UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 15 June 2000
Document codes: WT/DS160/R
Complainant: EU
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Switzerland
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 9.1  Intellectual Property (TRIPS)

UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5)
OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT
Report of the Panel
The report of the Panel on is being circulated
to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated as an unrestricted document from
15 June 2000, pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and Derestri ction of WTO Documents
(WT/L/160/Rev.1). Members are reminded that, in accordance with the DSU, only parties to the
dispute may appeal a panel report. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel
report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. There shall be no ex parte communications
with the Panel or Appellate Body concerning matte rs under consideration by the Panel or Appellate
Body.
Note by the Secretariat: This Panel Report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within 60 days after the
date of its circulation unless a party to the dispute decides to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report .
If the Panel Report is appealed to the Appellate Body, it sha ll not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after the
completion of the appeal. Information on the current status of the Panel Report is available from the WTO Secretariat.

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 26 January 1999, the European Communities and their member States (hereafter referred
to as the European Communities) requested consultations with the United States under Article 4 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and
Article 64.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related As pects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Agreement") regarding Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act as amended by the
"Fairness in Music Licensing Act" enacted on 27 October 1998.1
1.2 The European Communities and the United States held consultations on 2 March 1999, but
failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solutio n. On 15 April 1999, the European Communities
requested the establishment of a panel under Article 6 of the DSU and Article 64.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement.2
1.3 At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") established a panel in
accordance with Article 6 of the DSU with the following standard terms of reference:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the
European Communities in document WT/DS160/5, the matter referred to the DSB by the
European Communities in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."3
1.4 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan and Switzerland reserved their rights to participate in the
panel proceedings as third parties.
1.5 On 27 July 1999, the European Communities made a request, with reference to Article 8.7 of
the DSU, to the Director-in-charge to determine the composition of the Panel. On 6 August 1999, the
Panel was composed as follows:
Chairperson: Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda
Members: Mr. Arumugamangalam V. Ganesan
Mr. Ian F. Sheppard
1.6 The Panel met with the parties on 8-9 November 1999 and 7 December 1999. It met with the
third parties on 9 November 1999.
1.7 On 15 November, the Panel sent a letter to the International Bureau of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), that is responsible for the administration of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. In that letter, the Panel requested factual information
on the provisions of the Paris Act of 1971 of that Convention ("Berne Convention (1971)"),
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by its Article 9.1, relevant to the matter. The International
Bureau of WIPO provided such information in a letter, dated 22 December 1999. The parties to the
dispute provided comments on this information by means of letters, dated 12 January 2000.
1.8 The Panel submitted its interim report to the parties on 14 April 2000. The Panel submitted
its final report to the parties on 5 May 2000.

1 See document WT/DS160/1 (4 February 1999).
2 See document WT/DS160/5 (16 April 1999) reproduced in Annex 1 to this report.
3 See document WT/DS160/6 (6 August 1999) reproduced in Annex 2 to this report.

II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 The dispute concerns Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act of 1976 4, as amended by the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 ("the 1998 Amendment"), 5 which entered into force on
26 January 1999. The provisions of Section 110(5) place limitations on the exclusive rights provided
to owners of copyright in Section 106 of the Copy right Act in respect of certain performances and
displays.
2.2 The relevant parts of the current text of Section 106 read as follows:
"§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
…
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
…" 6,7

4 United States Copyright Act of 1976, Act of 19 October 1976, Pub.L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (as
amended).
5 Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 27 October 1998, Pub.L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830, 105 th Cong.,
2nd Session (1998).
6 As contained in Exhibit US-15(b).
7 Section 101 of the US Copyright Act contains a number of definitions, of which the following are
most relevant to the matter (as notified by the United States to the Council for TRIPS under Article 63.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement, see WTO document IP/N/1/USA/1, dated 25 March 1996):
"To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means
of any device or process or, in the case of a motion pictur e or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible."
"To perform or display a work 'publicly' means
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performan ce or display of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times."
"To 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process whereby
images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent."

2.3 The relevant parts of the current text of Section 110(5) read as follows:8
"§ 110. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption of certain performances and displays
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of
copyright:
…
(5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission embodying
a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless –
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public;
(B) communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a
performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general
public, originated by a radio or television broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal
Communications Commission, or, if an audiov isual transmission, by a cable system or
satellite carrier, if—
(i) in the case of an establishment other than a food service or drinking
establishment, either the establishment in which the communication occurs has less
than 2,000 gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and
for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has
2,000 or more gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking
and for no other purpose) and—
(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which
not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor
space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual
portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of
not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than 1 audiovisual
device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a
diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the
performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than
6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any
1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
(ii) in the case of a food service or drinking establishment, either the
establishment in which the communication occurs has less than 3,750 gross square
feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose),
or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 3,750 gross square feet
of space or more (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other
purpose) and—

8 As contained in Exhibit US-15(a). There is no official US Government consolidated text of the
amended Section 110(5).

(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which
not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor
space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual
portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of
not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one audiovisual
device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a
diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the
performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than
6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any
1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
(iii) no direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or retransmission;
(iv) the transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the
establishment where it is received; and
(v) the transmission or retransmission is licensed by the copyright owner of the work
so publicly performed or displayed; and
…"
9
2.4 Subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) essentially reproduces the text of the original
"homestyle" exemption contained in Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act of 1976. When Section
110(5) was amended in 1998, the homestyle exemption was moved to a new subparagraph (A) and the
words "except as provided in subparagraph (B)" were added to the beginning of the text.
2.5 A House Report (1976) accompanying the C opyright Act of 1976 explained that in its
original form Section 110(5) "applies to performances and displays of all types of works, and its
purpose is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an
ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for
private use". "The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the transmission by
turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be
imposed." "[The clause] would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial 'sound system'
installed or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or

9 Section 205 of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act amended Section 110 of the Copyright Act of
1976 by inserting a number of definitions thereto that relate to the new Section 110(5)(B), including the
following:
"An 'establishment' is a store, shop, or any similar place of business open to the general public
for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that
is nonresidential is used for that purpose, and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly."
"A 'food service or drinking establishment' is a restaurant, inn, bar, tavern, or any other similar
place of business in which the public or patrons assemble for the primary purpose of being served food or drink,
in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is nonresidential is used for that purpose, and in
which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly."
"The 'gross square feet of space' of an esta blishment means the entire interior space of that
establishment, and any adjoining outdoor space used to serve patrons, whether on a seasonal basis or otherwise."

extensive amplification equipment) into the equivalent of a commercial sound system." 10 A
subsequent Conference Report (1976) elaborated on the rationale by noting that the intent was to
exempt a small commercial establishment "which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical
matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service".11
2.6 The factors to consider in applying the exemption are largely based on the facts of a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court immedi ately prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright
Act. In Aiken,12 the Court held that an owner of a small fast food restaurant was not liable for playing
music by means of a radio with outlets to four speakers in the ceiling; the size of the shop was
1,055 square feet (98 m 2), of which 620 square feet (56 m 2) were open to the public. The House
Report (1976) describes the factual situation in Aiken as representing the "outer limit of the
exemption" contained in the original Section 110(5). This exemption became known as the
"homestyle" exemption.
2.7 As indicated in the first quotation in the preceding paragraph, the homestyle exemption was
originally intended to apply to performances of a ll types of works. However, given that the present
subparagraph (B) applies to "a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work", the parties
agree, by way of an a contrario interpretation, that the effect of the introductory phrase "except as
provided in subparagraph (B)", that was added to the text in subparagraph (A), is that it narrows down
the application of subparagraph (A) to works other than "nondramatic musical works".13
2.8 The Panel notes that it is the common understanding of the parties that the expression
"nondramatic musical works" in subparagraph (B) excludes from its application the communication of
music that is part of an opera, operetta, musical or other similar dramatic work when performed in a
dramatic context. All other musical works are covered by that expression, including individual songs
taken from dramatic works when performed outside of any dramatic context. Subparagraph (B)
would, therefore, apply for example to an individu al song taken from a musical and played on the
radio. Consequently, the operation of subparagraph (A) is limited to such musical works as are not
covered by subparagraph (B), for example a communication of a broadcast of a dramatic rendition of
the music written for an opera.
14
2.9 The 1998 Amendment has added a new subparagraph (B) to Section 110(5), to which we, for
the sake of brevity, hereinafter refer to as a "business" exemption. It exempts, under certain
conditions, communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a
performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public,

10 These quotations are from the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, 94th Congress, 2nd Session 87 (1976), as reproduced in Exhibit US-1. The Report adds that "[f]actors to
consider in particular cases would include the size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas within the
establishment where the transmissions are made audibl e or visible, and the extent to which the receiving
apparatus is altered or augmented for the purpose of improving the aural or visual quality of the performance".
11 Conference Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94 th Congress., 2 nd Session 75 (1976), as reproduced in Exhibit
US-2.
In their first written submissions, the European Communities and the United States expressed their
views on the background and subsequent application of the original homestyle exemption.
12 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
13 See the second written submissions by the United States (paragraph 3) and the European
Communities (paragraph 7).
14 The notion "nondramatic musical work" was introduced to Section 110(5) with the
1998 Amendment. However, this notion is also used in the Copyright Act of 1976 in a number of other
limitations to the public performance right (Section 110(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7)), and certain provisions
concerning the making of phonorecords (Section 115), juxeboxes (Section 116) and noncommercial
broadcasting (Section 118), all of which apply to nondramatic musical works, but not to dramatic works.

originated by a radio or television broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications
Commission, or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier.
2.10 The beneficiaries of the business exemption are divided into two categories: establishments
other than food service or drinking establishments ("retail establishments"), and food service and
drinking establishments. In each category, establishments under a certain size limit are exempted,
regardless of the type of equipment they use. The size limits are 2,000 gross square feet (186 m
2) for
retail establishments and 3,750 gross square feet (348 m2) for restaurants.
2.11 In its study of November 1995 15 prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Congressional Research Service ("CRS") estimated that 16 per cent of eating establishments, 13.5 per
cent of drinking establishments and 18 per cent of retail establishments were below the area of the
restaurant ran by Mr. Aiken, i.e. 1,055 square feet. 16 Furthermore, the CRS estimated that 65.2 per
cent of eating establishments and 71.8 per cent of drinking establishments would have fallen at that
time under a 3,500 square feet limit, and that 27 per cent of retail establishments would have fallen
under a 1,500 square feet limit.
2.12 In 1999, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ("D&B") was requested on behalf of the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to update the CRS study based on 1998 data and the
criteria in the 1998 Amendment. In this study, the D&B estimated that 70 per cent of eating
establishments and 73 per cent of drinking establishments fell under the 3,750 square feet limit, and
that 45 per cent of retail establishments fell under the 2,000 square feet limit.
17
2.13 The studies conducted by the National Restaurant Association (NRA) concerning its
membership indicate that 36 per cent of table service restaurant members (those with sit-down waiter
service) and 95 per cent of quick service restaurant members are less than 3,750 square feet.18,19
2.14 If the size of an establishment is above the limits referred to in paragraph 2.10 above (there is
no maximum size), the exemption applies provided that the establishment does not exceed the limits
set for the equipment used. The limits on equipment are different as regards, on the one hand, audio
performances, and, on the other hand, audiovisual performances and displays. The rules concerning
equipment limitations are the same for both retail establishments and restaurants above the respective
size limits.
2.15 The types of transmissions covered by both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5)
include original broadcasts over the air or by satellite, rebroadcasts by terrestrial means or by satellite,
cable retransmissions of original broadcasts, and original cable transmissions or other transmissions
by wire.
20 The provisions do not distinguish between analog and digital transmissions.
2.16 Section 110(5) does not apply to the use of recorded music, such as CDs or cassette tapes, or
to live performances of music.

15 As reproduced in Exhibit EC-16.
16 The Aiken case is explained in paragraph 2.6 above.
17 See paragraph 49 of the first written submission by the EC. The EC observers that the percentage
figures referred to in paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12 do not take account of other exempted establishments such as
hotels, financial services outlets, estate property brokers, and other types of service providers.
18 See the response from the US to question 9 from the Panel and confidential exhibit US-18.
19 The relevance of the percentage figures referred to in paragraphs 2.11 and 2.13 for the case at hand,
as well as other factual information and estimations concerning the number of establishments licenced by
collective management organizations and the revenues collected by them provided by the parties will be
discussed in section VI of this report. For complete information, please see the attached submissions by the
parties.
20 See the response of the US to question 5 from the Panel.

2.17 Holders of copyright in musical works (composers, lyricists and music publishers) normally
entrust the licensing of nondramatic public performance of their works to collective management
organizations ("CMOs" or performing rights organizations). The three main CMOs in the United
States in this area are ASCAP, the Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and SESAC, Inc. CMOs license the
public performance of musical works to users of music, such as retail establishments and restaurants,
on behalf of the individual right holders they represent, collect licence fees from such users, and
distribute revenues as royalties to the respective right holders. They normally enter into reciprocal
arrangements with the CMOs of other countries to license the works of the right holders represented
by them. Revenues are distributed to individual right holders through the CMOs that represent the
right holders in question. The above-mentioned three US CMOs license nondramatic public
performances of musical works, including nondramatic renditions of "dramatic" musical works.
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES
3.1 The European Communities alleges that the exemptions provided in subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act are in violation of the United States' obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, it alleges that these US measures are incompatible with
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement together with Articles 11(1)(ii) and 11 bis(1)(iii) of the Berne
Convention (1971) and that they cannot be just ified under any express or implied exception or
limitation permissible under the Berne Convention ( 1971) or the TRIPS Agreement. In the view of
the EC, these measures cause prejudice to the legitimate rights of copyright owners, thus nullifying
and impairing the rights of the European Communities.
3.2 The European Communities requests the Panel to find that the United States has violated its
obligations under Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement together with Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) and to recommend that the United States bring its domestic
legislation into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
3.3 The United States contends that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act is fully consistent
with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The Agreement, incorporating the substantive
provisions of the Berne Convention (1971), allows Members to place minor limitations on the
exclusive rights of copyright owners. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the standard by
which to judge the appropriateness of such limitations or exceptions. The exemptions embodied in
Section 110(5) fall within the Article 13 standard.
3.4 The United States requests the Panel to find that both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act meet the standard of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and
the substantive obligations of the Berne Convention (1971). Accordingly, the United States requests
the Panel to dismiss the claims of the European Communities in this dispute.
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES AND THE THIRD PARTIES AND FACTUAL
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF WIPO
4.1 The arguments of the parties and the third parties are set out in their submissions to the Panel
(see Attachment 1 for the European Communities, Attachment 2 for the United States and
Attachment 3 for the third parties). The letter from the Chair of the Panel to the Director General of
WIPO and the response thereto by the Director General of WIPO are reproduced in Attachment 4.
 21

21 Exhibits attached to the submissions and annexes to the letter from the Director General of WIPO are
not reproduced in this report.

V. INTERIM REVIEW
5.1 On 26 April 2000, the European Communities and the United States requested the Panel to
review, in accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU, precise aspects of the interim report that had been
issued to the parties on 14 April 2000. Neither the European Communities nor the United States
requested that a further meeting of the Panel with the parties be held. In a letter, dated 1 May 2000,
the United States made observations on some of the EC comments.
5.2 The European Communities made some editorial comments and requested some clarifications
to the Panel's reasoning:
(a) The European Communities deemed section III on "findings and recommendations
requested by the parties" and subsection VI.A on "claims" overlapping. We
considered that it was useful to reflect the parties' main claims in both sections.
(b) In subsection VI.B on "preliminary issue", the European Communities suggested
shortening the Panel's reasoning on its treatment of a letter from a law firm
representing ASCAP to the United States Trade Representative that was copied to it.
We made an editorial adjustment to the wording of paragraph 6.8.
(c) As proposed by the European Communities, we deleted the last sentence of
paragraph 6.27 of the interim report.
(d) With regard to an EC comment on the last sentence of paragraph 6.41, we considered
it useful to note that Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the relation between
successive treaties on the same subject-matter was not relevant to the case at hand.
(e) We were of the view that it was not necessary to rephrase our statement in paragraph
6.93 that the minor exceptions doctrine is primarily concerned with de minimis use.
(f) As suggested by the European Communities, we agreed to refer to the Dun &
Bradstreet study prepared in 1999 based on data from 1998 as the 1999 D&B study.
(g) As regards the second sentence of paragraph 6.140, the European Communities
stressed that it had consistently referred to the Claire's Boutique and Edison Bros .
cases as evidence that the homestyle exemption is not narrowly confined but had been
applied to huge nationally operating corporations. We clarified the sentence by
indicating that it expresses our understanding of the EC argumentation.
(h) The European Communities requested us to clarify our reasoning in paragraph 6.214.
We deemed the reasoning to be sufficiently clear.
(i) We did not agree to change our finding in paragraph 7.1(a), as suggested by the
European Communities, by adding, after the words "subparagraph (A) of Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act", the words "which covers exclusively dramatic
musical works".
5.3 The United States mainly made comments of an editorial and factual nature:
(a) We accepted certain editorial suggestions and made minor clerical changes in
paragraphs 6.97, 6.205 and 6.260 of the findings.
(b) We agreed, as requested by the United States, to refer to exhibits US-17 and US-18 as
"confidential exhibits", given that the United States had obtained them in confidence.

(c) Furthermore, as proposed by the United States, we deleted a reference in
footnote 127, inserted specific factual information from its responses to questions in
footnote 173 and added updated information in footnote 188.
VI. FINDINGS
A. CLAIMS
6.1 As mentioned above, the European Communitie s alleges that the exemptions provided in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act are in violation of the United
States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, and requests the Panel to find that the United States
has violated its obligations under Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement together with
Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) and to recommend that the United
States bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
6.2 The United States contends that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act is fully consistent
with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, and requests the Panel to find that both
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act meet the standard of Article 13
of the TRIPS Agreement and the substantive obligations of the Berne Convention (1971).
Accordingly, the United States requests the Panel to dismiss the claims of the European Communities
in this dispute.
B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE
6.3 Before examining the substantive aspects of this dispute, we discuss how we treat a letter
from a law firm representing ASCAP to the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") that was
copied to the Panel.
6.4 By means of a letter addressed to a law firm representing ASCAP, dated 16 November
1999,22 the USTR requested information from ASCAP in relation to questions 9-11 from the Panel to
the United States, which were reproduced in the letter. 23 The law firm responded to the USTR by
means of a letter, dated 3 December 1999. It forwarded a copy of this letter, addressed to the USTR,
to the Panel. The Panel received this copy on 8 December 1999. The Panel transmitted the letter
forthwith to both parties and invited them to comment on it if they so wished.
6.5 In a letter, dated 17 December 1999, the United States, inter alia , distanced itself from
positions expressed in the letter by that law firm and emphasized that in its view the letter was of little
probative value for the Panel because it provided essentially no factual data not already provided by
either party. But the United States supported in general the right of private parties to make their views
known to WTO dispute settlement panels.
6.6 In a letter, dated 12 January 2000, the European Communities stated that it did not have
substantive comments on the letter. While it appr eciated ASCAP's contribution to the current case, it
considered that the letter did not add any new element to what was already submitted by the parties.
In referring to the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 13 of the DSU in its report in the dispute
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ,24 the European
Communities also remarked that in its view, the auth ority of panels is limited to the consideration of
factual information and technical advice by individuals or bodies alien to the dispute and thus did not

22 Exhibit US-19(a). The USTR sent a similar letter to the BMI, Exhibit US-19(b).
23 These questions and the responses thereto by the United States are contained in Attachment 2.3 to the
report.
24 Appellate Body Report on United States – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, paragraphs 99-110.

include the possibility for a panel to accept any legal argument or legal interpretation from such
individuals or bodies.
6.7 According to Article 13 of the DSU, "each panel shall have the right to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. …". We recall that in the
United States – Shrimps dispute the Appellate Body reasoned with respect to the treatment by a panel
of non-requested information that the "authority to seek information is not properly equated with a
prohibition on accepting information which has been submitted without having been requested by a
panel. A panel has discretionary authority to accept and consider or to reject information and advice
submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not. …". 25
6.8 In this dispute, we do not reject outright the information contained in the letter from the law
firm representing ASCAP to the USTR that was copied to the Panel. We recall that the Appellate
Body has recognized the authority of panels to accept non-requested information. However, we share
the view expressed by the parties that this letter essentially duplicates information already submitted
by the parties. We also emphasize that the letter was not addressed to the Panel but only copied to it.
Therefore, while not having refused the copy of the letter, we have not relied on it for our reasoning or
our findings.
C. B
URDEN OF PROOF
6.9 Before turning to the substantive aspects of this dispute, we also discuss the issue of burden of
proof.
6.10 We note that the United States does not dispute that subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
Section 110(5) implicate Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into
the TRIPS Agreement. But we also recall the US statement that the question of whether these
subparagraphs are consistent with those Articles cannot be determined without looking both to the
scope of the rights that they afford and to the ex ceptions which are permitted to those rights. In the
view of the United States, only if subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) do not fall within the
confines of the relevant exceptions under the TRIPS Agreement, will a finding of inconsistency be
possible.
26
6.11 We further recall the European Communities' contention that it merely needs to establish an
inconsistency of Section 110(5) with any provision of the TRIPS Agreement (including those of the
Berne Convention (1971) incorporated into it). Once such inconsistency is established by the
complainant (or admitted by the respondent), in the view of the European Communities, the burden
rests on the United States to invoke and prove the applicability of an exception.27
6.12 Recalling the principles set out in the Appellate Body report on United States – Shirts and
Blouses,28 we note that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending,

25 Appellate Body Report on United States – Shrimps, op.cit., paragraph 108.
26 Response to question 2 from the Panel to the United States at the first substantive meeting.
27 First written submission by the European Communities, paragraph 74; the second written
submission by the European Communities, paragraph 34.
28 In United States – Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body stated:
"… the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing
proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most
jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that
what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption." (Footnotes omitted). See the Appellate Body Report on United States –
Measures Affecting Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , adopted on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R,
p.14.

who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient
to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will
fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
6.13 Consistent with past WTO dispute settlement practice, 29 we consider that the European
Communities bears the burden of establishing a prima facie violation of the basic rights that have
been provided under the copyright provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, including its provisions that
have been incorporated by reference from the Berne Convention (1971). By the same token, once the
European Communities has succeeded in doing so, the burden rests with the United States to establish
that any exception or limitation is applicable and that the conditions, if any, for invoking such
exception are fulfilled.
6.14 The same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party
who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof.
It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit
evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact.
6.15 While a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence
to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be di stinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate
burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence.
6.16 Thus we conclude that it is for the European Communities to present a prima facie case that
Section 110(5)(A) and (B) of the US Copyright Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement (including those of the Berne Conventi on (1971) incorporated into it). Should the
European Communities fail in establishing such violation, it goes without saying that the United
States would not have to invoke any justification or exception. However, we also consider that the
burden of proving that any exception or limitation is applicable and that any relevant conditions are
met falls on the United States as the party bearing the ultimate burden of proof for invoking
exceptions.
30 In view of the statements made by both parties at the first substantive meeting to the
Panel, it is our understanding that the parties do not disagree with our interpretation concerning the
allocation of the burden of proof as described above.
D. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE
1. General considerations about the exclusive rights concerned and limitations thereto
(a) Exclusive rights implicated by the EC claims
6.17 Articles 9–13 of Section 1 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement entitled "Copyright and Related
Rights" deal with the substantive standards of copyright protection. Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement obliges WTO Members to comply with Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention (1971)
(with the exception of Article 6bis on moral rights and the rights derived therefrom) and the Appendix
thereto.31 The European Communities alleges that subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) are
inconsistent primarily with Article 11 bis(1)(iii) but also with Article 11(1)(ii) of the Berne
Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.

29 Appellate Body Report on United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ,
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.22; Appellate Body Report on United States – Shirts and Blouses
from India, adopted on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, p.14.
30 Appellate Body Report on United States – Gasoline, adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.22-
23.
31 Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement: "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or obligations
under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Articles 6 bis of that Convention or the rights
derived therefrom."

6.18 We note that through their incorporation, the substantive rules of the Berne
Convention (1971), including the provisions of its Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii), have become
part of the TRIPS Agreement and as provisions of that Agreement have to be read as applying to
WTO Members.
(i) Article 11bis of the Berne Convention (1971)
6.19 The provision of particular relevance for this dispute is Article 11 bis(1)(iii).32
Article 11bis(1) provides:
"Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing:
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by
any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images;
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by re-broadcasting of the
broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an organization other
than the original one;
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument
transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work."
6.20 In the light of Article 2 of the Berne Convention (1971), "artistic" works in the meaning of
Article 11bis(1) include nondramatic and other musical works. Each of the subparagraphs of
Article 11bis(1) confers a separate exclusive right; exploitation of a work in a manner covered by any
of these subparagraphs requires an authorization by the right holder. For example, the communication
to the public of a broadcast creates an additional audience and the right holder is given control over,
and may expect remuneration from, this new public performance of his or her work.
6.21 The right provided under subparagraph (i) of Article 11 bis(1) is to authorize the broadcasting
of a work and the communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of
signs, sounds or images. It applies to both radio and television broadcasts. Subparagraph (ii)
concerns the subsequent use of this emission; the authors' exclusive right covers any communication
to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when the communication is
made by an organization other than the original one.
6.22 Subparagraph (iii) provides an exclusive right to authorize the public communication of the
broadcast of the work by loudspeaker, on a television screen, or by other similar means. Such
communication involves a new public performance of a work contained in a broadcast, which requires
a licence from the right holder.
33 For the purposes of this dispute, the claims raised by the European
Communities under Article 11bis(1) are limited to subparagraph (iii).34

32 Article 11bis was introduced into the Berne Convention at the occasion of the Rome Revision (1928)
and further elaborated by the Brussels Revision (1948) in the light of technological developments.
33 The Guide to the Berne Convention, published by WIPO in 1978 ("Guide to the Berne Convention")
gives the following explanation on the situation covered by Article 11 bis(1)(iii): "This case is becoming more
common. In places where people gather (cafés, restaurants, tea-rooms, hotels, large shops, trains, aircraft, etc.)
the practice is growing of providing broadcast programmes. … The question is whether the licence given by the
author to the broadcasting station covers, in addition, all the use made of the broadcast, which may or many not
be for commercial ends. … The Convention’s answer is 'no'. Just as, in the case of a relay of a broadcast by
wire, an additional audience is created (paragraph (1)(ii)), so, in this case, too, the work is made perceptible to
listeners (and perhaps to viewers) other than those cont emplated by the author when his permission was given.
Although, by definition, the number of people receiving a broadcast cannot be ascertained with any certainty,
the author thinks of his licence to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal within the

(ii) Article 11 of the Berne Convention (1971)
6.23 Of relevance to this dispute are also the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11(1)(ii) of the
Berne Convention (1971). Article 11(1) provides:
"Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing:
(i) the public performance of their works, including such public performance by
any means or process;
(ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their works."
6.24 As in the case of Article 11 bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971), which concerns
broadcasting to the public and communication of a broadcast to the public, the exclusive rights
conferred by Article 11 cover public performance; private performance does not require
authorization. Public performance includes performance by any means or process, such as
performance by means of recordings (e.g., CDs, cassettes and videos).
35 It also includes
communication to the public of a performance of the work. The claims raised by the European
Communities under Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) are limited to its subparagraph (ii).
6.25 Regarding the relationship between Articles 11 and 11bis, we note that the rights conferred in
Article 11(1)(ii) concern the communication to th e public of performances of works in general.
Article 11bis(1)(iii) is a specific rule conferring exclusive rights concerning the public communication
by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the
broadcast of a work.
6.26 As set out in section III above, the European Commun ities raises claims against
Section 110(5) primarily under Article 11bis(1)(iii), which covers the communication to the public of
a broadcast which has been transmitted at some point by hertzian waves. But the EC claims also
relate to Article 11(1)(ii) to the extent that a communication to the public concerns situations where
the entire transmission has been by wire.
6.27 We share the understanding of the parties that a communication to the public by loudspeaker
of a performance of a work transmitted by means other than hertzian waves is covered by the
exclusive rights conferred by Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention (1971).
36 Moreover, we note that
both parties consider that it is the third exclusive right under Article 11 bis(1)(iii) – i.e., the author’s
right to authorize the public communication of a broadcast of a work by loudspeaker or any other
analogous instrument – which is primarily concerned in this dispute. But we also note that there is no

family circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider circle, often for profit, an additional
section of the public is enabled to enjoy the work an d it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting. The
author is given control over this new public performance of his work." See Guide to the Berne Convention,
paragraphs 11bis.11 and 11bis.12, p.68-69.
34 EC reply to question 8 of Panel; Paragraphs 41-46 of the EC oral statement at the first panel
meeting; Paragraphs 61-72 of the EC first written submission.
35 However, public performance by means of cinematographic works is separately covered in
Article 14(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention. Public performance of a literary work or communication to the
public of the recitation is covered by Article 11ter of the Berne Convention.
36 In this respect we recall the explanation give n in the Guide to the Berne Convention: "The
communication to the public of a performance of the work … covers all public communication except
broadcasting which is dealt with in Article 11 bis. For example, a broadcasting organisation broadcasts a
chamber concert – Article 11 bis applies. But if it or some other body diffuses the music by landline to
subscribers, this is a matter for Article 11." Guide to the Berne Convention, paragraph 11.5, p. 65.

disagreement between the parties that both subpar agraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) implicate
both Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) – albeit to a varying extent.37
6.28 Both provisions, i.e., Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) are
implicated only if there is a public element to the broadcasting or communication operation. We note
that it is undisputed between the parties that playing radio or television music by establishments
covered by Section 110(5) involves a communication that is available to the public in the sense of
Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971). We share this view of the
parties.
38
6.29 As noted above, the United States acknow ledges that subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
Section 110(5) implicate Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971).
Consequently, the core question before this Panel is which of the exceptions under the TRIPS
Agreement invoked are relevant to this dispute and whether the conditions for their invocation are met
so as to justify the exemptions under subparag raphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act.
(b) Limitations and exceptions
(i) Introduction
6.30 A major issue in this dispute is the interpretation and application to the facts of this case of
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. The US defense is firmly based upon it. The United States
submits that the Article clarifies and articulates the "minor exceptions" doctrine applicable under
certain provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) and incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. But
the determination of the dispute raises other questions, for instance questions concerning the
relationship between Article 13 and the "minor exceptions" doctrine developed in relation to
Articles 11 and 11 bis(1) and (2) of the Berne Convention (1971) and incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement by Article 9.1 thereof. So although the US case rests on Article 13, the determination of
the questions at issue between the parties involves considerations beyond those that arise from the
mere application of Article 13 to the facts of this case.
6.31 Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, entitled "Limitations and Exceptions", is the general
exception clause applicable to exclusive rights of the holders of copyright. It provides:
"Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."
6.32 We discuss the scope of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement in subsection (iv) of this section
(paragraphs 6.71ff). In the second part of this report (paragraphs 6.97ff), we will apply the three

37 EC reply to question 8 of Panel; Paragraphs 41-46 of the EC oral statement at the first panel
meeting; Paragraphs 61-72 of the EC first written submission; US response to question 2 by the Panel to the
United States. The United States emphasizes, however, that it may not be found in violation of Articles 11
and/or 11 bis if subparagraphs (A) and (b) of Section 110(5) meet the requirements of relevant exceptions or
limitations under the TRIPS Agreement.
38 We note that Section 101 of the US Copyright Act contains the following definition: "To perform or
display a work 'publicly' means
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performan ce or display of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public are capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times."

conditions contained in that Article to subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act.
(ii) Summary of the arguments raised by the parties
6.33 The United States submits that the TRIPS Agreement, incorporating the substantive
provisions of the Berne Convention (1971), allows Members to place minor limitations on the
exclusive rights of copyright owners. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the standard by
which to judge the appropriateness of such limitations or exceptions. The exemptions embodied in
Section 110(5) fall within the Article 13 standard.
6.34 The principal EC argument concerning Article 13 is that it only applies to exclusive rights
newly introduced under the TRIPS Agreement and that the rights conferred under Articles 1–21 of the
Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into th e TRIPS Agreement can be derogated from only on
the grounds of pre-existing exceptions applicable under the Berne Convention (1971). In the EC
view, its position is supported by Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 20 of the Berne
Convention (1971), which it interprets as a prohibition on any derogation from existing standards of
protection under the Berne Convention (1971).
6.35 In the US view, Article 13 applies to all copyright-related provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, including the articles of the Berne Convention (1971) incorporated into it. As far as
Articles 11 bis(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement are concerned, the US view is that Article 13 clarifies and articulates the scope of the so-
called "minor exceptions" doctrine,
39 which applies to the exclusive rights provided under those
Articles. Thus, the United States argues that Article 13 provides the standard by which the
permissibility of limitations or "minor exceptions" from exclusive rights in question has to be judged.
6.36 In the alternative to its argument referred to in paragraph 6.34 above, the European
Communities contends that even if Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement was considered to be
applicable to the exclusive rights provided under the Berne provisions incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, its role would be to confine the scope of the pre-existing limitations and exceptions
provided in those Berne provisions. The European Communities concedes that the minor exceptions
doctrine has been referred to in the discussions during the diplomatic conferences for the revision of
the Berne Convention held in Brussels in 1948
40 and Stockholm in 1967, 41 but considers its precise
scope and legal status under the Berne Convention as unclear. In its view, the scope of limitations
allowed under the minor exceptions doctrine is limited to public performance of works for religious
ceremonies, military bands and the needs of child and adult education. It adds that such uses are
characterized by their non-commercial character. The European Communities also argues that the
minor exceptions doctrine was intended to "grandfa ther" only pre-existing exceptions that existed in
national legislation prior to the Stockholm Diplom atic Conference of 1967, regardless of when a
particular country acceded to the Berne Convention.42
6.37 The United States submits that the minor exceptions doctrine constitutes a subsequent
practice of the Berne Union members in the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"). In the US view, it is not limited to the specific examples
mentioned in the reports of the Brussels and Stockholm diplomatic conferences. There is no

39 See explanation in paragraphs 6.45ff below.
40 Brussels Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention, 5 to 26 June 1948.
41 Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, 11 June to 14 July 1967.
42 See, inter alia, the second written submission by the European Communities, paragraphs 16, 17, 22,
23, 27 and 28.

requirement that exempt uses be non-commercial. Moreover, the minor exceptions doctrine is not
limited to pre-existing exceptions in force prior to 1967 or any other date.43
6.38 As far as the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11 bis(1) are concerned, the European
Communities takes the position that neither the minor exceptions doctrine nor Article 13 can be
applied in isolation from the requirement to provide an equitable remuneration set forth in
Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971). In its view, an exception to the exclusive rights in
question must provide, as a minimum, equitable remuneration to the right holder, in addition to
meeting the three conditions of Article 13. In its view, an equitable remuneration can be provided
through means other than compulsory licensing
44 and thus the scope of application of Article 11 bis(2)
covers all exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11 bis(1). The European
Communities also refers to the extensive argumentation supporting this interpretation as developed in
Australia's third party submission.45
6.39 The United States responds that there is a basic distinction between exceptions to exclusive
rights and compulsory licences. Article 11 bis(2) merely authorizes a country to substitute a
compulsory licence, or its equivalent, for an exclusive right under Article 11 bis(1). Neither the
negotiating history of the Berne Convention nor the subsequent writings of commentators support the
view that 11 bis(2) authorizes outright exceptions to Article 11 bis, or represents a standard against
which to judge such exceptions. Consequently, Article 11bis(2) is not related to the minor exceptions
doctrine, and does not bear upon the scope of exceptions permissible under that doctrine.46
6.40 In the following, we first examine the legal status and scope of the minor exceptions doctrine
under the TRIPS Agreement, and then the applicability of Article 13 to the rights provided under the
provisions of the Berne Convention (1971), in particular to its Articles 11 bis(1) and 11(1), as
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. We then consider the relevance of Article 11 bis(2) of the
Berne Convention (1971) for this case.
6.41 In examining these issues, the question that arises is how the conditions for invoking
exceptions provided under the Berne Convention (1971), in particular under the minor exceptions
doctrine and Article 11 bis(2), and the conditions for invoking Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement
interrelate. We note that Article 30 of the Vienna Convention 47 on the application of successive
treaties is not relevant in this respect, because all provisions of the TRIPS Agreement – including the
incorporated Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention (1971) – entered into force at the same point in
time.

43 See the second written submission by the United States, paragraphs 16-22.
44 The European Communities notes that "[i]t would appear that a country could set minimum or
precise levels of royalties to be paid for the different uses protected under Article 11 bis of the Berne
Convention. Another way to provide for equitable remuneration could be the introduction of a levy system for
the audio/TV equipment purchased by the establishment being allowed to play copyrighted works without
authorisations, whereby the proceeds from such a levy system is distributed to the right holders". See EC
response to question 12 from the Panel to the European Communities.
45 The written submission of Australia, paragraphs 2.8-2.14, 3.7-3.14, 4.3 and 4.8.
46 Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the US second written submission; see also US response to question 6 from
the Panel to both parties.
47 The relevant parts of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide: "…
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible
with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all parties to the earlier treaty are partie s also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is
not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties,
the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. …"

(iii) The minor exceptions doctrine
6.42 As we noted above, the US view is that Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement clarifies and
articulates the scope of the minor exceptions doctrine, which is applicable under the TRIPS
Agreement. Before considering the applicability of Article 13 to Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of
the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated in to the TRIPS Agreement, we will first examine
whether the minor exceptions doctrine applies under the TRIPS Agreement. This examination
involves a two-step analysis. As the first step, we analyse to what extent this doctrine forms part of
the Berne Convention acquis; in doing so, we will also consider the different views of the parties as
to the scope of the doctrine. The second step is to analyse whether that doctrine, if we were to find
that it applies under certain Articles of the Berne Convention (1971), has been incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement, by virtue of Article 9.1 of that Agreement, together with Articles 1–21 of the
Berne Convention (1971).
General rules of interpretation
6.43 As frequently referred to by WTO panels and the Appellate Body, the fundamental rules of
treaty interpretation are Article 31 48 "General rule of interpretation" and Article 32 "Supplementary
means of interpretation" of the Vienna Convention. We note that, pursuant to Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention, we have to interpret in good faith the provisions within our terms of reference in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to th e terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. We have already addressed the terms of these Articles. But our task
does not end with that. The ordinary meaning has to be given to the terms of a treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.
49
6.44 In that respect, we note that Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; …" 50
6.45 The International Law Commission explains in its commentary on the final set of draft
articles on the law of treaties that this provision is based on the principle that a unilateral document
cannot be regarded as forming part of the context unless not only was it made in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty, but its relation to the treaty was accepted by the other parties.51 "On the other
hand, the fact that these two classes of documents are recognized in paragraph 2 as forming part of the
'context' does not mean that they are necessarily to be considered as an integral part of the treaty.

48 "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in acco rdance with the ordinary meaning to be given the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
49 Reading treaty terms in their context requires that th e text of the treaty must of course be read as a
whole. One cannot simply concentrate on a paragraph, an article, a section, a chapter or a part. (Cf. Ian
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2
nd ed.), Manchester (1984), p. 127.). See also:
Competence of Assembly regarding admission to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
p. 8; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 69; Polish Postal Service in Danzig,
P.I.C.J. Series B, No. 11, p. 39. Yasseen notes that "[d]'autres dispositions plus ou moins éloignées risquent
d'apporter une exception à la disposition qu'il s'agit d'interpréter ou de poser une condition à la mise en oeuvre
Traités, 151 Recueil des Cours (1976-III), p. 34.
50 Subparagraph (b) of Article 31(2) provides that the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty also comprises: "any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty".
51 Sinclair, op.cit. p. 129.

Whether they are an actual part of the treaty depends on the intention of the parties in each case." 52 It
is essential that the agreement or instrument should be related to the treaty. It must be concerned with
the substance of the treaty and clarify certain concepts in the treaty or limit its field of application.53 It
must equally be drawn up on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty. 54 Any agreement or
instrument fulfilling these criteria will form part of the "context" of the treaty and will thus not be
treated as part of the preparatory works but rather as an element in the general rule of interpretation.
55
6.46 Also uncontested interpretations given at a conference, e.g., by a chairman of a drafting
committee, may constitute an "agreement" forming part of the "context".56 However, interpretative or
explanatory statements by members of a drafting committee in their personal capacity should be
considered, if at all, simply as part of the preparatory works. We recall in this respect that, according
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, preparatory works of a treaty are relevant as supplementary
means of interpretation, together with the circumstances of its conclusion, inter alia, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 of that Convention.
The legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine under the Berne Convention
6.47 We will now apply these fundamental rules of in terpretation to the provisions of the Berne
Convention (1971) within our terms of reference, with a view to ascertaining the legal status of the
minor exceptions doctrine in relation to Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) of that Convention.
6.48 We note that, in addition to the explicit provisions on permissible limitations and exceptions
to the exclusive rights embodied in the text of th e Berne Convention (1971), the reports of successive
revision conferences of that Convention refer to "implied exceptions" allowing member countries to
provide limitations and exceptions to certain rights. The so-called "minor reservations" or "minor
exceptions" doctrine is being referred to in respect of the right of public performance and certain other

52 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966-II), p. 221.
p. 37; cited by Sinclair, op.cit., p.129.
même du contexte." See: Yasseen, op.cit., paragraph 16, p. 38.
55 Sinclair, op.cit. 129. Sinclair mentions the example of the Council of Europe, where governmental
experts charged with the task of negotiating and formulating an international convention of a particular topic,
draw up, in parallel with the text of the convention, an explanatory report which sets out the framework within
which and the background against which the convention has been drawn up, and which then goes on to furnish
an article by article commentary on the text. The explanatory report is agreed upon unanimously by the
governmental experts responsible for drawing up the text of the convention and it is adopted simultaneously
with the text of the convention.
56 "De plus, la procédure de certaines conférences générales permet, sans adoption de résolution
sérieusement, et si la disposition ainsi clarifiée est accep tée par un vote à la majorité requise, il est possible de
circonstances qui ont entouré l'adoption de la disposition dont il s'agit." See: Yasseen, op.cit., paragraph 20,
p. 39.

exclusive rights.57 Under that doctrine, Berne Union members may provide minor exceptions to the
rights provided, inter alia, under Articles 11bis and 11 of the Berne Convention (1971).58
6.49 This possibility, available to all Berne Union members, to provide exceptions to certain
exclusive rights is most often referred to as "minor reservations" doctrine. However, this terminology
is somewhat misleading in the sense that this possi bility does not constitute a reservation within the
meaning of Articles 19–23 of Section 2 on "Reservations" of the Vienna Convention. Specific rules
apply to the members of the Berne Union under Article 30 of the Berne Convention (1971) for
making reservations under that Convention. It should also be noted that WTO Members are forbidden
to make reservations under Article 72 of the TRIPS Agreement 59 without the consent of the other
Members. No reservation has been made on this basis under the TRIPS Agreement on this or any
other matter. 60 For the sake of clarity, we therefore use hereinafter the term "minor exceptions"
doctrine.
6.50 With respect to public performance of works, until 1948 only a national treatment obligation
was provided for under the Berne Convention. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Article 11 of that
Convention originated in the Brussels Act of 1948. Their wording remained essentially unchanged in
the Stockholm Act of 1967 and the Paris Act of 1971. No specific exception clause applicable to this
right was added to the text of the Convention. However, when the general right of public
performance was embodied for the first time in Article 11 of the Brussels Act, a statement was
included in the General Report of the Brussels Conference referring to the minor exceptions doctrine.
6.51 The provisions currently contained in Article 11 bis(1)(i) and 11 bis(2) were first introduced
into the Berne Convention at the Rome Conference of 1928, but subsequently modified.
Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of Article 11 bis(1) were added to the Convention at the Brussels
Conference of 1948. In discussing subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of Article 11 bis(1), the General Report
of the Brussels Conference states that the minor exceptions doctrine applies also to the exclusive
rights under Article 11bis.
6.52 More specifically, it was proposed at the Brussels Conference of 1948 that a general provision
be inserted into the Berne Convention under which it would be permissible for States parties to the
Convention to retain various minor exceptions that already existed in their national laws. However,
the proposal was not adopted by the Conference due to a concern that such a general provision could
encourage the widening of existing minor exceptions or the introduction of additional minor
exceptions in national laws. But the Conference did not question the very existence and maintenance
of minor exceptions in national laws as such. In the context of the discussions on Article 11, it was
agreed that rather than dealing with this matter in the text of the Convention itself, a statement

57 The other main category of implied exceptions are understood to apply to the use of translations of
literary works.
58 The doctrine refers to (i) public performance and (ii) communication thereof to the public in the
meaning of Article 11(1)(i-ii) as well as to (i) broadcasting by wireless diffusion, (ii) communication of the
broadcast to the public by wire or re-broadcasting, and (iii) public communication by loudspeaker etc. of the
broadcast in the meaning of Article 11 bis(1). The minor exceptions doctrine also has been referred to in the
context of Articles 11 ter, 13 and 14 of the Berne Convention. See the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works from 1886 to 1986, published by the International Bureau of WIPO (1986),
published by the International Bureau of WIPO in 1986 ("Berne Convention Centenary"), pp. 203 and 204. See
also Ricketson, Sam: The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986,
Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, London (1987), pp. 532-537ff.
59 Article 72 of the TRIPS Agreement: "Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the
provisions of this Agreement without the consent of the other Members."
60 Article XVI:5 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO reaffirms Article 72 of the TRIPS
Agreement.

concerning the possibility to provide minor exceptions in national law would be included into the
General Report.61
6.53 When ascertaining the legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine, it is important to note
that the General Report states that the Rapporteur-General had been " entrusted with making an
express mention of the possibility available to national legislation to make what is commonly called
minor reservations".62 We believe that the choice of these words reflects an agreement within the
meaning of Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention between the Berne Union members at the
Brussels Conference to retain the possibility of providing minor exceptions in national law. We arrive
at this conclusion for the following reasons. First, the introduction of Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) occurred simultaneously with the adopti on of the General Report expressly mentioning the
minor exceptions doctrine. Second, this doctrine is closely related to the substance of the amendment
of the Berne Convention in that it limits the scope of the exclusive rights introduced by
Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention. Third, an "agreement" between all the
parties exists because, on the one hand, the Rapporteur-General is being "entrusted to expressly
mention" minor exceptions and, on the other hand, the General Report of the Brussels Conference
reflecting this express mentioning was formally adopted by the Berne Union members. We therefore
conclude that an agreement within the meaning of Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention between
all the parties on the possibility to provide minor exceptions was made in connection with the
conclusion of a revision of the Convention introducing additional exclusive rights, including those
contained in Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii), to which these limitations were to apply, and that this
agreement is relevant as context for interpreting these Articles.
63
6.54 As pointed out above, the wording of Articles 11 bis and 11 remained essentially the same at
the Diplomatic Conferences in Stockholm (1967) and Paris (1971) where the General Reports were
also formally adopted by the Berne Union memb ers. The reports of the Stockholm Conference
reconfirm our conclusion concerning the existence of an agreement on minor exceptions. The report
of the Main Committee I64 refers to the existence of an agreement between the Berne Union members

61 The relevant part of the General Report of the Brussels Diplomatic Conference reads as follows:
"Your Rapporteur-General has been entrusted with making an express mention of the possibility
available to national legislation to make what are commonly called minor reservations. The Delegates of
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary, have all
mentioned these limited exceptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of the child
and adult education. These exceptional measures apply to articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. You will understand
that these references are just lightly pencilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the principles of the right."
See Annex XII.1 to the letter from the Director General of WIPO to the Chair of the Panel. The statement is
also reproduced in the Berne Convention Centenary, op.cit., p. 181.
62 This is not merely a statement by a chair of a drafting group made in his/her personal capacity.
63 If there were no possibility for "minor exceptions" from Articles 11 bis and 11, no de minimis
exemptions in national law whatsoever, allowing the use of the rights conferred by these Articles without
remuneration, could be justified under any provision of the Berne Convention.
64 The relevant parts of the Report of the Work of Main Committee I (Substantive Provisions of the
Berne Convention: Articles 1 to 20) read as follows:
"209. In the General Report of the Brussels Conference, the Rapporteur was instructed to refer
explicitly, in connection with Article 11, to the possibility of what it had been agreed to call 'the minor
reservations' of national legislation. Some delegates had referred to the exceptions permitted in respect of
religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, and the requirements of education and popularization.
The exceptions also apply to articles 11 bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. The Rapporteur ended by saying that these
allusions were given lightly without invalidating the principle in the right.
210. It seems that it was not the intention of the Committee to prevent States from maintaining in
their national legislation provisions based on the declaration contained in the General Report of the Brussels
Conference."
See the Berne Convention Centenary, p. 204. For a more complete review of the history of the minor
exceptions doctrine and other implied ex ceptions under the Berne Convention, see e.g. Ricketson, The Berne
Convention, op. cit., pp. 532 f.

that minor exceptions are permitted, inter alia , in respect of Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Berne
Convention.65
6.55 Furthermore, we recall that Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that together
with the context (a) any subsequent agreement, (b) subsequent practice, 66 or (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable between the parties, shall be taken into account for the purposes of
interpretation. We note that the parties and third parties have brought to our attention several
examples from various countries of limitations in national laws based on the minor exceptions
doctrine.
67 In our view, state practice as reflected in the national copyright laws of Berne Union
members before and after 1948, 1967 and 1971, as well as of WTO Members before and after the date
that the TRIPS Agreement became applicable to them, confirms our conclusion about the minor
exceptions doctrine.68
The scope of the minor exceptions doctrine
6.56 Apart from the legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine under the Berne Convention, the
parties disagree also on the scope of the doctrine. In the US view, the defining element of the minor
exceptions doctrine is that a limitation or exception must be minimal in nature to be permissible. The
possibility of providing minor exceptions is not limited to the examples provided in the records of the
Brussels and Stockholm Conferences cited above. In contrast, the European Communities argues that
the examples given in the Brussels and Stockholm records are exhaustive. It submits that the minor
exceptions doctrine is confined to limitations or exceptions of exclusively non-commercial character.
It also emphasizes that the records of the Stockholm Conference describe the minor exceptions

65 While we note that this statement in the reports of the Stockholm Conference of 1967 confirms the
agreement on the possibility of providing minor exceptions to certain exclusive rights at the Brussels
Conference of 1948, we feel that there is no need to determine whether it constitutes a separate or renewed
agreement at the Stockholm Conference within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. For the
purposes of our examination of Articles 11 bis(i)(iii) and 11(1)(ii), such an agreement would be relevant only to
the extent that these Articles had been modified or amended at the Stockholm Conference.
66 In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages , the Appellate Body described subsequent practice within the
meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention: "… Generally, in international law, the essence of
subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognised as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’
sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish subsequent
practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreemen t of the parties that is relevant." (Footnotes omitted).
See Appellate Body Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , adopted on 1 November 1996,
WT/DS8,10,11/AB/R, p. 13.
67 For example, Australia exempts public performance by wireless apparatus at premises of, inter alia,
hotels or guest houses. Belgium exempts a work's communication to the public in a place accessible to the
public where the aim of the communication is not the work itself, and exempts the performance of a work
during a public examination where the purpose is the assessment of the performer. Finland exempts public
performance in connection with religious services and education. Finland and Denmark provide for exceptions
where a work's performance is not the main feature of the event, provided that no fee is charged and the event is
not for profit. New Zealand exempts public performance of musical works at educational establishments. The
Philippines exempts public performances for charitable and educational purposes. A similar exception applies
in India, where also performances at amateur clubs or societies are exempted. Canadian law provides for
exceptions with respect to different exclusive rights for ed ucational, religious or charitable purposes, and also at
conventions and fairs. South Africa exempts public performances in the context of demonstrations of radio or
television receivers and recording equipment by dealers of or clients for such equipment. ( See US response to
question 16 by the Panel to the United States.) Brazil allows free use of works in commercial establishments for
the purpose of demonstration to customers in establishments that market equipment that makes such use
possible. (See the response by Brazil to question 1 from the Panel to the third parties.)
68 By enunciating these examples of state practice we do not wish to express a view on whether these
are sufficient to constitute 'subsequent practice' within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention. See description by the Appellate Body in its report on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages , op.cit., p. 13,
cited in footnote 66 above.

doctrine as a means to allow countries to "maintain" existing national exceptions. It infers from the
above quoted statement in the records of the Stockholm Conference that the minor exceptions
doctrine is capable of excusing only those exceptions or limitations which existed in the national
legislation of a country prior to 1967, when the Stockholm Conference took place. 69 The United
States rejects this "grandfathering" theory and the interpretation that the lists of examples found in the
records of the Diplomatic Conferences are exhaustive.
6.57 The General Report of the Brussels Conference of 1948 refers to "religious ceremonies,
military bands and the needs of the child and adult education" as examples of situations in respect of
which minor exceptions may be provided. The Main Committee I Report of the Stockholm
Conference of 1967 refers also to "popularization" as one example.
70 When these references are read
in their proper context, it is evident that the given examples are of an illustrative character. 71 We also
note that the examples given in the reports of the Brussels and Stockholm Conferences are not
identical. Furthermore, the examples are given in the context of Article 11(1) of the Berne
Convention, but the reports clarify that minor excepti ons can also be provided to the exclusive rights
conferred under Articles 11 bis, 11 ter, 13 and 14, without giving any specific examples. It is also
evident that existing minor exceptions vary between different countries. The information presented to
us on state practice in respect of minor exceptions in different countries is illustrative of that fact. 72
Furthermore, the academic literature supports the view that these examples of uses in respect of which
minor exceptions could be provided are not intended to be exhaustive.73
6.58 We note that some of the above-mentioned examples (e.g., religious ceremonies, military
bands) typically involve minimal uses which are not carried out for profit. With respect to other
examples (e.g., adult and child education a nd popularization), however an exclusively non-
commercial nature of potentially exempted uses is less clear. On the basis of the information
provided to us, we are not in a position to determine that the minor exceptions doctrine justifies only
exclusively non-commercial use of works and that it may under no circumstances justify exceptions to
uses with a more than negligible economic impact on copyright holders. On the other hand, non-
commercial uses of works, e.g., in adult and child education, may reach a level that has a major
economic impact on the right holder. At any rate, in our view, a non-commercial character of the use
in question is not determinative provided that the exception contained in national law is indeed
minor.
74
6.59 As regards the coverage of the minor exceptions doctrine in temporal respect, we cannot share
the European Communities' view that the coverage was "frozen" in 1967.75 In our view, the use of the
term "maintain" in the Stockholm records76 is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the interpretation

69 Response to question 11 from the Panel to the European Communities.
70 See the citations in footnote 64 above.
71 For example, in their preparatory work for the Brussels Conference, the Belgian Government and
BIRPI took the view that it would be impossible to list all of the pre-existing exceptions exhaustively in the
Convention as they were too varied. Documents de la Conférence Réunie a Bruxelles du 5 au 26 juin 1948,
published by BIRPI in 1951, p. 255.
72 See footnote 67 above.
73 Ricketson notes that "[t]he examples of uses given in the records of the Brussels and Stockholm
Conferences are in no way an exhaustive list or determinative of which particular exceptions will be justified".
See Ricketson, Berne Convention, op.cit., p. 536.
74 In the literature, it has been argued that such exceptions to the rights protected under the relevant
provisions of the Berne Convention must be concerned with minimal use, or use without significance to the
author. See Ricketson, Berne Convention, op.cit., p. 532-535.
75 As regards the year 1967 as a s uggested cut-off date, we note that the substantive provisions of the
Stockholm Act of 1967 have never entered into force. Its substantive provisions were later incorporated into the
Paris Act of 1971, which entered into force on 10 October 1974.
76 Paragraph 210 of the Main Committee I Report of the Stockholm Conference uses the term
"maintain". However, the original statement in the General Report of the Brussels Conference of 1948, to

that countries could justify under the minor exceptions doctrine only those limitations which were in
force in their national legislation prior to the year when that Conference was held.
The legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine under the TRIPS Agreement
6.60 Having concluded that the minor exceptions doctrine forms part of the "context" of, at least,
Articles 11bis and 11 of the Berne Convention (1971) by virtue of an agreement within the meaning
of Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention, which was made between the Berne Union members in
connection with the conclusion of the respective amendments to that Convention, we next address the
second step of our analysis outlined above. This second step deals with the question whether or not
the minor exceptions doctrine has been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, by virtue of its
Article 9.177, together with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention (1971) as part of the Berne acquis.
6.61 We note that the express wording of Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement neither establishes
nor excludes such incorporation into the Agreemen t of the minor exceptions doctrine as it applies to
Articles 11, 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14 of the Berne Convention (1971).78
6.62 We have shown above that the minor exceptions doctrine forms part of the context, within the
meaning of Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention, of at least Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Berne
Convention (1971). There is no indication in the wording of the TRIPS Agreement that Articles 11
and 11bis have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agr eement by its Article 9.1 without bringing with
them the possibility of providing minor exceptions to the respective exclusive rights. If that
incorporation should have covered only the text of Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention (1971), but
not the entire Berne acquis relating to these articles, Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement would have
explicitly so provided.79
6.63 Thus we conclude that, in the absence of any express exclusion in Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, the incorporation of Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Berne Convention (1971) into the
Agreement includes the entire acquis of these provisions, including the possibility of providing minor
exceptions to the respective exclusive rights.
6.64 We find confirmation of our interpretation in certain references to the minor exceptions
doctrine in the documentation from the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations on the TRIPS
Agreement.
80 A TRIPS Negotiating Group document 81 reproduces a document that was prepared by
the International Bureau of the WIPO followin g a decision taken by the Negotiating Group, on
3 March 1988, inviting the Bureau "to prepare a factual document to facilitate an understanding of the

which the Stockholm records refer, uses the expression "the possibility available to national legislation to make
what are commonly called minor reservations".
77 Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21
of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6 bis of the Convention or of
the rights derived therefrom."
78 While Article 9.1 does not mention the minor exceptions doctrine, it does not exclude the possibility
that this doctrine was incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement as part of the Berne acquis together with the
above-mentioned provisions to which it applies under the Berne Convention (1971).
79 In this respect, we refer to the treatment of moral rights under the TRIPS Agreement. Article 9.1
explicitly excludes Members' rights and obligations in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6 bis of the
Berne Convention (1971) and of the rights derived therefrom.
80 We recall that, according to Article 32 of th e Vienna Convention, "recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the pr eparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 …". We see no need
to determine whether the GATT Uruguay Round documentation constitutes "preparatory works " or relate to the
"circumstances of … [the] conclusion" of the TRIPS Agreement as annexed to the Agreement Establishing the
WTO.
81 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/Rev.1 of 15 September 1988.

existence, scope and form of generally internati onally accepted and applied standards/norms for the
protection of intellectual property". 82 The Section on the "Scope of Rights" contains the following
text on the minor exceptions doctrine:83
"In addition to the limitations explicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention,
there is one more possibility for certain exceptions about which there was express
agreement at various revision conferences, namely the possibility of minor exceptions
to the right of public performance (a concept which is close to the notion of 'fair use'
or 'fair dealing'; see item (iii), below)."
6.65 Another TRIPS Negotiating Group document
84 mentions the minor exceptions doctrine as
forming part of existing international standards. We are not aware of any record in the Uruguay
Round documentation of any country participating in the negotiations challenging or questioning the
minor exceptions doctrine being part of the Berne acquis on which the TRIPS Agreement was to be
built.85
6.66 In the area of copyright, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement form the overall
framework for multilateral protection. Most WTO Members are also parties to the Berne Convention.
We recall that it is a general principle of interpretation to adopt the meaning that reconciles the texts
of different treaties and avoids a conflict between them. Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting
the TRIPS Agreement to mean something differen t than the Berne Convention except where this is
explicitly provided for. This principle is in co nformity with the public international law presumption
against conflicts, which has been applied by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in a number of
cases.
86 We believe that our interpretation of the legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine under
the TRIPS Agreement is consistent with these general principles.

82 See GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/6, paragraphs 39 and 40 and Annex.
83 Ibid. p. 22.
84 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/32/Rev.2 of 2 February 1990 contains synoptic tables of proposals tabled in the
Group. It contains the first specific proposals on the rights to be conferred and on the permissible limitations,
exceptions and compulsory licensing in the area of copyright. The first column in each table sets out the
provisions of the international treaties existing at that time corresponding to the proposals made. The Secretariat
prepared the content of this column drawing on the above-mentioned document prepared by the International
Bureau of WIPO. In the first column of paragraph 5 on limitations, the Secretariat reproduced, in its rendering
of the existing international standards, the above-mentioned information provided by WIPO on minor
exceptions doctrine. Ibid. p. 32.
85 We find a further confirmation of our interpretation in the negotiating history of Article 9.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement. Earlier drafts of that Article referred merely to "the substantive provisions" of the Berne
Convention (1971), indicating that the intention was to embody the overall Berne acquis rather than just the
literal wording of the individual articles. During the negotiations a preference was expressed for identifying
these substantive provisions. As a result, these provisions where identified in the final version of the Article as
"Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto". It appears that this was done
for the sake of clarity, and there is no indication in th e records that there was an in tention to change the aim of
embodying the overall Berne acquis.
86 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals ("Canada –
Periodicals"), adopted on 30 July 1997, WT/DS31/AB/R, p. 19. Appellate Body Report on European
communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale an d Distribution of Bananas, ("EC - Bananas III") , adopted on
25 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, paragraphs 219-222.
In Guatemala – Cement , the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the
provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: "A special or additional provision should only
be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to
a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them." See Appellate Body Report on
Guatemala – Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico ("Guatemala- Cement") ,
adopted on 25 November 1998, WT/DS60/AB/R, paragraph 65.

Subsequent developments
6.67 The United States argues that Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT"), adopted at
a Diplomatic Conference on 20 December 1996 organized under the auspices of WIPO, reflects the
standard set forth in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph (1) of that Article provides a
standard for permissible limitations and exceptions to the rights granted to authors under the WCT,
while paragraph (2) extends this standard to the application of the provisions of the Berne
Convention (1971).
87 In the view of the United States, it becomes clear from the Agreed Statement
concerning Article 10 of the WCT that the signatories of the WCT, which include the European
Communities and its member States and the United States, commonly recognized the minor
exceptions doctrine.88 In support of its view, the United States also points out that Article 10 of the
WCT is based on Article 12 of the Basic Proposal for the 1996 Diplomatic Conference. 89 T h e
commentary in the Basic Proposal explains that the TRIPS Agreement already enunciates the standard
of that Article for limitations and exceptions in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and further states
that "[n]o limitation, not even those that belong in the category of minor reservations, may exceed the
limits set by the three-steps test".
6.68 The European Communities argues that the WCT has to date been ratified by only a small
number of contracting parties and has not yet reached the threshold of thirty ratifications necessary for
its entry into force.
6.69 We note that the subsequent developments just mentioned do not constitute a subsequent
treaty on the same subject-matter within the meaning of Article 30, or subsequent agreements on the
interpretation of a treaty, or subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3). Thus such
subsequent developments may be of rather limited relevance in the light of the general rules of
interpretation as embodied in the Vienna Conventi on. However, in our view, the wording of the
WCT, and in particular of the Agreed Statement thereto, nonetheless supports, as far as the Berne
Convention is concerned, that the Berne Union members are permitted to provide minor exceptions to
the rights provided under Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Paris Act of 1971, and certain other rights. It
appears that the objective was not to disallow the provision of such minor exceptions by WCT parties,
but rather to make their application subject to the "three step test" contained in Article 10(2) of the
WCT.

In Indonesia – Autos , the panel noted: "… we recall first that in public international law there is a
presumption against conflict. This presumption is es pecially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO
agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were
negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle
of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements)
must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words." (footnotes omitted). See Panel Report on
Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry ("Indonesia – Autos") , adopted on 23 July
1998, WT/DS/54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R and WT/DS64/R, paragraph 14.28.
87 Article 10 of the WCT provides:
"1. Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions
to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.
2. Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any limitations of or
exceptions to rights provided for ther ein to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."
88 Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT reads as follows: "It is understood that the
provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to ca rry forward and appropriately extend into the digital
environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the
Berne Convention. Similarly these provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new
exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment." (emphasis added).
89 Response to question 14 from the Panel to the United States.

6.70 In paragraph 6.66 we discussed the need to interpret the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement in a way that reconciles the texts of these two treaties and avoids a conflict between them,
given that they form the overall framework for multilateral copyright protection. The same principle
should also apply to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT. The WCT is
designed to be compatible with this framework, in corporating or using much of the language of the
Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. 90 The WCT was unanimously concluded at a
diplomatic conference organized under the auspices of WIPO in December 1996, one year after the
WTO Agreement entered into force, in which 127 countries participated. Most of these countries
were also participants in the TRIPS negotiations and are Members of the WTO.91 For these reasons, it
is relevant to seek contextual guidance also in the WCT when developing interpretations that avoid
conflicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly contain different
obligations.
(iv) The scope of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement
6.71 As earlier mentioned, at the heart of the US case is Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. The
United States submits that it clarifies and articulates the scope of the minor exceptions doctrine, which
is applicable under the TRIPS Agreement. Having considered the legal status of the minor exceptions
doctrine under the TRIPS Agreement, we will later examine the applicability of Article 13 to
Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention (1 971) as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement.
92
6.72 The language used in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 93 has its origins in the similar
language used in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971),94 although the latter only applies in the
case of the reproduction right.95
6.73 A general right of reproduction was not recognized under the Berne Convention until the
Stockholm Act of 1967. The main difficulty in the preparation of this amendment was to find an
appropriate formula which would allow exceptions to that right. In adopting the present text of

90 Article 10 of the WCT addresses the WCT’s relation to the Berne Convention, but there is no direct
connection between the WCT and the TRIPS Agreement. Article 1 of the WCT provides that "[t]his Treaty
shall not have any connection with the treaties other than the Berne Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights
and obligations under any other treaties".
91 As of 1 March 1999, 13 countries had ratified the WCT. It has 51 signatories, including the
European Communities and its member States.
92 See the chapter "The three criteria test under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement", beginning with
paragraph 6.97 of this report.
93 Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
"Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder."
94 Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) provides:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."
95 The preparatory works to Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention may be illustrative of how the
language used was originally intended to be understood. While Article 9(2) may form part of the context of
Article 13, preparatory works and negotiating history would, of course, be relevant primarily in the framework
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, e.g., for purposes of confirming an interpretation developed consistent
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.

Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, the Main Committee I of the Stockholm Diplomatic Conference
(1967) gave the following guidance on its interpretation:
"The Committee also adopted a proposal by the Drafting Committee that the second
condition should be placed before the first, as this would afford a more logical order
for the interpretation of the rule. If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with
the normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is
considered that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work, the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible
in certain special cases to introduce a co mpulsory license, or to provide for use
without payment. A practical example may be photocopying for various purposes. If
it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it
conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. If it implies a rather large number of
copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an
equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number of copies is made, photocopying
may be permitted without payment, particularly for individual or scientific use."
96
6.74 Apart from the difference in the use of the terms "permit" and "confine",97 the main difference
between Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement is that
the former applies only to the reproduction right. The wording of Article 13 does not contain an
express limitation in terms of the categories of rights under copyright to which it may apply. It states
that limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights can only be made if three conditions are met: (1) the
limitations or exceptions are confined to certain special cases; (2) they do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work; and (3) they do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder. As both parties agree, these three conditions apply cumulatively; a limitation or an
exception is consistent with Article 13 only if it fulfils each of the three conditions.
6.75 The European Communities argues that Articl e 13 of the TRIPS Agreement applies only to
those rights that were added to the TRIPS Agreement, and, therefore, it does not apply to those
provisions of the Berne Convention (1971), including its Articles 11(1) and 11 bis(1), that were
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by reference.
98
6.76 In the view of the European Communities, Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971) speaks
against the interpretation of Article 13 as providing a basis for exceptions to the Berne rights
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, because Article 20 of the Convention only allows "countries
of the Berne Union to enter into special agreements among themselves, insofar as such agreements
grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the (Berne) Convention".
99 In other

96 Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm. June 11 to July 14, 1967. Report on
the Work of Main Committee I (Substantive Provisions of the Berne Convention: Articles 1 to 20). As
reproduced in the Berne Convention Centenary, p. 197.
97 Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) provides that "[i]t shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction", while Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that
"Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights".
98 See EC response to question 10 from the Panel to the European Communities.
99 The complete text of Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971) reads:
"The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements
among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the
Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention. The provisions of existing agreements
which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable."

words, the European Communities contends that parties to the Berne Convention cannot agree in
another treaty to reduce the Berne Convention level of protection.
6.77 Furthermore, the European Communities adds that Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971)
is mirrored in the TRIPS Agreement by Article 2(2), which reads as follows:
"Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne
Convention, the Rome Convention and the Trea ty on Intellectual Property in Respect
of Integrated Circuits."
6.78 In the alternative to its principal argument, the European Communities contends that, even if
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement were given a role in the context of exceptions to exclusive rights
under the Berne Convention (1971), a principle should be respected according to which the objective
of the TRIPS Agreement is to reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, rather than to grant new or
extend existing ones. The European Communities refers to the difference in the wording between
Article 13 ("Members shall confine limitations or exceptions") and Articles 17, 26(2) and 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement ("Members may provide limited exceptions").
100 We recall, however, that under its
principal argument the European Communities takes the view that Article 13 provides exceptions to
new rights, rather than reduce the scope of any existing limitations.
6.79 The United States contends that "[t]he text of Article 13 is straightforward and applies to
'limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights'. Not some limitations, not limitations to some exclusive
rights".101 The United States adds that the application of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement to the
rights provided under Article 11(1) and 11 bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) does not derogate
from the obligations under the Berne Convention in violation of Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement
or Article 20 of the Berne Convention, because Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement articulates the
standard applicable to minor exceptions under the Berne Convention (1971) as far as these Articles
are concerned.
6.80 In our view, neither the express wording nor the context of Article 13 or any other provision
of the TRIPS Agreement supports the interpretation that the scope of application of Article 13 is
limited to the exclusive rights newly introduced under the TRIPS Agreement.
6.81 The application of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement to the rights provided under
Articles 11(1) and 11 bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement need not lead to different standards from those applicable under the Berne Convention
(1971), given that we have established that the possibility of providing minor exceptions forms part of
the context of these articles. Taking into account this contextual guidance, we will examine the scope
for permissible minor exceptions to the exclusive rights in question by applying the conditions of
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6.82 In regard to the argument of the European Communities that the US interpretation of
Article 13 is incompatible with Article 20 of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 2.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement because it treats Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement as providing a basis for
exceptions that would be inconsistent with th ose permitted under the Berne Convention (1971), we
note that the United States is not arguing this but rather that Article 13 clarifies and articulates the
standards applicable to minor exceptions under the Berne Convention (1971). Since the EC
arguments in relation to these provisions would onl y be relevant if a finding that would involve
inconsistency with the Berne Convention (1971) were being advocated, we do not feel it is necessary
to examine them further.

100 Paragraph 27 of the second written submission by the European Communities.
101 Paragraph 4 of the oral statement of the United States at the second meeting with the Panel.

(v) Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement
6.83 Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement
relates to the exclusive rights conferred under Article 11 bis(1), including the communication to the
public of a broadcast in the meaning of its subparagraph (iii). It reads as follows:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the
conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be
exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been
prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of
the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of
agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority."
6.84 This provision was inserted into the Rome Act of 1928, when the right of broadcasting was
first introduced. At the Brussels Conference of 1948, its scope was extended to cover the additional
rights recognized by Article 11bis(1), including the rights under Article 11bis(1)(iii). Article 11bis(2)
does not apply to the rights provided under Article 11(1). The reference to "conditions" is usually
understood to allow countries to substitute, for the author's exclusive right, a system of compulsory
licences,
102 or determine other conditions provided that they are not prejudicial to the right holder's
right to obtain an equitable remuneration.103
6.85 The European Communities argues that an y exception to the rights contained in
Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as inco rporated into the TRIPS Agreement would
have to provide for an equitable remuneration to the right holder; this is not the case under
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. In this respect, the European Communities refers to the
extensive argumentation supporting this interpretation as developed in Australia’s third party
submission.
104
6.86 The United States contends that Article 11 bis(2) has no bearing on Section 110(5);
Article 11bis(2) merely authorizes a country to substitute a compulsory licence, or its equivalent, for
an exclusive right under Article 11 bis. The United States adds that Article 11 bis(2) is not related to
the minor exceptions doctrine, and does not bear upon the scope of exceptions permissible under that
doctrine as it applies under Article 11bis.
6.87 We believe that Article 11 bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 13 cover
different situations. On the one hand, Article 11 bis(2) authorizes Members to determine conditions
under which the rights conferred by Article 11 bis(1)(i-iii) may be exercised. The imposition of such
conditions may completely replace the free exercise of the exclusive right of authorizing the use of the
rights embodied in subparagraphs (i-iii) provided that equitable remuneration and the author's moral
rights are not prejudiced. However, unlike Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, Article 11 bis(2) of
the Berne Convention (1971) would not in any case justify use free of charge.
6.88 On the other hand, it is sufficient that a limitation or an exception to the exclusive rights
provided under Article 11 bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement meets the three conditions contained in its Article 13 to be permissible. If these three
conditions are met, a government may choose between different options for limiting the right in

102 See e.g. the Guide to the Berne Convention, op.cit., paragraph 11bis.15, p. 70.
103 The European Communities notes that "[i]t would appear that a country could set minimum or
precise levels of royalties to be paid for the different uses protected under Article 11 bis of the Berne
Convention. Another way to provide for equitable remuneration could be the introduction of a levy system for
the audio/TV equipment purchased by the establishment being allowed to play copyrighted works without
authorisations, whereby the proceeds from such a levy system is distributed to the right holders." See EC
response to question 12 from the Panel to the European Communities.
104 The written submission of Australia, paragraphs 2.8-2.14, 3.7-3.14, 4.3 and 4.8.

question, including use free of charge and without an authorization by the right holder. This is not in
conflict with any of the paragraphs of Article 11 bis because use free of any charge may be permitted
for minor exceptions by virtue of the minor exceptions doctrine which applies, inter alia , also to
Article 11bis.
6.89 As regards situations that would not meet the above-mentioned three conditions, a
government may not justify an exception, including one involving use free of charge, by Article 13 of
the TRIPS Agreement. However, also in these situations Article 11 bis(2) of the Berne Convention
(1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement would nonetheless allow Members to substitute, for
an exclusive right, a compulsory licence, or determ ine other conditions provided that they were not
prejudicial to the right holder's right to obtain an equitable remuneration.
6.90 We believe that our interpretation gives meaning and effect to Article 11 bis(2), the minor
exceptions doctrine as it applies to Article 11 bis, and Article 13. However, in our view, under the
interpretation suggested by the European Communities this would not be the case, e.g., in the
following situations. If any de minimis exception from rights conferred by Article 11bis(1)(i-iii) were
subject to the requirement to provide equitabl e remuneration within the meaning of Article 11 bis(2),
no exemption whatsoever from the rights recognized by Article 11 bis(1) could permit use free of
charge even if the three criteria of Article 13 were met. As a result, narrow exceptions or limitations
would be subject to the three conditions of Article 13 in addition to the requirement to provide
equitable remuneration. At the same time, broader exceptions or limitations which do not comply
with the criteria of Article 13 could arguably still be justified under Article 11 bis(2) as long as the
conditions imposed ensure, inter alia, equitable remuneration. Such an interpretation could render
Article 13 somewhat redundant because narrow exceptions would be subject to all the requirements of
Article 13 and Article 11 bis(2) on a cumulative basis, while for broader exceptions compliance with
Article 11bis(2) could suffice. Both situations would lead to the result that any use free of charge
would not be permissible. These examples are illustrative of situations where the terms and
conditions of Article 13, Article 11 bis(2) and the minor exceptions doctrine would not be given full
meaning and effect.
6.91 In our view, Section 110(5) of the US Copyrigh t Act contains exceptions that allow use of
protected works without an authorization by the right holder and without charge. Whether these
exceptions meet the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement has to be examined by
applying Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 11 bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) as
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement is not relevant for the case at hand; the United States has not
provided a right in respect of the uses covered by the present Section 110(5), the exercise of which
would have been subjected to conditions determined in its legislation.
(vi) Summary of limitations and exceptions
6.92 In the light of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the context of Articles 11 and 11 bis of
the Berne Convention (1971) comprises, within the meaning of Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna
Convention, the possibility of providing minor exceptions to the exclusive rights in question. This
minor exceptions doctrine has been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, by virtue of its
Article 9.1, together with these provisions of the Berne Convention (1971). Therefore, the doctrine is
relevant as forming part of the context of Articles 11(1)(ii) and 11 bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention
(1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.
6.93 As regards the scope of permissible limitations and exceptions under the minor exceptions
doctrine, we conclude that the doctrine is primarily concerned with de minimis use, but that otherwise
its application is not limited to the examples contained in the reports of the Berne Convention revision
conferences held in Brussels and Stockholm, to exclusively non-commercial uses or to exceptions in
national legislation that existed prior to 1967. However, we note that the reports of the Brussels and

Stockholm Conferences are inconclusive about the precise scope of exceptions that can be provided in
national legislation.
6.94 We conclude that Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement applies to Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) as inco rporated into the TRIPS Agreement, given that
neither the express wording nor the context of Article 13 or any other provision of the TRIPS
Agreement supports the interpretation that the scope of application of Article 13 is limited to the
exclusive rights newly introduced under the TRIPS Agreement.
6.95 We also conclude that Article 11 bis(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into
the TRIPS Agreement allows Members to substitute a compulsory licence for an exclusive right under
Article 11bis(1), or determine other conditions provided that they are not prejudicial to the right
holder's right to obtain an equitable remuneration. Article 11 bis(2) is not relevant for the case at
hand, because the United States has not provided a right in respect of the uses covered by the present
Section 110(5), the exercise of which would have been subjected to conditions determined in its
legislation.
6.96 We now proceed to applying the three conditions contained in Article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement to the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act in relation to
Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement.
2. The three criteria test under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement
(a) General introduction
6.97 Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that limitations and exceptions to exclusive
rights (1) be confined to certain special cases, (2) do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work, and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
105 T h e
principle of effective treaty interpretation requires us to give a distinct meaning to each of the three
conditions and to avoid a reading that could reduce any of the conditions to "redundancy or
inutility".106 The three conditions apply on a cumulative basis, each being a separate and independent
requirement that must be satisfied. Failure to comp ly with any one of the three conditions results in
the Article 13 exception being disallowed. Both parties agree on the cumulative nature of the three
conditions. The Panel shares their view. It may be noted at the outset that Article 13 cannot have
more than a narrow or limited operation. Its tenor, consistent as it is with the provisions of Article
9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971), discloses that it was not intended to provide for exceptions or
limitations except for those of a limited nature. The narrow sphere of its operation will emerge from
our discussion and application of its provisions in the paragraphs which follow.
6.98 In the following, we will first explore the interpretation of the first condition of Article 13 in
general terms in the light of the arguments made by the parties. We will then examine, in turn,
subparagraphs (B) and (A) of Section 110(5) of th e US Copyright Act of 1976, as amended by the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, that contain, respectively, the business and homestyle
exemptions. We will discuss the business exemption of subparagraph (B) first because most of the
arguments raised by the parties focus on it. After that, we will similarly explore the interpretation of
the second and third conditions and apply them to subparagraphs (B) and (A) of Section 110(5).

105 See the text of the Article in paragraph 6.31 and in footnote 93 above. As we noted in paragraph
6.72 above, the wording of Article 13 derives largely from Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) which
applies, however, to reproduction rights only. Given the similarity of the wording, we consider that the
preparatory works of Article 9(2) of the Berne Conventio n and its application in practice may be of contextual
relevance in interpreting Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
106 Appellate Body Report on United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ,
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 23.

6.99 The parties have largely relied on similar factual information in substantiating their legal
arguments under each of the three conditions of Article 13. We are called upon to evaluate this
information from different angles under the three conditions, which call for different requirements for
justifying exceptions or limitations. We will look at the defined and limited scope of the exemptions
at issue under the first condition, and focus on the degree of conflict with normal exploitation of
works under the second condition. In relation to the third condition, we will examine the extent of
prejudice caused to the legitimate interests of the right holder in the light of the information submitted
by the parties.
6.100 In providing such factual information, the United States has focused on describing the
immediate and direct impact on copyright holders caused by the introduction of the exemptions into
its law; this can be characterized as the actual effects of the exemptions. The United States argues
that while both actual losses and potential losses may be relevant to the analysis, the key is a realistic
appraisal of the conditions that prevail in the market; the only way to avoid the danger of
arbitrariness is to base the analysis on realistic market conditions.
107
6.101 The European Communities emphasizes the importance of taking into account the way that
the exemptions affect the right holders' opportunities to exercise their exclusive rights as well as the
indirect impact of the exemptions; this can be characterized as the potential effects of the exemptions.
We will address below the question to what extent we should focus on the actual impact on the right
holder and to what extent we should also take into account the potential impact.
(b) "Certain special cases"
(i) General interpretative analysis
6.102 In invoking the exception of Article 13, as an articulation and clarification of the minor
exceptions doctrine, the United States claims that both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5)
meet the standard of being confined to "certain special cases".
6.103 The United States submits that the fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not elaborate on the
criteria for a case to be considered "special" provides Members flexibility to determine for themselves
whether a particular case represents an appropriate basis for an exception.108 But it acknowledges that
the essence of the first condition is that the exceptions be well-defined and of limited application.109
6.104 In the view of the European Communities, an exception has to be well-defined and narrow in
scope to meet the requirements under the first condition. In the EC’s view, in the case at hand, such
significant numbers of establishments are excepted from the duty to pay fees for the use of exclusive
rights under subparagraph (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) that the exemptions contained therein
constitute a rule rather than an exception.110
6.105 The European Communities argues that, in the light of the wording of the first condition in
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971), which forms part of the context of Article 13, an
exemption should serve a "special purpose". For the European Communities, in the case of
Section 110(5), no such special public policy or other exceptional circumstance exists that would
make it inappropriate or impossible to enforce the exclusive rights conferred by Articles 11 and 11 bis
of the Berne Convention (1971). In the EC view, the subparagraphs of Section 110(5) do not pursue
legitimate public policy objectives.

107 US second oral statement, paragraph 18.
108 US first written submission, paragraph 24.
109 US second written submission, paragraph 29.
110 EC first oral statement, paragraph 66ff and second written submission, paragraph 31.

6.106 In the US view, if the purpose of an exception is relevant at all, the TRIPS Agreement only
requires that an exception has a specific policy objective. It does not impose any requirement as to
the legitimacy of the policy objectives that a particular country might consider special in the light of
its own history and national priorities.
6.107 We start our analysis of the first condition of Article 13 by referring to the ordinary meaning
of the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. It appears that the notions of
"exceptions" and "limitations" in the introductory words of Article 13 overlap in part in the sense that
an "exception" refers to a derogation from an exclusive right provided under national legislation in
some respect, while a "limitation" refers to a reduction of such right to a certain extent.
6.108 The ordinary meaning of "certain" is "known and particularised, but not explicitly identified",
"determined, fixed, not variable; definitive, precise, exact". 111 In other words, this term means that,
under the first condition, an exception or limitation in national legislation must be clearly defined.
However, there is no need to identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which the
exception could apply, provided that the scope of the exception is known and particularised. This
guarantees a sufficient degree of legal certainty.
6.109 We also have to give full effect to the ordi nary meaning of the second word of the first
condition. The term "special" connotes "having an individual or limited application or purpose",
"containing details; precise, specific", "exceptional in quality or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary"
or "distinctive in some way".
112 This term means that more is needed than a clear definition in order
to meet the standard of the first condition. In addition, an exception or limitation must be limited in
its field of application or exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception or limitation should be
narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. This suggests a narrow scope as well as an
exceptional or distinctive objective. To put this as pect of the first condition into the context of the
second condition ("no conflict with a normal exploitation"), an exception or limitation should be the
opposite of a non-special, i.e., a normal case.
6.110 The ordinary meaning of the term "case" refers to an "occurrence", "circumstance" or "event"
or "fact".
113 For example, in the context of the dispute at hand, the "case" could be described in terms
of beneficiaries of the exceptions, equipment used, types of works or by other factors.
6.111 As regards the parties' arguments on whether the public policy purpose of an exception is
relevant, we believe that the term "certain special cases" should not lightly be equated with "special
purpose".114 It is difficult to reconcile the wording of Article 13 with the proposition that an exception
or limitation must be justified in terms of a legitimate public policy purpose in order to fulfill the first
condition of the Article. We also recall in this respect that in interpreting other WTO rules, such as
the national treatment clauses of the GATT and the GATS, the Appellate Body has rejected

111 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ("Oxford English Dictionary"), Oxford (1993), p. 364.
112 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2971.
113 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 345.
114 We note that the term "special purpose" has been referred to in interpreting the largely similarly
worded Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971). See Ricketson, The Berne Convention, op.cit., p. 482. We
are ready to take into account "teachings of the most hi ghly qualified publicists of the various nations" as a
"subsidiary source for the determination of law". We refer to this phrase in the sense of Article 38(d) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice which refe rs to such "teachings" (or, in French "la doctrine") as
"subsidiary means for the determination of law." But we are cautious to use the interpretation of a term
developed in the context of an exception for the reproduction right for interpreting the same terms in the context
of a largely similarly worded exception for other exclusive rights conferred by copyrights.

interpretative tests which were based on the subjective aim or objective pursued by national
legislation.115
6.112 In our view, the first condition of Article 13 requires that a limitation or exception in national
legislation should be clearly defined and should be narrow in its scope and reach. On the other hand,
a limitation or exception may be compatible with the first condition even if it pursues a special
purpose whose underlying legitimacy in a normative sense cannot be discerned. The wording of
Article 13's first condition does not imply passing a judgment on the legitimacy of the exceptions in
dispute. However, public policy purposes stated by law-makers when enacting a limitation or
exception may be useful from a factual perspective for making inferences about the scope of a
limitation or exception or the clarity of its definition.
6.113 In the case at hand, in order to determine whether subparagraphs (B) and (A) of
Section 110(5) are confined to "certain special cases", we first examine whether the exceptions have
been clearly defined. Second, we ascertain whether the exemptions are narrow in scope, inter alia,
with respect to their reach. In that respect, we take into account what percentage of eating and
drinking establishments and retail establishments may benefit from the business exemption under
subparagraph (B), and in turn what percentage of establishments may take advantage of the homestyle
exemption under subparagraph (A). On a subsidiary basis, we consider whether it is possible to draw
inferences about the reach of the business and homestyle exemptions from the stated policy purposes
underlying these exemptions according to the statements made during the US legislative process.
116
(ii) The business exemption of subparagraph (B)
6.114 As noted above, the United States argues that the essence of the first condition of Article 13
of the TRIPS Agreement is that exceptions be well-defined and of limited application. It claims that
the business exemption of subparagraph (B) meets the requirements of the first condition of
Article 13, because it is clearly defined in Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act by square footage
and equipment limitations.
117
6.115 In the US view, if at all the purpose of an exception is relevant, the first condition only
requires that the exception has a specific policy objective, but it does not impose any requirements on
the policy objectives that a particular country might consider special in the light of its own history and
national priorities. As regards the business exemption, the United States claims that the specific
policy objective pursued by this exemption is fostering small businesses and preventing abusive
tactics by CMOs.
118
6.116 The European Communities contends that the business exemption is too broad in its scope to
pass as a "certain special case", given the large number of establishments which potentially may
benefit from it. For the European Communities, it is irrelevant that the size of establishments and the
type of equipment are clearly defined, when the broad scope of the business exemption turns an
exception into the rule.
6.117 It appears that the European Communities does not dispute the fact that subparagraph (B) is
clearly defined in respect of the size limits of establishments and the type of equipment that may be

115 See Appellate Body Report on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages , op.cit., p. 19-23, for the rejection of
the so-called "aims and effects" test in the context of the national treatment clause of Article III of GATT 1994.
See also the Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , op.cit., paragraphs 241, 243, 246, for the rejection of
the "aims-and-effects" test in the context of the national treatment clause of Article XVII of GATS.
116 We discuss the business exemption of subparagraph (B) first because most of the arguments raised
by the parties focus on this exception. In turn, we then examine the homestyle exemption in its current form as
contained in subparagraph (A).
117 US second written submission, paragraph 29.
118 Ibid.

used by establishments above the applicable limits. 119 The primary bone of contention between the
parties is whether the business exemption, given its scope and reach, can be considered as a "special"
case within the meaning of the first condition of Article 13.
6.118 The Congressional Research Service ("CRS") estimated in 1995 the percentage of the US
eating and drinking establishments and retail establishments that would have fallen at that time below
the size limits of 3,500 square feet and 1,500 square feet respectively. Its study found that:
(d) 65.2 per cent of all eating establishments;
(e) 71.8 per cent of all drinking establishments; and
(f) 27 per cent of all retail establishments
would have fallen below these size limits.
120
6.119 The United States confirms these figures as far as eating and drinking establishments are
concerned.121
6.120 We note that this study was made in 1995 using the size limit of 3,500 square feet for eating
and drinking establishments, and the size limit of 1,500 square feet for retail establishments, while the
size limits under subparagraph (B) now are 3,750 square feet for eating and drinking establishments
and 2,000 square feet for retail establishments. Theref ore, in our view, it is safe to assume that the
actual percentage of establishments which may fall within the finally enacted business exemption in
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 is higher than the above percentages.
6.121 The United States has also submitted estimates by the National Restaurant Association (NRA)
concerning its membership.
122 According to these estimates, 36 per cent of its table service restaurant
members (i.e., those with sit-down waiter service) are of a size less than 3,750 square feet, and
approximately 95 per cent of its fast-food restaura nt members are of a size less than 3,750 square
feet.123 We are not able to fully reconcile the 1995 CRS estimates with those of the NRA because we
have not been provided with information on how representative the NRA membership is of all
restaurants in the United States, and on the proportion of table-service restaurants in relation to fast-
food restaurants among its membership. Therefore, we limit ourselves to stating that the NRA figures
do not seem to contradict the estimates of the CRS study of 1995.
6.122 In 1999, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ("D&B") was requested by ASCAP to update the 1995 CRS
study based on 1998 data and the criteria in the 1998 Amendment. 124 The European Communities

119 We recall that the beneficiaries of the busin ess exemption are divided into two categories:
establishments other than food service or drinking establishments ("retail establishments"), and food service and
drinking establishments. In each category, establishments under certain size limit (2,000 and 3,750 square feet,
respectively) are exempted regardless of the type of equipment they use. If the size of an establishment is above
the applicable limit, the exemption a pplies provided that the establishment does not exceed the limits set for the
equipment used. For details, see paragraphs 2.10 and 2.14 of Section II on Factual Aspects of this Report.
120 See also paragraph 2.11 above.
121 Exhibit US-16.
122 US reply to question 9 by the Panel to the United States and confidential exhibit US-18.
123 See also paragraph 2.13 above.
124 See also paragraph 2.12 and Exhibit EC-7. According to the European Communities, the 1998/1999
D&B’s "Dun's Market Identifying Market Profile" is a database of more than 6.5 million US businesses, based
on square footage. The European Communities explains that the figures of the D&B studies comprise bars,
restaurants, tea-rooms, snackbars, etc. and retail stores. However, other sectors, e.g. hotels, financial service
outlets, estate property brokers, other types of service providers, in which a number of establishments are likely
to be exempted as well, were not taken into account.

explains that the methodology used by the D&B in 1998/1999 was identical to the methodology used
in the analysis which the D&B prepared in 1995 for the CRS during the legislative process that
eventually led to the adoption of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act. The D&B study of 1999 125
concludes that approximately 73 per cent of all drinking, 70 per cent of all eating, and 45 per cent of
all retail establishments in the United States are entitled under subparagraph (B), without any
limitation regarding equipment, to play music from radio and television on their business premises
without the consent of the right holders.
126
6.123 We note that while the United States does not confirm the figures of the 1999 D&B study, it
has used them, for the sake of argument, as a basis for its calculations on possible losses suffered by
EC right holders as a result of the subparagraph (B) exemption.127
6.124 In view of the vagueness of the explanation available to us of the methodology used for the
1999 D&B study,128 we are not in a position to recalculate exactly the results and trends of this study.
But it appears that the results of the 1999 D&B study are largely consistent with the results and trends
of the 1995 CRS study.
6.125 Referring to these studies, the European Communities points out that these 70 per cent of
eating and drinking establishments and 45 per cent of retail establishments are all potential users of
the business exemption, because they can at any time, without permission of the right holders, begin
to play amplified music broadcasts.
129
6.126 The United States contends that even if 70 per cent of all eating and drinking establishments
and 45 per cent of all retail establishments are implicated by the size limits under subparagraph (B)
after the 1998 Amendment, many of these establishments would have to be subtracted for various
reasons. These include (i) establishments that do not play music at all; (ii) those that would turn off
the music if they became liable to pay fees; (iii) those that play music from sources other than the
radio or television, such as tapes, CDs, jukeboxes or live performances; (iv) establishments that were

125 According to the information submitted by the European Communities, the number of
establishments contained in the D&B database in 1998 were as follows:
(a) 7,819 drinking establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet which amounts to
73 per cent of all US drinking establishments filed in the D&B database;
(b) 51,385 eating establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet which amounts to 70
per cent of all US eating establishments filed in the D&B database;
(c) 65,589 retail establishments of a square footage below 2,000 square feet or 45 per cent of all
US retail establishments filed in the D&B database.
In addition, D&B estimated the total figures as follows:
(a) 49,061 drinking establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet which amounts to
85 per cent of all US drinking establishments filed in the D&B database;
(b) 192,692 eating establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet which amounts to
68 per cent of all US eating establishments filed in the D&B database;
(c) 281,406 retail establishments of a square footage below 2,000 square feet or 42 per cent of all
US retail establishments filed in the D&B database. See Exhibit EC-7.
126 The European Communities calculates that the number of eating, drinking and retail establishments
that fall below the size limits of subparagraph (B), compared to the number of establishments that fall below the
size of the restaurant that was operated by Mr. Aiken, has increased by 437 per cent, 540 per cent, and 250 per
cent, respectively. While we do not wish to accept or reject the particular percentage figures of these estimates,
we note that there is a magnitude of difference in th e coverage between the original homestyle exemption and
the new business exemption.
127 US second submission, paragraphs 33-48.
128 Exhibit EC-7.
129 Cf. the discussion on actual and potential effects in paragraphs 184ff below.

not licensed prior to the enactment of the business exemption in 1998; (v) establishments that would
take advantage of group licensing arrangements such as the one between the NLBA and the CMOs.130
6.127 We agree with the European Communities that it is the scope in respect of potential users that
is relevant for determining whether the coverage of the exemption is sufficiently limited to qualify as
a "certain special case". While it is true, as the United States argues, that some establishments might
turn off the radio or television if they had to pay fees, other establishments which have not previously
played music might do the opposite, because under the business exemption the use of music is free.
Some establishments that have used recorded music may decide to switch to broadcast music in order
to avoid paying licensing fees. It is clear that, in examining the exemption, we have to also consider
its impact on the use of other substitutable sources of music. Consequently, we do not consider the
US calculations of establishments to be deducted from the CRS or D&B estimates as relevant for
ascertaining the potential scope of the business exemption in relation to the first condition of
Article 13.
6.128 We refer to our discussion concerning the third condition of Article 13, in which context we
will examine in more detail the relevance of the US arguments concerning the five types of
subtractions that would need to be made from the above percentage figures, and the exemption's likely
effects on the licensing of other sources of music.
131 In that context, we will also address the US
argument that many establishments were not licensed before the enactment of the business exemption
and that many establishments covered by subparagraph (B) would be likely subscribers to the group
licensing agreement between the NLBA and the CMOs.
6.129 The United States does not appear to make a distinction between, on the one hand, the eating
and drinking or retail establishments whose size is within the applicable limits of subparagraph (B),
and, on the other hand, larger establishments that may still use music for free if they comply with the
applicable equipment limitations (e.g., concerning loudspeakers per room or screen size).
132 We have
not been provided with information concerning the absolute numbers or the proportion of these larger
establishments qualifying under the business exemption. Suffice it to say that the percentage of all
US eating, drinking and retail establishments that may fall within the coverage of subparagraph (B)
could be even higher than the above figures or estimates suggest.
6.130 The United States further notes that the prohibitions against charging admission fees and
retransmission in indent (iii) and (iv) of subparagraph (B) limit the field of application of the business
exemption. The European Communities contends that these prohibitions have no potential
whatsoever to limit the impact of the exemption. We have not been presented with information on
whether these prohibitions significantly reduce the number of establishments that could otherwise
qualify for the exemption. In view of this fact, we recall our general considerations about the
allocation of the ultimate burden of proof for invoking exceptions.
6.131 We note that, according to its preparatory works, Article 11 bis(iii) of the Berne
Convention (1971) was intended to provide right holders with a right to authorize the use of their
works in the types of establishments covered by the exemption contained in Section 110(5)(B).
Specifically, the preparatory works for the 1948 Brussels Conference indicate that the establishments
that were intended to be covered were places "above all, where people meet: in the cinema, in
restaurants, in tea rooms, railway carriages …". The preparatory works also refer to places such as

130 We discuss the US calculations under the third condition of Article 13 in the subsection entitled
"The alternative calculations by the parties of losses suffered by right holders" in paragraphs 6.252ff below.
131 These include, e.g., CDs, tapes, jukeboxes or live music. Music played on radio and television is
probably more interchangeable with recorded music than with live music performance. However, the fact that
there is a different degree of elasticity of substitution does not mean that the effect of substitution between
different sources of music is negligible.
132 See Section II on Factual Aspects, paragraph 2.14.

factories, shops and offices. 133 We fail to see how a law that exempts a major part of the users that
were specifically intended to be covered by the provisions of Article 11 bis(1)(iii) could be considered
as a special case in the sense of the first condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6.132 We are aware that eating, drinking and retail establishments are not the only potential users of
music covered by the exclusive rights conferred under Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne
Convention (1971). The United States has mentioned, inter alia , conventions, fairs and sporting
events as other potential users of performances of works in the meaning of the above Articles.
However, we believe that these examples of other potential users do not detract from the fact that
eating, drinking and retail establishments are among the major groups of potential users of the works
in the ways that are covered by the above-mentioned Articles.
6.133 The factual information presented to us indicates that a substantial majority of eating and
drinking establishments and close to half of retail establishments are covered by the exemption
contained in subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. Therefore, we conclude
that the exemption does not qualify as a "certain special case" in the meaning of the first condition of
Article 13.
6.134 The European Communities warns that the potential coverage of both exemptions contained
in Section 110(5) could become even larger because subparagraphs (A) and (B) could arguably
exempt the transmission of musical works over the Internet. Given that we have found that the
business exemption does not meet the first condition of Article 13 regardless of whether it potentially
implicates transmission of works over the Internet, we see no need to address this question in the
context of subparagraph (B). However, we will take up this question when we examine the homestyle
exemption of subparagraph (A) in relation to the first condition of Article 13.
(iii) The homestyle exemption of subparagraph (A)
6.135 We examine now whether the homestyle exemption in subparagraph (A), in the form in which
it is currently in force in the United States, is a "certain special case" in the meaning of the first
condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6.136 The United States submits that the exemption of subparagraph (A) is confined to "certain
special cases", because its scope is limited to the use involving a "homestyle" receiving apparatus. In
the US view, in the amended version of 1998 as well, this is a well-defined fact-specific standard.
The essentially identical description of the homestyle exemption in the original Section 110(5) of
1976 was sufficiently clear and narrow for US courts to reasonably and consistently apply the
exception – including square footage limitation since the Aiken case – in a number of individual
decisions. For the United States, the fact that judges have weighed the various factors slightly
differently in making their individual decisions is simply a typical feature of a common-law system.
6.137 The European Communities contends that th e criteria of the homestyle exemption in
subparagraph (A) are ambiguously worded because the expression "a single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes" is in itself imprecise and a "moving target" due to
technological development. Also the variety of approaches and factors used by US courts in applying
the original version of the homestyle exemption are proof for the European Communities that the
wording of subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) is vague and open-ended.

133 Documents de la Conférence Réunie a Bruxelles du 5 au 26 juin 1948, published by BIRPI in 1951,
p. 266. In discussing this provision, the Guide to the Berne Convention refers to "cafés, restaurants, tea-rooms,
hotels, large shops, trains, aircraft, etc.", op.cit., paragraph 11 bis.11, p. 68. (For a more complete quote see
footnote 33 above).

Beneficiaries of the homestyle exemption
6.138 The wording of the amended version of Section 110(5)(A) is essentially identical to the
wording of Section 110(5) in its previous version of 1976, apart from the introductory phrase "except
as provided in subparagraph (B)". Therefore, we consider that the practice as reflected in the
judgements rendered by US courts after 1976 concerning the original homestyle exemption may be
regarded as factually indicative of the reach of the homestyle exemption even after the 1998
Amendment.
6.139 We recall that in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
134 the Court held that an owner of a
small fast food restaurant was not liable for playing music by means of a radio with outlets to four
speakers in the ceiling. The size of the shop was 1,055 square feet (98m 2), of which 620 square feet
(56m2) were open to the public. In the evolution of case law, subsequent to the inclusion of the
original homestyle exemption in the Copyright Act of 1976 in reaction to the Aiken judgement, US
courts have considered a number of factors to determine whether a shop or restaurant could benefit
from the exemption.135 These factors have included: (i) physical size of an establishment in terms of
square footage (in comparison to the size of the Aiken restaurant); (ii) extent to which the receiving
apparatus was to be considered as one commonly used in private homes; (iii) distance between the
receiver and the speakers; (iv) number of speakers; (v) whether the speakers were free-standing or
built into the ceiling; (vi) whether, depending on its revenue, the establishment was of a type that
would normally subscribe to a background music service; (vii) noise level of the areas within the
establishment where the transmissions were made audible or visible; and (viii) configuration of the
installation. In some federal circuits, US courts have focused primarily on the plain language of the
homestyle exemption that refers to "a single rece iving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes".
6.140 The European Communities emphasizes that in some US court cases large chain store
corporations were found to be exempted provided that each branch shop met the criteria of the
exemption, e.g., in respect of the size of the establishment and the equipment used by it, regardless of
the ownership and the economic size or corporate structure of the chain store corporation.
136 It is our
understanding that the European Communities does not argue that the ability of a corporate chain to
pay or the number of individual stores in joint ownership or under the control of the chain store
corporation should be a decisive factor for refusing to grant the exemption to a particular branch store.
However, the European Communities cautions that these US court decisions are illustrative of a
judicial trend towards broadening the homestyle exemption of 1976 in recent years.
6.141 The United States responds that, in applying Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act of 1976,
only three US court judgements have found that a defendant was entitled to take advantage of the
exemption. It also contends that only two US court judgements ( Claire's Boutiques and Edison
Bros.
137) dealt with the applicability of the exemption to particular branch shops of chain stores.
6.142 We note that the parties have submitted quantitative information on the coverage of
subparagraph (A) with respect to eating, drinking and other establishments. The 1995 CRS study
found that:
(a) 16 per cent of all US eating establishments;

134 See paragraph 2.6 of the section on factual aspects above.
135 According to the European Communities, US Courts have never favourably applied the homestyle
exemption to an eating or drinking establishment of more than 1,500 square feet of total space, nor to
establishments using more than four loudspeakers.
136 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, N°
91-1232. 11 December 1991. See Exhibit EC-6.
137 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, N° 91-
2115, 13 January 1992. See Exhibit EC-5.

(b) 13.5 per cent of all US drinking establishments; and
(c) 18 per cent of all US retail establishments
were as big as or smaller than the Aiken restaurant (1,055 square feet of total space), and could thus
benefit from the homestyle exemption. These figures are not disputed between the parties. The
United States expressly confirms these figures as far as eating and drinking establishments are
concerned.
138
6.143 We believe that from a quantitative perspective the reach of subparagraph (A) in respect of
potential users is limited to a comparably small percentage of all eating, drinking and retail
establishments in the United States.
6.144 We are mindful of the above-mentioned EC argument alleging a judicial trend towards
broadening the homestyle exemption of 1976 in recent years. We cannot exclude the possibility that
in the future US courts could establish precedents that would lead to the expansion of the scope of the
currently applicable homestyle exemption as regards covered establishments. But we also note that
since 1976 US courts have in the vast majority of cases applied the homestyle exemption in a
sufficiently consistent and clearly delineated manner. Given the sufficiently consistent and narrow
application practice of the homestyle exemption of 1976, we see no need to hypothesise whether at
some point in the future US case law might lead to a de facto expansion of the homestyle exemption
of 1998.
Homestyle equipment
6.145 We note that what is referred to as homestyle equipment (i.e., "a single receiving apparatus of
a kind commonly used in private homes") might vary between different countries, is subject to
changing consumer preferences in a given country, and may evolve as a result of technological
development. We thus agree in principle with the European Communities that the homestyle
equipment that was used in US households in 1976 (when the original homestyle exemption was
enacted) is not necessarily identical to the equipment used in 1998 (when US copyright legislation
was amended) or at a future point in time. However, we recall that the term " certain special case"
connotes "known and particularised, but not explicitly identified". In our view, the term "homestyle
equipment" expresses the degree of clarity in definition required under Article 13's first condition. In
our view, a Member is not required to identify homestyle equipment in terms of exceedingly detailed
technical specifications in order to meet the standard of clarity set by the first condition. While we
recognize that homestyle equipment may become technologically more sophisticated over time, we
see no need to enter into speculations about potential future developments in the homestyle equipment
market. At any rate, we recall that our factual dete rminations are invariably limited to what currently
is being perceived as homestyle equipment in the US market.
Musical works covered by subparagraph (A)
6.146 We have noted
139 the common view of the parties that the addition of the introductory phrase
"except as provided in subparagraph (B)" to the homestyle exemption in the 1998 Amendment should
be understood by way of an a contrario argument as limiting the coverage of the exemption to works
other than "nondramatic" musical works. 140 As regards musical works, the currently applicable
version of the homestyle exemption is thus understood to apply to the communication of music that is

138 US reply to question 9(a) by the Panel to the United States and a letter from the NRA of
18 November 1999, confidential exhibit US-18.
139 See paragraph 2.7.
140 See the second written submission by the United States (paragraph 3) and the second written
submission by the European Communities and their member States (paragraph 7).

part of an opera, operetta, musical or other similar dramatic work when performed in a dramatic
context. All other musical works are covered by the expression "nondramatic" musical works,
including individual songs taken from dramatic works when performed outside any dramatic context.
Subparagraph (B) would, therefore, apply for example to an individual song taken from a musical and
played on the radio. Consequently, given the common view of the parties, the operation of
subparagraph (A) is limited to such musical works as are not covered by subparagraph (B), for
example a communication of a broadcast of a dramatic rendition of the music written for an opera,
operetta, musical or other similar works.
6.147 While taking this position on the interpretation of subparagraph (A), the European
Communities has, however, cautioned that US courts might read a broader coverage into
subparagraph (A) at a future point in time.
141 In view of the common understanding of the parties in
the current dispute, and given the EC responses to our questions about the scope of its claims, we see
no need to speculate whether in the future subpara graph (A) could be interpreted by US courts to
cover musical works other than those considered as "dramatic".
6.148 In practice, this means that most if not virtually all music played on the radio or television is
covered by subparagraph (B). Subparagraph (A) covers, in accordance with the common
understanding of the parties, dramatic renditions of operas, operettas, musicals and other similar
dramatic works. We consider that limiting the application of subparagraph (A) to the public
communication of transmissions embodying such works, gives its provisions a quite narrow scope of
application in practice.
Internet transmissions
6.149 As we noted in paragraph 2.15 above, the types of transmissions covered by both
subparagraphs of Section 110(5) include original broadcasts over the air or by satellite, rebroadcasts
by terrestrial means or by satellite, cable retransmissions of original broadcasts, and original cable
transmissions or other transmissions by wire. The provisions do not distinguish between analog and
digital transmissions.
6.150 The European Communities presumes that, given its open-ended wording, subparagraph (A)
may apply to the public communication of musical works transmitted using new technologies such as
computer networks (e.g., the Internet), the importance of which increases from day to day.
142
6.151 The United States emphasizes that, in general, neither subparagraph of Section 110(5)
exempts communication over a digital network. In its view, the transmission of works over a
computer network involves numerous incidents of reproduction and could also implicate distribution
rights. Therefore, Internet users would have to seek a licence for the reproduction and possibly for the
distribution of works. The United States further developed its argumentation by adding that it was
unclear whether the performance aspect of an Internet transmission would be covered by either
subparagraph of Section 110(5). 143 It stated, however, that if an FCC-licensed broadcaster itself
streams its signals over the Internet, the performance aspect of the broadcast might fall within the
exemption.
6.152 Whether or not an establishment would need an authorization for the reproduction or
distribution of musical works, in the situations envisaged under Section 110(5), does not in our view

141 Second written submission by the European Communities and their Member States, paragraph 8.
142 For example, an FCC-licensed radio (or TV) broadcaster parallels its over-the-air transmissions on
the Internet (as an audio back-up to his web-site). These programmes are received by a PC connected with a
number of loudspeakers in a bar or other establishmen t meeting all the conditions set out in Section 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act.
143 US reply to question 6(a) by the Panel to the United States.

detract from the fact that an authorization is required for the exploitation of protected works in respect
of the exclusive rights protected under Articles 11(1)(ii) or 11 bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention
(1971).
6.153 In the light of the parties' arguments, we cannot exclude the possibility that the homestyle
exemption might apply to the communication to the public of works transmitted over the Internet.
But we also note that, based on the information provided to us by the parties, there seems to be no
experience to date of the application of the homestyle exemption in its original or amended form to
the transmission of "dramatic" musical works over the Internet. In these circumstances, we cannot see
how potential repercussions in the future could affect our conclusions concerning subparagraph (A) at
this point in time in relation to the first condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. But we also
do not wish to exclude the possibility that in the future new technologies might create new ways of
distributing dramatic renditions of "dramatic" musical works that might have implications for the
assessment of subparagraph (A) as a "certain spec ial case" in the meaning of the first condition of
Article 13.
Other considerations
6.154 The European Communities contends that neither subparagraph of Section 110(5) discloses a
"valid" public policy or other exceptional circumstance that makes it inappropriate or impossible to
enforce the exclusive rights conferred.
6.155 A US Congress House Report explained Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act of 1976: "The
basic rationale of this clause is that secondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary
receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be imposed". "[The clause]
would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial 'sound system' installed or converts a
standard home receiving apparatus … into the equivalent of a commercial sound system."
144 A
subsequent Conference Report elaborated on the rationale by noting that the intent was to exempt a
small commercial establishment "which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a
subscription to a commercial background music service".145
6.156 The United States further explains that the policy purpose justifying subparagraph (A) is the
protection of small "mom and pop" businesses which "play an important role in the American social
fabric" because they "offer economic opportunities for women, minorities, immigrants and welfare
recipients for entering the economic and social mainstream".
6.157 We recall our considerations above that we reject the idea that the first condition of Article 13
requires us to pass a value judgement on the legitimacy of an exception or limitation. However, we
also observed that stated public policy purposes could be of subsidiary relevance for drawing
inferences about the scope of an exemption and the clarity of its definition. In our view, the
statements from the legislative history indicate an intention of establishing an exception with a narrow
scope.
6.158 Finally, we recall our conclusion that the context of Articles 11 and 11 bis of the Berne
Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Ag reement allows for the possibility of providing
minor exceptions to the exclusive rights in question; i.e. the intention was to allow exceptions as long
as they are de minimis in scope.

144 Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94 th Congress, 2nd Session
87 (1976), Exhibit US-1. See section on Factual Aspects, paragraph 2.5.
145 Conference Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 9 th Congress, 2 nd Session 75 (1976), Exhibit US-2. See also
footnote 11 to paragraph 2.5 above.

6.159 Taking into account the specific limits imposed in subparagraph (A) and its legislative
history, as well as in its considerably narrow application in the subsequent court practice on the
beneficiaries of the exemption, permissible equipment and categories of works, we are of the view
that the homestyle exemption in subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) as amended in 1998 is well-
defined and limited in its scope and reach. We, therefore, conclude that the exemption is confined to
certain special cases within the meaning of the first condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
(iv) Need to examine the other two conditions
6.160 Having concluded that subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) does not comply with the first
condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, we could, therefore, conclude that the business
exemption does not satisfy the requirements of Article 13, given that its three conditions are
cumulative. Thus it would appear that subparagraph (B) is in violation of Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorp orated into the TRIPS Agreement by reference in
Article 9.1, and not justified by Article 13. Nevertheless, we continue our analysis of the other
conditions of Article 13 in relation to subparagraph (B) for the reasons discussed below.
6.161 Given our conclusion that subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) does comply with the first
condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, it is necessary for us to examine subparagraph (A)
also in relation to the subsequent conditions of the Article. We note that the two subparagraphs are
closely related and their respective fields of operation overlap in respects other than the categories of
works covered. In the light of this, we consider, in performing our task to examine the matter referred
to the DSB and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making recommendations or in giving
rulings,
146 it is appropriate to address the several other fundamental arguments made by the parties
with respect to subparagraph (B) that relate to its consistency with the other two conditions of
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
147
6.162 In continuing our analysis of the second and third conditions of Article 13 with respect to the
business exemption in subparagraph (B), we note the statements of the Appellate Body on "judicial
economy" in the dispute on United States – Shirts and Blouses .148 In a subsequent dispute on
Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon , the Appellate Body focuses on the need
for panels to address all claims and/or measures necessary to secure a positive solution to a dispute
and adds that providing only a partial resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial
economy.149 It is in the spirit of the Appellate Body's statements in Australia – Salmon that we will

146 See Article 7 of the DSU.
147 A GATT panel has held that a finding of violation does not necessarily preclude the panel’s
consideration of other legal claims where correction of the violation will not necessarily eliminate the basis of
the complainant’s other legal claims. See Panel Report on European Economic Community - Payments and
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins , adopted on 25
January 1990, BISD 37S/86, 126, paragraph 142.
148 In United States – Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body stated:
"Nothing in this provision or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims
made by the complaining party. Previous GATT 1947 and WTO panels have frequently addressed only those
issues that such panels considered necessary for the resolution of the matter between the parties, and have
declined to decide other issues. Thus, if a panel f ound that a measure was inconsistent with a particular
provision of the GATT 1947, it generally did not go on to examine whether the measure was also inconsistent
with other GATT provisions that a complaining party may have argued were violated. …". (Footnotes
omitted). See Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses, adopted 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, p.18.
149 In Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body stated:
"The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping in mind the aim of the dispute settlement
system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and "to secure a positive solution to a dispute". To provide
only a partial resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address those
claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations
and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings "in

continue our analysis of the business exemption in relation to the other conditions of Article 13. We
now proceed to examine the compatibility of subpar agraph (A), as well as of subparagraph (B), with
the other two conditions of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
(c) "Not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work"
(i) General interpretative analysis
6.163 The United States claims that both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) do "not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work" in the meaning of the second condition of Article 13
of the TRIPS Agreement. The European Communities contests that. We will first address the
interpretation of this second condition of Article 13 in general, and then examine the business and
homestyle exemptions in turn.
6.164 In interpreting the second condition of Article 13, we first need to define what "exploitation"
of a "work" means. More importantly, we have to determine what constitutes a "normal" exploitation,
with which a derogation is not supposed to "conflict".
6.165 The ordinary meaning of the term "exploit" connotes "making use of" or "utilising for one's
own ends".
150 We believe that "exploitation" of musical works thus refers to the activity by which
copyright owners employ the exclusive rights conferred on them to extract economic value from their
rights to those works.
6.166 We note that the ordinary meaning of the term "normal" can be defined as "constituting or
conforming to a type or standard; regular, usual, typical, ordinary, conventional …". 151 I n o u r
opinion, these definitions appear to reflect two connotations: the first one appears to be of an
empirical nature, i.e., what is regular, usual, typical or ordinary. The other one reflects a somewhat
more normative, if not dynamic, approach, i.e., conforming to a type or standard. We do not feel
compelled to pass a judgment on which one of these connotations could be more relevant. Based on
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, we will attempt to develop a harmonious interpretation which
gives meaning and effect to both connotations of "normal".
6.167 If "normal" exploitation were equated with full use of all exclusive rights conferred by
copyrights, the exception clause of Article 13 would be left devoid of meaning. Therefore, "normal"
exploitation clearly means something less than full use of an exclusive right.
152

order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." (Footnotes omitted). See the
Appellate Body Report on Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon , adopted on 6 November
1998, WT/DS18/AB/R, paragraph 223.
150 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 888.
151 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 1940.
152 In the context of exceptions to reproduction rights under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention
(1971) – whose second condition is worded largely identically to the second condition of Article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement – the Main Committee I of the Stockholm Diplomatic Conference (1967) stated:
"If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is
not permitted at all. If it is considered that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work, the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory
licence, or to provide for use without payment. A practical example may be photocopying for various purposes.
If it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal
exploitation of the work. If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of th e author, provided that, accord ing to national legislation,
an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without
payment, particularly for individual or scientific use." See the Records of the Intellectual Property Conference

6.168 In the US view, it is necessary to look to the ways in which an author might reasonably be
expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events, when one determines what constitutes a
normal exploitation. In this respect, it is relevant that Article 13 does not refer to particular specific
rights but to "the work" as a whole. This implie s that, in examining an exception under the second
condition, consideration should be given to the scope of the exception vis-à-vis the panoply of all the
rights holders' exclusive rights, as well as vis-à-vis the exclusive right to which it applies. In its view,
the most important forms of exploitation of musical works, namely, "primary" performance and
broadcasting, are not affected by either subparagraph of Section 110(5). The business and homestyle
exemptions only affect what the United States considers "secondary" uses of broadcasts, and that too,
subject to size and equipment limitations. In the US view, right holders normally obtain the main part
of their remuneration from "primary" uses and only a minor part from "secondary" uses.
6.169 The European Communities rejects the idea that there could be a hierarchical order between
"important" and "unimportant" rights under the TR IPS Agreement. For the European Communities,
there are no "secondary" rights and the exclusive rights provided for in Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) are all equally important separate rights.153
6.170 The United States itself clarifies that it does not imply that a legal hierarchy exists between
different exclusive rights conferred under Articles 11, 11 bis or any other provision of the Berne
Convention (1971) and that a country cannot completely eliminate an exclusive right even if that right
be economically unimportant. But it takes the view that when a possible conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work is analysed, it is relevant whether the exception applies to one or several
exclusive rights. Similarly, the degree to which the exception affects a particular exclusive right is
also relevant for the analysis of the second condition of Article 13.
6.171 It is true, as the United States points out, that Article 13 refers to a normal exploitation of "the
work." However, the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention provide exclusive rights in
relation to the work. These exclusive rights are the legal means by which exploitation of the work,
i.e., the commercial activity for extracting economic value from the rights to the work, can be carried
out. The parties do not in principle question that the term "works" should be understood as referring
to the "exclusive rights" in those works.
154 In our view, Article 13's second condition does not
explicitly refer pars pro toto to exclusive rights concerning a "work" given that the TRIPS Agreement
(or the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into it) confers a considerable number of exclusive
rights to all of which the exception clause of Article 13 may apply. Therefore, we believe that the
"work" in Article 13's second condition means all the exclusive rights relating to it.
6.172 While we agree with the United States that the degree to which an exception affects a
particular right is relevant for our analysis under the second condition, we emphasize that a possible
conflict with a normal exploitation of a particular exclusive right cannot be counter-balanced or
justified by the mere fact of the absence of a conflict with a normal exploitation of another exclusive
right (or the absence of any exception altogether with respect to that right), even if the exploitation of
the latter right would generate more income.
6.173 We agree with the European Communities that whether a limitation or an exception conflicts
with a normal exploitation of a work should be judged for each exclusive right individually. We
recall that this dispute primarily concerns the exclusive right under Article 11 bis(1)(iii) of the Berne
Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, but also the exclusive right under

of Stockholm, 11 June – 14 July 1967. Report on the Work of the Main Committee I (Substantive Provisions of
the Berne Convention: Articles 1- 20. As reproduced in the Berne Convention Centenary, p. 197.
153 See also the written submission of Australia, paragraph 3.8.
154 These rights include, inter alia , the rights of public performance and broadcasting as well as the
right of communication to the public in the meanings of Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne
Convention (1971).

Article 11(1)(ii). In our view, normal exploitati on would presuppose the possibility for right holders
to exercise separately all three exclusive rights guaranteed under the three subparagraphs of
Article 11bis(1), as well as the rights conferred by other provisions, such as Article 11, of the Berne
Convention (1971). If it were permissible to limit by a statutory exemption the exploitation of the
right conferred by the third subparagraph of Article 11 bis(1) simply because, in practice, the
exploitation of the rights conferred by the first and second subparagraphs of Article 11 bis(1) would
generate the lion's share of royalty revenue, the "normal exploitation" of each of the three rights
conferred separately under Article 11bis(1) would be undermined. 155
6.174 An individual analysis of the second condition for each exclusive right conferred by copyright
is in line with the GATT/WTO dispute settleme nt practice. One panel found that GATT non-
discrimination clauses do not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure
against a less favourable treatment under others. 156 As another panel put it, an element of more
favourable treatment would only be relevant if it would always accompany and offset an element of
differential treatment causing less favourable treatment. 157 While these cases involved the GATT
non-discrimination clauses, we believe that the general principle embodied therein is mutatis mutandis
relevant to the issue at hand.
6.175 We also note that the amplification of broadcas t music will occur in establishments such as
bars, restaurants and retail stores for the commercial benefit of the owner of the establishment. 158
Both parties agree on the commercial nature of playing music even when customers are not directly
charged for it. It may be that the amount yielded from any royalty payable as a consequence of this
exploitation of the work will not be very great if one looks at the matter in the context of single
establishments. But it is the accumulation of establishments which counts. It must be remembered

155 Moreover, we need to keep in mind that the excl usive rights conferred by different subparagraphs of
Articles 11bis and 11 need not necessarily be in the possession of one and the same right holder. An author or
performer may choose not to license the use of a particular exclusive right but to sell and transfer it to another
natural or juridical person. If it were permissible to justify the interference into one exclusive right with the fact
that another exclusive right generates more revenue, certain right holders might be deprived of their right to
obtain royalties simply because the exclusive right held by another right holder is more profitable.
Our view that exclusive rights need to be analysed separately for the purposes of the second condition
is also corroborated by the licensing practices between CMOs and broadcasting organizations in the United
States and the European Communities. These practi ces do not appear to take into account the potential
additional audience created by means of a further communication by loudspeaker of a broadcast of a work
within the meaning of Article 11 bis(1)(iii), i.e. no fees are collected from broadcasters for the additional
audiences. See EC and US responses to question 4 by the Panel to both parties.
156 The Panel on European Communities – Regime for th e Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (adopted on 25 September 1997, WT/DS27/ECU/GUA/HND/MEX/USA, paragraph 7.239 and
footnote 446) referred to the Panel on United States – Denial of Most-favoured Nation Treatment as to Non-
rubber Footwear from Brazil:
"Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against a less
favourable treatment under others. If such balancing were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to
derogate from the most-favourable nation obligation in on e case, in respect of one contracting party, on the
ground that it accords more favourable treatment in some other case in respect of another contracting party. In
the view of the Panel, such an interpretation of the most-favoured nation obligation of Article I:1 would defeat
the very purpose underlying the unconditionality of that obligation." (Adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128,
151, paragraph 6.10).
157 The Panel on EEC – Bananas III also referred to the Panel on United States – Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 for the principle that "an element of more favourable treatment would only be relevant if it
would always accompany and offset an element of differential treatment causing less favourable treatment".
(Adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, 388, paragraph 5.16).
See also Panel Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of
Tobacco, adopted 4 October 1994, BISD 41S/131, 169, paragraph 98.
158 We note that US court cases and the legislative history of Section 110(5) suggest that restaurants
and other establishments play music in order to attract customers with a view to enhance turnover and profit.
(See Press Release by the NLBA, Exhibit US-7.)

that a copyright owner is entitled to exploit each of the rights for which a treaty, and the national
legislation implementing that treaty, provides. If a copyright owner is entitled to a royalty for music
broadcast over the radio, why should the copyright owner be deprived of remuneration which would
otherwise be earned, when a significant number of radio broadcasts are amplified to customers of a
variety of commercial establishments no doubt for the benefit of the businesses being conducted in
those establishments. We also note that although, in a sense, the amplification which is involved is
additional to and separate from the broadcast of a work, it is tied to the broadcast. The amplification
cannot occur unless there is a broadcast. If an operator of an establishment plays recorded music,
there is no legislative exception to the copyright owners' rights in that regard. But the amplification of
a broadcast adds to the broadcast itself because it ensures that a wider audience will hear it. Clearly
Article 11 bis(iii) contemplates the use which is in question here by conferring rights on copyright
owners in respect of the amplification of broadcasts.
6.176 That leaves us with the question of how to determine whether a particular use constitutes a
normal exploitation of the exclusive rights provided under Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the
Berne Convention (1971). In academic literature, one approach that has been suggested would be to
rely on "the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal
course of events".
159
6.177 The main thrust of the US argumentation is that, for judging "normal exploitation",
Article 13's second condition implies an economic analysis of the degree of "market displacement" in
terms of foregone collection of remuneration by right owners caused by the free use of works due to
the exemption at issue. 160 In the US view, the essential question to ask is whether there are areas of
the market in which the copyright owner would ordinarily expect to exploit the work, but which are
not available for exploitation because of this exemption. Under this test, uses from which an owner
would not ordinarily expect to receive compensation are not part of the normal exploitation.
6.178 In our view, this test seems to reflect the empirical or quantitative aspect of the connotation of
"normal", the meaning of "regular, usual, typical or ordinary". We can, therefore, accept this US
approach, but only for the empirical or quantitative side of the connotation. We have to give meaning
and effect also to the second aspect of the connotation, the meaning of "conforming to a type or
standard". We described this aspect of normalcy as reflecting a more normative approach to defining
normal exploitation, that includes, inter alia , a dynamic element capable of taking into account
technological and market developments. The question then arises how this normative aspect of
"normal" exploitation could be given meaning in relation to the exploitation of musical works.
6.179 In this respect, we find persuasive guidance in the suggestion by a study group, composed of
representatives of the Swedish Government and the United International Bureaux for the Protection of
Intellectual Property ("BIRPI"), which was set up to prepare for the Revision Conference at
Stockholm in 1967 ("Swedish/BIRPI Study Group"). In relation to the reproduction right, this Group
suggested to allow countries:
"[to] limit the recognition and the exercising of that right, for specified purposes and
on the condition that these purposes should not enter into economic competition with
these works " in the sense that "all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are
likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance, must be reserved to
the authors."
161 (emphasis added).

159 Ricketson, The Berne Convention, op.cit., p. 483.
160 US reply to question 17 by the Panel to both parties.
161 Document S/1: Berne Convention; Proposals for Revising the Substantive Copyright Provisions
(Articles 1-20). Prepared by the Government of Sweden with the assistance of BIPRI, p. 42.

6.180 Thus it appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal exploitation
is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that currently generate significant or tangible
revenue, those forms of exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could
acquire considerable economic or practical importance.
6.181 In contrast, exceptions or limitations would be presumed not to conflict with a normal
exploitation of works if they are confined to a scope or degree that does not enter into economic
competition with non-exempted uses. In this re spect, the suggestions of the Swedish/BIRPI Study
Group are useful:
"In this connection, the Study Group observed that, on the one hand, it was obvious
that all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire, considerable
economic or practical importance must in principle be reserved to the authors ;
exceptions that might restrict the possibilities open to the authors in these respects
were unacceptable. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that domestic laws
already contained a series of exceptions in favour of various public and cultural
interests and that it would be vain to suppose that countries would be ready at this
stage to abolish these exceptions to any appreciable extent."
162 (emphasis added).
6.182 We recall that the European Communities proposes to measure the impact of exceptions by
using a benchmark according to which, at least, all those forms of use of works that create an
economic benefit for the user should be considered as normal exploitation of works. We can accept
that the assessment of normal exploitation of works, from an empirical or quantitative perspective,
requires an economic analysis of the commercial use of the exclusive rights conferred by the
copyrights in those works. However, in our view, not every use of a work, which in principle is
covered by the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial gain, necessarily conflicts with a
normal exploitation of that work. If this were th e case, hardly any exception or limitation could pass
the test of the second condition and Article 13 might be left devoid of meaning, because normal
exploitation would be equated with full use of exclusive rights.
6.183 We believe that an exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation rises to
the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of the work (i.e., the copyright or rather the whole
bundle of exclusive rights conferred by the ownership of the copyright), if uses, that in principle are
covered by that right but exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic competition
with the ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work (i.e., the
copyright) and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains.
6.184 In developing a benchmark for defining the normative connotation of normal exploitation, we
recall the European Communities' emphasis on the potential impact of an exception rather than on its
actual effect on the market at a given point in time, given that, in its view, it is the potential effect that
determines the market conditions.
6.185 We note that a consideration of both actual and potential effects when assessing the
permissibility of the exemptions would be consistent with similar concepts and interpretation
standards as developed in the past GATT/WTO dispute settlement practice. For example, proof of
actual trade effects has not been considered an indispensable prerequisite for a finding of
inconsistency with the national treatment clause of Article III of GATT where there was a potentiality
of adverse effects on competitive opportunities and equal competitive conditions for foreign products
(in comparison to like domestic products).
163 We wish to express our caution in interpreting

162 Ibid., p. 41.
163 The Working Party Report on Brazilian Internal Taxes noted in the context of the GATT national
treatment clause that "the absence of imports from contracting parties during any period of time that might be
selected for examination would not necessarily be an indication that they had no interest in exports of the

provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in the light of concepts that have been developed in GATT
dispute settlement practice. But we also recall that, e.g., in the dispute EC – Bananas III , the panel
and the Appellate Body introduced concepts, as developed in dispute settlement practice under
Article III of GATT, into the national treatment clause of Article XVII of GATS whose wording is
based on the GATT national treatment clause and interpretations developed in GATT dispute
settlement practice.
164 Given that the agreements covered by the WTO form a single, integrated legal
system, we deem it appropriate to develop interpretations of the legal protection conferred on
intellectual property right holders under the TRIPS Agreement which are not incompatible with the
treatment conferred to products under the GATT, or in respect of services and service suppliers under
the GATS, in the light of pertinent dispute settlement practice.
6.186 Therefore, in respect of the exclusive rights related to musical works, we consider that normal
exploitation of such works is not only affected by those who actually use them without an
authorization by the right holders due to an exception or limitation, but also by those who may be
induced by it to do so at any time without having to obtain a licence from the right holders or the
CMOs representing them. Thus we need to take into account those whose use of musical works is
free as a result of the exemptions, and also those who may choose to start using broadcast music once
its use becomes free of charge.

product affected by the tax, since their potentialities as exporters, given national treatment, should be taken into
account. These members of the working party therefore took the view that the provision of … Article III …
were equally applicable whether imports from other contracting parties were substantial, small or non-existent."
See Report of the Working Party on Brazilian Internal Taxes, adopted 30 June 1949, BISD II/181, 185.
The statement that proof of actual trade effects was not an indispensable prerequisite for a finding of
GATT-inconsistency was followed by a number of subsequent panels, inter alia, in the dispute on United States
– Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136, 158,
paragraph 5.1.9. See also Panel Report on United States – Measures Affec ting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages ,
adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206, 270/271, paragraph 5.6; Panel Report on United States – Measures
Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco , adopted 4 October 1994, BISD 41S/131, 169,
paragraph 98.
These and other panels, including in Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery
(adopted on 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60, 64, paragraph 12) and in Canada – Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act (adopted on 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140, 159-161, paragraphs 5.8-5.10), interpreted
the national treatment standard, which prohibits de jure as well as de facto discrimination, as protecting the
equality in competitive opportunities and as prohibiting any laws or regulations which might adversely modify
conditions of competition between foreign and like domestic products.
Panels dealing with the prohibition of quantitative restrictions or prohibitions similarly found that
Article XI of GATT protected conditions of competition and that an import restriction was prohibited regardless
of whether it actually impeded imports. See Panel Report on EEC – Payments and Subsidies to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed Proteins , adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, 130,
paragraph 150. See also Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather , adopted on 15/16 May
1984, BISD 31S/94, 113, paragraph 55.
In the dispute Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (adopted on 1 November 1996,
WT/DS8,10,11/AB/R, p. 16), the Appellate Body upheld the concepts of equality of competitive conditions and
equal competitive relationship between foreign and like domestic products. In the dispute Korea – Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages (adopted on 17 February 1999, WT/DS75,84/AB/R, paragraphs 125-131), the Appellate
Body confirmed the absence of a trade effects test und er the national treatment clause and the principle that
Article III of GATT protects expectations as to competitive opportunities.
164 Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of GATS draws on the interpretation developed by a GATT panel with
respect to Article III:4 of GATT. See Panel Report on United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ,
adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, 386, paragraph 5.11.
Paragraph 3 of Article XVII of GATS draws on the interpretation developed in the Panel Report on
Italian Discrimination of Imported Agricultural Machinery, adopted on 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60, 63,
paragraph 12.

6.187 We base our appraisal of the actual and potential effects on the commercial and technological
conditions that prevail in the market currently or in the near future. 165 What is a normal exploitation
in the market-place may evolve as a result of technological developments or changing consumer
preferences. Thus, while we do not wish to speculate on future developments, we need to consider the
actual and potential effects of the exemptions in question in the current market and technological
environment.
6.188 We do acknowledge that the extent of exercise or non-exercise of exclusive rights by right
holders at a given point in time is of great relevance for assessing what is the normal exploitation with
respect to a particular exclusive right in a particular market. However, in certain circumstances,
current licensing practices may not provide a sufficient guideline for assessing the potential impact of
an exception or limitation on normal exploitation. For example, where a particular use of works is not
covered by the exclusive rights conferred in the law of a jurisdiction, the fact that the right holders do
not license such use in that jurisdiction cannot be considered indicative of what constitutes normal
exploitation. The same would be true in a situation where, due to lack of effective or affordable
means of enforcement, right holders may not find it worthwhile or practical to exercise their rights.
6.189 Both parties are of the view that the "normalcy" of a form of exploitation should be analysed
primarily by reference to the market of the WTO Member whose measure is in dispute, i.e., the US
market in this dispute. The European Communities is also of the view that comparative references to
other countries with a similar level of socio-economic development could be relevant to corroborate
or contradict data from the country primarily concerned.
166 We note that while the WTO Members
are free to choose the method of implementation, the minimum standards of protection are the same
for all of them. 167 In the present case it is enough for our purposes to take account of the specific
conditions applying in the US market in assessin g whether the measure in question conflicts with a
normal exploitation in that market, or whether the measure meets the other conditions of Article 13.
(ii) The business exemption of subparagraph (B)
6.190 The United States contends that the business exemption does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of works for a number of reasons. First, in view of the great number of small eating,
drinking and retail establishments, individual right holders or their CMOs face considerable
administrative difficulties in licensing all these establishments. Given that the market to which the
business exemption applies was never significantly exploited by the CMOs, the US Congress merely
codified the status quo of the CMOs' licensing practices. Second, a significant portion of the
establishments exempted by the new business exem ption had already been exempted under the old
homestyle exemption. Thus owners of copyrights in nondramatic musical works had no expectation
of receiving fees from the small eating, drinking or retail establishments covered by the latter
exemption. Third, even if subparagraph (B) had not been enacted, many of the establishments eligible
for that exemption would have been able to avail themselves of an almost identical exemption under
the group licensing agreement be tween the NLBA and ASCAP, th e BMI and SESAC ("US CMOs").
For these reasons, the United States assumes that, even before the 1998 Amendment, right holders
would not have normally expected to obtain fees from these establishments. The United States
believes that the number of establishments, that would not have been entitled to take advantage of the
original homestyle exemption of 1976 or the NLBA agreement and thus were newly exempted under
subparagraph (B), is small. Viewed against the pa noply of exploitative uses available to copyright

165 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , adopted on 17 February 1999,
WT/DS75,84/AB/R, paragraphs 125-131. See also Report of the Working Party on Brazilian Internal Taxes ,
adopted 30 June 1949, BISD II/181, 185. Panel Report on United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136, 158, paragraph 5.19.
166 EC and US responses to question 14 by the Panel to both parties.
167 In this regard, the United States refers to Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that
Members "shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement".

owners under US copyright law,168 in the US view, the residual limitation on some secondary uses of
broadcast works does not rise to the level of a conflict with normal exploitation.
6.191 The European Communities responds that administrative difficulties in licensing a great
number of small establishments do not excuse the very absence of the right, because there can be
enforcement of only such rights as are recognized by law. It also points out that the use of recorded
music is not covered by the exemptions. Arguing that this differentiation is difficult to justify, it
contends that, to the extent the licensing of a great number of establishments meets insurmountable
difficulties, then such difficulties should occur independently of the medium used. It also notes that
the EC CMOs are successfully licensing a great number of small businesses without encountering
insurmountable obstacles, whereas the US CMOs due to the lack of legal protection have not
developed the necessary administrative structure to licence small establishments.
6.192 In response to a question from the Panel, the United States clarifies that it does not argue that
administrative difficulties in licensing small establishments are more severe with respect to broadcast
music as opposed to CDs or live music. Part of the rationale for this distinction is rather an historical
one.169
6.193 In relation to its statement that the market to which the business exemption applies was never
significantly exploited by the CMOs, the United States submitted information concerning the number
and percentage of establishments that were licensed in the past by the CMOs.
170 The United States
explains that, in considering the original homestyle exemption of Section 110(5), the US Congress
found that, prior to 1976, the majority of beneficiaries of the then contemplated exemption were not
licensed.171 As regards the situation between the entr y into force of the 1976 Copyright Act and the
1998 Amendment, the United States refers to the information provided by the NRA. 172 Based on the
US Census Bureau data for 1996 and a number of its own studies, the NRA estimates that 16 per cent
of table service restaurants and 5 per cent of fast food restaurants were licensed by the CMOs at that
time in the United States. According to the NRA estimates based on the Census Bureau data, there
was approximately the same number of table service and fast food restaurants in the United States. 173
Averaging these percentage figures, the United States concludes that approximately 10.5 per cent of
restaurants were licensed by the CMOs.
6.194 In this context, the United States refers to the testimony of the President of ASCAP before the
US Congress in 1997. 174 Based on the total number of ASCAP restaurants licensees 175 and the total
number of restaurants estimated by the NRA on the basis of the Census Bureau data, 176 the United

168 Exhibit US-14.
169 US response to question 7 from the Panel to the United States.
170 US response to question 10 from the Panel to the United States.
171 House Report (1976), Exhibit US-1.
172 Letter, dated 18 November 1999, from the NRA to the USTR. Confidential exhibit US-18.
173 Based on the Census Bureau data, the NRA estimates that there were 183,253 table service
restaurants and 185,891 quick-service restaurants in the United States. Based on this data and a number of its
own surveys, it estimates that 16% (28,000-31,000) table service restaurants and 5% (8,000-10,000) quick
service restaurants were licensed in the same period by CMOs. See US response to question 10(b) from the
Panel to the United States.
174 Written statement by the President of ASCAP, Ms. Marilyn Bergman, dated 31 July 1997, to the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, House Judiciary Committee. Exhibit US-20.
175 In her testimony before Congress in 1997, the President of ASCAP stated that "the total number of
ASCAP restaurant licensees does not exceed 70,000". Exhibit US-20, p. 177. In her testimony, she also
complained that "[t]here exists a massive non-compliance problem by tens of thousands of restaurants". Exhibit
US 20, p. 175.
176 The NRA estimated on the basis of the Census Bureau data that there were a total of 369 144 table
and quick-service restaurants in the United States. Confidential exhibit US-18.

States estimates that ASCAP did not license more than 19 per cent of restaurants at that time. This, in
its view, also indicates a relatively low level of licensing of such establishments.
6.195 We recall that, in its study of November 1995, 177 the CRS estimated that the size of 16 per
cent of eating establishments 13.5 per cent of drinking establishments and 18 per cent of retail
establishments did not exceed at that time the size of the Aiken restaurant, i.e. 1,055 square feet.
These establishments could benefit from the exemption under the original Section 110(5), subject to
equipment limitations. The United States gives two estimates of the number of licensed restaurants at
that time: on the one hand, 10.5 per cent of restaurants were licensed by the CMOs, 178 and, on the
other hand, 19 per cent of restaurants were licensed by ASCAP. 179 The United States also estimates
that 74 per cent of all restaurants play some kind of music.180
6.196 Even when we deduct the share of the restaurants that were potentially exempted under the
original homestyle exemption, we can agree with the United States that these figures indicate a
relatively low level of licensing of restaurants likely to play music. However, as we noted above,
whether or not the CMOs fully exercise their right to authorize the use of particular exclusive rights,
or choose to collect remuneration for particular uses, or from particular users can, in our view, not
necessarily be fully indicative of "normal exploitation" of exclusive rights. In considering whether
the 1998 Amendment conflicts with normal exploitation, the fact that it does not generally change the
licensing practices in relation to those establishments that were already exempted under the old
homestyle exemption is not relevant; it is eviden t that due to the pre-existing homestyle exemption
such establishments could not be licensed. Below, we will address separately, whether the homestyle
exemption as contained in the amended Section 110(5) conflicts with normal exploitation.
6.197 The restaurants that were licensed by the CMOs before the 1998 Amendment were
presumably mostly restaurants which were above the Aiken size limits (or did not meet the equipment
limits for smaller restaurants). The two US estimates of the share of licensed restaurants (10.5 and 19
per cent) read together with the US estimate of the share of restaurants that play some kind of music
(74 per cent) imply that many restaurants, that were above the Aiken size limits and that were likely to
play music, appear not to have been licensed. This tends to indicate that amongst similar users some
paid licence fees while others did not. We have not been provided with any evidence that it would be
considered normal to expect remuneration from some but not other similarly situated users.
6.198 We do not find the argument compelling, according to which an exception that codifies an
existing practice by the CMOs of not licensing certain users should be presumed not to conflict with
normal exploitation, as it would not affect right holders' current expectations to be remunerated. In
our understanding, this would equate "normal exploitation" with "normal remuneration" practices
existing at a certain point in time in a given market or jurisdiction. If such exceptions were
permissible per se , any current state and degree of exercise of an exclusive right by right holders
could effectively be "frozen". In our view, such argumentation could be abused as a justification of
any exception or limitation since right holders could never reasonably expect remuneration for uses
which are not covered by exclusive rights provided in national legislation. Logically, no conflict with
normal exploitation could be construed. The same would apply where a low level of exercise of an
exclusive right would be due to lack of effective or affordable means of enforcement of that right. In
other words, the licensing practices of the CMOs in a given market at a given time do not define the
minimum standards of protection under the TRIPS Agreement that have to be provided under national
legislation.

177 See paragraph 2.11.
178 US response to question 10(b) by the Panel to the United States, paragraph 1.
179 US response to question 10(b) by the Panel to the United States, paragraph 2.
180 US response to question 11(b) by the Panel to the United States.

6.199 The United States draws attention to a proposal by the US CMOs to amend Section 110(5). 181
In 1995, the CMOs set forth a substitute text for the bill 182 that was pending in Congress at that time.
The CMO proposal suggested a square footage limit of 1,250 square feet and specific equipment
limitations of no more than four loudspeakers and two television screens not greater than 44 inches.
With respect to other matters, the CMOs said in their proposal that it was possible and desirable to
leave them for a negotiated settlement with user associations.
183 The CMO proposal represented a
modest expansion of the original homestyle exemption.184
6.200 There may be a variety of reasons and motivations why CMOs, coalitions of small businesses
or other interest groups make legislative proposals to a national parliament. Certain proposals might
form part of a larger package deal with elements that are more or less favourable for particular groups
involved in the process. It is not our task to se cond-guess such motivations or bargaining strategies.
Our terms of reference are limited to examinin g the consistency of the currently applicable
Section 110(5), which was eventually enacted, with the substantive standards of the TRIPS
Agreement. In carrying out our mandate, we have to interpret the phrase "not conflict with a normal
exploitation" on the basis of the criteria of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and examine
subparagraph (B) in the light of an objective standard. Therefore, we do not consider the legislative
proposal by the US CMOs as relevant for interpreting the second condition of Article 13. A proposal
made during the legislative proceedings by the CMOs cannot be held against them nor be used to
determine treaty obligations.
6.201 The United States also submits that, in the absence of a legislative solution at that time, the
US CMOs signed a private group licensing agreement with the NLBA in October 1995 ("NLBA
Agreement"). The CMOs offered to extend the agreement to the National Restaurant Association
(NRA) and other members of the coalition advocating an extension of the exemption in the law. The
agreement exempts establishments affiliated with the NLBA from paying licensing fees for the
performance of music by the radio or television, if the establishment is smaller than 3,500 square feet,
or bigger and complies with certain limitations on equipment. The United States emphasizes that the
scope of the exemptions in this voluntarily negotiated group licensing agreement is largely identical to
the legislation that, three years later, in 1998, became the Fairness in Music Licensing Act.
 185
6.202 The European Communities contends that the CMOs tried to negotiate such group licensing
agreements in order to prevent even less favourable legislation from being enacted. The European
Communities compares this to a situation where a right owner will be more inclined to grant a
contractual licence on relatively unfavourable terms in a country where it is easy to obtain a
compulsory licence than in a country where it is difficult to obtain a compulsory licence.
Furthermore, in its view, the US reference to private agreements is circular in nature. It is only after
the legislator has established a legal framework that private economic operators can start to act within
this framework. In other words, only when a law stipulates a public performance right can parties
usefully agree on a licensing contract. Where a law contemplates free use, there is no reason for a
licensing contract as there is no right to license in the first place.
6.203 We note that the United States was not in a position to provide a copy of the NLBA
Agreement to the Panel, because the NLBA considered it to contain business proprietary

181 US first written submission, paragraph 11.
182 H.R. 789, Exhibit US-4.
183 Letter of 24 July 1995 to the Honourable Carlos Moorhead from ASCAP, BMI, Inc. and SESAC,
Inc., Exhibit US-5.
184 US first written submission, paragraph 11.
185 For details, see US first written submission, paragraphs 12 and 13.

information.186 Therefore, in considering the relevan ce of the NLBA Agreement for the issues at
hand, we have had to rely on other indirect information provided to us by the parties.
6.204 While we recognize similarities between the terms of the NLBA Agreement and the
provisions of the finally passed version of the business exemption in subparagraph (B), we also notice
differences. The NLBA Agreement appears to be a comprehensive performing rights licensing
package, the terms of which go beyond the issues addressed in the business exemption as it was then
pending or later enacted. For example, the agreement is administered by the NBLA against a small
portion of the collected licence fees. Small establishments qualifying for an exemption under the
agreement have to apply for an "exemption licen ce" from the NLBA for a fee of US$30 per year.
Thus, the agreement can be characterized as a form of exercise of exclusive rights by the grant of
"exemption licences" to small eating and drinking es tablishments against the payment of a small flat-
rate fee.
187 Furthermore, under the agreement, the CMOs and the NLBA commit themselves to work
together to provide value-added packages for thos e who choose the group agreement. In announcing
the agreement, the NBLA strongly urged its me mbers to acquire a licence under the agreement. 188
This course of action by the NLBA was likely to induce a larger number of restaurants to voluntarily
subscribe to the group licence than concerted efforts by the CMOs to license individual restaurants.189
6.205 It is one thing to have a practice such as the NLBA Agreement. Right holders do not need to
exploit their rights, or they may do so for a nominal fee or no fee. It is another thing to pass
legislation preventing the exercise of a right, which a country is obliged, under a treaty binding it, to
afford to the nationals of the other parties to the treaty. Individual or group licensing arrangements
result from negotiations between parties, not from governmental imposition. They may, subject to the
terms agreed between the parties, be extended, modified or terminated at will. While the NLBA
arrangement may evolve in response to market developments affecting the normal exploitation of
works, the statutory business exemption cannot evolve similarly since it prevents the market from
developing or distorts it. We note that Arti cle 13, including its second condition, sets forth an
objective test for permissible exceptions to exclusive rights. In assessing whether a statutory
exemption meets that test, a comparison between its provisions and the terms and conditions of a
group licensing arrangement such as the one between the NLBA and the US CMOs is not pertinent.
6.206 We recall that a substantial majority of eating and drinking establishments and close to half of
retail establishments are eligible to benefit from the business exemption. This constitutes a major
potential source of royalties for the exercise of the exclusive rights contained in Articles 11(1) bis(iii)

186 See US response to the question 1(c) from the Panel to the United States.
187 In comparison, we note that the Australian Performing Rights Association grants complimentary
licences to certain small establishments. See Australia's response to question 2 by the Panel to the third parties.
188 The information above is based on the NLBA News, April 1997, Exhibit US-6, and "Music
Licensing Agreement with ASCAP, BMI & SESAC for NLBA members; NLBA announces the deal of the
century", Exhibit US-7. According to the United States, the fee for an exemption licence is currently US$50.
189 We cannot exclude the possibility that terms of the NLBA Agreement could have been influenced
by the Bill pending in the US Congress at the time when the agreement was concluded. However, we believe it
is irrelevant for the purposes of our examination of Article 13's second condition whether, as noted by the
United States, ASCAP praised the private group licensing agreement and called it a fair compromise, stating
that it would benefit small businesses while ensuring that the rights of rights holders would be protected.
Likewise, it is irrelevant for the purposes of our examination of that condition whether, as noted by the
European Communities, ASCAP and the BMI condemned the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 in a
press release at the occasion of its passage by US Congress. (The EC refers to a joint press release by ASCAP
and BMI, Exhibit EC-14: "With this music licensing legislation, which seizes the private property of copyright
owners, the US Government has severely penalised American songwriters, composers and publishers … The
earnings of songwriters, composers and publishers have been reduced by tens of millions of dollars annually.")
We note that right holders or their CMOs are not preven ted from enforcing their rights because of legislative
proposals or comments thereon made by them.

and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971), as demonstrated by the figures of the D&B studies
referred to under our analysis of the first condition of Article 13.
6.207 We recall that subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) exempts communication to the public of
radio and television broadcasts, while the playing of musical works from CDs and tapes (or live
music) is not covered by it. Given that we have not been provided with reasons other than historical
ones for this distinction, we see no logical reason to differentiate between broadcast and recorded
music when assessing what is a normal use of musical works.
6.208 It is true, as the United States notes, that many of these establishments might not play music
at all, or play recorded or live music. According to NLBA surveys,
190 among its member
establishments 26 per cent use CDs or tapes, 18 per cent rely on background music services, 37 per
cent have live music performances, while 28 per cent play radio music. 191 The United States
estimates that overall approximately 74 per cent of US restaurants play music from various sources.
The United States provided estimates also by the NRA concerning its membership on the percentage
of restaurants that play the radio or use the television; these figures are not reproduced here, given
that this information was provided to the United States in confidence.
192 From this data, the United
States assumes that no more than 44 per cent of licensing fees can be attributed to radio music.193
6.209 We note that the parties agree that the administrative challenges for the CMOs related to the
licensing of a great number of small eating, drinking and retail establishments do not differ depending
on the medium used for playing music. We believe that the differentiation between different types of
media may induce operators of establishments covered by subparagraph (B) to switch from recorded
or live music, which is subject to the payment of a fee, to music played on the radio or television,
which is free of charge. This may also create an incentive to reduce the licensing fees for recorded
music so that users would not switch to broadcast music.
6.210 Right holders of musical works would expect to be in a position to authorize the use of
broadcasts of radio and television music by many of the establishments covered by the exemption
and, as appropriate, receive compensation for the use of their works. Consequently, we cannot but
conclude that an exemption of such scope as subparagraph (B) conflicts with the "normal
exploitation" of the work in relation to the exclusive rights conferred by Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971).
6.211 In the light of these considerations, we conclude that the business exemption embodied in
subparagraph (B) conflicts with a normal exploitatio n of the work within the meaning of the second
condition of Article 13.
(iii) The homestyle exemption of subparagraph (A)
6.212 The United States argues that the homestyle exemption, even before nondramatic musical
works were removed from its scope through the 1998 Amendment, was limited to the establishments
that were not large enough to justify a subscription to a commercial background music service.
194 As
noted in the House Report (1976), the United St ates Congress intended that this exemption would
merely codify the licensing practices already in effect. The original homestyle exemption of 1976

190 US response to question 11(b) by the panel to the United States.
191 Letter from NLBA of 18 November 1999, confidential exhibit US-17.
192 We find that the designation as confidential of such statistical information does not assist us in
discharging of our responsibility to make findings that will best enable the DSB to perform its dispute
settlement functions. However, given our findings on the compatibility of the business exemption with the
second condition of Article 13, including our considerations on substitution effects between various sources of
music, the information in question is not essential for our findings.
193 US response to question 11(b) by the panel to the United States.
194 US Congress Conference Report (1976), Exhibit US-2, referred to in paragraph 2.5 above.

was intended to affect only those establishments that were not likely otherwise to enter into a licence,
or would not have been licensed under the practices at that time. The United States contends that
subparagraph (A) of the amended Section 110(5) does not conflict with the expectation of right
holders concerning the normal exploitation of their works.
6.213 As regards the permissible equipment, we note that, according to the House Report (1976),
the purpose of the exemption in its original form was to exempt from copyright liability "anyone who
merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly sold to members of the public for private use". "[The clause] would impose liability where
the proprietor has a commercial 'sound system' installed or converts a standard home receiving
apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment) into the
equivalent of a commercial sound system." 195 We also recall the rationale behind the homestyle
exemption as expressed in the legislative history relating to its original version: "The basic rationale
of this clause is that the secondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public
is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be imposed."
196
6.214 In other words, the provision is intended to de fine the borderline between two situations: a
situation where one listens to the radio or watches the television – this is clearly not covered by the
scope of copyright and, hence, outside normal exploitation of works – and a situation where one uses
appropriate equipment to cause a new public performance of music contained in a broadcast or other
transmission. This borderline is defined by laying emphasis on "turning on an ordinary receiver",
albeit that members of the public might also hear the transmission.
6.215 As regards the beneficiaries of the homestyle exemption, we note that its legislative history
reveals the intention that the exemption should affect only those establishments that were not likely
otherwise to enter into a licence, or would not have been licensed under the practices at that time. As
pointed out above, according to the 1995 CRS study, the number of establishments that were as big or
smaller than the Aiken restaurant and could benefit from the homestyle exemption is limited to a
comparatively small percentage of all eating, drinking and retail establishments in the United
States.
197
6.216 The United States argues that the homestyle exemption of 1998 is even less capable of being
in conflict with normal exploitation of works b ecause its scope is now limited to works other than
nondramatic musical works. While a collective licensing mechanism for nondramatic musical works
exists in the United States, there is no such mechanism for "dramatic" musical works and there is little
or no direct licensing by individual right holders of the establishments in question. Therefore, in the
US view, authors might not reasonably expect to exploit "dramatic" musical works in the normal
course of events through licensing public performances or communications thereof to the
establishments that may invoke subparagraph (A).

195 These quotations are from the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, 94th Congress, 2nd Session 87 (1976), as reproduced in Exhibit US-1. The Report adds that "[f]actors to
consider in particular cases would include the size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas within the
establishment where the transmissions are made audibl e or visible, and the extent to which the receiving
apparatus is altered or augmented for the purpose of improving the aural or visual quality of the performance".
The factors to consider in applying the exemption are largely based on the facts of a case decided by the United
States Supreme Court immediately prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). In Aiken, the Court held that an owner of a small fast food restaurant was
not liable for playing music by means of a radio with outlets to four speakers in the ceiling; the size of the shop
was 1,055 square feet (98 m
2), of which 620 square feet (56 m 2) were open to the public. The Report describes
the factual situation in Aiken as representing the "outer limit of the exemption".
196 See the House Report (1976), Exhibit US-1, referred to in paragraph 2.5 above.
197 More specifically, the 1995 CRS study found that 16 per cent of all US eating establishments, 13.5
per cent of all US drinking establishments and 18 per cent of all US retail establishments were as big or smaller
than the Aiken restaurant (1,055 square feet of total space). See above paragraphs 2.11 and 6.142.

6.217 We recall that it is the common understanding of the parties that the operation of
subparagraph (A) is limited, as regards musical works, to the public communication of transmissions
embodying dramatic renditions of "dramatic" musical works, such as operas, operettas, musicals and
other similar dramatic works. Consequently, performances of, e.g., individual songs from a dramatic
musical work outside a dramatic context would constitute a rendition of a nondramatic work and fall
within the purview of subparagraph (B).
6.218 It is our understanding that the parties agree that the right holders do not normally license or
attempt to license the public communication of transmissions embodying dramatic renditions of
"dramatic" musical works in the sense of Article 11 bis(1)(iii) and/or 11(1)(ii). We have not been
provided with information about any existing licensing practices concerning the communication to the
public of broadcasts of performances of dramatic works (e.g., operas, operettas, musicals) by eating,
drinking or retail establishments in the United States or any other country. In this respect, we fail to
see how the homestyle exemption, as limited to works other than nondramatic musical works in its
revised form, could acquire economic or practical importance of any considerable dimension for the
right holders of musical works.
6.219 Therefore, we conclude that the homestyle exemption contained in subparagraph (A) of
Section 110(5) does not conflict with a normal exploitation of works within the meaning of the second
condition of Article 13.
(d) "Not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder"
(i) General interpretative analysis
6.220 The United States defines "prejudice [to] the legitimate interests of the right holder" in terms
of the economic impact caused by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5). In the US view,
while the second condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement looks to the degree of market
displacement caused by a limitation or exception, the "unreasonable prejudice" standard measures
how much the right holder is harmed by the effects of the exception. Given that any exception to
exclusive rights may technically result in some degree of prejudice to the right holder, the key
question is whether that prejudice is unreasonable.
198
6.221 The European Communities submits that the legiti mate interests of a right holder consist in
being able to prevent all instances of a certain use of his or her work protected by a specific exclusive
right undertaken by a third party without his or her consent. The legitimate interests include, at a
minimum, all commercial uses by a third party of the right holder's exclusive rights. For the
European Communities, both empirical and normative elements are relevant for the examination of
the third condition of Article 13. In practice, economic prejudice to right holders should be assessed
primarily on the basis of the economic effects in the country applying the exception. In the EC's
view, it is sufficient to demonstrate the potentiality to prejudice; it is not necessary to quantify the
actual financial losses suffered by the right holders concerned.
6.222 We note that the analysis of the third condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement implies
several steps. First, one has to define what are the "interests" of right holders at stake and which
attributes make them "legitimate". Then, it is necessary to develop an interpretation of the term
"prejudice" and what amount of it reaches a level that should be considered "unreasonable".
6.223 The ordinary meaning of the term "interests"
199 may encompass a legal right or title to a
property or to use or benefit of a property (including intellectual property). It may also refer to a

198 Guide to the Berne Convention, op.cit., pp. 55-56, paragraph 9.8.
199 Further meanings: "The fact or relation of having a share or concern in, or a right to, something,
especially by law; a right or title, especially to a (sha re in) property or a use or benefit relating to property", "a

concern about a potential detriment or advantage, and more generally to something that is of some
importance to a natural or legal person. Accordingly, the notion of "interests" is not necessarily
limited to actual or potential economic advantage or detriment.
6.224 The term "legitimate" has the meanings of
"(a) conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle; lawful;
justifiable; proper;
(b) normal, regular, conformable to a recognized standard type."
Thus, the term relates to lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective, but it has also the connotation
of legitimacy from a more normative perspective, in the context of calling for the protection of
interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie the protection of exclusive
rights.
6.225 We note that the ordinary meaning of "prejudice" connotes damage, harm or injury. 200 "Not
unreasonable" connotes a slightly stricter threshold than "reasonable". The latter term means
"proportionate", "within the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than might be thought likely or
appropriate", or "of a fair, average or considerable amount or size".201
6.226 Given that the parties do not question the "legitimacy" of the interest of right holders to
exercise their rights for economic gain, the crucial question becomes which degree or level of
"prejudice" may be considered as "unreasonable". Before dealing with the question of what amount
or which kind of prejudice reaches a level beyond reasonable, we need to find a way to measure or
quantify legitimate interests.
6.227 In our view, one – albeit incomplete and thus conservative – way of looking at legitimate
interests is the economic value of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright on their holders. It is
possible to estimate in economic terms the value of exercising, e.g., by licensing, such rights. That is
not to say that legitimate interests are necessarily limited to this economic value.
202
6.228 In examining the second condition of Article 13, we have addressed the US argument that the
prejudice to right holders caused by the exemptions at hand are minimal because they already receive
royalties from broadcasting stations. We concluded that each exclusive right conferred by copyright,
inter alia, under each subparagraph of Articles 11 bis and 11 of the Berne Convention (1971), has to
be considered separately for the purpose of exam ining whether a possible conflict with a "normal
exploitation" exists.
203

financial share or stake in something;", "a thing which is to the advantage of someone, a benefit, an advantage",
"the relation of being involved or concerned as regards potential detriment or advantage", "a thing that is of
some importance to a person, company, state etc."; Oxford English Dictionary, p. 1393.
200 "Harm, damage or injury to a person or that results from a judgement or action, especially one in
which his/her rights are disregarded." Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2333.
201 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2496.
202 Panel Report on Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products , adopted on 7 April 2000,
WT/DS114/R, paragraphs 7.60ff. We note, however, the difference in wording between Articles 13 and 30 of
the TRIPS Agreement. The latter also refers to "taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties".
203 We also recall from our examination of Article 13's second condition that we were not presented
with evidence of licensing arrangements between CMOs and broadcasting organizations, concerning mainly the
exclusive rights of Article 11bis(1)(i) or (ii), that would make allowance for the additional communication to the
public in the meaning of Article 11 bis(1)(iii) by, e.g., the categories of establishments covered by the
subparagraphs of Section 110(5). We believe that we have to analyse whether the exemptions in question cause
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders similarly in respect of each exclusive right.

6.229 The crucial question is which degree or level of "prejudice" may be considered as
"unreasonable",204 given that, under the third condition, a certain amount of "prejudice" has to be
presumed justified as "not unreasonable".205 In our view, prejudice to the legitimate interests of right
holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause
an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner.
Legitimate interests of right holders of EC, US and third-country origin
6.230 We note the EC argument that, in respect of all conditions of Article 13, the effect on all right
holders from all WTO Members must be taken into account. For the European Communities, the
specific impact on EC right holders is not at issue at this stage of the dispute settlement process, but
could become relevant only in the context of Ar ticle 22 of the DSU concerning compensation or the
suspension of concessions or other obligations equivalent to nullification or impairment suffered. The
United States has limited its estimations of the economic impact of subparagraph (B) to the actual
losses caused by it to the EC right holders.
6.231 This raises the question who may enforce the legitimate interests of right holders of various
WTO Members in panel proceedings within the WTO dispute settlement system.
206 In EC – Bananas
III, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that no DSU provision contains a requirement that a
complaining party show its legal interest as a prerequisite for requesting a panel.207 This rejection of a

Our view is confirmed by the fact that, as we pointed out when examining the second condition of Article 13,
particular exclusive rights conferred by the subparagraphs of Articles 11 and 11 bis in relation to one and the
same work may be held by different persons. See EC and US replies to question 4 from the Panel to both
parties.
204 The term used in the French version of the Berne Convention is " injustifié". According to
Article 37(1)(c) of the Berne Convention, both the Englis h and the French text of the Convention are equally
authentic, but "in case of differences of opinion on the interpretation of the various texts, the French text shall
prevail".
However, Article 37 of the Berne Convention has not been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.
To the extent that Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by
virtue of its Article 9.1, the general rule of Article XVI of the Agreement Establishing the WTO applies, i.e.,
that the English, French and Spanish versions of the covered agreements are equally authentic.
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that treaties which are authentic
in several languages should be interpreted harmoniously, i.e., presuming that expressions in the treaty have the
same meaning in all authentic languages.
205 In respect of what could be the dividing li ne between "unreasonable" and "not unreasonable"
prejudice, we consider the explanation of the Guide to the Berne Convention to be of persuasive value. It states
in the context of the third condition of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, which is worded almost identically
to Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement but refers to exceptions to the reproduction right:
"Note that it is not a question of prejudice or no: all copying is damaging to some degree …". The
paragraph goes on to discuss whether photocopying "prejudices the circulation of the review", whether it "might
seriously cut in on its sales" and says that "[i]n cases where there would be serious loss of profit for the
copyright owner, the law should provide him with some compensation (a system of compulsory licensing with
equitable remuneration)." See the Guide to the Berne Convention, paragraph 9.8.pp. 55-56. We do not believe
that in this respect the benchmark has to be substantially different for reproduction rights, performance rights or
broadcasting rights in the meanings of Articles 9, 11 or 11bis of the Berne Convention (1971).
206 In addressing the question of effects on right holders from the European Communities, the United
States and other WTO Members, we note that Article 1.3 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "Members shall
accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members. …". For the purposes of
this dispute, this provision means that the United States is required to observe the obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement with respect to nationals of all other WTO Members including, but not limited to, EC nationals.
207 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , op.cit., paragraph 132. The Appellate Body also
agreed with the panel's statement that "with the incr eased interdependence of the global economy, … Members
have greater stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of
rights and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly." See paragraph 136, citing
from the Panel Reports on EC – Bananas III, paragraph 7.50.

"legal interest" requirement does not necessarily imply that, in the context of the third condition of
Article 13, prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders other than EC right holders should be
relevant. But we cannot find any indication in the express wording of the third condition of Article 13
that the assessment of whether the prejudice caused by an exception or limitation to the legitimate
interests of the right holder is of an unreasonable level should be limited to the right holders of the
Member that brings forth the complaint. For su ch a limitation to exist, the third condition of
Article 13 would have to refer exclusively to the right holders who are nationals of the complaining
party, not to "the right holder" as such.
6.232 We also refer to the explanation on the diff erence between the panel and Appellate Body
proceedings and the enforcement process within the WTO dispute settlement system given by the
Arbitrators, acting pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU, in the US/EC arbitration on the suspension of
concessions in Bananas III.208 An assessment of the impact of a WTO-inconsistent measure on an
individual Member in terms of nullification or im pairment is relevant under Article 22.6 of the DSU
when compensation or suspension of concessions or other obligations has to be estimated in
equivalence to the nullification or impairment suffered from a WTO-inconsistent measure which has
not been brought into WTO-compliance within a reasonable period of time.
6.233 In this case, both parties have provided estimations on the market share of music of EC right
holders. The European Communities submits that at least 25 per cent of all music played in the
United States belongs to EC copyright owners. This figure is based on an industry estimate according
to which the United Kingdom performing artists had a 23 per cent share of the US record sales in
1988. The European Communities appears to imply that this figure concerning United Kingdom
performing artists would be indicative of the share due to EC composers and other copyright holders
of the royalties collected for the amplification of music transmissions. The European Communities
adds that another way to estimate EC authors' market share is to look at the royalty distributions by
the US CMOs. The European Communities gives a figure, provided by ASCAP for 1998, indicating
what percentage of its total distributions were paid to EC right holders; this figure is not reproduced
here, given that the figure was given to the European Communities in confidence.
209
6.234 The United States disagrees with the EC's implication that 25 per cent of royalties collected in
the United States are due to EC right holders. According to the United States, a 1998 internal EC
analysis of the economic effect of the homestyle exemption on EC right holders estimated that just 6.2
per cent of ASCAP revenues were distributed to all foreign CMOs, and that just 5.6 per cent of BMI

208 The Arbitrators explained: "The presumption of nullification or impairment in the case of an
infringement of a GATT provision as set forth by Article 3.8 of the DSU cannot in and of itself be taken
simultaneously as evidence proving a particular level of nullification or impairment allegedly suffered by a
Member requesting authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU at a much later stage of
the WTO dispute settlement system. The review of the level of nullification or impairment by Arbitrators from
the objective benchmark foreseen by Article 22 of the DSU, is a separate process that is independent from the
finding of infringements of WTO rules by a panel or the Appellate Body. As a result, a Member's potential
interests in trade in goods or services and its interest in a determination of rights and obligations under the WTO
Agreements are each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. However, a
Member's legal interest in compliance by other Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is
entitled to obtain authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU." See the Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by
the EC under Article 22.6 of the DSU, adopted on 19 April 1998, WT/DS27/ARB, paragraph 6.10.
209 EC Response to question 5 from the Panel to the European Communities. Again we find that the
EC's designation as confidential of such information does not assist us in discharging our responsibility to make
findings that will best enable the DSB to perform its dispute settlement functions. However, given that our
assessment of whether the prejudice caused by the exemptions of Section 110(5) to the legitimate interests of the
right holder is of an unreasonable level is not exclusively limited to EC right holders, the exact figure is not
essential for our findings.

revenues were due to all foreign CMOs. 210 Obviously, the percentage payable to the EC collecting
societies would be significantly less than these figures for total payments to all foreign CMOs.211
6.235 We take note of these estimations, which are illustrative of the market conditions. However,
given our considerations above, our assessment of whether the prejudice, caused by the exemptions
contained in Section 110(5), to the legitimate interests of the right holder is of an unreasonable level is
not limited to the right holders of the European Communities.
Summary of the general interpretative analysis
6.236 We will now examine subparagraphs (B) and (A) of Section 110(5) in the light of these
general considerations. What is at stake in our examination of the third condition of Article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement is whether the prejudice caused by the exemptions to the legitimate interests of the
right holder is of an unreasonable level. We will consider the information on market conditions
provided by the parties taking into account, to the extent feasible, the actual as well as the potential
prejudice caused by the exemptions, as a prerequisite for determining whether the extent or degree of
prejudice is of an unreasonable level. In these respects, we recall our consideration above that taking
account of actual as well as potential effects is consistent with past GATT/WTO dispute settlement
practice.
212
(ii) The business exemption of subparagraph (B)
6.237 The European Communities focuses on an analysis of the potential economic effects of
subparagraph (B) on the legitimate interests of right holders. It argues that the unreasonableness of
the prejudice caused to the right holder becomes fully apparent when 73 per cent of all drinking
establishments, 70 per cent of all eating establishments and 45 per cent of all retail establishments are
unconditionally covered by the business exemption, while the rest of the establishments may also be
exempted under conditions which are easy to meet. In its view, the denial of protection has been
turned into the rule and protection of the exclusive right has become the exception.
213
6.238 The United States does not focus on questioning the correctness of these figures that indicate
the percentage of US eating, drinking and retail establishments that fall within the size limits of
subparagraph (B). Taking these figures as a starting-point for alternative calculations, the United
States, however, contends that they are not useful for estimating the economic impact or prejudice
caused by subparagraph (B) to right holders, because they fail to account for many relevant factors
that determine whether a right holder would be economically prejudiced at all by the business
exemption. In order to obtain a reasonable estimate of the number of establishments from which
copyright owners have truly lost revenue as a result of the business exemption, the United States
subtracts from these figures those establishments that:
(i) do not play music at all;
(ii) rely on music from some source other than radio or TV (such as tapes, CDs, commercial
background music services, jukeboxes, or live music);
(iii) were not licensed prior to the passage of the 1998 amendment and which the CMOs
would not be able to license anyway;

210 The United States refers to the Examination Pr ocedure Regarding the Licensing of Music Works in
the United States of America. European Commission, 23 February 1998. See US second written submission,
paragraph 34.
211 US response to question 12 from the Panel to the United States.
212 See paragraph 6.185 and footnotes 163-165 above.
213 See paragraphs 2.11-2.13, 6.118-6.122 and 6.142 above for more detailed discussions on the
estimations of the establishments exempted by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of Section 110(5).

(iv) would take advantage of the NLBA agreement, whose terms are practically identical to
subparagraph (B), if the statutory exemption were not available; and
(v) would prefer to simply turn off the mu sic rather than pay the fees demanded by the
CMOs.
The United States concedes that it is impossible to estimate these figures, but assumes that there is
ample reason to believe that they represent a substantial number of establishments.
6.239 We examine the relevance of these factors, be ginning with the first, second and the fifth
factors, and then the third and fourth factors. In this context, we recall that, while both parties have to
adduce evidence supporting their legal and factual arguments, it is the United States that bears the
ultimate burden of proof that Section 110(5) meet s all three conditions of Article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement.
No music or music from another source
6.240 In detailing its first, second and fifth reduction factor, the United States provides estimates on
the percentages of restaurants that use various sources of music, which we have summarized in
paragraph 6.208 above. We agree that it is possible that some establishments that currently play
broadcast music might decide to stop doing so, if they were required to pay fees to CMOs
representing right holders in the absence of an exemption. But it is also evident that establishments
that currently play recorded music may at any time decide to switch to music broadcast over the air or
transmitted by cable in order to avoid paying licensing fees. Also, some establishments that do not
play any music at all may start to use broadcast music, given that the only cost would be that of
acquiring a sound system. Similarly, if amplified br oadcast music would not be free of charge due to
subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5), operators of establishments covered by that provision that
currently use such broadcast music might switch to recorded music, to commercial background music
services or to live music performances. Furthermore, an exemption that makes the use of music from
one source free of charge is likely to affect, not only the number of establishments that opt for sources
of music that require the payment of a licensing fee, but also the price for which the protected sources
of music can be licensed.
6.241 It appears that the use of recorded music or commercial background music services can be
easily replaced by the amplification of music transmitted over the air or by cable. Digital broadcasts
and cable transmissions are increasing the supply of different types of music transmissions. The fact
that one source of music is free of charge while another triggers copyright liability may have a
significant impact on which source of music the operators of establishments choose, and on how
much they are willing to pay for protected music. Therefore, in addition to the right holders' loss of
revenue from the users that were newly exempted under subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5), the
business exemption is also likely to reduce the amount of income that may be generated from
restaurants and retail establishments for the use of recorded music or commercial background music
services.
6.242 Although these considerations do not render irrelevant the statistics and estimations on the
numbers and percentages of establishments that may play music from different sources or no music at
all, it is clear that such statistics and estimations have to be considered with the caveat that, although
they may reflect realities at a given point in time, they do not take into account the substitution
between various sources of music that is likely to take place in the longer term.
Establishments not licensed before the 1998 Amendment and the NLBA Agreement
6.243 As to its third reduction factor, the United States submitted information concerning past
licensing practices of establishments covered by Section 110(5). As regards the situation before the

1976 Copyright Act, the United States notes that, in considering the original homestyle exemption of
Section 110(5), the US Congress found that prior to 1976 the majority of beneficiaries of the then
contemplated exemption were not licensed. As regards the situation between the entry into force of
the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1998 Amendment, the United States gives two estimates, one
according to which approximately 10.5 per cent of restaurants were licensed by the CMOs, and
second according to which ASCAP licensed 19 per cent of restaurants at that time. In its view, these
figures indicate a relatively low level of licensing of establishments. We also recall the November
1995 estimate by the CRS that 16 per cent of eating establishments, 13.5 per cent of drinking
establishments and 18 per cent of retail establishments were at that time below the size of the Aiken
restaurant, i.e. 1,055 square feet.
214 In addition, the United States estimates that 74 per cent of all
restaurants play some kind of music.215
6.244 Based on these statistics about past licensing practices and ASCAP's revenue collection, the
United States submits that the likely impact of the amended Section 110(5) on the revenues collected
earlier by the CMOs from such establishments is likely to be minimal.216 ASCAP collects 14 per cent
of its total revenues from general licensees, including eating, drinking and retail establishments.
Much of this revenue is from the public performance of live or recorded music, rather than broadcast
music. Based on the data provided by the NLBA and NRA, the United States estimates that radio
music accounts for a maximum of 28–44 per cent of revenues from eating and drinking
establishments; this 28–44 per cent of 14 per cent is equivalent to 3.9–6.2 per cent of total revenues.
The United States reduces this figure further because not all restaurants and bars are eligible for the
Section 110(5) exemptions. The United States adds that, even using the EC figure indicating that
70 per cent of all US restaurants are exempted under subparagraph (B), it appears that the exemption
for radio music will have a maximum effect on revenues of 2.7–4.3 per cent.
6.245 The EC's main contention against the reduction factors applied by the United States to its
estimates of potential prejudice is that actual distributions to right holders, past licensing practices and
revenue collected or foregone by the CMOs in the past or at present are not representative of the
potential economic effect of subparagraph (B), because collection practices of the CMOs are a
function of the legal protection of the relevant exclusive rights.
6.246 More specifically, the European Communities po ints out that the long-standing exceptions to
copyright protection (i.e., prior to 1976, the Aiken decision, the passage of the homestyle exemption
of the 1976 Copyright Act, subsequent court decisions in Claire's Boutique and Edison Bros.
217)
render the actual royalty collection practices of the CMOs in the past unrepresentative for measuring
losses to right holders. In the EC view, this assessment is corroborated by the fact that, since the 1995
group licensing agreement between the US CMOs and the NLBA entered into force, no licensing fees
have been collected from exempted establishments with a square footage below 3,500. These include
65 per cent of all eating and 72 per cent of all drinking establishments.218
6.247 We recall our conclusion that in the application of the three conditions of Article 13 to an
exemption in national law, both actual and potential effects of that exception are relevant. As regards
the third condition in particular, we note that if only actual losses were taken into account, it might be
possible to justify the introduction of a new exception to an exclusive right irrespective of its scope in
situations where the right in question was newly introduced, right holders did not previously have

214 We note that the size of 1,055 of square feet is not contained in the original or revised text of the
homestyle exemption but derives from the Aiken judgement. See paragraph 2.6 above.
215 The above figures are discussed in more detail in the context of our examination of the second
condition of Article 13 in paragraphs 6.208 and US reply to question 11(b) by the Panel to the United States.
216 US reply to question 11(d) by the Panel to the United States.
217 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, N°
91-1232, 11 December 1991. See Exhibit EC-6. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores Inc., US Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit, N° 91-2115, 13 January 1992. See Exhibit EC-5.
218 See EC first oral statement, paragraph 37.

effective or affordable means of enforcing that righ t, or that right was not exercised because the right
holders had not yet built the necessary collective management structure required for such exercise.
While under such circumstances the introduction of a new exception might not cause immediate
additional loss of income to the right holder, he or she could never build up expectations to earn
income from the exercise of the right in question. We believe that such an interpretation, if it became
the norm, could undermine the scope and binding effect of the minimum standards of intellectual
property rights protection embodied in the TRIPS Agreement.
219
6.248 We recall our consideration, in relation to the second condition of Article 13, of the relatively
low level of licensing, before the 1998 Amendment, of restaurants above the Aiken size limits that
were likely to play music. We concluded that, without further evidence, the fact that some similarly
situated users were licensed, while others were not, could not be taken as an indication of normal
exploitation. As regards the third condition of Article 13, we have not been provided with any
persuasive arguments why the legitimate interests of the right holder would differ in respect of those
similarly situated users that are currently licensed and those that are not; neither have we been given
any persuasive explanation why some of these users were licensed and others not.
6.249 Therefore, in considering the prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders caused by
the business exemption, we have to take into account not only the actual loss of income from those
restaurants that were licensed by the CMOs at the time that the exemption become effective, but also
the loss of potential revenue from other restaurants of similar size likely to play music that were not
licensed at that point.
6.250 As to the fourth US reduction factor, we note that we have already addressed the US
argument about the similarity between the 1998 Amendment and the group licensing agreement
reached between the CMOs and the NLBA in 1995 in our discussion of the second condition of
Article 13. In that context, we noted that a private agreement constitutes a form of exercising
exclusive rights and is by no means determinative for assessing the compliance of an exemption
provided for in national law pursuant to international treaty obligations.
220
Summary of the relevance of the above factors
6.251 Consequently, we caution against attributing too much relevance to the factors proposed by
the United States for reducing the EC figures intended to indicate the potential prejudice in relation to
eating, drinking or retail establishments, and, accordingly, for the determination of the level of
prejudice caused by the business exemption to the legitimate interests of right holders. At the same
time, we recognize the difficulty of quantifying th e economic value of potential prejudice. Most of
the factual information on the current US licensing market provided by the parties relates to the
immediate actual losses to the right holders; in particular, both parties have provided us with detailed
calculations of the loss of income to the right ho lders resulting from the 1998 Amendment. Keeping
in mind our conclusion that such figures cannot alone be determinative for the assessment of the level
of prejudice suffered by right holders, we will now examine these calculations.
The alternative calculations by the parties of losses suffered by right holders
6.252 The United States estimates that the maximum annual loss to EC right holders of distributions
from the largest US collecting society, ASCAP, as a result of the Section 110(5) exemption, is in the
range of $294,113 to $586,332. Applying the same analysis, it estimates that the loss from the second
largest society, BMI, is $122,000. In its calculation of ASCAP's distributions, the United States takes

219 In comparison, we recall that in relation to the second condition, we noted that a low level of
licensing cannot be determinative of normal exploitation to the extent that it results from lack of legal protection
or of effective or affordable means of enforcement.
220 See paragraphs 6.204-6.205 above.

as a starting-point the total royalties paid to EC right holders by ASCAP. Second, it reduces the
amount attributable to general licensing (i.e. licensing of commercial background music services, and
a wide variety of licensees, including conventions and sports arenas, as well as restaurants, bars and
retail establishments). Third, it makes a deduction to account for licensing revenue from general
licensees that do not meet the statutory definition of an "establishment". Fourth, it deducts from the
general licensing revenue the portion that is due to music from sources other than radio or television
(e.g., tapes, CDs, commercial background music services, jukeboxes, live performances); and fifth, it
reduces this amount to account for licensing revenue from general licensing of eating, drinking or
retail establishments which play the radio but do not meet the size and equipment limitations of
subparagraph (B) and thus do not qualify for the business exemption. The complete calculation and
the US comments thereon can be found in the second written submission and in the second oral
statement of the United States.
221
6.253 The European Communities estimates that the annual loss to all right holders amounts to
$53.65 million. The EC calculation takes as the starting-point the number of establishments that may
qualify for the exception. Second, the European Communities makes a reduction from that number
using the US hypotheses that 30.5 per cent of all eating and drinking establishments with a surface
area below 3,750 square feet actually play music from the radio. Third, it applies to the remaining
establishments the appropriate licensing fees selected from the licensing schedules of ASCAP
222 and
BMI.223 The complete calculation and related comments can be found in paragraphs 39-45 of the
second oral statement by the European Communities, which is reproduced in Attachment 1.6 to this
report.224
6.254 Overall, we consider that neither estimate is devoid of relevance for the purposes of
estimating whether prejudice caused by subparagraph (B) to the legitimate interests of right holders
amounts to a level that could be deemed unreasonable. The difference between the results of these
two calculations can, to an extent, be explained by differences in the starting points and the
parameters used for the calculations. The calculations use also a number of similar assumptions. We
highlight below some of these differences and similarities.
6.255 The US estimate can be characterized as a "top-down" approach, which takes as its starting-
point ASCAP's and the BMI's average total distributions of domestic income for the years 1996-1998.
We recall that the United States estimates that only 10.5-19 per cent of restaurants were licensed at
that time. Hence, this calculation based on the pre-existing collection does not take into account the
potential income from establishments that were already covered at that time by the old homestyle
exemption or from the larger restaurants that used music but were not licensed at that time.
6.256 The EC calculation can, in turn, be characterized as a "bottom-up" approach. It takes as its
starting point the total number of restaurants and retail establishments that fall under the size limits of

221 See US second written submission, paragraphs 33-48, and US second oral statement, paragraphs 29-
42, reproduced in Attachments 2.5 and 2.6 to this report.
222 See excerpt in Exhibit EC-26.
223 See excerpt in Exhibit EC-27.
224 In response to question 4 from the Panel to the European Communities requesting information or
estimations on the revenues collected by the EC collect ing societies, the European Communities was only able
to provide information in regard to the Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO). As Ireland represents
approximately one per cent of the EC population, the European Communities suggests to multiply the Irish
figures by hundred in order to obtain an estimate for the EC CMOs in their entirety.
We recall our view that our analysis should focus primarily on the US market, but that information
from other countries might be useful for a comparative analysis of the US market. We regret that the European
Communities and its member States were not in a position to provide us with more meaningful data. We do not
believe that information from a single EC member State which would have to be extrapolated with a multiplier
of 100 for the entire EC territory can be useful for the task before us.

the exemption; then it applies to those establ ishments the lowest ASCAP and BMI licence fees,
assuming a 100 per cent compliance rate among the establishments concerned.
6.257 The EC calculation covers all right holders, while the US calculation covers only the EC right
holders' share. The United States estimates that this share is between 5 and 13.7 per cent of ASCAP's
distributions of domestic income, and 8.15 per cent of the BMI's distributions.
6.258 Both calculations make a number of reductions from the above starting points based on
estimations. In the absence of more detailed information from ASCAP, the United States estimates
that 50 per cent of ASCAP's general licensing revenue is derived from the establishments covered by
the business exemption. Based on the NRA and NLBA surveys, the United States estimates that 30.5
per cent of the establishments covered by the exemption play radio; the European Communities also
uses this figure. Averaging the NRA estimations of the percentage of restaurants that meet the size
limits, and the D&B study on the equivalent percentage of retail establishments, the United States
estimates that 52.1 per cent of all establishments fall below the size limits of the business exemption.
6.259 Neither calculation takes into account the distributions of the third US CMO, SESAC, or
music played on the television. The calculations do not attempt to estimate the losses from
establishments above the size limits of subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5), which however comply
with the respective equipment limitations. It appe ars that neither party assumes that these factors
would essentially change the outcome of their estimations.
6.260 We note that both calculations include many estimations and assumptions. The fact that
neither party was in a position to provide more direct information on the revenues collected from the
establishments affected by the business exemption does not facilitate the estimation of the immediate
effect of the exemption in terms of annual losses to the right holders.
6.261 One of the major differences between the calculations is that the US calculation takes into
account the loss of income only from those establishments that were not already exempted under the
old homestyle exemption and were actually paying licence fees. Given our considerations on the
potential impact of the exemption, we are of the view that the loss of potential income from other
users of music is also relevant.
6.262 In addition, the United States indicates a number of reasons why it considers that its five-step
calculation is conservative. It assumes that 30.5 per cent of the licensing revenue is attributable to
radio-playing, because 30.5 per cent of establishments play the radio, although these establishments
might play music from multiple sources. Furthermore, the United States assumes that the 65.5 per
cent of restaurants and the 45 per cent of retail establishments that meet the square footage limits
account for 65 per cent or 45 per cent of the losses to right holders; but it adds that the small
establishments that qualify for the exemptions are likely to represent a smaller proportion of the
licensing revenue. The United States does not argue that these considerations would change the
outcome of its estimation to an essential degree.
6.263 The United States also submits that its calculation does not take into account steps that
ASCAP and the BMI might take to minimize any impact of the 1998 Amendment (e.g., focusing
licensing resources exclusively on larger stores that generally pay larger fees, or by charging more for
the playing of music from CDs and tapes). In the US view, the analysis should also take into account
the limited resources of the CMOs and the small percentage of the market actually licensed by the
CMOs. In the light of the certainty provided by the precise limitations of the business exemption
contained in subparagraph (B), the CMOs can now efficiently redirect their licensing resources
toward those establishments not eligible for the business exemption, and thus compensate for any
minor prejudice they might suffer. The United States refers to an ASCAP statement of its intent to
"reverse the effects" of the 1998 Amendment by redirecting its licensing resources toward

establishments not covered by subparagraph (B) as well as by generating additional income by
encouraging the use of live and recorded music, for which there is no exemption.225
6.264 In our view, this line of argument is irrelevant for the issue before us, i.e., whether
subparagraph (B) complies with Article 13's third condition. If we were to find that subparagraph (B)
does not meet the conditions for invoking the exception of Article 13, there is no rule in WTO law
compelling another Member or private parties affected by a Member's WTO-inconsistent measure to
take steps to remedy any actual, or reduce the potential, nullification or impairment caused.
6.265 We recall that the ultimate burden of proof concerning whether all of the conditions of Article
13 are met lies with the United States as the Member invoking the exception. In the light of our
analysis of the prejudice caused by the exemption, including its actual and potential effects, we are of
the view that the United States has not demonstrated that the business exemption does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
6.266 Accordingly, we conclude that the business exemption of subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5)
does not meet the requirements of the third condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
(iii) The homestyle exemption of subparagraph (A)
6.267 The United States submits that the economic effect of the original homestyle exemption of
Section 110(5) of 1976 was minimal. Its intent was to exempt from liability small shop and restaurant
owners whose establishments would not have justified a commercial licence. Given that such
establishments are not a significant licensing market, they could not be significant sources of revenue
for right holders. Where no licences would be soug ht or issued in the absence of an exception, there
was literally no economic detriment to the right holder from an explicit exception. Exempted
establishments with small square footage and elementary sound equipment are the least likely to be
aggressively licensed by the CMOs and licensing fees for these establishments would likely be the
lowest in the range.
226 Given their size and that the playing of music is often incidental to their
services, these establishments are among those most likely simply to turn off the radio if pressed to
pay licensing fees. The 1998 Amendment has only decreased the economic relevance of the
exemption by reducing its scope to "dramatic" musical works. Therefore, in the US view, the
homestyle exemption as contained in subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) does not prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.
6.268 The European Communities responds that the vast body of case law on the pre-1998
homestyle exemption makes it clear that very significant economic interests were at stake. Already
under the Aiken scenario,
227 a considerable number of US establishments were covered by the
exemption. According to the European Communities, 228 the Aiken surface limitations were doubled
by US Courts before the 1998 Amendment.229

225 "A critical element of our plan will be to aggressively license those eligible establishments that
have withheld royalty payment and to promote the value of live and mechanical music to a large number of
newly targeted establishments." See ASCAP, Playback, October-November-December 1998, p. 2, Exhibit
US-13.
226 See Judiciary Committee Hearing, letter from Marilyn Bergman, ASCAP President and Chairman
of the Board, pp. 175-186. See US first written submission, paragraph 34.
227 According to the 1995 CRS study, 13.5 per cent, 16 per cent and 18 per cent of all US drinking,
eating and retail establishments were covered by the exemption. See paragraphs 2.11 and 6.142 above.
228 The European Communities initially raised its concerns that if the Courts might after the 1998
Amendment use in subparagraph (A), the surface categories set out in subparagraph (B), the coverage of
subparagraph (A) is likely to be similar or even identical to the coverage of subparagraph (B) and that, in
practical terms, this means that at least one half of all US service establishments are likely to be covered by the

6.269 We recall our discussion concerning the legislative history of the original homestyle
exemption in connection with the first and second conditions of Article 13. In particular, as regards
the beneficiaries of the exemption, the Conference Report (1976) elaborated on the rationale of the
exemption by noting that the intent was to exempt a small commercial establishment "which was not
of sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music
service".
230 We also recall the estimations on the percentages of establishments covered by the
exemption.231 Moreover, the exemption was applicable to such establishments only if they use
homestyle equipment. The House Report (1976) noted that "[the clause] would impose liability
where the proprietor has a commercial 'sound system' installed or converts a standard home receiving
apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment) into the
equivalent of a commercial sound system." 232 In this respect, we refer to our discussion on
permissible equipment as well as the applicability of the exemption to Internet transmissions in
connection with the first and second conditions of Article 13.
6.270 Furthermore, we recall the common understanding of the parties that the operation of the
homestyle exemption as contained in the 1998 Amendment has been limited, as regards musical
works, to the public communication of transmissions embodying dramatic renditions of "dramatic"
musical works (such as operas, operettas, musicals and other similar dramatic works). We have not
been presented with evidence suggesting that right holders would have licensed or attempted to
license the public communication, within the meaning of Article 11(1)(ii) or 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne
Convention (1971), of broadcasts of performances embodying dramatic renditions of "dramatic"
musical works either before the enactment of the original homestyle exemption or after the 1998
Amendment. We also fail to see how communications to the public of renditions of entire dramatic
works could acquire such economic or practical importance that it could cause unreasonable prejudice
to the legitimate interests of right holders.
6.271 We note that playing music by the small establishments covered by the exemption by means
of homestyle apparatus has never been a significant source of revenue collection for CMOs. We
recall our view
233 that, for the purposes of assessing unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests
of right holders, potential losses of right holders, too, are relevant. However, we have not been
presented with persuasive information suggesting that such potential effects of significant economic
or practical importance could occur that they would give rise to an unreasonable level of prejudice to
legitimate interests of right holders. In particular, as regards the exemption as amended in 1998 to
exclude from its scope nondramatic musical works, the European Communities has not explicitly
claimed that the exemption would currently cause any prejudice to right holders.
6.272 In the light of the considerations above, we conclude that the homestyle exemption contained
in subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) does not cause unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate
interests of the right holders within the meaning of the third condition of Article 13.

subparagraph (A) exemption. Given that the European Communities has not further substantiated this
hypothetical about future jurisprudence, we abstain from addressing this argument any further.
229 See EC first oral statement, paragraph 74. The European Communities also notes that, while it is
irrelevant for the question of unreasonable prejudice to look at the degree of aggressiveness of licensing
activities by CMOs, the US assertion that the establishm ents exempted under subparagraph (A) are least likely
to be aggressively licensed by the CMOs is in contradiction with the US statement that the CMOs have used
harassment and abusive tactics in the licensing practice.
230 Conference Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94 th Congress., 2 nd Session 75 (1976), as reproduced in Exhibit
US-2.
231 See paragraphs 2.11 and 6.142 above.
232 Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94 th Congress, 2nd Session
87 (1976), as reproduced in Exhibit US-1.
233 See paragraph 6.185, footnotes 163-165 and paragraph 6.237 above.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 In the light of the findings in paragraphs 6.92-6.95, 6.133, 6.159, 6.211, 6.219, 6.266 and
6.272 above, the Panel concludes that:
(a) Subparagraph (A) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act meets the
requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and is thus consistent
with Articles 11 bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) as
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1 of that Agreement.
(b) Subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act does not meet
the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and is thus
inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention
(1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1 of that
Agreement.
7.2 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to bring
subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.