Document: WT/DS282/R Page C-1 ANNEX C EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE SECOND SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Contents Page
Document codes: WT/DS282/R
Complainant: Mexico
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Argentina, Canada, China, Taiwan, EU, Japan, Venezuela, Thailand
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 18  Anti-dumpingArt. VI, X  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX C

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE SECOND SUBMISSIONS
OF THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex C-1 Second Written Submission of Mexico C-2
Annex C-2 Second Written Submission of the United States C-10

ANNEX C-1

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF MEXICO

(19 July 2004)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The US view that Article 11 contains few (if any) substantive obligations
1 is untenable. With
Articles 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3, WTO Members placed strict disciplines on the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, including definitive temporal limitations. At the heart of these provisions, and
central to this dispute, is the obligation to te rminate anti-dumping duties: under Article 11.2, when
they are no longer necessary to offset dumping; and, under Article 11.3, after five years.

2. The US determinations in this case to main tain duties under Articles 11.2 and 11.3 are based
on presumptions, inferences, speculation and conject ure and not on positive evidence. For this
reason, they are insufficient to invoke the limited exception to continue an anti-dumping duty beyond
five years under Article 11.3, and they cannot be used to evade the obligation in Article 11.2 to
immediately terminate the duty when it is no longer necessary.

II. THE DEPARTMENT'S SUNSET DETERMINATION

A. T
HE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED TO REBUT MEXICO'S PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT
DEMONSTRATES THAT US LAW ESTABLISHES A WTO-INCONSISTENT PRESUMPTION THAT
DUMPING IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE OR RECUR
3. The statute (19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(1)), the US Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA")
(pages 889-890), and the Sunset Policy Bulletin (" SPB") (Section II.A.3), operating independently
and together, establish a presumption that dumpi ng would be likely to continue or recur. 2 T h i s
presumption is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the United States
has failed to rebut Mexico's prima facie case demonstrating this inconsistency.

4. The United States asserts that Mexico's argument relies on the assumption that the three
scenarios outlined in the SPB "are the only possible ones and that as a result Commerce will always
make an affirmative finding."
3 Mexico does not argue that the three scenarios in Section II.A.3 of the
SPB are the only possible outcomes. Mexico argu es that, under US law, the Department treats the
fulfilment of any one of the three scenarios as conclusive of likely dumping – to the exclusion of other
relevant evidence. MEX-62 and MEX-65 demonstrate that the Department follows Section II.A.3 in
every sunset review, and every time it finds that at least one of the three criteria of the SPB is
satisfied, it makes an affirmative finding of likely dumping without considering additional factors. It
follows, then, that Section II.A.3 instructs the Depart ment to attach decisive weight to historical
dumping margins and declining import volumes (or cessation of imports) in every case.

1 See, e.g., US First Submission, paras. 2, 90-91.
2 Mexico's First Submission, paras. 87-109.
3 US First Submission, para. 97.

5. Contrary to US assertions that the US syst em provides the Department with the ability to
consider information apart from dumping ma rgins and import volumes through the "good cause"
provisions,4 the actual application of this provision shows that the "good cause" route has led only to
affirmative likelihood determinations. This is not surprising because, as MEX-62 and MEX-65
demonstrate, the Department has never rendered a not likely determina tion in any full or expedited
sunset review.

6. The US arguments that the SPB and the Depa rtment's practice cannot be challenged must be
rejected. This issue has been se ttled. The Appellate Body overruled
 the Panel's finding that the SPB
is not a measure that is challengeable, as such, in WTO dispute settlement. 5 The Appellate Body held
that "measure" for purposes of WTO challenge is cast broadly, and includes administrative
instruments such as the SPB. 6 The Appellate Body's reasoning in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan
similarly compels the conclusion that the Departme nt's consistent practic e may be challenged as
such.7

7. In sum, the statute, the SAA, and the SPB ar e measures that direct the Department to give
decisive guidance to historical dumping margins and import volume declines. Mexico's Exhibits
MEX-62 and MEX-65 (which set forth the Department 's consistent practice) demonstrate that the
Department follows the instruction of the statut e, the SAA, and the SPB in every sunset review
, and
every time it finds that at least one of the three criteria of the SPB is satisfied, the Department makes
an affirmative finding of likely dumping without considering additional factors.

B. T
HE DEPARTMENT'S LIKELIHOOD DETERMINATION IN THE SUNSET REVIEW OF OCTG FROM
MEXICO VIOLATED ARTICLES 11.3 AND 2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
1. The Department Impermissibly Relied on the Margin from the Original Investigation

8. The positive evidence submitted by the Mexican respondents demonstrated that dumping
would not be likely.
8 The evidence before the Department in cluded information as to why the margin
of dumping from the original investigation was not relevant to the question of likelihood of dumping,
as well as the results of the recently conducted administrative reviews of the anti-dumping order,
which resulted in consecutive zero margin (no dumping) determinations.

9. The Department relied on the lower Mexican OCTG import volume as the sole basis for
disregarding this the positive evidence submitted by the Mexican respondents. After doing so, the
only remaining information before the Departme nt was the margin of dumping margin from the
original investigation and the decline in volume. The Department then mechanically relied on this
information despite the Appellate Body's admoniti on that "a case-specific analysis of the factors
behind a cessation of imports or a decline in im port volumes (when dumping is eliminated) will be
necessary to determine that dumping will recur if the duty is terminated."
9

10. That the Department relied on the margin from the original investigation in this case
necessarily follows from the design of the US system. The statute requires that the Department "shall
consider" (1) "the dumping margins determined in th e investigation and subse quent reviews" and (2)

4 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(2) (MEX-24); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.218(d)(3)(iv) and (e)(2)(iii) (MEX-25);
Section II.C of the SPB.
5 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, paras. 94-100.
6 Id. at paras. 82-88.
7 Id. at para. 78, 88.
8 See, e.g., MEX-64 (Evidence Chart from Mexico's First Oral Statement).
9 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 177.

the volume of imports.
10 The SAA indicates that the Department will normally select a margin "from
the investigation, because that is the only calculated ra te that reflects the behavior of exporters . . .
without the discipline of an order or suspension agreement in place." 11 The regulations implementing
the statute add that: "only under the most ex traordinary circumstances will the Secretary rely on a . . .
dumping margin other than those it calculated a nd published in its prio r determinations. . . ." 12 The
SPB confirms "that continued margins at an y level would lead to a finding of likelihood ."13 In fact,
the Department's Issues and Decision Memorandum in this case, the margin from the original
investigation was the only finding of dumping made by the Department. 14 Mexico can find no other
information on the record before the Department in the sunset review showing dumping by a Mexican
exporter. As a result, it seems clear to Mexico that the Department necessarily relied on this margin.

2. The Department Impermissibly Presumed that Declining Import Volumes
Demonstrated That Dumping Would Be likely to Recur

11. In relying solely on the decline in impor t volume as a basis to ignore the positive evidence
submitted by the respondents, the Department ma de two assumptions, neither one of which was
supported by positive evidence, and then linked the se two assumptions to make the likely dumping
determination. First, the Department inferred th at the decline in import volume alone was sufficient
to show that the Mexican exporters could not compete in the United States without dumping. Second,
further compounding the error of the first assumption, the Department reasoned that simply because it
had inferred that the exporters could not compete in the United States without dumping, they would
likely
 dump in the United States upon revocation.

3. The Department Dismissed Relevant Ev idence Demonstrating That Dumping Would
Not Be Likely

12. The Department failed to consider TAMS A's arguments and the positive evidence on the
record that, but for the severe Mexican peso devaluation of 1994, an anti-dumping duty order on
Mexican OCTG would not have been imposed in the first place. The Department calculated zero
margins for TAMSA and Hylsa in the administrative reviews; therefore, if there had been no dumping
in the original investigation, but for the unique circumstances in 1994, then dumping cannot "continue
or recur" after revocation of the order. The De partment also ignored that zero margins had been
calculated for TAMSA and Hylsa in the most recent administrative reviews. This evidence is clearly
relevant to the Department's likelihood determination.

13. The Department did not consider TAMSA's ev idence, but rather dismissed it perfunctorily.
The Department inferred from the lower import vol umes that TAMSA could not export to the US
market without dumping
15 Inferences are not "positive evidence" of what is "likely."

10 19 U.S.C. 1675a(c)(1) (MEX-24).
11 US Statement of Administrative Action , accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) at 890, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040 ("SAA").
12 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added) (MEX-25).
13 Section II.A.4 (emphasis added).
14 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Full Sunset Review of the Anti-dumping Duty Order on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Mexico (9 Mar. 2001) (final results) at 5-6 (MEX-19) ("[t]he Department
continues to find that the margin rates from the original investigation are the appropriate rates to report to the
Commission. (emphasis added). . .").
15 Sunset Review Issues and Decision Memorandum at 4 (MEX-19).

III. THE COMMISSION'S SUNSET DETERMINATION

A. T HE COMMISSION'S "LIKELY" STANDARD IS INCONSISTENT AS SUCH AND AS APPLIED WITH
ARTICLE 11.3
14. The authority must find that expiry of the duty is "likely" to lead to a continuation or
recurrence of injury. It is beyond doubt that "lik ely" means "probable." Mexico demonstrated that
the Commission argued vigorously in the NAFTA dispute involving this same sunset review that the
SAA precludes the Commission from applying a "probable" standard. The Commission argued: "The
SAA explains, unambiguously, that afte r the revocation ‘[t]here may be more than one likely
outcome.' SAA at 883. The possibility of ‘more than one likely outcome' shows that Congress did
not intend ‘likely' to mean ‘probable' or ‘more probable than not.'"16

15. The United States cannot undo the Commission's st atements. At the time that it made the
Article 11.3 injury determination in this case, the Commission admitted that it did not need to
establish that injury was the probable result of revocation.

16. Mexico is challenging the standard
 used by the Commission both as such and as applied. If
the Panel finds that the Commission used the wrong standard, the Panel cannot now reassess the
evidence on its own to make a determination as to whether the evidence would have supported a
finding of "likely" injury. This would be tantamount to a prohibited de novo review.17 The Panel's
job is not to perform the analysis the Commiss ion was obligated to perform (but which it
affirmatively disavowed) in the first instance.

B. A RTICLE 3 APPLIES TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF INJURY DETERMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 11.3
17. The United States argues that footnote 9 "is simply a drafting device that avoids unnecessary
repetitions . . . ." 18 The United States also confuses the issue, and makes the text much more
complicated than it is. The issue is not whether the inquiry in an original investigation is identical to
the likelihood inquiry in a sunset review. The issu e is whether "injury" in Articles 11.1 and 11.3 is
different than "injury" defined by footnote 9, and whether "injury" in Articles 11.1 and 11.3 is to be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Articl e 3. That analysis must begin with the text, and
for Mexico and all of the Third Parties, footnote 9 settles the issue.

18. The Appellate Body found in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan that the term "dumping"
used in Article 2 "for the purpose of the Agreemen t" is the same "dumping" used in Article 11.3.
19
For the same reason, the term "injury" used in Artic le 3 "under this Agreement" is the same "injury"
used in Article 11.3. The Appellate Body did not find that the phrase "continuation or recurrence of"
changes the meaning of "dumping." The Panel cannot find that this same phrase changes the meaning
of "injury."

16 ITC Brief, Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico: Results of Five-Year Review, USA-MEX-201-
1904-06 (8 Feb. 2002) (non-proprietary version) at 43 (MEX-47).
17 See Panel Report United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood
Lumber from Canada , WT/DS277/R, adopted 26 April 2004, paras. 7.15, 7.16 (" Softwood Lumber from
Canada").
18 Id. at para. 245.
19 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, paras. 108-109 (emphasis removed).

C. T
HE COMMISSION'S SUNSET DETERMINATION WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 11.3, 3.1,
AND 3.2 BECAUSE IT WAS NOT BASED ON POSITIVE EVIDENCE AND AN OBJECTIVE
ASSESSMENT OF VOLUME, PRICE AND IMPACT; THE COMMISSION'S SUNSET
DETERMINATION ALSO VIOLATED ARTICLES 3.4 AND 3.5
19. The positive evidence and objective examination requirements of Article 3.1 are fundamental
to an Article 11.3 injury finding. The positive evidence and objective assessment requirement is also
inherent in Article 11.3 injury determinations, apart from the applicability of Article 3.

20. In evaluating "injury" in this case, the Commission did not develop "positive evidence"
necessary to determine that injury would likely follow from expiry. The information gathered
regarding volume, price, and impact did not rise to the level of positive evidence, and an objective
decision maker could not have conc luded that injury was "likely" based on this information. In
numerous instances, the Commission relied on assumpti ons and unsupported inferences. In other
relevant parts of the determination, the Commission based its conclusions on findings made during the
original investigation.

21. The United States argues based on the text of Article 3.4 that that provision "cannot
practicably be applied to all sunset reviews, and certainly could not be applied to sunset reviews in the
same systematic and comprehensive manner th at has been required in original dumping
investigations."
20 However, that dumped imports may not be present at the time of the sunset review
does not mean that Article 3.4 does not apply to Article 11.3 reviews. In the context of a sunset
review, the authority must examine the "likely" im pact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.
Without a thorough understanding of the state of the domestic industry, the authority cannot
determine whether injury would be likely to continue or recur
 in a manner consistent with Article
11.3.

22. The fundamental requirement of Article 3.5 is that the authority must establish a causal link
between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry. This causation requirement reflects the
requirement in Article VI of GATT 1994. The Unit ed States fails to explain how this concept cannot
apply in a sunset review.

D. T
HE US STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING THE TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH INJURY
WOULD BE LIKELY TO CONTINUE OR RECUR ARE INCONSISTENT, BOTH AS SUCH AND AS
APPLIED, WITH ARTICLES 11 AND 3 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
23. The United States argues that Article 11.3 does not specify the time frame relevant to a sunset
inquiry, and thus, the relevant time period is within each Member's discretion. 21 In this regard, the
United States notes that "[t]he words ‘to lead to' affirmatively indicate that the Agreement
contemplates the passage of some period of tim e between the revocation of the order and the
continuation or recurrence of injury."22

24. The United States ignores the immediate context of Article 11.3. Article 11.1 requires that
anti-dumping measures "shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract
dumping which is causing injury." Accordingly, it is evident that the time frame in which injury
would be likely to continue or recur under Article 11.3 must be as curtailed as possible to ensure that
anti-dumping measures are maintained only as long as necessary
 to counteract injurious dumping.
The phrase "to lead to" does not change this princi ple. The phrase merely links the expiry or
termination with the likely dumping and the likely injury.

20 US First Submission, para. 312.
21 US First Submission, paras. 330-331.
22 Id. at para. 330.

25. An undefined time frame is not c onsistent with the "likely" standard of Article 11.3, and even
less so when considered in light of Article 11. 1. US law does not define, nor has the Commission
articulated, what constitutes "a reasonably foreseeab le time." Furthermore, US law creates an
impermissible "gap" which is inconsistent with Ar ticle VI of the GATT and Article 11.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Finally, the violation arising from the application of the law in this case is
clear. The Commission never even disclosed when the injury was likely to continue or recur.

E. T
HE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION TO CONDITION MEXICO'S RIGHT TO REVOCATION OF
THE ANTI-DUMPING DUTY ORDER AGAINST MEXICAN OCTG ON THE BEHAVIOUR OF
EXPORTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES VIOLATED ARTICLES 11.3 AND 3 OF THE ANTI-
DUMPING AGREEMENT
26. The United States misconstrues Mexico's primary cumulation argument. Mexico does not
argue that Article 11.3 is silent with respect to cumulation. Mexico asserts that Article 11.3 – both
pursuant to its terms ("duty" in the singular) and as interpreted in its context – expressly prohibits
cumulation.

27. The United States contends that "the refere nce in Article 11.3 to ‘the duty' is merely
descriptive and is not evidence that the dr afters intended to prohibit cumulation."
23 The US argument
is inconsistent with the position it took in Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , in which it argued that
"the meaning of the word ‘duty' in Article 11.3 is explained in Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, which ‘makes clear that the definitive duty is imposed on a product-specific ( i.e., order-
wide) basis, not a company-specific basis." 24 The Appellate Body agreed that Article 9.2 informs the
interpretation of "duty" in Article 11.3. 25 Thus, the Appellate Body confirmed that the use of "duty"
in the singular means that the authority must de termine whether the termination of a single anti-
dumping order – and not multiple orders – would be likely to lead to injury.

28. Assuming arguendo that Articles 11.3 and 3.3 do not preclude cumulation in Article 11.3
reviews, then the terms of Article 3.3 would have pr ecluded cumulation in this case. In the event that
the Panel finds that cumulation is not prohibited by Articles 11.3 and 3.3, then the authorities must
respect the substantive standards for cumulation in Article 3.3.

29. Finally, in arguing that Article 3.3 cannot a pply to Article 11.3 injury reviews, the United
States never mentions clause (b) of Article 3.3. More than an additional requirement under Article
3.3, this clause re-states a basic justification fo r cumulation in any injury determination under the
Agreement. If the imports are not in the market together and competing against each other, what
possible justification could exist to evaluate the effects of the imports in a cumulative manner?

23 US First Submission, para. 339.
24 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 150.
25 Id.

IV. THE DEPARTMENT'S FOURTH ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND
DETERMINATION NOT TO REVOKE THE ANTI-DUMPING DUTY

A. A
RTICLE 11.2 IS NOT LIMITED TO ORDER-WIDE OBLIGATIONS TO TERMINATE ANTI-
DUMPING MEASURE
30. According to the United States, "Article 11.2 does not address, and does not require,
termination on a company-specific basis." 26 The US arguments should be rejected as they are
inconsistent with: (1) the text of Article 11.2; (2 ) the United States' implementation of its Article 11.2
obligations; and (3) the Panel Report in DRAMS from Korea.

31. First, the US position is inc onsistent with the text of Artic le 11.2, which refers to "any
interested party" and "interested parties." These refe rences to "interested parties" and "any interested
party" in the context of the anti-dumping review mu st be interpreted to in clude individual exporters,
who are arguably the most interested parties in an anti-dumping review. It is difficult to imagine why
Members would have granted such rights to individua l exporters to request a review, and would have
imposed an obligation on Members to perform such a review, if the obligation to terminate was
limited to an "order-wide" basis. Equally important , the explicit reference to "interested parties" in
Article 11.2 distinguishes that provision from Article 11. 3, which does not refer to interested parties.
In Sunset Review of Steel from Japan , the Appellate Body noted this distinction as a basis for finding
that Article 11.3 does not require company-specific sunset reviews.
27

32. Second, the US regulations that implemen t the US Article 11.2 obligation undermine the
US Position. The United States indicates that sectio n 351.222(g), "The changed circumstance review
most directly implements US obligations under Article 11.2 and can be conducted on an order-wide or
a company-specific basis." 28 However, the United States has never revoked an anti-dumping duty
under Section 351.222(g) based on a substantive anal ysis of whether the continued imposition of the
duty was necessary to offset dumping . Section 351.222(g) is chiefly a mechanism for revocation
where the US industry is no longer interested in the continuation of the anti-dumping order, not a
means through which the Department examines the s ubstantive standard of Article 11.2 – whether
continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping.

33. The United States indicates that "Section 351.222(b)(1) provides a second option for an
individual company to request revocation on an order-wide basis, so long as all exporters and
producers covered at the time of the revocation have not dumped for at least three consecutive
years."29 However, Section 351.222(e)(1) unambiguously limits the ability of an individual company
to request revocation only as it pertains to itself : "an exporter or producer may request in writing that
the Secretary revoke an order or terminate a susp ended investigation under paragraph (b) of this
section with regard to that person if the person submits with the re quest" the requisite certifications
pertaining to its export behaviour.30

34. Finally, the Panel Report in DRAMS from Korea makes the US position untenable. The Panel
Report in DRAMs from Korea, and the US implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommendations
in the wake of that report, leave no doubt that Article 11.2 creates obligations to terminate anti-
dumping orders on a company-specific basis. Followi ng the adverse ruling of the Panel, the United
States clarified to its trading partners the nature of the changes it was making to the US regulation

26 US First Submission, para. 148.
27 Appellate Body Report, Sunset Review of Steel from Japan, para. 149.
28 Opening Statement of the United States at the Firs t Meeting of the Panel With the Parties, May 25,
2004, para. 3.
29 US Answers to Questions from Mexico, para. 36 (emphasis added).
30 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e)(1) (emphasis added) (MEX-12).

implementing its Article 11.2 obligations. The United States provided notice that the company-
specific revocation procedure outlined in 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b) was the way in which the United
States implements its obligations under Article 11. 2 to determine whether the continued imposition of
the duty is necessary to offset dumping. The Un ited States cannot deny these statements and its
practice on implementing its Article 11.2 obligations now for the expediency of defending against the
Article 11.2 claim brought by Mexico.

B. T
HE DEPARTMENT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO REVOKE THE ANTI-DUMPING DUTY ORDER
ON OCTG FROM MEXICO VIOLATED ARTICLE 11.2
35. The Department violated Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the
Department did not terminate the anti-dumping duty on OCTG from Mexico immediately upon the
demonstration that the continued imposition of the duty was not necessary to offset dumping.

36. The Department's determination not to revoke the anti-dumping duty on OCTG from Mexico
was not based on positive evidence that the continue d imposition of the duty was necessary to offset
dumping. With respect to Hylsa, the Department 's determination not to revoke the duty violated
Articles 11.2, 2.4, and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Department failed to make a
fair comparison between export price and normal value, by "zeroing" Hylsa's negative margins. By
relying on the positive margin that resulted from th is unlawful methodology as justification for not
revoking the anti-dumping duty on OCTG from Mexico with respect to Hylsa, the Department did not
determine whether the duty was necessary to offset dumping.

37. With respect to TAMSA, the Department's de termination not to revoke violated Article 11.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Depart ment: (i) applied a standard which required a
demonstration that dumping was "not likely" in the future; (ii) arbitrarily imposed a "commercial
quantities" requirement test which is inconsistent with, and has no b asis in, Article 11.2; and (iii)
ignored positive evidence that demonstrated th at the measure was no l onger necessary to offset
dumping.

38. The Department violated Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 because the Department imposed
conditions on TAMSA for the termination of th e anti-dumping duty in advance of the official
publication of such conditions.

V. MEXICO'S REQUEST UNDER DSU ARTICLE 19.1

39. Even assuming that the United States could even cure many of the violations of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement through another sunset review, there would be no way for the United States to
comply with the fundamental time-bound obligations of Article 11.2 to terminate immediately upon a
showing that the duty is no longer necessary to offset dumping, or of Article 11.3 to terminate after
five years in the absence of the requisite likelihoo d findings. The violations of Article 11.2 and 11.3
in this case cannot be cured retroactively. Th erefore, the only way to bring the United States
measures into conformity with the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement would be through the immediate
termination of the order.

VI. CONCLUSION

40. Mexico refers the Panel to specific requests it made of the Panel in paragraphs 375 through
381 of Mexico's First Submission.

ANNEX C-2

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES

(19 July 2004)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Mexico has proffered, but not substantiated, a variety of claims regarding the sunset review of
OCTG, as well as the fourth administrative review of TAMSA and Hylsa. The United States more
fully rebutted these claims in its first written submi ssion, the first meeting, and answers to questions.
In this submission, the United States will limit its remarks to exposing further several basic flaws in
Mexico's arguments.

II. ISSUES RELATING TO MEXICO'S SUNSET REVIEW CLAIMS

2. Mexico has advanced various claims regardi ng the US conduct of sunset reviews. Having
already addressed Mexico's claims in detail in its first submission, the United States will limit its
discussion in this submission to the most basic flaws in those claims, first with respect to Commerce's
determination, and then with respect to the ITC's determination.

A. C
OMMERCE'S CONDUCT OF SUNSET REVIEWS
3. Mexico has essentially argued that the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a measure that mandates that
Commerce accord decisive weight to dumping margins and lower import volumes. A proper legal
analysis of Mexico's claims, as well as a review of the evidentiary support for them, reveals that
Mexico has not met its burden of proving those claims.

1. Legal Framework for Assessing whether th e Sunset Policy Bulletin is a Measure that
Mandates a Breach

4. Mexico seeks to establish that the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a measure and mandates a breach
by citing the results of full and expedited sunset re views. As the United States stated at the first
meeting of the parties, this approach is not legall y correct. Proper legal analysis of the question of
whether the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a measure that mandates a breach requires a two-step approach.
First, the Panel should examine whether the Sunset Policy Bulletin is a measure. Second, if the Sunset
Policy Bulletin were a measure, the Panel would then examine whether it mandates a breach.

5. As the United States described in its firs t written submission and its responses to Panel
Questions 29 and 41, the Sunset Policy Bulletin does not "do" anything. Regardless of the terms of
the Sunset Policy Bulletin, or the number of times it is cited in reviews, the Sunset Policy Bulletin has
no legal effect. It is not a measure. In addition, the Sunset Policy Bulletin does not mandate a breach
of any WTO provisions. As noted above, as a matter of US law the Sunset Policy Bulletin cannot
"mandate" that Commerce do anything. It certainly cannot mandate a breach.

2. Mexico Fails to Substantiate its Claim that the Sunset Policy Bulletin Mandates that
Commerce Give "Decisive Weight" to Dump ing Margins and Import Volumes When
Making the Likelihood of Dumping Determination in a Sunset Review

6. Mexico offers its Exhibit MEX-62 as "evidence" that the Sunset Policy Bulletin mandates an
affirmative likelihood determination whenever th ere is evidence of dumping margins and depressed
import volumes, to the exclusion of any other ev idence, in a sunset review. As a matter of
US municipal law – that is, as a matter of fact – this is simply incorrect. A document like the Sunset
Policy Bulletin which does nothing more than explain to the public Commerce's thinking with regard
to a variety of issues does not become binding simply because Mexico submits a misleading statistical
analysis of past results in sunset reviews. Th e meaning of the Sunset Policy Bulletin can only be
determined by examining US law, and Mexico has faile d to explain how its statistical analysis is part
of, or changes, US municipal law.

7. Exhibit MEX-62 demonstrates that Comme rce made reasoned and reasonable likelihood
determinations in each of the sunset reviews in the exhibit and has provided an explanation on each
affirmative determination. To set the record st raight, there was not an affirmative finding in "all
sunset reviews." Mexico would have the Panel co me away with the impression that Commerce made
an affirmative finding in every sunset review; but that is not the case.

8. Therefore, Mexico's claim concerns a subset of sunset reviews. Mexico's assertion in this
dispute is that the 227 cases in Exhibit MEX-62 ar e evidence that Commerce makes an affirmative
likelihood determination in every review simp ly because dumping margins or depressed import
volumes are present and
 the Sunset Policy Bulletin "mandates" that Commerce so find without
reviewing other evidence. Exhibit MEX-62 does nothing of the sort.

9. The question is whether the results in the 227 reviews in question are "mandated" by the
Sunset Policy Bulletin. Mexico appears to assert that the fa ct that no respondent has been able to
overcome the so-called "decisive weight" of dump ing margins and depressed import volumes, as
described
 in the Sunset Policy Bulletin, proves that the Sunset Policy Bulletin mandates an affirmative
likelihood finding in every case. This is nothing more than circular reasoning.

10. Even assuming arguendo that the Sunset Policy Bulletin could mandate results, Exhibit MEX-
62 does not prove that the Sunset Policy Bulletin is what generated the results in question. The Sunset
Policy Bulletin merely reflects logical principles. For ex ample, if dumping continued over the life of
the order, there is reason to be concerned that dumping will continue once the discipline of the order
is removed. The Appellate Body agrees.
1 Therefore, if dumping continues over the life of the order,
and Commerce concludes that continuation or recurre nce of dumping is likely, then Commerce has so
concluded because of logic – not the Sunset Policy Bulletin.2

11. A closer examination of the reviews in Exhibit MEX-62 reveals that Mexico's
characterization of the 227 reviews is erroneous. In sum, a review of Exhibit MEX-62 reveals the
following:

1 See United-States Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004 ("Japan Sunset AB"), para. 177.
2 We also note that, with regard to Mexico's cl aim that Exhibit MEX-62 proves that Commerce has
never made an affirmative sunset determination without referring to the guidance provided in the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, this assertion is incorrect as a factual matter. As we discussed in our answer to question 26 from the
Panel in this case, Commerce did not rely on historical data when making the final affirmative sunset
determination in the full sunset review of Canada-Sugar, but rather calculated a predicted future dumping
margin based on information submitted by both the domestic and respondent interested parties. Exhibit MEX-
62, Tab 261.

 - in almost a quarter of the reviews found in Exhibit MEX-62, the order was revoked;

 - in over 80 per cent of the remaining reviews , domestic interested parties placed
evidence on the record indicating that dumpi ng was likely to continue or recur, but
respondents placed no evidence on the record at all;

 - in all of these reviews, and the remaini ng ones, Commerce evaluated all the evidence
on the record and presented a reasoned conclusion that dumping was likely to
continue or recur.

12. This is hardly evidence that, in any of tho se reviews, Commerce attached "decisive" weight to
dumping margins and import volumes without considering more.

3. Mexico's Claim Regarding an Alle ged "Consistent Practice" is Beyond the Terms of
Reference of This Panel

13. In Question 12, the Panel specifically asked Mexico to identify "where, in the request for
establishment," Mexico set forth its claim regard ing Commerce's alleged "c onsistent practice."
Mexico responded by citing a section that fails to re ference this allegedly consistent "practice."
By contrast, Mexico did expressly refer to "practi ce" in Section D of its panel request (a claim
concerning GATT Article X:3(a), not Article 11.3). Thus, when Mexico wished to include a claim
concerning practice in its panel request, it knew how to do so. With respect to a claim in connection
with Article 11.3, it did not do so. The Panel s hould therefore reject Mexico's claim as not being
within the terms of reference of this dispute.

14. In any event, Mexico's claim – though beyond the terms of reference – is also without merit.
Commerce "practice" is not a measure; it is no more than short-hand to refer to recent Commerce
precedent. As the panel in India Steel Plate concluded, Commerce "practice" is not within the scope
of measures that may be challenged under Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement, and mere repetition
cannot turn such a "practice" into a procedure and thus a measure.
3 In particular, repetition does not
mean that Commerce's past applications of a law are binding as something called "practice."

B. I SSUES RELATING TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF INJURY IN A
SUNSET REVIEW
1. Cumulation of imports from more than one subject country is permitted under
Article 11.3

15. Mexico contends that cumulation is prohibited in sunset reviews, notwithstanding the silence
of the Agreement on this issue. The Appellate Bo dy has recognized that silence in an Agreement
must have some meaning. 4 Members are free to do that which is not prohibited. In this situation,

3 United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India, WT/DS206/R,
Panel Report adopted 29 July 2002, para. 7.22 (citation omitted). For a more detailed discussion, see US First
Written Submission, para. 113. That Mexico devoted ei ght paragraphs in its answers to Pane l questions
(paras. 46-53) without even referring to India Steel Plate is indicative of the feeble nature of this claim. Mexico
instead elected to rely on question posed by the Appellate Body in Japan Sunset – "does the type of instrument
itself – be it a law, regulation, procedure, practice, or something else – govern whether it may be subject to
WTO dispute settlement?" Nowhere did the Appellate Body conclude that Commerce's "practice" may be
challenged.
4 United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
From Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, Appellate Body Report adopted 19 Dec. 2002 ("German Sunset"), paras. 64-
65.

where nothing in the text of the AD Agreement prohi bits cumulation and Article 11.3 is silent on the
subject, the only logical conclusion is that cumulation is permitted.

16. Mexico attempts to pin its argument on the use of the word duty
 rather than duties in
Article 11.3, as well as in Articles 11.1 and 11.2. Reliance on the reference to the singular word
"duty" ignores that Article VI:6 of GATT 1994, in requiring an injury evaluation for purposes of an
original investigation, likewise refers to the levying of an anti-dumping (or countervailing) duty .
Cumulation in anti-dumping investigations was wi despread among GATT contracting parties under
Article VI, even prior to the adoption of Article s 3.3 and 11.3 of the AD Agreement in the Uruguay
Round.5 Mexico has not disputed this point.

2. Nothing in the Agreement makes the provisi ons of Article 3 applicable to Article 11.3
sunset reviews

17. As the United States has noted, there are many examples of how Article 3 cannot be applied
in a sunset review. 6 This is a strong textual indication that Article 3 was not intended to apply to
sunset reviews. Mexico has sought to counter th at argument by devising scenarios in which it might
be possible to apply the provisions of Article 3 to a sunset review. This argument is not persuasive.
Article 11.3 must be interpreted in a way that allows it be applied to all sunset reviews in order to give
it meaning and effect. "An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."7

18. Mexico has not explained how the specific pr ovisions of Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the
AD Agreement could be applied to all sunset reviews. One reasonably expected reaction to the
imposition of an anti-dumping order would be th e exit of the subject imports from the domestic
market. Yet Mexico has not demonstrated how the i nvestigating authority could, for example, apply
the requirements of Article 3.5 in such a situation.

19. Mexico's response to this obvious incongruity is to state that "WTO Members intended
 the
sunset analysis to be difficult and rigorous" (emphasi s in original). This answer is non-responsive.
The fact is that the provisions simply cannot be applied – no matter how rigorous the efforts of the
investigating authority.

20. Mexico may be concerned that Article 11 re views do not contain specific disciplines such as
those contained in Articles 2 and 3; but as th e Appellate Body has found, Article 2 does not per se
apply in Article 11.3 reviews, and by analogy nor do es Article 3. To the extent Mexico has concerns
about the absence of specific criteria in Article 11.3, those concerns are not properly raised in the
context of this dispute. As the DSU makes clear, "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
8

21. Article 5, unlike Article 11, cross-references Article 3 in several respects. In particular,
Article 5.2 requires that the application filed by the domestic industry shall include evidence of,
inter alia, "injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement."
This language echos that of Article 3.1 which refers to "a determination of injury for purposes of

5 See The GATT Uruguay Round, A Negotiating History (1986-1992), (T. Stewart, Ed.) at 1475-1478,
1594, and 1598 (Exhibit US-27).
6 See, e.g., US First Written Submission, paras. 312-313, and 319-322.
7 United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 , WT/DS176/AB/R, Report of the
Appellate Body, adopted 1 February 2002, para. 338; United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 20 May 1996, at 21.
8 Article 3.2. See also Article 19.2 ("in their findings and recommendations, the panel and the
Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.")

Article VI of GATT 1994," and footnote 9 of Article 3, which instructs that the term "injury," unless
otherwise specified "shall be interpreted in accordan ce with the terms of this Agreement." Whereas it
is clear from the language of the Agreement that injury
 for purposes of Article 5 shall be interpreted
in accordance with footnote 9, the Agreement provides no similar connection between the likely
"continuation or recurrence of injury" for purposes of Article 11.3 and the injury determination
contemplated by Article 3.

22. In addition, the cumulation provision containe d in Article 3 cross-refe rences Article 5 in two
ways. This cross-reference in an integral provisi on of Article 3 indicates that Article 3 and Article 5
are linked. Article 5 sets out the procedural aspec ts for the original determinations of both dumping
and injury.
9 Article 3 provides the substantive requirement s for original injury determinations. There
simply is no similar linkage between Article 11.3 and Article 3.

23. Mexico suggests that there are two types of injury "investigations" – a so-called "Article 5
injury investigation" and a so-called "Article 11.3 in jury investigation." This argument conflicts with
the Appellate Body's report in German Sunset, notwithstanding Mexico's assertion that its views are
"completely consistent" with the Appellate Body's statements.

24. The Appellate Body's observation that "original investigations and sunset reviews are distinct
processes with different purposes,"
10 is not, as Mexico suggests, less applicable to injury
determinations than to dumping de terminations. Article 11.3 of th e AD Agreement (and Article 21.3
of the SCM Agreement) make no mention or reference to an investigation of either dumping or injury.
With respect to both the dumping and injury dete rminations, the Agreement distinguishes between
original investigations and reviews that may follow imposition of an anti-dumping duty order.

25. That Article 11.3 contemplates basic evaluation and objectivity standards – the
"investigatory" aspect – does not translate into a w holesale incorporation of the step-by-step Article 3
analysis required for purposes of an original inv estigation. Just as the Appellate Body declined to
equate obligations of an investigatory
 nature with a wholesale incorporation of Article 2, there is
likewise no incorporation of Article 3.

III. ISSUES RELATING TO THE FOURTH ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

26. Mexico believes that TAMSA's and Hylsa's re quests for reviews trigger obligations under
Article 11.2. Mexico has also advanced vari ous arguments regarding the application of the
commercial quantities requirement in this particular review. These arguments fail.

A. O
VERVIEW OF REVOCATION OPTIONS
27. US law provides for three separate revocati on procedures. A company seeking revocation for
itself ("revocation in part") during an annual ass essment review will make a revocation request
pursuant to section 351.222(b)(2) of the regulati ons. TAMSA and Hylsa requested revocation
reviews under this procedure. If the company in question seeks revocation of the entire order during
its annual assessment review, then the compa ny needs to request a review under section
351.222(b)(1). TAMSA and Hylsa did not request revocation reviews under this procedure.
The United States also provides respondents the opport unity to seek revocation, either in whole or in
part, through a "changed circumstances" review . Commerce may revoke the order in whole ( i.e.,
order-wide) or in part (company-specific). Neither TAMSA nor Hylsa requested a "changed
circumstances" review.

9 See German Sunset, para. 67.
10 German Sunset, para. 87.

28. In practice, a foreign producer or exporter in a country with multiple exporters normally does
not request revocation of the order as a whole. A company requesting revocation has a business
incentive to request revocation with respect only to itself, rather than the entire order, because
revocation in part would put that company at a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other producers and
exporters that remain subject to the order.11

29. In this light, Mexico's argument that TAMSA and Hylsa were the only known Mexican
producers when Commerce conducted the fourth revi ew, and that the company-specific revocation
review in this proceeding was really the same as an order-wide review under Article 11.2, rings
hollow. First, there were several indications throughout the duration of this proceeding indicating that
TAMSA and Hylsa were not the only known producers of OCTG in Mexico. 12 Second, each
company had reason to seek revocation for itself alone and not for its competitor or competitors.

30. In any event, the company-specific revocation pr ocedure is of benefit to foreign exporters and
producers. If this revocation procedure were not available to respondents, the United States would
still meet its Article 11.2 obligations through orde r-wide review procedures. The fact that the
United States provides additional procedures, which benefit foreign producers, does not mean those
procedures are subject to Article 11.2. To conclude as much would create a disincentive for Members
to provide procedures beyond those required to fulfil specific obligations.

B. A
RTICLE 11.2 REQUIRES ONLY ORDER-WIDE REVOCATION REVIEWS
31. Mexico has argued that Article 11.2 requir es company-specific revocation procedures.
The text of Article 11.2 does not support Mexico's view. First, the text of Article 11.2 requires a
review of the continuing need for "the duty." As the Appellate Body found in connection with a
similar phrase in Article 11.3, "the duty" refers to the anti-dumping duty order as a whole, not as
applied to individual companies. 13 Second, the text of Article 11.2 states that "any interested party,"
domestic or respondent, may request a review by submitting positive informati on to substantiate the
need for the review. This simply means that the requ est of one interested party is sufficient to trigger
the review; interested parties need not collectively request the review.

32. Mexico has argued that the fact that the United States amended its company-specific
revocation regulations after DRAMs from Korea demonstrates that company-specific revocation
reviews are subject to Article 11.2.
14 However, the question of whether company-specific revocation
reviews are required by Article 11.2 w as not directly before the panel in DRAMs from Korea . More
importantly, whether company-specific reviews are subject to Article 11.2 is a question of treaty
interpretation, not whether a Member emphasized a pa rticular argument in previous proceedings or
how that Member later amended its regulations.

C. M
EXICO'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES ELEMENT OF THE
"THREE YEARS WITHOUT DUMPING" REQUIREMENT IS ERRONEOUS
33. Mexico has argued that Commerce's application in OCTG from Mexico of the requirement
that sales have been made in commercial quantities during the three sequential years of no dumping is
inconsistent with Article 11.2. As discussed a bove, Article 11.2 does not apply to company-specific

11 US Answers to Panel Questions, para. 2.
12 US Answers to Mexico's Questions, para. 33.
13 Japan Sunset AB, para. 150.
14 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b) (Exhibit US-4). This regulation was amended to include the phrase
"otherwise necessary to offset dumping" pursuant to implementation of the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the DSB in DRAMs from Korea.

revocation procedures; nevertheless, Commerc e's application of the commercial quantities
requirement was not inconsistent with Article 11.2.

34. Article 11.2 states that a Member is obligated to review the continuing need for an anti-
dumping duty upon request by an interested party "which submits positive information substantiating
the need for a review." It also states that a Member shall terminate the duty if, as a result of the
review, the authorities determine that the duty is "no longer warranted."

35. Under section 351.222(b), in determining whethe r the duty is "warranted," the United States
evaluates whether the exporter or producer in qu estion has been able to maintain a meaningful
presence in the US market after imposition of the orde r. Failure to do so is evidence that the exporter
or producer needs to dump in order to meaningfully participate in the US market and that, absent the
order, dumping will continue or recur. Requiring the exporter or producer under section 351.222(e) to
provide evidence that it has met the commercial quan tities requirement is thus in harmony with the
provision of Article 11.2 requiring a Member to conduc t a review thereunder only if the exporter or
producer provides "positive information" sufficient to warrant the review.

36. The commercial quantities element of Commerc e's requirements for revocation review does
not
 mandate that an importer maintain the same pr e- and post-order import volumes. Both Mexico
and the Panel have noted that it is natural that , following the imposition of an anti-dumping measure,
the volumes sold by the affected exporters would dec line. The United States agrees that this is often
the case, although some exporters have been able to raise their prices to avoid dumping and sell at
well above pre-order volumes.

37. More importantly, Mexico's claim that th e commercial quantities requirement "arises from a
presumption that volume declines means [ sic] that the order is necessary" is simply wrong. A drop in
volumes does not necessarily result in a finding that the commercial quantities threshold has not been
met. Indeed, Commerce has considered sales of 32 per cent of annualized POI sales to have been
made in commercial quantities and revoked on that basis.

D. C
OMMERCE'S APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES REQUIREMENT IN OCTG
FROM MEXICO WAS UNBIASED, OBJECTIVE, AND BASED ON THE RECORD EVIDENCE
38. As discussed above, Commerce's commercial quantities determinations are based on the facts
of each case. The information presented by TAMS A in support of its commercial quantities claim,
however, was not persuasive. First, TAMSA sold OCTG to the United States, when it sold at all, in
only token volumes after the order was issued. Specifically, TAMSA's year-long volumes for the
three basis years were only 0.5 per cent, 0.6 per cent, and 0.2 per cent of the annualized sales volumes
present in the period of investigation.15

39. TAMSA made two arguments, each of wh ich Commerce considered and addressed in the
final determination, finding them insufficient to provide a basis for finding that TAMSA's extremely
small sales were probative of its ability to maintain normal market participation without dumping.
16

40. Mexico bears the burden of proving that, in fulfilling its obligations under Article 11.2,
Commerce did not properly establish the facts or did not evaluate those facts in an unbiased and
objective manner. Mexico has simply demonstrated that TAMSA and Hylsa presented facts and

15 See Fourth Review Issues and Decision Memorandum, at Comment 1 (Exhibit MEX-9).
16 See Fourth Review Issues and Decision Memorandum, at Comment 1 (Exhibit MEX-9).

arguments; there is no evidence that Commerce di d not evaluate those facts in an unbiased and
objective manner. Mexico's claim fails.17

E. T
HE MARGIN CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR HYLSA IN THE FOURTH REVIEW WAS
CONSISTENT WITH THE AD AGREEMENT
41. Mexico's allegations that the United Stat es calculated the dumping margin for respondent
Hylsa in a manner inconsistent with Article 11.2 and 2 of the AD Agreement are without foundation
and should be rejected by this Panel.

42. First, Mexico has failed to advance any claim that the United States acted in a manner
inconsistent with Article 11.2 in its establishm ent of the margins of dumping in the fourth
administrative review. The calculation of margins of dumping in an administrative review under the
United States' system is performed pursuant to Artic le 9.3.1 of the AD Agreement. Mexico did not
reference Article 9.3.1 in its request for panel establishment.

43. Second, with respect to Mexico's Article 2 claims, the analysis of each export transaction in
the fourth administrative review was based on a comparison with a normal value for identical or
similar home market transactions. In each case, due allowance was made for any differences affecting
price comparability, consistent with Article 2.4. Mexico has offered no textual support for a finding
that, once an anti-dumping measure is in place, Members may not impose anti-dumping duties based
on the amount by which sales have been dumped. Si milarly, Mexico has offered no textual basis for
finding that Members must offset or reduce that amount of dumping based on the extent to which
distinct comparisons have involved export prices which were greater than normal value.

44. In addition, Mexico has failed to establish th at the AD Agreement contains any obligations as
to how an administering authority is to de termine an overall rate of dumping, or even whether an
administering authority must determine an overall rate of dumping in a review.

45. Third, to the extent that Me xico seeks to rely on Article 2.4.2 for its offset claim, Mexico is
pursuing contradictory legal arguments. Mexico suggests that the term "investigation phase" in

17 Mexico has also tried to argue that the United States conducted a full revocation review for TAMSA
and Hylsa, rather than an evaluation of the revocation requests. This argument is unavailing. US regulations
make clear that the commercial quantities requirement is a prerequisite for a request to conduct a revocation
review. Section 351.222(e)(i) of the regulations provides that a company may only request revocation if it
certifies, inter alia, that it has sold the subject merchandise in commercial quantities for three consecutive years.
In verifying that certification, Commerce concluded that TAMSA had not sold the subject merchandise in
commercial quantities and therefore did not qualify for a re vocation review. With respect to Hylsa, Commerce
noted that Hylsa had failed to obtain a de minimis margin in the fourth review. It stands to reason that if a
company does not meet the threshold requirement for seeking revocation, then revocation will not occur.
Mexico's reference to the title of the notice as providing evidence that a full revocation review in fact occurred
is sophistic. (See, e.g., Mexico's Written Answers to Panel Questions, para. 11.)
Moreover, Mexico's quotation of the Issues and Decision Memorandum is misleading. (Mexico's
Written Answers to Panel Questions, paras. 12-13.) In arguing that it met the commercial quantities
requirement, TAMSA tried to justify the significan t drop in sales. The passage quoted from the Issues and
Decision Memorandum simply represents Commerce's response to TAMSA's argument that it met the
commercial quantities requirement. This is confirmed by the paragraph following that which Mexico has
quoted, in which Commerce stated that the "commercial quantities standard is evaluated on a case-by-case
basis."
 (Issues and Decision Memorandum at 8 (Exhibit MEX-9)).
Finally, the United States notes that Mexico incl udes a quotation from the Issues and Decision
Memorandum as "evidence" that the United States con ducted a substantive review: "‘[W]e find that TAMSA
does not qualify for revocation of the order on OCTG under 351.222(e)(1)(ii) . . . ." Section 351.222(e) of the
regulations is the commercial quantities certification requ irement and thus expressly refers to a procedural,
rather than a substantive decision.

Article 2.4.2 means any time an administer ing authority undertakes a process that is investigative in
nature. Mexico also interprets the term "investig ations" in Article 3.3 as limited to only original
investigations. Not only does Mexico fail to offe r any textual support for its disparate use of these
terms, Mexico also fails to recognize that its interpretation of the phrase "investigation phase" in
Article 2.4.2 would deprive that term of any meaning.