TURKEY – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: Addendum
Date: 19 December 2023
Document codes: WT/DS561/R/Add.1; WT/DS561/R.
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: Turkey
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. I:1, II:1(a), II:1(b)  GATT 1994

TURKEY – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS
FROM THE UNITED STATES
REPORT OF THE PANEL
Addendum
This addendum contains Annexes A to E to the Report of the Panel to be found in document

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with Remote
Participation
11
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 15
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Türkiye 36
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 52
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 56
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 61
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand 64
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway 65
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 69
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland 73
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 77
ANNEX D
COMMUNICATION BY THE PANEL ON REQUESTS FOR ENHANCED THIRD PARTY RIGHTS
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Communication by the Panel on requests for enhanced third-party rights 80
ANNEX E
TABLE OF RELEVANT DUTY RATES
Contents Page
Annex E-1 Table of relevant duty rates 83

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures Concerning Substantive Meetings with Remote
Participation
11

ANNEX A-1
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Adopted on 5 April 2019
General
1. (1) In these proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). In addition, the
following Working Procedures apply.
(2) The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation
with the parties.
Confidentiality
2. (1) The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept
confidential. Members shall treat as confidential information that is submitted to the Panel
which the submitting Member has designated as confidential.
(2) Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party or third party
from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.
(3) If a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall
also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential summary of the information
contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
(4) Upon request, the Panel may adopt appropriate additional procedures for the treatment
and handling of confidential information after consultation with the parties.
Submissions
3. (1) Before the first substantive mee ting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall
submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in
accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(2) Each party shall also submit to the Panel, before the second substantive meeting of the
Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
(3) Each third party that chooses to make a written submission before the first substantive
meeting of the Panel with the parties shall do so in accordance with the timetable adopted by
the Panel.
(4) The Panel may invite the parties or third parties to make additional submissions during
the proceedings, including with respect to requests for preliminary rulings in accordance with
paragraph 4 below.
Preliminary rulings
4. (1) If Turkey considers that the Panel should make a ruling before the issuance of the
Report that certain measures or claims in the panel request or the complainant's first written
submission are not properly before the Panel, the following procedure applies. Exceptions to
this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
a. Turkey shall submit any such request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible
opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel.

The United States shall submit its response to the request before the first substantive
meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request.
b. The Panel may issue a preliminary ruling on the issues raised in such a preliminary
ruling request before, during or after the first substantive meeting, or the Panel may
defer a ruling on the issues raised by a preliminary ruling request until it issues its
Report to the parties.
c. If the Panel finds it appropriate to issue a preliminary ruling before the issuance of its
Report, the Panel may provide reasons for the ruling at the time that the ruling is
made, or subsequently in its Report.
d. Any request for such a preliminary ruling by the respondent before the first meeting,
and any subsequent submissions of the parties in relation thereto before the first
meeting, shall be served on all third parties. The Panel may provide all third parties
with an opportunity to provide comments on any such request, either in their
submissions as provided for in the timetable or separately. Any preliminary ruling
issued by the Panel before the first substantive meeting on whether certain measures
or claims are properly before the Panel shall be communicated to all third parties.
(2) This procedure is without prejudice to the parties' right to request other types of
preliminary or procedural rulings during the proceedings, and to the procedures that the Panel
may follow with respect to such requests.
Evidence
5. (1) Each party shall submit all evidence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, or evidence
necessary for answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party.
Additional exceptions may be granted upon a showing of good cause.
(2) If any new evidence has been admitted upon a showing of good cause, the Panel shall
accord the other party an appropriate period of time to comment on the new evidence
submitted.
6. (1) If the original language of an exhibit or portion thereof is not a WTO working language,
the submitting party or third party shall simultaneously submit a translation of the exhibit or
relevant portion into the WTO working language of the submission . The Pa nel may grant
reasonable extensions of time for the translation of exhibits upon a showing of good cause.
(2) Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing,
preferably no later than the next submission or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following
the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be accompanied
by an explanation of the grounds for the objection and an alternative translation. The Panel
may grant reasonable extensions of time for the submission of an alternative translation upon
a showing of good cause.
7. (1) To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the
course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exhibit on its
cover page. Exhibits submitted by the United States should be numbered USA-1, USA-2, etc.
Exhibits submitted by Turkey should be numbered TUR -1, TUR-2, etc. If the last exhibit in
connection with the first submission was numbered USA-5, the first exhibit in connection with
the next submission thus would be numbered USA-6.
(2) Each party shall provide an updated list of exhibits (in Word or Excel format) together
with each of its submissions, oral statements, and responses to questions.
(3) If a party submits a document that has already been submitted as an exhibit by the
other party, it should explain why it is submitting that document again.

(4) If a party includes a hyperlink to the content of a website in a submission, and intends
that the cited content form part of the official record, the cited content of the website shall be
provided in the form of an exhibit.
Editorial Guide
8. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its
submissions in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissio ns (electronic copy
provided).
Questions
9. The Panel may pose questions to the parties and third parties at any time, including:
a. Before any meeting, the Panel may send written questions, or a list of topics it intends
to pursue in questioning orally during a meeting. The Panel may ask different or additional
questions at the meeting.
b. The Panel may put questions to the parties and third parties orally during a meeting,
and in writing following the meeting, as provided for in paragraphs 15 and 21 below.
Substantive meetings
10. The Panel shall meet in closed session.
11. The parties shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before
it.
12. (1) Each party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when
meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working
Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings and the
submissions of the parties and third parties.
13. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation no later than
5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) two (2) working days before the first day of each meeting with the Panel.
14. A request for interpretation by any party should be made to the Panel as early as possible,
preferably at the organizational stage, to allow sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.
15. The substantive meetings of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite the United States to make an opening statement to present its
case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite Turkey to present its point of view. In the
second substantive meeting, Turkey shall be given the opportunity to make its statement first.
b. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at
the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. If interpretation is needed,
each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters.
c. Each party should avoid lengthy repetition of the arguments in its submissions. Each
party is invited to limit the duration of its opening statement to approximately one (1) hour.
If either party considers that it requires more time for its opening statement, it should inform
the Panel and the other party at least five (5) days prior to the meeting, together with an
estimate of the expected duration of its statement. The Panel will accord equal time to the
other party.

d. After the conclusion of the opening statements, the Panel shall give each party the
opportunity to make comments or ask the other party questions.
e. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties.
f. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with the United States presenting its statement first. Before
each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with
a provisional written version of its closing statement, if available.
g. Following the meeting:
i. Each party shall submit a final written version of its opening statement no later than
5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the second working day following the meeting. At the
same time, each party should also submit a final written version of any prepared
closing statement that it delivered at the meeting.
ii. Each party shall send in writing, within the timeframe established by the Panel before
the end of the meeting, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive
a response in writing.
iii. The Panel shall send in writing, within the timeframe established by the Panel before
the end of the meeting , any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a
response in writing.
iv. Each party shall respond in writing to the questions from the Panel, and to any
questions posed by the other party, within the time -frame established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting.
Third-party session
16. The third parties shall be present at the meetings only when invited by th e Panel to appear
before it.
17. (1) Each third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when
meeting with the Panel.
(2) Each third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working
Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings and the
submissions of the parties and third parties.
18. A request for interpretation by any t hird party should be made to the Panel as early as
possible, preferably upon receiving the Working Procedures and timetable for the proceeding s, to
allow sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.
19. (1) Each third party may present its views orally during a session of the first substantive
meeting with the parties set aside for that purpose.
(2) Each third party shall indicate to the Panel whether it intends to make an oral statement
during the third-party session, along with the list of members of its delegation, in advance of
this session and no later than 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) two (2) working days before the third-
party session of the meeting with the Panel.
20. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All parties and third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the oral statements of the third parties. Each third party
making an oral statement at the third -party session shall provide the Panel and other

participants with a provisional written version of its statement before it takes the floor . If
interpretation of a third party's oral statement is needed, that third party shall provide
additional copies for the interpreters.
c. Each third party should limit the duratio n of its statement to 15 minutes, and avoid
repetition of the arguments already in its submission. If a third party considers that it requires
more time for its opening statement, it should inform the Panel and the parties at least five
(5) days before the meeting, together with an estimate of the expected duration of its
statement. The Panel will accord equal time to all third parties for their statements.
d. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties shall be given the
opportunity to pose questions to any third party for clarification on any matter raised in that
third party's submission or statement.
e. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to any third party.
f. Following the third-party session:
i. Each third party shall submit the final written version of its oral statement, no later
than 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the second working day following the meeting.
ii. Each party may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting, any questions to a third party or parties to which it
wishes to receive a response in writing.
iii. The Panel may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the Panel
before the end of the meeting , any questio ns to a third party or parties to which it
wishes to receive a response in writing.
iv. Each third party choosing to do so shall respond in writing to written questions from
the Panel or a party, within a timeframe established by the Panel before the end of the
meeting.
Descriptive part and executive summaries
21. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the
Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which
shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve
as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the
case.
22. Each party shall submit a single integrated executive summary. The summary shall summarize
the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in the party's first and second written
submissions, its oral statement s, and if possible, its responses to questions following the first and
second substantive meetings. The timing of the submission of the integrated executive summar y
shall be indicated in the timetable adopted by the Panel.
23. Each integrated executive summary shall be limited to no more than 30 pages.
24. The Panel may request the parties a nd third parties to provide executive summaries of facts
and arguments presented in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be
specified in the timetable.
25. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary of its arguments as presented
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This
integrated executive summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, if relevant.
The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed six (6) pages. If a third-
party submission and/or oral statement does not exceed six (6) pages in total, this may serve as
the executive summary of that third party's arguments.

Interim review
26. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.
27. If no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit written comments
on the other party's written request for review, in accordan ce with the timetable adopted by the
Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party's written request for
review.
Interim and Final Report
28. The interim report, as well as the final report before its official circulation, shall be kept strictly
confidential and shall not be disclosed.
Service of documents
29. The following procedures regarding service of documents apply to all documents submitted by
parties and third parties during the proceedings:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by submitting them with
the DS Registry.
b. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel in Microsoft Word format
and in PDF format as an e-mail attachment, or if impractical, on a CD-ROM or a DVD by 5:00
p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel . The PDF version shall
constitute the official version for the purposes of submission deadlines and the record of the
dispute. Email of a document shall constitute electronic service on the Panel, the other party,
and the third parties.
c. All emails to the Panel shall be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, and copied to other WTO
Secretariat staff whose email addresses have been provided to the parties in the
proceedings. If a CD-ROM/DVD is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry (office
No. 2047) by 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel.
d. By 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the next working day following the electronic submission,
each party and third party shall submit one (1) paper copy of all documents it submits to
the Panel, including the exhibits, with the DS Registry (office No. 2047). If any documents
are in a format that is impractical to submit as a paper copy, the party shall inform the Panel
and the other party (and third parties if appropriate) accordingly.
e. In addition, each party and third party is invited to submit all documents through the Digital
Dispute Settlement Registry (DDSR) within 24 hours following the deadline for the
submission of the electronic versions. If the parties or third parties have any questions or
technical difficulties relating to the DDSR, they are invited to consult the DDSR User Guide
(electronic copy provided) or contact the DS Registry at DSRegistry@wto.org.
f. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party.
Each party shall, in addition, serve any submissions in advanc e of the first substantive
meeting with the Panel directly on the third parties. Each third party shall serve any
document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and on all other third parties. A party
or third party may serve its documents on another party or third party by email or on a CD-
ROM or DVD.
g. Each party and third party shall submit its documents with the DS Registry by 5:00 p.m.
(Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel.

h. As a general rule, all communications from the Panel to the parties and third parties will be
via email. In addition to transmitting them to the parties by email, the Panel shall provide
the parties with a paper copy of the Interim Report and the Final Report.
Correction of clerical errors in submissions
30. The Panel may grant leave to a party or third party to correct clerical errors in any of its
submissions (including paragraph numbering and typographical mistakes). Any such request should
identify the nature of the errors to be corrected, and should be made promptly following the filing
of the submission in question.

ANNEX A-2
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS
WITH REMOTE PARTICIPATION
Adopted on 18 February 2022
General
1. These Additional Working Procedures set out terms for holding the substantive meetings of
the Panel remotely.
Definitions
2. For the purposes of these Additional Working Procedures:
"Host" means the designated person within the WTO Secretariat responsible for the
management of the platform for participants to take part in the meeting with the Panel.
"Participant" means any authoriz ed person taking part in the meeting, including the
Members of the Panel, the WTO Secretariat staff involved in the dispute and the organization
of the meeting, members of the parties' and third parties' delegations, and interpreters.
"Platform" means the Cisco Webex platform.
Equipment and technical requirements
3. Each party shall be responsible for ensuring that the members of its delegation join the
meeting using the designated platform and satisfy the minimum equipment and technica l
requirements of the platform provider for the effective conduct of the meeting.
4. Technical questions, including the minimum equipment and technical requirements for the
usage of the platform, will be addressed in the advance testing sessions between th e host and
participants provided for in paragraph 7 below.
Technical support
5. (1) The Secretariat has limited ability to offer remote assistance during, and in advance of
the meeting. Each party, therefore, is responsible for providing its own technical support to
the members of its delegation.

(2) The host will assist participants in accessing and using the platform in preparation for,
and during the course of, the meeting with the Panel. The host will prioritize assisting those
participants designated as main speakers on the delegations' lists.

Pre-meeting

Registration

6. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of the members of its delegation on the dedicated
form in Annex 1 below, no later than 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) ten working days before the start of
the meeting. The list shall indicate those participants designated as main speakers.

Advance testing

7. The Secretariat will hold two testing sessions with participants before the substantive meeting
with the Panel. One of these sessions will be a joint session with all participants in the meeting.
These testing sessions will seek to reflect, as far as possible, the conditions of the proposed meeting.

Participants should make themselves available for the testing sessions. The Secretariat will be in
contact with the participants to set the schedule of the testing sessions in due course.

Confidentiality and security

8. The meeting shall be confidential and the rules of the DSU continue to apply during the remote
session of the meeting.

9. Each party shall follow any security and confidentiality protocols set by the Panel in advance
of the meeting.

10. The participants shall connect to the meeting through a secure internet connection and shall
avoid the use of an open or public internet connection.

Conduct of the meeting

Recording

11. The Secretariat will record the meeting in its entirety. The recording of the meeting shall form
part of the panel record.

12. Any recording of the meeting or any part thereof other than that referred to in paragraph 11,
through any means, including audio or video recording, or screenshot, is prohibited.

Access to the virtual meeting

13. Participants shall access the virtual meeting in accordance with these Additional Working
Procedures.

14. (1) The host will invite participants via email to join the virtual meeting.

(2) For security reasons, access to the virtual meeting will be password -protected and
limited to participants. Participants shall not forward or share the virtual meeting link or
password with unauthorized persons.

(3) Each party shall ensure that only participants from its delegation access t he virtual
meeting.

Advance log-on

15. (1) The virtual meeting room will be accessible 60 minutes in advance of the scheduled
start time of the meeting.

(2) To ensure that the meeting starts as scheduled, participants must login to the platform
at least 30 minutes in advance of the scheduled start time of the meeting.

(3) Participants will be placed in a virtual lobby where they will remain until the Panel is
ready to start the meeting, at which time the host will admit them to the meeting.

Document sharing

16. (1) Before each party takes the floor, it shall email the Panel and other participants at the
meeting a provisional written version of its statement, including any exhibits.

(2) Any participant wishing to share a document with the other partici pants during the
meeting – including via screen sharing – shall email the document and confirm that the other
participants have received the document, before first referring to the document at the
meeting.

Pauses for internal coordination and consultation

17. Parties are free to internally coordinate and consult while the meeting is ongoing so long as it
is not disruptive to the proceedings, but they should be aware that the chat feature of the platform
is visible to all participants. The Panel may briefly pause a session at any time, on its own initiative
or upon request of a party, to enable any necessary internal coordination and consultation.

Participation

18. Participants who are not speaking are expected to have their microphone on mute. They may
also wish to turn off their camera to preserve bandwidth. If a participant wishes to take the floor,
they should use the "raise a hand" function in the platform. Once the chairperson gives the floor to
the participant, they should unmute their microphone and turn their camera on.

Communication breakdown

19. Each party will designate a contact person who can liaise with the host during the course of
the meeting to report any technical issues that arise with respect to the platform. The parties and
third parties shall immediately notify the Panel of any technical or connectivity issues affecting the
participation of their delegation, or a member of their delegation, in the meeting. To do so, the party
that experiences the technical or connectivity issue shall:

(1) if possible, immediately intervene at the meeting and briefly state the nature of the
issue experienced; or

(2) if doing so is not possible, immediately contact the host and explain the nature of the
issue experienced. The host can be contacted via the platform chat, by sending an email to
saskia.shuster@wto.org, or by telephone at +41 22 739 5415.

20. The Panel may suspend the proceedings until the technical issue is resolved or continue the
proceedings with those that are connected.

Relationship with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel

21. These Additional Working Procedures complement the Working Procedures adopted by the
Panel, and to the extent of any conflict between the two, supersede them.

ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 15
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Türkiye 36

ANNEX B-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION
1. The United States has brought this dispute to address measures adopted by Turkey that are
plainly inconsistent with the fundamental WTO obligations to provide Most-Favored-Nation treatment
(MFN) and treatment no less favorable than that provided for in a Member's Schedule of Concessions,
as set out re spectively in Articles I and II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994").
2. On June 25, 2018, Turkey issued its Decision on Implementation of Additional Financial
Obligations for the Import of Certain Products Originating in the United States of America ("Decision
on Implementation"). According to a statement made by a Turkish official, Turkey imposed additional
duties on U.S.-origin products in response to U.S. national security actions taken pursuant to Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
3. Article 1 of the Decision on Implementation states that the "purpose" of the Turkish measure
is "to collect additional duties on the import of some products originating" in the United States. Thus,
the Turkish measure explicitly discriminates against certain U.S. products exclusively on the basis
of origin. Article 4 of the Decision on Implementation provides that the additional duties "shall enter
into force" on June 21, 2018.
4. On August 15, 2018, Turkey issued the Decision to Amend the Decision to Impose Additional
Financial Liabilities on the Import of Some Products Originating From the United States of America
("Decision to Amend"). Article 1 of the Decision to Amend modifies the additional duties stipulated
in the Decision on Implementation. The Decision to Amend does not indicate any country other than
the United States to which the additional duties apply.
5. Turkey's additional duties apply to all U.S. -origin products classified within the 22 four - and
six-digit tariff lines listed in the measure. Turkey publishes MFN rates at the 12 -digit level. The
United States examined Turkey's 2018 and 2019 MFN schedules. Both of these schedules indicate
that the 22 four- and six-digit tariff lines subject to the addi tional duties encompass a total of 479
tariff lines at the 12-digit level. Thus, the MFN and bound rate analysis presented here applies to all
479 tariff lines, not simply the 22 tariff lines listed in the measure.
6. Accordingly, Turkey has applied additional duties ranging from four to 70 percent on 479 tariff
lines of products originating in the United States, effective June 21, 2018. Turkey then applied
amended additional duties ranging from 4 to a 140 percent on the same 479 tariff lines of products
originating in the United States, effective August 15, 2018.
7. The United States demonstrates that Turkey exceeded its MFN commitments by referencing
three figures for each tariff code: (A) Turkey 's applied MFN rate; (B) Turkey 's additional duty that
applied to the MFN rate; and (C) the sum of those two duty values. Read together, these three
numbers demonstrate that Turkey 's additional duties on the U.S. -origin product exceed Turkey 's
MFN commitments.
8. The United States demonstrates that Turkey exceeded its bound rate commitments by
referencing two figures for each tariff line: (C) the sum of Turkey 's applied MFN rate and the
additional duty rate, and (D) Turkey's bound rate commitment. Turkey's bound rates are set at the
10-digit level. The United States identified a bound rate for each of the 479 tariff lines at issue.
9. Read together, the two figures referenced for each tariff line demonstrate the following. First,
during the June 21, 2018 to August 14, 2018 period, Turkey exceeded its bound rate commitments
for 115 of the 479 tariff lines. Second, during the August 15, 2018 to December 31, 2018 period,
Turkey exceeded its bound rate commitments on 210 of the 479 tariff lines. Third, during the period
January 1, 2019 and thereafter, Turkey exceeded its bound rate commitments on 210 of the 479
tariff lines.

10. On July 16, 2018, the United States requested consultations with Turkey pursuant to Article
4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")
and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994. Pursuant to this request, Turkey and the United States held
consultations August 29, 2018. Following the request for consultations, Turkey amended the
additional duties measure to increase the rates of duty for 21 out of the 22 t ariff lines affected by
the additional duties measure. On October 18, 2018, the United States requested supplemental
consultations with Turkey. The United States held supplemental consultations with Turkey on
November 14, 2018.
I. TURKEY'S MEASURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE
I:1 OF THE GATT 1994
11. Turkey's measure is inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994 because it fails to extend to
certain products of the United States an advantage granted by Turkey to like products originating in
other countries.
12. First, Turkey's measure is explicitly covered by the text of Article I:1. A "customs duty" is a
charge, such as those in Turkey 's measure, that is imposed on imports at the border. The terms
"tariff", "customs duty", and "import duty," as used in economics and international trade law, are
interchangeable, at least for purposes of the matters at issue in this dispute.
13. The MFN obligation of Article I:1 applies to both duties that have been bound as part of a WTO
Member's schedule under Article II of GATT 1994 and to unbound duties. It also applies to duties
that are set below a bound rate. Thus, Article I:1 requires a WTO Member that applies a duty rate
below the bound rate to imports from some WTO Members to apply that same duty rate to imports
of "like products" from all WTO Members.
14. In the measure at issue in this dispute, Turkey 's measure imposes additional duties rangin g
from 4 to a 140 percent on the same 479 tariff lines of products originating in the United States,
effective August 15, 2018. For the 479 tariff lines at issue in this dispute, the sum total of 's applied
MFN rate and its additional duty demonstrate that Turkey's rate of duty applied to U.S. originating
products is above its MFN rate.
15. Second, each U.S. product subject to Turkey's measure is "like" a product from other countries
not subject to the additional duties within the meaning of Article I:1. As explained in section II,
Turkey's measure discriminates against U.S products on the basis of origin. Thus, Turkey's measure
differentiates among products not on the basis of physical characteristics, end -use, or consumer
preferences, but rather on a distinction that is not relevant to a "like product" analysis.
In circumstances where the only distinction between two sets of
products is the country of origin, it may be presumed that the two
sets are "like products." Numerous Appellate Body and panel reports
have adopted this analysis.
16. Turkey's measure imposes additional duties only on products originating in the United States,
and leaves unchanged the rate duty applicable to other countries, including all other WTO Members.
U.S origin is the only criterion used by the measure for imposing additional duties on U.S. products
covered by 477 tariff lines, but not products from other countries entered under the same tariff lines.
Thus, the like product element of Article I:1 is satisfied.
II. TURKEY'S MEASURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE
II OF THE GATT 1994
17. Turkey's measure is inconsistent with its obligations under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994, which
requires WTO Members to exempt products of another WTO Member from duties in excess of those
set forth in their Schedule of Concessions and accord treatment no less favourable than what is
provided for in that Schedule.
18. An evaluation of a claim under Article II:1(a) and (b) involves an identification of the (1) the
treatment to be accorded under the importing Member's Schedule for the products at issue; (2) the
treatment actually accorded, to those products when originating in the territory of a Member; and

lastly (3) whether the measure results in the imposition of duties on such products that are in excess
of what is provided for in the importing Member's Schedule.
19. In other words, if a measure results in the imposition of duties ( x) that are in excess of the
duties provided for in the Schedule ( y), the measure breaches the obligations under Article II:1(a)
and (b) of the GATT 1994.
20. Additionally, establishing a breach of Article II:1(b) necessarily entails a breach of
Article II:1(a). For this reason, the United States turns first to paragraph (b) in Article II:1 of th e
GATT 1994.
21. Article II:1(b) is divided into two sentences. Under the first sentence, a WTO Member must
exempt the products of another WTO Member from any "ordinary customs duties" in excess of those
set forth in its Schedule when such products are imported into the territory of the former. Under the
second sentence, a WTO Member must exempt those products from all "other duties or charges" of
any kind that are in excess of those imposed as of certain dates.
22. The distinction between the first and second sentence concerns whether the duties in question
constitute "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties or charges." For purposes of this dispute, it is
legally immaterial whether the additional duties constitute "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties
or charges " because, under either characterization, the duties exceed Turkey 's rates bound in
Turkey's schedule.
23. With respect to the first sentence of Article II:1(b), from June 21, 2018 to August 14, 2018,
Turkey exceeded its bound rate commitments for 115 of the 479 tariff lines at issue in this dispute.
In addition, from August 15, 2018 to December 31, 2018, Turke y exceeded its bound rate
commitments on 210 of the 479 tariff lines at issue in this dispute. Finally, from January 1, 2019
and thereafter, Turkey has exceeded its bound rate commitments on 210 of the 479 tariff lines at
issue in this dispute.
24. Given Turkey's breach of Article II:1(b) through the imposition of the duties in excess of its
bound rate on products originating in the United States, Turkey has correspondingly accorded less
favourable treatment to these products and breached Article II:1(a) as well.
III. IN THE EVENT TURKEY ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BASED ON A
SAFEGUARD THEORY, SUCH A DEFENSE WOULD BE COMPLETELY WITHOUT MERIT
BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ADOPTED A SAFEGUARD
25. Turkey may attempt to assert a defense based on some type of theory that its additional
duties are justified under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards ("the Safeguards Agreement"). In the
event that Turkey attempts to present such a defense, the United States will respond to Turkey 's
arguments in subsequent submissions.
26. Nonetheless, in this first submission, the United States would emphasize a key, fatal flaw in
any defense based on the Safeguards Agreement: namely, no U.S. safeguard is related to the
matters in this dispute. For the Safeguard Agreement to apply to a Member's measure, the Member
must invoke the Safeguard Agreement as a justification for suspending GATT 1994 obligations or
withdrawing or modifying tariff concessions. The United States has not invoked the Safeguard
Agreement in connection with this dispute, and the Safeguard Agreement simply does not apply.
27. Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement establish a WTO Member's right
to implement a safeguard measure, temporarily suspending concessions and other obligations, when
that WTO Member invokes this right with the required notice indicating that it has determined that
a product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities and under such conditions
as to cause serious injury or threat of serious injury to the WTO Member's domestic industry.
28. The essential point that a Member must invoke the protections of Article XIX for the Safeguard
provisions to apply is reinforced by the text of the Safeguards Agreement.
29. The Safeguards Agreement elaborates on the rights and obligations in Article XIX. Article 1 of
the Safeguards Agreement states "[t]his Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard

measures which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of the
GATT 1994."
30. One of the requirements from Article XIX that the Safeguards Agreement elaborates upon is
that the right to apply a safeguard measure requires invocation of Article XIX through written notice
of that invocation to other WTO Members.
31. If that ri ght is not exercised with the appropriate notice invoking this authority, a measure
cannot be considered a safeguard under Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement. Moreover,
Turkey cannot exercise the rights of the United States under Article XIX. If the United States did not
invoke Article XIX, that is simply the end of the matter.
32. The Safeguards Agreement expressly defines safeguard measures as those provided for in
Article XIX of the GATT 1994, which in turn makes clear that an importing Member must invoke the
right under Article XIX in order to apply a safeguard measure. Without an invocation of that right, a
measure does not qualify as a safeguard under the WTO Agreement.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. OPENING STATEMENT AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE
MEETING OF THE PANEL
I. INVOCATION IS A PRECONDITION TO APPLYING A SAFEGUARD MEASURE UNDER
GATT ARTICLE XIX AND THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
33. The first step to determine whether a WTO Member has applied a safeguard measure under
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement is to identify whether the Member in
question has invoked the right to take action pursuant to these provisions. Absent this invocation,
a measure cannot fall under the WTO's safeguard disciplines.
34. First, Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement provides that the Safeguards Agreement
"establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be unde rstood to mean
those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994."
35. This proposition is clear from the text and structure of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. For
instance, Article XIX:1(a) provides that if certain conditions are met, a Member "shall be free" to
suspend an obligation or to withdraw or modify a concession. Thus, when a Member believes that
the conditions in Article XIX:1(a) are met, that Member has the discretion to invoke the right
reserved to it under Article XIX. The Appellate Body has expressed support for this analytical
approach.
36. In Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, the Appellate Body reasoned that the phrase "shall be
free" in Article XIX:1(a) accords to a "Member the 'freedom' to exercise its right to impose a
safeguard measure by suspending a GATT obligation or withdrawing or modifying a GATT concession
if the conditions set out in the first part of Article XIX:1(a) are met. " Accordingly, a Member may
elect to invoke Article XIX to implement a safeguard measure. Absent a Member's invocation of
Article XIX, however, a measure cannot constitute a safeguard under WTO safeguard disciplines.
37. The text of Article XIX:2 of the GATT 1994 confirms the U.S. position regarding invocation.
Under that provision, a Member 's ability to take action pursuant to Article XIX is conditioned on
invocation with notice to other Members before that Member can take action. In relevant part,
Article XIX:2 provides:
Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of
the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed
action. (emphasis added)
38. Accordingly, without invocation, and without notice of that invocation, a Member has not taken
and is not "free" to "take action pursuant" to Article XIX.

39. Similarly, the text and structure of Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 further support the U.S.
position. Under that provision, if the consultations envisioned by Article XIX:2 fail to address the
concerns of affected Members, then affected Members can s uspend substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations. Invocation and notice, however, is the triggering condition for the
consultation.
40. Third, multiple provisions in the Safeguards Agreement also support the necessity for
invocation and notice. For instance, the first sentence of Article 8.1 of the Safeguards Agreement
provides:
A Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an extension of a safeguard
measure shall endeavor to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other
obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 between it and the exporting Members who
would be affected by such a measure, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of
Article 12. (emphasis added)
41. According to its ordinary meaning, the term "propose" means to "suggest or state (a possible
plan or action) for consideration. " How does a Me mber "propose" to apply or extend a safeguard
measure? Through invocation of the WTO's safeguards provisions and notice.
42. Finally, consider Article 8.3 of the Safeguards Agreement. In relevant part, Article 8.3 provides
that a "Member proposing to appl y or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate
opportunity for prior consultation with those Members having a substantial interest as exporters" of
the product concerned. Again, this reference to "proposing" supports the U.S. position regarding
invocation. The term "proposing" presumes the existence of a notification by a Member seeking to
take action pursuant to Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement.
II. TURKEY'S ARGUMENT THAT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
IS AN "OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION" MISSES THE POINT
43. According to its ordinary meaning, the term "propose" means to "suggest or state (a possible
plan or action) for consideration. " How does a Member "propose" to apply or extend a safeguard
measure? Through invocation of the WTO's safeguards provisions and notice.
Finally, consider Article 8.3 of the Safeguards Agreement. In relevant part, Article 8.3 provides that
a "Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate opportunity
for prior consultation with those Members having a substantial interest as exporters" of the product
concerned. Again, this reference to "proposing" supports the U.S. position regarding invocation. The
term "proposing" presumes the existence of a notification by a Member seeking to take action
pursuant to Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement.
44. We now turn to Turkey's specific arguments in support of its flawed interpretation of the WTO's
safeguards provisions. According to Turkey, "the existence of a safeguard measure is based on an
objective examination." This argument completely misses the point.
45. The United States agrees that the applicability of the WTO 's safeguards disciplines to a
particular matter requires an "objective examination." As the United States has explained throughout
this proceeding, the first step in the analysis is the objective examination of whether a Member has
invoked the right to take action pursuant to Article XIX. In fact, the examination of whether a
Member has taken an action in the past – here, the invocation of the safeguards agreement – is the
type of objective analysis evaluated in every dispute settlement proceeding. It is no different than
the analysis of whether a Member has adopted a measure that increases duties on t he products of
another Member.
46. Here, an objective examination shows that the United States has not invoked Article XIX;
therefore, any objective examination must conclude with the determination that Article 8.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement is simply not applicable in this dispute.
III. TURKEY RELIES ON WTO REPORTS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT HERE
47. Turkey's failure to ground its justification on the relevant text of the WTO Agreement is a fatal
flaw of its approach. Instead, Turkey derives its legal theor y from the reasoning of panel and

Appellate Body reports in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products. That dispute, however, is not applicable
here because it did not address a situation where a Member has not invoked Article XIX of the
GATT 1994.
48. The panel and Appellate Body reports in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products do not support
Turkey's extreme position. For instance, in that dispute, the panel recognized that a "fundamental
question" was whether the measure should properly be considered a safeguard measure within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement. The panel pointed out that "not any measure
suspending, withdrawing or modifying a GATT obligation or concession will fall within the scope of
Article XIX:1(a)."
49. And, in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, the disputing parties concurred that the Indonesian
measure at issue was a safeguard measure. Why? Because the dispute followed invocation and
notification under Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement. Thus, in that dispute, the di sputing
parties concurred that the measure at issue in that dispute met what – in most situations – is the
fundamental criterion for establishing the existence of a safeguard measure: namely, that the
Member taking action invokes Article XIX of the GATT 1994 as the legal basis for its measure.
50. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products adopted a multi-step
analysis to determine whether the measure at issue was a safeguard measure under Article XIX.
Under the first step of that analysis, a WTO Member must invoke the right under Article XIX for a
measure to be considered a safeguard within the meaning of Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement.
Of course, as in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , invocation is not a sufficient condition for the
measure to fall under the WTO safeguards discipline because the measure still needs to meet the
other conditions of Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement. But if the first step of invocation and
notification does not take place, the measure is not a measure taken pursuant to Article XIX.
IV. TURKEY'S APPROACH FAILS UNDER ITS OWN TEST
51. Significantly, even under the analytical approach that Turkey urges the Panel to adopt, the
relevant factors still support the U.S. position. Turkey derives its legal theory from the Appel late
Body's report in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products . In that dispute, the Appellate Body reasoned
that as part of an assessment of whether a measure presents the features of a safeguard measure,
a panel should:
evaluate and give due consideration to a ll relevant factors, including the manner in which
the measure is characterized under the domestic law of the Member concerned, the
domestic procedures that led to the adoption of the measure, and any relevant
notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards.
52. Regarding the first factor (domestic law), the U.S. security measures were imposed under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 authorizes the President of the United
States, upon receiving a report from the U.S. Secretary of Commerce finding that an "article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair the national security," to take action that "in the judgment of the President " will "adjust
the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the
national security." In contrast, under U.S. domestic law, safeguards measures are taken pursuant
to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.
53. Regarding the second factor (do mestic procedures), the Bureau of Industry and Security of
the U.S. Department of Commerce conducted the investigation pursuant to Section 232. The mission
of the Bureau of Industry and Security is to protect the security of the United States, including it s
national security, cyber security, and homeland security. In contrast, the U.S. International Trade
Commission is the only competent authority in the United States authorized to conduct safeguards
investigations.
54. Finally, the application of the third factor (notification to the WTO Committee on Safeguards),
further supports the U.S. position. The United States has not notified the WTO Committee on
Safeguards of any relevant safeguard because the United States did not invoke Article XIX of the
GATT 1994.

55. Accordingly, were the Panel to assess the U.S. security measures under the factors suggested
by Turkey, it would conclude that the U.S. security measures do not qualify as safeguard measures
under Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
V. ADOPTING TURKEY'S APPROACH WOULD UNDERMINE THE WTO
56. Turkey has taken the position that any measure that a Member deems inconsistent with a
GATT obligation is a "safeguard." And, on that basis, that Member can decide to adopt retaliatory
measures disguised as "rebalancing" measures.
57. This is a stunning position. It is our understanding that, since 1947, no Member has ever
taken this view of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Nor, since 1995, of Article XIX plus the WTO
Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, Turk ey's position would radically undermine the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism and the WTO as a whole.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION
I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE TEXT OF GATT 1994 ARTICLE XIX ESTABLISHES THAT
INVOCATION IS A PRECONDITION TO APPLYING SAFEGUARD MEASURE
58. The text of GATT 1994 Article XIX, in its context and in the light of the agreement 's object
and purpose, establishes that invocation is a precondition to applying a safeguard measure. The title
of Article XIX, "Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products", does not focus on any particular
type of measure, nor does it reference any type of obligation. Instead, the article sets out rules for
how a Member may choose to take action that would otherwise be inconsistent with obligations
under the GATT 1994 affecting imports of particular products. Further, the term "emergency" in the
title of Article XIX implies that safeguard measures are meant to address exigent circumstances.
The ordinary meaning of "emergency" is a situation "that arises unexpectedly and requires urgent
action."
59. Article XIX:1(a) allows a WTO Member to deviate from its obligations under the GATT 1994
if the conditions set out in that provision are present. For analytical purposes, Article XIX:1(a ) can
be divided into two parts. The first part sets out the conditions that, if present, would give a Member
the right to apply a safeguard. Where those conditions are present, the second part establishes the
right of a Member to apply a safeguard ( i.e., "the contracting party shall be free ") and sets out
requirements for the application of a safeguard. Accordingly, Article XIX:1(a) establishes a right –
the right to suspend obligations or modify or withdraw concessions – in the sense that
Article XIX:1(a) permits a Member, when it has invoked this provision and under certain conditions,
to take action that would otherwise be inconsistent with its WTO obligations.
60. Under Article XIX:2, a Member's ability to take action pursuant to Article XIX:1 is conditioned
on invocation with notice to other Members before that Member can take action. The first sentence
of Article XIX:2 provides:
 Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions
 of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shal l give notice in writing to the
 CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and
 shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties
 having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an
 opportunity to co nsult with it in respect of the proposed action.
 (emphasis added)
61. The ordinary meaning of the terms in the first sentence of Article XIX:2 show that invocation
is a precondition to applying a safeguard. The term "before" is defined as "preceding an event." The
term "pursuant" means "in accordance with". And the term "propose" means to "[p]ut forward or
present for consideration " or "discussion". Thus, invocation and notice from the WTO Member
proposing to take action must precede "action pursuant to " paragraph 1. Without such notice, a
Member is not seeking legal authority pursuant to Article XIX to suspend an obligation or to withdraw
or modify a concession.
62. Of note, the third sentence of Article XIX:2 provides a limited exception to the consulta tion
requirement:

In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult
to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally
without prior consultation , on the condition that consultation shall be effected
immediately after taking such action.
Critically, this exception to act "without prior consultation " does not apply to the requirement in
Article XIX:2, first sentence, to invoke Article XIX by providing notice to Members in writing. Thus,
the requirement to provide notice is unconditional.
63. The text of Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 also shows that invocation is a precondition
to applying a safeguard measure. Under that provision, if the consultations envisioned by
Article XIX:2 fail to ad dress the concerns of affected Members, affected Members can suspend
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations. These envisioned consultations are
triggered by the invocation and notice provision under Article XIX:2. In full, Article XIX:3( a)
provides:
If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is
not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action
shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continue d, the
affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such
action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which
written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, th e
application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case
envisaged in paragraph 1(b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING
PARTIES do not disapprove.
64. Thus, in terms of Article XIX:3(a), without notice of a proposed action, a Member "which
proposes to take or continue the action shall [not] be free to do so." That is, without invocation,
a Member cannot take (and has not taken) action pursuant to Article XIX.
II. THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE XIX CONFIRMS THAT INVOCATION IS A PRECONDITION
TO APPLYING A SAFEGUARD MEASURE
65. The context provided by other provisions of the WTO Agreement confirms that invocation is a
precondition to applying a safeguard measure. A number of rebalancing provisions in the WTO
Agreement confirm that Article XIX of the GATT 1994 establishes a right that must be invoked by
a Member taking action under that provision. Although the requirements vary, these provisions
contemplate a Member exercising a right through invocation and contain structural similarities to
Article XIX.
66. Specifically, the follo wing provisions of the GATT 1994 contemplate a Member affirmatively
exercising the right to modify or withdraw a tariff concession or to suspend an obligation through
invocation: Article XXVIII, Article XXIV, Article XVIII, Article II, and Article XXVII. I n addition,
rebalancing provisions in other WTO agreements reflect a similar structure by which a Member may
invoke the right to modify or withdraw a tariff concession or to suspend an obligation, including:
Article XXI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article 5 of the Agreement on
Agriculture (Agriculture Agreement), and Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(Textiles Agreement).
III. THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF ARTICLE XIX CONFIRMS THAT INVOCATION IS A
PRECONDITION TO APPLYING A SAFEGUARD MEASURE
67. The drafting history of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 dates back to negotiations to establish
the International Trade Organization of the United Nations (ITO). In 1946, the United States
proposed a draft charter for the ITO, which included a provision titled "Emergency Action on Imports
of Particular Products".
68. As originally drafted, the predecessor to Article XIX included an invocation requirement. The
invocation requirement in Article XIX stems from the provisions on prov iding notice of a proposed
action. During the negotiations on the text of the proposed ITO provision that became Article XIX,

however, some drafters suggested removing the notice requirement. Led by the United States, the
drafters agreed to keep the requirement.
69. In the course of negotiations, the Chairman suggested that the drafters agree about prior
notice, but suggested that to address "exceptional cases" the drafters "have to try to find a formula"
that "gives the right in very exceptional cases" to "take immediate action" without prior consultation.
The United States agreed with the Chairman, noting that "the Chairman's suggestion that there
might be provision made for quicker action in exceptional cases is sound. " After the drafters
discussed the compromise, the Chairman wrapped up the discussion on Article 29 by observing that,
if he saw the remarks of the drafters clearly, that there "will be prior consultation unless exceptional
circumstances make it impracticable." The drafters agreed with pausing the discussion on Article 29
until a new draft was presented by the rapporteur.
70. On November 14, 1946, the drafters discussed a revised version of Article 29. At the beginning
of the discussion on Article 29, the rapporteur observed that:
It seemed to be agreed that prior or simultaneous notice should in all cases
 be given, but that with respect to consultation there should be some
 leeway in critical cases for the action to be taken first and the consultation
 should follow upon it immediately. It is believed that the draft as it
 originally stood permitted short notice. In other words, under the
 original language of the draft it reads
 Before any Member shall take action pursuant to the provisions of
 paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the
 Organisation as far in advance as may be practicable.
 It seems to me that would permit of short notice; it could a[l]most be
 simultaneous. Therefore, I did not think that any change was needed in
 that.
71. Regarding prior consultation, the rapporteur noted that new text had been added to Article 29
that would allow action without prior consultation in exceptional circumstances.
72. On November 20, 1946, the drafters issued a report that included a revised Article 29 that
retained the prior notice requirement. This version of Article 29 was included in the London Report
and it became Article 34 in the draft Charter of the ITO. While the drafters made further revisions
to Article 34 during the discussions in New York, Geneva, and Havana, the prior notice requirement
was kept by the drafters and found its way to the current Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
73. As the foregoing demonstrates, the drafters of the provision that became Article XIX of the
GATT 1994 made the intentional decision to keep the notice requirement. Accordingly, the drafting
history of Article XIX of the GATT confirms that invocation is a precondition to applying a safeguard
measure.
IV. THE TEXT OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES THAT INVOCATION IS
A PRECONDITION TO APPLYING A SAFEGUARD MEASURE
74. The text of the Safeguards Agreement further confirms that invocation is a precondition to
apply a safeguard measure. The Safeguards Agreement sets out detailed requirements for a Member
to follow regarding i ts application of a safeguard. Three articles of the Safeguards Agreement
highlight that invocation of Article XIX is the critical precondition for a Member to exercise its right
when departing from its obligations and commitments to prevent or remedy seri ous injury to a
relevant domestic industry.
75. First, the General Provision in Article 1 reaffirms that the Safeguards Agreement only applies
to measures that invoke Article XIX. In full, Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement provides:
This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard
measures which shall be understood to mean those measures
provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994.

76. An integral feature of the right in Article XIX, as explained above, is the requiremen t of
invocation as a precondition to taking action pursuant to Article XIX. The rules in the Safeguards
Agreement identify certain requirements that a Member must satisfy after deciding to take or seek
a safeguard measure. This includes, as discussed below , a Member 's obligation to notify other
Members of its decision to institute an investigation under its domestic safeguards authority, to
notify other Members after finding serious injury to a domestic industry based on such an
investigation, and to notify other Members after the decision to apply a safeguard measure.
77. Second, Article XIX of the Safeguards Agreement reinforces the requirement of invocation as
a precondition to action under Article XIX. Article 12.1 of the Safeguards Agreement contains
requirements concerning notifications and consultation, and provides that there are three milestones
over the course of a safeguards investigation that a Member must notify to the Committee on
Safeguards. A Member must provide a notification when: (a) initi ating a safeguards investigation
under its domestic authority, (b) making a finding that increased imports are causing or threatening
serious injury to a domestic industry, or (c) deciding to impose a safeguard measure based on an
investigation that results in a finding of serious injury.
78. In addition, Article 12.6 requires that Members "notify promptly the Committee on Safeguards
of their laws, regulations and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures
as well as any modifications made to them. " In other words, it is clear that a Member has invoked
Article XIX to apply or extend a safeguard measure and followed the procedural requirements in the
Safeguards Agreement when it notifies a decision according to Article 12.1(c) and it has taken that
decision under a provision of the safeguards laws, regulations, and administrative proceedings it
previously notified under Article 12.6. Consistent with this, other Members understand when a
safeguard measure has been imposed because the implementing Member will provide notice of the
measure taken under "laws, regulations and administrative procedures " it already notified as its
domestic authority to apply a safeguard measure.
79. The ability of other Members to take action under Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement is
dependent on an implementing Member actually invoking Article XIX. The rules regarding notification
of that invocation, as established above, appear in Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement. Sinc e
invocation involves the right under Article XIX that existed prior to the adoption of the Safeguards
Agreement, the latter does not transform the nature of that right but establishes the steps a Member
must take to exercise those rights.
80. In this dis pute, the United States has not applied a safeguard measure because it has not
invoked Article XIX of the GATT 1994. The absence of any invocation is clear because the United
States has not sent a notification to the Committee on Safeguards or taken any ac tion under a
domestic authority that it previously notified under Article 12.6. Consequently, the actions that would
inform other Members of a decision to invoke Article XIX (notification of a decision to apply a
safeguard measure and adoption of the measu re under domestic authority that has been notified
under Article 12.6) are absent from this dispute. Accordingly, since there has been no invocation,
Turkey's failure to identify where and how the United States has taken a measure "provided for in"
Article XIX means that it cannot rely on Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement to justify its
retaliation against the United States.
81. Third, Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement reinforces the requirement of invocation as a
precondition to action under Article XIX.
V. THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT CONFIRMS THAT
INVOCATION IS A PRECONDITION TO APPLYING A SAFEGUARD MEASURE
82. The negotiating history of the Safeguards Agreement has its origins in the Tokyo Round
negotiations and a perce ived need to clarify and strengthen the provisions of Article XIX of the
GATT 1994.
83. For example, certain GATT contracting parties "affected by Article XIX measures wanted its
provisions to be clarified and re -inforced." They stressed the "need for more precise criteria for
invocation of the safeguard clause". The Tokyo Declaration, adopted in September 1973, stated
that negotiations should examine "the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard system, considering
particularly the modalities of application of Article XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization

and preserving its results." At the end of the Tokyo Round in April 1979, the negotiations reached
an impasse over certain issues and no new text was agreed to.
84. Following the Tokyo Round, on November 29, 1982, the contracting parties issued a Ministerial
Declaration concerning the "need for an improved and more efficient safeguard system which
provides for greater predictability and clarity and also greater security and equity for both importing
and exporting countries. " Among the issues highlighted for consideration were "transparency,"
"coverage," "compensation and retaliation," and "notification."
85. On September 25, 1986, the contracting parties issued the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del
Este, Uruguay, thus beginning the Uruguay Round negotiations. Safeguard disciplines were again a
topic identified for discussion. Following the principles identified in the Ministerial Declaration
referenced above, the GATT Council of Ministers at tempted to overcome the previous impasse
regarding the negotiations of safeguard disciplines. In his report regarding developments in this
context, the Chairman of the Council noted "a general recognition that safeguard actions should
only be taken if the criteria laid down in Article XIX were met."
86. The major issues confronted during the renewed negotiations ultimately resulted in key
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. This includes Article 1 (for the understanding that the rules
to implement a safeguard measure only apply to measures provided for in Article XIX), Article 12
(with respect to the notification requirements), and Article 11 (confirming that the Safeguards
Agreement does not apply to a measure sought, taken, or maintained under provisi on other than
Article XIX).
87. Accordingly, the negotiating history confirms the plain meaning reflected in the text that the
rules in the Safeguards Agreement only apply to measures taken pursuant to Article XIX, that
invocation is the touchstone for wh ether a Member has taken a measure pursuant to Article XIX,
and that notification is the procedural mechanism to alert other Members of that invocation.
VI. THE U.S. SECTION 232 MEASURES CITED BY TURKEY DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
88. Turkey's suggestion that the U.S. security measures under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (Section 232) are safeguards cannot justify Turkey 's retaliatory tariffs, and does not
assist the Panel's objective assessment of the matter, because United States has not invoked Article
XIX. This is clear since the United States has not provided the notification under Article 12.1(c) of
the Safeguards Agreement that identifies a measure taken pursuant to a domestic authority already
notified to the Committee on Safeguards under Article 12.6 of the Safeguards Agreement. As the
United States has explained throughout this dispute, for a measure to fall under the WTO 's
safeguards disciplines the importing Member must invoke Article XIX.
89. The United States recalls that the Safeguards Agreement only applies to measures taken
pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT, as confirmed in Article 11.1(c) of the Safeguards Agreement.
Under that provision, only measures sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to Article XIX fall within
the scope of the Safeguards Agreement. Here, the Section 232 measures cited by Turkey were
sought, taken or maintained under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 – which is a provision "other than
Article XIX"; accordingly, by the plain text of the Safeguards Agreement, the Section 232 measures
cited by Turkey simply do not fall within the scope of the Safeguards Agreement.
VII. THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ONLY APPLIES TO MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATT 1994
90. In relevant part, Article 11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that the Agreement
on Safeguards "does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a Member pursuant to
provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX."
91. The words "sought, t aken or maintained " modify the word "measures" in Article 11.1(c).
"Sought" is the past tense and past participle of the verb "seek," which can be defined as "[t]ry or
attempt to do." "Taken" is the past participle of the verb "take," which can be defined as "[h]ave an
intended result; succeed, be effective, take effect." "Maintained" is the past tense and past participle
of the verb "maintain," which can be defined as "[c]ause to continue (a state of affairs, a condition,

an activity, etc.)." Definitions of the word "pursuant" – used as an adverb in Article 11.1(c) – include
"[w]ith to: in consequence of, in accordance with."
92. With these definitions in mind, the ordinary meaning of the terms in Article 11.1(c) can be
understood as "measures [that a Member has] tried to do, succeeded in doing or caused to continue
in accordance with provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX. " The ordinary meaning of
these terms establishes that Article 11.1(c) is triggered – and the Agreement on Safeguards "does
not apply" – when a Member acts (by seeking, taking or maintaining a measure) pursuant to a
provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX.
93. With these terms, Article 11.1(c) places the emphasis on whether a measure was sought,
taken, or maintained under a GATT 1994 provision other than Article XIX. Here, the United States
has expressly invoked a provision of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX – namely, Article XXI. This
is clear from U.S. statements, including those during meetings of the WTO Council for Trade in
Goods, that the United States took the action for the protection of its essential security interests
pursuant to Article XXI.
94. With this understanding in mind, it is clear that, under Article 11.1(c), the Agreement on
Safeguards "does not apply" when a Member has attempted or tried to take a measure in accordance
with provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, or when the Mem ber has succeeded in
taking such a measure or caused such a measure to continue. Here, the United States has attempted
to take – and succeeded in taking – the Section 232 security measures in accordance with Article
XXI of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, under the text of Article 11.1(c), the Agreement on Safeguards
"does not apply" here.
VIII. TURKEY HAS NO BASIS FOR ASSERTING THAT ITS ADDITIONAL DUTIES ARE
AUTHORIZED BY ARTICLE 8.2 OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
95. The central question in this dispute is whether Turkey has any justification for breaching
Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. Turkey attempts to characterize its additional duties as
"rebalancing measures" authorized by Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agree ment. This justification
lacks merit because such rebalancing measures require the existence of an underlying safeguard
measure; here, there is no relevant U.S. safeguard measure. Accordingly, the rights and obligations
under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 a nd the Safeguards Agreement are not applicable in this
proceeding.
96. As detailed below, Turkey's characterization of its additional duties as rebalancing measures
is flawed in several respects. First, Turkey derives its legal theory not from the text of the WTO
Agreement but from an Appellate Body report that is not applicable in this dispute and, in any event,
does not contain a comprehensive definition of a safeguard measure. Even under Turkey's suggested
approach to Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agree ment, an application of the Appellate Body 's
reasoning would confirm that there is no relevant U.S. safeguard measure. With respect to Turkey's
argument that a Member may implement rebalancing measures in cases of doubt as to the existence
of a safeguard m easure, this suggestion is plainly contrary to the text of Article XIX of the GATT
1994 and the Safeguards Agreement. Finally, Turkey is mistaken that the time limits in Article 8.2
of the Safeguards Agreement support its argument for unilateral rebalancin g measures. For these
reasons, Turkey's justification for its breach of Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 must be rejected.
97. Turkey does not ground its justification on the relevant text of the WTO Agreement. Instead,
Turkey derives its legal theory from the Appellate Body report in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products.
As an initial matter, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products is simply not applicable because it did not
address a situation where a Member has not invoked Article XIX of the GATT 1994. In that dispute,
the disputing parties agreed that the Indonesian measure at issue met what, in most circumstances,
is the fundamental criterion for establishing the existence of a safeguard measure: namely, that the
Member adopting a measure invokes Article XIX of the GATT 1994 as the basis for suspending an
obligation or withdrawing or modifying a concession. In Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, Indonesia
did notify other Members that it intended to adopt a safeguard measure, and thus did invoke Article
XIX of the GATT 1994.
98. Here, the United States did not invoke Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Thus, the Appellate
Body's reasoning in that dispute is not relevant in this dispute.

99. Moreover, Turkey is mistaken that the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products
established an all-encompassing definition of a safeguard measure. As Japan correctly states in its
third-party submission, the Appellate Body "did not attempt to propose a comprehensive definition
of a safeguard measure or ultimately to decide the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards." Rather,
the Appellate Body noted that "to constitute one of the 'measures provided for in Article XIX ', a
measure must present certain constituent features, absent which it could not be considered a
safeguard measure. " In other words, the Appellate Body 's reasoning only identifies certain
"necessary" features. Importantly, the Appellate Body did not say that a measure presenting both
(to use the terms used by the Appellate Body) "constituent features" automatically or necessarily
qualifies as a safeguard measure. Instead, the Appellate Body made explicit that "whether a
particular measure constitutes a safeguard measure for purposes of WTO law can be determined
only on a case-by-case basis."
100. Furthermore, even under Turkey's suggested approach, there is no U.S. safeguard measure.
As discussed, Turkey derives its legal theory from the Appellate Body's reasoning in Indonesia – Iron
or Steel Products. In that dispute, the Appellate Body identified three factors it considered relevant
for a panel to assess, among other relevant factors, in determining the existence of a safeguard
measure.
101. Regarding the first factor (domestic law), safeguard measures in the United States are
authorized by Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. In contrast, under U.S. domestic law, the U.S.
national security measures are authorized by Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Section 232 authorizes the President of the United States, upon receiving a report from t he U.S.
Secretary of Commerce finding that an "article is being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," to take
action that "in the judgment of the President" will "adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security."
102. Regarding the second factor (domestic procedures), the U.S. International Trade Commission
is the only competent authority in the United States authorized to conduct safeguard investigations.
In contrast, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce conducted
the investigation regarding the U.S. national security measures.
103. Finally, the application of the third factor (notification to the WTO Committee on Safeguards),
further supports the U.S. position. The United States has not notified the WTO Committee on
Safeguards of any proposed action or any safeguard measure taken because the United States did
not invoke Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Since the creation of the WTO, however, the United States
has met its obligations under Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement.
104. Accordingly, were the Panel to assess the U.S. security measures under the Appellate Body's
reasoning as suggested by Turkey, the Panel would conclude that the U.S. security measures do not
qualify as safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. OPENING STATEMENT AT THE PANEL'S
VIDEOCONFERENCE WITH THE PARTIES
105. The United States initiated this dispute in response to Turkey 's measure that imposes
additional duties on and discriminates against goods originating in the United States, in violation of
its obligations in Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. By and large, Turkey does not contest the factual
basis of the U.S. claims. Nor does Turkey raise legal arguments to defend its measure in terms of
the failure to accord MFN treatment and the imposition of duties in excess of the bound rate in
Turkey's Schedule.
106. Instead, Turkey attempts to justify its measure under Article 8.2 of the Safeguards
Agreement. The key question, therefore, is whether WTO safeguards disciplines – provided in
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement – apply. As the United States has
explained over the course of these proceedings, the rights and obligations under the safeguards
disciplines are not applicable here.
107. At the outset, the United States would like to emphasize a key point regarding termin ology.
This issue is important because the terminology can influence, either subtly or more directly, the

main legal question at issue in this dispute. The discussion in these proceedings sometimes has been
framed as whether there is a "safeguard measure." The use of this phrasing, however, is misleading.
The more appropriate framing is whether the safeguards disciplines apply.
108. Article XIX of the GATT 1994 does not define the term "safeguard measure." Instead, Article 1
of the Safeguards Agreement def ines "safeguard measures" as "those measures provided for in
Article XIX of GATT 1994. " And what does Article XIX say? Article XIX provides for an "emergency
action" that a Member is "free" to take after meeting the conditions in Article XIX:2. In particular,
Article XIX:2 provides that, before taking an action under Article XIX:1, a Member "shall give notice
in writing" and "shall afford…an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the p roposed action."
Article XIX is therefore concerned with action, and the consequences and procedures surrounding
that action, rather than on a particular type of measure.
109. Indeed, the action permitted under the emergency procedures in Article XIX is f ramed with
extraordinary breadth: the suspension of concessions or other obligations. In other words, any
measure that would otherwise breach any obligation under the GATT 1994 could potentially be
subject to Article XIX, if it applies. Thus, the text of the WTO Agreement is clear: there is no special
type of measure that, standing alone, can somehow be defined as a "safeguard measure." Rather,
the proper understanding is that Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement do not apply to specific
"types" of measures, but only apply when all the circumstances described in Article XIX apply. And,
as the United States has explained throughout this proceeding, the text of Article XIX makes clear
that the key circumstance for deciding whether Article XIX applies is whether the Member adopting
the measure that would otherwise be GATT-inconsistent invokes its rights under Article XIX to take
a measure that would otherwise be inconsistent with its WTO commitments. For this reason, the
United States will frame the legal qu estion at issue as whether the safeguards disciplines apply –
and not whether or not there exists a relevant "safeguard measure."
110. Turning to this question of whether the safeguards disciplines apply in this dispute, again, the
answer is 'no.' As the United States has explained, Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards
Agreement make clear that invocation through notice is a fundamental, condition precedent for a
Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article XIX, and for the application of safeguards
disciplines to that action. The United States plainly has not invoked Article XIX and, therefore, the
safeguards disciplines do not apply.
111. Moreover, another WTO Member cannot assert that Article XIX should have been invoked and,
on that basis, adopt a measure that is plainly inconsistent with fundamental WTO obligations. But
that is exactly the approach Turkey asks the Panel to adopt.
112. In other words, Turkey believes that certain U.S. national security measures are inconsistent
with U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreement notwithstanding that those measures were taken
pursuant to Article XXI of the GATT 1994. Turkey is challenging those U.S. measures in a separate
dispute. However, instead of following the WTO's dispute settlement procedures, Turkey decided to
impose additional duties on U.S. products that are plainly inconsistent with its obligations under
Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. And Turkey is now seeking to justify its additional duties by
advancing a baseless interpretation of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement.
113. Besides lacking any support in the text of the WTO Agreement, Turkey 's position is
fundamentally at odds with the basic element of the WTO Agreement that a Member is to utilize the
WTO's dispute settlement procedures if a Member believes that another Member 's measure is
inconsistent with WTO rules.
I. TURKEY'S ADDITIONAL DUTIES MEASURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLES I AND II OF THE GATT 1994
114. The United States has established the facts and demonstrated that Turkey's measure is plainly
inconsistent with the fundamental WTO obligations to provide MFN treatment, and to abide by the
tariff concessions in a Member 's Schedule, as set out respectively in Artic les I and II of the GATT
1994.

115. Turkey has failed to rebut the U.S. prima facie case by challenging the factual or legal basis
of the U.S. claims. Indeed, Turkey has noted that "the factual descriptions of the measures set out
in the United States' First Written Submission are broadly accurate."
116. While Turkey attempts to revise down the number of tariff lines affected by its measure in
asserting that the Panel must evaluate Presidential Decision 1130/2019 – a measure adopted after
panel establishment – this 2019 measure is legally insignificant as it is clearly outside the Panel 's
terms of reference. The 2019 measure is not identified in the U.S. panel request, and the DSB
established the Panel to examine the matter in that request.
117. Turkey grounds its argument in prior appellate reports arguing that panels may consider post-
establishment measures that do not change the "essence" of the measure at issue. The United States
has explained that this approach has no basis in the text of the WTO Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), particularly Articles 6.2 and 7.1. Moreover,
even under the incorrect "essence" approach, the 2019 measure may not be considered as it would
change the "essence" of the measure under review. That is, Turkey alleges that the 2019 m easure
reduces the duty rates for certain tariff lines. This could materially impact the content of the measure
being reviewed and therefore the U.S. claims under Article II.
118. Further, Turkey has not raised any interpretive arguments regarding the U.S . claims under
Articles I and II. In fact, with respect to Article II, Turkey has stated that it does not object to the
U.S. methodology for identifying bound rates, and has confirmed that a violation of Article II:I(b)
would result in a consequential violation of Article II:I(a).
119. Instead of raising arguments under Articles I and II, Turkey relies entirely on its flawed theory
under Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement to defend its additional duties measure. This defense
itself implies that the measure in question prima facie breaches Turkey's obligations under Articles
I and II.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL ISSUE REGARDING TURKEY'S ALLEGED JUSTIFICATION
FOR ITS ADDITIONAL DUTIES MEASURE IS WHETHER THE SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT APPLIES
120. Turkey asserts that it has implemented the measure at issue under Article 8 of the Safeguards
Agreement. Because Turkey has presented this argument, it bears the burden to establish it. Turkey
has failed to meet this burden because the Safeguards Agreement does not apply.
A. Turkey has no basis for trying to avoid its burden of proof to establish that
the Safeguard Agreement applies.
121. Turkey continues to assert that its Article 8.2 argument cannot be characterized as a "defense"
or "justification", an d therefore the United States somehow carries a burden with respect to a
provision it has not raised. The key point on burden of proof is that Turkey has raised safeguards
disciplines to rebut the U.S. prima facie case of a breach of the GATT 1994. Therefore, Turkey must
establish that (1) the safeguards disciplines are applicable and that (2) its challenged measure is
justified under the safeguards disciplines. The U.S. panel request does not assert a breach of any
WTO provision on safeguards. It is Turkey – not the United States – that is arguing that the
safeguards disciplines are applicable, and therefore it is Turkey 's burden to establish the truth of
this assertion.
B. The safeguards disciplines apply where a Member seeks to invoke its rights
under Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
122. Turkey's attempt to justify its additional duties as a measure taken under Article 8.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 is baseless.
123. As the United States has explained in prior submis sions, Article XIX of the GATT 1994
establishes a Member's right (but not obligation) under certain conditions to deviate from its WTO
obligations and take an emergency action. A key condition precedent to the exercise of that right is
that the Member has invoked Article XIX as the legal basis for its measure by providing notice in
writing and affording affected Members an opportunity to consult. This invocation requirement is

established by the ordinary meaning of each paragraph of Article XIX, the context provided by
numerous other WTO provisions, and the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 to provide "reciprocal
and mutually advantageous " arrangements directed to the "substantial reduction" of tariffs. This
requirement is confirmed by the negotiating history of Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards.
Thus, without invocation, a Member cannot and has not taken action pursuant to Article XIX and the
safeguards disciplines do not apply.
124. Article XIX:1 provides that if certain conditions are met, a Member "shall be free" "to suspend
an obligation or to withdraw or modify a concession. " Thus, when a Member believes that the
conditions in Article XIX:1(a) are met, the Member has the discretion to invoke the right reserved
to it under Article XIX. Under Article XIX:2, a Member's ability to take action pursuant to Article XIX:1
is conditioned on invocation through notice to other Members of a proposed action under Article XIX.
125. Without such notice, a Member is not seeking legal authority pursuant to Ar ticle XIX to
suspend an obligation or to withdraw or modify a concession and may not take the proposed action
"in accordance with" that provision.
126. The third sentence of Article XIX:2 also supports the interpretation that invocation is a
condition pre cedent for action under Article XIX. The third sentence of Article XIX:2 provides a
limited exception to the consultation requirement. Notably, this exception does not permit Members
to take action without providing "notice." This exception to the consultation requirement – but not
the notice requirement – establishes that Article XIX requires a Member to invoke through notice its
right to take a safeguard action as a condition precedent to action under that provision.
127. The terms of Article XIX:3 of the GATT 1994 also show that invocation is a precondition for a
Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article XIX and to the application of safeguards
rules to that action. Under this provision, if the consultations envisioned by Article XIX:2 f ail to
address the concerns of affected Members, affected Members can suspend substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations. These envisioned consultations are triggered by the invocation and
notice provision under Article XIX:2, underscoring t hat invocation through notice is a condition
precedent to action under Article XIX.
128. Numerous provisions of the GATT 1994 contemplate a Member affirmatively exercising the
right to modify or withdraw a tariff concession or to suspend an obligation thr ough invocation. In
addition, rebalancing provisions in other WTO agreements reflect a similar structure by which a
Member may invoke the right to modify or withdraw a tariff concession or to suspend an obligation.
These provisions of the GATT 1994 and oth er WTO agreements are an important context for
interpreting Article XIX.
129. The Safeguards Agreement, which provides context for Article XIX of the GATT 1994, also
supports that invocation of Article XIX through written notice is a condition precedent to a Member's
exercise of its right to take action under Article XIX. Both Article 1 and Article 11.1(a) refer to Article
XIX in its entirety in describing, respectively, the scope of application for the rules established in the
Safeguards Agreement and when a Member may take or seek any emergency action on imports of
particular products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994. By referring to Article XIX in its entirety
– including the requirement of invocation through notice set forth at Article XIX:2 – Article 1 and
Article 11.1(a) of the Safeguards Agreement support that invocation through written notice is a
condition precedent to a Member 's exercise of its right to take action under Article XIX and the
application of safeguards rules to that action.
130. Article 11.1(c) of the Safeguards Agreement also supports that invocation of Article XIX is a
necessary precondition to a Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article XIX and the
application of safeguards rules to that action. This provi sion states in relevant part that the
Safeguards Agreement "does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a Member
pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX." This provision is context which confirms
that the Member adopting a measure decides what type of mechanisms for otherwise GATT -
inconsistent measures are applicable.
131. Turkey attempts to dismiss the requirement to give notice in Article XIX as a proced ural
requirement, comparing the requirement to the publication requirement in Article 3.1 of the

Safeguards Agreement. Turkey's attempt to compare the notice requirement in Article XIX to the
publication requirement in the Safeguards Agreement is unavailing.
132. Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement provides that the Agreement "establishes rules for the
application of safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for
in Article XIX of GATT 1994 ." Therefore, requirements that are set forth only in the Safeguards
Agreement cannot address whether a measure is one "provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994" and
are fundamentally different from the requirement to give notice in writing in Article XIX.
C. Here, the United States di d not invoke Article XIX and therefore the
Safeguards Agreement does not apply.
133. Here, the United States has not invoked Article XIX. Further, the United States has invoked a
WTO right to take a measure, namely under Article XXI, a completely different provision of the GATT
1994. Turkey does not dispute these key facts. Nonetheless, Turkey claims that safeguards
disciplines are applicable, arguing that safeguards disciplines apply when a measure has the
"constituent features" identified in the Appellate Body report in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products.
Turkey continues to fail to recognize the unusual circumstance addressed by that report and even
that the report did not purport to identify all of the conditions precedent for application of the
safeguards disciplines.
134. The Appellate Body did not address the requirement to give notice in Article XIX in any detail,
because in fact Indonesia sought to invoke its rights under Article XIX. Turkey's argument is simply
unavailing.
D. Turkey's approach cannot be sustained in light of the relevant context of
the DSU.
135. Turkey's approach also cannot be sustained under an interpretation in light of the relevant
context of the DSU. Pursuant to DSU Articles 11 and 3.2, panels are to interpret and apply relevant
provisions of WTO covered agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Those rules are reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). Article 31(1) provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of the
treaty's object and purpose.
136. As the WTO Agreement is a single undertaking, the DSU is re levant context for interpreting
the terms of GATT 1994 Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement within the meaning of Vienna
Convention Article 31. In particular, the DSU establishes detailed procedures for a Member seeking
to address perceived violations of obligations in the WTO covered agreements. Here, Turkey 's
approach directly conflicts with DSU Article 23 (Strengthening of the Multilateral System).
137. If a Member believes that another Member 's measure is inconsistent with a WTO obligation,
DSU Article 23 makes clear that the method to address such a concern is through recourse to the
procedures of the DSU.
138. Turkey's approach – that a Member can deem another Member 's measure a safeguard
measure and, on that basis, adopt retaliatory measures – is plainly contrary to the text of Article XIX
and the Safeguards Agreement considered in light of the relevant context of DSU Article 23.
E. Under Turkey 's approach, any measure that breaches a Member 's GATT
obligations can be construed as a safeguard meas ure and give rise to a
"right" to "rebalancing" for another Member. Such an argument risks
undermining the legitimacy of the WTO and its dispute settlement system.
139. Under Turkey's argument, any measure that breaches a Member 's GATT obligation can be
construed as a safeguard measure and give rise to a "right" to "rebalance" for another Member. In
particular, Turkey argues that it has the right to take retaliatory measures because certain U.S.
Section 232 measures allegedly "suspend, in whole or in part, a GATT obligation" or "withdraw … a
GATT concession." Turkey adds an argument that the U.S. Section 232 measures present the second
"constituent feature" because, in its view, Section 232 measures "pursue the 'specific objective' of

preventing or remedying serious injury to the domestic industry. " This second alleged feature,
however, provides no meaningful limitation on Turkey's position on a unilateral right to retaliate for
an alleged breach of the GATT 1994. Almost any trade-related measure will have some effects with
respect to domestic industries." And here, it is Turkey itself that is attributing such a "design" to the
U.S. measures.
140. Contrary to Turkey's contentions, if a Member imposes duties on a non-MFN basis or in excess
of its tariff bindings, and it does not invoke Article XIX, then the Member would simply be in breach
of its GATT obligation. Other Members could then seek to impose countermeasures following
recourse to multilateral dispute settlement rules. That i s how the system is designed to work, as
evident from the DSU.
141. Instead, it is Turkey 's proposed approach that risks undermining the legitimacy of the WTO
and its dispute settlement system. In such a system, any Member could determine, for itself, tha t
almost any measure was an action taken under Article XIX, and adopt retaliatory measures as so -
called "rebalancing" measures.
III. EVEN IF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WAS APPLICABLE, TURKEY HAS NO BASIS
FOR ASSERTING THAT ITS ADDITIONAL DUTIES MEASURE IS A UTHORIZED BY
ARTICLE 8.2 OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS
NOT ADOPTED A "SAFEGUARD MEASURE"
142. As the United States has just explained, the Safeguards Agreement does not apply because
the United States has not invoked its right to apply a safeguard. However, even if the Panel were to
apply safeguards disciplines, Turkey's justification would.
143. Contrary to Turkey 's claim, a measure taken pursuant to Article XXI cannot fall within the
scope of the Safeguards Agreement, and this interpretation is clearly supported by the text of the
Safeguards Agreement.
144. The United States recalls that the Safeguards Agreement only applies to measures taken
pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT, as confirmed in Article 11.1(c) of the Agreement. Under that
provision, only measures sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to Article XIX fall within the scope
of the Safeguards Agreement. Where a Member invokes Article XXI (a provision of GATT 1994 other
than Article XIX) as the basis for its action, the Safeguards Agreement "does not apply."
145. In attempting to argue that Article 11.1(c) does not preclude the application of the Safeguards
Agreement, Turkey suggests an understanding of the terms "sought, taken or maintained " that
primarily focuses on the temporal aspects of these terms. However, Article 11.1(c) confirms that the
Safeguards Agreement "does not apply " to such measures, and the terms "sought, taken or
maintained" are not simply temporal in nature. Further, these terms confirm that the Sa feguards
Agreement does not constrain a Member 's ability to take action – or to seek to take action, or to
maintain action – pursuant to provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, such as Article XXI.
146. The ordinary meaning establishes that Art icle 11.1(c) is triggered – and the Safeguards
Agreement "does not apply" – when a Member acts (by seeking, taking, or maintaining a measure)
pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX.
147. The U.S. Section 232 measures cited by Turk ey were sought, taken or maintained pursuant
to Article XXI of the GATT 1994 – which is a provision "other than Article XIX"; accordingly, by the
plain text of the Safeguards Agreement, the Section 232 measures cited by Turkey simply do not
fall within the scope of the Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, no "right" of "rebalancing" can arise
for another Member, including Turkey.
148. Therefore, the exercise of the right – through invocation – to take action under Article XIX is
a precondition not only for a measure to constitute a safeguard but for another Member to implement
a rebalancing measure under Article 8.2. Because the United States has not sought to exercise a
right to exceed its tariff bindings through Article XIX, no "right" to "rebalancing" can arise for another
Member.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. CLOSING STATEMENT AT THE PANEL'S
VIDEOCONFERENCE WITH THE PARTIES
149. Given Turkey 's comment in its closing statement about Article 12.8 of the Safeguards
Agreement – that the United States has not provided a response to Turkey 's argument regarding
this provision – we would like to address this issue briefly before turning to our prepared remarks.
150. Turkey points to the counter -notification provision as undermining the U.S. argument that
invocation is a condition precedent for the applicability of safeguards disciplines. That is not the
case. We want to draw your attention to the text of Article 12.8. It reads "…all laws, regulations,
administrative procedures and any measures or actions dealt with in this Agreement that have been
notified by other Members that are required by this Agreement to make such notifications." As the
words "dealt with in this Agreement " and "required by this Agreement " make clear, this provision
relates only to notifications that Members are required to make under the Safeguards Agreement.
By its terms, this provision does not envision a Member notify ing the Committee on Safeguards of
another Member's invocation pursuant to Article XIX:2 of the GATT 1994.
151. Further to that, Article 12.8 permits counter-notification where a measure or action is required
to be notified under the Safeguards Agreement. Article 12.1 requires notification of "taking a decision
to apply " a "measure". That is not the same thing as giving notice of a proposed suspension,
modification or withdrawal of a WTO obligation or concessions under Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
152. The United States will close by elaborating on two key issues. First, with regard to the point
on the exercise of a right under Article XIX of the GATT 1994, the Panel has asked whether
characterizing the application of a safeguard as the exercise of a "right" means that it is solely for a
Member to decide to trigger the applicability of the WTO rules on safeguards to its measure."
153. As an initial matter, the United States would note that characterizing the invocation of the
WTO safeguards provisions as a right flows directly from the text of Article XIX. To recall, Article XIX
states that a Member "shall be free" to take a safeguard action, subject to certain conditions. This
is a language of rights, as opposed to language of obligations.
154. The starting point, which Turkey continually ignores in all its argumentation, is that any
measure involved in a safeguards situation is already disciplined. In fact, the measure is highly
disciplined – it is inconsistent with an obligation set out in the GATT 1994. Further, the Member
wishing to adopt the measure must acknowledge this inconsistency, and seek permission to suspend
the obligation through its invocation of Article XIX. Thus, with or without an invocation of the right
to try to obtain temporary permission to suspend a GATT obligation, the measure sought to be taken
is, by definition, inconsistent with GATT obligations.
155. It is only the Member that wishes to adopt a safeguard that can choose to attempt to exercise
the right, and thereby choose to enter into the process of trying to obtain the temporary permission
to suspend the relevant obligation. That process involves consultations with other trading partners.
And, of special interest to Turkey in this dispute, the process can lead to rebalancing measures if no
agreement is reached in those consultations.
156. Despite the clear language in Article XIX, Turkey is unwilling to acknowledge that invocation
of the safeguards provisions is the right of the Member wishing to adopt a safeguard . Ignoring the
text, Turkey tries to frame the issue in terms of fairness. According to Turkey, it must have the
"right to rely on Article 8 " or the "right to rebalance ". Otherwise, what is a Member in Turkey 's
position to do?
157. The answer, however, is simple – Article XIX does not provide special, super penalties for
certain types of measures; rather the measures involved under Article XIX are essentially just
breaches of the GATT 1994. And the right to take a rebalancing measure is not a general one
involving breaches of GATT obligations, it only applies in the specific context of the proceedings
described in Article XIX, following the invocation of those procedures by the Member seeking to
adopt a safeguard.
158. Accordingly, as for any asserted breach of the GATT 1994, Turkey has a clear path for relief –
namely, to pursue dispute settlement under the DSU. In fact, Turkey has done so by bringing a

separate dispute. So in the situation in this dispute, there is no unfairness to Turkey. As for any
Member claiming a breach of a WTO obligation, Turkey must wait for a decision in the separate
dispute it has brought against the United States concerning those measures before taking retaliatory
action. Turkey does not like this answer. But this is how the system is designed to work.
159. We will now turn to the systemic implication of Turkey's position that a Member may
unilaterally decide that another Member 's measure is an action taken under Article XIX, may
unilaterally decide that that measure is inconsistent with the safeguards disciplines, and may
immediately and unilaterally retaliate against that measure. Under Turkey 's approach that the
safeguards disciplines apply to any measure that presents two "constituent features", almost any
measure that is alleged to be WTO-inconsistent could fall within the safeguards disciplines and allow
for such retaliation.
160. Turkey's approach would fundamentally reverse the basic rule, as stated in the DSU, that no
Member shall unilaterally declare another Mem ber in breach of the WTO and unilaterally adopt
retaliatory measures without first proceeding with dispute settlement. It is difficult to imagine any
outcome more corrosive to the operation of the WTO system.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. RESPONSES TO THE PANEL'S QUESTIONS AFTER THE
PANEL'S VIDEOCONFERENCE WITH THE PARTIES
Excerpt from U.S. Response to the Panel Question 78
161. The ordinary meaning of the terms in Article 11.1(c) can be understood as "measures [that a
Member has] tried to do, succeeded in doing or caused to continue in accordance with provisions of
the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX." The ordinary meaning of these terms establishes that Article
11.1(c) is triggered – and the Safeguards Agreement "does not apply " – when a Member acts
(by seeking, taking or maintaining a measure) pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than
Article XIX. This result is confirmed by the negotiating history of the Safeguards Agreement.
162. In particular, although early draft text of the Safeguards Agreeme nt would have permitted
Members to take safeguard measures under Article XIX "only in a situation in which other GATT
provisions do not provide remedies ", this approach was abandoned by July 1990, when the draft
text was changed to provide that the agreeme nt "do[es] not prejudice" a Member's ability to take
action pursuant to provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX. As the July 1990 draft
Agreement on Safeguards provided in relevant part:
The provisions of paragraph 1 [defining a safeguard measure] above
do not prejudice the rights and obligations of contracting parties
regarding trade -restrictive measures taken in conformity with
specific provisions of the General Agreement other than Article XIX,
protocols, and agreements and arrangements negotiated under the
auspices of GATT.
163. Although the phrasing and placement of this provision changed as the negotiations went along,
subsequent drafts of the Safeguards Agreement continued to reflect negotiators ' underlying intent
to prevent the terms of th e Safeguards Agreement from prejudicing Members ' rights under other
GATT provisions. As the October 1990 draft text stated in relevant part:
No trade -restrictive measure shall be sought or taken by a
contracting party unless it conforms with the provision s of Article
XIX as interpreted by the provisions of this agreement, or is
consistent with other provisions of the General Agreement , or
protocols and agreements or arrangements concluded within the
framework of the General Agreement.

164. With this text, the October 1990 draft continues to make clear – like the July 1990 draft –
that the availability of Article XIX as a release from obligations does not constrain a Member's ability
to take action pursuant to other provisions of the GATT 1994. So much is clear based on the use of
the word "or" in the draft text quoted above, which confirms that Members could seek or take trade-

restrictive measures that were either in conformity with Article XIX or consistent with other
provisions of the General Agreement (including Article XXI).
165. The same meaning is clear in the December 1991 draft Safeguards Agreement, in which the
text that became Article 11.1(c) was moved, rephrased, and divided into parts, to read in relevant
part:
(c) Measures sought, taken or maint ained by a contracting party
pursuant to other provisions of the General Agreement, or protocols
and agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework
of the General Agreement are not included in the scope of this
agreement.

166. Subparagraph (c) of the December 1991 draft is similar to Article 11.1(c), particularly its
reference to measures "sought, taken or maintained . . . pursuant to" other provisions of the General
Agreement. By referring to measures sought, taken, or maintain ed "pursuant to" other provisions
of the General Agreement – a change from the October 1990 draft 's reference to measures
"consistent with" other provisions of the General Agreement, and the July 1990 draft's reference to
measures "taken in conformity with" specific provisions of the General Agreement – the December
1991 draft Safeguards Agreement underscores that the Safeguards Agreement doe s not apply to
measures that a Member has tried to do, succeeded in doing or caused to continue in accordance
with provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX.
167. In the final text of the Safeguards Agreement, this text was again rephrased to emph asize
this point. Specifically, the December 1991 draft language stating that measures sought, taken, or
maintained pursuant to other provisions of the GATT 1994 "are not included in the scope of " the
Safeguards Agreement was replaced with a more definite statement that the Safeguards Agreement
"does not apply " to such measures. By stating that the Agreement "does not apply " to such
measures, this final text makes even clearer that a Member 's ability to seek, take, or maintain
safeguard measures does not co nstrain a Member 's ability to take such action pursuant to other
provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Article XXI. And that where a Member has sought, taken or
maintained action pursuant to an "other provision of the GATT 1994, " as the United States has
explained, the Safeguards Agreement "does not apply."
Excerpt from U.S. Response to the Panel Question 96
168. A Member's exercise of the right to take emergency action by invoking Article XIX of the GATT
1994 is conceptually distinct from the specific notification requirements provided in the Safeguards
Agreement. Furthermore, while Article XIX invocation through notice and Article 12 notifications are
conceptually distinct, a Member's notification under Article 12 may serve to inform other Members
of a decision to invoke Article XIX.
169. In this dispute, however, the conceptual distinction does not appear relevant, because it is
undisputed that the United States did not invoke its right under Article XIX, nor – since the
Safeguards Agreement is inapplicable – did the United States provide any of the specific notifications
set out in the Safeguard Agreement.
170. For context, the United States notes that the distinction might be relevant in a situation where,
for example, a Member invoked Article XIX by pro viding the notice in writing under Article XIX:2,
but did not meet all of the notification requirements under Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement.
In that hypothetical situation, the Safeguards Agreement would apply, but another Member might
raise an issue with respect to compliance with a specific aspect of Article 12.

ANNEX B-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF TÜRKIYE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. This integrated executive summary contains the arguments presented by the Republic of Türkiye
(Türkiye) in its written submissions, oral statements, responses to questions, and comments on the
United States' responses in the present proceedings.
1.2. In this dispute, the United States challenges duties imposed by Türkiye on certain United States
goods in June and August 2018. These duties were imposed by Türkiye in response to safe guard
measures on steel and aluminium products that were introduced by the United States in March 2018
and subsequently modified on several occasions, including by increasing the additional duties on
steel products from Türkiye in August 2018.1
1.3. When a WTO Member takes a safeguard measure, Article XIX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Safeguards explicitly contemplate that other
affected Members may impose trade restrictions on the Member imposing the safeguard, in order to
restore a balance of equivalent concessions. This is precisely the purpose of the Turkish measures
at issue in this dispute.2
1.4. The United States adopted its safeguard measures without complying with its obligation under
Article XIX o f the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, including, in particular, the
obligation to take into account the trade interests of affected WTO Members. The United States also
failed to comply with the basic duty to hold consultations, as required by Ar ticle 12.3 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, in order to seek agreement on compensation.3
1.5. Thus, Türkiye had no choice other than to proceed to the suspension of equivalent concessions
in order to defend its legitimate economic interests. The additional duties adopted by Türkiye that
are being challenged by the United States in the present proceedings constitute this suspension of
equivalent concessions. Türkiye duly notified these actions and their legal basis to the WTO
membership.4 Hence, the United States, along with the rest of the WTO membership, was fully aware
of Türkiye's approach to this matter.5
1.6. The United States has brought its claims in the present dispute under Articles I and II of the
GATT 1994. As such, the United States' complaint in this dispute suffers from a fundamental flaw.
The proper legal basis for this dispute is the WTO legal regime governing safeguard measures.
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 establish an
affirmative right of any WTO Member(s) affected by a safeguard measure to obtain compensation
from the importing Member or, in case compensation is not agreed upon, to suspend equivalent
concessions.6
1.7. The United States argues that the measure at issue is not a safeguard measure and that,
therefore, neither its additional duties nor the Turkish additional duties fall under the Agreement on

1 Türkiye's First Written Submission, paras. 1.1-1.2.
2 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.2.
3 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.4.
4 See Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for
Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations referred to in Paragraph 2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/L/1242, G/SG/N/12/TUR/6, 22 May 2018; Immediate Notification
under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension
of Concessions and Other Obligations referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
G/L/1242/Suppl. 1, G/SG/N/12/TUR/6/Suppl.1, 15 August 2018, See also Türkiye's First Written Submission,
para. 1.6.
5 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.5.
6 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.7.

Safeguards or Article XIX of the GATT 1994. As the United States has not brought its claims under
the correct legal provisions of the covered agreements, those claims should be dismissed in toto.7
1.8. Where Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards apply, no direct stand -
alone claims under Articles I and II (or XI) of the GATT 1994 may be brought. This is because, under
Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, Members are "free … to suspend [any GATT] obligation in whole
or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession". In these circumstances, claims under Articles I,
II, and XI are merely subsidiary claims. A violation of these provisions may be found only after an
assessment of claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.8
1.9. The United States attempts to circumvent these basic rules by arguing that the applicability of
the Agreement on Safeguards reflects an "affirmative defence" by Türkiye. The United States thus
argues that, once it has "demonstrated" a violation of Articles I and II of the GATT 1994, it is for
Türkiye to demonstrate, by way of justification, that its measu res fall under Article XIX of the
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, and to demonstrate further that its measures comply
with these obligations.9
1.10. That is incorrect. The applicability of a particular provision, or of an entire agreement, to a
measure is a threshold question to be resolved by a panel or the Appellate Body, according to their
core functions set out in Articles 11 and 17.6 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). This question of ap plicability of an entire set of
disciplines (e.g. safeguards) is fundamentally distinct from an "affirmative defence", under which a
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that its measures comply with the relevant exception.10
1.11. The United States cannot compensate for its failure to raise safeguards -related claims by
labelling the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards as "affirmative defences". Rather, in the
event that the Panel were to determine – as it should – that both the United States' m easures on
steel and aluminium and the Turkish measures at issue in this dispute fall under Article XIX of the
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel would have no choice but to end its analysis
at that juncture and to reject the United States' claims.11
1.12. Türkiye's integrated executive summary is structured as follows: In Section 2, Türkiye
summarises the key facts in this dispute. In Section 3, Türkiye summarises the United States' legal
claims. In Section 4, Türkiye summarises its own legal arguments. In Section 5, Türkiye summarises
its conclusions and requests for findings.
2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.1 The United States' Section 232 measures
2.1. The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) conducted two investigations on the basis
of Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (Section 232). The nominal purpose of these
investigations was to determine whether imports of steel and aluminium were entering the United
States in a manner that impaired the United States ' national security. In reality, the investigations
essentially determined whether increased steel and aluminium imports were injuring, or threatening
to injure, the profitability of the US steel and aluminium industries.12
2.2. The reports of these two investigation s form the legal basis for the Presidential Proclamations
by means of which the President of the United States imposed the United States' import restrictions
on steel and aluminium products. In total, between March 2018 and August 2018, the President
issued 11 of these Presidential Proclamations.13 The precise form and extent of the import measures,
as set out in the Proclamations, evolved over time, as did the list of countries temporarily and then
definitively exempted from the measures.14 In addition, Türkiye understands that the United States

7 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.11.
8 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.16.
9 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.17.
10 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.18.
11 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 1.20.
12 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.8.
13 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.9.
14 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.9.

has lifted its steel and aluminium tariffs on Canada and Mexico, based on agreements it concluded
recently with these Members.15
2.3. The United States' safeguard measures consist of:
• additional duties on a wide range of steel and aluminium products, duties which are
well above the United States' tariff bindings in the United States' GATT Schedule of
Concessions;16
• quantitative restrictions, on steel or aluminium, or both;17 and
• certain unpublished measures in the form of voluntary export restraints.18
2.2 Türkiye's measures
2.4. Following the initial imposition of the United States' safeguard measures in March 2018, Türkiye
and certain other affected Members informed the United States that they considered these measures
to be safeguard measures and, therefore, requested an opportunity to consult with the United States
pursuant to Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards.19
2.5. Türkiye and other affected Members sought to communicate with the United States on the
nature of the measures and requested consultations with the United States. However, the United
States continued to insi st that its measures were not in fact safeguard measures and refused to
consult so as to maintain substantially equivalent concessions.20
2.6. Therefore, Türkiye and other affected Members were left with no choice but to exercise their
right to suspend equivalent concessions or other obligations. As a result, on 21 May 2018, Türkiye
notified the Council for Trade in Goods and the Committee on Safeguards to this effect, pursuant to
Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards, reserving its right to put into effect certain additional
duties as of 21 June 2018.21
2.7. On 15 August 2018, without further explanation, the United States doubled the duty applicable
to imports of steel from Türkiye. In response, and in order to maintain a level of substantially
equivalent concessions, Türkiye was compelled to revise the additional duties so as to reflect the
increased United States' safeguard duties. As a result, on 15 August 2018, Türkiye notified the WTO
and other WTO Members that it reserved its right to impose additional duties in the amount
equivalent to the amount of the US increased additional duties for Türkiye. Türkiye put these

15 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.9.
16 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.6. The measures include: (i) additional duty of 25 per cent
ad valorem that applies to steel products originating in all countries, except Argentina, Australia, Brazil and
South Korea; (ii) additional duty of 50 per cent ad valorem that applied to steel products originating in Türkiye;
and (iii) additional duty of 10 per cent ad valorem that applies to aluminium articles originating in all countries,
except Argentina and Australia. See Presidential Proclamation 9705, para. 8, clause (2) as amended;
Presidential Proclamation 9772; Presidential Proclamation 9704, para. 7, clause (2), as amended.
17 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.6. The measures include: (i) country-specific quantitative
limitations on steel goods that apply to Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea; and (ii) country-specific
quantitative limitations on imports of aluminium goods that apply to Argentina. See Presidential Proclamation
9740 clause (1), Annex (Part B); Presidential Proclamation 9759, paras. 4-5, clauses (1), (2); Presidential
Proclamation 9758, clause (2), Annex (Part B).
18 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.6. The measures include various unpublished voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, and similar measures, such as export moderation and
export price monitoring, agreed upon between the United States and certain other WTO Members, such as
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. See Presidential Proclamation 9740 para. 4;
Presidential Proclamation 9759, paras. 4-5; Presidential Proclamation 9758, para. 5; Presidential Proclamation
9893 of 19 May 2019, paras. 4-6; Presidential Proclamation 9894 of 19 May 2019, paras. 5-7; Joint Statement
by the United States and Canada on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminium; and Joint Statement by the
United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminium.
19 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.11.
20 Türkiye's First Written Submission, paras. 2.12-2.16.
21 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.16.

measures into effect on the same day, with respect to the same products that were subject to the
initial set of suspensions of concessions.22
2.8. On 21 May 2019, the United States announced that it was reducing the steel duty safeguard
applicable to Türkiye from 50 per cent back to the original level of 25 per cent. Effectively, this
meant that the United States returned the safeguard duties back to the level they had been prior to
August 2018. Subsequently, Türkiye also reduced its additional duties effective as of 21 May 2019,
to the level prior to 15 August 2018.23
3 SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES' CLAIMS UNDER ARTICLES I:1, II:1(A) AND II:1(B)
OF THE GATT 1994
3.1. The claims placed before the Panel by the United States are based on Articles I:1, II:1(a) and
II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
3.2. First, the United States argues that Türkiye has acted inconsistently with the most -favoured-
nation treatment obligation in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, because it has imposed the additional
duties on the United States alone, but has not imposed any such additional duties on any other
Member.24
3.3. Second, the United States further argue s that Türkiye violates Article II:1(b), first or second
sentence, and consequentially Article II:1(a). Under Article II:1(b), first sentence, the United States
claims that Türkiye has exceeded its tariff bindings. Under Article II:1(b), second sentence, t he
United States claims that Türkiye is applying other duties and charges not recorded in Türkiye's
GATT Schedule.25 Finally, the United States asserts that, "[s]ince Article II:1(b) proscribes the type
of measures that are equally inconsistent with Artic le II:1(a), in demonstrating a breach of the
former, the United States also established a breach of the latter".26
3.4. As Türkiye demonstrates below, none of the provisions invoked by the United States is
applicable to Türkiye's measures. Instead, these measures fall under Article XIX of the GATT 1994
and under the Agreement on Safeguards, because they reflect a suspension of equivalent
concessions within the meaning of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of
the GATT 1994. This is because, in turn, the measures on steel and aluminium imposed by the United
States are safeguard measures within the meaning of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Safeguards.
4 TÜRKIYE'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS
4.1 The United States' Section 232 measures are safeguard measures within the meaning
of Article XIX of the GATT1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards
4.1.1 Summary of the Appellate Body 's standard for determining the existence of a
safeguard measure
4.1. The term "safeguard measure" is not explicitly defined in the text of WTO covered agreements.
According to Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the agreement contains rules "for the
application of safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for
in Article XIX of GATT 1994 " (emphasis added). The existence of a safeguard measure within the
meaning of Article 1 and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 is thus a threshold issue. A panel is required
to make that determination independently and on an objective basis. As prior cases demonstrate, a
panel may decide independently whether a measure constitutes a safeguard measure even when
both parties agree that the measure is a safeguard measure.27
4.2. Given the absence of an explicit definition in the text of the WTO a greements, the governing
standard for determining whether a measure is a safeguard measure is the standard clarified by the

22 Türkiye's First Written Submission, paras. 2.18-2.19.
23 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 2.20.
24 United States' First Written Submission, paras. 22-38.
25 United States' First Written Submission, paras. 39-55.
26 United States' First Written Submission, para. 53.
27 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.7.

Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products. The Appellate Body has identified the following
two definitional criteria for the existence of a safeguard measures:
• The "measure must suspend, in whole or in part, a GATT obligation or withdraw or
modify a GATT concession";28 and
• The "suspension, withdrawal, or modification in question must be designed to
prevent or remedy serious injury to the Member's domestic industry caused or
threatened by increased imports of the subject product".29
4.3. The Appellate Body has provided specific guidance on the second element. Thus, the Appellate
Body has emphasized that, for a WTO safeguard to exist, the suspension of a GATT obligation "must
be designed to pursue a specific objective, namely preventing or remedying serious injury to the
Member's domestic industry".30 The Appellate Body also stated that there must be a "demonstrable
link" between the obligations being suspended, on the one hand, and the objective of preventing or
remedying serious injury to the domestic industry, on the other hand.
4.4. Whether this link exists should be examined by the Panel in order to determine which aspects
are "the most central" to the measure.31 In determining these "most central" aspects, the Appellate
Body noted that a panel should "evaluate and give due consideration to all relevant factors". These
"relevant factors" include the manner in which the measure is characterized under the domestic law
of the Member concerned, the domestic procedures that led to the adoption of the measure, and
any relevant notifications to the WTO C ommittee on Safeguards. At the same time, the Appellate
Body added that "no one such factor is, in and of itself, dispositive of the question of whether the
measure constitutes a safeguard measure".32
4.5. As Türkiye explains below, the United States' me asures satisfy both prongs of the Appellate
Body's test. The measure suspends or withdraws concessions, and this suspension is designed to
prevent or remedy serious injury. As a threshold point, Türkiye first addresses an important systemic
point raised in the United States' submission, i.e., the United States' self-invocation theory.
4.1.2 Contrary to the United States ' arguments, whether a measure is a safeguard
measure is to be determined on the basis of an objective analysis
4.1.2.1 The United States' self-invocation theory is inconsistent with Article 11 of the DSU
4.6. Throughout this dispute, the United States has argued that its measures on steel and aluminium
are not safeguard measures. This is because the United States did not intend for these measures to
fall under WTO safeguard rules and because it has not labelled these measures as "safeguard"
measures for purposes of domestic law. The United States has also argued that, in order for the
Safeguard Agreement to apply, a Member must "invoke" the W TO safeguard rules by submitting a
notification to the WTO Safeguard Committee under Article 12.1 of the Safeguards Agreement.33
4.7. The United States' self-invocation theory is fundamentally flawed. It is inconsistent with: (i) the
explicit rules in Ar ticle 11 of the DSU; (ii) a long -standing approach of the Appellate Body and
previous panels to determine objectively the applicability of WTO covered agreements to challenged
measures;34 and (iii) the objective features of "safeguard measures" outlined i n Article XIX:1(a) of
the GATT 1994, as recently clarified by the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products.35

28 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.8. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, para. 5.60.
29 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.8. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, paras. 5.60 and 5.64.
30 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.
31 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.9. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, paras. 5.56, 5.58, 5.60, 5.64, 5.68, and 5.70.
32 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para.4.10. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, para. 5.60.
33 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.20.
34 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.18.
35 Contrary to its arguments in these proceedings, the United States noted in Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products that "the Panel was entitled to examine on its own motion whether the measure at issue constitute[d]

4.8. First, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, the determination of whether WTO law applies or which
specific provisions of WTO law a pply to a given measure does not belong to a Member, under its
domestic law, but rather to a WTO panel. The panel's objective assessment focuses on the objective
features of a measure, such as its design structure and intended operation, rather than on any
unilateral domestic categorization of the measure.36 The Appellate Body and prior panels have used
this approach on several occasions to determine the applicability of WTO safeguard rules to the
measure at issue.
4.9. For instance, in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , the Appellate Body confirmed that "[a]
panel's assessment of claims brought under the Agreement on Safeguards may … require a threshold
examination of whether the measure at issue qualifies as a safeguard measure within the meaning
of Article XIX of the GATT 1994". 37 According to the Appellate Body, this assessment is part of a
panel's duty under Article 11 of the DSU.38
4.10. This applies regardless of whether the parties disagree on the proper legal characterization.
Thus, in Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures the complainant characterized the measures at
issue as safeguard measures, and the respondent contested this characterization. 39 In contrast, in
Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products and India – Iron and Steel Products, all disputing parties agreed
that the measures at issue constituted safeguard measures.40 In both instances, the panel conducted
its own independent assessment of whether the measures were safeguard measures.
4.11. Second, in a consistent line of previous dec isions, the Appellate Body and prior panels have
found that the categorization of a measure under domestic law is not dispositive for its categorization
under WTO law. 41 For instance, in China – Auto Parts, the Appellate Body examined whether a
specific charge at issue fell under Articles II:1(b) or III:2 of the GATT 1994 and clarified that "a
degree of caution must be exercised in attributing decisive weight to characteristics that fall
exclusively within the control of WTO Members , 'because otherwise Members could determine by
themselves which of the provisions would apply to their charges'".42 In the same case, the Appellate
Body noted that "the way in which a Member 's domestic law characterizes its own measures,
although useful, cannot be dispositive of the characterization of such measures under WTO law".43
4.12. In sum, the United States' self-invocation theory is inconsistent with Article 11 of the DSU and
well-settled WTO dispute settlement practice . In the following Section, Türkiye demonstrates that
this theory also has no basis in WTO safeguard disciplines.

a safeguard measure". This examination can be meaningful only if it is based on objective features of the
challenged measure, rather than on the regulating Member's subjective, unilateral determination of the legal
character of that measure. Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.18, citing Appellate Body Report,
Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.28. (emphasis added)
36 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.14. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil
Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 593 and Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy/Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, para. 5.127.
37 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.32.
38 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, paras. 5.32-5.33.
39 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, paras. 7.23-7.24, 7.89.
40 Panel Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 7.10; and Panel Report, India – Iron and Steel
Products, paras. 7.29-7.30.
41 See Türkiye's response to Panel Question 62; and Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review, footnote 87.
42 Türkiye's response to Panel Question 22. See also Appellate Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para.
178. (emphasis added)
43 The Appellate Body explained as follows:

[A] panel's determination of whether a specific charge falls under Article II:1(b) or Article III:2 of
the GATT 1994 must be made in the light of the characteristics of the measure and the
circumstances of the case. … A panel must thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in
its design and in its operation, and identify its principal characteristics. Having done so, the panel
must then seek to identify the leading or core features of the measure at issue, those that define
its "centre of gravity" for purposes of characterizing the charge that it imposes as an ordinary
customs duty or an internal charge.

See Appellate Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para. 178; and Türkiye's response to Panel Question 22.

4.1.2.2 The United States' self-invocation theory has no basis in WTO safeguard rules
4.13. One of the key elements of the United States' position is that WTO law contains no definition
of the term "safeguard". Instead, the United States argues, Article XIX establishes merely a
"process" for the invocation of safeguard rules, in which the first step for a regulating Member is to
notify its measure.44
4.14. This is incorrect. As Türkiye explained in Section 4.1.1, the Appellate Body has identified two
definitional features of a safeguard measure: (i) the nature of a safeguard (i.e., suspension of a
GATT obligation); and (ii) its purpose. These features are grounded in the text of Article XIX:1(a),
its context, object and purpose, and are also confirmed by the negotiating history of the Agreement
on Safeguards.45
4.15. Nothing in the text of Article XIX or the Agreement on Safeguards suggests t hat notice is a
condition precedent for the applicability of WTO safeguard rules. In reality, the United States appears
to ignore that in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products the Appellate Body drew a bright-line distinction
between, on the one hand, the obj ective definitional criteria of a safeguard measure, and, on the
other hand, compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements of a safeguard measure.46
The "notice" referred to by the United States is not a question of the definition or the existence of a
safeguard measure, but rather a question of compliance with a procedural rule applicable to
safeguard measures. Put differently, a failure to notify a safeguard measure does not prevent the
measure from being a safeguard measure. Instead, a fai lure to notify a safeguard measure is a
violation of the requirements that a safeguard measure must satisfy in order to be consistent with
WTO law.
4.16. To further illustrate the distinction between definition/existence and compliance, consider
other requirements under WTO safeguard disciplines. An incorrect or a missing determination of
unforeseen developments, or increased imports, or serious injury, does not mean that WTO
safeguard rules do not apply. Rather, the measure is still a safeguard measure as long as it meets
the definitional criteria explained above. The measure will, however, be inconsistent with Article XIX
of the GATT 1994 and the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.
4.17. Any other conclusion would lead to unreasonable resu lts. A Member could avoid the
applicability of potentially onerous rules simply by violating them.47 The same conclusion holds true
for procedural requirements, as explicitly noted by the Appellate Body.48 It would not be meaningful
to argue that a safeguard measure for which the importing Member did not comply with the
procedural requirements of Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards ceases to be, for this reason,
a safeguard measure. In keeping with this logic, in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, the Appellate
Body referred to notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards as a relevant, but not decisive,
factor in determining the applicability of WTO safeguard rules.49
4.18. Next, the United Sta tes also relies on the wording of Article 11.1(c) of the Agreement on
Safeguards to argue that an importing Member can decide unilaterally whether a measure falls within
the WTO safeguard rules. However, Article 11.1(c) indicates nothing of this sort. Arti cle 11.1
distinguishes between "emergency action[s] on imports … as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994"50,
and "measures sought, taken or maintained by a Member pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other
than Article XIX"51. The first category refers to safeguard measures. The second category refers to
measures taken under other GATT permissive provisions, such as Articles VI, XX, or XXI. According
to Article 11 of the DSU, whether a measure falls under the scope of Articles 11.1(a) or 11.1(c) must

44 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.15. See also United
States' second written submission, paras. 52-54.
45 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.18.
46 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.21; Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second
Substantive Meeting, para. 2.20. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para.
5.57.
47 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.22.
48 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.23. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, para. 5.57.
49 Türkiye's response to Panel Question 24. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products, para. 5.60.
50 Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.
51 Article 11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

be d etermined objectively by analysing the design, structure, and expected operation of the
measure, in particular whether the measure possesses the constituent features of a safeguard
measure or a "rebalancing measure" within the meaning of Articles XIX or Article 8.2.52
4.19. Türkiye 's arguments are also supported by how the Agreement on Safeguards disciplines
so-called "grey area" measures. These measures are explicitly prohibited by Article 11.1(b) of
the Agreement on Safeguards. The drafters of the Agreement on Safeguards decided to regulate
these "grey area measures" along with "standard" safeguard measures because "grey area"
measures pursue the same "purpose" as standard safeguard measures. Like standard safeguard
measures, “grey area” measures are int ended to prevent or to remedy serious injury to the
regulating Member's domestic industry, caused or threatened by increased imports. The sole
difference is that "grey area" measures take forms that differ from the forms of "standard" safeguard
measures (i.e. import tariffs or import quotas).53
4.20. As an example, consider voluntary export restraints. These measures do not take the same
form as standard safeguard measures. Without an explicit rule, voluntary export restraints would
thus escape the strict ures of the Agreement on Safeguards. Complainants and treaty interpreters
would therefore have to go through the effort of searching elsewhere in the covered agreements for
legal provisions to address these measures. In order to avoid this scenario, the dr afters included
"grey area" measures within the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards and prohibited them in
Article 11.1(b).54
4.21. Türkiye argues that there are no notification obligations for grey area measures. Because these
measures are explicitly pr ohibited, Members obviously do not notify them under WTO safeguard
rules. And yet, WTO safeguard rules, in particular Article 11.1(b), apply to these measures. This
demonstrates that "notification" is not necessary to trigger the application of the Agreement on
Safeguards. If this is true for "grey area" measures, Türkiye fails to see why this should not be the
case also for standard safeguard measures.55
4.22. As another contextual argument, Türkiye notes that, based on Article 12.8 of the Agreement
on S afeguard, "measures or actions" dealt with in the Agreement on Safeguards can be
"counter-notified" by other Members. This scenario can occur only if the importing Member has not
previously notified these measures, despite its obligation to do so. If the United States were correct
that notification by the importing Member is a constituent feature of a safeguard measure without
which WTO safeguard rules would not apply, Article 12.8 would have no purpose or logic. 56 The
absence of a notification by the importing Member would mean that the measure would not be a
safeguard measure. As a result, there would therefore be nothing to "counter -notify", and
Article 12.8 would never apply.
4.23. Moreover, the United States in correctly construes the negotiating history of Article XIX and
the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States refers to the views of various negotiators as to
whether a notification under Article XIX had to be submitted prior to taking a safeguard action, or
after the adoption of this action, especially in critical circumstances in which the measure had to be
taken urgently. 57 However, nothing in these discussions suggests that the various notification
requirements in Article XIX (or the Agreement on Safeguards) are one of the constituent features of
a safeguard measure. On the contrary, during the Uruguay Round, some drafts of the Agreement
on Safeguards contained an explicit definition of the term "safeguard measure", which reflected the
same elements tha t the Appellate Body has subsequently used to define these measures. This
confirms that the drafters of the Agreement on Safeguards had a very clear understanding of the
objective constituent features of a safeguard.58
4.24. Finally, recall that the United States collapses the distinction between the definitional elements
of a safeguard measure and the requirements that a safeguard measure must satisfy. This failure to

52 Türkiye's response to Panel Question 23.
53 See Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguard; and Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second
Substantive Meeting, para. 2.38.
54 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.39.
55 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.40.
56 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, paras. 2.24-2.25.
57 See, inter alia, United States' second written submission, paras. 64-74.
58 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.44.

distinguish between these two concepts undermines the United States ' other arguments. F or
example, the United States alleges that the GATT 1947 Working Party in the US – Fur Felt Hats
dispute defined the term "safeguard measure" and, in so doing, referred to the notification
condition.59 That is incorrect. Indeed, in that case, both parties agreed that the measure at issue
was a safeguard measure. The Working Party, therefore, merely explained the applicable
requirements under Article XIX, both substantive and procedural (including notification), and then
proceeded to analyse the complainant's claims. Furthermore, the Working Party did not attach any
particular importance to the notification requirement. The US – Fur Felt Hats report is thus inapposite
to the dispute at hand.60
4.1.2.3 The United States measures satisfy the legal definition of a safeguard measure in
Article XIX, as interpreted by the Appellate Body
4.25. The United States' Section 232 measures on steel and aluminum clearly satisfy the two
definitional features of a safeguard measure, that is: (1) the suspension of concessions; and (2) that
the measure be designed to remedy or prevent serious injury.61
4.26. The US import measures clearly meet the first definitional criterion of safeguard measures,
because they "suspend, in whole or in part, a GATT obligation" or "withdraw … a GATT concession"
of the United States within the meaning of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994.
4.27. In particular, the additional duties on steel and aluminium products are inconsistent with Article
II:1(a), and Article II:1(b), first sentence, or, in the alternative, Article II:1(b), second sentence, of
the GATT 1994. This is because these duties impose treatment on the subject products that is less
favourable than the treatment contemplated in the relevant parts of the United States' GATT
Schedule. In addition, the quantitative limitations imposed on steel articles originating in Argentina,
Brazil and South Korea, as well as the quantitative limitations imposed on aluminium articles
originating in Argentina are clearly inconsistent with, and , therefore, suspend, the United States'
obligations under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.62
4.28. These import measures also meet the second part of the definition of a safeguard measure,
because they pursue the "specific objective" of preventing or reme dying serious injury to the
domestic industry, through the suspension of GATT obligations. This objective is the "most central"
aspect of these measures.63 To give a few examples:
• The very purpose of the United States' Presidential Proclamations imposin g the
import measures on steel and aluminum is to limit imports in a manner that will
allow the United States' domestic industries to meet the self-defined target of 80 per
cent capacity utilization.64
• This economic recovery rationale is also visible i n the reasoning for why certain
countries were temporarily excluded from the import measures, including "shared
commitment to addressing global excess capacity for producing steel … [and] the
robust economic integration between [the United States and those countries] ".65
• The Presidential Proclamations were published on the website of the White House
under the rubric "Economy and Jobs", making it clear that they had been adopted
with economic concerns in mind.66

59 United States' second written submission, para. 55.
60 Türkiye's Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting, para. 2.48.
61 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37. See also Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products, para. 5.60.
62 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.49.
63 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.50.
64 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; Türkiye's First Written Submission para. 4.52.
65 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; Türkiye's First Written Submission para. 4.53.
66 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; Türkiye's First Written Submission para. 4.55.

• Both the Section 232 Steel and Aluminium Reports, which served as a basis for the
United States' safeguard measures, analyse classical injury factors in order to gauge
the extent of the injury or threat thereof.67
• From the President down to the Secretary of Commerce and senior economic
advisors to the President, the record is replete with tweets, press releases, and public
statements, such as TV interviews, that confirm, time and time again, that the true
purpose of the measures is to protect the domestic industry and to ensure its
continued operation and profitability.68
• Finally, the Joint Statements of the United States and Mexico as well as Canada,
respectively, which settled their respective WTO disputes with respect to the United
States' safeguard measures and the rebalancing measures, reveal the fundamentally
economic nature of the United States' measures. Among many relevant aspects,
these Joint Statements explicitly stipulate the right of the affected exporting
countries to take rebalancing measures.69
4.29. In sum, all of the relevant materials reveal that the measures at issue were designed to pursue
the "specific objective" of improving the economic health of the domestic steel and aluminium
industries, and preventing or remedying the injury allegedly caused t o them by increased imports
of steel and aluminium products. This is no different in any material respect from the objective
commonly pursued by any safeguard measure.70
4.30. The senior economic advisor to the President also stated that the measures at i ssue are a
bargaining chip to extract economic concessions from trading partners. Mr. Kudlow explained on the
TV station CNBC that negotiations with foreign countries about exemptions from the additional duties
were linked to reciprocal trade concessions and other economic considerations.71
4.31. The United States ' position in this dispute, as well as in the parallel DS564 proceeding, has
been that its Section 232 measures on steel and aluminum are concerned with national security,
and do not pursue any safeguard-related objectives. The United States, however, appears to conflate
the meaning of "national security measures" under its domestic law and WTO law. Even if Section
232 measures on steel and aluminium were to be considered as national security meas ures under
US domestic law, this does not mean that these measures also satisfy all of the requirements of
Article XXI of the GATT 1994. For instance, these measures were not taken "in time of war or other
emergency in international relations", or, at the very least, the United States failed to identify any
such emergency. In addition, these measures appear to be very remote from, or even unrelated to,
any conceivable "emergency", as well as the United States' "essential security interests", as the
primary objective of these measures is to protect the United States' domestic steel and aluminium
industries.72
4.32. To conclude, the US Section 232 measures at issue clearly fall under the scope of WTO
safeguard rules.
4.2 Türkiye's measures are rebalancing measures under Articles XIX:3(a) of the
GATT 1994 and 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards
4.2.1 Legal standard under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and
Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994
4.33. Türkiye's measures at issue are a response to the United States' disguised safeguard measures
on steel and aluminum. These measures are thus based on, and well -grounded in, the text of
Article XIX:3(a) and Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.73

67 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; Türkiye's First Written Submission paras. 4.56-4.62.
68 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; Türkiye's First Written Submission paras. 4.52-4.68.
70 Türkiye's First Written Submission, paras. 4.71-4.72.
71 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.68.
72 Türkiye's response to Panel Question 88, para. 2.109.

4.34. Under these two provisions, Members are explicitly authorized to take temporary "rebalancing
measures", to rebalance tariff concessions and other obligations after a safeguard measure has
distorted the original equilibrium. Based on the text of Articles XIX:3(a) and 8.2, a rebalancing
measure must possess the following key features:
• First, the rebalancing measure must respond to a safeguard measure. Article 8 refers
to a situation where "[a] Member [is] proposing to apply a safeguard measure or
[is] seeking an extension of a safeguard measure". Article 1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards makes it clear that the Agreement "establishes rules for the application
of safeguard measures". Thus, a rebalancing measure is defined as a response to a
previously imposed or proposed safeguard measure. Put differently, the existence of
an underlying safeguard measure is a condition precedent for applying a rebalancing
measure under Article 8.2.74
• Second, Article 8.2 applies to a particular type of measures, which are "rebalancing
measures", that is, "the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations". The purpose, structure, and operation of the measure must, therefore,
indicate that it was designed as an Article 8.2 "rebalancing measure". In particular,
it must be discernible from th e measure itself and its attendant circumstances that
the measure was designed to, and has been applied so as to, suspend "concessions
or other obligations" that are "substantially equivalent" to those of the underlying
safeguard measure. The elements a panel may consider under this criterion include:
o Whether the text of the measure or the text of a notification provided to the
WTO suggest a link to the underlying safeguard measure;
o Whether the amount of the retaliation, objectively, is linked to the l evel of
suspension in the original measure; or
o Whether the measure has been implemented after the suspending Member has
attempted to agree, with the Member applying the underlying safeguard
measure, on trade compensation within the meaning of Article 8.1.
• Finally, the third definitional feature of a measure that falls under Article 8.2 is the
absence of an agreement on trade compensation within the meaning of Article 8.1.
The absence of an agreement can, of course, be due to any reason, including a
disagreement about the precise amount of compensation or – as in this case – a
disagreement about the legal qualification of the underlying measure. Clearly, if an
agreement has been reached and acted upon, a measure taken by the affected
Member can no longer be considered a rebalancing measure.75
4.35. Thus, Articles 8.2 and XIX:3 may be considered as a special regime ( lex specialis ) that
prescribes the specific steps that a Member may take when its industry is affected by another
Member's safeguard action. These steps start with consultations under Article 12.3, and potentially
end with rebalancing duties. As a result, until a panel has examined the applicability of the WTO
safeguard rules and the consistency of the measure with these rules, no finding of violation of either
Article I or Article II of the GATT 1994 can be made.
4.2.2 Türkiye's measures meet the legal test under Art icle 8.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994
4.36. Türkiye's measures meet all of the definitional criteria of a rebalancing measure explained in
paragraph 4.2.1 above. On the first criterion – the condition-precedent of a prior safeguard measure
– the United States' Section 232 measures are safeguard measures. They depart temporarily from
the disciplines of, inter alia , Articles II:1(a), II:1(b), and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The "specific

74 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 35; and Türkiye's response to Panel Question 12.
75 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 35; and Türkiye's response to Panel Question 12.

objective" of this "suspension" is to prevent or remedy serious injury to the United States' domestic
industries, allegedly caused by increased imports.76
4.37. On the second criterion – the nature of Türkiye 's measures as rebalancing
measures – Türkiye's additional duties were notified to the Council for Trade in Goods and the
Committee on Safeguards, pursuant to Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards. These
notifications explain in detail the amount of rebalancing by reference to the United States' underlying
safeguard measures and the amount of duties imposed by those measures. It is beyond dispute that
these measures suspend "substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under
GATT 1994".77
4.38. All of the above confirms that the purpose of Türkiye's measures was to " rebalance"
concessions and other obligations within the meaning of Article 8.2. Moreover, as soon as the United
States doubled its duties with respect to Türkiye in August 2018, and when it subsequently reduced
those duties to their original level in May 2019, Türkiye always mirrored these changes immediately
in its own duty rates. This further confirms that Türkiye's measures are nothing else than
"rebalancing" measures within the meaning of Article 8.2. Finally, the measures themselves refer to
Türkiye's legislation, in particular Law No. 4067, dated 26 January 1995, which implemented the
WTO covered agreements, including the Agreement on Safeguards, within Türkiye's legal system.
4.39. Finally, on the third criterion, it is undisputed that no agreement o n trade compensation was
reached between Türkiye and the United States before Türkiye took its measures. On the contrary,
the United States refused to even engage in consultations under the Agreement on Safeguards.78
4.3 Contrary to the United States' argument, Türkiye's arguments based on Article XIX of
the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards are not in the nature of an "affirmative
defence"
4.40. Another important systemic argument of the United States is the assertion that Türkiye's
reference to the Agreement on Safeguards is in the nature of an "affirmative defence". In particular,
the United States has claimed that Türkiye has the burden of proof to demonstrate both the
applicability of the WTO safeguards regime and the consistency of its measures with the WTO
safeguards rules. According to the United States, Türkiye is required to raise and assert WTO
safeguard rules as an "affirmative defence", in response to the United States' claims of violation.
Accordingly, the United States' claims of violation need not take into account the WTO safeguard
rules and the United States was entit led to file this dispute on the basis of provisions of its choice,
which is Articles I and II of the GATT 1994.79
4.41. The term "affirmative defence" has a well-established connotation in WTO law. It applies when
a complainant has successfully establishe d a violation of a WTO legal provision and a responding
Member seeks to justify that violation by relying on a separate provision. The respondent that raises
the defence bears the burden to substantiate it. If the respondent fails to satisfy this burden, a
previously established violation of a WTO provision stands and the defending Member loses.
However, this is not the situation here. Türkiye and other Members in the parallel disputes have
argued extensively that this is an incorrect characterization of the WTO safeguard regime.80
4.42. Türkiye's reference to the WTO safeguards regime is not an "affirmative defence", because
WTO safeguard rules do not constitute an "exception" to GATT disciplines. Rather, Members have an
"autonomous right" to apply a safe guard measure, provided that they meet all of the substantive
and procedural conditions in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. Thus,
in referring to Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, Türkiye does not
invoke any "exception", but rather identifies the correct legal regime that applies to the measures

76 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 37; See also Türkiye's Second Written Submission,
paras. 2.24-2.30.
77 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 38; Türkiye's response to Panel Question 12; see also Türkiye's
Second Written Submission, paras. 2.24-2.30.
79 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.3; and Türkiye's Second Written Submission, para. 2.1.
80 Türkiye's Second Written Submission, para. 25.

at issue. This regime displaces other GATT provisions, such as Articles I and II, that might have
applied to Türkiye's measures if the safeguards regime did not.81
4.43. The legal rules applicable to safeguards – as well as the rules applicable to any suspension of
concessions taken in response to safeguards – therefore, establish independent, autonomous rights,
not an affirmative defence. Hence, if a WTO Memb er believes that another WTO Member has
improperly imposed a safeguard measure, or that it has improperly suspended equivalent
concessions in response to a safeguard measure, it is for the complainant to assert a violation of
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards and to satisfy its burden of proof.82
4.44. This was explicitly confirmed by, for instance, the panel in Korea – Dairy. The panel stated:
"[i]n the context of the present dispute, which is concerned with the assessment of t he WTO
compatibility of a safeguard measure imposed by a national authority, we consider that it is for the
European Communities [i.e. complainant] to submit a prima facie case of violation of the Agreement
on Safeguards, namely, to demonstrate that the Ko rean safeguard measures are not justified by
reference to Articles 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards". 83 On appeal, the Appellate
Body appears to have agreed with the panel's allocation of the burden of proof.84
4.45. The complainant cannot invoke non-applicable provisions, such as Articles I and II of the
GATT 1994, and require the respondent to demonstrate that the respondent's measures are justified
under the Agreement on Safeguards. 85 Doing so would be tantamount to circumventing the bas ic
rules of allocating the burden of proof and the burden of making a prima facie case.
4.46. Over twenty years of practice under WTO dispute settlement demonstrates that Türkiye's
reading of WTO law is correct. Türkiye is not aware of a single instance in which a complainant has
challenged a safeguard measure – or a suspension of concessions in response to a safeguard
measure – simply by invoking Articles I, II, or XI of the GATT 1994, and then expecting the defending
Member to demonstrate that WTO safeguards rules apply and have been complied with. Rather, in
all instances, the complainant presented claims of violation of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Safeguards. Claims under non-safeguard-specific provisions of the GATT 1994, such
as Articles I, II, or XI, were – if at all – included for subsidiary purposes.86
4.47. In keeping with this logic, panels and the Appellate Body in those disputes also first addressed
the safeguards-related provisions of WTO law and only then, as claims of a subsidiary nature, other
non-safeguard-specific provisions of the GATT 1994. This approach was followed, inter alia, in India
– Iron and Steel Products, where Japan raised claims under both the GATT 1994 and the Agreement
on Safeguards. The panel in that dispute addressed the non -safeguard-related claims only once it
had found that India did not meet all applicable requirements of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and
the Agreement on Safeguards, and that therefore India could not validly suspend its GATT
obligations.87
4.48. The United States itself has previously advanced this proposition. For instance, in US – Wheat
Gluten, the United States explicitly urged the panel to endorse the above -mentioned finding of the
panel in Korea – Dairy, which stated that the burden of proof in the context of safeguard measures
rested with the complainant.88
4.49. The same logic has also be en followed in the context of other trade remedy disputes, for
example, disputes concerning anti -dumping measures. In EC – Fasteners (China), the Appellate

81 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.32.
82 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.33.
84 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, paras. 149, 150; Türkiye's First Written Submission, para.
4.34.
85 Leaving aside the violation of the basic allocation of the burden of proof, this would also require the
defendant to demonstrate compliance with all conceivable provisions and obligations under Article XIX of the
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, whether of a substantive or procedural nature. This would be a
wholly unworkable standard in practice. See Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.35.
86 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.36.
87 Panel Report, India – Iron and Steel Products, paras. 7.408-7.409. See Türkiye's First Written
Submission, paras. 4.37-4.38.
88 Panel Report, US – Wheat Gluten, US arguments, Attachment 2-5, para. 14; Türkiye's First Written
Submission, para. 4.40.

Body found that, until a finding under Article VI and the Anti -Dumping Agreement has been made,
it i s not possible to determine whether a measure violates Articles I and II of the GATT 1994.
Similarly, in US – Zeroing (Japan), the Appellate Body found a violation of Article II of the GATT
1994 only after finding violations of WTO anti-dumping rules.89
4.50. In the latter case, the Appellate Body described Articles VI and the Anti -Dumping Agreement
as a "safe harbor" with respect to Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. The term "safe harbor" is
synonymous with Türkiye's previous argument: Articles I and II cannot be said to have been violated
until the analysis under the anti -dumping rules has been concluded. If the measure is consistent
with the anti-dumping rules, there is no violation of Articles I and II.90
4.51. The relationship between Articles I an d II, on the one hand, and Article VI and the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, on the other hand, is fully analogous to the relationship between general
GATT obligations and the safeguard rules. Safeguard measures are one of the three types of trade
remedies, which are measures that WTO Members may use to counter injurious imports in particular
circumstances. The use of each of these remedies is governed by specific agreements in Annex 1A
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. It would be untenable to argue that one of these specialized
agreements, such as the Agreement on Safeguards – but not the other trade remedy agreements –
contains no positive obligations, but instead contains only exceptions to be invoked and justified by
the Member choosing to apply trade remedy measures.91
4.52. The United States made the deliberate choice not to raise any safeguard -related claims.
The United States is free to make this choice, but must accept the consequences of that choice. If a
panel finds the safeguards-related provisions to be applicable, the panel would normally – assuming
the complainant has properly raised claims under Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards –
assess the consistency of the measure at issue under those provisions.92
4.53. If the measures are cons istent with those provisions, this necessarily means, by definition,
that they are also fully consistent with Articles I and II. In contrast, if the measures are inconsistent
with the safeguard rules, then – as a result – Articles I and II have not been validly suspended and
can then, but only then, be found to have been violated. This means that, until the applicability of,
and the consistency of the measure with, the WTO safeguard rules has been determined, there
cannot be a finding of violation of either Article I or Article II.93
4.54. The legal consequence of the United States' choice in this dispute is that, should the Panel find
that Türkiye's measure at issue is in fact a rebalancing measure, and given that the United States
has not raised any safeguard-related claims, there can be no finding of violation and the measure is
presumed to be WTO -consistent. The Panel will thus have to end its analysis at that juncture and
dismiss the United States' case in toto.94
4.55. Therefore, the proper legal basis for the United States to bring claims in this dispute is under
Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Should the Panel
agree with this position, it must reject the United States' claims under Articles I and II of the
GATT 1994, because these claims are not based on the correct applicable WTO legal provision.95

89 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 392-393; Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing
(Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), paras. 200, 209; Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 28; and Türkiye's
response to Panel Question 36.
90 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 209; Türkiye's Opening
Statement, para. 28; and Türkiye's response to Panel Question 36.
91 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 30; see also Türkiye's response to Panel Question 36.
92 Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 24; see also Türkiye's response to Panel Question 36.
93 Türkiye's Opening Statement, paras. 24-25; see also Türkiye's response to Panel Question 36.
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 278; Türkiye's Opening Statement, para. 27; and
Türkiye's response to Panel Question 36.
95 Türkiye's First Written Submission, para. 4.42.

4.4 The United States has failed to include claims under the Agreement on Safeguards and
Article XIX in its panel request and may, therefore, not raise these claims
4.56. The United States has not made out a prima facie case that Türkiye's measures are
inconsistent with the provisions that Türkiye's measure fall under, that is, Article 8.2 of
the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994.96
4.57. The claims put before the Panel by the United States are based on Articles I:1, II:1(a) and
II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. However, as Türkiye has demonstrated throughout these proceedings,
none of these provisions is applicable to Türkiye's measures.97
4.58. The United States has made no effort to formulate any alternative arguments under Article 8.2
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994. Thus, in this dispute, the
United States has chosen not to formulate any alternative claims, and has based its case exclusively
on the proposition that Türkiye's measures fall under Articles I and II. The United States has not
formulated any claims under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of
the GATT 1994, neither in its consultations and panel request, nor in its submissions.98
4.59. Thus, in the event that the Panel agrees with Türkiye – as Türkiye believes it should – that the
measures at issue are not covered by Articles I and II of the GATT 1994, but rather by Article 8.2 of
the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994, the Panel must dismiss the
United States' complaint in toto.99
5 CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR FINDINGS
5.1. For the above reasons, Türkiye requests the Panel to find that:
• Türkiye's measures fall under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on
Safeguards;
• The United States failed to file claims on a proper legal basis; and
• In the absence of a finding under the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX, no
findings under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 can be made.

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 52
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 56
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 61
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand 64
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway 65
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 69
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland 73
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 77

ANNEX C-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA
1. This executive summary integrates the Third Party Written Submission , Oral Statement and
Responses to the Panel's Questions by China in this dispute.
I. Order of Analysis
2. China believes the Panel should first examine the measures at issue in relation to Article 8.2
of the Safeguards Agreement, and only when the Panel was to find that that provision does not apply
to the measures at issue, the Panel would turn to and would need to turn to examine the United
States claims under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. This is based o n the correct understanding
of the legal relationship between the WTO safeguards disciplines and Articles I and II of the
GATT 1994.
3. Since the measures at issue were explicitly taken pursuant to Article 8.2 of the Safeguards
Agreement, unless the Panel first finds that this provision does not apply to the measures at issue,
violation of Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 cannot be found or even examined by the Panel. If
the Panel finds Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement is applicable to the measures at issue, there
would be no need for the Panel to examine the claims of the United States on violation of Articles I
and II of the GATT 1994 since the United States has not made a claim of inconsistency of the
measures at issue with Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement.
II. Legal Standard Standard in Relation to The Applicability of Article 8.2
4. Following the relevant analytical approach taken and principles established by the Appellate
Body concerning the applicability of safeguard disciplines in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products case,
the Panel would need to first identify the "constituent features" of a measure under Article 8.2 of
the Safeguards Agreement, and not conflating the factors relating to the legal characterization of a
measure with those relating to the WTO -consistency of a measure. Then, the Panel would need to
analyse, based on the facts before it, if "constituent features" are present for the measures at issue.
5. Based on plain reading of Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Panel would first need
to identify the type of "action" contemplated in the provision. The provision provides Members the
freedom "to suspend, ……, the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations
under the GATT 1994, to the trade of the Member applying the safeguard measure". Suspension of
the concessions or other obligations under the GATT 1994 is apparently the "action" contemplated.
6. In order to identify if the measure at issue suspends concessions or other obligations under
the GATT 1994, the Panel would need to compare the measure with the relevant GATT concessions
and obligations to determine if a suspension occurred as the result of the measure. Then the Panel
would need to turn to identify what is the "objective" of the "action" provided for in Article 8.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement, which purposed to keep suspension "substantially equivalent" and "to the
trade of the Member applying the safeguard measure". There must be a demonstrable link between
the "action" of suspension of concessions or other obligations and such an objective.
7. China believes, as long as the suspension of concessions and other obligation is "designed" to
reach such a rebalance with the Member taking a safeguard measure, i.e., this is the clear objective
of the action of suspension by a Member, it carries the "objective" feature required under Article
8.2. Whether the underlying measure taken by the target Member of the Article 8.2 measure is
indeed objectively a safeguard measure, i.e., ca rrying the "constituent features" of safeguard
measure under Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, seems to be a "substantive condition" for the
consistency with Article 8.2.
8. In order to identify whether the measures at issue present the "objective" featur e of an
Article 8.2 measure, a panel would need to "assess the design, structure, and expected operation of
the measure as a whole", "identify all the aspects of the measure that may have a bearing on its

legal characterization, recognize which of those aspects are the most central to that measure", and
as part of its determination, "a panel should evaluate and give due consideration to all relevant
factors, including the manner in which the measure is characterized under the domestic law of the
Member conc erned, the domestic procedures that led to the adoption of the measure, and any
relevant notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards. "
III. Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement are not "Affirmative
Defense" to the Members for the Breach of GATT 1994 Obligations
9. It has been well acknowledged that some provisions of the GATT 1994 such as Articles XX,
XXI, and XXIV are "limited exception" available as "affirmative defense" to the respondent.
10. However, GATT provisions establishing positive obligations are not "affirmative defenses". The
provisions that alter the scope of the obligations are not "affirmative defenses" . It does not seem
to be the case that Article XIX of the GATT 1994 or the Safeguards Agreement have been or should
be categorized as "limited exceptions" or "affirmative defenses".
11. Article XIX of the GATT 1994, as clarified and reinforced by the Safeguards Agreement, is an
integral part of the GATT 1994, and is part of the rights and obligations of WTO Members under the
GATT 1994.
12. Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Safeguards Agreement explicitly establish positive
obligations for Members applying safeguard measures, as well as for Members affected by such
measures in taking re -balancing measures. Such as o bligation to make proper determination on
"unforeseen developments", on imports "in such increased quantities" and "under such conditions",
and on serious injury or threaten of serious injury to domestic industry caused by such import, and
to observe the obligation of notification, of providing consultation opportunities, and obligation for
application irrespective of sources of imports and only for necessary period of time.
13. The fundamental nature and structure of the transitional safeguards regime under Article 6 of
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (the "ATC") shed light on how to understand the similar
provisions as Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement.
14. Furthermore, as provided in Articles XIX:1(a) and XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8.2
of the Safeguards Agreement, when safeguard measures or the rebalancing measures by affected
Members are imposed, the application of the relevant concessions or obligations under other
provisions of the GATT 1994, such as those und er Articles I and II, have already been stopped in
application, or made inactive, or taken away or changed, and therefore are not eligible to be
assessed independently from the safeguard provisions.
15. Measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement
would necessarily alter the scope of the relevant concessions or obligations established by other
GATT 1994 provisions. To China, the relationship of safeguard measures/rebalancing measures with
other GATT provisions supports the view that safeguard provisions are not exceptions or "affirmative
defense".
16. The correct legal characterization of the safeguard provisions means that, in a WTO dispute
proceeding concerning safeguard measures or rebalancing measures taken pursuant to the
safeguard provisions, it should be up to the complainant to assert inconsistency with the safeguard
provisions in its panel request to bring it within the terms of reference of the panel, and the burden
is on the complainant to establish a prima facie case that the measures at issue are inconsistent
with the safeguard provisions.
IV. United States' Claim Could Not Be Properly Brought Before the Panel if the
Complainant Ignored the Clear Legal Basis of the Measures at Issue
17. Article 6.2 of the DSU requires the panel request shall "provide a brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly ". The panel request "define the scope
of the dispute". Pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU, a panel's terms of r eference are governed by the
panel request.

18. The panel's terms of reference is a threshold issue. It identifies the measures and the claims
that a panel has authority to examine and on which it ha s authority to make findings, and a panel
may consider only those claims that it has authority to consider under its terms of reference.
19. China believes if a complainant purposely ignored the clear legal basis under the WTO legal
framework of a measure at issue by not including a claim based on such provision s in its panel
request, it runs the risk of not conveying the "legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly" as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU, and not notifying the respondent "the nature
of its case". This is true when the l egal basis of the measure at issue is positive obligations under
the WTO legal framework, not "exceptions".
20. As illustrated by the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences case, the complainant must, in
its request for the establishment of a panel, identify relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause which
the complainant considered have been violated by the measures at issue, in order to "notif[y] the
parties and third parties of the nature of [its] case". The Appellate Body is of the view that a
complaining party challenging a measure taken pursuant to the Enabling Clause must allege more
than mere inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, for to do only that would not convey the
"legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly". Moreover, as the EC measure
at issue in that dispute "is plainly taken pursuant to the Enabling Clause", the complaining party
should reasonably have articulated its claims of inconsistency with specific provisions of the Enabling
Clause at the outset of the dispute as part of its responsibility to "engage in [dispute settlement]
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute".
21. Following the Appellate Body's view, the United States, by alleging only inconsistency with
Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 in its panel request, and purposely ignoring the clear legal basis
of the measures, did not convey the "legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly" as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. The facts suggest that the United States was well
aware of the clear legal basis of the measures at issue at the time of bringing the measures to the
dispute settlement mechanism, and was fully capable of bringing its claim challenging such legal
basis. The United States chose not to do so.
22. Purposely ignoring the clear legal basis of the measures could not be understood as engaging
in the dispute settlement procedures in good faith. The fundamental defects of non-compliance with
Article 6.2 of the DSU in the panel request co uld not be left without serious consequences for the
purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
23. For the analysis above, China encourages the panel to consider the request of the Turkey for
the panel to dismiss the case of the United States.
V. United States Failed to Fulfil the Burden of Proof Requirement
24. Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement as an integral part of the overall rights and obligations
under the WTO safeguard disciplines, are not "exceptions" to o ther GATT provisions or "affirmative
defence" for violation of obligation under other GATT provisions. Measures taken pursuant to and
consistent with Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement do not violate the obligations under Article
I or II of the GATT 1994. Therefore, it should be first up to the United States, as the complainant,
to discharge its burden that Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement does not apply to the measures
at issue in order to establish a prima facie case of violation of Articles I and II of the GATT 1994.
25. The United States cannot discharge such a burden by simply stating its underlying measures
are not safeguard measures, since whether the underlying measures are safeguard measures is not
part of the "constituent features" of measures under Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement for
the determination of the applicability of this provision. To discharge its burden, the United States
need to present evidences and arguments as to why the measures do not present the "constituent
features" of Article 8.2 measures.
VI. Whether the U.S. Section 232 Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Constitute
Safeguard Measures
26. China does not believe the panel need to examine whether the U.S. Section 232 measures on
certain steel and aluminum products constitute safeguard measures under Article XIX of GATT 1994

in the current dispute. The U.S. Section 232 measures are not measures at issue in the current
dispute. The United States has failed to brought a proper claim of whether the measures at issue
are consistent with Article XIX:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement,
including whether the measures are in response to a safeguard measure under Article XIX of the
GATT 1994.
27. In case the Panel wishes to examine this issue in any way, China does not agree to the
argument of the United States that a measure is not a safeguard unless the WTO Member imposing
the measure has invoked its right to apply a safeguard measure.
28. As the Appellate Body recently affirmed in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products case, whether a
measure is a safeguard measure under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 is an objective question to be
evaluated by the Panel in light of the "constituent features" presented by the parties. This clear legal
finding by the Appellate Body does not leave room for the argument that it is up to a Member to
determine whether the safeguard provisions would apply to its measures in the dispute settlement
proceedings by choosing to invoke the safeguard provisions or not when imposing its measures.
China does not believe invocation by a Member of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 is a necessary
condition for the application of WTO safeguard disciplines on the measure at issue. Invocation is not
one of the "constituent features" of a safeguard measure, and the applicability of the WTO safeguard
disciplines is an issue properly subject to the objective examination by a Panel, not self-determined
by a Member with its domesti c labelling of the measure it chose. Such approach runs contrary to
Article 6.2 of the DSU which provides the applicability of covered agreements is subject to the
objective assessment and determination by the Panels.
29. Panel's assessment is based on specific facts of each case. China would like to reiterate that
Panel's assessment in this respect must be "independent and objective" as required by Article 11 of
the DSU.
30. Further, China agrees in general with the detailed analysis based on substantial relevant facts
by the Turkey in its first written submission that the Section 232 measures on certain steel and
aluminum products of the United States carry the "constituent features" of safeguard measures, and
therefore constitute safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
VII. Inter-Panel Coordination
31. China believes the presence of similar issues between DS564 and the present dispute proceeds
in parallel would warrant certain type of exchange between the Panels. China does not believe such
exchange is specifically prohibited under the DSU.

ANNEX C-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. THE UNITED STATES' FAILURE TO REFER IN ITS CONSULTATIONS REQUEST OR PANEL
REQUEST TO THE SPECIFIC CONTROLLING PROVISIONS, WHICH ARE ARTICLE 8 OF THE
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE XIX:3(A) OF THE GATT 1994
1. The US fails to refer to the provisions that control the question of permissible rebalancing in
response to a safeguard measures: Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the Agreement
on Safeguards. It believes that, in doing so, it can convince the Panel to close its eyes to the fact
that the US measure is a safeguard, and push the Panel in to treating the controlling provisions as
so-called "affirmative defences".
2. The US errs when arguing that Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the
Agreement on Safeguards are so-called "affirmative defences", assimilated for example to Article XX
of the GATT 1994.
3. Article XIX:3(a) (which refers to rebalancing), j ust like XIX:1(a) (which refers to the right to
impose a safeguard), provide that, if the requirements are met, Members "shall be free" to suspend
the relevant obligations. This is not a question of "justifying" a "violation". In other words, these
provisions are not affirmative defences, but enable the taking of an action (i.e. suspend the
obligation).
4. In that sense, both of these provisions are similar to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994
(modification of schedules) which provides that a party which pro poses to modify or withdraw a
concession "shall be free to do so ". Modifying a concession alters the content of that Member 's
obligations. It does not violate those obligations, such that justification would be called for. The legal
position is also simila r with respect to anti -dumping or countervailing measures taken under
Article VI of the GATT. Article VI does not "justify" a violation of Articles I and II; rather, it provides
for the possibility to take an action which does not constitute a violation. T he US also errs when
arguing that the Agreement on Safeguards as a whole be characterised as a mere "affirmative
defence". This is incorrect, because that Agreement is full of provisions which are simply in the
nature of obligations.
5. Cases such as US – 1916 Act, Australia – Apples, EC – Seal Products and Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines) (Article 21.5 – Philippines) show that the present Additional Duties cases are not an
isolated instance, but rather a type of situation that has occurred in the past. In those cases, the
WTO adjudicating bodies did not shy away from fulfilling their duties and deciding on the applicability
of the covered agreements. Logically, such an analysis took place upfront, before the substance of
the different claims was reached.
6. The European Union considers that past cases concerning the relationship between the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 provide useful guidance to understand the relationship
between the Agreement on Safeguards and certain provisions of the GATT 1994. In particular, the
European Union considers that those cases provide support to its legal position that the Agreement
on Safeguards is not in the nature of an affirmative defence to an alleged violation of Articles I or II
of the GATT 1994.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
7. Because Article 8.2 is not an affirmative defence, it is not for the respondent to raise or to
make a case under it. Rather, Article 8.2 is the controlling provision, and the US should have raised
it, if it was to have any hope of succeeding in its claims. It failed to do so.
8. Thus, the European Union agrees that it is the complainant that has the burden of making a
prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The European Union
recalls that the Agree ment on Safeguards is not in the nature of an affirmative defence and the
initial onus rests on the complainant, which has to make its case.

III. ORDER OF ANALYSIS
9. The European Union agrees with the US that the Panel can properly assess the more specifi c
claim before assessing the more general claim. Article II:1(b) is, indeed, more specific, as it
proscribes a specific type of less favourable treatment (duties in excess of bound rates) which will
also constitute less favourable treatment under Article I I:1(a) (the latter being a consequential
claim).
10. The European Union considers that the same approach of addressing the more specific
provision before the more general provision should guide the Panel 's order of analysis between
Articles 8.2 of the Agre ement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT 1994, on the one
hand, and Articles I and II of the GATT 1994, on the other hand.
11. First, Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards is the more specific provision.
12. Second, beginning the analysis with Article 8.2 offers possibilities to exercise judicial economy.
If the Panel were to find that Article 8.2 applies to the measures at issue, it would be impossible for
the US to succeed in its claims under Article I and II of the GATT 1994, because the US would have
failed to even make a claim under the controlling provisions. Beginning with Articles I and II of the
GATT 1994 offers no such possibilities, in any circumstances. This is because a measure that is
consistent with Article 8.2 (including a measure that is presumed to be consistent with that provision
because no claim to the contrary has been made, as in this case) cannot be inconsistent with Articles
I and II of the GATT 1994.
13. Third, the applicability of a covered agreement is a threshold issue which should, as a general
matter, be assessed first. This question of applicability is always an objective question that is never
entirely in the hands of either litigant acting unilaterally.
IV. THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATT 1994 ARE
APPLICABLE TO THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES
14. The EU recalls that, according to settled case-law, and as recently confirmed by the Appellate
Body in the specific context of the Agreement on Safeguards, whether or no t a measure is subject
to the disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards is an objective question. Contrary to what the US
asserts, it is not a question to be decided unilaterally by the Member imposing the safeguard
measure.
15. A reason why the characterisation of a measure as a safeguard must be an objective question
is that Article XIX and the rules of the Agreement on Safeguards include important and fundamental
rights of other WTO Members, notably the right to suspend equivalent GATT obligations such as are
at issue in this dispute.
16. In making that objective assessment of whether a measure is a safeguard, the Panel must
engage in a case-specific assessment, having regard to all of the relevant facts. In this respect, and
again contrary to what the US asserts, the domestic procedures pursuant to which a measure has
been adopted are not determinative, and neither are the WTO procedures that have been followed,
or not followed, by the adopting Member.
17. The fulfilment of the requirements in Article 12 is a question of consistency, and not a question
that decides the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. If a Member decides to take a
measure that is objectively a safeguard without notifying it, the conclusion is not that Article XIX of
the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards do not apply. The conclusion is that the measure
is WTO-inconsistent.
18. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has previously held that the characterisation of a measure
under a Member's municipal law is not dispositive of the question of whether or not that measure is
governed by the provisions of a particular agreement.
19. In the context of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, in order to be a safeguard
measure, a measure must have two constituent features. First, it must suspend, in whole or in part,
a GATT obligation or withdraw or modify a GATT concession. Second, the suspension, withdrawal,

or modification in question must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to the Member's
domestic industry caused o r threatened by increased imports of the relevant products. The
constituent features of a safeguard measure are distinct from and not to be conflated with the
conditions that must be met in order for the right to adopt, apply and maintain a safeguard measure
to be exercised.
20. If the measures have "a specific objective" of preventing or remedying serious injury to the
Member's domestic industry they are subject to the disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards. If
so, even if the measure had some other "aspects" that suggest that it also has another objective,
this would not detract from the conclusion that the measure is a safeguard. In such circumstances,
whatever other provisions of another agreement that might be applicable would not exempt the
measure from complying fully with the conditions set out in the Agreement on Safeguards. In the
EU's view, the test to be performed when deciding whether the Agreement on Safeguards applies to
a measure is not a "centre of gravity" test.
21. In conducting its assessment the Panel must have regard to the measure "as a whole". The
only reasonable outcome of such an objective assessment is to conclude that the US measures are
safeguards.
22. The US measures suspend at least one GATT obligation, in whole or in part, or withdraw or
modify at least one GATT concession. Indeed, prior to the Section 232 measures the US customs
duties on the steel and aluminium products at issue were bound, as well as applied at the level of
0%. However, the US measures provide for a customs duty rate of 25% ad valorem for the relevant
steel products and 10% ad valorem for the relevant aluminium products.
23. The US measures have a specific objective of preventing or remedying serious injury to the
US domestic steel and aluminium industri es caused or threatened by increased imports of the
relevant products. Furthermore, this is one of the "most central" aspects of the measures. Finally,
this is also a defining characteristic of a safeguard measure. Thus, with the two defining
characteristics being cumulatively present, the US measures clearly fall within the scope of the
Agreement on Safeguards. This conclusion is clearly supported by an analysis of the "design,
structure, and expected operation " of the steel and aluminium measures, as well as by several
additional features of those measures. Moreover, those measures were not taken pursuant to any
provisions of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX.
24. The European Union considers that whether the US' Section 232 duties constitute a safeguard
measure is the matter before the Panel in US – Steel and Aluminium Products, as the measure at
issue. The measures at issue in the present proceedings are the measures in the form of additional
duties taken by the respondent. It would be permissible, but not necessary, for this Panel to find as
a preliminary matter that the US measures are safeguards.
V. WITH REGARD TO THE RE-BALANCING MEASURES AT ISSUE
25. In order to determine whether or not a measure falls within Article 8.2 , a panel must make
an objective assessment of all the facts and evidence. Just as there are certain objective, constituent
features of safeguard measures, there are also certain objective elements which determine whether
a measure falls within Article 8.2.
26. In the European Union's view, there are two such elements. The first is the suspension of the
application of concessions or other obligations under the GATT 1994; the second is the absence of
a unilateral measure by the safeguard -imposing Member, or of an agreement on adequate means
of trade compensation, designed to and capable of maintaining a substantially equivalent level of
concessions.
27. The European Union notes that it is the very purpose of Article 8.2 to enable affected exporting
Members to rebalance (i.e. maintain substantial equivalence) without waiting for a multilateral
determination that the underlying measure is a safeguard. Article 8.2 foresees that suspension must
take place within strict deadlines shortly after the application of the underlying safeguard measure.
Moreover, under certain circumstances (as outlined in Article 8.3) the right of suspension can even
be exercised immediately. If those Members, faced with a safeguard measure that is mislabelled by

the adopting Member in a self-serving manner, had to wait for a multilateral finding that the measure
is indeed a safeguard, they would be effectively deprived of their rights under Articles 8.2 and 8.3.
28. Neither the decision-making rules of the CTG or the GC, nor the requirements of Article 8.2
concerning the absence of disapproval by the CTG, have any bearing whatsoever on the question of
whether or not Article 8.2 applies, i.e. whether the measure can properly be considered a rebalancing
measure. However it is to be interpreted, the requirement of the absence of a disapproval is no more
than an obligation for the rebalancing Member.
29. The existence of "doubt" about whether the underlying measure is a safeguard cannot prevent
Members from exercising their rights under Article 8.2. To require absolute certainty would mean in
effect that, whenever the adopting Member chooses not to characterise the measure as a safeguard,
rebalancing would be impossible. Moreover, as we have learned in Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products, a measure may not be a safeguard even where both Members agree that it is a safeguard.
Thus, there can be "doubt" even in the face of agreement among the Members involved.
30. Both for the underlying safeguard measure and for the rebalancing measure, the assessment
has to be objective, i.e. based on the objective characteristics of the measures as opposed to their
unilateral characterisation by the adopting Member. An objective assessment also means that the
legal characterisation of a measure cannot depend on the purely subje ctive intent of the adopting
Member.
31. To suspend a concession with respect to another Member or Members means to suspend a
promise, or commitment, to act or refrain from acting in a certain way towards that Member or
Members. To take the example of duti es, to suspend a concession in a Member 's Schedule means
to suspend the "promise" (towards one or more other Members) not to exceed the bound duty rate.
32. Whether the same Member actually exceeds the duty rate in question is a separate issue. It
is possible, for example, that the Member suspends a concession but does not actually increase the
relevant duty (or not yet). In this scenario, there would be a suspension, but there would not be any
violation of Article II:1(b), because the bound duty would not have been exceeded.
33. There is, however, one very important caveat, and a further distinction between suspensions
and violations. A valid suspension, i.e. a suspension taken in compliance with the applicable
provisions of the covered agreements, such as a WTO-consistent modification of a schedule under
Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, a WTO -consistent safeguard measure, or a WTO -consistent
rebalancing measure, does not amount to or create any violation of the covered agreement, not
even a prima facie violation which would then presumably need to be justified.
VI. MEASURES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND
ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATT 1994 ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLES I:1, II:1(A)
AND (B) OF THE GATT 1994
34. The treaty terms "to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the
concession" in Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 do not mean that the original obligation remains
unchanged, but is "violated", with such "violation" being "justified" by Article XIX:1(a) . Rather, as
the treaty expressly provides, they mean that the original obligation is suspended or altered.
Suspending an obligation is not the same thing as violating an obligation (which could then possibly
be justified).
35. The relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Articles I and II of the GATT 1994
is analogous to the relationship between, for example: (i) Articles I, II and VI of the GATT 1994;
and (ii) Article IV of the GATT 1994 and other provisions of that treaty.
36. If the Panel finds (as it should) that Article 8.2 applies, it can no longer make any findings of
WTO-inconsistency, either under the specific requirements of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards (since the US has not made any claim under that provision), or unde r Articles I and II
of the GATT 1994 (since a measure that is consistent, or even presumed consistent, with the
controlling provision of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards cannot be inconsistent with
Articles I and II of the GATT 1994).

VII. PROPOSAL ON INTER-PANEL COORDINATION
37. The European Union considers that there is nothing in the DSU that would prevent a form of
collaboration among the panels in the Steel and Aluminium disputes and those in the Additional
Duties disputes. This concerns, in particular, certain exchanges of views and harmonization of
timetables.
38. Importantly, there is no contagious risk to future disputes, given the particular and indeed
unique factual and legal setting of these cases, which are two sides of the same coin.
39. Article 13 of the DSU, among others, may provide a legal basis for such a collaboration, as it
provides that "panels may seek information from any relevant source ". Such a cooperation would
be in line with the objectives of the dispute settlement system to ensure security and predictability
of the multilateral trading system (Article 3.2 of the DSU), and to secure a positive solution to the
disputes (Article 3.7 of the DSU).
40. Indeed, the fact that panels can, and should, exchange views when deciding an identical or
closely related matter, is also supported by Rule 4(3) of the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review. Under that provision, members of an Appellate Body division shall exchange views with the
other Members befo re finalizing their report. Under Rule 4(5), this does not interfere with the
division's full authority and freedom to hear and decide the appeal.
41. If such an exchange of views is consistent with the DSU, then there would be no reason to
hold otherwise for an exchange of views between two panels dealing with the same or closely related
matter. This is especially so in the unique circumstances of this case, where panels are addressing
the same alleged safeguard measures, either as a measure at issue ( US – Steel and Aluminium
Products) or as the underlying measure which is rebalanced by the measure at issue (the Additional
Duties disputes).
42. In the same vein, the fact that the Chairman of the four panels in the Additional Duties
disputes is the same per son speaks to the same reasoning, perfectly justified in the particular
circumstances of these disputes. While Article 9.3 of the DSU is about co -complainants, the EU
considers that a similar approach is warranted in similar scenarios, and in specific circ umstances
such the present one.
43. Such cooperation between panels, in the form of a preliminary exchange of views, is aimed at
ensuring that each of the panels makes an objective assessment of the matter before it, of the facts
of the cases, including of the applicability of and conformity with the covered agreements, as
required by Article 11 of the DSU.
44. This is particularly important in the context in which the US is blocking the appointment of
new Appellate Body members, and thus of the high possib ility that when all these cases will be
decided there will be no appeal adjudicator to ensure coherence. Thus, it is even more important, in
order to ensure security and predictability to the multilateral trading system (Article 3.2 of the DSU),
that panels talk to each other in order to avoid divergent results and fragmentation.
45. The confidentiality obligation in Article 14 of the DSU does not prevent the form of
collaboration that the European Union has suggested. While panel deliberations are confidential, the
European Union sees this cooperative process, for example, in the form of a meeting or meetings
between all panellists in the Steel and Aluminium disputes and in the Additional Duties disputes.
Such exchanges of views or concertation would be pre liminary, and external to the panel
deliberations. Thus, they would not breach the duty of confidentiality in Article 14.1 of the DSU.
46. The European Union considers that it is logical that the Steel and Aluminium panels, which
were first invested with the US safeguard measures as the measures at issue before them, should
decide first on that matter and only then the Additional Duties panels should decide on the
rebalancing measures.

ANNEX C-3
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Japan welcomes this opportunity to present its views as a third party in this dispute . Japan
has a systemic interest in ensuring the proper and consistent interpretation of the WTO Agreements,
including Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( "GATT") 1994, as well as the
Agreement on Safeguards.
II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATT 1994 AND THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
2. Japan views that, pursuant to the express language of Article 11 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( "DSU"), a panel must conduct an
independent and objective assessment of whether a WTO agreement applies to a measure at issue,
regardless of the alleged characterization of the measure by the Member imposing it. The Appellate
Body recently confirmed this interpretation of Article 11, stating that "a panel is not only entitled,
but indeed required, under Article 11 of the DSU to carry out an inde pendent and objective
assessment of the applicability of the provisions of the covered agreements invoked by a complainant
as the basis for its claims, regardless of whether such applicability has been disputed by the parties
to the dispute ".1 As such, a Member imposing a measure does not alone determine whether the
Agreement on Safeguards applies to that measure; instead, this is a legal question that a panel must
answer based on its objective assessment.
3. Given that there is no clear textual definitio n of a "safeguard measure" in the text of the
relevant WTO Agreements, it would not be appropriate for panels or the Appellate Body to draft a
blanket definition of safeguard measures within the meaning of the Agreement on Safeguards. This
conclusion is consistent with the Appellate Body's findings in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products that
"whether a particular measure constitutes a safeguard measure for purposes of WTO law can be
determined only on a case-by-case basis".2 Thus, the role of the panel in t his dispute is to make a
case-specific, objective assessment of whether the particular measures at issue is subject to the
disciplines of the Agreement on Safeguards. This assessment should be conducted through , inter
alia, an interpretation of "safeguard measures" based on the ordinary meaning of the term in its
context, and in light of the object and purpose of the relevant agreements3 (i.e., the Agreement on
Safeguards, the GATT 1994 and the other WTO Agreements).
4. Regarding the factors that are "relevant" for a panel's consideration of whether a measure is
a safeguard measure, Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which refers to GATT Article XIX,
anticipates certain types of actions (i.e., suspension, withdrawal, or modification of the obligation or
concession) implemented for a certain purpose (i.e., to prevent or remedy serious injury to domestic
producers). Thus, the key features of a safeguard measure include (1) an action "to suspend the
obligation … or to withdraw or modify the con cession", and (2) a purpose "to prevent or remedy
serious injury to domestic producers". Japan's suggested approach is consistent with the Appellate
Body's findings in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, which listed two factors – one action and one
purpose – that are necessary to find a safeguard measure.4
5. On the other hand, Japan disagrees with the views of some Members that this statement
contains the sole "definition" of a safeguard measure or represents "settled case law " on the
applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards.
6. First, the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products categorized the action and
purpose factors as necessary, but not sufficient, to find a given measure to constitute a safeguard

1 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.33. (emphasis added)
2 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.57.
3 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
4 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.

measure. The Appellate Body did not attempt to propose a comprehensive definition of a safeguard
measure or ultimately to decide the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards.
7. Second, treating the action and purpose features raised by the Appellate Body as a
comprehensive definition of the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards could lead to
unreasonable outcomes. For example, an anti-dumping measure is usually imposed to protect the
domestic industry in the form of duties in excess of a Member 's tariff concessions. Treating these
two factors as the comprehensive definition of a safeguard measure could therefore result in treating
all anti-dumping duties as "safeguards".
8. In Japan's view, significant evidentiary value must also be ascribed to some important factors,
such as the status of fulfillment of the notification requirements under Article 12 of the Agreement
on Safeguards. The Appellate Body also refers to "relevant notifications to the WTO Committee on
Safeguards" as part of "all relevant factors ", to which due consideration should be given when
determining the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards.5
9. The object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards are described in its preamble, and
include "the need to clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994 … to re-establish multilateral
control over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape such control ".6 Japan maintains that,
to achieve this objective, a panel's assessment of a measure must prevent a Member from "escaping"
the "multilateral control" disciplines of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards through
the Member's unilateral characterization of the measure in question as something other than a
"safeguard measure".
10. In this regard, the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Ste el Products stated that, in
determining whether a measure constitutes a safeguard measure, "a panel is called upon to assess
the design, structure, and expected operation of the measure as a whole", and "must identify all the
aspects of the measure that may have a bearing on its legal characterization [and] recognize which
of those aspects are the most central to that measure".7 It continued that "a panel should evaluate
and give due consideration to all relevant factors, including the manner in which the measure is
characterized under the domestic law of the Member concerned, the domestic procedures that led
to the adoption of the measure, and any relevant notifications to the WTO Committee on
Safeguards", adding that "no one such factor is, in and of itself, dispositive of the question of whether
the measure constitutes a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards".8 The Appellate Body in fact agreed with the panel in that dispute that the measure did
not become a covered safeguard measure simply because the Member in question followed its
domestic procedures on safeguards and notified the measure as such. Clearly, other considerations
are as important or more important than a Member's own characterization of the measure.
11. In Japan's view, the Appellate Body's approach, emphasizing "due consideration to all relevant
factors", is generally consistent with the object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards
because it would not allow a measure at issue to "escape" the WTO agreements ' "multilateral
control". In other words, a panel 's comprehensive evaluation of a measure would ensure that the
Member imposing it could not avoid the Agreement on Safeguards ' disciplines by merely
characterizing the measure as so mething other than a safeguard measure or not invoking the
Agreement on Safeguards in dispute settlement.
12. Therefore, the Panel 's assessment of whether the Agreement on Safeguards applies in this
dispute must examine the design, structure, and expected operation of the measure at issue as a
whole and must give due consideration to all relevant factors. From this perspective, considering the
various factors raised by the Parties in these disputes, Japan sees no reason to exclude the
Section 232 measures at issue from the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards simply because
the United States does not characterize the measures as "safeguard measures".
13. Finally, Article XXVIII, entitled "Modification of Schedules ", is another GATT 1994 provision
that provides important context for the proper approach to and interpretation of Article XIX of the
GATT 1994. First, an Article XXVIII modification must be conducted "on the first day of each three-

5 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60. (emphasis added)
6 Emphasis added.
7 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60. (emphasis added)
8 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60. (footnote omitted)

year period, the first period beginning on 1 January 1958 (or on t he first day of any other period
that may be specified by the CONTRACTING PARTIES by two-thirds of the votes cast)", and at least
"by negotiation" with "contracting parties primarily concerned". The measure at issue in this dispute
has not satisfied these procedural requirements.
14. Second, in contrast to Article XIX:1, Article XXVIII does not impose any substantive conditions
for the modification or withdrawal of concessions, such as serious injury caused by imports to the
relevant domestic industry or t he necessity of protecting the relevant domestic industry. It is
essentially a political process that allows Members to re -negotiate their commitments. Therefore,
Article XXVIII addresses a similar action as that in Article XIX, but the process is not othe rwise
characterized by its purpose. The process under Article XXVIII therefore provides the broadest
possible legitimate manner in which a Member may seek to withdraw or modify a GATT concession.
In the context of the Section 232 measures at issue, however , the United States has conducted no
prior negotiations under Article XXVIII. In Japan 's view, this further confirms that the relevant
enquiry will need to be to assess whether the Member has complied with Article XIX of the GATT 1994
and the Agreement on Safeguards, rather than Article XXVIII.
III. PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
15. The above issue – the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards – must be separated from the
panel's terms of reference. A panel 's terms of reference must be understood by reference to the
panel request pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU – "identify the specific measures at issue and
provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".
It is common for Members to raise certain defenses, such as those under Article XX of the
GATT 1994, and these will be examined by panels even though they were not mentioned in the panel
request.
16. The recent Appellate Body decision confirmed that "the use of the phrase 'how or why'" by the
Appellate Body in some cases "does not imply a new and different legal standard for complying with
the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU ", and that "the applicable legal standard" is the text of
Article 6.2 of the DSU9, the objective of which is to: (i) delimit the scope of the panel's jurisdiction;
and (ii) ensure due process for the respondent and third parties. 10 In addition, "[t]he sufficiency of
a panel request under this standard is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis". 11

9 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Pneumatic Valves, para. 5.7
10 Ibid, para. 5.8.
11 Ibid, para. 5.7.

ANNEX C-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NEW ZEALAND
1. New Zealand's participation in the current dispute reflects its systemic interest in the issues
raised, in particular, the role of notifications under the Safeguards Agreement, and the role of the
Panel in determining the legal characterisation of measures in issue.
2. A measure does not need to be notified under Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement in order
to constitute a safeguard measure. In Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products the Appellate Body
distinguished between those factors that determine whether a measure is in fact a safeguard
measure, and those factors that will determine whether it is a WTO consistent safeguard measure.1
Notification falls into this latter category. It is a procedural requirement directed at maintaining
transparency around the safeguard process, and ensuring that affected Members are given
opportunity to engage. A failure to notify a safeguard measure will be inconsistent with the
obligations set down in Article XIX GATT and Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement. It is not,
however, determinative of the legal characterisation of the measure, or the applicability of the
safeguards regime.
3. Whether a measure is correctly to be characterised as a safeguard is a matter to be determined
objectively by a Panel. Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to carry out an objective assessment
of the matter before it, includ ing carrying out an assessment of the legal characterisation of the
measures in issue. 2 Where a dispute exists between Members, it can be expected that they may
have differing views on the legal characterisation of relevant measures under the covered
agreements. It is for a panel to objectively determine these matters, in accordance with its
obligations under Article 11. While the parties ' own views on the proper legal characterisation of a
measure may assist a panel in carrying out this exercise, they are not determinative.
4. In concluding – the giving of notice under Article 12 of the Safeguards Agreement is not an
essential step that must be taken for a measure to constitute a safeguard. Where a dispute exists
between Members, it is for a panel to reach an outcome in accordance with its obligations under
Article 11 DSU. This is to be determined objectively, on a case by case basis, and in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances.

1 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, at para 5.57.
2 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, at para 5.33.

ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NORWAY
I. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF WTO OBLIGATIONS
1. It is well-established that municipal law classifications are not determinative of legal questions
raised in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, in particular how a measure is characterised under
WTO law, including which WTO obligations apply to a measure. As the Appellate Body has explained,
"the manner in which the municipal law of a WTO Member classifies an item cannot, in itself, be
determinative of the interpretation of provisions of the WTO covered agreements ".1 Instead, the
characterisation of a mea sure under WTO law must be based on the measure 's "content and
substance", and "not merely on its form or nomenclature".2
2. It is not uncommon for a respondent to assert, based on domestic law classifications, that a
measure is not subject to particular WTO obligations. In that event, as the panel in Dominican
Republic – Safeguard Measures has explained, "the determination on applicability [of the provisions
of the covered agreements to the challenged measures] must be a prior step to the analysis of
whether the impugned measures are consistent with the obligations contained in the cited
provision[s]".3
3. This "prior step" of determining the applicability of the relevant covered agreements is one
frequently faced by panels and the Appellate Body.4 A Member's characterisation of the measure at
issue is not determinative of the applicable WTO obligations. Instead, the assessment is based on
the content and substance of the measure, clarified according to: the text and structure of the
measure; the surrounding regulatory context; the domestic legal framework in which the measure
is adopted; and the design and application of the measure.
4. In sum, if a measure is, in "content and substance", a "safeguard measure", a Member cannot
exclude the application of the Safeguards Agreement by characterising the measure as something
other than a "safeguard measure " under its own domestic law. Otherwise, the Member 's own
characterisation of the measure would be determinative of the WTO obligations applicable to the
measure. In short, a Member would be able to decide for itself which WTO obligations apply to its
measures.
5. Instead, a panel must decide whether a covered agreement – here the Safeguards Agreement
– applies to a measure using the substantive criteria in WTO law. First, a panel must ascertain the
legal standard in the agreement governing the applicability of the agreement. Second, a panel must
assess the facts, in particular the nature and character of the measures at issue, and apply the legal
standard to the relevant facts.
II. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT
6. Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement provides that "this Agreement establishes rules for the
application of the safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those provided for in
Article XIX of the GATT 1994". Norway, therefore, turns first to Article XIX to establish the scope of
application of the Safeguards Agreement. As the Appellate Body observed in Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products , A rticle XIX is not styled as a definitional provision: "Article XIX:1(a) does not
expressly define the scope of measures that fall under the WTO safeguard disciplines ".5 Instead,

1 Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 65 and China – Auto Parts, footnote 244.
2 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, footnote 87.
3 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.58, referring to Appellate Body
4 Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, para. 130; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para.
173; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.19, citing Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos,
para. 72; Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Philippines – Article 21.5), paras. 7.673-7.683.
5 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.57.

Article XIX serves to impose obligations on the adoption of safeguard measure s. These obligations
are considerably developed in the Safeguards Agreement.
7. Given the nature of Article XIX, the Appellate Body cautioned against conflating the factors
that properly define a safeguard measure (and, hence, the applicability of the Saf eguards
Agreement), with those that govern the WTO -consistency of such measures. A measure may be
properly regarded as a safeguard, even though it does not meet the WTO obligations governing
safeguard measures. If this were not the case, a measure could, b y definition, be subject to WTO
safeguard obligations solely if it complied with those obligations and, correspondingly, there could,
by definition, never be a WTO-inconsistent safeguard measure. The Appellate Body rightly rejected
this approach.
8. Although the provisions of Article XIX are not definitional, the Appellate Body found that they
shed light on the character of a safeguard measure. The Appellate Body found that the types of
measures "provided for" in Article XIX are those "designed to secure a specific objective, namely
preventing or remedying serious injury to the Member 's domestic industry ".6 To be a safeguard
measure, therefore, a challenged measure must have "a demonstrable link to the objective of
preventing or remedying injury".7
9. Connected to this objective, the Appellate Body also identified two "constituent features" of a
"safeguard measure": (1) it must suspend or withdraw a GATT 1994 obligation or tariff concession;
and (2) it must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to a domestic industry caused or
threatened by increased imports.8
10. The Appellate Body found that its view that the application of the Safeguards Agreement turns
on the "objective" of the measure was "buttressed" by the preamble to the Agreement, which
stresses "the importance of structural adjustment", and reiterates "the need to enhance rather than
limit competition in international markets".9
11. Article 12.1 of the Safeguards Agreement further confirms the Appellate Body's interpretation.
This provis ion identifies certain acts, by an importing Member, that trigger the application of
notification obligations in the Safeguards Agreement. These include the following acts: (1) "initiating
an investigatory process relating to serious injury or threat thereof" to a domestic industry, "and the
reasons for it "; and (2) "making a finding of serious injury of threat thereof caused by increased
imports". These notification obligations underscore the critical role in safeguards actions of a finding
of serious injury to a domestic industry, caused by imports.
12. The US argues that the Safeguards Agreement applies to a measure only if the importing
Member formally invokes Article XIX of the GATT 1994. In setting out its incorrect interpretation of
the term "safeguard measure" under Article 1, the US essentially misunderstands the difference
between three distinct questions: (i) whether a measure is a WTO safeguard; (ii) whether the
importing Member has the right to apply a safeguar d measure; and (iii) whether the measures are
applied in a manner consistent with the Safeguards Agreement.
13. Driven by its misunderstanding of the fundamental distinction between these three questions,
the US refers to inapplicable jurisprudence in support of its arguments. The US notes, for example,
the Appellate Body's statement that: "[n]otification under Article XIX … is 'a necessary prerequisite
to establishing a right to apply a safeguard measure'".10 The US relies on the Appellate Body's
statement to conclude erroneously that "[w]ithout an invocation of that right [through notification],
a measure does not qualify as a safeguard under the WTO Agreement".11
14. However, the Appellate Body 's statement simply means that a Member must notify a
safeguard measure in order for the safeguard measure to be consistent with the Safeguards
Agreement. The Appellate Body is not saying that the Member must notify a measure as a safeguard
in order for the Safeguards Agreement to apply to that measure. Rather, as the Appellate Body

6 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.56.
7 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.56.
8 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.
9 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, footnote 189.
10 The US' first written submission, para. 65.
11 The US' first written submission, para. 67.

explained in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , the applicability of the Agreement must be
objectively determined, separately from the question whether a measure is consistent with the
substantive and procedural conditions in Article X IX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards
Agreement.12
15. The US thus draws an incorrect distinction between the question of whether the Safeguards
Agreement applies, on the one hand, and the question of whether that safeguard measure has been
applied consistently with various requirements, on the other hand.
III. ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATT 1994 AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT DO NOT
OPERATE AS AN "AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE"
16. The US seems to treat Article XIX as an "affirmative defense", which applies to "justify" a
"violation" of the GATT, in two possible respects. First, Article XIX can be invoked by a Member
imposing a measure ( "importing Member"), to justify a violation of the GATT 1994; and second,
Article XIX can be invoked by a Me mber imposing retaliatory measures in response ( "retaliating
Member"), i.e., to justify retaliation measures that would otherwise violate the GATT 1994. However,
in both instances, the US argues that, for the "affirmative defense" to be available, the impo rting
Member must have formally invoked Article XIX, when imposing its measure in the first place. If it
does not do so, then neither the importing Member, nor the retaliating Member, can rely on
Article XIX to justify GATT violations.
17. Norway stresses that Article XIX does not operate as an "affirmative defense". It should be
recalled that the term "affirmative defense" is typically used to describe provisions like Article XX,
i.e., measures which are invoked by a respondent in order to justify a viola tion of the GATT 1994.
Norway points out that Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, by contrast, do not operate in
this way. Rather, they establish distinct obligations that apply when a Member wishes to take a
safeguard measure. Thus, if the importing Member imposes a safeguard consistent with those
obligations, there is no violation of the GATT 1994. In this sense, Article XIX and the Safeguards
Agreement operate in the same way as Article VI; they contain their own specific set of obligations
that, when particular substantive and procedural conditions are met, displace GATT obligations which
would otherwise be applicable.
18. The applicability of the Safeguards Agreement does not depend on the importing Member 's
invocation, as it would, for example, under Article XX. Rather, the applicability of the Safeguards
Agreement is subject to objective determination. The question is whether the measure satisfies the
"constituent features" of a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement.
IV. INTER-PANEL COORDINATION
19. The separate offensive and defensive dispute settlement proceedings originating from the US'
additional steel and aluminium tariffs are tightly interlinked. They are based on the same measures
imposed by the US, and the legal threshold questions to solve the disputes are identical. There is no
procedural obligation for the individual Panels to avoid contradiction. However, in line with the role
of the Panels in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system as mandated
in the DSU Article 3.2, general legal reasoning would require coherence between conclusions
spurring from identical issues. We presume that the efforts made to provide for the same Panel
Members in the offensive disputes and the same Panel Chair in the defensive disputes reflect this
need for coherence.
20. To achieve the desired coherence, it appears logical that the panels should take into
consideration the sequencing of the different panel deliberations and reports. The offens ive panels
were established first, and thus, the Panels in the defensive disputes should be conscious about the
Panels´ conclusions in the offensive disputes. This implies a certain interaction between the Panels.
Norway is of the opinion that there is no need to search for a specific legal basis for such interaction;
the question is rather whether the DSU precludes it - which does not appear to be the case.
Contrastingly, Article 13 of the DSU does indeed reflect the need for panels, as described above, to

12 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.57.

obtain relevant information to ensure coherent legal analysis. Generally, interaction between the
panels would ensure transparency and due process for the parties.
21. The confidentiality obligation set out in Article 14 of the DSU limits, but does not p reclude
consultations between the Panels. This provision requires the panel deliberations to be confidential,
but consultations may be conducted in a limited way, i. e. through reporting of preliminary
conclusions and the reasoning behind them. This limited interaction would not reasonably qualify as
"panel deliberations".

ANNEX C-6
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
I. Introduction
Russia welcomes this opportunity to present its views as a third party in this dispute.
Without prejudice to Russia's position that it is up to a complainant to formulate the measures
at issue, identify the legal basis of complaint in its panel request and to choose the seq uence of its
argumentation as it deems more appropriate, Russia submits that in the dispute before this Panel
the United States has articulated the improper legal basis for its claims. Thus, the United States
attempts to misguide the Panel as to the relevant legal and factual background of the dispute.
The United States appears to relegate Turkey's exercise of essential right under Article 8.2 of
the Agreement on Safeguards to counter the disruptive effects of the United States ' safeguards on
their bilateral trade by not raising concerns about the consistency of the resulted measures with
Article 8.2 and by merely asserting that Turkey's measures violate Articles I and II of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994").
With that in m ind, Russia addresses particular aspects of this dispute relating to why it is
important for a complainant to present the problem underlying the dispute in its entirety, as well as
to the interpretation of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.
II. Order of analysis
In Russia's view, the Panel should proceed with the examination of applicability of Article 8.2
of the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at issue.
Russia believes that whether the United States properly formulated its request for
establishment of a panel i s a jurisdictional matter and should be addressed first. If the Panel
concludes that the United States failed to provide the legal basis for its claims properly, its analysis
should stop there.
If the Panel proceeds beyond these jurisdictional matters, the Panel should consider whether
the measures at issue are suspension of obligations in its nature and form that falls under Article
8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
The proper order of analysis of the Panel is to start by recognizing that the measures at issue
entail a suspension within the meaning of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and that, as
a result, Turkey 's obligations under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 were suspended. Since
obligations under the said GATT Articles were suspended, there is no legal basis to rule whether or
not these obligations were violated as there is nothing to violate.
Therefore, there is no need for the Panel to rule whether or not obligations under Articles I
and II of the GATT were violated.
III. Terms of Reference
This dispute presents not an ordinary situation. The complainant, being aware of the nature
of the challenged measures (suspension of concessions) and of the legal basis for their adoption
(Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards) decided not to challenge the consistency of the
suspension itself with regard to a potential violation of the provisions under which the measures at
issue were adopted (Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards). Rather, the complainant decided
to challenge the consistency of the measures at issue with respect to the obligations which were
suspended.
Russia submits that it is an inherent right of a complainant to choose what shall be challenged.
However, Russia would like to stress that neither Turkey's application of Article 8.2 of the Agreement

on Safeguards, nor its compliance therewith is contested by the United States in its request for
establishment of a panel. Moreover, there is no panel 's or Appellate Body's ruling in either regard.
Hence, Turke y's suspension of concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994 pursuant to
Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards shall be presumed to be WTO-consistent. The fact that
the Council for Trade in Goods did not disapprove Turkey's suspension upholds this presumption.
In this context it should be noted that unlike, for example, provisions of Article 16.4 of the
DSU ("within 60 days … the report shall be adopted"), provisions of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards do not contain any explicit obligation for positive action on behalf of the Council for Trade
in Goods. Furthermore, unlike the provisions of Article 22 of the DSU ( "authorization from the DSB
to suspend "), provisions of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards do not require CTG 's
expressed authorization or permission in order to suspend concessions or other obligations. It should
be noted that a decision to suspend substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under
the GATT 1994 in accordance with Article 8.2 of the Ag reement on Safeguards is an individual
decision of a WTO Member. Of course, as it is stated in Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
there must be no opposition by the CTG to the suspension. A Member may not implement its decision
if the CTG disapproves the suspension.
A measure taken under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards entails a suspension of
concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994. In no way, a Member may raise a claim that such
a measure violates those commitments and obli gations whose application was suspended. In fact,
Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards sets forth conditions under which a Member may lawfully
suspend (as opposed to "violate") its concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994. In cases
where suspension occurred there can be no potential inconsistences with the obligations which were
suspended, since in such cases there is simply nothing to comply with, and thus no element of
inconsistency with suspended obligations can be found.
In other words, where suspension is concerned, consistency or inconsistency of a Member
with the suspended obligations cannot be a disputed issue. Instead, the only issue that can be
disputed in such cases is consistency or inconsistency of the suspension itself with WTO obligations
of a Member. Only after establishing a prima facie case of inaccuracy of suspension itself under
Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the complainant can elaborate on alleged violations of
Articles of the GATT 1994 which were not lawfully suspended. And only in such a case a panel may
examine such allegations of the complainant, provided that this issue forms part of its terms of
reference.
Taking into account that the terms of reference of a panel are formed by panel request, and
in its Panel Request the United States did not ask for the examination of Article 8.2 of the Agreement
on Safeguards (or any other provision of the mentioned Agreement), the Panel is not authorized to
make rulings and findings with respect to the compliance by Turkey with the positive obligations
contained therein.
In sum, the Panel should treat suspension under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards
as a matter of fact. Furthermore, the Panel is not in a position to rule on the consistency or
inconsistency of the challenged measures with obligations under Articl es I and II GATT 1994 since
these obligations were suspended.
IV. Applicable Legal Standard
First, Russia submits that being an emergency measure, a safeguard is not contingent upon
formal invocation. There is no such obligation under the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX
of the GATT 1994. Rather, a Member is obliged to notify the imposition of such a measure with a
view of ensuring other Members' right for preserving a substantially equivalent level of concessions.
It is the treaty language of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards that requires that
suspension should not be disapproved. Turkey decided to suspend its obligations, took certain
procedural steps under Article 8.2 including its notification to the Council for Trade in Goods and
received no disapproval. Therefore, there is no question as to whether the suspension took place
under Article 8.2 as it was authorized by the Council for Trade in Goods.

The fact that the United States has not notified its measures to the WTO pur suant to the
Agreement on Safeguards is a procedural flaw of those measures that does not, however, affect in
any way the substance of the measures and their qualification as safeguards. Similarly, for example,
a technical regulation that has not been prop erly notified to the TBT Committee does not become
less of a technical regulation.
In sum, notification per se is not a constituent element, absent which a safeguard does not
exist. Notification is a legal requirement that should be met among other req uirements for such a
measure to be WTO-consistent. A measure is a safeguard when it presents two constituent features,
as explained by the Appellate Body in Indonesia - Iron or Steel Products,1 and notification is not one
of them.
Second, by assessing the design, structure and expected operation of the measure at issue,
the Panel should take into consideration that:
(i) no agreement has been reached by Turkey and the United States in the sense of Article 8.1
of the Agreement on Safeguards;
(ii) Turkey has suspended substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under
GATT 1994 to the trade of the United States;
(iii) Turkey followed all the procedural steps set out in Article 8 of the Agreement on
Safeguards while imposing the measures, including the filing of the notification to the Council
for Trade in Goods;
(iv) the measures are designed and expected to operate for the purposes of compensation for
the adverse effects of the United States' measures on Turkey's trade;
(v) the Council for Trade in Goods did not disapprove the suspension.
In Russia's view, there is more than enough evidence on the record to conclude that Turkey
suspended its obligations under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Third, Russia submits that Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards cannot be treated as
an affirmative defense by the Panel as this provision's nature is that of a positive rule. The Agreement
on Safeguards does not constitute an exception to GATT 1994 obligations. As regards the
particularities of the present dispute, Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards sets forth
conditions, i.e. positive obligations, under which a WTO Member may lawfully suspend its obligations
under the GATT 1994 (not justify violation). Such rules include, inter alia, procedural requirements,
for example, to submit a notification to the Council of Trade and Goods, and a material obligation
that the application of concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994 shall be substantially
equivalent to the suspension made by the initial safeguard measure against which such suspension
is made. Thus, Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards contains a clear list of positive obligations
and requirements for the suspension of concessions or other obligations under GA TT 1994. These
provisions cannot be qualified as exceptions from obligations.
In sum, since there is no obligation that could be violated (rather, these obligations were
suspended), the Panel has neither legal basis to rule on the consistency or incon sistency of the
measures at issue with Articles I and II of the GATT 1994, nor legal basis to treat Article 8.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards as an affirmative defense.
V. The relationship between DS 561 and DS 564 disputes
Russia's principal position is that the Panel in this dispute should assess the matter before it
on its own merits as required by Article 11 of the DSU. The Panel should also act strictly within its
terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. There are also the following nuanc es the Panel
should take into account.

1 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.

On the one hand, Russia's position is that the existence of an underlying measure is not a
threshold issue for the determination of the applicability of Article 8.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. For the resolution of the dispute before this Panel the legal characterization of whether
the United States' measures constitute a safeguard measure or not is not required nor is contested
as a part of issue of potential inconsistency of Turkey 's suspension under Article 8.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards as well as Turkey 's suspension itself. It is undisputed fact that the
United States applies the import duties in respect of the goods originating from Turkey, as well as
some other countries, beyond the rate established in the United States' Schedule. Moreover, Turkey
in very clear terms adopted its measures under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Therefore, the Panel should treat suspension under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards as
a matter of fact.
At the same time, the issues arising in the present Panel proceedings may overlap to a certain
extent with those raised in other disputes brought by certain WTO Members against the
United States, including the one initiated by Turkey (United States – Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products). This overlap would arise in respect of the proper legal characterization of the
United States' measures should the Panel here decide that it needs to rule on legal characterization
of the United States ' measures regardless of Russia's position that the existence of an underlying
measure is not a threshold issue for the determination of the applicability of Article 8.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards.
Taking into account that the core issue of dispute DS5 64 is whether the United States '
measures constitute safeguard measures and whether certain GATT 1994 and Agreement on
Safeguards' provisions were violated by such United States' measures, issue of whether the United
States' Section 232 duties constitute safeguard measures is a question of law in that dispute as it
requires analyses of consistency or consistency with the requirements of the claimed treaty
provisions.
In this regard, Russia reminds that the ultimate goal of the Panel is to make such findings "as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements". The achievement of this goal will be seriously preju diced should the Panel engage in
parallel examination of the underlying safeguard measures.
Therefore, should the Panel recognize that the question as to "whether the US safeguard
measures on imports of aluminium and steel exist" is a question of law in this dispute, the Panel
would have to follow the DS564 panel's lead insofar as the issue is the proper qualification of the
United States' measures.

ANNEX C-7
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SWITZERLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Switzerland exercises its right to participate as a third party in this case because of its systemic
interest in the correct and consistent interpretation and application of Article XIX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Safeguards.
2. Switzerland notes that the present dispute relates to measures taken by Turkey in response
to the import adjustment measures imposed by the United States on certain steel and aluminiu m
products which are themselves being challenged in ongoing WTO proceedings by seven WTO
Members including Switzerland (DS544, DS547, DS548, DS552, DS554, DS556 and DS564). As
highlighted in its request for the establishment of a panel in DS556, Switzerlan d considers that the
adjustment measures imposed by the United States on imports of certain steel and aluminium
products constitute safeguard measures falling within the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards.
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
3. Switzerland notes that Article XIX of the GATT 1994 establishes a right to impose safeguard
measures provided that certain conditions and circumstances listed in that provision and in the
Agreement on Safeguards are satisfied. These requirements include inter alia the obligation for the
Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure to endeavour, pursuant to Article 8.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other
obligations to that existing under the GATT 1994 between i t and the Members which would be
affected by such a measure, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the
Agreement on Safeguards.
4. In the absence of an agreement on adequate means of trade compensation for the adverse
effects of the measure, the Agreement on Safeguards grants affected Members the right to suspend
the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under the GATT 1994.
The exercise of this "right of suspension ", as referred to in Article 8.3 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, is subject to the substantive and procedural requirements listed in Article XIX:3 (a) of
the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards. This right of suspension of equivalent
concessions of other obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the Member applying the
safeguard measure sets per definition Article I of the GATT 1994 aside, as well as Article II of the
GATT 1994, if the measure is taken in the form of a duty in excess of those set forth in the Member's
Schedule.
5. Thus, if a complainant considers that the respondent has failed to comply with the
requirements applicable to Members taking rebalancing measures, it is for the complainant to make
a prima facie case of violation of Article XIX:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the Agreement
on Safeguards. We note that the United States has not brought any such claims. Thus, if the Panel,
making an objective assessment of the matter before it, as pro vided for under Article 11 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), finds that
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards are applicable to the case at hand,
it would thus need to reject the United States' claims, which are solely based on Article I and Article II
of the GATT 1994.
6. Switzerland notes that, even though the United States ' panel request does not identify the
Agreement on Safeguards, that agreement has been identified by Turke y. The Panel 's terms of
reference are "to examine, in the light of the relevant provisions cited by the parties to the dispute,
the matter referred to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) by the United States in document
"WT/DS561/2". Article 8 of the Agreeme nt on Safeguards is one of the provisions cited by Turkey.
The Panel is therefore required, in accordance with its terms of reference, to examine the matter
referred to by the United States in light of that provision.

III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
a) Principles applicable to the legal characterization of the measures at issue
7. Contrary to what the United States argues in this dispute, the legal characterisation of a
measure for the purposes of determining the applicability of a relevant provision or agreement is
not an issue to be decided unilaterally by the Member taking the me asure. It is an issue that must
be determined objectively. In other words, the examination as to whether the provisions of the
covered agreements are "applicable" and "relevant" to the case at hand is part of the panel 's duty
to make an "objective assessment" pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU1.
8. The Panel's duty to conduct an "objective assessment of the matter" implies that the Panel is
not bound by the way the Member concerned characterises the measure in its municipal law. Indeed,
the description of the measure by a party and "the label given to [it] under municipal law" "cannot
be the end of [the Panel 's] analysis"2 and are "not dispositive" of the proper legal characterization
of that measure under the covered agreements"3. As the Appellate Body emphasized, "a panel must
assess the legal characterization for purposes of the applicability of the relevant agreement on the
basis of the 'content and substance' of the measure itself"4.
9. The Appellate Body noted in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products that the manner in which the
measure is characterized under domestic law, the domestic procedures that led to the adoption of
the measure, and any relevant notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards are relevant
factors in such an evaluation. However, "no one such factor is, in and of itself, dispositive of the
question of whether the measure constitutes a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article 1
of the Agreement on Safeguards"5.
10. Thus, the fact that a Member has not "invoked" its right to implement a safeguard measure
or has not notified the measure at issue to the WTO Committee on Safeguards does not mean that
such measure is no t a "safeguard measure" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. As emphasized above, the proper legal characterization of a measure has to be based
on the content and substance of the measure itself.
b) Constituent features of a safeguard measure
11. On the basis of the text of Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the
GATT 1994 read in its context, in order to be a safeguard measure, a measure must present two
constituent features, identified by the Appellate Body in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products.
12. First, the measure must suspend, in whole or in part, a GATT obligation or withdraw or modify
a GATT concession. This follows from the text of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 which refers to
measures that suspend a GATT obligation and/or withdraw or modify a GATT concession.
13. Second, the suspension, withdrawal, or modification in question must be designed to prevent
or remedy serious injury to the Member 's domestic industry caused or threatened by increas ed
imports of the subject product. As the Appellate Body emphasized, "[t]he use of the word 'to' […]
indicates that the suspension of a GATT obligation or the withdrawal or modification of a GATT
concession must be designed to pursue a specific objective, namely preventing or remedying serious
injury to the Member 's domestic industry "6. Thus, the suspension of a GATT obligation or the
withdrawal or modification of a GATT concession must have "a demonstrable link" to the objective
of preventing or remedying injury7.
14. Switzerland considers that additional features, such as the "extraordinary" character of the
measure, its complementary relationship with trade remedy measures, its focus on the "import" of
the products concerned or the fact that it has been adopted pursuant to a procedure which is very

1 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.31.
2 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), para. 593.
3 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.32.
4 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.32.
5 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.
6 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.56.
7 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel products, para. 5.56.

similar to the procedure followed in safeguard investigations constitute additional elements
supporting its qualification as a "safeguard measure", even though it is not labelled as a "safeguard
measure" in the Member's domestic law.
15. The assessment of whether a measure presents the features highlighted above, and thus
constitutes a safeguard measure, is to be made on a case -by-case basis, taking into a ccount the
design, structure, and expected operation of the measure as a whole. In order to make such an
objective assessment, "a panel must identify all the aspects of the measure that may have a bearing
on its legal characterization, recognize which of those aspects are the most central to that measure,
and, thereby, properly determine the disciplines to which the measure is subject"8.
16. Once it is established that the measure presents those constituent features, that measure falls
within the scope of application of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.
c) Observations regarding the two-step test cited by the United States
17. The United States submits that a two-step analysis is called for under Article XIX of the GATT:
the right to apply a safeguard measure as a first step and whether that safeguard measure has been
applied consistently with the various requirements as a second. The United States considers that the
invocation of Article XIX is a condition precedent that must be established not only with respect to
the second step but as an initial matter 9. The United States refers to the Appellate Body report in
US – Line Pipe in order to support its arguments.
18. However, in that case, the Appellate Body has not examined the issue of the existence of a
safeguard measure. The distinction made by the Appellate Body was between two inquiries relating
to the consistency of a safeguard measure with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on
Safeguards. Both inquiries related to obligations laid down in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Safeguards, but each inquiry related to a different type of obligations: on the one
hand, the obligations that must be satisfied in order for the Member to have the right to ap ply a
safeguard measure and, on the other hand, the obligations relating to the extent of the safeguard
measure.
19. The issue of the existence of a safeguard measure must not be confused with the issue of
whether such safeguard measure is consistent with the conditions and requirements laid down in
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and in the Agreement on Safeguards. As noted by the Appellate Body
in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , "it would be improper to conflate factors pertaining to the
legal character ization of a measure for purposes of determining the applicability of the WTO
safeguard disciplines with the substantive conditions and procedural requirements that determine
the WTO-consistency of a safeguard measure"10.
20. The "right" to apply a safeguard measure refers to the fulfilment of certain requirements
provided for in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. The exercise of the
right to impose a safeguard measure must in turn fulfil certain requirements in order to be "within
the limits set out in the treaty "11. Accordingly, contrary to what the United States argues, both
inquiries identified by the Appellate Body in US – Line Pipe related to the WTO -consistency of a
measure, and not to its legal characterization as a safeguard measure.
d) Notification is not a constituent feature of a safeguard measure
21. The notification requirements laid down in Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards are
unrelated to the issue of whether a measure constitutes a safeguard measure.
22. As the Appellate Body stated in Korea – Dairy regarding the object and purpose of Article 12,
"the notification serves essentially a transparency and information purpose"12. Thus, the notification

8 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.60.
9 United States' first written submission, paras. 69 and 72.
10 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 5.57. (emphasis original)
11 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, Fn. 193, referring to Appellate Body
12 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Dairy, para. 111, referring to the Panel Report, para. 7.126.

requirements constitute "obligations" but are not a "constituent feature" of a safeguard. In other
words, they do not determine the existence of a safeguard measure, as argued by the United States.
23. The notification obligations provided for under Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards are
thus conditions – among others – for a Member to lawfully exert its right to apply a safeguard
measure and not a constituent feature of a safeguard measure, the absence of which would impede
the characterization of the measure as a safeguard. Accordingly, if a Member fails to fulfil its
notification obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards, a panel would conclude that the Member
concerned acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards
and not that a safeguard measure does not exist.
24. If the invocation of the right to take a safeguard measure by way of noti fication were – as
argued by the United States – a prerequisite for a safeguard measure to exist, it would suffice for a
Member not to notify a measure in order to avoid the application of Article XIX of the GATT 1994
and the Agreement on Safeguards – and thus to circumvent its obligations under these provisions.
Doing so would also unilaterally deprive affected Members of their right to take rebalancing measures
under Article XIX:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
III. INTER-PANEL COORDINATION
25. To the extent that the determination of the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards to
Turkey's measure depends on whether the underlying measures, namely the US measures on import
on steel and aluminium, are safeguard measures, there is a direct link between this dispute and the
dispute in which the underlying US measures on imports on steel and aluminium are challenged
(DS564).
26. Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU "the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system", and, pursuant to
Article 3.7 of the DSU, "the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution
to a dispute". Contradictory findings in this dispute a nd in the other disputes concerning measures
taken in response to the import adjustment measures imposed by the United States on certain steel
and aluminium products on the one hand, and disputes concerning these import adjustment
measures on the other hand, would not be consistent with those principles.
27. In Switzerland's view, the Panel would act within the bounds of its discretionary authority
under Article 13 of the DSU in seeking information from the panel in DS564, as long as it maintains
the deliberations confidential as required by Article 14 of the DSU and respects the requirements of
due process. In particular, the other panel should not participate in the internal discussions and
decision process of this Panel and vice-versa.
28. Switzerland notes that another option would be for the Panel not to issue its report until the
report of the panel in DS564 has been issued, keeping in mind the rule under Article 12.2 of the
DSU that "[p]anel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel
reports while not unduly delaying the panel process". This would allow the Panel to take into account
the findings of the panel in DS564.

ANNEX C-8
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF UKRAINE*
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Ukraine welcomes the opportunity to participate as a third party in case Turkey – Additional
Duties on Certain Products from the United States and to present its views on certain issues raised
by parties in this dispute. Ukraine will provide its comments on the interpretation and application of
the provisions of the WTO agreements discussed before this Panel.
2. While not taking a final position on the specific merits of this case, Ukraine w ill provide its
views on some of the legal claims advanced by the Parties to the dispute. In particular, Ukraine will
make submissions on the issue whether the United States failed to present proper claims before the
Panel by not addressing Article XIX:3 o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994") and the Agreement on Safeguards in its panel request.
3. Ukraine reserves the right to raise other issues at the third party hearing with the Panel.
2. CLAIMS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES' FAILURE TO PRESENT PROPER CLAIMS
BEFORE THE PANEL
4. This dispute raises an important issue of the panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( "DSU") as well as
what information in panel request is "sufficient to present the problem clearly" under Article 6.2 of
the DSU. Ukraine would like contribute to the understanding of these Articles, outline its vision, and
help the Panel in the analysis without making judgments on the facts of the case.
5. Not for the repetition but for the sake of clarity, Ukraine would briefly provide the background
of this claim. In this case, the United States challenges the additional duties for some products
originating in the United States imposed by Turkey only under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994. 1
In this respect, Turkey claims that its measures are taken pursuant to Article XIX:3 of GATT 1994
and Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguard and the United States was aware of this fact as it
was explicitly specified in its notification of the measures to the Council for Trade in Goods on 29
March 2019.2 However, the United States did not to make any claim with regard to the Agreement
on Safeguards, because of its belief that it is "within the judgment of the WTO Member imposing the
measure" to characterise such measure as being safeguard or not.3
6. In this regard, Ukraine would like to put on record the following. First, it is beyond dispute
that Article 3.3 of the DSU entitles a Member that considers that any benefits accruing to it directly
or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member to have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to be able to redress the
violations.
7. Second, it is also clear that a Member is largely self -regulating under Article 3.7 of the DSU
and it must be presumed by panels and the Appellate Body that "whenever a Member submits a
request for establishment of a panel, that such Member does so in good faith, having duly exercised
its judgement as to whether recourse to that panel would be 'fruitful'."4

* Ukraine requested that its written submission is used as its integrated executive summary.
1 First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 2, 5.
2 First Written Submission of Turkey, para. 2.16.
3 First Written Submission of the United States, para. 76.
4 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 74.

8. Third, Article 7.2 of the DSU states that "panels shall address the relevant provisions in any
covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute"5 referring to parties and not
a party meaning that panels shall address the provisions of the agreements raised by both parties
(complaining and responding).
9. Fourth, it is however settled case law that a panel 's terms of reference is determined by the
panel request6 and panels thus cannot rule on the issues that were not included in the panel request.
In our case, this means that the Panel cannot rule whether Turkey acted consistently or
inconsistently with the Agreement on Safeguards as there were no claims raised by the United States
under this Agreement.
10. Fifth, findings in EC – Tariff Preferences and Brazil – Taxation cases stipulate that when the
complaining party is aware that the challenged measure was adopted under the specific agreement,
a complaining part y is obliged to identify the relevant provisions of this specific agreement in its
panel request.7
11. Thus, Ukraine sees two plausible scenarios of the situation. On the one hand, there is the
loop-hole for the complaining party to escape from its obligation to present the problem clearly under
Article 6.2 of the DSU in such cases where we hypothetically presume that a complainant intently
fails to address the claim under the specific agreement and simply refers to the GATT 1994 violation
when the issue is really governed by that specific agreement. On the other hand, the complaining
party is completely right, when we one more time presume, that the claim falls exclusively under
GATT 1994 and not under, for example, the Agreement on implementation of Artic le VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the Agreement on Safeguards, etc.
12. It is logically that in the first presumed instance, panel should decline to rule on the violation.
However, in the second, it flows that if panel declines to rule, it will deprive the complaining party
of its right to "a positive solution to a dispute" under Article 3.7 of the DSU.
13. Leaving the presumption behind, Ukraine therefore believes that the Pan el, while making its
analysis, should look into the nature of the measure at issue to find whether it is in its terms of
reference as was stated in paragraph 9 of this submission.
14. Notwithstanding the provision of Article 3.10 of the DSU that "complaints and counter -
complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked", Ukraine is of the view that the result
of this dispute cannot contradict and is tightly connected to the findings of the panel in the ongoing
United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products case brought by Turkey as in
that case Turkey claims the violation of the United States under the Agreement on Safeguard.
15. To summarize and to make it clear, Ukraine is without prejudice whether the United States
measures were safeguard measures or not, Ukraine rather believes that it is the Panel's task firstly
to look into the nature of the measure to understand if the Panel can then continue its analysis of
the GATT 1994 violations.
3. CONCLUSIONS
16. Ukraine hopes that its contribution in the present dispute will be helpful to the Panel in
objectively assessing the matter before it and in developing the respective legal interpretations of
the WTO agreements. Ukraine thanks the Panel for the opportunity to share its views and would be
happy to provide further comments on the third -party session or answer any questions the Panel
may have.
Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 125; Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing para. 160).
7 See for example, Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 118; Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Taxation, para 5.366.

ANNEX D
COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PANEL ON REQUESTS FOR ENHANCED THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Communication by the Panel on requests for enhanced third-party rights 80

ANNEX D-1
COMMUNICATION BY THE PANEL ON REQUESTS FOR ENHANCED THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
The Panel refers to the separate communications from Canada 1, Russia 2, the European Union3,
China4 and Mexico5 (hereafter "the requesting third parties"), asking that the Panel exercise its
discretion under Article 12.1 of the DSU to grant all third parties additional rights to those provided
in Article 10 of the DSU. In particular, the requesting third parties requested the Panel to grant the
following rights: (i) to receive copies of all of the parties' written submissions, their oral statements,
rebuttals and answers to qu estions from the Panel and each other, through all stages of the
proceedings; (ii) to be present for the entirety of all substantive meetings of the Panel with the
parties; and (iii) to review the draft summary of their own arguments in the descriptive par t of the
Panel Report. In addition, the requesting third parties, except for China, also requested the Panel to
allow them to make a brief oral statement during the second substantive meeting.
The requesting third parties argue that particular circumstanc es exist in this dispute that warrant
the granting of enhanced third-party rights, including that: (i) the measure that has been challenged
by the United States in this dispute is similar to the measures that have been challenged by the
United States in the five (5) disputes initiated against the requesting third parties; (ii) the outcome
of this dispute may have a significant impact on the Panels' findings and recommendations in the
other five (5) disputes initiated by the United States against the request ing third parties; (iii) the
number of responding parties as well as third parties participating in these six disputes demonstrates
the outcomes of these disputes will have important legal and systemic implications on the entire
WTO Membership; and (iv) th e enhanced third-party rights requested would not negatively affect
due process in general; or specifically, the due process rights of the United States; or would impose
any additional burden on the United States.
The Panel requested the parties' views on each of the five (5) requests for enhanced third -party
rights. Turkey supported these requests. For Turkey, the similarities between the measure
challenged by the United States in this dispute and those in the other five (5) Additional Duties
disputes, as well as the fact that the United States has brought, simultaneously to this dispute,
disputes against the requesting third parties, constitute special circumstances that warrant the
granting of enhanced third -party rights. Turkey also noted that the specif ic enhanced rights
requested by the third parties would not impose any undue additional burden on the parties to this
dispute.
The United States, for its part, requested that the Panel deny these requests for enhanced third-party
rights. The United States is concerned that the respondents in all six (6) Additional Duties disputes
may be using the additional requested rights to function as co -respondents in these disputes. For
the United States, these requests are not well founded under the DSU, and the granting of additional
rights to third parties would result in a corresponding imposition of additional obligations on the
parties. The United States also argued that additional obligations may not be imposed on a disputing
party absent its consent.
The Panel understands that it enjoys discretion to grant additional rights to third parties so long as
such rights are consistent with the DSU and due process.6 Prior panels have on occasion exercised
this discretion and granted additional third -party rights in certain circumstances, which could, for
instance, include situations where the measures at issue result in significant economic benefits for
certain third parties7; situations where third parties maintained measures similar to the measures

1 Communication dated 15 March 2019.
2 Communication dated 19 March 2019.
3 Communication dated 20 March 2019.
4 Communication dated 20 March 2019.
5 Communication dated 22 March 2019.
6 Appellate Body Reports, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 243; EC – Hormones (Canada),
Korea – Nucleoids, Annex D-2.
7 Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras), para. 7.8; EC – Tariff Preferences,

at issue8; or where practical considerations arise from a third party's involvement as a party in a
parallel panel proceeding.9 The Panel is not persuaded that the circumstances of the requests before
it would warrant the granting of enhanced third-party rights.
The Panel disagrees with the requesting third parties' assertion that the alleged similarity of the
challenged measures in the six (6) Additional Duties disputes requires that the Panel grant enhanced
third-party rights in this particular dispute. While understanding the interest of the requesting third
parties in the outcome of this dispute, the Panel considers that, in addition to their ability to present
their views in this dispute as third parties, each of the requesting third parties is the respondent in
one of the other five (5) Additional Duties disputes, and will therefore have the opportunity to defend
its own challenged measures in its respective panel proceedings.
Although the Panel appreciates the systemic importance of the outcome of these disp utes for all
third parties, the Panel is not persuaded that the rights provided for in Article 10 of the DSU would
not suffice to allow their interests to be fully taken into account. Consistent with Article 10.2 of the
DSU, all third parties in panel proc eedings may be presumed to have a substantial interest in the
matter before the Panel.10 WTO Members have a collective interest in the interpretation of covered
agreements, and panels' interpretations of WTO agreements are, by definition, of systemic
importance to WTO Members.11
The requesting third parties have also argued that granting their requests would not negatively affect
due process or impose any undue additional burden on the parties. The Panel notes that the
requesting third parties are asking the Panel to go beyond what is specifically provided for in the
DSU, despite the lack of agreement by the parties on the requests. In the Panel's view, this should
be enough to raise due process concerns. Furthermore, the Panel notes that the requested enhanced
third-party rights would impose upon the parties the additional burdens of processing and reviewing
numerous third -party submissions in addition to those foreseen in Article 10 of the DSU, and
eventually responding to related questions from the Panel or the other party.
In considering requests for enhanced third-party rights, the Panel must be mindful of the distinction
drawn in the DSU between parties and third parties, which should not be blurred. 12 In this respect,
the Panel agrees with the United States that, when considering whether the balance of rights and
obligations of parties and third parties agreed to in the DSU may be altered, it is important to bear
in mind the absence of an agreement of the parties to the dispute. The Panel is not persuaded that
the arguments put forward by the requesting third parties justify altering such a balance without the
agreement of the parties.13
In the light of the foregoing, the Panel declines the requests for enhanced third -party rights
submitted by Canada, Russia, the European Union, China and Mexico.

EC – Tariff Preferences, Annex A, para. 7(d); EC –Export Subsidies on Sugar (Australia, Brazil and Thailand),
para. 2.7; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 7.166; Korea – Nucleoids, Annex D-3.
13 Numerous panels have denied requests for enhanced third-party rights when one of the parties has
objected to such request, e.g. in EU – Biodiesel (Indonesia), Korea – Radionuclides, US – Coated Paper
(Indonesia), Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, US – Washing Machines, EC – Seal Products and
Argentina – Import Measures.

ANNEX E
TABLE OF RELEVANT DUTY RATES
Contents Page
Annex E-1 Table of relevant duty rates 83

ANNEX E-1
TABLE OF RELEVANT DUTY RATES
Based on Exhibits USA-6, USA-7, and USA -8; Türkiye's first written submission, para. 2.22 and
footnote 37; United States' r esponse to Panel question Nos. 4 and 5; Türkiye's response to Panel
question No. 73; the parties' comments on the draft descriptive part of this Report; Türkiye's
communication to the Panel of 18 April 2023; the United States' communications to the Panel o f
20 March 2023 and 25 April 2023; and the WTO's Consolidated Tariff Schedule (CTS) database.

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
1 08.02 080211100000 43.2 15 10 20
2 080211900000 43.2 15 10 20
3 080212100000 43.2 15 10 20
4 080212900000 43.2 15 10 20
5 080221000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
6 080222000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
7 080231000000 43.2 15 10 20
8 080232000000 43.2 15 10 20
9 080241000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
10 080242000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
11 080251000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
12 080252000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
13 080261000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
14 080262000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
15 080270000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
16 080280000000 43.2 43.2 10 20
17 080290100000 43.2 43.2 10 20
18 080290500011 43.2 43.2 10 20

1 The United States submitted tables showing Türkiye's 2018 and 2019 MFN rates (Exhibits USA-7 and
USA-8). There is, however, no difference between the 2018 and 2019 rates, and so we list them only once in
this Table. Neither party has argued that the MFN rates have changed in the years 2020-2022.

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
19 080290500012 43.2 43.2 10 20
20 080290850000 43.2 43.2 10 20
21 10.06 100610100000 45 15 25 50
22 100610300000 45 34 25 50
23 100610500000 45 34 25 50
24 100610710000 45 34 25 50
25 100610790000 45 34 25 50
26 100620110000 45 36 25 50
27 100620130000 45 36 25 50
28 100620150000 45 36 25 50
29 100620170000 45 36 25 50
30 100620920000 45 36 25 50
31 100620940000 45 36 25 50
32 100620960000 45 36 25 50
33 100620980000 45 36 25 50
34 100630210000 45 45 25 50
35 100630230000 45 45 25 50
36 100630250000 45 45 25 50
37 100630270000 45 45 25 50
38 100630420000 45 45 25 50
39 100630440000 45 45 25 50
40 100630460000 45 45 25 50
41 100630480000 45 45 25 50
42 100630610000 45 45 25 50
43 100630630000 45 45 25 50
44 100630650000 45 45 25 50

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
45 100630670000 45 45 25 50
46 100630920000 45 45 25 50
47 100630940000 45 45 25 50
48 100630960000 45 45 25 50
49 100630980000 45 45 25 50
50 100640000000 45 45 25 50
51 2106.90 210690200000 102 17.3 MIN 1
EUR/ %vol/ hl 10 20
52 210690300000 58.5 58.5 10 20
53 210690510000 58.5 58.5 10 20
54 210690550000 58.5 58.5 10 20
55 210690590000 58.5 58.5 10 20
56 210690920000 53 12.8 10 20
57 210690980012 58.5 9 + T1 10 20
58 210690980013 58.5 9 + T1 10 20
59 210690980014 58.5 9 + T1 10 20
60 210690980015 58.5 9 + T1 10 20
61 210690980016 58.5 9 10 20
62 210690980019 58.5 9 + T1 10 20
63 22.08 220820120000 102 0 70 140
64 220820140000 102 0 70 140
65 220820260000 102 0 70 140
66 220820270000 102 0 70 140
67 220820290000 102 0 70 140
68 220820400000 102 0 70 140
69 220820620000 102 0 70 140
70 220820640000 102 0 70 140

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
71 220820860000 102 0 70 140
72 220820870000 102 0 70 140
73 220820890000 102 0 70 140
74 220830110000 85 0 70 140
75 220830190000 85 0 70 140
76 220830300000 85 0 70 140
77 220830410000 85 0 70 140
78 220830490000 85 0 70 140
79 220830610000 85 0 70 140
80 220830690000 85 0 70 140
81 220830710000 85 0 70 140
82 220830790000 85 0 70 140
83 220830820000 85 0 70 140
84 220830880000 85 0 70 140
85 220840110000 102
0.6 EUR/
%vol/ hl + 3.2
EUR/ hl
70 140
86 220840310011 102 0 70 140
87 220840310012 102 0 70 140
88 220840390011 102
0.6 EUR/
%vol/ hl + 3.2
EUR/ hl
70 140
89 220840390012 102
0.6 EUR/
%vol/ hl + 3.2
EUR/ hl
70 140
90 220840510000 102 0.6 EUR/
%vol/ hl 70 140
91 220840910011 102 0 70 140
92 220840910012 102 0 70 140
93 220840990000 102 0.6 EUR/
%vol/ hl 70 140
94 220850110000 85 0 70 140
95 220850190000 85 0 70 140

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
96 220850910000 102 0 70 140
97 220850990000 102 0 70 140
98 220860110000 102 0 70 140
99 220860190000 102 0 70 140
100 220860910000 102 0 70 140
101 220860990000 102 0 70 140
102 220870100000 102 0 70 140
103 220870900000 102 0 70 140
104 220890110000 102 0 70 140
105 220890190000 102 0 70 140
106 220890330000 102 0 70 140
107 220890380000 102 0 70 140
108 220890410000 102 0 70 140
109 220890450000 102 0 70 140
110 220890480011 102 0 70 140
111 220890480019 102 0 70 140
112 220890540000 102 0 70 140
113 220890560000 102 0 70 140
114 220890690000 102 0 70 140
115 220890710011 102 0 70 140
116 220890710019 102 0 70 140
117 220890750000 102 0 70 140
118 220890770000 102 0 70 140
119 220890780000 102 0 70 140
120 220890911000 102 70 70 140
121 220890919000 102
1 EUR/ %vol/
hl + 6.4 EUR/
hl
70 140

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
122 220890991000 102 0 70 140
123 220890999000 102 1 EUR/ %vol/
hl 70 140
124 24.01 240110350000 45 25 30 60
125 240110600000 45 25 30 60
126 240110700000 45 25 30 60
127 240110850000 45 25 30 60
128 240110950000 45 25 30 60
129 240120350000 45 25 30 60
130 240120600000 45 25 30 60
131 240120700000 45 25 30 60
132 240120850000 45 25 30 60
133 240120950000 45 25 30 60
134 240130000011 45 25 30 60
135 240130000019 45 25 30 60
136 27.01 270111000000 Unbound 0 5 13.7
137 270112100000 Unbound 0 5 13.7
138 270112900000 Unbound 0 5 13.7
139 270119000000 Unbound 0 5 13.7
140 270120000011 Unbound 0 5 13.7
141 270120000012 Unbound 0 5 13.7
142 270120000019 Unbound 0 5 13.7
143 2704.00 270400100000 Unbound 0 5 10
144 270400300000 Unbound 0 5 10
145 270400901000 Unbound 0 5 10
146 270400909000 Unbound 0 5 10
147 2713.11 271311000000 Unbound 0 4 4

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
148 33.04 330410001000 62.6 0 30 60
149 330410009000 Unbound 0 30 60
150 330420000000 100 0 30 60
151 330430000000 Unbound 0 30 60
152 330491000000 Unbound 0 30 60
153 330499001000 62.6 0 30 60
154 330499009013 Unbound 0 30 60
155 330499009019 Unbound 0 30 60
156 3904.10 390410000011 35 6.5 25 50
157 390410000019 35 6.5 25 50
158 3908.10 390810000011 33.2 6.5 5 10
159 390810000019 33.2 6.5 5 10
160 39.26 392610000000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
161 392620000011 Unbound 6.5 30 60
162 392620000019 Unbound 6.5 30 60
163 392630000000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
164 392640000000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
165 392690500000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
166 392690920011 Unbound 6.5 30 60
167 392690920019 Unbound 6.5 30 60
168 392690971000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
169 392690972000 Unbound 6.5 30 60
170 392690979011 Unbound 6.5 30 60
171 392690979012 Unbound 0 30 60
172 392690979013 Unbound 6.5 30 60
173 392690979014 Unbound 6.5 30 60

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
174 392690979015 Unbound 6.5 30 60
175 392690979018 Unbound 6.5 30 60
176 44.01 440110000000 Unbound 0 5 10
177 440112000000 Unbound 0 5 10
178 440121000000 Unbound 0 5 10
179 440122000000 Unbound 0 5 10
180 440131000000 Unbound 0 5 10
181 440139000000 Unbound 0 5 10
182 440140100000 Unbound 0 5 10
183 440140900000 Unbound 0 5 10
184 48.02 480210000000 Unbound 0 10 20
185 480220001111 Unbound 0 10 20
186 480220001119 Unbound 0 10 20
187 480220001911 Unbound 0 10 20
188 480220001919 Unbound 0 10 20
189 480220002100 33.6 0 10 20
190 480220002900 33.6 0 10 20
191 480240100000 Unbound 0 10 20
192 480240901000 Unbound 0 10 20
193 480240909000 Unbound 0 10 20
194 480254001011 33.6 0 10 20
195 480254001019 33.6 0 10 20
196 480254002000 33.6 0 10 20
197 480254003100 33.6 0 10 20
198 480254003200 33.6 0 10 20
199 480254009900 33.6 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
200 480255151000 33.6 0 10 20
201 480255153000 33.6 0 10 20
202 480255155011 33.6 0 10 20
203 480255155019 33.6 0 10 20
204 480255156100 33.6 0 10 20
205 480255156200 33.6 0 10 20
206 480255159911 33.6 0 10 20
207 480255159912 33.6 0 10 20
208 480255159919 33.6 0 10 20
209 480255251000 33.6 0 10 20
210 480255253000 33.6 0 10 20
211 480255255011 33.6 0 10 20
212 480255255019 33.6 0 10 20
213 480255256100 33.6 0 10 20
214 480255256200 33.6 0 10 20
215 480255259911 33.6 0 10 20
216 480255259912 33.6 0 10 20
217 480255259919 33.6 0 10 20
218 480255301000 33.6 0 10 20
219 480255303000 33.6 0 10 20
220 480255305011 33.6 0 10 20
221 480255305019 33.6 0 10 20
222 480255306100 33.6 0 10 20
223 480255306200 33.6 0 10 20
224 480255309911 33.6 0 10 20
225 480255309912 33.6 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
226 480255309919 33.6 0 10 20
227 480255901000 33.6 0 10 20
228 480255903000 33.6 0 10 20
229 480255905011 33.6 0 10 20
230 480255905019 33.6 0 10 20
231 480255906100 33.6 0 10 20
232 480255906200 33.6 0 10 20
233 480255909911 33.6 0 10 20
234 480255909912 33.6 0 10 20
235 480255909919 33.6 0 10 20
236 480256201000 33.6 0 10 20
237 480256202000 33.6 0 10 20
238 480256203100 33.6 0 10 20
239 480256203900 33.6 0 10 20
240 480256209900 33.6 0 10 20
241 480256801000 33.6 0 10 20
242 480256803000 33.6 0 10 20
243 480256805011 33.6 0 10 20
244 480256805019 33.6 0 10 20
245 480256806100 33.6 0 10 20
246 480256806200 33.6 0 10 20
247 480256809911 33.6 0 10 20
248 480256809912 33.6 0 10 20
249 480256809919 33.6 0 10 20
250 480257001000 33.6 0 10 20
251 480257003000 16.2 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
252 480257005000 33.6 0 10 20
253 480257006100 33.6 0 10 20
254 480257006200 33.6 0 10 20
255 480257009900 33.6 0 10 20
256 480258101000 33.6 0 10 20
257 480258103000 16.2 0 10 20
258 480258105011 33.6 0 10 20
259 480258105019 33.6 0 10 20
260 480258106100 33.6 0 10 20
261 480258106200 33.6 0 10 20
262 480258109900 33.6 0 10 20
263 480258901000 33.6 0 10 20
264 480258903000 16.2 0 10 20
265 480258905011 33.6 0 10 20
266 480258905019 33.6 0 10 20
267 480258906100 33.6 0 10 20
268 480258906200 33.6 0 10 20
269 480258909900 33.6 0 10 20
270 480261151111 33.6 0 10 20
271 480261151112 33.6 0 10 20
272 480261151119 33.6 0 10 20
273 480261152100 33.6 0 10 20
274 480261152200 33.6 0 10 20
275 480261152900 33.6 0 10 20
276 480261801100 33.6 0 10 20
277 480261801200 33.6 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
278 480261801300 33.6 0 10 20
279 480261801500 33.6 0 10 20
280 480261801911 33.6 0 10 20
281 480261801919 33.6 0 10 20
282 480261802100 33.6 0 10 20
283 480261802200 33.6 0 10 20
284 480261802900 33.6 0 10 20
285 480262001100 33.6 0 10 20
286 480262001200 33.6 0 10 20
287 480262001300 33.6 0 10 20
288 480262001500 33.6 0 10 20
289 480262001911 33.6 0 10 20
290 480262001919 33.6 0 10 20
291 480262002100 33.6 0 10 20
292 480262002200 33.6 0 10 20
293 480262002900 33.6 0 10 20
294 480269001100 33.6 0 10 20
295 480269001200 33.6 0 10 20
296 480269001300 33.6 0 10 20
297 480269001900 33.6 0 10 20
298 480269002100 33.6 0 10 20
299 480269002200 33.6 0 10 20
300 480269002900 33.6 0 10 20
301 480269003900 33.6 0 10 20
302 48.04 480411111000 23.4 0 10 20
303 480411112000 32.4 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
304 480411151000 23.4 0 10 20
305 480411152000 32.4 0 10 20
306 480411191000 23.4 0 10 20
307 480411192000 32.4 0 10 20
308 480411901011 24.6 0 10 20
309 480411901012 24.6 0 10 20
310 480411901013 24.6 0 10 20
311 480411902000 33.6 0 10 20
312 480419121000 33.6 0 10 20
313 480419122000 33.6 0 10 20
314 480419191000 23.4 0 10 20
315 480419192000 32.4 0 10 20
316 480419301000 33.6 0 10 20
317 480419302000 33.6 0 10 20
318 480419901000 24.6 0 10 20
319 480419902000 33.6 0 10 20
320 480421100000 24.2 0 10 20
321 480421900000 24.6 0 10 20
322 480429100000 24.2 0 10 20
323 480429900000 24.6 0 10 20
324 480431510000 23.4 0 10 20
325 480431581000 32.4 0 10 20
326 480431582000 32.4 0 10 20
327 480431801000 32.4 0 10 20
328 480431802000 32.4 0 10 20
329 480431809000 32.4 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
330 480439511000 23.4 0 10 20
331 480439512000 32.4 0 10 20
332 480439581000 32.4 0 10 20
333 480439582000 32.4 0 10 20
334 480439801000 32.4 0 10 20
335 480439802000 32.4 0 10 20
336 480439809000 32.4 0 10 20
337 480441910000 32.4 0 10 20
338 480441981000 32.4 0 10 20
339 480441982000 32.4 0 10 20
340 480441989000 32.4 0 10 20
341 480442001000 32.4 0 10 20
342 480442002000 32.4 0 10 20
343 480442009000 32.4 0 10 20
344 480449001000 32.4 0 10 20
345 480449002000 32.4 0 10 20
346 480449009000 32.4 0 10 20
347 480451001000 32.4 0 10 20
348 480451002000 32.4 0 10 20
349 480451009000 32.4 0 10 20
350 480452001000 32.4 0 10 20
351 480452002000 32.4 0 10 20
352 480452009000 32.4 0 10 20
353 480459101000 23.4 0 10 20
354 480459102000 32.4 0 10 20
355 480459900000 Unbound 0 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
356 48.11 481110001000 Unbound 0 25 50
357 481110009000 Unbound 0 25 50
358 481141200000 29.4 0 25 50
359 481141901000 29.4 0 25 50
360 481141909000 29.4 0 25 50
361 481149001000 29.4 0 25 50
362 481149009000 29.4 0 25 50
363 481151001000 Unbound 0 25 50
364 481151009000 Unbound 0 25 50
365 481159001000 Unbound 0 25 50
366 481159009000 Unbound 0 25 50
367 481160001000 Unbound 0 25 50
368 481160009000 Unbound 0 25 50
369 481190001000 21.6 0 25 50
370 481190002000 21.6 0 25 50
371 481190009000 21.6 0 25 50
372 5502.10 550210000000 Unbound 4 30 60
374 7308.90 730890510000 Unbound 0 30 60
375 730890590011 Unbound 0 30 60
376 730890590019 Unbound 0 30 60
376 730890980012 Unbound 0 30 60
377 730890980013 Unbound 0 30 60
378 730890980014 Unbound 0 30 60
379 730890980015 Unbound 0 30 60
380 730890980016 Unbound 0 30 60
381 730890980018 Unbound 0 30 60

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
382 8413.70 841370211000 16.6 0 10 20
383 841370219000 16.6 1.7 10 20
384 841370291000 16.6 0 10 20
385 841370299000 16.6 1.7 10 20
386 841370301000 16.6 0 10 20
387 841370309000 16.6 1.7 10 20
388 841370351000 16.6 0 10 20
389 841370359000 16.6 1.7 10 20
390 841370451000 16.6 0 10 20
391 841370459000 16.6 1.7 10 20
392 841370511000 16.6 0 10 20
393 841370519000 16.6 1.7 10 20
394 841370591000 16.6 0 10 20
395 841370599000 16.6 1.7 10 20
396 841370651000 16.6 0 10 20
397 841370659000 16.6 1.7 10 20
398 841370751000 16.6 0 10 20
399 841370759000 16.6 1.7 10 20
400 841370811000 16.6 0 10 20
401 841370819000 16.6 1.7 10 20
402 841370891000 16.6 0 10 20
403 841370899000 16.6 1.7 10 20
404 8479.89 847989300000 Unbound 1.7 10 20
405 847989600000 Unbound 1.7 10 20
406 847989700000 13.8 1.7 10 20
407 847989971000 Unbound 1.7 10 20

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
408 847989972000 Unbound 1.7 10 20
409 847989973000 13.8 1.7 10 20
410 847989979000 Unbound 1.7 10 20
411 87.03 870310110000 19 5 60 120
412 870310180000 20 10 60 120
413 870321101000 Unbound 10 60 120
414 870321109011 19 10 60 120
415 870321109019 19 10 60 120
416 870321901000 Unbound 10 60 120
417 870321909011 19 10 60 120
418 870321909019 19 10 60 120
419 870322101000 Unbound 10 60 120
420 870322109011 19 10 60 120
421 870322109012 19 10 60 120
422 870322109019 19 10 60 120
423 870322901000 Unbound 10 60 120
424 870322909011 19 10 60 120
425 870322909012 19 10 60 120
426 870322909019 19 10 60 120
427 870323110000 19 10 60 120
428 870323191100 Unbound 10 60 120
429 870323191200 Unbound 10 60 120
430 870323191300 Unbound 10 60 120
431 870323199011 19 10 60 120
432 870323199019 19 10 60 120
433 870323901100 Unbound 10 60 120

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
434 870323901200 Unbound 10 60 120
435 870323901300 Unbound 10 60 120
436 870323909011 19 10 60 120
437 870323909019 19 10 60 120
438 870324101000 Unbound 10 60 120
439 870324109011 19 10 60 120
440 870324109019 19 10 60 120
441 870324901000 Unbound 10 60 120
442 870324909011 19 10 60 120
443 870324909019 19 10 60 120
444 870331101000 Unbound 10 60 120
445 870331109011 19 10 60 120
446 870331109019 19 10 60 120
447 870331901000 Unbound 10 60 120
448 870331909011 19 10 60 120
449 870331909019 19 10 60 120
450 870332110000 19 10 60 120
451 870332191100 Unbound 10 60 120
452 870332191200 Unbound 10 60 120
453 870332191300 Unbound 10 60 120
454 870332199011 19 10 60 120
455 870332199019 19 10 60 120
456 870332901100 Unbound 10 60 120
457 870332901200 Unbound 10 60 120
458 870332901300 Unbound 10 60 120
459 870332909011 19 10 60 120

4- or 6-
Digit HS
Code
12-Digit HS Code Bound Rate MFN Rate1
Additional
Duty (until
15 August
2018)
Additional
Duty (from
15 August
2018 until
21 May
2019)
460 870332909019 19 10 60 120
461 870333110000 19 10 60 120
462 870333191011 19 10 60 120
463 870333191012 19 10 60 120
464 870333199011 19 10 60 120
465 870333199019 19 10 60 120
466 870333901011 Unbound 10 60 120
467 870333901012 Unbound 10 60 120
468 870333909011 19 10 60 120
469 870333909019 19 10 60 120
470 870340100000 19/20/U2 10 60 120
471 870340900000 19/20/U3 10 60 120
472 870350000000 19/20/U4 10 60 120
473 870360100000 19/20/U5 10 60 120
474 870360900000 19 10 60 120
475 870370000000 19 10 60 120
476 870380100000 20 10 60 120
477 870380900000 20 10 60 120
478 870390000000 19 10 60 120
479 9022.19 902219000000 Unbound 0 5 10