EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – REGIME FOR THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS
Document: Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador Report of the Panel
Date: 7 April 2008
Document codes: WT/DS27/RW2/ECU
Complainant: Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, U.S.
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Belize, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican, Ghana, Grenada, India, Jamaica, Japan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Panama, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname, Venezuela, Côte d’Ivoire, Brazil, Madagascar
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. I, II, III, X, XI, XIII  GATT 1994Art. 1, 3  Import LicensingArt. II, XVI, XVII  Services (GATS)Art. 2  Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)Art. 19  Agriculture

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – REGIME FOR THE
IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS

Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador

Report of the Panel

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 28 November 2006, Ecuador requested cons ultations with the European Communities,
under Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) and Article XXII of the General Ag reement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),
regarding measures taken by the European Communities allegedly to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the dispute European
Communities – Regime for the Importati on, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ( EC – Bananas III ).
According to the request, the measures identified (i.e., those contained in Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1964/2005 and its associated implementing regulati ons), are inconsistent with the obligations of
the European Communities under Articles I, II and XIII of the GATT 1994. 1 Consultations were held
on 14 December 2006, but failed to resolve the disagreement between the parties.2
1.2 On 23 February 2007, Ecuador requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 21.5
of the DSU concerning the alleged inconsiste ncy of the measures adopted by the European
Communities to comply with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB in the dispute EC –
Bananas III and subsequent related rulings.3
1.3 At its meeting on 20 March 2007, the DSB deci ded, in accordance with Article 21.5 of the
DSU, to refer to the original Panel, if possi ble, the matter raised by Ecuador in document
 The Panel's terms of reference were the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by Ecuador in document , the ma tter referred to the DSB by Ecuador in
that document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."5
1.4 On 5 June 2007, Ecuador requested the Directo r-General to determine the composition of the
Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. 6 On 15 June 2007, the Director-General
composed the Panel as follows:
 Chairperson: Mr Christian Häberli

 Members: Mr Kym Anderson
 Mr Yuqing Zhang
7

1.5 Belize, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Ghana, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Pana ma, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname and the United States reserved their th ird-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
8 At the request of some third parties, the Panel decided that third parties would have, in
addition to the rights provided for under the DSU, the following additional rights: (i) the right to be
present during the entirety of the substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties and the third parties;

1 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for Consultations (WT/DS27/65),
20 November 2006.
2 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for the Establishment of a Panel
(WT/DS27/80) 26 February 2007.
3 Ibid.
4 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), Constitution of the Panel (WT/DS27/82), 18 June 2007,
para. 1.
5 Ibid., para. 2.
6 Ibid., para. 3.
7 Ibid., para. 4.
8 Ibid., para. 5.

(ii) the right to receive copies of the Parties' fi rst written submissions and rebuttals, as well as copies
of the questions posed by the Panel to the parties an d to the other third parties and copies of parties'
and third parties' responses to such questions; and, (iii) the right to ask oral questions to the parties
during the course of the substantive meeting, alt hough the parties would be under no obligation to
respond to those questions.
1.6 On 18 June 2007, the Panel addressed a communi cation to the parties (Ecuador and the
European Communities), submitting draft Working Procedures and the timetable that the Panel
proposed to follow in these proceedings and inviting them to an organizational meeting in order to
receive the views of the parties. The organizati onal meeting was held with the parties on 21 June
2007. On 29 June 2007, the Pane l notified the parties (Ecuador and the European Communities) and
the third parties of the adopted Working Procedures and timetable.
1.7 On 29 June 2007, the United States (US) requ ested the establishment of a panel pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU concerning the alleged inconsistency of the measures adopted by the
European Communities to comply with the recomme ndations and rulings of the DSB in the dispute
EC – Bananas III and subsequent related rulings.
9
1.8 On 6 July 2007, in a communication addressed to the Panel, the European Communities
requested a modification of the timetable in these proceedings, in order to take into account the
timetable of the proceedings of the compliance pane l requested by the United States. The European
Communities requested that the deadline for its fi rst written submission to this Panel be postponed
until after the United States had filed its own fi rst written submission in the compliance panel
proceedings initiated by the United States. The Eu ropean Communities cited its concern that, were
the United States to file its first written submission after the European Communities had filed its own,
this would amount "to a de facto reversal of the order in which first written submissions should be
submitted" and "create "very serious due process problems". 10 When asked by the Panel to comment
on the European Communities' request, in a comm unication dated 9 July 2007, Ecuador strongly
objected to any delay in the proceedings. In Ecua dor's view, the timetable in the proceedings "is
already much more protracted than the 90 days called for in Article 21.5" and "Ecuador would be
prejudiced by a further delay, which [would] only [f avour] the interests of the EC as the defending
Party".11 Ecuador additionally noted that the European Communities had only filed its request "after
Ecuador had submitted its first submission" and mo re than a week after the European Communities
had received copy of the United States' request for the establishment of a compliance panel.12 Also on
9 July 2007, the United States sent a communicat ion to the Panel, providing comments to the
European Communities' request for the Panel's c onsideration. The United States noted that the
European Communities had received a copy of the United States' request for the establishment of a
compliance panel on 29 June 2007. In the view of the United States, the European Communities
"does not appear to have identified any 'very serio us due process problems' that would arise if the
current timetable were maintained in the present proceeding". 13 On 10 July 2007, the Panel notified
the parties that it did "not find it necessary, at this point, to amend the timetable for its proceedings
fixed on 29 June". The Panel informed the parties that it would "follow closely developments relating
to the US request for the establishment of an Artic le 21.5 panel regarding the EC's compliance in the
EC – Bananas III case [and in] the eventuality of a DSB d ecision to establish such an Article 21.5

9 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), Request for the Establishment of a Panel (WT/DS27/83) 2 July
2007.
10 Communication by the European Communities to the Panel, dated 6 July 2007.
11 Communication by Ecuador to the Panel, dated 9 July 2007.
12 Ibid.
13 Communication by the United States to the Panel, dated 9 July 2007.

panel, [it would] promptly consult with the parti es in order to decide whether the new developments
should affect the timetable in the current proceedings."14
1.9 At its meeting on 12 July 2007, the DSB decided, in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU,
to refer to the original Panel, if possible, the matter raised by the United States in document
WT/DS27/83.15 The Panel's terms of reference were the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by the United States in document WT/DS27/83, the matter referred to the DSB by the
United States in that document, and to ma ke such findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those
agreements."
16
1.10 On 3 August 2007, the United States requested the Director-General to determine the
composition of the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. 17 On 13 August 2007, the
Director-General composed the Panel as follows:
 Chairperson: Mr Christian Häberli

 Members: Mr Kym Anderson
 Mr Yuqing Zhang 18

1.11 On 15 August 2007, the Panel addressed a communication to the parties (Ecuador and the
European Communities), regarding the possibility of harmonizing the timetable in these proceedings
with that of the panel requested by the United St ates. The Panel also consulted the parties on the
possibility of introducing adjustments to the Work ing Procedures in these proceedings. In its
communication, the Panel invited the parties to a meeting on 20 August 2007, to be followed by a
separate organizational meeting of the compliance Pane l requested by the United States to be held in
the presence of the parties to that case.
19
1.12 On 20 August 2007, the Panel held a meeting w ith the parties (Ecuador and the European
Communities) and received their comments regarding the possibility of harmonizing the timetable in
these proceedings with those of the panel requested by the United States, as well as on the possibility
of introducing adjustments to the Working Procedures. On the same date, the Panel held a separate
organizational meeting with the parties to the compliance Panel requested by the United States.
1.13 On 23 August 2007, the Panel notified the parti es (Ecuador and the Eu ropean Communities)
that, after consideration of the comments receiv ed from both parties, the timetable originally
established remained unchanged. The Panel also notif ied the parties of the amendments incorporated
into the Working Procedures, in order to allow fo r the possibility of holding panel meetings in joint
sessions of both the proceedings requested by Ecua dor and those requested by the United States and
to allow the Panel to copy its communications to the parties in both cases.20

14 Communication by Panel to the parties, dated 10 July 2007.
15 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US) , Constitution of the Panel, Note by the Secretariat
(WT/DS27/84), 13 August 2007, para. 1.
16 Ibid., para. 2.
17 Ibid., para. 3.
18 Ibid., para. 4. Belize, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Suriname reserved their third-party rights to participate in the
proceedings of the compliance Panel requested by the United States. Ibid., para. 5.
19 Communication by Panel to the parties, dated 15 August 2007.
20 Communication by Panel to the parties, dated 23 August 2007.

1.14 In accordance with the timetable approved by the Panel, Ecuador filed its first written
submission on 6 July 2007 and the European Communities on 20 July 2007. Ecuador filed its rebuttal
on 1 August 2007 and the European Communities on 13 August 2007. The Panel received third party
submissions from Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States, as well as a joint third party
submission from Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoi re, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.
1.15 The Panel met with the parties and third parties on 18 and 19 September 2007.
1.16 On occasion of its oral statement at the meeting of the Panel with the parties and third parties,
the European Communities again reque sted a modification of the timetables of these proceedings. At
the end of the meeting the Panel communicated to the parties that it had looked into the matter and
decided that, notwithstanding the Panel's initial inte ntions to either harmonize the timetable of both
proceedings or totally separate both cases, it could not at that point in time find a better alternative for
the timetable of proceedings. This despite the fact that the Panel was aware that the approved
timetable implied a considerable burden of work, p eaking at particular moments for the parties, as
well as for the Panel and the Secretariat.
1.17 On 4 October 2007, parties and third parties submitted replies to questions posed by the
Panel. On 5 October 2007, the European Comm unities requested that the deadline for submitting
comments to replies to questions be delayed un til 22 October 2007. After having considered the
views of both parties, the Panel extended the dead line for submission of comments to replies until
16 October 2007. On 16 October 2007, parties and th ird parties submitted comments on the replies to
questions.
1.18 The Panel issued the descriptive sections of the draft report to the parties to the dispute on
12 November 2007. On the same date, the Panel is sued the relevant sections with their respective
arguments to each of the third parties. On 15 November 2007, the Panel received comments from
both parties regarding the descriptive sections of the draft report and from the ACP third parties,
Brazil and Japan regarding the relevant section with its own arguments.
1.19 The Panel submitted its interim report to the pa rties on 27 November 2007. Issuance of the
interim report had been originally scheduled for 23 November, but was delayed by the Panel in order
to ensure that replies to questions and comments on replies in the proceedings requested by the United
States had been received by that panel, before th e interim report in the current proceedings was
issued. The Panel issued its final report to the parties on 10 December 2007.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
A. B
ACKGROUND
1. Object of the current dispute
2.1 This dispute concerns measures adopted by th e European Communities (EC) with the alleged
purpose of complying with the rulings and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
in the case
(EC – Bananas III ) and with subsequent related rulings a nd recommendations. Parties disagree as to
whether these measures are in conformity with the European Communities' obligations under the
WTO covered agreements.

2. Basic chronology
2.2 At its meeting on 25 September 1997, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body Report on EC –
Bananas III (WT/DS27/AB/R) and the four panel repor ts on the same case (WT/DS27/R/ECU,
WT/DS27/R/GTM-WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX and WT/DS27/R/USA), as modified by the
Appellate Body's Report. 21 Pursuant to these reports, the DS B requested the European Communities
to bring its banana regime, as found to be incons istent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), the General Agreement on Tr ade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement
on Import Licensing Procedures (Import Licensing Agreem ent), into conformity with its obligations
under those Agreements.
2.3 On 7 January 1998, the arbitral award requested by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and
the United States (US), pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, was circulated. The Arbitrator
concluded that the "reasonable period of time" for the European Communities to implement the rulings
and recommendations of the DSB adopted on 25 September 1997 in EC – Bananas III , would be the
period from 25 September 1997 to 1 January 1999.22
2.4 On 18 December 1998, Ecuador requested the DSB to re-establish the original panel in order
to examine the consistency of the measures adopted by the European Communities to implement the
rulings and recommendations adopted by the DSB in September 1997. 23 On 12 January 1999, the
DSB decided, in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU, to refer to the original panel the matter
raised by Ecuador in document WT/DS27/41. 24 The report issued by th e compliance Panel requested
by Ecuador was adopted by the DSB on 6 May 1999.
2.5 On 23 June 2000, the European Communities a nd certain developing countries concluded a
partnership agreement in Cotonou of Benin (the "Cotonou Agreement"). The Cotonou Agreement
provided that the European Communities would allo w the importation of products originating from
beneficiary developing countries free of customs duti es and charges having equivalent effect (or, at
least, at preferential terms), until 31 December 2007. In the sector of bananas, this trade preference is
applied in the form of an annual importation into the European Communities of up to 775,000 mt of
bananas subject to zero duty.25
2.6 Through a communication dated 22 June 2001, the European Communities notified the DSB
that it had:
"[R]eached, with the United States of Am erica and Ecuador, a mutually satisfactory
solution within the meaning of Article 3.6 of the DSU regarding the implementation
by the EC of the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the DSB in the
dispute 'Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas' (WT/DS27)."
26

21 EC – Bananas III, Appellate Body Report and Panel Reports, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body
(WT/DS27/12), 10 October 1997.
22 EC – Bananas III , Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Award of the Ar bitrator (WT/DS27/15), 7 January 1998. See also EC –
Bananas III , Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (WT/DS27/16), 7 January 1998.
23 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), (WT/DS27/41), 18 December 1998.
24 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , Constitution of the Panel, Note by the Secretariat
(WT/DS27/44), 18 January 1999.
25 European Communities' first written submission paras. 11 and 13.
26 EC – Bananas III, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001.

2.7 Through a communication dated 26 June 2001 and addressed to the DSB, the United States
referred to the understanding reached with the European Communities on 11 April 2001.
27 In its
communication, the United States stated that the understanding:
"[I]dentifies the means by which the long- standing dispute over the EC's banana
import regime can be resolved, but, as is obvious from its own text, it does not in
itself constitute a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.6 of the DSU. In
addition, in view of the steps yet to be take n by all parties, it would also be premature
to take this item off the DSB agenda."28
2.8 Through a communication dated 3 July 2001 and addressed to the DSB, Ecuador referred to
the understanding reached with the European Communities on 30 April 2001.29 In its communication,
Ecuador stated that the understanding:
"[I]dentifies means by which a long-standing dispute can be resolved. However, the
Understanding also comprises of the execution of two phases and requires the
implementation of several key features, which demands the collective action of the
WTO membership ... [T]he Understanding reach ed with the EC refers to the current
banana import regime in force as of 1 July 2001 as one of a transitory nature since,
beginning at the latest on 1 January 2006, a new and definitive Tariff Only regime
will be in force ... Since the new EC bana na import regime which is currently in
force still requires that several steps be ta ken in the context of the DSB and other
WTO bodies, it would be premature to take this item off the DSB agenda which
considers this issue at ever y regular meeting pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU ...
In light of the above and although Ec uador sees the Understanding as an agreed
solution which can contribute to an overa ll, definite and universally accepted
solution, it must be made clear that the provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not
applicable in this case."
30
2.9 On 14 November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference decided to waive Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994:
"[U]ntil 31 December 2007, to the extent necessary to permit the [EC] to provide
preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by
Article 36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, 31
without being required to extend the same preferential treatment to like products of
any other member".32

27 EC – Bananas III, Communication from the United States (WT/DS27/59), 2 July 2001.
28 Ibid.
29 EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July
2001.
30 Ibid.
31 (footnote original) Any reference to the Partnership Agreement in this Decision shall also include the
period during which the trade provisions of this Agreement are applied on the basis of transitional measures
adopted by the ACP-EC joint institutions.
32 Ministerial Conference, European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision of
14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001.

2.10 While in principle this waiver wa s to be valid until 31 December 2007 33, in regard to bananas
this was subject to the terms and conditions set out in the text of the Decision, which include the
additional provisions contained in the Annex to the Doha Waiver Decision (Bananas Annex).34
2.11 Also on 14 November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference decided to waive Article XIII:1
and XIII:2 of the GATT 1994:
"With respect to the EC's imports of bananas, as of 1 January 2002, and until
31 December 2005 ... with respect to the EC's separate tariff quota of 750,000 tonnes
for bananas of ACP origin."
35
2.12 On 21 January 2002, the European Commun ities addressed a communication to the DSB,
concerning its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the EC –
Bananas III dispute. The European Communities informed the DSB that Regulation (EC) No.
2587/2001 had been adopted by the Council on 19 December 2001 and published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities L 345 of 29 December 2001.36 It stated that:
"By this Regulation, the EC has implemente d Phase 2 of the Understandings with the
United States and Ecuador (circulated as document WT/DS27/58 of 2 July 2001)37
2.13 On its session of 1 February 2002, the DSB considered a report submitted by the European
Communities concerning its progress in the implemen tation of the DSB's recommendations regarding
its bananas import regime. At the meeting, the European Communities expressed its view that "this
matter should now be withdrawn from the DSB agenda". 38 The European Comm unities stated that it
had implemented on schedule the second phase of the Understandings on Bananas concluded with the
United States and Ecuador in April 2001, and had co mplied with its interna tional obligations. The
European Communities added that the regime set out in Regulation (EC) No. 2587/2001, adopted on
19 December 2001, would be applicable until the time the EC's banana import regime would become
a tariff-only regime. This would take place by 1 Ja nuary 2006 at the latest, following the negotiations
under Article XXVIII, which in principle would begin in 2004. In response, at the same meeting,
Ecuador stated that "like other countries, [it] also considered that this item should no longer appear on
the agenda of future DSB meetings". Ecuador a dded that the bilateral understanding signed with the
European Communities on 30 April 2001:
"[C]onstituted a sound basis for the EC to implement a transiti onal banana import
regime so that by 1 January 2006, at the latest, a WTO-compatible tariff-only regime
would be put into place. The transitional regime contained various phases, stages and
elements to be implemented. One elemen t was to obtain waivers from Articles I and
XIII of the GATT 1994. However, the decision to grant these waivers included new
stages which would have to be carried out in order to ensure a proper transition to a
tariff-only banana import regime, as from 1 January 2006. Accordingly, insofar as
the EC continued to implement the DSB's recommendations by meeting its
commitments, Ecuador wished to reserve its rights under Article 21 of the DSU.

33 Ministerial Conference, European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision of
14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001, p. 2, para. 1.
34 Ibid., p. 3, para. 3bis.
35 Ministerial Conference, European Communities, Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff
Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/16), 14 November 2001.
36 EC – Bananas III, Status Report by the European Communities, Addendum ("WT/DS27/51/Add.25),
21 January 2002.
37 Ibid.
38 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 1 February

Therefore if there was any disagreement c oncerning the measures applied by the EC,
the matter could be referred to the origin al Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU."
39
2.14 On 19 January 2004, the European Communities, in view of the enlargement of the European
Union, resulting from the accession of Cyprus, th e Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, notified, within the framework of
procedures laid down in Article XXIV GATT 1994, and in particular Article XXIV:6, the withdrawal
on 1 May 2004 of the commitments in Schedules CXL of the EC-15, and in the Schedules of Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lith uania, Malta, Poland, th e Slovak Republic and
Slovenia. The European Communities added that it w as ready to enter into Article XXIV and Article
XXVIII GATT 1994 procedures, including tariff ne gotiations or consultations, to address
compensatory adjustments provided for under Artic le XXIV:6 of the GATT 1994. The European
Communities also stated that, pending the comple tion of the procedures under Article XXIV and
Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, and the creation of a new schedule valid for the EC-25, the
commitments in Schedule CXL would be fully respected and that the new member States of the
European Communities intended to align their Sche dules with those of the European Communities on
1 May 2004.
40
2.15 On 15 July 2004, the European Communiti es announced, in a communication to WTO
Members, that it intended to modify, in acco rdance with the provisions and procedures of
Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1994, its concessions w ith respect to tariff item 0803 00 19 (bananas)
included in the EC Schedule CXL.41
2.16 On 31 January 2005, the European Communitie s notified the WTO Members that it intended
to replace its concessions on tariff item 0803 00 19 (ban anas) included in the EC Schedule CXL with
a bound duty of €230/mt.42 It also indicated that the communication constituted:
"[T]he announcement under the terms of the Annex to the Decision of the WTO
Ministerial Conference of 14 November 2001 concerning the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement (WT/MIN(01)/15)."43
2.17 On 30 March 2005, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama,
followed by Venezuela and Nicaragua on 31 Marc h 2005 and Brazil on 1 April 2005, notified the
WTO that they were requesting arbitration pursuant to the procedures contained in the Annex to the
Doha Waiver, in order to determine whether th e envisaged rebinding on the European Communities'
tariff on bananas (at €230/mt), announced under the A nnex to the Waiver, fulfilled the requirements
of the Waiver Decision.
44 The Arbitrator's award was circulated on 1 August 2005. 45 The Arbitrator
concluded that:

39 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 1 February
2002 (WT/DSB/M/119), 6 March 2002, paras. 4-5.
40 Article XXIV:6 Negotiations, Enlargement of the European Union: Communication from the
European Communities (G/SECRET/20), 30 January 2004.
41 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities (G/SECRET/22), 2 August
2004.
42 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities (G/SECRET/22/Add.1),
1 February 2005.
43 Ibid.
44 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Ag reement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Annex to the Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/L/607), 1 April 2005. See also, European Communities,
The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Annex to the Decision of 14
November 2001, Communication from Colombia , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.1), 1 April 2005;

"[T]he European Communities' envisaged rebinding on bananas would not result in at
least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking into account
all EC WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas".
46
2.18 On 13 September 2005, the European Communities notified the interested parties that it had
revised its proposal to provide as from 1 January 2006 for an MFN tariff for bananas at €187/mt and a
tariff quota for ACP countries of 775,000 mt per year at zero duty.47
2.19 In a communication dated 26 September 200 5, the European Communities notified the
Arbitrator that, after consultations with the interested parties, there was at that point no basis for even
seeking a mutually satisfactory solution within a ti meframe that would allow for implementation of
the new European Communities' banana regime by 1 January 2006. The European Communities
therefore requested that the matter be referred back to the same Arbitrator, in accordance with the
Annex to the Doha Waiver. 48 The Arbitrator's award was circulated on 27 October 2005. 49 T h e
Arbitrator concluded that:
"[T]he European Communities' proposed rectification, consisting of a new MFN tariff
rate on bananas of €187 per metric ton a nd a 775,000 mt tariff quota on imports of
bananas of ACP origin, would not result 'in at least maintaining total market access
for MFN banana suppliers', taking into account 'all EC WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas'. Con sequently... the European Communities has
failed to rectify the matter, in accordance with the fifth tiret of the Annex to the Doha
Waiver."
50
2.20 On 27 September 2006, the European Communities, noting the enlargement of the European
Union, resulting from the accession of Bulgaria and Romania that would take place from 1 January
2007, notified, within the framework of procedur es laid down in Article XXIV GATT 1994, and in
particular Article XXIV:6, the modification of the EC Schedule, as well as the fact that the two new
members of the European Union would be subject to the EC Schedules from 1 January 2007 and,
consequently the commitments in the Schedules of Bulgaria and Romania would be withdrawn from
that date.
51

Communication from Costa Rica, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.2), 1 April 2005; Communication from Ecuador,
Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.3), 1 April 2005; Communication from Guatemala, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.4),
1 April 2005; Communication from Honduras, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.5), 1 April 2005; Communication
from Panama , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.6), 1 April 2005; Communication from Nicaragua , Addendum
(WT/L/607/Add.7), 4 April 2005; Communication from Venezuela , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.8), 4 April
2005; and, Communication from Brazil, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.9), 4 April 2005.
45 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Ag reement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator (WT/L/616), 1 August 2005. See also, European
Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Reco urse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Annex to the
Decision of 14 November 2001, Communication from the Secretariat (WT/L/607/Add.13), 5 September 2005.
46 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, para. 94.
47 See Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement II, para. 7.
48 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Ag reement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Annex to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Addendum, Communication from the European Communities
(WT/L/607/Add.14), 28 September 2005.
49 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement II . See also, European
Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Reco urse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Annex to the
Decision of 14 November 2001, Communication from the Chairman of the General Council
(WT/L/607/Add.15), 28 October 2005.
50 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement II, para. 127.
51 Article XXIV:6 Negotiations, Enlargement of the European Union: Communication from the
European Communities (G/SECRET/26), 28 September 2006.

B.
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
2.21 Under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (Harmonized System or
HS) developed by the World Customs Organizatio n (WCO), bananas are cl assified under the HS
Code 0803.00 which also includes plantains, fresh or dried. The European Communities applies a
"combined nomenclature" (CN) comprised of the harmonized system nomenclature and the
Community subdivisions. 52 The European Communities' combined nomenclature is revised on an
annual basis. The revised version entered in to force 1 January 2007 as a result of Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC)
2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff. 53 This EC
Commission Regulation establishes that the CN code for "bananas, including plantains, fresh or
dried," is 0803 00 with the following sub-divisions 54: 0803 00 11 for Fresh- Plantains; 0803 00 19 55
for Fresh- Other (bananas);56 0803 00 90 for Dried (bananas, including plantains). 57 The Panel notes,
however that, in some documents, including in its WTO Schedules LXXX and CXL, the European
Communities refers to fresh bananas under tariff item 0803 00 12.
2.22 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) considers bananas to be
the world's most exported fruit in terms of volume a nd second in terms of value. According to the
FAO, bananas represent a substantial source of income and employment for several tropical
countries.58
C. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANANAS IMPORTS
1. European Communities' WTO commitments regarding bananas
2.23 The European Communities' co mmitments under the WTO with respect to trade in goods
were established in Schedule LXXX , which was incorporated to the results of the Uruguay Round on
15 April 1994. 59 On 15 December 1994, the European Communities announced its intention to
withdraw Schedule LXXX, effective from 1 January 1995, due to the accession of Austria, Finland
and Sweden into the Communities.
60 On this occasion, the Europ ean Communities d eclared that,
pending the submission of the new Schedule, it would continue to respect the commitments
established in Schedule LXXX.

52 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and
on the Common Customs Tariff, OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p.1-675.
53 The Combined Nomenclature is annually updated on October 31. This Commission Regulation
refers to the version, published on the Official Journal of the European Union, 31 October 2006.
54 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council
Regulation (EEC) 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff,
Official Journal of the European Union, 31 October 2006, p. 87.
55 In Exhibit EC-1 Schedule CXL- European Communities, fresh bananas appear under the CN Code
0803 00 12. The same applies to Schedule LXXX- European Communities, which is also part of Exhibit EC-1.
56 Annex 7 "WTO Tariff quotas to be opened by the competent Community Authorities" of the Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff
refers to CN Code 0803 00 19 Bananas. Official Journal of the European Union, 31 October 2006, p. 853.
57 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council
Regulation (EEC) 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff,
Official Journal of the European Union, 31 October 2006, p. 87
58 Available at: http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/Y4343E/y4343e06.htm (as of 6 November 2007).
59 European Communities' first written submission, para. 5.
60 Ibid., para. 5.

2.24 The European Communities submitted its propo sed new Schedule CXL to the WTO on 14
March, 1996. However, this schedule has not been certified, following objections by WTO
Members.61
2.25 For all practical purposes, with respect to tariff heading 0803, Part I, Section I.A (Tariffs) of
EC Schedule LXXX and EC Schedule CXL have identical provisions. 62 The relevant text in this
section reads:
Tariff item
number Description of products Base rate of
duty
Bound rate
of duty
Special
safeguard
1 2 3 4 6
0803 00 Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried:
0803 00 1 - Fresh:
0803 00 11 -- Plantains 20.0% 16.0%
0803 00 12 -- Other 850ECU/T 680ECU/T SSG
0803 00 90 - Dried 20.0% 16.0%

2.26 Likewise, Part I, Section I.B (Tariff quotas) of EC Schedule LXXX and EC Schedule CXL
have identical provisions for tariff line 0803.00.12. The text reads:
Description of
product
Tariff item
number(s)
Initial quota
quantity
and in-
quota tariff
rate
Final quota
quantity
and in-
quota tariff
rate
Implemen-
tation
period
from/to
Initial
negotiating
right
Other terms
and
conditions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fresh bananas, other
than plantains
0803 00 12 2.200.000 t
75 ECU/t
2.200.000 t
75 ECU/t
 As indicated
in the Annex

2.27 The Annex referred to in both EC Schedule LXXX and EC Schedule CXL is the so-called
"Framework Agreement on Bananas" (Bananas Fr amework Agreement or BFA). The Bananas
Framework Agreement was originally negotiated in 1994 by the European Communities with the
following GATT Contracting Parties: Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela. 63 Under the
Bananas Framework Agreement:
"1. The global basic tariff quota is fixed at 2.100.000 t for 1994 and at
2.200.000 t for 1995 and the following y ears, subject to any increase resulting from
the enlargement of the Community.
This quota is divided up into specific quotas allocated to the following countries:

61 European Communities' first written submission para. 6.
62 See Exhibit EC-1.
63 See Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 3.30.

Country Percentage of the global quota
Costa Rica 23.4
Colombia 21.0
Nicaragua 3.0
Venezuela 2.0
Dominican Republic
and other ACP concerning
non-traditional quantities

 90.000 t
Others 46.32% (1994) – 46.15% (1995)

... 7. The in-quota tariff rate shall be 75 Ecus tonne.
8. The agreed system will be operational by 1 October 1994 at the latest,
without prejudice to any provisional or transitional measures to be examined for the
year 1994.
9. This agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002. Full consultations with
the Latin American suppliers that are GA TT Members should start no later than in
year 2001.
The functioning of the agreement will be revi ewed before the end of the third year,
with full consultation of GATT Member Latin American suppliers.
10. This agreement will be incorporat ed into the Community's Uruguay Round
Schedule.
11. This agreement represents a settleme nt of the dispute between Colombia,
Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and th e Community on the Community's banana
regime. The parties to this agreemen t will not pursue the adoption of the GATT
panel report on this issue."
2.28 The panel notes that, as a result of the replaceme nt of the currency unit "ECU" by the "Euro"
(€), on a one to one basis,
64 the European Communities' commitments contained in the respective
Schedules would have to be read accordingly.
2.29 As noted above, on 19 January 2004, the Eur opean Communities announced the withdrawal
from 1 May 2004 of the commitments in Schedule CXL, due to the accession of ten new member
States into the European Union.
65 At this moment, the negotiations under Article XXIV and Article
XXVIII of the GATT have not been concluded a nd the European Communities has not submitted a
new Schedule.

64 Enlargement of the European Union: Rectification and Modification of Schedule CXL - European
Communities, Addendum (G/L/Rev.1/Add.3), 23 November 1998.
65 Article XXIV:6 Negotiations, Enlargement of the European Union: Communication from the
European Communities (G/SECRET/20), 30 January 2004. See also, European Communities' first written
submission, para. 7.

2. European Communities' banana import regime
2.30 European Communities' Council Regulati on (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 66
established the common organization of the banana market. This regulation established the free
circulation of bananas within the common market , it regulated the domestic production of bananas,
and established the regime for the importation of bananas into the Eu ropean Communities.
Regulation 404/93 accorded different treatment to bananas depending on their origin. It divided the
system into community bananas, which were the bananas produced within the European
Communities; traditional ACP bananas, which were bananas originated in any of 12 ACP countries
within the quantities established in the annex; 67 non-traditional ACP imports, which referred to the
quantities of imported bananas in any of the ACP countries that exceeded the quantity established in
the Annex; and bananas imported from non-ACP third countries. 68 Regulation 404/93 established a
quota of 854,000 mt for Community bananas 69 and of 857,700 mt for traditional ACP bananas as
established in the annex. A tariff quota of two million mt was opened each year for imports of third
country bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas.
70 Within this tariff quota, third country bananas
were subject to an in-quota tariff of 100 ECU/mt , while imports from non-traditional ACP countries
were subject to zero duty.71 The out-of-quota tariff was 750 ECU/mt for non-traditional ACP-bananas
and 850 ECU/mt for out-of-quota third country bananas. 72 Imports from both the non-ACP third
country bananas and non-traditional ACP countries we re subject to import licences granted in the
following proportions: (a) 66.5 per cent to operator s established in third country and non traditional
ACP bananas; (b) 30 per cent to operators estab lished in the European Communities or traditional
ACP bananas; and, (c) 3.5 per cent to operato rs established in the European Communities that
marketed bananas other than community and traditional ACP bananas from 1992. 73 The Regulation
also provided that, no later than the end of the third year after the entry into force of this Regulation,
the Commission had to submit a report to the Euro pean Parliament and the Council on the operation
of the Regulation. The report had to contain among other things "an analysis of the development of
Community, third-country and ACP banana marke ting flows since the implementation of these
arrangements." The same provision also established that the "Commission shall again report to the
European Parliament and the Council by 31 Dece mber 2001 on the operation of this Regulation and
make appropriate proposals concerning new arrangements to apply after 31 December 2002."74
2.31 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93 of 10 June 1993 75 complemented Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 by laying down detailed rules for the application of the arrangements
for importing bananas into the European Commun ities. Regulation 1442/93 established the licensing
procedures for imports from traditional ACP and non traditional ACP and thir d country bananas.
Applications for traditional ACP imports were requi red to be accompanied by a certificate of origin

66 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the
market in bananas, Official Journal L 047, 25/02/1993 P.0001-0011.
67 The Annex of the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 established the following traditional
quantities of bananas from ACP states: Cote d'Ivoire 155 000, Cameroon 155 000, Suriname 38 000, Somalia
60 000, Jamaica 105 000, St Lucia 127 000, St Vincent and the Grenadine 82 000, Dominica 71 000, Belize 40
000, Cape Verde 4 800, Grenada 14 000, Madagascar 5 900 for a total of 857 700 tonnes.
68 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993, Article 15.
69 Ibid., Article 12.
70 Ibid., Article 18.1.
71 Ibid., Article 18.1.
72 Ibid., Article 18.2.
73 Ibid., Articles 17 and 19.1.
74 Ibid., Article 32.
75 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93 of 10 June 1993 laying down detailed rules for the
application of the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community, Official Journal L142, 12/06/1993
P.0006-0015.

testifying the status as traditional ACP bananas.
76 Import licences for non traditional bananas and
third country bananas were subject to several cumula tively procedures. These applicable procedures
included: "(i) allocation of licences based on thre e operator categories; (ii) allocation of licences
according to three activity functions; (iii) export certificate requirements for imports from Costa Rica,
Colombia and Nicaragua; and (iv) a two-r ound quarterly procedure to administer licence
applications."77
2.32 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the Adjustments and
Transitional Arrangements Required in the Agricultural Sector in order to Implement the Agreements
Concluded during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 78 modified Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 and incorporated in to EC Law the European Communities' banana
import commitments established in Schedule LXXX a nd the Bananas Framework Agreement. In this
regard, a tariff quota of 2.2 million mt was opene d to third country bana nas and non traditional ACP
bananas. Within the framework of this quota, imports of third country bananas were subject to a duty
of 75 ECU/mt and imports of non-traditional ACP bananas were subject to a zero duty. Non-
traditional ACP bananas imported outside this quota we re subject to the custom duty specified in the
European Communities' Common Customs Tariff, less 100 ECU/mt.
2.33 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 478/95 of 1 March 1995 79 established additional rules for
the application of Regulation 404/93 as regards the ta riff quotas arrangements for imports of bananas.
Regulation 478/95 incorporated country-specifîc shar es allocated to the countries mentioned in the
Bananas Framework Agreement, as well as the othe r provisions established in this agreement.
Therefore, tariff quotas for imports of bananas fro m third countries and non- traditional ACP bananas
were subject to the following distribution: Co sta Rica 23.4 per cent; Colombia 21 per cent;
Nicaragua 3 per cent; Venezuela 2 per cent; no n-traditional ACP countries and other ACP countries
and others were allocated up to 90,000 mt.
2.34 Regulation 404/93 and its subsequent EC rules were reviewed in the EC – Bananas III case.
The Panel and Appellate Body Report found that certain aspects of these regulations were inconsistent
with Articles I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, Article 1.2 of the Licensing Agreement and
Articles II and XVII of the GATS.80
2.35 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amended Regulation 404/93. 81
Regulation 1637/98 maintained the tariff quota for imports of third countries and non-traditional ACP
bananas at 2.2 million mt. 82 The in-quota tariff imports from third country bananas were subject to a
duty of 75 ECU/mt, while imports from non-traditional ACP countries were free of duty.83 As a result
of the European Communities' enlargement in 1995, an additional tariff quota of 353,000 mt was
opened for imports of third countries and non-traditi onal ACP bananas. Under this quota, imports of

76 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 6.18
77 Ibid., para. 6.20.
78 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94 of 22 Decembe r 1994 on the adjust ments and transitional
arrangements required in the agricultural sector in order to implement the agreements concluded during the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Official Journal L349, 31/12/1994, P.0105-0200.
79 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 478/95 of 1 March 1995 on additional rules for the application of
Council regulation (EEC) 404/93 as regards the tariff quotas arrangements for imports of bananas into the
Community and amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93, Official Journal L049, 04/03/1995 P.0013-0017.
80 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 9.1, as modified by the Appellate Body Report on EC –
Bananas III, paras. 255-256.
81 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 on
the common organization of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European Communities L210/28,
28/7/98.
82 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998, Article 18.1.
83 Ibid., Article 18.1.

bananas from third countries were subject to 75 ECU/mt, while imports of non-traditional ACP
bananas were free of duty. 84 No import duty was charged on banana imports from traditional ACP
origin.85 All bananas imports to the European Communities were subject to import licences. 86
Regulation 1637/98 also established that, if there was no reasonable possibility of securing the
agreement of all WTO Members with a substantial interest in the supply of bananas, the European
Communities' Commission could proceed to allocate the tariff quotas for traditional and non-
traditional ACP bananas and for third country bananas.
87 The out-of-quota tariff for non-traditional
ACP bananas was reduced by ECU200.88 Regulation 1637/98 also abolished the operator categories.
2.36 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 89 repealed Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/93 as amended by Regulati on (EC) No. 702/95 and it laid down detailed
rules for the implementation of Council Regulati on (EEC) No. 404/93 regarding imports of bananas
into the European Communities. According to Regulation 2362/98, the tariff quotas and the
traditional ACP quantities were to be allocated ta king into account traditional trade flows, in the
following way: 92 per cent to traditional operators and 8 per cent to newcomers. 90 Annex I of
Regulation 2362/98 established the distribution of the tariff quota for third country imports in the
following way: Ecuador 26.17 per cent; Costa Rica 25.61 per cent; Colombia 23.03 per cent;
Panama 15.76 per cent; and, "Other" 9.43 per cent. The quantity for traditional ACP bananas
remained at 857,700 mt.
2.37 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 and Comm ission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 were
challenged by Ecuador in its first recourse to a compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU
in the EC – Bananas III dispute. The compliance Panel found certain aspects of these Regulations
inconsistent with the European Communities' oblig ations under Article I:1 and XIII:1 and 2 of the
GATT 1994 and under Articles II and XVII of the GATS.91
2.38 Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 92 further amended Regulation
(EEC) No. 404/93 on the common organization of the European Communities' market in bananas.
Regulation 216/2001 opened a third autonomous tariff quota of 850,000 mt for bananas of all origins
(quota C) subject to a customs duty of €300/mt.93 This quota was in addition to the first tariff quota of
2.2 million mt at a rate of €75/mt bound in the WTO (or quota A) and a second tariff quota of 353,000
mt due to the enlargement of the European Communities in 1995 (or quota B). 94 All of these tariff
quotas were opened for imports of products originating in all third countries. ACP bananas under and
outside the tariff quotas were subject to a tariff preference of €300/mt. 95 Regulation 216/2001
established that the Commission, on the basis of an agreement with the WTO Members with a
substantial interest in the supply of bananas, would allocate tariff quotas A and B among supplier
countries. According to Regulation 216/2001, im ports under tariff quota A and B were subject to a

84 Ibid., Article 18.2.
85 Ibid., Article 18.3.
86 Ibid., Article 17.
87 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998, Article 18.4.
88 Ibid., Article 18.5
89 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 regarding imports of bananas into the Community,
Official Journal of the European Communities, L293/32, 31/10/98.
90 Ibid., Article 2.1.
91 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para.7.1.
92 Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93
on the common organization of the market in bananas, Official Journal of the European Communities, L31/2,
2/2/2001.
93 Ibid., Article 18.1.
94 Ibid., Article 18.1.
95 Ibid., Article 18.4.

custom duty of €75/mt, while imports under the ta riff quota C were subject to a duty of €300/mt.
96
Regulation 216/2001 also established that the tariff quotas would be administered by taking into
account the traditional trade flows ("traditionals"/"newcomers") or through other methods.
97
2.39 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 98 further amended Regulation
(EEC) No. 404/93 on the common organization of the European Communities' market in bananas.
Regulation 2587/2001 cha nged the quotas in the following way: Quota A of 2.2 million mt for
imports from third countries subject to a customs dut y of €75/mt; Quota B of 453,000 mt for imports
from third countries subject to a tariff duty of €75/mt; Quota C of 750,000 mt open to imports from
ACP countries subject to a zero duty.
99 A tariff preference of €300/mt was established for imports
originating in ACP countries.100
3. European Communities' current banana import regime
2.40 The current regime for imports of bananas to the European Communities has been established
in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005. 101 Regulation 1964/2005 entered
into force on 1 January 2006 and established a tariff rate of €176/mt for bananas (tariff
item 0803 00 19).102 Regulation 1964/2005 also established a tariff quota for bananas originating in
ACP countries pursuant to the European Communiti es' commitments under the ACP-EC partnership
Agreement, also known as the Cotonou Agreement. 103 The Cotonou Agreement allows imports
originating from participating developing countr ies (ACP countries) to enter the European
Communities free of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, or under preferential terms,
until 31 December 2007. 104 Regulation 1964/2005 grants an annual autonomous tariff quota of
775,000 mt subject to a zero-duty rate to imports of bananas originating in ACP countries.105
2.41 In addition to the preferences under the Cotonou Agreement, bananas originating in least
developed countries (LDCs) also enjoy duty-free access to the European Communities' market from a
generalized tariff preferences scheme known as the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement, which
is laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005.
106
2.42 Implementing regulations have been adopted by the European Communities subsequent to
Regulation 1964/2005. According to the European Communities, these regulations are: Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 2015/2005 of 9 December 2005, on imports during January and February 2006

96 Ibid., Article 18.2 and 18.3.
97 Ibid., Article 19.1.
98 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 on the common organization of the markets in bananas, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L345/13, 29/12/2001.
99 Ibid., Article 18.1, 18.2, 18.3.
100 Ibid., Article 18.4.
101 Exhibit ECU-1.
102 Exhibit ECU-1, Article 1.1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005.
103 Exhibit ECU-1, para. (6) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005.
104 European Communities' first written submission, para. 13.
105 Exhibit ECU-1, Article 1.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005.
106 Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005. European Communities' response to
question 53 paras. 109-112. Regulation 980/2005 establishes that the common customs tariff duties on tariff
item 0803 00 19 (bananas) would be reduced by 20 per cent annually from 1 January 2002 and would be
entirely suspended as from 1 January 2006. European Communities' response to question 53, para. 110.
Ecuador clarified that within the period 1999-2007 its bananas exports to the EC have not beneficiated from any
preferential system. Ecuador's response to panel question No. 33. However, according to the information
provided by the European Communities, all least develo ped countries that could enjoy tariff preferences under
the EBA arrangement already benefited from the Cotonou Agreement trade preferences. European
Communities' comments to the draft descriptive sections of the Panel's Report.

of bananas originating in ACP countries; Commiss ion Regulation (EC) No. 219/2006 of 8 February
2006, on imports of bananas from ACP countries for the period 1 March to 31 December 2006; and,
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1789/2006 of 5 D ecember 2006, on imports of bananas from ACP
countries for the period 1 January to 31 December 2007.107
2.43 Besides those identified by the European Communities, Ecuador has mentioned other
implementing regulations 108, such as Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2014/2005 of 9 December
2005109; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2149/2005 of 23 December 2005 110; Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 325/2006 of 23 February 2006 111; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 566/2006
of 6 April 2006 112; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 966/2006 of 29 June 2006 113; Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 1261/2006 of 23 August 2006 114; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 34/2007 of
16 January 2007115; and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 47/2007 of 19 January 2007.116
2.44 In addition to these regulations, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October
2006117 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (E EC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical
nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff, shows under tariff item 0803 00 19 (bananas) a
conventional rate duty of €176/mt subject to f ootnote 1 which indicates a WTO tariff quota explained
in Annex 7.
118 This annex refers to the "WTO Tariff quotas to be opened by the competent
Community authorities - qualifications for these quotas is subject to conditions laid down in the
relevant Community provisions." According to th is annex, tariff item 0803 00 19 (bananas) appears
with a quota quantity of 2.2 million mt to a rate of duty €75/mt.
119 The general rules concerning
duties laid down in this regulation provide that when autonomous rates of duty are lower than

107 European Communities' response to question 3, para. 5.
108 Ecuador's response to question 3.
109 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2014/2005 of 9 December 2005 on licences under the
arrangements for importing bananas into the Community in respect of bananas released into free circulation at
the common customs tariff rate of duty (OJ L 324, 10.12.2005, p. 3.
110 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2149/2005 of 23 December 2005 fixing the reduction coefficients
to be applied to applications for import licences for bananas originating in the ACP countries for the months of
January and February 2006.
111 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 325/2006 of 23 February 2006 fixing the reduction coefficient to
be applied to applications for import licences for bananas originating in the ACP countries for the period 1
March to 31 December 2006.
112 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 566/2006 of 6 April 2006 amending and derogating from
Regulation (EC) 2014/2005 on licences under the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community in
respect of bananas released into free circulation at the common customs tariff rate of duty and amending
Regulation (EC) No. 219/2006 opening and providing for the administration of the tariff quota for bananas
falling under CN code 0803 00 19 originating in ACP countries for the period 1 March to 31 December 2006.
113 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 966/2006 of 29 June 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No.
219/2006 opening and providing for the administration of the tariff quota for bananas falling under CN code
0803 00 19 originating in ACP countries for the period 1 March to 31 December 2006.
114 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1261/2006 of 23 August 2006 amending Regulation (EC)
219/2006 opening and providing for the administration of the tariff quota for bananas falling under CN code
0803 00 19 originating in ACP countries for the period 1 March to 31 December 2006.
115 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 34/2007 of 16 January 2007 fixing the allocation coefficient to be
applied to applications for import licences for bananas originating in the ACP countries for the period to
31 December 2007.
116 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 47/2007 of 19 January 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No.
34/2007 fixing the allocation coefficient to be applied to applications for import licences for bananas originating
in the ACP countries for the period to 31 December 2007.
117 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff,
Official Journal of the European Union, 31/10/2006.
118 Ibid., page 87.
119 Ibid., page 853.

conventional rates of duty, the autonomous du ties (shown by means of a footnote) would be
applicable. On 9 June 2007, a corrigendum to Regulation 1549/2006 was published, deleting the
reference to the tariff quota for tariff item 0803 00 19 (bananas).
120
2.45 The following table summarizes the main aspects of the different import regimes for bananas.
EC's Different Banana Import Regimes

Tariff
(ECU/€ per metric tonne) EC Regulation
(applicable from) Beneficiaries Quotas
(tonnes net weight) in-quota out-of quota

▪Traditional ACP
(country specific allocations)

857 700

zero duty

Council Regulation
(EEC) No 404/93
(1 July 1993)

▪Non- traditional ACP

▪Third Country

2 000 000

zero duty

ECU100

ECU750

ECU850

▪Traditional ACP
(country specific allocations)

857 700

zero duty

Council Regulation
(EC) No 3290/94
(1 July 1995)

▪Non- traditional ACP

▪Third Country

2 200 000*

zero duty

ECU75

ECU100 tariff
preference**

▪Traditional ACP
(country specific allocations)

857 700

zero duty

▪Non- traditional ACP
(country specific allocation)

90 000

zero duty

Commission
Regulation (EC)
No 478/95
(5 March 1995)
▪Third Country
(country specific allocation)

2 200 000

ECU75

▪Traditional ACP
(elimination country specific
allocations)

857 700

zero duty

▪Non-traditional ACP
(elimination country specific
allocations)

▪Third Country
(country specific allocations)

2 200 000

zero duty

ECU75

ECU200 tariff
preference**

ECU737

Council Regulation
(EC) No 1637/98
(1 January 1999)

▪Non-traditional ACP
(elimination country specific
allocations)

▪Third Country
(country specific allocations)

353 000

zero duty

ECU75

ECU200 tariff
preference**

ECU737

120 Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending
Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and the Common
Customs Tariff, Official Journal of the European Union, 9/06/2007.

▪Quota A
 ACP

 Third Country

2 200 000

zero duty

€ 75

€300 tariff
preference**

▪Quota B
 ACP

 Third Country

353 000

zero duty

€ 75

€300 tariff
preference**
Council Regulation
(EC) No 216/2001
(1 April 2001)
▪Quota C
 ACP

Third Country

850 000

€ 300 with a € 300
tariff preference

€ 300

€300 tariff
preference**

▪Quota A
 ACP

Third Country

2 200 000

zero duty

€75

€300 tariff preference

▪Quota B
ACP

Third Country

453 000

zero duty

€75

€300 tariff preference

Council Regulation
(EC)
No 2587/2001
(1 January 2002)

▪Quota C
 ACP

750 000

zero duty

€300 tariff preference

Bananas of all origin

€176

€176

Council Regulation
(EC)
No 1964/05
(1 January 2006)
ACP

775 000

zero duty

€176

* In 1994 this tariff quota was 2 100 000t. In 1 January 1995 it was increased to 2 200 000t.
** This tariff preference is deducted from the rate of duty established in the Common Customs Tariff that was in
force at that time. Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94, Articles 15.1 and 18.2.

D. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' BANANAS MARKET
1. European Communities' bananas production
2.46 According to the available data provided by th e parties, the European Communities' domestic
banana production comes from Greece (Crete), Spai n (Canary Islands), Cyprus, Portugal (continental
Portugal, Madeira, and the Azores) and France (overseas territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe).121
In 2006, the European Communities' domestic banana production amount ed to 641,754 mt.
According to information provided by the Eur opean Communities, domestic production for 2007 is
expected to be lower than the previous year, since banana plantations were damaged by the passage of
Hurricane Dean through the territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe.122

121 Exhibit EC 16. See also Nicaragua and Panama's response to question 108.
122 European Communities ' response to question 51(a).

2.47 There are no exports of bananas from the European Communities, as all production is
destined for domestic consumption.
123
2. European Communities' bananas consumption
2.48 Due to factors such as the Eur opean Communities' successive enlargements and the operation
of a European single market with free movement of goods among the different countries, the Panel
has no available data on the cons umption volumes of bananas for each of the European Communities
member States. However, statistical informati on provided by the European Communities shows total
domestic sales of bananas.124
Total Sales of Bananas in the EU (mt)
(figures provided by the EC in Exhibit EC-17)

Origin 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU 742,804 790,675 777,068 801,122 765,416 758,206 648,375 641,754
(share of total) 18.8% 16.9% 17.1% 17.4% 16.3% 16.4% 14.8% 13.3%
ACP Countries 688,707 771,857 748,779 739,825 799,896 784,427 763,675 891,218
(share of total) 17.4% 16.5% 16.5% 16.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.5% 18.5%
non-LDC 688,158 771,451 748,181 739,483 798,538 783,810 763,675 891,133
LDC-other 549 406 598 342 1,358 617 0 85
Non-ACP LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MFN 2,521,823 3,119,605 3,015,474 3,073,124 3,143,631 3, 078,430 2,963,745 3,293,679
(share of total) 63.8 % 66.6% 66.4% 66.6% 66.8% 66.6% 67.7 68.2%
Ecuador (Eurostat) 696,789* 1,042,350 1,043,306 1,089,019 1,081,787 993,825 1,062,735 1,027,209
(share of total) 17.6% 22.3% 23.0% 23.6% 23.0% 21.5% 24.3% 21.3%
Total 3,953,334 4,683,137 4,541,321 4,614, 071 4,708,943 4,621,063 4,375,795 4,826,651
* For the amount of Ecuador's exports to the EC in 1999 there is a difference between the figures provided by the EC and
those provided by Ecuador. Exhibit ECU-9 shows that the amount of bananas exported by Ecuador to the European
Communities in 1999 was of 1,074,407 representing 24.8% of the EU sales for that year. This figure assumes that the higher
volume of trade from Ecuador leads to an increase in th e MFN total for 1999 to 2,889,441 and an increase in the total
amount of sales in the EU for 1999 to 4,330,952.
Source: Figures provided by the EC in Exhibit EC-17. Imports from non-ACP LDCs provided by Eurostat (2007) "Intra-
and extra- EU trade data, CD-ROM," ISSN: 1725-3365. Figures from Eurostat refer to EC25.

3. European Communities' bananas imports
2.49 The European Communities is the world's biggest export market for bananas, followed by the
United States.125 Bananas in the European Communities' market are mainly imported from MFN or
so-called "Dollar Zone" countries and to a lesser extent from ACP countries. The term MFN bananas
is generally used by both parties to indicate bananas originating in WTO Members that are not
signatories of the Cotonou Agreement.
2.50 For the year 2006, the main MFN countries that exported bananas to the European
Communities were Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica , Panama, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, Honduras,
Venezuela, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 126 Among the ACP countries exporting bananas to the European
Communities were Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Domi nican Republic, Belize, Suriname, Saint Lucia,
Jamaica, Ghana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica.127

123 European Communities ' response to question 51(b).
124 Exhibit EC-17, Table 15.
125 Exhibit EC-20.
126 Exhibit EC-17. See also Exhibit EC-3.
127 Exhibit EC-17. See also Exhibit EC-8.

2.51 According to information provided by Cameroon, some natural, economic and human factors
make ACP bananas less competitive than MFN bananas. 128 Among these factors would be scarcity of
land appropriate for growing bananas; poor qualit y of the ground in which bananas are grown;
higher input costs; impossibility of achieving eco nomies of scale due to limited size of production
volumes; and higher shipping costs.129
2.52 With respect to imports under the Eur opean Communities' EBA preference scheme 130, the
European Communities mentioned that since 2000 only four LDCs (Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia and
Cape Verde131) have benefited from the EBA pr eference and in limited quantities. 132 The European
Communities considers that this is because only a limited number of LDCs have the capacity to
export bananas.133 According to information provided by Ecuador 134, EBA imports to the EC-25 in
2006 amounted to 1,187 mt. The European Communities has contested this figure.135
4. European Communities' bananas imports under Council Regulation 1964/2005
2.53 Since 1 January 2006, the European Communities has been applying the €176/mt tariff to all
bananas of MFN origin and to ACP origin bana nas in excess of the 775,000 mt duty free quota.
According to information provided by the Europ ean Communities, in 2006 the aggregate volume of
bananas imported into the Europ ean Communities was 4,184,897 mt. 136 The €176/mt tariff was
applied to 3,409,897 mt 137 and a zero duty was applied to the 775,000 mt of ACP Bananas. 138 The
information provided by the European Communities re flected that its tariff revenue for 2006 was of
€600,141,907, from which €579,687,363 corresponded to duties paid by trading companies importing
bananas from Latin American countries and €20, 454,544 represented the out-of-quota exports from
ACP countries.
139 In 2005, under the previous system w ith an in-quota €75/mt tariff, trading
companies importing bananas from Ecuador paid €79,705,148 on tariff duties to the European
Communities. Following the introduction of the new system on 1 January 2006 with the €176/mt
tariff duty, the amount paid by trading companies importing bananas from Ecuador rose to
€180,788,696 in 2006.
140 This calculation does not take into c onsideration the costs borne by trading
companies before 2006, in order to acquire import licences. Following the elimination of the licence
system for MFN imports on 1 January 2006, these costs have ceased to exist. Ecuador and the
European Communities did not submit any data th at would allow the Panel to accurately estimate
these costs.

128 Cameroon's response to question 86.
129 Ibid.
130 See para. 2.41 above.
131 However, Exhibit EC-17 Table 15 shows that Cape Verde has not been exporting bananas to the EC
since 2001.
132 European Communities ' response to question 53, pa ra. 111. But see the statement in the study by
the Centre for International Economics, provided by Nicaragua and Panama, that "from 2008 onwards Latin
American access will decline sharply, and under some scenarios, by 2010, ACP/EBA exports to the EU could
exceed those of Latin America." Centre for Internationa l Economics, "The detrimental effects of a €176 per
tonne ACP banana tariff preference on MFN suppliers" (August 2007), in Exhibit N-2 and Exhibit P-2.
133 European Communities' response to question 53, para. 111.
134 Exhibit ECU-6.
135 Exhibit ECU-6 shows banana imports from Uganda in 2006 to be 1,128 mt. According to Exhibit
EC-19, the EC imported only 28mt of bananas from Uganda.
136 European Communities ' response to question 2.
137 This amount is different to the one presented by Ecuador in response to question 2. According to
Ecuador the volume of imports subject to the €176/mt tariff was 3,473, 521mt of which 116, 190 mt were ACP
over quota imports.
138 European Communities' response to question 2, para. 4.
139 Exhibit EC-14
140 Ecuador's response to question 35. See also Exhibit ECU-8 in response to Panel's Question 29(d).

2.54 Banana import conditions to the European Co mmunities have also been affected by the
European Communities enlargement that took place on 1 May 2004, increasing the number of
European Communities member States from 15 to 25. In this regard, for the period between 1 May
and 31 December 2004, the European Communities opened an autonomous tariff quota of 300,000 mt
subject to the in-quota tariff of €75/mt. In 2005, the tariff quota was extended to 460,000 mt.
141
Before the 2004 enlargement, MFN suppliers expor ted "from 560,000 to 570,000 mt of bananas per
annum to the 10 new Member States." 142 Ecuador's share in the autonomous tariff quota for imported
bananas into the 10 new member States was 58.2 per cent.143
2.55 With respect to Romania and Bulgaria, whic h acceded to the European Communities in
January 2007, in 2005 Romania imported approximate ly 143,000 mt of Latin American bananas,
subject to a tariff of 16 per cent ad valorem, and Bulgaria imported 55,000 mt subject to a tariff of
11.2 per cent ad valorem .144 Since enlargement, MFN banana imports into Romania and Bulgaria
have been subject to the €176/mt tariff duty.145
2.56 Parties do not agree on the impact that Regulation 1964/2005 has had on European
Communities' banana imports. For the European Communities, following the introduction of the
€176/mt tariff duty, there has been a significant incr ease in the volumes of bananas imported into the
European Communities from all groups of exporting developing countries 146; new developing
countries have started or have increased ba nanas exports to the European Communities; 147 and there
has been relative stability in wholesale prices for bananas of all origins.148
2.57 According to the European Communities, the 3.28 million mt of bananas imported from MFN
countries into the European Communities in 2006 149 is the "highest annual volume of bananas
imported into the European Communities from MF N countries since 1999 and represents an increase
of 10.7 per cent in comparison with 2005". 150 However, Ecuador notes that "ACP exports increased
by 16.70%, which is higher than the raise of exports [of] Latin American banana suppliers during this
year (11%)." 151 Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama pointed out that between 1999 and 2006, ACP
banana exports to the European Communities have systematically increased by around 30 per cent. 152
On the other hand, Ecuador's exports towards th e European Communities have increased by more
than 25 per cent during the same period.153
2.58 The European Communities also argues that its 2006 banana import regime has allowed new
market access opportunities, since new developing c ountries such as Brazil, Guatemala and Peru have
started to increase their exports to the European Communities. 154 Also, countries like Bolivia,

141 European Communities' response to question 54.
142 Ecuador's response to question 34.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid. and Exhibit ECU-10.
145 Ecuador's response to question 34.
146 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 38-39.
147 Ibid., para. 40.
148 Ibid., para. 41.
149 Ibid., para. 43.
150 Ibid. As noted by the European Communities, the increase in the quantity of bananas imported from
MFN countries in 2007, with respect to 2006, is bigger than the growth of total sales of bananas from every
origin in the European Communities during the same period. See Exhibit EC-17 and European Communities'
first written submission, para. 49.
151 Ecuador's response to question 31.
152 Ibid. See also, Exhibit ECU-9. Nicaragua and Panama response to question 104 and Exhibit N/P-3.
154 Ibid., paras. 54-55.

Thailand and Sri Lanka have started to e xport bananas to the European Communities. 155 However,
Ecuador notes that, while MFN exporters like Braz il and Peru recorded significant increases in
exports in 2006, other countries like Venezuela, Mexico and Honduras experienced important
decreases in sales to the European Communities.156
2.59 According to Ecuador, Regulation 1964/2005 has more than doubled the MFN tariff from
€75/mt to €176/mt, while also reducing by more than half the ACP out-of-quota tariff from €380/mt
to €176/mt and increasing the zero tariff quota for bananas from ACP countries from 750,000 mt to
775,000 mt.
157
5. Ecuador's banana exports to the European Communities
2.60 Ecuador is the leading MFN exporter of banan as to the European Communities. In 2006,
Ecuador exported to the European Communities 1,026,447 mt of bananas. 158 Ecuador's exports
represented 24.5 per cent of the Euro pean Communities' bananas market.159 This amount represents a
decrease from the quantity exported by Ecuador to the European Communities in 2005, which
was 1,059,269 mt.160
2.61 According to the European Communities, the d ecline in Ecuador's banana exports to the
European Communities is not related to the 176 €/mt tariff duty imposed in 2006. Difficulties faced
by Ecuador's banana industry, such as adverse cl imatic conditions (drought at the end of 2005 and
heavy rain at the beginning of 2006); the eruption of the Tungurahua volcano in August 2006; and
administrative measures introduced by the Govern ment of Ecuador, would instead explain this
decline.
161 The European Communities identified two ad ministrative measures in particular: the
Ecuadorian decree providing that the fruits should be inspected at the plantation and not at the port;
and an administrative measure which "imposed a minimum price of US$3.25 per box and obliged
exporters to pay producers via the Central Bank."162
2.62 Ecuador has responded that the volcano erupti ons affected only 108,000 mt of production,
and that the administrative measures did not affect the growth of total Ec uadorian exports in 2006. 163
Ecuadorian exports of bananas to all destin ations increased from 4,331,300 mt in 2005 to
4,402,390 mt in 2006 (an increase of 71,090 mt). 164 In recent years, Ecuador has increased banana
exports to countries such as Russia and Ukraine.165
2.63 Ecuador has also stated that, although the quantiti es of Latin American banana exports to the
European Communities increased in 2006, the total value of those exports was lower than that
registered in 2005. 166 In 2005 the value for Latin Ameri can bananas was €1,907,502 million in
comparison with that of 2006, which was €1,903,244 million. According to the calculations provided

155 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 54-55.
156 Ecuador's response to question 31.
157 Ibid.
158 Ecuador's response to question 29.
159 Exhibit EC-18, Table 16, and Ecuador response to question 29 (c).
160 This is according to the statistics provided by Ecua dor in response to question 29. According to the
statistics provided by the European Communities in Exhibit- EC 17, the amount of Ecuador exports to the
European Communities in 2005 was 1,062,735 mt and 1,027,209 mt in 2006.
161 European Communities' first written submission, para. 50.
162 Ibid., para. 50(iii)
163 Ecuador's response to question 32.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid. See also, European Communities' comments to Ecuador's response to question 32 and Exhibit
EC-23.
166 Ecuador's response to question 31.

by both parties
167, the average unit price for bananas from Ec uador increased by approximately 5.7 to
6.7 per cent in 2006, with respect to 2005, in US dollars/mt. The same prices, however, when
estimated in €/mt, decreased by 4.8 per cent over the same period.168
E. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY FINDINGS IN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Measures subject to the original proceedings
2.64 The original panel and Appellate Body pro ceedings concerned the European Communities'
common market organization for bananas, as established through Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93
(Regulation 404/93), introduced on 1 July 1993, and implemented, supplemented and amended through
subsequent European Communities' legislation, regulations and administrative measures.169
2. Panel and Appellate Body main findings in the original proceedings
2.65 With regard to the challenged European Commun ities' measures, the original panel made the
following main substantive findings:
(a) The European Communities' allocation of tariff quota shares by agreement and by
assignment to some Members not having a s ubstantial interest in supplying bananas
to the European Communities (including Nicaragua, Venezuela and certain ACP
countries in respect of traditional and non- traditional exports) but not to other
Members (such as Guatemala) and the tariff quota reallocation rules of the Bananas
Framework Agreement, were in consistent with the requirements of Article XIII:1 of
the GATT 1994.
170
(b) To the extent that the Panel had found that the European Communities had acted
inconsistently with the requirements of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, the Lomé
waiver waived that inconsistency with Ar ticle XIII:1, to the extent necessary to
permit the European Communities to allocat e shares of its banana tariff quota to
specific traditional ACP banana supplying c ountries in an amount not exceeding their
pre-1991 best-ever exports to the European Communities.171
(c) Neither the negotiation of the Bananas Fram ework Agreement and its inclusion in the
European Communities' Schedule, includi ng the Bananas Framework Agreement
tariff quota shares, nor the Agreement on Agriculture permitted the European
Communities to act inconsistently with th e requirements of Article XIII of the GATT
1994.172

167 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 29 and Exhibit EC-11.
168 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 29.
169 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 3.1 and 3.4.
170 Ibid., paras. 7.90 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) ,
paras. 7.90 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.90 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC
– Bananas III (US), paras. 7.90 and 7.399.
171 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.110 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.110 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.110 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.110 and 7.399.
172 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 7.118, 7.127 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.118, 7.127 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III
(Mexico), paras. 7.118, 7.127 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.118, 7.127 and 7.399.

(d) To the extent that the European Commun ities' preferential tariff treatment of non-
traditional ACP bananas was inconsistent with its obligations under Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994, those obligations had been waived by the Lomé waiver.173
(e) The allocation to Category B operators of 30 per cent of the licences allowing the
importation of third-country and non-traditi onal ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates
was inconsistent with the requirements of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.174
(f) The application in general of operator cate gory rules in respect of the importation of
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates, in the absence
of the application of such rules to trad itional ACP imports, and in particular the
allocation to Category B operators of 30 per cent of the licences allowing the
importation of third-country and non-traditi onal ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates,
were inconsistent with the requirements of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
175
(g) The Lomé waiver did not waive the European Communities' obligations under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 in respect of licensing procedures applied to third-
country and non-traditional ACP imports, including those related to operator category
rules.
176
(h) The application of operator category rules in respect of the importation of third-country
and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates, in the absence of the
application of such rules to traditional ACP imports, was inconsistent with the
requirements of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.177
(i) The use of activity functions in connection with the allocation of licences allowing the
importation of third-country and non-traditional ACP banana s at in-quota tariff rates
was not inconsistent with the requirements of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.178
(j) The application of activity function rules in respect of the importation of third-
country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in -quota tariff rates, in the absence of the
application of such rules to traditional ACP imports, was inconsistent with the
requirements of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.179

173 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.136 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.136 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.136 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.136 and 7.399.
174 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.182 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.182 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.182 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.182 and 7.399.
175 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.195 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.195 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.195 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.195 and 7.399.
176 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.204 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.204 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.204 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.204 and 7.399.
177 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.212 and 7.399; Panel
Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) , paras. 7.212 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US) , paras.
7.212 and 7.399.
178 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.219 and 7.399; Panel
Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.212 and 7.399.
179 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.223 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.223 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US) ,
paras. 7.223 and 7.399.

(k) The application of activity function rules in respect of the importation of third-
country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in -quota tariff rates, in the absence of the
application of such rules to traditional ACP imports, was inconsistent with the
requirements of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.
180
(l) The requirement to match European Communities import licences with Bananas
Framework Agreement export certificates was inconsistent with the requirements of
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.181
(m) The issuance of hurricane licences exclusively to European Communities producers and
producer organizations or operators incl uding or directly representing them was
inconsistent with the requirements of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.182
(n) The issuance of hurricane licences exclusively to traditional ACP producers and
producer organizations or operators incl uding or directly representing them was
inconsistent with the requirements of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.183
(o) The issuance of hurricane licences exclusively to ACP and European Communities
producers and producer organizations or opera tors including or directly representing
them was inconsistent with the requiremen ts of Article 1.3 of the Import Licensing
Agreement.184
(p) To the extent that specific aspects of th e European Communities licensing procedures
were found not to be in conformity with Articles I, III or X of the GATT 1994, an
inconsistency was necessarily also found w ith the requirements of Article 1.2 of the
Import Licensing Agreement.
185
(q) The allocation to Category B operators of 30 per cent of the licences allowing the
importation of third-country and non-traditi onal ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates
created less favourable conditions of co mpetition for like service suppliers of
Complainants' origin and was therefore inconsistent with the requirements of
Articles II and XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter
"GATS").186
(r) The allocation to ripeners of 28 per cent of the Category A and B licences allowing
the importation of third-country and non-tr aditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff
rates created less favourable conditions of competition for like service suppliers of

180 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.231 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.231 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.231 and 7.399.
181 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.241 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.241 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico) ,
paras. 7.241 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.241 and 7.399.
182 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) , paras. 7.250 and 7.399; Panel
Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.250 and 7.399.
183 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras), paras. 7.256 and 7.399.
184 Ibid., paras. 7.263 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.263 and 7.399;
Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.263 and 7.399.
185 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.271 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.271 and 7.399.
186 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 7.341, 7.353 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Mexico) , paras. 7.341, 7.353 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US) , paras. 7.341,
7.353 and 7.399.

Complainants' origin and was therefore inconsistent with the requirements of
Article XVII of the GATS.187
(s) The exemption of Category B operators of European Communities origin from the
requirement to match European Comm unities import licences with Bananas
Framework Agreement export certificates created less favourable conditions of
competition for like service suppliers of Complainants' origin and was therefore
inconsistent with the requirements of Article XVII of the GATS.188
(t) The exemption of Category B operators of ACP origin from the requirement to match
European Communities import licences w ith Bananas Framework Agreement export
certificates created less favourable conditions of competition for like service suppliers
of Complainants' origin and was therefore inconsistent with the requirements of
Article II of the GATS.189
(u) The allocation of hurricane licences exclusively to operators who include or directly
represent European Communities producer s created less favoura ble conditions of
competition for like service suppliers of Complainants' origin and was therefore
inconsistent with the requirements of Article XVII of the GATS.190
(v) The allocation of hurricane licences exclusively to operators who include or directly
represent ACP producers created less favour able conditions of competition for like
service suppliers of Complainants' origin and was therefore inconsistent with the
requirements of Article II of the GATS.191
2.66 In summary, the original panel found that the cha llenged measures were inconsistent with the
European Communities' obligations under Articl es I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994,
Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement and Articles II and XVII of the GATS.
2.67 In turn, the Appellate Body decided to:
(a) Uphold the Panel's conclusion that the Ag reement on Agriculture did not permit the
European Communities to act inconsistently with the requirements of Article XIII of
the GATT 1994;192
(b) Uphold the Panel's finding that the allo cation of tariff quota shares, whether by
agreement or by assignment, to some, but not to other, Members not having a
substantial interest in supplying bananas to the European Communities was inconsistent
with Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994;
193

187 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.368 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (US), paras. 7.368 and 7.399.
188 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.380 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (US), paras. 7.380 and 7.399.
189 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.385 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.385 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.385 and 7.399.
190 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.393 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (US), paras. 7.393 and 7.399.
191 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , paras. 7.397 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (Mexico), paras. 7.397 and 7.399; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.397 and 7.399.
192 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 158.
193 Ibid., para. 162.

(c) Uphold the Panel's finding that the tariff quota reallocation rules of the Bananas
Framework Agreement were inconsistent with Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, and to
modify the Panel's finding by concluding that the Bananas Framework Agreement
tariff quota reallocation rules were also inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2
of the GATT 1994;
194
(d) Reverse the Panel's finding that the Lomé Waiver waived any inconsistency with
Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 to the ex tent necessary to permit the European
Communities to allocate tariff quota shares to traditional ACP States;195
(e) Uphold the Panel's conclusions that the European Communities activity function rules
and the Bananas Framework Agreement export certificate requirement were
inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;196
(f) Uphold the Panel's finding that the Europ ean Communities practice with respect to
hurricane licences was inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994;197
(g) Uphold the Panel's conclusions that the allo cation to Category B operators of 30 per
cent of the licences allowing the importation of third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas at in-quota tariff rates was incons istent with Articles II and XVII of the
GATS;198
(h) Uphold the Panel's conclusions that the allocation to ripeners of a certain portion of the
Category A and B licences allowing the importation of third-country and non-
traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rate s was inconsistent with Article XVII of
the GATS; and,199
(i) Uphold the Panel's conclusions that the European Communities practice with respect to
hurricane licences was inconsistent with Articles II and XVII of the GATS.200
3. Panel findings in the first compliance proceedings
2.68 The compliance panel requested by Ecuador made the following main substantive findings:
(a) Imports from different non-substantial supplier countries were not similarly restricted
in the meaning of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. Moreover, the allocation of a
collective tariff quota for traditional ACP St ates did not approach as closely as
possible the share which these countries might be expected to obtain in the absence of
the restrictions as required by the chap eau to Article XIII: 2 of the GATT 1994.
Therefore, the reservation of the quantit y of 857,700 mt for traditional ACP imports
under the revised regime is inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the
GATT 1994.201
(b) While Members have a degree of discreti on in choosing a previous representative
period, the period 1994-1996 was not a "representative period". Accordingly, the

194 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 163.
195 Ibid., para. 188.
196 Ibid., paras. 206-207.
197 Ibid., para. 214.
198 Ibid., para. 244.
199 Ibid., para. 246.
200 Ibid., para. 248.
201 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.29.

country-specific allocations assigned by th e European Communities to Ecuador, as
well as to the other substantial suppliers, were not consistent with the requirements of
Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.202
(c) On the basis of the data offered by the European Communities, it was not
unreasonable for the European Communities to conclude that the level of 857,700 mt
for duty-free traditional ACP exports could be considered to be required by the Lomé
Convention because it appeared to be b ased on pre-1991 best-ever exports and not on
allowances for investments.203
(d) It was not reasonable for the European Comm unities to conclude that Protocol 5 of
the Lomé Convention required a collective allocation for traditional ACP suppliers.
Therefore, duty-free treatment of imports in excess of an individual ACP State's pre-
1991 best-ever export volumes was not required by Protocol 5 of the Lomé
Convention. Absent any other applicable requirement of the Lomé Convention, those
excess volumes were not covered by the Lomé waiver and the preferential tariff
thereon was therefore inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
204
(e) It was not unreasonable for the European Communities to conclude that non-
traditional ACP imports at zero tariff within the "other" category of the MFN tariff
quota was required by Article 168 of the Lomé Convention. Therefore, the violation
of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, as alleged by Ecuador, was waived by the Lomé
waiver.
205
(f) It was not unreasonable for the European Communities to conclude that including the
tariff preference of 200 Euro per mt fo r out-of-quota imports of non-traditional ACP
bananas was within the scope of what the European Communities was required to
accord to non-traditional ACP supplies by virtue of the Lomé Convention. Therefore,
the violation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, as alleged by Ecuador, was covered by
the Lomé waiver.
206
(g) Under the revised regime, Ecuador's suppliers of wholesale services were accorded de
facto less favourable treatment than European Communities/ACP suppliers of those
services in violation of Articles II and XVII of the GATS.207
(h) The criteria for acquiring "newcomer" stat us under the revised licensing procedures
accorded de facto less favourable conditions of competition, in the meaning of
Article XVII of the GATS, to Ecuador's service suppliers than to like European
Communities service suppliers.208
2.69 The compliance panel requested by Ecuador concluded that:
(a) The reservation of the quantity of 857,7 00 mt for traditional ACP imports under the
revised regime was inconsistent with paragr aphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT
1994. Additionally, the c ountry-specific allocations to Ecuador, as well as to the

202 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.50.
203 Ibid., para. 6.65.
204 Ibid., para. 6.69.
205 Ibid., para. 6.78.
206 Ibid., para. 6.80.
207 Ibid., para. 6.134.
208 Ibid., para. 6.149.

other substantial suppliers, were not consistent with the requirements of
Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.
209
(b) The level of 857,700 mt for duty-free traditiona l ACP imports could be considered to
be required by the Lomé Convention becau se it appeared to be based on pre-1991
best-ever exports and not on allowances for investments. However, it was not
reasonable for the European Communities to conclude that Protocol 5 of the Lomé
Convention required a collective allocation fo r traditional ACP suppliers. Therefore,
duty-free treatment of imports in excess of an individual ACP State's pre-1991 best-
ever export volumes was not required by Protocol 5 of the Lomé Convention.
Accordingly, absent any other applicable re quirement of the Lomé Convention, those
excess volumes were not covered by the Lomé waiver and the preferential tariff
thereon was therefore inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.210
(c) In respect of preferences for non-traditional ACP imports, it was not unreasonable for
the European Communities to conclude that (i) non-traditional ACP imports at zero
tariff within the "other" category of the tariff quota and (ii) the tariff preference of
200 €/mt for out-of-quota imports, were required by Article 168 of the Lomé
Convention. Therefore, the violations of Article I:1 of the GATT 1 994, as alleged by
Ecuador in respect of preferences for n on-traditional ACP imports , were covered by
the Lomé waiver.211
(d) Under the revised regime, Ecuador's suppliers of wholesale services were accorded
de facto less favourable treatment in respect of licence allocation than European
Communities/ACP suppliers of those services in violation of Articles II and XVII of
the GATS.212
(e) The criteria for acquiring "newcomer" stat us under the revised licensing procedures
accorded to Ecuador's service suppliers de facto less favourable conditions of
competition than to like European Commun ities service suppliers in violation of
Article XVII of the GATS.213
2.70 In its report, pursuant to the request ma de by Ecuador, the compliance panel found
appropriate to make suggestions on how the Eur opean Communities could br ing its banana import
regime into conformity with WTO rules. In the panel's view, the European Communities had at least
the following options:
"6.156. First, the European Communities could choose to implement a tariff-only
system for bananas, without a tariff quota. This could include a tariff preference (at
zero or another preferential rate) for ACP bananas. If so, a waiver for the tariff
preference may be necessary unless the need for a waiver is obviated, for example, by
the creation of a free-trade area consistent with Article XXIV of GATT. This option
would avoid the need to seek agreement on tariff quota shares.
Second, the European Communities could choose to implement a tariff-only system
for bananas, with a tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by a suitable waiver.

209 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.160.
210 Ibid., para. 6.161.
211 Ibid., para. 6.162.
212 Ibid., para. 6.163.
213 Ibid.

Third, the European Communities could ma intain its current bound and autonomous
MFN tariff quotas, either without allocati ng any country-specific shares or allocating
such shares by agreement with all subs tantial suppliers cons istently with the
requirements of the chapeau to Article XIII:2. The MFN tariff quota could be
combined with the extension of duty-free tr eatment (or preferential duties) to ACP
imports. In respect of such duty-free treatment, the European Communities could
consider with the ACP States whether the Lo mé Convention can be read to "require"
such treatment within the meaning of the Lomé waiver. We recall that some
important preferences found by the original panel and Appellate Body reports to be
required by the Lomé Convention cannot be implemented consistently with WTO
rules (the most important being the quantitativ e protections foreseen in Protocol 5).
If such a view of the Lomé Convention is challenged, a waiver covering such duty-
free treatment could be sought. The MFN ta riff quota could also be combined with a
tariff quota for ACP imports, whether traditional or not, provided an appropriate
waiver of Article XIII is obtained. We note that waivers for duty-free treatment for
developing country exports have been gr anted on several occasions by Members.
214
In this context, some action may be required soon in respect of the Lomé waiver since
it expires on 29 February 2000."215
F. MEASURES CHALLENGED BY ECUADOR IN THIS DISPUTE
2.71 The measures challenged by Ecuador through this recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU are the
following:
(a) The tariff quota, with a current volume of 775,000 mt, which allows bananas of ACP
origin to enter the European Communities market duty-free; and,
(b) The European Communities' tariff, curren tly set at €176/mt, which applies to all
European Communities imports of banan as, except those benefiting from access to
the zero-duty TRQ.216
2.72 These measures are contained in the Council Regulation (EC) 1964/2005 (hereinafter
"Regulation 1964") 217 and its associated implementing re gulations, including the European
Communities' autonomous tariff provisions.218
G. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
2.73 Pursuant to Article 12.11 of the DSU:
"[W]here one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's
report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant
provisions on differential and more-favour able treatment for developing country

214 ( footnote original ) See WT/L/104 (United States – Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act);
WT/L/183 (United States – Former Trust Territory of th e Pacific Islands); WT/L/184 (United States - Andean
Trade Preferences Act); WT/L/185 (Canada – CARICAN).
215 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), paras. 6.156-6.158.
216 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for the Establishment of a Panel
(WT/DS27/80) 26 February 2007, p. 4. See also, Ecuador's first submission, para. 21.
217 Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 on
the tariff rate for bananas, Official Journal of the European Union, 2 December 2005, L 316/1.
218 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for the Establishment of a Panel
(WT/DS27/80) 26 February 2007, p. 4. See also, Ecuador's first submission, para. 21.

Members that form part of the covered ag reements which have been raised by the
developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures."
2.74 In addition, the DSU provides in Article 12.10 that:
"[I]n examining a complaint against a de veloping country Member, the panel shall
accord sufficient time for the developing c ountry Member to prepare and present its
argumentation."
2.75 The Panel notes that Ecuador is a developing co untry Member. However, in the course of
these Panel proceedings Ecuador did not raise an y specific provisions on differential and more-
favourable treatment for developing country Member s that would require additional consideration,
nor do we find that these specialized provisions are relevant for the resolutio n of the specific matter
brought before this Panel.
2.76 In any event, during the Panel proceedings, the Panel took into account the complainant's
status as a developing country Member when preparing and revising the timetable for the proceedings.
The Panel also took into account the complainant's status as a developing country Member, and its
interest in a prompt decision, when considering the European Communities' repeated requests for the
proceedings to be delayed.
III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Ecuador has requested that the Panel find th at the European Communities has failed to
implement the rulings and recommendations of the DSB in the original dispute and continues to be in
breach of its obligations as a WTO Member. More specifically, Ecuador has requested that the Panel
find that the EC measures are inconsistent with the following obligations contained in the WTO
agreements:
(a) Article I of the GATT 1994, because the European Communities applies different and
more favourable duties to bananas originati ng in ACP countries than those applied to
bananas originating in Ecuador and most or all other WTO members;
(b) Article II of the GATT 1994, because the European Communities applies a tariff
(currently €176/mt) on the import of banan as originating in Ecuador (and other WTO
Members) that is above the EC bound rate of duty under Article II, which is €75/mt;
and,
(c) Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994, because the European Communities
continues to provide a tariff rate quota syst em reserved exclusively for bananas of
ACP origin, while Ecuador is denied any share of the preferential quota, let alone the
share to which it is entitled under Article XIII.
3.2 The European Communities raises two preliminar y issues. First, the European Communities
argues that Ecuador should not be allowed to ch allenge the European Communities' current import
regime for bananas, including the preference for ACP countries. The European Communities
contends that the Understanding on Bananas, si gned by Ecuador and the European Communities in
April 2001 (Bananas Understanding)
219, is a mutually agreed solution to the banana dispute. 220

219 See Understanding on Bananas between the EC and Ecuador of 30 April 2001, in EC – Bananas III,
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001; and EC – Bananas III , Understanding
on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001.
220 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 61-65. See also European Communities'
second written submission, paras. 7-18.

The European Communities adds that, even if it wa s to be assumed that the Bananas Understanding is
not a "mutually agreed solution" for purposes of the DSU, it would still constitute a bilateral
agreement that must be taken into consideration in analysing the rights and obligations of the parties
to this dispute.221
3.3 As a second preliminary issue, the European Communities argues that Ecuador's complaint
against the Cotonou Preference under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 should be rejected, because in
effect Ecuador is challenging a suggestion made by the first compliance panel requested by
Ecuador.222 According to the European Communities, such suggestion can be challenged only
through recourse to appellate review, but not through a compliance panel.223
3.4 The European Communities has not made any sp ecific arguments to contest Ecuador's claim
that the preference granted to bananas of ACP orig in would be inconsistent with Article I of the
GATT 1994. 224 The European Communities argues, however , that this preference is covered by a
waiver from Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Doha Waiver. 225 According to the European
Communities, the duration of that waiver is not li nked to the number of arbitrations lost by the
European Communities, but rather depends on wh ether the new import regime for bananas it
introduced on 1 January 2006 at least maintains total market access for MFN suppliers.226
3.5 As regards Ecuador's claim under Article XIII of the GATT 1994, in addition to its second
preliminary objection, the European Communities requ ests the Panel to reject Ecuador's claims in
regard to both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII, arguing in part that its current banana import regime
cannot violate both Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 at the same time.
3.6 Finally, the European Communities responds th at Ecuador's claims under Article II of the
GATT 1994 are "completely unfounded"227 because:
"[T]he bound tariff for bananas in the 'GATT schedule of concessions' of the
European Communities is €680 per ton and the tariff applied since January 1, 2006 is
€176 per ton".228
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1 The arguments presented by the parties in thei r written submissions and oral statements are
reflected below. 229 The parties' answers to questions and comments on each other's responses are
reproduced in Annex D to this report.

221 Final written version of the European Communities' closing oral statement at the substantive
meeting of the Panel with the parties and third parties, para. 4.
222 See European Communities' first written submission, paras. 79-86.
223 See European Communities' second written submission, paras. 19-35.
224 European Communities' response to panel question No. 61, para. 125. See also, Ecuador's second
written submission, para. 16; and written version of Ecua dor's oral statement during substantive meeting with
the parties and third parties, para. 34.
225 Ministerial Conference, Europe an Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision
of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001.
226 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 67 and 69.
227 Ibid., para. 112.
228 Ibid.
229 The summaries of the parties' arguments are ba sed on the executive summaries submitted to the
Panel by the parties. All footnotes in this section are original, unless otherwise specified.

A. ECUADOR
1. First written submission of Ecuador
(a) The measures of the European Communities that are subject to this challenge
4.2 In this submission, the Government of Ecuador is challenging the conformity with Articles I,
II and XIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) of certain measures
taken by the European Communities to conform with the rulings and recommendations of this Panel
in its Report on , 22 May 1997, WT/DS27/R/ECU (hereinafter "Pan el Report"), as modified by the Appellate
Body in its Report on , 9 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R (hereinafter "Appellate Body Report").
230
4.3 The challenged EC measures are containe d in EC Council Regulation No. 1964/2005
("Regulation 1964") 231 and its associated implementing regulations, including the European
Communities' autonomous tariff provisions. These measures include:
• A tariff-rate quota, with a current volume of 775,000 mt, exclusively reserved for bananas
of ACP origin. Bananas of ACP origin enter the EC duty-free up to a quantity of
775,000 mt, while bananas of Ecuadorian origin and any other non-ACP origin, as well
as ACP origin bananas in excess of 775,000 mt are currently charged a duty of €176/mt.
Ecuador does not get any share of this ta riff-rate quota, let alone receive the share
required under Article XIII, as confirmed by pr ior rulings of the Panel, the Appellate
Body, and the previous Article 21.5 Panel.
• The European Communities applies a tariff at €176/mt to EC imports of bananas of
Ecuadorian origin and to all other bananas except those bananas of ACP origin that are
favourably treated as described above.
4.4 The measures at issue in this dispute are similar to, but far less complex than, those
considered by the Panel a nd the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III and by the Article 21.5 Panel in
1999. The original EC regime, and the revised regi me considered (and found inconsistent with the
European Communities' obligations) in those pro ceedings involved two tariff rate quotas, separate
country allocation regimes, and complex import lic ensing measures. The current measures involve
only a single tariff-rate quota that is reserved en tirely for ACP countries and from which Ecuador and
other countries are excluded, and a tariff applie d above the European Communities' bound rate to
bananas from Ecuador as well as to all other bananas not benefiting from the zero duty tariff quota.

230 At the DSB meeting of 20 March 2007, the EC ar gued that Article 21.5 does not apply to this
dispute because the EC considered that its current banana regime is not taken to comply with the prior DSB
rulings and recommendations, which the EC said had been "implemented" in 2001. Dispute Settlement Body -
Minutes of Meeting of 20 March 2007, WT/DSB/M/228, 2 May 2007. Article 21.5 contains no time limitation
on when its procedures may be invoked, and the adm ittedly long period of time since the prior invocation of
Article 21.5 is, in this case, readily explained by the Agreements reached by the Parties in 2001, and supported
by the waivers granted that same year. In effect, the Agreement allowed the EC a prolonged period to phase in a
system that would remove the inconsistencies with th e WTO found by successive DSB rulings, with the cover
of appropriate waivers for the temporary and conditional phase-in period in which the EC measures would
continue not to conform with its obligations. This agreement does not cut off Ecuador's right to invoke
Article 21.5 when Ecuador consider s that the European Communities' re placement measures have failed to
achieve the conformity from which the EC was excused on a conditional and time-limited basis. Ecuador
reserves the right to comment further if the EC pursues this argument.
231 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005, Official Journal of the European
Union of 2 December 2005, L 316/1 on the tariff rates for bananas.

4.5 As discussed below, the simplification of the EC measures has not remedied the inconsistency
with WTO obligations and the discrimination against non-ACP bananas.
(b) The EC measures are inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(i) Tariff preferences contrary to Article I
4.6 Article I:1 of the GATT provides, in part:
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation ..., any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
4.7 The EC banana tariff preferences, while less complex than those examined in EC – Bananas
III and by the first Article 21.5 Panel, neverthel ess are plainly inconsistent with the European
Communities' obligations under Article I of the GATT 1994, in according tariff preferences to
bananas of ACP origin that are not accorded to bananas originating in Ecuador or other non-ACP
countries. There is no dispute that all bananas ar e like products, nor that the European Communities
accords bananas of ACP origin duty-free treatment up to the 775,000 mt tariff quota, while bananas of
Ecuadorian origin (as well as other bananas not be nefiting from the duty-free tariff quota) are subject
to a duty of €176/mt. Absent some applicable ex ception or waiver, it could not seriously be asserted
that Article I permits a WTO member to grant a duty preference limited to one group of WTO
members, and excluding others.
4.8 In WTO discussions, the European Communities has argued that the tariff discrimination was
justified by the waiver that the European Co mmunities was granted in 2001 at the ministerial
conference.
232 The burden is on the European Communities if it wishes to claim that it still has a valid
waiver with respect to bananas, a nd that this waiver covers the EC measures at issue. Ecuador notes
that, even if the burden were on Ecuador to prove the lack of an applicable waiver, the record is clear
in this matter. The European Communities failed to meet the conditions of the Article I waiver for it
to continue past 1 January 2006. The European Communities was supposed to have withdrawn its
prior banana concessions and, observing Article XXVIII requirements and procedures, to have
rebound its banana duty at a level meeting the sta ndards expressed in the waiver. Notably, the
European Communities had two opportunities to satis fy an arbitrator, under the conditions of the
waiver, that the level at which it proposed to rebind its banana duty would meet the standards of the
waiver. The European Communities failed in both opportunities. In 2005, the European
Communities twice proposed a new MFN rate for ba nanas that was, in each case, challenged by
substantial suppliers and reject ed by Arbitrators as not meeting the standards of the Article I
waiver.233 The European Communities, nevertheless, proceeded to impose a new MFN duty at

232 European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement , WT/MIN(01)/15, 14 November
2001.
233 European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement , WT/MIN(01)/15, 14 November
2001. The Article I Waiver included an Annex on bananas requiring that the European Communities' future
tariff-only regime "result in at l east maintaining total mark et access for MFN banana suppliers," taking into
account "all EC WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas..." In the event of disagreement over
whether the proposed regime met the conditions of the Annex, the Annex provided for arbitration. If the EC
was found by the Arbitrator twice to have failed to sa tisfy the terms of the Annex standard, the waiver of
Article I with respect to bananas would expire. Id at Annex, tirets 3 and 4.

€176/mt, with a tariff rate quota for ACP countries at a zero duty for 775,000mt., notwithstanding the
termination of the Article I waiver with respect to bananas.
234
4.9 The waiver did not and does not give the Eu ropean Communities the opportunity to keep
proposing duties that it considers appropriate, while continuing to apply GATT-inconsistent measures
on bananas. The European Communities in fact has met none of the conditions required for
continuation of the waiver for bananas under Article I past 1 January 2006. Should the European
Communities claim otherwise, Ecuador reserves the right to respond.
(ii) Allocation of Tariff Rate Quota contrary to Article XIII
4.10 As the original Panel 235 found, and the Appellate Body 236 affirmed in EC – Bananas III , and
as again affirmed in the first Article 21.5 Panel, 237 Article XIII of the GATT applies to tariff-rate
quotas as well as other quotas. The European Commun ities was granted a conditional waiver of its
obligations under Article XIII, but this waiver expired by its own terms on 31 December 2005. 238
Notwithstanding the expiration of that waiver, th e European Communities now imposes a tariff rate
quota on bananas in which only ACP countries have access to the duty free quota, while Ecuador and
all other countries are excluded from that quota.
4.11 The EC measures are inconsistent with Article XIII:1 in that Ecuadorian (and other non-ACP)
bananas cannot be considered "similarly restricted " in comparison to ACP bananas, when Ecuadorian
(and other non-ACP) bananas are simply excluded from access to the duty free tariff quota.239
4.12 The EC measures are also inconsistent with Article XIII:2. The Panel in EC – Bananas III
noted the general rule that, if Members apply quotas to a product, then, in the terms of the chapeau to
Article XIII:2, "Members shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as
possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such
restrictions".240 This interpretation, not surprisingly, was al so affirmed by the Appellate Body in that
case.241
4.13 Though the EC system has eliminated the count ry allocations that previously existed as
between non-ACP countries, the discrimination remains as between ACP and non-ACP bananas. The
Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III vigorously condemned this discrimination.242
4.14 The allocation of the duty free quota exclusively to ACP countries bears no relation to trading
patterns in the world or EC markets. As it was sh own in the charts submitted by Ecuador on 6 July
2006, Ecuador is a pre-eminent e xporter of bananas to the world market. Further, Ecuador and
several other countries that are excluded from the zer o duty quota, are substantial suppliers to the
European Communities, while ACP countries, many of whom are minor suppliers at best, are allowed
to ship duty free under the tariff quota.

234 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement , para. 94; Award of the
Arbitrator, EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement II, para. 127.
235 Panel Report at para. 7.68.
237 Panel Report at para. 6.160.
238 European Communities – Trans itional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on
Imports of Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16, 14 November 2001, para. 7.
240 Panel Report at para. 7.68.
242 Appellate Body Report at paras. 190 and 191.

(iii) Applied duty of €176/mt contrary to EC binding under Article II
4.15 The EC duty on bananas was not previously subject to challenge, except for its discriminatory
aspect. However, in replacing its previous measure s with a tariff-rate quota with a single duty rate
applicable to bananas not benefiting from the zer o duty tariff-rate quota, the European Communities
has breached its tariff binding on bananas. Th e EC tariff on bananas (HTS 0803.00.12) remains
bound in the EC GATT schedule of concessions (Sche dule CXL of the EC – 15) at a level of €75/mt,
subject to the annexed Agreement on Bananas, wh ich elaborates the tariff rate quota regime.
Article II of the GATT forbids imposition of duties in excess of bound rates in a schedule.
4.16 The inconsistency with other GATT provisions of the Agreement annexed to the EC bananas
concession does not release the European Comm unities from its binding nor does it entitle the
European Communities unilaterally to determine to apply a duty well in excess of the bound rate,
which was not itself found inconsistent with EC obligations. Article II does not contain any such
exception, nor has the European Communities followed provisions of Article XXVIII to withdraw its
concessions. Accordingly, the EC applied duty of €176/mt must be held inconsistent with the
European Communities' obligations under Artic le II of the GATT and the EC Schedule of
Concessions.
(c) Conclusion
4.17 For the reasons set forth above, the EC measur es taken to conform with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB in EC – Bananas III do not comply with the European Communities'
obligations under the WTO. Ecuador, a developi ng country, continues to be deprived of the
competitive opportunities in the EC market to whic h Ecuador is entitled as a WTO Member. Neither
the factual nor legal issues are complex in this dispute. Ecuador asks that the Panel proceed fairly and
promptly to its decisions, as called for under Article 21.5.
2. Second written submission of Ecuador
(a) Argument
(i) The EC-Ecuador Understanding on Bananas is not a bar to this Article 21.5 proceeding
4.18 The European Communities argues as a "preliminar y matter" that Ecuador's claims in this
Article 21.5 proceeding should all be dismissed because the European Communities considers that:
the Ecuador-EC "Understanding on Bananas" 243 constitutes "a mutually agreed solution" in the sense
of Article 3 of the DSU in 2001; 244 the solution contemplated a preference for ACP bananas; and
Ecuador's challenge to the preferences now gr anted by the European Communities constitutes
"question[ing] a mutually agreed solution";245 which "goes against" Article 3.7 and 3.10, of the DSU.
4.19 The European Communities' argument must be rejected on several independent grounds.
First, even if the Understanding on Bananas we re considered a "mutually agreed solution",
Articles 3.7 and 3.10 do not preclude a dispute settlement challenge to any measures.

243 See European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas –
Understanding on Bananas between the European Communities and Ecuador , WT/DS27/60, 9 July 2001 ("EC
– Ecuador Understanding").
244 European Communities' first written submission, at para. 64.
245 European Communities' first written submission, at para. 64.

4.20 Second, the Understanding on Bananas might have turned out to be "a mutually accepted
solution," but unfortunately, the European Communiti es did not comply with the requirements of the
last phase of the Agreement. A mutually agreed solution is not a solution without compliance.
4.21 Third, Article 3.7 provides that the solution to be "preferred" is not merely "mutually
accepted" but also "consistent with the covered agreem ents." That is consistent with the requirement
in Article 3.5 that "[a]ll solutions to matters fo rmally raised under the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements ... shall be consistent with those agreements ..."
4.22 Fourth, Ecuador does not agree that the EC measures at issue are covered by the Doha
Waiver. The Understanding did not commit Ecuador to accept whatever preferences or "tariff only"
scheme that the European Communities might decide to apply as of 1 January 2006, regardless of
whether the measures were covered by the waiver or conformed with the European Communities'
obligations under the WTO Agreement.
4.23 In this proceeding, Ecuador is challenging the c onformity of EC measures with the European
Communities' obligations under the WTO Agreemen t. The European Communities cannot claim
immunity from this challenge of its measures b ecause it alleges that the challenged measures fell
within what the European Communities unilatera lly conceives to be its rights and Ecuador's
obligations under the Understanding.
4.24 For each and all of the above reasons, the Eu ropean Communities' "preliminary" challenge
should be dismissed.
(ii) The EC tariff preferences infringe Article I and are not covered by the Doha Waiver
4.25 The European Communities does not contest that it grants preferences that are contrary to
Article I, but argues that the preferences it grants to bananas of ACP origin are covered by the Doha
Waiver through 31 December 2007. The essence of the dispute under Article I is that Ecuador
considers that the Doha Waiver of Article I for ba nanas expired following the Arbitrator's rejection of
both of the tariff rebinding proposals made by the European Communities. while the European
Communities, in effect, contends that the waiver allowed it to implement unilaterally a third regime
(or any other regime) that the European Commun ities considers to meet the standard that the
"envisaged rebinding would result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana
suppliers, taking into account the EC's commitments".
246 The European Communities then argues that
its current applied regime meets that standard as the European Communities conceives it. The
European Communities concedes that it has not rebound its duties or fulfilled the requirements with
respect to Article XXVIII as also required by the waiver, but the European Communities claims that
this is a matter of "good faith" out of deference to the views of Ecuador.
4.26 The European Communities' arguments should be rejected. In accordance with the Doha
Waiver, having failed in its two opportunities to e nvisage a tariff rebinding that would meet the
waiver standard, the European Communities cannot cl aim the protection of the waiver for the system
it then established unilaterally. Ecuador does not cons ider that the current EC banana measures, had
they been proposed as the second EC proposal prior to 2006, would have been found to meet the
requirements of the waiver. However, that is irreleva nt to the task of this Panel, because, the terms of
the waiver did not grant the EC banana regime the continued protection of the waiver for this or any
other regime it might establish unilaterally.

246 Doha Waiver Annex, fourth tiret.

4.27 Applying the principles of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention247, it is apparent that
the European Communities' argument is not suppor ted by the terms of the waiver, read in their
context and in light of the object and purpose of the WTO and this waiver.
4.28 The European Communities has not disputed that the Arbitrator found that both the European
Communities' initial "envisaged rebinding" and the Eu ropean Communities' proposed "rectification,"
did not meet the standards of the waiver.
4.29 Nevertheless, the European Communities proceeded , effective 1 January 2006, unilaterally to
institute the measures that are the subject of Ec uador's present challenge, without withdrawing the
existing binding or binding the new system, with a duty of €176/mt, and a tariff quota of 775,000 mt
at a zero duty, available exclusively to bananas of ACP origin.
4.30 The Doha Waiver of Article I expired on 1 January 2006, following the Arbitrator's
determinations that neither the initial nor the se cond "envisaged rebinding" met the requirements of
the waiver. The second arbitration award explicitly found that the European Communities had "failed
to rectify the matter." The terms of the fifth tiret explicitly provide that following the second
arbitration award:
"If the EC has failed to rectif y the matter, this waiver sha ll cease to apply to bananas
upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime."248
This sentence, in the context of the waiver, can onl y mean that the Arbitrator having found that the
European Communities had failed to rectify the matter, the waiver ceased to apply on 1 January 2006,
when the current EC measures entered into force.
4.31 The European Communities' arguments to the cont rary are unpersuasive. First, the European
Communities argues that Ecuador's interpretati on of the waiver "would lead to unreasonable
conclusions". On the contrary, it would de-stabili ze the entire premise of the WTO tariff system if
concessions were to be adjusted according to whet her the concessions had the result contemplated at
the time that the concession was granted. The term s of the Doha Waiver itself refute the European
Communities' argument. The waiver makes explic it that the Arbitrator had to assess the European
Communities' "envisaged rebindings" to determine whet her they met the "at least maintain" standard
before the European Communities would be permitted to implement the envisaged rebinding and
therefore obviously before it could be known base d on experience what the actual effect of the
rebinding would be.
4.32 The European Communities argues th at the reference to having "failed to rectify the matter"
in the fifth tiret means that the European Communities was "obliged to introduce a new import regime
that would maintain total mark et access for MFN suppliers in reality and not in theory", and that the
assessment as to whether this standard is met can onl y be determined "based on an analysis of the real
effects of the new import regime on the banana market". 249 The European Communities does not
explain how such a detailed rule for its conduct could be derived from those four words of that
sentence. The logical reading is that the refere nce to failure to rectify the matter is precisely a
reference to the European Communities having faile d a second time to establ ish a proper rebinding.
Had the WTO Members wished to establish the rule that the European Communities struggles to
extract from these words, the waiver could simply have provided that the European Communities
could institute the system of its choosing, provided that it at least preserved access for MFN suppliers.

247 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
248 Doha Waiver Annex, fifth tiret.
249 European Communities' first written submission, at para. 70.

4.33 The European Communities goes on to argue that the provision of the fifth tiret that the
waiver ceases to apply "upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime" should be interpreted to
mean that:
"The Doha Waiver would cease to a pply only if the European Communities
implemented the exact import regime analy zed by the Arbitrator and found not to
satisfy the standard of the Doha Waiver. If the European comm unities introduced a
different import regime... and that import regime did indeed maintain the total market
access of the MFN suppliers, then the Doha Waiver would continue to apply."
250
4.34 The plain language of that sentence, even view ed in isolation, does not support the European
Communities' view that "the new tariff regime" means only the exact regime that was disapproved by
the Arbitrator may not be implemented. To the c ontrary, the measures examined by the Arbitrator are
never referred to by the term "the new tariff regi me". The matter examined by the Arbitrator is
described as "the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas," 251 or, in shorthand as "the
rebinding", while the second arbitration simply re fers to a determination "whether the European
Communities has rectified the matter". 252 "The new tariff regime" is not even the same term as the
"EC tariff only regime," which is the term used in th e first and fifth tirets when the waiver is referring
to a regime that has met or will have met the waiv er requirements for a tariff only system that will
continue to benefit from the waiver, i.e. one that is tariff only, with a tariff level that either has been
agreed upon by interested parties or has been approved by the Arbitrator applying the waiver
standard.
4.35 The structure, context and object of the waiver also supports Ecuador's understanding of the
waiver and conflicts with that of the European Communities. First, both the first tiret of the Annex, as
well as the last sentence of the last tiret, clearly re quire as a condition of the waiver that the processes
be concluded and the agreed upon or approved tariff-only system be in place by 1 January 2006.
Second, the creation of special and expedited di spute settlement procedures show both that WTO
members wanted to ensure that the European Communities was not free to act unilaterally, and that
the WTO members wanted a dispute settlement system that would provide results quickly, in keeping
with the requirement that there would be cer tainty whether the European Communities had
established a system meeting the standards of the wa iver by 1 January 2006, an essential prerequisite
for the waiver of Article I for bananas to continue past that date.
4.36 The penultimate clause of the prea mble to the Doha Waiver s upports Ecuador's interpretation
of the Annex, explicitly noting that the Parti es to the Cotonou Agreement "accept a multilateral
control on the implementation" of the commitmen t to at least maintain market access for MFN
suppliers of bananas.253
4.37 By contrast, the European Communities' interpretation would make a nullity of most of the
provisions of the Doha Waiver's Annex. The di spute settlement provisions would provide no control
over European Communities' unilateral actions becau se the only consequence of a negative finding of
the Arbitrator would be to preclude the preci se scheme that was ruled on. The European
Communities could then apply whatever scheme it unilaterally chose (other than the two that had been
found to fail the standard) and maintain the waiver , subject to possible challenge under the relatively
lengthy dispute settlement processes of the DSU, with the European Communities enjoying the
benefit of an undeserved waiver all the time that the dispute settlement processes were pending.
Furthermore, a successful challenge would lik ely result only in the European Communities

250 European Communities' first written submission, at para. 71.
253 Doha Waiver, at 2.

unilaterally imposing yet another non-compliant regi me that would have to be taken through dispute
settlement processes again – in short, precisely the so rt of endless pattern of non-compliance that the
waiver was intended finally to stop.
4.38 The European Communities also failed to meet other requirements of the Doha Waiver. The
European Communities has not concluded the Artic le XXVIII process, nor has it withdrawn its prior
bindings and rebound at a new level.
(iii) Allocation of Tariff Rate Quota is contrary to Article XIII
4.39 The European Communities does not contest that it applies a zero duty tariff quota of 775,000
mt exclusively open to bananas of ACP origin. As Ecuador explained in its first submission, such a
tariff quota is a patent violation of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, in that Ecuador (and other MFN
suppliers) are restricted from an y duty free access to the EC mark et, while ACP bananas are not
similarly restricted. The EC measures infringe Artic le XIII:2, in that the allocation of the duty free
tariff quota exclusively to bananas of ACP origin, wh ile Ecuador and most of the rest of the world's
largest suppliers are excluded, in no sense could be considered to result in shares of the duty-free
quota that approached what Ecuador and other me mbers could expect to obtain in absence of
restrictions on duty free access.
4.40 The European Communities, in its first submi ssion, attempts various defenses, all without
merit.
The European Communities' preliminary issue on Article XIII
4.41 First, the European Communities argues as anot her "preliminary issue" that the tariff quota
without an Article XIII waiver is implementi ng the suggestion of the Article 21.5 Panel in EC –
Bananas III that the European Communities could "implement a tariff only system for bananas, with a
tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by a suitable waiver." 254 The European Communities then
asserts that, in its view, the reference to a "suitabl e waiver" meant only a waiver of Article I, because
the Panel did not explici tly say that the suitable waiver woul d include a waiver of Article XIII,
whereas an alternative suggestion of the Panel did explicitly refer to a waiver of Article XIII.
4.42 The European Communities did in fact obtai n a waiver of Article XIII which applied
exclusively to the tariff quota limited to bananas of ACP origin, and which expired on 31 December
2005. Further, in its second award, the Arbitrator , in agreeing to consider the tariff quota for ACP
countries along with the envisaged rebinding of €187 /mt, noted that the European Communities "also
intends to seek a waiver of its obligations under Article XIII of GATT 1994 to implement its proposed
tariff quota," and that the European Communities had applied for such a waiver.255
4.43 The European Communities also ignores the findings of EC – Bananas III with regard to
Article XIII. The Appellate Body sustained the Pa nel finding that "Articles I:1 and XIII apply to the
relevant EC regulations, irrespective if there is one or more 'separate regimes' for the importation of
bananas."256 When the European Communities atte mpted to preserve a tariff quota reserved
exclusively for bananas of ACP origin, the first Article 21.5 Panel in EC – Bananas III again found

254 European Communities' first written submission, at para. 79 (quoting Panel Report , – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Ecuador, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 Apr. 1999, at para. 6.157).
256 Ibid., at para. 191.

that the EC measure was inc onsistent with the European Communities' obligations under
Article XIII.
257
4.44 The European Communities then goes on to cont end that "claims challenging the consistency
with the covered agreements of the measures suggested by the Panel cannot be brought before an
Article 21.5 Panel," because this would be contrary to the principle of res judicata that the European
Communities says is embodied in Article 19.1 of the DSU (permitting panels to make suggestions)
and of Article 17.14 (dealing with a doption of Appellate Body reports). 258 The European
Communities is wrong on all counts. The Panel neve r suggested or even implied that the European
Communities would not require a waiver of Article XIII to implement a tariff quota reserved for ACP
countries. Further, none of the provisions of th e DSU would have precluded this challenge of the
conformity of the European Communities' measures ta ken to comply with the Panel Report, even if
the particular measures had been suggested by the Panel. Finally, it is not necessary to challenge
before the Appellate Body the suggestions of a pa nel in order to preserve the right to make a
challenge under Article 21.5.
The absence of nullification or impairment
4.45 The European Communities next contends that its tariff quota does not cause nullification or
impairment to Ecuador by limiting the quantity of duty free bananas of ACP origin that may be
imported into the EC market. The European Comm unities, however, completely misses the point.
The violation of Article XIII is the denial of Ecuador's right to participate in the zero-duty quota. It is
obvious that, if allowed to participate in that qu ota, Ecuador could reasonably expect to benefit
substantially, based on its efficiency and large shar e of world trade in bananas. The issue is not
whether the quota results in less harm than an unr estricted preference for ACP countries, but rather
the harm that Ecuador suffers by reason of being excluded from the favourable quota.
The European Communities' erroneous interpretation of Article XIII
4.46 The European Communities, in its first submissi on, goes on at great length in its effort to
defend itself based on a series of false premises, most of which relate to the European Communities'
contention that Ecuador is not restricted by the European Communities' tariff quota because Ecuador
is excluded from that quota and therefore, in the European Communities' view "not subject to any
quantitative restrictions."259 This is patently false and turns on its head what is restricted by a quota or
a tariff quota. The restricted products are those th at are denied access, outside the preferential tariff
quota. A zero share of the preferential quota is a worse violation of Article XIII than a
disproportionately small share.
4.47 The European Communities' argument that Article XIII:2 does not apply fails for similar
reasons. The European Communities contends that Ec uador is not subject to restrictions other than
the tariff, and therefore cannot complain about rul es that apply when "applying import restrictions."
To the contrary, the European Communities' tariff quota does apply restrictions – total exclusion –
from access under the tariff quota, and it obviously does so inconsistently with Article XIII:2, as
explained in Ecuador's first submission.

257 Panel Report, – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 Apr. 1999, at para. 6.29.
258 European Communities' first written submission, para. 85.
259 Ibid., para. 98.

4.48 The US – Line Pipe Panel did not hold otherwise. 260 The Panel found that the US quota
allocation system favoured small over large exporters by allocating identical shares of low duty quota
to countries with different shares of the world and US markets.261
(iv) Breach of tariff bindings under Article II
4.49 Ecuador demonstrated in its first submission th at the EC duty of €176/mt applied to all
bananas originating in Ecuador or other MFN count ries was in breach of the EC binding duty of
€75/mt, as contained in Schedule CXL. In its first submission, the European Communities defends its
applied tariff level on two grounds, both unfounded. The European Communities argues that:
"(1) The European Communities no longer has a binding at €75/mt for any
quantity of bananas because the European Communities now contends that that bound
tariff quota expired on 31 December 2002, under the terms of the Framework
Agreement on Bananas ('BFA')262, leaving in effect only the upper level binding at the
essentially prohibitive level of €680/mt duty; and
(2) Even if the €75/mt concession did not expire with the termination of the
BFA, that duty concession 'automatically' di sappeared with the elimination of the
Tariff quota of 2.2 million mt to which it was 'attached'."
The European Communities' GATT binding at €75/mt was not limited in time by the
Framework Agreement on Bananas
4.50 The EC Uruguay Round schedule for its tariff quota provides for an initial and final
concession of €75/mt for a quantity of 2.2 million mt, as provided in columns 3 and 4 of the schedule.
under column 7 – "other terms and conditions" – it states "[a]s indicated in the Annex". The Annex
simply sets out the BFA, which provides for matters such as the allocation of quotas, allocation of
shortfalls in the quota shares, and management of the tariff quotas, by licensing and export
certificates. Many, if not all of these terms of the BFA were found inconsistent with the European
Communities' obligations and became moot or were superseded as a result of the EC – Bananas III
rulings and of the actions that the European Communities agreed to undertake in the Understanding
on Bananas and under the terms of the Doha Waiver.
4.51 The European Communities' first argument is based on the European Communities' new
premise that the BFA does not merely set other terms and conditions for the bound tariff quota, but
also that the existence of the concession is entirely dependent on the continuation in force of the BFA.
4.52 Neither the terms of the tariff quota concessi on nor its context and history support the
European Communities' position that the €75/mt c oncession for 2.2 million mt was made subject to
the continued existence of the Annex or the BFA. Paragraph 9 of the BFA provides that "this
agreement" (the BFA) applies until the end of 20 02, but it does not provide that the European
Communities' GATT tariff quota concession expires at any time. The duty and quantity of the tariff
concession does not depend on the other terms and conditio ns as set out in the Annex, but rather is
laid out in the schedule itself. Had the Parties inte nded to bind the tariff quota only for so long as the
BFA applied – which would have been an extraord inary step, contrary to normal practice and the

260 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/R, 29 Oct. 2001 ("US – Line Pipe").
261 US – Line Pipe, at paras. 7.53, 7.54 and 7.55.
262 Annex to Schedules CXL and LXXX of the European Communities, "Framework Agreement on
Bananas."

modalities of the Uruguay Round – they would ha ve specified the limited duration of the concession
in the BFA.
4.53 Several factors support the view that the tariff quota concession did not terminate with the
expiration date of the BFA. First, it is scarcely likely that the negotiators of the BFA would consider
a satisfactory solution a system that, as of 2003, wo uld leave all their banana exports to the European
Communities subject to an essentially prohibitive duty of €680/mt. Second, a time limited tariff quota
concession would have been gro ssly inconsistent with the Ur uguay Round modalities, because it
would leave the European Communities with the WT O right to apply an essen tially prohibitive duty
on all bananas.
4.54 Third, throughout the many chapters of the banana dispute, all parties, the Arbitrators and the
WTO members acting collectively in the Doha Waiver have proceeded on the justifiable basis that the
€75/mt binding for the tariff quota would not expire until withdrawn and replaced with a rebound duty
through the Doha Waiver process, or some other valid WTO procedure such as Article XXVIII or a
new round of negotiations. There are many examples on the record, and Ecuador will refer to just a
few.
The European Communities' Article XXVIII:5 notifications

4.55 First, the Doha Waiver required conclusion of Article XXVIII negotiations for the rebinding
of the tariff that could comply with the terms of the waiver. The European Communities filed
Article XXVIII:5 notifications in Augu st 2004, and again in February 2005. 263 Both notifications
explicitly referred to the European Communities' intention to wit hdraw "concessions" (in the plural)
on bananas. Its second notification announced the European Communities' intention to replace its
"concessions" with a bound duty of €230/mt. If €680/mt was the European Communities' only bound
rate as of January 1, 2003, the European Co mmunities would never even have issued an
Article XXVIII notification in the first instance, much less referred to its concessions in the plural.
No Member would invoke Article XXVIII:5 procedures to lower its bound rate.
4.56 In the Arbitration proceedings , conducted in 2005, the Eur opean Communities made clear
that it considered that the tariff quota was binding. For example the European Communities stated:
"The EC also has a bound tariff rate quota of 2,200,000 tonnes, with an in-quota rate
of €75/t."264
4.57 The first award of the Arbitrator in 2005 re flects the common understanding that tariff quota
remained bound in Schedule CXL. 265 Even the European Communities' own first submission to this
Panel continues to assume that the European Communiti es needs to comply with Article XXVIII to
rebind its tariff at the current applied rate.266
4.58 For all the above reasons, the Panel should em phatically reject the European Communities'
unfounded and unsavory attempt to avoid its responsibilities under its bound tariff quota.

263 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations: Sche dule CXL – European Communities , G/SECRET/22, 2 August
2004; Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations: Schedule CXL – European Co mmunities – Addendum ,
G/SECRET/22/Add.1, 1 February 2005.
264 Communication by the European Communities, Arbitration under the Annex to the Doha
Ministerial Decision of the AC P-EC Partnership Agreement, 13 May 2005, para. 9. Available at the European
Commission – External Trade I Centre through (http://trade.ec.europa.eu).
265 Ibid.,at para. 18.
266 European Communities' first written submission, at paras. 30, 35.

The binding at €75/mt did not expire with the elimination of the volume limit
4.59 The European Communities makes a second, equa lly groundless, defense; the European
Communities contends that, even if the binding cont inued past the expiration of the BFA, the binding
at €75/mt nevertheless "automatically" disappeared when the European Co mmunities eliminated the
2.2 million mt tariff quota and replaced it with its curr ent regime, consisting of an autonomous duty at
€176/mt, together with a tariff quota exclusively for bananas of ACP origin.
4.60 Nothing in the waiver and nothing in the suggestions of the Article 21.5 Panel in any way
suggested that the European Communities could escape its tariff bindings by unilaterally replacing the
bound tariff quota at €75/mt ton with an autonomous MFN duty of €176/mt. Such a proposition is
contrary to the obligations of a tariff concession and the principles of good faith.
4.61 If the European Communities wishes to eliminat e the quota element limiting a tariff quota, it
may do so. Equally, it may maintain one or more ta riff quotas so long as it does so consistent with its
obligations under Article XIII and its schedule of concessions. Howe ver, autonomously eliminating
the volume restraint element of a tariff quota does not authorize ignoring the tariff binding. If that
was the case, the hundreds of tariff quotas introduced by all WTO members could be expunged by the
simple expedient of declaring an end to their existence.
(b) Conclusions
4.62 Ecuador, in its first submission proved that the EC measures at issue were inconsistent with
Articles I, II and XIII of the GATT 1994. For reasons discussed above, the European Communities
has failed to provide any valid defence for the breaches of Articles I, II and XIII.
3. Oral statement of Ecuador
4.63 Ecuador's per capita GDP for 2005 was about 8 per cent of the per capita average of the
European Communities, and also is less than that of many of the ACP countries. Last year, the
European Communities' tariff on bananas required the payment of additional tariffs for Ecuador in the
order of €103 million more than the previous year as a result of the European Communities' unilateral
"tariff only" scheme. The European Communities, meanwhile, is giving more than 200 million euros
in subsidies to the EC producers of bananas, so the increased duties on Ecuadorian bananas in effect
finances half of the EC subsidies to its own banana producers.
4.64 Ecuador is a developing country, but it has one of the most efficient banana producing
industries in the world.
4.65 The task of an Article 21.5 panel is to dete rmine whether measures that the defending party
has taken to conform with the rulings and recomme ndations of the DSB are consistent with that
Party's obligations under the WTO agreements.
4.66 The European Communities has not contested, indeed has insisted, that the measures
challenged by Ecuador in this Ar ticle 21.5 proceeding were taken to conform with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB in EC – Bananas III . In light of that, and of the short explanation
provided by Ecuador in its first submission, Ecuador does not see merit to the ACP's objections in this
regard.
4.67 Ecuador's claims are that these EC measures ar e inconsistent with the anti-discrimination
provisions of both Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1 994, and that the duty of €176/mt applied to all
bananas of Ecuadorian and other MFN origin also violates the European Communities' tariff bindings
under Article II of the GATT, in particular the €75/mt tariff quota bound in the EC Schedule.

(a) Response to the European Communities' preliminary objections
(i) The EC-Ecuador Understanding on bananas is not a bar to this Article 21.5 proceeding
4.68 The European Communities raises a "preliminary objection" that the EC-Ecuador
Understanding bars Ecuador from complaining abou t preferences that the European Communities
grants on bananas to the ACP countries. The Eur opean Communities' premises are: (1) that the
Understanding is a mutually agreed solution of the bananas dispute; (2) that the measures at issue
were "accepted" by Ecuador in the Understanding; and (3) that allowing Ecuador to challenge the
conformity of these measures with the WTO rules is contrary to the preference for mutually agreed
solutions under the DSU.
4.69 Ecuador set out in its second submission the reasons that this European Communities'
preliminary objection is unfounded. Ecuador st ands behind the position it expressed in the second
submission.
4.70 To summarize, this European Communities' argument fails on a few independent grounds.
4.71 First, a mutually agreed solution by the terms of Article 3 of the DSU must conform with the
WTO agreements. It would be illogical to exempt measures from challenge to their consistency with
WTO rules on grounds that they were part of a mu tually agreed solution which, by definition, must
conform with those rules. As the European Co mmunities has conceded, Ecuador did not agree that
the Understanding was a mutually agreed solution in the sense of Article 3.6, though Ecuador
believed and hoped that proper implementation of the various phases of the agreement would result in
a mutually satisfactory and permanent solution, consistent with the rules.
4.72 Second, the European Communities did not comply with the Understanding. The
Understanding plainly requires a waiver of Article I (for which Ecuador agreed to lifts its reserve) and
a waiver of Article XIII, which Ecuador committed to promote to permit the European Communities'
tariff quota for ACP countries until 1 January 2006. Ecuador did its part regarding the waivers and
for the most part in the early years, the EC complied regarding the gradual liberalization of its
measures, which would have been illegal but for the waivers, as the EC – Bananas III case had
established.
4.73 However, the European Communities then failed to comply with the terms of the waiver of
Article I, causing it to expire at the same time that the Article XIII waiver expired by its own terms.
The European Communities squandered its opportuni ty to propose a proper rebinding, proposing
instead levels that would vastly increase the pref erence for ACP bananas. When Ecuador and other
countries would not agree to those proposals and the Arbitrator found that in each case the European
Communities failed to meet the waiver standards, the European Communiti es nevertheless proceeded
unilaterally to implement the measures that are now before this panel. The European Communities
also, did not follow the Article XXVIII process requi red as a condition of the waiver. The European
Communities thus tries to claim protection under an Understanding with which it does not comply.
4.74 Third, the European Communities does says it is a breach of Ecuador's obligations for
Ecuador to challenge the WTO consis tency of measures that are inconsistent with the waiver and the
Understanding.
4.75 In the Understanding, Ecuador did not commit not to bring a WTO dispute against any EC
measures, and there is nothing in the WTO rules or in the Understanding that could justify implying
such a limitation.

(ii) The Panel's suggestions also do not bar Ecuador's claims
4.76 The European Communities also argues that its measures conform to a "suggestion" of the
Article 21.5 Panel. On that basis, and because Ecuador did not appeal th e Panel's suggestion and
because the Panel report was adopted, the Europ ean Communities argues that Ecuador should be
barred from challenging the EC measures that conform to the Panel's suggestion.
4.77 Ecuador disagrees, again on several grounds. First, the Panel suggestion in question was that
the European Communities could adopt a "tariff only system for bananas, with a tariff quota for ACP
bananas covered by a suitable waiver". That s uggestion might have been implemented in a way
consistent with WTO obligations, but of course the European Communities failed to get a suitable
waiver that would cover the actions that the Europ ean Communities took. This Panel, of course, will
be making rulings on whether the EC system does conform with EC obligations. Ecuador is confident
that the first Article 21.5 Panel did not view its suggestions as conveying any suggestion or
authorization of WTO-illegal measures.
4.78 Ecuador would also urge the panel to reject the European Communities' argument. WTO
rules prevent a party from making an argument previously rejected by a Panel report that was not
appealed. Indeed, the European Communities is doing just that in this proceeding. The European
Communities' proposed rule would force needless appeals of Panel suggestions in any case where a
suggestion might be open to impreci se interpretation by the defending party. Further, it is wholly
unnecessary to create such a rule, even if Panels had th at authority, since in fact Article 21.5 panels,
who preferably are composed of the same members as the original panel, are certainly well equipped
to determine whether the measures that a party has taken indeed are consistent with the WTO rules,
which any panel suggestion must be.
(b) Article I
4.79 The European Communities does not contest the rather obvious point that its Cotonou tariff
preferences are inconsistent with Article I if not covered by the Doha Waiver. Rather, the European
Communities argues that the preferences it grants to bananas of ACP origin are covered by the Doha
Waiver through 31 December 2007. Ecuador disagrees.
4.80 The essence of the dispute is that Ecuador cons iders that the Doha Waiver of Article I for
bananas expired following the Arbitrator's rejec tion of both of the European Communities' tariff
rebinding proposals, when the Eu ropean Communities unilaterally put into force the so-called tariff
only system that is before you. The European Co mmunities, in effect, contends that the waiver
allowed it to implement unilaterally a regime that the European Communities considers to meet the
standard that the "envisaged rebinding would result in at least maintaining total market access for
MFN banana suppliers, taking into account the EC's commitments".
267 The European Communities
then argues that its current applied regime m eets that standard as the European Communities
conceives it. The European Co mmunities concedes that it has not rebound its duties or fulfilled the
requirements with respect to Article XXVIII as al so required by the waiver, but the European
Communities claims that this is a matter of "good faith" out of deference to the views of Ecuador.
4.81 The European Communities continues to argue that the waiver remains in effect despite the
failure to propose a rebinding acceptable to interested parties or to the Arbitrator, so long as the
European Communities' system allows access for MF N countries at least equivalent to previous
access.

267 Doha Waiver Annex, fourth tiret.

4.82 The European Communities' argument illustra tes why MFN countries, including Ecuador,
were insistent that the continuation of the waiver be subject to the establishment of a bound MFN duty
rate by 1 January 2006 that was either agreed or had been approved by the Arbitrator.
4.83 It was no part of the waiver that, having faile d to satisfy the Arbitrator, and having failed to
reach agreement with Ecuador and other intere sted parties, the European Communities could
unilaterally impose the regime of its choosing on 1 January 2006.
4.84 The European Communities argues that the Pane l should ignore the European Communities'
failure to conclude Article XXVIII proceedings because Ecuador has not brought a claim under
Article XXVIII in this proceeding. However, Ec uador has raised Article XXVIII not as a separate
claim, but rather to point out that the European Communities' failing is another respect in which the
European Communities did not comply with the requ irements for a continuation of the waiver for
bananas after 31 December 2005.
4.85 Ecuador expresses its wish to associate its dele gation with the helpful additional arguments
put forward by Latin American third parties in this proceeding as to why the European Communities
is wrong that the waiver continued after 1 January 20 06. It is evident that the European Communities
is arguing as if it got the waiver it wanted rather than the waiver that was granted and to which it
agreed.
(c) Article XIII
4.86 The existence of the European Co mmunities' tariff quota on bananas is not in dispute, nor is
the fact that Ecuador and other MFN suppliers are entirely excluded from that quota, nor that the
previous waiver of Article XIII has expired.
4.87 Ecuador's claim is, first, that the European Communities' tariff quota violates Article XIII.1,
because it restricts Ecuadorian and other bananas by depriving them of any access to the duty-free
tariff quota, while bananas of ACP origin, which do have access to this tariff quota, are not similarly
restricted. Second, the tariff quota, by excluding bananas of Ecuadorian and other origin, plainly does
not meet the requirements of Article XIII:2.
4.88 The European Communities had a waiver of Artic le XIII for its tariff quota, but that waiver
expired on 31, December 2005. The European Comm unities sought a renewal of the waiver, but it
was not granted.
4.89 The European Communities tries to argue that Article XIII does not apply to exclusion from a
tariff quota, at least when it is a single tariff quota rather than two or more tariff quotas.
4.90 The European Communities' argument is that denying Ecuador access to the tariff quota
means that Ecuador is not restricted by the tariff quot a. Plainly that is not true, as Ecuador's exports
are restricted by the high duty compared to those who participate in the zero duty quota. The only
difference between a straight quota and a tariff quota in this regard is that exclusion from a straight
quota means no access, while exclusion from a tariff quot a means access restricted by the higher duty
that applies to imports not benefiting from the ta riff quota, which may be prohibitive in effect. The
European Communities would presumabl y not find it difficult to see the violation of Article XIII if it
were denied participation in a quota of another me mber in regard to a product of which it was a
principal supplier. Likewise, outside of the time when the European Communities is arguing in this
proceeding, we are reasonably confident that the European Communities would think that denying it a
share of a favourable tariff quota of another member is no less a violation of Article XIII.

4.91 The European Communities argu es that its tariff quota regime confers a benefit on MFN
countries, because it would be worse for them if there were no quantitative limit on duty free entry of
bananas of ACP origin. It is true that unlimited preferences for ACP bananas would be worse than the
tariff quota only for ACP countries, but exclusion from the tariff quota is more restrictive of Ecuador
and other members than if they were allowed to participate in the zero duty tariff quota as they are
entitled under Article XIII.
4.92 This is also the response to the European Communities' argument that there is no nullification
or impairment to Ecuador because the tariff quota is better for Ecuador than if the ACP countries had
unlimited preferential access. Leaving aside that nullification or impairment does not have to be
proven in cases of violation, the harm to Ecuador is the exclusion from participation in the tariff
quota.
4.93 The European Communities says that applying Article XIII:1 would have the effect of
requiring benefits for non-member countries. That is not true. Granting fair access to all WTO
members would fully satisfy Article XIII:1, because the obligation extends only to fellow members.
On the other hand, if the Europ ean Communities, for example, gave access to a non-member that was
not accorded to a member, then the member woul d have grounds for complaint because the member
was restricted more than the non-member. This is no less true of a straight quota than a tariff quota, so
it is no basis for distinguishing tariff quotas.
4.94 The European Communities argues that applying Article XIII to exclusion from a tariff quota
could make Article XIII duplicative of Article I. However, the underlying assumption of the
European Communities - that there must be no overlap in what is prohibited by different WTO rules –
is plainly wrong. In this instance, the exclus ion from a tariff quota does breach both Article XIII and
Article I, but there are many examples of this in the WTO rules. The European Communities'
successful challenge of Canada in the Automotive Products case is just one example of a single
regime violating multiple rules. The overlap of local content prohibitions in the GATT, TRIMS, and
the SCMA is another example.
4.95 The European Communities argues that the previous rulings in Bananas III are not applicable,
because those rulings were dealing with a situation that involved more than one tariff quota. We see
nothing in those rulings or in the text of Article X III to justify such a distinction, nor did the DSB in
EC – Bananas III.
4.96 It is a fact that the restriction in a tariff quota is achieved by means of a tariff – the higher
duty applied to products imported outside the quota than inside the quota. That is not a problem
because Article XIII specifically applies to any tari ff quota, and, unlike Article XI the reference to
restrictions in Article XIII does not exclude taxes, duties or other charges.
(d) Article II: I (a) and (b)
4.97 Ecuador considers that almost everybody, including in the European Communities, was
startled to read that the Europ ean Communities, at least for purposes of its defence here, considers
that it has not been bound by the €75/mt tariff quota since either 2002 or alternatively 2006. As a
result, the European Communities c onsiders that its only binding is and has been at a level of
680€/mt.
4.98 The European Communities first argues that th e 75 ecu tariff quota expired in 2002. The
European Communities concession setting out this ta riff quota concession as both the initial and final
rate also includes under column 7 – "other terms and conditions" – "[a]s indicated in the Annex." The
Annex in turn simply provides a copy of the Banana Framework Agreem ent (BFA) between the

European Communities and Colombia, Costa Rica, Ve nezuela, Nicaragua. Paragraph 9 of the BFA
provides that the BFA "shall apply until 31 December 2002."
4.99 The European Communities argues that, because the BFA expired at the end of 2002,
therefore so did the European Communities' en tire concession, leaving only the ceiling binding at
680€/mt.
4.100 Ecuador considers that the provision of an expiration date in the BFA did not imply expiration
of the WTO concession. Ecuador does not doubt th at a concession can be limited in time, but the
BFA itself and the schedule do not provide that th e concession was meant to terminate with the
termination of the BFA. In instances where a concession has been found limited in time, the
condition was explicit. Further, the European Co mmunities' own words and actions, as well as those
of the WTO members as a whole, make clear that the concession was not and is not limited in time.
4.101 The European Communities does not deny that a time-limited concession would have been
inconsistent with the agreed Uruguay Round moda lities, but the European Communities complains
that those modalities should be ignored because they were not to be used as a basis for dispute
settlement. Ecuador is not making a claim that the European Communities is violating the
modalities, but only pointing out that the modalities were such that, if the European Communities
intended or was thought by anyone to have made a time limited access commitment on a product as
important as bananas, it is inconceivable that it would have passed unnoticed.
4.102 The European Communities argues that the BFA would not have been referenced in column 7
if the parties had not intended to limit the concessi on in time. However, this disregards the various
other conditions of the BFA pertaining to quota a llocation, albeit most of these have since been
superseded.
4.103 The European Communities stre sses that the BFA provides for consultations among its
limited parties in 2001, which the European Co mmunities says was included as a term of the BFA
because the European Communities had undertaken to negotiation a replacement system. That would
not explain why those countries would agree that in the absence of a new ag reement, the concession
would simply expire, leaving an essentially prohibitive binding at €680/mt.
4.104 Ecuador has pointed out that the inclusion of a requirement to make the waiver subject to
compliance with Article XXVIII, and the European Communities' conduct in that regard, is further
evidence that all WTO members, including the Europ ean Communities, considered that the €75 tariff
quota was not limited in time by the BFA. If the only binding that was effective after 2002 (or after
2005) was €680, then there was no need for Article XXVIII negotiations, since applying a lower duty
than the bound rate does not infringe the rights of other members. As Nicaragua and Panama have
pointed out, the Newsprint case does not imply to the contrary. Article XXVIII has frequently been
used where a party is going to undertake a change of form of duty, such as from specific to ad
valorem duties, because otherwise suppliers could clai m a violation of bindings whenever, as a result
of market forces, an intended neutral conversion resulted in a duty higher than specified in the
schedule. The notion is absurd that a party woul d invoke article XXVIII to reduce a duty from €680
to some much lower level specific duty.
4.105 The European Communities dismisses the many ex amples in the Arbitrator awards in which
the European Communities argues a nd the Arbitrator accepts that the European Communities has a
tariff quota binding at €75/mt. Nicaragua and Pa nama have provided additional examples. The
European Communities dismisses these as "arguments ma de in the heat of litigation". With respect,
the European Communities seems in the current proceeding to have b een consumed with the "heat of
litigation."

4.106 The European Communities probably realizes the implausibility of its newly contrived view
that its concession expired at the end of 2002, an d so argues in the alternative that the €75/mt
concession expired when the European Communities el iminated the quota to which it was "attached".
A member cannot escape its tariff quota bindings by un ilateral action on grounds that it is eliminating
the quota element, so of course it get to eliminat e the favourable tariff along with the quota, all for
free.
4.107 Tariff quota concessions can be withdrawn, but the withdrawing member must follow
Article XXVIII procedures which the Doha Waiver required and the European Communities failed to
do. There is accordingly no basis for this alternative argument of the European Communities.
B. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1. First written submission of the European Communities
(a) The facts of the case
4.108 The history of the facts shows that the EC bound rate for bananas is €680 per ton, and that the
Cotonou preference granted to ACP countries amounts currently to 775 000 tons. It also highlights
that the previous Article 21.5 Panel initiated by Ecuador provided three suggestions whereby the
European Communities could comply with WTO rules, among which the second was to implement a
tariff only system with a tariff quota for ACP banan as (Panel Report, paragraph 6.157), provided that
a suitable (Article I) waiver be granted to the European Communities.
4.109 To comply with this suggestion, the Europ ean Communities introduced a tariff only system
with a duty free tariff quota of 775 000 tons on 1 January 2006, having secured the necessary WTO
waiver through the negotiation and conclusion of an "Understanding on bananas", which entered into
force between Ecuador and the European Communities on 30 April 2001.
4.110 This understanding committed the European Communities to continue importing MFN
countries' bananas at the tariff rate of €75 par ton, until the implementation, by 1 January 2006 at the
latest, of a definitive import regime complying with the 1999 Panel conclusions.
4.111 The counterpart for this understanding was the granting to the Eu ropean Communities of
WTO waivers for the interim import regime applie d between 1 July 2001 and 1 January 2006 and for
the subsequent tariff only system applied from 1 January 2006.
4.112 The first "Doha Waiver" related to GATT Article XIII related to the interim all-tariff-quota
import regime applied until 1 January 2006, since it was comparable to a quota regime according to
the findings of the Panel; since the terms and conditi ons applied to different groups of countries were
different, a waiver from the application of GATT Arti cle XIII paragraphs 1 and 2 was then necessary;
the second waiver to GATT Article 1 was sought in relation to the preferences granted under the
Cotonou agreement to ACP countries; the duration of this waiver is commensurate to the duration of
these preferences, to be found under Article 37 of the Cotonou Agreement, i.e. 31 December 2007.
4.113 In the terms contained in the Annex to the re levant Doha Waiver (WT/L/436), the European
Communities accepted to negotiate a rebinding of its tariff for bananas imports that would result in "at
least maintaining total market access for MFN ba nanas suppliers", subject to an arbitration
mechanism in case of disagreement. This waiver would expire either on 31 December 2007 or would
cease to apply upon the entry into force of an EC regime that would have been found by the second
Arbitrator award as not satisfying the standard of "maintaining total market access for MFN bananas
suppliers", taking into account all EC WTO mark et-access commitments relating to bananas. The

European Communities has complied w ith all the conditions contained in the waiver and this fact is
not disputed by Ecuador.
4.114 The situation of the bananas import market si nce 1 January 2006 confirms the positive effect
of the EC tariff only regime in general, for all gr oups of developing exporting countries in particular.
It triggered an increase of import from developing countries which had no or little exports of bananas
into the European Communities, while not affecting the relative stability in wholesale prices.
4.115 More importantly for the present case even, th e total volume of imports from MFN countries
increased to a record 3.28 million tons, the high est since at least 1999, increasing by 10.7% from
2005. This trend is confirmed by market data fo r the first quarter of 2007, with a further 10.1%
increase from the preceding year, and this evidence alone suffices to establish that the new regime
more than maintain total market access for MFN suppliers.
4.116 For the sake of completeness, the EC submission evidences the reasons why Ecuador's banana
industry could not fully benefit from this trend for reasons unrelated to the new regime. Firstly, the
objective increase in the market access opportunities provided to all MFN countries is evidenced by
the fact that the increase in imports from that group in 2006 (10,7%) in greater than the total growth
of the market (10,3%).
4.117 Secondly, there is ample evidence of aut onomous difficulties experienced by Ecuador's
industry during this period: adverse climatic c onditions, a volcanic eruption damaging approximately
35% of the plantations in the Los Rios province, which produces about a third of Ecuador's total
production, new administrative measures encouraging traders to source bananas from other countries.
It should be noted that these difficulties impacted the export potential of Ecuador also toward the
USA.
4.118 Thirdly, the exports of ACP countries followed similar patterns as those of the MFN countries
group: although the group as a whole could increase their exports, some countries (Jamaica, Belize,
Surinam or Ivory Coast) have experienced significan t reductions unrelated to the implementation of
the new tariff only regime.
4.119 Finally, it appears that the new regime triggered new market access opportunities for
countries which had little exports to the European Communities, such as Guatemala, Peru and Brazil,
or no exports at all, such as Bolivia, Thailand a nd Sri Lanka. This positive trend observed in 2006 is
confirmed during the first quarter of 2007.
(b) The legal analysis
(i) Preliminary issues
4.120 As a preliminary matter, it must be recalle d that Ecuador entered with the European
Communities into the Understanding on bananas, whic h is pursuant to its own terms "a mutually
agreed solution to the banana dispute". Notw ithstanding the subsequent ambiguous and unilateral
declaration that "the provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not applicable in this case", the
Understanding is a binding international agreement in its own right which commit its parties, and
which must be taken into account in analysing the righ ts and obligations of the parties to this dispute,
in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31.3.c).
4.121 The legally binding nature of this instrument is confirmed by the fact that both parties
implemented the terms and conditions of the U nderstanding, the European Communities through the
implementation of a tariff only regime in partic ular, Ecuador through the support it gave to the
adoption of the Doha Waivers requested by the European Communities.

4.122 On this basis, Ecuador should not be allowe d to challenge the preference granted by the
European Communities for ACP bananas, using Article 21.5 of the DSU for challenging a mutually
agreed solution between the parties, in violation of Articles 3:7 and 3:10 of the DSU, which provides
that mutually agreed solutions should be preferred to resorting to dispute settlement procedures, and
the corresponding Ecuador's claims should be dismissed in their entirety.
(ii) There is no violation of GATT Article I
4.123 Accepting Ecuador's interpretation of the Doha Wa iver's Annex (i.e. that the duration of the
Doha Waiver for Article I concerning bananas s hould be based on the findings of the arbitration
mechanism provided for in that Annex, rather than on the European Communities actually "rectifying
the matter" de facto, as provided for by the text), would lead to absurd results.
4.124 For instance, the Arbitrator in such an in stance could find the defendant formally in
compliance, when the facts would demonstrate th at total market access of the MFN suppliers as a
whole would not
 be maintained. In such a case, the waiv er would continue to protect a non compliant
system. Alternatively, the Arbitrator could have ruled in favour of an interim EC regime prior to
1 January 2006, while the system introduced as from that date would be blatantly inconsistent, and
would still be operable under a waiver unduly sustained by the Arbitrator's ruling.
4.125 For the European Communities, it is clear that the WTO Ministerial Conference could not
have linked the operation of such a major exemption to a basic WTO rule to the number of arbitration
results reached on the basis of theoretical analyses and arithmetic calculations, such a standard being
in "clinical isolation" from the real effects of the import regime in the real world.
4.126 Indeed, the text of the Doha Waiver itself provi de in the Annex that it would cease to apply if
the European Communities "failed to rectify the matter"; this means for the European Communities
that it was due to introduce a new regime that w ould maintain total market access for MFN suppliers
in reality and not merely in theory. This assessment must be made on the basis of the real effects of
the system on actual market access for the group of MFN suppliers, i.e. assessing the regime "as
applied", pursuant to the terms of the First Arbitration Award.
4.127 Further, the text of the Annex provide that the waiver would cease to apply "upon entry into
force of the new EC tariff regime"; this means "the" re gime that was submitted to the Arbitrator and
found by him inconsistent. Pursuant to these term s of the Annex and to a negative finding in the
second Arbitration Award, the European Communities must have retained the discretion to review its
plans and to introduce a different new tariff regime so as to comply with such findings. This is
exactly what the European Communities did.
4.128 To avoid repetition on this evidence provided in the previous section of its submission, the
European Communities draws the attention of the Pa nel on three mere points: firstly, the volume of
imports of bananas from MFNB countries has incre ased significantly, exceeding even the growth of
the bananas market as a whole; this demonstrates that MFN suppliers have more than maintained
their total market access opportunities. Secondly, as highlighted in the First Arbitration Award,
maintaining total market access "is not a guarantee for any particular volume of trade or price"
(para.37), and refers to "the entirety of the opport unity actually afforded the MFN suppliers" (para.
33), definitely not guaranteeing a particular leve l of trade for any single MFN supplier such as
Ecuador. Thirdly, the trends in the export of any particular country cannot by themselves be used to
determine whether total market access is being maintained for the group of countries concerned.

(iii) There is no violation of Article XIII
Preliminary Issues

4.129 The European Communities recalls the terms of the Panel's findings presenting the three
options found to allow for the Eu ropean Communities to remedy the situation (paras 6.155 to 6.158):
(1) to introduce a tariff only system without a tariff quota and with a tariff preference for ACP
bananas, and with either a waiver for the tariff pref erence or the creation of a free trade area; (2) to
introduce a tariff only system with a tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by a suitable waiver; (3) to
maintain the previous system of MFN tariff quot a either without allocation or with negotiated
allocations consistently with Article XIII.2, wh ich could be combined with an ACP tariff quota
covered with an appropriate Article XIII waiver.
4.130 The European Communities has fu lly implemented the second Pane l's suggestion, covered by
a "suitable" Article I waiver, since it is a tariff only regime with a preferential treatment for ACP
bananas. This interpretation of what "suitable" means in this context is supported by the language
used by the Panel for formulating its suggestions, an d by the consistent explanations and behaviour of
the European Communities, notwithstanding the EC request for an Article XIII waiver.
4.131 The European Communities notes that Ecua dor does not claim that the European
Communities failed to take the measures suggested by the Panel in its second option, or that such
measures were implemented incorrectly; Ecuador merely claims that a tariff only import regime with
a preferential tariff quota would violate Article XIII.
4.132 Thus the European Communities submits that Ecua dor's claims are in reality a challenge to
the measures suggested by the Panel, rather than to the measures actually taken by the European
Communities. Such claims are inconsistent with the terms of Article 21.5 DSU, whereby a Party can
bring claims against "measures taken to comply" w it the findings of the Panel, and not against the
measures suggested by the Panel. Were Ecuador to take issues with these suggestions, it should have
appealed pursuant to Article 17 DSU. In the absence of such action, Ecuador is bound by res judicata,
pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 1 and 17, paragraph 14 of the DSU.
Absence of nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to Ecuador

4.133 The European Communities recalls that pursu ant to the Cotonou agreement, it has an
obligation to grant a preference for banana trade to ACP countries. It also undertook in the context of
the Doha Waiver to "maintain total market access for MFRN suppliers". In interpreting the above
condition, the Arbitrator found that the European Communities had to ensure that the new system
would maintain the "entirety of the opportunity actually afforded to MFN suppliers", by the
"conditions of entry to the EC market" existing unde r the import regime that was in place before
1 January 2006. Thus, the capping of the ACP pr eference under the new 2006 regime effectively
ensured that this standard was respected.
4.134 In light of these facts, the European Commun ities respectfully submits that the limit on the
quantities of ACP bananas that can be imported in to the European Communities free of duty does not
cause any nullification or impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador, in the meaning of GATT
Article XXIII and Article 3.8 of the DSU.
The European Communities' tariff treatment of bananas from Ecuador and other MFN
countries does not infringe GATT Article XIII
4.135 The European Communities notes that the texts of the provisions of Article I and Article XIII
have a very important difference. GATT Article I: 1 obliges each Member to extend to all Members

the exact same advantage that it grants to one si ngle Member. In contrast, Article XIII:1 obliges each
Member not to impose a restriction on a single Member, unless it imposes the same restriction on all
other Members.
4.136 The difference in the titles and texts of these tw o provisions demonstrate the intention of the
drafters to give them different purposes, and that certain types of measures may violate GATT
Article I without violating Article XIII:1.
4.137 In addition, a claim of violation of Article X III:1 requires the meeting of two conditions: (i)
the allegedly offending Member im poses a prohibition or restrictio n which establishes a nullification
or impairment of a right accruing to the complaining Member, and (ii) this prohibition or restriction is
not imposed on the like products originating from all other countries. The application of these
principles to the facts of the present case shows that the Cotonou Preference does not constitute a
violation of Article XIII, for a number of reasons.
4.138 Firstly, bananas imports from Ecuador and other MFN suppliers are not subject to any
quantitative restriction, and thus none of the two conditions for invoking Article XIII:1 can thus be
fulfilled.
4.139 Secondly, in the present case, if one tries to apply the conditions of GATT Article XIII:1 on
the countries that actually are subjected to a r estriction (the ACP group), the provision becomes
inoperable: the MFN countries are then the "all th ird countries", whose position should be taken as a
basis in order to determine whether the ACP countri es are treated "worse" than them. But not being
subject to any quantitative restriction, there is nothing on which the comparison can be based.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that there is a quantitative restriction imposed on the ACP
countries, Ecuador cannot successfully challenge it, because this quantitative restriction does not
result in any nullification or impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador; quite to the contrary.
4.140 Thirdly, the facts that the ACP countries enjoy a trade preference and that there is a "cap"
imposed on this preference may be relevant fo r purposes of GATT Article I, but are completely
irrelevant for the application of GATT Article XIII. Unlike Article I, paragraph 1, the provisions of
Article XIII:1 do not impose on a Member the oblig ation to extend to all other Members a tariff
preference granted to some Members only. Article XIII:1 obliges each Member simply not to impose
a quantitative restriction on another Member, unless it imposes a similar quantitative restriction on all
Members.
4.141 In the present case, this me ans that GATT Article XIII:1 does not oblige the European
Communities to extend to all Members the tariff pref erence granted to the ACP countries, but simply
obliges the European Communities not to impose a quantitative restric tion on Ecuador, unless a
similar quantitative restriction was imposed on all other WTO Members.
4.142 Fourthly, Ecuador cannot legitimately claim that the European Communities is involved in a
"discriminatory administration of quantitative restri ctions", unlike the situation analysed by the
Appellate Body in the EC – Bananas III case. Ecuador's exports are subject to a simple and ordinary
tariff, and it is clear, both textually and contextually, that GATT Article XIII does not apply to tariffs.
4.143 The European Communities draws support for this point from the report of the Appellate
Body in EC – Bananas III , where it found that the European Co mmunities was indeed involved in a
"discriminatory administration of quantitative restri ctions" in violation of GATT Article XIII:1, and
found that the restriction imposed on certain count ries through the allocation of the "Other" quota was
not "similar" to the restriction imposed on the pr oducts of the countries to which country-specific
quotas were allocated. This finding shows that GA TT Article XIII:1 covers only situations where a
Member applies tariff quotas with different terms to different groups of countries in a market where

all imports are made under tariff quotas, and conseq uently, GATT Article XIII:1 does not apply to a
tariff only import regime.
4.144 For the same reasons, the current import regime of the European Communities does not
violate GATT Article XIII:2. The text of the chap eau starting with "In appl ying import restrictions"
shows that paragraph 2 like paragr aph 1 is solely concerned with quantitative restrictions, and does
not regulate the relationship between quantitative r estrictions and other measures, notably simple
tariffs, that a Member may be applying.
4.145 The context also provides support for this inte rpretation, as the same limited scope of the
Article can be seen in the way that the four sub-pa ragraphs of Article XIII:2 are entirely focused on
the scope and internal distribution of the quota, and disregard any trade that falls outside the quota.
4.146 Given that GATT Article XIII:2 is directed at the administration of quantitative restrictions
and tariff quotas, it does not extend to the EC banana import regime in so far as that concerns Ecuador
and the other MFN countries, because their exports ar e not subject to any non-tariff restrictions or
tariff quotas. The European Communities draws support for this interpretation from the panel's report
in US – Line Pipe . In that case, the United States had impo sed a safeguard measure in the form of a
tariff quota. The panel invoked GATT Article XIII:2 onl y as regards the internal division of the tariff
quota and the setting of the total amount of imports permitted at a lower tariff rate (Panel Report, US
– Line Pipe, paras. 7.54 and 7.58).
(iv) There is no violation of GATT Article II
4.147 Ecuador claims are completely unfounded both in fact and in law. The bound tariff for
bananas in the EC schedule is €680 per ton and the tariff applied since 1 January 2006 is €176 per ton.
The European Communities' concession of a tari ff quota for 2.2 million tons of bananas at a
rate of €75 per ton expired at the end of 2002
4.148 As mentioned in the Facts section of the submission, Schedule CX L and its predecessor
Schedule LXXX provide that the bound tariff rate for bananas is €680 per ton. Both Schedules also
included an additional concession in the form of a ta riff quota for 2.2 million tons of bananas at a rate
of €75 per ton, but the Schedules expressly provid ed that this additional concession applied "as
indicated in the Annex". The European Communities notes with satisfaction that Ecuador accepts this
fact in paragraph 33 of its first written submission, and observes that the Annex, which is an integral
part of the Schedules, provides that this tariff quota would expire on December 31, 2002. Therefore
since 1 January 2003, the only bound rate for bananas in the Schedules of concessions of the
European Communities is €680 per ton.
4.149 It is settled law that WTO Members can lawf ully grant concessions subject to "terms,
conditions or qualifications", and that a time limitation in the duration of the concession, qualifies as
such. Moreover, such time limitations do not even need to be expressly provided for in the Schedules,
and can simply result from a link between the du ration of the concession and the existence (or
duration) of some domestic legislation or other measure, as exemplified in the US – Sugar Waiver
case (See the GATT Panel Report in United States-Re strictions on the importation of sugar and sugar
containing products applied under the 1955 waiver and under the headnote to the schedule of the tariff
concessions, dated 22 January 1990, L/6631-37S/228, at paragraph 5.8.). The European Communities
respectfully submits that the case for the legality of its own time limitation for the tariff quota of
bananas is even stronger than for the measures examined by the Panel in the US – Sugar Waiver case
since it has incorporated the time limitation and the date of expiry of the concession into the body of
the Schedule itself.

4.150 The fact that the European Communities continue d to allow significant imports of bananas at
a tariff rate of €75 per ton even after the expira tion of the relevant concession in its Schedules on
31 December 2002, does not in any way imply that the European Communities considered itself
bound by the expired concession, or that it acted in a way that is inconsistent with the arguments
presented before this Panel. As already mentioned, within the context of the Doha Waiver granted in
2001, the European Communities undertook to allocat e to MFN countries a quota at this low tariff
until the introduction of the new import regime on 1 January 2006. The European Communities
undertook the same obligation in the Understandi ngs with Ecuador and the United States. The
European Communities' good faith compliance with the conditions of the Doha Waiver and the
Understandings cannot have any br oader legal significance, especially when considering that the
European Communities duly discontinued this practi ce on the date provided for in the Doha Waiver
and the Understanding (i.e. 1 January 2006).
4.151 It may be noted that the expiration of this concession was not fully discussed in the two
Arbitration Awards that were issued in 2005. Th is is due to the fact that the purpose of the
Arbitration was to determine the "total market access" enjoyed by MFN suppliers prior to the
introduction of the new import regime, based on th e actual import opportunities enjoyed by MFN
suppliers. The fact that the binding for 2.2 million tons in the Schedules had expired was not relevant
for the Arbitration.
The abolition of the tariff quota for 2.2 million t ons results in the automatic abolition of the
tariff rate of €75 per ton
4.152 In light of the preceding section, it is clear th at the concession in question expired However,
even if that concession had not expired at the end of 2002, it is clear that it was lawfully terminated on
1 January 2006, when the European Communities in troduced the tariff only import regime. There are
two considerations underpinning this conclusion.
4.153 Firstly, the tariff rate of €75 was not a simp le and unconditional "bound tariff rate", as
Ecuador appears to imply in paragraph 33 of its firs t written submission. As with any tariff quota in
the WTO system, the tariff rate of €75 was attached to the quota of 2.2 million tons and its existence
depended upon the existence of that quota.
4.154 Secondly, the Panel had strongly suggested that the European Communities abolish its tariff
quota system and replace it with a tariff-only import regime, which would inevitably bring the
automatic abolition of the tariff quota for the 2.2 milli on tons of bananas, was also a condition in the
Doha Waiver and in the Understandings that the European Communities entered into with Ecuador
and the United States.
4.155 On the basis of these considerations, it is clear that (a) the European Communities
legitimately abolished the quota for 2.2 million tons of bananas on 1 January 2006, in compliance
with the suggestions of the Panel and the conditions of the Doha Wa iver and the Understanding, and
(b) the abolition of this quota led to the automatic abolition of the corresponding tariff of €75 per ton.
(c) Conclusion
4.156 In light of the facts and argument presente d above, the European Communities respectfully
requests the Panel to dismiss all of Ecuador's claims.

2. Second written submission of the European Communities
(a) The Cotonou Preference
(i) Preliminary objections
The Understanding

4.157 Ecuador accepts the principle that a "mutually agreed solution" entered into between two
WTO members must be taken into consideration in or der to determine those parties' mutual rights and
obligations within the WTO legal order. Therefor e, it is uncontested that bilateral agreements
between two WTO members, such as the Understanding, form part of the "applicable rules of law"
between the parties to the dispute, as defined in the Vienna Convention.
4.158 The application of the principles of Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU on the facts of this case
leads to the conclusion that Ecuador is barred from challenging the Cotonou Preference, because (i)
Ecuador has already contractually accepted the exis tence of the Cotonou Preference and (ii) Ecuador
has already been compensated fo r accepting the existence of the Cotonou Preference. Both the
language used in Article 3.10 of the DSU and its natu re as a general principle of law, make clear that
the principle of good faith runs through the entire DSU and defines the outer limits of the application
of all rights recognized by the DSU to WTO Me mbers. The European Communities has fully
complied with all its obligations under the Understa nding and Ecuador does not explain which of its
obligations the European Communities has allegedly failed to implement. Ecuador cannot escape its
obligations by claiming that they are not compliant with the WTO rules, because Ecuador has already
accepted the legality of the Understanding, by in itially complying with its provisions and does not
explain why and how the Understanding has sudde nly become "inconsistent with the covered
agreements". Moreover, the application of the pr inciple of good faith bars this Ecuador objection,
because Ecuador has already drawn the benefits of the Understanding and had full knowledge of the
legal status of the Understanding when it entered in to it. The Understanding does not provide that the
new import regime, or the Cotonou Preference should have any specific characteristics and, therefore,
Ecuador cannot claim that the lack of these undefined characteristics allow it to escape its obligations.
Finally, Ecuador's position if accepted would create important "systemic" problems for the WTO legal
order.
The findings and suggestions of the Article 21.5 Panel
4.159 Ecuador is barred from challenging the Cotonou Pr eference under Article XIII, because this
amounts to a challenge to a suggestion made by th e Panel (and consequently a ruling adopted by the
DSB) that is binding on Ecuador. Ecuador's argume nts to the contrary should be rejected. Panel
reports that have been adopted by the DSB are binding for both the complaining and the defending
parties to the dispute. A panel's suggestions are not binding for the defending party, but this does not
mean that suggestions are entirely devoid of lega l significance. With the suggestion the Panel is
indicating that such action is lawful and its implementation will lead to the defending party's
compliance with its obligations. Following the adop tion of the panel's report by the DSB there is a
presumption of legality covering the suggestions which makes them binding on the complaining
party. If the defending party decides to impl ement the measures suggested by the panel, the
complaining party may not challenge the conformity of these measures with the WTO rules in an
Article 21.5 procedure, because this way the comp laining party would not "unconditionally accept"
the report. To hold otherwise would create an undue legal uncertainty for the defending party,
seriously compromise the credibility of panels and of the DSB and would render Article 19.1 of the
DSU inoperative.

4.160 Allowing a complaining party to initiate an Arti cle 21.5 procedure in order to challenge the
suggestions of a panel, even where it has not ch allenged these suggestions before the Appellate Body
would also open the door for an abuse of Article 21.5 of the DSU, as well as of Article 16.4 of the
DSU and of Article 17 of the DSU. There should be no confusion between the roles of the Appellate
Body and Article 21.5 panels. To hold otherwi se would amount to giving complaining parties the
right to "bypass" the strict procedural requirements for appellate review and "replace" the procedures
before the Appellate Body with procedures before Article 21.5 panels.
4.161 Finally, the implementation of the specific Pane l suggestion required an Article I waiver and
not an Article XIII waiver. This can be seen from the textual differences between paragraphs 6.157
and 6.158 of the Article 21.5 Panel report and the diffe rences in the import regime that each of these
paragraphs provided for. The Second Arbitrati on Award does not support Ecuador's position. The
Arbitrator took it as a given that the proposed import regime would be compatible with Article XIII
either by itself or through a waiver and did not d ecide the issue. The Ba nanas III jurisprudence does
not support Ecuador's position. The system analy sed by the Appellate Body and the Article 21.5
Panel has nothing to do with the current import regime of the EC.
(ii) There is no violation of GATT Article I
4.162 The evidence submitted by the European Communities establishes that the total market access
enjoyed by MFN suppliers prior to 1 January 2006 has been more than main tained with the current
import regime of the European Communities. Ec uador's second written submission chooses to ignore
completely the market reality.
4.163 The Doha Waiver's objective was that Ecuador and the MFN countries would allow the ACP
countries to benefit from the Cotonou Preference un til the end of 2007, in exchange for the EC'
ensuring that the MFN countries' to tal market access would be maintained. It is a well established
fact that the current import regime more than ma intains the market access of Ecuador and the other
MFN countries. If Ecuador manages to succeed in these proceedings, it will have achieved a result
that was not envisaged by the Doha Waiver's arrangement: it will have both maintained its access
opportunities into the market of the European Communities and abolish the Cotonou Preference.
4.164 The proper interpretation of the Doha Waiver is that the waiver would continue to apply until
the end of 2007, provided that the European Co mmunities introduced an import regime that (i)
actually maintained the total market access of the MF N suppliers and (ii) was different to the regime
that the Arbitrators had found not likely to main tain such market access. Ecuador's formalistic
argumentation to the contrary should be reject ed. Ecuador accepts that its position leads to
unreasonable conclusion, but still invites the Pa nel to reach findings that produce unreasonable
results, so that Ecuador can earn more than what the Doha Waiver's arrangement was intended to
provide it with. Ecuador's insistence that the term ination of the Doha Waiver depended exclusively
on the entry into force of any
 " new tariff regime ", without any reference to that regime's
characteristics, leads to the unreasonable conclusion that the European Communities would have been
able to prolong the duration of the Doha Waiver by not introducing any new tariff regime and simply
continuing to apply the old import regime.
4.165 The Doha Waiver's provisions on the Arbitrations cannot be used to support a formalistic and
unreasonable interpretation of the waiver's terms. The Doha Waiver provided that the interested
parties would enter into good faith negotiations to agree on an import regime that would strike a
balance between the interests of all banana exporte rs. The Arbitrations were included in order to
ensure that these negotiations would indeed take place. This is precisely what has happened.

4.166 Ecuador argues that the Doha Waiver termin ated because the European Communities has
breached Article XXVIII. Ecuador's claims unde r Article XXVIII should be rejected, because
Ecuador has not included any Article XXVIII claims in its request for the establishment of the Panel.
(iii) There is no violation of GATT Article XIII
Absence of nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to Ecuador

4.167 The limitation of the Cotonou Preference to specific quantities does not cause the nullification
or impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador. This limitation is to Ecuador's advantage, because,
in its absence, the preference given to ACP countries would have been even more important. Ecuador
accepts the factual accuracy of the point raised by the European Communities. The only injury that
Ecuador may suffer stems from the fact that it cannot benefit from the Cotonou Agreement's trade
preference, which is compatible with Article I. The limitation on the quantities of this preference
neither results in any other injury for Ecuador, nor adds anything to any injury that the trade
preference itself may already cause to Ecuador.
The European Communities' tariff treatment of bananas from Ecuador and other MFN
countries does not infringe GATT Article XIII
4.168 Article XIII is concerned with quantitative measures. Provisions explicitly designed for
dealing with quantitative measures give rise to diffi culties of interpretation when applied to tariffs.
There are important differences between "prohi bitions and restrictions" and tariff quotas.
"Prohibitions and restrictions" are prejudicial to the trade of the affected WTO Member, while tariff
quotas may in certain circumstances be beneficial. A rule which is designed to constrain measures
that are disadvantageous to WTO Members produ ce odd results if it is applied without further
consideration to measures that confer benefits. One odd result would be that WTO Members would
be required to confer benefits on non-WTO Members, because paragraph 1 would be taken to say that
a tariff quota could be conferred on one WTO Member only if similar tariff quotas had been conferred
on "all other countries" and not just on WTO Memb ers. A protection for WTO Members would be
converted into a benefit for non-WTO Members.
4.169 Having strict regard to the wording of paragra ph 1, there is no way in which this provision
can be applied in circumstances such as those being considered in the present dispute. Even regarding
a "prohibition or restriction" as including a tariff quota, it cannot be said that any such measure is
applied to the imports from MFN countries: such im ports are merely subject to a tariff. Ecuador
attempts to argues that " the products not quantitatively restricted are those that are within the quota,
while the restricted products a re those that are denied access ". The European Communities does not
see how it can be that products within a quota are those that are " not
 quantitatively restricted ".
Ecuador in effect claims that alongside the real ta riff quota of X tons at zero tariff there is a notional
tariff quota of zero tons at zero tariff, so the two tariff quotas are not "similarly restricted". The truth
is that there is no tariff quota of zero tonnes at zero duty. Imports from MFN countries are not subject
to any tariff quota. Ecuador's interpretation is al so in conflict with the object and purpose of the
GATT. It would lead to Article XIII:1 effec tively duplicating Article I:1. Situations of
straightforward tariff discrimination could be artif icially presented as involving notional tariff quotas
which would fall within the ambit of Article XIII. The distinction between obligations regarding
tariffs and obligations regarding quantitative measure s can be maintained only if a tariff quota relates
to a positive quantity or value of goods. It cannot have unlimited or zero scope.
4.170 Ecuador's analysis of paragraph 2 presents the sa me legal fiction, but in a slightly different
way, describing as a "restriction" a "total excl usion" of imports from MFN countries from access
under the tariff quota given to ACP products. Ecuador in giving a meaning to the term "restriction"
which is entirely different from the one found in Arti cle XIII (or in any of Articles XI to XIV). The

term "restriction" is something that can be identif ied without reference to the actions taken against
other Members or products. It is a quantitative li mit on the volume of goods. Ecuador is saying that
the discrimination constitutes the "restriction". On this logic an unduly small tariff quota within a
system of tariff quotas would be a restriction tw ice over, firstly because it was a tariff quota and
secondly because it was excluded from its fair share of the tariff quota. Similarly, Ecuador could also
make a claim that the failure to accept any MFN co untry products at the ACP tariff-quota rate would
constitute an infringement of Article XI: 1 becau se it would amount to a forbidden prohibition or
restriction. These bizarre consequences of Ecuador's interpretation of the term "restriction" serve to
underline its falseness.
4.171 Article XIII is intended to deal with discrimination in quantitative limitations and is not aimed
at tariff discrimination, as seen by its heading and the te xt of all its paragraphs. It is hardly likely that
a single phrase in paragraph 5 was intended to tran sform the Article into one that could also be
targeted at tariff discrimination. Moreover, the wo rding of paragraph 5 says that the "provisions of
this Article shall apply to any ta riff quota instituted or maintained" by a Member, suggesting that it is
the tariff quota itself, and not its relationship with other import arrangements, at which the application
of GATT Article XIII is directed.
4.172 In a scenario of simple tariff discrimination, subject to any exception that might be applicable,
the situation would constitute a breach of Article I:1. If a limit is placed on the goods that may benefit
from the lower tariff, the effect is to limit the extent of the discrimination, an action that would surely
lessen the seriousness of the breach. However, according to Ecuador, the action would actually
increase the level of infringement of GATT because now an infringement of Article XIII:1 would be
added to that of Article I:1. While the harm caused to other Members was lessened, the GATT
inconsistency would be aggravated. The very perver sity of this result is a further argument against
Ecuador's claims.
4.173 The provisions of paragraph 5 can be applied to those aspects of tariff quotas that involve
quantitative restrictions. If tariff quotas are assigne d to a number of countries, paragraph 1 will
require that the restrictions placed on the one tariff quota are similar to those applied to other tariff
quotas. The precise way in which that similarity would be achieved is elaborated in paragraph 2.
(b) The applied tariff does not violate GATT Article II
4.174 Ecuador seems to imply that the European Co mmunities is still obliged to operate a tariff
quota system, allocating to Ecuador a part of the old 2.2 million tons quota at €75 per ton. This would
mean that Ecuador wishes to ha ve the European Communities reinst ate the old tariff quota system.
However, it was Ecuador itself that negotiated in to the Understanding and the Doha Waiver the
abolition of the tariff quota system and the introduction of the tariff only system as of 1 January 2006.
If Ecuador does not seek a return to the old tariff q uota system, it wishes to influence the negotiations
on the banana tariffs that are held in parallel with the general negotiations in the Doha Development
Round. By initiating these proceedings Ecuador im plicates this Panel in the tariff negotiations
between the European Communities and the banana exporting countries.
(i) The expiration of the concession for 2.2 million tons of bananas
4.175 The Annex to Section I-B of Schedule CXL set s the start date and the end date for the
existence and operation of that tariff quota.
4.176 Ecuador invokes the "Modalities Paper" published in 1993 and argues that it is inconsistent
with the expiration date. Ecuador is attempting to use the Modalities Paper as a "basis for dispute
settlement" in the current proceedings against the Pa per's own provisions, which have been upheld by
the Appellate Body. Ecuador's arguments shoul d be disregarded. Moreover, the Marrakesh

Agreements constituted a fresh start in the process of accumulating obligations from the schedules
and, as a consequence, the EC' concessions in its Uruguay Round Schedule must be read as they
stand, without any reference to earlier concessions and without any reference to the Modalities Paper.
4.177 Ecuador interprets the column "other terms a nd conditions" as not being capable of including
time limitations on the concessions. However, th e fact that the title reads "other terms and
conditions" does not
 mean that a WTO Member cannot insert in that column time limitations, or other
limitations on its concessions. To hold otherwis e would disrupt numerous carefully negotiated
concessions and limitations found in the GATT schedules of all WTO Members.
4.178 Ecuador states that the time limitation should be "laid out in the Schedule itself", and not in
the Annex. But the Annex is part of the Schedul e and Ecuador itself accepts this fact. The Panel
should not give an unwarranted legal significance to the space limitations of page 9 of Section I-B in
Schedule CXL.
4.179 Ecuador attempts to draw an argument from the fact that the Annex uses the word
"agreement" instead of "concession". However, Ec uador does not explain why the parties would set
an expiration date in the agreement, if it did not also cover the tariff quota concession which was the
main object of the agreement. Ecuador also does not explain why the parties would incorporate the
agreement together with the expiration clause in to the Schedule of Concessions of the European
Communities. If their intention was to establish a perpetual concession for the 2.2 million tons, they
would simply include in the Schedule the con cession and would not incorp orate the Annex which
limits the concession's duration. Moreover, Ecuador ignores the fact that the Annex provides that
"full consultations with the Latin American supp liers that are GATT Members should start no later
than in year 2001". This means that the parties ha d agreed to negotiate the system that would replace
the concession for the 2.2 million tons in view of its expiration and that these negotiations should
commence well in advance of the concession's expiration, which was agreed for the end of 2002.
4.180 Ecuador's argument that the MFN parties coul d not have agreed to such terms is wrong
because it ignores the fact that the parties had agreed to negotiate a new banana import system as of
2001, i.e., one year before the expiration of the concession for the 2.2 million tons. Therefore, the
banana exporting countries had ensured that they w ould have an important quantity exported at a low
tariff until the end of 2002 and that before the expiration of this concession they would have the
opportunity to negotiate new concessions.
4.181 The fact that the European Communities did not argue in previous dispute settlement
procedures that the concession for the 2.2 million t ons of bananas expired at the end of 2002 is
irrelevant. This the first time that the European Communities is accused of having breached Article II
by applying a tariff that is above the concessions in its Schedules and its tariff concessions are the
main subject matter of the dispute.
4.182 The reference to Article XXVIII negotiations in the Doha Waiver is irrelevant. Ecuador itself
had negotiated into the Understa nding the Article XXVIII negotiations. The Doha Waiver simply
repeats the terms of the Understanding that was signed earlier. Ecuador's assertion that the European
Communities would have been in a strong negotiating position is wrong. At the time, the European
Communities had already lost the Article 21.5 Panel and was seeking a waiver for the entire Cotonou
Agreement, to the grant of which Ecuador had reached reservations.
4.183 Ecuador cannot claim a breach of GATT Article XXVIII in these proceedings, because it has
not included such a claim in its request for the establishment of this Panel.
4.184 Ecuador argues that no member would invoke Article XXVIII:5 procedures to lower its
bound rate. The European Communities was obliged to initiate Article XXVIII:5 negotiations both by

the Understanding and the Doha Waiver. The Anne x in Schedule CXL also provided for negotiations
for the import regime that would replace the conc ession after its expiration at the end of 2002.
Therefore, the initiation and continuation of the Article XXVIII negotiations does not amount to a
supposedly de facto "rebinding" of that tariff quota. Moreover, it is not clear that Ecuador's
interpretation of Article XXVIII is correct, although the Panel does not need to decide on this point in
this case.
4.185 The Arbitration Awards' description of the European Communities' import regime is not
relevant for the present procedure. The Arbitration was not held within the context of the DSU. The
subject matter of the Arbitration was not to dete rmine what were the concessions bound in Schedule
CXL. Therefore, any relevant statements in the Ar bitration Awards should be treated as simple dicta.
The same applies to any relevant arguments advanced by the parties at the time.
(ii) The abolition of the tariff quota on 1 January 2006
4.186 Ecuador attempts to raise an Article XXVIII claim, which should be rejected because it was
not included in the request for the establishment of this Panel.
4.187 Ecuador argues that once a tariff quota is granted, the tariff part becomes obligatory and
perpetual, while the quota part may be freely elimin ated. Ecuador should explain why the rule that it
proposes should not be the other way round, i.e., that the "tariff element" of a tariff quota may be
freely amended, while the "quota element" should be treated as obligatory and perpetual. Moreover,
there is no legal basis for this argument.
(c) Conclusion
4.188 The European Communities requests the Panel to reject Ecuador's challenge to its banana
import regime.
3. Oral statement of the European Communities
(a) The timing of these proceedings is unfortunate
4.189 The first point the European Communities would like to make is that these proceedings are
taking place at the wrong time. As already men tioned in its written submissions, the European
Communities and the MFN banana producers are curren tly negotiating new tariffs for bananas. The
European Communities remains co mmitted to reaching an agreement in the pending negotiations,
despite the fact that the proceed ings initiated by Ecuador are presenting a big impediment to the
successful conclusion of the discussions.
(b) The challenge to the Cotonou Preference
4.190 The European Communities has been wanting to close the chapter of the banana dispute for
many years. And this is why it reached a deal with the complainants in 2001. The deal was that the
complainants would not object to the ACP countri es having their trade preference in bananas until the
end of 2007. In exchange, the European Commun ities would ensure that the MFN exporters would
maintain their access to the Europ ean market under the new import regime that would be introduced
in 2006. The European Communities even accepted to negotiate with the MFN suppliers the level of
its bound banana tariffs, just to get them to agree to the ACPs' having their preference extended for an
extra two years. This fact alone shows how co mmitted the European Communities is to supporting
the development efforts of the ACP countries. At the same time, the procedural safeguards offered to
the MFN countries shows how committed the Europ ean Communities is in reaching a solution that
addresses their concerns.

4.191 The year is 2007. It is now possible to verify whether the European Communities has kept its
promise and whether the MFN exporters' access to th e European market has b een maintained. There
is ample market data and statistics, hard figures show ing what is really happening in the market. The
European Communities has provided some of it in its two written submissions. What does the market
data show? It shows a clear fact. Without an y doubt, clearly and unequivocally, the group of MFN
exporters has more than maintained its market access. The group of MFN banana suppliers had never
exported so many bananas into the European Communities as it did in 2006.
4.192 The European Communities has updated its figures and it is now possible to see the results for
the first six months of 2007 (relevant table attached as Exhibit EC-10). What can be seen? Even
more growth in the quantities of MFN bananas coming into Europe. And that is not all. The MFN
growth is bigger than the growth of the total ma rket for bananas in the European Communities. And
that is not all either. The MFN growth is bigger th an the ACP growth in 2007. And again that is not
all. We have calculated the average f.o.b. pr ices paid to Ecuadorian and Colombian producers for
every year between 2004 and 2007 (relevant table attached as Exhibit EC-11). And what can be seen?
That the plantation owners in Ecuador and Colo mbia received in 2006 and are receiving in 2007
better prices than in 2005 and 2004.
4.193 Larger quantities and higher prices for MFN supplie rs. What does this mean? It means that
the MFN producers are much better off than before . It means that the European Communities has
done more than simply maintaining the market acce ss of the group of MFN suppliers. The European
Communities has actually helped increase the income of the MFN banana producers.
4.194 All of this shows that the European Commun ities has kept its promises. The European
Communities has respected its part of the deal.
4.195 The European Communities regrets to say that these proceedings show that the complainants
do not intend to keep their part of the deal. They do not wish to allow the ACP countries to have their
trade preference until the end of this year. The Euro pean Communities finds this regrettable. And it
invites the Panel to preserve the arrangement that it had reached with the complainants in the context
of the Doha Waiver and to reject the complain ants' claims in their entirety. The European
Communities has explained in its written submissions the legal bases justifying this result.
4.196 The third party submissions of Nicaragua and Panama include certain statements alluding that
the European Communities does not really care about the development needs of the developing
countries, but about its own "Treasury". The Euro pean Communities believe th at the facts are clear
and establish that these allusions are not correct. First of all, this very proceeding is a challenge to a
development friendly trade preference. More im portantly, the European Communities grants more
than €500 million every year to Latin America in th e form of development aid and it plans to spend
more than €2.7 billion of development aid during the next 5 years. Another €2.5 billion will come
from the European Investment Bank for the financing of projects in Latin America. And this does not
take into consideration the trade development aid, which would bring the figure to €one billion per
year. In light of the power of these facts, the European Communities invites the Panel not to take
these allusions into consideration.
4.197 Coming back to the legal claims of the comp lainants, the European Communities notes that
their entire case is based on the interpretation of the text of the Doha Waiver. The complainants argue
that it did not matter whether the European Co mmunities would actually put in place an import
regime that would maintain the market access of the MFN countries. What mattered was whether the
European Communities could convince the Arbitrators that its tariff calculations were correct. In
other words, the Doha Waiver was not based on market reality. It was based on "virtual reality".

4.198 The European Communities disagrees. The Eu ropean Communities believes that the Doha
Waiver was meant to achieve a certain situation in the market, namely maintaining the MFN market
access for the duration of the Cotonou Preference. The European Communities does not believe that
the Doha Waiver was meant to be based solely on predictions for the future. The European
Communities does not believe that the Doha Waiver w as meant to disregard the reality of the present.
The European Communities has explained in its written submissions what it considers to be the proper
application of the GATT rules and of the terms of the Understanding and the Doha Waiver on the
facts of this case. The European Communities invites the Panel not to take a formalistic interpretation
of the texts. The legal interpretation of the words in a document can be meaningful only if it is based
on market reality. In this case, the reality of th e market leads to a single conclusion: that the
complainants must respect their deal with th e European Communities, the way the European
Communities has respected its deal with them.
(c) The Article XIII claims
4.199 The complainants have tried to use the GA TT provisions on quantitative restrictions in
Article XIII in order to challenge the Cotonou Preference. The European Communities disagrees for
a number of reasons.
4.200 First of all, the banana import regime of the European Commun ities has exactly the
characteristics suggested by this Panel in 1999. Ther e is a single tariff and the ACP countries have a
preference. There must be a presumption of legality covering the solutions suggested by a Panel.
Otherwise the defending parties would be complete ly lost when they try to implement their
compliance measures.
4.201 But the fact that this import regime is exactly the import regime suggested by this Panel is not
the only reason for which the compla inants' claims should be rejected . Ecuador's interpretation of
Article XIII and its application on the facts of th is case leads to absurd results. The European
Communities offers a trade preference to the ACP countries. This preference takes the form of a
lower tariff. This might be tariff discrimination, but this is an issue to be dealt with under Article I of
the GATT. The fact that the Cotonou Preference is subject to a "cap" does not, by some kind of
magic, transform this preference in to an Article XIII issue. If this was the case, then what would be
the reason to have a separate Article I and a separate Article XIII?
4.202 The complainants attempt to draw some analogy with the regimes analysed by this Panel in
1997 and 1999. This is not correct. Following the abolition of the tariff-quota-based system in 2006,
the current regime is so different to those of the 1990s that no analogy can be drawn.
4.203 But what is really astonishing is that the co mplainants are basing their claims on a measure
that has been put in place in order to protect thei r market access. This th e best illustration of the
absurd results to which the complainants' position lead s. What they are saying is that if the Cotonou
Preference did not have any limit and the ACP countries had the right to export as many bananas as
they wanted free of duty, then the import regime of the European Communities would be fully
compatible with Article XIII of the GATT. The fact that the European Communities has tried to
protect the complainants by imposing a "cap" on the ACP preference somehow makes the system
illegal! Does this mean that the complainants wa nted the European Communities to offer to the ACP
countries an unlimited preference?
4.204 The European Communities still fails to understa nd what is the nullification or impairment
that the "cap" on the Cotonou Preference causes to the complainants. Indeed, if the European
Communities were to abolish this limit on the ACP preference, would the complainants be in a better
position?

(d) The challenge to the European Communities' applied tariff.
4.205 The last claim of the complainants relates to the tariff applied by the European Communities.
As already mentioned, the European Communities is negotiating with the MFN countries new tariffs
for bananas. These negotiations are being held in a transparent way, in accordance with the
provisions of Article XXVIII of the GATT. This is what the European Communities had promised to
do when it entered into the Understanding in 2 001, and this is exactly what the European
Communities is doing. And in the middle of the ne gotiations, Ecuador decides to bring this case. In
light of how this case has developed, it is difficult to avoid suspicion that its objective is to influence
these negotiations. The dispute settlement system should not be used for such tactics. The European
Communities does not think that panels should be dragged into tariff ne gotiations between WTO
Members.
4.206 In any event, the challenge to the European Communities' app lied tariff is baseless. The
provisions of the European Communities' Schedule are clear. The concession for the tariff quota of
2.2 million tons of bananas terminated at the end of 2002. The fact that the European Communities
decided to continue to import bananas at a lower applied tariff does not mean that the tariff was
rebound. If every WTO Member was bound by its applie d tariff and not by its officially bound rate,
then the whole GATT system would collapse.
4.207 The complainants have also come up with th e argument that the two elements of a tariff
quota, that is to say the tariff and the quantity, ar e completely separable and that a country can only
abolish the quantity, but not the tariff. We believe the Panel should reject this argument. There is no
legal basis or precedent that would justify a panel finding that the tariff "part" of a tariff quota is
perpetual, while the "quantity" part is not. And it is not clear what the re percussions for the entire
GATT and WTO system would be, if the Panel were to create such a new rule in this case.
4.208 The European Communities does not understand what is the import regime that the
complainants would like the Eur opean Communities to have. Are they saying that the European
Communities is still bound to have a tariff quota based system? Do they want the European
Communities to undo the reform of 2006, in disregard of the Understanding of 2001?
(e) Conclusion
4.209 In concluding its statement, the European Co mmunities would like to invite the Panel to
contribute to a definitive solution to this dispute by confirming two things. First, that the Cotonou
Preference can be maintained until the end of this year. And, second, that the tariff applied by the
European Communities is consistent with its Schedule of concessions.
4. Closing statement of the European Communities
4.210 The first point the European Communities wi shes to address is the assertion advanced by
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama that the Understa nding is not a "mutually agreed solution" for
purposes of the DSU. The European Communities has already explained in it written submissions
that the text itself of the Understanding provides th at it is a "mutually agreed solution". Ecuador's
accepting to have its retaliation rights terminated pr ovides further support to this conclusion. In any
event, even if it was to be assumed that the U nderstanding is not a "mutually agreed solution" for
purposes of the DSU, which the European Communiti es does not consider to be the case, it cannot be
denied that it is a bilateral agreement that must be taken into consideration in analysing the rights and
obligations of the parties to this dispute. Through the Understanding Ecuador accepted that the
Cotonou Preference would continue until the end of 2007. The European Communities considers that
this bars Ecuador from challenging th e operation of the Cotonou Preference to the end of this year.
The European Communities also c onsiders that the principle of good faith, which covers the entire

DSU, bars Ecuador from escaping its obligations by asserting the alleged non-compliance of the
Understanding with the WTO rules.
4.211 The second point is the assertion advanced by Ecua dor, Nicaragua and Panama that the Doha
Waiver terminated at the end of 2005, because the Arbitrators had found that the import systems
proposed by the European Communities at that time failed to meet the waiver standards. The
European Communities considers that this interpreta tion is wrong. The Doha Waiver states that it
would terminate if "the EC has failed to rectify th e matter". If the Doha Waiver wanted to say what
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama are arguing, the te xt should have read that the waiver would
terminate "if the Arbitrator concludes that the EC has failed to rectif y the matter". The Doha Waiver
does not say so. This shows that the crucial fa ctor was whether the import regime actually
implemented by the European Communities maintains the MFN countries' market access.
4.212 Nicaragua and Panama have tried to use the negotiating history of the Doha Waiver to support
their position. Their effort has failed. The truth is that the negotiating history of the Doha Waiver
supports the interpretation of the European Communi ties. Indeed, the draft dated 2 November 2001,
which Nicaragua has attached to its Third Party submission as Exhibit N-1, provided that the Doha
Waiver would be terminated automatically within tw o months from the notification of the arbitration
award to the General Council. However, this provi sion was not included in the final version of the
Doha Waiver. The link between the awards of the Ar bitrator and the termination of the Doha Waiver
was abandoned. This shows that the parties agreed that the termination of the Doha Waiver would not
be linked to the outcome of the arbitration awards, but on whether the European Communities
actually "rectified the matter".
4.213 Moreover, the Doha Waiver provides that it woul d terminate "upon the entry into force of the
new EC tariff regime". As we have already explai ned in our written submissions, this means that the
Doha Waiver would terminate if the European Co mmunities implemented the tariff regime that the
Arbitrators had found not to satisfy the standard of maintaining the MFN countries' market access.
4.214 The European Communities would like to draw th e attention of the Panel to two important
facts. First, the import regime implemented by the European Communities in 2006 is not the import
regime that the Arbitrators found not to meet the waiver's standards. Second, it has been established
that the import regime of the European Comm unities maintains the MFN countries' total market
access. Therefore, the European Communities "r ectified the matter" and the condition for the
continued application of the Doha Waiver has been satisfied.
4.215 As regards Article XIII, it is not the European Communities' intention to repeat the arguments
that it has already presented to the Panel. Howeve r, in its opening statement Ecuador has made a
number of assertions regarding this Article that require a response. Behind some of these assertions
lies unwillingness on the part of Ecuador to understa nd the fundamental distinction made by the
GATT between tariff and non-tariff measures. Thus, in its statement it seeks to confuse the notion of a
"restriction" (the term used in Articles XI and X III of the GATT) with that of the level of tariffs,
saying that Ecuador's exports are "restricted by th e high duty". Later in its statement Ecuador claimed
that "the reference to restrictions in Article X III does not exclude taxes, duties and other changes."
This is an interpretation for which there is no b asis in the GATT or GATT jurisprudence. Such an
interpretation would remove any need for Artic le I:1 in the GATT. Parties alleging tariff
discrimination would simply have to invoke Article XIII:1 to claim that the tariff in question was not
"similar" to that imposed on goods from another count ry. Furthermore, on such an interpretation of
"restrictions" it would hardly have been necessary for the drafters to insert in paragraph 5 an explicit
rule on tariff quotas.
4.216 The fundamental GATT distinction between tari ff and non-tariff measures is an important
element in this case. Tariff measures are subject to Articles I and II, and non-tariff measures are

governed by Articles XI and XIII. The European Co mmunities is unaware of any instance in which a
single measure has been found to be in breach of both Article I and Article XIII. The fact that, as
Ecuador observes in its Statement, other WTO provisi ons may overlap in their application detracts in
no way from this fundamental GATT principle.
4.217 Finally, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama have tried to show that the Schedule of concessions
of the European Communities does not say what it cl early says. They ask the Panel to disregard the
language in the Annex to the Schedule, which prov ides that the tariff quota for the 2.2 million tons
would expire at the end of 2002, and to try to dete rmine what might have been logical for the parties
to the Banana Framework Agreement to agree in the early 1990s. It is noted that this argument does
not seem to be very consistent with the position they are taking in the interpretation of the terms of the
Doha Waiver. The European Communities also notes the continued efforts of the complainants to
rely on the modalities paper, despite the fact that the modalities paper states that it cannot be used in
dispute settlement proceedings. The European Co mmunities considers that the situation with its
bound tariffs is clear and that the tariff quota for th e 2.2 million tons expired at the end of 2002 in
accordance with its terms.
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1 The arguments presented by Belize, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Japan, Madag ascar, Nicaragua, Panama, St Lucia, St Vincent
and the Grenadines, Suriname and the United States in their written submissions and oral statements
are reflected in the summaries below.
A. B
ELIZE, CAMEROON, CÔTE D'IVOIRE, DOMINICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GHANA, JAMAICA,
MADAGASCAR, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, AND SURINAME
1. Written submission of the ACP third parties
5.2 Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Domini ca, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica,
Madagascar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Gr enadines, and Suriname, referred to as "the ACP
third parties", respectfully request the Panel to reject as inadmissible and unfounded Ecuador's claim
against the new EC banana import regime which entered into force on 1 January 2006.
5.3 By way of introduction, the ACP third parties underline that Ecuador's complaint is an
attempt to use dispute settlement proceedings as a tool to increase Ecuador's leverage in the still
pending GATT Article XXVIII negotiations with the aim of forcing down the EC tariff and, with it,
undermine and reduce the ACP preference. Ecuador cl early disregards the fact that the new regime
against which its complaint is directed has actua lly improved total market access for MFN suppliers
and has fully complied with the letter and spirit of the "Understanding on Bananas" agreed between
Ecuador and the European Communities. Ecuador purposefully ignores the delicate balance which
this new regime seeks to achieve between the leg itimate interests of the MFN and ACP countries. In
order to accomplish this, Ecuador raises a number of formalistic arguments relating to the Doha
Waiver, GATT Article XIII and the EC Schedule of Concessions.
(a) Ecuador cannot challenge the new EC banana im port regime pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU
5.4 The ACP third parties submit that Ecuador cannot challenge the ne w EC banana import
regime by Article 21.5 proceedings as a measure taken to comply with the rulings in the original EC –
Bananas III case, due to the fact that the mutually ag reed solution between Ecuador and the European
Communities in the form of an "Understanding on Ba nanas" has settled that dispute and therefore

constitutes a bar to Article 21.5 proceedings. If Ec uador considers that the new EC banana import
regime is inconsistent with its WTO obligations, it should start new dispute settlement proceedings.
5.5 The issues involved in the present dispute are ra dically different from those examined in the
original EC –Bananas III dispute. What the Panel is required to analyse in the present case is the
WTO consistency of the new banana import regime which is a tariff-only regime adopted by the
European Communities under the provisions of the wa iver granted at Doha in order to enable it to
implement the Cotonou Agreement and the Unders tandings on Bananas with Ecuador and the US,
i.e. legal instruments which came into existen ce after the original dispute. These issues are
fundamentally different from those examin ed in the framework of the original EC – Bananas III case
and the subsequent Article 21.5 Panel which examined a tariff q uota regime under which different
quotas were allocated to various groups of supplie rs. The issues raised in the present case cannot
therefore be challenged via a compliance panel but require that they be examined through new dispute
settlement proceedings.
5.6 Authorizing Ecuador to challenge the new EC banana import regime in a compliance
proceeding would adversely affect the ACP third par ties' interests and rights. Indeed, the importance
for the ACP third parties of preserving their rights and the possibility of full y participating in the
proceedings as third parties is essential in the co ntext of the present dispute which may have grave
consequences for them. The expedited nature of co mpliance proceedings and, in particular, the very
strict deadlines within which parties must make their views known, adversely affect the possibility for
the ACP third parties to defend their interests. This would not be the case in original panel
proceedings.
(b) There is no violation of GATT Article I because the Doha Waiver still applies
5.7 Ecuador's argument that the European Commun ities no longer enjoys the Doha Waiver is
based on the view that the existence of two arbi tration awards concluding that the European
Communities' rebinding proposals were not such as to maintain total market access for MFN suppliers
has automatically led to the waiver ceasing to apply upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime.
Ecuador's argument must be rejected as it is refute d by the facts evidenced by the sustained growth in
MFN imports and ignores the object and purpose of the Doha Waiver.
5.8 The purpose of the Doha Waiver is to allo w the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement
and, in particular, of the preferential tariff tr eatment granted by the European Communities to
products originating in ACP countries until 31 Dece mber 2007. The specific procedures with respect
to bananas contained in the Annex to the Doha Wa iver confirm the application of the waiver with
respect to bananas until 31 December 2007, even if they also allow for the possibility of the waiver
ceasing to apply prior to that date. However, th is possibility would only occur if the European
Communities has failed to implement a new banana import regime which at least maintains total
market access for MFN suppliers.
5.9 This is not the case. Indeed, all available ma rket data indisputably demonstrate that the
competitive position of MFN bananas on the EC market has improved both as far as volumes and
prices are concerned since the introduction of the ne w EC banana import regime on 1 January 2006.
The import volume of MFN bananas significantly in creased in 2006 and even more in 2007. Cost
savings arising from the abolition of the quota licensing system and the reduction of the out of tariff
rate quota tariff of €680 per tonne to the new flat tariff of €176 per tonne more than outweighed the
cost of the perceived increase in the in quota rate of €75 euro, an improvement in the terms of access
that has led both to higher import volumes and improved prices paid to producers in Ecuador.
5.10 In light of the object and purpose of the Doha Wa iver, it is not possible to cogently argue that
the waiver has ceased to apply on purely procedur al grounds as submitted by Ecuador, since the new

regime which has actually been implemented mo re than maintains total market access for MFN
suppliers.
5.11 In addition, ACP countries were not allowed to fully participate in the arbitration proceedings.
This significantly reduced their opportunities to defe nd their positions. The fact that in the first
arbitration the Arbitrator ignored crucial ACP ar guments had an unfortunate effect on the way the
issues were addressed in the second arbitration and he nce may have had a decisive impact on its final
outcome. The finding in the second arbitration that the European Communities had not rectified the
matter should not override the undeniable fact that the new implemented import regime effectively
improves total MFN market access.
(c) There is no violation of GATT Article XIII
5.12 Ecuador's contention that the new EC banana import regime violates GATT Article XIII
because it imposes a tariff rate quota to which only ACP countries have access but not Ecuador and
other countries, is not valid.
5.13 First, the cap on the amount of bananas which can be imported duty-free from ACP countries
into the European Commun ities has been put in place in order to address MFN suppliers' concerns
with respect to an unlimited preferential access granted to ACP countries. Such limitation is therefore
beneficial to Ecuador. As a result, there is no nullif ication or impairment of Ecuador's benefits within
the meaning of GATT Article XXIII.
5.14 Second, there cannot be any violation of GATT Article XIII:1 and 2 since, in the new EC
banana import regime, there is no prohibition or restriction within the meaning of GATT
Article XIII:1 and a fortiori, none imposed on Ecuador or MFN suppliers.
5.15 What Ecuador is challenging is not the limita tion placed on the quantit y of duty-free banana
imports from ACP countries but the preferential duty which is granted to these countries. However,
this is not the object of GATT Article XIII but of GATT Article I. Ecuador 's interpretation would
have the effect of blurring the distinction between GATT Article I and GATT Article XIII.
5.16 The new banana import regime implemented by the European Communities, complies with
the second suggestion of the compliance panel in the original EC – Bananas III dispute. The fact that
no Article XIII waiver is necessary for the implementation of the new EC banana import regime is
confirmed by the fact that an express reference to an Article XIII waiver is only made in the context
of the third option, which covers a tariff quota re gime under which different quotas are allocated to
various groups of suppliers.
(d) There is no violation of GATT Article II
5.17 Ecuador's argument that the EC tariff of €176 per tonne breaches GATT Article II because it
would exceed the European Communities' binding must be rejected because a proper reading of the
EC Schedule of Concessions shows that the binding to grant a tariff rate quota of 2.2 million tonnes at
€75 per tonne expired at the end of 2002.
5.18 In any case, the tariff of €75 per tonne is neces sarily linked to the quota. Therefore, the
abolition of the quota necessarily implies the termination of the corresponding tariff.
5.19 In conclusion, on the basis of the above argumen ts, the ACP third parties respectfully request
the Panel to reject Ecuador's challenge to the European Communities' new banana import regime.

B. CAMEROON
1. Oral statement of Cameroon
(a) Introduction
5.20 The dispute before you is crucial to the ACP countries, inasmuch as Ecuador's purpose in this
case is no more and no less than to challenge the import regime for bananas provided for by the
Cotonou Agreement, whereas the fact is that, without that regime, the ACP producers would be
unable to export their bananas.
5.21 The ACP States are deeply concerned by Ecuador 's attack on the preferences granted under
the Cotonou Agreement. It should be recalled that Ecuador has repeatedly accepted the principle that
a preference for ACP bananas was justified. This is clear from the Understanding on Bananas reached
by Ecuador and the European Communities on 30 Ap ril 2001. Ecuador also supported at Doha the
European Communities' request for a waiver cove ring the ACP preference. Moreover, when the
bananas dispute was placed on the agenda of th e WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in
December 2005, Ecuador challenged neither the waiver nor, by extension, the preference itself. On
the contrary, it even agreed to participate in th e monitoring system put in place to determine, under
the responsibility of Mr Store, the Norwegian Mini ster for Foreign Affairs, whether market access
was maintained for MFN bananas under the new EC regime for the importation of bananas.
5.22 Obviously, Ecuador's support had a price. Indeed, the European Communities granted a
number of concessions to Ecuador in exchange for it s consent to the maintenance of the waiver until
31 December 2007. Thus, the European Commun ities agreed to increase the tariff quota for
MFN bananas and committed itself to putting in place a tariff-only regime as of 1 January 2006. The
Panel will recall that tariff quota B, open to MFN producers, was increased by 100,000 tonnes, from
353,000 to 453,000 tonnes. This increase was introdu ced at the expense of the ACP countries, whose
quota was reduced from 850,000 to 750,000 tonnes. Furthermore, this reduced quota, which had
originally been reserved for the 12 traditional ACP supplier countries, now had to be shared with the
non-traditional ACP suppliers, bearing in mind th at imports of non-traditional ACP bananas had
previously been included under the MFN quota. The resulting transfer had the effect of increasing the
quota available to the MFN producers by 100,000 tonnes at the expense, of course, of the
ACP countries.
5.23 The European Communities and the ACP countries t hus had to pay a heavy price in order to
be able to maintain the ACP preference until the end of this year, especially since the reduction of the
ACP quota by 200,000 tonnes as a result of the U nderstanding on Bananas and the Doha Waiver
drove a number of banana producers and exporte rs in our countries out of business. The ACP
countries are therefore extremely concerned by Ecuador's current attempt to eliminate the ACP
preference after it has itself reaped major benefits from the Understanding and the waiver.
5.24 The ACP countries accordingly consider that Ecuador's claim against the new EC banana
import regime, which entered into force on 1 Janua ry 2006, is both inadmissible and unfounded.
Inadmissible because Ecuador's claim does not co ncern a compliance issue which would justify
recourse to a panel established under Article 21.5; unfounded because the new EC banana import
regime has considerably improved access to th e EC market for MFN bananas and is in full-
compliance with the European Communities' WTO obligations.
5.25 Lastly, Ecuador's claim deliberately ignores or feigns to ignore the delicate balance which this
new regime has sought to achieve between the legitimate interests of both the ACP and the
MFN countries, that is to say a tariff-only sy stem which maintains total market access for
MFN bananas, while at the same time offering viab le preferential access to ACP producers. In this

connection, it is curious and surprising that Ecuador completely disregards the fact that the disputed
regime has in fact more than adequately maintained total market access for MFN suppliers and has
fully complied with the letter and the spirit of the Understanding on Bananas reached by Ecuador and
the European Communities. It is obvious that Ecuador, by challenging the already limited preferential
access enjoyed by the ACP banana producers, is qu ite simply seeking to capture the market share
currently held by the ACP producers which would be unable to survive without the preference regime.
(b) Ecuador cannot challenge the new EC banana import regime under Article 21.5 of the DSU
5.26 Cameroon, on behalf of the ACP countries, would like to draw the Panel's attention to the fact
that Ecuador cannot challenge the new EC banana import regime under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
5.27 The ACP countries consider that Ecuador cannot bring this case before an Article 21.5 panel
because the disputed measure is not a compliance measure related to the original Bananas III dispute.
5.28 This is a completely new and different impor t regime, one which was adopted, not as a result
of the original Bananas III dispute, but in the framework of the mutually agreed solution and the
Doha Waiver. It would in any event be unreasonable for Ecuador to use the dispute settlement system
to challenge the new banana import regime as if it were a compliance issue.
5.29 The distinguished Minister of Agriculture of Suriname, Mr Raghoebarsing, will shortly go
into greater detail on this issue, which the ACP countries regard as crucially important.
(c) The new EC banana import regime has not onl y maintained but has significantly improved
market access for MFN bananas
5.30 Market data show that the new EC banana import regime has not only maintained but has
significantly improved market access for MFN bananas. To recall, this is a completely new tariff
regime which complies with the commitments u ndertaken by the Europ ean Communities in its
Understanding with Ecuador and in the Doha Waiver. As provided by the Doha Waiver, the new
regime should, at the very least, maintain tota l market access for MFN banana suppliers. This
condition has been fulfilled.
5.31 Ecuador ignored this fact in its written submissions as well as in its oral statement of this
morning, as we all observed. This is all the more surprising since Ecuador has always maintained that
market access was the benchmark or, indeed, the criterion – to take the expression used by the
Chairman yesterday – against which the new EC regime had to be assessed.
5.32 Unless it can provide proof to the contrary, which is the burden incumbent on Ecuador in this
case, all the available statistical data show th at the competitive position of MFN bananas on the
EC market has improved in terms of both export volumes and prices paid to MFN producers ever
since the EC banana import regime was introduced.
5.33 First, the import volume of MFN bananas increased significantly in 2006, by 325,270 tonnes
in fact, compared with 2005, bringing the share of MFN bananas in total EC banana imports to
80 per cent.
5.34 The first six months of 2007 show the same upward trend, with a further increase of
144,203 tonnes compared to the same period in 2006 (according to the figures provided yesterday by
the European Communities). This is evidence, if any were needed, that the new EC import regime
has improved market access for MFN bananas.

5.35 It is at the same time interesting to note, on th e basis of a detailed analysis of the statistics,
that most MFN suppliers have reduced the volum e of their exports to the United States while
increasing exports to the European market. The representative of Côte d'Ivoire, Ambassador Guy
Alain Emmanuel Gauze, will have an opportunity to return to this point in a moment.
5.36 Secondly, the wholesale prices of MFN bananas have remained the same or have even
decreased following the introduction of the new regime. It is clear, therefore, that the introduction of
the duty of €176 per tonne, without any restriction on volume, has not had the effect of excluding
MFN bananas from the EC market. Moreover, price movements during the year have been similar to
price movements in previous years. This shows th at the new tariff has not had a disruptive effect on
market price trends.
5.37 Finally, the liberalization brought about by th e abolition of the import licensing system has
created new opportunities for MFN exporters. For ex ample, Guatemala, Peru and Brazil, which had
supplied only small quantities in recent years, shar ply increased their exports to the EC market once
the new regime entered into force.
5.38 Interestingly, the main beneficiaries of the new EC regime are actually the small local
MFN exporters, who have repeatedly expressed thei r satisfaction with the new opportunities offered
by this regime. Indeed, for the first time th ey are no longer dependent on a small number of
intermediaries exercising control over import licen ces. Several examples of such statements have
been included in the ACP submissions. They include, among others, the following statement by the
President of the El Oro chamber of banana producers:
de buenos precios. […] Segun Julio Ullauri, pr esidente de la camara de Productores de
268

5.39 The opening of the market to new importers and the increased competition for the available
bananas between buyers have also enabled MFN prod ucers to charge higher prices for their products.
As a result, the price paid to producers in Ecuador reached its highest ever level in 2006. Moreover,
the differential with the official minimum price set by the Ecuadorian Government had never been so
great.
5.40 All the aforementioned market data lead to onl y one conclusion: the new EC banana import
regime has significantly improved MFN access to the EC market thanks to the elimination of the tariff
quota and, hence, the quota rent.
5.41 The substantive conditions for maintaining in force the Doha Waiver covering the
ACP banana preferences until 31 December 2007 have thus been met.

268 In English: "The change in the export syst em which started on 1 January and which replaced
licences by an import duty of €176 per tonne changes the rules of the game and brings new players to the table.
Importer diversification coincides with a period of good pr ices. [ … ] According to Julio Ullauri, President of
the El Oro chamber of banana producers, the new system breaks the monopoly of the traditional importers and
has put the famous ' cuperos' out of business." See Exhibit ACP-5, press clipping from El Comercio dated 15

(d) The preference granted to ACP countries is the expression of a long-standing commitment to
offer viable trading opportunities to ACP bana na producers in a market dominated by MFN
producers
5.42 Cameroon would like at this stage to emphasi ze that the preference granted to the ACP
countries is the expression of a long-standing commit ment to offer viable trading opportunities to
ACP banana producers in a market dominated by MFN producers.
5.43 The banana sector is essential for the economic and social development of the ACP countries,
and the long-term survival of the sector depends on the continued existence of preferential access to
the EC market.
5.44 Bananas account for a major share of ACP agri cultural exports. Hundreds of thousands of
jobs have been created. The introduction of regu lar shipping services to transport bananas to the
European Communities on a weekly basis has signifi cantly reduced the economic isolation of these
countries. The existence of these regular maritime services has enabled the ACP countries to export
other goods to Europe and, in return, to import goods essential to the development and daily life of
their inhabitants. The banana sector thus plays a major role in the fight against poverty, particularly in
rural areas.
5.45 For more than 40 years, the European Commun ities has sought to promote the banana sector
as an important tool for the economic and social development of the ACP countries. Providing
preferential access to the EC market has always been the best way of achieving that objective.
However, as mentioned earlier, this preferential access has increasingly been eroded in order to
accommodate Ecuador and other MFN countries. Se veral banana producers in the ACP countries are
experiencing serious economic and social difficultie s and some of these countries, which previously
exported to the European Communities, no longer do so.
5.46 WTO Members have repeatedly recognized the legitimacy of this development objective and
of preferential tariff treatment as a tool for achievi ng it. Many WTO Members use tariff preferences
to foster development objectives, and the WTO Ag reements expressly provide for this possibility.
Similarly, under the EC Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the MFN countries benefit from
improved preferential access in sectors where they are not the dominant producers. The Cotonou
Agreement, and the banana import regime in particular, have been and must be considered in this light
as providing trading opportunities for the weakest market players like the ACP banana producers.
5.47 The importance of the Cotonou Agreement to the ACP producers was accepted by the
WTO Members in their Decision on the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement adopted at the Doha
Ministerial Conference on 14 November 2001. The D ecision grants a waiver enabling the European
Communities to accord preferential tariff treatment to products originating in ACP countries, and this
waiver covers not only bananas but practically all agricultural and industrial products exported by the
ACP countries to the European Communities. Such pr eferential access is of particular importance for
the survival of the ACP banana producers.
5.48 It is a well known fact that ACP banana produ cers are less competitive than MFN producers.
Compared to the latter, ACP producers have higher production costs. For historical and geographical
reasons, they do not enjoy the same economies of scale as the MFN producers. As a result,
ACP producers can only compete with MFN producer s in markets where they enjoy preferential
access. This is evidenced by the fact that even the Caribbean ACP countries, despite their proximity
to the United States, are unable to compete with the MFN countries on the US market, given that the
lack of preferential access and their higher cost st ructure make access to that market impossible.
Since the European Communities is the only major ba nana market offering trading opportunities to

ACP banana producers, the ACP countries are entirely dependent on the EC market. All the other
developed markets are completely dominated by MFN suppliers.
(e) Conclusion
5.49 To conclude, Ecuador has one objective in instituting this proceeding, namely to challenge the
preferential access granted by the Communities to AC P bananas. Ecuador does not hesitate to abuse
the dispute settlement system by presenting this case as if it concerned a compliance issue in relation
to the original Bananas III dispute. Moreover, Ecuador has re lied on a whole range of formalistic
arguments in order to attack the new EC banana import regime. Not only are these unfounded, but
they do not take into account the benefits that have accrued to the MFN producers under the new
regime.
5.50 In 2006 alone, imports of MFN bananas increased by more than 10 per cent. Many new
smaller producers, no longer hampered by a licensing system monopolized by a few large companies,
have in consequence been able to enter the EC mark et, thus contributing to the diversification of its
sources of supply. Moreover, they have seen their income increase. European consumers have also
benefited from the new regime. Prices have remained stable or even declined, thus ensuring that
bananas remain the cheapest fruit available to European consumers.
5.51 Prices paid to MFN producers are higher, import quantities have increased, and wholesale
prices on the EC market have fallen slightly despit e a rise in the customs duty. There is a single
incontrovertible explanation for these seemingly contradictory phenomena: the few large-scale
operators which previously held import licences are no longer able to abuse their position in order to
obtain extraordinary profits. A ll these elements show that the European Communities was in full
compliance with its obligations when it introduced the new banana import regime on 1 January 2006.
5.52 Mr Chairman, members of the Panel, you will ag ree that developments in the EC banana
market have demonstrated that the abolition of the quota system and the introduction of a single tariff
of €176 per tonne has done more than simply mainta in market access for MFN bananas. The market
has done what statistical projections and econometri c models could not achieve during the arbitration
proceedings, by demonstrating beyond a shadow of a doubt that the replacement of a quota system by
a tariff-only system has worked to the benefit of both MFN producers and European consumers.
5.53 The ACP countries wish to express their confiden ce in the multilateral trading system and, of
course, their confidence in the dispute settlement system. Our representation at the political level
attests to the importance we attach to the WTO system in general and the banana dossier in particular.
In any event, the ACP countries attach high hop es to the decision or recommendations you will be
adopting.
C. C
ÔTE D'IVOIRE
1. Oral statement of Côte d'Ivoire
5.54 In its decision of 14 November 2001 granti ng a waiver for the ACP–EU Partnership
Agreement, the Doha Ministerial Conference stated th at "in the field of trade, the provisions of the
ACP–EC Partnership Agreement requires preferentia l tariff treatment by the EC of exports of
products originating in the ACP States", and that "t he Agreement is aimed at improving the standard
of living and economic development of the ACP States".
5.55 The Ministerial Conference also considered that "the preferential tariff treatment for products
originating in the ACP States as required by Article 36.3, Annex V and its protocols of the Agreement
is designed to promote the expansion of trade and economic development of beneficiaries in a manner

consistent with the objectives of the WTO and with the trade, financial and development needs of the
beneficiaries and not to raise undue barriers or to create undue difficulties for the trade of other
Members".
5.56 In the context of this waiver and the management of the new EC regime for the importation of
bananas, what was the situation of ACP and MFN banana suppliers in 2006?
5.57 The Côte d'Ivoire notes that in the course of 2006, European banana imports from the ACP
countries reached a total of 906,000 tonnes, and the le vel of imports at the end of June 2007 confirms
this stability: imports from the ACP countries ha d increased by only 6,000 tonnes as compared to
2006. This figure of approximately 900,000 tonnes should come as no surprise, since it corresponds
to the actual capacity of the ACP countries which, unfortunately, was masked by the poor production
conditions in 2005, the reference year, and by the concessions made by the EC to the United States
and Ecuador in April 2001 as a result of the Lamy-Zoellick Agreement:
• Under this Agreement, the ACP quota, which until then had been set on the basis of
historical records at 850,000 tonnes, was to be reduced by 100,000 tonnes while the
autonomous quota B of the MFN countries would be increased from 353,000 tonnes
to 453,000 tonnes, i.e. an additional 100,000 tonnes.

• The Agreement also provides that the ACP quota, which until then had been reserved
for the EU's 12 traditional ACP banana supplie rs, would be extended to cover all of
the non-traditional ACP suppliers. At that time, these countries exported
approximately 100,000 tonnes to Europe through MFN quotas A and B. Access by
these ACP countries to the ACP quota and their exclusion from MFN quotas A and B
has increased the quantities available to the MFN countries by 100,000 tonnes and
reduced the amounts available to the ACP by the same amount.

• Thus, the two measures combined have r esulted in a 200,000 tonne increase in MFN
access to the European market, and conver sely, a 200,000 tonne decrease in ACP
access. The 906,000 tonnes exported to Euro pe by the ACP countries in 2006 fall
short of the 950,000 tonnes that the ACP c ould have exported to Europe had these
two major concessions not been made.

• Moreover, the first-come first-served quota management system, announced too late
under the new system, has inevitably caused ACP exporters to export more than the
allocated quota of 775,000 tonnes of bananas to Europe and to pay an import duty of
€176 per tonne for the excess which, in 2006, amounted to 131,000 tonnes.

Indeed, under the first-come first-served syst em, it is not possible to ensure that the
quota volume is not exceeded if the exportable quantities are higher than the quota
volume. An exporter cannot decide on its own to reduce its exports, because unless
there is an understanding among all of the exporters (which would of course be
unethical), the volume that it refrains from exporting will be taken up by other ACP
suppliers.

In addition, because the ripeners require a regular supply of referenced quality
bananas, exporters have to deliver regularl y on a weekly basis throughout the year.
This leads to the importation of bananas w ith payment of the tariff during the periods
in which the zero tariff quota has come to an end – which is why in 2006, ACP
producers exported volumes corresponding to their capacity of 900,000 tonnes, even
though it meant taking a loss.

5.58 Also, at the same time, or conversely, Eur opean banana imports from the MFN countries
experienced an overall increase of more than 325,00 0 tonnes in 2006 as compared to 2005, reaching
3,290,000 tonnes. This upward trend has continued at the same pace in 2007: indeed, during the first
six months of the year, the MFN countries increased their exports to the European market by 144,000
tonnes as compared to 2006, in contrast to the stab ility of the ACP supply. In other words, the MFN
countries have more than maintained their access to the European ma rket, and the objective set by the
Ministers in Doha has clearly been achieved throu gh the implementation of the new European banana
importation regime.
5.59 These statistical data show that most of the MFN countries have reduced their supply to the
American market, of which they are the exclusive suppliers, in order to increase their shipments to the
European market. For example:
• In 2006, Columbia increased its exports to the European Union by 59,000 tonnes
compared to 2005, and decreased its exports to the US market by 40,000 tonnes.

• Costa Rica increased its exports to the Eu ropean Union by some 200,000 tonnes, and
its exports to the United States by 105,000 tonnes.

• Panama also preferred to increase its ship ments to the European market by 29,000
tonnes, while increasing its exports to the United States by only 5,500 tonnes.

• Peru doubled its exports to the European Union with a 22,400 tonne increase, while
its exports to the United States increased by only 2,700 tonnes.

5.60 These figures are all the more interesting in that in terms of volume, purchasing power and
consumer habits, the American market is similar to the European market. For the Latin American
producers it has the geographical advantage of being mu ch closer than the European market, so that
the logistical costs are obviously lower; added to which, no duties are levied on bananas from the
MFN countries. And yet in spite of these advantag es, many MFN countries, including some of the
leading ones, have preferred to step up their expor ts to the European market which is geographically
more remote, and pay the customs duty that they are now challenging – oddly enough.
5.61 It therefore seems clear that this duty, which was established with the introduction of the new
European banana importation regime on 1 January 2006, has not been an obstacle to exports from the
Latin American countries, but on the contrary, has encouraged them to export even greater volumes to
Europe.
5.62 Other MFN countries have apparently adopted di fferent strategies, and have exported less to
the European market for internal reasons: for example Ecuador, which in 2006 increased its exports
to the United States by 90,000 tonnes while decreasing its exports to the EU by 40,000 tonnes.
5.63 The Côte d'Ivoire questions the reasons for these contradictions:
• Can it be linked to Ecuador's geographical situation and to the difficulties it may have
encountered in using the Panama canal?

• Or is it because Ecuador preferred to devel op its exports towards new markets, such
as Russia, which have experienced rapid growth?

• Or finally, is this situation not attributab le to the internal production difficulties that
Ecuador has experienced?

5.64 The Côte d'Ivoire cannot answer for Ecuador ; but it is clear that Ecuador's relative
underperformance in exporting bananas to Europe cannot and must not be attributed to the customs
duty. This reduction of a mere 40,000 tonnes represents less than 4 per cent of Ecuador's total exports
in 2005, which amounted to 1,026,000 tonnes.
5.65 The Côte d'Ivoire is of the view that this statistical overview reflects actual market figures
resulting from 18 months of operation of the new banana importation regime in the European Union.
5.66 In spite of this irrefutable reality, certain MFN countries continue to claim that with a
preference of €176 per tonne, Europe's ACP banana suppliers will considerably increase their exports
in the future. Panama, for example, has presented th e conclusions of a study carried out on its behalf
by an Australian consultancy firm, the Centre fo r International Economics (CIE), according to which
important investments can be expected in the banana sector, in particular among the African LDCs.
5.67 As far back as the arbitration hearings of 2005, the author of this study, Mr Borell, went to
great lengths to demonstrate to the arbitrators that African exports to Europe would be growing very
rapidly. Since the actual figures proved him wrong, he now claims that the weak growth in ACP
exports was due to poor climatic c onditions both in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon. But, he claimed, in
Cameroon, Angola and Mozambique, for example, i nvestors would be quick to seize the opportunity
offered by this preference to invest massively.
5.68 Without wishing to spark a controversy, it is worth noting that Mozambique is not in a
particularly good position to devel op the production of bananas for e xport to Europe, if only because
the long sea journey is incompatible with the preservation of the quality of the fruit.
5.69 Finally, to illustrate the difficulty for the A frican countries to compet e with MFN bananas,
Côte d'Ivoire attaches to this statement the interv iew given by the President of Chiquita Europe to
Eurofruit Magazine last July. In that interview, he states that as a prerequisite to any new
developments, the competitiveness of the Africa n banana sector will have to be improved,
notwithstanding the preference granted to them.
5.70 According to Côte d'Ivoire, a model based on sc ientific reasoning, whether mathematical or
econometric, must be verifiable within a reasonabl e time-frame. If not, it becomes a mere prediction
or prophecy. In its submission, Panama has su ggested that once again reliance is placed on the
Bananarama model of the Centre for International Economics. In August 2007, Mr Borell is still
predicting hellfire for Latin American producers, but for 2012 this time, if not 2014.
5.71 This same forecaster, using the same variabl es in his mathematical analyses, has already
predicted:
• In 2004, that "the results of the Bananarama model showed that with a duty of €187
per tonne:

• The Latin Americans would see their market access reduced because the ACP
quota would be exceeded and because of the development of production in
the least developed countries (LDCs), and this even in the case of the most
optimistic scenarios

• the average loss for the Latin American producers would be more than a
million tonnes."269

5.72 Cote d'Ivoire notes that the decline predicted as soon as the tariff of more than €75 per tonne
was introduced actually turned into an increase of more than 300,000 tonnes in 2006, and probably as
much in 2007, i.e. 600,000 tonnes more in two years.
• In 2005, Mr Borell announced that "the development of the ACP countries and LDCs
would cause a million tonnes of bananas to be displaced from the developing
countries of Latin America."
270

5.73 Although they have had unlimited access at a zero duty rate since 1 January 2006, not a single
exporter among the least developed countries has appeared on the European market. So where are the
investments which, according to the Centre for In ternational Economics, we re supposed to be so
profitable?
5.74 In 2007, the Centre for International Economic s pushed its predictions forward to 2014 in
order to cover up the failure of its forecasti ng model. Projects are allegedly under way in
Mozambique and Angola. Côte d' Ivoire questions why there is a wait until 2014 to see the results
271
when less than a year suffices to produce and export bananas.
5.75 Côte d'Ivoire prefers to keep its intervention brief and will therefore avoid talking about the
numerous basic errors already reported during the ar bitration, which suggest that the model of the
Centre for International Economics was merely th e reflection of a determination to push the ACP
producers out of the European market for once and for all.
5.76 Before concluding, Côte d'Ivoire would like to recall once again the actual market data which
show to what extent the statements of some MFN countries conceal their single objective of supplying
the entire world market alone, with still one small exception in Asia.
5.77 It has been clearly established that the MF N countries dominate the world banana market.
According to the FAO, in 2005 they exported some 9.5 million tonnes of bananas: 3,800,000 tonnes
to the United States, where they are the only suppliers, and 3 milli on tonnes to the European market
where they already account for more than 80 per cent of total imports.
5.78 The MFN countries also supply much of the rest of the world. The Russian market has
developed considerably over the past few years, and now represents one million tonnes. The MFN
countries, thanks to their lower production costs, export to all countries in the world. They even
compete with regional producers in Asia and Oceania in spite of the high logistical costs involved. A
single figure sums up the situation: from 1993 to 20 04, banana exports from Ecuador alone increased
by 1.5 million tonnes, i.e. close to 60 per cent.
5.79 Côte d'Ivoire repeats and stresses that contra ry to the MFN suppliers, the ACP countries have
only one outlet for their exports: the territory of the European Union.
5.80 At the end of the day, it is the MFN exporters that really have the capacity and the powerful
means needed to eliminate the ACP suppliers on th e European market, and not the contrary. The

269 EU banana drama: Not Over Yet – CIE March 2004.
270 Latin American will suffer crippling access losse s under the European Co mmunities' €176/t tariff
and other increased tariff rates – CIE December 2005.
271 Annex 2 to Panama's submission.

900,000 tonnes from the ACP countries cannot possibly represent a threat to the 10 million tonnes
from the Latin American suppliers.
5.81 Let us approach the problems of world trade in bananas intelligently and bear in mind that the
equivalent of the total exports of all the ACP c ountries is supplied by a single Ecuadorian exporter.
This should give an idea of what is really at stake and of the injustices surrounding this dispute.
5.82 Côte d'Ivoire points out that while the ACP countries reputed to be "preferential" are confined
to their zero duty tariff quota without any real prospects for growth in their production and in their
exports to the European Communities, the MFN countries, which until recently were marginal
producers, have doubled or even tripled their produc tion in the space of three years from 50,000 to
100,000 and even 150,000 tonnes.
5.83 After all, Brazil became the fifth MFN supplie r with a continuous and steadily increasing
supply over the past four years:
• 13,120 tonnes during the first six months of 2004;

• 20,800 tonnes in 2005;

• 28,500 tonnes in 2006;

• 30,000 tonnes in 2007.

5.84 Preference here is not a barrier, nor does it limit production, let alone access, of MFN bananas
to the Community market.
5.85 The statistics show that access by new exporters to the European market and the increase in
the exports of certain MFN countries would appear to answer the concerns expressed by Colombia
with respect to improvement of the conditions of competition.
D. D
OMINICAN REPUBLIC
1. Oral statement of the Dominican Republic
5.86 The Dominican Republic wants to underline th e importance and the priority of the present
case for the Dominican Republic, particularly for the survival of its banana producers, who are
struggling so hard to maintain this sector.
5.87 The preferential system given to the ACP c ountries by the European Union has allowed a
solid banana industry to develop in the Dominican Republic, guaranteeing a livelihood to thousands
of poor producers and making a major economic and so cial contribution. Consequently, the banana
sector is a catalyst for development in the Dominican Republic.
5.88 It is therefore a matter of deep concern to the Government of the Dominican Republic that
Ecuador is questioning this system through the curre nt procedure and, as stated by other colleagues
from ACP countries, it should not be allowed. Firs tly, Ecuador's complaints do not refer to any issue
of non-compliance, which is the basis for Artic le 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) and secondly because the data show that with the new regime the European Union has
substantially improved access for MFN suppliers and has met its commitments at the WTO.

5.89 The Dominican Republic hopes that the Panel will take its arguments into account in such a
way that this preferential EU scheme for ACP count ries for the marketing of bananas is not modified,
thus enabling its producers to survive.
E. JAMAICA
1. Oral statement of Jamaica
5.90 The case at hand is of paramount importance to Jamaica and to banana exporting countries
within the ACP Group. It underscores the cha llenges faced by developing countries within the
multilateral trading system as illustrated by the fact that the issue of ACP banana exports within the
framework of the EC banana regime has accounted for a disproportionate share of the cases that have
been brought within the ambit of the dispute settlement regime.
5.91 Jamaica and other ACP third parties affirm that there is no justifiable interest for Ecuador in
the present proceedings. The purpose of the dispute se ttlement system is to ensure prompt settlement
of situations in which a Member considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under
the WTO Agreements is being impaired by measures taken by another Member.
5.92 Ecuador is ostensibly seeking to demonstrate that the European Communities' Article I waiver
ended on 1 January 2006 and is doing so in proceedings that are unlikely to be completed near the end
of the period for which the Doha Waiver was gran ted, i.e. 31 December 2007. It is apparent,
however, that Ecuador's sole purpose in bringing this claim forward is to exert pressure on the
European Communities in the ongoing tariff negot iations. By initiating Article 21.5 compliance
proceedings, Ecuador is seeking to accelerate the pr ocedure in order to be able to use the Panel's
findings during the ongoing negotiations with the Eur opean Communities. This is a clear misuse of
the dispute settlement provisions.
5.93 The proceedings initiated by Ecuador are also ve ry surprising, given that country's explicit
commitment via the Understanding on Bananas c oncluded with the European Communities, to
support a waiver of GATT Article I in order to enable the European Communities to grant preferential
tariff treatment, until the end of 2007, to the ACP states which are Parties to the Cotonou Agreement.
The timing of Ecuador's latest action therefore calls into question the principle of good faith on which
the Understanding was constructed.
5.94 The Understanding on Bananas and the Doha Waiver have enabled ACP exporters to
maintain a presence in the European market but th e attendant reduction in the ACP tariff quota has
also put several local banana growers and exporte rs out of business. They suffered both from the
reduction in the ACP quota of 100,000 tonnes and from the inclusion within this reduced quota of
non-traditional ACP suppliers which previously had preferential access within the MFN quota. This
vividly applies to the Jamaican banana industry which is dominated by small-scale producers, who
rely almost exclusively on market access to the EU for their livelihoods and those of the communities
in which they operate. It is clear that after securing all the benefits at our expense, Ecuador now
wishes to renege on the Understanding and in the process, completely eliminate Jamaican producers
from the EU market. Ecuador should therefore not be allowed to use Article 21.5 procedures to
challenge the implementation of the final phase of a mutually agreed solution, after it has gained the
advantages given to it by the Understanding concerned.
5.95 Bananas represent a major share of total ACP agricultural exports and in Jamaica's case, ranks
among the top five export items. The industry is a prime contributor to rural development, job
creation and poverty reduction. It is also extrem ely vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly
hurricanes, which in recent years have wreaked havoc on long term production and export earnings.

5.96 Caribbean banana producers are not the only ones affected by natural disasters and Jamaica
readily acknowledges that a number of the MFN s uppliers are also impacted, even by the same
hurricanes that pass through the Caribbean region. In terms of the scope for recovery and the
resumption of export earnings, however, MFN suppliers have a distinct advantage given that they
have access to a global market for their exports whereas Jamaica and nearly all ACP exporters are
restricted to the EU market.
5.97 The case under consideration could be construed as an attack on the development prospects of
ACP banana exporting countries particularly as the elimination of the preferential arrangements for
bananas in the EU market will have a negative and far-reaching impact on the scope for economic
growth and development in the ACP. Jamaica subm its that this is not a desired objective of the
multilateral trading system which continues to champion special and differential treatment for
developing countries, particularly the small and vulnerable among them. Both the European
Communities and the ACP have delivered sound argum ents regarding the inappropriateness of the
instant case and Jamaica therefore looks forward to a ruling that will contribute to the long term
growth and development of the ACP banana industry.
F. S
AINT LUCIA
1. Oral statement of Saint Lucia
5.98 St Lucia recalls several years ago in a meeting of the DSB noting that "[a]lthough we did not
negotiate the solution [referring to the Ecuador/E C and US/EC accords] we accept it as a reasonable
settlement. … [T]he time has now come to consider the matter closed and move on. With the
removal of sanctions the dispute has now been resolved and the item should be removed from
subsequent agendas." The attempt to now invoke Ar ticle 21.5 compliance proceedings in this case is
simply an abuse of process. It is merely a cynical tactic to gain leverage to force the European
Communities to reduce the level of its tariff, using vulnerable ACP countries as pawns.
5.99 After all that St Lucia's farmers have gone thro ugh in recent years to be back here before a
dispute panel that has the power to decide whether or not my country will be able to continue the
export of bananas to Europe is a real disappointment for all of our people who depend on this vital
industry for their livelihood. Ever since the 1950s when Saint Lucia made the switch from sugar cane
to bananas, this fruit grown exclusively for expor t to the United Kingdom and the industry has been
the bedrock of St Lucia's economy. It transformed St Lucia's society and created an independent
peasantry that for the first time owned their small fa rms on which they worked. St Lucia has in the
past already stressed how important bananas are for it, not only economically, socially and politically,
but also because they give St Luci a a real chance to achieve sustaina ble development. For this west
Lucia appreciates that economic diversification will be necessary but this can only be successful in the
context of the stability of income and employment that the banana industry provides.
5.100 The successive reforms that have been made to the EC banana import regime since the 1990s
have been most damaging to St Lucia and resu lted in the undermining of our market access and
deterioration of prices received by our farmers. St Lucia was not able to prevent those changes but
instead has consistently sought to secure an accommodation of the legitimate interests of both ACP
and MFN suppliers. In April 2001 Ecuador concluded an accord with the European Communities that
gave it and MFN suppliers, new advantages whilst fu rther disadvantaging us. As a result many of
St Lucia's farmers were driven out of business and rural poverty increased, but at least some farmers
were able to continue. Part of that deal in itiated by Ecuador was that the MFN quotas would have
been tariffied by 2006. The deal was that the TRQ would be replaced by a single tariff that would
keep the conditions of competition unchanged for the MFN, i.e. that they would be no worse off.
That Ecuadorian deal was incorporated into the A nnex on Bananas of the Doha Declaration. In 2005
WTO Ministers in Hong Kong accepted the tariffication proposal in which the TRQ was replaced by a

single tariff of €176 per tonne. Indeed, the Ecuadorian delegation was the leading campaigner for this
change and Minister Store of Norway was charged with monitoring trade flows that would indicate if
the change had in fact disadvantaged MFN supp liers. Saint Lucia accepted the Annex and the 2005
Ministerial decision on bananas because it was merely one of tariffication. There was no intention
that it would reduce the effective level of our pr eference and therefore our ability to access the EC
market (after all, we are not so naive and would not have consented to a deal that would undermine
the viability of our industry).
5.101 Following the arbitrations on the proposed level of the tariff, the second arbitration award was
notified to the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. At that meeting St Lucia clearly stated its
position. "Should countries seek to use WTO rulings as a ploy to deprive Saint Lucia of its rights,
they would be calling into question not only their own good faith, but undermining any residual
illusions that the system existed to advance the interests of all, and not just some, of its Members."
272
5.102 It is completely unreasonable for Ecuador, ha ving obtained what it sought for both in 2001
and 2005 to now seek to exact, through misinterpr etation and distortion the reduction, indeed, the
removal of ACP preferences that would result in Saint Lucia’s exclusion from the market.
5.103 St Lucia asks the Panel to reject this proce dural manoeuvre. The mutually agreed solution
which the European Communities has implemente d in good faith cannot now be thrown out in
Article 21.5 proceedings by the party which has al ready gained the most from successive reforms of
the EC banana market which it designed, demanded, a nd St L ucia paid for. This is eve n m ore so,
where it is clear and has been demonstrated by those before us that the European Communities has
"rectified the matter" and indeed, had in fact already done so in its second proposal to the Arbitrator.
5.104 This can clearly be seen from th e way the market has developed. With a tariff of €176/tonne
MFN exports to the European Communities rose by about ten per cent (10%) in 2006 and they have
continued to rise in 2007. In its written submission Colombia argues that these figures are irrelevant
because market access is not the same as the volume of imports. Indeed, the Arbitrator said that it
relates to market opportunities not a guarantee of a particular level or volume or price. Certainly it
isn’t a guarantee. Many factors can influence the availability of bananas for export. But this does not
make irrelevant the plain fact that EC imports from MFN countries have actually increased, and
increased significantly. They could not have done so if the opportunity
 of improved access was not
there.
5.105 Indeed, the Understanding on the Interpre tation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994,
paragraph 6, provides WTO rules for comparing the access provided by a tariff quota with that
provided by a flat tariff. According to these rules, if a member wishes to change a flat tariff to a tariff
quota it must set the volume of the tariff quota at the average levels of imports in the most recently
available reference period plus ten per cent . Th e ten per cent represents compensation for the loss of
future opportunity to increase exports to that me mber. The European Communities has moved in the
opposite direction as it was required to do by the U nderstandings with the US and Ecuador. It has
moved from a tariff quota to a flat tariff. So by deduction from the Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXVIII one can say that even if initially exports under the flat tariff had been
somewhat lower than those that occurred under the TRQ, this coul d still have constitu ted equivalent
access, because a flat tariff provides a possibility of future growth. But in reality MFN imports under
the flat tariff rose immediately by ten per cent in 2006 and they are still rising in 2007.
5.106 The factual evidence of the way the market has developed provides more certainty than price
gap analysis which is inevitably subject to a marg in of uncertainty because it is never possible to

272 See WT/MIN(05)/SR/4, p. 21, remarks of the Repr esentative of Saint Lucia at the formal plenary
meeting

ascertain and demonstrate the exact level of the in ternal or external price. Market facts are
undoubtedly far more eloquent than forecasts based on theoretical models and projections. And what
the market is showing us is not only that €176/tonne more than maintains MF N access but also that
€187/tonne would also have done so.
5.107 Exactly the same point arises in relation to what the Arbitrator said about terms of
competition. Certainly, he identified terms of comp etition as a relevant criterion. But he did not by
so doing reject the use of market data. An abstract examination of terms of competition is subject to
uncertainties of detail and interpretation. Market da ta shows the real effect of real conditions of
competition.
5.108 St Lucia is not asking the Panel to review the aw ards of the Arbitrator. The Panel's task is to
consider whether the claims now made by Ecuado r are well founded and, in particular, whether the
Article I waiver disappeared on 1 January 2006 wh en the European Communities applied the flat
tariff regime. The wording of the waiver is clear on this. The loss of the waiver depends on whether
the European Communities has "rectifie d the matter", not directly on the awards of the arbitrator.
And "rectifying the matter" means preserving MFN market access. The increase in MFN imports
since January 2006, incontestably shows that a tariff of €176/tonne more than meets this test. But
Ecuador argues that this is irrelevant because th e European Communities w as allowed only one shot
at "rectifying the matter". St Lucia trusts that the Panel will reject this narrow and self-serving
reading of the waiver – a reading that even Ec uador did not share when it agreed to join the
monitoring group that kept under review the actual effects on import volumes of the tariff of
€176/tonne. There is nothing in the wording of th e waiver that makes the ending of the waiver
directly dependent on the second award. What ma tters, is whether the European Communities did
rectify the matter, and this it most assuredly di d from 1 January 2006. This would have been
achieved, both with the proposed tariff of €187/tonne and even more so with the lower tariff of
€176/tonne that was actually applied.
5.109 These proceedings are taking place at a highly symbolic time for us. Sir John Compton the
long serving Prime Minister of St Lucia, who had for decades been a leading defender of the
Windward Island and ACP banana ex ports to Europe, was buried yesterday. Sir John, that most
respected Caribbean Statesman, said that "without bananas we have no boats and without boats no
trade", which means no future. St Lucia trusts th at these deliberations taking place here on the other
side of the Atlantic will not put the final nail in the coffin of the industry for which he fought so
vigorously for and so long and on which so many left behind depend.
G. S
URINAME
1. Oral statement of Suriname
5.110 In its oral statement, Suriname submits that Ecuador should not be allowed to bring the
present case under Article 21.5 of the DSU. In suppor t, Suriname raises two issues of particular
importance to the ACP third parties and which are of a systemic nature. .
5.111 The first issue is the fact that Ecuador has already concluded with the European Communities
in April 2001 an Understanding on Bananas. Th is Understanding on Bana nas which constitutes a
mutually agreed solution to the Bananas III dispute has settled that dispute and therefore constitutes a
bar to Article 21.5 proceedings.
5.112 It is indisputable that the "Understanding on Bananas" was reached by the European
Communities and Ecuador in order to resolve the original Bananas III dispute. This Understanding is
an agreement under public international law which is binding upon its parties. This Understanding
constitutes a mutually agreed solution to the original Bananas III dispute. Once a mutually agreed

solution has been reached, it is not admissible to ch allenge the consistency of subsequent measures
with the recommendations and ruling of the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU.
Article 21.5 provides a mechanism for dispute reso lution "where there is disagreement as to the
existence or consistency with a covered agr eement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings". In this case there can be no doubt that a mutually agreed solution
exists. Therefore, there cannot be any disagreement in the sense of Article 21.5 of the DSU. The
existence of the mutually agreed solution constitutes a bar to a subsequent Article 21.5 proceeding.
5.113 The fact that Ecuador cannot bring its claim as a compliance issued is further supported by
the fact that, after the Understanding was agreed, the DSB took the Bananas III case off its agenda as
an issue which has been "resolved" in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
5.114 If Ecuador considers that the new EC banana im port regime is inconsistent with its WTO
obligations, it should start new dis pute settlement proceedings. To allow Ecuador to challenge the
new EC banana import regime in the framework of Article 21.5 proceedings would be equivalent to
ignoring the legal effects of the mutually agreed solution reached between Ecuador and the European
Communities. This would create a very dangerous precedent since it would undermine the clear
preference given by Article 3.7 of the DSU to negotiated solutions to disputes.
5.115 The second reason why Ecuador should not be allo wed to bring this case before a compliance
panel is the fact that the measures now being chal lenged are not measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings in the original Bananas III dispute.
5.116 What the Panel is required to analyse in the present case is the WTO consistency of the new
EC banana import regime which is a tariff-only regime adopted by the European Communities under
the provision of the waiver granted at Doha in order to enable it to implement the Cotonou Agreement
and the Understandings on Bananas with Ecuador and the United States. This new regime is
completely different from the quota regime examined in the original Bananas III case. Also, the legal
framework, namely the Understanding and the Doha Wa iver, is entirely new. The Doha Waiver and
the Understanding on Bananas were negotiated after the DSB a dopted its recommendations and
rulings in the original Bananas III case. These two instruments constitute new secondary WTO law
and create an entirely new legal framework for the i ssues that are now pending before the Panel. This
legal framework did not exist at the time the original dispute was examined. The issues raised in the
present case cannot therefore be challenged via a compliance Panel.
5.117 Suriname also submits that Ecuador cannot ch allenge the preference it has accepted in the
mutually agreed solution. Indeed, each party to the Understanding on Bananas has made concessions
and obtained concessions in return. It would be tota lly unfair if Ecuador was now allowed to call into
question the Understanding on Bananas from which it h as already reaped the benefits. This would
also amount to denying any legally binding effect to the Understanding and would be contrary to
Article 3.7 of the DSU which necessarily implies that mutually agreed solutions have legal effects in
subsequent proceedings.
H. BRAZIL
1. Oral statement of Brazil
5.118 The European Communities claims that the par ties to a mutually agreed solution would be
precluded from challenging elements of such an agre ement through recourse to the dispute settlement
mechanism because, according to the European Communities' understanding, Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of
the DSU provide that mutually negotiated solutions should be preferred to resorting to dispute
resolution procedures.

5.119 For Brazil, this is partially true. Article 3.7 of the DSU should be interpreted in its integrality,
with due account of all the provisions contained ther ein, that is to say the preference for negotiated
solutions and the conformity with the WTO agreem ents. Those two elements permit to draw the
conclusion that compliance with the covered agreements has precedence over negotiated solutions and
that parties to an agreed solution are not authorized by such instrument to circumvent their obligations
under the multilateral trading rules.
5.120 Therefore, the fact that the DSU favours nego tiated solutions over the litigation avenue does
not allow concluding that any negotiated solution is preferred by the DSU. The negotiated solution
must be compatible with the covered agreements.
5.121 The European Communities also argues that the mere fact that a Member chooses to adopt
and implement a suggestion made by a panel woul d automatically establish that this Member has
complied with the obligations it was found to be in breach of.
5.122 In Brazil's opinion, by solely declaring, unilaterally, that the current import regime is
compatible with the WTO rule b ecause it derives from a suggestion made by the panel, the European
Communities is not supporting its claim. Braz il concurs with the European Communities on the
binding nature of the panel and Appellate Body reports. However, the European Communities
abruptly jumps to the flawed conclusion that because the Member has chosen to implement a
suggestion by the panel such Member would always be in compliance with its obligations under the
covered agreements. In the European Commun ities' view, the implementation of a suggestion
contained in a panel report would lead to automatic
 compliance with the covered agreements,
regardless of the means chosen and the effects achieved.
5.123 In no provision does the DSU grant Members certa inty as to the "lawfulness" of a measure
taken to comply just becau se such measure is intended to implement a suggestion made by a panel.
To the contrary, Article 21.5 sets forth the Member s' right to resort to a panel where there is
disagreement as to the consistency with covered agreements of the measures taken to comply.
5.124 Whether or not a Member's intention to comply meets the test of consistency with covered
agreements is an assessment that should be left to a panel. That is so because even in the case a
Member chooses to implement a suggestion by the panel, such a measure is still subject to an
Article 21.5 review.
5.125 If the European Communities' arguments were to pr evail, they would lead to absurd results.
If accepted, they would render Article 21.5 devoid of any significance, for the reason that any
measure based on a panel's suggestion would automa tically escape the test of consistency with the
covered agreements. Thereby it would give the implementing Member a blanket waiver from proving
that it has met its obligations and depriving th e complaining party of any surveillance of the
implementation process.
5.126 In addition, according to the European Communitie s, by resorting to an Article 21.5 panel,
Ecuador would be using the current proceedings as an appeal procedure. In Brazil's opinion, it is
crystal clear that Ecuador's claims relate to the conformity of the EC measures with its obligations
under Articles I, II and XIII of the GATT 1994. Th erefore, Ecuador is neither challenging the
suggestions of the panel nor the terms of the Unde rstanding. Rather, the thrust of the case addresses
the consistency of the measures taken by the Eu ropean Communities to comply with the covered
agreements, in accordance with the mandate of Article 21.5.
5.127 To Brazil's knowledge there is nothing in the DSU that precludes a Member from challenging
under Article 21.5 any kind of measure taken by the defending party to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In Brazil's view, a Member is not exempted from

discharging its burden of proof as regards the compliance of the new measures with the DSB
recommendations and rulings even if such measures are intended to implement a suggestion by the
panel.
I. COLOMBIA
1. Written submission of Colombia
(a) The preferential tariff treatment accorded to ACP bananas is not justified under the Article I
Doha Waiver
(i) The Article I Doha Waiver has ceased to appl y to bananas as of 1 January 2006, and the
European Communities was no longer entitled to "rectify the matter"
5.128 The Waiver Annex contemplates that the determ ination at the Second Arbitration that the
European Communities "has failed to rectify the matte r" would have definite legal consequences.
These consequences are that following a negative dete rmination, the Article I Doha Waiver ceases to
apply to bananas upon the entry into force of the new EC tariff regime, and the European
Communities has no additional legal opportunity to "rectify the matter".
5.129 In the light of the fifth tiret of the Waiver Annex, and based on the determination "that the
European Communities ha[d] failed to rectify the ma tter", Colombia submits that the Article I Doha
Waiver ceased to apply to bananas as of 1 Janua ry 2006. Colombia agrees with Ecuador that the
Arbitrator's determination in this regard is a matter of the record that no party has disputed.
5.130 Thus, following the adverse finding in the Second Award, the European Communities was not
entitled to any additional o pportunity to "rectify the matter", and the Article I Doha Waiver ceased to
apply to bananas as of 1 January 2006.
(ii) Assuming, arguendo, that the European Comm unities had the opportunity to "rectify the
matter", the tariff level of €176/tonne does not comply with the Tariff Level Standard.
The European Communities has not discharged its burden of showing compliance with the
elements required under the Waiver Annex
5.131 To prove compliance with all the terms and c onditions of the Waiver Annex, the European
Communities should have addressed the three elements referred to by the Arbitrator, against which
that compliance must be assessed: (i) whether th ere is a rebinding of the European Communities'
tariff on bananas; (ii) whether any such rebound tariff would result in at least maintaining total
market access for MFN suppliers; and (iii) whet her the rebound tariff takes into account all EC WTO
market-access commitments relating to bananas. However, the European Communities has failed to
address the first and the third elements and has not been able to demonstrate compliance with the
second element.
5.132 With respect to the first element, while the European Communities submits that the
introduction of a different import regime than the one analyzed by the Arbitrator "… maintain[s] the
total market access of the MFN suppliers", the Euro pean Communities has failed to indicate what is
the "envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas" within the meaning of the Waiver Annex. An
applied tariff of €176/tonne does not constitute a "rebinding ". With respect to the third element, the
European Communities has failed to explain how it has taken into account all its WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas in designing its current import regime. The European Communities
has referred in its submissions only to the second el ement, on which it confines itself to a conclusion

of law – that the second element contemplates a quantity- or volum e- based standard – and has not
even presented arguments to substantiate that conclusion of law.
The European Communities' quantity- or volumes-b ased analysis is contrary to the Tariff
Level Standard
5.133 According to the European Communities, "the volume of total imports of bananas from MFN
countries has increased significantly since the introduction of the new import regime … This shows
that MFN suppliers have maintained the market access opportunities they had before the introduction
of the new system." In effect, the European Communities asserts that the determination of
compliance with the Tariff Level Standard requi res a volumes-based (or quantity-based) assessment.
In other words, the European Communities argues that the Tariff Level Standard contemplates a tariff
level that would result in at least maintaining the export volumes of MFN banana suppliers.
5.134 Agreeing with the European Comm unities, the Arbitrator rejected the contention that "market
access" should be assessed in terms of trade volumes. In its Rebuttal Submission at the first
arbitration, the European Communities asserted that "market access in the WTO is a legal concept
which enshrines the level of protection or liberali zation. The extent to which trade flows, or one
Member has a particular market share, has neve r been part of the WTO understanding of market
access". Then the European Communities added: "I n the WTO the phrase 'market access' is not to be
understood as a measurement of the volume of impor ts or of market shar e (between either MFN
suppliers or between MFN and other suppliers)". Thus, the notion of volumes as the benchmark for
purposes of compliance with the Tariff Level St andard was thoroughly discussed and squarely
rejected in the First Arbitration.
5.135 Accordingly, there is no legal basis for a volumes-based assessment for purposes of
determining compliance with the Tariff Level Standa rd. It is irrelevant that MFN export volumes
have increased.
The applied tariff of €176/tonne does not result in at least maintaining total market access for
MFN banana suppliers
5.136 In its First Arbitration, the Arbitrator noted that a determination of the conditions of
competition between MFN bananas and both EC bananas and ACP bananas was necessary to
determine compliance with the Tariff Level Standard.
5.137 Colombia submits that, even if bound, a tariff of 176€/tonne does not maintain the conditions
of competition between either (i) MFN bananas and EC bananas or (ii) MFN bananas and ACP
bananas. Using the methodology, reference period and figures endorsed by the Arbitrator a tariff of
€176/tonne does not maintain conditions of compet ition between either (i) MFN bananas and EC
bananas or (ii) MFN bananas and ACP bananas.
5.138 With respect to conditions of competition between MFN bananas and EC bananas , the
Arbitrator found that the price-gap methodology "w ould accurately reflect the level of protection
accorded to domestic or EC growers from foreign competitors."
5.139 Regarding the appropriate reference period, the Arbitrator found that "the use of the most
recent representative period minimizes the need for ad hoc adjustments to be made to the data and
corresponds as closely as possible to th e trade regime as applied." The Arbitrator determined that the
appropriate reference period was the period 2002-2004.
5.140 With respect to the figures for the internal price for bananas, at the Second Arbitration, the
European Communities presented and relied on figur es based on data derived from Sopisco News.

The Arbitrator found that it "does not consider that the European Communities' use of Sopisco News
data to estimate the internal price of bananas on the EC market was inappropriate."
5.141 With respect to the figures for the external price for MFN bananas, at the First Arbitration,
the European Communities relied on Eurostat c.i.f. pr ice data. The appropriateness of the European
Communities' use of Eurostat data to establish the external price was not disputed by any of the
interested parties.
5.142 Thus, using the methodology that was used by the European Communities, endorsed by the
Arbitrator, and based on statistics from sources re lied upon by the European Communities (Sopisco
News) or generated by the European Communities' agencies (Eurostat), and which were also endorsed
by the Arbitrator, it is evident that a tariff of 176€/tonne does not maintain conditions of competition
between MFN bananas and EC bananas.
5.143 Based on the figures provided by the European Communities, the Sopisco-based weighted
average internal price for bananas in the EC-25 dur ing the reference period 2002-2004 was
€702/tonne. Based on Eurostat statistics, the weighted average external price for MFN bananas in the
EC-25 during the reference period 2002-2004 was €605/tonne. The price gap for MFN bananas
during the reference period was, therefore, €97/tonne. In short, the tariff level that would result in at
least maintaining the conditions of competition between MFN bananas and EC bananas cannot be
more than €97/tonne.
5.144 In the course of the First Arbitration, the Arbitrator emphasised that a tariff meeting the Tariff
Level Standard also needed to take in to account conditions of competition between MFN and ACP
bananas. Based on Eurostat statistics, the weighted average external price for ACP bananas in the
EC-25 during the reference period 2002-2004 was €616/tonne. Deducting this external price from the
Sopisco-based weighted average inte rnal price in the EC-25 during the same period, as provided by
the European Communities of €702/tonne, the price gap for ACP bananas during the reference period
was €86/tonne.
5.145 Accordingly, the tariff level that would resu lt in at least maintaining the conditions of
competition between MFN bananas and ACP bananas is the difference between the price gap for
MFN bananas (€97/tonne) and the price gap for ACP bananas (€86/tonne), or €11/tonne.
5.146 Hence, a tariff of 176€/tonne in no way main tains the conditions of competition between
MFN bananas and ACP bananas and, just as it does with respec t to the conditions of competition
between MFN bananas and EC bananas, fails the Tariff Level Standard.
(b) The Preferential Tariff Rate Quota accorded to ACP bananas is inconsistent with Article XIII
of the GATT 1994
5.147 Colombia recalls that the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry stated that:
"In applying import restrictions to any product, Members shall aim at a distribution of
trade in such product approaching as clo sely as possible the shares with the various
Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions."
5.148 The TRQ granted by the European Communities to ACP bananas clearly does not conform to
this standard. While MFN bananas must always bear a tariff, ACP bananas do not, because of the
preferential intra-quota zero tariff. It can hardly be argued that such a distribution of trade complies
with the standard set out in Article XIII:2 of aiming "at a distribution of trade in such product
approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various [Members] might be expected to
obtain in the absence of such restrictions".

5.149 Likewise, Colombia believes that the TRQ gran ted by the European Communities to the ACP
countries excludes all MFN bananas from the zero-dut y quota, and in doing so, violates Article XIII:1
of the GATT 1994. This discriminatory treatment denies other WTO Members the right to participate
in the European Communities' TRQ, and thereby to improve their access to the EC banana market.
(c) Conclusion
5.150 In light of the foregoing, Colombia respectfully requests the Panel to find that the measures at
issue is inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994, or alternatively, does not comply with the terms
and conditions of the Article I Doha Waiver, and is inconsistent with Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
2. Oral statement of Colombia
5.151 The dispute on bananas is the longest dispute in the history of GATT/WTO. Regrettably, this
Panel proceeding is the tenth since 1992 examining the EC banana import regime. Fifteen years on,
in 2007, that regime is still not in conformity with WTO law.
5.152 Bananas are a product of paramount importance for the Colombian economy. They are the
main source of employment in rural areas crucia l for our national security, and are also one of
Colombia's main export products.
5.153 In its third-party written submission, Colombia establishes why the EC banana import regime
is inconsistent with Articles I and XIII of the GATT. Colombia will take this opportunity to
emphasize the most salient aspects of that submission.
5.154 It is evident that the preferential tariff treatment granted to ACP bananas is inconsistent with
the MFN obligation in Article 1:1 of the GATT. Th e Article I Doha Waiver temporarily justifying
this treatment was granted subject to an EC obligation to rebind the EC MFN tariff on bananas at a
level that results in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking into
account all EC WTO market-access commitments relati ng to bananas. The process of rebinding of
the EC tariff contemplated a two-stage arbitration procedure and a waiver-termination provision.
5.155 The fifth tiret of the Annex to the Article I Doha Waiver provided for a second arbitration to
determine "whether the EC has rectified the matter ll and that "[i]f the EC has failed to rectify the
matter, this waiver shall cease to apply to bananas up on entry into force of the new EC tariff regime".
The European Communities reads this provision to mean that if the European Communities
introduced a different import regime than the one an alyzed in the second arbitration, and that import
regime did indeed maintain the total market acce ss of the MFN suppliers. then the Article I Doha
Waiver would continue to apply. Colombia cannot agree with this interpretation.
5.156 The structure of fifth tiret of the Annex clea rly indicates that the European Communities had
only one opportunity to rectify. If the first arb itration award resulted in a determination that the
rebinding would not result in at least maintaining total market access. an opportunity was given for
the parties to reach a mutually sa tisfactory solution. Thereafter, a last opportunity to rectify the
matter was contemplated. This created a powerfu l incentive for the parties to seek a negotiated
solution. An additional opportunity to rectify the matter would nullify this incentive to negotiate.
5.157 Furthermore, had the European Communities an additional opportunity to rectify the matter,
and unilateral authority to judge whether or not th at import regime maintained the total market access
of MFN suppliers, the purpose and rationale of the banana-specific dispute settlement mechanism in
the waiver would be defeated. The MFN suppliers would have never gran ted the Article I Doha
Waiver for bananas were this the case.

5.158 In any event, assuming arguendo that the European Comm unities had an additional
opportunity to "rectify the matter", the applied tariff of €176/ton does not meet the terms and
conditions of the Article I Doha Waiver.
5.159 First, an applied tariff of €176/ton does not c onstitute a "rebinding". Second, the European
Communities has failed to take into account all its WTO market-access commitments relating to
bananas.
5.160 Third, and of greatest concern to Colombia, the applied tariff €176/ton does not meet the tariff
level standard of "at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers".
5.161 Yesterday, the Panel asked the parties in th ese proceedings whether it should approach the
question of whether the EC tariff meets the tariff le vel standard in the same manner as the Arbitrator
in the banana tariff arbitrations.
5.162 The European Communities invited the Panel not be too formalistic and asserted that the
assessment of whether the new import regime does indeed maintain total market access for MFN
suppliers can only be based on an analysis of the real effects of the new import regime on MFN
bananas. For the European Communities, this requires a volumes-based assessment.
5.163 Colombia has provided a detailed argument in pa ragraphs 18 to 24 of its third party written
submission for why compliance with the tariff level standard ought to be assessed in the same manner
as the Arbitrator and therefore in terms of cond itions of competition between MFN bananas and both
EC and ACP bananas.
5.164 In this statement, Colombia simply highlights that a volumes based assessment is contrary to
the position put forward by the European Communiti es in the banana tariff arbitrations where it
argued that the "legal notion of market access can only guarantee the legal conditions of imports, not
the actual imports" and the "EC therefore urges the Arbitrators to reject the argument that market
access should be measured in trade volumes or market shares".
5.165 It is also contrary to the rulings of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator squarely rejected the
contention that "market access" should be assessed in terms of trade volumes. It noted that "total
market access for MFN banana suppliers" is "not a guarantee of any particular level or volume of
trade or price. Rather, it relates to the opportuni ty for MFN suppliers to enter and compete on the EC
banana market". Instead, the Arbitrator endorsed a tariff level standard based on conditions of
competition.
5.166 A test based on conditions of competition rather than actual trade flows is consistent with a
long line of GATT and WTO jurisprudence and reflects the pr actical reality that it is impossible to
isolate the impact of a measure from the myriad of other factors in the real world that constantly affect
fluctuations in international trade. It is clear , then, that a quantity or volume based analysis is
contrary to the tariff level standard and should be rejected.
5.167 Colombia also submits that, even if bound, a tariff of €176/ton does not maintain the
conditions of competition between either (i) MFN ba nanas and EC bananas or (ii) MFN bananas and
ACP bananas.
5.168 The Arbitrator endorsed the price gap methodology which, using correct prices, would
produce an estimate of the tariff equivalent that woul d confer the same level of protection to domestic
producers as the border measures being replaced by the tariff equivalent. The Arbitrator also
endorsed the following elements of the price gap methodology:

• The period 2002-2004 as the appropriate reference period.

• The Sopisco-based weighted average internal price of €702/ton in the EC-25.

• The Eurostat weighted average external price of €605/ton for MFN bananas in the EC-25.

• The Eurostat weighted average external price of €616/ton for ACP bananas in the EC-25.

5.169 Therefore, the price gap for MFN bananas during the reference period was €97/ton. In short,
the tariff level that would result in at least ma intaining the conditions of competition between MFN
bananas and EC bananas cannot be more than €97/ton.
5.170 Furthermore, the price gap for ACP bananas during the reference period was €86/ton. Thus,
the tariff level
 that would result in at least maintaining the conditions of competition between MFN
bananas and ACP bananas is €11/ton.
5.171 Hence, a tariff of €176/ton – even if bound – in no way maintains the conditions of
competition between MFN bananas and EC bananas or between MFN bananas and ACP bananas and,
therefore, fails to comply with the tariff level standard.
5.172 For all the above reasons, Colombia submits that the Article I Doha Waiver cannot justify the
preferences granted by the European Communities.
5.173 Colombia also asserts that the preferential tariff-rate quota accorded to ACP bananas is
inconsistent with Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 of the GATT.
5.174 The essence of GATT Article XIII, and, therefore Article XIII:1 is that like products should
be treated equally irrespective of their origin. Ar ticle XIII:1, as applied to tariff quotas, prohibits the
European Communities from establishing duty-free qua ntities for some Members, but not others, and
from denying equal treatment to banana imports of all origins.
5.175 Furthermore, given that the European Commun ities' tariff-rate quota is reserved exclusively
for ACP bananas it does not comply with the standard set out in Article XIII:2 of the GATT. This
standard requires that "in applying import restri ctions to any product, Members shall aim at a
distribution of trade in such product as closel y as possible the shares which the various Members
might be expected to obtain in the absence of su ch restrictions. While MFN bananas must always
bear a tariff, ACP bananas do not, because of the pref erential intra-quota zero tariff. It can hardly be
argued that such a distribution of trade complies with the standard set out in Article XIII:2.
5.176 In the light of the foregoing, Colombia r espectfully requests the Panel to find that the
measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles I and XIII of the GATT.
J. JAPAN
1. Written submission of Japan
(a) The EC-Ecuador Understanding on Bananas does not preclude Ecuador from resorting to this
Article 21.5 proceeding
5.177 The European Communities preliminarily argues th at the Ecuador's challenge to the current
banana import regime of the European Communities should be dismissed entirely because bringing

such a challenge is not allowed due to the Understanding. 273 The European Communities considers
that Ecuador's challenge to the said European Co mmunities' import regime goes against Articles 3.7
and 3.10 of the DSU since Ecuador has accepted in the Understanding that the import regime taken by
the European Communities on and after 1 January 2006 will include a preference for bananas
imported from African, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP") countries.274
5.178 Ecuador primarily contends on the above-menti oned European Communities' argument that it
is not barred by the Understanding to refer the European Communities' current import regime of
bananas to this panel establishe d under Article 21.5 proceeding because "Articles 3.7 and 3.10 [of the
DSU] do not preclude a challenge to measures based on the contention of the defending party that the
measures have been 'accepted' in a mutually agreed solution."
275
5.179 As to the legal status and the effect of mutually agreed solutions, the panel in India – Autos
has given some useful indication. The panel has not ed that there is no such provision in the DSU that
precludes parties to the mutually agreed solutions from resorting to subsequent dispute settlement
procedures.276 Regarding this absence of such provision, the panel, on one hand, has mentioned that
"it could not be lightly assumed in what particular circumstances the drafters of the DSU might have
indicated [the rights of the Members to bring a di spute] to be foregone"; on the other hand, however,
the panel has also indicated that "it could not be lightly assumed that those drafters intended mutually
agreed solutions… to have no meaningful legal eff ect in subsequent proceedings", recognizing that
"[mutually agreed solutions] are expressl y referred to and supported by the DSU". 277 In this regard,
Japan particularly would like to take a note of the panel's following observation presented in a
precedent paragraph in its report:
"It is certainly reasonable to assume, particularly on the basis of Article 3 of the
DSU … that these agreed solutions are intende d to reflect a settlement of the dispute
in question, which both parties expect will bring a final conclusion to the relevant
proceedings."278 (Emphasis added.)
5.180 Japan agrees with the panel's observation in India – Autos.
5.181 However, Japan believes that the Understa nding between the European Communities and
Ecuador in this banana dispute 279 does not affect Ecuador's right to challenge the European
Communities' current import regime in the course of this Article 21.5 proceeding for the following
reasons.

273 Japan notes that the European Communities argues that Ecuador's challenge to the preference for
ACP bananas for another reason; Ecuador should not challenge a measure which is the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings contained in the adopted panel report. Please see para. 5.185, below, with respect
to this argument.
274 European Communities' first written submission, para. 64; European Communities' second written
submission, para. 8.
275 Ecuador's second written submission , para. 8.
277 Ibid., para. 7.115.
278 Ibid., para. 7.113.
279 With regard to the nature of the Understanding, although Ecuador does not clearly states so, there
seems to be a disagreement between the parties: the EC alleges that the Understanding constitutes a "mutually
agreed solution" in the sense of Article 3 of the DSU while Ecuador sees it contrary by declaring that the
"provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not applicable in this case. " Japan is not a party to the Understanding
and it refrains from commenting on whether the Understanding constitutes a "mutually agreed solution" for the
purpose of Article 3 of the DSU or not. However, as Ecuador bases its arguments on an assumption that the
Understanding is a "mutually agreed solution" for the purpose of Article 3 of the DSU (see paras. 8-13 of its
second written submission), Japan argues on the basis of the same assumption in this submission.

5.182 As pointed out by Ecuador in its Second Written Submission, it has to be made clear that any
solutions which serve the purpose of Article 3 of the DSU should be consistent with the WTO rules
280
and the terms of the agreement should be observed281. Concerning the European Communities' current
banana import regime, the European Communities claims that the import regime is the exact measure
agreed between the European Communities and Ecua dor under the Understanding to be taken by the
European Communities on and after 1 January 2006, since the Understanding clearly prescribes that
such a measure should have two characteristics, na mely, "tariff only" and "granting preference to
ACP countries."282 Japan believes, however, in addition to these two characteristics, implementation
of the measure prescribed in the Understanding, by definition, requires at least one more element to be
satisfied, that is, to maintain a valid waiver fro m Article I of the GATT. Since the said regime
explicitly grants a preference to bananas im ported from ACP countries over those from non-ACP
countries, implementation of the regime would plainl y violate Article I:1 of the GATT but for a valid
waiver from it. As stated at the beginning of this paragraph, a mutually ag reed solution needs to be
consistent with WTO rules and to be adhered to. Therefore, in Japan's view, in order for the European
Communities to claim that its current import regime is implemented as prescribed in the
Understanding, it is indispensable for the Europ ean Communities to implement the regime with a
valid relevant waiver because such a wavier is in the nature of a mutually agreed solution for the
purpose of Article 3 of the DSU.
5.183 Then, the question comes down to the issue wh ether the European Communities maintains a
valid waiver from GATT Article I or not, which wa iver is necessary for th e European Communities'
current import regime to be implemented in line with the mutually agreed solution. As the condition
for the application of the waiver has been set in the subsequent arrangement, the "Doha Waiver", 283 it
is therefore necessary to examine if the Europ ean Communities has satisfi ed the condition for the
application of the Doha Waiver. In this rega rd, as both the European Communities and Ecuador
recognize, there is a disagreement between them regarding the application of the waiver: the
European Communities asserts that it "has fully satisfied the condition for the continued application of
the Doha Waiver"; in contrary, Ecuador conte nds that the waiver expired on 1 January 2006,
following the second arbitration award finding that th e European Communities had "failed to rectify
the matter", which is a condition of the waiver to cease its application.284
5.184 The validity of the waiver, and, the Eur opean Communities' current import regime's
compliance with the Understanding, may, as indi cated by the European Communities in its second
written submission 285, require the examination of relevant facts. Japan, however, understands the
point here to be that the fact that the European Communities' current import regime is the measure
taken in accordance with the Understanding, that is, a mutually agreed solution, itself was not
established at the time when Ecuador initiated this panel proceeding. 286 Therefore, even if European
Communities' argument concerning the validity of th e Doha Waiver for Article I of the GATT is
justified in the later proceeding, and thus the European Communities' current import regime is
established to be in compliance with the mutually agr eed solution, there is still a merit in bringing this
claim to the panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU.

280 Second written submission of Ecuador, para. 12.
281 Ibid., para. 11.
282 The Understanding, point B.
283 European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement , WT/MIN(01)/15, 14 November
2001; European Communities – Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of
Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16, November 14, 2001.
284 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 24.
285 European Communities' second written submission, paras. 36-38.
286 In this regard, Japan notes that the European Communities argues in its second written submission
that "[i]t is a well established fact that the current import regime more than maintains the market access of
Ecuador… and Ecuador already knew this fact when it initiated the current proceedings" (para. 38). Japan is not
aware of statements in the parties' submissions which confirm this European Communities' argument, though.

5.185 Moreover, Japan recognizes that the European Communities further argues in its second
written submission that Ecuador is barred from ch allenging the preference existed in European
Communities' measure "because it amounts to a ch allenge to a suggestion made by the panel." 287
Japan considers that European Co mmunities' assertion here does not stand, either. The panel in EC –
Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) has indicated possible measures that the European Communities
may take to comply with the recommendations and ru lings. It is important to note that the panel
suggested the European Communiti es to take those measures with relevant waiver, if necessary. 288
Thus, Japan believes that the European Communiti es needs to implement the current import regime
with a necessary valid waiver in order to claim that it is implementing the regime as suggested in the
panel report, for the same reason stated so far, since it is not considered that the panel in EC –
Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) has suggested that the European Communities may take a
measure inconsistent with WTO rules.
5.186 For the above reasons, Japan believes that, even if the Understanding constitutes a "mutually
agreed solution" under Article 3 of the DSU, it does not become an obstacle for Ecuador to bring a
case under this Article 21.5 proceeding. Therefore, Japan considers that European Communities'
preliminary argument should be rejected to this extent.
K. N
ICARAGUA
1. Written submission of Nicaragua
(a) Introduction
5.187 The European Communities' latest banana me asures, a more-than-doubled MFN tariff and
duty-free ACP quota, represent yet another instalment of recurring EC non-compliance in the
Bananas dispute. They are again the outgrowth of an internal negotiating mandate that primarily aims
to guarantee a tariff-only arrangement under which "Community production is maintained and [EC]
producers are not put in a less favourable situation as before the entering into force of the import
quota regime in 1993." Like Ecuador, Nicaragua considers that the measures introduced by the
European Communities on 1 January 2006 to fulfil its internal protectionist mandate are properly
before the Panel for review, and c onstitute prima facie violations of GATT Articles I:1, XIII:1 and 2,
and II:1.
(b) The European Communities' banana measures are properly before the Panel for review
5.188 The European Communities' first and second wr itten submissions concede that its current
measures were taken for the purpose of trying to comply with the rulings of EC – Bananas III and EC
– Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) . Since the European Communities would also have to
concede that a "disagreement" exis ts as to whether its current measu res are in conformity with the
European Communities' compliance ob ligations, all elements needed for an Article 21.5 review are
present.
(c) The European Communities' ACP Tariff Preference is inconsistent with GATT Article I:1
5.189 GATT Article I:1 requires that any customs adva ntage granted to the product of one Member
must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product of another Member. The
European Communities is granting ACP bananas a zero-duty tariff preference within a 775,000 mt
ACP tariff quota, while subjecting all MFN bananas to a €176/mt rate. Its ACP tariff preference is,
therefore, inconsistent with GATT Article I:1.

287 European Communities' second written submission, para. 19.
288 Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), paras. 6.155-6.158.

5.190 The European Communities does not contest that GATT Article I incons istency, but wrongly
asserts that the inconsistency continues to be c overed by its GATT Article I waiver. Under the
European Communities' interpretation, the waiver a nd its special banana Annex required it to subject
its pre-2006 tariff proposals to successive arbitration reviews under defined terms of reference, but
then allowed the European Commun ities, after it lost twice in arbitration, to impose whatever 2006
regime it unilaterally determined would satisfy the terms of reference for those proceedings. Properly
interpreted, the waiver requires that once the S econd Arbitration determined that the European
Communities "has failed to rectify the matter", the waiver automatically terminated for bananas upon
implementation of the European Communities' 2006 regime, making any ACP banana preference
granted thereafter inconsistent with Article I.
5.191 As the ordinary meaning of the chapeau and five tirets of the waiver Annex make clear, the
Annex establishes pre-2006 approval requireme nts governing "tariff only". Under those
requirements, the European Communities' waiver for bananas was only authorized to continue beyond
2006 if the European Communities received a First Arbitration determination that its "envisaged
rebinding ... would result in at least maintaining to tal market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking
into account ... all EC WTO market access commitments"; or "rectified the matter" by reaching a
"mutually satisfactory solution" with the interested parties; or "rectified the matter" by receiving a
Second Arbitration determination that the European Communities "has rectified the matter". Because
none of these pre-requisites was fulfilled, the waiver automatically lapsed on 1 January 2006, upon
implementation of the current EC "tariff only" regime.
5.192 The European Communities seeks to override th e textually-mandated termination of the
waiver by highlighting what it refers to as the "real wo rld and ... real situation in the banana market."
As concerned as Nicaragua is about the actual detrimental MFN effects of the current regime, those
effects have no legal relevance to the conditions attaching to the continuation of the European
Communities' waiver for bananas. Nevertheless, as confirmed in a recently updated market analysis
published by the Centre for International Econom ics ("CIE"), the €176/mt tariff preference and
775,000 mt duty-free ACP quota regime are already eroding access for the developing countries of
Latin America, which damage will grow substantially worse over time.
(d) The European Communities' ACP Tariff Quota is inconsistent with GATT Articles XIII:1
and XIII:2
5.193 Paragraph one of GATT Article XIII sets fo rth an uncategorical prohibition against
discriminatory quantitative restrictions. Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XIII extends that prohibition to
tariff quotas. The EC – Bananas III Panel Report carefully analyzed the text of Article XIII:1 and
affirmed that, consistent with its text, the like pr oducts of all Members must be similarly restricted,
finding that "a Member may not limit the quantity of imports from some Members but not from others
[and] [a] Member may not restrict imports from some Members using one means and restrict them
from another using another means ". In upholding the Panel's findings, the EC – Bananas III
Appellate Body added that the "essence" of GATT Artic le XIII, and, therefore Article XIII:1, "is that
like products should be treated equally, irrespective of their origin ". The European Communities is
applying its current zero-duty tariff quota to bana nas of ACP origin, but not to bananas of MFN
origin. Bananas from Nicaragua and other MFN orig ins are subject, instead, to a €176/mt tariff. As
its tariff quota is not "similarly restricting" or "tr eating equally" all EC banana imports, it is facially
inconsistent with GATT Article XIII:1.
5.194 The chapeau of Article XIII:2, made appli cable to tariff quotas through paragraph 5,
establishes an equally strict companion requirement governing the distribution of any tariff quota
applied by a Member. In its interpretation of that chapeau text, the EC – Bananas III Panel found that
if tariff quotas are used, and a Member wishes to a llocate shares of a tariff quota to some Members
without a substantial interest, then shares must be allocated to all Members to be consistent with the

"similarly restricted" requirement of Article XIII: 1. The European Communities' current zero-duty
tariff quota has been distributed in its entirety to the non-substantial supplying interests of the ACP.
Nicaragua, which like the ACP countries, is a non-substantial supplier of bananas to the EC market, is
receiving no share whatsoever of that tariff quota. The European Communities' ACP tariff quota is,
thus, also inconsistent with Article XIII:2.
5.195 The European Communities seek s to escape Article XIII review by essentially reformulating
three defenses it previously attempted in earlier EC – Bananas III proceedings. All three of those
arguments were expressly rejected in the EC – Bananas III and EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
Ecuador) reports, and are equally groundless today. First, the European Co mmunities proposes, as it
did in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , that prior findings confirm the ACP tariff quota is
covered only by Article I, not Article XIII. The EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) panel
directly rejected this argument and would not ha ve issued a "suggestion" that nullified its own
findings. Its use of the words "suitable waiver" m eant only that all necessary coverage would need to
be pursued under Articles I and XIII, and that the European Communities had the drafting option
under WTO practice of consolidating the necessary c overage into a single waiver decision if it so
chose.
5.196 Second, the European Communities argues that Artic le XIII is not applicable to its ACP tariff
quota because Article XIII does not "regulate the re lationship between quantitative restrictions [an
ACP tariff quota] and other measures [a MFN tariff regime ]." Its effort to divide the EC market into
different types of regimes to escape Article XIII revi ew is an obvious variation of its prior "separate
regimes" argument, which was also decisively rejected in the EC – Bananas III and EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador) reports. The panels and Appellate Body in those proceedings affirmed that,
if Article XIII could be bypassed by assigning a tariff quota to one set of countries [ACP suppliers]
and an entirely different import measure to others [MFN suppliers], as the European Communities
proposes, tariff-quota discrimination would proliferate, and Article XIII would be "eviscerated".
5.197 Third, the European Communities reasserts its old argument that "even if there is a
quantitative restriction imposed on ACP countries" s ubject to GATT Article XIII, this "cap" is a
"benefit" to MFN countries because it limits the qua ntity of ACP imports entering the Community at
zero duty. Article XIII does not require a showing of nullification or impairment to sustain a claim
under its provisions. In any case, MFN suppliers are being denied the benefit of zero-duty access
within a protected quota. Moreover, as found in prior EC – Bananas III rulings, a quantitative limit
reserved only for preferred suppliers enables vari ous beneficiaries of the tariff preference " to compete
more effectively than [they] would [under] the tariff preference alone ," and "will have repercussions
on the import performance of other substantial or non-substantial supplier countries."
(e) The European Communities' €176/mt tariff is inconsistent with its GATT Article II
concessions
5.198 GATT Article II:1 prohibits a Memb er from treating imported product less favourably than
provided in its Schedule and forbids the imposition of tariffs in excess of the bound rates set out in a
Member's Schedule. The European Communities is applying a tariff of €176/mt on all MFN banana
imports, a rate more than double the €75/mt in-quota bound rate. As the application of an ordinary
customs duty far in excess of €75/mt to all impor ts of MFN bananas constitutes treatment obviously
less favourable than the concessions provided for in the European Communities' Schedule, the
European Communities' €176/mt "autonomous" rate is inconsistent with GATT Article II:1.
5.199 The European Communities disingenuously asserts, for the first time in this decade-long
dispute, that its €75/mt concession lapsed as of 31 December 2002 by reason of the BFA annexed to
its Schedule. It incorrectly argues in the alternativ e that even if the €75/mt binding did not expire at
the end of 2002, it was "lawfully" terminated on 1 January 2006 because the abolition of the MFN

tariff quota would "inevitably bring along the aboliti on of the corresponding tariff". As demonstrated
by Ecuador, the ordinary meaning, context, and object of the European Communities' Uruguay Round
banana concessions, in combination with the Eur opean Communities' own conduct, make clear that
the €75/mt binding continues to have legal ef fect and did not, as alleged by the European
Communities, terminate in 2002.
5.200 By its terms, the 1994 BFA was a free-standing "settlement" agreement between the European
Communities, on the one hand, and Nicaragua, Colomb ia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, on the other.
When the BFA stated that "this agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002", it meant just that,
i.e., that the European Communities' agreement with the four BFA Latin American countries , not the
Uruguay Round concessions applicable to all WTO Me mbers, would terminate at the end of 2002.
Insofar as the European Communities' WTO stat ements, legal instruments, and internal
communications repeatedly acknowledge the continuing validity of the €75/mt binding, it is in no
position now to argue otherwise. Likewise, it cannot argue that its move from a MFN tariff quota to
"tariff-only" "automatically" dissolved all GATT Article II obligations attaching to its €75/mt
binding. The very purpose of GATT Article II is to preserve the value of a Member's tariff
concessions and prohibit the "automatic abolition" of those concessions. Indeed, the European
Communities has itself officially acknowledged the continuing bound commitment of €75/mt under
Article II upon discontinuation of the MFN tariff quota.
(f) Conclusion
5.201 To ensure that this decade-long dispute does not culminate in discrimination and restrictions
equal to or worse than those already condemned in prior WTO reviews, Nicaragua joins Ecuador in
urging a prompt determination that the measures now before the Panel are inconsistent with GATT
Articles I:1, XIII:1 and XIII:2, and II.
L. P
ANAMA
1. Written submission of Panama
(a) Introduction
5.202 The European Communities' latest banana me asures, a more-than-doubled MFN tariff and
duty-free ACP quota, represent yet another instalment of recurring EC non-compliance in the
Bananas dispute. They are again the outgrowth of an internal negotiating mandate that primarily aims
to guarantee a tariff-only arrangement under which "Community production is maintained and [EC]
producers are not put in a less favourable situation as before the entering into force of the import
quota regime in 1993". Like Ecuador, Panama considers that the measures introduced by the
European Communities on 1 January 2006 to fulfil its internal protectionist mandate are properly
before the Panel for review, and c onstitute prima facie violations of GATT Articles I:1, XIII:1 and 2,
and II:1.
(b) The European Communities' banana measures are properly before the Panel for review
5.203 The European Communities' first and second wr itten submissions concede that its current
measures were taken for the purpose of trying to comply with the rulings of EC – Bananas III and EC
– Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) . Since the European Communities would also have to
concede that a "disagreement" exis ts as to whether its current measu res are in conformity with the
European Communities' compliance ob ligations, all elements needed for an Article 21.5 review are
present.

(c) The European Communities' ACP Tariff Preference is inconsistent with GATT Article I:1
5.204 GATT Article I:1 requires that any customs adva ntage granted to the product of one Member
must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product of another Member. The
European Communities is granting ACP bananas a zero-duty tariff preference within a 775,000 mt
ACP tariff quota, while subjecting all MFN bananas to a €176/mt rate. Its ACP tariff preference is,
therefore, inconsistent with GATT Article I:1.
5.205 The European Communities does not contest that GATT Article I incons istency, but wrongly
asserts that the inconsistency continues to be c overed by its GATT Article I waiver. Under the
European Communities' interpretation, the waiver a nd its special banana Annex required it to subject
its pre-2006 tariff proposals to successive arbitration reviews under defined terms of reference, but
then allowed the European Commun ities, after it lost twice in arbitration, to impose whatever 2006
regime it unilaterally determined would satisfy the terms of reference for those proceedings. Properly
interpreted, the waiver requires that once the S econd Arbitration determined that the European
Communities "has failed to rectify the matter," the waiver automatically terminated for bananas upon
implementation of the European Communities' 2006 regime, making any ACP banana preference
granted thereafter inconsistent with Article I.
5.206 As the ordinary meaning of the chapeau and five tirets of the waiver Annex make clear, the
Annex establishes pre-2006 approval requireme nts governing "tariff only". Under those
requirements, the European Communities' waiver for bananas was only authorized to continue beyond
2006 if the European Communities received a First Arbitration determination that its "envisaged
rebinding ... would result in at least maintaining to tal market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking
into account ... all EC WTO market access commitments;" or "rectified the matter" by reaching a
"mutually satisfactory solution" with the interested parties; or "rectified the matter" by receiving a
Second Arbitration determination that the European Communities "has rectified the matter." Because
none of these pre-requisites was fulfilled, the waiver automatically lapsed on 1 January 2006, upon
implementation of the current EC "tariff only" regime.
5.207 The European Communities seeks to override th e textually-mandated termination of the
waiver by highlighting what it refers to as the "real wo rld and ... real situation in the banana market."
As concerned as Panama is about the actual detrimental MFN effects of the current regime, those
effects have no legal relevance to the conditions attaching to the continuation of the European
Communities' waiver for bananas. Nevertheless, as confirmed in a recently updated market analysis
published by the Centre for International Econom ics ("CIE"), the €176/mt tariff preference and
775,000 mt duty-free ACP quota regime are already eroding access for the developing countries of
Latin America, which damage will grow substantially worse over time.
(d) The European Communities' ACP tariff quota is inconsistent with GATT Articles XIII:1 and
XIII:2
5.208 Paragraph one of GATT Article XIII sets fo rth an uncategorical prohibition against
discriminatory quantitative restrictions. Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XIII extends that prohibition to
tariff quotas. The EC – Bananas III Panel Report carefully analyzed the text of Article XIII:1 and
affirmed that, consistent with its text, the like products of all Members must be similarly restricted,
finding that "a Member may not limit the quantity of imports from some Members but not from others
[and] [a] Member may not restrict imports from some Members using one means and restrict them
from another using another means ". In upholding the Panel's findings, the EC – Bananas III
Appellate Body added that the "essence" of GATT Artic le XIII, and, therefore Article XIII:1, "is that
like products should be treated equally, irrespective of their origin ". The European Communities is
applying its current zero-duty tariff quota to bana nas of ACP origin, but not to bananas of MFN
origin. Bananas from Panama and other MFN origins are subject, instead, to a €176/mt tariff. As its

tariff quota is not "similarly restricting" or "trea ting equally" all EC banana imports, it is facially
inconsistent with GATT Article XIII:1.
5.209 The chapeau of Article XIII:2, made appli cable to tariff quotas through paragraph 5,
establishes an equally strict companion requirement governing the distribution of any tariff quota
applied by a Member. In its interpretation of that chapeau text, the EC – Bananas III Panel found that
if tariff quotas are used, and a Member wishes to a llocate shares of a tariff quota to some Members
without a substantial interest, then shares must be allocated to all Members to be consistent with the
"similarly restricted" requirement of Article XIII: 1. The European Communities' current zero-duty
tariff quota has been distributed in its entirety to the non-substantial supplying interests of the ACP.
Panama, which like Ecuador, has been recognized by the European Communities as a principal
supplier of bananas to the EC market, is receivi ng no share whatsoever of that tariff quota. The
European Communities' ACP tariff quota is, thus, also inconsistent with Article XIII:2.
5.210 The European Communities seek s to escape Article XIII review by essentially reformulating
three defenses it previously attempted in earlier EC – Bananas III proceedings. All three of those
arguments were expressly rejected in the EC – Bananas III and EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
Ecuador) reports, and are equally groundless today. First, the European Co mmunities proposes, as it
did in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , that prior findings confirm the ACP tariff quota is
covered only by Article I, not Article XIII. The EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) panel
directly rejected this argument and would not ha ve issued a "suggestion" that nullified its own
findings. Its use of the words "suitable waiver" m eant only that all necessary coverage would need to
be pursued under Articles I and XIII, and that the European Communities had the drafting option
under WTO practice of consolidating the necessary c overage into a single waiver decision if it so
chose.
5.211 Second, the European Communities argues that Artic le XIII is not applicable to its ACP tariff
quota because Article XIII does not "regulate the re lationship between quantitative restrictions [an
ACP tariff quota] and other measures [a MFN tariff regime ]." Its effort to divide the EC market into
different types of regimes to escape Article XIII revi ew is an obvious variation of its prior "separate
regimes" argument, which was also decisively rejected in the EC – Bananas III and EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador) reports. The panels and Appellate Body in those proceedings affirmed that,
if Article XIII could be bypassed by assigning a tariff quota to one set of countries [ACP suppliers]
and an entirely different import measure to others [MFN suppliers], as the European Communities
proposes, tariff-quota discrimination would proliferate, and Article XIII would be "eviscerated".
5.212 Third, the European Communities reasserts its old argument that "even if there is a
quantitative restriction imposed on ACP countries" s ubject to GATT Article XIII, this "cap" is a
"benefit" to MFN countries because it limits the qua ntity of ACP imports entering the Community at
zero duty. Article XIII does not require a showing of nullification or impairment to sustain a claim
under its provisions. In any case, MFN suppliers are being denied the benefit of zero-duty access
within a protected quota. Moreover, as found in prior EC – Bananas III rulings, a quantitative limit
reserved only for preferred suppliers enables vari ous beneficiaries of the tariff preference " to compete
more effectively than [they] would [under] the tariff preference alone ," and "will have repercussions
on the import performance of other substantial or non-substantial supplier countries".
(e) The European Communities' €176/mt tariff is inconsistent with its GATT Article II
concessions
5.213 GATT Article II:1 prohibits a Memb er from treating imported product less favourably than
provided in its Schedule and forbids the imposition of tariffs in excess of the bound rates set out in a
Member's Schedule. The European Communities is applying a tariff of €176/mt on all MFN banana
imports, a rate more than double the €75/mt in-quota bound rate. As the application of an ordinary

customs duty far in excess of €75/mt to all imports of MFN bananas constitutes treatment obviously
less favourable than the concessions provided for in the European Communities' Schedule, the
European Communities' €176/mt "autonomous" rate is inconsistent with GATT Article II:1.
5.214 The European Communities disingenuously asserts, for the first time in this decade-long
dispute, that its €75/mt concession lapsed as of 31 December 2002 by reason of the BFA annexed to
its Schedule. It incorrectly argues in the alternativ e that even if the €75/mt binding did not expire at
the end of 2002, it was "lawfully" terminated on 1 January 2006 because the abolition of the MFN
tariff quota would "inevitably bring along the aboliti on of the corresponding tariff." As demonstrated
by Ecuador, the ordinary meaning, context, and object of the European Communities' Uruguay Round
banana concessions, in combination with the Eur opean Communities' own conduct, make clear that
the €75/mt binding continues to have legal ef fect and did not, as alleged by the European
Communities, terminate in 2002.
5.215 By its terms, the 1994 BFA was a free-standing "settlement" agreement between the European
Communities, on the one hand, and Nicaragua, Colomb ia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, on the other.
When the BFA stated that "this agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002", it meant just that the
European Communities' agreement with the four BFA Latin American countries , not the Uruguay
Round concessions applicable to all WTO Members, w ould terminate at the end of 2002. Insofar as
the European Communities' WTO statements, lega l instruments, and internal communications
repeatedly acknowledge the continuing validity of the €75/mt binding, it is in no position now to
argue otherwise. Likewise, it cannot argue that its move from a MFN tariff quota to "tariff-only"
"automatically" dissolved all GATT Article II obliga tions attaching to its €75/mt binding. The very
purpose of GATT Article II is to preserve the value of a Member's tariff concessions and prohibit the
"automatic abolition" of those concessions. Indeed , the European Communiti es has itself officially
acknowledged the continuing bound commitment of €75/mt under Article II upon discontinuation of
the MFN tariff quota.
(f) Conclusion
5.216 To ensure that this decade-long dispute does not culminate in discrimination and restrictions
equal to or worse than those already condemned in prior WTO reviews, Panama joins Ecuador in
urging a prompt determination that the measures now before the Panel are inconsistent with GATT
Articles I:1, XIII:1 and XIII:2, and II.
2. Combined oral statement by Panama and Nicaragua
5.217 Panama begin this morning with brief comments on what the European Communities'
renewed WTO violations, and enduring history of non-compliance, have meant for the people of
Panama. Nicaragua, will then briefly discuss the European Communities' inequitable access treatment
from the standpoint of her own country. Finally, th e legal advisor to the Governments of Panama and
Nicaragua, will explain why the European Communitie s' banana measures are plainly in violation of
GATT Articles I, II, and XIII, and fail to bring th e European Communities into compliance with prior
DSB rulings.
5.218 Thirteen years ago, Panama was negotiating its accession to the WTO. Then, as now,
bananas were Panama's principal agricultural expor t and an indispensable source of income for the
poorest rural populations. Then, as now, the European Communities restricted access to bananas from
Panama and other Latin American countries in obviously discriminatory ways. Although the
accession process was not an easy one for Panama, Panama promised its people that in exchange for
accession sacrifices, Panama would be part of a rule-b ased system that would finally help it protect its
trading interests against unfair restrictions and discrimination on products like bananas.

5.219 Once Panama's accession was finalized in 1997, Panama was procedurally foreclosed from
joining Bananas III , but spent substantial time and res ources in Geneva and at the 2001 Doha
Ministerial helping to lead the GATT Article I waiver negotiations relating to bananas. As the record
of those negotiations makes perfectly clear, Panama and other Latin American suppliers declined to
accept the European Communities' waiver request for many months until strict Arbitration controls,
and the "two strikes and you're out" rule in partic ular, were built into the waiver's text. Upon
receiving those commitments, Panama returned from the Doha Ministerial meeting once again
promising its people that the multilateral controls of the Annex were certain to safeguard its banana
interests.
5.220 These various rule-related promises, which initiall y gave the people of Panama such comfort,
have now sadly given way to reality. Shaken first by the European Communities' extended
Bananas III non-compliance in 1999, they have now been all but shattered by the European
Communities' obviously non-compliant transition to "tariff-only."
5.221 Two years ago, during the 2005 Arbitration hearing, Panama listened with dismay and alarm
as the European Communities defended its high-tariff discrimination using justifications that would
dismantle the protections of the Annex word-by- word. Panama heard th e European Communities
insist then:
• that it had done the right and responsible thing in "balancing all interests" by
increasing the €75 tariff by several multiples;
• that the Arbitrator should not read the word s of the waiver Annex with "mechanistic"
formality, meaning it should ignore the words as they were written;
• that the Arbitrator should not consider the preferential treatment accorded to ACP
suppliers, which the European Communities claimed was separate and apart from the
MFN arrangement;
• that MFN access should be reduced to the €75 tariff for 2.2 million tonnes of bananas
scheduled in the Uruguay Round, alt hough MFN access had grown considerably
since then; and
• that the European Communities was entirely w ithin its right to structure its banana-
access arrangement primarily to protect its subsidized banana producers.
5.222 In listening to the vigour with which those argu ments were made, it was hard for Panama to
find any comfort that the European Communities w ould faithfully respect the Annex as of 2006.
Indeed, it did not.
5.223 After losing twice in Arbitration, and without so much as a single negotiation with Latin
America, the European Communities enacted in haste a new arrangement virtually identical to the one
already condemned in Arbitration, with ACP pr eferences that were no longer allowed under the
waivers of Article I and XIII. The European Communities presented its 2006 arrangement to us as a
fait accompli, explained that its effects would be "monitored" in the "real world."
5.224 So, today, Panama is here again to protect its rural producers and communities that depend on
this product, Panama hopes you will understand its deep sense of inju stice and disappointment. Even
now, in ways both disturbingly familiar and strange ly contradictory, Panama hears the European
Communities argue:

• that it has struck a successful balance be tween all interests involved, which would
"not be in the interest of any country involved ... to undo;"
• that the Panel must avoid a "formalistic" reading of the Annex, meaning it should
ignore the words of the text as they were written;
• that the relationship between the MFN a nd the ACP treatment cannot be compared;
and
• that the €75 tariff is not even bound, despite its insistence throughout Arbitration that
its Uruguay Round concessions (€75/mt for 2.2 million tonnes) were the only
effective commitments the Arbitrator could use to measure "market access."
5.225 What should Panama make of a dispute in which after over a decade of successful multilateral
challenges, extensive panel and Appellate B ody findings against the European Communities,
compliance and suspension actions, and two WTO arb itration determinations against the European
Communities, the European Communities is still unila terally installing discrimination that it defends
with the same failed claims? The frustrations fe lt by those who worked hard to accomplish accession
for Panama are nothing compared to the concerns of Panama's banana producers, whose livelihood is
inseparably linked to a successful, non-discriminatory resolution of this dispute.
5.226 Panama knows there is nothing that can be done to restore the hundreds of millions of dollars
in lost revenues, and nothing that can be done to restore the thousands of lost jobs Panama has already
suffered from years of EC banana discrimination. All Panama can respectfully seek is a ruling against
the European Communities on all counts that is time ly, decisive, and leaves no room for European
Communities misinterpretation. A ruling of that nature will hopefully enable Panama, as a principal
banana supplier to the EC market, to negotiate acceptable access reforms that finally accord its
producers the opportunity to trade in a market run acco rding to the rules. Only then can Panama's
banana producers prosper and have a legitimate opportunity to trade their way out of poverty.
5.227 Like Panama, Nicaragua finds the circumstances of these proceedings to be most
disappointing. The bananas issue is by no means new to us either. In virtually all of the many
litigation proceedings that have occurred over bana nas since the early 1990s, Nicaragua has been a
participant.
5.228 Nicaragua's reason for remaining engaged in the dispute is a simple one. Bananas are one of
the agricultural sectors in Nicara gua that offers the people econom ic hope. As this Panel knows,
Nicaragua is a severely indebted country. Its a nnual Gross National Income of $910 is below the
GNIs of several LDCs and well behind the GNIs of most ACP countries. Bananas are one of
Nicaragua's major agricultural crops and genera te thousands of jobs across its agricultural
departments. An additional 30,000 Nicaraguans ar e working on banana farm s elsewhere in Central
America, making the health of th e entire Latin American banana i ndustry important to large portions
of our population.
5.229 Nicaragua's banana production has good competitive advantages: fertile soil, ample labor, the
latest technologies, excellent quality, and reasonable proximity to ports. Because of its structural
advantages, this is a sector that should be able to raise the economic standards of Nicaragua's most
vulnerable regions if it is given a fair opportunity to compete.
5.230
 Although the European Communities has said in th is proceeding, and in all prior banana
proceedings, that it is committed to assisting de veloping countries overcome their economic problems
through trade, it is hard to see how this is so in the case of Nicaragua's banana industry. Nicaragua's
opportunities to compete in the European Communities' banana trade have essentially vanished.

5.231 When the dispute first began years ago, Nicara gua was able to market 60,000 mt of bananas
annually to the northern European markets that now represent the European Communities. Access
was possible because those markets were encumbered by a simple tariff of 20% ad valorem and, in
the case of Germany, no tariff at all. The 20 pe r cent tariff, which was the European Communities'
scheduled banana concession from 1963-1994, was the e quivalent of about €80 per tonne. Thereafter
in 1994, Nicaragua was one of the Banana Framewor k Agreement countries that helped negotiate the
European Communities' €75 in-quota concession, a rate subsequently scheduled by the European
Communities in the Uruguay Round. Under that sche duled arrangement, Nicara gua was still able to
maintain reasonable EC imports, although the signs of discrimination were becoming more
pronounced.
5.232 Today, after years of "winning" multilateral challenges against the European Communities'
banana policies, this long dispute has left Nicara gua with measures more discriminatory than those
first challenged at the outset of the dispute years ago. Nicaragua, like other developing countries of
Latin America, faces an insurmountable duty of €1 76 (or $4.33/box), a rate several multiples higher
than the rates we relied on to enter our bananas ove r the course of more than four decades. To make
matters worse, Nicaraguan producers are denied all access to the European Communities' duty-free
quota, which is reserved for suppliers that in mo st cases are economically far better situated than
Nicaragua.
5.233 By favouring its own subsidized producers a nd certain developing countries over Nicaraguan
suppliers, the European Communiti es has come close to defeating our banana industry. Today,
Nicaraguan banana shipments to the European Communities are non-existent. Until the European
Communities opens its market on an equitable basis to all suppliers irrespective of origin, Nicaragua
sees no prospect of ever again shipping to this once-promising market.
5.234 Nicaragua, like Ecuador, seeks the Panel's help in clarifying to the European Communities
and its member States that equitable market access, consistent with the EC schedule, is not a matter of
EC discretion. It is unconditionally mandated by Articles I, II, and XIII, and is long overdue.
5.235 Before handing over to Nicaragua and Panama's le gal advisor to discuss the various details of
law, Nicaragua would like to share two negotiating r ealities, about which it is quite clear because of
Nicaragua's direct participation on these matters.
5.236 Nicaragua, like Panama, actively negotiated the GATT Article I waiver Decision in the
months and days leading up to November 2001. Th at waiver's negotiating history is a matter of
record and uncontestable. It shows that the Euro pean Communities tried for nearly two years to get
open-ended discretionary authority for its 2006 regi me, but was explicitly denied a waiver on that
basis. It was only after the negotiators bu ilt into the waiver an express commitment that any future
tariff would be subject to WTO arbitration and that the waiver would terminate in the event of two
failed arbitrations that a multilateral consensus was po ssible. Absent those strict controls, the waiver
would not have been granted.
5.237 The story is an equally clear one in the case of the Banana Framework Agreement, to which
Nicaragua was a signatory. The Government of Ni caragua was seeking in that Agreement improved
EC access in exchange for a Bananas II "peace clause". Nicaragua never once discussed revoking all
current access opportunities as of 2003, would obviously have never agreed to such a revocation, and
would certainly never have cons idered ourselves authorized to revoke access commitments on a
plurilateral basis that were otherwise required on a multilateral basis.
5.238 These two EC notions – that the BFA signatories would have agreed to a Bananas II peace
clause in exchange for a virtual ban on access as of 2003, and that the Latin American negotiators
would have lifted their two-year banana waiver reservation in exchange for EC unilateralism as of

2006 – defy everything those two agreements stood for. They are arguments, Nicaragua is sorry to
say, reminiscent of countless comparable EC arguments in the past that have contributed to chronic
EC non-compliance over the years and have placed su ch an intolerable resource burden on a country
like Nicaragua to defend its basic WTO rights.
5.239 In almost all of the proceedings that have ever occurred on bananas, the WTO reviewing
bodies have closed with a common reflection. They have made the point that whatever policy priority
the European Communities may assign to protecting its subsidized producers and ACP suppliers, the
fundamental principles of the WTO are designed to foster the development of all countries, not just
some, and must be fulfilled through WTO-consistent trade and non-trade measures.
5.240 In keeping with that same immutable WTO pr inciple, and the ample demonstration of non-
compliance now on the record, Nicaragua respectfully asks the Panel to uphold Ecuador's case on all
claims. With your strong support, lasting EC compliance may finally be possible.
5.241 The legal advisor to the Governments of Pa nama and Nicaragua will now explain why the
European Communities' banana measures are inconsis tent with its WTO obligations and fail to bring
the European Communities into compliance with DSB rulings.
5.242 Rather than repeating Ecuador's affirmative case, with which Panama and Nicaragua fully
agrees, Panama and Nicaragua will put principal emphasis this morning on the European
Communities' flawed defences and certain issues raised in yesterday's session.
5.243 In the ten GATT and WTO proceedings involving this product, EC compliance problems
under GATT Articles I, II, and XIII have all come up before. So as not to be later arguing, once again,
retried versions of failed EC defenses – some of wh ich are already in their third generation – Panama
and Nicaragua believe that clarity is needed on all three claims, and that no one of these claims should
be subordinate to another.
(a) The inconsistency with GATT Article I
5.244 In the case of the European Co mmunities' tariff preference, which violates GATT Article I,
the European Communities opens its defence with the unwarranted "preliminary objection" that
Ecuador's claim should be dismissed because Article 21.5 can not be used to question a "mutually
agreed solution" between the parties. This objection tries to mire you in a systemic question when the
necessary predicate of that question, a proper DSU Article 3 "solution," is not even present.
5.245 Under the clear terms of DSU Articles 3.5 and 3. 7, there can be no "solution" to a dispute,
including a "mutually agreed solution," unless it is "c onsistent with the covered agreements." As the
European Communities has already acknowledged, the Understanding, in and of itself, was not WTO-
consistent. It was a "means" to a solution involv ing phased steps, each of which would not become
consistent with the covered agreements unless wa ivers of GATT Article I and GATT Article XIII
were achieved, and the conditions of those waivers we re then met. When it came to the final phase of
the Understanding, "tariff only," the European Co mmunities never met the terms of the Article I
waiver or its other WTO obligations. It was the European Communities, through its own illegal
actions, that obstructed a solution consistent with the covered agreements. The European
Communities cannot be allowed to prevent a cons istent Article 3 solution by reverting to non-
compliance, and then deprive Ecuador of its ab ility to challenge these re newed illegalities in DSU
non-compliance procedures.
5.246 In fact, to try to prevent this very problem , when the European Co mmunities requested that
the matter be withdrawn from the DSB agenda in Fe bruary 2002, the minutes confirm that Ecuador
and other countries were only willing to accept its re moval from the agenda on a conditional basis.

As expressed by Ecuador, because "these waivers included new stages which would have to be carried
out in order to ensure a proper transition to a tariff-only banana regime … if there was any
disagreement concerning the measures applied by th e European Communities, the matter could be
referred to the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5."
289 Other countries made comparable
reservations. The European Communities' effort to block Ecuador's reserved right would amount to
double jeopardy, finds no support anywhere in the DSU, and should itself be dismissed.
5.247 The European Communities' substantive Article I defence is equally baseless. As argued by
the European Communities, the Doha waiver continu es to excuse its Article I violation because even
after it lost twice in arbitration, the waiver still allowed it to implement another regime of its own
choosing so long as it simply asserted that its definiti on of the waiver access standard had been met.
There is literally nothing in the words, architecture, purpose, or negotiating history of the waiver that
lends support to that claim.
5.248 This waiver took nearly two years to approve precisely because of bananas. Having suffered
the "long-standing banana dispute," not a single La tin American banana supplier was willing to leave
the 2006 banana regime to the European Commun ities' discretion. The European Communities'
second submission readily acknowledges the waiver difficulties the European Communities faced on
bananas.290 As confirmed by its eleventh recital, this waiver was only able to receive the collective
endorsement of the Membership after the European Communities committed in the Annex to a strict
"multilateral control" on "any rebinding."
5.249 The words finally reflected in the Annex – inser ted at the insistence of the Latin American
banana suppliers – narrowly limited the extension of the waiver for bananas beyond 2006 to three
carefully controlled circumstances: the European Co mmunities could prevail in the first arbitration, it
could prevail in the second arbitration, or it coul d reach a "mutually satisfactory solution" with the
MFN suppliers. Whichever option the European Communities took, the plain words of the Annex
required the process to be concluded, in its entirety, before the 2006 arrangement took force. This left
no room for unilateral EC discretion from 2006 forw ard. To make unmistakably clear that EC
discretion was not allowed, the European Commun ities' penalty for failing the Annex controls, a
lapsed waiver, was framed to take effect automatically "upon entry into force" of the new regime, and
not a day later.
5.250 These waiver provisions – the time-delineated arb itration controls; the prospective orientation
of the Annex standard; the "upon entry into for ce" termination language; the "shall be concluded
before the entry into force" language, and the other supportive passages of the Annex – would have no
meaning whatsoever if the European Communities s till had the right as of 2006 to install whatever
regime it wanted to. No one would have bothered with an Annex or two arbitration procedures if this
were so.
5.251 The European Communities asks the Panel to reject this "formalistic" reading of the Annex in
favour of what it calls a "real world" analysis. Th is is its euphemism for asking the Panel to ignore
the Vienna Convention, the rules for interpretin g waivers, the words of the Annex, the ample
negotiating history, and the very purpose of these mult ilateral controls in favour of an approach under
which there are no real Latin American protections nor penalties for EC non-compliance of any kind.
Here is how the European Communities' approach w ould work in practice. As here, the European
Communities would set the tariff wherever it wanted to and wait for a DSB challenge. If the DSB
panel erroneously revisited the de funct waiver access standard and confirmed what the Arbitrator's
prior analytical framework makes obvious – that a 135 per cent increase in the MFN tariff, and ACP
and EBA margin of preference, definitionally fails to result "in at least maintaining" MFN conditions

289 Minutes of DSB Meeting of 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119, 6 March 2002, para. 5.
290 European Communities' second written submission, para. 83.

of competition into the future – the European Comm unities would be undeterred. It would simply do
what it did in late 2005. It would reduce its tariff by only a few digits and call the matter "rectified".
If the Latin American suppliers then returned to the same panel, the European Communities could
merely continue the same sequence for as long as it needed to, reducing its tariff by miniscule
amounts, digit-by-digit, until the Partnership Agreement expired by its own terms.
5.252 After so many years of banana discord, that EC unilateralism is exactly what the Latin
American negotiators were unwilling to accept in the waiver negotiations, and exactly why they
insisted on pre-2006 controls and a "two-strikes-and-you're-out" termination provision before granting
their approval.
5.253 The European Communities has lost its waiv er for bananas, making its ACP banana
preference illegal under Article I.
(b) The inconsistency with GATT Article XIII
5.254 The European Communities' Article XIII violation, arising from its discriminatory ACP tariff
quota, is likewise inexcusable.
5.255 Here, the European Communities begins its defe nce with another "preliminary objection."
Under this one, its three-part contention is: (i) th at the simple use of the phrase "suitable waiver" in
the "MFN tariff and ACP tariff-quota suggestion" of the first Article 21.5 panel must be read to mean
that Article XIII is per se inapplicable to all tariff and tariff- quota arrangements; (ii) that this EC-
defined meaning of the suggestion should be elevated to a binding determination of law; and (iii) that
because Ecuador never contested these multi-layere d EC presumptions, it is terminally barred from
challenging any tariff and tariff-quota arrangement u nder Article XIII. For all the reasons Ecuador
summarized yesterday, this is a tortured reading of the panel report and DSU.
5.256 The panel's second suggestion never absolved any discriminatory ACP tariff quota from the
obligations of Article XIII, however the larger impor t regime might be structured. To the contrary,
the panel, only paragraphs befo re, found the European Communities' exclusive ACP tariff quota, by
its own specific shape and nature , to be a quantitative restriction c overed by Article XIII:5 that failed
to treat like products "equally, irrespective of origin ," in violation of Article XIII. No subsequent
compliance suggestion can be read to nullify that actual finding of law.
5.257 The only credible reading of the panel's se cond suggestion emerges from the structure and
syntax of the recommendations them selves. The first clause of th e second suggestion, relating to a
MFN tariff, did not address the Article I waiver requirements simply because those requirements had
just been addressed in the first pure-tariff-only suggestion. The ACP tariff quota was the new element
differentiating suggestion two from suggestion one, explaining why the panel would add the clause,
"with a tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by a suita ble waiver." It was that added tariff quota that
needed a "suitable waiver," as distinguished fro m the tariff-related waiver already discussed in
suggestion one.
5.258 The fiction the European Communities creates in its preliminary objection is further
belabored in its "substantive" defence. It insist s that while Article XIII does regulate arrangements
under which all imports are entered under tariff quotas, it does not regulate those under which some
sources are entered under quantitative restrictions and ot hers not. This is its old, failed "separate
regime" argument. The Bananas III panel and Appellate Body already expressly found that
Article XIII, including Article XIII:5, applies to all bananas irrespective of origin and irrespective of
the regulatory means by which those bananas are entered. If the unconditional obligations of
Article XIII were interpreted otherwise, any Memb er could apply a discriminatory tariff quota with
impunity, so long as one or more suppliers were regulated by other means.

5.259 The European Communities' second substantive Article XIII defence is another failed relic of
prior Bananas III proceedings. Its essence is that because the tariff quota is a "cap" on ACP imports,
it "benefits" MFN suppliers. While the European Communities can no doubt find any number of
ways to make its banana import arrangement more discriminatory, and certainly has over the years,
that possibility does nothing to excuse the dissimila r Article XIII restrictions, nor to rebut the
presumption of nullification and impairment created by that discrimination. This is a measure that
shields all ACP suppliers from competition within the quota, guarantees them sole access to a
discriminatory portion of the EC market, allows certa in ACP suppliers to compete more effectively in
the European Communities than would otherwise have been the case absent the discriminatory
reserve, and denies all MFN suppliers equivalent access to the zero-duty allocation. No one can
credibly consider this a "benefit" to MFN suppliers.
5.260 The European Communities itself appears to recognize that its Article XIII defences are not
convincing. Why else would it still have a request pending for a renewed Article XIII waiver to cover
its exclusive ACP tariff quota under an arrangeme nt in which MFN bananas would separately be
entered under a flat tariff? At least in this r espect the European Communities is right. Absent a
waiver, its exclusive ACP tariff quota is a patent violation of Article XIII.
(c) The inconsistency with GATT Article II
5.261 As Ecuador stated yesterday, the European Co mmunities' Article II defences are, in some
ways, the most dismaying EC claims of all. Un like its other defences, many of which have been
heard for years, these are a 180° reversal of prior EC statements, which have been documented again
and again in EC legal instruments, internal communications, WTO notifications, and prior WTO
proceedings.
5.262 For the first time ever in this very long di spute, the European Communities asserts that its
€75/mt concession expired at the end of 2002 under the BFA language annexed to its Schedule. To
accept that proposition, one would have to ignore:
− the current-access rules of the Uruguay Rou nd, which informed these concessions and
required all current-access opportunities to continue over time;
− the European Communities' 1994 corrigendum, which specifically confirms that its in-quota
concession of 75 ECU/mt for 2.2 million tonnes is its "final" bound "current access quota;"
− the BFA's termination provision, which speaks onl y of the "agreement" reached by the five
parties, and nowhere of the multilateral "concessions" the European Communities was
independently required to schedule as its final Uruguay Round bound rates;
− the European Communities' original Uruguay R ound proposal on bananas, a 100 ECU/mt in-
quota concession for an unlimited period, which the BFA sought to improve, not cancel
altogether as of 2003;
− the Bananas III panel report, which explicitly validates the €75/mt concession, as the
European Communities itself has acknowledged;
− the 2005 Arbitration Award, which equally validates that concession;
− the European Communities' official 2004 and 2005 Article XXVIII notifications, which in
both cases refer to "concessions" in the plural, not the singular; and
−
 a series of other EC statements and documents , too numerous to recount, that confirm the
continuing bound effect of its €75/mt rate.

5.263 The European Communities now appears esp ecially discomforted by its adamant
confirmation of the €75/mt bound rate during Arbitr ation. To try to reconcile that awkward
inconsistency, it argues that the bound rates were neve r really at issue in Arbitration. Members of the
Panel, with due respect, the European Commun ities made its in-quota Uruguay Round concessions

the centerpiece of its entire Arbitration argument, insis ting that its 2006 market-access arrangement
should only have to approximate its bound €75/mt tari ff for 2.2 million tonnes. It is disingenuous and
fundamentally disheartening for the European Co mmunities now to pretend that those concessions
disappeared years ago.
5.264 For the European Communities to argue, alte rnatively, that the €75/mt binding "lawfully
terminated" with the abolition of its MFN tariff quota is no less disingenuous. Here, too, there is an
ample paper trail of EC acknowledgements that its €75/mt concession would have to be accorded
Article II protection in the European Communities' move to "tariff only."
5.265 The European Communities' €176/mt tariff on all MFN bananas represents far less favourable
treatment than the concessions pr ovided for in the Eur opean Communities' Schedule in violation of
Article II:1(a) and far exceeds those in-quota concessions in violation of Article II:1(b).
5.266 When the European Communities closes its case by contending that its current arrangement
"balances" the interests of all involved, Panama and Ni caragua, like Ecuador, must take issue. This is
a regime that was shaped primarily to protect its subsidized Community production; that was installed
without so much as a single consultation with MFN interests; that replicates measures plainly
disallowed by previous Banana rulings; that, perhaps more than any other WTO case, has eroded
confidence in the dispute settlement mechanisms of this institution; and that, yes, in EC tariff
payments alone, is drawing almost $1 billion an nually out of the developing countries of Latin
America. No WTO objective is served by this illegal regime.
5.267 Panama and Nicaragua join Ecuador in urging the promptest possible determination that these
banana measures are inconsistent with the European Communities' obligations under GATT
Articles I, XIII, and II, and fail to bring the European Communities into compliance.
M. UNITED STATES
1. Written submission of the United States
5.268 The United States agrees with Ecuador that th e European Communities' import regime for
bananas is inconsistent with Articles I and XIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
The United States reserves the right to elaborate furt her on its views in a statement at the meeting of
the Panel with the parties and third parties.
2. Oral statement of the United States
5.269 The United States believes that Ecuador is on so lid legal ground in challenging the European
Communities' revised banana regime. The United St ates will first address the preliminary objections
raised by the European Communities in this proceeding before turning to our view on the merits.
(a) Preliminary objections
5.270 The European Communities argues that Ecuador should be precluded from having recourse to
DSU Article 21.5 on two grounds: one, becau se the EC-Ecuador Understanding on Bananas
constitutes a "mutually agreed solution" through wh ich Ecuador has allegedly agreed to the current
EC banana regime, including the preference granted to the ACP countries; and, two, because a WTO
Member cannot challenge a measure that was "s uggested" by a WTO panel. These arguments are
groundless and should be rejected.

(b) Mutually agreed solution
5.271 The EC-Ecuador Understanding on Bananas (and a similar understanding between the United
States and the European Communities) described a phased series of steps to be taken by the European
Communities over several years, in combination with certain waivers, for the purpose of bringing
itself into compliance with its WTO obligations. The series of steps would culminate with a "tariff
only regime" by 1 January 2006, not a "tariff-ra te-quota-only-for-some" regime. The European
Communities and Ecuador disagree whether as a ma tter of fact their Understanding constitutes a
mutually agreed solution for purposes of Article 3.6 of the DSU. But in the end this is irrelevant since
the Understanding in any event does not preclude this dispute.
5.272 Article 1.1 of the DSU restricts the application of the DSU to the "covered agreements" listed
in Appendix 1 to the DSU. The Understanding is not
 a "covered agreement". Accordingly, the DSU
cannot be used to settle a dispute as to the mean ing or effect of the Understanding, and the DSU
cannot enforce the Understanding by blocking a party to the Understanding from recourse to the DSU.
It is worth noting that, during the India – Autos proceeding, the European Communities also held that
view that a mutually agreed solution could not pr event recourse to the DSU: "Even if the 1997 [EC-
India] Agreement had settled the matter in dispute in the present case, that would still not preclude the
European Communities from bringing this dispute. The 1997 Agreement was not a 'covered
agreement' in the sense of Article 1.1 of the DSU. Therefore, the rights and obligations of the parties
under the 1997 Agreement were not enforceable under the DSU."
5.273 The European Communities argues that "using Ar ticle 21.5 ... to question a mutually agreed
solution between the Parties, goes against Article 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU." But nothing in those
provisions bars recourse to dispute settlement where one party claims to have a mutually agreed
solution with the other party. Article 3.7 expresses a clear preference for mutually agreed solutions,
but it does not prohibit recourse to procedures under Article 21.5 or any other provision of the DSU.
5.274 Further, the European Communities' proposed appro ach is directly contrary to Article 3.5 of
the DSU. Article 3.5 specifically requires mutually ag reed solutions to be consistent with the covered
agreements. Yet the European Communities would bar the dispute settlement system from examining
whether a measure alleged to be adopted pursuant to a mutually agreed solution is consistent with the
covered agreements. And the United States agrees with Ecuador's statement that Article 3.10
"contains nothing remotely prohibiting resort to dispute settlement procedures."
5.275 The European Communities stretches its argument further by arguing that Ecuador is barred
from challenging the ACP preference because "it is uncontested that bilateral agreements between two
WTO members form part of the 'applicable rules of law' between the parties to the dispute, as defined
by the Vienna Convention." The European Communiti es is referring to Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna
Convention. The European Communities has advan ced this argument, as a responding party, in a
number of recent disputes, and the United States is not aware that it has yet been successful. For
example, this argument was raised by the European Communities in EC – Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products and rejected by that panel. The United States urges this Panel to do likewise.
5.276 Nothing in the customary rules of interpreta tion of public international law reflected in
Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention suppor ts the European Commun ities' claim that the
Understanding acts as a procedural defense for the European Communities. Article 31.3(c) of the
Vienna Convention deals with interpretation
 of the covered agreements. The European Communities
is not arguing that the Understanding indicates a par ticular interpretation of any term in any covered
agreement, rather the European Communities is cl aiming the Understanding is a jurisdictional bar to
this dispute. Article 31.3(c) does not deal with jurisdiction.

5.277 Furthermore, Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention provides for the taking into account,
in the interpretation of a treaty, "any relevant rul es of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties". The EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products panel found that "the
rules of international law" that are to be "tak en into account" in the interpretation of the WTO
Agreements "are those which are applicable in th e relations between the WTO Members". The panel
expressly rejected the notion that the "rules of intern ational law" could be those applicable only to the
disputing parties. Since the Understanding is a bila teral agreement between only the parties to this
dispute, not all Members of the WTO, it cannot be considered part of any "applicable rules of law"
that could inform the panel's interpretation of the covered agreements.
(c) Suggestion by the Panel
5.278 The European Communities argues that claims challenging the consistency of measures
suggested by a panel cannot be brought before an Article 21.5 panel and that, Ecuador not having
appealed those suggestions, it is supposedly bound by "res judicata", pursuant to Article 19.1 and
17.14 of the DSU. These arguments completely miss the status of a panel "suggestion" and the scope
of an Article 21.5 panel proceeding. EC Regul ation 1964, which implemented the latest import
regime for bananas, is a measure taken by the Eu ropean Communities to come into compliance after
Bananas III . That this regime may fit the description of one of three suggestions made by the
Bananas III 21.5 panel is irrelevant. Contrary to the European Communities' assertions,
implementation by a Member of suggesti ons made by panels does not have a res judicata effect, nor
could it render that Member's measures per se compatible with WTO rules. Nothing in the DSU, in
particular Article 19.1, can be interpreted to lead to that result. That a Member chooses to implement
a suggestion made by a panel does not relieve th e Member from ensuring that it does in a manner
consistent with its WTO obligations.
(d) Article I waiver
5.279 Turning to the merits, the European Commun ities does not contest that the granting of
preferences to ACP bananas is in breach of Artic le I of the GATT 1994. Instead, it argues that the
ACP Article I waiver is still valid with respect to bananas. The United States agrees with Ecuador's
analysis that the Article I waiver terminated w ith respect to bananas on ce the European Communities
implemented the new regime in 1 January 2006.
5.280 Under the express terms of the Annex, the European Communities had two opportunities to
propose a regime that would "result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN suppliers." In
2005, pursuant to the Annex arbitration mechanism, two WTO arbitrators determined that the two
proposals made by the European Communities did no t meet those conditions. The phrase "[i]f the EC
has failed to rectify the matter", at the beginning of the fifth sentence in tiret 5 of the Annex can only
refer back to the determination made by the sec ond arbitrator following the European Communities'
effort to "rectify the matter". Therefore, as require d by the fifth sentence, the waiver "shall cease to
apply to bananas upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime".
5.281 The European Communities seems to be claiming that Members decided that, after the
European Communities had twice failed to provide th e type of regime required under the Annex, the
European Communities was allowed to unilaterally institute any regime, whether it met the conditions
of the Annex or not, and still retain the cover of the waiver. This approach finds no basis in the
Annex.
(e) Article XIII
5.282 Article XIII applies with respect to the current tariff rate quota regime, just as it did with
respect to the European Communities' prior banana import regimes. In EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5

– Ecuador) , the panel explained that "by definition, a tariff quota is a quantitative limit on the
availability of a specific tariff rate". The Panel in Bananas III explained that GATT Article XIII:1
requires that "no import restriction shall be app lied to one Member's products unless the importation
of like products from other Members is similarly rest ricted". According to the Appellate Body, the
"essence" of GATT Article XIII, and therefore Article XIII:1, "is that like products should be treated
equally, irrespective of origin".
5.283 The European Communities is maintaining a tariff rate quota under which MFN-origin
bananas are neither "treated equally" nor restricted "similarly" to "like" ACP-origin bananas. ACP
bananas receive preferential, protected access under th e EC's banana regime, entering the EC market
duty-free up to a quantity of 775,000 tons. No MFN supplier receives any such tariff rate quota
treatment. By using a tariff rate quota on ACP imports, and an entirely different means to restrict
MFN imports, the European Communities is in violation of GATT Article XIII:1.
5.284 Furthermore, the Bananas III panel found that GATT Article XIII:2 requires that "[i]f
quantitative restrictions are used ... they are to be used in the least trade-distorting manner possible".
Any tariff rate quota allocations must attempt to "approximate ... the trade shares that would have
occurred in the absence of the regime ". In addition, if a Member allocates tariff rate quota shares to
Members not having a substantial interest in supplyi ng the product, then shares must be allocated to
all suppliers. The European Communities' exclus ive 775,000 ton ACP tariff rate quota fails to
distribute any share whatsoever to MFN suppliers, let al one a share they would have expected to
obtain in the absence of restrictions. This, despite the fact that many of the excluded MFN suppliers
are principal or substantial suppliers of bananas to the European Communities, and leading exporters
of bananas to the world. For all these reasons, we agree with Ecuador that the European
Communities' tariff rate quota for ACP origin bananas established thro ugh Regulation 1964 is
inconsistent with Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2. Th e European Communities has no Article XIII waiver
currently in force – its last waiver having expired on its own terms on 31 December 2005.
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 On 27 November 2007, the Panel submitted its inte rim report to the parties. On 4 December
2007, the European Communities submitted a written re quest for the review of precise aspects of the
interim report. On the same date, Ecuador stated that it had no comments on the interim report.
6.2 The Panel modified aspects of its report in light of the European Communities' comments
where it considered that appropriate, as explained below. The Panel has also made some minor
editorial adjustments to the text and footnotes, as e xplained below. References to paragraph numbers
and footnotes in this Section refer to those in the interim report, except as otherwise noted.
(a) Waivers adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference
6.3 The Panel has amended paragraph 2.9 of the interim report, as requested by
the European Communities.
(b) Corrigendum to the European Communities' Commission Regulation (EC) 1549/2006
6.4 Paragraph 2.44 of the interim report referred to the European Communities' Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to C ouncil Regulation (EEC)
No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff. 291 In its

291 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff,
Official Journal of the European Union, 31/10/2006.

comments on the interim report, the European Co mmunities states that this paragraph was wrong and
noted that a corrigendum to Regulation 1549/2006, de leting the reference to the tariff quota for tariff
item 0803 00 19 (bananas) was published on 9 June 2007. The Panel has noted the adoption of this
corrigendum to Regulation 1549/2006 and adjusted paragraph 2.44 of the interim report accordingly.
(c) Factual description of the European Communities' bananas market
6.5 In its comments on the interim report, the Eu ropean Communities requests the Panel to make
changes to several paragraphs in Section II.D, en titled "European Communities' bananas market". In
the European Communities' view, the description of the arguments of the parties in specific
paragraphs of that section is not accurate. Th e Panel has noted the European Communities' request
and has incorporated changes into paragraphs 2.53 , 2.57 and 2.63, as explained below. Preliminarily,
however, the Panel must start by noting that the pu rpose of Section II of the report, entitled "Factual
aspects", of which Section II.D.4 is a part, is not to provide a description of the arguments of the
parties. The arguments of the parties are mainly reflected in Section IV of the report, entitled
"Arguments of the parties", and reproduced in other sections of the report, as appropriate. The
purpose of Section II of the report, entitled "Factual aspects", is rather to provide a description of the
relevant facts, as supported by the evidence on record . In those specific aspects where the description
of the facts made by each of the parties differed, and there was no sufficient evidence on record for
the Panel to make a factual determination, the Pane l has described such parties' views on the relevant
facts and any discrepancies between those views.
Alleged increase in prices paid to Ecuadorian banana producers

6.6 The European Communities requests the Panel to note "the fact that the prices paid to
Ecuadorian banana producers increased by 6.7% afte r the introduction of the new import regime".
The Panel notes that, according to the calculations provided by both parties 292, the average unit price
for bananas from Ecuador increased by approximately 5.7 to 6.7 per cent in 2006, with respect to
2005, in US dollars/mt. The same prices, however, when estimated in €/mt, decreased by 4.8 per cent
over the same period. 293 The Panel has adjusted paragraph 2. 63 of the interim report and footnote
165, in order to note this fact.
Increase in imports of bananas from MF N countries, compared to growth of
European Communities' bananas market
6.7 The European Communities requests the Panel to note "the fact that the increase in the
quantity of bananas imported from MFN countries in 20 06 and 2007 is bigger than the increase of the
total market for bananas in the European Communities during the same period". The Panel notes that,
indeed, according to the data available on record 294, the percentage of incr ease in the quantity of
bananas imported from MFN countries in 2006 from those imported in 2005 is greater than the
percentage of increase in the quantity of bananas from all origins sold in the European Communities
over the same period
295. The Panel has noted this fact in a footnote to paragraph 2.57 of the report.
There is, however, no definitive information on record with regard to the year 2007 that would allow
the Panel to make any determination comparing the data for that year with that for the year 2006.

292 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 29 and Exhibit EC-11.
293 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 29.
294 See Exhibit EC-17.
295 See also European Communities' first written submission, para. 49.

Increase in imports of bananas from MFN count ries, compared to increase in imports of
bananas from ACP countries
6.8 The European Communities requests the Panel to note "the fact that the increase in the
quantity of bananas imported from MFN countries in 200 7 is bigger than the increase in the quantity
of bananas imported from ACP countries during the same period". The European Communities has
provided market information corresponding to the first six months of 2007. The information provided
by the European Communities, however, does not al low the Panel to make any finding comparing the
data for the whole year 2007 with that for the year 2006. Accordingly, the Panel has not modified in
this respect the language contained in paragraph 2.57 of the interim report.
Increase in imports of bananas from Ecuador between 1999 and 2006
6.9 The European Communities requests the Panel to no te "the fact that the quantity of bananas
imported from Ecuador increased by more than 25 % between 1999 and 2006". Based on the data
available on record, as reflected in the table included in paragraph 2.57 of the interim report, the Panel
has adjusted paragraph 2.57 of the interim report accordingly.
Decrease in imports of bananas from ACP countries
6.10 The European Communities request s the Panel to note "the fact that many ACP countries
have seen significant reductions in the quant ities of the bananas they export to the
European Communities following the introduction of the new import regime, just like some MFN
countries". The Panel notes that, according to the data available on record
296, most ACP countries
(with the exception of Cameroon, Belize and Somalia ) increased their exports of bananas to the
European Communities in the year 2006, followi ng the introduction of the new import regime, as
compared to the previous year 2005. There is no de finitive information on record with regard to the
year 2007 that would allow the Panel to make any determination comparing the data for that year with
that for the year 2006. Accordingly, the Panel has not modified in this respect the language contained
in paragraph 2.57 of the interim report.
(d) Costs for import licences
6.11 Paragraph 2.53 of the interim report notes inter alia that, following the introduction of the
European Communities' new banana import system on 1 January 2006, with the €176/mt tariff duty,
the amount paid by trading companies importing bananas from Ecuador had increased. In its
comments on the interim report, the European Comm unities states that this description of the effects
of the new import regime on the cost of impor ting bananas was misleading. The European
Communities notes that, under the old regime, banana trading companies had to incur the cost of
acquiring an import licence, in addition to the duties paid upon importation. Following the
introduction of the new system and the abolition of import licences, these import licence costs have
ceased to exist. The Panel has noted this fact and adjusted paragraph 2. 53 of the interim report
accordingly.
(e) European Communities' aguments concerning Ecuador's claim under Article XIII of the
GATT 1994
6.12 In its comments on the interim report, the Eur opean Communities requests that the structure
of Section VII.D.3 of the interim report be amende d. The European Communities states that certain
of its arguments, summarised in Section VII.D.3 of the interim report, had been mistakingly qualified
as a preliminary objection, whereas these arguments were actually part of the European Communities'

296 See Exhibit EC-17.

defence on substantive claims advanced by Ecuador under Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The Panel
has amended Section VII.D of the interim report accordingly.
(f) Additional revisions and corrections
6.13 In Section III, entitled "Parties' requests for findings and recommendations", the Panel
included references to the European Communities' arguments that had been already described at
length in other parts of the interim report. The new language is to be found in paragraphs 3.2 to 3.6 of
the final report. The Panel corrected some referenc es in the table of cases cited in the report. The
Panel also made some editorial changes in paragr aphs 2.76, 5.75, 7.7, 7.9, 7.340, 7.362, 7.376 and
7.429 and in several footnotes of the report.
VII. FINDINGS
A. ATTEMPTS AT HARMONIZING THE TIMETABLES
7.1 In the present proceedings the Panel is faced with an unprecedented situation. The matter
before this compliance Panel, requested by Ecuado r on 23 February 2007, is closely related to the
matter that was raised by the United States in its request for the establishment of a panel on 2 July
2007. However, despite repeated attempts, the Pa nel was unable to harmonize the timetable of the
current proceedings with the timetable of the compliance panel requested by the United States.
7.2 Both disputes concern measures adopted by the European Communities with the alleged
purpose of complying with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB in the dispute (EC – Bananas III). In
both disputes, the parties disagree whether these m easures are in conformity with the European
Communities' obligations under the WTO covered agreements.
7.3 In their complaints, Ecuador and the United States each challenge the same specific measures
adopted by the European Communities. Namely:
(a) The tariff quota, with a current volume of 775,000 mt, which allows bananas of ACP
origin to enter the European Communities market duty-free; and,
(b) The European Communities' tariff, curren tly set at €176/mt, which applies to all
European Communities imports of banan as, except those benefiting from access to
the zero-duty TRQ.297
7.4 The claims in each of the two cases are very similar. Both Ecuador and the United States
claim that the challenged measures are inconsistent with Article I:1 and Article XIII, paragraphs 1 and
2, of the GATT 1994. Additionally, Ecuador clai ms in this dispute that these measures are
inconsistent with Article II of the GATT 1994.
7.5 The Panel is aware that, according to Article 9.3 of the DSU:
"If more than one panel is established to ex amine the complaints related to the same
matter, to the greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve as panelists on
each of the separate panels and the timetab le for the panel process in such disputes
shall be harmonized."

297 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for the Establishment of a Panel
(WT/DS27/80) 26 February 2007, p. 4. See also, Ecuador's first submission, para. 21.

7.6 During the course of the proceedings, the Pane l received a number of requests from the
European Communities to extend the deadlines and to harmonize the timetable for this case with that
of the panel requested by the United Stat es. These requests were made through written
communications on 6 July and 20 August 2007, as we ll as orally, during the substantive meeting of
the Panel with the parties and third parties, on 18 September 2007. In all instances, the Panel
considered, both the European Communities' request and the views expressed by Ecuador, the
complaining party.
7.7 Harmonization of the timetable in both cases was made particularly difficult because of the
two-month period that elapsed between the dates on which the two panels began their respective
work. The Panel requested by Ecuador was compos ed by the WTO Director-General on 18 June. In
turn, the panel requested by the United States, whic h was established on 12 July 2007, was composed
on 13 August by the WTO Director-General. This two-month difference between the disputes was
particularly significant, since compliance proceedings, by their very nature, are intended to be brief.
7.8 In all cases, when asked, Ecuador as the complain ing party, strongly objected to any changes
in the timetable that would result in extending the proceedings further beyond the 90-day period
envisaged in Article 21.5 of the DSU.
7.9 As noted in the factual aspects section of this Report, Ecuador's status as a developing country
Member, and its interest in a prompt decision of th e matter, were additional factors taken into account
by the Panel when preparing and revising the timetable for its proceedings.
7.10 In the light of these considerations, and no twithstanding the Panel's initial intention to
harmonize the timetable of both the proceedings re quested by Ecuador and those requested by the
United States, the Panel was unable to find a better a lternative for the timetable that was eventually
adopted in these proceedings. This despite the f act that the Panel was aware that the approved
timetable implied a considerable burden of work, p eaking at particular moments for the parties, as
well as for the Panel and the Secretariat.
298
B. PRELIMINARY ISSUES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1. Summary of the two preliminary issues
7.11 The European Communities raises two preliminary issues.
7.12 First, the European Communities argues that Ecuador should not be allowed to challenge the
European Communities' current import regime fo r bananas, including the preference for ACP
countries. The European Communities contends that the Understanding on Bananas, signed by
Ecuador and the European Communities in April 2001 (Bananas Understanding) 299, is a mutually
agreed solution to the banana dispute, "in which it is provided that the current import regime of the
European Communities would includ e a preference for ACP bananas". 300 According to the
European Communities, Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of th e DSU prevent Ecuador from challenging, through
an Article 21.5 compliance panel, a mutually agreed solution reached by the parties.301

298 As noted above, however, issuance of the interim report was delayed by the Panel in order to ensure
that replies to questions and comments on replies in the proceedings requested by the United States had been
received by that panel, before the interim report in the current proceedings was issued.
299 See Understanding on Bananas between the EC and Ecuador of 30 April 2001, in EC – Bananas III,
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001; and EC – Bananas III , Understanding
on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001.
300 European Communities' first written submission, para. 64.
301 Ibid., paras. 61-65. See also European Communities' second written submission, paras. 7-18.

7.13 As a supplementary argument under the same pr eliminary issue, the European Communities
adds that:
"[E]ven if it was to be assumed that the [Bananas] Understanding is not a 'mutually
agreed solution' for purposes of the DSU, ... it cannot be denied that it is a bilateral
agreement that must be taken into c onsideration in analysing the rights and
obligations of the parties to this dis pute. Through the Understanding Ecuador
accepted that the Cotonou Preference w ould continue until the end of 2007.
The European Communities considers that this bars Ecuador from challenging the
operation of the Cotonou Preference to the end of this year.
The European Communities al so considers that the principle of good faith, which
covers the entire DSU, bars Ecuador from escaping its obligations by asserting the
alleged non-compliance of the Understanding with the WTO rules."
302
7.14 As a second preliminary issue, the European Communities argues that Ecuador's complaint
against the Cotonou Preference under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 should be rejected, because in
effect Ecuador is challenging a suggestion made by the first compliance panel requested by
Ecuador.303 According to the European Communities, such suggestion can be challenged only
through recourse to appellate review, but not through a compliance panel.304
2. Order of analysis of the two preliminary issues
7.15 The first preliminary issue raised by the Eu ropean Communities relates more generally to
whether Ecuador can bring this dispute under Article 21.5 of the DSU. Therefore, the Panel addresses
that first preliminary issue in this part of its repor t, in order to decide whether there is a need to
proceed to assess the substantive claims by Ecuador.
7.16 The second preliminary issue raised by the Eur opean Communities relates exclusively to the
claim made by Ecuador under Article XIII of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the Panel intends to address
it as a preliminary issue in the context of Ecuado r's claim under Article XI II, provided that the
analysis of that claim is deemed warranted in the light of the Panel's findings on the
European Communities' first preliminary objection.
3. First preliminary issue raised by the European Communities
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) Main arguments by the European Communities
7.17 The European Communities points out that on 30 April 2001 it signed with Ecuador the
Bananas Understanding. The European Communities argues that, "in accordance with its terms, [the
Bananas Understanding] is a 'mutually agreed solution to the banana dispute' 305 and 'identified the
means by which the long standing dispute over th e European Communities' banana import regime can
be resolved'.306"307

302 Final written version of the European Communities' closing oral statement at the substantive
meeting of the Panel with the parties and third parties, para. 4.
303 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 79-86.
304 See European Communities' second written submission, paras. 19-35.
305 (footnote original) See the Understanding, at point G.
306 (footnote original) See the Understanding, at point A.
307 European Communities' first written submission, para. 61.

7.18 In regard to the content of the Bananas Understanding, the European Communities asserts
that:
"Through the Understanding, Ecuador accepted that the banana import regime that
the European Communities would implement after January 1, 2006, would have two
main characteristics. First, it would be tariff only.
308 Second, there would be a
preference granted to bananas coming from the ACP countries. This is made clear by
the fact that Ecuador undertook to actively support the grant of a waiver from
GATT Article I for these preferences.
309"310
7.19 According to the European Communities, the Bananas Understanding is "binding" 311 on both
Parties, including Ecuador, as confirmed by both si des' compliance "with the obligations undertaken
in the Understanding".312
7.20 In particular, the European Communities argues that it "has fully complied with all [three]
obligations [set out in the Bananas Understanding]" 313, namely: "(i) to implement an interim import
regime until January 1, 2006; ( ii) to initiate negotiations unde r GATT Article XXVIII, recognizing
Ecuador as the principal supplier in these negotiations ; and (iii) to introduce a tariff only import
regime on January 1, 2006." 314 First, the European Communities argues that, before the introduction
of the tariff only regime on 1 January 2006, it had accepted increased quantities of bananas from
Ecuador and other MFN countries at a tariff of €75/ mt, and had introduced a corresponding decrease
in the volume of preferential banana exports from ACP countries. 315 Second, according to the
European Communities, "Ecuador was recognised as a principal supplier in the GATT Article XXVIII
negotiations".316 Third, the European Co mmunities claims that on 1 January 2006 it introduced a
tariff-only regime, as foreseen by the Understanding317, since:
"The Understanding does not provide that this tariff only regime should have any
particular characteristics and, indeed , the import regime introduced by the
European Communities does not have any speci al features: there is a single tariff
applicable to all banana imports, with a preference granted to the ACP countries
limited to certain quantities only. This is the type of regime that the Article 21.5
Panel had described as 'tariff only' in paragraph 6.157 of its report."318
7.21 As regards Ecuador's compliance, the Eur opean Communities argues that "Ecuador had
initially complied with the obligations undertaken in the Understanding"319 by supporting the adoption
of the waivers from Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994, as provided in the
Bananas Understanding.
320

308 (footnote original) See the Understanding, at point B.
309 (footnote original) See the Understanding at point F.
310 European Communities' first written submission, para. 63.
311 Ibid., para. 61.
312 Ibid., para. 62.
313 European Communities' second written submission, para. 13.
314 Ibid., para. 13.
315 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 28.
316 European Communities' second written submission, para. 13.
317 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 29.
318 European Communities' second written submission, para. 16.
319 Ibid., para. 15.
320 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 29.

7.22 Concerning Ecuador's communication on the Ba nanas Understanding to the DSB that the
"provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not applicable in this case" 321, the European Communities
claims that such a "subsequent unilateral ... decl aration cannot alter the binding nature of the
Understanding between the parties to this dispute." 322 According to the European Communities,
"the analysis of the legal status and effect of the Understanding should be primarily based on its
content and not on any unilateral statements issued by the signatories after its signing." 323
The European Communities points out that "the Ba nanas Understanding (i) describes in great detail
the characteristics of the two banana import regimes that the European Communities should
implement by July 1, 2001 and by January 1, 2002 respectively and (ii) expressly provides that
Ecuador's right to retaliate will be terminated."
324
7.23 The European Communities also supports the argument made by a number of ACP third
parties (namely Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoi re, Dominica, the Domi nican Republic, Ghana,
Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and th e Grenadines, and Suriname) that, with Ecuador's
explicit agreement325, "the banana dispute was taken off the agenda of the DSB in accordance with
Article 21.6 of the DSU ... at the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002 326"327. In this regard,
the European Communities argues that:
"Given that ... Article [21.6 of the DSU] provides that the issue of implementation
'shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is solved', th e removal of the item
from the agenda of the DSB supports the argu ment that Ecuador considered that the
issue was solved with the introduction in 2002 of the new tariff-quota-based import
regime as envisaged in the Understanding."
328
7.24 Nevertheless, in response to a question by the Panel concerning that specific statement by
ACP third parties, at a later stage in the proceedi ngs the European Communities stated that it "has not
argued that the withdrawal of the issue on the implementation of the DSB rulings and
recommendations from the agenda of the DSB has any particular legal significance."
329
7.25 The European Communities also contends that, since the Bananas Understanding constitutes a
mutually agreed solution, it "must be taken into c onsideration in analysing the rights and obligations
of the parties towards each other, as provided by th e Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at
Article 31, paragraph 3(c)." 330 According to the European Co mmunities, "[b]ilateral agreements
between two WTO members form part of the 'appli cable rules of law' between the parties to the
dispute, as defined in the Vienna Convention" 331, and, therefore, "a party that has entered into a

321 EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60),
9 July 2001, p. 1.
322 European Communities' first written submission, para. 61.
323 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 94.
324 Ibid.
325 See joint third-party submission of Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica,
the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar , St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Suriname, para. 37.
326 ( footnote original ) Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119,
6 March 2002, at point 1 (a).
327 Joint third-party submission of Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname, para. 37.
328 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 6.
329 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 59.
330 European Communities' first written submission, para. 62.
331 European Communities' second written submission, para. 7.

'mutually agreed solution', such as the Unde rstanding, [is] bound by the obligations it has
undertaken".
332
7.26 In particular, the European Communities mainta ins that, "[g]iven that Ecuador has entered
into a mutually agreed solution with the European Communities, in which it is provided that the
current import regime of the European Communities would include a preference for ACP bananas, ...
Ecuador should not be allowed to now challenge this preference." 333 The European Communities
requests "the Panel to dismiss the relevant Ecuador claims in their entirety" 334, arguing that
"using Article 21.5 of the DSU to question a mu tually agreed solution between the Parties,
goes against Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, wh ich provide that mutually negotiated solutions
should be preferred to resorting to dispute resolution procedures."335
7.27 The European Communities contends that "these provisions [of the DSU] are the corollary in
the WTO legal order of the principles of good faith and ' pacta sunt servanda ', which are well
established in customary international law."336 In particular, according to the European Communities:
"[I]t is wrong to assume that the principle of good faith does not cover Article 21.5 of
the DSU, as asserted in paragraph 9 of Ecuador’s second submission. Both the
language used in Article 3.10 of the DSU (i.e., ' all Members will engage in these
procedures in good faith') and its nature as a general principle of law, make clear that
the principle of good faith runs through the entire DSU and defines the outer limits of
the application of all rights recognized by the DSU to WTO Members."
337
7.28 In response to a question by the Panel, the European Communiti es also addresses the
argument by the United States that:
"The Understanding [on Banana s] is not a 'covered agreem ent' – it is not listed in
Appendix 1. Accordingly, the DSU cannot be used to settle a dispute as to the
meaning or effect of the Understa nding, and the DSU cannot enforce the
Understanding by blocking a party to the Understanding from recourse to the DSU.
The EC itself has in fact conceded that th ere is no bar to proceeding with dispute
settlement even in the face of a mutually ag reed solution. It is worth noting that,
during the India – Autos proceeding (which, like the negotiation of the
Bananas Understandings, took place in the spring of 2001), the EC also held that
view that a mutually agreed solution could not prevent recourse to the DSU..."
338
7.29 In response to that argument by the United States, the European Communities asserts that
"India – Autos was an ordinary Article XXIII dispute whereas the present dispute is a 'compliance'
case under DSU Article 21.5."339 Further, according to the European Communities:
"In effect, the mutually agreed settlement is an acceptance that the respondent has
complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings, since it must be in accordance
with WTO rules. It would therefore be perverse to allow the complainant to
commence proceedings that explicitly denied this. By respecting the Understanding

332 European Communities' second written submission, para. 8.
333 European Communities' first written submission, para. 64.
334 Ibid., para. 65.
335 Ibid., para. 64.
336 European Communities' second written submission, para. 11.
337 Ibid., para. 12.
338 Final written version of the United States' oral statement at the substantive meeting of the Panel with
339 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 60.

the panel would be doing what is required of it in the DSU, which is of course a
covered agreement."340
7.30 Moreover, the European Communities notes:
"[T]hat the report of the panel in the India – Autos case states in paragraph 7.113:
'[…] such agreements are expressl y referred to and supported by the
DSU. It is certainly reasonable to assume, particularly on the basis
of Article 3 of the DSU […] that these agreed solutions are intended
to reflect a settlement of the dispute in question, which both parties
expect will bring a final conclusion to the relevant proceedings.'
341"342
7.31 The European Communities also argues that:
"[T]he [India – Autos] panel found in paragraph 7.115 of its report that 'it may also be
the case that it cannot be lightly assumed that those drafters intended mutually agreed
solutions, expressly promoted by the DSU, to have no meaningful legal effect in
subsequent proceedings'. These stat ements confirm that the panel in India – Autos
considered it possible that a mutually agreed solution could bar a party from
commencing dispute settlement proceedings."
343
7.32 Thus, the European Communities concludes that:
"Granting to WTO members the right to re nege on the agreements with which they
reach mutually agreed solutions to thei r disputes would seriously compromise the
effectiveness of these mutually agreed so lutions and would foster the 'contentious'
character of the dispute resolution system. This would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the DSU, as reflected in Article 3.10, and with the principles enshrined in
Article 3.7 (where it is stated that mutually agreed solutions are to be preferred)."344
7.33 In addition to claiming that the Bananas Unders tanding is a mutually agreed solution for the
purposes of WTO dispute settlement, the Europ ean Communities advances the supplementary
argument that, "even if it was to be assumed that th e Understanding is not a 'mutually agreed solution'
for purposes of the DSU, ... it cannot be denied that it is a bilateral agreement that must be taken into
consideration in analysing the rights and oblig ations of the parties to this dispute." 345 Accordingly, if
the Bananas Understanding were deemed not to be a mutually agreed solution,
the European Communities reaches the conclusion that Ecuador should still be:
"[B]arred from challenging the Cotonou Pref erence, because (i) Ecuador has already
contractually accepted the existence of the Cotonou Preference and (ii) Ecuador has
already been compensated for accepting the existence of the Cotonou Preference."346

340 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 60.
341 (footnote original) See the report of the panel in India – Measures affecting the automotive sector ,
dated December 21, 2001, ("India – Autos"), paragraph 7.113.
342 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 60.
343 Ibid.
344 European Communities' second written submission, para. 18.
345 Final written version of the European Communities' closing oral statement at the substantive
meeting of the Panel with parties and third parties, para. 4.
346 European Communities' second written submission, para. 11.

(ii) Main arguments by Ecuador
7.34 While arguing that that "the EC 'preliminary' challenge should be dismissed"
347, in response to
a question posed by the Panel, Ecuador confirms that it "signed the Understanding on Bananas with
the EC on 30 April 2001".348 However, Ecuador also argues that it:
"[W]as, and is, quite certain regarding what it agreed to under the Understanding –
a transitional regime comprised of several phased steps to be taken by the EC to
ultimately bring about a resolution to the dispute, not an immediate end to the
dispute. Both the text of the Unders tanding and Ecuador's communication confirm
this interpretation."349
7.35 Referring to its communication to the DSB concerning the Bananas Understanding 350,
Ecuador adds that:
"Immediately after the EC's communication [to the DSB concerning the
Bananas Understanding], Ecuador clarified that the Understanding identified a 'means
by which a long-standing dispute can be resolved,' 351 comprised of 'the execution of
two phases' and 'the implementation of several key features, which demands the
collective action of the WTO membership.' Ecuador viewed the EC's approach to the
Understanding (as a mutually agreed solution within the meaning of Article 3.6) as
denying the transitional nature of the Understanding."352
7.36 When asked by the Panel about the purpose of Ecuador's communication to the DSB and the
sentence therein that "the provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not applicable in this case" 353,
Ecuador responded that:
"[W]hat prompted [its] July 2001 communication to the DSB, was the EC's portrayal
of the Understanding to the DSB in June 2001 – as a mutually satisfactory solution
within the meaning of DSU Article 3. 6 and an end to the Bananas dispute.
354
Ecuador did not, and to this day does not, share the EC's interpretation."355
7.37 Ecuador also adds that:
"[E]specially because of the EC purported notif ication, [Ecuador] came to realize that
the EC might try to use the Understanding as means to restrict WTO control and
Ecuador's rights under WTO dispute settlement rights. Ecuador wished to make clear
to the EC and WTO members generally, despite Ecuador's commitment to and hope

347 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 15.
348 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 37.
349 Ibid.
350 See EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60),
9 July 2001, p. 1.
351 (footnote original) – Understanding on Bananas between the European Communities and Ecuador , WT/DS27/60,
9 July 2001("Ecuador Communication"), quoting EC-Ecuador Understanding, paragraph A.
352 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 37.
353 EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60),
9 July 2001, p. 1.
354 (footnote original) See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, , WT/DS27/58, 2 July 2001.
355 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 37.

for the Understanding, it was not a mutual ly satisfactory solution in the sense of
Article 2 [sic] of the DSU."356
7.38 As to the legal effects of the Bananas Unde rstanding in the context of the WTO, Ecuador
states that, "[a]s is evident [from] ... the different notifications that were made, the parties did not have
the same view of the significance and effect of the respective agreements."357 In particular, according
to Ecuador, there is a difference between the legal st atus of waivers and bilateral agreements, such as
the Bananas Understanding:
"[T]he Doha waiver, which was granted by the WTO membership on a time-limited
and conditional basis, does affect rights and obligations of WTO members. A waiver
granted by WTO Members in accordance with the rules can modi fy those rules for
WTO purposes. However, the Understandi ng was between Ecuador and the EC, and
is not an agreement that can modify ri ghts and obligations of anyone under the
WTO."358
7.39 In regard to the European Communities' arguments about compliance with the
Bananas Understanding, Ecuador argues that, even if the Bananas Understanding might eventually
have come to be considered as a mutually agreed solution, "[its] terms ... were not adhered to by the
EC"359:
"The Understanding, together with the waivers that were granted, laid out a path that
was supposed to result in a system by January 1, 2006, that would be consistent with
the EC's obligations without the need fo r a waiver of any obligation except those
under Article I, and then to further actions that, by January 1, 2008 would enable the
system to operate fairly without any waiver at all. ... [T]hough the system operated
with reasonable success in its early years, in the end the EC did not comply with the
last phase. A mutually agreed solution is not a solution without compliance."360
7.40 Ecuador adds that it:
"[D]oes not agree that the EC measures at issue are covered by the Doha Waiver.
The Understanding did not commit Ecuador to accept whatever preferences or
'tariff only' scheme that the EC might decide to apply as of January 1, 2006,
regardless of whether the measures were c overed by the waiver or conformed with
the EC's obligations under the WTO Agreement."
361
7.41 Further, in Ecuador's view:
"The EC squandered its opportunity to propose a proper rebinding, proposing instead
levels that would vastly increase the preference for ACP bananas. When Ecuador and
other countries would not agree to those proposals and the Arbitrator found that in
each case the EC failed to meet the waiver standards, the EC nevertheless proceeded
unilaterally to implement the measures that ar e now before this panel. The EC also,
as part of its same non-compliant behavior, did not follow the Article XXVIII process

356 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 38.
357 Ibid.
358 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 92.
359 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 11.
360 Ibid. See also Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 41.
361 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 13.

required as a condition of the waiver. The EC thus tries to claim protection under an
Understanding with which it does not comply."
362
7.42 While arguing that it had "complied with its obligations under the Understanding" 363,
Ecuador also argues that, in any event:
"Compliance with the terms of the bilate ral Understanding does not remotely mean
that Ecuador cannot complain under the WTO about measures that the EC never
would have applied if the EC had complied with the bilateral Understanding. ...
The intention of the parties that the U nderstanding result in a durable mutually
satisfactory solution does not make the U nderstanding such a mutually satisfactory
solution..."364
7.43 In response to the argument advanced by some third parties that "the banana dispute was
taken off the agenda of the DSB in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU ... at the DSB meeting
held on 1 February 2002 365"366, and that "Ecuador agreed [to that] by stating that it 'also considered
that this item should no longer appear on th e agenda of future DSB meeting [sic]'" 367, Ecuador
responds that it "agreed to the withdrawal of the item from the DSB agenda, subject to an explicit
reservation of rights to bring a complaint under Article 21.5"
368, made at the same DSB meeting.
Also, "Ecuador was clear that the Understanding invo lved staged obligations over several additional
years, and that Ecuador was reserving Article 21.5 rights precisely because of concern that the terms
might not be followed in subsequent years."
369
7.44 Ecuador cites the following part from th e minutes of the DSB meeting held on
1 February 2002, reflecting the statement made by Ecuador before the issue was taken off the DSB
agenda:
"During the dispute settlement process, Ecuador had demonstr ated patience and
flexibility and had, in this spirit, signed a bilateral Understanding on Bananas with the
EC on 30 April 2001. This Understanding c onstituted a sound basis for the EC to
implement a transitional banana import regi me so that by 1 January 2006, at the
latest, a WTO-compatible tariff-only regime would be put into place. The transitional
regime contained various phases, stages and elements to be implemented.
One element was to obtain waivers from Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994.
However, the decision to grant these waiv ers included new stages which would have
to be carried out in order to ensure a pr oper transition to a tariff-only banana import
regime, as from 1 January 2006. Accord ingly, insofar as the EC continued to
implement the DSB’s recommendations by meeting its commitments, Ecuador
wished to reserve its rights under Article 21 of the DSU. Therefore if there was any
disagreement concerning the measures app lied by the EC, the matter could be
referred to the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Ecuador, like other

362 Final written version of Ecuador's oral statement at the substantive meeting of the Panel with parties
and third parties, para. 27.
363 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 39.
364 Ibid.
365 ( footnote original ) Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119,
6 March 2002, at point 1 (a).
366 Joint third-party submission of Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname, para. 37.
367 Ibid.
368 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 6.
369 Ibid.

countries, also considered that this item should no longer appear on the agenda of
future DSB meetings."370
7.45 Ecuador adds that "[t]here was no objection to th is reservation, and similar reservations were
expressed by other [Member]s."371
7.46 In Ecuador's view, as underscored by Article 3.7 of the DSU, mutually agreed solutions are
not exempt from the requirement in Article 3.5 of the DSU that all solutions to matters formally raised
under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be consistent
with those agreements. 372 Therefore, Ecuador argues that, "even if [it] had wanted to agree to
measures inconsistent with the covered agreements, that would not be a mutually satisfactory solution
in the sense of Article 3 because of the lack of conformity with covered agreements."373
7.47 As to the argument of the European Comm unities that the Bananas Understanding, as a
mutually agreed solution, would prevent Ecuador from bringing this case, Ecuador points out that it
"is not challenging or questioning the EC-Ecuador Understanding on Bananas, but rather is
challenging the conformity of EC measures with the EC's obligations under the WTO Agreement". 374
Further, Ecuador argues that "[i]n the [Bananas] Understanding, Ecuador did not commit not to bring
a WTO dispute against any EC measures, and there is nothing in the WTO rules or in the
Understanding that could justify implying such a limitation."
375 In particular, in Ecuador's view:
"There is no provision of the DSU that precludes bringing a complaint under
Article 21.5 simply on the basis that the challenged measure complied or was alleged
to comply with an agreement alleged to constitute a mutually agreed solution.
The DSU encourages mutually agreed so lutions, but carefully does not provide
anywhere that a mutually agreed solution precludes or limits the right to bring dispute
settlement proceedings. The DSU drafters we re wise not to provide that a mutually
agreed solution limits any DSU rights, for any such limitation would be a disincentive
for parties to try to negotiate solutions. This is graphically illustrated in this dispute,
where the EC is attempting to avoid scrutiny of it[s] flagrant violations of the WTO
on grounds that the U nderstanding constituted a sub silencio waiver of Ecuador's
WTO rights. The DSU authorizes and requires Panels to determine compliance with
covered agreements. The DSU does not au thorize a Panel to forego or limit its
responsibilities because the defending part y in the dispute alleges that the
complaining party waived its WTO rights in a bilateral agreement. Despite their
protests, the EC and ACP countries are urging the Panel out of expediency in this
dispute to fabricate rules regarding mutually agreed solutions that would make
dispute parties, especially complaining parties, reluctant ever to enter into a mutually
agreed solution, since that would cost them their WTO rights. The WTO Agreements
do not provide such a rule, and it would be bad policy and bad law to try to contrive
one."
376
7.48 Ecuador adds that, even if the Bananas Understanding was to be considered a mutually agreed
solution, "Articles 3.7 and 3.10 [of the DSU] do not preclude a challenge to measures based on the

370 Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body Held at the Centre William Rappard on
1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119 of 6 March 2002, para. 5.
371 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 6.
372 See Ecuador's second written submission, para. 12.
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid, para. 14.
375 Final written version of Ecuador's oral statement at the substantive meeting of the Panel with parties
and third parties, para. 29.
376 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 40.

contention of the defending party that the measures have been 'accepted' in a mutually agreed
solution."
377 In particular, Ecuador considers that Article 3.7 of the DSU "is not a prohibition of
invoking the dispute settlement procedures, nor does it purport to override Article 21.5 or the other
provisions of the DSU that make clear the right to invoke dispute settlement procedures of the
DSU."378 Further, Ecuador argues that Article 3.10 of the DSU "contains nothing remotely
prohibiting resort to dispute settlement procedures." 379 According to Ecuador, "[i]t would be illogical
to exempt measures from challenge to their consis tency with WTO rules on grounds that they were
part of a mutually agreed solution which, by definition, must conform with those rules."380
(b) Panel's analysis
7.49 To establish its approach to this preliminary i ssue, the Panel will analyse first the nature and
scope of this preliminary objection of the Europ ean Communities, in particular in regard to
Article 21.5 of the DSU. Subsequently, the Panel will apply the approach es tablished in order to
assess the European Communities' preliminary objection.
(i) The scope of this preliminary issue and Article 21.5 of the DSU
7.50 In its first preliminary objection, the European Communities calls into question Ecuador's
right to contest the ACP preference, both in ge neral in the context of WTO dispute settlement 381 and
particularly in a compliance dispute.382 This Panel is bound by the terms of reference approved by the
Dispute Settlement Body, at its meeting on 20 Ma rch 2007, which refer to the matter raised by
Ecuador in its request for the establishment of a panel made under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 383
Accordingly, the Panel will limit its considerat ion of the preliminary issue raised by the
European Communities to whether Ecuador is prev ented, as a result of the Bananas Understanding,
from bringing a compliance dispute pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. An additional and more
general consideration of whether Ecuador is barred by the Banana s Understanding from bringing any
dispute under the WTO dispute settlement system, including a non-compliance dispute, would be
unnecessary for the resolution of this dispute, and fo r the assessment of this preliminary issue in
particular.
7.51 The issue of whether the Bananas Unders tanding can prevent Ecuador from bringing a
compliance dispute is closely related to the scope of compliance disputes. In relevant part,
Article 21.5 of the DSU provides that:
"Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel."

377 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 9.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid., para. 10.
380 Final written version of Ecuador's oral statement at the substantive meeting of the Panel with parties
and third parties, para. 25.
381 See European Communities' first written submissi on, para. 64; and European Communities' second
written submission, paras. 6 and 11.
382 Ibid.
383 See ,
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, Constitution of the Panel (WT/DS27/82), 18 June 2007, paras. 1-2.

7.52 In the context of this preliminary issue, neither of the parties argues that the matter before this
Panel would fall outside of the sc ope of Article 21.5 of the DSU. 384 Ecuador has brought this dispute
under Article 21.5 of the DSU, by making the following request:
"As there continues to be a disagreemen t between Ecuador and the EC over the
WTO-consistency of the EC banana measures taken to comply with Bananas III and
Bananas-DSU Article 21.5 (Ecuador) and subsequent related rulings,
Ecuador respectfully requests that this matte r be referred to a Panel, if possible the
original panel, in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU."385
7.53 As for the European Communities, in respon se to a question from the Panel on whether the
European Communities was arguing that the Panel ha d no jurisdiction to hear Ecuador's claims,
the European Communities stated that it "does no t challenge the Panel's jurisdiction with this
preliminary objection, but rather Ecuador's right to bring these claims." 386 In its claim under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, Ecuador challenges an EC measure under which, according to the
European Communities:
"There is a single tariff applicable to all banana imports, with a preference granted to
the ACP countries limited to certain quantities onl y. This is the type of regime that
the [previous] Article 21.5 Panel [in this di spute] had described as 'tariff only' in
paragraph 6.157 of its report [when ma king suggestions for implementing the
recommendations under Article 19 of the DSU]."387
7.54 Accordingly, there is no need for the Panel to fully consider, in the context of the
European Communities' first preliminary objection, whether this is properly a compliance dispute
under Article 21.5 of the DSU. Rather, the Panel will focus on the more narrow issue of whether the
Bananas Understanding bars Ecuador from bringing this compliance challenge, in the light of parties'
arguments in that specific regard.
(ii) Is Ecuador barred by the Bananas Understanding from bringing this compliance challenge?
Panel's approach
7.55 Turning to the issue whether Ecuador is barre d by the Bananas Understanding from bringing
this compliance challenge, the Panel notes that the European Communities makes the following
proposal on how the Panel might assess this first preliminary issue:
"[T]he Panel should first find that Ec uador is bound by the terms of the
Understanding. Then, the Panel should find that, through the Understanding,
Ecuador accepted that the Cotonou Preference would continue to exist for the entire
duration of the waiver that the European Communities had requested at the time the
Understanding was signed and the grant of which Ecuador accepted to support in the
Understanding. Finally, the Panel should find that Ecuador must now comply with its
undertakings and, therefore, that Ecuador cannot challenge the Cotonou
Preference."388

384 This issue is raised by the European Communities only in the specific context of its second
preliminary objection, and will be addressed in that context, if necessary.
385 See EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , Request for the Establishment of a Panel
(WT/DS27/80) 26 February 2007, p. 5.
386 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 58.
387 European Communities' second written submission, para. 16.
388 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 58.

7.56 As indicated above, the European Commun ities appears to be making a two-pronged
argument under its first preliminary objection.
389 First, the European Communities argues that the
Bananas Understanding constitutes a mutually agreed solution providing for the ACP preference, and
therefore Ecuador is prevented from contesting the conformity of the European Communities' current
banana import regime in a compliance dispute. Second, the European Communities makes a similar,
residual argument if "it was to be assumed that the [Bananas] Understanding is not a 'mutually agreed
solution' for purposes of the DSU" 390. If that were the case, the European Communities argues that
the Bananas Understanding is a legally binding bi lateral agreement, which provides for the ACP
preference, and therefore similarly prevents Ecuador from challenging such preference.
7.57 As the above suggestion by the European Co mmunities confirms, there seem to be three
common elements in the two prongs of the Eu ropean Communities' arguments under the first
preliminary issue:
(a) The alleged legally binding nature of the Bananas Understanding on Ecuador,
whether or not such Understanding qualifies as a mutually agreed solution;
(b) That, as the European Communities puts it, "through the [Bananas] Understanding,
Ecuador accepted that the Cotonou Preference would continue to exist for the entire
duration of the waiver that the European Communities had requested at the time the
Understanding was signed and the grant of which Ecuador accepted to support in the
Understanding"391; and,
(c) That, based on this, Ecuador could not challenge the Cotonou Preference.
7.58 These three questions are potentially relevant fo r addressing this preliminary objection by the
European Communities. The Panel will first asses s whether the Bananas Understanding bars Ecuador
from bringing this compliance challenge, by first looking at the language of the Understanding.
Only if the Panel was to find that the Bananas Understanding bars Ecuador from bringing this dispute,
would the Panel then turn to assessing, as sugg ested by the European Communities, whether the
Understanding indeed qualifies as a mutually agreed solution or an agreement binding on Ecuador for
the purposes of WTO dispute settlement.
7.59 The Panel will follow the approach of the panel in India – Autos in that it will conduct a case-
specific analysis of the preliminary issue raised by the European Communities. Indeed, in the India –
Autos dispute, in which the question of whether a mu tually agreed solution can prevent a party from
bringing a dispute was raised, the panel noted that:
"Without clear guidance in the DSU, this ques tion raises an important systemic issue.
... There may be significant differences between the provisions of mutually agreed
solutions from case to case, which may ... make it difficult to draw general
conclusions as to the relevance of [mut ually agreed] solutions to subsequent
proceedings other than on a case by case basis."392 (footnote omitted)
7.60 Further, the panel in India – Autos found that it "need[ed] to consider… the terms of the
MAS"393 because "[u]ltimately, it is the terms of the MAS that are the only possible source of any

389 See summary of the European Communities' main arguments under this preliminary issue above.
390 Final written version of the European Communities' closing oral statement at the substantive
meeting of the Panel with parties and third parties, para. 4.
391 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 58.
392 Panel Report on India – Autos, para. 7.116.
393 Ibid., para. 7.117.

restriction on our jurisdiction." 394 The Panel agrees with the Eu ropean Communities' argument in
these proceedings that "the analysis of the legal status and effect of the Understanding should be
primarily based on its content ... ."395
7.61 While the Panel intends to duly assess the preliminary issue raised by the
European Communities in the context of this dispute, it does not consider it necessary for the
resolution of this dispute to assess the more syst emic issue of whether or not mutually agreed
solutions or legally binding agreements between parties to a dispute that might not qualify as a
mutually agreed solution may prev ent parties to such instruments from bringing compliance disputes.
The Panel agrees with the panel in India – Autos that "this issue is not expressly addressed in the
DSU".396 The Panel also recalls that, under Article 3.2 of the DSU, the WTO dispute settlement
system "serves to preserve the rights and obligatio ns of Members under the covered agreements, and
to clarify the existing provisions of those agre ements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law." Furt her, under the same provision, "[r]ecommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."
7.62 With regard to the method of assessment, the panel in India – Autos recognized that "[a]s [an]
MAS is not a covered agreement, it is not expr essly subject to the DSU requirement to utilise
customary rules of interpretation of international law." 397 Nevertheless, that panel also stated that:
"[S]ince [the MAS in question] is an agreement among States, the Panel finds it
appropriate to address the terms of this ag reement in accordance with the customary
rules of interpretation of international law. It will therefore consider the ordinary
meaning of the terms of the MAS in light of their context and taking into account
their object and purpose."398
7.63 In the light of that statement by the panel in India – Autos and given the argument of the
European Communities that the Bananas Understandi ng would qualify as a mutually agreed solution,
this Panel will analyse the terms of the Banan as Understanding in accord ance with the customary
rules of interpretation of international law, as expressed in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to estab lish whether the Banan as Understanding prevents
Ecuador from bring this compliance dispute. This is without prejudice to the actual legal status of the
Bananas Understanding, which, as stated earlier, the Panel will not address at this stage.
The terms and main elements of the Bananas Understanding
7.64 Turning to the analysis of the terms of the Bananas Understanding, the Panel notes that the
Understanding provides that "[t]he EC and Ecuador consider that th[e] Understanding constitutes a
mutually agreed solution to the banana dispute." 399 Further, the Understanding states in its first

394 Panel Report on India – Autos, para. 7.117.
395 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 94.
396 Panel Report on India – Autos, para. 7.114.
397 Ibid., para. 7.118.
398 Ibid., para. 7.118.
399 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solutio n (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. G;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. G.

paragraph that "[t]he European Commission and Ec uador have identified the means by which the
long-standing dispute over the EC's banana import regime can be resolved."
400
7.65 The Bananas Understanding sets out various future steps to be taken by its parties, who are
also the parties to the dispute before this Panel. The Understanding first addresses the three distinct
steps to be taken by the European Communities following the adoption of the Understanding.
First, the Understanding identifies the last, third step:
"In accordance with Article 16(1) of Re gulation No. (EC) 404/93 (as amended by
Regulation No. (EC) 216/2001), the European Communities (EC) will introduce a
Tariff Only regime for imports of bananas no later than 1 January 2006 .
GATT Art XXVIII negotiations shall be in itiated in good time to that effect,
recognizing Ecuador as the principa l supplier in these negotiations." 401
(emphasis added)
7.66 Subsequently, the Bananas Understanding identif ies the initial two steps to be implemented
by the European Communities in the following terms:
"In the interim, the EC will implement an import regime on the basis of historical
licensing as follows:
1. Effective 1 July 2001, the EC will implement an import regime on the basis
of historical licensing as set out in Annex 1.
2. Effective as soon as possible thereafter, subject to Council and European
Parliament approval and to adoption of the Article XIII waiver referred to in
paragraph F, the EC will implemen t an import regime on the basis of
historical licensing as set out in Annex 2. The Commission will seek to
obtain the implementation of such an import regime as soon as possible."402
7.67 As for Ecuador, the Bananas Understanding prescribes one main step:
"Ecuador will lift its reserve concerning th e waiver of Article I of the GATT 1994
that the EC has requested for preferential access to the EC of goods originating in
ACP States signatory to the Cotonou Agre ement; and will actively work towards
promoting the acceptance of an EC request for a waiver of Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 needed for the management of quota C under the import regime
described in paragraph C(2) until 31 December 2005."
403

400 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solutio n (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. A;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. A.
401 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. B;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. B.
402 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. C;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. C.
403 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. F;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. F.

The importance of providing a positive solution and effective settlement to WTO disputes,
in conformity with the covered agreements
7.68 Without addressing the legal status of the Ba nanas Understanding, the Panel agrees with
European Communities that, as Article 3.7 of the DS U provides, mutually agreed solutions constitute
the "clearly preferred" solution to WTO disputes. Also, the Panel recognizes the systemic importance
of mutually agreed solutions for WTO dispute se ttlement, and the importance of parties reaching a
specific mutually agreed solution to comply with the terms of such mutually agreed solution.
7.69 Nevertheless, the Panel reaches a different c onclusion on Article 3.7 of the DSU than the
European Communities as to whether the Bananas Understanding can bar Ecua dor from bringing this
compliance challenge.
7.70 Article 3.7 of the DSU also provides that "[t]he aim of the [WTO] dispute settlement
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute". (emphasis added)
7.71 Further, under Article 3.2 of the DSU, "the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system", and one of the
objectives of the WTO dispute settlement system is "to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements".
7.72 Also, under Article 3.3 of the DSU,
"The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired
by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the
WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of
Members." (emphasis added)
7.73 Finally, pursuant to Article 3.4 of the DSU, "[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB
shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordan ce with the rights and
obligations under [the DSU]". (emphasis added)
7.74 Accordingly, the Panel considers that any a lleged solution to WTO disputes must first and
foremost "secure a positive solution" to the disput e in the sense of Article 3.7 of the DSU.
This requirement also applies to a solution that is alleged to be a "clearly preferred" or a legally
binding one, as the European Communities argues in regard to the Bananas Understanding.
Further, given the emphasis in the DSU on the prom pt settlement of disputes, on the security and
predictability of the multilateral trading system, a nd on the "central" role of WTO dispute settlement
in providing such security and pred ictability, any solution to a WT O dispute, including an alleged
mutually agreed solution or other legally binding agreement, can lead to a positive resolution of a
dispute only if the solution provides a satisfactory an d effective settlement to the dispute in question
in the sense of Article 3.4 of the DSU.
7.75 Consequently, the Panel is of the view th at the Bananas Understanding can legally bar
Ecuador from bringing this compliance challenge only if that Understanding constitutes a positive
solution and effective settlement to the dispute in question.
7.76 The Panel considers that that is not the case here – for the following three reasons taken
together:
(a) the Bananas Understanding provides only for a means, i.e. a series of future steps,
for resolving and settling the dispute;

(b) the adoption of the Bananas Understandi ng was subsequent to recommendations,
rulings and suggestions by the DSB; and,
(c) parties have made conflicting communi cations to the WTO concerning the
Bananas Understanding.
7.77 Before turning to these three issues, the Panel r ecalls that one of the main arguments of the
European Communities under this preliminary issue is that the Bananas Understanding is a mutually
agreed solution or a legally binding agreemen t for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement.
The Panel does not address that argument at this point; however, the Panel does note that, assuming
that the Bananas Understanding qualifies as a mutually agreed solution or a legally binding agreement
for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement, there is a clear requirement for it to be consistent with
the covered agreements.
7.78 Article 3.7 of the DSU not only expresses a "clear preference" for mutually agreed solutions,
it also provides that "[a] solution mutua lly acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with
the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred." (emphasis added) Article 3.5 of the DSU confirms
this requirement of conformity in regard to all solutions, not only mutually agreed solutions,
by stipulating that:
"All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements, in cluding arbitration awards, shall be
consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any Member under those agreements, nor impe de the attainment of any objective of
those agreements."
7.79 This obligation of conformity is closely relate d to the requirement that an alleged mutually
agreed solution or legally binding agreement can prevent Ecuador from bringing this compliance
challenge only if such alleged mutually agreed solution or legally binding agreement provides a
positive solution and effective settlement of the disput e. It is not clear how an alleged mutually
agreed solution or legally binding agreement could provide a positive solution or effective settlement
for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement without being in conformity with the covered agreements.
The Bananas Understanding provides only fo r a means for resolving and settling the
dispute
7.80 As the analysis of the terms and main elements of the Bananas Understanding shows,
the essence of the Understanding is a series of staged future steps that both sides agreed to take over a
period of several years following the adoption of the Understanding.
7.81 The Panel notes that, by its terms, th e Bananas Understanding "identified the means by which
the long-standing dispute over the Europ ean Communities' banana import regime can be resolved."
404
(emphasis added) In the light of that language and the various subsequent steps set out in the
Bananas Understanding, it is difficult to see how the Bananas Understanding, even if it was an alleged
mutually agreed solution or a bindin g agreement, could be an effective solution to a dispute in the
absence of parties' full compliance with all the steps set out therein.
7.82 Also, as indicated earlier, the Panel considers that one of the main functions of the
Bananas Understanding, if it were a mutually ag reed solution or a binding agreement, as the

404 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solutio n (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. A;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. A.

European Communities argues, would be to provide an effective settlement to the dispute in question.
The Panel agrees with the panel in India – Autos, which was considering a mutually agreed solution
providing for future steps by its parties, that:
"It is certainly reasonable to assume, particularly on the basis of Article 3 of the DSU,
... that [mutually] agreed solutions are inte nded to reflect a settlement of the dispute
in question, which both parties expect will bring a final conclusion to the relevant
proceedings."405
7.83 The same panel added that:
"This does not necessarily resolve the issue of what can be done if, despite the agreed
solution, a subsequent disagreement emerges relating to the scope of the solution or
to compliance with it. This is not an issue expressly addressed in the DSU."406
7.84 The Panel considers that an alleged mutually agreed solution or binding agreement that
essentially serves to provide for future steps by its parties, lik e the Bananas Understanding, can only
"secure a positive solution" in the sense of Article 3.7 of the DSU after implementation, because it
is inseparably linked to those futu re steps and to full compliance by the parties with each of those
steps.
7.85 The Panel does not assess whether there is the possibility to enforce, under the DSU, the steps
set out in an alleged mutually agreed solution or other legally binding agreement between the parties
to a dispute. Nevertheless, th e Panel considers that, for the purposes of providing a positive solution
and effective settlement to the dispute in question, the full effect of the Bananas Understanding will
be realized only after parties' compliance with all the steps set out in the Understanding.
7.86 The Panel considers that one of the reasons fo r the "clear preference" for mutually agreed
solutions under Article 3.7 of the DSU, would seem to be that, by virtue of the mutual agreement of
the parties that they involve, such solutions are su pposed to provide the mo st effective solution and
settlement to the dispute in question.
7.87 The Panel recalls the importance of the requi rement of consistency with the covered
agreements of all solutions to WTO disputes. Without assessing the legal status of the
Bananas Understanding, the Panel considers that that requirement is twofold in regard to an alleged
mutually agreed solution or legally binding solu tion, like the Bananas Understanding, that provides
for a series of staged future steps by its parties.
7.88 First, pursuant to Articles 3.7 and 3.5 of the DSU, any mutually agreed solution shall be
consistent with the covered agreements. By virtue of Article 3.5 of the DSU, the same requirement of
consistency with the covered agre ements applies to an alleged le gally binding agreement that is
intended to provide an effective solution to a particular dispute.
7.89 Second, by virtue of the close link between Bananas Understanding and the future steps set
out therein, to the extent that the Bananas Understa nding provides for future steps by its parties, such
steps shall also be consistent with the covered ag reements. The Panel does not see how conformity of
an alleged mutually agreed solution or legally bi nding agreement providing for future steps by its
parties may be achieved in a meaningful way wit hout making sure that the actual future steps
enshrined in such mutually agreed solutions are also in conformity with the covered agreements.
For the same reason, the Panel does not see how an alleged mutually agreed solution or legally

405 Panel Report on India – Autos, para. 7.113.
406 Ibid., para. 7.114.

binding agreement providing for future steps can be a positive solution or an effective settlement
without conformity with the covered agreements.
7.90 This link between on the one ha nd, alleged mutually agreed solutions or legally binding
agreements and, on the other hand, the steps set out in such solutions or agreements, in the context of
compliance with the covered agreements, is perh aps more obvious for alleged mutually agreed
solutions or legally binding agreements recording the implementation of past steps agreed upon by the
parties. However, despite the different time persp ective, the same link is equally valid in the context
of alleged mutually agreed solutions or legally binding agreements setting out future steps.
7.91 In the light of that paramount requirement of conformity with the covered agreements,
the Panel remains convinced that a complainant must have the possibility of having recourse to WTO
dispute settlement in order to review the confor mity with the covered agreements of a measure
purportedly taken by the respondent to implement a step set out in an alleged mutually agreed solution
or other legally binding agreement.
The adoption of the Bananas Understandi ng subsequent to recommendations and
suggestions by the DSB
7.92 The Panel considers that the fact that th e parties adopted the Bananas Understanding
subsequent to a series of reports in this dis pute by panels and the Appellate Body establishing
inconsistency with the covere d agreements constitutes relevant context for assessing the
European Communities' first preliminary objection.
7.93 The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the rele vant reports with recommendations that the
European Communities bring its measures into compliance, and suggestions as to how the
European Communities might do that.
407 Through these recommendations and suggestions, the DSB
thus repeatedly tried to promote a resolution of this dispute.
7.94 The Panel notes that the European Communities argues that its current banana import regime,
introduced on 1 January 2006, is the tariff-only regime foreseen by the Bananas Understanding 408,
since "[t]he Understanding does not provide that th is tariff only regime should have any particular
characteristics and, indeed, the import regime introduced by the European Communities does not have
any special features: there is a single tariff applicable to all banana imports, with a preference granted
to the ACP countries limited to certain quantities only." 409 For this latter reason, the
European Communities also argues that its current ba nana import regime "is th e type of regime that
the [first] Article 21.5 Panel [requested by Ecuador ] had described as 'tariff only' in paragraph 6.157
of its report." 410 Further, the European Communities notif ied the Bananas Understanding with the
following communication:
"The European Communities (EC) wish to notify the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
that they have reached, with the United States of America and Ecuador, a mutually
satisfactory solution within the meaning of Article 3.6 of the DSU regarding the
implementation by the EC of the conc lusions and recommendations adopted by the

407 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body Held in the Centre William Rappard on
25 September 1997, WT/DSB/M/37 of 4 November 1997, p. 27; and Minutes of the Meeting of the
Dispute Settlement Body Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 May 1999, WT/DSB/M/61 of 30 June 1999,
p. 6.
408 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 29.
409 European Communities' second written submission, para. 16.
410 Ibid.

DSB in the dispute "Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas"
(WT/DS27)."411 (emphasis added)
7.95 Thus, the European Communities establishes a cl ose link between each of the following:
(i) the DSB recommendations and suggestions made previ ously in this dispute; (ii) the third, final
step foreseen by the Bananas Understanding; and, (iii) the measures contested by Ecuador before this
Panel.
7.96 As mentioned earlier, the Panel does not intend to assess whether – beyond the possibility of
having alleged implementation steps reviewed under the DSU – there is also the possibility to enforce,
under the DSU, the steps to be taken by parties under an alleged mutually agreed solution or legally
binding agreement. The Panel considers that the close link that the European Communities
establishes between the Bananas Understanding an d the recommendations and suggestions of the
DSB underscores the relevance of the Bananas Unders tanding for the resolution and settlement of this
dispute. At the same time, the close link that the European Communities establishes between the
DSB recommendations and suggestions made previously in this dispute, the third, final step foreseen
by the Bananas Understanding, and the measures contested by Ecuador before this Panel confirms that
the Bananas Understanding in itself cannot prevent Ecuador from bringing this compliance dispute.
7.97 Given that close link, parties' compliance with all future steps set out in the
Bananas Understanding is an even more important precondition of a positive solution and an effective
settlement of the dispute. However, there is no recognition by the complainant that the
European Communities has implemented all three steps set out in the Bananas Understanding.
In particular, while Ecuador recognizes the European Communities' compliance with the first two
steps under the Bananas Understanding 412, Ecuador contests 413 whether the European Communities
has complied with the third step: "to introduce a Ta riff Only regime for imports of bananas no later
than 1 January 2006". 414 Further, in its compliance challenge, Ecuador contests that the current EC
banana import regime is in conformity with the covered agreements.
Parties' conflicting communicati ons to the WTO concerning the
Bananas Understanding
7.98 Article 3.6 of the DSU provides that:
"Mutually agreed solutions to matters fo rmally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB
and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any Member may raise any point
relating thereto."
7.99 In addition to conformity with the covered agreements, notification is the other main
requirement with regard to mutually agreed solutions under the DSU. The Panel notes that Article 3.6
of the DSU uses the passive voice, and it does not sp ecify whether the parties shall notify a mutually
agreed solution separately or jointly, or whether notification by one of the parties to a mutually agreed
solution is sufficient, and if yes, whether the complainant or the respondent shall make the
notification.

411 EC – Bananas III, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, p. 1.
412 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 11.
413 Ibid.
414 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. B;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. B.

7.100 Accordingly, the Panel does not address whet her the Bananas Understanding was notified
appropriately under Article 3.6 of the DSU or whether, as a result, it could qualify as a mutually
agreed solution. At the same time, the Panel cons iders that the explicit notification requirement under
Article 3.6 of the DSU is evidence of the importanc e that the DSU attaches to the notification of
mutually agreed solutions to the WTO. Thus , for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement, the
reaching of an alleged mutually agreed soluti on between parties to a dispute needs to be
complemented with notifying such agreement to all WTO Members. The indispensability of this
latter, multilateral element of mutually agreed so lutions is underscored by the requirement, under
Article 3.6 of the DSU, of notifying mutually agreed solutions not only to one WTO body or to the
WTO in general but to the "DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees", and also by the explicit
provision in Article 3.6 that in those bodies "any Member may raise any point relating thereto."
7.101 The Panel recalls in this context that Article 3.5 of the DSU, the provision immediately
preceding Article 3.6, sets out two basic requirements for "[a]ll solutions to matters formally raised
under the consultation and dispute set tlement provisions of the covered agreements": (i) they "shall
be consistent with [the covered] agreements"; and, (ii) they "sha ll not nullify or impair benefits
accruing to any Member under [the covered] agreem ents, nor impede the attainment of any objective
of those agreements."
7.102 The fulfilment of these two basic requirements of Article 3.5 of the DSU is an indispensable
multilateral element of "[a]ll solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements", including any alleged mutually agreed solution or
legally binding agreement that is intended to provi de a positive solution and effective settlement to a
dispute. Notification is an additional multilateral element specific to mutually agreed solutions
because, unlike other solutions to disputes, mutua lly agreed solutions are usually not developed
multilaterally.
7.103 It is a matter of fact that in this dis pute the European Commun ities sent to the DSB a
communication, dated 22 June 2001 entitled "Not ification of a Mutually Agreed Solution".
415
That EC communication stated that "[t]he European Communities (EC) wish to notify the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) th at they have reached, with ... Ecuador, a mutually satisfactory
solution within the meaning of Article 3.6 of the DSU" 416, and it reproduced the text of the
Bananas Understanding. This communication by th e respondent was closely followed by a separate
communication from the complainant, dated 3 July 2001, stating that, "although Ecuador sees the
[Bananas] Understanding as an agreed solution wh ich can contribute to an overall, definite and
universally accepted solution, it must be made clear that the provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are
not applicable in this case."417
7.104 The Panel notes that this latter communication by Ecuador also reproduced the text of the
Bananas Understanding, with the same language as the Bananas Understanding annexed to the EC
communication. Also, Ecuador acknowledges that it signed the Bananas Understanding. 418
Without assessing whether the Bananas Understanding is a mutually agreed solution or legally
binding agreement, the Panel notes that th ese circumstances seem to show that the
Bananas Understanding created an important bilateral link between Ecuador and the
European Communities. At the same time, these ci rcumstances also show that almost immediately
after the European Communities' attempt to try to accord a poten tial multilateral element to the

415 See EC – Bananas III, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, p. 1.
416 See Ibid., p. 1.
417 EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July
2001, p. 1.
418 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 37.

Bananas Understanding, Ecuador called into question the multilateral status of that Understanding and
its role in definitively resolving the dispute.
7.105 The Panel does not need to assess whether the Bananas Understanding was notified
appropriately under Article 3.6 of the DSU or whet her, as a result, the Understanding could qualify as
a mutually agreed solution. However, the Panel notes that, under Article 3.6 of the DSU, so far nearly
all mutually agreed solutions have been notifie d by the respondent and the complainant (whether
jointly or separately), with two exceptions where the mutually agreed solution was notified by the
complainant only. 419 The Panel interprets this practice as illustrating the importance of the
complainant's involvement in, or at least its consen t to, not only the bilateral but also the multilateral
element, i.e. the notification to the DSB and relevant Councils and Committees, of any alleged
mutually agreed solution.
7.106 As mentioned earlier, under Article 3.5 of the DS U, "[a]ll solutions to matters formally raised
under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements ... shall not nullify
or impair benefits accruing to any Member under [the covered] agreements". If a solution to a dispute
potentially affects the benefits accruing to WTO Me mbers, it is first and foremost the benefits
accruing to the complainant in the dispute that might be affected. This is particularly true for an
alleged mutually agreed solution or legally bind ing agreement that the respondent argues would bar
the complainant from bringing a challenge against a measure allegedly implementing a step set out in
such alleged mutually agreed solution or legally binding agreement.
7.107 Irrespective of whether the Bananas Understandi ng was properly notified under Article 3.6 of
the DSU, which the Panel does not assess, in the light of the multilateral requirement set out in
Article 3.5 of the DSU for all solutions, it is difficult for the Panel to see how the
Bananas Understanding could provide a positive solution and effective settlement to the dispute when,
immediately following the respondent's commun ication of the Understanding to the WTO,
the complainant in the dispute contested the multilate ral status of the Unders tanding and its role in
definitively resolving the dispute.
7.108 It would seem appropriate to assume that an alleged mutually agreed solution or legally
binding agreement that could bar the complainant from bringing a subsequent compliance dispute,
would need to provide a solution to the dispute fo r both parties, including in particular for the
complainant, and especially after the DSB establishe d the inconsistency with the covered agreement
of measures adopted by the respondent.
Remaining key arguments raised under this preliminary issue
7.109 The Panel will now turn to the remaining key ar guments raised under this preliminary issue,
namely:
(a) whether, through the Bananas Understanding , Ecuador accepted the existence of the
ACP preference beyond 2005;
(b) the EC arguments concerning parties' compliance with the Bananas Understanding;
(c) the European Communities' arguments on contentiousness, pacta sunt servanda and
good faith; and,

419 See Mexico – Certain Pricing Measures for Customs Valuation and Other Purposes ,
Communication from Guatemala (WT/DS298/2), 1 September 2005; and Colombia – Customs Measures on
Importation of Certain Goods from Panama , Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS348/10),
7 December 2006.

(d) the withdrawal of the matter from the DSB agenda.
Did Ecuador accept, through the Bananas U nderstanding, the existence of the ACP
preference beyond 2005?
7.110 As noted earlier, one of the key argumen ts of the European Communities under this
preliminary issue is that:
"[T]hrough the [Bananas] Understanding, Ecuador accepted that the Cotonou
Preference would continue to exist for th e entire duration of the waiver that the
European Communities had requested at th e time the Understanding was signed and
the grant of which Ecuador accepted to support in the Understanding."
420
7.111 For the purposes of this compliance dispute, the relevant period is the one starting on
1 January 2006, when the European Communities introduced its current banana import regime,
contested by Ecuador. Accordingly, the questio n is whether the European Communities makes a
prima facie case that, through the Bananas Understa nding, Ecuador has accepted the extension of the
ACP preference beyond 2005.
7.112 The Bananas Understanding does not specify its period of applicability. While the
Understanding prescribes a step to be taken by the European Commun ities "no later than
1 January 2006"421, it does not explicitly prescribe any steps to be taken by Ecuador with effect
beyond 2005.
7.113 In arguing that, through the Bananas Unde rstanding, Ecuador has accepted the ACP
preference, the European Communities must be maki ng reference to the following step prescribed in
the Understanding for Ecuador:
"Ecuador will lift its reserve concerning th e waiver of Article I of the GATT 1994
that the EC has requested for preferential access to the EC of goods originating in
ACP States signatory to the Cotonou Ag reement; and will actively work towards
promoting the acceptance of an EC request for a waiver of Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 needed for the management of quota C under the import regime
described in paragraph C(2) until 31 December 2005."422
7.114 While this language in the Bananas Understanding might reflect an indirect acceptance of the
ACP preference until the end of 2005, it does not appear to mention any acceptance of the ACP
preference by Ecuador beyond 2005. Indeed, the s econd element in the Unde rstanding with Ecuador
referred to in the preceding paragra ph, relating to the waiver under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 is
explicitly limited to the end of 2005. In other words, it cannot extend to the period after 2005.
Further, the first element of the step to be taken by Ecuador, relating to the waiver under Article I of
the GATT 1994, requires Ecuador to lift its reserve in the context of a waiver requested by the
European Communities.
7.115 The acceptance of that waiver request, like an y waiver request, does not depend only on one
Member, Ecuador, but on all WTO Members. As Ecuador notes in its communication to the DSB

420 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 58.
421 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. B;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. B.
422 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. F;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. F.

concerning the Bananas Understanding, "the Unders tanding also comprises of the execution of two
phases and requires the implementation of several key features, which demands the collective action
of the WTO membership."
423
7.116 Since Ecuador could have accepted the ACP preference only indirectly through committing to
lifting its reserve concerning a waiver request, the period for which Ecuador might have indirectly
accepted the ACP preference depends ultimately on th e waiver being adopted partly as a result of
Ecuador's step under the Bananas Understanding.
7.117 The waiver ultimately adopted, namely th e Doha Waiver from Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994424, does not provide that it would unconditio nally apply beyond 2005 in regard to
bananas. Even the European Communities accepts that the Doha Waiver sets out conditions for its
applicability to bananas in the period between 1 Ja nuary 2006 and the overall expiration of the waiver
on 31 December 2007.
7.118 In the light of the above, the Panel finds th at the European Communities has not made a
prima facie case for one of its central arguments under this preliminary issue, namely that Ecuador
would have accepted, through the Bananas Understa nding, the extension of the ACP preference
beyond 2005. As a consequence, the Panel fails to see how, as argued by the European Communities,
Ecuador would be prevented from bringing this compliance dispute against the ACP preference
during the period starting on 1 January 2006.
7.119 This is underscored by the fact that one of th e main points of contention between the parties
to this compliance dispute concerns the conditions of the validity of the Doha Waiver from Article I:1
of the GATT 1994 to bananas in 2006-2007, a nd in particular the question whether the
European Communities effectively complied with the final step envisaged in the
Bananas Understanding and what implications that might have for the validity of the waiver for
bananas in 2006-2007.
Arguments by the European Communities concerning parties' compliance with the
Bananas Understanding
7.120 The Panel sees the European Communities' cont extual argument about parties' compliance
with the Bananas Understanding as having li mited relevance for assessing whether the
Bananas Understanding prevents Ecuador from bringing this compliance dispute.
7.121 The Panel notes that neither of the parties cont ests having undertaken the above steps through
the Bananas Understanding. Fu rther, Ecuador recognizes that the European Communities has
complied with its obligations for the first tw o interim phases set out in the Understanding 425, and the
European Communities recognizes that Ecuador h as complied with its main obligation under the
Understanding.426
7.122 At the same time, both parties seem to sugg est that compliance with Bananas Understanding
remained partial. Ecuador openly contests whethe r the European Communities has complied with the
third phase set out in the Understanding. 427 The European Communities' request that the Panel

423 EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60),
9 July 2001, p. 1.
424 See Ministerial Conference, European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement,
Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001.
425 See Ecuador's second written submission, para. 11.
426 See European Communities' first written submission para. 62.
427 See Ecuador's second written submission, para. 11.

enforce the Bananas Understanding because "Ecuador must now comply with its undertakings"
428
under the Understanding implies that even the European Communities sees compliance with the
Understanding as being limited, at least on Ecuador's side.
Arguments by the European Communities on contentiousness, pacta sunt servanda
and good faith
7.123 As mentioned earlier, the European Communiti es argues that Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the
DSU "are the corollary in the WTO legal order of the principles of good faith and ' pacta sunt
servanda', which are well established in customary international law." 429 In particular, according to
the European Communities:
"[I]t is wrong to assume that the principle of good faith does not cover Article 21.5 of
the DSU, as asserted in paragraph 9 of Ecuador’s second submission. Both the
language used in Article 3.10 of the DSU (i.e., ' all Members will engage in these
procedures in good faith') and its nature as a general principle of law, make clear that
the principle of good faith runs through the entire DSU and defines the outer limits of
the application of all rights recognized by the DSU to WTO Members."
430
7.124 Further, the European Communities argues that:
"Granting to WTO members the right to re nege on the agreements with which they
reach mutually agreed solutions to thei r disputes would seriously compromise the
effectiveness of these mutually agreed so lutions and would foster the 'contentious'
character of the dispute resolution system. This would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the DSU, as reflected in Article 3.10, and with the principles enshrined in
Article 3.7 (where it is stated that mutually agreed solutions are to be preferred)."431
7.125 The European Communities makes re ference to Article 3.10 of the DSU, which, in relevant
part, provides that:
"It is understood that requests for concilia tion and the use of the dispute settlement
procedures should not be intended or consid ered as contentious acts and that, if a
dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort
to resolve the dispute."
7.126 As regards the contentious nature of disputes, the Panel reads Article 3.10 of the DSU to
exclude on its plain terms the interpretation ac corded to it by the European Communities.
In particular, in the light of the language of Ar ticle 3.10 of the DSU, the Panel does not see how the
European Communities could consider the current dispute settlement proceeding as a contentious act.
7.127 As to pacta sunt servanda , the Panel does not address the more systemic issue of whether a
Member may waive, under a bilateral agreement and for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement,
its rights to action pursuant to the DSU. The Pane l merely notes that the Bananas Understanding does
not explicitly provide anywhere th at Ecuador would forego its rights to bring a compliance dispute.
The following provision of the Bananas Understa nding is clearly not on point here, as it does not
specifically address Ecuador's right to bring a compliance dispute:

428 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 58.
429 European Communities' second written submission, para. 11.
430 Ibid., para. 12.
431 Ibid., para. 18.

"Upon implementation of the import regime described in paragraph C, Ecuador's right
to suspend concessions or other obligati ons of a level not exceeding US$201.6
million per year vis-à-vis the EC will be terminated."432
7.128 Finally, as to the arguments of the European Communities on good faith, the Panel notes that
Ecuador points out that it "is not challenging or questioning the EC-Ecuador Understanding on
Bananas, but rather is challenging the conformity of EC measures with the EC's obligations under the
WTO Agreement". 433 The Panel recalls that Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the dispute
settlement system of the WTO "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements." Also, as mentioned above , the Panel attaches great importance to the
conformity of an alleged mutually agreed solution or legally binding agreement, including the future
steps set out therein, with the covered agreements, as well as to the possibility of the complainant to
have recourse to WTO dispute settlement to revi ew the issue of conformity. Nowhere in the
Understanding has Ecuador accepted that it would fore go its right to challeng e the conformity with
the covered agreements of any measure that the European Communities might take to implement a
step set out in the Bananas Understanding.
7.129 The Panel notes that in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) the Appellate Body stated that
"there is a basis for a dispute settlement panel to determine, in an appropriate case, whether a Member
has not acted in good faith"434. However, the Appellate Body added that:
"Nothing ... in the covered agreements suppor ts the conclusion that simply because a
WTO Member is found to have violated a substantive treaty provision, it has
therefore not acted in good faith. In our view, it would be necessary to prove more
than mere violation to support such a conclusion."
435
7.130 Interpreting those considerations by the Appellate Body, the panel in Argentina –
Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties stated that:
"[T]wo conditions must be satisfied before a Member may be found to have failed to
act in good faith. First, the Member must have violated a substantive provision of the
WTO agreements. Second, there must be something 'more than mere violation'.
436
7.131 Article 3.10 of the DSU provides in relevant part that "if a dispute arises, all Members will
engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute." It does not seem that the
European Communities has succeeded in making a prim a facie case for the alleged violation of that
provision, let alone also for something "more than mere violation".
7.132 In light of the above, the Panel rejects the European Communities' arguments on
contentiousness, pacta sunt servanda and good faith.
Withdrawal of the banana dispute from the DSB agenda
7.133 Finally, the Panel refrains from considering in detail the contextual argument, raised by a
number of ACP third parties that, with Ecuador's explicit agreement 437, "the banana dispute was taken

432 EC – Bananas III , Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (WT/DS27/58), 2 July 2001, para. E;
and EC – Bananas III , Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC (WT/DS27/60), 9 July 2001,
para. E.
433 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 14.
434 Appellate Body Report on US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 297.
435 Ibid., para. 298.
436 Panel Report on Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.36.
437 See joint third-party submission of Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica,
the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar , St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Suriname, para. 37.

off the agenda of the DSB in accord ance with Article 21.6 of the DSU ... at the DSB meeting held on
1 February 2002
438".439
7.134 Indeed, it is unclear to what extent the Eur opean Communities wishes to use this as a legal
argument. While at one point the European Comm unities argued that that such withdrawal was
supportive of its preliminary objection in this dispute 440, at a later point the European Communities
explicitly stated that it "has not argued that the withdrawal of the issue on the implementation of the
DSB rulings and recommendations from the age nda of the DSB has any particular legal
significance."441
(iii) Conclusion
7.135 In the light of the foregoing analysis of the terms and context of the Bananas Understanding,
the Panel concludes that, even if the Bananas U nderstanding qualified as a mutually agreed solution
or a legally binding agreement, it would not preven t Ecuador from bringing this compliance dispute.
The Panel therefore does not need to assess whethe r the Bananas Understanding indeed qualifies as a
mutually agreed solution or a legally binding agre ement, as argued by the European Communities.
In particular, there is no need to assess the ar guments by the European Communities that the
Bananas Understanding would constitute applicable rules of law for WTO dispute settlement.
7.136 In the light of the relevant arguments ra ised by the European Communities, the Panel
concludes that the European Communities has not succeeded in making a prima facie case in favour
of its preliminary objection. Accordingly, th e Panel rejects the European Communities' first
preliminary objection, and turns to assess Ecuador's substantive claims in this dispute.
C. ECUADOR'S CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE I OF THE GATT 1994
1. Ecuador's claim
7.137 Ecuador argues that the European Communitie s' import regime for bananas and, more
specifically, the tariff quota, which allows a specif ied yearly volume of 775,000 mt of bananas of
ACP origin to enter the EC market duty-free, is inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994.
Ecuador considers that this regime "[accords] tariff preferences to bananas of ACP origin that are not
accorded to bananas originating in Ecuador or other non-ACP countries". 442 Ecuador adds that the
preferences granted to bananas of ACP origin are not covered by the waiver from Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994, the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement waiv er (Doha Waiver), which was granted to the
European Communities by the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha on 14 November 2001.443
7.138 In Ecuador's view:

438 ( footnote original ) Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 1 February 2002, WT/DSB/M/119,
6 March 2002, at point 1 (a).
439 Joint third-party submission of Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica,
the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar , St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Suriname, para. 37.
440 See European Communities' response to Panel question No. 6.
441 European Communities' response to Panel question No. 59.
442 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 25.
443 Ministerial Conference, Europe an Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision
of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2 001. See Ecuador's second written submission, paras.
16-36, , and written version of Ecuador's oral statemen t during substantive meeting with the parties and third
parties, paras. 34-44.

"There is no dispute that all bananas ar e like products, nor that the EC accords
bananas of ACP origin duty-free treatment up to the 775,000 mt tariff quota, while
bananas of Ecuadorian origin (as well as other bananas not benefiting from the duty-
free tariff quota) are subject to a duty of €176/mt. Absent some applicable exception
or waiver, it could not seriously be asserted that Article I permits a WTO member to
grant a duty preference limited to one group of WTO members, and excluding
others."
444
7.139 Ecuador contends that, if the European Communities was to argue that its breach of Article I
of the GATT 1994 is covered by an appropriate wa iver, the burden would then fall on the EC to
demonstrate "that it still has a valid waiver with respect to bananas, and that this waiver covers the ...
measures at issue."445
7.140 Ecuador adds that, in any event, the Europ ean Communities' preferen ce for bananas of ACP
origin is no longer covered by the Doha Waiver. In Ecuador's view, the European Communities failed
to meet the conditions of the waiver, which would have allowed the waiver to continue to apply
beyond 31 December 2005.446 In particular, Ecuador argues that:
"In accordance with the Doha Waiver, ha ving failed in its two opportunities to
envisage a tariff rebinding that would meet the waiver standard, the EC cannot claim
the protection of the waiver for the system it then established unilaterally"447
2. The European Communities' response
7.141 The European Communities has not made any sp ecific arguments to contest Ecuador's claim
that the preference granted to bananas of ACP orig in would be inconsistent with Article I of the
GATT 1994.448
7.142 The European Communities argues, however, that this preference continues to be covered by
a waiver from Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Doha Waiver. According to the European
Communities, the duration of that waiver is not li nked to the number of arbitrations lost by the
European Communities, but rather depends on wh ether the new import regime for bananas it
introduced on 1 January 2006 at least maintains total market access for MFN suppliers.
449
7.143 The European Communities also argues that, in accordance with the language contained in
the Doha Waiver, this waiver would only cease to a pply to bananas "upon entry into force of the new
EC tariff regime", which the European Communities considers to mean "the tariff regime that was
presented to the Arbitrator and on which the Arbitrator made a pronouncement in its Award."450
7.144 In the European Communities' view:
"The European Communities has fully sa tisfied the condition for the continued
application of the Doha waiver ... . The European Communities introduced on

444 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 25.
445 Ibid., para. 26.
446 Ibid.
447 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 17. See also, Ecuador's first written submission,
para. 26.
448 European Communities' response to panel question No. 61, para. 125. See also, Ecuador's second
written submission, para. 16; and written version of Ecua dor's oral statement during substantive meeting with
the parties and third parties, para. 34.
449 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 67 and 69.
450 Ibid., para. 71.

January 1, 2006 a different import regime than the one analysed by the Arbitrator.
Moreover, the evidence derived from the real operation of this import regime clearly
establishes that it maintains total market access for MFN suppliers."
451
7.145 In conclusion, the European Communities argue s that, since the preference granted to
imported bananas originating in ACP countries con tinues to be covered by the Doha Waiver, the
Panel should reject Ecuador's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.452
3. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
7.146 Under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994:
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules a nd formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matte rs referred to in pa ragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article III ... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party [Member] to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties [Members]."453
7.147 In Canada – Autos, the Appellate Body explained the obj ect and purpose of Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 as follows:
"Th[e] object and purpose [of Article I:1] is to prohibit discrimination among like
products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibition of
discrimination in Article I:1 also serve s as an incentive for concessions, negotiated
reciprocally, to be extended to all other Members on an MFN basis."454
7.148 In Indonesia – Autos, referring to the Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Bananas III , the panel
explained how to carry out the examination of a measure under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994:
"The Appellate Body, in Bananas III , confirmed that to establish a violation of
Article I, there must be an advantage, of the type covered by Article I and which is
not accorded unconditionally to all 'like products' of all WTO Members."455
4. Panel's analysis
7.149 The Panel starts by recalling that the Europ ean Communities has chosen not to contest
Ecuador's claim that the preference granted to banan as of ACP origin is inconsistent with Article I of
the GATT 1994.
7.150 Following the approach set out by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III , as described by
the panel in Indonesia – Autos , the Panel will nevertheless cons ider the arguments and evidence
presented by Ecuador, in order to determine whether they are sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of inconsistency with Article I of the GATT 1994. If this were determ ined to be the case, the Panel

451 European Communities' first written submission, para. 72. See also, Ibid., para. 71; and
European Communities' second written submission, para. 36.
452 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 34-37 and 68-73.
453 Ad note omitted.
454 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Autos, para. 84.
455 Panel Report on Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.138.

would then turn to assessing whether the European Communities has made a prima facie case that
such inconsistency is covered by the Doha Waiv er granted by the WTO Ministerial Conference on
14 November 2001.
(a) Is the ACP preference inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994?
7.151 As noted above, in order to analyse a clai m under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Panel
needs to determine first whether the measure challenged constitutes an advantage (or favour, privilege
or immunity), of the type covered by Article I. If that were the case, the Panel would then turn to the
issues of the likeness of products and the immediate and unconditional extension of such advantage.
(i) Whether the preference granted by the Eu ropean Communities constitutes an advantage of
the type covered by Article I of the GATT 1994
7.152 The following facts are not in dispute:
(a) Under the terms of Council Regulation (E C) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005,
and in accordance with the European Co mmunities' commitments under the ACP-EC
partnership Agreement, also known as the Cotonou Agreement, the European
Communities allows a volume of 775,000 mt of bananas to enter the EC market free
of tariff duties;
(b) This duty-free treatment is only available to imports of bananas originating in ACP
countries, and not to like bananas originating in other Members; and,
(c) Imported bananas originating in other Members, as well as imports of bananas
originating in ACP countries beyond the annual volumes prescribed in the tariff
quota, are subject to a specific tariff of €176/mt.
456
In other words, access eligibility to this preference depends on th e origin of the bananas, as only ACP
bananas qualify.

7.153 The Panel notes that the term "advantage" , under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, has
traditionally been given a broad scope by GATT and WTO panels, as well as by the Appellate
Body.
457 In this regard, the Panel concludes that the duty-free treatment available to imports of
bananas originating in ACP countries, solely because of their origin, constitutes an advantage, when
compared to the ordinary treatment accorded to bana nas of all other origins, which are subject to a
specific tariff of €176/mt.
(ii) Whether the relevant products in this dispute are like products
7.154 As to whether the relevant products in this dispute are "like products", the Panel notes that the
original panel in this dispute already "consider[ed] whether bananas from the EC, ACP countries,
BFA countries and other third countries are 'like' products for purposes of the claims made in respect
of Articles I, III, X and XIII of GATT"
458, and found that:

456 See tariff regime for imports of bananas to th e EC, in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of
29 November 2005, Exhibit ECU-1. See also, Ecuado r's first written submission, para. 21, and European
Communities' first written submission, paras. 13 and 15.
457 "[A] broad definition has been given to the term 'advantage' in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by the
panel in United States – Non-Rubber Footwear ." Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , para. 206,
quoting GATT Panel Report on US – Non-Rubber Footwear, para. 6.9.
458 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.62.

"The factors commonly used in GATT prac tice to determine likeness, such as, for
example, customs classification, end-use, and the properties, nature and quality of the
product, all support a finding that bananas from these various sources should be
treated as like products.
459 Moreover, all parties and third parties to the dispute have
proceeded in their legal reasoning on th e assumption that all bananas are 'like'
products in spite of any differences in quality, size or taste that may exist.
We find that bananas are 'like' products, for purposes of Article I, III, X, and XIII of
GATT, irrespective of whether they origin ate in the EC, in ACP countries, in BFA
countries or in other third countries."460
7.155 Similarly, in the original proceedings the Appellate Body stated that:
"As no participant disputes that all bana nas are like products, the non-discrimination
provisions apply to all imports of bana nas, irrespective of whether and how a
Member categorizes or subdivides these imports for administrative or other
reasons."
461
The Appellate Body concluded that "[i]n the presen t case, the non-discrimination obligations of the
GATT 1994, specifically Articles I:1 and XIII 462, apply fully to all imported bananas irrespective of
their origin ..."463

7.156 The Panel agrees with Ecuador that, similar to th e earlier proceedings in this dispute, "[t]here
is no dispute that all bananas are like products"
464 for the purposes of the proceedings before this
Panel. This is not contested by the European Communities.
7.157 Accordingly, and in the light of the relevant fi ndings in earlier proceedings in this dispute, the
Panel confirms that the relevant products in this dispute, fresh bananas (corresponding to tariff item
080300 12 or 080300 19) originating in ACP countries, are like products to fresh bananas originating
in other WTO Members.
(iii) Whether the preference granted by th e European Communities is immediately and
unconditionally extended
7.158 Finally, it is not contested between the parties that the preference granted by the European
Communities to bananas of ACP origin is not extende d to like bananas originating in the territories of
any other WTO Members.
7.159 As this advantage is not extended to the lik e products of any other WTO Members, it is
necessarily not extended "immediately", nor "unconditi onally". This is notwithstanding the fact that
the Panel notes that, in addition to the preferen ces granted to bananas of ACP origin under the

459 ( footnote original) For a general discussion of relevant factors for determining the likeness of
products, see Panel Report on "Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages", adopted on 1 November 1996,
WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R & WT/DS11/R, pp. 111-114, paras. 6.20-6.23, as modified by, Appellate Body Report
on "Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages", adopted on 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R &
WT/DS11/AB/R, pp. 19-21.
460 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 7.62-7.63.
461 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 190.
462 (footnote original) We do not agree with the Panel's findings that Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994
and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement preclude the imposition of different import licensing systems on like
products when imported from different Members. See our Findings and Conclusions, paras. (l) and (m).
463 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 191.
464 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 25.

Cotonou Agreement, the European Communities also grants autonomous duty-free access to its
market to bananas originating in Least Develope d Countries (LDCs) under the Everything But Arms
(EBA) arrangement.465
(iv) Preliminary conclusion regarding Ecuador's claim under Article I:1 of GATT 1994
7.160 For the reasons indicated above, the Panel finds that Ecuador has successfully made a prima
facie case that the preference granted by the Eu ropean Communities to an annual duty-free tariff
quota of 775,000 mt of imported ba nanas originating in ACP countr ies constitutes an advantage for
this category of bananas, which is not accorded unconditionally to like bananas originating in non-
ACP WTO Members. The Panel therefore finds that this preference is inconsistent with Article I:1 of
GATT 1994.
(b) Is the preference covered by a waiver?
7.161 Having found that the preference granted by the European Communities to imported bananas
originating in ACP countries is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the Panel will now
turn to the issue of whether this preference is covered by the Doha Waiver.
(i) Terms and conditions of the Doha Waiver and the Bananas Annex
7.162 In examining the terms of conditions containe d in the Doha Waiver, the Panel recalls the
words of the Appellate Body in its EC – Bananas III report:
"Although the WTO Agreement does not provide any specific rules on the
interpretation of waivers, Article IX of the WTO Agreement and the Understanding
in Respect of Waivers of Obligations u nder the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, which provide requirements fo r granting and renewing waivers, stress
the exceptional nature of waivers and subject waivers to strict disciplines. Thus,
waivers should be interpreted with great care."
466
7.163 While in principle the Doha Waiver was to be valid until 31 December 2007 467, in regard to
bananas this was subject to the terms and conditions set out in the text of the Decision by which the
WTO Ministerial Conference adopted this waiver. Those terms and conditions include the additional
provisions contained in the Annex to the Doha Waiver Decision (the Bananas Annex).468
7.164 Under the terms and conditions set out in the Bananas Annex, the European Communities was
to announce a proposed rebinding of its tariff on bananas. 469 Within a 60-day period following the
announcement by the European Communities of its in tentions concerning the rebinding of the tariff
on bananas, any WTO Member exporting bananas on an MFN basis could request that an arbitrator
determine "whether the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas would result in at least

465 Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005. European Communities' response to Panel
question No. 53 paras. 109-112. See para. 2.41 above.
466 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , para. 185. See also GATT Panel Report on US –
Sugar Waiver, para. 5.9. See also, Nicaragua's third pa rty written submission, para. 22, and Panama's third
party written submission, para. 22. See additionally, Ec uador's response to panel question No. 12, European
Communities' response to panel question No. 12, para. 28, and No. 14, paras. 32-34, and European
Communities' comments on Ecuador's response to panel question No. 12, paras. 3-7.
467 Ministerial Conference, Europe an Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision
of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001, p. 2, para. 1.
468 Ibid, p. 3, para. 3bis. The Bananas Annex is an integral part of the Doha Waiver.
469 Bananas Annex, tirets 1, 2 and 5.

maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers".
470 Should the arbitrator find that this was
not the case, according to the first sentence in the fifth tiret of th e Bananas Annex, the European
Communities was to "rectify the matter". In this case, the second sentence in the fifth tiret of the
Bananas Annex provides that the European Communiti es was to enter into consultations with those
interested parties that had requested the arbitration. According to the third sentence in the fifth tiret of
the Bananas Annex, if, notwithstanding these cons ultations, no mutually satisfactory solution was
agreed, the same arbitrator could be called upon ag ain, this time to determine "whether the EC had
rectified the matter". If the arbitrator found that the European Communities had failed to rectify the
matter, the fifth sentence in the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex provides that the waiver would "cease
to apply to bananas upon entry into force of the new EC tariff regime". Pursuant to the sixth sentence
in the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex, the entir ety of this process had to be conducted in such a
manner that the "negotiations and the arbitration procedures [should] be concluded before the entry
into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1 January 2006".471
7.165 Whether the Doha Waiver covers the European Communities' current banana import regime
may accordingly depend on whether or not, under the Bananas Annex, the Doha Waiver expired with
the introduction of the "new EC tariff regime" on 1 January 2006. Indeed, whether or not the Doha
Waiver expired on this date is the main issue of contention between the parties to this dispute.
(ii) Uncontested facts
7.166 The following facts are uncontested:
(a) On 31 January 2005, the European Comm unities notified the WTO Members that it
intended to replace its tariff concessions on tariff item 0803 00 19 (bananas) included
in the European Communities' Schedule CXL, with a bound duty of €230/mt. In its
notification, the European Communities indicated that its communication constituted
the announcement under the terms of the Bananas Annex to the Doha Waiver.
472
(b) In March and April 2005, a number of WTO Members, including Ecuador, the
complainant in these proceedings, requested arbitration, pursuant to the Bananas
Annex.473
(c) In August 2005, the arbitrator delivered its first award pursuant to the Bananas
Annex, concluding that:
"[T]he European Communities' envisaged rebinding on bananas
would not result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN

470 Bananas Annex, tirets 2-4.
471 Ibid., tiret 5.
472 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities, Addendum
(G/SECRET/22/Add.1), 1 February 2005. See para. 2.16 above.
473 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Annex to the Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/L/607), 1 April 2005. See also, European Communities,
The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Annex to the Decision of 14
November 2001, Communication from Colombia , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.1), 1 April 2005;
Communication from Costa Rica, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.2), 1 April 2005; Communication from Ecuador,
Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.3), 1 April 2005; Communication from Guatemala, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.4),
1 April 2005; Communication from Honduras, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.5), 1 April 2005; Communication
from Panama , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.6), 1 April 2005; Communication from Nicaragua , Addendum
(WT/L/607/Add.7), 4 April 2005; Communication from Venezuela , Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.8), 4 April
2005; and, Communication from Brazil, Addendum (WT/L/607/Add.9), 4 April 2005. See para. 2.17 above.

banana suppliers, taking into acc ount all EC WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas".474
(d) On 13 September 2005, the European Communities notified the interested parties its
revised proposal to provide from 1 January 2006 for an MFN tariff for bananas at
€187/mt and a tariff quota for ACP countries of 775,000 mt per year at zero duty.
475
(e) On 26 September 2005, the European Commun ities requested arbitration, under the
Bananas Annex, on its revised proposal.476
(f) In October 2005, the arbitrator delivered its second award pursuant to the Bananas
Annex, concluding that:
"[T]he European Communities' pr oposed rectification ... would not
result 'in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana
suppliers', taking into account 'all EC WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas' [and that] consequently ... the
European Communities has failed to rectify the matter, in accordance
with the fifth tiret of the Annex to the Doha Waiver [the Bananas
Annex]".
477
(g) On 1 January 2006, the European Communiti es put into force a new regime for the
importation of bananas, through Counc il Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005, which
includes a €176/mt MFN tariff, as well as a 775,000 mt duty-free tariff-rate quota for
ACP bananas.
478
(iii) Issue contested between the parties
7.167 As mentioned above, the main issue that is th e object of contention between the parties is
whether, under the terms of the Bananas Annex, the Doha Waiver expired with regard to bananas on 1
January 2006. Each of the parties suggests an alternative approach:
(a) Ecuador argues that, with regard to banan as, the Doha Waiver expired automatically
upon the entry into force of the new Europ ean Communities' tariff regime, inasmuch
as two successive arbitrations determined that the European Communities' proposed
rebinding of its tariff on bananas would not result in at least maintaining total market
access for MFN suppliers; and,

474 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator (WT/L/616), 1 August 2005, para. 94. See also,
European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreemen t, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Annex
to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Communication from the Secretariat (WT/L/607/Add.13), 5 September
2005. See para. 2.17 above.
475 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnershi p Agreement, Second Re course to Arbitration
Pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator (WT/L/625), 27 October 2005, para. 7.
See para. 2.18 above.
476 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Annex to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Addendum, Communication from the European Communities
(WT/L/607/Add.14), 28 September 2005. See para. 2.19 above.
477 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnershi p Agreement, Second Re course to Arbitration
Pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator (WT/L/625), 27 October 2005, para.
127. See para. 2.19 above.
478 Exhibit ECU-1, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005. See para. 2.40 above.

(b) The European Communities argu es instead that, with regard to bananas, the Doha
Waiver would expire after all the procedur al steps envisaged in the Bananas Annex
had been completed, but only if the European Communities put into force an identical
regime to that analysed by the arbitrator or a new regime that would also fail to result
in at least maintaining total market access for MFN suppliers.
7.168 Indeed, Ecuador argues that:
"[T]he Doha Waiver of Article I expi red on January 1, 2006, following the
Arbitrator's determinations that neither the initial nor the second 'envisaged rebinding'
met the requirements of the waiver ... [T]he Arbitrator having found that the EC had
failed to rectify the matter, the waiver ceased to apply on January 1, 2006, when the
current EC measures entered into force."
479
7.169 The European Communities responds that, under the terms of the Doha Waiver, it was:
"[O]bliged to introduce a new import regime that would maintain total market access
for MFN suppliers in reality and not in theory. The assessment of whether the new
import regime does indeed maintain total market access for MFN suppliers can only
be based on an analysis of the real effects of the new import regime on the banana
market ... [Furthermore,] the Doha waiver would cease to apply only if the European
Communities implemented the exact import regime analysed by the Arbitrator and
found not to satisfy the standard of the Doha waiver. If the European Communities
introduced a different import regime than the one analysed by the Arbitrator and that
import regime did indeed maintain the tota l market access of the MFN suppliers, then
the Doha waiver would continue to apply."
480
7.170 In other words, Ecuador asks the Panel to not e the expiration of the Doha Waiver by noting
the completion of the procedural steps identified in the Bananas Annex, namely, two negative arbitral
awards and the introduction of a new EC tariff regime for bananas. 481 Conversely, the European
Communities argues that the Panel can establish the e xpiration of the Doha Waiver before the end of
2007 only if, in addition to those procedural step s, it determines that the current EC regime for
bananas is the exact regime that was analysed by the arbitrator under the procedures in the Bananas
Annex482 and if the Panel further establishes that the European Communities' current regime for the
importation of bananas has not resulted in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana
suppliers, taking into account the relevant EC commitments.
483

479 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 24.
480 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 70-71. See also, European Communities'
second written submission, para. 39, and European Communitie s' response to panel question No. 4, paras. 6-9,
No. 10, paras. 20-21, and No. 67, para. 132. But see, Ecuador's comment on the European Communities'
response to panel question No. 13.
481 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 17.
482 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 71-72. See also, European Communities'
second written submission, para. 41, and , and European Co mmunities' response to panel question No. 4, paras.
6-8.
483 European Communities' first written submission, pa ras. 70, 72 and 73-77. See also, European
Communities' second written submission, paras. 36-37.

(iv) Conditions envisaged in the Bananas Annex
7.171 As noted above, the completion of the intermed iate procedural steps envisaged in the terms
and conditions set out in the Bananas Annex, i.e., the two negative arbitral awards, is an uncontested
matter of fact. Indeed, two successive arbitrations, as envisaged respectively in the fourth and fifth
tirets of the Bananas Annex, reached the conc lusion that the European Communities' proposed
rebinding of its tariff on bananas would not result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN
suppliers.484 Furthermore, on 1 January 2006, the European Communities put into force a new regime
for the importation of bananas, which was different from the one previously applied.485
7.172 As noted above, however, the European Commun ities argues that its current regime for the
importation of bananas is not to be considered as "t he new EC tariff regime" in the terms contained in
the Bananas Annex. Additionally, the European Communities argues that its current regime for the
importation of bananas results in at least mainta ining total market access for MFN banana suppliers,
taking into account the relevant EC commitments.
7.173 The European Communities' arguments in this regard raise two main questions:
(a) Whether the European Communities' current regime for the importation of bananas is
to be considered as "the new EC tariff regi me" in the sense of the terms contained in
the Bananas Annex; and,
(b) Whether, the Bananas Annex links the expira tion of the Doha Waiver in regard to
bananas to the mere entry into force of such new regime or whether, under the
Bananas Annex, only a new tariff regime that does not at least maintain total market
access would result in such expiration of the waiver.
7.174 The Panel will accordingly consider the European Communities' arguments in this regard.
(v) Is the European Communities' current bananas regime "the new EC tariff regime"?
7.175 The first issue raised by the European Comm unities is whether the European Communities'
current regime for the importation of bananas is to be considered as "the new EC tariff regime" under
the terms contained in the fifth sentence of the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex.
7.176 Under the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex:
"The second arbitration award will be notifie d to the General Council. If the EC has
failed to rectify the matter, this waiver shall cease to apply to bananas upon entry into
force of the new EC tariff regime" (emphasis added).
7.177 As noted above, the European Communities argues that:
"[T]he phrase ' the new EC tariff regime' can only refer to the tariff regime that was
presented to the Arbitrator and on which the Arbitrator made a pronouncement in its
Award. In other words, the Doha waiver would cease to apply only if the European
Communities implemented the exact import regime analysed by the Arbitrator and
found not to satisfy the standard of the Doha waiver. If the European Communities
introduced a different import regime than the one analysed by the Arbitrator and that

484 See above, paras. 2.17 and 2.19.
485 See above, para. 2.40.

import regime did indeed maintain the total market access of the MFN suppliers, then
the Doha waiver would continue to apply."
486
7.178 The European Communities then concludes that, since it "introduced on January 1, 2006 a
different import regime than the one analysed by the Arbitrator", it "has fully satisfied the condition
for the continued application of the Doha waiver".487
7.179 The Panel agrees with the European Communities that its current bananas import regime is
different from the ones analysed by the arbitrator s under the Bananas Annex. However, the Panel
fails to see how the terms of the Bananas Annex su pport the conclusion drawn from that fact by the
European Communities, namely that the European Communities has satisfied the condition for the
continued application of the Doha Waiver. More specifically, the Panel disagrees with the European
Communities that the phrase "the new EC tariff regime " can only refer to the tariff regime that was
presented to the arbitrator and on which the arbitrator made a pronouncement in its award. Indeed,
the terms of the Doha Waiver do not support the in terpretation of the expression "the new EC tariff
regime" proposed by the European Communities.
7.180 The ordinary meaning of the word "new" suggest s something that is "[n]ot existing before;
now made or existing for the first time ... Different from a thing previously existing, known, etc."
488
Taking into account this ordinary meaning of the word "new", the expression the "new EC tariff
regime" for bananas, in the context in which it is us ed in the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex, should
be read as nothing else than a regime adopted by the European Communities that is different from the
one previously in existence.
7.181 As noted by Ecuador,
"[T]he measures examined by the Arbitrator are never referred to [in the Bananas
Annex] by the term 'the new tariff regime'. The matter examined by the Arbitrator is
described as 'the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas,' or, in shorthand as
'the rebinding', while the second arbitration simply refers to a determination of
'whether the EC has rectified the matter'."
489
7.182 In any event, the European Communities' current tariff regime is clearly different from the
one previously in existence. Furthermore, the si xth sentence of the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex
provides that "[t]he Article XXVIII negotiations an d the arbitration procedures shall be concluded
before the entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1 January 2006 ." (emphasis added)
The European Communities' current banana import regime entered into force exactly on that date.
7.183 Consequently, the Panel is not persuaded that the expression "the new EC tariff regime" used
in the fifth sentence of the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex does not apply to the bananas import
regime instituted by the European Communities from 1 January 2006, through Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1964/2005.
(vi) Is the maintenance of total market access for MFN banana suppliers a relevant consideration
for extending the Doha Waiver in regard to bananas?
7.184 The Panel now turns to the second question rai sed by the European Communities, namely,
whether the European Communities' current regime fo r the importation of bananas results in at least

486 European Communities' first written submission, para. 71.
487 Ibid., para. 72. But see, Ecuador's response to panel question No. 4.
488 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, fifth edition (Clarendon Press, 2002), Vol. II, p. 1914.
489 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 29.

maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, taking into account the relevant EC
commitments. In order to address this argument, ho wever, the Panel needs first to verify whether,
under the terms set out in the Bananas Annex, the Pa nel is required and has the authority to determine
if the European Communities' current regime for the importation of bananas results in at least
maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers.
7.185 If the Panel were to verify that, under the terms set out in the Bananas Annex, it is required to
make such a finding and that it has the authority to do so and if the Panel further found that, indeed,
the European Communities' current regime for th e importation of bananas results in at least
maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, the question would then be whether such a
determination implies that the Doha Waiver, as it applies to bananas, has remained in force.
7.186 The Panel notes in this regard the European Communities' argument that:
"The Doha waiver states that it would term inate if 'the EC has failed to rectify the
matter'. If the Doha waiver wanted to say what Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama are
arguing, the text should have read that the waiver would terminate 'if the Arbitrator
concludes that the EC has failed to rectify the matter'. The Doha waiver does not say
so. This shows that the crucial factor was whether the import regime actually
implemented by the European Communiti es maintains the MFN countries' market
access."
490
7.187 However, this argument is not persuasive. The te xt of the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex is
clear enough:
"If the arbitrator determines that the rebinding would not result in at least
maintaining total market access for MFN supp liers, the EC shall rectify the matter.
Within 10 days of the notification of the ar bitration award to the General Council, the
EC will enter into consultations with tho se interested parties that requested the
arbitration. In the absence of a mutually satisfactory solution, the same arbitrator
will be asked to determine ... whether the EC has rectified the matter . The second
arbitration award will be notified to the General Council. If the EC has failed to
rectify the matter, this waiver shall cease to apply to bananas upon entry into force of
the new EC tariff regime" (emphasis added).
7.188 In our view, the expression " If the EC has failed to rectify the matter , this waiver shall cease
to apply" used in the last full sentence of the fift h tiret cannot be read in isolation from the expression
"In the absence of a mutually satisfactory solution, the same arbitrator will be asked to determine ...
whether the EC has rectified the matter ." The Panel agrees in this rega rd with the United States' third
party statement that:
"The phrase '[i]f the EC has failed to rectify the matter', at the beginning of the fifth
sentence in tiret 5 of the Annex can only refe r back to the determination made by the
second arbitrator following the EC's effort to 'rectify the matter'."491
7.189 Under the terms contained in the Bananas Anne x, the authority to determine whether the
European Communities' proposed regime for the im portation of bananas would result "in at least

490 Written version of the European Communities' closing statement during substantive meeting with
the parties and third parties, para. 5.
491 Written version of the United States' oral statemen t during substantive meeting with the parties and
third parties, para. 21.

maintaining total market access for MFN banana s uppliers" fell on the arbitrator and not on any other
WTO body.
7.190 The Bananas Annex contemplated two successi ve rounds of examination by which the
arbitrator would examine, first the European Co mmunities' original proposed rebinding of the EC
tariff on bananas to determine whether it would ma intain total market access for MFN banana
suppliers, and then, if such were the case, the revi sed proposal, to determine whether it had rectified
the matter (i.e., if it would result in maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers, to the
extent that the previous proposal had failed such test).
7.191 The terms contained in the Bananas Annex do not envisage any further examination after the
introduction of the new measure, which would in practice amount to a third round of examination
beyond the two arbitrations provided in the Bananas Annex. Nor do those terms entrust to this Panel
the authority to review the findings made by the arbitrator. If the intention of WTO Members had
been to contemplate such additional round of exam ination, the Bananas Annex would have included a
provision to that effect. In the absence of such language, the Panel fails to see how it could introduce
such new step.
7.192 The European Communities argues that the duration of the Doha Waiver was not linked to the
number of arbitrations lost by the European Communities before the new import regime was
introduced, but rather it depended on whether the new import regime actually maintains total market
access for MFN suppliers.
492 In the European Communities' view, the WTO Members would not
have linked the duration of such an important waiver:
"[T]o the number of arbitration results r eached on the basis of theoretical analyses
and arithmetic calculations, in 'clinical isol ation' from the real effects of the new
import regime on the bananas market."493
7.193 The Panel concurs with the European Comm unities' statement that any determination
regarding the continued existence of the Doha wa iver should not be based on a purely "formalistic
approach".494 However, under the terms of the Bananas Annex, it was the arbitrator, and not a dispute
settlement compliance panel, that had the authorit y to conduct a substantive analysis in order to
determine whether the European Communities' proposed regime for the importation of bananas would
result in maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers. Moreover, under the terms of the
Bananas Annex, it was the European Communities that had the burden to either propose a rebinding
of its tariff on bananas that would result in mainta ining total market access for MFN banana suppliers
or, if it had failed to do so through its original prop osal, to rectify the matter to the satisfaction of the
same arbitrator through a second examination.
7.194 The European Communities raises the issue of what would have happened if the arbitrator
had found that the European Communities' proposed regime for the importation of bananas would
result in maintaining market access for MFN bana na suppliers and the European Communities had
then implemented a different system from that examin ed by the arbitrator or if the actual operation of
the system did not in fact maintain market access for bananas. 495 However, this counterfactual
argument does not change the terms actually contained in the Bananas Annex. In any event, even if

492 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 67 and 69.
493 Ibid., para. 69.
494 European Communities' second written submission, para. 39, and written version of the European
Communities' oral statement during substantive meeting w ith the parties and third parties, paras. 14-15. See
also, Joint third party written submission by Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenad ines, and Suriname (ACP
Countries' third party written submission), paras. 54-55 and 61-64.
495 European Communities' first written submission, para. 68.

the arbitrator had made such a finding and the Eu ropean Communities later implemented a different
system from that examined by the arbitrator, there is nothing in the Bananas Annex that would have
prevented any WTO Member from having recourse to dispute settlement procedures, as in the present
case, in order to challenge whether in those circ umstances the system ultimately imposed by the
European Communities was inconsis tent with the WTO agreements and whether the Doha Waiver
was still in effect.
7.195 On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that, since the arbitrator w as expected to base its
findings on a proposed regime, the actual operation of su ch regime in the future could result in effects
on the bananas market different from those estimated by the arbitrator. 496 This is of course an
inherent limitation of any prosp ective determination, such as the one that, under the terms of the
Bananas Annex, the arbitrator was to conduct regarding the European Communities' proposed regime.
The arbitrator based its determination on the term s of the European Communities' proposal, including
through the use "of theoretical analyses and arithme tic calculations", and availing itself of the best
available information at the time. In any event, ev en if this was to be regarded as a shortcoming of
the rules contained in the Bananas Annex, it would not change the terms of that text, nor would it
insert new additional steps that were not provided for or even intended by the WTO membership.
7.196 For the reasons explained above, the Panel not es that the Bananas Annex contemplated two
successive rounds of examination by which the arbitrator would determine, first whether the European
Communities' original proposed rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas would maintain market access
for MFN banana suppliers, and then, if that was found not to be the case, whether the revised proposal
made by the European Communities had rectifie d the matter. No further examination was
contemplated in the Bananas Annex after the Eu ropean Communities had introduced its new import
regime for bananas, nor did the terms of the Ba nanas Annex entrust any authority to a dispute
settlement panel to review the findings made by the arbitrator.
7.197 The Panel also notes that, under the terms contai ned in the Bananas Annex, the authority to
determine whether the European Communities' proposed regime for the importation of bananas would
result "in at least maintaining total market access fo r MFN banana suppliers" fell on the arbitrator and
could not be decided by a WTO dispute settlement compliance panel, or by any other WTO body.
7.198 In view of the preceding analysis, the Panel c oncludes that the maintenance of total market
access for MFN banana suppliers is not a relevant consideration for extending the Doha Waiver in
regard to bananas beyond the date of its expi ration on 1 January 2006. While the Panel notes the
European Communities' arguments that its current bananas import regime would maintain total
market access for MFN suppliers497, it finds that this fact, even if found true, is irrelevant for assessing
whether the Doha Waiver continued to apply to bananas beyond 1 January 2006.
7.199 In consequence, the Panel finds that it does not have the authority to determine whether the
European Communities' current regime for the importa tion of bananas results in at least maintaining
total market access for MFN banana suppliers, for the purposes provided in the Bananas Annex.

496 Cf. Ecuador's second written submission, paras. 25-27.
497 See, inter alia , European Communities' first written submission, paras. 72-77, European
Communities' second written submission, para. 36, written version of the European Communities' oral statement
during substantive meeting with the parties and third pa rties, paras. 8-10, European Communities' response to
panel question No. 1, paras. 1-2, No. 8, paras. 15.-16, and No. 68, para. 133, and European Communities'
comments on Ecuador's response to panel question No. 31, paras. 22-25, and No. 32, paras. 26-28.. See also,
ACP Countries' third party written submission, paras. 69 -83. But see also, Colombia's third party written
submission, paras. 12-40, and Ecuador's response to panel questions Nos. 1, 8, 31 and 32.

(vii) Conclusion regarding the Doha Waiver
7.200 For the reasons indicated above, with the comple tion of the different intermediate procedural
steps envisaged in the terms and conditions set out in the Bananas Annex, and upon the entry into
force of the bananas import regime instituted by the EC through Council Regulation (EC) No.
1964/2005, the Doha Waiver cannot extend to the EC banana regime introduced from 1 January 2006.
The European Communities has failed to make a prima facie case that, since the entry into force of the
new EC tariff regime, on 1 January 2006, a waiver from Article I:1 of GATT 1994 has been in force
to cover the preference granted by the European Communities to imported bananas originating in
ACP countries.
5. General conclusion
7.201 For the reasons indicated in this section, the Panel finds that the preference granted by the
European Communities to an annual duty-free tariff quota of 775,000 mt of imported bananas
originating in ACP countries constitutes an advantag e for this category of bananas, which is not
accorded to like bananas originating in non-ACP WTO Members. The Panel therefore finds that this
preference is inconsistent with Article I:1 of GA TT 1994. The Panel further finds that, with the
expiration of the Doha Waiver from 1 January 2006 as it applied to bananas, there is no evidence that,
during the period that is relevant for this Panel's findings, that is, from the time of the establishment of
the Panel until the date of this Report, any waiver from Article I:1 of GATT 1994 has been in force to
cover such preference.
D. E
CUADOR'S CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE XIII OF THE GATT 1994
1. Introduction
(a) Summary of parties' arguments
(i) Ecuador's claim
7.202 Ecuador has requested the Panel to find that the European Communities' current banana
import regime is inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994.498
7.203 Ecuador argues that, "[a]s the original Panel 499 found, and the Appellate Body 500 affirmed in
Bananas III, and as again affirmed in the first Article 21.5 Panel 501, Article XIII of the GATT applies
to tariff-rate quotas as well as other quotas."502
7.204 Ecuador adds that:
"The EC was granted a conditional waiver of its obligations under Article XIII, but
this waiver expired by its own terms on December 31, 2005. 503 Notwithstanding the
expiration of that waiver, the EC now im poses a tariff rate quota on bananas in which

498 Ecuador's first written submission, paras. 29-30.
499 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 7.68.
500 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report at para. 160.
501 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 6.160.
502 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 28.
503 (footnote original) European Communities – Transitional Regime For The EC – Autonomous Tariff
Rate Quotas On Imports Of Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16, 14 November 2001, para. 7.

only ACP countries have access to the duty fr ee quota, while Ecuador and all other
countries are excluded from that quota."504
7.205 In Ecuador's view, on the one hand:
"The EC measures are inconsistent with Ar ticle XIII:1 in that Ecuadorian (and other
non-ACP) bananas cannot be c onsidered 'similarly restricted' in comparison to ACP
bananas, when Ecuadorian (and other non- ACP) bananas are si mply excluded from
access to the duty free tariff quota.505"506
7.206 On the other hand, Ecuador maintains that:
"The EC measures are also inconsistent with Article XIII:2. The Panel on Bananas
III noted the general rule that, if Member s apply quotas to a product, then, in the
terms of the chapeau to Article XIII:2, 'Members shall aim at a distribution of trade in
such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various
Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions.'507"508
7.207 Ecuador adds that "[t]hough the EC system has eliminated the country allocations that
previously existed as between non-ACP countries, the discrimination remains as between ACP and
non-ACP bananas" 509, and "[t]he Appellate Body in Bananas III vigorously condemned this
discrimination."510
7.208 Finally, in Ecuador's view the challenge d measures are also inconsistent with
Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994 because:
"The allocation of the duty free quota exclusively to ACP countries bears no relation
to trading patterns in the world or EC market s. As can be seen in the charts annexed
as Exhibits ECU-2 and ECU-3, Ecuador is a preeminent exporter of bananas to the
world market. Further, Ecuador and sever al other countries that are excluded from
the zero duty quota, are substantial suppliers to the EC, while ACP countries, many of
whom are minor suppliers at best, are allowed to ship duty free under the tariff
quota."511
(ii) The European Communities' arguments
7.209 The European Communities has raised a prelimin ary objection in the context of Article XIII
of the GATT 1994. As mentioned earlier 512, the European Communities has argued that Ecuador's
complaint against the Cotonou preference under Article XIII should be rejected because "Ecuador's
claims are in reality a challenge on the measures suggested by the [first compliance] Panel [requested
by Ecuador], rather than on the measures actually taken by the European Communities." 513

504 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 28.
505 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 7.69; Appellate Body Report at para. 160.
506 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 29.
507 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 7.68.
508 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 30.
509 Ibid., para. 31.
510 Ibid.
511 Ibid., para. 32.
512 See para. 7.14 above.
513 European Communities' first written submission, para. 84.

According to the European Comm unities, such suggestion could onl y be challenged through recourse
to appellate review, but not through a compliance panel.
514
7.210 In addition to that preliminary objection to Ecuador's claims under Article XIII, the
European Communities explicitly requests the Panel to reject Ecuador's claims in regard to both
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII. In particul ar, the European Communities argues that Article XIII
is not applicable to the measure challenged by Ecuador because that measure would fall within the
scope of Article I of the GATT 1994 given the "differe nt purpose and different field of application [of
those two provisions of the GATT 1994]."515 In particular, according to the European Communities:
"Ecuador's exports are subject to a simple and ordinary tariff. And it is clear that
GATT Article XIII does not apply to tariffs. Textually, this is made clear from the
title of GATT Article XIII. Contextually, it is made clear by the fact that if GATT
Article XIII was to also cover ordinary ta riffs, then there would be no more meaning
or reason of existence for GATT Article I, paragraph 1."516
7.211 According to the European Communities' view, the current EC banana import regime is not
inconsistent with Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 because:
"[T]he Members on whose imports the quantitative restriction is imposed are the ACP
countries. The MFN countries, including Ecuador, are the 'all third countries', whose
position should be taken as a basis in or der to determine whether the ACP countries
are treated 'worse' than them. However, the MFN countries are not subject to any
tariff quota, or other quantitative restriction. As a consequence, there is nothing on
which the comparison can be based."
517
7.212 The European Communities adds that:
"GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 does not oblige the European Communities to
extend to all Members (including Ecuador and the other MFN suppliers) the tariff
preference granted to the ACP countries. GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 simply
obliges the European Communities not to impose a quantitative restriction on
Ecuador, unless a similar quantitative rest riction was imposed on all other WTO
Members."518
7.213 According to the European Communities:
"[E]ven assuming arguendo that there is a quantitative restriction imposed on the
ACP countries, Ecuador cannot successfully challenge it, because this quantitative
restriction imposed on the ACP countries does not result in any nullification or
impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador. Quite to the contrary, this 'cap' to the
preference afforded to the ACP countries pr otects the interests of Ecuador and the
other MFN countries, because it limits the quantities of ACP bananas that can be
imported into the European Communities at zero duty."519
7.214 Further, referring to the report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III , the
European Communities argues that:

514 See European Communities' second written submission, paras. 19-35.
515 European Communities' first written submission, para. 94.
516 Ibid., para. 104.
517 Ibid., para. 100.
518 Ibid., para. 103.
519 Ibid., para. 101.

"GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 covers only situations where a Member applies
tariff quotas with different terms to different groups of countries in a market where all
import are made under tariff quotas. Conse quently, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1
does not apply to a tariff only import regime where there are no different tariff quotas
allocated to different groups of countries, such as the current import regime of the
European Communities."
520
7.215 As regards Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, the European Communities contends that "[f]or
the same reasons, the current import regime of the European Communities does not violate GATT
Article XIII, paragraph 2."521 In the European Communities' view,
"The ... limited ... scope of ... Article [XIII] is seen in the way that the four sub-
paragraphs of GATT Article XIII, paragra ph 2 are entirely focused on the scope and
internal distribution of the quota. They disregard any trade that falls outside the quota
(or tariff quota)".
522
7.216 Also, according to the European Communities, "[t]he text ' In applying import restrictions '
shows that paragraph 2 (like paragr aph 1) is solely concerned with quantitative restrictions, and does
not regulate the relationship between quantitative r estrictions and other measures, notably simple
tariffs, that a Member may be applying."523
(b) Order of analysis
7.217 The Panel will assess first the European Co mmunities' preliminary objection concerning
Article 21.5 of the DSU. If that preliminary objec tion was rejected, the Panel would turn to Ecuador's
claim under Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994.
7.218 In that latter context, the Panel intends to start its analysis with addressing the
European Communities' systemic arguments concerning the interrelati on of Articles I and XIII of the
GATT 1994 and the latter's applicability to the European Communities' banana import regime, as well
as Ecuador's response to those arguments. If the European Communities' arguments in that context
were rejected, the Panel would address Ecuador's s ubstantive claim under both paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article XIII. In the alternative, there would be no need to assess Ecuador's substantive claim under
Article XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT 1994.
2. The European Communities' preliminary objection
(a) Parties' main arguments
(i) The European Communities' arguments
7.219 In its preliminary objection, the European Communities argues that it "complied with the
findings of the [first compliance] Panel [requested by Ecuador] by implementing one of the
suggestions put forward by [that panel]" 524, namely that "the European Communities could choose to
implement a tariff-only system for bananas, with a tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by a suitable
waiver."525

520 European Communities' first written submission, para. 105.
521 Ibid., para. 106.
522 Ibid., para. 108.
523 Ibid., para. 107.
524 Ibid., para. 23.
525 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.157.

7.220 On the one hand, according to the European Communities, "on January 1, 2006, the
European Communities introduced a tariff only system and the Cotonou Preference took the form of a
tariff quota for certain volumes of bananas coming from Cotonou beneficiary developing countries, as
suggested by the Panel in paragraph 6.157 of its Report."
526 On the other hand, "prior to the
introduction of this new import regime, the Europe an Communities received a suitable waiver from
the application of GATT Article I, again as suggest ed by the Panel in the same paragraph of its
Report."527
7.221 According to the European Communities:
"[I]t is clear that, in the second suggestion of the Panel, 'suitable waiver' meant a
waiver from the application of GATT Article I. The reason for this is that the
suggested import regime would be a tariff- only system with a preferential treatment
granted to the ACP countries. This interp retation is supported by the language used
by the Panel in its third suggestion. The third suggestion provided for the
continuation of an all-tariff-quota import re gime, with different quotas allocated to
different groups of countries. The Panel expressly mentioned that a waiver from the
application of GATT Article XIII would be needed in the context of such an all-tariff-
quota system.
528"529
7.222 Further, the European Communities contends that:
"[U]nder Article 21.5 of the DSU a party can bring claims on the 'consistency with a
covered agreement of a measure taken to comply' with the findings of the panel.
Therefore, the European Communities submits that claims challenging the
consistency with the covered agreements of the measures suggested by the panel
cannot be brought before an Article 21.5 Panel. If Ecuador disagreed with the Panel's
suggestions, it should have filed an appeal with the Appellate Body, pursuant to the
terms of Article 17 of the DSU. Given that Ecuador did not file such an appeal,
Ecuador is now bound by res judicata , pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 1 and
Article 17, paragraph 14 of the DSU."
530
(ii) Ecuador's response
7.223 Ecuador argues that it is "obviously [a] fal se assertion that Ecuador has not challenged
measures actually taken by the EC."531 Further, Ecuador contends that "[t]he Panel never suggested or
even implied that the EC would not require a wa iver of Article XIII to implement a tariff quota
reserved for ACP countries"532:
"The EC has no basis for assuming that th e Panel in any sense was suggesting that a
suitable waiver would be limited to Article I. To the contrary, it is apparent in the
Panel's alternative suggestion that it considers that a tariff quota confined to bananas
of ACP origin would require an Article XIII waiver. What the EC purports to view as
a Panel determination that a waiver of Article XIII for duty free treatment of
developing countries is required only if ther e is more than one tariff quota in the
system can only be reasonably interpreted as in fact a further explanation of the need

526 European Communities' first written submission, para. 23.
527 Ibid.
528 (footnote original) See the Panel report, at paragraph 6.158.
529 European Communities' first written submission, para. 81.
530 Ibid., para. 85.
531 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 43.
532 Ibid., para. 44.

for a waiver. It borders on insulting to th e Panel to argue otherwise, and it would be
inconsistent with the Panel's own ruli ngs that confirmed the application of
Article XIII to all tariff quotas."533
7.224 Ecuador adds that:
"[N]one of the provisions of the DSU woul d have precluded this challenge of the
conformity of the EC's measures taken to co mply with the Panel Report, even if the
particular measures had been suggested by the Panel. [Also,] it is not necessary to
challenge before the Appellate Body the s uggestions of a panel in order to preserve
the right to make a challenge under Article 21.5."
534
(b) Panel's analysis
(i) Relevance of Article 21.5 of the DSU in this dispute
7.225 Article 21.5 of the DSU provides in relevant part that:
"Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel."
7.226 Further, the measure contested by Ecuador in this compliance dispute has been identified in
Ecuador's request for the establishment of a panel in the following terms:
"The challenged EC measures are c ontained in EC Council Regulation
No. 1964/2005 ('Regulation 1964')
535 and its associated implementing regulations,
including the EC's autonomous tariff provisions. These measures include:
– A tariff-rate quota, with a current vol ume of 775,000 mt, exclusively reserved
for bananas of ACP origin. ACP bananas within the quota enter duty-free,
quantities above the TRQ paying a current duty of 176 €/mt. The 775,000 mt
ACP tariff quota volume is subject to import licenses and allocation.
Ecuador does not get any share of this tariff rate quota or related measures,
let alone receive the share required under Article XIII.
– An EC tariff, currently at 176 €/mt to EC imports of bananas, that applies to
all bananas of Ecuadorian origin an d to all other bananas except those
benefiting from access to the zero-duty TRQ."
536
7.227 As also indicated in Ecuador's request for the est ablishment of a panel, Ecuador contends that
"[t]hese measures are not justified under the Unde rstandings or any agreed settlement, and are not

533 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 40.
534 Ibid., para. 44.
535 ( footnote original ) Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of
29 November 2005 on the tariff rate for bananas, OJL 316/1, 2 December 2005.
536 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ecuador, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II),
26 February 2007, WT/DS27/80, p. 4.

covered by any waiver of EC obligations"
537; moreover, "Ecuador considers that the EC measures are
inconsistent with [certain] obligations of the WTO Agreements."538
7.228 Ecuador is, therefore, asking this Panel to asses s the conformity with the covered agreements
of the European Communiti es' current banana import regime, i.e., of the measure the
European Communities alleges it has taken in line w ith the suggestions of the first compliance panel
requested by Ecuador. Ecuador is not asking this compliance Panel to assess the conformity with the
covered agreements of the suggestions of the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador.
7.229 Since the European Communities argues in this dispute that its current banana import regime
corresponds to the second suggestion of the fi rst compliance panel requested by Ecuador 539, it would
seem difficult for the European Communities to c ontest that that regime should be considered
properly as a "measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings [of the DSB]" for the
purposes of Article 21.5 of the DSU. Indeed, the European Communities states that "[i]n suggesting a
particular course of action, the Panel is indi cating that such action is lawful and that the
implementation of this suggestion will lead to the defending party's compliance with the obligations
found to have been infringed."540 (emphasis added)
7.230 Under Article 21.5 of the DSU, compliance panels are required to assess "measures taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the DSB. In Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 –
Brazil), the Appellate Body held that:
"Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the
WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those 'measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings' of the DSB. In our view, the phrase 'measures
taken to comply' refers to measures which have been, or which should be, adopted by a
Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB."541
7.231 The Panel recalls that in its request for the establishment of the first compliance panel,
Ecuador explicitly asked that panel to issue s uggestions pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU. 542 In its
request Ecuador argued that:
"It considers that it is necessary to invoke Article 19 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes to ensure that the Panel, in
addition to issuing its rulings, suggests how the European Communities might
implement its recommendations."543 (emphasis added)
7.232 In turn, the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador noted that "Ecuador requests this
Panel to make specific suggestions to the European Communities on how it might implement our
findings in this proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU." (emphasis added)

537 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ecuador, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II),
26 February 2007, WT/DS27/80, p. 4.
538 Ibid.
539 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 80.
540 European Communities' second written submission, para. 23.
541 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) , para. 36. See also Appellate
Body Report on Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), paras. 78-79.
542 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.154.
543 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) ,
18 December 1998, WT/DS27/41, p. 3.

7.233 The first compliance panel requested by Ecuado r in this dispute issued its suggestions
pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, which provides that:
"Where a panel or the Appellate Body concl udes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned 544 bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. 545 In addition to its recommendations,
the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations." (emphasis added)
7.234 Through its last three words, Article 19.1 estab lishes a close link between suggestions and the
recommendations of panels and the Appellate Body. In issuing its suggestions pursuant to that
Article 19.1, the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador in EC - Bananas III also emphasised
that link:
"Panels have not often made suggestions pursuant to Article 19.1. While Members
remain free to choose how they implement DSB recommendations and rulings ,
it seems appropriate, after one implementation attempt has proven to be at least
partly unsuccessful, that an Article 21.5 panel make suggestions with a view toward
promptly bringing the dispute to an end."546 (emphasis added)
7.235 The reports of the panel and the Appellate Body as well as the report of the first compliance
panel requested by Ecuador in the EC – Bananas III dispute were adopted by the DSB.547 Thus, to the
extent that the suggestions of the first complia nce panel requested by Ecuador are linked to the
recommendations and rulings of those panels and the Appellate Body, they are also closely linked to
the relevant DSB recommendations and rulings.
7.236 In US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5) the Appellate Body found that the term "measures
taken to comply" in Article 21.5 of the DSU refers to measures "taken in the direction of, or for the
purpose of achieving, compliance"548:
"In examining the meaning of 'measures taken to comply' in Article 21.5, we begin
with the word 'taken'. There is a wide range of dictionary meanings of the word
'taken', which is the past participle of the verb 'take'. The meanings of 'take' include,
for example, '[b]ring into a specified positi on or relation'; '[s]elect or use for a
particular purpose.' 549 The preposition 'to' is '[u]sed in verbs ... in the sense of
'motion, direction, or addition to', or as the mark of the infinitive.' 550 ... [T]he word
'comply' is defined as 'accommodate oneself to (a person, circumstances, customs,
etc.) ... Act in accordance with or with a request, command, etc.'
551 The French and,

544 ( footnote original ) The "Member concerned" is the party to the dispute to which the panel or
Appellate Body recommendations are directed.
545 ( footnote original ) With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of
GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement, see Article 26.
546 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador – Article 21.5), para. 6.154.
547 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body Held in the Centre William Rappard on
25 September 1997, WT/DSB/M/37 of 4 November 1997, p. 27; and Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute
Settlement Body Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 May 1999, WT/DSB/M/61 of 30 June 1999, p. 6.
548 Appellate Body Report on US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 66.
549 (footnote original) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds)
(Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 3170.
550 (footnote original) Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 3284.
551 (footnote original) United States' appellant's submission, para. 30 (quoting The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, supra, footnote 37, p. 461 (original italics) (Exhibit US-15 submitted by the United States to
the Panel)).

in particular, Spanish versions of this phrase ('mesures prises pour se conformer' and
'medidas destinadas a cumplir', respectively) also imply that relevant measures are
associated with the objective of complying. On its face, therefore, the phrase
'measures taken to comply' seems to refer to measures taken in the direction of, or for
the purpose of achieving, compliance."
552
7.237 The first compliance panel requested by Ecuador ma de its suggestions "for [the EC to] bring
... its banana import regime into conformity with WTO rules."553 Further, as noted earlier, Ecuador is
asking this Panel to assess the conformity with the covered agreements of the European Communities'
current banana import regime, which the European Communities alleges to have taken to implement a
suggestion made, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, by the first compliance panel requested by
Ecuador.
7.238 In the light of the above, to the extent th at the European Communities argues that it has
implemented such a suggestion, this Panel is not prevented from conducting, under Article 21.5 of the
DSU, the assessment requested by Ecuador in this dispute.
(ii) The European Communities' arguments on res iudicata
7.239 As to whether this Panel would be neverthe less prevented from carrying out such assessment
under Article 21.5 because the European Communiti es would be implementing a suggestion by the
first compliance panel requested by Ecuador, the Panel notes that the European Communities invokes
the concept of " res judicata, pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 1 and Article 17, paragraph 14 of the
DSU."554
7.240 Article 19.1 of the DSU provides that:
"Where a panel or the Appellate Body concl udes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned 9 bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. 10 In addition to its recommendations,
the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations.
Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members. 8
This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their
views on an Appellate Body report.
This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their
views on a panel report.
European Communities in this context, namely Articles 16.4, 17.14, 19.1 and 21.1 of the DSU, can be
read as establishing an automatic link between the al leged binding nature of a suggestion pursuant to
Article 19.1 of the DSU and a measure purportedly taken by a Member to implement such suggestion.
While suggestions are issued by panels or the A ppellate Body under Article 19.1, any measure to
implement such suggestion is taken by a Member, a nd the conformity with the covered agreements of
such measures will depend on the actual implementation of the suggestion by the Member in question.
7.248 The Panel notes that Article 19.1 states that suggestions encompass "ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations." (emphasis added) The first compliance
panel requested by Ecuador issu ed three alternative suggestions
559, introducing those with the
following words:
"In light of our findings and conclusions w ith respect to Articles I and XIII of GATT
..., in our view, the European Communities has at least the following options for
bringing its banana import regime into conformity with WTO rules." 560
(emphasis added)
7.249 Also, the same compliance panel explicitly rec ognized that "Members remain free to choose
how they implement DSB recommendations and rulings."561
7.250 In the light of the language in Article 19.1, the Panel underlines that Members' freedom to
choose how they implement DSB recommendations and rulings is in no way diminished as a result of
there being specific "suggestions" in a particular dis pute. The Panel agrees in this respect with the
panel on US - Steel Plate, which stated that "while a panel may suggest ways of implementing its
recommendation, the choice of means of implementati on is decided, in the first instance, by the
Member concerned".
562 The Panel notes that the European Communities does not contest this;
indeed, the European Communities:
"[A]cknowledges that a panel's suggestions as to how the defending party may put
itself in compliance with the WTO rules are not binding for the defending party :
the defending party enjoys the freedom to choose any of the various options that may
exist to bring about compliance.563"564 (emphasis added)
7.251 None of the DSU provisions invoked by the European Communities in this context, namely
Articles 16.4, 17.14, 19.1 and 21.1, indicates that the fact that a Member adopts a measure to
implement a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1 would prevent another Member from challenging,
pursuant to Article 21.5, the compliance of such meas ure with the covered agreements. Even if there

559 See Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador – Article 21.5), paras. 6.156-6.158.
560 Ibid., para. 6.155.
561 Ibid., para. 6.154.
562 Panel Report on US – Steel Plate, para. 8.8.
563 (footnote original) See, for example, the relevant refere nce in the "Handbook on the WTO Dispute
Settlement System, A WTO Secretariat Publication prepared for publication by the Legal Affairs Division and
the Appellate Body", published in 2004, on page 58.
564 European Communities' second written submission, para. 23.

was a presumption of the legality of measures taken to implement a suggestion pursuant to
Article 19.1, there is nothing in the DSU suggesting that the alleged legality of such measures could
not be reviewed by a compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5.
7.252 Any alternative reading of the DSU would make Article 21.5 of the DSU and Members' rights
under that provision irrelevant. The Panel recalls in this context that Article 21.5 applies in all
situations "where there is disagreement as to the ... consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings." Further, Article 21.5 provides that
"such dispute shall be decided through rec ourse to these dispute settlement procedures , including
wherever possible resort to the original panel." (emphasis added)
7.253 As the words "where" and "shall" indicate, Ar ticle 21.5 creates an unconditional requirement
that any dispute resulting from "disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" can be decided
through WTO dispute settlement, and in particular in compliance proceedings pursuant to
Article 21.5.
7.254 Further, even under the European Communities' lo gic, for this preliminary objection to be
successful, the EC measure in question would need to implement a suggestion pursuant to
Article 19.1. The European Communities argues that it implemented the second suggestion of the
first compliance panel requested by Ecuador
565, namely that "the European Communities could
choose to implement a tariff-only system for bananas, with a tariff quota for ACP bananas covered by
a suitable waiver."566
7.255 A core element of this argument is that th e current EC measure would be tariff only.
The Panel notes that Ecuador contests whether the current EC regime indeed shows that
characteristic:
"The EC contends accurately that it was supposed to provide a tariff only system and
therefore eliminate tariff quotas, but fails to mention that this was to be done in
conjunction with the elimination of all tariff quotas and the establishment of a bound
tariff in compliance with the requirements of the waiver and in conformity with
Article XXVIII."567
Ecuador disagrees that the term "suitable waiver" in the above suggestion is limited to a waiver under
Article I.568
7.256 In the light of the fact that Ecuador disagrees that the current EC banana import regime
implements the suggestion of the first complian ce panel requested by Ecuador, it would seem an
unwarranted diminution of Ecuador's rights under the covered agreements, in particular Article 21.5
of the DSU, to now prevent Ecuador from challenging the conformity of that measure with the
covered agreements.
7.257 Given the unconditional language of Article 21.5 of the DSU, mere allegation by a Member
that its measure taken to comply exists or is cons istent with the covered agreements clearly cannot be
sufficient to establish eo ipso the existence of such measure taken to comply or its conformity with the
covered agreements, especially when another Member , in this case the complainant, disagrees with
that.

565 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 80.
566 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.157.
567 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 68.
568 See Ibid., para. 40.

7.258 As a matter of principle, the existence of a measure taken to comply or the compliance of a
measure with the covered agreements is not a matter of self-declaration by the Member taking the
measure in question. If that were the case, WTO dispute settlement, the role of adjudicators and the
rights of Members under the covered agreements, in pa rticular the DSU, would in such a situation be
reduced to redundancy.
7.259 As to the relevance of the absence of an app eal by Ecuador, the Panel reads the DSU and in
particular Article 21.5 as not excluding a compliance dispute subsequent to a panel report adopted by
the DSB merely because the panel report in ques tion included suggestions pursuant to Article 19.1
and the respondent is now alleging that it has implemented one of those suggestions.
7.260 There is nothing in the DSU preventing a compliance dispute following a non-appealed panel
report adopted by the DSB. Indeed, compliance procedures have been conducted under Article 21.5
of the DSU on several occasions, even though in the original proceedings the DSB adopted the panel's
report without any appeal by the complainant.
569
7.261 Further, the absence of an appeal by the comp lainant against a panel report with suggestions
adopted by the DSB cannot mean eo ipso acceptance by the complainant of the measures that the
respondent takes in order to comply. A measure taken by the respondent allegedly to implement a
suggestion made under Article 19.1 is necessarily subsequent to the adoption by the DSB of the report
of the panel in question and, if there has been an appeal, of the report of the Appellate Body,
including of the suggestions set out therein. A ccordingly, when the DSB adopts the suggestions, the
complainant cannot assess – but at best may expect – the adoption of such implementing measures by
the respondent and their consistency with the covered agreements.
7.262 Once the respondent has taken the measure a llegedly to implement a suggestion under
Article 19.1, to the extent that the complainant contests the existence of such measures or their
conformity with the covered agreements, existence and conformity with the covered agreements may
be verified, if requested by the complainant, by a compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5.
(iii) Conclusion
7.263 As noted earlier, to the extent that the Eur opean Communities argues that it has implemented
a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, this Panel is not prevented from conducting, under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the assessment requested by Ecuador in this dispute. Also, the Panel finds
that the arguments of the European Communities on res iudicata are not convincing as objections to
the compliance proceeding requested by Ecuador under Article 21.5 against the measure that the
European Communities alleges it has taken to impl ement a suggestion of the first compliance panel
requested by Ecuador.
7.264 In the light of the foregoing, the Panel reject s the European Communities' first preliminary
objection in the context of Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
7.265 The Panel notes that, in addressing the European Communities' first preliminary objection,
the Panel does not need to assess whether the Euro pean Communities has effectively implemented
any of the suggestions of the first compliance pane l requested by Ecuador. Therefore, the Panel does
not need to address, in the context of the European Communities' first preliminary objection, whether
the EC has fulfilled the two parts of the second sugg estion of that compliance panel, in particular

569 See Panel Report on US – DRAMS (Article 21.5 – Korea); Panel Report on Australia – Automotive
Leather II (Article 21.5 – US); Panel and Appellate Body Reports on Mexico – Corn Syrup (US – Article 21.5);
and Panel and Appellate Body Reports on US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada).

whether the term "suitable waiver" refers to a waiv er from only Article I or also from Article XIII of
the GATT 1994.
3. Ecuador's claims under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994
7.266 As mentioned earlier, in the context of Ecuador's claims under Article XIII of the
GATT 1994, the Panel intends to start its analys is with addressing the European Communities'
systemic arguments concerning the interrelation of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 and the
latter's applicability to the EC banana import regime, as well as Ecuador's response to those
arguments. If the European Communities' arguments in that context were rejected, the Panel would
address Ecuador's substantive claim under both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII. In the alternative,
there would be no need to assess Ecuador's subs tantive claim under Article XIII:1 and 2 of the
GATT 1994.
(a) The interrelation of Articles I and XIII of th e GATT 1994 and the latter's applicability to the
EC banana import regime
(i) Parties' main arguments
The European Communities' arguments
7.267 In this context, the European Communities h as argued that Article XIII of the GATT 1994 is
not applicable to the measure challenged by Ecuador because that measure would fall within the scope
of Article I of the GATT 1994 because of the "differe nt purpose and different field of application [of
those two provisions of the GATT 1994]."570
7.268 The European Communities does not contest that in principle, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
might apply to the European Communities' current banana import regime. Also, the
European Communities does not call into question that Article XIII of the GATT 1994 is in principle
applicable to tariff quotas. Rather, the European Communities argues that "[t]he crucial issue facing
the Panel is the way in which paragraphs 1 and 2 of GATT Article XIII apply to tariff quotas, in
accordance with paragraph 5"571 (emphasis added):
"'[O]rdinary meaning' of [Article XIII:5] ... is of limited direct help in the present
context. The statement in paragraph 5 that the provisions of GATT Article XIII
('apply to any tariff quota') does not give any guidance as to how they apply, which is
the issue facing the Panel."572
7.269 The European Communities does not contest that its current banana import regime includes a
tariff quota. Indeed, Article 1.2 of Council Re gulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005
provides that:
"Each year from 1 January, starting from 1 January 2006, an autonomous tariff quota
of 775000 tonnes net weight subject to a zero-duty rate shall be opened for imports of
bananas (CN code 08030019) originating in ACP countries."573 (emphasis added)

570 European Communities' first written submission, para. 94.
571 European Communities' second written submission, para. 49.
572 Ibid., para. 53.
573 Council Regulation (EC) No 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 on the tariff rates for bananas,
OJ L/316 , 2 February 2005, pp. 1-2, Article 1.2.

Further, as mentioned earlier, the European Communities has argued that its current banana import
regime implements the second sugges tion of the first compliance panel
574, namely that
"the European Communities could choose to implem ent a tariff-only system for bananas, with a tariff
quota for ACP bananas covered by a suitable waiver."575 (emphasis added)
7.270 While noting that "in creating a zero-rate tariff quota for those bananas the
European Communities conferred to the ACP countries a benefit, since those imports would otherwise
have been subject to duty"576, the European Communities argues that:
"Ecuador's (and the other MFN countries') exports are not subject to any tariff-quota,
quota or other quantitative restriction of an y type or form. Ecuador's exports are
subject to a simple and ordinary tariff. And it is clear that GATT Article XIII does
not apply to tariffs. Textually, this is made clear from the title of GATT Article XIII.
Contextually, it is made clear by the fact th at if GATT Article XIII was to also cover
ordinary tariffs, then there would be no more meaning or reason of existence for
GATT Article I, paragraph 1."577
7.271 In particular, the European Communities argues that "GATT Article XIII is concerned with
quantitative measures and, with the sole exception of the reference in paragraph 5 to tariff quotas, has
nothing to say about tariffs"578:
"[T]he texts of the provisions of Article I, paragraph 1 and Article XIII, paragraph 1
of the GATT have a very important differen ce. GATT Article I, paragraph 1 obliges
each Member to extend to all Members the ex act same advantage that it grants to one
single Member. In contrast, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 obliges each Member
not to impose a restriction on a single Member, unless it imposes the same restriction
on all other Members. In other words, GATT Article I obliges Member A to treat
Member B at least as 'well' as it treats any other Member. In contrast,
GATT Article XIII obliges Member A not to treat Member B 'worse' than the way it
treats all other Members.
This important textual diffe rence is underlined by the titles of the two Articles.
The title of GATT Article I is 'General Most Favoured Nation Treatment'.
In contrast, the title of GATT Article XIII is 'Non-discriminatory Administration of
Quantitative Restrictions'. These different titles confirm that the intention of the
drafters of the GATT was to make clear that each Article has the different purpose
and different field of application identif ied in the preceding paragraph of this
submission."
579
7.272 Further, while the European Communities con cedes that both Articles I and XIII of the
GATT 1994 deal with non-discrimination, th e European Communities argues that "GATT
Article XIII ... is intended to deal with discrimina tion in quantitative limitati ons and is not aimed at
tariff discrimination."580 In particular, according to the European Communities:
"The text of GATT Article XIII repeatedly refers to quantitative issues. The heading
speaks of 'Non-discriminatory administration of Quantitative Restrictions'.

574 See European Communities' first written submission, para. 80.
575 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.157.
576 European Communities' second written submission, para. 51.
577 European Communities' first written submission, para. 104.
578 European Communities' second written submission, para. 50.
579 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 93-94.
580 European Communities' second written submission, para. 62.

Paragraph 1 refers exclusively to 'prohi bitions and restrictions'. Paragraph 2
addresses how 'import restrictions' are to be distributed, and talks about the 'shares'
which Members might obtain. It provides for the allocation of quotas, and for the use
of licences. Paragraph 3 has more to say about licences and quota allocation.
Quota allocation is also the subject of paragraph 4."
581
7.273 The European Communities adds that:
"Bearing in mind this total concentration on quantitative issues it hardly seems likely
that a single phrase in paragraph 5 was intende d to transform the Article into one that
could also be targeted at tariff discrimination. Nor is there anything in the wording of
this paragraph that would encourage such a c onclusion. It says that the 'provisions of
this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained' by a Member.
This text suggests that it is the tariff quot a itself, and not its relationship with other
import arrangements, at which the application of GATT Article XIII is directed."582
7.274 The European Communities also argues that:
"The 'tariff only' nature of the [European Communities'] new [banana] import regime
cannot be disputed. The fact that there is a limit on the quantity of ACP bananas that
can be imported free of duty does not change this fact. The GATT itself recognises
that tariff quotas are tariff measures and not ordinary quotas. This is seen from the
fact that GATT Article XIII, paragraph 5 expressly provides that the rules of GATT
Article XIII 'shall also apply' to tari ff quotas. If tariff quotas were quantitative
restrictions, then there would be no need fo r GATT Article XIII, paragraph 5 at all.
Moreover, the fact that tariff quotas are tariff measures and not quotas has also been
expressly recognised in the context of the bananas dispute: the Arbitrator confirmed
that 'tariff quota commitments constitute, in the WTO context, a variant of a tariff
concession rather than a non-tariff measure per se.'
583 This point is also confirmed in
the report of this Panel, where it is stated that the European Communities could adopt
a 'tariff only system with a tariff quota for ACP bananas'.584"585
7.275 Further, the European Communities contends that "the existence and operation of the
Cotonou Preference in the form of a limit on the qua ntities of ACP bananas that can be imported into
the European Communities free of duty does not cause any nullification or impairment of any benefit
accruing to Ecuador, in the meaning of GATT Article XXIII and Article 3.8 of the DSU"586:
"[W]hen the European Communities introduced its new, tariff only system on
January 1, 2006, it imposed a limit on the quantities of ACP bananas that could take
advantage of the Cotonou Preference. This was precisely aimed at protecting
Ecuador's and the other MFN countries' inte rests and ensuring that the total market
access that MFN suppliers enjoyed up to January 1, 2006 would be maintained,
as required by the Doha waiver. Therefore, the quantitative limit imposed on the

581 European Communities' second written submission, para. 62.
582 Ibid., para. 63.
583 (footnote original) See the First Arbitration Award, at para graph 60. The Arbitrator found that the
economic effect of the particular tariff quotas applied at that time by the European Communities was
comparable to a quota regime (non-tar iff measure), because virt ually all imports were being effected through
these quotas.
584 (footnote original) See the report of the Panel, at paragraph 6.157.
585 European Communities' first written submission, para. 24.
586 Ibid., para. 89.

Cotonou Preference protects the interests of MFN suppliers' including Ecuador and
does not harm them."
587
7.276 The European Communities also argues that:
"[T]his analysis of GATT Article XIII does not take away the utility of the reference
to tariff quotas in paragraph 5. Its provi sions can be applied straightforwardly to
those aspects of tariff quotas that involve qua ntitative restrictions. If tariff quotas are
assigned to a number of countries (such as under the arrangements that were
examined in EC – Bananas III), paragraph 1 will require that the restriction placed on
the tariff quota given to Member A is similar to that applied to the tariff quotas given
to other Members."
588
7.277 In response to Ecuador's references to earlier findings in the EC – Bananas III dispute, the
European Communities argues that those are not relevant in these proceedings:
"Ecuador's references to the Bananas III jurisprudence, in paragraph 42 of its second
written submission, are simply wrong. As already mentioned, the Appellate Body
analysed an import regime that was the e quivalent of a 'quota regime', because all
imports were made pursuant to tariff quotas. Moreover, each tariff quota was
administered in a different way. The Appellate Body concluded that a 'quota regime'
with these characteristics was not compatible with GATT Article XIII. However, the
system analysed by the Appellate Body in Bananas III in 1997 has nothing to do with
the current import regime of the European Communities. Therefore, the Appellate
Body's assessment of the 1997 regime does not have any relevance for this Panel's
assessment of the European Communities' current import regime."
589
7.278 The European Communities contends also that:
"The import regime analysed by the Article 21.5 Panel was a 'quota regime' (just like
the one analysed by the Appellate Body in 1997), which has nothing to do with the
current import regime of the European Co mmunities. Moreover, the measure found
by the Article 21.5 Panel to violate GATT Article XIII has nothing to do with the
current import regime of the European Communities, which is tariff only and where
imports from MFN countries are not subject to any quantitative restrictions.
Therefore, paragraph 6.29 of the Article 21.5 Panel report has no relevance for the
current Panel procedures."
590
7.279 The European Communities adds that in 2005, "the [second] Arbitrator had noted the
disagreement between the Europ ean Communities and Ecuador and had not concluded whether the
Cotonou Preference would need a waiver from GATT Article XIII.591"592
7.280 The European Communities argues also that the earlier findings in the EC –- Bananas III
dispute would support the European Communities' ar guments in regard to Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 in these proceedings:

587 European Communities' first written submission, para. 88.
588 European Communities' second written submission, para. 65
589 Ibid., para. 33.
590 Ibid., para. 34.
591 (footnote original) See the Second Arbitration Award, at paragraphs 34 and 36.
592 European Communities' first written submission, para. 82. See also European Communities' second
written submission, para. 32.

"[I]n EC-Bananas III ..., the Appellate Body found that the European Communities
was indeed involved in a 'discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions'
in violation of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1, because (i) all imports of bananas
were effected through the allocation of tariff quotas,
593 (ii) each group of suppliers
was allocated a tariff quota with different terms, (iii) some groups of countries were
allocated country specific tariff quotas, while some MFN countries were only
allocated the general 'Other' tariff quota. With these facts in mind, the
Appellate Body found that the restriction imposed on those countries through the
allocation of the 'Other' quota was not 'sim ilar' to the restriction imposed on the
products of the countries to which c ountry-specific quotas were allocated.
594
This finding of the Appellate Body show s that GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1
covers only situations where a Member app lies tariff quotas with different terms to
different groups of countries in a market where all import are made under tariff
quotas. Consequently, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 does not apply to a tariff only
import regime where there are no different tariff quotas allocated to different groups
of countries, such as the current import regime of the European Communities."595
Ecuador's arguments
7.281 As regards the EC arguments on the interrelation of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 and
the latter's applicability to the EC banana import regime, Ecuador argues that:
"The EC ... ignores the findings of Bananas III with regard to Article XIII.
The Appellate Body explicitly rejected th e EC argument, initially upheld by the
Panel, that the waiver of Article I imp licitly waived Article XIII to the extent
necessary to apply quantitative limits on imports from ACP countries at the
preferential duty rate.
596 The Appellate Body sustained the Panel finding that
'Articles I:1 and XIII apply to the relevant EC regulations, irrespective if there is one
or more "separate regimes" for the importation of bananas.' 597 W h e n t h e E C
attempted to preserve a tariff quota reserved exclusively for bananas of ACP origin,
the first Article 21.5 Panel in Bananas III again found that the EC measure was
inconsistent with the EC's obligations under Article XIII.
598"599
7.282 Ecuador adds that "[t]hough the EC system has eliminated the country allocations that
previously existed as between non-ACP countries, the discrimination remains as between ACP and
non-ACP bananas." 600 Ecuador argues that "[t]he Appe llate Body in Bananas III vigorously
condemned this discrimination"601, and quotes the following paragraphs:

593 ( footnote original) As already mentioned, only 0.3% of to tal imports were effected out-of-tariff-
quota.
594 ( footnote original ) See the Appellate Body report in EC – Regime for the importation, sale and
distribution of bananas, at paragraph 161.
595 European Communities' first written submission, para. 105.
596 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, , WT/DS27/AB/R 9 Sept. 1997, at paras. 183-188.
598 ( footnote original) Panel Report, – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 Apr. 1999, at
para. 6.29.
599 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 42.
600 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 31.
601 Ibid., para. 31.

"The issue here is not whether the Europ ean Communities is correct in stating that
two separate import regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or
more, separate EC import re gimes is of any relevance for the application of the
non-discrimination provisions of th e GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A
agreements. The essence of the non-discrimina tion obligations is that like products
should be treated equally, irrespective of thei r origin. As no participant disputes that
all bananas are like products, the non- discrimination provisions apply to all imports
of bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Member categorizes or subdivides
these imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different legal
basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member
could avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like
products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination
provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the
non-discrimination provisions of th e GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A
agreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by
that Member.
Non-discrimination obligations apply to a ll imports of like products, except when
these obligations are specifically waived or are otherwise not applicable as a result of
the operation of specific provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Article XXIV.
602
In the present case, the non-discrimination obligations of the GATT 1994,
specifically Articles I:1 and XIII
603, apply fully to all imported bananas irrespective of
their origin, except to the extent th at these obligations are waived by the
Lomé Waiver. We, therefore, uphold the findings of the Panel 604 that the non-
discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994, specifically, Articles I:1 and XIII, apply
to the relevant EC regulations, irrespective if there is one or more 'separate regimes'
for the importation of bananas."
605
7.283 As to the European Communities' argum ents on nullification and impairment,
Ecuador contends that:
"The violation of Article XIII is the denial of Ecuador's right to participate in the
zero-duty quota. It is obvious that, if allo wed to participate in that quota, Ecuador
could reasonably expect to benefit substa ntially, based on its efficiency and large
share of world trade in bananas. The issu e is not whether the quota results in less
harm than an unrestricted preference for ACP countries, but rather the harm that
Ecuador suffers by reason of being excluded from the favorable quota."606
7.284 Ecuador adds that:
"If [it] established a quota, for example in a safeguard action, and provided that only
products originating in the southern hemi sphere would be admitted under the quota,
the countries of Europe would swiftly complain that they were denied access contrary
to Article XIII. The fact that such c ountries were excluded from the quota would not
mean that those countries are not restricted, but rather that those countries were even

602 (footnote original) Panel on Newsprint, adopted 20 November 1984, BISD 31S/114.
603 (footnote original) We do not agree with the Panel's findings that Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994
and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement preclude the imposition of different import licensing systems on like
products when imported from different Members. See our Findings and Conclusions, paras. (l) and (m).
604 (footnote original) Panel Reports, paras. 7.82 and 7.167.
605 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, paras. 190-191.
606 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 45.

more restricted contrary to Article XIII than if they had been allotted some small
share of the quota, but rather would mean that they were completely restricted.
The same is true of a tariff quota. Ecuador and other MFN suppliers are completely
restricted by the EC's tariff quota, in th e sense that the MFN suppliers have no access
to the duty-free quota. A zero share of the preferential quota is a worse violation of
Article XIII than a disproportionately small share."607
(ii) Panel's analysis
Relevance of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to tariff quotas in agriculture
7.285 At the outset, the Panel notes that Article X III was originally drafted in the GATT 1947 to
address the administration of quantitative restrictio ns, in particular country quotas and any other
quotas. As a result of the Uruguay Round of Multila teral Trade Negotiations, quantitative restrictions
in agriculture were to be abolis hed and tariffied. As the panel on Turkey – Textiles stated in the
context of Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994:
"The prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions forms one of the cornerstones
of the GATT system. A basic principle of the GATT system is that tariffs are the
preferred and acceptable form of protection. Tariffs, to be reduced through reciprocal
concessions, ought to be applied in a non-di scriminatory manner independent of the
origin of the goods (the 'most-favoured-na tion' (MFN) clause). ... The prohibition
against quantitative restrictions is a re flection that tariffs are GATT's border
protection 'of choice'. Quantitative restrictions impose absolute limits on imports,
while tariffs do not. In contrast to MF N tariffs which permit the most efficient
competitor to supply imports, quantitative rest rictions usually have a trade distorting
effect, their allocation can be problema tic and their administration may not be
transparent.
Notwithstanding this broad prohibition against quantitative restrictions, GATT
contracting parties over many years failed to respect completely this obligation.
From early in the GATT, in sectors such as agriculture, quantitative restrictions were
maintained and even increased to the extent that the need to rest rict their use became
central to the Uruguay Round negotiations. … Certain contracting parties were even
of the view that quantitative restrictions had gradually been tolerated and accepted as
negotiable and that Article XI could not be and had never been considered to be, a
provision prohibiting such restrictions irrespective of the circumstances specific to each
case. This argument was, however, rejected in an adopted panel report EEC –
Imports from Hong Kong.
608
Participants in the Uruguay Round recognized the overall detrimental effects of non-
tariff border restrictions (whether applied to imports or exports) and the need to
favour more transparent price-based, i.e. ta riff-based, measures; to this end they
devised mechanisms to phase-out quantitati ve restrictions in ... agriculture ... .

607 Ecuador's second written submission, paras. 47-48.
608 ( footnote original) Panel Report on EEC – Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, adopted on 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129, ("EEC – Imports from Hong Kong").

This recognition is reflected in ... th e Agreement on Agriculture where quantitative
restrictions were eliminated
609 ..."610 (emphasis added)
7.286 Notwithstanding tariffication, the text of Article XIII of the GATT 1947, including its title,
"Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative R estrictions", has not been modified in the
Uruguay Round. The Panel reads that title as bei ng relevant to maintaining a close link with
Article XI of the GATT 1994, entitled "General Elimin ation of Quantitative Restrictions". The panel
on Turkey – Textiles stated that:
"The wording of Articles XI and XIII is clear. Article XI provides that as a general
rule (we note the wording of the title of Article XI: " General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions"), WTO Members shall not use quantitative restrictions
against imports or exports.

Article XIII provides that if and when quantitative restrictions are allowed by the
GATT/WTO, they must, in addition, be imposed on a non-discriminatory basis."
611
7.287 Following tariffication, Article XIII of the GA TT 1994 remains relevant for the agricultural
sector. As the Appellate Body stated earlier in this dispute, "[i]f the negotiators had intended to permit
Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 [by virtue of the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture], they would have said so explicitly." 612 In particular, Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 is relevant to one of the few remain ing permissible practices of with a quantitative
dimension in agriculture: tariff quotas. In this context, this Panel notes that the original panel
requested by Ecuador in this dispute found, similarly to the panel on Turkey – Textiles, that:
"The wording of Article XIII is clear. If quantitative restrictions are used (as an
exception to the general ban on their use in Article XI), they are to be used in the least
trade-distorting manner possible."613
7.288 The original panel requested by Ecuador in this dispute added that:
"In this case, we are concerned with tariff quotas, which are permitted under GATT
rules, and not quantitative restrictions per se. However, Article XIII:5 makes it clear,
and the parties agree, that Article XIII app lies to the administration of tariff quotas.
... In interpreting the terms of Article XIII, it is important to keep their context in
mind. Article XIII is basically a provision relating to the administration of
restrictions authorized as exceptions to one of the most basic GATT provisions –
the general ban on quotas and other non-tariff restrictions contained in Article XI."
614

609 (footnote original) Under the Agreement on Agriculture, notw ithstanding the fact that contracting
parties, for over 48 years, had been relying a great deal on import restrictions and other non-tariff measures, the
use of quantitative restrictions and ot her non-tariff measures was prohibited and Members had to proceed to a
"tariffication" exercise to transform quantitative restrictions into tariff based measures.
610 Panel Report on Turkey – Textiles, paras. 9.63-9.65.
611 Ibid., paras. 9.61-9.62.
612 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , para. 157. See also Panel Report on US – Line Pipe,
para. 7.40.
613 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.68.
614 Ibid., para. 7.68.

Analysis of Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994
7.289 The analysis of the Europ ean Communities' arguments concerning the interrelation of
Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994, and the appli cability of the latter to the EC banana import
regime necessarily involves Article XIII:5 of th e GATT 1994, which provides that "[t]he provisions
of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota institu ted or maintained by any contracting party [WTO
Member], and, in so far as app licable, the principles of this Ar ticle shall also extend to export
restrictions." As mentioned earlier, the European Communities does not contest that, in principle, by
virtue of Article XIII:5, Article XIII is applicable to tariff quotas.615
7.290 First, the Panel looks at the language of Artic le XIII:5 of the GATT 1994. The words "any"
(both before the terms "tariff quota" and "contracti ng party") and "shall" in Article XIII:5 underscore
the absolute and categorical nature of the application of "the provisions of ... Article [XIII]" to tariff
quotas. The Panel notes also that Article XIII:5 uses the term " any tariff quota instituted or
maintained by any [Member]" in the singular. The Pa nel reads this to mean that Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 is also applicable to one single tariff quota, and that this is so irrespective of whether that
single tariff quota is part of an import regime with mo re tariff quotas or is part of an import regime
that comprises only one tariff quota.
7.291 In an import regime containing a tariff quota w ith a preferential in-quota duty (whether or not
a zero duty) for some Members, and a higher out-of-quota MFN duty, the in- and out-of-quota duties
are two facets of the same preferential tariff quot a. As the first compliance panel requested by
Ecuador in this dispute stated, "a tariff quota is a quantitative limit on the availability of a specific
tariff rate".
616 Citing that statement, the panel on US – Line Pipe established that "[it] see[s] no reason
to disagree with the United States that a tariff quota involves the '[a]pplication of a higher tariff rate to
imported goods after a specified quantity of the ite m has entered the country at a lower prevailing
rate'."617 (footnote omitted)
7.292 Neither of the parties contest that the Eur opean Communities has, under its current banana
import regime introduced on 1 January 2006, a prefer ential zero-duty tariff quota of 775,000 mt per
annum reserved for ACP countries, combined with an MFN applied duty of 176 €/mt. The tariff
quota represents a quantitative limit on the pref erence to ACP countries because any ACP banana
imports to the European Communities exceeding that quantitative limit are subject to the out-of-quota
MFN duty.
7.293 Thus, the European Communities' current banana import regime is a tariff-quota-based import
regime, and the in- and out-of-quota duties are inherent parts of that regime. Accordingly, and in the
light of Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994, in princi ple, Article XIII of the GATT 1994 applies to all
aspects of a preferential tariff quota, including the out-of-quota duty.
Interrelation of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994
7.294 The European Communities argues that the a pplicability of Article I of the GATT 1994 to
tariff discrimination prevents the applicabilit y of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to the
European Communities' current banana import regime.618

615 See European Communities' second written submission, para. 49.
616 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , para. 6.20; and Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 5.9.
617 Panel Report on US – Line Pipe, para. 7.18.
618 See European Communities' second written submission, para. 62.

7.295 Article I of the GATT 1994 is entitled "Gen eral Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment".
Paragraph 1 of Article I stipulates that:
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules a nd formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matte rs referred to in pa ragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party [WTO Member] to any product origina ting in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditi onally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties [WTO Members]."
7.296 The Panel notes that Members' measures must comply with all relevant provisions of the
covered agreements. In regard to the applicabilit y of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 in the specific
context of agriculture, as mentioned above, the A ppellate Body found earlier in this dispute that
"[i]f the negotiators had intended to permit Member s to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 [by virtue of the provisions of the Agre ement on Agriculture], they would have said so
explicitly."
619
7.297 Also, as the European Communities argues, Article I of the GATT 1994 covers tariff
discrimination.620 As a result, Article I does not a ddress the quantitative element of the
European Communities' current ba nana import regime, which is c overed by Article XIII of the
GATT 1994. As elaborated further below 621, the European Communities' current banana import
regime contains an important quantitative element, a nd even if that element is applicable directly to
the ACP countries, it results in a restriction for Ec uador within the meaning of Article XIII:1 of the
GATT 1994.
7.298 As regards a partial overlap between tw o provisions in the covered agreements,
Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994 and Article 5. 2 of the Safeguards Agreement, the panel on
US - Line Pipe stated that:
"As noted by the panel in Turkey – Textiles , 'the principle of effective interpretation
or 'l'effet utile' or in Latin ut res magis valeat quam pereat reflects the general rule of
interpretation which requires that a treaty be interpreted to give meaning and effect to
all the terms of the treaty. For instance one provision should not be given an
interpretation that will result in nullifying th e effect of another provision of the same
treaty.'
622 An interpretation of Article XIII that applies that provision in the context
of safeguard measures does not, in our vi ew, nullify any of the provisions of the
Safeguards Agreement. All of the provis ions of the Safeguards Agreement remain
fully applicable. Although there may be some duplication between Article XIII:2(d)
and Article 5.2 of the Safeguards Agreem ent, duplication is not the same as
nullification."623

619 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 157. See also Panel Report on US – Line Pipe,
para. 7.40.
620 See European Communities' second written submission, para. 64.
621 See paras. 7.333 to 7.337 below.
622 (footnote original) Turkey – Textiles at footnote 327.
623 Panel Report on US – Line Pipe, para. 7.45.

7.299 Applying the same approach to the interrela tion of Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994,
this Panel notes that, even if there was some ove rlap between those two Articles, giving effect to
Article XIII would not nullify the effect of Article I.
7.300 The Panel also notes that in EC – Bananas III the European Communities argued, in regard
to the Lomé Waiver, that:
"[W]here aspects of a measure have been found to be covered by the waiver for
purposes of Article I, they should not be found to violate another GATT provision
imposing MFN-like obligations similar to those that have been waived..."
624
7.301 The original panel requested by Ecuador in EC – Bananas III found, – a finding later reversed
by the Appellate Body625 – that the Lomé Waiver from Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 would extend to
Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994.626 In this context, that panel also looked into the "close relationship
between Articles I and XIII:1".627
7.302 The Appellate Body explicitly rejected the orig inal panel's conclusion that the Lomé Waiver
from Article I:1 would automatically ex tend to Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. 628 In that context,
the Appellate Body noted that "[t]he Panel based its conclusion on the need to give 'real effect'629 to the
Lomé Waiver and on th e 'close relationship' 630 between Articles I:1 and XIII:1" 631; however, the
Appellate Body stated that, "although Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 are both non-discrimination
provisions, their relationship is not such that a waiver from the obligations under Article I implies a
waiver from the obligations under Article XIII."632 (emphasis added)
7.303 The Appellate Body did not elaborate further on the relationship between Articles I and XIII of
the GATT 1994. Nevertheless, the rejection by the Appellate Body of the panel's finding on the scope
of the Lomé Waiver indicates that Articles I a nd XIII of the GATT 1994 do not have the same scope,
and that an inconsistency with Article XIII is possible irrespective of an inconsistency with Article I.
7.304 Finally, the Panel notes that on two earlier occasions in the EC – Bananas III dispute the
European Communities made an objection to the ap plicability of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to
the then 857,700 mt duty-free tariff quota for ACP bananas 633 similar to the objection the
European Communities has made in these proceedings regarding the 775,000 mt duty-free tariff quota
for ACP bananas. Both the first compliance panel requested by Ecuador and the arbitrator in the

624 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.104.
625 See Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 188.
626 See Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.110.
627 The original panel on EC- Bananas III stated that "both [Articles I and XIII:1] prohibit
discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatme nt in respect of 'rules and formalities in connection
with importation', a phrase that has been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can
appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff qu ota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in
connection with importation. Indeed, they are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be imposed.
To describe the relationship somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring non-
discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation.
Article XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of quantitative
restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with that of Article I."
(footnote omitted) Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.107.
628 See Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 188.
630 (footnote original) Ibid., para. 7.107.
631 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 182.
632 Ibid., para. 183.
633 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , paras. 4.26-4.27, 6.19-6.20; and
Decision by the Arbitrators on EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 5.8-5.9.

proceedings requested by the European Communiti es pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU rejected
that objection:
"Article XIII:5 provides that the provisions of Article XIII apply to 'tariff quotas'.
The European Communities es sentially argues that the amount of 857,700 tonnes for
traditional imports from ACP States constitutes an upper limit on a tariff preference
and is not a tariff quota subject to Article X III. However, by definition, a tariff quota
is a quantitative limit on the availability of a specific tariff rate. Thus, Article XIII
applies to the 857,700 tonne limit."
634
In the context of the European Communities' objection to the applicability of Article XIII in regard to
the European Communities' preferential duty-free tariff quota for ACP countries, the main difference
between the European Communities' former and curr ent preferential tariff quota for ACP countries is
the level of the quantitative limit: it is curren tly 775,000 mt instead of 857,000 mt. From the
viewpoint of the applicability of Article XIII, that quantitative difference is irrelevant as it does not
eliminate the quantitative element of the Europ ean Communities' measure. As stated by the
compliance panel requested by Ecuador and the ar bitrator in the proceedings requested by the
European Communities pursuant to Article 22.6 of th e DSU, it is the very quantitative limit that
establishes the applicability of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to the European Communities'
preferential tariff quota for ACP countries, not the sp ecific level of the quantitative limit, nor whether
MFN countries are also subject to a tariff quota or only an MFN tariff. 635 The Panel therefore rejects
the argument made by the European Communities that "the fact that the ACP countries enjoy a trade
preference and the fact that there is a 'cap' impo sed on the quantities of ACP bananas that can benefit
from this preference may be relevant for purposes of GATT Article I, but are completely irrelevant for
the application of GATT Article XIII."636
7.305 In the light of the foregoing, the Panel is justified in addressing the consistency of the
European Communities' current banana import re gime with Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
Accordingly, the Panel will now turn to the substa ntive claims of Ecuador under Article XIII:1 and 2
of the GATT 1994.
(b) Ecuador's claim under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994
(i) Parties' main arguments
Ecuador's arguments
7.306 Ecuador argues that:
"The EC measures are inconsistent with Ar ticle XIII:1 in that Ecuadorian (and other
non-ACP) bananas cannot be c onsidered 'similarly restricted' in comparison to ACP
bananas, when Ecuadorian (and other non- ACP) bananas are si mply excluded from
access to the duty free tariff quota.637"638

634 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.20; and Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 5.9.
635 See Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.20; and Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 5.9.
636 European Communities' first written submission, para. 102.
637 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 7.69; Appellate Body Report at para. 160.
638 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 29.

7.307 According to Ecuador,
"[S]uch a tariff quota is a patent violation of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, in that
Ecuador (and other MFN suppliers) are restricted from any duty free access to the EC
market, while ACP bananas are not similarly restricted."639
7.308 Ecuador also argues that, as a result of the ACP tariff quota, it suffers a restriction in the sense
of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, namely "[t]he products that are not quantitatively restricted are
those that are within the quota, while the restri cted products are those that are denied access." 640
Ecuador adds that "the EC is wrong to argue that Ecuador's bananas are subject only to tariff
restrictions641, when in fact Ecuador's bananas are subject to a zero duty quota on entry of bananas."642
The European Communities' arguments
7.309 In the view of the European Communities, there is no inconsistency with Article XIII:1 of the
GATT 1994. According to the European Communities:
"[T]he text of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 makes clear that a Member can
successfully claim that another Member's measures violate the provisions of
GATT Article XIII, only if its [sic!] can show that:
(i) the allegedly offending Member imposes a prohibition or restriction on
products originating from the complaining Member and, in principle, there is
a nullification and impairment of a benefit accruing to the complaining
Member;
(ii) the allegedly offending Member does not impose a similar
prohibition or restriction on the like products originating from all
other countries."
643
7.310 Applying the first part of that test to its current banana import regime, the
European Communities contends that:
"Given that Ecuador's imports are not subject to any quantitative restriction, the first
condition for the application of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1, identified in the
preceding paragraphs, is not satisfied."644
7.311 The European Communities reaches a similar conclusion on the second part of the above test:
"At the same time, the second condition fo r the application of GATT Article XIII,
paragraph 1, identified above, cannot be sa tisfied: since imports from Ecuador are
not subject to any quantitative restriction, there is no basis that would allow an
examination of whether 'similar quantitative restrictions' are also imposed on all other
Members."645
7.312 In particular, in the European Communitie s' view, there is no inconsistency with
Article XIII:1 because:

639 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 37.
640 Ibid., para. 46.
641 (footnote original) First Written Submission of the EC, at para. 104.
642 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 49.
643 European Communities' first written submission, para. 96.
644 Ibid., para. 98.
645 Ibid., para. 99.

"[T]he Members on whose imports the quantitative restriction is imposed are the ACP
countries. The MFN countries, including Ecuador, are the 'all third countries', whose
position should be taken as a basis in or der to determine whether the ACP countries
are treated 'worse' than them. However, the MFN countries are not subject to any
tariff quota, or other quantitative restriction. As a consequence, there is nothing on
which the comparison can be based."
646
7.313 According to the European Communities:
"[E]ven assuming arguendo that there is a quantitative restriction imposed on the
ACP countries, Ecuador cannot successfully challenge it, because this quantitative
restriction imposed on the ACP countries does not result in any nullification or
impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador. Quite to the contrary, this 'cap' to the
preference afforded to the ACP countries pr otects the interests of Ecuador and the
other MFN countries, because it limits the quantities of ACP bananas that can be
imported into the European Communities at zero duty."647
7.314 Further, referring to the report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III , the
European Communities argues that:
"GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 covers only situations where a Member applies
tariff quotas with different terms to different groups of countries in a market where all
import are made under tariff quotas. Conse quently, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1
does not apply to a tariff only import regime where there are no different tariff quotas
allocated to different groups of countries, such as the current import regime of the
European Communities."
648
7.315 The European Communities adds that:
"GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 does not oblige the European Communities to
extend to all Members (including Ecuador and the other MFN suppliers) the tariff
preference granted to the ACP countries. GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 simply
obliges the European Communities not to impose a quantitative restriction on
Ecuador, unless a similar quantitative rest riction was imposed on all other WTO
Members."649
7.316 The European Communities maintains that:
"[T]the fact that the ACP countries enjoy a trade preference and the fact that there is a
'cap' imposed on the quantities of ACP bana nas that can benefit from this preference
may be relevant for purposes of GATT Article I, but are completely irrelevant for the
application of GATT Article XIII. The important textual differences of the two
Articles, discussed above, show that, un like GATT Article I, paragraph 1, the
provisions of GATT Article XIII, para graph 1 do not impose on a Member the
obligation to extend to all other Member s a tariff preference granted to some
Members only. Quite to the contrary, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 obliges each

646 European Communities' first written submission, para. 100.
647 Ibid., para. 101.
648 Ibid., para. 105.
649 Ibid., para. 103.

Member simply not to impose a quantitative restriction on another Member, unless it
imposes a similar quantitative restriction on all Members."650
7.317 According to the European Communities, "[t]he difference in the texts of these two provisions
shows that there are certain types of measures that may violate GATT Article I, paragraph 1, without
violating GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1."651
7.318 In response to Ecuador's arguments, the Europ ean Communities argues that "[it] does not see
how it can be that products within a quota are those that are ' not quantitatively restricted '."652
The European Communities adds that:
"The GATT distinction between obligati ons regarding tariffs and obligations
regarding quantitative measures can be mainta ined only if a tariff quota relates to a
positive quantity or value of goods. It ca nnot have unlimited or zero scope. Thus,
a 'tariff of 10% with an unlimited-quantity ta riff quota at 5%' is simply a 5% tariff.
Likewise, a 'tariff of 10% with a zero-quantity tariff quota at 5%' is simply a
10% tariff."
653
7.319 The European Communities also states that:
"[I]f Ecuador's arguments were to be accepted they would lead to GATT Article XIII,
paragraph 1 effectively duplicating GATT Artic le I, paragraph 1. Take a simple
scenario of tariff discrimination, where imports from Member A are granted a 5%
tariff, whereas a higher tariff is imposed on im ports from Member B. The situation is
precisely the one that GATT Article I, paragr aph 1 is intended to address. However,
according to Ecuador, one can invent noti onal tariff quotas in order to bring the
situation within the scope of GATT Article X III. On this logic the situation could be
presented as one where Member A had an unlimited-quantity tariff quota at 5%,
whereas Member B had a zero-quantity tariff quota at 5%. Consequently the two sets
of imports would not be similarly restricted and there would be a breach of GATT
Article XIII, paragraph 1. Thus, a situa tion of straightforward tariff discrimination
could be artificially presented as one involving notional tariff quotas which would fall
within the ambit of GATT Article XIII."
654
7.320 The European Communities adds that:
"[I]f paragraph 1 of GATT Article XIII is a pplied unthinkingly to the situation of the
Cotonou Preference[, o]ne odd result would be that WTO Members would be
required to confer benefits on non-WTO Memb ers. This would come about because
paragraph 1 would be taken to say that a tariff quota could be conferred on one WTO
Member only if similar tariff quotas had b een conferred on 'all other countries' and
not just on WTO Members. If this interp retation were accepted, what was intended
as a protection for WTO Members (i.e., that they would not have restrictions imposed
upon them unless similar restrictions were placed on other countries) would be
converted into a benefit for non-WTO Members."
655

650 European Communities' first written submission, para. 102.
651 Ibid., para. 95.
652 European Communities' second written submission, para. 55.
653 Ibid., para. 58.
654 Ibid., para. 57.
655 Ibid., para. 52.

(ii) Panel's analysis
The relevant language of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 for this dispute

7.321 According to Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994:
"No prohibition or restriction shall be a pplied by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the
exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party,
unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of
the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted."
7.322 Replacing the terms "any contracting party", "a ny other contracting party" and "all third
countries" with the relevant WTO Members involve d in this dispute, the Panel understands that
Ecuador's claim under Article XIII:1 invokes that provision in the following way:
"No prohibition or restriction shall be app lied by [the European Communities] on the
importation of any product of the territory of [Ecuador] ... unless the importation of
the like product of [the beneficiaries of the ACP tariff quota] ... is similarly prohibited
or restricted."
7.323 The Panel does not find anything in Article X III of the GATT 1994 or more generally in the
WTO agreements to support the European Communities' argument that in this dispute "[t]he MFN
countries, including Ecuador, are the 'all third count ries', whose position should be taken as a basis in
order to determine whether the ACP coun tries are treated 'worse' than them."
656 This dispute is about
Ecuador's claim that the European Communities treats Ecuador 'worse' than the ACP countries. In the
context of that claim by Ecuador, the only possible reading of Article XIII:1 is the one provided by
the Panel in the preceding paragraph.
7.324 The Panel does not agree with the European Co mmunities that "[i]f this interpretation were
accepted, what was intended as a protection for WTO Members (i.e., that they would not have
restrictions imposed upon them unless similar rest rictions were placed on other countries) would be
converted into a benefit for non-WTO Members."
657 In fact, the Panel agrees with the
European Communities that the main purpose of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 is that
"WTO Members ... [sh]ould not have restrictions im posed upon them unless similar restrictions were
placed on other countries". In this dispute, Ecuador, a WTO Member, claims that it should be
protected under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. If, accordingly, the term "any other contracting
party" in Article XIII:1 is replaced with "Ecuador", and the term "any contracting party" is replaced
with "the European Communities" (which the Eu ropean Communities does not seem to contest), the
term "all third countries" may indeed refer to the AC P countries. In that context, the term "all third
countries" does not necessarily exclude WTO Memb ers other than the European Communities and
Ecuador. Also, even if "all third countries" should be interpreted as referring also to non-Members of
the WTO, an issue this Panel does not address, th e Panel's above interpretation of the terms of
Article XIII:1 does not imply that Article XIII:1 woul d suddenly be turned into a provision protecting
non-Members.
Analysis of the applicability of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994

7.325 In the light of that interpretation of the releva nt terms of Article XIII:1, the Panel needs to
address three issues:

656 European Communities' first written submission, para. 100.
657 European Communities' second written submission, para. 52.

(a) Whether all bananas are like products;
(b) Whether any prohibition or restriction is applied by the European Communities on
the importation of bananas of the territory of Ecuador; and,
(c) Whether the importation of the like product of the beneficiaries of the ACP tariff
quota is similarly prohibited or restricted.
Whether all bananas are like products
7.326 The Panel has already concluded that the releva nt products in this dispute, fresh bananas
(corresponding to tariff item 0803 00 12 or 0803 00 19) originating in ACP countries, are like
products to those fresh bananas originating in other WTO Members, in terms of Article I of the GATT
1994.658 Based on the same considerations, the Panel ma y also consider them to be like products in
terms of Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
7.327 Accordingly, for the purpose of considerati on of Ecuador's claim under Article XIII of the
GATT 1994, the Panel confirms that all fresh banana s are like products, irrespective of their origin,
i.e., independently of whether they are produced in ACP or MFN countries, or whether they are
subject to the MFN out-of-quota tariff, the preferen tial in-quota tariff under the ACP tariff quota or to
any further preferential import regime of the European Communities.
Whether any prohibition or restriction is applied by the European Communities on
the importation of bananas of the territory of Ecuador
7.328 Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, entitled "Non-discriminatory Administration of
Quantitative Restrictions", can apply in this dispute only if there is a "prohibition or restriction"
within the meaning of Article XIII:1 on th e importation of bananas from Ecuador to the
European Communities. This is the second issue the Panel will address under Article XIII:1, noting
that, for the purposes of the analysis, finding either a restriction or a prohibition would be sufficient
for the Panel to move to the third element of its analysis under Article XIII:1.
7.329 As regards the existence of any "restriction" , the Panel notes that, while panels and the
Appellate Body have not looked into the meani ng of the term "restriction" specifically under
Article XIII of the GATT 1994, traditionally, they have interpreted that term broadly in the context of
Article XI of the GATT 1994.
659
7.330 Also, in the context of Article XI and othe r non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994,
it has been found that GATT disciplines on the use of restrictions are not meant to protect
"trade flows", but rather the "competitive opport unities of imported products". As the panel on
Argentina – Hides and Leather stated in the context of Article XI of the GATT 1994:
"[A]s to whether [the challenged measure ] makes effective a restriction, it should be
recalled that Article XI:1, like Articles I, II and III of the GATT 1994, protects
competitive opportunities of imported products, not trade flows.660"661

658 See paras. 7.154 to 7.157 above.
659 See Panel Report on India – Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 5.129-5.130. See also Panel Report on
Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.64; Panel Report on India – Autos , paras. 7.320 and 7.322; and Panel Report on
660 ( footnote original ) See the Appellate Body Reports on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
(hereafter "Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II "), adopted on 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,

7.331 In the light of the above-mentioned close link between Articles XI and XIII of the
GATT 1994, the Panel considers that this broad in terpretation of the word "restriction" under
Article XI is relevant also for Article XIII.
7.332 Given that broad interpretation of the term "restriction", the Panel sees the
European Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota as a restriction for Ecua dor within the meaning
of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. As the Eu ropean Communities recognizes, its banana import
regime confers a benefit, although a quantitativel y limited one, to ACP countries, and Ecuador, like
other MFN banana suppliers, cannot have acc ess to that quantitatively limited benefit.
662 Any benefit
accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members pr esumably affects the competitive opportunities of
like bananas imported from other Members, incl uding from Ecuador, to the European Communities
market. By its very nature, such a benefit reserved for some Members generally represents a
disadvantage for other Members.
7.333 The European Communities argues that Article X III only deals with quantitative restrictions
and quantitative discrimination, and not tariff restricti ons or discrimination. In this context, the Panel
notes that the word "quantitative" means "[p]ossessing quantity, magnitude, or spatial extent"; "[t]hat
is, or may be, considered with respect to the quan tity or quantities involved; estimated or estimable
by quantity."663
7.334 On its face, the quantity of bananas that Ecua dor can export to the European Communities is
not restricted by the European Communities' curr ent banana import regime: Ecuador can export as
many bananas to the European Communities as it wi shes. However, Ecuador can export bananas to
the European Communities only at the MFN out-of- quota tariff. Therefore, the quantities Ecuador
can export to the European Communities are certainly affected by the fact that, up to the quantitative
limit set by the tariff quota, the ACP count ries are entitled to export bananas to the
European Communities at a zero in-quota duty. As stated by the first compliance panel requested by
Ecuador in this dispute, "[a]s to the EC's sugges tion that Ecuador has no interest in the collective
allocation to traditional ACP suppliers, we note that the price and even the volume of Ecuador's
exports could be affected by the price and volume of traditional ACP exports."
664 (emphasis added)
7.335 Further, as mentioned earlier, under the tariff quot a, the benefit accorded to ACP countries is
determined in a quantitative manner: up to the qua ntitative limit specified by the tariff quota, ACP
countries can export bananas to the European Co mmunities under the preferential in-quota duty;
beyond the quantitative limit, ACP banana exports to the European Communities are also subject to
the out-of-quota duty.
7.336 As mentioned above, both the first compliance pa nel requested by Ecuador and the arbitrator
in the proceedings requested by the European Communities pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU
established that it is the very quantitative limit that establishes the applicability of Article XIII to the
European Communities' preferential tariff quota for ACP countries 665, not the specific level of the
quantitative limit, nor whether MFN countries are also subject to a tariff quota or only to an MFN
tariff.

WT/DS11/AB/R, at p.16; Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , adopted on 17 February 1999,
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, at paras. 119-120 and 127.
661 Panel Report on Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.20.
662 See European Communities' second written submission, para. 51; and European Communities' first
written submission, para. 104.
663 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. II,
p. 2439.
664 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.22.
665 See Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), para. 6.20; and Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 5.9.

7.337 Having established, for the above-mentioned reas ons, that Ecuador's banana imports to the
European Communities are restrict ed within the meaning of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 by the
European Communities' preferential tariff quota fo r ACP countries, the Panel also rejects the
European Communities' argument that:
"[E]ven assuming arguendo that there is a quantitative restriction imposed on the
ACP countries, Ecuador cannot successfully challenge it, because this quantitative
restriction imposed on the ACP countries does not result in any nullification or
impairment of any benefit accruing to Ecuador. Quite to the contrary, this 'cap' to the
preference afforded to the ACP countries pr otects the interests of Ecuador and the
other MFN countries, because it limits the quantities of ACP bananas that can be
imported into the European Communities at zero duty."
666
7.338 Having established and identified a restriction w ithin the meaning of Article XIII:1 of the
GATT 1994 on Ecuador's banana imports to the European Communities, the Panel turns to the third
and last aspect of its analysis under Article XIII:1: whether banana imports from ACP countries to
the European Communities are similarly restricted.
Whether the importation of bananas from ACP countries is similarly restricted
7.339 As mentioned earlier, similar to the MFN countries, the ACP countries may export bananas to
the European Communities at the MFN out-of-quota ta riff. However, as the European Communities
itself recognizes667, ACP countries can also export bananas under the lower in-quota duty, which is
not available to MFN countries at all. The in-quota duty is zero, while the out-of-quota duty is
176 €/mt. Since MFN countries cannot have access to that preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP
countries, on its face, the importation into the Eu ropean Communities of bananas from ACP countries
is not similarly restricted as banana imports from Ecuador.
7.340 The Panel notes in this context that , according to Exhibit EC-17, total
European Communities' banana imports from the ACP countries amounted to 891,218 mt in 2006,
and to a proportional 439,328 mt during the first half of 2007. In other words, since the introduction
of the European Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota, most European Communities banana
imports from the ACP countries have taken place unde r the beneficial zero in-quota duty of 775,000
mt per annum. Consequently, as indicated in Exhibit EC-14, the European Communities has collected
€20,454,544 of tariff revenues on the 891,218 mt of total ACP banana imports in 2006, while it
collected €579,687,363 of tariff revenues on the 3,293,679 mt total MFN imports in the same year.
Thus, in the first year of the applicati on of its current banana import regime, the
European Communities has collected about 28 times more tariff revenues on its MFN banana imports
for almost four times the amount of imports than fo r its total banana imports from ACP countries. In
other words, in 2006, on average, the European Communities has subjected each quantitative unit of
MFN banana import to about seven times more dut y than each equal quantitative unit of ACP banana
import. These figures illustrate the way in which the European Communities' current banana import
regime restricts MFN banana imports, including imports from Ecuador, within the meaning of
Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994; at the same time, it is quite clear that ACP bananas are not
similarly restricted.
7.341 This Panel also notes that the original panel requested by Ecuador in this dispute stated that:
"Article XIII:1 establishes the basic principle that no import restriction shall be
applied to one Member's products unless th e importation of like products from other

666 European Communities' first written submission, para. 101.
667 See European Communities' second written submission, para. 46.

Members is similarly restricted. Thus, a Member may not limit the quantity of
imports from some Members but not from others. But as indicated by the terms of
Article XIII (and even its title, 'Non-discr iminatory Administration of Quantitative
Restrictions'), the non-discrimination ob ligation extends further. The imported
products at issue must be 'similarly' restricted. A Member may not restrict imports
from some Members using one means and restrict them from another Member using
another means."
668
7.342 In its ruling in EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body upheld the relevant findings of that
original panel in the context of Article XIII:1, by stating that:
"When th[e] principle of non-discrimination is applied to the allocation of tariff quota
shares to Members not having a substantial interest, it is clear that a Member cannot,
whether by agreement or by assignment, allocate tariff quota shares to some Members
not having a substantial interest while not allocating shares to other Members who
likewise do not have a substantial interest. To do so is clearly inconsistent with the
requirement in Article XIII:1 that a Memb er cannot restrict the importation of any
product from another Member unless the importation of the like product from all third
countries is 'similarly' restricted.
Therefore, ... we conclude that the Panel f ound correctly that the allocation of tariff
quota shares, whether by agreement or by assignment, to some, but not to other,
Members not having a substantial interest in supplying bananas to the
European Communities is inconsistent with the requirements of Article XIII:1 of the
GATT 1994.
The [tariff quota] reallocation rules [of the BFA] allow the exclusion of
banana-supplying countries, other than BFA countries, from sharing in the unused
portions of a tariff quota share. Thus, imports from BFA countries and imports from
other Members are not 'similarly' restricted. We conclude, therefore, that the Panel
found correctly that the tariff quota realloca tion rules of the BFA are inconsistent
with the requirements of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994."
669
7.343 Based on the reasoning of the original panel and the Appellate Body in this dispute, both the
first compliance panel requested by Ecuador and the arbitrator in the proceedings requested by the
European Communities pursuant to Article 22. 6 of the DSU established inconsistency with
Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, by stating that:
"[S]ome non-substantial supp liers, namely the ACP suppliers, could benefit from
access to the 'other' category of the MF N tariff quota once the 857,700 tonne tariff
quota was exhausted. On the other ha nd, non-substantial suppliers from third
countries have no access to the 857,700 tonne tariff quota once the 'other' category of
the MFN tariff quota is exhausted. Individual Members in these two groups –
traditional ACP suppliers and the other non- substantial suppliers – are accordingly
not similarly restricted. This disparate treatment is inconsistent with the provisions of
Article XIII:1, which require that '[n]o … r estriction shall be applied by any Member
on the importation of any product of the te rritory of any other Member … unless the

668 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.69.
669 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, paras. 161-163.

importation of the like product of all thir d countries … is similarly prohibited or
restricted'."670
7.344 In the proceedings before this Panel, the European Communities argues that its current
banana import regime is different from the previ ous ones addressed by the Appellate Body and the
previous panels in this dispute, primarily becau se the European Communities' current banana import
regime allegedly has only one preferential tariff. As the European Communities argues:
"[The report of the] Appellate Body [in EC – Bananas III ] shows that
GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1 covers only situations where a Member applies tariff
quotas with different terms to different gr oups of countries in a market where all
import are made under tariff quotas. Conse quently, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 1
does not apply to a tariff only import regime where there are no different tariff quotas
allocated to different groups of countries, such as the current import regime of the
European Communities."671
7.345 In the original dispute the Appellate Body no ted that, in regard to the earlier EC measures
before the original panel and the Appellate Body:
"It ha[d] been argued by the European Co mmunities that there are two separate EC
import regimes for bananas, the preferentia l regime for traditional ACP bananas and
the erga omnes regime for all other imports of ba nanas. Submissions made by the
European Communities raise the question whet her this is of any relevance for the
application of the non-discrimination pr ovisions of the GATT 1994 and the other
Annex 1A agreements. The European Comm unities argues, in particular, that the
non-discrimination obligations of Articles I:1, X:3(a) and XIII of the GATT 1994 and
Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement , apply only within each of these separate
regimes. The Panel found that the European Communities has only one import
regime for purposes of applying the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994
and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement."
672
7.346 As indicated by Ecuador in these proceedings 673, in response to that argument by the
European Communities, the Appellate Body established that:
"The issue here is not whether the European Communities is correct in stating that two
separate import regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or more,
separate EC import regimes is of any relevance for the application of the
non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements.
The essence of the non-discrimination obliga tions is that like products should be
treated equally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all
bananas are like products, the non-discrimina tion provisions apply to all imports of
bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Member categorizes or subdivides these
imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different legal basis for
imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member could
avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like
products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination
provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the

670 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) , para. 6.26; and Decision by the
Arbitrators on EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 5.14.
671 European Communities' first written submission, para. 105.
672 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 189.
673 See Ecuador's first written submission, para. 31.

non-discrimination provisions of th e GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A
agreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by
that Member."
674
Accordingly, the Appellate Body "uph[e]l d the findings of the [original] Panel 675 that the non-
discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994, specifically , Articles I:1 and XIII, apply to the relevant
EC regulations, irrespective if there is one or more 'separate regimes' for the importation of
bananas."676
7.347 As the original panel requested by Ecuador also noted, "to accept that a Member could
establish quota regimes by different legal instrument s and argue that they are not as a consequence
subject to Article XIII would be, as argued by the Complainants, to eviscerate the non-discrimination
provisions of Article XIII."677
7.348 Under the European Communities' current bana na import regime, there might be no tariff
quota applicable to the MFN countries, and the ACP tariff quota might be the only preferential tariff
quota. However, that would not reduce the releva nce of the statement by the Appellate Body that
"[t]he issue here is not whether the European Communities is correct in stating that two separate import
regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or more, separate EC import regimes is of
any relevance for the application of the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other
Annex 1A agreements". As long as the European Communities has a preferential tariff quota reserved
for some Members and a higher MFN out-of-quota duty for all other Members, that statement remains
relevant. Further, the alleged absence of more than one tariff quota reserved for some WTO Members
under the European Communities' current banana import regime makes the following statement by the
Appellate Body even more relevant in these proceedings:
"If, by choosing a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by
applying different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the non-
discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different Members, the
object and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would
be very easy for a Member to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the
GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreem ents, if these provisions apply only
within regulatory regimes established by that Member."
678
7.349 In the light of the foregoing, despite the Eur opean Communities' arguments on the specificity
of its current banana import regime and the preferential ACP tariff quota under such regime, the Panel
reiterates that ACP banana imports to the Europ ean Communities are not similarly restricted as are
like banana imports from Ecuador.
7.350 Having found that the current EC banana import regime shows all three elements set out in
Article XIII:1, the Panel concludes that the Eur opean Communities' current banana import regime,
in particular its preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP countries, is inconsistent with Article XIII:1
of the GATT 1994.

674 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 190.
675 (footnote original) Panel Reports, paras. 7.82 and 7.167.
676 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 191.
677 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.79.
678 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 190.

(c) Ecuador's claim under Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994
(i) Parties' main arguments
Ecuador's arguments
7.351 Ecuador maintains that:
"The EC measures are also inconsistent with Article XIII:2. The Panel in Bananas III
noted the general rule that, if Members apply quotas to a product, then, in the terms of
the chapeau to Article XIII:2, 'Members sha ll aim at a distribution of trade in such
product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members
might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions.'679"680
7.352 Ecuador adds that "[t]hough the EC system has eliminated the country allocations that
previously existed as between non-ACP countries, the discrimination remains as between ACP and
non-ACP bananas" 681, and "[t]he Appellate Body in Bananas III vigorously condemned this
discrimination."682
7.353 In Ecuador's view there is also an inconsis tency with Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994
because:
"The allocation of the duty free quota exclusively to ACP countries bears no relation
to trading patterns in the world or EC market s. As can be seen in the charts annexed
as Exhibits ECU-2 and ECU-3, Ecuador is a preeminent exporter of bananas to the
world market. Further, Ecuador and sever al other countries that are excluded from
the zero duty quota, are substantial suppliers to the EC, while ACP countries, many of
whom are minor suppliers at best, are allowed to ship duty free under the tariff
quota."683
7.354 In respect of the report of the panel on US – Line Pipe, mentioned in these proceedings by the
European Communities, Ecuador argues that:
"In [the US – Line Pipe ] case, the United States created an unusual tariff quota
system, in that each country in the world wa s allowed to ship an identical quantity of
line pipe steel to the United States at a low rate of duty, while other steel imports
were subject to stiff new safeguard tariffs. The Panel found that such a system did
not respect the distribution of trade in low duty steel that would be expected in the
absence of restrictions, in that the system favored small over large exporters by
allocating identical shares to countries with different shares of the world and US
markets.
684"685

679 (footnote original) Panel Report at para. 7.68.
680 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 30.
681 Ibid., para. 31.
682 Ibid.
683 Ibid., para. 32.
684 (footnote original) US – Line Pipe, at paras. 7.53, 7.54 and 7.55.
685 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 51.

The European Communities' arguments

7.355 The European Communities contends that "[ its] current import regime... does not violate
GATT Article XIII, paragraph 2."686 In the European Communities' view,
"The ... limited ... scope of ... Article [XIII] is seen in the way that the four sub-
paragraphs of GATT Article XIII, paragra ph 2 are entirely focused on the scope and
internal distribution of the quota. They disregard any trade that falls outside the quota
(or tariff quota)".687
7.356 According to the European Communities, "[t]he text ' In applying import restrictions ' shows
that paragraph 2 (like paragraph 1) is solely c oncerned with quantitative restrictions, and does not
regulate the relationship between quantitative restricti ons and other measures, notably simple tariffs,
that a Member may be applying."688
7.357 The European Communities adds that:
"The context provides support for this interpretation. Mention has already been made
of the inferences to be drawn from the title of GATT Article XIII. The same, limited,
scope of the Article is seen in the wa y that the four sub- paragraphs of GATT
Article XIII, paragraph 2 are entirely focused on the scope and internal distribution of
the quota. They disregard an y trade that falls outside the quota (or tariff quota): sub-
paragraph (a) refers to fixing and noti fying the total amount of the quota; sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) concern the use of import licences; and sub-paragraph (d)
concerns the allocation of quotas by agreement or on the basis of previous import
levels."
689
7.358 Finally, according to the European Communities,
"Given that GATT Article XIII, paragraph 2 is directed at the administration of
quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas, it does not extend to the
European Communities' banana import regime in so far as that concerns Ecuador and
the other MFN countries, because their expor ts are not subject to any non-tariff
restrictions or tariff quotas.
The European Communities draws support fo r this interpretation from the panel's
report in US – Line Pipe. In that case, the United States had imposed a safeguard
measure in the form of a tariff quota. The panel invoked GATT Article XIII,
paragraph 2 only as regards the internal di vision of the tariff quota and the setting of
the total amount of imports permitted at a lower tariff rate.
690"691

686 European Communities' first written submission, para. 106.
687 Ibid., para. 108.
688 Ibid., para. 107.
689 Ibid., para. 108.
690 (footnote original) Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, paras. 7.54 and 7.58.
691 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 109-110.

(ii) Panel's analysis
7.359 Ecuador has invoked both the chapeau and subparagraph (d) of Article XIII:2 of the
GATT 1994.692
Chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994
7.360 Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 stipulates in its chapeau that:
"In applying import restrictions to any pr oduct, contracting parties [WTO Members]
shall aim at a distribution of trade in su ch product approaching as closely as possible
the shares which the various contracting parties [WTO Members] might be expected
to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the
following provisions..."
7.361 The original panel requested by Ecuador in th is dispute confirmed that language by stating
that "the object and purpose of Article XIII:2 is to minimize the impact of a quota or tariff quota
regime on trade flows by attempting to approximate under such measures the trade shares that would
have occurred in the absence of the regime."
693
7.362 The Panel notes that Cameroon argues in its statem ent at the substantive meeting of the Panel
with the parties and third parties that:
"It is a well known fact that ACP banana producers are less competitive than MFN
banana producers. Compared to the la tter, ACP producers have higher production
costs. For historical and geographical reasons, they do not enjoy the same economies
of scale as the MFN producers. As a result, ACP producers can only compete with
MFN producers in markets where they enjoy preferential access."
694
7.363 In response to the Panel's request to provide evidence for its assertions, Cameroon adduces
evidence to its statement and confirmed the latter by concluding that:
"As a result of the more limited yields and the higher costs, the banana producers in
the ACP countries are less co mpetitive than the banana pr oducers in MFN countries.
The less competitive position of ACP banana producers has also been noted by the
President of Chiquita Europe in an in terview in 2007 which was annexed to Côte
d'Ivoire's Oral Statement695. The lack of competitiveness is also demonstrated by the
fact that the ACP countries from the Caribbean are unable to export to the US market
which is geographically much closer than the EC market."696
7.364 In response to a question by the Panel relating to Cameroon's above-cited statement, the other
main beneficiaries of the European Communities' banana import regime, i.e. the other ACP third
parties (Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar,

692 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ecuador, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador
II), 26 February 2007, WT/DS27/80, p. 4; and Ecuador's first written submission, para. 27.
693 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.68.
694 Final written version of Cameroon's oral statement at the Panel's substantive meeting with the
parties and third parties, paragraph 31. See para. 5.48 above.
695 (footnote original) See also the Italtrend Report on "Etat des lieux et compétitivité des plantations
de bananas en Côte d'Ivoire" and the Horus Report on "La banane africaine dans l'Union européenne", which are
attached as an Annex to this Reply.
696 Cameroon's response to question No. 86.

Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname), "confirm that that they agree with
these specific assertions [by Cameroon]".
697
7.365 Finally, in response to a question by the Pane l relating to Cameroon's above-cited statement,
the European Communities itself st ates that "[it] believes that the facts described by Cameroon are
manifestly accurate and correct ."698 (emphasis added) The Euro pean Communities also argues in
that context that:
"However, if these elements could have a certa in relevance within an analysis of the
WTO compatibility of a regime providing for quantitative restrictions, they are
certainly irrelevant in the context of an analysis of a tariff-only regime under
Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
In fact, for the reasons explained in the answer to Question 73, above, Article XIII
applies to quantitative restrictions and not any kind of trade restriction."
699
7.366 Having established that the European Communitie s' current banana import regime subjects
Ecuador to a restriction within the meaning of Ar ticle XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, the Panel rejects this
last argument by the European Communities. C onsequently, the Panel also considers that the
statement by Cameroon that "ACP producers can only compete with MFN producers in markets
where they enjoy preferential access" 700, explicitly confirmed by both the other ACP third parties and
by the European Communities, constitutes a rec ognition by the European Communities and the ACP
third parties that the preferential ACP tariff quot a regime under the European Communities' current
banana import regime is a preferen tial regime that is indispensable for the very existence of ACP
banana imports to the European Communities. It is not necessary to further assess this apparent lack
of competitiveness of ACP countries. The above affirmations by the European Communities and the
ACP third parties suffice to find that, given that MFN countries are excluded from the
European Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota, by definition, the ACP preference cannot and
does not "aim at a distribution of trade in [ban anas] approaching as closely as possible the shares
which the various [Members, including both ACP and MFN countries] might be expected to obtain in
the absence of such restrictions." Thus , the Panel also finds that on its face the
European Communities' current bana na import regime, including its pr eferential ACP tariff quota, is
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.367 The Panel notes that the European Communities argues in the context of Article XIII:2 that:
"Given that GATT Article XIII, paragraph 2 is directed at the administration of
quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas, it does not extend to the
European Communities' banana import regime in so far as that concerns Ecuador and
the other MFN countries, because their expor ts are not subject to any non-tariff
restrictions or tariff quotas.

697 The response of Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Domi nica, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica,
Madagascar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname to question 86. But see the statement
in the study by the Centre for International Economics, provided by Nicaragua and Panama, that "from 2008
onwards Latin American access will dec line sharply, and under some scenar ios, by 2010, ACP/EBA exports to
the EU could exceed those of Latin America." Centre for International Economics, "The detrimental effects of a
€176 per tonne ACP banana tariff preference on MFN suppliers" (August 2007), in Exhibit N-2 and P-2.
698 European Communities' response to question 86.
699 Ibid.
700 Final written version of Cameroon's oral statement at the Panel's substantive meeting with the
parties and third parties, paragraph 31.

The European Communities draws support fo r this interpretation from the panel's
report in US – Line Pipe. In that case, the United States had imposed a safeguard
measure in the form of a tariff quota. The panel invoked GATT Article XIII,
paragraph 2 only as regards the internal di vision of the tariff quota and the setting of
the total amount of imports permitted at a lower tariff rate.
701"702
7.368 The Panel recalls that, in line with the Appellate Body's statement in EC – Bananas III 703,
it has already rejected the Europ ean Communities arguments that Article XIII would apply only to
separate parts of the European Communities' current banana import regime.704
7.369 Despite the arguments of the European Communitie s, this Panel reads the ruling of the panel
on US – Line Pipe as confirming this Panel's approach to Article XIII:2 in the current proceedings.
As a matter of fact, the safeguard measure reviewed by the panel on US – Line Pipe involved identical
tariff quotas for various countries.705 The panel on US – Line Pipe stated that:
"Without setting forth an exhaustive definition of tariff quotas, we consider that an
accurate definition must include measures which place a quantitative limit on the
application, or availability, of a lower tari ff rate (and a higher tariff rate applicable
once that quantitative limit has been ex ceeded), irrespective of whether that
quantitative limit is (a) 'overall', (b) 'ove rall' and further allocated among exporting
countries, or (c) country-specific, with no 'overall' limit. ... [T]he 'specified quantity',
or 'quantitative limit', referred to in the definitions advanced by the United States,
could be overall, overall and further allo cated among exporting countries, or simply
country-specific. On this basis, we concl ude that the line pipe measure at issue is a
tariff quota, since there are country-speci fic limits (9000 short tons) placed on the
application, or availability, of the lower tariff rate, and it is these country-specific
limits that determine whether or not lin e pipe from specific countries enters the
United States at the lower or higher rate of duty."
706
7.370 The panel on US – Line Pipe found that the US safeguard measure which was not based on
historical trade patterns, and did not reflect an intent of approaching the shares that the Members
could have been expected to obtain in the ab sence of the measure, was inconsistent with the chapeau
of Article XIII:2:
"There is nothing in the record before the Panel to suggest that the line pipe measure
was based in any way on historical trade patterns in line pipe, or that the
United States otherwise 'aim[ed] at a distribution of trade … approaching as closely
as possible the shares which the various Memb ers might be expected to obtain in the
absence of' the line pipe measure. Instead, as noted by Korea, 'the in-quota import
volume originating from Korea, the largest supplier historically to the US market,
was reduced to the same level as the smallest – or even then non-existent – suppliers
to the US market (9,000 short tons)'. For this reason, we find that the line pipe
measure is inconsistent with the gen eral rule contained in the chapeau of
Article XIII:2."707 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)

701 (footnote original) Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, paras. 7.54 and 7.58.
702 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 109-110.
703 See Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 190.
704 See paras. 7.339 to 7.349 above.
705 See Panel Report on US – Line Pipe, para. 7.23.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid., para. 7.55.

Subparagraph (d) of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994

7.371 Ecuador has also invoked subparagraph (d) of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994. 708
That subparagraph provides that:
"(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the
contracting party applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the
allocation of shares in the quota with all ot her contracting parties having a substantial
interest in supplying the product concerne d. In cases in which this method is not
reasonably practicable, the contracting part y concerned shall allot to contracting
parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the
proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during a previous representative
period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being
taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in
the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any
contracting party from utilizing fully the sh are of any such total quantity or value
which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed
period to which the quota may relate."
7.372 As stated by the original panel requested by Ecuador in this dispute,
"Article XIII's general requ irement of non-discrimination is modified in one respect
by Article XIII:2(d), which provides for th e possibility to allocate tariff quota shares
to supplying countries. Any such country specific allocation must, however, 'aim at a
distribution of trade ... approaching as cl osely as possible the shares which Members
might be expected to obtain in the absen ce of such restrictions' (chapeau of
Article XIII:2(d)).
Article XIII:2(d) further specifies the treatment that, in case of country-specific
allocation of tariff quota shares, must be give n to Members with 'a substantial interest
in supplying the product concerned'. For those Members, the Member proposing to
impose restrictions may seek agreement with them as provided in Article XIII:2(d),
first sentence. If that is not reasonably practicable, then it must allot shares in the
quota (or tariff quota) to them on the basis of the criteria specified in
Article XIII:2(d), second sentence."
709
7.373 That same original panel addressed the question whether, under Article XIII:2(d),
"country-specific shares can also be allocated to Me mbers that do not have a substantial interest in
supplying the product and, if so, what th e method of allocation would have to be." 710 The panel noted
that:
"As to the first point, we note that the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) refers to
allocation of a quota 'among supplying countries'. This could be read to imply that an
allocation may also be made to Members th at do not have a substantial interest in
supplying the product. If this interpre tation is accepted, any such allocation must,
however, meet the requirements of Article X III:1 and the general rule in the chapeau
to Article XIII:2(d). Therefore, if a Member wishes to allocate shares of a tariff quota
to some suppliers without a substantial inter est, then such shares must be allocated to
all such suppliers. Otherwise, imports from Members would not be similarly

708 See Ecuador's first written submission, para. 27.
709 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 7.70-7.71.
710 Ibid., para. 7.73.

restricted as required by Article XIII:1. 711 As to the second point, in such a case it
would be required to use the same method as was used to allocate the
country-specific shares to the Members havi ng a substantial interest in supplying the
product, because otherwise the requirements of Article XIII:1 would also not be
met."712
7.374 On appeal, the Appellate Body stated that:
"Article XIII:2(d) provides specific rule s for the allocation of tariff quotas among
supplying countries, but these rules pertain only to the allocation of tariff quota shares
to Members 'having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned'.
Article XIII:2(d) does not provide any specific rules for the allocation of tariff quota
shares to Members not having a substantial interest. Nevertheless, allocation to
Members not having a substantial interest must be subject to the basic principle of
non-discrimination. When this principle of non-discrimination is applied to the
allocation of tariff quota shares to Members not having a substantial interest, it is
clear that a Member cannot, whether by agreem ent or by assignment, allocate tariff
quota shares to some Members not having a substantial interest while not allocating
shares to other Members who likewise do not have a substantial interest. To do so is
clearly inconsistent with the requirement in Article XIII:1 that a Member cannot
restrict the importation of any product from another Member unless the importation
of the like product from all third countries is 'similarly' restricted."
713
(emphasis added)
7.375 The Panel notes that all MFN countries are excluded from the European Communities'
preferential ACP tariff quota, and the group of MFN countries includes both substantial and non-
substantial suppliers of bananas to the European Communities. Ecuador has argued that, "Ecuador
and several other countries that are excluded from the zero duty quota, are substantial suppliers to the
European Communities, while ACP countries, many of whom are minor suppliers at best, are allowed
to ship duty free under the tariff quota." 714 The European Communities h as not denied the existence
of this situation.
7.376 Also, according to Exhibits EC-17 and EC-18, for each year since 1999 Ecuador has had the
highest share of European Communities banana im ports among all banana suppliers, including ACP
and MFN suppliers. Accordingly, Ecuador has a s ubstantial interest in supplying bananas to the
European Communities under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994.
7.377 In the light of the way in which Article XIII:2( d) has been interpreted by the original panel
and the Appellate Body in this dispute, a preferen tial tariff quota that is granted exclusively to some
Members and not to others, including a substantial supplier, may not result in a distribution of trade in
bananas that would approach as closely as possibl e the shares which the various Members might be
expected to obtain in the absence of such restricti ons. Further, the same preferential tariff quota does
not comply with the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d) that:
"In cases in which [agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota
with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product
concerned] is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party concerned shall allot to

711 (footnote original) See Panel Report on "EEC Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile", adopted
on 10 November 1980, BISD 27S/98, 114, 116, paras. 4.11, 4.21.
712 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.73.
713 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 161.
714 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 32.

contracting parties having a substantial inte rest in supplying the product shares based
upon the proportions, supplied by such c ontracting parties during a previous
representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due
account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be
affecting the trade in the product."
7.378 Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Europ ean Communities' current banana import regime,
including its preferential ACP tariff quota, is incons istent not only with Article XIII:1 and with the
chapeau of Article XIII:2, but also with subparagraph (d) of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994.
(d) No applicable waiver
7.379 As the Appellate Body stated in the context of Article XIII earlier in this dispute:
"Non-discrimination obligations apply to all imports of like pro ducts, except when
these obligations are specifically waived or are otherwise not applicable as a result of
the operation of specific provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Article XXIV.
715 In the
present case, the non-discrimination obligat ions of the GATT 1994, specifically
Articles I:1 and XIII716, apply fully to all imported bananas irrespective of their origin,
except to the extent that these obligations are waived ..."717
7.380 As Ecuador argues in these proceedings, the waiv er from Article XIII:1 and 2 adopted by the
Ministerial Conference in Doha718 "expired by its own terms on December 31, 2005.719"720 In the light
of the language of that waiver, and noting that the European Communities does not argue that that
waiver is still in force, the Panel finds that th ere is no waiver from Article XIII:1 and 2 of the
GATT 1994 that could apply to the European Communities' current banana import regime, introduced
on 1 January 2006. Thus, there is no waiver th at could exonerate the inconsistencies of the
European Communities' current bana na import regime with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the
GATT 1994.
7.381 Also, for the reasons set out by the Appellate Body earlier in this dispute
721, even if the Doha
Article I waiver applied to bananas beyond the e nd of 2005, which the Panel has already found not to
be the case 722, the coverage of that waiver from Article I could not be automatically extended to
Article XIII.
4. General conclusion
7.382 For the reasons explained above, the Panel conc ludes that the European Communities' current
banana import regime, in particular its pref erential tariff quota reserved for ACP countries, is
inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994. The Panel also concludes

715 (footnote original) Panel on Newsprint, adopted 20 November 1984, BISD 31S/114.
716 (footnote original) We do not agree with the Panel's findings that Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994
and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement preclude the imposition of different import licensing systems on like
products when imported from different Members. See our Findings and Conclusions, paras. (l) and (m).
717 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 191.
718 See Ministerial Conference, European Communities, Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous
Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001, (WT/MIN(01)/16),
14 November 2001.
719 (footnote original) European Communities – Transitional Regime For The EC – Autonomous Tariff
Rate Quotas On Imports Of Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16, 14 November 2001, para. 7.
720 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 28.
721 See Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 188.
722 See para. 7.200 above.

that there is no waiver that could exonerate the inconsistencies of the European Communities' current
banana import regime with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
E. ECUADOR'S CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE GATT 1994
1. Ecuador's claim
7.383 Ecuador argues that the European Communities' measure, consisting of "a tariff-rate quota
with a single duty rate applicable to bananas not benefiting from the zero duty tariff-rate quota" 723,
"applied to all bananas originating in Ecuador or other MFN countries" 724, constitutes a breach of the
European Communities' tariff binding on bananas 725. More specifically, Ecuador states that "the EC
applied duty of €176/mt must be he ld inconsistent with EC obligat ions under Article II of the GATT
and the EC's schedule of concessions" 726 and, in particular with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT
1994727.
7.384 In Ecuador's view:
"The EC tariff on bananas (HTS 0803.00 .12) remains bound in the EC GATT
schedule of concessions (Schedule CXL of the EC – 15) at a level of €75/mt, subject
to the annexed Agreement on Bananas, which elaborates the tariff rate quota regime.
Article II of the GATT forbids impositi on of duties in excess of bound rates in a
schedule."
728
7.385 Ecuador adds that:
"With respect to bananas, the EC's sc hedule consistent with the modalities for
agricultural products established in the Uruguay Round, has two elements, a bound
tariff quota intended to at least maintain pre-Uruguay Round access for bananas; and
a bound upper rate for bananas above the level of the tariff quota ...
The 75 Ecu/mt concession for 2.2 million mt was not made subject to the continued
existence of the Annex [to the European Communities' Schedule] or the BFA [the
Bananas Framework Agreement]. Paragr aph 9 of the BFA provides that 'this
agreement' (the BFA) applies until the end of 2002, but it does not provide that the
EC's GATT tariff quota concession expires at any time. The duty and quantity of the
tariff concession does not depend on the othe r terms and conditions as set out in the
annex, but rather is laid out in the schedul e itself. Expiration of the agreement would
thus not eliminate the tariff quota concession, which is not subject to the continued
effect of the BFA."
729
7.386 Ecuador concludes that the European Communitie s' measure, consisting of "a tariff rate quota
with a single duty rate applicable to bananas not benefiting from the zero duty tariff-rate quota", 730
applied to "all bananas originati ng in Ecuador or other MFN countries" 731 constitutes a breach of the

723 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 33.
724 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 52.
725 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 33.
726 Ibid., para. 34.
727 Ecuador's response to panel question No. 44.
728 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 33.
729 Ecuador's second written submission, paras. 53 and 58.
730 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 33.
731 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 52.

European Communities' tariff binding on bananas.
732 More specifically, Ecuador advances the claim
that the European Communities' duty of €176/mt is in consistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994.733
2. The European Communities' response
7.387 The European Communities responds that Ecua dor's claims under Article II of the GATT
1994 are "completely unfounded"734 because:
"[T]he bound tariff for bananas in the 'GATT schedule of concessions' of the
European Communities is €680 per ton and the tariff applied since January 1, 2006 is
€176 per ton".735
7.388 The European Communities states that:
"The European Communities' tariff commitm ents were initially included in Schedule
LXXX, which was incorporated into the le gal instruments embodying the results of
the Uruguay Round, executed on April 15, 1994. On December 15, 1994, the
European Communities announced its intention to withdraw Schedule LXXX as of
January 1, 1995, in order to prepare new schedules reflecting the accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden into the European Communities ...
The European Communities submitted to the WTO the new Schedule CXL on
March 14, 1996. However, still today, ther e are certain WTO Members that have not
yet lifted all objections necessary for the certification of Schedule CXL in accordance
with the GATT Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff
Concessions.
The European Communities announced its in tention to withdraw Schedule CXL on
January 19, 2004, in order to prepare ne w schedules reflecting the accession of ten
new member states to the European Comm unities on May 1, 2004... The relevant
negotiations conducted pursua nt to GATT Article XXIV and GATT Article XXVIII
are still pending. As a result, the European Communities has not yet submitted a new
schedule."
736
7.389 According to the European Communities:
"Both Schedule CXL and Schedule LXXX cont ain the same tariff concessions with
regard to bananas. In Part I, Secti on I A, under tariff item number 080300 12, it is
provided that the bound rate of duty for bana nas is €680 per ton. This is the only
bound tariff rate for bananas that currently exists in the Schedules of the European
Communities."737
7.390 The European Communities states that:
"Both Schedules [Schedules LXXX and CX L] included an additional concession in
the form of a tariff quota for 2.2 million tons of bananas to be imported at a tariff rate

732 Ecuador's first written submission, para. 33.
733 Ecuador's response to panel question No. 44.
734 European Communities' first written submission, para. 112.
735 Ibid.
736 Ibid., paras. 5-7 (footnote omitted).
737 Ibid., para. 8.

of €75 per ton. However, the Schedul es expressly provided that this additional
concession applied 'as indicated in the Annex' to Part I, Section I B of the Schedules.
The Annex, which is an integral part of the Schedules, provides that this tariff quota
would be operational as of October 1, 1994 and that it would expire on December 31,
2002. Therefore, on December 31, 2002, th is concession expired in accordance with
its terms and as of January 1, 2003, the onl y bound rate for bananas in the Schedules
of concessions of the European Communities is €680 per ton".738
7.391 The European Communities adds that:
"[E]ven if that concession [the tariff quota fo r 2.2 million tons of bananas at a tariff
rate of €75/mt] had not expired at the end of 2002, it is clear that it was lawfully
terminated on January 1, 2006, when the European Communities introduced the tariff
only import regime.
First [because] the tariff rate of €75 was not a simple and uncond itional 'bound tariff
rate'... [but, a]s with any tariff quota in the WTO system, the tariff rate of €75 was
'attached' to the quota of 2.2 million t ons and its existenc e depended upon the
existence of that quota. The abolition of the quota would inevitably bring along the
abolition of the corresponding tariff ...
Second [because the EC] was obliged to introduce a tariff only regime (and
consequently abolish the tariff quota for the 2.2 million tons of bananas) on
January 1, 2006, in order to comply with th e suggestions of the Panel [in the original
EC – Bananas III case] and the conditions of th e Understandings and the Doha
waiver".
739
3. Article II:1 of the GATT 1994
7.392 Under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994:
"(a) Each contracting party [Member] sha ll accord to the commerce of the other
contracting parties [Members] treatment no less favourable than that provided for in
the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting
party [Member], which are the products of territories of other contracting parties
[Members], shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates,
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualif ications set forth in that Schedule, be
exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided
therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on
the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed
thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date."

738 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 113-114. See also, Ibid., para. 9. See also,
European Communities' second written submission, para. 68.
739 European Communities' first written submission, paras. 122-124.

4. Panel's analysis
7.393 Regarding Ecuador's claim under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, this Panel is faced
with two questions. In the context of Article II:1( a), the issue is whether the European Communities
is according to the commerce of Ecuador or other MFN countries a treatment that is less favourable
than that provided for in the European Communities' Schedule. In the context of Article II:1(b) of the
GATT 1994, the issue is instead whether bananas orig inated in Ecuador or other MFN countries are
being subject to import duties in excess of those th at are provided for in the relevant part of the
European Communities' Schedule. The term MFN count ries is generally used by the parties to refer
to WTO Members that are not signatories to the Co tonou Agreement. In turn, MFN bananas are the
bananas originating in those countries.
740
7.394 In its report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , the Appellate Body elaborated upon the
meaning and scope of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994:
"The terms of Article II:1(a) require that a Member 'accord to the commerce of the
other Members treatment no less favourable than that provided for' in that Member's
Schedule ... Article II:1(b), first sentence, st ates, in part: 'The products described in
Part I of the Schedule ... shall, on their im portation into the territory to which the
Schedule relates, ... be exempt from ordina ry customs duties in excess of those set
forth and provided therein.' Paragraph (a) of Article II:1 contains a general
prohibition against according treatment less favourable to imports than that provided
for in a Member's Schedule. Paragraph (b ) prohibits a specific kind of practice that
will always be inconsistent w ith paragraph (a): that is, the application of ordinary
customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Schedule."
741
7.395 As for the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994,
in the same report, the Appellate Body stated that:
"In accordance with the general rules of treat y interpretation set out in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention, Article II:1(b), first sentence, must be read in its context and
in light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994. Article II:1(a) is part of the
context of Article II:1(b); it requires that a Member must accord to the commerce of
the other Members 'treatment no less favourable than that provided for' in its
Schedule. It is evident to us that the application of customs duties in excess of those
provided for in a Member's Schedule, in consistent with the first sentence of
Article II:1(b), constitutes 'less favourab le' treatment under the provisions of
Article II:1(a) …"
742
7.396 In the same report, the Appellate Body further added:
"Because the language of Article II:1(b), firs t sentence, is more specific and germane
to the case at hand, our interpretative anal ysis begins with, and focuses on, that
provision."743
7.397 Following the approach indicated by the Appella te Body, the Panel will begin its analysis
regarding Ecuador's claim against the European Communities' duty of €176/mt for bananas from
MFN countries with the first sentence of Article II:1( b) of the GATT 1994. In this regard, the Panel

740 See para.2.49 above.
741 Appellate Body Report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45.
742 Ibid., para. 47.
743 Ibid., para. 45.

needs to ascertain: (a) the tr eatment granted to bananas imported from MFN countries under the
challenged measure; (b) the treatment provided fo r bananas from WTO Members under Part I of the
the European Communities' Schedule; and (c) whether the challenged measure results in the
imposition on bananas from MFN countries of ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and
provided in Part I of the European Communities' Sche dule. Only then will the Panel turn, if needed,
to the issue of whether the duty of €176/mt for ba nanas accords to the commerce of Ecuador or other
WTO Members a less favourable tr eatment than that provided for in the European Communities'
Schedule.744
(a) Treatment accorded by the European Communities to bananas from MFN countries
7.398 The basic facts pertaining to the treatment acco rded by the European Communities to imports
of bananas from MFN countries ar e not contested between the parti es. Under the terms of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005, since 1 January 2006, the tariff applied by the
European Communities to MFN imports of bananas has been set at €176/mt.745
7.399 In turn, under the terms of Regulation 1964/ 2005, and in accordance with the European
Communities' commitments under the ACP-EC Part nership Agreement, also known as the Cotonou
Agreement, the EC also allows duty-free access into its market to an annual quota of 775,000 mt
bananas of ACP origin. 746 In addition, the European Commun ities allows duty-free access into its
market to bananas originating from least develope d countries, under a scheme of generalized tariff
preferences, the so-called "Everything But Arms" (EBA) arrangement.747
7.400 No allowance is made by the European Comm unities for the maintenance of any tariff quota
allowing the importation of bananas from MFN countries at rates below the €176/mt tariff duty.
(b) Treatment provided for bananas from WTO Members under the European Communities'
Schedule
(i) Description of the relevant language in the European Communities' Schedule
7.401 The Panel will now turn to the issue of the treatment provided for bananas from WTO
Members under the European Communities' Schedule. 748 For the purpose of this dispute, the relevant
treatment is the one accorded in the European Communities' Schedule to bananas (corresponding to
tariff item 0803 00 19).
7.402 As noted in the factual section of this report, for all practical purposes, with respect to tariff
heading 0803, Part I, Section I.A (Tariffs) of the European Communities' Schedule LXXX and
Schedule CXL have identical provisions.749 Under the terms of this section, the tariff rate for bananas
(corresponding to tariff item 0803 00 19) is bound at €680/mt.750

744 cf. Panel Report on EC – Chicken Cuts (Brazil), para. 7.65.
745 See para. 2.40 above.
746 See para. 2.40 above.
747 Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005. See European Communities' response to
panel question No. 53, paras. 109-112. See para. 2.41 above.
748 Part I, Sections I.A and I.B, of the EC Schedul e, as well as the Bananas Framework Agreement, use
the terms ECU or ECU/mt. As noted above, as a result of the introduction of the Euro (€), from 1 January 1999
all references to ECU in these documents were replaced by the term Euro (€). See para. 2.28 above.
749 See para. 2.25 above.
750 Ibid.

7.403 Likewise, Part I, Section I.B (Tariff quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule LXXX
and Schedule CXL have identi cal provisions for bananas.
751 Under the terms of this section, the
European Communities has committed to granting a tariff quota for 2.2 million mt of bananas at a
bound in-quota tariff rate of €75/ mt. This tariff quota commitment is classified under the subsection
entitled "Current Access Quotas" and is qualified by the following terms and conditions: "As
indicated in the Annex". 752 The Annex referred to in both th e European Communities' Schedule
LXXX and Schedule CXL is the so-called "Framework Agreement on Bananas" (Bananas Framework
Agreement or BFA).753
7.404 The Bananas Framework Agreemen t contains various provisions pertaining to the operation
of the tariff quota for bananas. Inter alia , the provisions in the Bananas Framework Agreement
confirm the quota quantity and the in-quota tariff ra te, allocate the quota between different countries
and state that the "agreement will be incorporat ed into the Community's Uruguay Round Schedule"
and that the "agreement shall apply until 31 December 2002".754
(ii) The task before this Panel
7.405 The treatment provided for bananas from WT O Members under the European Communities'
Schedule must be determined by c onsidering the language contained in Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs)
and I.B (Tariff quotas) of the European Communitie s' Schedule, as well as in the Bananas Framework
Agreement that is an annex to that Schedule. The European Communities' Schedule LXXX was the
result of negotiations during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. It was annexed
to the Marrakesh Protocol. 755 In turn, the European Communitie s' Schedule CXL was submitted to
the WTO in March 1996. 756 As of 1 May 2004, Schedule CXL was withdrawn by the European
Communities, in the light of the European Comm unities' process of enlargement to 25 member
States.757 As noted, the language with respect to bananas contained in both the European
Communities' Schedule LXXX and Schedule CXL is identical.758
7.406 After the European Communities withdrew its Schedule CXL as of 1 May 2004, no new
Schedule of Concessions has yet been submitted and certified (for the current European Communities
of 25 member States) as of the date of this report, as the relevant negotiations under Article XXIV and
Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 are still pending. 759 In a communication dated 15 July 2004, the
European Communities informed the WTO Members of its intention to modify concessions on item
0803 00 19 (bananas) included in Schedule CXL. 760 Two new member States subsequently acceded
to the European Communities on 1 January 2007 761 and, as of the date of this report, the European
Communities is still in the process of concluding th e relevant negotiations under Article XXIV and
Article XXVIII.762
7.407 The language contained in the European Commun ities' Schedules and described above in its
relevant parts is not contested between the parties. Indeed, in spite of the pending negotiations under
Article XXIV and Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, th e parties agreed that the Panel should base its

751 See para. 2.26 above.
752 Ibid.
753 See para. 2.27 above.
754 Ibid.
755 See para. 2.23 above.
756 See para. 2.24 above.
757 See paras. 2.14 and 2.29 above.
758 See European Communities' response to panel question No. 24, paras. 79-81.
759 Ibid.
760 See para. 2.15 above.
761 See para. 2.20 above.
762 See para. 2.29 above.

decision on the identical text of the European Communities' Schedule LXXX and Schedule CXL. 763
The main area of contention between the parties is rather whether the European Communities is still
bound to maintain a quota of 2.2 million mt of bananas at a bound tariff rate of €75/mt. More
specifically, the parties hold opposite views regard ing whether the European Communities' binding of
the tariff quota was limited in time by the Bananas Framework Agreement.
764
7.408 Accordingly, the main task before this Panel, regarding the issue of the treatment provided for
bananas from WTO Members under the European Commun ities' Schedule, is to ascertain whether the
European Communities' concession to maintain a quota of 2.2 million mt of bananas at a bound tariff
rate of €75/mt is still valid after 31 December 20 02 or, on the contrary, whether this concession
expired as of such date, under paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, leaving the
€680/mt bound rate of duty as the only binding commitment for bananas under the European
Communities' Schedule. For this purpose, the Pa nel will interpret the terms contained in the
European Communities' Schedule.
(iii) General rules of interpretation
7.409 As noted by the panel on EC – Chicken Cuts:
"Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that the schedules annexed to the
GATT 1994 are made an integral part of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body in
 EC – Computer Equipment clarified that Article II:7 means that the concessions
provided for in such schedules are part of the terms of the treaty, namely the GATT
1994.
765 Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement pr ovides that the Agreements contained
in the Annexes to the WTO Agreement, which includes the GATT 1994, are integral
parts of the WTO Agreement. Therefore, on the basis of Article II:7 of the GATT
1994 and Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement, concessions contained in the EC
Schedule are treaty terms of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement."
766
7.410 Given that the provisions contained in the European Communities' Schedules are to be
considered integral parts of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, as treaty language they must be
read "in accordance with customary rules of inte rpretation of public intern ational law". Indeed,
Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that:
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral tradin g system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpret ation of public international law . Recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements." (emphasis added)
7.411 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)
codify "customary rules of interpretation of pub lic international law" within the meaning of

763 See Ecuador's and the European Communities' response to panel question No. 24.
764 See, in particular, Ecuador's s econd written submission, paras. 53-67, European Communities' first
written submission, paras. 113-121, and European Communities' second written submission, paras. 68-90.
765 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
766 Panel Report on EC – Chicken Cuts (Brazil), para. 7.6.

Article 3.2 of the DSU.
767 These provisions comprise the legal framework within which any
interpretative exercise of language contained in the WTO covered agreements must take place.
7.412 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in goo d faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the trea ty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the inte rpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the appli cation of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international la w applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a te rm if it is established that the parties
so intended."
7.413 In turn, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary me ans of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
7.414 As noted by the Appellate Body in its report on US – Shrimp:

767 See, inter alia, Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 17; Appellate Body Report on India –
Patents (US), para. 45; and Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 114.

"A treaty interpreter must begin with, a nd focus upon, the text of the particular
provision to be interpreted. It is in the wo rds constituting that provision, read in their
context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be
sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive,
or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired,
light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought."768
7.415 In its report on US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body had also stated that:
"One of the corollaries of the 'gener al rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention
is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."769
7.416 As noted in its report by the panel on US – Section 301 Trade Act , the various elements
provided for in Article 31 "are to be viewed as one holistic rule of inte rpretation rather than a
sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order"770. Accordingly, the criteria contained
in that provision are not to be applied in isolati on of each other. In any event, we note that the
purpose of treaty interpretation is "to ascertain the common intentions of the parties".771
(iv) Interpretation of the European Communities' Schedule as it refers to bananas
Uncontested facts
7.417 As noted above, there is no controversy between the parties that, under Part I, Section I.A
(Tariffs) of its Schedule, the European Communities' tariff binding for bananas, other than plantains,
is €680/mt. Section I.B (Tariff quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule contains an additional
concession for such bananas, namely, a 2.2 million mt quota at a €75/mt in-quota rate. This additional
concession is subject to the following qualification specified under the column of "terms and
conditions": "As indicated in the Annex". The Annex referred to in the column of "terms and
conditions" for bananas is the "Framework Agreement on Bananas" (Bananas Framework
Agreement). This Bananas Framework Agreement lays out the conditions for the operation of the
tariff quota and, in paragraph 9, specifically pr ovides that: "This agreement shall apply until
31 December 2002."
Ecuador's argument

7.418 We note Ecuador's argument that, while the Bananas Framework Agreement expired on
31 December 2002 772, the tariff quota of 2.2 million mt at a bound tariff rate of €75/mt is still in
force773:
"The 75 Ecu/mt concession for 2.2 million mt was not made subject to the continued
existence of the Annex or the BFA. Paragraph 9 of the BFA provides that 'this
agreement' (the BFA) applies until the end of 2002, but it does not provide that the
EC's GATT tariff quota concession expires at any time. The duty and quantity of the
tariff concession does not depend on the othe r terms and conditions as set out in the

768 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 114.
769 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 23.
770 Panel Report on US – Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.22.
771 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
772 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 45.
773 Ecuador's second written submission, paras. 53-6 0; and Ecuador's response to Panel questions
No. 25, No. 26, No. 27 and No. 45.

annex, but rather is laid out in the schedul e itself. Expiration of the agreement would
thus not eliminate the tariff quota concession, which is not subject to the continued
effect of the BFA ..."
774
The European Communities' response
7.419 The European Communities responds to this argument by stating that:
"The Annex [to Part I, Section I.B of th e European Communities' Schedule], which is
an integral part of the Schedules, 775 provides that this tariff quota would be
operational as of October 1, 1994 and that it would expire on December 31, 2002.
Therefore, on December 31, 2002, this c oncession expired in accordance with its
terms and as of January 1, 2003, the only bound rate for bananas in the Schedules of
concessions of the European Communities is €680 per ton."776
Consideration of all relevant terms contained in the European Communities' Schedule
7.420 The correct interpretation of the European Co mmunities' Schedule requires the consideration
of all the relevant terms contained in Part I, Sec tions I.A and I.B, of that Schedule, as well as those
contained in the Bananas Framework Agreement.
7.421 As noted, Part I, Section I.A, of the Europ ean Communities' Schedule provides that the tariff
rate for bananas (corresponding to tariff item 0803 00 12 or 0803 00 19) is bound at €680/mt. In turn,
Part I, Section I.B, of the European Commun ities' Schedule reflects the European Communities'
concession for bananas to maintain a quota of 2.2 m illion mt at a bound tariff rate of €75/mt, subject
to the terms and conditions "indicated in the Annex" (the Bananas Framework Agreement).
7.422 Under Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994:
"The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any [Member], which are
the products of territories of other [Members], shall, on their importation into the
territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or
qualifications set forth in that Schedule , be exempt from ordinary customs duties in
excess of those set forth and provided therein." (emphasis added).
7.423 In other words, Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994 specifically allows WTO Members to
subject the concessions contained in their schedules to the "terms, conditions or qualifications set
forth in that Schedule".
7.424 As specifically provided for under column 7 of Section I.B, Part I, of the European
Communities' Schedule, the European Communities' concession regarding bananas, to maintain a
quota of 2.2 million mt at a bound tariff rate of €75/mt, is subject to terms, conditions or qualifications
defined in the following way: "As indicated in th e Annex". This Annex is none other than the
Bananas Framework Agreement.
7.425 All elements of the European Communities' ta riff quota for bananas are described in the
Bananas Framework Agreement, including not only th e quota quantity and the in-quota tariff rate but
also details pertaining to the operation of the system, such as the allocation of country-specific quotas,

774 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 58.
775 (footnote original) See Article 10 of the Annex, which provides that it should be "incorporated into
the Community's Uruguay Rounds Schedule".
776 European Communities' first written submission, para. 114.

the management of the quotas and the duration of th e system. As a matter of fact, certain provisions
of the Bananas Framework Agreement, such as the allocation of country-specific quota shares, but not
the Bananas Framework Agreement as a whole, we re found in the original proceedings to be
inconsistent with the WTO agreements.777
7.426 The European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas must therefore be
understood, under the "terms, conditions or qualifications" set forth in column 7 of Section I.B, Part I,
of the European Communities' Schedule, to be subject to what is indicated in the Bananas Framework
Agreement. In other words, the European Comm unities' tariff quota concession for bananas provided
for in column 7 of Section I.B, Part I, of the European Communities' Schedule cannot be read in
isolation from the terms in the Bananas Framework Agreement.
7.427 Paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement states that "[t]his agreement shall apply
until 31 December 2002". This provision is, for the reasons stated above, part of the "terms,
conditions or qualifications" that apply to th e European Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas. As provided in column 7 of Section I. B, Part I, of the EC Schedule, the European
Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas is subject to what is indicated in the Bananas
Framework Agreement. Accordingly, the expi ration of the Bananas Framework Agreement on
31 December 2002 would automatically imply expira tion of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession under the terms of its Schedule. The European Communities could subsequently, of
course, renegotiate any new concession for bananas in its Schedule, subject to the completion of the
appropriate procedures, whether or not under Artic le XXIV of the GATT 1994 in the context of an
enlargement of its member States.
7.428 The Panel notes Ecuador's argument that "[t]he duty and quantity of the tariff concession does
not depend on the other terms and conditions as set out in the annex [the Bananas Framework
Agreement], but rather is laid out in the schedule itself." 778 The Panel reads this statement to mean
that, in Ecuador's view, the quota quantity, as well as the in-quota duty, applicable to the European
Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, are laid out in Part I, Section I.B, of the European
Communities' Schedule, although both are also mentione d in paragraphs 1 and 7, respectively, of the
Bananas Framework Agreement. The European Communities' Schedule as it refers to bananas,
however, does not only comprise Part I, Sections I.A and I.B, but also, as we have noted above, the
Bananas Framework Agreement.
7.429 However, even if we agree that the quota quan tity, as well as the in-quota duty, applicable to
the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, are laid out in the European
Communities' Schedule, it does not follow that: "E xpiration of the agreement would... not eliminate
the tariff quota concession, which is not subj ect to the continued effect of the BFA."
779 Indeed, the
European Communities' concession to grant a tariff quot a for bananas is specifically subject to the
"terms, conditions or qualifications" set forth in the Bananas Framework Agreement. These terms
include the fact that the agreement would only a pply only until 31 December 2002. As Ecuador itself
admits780, there is nothing in the WTO Agreement th at would prevent a Member from qualifying a
specific concession in its Schedule by subjecting it to a date of expiry. As noted by the GATT panel
on US – Sugar Waiver:
"Although the granting of concessions c onditional upon the discretion of the
concession-granting government may not be meaningful because of the obvious legal
uncertainty thereby created, the Genera l Agreement does not oblige contracting

777 See paras. 2.65 to 2.67 above.
778 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 58.
779 Ibid.
780 Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 99.

parties to make concessions and specifically allows them in Article II:1(b) to subject
to conditions the concessions they decide to make."
781
Consideration of the object and purpose of the WTO Agreements
7.430 Under the general customary rule of interpretati on of public international law, as codified in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the Panel is di rected to interpret the te rms of a treaty in their
context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose.
7.431 The object and purpose of the WTO Agreement can be deduced from its preamble and from
the preambles of the agreements that are annexe d to it. The preamble of the WTO Agreement
specifies that one of the purposes of the Agreement is to "expand... trade in goods and services". It
also states that Members should contribute to the above-mentioned expans ion "by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements di rected to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade."
7.432 In this respect, in EC – Computer Equipment the Appellate Body stated that:
"[T]he security and predictability of 'the reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduc tion of tariffs and other trade barriers to
trade' is an object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of the
GATT 1994."782
7.433 This general object and purpose is consistent with the more specific object and purpose of
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. Indeed, the requirement in these provisions that Members
shall not accord to the products of other Members a "t reatment less favourable than that provided for"
in their respective Schedules of Concessions, is comp atible with the objective of promoting security
and predictability in international trade, through th e exchange of concessions that are contained in
Schedules that are multilaterally approved and become binding on all WTO Members as integral parts
of their commitments under the WTO agreements.
7.434 In the light of the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994,
concessions made by WTO Members should be interp reted so as to further the general objective of
expanding trade in goods and services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements. At the same time, in order to promote security
and predictability, such an interpretation is limite d by the specific terms, conditions and qualifications
contained in the Members' respective Schedules of Concessions.
7.435 Accordingly, a consideration of the terms of the European Communities' Schedule, which
takes into account Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs ) and I.B (Tariff quotas) and the Bananas Framework
Agreement, is consistent with the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the GATT 1994 and,
more specifically, of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT.
7.436 In conclusion, in light of the ordinary meani ng to be given to the terms of the European
Communities' Schedule, taking into account Part I, S ections I.A (Tariffs) and I.B (Tariff quotas), and
the Bananas Framework Agreement, in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose,
the European Communities' tariff quota concession fo r bananas was unequivocally intended to expire
on 31 December 2002. The alternative reading of the Schedule suggested by Ecuador would reduce
to inutility Paragraph 9 and, indeed, the whole Bana nas Framework Agreement. It would amount to a
partial reading of the European Communities' Sche dule, limited to columns 1 to 4 of Section I.B,

781 GATT Panel Report on US – Sugar Waiver, para. 5.8.
782 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 82.

Part I, of the European Communities' Schedule, i gnoring the language containe d in column 7 and in
the Bananas Framework Agreement.
Subsequent agreement between the parties
Treatment of subsequent agreement between the parties
7.437 The Panel has so far noted the terms of the European Communities' Schedule, taking into
account Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs) and I.B (T ariff quotas), and the Bananas Framework Agreement,
in their context and in the light of the treaty' s object and purpose. However, under the general
customary rule of interpretation of public interna tional law, as codified in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, the Panel is also directed to take into account, together with the context:
"(a) any subsequent agreement between th e parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the appli cation of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international la w applicable in the relations between the
parties."
7.438 In the light of this rule of interpretation, th e Panel must therefore determine whether there is
any subsequent agreement between the parties, a ny subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty, or any relevant rules of international law th at are relevant for the task of identifying what was
the common intention of the WTO Members, re garding the European Communities' tariff quota
concession for bananas. The Panel has already noted that, pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994,
the Schedules of Concessions of WTO Members are an integral part of the GATT 1994 and, more
generally, an integral part of the WTO Agreement. Consequently, in the context of the interpretation
of such Schedules, any subse quent agreement between the parties, regarding the European
Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, in the terms of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, is to be understood as any subsequent agreement between the WTO Members.
Evidence of subsequent agreement between th e parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions
7.439 Paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement states that:
"This agreement shall apply until 31 Decemb er 2002. Full consultations with the
Latin American suppliers that are GATT Memb ers should start no later than in year
2001..."783
7.440 On its face, the second sentence of paragraph 9 ca lls for consultations to take place, starting
"no later than in year 2001", between the Europ ean Communities and the Latin American suppliers,
presumably to negotiate the new terms and conditions that the European Communities would apply to
imports of bananas after 31 December 2002. The te rms of the text do not prejudge the result of the
consultations that would take place between th e European Communities and the Latin American
suppliers. At the same time, those same terms do not exclude the possibility that the concession on
bananas could be extended as a result of the cons ultations. Indeed, the European Communities has
stated that, pursuant to the Bananas Framework Agreement, "the parties had agreed to negotiate a new

783 See also, European Communities' second written submission, para. 78.

banana import system as of 2001", thereby ensuri ng that, "before the expiration of this concession
they would have the opportunity to negotiate new concessions".
784
7.441 On 14 November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Co nference meeting in Doha approved the
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement waiver (Doha Waiver). 785 In its preamble to the Doha Waiver, the
WTO Members noted, among other things:
"[T]hat the tariff applied to bananas im ported in the 'A' and 'B' quotas shall not
exceed 75 €/tonne until the entry into force of the new EC tariff-only regime.
[T]hat the implementation of the preferen tial tariff treatment for bananas may be
affected as a result of GATT Article XXVIII negotiations;
[T]he assurances from the Par ties to the Agreement that any re-binding of the EC
tariff on bananas under the relevant GATT Article XXVIII procedures should result
in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers and their
willingness to accept a multilateral control on the implementation of this
commitment."
786
7.442 In turn, the Bananas Annex to the Doha Waiver provides, inter alia, that:
"The waiver would apply for ACP pr oducts under the Cotonou Agreement until
31 December 2007. In the case of banan as, the waiver will also apply until 31
December 2007, subject to the following, which is without prejudice to rights and
obligations under Article XXVIII.
The parties to the Cotonou Agreement w ill initiate consultations with Members
exporting to the EU on a MFN basis (interested parties) early enough to finalize the
process of consultations under the procedures hereby established at least three months
before the entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime.
No later than 10 days after the conclusi on of Article XXVIII negotiations, interested
parties will be informed of the EC intentions concerning the rebinding of the EC tariff
on bananas. In the course of such cons ultations, the EC will provide information on
the methodology used for such rebinding. In this regard, all EC WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas should be taken into account."787 (emphasis added)
7.443 The Doha Waiver is an agreement reached between the same parties to the Bananas
Framework Agreement 788 (i.e., the WTO Members), it is subsequent to the Bananas Framework
Agreement, and, like the Bananas Framework Agreement, it deals, inter alia , with the European
Communities' WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas. Similarly to what is provided
for in paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Ag reement, under the Doha Waiver the European
Communities is committed to engage in consultati ons with WTO Members exporting bananas to the
European Communities on an MFN basis. Given the se factors, the Doha Waiver, as it relates to the

784 European Communities' second written submission, para. 80.
785 Ministerial Conference, Europe an Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision
of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001.
786 Ibid.
787 Ibid. (Emphasis added).
788 Although the Bananas Framework Agreement was originally negotiated in 1994 between the
European Communities, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Nicaragua (see Panel Report on EC – Bananas III
(Ecuador), para. 3.30), it was made an integral part of the WT O agreements, by virtue of its incorporation as an
annex to the European Communities Schedule and thus became multilateral in nature.

European Communities' WTO market-access commitmen ts relating to bananas, is a "subsequent
agreement between the parties" to the Banan as Framework Agreement (i.e., the WTO Members),
regarding the application of the provisions of the WT O agreement as it pertains to such market access
commitments. In other words, in order to ascer tain the common intentions of the WTO Members,
regarding the European Communities' WTO market access commitments rela ting to bananas, we
cannot ignore the agreement reached between the WTO Members through the Doha Waiver.
The extension of the European Commun ities' tariff quota concession for bananas
beyond the date of expiration in the Bananas Framework Agreement
7.444 As noted above, the Doha Waiver recognizes the WTO Members' common intention that,
until the entry into force of the new European Co mmunities' tariff-only regime, the in-quota tariff
applied to bananas "shall not exceed 75€/mt", as we ll as the common intention that any rebinding of
the European Communities' tariff on bananas under GATT Article XXVIII procedures "should result
in at least maintaining total market access for MF N banana suppliers". The Doha Waiver also
provides that, in the case of bananas, the waiver would apply "without prejudice to rights and
obligations under Article XXVIII", and that, in th e process of Article XXVIII negotiations for the
purpose of the rebinding of the European Comm unities' tariff on bananas, "all EC WTO market-
access commitments relating to bananas should be taken into account".
789
7.445 Under the terms of the Doha Waiver, the Eur opean Communities is committed to maintaining
its concessions regarding bananas contained in Part I, Section I.A (Tariffs) and Section I.B (Tariff
quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule, un til the entry into force of the new European
Communities' tariff-only regime. 790 Such a tariff-only regime would result from a rebinding of the
European Communities' concession on bananas, subsequent to negotia tions under GATT Article
XXVIII procedures.791
7.446 In adopting the Doha Waiver, the WTO Memb ers agreed to extend the duration of the
European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas beyond 31 December 2002, the date of
expiration envisaged in the Bananas Framework Agre ement. As a result, the European Communities'
tariff quota concession for bananas, as contained in Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs) and I.B (Tariff
quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule, w ould remain in force until the completion of the
Article XXVIII negotiations for the purpose of the rebinding of the European Communities' tariff on
bananas and the subsequent entry into force of a new European Communities' tariff regime. While
some aspects of the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, as described in the
Bananas Framework Agreement, ha d to be modified as a result of the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the DSB in the EC – Bananas III case, the basic aspects of such concession and, more
specifically, the quota quantity and the in-quota tariff rate, as described in co lumn 4 of Section I.B,
Part I, of the European Communities' Schedule, are not as such affected by these recommendations
and rulings.
7.447 The European Communities has confirmed that Article XXVIII negotiations for the purpose
of the rebinding of the European Communities' c oncession on bananas, as envisaged in the Doha
Waiver, have not yet been concluded.
792 There is no provision in the WTO Agreement that would

789 Ministerial Conference, Europe an Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Decision
of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/15), 14 November 2001.
790 Ibid.
791 Ibid., preamble, recital 11, and Bananas Annex.
792 See European Communities' first written submission, paras. 6 and 7, European Communities' second
written submission, para. 87, and European Communities' response to panel question No. 9, paras. 18-19,

allow a Member to unilaterally modify the con cessions contained its Schedule, unless procedures for
renegotiation of such Schedule are formally concluded.
7.448 The Panel has noted the European Communities' statement that:
"[E]ven if that concession [the tariff quota fo r 2.2 million tons of bananas at a tariff
rate of €75/mt] had not expired at the end of 2002, it is clear that it was lawfully
terminated on January 1, 2006, when the European Communities introduced the tariff
only import regime."
793
7.449 The Panel reads this argument to mean that, in the European Communities' view, the entry
into force of the "new EC import regime" for bananas would be enough to modify the European
Communities' concession. However, the final sentence of the fifth tiret of the Bananas Annex to the
Doha Waiver expressly provides that:
"The Article XXVIII negotiations and the ar bitration procedures shall be concluded
before the entry into force of the new EC tariff only regime on 1 January 2006".
(emphasis added)
7.450 Furthermore, the chapeau of the Bananas Annex states that the waiver is "without prejudice to
rights and obligations under Article XXVIII [of the GATT 1994]"
7.451 Accordingly, the appropriate procedures must be finalized, before the concession can be
legitimately modified or withdrawn and replaced with a new one.
7.452 The Panel additionally notes that Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 (Modification of
Schedules) deals with the renegotiation of concessi ons contained in the Schedule of a WTO Member
that is annexed to the GATT 1994. This provisi on allows Members to modify or withdraw a
concession included in the appropriate Schedul e annexed to the GATT 1994, but only through
negotiation and agreement with Members holding special rights. Once these negotiations are
concluded, the Member shall submit a draft reflec ting the modifications to be introduced to its
schedule resulting from the Article XXVIII negotiati ons to the Director-General, who will in turn
communicate such a draft to the Members. The chan ges would then be certified, provided no relevant
objection is raised by the Members.
794 No withdrawal or modification of the original European
Communities' schedule has so far been certified.
7.453 The European Communities argues that:
"[T]he Panel should disregard Ecuador's claims under Article XXVIII of the GATT,
because Ecuador did not include any Artic le XXVIII claims in its request for the
establishment of the Panel and, therefore, an analysis of Article XXVIII issues is not
within the Terms of Reference of this Panel."795
7.454 The examination of a claim relating to a possible breach of GATT Article XXVIII of the
GATT 1994 would be outside the terms of reference of this Panel. Nevertheless, in light of the
specific matter before this Panel and because of th e numerous references made to Article XXVIII in
the Doha Waiver, the Panel cannot totally disregard this provision. The combined reading of Articles
II and XXVIII of the GATT 1994 implies that, un til negotiations under the latter provision are

793 European Communities' first written submission, para. 122.
794 Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Decision of
26 March 1980 (L/4962).
795 See European Communities' response to panel question No. 28, para. 93.

formally concluded, a Member continues to be bou nd by the concessions contained in its Schedule.
This is so even though, as in this case, the concession was originally intended to expire on
31 December 2002.
Conclusion regarding the subsequent agreement between the parties
7.455 In light of the above, and more specifically, of the terms of the Doha Waiver, the common
intention of the WTO Members, regarding the European Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas, cannot have been that the concessions fo r MFN banana suppliers contained in such tariff
quota, contained in column 4 of Section 1.B, Part I, of the European Communities' Schedule, would
expire on 31 December 2002 upon expiration of the Bananas Framework Agreement. Neither would
it have been that, lacking completion of the relevant GATT Article XXVIII procedures, those market
access opportunities for MFN banana suppliers would not be preserved.
7.456 On the contrary, the common intention of the WT O Members, as reflected in the text of the
Doha Waiver, is that all the European Commun ities' WTO market-access commitments relating to
bananas would be taken into account for the purpose of the rebinding of the European Communities'
tariff, in the context of the GATT Article XXVIII ne gotiations, so that the rebinding of the tariff on
bananas would result in at least maintaining total ma rket access for MFN banana suppliers. It is also
the common intention of the WTO Members that, pending the completion of the Article XXVIII
negotiations for the purpose of the rebinding of the European Communities' tariff on bananas, and the
subsequent entry into force of a new Europ ean Communities' tariff regime, the European
Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, as contained in Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs) and
I.B (Tariff quotas) of the European Communities' Schedule, would contin ue to constitute the
European Communities' scheduled commitments regarding bananas.
Consideration of supplementary means of interpretation

Treatment of supplementary means of interpretation
7.457 Under the customary rules of interpretation of pub lic international law, as codified in Article
32 of the Vienna Convention, the Panel may also have recourse to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. In
the present case it is useful to have recourse to such supplementary means of interpretation in order to
determine whether those instruments confirm th e meaning resulting from the application of the
general rule of interpretation codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
7.458 The Panel notes in this regard that parties have provided extensive arguments and factual
information that may be relevant as supplementary means of interpretation in order to ascertain the
common intention of WTO Members, regarding the European Communities' tariff quota concession
for bananas. The Panel accordingly considers th ese arguments and information advanced by the
parties.
Arguments provided by the parties
7.459 Ecuador refers to a number of factors related to the context and history of the European
Communities' tariff quota for bananas. Ecuador ar gues, for example, that, in accordance with the
modalities for the agricultural ma rket access negotiations that took place in the Uruguay Round, the
tariff quota was "bound at a level intended to preserve pre-Uruguay Round access".796

796 Ecuador's second written submission, paras. 53 and 59.

7.460 The European Communities responds that the Modalities Paper for the Uruguay Round
agricultural market access negotiations was issued w ith the explicit qualification that it would "not be
used as a basis for dispute settlement proceedi ngs" under the WTO Agreement. The European
Communities consequently asks the Panel to disregard Ecuador's arguments built on such
document.
797
7.461 Ecuador also argues that, "[h]ad the Parties intended to bind the tariff quota only for so long
as the [Bananas Framework Agreement] applied... th ey would have specified the limited duration of
the concession [rather than of the agreement] in the [Bananas Framework Agreement]." 798 In
Ecuador's view:
"The duty and quantit y of the tariff concession does not depend on the other terms
and conditions as set out in the annex, but ra ther is laid out in the schedule itself.
Expiration of the agreement would thus not eliminate the tariff quota concession,
which is not subject to the continued effect of the BFA ...
[I]t is scarcely likely that the negotiato rs of the [Bananas Framework Agreement]
would [have considered] a satisfactory solution a system that, as of 2003, would leave
all their banana exports to the EC subject to an essentially prohibitive duty of
€680/mt".
799
7.462 In response to this argument, the European Communities notes that Ecuador has stated that:
"It would de-stabilize the entire premise of the WTO tariff system if concessions were
to be adjusted according to whether the concessions had the result contemplated at the
time that the concession was granted."800
7.463 The European Communities adds that "the par ties had agreed to negotiate a new banana
import system as of 2001" (one year before the e xpiration of the European Communities' tariff quota
concession, an anticipated in the Bananas Framewor k Agreement), thereby ensuring that "they would
have an important quantity exported at a low tari ff" until the end of 2002 and that, "before the
expiration of this concession they would have the opportunity to negotiate new concessions".801
7.464 Ecuador also argues that:
"If the only EC binding after 2002 were at a level of €680/mt, there would have been
no reference to Article XXVIII negotiations [in the Doha Waiver]... Plainly, the
waiver called for Article XXVIII negotiations because of the possibility that the EC
would seek to rebind its MFN duty at a le vel above the bound tariff rate quota of
75Ecu/mt."802
7.465 In Ecuador's view:
"If €680/mt was the EC's only bound rate as of January 1, 2003, the EC would never
even have issued an Article XXVIII notif ication [such as those filed in August 2004

797 European Communities' second written submission, paras. 70-72.
798 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 58.
799 Ibid., paras. 58-59.
800 European Communities' second written submissi on, para. 79, quoting Ecuador's second written
submission, para. 25.
801 European Communities' second written submission, para. 80.
802 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 61.

and February 2005]... No Member would invoke Article XXVIII:5 procedures to
lower its bound rate."803
7.466 To this argument, the European Communities responds that "Ecuador's link between the
initiation of negotiations under GATT Article XXVIII and the expiration of the tariff quota for the
2.2 million tons is erroneous and di sregards the facts of this case". 804 In the European Communities'
view:
"[The European Communities] was obliged to initiate negotiations in accordance with
GATT Article XXVIII both by the [Bananas] Understanding and by the Doha
waiver... [and] the initiation of the GATT Article XXVIII negotiations by the [EC]
does not amount to a supposedly de facto 'rebinding' of that tariff quota".
805
7.467 The European Communities also argues that:
"[T]his Panel does not need to proceed to a full legal analysis of the provisions of
GATT Article XXVIII and, in particular, rule on whether the GATT Article XXVIII
procedures must be followed only when a WTO Member intends to increase its
bound rates, or also when it intends to lower its bindings."
806
7.468 The European Communities further states that:
"[G]iven the facts of this case, this Panel does not need to proceed to a full legal
analysis of the provisions of GATT Article XXVIII and, in particular, rule on whether
the GATT Article XXVIII procedures must be followed only when a WTO Member
intends to increase its bound rates, or also when it intends to lower its bindings.
Without taking a position on this issue, the European Communities simply notes that
the panel report in EEC-Newsprint may support the proposition that 'under long
standing GATT practice, even purely formal changes in the tariff schedules of a
contracting party which may not affect the GATT rights of other countries, such as
the conversion of a specific to an ad valorem duty without an increase in the
protective effect of the tariff rate in qu estion, have been considered to require
renegotiations'.
807"808
7.469 Ecuador notes that "[t]he first award of the Arbitrator in 2005 reflects the common
understanding that tariff quota remained bound in Schedule CXL".809 In Ecuador's view:
"[T]he EC, the Arbitrator, and the WTO me mbers as a whole have consistently and
repeatedly treated the tariff quota bananas as bound past the expiration date of the
[Bananas Framework Agreement]. Indeed, until the EC's submission of July 20 to
this Panel, the EC has never argued to the contrary, never objected to any statement to
the contrary, never contended that it would not need to go through Article XXVIII to
bind a duty above 75 Ecu/mt... Neither has any other WTO Member, Panelist or
Arbitrator taken the position that the EC now espouses. This consensus, now

803 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 62.
804 European Communities' second written submission, para. 85.
805 Ibid., para. 86.
806 Ibid., para. 88.
807 (footnote original) See the Report of the GATT Panel on Newsprint , dated October 17, 1984 and
adopted on November 20, 1984, at paragraph 50.
808 European Communities' second written submission, para. 88.
809 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 65.

breached by the EC, is not surprising, b ecause it is consistent with the language,
context and history of the concession."
810
7.470 To this argument the European Communities responds that it:
"[C]onsiders that the description of its im port regime... and the conclusions of the
[Arbitration] Awards on the effects of its import regime on the total market access of
MFN suppliers are not correct."811
7.471 The European Communities adds that:
"[T]he descriptions contained in the Ar bitration Awards do not have any relevance
for the present procedure... First, because the Arbitration was not held within the
context of the DSU... Second, because the subject matter of the Arbitration was to
determine whether the new import regime of the [European Communities] would
maintain total market access for MFN suppliers and not to determine what were the
concessions bound in Schedule CXL [and t]here fore, any relevant statements in the
Arbitration Awards should be treated as simple dicta..."812
Modalities for Uruguay Round agricultural market access negotiations
7.472 The Panel turns to the issue of the so-called "Modalities Paper" 813, which was used during the
Uruguay Round negotiations to schedule commitments under the future Agreement on Agriculture .
The preamble to the Modalities Paper provides the following:
"The revised text is being re-issued on the understanding of participants in the
Uruguay Round that these negotiating modalities shall not be used as a basis for
dispute settlement proceedings under the [WTO] Agreement."
814
7.473 As noted by the panel in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar:
"[T]he so-called Modalities Paper is not a covered agreement and thus cannot provide
for WTO rights and obligations to Members. Nonetheless, it could be relevant when
interpreting the Agreement on Agriculture, including Members' Schedules."815
7.474 In the present case, the Modalities Paper, while havi ng no legal standing of its own in terms
of affecting WTO Members' rights and obligations , can be useful as a supplementary means of
interpretation, in order to ascertain the common in tention of WTO Members, regarding the European
Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas.
7.475 Indeed, as a result of the agricultural market access negotiations that took place in the
Uruguay Round, Members undertook the commitment to maintain and increase current market access
opportunities as part of the so-called "tariffication" process, "on terms at least equivalent to those

810 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 66.
811 European Communities' second written submission, para. 89.
812 Ibid., para. 90.
813 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding
Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24), 20 December 1993.
814 Ibid., p. 1.
815 Panel Report on EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Brazil) , para. 7.350. See also, Appellate Body
Report on EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 199.

existing" at the time 816. The maintenance of current market access opportunities was achieved, inter
alia, through the concession of tariff quotas at rates that were lower than the respective tariff binding.
7.476 In this regard, we note Ecuador's argument that:
"The tariff quota[s], in accordance with the modalities for the agricultural market
access negotiations, were bound at a level intended to preserve pre-Uruguay Round
access."817
7.477 Ecuador additionally notes that:
"[A] time limited tariff quota concession woul d have been grossly inconsistent with
the Uruguay Round modalities, because it would leave the EC with the WTO right to
apply an essentially prohibitive duty on a ll bananas. As noted, the Uruguay round
modalities called for binding tariff quotas in an amount and at a duty level sufficient
to permit access at least equivalent to that existing in the base period".
818
7.478 This argument in itself is not enough to provide a definitive orientation regarding the common
intention of the WTO Members, as it pertains to the European Communities' WTO market-access
commitments relating to bananas. Nevertheless, the modalities agreed for the establishment of binding
commitments during the agricultural market acce ss negotiations that took place in the Uruguay
Round, reflected in the Modalities Paper, confirm th e conclusion reached by the Panel regarding the
common intention of WTO Members: that the European Communities' tariff quota concession for
bananas would remain in force, in its substa nce, pending any later rebinding of the European
Communities' tariff on bananas.
Expectations of the parties when negotiating the Bananas Framework Agreement
7.479 The Panel turns to Ecuador's argument that it is unlikely that the negotiators of the Bananas
Framework Agreement would have agreed to a sy stem that, as of 2003, would have left banana
exports to the European Communities being subject to a duty of €680/mt and that, if the parties to the
Bananas Framework Agreement ha d intended to bind the tariff quota only for so long as such
agreement applied, they would have specified the li mited duration of the concession in the text of the
Bananas Framework Agreement.
7.480 This argument is not particularly helpful for the following two reasons.
7.481 First, under the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, as codified in the
Vienna Convention, when attempting to ascertain the common intentions of the parties we must
initially turn to the terms of the treaty, and not to th e subjective intentions of one of the parties. Much
less may we engage in an exercise to determine whet her it is likely or unlikely that the negotiators of
the Bananas Framework Agreement would have agreed to a time-limited concession.
7.482 Second, we have already found that, although the date of expiration envisaged in the Bananas
Framework Agreement for the European Communities' tariff quota concession for bananas, as listed
in the EC Schedule, was modified by a subseque nt agreement between the WTO Members contained

816 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding
Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24), 20 December 1993,
817 Ecuador's second written submission, para. 53.
818 Ibid., para. 59.

in the Doha Waiver, the Bananas Framework Agreem ent did originally provide that this concession
would expire on 31 December 2002.
Negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994

7.483 As regards Ecuador's argument relating to Ar ticle XXVIII of the GATT 1994, the Panel has
already noted the relevance of this provision for the present case.819
7.484 The procedures contemplated in the Bananas A nnex to the Doha Waiver establish a link with
the negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GA TT 1994. Indeed, the European Communities has
issued notifications and initiated negotia tions under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, inter alia on
July 2004 and January 2005820, for the purpose of rebinding its concession on bananas.
7.485 As Ecuador notes, the process of negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 would
become irrelevant if, from 1 January 2003, the European Communities' only binding for bananas were
€680/mt. Indeed, if this were the European Communities' only commitment, the application of a tariff
of €230/mt, of €187/mt or of €176/mt would all be consistent with a binding at that tariff level and
would not require the conclusion of negotiations under Article XXVIII. Indeed, if such were the case,
the European Communities would hava been free to reduce its binding on bananas to any level below
€680/mt. Furthermore, the inclusion of provisions in the Doha Waiver intended to safeguard the
rights of MFN suppliers under Article XXVIII would have been unnecessary, as these suppliers would
not have been entitled to compensation. Negotia tions under Article XXVIII would instead become
necessary before moving the tariff quota on bananas into a tariff-only system.
7.486 The European Communities' argument that it only initiated negotiations under Article XXVIII
because it was required to do so under both the Bana nas Understanding it signed with Ecuador on
April 2001 and the Doha Waiver does not disprove such a conclusion. On the contrary, the
requirement contained in both the Bananas Understanding signed between the European Communities
and Ecuador on April 2001 and the Bananas Annex to the Doha Waiver is further evidence of the
common intention of the WTO Members, including the European Communities, that negotiations
under Article XXVIII were necessary for the purpose of rebinding the European Communities' tariff
on bananas.
7.487 The Panel notes the European Communities' argument, referring to the GATT panel Report
on EEC – Newsprint , that procedures under Article XXVIII may be followed even when a WTO
Member is not intending to increase its bound rates. 821 The current situation is, however, different
from that analysed by the GATT panel in EEC – Newsprint . None of the parties argues that the
proposed modification of the European Communities' concession on bananas amounts to a "purely
formal change in the tariff schedules of" the Eu ropean Communities, which would "not affect the
GATT rights of other [Members]" nor that it is "[t]he conversion of a specific to an ad valorem duty".
7.488 In conclusion, this argument in itself is also not enough to provide a definitive orientation
regarding the common intention of the WTO Members, as it pertains to the European Communities'
WTO market-access commitments rela ting to bananas. Nevertheless, the negotiations undertaken by
the European Communities under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 for the purpose of rebinding its
tariff on bananas, and the additional fact that th ese negotiations were required in both the Bananas
Understanding signed between the European Comm unities and Ecuador on April 2001 and the
Bananas Annex to the Doha Waiver, confirm the conclusion reached by the Panel regarding the
common intention of WTO Members.

819 See paras. 7.444 to 7.456 above.
820 See paras. 2.15 and 2.16 above.
821 European Communities' second written submission, para. 88.

Statements in the Arbitrator Award issued pursuant to the Bananas Annex
7.489 As noted by Ecuador, the first Arbitrator's aw ard issued pursuant to the procedures in the
Bananas Annex to the Doha Waiver contains several statements regarding the European Communities'
WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas:
"Schedule CXL of the EC-15 records co mmitments by the Eu ropean Communities
detailing a 2.2 million metric ton tariff quot a with a bound in-quota tariff of €75 per
metric ton and a final bound out-of-quota tariff of €680 per metric ton...
In summary, the existing EC banana import system consists of tariff quotas totalling
3.113 million metric tons open to all supp liers, and a tariff quota of 750,000 metric
tons at zero duty open exclusively to pr eferential suppliers. MFN suppliers are
subject to a bound in-quota tariff of €75 per metric ton, whereas all in-quota banana
imports from preferential suppliers enter the European Communities at zero duty."822
7.490 The Panel notes the European Communities' ar gument that the description of its import
regime made by the Arbitrator is incorrect and has no relevance for the present proceedings.823
7.491 In any event, and even if the statements made by the Arbitrator, with respect to the European
Communities' WTO market-access commitments relating to bananas, were to be regarded as "simple
dicta", as suggested by the European Communities, they would not di sprove the conclusion reached
by the Panel regarding the question at issue, i.e., the common intention of WTO Members.
(v) General conclusion regarding the European Communities' Schedule as it refers to bananas
7.492 In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, th e Panel finds that, although under its original
terms the tariff quota concession for bananas, as liste d in the European Communities' Schedule, was
intended to expire on 31 December 2002, the subseque nt agreement between the parties resulted in an
extension of this concession. Pending the comple tion of Article XXVIII negotiations for the purpose
of rebinding of the European Communities' concession on bananas, the European Communities
remains bound by this concession, as contained in Part I, Sections I.A (Tariffs) and I.B (Tariff quotas)
of the European Communities' Schedule.
(c) Is the €176/mt tariff on bananas in excess of th at provided in the European Communities'
Schedule?
7.493 The Panel has already determined the treat ment granted to bananas imported from MFN
countries (i.e., non-ACP WTO Members) under the ch allenged measure, as well as the treatment
provided for bananas under the terms of Part I of th e European Communities' Schedule. Accordingly,
it must now determine whether the tariff imposed by the European Communities on bananas from
MFN countries results in the imposition of ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and
provided in Part I of the European Communities' Schedule.
7.494 The Panel has noted that, under terms of Regul ation 1964/2005, since 1 January 2006, the
tariff generally applied by the European Communities to MFN imports of bananas is set at €176/mt.824
At the same time, the Panel has also noted th at under Part I of its Schedule, the European

822 European Communities, The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement, Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to
the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator (WT/L/616), 1 August 2005, paras. 13 and 18.
823 See European Communities' second written submission, paras. 89-90. See also, paras. 7.470 to
7.471 above.
824 See para. 2.40 above.

Communities' commitment with regard to bananas consists in a tariff binding of €680/mt as well as in
a tariff quota for 2.2 million mt at a bound in-quota tariff rate of €75/mt. No allowance is made by the
European Communities for the main tenance of a tariff quota for the importation of bananas from
MFN countries at rates below the €176/mt tariff duty.
7.495 Therefore, the imposition of the tariff genera lly applied by the European Communities to
MFN imports of bananas, set at €176/mt, under th e terms of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005
of 29 November 2005, without consideration of the tariff quota for 2.2 million mt bound at an in-
quota tariff rate of €75/mt, must be considered to be an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set
forth and provided in Part I of the European Communities' Schedule.
(d) Conclusions regarding Ecuador's claims under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994
7.496 Ecuador raised claims against the European Communities' duty of €176/mt for bananas under
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. The Pa nel has already noted that it would follow the
approach indicated by the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, and begin
its analysis with consideration of the first sentence of Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994.
(i) Conclusion regarding the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994
7.497 The Panel has already noted that, under the fi rst sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994:
"The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party
[Member], which are the products of te rritories of other contracting parties
[Members], shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates,
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualif ications set forth in that Schedule, be
exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided
therein..."
7.498 Inasmuch as the tariff applied by the European Communities to MFN imports of bananas, set
at €176/mt, without consideration of the tariff quota for 2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota tariff rate
of €75/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set forth and provided for in Part I of the
European Communities' Schedule, it is to be consider ed inconsistent with the first sentence of Article
II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
(ii) Conclusion regarding Article II:1(a) of the GATT 1994
7.499 The Panel has noted that, under Article II:1(a) of the GATT 1994:
"Each contracting party [Member] sha ll accord to the commerce of the other
contracting parties [Members] treatment no less favourable than that provided for in
the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement."
7.500 The Panel has found that the tariff applied by the European Communities to MFN imports of
bananas, set at €176/mt, without consideration of the tariff quota for 2.2 million mt bound at an in-
quota tariff rate of €75/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set forth and provided for in
Part I of the European Communities' Schedule, and is therefore to be considered inconsistent with the
first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
7.501 The Panel recalls the words of the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel:

"It is evident to us that the application of customs duties in excess of those provided
for in a Member's Schedule, inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b),
constitutes 'less favourable' treatment under the provisions of Article II:1(a) …" 825
7.502 Notwithstanding the above, the Panel does not believe that, having found that the tariff
applied by the European Communities to MFN imports of bananas is inconsistent with the first
sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, an additional finding regarding the same measure under
Article II:1(a) of the GATT 1994 would be necessary to resolve the matter at issue.
7.503 Accordingly, under the guidance of the principle of judicial economy, the Panel considers it
unnecessary for the resolution of this dispute to addr ess Ecuador's claim that the tariff applied by the
European Communities to MFN imports of bananas is inconsistent with Article II:1(a) of the GATT
1994. Therefore, the Panel refrains from making any findings with respect to this particular claim
5. General conclusion
7.504 For the reasons indicated in this section, the Panel finds that the tariff applied by the European
Communities to MFN imports of bananas, set at €176/ mt, without consideration of the tariff quota for
2.2 million mt bound at an in-quota tariff rate of €7 5/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that
set forth and provided for in Part I of the European Communities' Schedule, and results in a treatment
for the commerce of bananas from MFN countries (i.e., non-ACP WTO Members) that is less
favourable than that provided for in Part I of th e of the European Communities' Schedule. The Panel
therefore finds that this tariff is inconsistent w ith the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994.
F. F
INAL REMARKS
7.505 In the factual section of this Report, the Panel not ed that the complainant in this dispute is a
developing country Member. However, as noted a bove, Ecuador did not invoke any provisions on
special and differential treatment for developing coun try Members. Nor did the Panel find that these
provisions were particularly relevant for the resolu tion of the specific matter that was brought before
this Panel.
7.506 In this same proceedings, a significant numbe r of developing and least developed country
Members also stated their respective substantial interest in the matter before this Panel.
7.507 Indeed, the Panel is aware of the economic and social effects of the European Communities'
measures at issue in this case, particularly for ACP and Latin American ba nana exporting countries.
In recognizing this, as in previous panel proceed ings, the Panel decided to grant third parties
participatory rights which were subs tantially broader than those norma lly afforded to them under the
DSU.826 This was done in the light of the particular circumstances of the present case, and without the
intention of setting any type of precedent.
7.508 In any event, the Panel wishes to recall the words of the original panel in the EC – Bananas
III dispute:
"The procedures under the DSU serve to ensure the settlement of disputes among
WTO Members in accordance with WTO obliga tions, not to add to or diminish these
obligations. Accordingly, our terms of re ference are to assist the DSB in reaching

825 Appellate Body Report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47.
826 cf. Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 8.2.

conclusions with regard to the legal consistency with WTO rules of the EC's common
market organization for bananas. ...
From a substantive perspective, the fu ndamental principles of the WTO and WTO
rules are designed to foster the development of countries, not impede it. Having
heard the arguments of a large number of Members interested in this case and having
worked through a complex set of clai ms under several WTO agreements, we
conclude that the system is flexible en ough to allow, through WTO-consistent trade
and non-trade measures, appropriate po licy responses in the wide variety of
circumstances across countries, including countries that are currently heavily
dependent on the production and commercialization of bananas."
827
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 In light of the findings above, the Panel rejects the preliminary issue raised by the
European Communities that Ecuador is prevente d from challenging the European Communities'
current import regime for bananas, including th e preference for ACP countries, because of the
Understanding on Bananas, signed by both Members in April 2001.
8.2 Accordingly, and after having examined the subs tantive claims raised by Ecuador as well as
the defences invoked by the European Communities, the Panel concludes that:
(a) The preference granted by the European Co mmunities to an annual duty-free tariff
quota of 775,000 mt of imported bananas orig inating in ACP countries constitutes an
advantage for this category of bananas, which is not accorded to like bananas
originating in non-ACP WTO Members, and is therefore inconsistent with Article I:1
of GATT 1994;
(b) With the expiration of the Doha Waiver from 1 January 2006 as it applied to bananas,
there is no evidence that, during the period that is relevant for this Panel's findings,
that is, from the time of the establishment of the Panel until the date of this Report,
any waiver from Article I:1 of GATT 1994 h as been in force to cover the preference
granted by the European Communities to the duty-free tariff quota of imported
bananas originating in ACP countries;
(c) The European Communities' current bana na import regime, in particular its
preferential tariff quota reserved for ACP countries, is inconsistent with
Article XIII:1, with the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and with Article XIII:2(d) of the
GATT 1994;
(d) The tariff applied by the European Commun ities to MFN imports of bananas, set at
€176/mt, without consideration of the tariff quota for 2.2 million mt bound at an in-
quota tariff rate of €75/mt, is an ordinary customs duty in excess of that set forth and
provided for in Part I of the European Communities' Schedule. This tariff is therefore
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994; and,
(e) It is unnecessary, for the resolution of this dispute, to make a separate finding on
Ecuador's claim under Article II:1(a) of the GATT 1994.
8.3 In consequence, the Panel concludes that, thr ough its current regime for the importation of
bananas, established in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005, including the

827 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), paras. 8.1 and 8.3.

duty-free tariff quota for bananas originating in AC P countries and the MFN tariff currently set at
€176/mt, the European Communities has failed to im plement the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB.
8.4 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to cons titute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under th at agreement. The European Co mmunities has failed to rebut this
presumption. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent that the European Communities has
maintained measures inconsistent with different provisions of the GATT 1994, it continues to nullify
or impair benefits accruing to Ecuador under that Agreement.
8.5 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settleme nt Body request the European Communities
to bring the inconsistent measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.