BRAZIL – EXPORT FINANCING PROGRAMME FOR AIRCRAFT RECOURSE TO ARBITRATION BY BRAZIL UNDER ARTICLE 22.6 OF THE DSU AND ARTICLE 4.11 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT DECISION BY THE ARBITRATORS
Document: DECISION BY THE ARBITRATORS The Decision of the Arbitrators on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and Article 4.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) - is being circulated to all Members,
Date: 28 August 2000
Document codes: WT/DS46/ARB
Complainant: Canada
Respondent: Brazil
Third parties: Australia, EU, South Korea, U.S.
Dispute stage: Retaliation & Arbitration
Agreements cited: Art. XVI  GATT 1994Art. 3, 27  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

BRAZIL – EXPORT FINANCING PROGRAMME FOR AIRCRAFT
RECOURSE TO ARBITRATION BY BRAZIL
UNDER ARTICLE 22.6 OF THE DSU
AND ARTICLE 4.11 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT
DECISION BY THE ARBITRATORS
The Decision of the Arbitrators on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Recourse to
Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and Article 4.11
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) - is being circulated to all Members,
pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated as an unrestricted document from 28 August 2000
pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/160/Rev.1).

I. INTRODUCTION
A. REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION AND SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATORS
1.1 On 10 May 2000, Canada, pursuant to Article 4.10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (hereinafter the "SCM Agreement") and Article 22.2 of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the "DSU"), requested
that a special meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") be convened to authorise Canada to
take appropriate countermeasures in the amount of Canadian dollars (hereinafter "C$") 700 million
per year (). At the DSB meeting held on 22 May 2000, Brazil requested, pursuant to
Article 22.6 of the DSU, that the matter be referred to arbitration.
1
1.2 In response to Brazil’s request, the DSB decided on 22 May 2000 to submit the matter to
arbitration of the original panel in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement. The arbitrators were to determine whether the countermeasures requested by
Canada in document were appropri ate; it being understood that no countermeasures
would be sought pending the Appellate Body report and until after the arbitrators' report in the present
case.
 2
1.3 The arbitration was carried out by the original panel (referred to hereinafter as the
"Arbitrators"), namely:
Chairman: Dr. Dariusz Rosati
Members: Professor Akio Shimizu
Dr. Kajit Sukhum
B. PRESENTATION OF THIS REPORT
1.4 This report is structured as follows: we first address a number of issues which were discussed
in the course of these proceedings and which we considered should be properly reported for the
information of the Members and the transparency of the proceedings. These issues are the specific
timetable applied by the Arbitrators in this case and the request for third party rights submitted by
Australia. Included also is a section on the burden of proof in which we describe how we intend to
consider the various data supplied by the parties, having regard to the fact that this case deals with the
exportations of one single company, the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Empresa Brasileira de
Aeronáutica S.A. (hereinafter "Embraer").
1.5 Secondly, we proceed to the determination of the "appropriate countermeasures" in the
present case, within the meaning of Article 4.10 and 11 of the SCM Agreement. In that context, we
first determine the scope of our task. Thereafter, we proceed to determine whether Canada's proposed
suspension of concessions or other obligations
3 fall within the definition of the term
"countermeasures". Then, we address the question of whether Canada's proposed countermeasures
are "appropriate". In order to do so, we first determine the meaning of the word "appropriate" in
terms of the level of countermeasures that may be deemed "appropriate". This implies that we address
the question of the actual amount of "prohibited subsidy" to be withdrawn pursuant to Article 4.7 of
the SCM Agreement and the issue of whether Canada's measures should be based on the amount of
nullification or impairment suffered or on the full amount of subsidization under the Brazilian

1 See WT/DSB/M/81, para. 10. Brazil later confirmed its request in a communication dated 7 June
2000 (WT/DS46/18). At the meeting of the DSB on 22 May 2000, Brazil also notified the DSB of its decision to
appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the panel report under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
3 See WT/DS46/16.

Programa de Financiamento às Exportaçaões ("PROEX") interest rate equalisation payments. We
then apply the criteria identified and perform our own calculations in order to determine whether the
level of countermeasures proposed by Canada is appropriate.
1.6 Thirdly, we state in our conclusion the level of countermeasures which we consider to be
appropriate in this case.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A. TIMETABLE FOR THE ARBITRATION
2.1 The Arbitrators met with the parties on 30 May 2000 to establish their working procedures
and timetable. Canada and Brazil objected to the original timetable submitted by the Arbitrators for
different reasons. The Arbitrators took into account the comments of the parties. They also
considered the complex legal and factual situation which resulted mainly from two elements:
(a) a bilateral agreement between the parties on recourse to Articles 21 and 22 of the
DSU and Article 4 of the SCM Agreement (hereinafter the "Bilateral Agreement")
which provided for deadlines in relation to the invocation of Article 22;4 and
(b) the fact that Brazil had appealed certain findings of the panel report issued under
Article 21.5 of the DSU before the Appellate Body at the same time as it requested
arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and the fact that the report of the Appellate
Body in the Article 21.5 proceedings was expected to be issued on 21 July 2000.
The time-periods referred to in the Bilateral Agreem ent were difficult to reconcile with the situation
created by Brazil’s appeal.
5 The extent to which the parties’ rights and obligations under the DSU
might have been affected by the Bilateral Agreement also had to be taken into account. The decision
of the Appellate Body could influence the extent to which Brazil may be considered to have brought
its legislation into conformity with its WTO obligations. Due process required that parties be in a
position to meaningfully comment on the content of the Appellate Body report. 6 Thus, the Arbitrators
adopted a timetable which, in their opinion, respected the spirit of Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU and
the purpose of arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4 of the SCM, 7 while not unduly
delaying the issuance of the award.

4 See document WT/DS46/13. The Arbitrators note in this respect that the Bilateral Agreement did not
expressly refer to the fact that a party may appeal the report of the panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU. They
also note that Brazil, at the DSB meeting of 9 December 1999, reserved its right to appeal the Article 21.5 panel
report issued under Article 21.5 (see WT/DSB/M/72, p. 2).
5 At the hearing with the Arbitrators, on 14 July 2000, Brazil stated that the recourse by Canada to
Article 22.2 of the DSU before the completion of the Article 21.5 proceedings was a material breach of the
Bilateral Agreement. Referring to Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), hereinafter the "Vienna Convention"), Brazil declared that it was terminating the
Bilateral Agreement. This issue is addressed in section III.A.1. below.
6 We agree in this respect with the statement of the arbitrators in European Communities – Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Dist ribution of Bananas - Recourse to Ar bitration by the European Communities
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 9 April 1999, WT/DS27/ARB (hereinafter "EC – Bananas (1999)"), para. 2.12:
"[…] given that our own decisions cannot be a ppealed, we consider it imperative to achieve
the greatest degree of clarity possible with a view to avoiding future disagreements between
the parties. Reaching this objective required the parties to have more time to submit to us the
information necessary to complete our tasks." (See also footnote 7 to that paragraph)
7 The Arbitrators are also aware of the question of "sequencing" recourses to Article 21.5 and
Article 22.6 of the DSU. They note that one of the effects of the Bilateral Agreement was to establish such a

2.2 The Arbitrators designed a timetable providing for two alternative dates of issuance of their
report. Should the Appellate Body either decline jurisdiction in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the
DSU or fully uphold the conclusions of the panel under Article 21.5, the report would be issued on
26 July 2000. Should any party consider that the conclusions of the Appellate Body would require
additional submissions by the parties, a second round of submissions and possibly a second hearing
would be organised. The award of the Arbitrators would then be issued on 23 August 2000.
8
2.3 On the basis of the above-mentioned timetable, Canada was invited to submit a
communication by 5 June 2000 explaining the methodology it applied in calculating its proposed level
of suspension. Brazil commented on Canada's methodology on 13 June 2000. The parties made their
initial written submissions on 26 June 2000. The Arbitrators held a meeting with the parties on
14 July 2000. Questions were asked to both parties by the Arbitrators and by Canada to Brazil on
17 July 2000. Both parties replied on 24 July. On the same date, having reviewed the report of the
Appellate Body issued on 21 July, Brazil submitted a dditional comments to the Arbitrators. Canada
commented on 28 July. The Arbitrators, on the basis of the parties' replies to their questions of
24 July, asked additional questions to the parties on 4 August 2000. The parties replied on
14 August 2000. For the reasons mentioned in paragraph 2.14 below, the report was first issued to the
parties on 21 August 2000. It was then issued to the Members on 28 August 2000.
B. R
EQUEST FOR THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
2.4 On 5 June 2000, Australia requested the Arbitrators to register its participation as a third party
given its participation as a third party in the proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU and its
substantial and continuing interest in the dispute.
2.5 At our request, the parties made their views known on 8 June 2000. On the same day, we
informed Australia that we declined its request. Our decision took into account the views expressed
by the parties, the fact that there is no provision in the DSU as regards third party status under
Article 22, and the fact that we do not believe that Australia's rights would be affected by this
proceeding.
2.6 We note in this respect that third party rights were granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations
concerning European Communities – Measures Concerni ng Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 9

"sequencing". By issuing their report after the Appellate Body report, the Arbitrators consider that they have
respected the intention of the parties. The question of whether such a sequencing is actually required under the
DSU is not part of the mandate of the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators also took note of the statement of Canada at
the DSB meeting of 22 May 2000 not to apply countermeasures before the Appellate Body report had been
issued.
8 The Arbitrators would like to recall that the timetable adopted in this case, which substantially departs
from the timetables in previous arbitrations under Ar ticle 22.6 of the DSU, was dictated by the particular
circumstances of the case. It may be argued that, as a result of the Appellate Body report in this case, the
question of whether a panel decision under Article 21.5 can be appealed or not is solved. If this is correct, the
legal uncertainty which led the Arbitrators to act cautiously may be unlikely to occur again in similar
circumstances and the approach followed is unlikely to set a precedent. However, it is the understanding of the
Arbitrators that the issue of the jurisdiction of the Appe llate Body in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU
was not addressed by the Appellate Body because the par ties did not raise it. The Arbitrators have to assume
that the Appellate Body considered its jurisdiction to be particularly obvi ous, because it is generally agreed in
public international law that any tribunal is responsible to address the question of its jurisdiction, whether the
parties raise it or not.
9 See European Communities – Measures Concerning Me at and Meat Products (Hormones), Original
Complaint by Canada, Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU ,
12 July 1999, WT/DS48/ARB, para. 7; European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United States, Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU , 12 July 1999, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 7. These decisions are
hereinafter referred to as "EC – Hormones".

and rejected in the EC – Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration.10 We do not consider that Australia
in this case is in the same situation as Canada and the United States in the EC – Hormones
arbitrations, nor even in the same situation as Ecuador in the EC – Bananas (1999) arbitration.
Indeed, Australia never initiated dispute settlement proceedings against Brazil with respect to the
export financing programme at issue. Moreover, Australia did not draw the attention of the
Arbitrators to any benefits accruing to it or any rights under the WTO Agreement which might be
affected by their decision.
11
C. BURDEN OF PROOF
2.7 Parties have addressed the question of the burden of proof in their submissions. The need for
the Arbitrators to rely on data available only to one party also justifies that we recall at this stage how
we deal with these aspects in this case.
2.8 In application of the well-established WTO practice on the burden of proof in dispute
resolution, it is for the Member claiming that another has acted inconsistently with the WTO rules to
prove that inconsistency.12 In the present case, the action at issue is the Canadian proposal to suspend
concessions and other obligations in the amount of C$700 million as "appropriate countermeasures"
within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. 13 Brazil challenges the conformity of this
proposal with Article 22 of the DSU and Article 4. 10 of the SCM Agreement. It is therefore up to
Brazil to submit evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or "presumption" that the
countermeasures that Canada proposes to take are not "appropriate". Once Brazil has done so, it is for
Canada to submit evidence sufficient to rebut th at "presumption". Should the evidence remain in
equipoise on a particular claim, the Arbitrators would conclude that the claim has not been
established. Should all evidence remain in equipoise, Brazil, as the party bearing the original burden
of proof, would lose the case.
2.9 An issue to be distinguished from the question of who bears the burden of proof is that of the
duty that rests on both parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in presenting evidence to the
Arbitrators. This is why, even though Brazil be ars the original burden of proof, we expected Canada
to come forward with evidence explaining why its proposal constitutes appropriate countermeasures
and we requested it to submit a "methodology paper" describing how it arrived at the level of
countermeasures it proposes.
14
2.10 A related problem faced by the Arbitrators in this case was that, in many instances, the
original data necessary for the calculations or assessments was solely in the hands of Brazil. When
this information originated in the Brazilian government, we assumed good faith and accepted the
information and the supporting evidence provided by Brazil to the extent Canada also accepted it or
did not provide sufficient evidence to put in doubt the accuracy of Brazil’s statements and/or
evidence.
2.11 However, since this case relates to subsidies granted for the purchase of aircraft produced by
the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, Embraer, a large number of data essential for the resolution of our
task is only available to that company. We assumed that Embraer was independent from the Brazilian
government and, for that reason, we could not treat statements from that company as we would have if

10 Op. Cit., para. 2.8.
11 Our decision may have been different if Australia had demonstrated that the countermeasures which
Canada plans to adopt may affect Australia's rights or benefits under the WTO Agreement.
12 See also how this issue is addressed in the decisions by the arbitrators in EC – Hormones, Op. Cit.,
paras. 8 to 11.
13 See WT/DS/46/16.
14 This approach is similar to those followed in the arbitrators' decisions in EC - Bananas (1999) and
EC - Hormones, Op. Cit.

they had originated from a subject of international law. 15 When Brazil only provided statements
regarding information available solely to Embraer, we requested that Brazil support those statements
with materials usually regarded as evidence, such as articles or statements reproduced in the
specialized press, company annual reports or any other certified information originating in Embraer or
other reliable sources. When Brazil was not in a position to provide documentary evidence, we
requested a detailed explanation of the reasons why such evidence was not available and expressed
our willingness to consider written declarations from authorised Embraer officials, if duly certified.
We then weighed this evidence against the evidence submitted by Canada.
2.12 In some instances, such as for the unit price of each model of Embraer’s regional jets, Brazil
declared that it was not in a position to provide the information or evidence supporting it, but stated
that it accepted the data provided by Canada. In these circumstances, we accepted the information
and evidence supplied by Canada.
2.13 Finally, Brazil insisted in the course of the proceedings on the confidentiality of certain
documents it provided to the Arbitrators. We were mindful of the serious problems that could be
caused by the disclosure of certain commercial or financial information. We were also aware of the
fact that the full cooperation of Members and private persons to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, which is essential for an objective assessment of the facts, often depends on the
appropriate protection of confidential information.
2.14 This is the reason why we decided to prepare two versions of this report. The first version,
including the details of our calculations and all the information relied upon, was issued exclusively to
the parties on a confidential basis. The second version, in which the most commercially sensitive
information has been removed, is circulated to the Members.
16 While some data is not included in
this version, it is nevertheless sufficiently detailed for all Members to understand the reasoning of the
Arbitrators and the methodology applied in determining whether the countermeasures proposed by
Canada are appropriate. By doing so, the Arbitrators are of the view that they have respected their
obligations under the DSU while appropriately protecting the confidentiality of certain information,
for which the parties had requested confidentiality.
III. DETERMINATION OF THE "APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES"
A. EXTENT OF THE MANDATE OF THE ARBITRATORS
1. Applicable provisions
(a) WTO provisions
3.1 The Arbitrators note that the provisions which establish their mandate are also discussed in
several of the following sections. Therefore, rather than quoting them each time they are referred to,
the Arbitrators reproduce them here and will refer to this subsection as necessary.
3.2 Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement reads as follows:

15 See preceding paragraph, where we apply a presumption of good faith to statements and evidence
originating in subjects of international law (on production and appraisal of evidence, see, inter alia ,
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") judgement of 9 April 1949 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 32;
ICJ judgement of 11 September 1992 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras,
Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 1992, p. 399, para. 63; ICJ judgement on merits Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 40, para. 60.
16 The text of the version circulated to Members is identical to the text of the confidential version
issued to the parties, with the exception of the information which the Arbitrators, having regard to the comments
of the parties, considered to be confidential. This information was replaced by "xxx".

"In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall
determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate."[footnote 10]
Footnote 10 reads as follows:
"This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in
light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited."
3.3 Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement refers to an arbitration requested under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the DSU. Article 22.6 reads in relevant parts as follows:
"[…] However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed,
or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been
followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be
referred to arbitration. […]"
3.4 The role of the arbitrator under Article 22.6 is described in Article 22.7, which reads in
relevant parts as follows:
"The arbitrator […] shall determine whether the level of such suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also
determine if the proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed
under the covered agreement. However, if the matter referred to arbitration includes
a claim that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been
followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim. In the event the arbitrator
determines that those principles and procedures have not been followed, the
complaining party shall apply them consistent with paragraph 3. […]"
3.5 The Arbitrators are aware that Article 4.10 and 11 has the status of "special or additional rules
and procedures", within the meaning of Article 1.2 of the DSU. Having considered the views
expressed by the parties, we follow the practice of the Appellate Body as defined more specifically in
its report on Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico.
17
(b) Status of the Bilateral Agreement
3.6 Both Canada and Brazil have referred to the Bilateral Agreement, which was concluded on
23 November 1999 and notified to the DSB in an annex to a communication from Canada. 18 At the
hearing with the Arbitrators on 14 July 2000, Brazil declared that it had terminated the Bilateral
Agreement because of a material breach by Canada. Brazil referred to Article 60 of the Vienna

17 Adopted on 25 November 1998, WT/DS60/AB/R (hereinafter " Guatemala – Cement "). See, in
particular, paras. 65 and 66, where the Appellate Body stated that special or additional rules and procedures
referred to in Article 1.2 of the DSU fit together with the generally applicable rules and procedures of the DSU
to form a comprehensive, integrated dispute settlement system (para. 66). Special or additional rules and
procedures shall prevail over the provisions of the DSU to the extent there is a difference between the two sets
of provisions. If there is no "difference", the rules and procedures of the DSU apply together with the special or
additional provisions of the covered agreement. A special or additional rule or procedure should only be found
to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to one provision will lead to a violation of
the other provision, that is, in case of conflict between them (para. 65); see also Appellate Body Report in
Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , adopted on 20 March 1997, WT/DS22/AB/R, p. 14. We
therefore read these provisions as a whole and give a us eful meaning to all, in application of the principle of
effective interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).
18 WT/DS46/13.

Convention. Brazil thus stated that, pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU, the Arbitrators should
determine that the proposed countermeasures are not allowed under the SCM Agreement on the
grounds that the time within which they may be authorized has expired. Canada considered that the
Arbitrators do not have authority to interpret the Bilateral Agreement. Canada added that there is
nothing in the SCM Agreement that provides that a Member must request or receive authorization to
take countermeasures within a particular period of time. Furthermore, Article 22.6 of the DSU does
not provide that a Member is required to take action within a particular period of time.
3.7 With respect to the Bilateral Agreement, the Arbitrators consider that the first question to
address is whether it relates to the tasks of the Arbitrators. Without interpreting the Bilateral
Agreement, the Arbitrators note that the only provision which could be taken to relate to their work is
paragraph 5,
19 which provides for time periods for DSB action under the first sentence of Article 22.6
of the DSU and for a 30 day deadline for the completion of the arbitration.
3.8 The Arbitrators note that the parties disagree as to the meaning of the term "report under
Article 21.5 of the DSU" in paragraph 5 of the Bilateral Agreement. However, we recall that, at the
DSB meeting of 22 May 2000, it was agreed not to seek countermeasures "pending the Appellate
Body report and until after the arbitration report in the present case."20 We consider that, by doing so,
the parties have amended the terms of paragraph 5 of the Bilateral Agreement. Since the date of
issuance of the report proposed by the Arbitrators has not led to objections by the parties, we consider
that we acted in conformity with our obligations under the norms applicable to our task. We therefore
do not need to discuss the question of whether we could interpret the Bilateral Agreement or whether
it ceased to apply to the Arbitrators' tasks after Brazil's alleged application of Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention
21on 14 July 2000.
3.9 Brazil also claimed that, as a result of the termination of the Bilateral Agreement, the
Arbitrators should, pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU, determine that the proposed countermeasures
are not allowed under the SCM Agreement on the grounds that the time within which they may be
authorised has expired.
3.10 We note that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention provides for the "termination" of a treaty
by one party in response to a "material breach" by the other party. Article 70 of the Vienna
Convention nevertheless provides that the termination of a treaty does not affect any right, obligation
or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination. We
conclude that, even assuming that the Bilateral Agreement has been terminated by Brazil on
14 July 2000, the request by Canada under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, to the extent it was
made in accordance with the terms of the Bila teral Agreement, remains unaffected by the
termination.22 We therefore do not find it necessary to address further this question.

19 Paragraph 5 of the Bilateral Agreement reads as follows:
"Pursuant to footnote 6 to Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, Brazil and Canada agree that the
deadline for DSB action under the first sentence of Article 22.6 of the DSU shall be 15 days
after the circulation of the report under Article 21.5of the DSU, and that the deadline specified
in the third sentence of Article 22.6 of the DSU for completion of arbitration shall be 30 days
after the matter is referred for arbitration."
20 WT/DSB/M/81, para.31.
21 See above, para. 3.6.
22 Furthermore, we note that the interpretation of the first sentence of Article 22.6 of the DSU
suggested by Brazil has not been followed by the DSB so far. For instance, the request by Ecuador to suspend
concessions or other obligations under Article 22.6 of the DSU in the case on European Communities – Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (hereinafter "EC – Bananas "), adopted on 25 September

2. Specific claims and arguments raised by Brazil
3.11 The parties agree that the Arbitrators are called upon to determine whether the level of
countermeasures is appropriate. Having regard to the terms of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement
and Article 22.7 of the DSU, we agree with them that we have, pursuant to those provisions,
jurisdiction to determine whether the level or the amount of countermeasures proposed by Canada is
appropriate.
3.12 More particularly, we note that Brazil, at the DSB meeting of 22 May 2000, where it
requested arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, objected
to the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations proposed by Canada. We note, however,
that Brazil has, in the course of the proceedings, presented certain claims or arguments the
admissibility of which needs to be addressed at this stage.
3.13 First, in a communication circulated as document WT/DS46/18, Brazil argued that the
principles and the procedures set out in Article 22.3 of the DSU had not been followed by Canada.
Canada has objected that this claim is not within the mandate of the Arbitrators. At the hearing of the
Arbitrators, Brazil stated that "Since Canada's current retaliation proposal appears to fall within the
provisions of Article 22.3(a), Brazil is not today raising any issue under Article 22.3. Brazil reserves
its right to do so in the event that Canada modifies or expands its requested countermeasures."
3.14 It is within our jurisdiction to determine the scope of our mandate. We consider that if
Brazil's claim were part of our mandate, Brazil would be entitled to develop it at any stage of the
proceedings.23 However, we would like to specify first that we are doubtful that Canada may "modify
or expand its requested countermeasures" in the course of the present proceedings. We note that, at
the time of issuance of this report, Canada has actually not notified anything of that sort.
3.15 Furthermore, we reviewed the minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 May 2000, where our
mandate was adopted by the DSB. We note that, during that meeting, Brazil stated that:
"[it] ha[d] to object to the level of suspension proposed by Canada, which was
entirely arbitrary"24
However, we did not find any clear evidence that, at that meeting, Brazil actually raised the claim that
the principles and the procedures set out in Article 22.3 of the DSU had not been followed.
Consequently, the statement of Brazil regarding that claim in document WT/DS/46/18 does not refer
to a claim which is part of our terms of reference, as established at the DSB meeting of 22 May 2000.
Therefore, we do not find it necessary to address this point any further.
3.16 Second, Brazil also argued in its oral presentation that certain measures which Canada
planned to adopt in relation to certain obligations under Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 and in
relation to certain obligations under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures were not appropriate.
25
3.17 While the claim raised by Brazil might seem to relate to the nature of the measures at issue,
we consider that it is closely linked to the level of the countermeasures. Indeed, according to Brazil, it
is not clear how the impact of these measures will be assessed in terms of the value of the Brazilian
trade to be affected. Since, as mentioned above, the parties agree that we have jurisdiction to

1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, was made on 8 November 1999, several months after the adoption of the panel report
under Article 21.5 (at the DSB meeting of 6 May 1999).
23 See Appellate Body report in EC – Bananas, Op. Cit, paras. 145-147.
24 WT/DSB/M/81, para. 10.
25 Brazil's oral presentation, 14 July 2000, para. 3.

determine whether the level of countermeasures is appropriate, we consider that, if necessary, we may
decide on the relevance of the application of such measures by Canada.
3. Task of the Arbitrators
3.18 As to our task, we follow the approach adopted by previous arbitrators under Article 22.6 of
the DSU.26 We will have not only to determine whether Canada’s proposal constitutes "appropriate
countermeasures", but also to determine the level of countermeasures we consider to be appropriate in
case we find that Canada's level of countermeasures is not appropriate, if necessary by applying our
own methodology.
B. ARE CANADA'S PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES "APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES"?
1. Summary of Canada's methodology and Brazil's counter approach
(a) Canada's methodology
3.19 Hereafter is a summary of Canada's methodology, as understood by the Arbitrators. 27 In
Canada's calculation, the level of countermeasures is directly proportionate on both an annual and
total basis to the size of the prohibited subsidies Brazil pays out in support of its regional aircraft
exports. Canada estimates the subsidy by multiplying the average subsidy per exported aircraft by
Brazil's announced annual rate of production for these aircraft. The cumulative total of Brazil's
subsidies, based on Embraer's order book, is C$4.1 billion with a present value of C$3.2 billion based
on the annual profile of regional aircraft deliveries. In this calculation, Canada has taken into
account:
(a) The average level of prohibited subsidy found to apply to Brazil's regional aircraft
exports pursuant to contracts concluded prior to 18 November 1999 for aircraft
delivered after that date under the PROEX regime that applies to those contracts;
(b) the average level of prohibited subsidy on regional aircraft to be delivered pursuant to
contracts concluded after 18 November 1999 under the modified PROEX regime; and
(c) Brazil's announced production rates for ERJ-135/140/145 and ERJ 170/190.
3.20 Canada's calculation results in annual prohibited subsidies equal to United States dollar
(hereinafter "US$") 480 million. At an exchange rate of C$1.47 to US$, this is equivalent to
C$705.6 million per year.
3.21 In the alternative, Canada also provided a calculation based on the value of the harm caused
by the subsidy to the Canadian industry. In that calculation, Canada estimates that the present value
of the harm to Canada's regional aircraft industry is C$ 4.7 billion.
3.22 However, Canada specified that its preference was to use the option based on the amount of
the subsidy granted by Brazil.
(b) Brazil's counter approach
3.23 As the Arbitrators understand it, Brazil's position can be summarised as follows. Brazil
considers that the Arbitrators must determine what annual prospective Canadian exports of regional

26 See Article 22.6 arbitrations in EC – Hormones, Op. Cit., para. 12.
27 See Canada's explanation of its methodology in the paper submitted to the Arbitrators on
5 June 2000. This methodology was developed in Annex I to its written submission of 26 June 2000.

aircraft would be if Brazil had withdrawn PROEX from undelivered aircraft as of 18 November 1999
and for transactions entered into after 18 November 1999.28
3.24 Brazil differentiates between sales of aircraft made before 18 November 1999 – the date by
which it was supposed to have complied with the recommendations of the DSB – and sales made after
that date. Brazil provides separate calculations of the level of impairment of Canada’s trade with
respect to sales of aircraft which took place before 18 November 1999 but for which delivery had not
taken place at that date and sales made after 18 November 1999. For sales made after 18 November
1999, Brazil bases the appropriate countermeasures by reference to three elements: Brazil’s number of
deliveries of aircraft each year, the number of those sales that might have been won by Canada if
PROEX had been cancelled as of 18 November 1999, and the likely amount of the subsidy on each
aircraft.
3.25 First, Brazil took the projected number of deliveries of aircraft per year as 168. Brazil then
considered how many of these sales might have been won by Canada if PROEX had been cancelled as
of 18 November 1999. In discussing the situati on of undelivered aircraft, Brazil explained that
Canada would not compete for sales of several categories of aircraft. Thus, because Canada does not
produce a 37-seat regional jet (and has no apparent plans to do so), sales of the ERJ-135 do not
compete with Canada’s industry and should be excluded from the calculation. Similarly, there are a
number of contracts for which, for various technical/operational reasons, Canada’s aircraft did not
compete. Brazil found that, out of the total of 942 undelivered aircraft, Canada may only have
competed for and won sales of 44 of these aircraft had PROEX been cancelled as of
18 November 1999. Brazil assumed that the same competitive and technical conditions would apply
for future sales after 18 November 1999. Brazil therefore multiplied the annual production level of
168 aircraft by the ratio of undelivered sales that Canada might win to the total number of undelivered
sales (44/942). The result was 8 aircraft per y ear that Canada might possibly win were PROEX
cancelled as of 18 November 1999.
3.26 Second, this number of aircraft must be multiplied by the average amount of the prohibited
portion of the subsidy per aircraft. Brazil calculated this amount as US$xxx per aircraft. Multiplying
this amount by 8 (the number of aircraft explained above) gives a determination of US$xxx as the
annual level of impairment of Canada’s trade with respect to sales made by Brazil after 18 November
1999.
(c) Preliminary remarks regarding the consequences of these approaches on the Arbitrators' task
3.27 The Arbitrators note that Canada is not requesting countermeasures corresponding to the level
of nullification or impairment it suffers. The Arbitrators also note that both parties, even though they
disagree on the subsequent steps, suggested that the calculation of the level of appropriate
countermeasures could be based on the amount of subs idy. As a result, we take Canada's approach as
a starting point and proceed to determine whether, and to what extent, this approach results in
"appropriate countermeasures", having regard to Brazil's arguments.
2. Does the term "countermeasures" in Arti cle 4.10 and 11 of the SCM Agreement apply
to the type of countermeasures which Canada plans to take?
3.28 In a communication dated 10 May 2000, Canada informed the DSB that it would request the
authorization from the DSB to take countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions and
other obligations under GATT 1994 and other Annex 1A agreements. Canada also notified a list of

28 Brazil's approach and the figures referred to hereafter are contained essentially in paragraphs 66 to 72
of its written submission of 26 June 2000 and in its reply of 24 July to question No. 21 of the Arbitrators.

products for which concessions could be suspended.29 Except for the claims referred to in the previous
section, Brazil did not comment in the course of the proceedings on the measures planned by Canada.
3.29 We do not consider that we need to elaborate further on this issue. In particular, we do not
need to identify a generally applicable definition of "countermeasures". We, therefore, note that both
parties agree that the term "countermeasures", as used in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, may
include suspension of concessions or other obligations. We have found no reason why we should
disagree with the parties.
3. Meaning of "appropriate"
(a) Issues before the Arbitrators
3.30 The core of the arguments exchanged by the parties relates to what should be considered an
appropriate level of countermeasures. Canada considers that countermeasures are appropriate if they
correspond to the amount of the prohibited export subsidy granted. Brazil agrees that the starting-
point for the calculation of the appropriate level of countermeasure should be the subsidy granted.
However, Brazil considers that this amount does not correspond to the full payment under the PROEX
interest rate equalization programme. Brazil considers that only the part of the payments used to
"secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms" within the meaning given to those
terms in item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
30 constitutes a prohibited subsidy. Brazil
also considers that, since Canada chose to take countermeasures in the form of suspension of
concessions or other obligations, the countermeasures adopted by Canada must be equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment pursuant to Article 22.4 of the DSU.
3.31 The Arbitrators are of the view that two main issues have to be addressed with respect to this
question in the present case:
(a) since both parties agree that the determination of an appropriate level of
countermeasures can be based on the amount of the subsidy granted, we must first
determine what constitutes the subsidy, the withdrawal of which has been
recommended;
(b) the second issue is to determine whether the level of countermeasures should
correspond to the amount of the subsidy to be withdrawn or be equivalent to the level
of nullification or impairment caused to Canada, with a consequence on the number
of aircraft sales which should be taken into account.
We proceed to address these two main issues and the questions related to them successively hereafter.
(b) Is the "subsidy", to be used as the basis for the calculation of the level of appropriate
countermeasures, the portion of the PROEX payments that reduces the net interest rate below
the appropriate benchmark rate, or the full amount of the PROEX payments?
3.32 We note that Brazil has argued in its written submission of 26 June 2000 that the
determination of the appropriate countermeasures based on the amount of the prohibited subsidy in
this case should be limited to the difference betw een the amount of the PROEX support provided in
each transaction and the appropriate benchmark, be it the rate of the US Treasury 10-year bond plus
20 basis points ("T-bill plus 20") used in the revised PROEX programme or the Commercial Interest
Reference Rate ("CIRR") established under the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially
Supported Export Credits. Brazil recalled at the hearing with the Arbitrators that this issue was

29 WT/DS46/16.
30 Annex I to the SCM Agreement (hereinafter the "Illustrative List").

pending before the Appellate Body as part of its appeal of the findings of the panel under Article 21.5
of the DSU. On 24 July, after the circulation of the Appellate Body report in the proceedings under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, 31 Brazil submitted comments in which it claimed that the Appellate Body
had concluded that only the portion of the PROEX payments that reduces the net interest rate below
an appropriate benchmark constitutes a prohibited subsidy. Canada contested Brazil’s interpretation
in remarks filed on 28 July 2000.
3.33 We recall that the first panel established in this case (hereinafter the "Original Panel")
concluded that PROEX payments on exports of Brazilian regional aircraft are subsidies within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement which are contingent upon export performance within
the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
32 This conclusion was not modified by the
original Appellate Body report. We also recall that the Original Panel did not differentiate in its
findings between the portion of the "payments" which is not "used to secure a material advantage
within the field of export credit terms", within the meaning of item (k) of the Illustrative List, and the
portion which is or may be used for that purpose. The original Appellate Body report did not rule on
the issue either. One of the reasons was that the issue of whether such "payments" would be a
contrario "permitted" under the SCM Agreement led to no findings by the Original Panel and the lack
of findings was not appealed.
33
3.34 However, the panel in the proceedings initiated under Article 21.5 of the DSU (hereinafter the
"Article 21.5 Panel") was confronted with a specific allegation of Brazil that, as a result of Brazil's
Resolution 2667 of 19 November 1999, PROEX payments are no longer used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms and are hence "permitted" by the first paragraph of
item (k) of the Illustrative List.34 The Article 21.5 Panel considered that:
"[…] Brazil's defence in this dispute depends upon the proposition that the first
paragraph of item (k) may be used to establish that an export subsidy within the
meaning of item (k) is "permitted" by the SCM Agreement. It further depends upon
Brazil establishing that (a) PROEX payments are 'payments' within the meaning of
item (k); and (b) PROEX payments are not 'used to secure a material advantage in the
field of export credit terms'."
35
3.35 On appeal, the Appellate Body stated:
"[…] we agree with the Article 21.5 Panel that in order for Brazil to establish its
alleged "affirmative defence", Brazil must succeed in its legal and factual arguments
on each of the three issues examined by the Article 21.5 Panel."36
3.36 The Appellate Body then proceeded with the exam ination of the last issue dealt with by the
Article 21.5 Panel, i.e. whether subsidies under the revised PROEX are "used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms." Having found that Brazil had failed to demonstrate that
PROEX payments are not "used to secure a materi al advantage in the field of export credit terms"

31 Report of the Appellate Body on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, adopted on 4 August 2000, WT/DS46/AB/RW.
32 Panel Report on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , adopted on 20 August 1999,
WT/DS46/R, para. 7.14.
33 Ibid. paras. 7.18 and 7.37; Appellate Body Report on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, adopted on 20 August 1999, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 187.
34 Panel Report on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, adopted on 4 August 2000, WT/DS46/RW, para. 6.20.
35 Ibid., para. 6.22.
36 Appellate Body Report on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada
to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Op. Cit., para. 58.

within the meaning of the first paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative List, 37 the Appellate Body did
not believe it was necessary to examine the other two issues identified by the Article 21.5 Panel. The
Appellate Body declared the findings of the pane l on these two issues "moot, and, thus, of no legal
effect".38
3.37 We consider that, in order to reach a conclusion consistent with the various decisions adopted
in the course of this case, we have to start from the findings and conclusions of the Appellate Body
report in the Article 21.5 proceedings. We note that, in paragraph 82(b) of its report, the Appellate
Body "[upheld] the Article 21.5 Panel findings that payments made under the revised PROEX are
prohibited by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement and are not justified under item (k) of the Illustrative
List."39 The Original Panel and the Article 21.5 Panel always made it clear that, when they referred to
"PROEX payments", they referred to the PROEX interest rate equalization payments as a whole, not
to a portion of such payments under PROEX. 40
3.38 If, as Brazil suggested, the Appellate Body had meant in its report in the Article 21.5
proceedings that the prohibited subsidy was only the portion beyond the appropriate benchmark under
item (k) of the Illustrative List, it would have ha d to specify it, since the Appellate Body did not
contest in the original proceedings the fact that "PROEX payments", as meaning the full interest rate
equalization payments, were considered to be a prohibited subsidy. It could be argued that the
Appellate Body did not have to specify whether the prohibition applied to the full PROEX payment or
only to part of it. Since it found that Brazil had not provided evidence that the subsidy was not used
to secure a "material advantage", even the portion of the PROEX payments going beyond the CIRR
was a prohibited subsidy. However, as mentioned above, the meaning given to the term "PROEX
payments" by the Original Panel and by the Article 21.5 Panel was clear. If the Appellate body had
disagreed with that meaning, an explanation would have been essential in its report under Article 21.5
of the DSU. In the absence of such a clarification, we can only conclude that, by "[upholding] the
Article 21.5 Panel findings that payments made under the revised PROEX are prohibited by Article 3
of the SCM Agreement and are not justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List", the Appellate
Body understood the term "payments" as meaning the full equalization payment under PROEX.
3.39 Moreover, Brazil's argumentation in its additional comments of 24 July 2000 seems to be
based on a confusion between the notion of "benefit" under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and the
notion of "material advantage" in item (k) of the Illustrative List, a confusion against which the
Appellate Body carefully cautioned in its original report.
41 Even if an export subsidy is "justified"

37 Ibid., para. 77.
38 Ibid., paras. 78 and 81. Moreover, we note that the Appellate Body stated in para. 80 of its report
that:
"If Brazil had demonstrated that the payments made under the revised PROEX were not 'used
to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms', and that such payments were
'payments' by Brazil of 'all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in
obtaining credit', then we would have been prepar ed to find that the payments made under the
revised PROEX are justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List." (Emphasis added)
This seems to imply that, in spite of its statement at paragraph 58 that "in order for Brazil to establish
its alleged "affirmative defence", Brazil must succeed in its legal and factual arguments on each of the three
issues examined by the Article 21.5 Panel", the Appellate Body would have been ready to find that the payments
made under the revised PROEX are justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List if Brazil had proven two of
the three issues. The Appellate Body also stated that it did not interpret footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement and
did not opine on the scope of footnote 5 or on the meaning of any other items in the Illustrative List.
39 Emphasis added. Italics in the original.
40 See, e.g., Original Panel Report, Op. Cit., paras. 7.14; 7.74; 8.1 and 8.2; Article 21.5 Panel Report,
Op. Cit. , section VI.C.2.(c) "Conclusions and closing remarks".
41 Op. Cit., para. 179.

under item (k) because it is not used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms,
it still confers a benefit and it is still an export subsidy.42 A possible justification under item (k), like a
justification under Article XX of the GATT 1994, does not change the legal nature of a measure. If
the justification did not exist, it would be that same amount of subsidy for which justification was
sought which would be prohibited, because the fact that a subsidy is justified does not mean that it is
no longer a subsidy. It simply means that it is not a prohibited subsidy.
3.40 We also note that Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides that "If the measure in question
is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw
the subsidy without delay." We are therefore of the view that the subsidy to be withdrawn within the
meaning of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, and consequently the one on which we must base our
calculations, is the full amount of the PROEX interest rate equalisation payments on exports of
Brazilian regional aircraft, not the portion of those payments which goes beyond the CIRR rate or any
other appropriate benchmark rate under item (k) of the Illustrative List.
(c) Should the level of countermeasures correspond to the amount of the subsidy granted by
Brazil or be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment suffered by Canada?
(i) Analysis of the relevant provisions
3.41 Canada considered that, since it could have proposed countermeasures based on the level of
nullification or impairment suffered, its proposal based on the amount of subsidy per aircraft is a
fortiori "appropriate", because it is much less.
43 Brazil claimed in substance that nullification or
impairment has always been the yardstick in GATT 1947 and it has been carried into the WTO
Agreement. Brazil agreed that Canada could have requested the authorization to grant a counter-
subsidy. However, since Canada has chosen to impose countermeasures in the form of suspension of
concessions or other obligations, it must comply with the requirements of Article 22.4 of the DSU.
3.42 In accordance with Article 3.2 of the DSU, we proceed with an analysis of the meaning of the
term "appropriate" based on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
3.43 Examining only the ordinary meaning of the term "appropriate" does not allow us to reply to
the question before us, since dictionary definitions are insufficiently specific. Indeed, the relevant
dictionary definitions of the word "appropriate" are "specially suitable; proper".
44 However, they point
in the direction of meeting a particular objective.
3.44 The first context of the term "appropriate" is the word "countermeasures", of which it is an
adjective. While the parties have referred to dictionary definitions for the term "countermeasures", we
find it more appropriate to refer to its meaning in general international law 45 and to the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) on state responsibility, which addresses the notion of
countermeasures.46 We note that the ILC work is based on relevant state practice as well as on

42 Ibid. See also para. 180.
43 See para. 3.21 above.
44 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), p. 103; Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary
(1994), p. 48.
45 See, e.g., the Naulilaa arbitral award (1928), UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, p.
1028 and Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (France v. United States of America)
(1978) International Law Reports, Vol. 54 (1979), p. 338. See also, inter alia , the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility With Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the International Law Commission on First Reading
(January 1997), hereinafter the "Draft Articles" and the draft articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting
Committee on second reading, A/CN.4/L 600, 11 August 2000. Even though the latter modify a number of
provisions of the Draft Articles, they do not affect the terms to which we refer in this report.
46 We also note that, on the basis of the definition of "countermeasures" in the Draft Articles, the notion
of "appropriate countermeasures" would be more general than the term "equivalent to the level of nullification

judicial decisions and doctrinal writings, which constitute recognized sources of international law. 47
When considering the definition of "countermeasures" in Article 47 of the Draft Articles, 48 we note
that countermeasures are meant to "induce [the State which has committed an internationally
wrongful act] to comply with its obligations under articles 41 to 46". We note in this respect that the
Article 22.6 arbitrators in the EC – Bananas (1999) arbitration made a similar statement. 49 We
conclude that a countermeasure is "appropriate" inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.
3.45 In this respect, we recall that the meas ure in respect of which the right to take
countermeasures has been requested is a prohibited export subsidy falling under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides in this respect that if a measure is
found to be a prohibited subsidy, it shall be withdrawn without delay. In such a case, effectively
"inducing compliance" means inducing the withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy.
3.46 In contrast, other illegal measures do not have to be withdrawn without delay. As specified in
Article 3.8 of the DSU, if a measure violates a provision of a covered agreement, the measure is
considered prima facie to cause nullification or impairment. However, if the defendant succeeds in
rebutting the charge, no nullification or impairment will be found in spite of the violation. Such a
rebuttal may be impossible to make in a number of cases. Yet, this does not change the fact that the
concept of nullification or impairment is not found in Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. The
Arbitrators are of the view that meaning must be given to the fact that the negotiators did not include
the concept of nullification or impairment in those articles, whilst it is expressly mentioned in Article
5 of the SCM Agreement, which deals with the adverse effects of actionable subsidies.
3.47 A first approach would be to consider that the concept of nullification or impairment does not
apply to Article 4 of the SCM Agreement. We note in this respect that, in relation to actionable
subsidies, Article 5 refers to nullification or impairment as only one of the three categories of adverse
effects. This could mean that another test than nullification or impairment could also apply in the
context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement.
3.48 That said, we note that the Original Panel concluded that, since a violation had been found, a
prima facie case of nullification or impairment had been made within the meaning of Article 3.8 of
the DSU, which Brazil had not rebutted. In that context, we are more inclined to consider that no
reference was expressly made to nullification or impairment in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement for
the following reasons:
(a) a violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement entails an irrebuttable presumption of
nullification or impairment. It is therefore not necessary to refer to it;
(b) the purpose of Article 4 is to achieve the withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy. In
this respect, we consider that the requirement to withdraw a prohibited subsidy is of a

or impairment". It would basically include it. Limiting its meaning to that given to the term "equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment" would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness in interpretation of
treaties.
47 See Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
48 We note that Canada objects to us using the Dr aft Articles in this interpretation process. Canada
argues that the Draft Articles are not "relevant rules of in ternational law applicable to the relations between the
parties" within the meaning of Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention. As already mentioned, we use the
Draft Articles as an indication of the agreed meaning of certain terms in general international law.
49 Op. Cit. , para. 6.3. In that case, the arbitrators had to determine the level of nullification or
impairment. Since the Article 22.6 arbitrators in the EC – Bananas case considered that measures equivalent to
the level of nullification or impairment can induce compliance, it could be argued that in the present case too,
countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment should be sufficient to induce
compliance. However, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas were instructed by Article 22.7 to determine whether the
proposed measures were equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.

different nature than removal of the specific nullification or impairment caused to a
Member by the measure. 50 The former aims at removing a measure which is
presumed under the WTO Agreement to cause negative trade effects, irrespective of
who suffers those trade effects and to what extent. The latter aims at eliminating the
effects of a measure on the trade of a given Member;
(c) the fact that nullification or impairment is established with respect to a measure does
not necessarily mean that, in the presence of an obligation to withdraw that measure,
the level of appropriate countermeasures should be based only on the level of
nullification or impairment suffered by the Member requesting the authorisation to
take countermeasures.
3.49 We also note that, when the negotiators have intended to limit countermeasures to the effect
caused by the subsidy on a Member's trade, they have used different terms than "appropriate
countermeasures". Article 7.9 and 10, which is the provision equivalent for actionable subsidies to
Article 4.9 and 10 for prohibited subsidies, uses the terms "commensurate with the degree and nature
of the adverse effects determined to exist". In that context, we do not consider the arguments made by
Brazil in its oral presentation and based on the central position of the notion of nullification in the
GATT to be compelling. As we have seen above, the term "appropriate countermeasures" does not
impose similar constraints.
3.50 The parties have also discussed the meaning of footnotes 9 and 10 to, respectively,
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement. The content of those footnotes is identical;
they both read as follows:
" This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in
light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited."
3.51 We agree that, as those footnotes are drafted, it seems difficult to clearly identify how the
second part of the sentence ("in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions
are prohibited") relates to the first part of the sentence ("This expression is not meant to allow
countermeasures that are disproportionate"). This is probably due to the use of the words "in light of
the fact that". However, since the text of the treaty is supposed to be the most achieved expression of
the intent of the parties, we should refrain from second guessing the negotiators at this point. We can
nonetheless note that the reference to the fact that the subsidies dealt with are prohibited can most
probably be considered more as an aggravating factor than as a mitigating factor. We also find the
use of the word "disproportionate" to be interesting in light of the term "out of proportion" used in
Article 49 of the Draft Articles. We do not draw any firm conclusions as to the meaning of footnotes 9
and 10. However, we note that footnotes 9 and 10 at least confirm that the term "appropriate" in
Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement should not be given the same meaning as the term
"equivalent" in Article 22 of the DSU.
51

50 We note that Article 3.7 of the DSU refers to th e "withdrawal of the measures concerned" as a first
objective. However, we also note that, contrary to Article 3.7 of the DSU, Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement
does not provide for any alternative than the withdrawal of the measure once it has been found to be a prohibited
subsidy.
51 We are mindful of the fact that, from the point of view of a textual interpretation, "equivalent" and
"appropriate" should not be given the same meaning. Interpreters are not permitted to assume such a thing.
What we mean is that the term "appropriate", read in the light of footnotes 9 and 10, may allow for more
leeway than the word "equivalent" in terms of assessing the appropriate level of countermeasures. A
countermeasure remains "appropriate" as long as it is not disproportionate, having also regard to the fact that
the measure at issue is a prohibited subsidy.

3.52 Brazil raised a number of non-textual arguments in support of its position. We consider our
analysis based on the text of the SCM Agreement sufficiently compelling. We will nevertheless
discuss these other arguments for the sake of completeness.
3.53 Brazil agreed with Canada that the countermeasures should relate to the amount of the
subsidy.52 Brazil nonetheless claimed that countermeasures based on the full amount of the PROEX
interest rate equalization payment and not taking into account solely the number of sales of aircraft
with respect to which Canada suffers nullification or impairment would be disproportionate.
3.54 Our interpretation of the scope of the term "appropriate countermeasures" in Article 4 of the
SCM Agreement above shows that this would not be the case. Indeed, the level of countermeasures
simply corresponds to the amount of subsidy which has to be withdrawn. Actually, given that export
subsidies usually operate with a multiplying effect (a given amount allows a company to make a
number of sales, thus gaining a foothold in a gi ven market with the possibility to expand and gain
market shares), we are of the view that a calculation based on the level of nullification or impairment
would, as suggested by the calculation of Canada based on the harm caused to its industry, produce
higher figures than one based exclusively on the amount of the subsidy. On the other hand, if the
actual level of nullification or impairment is subs tantially lower than the subsidy, a countermeasure
based on the actual level of nullification or impairment will have less or no inducement effect and the
subsidizing country may not withdraw the measure at issue.
53
3.55 Brazil also claimed that countermeasures based on the full amount of the subsidy would be
highly punitive. We understand the term "punitive" within the meaning given to it in the Draft
Articles.54 A countermeasure becomes punitive when it is not only intended to ensure that the State in
breach of its obligations bring its conduct into conformity with its international obligations, but
contains an additional dimension meant to sanction the action of that State. Since we do not find a
calculation of the appropriate countermeasures based on the amount of the subsidy granted to be
disproportionate, we conclude that, a fortiori, it cannot be punitive.
55
3.56 We note that Brazil also claimed that Canada could not request the right to take
countermeasures in the amount of the subsidy because it chose to take countermeasures in the form of
suspension of concessions or other obligations and, pursuant to Article 22.4 of the DSU, such
measures must be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.
3.57 We read the provisions of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as special or additional rules.
In accordance with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Guatemala – Cement,
56 we must read the
provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules in the SCM Agreement so as to give
meaning to all of them, except if there is a conflict or a difference. While we agree that in practice
there may be situations where countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment
will be appropriate, we recall that the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3
and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in
the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment.

52 Brazil's comments on Canada's methodology paper, 13 June 2000, para. 2.
53 Moreover, Brazil's approach seems to be contradictory in so far as it combines the level of the
subsidy with its trade effect. By using the level of subsidy as the starting-point of its analysis, Brazil disregards
the fact that trade effects may have no direct relation with the amount of the subsidy itself.
54 See Draft Articles, p. 307.
55 In this respect we recall our comment in footnote 43 above that "appropriate" should not be given the
same meaning as "equivalent", but should be understood as giving more discretion in the appraisal of the level
of countermeasures against prohibited subsidies.
56 Op. Cit., para. 65.

3.58 On the contrary, requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or
other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the
principle of effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of
prohibited subsidies. Indeed, as shown in the present case, 57 other countermeasures than suspension
of concessions or obligations may not always be feasible because of their potential effects on other
Members. This would be the case of a counter-subsidy granted in a sector where other Members than
the parties compete with the products of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the
countermeasure may not be in a position to induce compliance.
3.59 We are mindful that our interpretation may, at a first glance, seem to cause some risk of
disproportionality in case of multiple complainants. However, in such a case, the arbitrator could
allocate the amount of appropriate countermeasures among the complainants in proportion to their
trade in the product concerned. The "inducing" effect would most probably be very similar.
3.60 For the reasons set out above, we conclude that, when dealing with a prohibited export
subsidy, an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount of the subsidy is
"appropriate".
58
(ii) Implications with respect to the number of aircraft sales to be taken into account in the
calculation of the appropriate countermeasures
Treatment of sales of certain models of aircraft
3.61 In its submissions, Brazil excluded a number of sales on the grounds that they did not give
rise to PROEX payments. This is the case for the sales of the xxx xxxxxxx to xxxxxxxx and xx
xxxxxxx. Brazil also excluded certain sales in which competition was based on other factors than
price (such as weight or maintenance costs of the aircraft, passengers and freight capacity and airport
certifications). Finally, Brazil excluded the sales of ERJ-135 on the grounds that they do not compete
with the turboprop aircraft produced by Bombardier.
3.62 Since we selected the amount of the subsidy as the basis for the countermeasures and not the
level of nullification or impairment suffered by Canada, it is appropriate and logical to include in our
calculation all the sales of subsidised aircraft, whether they compete or not with Bombardier's
production. However, consistent with our approach on the burden of proof, we excluded all the sales
where Brazil demonstrated that no PROEX interest rate equalization payments had been made and we
assumed that future sales of the xxx xxxxxxx and xxx would not benefit from the PROEX interest rate
equalization payments.
Treatment of the contracts pre-dating 18 November 1999
3.63 Brazil has claimed that the deliveries of aircraft for which PROEX letters of commitment had
been issued before 18 November 1999 should be excluded from the calculation of the appropriate
countermeasures, and that only sales subsequent to the 90 day implementation period should be
considered.

57 Canada mentioned that it could have applied a counter-subsidy but refrained from doing so for a
number of reasons.
58 The Arbitrators also reviewed the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties concerning the
approach based on the level of nullification or impairment suffered by Canada. They note that this approach
implied – as any counterfactual - many more assumptions than the approach based on the amount of the subsidy.
The Arbitrators were of the view that, if the calculation of appropriate countermeasures based on the amount of
the subsidy were compatible with Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, it would be preferable to follow this
approach since it could lead to a more objective result.

3.64 We note that, in its report within the framework of the proceedings under Article 21.5 of the
DSU, the Appellate Body made the following findings:
"[the Appellate Body] upholds the conclusion of the Article 21.5 Panel that as a result
of the continued issuance by Brazil of NTN-I bonds, after 18 November 1999,
pursuant to letters of commitment issued before 18 November 1999, Brazil has failed
to implement the recommendation of the DSB that it withdraw the prohibited export
subsidies under PROEX within 90 days"
59
3.65 We, therefore, consider that we have to include in the calculation of the appropriate
countermeasures the firm sales for which PROE X letters of commitment were issued before
18 November 1999 and which had not yet been delivered (since the NTN-I bonds are issued at the
time of the delivery of the aircraft). 60 We do not consider the arguments based on Brazil's contractual
obligations to be compelling. Obligations under internal law are no justification for not performing
international obligations.
61
4. Methodology applied by the Arbitrators
3.66 We first note that the parties agree to distinguish between pre and post 18 November 1999
aircraft sales in relation to the percentage of PROE X interest rate equalization applied. On the basis
of the above considerations, we have decided to calculate the appropriate amount of countermeasures
on the following basis:
(a) We start with the identification of the average sale price of the models of aircraft for
which sales are subsidised. We also take into account the fact that sales of spare parts
have also been subject to payments under PROEX. We consider that PROEX
financing for spare parts should be included in our calculation of the subsidy.
(b) We then make a projection of the annual production of aircraft per model for the
period 2000-2005 (six years). We chose this period essentially because it
corresponds to the period in which Embraer's production capacity assessments can be
assumed to be reasonably accurate. We also note, on the basis of the information
available, that it will take until 2005 for Embraer to exhaust its backlog relating to
sales pre-dating 18 November 1999 for which deliveries had not taken place on that
date and for sales between 19 November 1999 and 30 June 2000 for ERJ-135.
62
(c) The next stage consists of the calculation of the present value of the subsidy per
aircraft model using the sale price for each model, a financing rate of xxx% (for a
financing corresponding to xxx% of the price), the applicable PROEX interest rate
equalization (3.8% or 2.5% of the financing depending on the sale or the time at

59 Op. Cit. para. 82(a).
60 This clarification is made in relation to the use by the Arbitrators of the delivery data provided by
Brazil rather than on information relating specifically to the issuance of the NTN-I bonds. Our choice is
consistent with the factual finding of the Original Panel ( Op. Cit., para. 7.71) and the Appellate Body report in
the original proceedings (Op. Cit. para. 154).
61 See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention:
"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for the failure to
perform a treaty. […]"
62 See Table 1 and the related explanations below.

which it was made), the agent fee which we considered to be representative of these
types of transactions for Brazil and a discount rate equal to LIBOR.63
(d) Finally, for each model we multiply the total amount of aircraft sold with a PROEX
interest rate equalization of 3.8% by the present value of the subsidy per model and
the total amount of aircraft sold with a PROEX interest rate equalization of 2.5% by
the present value of the subsidy per model. The total is spread over 6 years to give
the annual average present value of the subsidy for each of the subsidised models
(ERJ-135 and ERJ-145). The total corresponds to the appropriate level of
countermeasures based on the premises developed above.
C. C
ALCULATION OF THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF COUNTERMEASURES
1. Average unit price per model
(a) Basic elements
(i) Sale price
3.67 We used the average sale price for the ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 models. For the reasons
mentioned above, sales of ERJ-170 and 190 have been excluded. There were no sales of ERJ-140
among the transactions considered. Brazil was not in a position to provide the Arbitrators with
detailed price information regarding each sale. Therefore, having considered the arguments of the
parties, we use the average sale prices supplied by Canada for each of the models concerned. Canada
gives the price of the ERJ-135 as US$xxx million and of the ERJ-145 as US$xxx million.
64
(ii) Spare parts
3.68 Canada's net price for each aircraft has been adjusted to take into account financing of spare
parts under PROEX. Brazil estimates the total value of spare parts covered by PROEX that remained
undelivered as of 18 November 1999 to be US$xxx.
65 According to evidence provided by Brazil, 66
there is no financing for spare parts under PROEX for the ERJ-135. Canada did not provide specific
information contradicting this statement. Theref ore, we accept Brazil's evidence that PROEX only
includes financing of spare parts for the ERJ-145 model. We also accept that the average expected
PROEX financing for spare parts on the total number of ERJ-145 aircraft to be delivered after 18
November 1999 is US$xxx. After 18 November 1999, there were no new requests for spare part
financing under PROEX.
3.69 We noted that not all of the ERJ-145 aircrafts w ill likely benefit from PROEX financing for
spare parts, but the evidence submitted does not allow a determination of which sales will and which
will not benefit. Therefore, in order to take into account the subsidisation which resulted from
undelivered spare parts as of 18 November 1999, we chose to divide the amount of US$xxx by the
total number of ERJ-145 aircraft to be delivered between 2000 and 2005 (i.e. 780 aircraft). We reach
an approximate average figure of US$xxx for spare parts per ERJ-145.

63 LIBOR stands for "London Interbank Offer Rate".
64 Information on the average sale price for ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 models as provided in Table 8 of
Annex I to Canada's 26 June 2000 written submission. In its reply at p. 23 to question No. 9 of the questions of
the Arbitrators dated 17 July 2000, Brazil " xxxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx, and Brazil accepts the use of Canada's figures xxx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xx xxxxx x
for the purpose of calculating the amount of the PROEX subsidy".
65 Brazil's written response of 24 July 2000 to question No. 18 of the Arbitrators, pp. 32-33.
66 Statement from the Banco do Brasil contained in Brazil's Exhibit Br-A-33.

(b) Results
3.70 We thus use Canada's sale price for ERJ-135/145 aircraft and allocate the total value of
undelivered spare parts provisioning that benefited from PROEX support to the total amount of
ERJ-145 aircraft to be delivered between 2000 and 2005. As mentioned above, there is no financing
for spare parts for ERJ-135. Therefore, for ERJ-145 only, we add US$xxx per aircraft for spare parts
benefiting from PROEX.
3.71 Thus, the average unit price per aircraft model for the purpose of our calculation is as follows:
(a) the average price for an ERJ-135 is US$xxx million;
(b) the average price for an ERJ-145 is US$xxx million (US$xxx million plus US$xxx
for spare part financing under PROEX);
3.72 Having regard to the arguments of the parties, we considered that it was appropriate, for the
purpose of calculating appropriate countermeasures, to consider that the external or bank financing on
the basis of which PROEX interest rate equalization payments are calculated covers xxx% of the price
of each model of aircraft. Thus, we consider that the financing for the ERJ-135 is xxx% of the
US$xxx million price of the aircraft, which amounts to US$xxx. PROEX financing for the ERJ-145
is xxx% of the US$xxx million price of the aircraft, which amounts to US$xxx.
2. Projection of annual aircraft production per model
3.73 Pursuant to the methodology described above, we have established a projection of annual
aircraft production per model of aircraft for the period 2000-2005. This projection is contained in
Table 1. The parameters used in this table and the sources on which we relied to prepare this table are
explained hereafter.
3.74 Table 1 sets out the comparison between the projected production capacity and projected
deliveries of ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 aircraft for the period 2000-2005. As highlighted above, we
consider a time-period of six years, i.e. 2000-2005, for our analysis of the structure of production per
model of aircraft. In selecting this period, we took into account the fact that the production capacity
figures given by Brazil only extend to 2004. Howeve r, this six-year period corresponds to the period
of time which, under the production capacity figures pr ovided to the Arbitrators, will be necessary to
exhaust the backlog for existing orders of ERJ-135/145 aircraft. This should occur, according to our
projection, by 2004 for the ERJ-145 and by 2005 for ERJ-135. We therefore considered that we
should use a period of time which covers the foreseeable production based on existing firm orders and
conversions of existing options as of 30 June 2000.
67 We did not find it reasonable to apply a longer
period since it would be too speculative in this rapidly evolving sector of commercial aviation.
3.75 Table 1 contains three categories. Category A features the total production capacity figure
per year for ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 aircraft for the period 2000 to 2005. Category B gives the
production structure for the ERJ-135 model. Category C sets out the production structure for the ERJ-
145 model. Under each of these categories, the total deliveries are given.
68

67 We note that, in its reply to question No. 16 of the Arbitrators, dated 24 July 2000, Brazil mentions
that production of ERJ-135 and 145 should be gradually phased out. In Exhibit Br-A-30, Embraer states that its
current backlog should be reduced substantially by 2002 xxx xxxx xxxx cxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xx
xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxxx. We considered this information and that provided by Canada
and concluded that it was preferable to rely on current orders and options xxxx xx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xx xxxxxx xx xxxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxx.
68 The Arbitrators relied on Brazil's Exhibit Br-A-21.

3.76 In Category A of Table 1, we chose Brazil's projection of annual aircraft production per
model for 2000-200269 and Canada's assessment for 2003-2005. 70 Otherwise, if one follows Brazil's
production figures after 2002, the backlog of aircraft would be impossible to deliver in any reasonable
time period. Given full production, we expect the backlog for ERJ-135 to be exhausted by 2005 and
for ERJ-145 to be exhausted by 2004. Therefore, the total production figure at full capacity for ERJ-
135 and ERJ-145 aircraft for the period 2000 to 2005 is 1,118 aircrafts.
3.77 For the breakdown of production between ERJ-135 and ERJ-145, we note that Brazil was not
in a position to provide a detailed breakdown.
71 Canada assumed weights of 20% for ERJ-135, 10%
for ERJ-140 and 70% for ERJ-145.72 We did not find convincing evidence to support this breakdown
of production. Therefore, we decided to apply the ration of 30/70 derived from the structure of the
existing backlog for ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 aircraft respectively, based on data supplied by Brazil.73
3.78 The amount of aircraft benefiting from the 3.8% or the 2.5% equalization rate applied under
PROEX is given per model in Categories B and C. This structure is based on Brazil's submission. 74
Furthermore, in projecting deliveries of aircrafts, we assumed that the deliveries of aircraft benefiting
from the PROEX interest rate equalization of 3.8% will likely be executed first. Therefore, for the
ERJ-135, the total number of aircraft to be delivered between 2000 and 2005 at 3.8% is xxx, and the
total number to be delivered at the equalization rate of 2.5% is xxx. For the ERJ-145, the total
number of aircraft to be delivered between 2000 and 2005 at 3.8% is xxx and the total number at 2.5%
is xxx.
3.79 For Categories B and C, Table 1 sets out the conversion of options into firm orders for ERJ-
135 and ERJ-145. For pre-18 November 1999 and 18 November 1999-30 June 2000 orders, the
existing options are assumed to be converted into firm orders at the rate of 85%. Canada suggested a
conversion rate of 100% due to high demand. Canada also suggested a conversion rate of 80% as the
market for regional jets matures.
75 Brazil provided evidence of cancellations of options and states that
the rate of conversion will be no more than 84%. 76 Having considered the evidence provided by the
parties, we assumed a conversion of options into firm orders at a rate of 85% for the period
2000-2005. However, this assumption is only relevant to determine the proportion of aircraft
transactions benefiting from PROEX at 3.8% and of those benefiting from PROEX at 2.5% because,
in the assumed context of production at full capacity, the conversion rate of options does not affect the
amount of deliveries.

69 Brazil's written submission of 24 July 2000, p. 32.
70 Annex I of Canada's 26 June 2000 written submission.
71 Brazil's Exhibit Br-A-30, para. 7.
72 Table 9 of Canada's 26 June 2000 written submission.
73 Brazil's Exhibit Br-A-21.
74 Brazil's Exhibit Br-A-15. The Arbitrators assumed that the PROEX rate applied after
18 November 1999 is 2.5%.
75 Annex I, paras. 18 to 20 of Canada's written submission.
76 Brazil's oral statement, 14 July 2000, para. 60.

Table 1: Projection of Annual Aircraft Production per Model, 2000-2005
Model Jan-
June
2000
July
Dec
2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
A. ERJ-135/145
total production capacity
(Brazil's figures)
(Canada's figures)
151
(151)
(168)
188
(188)
(192)
203
(203)
(192)
192
(148)
(192)
192
(122)
(192)
192
(122)
(192)
1118
(934)
(1128)
B. ERJ-135
total deliveries 25 22 56 61 58 58 58 338
Pre 18.11.99 orders
(85 % conversion rate)
25 22 56 61 58 31 - 253
18.11.99–30.6.00 orders
(85% conversion rate)
-- - - - 2 7 6 3 3
New orders - - - - - - 52 52
Total ERJ-135 at 3.8% xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Total ERJ-135 at 2.5% xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
C. ERJ-145
total deliveries 54 50 132 142 134 134 134 780
Pre 18.11.99 orders
(85% conversion rate)
54 50 132 81 - - - 317
18.11.99–30.6.00 orders
(85% conversion rate)
- - - 61 134 129 - 324
New orders - - - - - 5 134 139
Total ERJ-145 at 3.8% xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Total ERJ-145 at 2.5% xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
3. Calculation of the present value of the subsidy
(a) Calculation of the present value of the subsidy
(i) Relevant tables
3.80 The Annex to this report contains, for each model of aircraft (ERJ-135 and ERJ-145), the
calculation of the present value of the subsidy per aircraft and per equalization rate. The results are
reported in Table 2 below. This calculation assumes the following parameters.
(ii) Financing method
3.81 We note that the parties have based their calculations on different forms of repayment of the
loan. We assumed that interest was paid on the outstanding balance. We agreed that there could be,
in theory, a possibility to apply an annuity met hod of repayment (i.e., equal instalments including

payments and interest, as used by Canada). However, we assumed that the method suggested by
Brazil corresponded to the form of repayment actually used when PROEX interest rate equalization
payment is provided. Accordingly, we applied constant instalments for capital reimbursement in our
calculations.
3.82 Moreover, we assume semi-annual constant instalments for capital reimbursement. Thus, 30
payments are made over a period of 15 years, in accordance with the maturation period of NTN-I
bonds used by Brazil to finance PROEX interest rate equalization payments. 77 These instalments are
based on PROEX financing of xxx% of the price of the aircraft (see section C.1 above on aircraft
prices).
(iii) Financing rate
3.83 We have taken note that Canada's proposed me thodology used a financing rate of 7.79%.
However, we do not need to take a position on the accuracy of this rate. Indeed, the financing rate
does not affect the level of the subsidy as it is expressed as a percentage of the financed portion of the
price of the aircraft, which does not depend on the level of the interest rate. We therefore refrain from
addressing this aspect of the financing.
(iv) Agent fee
3.84 Canada assumed that commercial banks involved in financing aircraft sales in the context of
PROEX payments levy an agent fee inferior to one percent. In contrast, Brazil alleged that the
commercial banks involved in PROEX payments take xxxx xxxx agent fees. In support of its claims,
Brazil submitted evidence setting out the terms of financing for PROEX over a 15-year period for
specific transactions.
 78
3.85 Even though the evidence presented by Brazil related to a limited number of aircraft, we
assumed it to be sufficiently representative, because it refered to actual transactions. Therefore, we
accept Brazil's claim. We understand that the agent fee of xxx% of the value of the NTN-I bonds
mentioned in the evidence submitted by Brazil is suppos ed to reflect the "Brazil risk" inherent in the
payment of PROEX over a 15-year period. Even thoug h this is a high agent fee, we accept to use it
for the following reasons:
(a) the liquidity of the NTN-1 bonds is more limited than other government bonds that
are denominated in convertible currencies. This is demonstrated by the fact that,
according to Brazil, only three banks are involved in PROEX payments;
(b) NTN-1 bonds are paid in domestic currency and face a convertibility risk; and
(c) Brazil submitted two concrete examples involving the xxx banks which handle xxx%
of the bonds used for PROEX financing and demonstrating that these banks have in
the recent past charged an agent fee or commission of xxx% of the value of the NTN-
I bonds or higher.
79

77 For a description of the operation of the PROEX programme, see Original Panel Report, Op. Cit.,
section II.
78 Brazil's Exhibits Br-A-14, Br-A-22 and Br-A-30.
79 On p. 18 of Brazil's written submission of 26 June 2000, Brazil refers to a letter from a bank, which
proposes an agent fee of xxx%. Brazil states that:
"this discount fee represents xx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xx
xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xx xxxxx xxxx x xxxxxxx xxxxxx, and is in line with normal
commercial operations in Brazil. xxxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxx xx xx xxxxxxxxx

3.86 We therefore use the figures contained in the evidence submitted by Brazil that stipulates an
agent fee or commission of xxx% of the interest rate equalization payment (PROEX) for the first ten
years and xxx% for the remaining five years over a total 15-year financing period. At the PROEX
rate of 3.8%, a xxx% agent fee is equivalent to xxx percentage points of 3.8% of the financing for the
first ten years, and a xxx% agent fee is equivalent to xxx percentage points for the remaining five
years (i.e. 3.8% x xxx% = xxx percentage points; 3.8% x xxx% = xxx percentage points). At the
PROEX rate of 2.5%, a xxx% agent fee is equivalent to xxx percentage points for the first ten years,
and a xxx% agent fee is equivalent to xxx percentage points for the remaining five years.
(v) Discount rate
3.87 We note that Canada's methodology used a discount rate of 12% and an agent fee of 0.15%.
We understand that Brazil has included the xxx% agent fee in its calculation of the discount rate, as
part of its claim that the total amount levied by the bank is equivalent to a discount rate of xxx%.
Thus, Brazil adds the xxx% agent fee to the xxxxx rate of xxx% in order to reach what it claims to be
equivalent to a discount rate of xxx%.
80 As outlined above, we prefer to calculate the specific risk
factor entirely as part of the agent fee, since it appears to be the practice followed by the main banks
involved in PROEX financing.
3.88 Therefore, for the discount rate, we considered it appropriate to use a xxxxx rate for US
dollars of xxx%, as suggested by Brazil. We used a xxxxx rate for US dollars because the
transactions are in US dollars. We did not use a higher discount rate, such as the rate suggested by
Canada, because we assumed that all risk factors are reflected entirely in the agent fee, as explained
above.
(vi) Present value of the subsidy per aircraft model
3.89 As set out in Table 2, we define the net PROEX subsidy per aircraft as a figure that is net of
the agent fee (i.e. total PROEX financing minus the agent fee). This is in our view consistent with the
definition of subsidy in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.81
3.90 We have calculated the present value of the subsidy for an ERJ-135 and an ERJ-145 with
financing at the PROEX interest rate equalization of 3.8% and with financing at the PROEX interest
rate equalization of 2.5%. Therefore, the present value of a PROEX interest rate equalization
payment of 3.8% of xxx% of the sale price of an ERJ-135 (US$xxx million) is US$xxx; and with a
PROEX interest rate equalization payment of 2.5% is US$xxx. The present value of a PROEX
interest rate equalization payment of 3.8% of xxx% of the sale price of an ERJ-145 (US$xxx million)
is US$xxx; and with a PROEX interest rate equalization payment of 2.5% is US$xxx.

xxxxxxxx xxxx xx xxxxxx. The calculation of this rate is shown in the worksheets attached as
Exhibit Br-A-13."
80 Our calculations show that this implied discount rate is slightly lower than the xxx% rate used by
Brazil. Our calculations show that the rate is between xxx and xxx%, depending on the assumptions used.
81 See also the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, Annex I to the SCM Agreement.

3.91 The above elements are set out in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Calculation of the Present Value of the Subsidy:
Repayment according to constant instalments (method used by Brazil)
Sale Price
(US$)
PROEX
rate
(percentage
points)
Agent fee
(%)
Net PROEX
subsidy rate (after
deducting the
agent fee)
(percentage points)
Present value of
the subsidy per
aircraft model
(US$)
ERJ-135 xxx 3.8 xxx/xxx 3.8-xxx = xxx xxx
xxx 2.5 xxx/xxx 2.5-xxx = xxx xxx
ERJ 145 xxx 3.8 xxx/xxx 3.8-xxx = xxx xxx
xxx 2.5 xxx/xxx 2.5-xxx = xxx xxx
(b) Calculation of the total present value of the subsidy
3.92 Based on the information set out in Tables 1 and 2 above, the average present value of the
subsidy per aircraft is estimated by multiplying the total number of aircraft by model at 3.8% PROEX
and 2.5% PROEX produced during the period 2000-2005 (see Table 1) by the average annual subsidy
per model (see Table 2). The calculation is as follows:
ERJ-135: xxx aircraft @ 3.8% x US$xxx = US$xxx
PLUS:
xxx aircraft @ 2.5% x US$xxx = US$xxx
EQUALS:
US$405,046,838
ERJ-145: xxx aircraft @ 3.8% x US$xxx = US$xxx
PLUS:
xxx aircraft @ 2.5% x US$xxx = US$xxx
EQUALS
US$996,266,316
3.93 The total amount of the subsidy per year is then calculated by adding the above figures for the
total number of ERJ-135 and ERJ-145 aircraft, i.e. US$405,046,838 plus US$996,266,316, to reach a
total of US$1,401,313,154 over the time-period 2000-2005. This figure is then divided by six (for the
time-period of six years) to determine the average present value of the subsidy per year. This average
in US dollars is then converted into Canadian dollars. In this process, we use the most recent
exchange rate between the Canadian and the US dollar.
82 We therefore apply a rate of C$1.474 to
US$1. The result is therefore as follows: US$233,552,192.3 multiplied by 1.474 equals
C$344,255,931.4502. This figure can be rounded to C$344.2 million.

82 Exchange Cross Rates, 18 August 2000, Financial Times, Monday, 21 August 2000, p. 22.

IV. AWARD OF THE ARBITRATORS
4.1 For the reasons set out above, the Arbitrators decide that, in the matter Brazil – Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft , the suspension by Canada of the application to Brazil of tariff
concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures covering trade in a maximum amount of C$344.2 million
per year would constitute appropriate countermeasures within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement.
4.2 In this respect, the Arbitrators urge Canada to make sure that, if it decides to proceed with the
suspension of certain of its obligations vis-à-vis Brazil referred to in document WT/DS46/16 other
than the 100 per cent surtax, this will be done in such a way that the maximum amount of
countermeasures referred to in the preceding paragraph will be respected.
4.3 Finally, the Arbitrators would like to emphasize that Article 22.8 of the DSU provides that:
"The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only
be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations
or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a
mutually satisfactory solution is reached. […]"

ANNEX
ERJ-135, 2.5% PROEX financing
Aircraft price
Down payment portion PROEX equalization rate 2.50%
Equalization applicable portion Agent fee year
Down payment value Agent fee year
Total financing Financing period – years 15
Discount rate Semi-annual payments 30
Year Capital Portion Principal Balance Equal. Total Agent fee Net EQ EQ/Year NPV
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Agent fee
Nominal value of EQ
NPV of EQ

ERJ-135, 3.8% PROEX financing
Aircraft price
Down payment portion PROEX equalization rate 3.80%
Equalization applicable portion Agent fee year
Down payment value Agent fee year
Total financing Financing period – years 15
Discount rate Semi-annual payments 30
Year Capital Portion Principal Balance Equal. Total Agent fee Net EQ EQ/Year NPV
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Agent fee
Nominal value of EQ
NPV of EQ

ERJ-145, 2.5% PROEX financing
Aircraft price
Down payment portion PROEX equalization rate 2.50%
Equalization applicable portion Agent fee year
Down payment value Agent fee year
Total financing Financing period – years 15
Discount rate Semi-annual payments 30
Year Capital Portion Principal Balance Equal. Total Agent fee Net EQ EQ/Year NPV
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Agent fee
Nominal value of EQ
NPV of EQ

ERJ-145, 3.8% PROEX financing
Aircraft price
Down payment portion PROEX equalization rate 3.80%
Equalization applicable portion Agent fee year
Down payment value Agent fee year
Total financing Financing period – years 15
Discount rate Semi-annual payments 30
Year Capital Portion Principal Balance Equal. Total Agent fee Net EQ EQ/Year NPV
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Agent fee
Nominal value of EQ
NPV of EQ