UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN SHRIMP FROM VIET NAM ARB-2015-2/29
Document: Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Award of the Arbitrator Simon Farbenbloom
Date: 15 December 2015
Document codes: WT/DS429/12
Complainant: Vietnam
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: China, Ecuador, EU, Japan, Norway, Thailand
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 2, 9, 1  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1, VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 11  Anti-dumpingPart I, para. 1.2  Protocol of AccessionArt. 18  Anti-dumpingArt. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON
CERTAIN SHRIMP FROM VIET NAM
ARB-2015-2/29
Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Award of the Arbitrator
Simon Farbenbloom

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS AWARD
Abbreviation Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementa tion of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Appellate Body Report Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam, and Corr.1
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
NME non-market economy
Panel Report Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Shrimp from Viet Nam,
RPT reasonable period of time
Shrimp USDOC anti-dumping proceedings in Certain Frozen Warmwater
Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Case No. A-522-802
URAA Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4838, codified under United States Code, Title 19, Section 3538
US Case Calendar "DS429 – Approximat e 21-month Case Calendar", proposed
timetable by the United States
USDOC United States Department of Commerce
USTR United States Trade Representative
Viet Nam's proposed
timetable
"Vietnam's Proposed RPT with Sequencing" (Exhibit VNM-8)
WTO

CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD
Short Title Full Case title and citation
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, ,
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581
Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS114/13,
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p. 3
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, WT/DS207/13, 17 March 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1237
China – GOES
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS414/12, 3 May 2013, DSR 2013:IV,
p. 1495
Colombia – Ports of Entry
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on
Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS366/13,
2 October 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3819
EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 3
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS265/33, WT/DS266/33,
WT/DS283/14, 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11581
EC – Hormones
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS26/15,
WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833
EC – Tariff Preferences
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS246/14, 20 September 2004,
DSR 2004:IX, p. 4313
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random
Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS336/16, 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8553
US – 1916 Act
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14,
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017
US – COOL
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, 4 December 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173
US – Countervailing Measures
(China)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS437/16, 9 October 2015
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1163
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS268/12, 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11619
US – Section 110(5)
Copyright Act
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS160/12, 15 January
2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 657
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Shrimp from Viet Nam, WT/DS429/AB/R, adopted 22 April 2015, and Corr.1

US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp
from Viet Nam, WT/DS429/R and Add.1, adopted 22 April 2015, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS429/AB/R
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS344/15, 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619

AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR

United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam

Parties:

Viet Nam
United States

ARB-2015-2/29

Arbitrator:

Simon Farbenbloom

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. On 22 April 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body Report
1
and the Panel Report 2, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, in United States – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam.3 This dispute concerns Viet Nam's challenge of certain
anti-dumping measures imposed by the United St ates in the context of the US anti-dumping
proceedings in Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 4
(Shrimp), and of certain US laws, methodologies, and practices with respect to the imposition of
anti-dumping duties. 5 The Panel found the measures at issue to be inconsistent with several
provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), as well as with Article VI:2 of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). 6 Most of the Panel's findings were not subject to appeal.
Viet Nam's appeal was limited to the issue of whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) in
finding that Viet Nam had not established that Section 129(c)(1) of the US Uruguay Round
Agreements Act
7 (URAA) is inconsistent "as such" with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.8 At the meeting of the DSB held on 20 May 2015, the United States indicated its
intention to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute in a manner that
respects its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, and stated that it would need a
reasonable period of time in which to do so.9
1.2. By letter dated 17 September 2015, Viet Nam informed the DSB that consultations with the
United States had not resulted in an agreement on the reasonable period of time for
implementation pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of th e DSU. Viet Nam therefore requested that this
period be determined through binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c). 10 By joint letter
dated 7 October 2015, Viet Nam and the United States agreed on the undersigned as the
Arbitrator for this matter. I informed the partie s of my acceptance of the appointment by letter
dated 8 October 2015.11

1 WT/DS429/AB/R and Corr. 1.
2 WT/DS429/R.
3 WT/DS429/8.
4 USDOC Case No. A-552-802.
6 See infra, para. 3.12.
7 Public Law No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4838, codified under United States Code, Title 19, Section 3538.
8 More specifically, Viet Nam claimed that Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA is inconsistent "as such" with
Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1, and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body rejected Viet Nam's
claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU and upheld the Panel's above finding.
(See infra, para. 3.14; Appellate Body Report, paras. 3.1 and 5.1)
9 WT/DS429/9.
10 WT/DS429/10.
11 WT/DS429/11.

1.3. The United States and Viet Nam filed their written submissions, together with the executive
summaries thereof, on 15 and 22 October 2015, respectively. 12 A hearing was held on
10 November 2015.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
2.1. Annexes A and B to this Award contain the executive summaries of the parties' submissions.
Details of the parties' arguments are further describ ed, as appropriate, in my analysis set out in
this Award.
3 REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME
3.1. This section begins by setting out the mand ate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, as defined in the text of the DSU and outlin ed in past awards under Article 21.3(c). It then
addresses the measures to be brought into conf ormity with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB, before considering the parties' arguments on what constitutes a reasonable period of
time for implementation in this dispute.
3.1 Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU
3.2. Article 21.3 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings [of
the DSB], the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to
do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:

(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration, a guideline
for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or
Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body repo rt. However, that time may be shorter or
longer, depending upon the particular circumstances. (fns omitted)
3.3. The mandate of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) is therefore to determine the time period
within which the implementing Member must comply with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB in the dispute at issue.
13 In making this determination, the means of implementation chosen
by the Member concerned is a relevant consideration. As noted in past awards, " when a Member
must comply cannot be determined in isolation from the means used for implementation." 14
Therefore, in order "to determine when a Member must comply, it may be necessary to consider
how a Member proposes to do so." 15 Consistent with previous awards of arbitrators under
Article 21.3(c), the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of
implementation that it deems most appropriate. This discretion, however, "is not an 'unfettered'
right to choose any method of implementation".
16 Rather, it is relevant to consider, in particular,
"whether the implementing action falls within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in
order to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings".
17 Thus, the chosen method of

12 By letter dated 9 November 2015, the United States raised procedural concerns regarding certain
portions of Viet Nam's written submission, and requested that I ask Viet Nam to withdraw the relevant portions
of its submission. Having considered the factors affecting the reasonable period of time in this dispute
(see section 3.3 of this Award), I do not find it necessary to take into account these portions of Viet Nam's
submission in my determination. I therefore do not address this matter further in this Award.
13 The parties have agreed that this Award will be deemed an arbitration award under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, notwithstanding the fact that more than 90 days have expired since the DSB adopted the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports on 22 April 2015 (WT/DS429/9). I recall that this arbitration was initiated on
17 September 2015.
14 Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 68. (emphasis original)
15 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26. (emphasis original) See
also Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 68.
16 Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 36.
17 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42; Japan – DRAMs
(Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.

implementation must be capable of bringing the Member into compliance with its WTO obligations
within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with the guideline contained in Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU.
18 At the same time, it is beyond the arbitrator's mandate to determine the consistency
with the covered agreements of the measure taken to comply. This question, should it arise, is to
be addressed in proceedings conducted pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU.19
3.4. As regards the length of the reasonable period of time, Article 21.3(c) provides a guideline
for the arbitrator that the period for implementation should not exceed 15 months from the date of
adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report. It should be recalled that Article 21.1 of the DSU
provides that "prompt compliance" is essential for the effective resolution of WTO disputes.
Furthermore, the first clause of Article 21.3 stipulates that a "reasonable period of time" for
implementation shall be available only "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately" with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Accordin g to the last sentence of Article 21.3(c), the
"particular circumstances" of a dispute may affect the length of the reasonable period of time,
making it "shorter or longer". In principle, therefore, the reasonable period of time for
implementation should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing
Member
20, in the light of the "particular circumstances" of a dispute.
3.5. In considering the "particular circumstan ces" under Article 21.3(c), arbitrators in past
disputes have found that the complexity of the implementation process and the nature of the steps
to be taken for implementation are relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of
time.
21 It has also been held in previous arbitrat ion awards that the implementing Member must
utilize all of the flexibilities available within it s legal system in order to implement the relevant
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible. 22 An
implementing Member is not, however, expected to utilize "extraordinary procedures" to bring its
measures into compliance.23 Finally, Article 21.2 of the DSU directs an arbitrator to pay particular
attention to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members.
3.6. With regard to the burden of proof, it is well established that the implementing Member bears
the overall burden of proving that the time period requested for implementation constitutes the
"shortest period possible" within its legal system to implement the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB, and thus a "reasonable period of time".24
3.7. In response to questioning at the hearin g in this arbitration, both Viet Nam and the
United States agreed that the principles set out above are relevant for the determination of the
reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute.25

18 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; US
– COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69; and EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69.
19 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.
20 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; and EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26.
21 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.19;
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26; EC – Tariff Preferences
22 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42; Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25; and US –
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 64.
23 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4; US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 70; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 42; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 25; and US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 74.
24 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 44; Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.6;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para 3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)), para. 47; US –
1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 33; and EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.
25 I note that, in response to questioning at the hearing, the parties agreed that Article 21.2 of the DSU
was not invoked in the present dispute.

3.2 Measures to be brought into conformity
3.8. The dispute underlying this arbitration concerns Viet Nam's challenge of certain US laws,
methodologies, and practices with respect to the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and certain
actions and determinations by the US Departme nt of Commerce (USDOC) in the anti-dumping
proceedings on Shrimp. The USDOC initiated the Shrimp investigation in January 2004 and issued
an anti-dumping order in February 2005.
26 At the time of the Panel proceedings in the present
dispute, the USDOC had completed seven administrative reviews and one sunset review in which it
determined that the revocation of the anti-dumping duty order would likely lead to the
continuation or recurrence of dumping.27
3.9. In the Shrimp proceedings, the USDOC designated Viet Nam as a non-market economy
(NME) and applied a rebuttable presumption that all producers/exporters in Viet Nam "are
essentially operating units of a single government-wide entity" 28 and, thus, should receive a single
anti-dumping duty rate. In the light of the larg e number of respondents involved in the original
investigation and in each of the administrative reviews, the USDOC limited its examination and
determined individual margins for a limited number of companies (mandatory respondents). In
order to receive a separate rate, Vietnamese producers/exporters that were not individually
examined had to pass a "separate rate test", i.e. to demonstrate sufficient independence from the
government-wide entity. Those producers/exporters that did not establish that they were separate
from the government-wide entity received the "Viet Nam-wide entity rate".
29
3.10. Before the Panel, Viet Nam made "as such" claims with respect to: (i) the USDOC's use of
the "simple zeroing methodology" in administrative reviews 30 ; (ii) the USDOC's practice with
respect to the rate that is assigned to certain producers/exporters who did not demonstrate
sufficient independence from government control in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports
from NMEs; and (iii) Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA.
31
3.11. Viet Nam's "as applied" claims concerned certain aspects of the USDOC's determinations in
the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews. In particular, Viet Nam challenged: (i) the
USDOC's use of the simple zeroing methodology in the calculation of the dumping margins of
mandatory respondents; (ii) the duty rate that was assigned by the USDOC to certain Vietnamese
producers who did not demonstrate sufficient independence from government control and thus
were deemed to be part of the Viet Nam-wide en tity; and (iii) the USDOC's failure to revoke the
anti-dumping order with respect to certain respon dent Vietnamese producers/exporters. Viet Nam
also made claims with respect to the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination in the context
of the sunset review.
32
3.12. The Panel made the following findings of inconsistency:
a. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as a result of the USDOC's application of the simple
zeroing methodology to calculate the dumping margins of mandatory respondents in the
fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order
33;

26 See Appellate Body Report, para. 1.2 (referring to USDOC, Notice of Amended Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, United States Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 20 (1 February 2005) (Panel Exhibit
VNM-5)). See also Panel Report, para. 2.4.
27 Panel Report, para. 2.4.
28 Panel Report, para. 2.5.
29 See Panel Report, paras. 2.5-2.6; and Appellate Body Report, para. 1.2.
30 Viet Nam described the "simple zeroing methodology" as the methodology by which the USDOC, when
calculating dumping margins on the basis of a comparison of a weighted-average normal value to individual
export transactions, disregards negative comparison results. (Panel Report, fn 19 to para. 2.10 (referring to
Viet Nam's first written submission to the Panel, para. 54))
31 Panel Report, para. 2.10.
32 Panel Report, para. 2.9.
33 Panel Report, para. 8.1.b.

b. the practice or policy whereby, in NME proceedings, the USDOC presumes that all
producers/exporters in the NME country belong to a single, NME-wide entity and assigns
a single rate to these producers/exporters is inconsistent "as such" with the
United States' obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
34;
c. the United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a result of th e application by the USDOC, in the fourth,
fifth and sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order, of a
rebuttable presumption that all companies in Viet Nam belong to a single, Viet Nam-wide
entity and assignment of a single rate to that entity35;
d. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as
a result of the application to the Viet Nam-wide entity of a duty rate exceeding the
ceiling applicable under that provision in the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative
reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order36;
e. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping or rates in
its likelihood-of-dumping determination in the first sunset review37;
f. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews as a result of its treatment of requests for
revocation made by certain Vietnamese producers/exporters that were not being
individually examined
38; and
g. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping in its
determination, in the fourth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp
anti-dumping order with respect to Minh Phu, and with respect to its determination, in
the fifth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp anti-dumping order with
respect to Camimex.39
3.13. With regard to the remainder of Viet Nam's claims, the Panel found that:
a. Viet Nam had failed to establish that the simple zeroing methodology as used by the
USDOC in administrative reviews is a measure of general and prospective application
that can be challenged "as such". Therefore, the Panel found that Viet Nam had not
established that the USDOC's simple zeroing methodology in administrative reviews is
inconsistent "as such" with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of
the GATT 1994
40;
b. Viet Nam had failed to establish the existence of a measure with respect to the manner
in which the USDOC determines the NME-wide entity rate, in particular concerning the
use of facts available. Therefore, the Panel found that Viet Nam had not established that
the alleged measure is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 6.8 and 9.4, and Annex II to
the Anti-Dumping Agreement41;

34 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c. For purposes of this Award, and on the basis of the parties' submissions,
I use the phrase "NME-wide entity practice" as shorthand for the presumption subject to the Panel's "as such"
finding.
35 Panel Report, para. 8.1.d.
36 Panel Report, para. 8.1.f.
37 Panel Report, para. 8.1.i.
38 Panel Report, para. 8.1.j.
39 Panel Report, para. 8.1.k.
40 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.
41 Panel Report, para. 8.1.e.

c. Viet Nam had failed to establish that the rate applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the
fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and
Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement
42; and
d. Viet Nam had failed to establish that Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA precludes
implementation, with respect to prior unliquidated entries, of DSB recommendations and
rulings. Therefore, the Panel found that Viet Nam had not established that
Section 129(c)(1) is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1, and 18.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
43
3.14. Viet Nam appealed the Panel's finding that Viet Nam had failed to establish that
Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA precludes implementa tion of recommendations and rulings of the
DSB with respect to prior unliquidated entries, and the consequential finding that Viet Nam had not
established that Section 129(c)(1) is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1, and
18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 44 Specifically, Viet Nam claimed that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU because its interpretation and analysis of
Section 129(c)(1) was not based on an objective assessment of the provision and its broader
statutory context. 45 The Appellate Body rejected Viet Nam's claim that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU 46, and upheld the Panel's finding that Viet Nam had not
established that Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA is inco nsistent "as such" with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3,
11.1, and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 47 The Appellate Body, therefore, made no
recommendation to the DSB pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU. 48 As noted, the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports were adopted at the DSB meeting on 22 April 2015.
3.15. By letter dated 24 June 2015, Viet Nam notified the United States that certain Vietnamese
producers/exporters did not intend to pursue revocation of the anti-dumping duty order in the
context of the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.
49 At the
hearing in this arbitration, the parties agreed th at the United States need not take any further
steps to implement the Panel's findings that the United States acted inconsistently with
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with re gard to the requests for revocation made by
these producers/exporters.
3.16. In the light of the above, in these arbi tration proceedings, the parties agree that the
reasonable period of time for implementation should be determined in relation to the following six
findings of inconsistency by the Panel:
a. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as a result of the USDOC's application of the simple
zeroing methodology to calculate the dumping margins of mandatory respondents in the
fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order
50;
b. the practice or policy whereby, in NME proceedings, the USDOC presumes that all
producers/exporters in the NME country belong to a single, NME-wide entity and assigns
a single rate to these producers/exporters is inconsistent "as such" with the
United States' obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement51;

42 Panel Report, para. 8.1.g.
43 Panel Report, para. 8.1.h.
44 Appellate Body Report, para. 1.6.
45 Appellate Body Report, para. 2.1.
48 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.2.
49 See United States' submission, fn 4 to para. 3 (referring to letter dated 24 June 2015 from Viet Nam
to the United States, regarding "Implementation of the Panel Report in United States – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Certain Shrimp from Vietnam" (Exhibit USA-1)). See also letters to the USDOC, regarding "Implementation
of DS429: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam (Case No. A-552-802)" (Exhibit VNM-2). These
companies are: Viet Nam Fish One Co., Ltd, Nha Trang Seafoods, Phuong Nam Foodstuff Corp, Camau Frozen
Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation (Camimex), and Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd (former
Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd).
50 Panel Report, paras. 7.81 and 8.1.b.
51 Panel Report, paras. 7.193 and 8.1.c.

c. the United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a result of th e application by the USDOC, in the fourth,
fifth, and sixth administ rative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order, of a
rebuttable presumption that all companies in Viet Nam belong to a single, Viet Nam-wide
entity and assignment of a single rate to that entity52;
d. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as
a result of the application to the Viet Nam-wide entity of a duty rate exceeding the
ceiling applicable under that provision in the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative
reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order53;
e. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping or rates in
its likelihood-of-dumping determination in the first sunset review54; and
f. the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping in its
determination, in the fourth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp
anti-dumping order with respect to Minh Phu.55
3.3 Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time
3.17. The United States submits that the reason able period of time for implementing the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in the present dispute should be "at least 21 months". 56 The
United States argues that this is the shortest period of time in which it would be possible to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, "[g]iven the number of modifications to
the challenged measures, including the procedural requirements under U.S. law, the complexity of
the issues involved, and the current resource demands and constraints on the [USDOC]".
57
Viet Nam contends that the time period requested by the United States is "extraordinarily long",
and that there is no basis for a reasonable period of time longer than six months in this dispute. 58
In Viet Nam's view, the United States has flexibilities under US law to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a manner consistent with Articles 21.1 and 21.3(c) of
the DSU.
3.18. This section begins by providing an over view of the means and steps of implementation
chosen by the United States. Thereafter, I turn to analyse the parties' specific arguments
concerning the factors relevant for the determination of the reasonable period of time to
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.
3.3.1 Overview of the chosen means of implementation
3.19. The United States claims that "the most practical way under U.S. law" is to implement the
Panel's findings
59 in three, sequential phases, utilizing both Section 123(g) 60 and Section 129(b)61
of the URAA.62 The United States submits that, under US law, Section 123(g) of the URAA is often
used to amend or modify an agency regulation or practice, while Section 129 of the URAA is often
used to amend or modify an action taken in a particular proceeding.63

52 Panel Report, paras. 7.208 and 8.1.d.
53 Panel Report, paras. 7.223 and 8.1.f.
54 Panel Report, paras. 7.320 and 8.1.i.
55 Panel Report, paras. 7.396 and 8.1.k.
56 United States' submission, para. 7.
57 United States' submission, para. 8.
58 Viet Nam's submission, paras. 12-14.
59 The United States indicates that it is implementing the DSB's recommendations and rulings with
respect to six matters. (United States' submission, para. 3. See also supra, para. 3.16)
60 Codified under United States Code, Title 19, Section 3533(g) (Exhibit USA-2).
61 Codified under United States Code, Title 19, Section 3538(b) (Exhibit USA-3).
62 United States' submission, paras. 4-5.
63 United States' submission, fn 7 to para. 4.

3.20. The United States submits that, in Phase I 64, the United States will employ Section 123(g)
to address the Panel's finding that the presumption that all producers and exporters in Viet Nam
belong to a single, Viet Nam-wide entity is inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
65
Phase II66 and Phase III67 will both be conducted in accordance with Section 129(b) of the URAA.
In Phase II, the United States will address the Panel's "as applied" findings regarding the
NME-wide entity practice in the fourth, fifth, an d sixth administrative reviews and the use of the
simple zeroing methodology to calculate the dumping margins of mandatory respondents in these
reviews.68 In this phase, the United States will also address the Panel's finding regarding Minh
Phu's revocation request in the fourth administrative review. 69 Finally, in Phase III, the United
States will implement the Panel's finding regarding the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent
margins of dumping in the first sunset review.
70 As further explained below 71, the United States
emphasizes that Phase I must be completed before Phase II, but anticipates a degree of overlap
between these two phases.
3.21. With regard to the overall time frame, the United States contends that both Section 123 and
Section 129 provide for a multi-step implementation process, and it will take at least 21 months to
complete the entire process. The United States submits a proposed timetable of approximately
21 months (US Case Calendar) to describe in detail the steps and relevant time frames in the
implementation process.72 According to the US Case Calendar, the Section 123 process in Phase I
will take 13 months, from April 2015 to May 2016. The Section 129 proceedings in Phase II will
commence by January 2016 at the latest, and the final determinations will be issued by October
2016. The Section 129 proceeding regarding the sunset review in Phase III will begin in October
2016, and the final determination will be issued in December 2016. Finally, in January 2017, the
US Trade Representative (USTR) will direct the USDOC to implement the final Section 129
determinations, and the USDOC will issue a Federal Register notice in which it will officially
implement the final Section 129 determinations.
3.22. For its part, Viet Nam contends that the United States' chosen means of implementation has
"shortcomings".
73 Viet Nam highlights that Section 129 determinations apply only "to unliquidated
entries of the subject merchandise … that are ente red, or withdrawn from warehouse … on or after
… the date on which the [USTR] directs the administering authority under subsection (b)(4) [of
Section 129] to implement that determination".
74 In Viet Nam's view, the Panel's findings, to the
extent they concern such unliquidated entrie s, cannot be implemented by the means of
implementation proposed by the United States. Vi et Nam further submits that the United States
has ignored the possibility of achieving "almost im mediate implementation" by negotiating a trade
agreement with Viet Nam, as it did in the softw ood lumber dispute between the United States and
Canada. 75 At the hearing, the United States reiterated that the implementing Member has
discretion in choosing the means of implementa tion, and expressed the view that the means
proposed by the United States is appropriate for implementing the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in this dispute. The United States further noted that the negotiations in the US-Canada
softwood lumber dispute took well over 21 months. Viet Nam reiterated its position that full
compliance in respect of unliquidated entries canno t be achieved by the means proposed by the
United States.
3.23. Viet Nam further submits that, even if Sections 123 and 129 are the only mechanisms for
implementation in this dispute, the time frame pr oposed by the United States is "extraordinarily
long"
76, and that "there is no basis for a longer period than 6 months for implementation" of the

64 Phase I – Implementation to Address As-Such Finding on Vietnam-wide Entity. (United States'
submission, para. 5)
65 United States' submission, paras. 4-5. See also Panel Report, para. 8.1.c.
66 Phase II – Implementation to Address As-Applied Findings with respect to Three Administrative
Reviews and Consideration of Request for Company-Specific Revocation. (United States' submission, para. 5)
67 Phase III – Reconsideration in the Five-Year Sunset Review. (United States' submission, para. 5)
68 United States' submission, paras. 4-5. See also Panel Report, paras. 8.1.b, 8.1.d, and 8.1.f.
69 United States' submission, paras. 4-5. See also Panel Report, para. 8.1.k.
70 United States' submission, paras. 4-5. See also Panel Report, para. 8.1.i.
71 See section 3.3.2.1 of this Award.
72 See table entitled "DS429 – Approximate 21 Month Case Calendar" at United States' submission,
para. 41.
74 Viet Nam's submission, para. 26 (quoting Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA).
75 Viet Nam's submission, paras. 13 and 27.

DSB's findings and recommendations. 77 Viet Nam maintains that neither Section 123 nor
Section 129 prescribes minimum time periods for completing the overall process. According to
Viet Nam, the Section 123 process can be completed in 60 days. At the hearing, Viet Nam further
clarified that, in its view, the Section 129 determinations regarding both the administrative reviews
and the sunset review at issue can be completed within a period of four to six months.
78 Moreover,
although Viet Nam agreed in principle that the implementation of the Panel's "as such" and
"as applied" findings will need to be conducted se quentially, it contended that the US legal system
would allow for a greater degree of overlap be tween the different phases proposed by the
United States.
3.3.2 Analysis
3.24. I recall that it is within my mandate to determine the reasonable period of time for the
United States to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. It has been
well established that the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means
of implementation it deems most appropriat e. At the same time, the chosen means of
implementation must be capable of bringing the Member into compliance with its WTO obligations
within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with the guideline contained in Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU. Moreover, the implementing Member is ex pected to use the flexibilities within its legal
system to achieve the shortest period of time possible for implementation. In determining the
reasonable period of time, I should take into account the particular circumstances of the dispute,
including the complexity of the implementation pr ocess and the nature of the steps to be taken.
With these considerations in mind, I turn now to review the relevant factors for determining the
reasonable period of time in this dispute in the light of the parties' arguments.
3.3.2.1 Sequence of the implementation process
3.25. The United States submits that the three phases of implementation are to be conducted
sequentially, while noting a degree of overlap between the first two phases. According to the
United States, while preparing a preliminary determination under Section 123(g) of the URAA, the
USDOC will begin working on the implementation of the Panel's findings regarding the use of the
simple zeroing methodology and Minh Phu's revoca tion request. Thus, with respect to these
findings, there will be an overlap between the en d of Phase I and the beginning of Phase II. The
United States emphasizes, however, that Phase II cannot be completed prior to the final
determination under the Section 123 process in Phas e I. This is because the USDOC will need to
incorporate any modification to the NME-wide entity practice into the Section 129 determinations
on the administrative reviews. Specifically, the United States submits that the revised manner in
which the United States treats the NME-wide enti ty may affect the USDOC's decisions as to which
entities should receive individual margins in the administrative reviews at issue.
79 In Phase III, the
United States will implement the Panel's finding regarding the sunset review, and will likely take
into account the determinations made in Phase II on the administrative reviews.80
3.26. In response to questioning at the hearing, Viet Nam acknowledged that the United States'
implementation of the Panel's "as such" finding regarding the NME-wide entity practice would in
principle precede the implementation of the "as applied" findings. Nonetheless, Viet Nam
considered that the flexibilities under US law would allow for a greater degree of overlap among
the different phases of implementation proposed by the United States. Specifically, Section 129
determinations regarding the recalculation of anti-dumping duty rates and the review of
Minh Phu's revocation request can be completed concurrently with the Section 123 process.
Moreover, the Section 129 proceeding regarding the Panel's finding on the sunset review can begin
before the completion of the Section 129 proceedings on the other findings.
81
3.27. Overall, the sequence of the implementati on steps proposed by the United States appears
reasonable in the context of the US legal system . Given that any modification to the NME-wide
entity practice would need to be incorporated in the implementation of the Panel's "as applied"

78 See also Viet Nam's submission, paras. 19-31; and "Vietnam's Proposed RPT with Sequencing"
(Viet Nam's proposed timetable) (Exhibit VNM-8).
79 United States' submission, para. 19.
80 United States' submission, para. 20.
81 See also Viet Nam's submission, paras. 19-25; and Viet Nam's proposed timetable (Exhibit VNM-8).

findings in the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews, it is logical that the implementation
of the Panel's "as such" finding on the practice will need to be completed first. Furthermore,
because the results of the Section 129 determinations on the administrative reviews may be
considered for purposes of making a sunset re view determination, it also seems logical to
complete the implementation of the finding concerning the first sunset review in the last phase.
3.28. In addition, I note that there will be a degree of overlap between Phase I and Phase II of
the implementation process proposed by the Unit ed States. As the United States confirms, the
work on the implementation of the findings concerning the application of the simple zeroing
methodology and Minh Phu's revocation request may take place concurrently with the work on the
implementation of the "as such" finding concerning the NME-wide entity practice. Viet Nam's
argument as to the degree of overlap that can be achieved will be further addressed in my analysis
below.
82
3.3.2.2 The process under Section 123(g) of the URAA
3.29. In order to implement the Panel's "as such" finding regarding the NME-wide entity practice,
the United States intends to utilize the process set out in Section 123(g) of the URAA.
Section 123(g) of the URAA reads:
(g) REQUIREMENTS FOR AGENCY ACTION.—
(1) CHANGES IN AGENCY REGULATIONS OR PRACTICE.—In any case in which a
dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or
practice of a department or agency of the United States is inconsistent with any of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice may not be amended,
rescinded, or otherwise modified in the implementation of such report unless and
until—
(A) the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted under subsection
(f);
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding the modification from
relevant private sector advisory committees established under section 135 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155);
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an opportunity for
public comment by publishing in the Federa l Register the proposed modification and
the explanation for the modification;
(D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for the
modification, and a summary of the advice obtained under subparagraph (B) with
respect to the modification;
(E) the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant department or agency have
consulted with the appropriate congressional committees on the proposed contents of
the final rule or other modification; and
(F) the final rule or other modification has been published in the Federal Register.
3.30. The United States estimates that the Section 123(g) process to implement the Panel's
"as such" finding will take "no less than 12 months".
83 Viet Nam submits that "[t]here is no legal
reason requiring significant time to adopt the change in practice", and that this can be done in 60
days. 84 The parties' arguments focus on the time needed for the preparatory stage of the
Section 123 process, the need for soliciting and analysing public comments before changing the

82 See section 3.3.2.3 of this Award.
83 United States' submission, para. 25.
84 Viet Nam's submission, para. 20; Viet Nam's proposed timetable (Exhibit VNM-8).

practice, and, as a result, the overall time fram e for completing the Section 123(g) process. The
analysis below addresses each of these points of contention in turn.
3.31. At the outset, the United States emphasizes that this is the first time the USDOC's
NME-wide entity practice was found to be inconsistent "as such" with the WTO covered
agreements. As a result, implementation will involve considerations of "novel and multifaceted
issues" about the relationship between an NME Member government and producers/exporters from
that Member.
85 The United States submits that, as the first step in the Section 123(g) process,
Sections 123(g)(1)(A) and (B) require the USTR to consult with appropriate congressional
committees and seek advice from relevant private sector advisory committees regarding the
implementation of the Panel's "as such" findin g. According to the US Case Calendar, the
consultations and pre-commencement analysis stage takes two to three months. Thereafter, the
United States estimates that the preparation for the preliminary determination proposing any
modification to the NME-wide entity practice will take 7-8 months, until January 2016.
86 In
response to questioning at the hearing, the Un ited States confirmed that the USTR had been
engaged in consultations with the US Congress, and that the preparatory work with a view to
implementing the Panel's "as such" finding was still under way.
3.32. Viet Nam contends that the United States has "prolonged" implementation by failing to
"promptly commence compliance … and continue concrete steps towards implementation". 87 In
response to questioning at the hearing, Viet Nam noted that the United States would have been
aware of its potential obligation to implement the Panel's findings when it decided not to appeal
the Panel's findings in January 2015. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect that the consultations
required under Section 123(g) would have been completed upon, or shortly after, the adoption of
the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute.
3.33. I recall that Article 21.3(c) of the DSU makes clear that formal implementation steps need
to be taken as of the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report. In determining the
reasonable period of time, arbitrators in past disputes have taken into account whether the
implementing Member had taken action since the adoption of the DSB's recommendations and
rulings.
88 In this regard, arbitrators in past disput e s h a v e f o u n d t h a t p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k c a n b e
relevant in determining the reasonable period of time. 89 At the same time, it is worth noting that,
in the present dispute, the United States did not appeal any of the Panel's findings. I note that
seven months have passed since the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this
dispute and, as such, it would be reasonable t o a s s u m e t h a t p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k o f t h e
implementation process under Section 123(g) had already commenced. In this respect, I note
that, pursuant to Section 123(f)(3) of the URAA, "promptly after the circulation" of a panel or
Appellate Body report, the USTR shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees as to
the manner of implementation of the report.
90 At the hearing, the United States confirmed that
consultations regarding the implementation of the Panel's "as such" finding had occurred and that
other preparatory work relating to implementation had also been undertaken.
3.34. Turning to the next step in the process, the United States notes that Section 123(g)(1)(C)
of the URAA requires the USDOC to provide an op portunity for public comment by publishing a
proposed modification to an agency regulation or practice. The United States contends that
implementing the Panel's "as such" finding will involve "novel and multifaceted issues". 91 The
United States considers it likely that, after issuing its preliminary determination, the USDOC will

85 United States' submission, para. 15.
86 US Case Calendar.
88 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.44;
and US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 46.
89 See e.g. Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 83; and China – GOES
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.37.
90 Subsection (f) of Section 123 of the URAA provides:
Promptly after the circulation of a report of a panel or of the Appellate Body to WTO members in a
proceeding described in subsection (d), the Trade Representative shall— (1) notify the appropriate
congressional committees of the report; (2) in the case of a report of a panel, consult with the
appropriate congressional committees concerning the nature of any appeal that may be taken of the
report; and (3) if the report is adverse to the United States, consult with the appropriate congressional
committees concerning whether to implement the report's recommendation and, if so, the manner of
such implementation and the period of time needed for such implementation.
91 United States' submission, para. 15.

receive "hundreds of pages of comments from the pu blic and will have to prepare a lengthy final
Section 123 determination addressing these comments". 92 The United States estimates that it will
take the USDOC around two months to solicit and analyse such comments.
3.35. Viet Nam takes issue with the alleged comp lexity of the implementation of the "as such"
finding regarding the NME-wide entity practice. In particular, Viet Nam notes that the practice
regarding the NME-wide entity "is not required" by US law, "and has arisen only out of a consistent
practice".
93 For Viet Nam, "implementation is not complex since it only involves the adoption of a
practice which does not assign anti-dumping duty rates to the so-called country-wide entity in
excess of the weighted average margins of the individually examined respondents." 94 Viet Nam
adds that, "in a much more complicated situation" in a prior dispute, the United States concluded
the process under Section 123(g) within a much sh orter time frame than that proposed in this
dispute.
95
3.36. I recall that the Panel's "as such" finding concerns "[t]he practice or policy whereby, in NME
proceedings, the USDOC presumes that all produc ers/exporters in the NME country belong to a
single, NME-wide, entity and assigns a single rate to these producers/exporters". 96 Thus, the
implementation of the Panel's "as such" finding is not necessarily limited to the assignment of a
single anti-dumping duty rate, but may encompass a change to the USDOC's presumption that
producers/exporters from an NME country belong to a single, NME-wide entity. It cannot be
excluded that any proposed modification of the NME-wide entity practice, once published, could
trigger multiple views from the public that the USDOC will need to address in the final
determination. At the same time, there must be a proper balance between the transparency and
due process rights of interested parties, on the one hand, and the promptness required in
implementing recommendations and rulings of the DSB, on the other hand.
97
3.37. As regards the overall time frame, I recall the United States' estimate that the completion of
the entire Section 123(g) process will take "no less than 12 months". 98 As described above, this
process will start with the consultations an d pre-commencement stage, followed by the
preparation and issuance of the preliminary dete rmination. Thereafter, as the United States
explains, there are several remaining steps in th e process, the majority of which are mandated
under Sections 123(g)(1)(D), (E) and (F). 99 Viet Nam reiterates that Section 123(g)(1) does not
prescribe any time-limit for the steps listed therein. At the oral hearing, the United States noted
that, in the EC – Fasteners (China) dispute, it took the European Union approximately 11 months
to implement the findings that were similarly concerned with the treatment of producers/exporters
from NME Members in anti-dumping proceedings. Therefore, the United States alleged that it
would be reasonable to expect that the United States would need a similar amount of time for
implementing the Panel's "as such" finding in the present dispute.
3.38. I note that the steps set out under Section 123(g)(1) are mandatory and must be complied
with, although no specific time periods are prescribed for these steps. I also note that
Section 123(g) has been utilized by the United States in a number of prior disputes for purposes of
implementing the DSB's recommendations and ru lings, and that, on some occasions, the
United States indicated that a period of seven to nine months would be sufficient to complete the

92 United States' submission, para. 24.
95 Viet Nam's submission, fn 9 to para. 20. Viet Nam submitted the Section 123 determination in the
dispute in US – Certain EC Products and alleged that the Section 123 proceedings in that dispute were
completed in 92 days. (USDOC, Notice of Final Modification of Agency Practice Under Section 123 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Modification of agency practice regarding privatization, United States Federal
Register, Vol. 68, No. 120 (23 June 2003), pp. 37125-37138 (Exhibit VNM-4)) According to that determination,
the Section 123 process took 166 days, from the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports to the
publication of the final determination.
96 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c.
97 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMS (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51.
98 United States' submission, para. 25.
99 These remaining steps are: (i) the USTR submits a report to the congressional committees on the
proposed modification and a summary of advice received from the private sector advisory committees,
pursuant to Section 123(g)(1)(D); (ii) the USTR and USDOC consult with the congressional committees
regarding the content of the final rule, pursuant to Section 123(g)(1)(E); (iii) the USTR instructs the USDOC to
implement the Section 123 final determination; and (iv) publication of the final determination pursuant to
Section 123(g)(1)(F). (See United States' submission, para. 25; and US Case Calendar)

Section 123(g) process. 100 Finally, I note that the findings in the EC – Fasteners (China) dispute
concerned a different measure taken by another WTO Member, and the implementation of those
findings was conducted in a different legal system. I therefore do not find the alleged
implementation period in EC – Fasteners (China) to be relevant to my determination of the
reasonable period of time in the present dispute.
3.3.2.3 The process under Section 129(b) of the URAA
3.39. As noted above, the United States plans to utilize Section 129(b) of the URAA to conduct
Phase II and Phase III of its implementation proce ss. In Phase II, The United States intends to
implement the Panel's findings regarding the four th, fifth, and sixth ad ministrative reviews,
including: (i) the use of the simple zeroing methodology to calculate the dumping margins of
mandatory respondents in these reviews
101; (ii) the application of the NME-wide entity practice
and the assignment of a duty rate exceeding th e ceiling applicable under Article 9.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in these reviews 102; and (iii) the treatment of Minh Phu's revocation
request in the fourth administrative review. 103 In Phase III, the United States plans to implement
the Panel's finding concerning the first sunset review.104
3.40. Section 129(b) of the URAA provides:
(b) ACTION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY.—
(1) CONSULTATIONS WITH ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES.—Promptly after a report by a dispute settlement panel or the
Appellate Body is issued that contains findings that an action by the administering
authority in a proceeding under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is not in conformity
with the obligations of the United States under the Antidumping Agreement or the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Trade Representative shall
consult with the administering authority and the congressional committees on the
matter.
(2) DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any
provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, the admi nistering authority shall, within 180 days
after receipt of a written request from the Trade Representative, issue a determination
in connection with the particular proceeding that would render the administering
authority's action described in paragraph (1) not inconsistent with the findings of the
panel or the Appellate Body.
(3) CONSULTATIONS BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION.—Before the administering authority
implements any determination under paragraph (2), the Trade Representative shall
consult with the administering authority and the congressional committees with
respect to such determination.
(4) IMPLEMENTATION OF DETERMINATION.—The Trade Representative may, after
consulting with the administering authority and the congressional committees under
paragraph (3), direct the administering auth ority to implement, in whole or in part,
the determination made under paragraph (2).

100 See Awards of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 56; and US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Review (Article 21.3(c)), para. 7.
101 Panel Report, para. 8.1.b.
102 Panel Report, paras. 8.1.d and 8.1.f.
103 Panel Report, para. 8.1.k.
104 Panel Report, para. 8.1.i.

3.41. In addition, the United States notes th at, pursuant to Section 129(d) of the URAA, the
USDOC is required to provide interested parties with an opportunity to submit written comments
before issuing a final determination.
105
3.42. Both parties agree that, under Sections 129(b) and (d) of the URAA, the following five steps
are required to implement the Panel's relevant findings: (i) the USTR consults with the USDOC and
the relevant congressional committees; (ii) the USTR requests the USDOC to take implementation
action; (iii) the USDOC issues preliminary dete rminations and provides an opportunity for
interested parties to comment; (iv) the USTR consults with the USDOC and the relevant
congressional committees with regard to the USDOC's determinations; and (v) the USTR directs
the USDOC to implement the determinations, as we ll as the issuance of a US Federal Register
notice in which the USDOC officially implements the determinations.
106 The parties' views diverge
significantly, however, with respect to the time needed for these steps, and the need for additional
information-gathering in the Section 129 proceedi ngs. The parties also disagree as to whether
there could be a greater degree of overlap among certain steps in the implementation process, so
that the overall time frame for the Section 129 proc eedings could be further reduced. Finally, the
parties disagree as to whether the current workload of the USDOC should be a relevant
consideration.
107 I turn now to review each of these points of contention.
3.43. First, with respect to the time needed for various steps in the Section 129 proceedings, the
US Case Calendar indicates that, by January 2016 at the latest, the USDOC will begin its work to
implement the Panel's findings on the use of the simple zeroing methodology and Minh Phu's
revocation request in the administrative reviews at issue. The United States emphasizes that the
Panel's findings regarding the application of the NME-wide entity practice in the administrative
reviews cannot be implemented before the completion of the Section 123(g) process. Moreover, it
will take at least three months to draft the preliminary Section 129 determinations to address the
Panel's findings regarding the use of the simple zeroing methodology and to apply any change to
the NME-wide entity practice in the three administrative reviews. It will also take at least three
months to draft the preliminary Section 129 determination regarding Minh Phu's revocation
request.
108 The United States anticipates that the preliminary Section 129 determinations covering
the three administrative reviews will be issued by June 2016.109
3.44. The United States submits that, subsequently, it will take approximately three months for
the USDOC to provide the interested parties an opportunity to comment, in accordance with
Section 129(d) of the URAA 110, and to hold hearings if requested. It will then take an additional
two-month period for the USDOC to analyse the comments received, issue the final
determinations, and correct any ministerial errors identified by interested parties. The
United States estimates, therefore, that it will issue the final Section 129 determinations on the
three administrative reviews by October 2016.
111 The United States further submits that the
USDOC expects to issue a preliminary Section 129 determination regarding the sunset review close
in time to its final Section 129 determinations on the administrative reviews. Thereafter, the
USDOC will need approximately one month in which to receive comments from interested parties
and conduct a hearing if requested, and an additional month to prepare and issue a final sunset
review determination.
112 Finally, after conducting consultations with the USDOC and relevant
congressional committees, in January 2017, the USTR will direct the USDOC to implement the final

105 United States' submission, para. 29 and fn 25 thereto. Section 129(d) provides:
Prior to issuing a determination under [Section 129], the administering authority or the
Commission, as the case may be, shall provide interested parties with an opportunity to submit
written comments and, in appropriate cases, may hold a hearing, with respect to the
determination.
106 United States' submission, paras. 27 and 29-40; Viet Nam's submission, para. 29; parties' responses
to questioning at the hearing.
107 I note that the United States' arguments regarding the USDOC's workload are also applicable to the
Section 123 process. (United States' submission, paras. 42-45) I address the parties' arguments relating to the
USDOC's workload in this section of the Award.
108 United States' submission, paras. 30-31.
109 US Case Calendar.
110 See supra, fn 105.
111 United States' submission, paras. 32-34; US Case Calendar.
112 United States' submission, paras. 37-38.

Section 129 determinations, and the USDOC will issue a Federal Register notice in which it
officially implements the final Section 129 determinations.113
3.45. Viet Nam maintains that Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA requires that the determination by
the USDOC to implement the Panel's findings be made "within 180 days" from the USTR's request
to the USDOC to take implementing actions. 114 At the hearing, Viet Nam acknowledged that there
are other steps before and after this 180-day period, but characterized them as "ministerial" steps
that should not take much time. In Viet Nam's view, the substantive work for Section 129
proceedings should take place within the 180-day period. In this respect, Viet Nam takes issue
with the time requested by the United States for correcting ministerial errors and for the USTR to
conduct consultations regarding the final determinations. According to Viet Nam, in most cases,
the effect of ministerial errors is very limited, and a period of several days would be sufficient to
address them.
115 In the same vein, Viet Nam contends that the USTR consultations regarding the
final determinations "in fact occur in a single day". 116 Finally, Viet Nam argues that the time frame
proposed by the United States is "extraordinary an d inappropriate", in the light of the duration of
Section 129 proceedings in some other disputes.117
3.46. According to the text of Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA, the period of 180 days specified in
that provision refers only to the period within which, following the receipt of a written request from
the USTR, the USDOC must issue a determination implementing the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB. In addition to this step, Sections 129(b)(1), (3), and (4) set out other actions
involving the USTR, the USDOC, and the US Congress that have to be completed both before and
after the step contemplated in Section 129(b)(2). It is thus clear that the 180-day time period
specified in Section 129(b)(2) is not the maximu m amount of time for the USDOC to issue a
determination implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in every case.
118 I
further note that both parties have provided evidence regarding the time periods for implementing
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in certain disputes pursuant to Section 129(b) of the
URAA.119 Such evidence shows that the duration of Section 129 proceedings varies from case to
case, and that the period from the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report to the
publication of the final Section 129 determination may also be in practice longer than 180 days.
3.47. Second, the parties disagree as to whether, during the Section 129 proceedings, the USDOC
may need to gather additional information for: (i) calculating the anti-dumping duty rates in the
administrative reviews at issue; (ii) reviewing Minh Phu's revocation request; and (iii) the first
sunset review. At the hearing, the United States emphasized that, because any modification of the
USDOC's NME-wide entity practice could potentially affect the USDOC's decision as to which
entities may receive individual dumping margins, it would be difficult to prejudge which
information might be needed for calculating the duty rates. Furthermore, with respect to Minh
Phu's revocation request, the United States maintains that the USDOC will need to review data
covering three periods of review, and may need to collect additional information, conduct on-site
verifications, and allow time for interested parties to file responses.
120
3.48. Viet Nam contends that it is "a matter of simple calculation" to implement the Panel's
findings on the use of the simple zeroing methodology and the assignment of the Viet Nam-wide
duty rate in the administrative reviews at issue.
121 Specifically, it involves "altering a few lines of
computer code" in the program for calculating margins and recalculating margins using the altered

113 United States' submission, paras. 35-36 and 39-40; US Case Calendar.
115 Viet Nam's response to questioning at the hearing.
118 See also Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.41.
119 Viet Nam's submission, para. 32; United States' oral statement at the hearing. I note that the parties
submitted different figures for the duration of proceedings in the same disputes. Upon closer examination, it
appears that, at least in some cases, the differences arose mainly from the fact that, whereas the
United States counted the time periods from the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports to the
publication of the final Section 129 determinations, Viet Nam focused on the time periods between the
initiation of the Section 129 proceedings to the publication of the final determinations.
120 United States' submission, para. 31.

program, and no additional information is required for this process. 122 With regard to Minh Phu's
revocation request, Viet Nam maintains that, according to the relevant practice, the USDOC should
"automatically revoke" the anti-dumping duty because Minh Phu has demonstrated the absence of
any margins of dumping in three consecutive reviews.
123 As regards the sunset review, Viet Nam
argues that the need for any new information is also "minimal".124
3.49. As noted above, both parties agree that the United States will implement the Panel's
"as such" finding regarding the NME-wide entity practice before implementing the Panel's
"as applied" findings regarding this practice. I recall that the NME-wide entity practice concerns the
USDOC's approach in addressing the relation ship between the NME Member government and
producers/exporters from that Member. It cannot be excluded that, following implementation of
the "as such" finding, the USDOC may need to gather more information regarding individual
producers/exporters from Viet Nam in the administrative reviews. I also note the United States'
argument at the hearing that, pursuant to the applicable regulation 125, the USDOC must evaluate
two other criteria in examining Minh Phu's revocation request in addition to the existence or
absence of dumping in three consecutive reviews, and the need for additional information cannot
be excluded. At the same time, once relevant additional information is gathered, it appears that
changing the computer program for recalculating dumping margins might not necessarily be
time-consuming in itself. Finally, I recall that there must be a balance between the transparency
and due process rights of interested parties, on the one hand, and the promptness required in
implementing recommendations and rulings of the DSB, on the other hand.
126
3.50. Third, regarding the degree of overlap among certain steps, Viet Nam argued at the hearing
that the USDOC's review of Minh Phu's revocation request would not depend on the
implementation of the other findings made by the Panel. Thus, the USDOC could speed up the
process by issuing a separate Section 129 determ ination on the revocation request while the
Section 123(g) process is ongoing, thereby achiev ing compliance with regard to the revocation
request earlier. In addition, Viet Nam contended that certain aspects of the sunset review, such as

122 Viet Nam's submission, para. 22. On the basis of an affidavit from a specialist familiar with the
USDOC computer programs for calculating dumping margins, Viet Nam claims that recalculation of the
dumping margins for purposes of implementing the Panel's above findings can be completed within five hours.
(Viet Nam's submission, para. 22 (referring to Affidavit of Paul M. Casas, dated 21 October 2015
(Exhibit VNM-3), p. 3))
123 Viet Nam's submission, para. 23. In support of its argument, Viet Nam submitted the Federal
Register notice promulgating Section 351.222 of the USDOC Regulations that, according to Viet Nam, provided
the authority to revoke anti-dumping duties for individual companies based on the absence of dumping.
(USDOC, Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders,
Final Rule, United States Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 183 (22 September 1999), pp. 51236-51240
(Exhibit VNM-6)) In addition, Viet Nam submitted a Federal Register notice revoking anti-dumping duties for a
company in an administrative review conducted pursuant to Section 351.222 of the USDOC Regulations in
2002. (USDOC, Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Rescission of Administrative
Review in Part, and Final Determination to Revoke Order in Part: Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand,
United States Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 240 (13 December 2002), pp. 76718-76720 (Exhibit VNM-7))
125 The United States explained that, for purposes of implementing the Panel's finding concerning
Minh Phu's revocation request, it would apply the regulation effective at the time of Minh Phu's revocation
request in the fourth administrative review. According to the Panel Report, this regulation was
Section 351.222(b) of the USDOC Regulations. Section 351.222(b) provided, in relevant part:
(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order in part, the Secretary will
consider:
(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order have sold the
merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at least three consecutive years;
(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary previously has determined to have
sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value, the exporter or producer agrees in
writing to its immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any exporter or producer is
subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that the exporter or producer, subsequent to the
revocation, sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value; and
(C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise necessary to
offset dumping.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) through (C) of
this section, that the antidumping duty order as to those producers or exporters is no longer
warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those producers or exporters.
(Panel Report, para. 7.323 (quoting Section 351.222(b), Title 19 of the United States Code of Federal
Regulations (Panel Exhibit VNM-58)))
126 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMS (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51.

an examination of the import volumes, could already begin before the completion of the
Section 129 proceedings regarding the administrative reviews.
3.51. In response, the United States recalled at the hearing its intention to begin working on
implementing the Panel's finding regarding Minh Phu's revocation request as soon as possible,
concurrently with the Section 123(g) process. The United States clarified that, in the light of the
Panel's relevant findings and how reviews are conducted in the US legal system, the USDOC would
issue final Section 129 determinations regarding the three administrative reviews and the sunset
review at issue. These determinations would address the Panel's findings regarding various aspects
of the reviews, including Minh Phu's revocation request in the fourth administrative review. In the
United States' view, parsing out one element from an administrative review and making a separate
final Section 129 determination on that element, as Viet Nam seemed to suggest, would not be
conducive to the proper implementation of the Panel's relevant findings.
3.52. I recall that the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of
implementation that it deems most appropriate, provided that the means chosen is capable of
bringing it into compliance with its WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time. In this
vein, the United States has a measure of discretion to decide how to structure its Section 129
determinations according to its normal practice, while at the same time utilizing all the flexibilities
that are available under its legal system in orde r to achieve compliance in the shortest possible
time. In this respect, I note that the USDOC's work on implementing the Panel's findings regarding
the use of the simple zeroing methodology and Minh Phu's revocation request will both be
conducted concurrently with the Section 123 process.
3.53. Furthermore, I recall that the USDOC may need to take into account relevant
determinations in the administrative reviews for purposes of making the sunset review
determination. Indeed, under both the US Case Ca lendar and Viet Nam's proposed timetable, the
issuance of the final Section 129 determination on th e sunset review would be the last step in the
implementation process. I also note that, according to the US Case Calendar, the USDOC will issue
the preliminary Section 129 sunset review determination in the same month as it issues the final
Section 129 determinations on the administrative reviews.
127 Thus, regardless of whether, and the
extent to which, the USDOC could begin its work on the sunset review before completing the
administrative reviews, it appears that there shou ld not be a significant time-lag between the end
of the Section 129 proceedings on the administrative reviews and the beginning of the Section 129
sunset review proceeding.
3.54. Finally, the United States submits that, while working on the Section 123 and Section 129
determinations to implement the findings in the present dispute, the USDOC must also continue
working on numerous ongoing anti-dumping and countervailing duty proceedings. The
United States alleges that the USDOC "is currently experiencing a 12-year record high for original
investigations".
128 Therefore, the United States contends that the current workload of the USDOC
"should be included as part of the 'particular circumstances' of this dispute". 129 At the hearing,
Viet Nam contended that the USDOC's current workload should not be taken into account, because
the USDOC could have planned its workload in ad vance and prioritized the implementation of the
relevant findings in this dispute.
3.55. I note that the United States raised the same argument in the recent arbitration in US –
Countervailing Measures (China) . The arbitrator in that dispute found that, in the light of the
fundamental obligations assumed by the Members of the WTO, the current workload of the USDOC
s h o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a s r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e a s o n a b le p e r i o d o f t i m e f o r
implementation.
130 That arbitrator also noted that the impl ementing Member is expected to use all
available flexibilities within its legal system to ensure "prompt compliance" with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in accordance with Article 21 of the DSU. 131 Prioritizing compliance
action in respect of the DSB recommendations an d rulings at issue in these proceedings would

127 See also United States' submission, para. 37.
128 United States' submission, para. 43.
129 United States' submission, para. 45.
130 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing measure (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.49 (referring
to Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 38).
131 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.49.
(referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 73).

constitute an exercise of flexibility available to the USDOC, which it would be expected to utilize.132
Similarly, I therefore do not find the workload clai med by the United States to be relevant to my
determination of the reasonable period of time in this dispute.
4 AWARD
4.1. In the light of the foregoing considerat ions, the "reasonable period of time" for the
United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is
15 months, from 22 April 2015, that is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports in this dispute. The reasonable period of time will expire on 22 July 2016.
Signed in the original at Geneva this 27th day of November 2015 by:

Simon Farbenbloom
Arbitrator

132 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.49.

ANNEX A
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES' SUBMISSION
1. At its meeting on April 22, 2015, the DSB ad opted its recommendations and rulings in
United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam (DS429). Pursuant to
Article 21.3 of the DSU, the United States inform ed the DSB on May 20, 2015, that it intends to
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and that it would need a reasonable period of
time (RPT) to do so. The United States engaged in discussions with Vietnam in an effort to agree
on the RPT, but the parties were unable to reach agreement.
2. The amount of time a Member requires for implementation of DSB recommendations and
rulings depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the dispute, including the scope of the
recommendations and rulings and the types of procedures required under the Member's laws to
make the necessary changes in the measures at issue. Specific circumstances identified in
previous awards as relevant to the arbitrator's determination of the RPT include: (1) the legal form
of implementation; (2) the technical complexity of the measure the Member must draft, adopt,
and implement; and (3) the period of time in which the implementing Member can achieve that
proposed legal form of implementation in accordance with its system of government.
3. In this dispute, the United States is impl ementing DSB recommendations and rulings with
respect to six matters. The most practical way under U.S. law to implement these six matters is by
conducting three sequential proceedings, utiliz ing Sections 123 and Section 129 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act. First, the United States will employ Section 123 to address the Panel's
finding that the presumption that all producers and exporters in Vietnam belong to a Vietnam-wide
entity is inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The Section 123 process will need to be completed
before any other determination regarding impl ementation can be finalized, because the
United States will need to incorporate applicab le findings made pursuant to the Section 123
process into certain subsequent determinations. Once all other determinations regarding
implementation has been finalized, the United States will be able to reevaluate the results of the
first five-year sunset review as it will need to study whether these determinations should play a
role in its reconsideration of that sunset review to address the Panel's finding that aspects of that
review were inconsistent with the AD Agreement.
4. Both parties have a strong interest in setting the RPT at a length that allows for an
implementation process that takes account of all available information and uses a well-considered
approach to implementing the findings in the Panel report. The RPT determined by the arbitrator in
this dispute thus should be of sufficient length to allow the United States to implement the DSB
recommendations and rulings in a manner consiste nt with those recommendations and rulings.
This would preserve the rights of the United States to have a reasonable time for compliance and
ensure that antidumping duties are imposed only in accordance with WTO rules. If the RPT is too
short to allow for effective implementation, the likelihood of a "positive solution" to the dispute
would be reduced.
5. The United States is taking the necessary administrative actions to bring itself into
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ru lings. For the reasons outlined in the U.S.
submission, an RPT of at least 21 months is a reason able period of time for implementation in this
dispute.

ANNEX B
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF VIET NAM'S SUBMISSION
WTO JURISPRUDENCE
1. Under Article 21.1 and 21.3(c) of the DS U implementation must be prompt. WTO
jurisprudence has established that "prompt" mean the shortest time possible.
2. Only circumstances resulting from the legal system of the implementing Member and the
complexity of the implementation are relevant.
3. There have been virtually no arbitral awards which exceed the 15 month guideline provided in
Article 21.3(c).

IMPLEMENTATION IN DS429 IS NOT COMPLEX
1. Each of the steps required for implementation can be accomplished in a short period of time
and none are complex.
2. Revisions in margins in all of the underlying proceedings can be done in 5 hours.
3. The existing record allows the U.S. to make new determinations with respect to both the
individual respondent revocation and the sunset review with minimal need to supplement the
existing record and a short period comments on the U.S. proposed determination.

LEGAL, PROCEDURAL AND TIME LIMITS CO NSTRAINTS ON IMPLEMENTATION DO NOT
EXIST UNDER U.S. LAW
1. Neither of the proposed mechanisms for implementation, Sections 123 and 129, impose time
constraints on implementation under these provisions of U.S. law.

PAST U.S. EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTATION
1. Based on prior U.S. implementation in trade remedy WTO disputes, there is no precedent for
the time proposed by the U.S. for implementation.

VIET NAM'S PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION
1. Viet Nam's proposal for a six month RPT is consistent with WTO jurisprudence, the
requirements of U.S. law, and the complexity, or lack thereof, of the actions required for
implementation.