EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Document: REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL
Date: 28 May 2015
Document codes: WT/DS476/2
Complainant: Russia
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Brazil, China, India, Japan, Ukraine, U.S., Colombia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. XVI:1, XVII  Services (GATS)Art. III:4  GATT 1994Art. II:1, VI:1, VI:5(a)  Services (GATS)Art. I:1, XI:1, X:3(a)  GATT 1994Art. XVI  Services (GATS)

EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES RELATING
TO THE ENERGY SECTOR
REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The following communication, dated 11 May 2015, fr om the delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

My authorities have instructed me to request the establishment of a panel, pursuant to Article 6 of
the DSU, Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), and Article XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tr ade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), with respect to certain
measures maintained by the European Union (" EU") and its Member States, and implemented
within EU territory by the EU and its Member States, including through the so-called "Third Energy
Package" and related legal instruments, as described below.
On 30 April 2014, the Russian Federation requested consultations with the EU and its Member
States pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the DS U, Article XXIII of the GATS, Article XXIII of the
GATT 1994, Articles 4.1, 7.1 and 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
and Article 8 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, with respect to certain
restrictions and requirements adopted, maintain ed and implemented by the EU and its Member
States within their respective territories , including Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania, through the
so-called "Third Energy Package" and related lega l instruments. The request was circulated on 8
May 2014 as document , , , , On 23-
24 June and 10 July 2014, the Russian Federation held consultations with the EU and its Member
States with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. Unfortunately, the consultations
failed to settle the dispute.
The EU adopted the Third Energy Package ("TEP") in July 2009. The TEP's principal component
regarding gas, Directive 2009/73/EC (the "Directive"),
1 establishes what it describes as common
rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage in the EU of natural gas, including
LNG.
2 The Directive also states that the TEP repealed and replaced the legal acts making up the
Second Energy Package ("SEP"), even though cert ain SEP measures related to exemptions remain
in effect. As such, the TEP is the latest in a series of legal instruments and policy initiatives
designed to tighten and centralize control over the EU energy market, including the rights of
Russian suppliers of natural gas and natural gas services, as well as imported Russian gas as a
source of supply to the EU market. The Russian Fe deration considers that the TEP, like the EU's
natural gas and broader energy policy overall, unjustifiably restricts imports of natural gas
originating in Russia and discriminates against Russian natural gas pipeline transport services and
service suppliers.
3

1 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211/94 of
14.8.2009 ("Directive 2009/73/EC" or the "Directive").
2 "Natural gas" includes liquefied natural gas ("LNG"), consistent with the provisions of the Directive.
3 "Natural gas pipeline transport services" (or "pipeline transport services") include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the transmission (or transport) and supply of natural gas, including LNG, and the
services related to the transmission and supply of natural gas, including LNG services.

Accordingly, the Russian Federation respectfully re quests that, pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU,
the DSB establish a Panel, with the standard term s of reference contained in Article 7.1 of the
DSU, to examine the following matter:
1. Unbundling, Third-Country Certificatio n and Infrastructure Exemption Measures
The Directive requires "vertically integrated natural gas undertakings" ("VIUs") to undergo
"unbundling" and to separate their transmission system assets, or the transmission system
operator ("TSO"), from assets relating to production and supply. The Directive grants Member
States discretion to select from among three alternative unbundling models: ownership
unbundling, independent system operator ("ISO"), and independent transmission operator
("ITO").
4 Ownership unbundling is the most restrictive model. It precludes the same person or
persons from exercising control over an undertaking performing any of the functions of production
or supply and exercising control or any right over the TSO or the transmission system, and vice
versa. Among the rights that ownership unbundling precludes is the holding of a majority share. 5
The ISO model, in contrast, permits the VIU to re tain full ownership of the TSO upon designation
of an outside entity, the ISO, to operate the TSO. 6 The ITO model is even less restrictive and
permits VIUs to maintain control and operate the TSO through a separate subsidiary.7
The implementing laws of Croatia and Hungar y permit all three unbundling models, whereas
Lithuania permits only the ownership unbundling model. In the pipeline transport services sector,
as set out in their GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments on Services (the "Schedules"),
Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania undertook commitm ents under Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS
with respect to pipeline transport services. In lig ht of these commitments, the Russian Federation
considers that the unbundling measures, as implem ented in the laws of Croatia, Hungary and
Lithuania, are inconsistent with these Members' market access obligations under GATS
Article XVI:1 to accord services and service su ppliers of any other Member treatment no less
favorable than that provided for in their Schedules, and that all three Members are each
maintaining or adopting measures set out in GATS Article XVI:2.
The Directive also provides that, when the owner of the VIU is the Member State or another public
body, two separate public bodies exercising control over the TSO and over an undertaking
performing production or supply functions shall be deemed not to be the same person or persons.
8
In reality, this measure permits a Member State government to own and control both the TSO and
the production or supply portions of the VIU, whereas third-country service suppliers, including
those of Russia, may not. Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania have each implemented versions of this
measure in their respective legislation. The Russian Federation considers that these measures are
inconsistent, de jure, with the obligations of Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania under GATS Article
XVII to accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable
than they accord to their own like services an d service suppliers. Moreover, the governments of
Croatia and Lithuania both own and control the TSO and production or supply portions of the single
VIU supplying pipeline transport services in their respective territories. Therefore, the Russian
Federation considers that these measures are inconsistent, de facto, with the obligations of Croatia
and Lithuania under GATS Article XVII.
In addition, in certain Member States that have adopted implementing legislation requiring
ownership unbundling, including Lithuania and Esto nia, the Russian supplier of pipeline transport
services has been required to cede control in the TSO or will be required to do so in the future on
the basis of existing legislation. In other Memb er States that permit the ISO and/or ITO models,
VIUs that are owned or controlled by a person or persons of other third-countries have been
permitted to adopt either of those unbundling models, and thus to maintain ownership and varying
degrees of control over both the TSO and producti on or supply portions of the VIU. The Russian
Federation considers that these measures result in less favorable treatment being accorded to
pipeline transport services and service suppliers of Russia than to like services and service

4 Directive, Article 9. Article 9(9) of the Directive provides for a fourth ownership unbundling model. For
the sake of clarity, the Russian Federation notes that the references to specific provisions of legal instruments
in this request are for explanatory purposes and without prejudice to the examination in the proceedings of
other relevant provisions of the specific legal instruments cited herein.
5 Directive, Article 9(2)(c).
6 Directive, Article 14.
7 Directive, Chapter IV.
8 Directive, Article 9(6).

suppliers of other third-countries, contrary to the EU's obligations under GATS Article II:1.
Moreover, contrary to the requirements of Arti cle I:1 of GATT 1994, the fact that third-country
natural gas suppliers in certain Member States have been permitted to adopt the ISO or ITO
unbundling models grants an advantage, favor, priv ilege or immunity to the natural gas imported
from those third-countries that is not immediately and unconditionally accorded to natural gas
originating in Russia, which is transported and placed on the market in Member States that require
ownership unbundling. Such Russian-origin natural gas is also accorded less favorable treatment
than domestic natural gas that is transported and placed on the market in Member States
permitting the ISO and/or ITO models, contrary to the EU's obligations under Article III:4 of
GATT 1994.
Next, the Directive requires that TSOs in each Member State be certified as complying with the
relevant unbundling requirements. However, when certification is requested by a transmission
system owner or TSO controlled by a person or persons from a third-country, the Directive
requires that the request be refused unless it is demonstrated that certification "will not put at risk
the security of supply" of the Member State and the EU.
9 No similar requirement applies to
certification requests by domestic persons. Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania have implemented
versions of this "third-country certification measure" in their respective legislation. The Russian
Federation considers these measures to be inconsistent, de jure, with the obligations of Croatia,
Hungary and Lithuania under GATS Article XVII to accord services and service suppliers of any
other Member treatment no less favorable than these three Members' like services and service
suppliers. In addition, pursuant to the Directive, requests for certification by a transmission
system owner or TSO located in one EU Member St ate, but controlled by a person or persons of
another Member State, are not subject to the thir d-country certification measure. The services
and service suppliers of one EU Member State ar e thus treated more favorably by other Member
States than are the services and service suppliers of other third-countries, including Russia. This
is despite the fact that the EU and each such Me mber State is also a Member of the WTO. The
Russian Federation considers this measure to be inconsistent, de jure, with the EU Member States'
obligations under Article II:1 of the GATS to accord immediately and unconditionally to services
and service suppliers of each Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country.
In the same sense, given the general applicability of the certification requirement, Croatia,
Hungary and Lithuania do not administer the third-country certification measure in a reasonable,
objective and impartial manner, contrary to these Members' obligations under GATS Article VI:1.
Likewise, Russia considers the third-country certification measure as constituting a licensing and
qualification requirement that nullifies or impairs the specific commitments of Croatia, Hungary
and Lithuania in the pipeline transport services sector, in a manner inconsistent with GATS
Article VI:5(a).
Moreover, various Member States have issued certification decisions, most of which the European
Commission ("Commission") has approved. Yet the Commission refused to approve Poland's
certification of Gaz-System S.A. as an ISO for the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe Pipeline
("Yamal"). Having found that Yamal's owner, Europolgaz, is jointly controlled by the Polish gas
incumbent and a Russian pipeline transport servic e supplier, the Commission required Poland to
conduct a security of supply assessment. Previously, however, the Commission approved
certification of at least two TSOs in Member States in which other third-country persons owned up
to 100 percent interests, without any control or "security of supply" assessments having been
conducted. In so doing, contrary to its obligations under GATS Article II:1, the EU accorded
Russian services and service suppliers less favora ble treatment than like services and service
suppliers of those third-countries.
The Directive further requires Member States to en sure implementation of a system of third-party
access ("TPA") to the transmission and distribution system and LNG facilities in the EU.
10 T h e
Directive permits "major new gas infrastructure, i. e. interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities,"
to be exempted from the unbundling, TPA and othe r requirements under certain conditions. The
same exemptions are also permitted for "significant increases of capacity in existing infrastructure
and to modifications of such infrastructure which enable the development of new sources of gas

9 Directive, Article 11.
10 Directive, Article 32.

supply."11 The conditions to be examined in assessing such requests permit Member States and
the Commission significant discretion in determining whether to grant infrastructure exemptions.
A number of infrastructure exemptions have been gr anted under these provisions of the Directive.
Similar exemptions remain in effect that were previously granted pursuant to comparable
provisions of Directive 2003/55/EC, as part of the SEP. 12 A Russian pipeline transport service
supplier controls the Ostseepipeline-Anbindungsleitung ("OPAL") pipeline. After being categorized
as an "inter-connector," the Germany authority granted the OPAL pipeline owners a limited
infrastructure exemption for capacity used to transport natural gas from Griefswald, where gas
enters Germany from the Nordstream Pipeline ("Nordstream"), to Brandov, where gas exits
Germany and enters the Czech Republic. However, the Commission imposed a 50 percent cap on
the ability of the Russian supplier operating the OPAL pipeline, described as a "dominant
undertaking," to acquire exit capacity at the Cz ech border. The Russian supplier may exceed this
cap only by implementing a "gas release" program and selling 3 billion cubic meters ("bcm") of its
gas annually at a government-set, fixed price to competing gas suppliers on the Czech market,
regardless of what amount of additional capacity is booked by the Russian supplier. No similar gas
release requirement was imposed in decisions granting infrastructure exemptions concerning
pipelines defined as interconnectors and controlled by other third-country suppliers of natural gas
and pipeline transport services.
In addition, the Nordeuropäische Erdgasleitung ("NEL") pipeline is intended to transport Russian
gas westward through Germany from Griefswald, the Nordstream entry point, to Rehden in
Germany. The owners of the NEL pipeline, which include a Russian service supplier, requested an
exemption from the requirements of the Directive. Germany denied this request on the basis that
the pipeline does not qualify as an interconnector. Although the definition of interconnector in the
Directive was interpreted strictly in denying an exemption for NEL, exemption requests were
granted to the third-country service suppliers or ow ners of other pipelines, which also do not meet
the definition of an interconnector in the Directive (and in the SEP).
The Russian Federation considers that, contrary to its obligations under GATS Article II:1 in the
case of both the OPAL and NEL decisions, the EU accorded Russian services and service suppliers
less favorable treatment than it accorded to like services and service suppliers of other third-
countries pursuant to relevant decisions granting exemptions to those suppliers. As a result of
these measures, natural gas originating in Russia is not accorded immediately and unconditionally
any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted to natural gas originating in certain third-
countries, contrary to the EU's obligations under Article I:1 of GATT 1994.
In addition, requiring that the operator of the OPAL pipeline adopt the 3 bcm gas release program
has a limiting effect on the volume of Russian gas being imported into the EU market. The
measure thus maintains or institutes a de facto restriction on importation, contrary to the
requirements of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994. The Russian Federation also considers that the OPAL
gas release requirement also violates Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994. Specifically, by imposing the 3
bcm gas release requirement under the conditions described above only on imported Russian gas,
but not third-country gas transported through pipe lines subject to other exemption decisions, the
EU has failed to administer the infrastructure exemption provisions in the Directive and the SEP in
a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, including with regard to the sale, distribution and
transportation of natural gas.
Furthermore, the definition of "transmission" in the Directive expressly exempts "upstream
pipeline networks," which are defined separately. The Directive also defines the functions of
transmission and LNG as separate from the functi ons of natural gas production and supply. The
unbundling provisions, in turn, apply only to the transmission system and TSO, which must be
separated from the production and supply portions of the VIU. Domestic and third-country
pipeline transport service suppliers are thus exempt from the unbundling requirements with regard
to their upstream pipeline networks and LNG facilities. As a result, contrary to the EU's obligations
under Article I:1 of GATT 1994, natural gas originat ing in third-countries that is transported and
placed on the EU market through either of these ty pes of infrastructure is accorded an advantage,

11 Directive, Article 36.
12 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, Article 22, OJ L 176,
15.7.2003, pp. 57-78 ("Directive 2003/55/EC").

favor, privilege or immunity that is not immediately and unconditionally accorded to natural gas
originating in Russia, which is transported and placed on the market by pipeline transport service
suppliers that are subject to the unbundling requirements. Such Russian-origin natural gas is also
accorded less favorable treatment than domestic natural gas that is transported and placed on the
market through upstream pipeline networks, and possibly LNG facilities, in a manner inconsistent
with Article III:4 of GATT 1994.
The Russian Federation understands that these measures are enacted and implemented through
the following legal instruments:
 Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Directive 2003/55/EC;
 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission
networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 ("Regulation (EC) No
715/2009");
13
 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July
2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperat ion of Energy Regulators ("Regulation
(EC) No 713/2009");14
 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing
Council Directive 2004/67/EC;15
 Certification decisions and opinions pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive by
the Commission, and certification decisions and opinions by national regulatory
authorities of the EU Member States pursuant to their implementing laws, including
but not limited to:
 Commission Opinion, 6.9.2012, C(2012) 6255, Certification of jordgas Transport
GmbH (Germany), pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and
Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Commission Opinion, 11.12.2012, C(2012) 9575, Certification of NABUCCO Gas
Pipeline International GmbH (Austria), pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation
(EC) No 715/2009 and Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Commission Opinion, 9.9.2014, C(2014) 6463, Certification of Gaz-System S.A.
as the operator of the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe Pipeline, pursuant to
Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and Article 10(6) and 11(6) of
Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Infrastructure exemption decisions and opinions pursuant to Article 36 of the Directive
and its predecessors, including the SEP, by the Commission and national regulatory
authorities of the EU Member States;
 Member State legislation implementing the TEP, including but not limited to:
 Austria, Natural Gas Act of 2011 (Gaswirtschaftsgesetz), FLG I no 107/2011
(National Council: GP XXIV RV 1081 AB 1128 p. 124. Federal Council: 8581 AB
8593 p. 801);
 Belgium (Federal), Act of 8 January 2012, amending the Federal Gas Act of 12
April 1965; Government of Belgium (Flanders), Decree of 8 July 2011, amending
the Energy Decree of 8 May 2009; Government of Belgium (Brussels Capital

13 OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, pp. 36-54.
14 OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, pp. 1-14.
15 OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, pp. 1-22.

Region), Edict of 20 July 2011, amending the Gas Edict of 1 April 2004;
Government of Belgium (Wallonia), various amending decrees and governmental
orders implementing the Directive;
 Bulgaria, Energy Act (as amended through SG No. 66/26.07.2013, effective
26.07.2013);
 Croatia, Energy Act (Official Gazette 120/12); Government of Croatia, the Act on
the Regulation of Energy Activities of 11 November 2012; Government of
Croatia, Gas Market Act of 14 March 2013;
 Cyprus, Law for Regulating the Natural Gas Market, Law 1219(I)/2012, which
amends Laws for Regulating the Natural Gas Market 2004-2007;
 Czech Republic, Amendment of the Energy Act, Act No. 211/2011 Coll.,
amending the Act no. 458/2000 Coll., on business conditions and public
administration in the energy sectors and on amendment of certain laws (the
Energy Act), as amended, and other related laws;
 Denmark, Amendments to the Electricity Supply Act and the Natural Gas Supply
Act, Act no. 466 of 18 May 2011;
 Estonia, Natural Gas Act, Maagaasiseaduse muutmise seadus, seaduse
parandus, RT I, 28.06.2012, 2; Elektrooniline Riigi Teataja (MNE(2012) 52911);
 Finland, Act to amend the Natural Gas Market Act (laki maakaasumarkkinalain
muuttamisesta 589/2013); Electricity and Gas Market Supervision Act (laki
sähkö- ja maakaasumarkkinoiden valvonnasta 590/2013); and Act on the
Energy Market Authority (laki energiamarkkinavirastosta 591/2013);
législative du code de l'énergie;
 Germany, Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und
Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG) i.d.F. von Artikel 2 des
Gesetzes vom 16.1.2012, BGBl I S. 74.);
 Greece, Law 4001/2011, "For the operation of the energy markets of Electricity
and Natural Gas, for research, production and transmission networks of
hydrocarbons and other arrangements" (Official Gazette A'176/22.08.2011);
 Hungary, Act No. XXIX of 2011 amending the Gas Supply Act; Act No. XL of
2008 on Natural Gas Supply;
 Ireland, S.I. No. 463 of 2011, European Communities (Internal Market in
Electricity and Gas) (Consumer Protection) Regulations 2011;
 Italy, Legislative Decree, 1 June 2011, no. 93, "Attuazione delle direttive
2009/72/CE, 2009/73/CE e 2008/92/CE relative a norme comuni per il mercato
interno dell'energia elettrica, del gas naturale e ad una procedura comunitaria
sulla trasparenza dei prezzi al consumator e finale industriale di gas e di energia
elettrica, nonche' abrogazione delle direttive 2003/54/CE e 2003/55/CE;
 Latvia, Energy Law (amended as of 25.03.2014);
 Lithuania, Law on Natural Gas, No VIII-1973, 10 October 2000 (amended as of
13 March 2014 – No XII-772); Law Implementing the Law Amending the Law on
Natural Gas, No. XI-1565, 30 June 2011; Resolution No. 1239 of 28 October
2011, on Approval of the Plan for Perfor ming the Unbundling of Activities and
Control of Natural Gas Undertakings That Do Not Conform to the Requirements
of the Law on Natural Gas of the Republic of Lithuania; Plan for Performing the

Unbundling of Activities and Control of Natural Gas Undertakings That Do Not
Conform to the Requirements of the La w on Natural Gas of the Republic of
Lithuania, Approved by Resolution No. 1239 of 28 October 2011 (Official
Gazette, 2011, No. 130-6170);
 Malta, Subsidiary Legislation 423.21, Natural Gas Market Regulations, 5 May
2011, Legal Notice 167 of 2011, as amended by Legal Notice 189 of 2012;
 Netherlands, Dutch Gas Act (Gaswet) (amended as of April 2013);
 Poland, The Energy Law of 10 April 1997 - consolidated text (Journal of Laws of
2012, item 1059, as amended).;
 Portugal, Decreto Lei 77/2011, de 20 de Junho (20 June 2011);
 Romania, Propunere ANRE de transpunere a Directivei CE si PE nr.73/2009;
 Slovakia, Act No. 251/2012 Coll. on the Energy Industry and on Amendment and
Supplement of several acts;
 Slovenia, Energy Act;
 Spain, Legal Decree (Real Decreto-ley) 13/2012, 30 March 2012;
 Sweden, Natural Gas Act (2005:403) (amended as of 1 January 2012);
 United Kingdom, Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets) Regulations 2011;
 as well as any amendments or extensions, any replacement measures, any renewal
measures, any other implementing measures or legal instruments, and other related
measures of the foregoing.
2. Capacity Allocation Measures
Access to transmission networks within the EU is granted by selling rights to gas suppliers for a
particular volume of capacity. The TEP imposed a system of regulations concerning the manner in
which capacity allocation takes place. Th ese included Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and
Commission Regulation (EU) 984/2013, which was adopted subsequently.
16 These regulations
grant Member States discretion to define interconnection points ("IPs") and entry points. Capacity
at IPs must be sold by auction, whereas capacity at entry points is typically sold on a first-come-
first-served ("FCFS") basis. Capacity for natural gas originating in Russia is disproportionately
defined as entering through IPs and thus is subj ect to auction, whereas domestic-origin and other
third-country-origin gas is generally defined as entering through entry points, making it subject to
FCFS. FCFS (a) results in a tariff freely nego tiated between the contracting parties, while
auctioning is subject to a tariff approved by the regulator; and (b) can be contracted for 20 or
more years, while auctioned capacity is limited to 15 years.
As a result, contrary to the EU's obligations under Article I:1 of GATT 1994, natural gas originating
in third-countries that is transported, placed on the EU market and made subject to FCFS is
accorded an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity that is not immediately and unconditionally
accorded to natural gas originating in Russia, which is transported, placed on the market and
made subject to auction. Such Russian-origin natural gas is also accorded less favorable
treatment than domestic natural gas that is tran sported, placed on the market and made subject
to FCFS, in a manner inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994.

16 Commission Regulation (EU) 984/2013 of 14 October 2013 establishing a Network Code on Capacity
Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and supplementing Regulation (EC) 715/2009, OJ L 273,
15.9.2013, pp. 5-17 ("Commission Regulation (EU) 984/2013").

The Russian Federation understands that these measures are enacted and implemented through
the following legal instruments:
 Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009;
 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009;
 Commission Regulation (EU) 984/2013;
 as well as any amendments or extensions, any replacement measures, any renewal
measures, any implementing measures, and other related measures of the foregoing.
3. "Projects of Common Interest" Measures
The EU has also enacted regulations establishing "trans-European energy infrastructure priority
corridors and areas," including four specific "pri ority gas corridors." The principal regulation,
Regulation (EU) No 347/2013, is referred to as the "TEN-E regulation." It sets forth criteria for
identifying "projects of common interest" or "PCIs," which are accorded priority status, including
within priority gas corridors. The TEN-E regula tion provides for the implementation of PCIs,
including those concerning natural gas, to be fa cilitated by "streamlined and efficient permit
granting procedures," "improved regulatory treatment" and EU financial assistance. In
October 2013, the Commission issued an amendment to the TEN-E regulation setting out the initial
list of PCIs.
17 These include a number of projects that promote and facilitate the production and
transportation of domestic natural gas, as well as the importation and transportation of gas from
various third-countries, including numerous LNG projec ts. However, the list of PCIs excludes any
project designed to facilitate the importation or transportation of natural gas from Russia. The
Russian Federation is not aware of any such projects currently under consideration for designation
as a PCI.
The Russian Federation considers that, contrary to GATS Article II:1, these measures accord
Russian services and service suppliers less favorabl e treatment than is accorded to like services
and service suppliers of other third-countries, which benefit from having projects listed as PCIs.
Natural gas originating in third-countries that is transported and placed on the EU market through
pipelines or other infrastructure listed as PCIs is also accorded an advantage, favor, privilege or
immunity that is not immediately and unconditionally accorded to natural gas originating in Russia,
contrary to Article I:1 of GATT 1994. Such Russian-origin natural gas is also accorded less
favorable treatment than domestic natural gas th at is transported and placed on the market
through pipelines or other infrastructure listed as PCIs, in a manner inconsistent with Article III:4
of GATT 1994.
The Russian Federation understands that these measures are enacted and implemented through
the following legal instruments:
 Directive 2009/73/EC;
 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009;
 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013;
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1391/2013; and
 Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation

17 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1391/2013 of 14 October 2013, amending Regulation (EU)
No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European
energy infrastructure as regards the Union list of projects of common interest, OJ L 349, 21.12.2013,
pp. 28-43 ("Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1391/2013").

(EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010,
OJ L 348, 20.12.2013.
 as well as any amendments or extensions, any replacement measures, any renewal
measures, any implementing measures, and other related measures of the foregoing.
The Russian Federation considers that the above-mentioned measures are inconsistent with the
obligations of the EU and its Member States under Articles II:1, VI:1, VI:5(a), XVI, including XVI:1
and XVI:2(a), (e) and (f), and XV II of the GATS; and Articles I:1, III:4, X:3(a) and XI:1 of the
GATT 1994. These measures also appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the Russian
Federation directly or indirectly under the cited agreements.
The Russian Federation asks that this request be placed on the agenda for the regular meeting of
the Dispute Settlement Body to be held on 19 June 2015.