me during the instant sunset review Siderca
was given further opportunities to defend itself under US law but failed to do so.

53. Siderca had a number of opportunities to subm it argument and information in support of its
rights in the expedited sunset review of OCTG from Argentina. First, when a respondent interested
party files a substantive response, one of the re quirements of section 351.218(d)(3) is a statement
from the submitter regarding the likely effects of revocation which includes any information,
argument, and reasons supporting the statement. Siderca’s entire claim in this regard was that
Commerce should apply the de minimis standard found in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and, as a
consequence, should revoke the order. In addition, section 351.218(d)(3)(iv)(B) provides interested
parties the opportunity to submit any other releva nt information or argument the interested party
would like considered in the sunset review. Siderca made no other arguments or submission of
factual information.
39

54. Second, each interested party is afforded the opportunity to submit a response in rebuttal (a
"rebuttal response"), pursuant to section 351.218(d)(3)(vi)(4) of the Sunset Regulations, to challenge
any argument or information contained in the substa ntive responses of the othe r interested parties.
Siderca did not file any rebuttal response despite the fact that the domestic interested parties had made
allegations, supported by st atistics, that there were shipments of Argentine OCTG in four of the five
years preceding the sunset review. Siderca did not challenge these statistics or any other information
in the domestic interested parties substantive re sponses, although it was provided the opportunity to
do so.

55. Finally, as discussed in the US first wr itten submission and in the US answers above,
Commerce determines whether to conduct a full or e xpedited sunset review based on the adequacy of
the aggregate response to the notice of initiati on. In making this determination, Commerce
determines whether the imports from the responde nt interested parties who filed a complete
substantive response, on an aggregate basis, represent more than 50 per cent of the imports of the
subject merchandise during the five years preceding the sunset review. Commerce then issues an
Adequacy Memorandum which announces the decision and the factual bases underlying the decision.
This determination is subject to challenge by the in terested parties, pursuant to section 351.309(e) of
the Sunset Regulations.

56. Commerce issued its adequacy determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina
and based the determination on the import statistics provided by the domestic interested parties after
verifying them using the ITC Trade Database.
40 (Commerce re-verified the import statistics for the
final sunset determination using Commerce’s Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics; see Decision
Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51)). Siderca di d not challenge Commerce’s adequacy
determination, as it had the right to do pursuant to section 351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations.

57. At no time did Siderca provide any statements or assertions that it would not dump in the
future if the order were revoked, offer any explan ations why it had ceased shipments of the subject
merchandise after imposition of the duty, or submit any allegations that information submitted in the
sunset review proceeding of OCTG from Argentina wa s inaccurate or incorrect. In this proceeding,
the First Written Submission of Argentina implies that Siderca was the only producer of OCTG in
Argentina during the sunset review and that Side rca’s lack of shipments contradicts the data
indicating that Argentine OCTG was in fact exported to the United States during the period of review.
Siderca made similar statements in its complete su bstantive response to the notice of initiation.
However, there is a second Argentine producer of OCTG: Ac indar. The United States has conducted
administrative reviews of Acindar since 2001, and as recently as 19 March 2003, Commerce found

39 See Siderca’s Substantive Response at 2-3 (Exhibit ARG-57).
40 See Adequacy Memorandum at (Exhibit ARG-50).

Acindar to have a dumping margin of 60.73 per cent. 41 Moreover, it is the understanding of the
United States that Acindar produces welded OCTG, whereas Siderca produces seamless OCTG (both
are covered by the anti-dumping order). It is not be yond the realm of possibility that Siderca did not
challenge the import statistics used during the sunset review because it was aware that another
Argentine producer had begun to ship OCTG to the United States during the period of review and that
Commerce’s adequacy finding based on the 50 per cent threshold was in fact accurate.

58. To permit Argentina to raise factual issues now that neither it nor Siderca raised during the
underlying sunset review would permit respondent interested parties to manipulate the system.
Consistent with the general principles in Article 6, the United States afforded all Argentine exporters
– and the Argentine government – the opportunity to present sufficient information to warrant a full
sunset review. Siderca and Argentina declined to do so.

59. Therefore, in spite of Argentina’s complain t, Commerce’s likeliho od determination was in
fact correct , as evidenced by the dumping margin found with regard to Acindar after the sunset
review.

 (b) Which provisions of the DOC's Regulati ons, or other relevant legal instruments
under US law, give interested exporters the right to defend their interests?
Please respond in conjunction with the la nguage "without further investigation"
in section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of th e DOC's Regulations. What meaning
should be given to this provision if the Regulations give interested exporters the
right to defend their interests?

60. Please see US Answer to Question 7(a) above.

61. Section 751(c)(3)(B) provides that Commerce w ill base its final sunset determination on the
facts available if the aggregate response from responden t interested parties, in the aggregate, is found
to be inadequate. Section 35 1.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the Sunset Regulations provides that Commerce
"normally" will issue a final determinati on in a sunset revi ew "without further
 investigation" when
insufficient interest in participation is demonstrated by the interested parties. The provision for a final
sunset determination "without further investigation" is intended to expedite the sunset review process.
Nevertheless, Commerce has the discretion not to expedite and, even in cases where the sunset review
is expedited, interested parties who supplied complete su bstantive responses may still submit rebuttal
responses, a challenge to Commerce’s adequacy determination, and have the right to supply any
argument and information that interested party wishes Commerce to consider in the sunset review.

Q13.
 (a) What was the amount of exports of th e subject product by Argentine exporters
other than Siderca during the five-year period of application of this measure?
Who were the exporters that made such exports? What was the source of these
statistics?

62. The domestic interested parties submitted im port statistics in their substantive responses
indicating that there were imports of the subject merchandise into the United States in each year,
except 1996, from the imposition of the order until the sunset review.
42 These statistics show that
there were approximately 45,000 ne t tons prior to the initiation of the original investigation,
26,000 net tons entered during the investigation, and an average of less than 900 net tons in each year
from the imposition of the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina until the sunset review.

41 Notice of Final Results and Decision in Part of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review; Oil
Country Tubular Goods, Other Than Drill Pipe, from Argentina, 68 Fed. Reg. 13262, 13263 (19 March 2003).
42 See Exhibit US-23.

63. The domestic interested partie s supplied import statistics concerning imports of OCTG for the
five year period prior to the sunset review.
43 These statistics were verified during the sunset review
by using two independent sources: (1) ITC Trad e Database; and (2) Commerce’s Census Bureau
IM-145 import data.44

64. Also, through administrative review procedures, the United States has identified Acindar as
another Argentine producer of OCTG, and one that may have shipped OCTG to the United States
during the period of review, as described above.

 (b) The Panel notes Argentina's assertio n in paragraph 43 of its first oral
submission that the DOC's determination that there were exports of the subject
product from Argentina into the United States during the period of imposition of
the measure at issue was flawed because the DOC incorrectly recorded
non-consumption entries as consumption en tries. Please explain whether the so
called "non-consumption entries" are those products in transit which are not
destined for ultimate consumption in the United States?

65. First, the panel should be aware Siderca did not raise this issue during the underlying sunset
review. Second, as detailed below, Argentina’s assertion concerning the nature of these shipments
and their effect on the accuracy of the import sta tistics used in the sunset review is significantly
exaggerated.

66. In order to assist the Panel, however, we provide an accurate reiteration of the facts on this
issue. During the five year period, there were fo ur administrative reviews initiated for Siderca at the
request of domestic interested par ties. Commerce terminated each of these administrative reviews
because Commerce determined that there were no consumption entries of OCTG from Argentina
exported by Siderca
 during these periods.

67. In the administrative review initiated for the period 25 June 1995 – 31 July 1996, Commerce
found that, although there were entries of Arge ntine OCTG during the period, there were no
consumption entries of OCTG made by Siderca and, consequently, Commerce terminated the
administrative review for Siderca. 45 Domestic interested parties claimed that Siderca made seven
shipments of OCTG during the period that were not included in the import statistics. Commerce
determined that six of the shipments were FTZ or TIB entries destined for re-export. For the seventh
entry, "Siderca surmised that this shipment of [Argentine OCTG] involved parties other than itself." 46
The US Customs Service verified that there were no shipments of OCTG made by Siderca during the
period under review. There was no assertion ma de by Siderca nor did Commerce find in this
administrative review that the import statistics contained an error or errors.

68. In the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1996 – 31 July 1997, Commerce
found that the one entry directly attributed to Si derca was destined for re-export and, consequently,
Commerce terminated the administrative review for Siderca" 47 There was no finding that there were
no consumption entries of OCTG made during the period. The only finding was that there were no
entries of OCTG during the period under review exported by Siderca and that the one entry reportedly
made by Siderca was in error.

43 See Exhibit US-23.
44 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (Exhibit ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit
ARG-51), respectively.
45 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 18747, 18748 (17 April 1998) (Exhibit ARG-29).
46 62 Fed. Reg. at 18748 (Exhibit ARG-29).
47 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 49089, 49090 (September 14, 1998) (Exhibit ARG-36).

69. In the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1997 – 31 July 1998, Commerce
found that the one shipment of Argentine OCTG made during the period was entered for consumption
in the United States, but that the shipment was not exported by Siderca. 48 Consequently, Commerce
terminated the administrative review for Siderca.

70. Finally, in the administrative review initiated for the period 1 August 1998 – 31 July 1999,
Commerce found that there were no entries of OC TG made by Siderca and, consequently, Commerce
terminated the administrative review for Siderca. 49 There was no finding that there were no
consumption entries of OCTG made during the period. In fact, Commerce determined that there was
at least one entry of OCTG for consumption made during the period, but that Siderca was not the
exporter.

71. Therefore, in the administrative proceeding covering the 1996-1997 period, Commerce
determined that there was a minor error concerning one entry in the statistical reporting of the import
statistics and, in the administrative review covering the 1998-1999 period, there was an undetermined
amount of mechanical tubing misclassified as OCTG, but at least one entry of OCTG for
consumption. Again, the Panel should note that Siderca did not raise this issue in either its
substantive response or by filing a challenge to Commerce’s adequacy determ ination in the sunset
review where it could have been addressed in the cont ext of the sunset proceeding and not for the first
time before this Panel.

 (c) Did the United States base its adequa cy determination in the instant sunset
review on these statistics?

72. Yes, as verified by the statistics compile d in the ITC’s Trade Database and Commerce’s
Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics.
50

Q14. Is there a legal basis for the 50 per cent threshold that determines the adequacy of the
foreign exporter's response to the questionnaire in a sunset review?

73. Section 752(c)(3) of the Act leaves to Commerce’s discretion the choice of methodology for
determining when the response from interested parties to the notice of initiation is "adequate" for the
purposes of conducting a full sunset review.
51 Consequently, Commerce promulgated section
351.218(e)(1)(ii) of the Sunset Regulations to codify the 50 per cent threshold to give effect to section
752(c)(3) of the Act.52

74. The context of sunset reviews is important in understanding the 50 per cent threshold. While
an original investigation requires a factual asse ssment of dumping, a sunset review requires a
counterfactual finding of "likelihood" of future dumping when a finding of dumping has already been
made. Article 11.3 does not prescribe the methodology for conducting sunset reviews; instead, it
requires that parties be given genera l procedural and evidentiary rights in accordance with Article 6.
The Anti-Dumping Agreement does no t require Members to expend resources to unearth information
that is being withheld.

48 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 64 Fed. Reg. 4069, 4070 (27 January 1999) (Exhibit ARG-38).
49 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina; Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative
Review, 65 Fed. Reg. 8948 (23 February 2000) (Exhibit ARG-43).
50 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (Exhibit ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 3 (Exhibit
ARG-51), respectively.
51 See SAA at 880 (Exhibit ARG-5) (in many cases, some but not all parties will respond; nevertheless,
where parties demonstrate a "sufficient willingness to participate," the agency will conduct a full sunset review).
52 See Preamble, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13518 (Exhibit US-3).

Q15.
 (a) Does the cross-reference in Article 11.4 of the Agreement incorporate all
provisions of Article 6 in Article 11.3? Does the same cross-reference also
incorporate Annex II in Article 11.3?

75. No, the cross-reference in Article 11.4 specifically incorporates only those provisions of
Article 6 regarding "evidence and procedure." Please see the answer to Question 10(a) above.

76. The reference in Article 6 to Annex II incorp orates Annex II into Article 11.3. However,
Annex II is only applicable to the same extent as Article 6.

 (b) If you are of the view that the cross-reference in Article 11.4 makes article 6.1 of
the Agreement applicable to sunset reviews, does Article 6.1 – together with its
subparagraphs – require that the investigating authority send
 questionnaires to
exporters in sunset reviews?

77. No. Article 6.1 requires that interested pa rties be given notice of the information the
authorities require in respect of the investigation in question. It does not require that a "questionnaire"
be sent. Commerce published its "sunset questionna ire" and made the reportin g requirements part of
its regulations.53

 (c) What significance, if any, should be gi ven to the use of the word "investigation"
in paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex II, and to the use of the word "should" rather
than "shall" in all of its paragraphs?

78. The use of the word "investigation" means that the obligations contained in Annex II are
limited to original investigations . The cross-reference in Article 11.4 concerning the application
Article 6 to sunset reviews makes the obligations of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure and,
consequently, the obligations in Annex II regarding evidence and procedure applicable in sunset
reviews also. The use of the word "should" indicates that the requirement is directory or
recommended, rather than mandatory.

Q16. In this sunset review, did Siderca attempt to submit additional evidence to the DOC
after its substantive response to the notice of initiation? If so, how did the DOC respond to such
attempts?

79. No.

Q17. What is the significance of the word "may" in section 1675(c)(3)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930?

80. The use of the word "may" means that Comme rce has the discretion no t to base the final
sunset determination on "the facts available" if Commerce determines that other information is more
appropriate. In other words, Commerce is not bound by the statute to use "the facts available" in
every case where there is an inadequate response to the notice of initiation.

53 See section 351.218(d) (Exhibit US-3).

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE
OF DUMPING

Q20. The Panel notes Argentina's arguments in paragraphs 124-147 of its first written
submission regarding the alleged irrefutable presumption under US law/practice regarding
likelihood determinations in sunset reviews. Please respond to the following questions [. . .]

 (c) Please explain how you identify "pra ctice" and how you distinguish practice
from law? In light of the WTO jurispr udence, please explain your views as to
whether practice as such is challengeable under WTO law or not.

81. A Commerce administrative practice is ne ither a "measure" within the meaning of the
relevant WTO agreements, nor a "mandatory" measure within the meaning of the
mandatory/discretionary distinction. A "measure" – which can give rise to an independent violation
of WTO obligations – must constitute an instrument with a functional life of its own – i.e., it must do
something concrete, independently of any other instrume nts. It is well-established that a "practice" is
not a measure. 54 Indeed, a practice under US law consists of nothing more than individual
applications of the US AD law in the context of sunset reviews. While Commerce, like many other
administrative agencies in the United States, uses th e term "practice" to refer collectively to its past
precedent, "practice" has neithe r a "functional life of its own" nor operates "independently of any
other instruments" because the term only refers to individual applications of the US statute and
regulations.55 In contrast to the US statute and regulati ons, which clearly function as "measures", no
general, a priori conclusions about the conduct of sunset re views under US law can be drawn from an
examination of "practice."

82. Moreover, even if "practice" could be cons idered a measure (and the United States’ position
is that it cannot), in order for any measure, as su ch, to be found WTO-inconsistent, the measure must
be "mandatory", i.e., it must require WTO-inconsis tent action or preclude WTO-consistent action.
The Appellate Body and several Panels have explained the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary measures. A Member may challenge, and a WTO panel may find against, a measure as
such only if the measure "mandates" action that is inconsistent with WTO obligations, or "precludes"
action that is WTO-consistent.56 In accordance with the normal WTO rules on the allocation of the
burden of proof, it is up to the complaining party to demonstrate that the challenged measure
mandates WTO-inconsistent action or precludes WTO-consistent action. 57 "Practice" is not binding
on Commerce, and, under US administrative law, Commerce may depart from its precedent in any
particular case, so long as it explains the reasons for doing so. Therefore, this "practice" does not
mandate WTO-inconsistent action or preclude WTO-consistent action.

54 See, e.g., United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, Report of
the Panel, adopted 29 June 2001 ("US Export Restraints").
55 Japan’s definition of "practice" does not comport with its status in US law. Japan describes practice
as "administrative procedures", which it defines as "a detailed guideline that the administrating [sic] authority
follows when implementing certain statutes and regulations." Japan's First Submission, para. 8. We define
"administrative procedures" and "guidelines" in our answer to Question 82.
56 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel , para. 162; United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
("1916 Act"), WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, paras. 88-9; Appellate Body
Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted
2 February 2002, para. 259; see also US – Export Restraints , paras. 8.77-9; Panel Report, United States –
Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, adopted 30 August 2002, para. 6.22.
57 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 5.50.

 (d) What, in your view, is the relationship between "practice" on the one hand and
"the SPB" and "the SAA" on the ot her? Could the SPB and the SAA be
considered as legal instruments that embody the US practice with regard to
sunset reviews?

83. Neither the SAA nor the Sunset Policy Bulletin can be challenged as independent violations
of the AD Agreement because they do not mandate or preclude actions subject to the AD Agreement.
The SAA is a type of legislative history which, und er US law, provides au thoritative interpretative
guidance in respect of the statute. Thus, the SAA operates only in conjunction with (and as an
interpretive tool for) the US anti-dumping statut e, and cannot be independently challenged as
WTO-inconsistent.

84. Nor can the Sunset Policy Bulletin be challenged independently as a violation of WTO
obligations. Under US law, the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a non-binding statement, providing
Commerce’s general understanding of sunset-related issues not explicitly addressed by the statute and
regulations.
58 In this regard, the Sunset Policy Bulletin has a legal status comparable to that of agency
precedent: Commerce may depart from its policy bulletin in any particular case, so long as it explains
the reasons for doing so.59 The Sunset Policy Bulletin does nothing more than provide Commerce and
the public with a guide as to how Commerce may inte rpret and apply the statute and its regulations in
individual cases. Absent application in a particular case, and in conjunction with US sunset laws and
regulations, the Sunset Policy Bulletin does not "do something concrete" for which it could be subject
to independent legal challenge under the WTO agreements.

Q21. Do Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement apply to sunset reviews? If your response is in the
affirmative, do these articles apply to sunset re views in the same manner in which they apply to
original investigations, or in a different manner? Please elaborate on the basis of the provisions
of the Agreement and the relevant WTO case law.

85. No. In a sunset review, Commerce is anal yzing whether dumping is likely to continue or
recur in the absence of the discipline of the duty . An analysis of the likelihood of dumping under
Article 11.3 does not require a determination of th e magnitude of the margin of dumping because the
amount of dumping is not relevant to the issue of whether dumping will continue or recur if the
discipline is removed. In other words, the is sue in an Article 11.3 sunset review is not how much the
exporters may dump in the future, but simply whether they will dump in the future if the order were to
be revoked. Given that there is no obligation under Article 11.3 to calculate a margin of dumping, the
provisions of Article 2 relevant to the calculation of a margin of dumping are not applicable to sunset
reviews. Indeed, the Appellate Body in Japan Steel Sunset concluded that the investigating authority
is not required to calculate dumping margins in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review
under Article 11.3.
60

86. The United States explained its position that Article 3 does not apply to sunset reviews in
paragraphs 287-302, 304-307, 344- 346, and 348-354 of its first written submission, and in its second
written submission in paragraph 44 et seq.

58 Sunset Policy Bulletin , 63 FR at 18871 ("This policy bulletin proposes guidance regarding the
conduct of sunset reviews. As described below, the proposed policies are intended to complement the
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions by providing guidance on methodological or analytical issues not
explicitly addressed by the statute and regulations.") (emphasis added) (Exhibit ARG-35).
59 As a matter of US administrative law, Commerce practice cannot be binding because Commerce is
not obliged to follow its own precedent so long as it explains departures from such precedent. Thus, as a matter
of law, Commerce practice cannot transform a discretionary measure into a mandatory measure.
60 See Japan Sunset, paras. 123-124, 155.

Q22. The Panel notes Argentina's statements in paragraphs 132, 184, 190 and 192 of its first
written submission. In your view, does Arti cle 11.3 require an investigating authority to
calculate the likely dumping margin in a sunset review? If your response is in the negative, does
Article 11.3 at least require some kind of comparison between the future export price and the
future normal value? Please explain on the basis of the relevant provisions in the Agreement.

87. No. 61

Q23. The Panel notes that the DOC's Issues a nd Decision Memorandum in the instant sunset
review mentions that it was determined that dumping continued over the life of the measure in
question and that the margin of dumping did not decline in the same period. Please explain the
factual basis of that determination, in particul ar, please indicate whether the DOC calculated a
dumping margin for Siderca or any other Arge ntine exporter after the imposition of the
original measure.

88. As noted above, the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset confirmed that Article 11.3 does not
require the calculation of a dumping margin. Commerce did not calculate a dumping margin in the
sunset review for Siderca or any other Argentine exporter of OCTG during the five years preceding
the sunset review because Siderca had ceased shipping to the United States during that time. In the
sunset review, Commerce found that dumping continued to exist during the five years preceding the
sunset review because there were shipments of Arge ntine OCTG during four of those five years and
dumping duties were assessed on those same imports.
62 (In a subsequent administrative review,
Commerce found a dumping margin of 60.73 per cent for Acindar, an Argentine producer of OCTG
that the United States believes began to ship OCTG to the United States in 1997.)63

Q24. What was the factual basis of the DOC's likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping determination in this sunset review? What factual information was collected by the
DOC and from what sources?

89. Commerce found that dumping was likely to continue or recur based on the existence of
dumping and the continued depressed import volumes since the imposition of the OCTG order.
64
Both the domestic interested parties and Siderca supplied complete substantive responses which
contained the factual information required by section 351.218(d)(3) of the Sunset Regulations . In
addition, domestic interested parties each suppli ed Argentine OCTG import statistics in their
substantive responses, which indicated that Siderc a was not the only exporter of Argentina OCTG to
the United States. 65 Commerce used both the ITC Trade Database and the Commerce’s Census
Bureau statistics to verify the OCTG import statistics submitted by the domestic interested parties.66

CUMULATION

Q26. Would cumulation be generally allowed (i.e. both in original investigations and reviews)
in the absence of Article 3.3 of the Agreement? What provision, if any, of the Agreement would
cumulation violate in the absence of Article 3.3? In other words, in your view, is Article 3.3 an
authorization for the use of cumulation, or, is it rather a provision that imposes certain
restrictions on the use of cumulation in investigations? Please elaborate on the basis of the
relevant provisions of the Agreement.

61 See US Answer to Panel Question 21 and Japan Sunset, paras. 123-124, 155.
62 See Decision Memorandum at 5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
63 Notice of Final Results and Rescission in Part of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review; Oil
Country Tubular Goods, Other Than Drill Pipe, from Argentina, 68 Fed. Reg. 13262, 13263 (19 March 2003).
64 See Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
65 See Exhibit US-23.
66 See Adequacy Memorandum at 2 (ARG-50) and Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).

90. In the view of the United States, cumulation is generally allowed in both investigations and
reviews. Article 3.3 is a provision that imposes certain restrictions on the use of cumulation in
investigations, but not in reviews.

91. Nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement prevents a Member from cumulating imports. In
the absence of a restriction, the measure is permissible and must be found to be in conformity with the
Agreement. This is particularly true for sunset reviews, for which no methodology is prescribed.
67

92. The United States notes that cumulation in anti-dumping investigations was a widespread
practice among GATT contracting parties prior to th e adoption of Article 3.3 in the Uruguay Round,
even though the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code was sile nt on the subject. If the negotiators of the
Uruguay Round had intended to limit the practice of cumulation to investigations, it seems unlikely
that they would have made no mention of the subject in Article 11.3.

REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS

Q27. The Panel notes the statement of the United States in paragraph 52 of its oral
submission that it was prejudiced in its right to defend itself in these proceedings because of the
alleged defects in Argentina's panel request. Plea se explain in what ways the United States was
prejudiced with respect to each alleged inconsiste ncy that the United States is raising in its
request for preliminary rulings.

93. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Disputes ("DSU") provides
carefully-established procedures to ensure that all parties to the proceeding are afforded due process.
These procedures include deadlines calibrated to ensure that the proceeding moves expeditiously
while providing parties adequate time to prepare its defence. The lack of due process in the early part
of the proceeding, if not cured, is of particul ar concern because it risks tainting the remaining
proceeding.

94. The violation in question is Argentina’s failu re pursuant to DSU Article 6.2 to "provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complain t sufficient to present the problem clearly."
Argentina’ s failure to do so initially, and its failure to cure the defect, deprived the United States of
the opportunity to prepare defence; the United States did not know the legal basis of Argentina’s
specific claims. From panel establishment th rough panel selection through preparation of
submissions, the United States has not been afforded the full measure of due process required under
the DSU, compromising its ability to research the is sues at hand, assign personnel, etc. As the
Appellate Body has explained, "A defending party is entitled to know what case it has to answer, and
what violations have been alleged so that it can begi n preparing its defence . . . . This requirement of
due process is fundamental to ensuring a fair and orderly conduct of dispute settlement
proceedings."
68 Indeed, "it is a corollary of the due proc ess objective inherent in Article 6.2 that a
complaining party, as the party in control the draftin g of a panel request, should bear the risk of any
lack of precision in the panel request."69

67 Japan Sunset, para. 123.
68 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Section of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel H-Beams
from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body adopted 28 September 2000, para. 88.
69 Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276,
Preliminary Ruling on the Panel’s jurisdiction under Article 6.2 of the DSU, 25 June 2003, para. 25.

OTHER

Q29. During the five-year period of imposition of the anti-dumping duty at issue in this case,
did any exporter other than Siderca ask for an administrative review for its own duty?

95. During the five years preceding the sunset review, no exporter or producer of Argentine
OCTG requested an administrative review of its assi gned margin of dumping, including Siderca. As
explained in the US answer to question 13(b) from the Panel, the domestic interested parties requested
administrative reviews of Siderca for each of three periods (1995-1996; 1996-1997; 1997-1998) prior
to the sunset review. These administrative review s were terminated after Commerce determined, for
each of the relevant periods, that Siderca had no imports of OCTG for consumption in the United
States. Notably, since the sunset review, another Argentina exporter of OCTG has participated in an
administrative review.

Q30. The United States argues that certain US legal instruments such as the SPB cited by
Argentina is not a measure that can be ch allenged as such under the WTO Agreements.
70
Please provide the Panel with detailed in formation regarding the legal status and
interrelationships, if any, of the following instruments under US law, and in particular whether
they are mandatory or discretionary. In particular, in light of the relevant WTO dispute
settlement reports, the Panel would like to know whether each of these instruments have an
operational life of their own under US law, and whether the DOC and the ITC are required to
follow their provisions in sunset reviews.

 (i) Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended by the URAA).

96. The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the statute or "the Act") is US law. Commerce is bound
by the statute – e.g., there is no higher law except for the US Constitution. Consequently, the statute
has an operational life of its own.
71 Many of the provisions in the statute are mandatory, although
certain provisions are discretionary.

 (ii) Statement of Administrative Action,

97. The SAA was prepared and submitted with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. The
function of the SAA is set forth in the SAA itself, as follows:

This Statement describes significan t administrative actions proposed
to implement the Uruguay Round agreements. In addition,
incorporated into this Statement are two other statements required
under section 1103: (1) an explanation of how the implementing bill
and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law;
and (2) a statement setting forth the reasons why the implementing
bill and proposed administrative ac tion are necessary or appropriate
to carry out the Uruguay Round agreements.
As is the case with earlier Statements of Administrative Action
submitted to the Congress in connection with fast-track bills, this
Statement represents an authoritative expression by the
Administration concerning its view s regarding the interpretation and
application of the Uruguay Round agreements, both for purposes of
US international obligations and domestic law. Furthermore, the
Administration understands that it is the expectation of the Congress

70 See, e.g., First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 193-195.
71 US – Export Restraints para. 8.91.

that future Administrations will ob serve and apply the interpretations
and commitments set out in this Statement. Moreover, since this
Statement will be approved by the Congress at the time it implements
the Uruguay Round agreements, the interpretations of those
agreements included in this Statement carry particular authority.
72
98. In other words, the SAA is a type of legislative history. In the United States, legislative
history is often considered for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of a statute, but cannot change the
meaning of, or override, the statute to which it rela tes. It provides auth oritative interpretative
guidance in respect of the statute. The status granted to the SAA under the US system, however, is
only in respect to its interpretive authority vis à vis the statute. Thus, the SAA operates only in
conjunction with (and as an interp retive tool for) the US anti-dumping statute has no operational life
of its own.73 In addition, the SAA is not mandatory.

 (iii) Sunset Regulations (Both the DOC's and the ITC's regulations), and

99. These regulations are US law. The regulat ions contain both mandatory and discretionary
directives. The regulations have force and effect of law and must be followed where the language of
the specific provision leaves no discretion. The regulations, however, have provisions that provide for
the exercise of discretion by the applicable decision-maker. The regulations are issued in accordance
with US federal agency rule-making procedures an d are accorded controlling weight by US courts
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.74 Thus, the regulations have
an independent operational life of their own.75

 (iv) Sunset Review Policy Bulletin.

100. Under US law, the Sunset Policy Bulletin is considered a non-binding statement, providing
Commerce’s general understanding of sunset-related issues not explicitly addressed by the statute and
regulations.76 In this regard, the Sunset Policy Bulletin has a legal status comparable to that of agency
precedent. As with its administrative precedent, Commerce may depart from its policy bulletin in any
particular case, so long as it e xplains the reasons for doing so. 77 The Sunset Policy Bulletin does
nothing more than provide Commerce and the public with guidance as to how Commerce may
interpret and apply the statute and its re gulations in individual cases. The Sunset Policy Bulletin does
not "do something concrete" for which it could be subject to independent le gal challenge under the
WTO agreements.

72 SAA, page 656 (Exhibit US-11). The reference to "section 1103" is to section 1103 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("1988 Act"). Among other things, the 1988 Act provided the
Administration with fast-track negotiating authority with respect to the Uruguay Round.
73 US Export Restraints, paras. 8.98 - 8.100.
74 See, e.g., Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc. , 467 US 837, 842, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778-845 (1984).
75 US Export Restraints, paras. 8108 - 8.113.
76 Sunset Policy Bulletin , 63 FR at 18871 ("This policy bulletin proposes guidance regarding the
conduct of sunset reviews. As described below, the proposed policies are intended to complement the
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions by providing guidance on methodological or analytical issues not
explicitly addressed by the statute and regulations.") (Emphasis added) (Exhibit ARG-35).
77 As a matter of US administrative law, Commerce practice cannot be binding in the sense that
Commerce is not obliged to follow its own precedent so long as it explains departures from such precedent.
Thus, as a matter of law, Commerce practice cannot transform a discretionary measure into a mandatory
measure.

Q31.
 (a) Are "the SPB" and "t he SAA" binding legal instruments under the US law?

101. No.

 (b) If not, please explain the legal status of these two legal instruments under the US
law and the purpose of having them?

102. Please see our responses to questions 30(ii) and 30(iv), as well as 20(d).

 (c) Can the US administration depart from the provisions of the SAA and the SPB
without formally amending them?

103. Both the SAA and the Sunset Policy Bulletin are forms of guidance and are not mandatory.
Consequently, it is inapposite to discuss the SAA or the Sunset Policy Bulletin in terms of "departing"
from them.

 (d) Have the SAA and the SPB ever been amended?

104. No. There is no mechanism for amending the SAA.

ANNEX E-4

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS
OF ARGENTINA – FIRST MEETING

8 January 2004

The Department’s Sunset Review of OCTG from Argentina

Q1. Does Article 11.3 require countries to export to the United States in order to obtain
termination of the measure? In a case where there are no exports, how would the Department
make its determination of likelihood of dumping?

1. Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement does no t provide criteria for making a likelihood
determination in a sunset review.1 The Sunset Policy Bulletin states that "normally" Commerce would
find that a cessation of exports after the imposition of the order is highly probative that it would be
likely dumping would continue or re cur. Nevertheless, the likelihood determination ultimately would
be based on all the facts present on the administrative record in a particular case.2

Q2. If there are some exports, but the company or companies representing 100 per cent
exports to the United States during the 5 year period do not participate, what is the
Department’s conclusion regarding this company or companies? Does the statute mandate a
likely dumping determination for this company or companies? What is the effect of this finding
for the measure as a whole?

2. The statute mandates that Commerce make a company-specific likelihood finding with
respect to a respondent interested party that ha s waived its right to participate in the sunset
proceeding.3 However, Commerce’s final likelihood determ ination is made on an order-wide basis.
In making that determination, Commerce will take into consideration all th e facts present on the
administrative record for that sunset review proceeding.

 In this case:

 (a) Did the Department conclude that the non-responding respondents were likely
to dump?

3. Yes.

 (b) What was the effect on the d ecision for the measure as a whole?

4. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce considered these findings along
with all the information on the record of the sunset review, including the prior agency determinations,
the substantive and rebuttal responses of the domestic interested parties, and the substantive response

1 See United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan , WT/DS244/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 15 December 2003 (" Japan
Sunset"), at para. 123.
2 See Sunset Policy Bulletin, Section II.A, 63 Fed . Reg. at 18872 (Exhibit ARG-35).
3 19 USC. § 1671(c)(4)(B) (Exhibit ARG-1).

of the only Argentine respondent interested party to file a complete substan tive response, Siderca, in
accordance with section 751(c)(3)(B) of the Act and section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.4

 (c) Given that the Department assumed that non-responding respondents
represented 100 per cent of the exports, what opportunity did Siderca have to
affect the outcome of the determination for the measure as a whole?

5. It is not known to the United States what may have been the effect, on the final sunset
determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, of statements Siderca could have made
or of any information Siderca may have provided be cause Siderca chose to participate minimally in
the sunset review proceeding. In its substantive response, Siderca did not provide any argument or
information beyond its assertions concerning the de minimis rate to be applied in a sunset review; nor
did Siderca submit a rebuttal response, as provided in section 351.218(d)(4) of the Sunset Regulations.
In addition, Siderca did not submit any comments on the adequacy determination generally or on the
import statistics Commerce used to make the adequacy determination, as provided for in section
351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations . In other words, Siderca failed
 to avail itself of several
opportunities to affect the outcome of the determination.

 (d) Under this scenario, what is the evid ence that dumping is likely to continue?

6. As stated in the Final Sunset Determination and the Decision Memorandum , Commerce
found that there was a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in the sunset review of
OCTG from Argentina because there was evidence of dumping since the imposition of the order (i.e.,
there were entries of subject merchandise for wh ich dumping duties were paid). Furthermore,
Commerce considered that import volumes were reduced significantly and had remained depressed
since the imposition of the order.
5

Q3. In this case, did DOC attach any relevance to:

 (a) the fact that Siderca was the only Argentine exporter ever investigated?

7. No.

 (b) the errors that it had discovered in its own statistics in the no-shipment reviews?

8. No. For the administrative reviews initiated and later terminated for Siderca (periods of
review ("POR"), 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997- 1998), only the administrative review for the
1996-1997 POR had no shipments of OCTG from Argentina. For the other two administrative
reviews, although errors were discovered in the DOC’s Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics with
respect to Siderca’s shipments of OCTG to the Un ited States during these reviews, there were other
shipments of OCTG from Argentina during these PORs. More importantly, Commerce’s adequacy
determination in the sunset revi ew of OCTG from Argentina was made using the USITC’s Trade
Database, not the Census IM-145 data.

9. Notwithstanding Argentina’s claims regarding the import statistics, neither Siderca nor any
other interested party alleged, during the sunset review, that there were errors in the statistics
Commerce used to make its aggregate adequacy determination. Notably, as the only respondent
interested party to participate in the sunset revi ew, Siderca did not file comments on the adequacy
determination, as provided for in section 351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations.

4 See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Sunset Reviews of the AD Orders on Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Korea (Dep’t Comm., 31 Oct. 2000) (final results) ("Decision
Memorandum") at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
5 See Decision Memorandum at 7 (Exhibit ARG-51).

 (c) the fact that, even if some of the statistics represented Argentine OCTG, these
exports were minuscule and commercially meaningless?

10. As discussed above, neither Siderca nor any other respondent interested party presented any
arguments or comments in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina concerning the import
statistics Commerce used to determine the adequacy of the aggregate response and the effect the order
had on shipments to the United States of Ar gentine OCTG. Notwithstanding Argentina’s
characterization of the import volumes ("minuscule and commercially meaningless"), the significant
reduction and continued depressed condition of the Argentina OCTG imports for the five year period
preceding the sunset review formed part of Co mmerce affirmative likelihood determination in the
sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.
6

Q4. The United States asserts that, under the waiver provisions, "there are two methods for
a respondent interested party to waive its right to participate in a sunset review: (1) submit a
statement affirmatively waiving participation; or (2) fail to submit a substantive response to
Commerce’s notice of initiation and allow Commerce to deem its non-response as a waiver of its
right to participation." (US First Submission, para. 213). This reading, however, fails to
acknowledge the regulation’s instruction that Commerce "will consider the failure by a
respondent interested party to file a complete
 substantive response . . . as a waiver of
participation . . . ." (19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d )(2)(iii) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the
Department will deem a respondent interested party to have waived its participation where it
files an incomplete substantive response. How is such a deemed waiver consistent with
Articles 11.3?

11. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, the respondent interested parties’ response to
the notice of initiation could only be characterized in two ways. First, Argentine respondent
interested parties who filed a complete substantiv e response, namely Siderca. Second, the Argentine
exporters of OCTG who collectively failed to respond to the notice of initiation at all. No respondent
interested party filed an incomplete substantive response in the sunset review of OCTG from
Argentina. Consequently, the rele vance of this question to the present dispute is not clear to the
United States. Furthermore, regardless of whether an interested party is considered to have waived
participation, Commerce considers any and all
 information submitted during the sunset review in
making the final sunset determination.

Q5. The United States argues that, "although Commerce used the facts available to make
the final sunset determination of likelihood, Co mmerce did not apply facts available to the issue
of whether there was a likelihood that dumping would continue or recur if the order were
revoked with respect to Siderca specifically, because the sunset determination is made on an
order-wide basis, not a company- specific basis." (US First Submission, para. 214). The United
States thus suggests that the Department consid ered whether Siderca alone would be likely to
dump upon termination of the order. What was th e positive evidence that Siderca was likely to
dump if the order were terminated?

12. Commerce makes its likelihood determination on an order-wide basis in all sunset reviews it
conducts. In its final determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce did not
base its finding of likelihood on Siderca alone.

Q6. In its first submission, the United States asserts that "‘current information’ is not the
issue in a sunset review conducted pursuant to Ar ticle 11.3. Rather, the issue under Article 11.3
is whether dumping and injury are likely to conti nue or recur in the event of the expiry of the

6 See Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51) and Sunset Policy Bulletin , 65 Fed. Reg. at
18872 (Exhibit ARG-35).

duty, an inherently forward-looking inquiry." (US First Submission, para. 265). How can a
prospective determination of whether dumping is likely to continue, if there is no analysis of
whether it exists currently? How does the United States support its stat ement in the Issues and
Decision Memorandum that dumping continued throughout the order?

13. Nothing in Article 11.3 or elsewhere in th e AD Agreement states how the Members are to
determine likelihood in a sunset review. It is not clear to the United Stated how a current margin of
dumping is necessarily indicative of future dumping. The AD Agreement recognizes this fact in
providing footnote 9.

14. Since the affirmative preliminary determination in the original anti-dumping investigation of
OCTG from Argentina, the United States has been collecting cash deposits on all entries of the subject
merchandise. There have been no administrative re views of the order. Therefore, for all imports of
OCTG entered since the affirmative preliminary dete rmination, the United States has been assessing
and collecting dumping duties on OCTG from Argentina.

Q7. Does the United States agree that the determination in the original investigation was
made on the basis of the practice of zeroing? Does the United States agree with Argentina’s
assertion that, without the practice of zeroing, Siderca would not have had a positive dumping
margin? Leaving aside the question of whether zeroing was proper at the time of the
investigation in 1994/95, does the United States be lieve that a margin calculated on the basis of
zeroing can be relied upon as the evidence of likely continuation or recurrence of dumping in an
11.3 review?

15. The term "zeroing" is not found in the AD Agreement. It arose in the EC – Bed Linen dispute
and involved the EC’s calculation of dumping margins in an original investigation on an average-to-
average basis. The Appellate Body found in that dispute determined that the EC’s methodology was
"inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Argentina has neither claimed nor
demonstrated – nor does the United States agree – that the methodology Commerce used to calculate
a dumping margin for Siderca in the original invest igation is the same methodology considered by the
Appellate Body in EC Bed Linen.

The Commission’s Sunset Review of OCTG from Argentina

Q1. The United States argues that the Commissi on applies a "likely" standard in its sunset
determinations. The United States supports this statement, in part, by referring to the fact that
its national courts ultimately approved the Co mmission’s remand determination in the Usinor
litigation. Is it the United States’ position th at it applied the same standard ("likely") in the
remand determination as it applied in the original sunset determination in that case?

16. No. The US International Trade Commission (" ITC") did not apply the same standard in the
Usinor remand determination as it had in its original sunset determination in that case. As the ITC
explained in its remand determination:

For the purpose of the Commission’s determinations on remand in these reviews we
follow the Court’s instructions to apply the meaning of "likely" as "probable," not
"possible." To the extent the Court uses "p robable" to impute to "likely" a higher
level of certainty of result than "likely," we also apply that standard, but only for
purposes of this remand, as we find such standard to be inconsistent with the statute
and the SAA.
7

7 Usinor Remand Determination at 14 (USITC July 2002) (Exhibit US-19).

17. Later events made it clear that the ITC in the Usinor remand determination applied a "likely"
standard that was more stringent than the US Co urt of International Trade actually construed US
domestic law to require. This became evident when the Court subsequently stated in affirming the
ITC’s remand determination that the Court did not interpret "likely" to "imply any degree of
certainty.
8 Moreover, there was no question on the Court’ s part that some of the Commissioners in
the original determination had co nstrued the term "likely" in a manner consistent with the US
statutory requirements.9 Indeed, apart from the uncertainty on the part of other Commissioners as to
whether the Court’s equating the meaning of the te rm "likely" with the word "probable" required
application of a higher standard in sunset reviews, it is fair to say that there would have been little or
no disagreement about the standard to be applied in such proceedings.

Q2. Does the United States believe that there is a difference between the term "injury" as
used in Article 11.1 and the term "injury" as used in Article 11.3? Does the United States
believe that the term "injury" as used in Article 11.1 is different from the term "injury" as used
in Article 3?

18. The more appropriate question is whether there is a difference between the determinations
called for in Articles 11.1 and 11.3. The United St ates submits that the analysis provided for in
Article 11.1 is different than that required by paragraph 3 of Article 11. More specifically,
paragraph 1 of Article 11 sp eaks of existing "injury," using the present tense of the verb "to be," i.e.,
"dumping which is causing injury." Paragraph 3, on the other hand, speaks of the likelihood of the
"continuation or recurrence of . . . injury." These provisions have a different focus and involve
entirely different determinations, as the Appellate Body has recognized on more than one occasion.
10

19. As suggested by the response to the first part of Argentina’s question, the United States also
does not contend that there is a difference in the term "injury" as used in Article 3 and Article 11.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

Q3. In the sunset review of Argentine OCTG, did the Commission ever consider Argentine
exports on an individual basis, that is, without cumulating the Argentine exports with those of
other countries? If not, does the United St ates consider that Argentina has an independent
right to termination under Article 11.3?

20. The ITC considered Argentine exports on an individual basis only in connection with its
analysis of whether it was appropriate to cumulate the volume and effect of imports from the five
countries subject to the sunset reviews. The ITC found that there likely would be a reasonable
overlap of competition between the subject im ports (including imports from Argentina) and
domestically produced casing and tubing, and amon g the subject imports themselves, sufficient to
warrant cumulation.

21. The United States does not consider that Argentina has a right to termination under
Article 11.3 premised on the examination only of whether the revocation of the anti-dumping duty
order relating to subject imports from Argentina will lead to a continuation or recurrence of injury.
As discussed in the United States’ second written submission, Article 11.3 does not confer such a
right. Moreover, since imports from a group of countries may cumulatively cause injury even though
imports from individual countries in this group do not,
11 it would be illogical to require that sunset

8 Usinor Industeel v. United States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 6 (CIT 20 December 2002) (Exhibit US-18).
9 Usinor Industeel v. United States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 6 (CIT 20 December 2002) (Exhibit US-18); see
also, Indorama Chemicals v. USITC, Slip Op. 02-105 at 20 (CIT 4 September 2002) (sunset standard based on
"likelihood," not certainty) (Exhibit US-26).
10 US-German Steel, AB Report, para. 87, US-Japan Sunset, AB Report, para. 106
11 See European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings
from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 22 July 2003, para. 116.

reviews be conducted only on a country-specific basis. Such a requirement would permit anti-
dumping duties to expire even though the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of injury.

Q4. On the facts of this case, could the Commission have rendered an affirmative likelihood
of injury determination without conducting a cumulative analysis?

22. The ITC declines to speculate on what the outc ome of the sunset review of casing and tubing
from Argentina would have been in the absence of cumulation.

Q5. In certain portions of the determination, the Commission refers to "Tenaris." Did the
Commission make any allowance for the fact that Tenaris included companies that were not
subject to the orders under review? If so, please indicate where the record reflects any
consideration of this fact.

23. The ITC recognized that one of the five companies that formed Tenaris (the producer Algoma
in Canada) was not located in the five subject countries.12

Q6. Does any of the evidence relating to the likely price effects of imports and the likely
impact of increased imports relate to Argentina? If so, was this evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that injury was likely to continue or recur if the order applicable to Argentine
OCTG were terminated?

24. Because the ITC cumulated the likely volume and impact of subject imports from the five
countries involved, it did not generally focus on the likely price effects or impact of imports from any
single country.

25. Some of the evidence relating to likely price effects relates to casing and tubing from
Argentina. For example, in reviewing pricing data from the original investigation, the ITC noted that
"[p]urchasers repeatedly stated that subject imports from Argentina, Italy, Ko rea, Japan, and Mexico
exerted downward pressure on domestic prices.
13 Also, the ITC noted that subject imports were
highly substitutable for domestic casing and tubing, and based this conclusion on questionnaire
responses from producers, importers and purchasers of casing and tubing. 14 These questionnaire
responses sometimes singled out casing and tubing from Argentina. 15 In analyzing the likely impact
of subject imports, the ITC did not single out any of the five subject countries.

26. The ITC declines to speculate on what the outc ome of the sunset review of casing and tubing
from Argentina would have been if the data relating to casing and tubing from Argentina. had been
examined in isolation.

Q7. In this case, did the Commission consider that injury was likely to continue or likely to
recur? If the decision was based on the likelihood of a recurrence of injury, what was the
positive evidence that imports from the individual countries would have an impact on the US
market at the same time? If there was no posi tive evidence to support the proposition that
imports from the countries would have an impa ct on the domestic industry at the same time,
what is the basis for considering that the cumulated imports were likely to cause a recurrence of
injury?

12 Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argent ina, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Mexico , USITC Pub. 3434,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-364, 731-TA-711, and 713-716 (June 2001) ("ITC Report") at 16 (Exhibit ARG-54)
13 ITC Report at 21.
14 ITC Report at 21.
15 ITC Report at II-17-18.

27. Article 11.3 does not prescribe the methodolog y Members use in conducting sunset reviews.
The ITC found that revocation of the anti-dumping duty orders from the five subject countries, and
the countervailing duty order on imports of casing and tubing from Italy, would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States.
16 Such a finding is
consistent with Article 11.3.17 There is no obligation under Article 11 to determine that injury would
be likely to recur as opposed to likely to continue, as there is no requirement for a determination that
the dumping duties have eliminated the injury. Further, a finding that either injury is likely to recur or
continue, when coupled with a similar finding regard ing dumping, is adequate to permit retention of
the anti-dumping duty order.

16 ITC Report at 1.
17 See, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon-Quality
Line Pipe From Korea , WT/DS202/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 8 March 2002, para. 167
(unnecessary to make a discrete finding of "serious injury" or "threat of serious injury" when making a
determination whether to apply a safeguard measure).

ANNEX E-5

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS
OF ARGENTINA – FIRST MEETING (REVISED VERSION)

27 February 2004

The Department’s Sunset Review of OCTG from Argentina

Q1. Does Article 11.3 require countries to export to the United States in order to obtain
termination of the measure? In a case where there are no exports, how would the Department
make its determination of likelihood of dumping?

1. Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement does no t provide criteria for making a likelihood
determination in a sunset review.
1 The Sunset Policy Bulletin states that "normally" Commerce would
find that a cessation of exports after the imposition of the order is highly probative that it would be
likely dumping would continue or re cur. Nevertheless, the likelihood determination ultimately would
be based on all the facts present on the administrative record in a particular case.2

Q2. If there are some exports, but the company or companies representing 100 per cent
exports to the United States during the 5 year period do not participate, what is the
Department’s conclusion regarding this company or companies? Does the statute mandate a
likely dumping determination for this company or companies? What is the effect of this finding
for the measure as a whole?

2. The statute mandates that Commerce make a company-specific likelihood finding with
respect to a respondent interested party that ha s waived its right to participate in the sunset
proceeding.3 However, Commerce’s final likelihood determ ination is made on an order-wide basis.
In making that determination, Commerce will take into consideration all th e facts present on the
administrative record for that sunset review proceeding.

 In this case:

 (a) Did the Department conclude that the non-responding respondents were likely
to dump?

3. Yes.

 (b) What was the effect on the d ecision for the measure as a whole?

4. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce considered these findings along
with all the information on the record of the sunset review, including the prior agency determinations,
the substantive and rebuttal responses of the domestic interested parties, and the substantive response

1 See United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan , WT/DS244/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 15 December 2003 (" Japan
Sunset"), at para. 123.
2 See Sunset Policy Bulletin, Section II.A, 63 Fed . Reg. at 18872 (Exhibit ARG-35).
3 19 USC. § 1671(c)(4)(B) (Exhibit ARG-1).

of the only Argentine respondent interested party to file a complete substan tive response, Siderca, in
accordance with section 751(c)(3)(B) of the Act and section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations.
4

 (c) Given that the Department assume d that non-responding respondents
represented 100 per cent of the exports, what opportunity did Siderca have to
affect the outcome of the determination for the measure as a whole?

5. It is not known to the United States what may have been the effect, on the final sunset
determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, of statements Siderca could have made
or of any information Siderca may have provided be cause Siderca chose to participate minimally in
the sunset review proceeding. In its substantive response, Siderca did not provide any argument or
information beyond its assertions concerning the de minimis rate to be applied in a sunset review; nor
did Siderca submit a rebuttal response, as provided in section 351.218(d)(4) of the Sunset Regulations.
In addition, Siderca did not submit any comments on the adequacy determination generally or on the
import statistics Commerce used to make the adequacy determination, as provided for in section
351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations . In other words, Siderca failed
 to avail itself of several
opportunities to affect the outcome of the determination.

 (d) Under this scenario, what is the evid ence that dumping is likely to continue?

6. As stated in the Final Sunset Determination and the Decision Memorandum , Commerce
found that there was a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in the sunset review of
OCTG from Argentina because there was evidence of dumping since the imposition of the order (i.e.,
there were entries of subject merchandise for wh ich dumping duties were paid). Furthermore,
Commerce considered that import volumes were reduced significantly and had remained depressed
since the imposition of the order.
5

Q3. In this case, did DOC attach any relevance to:

 (a) the fact that Siderca was the only Argentine exporter ever investigated?

7. No.

 (b) the errors that it had discovered in its own statistics in the no-shipment reviews?

8. No. For the administrative reviews initiated and later terminated for Siderca (periods of
review ("POR"), 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997- 1998), only the administrative review for the
1996-1997 POR had no shipments of OCTG from Argentina. For the other two administrative
reviews, although errors were discovered in the DOC’s Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics with
respect to Siderca’s shipments of OCTG to the Un ited States during these reviews, there were other
shipments of OCTG from Argentina during these PO Rs. More importantly, Commerce’s adequacy
determination in the sunset revi ew of OCTG from Argentina was made using the USITC’s Trade
Database, not the Census IM-145 data.

9. Notwithstanding Argentina’s claims regarding the import statistics, neither Siderca nor any
other interested party alleged, during the sunset review, that there were errors in the statistics
Commerce used to make its aggregate adequacy determination. Notably, as the only respondent
interested party to participate in the sunset revi ew, Siderca did not file comments on the adequacy
determination, as provided for in section 351.309(e) of the Sunset Regulations.

4 See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Sunset Reviews of the AD Orders on Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Korea (Dep’t Comm., 31 Oct. 2000) (final results) ("Decision
Memorandum") at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51).
5 See Decision Memorandum at 7 (Exhibit ARG-51).

 (c) the fact that, even if some of the statistics represented Argentine OCTG, these
exports were minuscule and commercially meaningless?

10. As discussed above, neither Siderca nor any other respondent interested party presented any
arguments or comments in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina concerning the import
statistics Commerce used to determine the adequacy of the aggregate response and the effect the order
had on shipments to the United States of Ar gentine OCTG. Notwithstanding Argentina’s
characterization of the import volumes ("minuscule and commercially meaningless"), the significant
reduction and continued depressed condition of the Argentina OCTG imports for the five year period
preceding the sunset review formed part of Co mmerce affirmative likelihood determination in the
sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.
6

Q4. The United States asserts that, under the waiver provisions, "there are two methods for
a respondent interested party to waive its right to participate in a sunset review: (1) submit a
statement affirmatively waiving participation; or (2) fail to submit a substantive response to
Commerce’s notice of initiation and allow Commerce to deem its non-response as a waiver of its
right to participation." (US First Submission, para. 213). This reading, however, fails to
acknowledge the regulation’s instruction that Commerce "will consider the failure by a
respondent interested party to file a complete
 substantive response . . . as a waiver of
participation . . . ." (19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d )(2)(iii) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the
Department will deem a respondent interested party to have waived its participation where it
files an incomplete substantive response. How is such a deemed waiver consistent with
Articles 11.3?

11. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, the respondent interested parties’ response to
the notice of initiation could only be characterized in two ways. First, Argentine respondent
interested parties who filed a complete substantive response, namely Siderca. Second, the Argentine
exporters of OCTG who collectively failed to respond to the notice of initiation at all. No respondent
interested party filed an incomplete substantive response in the sunset review of OCTG from
Argentina. Consequently, the rele vance of this question to the present dispute is not clear to the
United States. Furthermore, regardless of whether an interested party is considered to have waived
participation, Commerce considers any and all
 information submitted during the sunset review in
making the final sunset determination.

Q5. The United States argues that, "although Commerce used the facts available to make
the final sunset determination of likelihood, Co mmerce did not apply facts available to the issue
of whether there was a likelihood that dumping would continue or recur if the order were
revoked with respect to Siderca specifically, because the sunset determination is made on an
order-wide basis, not a company- specific basis." (US First Submission, para. 214). The United
States thus suggests that the Department consid ered whether Siderca alone would be likely to
dump upon termination of the order. What was the positive evidence that Siderca was likely to
dump if the order were terminated?

12. Commerce makes its likelihood determination on an order-wide basis in all sunset reviews it
conducts. In its final determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce did not
base its finding of likelihood on Siderca alone.

Q6. In its first submission, the United States asserts that "‘current information’ is not the
issue in a sunset review conducted pursuant to Ar ticle 11.3. Rather, the issue under Article 11.3
is whether dumping and injury are likely to conti nue or recur in the event of the expiry of the

6 See Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (Exhibit ARG-51) and Sunset Policy Bulletin , 65 Fed. Reg. at
18872 (Exhibit ARG-35).

duty, an inherently forward-looking inquiry." (US First Submission, para. 265). How can a
prospective determination of whether dumping is likely to continue, if there is no analysis of
whether it exists currently? How does the United States support its stat ement in the Issues and
Decision Memorandum that dumping continued throughout the order?

13. Nothing in Article 11.3 or elsewhere in th e AD Agreement states how the Members are to
determine likelihood in a sunset review. It is not clear to the United Stated how a current margin of
dumping is necessarily indicative of future dumping. The AD Agreement recognizes this fact in
providing footnote 9.

14. Since the issuance of the anti-dumping duty order following original anti-dumping
investigation of OCTG from Argentina, the United States has been collecting cash deposits on all
entries of the subject merchandise. There have been no administrative reviews of the order.
Therefore, for all imports of OCTG entered since th e anti-dumping duty order, the United States has
been assessing and collecting dumping duties on OCTG from Argentina.

Q7. Does the United States agree that the determination in the original investigation was
made on the basis of the practice of zeroing? Does the United States agree with Argentina’s
assertion that, without the practice of zeroing, Siderca would not have had a positive dumping
margin? Leaving aside the question of whether zeroing was proper at the time of the
investigation in 1994/95, does the United States be lieve that a margin calculated on the basis of
zeroing can be relied upon as the evidence of likely continuation or recurrence of dumping in an
11.3 review?

15. The term "zeroing" is not found in the AD Agreement. It arose in the EC – Bed Linen dispute
and involved the EC’s calculation of dumping margins in an original investigation on an average-to-
average basis. The Appellate Body found in that dispute determined that the EC’s methodology was
"inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Argentina has neither claimed nor
demonstrated – nor does the United States agree – that the methodology Commerce used to calculate
a dumping margin for Siderca in the original invest igation is the same methodology considered by the
Appellate Body in EC Bed Linen.

The Commission’s Sunset Review of OCTG from Argentina

Q1. The United States argues that the Commissi on applies a "likely" standard in its sunset
determinations. The United States supports this statement, in part, by referring to the fact that
its national courts ultimately approved the Co mmission’s remand determination in the Usinor
litigation. Is it the United States’ position th at it applied the same standard ("likely") in the
remand determination as it applied in the original sunset determination in that case?

16. No. The US International Trade Commission (" ITC") did not apply the same standard in the
Usinor remand determination as it had in its original sunset determination in that case. As the ITC
explained in its remand determination:

For the purpose of the Commission’s determinations on remand in these reviews we
follow the Court’s instructions to apply the meaning of "likely" as "probable," not
"possible." To the extent the Court uses "p robable" to impute to "likely" a higher
level of certainty of result than "likely," we also apply that standard, but only for
purposes of this remand, as we find such standard to be inconsistent with the statute
and the SAA.
7

7 Usinor Remand Determination at 14 (USITC July 2002) (Exhibit US-19).

17. Later events made it clear that the ITC in the Usinor remand determination applied a "likely"
standard that was more stringent than the US Co urt of International Trade actually construed US
domestic law to require. This became evident when the Court subsequently stated in affirming the
ITC’s remand determination that the Court did not interpret "likely" to "imply any degree of
certainty.8 Moreover, there was no question on the Court’ s part that some of the Commissioners in
the original determination had co nstrued the term "likely" in a manner consistent with the US
statutory requirements.9 Indeed, apart from the uncertainty on the part of other Commissioners as to
whether the Court’s equating the meaning of the te rm "likely" with the word "probable" required
application of a higher standard in sunset reviews, it is fair to say that there would have been little or
no disagreement about the standard to be applied in such proceedings.

Q2. Does the United States believe that there is a difference between the term "injury" as
used in Article 11.1 and the term "injury" as used in Article 11.3? Does the United States
believe that the term "injury" as used in Article 11.1 is different from the term "injury" as used
in Article 3?

18. The more appropriate question is whether there is a difference between the determinations
called for in Articles 11.1 and 11.3. The United St ates submits that the analysis provided for in
Article 11.1 is different than that required by paragraph 3 of Article 11. More specifically,
paragraph 1 of Article 11 sp eaks of existing "injury," using the present tense of the verb "to be," i.e.,
"dumping which is causing injury." Paragraph 3, on the other hand, speaks of the likelihood of the
"continuation or recurrence of . . . injury." These provisions have a different focus and involve
entirely different determinations, as the Appellate Body has recognized on more than one occasion.
10

19. As suggested by the response to the first part of Argentina’s question, the United States also
does not contend that there is a difference in the term "injury" as used in Article 3 and Article 11.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

Q3. In the sunset review of Argentine OCTG, did the Commission ever consider Argentine
exports on an individual basis, that is, without cumulating the Argentine exports with those of
other countries? If not, does the United St ates consider that Argentina has an independent
right to termination under Article 11.3?

20. The ITC considered Argentine exports on an individual basis only in connection with its
analysis of whether it was appropriate to cumulate the volume and effect of imports from the five
countries subject to the sunset reviews. The ITC found that there likely would be a reasonable
overlap of competition between the subject im ports (including imports from Argentina) and
domestically produced casing and tubing, and amon g the subject imports themselves, sufficient to
warrant cumulation.

21. The United States does not consider that Argentina has a right to termination under
Article 11.3 premised on the examination only of whether the revocation of the anti-dumping duty
order relating to subject imports from Argentina will lead to a continuation or recurrence of injury.
As discussed in the United States’ second written submission, Article 11.3 does not confer such a
right. Moreover, since imports from a group of countries may cumulatively cause injury even though
imports from individual countries in this group do not,
11 it would be illogical to require that sunset

8 Usinor Industeel v. United States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 6 (CIT 20 December 2002) (Exhibit US-18).
9 Usinor Industeel v. United States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 6 (CIT 20 December 2002) (Exhibit US-18); see
also, Indorama Chemicals v. USITC, Slip Op. 02-105 at 20 (CIT 4 September 2002) (sunset standard based on
"likelihood," not certainty) (Exhibit US-26).
10 US-German Steel, AB Report, para. 87, US-Japan Sunset, AB Report, para. 106
11 See European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings
from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 22 July 2003, para. 116.

reviews be conducted only on a country-specific basis. Such a requirement would permit anti-
dumping duties to expire even though the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of injury.

Q4. On the facts of this case, could the Commission have rendered an affirmative likelihood
of injury determination without conducting a cumulative analysis?

22. The ITC declines to speculate on what the outc ome of the sunset review of casing and tubing
from Argentina would have been in the absence of cumulation.

Q5. In certain portions of the determination, the Commission refers to "Tenaris." Did the
Commission make any allowance for the fact that Tenaris included companies that were not
subject to the orders under review? If so, please indicate where the record reflects any
consideration of this fact.

23. The ITC recognized that one of the five companies that formed Tenaris (the producer Algoma
in Canada) was not located in the five subject countries.
12

Q6. Does any of the evidence relating to the likely price effects of imports and the likely
impact of increased imports relate to Argentina? If so, was this evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that injury was likely to continue or recur if the order applicable to Argentine
OCTG were terminated?

24. Because the ITC cumulated the likely volume and impact of subject imports from the five
countries involved, it did not generally focus on the likely price effects or impact of imports from any
single country.

25. Some of the evidence relating to likely price effects relates to casing and tubing from
Argentina. For example, in reviewing pricing data from the original investigation, the ITC noted that
"[p]urchasers repeatedly stated that subject imports from Argentina, Italy, Ko rea, Japan, and Mexico
exerted downward pressure on domestic prices.
13 Also, the ITC noted that subject imports were
highly substitutable for domestic casing and tubing, and based this conclusion on questionnaire
responses from producers, importers and purchasers of casing and tubing. 14 These questionnaire
responses sometimes singled out casing and tubing from Argentina. 15 In analyzing the likely impact
of subject imports, the ITC did not single out any of the five subject countries.

26. The ITC declines to speculate on what the outc ome of the sunset review of casing and tubing
from Argentina would have been if the data relating to casing and tubing from Argentina. had been
examined in isolation.

Q7. In this case, did the Commission consider that injury was likely to continue or likely to
recur? If the decision was based on the likelihood of a recurrence of injury, what was the
positive evidence that imports from the individual countries would have an impact on the US
market at the same time? If there was no posi tive evidence to support the proposition that
imports from the countries would have an impa ct on the domestic industry at the same time,
what is the basis for considering that the cumulated imports were likely to cause a recurrence of
injury?

12 Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argent ina, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Mexico , USITC Pub. 3434,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-364, 731-TA-711, and 713-716 (June 2001) ("ITC Report") at 16 (Exhibit ARG-54)
13 ITC Report at 21.
14 ITC Report at 21.
15 ITC Report at II-17-18.

27. Article 11.3 does not prescribe the methodolog y Members use in conducting sunset reviews.
The ITC found that revocation of the anti-dumping duty orders from the five subject countries, and
the countervailing duty order on imports of casing and tubing from Italy, would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States. 16 Such a finding is
consistent with Article 11.3.17 There is no obligation under Article 11 to determine that injury would
be likely to recur as opposed to likely to continue, as there is no requirement for a determination that
the dumping duties have eliminated the injury. Further, a finding that either injury is likely to recur or
continue, when coupled with a similar finding regard ing dumping, is adequate to permit retention of
the anti-dumping duty order.

16 ITC Report at 1.
17 See, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon-Quality
Line Pipe From Korea , WT/DS202/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 8 March 2002, para. 167
(unnecessary to make a discrete finding of "serious injury" or "threat of serious injury" when making a
determination whether to apply a safeguard measure).

ANNEX E-6

QUESTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
TO THE UNITED STATES – THIRD PARTIES SESSION

Does the United States consider that the phrase “during the investigation phase” in
Article 2.4.2 AD Agreement means that Article 2.4.2 does not apply in an Article 11.3 review?

If so, does the United States consider that the word “investigation” in Article 2.4.2 AD
Agreement refers only to initial or original invest igations within the meaning of Article 5 AD
Agreement, or does it also refer to an investigation as that word is used in Article 6 AD Agreement –
and if not the latter, why not?

Taking into account the fact that 11.4 AD Agreement , unlike 11.5, does not use the term
mutatis mutandis , does the United States consider that an Article 11.3 review does not involve an
investigation within the meaning of Article 6 AD Agreement, notwithstanding the repeated use of the
word “investigation” in Article 6, and if so, why?

Would the United States explain the consistenc y of its position with the use in WTO anti-
dumping law, in United States legislation and in th e United States documents relating to the contested
determination, of the terms : definition of dump ing; anti-dumping proceedings; initial or original
investigation; and review investigation – with pa rticular regard to the instances identified in
footnotes 43, 46, 47 and 48 of the European Communities’ written submission?

 Having regard, in particular, to the EC – Bed Linen case, does the United States consider that,
under the current AD Agreement, zeroing such as that used in the original dumping calculation in the
present case would constitute a “fair compar ison” within the meaning of Article 2.4 AD Agreement,
and if so, why?

ANNEX E-7

ANSWERS OF MEXICO TO QUESTIONS OF ARGENTINA
– THIRD PARTIES SESSION

In its oral statement to the Panel on 10 December, Mexico referred to the Sunset Review of Oil
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, included as Exhibit ARG-63, Tab-179, in Argentina's
First Submission. Would Mexico indicate the type of review that was conducted and the result?
Would Mexico indicate the nature and content of the information that it supplied to the Department of
Commerce? Would Mexico please describe whether the information that Mexico provided to the
Department of Commerce was relied upon by the Depa rtment in making its determination? Would
Mexico please describe the basis for the Department's determination in that case?

 This document contains the following replies to the clarifications requested by the
Government of Argentina:

1. Type of review and results

 In the sunset review of oil country tubular goods (OCTG) from Mexico, the Department of
Commerce (hereafter the "Department") conducted a "full review" as defined in United States
legislation. The decision to conduct a "full review" is mentioned in the documents included in Exhibit
ARG-63, Tab-179, which includes the Department's Final and Preliminary Determinations in the
sunset review. The result of the "full" review in this case was a decision that revocation would be
likely to lead to a recurrence of dumping.

2. Nature and content of the information provided during the review

 The two major Mexican exporters of OCTG took part in the review.

 As described in the Issues and Decisions Memorandum accompanying both the Final
Determination and the Preliminary Determinati on included in Exhibit ARG-63, Tab-179, both
companies explained in detail that they had participated in annual reviews and that the Department
had concluded that the two countries had not enga ged in dumping. Particularly, in the case of
TAMSA, the fact that for three consecutive reviews the margin of dumping was zero was the best
evidence that dumping was not likely to continue or recur. Additionally, with regard to the fact that
the Department used the margin of the original in vestigation (21.7 per cent, which was a result of a
disputed claim that TAMSA withheld certain inform ation related to the comp any's financial expenses
during the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994), TAMSA provided evidence to show that
such rate from the original investigation could no longer be applicable owing to two significant
changes since the time of the original investigation five years earlier. Firs t, the company's level of
foreign currency indebtedness had been significantly reduced. Second, the stability of the Mexican
peso meant that there had been no major risk of a de valuation of the peso, similar to that used as the
basis for the "best information available" calculation in the original investigation.

 In the case of the other Mexican company, Hylsa explained that, because it had not been
investigated in the original 1994/1995 investigation and, in the only annual review in which it had
participated it was found not to be dumping, there was no factual basis to consider that it was ever
dumping or that dumping was likely to continue or recur.

3. The Department's consideration of the info rmation provided by the Mexican companies
 and the basis for the Department's determination

 With regard to the question whether the De partment relied upon the Mexican exporters'
information and the basis for the Department's determination, the Preliminary and Final
Determinations show that the Department totally ignored the information provided by the exporters.
In fact, both determinations demonstrate that the De partment relied systematically on the statute, the
Statement of Administrative Action and the Sunset Policy Bulletin as the basis for its determination,
without taking into account the information submitted by the exporters. Thus, the sole basis for
determining that dumping was likely to continue or recur was import volumes.

 This conclusion can be drawn from the Issues and Decision Memorandum included in
Exhibit ARG-63, Tab-179. The Memorandum summar izes the arguments presented in the parties'
case and rebuttal briefs, including TAMSA's argument that the Preliminary Determination "relied too
heavily on 'inferences' when it determined that dumpi ng is likely to recur" and Hylsa's argument that
the information it submitted showed that dumping wa s not likely to recur. Notwithstanding this and
other evidence submitted by the Mexican companies, the response to these arguments appears on page
4 of the Memorandum, demonstrating the following decision-making process:

 (i) The statute, the Statement of Administrative Action and Sunset Policy Bulletin
provide "guidance on methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for
likelihood determinations". Particularly, the Sunset Policy Bulletin states that the
Department "normally will determine that revocation of an anti-dumping order is
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where dumping was
eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes of the subject
merchandise declined significantly"; and

 (ii) given the fact that there was a decreas e in import volumes after the imposition of the
anti-dumping measure in 1995;
1

 (iii) the Department concluded that "Because we continue to find that Mexican export
volumes in the post-order period were sign ificantly lower than pre-order levels, we
also continue to find that a recurrence of dumping of OCTG from Mexico is likely if
the order were to be revoked". Thus, the Department determined that, if the order
were removed, it "would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at
the following percentage weighted-average margins": TAMSA 27.70 per cent,
Hylsa 21.70 per cent; "all others" 21.70 per cent. Issues and Decision Memorandum,
included in Exhibit ARG-63, Tab-179.

1 It is important to note that, responding to TAMSA's explanation of why the import volumes had
decreased, the Department stated that the business justification for the lower volume "in no way conflicted with
the Department's inference; if it became 'prudent and necessary' to make fewer sales at more fairly traded prices
while the discipline of the order was in place, it is reasonable to infer that dumping would be likely to resume if
such disciplines ceased to exist and it was not longer 'necessary' for TAMSA and other Mexican exporters to
maintain the same business strategy".

ANNEX E-8

ANSWERS OF ARGENTINA TO QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL
– SECOND MEETING

13 February 2004

1. The Panel notes "Heading A" on page 36 of Argentina's first written submission and
Argentina's statements in paragraph 120 of its fi rst written submission and paragraph 51 of its
second written submission. Please clarify whet her Argentina's claim challenging the US law's
waiver provisions under Articles 11.3, 6.1 and 6.2 of the Agreement are limited to "deemed
waivers", or, whether they also take issue with "affirmative waivers".

Response:

 Argentina believes that both forms of waivers – “deemed waivers” and “affirmative waivers”
– are inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Agreem ent. The statute and the regulations mandate an
affirmative determination of likelihood of dumping in the event of a waiver, whether resulting from
an affirmative statement of waiver, no response, an incomplete response, or the 50 per cent threshold
test. In Argentina’s view, the notion of a statute and regulation mandating an affirmative
determination of likelihood of dumping without any analysis is inconsistent with Article 11.3.

 If a party does not cooperate (for example, through an affirmative waiver), the Anti-Dumping
Agreement permits the investigating authority to render its determination on the basis of facts
available, subject to the disciplines of Article 6.8 and Annex II. However, in no circumstance is the
authority relieved from the obligation of conducting an investigation and making a determination
based on evidence.

 Argentina’s challenge with respect to Articles 6. 1 and 6.2 is limited to the “deemed waiver.”
Under the deemed waiver provision,
1 the Department considers an individual respondent to have
waived participation where the respondent submits a su bstantive response that is inadequate – either
because it is incomplete or because the respondent does not satisfy the 50 per cent threshold test. 2 By
requiring the Department to render an affirma tive likelihood determination for a respondent that
submits a substantive response, the deemed waiver provision violates Articles 6.1 and 6.2.

 As to Argentina’s “as applied” argument, the on ly waiver(s) in the case of the Department’s
sunset review of the anti-dumping measure on Argentine OCTG would be classified as “deemed
waiver(s).” No party affirmatively stated that it w ould not participate, and in fact the only response
received indicated that the principal Argentine pr oducer/exporter (Siderca) would cooperate fully.
The deemed waiver(s) arose because (1) the Departme nt considered Siderca’s substantive response to
be “inadequate”3 and/or (2) the Department believed that other exporters should have responded.
Either way, the statute and regulation then mandated that the Department render an affirmative
likelihood determination. As explained in Argentin a’s brief, the deemed waiver led directly to an
affirmative likelihood determination for Argentina in this case.

1 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii).
2 See 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A )(requiring “complete” responses from exporters representing
50 per cent of total exports); 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii)(stating that incomplete responses will constitute
waiver); and 19 USC. § 1675(c)(4)(B)(stating that waiver mandates an affirmative determination of likely
dumping).
3 See Determination to Expedite at 2 (ARG-50); Issues and Decision Memorandum at 3, 5, 7 (ARG-
51).

2. The Panel notes that in sections VII.C.2 and VII.C.3 of its first written submission,
Argentina challenges the application of the US waiver provisions to Siderca whereas in the
following part of paragraph 6 of its second oral statement it also takes issue with the application
of these provisions to Argentina:

Indeed, the Department’s application of the waiver provisions to Siderca (or, at a
minimum, to Argentina) is plainly indicated in the Department’s Issues and Decision
Memorandum.
Please clarify the scope of Argentina's claim. Mo re particularly, please explain whether, in the
view of Argentina, the alleged application of the US waiver provisions in this sunset review
impaired the rights of Argentina or Siderca.

Response

 Argentina’s First Submission presents the waiver claim as it arises from the Issues and
Decision Memorandum , which indicates that a waiver was ap plied to the “respondent interested
parties,”4 which Argentina reasonably interpreted to include Siderca. Nothing in the Issues and
Decision Memorandum indicates that Argentina’s understanding of the application of the waiver
provision to Siderca was incorrect. The phrase “non-responding respondents” is never mentioned.
Based on the description in the Issues and Decision Memorandum , Argentina considered that the
waiver provisions were applied to Siderca, and therefore claimed that the application of the waiver
provisions to Siderca was unjustified, violated Articles 11.3, 6.1, and 6.2 of the Agreement, and
impaired Argentina’s right under Article 11.3 to termination of the measure applied to its exports.

 It was not until the US First Written Submission that the term “non-responding respondents”
was used, and that the United States offered the argument that it did not
 apply the waiver provision to
Siderca.5 Argentina submits that accepting this argument by the United States would require the
Panel to disregard the words used in the Issues and Decision Memorandum, which the Panel cannot
do. Consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme providing for “deemed waivers,” 6 the
Determination to Expedite and the Issues and Decision Memorandum unambiguously state that the
Department found Siderca’s substantive response to be “inadequate,” and that because the Department
“did not receive an adequate response from responde nt interested parties[,] . . . [t]his constitutes a
waiver of participation.”7

 Even if the Panel accepts the US ex post facto justification, Argentina believes that the
application of the waiver provisions to the so -called non-responding respondents also violates
Articles 11.3, 6.1, and 6.2. With respect to Siderca, despite having offered to cooperate fully, the
application of the waiver provision to the non-responding respondents mandated an affirmative
likelihood determination, which prevented any type of “investigation” or “determination” based on an
analysis of facts and arguments. With respect to Argentina, it deprived Argentina of termination of
the measure without the type of substantive analysis that is required by Article 11.3, and without
affording Argentina’s principal OCTG producer and exporter, Siderca, the right to participate.

4 Issues and Decision Memorandum at 5 (ARG-51).
5 US First Submission, para. 216.
6 See 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A); 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii); and 19 USC. § 1675(c)(4)(B).
7 Determination to Expedite at 2 (ARG-50); Issues and Decision Memorandum at 3, 5, 7 (ARG-51).

11. The Panel notes Argentina's allegation in its first written submission that in this sunset
review the DOC failed to use the "likely" standard and applied a different standard
instead.
8

 (a) The Panel notes that Argentina did not mention this claim in its second written
submission. Please clarify whether Argentina is still pursuing this claim.

Response

 Argentina would like to clarify that it contin ues to make this claim. Argentina’s claim is
summarized in Heading D on page 58 of its First Written Submission. This claim contains several
arguments including: (1) that Article 2 disciplines a pply to Article 11.3 reviews; (2) that Article 11.3
reviews are prospective in nature and require fresh information; (3) that dumping must be “probable”;
(4) that reviews are subject to the evidentiary re quirements of Article 6; and (5) that the likely
determination must be based on positive evidence. Argentina’s claim, developed in Section D of its
First Written Submission, is that the Department failed to satisfy each of these obligations and that its
decision therefore violated the provisions of Articles 6 and 11.3.

 In its Second Written Submission, Argentina developed the same arguments in Section
III.C.3, beginning on page 40 (paragraphs 131-136). Paragraph 133 states: “The Department’s
reliance on such flawed and dated information necessa rily resulted in speculation as to whether or not
dumping would be likely to contin ue or recur were the order to be terminated, rather than a
determination based on positive evidence.”

 In addition, Argentina’s oral statement in th e Panel’s second substantive meeting with the
Parties continues the development of this argument in paragraphs 20-23. In paragraph 22, Argentina
speaks to the standard, stating: “Also, the United States still has never offered a logical explanation of
what the 1.36 per cent rate says about future dumping, let alone the likelihood of future dumping. The
rate is historic, with no relationship whatsoever to the forward-looking determination required to
invoke the exception of Article 11.3 and continue the measure.”

 Finally, and equally important, throughout these proceedings, Argentina has argued that the
Department employs a WTO-inconsistent presumption in all sunset reviews.9 Operating together, the
statute, the SAA, and Section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin direct the Department to treat
historical dumping margins and past import volumes as decisive evidence of likely dumping in every
sunset review, and ARG-63 and ARG-64 demonstrate th at the Department, in fact, treats these factors
as decisive in every case in which the domestic industry participates. In Sunset Review of Steel from
Japan, the Appellate Body declared that giving these two factors alone decisive weight in every case
would violate Article 11.3. 10 The US provisions thus prevent the Department from basing its
likelihood determination on a factual basis sufficient to demonstrate that dumping would be likely to
continue in the event of termination of the order. Therefore, through the application of the WTO-
inconsistent presumption in the sunset review of Argentine OCTG, the Department failed to use the
“likely” standard required by Article 11.3.

 Argentina has argued consistently that the Department only considers domestic industry
participation, import volume, and historical dumping margins in sunset reviews. Accordingly, the
only manner in which the Department’s determinatio n can be upheld is if “likely” means something
other than its common and ordinary meaning (i.e., “probable”), and if the type of analysis permitted to
establish a likelihood is something other than required by the standards of Article 11.3, as reaffirmed

9 Argentina’s First Submission, Sec. VII.B; Argentin a’s First Oral Statement, paras. 32-33, 36, 77-83;
Argentina’s Second Submission, Sec. III.B; Argentina’s Second Oral Statement, paras. 57-67.
10 See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, paras. 176-178, 191.

by the Appellate Body.

 (b) Please refer to the relevant part(s) of the record of this sunset review where this
inconsistent standard can be found.

Response

 Whether reading its express terms or viewed in the light most favourable to the United States,
the Issues and Decision Memorandum demonstrates that the Department failed to apply the correct
“likely” standard.

 In the first instance, the Issues and Decision Memorandum provides that waiver served as the
basis for the Department’s affirmative likelihood determination:

[S]ection 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall
 determine that
revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping
where a respondent interested party waives its participation in the sunset review. In
the instant reviews, the Department did not receive an adequate response from
respondent interested parties. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset
Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.
11

 Argentina submits that the Department’s app lication of the waiver provision conclusively
demonstrates that it did not apply the correct “likel y” standard in the sunset review of Argentine
OCTG. In discussing the “likely” standard under Article 11.3, the Appellate Body has stated that “an
affirmative likelihood determination may be made only if the evidence demonstrates that dumping
would be probable if the duty were terminated . . . .” 12 The Appellate Body has further held that a
likelihood determination requires a “forward-looking analysis,” the ultimate determination of which
must be based on a “rigorous examination” of “all relevant evidence.” 13 A statutorily-mandated
finding of likely dumping is patently inconsistent with this exacting standard.

 Assuming arguendo that waiver did not serve as the basis for the Department’s likelihood
determination, the Issues and Decision Memorandum , at best, indicates that the Department followed
the direction of the stat ute, the SAA, and the Sunset Policy Bulletin and based its affirmative
likelihood determination solely on two factors: (1) the existence of the 1.36 per cent margin from the
original investigation, and (2) the decline in import volumes. 14 Under the guidance of the Appellate
Body’s decision in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , the Department’s decisive reliance on these
two factors represents a presumption that dumping was likely to continue or recur. 15 A presumption
of likely dumping cannot constitute positive evidence of likely dumping within the meaning of
Article 11.3, the evidentiary standard s of Article 6, and the interpreta tions of these provisions by the
Appellate Body. 16 Therefore, the record demonstrates th at the Department did not apply the likely
standard required by Article 11.3 in this case.

11 Issues and Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (ARG-51)(emphasis added).
12 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 111 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at paras. 105, 113, 191.
14 Issues and Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (ARG-51)(“In the Argentine case, there has been no
decline in dumping margins coupled with an increase in imports. Rather, absent an administrative review, the
dumping margin from the original investigation is the only indicator available to the Department with respect to
the level of dumping. Because 1.27 [sic] per cent is above the 0.5 per cent de minimis standard applied in sunset
reviews, we find that dumping has continued over the life of the Argentine order and is likely to continue if the
order were revoked.”).
15 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, paras. 176-178.
16 See id. at paras. 178, 191.

12. The Panel notes that, in its second writte n submission, Argentina did not address its
claim under Article 12.2 of the Agreement. Plea se clarify whether Argentina is still pursuing
this claim.

Response:

 Argentina has not abandoned its claim with respect to Article 12.2, which was set forth in
paragraphs 177-180 of its First Written Submission. In Argentina’s view, Article 12.2 is a substantive
obligation with which the United States must comply in an Article 11.3 review by virtue of the
explicit cross-reference in Article 12.3 stating that the provisions of Article 12 apply mutatis mutandis
to Article 11 reviews.

 The violation of Article 12 is made more clear in this case by the continuing changes in the
position of the United States on several core i ssues, including whether Siderca’s response was
“adequate,” to whom the Department applied the wa iver provisions, the basis for the Department’s
determination that dumping continued over the life of the order, and the basis for the Department’s
likelihood determination. The United States ha s also indicated that a few key portions of its
underlying decisions were “inartfully drafted.” When the Panel cuts through all of these explanations
and ex post facto justifications, the underlying decision cann ot meet the substantive requirements of
Article 12.2.

17. What is the supporting evidence in the recor d of this sunset review for your allegation
that the Commission failed to apply the "likely" standard of Article 11.3 of the Agreement in
this sunset review?

Response

 In Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , the Appellate Body confirmed that “likely” under
Article 11.3 must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning of “probable.” 17 Although the US
statute uses the word “likely,” and the Commission used the term in its sunset determination of
Argentine OCTG, mere reference to the word “likely” does not mean that the Commission applied the
correct standard.

 Two levels of evidence support Argentina’s claim that, in the sunset review of Argentine
OCTG, the Commission did not interpret likely by its ordinary meaning of probable and thus failed to
apply the likely standard of Article 11.3: (1) admissions by the Commission itself; and (2) portions of
the record from the Commission’s sunset review de monstrating that it was not, in fact, applying a
“likely” standard.

 On at least two separate occasions, the Commission has admitted that it did not interpret
“likely” to mean probable in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina. In the Usinor remand, the
Commission stated that in all of the sunset review decisions it considered as of 1 July 2002 (including
the sunset review of Argentine OCTG), it followed the SAA and consistently interpreted “likely” as
“a concept that falls in between ‘probable’ a nd ‘possible’ on a continuum of relative certainty.” 18
More directly, the Commission expressly stated be fore a NAFTA panel reviewing the same sunset
determination of Argentine OCTG that “likel y” does not – and under the SAA cannot – mean
“probable.”19 Therefore, the Commission has admitted that it did not consider “likely” to mean
“probable,” and that the standard that it applied in this case is less than “probable.”

17 Id. at para. 111.
18 Usinor Remand Determination at 5, 6 (ARG-56 bis).
19 ITC Brief, Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico, Results of Five-Year Review (8 Feb. 2002) at 43
(excerpt included as Exhibit ARG-67).

 In addition, as Argentina has consiste ntly argued throughout these proceedings,
20 the record
of the sunset review demonstrates that the Commi ssion did not apply the correct likely standard. The
Commission based its conclusion that termination of the orders would be likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of injury on its findings with respect to the likely volume, price effects, and impact of
the subject imports. 21 With respect to each of these fact ors, however, the Commission based its
findings on speculation and conjecture, rather than on positive evidence that certain outcomes would
be likely (i.e., probable or more likely than not). Specifically:

 Volume: Despite positive evidence that showed that the likely volume of subject imports
orders would not be significant upon termination of the orders, the Commission concluded
that subject producers had “incentives” to devote more of their output to the US market and
thus the likely volume would be significant.
22 Each of the alleged incentives, however, was
based on evidence of possibility, rather than on positive evidence of likelihood.23

 Price: In paraphrasing the basis for the Commission’s finding on price effects, the United
States stated that “evidence from the original investigation strongly supports a finding that
imports can drive down domestic prices even during a period of strong demand” and that this
means therefore that “imports would drive down or suppress the price of the domestic like
product if the orders were revoked.” 24 This statement demonstrates the significance attached
to the analysis in the original investigation, rather than positive evid ence developed in the
sunset review to support a “likely” injury determination. In fact, the Commission admitted in
its decision that it had little record evidence upon which to draw conclusions regarding the
likely price effect.25 Yet the Commission, summarizing its decision on price effects, stated:

Given the likely volume of subj ect imports, the high level of
substitutability between the subject imports and domestic like
product, the importance of price in purchasing decisions, the volatile
nature of US demand, and the underselling by the subject imports in
the original investigations and during the current review period, we
find that in the absence of the orders, casing and tubing from
Argentina, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Mexico likely would compete on
the basis of price in order to gain additional market share. We find
that such price-based competition by subject imports likely would
have significant depressing or suppressing effects on the prices of the
domestic like product.
26

Impact: The Commission found that the domestic industry’s condition had
“improved” and that it was not “currently vulnerable.”27 Yet despite these findings of
a healthy domestic industry, the Commission concluded that the subject imports
would likely have a significant adverse impact on the domestic industry. As support
for this conclusion, the Commission once again referred to its findings from the

20 See Argentina’s First Submission, paras. 231-232, 243-254; Argentina’s First Oral Statement, paras.
116-126; Argentina’s Second Submission, paras. 169-178; Argentina’s Second Oral Statement, paras. 79-89.
21 Commission’s Sunset Determination at 17-23 (ARG-54).
22 See id. at 19.
23 See Argentina’s First Submission, paras. 244-246; Argentina’s First Oral Statement, paras. 116-125;
Argentina’s Second Submission, paras. 169-171; Argentina’s Second Oral Statement, paras. 179-83.
24 US First Submission, para. 339 (emphasis added).
25 Commission’s Sunset Determination at 21 (ARG-54)(“While direct selling comparisons are limited
because the subject producers had a limited presence in the US market during the period of review, the few
direct comparisons that can be made indicate that subject casing and tubing generally undersold the domestic
like product especially in 1999 and 2000.”).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 22.

original investigation: “in the original investigations, subject imports captured market
share and caused price effects despite a significant increase in apparent consumption
in 1993 and 1994 as compared to 1992.” 28 Thus, the Commission determined on the
basis of possibility (in this case, demonstrat ed by events seven years earlier) that an
outcome would be “likely.” Such reasoning further shows that the Commission did
not apply the “likely” standard required by Article 11.3 in this case.
In sum: (1) the Commission has expressly admitted that it did not in fact interpret
likely to mean probable in this very case , and (2) the Commission’s specific findings
demonstrate that it did not apply the “likely” standard of Article 11.3 in the sunset
review of OCTG from Argentina.
18. The Panel notes Argentina's allegations in paragraphs 183 and 185 of its second written
submission that in the OCTG sunset review the Commission failed to carry out the causal link
analysis required under Article 3.5 of the Agreemen t. Please clarify the basis of this claim.
More specifically, please indicate whether ther e were some potential factors, other than likely
dumped imports, that could have contributed to the likely injury and were not evaluated by the
Commission in its sunset determinations.

Response:

 Argentina firmly believes, and reiterates, its view that the “causal link” requirement of
Article 3.5 applies to all injury determinations, including the injury determination in Article 11.3
reviews. The notion that a causal link is requir ed between the dumped imports or between dumping
and injury is present in Article VI of the GATT 94 , and has been a constant feature of the regulation
of dumping at the international level thr ough the Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Round Anti-
Dumping Agreements. There is no textual support for the view that the causation requirement was
removed from the injury analysis required by Article 11.3. To the contrary, the statement in
footnote 9 that injury “shall be interpreted in accord ance with the provisions of this Article” can only
be interpreted to mean that the basic requiremen t of a causal link between “likely” dumping and
“likely” injury must be shown in all
 injury determinations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
including those in Article 11 reviews.

 With respect to the Panel’s specific question, Argentina points out that its argument with
respect to Article 3.5 was contained not only in pa ragraphs 183 and 185, but also 184. Paragraph 184
reiterates the basic proposition first explained in Section VIII.B.4 (beginning on page 82) of
Argentina’s First Written Submission. As explained in both briefs, and consistent with the Appellate
Body’s approach in Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan ,29 Argentina’s position with respect to Article 3.5 is
that: (1) the Commission was required to demonstrate a causal link between the likely dumping and
the likely injury; and (2) that the Commission failed to analyze and distinguish the likely effects of
other factors that could have contributed to any likely injury. Much of this occurs in the context in
which the Commission found that the US industry was not currently vulnerable to injury, 30 and that
other factors have a direct impact on the condition of the industry, 31 especially the demand for oil and
drilling activities. Also, the Commission noted that non-subject imports had captured market share
from the domestic industry,32 and never explained how it distinguished the likely impact of these non-
subject imports from the likely impact of the subject imports. Therefore, as explained in Argentina’s

28 Id. at 22 (emphasis added); see also US First Submission at para. 342 (“The ITC noted that in the
original investigation, a significant increase in demand had not precluded subject imports from gaining market
share and having adverse price effects.”).
29 Appellate Body Report, Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan, paras. 222-223.
30 Commission’s Sunset Determination at 22 (ARG-54).
31 See id. at 14-16, II-9, II-10, and II-13.
32 See id. at 22.

previous submissions,
33 while mentioning other factors, the Commission did not separate their likely
effects from the potentially injurious effect of the likely subject imports.

33 See Argentina’s First Submission at paras. 267-269; Argentina’s Second Submission, paras. 182-185.

ANNEX E-9

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS
OF THE PANEL – SECOND MEETING

13 February 2004

Q3. The Panel notes the US response to Questions 2(a) and 3 from the Panel and the US
statements in paragraph 21 of its second written submission. Does the US law require an
individual likelihood determination only in resp ect of respondent interested parties that waive
their right to participate in a sunset review?

1. Yes.

Q4. The Panel notes the following statement in the response of the United States to
Question 3 from the Panel:

In other words, one company’s failure to submit a complete substantive response results in a
finding of likelihood with respect to that company, and not on an order-wide basis; Commerce
could still, in light of other submissions and facts on the record, conclude that there is no order-
wide likelihood of dumping.

 (a) Please explain whether this scenario has ever happened. In other words, has
there ever been a sunset review in which although the DOC had made a positive
likelihood determination with respect to certain individual exporter(s) who had
waived their right to participate, and later on in the final order-wide likelihood
determination the DOC found no likelihood for the country as a whole, including
the exporter(s) for which it had already found likelihood?

2. No. This scenario has never occurred.

 (b) If, as the United States argues, the individual likelihood determination for
exporters that waive their right to participate does not affect the final
order-wide basis likelihood determinatio n, then why is it that the US law
requires that individual determinations be made for exporters who waive their
right to participate?

3. The United States has not argued that a waiver "does not affect" the final order-wide
likelihood determination. While the individual af firmative likelihood determinations may affect the
order-wide likelihood determination, they do not determine, in and of themselves, the ultimate
outcome of the order-wide analysis. Commerce considers all the information on the administrative
record, including prior agency determinations and the information submitted by the interested parties
or collected by Commerce, as well as any indivi dual affirmative likelihood determinations, when
making the order-wide likelihood determination.

 (c) In the OCTG sunset review, did the application of the waiver provisions to
Argentine exporters other than Siderca affect/determine the final outcome of the
sunset review with respect to Argentina? Please respond in light of the fact that
Siderca's share in the total imports of the subject product in the five-year period
of application of the order at issue was zero.

4. The application of the waiver provisions did not determine the final outcome of the sunset
review with respect to Argentina. Commerce’s final affirmative likelihood determination in the
sunset review of OCTG from Argentina was based on the existence of dumping and depressed import
volumes over the life of the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina. See Decision
Memorandum at 4-5.

Q5. The Panel notes the US response to Question 4(c) from the Panel. On the basis of the
scenario referred to in the mentioned Question, please respond to the following:

 (a) Would Section 1675(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 require that the DOC find
likelihood with respect to the exporters that submit an incomplete response to
the notice of initiation? If your respon se is in the negative, please explain the
reasons thereof on the basis of the relevant provisions of the US law.

5. Section 1675(c)(3)(B) of the Act requires that where Commerce has an inadequate response
from the respondent interested parties to the no tice of initiation (order-wide response), then
Commerce may issue the final sunset determinati on on the basis of the facts available. (Section
1675(c)(4)(B) requires a finding of likelihood with respect to a party that has affirmatively waived
participation.) Section 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations defines "the facts available" in a sunset
review as the prior agency dete rminations and any information submitted by the interested parties
during the sunset review. Neither Section 1675(c)(3) nor section 1675(c)(4) of the Act addresses the
issue of the "completeness" of a particular expo rter’s substantive respon se, but rather section
1675(c)(3) focuses on the response from the respondent interested parties, in the aggregate, to the
notice of initiation.

 (b) If your response to the question in (a) is in the affirmative, i.e. if the Statute
would require a finding of likelihood with respect to the exporters that waive
their right to participate in the mentioned sunset review, please explain whether
in such a sunset review the DOC would nevertheless carry out an expedited
sunset review to make an order-wide likelihood determination even though the
DOC would have already found likelihood with respect to all exporters. If so, on
what factual basis would the DOC base its order-wide determination?

6. Section 1675(c)(3)(B) of the Act requires that where Commerce has an inadequate response
from the respondent interested parties to the no tice of initiation (order-wide response), then
Commerce may issue the final sunset determination on the basis of the facts available. Where the
order-wide response is inadequate – which is not necessarily a function of the application of waiver
provisions – Commerce would conduct an expe dited review and "normally" base the final
determination on "the facts available" in accord ance with sections 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) and
351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations . Section 351.308(f) provides that "the facts available" include
prior agency determinations and any information submitted by the interested parties. Thus,
Commerce would base the final sunset determination in this scenario on all the information on the
administrative record, whether submitted by the inte rested parties or collected by Commerce, and
prior agency determinations. It should be noted that the substant ive text of sections
351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) and 351.308(f) of the Sunset Regulations are prefaced with the word
"normally" and provide Commerce with the discre tion to deviate from requirements of these
regulatory provisions where circumstances in a particular case warrant.

Q6. The Panel notes the US statement in paragraph 24 of its second written submission and
the US response to Question 2(e) from the Pane l. If the DOC does no t consider the information
submitted in an incomplete substantive response submitted by an export er for purposes of the
individual likelihood determination for that partic ular exporter, then for what purpose does the
DOC take that information into account in the final order-wide determination?

7. Commerce considers all the information on the administrative record in making the
order-wide likelihood determination in a sunset review, including information contained in an
incomplete substantive response, but the relevance of the information submitted in an incomplete
substantive response to the order-wide likelihoo d determination would depend on the nature of the
information. For example, a respondent interested party might offer information and argument to
explain depressed import volumes. Even if that party’s response were incomplete, Commerce would
take that information and argument into account in making the order-wide determination.

Q7. The Panel notes the following statement in the US response to Question 2(d) from the
Panel:

The differences between a full and an expedited s unset review are timing (the final sunset
determination in an expedited su nset review is issued 120 days after the notice of initiation,
rather than the full sunset review’s 240 days) and the fact that case briefs are not filed
 in an
expedited case. Because as a rule hearings are ti ed to the contents of the case briefs, hearings
are generally not held in an expedited proceeding. It should be noted that the deadline for the
submission of factual information is the same for both an expedited and a full sunset review
proceeding and normally is no later than the deadline for the submission of the interested party
rebuttal briefs. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added)

 (a) Please explain the role of case briefs in full sunset reviews under the US law.
What is their content? At what stage during the full sunset review are they
submitted to the DOC?

8. As the United States noted in its first written submission, full sunset reviews may afford
parties expanded opportunities to submit evidence and argument.
1 Case briefs provide such an
opportunity. They normally contain a recitation of th e issues parties consider to be relevant to the
determinations Commerce must make in a sunset review and the parties’ arguments concerning those
issues. The case briefs provide the parties an a dditional opportunity to convince the administering
authority of the correctness of their position on part icular issues of import. Rebuttal briefs are the
parties’ responses to the arguments raised in the case briefs submitted by the other parties
participating in the sunset review. Case briefs normally are due on day 160 (50 days after the
preliminary sunset determination); rebuttal briefs normally are due on day 165 (5 days after the filing
of case briefs). See sections 351.309(c)(1)( i) and 351.309(d)(1) of the Sunset Regulations
respectively. Extensions of these deadlines may be requested pursuant to section 351.302(b) of
Commerce’s Regulations.

 (b) Please explain whether the re are any differences between full
 and expedited
sunset reviews under the US law as to whether the following rights provided for
in the Agreement can be used by exporters:

 (i) The right to see the evidence submitted by other interested parties, as
 provided under Article 6.1.2 of the Agreement,

 (ii) The right to see the full text of the application, as provided under Article
 6.1.3 of the Agreement,

 (iii) The right to submit information or ally, as provided in Article 6.2 of the
 Agreement.

9. There are no differences between a full and an expedited sunset review with respect to the
obligations contained in the cited obligations from Article 6 of the AD Agreemen t. Interested parties

1 First Written Submission of the United States, para. 162.

are required to serve all submissions on the other in terested parties in a sunset review, whether full or
expedited. See section 351.303(f) of Commerce’s Regulations. All documents submitted to or
produced by the administering authority form the ad ministrative record in any sunset review and are
available in the public reading room in the Centra l Record Unit located at the US Department of
Commerce. See sections 351.103 and 351.104 of Commerce’s Regulations. In addition, meetings
with the decision-maker in a sunset review, as well as other Commerce officials, can be requested and
are routinely held, but if factual material is presented, the factual material also must be submitted in
writing in accordance with section 351.309 of Commerce’s Regulations. This requirement is in
keeping with the obligation of Article 6.3 that oral information be reduced to writing prior to
consideration by the authorities.

10. With respect to Article 6.1.3, the United Stat es notes that under US law, sunset reviews are
automatically initiated by the administering authority, not in response to the fili ng of an application.
(The notice of initiation is published in the Federal Register and is therefore publicly available.)

Q8. Under the US law, in a sunset review in which some of the exporters have waived their
right to participate (be it an affirmative or a de emed waiver), does the order-wide analysis to be
carried out for the country as a whole entail any el ements in addition to what is being examined
in the context of company-specific determinatio ns regarding the exporters that have waived
their right to participate in the sunset review? Put differently, does the order-wide analysis
entail any analysis that would not have been ca rried out at the company-specific level regarding
the exporters that have waived their right to participate in the sunset review?

11. As noted in response to Question 5, the exis tence of waivers does not automatically result in
an expedited review. Commerce normally consid ers the existence of dumping and the depressed
import volumes to be highly probative evidence that dumping will likely continue or recur if the
discipline of an order were removed. However, these factors are not necessarily company-specific.
Therefore, any information on the record rebutting the probative value of these factors – e.g., reasons
other than the anti-dumping order explaining why im port volumes were depressed, or conditions in
the country as a whole that explain why dumping is not likely to continue or recur – will be
considered. In this regard, all the information on the administrative record of the sunset review
including the information and arguments submitted by the interested parties and information collected
by Commerce, as well as prior agency determinat ions, is considered in making the final sunset
determination. For example, in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce addressed
Siderca’s comment concerning the applicability of the de minimis standard found in Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement in sunset reviews. See Decision Memorandum at 3-4.

Q9. The Panel notes the US statement that the decision concerning the incompleteness of an
exporter's substantive response to the notice of in itiation is made on a case-by-case basis by the
DOC and that the DOC may consider an incomplete substantive response to be complete if the
party submitting that response provides explanat ion as to why it was unable to provide that
information
2 In this respect, the United States referred to section 351.218(d)(3) of the DOC's
Regulations and to the preamble of the Regulations 3 However, the Panel notes that the cited
portions of the Regulations deal with the DOC's adequacy determinations rather than waivers.
Please clarify whether the cited provisions of th e Regulations have any effect on the application
of the waiver provisions of the US law to export ers that submit an incomplete response to the
notice of initiation in sunset reviews.

12. A foreign interested party is required to file a substantive response that contains all of the
information required by sections 351.218(d)(3)(ii) and (iii) of the Sunset Regulations. If a foreign
interested party fails to provide all the inform ation required by sections 351.218(d)(3)(ii) and

2 Response of the United States to Question 8 from the Panel and footnote 33 thereto.
3 Footnote 33 to the Response of the United States to Question 8 from the Panel.

(d)(3)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations , Commerce normally will find that substantive response to be
"incomplete." If the substantive response is in complete, then the foreign interested party who
submitted the incomplete substantive response is deemed to have waived its right to participate in the
sunset review pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations.

13. Notwithstanding the above, Commerce may find a substantive response which does not
contain all the information required by sec tions 351.218(d)(3)(iii) and (d)(3)(iii) of the Sunset
Regulations to be "complete," despite the missing information, when the foreign interested party
provides a reasonable explanation why it is unable to report the information. See Preamble, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 13518. If Commerce found that the subs tantive response was "complete" despite missing
information, the foreign interested party submitting this substantive response would not be deemed to
have waived its right to participat e in the sunset review. Although the cited section of the Preamble
specifically references s ection 351.218(d)(3) of the Sunset Regulations, the text discusses both the
determination concerning the "completeness" of a substantive response (reporting requirements of
section 351.218(d)(3)) and the determination concerning the "adequacy" of the over-all response to
the notice of initiation (section 351.218(d)).

Q10. Please explain whether anyone of the Argentine exporters subject to the OCTG sunset
review other than Siderca affirmatively waived their right to participate, or whether they were
deemed as having waived their right to participate in the OCTG sunset review. If there was a
deemed waiver, please specify the grounds thereof.

14. No Argentine producer or exporter of OCTG affirmatively waived its right to participate in
the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina. Comm erce determined that there were exports of OCTG
during the five-year period preceding the sunset revi ew based on the import statistics provided by the
domestic interested parties and verified by the Ce nsus Bureau’s IM-145 import statistics and the ITC
Trade Database. These non-responding respondents were deemed to have waived their rights to
participate due to their failure to respond to the notice of initiation of the sunset review. See
section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations.

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF
DUMPING

Q13. The Panel notes the following statement in the DOC's Issues and Decision Memorandum
in the OCTG sunset review:

Because 1.27 per cent
 is above the 0.5 per cent de minimis standard applied in sunset reviews,
we find that dumping has continued over the life of the Argentine order and is likely to continue
if the order were revoked4 (underline emphasis added)

Please explain whether the 1.27 per cent indi cated in the memorandum is a typo and should
therefore be read as 1.36 per cent. If not, please explain what this margin means.

15. The 1.27 per cent in the Decision Memorandum is a typographical error. The correct number
is 1.36 per cent. See Final Determination, 65 Fed. Reg. at 66703; and Decision Memorandum at 1
and 3.

4 Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exhibit ARG-51 at 5).

Q14. The Panel notes the statistics provided by Argentina in Exhibits ARG-63 and ARG-64
regarding the alleged consistent application of th e provisions of sections II.A.3 and II.A.4 of the
Sunset Policy Bulletin by the DOC. The Panel also note s the US statements in paragraphs
183-186 of its first written submission regarding these statistics.

 (a) Please explain whether in your view the statistics provided by Argentina are
factually correct or not. Please limit your response in this respect to whether or
not the information submitted by Argentin a in these two exhibits is flawed or
not. If in your view these statistics are not factually correct, please explain in
detail the reasons thereof.

16. The United States has not examined each and every sunset review cited by Argentina in
Exhibit ARG-63 and Exhibit ARG-64. To the exte nt that the United States has addressed these
exhibits in its written submissions, th e United States has no reason to believe that the overall total of
sunset reviews conducted and the ultimate outcomes in those sunset reviews as alleged by Argentina
is significantly flawed.

 (b) Please explain your views as to whether these statistics can be used by the Panel
in inquiring whether the DOC perceives the provisions of the cited sections of
the Sunset Policy Bulletin as determinative/conclusive for purposes of its sunset
determinations.

17. These statistics have no bearing on whether the cited sections of the Sunset Policy Bulletin are
determinative/conclusive for purposes of sunset determinations. That question can be answered solely
on the basis of the status of the Sunset Policy Bulletin under US law, since Commerce must follow the
requirements of US law, and not artificial and non-existent "presumptions" implied by Argentina from
statistics. The status of the Sunset Policy Bulletin is clear and unequivocal. It is simply a
transparency tool published by Commerce to provide guidance to interested parties as to Commerce’s
current thinking on how it might exercise its discretion under US law when conducting sunset
reviews. The document has no independent legal status under US law and imposes no requirements
whatsoever on Commerce to actually follow the methodologies set forth in the Bulletin in a particular
sunset review, and Argentina has cited no provision of US law which suggests otherwise. The only
requirements concerning the conduct of sunset revi ews which Commerce must follow are set forth in
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.

18. Moreover, in offering these statistics, Argentina focuses only on the result, and not on the
legal and factual circumstances of each review which lead to that result. Again, Argentina can point
to nothing on the record of any of these sunset revi ews, or in US law generally, which indicates that
the Sunset Policy Bulletin required any result in any case. And Argentina ignores the particular
factual circumstances of these disputes which underpinned Commerce’s ultimate findings.

19. Finally, these statistics at best indicate a "r epeated pattern of similar responses to a set of
circumstances.
5 As the United States discussed in its First Written Submission, and as a WTO panel
has already found, such a pattern does not indicat e that a "Member becomes obligated to follow its
practice.6 Therefore, the statistics do not indicate whether the Sunset Policy Bulletin is, as a matter of
US law, determinative/conclusive as to how Commerce must act in a given review.

Q15. The Panel notes the US statements in para graphs 15 and 23 of its second oral submission
that neither the DOC nor the ITC relied on the original dumping margin in relation to their

5 United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India , WT/DS206/R,
Report of the Panel adopted 29 July 2002, para. 722.
6 Id. For full discussion, see First Written Submission of the United States at para. 198.

determinations the OCTG sunset review. The Panel also notes the following part of the DOC's
Issues and Decision Memorandum:

Therefore, consistent with the Sunset Policy Bulletin , the Department determines that the
margin calculated in the original investigation is probative of the behaviour of Siderca if the
order were revoked as it is the only rate that reflects the behaviour of Siderca without the
discipline of the order. As such, the Depart ment will report to the commission the rate of
1.36 per cent from the original investigation for Siderca and all other exporters from Argentina.

Consistent with section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin and the SAA at 890, we determine
that the rates from the original investigations are probative of the behaviour of producers and
exporters of OCTG from Argentina. There fore, we will report to the Commission the
company-specific and "all others" rates from the original investigations.
7

 (a) The Panel notes that in its responses to Questions 23 and 24 from the Panel
concerning the factual basis of the DOC's likelihood determination in the OCTG
sunset review, the United States submitted that the DOC's determination was
based on the existence of imports from Argentina and the continued collection of
the anti-dumping duty on the imports of the subject product from Argentina in
the five-year period of application of the subject order. Please explain how these
statements can be reconciled with the above-quoted text of the DOC's
Memorandum in as much as the DOC's alleged reliance on the original dumping
margin is concerned.

20. The above quoted passages refer to the "margin likely to prevail" reported by Commerce to
the ITC in the event the order were revoked. The "mar gin likely to prevail" is a construct of US law.
The "margin likely to prevail" is the best evidence of the potential pricing behaviour of exporters if
the order were revoked because it was the only ev idence on the administrative record of OCTG from
Argentina of the pricing behaviour of OCTG expo rters without the discipline of the anti-dumping
duty order in place. The "margin likely to prevail" is not used in any degree as a basis for the
determination whether it is likely dumping will continue or recur if the order were revoked. Rather,
Commerce first makes the likelihood determination, th en determines the "margin likely to prevail" in
the event of an affirmative order-wide likelihood determination. See SAA at 889 ("Likelihood of
Dumping") and 890 ("Provision to the Commission of Dumping Margins").

21. Section 752(c)(3) of the Act di rects that Commerce "shall provide
" to the ITC a "margin
likely to prevail" in the event of revocation. Section 752(a)(6) of the Act, however, provides that the
ITC "may consider " the "margin likely to prevail" in making the likelihood of injury determination,
but the statute leave the decision whether to use the "mar gin likely to prevail" in the injury analysis to
the ITC’ s discretion. See SAA at 890-91.

 (b) Please explain what meaning the Panel should give to the above-cited parts of
the Memorandum in light of the US statement that the DOC did not rely on the
original dumping margin in its sunset determination in this sunset review.

22. As discussed in the US answer to Panel Ques tion 15(a), the "margin likely to prevail" is a
construct of US law and is reporte d to the ITC as such. It is not used by Commerce in making the
likelihood determination. Inde ed, Commerce must first determine whether dumping is likely to
continue or recur before it is required to report the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to
prevail. The magnitude of dumping, however, whet her past, present, or future, has no bearing on
Commerce’s likelihood determination. The magnitu de of the dumping is immaterial because the

7 Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exhibit ARG-51 at 7-8).

obligations of Article 11.3 require a determinati on of the likelihood of dumping and not a calculation
of how much dumping is likely to continue or recur.

Q16. The Panel notes Argentina's allegations in Section III.C.3.b of its second written
submission and Exhibits ARG-52, ARG-63a and ARG-63b regarding the methodology by which
the DOC calculated the 1.36 per cent dumping margin in the original OCTG investigation.

23. As a preliminary matter, the United States notes that there are several procedural concerns
with Argentina’s Exhibits ARG-52, -66A, and -66B
8 As discussed at the second substantive panel
meeting, none of these exhibits are part of or based on the record compiled by the United States in
order to make its sunset determination. Pursuant to Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement, the basis of
this Panel’s examination of the matter before it is the "facts made available in conformity with
appropriate domestic proc edures to the authorities of the im porting Member." Because neither
Argentina nor Siderca placed this factual informati on on the record, these documents are not properly
before the Panel.

24. Furthermore, the United States notes that paragraph 14 of the working procedures for this
Panel provides that parties are to submit "all factua l information to the Panel no later than during the
first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttals or
answers to questions." Argentina did not submit Exhibits ARG-66A and -66B until its second written
submission, nor is it submitting these exhibits "for purposes of rebuttals or answers to questions."
Further pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Panel’s working procedures, Argentina has not shown that
there was any "good cause" to justify this belated su bmission and, because these exhibits are basic to
Argentina’s claims, Argentina cannot now seek to claim that these documents were prepared for
purposes of rebutting arguments presented by the Unit ed States. While the United States responds as
follows to the Panel’s questions re lated to these documents, the United States respectfully requests
that the Panel give effect to Article 17.5 of th e AD Agreement and paragraph 14 of the Panel’s
working procedures by not considering these documents.

 (a) Please explain on the basis of whic h methodology (e.g. weighted average to
weighted average, transaction to transaction or weighted average to transaction)
the DOC compared the normal value with the export price in this original
investigation.

25. First of all, taking into account Article 18.3 of the AD Agreement, it must be noted that the
record makes clear that the original investigation of OCTG from Argentina was initiated prior to the
effective date of the AD Agreement. Furthermore, although the record of the sunset review does not
specify the methodology that was used in the original investigation, the United States confirms that
the original investigation did not utilize the we ighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison
methodology examined in EC – Bed Linen . Specifically, the United States used a weighted-average-
to-transaction methodology in the original investigation of OCTG from Argentina.

 (b) Please comment on Argentina's allegations regarding the alleged use of the
so-called zeroing methodology in this or iginal investigation. In particular,
explain whether, as Argentina alleges, the DOC ignored export sales
transactions that were not dumped in the calculation of the 1.36 per cent original
dumping margin.

26. The record of the sunset review does not contain information responsive to this question.
Nevertheless, the United States confirms that th e 1.36 per cent margin was based on the results of
comparisons of all export transactions.

8 Based on the citation to Argentina’s second submission, the United States understands the reference
in the Panel’s question to indicate Exhibit ARG-66A and -66B, rather than ARG-63a and -63b.

 (c) Please explain whether the DOC reassesse d, in the context of the instant sunset
review, the conformity of the calculation methodology that had given rise to the
1.36 per cent dumping margin in the original OCTG investigation.

27. The United States did not reassess the calcul ation methodology and had no reason to reassess
the calculation methodology in this sunset review because the magnitude of the margin did not form
any part of Commerce’s final likelihood determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.
The record of the sunset review contained the final determination from the original investigation. The
record contained no information challenging or even questioning that final determination. The final
determination had not been previously challe nged and neither Argen tina nor Siderca placed
information on the record calling into question the final determination. Moreover, the information
necessary to reassess the final determination (Sider ca’s sales and cost information, the computerized
transaction information, Commerce’s verification fi ndings, any legal briefs submitted to Commerce,
and any other information which was pertinent to the final determination in the original investigation)
was not part of Commerce’s sunset review record. Consequently, there was no reason for an unbiased
and objective administering authority to "reassess" the 1.36 per cent margin from the original
investigation.

 (d) Please explain your views about Argentina's assertion that had zeroing not been
used in the calculation of the original dumping margin the result would have
been a negative dumping margin of 4.35 per cent.
9

28. Argentina’s assertion appears to be based on Argentina’s calculations, the output of which
was presented to the Panel in Exhibit ARG-66A. Not only was this exhibit not based on source
information contained in Commerce’s sunset review record, Argentina has failed to identify any of the
computer programming by which it manipulated Sider ca’s data to arrive at the output contained in
Exhibit ARG-66A.

29. Beyond these substantive and procedural de fects with Argentina’s assertion, Argentina’s
assertion is legally flawed. Not only does th e United States not concede that Exhibit ARG-66A
demonstrates that Siderca’s information could have supported the output contained in that exhibit, the
exhibit itself appears to be based on weighted-a verage-to-transaction comparisons, whereas the
Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen addressed only the weighted average-to-weighted-average
comparison methodology employed by the EC in that case, and explicitly found that, with respect to
that methodology only, there could be no "two stage" calculation. EC – Bed Linen, at para. 53. EC –
Bed Linen did not address any weighted-average-to-transaction methodologies, or any other
methodology in which a two-stage calculation would be both appropriate and necessary. Other than
citation to EC – Bed Linen and Japan Sunset, neither of which addressed the methodology used in the
original investigation of OCTG from Argentina, Ar gentina has failed to provide any factual or legal
basis for its claim that the methodology used in the original investigation was WTO-inconsistent.

OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF
INJURY

Q19. Would the United States agree, as a factua l matter, that the ITC did not consider some
of the injury factors set out in Article 3.4 of th e Agreement in its likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of injury determinations in the instant sunset review?

30. As the United States has noted, Article 3, and th us Article 3.4, do not apply in sunset reviews.
Nevertheless, the ITC considered all of the Article 3.4 injury factors. Data concerning each of the
injury factors is contained in the report that acc ompanies the views of the ITC Commissioners, as

9 See Second Written Submission of Argentina, para. 140.

detailed in the chart accompanying paragraph 347 of the United States’ first submission
10 This report
(consisting of four parts, and running from page I-1 to E-6) is prepared by the ITC staff for the
Commissioners and is made available to the parties before the Commissioners make their
determinations. The ITC Commissioners review and approve the report before making their
determinations and, thus, have considered all of the information in the report in reaching their
determinations, even though in their views they may identify only certain of the injury factors as
particularly relevant to their determinations. This approach is consistent with the text of Article 3.4
which states that the "list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give
decisive guidance."

Q20. The Panel notes the distinction the United States makes between a determination of
injury and a determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury.

 (a) Is the United States of the view that there is a fourth category of injury that
applies in the context of sunset reviews in addition to the three mentioned in
footnote 9 of the Agreement?

31. The United States is of the view that "the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of . . .
injury" is a fourth type of determination regarding injury, separate from the three other types named in
footnote 9. The three types of determinations in footnote 9 relate to a "determination of injury." A
sunset review does not involve such a determination; rather, it involves a determination of
continuation or recurrence of injury.

32. It is clear that "injury" cannot be defined in the same way in Article 11.3 as it is in footnote 9.
If it were, then the inquiry in a sunset review would become whether expiry of the duty would be
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to a domestic industry, threat of
material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an
industry. Article 11.3 does not contemplate determinations of a continuation or recurrence of threat or
material retardation as a basis for continuing to apply an anti-dumping duty after a sunset review.

 (b) Would the United States agree that in a sunset review involving recurrence, as
opposed to continuation, the investigating authority would have to satisfy itself
about the likely recurrence of injury in the same manner in which it would
determine injury in an investigation. Please elaborate.

33. No. A determination of injury in an investig ation is quite different than a determination as to
the likely recurrence of injury in a sunset review. They are, in the words of the Appellate Body
"distinct processes with different purposes.
11 The analysis and the factors relevant to the two types of
inquiry are not the same.

34. In an original anti-dumping investigation authorities examine the current condition of an
industry and the current effect of imports that are not subject to anti-dumping duties. This is true
whether the authorities are evaluating ma terial injury, threat of material injury, or material retardation
of the establishment of an industry.

35. In a sunset review, on the other hand, author ities examine the likely volume of imports in the
future that may have been restrained by an anti-dumping duty order and the likely impact in the future
of that volume on a domestic industry that has enjoyed the benefit of an anti-dumping order for the
past five years. There may not be any current imports; these imports might not be dumped; and the
domestic industry may or may not be currently injured or threatened w ith injury. In short, in a sunset

10 There is one correction that needs to be made to this chart. The location in the ITC report of
information on the margins of dumping is p. I-14, not p.V-1.
11 US – German Steel, para. 87.

review the investigating authority must engage in counterfactual analysis to determine whether a
prospective change in the status quo – i.e ., revocation of the order – would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of injury.

36. That said, the United States notes that ther e is no obligation under Article 11.3 for authorities
to specify whether it has determined that injury would be likely to recur, as opposed to or that injury
is likely to continue.

REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS

Q21. The Panel notes the US statement in par agraph 35 of its first oral statement that the
United States has never argued that Argentin a's panel request had failed to identify the
contested measures in its request for establishmen t. The Panel also notes the US assertion in
paragraph 90 of its first written submission and paragraph 37 of its second oral statement that
Argentina's description of the measure at issue in the context of its page four claims is also
vague. Please clarify whether the United States is also alleging that Argentina failed to identify
the measure at issue, in the context of its page four claims.

37. It has never been clear to the United States what purpose, if any, Page Four serves, but the
United States is not claiming that Argentina has failed to identify the measures at issue. Rather, the
reference to "certain aspects" of the challenged measures contributes to Argentina’s failure to "present
the problem clearly," a requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU. It is this that the United States is
challenging.

Q22. The Panel notes the following statement in paragraph 82 of the US first written
submission:

The United States, therefore, requests that the Panel accept Argentina’s proposed clarification
at face value and find that the claims falling within this category
 are not within the Panel’s
terms of reference due to Argentina’s failure to comply with Article 6.2 of the DSU. (emphasis
added)

What portions, if any, of the claims raised in Argentina's written submissions to the Panel find
their basis exclusively in page four of Argentin a's request for establishment? In other words,
which claims, if any, that Argentina has raised during these panel proceedings have to be found
by the Panel to be outside its terms of reference be cause of the alleged ambiguity of page four of
Argentina's panel request?

38. The claims identified in Sections A a nd B of the Panel Request are limited to:

 As such claims:

- 19 USC. 1675(c)(4), in violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, 11.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4,
6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, .69, 6.10, 12.2, 12.3, and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;12
- 19 C.F.R. 351.218(e), in violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, 11.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4,
6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 12.2, 12.3, and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;13
- 19 USC. 1675a(a)(1), in violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, and 3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;14

12 Section A.1.
13 Section A.1.
14 Section B.3.

- 19 USC. 1675a(a)(5), in violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, and 3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;
15

 As applied claims 16

- the Department of Commerce’s alleged application of waiver provisions to
Siderca in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, in violation of
Articles 11.1, 11.3, 11.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, .69, 6.10, 12.2, 12.3,
and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;17
- the Department of Commerce ’s allege d failure to conduct a review, in
violation of Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;18
- the Department of Commerce ’s alleged failure to make a "determination" in
violation of Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;19
- the Department of Commerce ’s Determination to Expedite based on the
50 per cent threshold;20
- the allegedly "virtually irrefutable pres umption" of likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping, in violatio n of Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994;21
- the Department of Commerce ’s a lleged application of a zeroing
methodology, in violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;22
- the International Trade Commission’s application of the "likely" standard, in
violation of Articles 11.1, 11.3, 11.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 6 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;23
- the International Trade Commission’s alleged failure to conduct an objective
examination of the record and to base its determination on "positive evidence,
"with respect to the volume of imports, price effects on domestic like
products, and impact of imports of the domestic industry, in violation of
Articles 11.1, 11.3, 11.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;
24
- the International Trade Commission’s us e of cumulation, in violation of
Articles 11.1, 11.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.25

37. Argentina’s written submissions, however, incl ude claims beyond those listed in Sections A
and B of the Panel Request. Moreover, Argentina has not argued that these additional claims are
based on the listing of measures on Page Four (and indeed the lack of description of measures on Page
Four certainly would make any such argument diffic ult to ascertain). Thes e additional claims – not
properly before the Panel because they are not within the Panel’s terms of reference as established by
Argentina’s panel request – are found in Argentina’s submissions as follows:

15 Section B.3
16 By "as applied," the United States means "as applied" in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.
17 Section A.2
18 Section A.2
19 Section B.2
20 Section A.3
21 Section A.4
22 Section A.5
23 Section B.1
24 Section B.2
25 Section B.4

First Written Submission:

- Section VII.A: This section makes claims regarding the waiver provisions
under Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the regulations (deemed waivers).
Section A of Argentina’s Panel Request refers only to Section 351.218(e) of
the regulations (adequacy of response to notice of initiation);26
- Section VII.B.2: This section makes claims regarding 19 USC. 1675(c) and
1675a(c), the SAA, and the Sunset Policy Bulletin . Section A of the Panel
Request refers to 19 USC. 1675(c)(4) only and does not refer to the other
provisions of 19 USC. 1675(c), 19 USC. 1675a(c), the SAA, or the Sunset
Policy Bulletin. The only basis for a claim under these provisions would be
their listing on Page Four;
- Section VII.E.1: This section makes a claim regarding US administration of
its laws, regulations, decisions, and ruling s with respect to sunset reviews in
violation of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. However, Section A.4 of the
Panel Request only challenges the sunset determination of OCTG from
Argentina in this regard, not all US laws, regulations, decisions, and rulings
with respect to all sunset reviews.
27 The United States does not find a basis
for this claim even in Page Four;
- Section VIII.C.2: This section make s a claim regarding the International
Trade Commission’s application of 19 USC. 1675a(a)(1) and (5) in the
Sunset Review of OCTG from Argentina. However, Section B.3 of the panel
request makes no reference to the sunset review from Argentina; instead, it
challenges the statute "as such." The only basis for an "as applied" claim,
therefore, would be the bl anket reference on Page Four to the ITC ’s "Sunset
Determination;"
- Section IX: This Section on its face addresses measures that are only listed on
Page Four (Article VI of the GA TT 1994; Articles 1 and 18 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement; and Article XVI :4 of the WTO Agreement). The
only basis for these claims would be Page Four;
- Section X: The Conclusion states that "US Sunset Review, Statutory,
Regulatory, and Administrative Provisions As Such Violate the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and the WTO Agreement." However, as noted above,
the only measures identified in Sections A and B of the Panel Request are 19
USC. Section 1675(c)(4), 19 C.F.R. Section 351.218(e), Section 1675a(a)(1),
and 19 USC. 1675a(a)(5). The only basis for claims regarding any other
measures would be the list of measures on Page Four.

 Second Written Submission:

- Section III.A: As in its First Submission, Argentina makes a claim regarding
19 C.F.R. Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) (deemed waiver). Section A of the
Panel Request only refers to Section 351.218(e);28

26 The United States has stated that the extension of Argentina’s claim to Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) did
not result in sufficient prejudice to warrant an objection because Argentina in its "brief description" under
Section A.1 at least indicated that it intended to challenge the waiver provisions. See US First Written
Submission, n.103.
27 It should further be noted that Argentina has argued that use of the phrase "as such" in Section A.4
of the Panel Request makes the entire claim an "as such" claim. However, the language of the claim indicates
that it is only the Sunset Determination in this case that is being challenged, and the underlying law and other
sunset determinations are merely evidence in support of the "as applied" claim.
28 See n. 26 above.

- Section III.B: This Section makes a claim regarding 19 USC. Section
1675a(c)(1), the Statement of Administrative Action, and the Sunset Policy
Bulletin and argues that US law as such re sult in an irrefutable presumption
of likelihood. Yet Section A.4 of Argentina’s Panel Request only makes a
claim that the irrefutable presumption as applied in this sunset determination.
The only basis for an "as such" claim regarding the statute, the Statement of
Administrative Action, and the Sunset Policy Bulletin would be Page Four;
- Section III.D.2: Argentina makes a clai m regarding the ITC’s application of
the statutory provisions regarding time frame. Yet the Panel Request only
contains an "as such" claim. The only basis for an "as applied" claim would
be the blanket reference to the ITC’s "Sunset Determination" on Page Four;
- Section V: This Section makes claims regarding "consequential" violations,
and, as discussed above, these Artic les (Article VI of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Articles 1 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement) are only found on Page Four.

ANNEX E-10

ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS FROM
ARGENTINA – SECOND MEETING

13 February 2004

Volume of imports

Q1. There are discrepancies in precise import volumes. Argentina submitted Chart 4 to its
second oral statement to represent the Department’s determinations in the four concluded
annual reviews regarding the import volume. This chart shows that the Department had
confirmed at least 154 MT of imports over the p eriod. Argentina also takes the point from the
Appellate Body that the authority cannot draw any presumption from the sole fact that there
was a decline in import volume after the impositi on of the order. The Appellate Body stated:
“[A] case-specific analysis of the factors behind a cessation of imports or a decline in import
volumes (when dumping is eliminated) will be ne cessary to determine that dumping will recur if
the duty is terminated.” (para. 177) With th is background, did the United States undertake a
case-specific analysis of the factors behind the d ecline in import volumes in this case? If so,
please provide a detailed explanation of that analysis.

1. Notwithstanding Argentina’s selective recitation of portions of the AB report in Japan Sunset
and the misrepresentations contai ned in Chart 4, Commerce confirme d the import statistics using two
different sources, the Census Bureau IM-145 impo rt statistics and the ITC Trade Database. No
respondent interested party, including Siderca, commented on Commerce’s use of these import
statistics during the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina despite being given the opportunity to do
so.

Substantive Basis for the Department’s Likelihood Determination

Q2. In its 3 February opening statement (para. 11), the United States confirmed that the
Department’s likelihood of dump ing determination was based on the existence of entries that
established a decline in volume and that dumping continued during period of the order. The
Appellate Body said that procedures or “p rovisions” that create “presumptions” or
“predetermine” a particular result “run the risk of being found inconsistent with this type of
obligation.” (Japan Sunset, para. 178)

 (a) Did the Department presume from th e payment of duties that dumping (as
defined by Article 2) had continued during the period of the order?

2. The United States uses a retrospective system and does not calculate a margin of dumping
unless it conducts an administrative review. Where there is no such administrative review, the United
States assesses dumping duty liability at the cash deposit rate in effect for particular subject
merchandise at the time of entry. In this case, th e deposit rate for OCTG from Argentina at the time
of entry for all the periods prior to the sunset review was 1.36 per cent because no annual reviews
were completed. The United States believes that the existence of dumping and a reduction in the
volume of imports since the imposition of a duty is probative of the likelihood of the continuation or
recurrence of dumping. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, neither Siderca nor any other
respondent interested party submitted evidence contrary to this probative evidence.

 (b) Does the United States consider that this constitutes positive evidence that
dumping (as defined by Article 2) would be likely to continue or recur in the
event of revocation?

3. The United States believes that the existenc e of dumping and a reduction in the volume of
imports since the imposition of a duty is probative of the likelihood of the continuation or recurrence
of dumping. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, neither Siderca nor any other respondent
interested party submitted evidence contrary to this probative evidence.

 (c) Would the United States agree that in some cases there may be circumstances
where it would be commercially unreasonable to undertake an administrative
review to obtain a small refund of deposits?

4. A finding that it would be commercially reason able to request an administrative review in a
particular case would depend on the factual circumst ances established in that case. The scenario
posited by Argentina is not relevant to the present dispute because it supposes facts not in evidence in
this case.

Q3. The United States has modified its position with regard to its basis for determining that
dumping continued throughout the order. In the Issues and Decisions Memorandum the
Department stated: “the Department finds the existence of dumping margins after the issuance
of the orders is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.” In
its First Submission (para. 54) and its Second Submission (paras. 56), the United States
indicated (consistent with the US statute) that it considered “dumping margins.” In the second
substantive meeting, the United States indicated that the basis for the Department’s finding that
dumping continued was based on the collection of anti-dumping duties. Is there a distinction
between the existence of a dumping margin – wh ether from the original investigation or a
review – and the payment of a duties at the deposit rate?

5. The United States has not modified its positi on with regard to Commerce’s finding that
dumping continued throughout the like of the dumping order on OCTG from Argentina. There is no
difference between the existence of a dumping margin and the payment of duties at the deposit rate
for the purposes of determining whether dumping has continued throughout the life of an order in a
sunset review.

Q4. Please, compare paragraph 54 of the US Fi rst Submission with paragraph 23 of the US
Opening Statement of February 3 and explain the contradiction.

6. There is no contradiction between these tw o statements. Commerce did not rely on the
magnitude of the margin, but rather on the existe nce of dumping and the depressed import volumes
throughout the life of the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina.

Waiver

Q5. What is the information on the record in the sunset review regarding the non-
respondent respondents?

7. The import statistics, verified by the Commer ce’s Census Bureau IM-145 import statistics and
the ITC Trade Database, confirmed the existence of one or more non-responding respondents. These
interested parties failed to respond to the notice of initiation of the sunset review for OCTG from
Argentina.

Q6. Is the likelihood of dumping determination for the non-responding respondents based
solely on their non-participation?

8. The facts in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina establish that there were imports of
Argentina OCTG during the five year period preceding the sunset review and that Siderca did not
export OCTG during this period. This means that there were one or more exporters of Argentine
OCTG who failed to respond to the notice of initiation of the sunset review. Therefore, based on the
evidence of Argentine OCTG imports and the failure of certain Argentine exporters to respond,
Commerce found that there was a likelihood of contin uation or recurrence of dumping with respect to
these non-responding respondents.

Q7. During the second substantive meeting, th e United States indicated that there was
nothing on the record to contradict Siderca’s statement that Siderca was the only Argentine
producer
 of OCTG. Nonetheless, the United States indicated that the imports statistics showed
that there were other exporters of Argentine OCTG, which m ay have been produced by
Siderca.

 (a) How does the Department reconcile these statements with its findings in the
Issues and Decision Memorandum (at page 5) that “there have been above de
minimis margins for the investigated companies throughout the history of the
orders”?

9. There were no administrative reviews of OC TG from Argentina, so the dumping margin
calculated for Siderca in the orig inal investigation con tinued to apply and continues to apply to
Siderca. In addition, the "all others" rate (1.3 6 per cent), also calculated during the original
investigation, was applied to all imports of Ar gentine OCTG during the period preceding the sunset
review.

 (b) Does the United States agree that the on ly “investigated compan[y]” in this case
was Siderca?

10. Siderca was the only company investigation in the original investigation of OCTG from
Argentina.

 (c) Could the United States explain how im ports into the United States of Siderca-
produced OCTG, which exports were made by other exporters of potentially
different nationalities, is probative of th e issue of whether dumping is likely to
continue or recur?

11. Siderca ceased shipping OCTG almost immediat ely after the imposition of the order, which is
probative evidence that Siderca could not sell OCTG in the United States absent dumping. Siderca
had the opportunity to explain why this factual situ ation was not probative in the sunset review, but
failed to do so. Also, there were imports of OC TG from Argentina during the life of the order for
which dumping duties were paid. The domestic interested parties placed evidence of these imports on
the administrative record of the sunset review and Commerce verified the statistics. Siderca’s only
statement in this regard made during the sunset review was that it had not exported OCTG to the
United States. It did not allege that these exports came from anywhere other than Argentina or that
these exports were or were not produced by Siderca. Therefore, based on the evidence of Argentine
OCTG imports and the failure of the Argentine expor ters to respond, Commerce found that there was
a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping with respect to these non-responding
respondents.

Q8. During the second substantive meeting, the United States indicated that it typically
notifies the parties on the interested party list of the proceedings. Can the United States provide

a copy of the notice in this case and explain who the interested parties are, to the extent that
they are not obvious from the interested party list?

12. Commerce created a web-site for sunset reviews that contains each anti-dumping and
countervailing duty order. Each order has an interested party list appended which lists every
interested party who has participated in an admi nistrative proceeding covering the respective order
since the imposition of the order. This list is updated with each subsequent proceeding, including
administrative reviews. Therefore, the interested party list for the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG
from Argentina will necessarily be longer at present than it would have been at the time the sunset
review was conducted, because administrative review s have been conducted since the sunset review.
The list as it currently stands can be found at the Department of Commerce website, www.doc.gov.

Q9. The Department’s Issues and Decisions Memorandum , the US First Submission, and US
responses to questions indicate that the Department determined that the Argentine non-
responding respondents were deemed to have waived participation. The Department also
confirmed that Siderca did not ship during th e relevant period. The Department confirmed
that the waiver of the non-responding respo ndents meant that they would be likely to dump
(response to question 2(a))? Based on the Depart ment’s determined that Siderca did not ship to
the US market. How could the Department’s wa iver of the non-responding respondents not
have had an impact on the order wide analysis?

13. Please see the answers of the United St ates to Panel Questions 4(b) and 4(c).

Facts Available/Expedited Review

Q10. The United States agreed in the first he aring that Article 6.8 and Annex II apply to
Article 11.3 reviews.

 (a) Does the United States continue to hold this view?

14. Yes.

 (b) Does the United States continue to ag ree that Siderca filed a complete response
and offered to cooperate fully?

15. Yes.

Q11. Did Siderca’s conduct justify use of facts available within the meaning of Article 6.8 and
Article II?

16. Commerce did not apply "facts available within the meaning of Article 6.8 and Annex II" to
Siderca in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.

Q12. The United States says that “facts available” has no negative connotation (US Second
Submission at para. 24
).D

 (a) Does the United States agree that section 351.218(d)(3) requires respondent
interested parties to supply past dumping margins and historical import volume
data in their substantive response?

 (b) Does section 19 USC. section 1675a(c)(1) mandate that the Department “shall
consider (A) the weighted average dum ping margins determined in the
investigation and subsequent reviews, and (B) the volume of imports of the
subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of

the anti-dumping duty order or accepta nce of the suspension agreement” in
making the likelihood determination?

17. In the context of a sunset review, section 351.308(f) defines "the facts available" as prior
agency determinations, information submitted by th e interested parties, and any information on the
administrative record of the sunset review, incl uding the likelihood determinations concerning the
non-responding respondents. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce considered
all the evidence on the administrative record including the prior agency determinations and any
information submitted by the interested parties in accordance with section 351.308(f) of the Sunset
Regulations.

Q13. The statute(1675(c)(3)(B)) and regulation 3 51.218(e)(1)(C)(2) state that, in an expedited
review, the Department will “issue, without further investigation, final results of review based
on the facts available . . ..” In light of your response to question 3, how is this consistent with
the Appellate Body’s statement that the authorities are required to make a “fresh
determination, based on credible evidence” when the facts available are limited to the margin
from the original investigation and the volume decline?

18. In the context of a sunset review, section 351.308(f) defines "the facts available" as prior
agency determinations, information submitted by th e interested parties, and any information on the
administrative record of the sunset review, incl uding the likelihood determinations concerning the
non-responding respondents. In the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina, Commerce made a fresh
determination by considering all the informatio n on the administrative record, including the
information submitted by the domestic interested parties and Siderca, as well as prior agency
determinations and the information collected by Comm erce, in light of the new standard of likelihood
of continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Zeroing

Q14. Does the United States agree that the 1.36 per cent dumping margin cited in the
Department’s sunset determination resulted from the division of a numerator of 125,478.93 by a
denominator of 9,240,392.64, as represente d in Exhibit ARG-52 to Argentina’s First
Submission?

 (a) Does the United States agree that the net price of some of Siderca’s US sales
exceeded the weighted-average price to China for the matching product?

 (b) Does the US agree that the extent to which the net price of sales to the United
States exceeded the weighted-average net price to China is not reflected in the
numerator of this calculation?

 (c) Does the United States believe th at CONNUM 1 (used in the example in
paras. 141-142 Argentina’s Second Submission) was “dumped” within the
meaning of Article 2.

19. Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement provides that the panel is to examine the matter based
upon "the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities
of the importing Member." The record of the sunset review which is before this panel contains only
that information which was placed on the record by Argentina, Siderca, Commerce, or any other
interested party that chose to participate in the revi ew. As discussed below, the record of the sunset
review contains the final determination of Commer ce in the original investigation, and does not
contain the information pertinent to Argentina’s questions.

Q15. Does the United States agree with Argentina’s description of the calculation
methodology in paragraphs 137-144 of Argentina’s Second Submission? If not, please explain
the basis for your answer.

20. The United States does not agree with Argentina’s description of the calculation methodology
in paragraphs 137-144 of Argentina’s second written su bmission. That discussion contains a number
of legal and factual assertions, the basis for which Argentina has failed to establish and/or which are
not properly before this Panel pursuant to Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement.

Q16. Does the United States agree with the calculation in ARG-66A to the extent that it shows
that the addition of the positive and negative “margins” would yield a negative $402,159.45? If
not, why not?

21. Exhibit ARG-66A contains computer output which was not on the record of the sunset
review. The computer programming used to create the output contained in ARG-66A is neither on the
record of the sunset review, nor is it contained in the exhibit itself. Consequently, the United States
does not agree with, and is not in any position to eval uate, anew, in the context of this dispute, the
contents of Argentina’s exhibit.

Q17. Paragraph 54 of the US First Submission indicates that the dumping margin from the
original investigation was the only indicator availa ble to the Department. In light of this, does
the United States dispute that the margin that was calculated in the original investigation was
part of the record from the sunset proceedings?

22. Commerce reported the margin from the orig inal investigation, 1.36 per cent, to the
International Trade Commission as the "margin likel y to prevail" in the event the anti-dumping order
on OCTG from Argentina was revoked.

23. Thus, the record in the sunset review cont ained the final determination of Commerce which
stated that the margin calculated in that determin ation was 1.36 per cent. However, Siderca’s detailed
questionnaire responses and computerized cost and sales information, supplemental questionnaires
issued by Commerce, verification findings, legal briefs, and other relevant documents and memoranda
supporting the final determination in the original investigation were not placed on the record of the
sunset review by Argentina, Siderca, or any other party.

Q18. Was the 1.36 per cent margin relied on by the Department for purposes of its likelihood
determination in the sunset review established on the basis of a fair comparison in light of the
Appellate Body’s decisions in Bed Linens (paras. 55, 61, 62) and Japan Sunset (paras. 126-132)?
If so, please explain how a “fair comparison” wa s established given that a negative margin of
4.536 would have been the result of the calculation without the use of zeroing?

24. First, Commerce did not rely on the 1.36 per ce nt calculated in the original investigation in
making its likelihood determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina. Rather,
Commerce found that the existence of dumping and depressed import volumes since the imposition of
the order was highly probative that dumping would be likely to continue or recur if the anti-dumping
duty order on OCTG from Argentina were revoked.

25. With respect to the remainder of Argentina’ s question, the answer is yes. Although the
calculation methodology used to establish the 1.36 per cent margin was not on the record of the sunset
review, the United States confirms that the methodology was different from that used in EC – Bed
Linen. Argentina has not explained the legal basis fo r its claims with respect to the United States’
methodology to the extent that the methodology differs from that involved in EC – Bed Linen.

Q19. Under Article 17.6(i), the Panel is charged with assessing whether the Department’s
“assessment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective.” In the recent compliance panel appeal in the Bed-Linens case, the Appellate
Body provided additional guidance on the applicable standard under Article 17.6(i):

In US – Hot-Rolled Steel , we stated that “[a]lthough the text of Article 17.6(i) is
couched in terms of an obligation on panels . . . the provision, at the same time,
in effect defines when investigating authorities can be considered to have acted
inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.” We further explained that
the text of Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as that of
Article 11 of the DSU, “requires panels to ‘assess’ the facts and this . . . clearly
necessitates an active review or examination of the pertinent facts.” (Appellate
Body Report, Recourse to Article 21.5, Bed Linen from India, para. 163)
In light of this:

 (a) What did the Department do to “assess” whether the 1.36 per cent margin that
the Department relied on for its likelihood of dumping determination could
serve as a “proper” basis for that determination?

26. As discussed above, Commerce did not rely on the 1.36 per cent calculated in the original
investigation in making its likelihood determination in the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina.
Rather, Commerce found that the existence of dumping and depressed import volumes since the
imposition of the order was highly probative that dump ing would be likely to continue or recur if the
anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina were revoked.

27. With respect to Article 17.6 (i) of the AD Agreement, that provision states that, "If the
establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, [...], the
evaluation shall not be overturned." Thus, the starting point for any review of Commerce’s actions is,
initially, Commerce’s procedures for establishing facts, then Commer ce’s evaluation of those facts.
In this case, the anti-dumping duty margin referenced by Commerce in its sunset review was placed
on the record of the sunset review as part of the final determination from the anti-dumping duty
investigation. The results of that investigation were unchallenged/unchanged. Although they had the
opportunity available to them procedurally, neither Argentina, nor Siderca, placed any information or
argument on the record of the sunset review seeking to call into question the validity of the margin
calculation. Thus, the fact of the 1.36 per cent marg in as the result of the initial investigation was not
challenged on the record. Consequently, there was no reason for the United States, acting in an
unbiased and objective manner, to question the validity of that margin.

 (b) Given that the margin was calculated in the original investigation on the basis of
zeroing, how does the Department defend it’s “evaluation” of the 1.36 per cent
margin as “unbiased and objective” in using that margin as the basis for its
conclusion that “dumping” (as defined by Article 2) was likely to continue or
recur?

28. It has not been established before this Pane l or elsewhere that the margin calculated for
Siderca in the original investig ation of OCTG from Argentina was determined using a methodology
not consistent with the obligations of Article 2; otherwise, see US answer above.

The Commission’s Likely Standard

Q20. Does the United States consider to be accurate the Commission’s description to a
NAFTA panel of the likely standard applied to the OCTG sunset review (excerpt included as
Exhibit ARG-67 to Argentina’s Second Submission)?

29. See the response to the question below.

Q21. Does the United States agree that the desc ription expresses the view that “likely” does
not mean “probable”?

30. Two of the Commissioners, Vice Chairman Hillman and Commissioner Koplan, both of
whom participated in the OCTG sunset reviews, co nsistently have applied the "probable standard or
its equivalent, 1 since the commencement of the first US sunset reviews. 2 The description in the
NAFTA panel brief concerning the approach taken by some other members of the ITC was based on
their understanding that the term "probable" co nnoted a very high degree of certainty. See, e.g., the
discussion of this issue in the July 2002 Usinor submission (Exhibit ARG-56 at 6). As it became
apparent from subsequent opinion s of the US court, however, there are different connotations
associated with the word "probable." Since the NA FTA panel brief was filed (in February 2002), at
least two judges in a US court have implied that th e term "probable" does not indicate a requirement
for any particular level of certainty, let alone a high level of certainty. Usinor Industeel v. United
States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 6 n.6 (20 Dec. 2002) ("the co urt has not interpreted ‘likely’ to imply any
particular degree of certainty") (Exhibit US-18); Indorama Chemicals (Thailand) Ltd. et al v. United
States International Trade Commission, Slip Op. 02-105 at 20-21 (4 Sep. 2002) ("standard is based on
a ‘likelihood’ of continuation or recurrence of injury, not a certainty") (Exhibit US-32). This
guidance from the US court was not available to the ITC when the brief to the NAFTA panel was
drafted. Once the court clarified what it meant by the statement that "probable" was synonymous with
the statutory term "likely," it became clear that the views of individual Commissioners as to the
standard applicable in sunset reviews (including the standard applied in the OCTG sunset review)
were either identical to that articulated by the court or indistinguishable from it. The US court
recognized this point in affirming the ITC’s uncha nged affirmative remand determination in Usinor.
For these reasons, the views of participating Commissioners in the OCTG sunset review remain
consistent with the "likely" standard as that term has been defined by the US courts.

Evidentiary Basis

Q22. Paragraph 56 of the US Second Submission states that the margins reported by the
Department to the Commission are relevant to the Commission’s sunset determination? Does
the United States believe that the 1.36 per cen t margin was relevant to the Commission’s sunset
determination? Did the Commission consider that margin in its likelihood of injury analysis?

31. Paragraph 56 of the US se cond written submission does not state that the margins reported by
Commerce to the ITC are relevant to the Commission’s sunset determination.

1 Vice Chairman Hillman has interpreted "likely" to mean "more likely than not."
2 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom ,
Inv. Nos. AA-1921-197 (Remand), 701-TA-231, 319-320, 32 2, 325-328, 340, 342, and 348-350 (Remand), and
731-TA-573-576, 578, 582-587, 604, 607-608, 612, and 614-618 (Remand), USITC Pub. 3526 (July 2002) at
Separate Views of Vice Chairman Jennifer A. Hillman Regarding the Interpretation of the Term "Likely" , and
Dissenting Views of Commissioner Stephen Koplan Regarding the Interpretation of the Term "Likely." (Exhibit
US-31.)

32. The staff report accompanying the ITC’s determination simply noted the margins (ranging
from 1.36 per cent to 49.78 per cent) reported to the ITC by Commerce. 3 The ITC also noted these
margins in its view4 but did not discuss them further.

Q23. If so, did the Commission consider whet her this margin had been “tainted” by the
practice of zeroing?

33. As noted above, the ITC did not evaluate the margin specific to subject imports from
Argentina as part of its likelihood of injury analysis.

Q24. Does the United States agree that if Article 3 applies to Article 11.3 reviews, then the
failure to consider the margin would violate Articles 11.3 and 3.4?

34. The United States does not agree that Article 3 applies to Article 11.3 reviews. Additionally,
the United States notes that Article 3.4 provides only for consideration of the magnitude of the duty
and provides that no one factor is dispositive.

Q25. The Appellate Body in Steel from Germany (para. 88) stated that: “Where the level of
subsidization at the time of the review is very low, there must be persuasive evidence that
revocation of the duty would nevertheless lead to injury to the domestic industry.” With respect
to the obligation under Article 11.3, does the United States believe it was necessary for the
Commission to consider the magnitude of the marg in in determining whether revocation of the
order on OCTG from Argentina would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of injury?

35. Article 11.3 does not impose an obligation to co nsider the magnitude of the margins as part of
the analysis of whether revocation of the order woul d be likely to lead to c ontinuation or recurrence
of injury. If the ITC had evaluated the margins, it would have considered the margins from all five
countries whose imports were cumulated in these sunset reviews, margins that ranged from 1.36 to
49.78 per cent.

Cumulation

Q26. Does the US agree that that Article 3.3 contains substantive disciplines on the use of
cumulation? In the US view, are these subs tantive disciplines restricted to Article 5
investigations?

36. The United States agrees that Article 3.3 contains substantive disciplines on the use of
cumulation, and that these disciplines are restricted to Article 5 investigations.

Q27. In the view of the US, is there any substant ive discipline on the use of cumulation in an
11.3 review?

37. No.

Q28. If not, what is the US view as to why the Agreement would be disciplined in the context
of an Article 5 investigation, but not in an Article 11.3 review?

38. The United States does not wish to speculate on the negotiating background to specific
provisions of the AD Agreement. The United States notes, however, that there is a fundamental
difference between investigations and sunset reviews that might explain why cumulation is
disciplined in the former but not in the latter case. This difference is that in sunset reviews the

3 ITC Report, p. I-14.
4 ITC Report, p. 9 n.51.

imports being examined are restrained by the effects of an anti-dumping measure, and this may also
explain why it was decided not to apply de minimis and negligibility conditions on the use of
cumulation in sunset reviews. Indeed, the Appellate Body made a similar observation (in the
countervailing duty context) when it stated that "[ q]ualitative differences [between investigations and
sunset reviews] may also explain the absence of a requirement to apply a specific de minimis standard
in a sunset review
5

Q29. Does the US have any textual support for its view that cumulation is permitted in
Article 11.3 reviews?

39. As the United States explained in its firs t submission (para. 363), the genesis of any
obligation or right arising under the WTO Agreement is the text of the relevant provision, and absent
a textual basis, the rights of Members cannot be circumscribed. The question, therefore, is whether
Argentina has any textual support for its view that cumulation is not permitted in sunset reviews. As
the United States also explained in that submission (paras. 364-365), a prohibition on cumulation
would run counter to the overall object and purpose of the AD Agreement.

5 US – German Steel, AB Report, para. 87.

ANNEX E-11

COMMENTS OF ARGENTINA ON THE UNITED STATES' CLOSING
STATEMENT AND THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSES TO THE
PANEL'S AND ARGENTINA'S QUESTIONS – SECOND MEETING

20 February 2004

I. WAIVER/EXPEDITED REVIEW
US Position:

1. The United States admits that the waiver provisions of US law affect
 the order-wide
likelihood determination, but the United States a sserts that these provisions do not determine the final
outcome of its order-wide likelihood determinations. This assertion is made both generally and in the
specific case of the sunset review of Argentin e OCTG. (US Answers to Second Set of Panel
Questions, para. 4).

Argentina’s Comment:

2. The US answer is not credible on any level, and the United States carefully avoids answering
the difficult questions asked by the Panel.

3. First, the United States admits that there ha s never been a case in which waiver was applied
on the company-specific level (leading to the statutorily-mandated likely dumping determination) and
a negative determination was made on an order-wi de basis (US Answers to Second Set of Panel
Questions, para. 2.). Exhibits ARG-63 and ARG-64 show that waiver was applied 173 times, and
each time the Department rendered an affirmative order-wide, likelihood determination. The United
States simply cannot rebut the fact, proven by Argentina, that there has never been a negative
likelihood of dumping determination in any case in which the waiver provision was applied.

4. Furthermore, in these cases the United States often cites the waiver provisions as the basis for
its affirmative, order-wide likelihood decision, even when other exporters have attempted to
participate.
1 This is precisely what happened in this case, in which the Department stated:

Therefore, given that dumping continued after issuance of the orders, average imports
continued at levels far below pre-order levels from 1995 through 1999, and
respondent interested parties waived their right to participate in these reviews or
failed to submit adequate substantive responses , we determine that dumping is likely
to continue if the orders were revoked.2

1 For example, the case provided at ARG-63, Tab 165 provides some striking similarities to the review
at issue, and provides another reference point from which the Panel can judge the credibility of the U.S.
statements about the effect of company-specific waivers. In the full sunset review of mechanical transfer
presses from Japan, respondent interested parties provided an adequate aggregate response, and therefore the
Department conducted a full review. Nevertheless, the Department based its affirmative likelihood
determination in part on the waiver applied to certain of the respondents: “[W]e note that additional
producers/exporters waived their right to participate in this review, which also constitutes grounds for likelihood
of continuation or the recurrence of dumping should the order be revoked (see section 751(c)(4)(B)) .” (Issues
and Decision Memorandum for the Full Sunset Review of MTPs from Japan (Final Results) at 3 (ARG-63, Tab
165)) (emphasis added).
2 Issues and Decision Memorandum at 5 (ARG-51) (emphasis added).

 This statement, viewed both separately and in the context of the Department’s practice,
demonstrates that: (1) the Department’s system does not, in fact, operate as the bifurcated, two-step
process that the United States explains in its answers; and (2) waiver is determinative in every case in
which it is applied, including this case.

5. Even if the Panel were to accept the US explan ation as a general proposition (i.e. relevant to
Argentina’s “as such” claim), the Panel must find that in this case
 the application of the waiver was
determinative. Company-specific waivers (even if limited to non-responding respondents), combined
with Siderca’s zero share, and the “highly probative” value attached to lower export volumes and an
assumed existence of dumping determined the outcome.

6. The United States declined to answer the Panel’s specific question on this point. Question 4.c
specifically asked the United States to answer the question in light of Siderca’s zero share of exports

In other words, when company-specific waivers apply to companies accounting for 100 per cent of
the exports, and statutorily mandated likelihood findings result for those companies, can there be a
different finding on the order-wide level? Th e United States gave a non-answer and avoided
referencing the fact that, in this case, the automa ticity of the waiver finding, combined with the
decision to expedite the review and make the determination on the basis of waiver and facts available,
determined the outcome of this case.

7. The only possible explanation left for the United States is to explain that the result might be
different if one of the exporters offers an explan ation as to why the import volumes decreased. The
United States attempts this explanation at paragraphs 7 and 11 of its response. This explanation is not
credible. As Mexico explained in its written respons e to a question after the first substantive meeting,
even in a full review in which its exporters explained the reasons for the lower shipment levels, the
Department categorically dismissed the explanations, repeated the SAA/ Sunset Policy Bulletin mantra
of the highly-probative value of the original dumping margins and lower export volumes, and found
dumping likely to recur. Argentina asks the Panel to review Mexico’s response and the Department’s
decision at ARG-63, Tab 179, when judging the credibility of the explanation by the United States.
And, there are several other examples included as supporting evidence in ARG-63 and ARG-64 to
demonstrate the point, including the MTP case referenced in note 1 above.
3

8. The US assertion that the Department will consider any information on the record that rebuts
the probative value of the existence of dumping and depressed import volumes (US Answers to
Second Set of Panel Questions, paras. 7 and 11) also contradicts the statute and the regulations. As
Argentina has explained in past submissions, and the United States has never rebutted, under the
statute, regulations, and Sunset Policy Bulletin , the Department will only consider such other
information where “good cause” is shown and, pursuant to the regulation and Sunset Policy Bulletin,
will do so only in “full reviews.”
4 (Argentina’s Second Submission, paras. 76-77; Argentina’s Second

3 In MTPs from Japan, although post-order import volumes had declined, the respondents explained the
reasons for the reduction in volume. Nevertheless, the Department found that “deposit rates above de minimis
continue[d] in effect for other producers/exporters of MTPs from Japan” and thus determined that dumping
would be likely to continue if the order were revoked. ( Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Full Sunset
Review of MTPs from Japan (Final Results) at 3 (ARG-63, Tab 165)).
4 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(2)(iii). For example, in the full sunset review of sugar and syrups from
Canada (Sugar and Syrups from Canada , 64 Fed. Reg. 48,362 (1999) (ARG-63, Tabs 261)), the Department
stated: “The Department’s Sunset Policy Bulletin notes that the Department will consider other factors (such as
prices and costs) in full sunset reviews
 where an interested party identifies good cause through the provision of
information or evidence that would warrant consideration of such factors.” (64 Fed. Reg. at 48,363 (ARG-63,
Tab 261)) (emphasis added).

Oral Statement, paras. 53, 64-66) In full review s, the Department has rou tinely rejected respondent
interested parties’ attempts to show “good cause” to consider additional factors.5

9. Finally, the United States continues to strugg le with its explanations of the “deemed waiver”
mechanism that results from US law and the impl ementing regulations. In question 5(a), the Panel
clearly asks whether section 1675(c)(4)(B) requires the Department to find likelihood of dumping for
respondents that file an incomplete response. Th e United States responds by answering that section
1675(c)(3)(B) deals with adequacy determinations and the application of facts available, and then
adds parenthetically that section 1675(c)(4)(B) relates to affirmative waivers. (US Answers to Second

10. At this stage of the proceeding, there is no reason for an indirect answer to this question. It is
plainly the case that: (1) section 1675(c)(4)(B)
 of the codified statute mandates an affirmative
likelihood determination for partie s who have waived (“In a review in which an interested party
waives its participation pursuant to this paragraph, the administering author ity shall conclude that
revocation of the order . . . would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping . . . with
respect to that interested party”); and (2) section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the implementing regulation
treats parties submitting incomplete responses as having waived their right to participate (“The
Secretary will consider the failure by a respondent interested party to file a complete substantive
response to a notice of initiation . . . as a waiver of participation . . . .”). So, when a party submits an
incomplete response, it is deemed to have waived its right to participate, and the statute mandates an
affirmative likelihood finding. The United States avoids answering the Panel’s question by not
mentioning the implementing regulation, but subse quently acknowledges the effect of the regulation
in its response to Panel Question 9.6 (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 12).

11. In the case under review, the Department fo und Siderca’s response to be “inadequate,” (Issues
and Decision Memorandum at 3,7) (ARG-51) and later justif ied the invocation of the waiver
provisions by stating it had not received complete responses from the respondent interested parties.
(Id. at 5.) It is hard to understand why the United States is being so indirect with its answers on this
point given the clear words of the statute, regulations, and the Issues and Decision Memorandum in
this case.

12. The US answers to the Panel’s questions regarding the waiver and facts available provisions
are not convincing. Argentina has established in the proceeding that:

• The waiver provisions of US law and regulatio ns require an automatic determination that
dumping is likely to continue or recur. Even if respondents try to participate, they can be deemed to
have waived their participation.

5 For example, in the preliminary phase of the full sunset review of magnesium from Canada, the
respondent, for which the Department had calculated zero margins in the past four administrative reviews,
argued that “good cause” existed for the Department to consider exchange rates in making the likelihood of
dumping determination. ( Issues and Decision Memo for the Sunset Review of Pure Magnesium from Canada
(Preliminary Results) at 4 (ARG-63, Tab 201)) The Department declined to consider such information, basing
its determination instead on a decline in volume: “Given that the Department has conducted numerous
administrative reviews and is satisfied that observed patterns regarding import volumes are indicative of the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, we will not consider good cause arguments in this case.”
(Id. at 7) In the final results, the Department refused to consider the respondent’s explanation for the decline in
imports. (Issues and Decision Memo for the Sunset Review of Pure Magnesium from Canada (Final Results) at
5 (ARG-63, Tab 201)).
6 Pursuant to the regulation, the Department in practice deems a respondent that submits an incomplete
substantive response to have waived participation in the sunset review. ( See, e.g., Issues and Decision Memo
for the Expedited Sunset Review of Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium at 2-3, 5 (ARG-63, Tab
82)).

• In this case, the waiver provisions determined the result.

- The Department said that Siderca’s re sponse was inadequate and that all of
the respondents waived their right to participate.
- Even if the Panel accepts the US explanation that only the “non-responding
respondents” waived their right, the d eemed waiver in this case determined
the outcome.
 Article 11.3 does not permit automatic decisions based on “deemed waivers.” As seen in this
case, the authority abdicated its responsibility to conduct an investigation and render a determination
based on positive evidence. By abdicating this responsibility, the Member loses its right to invoke the
exception in Article 11.3, and it must honour its obligation to terminate the measure.

II. SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR LIKELY DUMPING DETERMINATION
US Position:

 The United States confirmed that “Commerce’s final affirmative likelihood determination in
the sunset review of OCTG from Argentina was ba sed on the existence of dumping and depressed
import volumes over the life of the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina.” (US
Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 4).

A. D
ECLINE IN VOLUME
US Position:

 The United States indicated that “reduction in the volume of imports since the imposition of a
duty is probative of the likelihood of the continuation or recurrence of dumping.” (US Answers to
Argentina’s Questions, paras. 2 & 3) The United States also noted that “Siderca ceased shipping
OCTG almost immediately after the imposition of the order, which is probative evidence that Siderca
could not sell OCTG in the United States absent dumping.” (US Answers to Argentina’s Questions,
para. 11) Elsewhere, the United States asserted that the Department normally considers “depressed
import volumes to be highly probative evidence that dumping will likely continue.” (US Answers to
Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 11) The progression of the US responses leads to the conclusion
that the decline in import volumes was given decisive (if not conclusive and determinative) weight by
the Department in this case. As noted above, along with the purported existence of dumping (based
on the margin from the original investigation), th e United States confirmed that “Commerce’s final
affirmative likelihood determination in the sunset re view of OCTG from Argentina was based on . . .
depressed import volumes over the life of the anti- dumping duty order on OCTG from Argentina.”
(US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 4).

Argentina's Comment:

13. The Appellate Body said it “would have difficulty accepting that dumping margins and
import volumes are always ‘highly probative’ in sunset reviews” and that such factors could not alone
be presumed to constitute sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dumping (Appellate Body Report,
Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 177).

14. The United States did nothing to examine the reason for the decline. The Appellate Body
expressly rejected such a passive approach. The Appellate Body stated that a “decline in import
volume could well have been caused or reinforced by changes in the competitive conditions of the
market-place or strategies of exporters, rather than by the imposition of the duty alone.” Accordingly,
the Appellate Body said that “a case-specific analysis of the factors behind a cessation of imports or a

decline in import volumes . . . will always be necessary .” ( Id) Here, the Department did nothing,
which the United States appears to concede (US Answers to Questions from Argentina, para. 11).

15. ARG-63 and ARG-64 demonstrate that import volume along with the existence of dumping
margins is treated by the Department as “conclusiv e and determinative” of likelihood of dumping in
every sunset case. Thus, far from being simply “probative” of likely dumping or even “highly
probative” as the United States indicates (echoi ng the SAA) in its responses, in practice, the
Department attaches decisive weight to declines in import volume for purposes of determining the
likelihood of dumping in every sunset case.

16. In light of the Department’s consistent practic e to treat import volume declines as conclusive
and determinative of likely dumping, as evidenced in ARG-63 and ARG-64, it is simply not credible
for the United States to argue that Siderca, or any other Argentine exporter for that matter, could have
offered any
 additional information regarding the decline in Argentine OCTG and that such
information would have had any effect on the outcome. For example, the Panel should view the US
answers in light of two examples taken from ARG-63 and ARG-64:

• The record of the expedited sunset review of the anti-dumping order on stainless steel wire
rod from Spain indicated that the dumping margin for the sole respondent declined after the order, and
that the subject import volume had risen to pre-order levels. ( Issues and Decision Memo for the
Expedited Sunset Review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain at 4, 6 (ARG-64, Tab 4)) Under the
SAA, this evidence should have led to a finding that continuation or recurrence of dumping would not

be likely. 7 Nevertheless, the Department narrowly focused on the year immediately following the
imposition of the order, during which time import volumes declined, and concluded on that limited
basis alone that dumping would be likely to continue or recur. (Id. at 6)

• In the full sunset review of brass sheet and strip from the Netherlands, the facts showed that
after imposition of the order, the sole respondent had obtained zero dumping margins in the three
most recent administrative reviews. In addition , this respondent supplied the US market almost
exclusively from its newly-purchased US facility, resulting in a decline in import volume. The
Department ignored these facts – and the logical re ason for the decline in volume – and simply cited
the decline in import volume as conclusive evidence that termination would be likely to lead to a
continuation or recurrence of dumping. ( Brass Sheet and Strip from the Netherlands (Preliminary
Results) 64 Fed. Reg. 46,637, 46,641, and 65 Fed. Reg. 735, 738 (final results), (ARG-63, Tab 32))

B. DUMPING MARGIN
US Position:

 The US answers to questions 15.a. and 15.b. of the Second Set of Panel Questions continue
the line, started in its Second Submission, that the Department did not rely on the margin from the
original investigation in this case, and that, instead, it relied on the evidence of continued dumping.
But in response to Argentina’s question 3, the Unit ed States indicates: “There is no difference
between the existence of a dumping margin and th e payment of duties at the deposit rate for the
purposes of determining whether dumping has continued throughout the life of an order in a sunset
review.” (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, paras. 21-23).

Argentina’s Comment:

17. The answer is both evasive and contradictory with the US position.

7 “[D]eclining (or no) dumping margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports may indicate that
foreign companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the United States and that dumping is less
likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.” SAA at 889-90 (ARG-5).

18. The issue is not whether the United States beli eves that the existence of a deposit rate based
on the original margin, and collection of duties without a review, is evidence of continued dumping.
This is, unambiguously, the US position which began in its Second Submission. The issues for the
Panel to decide are: (1) is this really evidence of Article 2 dumping? and (2) what does such
information say about the likelihood of dumping in the future (is it sufficient evidence of likelihood of
dumping for purposes of Article 11.3)? The United States dodges these critical issues in its answers.

19. The statement is also contradictory. If ther e is no distinction between the existence of a
dumping margin and the payment of duties at the de posit rate, how can the United States say that the
Department relied on payment of duties at the depos it rate but that it did not rely on the dumping
margin? This demonstrates the weakness of the US theory that collection of dumping deposits in a
retrospective system can constitute: (1) evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 (it
cannot); and (2) positive evidence of likely dumping within the meaning of Article 11.3 (it cannot).

US Position:

The United States asserts that “[t]he magnitude of dumping, . . . whether past, present, or future, has
no bearing on Commerce’s likelihood determinat ion.” (US Answers to Second Set of Panel
Questions, para. 22).

Argentina’s Comment:

20. The US position is inconsistent with Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , in which the
Appellate Body indicated that the magnitude of du mping is relevant to the likelihood of dumping
determination:

The degree to which import volumes of dumpin g margins have de creased will be
relevant in making an inference that dumping is likely to continue or recur. Whether
the historical data is recent or not may affe ct its probative value, and trends in data
over time may be significant for an assessm ent of likely future behaviour. (Appellate
Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 176)
21. Also, the US position misses an obvious point, and one that is also directly relevant to this
case. The magnitude of the margin goes directly to the question of the existence of dumping (within
the meaning of Article 2). And, the United States considers the existence of a dumping margin to be
highly probative in determining whether dumping would be likely to continue or recur in the event of
termination of the measure (for purposes of Article 11.3). That the “magnitude of the margin” and the
“existence of dumping” are at times inseparable wa s explicitly recognized by the Appellate Body in
Sunset Review of Steel from Japan in the context of its “zeroing” discussion, which is also at issue in
this case. (See Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 135).

22. In addition, the US assertion conflicts with the US statute, 19 USC. § 1675a(c)(1)(A), which
states that in making the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping determination, the
Department “shall consider – the weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation
and subsequent reviews . . . .” (emphasis added) The US position is also inconsistent with the
Department’s regulations which, at a minimum, require the Department to determine whether a
particular margin is above or below the 0.5 per cent de minimis level established by the United States.
See 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c)(1) (requiring the Department “to treat as de minimis any weighted average
dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate that is less than 0.5 per cent”). The United States’
statements that the magnitude of dumping “has no bearing” on the likelihood determination are
therefore not credible.

III. US POSITION ON ARG-63 AND ARG-64
 The United States first concedes that it “has not examined each and every sunset review cited
by Argentina in Exhibit ARG-63 and Exhibit ARG-64 ” and then dismisses the significance of these
exhibits. (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Ques tions, paras. 16-19). The United States went as
far to say in its Closing Statement of 3 February 2004, that these exhibits are “meaningless.” (US
Second Closing Statement, para. 4)

Argentina’s Comment:

23. Having acknowledged not having reviewed the sunset determinations cited in ARG-63 and
ARG-64, the United States cannot credibly make the blanket assertions in its Closing Statement that
these exhibits do not “shed any light on the natu re of Policy Bulletin” and that ARG-63 and ARG-64
“provide no insights into the facts of those cases with respect to information on dumping and import
volumes.” (US Second Closing Statement, para. 4).

24. As Argentina explained, Exhibits ARG-63 and ARG-64 set out the legal and factual basis for
the Department’s sunset determination in every ca se in which the domestic industry participated.
Contrary to the US statements, Argentina did in fact examine the factual and legal basis of every one
of the Department's sunset determinations. Argentina digested each
 case and tabulated the legal and
factual basis for the Department’s determination in each case in which the domestic industry
participated. Among other info rmation, ARG-63 and ARG-64 set forth the stated basis for the
Department’s likelihood of dumping determination and establish that the Department gave
“conclusive and determinative” we ight to historical dumping margins and import volumes in every
single case in which the domestic industry partic ipated. Specifically, ARG-63 and ARG-64 contain
the heading entitled “Stated Basis for Likelihood Determination,” under which there are four columns,
three of which represent the checklist criteria for the likelihood of dumping determination as outlined
in the statute, the SAA, and the Sunset Policy Bulletin : (a) the existence of continued dumping
margins – whether from the original investigation or an administrative review; (b) a finding that
imports ceased; and (c) a decline in the volume of imports after dumping was eliminated. The charts
in ARG-63 and ARG-64 also reflect a fourth category, which indicates whether the Department
undertook the prospective analysis as required by Ar ticle 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This
category (highlighted in yellow) has no data in it, as the Department has never undertaken the
requisite Article 11.3 analysis.

25. Argentina also submitted all of the written dete rminations of the Department in every case to
substantiate Argentina’s claims and the information set forth in ARG-63 and ARG-64. Throughout
this dispute, the United States has confined its ar guments relating to ARG-63 and ARG-64 to saying
that the only relevant cases are those so-called “cont ested” sunset reviews in which both the domestic
industry and respondents participate. (Even for the so-called contested cases, however, the
Department has never made a not likely determinati on, and the United States has thus failed to rebut
Argentina’s prima facie case that the Department’s consistent practice demonstrates a WTO-
inconsistent presumption, using whatever numbers – 223/223, 43/43, or 35/35). In fact, the United
States has failed to offer a single rebuttal to an y of the information in ARG-63 and ARG-64 that
Argentina has presented as the basis for the Department’s likelihood of dumping determination in the
cases cited in ARG-63 an ARG-64. Rather, the Un ited States indicated that it had no reason to
believe that “the overall total of sunset reviews conducted and the ultimate outcomes in those sunset
reviews” as presented by Argentina was flawed. (US Response to the Panel’s Questions, para. 16)

26. Argentina has also referenced about a half-doz en other particular sunset reviews conducted by
the Department during the course of the proceedings to support Argentina’s claims.
8 The United

8 Issues and Decision Memo for the Expedited Sunset Review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain at
4, 6 (ARG-64, Tab 4); Industrial Nitrocellulose from Yugoslavia, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,852, 57,853-54 (1999)(ARG-

States did not respond to Argentin a’s characterization of those cases, nor did the United States offer
any rebuttals to the conclusions that Argentina drew from those specific cases.

27. As a separate matter, US characterizations of the Sunset Policy Bulletin and US arguments
that the Sunset Policy Bulletin is not a measure that can be challenged are directly contrary to the
Appellate Body rulings on this point. More importantly, such argumentation does not respond to or in
any way rebut the evidence presented by Argentina in ARG-63 and ARG-64 that demonstrates that
the Department attached decisive (if not conclusi ve and determinative) weight to dumping margins
and import volumes in every case. The Department’s sunset determinations in ARG-63 and ARG-64
provide support for the Appellate Body’s observation that the following passage from the Sunset
Policy Bulletin suggests by negative implication that the Department considers satisfaction of any of
the three Sunset Policy Bulletin criteria as conclusive of likely dumping in sunset reviews of anti-
dumping duty orders
: “The Department recognizes that, in the context of a sunset review of a
suspended investigation , the data relevant to the criteria un der paragraphs (a) through (c), above,
[dumping margins and import volumes] may not be conclusive with respect to likelihood.” (Appellate
Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 179, citing Sunset Policy Bulletin, at 18872).

28. Furthermore, the Sunset Policy Bulletin itself states that “the legislative history makes clear
that continued margins at any level would lead to a finding of likelihood. See Section II.A.3.”
(Sunset Policy Bulletin (ARG-35) at 18872) The Sunset Policy Bulletin’s internal cross-citation to the
three criteria in Section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin further supports Argentina’s textual
arguments (as confirmed by the De partment’s practice in ARG-63 and ARG-64) that consistent with
the direction of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the existence of dumping margins and volume declines are
given conclusive and determinative weight by the Department in all cases.

29. In addition, the Panel should also assess th e US position that the Department’s consistent
practice in ARG-63 and ARG-64 does not prove the existence of a WTO-inconsistent presumption, in
light of statements in the US First Submission wh ere the United States indicated that based on the
Sunset Policy Bulletin criteria, “sometimes Commerce ‘normally’ will determine likelihood, and at
other times it ‘normally’ will not.” (US First Submission, para. 181). Howeve r, as the Department’s
consistent practice reflects, even in those cases where dumping margins declined or dumping was
eliminated and imports rose to pre-order volumes – a scenario that the United States says will
“normally” result in a not likely determination – th e Department nevertheless still determined that
dumping would be likely to continue in each such case. ( See, e.g., Issues and Decision Memo for the
Expedited Sunset Review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain at 4, 6 (ARG-64, Tab 4); Sugar and
Syrups from Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,362, 48,363-64 (1999) (ARG-63, Tab 261))

30. Finally, Argentina is not arguing that becaus e the Department's practice shows a pattern, that
it is therefore obligated to follow its practice. Rather, it is precis ely the opposite. Because Section
II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin directs the Department to give d ecisive weight to these factors, it
is not surprising that, in every case, the Department does in fact treat dumping margins and import
volume as conclusive or determinative of likely dum ping. The Department gives decisive weight to
these factors, as demonstrated in this case, and in every case indicated in ARG-63 and ARG-64.

42 and ARG-63, Tab 145); Sugar and Syrups from Canada , 64 Fed. Reg. 48,362, 48,363-64 (1999)(ARG-50
and ARG-63, Tab 261); Issues and Decision Memo for the Sunset Review of Gray Portland Cement and Cement
Clinker from Venezuela (Preliminary Results) at 3-5 (ARG-47 and ARG-63, Tab 125); Issues and Decision
Memo for the Sunset Review of Uranium from Russia at 15-17 (ARG-48 and ARG-63, Tab 282); Issues and
Decision Memo for the Sunset Review of Uranium from Uzbekistan at 9-11 (ARG-49 and ARG-63, Tab 284).

IV. ZEROING
US Position:

 “The United States did not reassess the calculation methodology and had no reason to
reassess the calculation methodology in this sunset review because the magnitude of the margin did
not form any part of Commerce’s final likelihood determination in the sunset review of OCTG from
Argentina.” (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 27).

Argentina’s Comment:

31. The United States cannot credibly say that the magnitude of the margin is irrelevant. The
Appellate Body made clear that if zeroing affected the “magnitude” to the extent that it made the
difference between dumping or no dumping as defined in Article 2, it is not only relevant, but it is the
investigating authority’s responsibility to ensure that it is “dumping” within the meaning of Article 2.

32. If the United States insists that it will not look at the magnitude, then it is declining to accept
this responsibility, in which case it cannot rely on this piece of evidence as evidence of Article 2
dumping.

US Position:

 The United States has, at this late stage, raised a number of procedural objections to
Argentina’s zeroing claim. (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, paras. 23-24)

Argentina’s Comment:

33. All of the US objections are wrong and should be rejected by the Panel. In stating that ARG-
66A and B were only given to the Panel in Argent ina’s Second Submission and were not offered as
rebuttal evidence (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 24), the United States
completely ignores ARG-52 and the arguments in Ar gentina’s First Submission. The United States
responded to Argentina’s First Submission by stating that it did not engage in Bed Linens zeroing, so
Argentina provided evidence of exactly the type of zeroing that was used to calculate the 1.36 per cent
margin relied on by the Department in the sunset review. In addition, the Panel has now asked
specific questions to the United States regarding the use of zeroing, so there is little value in the
United States arguing that the issue is not properly be fore the Panel. The fact is that this issue was
included in the consultations,
9 the request for a panel, Argentina’s First Submission, the US First
Submission, Argentina’s question to the United States after the first substantive meeting, Argentina’s
Second Submission, and now questions from the Panel.

34. Also, the United States complains that “Argentina failed to identify any of the computer
programming by which it manipulated Siderca’s data to arrive at the output contained in ARG-66A,”
(Id., para. 28) even though footnote 182 of Argentina’s First Submission identified the source of the
data as the Department’s 1995 determination, and ARG-66B showed precisely the computer
programming used to remove the zeroing effect.

9 See Exhibit US –12 to the U.S. First Submission (written question No. 25 of Argentina to the United
States, submitted for the November 14, 2002 consultations).

US Position:

 In responding to the Panel’s substantive questions, the United States reminds the Panel that
the original investigation pre-dated the entry into force of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, implying
that the disciplines of Article 2 are not applicable to this sunset review. (US Answers to Second Set
of Panel Questions, para. 25).

Argentina’s Comment:

35. This is not a credible argument after the Appellate Body decision in Sunset Review of Steel
from Japan. The Appellate Body clearly established that “dumping,” in an Article 11.3 review, is the
“dumping” defined in Article 2. Also, while the United States cites Article 18.3 to support its
argument, it ignores the fact that Article 18.3 also states that the disciplines of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement apply to reviews initiated after entry into force of the agreement, which describes this
sunset review. This is perfectly consistent with the Appellate Body’s decision that “dumping” in a
sunset review is defined by – and only by – Article 2.

36. The answers in paras. 25, 26, and 29 of the US Answers to the Second Set of Panel Questions
are non-responsive. The fact that this is not Bed Linens zeroing, and that “the 1.36 per cent margin
was based on the results of comparisons of all export transactions” are non-answers. ( Id.) The
evidence before the Panel unambiguously shows that: (1) in most of the comparisons of US
transactions to weighted-average normal values, the net price to the US exceeded the net normal value
(see ARG-52, lines 25-58 and ARG-66, lines 98-385); (2) in calculating the PUDD (which is the
numerator of the dumping margin calculation), the Department did not recognize the excess of the net
US price over the normal value in any of these transa ctions; and (3) the numerator only included sales
comparisons for which the dumping margin was “greater than zero,” which effectively assigned a zero
value to each of the individual results in which the US price exceeded the normal value (Argentina’s
Second Submission, para. 143; Exhibit ARG-66B, line 13 of programming).

37. If the Panel believes that it has to compare the results of this method to the type of zeroing
done in Bed Linens (which Argentina believes is unnecessary), then the Panel would have to conclude
that it is worse than Bed Linens zeroing. At least in an average-to-average comparison, high-priced
US sales have some effect on the numerator of the dumping margin, as the higher priced sales into the
importing market increase the weighted average, th ereby lessening (or eliminating) the amount of
dumping that results from the comp arison to the weighted-average normal value. In the methodology
at issue in this case, any excess of US price over normal value is ignored and is never considered in
the calculation of the total amount of dumping, which is placed in the numerator of the dumping
margin calculation.

38. Finally, it is not true that the decisions of the Appellate Body have been narrowly limited to
zeroing in a system employing a weighted-average-to-weighted-average method of comparison. In its
discussion regarding the distorting effect that zeroing has on establishing a fair comparison as
required by Article 2.4, the Appellate Body decision in Bed Linens noted that transaction-specific-to-
weighted-average comparisons could be used only in very limited circumstances as indicated in
Article 2.4.2. (Appellate Body Report, Bed Linens, paras. 60-62) The United States has admitted that
the 1.36 per cent margin resulted from a transac tion-specific-to-weighted-average calculation (US
Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 25), and it has never tried to justify that calculation
under the exceptions listed in Article 2.4.2. More importantly, however, the problem, as the Appellate
Body explained, is with the zeroing methodolog y, which is separate and independent from the
particular type of comparison used.

39. Also the Appellate Body in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan addressed the US practice of
zeroing in the context of Article 11.3 reviews, and recognized that the United States used a
transaction-specific-to-weighted-average calculation methodology “in which no offset is granted to

the respondent for negative differences between normal value and export price (or constructed export
price) of individual transactions.” (para. 136, quoting the US First Submission, para. 125)) The
Appellate Body reaffirmed the principle that a zeroing methodology has a distorting effect that is not
consistent with the substantive requ irements in Article 2.4 for a fair comparison. Thus, the Appellate
Body’s focus has not been on the type of zeroing that was done, or the comparison methodology in
which the zeroing takes place. Its focus has properly been on the fact that zeroing – by not taking into
account the results of comparison (whether on a mode l or transaction basis) in which the net import
prices exceeds the net normal value – always overst ates the margin of dumping and, consequently, a
margin calculated on the basis of zeroing cannot serve as the basis for a likelihood of dumping
determination.

V. INJURY
US Position:

The United States believes that:

• Article 3 does not apply to sunset reviews – no t at all. (US Answers to Second Set of Panel
Questions, para. 30)

• Despite footnote 9, “injury” as used in Article 11.3 is “a fourth type of determination
regarding injury, separate from the other three types named in footnote 9.” (Id. at para. 31).

• “Article 11.3 does not contemplate determinations of a continuation or recurrence of threat or
material retardation as a basis for continuing to apply an anti-dumping duty after a sunset review.”
(Id. at para. 32)

• Textual support is not necessary for its view that cumulation is permitted in sunset reviews,
and that the use of cumulation is unregulated in sunset reviews. (US Answers to Argentina’s
Questions, paras. 36 and 38)

Argentina’s Comment:

40. The US answers demonstrate that the Unite d States and Argentina have fundamentally
different views of Articles 11.3 and 3 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement, and the differences relate
almost exclusively to textual interpretations of the Agreement. If the United States is wrong about the
application of Article 3, it is hard to imagin e how the Panel could avoid a finding that the
determination in this case is inconsistent with Article 3.

41. Footnote 9 defines “injury,” not determinations
 of injury. In determining the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of “injury” under Articl e 11.3, the Anti-Dumping Agreement is clear that
“injury” is defined by Footnote 9 and “shall be in terpreted in accordance with the provisions of
[Article 3].”

42. The United States provides absolutely no support – textual or otherwise – for its assertion that
Article 11.3 does not contemplate determinations of a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
threat or material retardation.

43. As Argentina has demonstrated, the text of Articles 11.3 and 3.3 preclude cumulation in
sunset reviews. (Argentina’s First Submission, paras. 282-284; Argentina’ Second Submission,
paras. 189-190) In arguing that textual support is not necessary for its view that cumulation is
permitted – and unregulated – in sunset reviews, th e United States apparently relies on the fact that
cumulation was used by GATT contracting parties prio r to the adoption of Articles 3.3 and 11.3. (US
First Submission, para. 370; US Second Submission, para. 56) However, the fact that cumulation was

not regulated prior to the implementation of th e Uruguay Round agreements weakens, rather than
helps, the US position. Through Article 3.3, th e drafters of the Uruguay Round agreement code
limited the use of cumulation to “investigations,” and even then only where certain conditions are
met.

US Position:

 The United States asserts that, although the Article 3.4 factors are not required in a sunset
review, in the sunset review of Argentine OCTG the Commission considered them all anyway. (US
Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 30).

Argentina’s Comment:

44. This is obviously contradicted by the US response at the Second Meeting of the Parties and in
its response to Argentina’s questions at paragraphs 30 – 34, in which the United States admitted to not
considering the magnitude of the margin, which is one of the Article 3.4 factors. Again, the United
States cannot have it both ways.

US Position:

 The United States asserts for the first time that “two of the Commissioners, Vice Chairman
Hillman and Commissioner Koplan, both of whom participated in the OCTG sunset reviews,
consistently have applied the ‘probable standard or its equivalent’ since the commencement of the
first US sunset reviews.” (US Answers to Questions from Argentina, para. 30).

Argentina’s Comment:

45. First, the Commission, as the US agency respon sible for the likely injury determination in this
case, submitted a brief (on behalf of Commission) in a NAFTA panel proceeding challenging the
same determination in this case. The Commission’s brief unequivocally states that the Commission
did not apply – and in fact was precluded by the SAA from applying – a “probable” standard in this
case. (See ARG-67) Both of the Commissioners noted were members of the Commission at the time
that the Commission’s NAFTA brief was filed, and there is no indication in the brief that they
disagreed with the explanations to the NAFTA panel that likely does not and cannot mean “probable.”

46. Second, the United States itself indicated during the question and answer session of the
Panel’s First Substantive Meeting with the Parties that the Commission is made up of individual
Commissioners, that these individuals often have se parate views, and that they come and go from the
Commission, and given all of this, it was therefore important for the Panel to only consider what is
written in the particular sunset determ ination that is subject to challeng e. Even if there were separate
or independent views suggesting that one or two Co mmissioners viewed “likely” to mean “probable”
that does not change the nature of the determina tion reached by the Commission (as the single US
authority responsible for the likelihood of injury determination) in this case.

VI. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. GENERAL APPROACH TO DSU ARTICLE 6.2
US Position:

 As it has throughout these proceedings, the United States continues its efforts to divorce
portions of Argentina’s claims from the panel request as a whole. The United States evidently would
prefer to the Panel to sever, and then parse, isolated portions of Argentina’s request. ( See US
Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions, para. 38).

Argentina’s Comment:

47. Argentina offers two initial observations at th e outset. First, the United States has failed to
discharge its burden in establishing its claims under DSU Article 6.2. Second, the United States has
failed to rebut any of Argentina’s textual arguments that demonstrate that all of Argentina’s claims are
set forth in Argentina’s panel request and that they fully comply with the requirements of Article 6.2.

48. As to its specific response, the United States failed to answer the Panel’s question. In
question 22, the Panel asked “what portions, if a ny, of the claims raised in Argentina’s written
submissions to the Panel find their basis exclusively in page four of Argentina’s request for
establishment?” Notwithstanding th e focused nature of the Panel’s in quiry – limited to the effect of
severing “page four” – the United States used the question as an opportunity to recast Argentina’s
claims. In so doing, the United States completely misstates the claims advanced by Argentina. Apart
from being non-responsive, the US tactic is wh olly inappropriate. Accordingly, Argentina
respectfully requests that the Panel reject completely the US responses in paragraphs 37 and 38.

49. The United States also addresses an issue no t raised by the Panel’s question. The US non-
responsive response deals with the so-called claims th at were allegedly outside the terms of reference.
The reason for the lack of a straight-forward response to the direct question of the Panel by the United
States is simple – the United States does not have an answer. This is not surprising to Argentina
because page four of Argentina’ s panel request was not intended to – and does not – set forth
additional claims. Indeed, there ar e no new claims on page four of the panel request. Consequently,
even were page four to be artificially “severed” from Argentina’s Panel Request, the effect would be
minimal.

50. Argentina reiterates in the strongest possible terms that the Appellate Body has specifically
instructed panels not
 to read panel requests in the manner requested by the United States. The
Appellate Body has made clear that a panel request must be read “as a whole.”

51. Argentina’s claims are not found exclusively in Section A, or Section B, or on “Page Four.”
The totality of Argentina’s claims are clear when the panel request is read as a whole – the narrative
section, Section A, Section B, and page four. The request presents Argentina’s claims as a seamless
web. One section cannot be read in isolation of the others.

52. Moreover, contrary to the US assertion, the headings used by Argentina its panel request are
also of relevance in defining the scope of Argentin a’s claims. The general headings indicated that
Argentina was challenging the Determinations of the Department and the Commission. The
individual paragraphs under the headings enumerat ed whether such challenges were being advanced
on an “as such” basis, an “as applied” basis, or both.

53. The use of headings, like any other portion of the panel request, are relevant to the basic
question: Was the United States put on notice as to the nature of Argentina’s claims? As Argentina

has argued previously, it is clear that the United States was fully aware – at all stages – of the claims
Argentina was advancing.

54. As the Appellate Body has made clear, Argent ina has a right under the DSU to have its panel
request read as a whole, and this US attempt to deviate from well-established jurisprudence should be
firmly rejected by the Panel.

B. US
 INACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION OF ARGENTINA’S CLAIMS
US Position:

 The United States asserts that Argentina’s claims in Sections A and B “are limited to” certain
measures then enumerated by the United States. (US Answers to Second Set of Panel Questions,
para. 28).

55. The panel request, however, must be read in its totality. This means, as Argentina has made
clear in its earlier submissions, that Sections A and B need to be read in conjunction with both Page
Four and the opening narrative section.

56. Moreover, even the presentation of Argentina’s Section A and B claims by the United States
is incomplete and inaccurate. Throughout its comments, the United States sets out Argentina’s claims
as narrowly as possible, ignoring the actual language used by Argentina in its panel request. For
example, in setting out Argentina’s claims in Se ction A1, the United States lists only specific
references to the US statute and regulations, whil e ignoring Argentina’ broader references to “US
laws, regulations and procedures.”

57. The US answers are even more misguided when they assert that Argentina has challenged the
Department’s presumption on an “as applied” basis only. As Argentina demonstrated in its
Submission of 4 December 2003, Argentina has ch allenged the Department’s presumption both “as
such” and “as applied.” The US answers inaccurately characterize many of Ar gentina’s positions. It
repeatedly asserts that the “only basis” for a number of Argentina’s claims would be page four. That
is inaccurate. In its 4 December Submission, Arge ntina provided detailed textual argumentation as to
why US allegations about the so-called “five a dditional claims” were unfounded. There are no
“additional” claims – all of Argentina’s claims are found in Argentina’s Panel request, and in most
cases no reference to page four is necessary. Arge ntina will not repeat all of those textual arguments
here, other than to stress that: (i) the US Comments on these issues is not accurate; and (ii) Argentina
stands fully by all of the textua l arguments advanced in its earlier submissions to the Panel. The
United States has never responded to, let alone rebutted, Argentina’s textual arguments.

C. T
HE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE
58. Throughout these proceedings, the United States has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction
with the need to demonstrate that it has sustained pr ejudice. It would evidently prefer to have its
Article 6.2 claims adjudicated in clinical isolati on, separated from the broader issue of whether the
United States was actually misled as to the nature of Argentina’s claims. However, the Appellate
Body has emphatically rejected the narrow approach being advanced by the United States. In the
absence of actual, demonstrated prejudice, the US request under Article 6.2 will fail.

59. Even in this final stage of the proceedings, the United States has still not demonstrated any
prejudice. Indeed, the United States ignored the very specific request from the panel to indicate how
it has suffered prejudice with respect to each of the alleged inconsistenc ies that the United States
raised in its request for preliminary rulings. It instead advanced vague arguments about how the
United States was allegedly compromised in “its ability to research the issues at hand, assign
personnel, etc.” As Argentina has indicated in its earlier submissions, such nebulous assertions have

been rejected by previous panels as insufficient to rise to the level of a violation of the due process
rights of the respondent.

60. After having failed to demonstrate any prejudice whatsoever for the so-called “Page Four”
and “Sections B1, B2 and B3” claims, the United States asserted that it did not have to demonstrate
any prejudice at all for the so-called “additional clai ms.” Apart from the fact that the United States
cited no authority in support for this proposition, the US comments contradict this position.

61. In footnote 26 of the US answers (as indeed in footnote 103 of the US First Submission), the
United States indicated that it wo uld not object to the alleged “extension” of Argentina’s claim
regarding Section 351.218(e) of the Department’s regulations to Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii). The
United States indicates that it decided not to object to this so-called “additional claim” because “the
extension of Argentina’s claim to Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) did not re sult in sufficient prejudice to
warrant an objection . . . .” (emphasis added). Thus, the United States clearly recognizes that the
obligation to demonstrate prejudice applies to all of its Article 6.2 claims, including the alleged
“additional” claims.

62. Also, with respect to this specific issue, th e United States cannot now reverse its position and
object to Argentina’s waiver claim related to Se ction 351.218(d)(2)(iii). The United States conceded
that it was on notice regarding Argentina’s waiver ch allenge, which the United States noted included
a challenge to this regulatory prov ision, as the US First Submission reflects: “[T]he United States is
not asserting that the prejudice it experienced thereby was of such a degree as to warrant a preliminary
objection.” (US First Submission, note 103) Clearly, the United States cannot now reverse its
position under the guise of responding to the Panel’s question about “page four.”

63. In summary, the Panel should have little difficulty in concluding that the United States has
demonstrably failed to prove the requisite elements under DSU Article 6.2, and for this reason the US
preliminary objections can be dismissed in their entirety.

VII. ARGENTINA’S REQUEST UNDER DSU ARTICLE 19.1
US Position:

 In its closing statement to the Panel on February 3, the United States urged the Panel not to
make any suggestions under DSU Article 19.1, and stated that “GATT and WTO practice with respect
to remedies has been to urge the respondent, where the panel rules against it, to bring the inconsistent
measure into conformity with that Member’s WT O obligations.” (US Second Closing Statement,
para. 34).

Argentina’s Comment:

64. First, there is nothing improper about Argen tina’s request. DSU Article 19.1 specifically
authorizes panels to make suggestions with respect to implementation.

65. Second, there have been many instances in wh ich Panels have exercised their discretion to
make a suggestion regarding implementation. To cite a few examples:

• in the Argentina Poultry case, the Panel suggested that Argentina repeal the measure
imposing definitive anti-dumping measures on poultry from Brazil10;

10 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil , WT/DS241/R, adopted on
19 May 2003, para. 8.7.

• in the “Byrd Amendment” case, the Panel called for the repeal of the WTO-inconsistent US
statute
11;

• in the US – Textiles from Pakistan case, the Panel called for the prompt removal of the import
restriction12;

• in the Guatemala Cement dispute, the Panel recommended the revocation of the anti-dumping
measure13; and

• in the Lead Bars case, the Panel called fo r a revision of US administrative practices.14

66. This is a non-exhaustive list. Thus, Argentina’ s request is not improper, and it is certainly not
unusual. Previous panels have recognized th at suggestions under DSU Article 19.1 would be
appropriate to help promote the resolution of the dis pute, particularly where – as in the present case –
the violations of the responding party are fundamental and pervasive.

67. In this case, Argentina’s resort to DSU Article 19.1 is necessary given the right conferred to
Argentina by Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement – termination of the anti-dumping
measure after five years. Argentina’s right was s ubject only to a limited exception that could be
invoked by the United States only in the event that strict requirements were satisfied, and Argentina
has demonstrated that the United States failed to sa tisfy the requirements necessary for continuing the
measure. Consequently, the role of DSU Article 19.1 becomes critical to Argentina’s ability to obtain
the right denied by the United States. Argentina ther efore respectfully urges the Panel to suggest that
the measure be terminated so as to restore the right conferred to Argentina by Article 11.3.

11 United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 , WT/DS 217/234/R, adopted on
27 January 2003, para. 8.6.
12 United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan ,
13 Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Gray Portland Cement from Mexico ,
WT/DS156/R, adopted on 17 November 2000, para. 9.6.
14 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R, adopted on 7 June 2000, para. 8.2.

ANNEX E-12

COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON ARGENTINA'S RESPONSES
TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL – SECOND MEETING

20 February 2004

I. EXPEDITED REVIEWS/WAIVER PROVISIONS
1. The Panel notes "Heading A" on page 36 of Argentina's first written submission and
Argentina's statements in paragraph 120 of its fi rst written submission and paragraph 51 of its
second written submission. Please clarify whet her Argentina's claim challenging the US law's
waiver provisions under Articles 11.3, 6.1 and 6.2 of the Agreement are limited to "deemed
waivers", or, whether they also take issue with "affirmative waivers".

1. Argentina’s response further confuses th e question of what precisely Argentina is
challenging. According to Argentina’s response to this question, both affirmative and deemed
waivers "mandate an affirmative determination of likelihood of dumping" and "[i]n Argentina’s view,
the notion of a statute and regulation mandating an affirmative determination of likelihood of
dumping without any analysis is inconsistent with Article 11.3." However, while Argentina expresses
its "view," it does not explain precisely what claim it is in fact advancing in this proceeding with
respect to Article 11.3. While the United States considers that it has fully addressed both the
"deemed" and "affirmative" waiver issues, it notes that Argentina’ s failure to clearly identify the
claims it is making also constitutes a failure to make a prima facie case with respect to either issue.

2. Argentina does explicitly stat e that its challenge with resp ect to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 "is
limited to the ‘deemed waiver.’" The United States therefore understands that Argentina’s claims with
regard to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 do not relate to "affirmative waivers."

2. The Panel notes that in sections VII.C.2 and VII.C.3 of its firs t written submission,
Argentina challenges the application of the US waiver provisions to Siderca whereas in the
following part of paragraph 6 of its second oral statement it also takes issue with the application
of these provisions to Argentina:

Indeed, the Department’s application of th e waiver provisions to Siderca (or, at
a minimum, to Argentina) is plainly indicated in the Department’s Issues and
Decision Memorandum.
Please clarify the scope of Argentina's claim. Mo re particularly, please explain whether, in the
view of Argentina, the alleged application of the US waiver provisions in this sunset review
impaired the rights of Argentina or Siderca.

3. Argentina continues to argue that the waiver provisions were applied to Siderca. The United
States has already rebutted this argument. Arge ntina does not claim that Siderca’s rights were
impaired as a result but instead states that Argentina ’s rights under Article 11.3 to termination of the
measure were violated. However, as we have alread y explained, it is simply inaccurate to state that
the application of the waiver pr ovisions settle the question of whether an order will be terminated.
1
Inasmuch as Argentina’s Article 11.3 claim is pr emised on this false assumption, Argentina had no
"right" to termination in this case.

1 See, e.g., Answers of the United States to the First Set of Panel Questions, paras. 3 and 19.

4. Argentina then argues that application of the waiver provisions to the non-responding
respondents violates Articles 11.3, 6.1, and 6.2 but does not explain how its rights to present facts and
arguments and otherwise fully defend its interest s were impaired in light of Argentina’s non-
participation in the review and Siderca’s minimalist participation. Argentina does argue that the
application of the waiver provisions "prevented any type of ‘investigation’ or ‘determination’,"
deprived Argentina of termination of the measur e under Article 11.3, and did not afford what
Argentina refers to as its "principal" OCTG producer (as opposed to "the only producer"
2) the right to
participate. Again, there is no evidence that th e waiver provisions prevented termination of the
measure or that they resulted in failure to conduc t "any type" of investigation or determination.
Further, the only party that deprived Siderca of its right to participate was Siderca, through its failure
to file a substantive response that addressed the issue of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping, a rebuttal response, or comments on Commerce’s adequacy determination.

II. OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR
RECURRENCE OF DUMPING
11. The Panel notes Argentina's allegation in its first written submission that in this sunset
review the DOC failed to use the "likely" standard and applied a different standard instead.
3

 (a) The Panel notes that Argentina did not mention this claim in its second written
submission. Please clarify whether Argentina is still pursuing this claim.

5. Argentina’s "clarification" concerning the "likel y" standard is nothing more than Argentina’s
view as to whether there is sufficient evidence on the record to support the affirmative likelihood
determination.

 (b) Please refer to the relevant part(s) of the record of this sunset review where this
inconsistent standard can be found.

6. Argentina’s discussion of the record evidence in its answer to this question is misleading.
First, the cited statutory provision (19 USC. 1677(c)(4)(B)) and its reference to an affirmative
likelihood determination are, by thei r very terms, limited to non-resp onding interested parties. In
other words, section 1677(c)(4)(B) mandates that Commerce shall find that there is a likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping "with respect to that interested party" when the interested party
waives its participation in a sunset review.

7. Nothing in this provision or anywhere else in the US statute requires an affirmative likelihood
determination on an order-wide basis simply beca use one or all the inte rested parties waived
participation in the sunset review. As the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset noted, although "the
authorities have a duty to seek out relevant info rmation . . . Company specif ic data relevant to a
likelihood determination under Article 11.3 can often only be provided by the companies
themselves."4 Nothing in Article 11.3 or elsewhere in the AD Agreement requires the administering
authority to attempt to coerce information from reca lcitrant interested parties in order to meet the
obligations of the AD Agreement. Second, Commer ce based its affirmative likelihood determination
on the existence of dumping and the depressed impo rt levels in the sunset review of OCTG from
Argentina. Rather than address the probative nature of this evidence, Argentina simply continues to
assert that this evidence is not sufficient to s upport the likelihood finding. Finally, Argentina again
has selectively and incorrectly cited to the Appellate Body report in Japan Sunset for the proposition
that the existence of dumping and depressed import volumes create a impermissible "presumption."

2 See discussion in First Written Submission of the United States, note 3.
3 First Written Submission of Argentina, para. 186.
4 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, at para.199.

The Appellate Body in Japan Sunset ultimately stated that the record evidence relied upon by
Commerce in that case, the existence of dump ing and depressed import volumes, were not
unreasonable indicators of likely future dumping. 5 Like the Japanese respondent interested party in
Japan Sunset, neither Argentina nor Siderca submitted an y evidence to address the evidence of the
existence of dumping and depressed import volumes since the imposition of the order on OCTG from
Argentina.6 Rather, the record evidence only demonstrates that neither Siderca nor Argentina raised
any issues with respect to whether dumping was likely to continue or recur, 7 nor did they submit
factual evidence to support a conclusion to the contrary.

12. The Panel notes that, in its second writte n submission, Argentina did not address its
claim under Article 12.2 of the Agreement. Plea se clarify whether Argentina is still pursuing
this claim.

8. The United States again asserts, as it did in its first written submission in response to this
claim by Argentina, that the Commerce Department did provide notice and detailed explanations of its
determinations in the Final Sunset Determination , the Decision Memorandum , and the Adequacy
Memorandum, all of which were publicly available.
8 In addition, Argentina’s assertion that the
"United States has also indicated that ‘a few key po rtions’ of its underlying decision were ‘inartfully
drafted’" is misleading, in that the United States never stated that "key portions" were inartfully
drafted and never suggested that the drafting of the decision prevented participants in the dispute from
fully understanding Commerce’s actions.

9. Finally, the United States notes Argentina’s contentions about so-called " ex post facto
justifications." Those are simply US responses to arguments which Argen tina is advancing for the
first time in this proceeding and which were not advanced during the review. Had Argentina or
Siderca made these arguments during the review, as th ey had the opportunity to do, the United States
could have addressed them then. To do so now for the first time and allege that by responding the
United States is engaging in " ex post facto justifications" ignores the responsibility the Anti-Dumping
Agreement places on parties to participate in sunset reviews, a responsibility the panel in Japan
Sunset emphasized.

III. OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATIONOR
RECURRENCE OF INJURY
17. What is the supporting evidence in the recor d of this sunset review for your allegation
that the Commission failed to apply the "likely" standard of Article 11.3 of the Agreement in
this sunset review?

10. Argentina claims that two types of evidence support its claim that the ITC did not properly
apply the "likely" standard: (1) "admissions by th e Commission;" and (2) the record in the sunset
reviews. Argentina’s arguments are unpersuasive.

11. With regard to the so-called admissions by the Commission, the United States draws the
Panel’s attention to paragraph 30 of the 13 February 2004, US answers to Argentina’s questions. As
explained there, earlier statements by the ITC (such as in the Usinor remand results and the NAFTA
panel brief, both of which are cited by Arge ntina) were based on the understanding of some
Commissioners that the term "probable" connoted a very specific and high degree of certainty – a
misapprehension which the US courts have since clarified.

5 See id. at para. 205.
6 See id. at paras. 203-204.
7 Siderca advanced an argument regarding the application of the de minimis standard but nothing to
address the issue as to whether dumping was likely to continue or recur.
8 See First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 238-248.

12. With regard to the record in the sunset reviews, the United States believes that when
considered as a whole, it shows that certain outcom es would be likely (or "probable or more likely
than not," as Argentina puts it). The United States has discussed the record in detail in its earlier
submission and will not reiterate that discussion here.

18. The Panel notes Argentina's allegations in paragraphs 183 and 185 of its second written
submission that in the OCTG sunset review the Commission failed to carry out the causal link
analysis required under Article 3.5 of the Agreemen t. Please clarify the basis of this claim.
More specifically, please indicate whether ther e were some potential factors, other than likely
dumped imports, that could have contributed to the likely injury and were not evaluated by the
Commission in its sunset determinations.

13. Consistent with its arguments throughout this case, Argentina stands one of the key principles
of treaty interpretation, reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, on its head. Argentina
asserts that "[t]here is no textual support for th e view that the causation requirement was removed
from the injury analysis required by Article 11.3." However, it is Argentina that must find textual
support for the proposition that a causation requiremen t of Article 3.5 is requ ired by Article 11.3.
There is no such textual support. To the contrary, there are specific textual bases for concluding that
the causation requirements of Article 3.5 are not applicable to sunset reviews.
9

9 See First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 287-302 and 352-353.