EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON MALLEABLE CAST IRON TUBE OR PIPE FITTINGS FROM BRAZIL
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 7 March 2003
Document codes: WT/DS219/R
Complainant: Brazil
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Chile, Japan, Mexico, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15  Anti-dumpingArt. I, VI  GATT 1994

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON
MALLEABLE CAST IRON TUBE OR PIPE FITTINGS
FROM BRAZIL
Report of the Panel
The report of the Panel on is being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The report
is being circulated as an unrestricted document from 7 March 2003 pursuant to the Procedures for the
Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/452). Members are reminded that in
accordance with the DSU only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report. An appeal shall be
limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
There shall be no ex parte communications with the Panel or Appellate Body concerning matters
under consideration by the Panel or Appellate Body.
Note by the Secretariat: This Panel Report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within 60 days after the
date of its circulation unless a party to the dispute decides to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report .
If the Panel Report is appealed to the Appellate Body, it sha ll not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after the
completion of the appeal. Information on the current status of the Panel Report is available from the WTO Secretariat.

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 21 December 2000, Brazil requested consultations with the European Communities
pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (the "DSU"), Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT
1994") and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping Agreement") concerning the EC anti-dumping measures
imposed in respect of imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from Brazil. 1 T h e
European Communities and Brazil held consultations on 7 February 2001, but failed to settle the
dispute.
1.2 On 7 June 2001, Brazil requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article XXIII of the
GATT 1994, Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 6 of the DSU.2
1.3 At its meeting on 24 July 2001, the Dispute Settle ment Body (the "DSB") established a Panel
in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU to examine the matter referred to the DSB by Brazil in
document WT/DS219/2. At that meeting, the parties to the dispute also agreed that the Panel should
have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by Brazil in document WT/DS219/2, the matter referred to the DSB by Brazil in that
document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements".
1.4 On 5 September 2001, the parties agreed to the following composition of the Panel
3:
Chairman: Mr. Maamoun Abdel-Fattah
Members: Ms. Deborah Milstein
Mr. G. Bruce Cullen
1.5 Chile, Japan, Mexico and the United States reserved their rights to participate in the Panel
proceedings as third parties.
1.6 The Panel met with the parties on 4-5 December 2001 and 11-12 June 2002. It met with the
third parties on 5 December 2001.
1.7 The Panel submitted its interim report to the parties on 7 October 2002. The Panel submitted
its final report to the parties on 10 December 2002.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 This dispute concerns the imposition by the European Communities of anti-dumping
measures on imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from Brazil.
2.2 Following the filing in April 1999 of an application for an anti-dumping investigation by the
Defence Committee of Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings Industry of the European Union 4, the

1 WT/DS219/1.
2 WT/DS219/2.
3 WT/DS219/3.
4 Exhibit BRL-1. The EC producers on whose behalf the application was made – indicated as
representing 100 per cent of the EC industry -- are: Georg Fischer Fittings Gmbh. of Austria; R. Woeste Co.
Gmbh & Co. KG. of Germany; Ferriere e Fonderie di Do ngo SPA. and Raccordi Pozzi Spoleto S.P.A. of Italy;
Accesorios de Tuberia, S.A. of Spain; and Crane Fluid Systems of the United Kingdom.

European Communities published, on 29 May 1999, a Notice of Initiation in its Official Journal 5,
initiating an investigation on malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating in: Brazil, China,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. 6
Industria de Fundicao Tupy Ltda. ("Tupy") was the only Brazilian exporting producer investigated.
Imports from certain third countries, including Bulgaria, Poland and Turkey, were not included in the
investigation.
7
2.3 The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 April 1998 to
31 March 1999 ("Investigation Period"). The EC examination of "trends" in the context of the injury
analysis covered the period from 1 January 1995 to 31 March 1999 ("Injury Investigation Period").8
2.4 A 42 per cent devaluation of the Brazilian Real occurred in January 1999.
2.5 Numerous communications and exchanges, including the questionnaire and hearings,
occurred between the European Communities and Tupy and/or Tupy's legal counsel in the course of
the investigation. 9 A verification visit occurred at the premises of Tupy in September 1999. 10
Communications also occurred between government officials of the European Communities and
Brazil relating to aspects of the investigation.11
2.6 On 28 February 2000, the European Communities imposed provisional anti-dumping duties
on imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from, inter alia , Brazil as reflected in the
Provisional Regulation.12

5 O.J. C 151/21, 29 May 1999. Exhibit BRL-2.
6 The proceeding against Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was terminated. See
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 449/2000, O.J. L 55, 29.02.2000 (the "Provisional Regulation"), Exhibit
BRL-12, para. 7.2.2; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2000, O.J. L 208, 18.08.2000 (the "Definitive
Regulation"), Exhibit BRL-19, para. K.2. Turkey was listed in the application, but the European Communities
decided to exclude it from the investiga tion as its market share was considered de minimis pursuant to
Article 5(7) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped
imports from countries not members of the European Community. O.J. L 56/6, 6 March 1996 (the "EC basic
Regulation"). See Notice of Initiation, supra, note 5.
7 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, paras. 7 and 8.
9 These included the following that have been submitted in these Panel proceedings as forming part of
the record of the EC investigation (in chronological order): 15 July 1999: first submission of Tupy in the EC
investigation, Exhibit BRL-5, and Tupy's questionnaire response, Exhibit BRL-4; 9 August 1999: EC deficiency
letter to Tupy, Exhibit BRL-6; 20 August 1999; Tupy's reply to deficiency letter, Exhibit BRL-7;
22 November 1999: second submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-9.; 7 December 1999:
hearing and third submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-10; 28 February 2000: EC
Disclosure Preceding the Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-11; 30 March 2000; fourth submission of Tupy,
Exhibit BRL-13; 29 May 2000: hearing, Exhibit BRL-14; 30 May 2000: Tupy's post-hearing document,
Exhibit, BRL-15; 31 May 2000: EC Di sclosure Preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16; 13 June
2000: fifth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-17; 20 July 2000: EC transparency letter,
Exhibit BRL-18.
10 An EC letter dated 7 September 1999 to Tupy's legal counsel concerning the verification was
submitted in these Panel proceedings as Exhibit BRL-8.
11 These included: meetings between EC and Brazilian officials that occurred on: 23 March 2000
(including the EC Trade Commissioner, Mr. Lamy, and a Brazilian delegation that included Brazil's Minister of
Development, Industry and Trade and the Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber,
reflected in Exhibit EC-6); 9 May 2000 (preparatory meeting, reflected in Exhibit EC-2); and 25-26 May 2000
(the European Community-Brazil Joint Committee, reflected in Exhibit EC-4) and written communications from
Brazil's Ambassador in Brussels to EC officials dated 10 December 1999, 29 January 2000 and
23 February 2000 (Exhibits EC-27-29).
12 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12.

2.7 On 11 August 2000, the European Communities adopted the Definitive Regulation imposing,
inter alia , definitive anti-dumping duties of 34.8% on imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe
fittings from Brazil.13
III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BRAZIL
3.1 Brazil requests that the Panel:
(a) find that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, summarised as follows:14
• that the initiation of the proceeding against imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe
fittings originating in Brazil was inconsistent with Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.8 and 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement;15
• that the imposition of anti-dumping measures by the European Communities on
Brazilian imports is inconsistent with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Article 1 or
Articles 11.1 and 11.2, and Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
• that the imposition of anti-dumping measures by the European Communities on
Brazilian imports is inconsistent with Article VI of GATT 1994 (particularly
Articles VI:1 and VI:4) and Articles 2.2, 2.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 6.4, 9.3, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement;16
• that the imposition of the anti-dumping measures by the European Communities on
the Brazilian imports is inconsistent with Article VI of GATT and Articles 3.1, 3.2,
3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 6.2, 6.4, 6.6, 6.9, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and
• that the imposition of anti-dumping measures by the European Communities on the
Brazilian imports is inconsistent with Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(b) recommend that the European Communities bring its measures into conformity with
Article VI of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(c) suggest that the European Communities repeal its anti-dumping duty order and
reimburse all anti-dumping duties collected thereunder.
(d) reject for being unfounded the European Communities' request for a preliminary
ruling alleging that certain claims in Brazil's first written submission have not been
properly covered by its request for the establishment of a Panel and reject for being
unfounded the European Communities' request for a preliminary ruling alleging that
certain claims in Brazil's first written submission are vague. Alternatively, if the
Panel were to find that some of the EC requests might have some merit, Brazil
requests that any final decision to be taken by the Panel regarding the European
Communities' requests would only be made once the full scope, substance and all the
merits of this dispute have been properly and conclusively assessed.

13 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19.
15 Brazil subsequently withdrew its claims related to the application and initiation of the investigation
under Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.8 and 6.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement (referred to by Brazil as "Issue 2"). Brazil
second written submission, para. 24.
16 Brazil subsequently withdrew its claims related to advertisement and promotional expenses under
Article 2.4 (referred to by Brazil as "Issue 7"). Brazil second written submission, para. 75.

(e) reject the European Communities request that the Panel rule that certain Exhibits
submitted by Brazil are inadmissible.17
(f) make a preliminary ruling that the European Communities amend the text of the
European Communities' first written submission so that references therein to Brazil's
first written submission be made to the actual text of Brazil's first written submission
as originally submitted by Brazil.18
(g) rule that Exhibit EC-12 is not part of the record of the EC investigation and is not
properly before the Panel.19
B. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
3.2 The European Communities:
(a) maintains that its submissions comprehensively refute Brazil's claims and requests the
Panel to make appropriate rulings.
(b) believes that it would not be appropriate for the Panel, should Brazil successfully
establish one or more of its claims, to make suggestions regarding the repeal of the
anti-dumping order and the reimbursement of all anti-dumping duties.20
(c) requests that the Panel make preliminary rulings dismissing certain claims of Brazil
as either overly vague, outside the Panel's terms of reference, or both.21
(d) requests that the Panel make a preliminary ruling that certain Exhibits submitted by
Brazil are inadmissible as Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides
that the Panel must examine the matter based upon the facts made available in
conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing
Member.22
(e) requests that the Panel reject Brazil's request for a preliminary ruling to amend the
text of the European Communities' first written submission.23

17 Additional oral statement of Brazil regarding Exhibits BRL-47-52 - First Meeting, Annex D-4.
18 Brazil request for preliminary ruling, Annex A-3.
19 Brazil second written submission, paras. 226-233 and 252; Comments of Brazil on EC responses to
Panel question 114 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-6.
20 EC first written submission, paras. 570-571. The European Communities subsequently submits that
should the Panel find infringements arising only from the claims under Issues 9 (concerning currency
conversion), 10 (concerning PIS/COFINS indirect taxes) and 11 (concerning "zeroing"), no finding of
nullification or impairment would be appropriate. See EC second oral statement, paras. 162-165; Executive
summary of EC oral statement – second meeting, An nex D-9, para. 32. The European Communities also
requests that, if the Panel were to find that the Eu ropean Communities acted in breach of its WTO obligations
by applying zeroing in the calculation of Tupy's anti-dumping margin, or by not re-examining Tupy's margin of
dumping following the devaluation, the Panel should make no recommendation in respect of these findings as
the European Communities would already have done what was necessary to remedy the situation by initiating a
review in December 2001 in respect of the anti-dumping measures imposed by the Definitive Regulation
(Exhibit EC-26). See EC second oral statement, para. 168 and EC answer to Panel question 144; Executive
summary of EC oral statement – second meeting, Annex D-9, paras. 33 and 34.
21 EC first submission, paras 19-24. Executive summary of EC first written submission, Annex A-2,
paras. 5 and 6. EC second oral statement, para. 9.
22 See executive summary of EC oral statement, first meeting, Annex D-2, para. 28.
23 EC reply to Brazil's request for preliminary ruling, Annex A-4.

IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1 The arguments of the parties as submitted or as summarised in their executive summaries as
submitted to the Panel, are attached as Annexes (see List of Annexes, page vi).
4.2 The parties' answers to the Panel's questions and their comments on each other's answers are
also attached as Annexes (see List of Annexes, page vii).
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1 The arguments of those third parties which have made submissions to the Panel, i.e. Chile,
Japan, and the United States, are attached to this Report as Annexes. The US responses as third party
to the Panel's questions are also attached as Annexes (see List of Annexes, pages ii and iii).
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 On 7 October 2002, we submitted our interim report to the parties. On 15 October 2002,
Brazil submitted a written request for review of precise aspects of the interim report. On
22 October 2002, the European Communities submitted written comments on Brazil's request for
interim review.
6.2 We have modified aspects of our report in light of the parties' comments where we deemed it
appropriate. Those modifications limited to arguments made by Brazil are dealt with in section A.1
below. Those modifications involving our findings are dealt with in section A.2 below.
6.3 We have also made certain necessary technical corrections.
6.4 For greater clarity with respect to our terms of reference, we have appended Brazil's Panel
request to our report.
A.
REQUEST OF BRAZIL
1. Panel's treatment of certain of Brazil's arguments
6.5 Brazil requested that we modify our summary of its arguments in several places to more fully
and/or accurately reflect Brazil's arguments.
6.6 The European Communities ' view is that the Panel has properly represented those
arguments, and that few changes would be justified.
6.7 In light of the parties' comments, the Panel has made modifications to our summary of
Brazil's arguments in paragraphs 7.80, 7.121, 7.234, 7.298, 7.325, 7.339 and 7.343. We have also
made the technical revision suggested by Brazil in footnote 167.
6.8 With respect to Brazil's suggested modification of its argument in paragraph 7.309 to reflect
Brazil's argument that Brazil denies that an alleged examination, which is only implicitly (if at all)
deductible from the other injury factors examined, can be considered a well-reasoned and meaningful
analysis in view of the A ppellate Body's findings in US – Hot-Rolled Steel ,24 our analysis treats
separately the issue of whether the European Communities addressed each Article 3.4 factor and the
adequacy of the EC examination of Article 3.4 factors. We therefore decline to make the suggested

24 Brazil cites Brazil second written submission, para. 230.

modification in this paragraph. We assess the adequacy of the EC's implicit evaluation of "growth" in
conjunction with our assessment of the EC's evaluation of other Article 3.4 factors.
2. Panel's treatment of certain aspects of its findings
(a) Terms of reference: Brazil's "claims" under Article 6.9
6.9 Brazil submits that the Panel's ruling that Article 6.9 is outside our terms of reference makes
no reference and takes no account of Brazil’s argument that Article 6.9 was raised with the European
Communities during consultations and that Brazil’s hand-written notes of the consultations meeting,
which were offered to the Panel but to which Brazil alleges we did not react, clearly demonstrate that
this was indeed the case.
25
6.10 The Panel has modified and supplemented paragraph 7.15 in light of Brazil's comments.
(b) Exhibits BRL-47-52
6.11 In respect of our ruling that Exhibits BRL 47-52 are inadmissible in these Panel proceedings
(paras. 7.28 ff), Brazil asserts that we "completely ignore" Brazil’s reasoning for putting forward
these Exhibits. Brazil argues that these did not relate at all to any substantive claim (as wrongly
assumed by the Panel) and were thus not concerned by Article 17.5(ii) at all. Brazil recalls that it had
submitted these Exhibits in order to: refute the EC’s contention in its first written submission on
Brazil’s “wild allegations” (Brazil submits that, in this respect, these Exhibits demonstrated that
Brazil’s claims were factually correct); and demonstrate to the Panel that the EC’s refusal to
investigate the same claims which had been made by Tupy during the EC investigation clearly
indicated the failures of the EC’s investigating authority to conduct a comprehensive investigation and
examination of facts presented to it by the Brazilian exporter and by other interested parties.
6.12 With respect to the reason for which Brazil submitted the Exhibits in question, the Panel
refers to Brazil's argumentation. For example, in its additional oral statement regarding Exhibits BRL-
47 through 52 at the first Panel meeting
26, Brazil indicates that it was uncertain as to whether this
information existed "in the same way" during the EC investigation, that the European Communities
was asked to examine certain information in the course of the investigation, but that Brazil could find
no indication that the EC had conducted an adequate examination. We find support in Brazil's
argumentation in these proceedings for our understanding that Brazil submitted these Exhibits with a
view to having us examine the EC injury and causation determinations on the basis of facts other than
those made available in accordance with appropriate domestic procedures of the European
Communities. In light of these considerations, we do not believe that we have ignored Brazil's
reasons for putting forth these Exhibits. We have, however, clarified our view in paragraph 7.35.
(c) Issue 3: currency devaluation
6.13 In respect of paragraph 7.104, Brazil states that it has never suggested that the European
Communities should have focused exclusively on data from the end of the investigation period.
6.14 The Panel recalls Brazil's argument that the European Communities imposed measures in the
present case "regardless of its findings for the last months of the investigation where the actual
situation did not require counter-measures."27 We further recall that, in response to Panel questioning
concerning the time period to which Brazil's claim relates, Brazil clarified that it viewed the "dividing
line" as the date of devaluation. Brazil continued: "As of that date and in view of the lasting effect of

25 Brazil refers to statements made by Brazil during the first meeting with the Panel.
26 Annex D-4.
27 See Brazil second written submission, para. 28 and Brazil first written submission, paras. 162-203.

the devaluation, any proper imposition of anti-dumping measures, or a decision to maintain such
measures had to be assessed, as the case may be, against the need to offset or counteract dumping."28
6.15 We therefore understand Brazil to suggest that the European Communities should have
focused exclusively or particularly on the situation following the devaluation – that is, the latter part
of the investigation period -- in considering whether to impose AD measures. We have slightly
modified this paragraph in light of Brazil's comments.
(d) Claims 12 and 15: import volume trends and cumulation
6.16 In respect of our finding in paragraph 7.265, Brazil submits that it has not argued that the
investigating authority’s determinations under Article 2.4 are relevant under Article 3.3. Brazil states
that it has argued that, on the basis of its determination under Article 2.4, the European Communities
was fully aware of the Brazilian exporter’s distribution channels on the EC market and, thus, of the
fact that almost one third of the sales were made to OEM-customers.
29 In view of the EC’s statement
quoted in paragraph 280 that “[a]ll of the countries concerned operate within the same or similar
channels of distribution” (emphasis added), Brazil argues that it logically follows that either the EC’s
conclusion is incorrect or (at least) some exports from all of the other countries concerned were made
at the OEM-level of trade. Brazil submits that given that the European Communities has not even
argued that the latter factual situation prevails, the Panel does not discuss this important part of
Brazil’s argument at all.
6.17 The Panel notes that the EC determination cites the following as confirmation for its
statement that all the countries concerned operate within the same or similar channels of distribution:
"some traders imported or purchased the product under consideration from both various countries
concerned and the Community producers".
30 Given that there is, as we have stated, no explicit
requirement in Article 3.3(b) to examine levels of trade as a component of the "conditions of
competition" examination and thus that there is no guidance as to the manner in which such an
examination is to be conducted, and that the OEM sales in question did not pertain to all (or most) of
the sales of the product concerned in the EC market , we do not believe that these EC statements are,
in themselves, inherently contradictory. We believe that we have adequately addressed Brazil's
argument in this connection. We therefore make no modification.
(e) Issue 13: price undercutting
6.18 In respect of paragraph 7.283, Brazil submits that the Panel refers to the EC’s assertion that
the practical result of “zeroing” in the EC’s price undercutting analysis in this case was de minimis
(0.01%). However, according to Brazil, the Panel is not reflecting the fact that neither Brazil nor the
Brazilian exporter were able to comment on the accuracy of the EC’s assessment ( i.e. whether the
practical result was de minimis or not), as the European Communities did not disclose its calculations
with regard to the “negative” undercutting margins.
31
6.19 The European Communities contends that, as it made clear in its second oral statement, 32
the information necessary for calculating the EC’s use of ‘zeroing’ in this context was available to
Tupy in data provided in the Provisional disclosure (Exhibit BRL-11) document, Annex III, part 4.

28 See Brazil's response to Panel Question 22 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
29 According to Brazil, this is the only reason why Brazil refers to the determination of dumping in
paragraph 214 of its second written submission.
30 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 73.
31 Brazil refers to Brazil second written submission, paragraphs 146 and 147.
32 The European Communities refers to EC second statement, paragraph 95.

According to the European Communities, Brazil has made no attempt to refute this statement, nor has
it indicated, even if its allegation were true, how its claim would be affected.
6.20 The Panel recalls that due to our finding that the European Communities has not violated its
obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2, we did not consider it necessary to address the practical result
of zeroing in the EC consideration of undercutting in this case. It is consequently not necessary for us
to address Brazil's arguments concerning alleged non-disclosure of certain data, which, in any event,
would seem to relate more to disclosure and tran sparency, for example, under Article 6, than to the
substance of the EC undercutting calculation under Article 3. We do not understand Brazil to have
made any such allegations in this context. For these reasons, we decline to make any modifications in
this respect.
(f) Issue 16: injury
6.21 In respect of para. 7.327, Brazil submits that the Panel does not take into account Brazil’s
argument contained in paragraph 237 of Brazil’s second written submission, which states that: “Brazil
recalls that Article 3.6 provides that the effect of the dumped imports ‘shall be assessed in relation to
the domestic production of the like product’. According to Brazil, the European Communities has
never claimed that ‘separate identification of that production was not possible’ and, in view of the
other injury factors specifically pertaining to the like product, was not even able to do so.”
6.22 The Panel has modified this paragraph to expressly reflect and more fully address Brazil's
argument.
6.23 In respect of paragraph 7.332, Brazil asserts that the sentence referring to investments “Brazil
observes that the absolute value of the EC producers’ investments decreased by 7% between 1995 and
the IP” is from Brazil’s point of view meaningless and should be replaced by certain language in
paragraph 282 of its second written submission.
6.24 The Panel has not deleted the former statement which is taken from paragraph 713 of Brazil's
first written submission, but has added certain language to reflect Brazil's argument made in
paragraph 282 of its second written submission.
6.25 Brazil also asserts that, with respect the issue of data discrepancies, Brazil’s argumentation
has not been properly presented and requests that we insert certain language. Firstly, Brazil pointed
out in its first written submission that the data related to inventories and discernible from the EC
producers’ non-confidential questionnaire responses was contradictory.
33 Given that the European
Communities provided during the dispute settlement processing the domestic industry’s exports
allowing Brazil to check the general consistency of the EC data, Brazil recalls that it provided a
reconciliation in its second written submission: 34 Brazil states that in relation to figures provided for
1998, the said discrepancy represents 3.4% of the EC consumption (2,120/62,232 tonnes), 4.3% of the
domestic production (2,120/49,875 tonnes), 5.5% of the EC producers’ domestic sales (2,120/38,670
tonnes), 12.1% of the imports under investigati on (2,120/17,581 tonnes) and 39.3% of the other third

33 Brazil refers to paragraphs 716 to 724 of Brazil’s first written submission.
34 Brazil refers to its second written submission, para 286. Brazil asserts that it is important to note that
this test is used to verify the general consistency of the EC’s data and not only data related to the stocks. Indeed,
according to Brazil, any discrepancy between ‘’input’ ( i.e. opening stock, production and purchases) and
‘output’ (i.e. domestic sales, exports and closing stocks) indicates that the figures related to either input or
output ( or both) are inaccurate. Stocks are used as a threshold against which the general consistency is
measured.

country imports (2,120/5,388 tonnes). 35 Therefore, according to Brazil, paragraph 348 is misleading
and reflects one-sidedly the EC’s explanations.36
6.26 The European Communities objects to Brazil’s misuse of this stage of the proceedings to
introduce arguments that could have been made during its submissions to the Panel. According to the
European Communities, Brazil appears to assume that presenting data in various relationships, so as
to produce nominally higher and higher percentages, is itself a persuasive argument. The European
Communities rejects this approach as empty rhetoric. The figures given by the European
Communities in its second oral statement, and quoted by the Panel, refer to the discrepancies
regarding stocks as a percentage of production levels. Of course, if they were compared to reported
stocks they would be much higher. The European Communities argues that it presented the data in
this way because, as it explained, and as the Panel reports, it believed that the discrepancy was due to
the inclusion of scrap in the gross production figures. While the amount of scrap has an obvious direct
relationship with production levels, it has no meaningful connection with existing stock levels.
Brazil’s arguments, even now, completely ignore this explanation. In view of Brazil’s allegations that
in 1998 the discrepancy would have amounted to 13% of production, the European Communities has
reviewed the calculations. The precise figures are the following: 1996 - 1.3981%; 1997 - 1.4401%
and 1998 - 4.2506 %. There is, therefore, a small difference with respect to the percentages originally
reported by the EC for 1996 (1%) and 1998 (4%), which is probably due to the fact that only the
percentages for those two years were rounded to one figure. On the other hand, the European
Communities fails to understand how Brazil arrives at the percentage of 13 % for 1998. The correct
figure for production in 1998 is 49.875 tonnes and not 16.300 tonnes. Indeed, Brazil itself states
elsewhere that the percentage is 4.3%.
6.27 The Panel has made certain modifications in this paragraph to more fully reflect Brazil's
arguments made in its second written submission. The record of the investigation indicates that the
1998 figure for production is 49 875 tonnes (and not 16 300 as Brazil seems to argue); the relevant
figure is therefore 4% (and not 13% as Brazil seems to argue).
6.28 Brazil submits that a sentence should be added indicating that Brazil contested the EC's
conclusions that the market for malleable fittings is "highly price sensitive", although the prices of
imported fittings had demonstrably not affected the prices of the EC industry.
6.29 The Panel has modified paragraph 7.336 in light of these comments.
(g) Issue 17: causation
6.30 Brazil asserts that its arguments concerning the impact of data discrepancies concerning
stocks on the EC's assessment of the consequential effects of the dumped imports on the EC industry
were not fully reflected, and requests that we reflect its arguments made in paragraph 317 of its
second written submission, as follows:
“Moreover, Brazil observes that the EC correctly attributes the
injury to one injury factor, i.e. the increase in stocks. However, given that the data used by the EC was
manifestly inaccurate, Brazil submits the consequential effects of the dumped imports on the EC

35 Brazil states that it is also to be noted that the domestic producers were also importers of the product
concerned. Therefore, Brazil submits, Brazil’s reconciliation, where the unknown volume of the EC producers’
own imports is not included to the equation, is a very conservative (under) estimate of the discrepancy in the
EC’s data; Brazil refers to footnote 315 of Brazil’s second written submission.
36 Brazil submits that according to the EC assertion reprinted in paragraph 348 of the Interim Report
(although without any reference to the source), the discrepancy “amount to 1% in 1996, 1.4% in 1997 and 4% in
1998”. Brazil submits that, the EC’s calculation for 1998 is incorrect: not 4% but 13% (2,120/16,300 tonnes).

industry were not properly established on the basis of positive evidence”; see Brazil’s Second
Submission, para 317.”37
6.31 The Panel has inserted footnote 320 in order to reflect more fully Brazil's arguments made in
paragraphs 316 and 317 of its second written submission and to clarify our findings.
6.32 Brazil alleges that paragraph 7.380 did not reflect its argumentation and suggests that we
amend it, either by deleting a certain phrase , or by indicating the source of this phrase.
6.33 The Panel has modified our findings in paragraph 7.380 in response to Brazil's request that
we indicate the source of our statement that we do not understand that Brazil has invoked Article 6.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.34 Brazil submits, in respect of paragraph 7.385, that the Panel combines two different sets of
arguments into one. However, Brazil contests the EC’s conclusion that the imports from Poland had
not caused any injury to the EC industry, although the import volume from Poland increased
significantly, Polish unit prices were undercutting the EC producers’ prices and the EC classified the
product as “highly price sensitive”. Thus, according to Brazil, the Panel has not reflected Brazil's
argumentation provided in paragraph 324 of its second written submission at all.
6.35 The Panel has modified paragraph 7.385 in order to more fully reflect Brazil's argument, and
have expanded upon our findings in paragraphs 7.387-7.388.
6.36 Brazil argues that paragraph 7.409 did not reflect Brazil's arguments concerning the rate of
decrease in consumption and requests that we amend it. Brazil further submits that this suggested
amendment pointing out the EC’s contradictory argumentation may also help to resolve the Panel’s
confusion which Brazil argues is indicated in paragraph 7.412, which Brazil suggests that we clarify
by deleting a certain sentence.
6.37 The Panel has added certain language in paragraph 7.409 to reflect Brazil's argument
concerning the rate of decrease in consumption from 1995-IP and we have clarified our findings in
paragraph 7.412.
VII. FINDINGS
A.
GENERAL ISSUES
1. Standard of Review
7.1 In light of the claims and arguments made by the parties in the course of these Panel
proceedings38, we recall, at the outset of our examination, the standard of review we must apply to the
matter before us.
7.2 Article 11 of the DSU39, in isolation, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels
for all covered agreements except the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 11 imposes upon panels a

37 Brazil second written submission, paragraph 317.
38 For example, EC first written submission, paras. 25-28; EC first oral statement, paras. 8-20.
39 Article 11 of the DSU, entitled "Function of Panels", states: "The function of panels is to assist the
DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a
panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements…"

comprehensive obligation to make an "objective assessment of the matter", an obligation which
embraces all aspects of a panel's examination of the "matter", both factual and legal.
7.3 Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth the special standard of review
applicable to anti-dumping disputes. Certain elements of Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
complement -- or supplement -- the standard contained in Article 11 of the DSU. In particular, with
regard to factual issues, Article 17.6(i) provides:
“(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether
the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;”
7.4 With respect to legal questions of the interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ,
Article 17.6(ii) provides:
“(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where
the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in
conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations.”
7.5 Thus, together, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement set
out the standard of review we must apply with re spect to both the factual and legal aspects of our
examination of the claims and arguments raised by the parties.
40
7.6 In light of this standard of review, in examining the matter referred to us, we must evaluate
whether the determination made by the European Communities is consistent with relevant provisions
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . We may and must find that it is consistent if we find that the
European Communities investigating authority has properly established the facts and evaluated the
facts in an unbiased and objective manner, and that the determination rests upon a "permissible"
interpretation of the relevant provisions. Our task is not to perform a de novo review of the
information and evidence on the record of the underlying anti-dumping investigation, nor to substitute
our judgment for that of the EC investigating authority even though we may have arrived at a different
determination were we examining the record ourselves.
2. Burden of Proof
7.7 We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement
require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member
must assert and prove its claim. 41 In these Panel proceedings, we thus observe that it is for Brazil,
which has challenged the consistency of the European Communities' measure, to bear the burden of
demonstrating that the measure is not consistent w ith the relevant provisions of the Agreement. We
also note, however, that it is generally for each party asserting a fact, whether complainant or
respondent, to provide proof thereof. 42 In this respect, therefore, it is also for the European

40 Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan ("US-Hot-Rolled Steel"), WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, paras. 54-62.
41 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India (" US – Wool Shirts and Blouses") , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
DSR 1997:I, 323, at 337.
42 Ibid.

Communities to provide evidence for the facts which it asserts. We also recall that a prima facie case
is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as a matter of
law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima facie case. In addition, we consider that both
parties generally have a duty to cooperate in the proceedings in order to assist us in fulfilling our
mandate, through the provision of relevant information.43 We must draw inferences on the basis of all
of the relevant facts of record, including, for example, where a party refuses to provide relevant
information.
44
B. PRELIMINARY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Introduction
7.8 The parties each made requests for rulings on preliminary or procedural matters in this
dispute. We turn first to the preliminary rulings requested by the European Communities. We then
address the preliminary and procedural issues raised by Brazil.
2. Requests by the European Communities
(a) Alleged vagueness of Brazil's claims and scope of the Panel's terms of reference
7.9 The European Communities requests that we make preliminary rulings dismissing certain
claims of Brazil as either overly vague or outside our terms of reference, or both.
(i) Alleged vagueness of certain claims by Brazil
7.10 At the first substantive meeting with the parties, we issued the following ruling in response to
the EC request45 relating to the alleged vagueness of certain claims by Brazil:
1. The European Communities has requested the Panel to refuse to consider
certain of Brazil's claims 1 on the grounds that these claims are "defective" 2 in that
they are "vaguely defined" 3 in Brazil's first written submission. In the view of the
European Communities, admission of these claims would constitute an infringement
of the EC's rights of defence and a departure from the good faith standard in Article
3.10 DSU and from the due process requirement that underlies the DSU.

43 Appellate Body Report , Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft ("Canada –
Aircraft"), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1377, para. 190.
44 Ibid., para. 203; Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Wheat Gluten from the European Communities ("US – Wheat Gluten "), WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted
19 January 2001, paras. 173-174.
45 In particular, this EC request involved the following claims or arguments: allegation under
Article 6.2 relating to alleged differences between the scope of the product referred to in the Application and
subject to the investigation; allegation under Article 11. 2 relating to the EC alleged failure to self-initiate a
review immediately upon imposition of the AD measures; allegation under Article 2.4.1 because the EC
allegedly did not make the currency conversions required under Article 2.4 for the purpose of making a fair
comparison between the export price and the normal value; allegation of violation as the EC allegedly failed to
satisfy itself as to the accuracy of information submitted by Tupy relating to imports of the product concerned
under other CN codes; allegation of violation of Article 3.3 relating to channels of distribution and levels of
trade; allegation of violation of Article 3.4 that it was incumbent on the EC to rely on more indicators and
evidence of injury; allegation of violation relating to Articles 6.6 and 3.5 that the EC allegedly did not take
proper account of positive evidence relating to alleged differences in the cost of production and market
perception concerning black and white heart variants of the product concerned; and all claims under Article 12.

2. Brazil asserts that the Panel should reject the EC's request as "unfounded". 4
According to Brazil, its first written submission clearly identifies the legal basis for
Brazil's complaint and eliminates any risk of "vagueness" with regard to Brazil's
claims. Brazil submits that the claims concerned fall within the Panel's terms of
reference and are therefore properly before the Panel. In Brazil's view, it is for the
Panel to decide, in the course of its substantive analysis, whether or not the claims are
too vague to be accepted. In response to the EC request, Brazil has also submitted
specific clarifications with respect to each allegation identified by the European
Communities.
5
3. The Panel understands this EC request to pertain to the alleged vagueness of
Brazil's claims as presented in Brazil's first written submission, and not to how these
claims have been set out in Brazil's request for the establishment of a Panel. The
European Communities has made this clear to us in its first written submission
6 and at
the Panel's first substantive meeting with the parties.7
4. We understand that it is the request for establishment of the Panel 8 in this
dispute that establishes the scope of our terms of reference. This document dictates
the scope of this dispute and our mandate and jurisdiction. We do not understand the
European Communities to be alleging that any "vagueness" in Brazil's claims would
have the effect, in and of itself, of removing these claims from the Panel's terms of
reference as set out in the Panel request.
5. We have therefore decided, at this early stage of the proceedings, to deny the
EC request that we refuse to consider Brazil's claims on the basis of their alleged
vagueness. These claims fall within our terms of reference and therefore form part of
the matter referred to us by the DSB.
6. To the extent the European Communitie s is arguing that the first submission
is determinative for the clarity of the claims for the purpose of the entire proceeding -
- in the sense that if a claim is not clearly stated there, no further opportunity exists
for clarification over any of the remaining portion of the proceedings -- we cannot
accept this argument. In our view, it is in the nature of the Panel process that the
claims made by a party may be progressively clarified and refined throughout the
proceeding.
9 This may occur through the submission of supporting evidence and
argumentation by the parties, commencing with their first written submission, and
followed by a round of rebuttal submissions, supplemented by oral statements and
answers to questions. It is, of course, clear that this process of progressive
clarification would not allow a party to add additional claims (which were not
included in the request for establishment of the Panel) during the course of the
proceedings. The fundamental due process rights of the parties are thereby preserved.
7. In the case before us, we consider that even if we were to agree with the
European Communities that, at this stage, some of the allegations it identified in
Brazil’s first submission may be vague, the opportunity would still exist for Brazil to
provide further supporting evidence and argumentation in its subsequent submissions
with a view to clarifying those allegations in the course of the Panel proceedings
(recalling, of course, that the working procedures we have adopted for these panel
proceedings provide that the parties shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no
later than during the first substantive m eeting, except with respect to evidence
necessary for purposes of rebuttal submissions or answers to questions).
10 In this
regard we note, for example, that Brazil has already submitted, in response to the EC
request, clarifications with regard to each of the claims identified by the European

Communities as being "overly vague". 11 Through the Panel process, the claims that
the European Communities now considers to be vague may therefore become clear at
a subsequent stage in these proceedings, including through submissions and through
responses by Brazil to questions that the Panel and the European Communities may
pose. However, if, subsequently in the course of these proceedings, the European
Communities considers that Brazil's claims remain insufficiently clear or that these
claims have finally become clear at such a late stage that the European Communities
considers that it has not had an opportunity properly to respond, it may bring this
situation to the attention of the Panel. The Panel will then consider the situation,
keeping in mind the due process rights of the European Communities.
8. We find support for our ruling in the statement by the Appellate Body in its
report on US – FSC that the "procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are
designed to promote, not the development of litigation techniques, but simply the fair,
prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes".
12
9. We underline that our decision not to reject some of Brazil's “claims” that
have been alleged as being vague by the European Communities does not prejudge
the question of whether or not Brazil may ultimately succeed in clarifying or
substantiating its claims of violation of the provisions in question.
13
10. If necessary, we may supplement our reasoning here in our final report.
Annex A-2, paras. 5 and 6.
4 Brazil's response to the EC's request for a preliminary ruling, para. 74.
5 See Brazil's response to the EC's request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 26-36.
7 E.g., EC reply to Brazil's response to the preliminary rulings requested by the EC, paras. 12-
15.
8 WT/DS219/2.
9 We recall the statement by the Appellate Body that "there is a significant difference between
the claims identified in the request for the establishment of a panel, which establish the panel's
terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims,
which are set out and progressively clarified in the first written submissions, the rebuttal
submissions and the first and second panel meetings with the parties". Appellate Body
Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
("EC – Bananas III
 "), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591,
para. 141.
11 See Brazil's response to the EC's request for a preliminary ruling, paras. 26-36.
12 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment of "Foreign Sales Corporations "
("US – FSC"), WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, para. 166.
13 We draw support for our view from Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand –
H-Beams "), WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.43.

7.11 We do not consider it is necessary to supplement our ruling with respect to this matter.
(ii) Scope of Panel's terms of reference
a. Brazil's "claims" alleged by the EC to be outside our terms of reference
7.12 In its first written submission, the European Communities r e q u e s t e d t h a t w e m a k e a
preliminary ruling that certain of Brazil's claims are not within our terms of reference. In particular,
the European Communities alleges that the following claims of Brazil are not within our terms of
reference:
46
• Claims of breach of Article 9.3 in connection with Issues 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10.
• Claim of infringement of Article 2.2.2 because of use of different criteria for the calculation
of SG&A costs and of profits.
• Claim of breach of Article 6.13 because of a failure to provide Tupy with “any assistance
practicable” in connection with Issue 8.
• Claim of infringement of Article 3.2 because the consideration of significant undercutting was
confined to products that had matching EC products.
• Claims under Articles 6.2 and 6.9 in connection with Issues 16 and 17.
• Claims regarding the examination of specific injury factors listed in Article 3.4, including in
particular the claim of inadequate consideration of ‘factors affecting domestic prices’ in
breach of Article 3.4.
• Claim of violation of Article 3.5 based on the ‘comparative advantage’ of Tupy.
• Claim of violation of Article 6.6 because the authorities refused to investigate properly
Tupy’s assertion that imports from Poland had occurred in greater amounts and at lower
prices than the European Communities had concluded on the basis of Eurostat information.
• Claim of breach of Article 3.5 based on the differences between ‘black heart’ and ‘white
heart’ fittings.
• Claims of breach of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 in connection with Issues 1, 3, 5, 13 and 16.
• Claims of failure to provide information under Article 12.1.
7.13 We examine the EC request with respect to each of these "claims" below.
b. Claims under Articles 6.9, 6.13, 9.3 and 12.1
7.14 At the first substantive meeting with the parties, we issued the following ruling in response to
the request by the European Communities relating to the scope of the Panel's terms of reference
concerning Articles 6.9, 6.13, 9.3 and 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement :
1. The European Communities has requested that we issue a
preliminary ruling to the effect that certain of Brazil's claims are not
within our terms of reference. According to the European

46 EC first written submission, para. 24. This EC reques t for a ruling pertained originally to certain claims
made by Brazil in connection with Issue 2 in respect of the application and initiation of the investigation. In
the course of these Panel proceedings, Brazil withdrew its claims under Issue 2. Brazil second written
submission, para. 24. We therefore do not examine the request by the European Communities for a ruling
on the scope of our terms of reference pertaining to Brazil's "claims" on the application and initiation of the
investigation under Issue 2 , in particular: claim of breach of Article 5.2 on the basis that products covered
in the investigation must be identical with those described in the application; claim of breach of Article 5.2
on the grounds that the application did not include a complete list of known importers; and claim that the
EC authorities failed to satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of information in the application.

Communities, there is a well-established principle in WTO
jurisprudence that claims that are not raised or are inadequately
defined in the complainant Member’s panel request will fall outside
the panel’s terms of reference and will therefore not be considered.1
2. Brazil asserts that the Panel should reject the EC's request as
"unfounded".2 While Brazil agrees that a panel's terms of reference
are critical, it disagrees that Article 6.2 of the DSU imposes an
obligation to set out every element of each obligation it intends to
invoke. Brazil asserts that its Panel request is indicative of the claims
it would invoke. Brazil submits that where certain allegations are
"dependent" upon other claims, they must necessarily fall within the
Panel's terms of reference.
3. The Panel, in considering the EC's request 3, recalls that
Article 6.2 of the DSU provides, in relevant part, that:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing.
It shall indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific
measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of
the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.
4. Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that there must be sufficient
clarity in the panel request with respect to the legal basis of the
complaint.
5. We consider that the treaty provision claimed to have been
violated is a fundamental aspect of the "legal basis of the complaint"
within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
4 Therefore, there must
be sufficient clarity in the request for establishment of the panel with
respect to this aspect of the legal basis of the complaint. We view
identification in the request for establishment of the panel of the
specific treaty provisions claimed to have been violated by the
respondent as a necessary element in complying with this aspect of
the minimum standard of clarity required under Article 6.2 of the
DSU.
5
6. In considering the request by the European Communities and
in order to resolve the issue before us, we have carefully reviewed
Brazil's request for the establishment of the panel 6 in this dispute.
We have found that four provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
cited in Brazil's first written submission, do not appear in the list of
provisions in the request for establishment of the Panel, nor are they
referred to in the ensuing description of allegations in that document.
These provisions are: Articles 6.9; 6.13; 9.3 and 12.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement . We therefore consider that these treaty
provisions have not been identified in Brazil's request for the
establishment of the Panel. Brazil's claims under these provisions are
therefore not within our terms of reference.
7. We note that the Panel request refers generally to the Articles
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in question (i.e. Articles 6, 9 and 12)
and contains the phrase "especially (but not exclusively)" when
enumerating selective provisions (not including the provisions

concerned here) under these Articles. However, we do not view such
a general reference as sufficiently clear to identify the specific
provisions at issue. This is particularly so in view of the fact that
Articles 6, 9 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contain multiple
and diverse obligations, which relate to different subject-matters than
the obligations contained in the specific provisions that are cited in
the Panel request.
7 The phrase “especially, but not exclusively” may
be convenient, but is inadequate to "identify the specific measures at
issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint
sufficient to present the problem clearly" as required by Article 6.2 of
the DSU. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the obligations
in these provisions may be "inter-linked" with or "dependent" upon a
provision that is identified in the Panel request, we do not consider
that this consideration is relevant here. The mere fact that a claim
may be legally dependent upon another claim does not mean that it is
subsumed within, or encompassed by, that claim. If a claim is not
identified in the Panel request, the fact that it may be "inter-linked"
with an identified claim is not determinative.
8. For these reasons, we conclude that Brazil failed to state
claims under Articles 6.9, 6.13, 9.3 and 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in its request for establishment of the Panel in this
dispute. Therefore, claims presented under those provisions in
Brazil's first submission fall outside our terms of reference, and we
are precluded from examining those claims.
9. We have yet to rule on the remaining claims identified by the
EC in its preliminary ruling request as being outside our terms of
reference. If necessary, we may also supplement our reasoning here
with respect to Article 6.9, 6.13, 9.3 and 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in our final report.
-----------------------------------------------------
2 Brazil's response to the EC's request for a preliminary ruling, para. 74.
3 We note that "…when a "matter" is referred to the DSB by a complaining
party under Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , the panel request
must meet the requirements of Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement as well as Article 6.2 of the DSU". See Appellate Body Report,
Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from
Mexico ("Guatemala - Cement") , WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November
1998, para. 75. In this regard, we note that Brazil has identified a definitive
anti-dumping duty in its panel request as part of the matter referred to the
DSB pursuant to Article 17.4 and Article 6.2. We further note that the EC
has not asserted that there are any deficiencies under Article 17.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the Panel request in this dispute.
4 We find support for this approach in Appellate Body Report, Guatemala -
Cement, supra , note 3, para. 69: "…Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that
 both the "measure at issue" and the "legal basis for the complaint" (or the
"claims") be identified in a request for the establishment of a panel".
5 We find support for our view that identification of the treaty provision in
question is a critical precondition for presenting the legal basis of the
complaint for the purposes of Article 6.2 DSU in the Appellate Body report
in Korea – Dairy. In that case the Appellate Body stated:

"Identification of the treaty provisions claimed to have been violated by the
respondent is always necessary both for purposes of defining the terms of
reference of a panel and for informing the respondent and the third parties of
the claims made by the complainant; such identification is a minimum
prerequisite if the legal basis of the complaint is to be presented at all.
"
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy "), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted
12 January 2000, para. 124.
6 WT/DS219/2.
7 For example, Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to "Public
Notice and Explanation of Determinations". It contains multiple and diverse
requirements with respect to various public notices relating to an anti-
dumping investigation. While Article 12.2 relates to preliminary and final
determinations, Article 12.1 contains obligations pertaining to the public
notice and notification of the initiation of the investigation.
7.15 We consider that our earlier ruling with respect to the EC request concerning the claims by
Brazil under Articles 6.9, 6.13, 9.3 and 12.1 remains sufficient. For greater clarity, we would point
out that our decision that Brazil's "claims" under Article 6.9 do not fall within our terms of reference
was based upon our finding that this treaty provision was not identified at all in Brazil's Panel request
and that the Panel request therefore did not meet the minimum requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU
in this respect. Whether or not Brazil raised allegations under Article 6.9 in consultations was not the
focus of our inquiry. Even assuming arguendo that Brazil had raised this issue in consultations, this
would not cure the deficiency in the Panel request as to the lack of any explicit textual identification
of the legal basis of Brazil's complaint in this respect. It remains for us to consider, however, the EC
request with respect to the claims not covered by this early ruling.
c. "Claims" under Articles 2.2.2, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.2, 6.6, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement
7.16 We now examine the EC request for us to dismiss certain of Brazil’s “claims” under Articles
2.2.2, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6.2, 6.6, 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 6.2 of the DSU
provides, in relevant part:
"The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall …identify
the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly…"
7.17 The issue before us is whether Brazil's Panel request provides "a brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly" and therefore satisfies the standard set
out in Article 6.2 of the DSU with respect to Brazil's claims under these provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
7.18 We must closely scrutinize the Panel request to ensure its compliance with both the letter and
the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU.47 In examining the sufficiency of the Panel request under Article
6.2 of the DSU, we must consider the text of the Panel request itself. 48 Second, we take into account

47 We find support for this approach in Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (" European Communities - Bananas "), WT/DS27/AB/R,
adopted 25 September 1997, para. 142.
48 Each of the treaty provisions we examine here is cited in the Panel request and therefore meets at
least that minimum standard.

whether the ability of the respondent to defend itself was prejudiced, given the actual course of the
panel proceedings, by any alleged lack of specificity in the text of the Panel request.49
7.19 We first recall that while claims must be specified in the Panel request, arguments in support
of claims need not be set out in the panel request but may rather be progressively clarified and refined
in the first submission, followed by the round of rebuttal submissions to the Panel.
7.20 On this basis, we turn first to a consideration of whether the text of the Panel request is
sufficient for the purposes of Article 6.2 of the DSU with respect to the allegations identified by
Brazil.
7.21 We recall the following allegations of Brazil at issue here:
• "claim" of infringement of Article 2.2.2 because of use of different criteria for the calculation
of SG & A costs, on the one hand, and for profits, on the other hand, where only one test
appears to be expressly mandated by Article 2.2.2;
• "claim" of infringement of Article 3.2 because the consideration of significant undercutting
was confined to products that had matching products;
• "claims" regarding the examination of specific in jury factors listed in Article 3.4 including in
particular the claim of inadequate consideration of “factors affecting domestic prices” in
breach of Article 3.4;
• "claim" of violations of Article 3.5 based on the “comparative advantage” of Tupy” and on
the differences between “black heart” and “white heart” fittings”;
• "claims" of breach of Articles 12, 12.2 and 12.2.2 concerning Brazil’s allegation relating to
Article 15 (in connection with Issue 1, that is, exploration of possibilities of constructive
remedies; and Brazil’s allegation relating to the injury determination (in connection with
Issue 16), that is, by allegedly not disclosing the figures related to the EC producers’ own
purchases (imports) and exports of the product concerned over the Injury Investigation
Period.
50
• Brazil's "claim" of infringement of Article 6.6 due to an alleged refusal by the European
Communities to investigate properly Tupy’s assertion that imports from Poland had occurred

49 We find support for this approach in Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure
on Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy "), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000.
50 In its second written submission, para. 361, Brazil maintains certain of its allegations of
inconsistency with Articles 12 and 12.2, including certain of relevance here, i.e. in connection with: Issue 1 (not
making public findings and conclusions with regard to the exploration of possibilities of constructive remedies
under Article 15); Issue 16 (not making public findings and conclusions with regard to EC producers' export
performance). As the second submission is a more recent iteration of Brazil's allegations, we understand that
Brazil has limited itself to those allegations under Article 12 that are identified in its second written submission.
In this regard, we take note of the following statement by Brazil: "Brazil is aware that claims made under
Article 12.1 of the Anti-dumping Agreement are not within the Panel's terms of reference. Some of the claims
under Article 12.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement can however be upheld, contrary to the EC's opinion that
these claims must also be dismissed." Brazil second written submission, para. 361. We therefore do not
consider the EC's preliminary ruling request with respect to Brazil's initial allegations concerning: allegedly no
disclosure showing that the EC had properly considered the effect that the devaluation of Brazil's currency in
January 1999 had on the question whether measures should have at all been imposed (in connection with
Issue 3); constructed normal value and Article 2.2.2 (failing to sufficiently explain why and how it applied
Article 2.2.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement when it refused to make due allowances for differences in physical
characteristics affecting price comparability, in connection with Issue 5); the EC's alleged failure to sufficiently
explain why and how it applied Article 2.2.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement when it refused to make due
allowances for differences in physical characteristics aff ecting price comparability in its consideration of price
undercutting; Brazil's allegation that the EC has not properly explained why it deleted the last position from the
product control number (in connection with Issue 13).

in greater amounts and at lower prices than the European Communities had concluded on the
basis of Eurostat information, and Brazil's allegation of violation of Article 6.2 in not
disclosing the European Communities producers' purchases and exports of the product
concerned which precluded Tupy from being able to properly defend its interests.
7.22 We consider that it is not necessary for us to rule on whether these allegations constitute
"claims" or "arguments". If they are arguments, there would be no need for them to be set out in the
Panel request. Even assuming that all of the alle gations identified above are "claims" in respect of
which the text of the Panel request may be somewhat deficient in describing the nature of the
complaint, the European Communities has failed in any event to demonstrate to us any prejudice to its
interests throughout the course of these Panel proceedings by the way these "claims" appeared in the
Panel request. We asked the European Communities to indicate any prejudice that it had sustained.
The European Communities responded as follows:
"The EC takes the view that in all the cases in which it has raised this objection its
interests have been prejudiced by the lack of adequate notice of the issues. The scope
of the claims that are explicitly made in Brazil’s panel request is already
exceptionally broad. The EC is entitled to the period that elapses between the
establishment of the panel and the presentation of the complainant’s first written
Submission to prepare its defence. Such preparation is only possible if the
complainant adequately specifies its claims in its panel request for incorporation into
the terms of reference."
51
7.23 However, it was evident to us from the participation of the European Communities in
asserting its views in various phases of these Panel proceedings, including in its first written
submission and in the first Panel meeting and in th e exchanges between the parties preceding the first
Panel meeting on preliminary issues, that the EC's ability to defend itself had not been prejudiced over
the course of these Panel proceedings.
7.24 We therefore consider that the text of the Panel request adequately indicates the nature of the
problem addressed by Brazil's claims and deny th e EC request to dismiss these allegations made by
Brazil.
d. Allegations identified by the European Communities in its second oral statement as
outside the Panel's terms of reference
7.25 The European Communities subsequently asserted that
52 certain additional allegations made
by Brazil in Brazil's second written submission fell outside our terms of reference. According to the
European Communities, Brazil had "misused" its rebuttal submission to extend the claims made in its
first submission and to introduce wholly new ones. In the EC's view, such manoeuvres constitute "an
abuse of the dispute settlement process" and the European Communities requested that we rule that
these claims are inadmissible.
53 The allegations concerned fell under Issues 1, 6 and 16.
7.26 Under Issue 1, the allegations that the European Communities alleged to fall outside our terms
of reference were: first, Brazil's assertion that "the first sentence of Article 15 refers to a general
obligation to pay particular attention to the special situation of developing country members" 54; and
second, Brazil's allegation that, "by failing to raise the possibility of an undertaking before the
imposition of the provisional measure, the European Communities breached the second sentence of
Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement" (emphasis in the original). Brazil submits that the Panel

51 EC response to Panel question 27 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8.

request lists Article 15 and provides a description as to the nature of the claim and that consequently
the terms of reference cover the first and second sentences of Article 15 as well as the issue of
exploration of constructive remedies.55 We note that these allegations may have been encouraged by
questioning from the Panel56 in our attempt to clarify certain facts as well as the legal argumentation
by the parties and we are conscious that we may neither overstep our terms of reference nor relieve
Brazil of its task of establishing the inconsistency of the EC anti-dumping measure with the relevant
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . In particular, we are aware that, in our questions posed
to the parties, we must not "overstep the bounds of legitimate management or guidance of the
proceedings … in the interest of efficiency and dispatch."
57
7.27 With respect to these allegations and with respect to: (a) Brazil's allegation under Issue 6 that
the European Communities breached Article 2.4 by not indicating to the Brazilian exporter what
additional information with regard to the IPI Premium Credit was necessary to ensure a fair
comparison;
58 and (b) Brazil’s allegation of violation of Article 6.2 and 6.4 in connection with
Issue 1659 that the contents of Exhibit EC-12 relating to certain listed Article 3.4 factors were not
disclosed during the investigation thereby denying Tupy a full opportunity to defend its interests or a
timely opportunity to have access to all relevant evidence, we recall that a complaining party must
specify its claims in its Panel request, but that its arguments may be clarified and refined in
subsequent submissions. As we have already indicated above, even assuming arguendo that these
allegations were claims insufficiently set out in the Panel request, the European Communities has
failed to demonstrate that it suffered any prejudice to its interests over the course of these Panel
proceedings.
60 We therefore deny the EC request to dismiss these allegations made by Brazil.
(iii) Alleged inadmissibility of Exhibits BRL-47 through 52 under Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement
7.28 In conjunction with its oral statement at the first substantive meeting, Brazil submitted
Exhibits BRL-47 through 52, in support of its argu mentation regarding "relocation" and "outsourcing
arrangements" of several EC producers. Exhibits BRL 47-50 consist of information and tables that
Brazil states it drew from the website of the Bulgaria Economic Forum relating to the acquisition by a
Community producer (Atusa) of shares in Berg Montana and the consolidation of Atusa's control over
Berg Montana on 4 July 2000. Exhibits BRL 51-52 contain information that Brazil states that it drew
from Infit SAE's website (and page containing link to Woeste) and from another website providing
general and market information in relation to Infit SAE. The gist of Brazil's argumentation, made in
connection with its claims concerning injury and causation under Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, is that the European Communities failed adequately to examine and to take into
account information regarding outsourcing and relocation in reaching its injury and causation
determinations. Indeed, according to Brazil, "[o]n the basis of the evidence provided by the Brazilian
exporter, an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence could not have
reached the conclusions that the EC investigating au thorities reached under several provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement , primarily regarding injury indicators and causality."
61 (emphasis in the
original; footnote omitted).

55 Brazil response to Panel question 25 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
56 In particular, Panel questions 6 and 9 following the first Panel meeting.
57 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Dairy Safeguard, supra, note 49, para. 149. We also find support for
our view in Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy
Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams "), WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.43.
58 Brazil second written submission, paras. 69 – 73.
60 See supra, paras.7.22 ff.

7.29 Recalling that Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that a panel
established by the DSB to consider claims made under the Anti-Dumping Agreement will examine the
matter referred to it based upon "the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic
procedures to the authorities of the importing Member", the European Communities objects to the
submission of these Exhibits by Brazil and requests us to make a preliminary ruling rejecting these
exhibits as they did not form part of the record of the underlying investigation.
7.30 Brazil asks us to reject this EC request. Braz il submits that the information contained in the
Exhibits in question is "the same" as information that Tupy, as well as other interested parties,
presented to the EC authorities in the course of the investigation. Brazil invokes the panel report in
US-Hot-Rolled Steel62 to support its view that the Panel is en titled to admit these Exhibits in these
Panel proceedings.
7.31 The Panel understands that the issue presented by this EC request for a preliminary ruling is
whether we should exclude from our consideration in this dispute certain Exhibits submitted by Brazil
in these Panel proceedings that were not submitted to the EC investigating authorities during the
investigation. We recall that our Working Procedures provide that preliminary rulings must be
requested not later than the first written submission, but that exceptions may be made upon showing
of "good cause". As Brazil submitted these Exhibits in conjunction with its oral statement at the first
meeting, which meant that the European Communities was not in a position to make a preliminary
objection in its first written submission, good cause exists for us to consider the merits of the EC
request for a preliminary ruling here.
7.32 Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement – which the European Community identifies
as the legal basis for its preliminary ruling request -- provides:
"The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a
panel to examine the matter based upon: …
(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate
domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing
Member".
7.33 This provision offers binding guidance directing our decision as to what evidence we are
permitted to consider in examining a claim under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This provision makes
clear that, in an examination of a claim of violation of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in a
particular investigation and determination, we may consider only facts or evidence going to the
substance of the determination that had been made available in conformity with the appropriate
domestic procedures to the authorities of the investigating country during the investigation.
63
7.34 Further, contextual, support stems from Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ,
which sets out a specific standard of review for anti-dumping panels. This provision sets the
parameters for the standard of our review of th e determination of the investigating authority and
clearly confirms that a de novo review is not contemplated by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Thus,
we must satisfy the requirement imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to conduct "an objective

62 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan ("US – Hot-Rolled Steel "), WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 A ugust 2001 as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS184/AB/R.
63 This evidence proffered by Brazil and challenged by the European Communities relates to the injury
determination by the investigating authority and, in particular, to the substance of the EC analysis of the causal
link between the injury and the dumped imports. Article 3.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement also contains
specific relevant language. It states, in pertinent part: "The demonstration of a causal relationship between the
dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant
evidence before the authorities." (emphasis added)

assessment of the matter before [us]" in accordance with the parameters set by Article 17.5 (ii) and
17.6(i).64
7.35 Brazil argues that the information is "the same" as information contained in the record of the
underlying investigation. Brazil asserts that the information may be "re-formatted", and is unable to
confirm whether or not the information was available in this format or in the same way at the time of
the investigation. However, Brazil concedes that this information, as contained in these Exhibits, was
not submitted to the European Communities during the investigation.
65 We are therefore prevented by
Article 17.5(ii) from considering these Exhibits in the context of our Article 3 examination and do not
take them into account in our review of the EC determination. Brazil invoked the panel report in US-
Hot-Rolled Steel to support its view that we would act with full authority in denying the EC request
and admitting the Exhibits in question. However, that panel confronted different claims, additional to
those dealing with the substance of the determ ination of the investigating authority under the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, including a claim under Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.
That panel made it clear that the evidence to be considered in connection with the complaining party's
Article X claim was not limited by the provisions of Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
By contrast, Brazil's claims (in this context) are limited to Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and their factual basis is therefore delineated by Article 17.5(ii).
7.36 We thus exclude Exhibits BRL-47 through 52 from our consideration in these proceedings.
3. Requests by Brazil
(a) Exhibit EC-1
7.37 Brazil's first written submission, as originally submitted by Brazil on 10 October 2001
contained no paragraph or line numbering. The European Communities submitted, as Exhibit EC-1 to
its first written submission, a version of Brazil's first written submission with line numbers
superimposed upon it, and references in the European Communities first written submission to
Brazil's first written submission were made on the basis of the line-numbered version in Exhibit EC-1.
7.38 Brazil requests that we make a preliminary rulin g that the European Communities amend the
text of the European Communities' first written submission so that references therein to Brazil's first
written submission be made to the actual text of Brazil's first written submission as originally
submitted by Brazil.
66

64 We find support for this approach to the obligations of panels in anti-dumping disputes in Panel
Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 62, paras. 7.6-7.7, as well as in the reports of a number of panels that
have applied similar principles in reviewing determinations of national authorities in the context of safeguards
under the Agreement on Safeguards and special safeguards under Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing. There is no corollary to Article 17.5(ii) in those agreements. Nonetheless, these panels have
concluded that a de novo review of the determinations would be inappropriate, and have undertaken an
assessment of, inter alia , whether all relevant facts were considered by the authorities. Panel Report, United
States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities ("United
States - Wheat Gluten") , WT/DS166/R, para. 8.6, adopted as modified (WT/DS166/AB/R) 19 January 2001;
Panel Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy "),
WT/DS98/R and Corr.1, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS98/AB/R,
DSR 2000:I, 49, para. 7.30, Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear ("Argentina
- Footwear Safeguard"), WT/DS121/R, para. 8.117, adopted as modified (WT/DS121/AB/R) 12 January 2000.
65 Additional oral statement of Brazil regarding Exhibits BRL-47-52, Annex D-4, para. 2.
66 Brazil request for a preliminary ruling, Annex A-3.

7.39 The European Communities asks that we reject this request, and further requests that we
amend our Working Procedures in order to provide that the parties shall number the paragraphs or
lines of all their subsequent submissions.67
7.40 At the first substantive meeting with the parties, the Panel made the following statement:
Having heard both parties' views on this question, the Panel would like to clarify its
understanding that Brazil’s first submission, as originally submitted by Brazil,
remains the official version of that submission for the purpose of the Panel record.
We also understand that the EC makes references to its Exhibit EC-1 for the purposes
of references in the EC’s first written submission. We therefore reject Brazil’s
request to ask the EC to amend the text of the EC's first written submission so that all
references are made to the actual text of Brazil's first written submission as originally
submitted by Brazil. We also reject the EC’s request to make a formal amendment to
our Working Procedures specifically requiring that parties shall number the
paragraphs or the lines of their subsequent submissions. Having said this, we
underline that we would appreciate efforts on the part of the parties to facilitate the
task of the Panel in examining the matter referred to us by the DSB.
With this in mind, we would invite Brazil to submit a paragraph numbered version of
its first submission to facilitate referencing by the Panel and the parties. We would
appreciate if the paragraph numbered version of Brazil's first submission could be
made available by 14 December 2001. In the mean time, the parties are asked, to the
extent possible, to refer to arguments in Brazil's first written submission by citing the
page number, in addition to any other information which would facilitate our task of
locating where those arguments have been made.
7.41 Brazil accordingly submitted a revised, paragraph-numbered version to the Panel of its first
written submission on 14 December 2001.
(b) Exhibit EC-12
7.42 The European Communities submits an internal "note for the file" -- Exhibit EC-12 -- in
support of its arguments relating to the EC examination of Article 3.4 injury factors. According to the
European Communities,
"The outcome of the EC authorities' investigation of individual factors is recorded in
two Regulations, principally in the Provisional Regulation, in so far as the
examination produced significant results. The examination of the remaining factors
(with one exception) is explicitly recorded in an internal EC Commission "note for
the file" of 14 April 2000 (Exhibit EC-12) . As the Panel will observe, with the
exception of the [sic] concerning "growth", this looks at each of the factors which
Brazil accuses the EC of not considering."
7.43 Brazil submits that Exhibit EC-12 is not part of the record of the underlying investigation.
According to Brazil, this document is not part of the non-confidential file and there are indications
that it was not part of the confidential file either. In Brazil's view, it is therefore is not properly before
the Panel. Indeed, Brazil states:
"…the said exhibit, which is just an obvious attempt by the EC at curing the flaws of
the investigation, should be completely disregarded by the Panel. Indeed, the

67 EC reply to Brazil's request for a preliminary ruling, Annex A-4.

acceptance of Exhibit EC-12 would be a dangerous precedent with enormous
systemic implications."68
7.44 The European Communities contends that Exhibit EC-12 legitimately forms part of the
injury determination that the Panel must examine in its analysis of Brazil's Article 3.4 claim. 69 I n
response to Panel questioning, the European Communities confirmed that Exhibit EC-12 forms part of
the record of the underlying investigation. The European Communities states that it "will accord the
scurrilous assertions made by Brazil regarding the bona fides of this document the attention they
deserve."
70
7.45 The Panel notes that the information in Exhibit EC-12 was not disclosed in any form to the
interested parties in the course of the investigation. We wish to emphasize that we deplore the fact
that this information, or an accurate non-confid ential summary of any confidential information
contained therein, was not disclosed to interested parties during the investigation, and that the fact of
consideration of the elements discussed in EC-12 is not directly discernible from the published
documents. It was apparently entirely unfamiliar to Brazil prior to the submission by the European
Communities of Exhibit EC-12 in conjunction with the EC first written submission in these Panel
proceedings. However, we understand that, in assessing the European Communities' compliance with
Article 3, Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require us to examine the facts
available to the investigating authority of the importing Member. These provisions do not prevent us
from examining facts that were confidential and/or not disclosed to, or discernible by, the interested
parties at the time of the final determination. We are therefore required by the Agreement to take
into account all information upon which the investigating authority relied in order to reach its final
determination, whether or not this information forms part of the non-confidential or disclosed record
of the investigation or whether its consideration can be discerned from the published documents.
 This
necessarily includes the information contained in Exhibit EC-12. We are guided by the Appellate
Body Report in Thailand-H-Beams.71 We consider that this Appellate Body Report thoroughly
addresses and resolves the issue that arises here and that we are permitted, indeed required, to take the
contents of Exhibit EC-12 into account in our examination of Brazil's claims concerning the EC injury
analysis under Article 3.4.
7.46 We understand Brazil to insinuate that Exhibit EC-12 may be some sort of post hoc attempt
by the European Communities to cure the flaws that it perceived to exist in its Article 3.4 analysis for
the purposes of these Panel proceedings. In this respect, we must presume that WTO Members
participate in good faith in dispute settlement proceedings. We asked the European Communities to
indicate in the record of the investigation the sources of information and the methodology on which

69 For example, the European Communities states that, in its view, "the findings in the Provisional and
Definitive Regulations and the explanations set out in Exhibit EC - 12 show the EC's authorities compliance
with these requirements." EC second oral statement, para. 119.
71 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams "), WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001,
paras. 107, 111 and 118. The Appellate Body stated: "…the requirement in Article 3.1 that an injury
determination be based on "positive" evidence and involve an "objective" examination of the required elements
of injury does not imply that the determination must be based only on reasoning or facts that were disclosed to,
or discernible by, the parties to an anti-dumping investigation. Article 3.1, on the contrary, permits an
investigating authority making an injury determination to base its determination on all relevant reasoning and
facts before it" (para. 111); and "Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i) require a panel to examine the facts made available to
the investigating authority of the importing Member. These provisions do not prevent a panel from examining
facts that were not disclosed to, or discernible by, the interested parties at the time of the final determination"
(para. 118).

the statements and information in Exhibit EC-12 are based. 72 The European Communities gave an
account of the methodology and the sources of information on the basis of which the statements in
Exhibit EC-12 were made. We further asked the European Communities to confirm and substantiate
to us that Exhibit EC-12 was written within the time period of the investigation. 73 The European
Communities confirmed that this was the case. Given the EC responses, we find no basis to question
whether Exhibit EC-12 forms part of the record of the underlying investigation and we must
consequently take its contents into account in our examination of the relevant substantive claims made
by Brazil.
7.47 We therefore decline Brazil's request for us to rule that Exhibit EC-12 is not properly before
us.
(c) Request to append Brazil's full written submissions instead of executive summaries to the
Panel Report
7.48 In its 31 July 2002 comments on the draft descriptive part of the Panel Report, Brazil
requested that the complete text of its first and second submissions, rather than Brazil's executive
summaries thereof, be included in Annexes A and C respectively. According to Brazil:
"The executive summaries provided by Brazil were intended only to assist the Panel
in drafting a concise arguments section of the report; they were not intended to
replace submissions nor are they to be attached as annexes to the panel's report. This
was Brazil's understanding at the time the executive summaries were provided.
Moreover, given the high number of claims in the present case, Brazil believes that a
10-page executive summary could not possibly accommodate the main arguments
related to each of those claims. As far as Brazil is informed, also in other disputes
where a similar rule of procedure [paragraph 16 of the Working Procedures]
requested executive summaries, the complete submissions were annexed to the panel
report."
7.49 For the reasons that follow, the Panel cannot accede to Brazil's request that we attach the full
text of Brazil's first and second written submission to our Report.
7.50 First, we recall that paragraph 16 of the Working Procedures that we adopted at the outset of
these proceedings pursuant to Article 12.1 of the DSU, after hearing the parties' views, provide:
"The parties shall provide the Panel with an executive summary of the claims and
arguments contained in their written subm issions and oral presentations. These
executive summaries will be used by the Panel only for the purpose of assisting the
Panel in drafting a concise arguments section of the Panel report so as to facilitate
timely translation and circulation of the Panel report to the Members. They shall not
serve in any way as a substitute for the s ubmissions of the parties. The summaries of
the first written submission and rebuttal written submission shall be limited to 10
pages and the summaries of the oral statements at the meeting will be limited to 5
pages. Summaries shall be submitted to the Secretariat within seven days of the
original submission concerned."

72 See Panel question 110 and EC response thereto following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3.
73 See Panel question 20 and EC response thereto following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8. We
further asked (Panel question 19 following the second Panel meeting) whether there were any worksheets or
investigation notes which formed the basis for Exhibit EC - 12 and asked the European Communities to provide
them or to explain why these were not provided. The European Community replied that: "The conclusions
recorded in Exhibit EC - 12 are based on worksheets, bu t these contain highly confidential business information
relating to the performance of individual EC producers and the EC would prefer not to release them." See
Annex E-8.

7.51 This paragraph makes it clear that we are to use the executive summaries only for the purpose
of assisting us in drafting a concise arguments section of the Panel Report so as to facilitate timely
translation and circulation of the Panel Report to the Members. The rationale of this paragraph is to
facilitate our production of a concise and timely descriptive part and to not attach the entire written
submissions and statements of the parties. We find no substantiation for Brazil's assertion that other
panels that have adopted a similar paragraph in their working procedures have also nevertheless
attached the parties' entire written submissions to their reports. Indeed, this would seem to us to
defeat the purpose of adopting the "executive summary approach" in the first place.
7.52 Second, the attachment of executive summaries to our report also leaves the parties in control
of the contents of the executive summaries and enables them to set forth their most important
arguments as they wish to set these forth. Each party has the obligation and the discretion to ensure
that its own executive summaries of its own submissions accurately reflects its claims and arguments.
Neither party requested us to increase the page limits referred to in our Working Procedures.
7.53 Third, we adopted these Working Procedures after hearing the views of the parties, at which
time Brazil expressed no objection to the formulation in paragraph 16 of the Working Procedures.
We decided at the outset to follow the "executive summaries approach" for these Panel proceedings.
Having adopted this approach at the outset, we do not consider that it would beneficial, at this rather
advanced stage in the proceedings, to adopt Brazil's suggested approach of attaching its full first and
second submissions. Our adoption of such an approach at this stage would result in significant further
delays in issuing our Report, particularly in view of the lengthy nature of these submissions (totalling
over 370 pages). This would impose a considerable translation burden, adding to the burden already
being borne due to the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system generally. There would also
be an incongruity if the full EC submissions were not also attached, which, if we were to address by
taking the requisite procedural steps and then by annexing the EC submissions, would augment the
translation burden. We find particularly salient, in this respect, Article 12.2 of the DSU, which
provides:
"Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality
panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process." (emphasis added)
7.54 Fourth, as our Working Procedures also make clear, in no way are the executive summaries to
substitute for the parties' submissions. In the course of our examination of the parties' claims and
arguments in these proceedings, we have read and analyzed with great care the full written and oral
submissions of the parties and the exchanges of questions and answers relating thereto. Our findings
and conclusions in this Panel Report are based upon these full written and oral submissions and
questions and answers. They form an integral part of the record before the Panel in this case. We
therefore believe that we have adhered to both the letter and spirit of our Working Procedures and do
not believe that any prejudice has arisen to Brazil in the course of these proceedings from annexing
executive summaries of its first and second written submissions.
7.55 Fifth, we recall that Article 18.2 of the DSU, as also reflected in paragraph 3 of our Working
Procedures, states that nothing in the DSU shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing
statements of its own positions to the public. There is therefore nothing precluding Brazil from
making its full first and second submissions generally and publicly available (subject, of course, to the
requirements of maintaining the confidentiality of the EC's submissions in Article 18.2 of the DSU
and paragraph 3 of our Working Procedures).
74

74 Our Working Procedures state, in relevant part: "Members shall treat as confidential information
submitted by another Member to the Panel which that Member has designated as confidential and shall not
disclose such information to individuals not involved in the dispute. Where a party to a dispute submits a

C. ISSUES RAISED IN THIS DISPUTE
1. Issue 1: "constructive remedies"
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.56 Brazil argues that both the first and second sentences of Article 15 impose legal obligations
by which the European Communities failed to abide. In the alternative, Brazil asserts that if the
European Communities did explore constructive remedies under Article 15, this was never
communicated to representatives of the Government of Brazil or to company officials of Tupy.
7.57 Brazil argues that the first sentence of Article 15 refers to a general obligation to pay
particular attention to the special situation of developing Members, while the second sentence
concerns one possible way of fulfilling this obligation. Brazil submits that the European
Communities failed to give special regard to the sp ecial situation of Brazil as a developing Member
and conducted itself (in respect of the imposition of a "lesser duty") as it would have done when
dealing with a developed Member. Brazil further asserts that the European Communities failed to
give "special regard" as it did not take into account certain factors that were linked to Brazil's status as
a developing Member, that is, the specificity of the Brazilian tax rebate system ("which cannot be
compared to the sophisticated VAT systems that exist in the EC and in other developed countries")
75,
and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency.
7.58 With respect to the second sentence of Article 15, Brazil "agrees with the EC that the
obligation arising out of this sentence is an obligation to "explore" possibilities of constructive
remedies rather than an obligation to enter into constructive remedies", 76 and further concurs with the
European Communities that the EC-Bed Linen panel77 properly analyzed the concept of "exploring the
possibilities of constructive remedies". Brazil asserts that it was Brazil that raised the matter in
bilateral government contacts, but that should the Panel consider that the European Communities
actually raised the matter, the issue of which side raised it is irrelevant. Brazil argues that the
obligation to explore the possibilities of constructive remedies --such as price undertakings -- is an
obligation directed towards exporters rather than WTO Members, and that (regardless of any contact
with the Brazilian government) the European Communities violated its obligation by failing to
suggest or communicate the possibility of an undertaking to the Brazilian exporter directly. Brazil
disagrees with the view of the EC – Bed Linen panel that Article 15 applies only to the imposition of
definitive anti-dumping measures, arguing that the obligation to explore possibilities of constructive
remedies also applies to the period preceding the imposition of provisional measures. According to
Brazil, the European Communities breached the second sentence of Article 15 by failing to raise the
possibility of an undertaking with the Brazilian exporter before the imposition of provisional
measures.
7.59 Brazil disagrees with the EC assertion that the Article 15 is an exception to other obligations
in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and that the burden of proof is on the Member invoking the
exception.

confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request, provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public,
within ten days of its submission to the Panel."
75 Brazil second written submission, para. 11; also, Brazil first written submission, para. 101.
76 Brazil second written submission, para. 7 referring to EC first written submission, para. 35 and US
third party submission, Annex B-2, para. 9.
77 Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India ("EC – Bed Linen "), WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS141/AB/R.

7.60 The European Communities asserts that the first sentence of Article 15 imposes no legal
obligation on Members, but submits that even if the first sentence did impose an obligation, this
obligation would be fulfilled upon compliance with the obligation in the second sentence. The
European Communities endorses the EC-Bed Linen panel's approach concerning the second sentence
of Article 15. The European Communities argues that it complied with Article 15. Price
undertakings are a "constructive remedy" and the European Communities raised with Brazil the
possibility of a price undertaking on three separate occasions (including at a high political level). The
European Communities argues that "one of the unusual features about this investigation was the
obvious close involvement of the Brazilian government on Tupy's behalf" and asserts that the
European Communities "had every reason to believe th at in speaking to government officials, the EC
was speaking to Tupy”.
78
7.61 The European Communities does not dispute that Brazil is a developing Member, but does
dispute that the imposition of anti-dumping duties on pipe fittings affects the "essential interests" of
Brazil within the meaning of Article 15. The European Communities submits that since Article 15 is
an exception to the rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the onus lies on the developing Member
concerned to prove that its invocation of the exception is justified.
7.62 The European Communities invokes the EC-Bed Linen panel report in support of the
proposition that the provision applies only to the application of definitive anti-dumping measures.
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.63 The United States asserts that Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement addresses
procedural issues and does not require a particular outcome. it argues that the first sentence of
Article 15 does not contain a substantive obligation with respect to any particular outcome. There is
no basis in the text of the first sentence on which to conclude that developed Members are required to
apply distinct practices with respect to the methodologies used to determine whether dumping exists.
The United States further argues that nothing in the second sentence of Article 15 requires that a
developed Member “propose” constructive remedies, nor requires any particular outcome.
Furthermore, the obligation to “explore” constructive remedies arises only when the application of
antidumping duties would affect the “essential interests” of the developing Member. Accordingly,
when a developing Member seeks the application of Article 15, it must demonstrate to the
investigating authority that there are “essential interests” implicated in the case and that they would be
affected by the application of anti-dumping duties. A panel, in turn, must first determine whether the
developing Member has made these demonstrations. Any reading of the “essential interests” clause
that does not reflect its limiting nature cannot be a permissible reading.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.64 Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , entitled “Developing Country Members”,
provides:
It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country Members to
the special situation of developing country Members when considering the
application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. Possibilities of
constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of
developing country Members.

7.65 The divergences between the parties centre on the nature of the legal obligation(s) imposed by
the two sentences of Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , and the timing and scope of
application of the obligation(s).
7.66 Accordingly, the Panel first examines the text of the first sentence of Article 15, followed by
the text of the second sentence, in order to discern the nature of the legal obligation(s) imposed, as
well as the timing and scope of application of the provision.
7.67 We address first the nature of the legal obligation, if any, imposed by the first sentence of
Article 15. Brazil asserts that, while the first sentence does not create a substantive obligation with
respect to any particular outcome, it refers to a general obligation to pay particular attention to the
special situation of developing country Members, and the second sentence indicates one possible way
of fulfilling this obligation.79 For its part, the European Communities disagrees that the first sentence
contains any obligation.80
7.68 We agree with Brazil that there is no requirement for any specific outcome set out in the first
sentence of Article 15. We are furthermore of the view that, even assuming that the first sentence of
Article 15 imposes a general obligation on Members, it clearly contains no operational language
delineating the precise extent or nature of that obligation or requiring a developed country Member to
undertake any specific action. The second sentence serves to provide operational indications as to the
nature of the specific action required. 81 Fulfilment of the obligations in the second sentence of
Article 15 would therefore necessarily, in our view, constitute fulfilment of any general obligation
that might arguably be contained in the first sentence. We do not see this as a "reduction" of the first
sentence into the second sentence, as suggested to us by Brazil. Rather the second sentence
articulates certain operational modalities of the first sentence.
7.69 We next consider the obligations imposed by the second sentence of Article 15. Our starting
point is naturally the text of that sentence:
"Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be
explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential
interests of developing country Members."
7.70 With respect to the second sentence, while there is no dispute between the parties as to certain
core aspects of the nature of the obligation to "explore" "possibilities of" constructive remedies, the
parties' views diverge on the timing and scope of application of the provision as well as the nature of
possible "constructive remedies" (including with whom and how such possibilities must be explored),

81 In this regard, a previous panel found that "the first sentence of Article 15 imposes no specific or
general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action." Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping
and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India ("US – Steel Plate "), WT/DS206/R and Corr.1, adopted
29 July 2002., para. 7.110. We further recall that the EEC-Cotton Yarn GATT Panel, considering similar
arguments in respect of Article 13 of the Tokyo Round Agreement (which is substantively identical to Article
15 of the Anti-dumping Agreement), stated:
"582. … The Panel was of the view that Article 13 should be interpreted as a whole. In the
view of the Panel, assuming arguendo that an obligation was imposed by the first sentence of
Article 13, its wording contained no operative language delineating the extent of the
obligation. Such language was only to be found in the second sentence of Article 13 whereby
it is stipulated that "possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Code shall be
explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests
of developing countries"."
Panel Report, European Economic Community – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn
from Brazil ("EEC – Cotton Yarn
 "), adopted 30 October 1995, BISD 42S/17, para. 582 (emphasis added).

and the meaning and role of the phrase "shall affect the essential interests" of Brazil as the developing
Member country in question in this dispute.
7.71 We examine the requirement in the second sentence of Article 15 to explore possibilities of
"constructive remedies" provided for by the Anti-Dumping Agreement.82 The term "remedy" can be
defined as, inter alia, "a means of counteracting or removing something undesirable; redress, relief".83
"Constructive" is defined as "tending to construct or build up something non-material; contributing
helpfully, not destructive". 84 We thus understand the term "constructive remedies" as referring to
helpful means of counteracting the effect of injurious dumping. The text of Article 15 explicitly
limits the types of constructive remedies involved to constructive remedies "provided for [by] this
Agreement". We find support for our approach in the panel reports in EC-Bed Linen85 and US-Steel
Plate.86
7.72 At this point in our analysis, it is sufficient for us to endorse the shared view of both parties
that the imposition of a "lesser duty" or a price undertaking would constitute "constructive remedies"
within the meaning of Article 15.87 As to the meaning of the requirement to "explore" possibilities of
constructive remedies, we also support the shared view of the parties that this obligation is
affirmatively to "explore" the possibility of -- rath er than affirmatively to "propose" – constructive
remedies. We believe that the concept of "explore" cannot be understood to require any particular
outcome with respect to the substantive decision that results from the exploration. We draw support
for this point of view from the EC-Bed Linen panel report, which stated that:
Article 15 does not require that "constructive remedies" must be explored, but rather
that the "possibilities" of such remedies must be explored, which further suggests that
the exploration may conclude that no possibilities exist, or that no constructive
remedies are possible, in the particular circumstances of a given case. Taken in its
context, however, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 15, we do consider
that the "exploration" of possibilities must be actively undertaken by the developed
country authorities with a willingness to reach a positive outcome. Thus, in our view,
Article 15 imposes no obligation to actually provide or accept any constructive
remedy that may be identified and/or offered.
92 It does, however, impose an
obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a remedy
prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential
interests of a developing country.
Panel which considered the predecessor of that provision, Article 13 of the Tokyo Round
Anti-Dumping Code, which provision is substantively identical to present Article 15. That
Panel found:

82 While the first sentence of Article 15 imposes an obligation on developed countries to give "special
regard" to the situation of developing country Members, the second sentence of Article 15 is not so limited.
83 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.
84 Ibid.
85 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, supra, note 77, para. 6.228.
86 Panel Report, US-Steel Plate, supra, note 81, para. 7.112.
87 Panel Report, EC - Bed Linen , supra, note 77, para. 6.229. The EC – Bed Linen panel was of the
view that the imposition of a "lesser duty" or a price undertaking would constitute "constructive remedies"
within the meaning of Article 15 and came to no conclusions as to what other actions might in addition be
considered to constitute "constructive remedies" under Article 15, as none had been proposed to it.

"The Panel noted that if the application of anti-dumping measures "would
affect the essential interests of developing countries", the obligation that
then arose was to explore the "possibilities" of "constructive remedies". It
was clear from the words "[p]ossibilities" and "explored" that the
investigating authorities were no t required to adopt constructive
remedies merely because they were proposed. " EC - Imposition of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil , Panel Report,
ADP/137, adopted 30 October 1995, para. 584 (emphasis added)."
7.73 We must therefore examine whether the EC authorities actively considered with an open mind
the possibility of constructive remedies – that is, a price undertaking or the imposition of a lesser
duty
88 -- prior to the imposition of final anti-dumping measures in this investigation.
7.74 Brazil confirms that neither Tupy nor Brazil actively communicated to the European
Communities a desire to offer undertakings or to pursue any other kind of "constructive remedy",
while asserting that the burden of actively undertaking the exploration -- proposal -- of constructive
remedies lies on the developed Member. 89 The European Communities states that it raised the
possibility of a price undertaking in bilateral government contacts between the European
Communities and Brazil and submitted evidence in support. 90 According to the European
Communities, Brazil did not show interest in this possibility. While the parties differ in their
assertions as to who took the initiative to raise "the matter" and whether "the matter" referred to was
the pipe fittings investigation in general or the po ssibility of a price undertaking in particular, we do
not believe that these distinctions are relevant in this context. This flows from our understanding that
there is no disagreement between the parties that the issue of a price undertaking was discussed in
exchanges between EC and Brazilian officials.
7.75 We consider that Brazil's suggestion that the exploration of possibilities of constructive
remedies must be conducted directly with a developing country exporter and Brazil's related
assertions do not sit easily with the textual obligation in Article 15 to give special regard to the special
situation of developing country Members, not individual companies. The reference in Article 15 is
that special regard must be given "to the special situation of developing country Members".
Moreover, particularly in the context of an investigation like this one, where Brazilian government
officials were frequently involved – including attending bilateral meetings where issues relating to the
investigation arose and communicating with EC offici als in respect of issues in the investigation
indicating a familiarity with certain details of the case,
91 it seems to us that discussing the possibility
of price undertakings with such government officials would be an entirely reasonable way in which to
explore the possibility of a constructive remedy in the form of a price undertaking with respect to the
particular company involved.92

88 While the parties agree that the imposition of a "lesser duty" might constitute a constructive remedy
under Article 15, we do not understand Brazil to contest that the EC did impose a lesser duty. Rather, Brazil
asserts that the choice by the EC to impose a lesser duty is mandated by Article 7(2) and 9(4) of the Basic
Regulation and is not a consequence of the obligations set out in Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ;
the EC applies this rule regardless of whether the Memb er in which the exporter is located is a developing or
developed Member. See Brazil response to Panel question 7 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
89 Brazil response to Panel question 3 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E- 1.
90 These included: meetings between EC and Brazilian officials that occurred on: 23 March 2000
(including the EC Trade Commissioner, Mr. Lamy, and a Brazilian delegation that included Brazil's Minister of
Development, Industry and Trade and the Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber,
reflected in Exhibit EC-6); 9 May 2000 (preparatory meeting, reflected in Exhibit EC - 2); and 25-26 May 2000
(the European Community-Brazil Joint Committee, reflected in Exhibit EC - 4).
91 For example, written communications from Brazil's Ambassador in Brussels to EC officials dated
10 December 1999, 29 January 2000 and 23 February 2000 (Exhibits EC-27-29).
92 In response to Panel questioning as to whether the Brazilian government transmitted to Tupy the
possibility of pursuing a price undertaking to the European Communities as a result of the meetings between

7.76 As we have found that the European Communities adequately explored possibilities of
constructive remedies in the form of a price undertaking, it is not necessary for us to consider also
whether the European Communities adequately explored constructive remedies in the form of the
imposition of a "lesser duty".
7.77 We next examine Brazil's argument that there may be constructive remedies within the
meaning of Article 15 other than "lesser duty" and price undertakings. Brazil submits that the term
"constructive remedies" embraces undertakings other than price undertakings (for example,
undertakings limiting the quantities to be exported to the European Communities, which Brazil asserts
that the European Communities in practice accepts). Brazil therefore asserts that the European
Communities failed to explore all the possibilities of constructive remedies by not considering
undertakings other than price commitments.93 In the EC view, there is no need for the Panel to reach
the issue of whether or not there may be other constructive remedies in addition to price undertakings
or the application of the lesser duty rule. The European Communities asserts that exploring other
types of undertakings (other than price undertakings) is not a "remedy" envisaged under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
7.78 We do not agree with Brazil's assertion that the term "constructive remedies" also embraces
undertakings other than price undertakings (for example, undertakings limiting the quantities to be
exported to the European Communities, which Brazil asserts that the European Communities in
practice accepts) nor that "any measure which would have a less restrictive impact than an anti-
dumping duty should be allowed under Article 8".
94 In this context, we note that Article 8.1 also
envisages the possibility that an exporter may undertake to "cease exports to the area in question at
dumped prices". This provision refers specifically to an undertaking not to sell at dumped prices. It
does not envisage a restraint on the quantity of the product exported. Furthermore, the title of
Article 8 is "Price Undertakings", rather than "Undertakings", or "Price or Other Undertakings".
These factors support our view that quantitative "undertakings" are not a remedy foreseen in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement , and that Article 15 therefore does not impose any obligation to explore
undertakings other than price undertakings in the case of developing country Members. Thus, we
disagree with Brazil's argument that the Anti-Dumping Agreement "does not prevent" WTO Members
from accepting quantitative undertakings, tariff quotas or price quotas.
95 We do not see such
undertakings as remedies provided for by the Agreement and therefore do not consider that Article 15
imposes an obligation upon developed country Members to consider undertakings other than price
undertakings.
7.79 Consequently, we are of the view that the European Communities did not fail to abide by its
obligations under Article 15 by not exploring possibilities of undertakings other than price
undertakings. We wish to make it clear that we reach no conclusions as to what other actions might
be considered to constitute "constructive remedies" under the second sentence of Article 15, as the
parties have not specifically pursued other possible such remedies before us.
96 It should also be noted

Brazilian and EC government officials, Brazil responded that "The Government of Brazil has no record of any
contacts maintained with the Brazilian exporter regarding the issue of undertakings. In fact, there was no need
at all for Brazil to inform the Brazilian exporter of the possibility of a price undertaking….". Brazil response to
Panel question 1 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E - 7.
93 Brazil response to Panel question 4 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E - 7.
94 See Brazil response to Panel questions 4 and 5 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E - 7.
95 Ibid.
96 Although Brazil stated that tariff quotas or price quotas might possibly constitute other kinds of
constructive remedies, we do not understand Brazil to have made specific assertions concerning such
instruments. Rather it asserted that it was up to the European Communities to devise and propose a constructive
remedy. See Brazil response to Panel question 5 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-7.

that Brazil confirms that neither it nor Tupy proposed any alternatives to a price undertaking (or any
other kind of constructive remedy) during the investigation.97
7.80 Turning to the question of the timing and scope of application of Article 15, we recall Brazil's
argument that the European Communities breached the second sentence of Article 15 by failing to
raise the possibility of an undertaking to the Brazilian exporter before the imposition of provisional
measures. Brazil disagrees with the view of the EC – Bed Linen panel that Article 15 applies only to
the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures, arguing that the obligation to explore possibilities
of constructive remedies also applies to the period preceding the imposition of provisional measures.
Brazil asserts that, were the EC – Bed Linen panel's reasoning to prevail, there would be no need to
qualify the term ‘duty’ in the Agreement. Arguin g that this is not what happens in the Agreement,
however, Brazil draws our attention to Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 which respectively read, in relevant
part: ‘...and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty”, and “...the imposition of a definitive
duty...”. On the other hand, Brazil asserts, if the intention of the drafters were to give a uniform
meaning to the term ‘duty’ throughout the text, they would have used, for instance, a footnote, as is
the case for the term ‘injury’ (footnote 9 to Article 3).” 98 Brazil contends that the imposition of a
provisional measure, irrespective of the form it takes, adversely affects the interests of the developing
country Member concerned, for it restricts, since its very beginning, the access to the developed
country market for the product concerned.99
7.81 For its part, the European Communities invokes the EC-Bed Linen panel report in support of
the proposition that the provision applies only to the application of definitive anti-dumping measures.
7.82 We understand the phrase "before applying anti-dumping duties" in Article 15 to refer to the
period preceding the application of definitive anti-dumping duties, and not the period preceding the
imposition of any provisional measures. It is clear that the Anti-Dumping Agreement consistently uses
the term "provisional measures" to refer to measures imposed prior to the completion of the
investigation.100 There is a distinction drawn in the text of the Agreement between provisional
measures (which may take the form of a provisional duty or a security by cash deposit or bond) and
anti-dumping duties, with the latter term referring c onsistently to definitive measures. Therefore, the
ordinary meaning of the term "anti-dumping duties" in Article 15, particularly read in the context of
the other provisions of the Agreement, refers to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties
following the completion of the investigation process.
101 Read in this light, the term "before" in
Article 15 refers to the period prior to the imposition of definitive duties (in any event, price
undertakings cannot be sought or accepted prior to a preliminary affirmative determination (see
Article 8.2)). This is entirely consistent with the statement in the first sentence of Article 15 that
special regard must be given "when considering the application of anti-dumping measures". 102
Accordingly, we find that the European Communities did not fail to abide by its obligation under
Article 15 by not exploring possibilities of constructive remedies before the imposition of the
provisional measure.
7.83 Since we have found that the European Communities has explored possibilities of
constructive remedies within the meaning of Article 15, we need not address the issues of whether the
anti-dumping duties would "affect" the "essential interests" of Brazil in this case, within the meaning

97 Brazil response to Panel question 3 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E- 1.
98 Brazil second written submission, paragraph 18.
99 Brazil second written submission, paragraph 17.
100 Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifies that: "An anti-dumping measure shall be applied
only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement." (footnote omitted) Articles 8.1 and 10.1
refer to: "provisional measures" and "anti-dumping duties …". See also Articles 7, 9 and 17.4.
101 We find support for our view in Panel Report, EC-Bed Linen, supra, note 77, paras. 6.231-6.232.
102 In this regard, we note the Panel Report, US-Steel Plate, supra, note 81, para. 7.111.

of the second sentence of Article 15. To the extent Brazil's allegations relate to the contents of the
Provisional and Definitive Regulations under Article 12, we examine these infra.
7.84 In light of all of these considerations, we find that the European Communities did not act
inconsistently with Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.85 We note, in passing, that, at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, WTO
Members adopted the Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, which
states that Ministers recognize103:
 "that, while Article 15 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 is a mandatory provision, the
modalities for its application would benefit from clarification. Accordingly, the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices is instructed, through its working group on
Implementation, to examine this issue and to draw up appropriate recommendations
within twelve months on how to operationalize this provision."
WTO Members are currently engaged in a process of discussions in response to this
Ministerial Decision. It is not our task to presuppose the outcome of those discussions.
2. Issue 2: application and initiation of the investigation (claims withdrawn)
7.86 Brazil withdraws its claims regarding the application under Issue 2.
104 We therefore do not
examine these claims.
3. Issue 3: currency devaluation
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.87 Brazil alleges that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 in imposing an anti-dumping measure where
no dumping existed due to the effects of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency on the prices of the
Brazilian products exported to the European Communities. In Brazil's view, Article VI of the GATT
1994 -- as reflected in Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and in the context of Articles 7 and
11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement -- allows "counter-measures only against and in order to offset
present dumping".105
7.88 In the alternative, Brazil alleges that the Eu ropean Communities violated Article 11.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement by maintaining the measure to the extent it was not necessary to counteract
dumping; and Article 11.2 by failing, simultaneously with the imposition of the measure, to self-
initiate a review of the need for the continued imposition of the duty in view of the currency
devaluation. Brazil asserts that it was unable to request a review as EC law provides that a review
may be initiated "provided a reasonable period of time of at least one year has elapsed since the
imposition of the definitive measure". The European Communities had an obligation to self-initiate a
review "where warranted". The data made availabl e to the European Communities with regard to the
fourth quarter of the POI "should have provided it with a sufficient indication that the dumping
margins it had found for the Brazilian exporter in the beginning of the IP has totally disappeared" at
the end of the last quarter of the IP and "should have at least led the EC to initiate an immediate

103WT/MIN(01)/17, 20 November 2001, paragraph 7.2.
104 Brazil's second written submission, para. 24.
105 Brazil's second written submission, para. 27.

review to assess whether the phenomenon had continued". 106 Brazil asserts that: Tupy was "time-
barred"107 by the EC legislation from requesting a review within the year following the imposition of
the definitive anti-dumping duties; Tupy has not requested any review at any time108; and the "review"
initiated by the European Communities in December 2001 was limited to the issue of "zeroing" and is
not part of the Panel's terms of reference.
7.89 The European Communities argues that, consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
the practice of most Members, it calculated dumping margins for a period of twelve months ending
prior to the date of initiation of the investigati on. According to the European Communities, there is
no legal obligation in the Agreement for a Member to consider whether the circumstances following
the end of the investigation period but prior to the imposition of the measure still necessitate the
imposition. For the European Communities, there is no evidence in this case that dumping ceased
during the course of the investigation period. In any event, the devaluation of Brazil's currency
occurred during the IP and its effects were reflected in the data used by the EC authorities.
7.90 With respect to Brazil's claims alternative claims under Articles 11.1 and 11.2, the European
Communities submits that the implications of the devaluation for Tupy's dumping margin would
depend on pricing decisions made by Tupy, and that it was "by no means a foregone conclusion" that
the devaluation would result in a reduction of the dumping margin". 109 The EC authorities did not
believe that the devaluation that occurred during the IP was an event warranting a review. For the
European Communities, self-initiation is a residual category, appropriate for extreme or unusual
circumstances. The European Communities also states that, at the request of another exporter, it has
since initiated (in December 2001) a review of the duties that are the subject of this dispute,
110
covering the period 1 January to 30 September 2001, but that Tupy has not cooperated in this review.
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.91 Chile submits that Article VI.1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement require that an antidumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping and that the duty
may remain in place only to the extent and for as long as necessary to counteract dumping. In
establishing the dumping margin in this case, the European Communities failed to take into account a
series of important factors, including the devaluat ion. The investigating authority must re-evaluate
whether dumping still exists if the circumstances change so that the dumping margin as calculated no
longer reflects the situation. The concepts of conditionality and proportionality referred to by the
panel and Appellate Body in Korea-Dairy Safeguards are implicit in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994
and Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.92 The United States notes that the Anti-Dumping Agreement constitutes the agreed rules for
determining how to implement Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 by identifying and countering injurious
dumping. Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are meant to be read together. The US further
argues that the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for reviews under Article 11. Footnote 22 to
Article 11 confirms that even a finding that no dumping occurred in a period subsequent to that
examined in the original investigation does not by itself require authorities to terminate the definitive
duty order. Furthermore, as the panel recognized in US – DRAMS.111 Article 11.2 does not require
the revocation of an order upon the finding of no dum ping in a review on the grounds that duties are

106 Brazil's second written submission, para. 39.
107 See, for example, Brazil response to EC question 7 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E - 2.
108 Brazil response to Panel question 6 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
110 EC second written submission, para. 10. EC O fficial Journal, C/342/5, 5 December 2001, Exhibit
EC-26.
111Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (" US – DRAMS "), WT/DS99/R, adopted
19 March 1999, DSR 1999:II, 521, paras. 6.26- 6.29.

no longer “necessary.” There is no basis for Brazil's argument in the text of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement or in Article VI:2.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
(i) Brazil's claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT
1994
7.93 We begin our examination of Brazil’s claim under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by recalling the text of these treaty provisions.
7.94 Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that a Member may levy an anti-dumping duty "[i]n
order to offset or prevent dumping".
7.95 Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
"An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided
for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The following
provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action is
taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations." (footnote omitted)
7.96 The specific relevant chronology of this case is as follows: The date of initiation of the
investigation was 29 May 1999. The dumping IP in this investigation was from 1 April 1998 through
31 March 1999. The "injury investigation period" was from 1 January 1995 through 31 March 1999.
A 42% devaluation of the Brazilian currency occurred in January 1999 (that is, at the beginning of the
last quarter of IP). The date of the Provisional Regulation was 28 February 2000 and the date of the
Definitive Regulation was 11 August 2000.
7.97 We understand the issue here to be whether an investigating authority, having established the
existence of dumping on the basis of the period of investigation, is obligated, under Article 1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 , to re-assess this determination
immediately prior to imposing definitive anti-dumping duties.
7.98 We understand that Brazil does not specifically contest, in this context, the findings of the EC
investigating authorities during the IP
112 with respect to the margin of dumping. Rather, Brazil has
clarified before us that its contention is that following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, the
EC's findings and determinations for the IP became "obsolete"113.
7.99 In considering the issue before us, we believe that it is important to keep firmly in mind two
elements: first, the temporal distinction between the "investigation period" and the subsequent
periods before and after the imposition of the anti-dumping measure; and second, the nature of the
methodology used with respect to the determination of dumping over the course of this investigation
period. We examine Brazil’s arguments in the light of these two elements.
7.100 With respect to the temporal distinction between the investigation period and the subsequent
periods before and after the imposition of the measure, the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers to the
concept of a "period of investigation".114 The use of an investigation period is therefore contemplated
in several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Moreover, the ADP Committee has adopted a

112 Brazil response to Panel question 22 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
113 Ibid.
114 See for example, Article 2.2.1, 2.2.1..1, 2.4.1 and 9.5.

"Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations" 115,
which states, inter alia, that the period of data collection for dumping investigations normally should
be twelve months, and in any case no less than six months, ending as close to the date of initiation as
is practicable; and that the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should be at
least three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser period, and
should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping investigation.116
7.101 There are practical reasons for using an investigation period, the termination date of which
precedes the date of initiation of the investigation. This ensures that the data that will form the basis
for the eventual determination are not affected in any way by the initiation of the investigation and
any subsequent actions of exporters/importers. The rationale is thus to acquire a finite data set
unaffected by the process of the investigation. This can form the basis for an objective and unbiased
determination by the investigating authority. Th e period of investigation terminates as close as
possible to the date of initiation of the investigation in order to ensure that the data pertaining to the
investigation period, while historical, nevertheless refers to the recent past. The use of a sufficiently
long period of investigation is critical in order to ensure that any dumping identified is sustained
rather than sporadic.
7.102 Brazil notes that Article VI of the GATT 1994 addresses the phenomenon of dumping and
authorizes the imposition of countermeasures "in the present tense".
117 Brazil supports its argument
that the Agreement permits "counter-measures only against and in order to offset present dumping"
with reference to the contextual elements of Articles 7 and 11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
However, we do not view these contextual elements as supporting Brazil's position. Article 7.1(iii)
permits the application of provisional measures only if "the authorities concerned judge such
measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation". Article 11.1 states:
"[a]n anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract
dumping which is causing injury." We agree with Brazil that, like Article VI of the GATT 1994, both
of these provisions are in the present tense, and that the point is to offset present dumping. The issue
is, however, how best to follow a consistent a nd reasonable methodology for determining present
dumping. Read in the context of the provisions we have already cited, and on the basis of the
necessity to follow a consistent and reasonable methodology, we are of the view that a finding that
dumping exists during a recent past IP is a finding of “present” dumping for the purposes of the
Agreement. This flows from our observation that the only mechanisms provided for in the Agreement
for determining the necessity or propriety of an ti-dumping measures are those concerning dumping,
injury and causation. There are no additional mandatory procedures envisaged to establish, over and
above this, the propriety of, or necessity for, the initial imposition of anti-dumping measures.
7.103 Brazil itself states that "it is in the very natu re of anti-dumping investigations to assess a
practice which has taken place in the past in order to determine whether to remedy the consequences
of that past practice in the future."
118 However, Brazil continues, the basic rationale behind this
approach – that the same or closely resembling circumstances as in the IP will, or are at least likely to,
continue so that remedies would still play their predefined role once they are imposed –- is absent in
circumstances as in this case, where the circumstances prior to the imposition of anti-dumping
measures change dramatically. Brazil alleges that the EC's "mechanical approach"
119 failed to take

115 G/ADP/6, adopted by the Committee on 5 May 2000.
116 The concept of a set period of investigation to examine the existence of dumping has been present in
the GATT system for over 40 years. Indeed, a 1960 Report by a Group of Exports concerning anti - dumping
and countervailing duties considered the use of a "pre - selection system". See Group of Experts, Second
Report on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, adopted on 27 May 1960 (L/1141) BISD 9S, 194.

adequate note of the lasting effect of the currency de valuation that occurred in the last quarter of the
investigation period.
7.104 In addressing these arguments by Brazil, we turn to the requirements of the Agreement with
respect to the methodology used in the determin ation of dumping over the investigation period.
Article 2.4.2 generally calls for "a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export
prices on a transaction-by transaction basis". Either of these methodologies would seem to require, in
general, that data throughout the entire investigation period would necessarily consistently be taken
into account. That is, an investigating authority would generally be precluded from limiting its
dumping analysis to a selective subset of that data from only a temporal sub-segment of the IP. To
the extent that Brazil is suggesting that the EC authorities should have focused exclusively or
particularly on data from the end of the investigation period (following the devaluation), we therefore
reject Brazil's argument. We observe that the application of such a selective temporal methodology
could indeed risk undermining the consistent and impartial application of the Agreement. The data
taken into account pertaining to the entire investigation period will produce a margin of dumping for
that period. That margin of dumping will reflect developments that occurred within the period of
investigation. In this way, the effects of the currency devaluation for the three last three months of the
IP in this case were already taken into account and reflected in the margin of dumping calculated by
the EC investigating authority.
7.105 We find further contextual support for this view in the provision of the Agreement that
explicitly addresses sustained movements in exchange rates during the IP, Article 2.4.1. This
confirms to us that the Agreement contemplates the presence of a sustained movement of exchange
rates and that the information pertaining to the entire IP continues to be relevant in determining
whether a basis exists for the imposition of anti-dumping measures.
7.106 Brazil's argument seems to centre on the proposition that "[a]ny calculation or methodology,
however compatible with the technical requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which would
ultimately defeat the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, constitutes a violation of
these rules".
120 Brazil refers to a “general obligation” under which the European Communities was
bound not to impose, or at least to withhold, anti-dumping measures.121 As we are bound to apply the
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law"122 to the provisions of the Agreement, it
would be essential to have a textual basis that imposes an obligation of the kind suggested by
Brazil.123 Any departure from the requirement to apply the provisions of the Agreement in a precise
and methodical way would have to be explicitly provided for. However, we see no foundation in the
text of the Agreement for Brazil's argument that this provision does not apply "in the same way" in
this case,
124 nor for a requirement that an investigating authority re-assess its own determination made
on the basis of an examination of data pertaining to the IP prior to the imposition of an anti-dumping
measure in the light of an event which occurred during the IP. 125 We decline to read such a provision

121 Brazil response to Panel question 23 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
122 DSU, Article 3.2.
123 With our finding, we do not mean to entirely rule out the possibility that a currency devaluation that
occurs during the course of an investigation period could eliminate any margin of dumping that might be found
to exist at some point during that investigation period. In any event, we are of the view that the effects of any
currency devaluation during an investigation period would ordinarily be reflected in the data used in properly
conducted calculations comparing the normal value and the export price.
125 We take note of Brazil’s argumentation that the European Communities has a number of cases in its
internal law that address circumstances arising following the IP (see, for example, Brazil first written
submission, para. 168; Brazil response to Panel question 35 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E–1). Our

into the text. Moreover, the Agreement provides mechanisms to address situations where dumping
decreases or terminates following an affirmative determination of dumping on the basis of historical
data from a recent past IP, for example, in Articles 9.3 (full or partial refund of duties paid) and 11
(review).
7.107 Thus, absent any such explicit caveat or conditionality, Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement does not require an investigating authority to re-assess its own determination made on the
basis of an examination of data pertaining to the IP prior to the imposition of an anti-dumping
measure in the light of an event that occurred during the IP.
7.108 We therefore find that Brazil has not established that the European Communities violated its
obligations under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
in imposing an anti-dumping measure in this case following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the IP.
(ii) Brazil's alternative claims under Article 11.1 and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.109 Brazil submits that the European Communities violated Article 11.1 by maintaining the
imposition of the anti-dumping duty to the extent it was not necessary to counteract dumping, and that
the European Communities violated Article 11.2 by not simultaneously reviewing, on its own
initiative, the need for the continued imposition of the duty in view of the currency devaluation.
7.110 As always, we begin our examination of Brazil’s claims by recalling the relevant text of the
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 11.1,
"[a]n anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent
necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury".
7.111 Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
“The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any
interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a
review. Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine
whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether
the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or
both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that
the anti-dumping duty is no longer warrante d, it shall be terminated immediately.”
(footnote omitted)
7.112 Pursuant to Article 11.2, an investigating authority is therefore required, where "warranted",
to review the need for the continued imposition of the duty. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the
verb "warrant" is: "To furnish good and sufficient grounds for (a course of action); to render
allowable, justify. b. To justify (a person in or to a course of action)."
126 We therefore understand the
phrase "where warranted" in Article 11.2 to denote circumstances furnishing good and sufficient
grounds for, or justifying, the self-initiation of a review. Where an investigating authority determines
such circumstances to exist, an investigating auth ority must self-initiate a review. Such a review,
once initiated, will examine whether continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping,

task is to examine the matter on the basis of the covered agreements. We therefore make no pronouncement on
the WTO-consistency of the EC’s non-application of this EC methodology in this particular case.
126 Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://dictionary.oed.com.

whether the dumping would be likely to continue or recur, or both. Article 11.2 therefore provides a
review mechanism to ensure that Members comply with the rule contained in Article 11.1.127
7.113 In respect of Brazil’s alternative claims concerning the obligation to assess the need to impose
anti-dumping measures prior to their imposition or immediately to self-initiate a review, we consider
that Article 11.1 does not set out an independent or additional obligation for Members. By virtue of
Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , an anti-dumping duty may only continue to be imposed
if it remains "necessary" to counteract injuri ous dumping. Article 11.1 contains a general,
unambiguous and mandatory requirement that anti-dumping duties "shall remain in force only as long
as and to the extent necessary" to counteract injurious dumping.
128 It furnishes the basis for the
review procedures contained in Article 11.2 (and 11.3) by stating a general and overarching principle,
the modalities of which are set forth in paragraph 2 (and 3) of that Article. On this basis, we examine
Brazil’s claims under Articles 11.1 and 11.2.
7.114 We understand Brazil to allege that the European Communities violated Article 11.1 by
maintaining the imposition of the anti-dumping duty to the extent it was not necessary to counteract
dumping, and that the European Communities violated Article 11.2 by not, simultaneously with the
imposition of the measure, reviewing, on its own in itiative, the need for the continued imposition of
the duty in view of the currency devaluation. We further understand that the focus of Brazil’s
argument is upon the lasting effect of the currency devaluation, an event which occurred at the
beginning of the last quarter of the IP. According to Brazil, the effects of the devaluation, which were
known and verified by the European Communities, warranted an immediate self-initiated review and
“there was no need for the Brazilian exporter to provide any additional information to the European
Communities to trigger the review”.
129 This was particularly so, in Brazil's view, as the EC's internal
legislation provides for requested reviews after "a reasonable period of time of at least one year has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive measures".130
7.115 We disagree. The devaluation occurred in January 1999, three quarters of the way through
the period of investigation, and Brazil does not contest the finding of dumping during the IP in this
context.131 While we cannot exclude the possibility that circumstances may warrant the simultaneous
self-initiation of a review in certain circumstances, we find no basis in the Agreement for an
obligation that the self-initiation of a review simultaneous with the imposition of the measure is
necessarily warranted or that an authority must self-initiate a review immediately upon the imposition
of measures on the basis of an affirmative dumping determination in respect of a recent past IP. 132

127 The Appellate Body has examined the obligation contained in Article 21.1 and 21.2 of the SCM
Agreement in Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot - Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom ("US – Lead and Bismuth II "),
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2601 concerning a Member’s obligations once a review
has been initiated. That decision does not deal with the issue of when the self-initiation of a review is
“warranted”. We nevertheless think that it is relevant with respect to the relationship between Articles 11.1 and
11.2.
128 We find support for this approach in Panel Report, US-DRAMS, supra, note 111.
129 Brazil response to Panel question 27 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
130 Brazil cites Article 11.3 of the EC Basic Regulation, Exhibit BRL-24.
131 Brazil response to Panel question 22 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
132 The argument that Articles 11.1 and 11.2 necessarily require the withholding of imposition of
measures and/or the self-initiation of an immediate review is irreconcilable with note 22 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement. Note 22 states that, in cases where anti-dumping duties are levied on a retrospective basis, "a
finding in the most recent assessment pr oceeding … that no duty is to be le vied shall not by itself require the
authorities to terminate the definitive duty". If this view of Article 11.2 were to prevail, an investigating
authority would be obligated under Article 11.2 perpetually to withhold the imposition of measures and/or to
continuously assess the situation by repeatedly self-initiating a review, and note 22 would be rendered
meaningless as there would never be duties imposed on which to conduct a re-assessment. This confirms our

The determination of whether or not good and sufficient grounds exist for the self-initiation of a
review necessarily depends upon the factual situation in a given case and will necessarily vary from
case to case.
7.116 It is therefore necessary for us to examine the surrounding relevant facts. In so doing, we
consider that while the European Communities was by no means precluded from immediately
initiating a review upon its own initiative under Ar ticle 11.2, we are of the view that, even assuming
arguendo that the devaluation had resulted in a convergence of the normal value and the export price
at the time of the imposition of the measures, it was not necessarily clear whether and to what extent
such a situation would continue. This is particularly the case given that there was no clarity
concerning the magnitude and direction of any subsequent movements in Brazil's currency nor
concerning the pricing decisions that Tupy might take in the face of any such developments. It was
therefore not clear that, even assuming arguendo a convergence of export price and normal value by
the time of the imposition of the measures -- an issue that was not considered by the EC authorities
and that we need not and do not consider here for the purposes of resolving the issue before us -- any
"lasting effect" of the devaluation would be a convergence of normal value and export price.
7.117 To the extent that Brazil's argument is that the continued effect of the devaluation between the
end of the IP and the imposition of the measure was such as to eliminate any dumping that was
established to exist during the IP, we recall that the existence of a duty assessment mechanism under
Article 9.3 is intended to address precisely a situation of that kind. This mechanism (which, in the
case of the European Communities is a refund system) aims to ensure that the amount of anti-
dumping duty actually collected does not exceed the actual margin of dumping, and refunds are to be
granted in order to attain this objective. In light of the fact that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
contemplates, inter alia, prospective duty collection, and that Article 9.3 contemplates a mechanism
to refund duties in the event the actual margin of dumping is less than duties actually collected, it
appears inherent in the structure of the Agreement that the data and calculations pertaining to the
investigation period legitimately form the basis for the imposition of the measure.
7.118 The findings of the panel in US – DRAMS
133 are relevant here. In examining the nature of a
review conducted under Article 11.2 AD, that panel rejected the view that Article 11.2 "requires
revocation as soon as an exporter is found to have ceased dumping, and that the continuation of an
anti-dumping duty is precluded a priori in any circumstances other than where there is present
dumping." This reasoning would suggest to us that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require a
decision to be made by the investigating authorities after the end of the IP not to impose duties, nor to
review the imposition of a duty immediately after it is imposed based on events between the end of
the IP and the time of imposition, much less on the basis of events occurring before the end of the IP.
7.119 We therefore find that Brazil has not established that the European Communities violated
Article 11.1 or Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing definitive anti-dumping
measures in this case or by not, simultaneously with that imposition, self-initiating a review following
the devaluation of Brazil's currency that occurred at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the IP.
7.120 We understand Brazil's allegations of violation by the European Communities focus upon the
failure to self-initiate a review, and not on any other aspect of Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In particular, pursuant to Article 11.2 a review may also be initiated at the request of a

view that, once an investigating authority has established the existence of dumping during a recent past IP, an
absence of dumping (assuming arguendo that there is such an absence, however its existence is established) at
the time of the imposition does not, in and of itself -- and in the absence of a new or changed circumstance not
present during the IP -- preclude the imposition of a measure or necessarily render a review "warranted" so as to
require the self-initiation of a review pursuant to Article 11.2. Brazil does not argue that such a new or changed
circumstance arose following the IP, but only that the devaluation had lasting effects.
133 Supra, note 111.

party "provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed" since the imposition of definitive AD
duties. The EC Basic Regulation provides that a review may be initiated upon request of an interested
party provided that a reasonable period of time of at least one year has elapsed since the imposition of
the AD measure. However, as Brazil has argued that Tupy was legally precluded from requesting a
review before the year lapsed, and Brazil has not argued that it ever requested such a review, and we
note that Tupy declined to participate in a subse quent review of the measure, Exhibits BRL-55 and
56, including a review initiated in December 2001,
134 we do not examine this element of Article 11.2
here.
4. Issue 4: constructed normal value amounts used for profit and SG&A
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.121 Brazil alleges that the European Communities erred in the calculation of constructed normal
value under Article 2.2 and 2.2.2. In particular, Brazil alleges that in constructing normal value, the
European Communities used data associated with sales of certain product types that "[did] not permit
a proper comparison" due to "low volume" under Article 2.2.
135 Brazil argued that, as the Agreement
does not define the term “in the ordinary course of trade”, the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 is open to
interpretation.136 Brazil therefore submits that the European Communities violated Article 2.2.2, as
Article 2.2.2, when read together with Article 2.2, requires that the amounts for SG&A and for profits
should be based on the data of representative and profitable domestic sales. Where an investigating
authority excludes data under Article 2.2, it follows “as a matter of construction” that the same data
should be excluded under Article 2.2.2.
137 Brazil also invokes Article 2.4, alleging that, in using this
same data in relation to profit margins, and not ma king an adjustment for the use of data relating to
sales which do not permit a proper comparison, the European Communities breached the requirement
to make a fair comparison between normal value and export price.
7.122 The European Communities admits that it used data relating to "low volume" sales in
establishing the profit margins under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2. The European Communities argues
that this approach is envisaged by the chapeau of Article 2.2.2, which requires (and permits) solely the
exclusion of sales not made "in the ordinary course of trade" in establishing the amounts for profit and
SG&A in constructing normal value. The European Communities contends that Tupy did not request
an adjustment on this ground in the investigation, that the Article 2.4 claim is therefore inadmissible
in these Panel proceedings and that no such adjustment would be warranted in any event.
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.123 Without taking a position on Brazil’s allegations under Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2, the United
States disagrees with Brazil that an improper calculation of constructed normal value can constitute a
breach of Article 2.4, or that a putative breach of Article 2.4 can be used to bolster a claim under
Article 2.2 and 2.2.2. For the United States, Brazil’s arguments with respect to the calculation of

134 O.J. C 342 5, 2 December 2001, Exhibit EC-26.
135 Brazil's original allegation was that the European Communities wrongly included "low volume"
profit data in constructing normal value, and that the European Communities used different data from a different
set of transactions for SG&A, on the one hand, and profit, on the other. However, Brazil does not reiterate in its
second submission its allegation concerning the use of different data for SG&A and profits. Rather, we
understand Brazil's argumentation to have developed to allege that the European Communities violated
Article 2.2.2 by including amounts for both SG & A and profits pertaining to sales of product types for which
domestic sales were "not representative" within the meaning of Article 2.2 and footnote 2 thereto (see Brazil
second written submission, para. 49).
136 Brazil second written submission, paragraph 45.
137 Brazil second written submission, paras. 46-47.

constructed normal value, relate to the identification of normal value under Article 2.2 and 2.2.2, and
not to its subsequent comparison with export price, under Article 2.4.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.124 Our understanding of the factual situation that gave rise to this claim by Brazil is the
following.
7.125 In the underlying investigation, the European Communities defined the product under
consideration as: "threaded malleable cast-iron tube or pipe fittings … which are joined by a
screwing joining system, falling within CN code ex 7307 19 10". 138 The European Communities also
found that "malleable fittings produced by the Community industry and sold on the Community
market as well as malleable fittings produced in the countries concerned and exported to the
Community were like products, since there were no differences in the basic physical and technical
characteristics and uses of the existing different types of malleable fittings".139
7.126 The European Communities determined that products with Tupy's internal product codes 12,
18, 68 and 69 were all within the "product concerned"/"like product" definition. Only types within
two of these product codes – 12 and 18 -- were exported to the European Communities.140
7.127 The European Communities determined normal value for 1375 product types exported by
Tupy. The European Communities constructed the normal value for 809 of these types.
7.128 In order to determine whether or not, based on a low volume of domestic sales, it should
calculate a constructed normal value, the European Communities applied the 5% "test" referred to in
footnote 2 to Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement-- i.e. sales in the domestic market being of
such a low volume as to "not permit a proper comparison" -- first at the level of the total sales for each
exporting producer 141; and subsequently within "directly comparable" 142 "types" of the exported
product for the exporting producer.143

138 Provisional Regulation, recitals 9 - 12, confirmed in Definitive Regulation, recital 9.
139 Provisional Regulation, recital 13, confirmed in Definitive Regulation, recitals 14 - 19.
140 The following is a summary of these four different types (with Tupy internal product codes 12, 18 ,
68 and 69) indicating basic characteristics and domestic and export sales to the EC:
Types of product concerned Sold in domestic market (Brazil) Exported for sale in EC market
12 (BSP threading) yes yes
18 (BSP threading) no yes
68 (NPT threading) yes no
69 (NPT threading) yes no
In the Provisional Regulation, the European Communitie s used the product control numbers proposed by Tupy
in the questionnaire, and normal values based on domestic sales were based only on product types 12. In the
Definitive Regulation, the EC altered its approach by using internal product numbers, taking into account also
data for product types "68" and "69".
141 The volume of domestic sales by Tupy was 22.8 million units, compared to 22.3 million exported to
the EC. See EC response to Panel question 36 following the first Panel meeting, para. 36, Annex E-3.
Definitive Disclosure, BRL - 16, Annex II, page 8, po int 2.11; Provisional Disclosure, BRL-11, Annex II, page
1, point 1.1; Provisional Regulation, recital 20.
142 I.e. whether for each of the product types exported, the quantity sold on the domestic market was at
least 5% of the identical type exported to the EC.
143 Provisional Disclosure, Exhibit BRL - 11, Annex 4; Definitive Disclosure, BRL-16, Annex II,
Annex 4.

7.129 The European Communities then considered whet her sales were in the "ordinary course of
trade", first for the product as a whole and then, for each product type sold by Tupy in Brazil.144
7.130 For the product types where there was an insufficient level of sales ( i.e. such a low volume as
"not to permit a proper comparison") and/or sales we re not within the ordinary course of trade, the
European Communities constructed the normal value145 146
7.131 The European Communities used SG&A and profit data from domestic sales made in the
ordinary course of trade (regardless of whether these sales were considered to be of sufficient volume
to permit a proper comparison within the meaning of Article 2.2).147
7.132 We understand that the issue before us is whether data associated with sales deemed "not to
permit a proper comparison" within the meaning of Article 2.2 because of the low relative volume of
domestic sales may nevertheless be used in determining profits in constructing normal value under the
chapeau of Article 2.2.2. Our examination begins with the text of the relevant provisions.
7.133 Article 2.2 provides for the construction of normal value under certain identified
circumstances. It states:
2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in
the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular
market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the
exporting country
2, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of
dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like
product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is
representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.
2Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting
country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal
value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the sales of the product under consideration
to the importing Member, provided that a lowe r ratio should be acceptable where the evidence
demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to
provide for a proper comparison.
7.134 Article 2.2.2 governs the calculation of SG&A and profits for the purpose of constructing
normal value under Article 2.2. Article 2.2.2 provides, in pertinent part:
2.2.2 For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and
general costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and
sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer
under investigation.

144 See Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 23.
145 We do not understand Brazil to be challenging th e fact that the EC applied certain tests at two
different levels in its calculations, nor the EC's model-by-model analysis.
146 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 26 and 27.
147 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, paras. 20-27. When the sales to independent customers at
prices equal to or above the cost of production represented at least 10% of the total of domestic sales volume of
the product concerned by the company concerned. Wher e this criterion was not met, a weighted average profit
margin of the other companies with sufficient sales in the ordinary course of trade in the country concerned was
used. We do not understand that Brazil is alleging any inconsistency with the Anti-Dumping Agreement with
respect to the EC’s application of this 10% test.

7.135 The chapeau of Article 2.2.2 makes clear that data from sales not in the ordinary course of
trade are to be excluded from the calculation of constructed normal value.148
7.136 However, this does not fully resolve the question before us. We must consider whether the
"ordinary course of trade" test is the sole exclusionary test that an investigating authority is permitted
to apply to profits in constructing normal value under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2, and, in particular,
whether or not data from so-called "unrepresentative" sales – i.e. sales deemed "not to permit a proper
comparison" because of low volume within the meaning of Article 2.2 -- must or may also be
excluded under Article 2.2.2 (although they may be sales in the ordinary course of trade).
7.137 It is clear that the text of the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 refers to the use of "actual data
pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product". It does not refer
to any additional exceptions or qualifications. The "ordinary course of trade" test is the only test that
the text of the provision explicitly identified for application by a Member to exclude data in
establishing SG&A and profits under the chapeau methodology.
7.138 We understand that the explicit exclusion pertaining to sales not in the ordinary course of
trade in this first sentence of the chapeau to mean that where there is no other such explicit exclusion
with respect to sales "not permitting a proper comparison" due to "low volume" elsewhere in the same
provision, no such exclusion should be implied. From this, we discern that a Member is not permitted
to exclude actual data -- on a basis other than not being made in the ordinary course of trade -- from
the calculation under Article 2.2.2. In contrast to the Article 2.2 chapeau, there is no explicit
exclusion, in the Article 2.2.2 chapeau, of data relating to sales the volume of which was so low as not
to permit a proper comparison. On the other hand, the condition of "sales in the ordinary course of
trade", mentioned in Article 2.2, is also explicitly included once again in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2.
It is not our task to read into the text of the treaty words that are not there. The ordinary meaning of
this phrase includes the SG&A actually incurred a nd the profits actually realized in the category of
production and sales explicitly specified in the Agreement.
7.139 In light of these considerations, we find that Brazil has not established that the European
Communities breached its obligations under Article 2.2.2 by including data relating to "low volume"
sales in the construction of normal value.
7.140 Brazil also alleged that the European Communities breached the requirement to make a fair
comparison between normal value and export price by using data from "low volume" sales and not
making an adjustment for the use of such data under Article 2.4. However, we are of the view that
Article 2.4 does not provide a legal basis for Brazil's allegation. Brazil’s arguments with respect to
the calculation of constructed normal value in this case relate to the identification of normal value
under Article 2.2 and 2.2.2, rather than to the requirement subsequently to ensure a fair comparison
with export price under Article 2.4. For this reason, we decline to consider Brazil's allegation under
Article 2.4 in this context.

148 Article 2.2.1 addresses when sales of the like product may be treated as not "in the ordinary course
of trade". It is clear that data from sales not in th e ordinary course of trade should be excluded under the
chapeau methodology. We find support for this view in Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (" EC – Bed Linen "), WT/DS141/AB/R,
adopted 12 March 2001, para. 82.

5. Issue 5: constructed normal value -- product codes
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.141 Brazil asserts that Article 2.2.2, read together with Article 2.6, requires that where an
identical product exists, sales data relating to the SG&A and profits of that identical product must be
used exclusively in constructing normal value. Only in the absence of sales of such an identical
product may data relating to sales of a product with closely resembling characteristics be used. Brazil
therefore submits that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.2 in
constructing the normal value for certain product types (with codes “12” and “18”) by including data
relating to domestic sales of "non-identical" product types (with codes "68" and "69").
149
7.142 The European Communities contends that it correctly included the data in question in
constructing normal value under Article 2.2.2. As the data were associated with sales of the like
product, there was no reason to exclude them.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.143 The Panel refers again to our understanding of the basic factual situation giving rise to
Brazil's claim. 150 The European Communities determined normal value for 1375 product types
exported by Tupy. The European Communities constructed the normal value for 809 of these types,
which included (526) product types within code 12 (for which no identical types were sold
domestically or were sold but in insufficient quantities and/or not in the ordinary course of trade); and
(283) product types within code 18.
151
7.144 In constructing the normal value of certain product types with Tupy internal product code
"12" and "18" under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 (i.e. using actual data for SG&A and profit from
sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product), the European Communities included data
relating to sales of types in internal product codes 12, 68 and 69.
7.145 Brazil objects to the European Communities' use of data from sales of types with internal
product codes "68" and "69", submitting that the only domestically-sold product types to which the
EC should refer when identifying amounts for SG &A and profits under Article 2.2.2 for exported
types with codes 12 and 18 are the product type with code 12 for which domestic sales are both
representative and profitable. According to Brazil, the product type with code "12" is the identical
product type to product type "18". Brazil asserts that types in codes "68" and "69" have differences
which make them "non-comparable" with product types in code "18" and that the data from these
sales should have been excluded in the calculations under Article 2.2.2. Brazil submits that
Article 2.2.2, read together with Article 2.6, makes clear that where an identical product exists, data
relating to its SG&A costs and profits shall be used. Only in the absence of such a product may data
relating to a non-identical but similar or closely resembling product be used.

149 Brazil does not refer in its second written submission to its claim under Article 2.4 that, having
included data from such sales, the European Communities violated Article 2.4 by refusing to make adjustments
for differences in physical characteristics affecting pri ce comparability. We take Brazil’s response to Panel
Question 45 and Brazil's second written submission to indicate that Brazil pursues this claim under Article 2.2.2,
rather than Article 2.4. In any event, we recall our view supra, para. 7.140, that Brazil’s arguments with respect
to the calculation of constructed normal value here relate to the identification of normal value under Article 2.2
and 2.2.2, rather than to the requirement subsequently to ensure a fair comparison with export price under
Article 2.4.
150 Supra, paras. 7.124 ff.
151 See Provisional Regulation, recitals 20-27, 35-37; EC response to Panel question 39 following the
first Panel meeting, Annex E-3, para. 46 ff.

7.146 As always, the starting point for our examination of Brazil's claim is the text of the provision
invoked by Brazil. We recall Article 2.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement , cited in full supra.152
Article 2.2.2 governs the calculation of SG&A and profits for the purpose of constructing normal
value under Article 2.2. Article 2.2.2 provides, in pertinent part:
2.2.2 For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and
general costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and
sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer
under investigation.
7.147 Thus, Article 2.2.2 mandates the use of actual SG&A and profit data relating to certain sales
of the "like product". It makes clear that data from sales of the like product not in the ordinary course
of trade should be excluded from the calculation of constructed normal value. This is the only explicit
indication given in the provision that data from certain sales should not be taken into account in the
construction of normal value. No other data relating to sales of the "like product" are explicitly
earmarked for such exclusion.
7.148 Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a definition of the term "like product". It
reads:
2.6 Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("product similar") shall
be interpreted to mean a product which is id entical, i.e. alike in all respects to the
product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product
which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those
of the product under consideration.
7.149 The definition of "like product" in Article 2.6 governs how an investigating authority
identifies the scope of the "like product" for the purposes of the investigation and of the Agreement.
Once the investigating authority has identified th e scope of the "like product", the scope of that
definition remains consistent.
7.150 The chapeau of Article 2.2.2 requires the use of actual data from all relevant sales of the like
product. Thus, by the express terms of Article 2.2.2 chapeau, actual data from relevant transactions
relating to sales of the "like product" – as a whole – may be taken into account to construct normal
value. There is no provision to the effect that constructed normal value is to be based only on a
limited subset of data relating to sales of certain selective product types falling within the definition of
like product, but excluding data relating to sales of other such types. It is not our task to read into the
text of the treaty words that are not there.
7.151 We therefore find that Brazil has not established that the European Communities, having
defined the "like product" as it did, acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2 by including data
from sales of the product types of internal product codes 68 and 69, which fell within the definition of
"like product", for the purposes of constructing normal value in order to reach a margin of dumping
for the like product as a whole.

152 Supra, para. 7.133.

6. Issues 6 and 10: "fair comparison" with respect to taxation
(a) Issue 6: IPI Premium Credit
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.152 Brazil submits that Tupy obtained a 20% refund of the value of its exported fittings to the EC
– the IPI Premium Credit -- to compensate for indirect taxes borne on the Brazilian market by inputs
used to produce the exported product. Brazil alleges that the EC violated: Article VI:4 of the GATT
1994 by not negating the effect of the IPI Premium Credit; and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (1) by failing to fulfil the requirement of a fair
comparison between the normal value and the export price by denying allowances for differences in
indirect taxation affecting the price comparability; (2) by not indicating to the Brazilian exporter what
additional information with regard to the IPI Premium Credit was necessary to ensure a fair
comparison; and (3) by imposing an unreasonable burden of proof upon the Brazilian exporter to
demonstrate the justification of the Brazilian tax law concerned.
7.153 The European Communities submits that the it denied an allowance in respect of the IPI
Premium Credit as Tupy did not demonstrate that this credit "compensated" for internal taxes "borne
by the like product" when destined for domestic consumption within the meaning of Article VI:4 of
the GATT 1994. Additional reasons for the rejection by the EC authorities of an adjustment to normal
value for the IPI Premium Credit was that it was not consistently "booked", doubtful in value and
wrongly calculated by Tupy.
(ii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.154 The Panel begins our examination of Brazil's claim in respect of the IPI Premium Credit with
the text of the treaty provisions cited by Brazil. Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 provides that in the
determination of dumping:
"Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of
sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price
comparability."
7.155 Article VI:4 of the GATT 1994 states:
"4. No product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of any
other Member shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of
the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when
destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the
refund of such duties or taxes."
7.156 Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads, in pertinent part:
"A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels
of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability . … The authorities shall indicate to the
parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison and
shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties. (footnote omitted)

7.157 Article 2.4 imposes upon the investigating authority the obligation to make due allowance, in
each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability. Differences in taxation are
explicitly listed as a factor that must be taken into account under Article 2.4 to the extent they may
affect price comparability, and for which due allowance shall be made, in each case, on its merits.
The last sentence of Article 2.4 provides that the authorities shall indicate to the parties in question
what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison. The requirement to make due allowance
for such differences, in each case on its merits , means that the authority must at least evaluate
identified differences in taxation with a view to de termining whether or not an adjustment is required
to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and export price under Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, and then to make an adjustment where it determines this to be necessary on the
basis of this evaluation.
153 The issue of which specific "allowances" should be made in any case
depends very much on the particular facts of the case. The last part of the last sentence of Article 2.4,
that the authorities "shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof" on interested parties, does not
remove the burden from interested parties to substantiate their assertions concerning claimed
adjustments. In a similar vein, an investigating authority in possession of the requisite information
substantiating a claimed adjustment would not be justified in rejecting outright that claimed
adjustment.
7.158 Thus, while it is incumbent upon the investiga ting authorities to ensure a fair comparison,
154
so also is it incumbent upon interested parties to substantiate their assertions concerning adjustments
as constructively as possible. The duty of an investigating authority to ensure a fair comparison
cannot, in our view, signify that an investigating authority must accept any claimed adjustment.
Rather, the investigating authority must take steps to achieve clarity as to the adjustment claimed and
then determine whether and to what extent that adju stment is merited. On this basis, we examine
Brazil's claim under Article 2.4.
7.159 While there is no disagreement between the parties that legitimate differences in taxation may
be the subject of adjustment under Article 2.4, the parties disagree as to whether the IPI Premium
Credit fulfils the necessary conditions for an allowance to have been granted in this particular case.
7.160 We therefore examine the particular circumstances surrounding this issue. We have closely
scrutinized the record of the underlying inves tigation, including the communications between Tupy
and the European Communities pertaining to the IPI Premium Credit. The European Communities
indicated and requested relevant substantiated information in the questionnaire. 155 Tupy indicated in

153 We find support for our view in Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy ("Argentina – Ceramic Tiles "), WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November
2001, para. 6.113.
154 We recall the view of the Appellate Body that the obligation to ensure a fair comparison under
Article 2.4 "lies on the investigating authorities" and not on exporters. Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled
Steel, supra, note 40, para. 178.
155 The questionnaire states, inter alia , "List all internal taxes imposed on the domestic market
products, which were either rebated upon exportation or not collected on the products exported to the
European Community.
For each tax listed above, provide English translations of statutes and regulations authorising the
collection of the tax, including documents which explain the method of calculation, assessment, and
payment of the tax.
For each tax listed above, separately provide information on the tax base or taxable price, the tax rate,
the amount of taxes assessed, any deductions or offsets to the tax and the formula used to calculate
the tax amount.
Indicate when you are legally obligated or liable for tax payment. Report when you actually paid
taxes and whether you maintain separate accounts for these taxes.
Report in the transaction-by-transaction listing below (see points 11 and 12) the amount of such taxes
applicable to each domestic sale.
Explain how you calculated this amount….…

its questionnaire response that according to Brazilian law, "…the Brazilian government gave to
Brazilian export companies a tax of 20% refund over the FOB value for indirect taxes paid."156 At the
provisional stage, the European Communities stated that it would "further investigate this issue in
order to establish the exact amount of indirect taxes which was actually refunded on export sales
made to the Community and at the same time borne by the like product concerned when consumed in
Brazil".
157 Brazil submits that Tupy presumed from this statement that it would have had an
opportunity to provide more information regarding the Brazilian legislation, if needed. Brazil submits
that the European Communities did not, however, "further investigate" the issue and that any
uncertainty that remained should be ascribed to the European Communities as a violation of its
obligation in Article 2.4 in that the European Comm unities did not indicate to the Brazilian exporter
what additional information with regard to the IP I Premium Credit was necessary to ensure a fair
comparison, and imposed an unreasonable burden of proof upon the Brazilian exporter to demonstrate
the justification of the Brazilian tax law concerned. Brazil submits that Tupy provided all the
information at its disposal with regard to the IPI Premium Credit.
7.161 On the basis of the record, we do not consider Brazil's allegation that the European
Communities "did not further investigate the issue" to be a valid one. Tupy's submissions even
following the Provisional Regulation continued to contain assertions and information regarding this
issue
158, and the European Communities indicated in the Definitive Disclosure that "it had further
investigated the claim for an allowance for import charges and indirect taxes made by Tupy".
7.162 In its questionnaire response, Tupy submitted a legal instrument as a basis for its claim for
adjustment for the IPI Premium Credit. The Eu ropean Communities determined that the domestic
sales prices relied upon by the EC were "net" of four taxes identified as charged on the sales
invoices
159, thereby obviating any need for an adjustment to be made in respect of these particular
taxes, and no other taxes were explicitly identifi ed by Tupy as being compensated for by the IPI
Premium Credit.

Prepare a listing named “DMALLUR” (computer file – for details see Section H6) of all adjustments
you claim for direct sales to independent customers on the domestic market on a transaction-by-
transaction basis.”
156 Tupy's questionnaire response, Exhibit BRL-4, section G-2. Edict 491, dated 5 March 1969
(submitted as Exhibit BRL-46 in these Panel proceedings) was attached to the questionnaire response, section
G-2.2. See also first submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-5, point 1.3.2. In its reply to the
deficiency letter, Exhibit BRL-7, para. C.1.1 Tupy identified a "tax refund of 20%" in addition to a "credit
PIS/COFINS of 5.37% over input". Brazil has referred in these Panel proceedings to legislation that was not on
the record of the underlying investigation in connection with this claim: Resolution No. 2 of the Exportation
Incentive Commission of 17 January 1979, which, Brazil asserts, establishes the rates applicable to exported
products and established an IPI Credit of 20% for the product concerned (Brazil first written submission,
para. 304; Brazil's response to Panel question 54 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1). Pursuant to
Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-dumping Agreement , we are precluded from consid ering factual evidence that was
not on the record of the underlying EC investigation.
157 Disclosure preceding the Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-11, Annex II, pp. 7-8.
158 e.g. Fourth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation; Exhibit BRL-13, Annex II, paras. 25 ff.
Tupy's agenda for hearing on 29 May 2000, Exhibit BRL-14, para. 11.
159 These taxes were identified as: PIS, COFINS, ICMS and IPI. The European Communities
expressed this view in the Disclosure Preceding the Pr ovisional Regulation Exhibit BRL-11, Annex II, pp. 7-8
and submits evidence from the record of the investigation (Exhibits EC-18 through 20) supporting this
proposition. EC response to Panel question 55 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3. In response to
Panel questioning, Brazil states that "…even in case the normal value was calculated net of the IPI tax, there
could be basis for granting an adjustment on the grounds of IPI premium credit. The EC simply denied such an
adjustment without indicating to the Brazilian exporter what additional information was necessary to justify the
differences between the IPI Premium Credit and the IPI tax" (Brazil response to Panel question 10 following the
second Panel meeting, Annex E-7). The record evidence contains no positive nor explicit identification of a tax
for which the IPI Premium Credit might have compensated.

7.163 The European Communities remarked upon the complexity of the issue and questioned the
basis for the specification of a 20% adjustment. In the light of the EC indication that more
substantiation was required, Tupy still did not specifically identify any particular additional tax borne
by the products under consideration and continued to assert that Brazilian internal law provided for
such a Credit at a level of 20 per cent.
7.164 The European Communities was faced with the citation by Tupy of its legal right under
Brazilian law to receive the 20% IPI Premium Credit. It was not in possession of substantiation of
that level through the provision of a copy of the relevant legislation specifying that level nor explicit
specific identification of any tax for which this Credit was granted in compensation. We do not
consider that the obligation imposed by Article 2.4 would necessarily compel the EC investigating
authority to grant the total claimed adjustment in this situation. It may be, for example, that this legal
right had not been exercised in a given period by Tupy. In any event, it would be necessary to resort
to Tupy's records to discern what had actually occu rred. In this respect, moreover, the EC authorities
examined the factual basis for Tupy's claim and their evaluation was that they considered, inter alia,
that "the real value of this tax credit [is] doubtful"; it was not consistently booked and was wrongly
calculated.160 The record indicates that the EC made these views known to Tupy in the course of the
investigation and Tupy had an opportunity to remedy these perceived deficiencies.
7.165 Furthermore, Article VI:4 of the GATT 1994 requires that where the internal tax or duty
concerned is a tax or duty borne by the like pr oduct sold on the domestic market and where such
duties or taxes are refunded or where the exported product is exempted from bearing such taxes or
duties, no anti-dumping duty shall be imposed in respect of such duties or taxes. It is clear that the
"duties or taxes" in question must be "borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the
country of origin or exportation" (emphasis added). The EC investigating authority was not satisfied
that the credit in question fulfilled the requirements of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
 161 Again, the
record indicates that the European Communities made these views known to Tupy in the course of the
investigation and Tupy had an opportunity to remedy these perceived deficiencies.
7.166 We do not consider that the conduct of the European Communities and its decision not to
make any adjustment constitutes a failure to ensure a fair comparison within the meaning of
Article 2.4.
162 A reasonable and objective investigating authority could have made an examination of
this evidence and taken this decision on the basis of the record of this investigation.
7.167 On the basis of these considerations, and keeping firmly in mind the standard of review we
are bound to apply to our examination of the matter before us, we find that Brazil has not established
that the European Communities violated Article 2.4 or Article VI of the GATT 1994 in not granting an
adjustment in relation to the IPI Premium Credit.
(b) Issue 10: PIS/COFINS
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.168 Brazil argues that under Brazilian law, Tupy received a PIS/COFINS credit amounting to
5.37% over input of the exported final product. Brazil submits that the European Communities
violated Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to
make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price by denying full allowances for
resulting differences in indirect taxation affecting price comparability and by applying an arbitrary,

160 Disclosure Preceding Provisional Regulation, E xhibit BRL-11, Annex II, p. 7; and Transparency
Letter, Exhibit BRL-18, p. 5.
161 Ibid.
162Appellate Body Report, US-Hot Rolled Steel, supra, note 40, para. 178.

manipulative and punitive "sampling" methodology in its assessment of the PIS/COFINS tax and
credit that lacks any legal foundation.
7.169 The European Communities does not dispute that an allowance for the PIS/COFINS credit
is appropriate.163 It argues that the EC authorities took the initiative in calculating the adjustment as
Tupy made no claim for adjustment relating to this credit in its questionnaire response. Tupy referred
to an "estimated Credit PIS/COFINS of 5.37% over input" for the first time in replying to a deficiency
letter, but did not request an adjustment or rectify incorrect data it had submitted in its questionnaire
Response. The European Communities argues that its calculation of the adjustment on the basis of
data from the 20 most exported types sold on the domestic market was a reasonable and appropriate
methodology representative of the products sold.
(ii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.170 The Panel recalls that the chapeau of Article 2.4 requires that “a fair comparison shall be
made between the export price and the normal value”. As we have already stated, differences in
taxation are explicitly listed as a factor that must be taken into account under Article 2.4 to the extent
they may affect price comparability, and for which due allowance shall be made, in each case, on its
merits. The last sentence of Article 2.4 provides that the authorities shall indicate to the parties in
question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison. The requirement to make due
allowance for such differences, in each case on its merits , means that the authority must at least
evaluate identified differences in taxation with a vi ew to determining whether or not an adjustment is
required to maintain price comparability and to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and
export price under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and then to make an adjustment where
it determines this to be necessary on the basis of this evaluation.
164
7.171 Differences in taxation are explicitly listed as a factor that should be taken into account under
Article 2.4 to the extent they may affect price comparability. The divergence between the parties
centres on the methodology applied by the European Communities in calculating this adjustment,
which, according to Brazil, is inherently unfair and resulted in this case in an adjustment that Brazil
alleges is less than the full amount required. We understand Brazil to allege that the EC failed to
conduct a "fair comparison" within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by
calculating an adjustment for PIS/COFINS on the basis of a methodology involving data pertaining to
transactions involving the twenty "most-exported" types of pipe fittings from Brazil that were also
sold domestically, representing approximately 33% of the total quantity exported.
7.172 We see the issue we must decide as whether the obligation to conduct a "fair comparison"
under Article 2.4 permits, or does not preclude, the use by an investigating authority of a
representative subset of data relating to certain transactions in calculating adjustments, or whether an
investigating authority has an obligation to take in to account a comprehensive data set in calculating
adjustments.
165

163 See, for example, EC response to Panel Question 92 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3.
164 We recall our views expressed supra, paras. 7.157-7.158.
165 We do not understand Brazil to have challenged the use by the European Communities of model-by-
model analysis per se . We wish to underline that this issue does not relate to the resort by the investigating
authority to "facts available" under Article 6.8, nor to the issue of "sampling" under Article 6.10 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. The European Communities states that its methodology does not relate to "sampling" in
the sense in which that term is used in Article 6.10. See EC response to Panel Question 67 following the first
Panel meeting, Annex E - 3. The European Communities asserts that the challenged methodology was used in
order to allocate the total amount of PIS/COFINS refund among the different types of fittings with a view to
adjusting the normal value for each type. EC first written submission, para. 236.

7.173 There is no dispute between the parties that the total amount of PIS/COFINS refunded to
Tupy in the IP was 2,491,000 Real. The European Communities calculated the PIS/COFINS
adjustment as follows: it divided that total amount by the value of total export sales and then
multiplied this percentage by the ratio between the export prices and domestic sales of the product
concerned.166 It thereby granted an adjustment to normal value of 0.88%. The European
Communities indicated that it considered that the difference between the adjustment originally
requested by Brazil for indirect taxation and 0.88% was misleading and that the entire claimed
adjustment could therefore be totally rejected. “Given the complexity of the issue”, the European
Communities nevertheless decided to grant the adjustment.
167 Tupy contested the accuracy of the EC
calculation of the adjustment questioned the legal basis for this adjustment during the investigation.168
169
7.174 The European Communities justifies its methodology, using data pertaining to the 20 most
exported types, as being "representative of the products sold" 170, "necessary to allocate the total
amount of the refund among the different types of fittings 171 and reasonable "given the practical
constraints under which investigators act".172 In response to questioning, the EC specified that its use
of the methodology was not exclusively "because of personnel and time constraints",173 but that, "[t]he
judgement made by the EC investigators was that, in the circumstances of the investigation, given the
data in question and the significance of the outcome of the calculation relative [to] the size of the
dumping margin, the use of a key based on the 20 most-exported types was appropriate and
reasonable."
174The European Communities asserts that Brazil has not shown that a more expansive
methodology would have been more advantageous to Tupy. Brazil now submits to us a calculation --
on the basis of 40 types -- which it argues would have resulted in a more favourable amount for Tupy.
On this basis, Brazil contests the EC assertio n that there is no indication that its methodology
produced less favourable results than another methodology or the use of a complete data set. 175 We
are conscious of the constraints placed upon us by Article 17.5(ii). Tupy submitted no such
alternative methodology in the course of the underlying investigation.
7.176 We also asked the European Communities to identify the legal basis that permits or does not
preclude the use by an investigating authority of data from a representative selection of transactions or
the use of an "allocation key" for the purposes of calculating adjustments in an investigation ( not

166 See, for example, transparency letter, Exhibit BRL - 18, p. 5.
167 Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulatio n, Exhibit BRL-16, Annex II, p. 7. In the
questionnaire, Exhibit BRL-3, pp. 33-34, the European Communities asked for the following information: "List
all internal taxes imposed on the domestic market products which were either rebated upon exportation or not
collected on the products exported to the European Community." Tupy claimed no adjustment in its
questionnaire response specifically and explicitly in respect of PIS/COFINS.
168 E.g., Tupy's reply to the deficiency letter, Exhibit BRL-7, p. 3, C.1.1; Fifth submission of Tupy in
the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-17, points 2.7.2- 2.7.6.
169 Brazil has referred in these Panel proceedings to legislation that was not on the record of the
investigation in connection with this claim: Law 9363. Brazil has similarly provided a formulation relating to
the quantification of PIS/COFINS. (Brazil confirms that this is the case in response to Question 63 from the
Panel following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1). Pursuant to Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-dumping
Agreement, we are precluded from considering factual eviden ce that was not on the record of the underlying
investigation.
170 EC response to Panel Question 57 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3.
171 EC response to Panel Question 67 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3, para. 100.
172 Ibid.
173 EC response to Panel Question 8 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8.
174 Ibid.

involving "facts available" or "sam pling" within the meaning of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). The
European Communities drew our attention to Article 6.14.176
7.177 Article 6.14 refers to the "procedures set out above", which we take as a reference to the
procedures set out in Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As we understand that the EC is not
specifically basing its methodology in this instance upon any provision of Article 6 (in particular,
Articles 6.8 or 6.10) we do not believe that Article 6.14 is specifically applicable in this context.
7.178 An investigating authority must act in an unbiased, even-handed manner and must not
exercise its discretion in an arbitrary manner. This obligation also applies where an investigating
authority confronts practical difficulties and time constraints. We do not find, in Article 2.4, or in any
other relevant provision in the Agreement, any specific rules governing the methodology to be applied
by an investigating authority in calculating adjustments. In the absence of any precise textual
guidance in the Agreement concerning how adjustments are to be calculated, and in the absence of
any textual prohibition on the use of any particular methodology adopted by an investigating authority
with a view to ensuring a fair comparison, we consid er that an unbiased and objective authority could
have applied this methodology applied by the European Communities and calculated this adjustment
on the basis of the actual data in the record of this investigation. Moreover, Tupy had an opportunity
to substantiate its claimed adjustment.
7.179 Recalling that we are bound by our standard of review, we find that Brazil has not established
that the European Communities has breached its obligation to ensure a fair comparison under
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or its obligations under Article VI of the GATT 1994 by
the methodology it applied in calculating the PIS/COFINS adjustment.
7. Issue 7: advertising expenses (claims withdrawn)
7.180 Brazil withdraws its claims regarding advertising expenses under Issue 7.
177 We therefore do
not examine these claims.
8. Issue 8: packing costs
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.181 Brazil asserts that Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement obligates the investigating
authority, as opposed to the exporter, to ensure a fair comparison. Brazil alleges that, in breach of
Article 2.4, the European Communities wrongly deni ed Tupy an adjustment relating to greater
packing costs associated with domestic as compared to export sales: imposed an unreasonable burden
of proof on the Brazilian exporter and did not indicate to the Brazilian exporter what information was
necessary to ensure a fair comparison. According to Brazil, packing costs were allocated (essentially
on the basis of labour) 25% for export sales and 75% for domestic sales, and this reasonable
allocation key was provided to the EC investigating authorities, who could then have used the on-the-
spot verification exercise to assess the physical conditions for packing at the company itself.

176 See EC response to Panel question 9 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8. Article 6.14
states:
"6.14 The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member
from proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary
or final determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final
measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement."
177 Brazil's second written submission, para. 75.

7.182 The European Communities argues that, under Article 2.4, the primary responsibility for
justifying adjustments is on those claiming them. According to the European Communities, no data
were available in respect of Tupy either for pack ing materials or for working time that distinguished
between domestic and export sales. Tupy was unable to produce an allocation key for packing
expenses that it could show had been historically used for such expenses. The European
Communities denies that its officials ever denied invitations to view relevant evidence, and asserts
that -- in the questionnaire and in the verification letter -- it indicated the information that would be
necessary to ensure a fair comparison. For the European Communities, verification is essentially a
documentary exercise, and no documentary evidence supporting Tupy's request for an adjustment was
provided.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.183 The Panel recalls our earlier examination of the obligations imposed by Article 2.4.
178 In this
respect, we underline that we agree with the view of a previous panel that the obligation in Article 2.4
to make due allowances for differences that affect price comparability is intended to neutralize
differences in transactions that an exporter could be expected to have reflected in its pricing.
179 We
further recall that the requirement to make due allowance for such differences, in each case on its
merits, means that the authority must at least evaluate identified differences with a view to
determining whether or not an adjustment is required to maintain price comparability and to ensure a
fair comparison between normal value and export price under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and to then to make an adjustment where it determines this to be necessary on the basis of
this evaluation.
7.184 It is not disputed that packing costs may, in principle, be a difference affecting price
comparability for which an allowance must be granted in order to ensure a fair comparison of export
price and normal value under Article 2.4. Rather, the parties differ in their view of the nature of the
evidence that should be submitted in support of a cl aim for such an adjustment and whether it is the
investigating authority or the exporter that bears the burden of identifying and substantiating the
claimed adjustment.
7.185 Because the details relating to the exchange of information between Tupy and the EC
investigating authorities in the underlying investigation are critical to an understanding of Brazil's
claim, we begin by outlining the relevant developments in the underlying investigation.
7.186 The EC questionnaire
180 sent to Tupy contained precise instructions as to the nature of the
information requested in respect of packing costs in order to provide the basis for a fair comparison
between normal value and export price. In particular, the questionnaire directed Tupy to specify the
packing costs for the product concerned; to list material and labour costs separately; to describe
packing materials and any special or extraordinary procedures used in preparing the product
concerned for shipment to the European Communities; and to report the adjustment transaction-by-
transaction. Furthermore, the European Communities sent a letter to Tupy prior to the verification
181,
which stated, inter alia, "[y]ou are hereby requested to have all supporting documents available for
the investigation, including all worksheets used to prepare the reply for the questionnaire…" and "[i]f
you claimed in the reply to the questionnaire allowances…you should be prepared to justify these and
to have all relevant substantiating evidence readily available."

178 Supra, paras. 7.157-7.158 .
179 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea ("US – Stainless Steel "), WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001,
para. 6.77.
180 Questionnaire intended for exporting producers in exporting country, Exhibit BRL-3, Section G-
Allowances, Fair Comparison; G-1, Allowances on export sales and G-2 Allowances on domestic sales.
181 EC letter to Tupy concerning verification, Exhibit BRL-8.

7.187 In its questionnaire response, 182 Tupy claimed an allowance in respect of the difference
between the amounts of packing expenses betwee n the Brazilian and the EC markets. In its
submissions in the course of the EC investigatio n, Tupy asserted that its packaging costs in the
domestic market were greater than in the export ma rket and that an adjustment to the normal value
was therefore needed to ensure a fair comparison. 183 In particular, Tupy asserted, at the verification
visit, that packing costs were allocated (25%/75% ) in respect of labour used, because packing orders
for the domestic market required the use of three persons, whereas packing for export orders required
only one person. 184 Further, Tupy asserted, the packing process for products to be sold on the
domestic market involves the use of more boxes, of varying sizes. According to Tupy, these
differences could and should have been verified at the warehouse during the verification visit and an
adjustment should not be denied because the Commission abstained from verifying the packing
process.185
7.188 The European Communities rejected Tupy's cl aim for adjustment for packing in the
Provisional Regulation,186 and subsequently. The European Communities indicated that the reason for
the refusal was insufficient substantiating evidence for the cost estimate provided by Tupy, including
during verification, and that Tupy had not previously raised the issue of different packing materials.187
Tupy submitted further objections to the EC assertion that the European Communities had not been
provided with sufficient information during the verification visit substantiating the claim for a packing
adjustment.188 The European Communities maintained its re fusal to grant an allowance, on the basis
of its view that Tupy had not provided sufficient evidence.189
7.189 Against this factual background, we turn to Brazil's allegation that the European Communities
failed to indicate to Tupy what information was n ecessary in order to ensure a fair comparison within
the meaning of Article 2.4. We find ample indication of the European Communities' requests for
precise information and further objective substantiation in respect of the packing cost allowance
claimed by Tupy in the questionnaire and in subsequent communications with Tupy and record
documents.190 On the basis of these indications in the record of the investigation, we do not find that
the European Communities failed to indicate to Tupy the information that was necessary to ensure a
fair comparison. The chief difficulty identified by the European Communities in the investigation
was the lack of substantiation for the "allocation key" for packaging costs as submitted by Tupy. The
European Communities indicated that it considered Tupy's allocation key was not supported by
evidence191, that further objective substantiation was required, and that the allocation key “was

182 Exhibit BRL-4, G-2.6: “…Concerning … material we use direct materials applied on domestic and
foreign sales. Salaries were splited [ sic] according to work time spent. Those information [ sic] are available in
the accounting as “cost centre” of warehouse.”
183 e.g. First submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-5, paragraph 1.3.4, page 5.
184 Confidential Exhibit EC-17 indicates that during the verification visit, Tupy provided data that did
not distinguish between domestic and foreign sales concerning labour (or packing) costs.
185 Fourth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-13, page 38, para. 18.
186 Provisional Regulation, recital 44. “The exporting producer claimed an adjustment to the normal
value and to the export price for differences in pack ing costs. However, the company could not submit any
evidence showing such a difference and the Commission could therefore not grant the adjustment claimed.” See
also the Disclosure preceding the Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL- 11, Annex II, page 5.
187 Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16, Annex II, p. 6.
188 Fifth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-17, page 6., para. 2.6.1.
189 Transparency letter, Exhibit BRL-18, page 5.
190 E.g. questionnaire, Exhibit BRL-3; EC letter concerning verification, Exhibit BRL-7, Provisional
Regulation, recital 44; Disclosure preceding the Prov isional Regulation, Exhibit BRL- 11, Annex II, page 5;
Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16, Annex II, p. 6; Transparency letter, Exhibit
BRL-18, page 5.
191 Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation. See Brazil’s second written submission, para. 77
and EC response to Panel Question 77, para. 109.

completely at odds with any figure that could be derived from the volumes of sales on the domestic
and export markets”.192 This is an evaluation by the EC inve stigating authority with respect to the
facts before it. The record reflects that the European Communities evaluated the claim for adjustment
with a view to considering whether or not an ad justment was merited. We recall our standard of
review, which precludes us from substituting our judgment for that of the investigating authority.
7.190 We understand Brazil to reproach the European Communities for not having accepted Tupy's
"allocation key" and for not having attempted to verify the approach in the allocation key through
physical (i.e. non-documentary) inspection during the verification visit at the premises of Tupy. We
therefore examine whether the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 2.4 in not accepting, or in not verifying through non-documentary/physical means, the labour
cost "allocation key" submitted by Tupy in support of its request for adjustment for packing costs and
whether the European Communities imposed an unreasonable burden of proof upon Tupy.
7.191 We do not agree with Brazil's argument that Article 2.4 required the European Communities
to base the adjustment on a visual/physical inspection of the working activities and practices in the
packaging area at the company’s premises. Rather, we view verification as an essentially
“documentary” exercise that may be supplemented by an actual on-site visit. On-site verification is
provided for, but not mandated by, the Agreem ent. Thus, it would seem incongruous to require the
European Communities to use a methodology that would have necessitated substantiation through on-
site verification.
7.192 An essentially documentary approach to verification -- which focuses upon documented
support for claims for adjustment – seems to us to be entirely consistent with the nature of an anti-
dumping investigation193 and, is, indeed, critical for the purposes of dispute settlement and meaningful
Panel review under the DSU and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We recall that pursuant to the DSU
and Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, compliance by a Member with the obligations of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement is subject to review by a panel and the Appellate Body. 194 A
contemporaneous written record, including of evidence substantiating a claimed adjustment by an
interested party, is essential as a basis for such multilateral review. Moreover, in this particular case,
Tupy was given a clear indication of the EC intention to conduct a verification visit that was
predominantly documentary in nature.
195 In these circumstances, in particular, in light of the specific
information requested by the European Communities and the continued absence of any specific
documentary evidence for adjustment for packing costs on the record of the investigation
substantiating Tupy's claim for adjustment for pa cking costs forming part of the record of the
underlying investigation – for example, audited and confirmed historical data clearly distinguishing
between packing material or labour costs allocated to domestic and foreign sales -- we cannot find
that the European Communities violated its Article 2.4 obligations by not having granted a packing
cost adjustment or that it imposed an unreasonable burden of proof upon Tupy.
7.193 On the basis of these considerations, and recalling the standard of review we are bound to
apply to our examination of the matter before us, we find that Brazil has not established that the

192 EC response to Panel question 83 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3, para. 113.
193 Article 6.7 of the Anti-dumping Agreement , which deals with verification visits, states that
"authorities shall make the results of any such investiga tions available, or shall provide disclosure thereof … to
the firms to which they pertain and may make such results available to the applicants." This supports our view
that the nature of verification exercise is primarily documentary.
194 Article 3.2 of the DSU recognizes that: "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that
it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Me mbers under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law….". Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-dumping Agreement requires us to examine the matter on the
basis of the facts made available to the investigating authority.
195 EC letter concerning verification, Exhibit BRL-8.

European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by denying an adjustment with respect to packing costs, by failing to indicate to
Tupy what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison or by imposing an unreasonable
burden of proof on Tupy in respect of packing costs.
9. Issues 9 and 18: currency conversion and opportunities to see relevant information
(a) Issue 9: currency conversion for adjustments
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.194 Brazil alleges that the European Communities, in violation of Article 2.4.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement,, did not convert currencies using the rate of exchange on the date of sale in all
cases. In particular, the European Communities used the exchange rates on the date of sale for the
export invoice value but not for the allowances deducted from this value (for which monthly and daily
rates were used). Brazil also alleges that the European Communities violated Article 2.4 by using the
exchange rates selectively and increasing the nominal value of allowances deducted from export
transactions. In response to questioning, Brazil subsequently clarified that its claim is limited to the
exchange rates used in the currency conversions relating to adjustments.
196
7.195 The European Communities responds that Brazil provides no evidence in support of its
claim of violation of Ar ticle 2.4.1, but that Brazil instead argues that it never received an adequate
explanation of the exchange rates used in the currency conversions. The European Communities
states that, although it used monthly rates in the Provisional Regulation, in the Definitive Regulation it
mainly used daily exchange rates supplied by Tupy itself. In response to Panel questioning, the
European Communities clarifies that for the purpose of calculating most allowances (inland transport,
freight, insurance, charges, packing and other (publicity expenses), the European Communities used
the daily exchange rates used by Tupy for currency conversion. For three other allowances (credit
costs, warranty and commission), the European Communities used monthly rates as had been
suggested in the questionnaire.
197 According to the European Communities, the use of monthly
conversion rates led to smaller adjustments to the export price than the conversion at Tupy's exchange
rates, to Tupy's benefit. 198 The European Communities asserts that the obligation in Article 2.4.1 to
perform currency conversions using the rate of exchange on the date of sale refers to export sales
prices and not to conversions made for the purpose of adjustments.
(ii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.196 On the basis of the evolution in the parties' argumentation over the course of these
proceedings and the evidence submitted in support, the Panel understands Brazil to claim a violation
of Article 2.4.1 by the European Communities through the "selective" use of daily and monthly
exchange rates in making adjustments. Brazil states that although the conversion of the export
invoice values was based on daily exchange rates disclosed to Tupy, the conversion of allowances
was not.
199
7.197 We first consider whether Brazil has established that its claim falls within the scope of
Article 2.4.1, that is, whether Article 2.4.1 necessarily applies to the calculation of adjustments to
normal value and export price for the purposes of Article 2.4. Article 2.4.1 reads:

196 Brazil response to Panel question 12 following second Panel meeting, Annex E-7.
197 EC response to Panel question 88 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3.
198 EC response to Panel question 88 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3; and Exhibit EC-25.

2.4.1 When the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of
currencies, such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of
sale, provided that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly
linked to the export sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be
used. Fluctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the
authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted their export prices
to reflect sustained movements in exchange rates during the period of investigation.
(emphasis added, footnote omitted)
7.198 The reference in Article 2.4.1 that the currency conversion rules therein apply only "when the
comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of currencies" (emphasis added) is to the
comparison between the normal value and the export price is conducted under paragraph 4. The
references to "sale", "export sale" and "export prices" are a clear textual indication that the provision
refers to currency conversion in connection with the prices of export sales, rather than to any
conversion that may occur in the calculation of specific adjustments to either the normal value or the
export price.
7.199 Looking to the context of the provision, there is an explicit textual link to Article 2.4, which
imposes the general obligation that a "fair comparison" be made between export price and normal
value. This general obligation informs the other obligations in Article 2. 200 This supports our view
that the obligations concerning currency conversions in Article 2.4.1 do not apply to all conversions
made in order to calculate adjustments under Article 2.4.1—we can conceive of certain situations in
which differences affecting price comparability that might lead to an adjustment under Article 2.4
might not correspond precisely with the date of the export sale (e.g. credit and warranty expenses),
and where conversion of all currency data as at the date of export sale might therefore distort a fair
comparison. It is only once an investigating authority has made all necessary adjustments that it
progresses as necessary toward the “comparison” referred to in Article 2.4.1.
7.200 For these reasons, we find that Brazil has failed to establish that Article 2.4.1 provides a legal
basis for its claim concerning the currency conversions for adjustments.
201 We therefore do not
consider the merits of Brazil's claim under Article 2.4.1.
(b) Issue 18: opportunities to see relevant information
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.201 Brazil argues that the European Communities violated Article 6.4 by not providing, in the
course of the investigation, all of the exchange rates used in the currency conversions used in the
Definitive Regulation.202 The exchange rate tables disclosed by the European Communities203 did not
provide a conversion rate for the precise date, and the currency conversion rates used by the European
Communities insofar as they concerned conversions on certain pertinent dates as disclosed to Tupy
did not enable Tupy to determine the methodology applied. Consequently the European Communities
did not provide Tupy with timely opportunities to see all information that was relevant to the
presentation of its case, in violation of Article 6.4. Brazil indicates that it would withdraw this claim
if the European Communities admitted that all allowances were converted on the basis of monthly

200 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen , supra, note 148, para. 59.
201 To the extent that Brazil's allegations with respect to currency conversions have more to do with
allegedly inadequate disclosure by the European Communities of the basis of its currency conversion
calculations in the course of the investigation, we examine this issue under Article 6.4, infra, Issue 18.
202 Brazil clarified that its allegations relate only to the EC definitive measure. Thus, Article 17.4,
which relates to provisional measures, is not relevant. See Brazil’s responses to Panel questions 132 and 136
following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
203 Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16.

rates (as the European Communities would presumably have used the monthly rates indicated in the
questionnaire).
7.202 The European Communities argues that it never received a request from Tupy for the
monthly rates used in the Provisional Regulation, nor did Tupy object to the accuracy of the monthly
rates used. The table of daily exchange rates used in the Definitive Regulation was submitted by
Tupy, so it was perplexing for the European Communities to be accused of not having provided it.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.203 Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads:
6.4 The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for
all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their
cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the
authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis
of this information.
7.204 Article 6.4 therefore requires, whenever practicable, that investigating authorities provide
timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all (non-confidential) information that is relevant
to the presentation of their cases.
7.205 The European Communities used average monthly currency exchange rates in the Provisional
Regulation.
204 Tupy objected to the EC approach as being "misleading and inaccurate". 205 For the
Definitive Regulation, the European Communities revised its approach, indicating that it had, "…in
view of the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999, and in view of the alleged impact on the
dumping margin, now used the daily exchange rates as collected during the on-the-spot
verification".206 Following Tupy's expression that it would have appreciated it "had the Commission
provided it, in the context of the definitive disclosu re, with a table of the daily exchange rates that it
had 'collected during the on-the-spot verification'", 207 the European Communities attached to the
transparency letter a copy of the daily exchange rate table used for currency conversions.
7.206 Brazil argued before us that there were certain discrepancies in the exchange rate tables
disclosed by the European Communities, in particular concerning certain dates, and that the disclosed
information did not permit Tupy to determine the methodology applied with respect to exchange rate
conversion for those dates. In response to Panel questioning, the European Communities now
clarifies that for the purpose of calculating most allowances (inland transport, freight, insurance,
charges, packing and other (publicity expenses)), the European Communities used the daily exchange
rates used by Tupy as collected during the on-the-spot verification. However, for three other
allowances (credit costs, warranty and commission), the European Communities used monthly rates
"as had been suggested in the [q]uestionnaire".
208

204 The Disclosure preceding the Provisional Regula tion, Exhibit BRL-11, Annex II, page 4, states
"Tupy had used the exchange rates at the day of settlement to convert the currencies used for conversion into
Brazilian Real. In accordance with Article 2(10)(j) and corresponding to its normal practice, the Commission
Services re-converted the currencies used for export by using the exchange rates at the date of invoice (for
practical reasons, average monthly rates were used)…"
205 Fourth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL- 13.
206 Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16, Annex II, p. 5.
207 Fifth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL- 17, p. 6, para. 2.5.6.
208 EC response to Panel question 88 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3 and EC response to
Panel question 13 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8. The European Communities explains that it
resorted to monthly rates in the case of adju sting for credit costs, warranties and commissions inter alia as

7.207 The Panel understands Brazil's allegation of inconsistency with Article 6.4 is that the
European Communities did not disclose, in connection with the conversion of currencies for
adjustments in the Definitive Regulation, the "daily exchange rates as collected during the on-the-spot
verification". As a result, Tupy apparently experienced confusion as to the exchange rates applied in
the conversions for allowances, in part because at the stage of the Provisional Regulation, the
European Communities applied average monthly exchange rates, did not disclose consistent
information as to the currency conversions and did not provide the rates used nor the data source for
the information.
7.208 It is incumbent upon an investigating authorit y, in line with its obligations under the
Agreement, to achieve a certain required degree of transparency and certainty in an anti-dumping
investigation. However, we do not view information that is already in the possession of an interested
party and that has been submitted by an interested party to an investigating authority in the course of
an anti-dumping proceeding as information that an investigating authority must provide opportunities
for that same interested parties to see within the meaning of Article 6.4. This provision relates to
information that would not initially be in the possession of an interested party and would therefore be
unknown or unfamiliar to an interested party if it were not disclosed to that party in the course of an
investigation. We therefore do not find that the European Communities has violated Article 6.4 by
failing to provide timely opportunities for Tupy to see information relevant to the presentation of its
case with respect to exchange rate conversion for adjustments.
10. Issue 11: "Zeroing"
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.209 Brazil alleges that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by "zeroing" negative dumping margins calculated for some product
types of Brazilian origin exported to the European Communities. Brazil invokes the panel and
Appellate Body reports in EC-Bed Linen in support of its claim. Brazil disagrees with, and considers
irrelevant, the EC assertion that “zeroing” had a limited impact and is not significant in this case. For
Brazil, this practice resulted in an increase not only of the likelihood of a dumping determination but
also the magnitude of the margin of dumping. This application of an inherently unfair comparison
methodology was a violation of Article 2.4.
7.210 The European Communities asserts that the Definitive Regulation was adopted prior to the
adoption of the Appellate Body Report in EC-Bed Linen that upheld the panel's finding in that case
that the practice of "zeroing" constitutes a breach of Article 2.4.2. The European Communities admits
that it applied the practice of "zeroing" in the calculation of the dumping margin in this case.
However, it states that this practice had a relatively limited impact on the result (a dumping margin of
34.82% as opposed to 32.09%).
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.211 Chile asserts that the European Communities violated Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by zeroing negative dumping margins. Chile invokes the panel and Appellate Body
reports in EC-Bed Linen in support.
7.212 Japan submits that the European Communities violated Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by zeroing negative dumping margins for certain products. Japan invokes the
panel and Appellate Body reports in EC-Bed Linen in support. Japan submits that the European

Tupy's accounts did not contain transaction-specific data on these costs, Tupy had made no requests concerning
conversion rates for adjustments, the adjustments were relatively small and the use of monthly rates resulted a
slightly more favourable outcome for Tupy.

Communities has accordingly violated Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.213 The Panel examines Brazil's claim that the practice of zeroing applied by the European
Communities in the investigation constitutes a violation of Article 2.4.2. Article 2.4.2 provides:
“Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual
export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or
transaction-to-transaction comparison.”
7.214 The European Communities has admitted that it applied "zeroing"
209 in this case and, while it
submits that the practice had an insignificant impact on the dumping margin, it does not contest
Brazil's assertion that this practice has been found in other WTO dispute settlement cases to be a
violation of Article 2.4.2.210
7.215 In this investigation, the European Communities defined the product under consideration as:
"threaded malleable cast-iron tube or pipe fittings, which are joined by a screwing joining system,
falling within CN code ex 7307 19 10".
211 The European Communities also found that "malleable
fittings produced by the Community industry and sold on the Community market as well as malleable
fittings produced in the countries concerned and exported to the Community were like products, since
there were no differences in the basic physical and technical characteristics and uses of the existing
different types of malleable fittings.

209 The practice of zeroing has been described as follows (see, e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC- Bed
Linen, supra, note 148): first, the European Communities identified with respect to the product under
investigation, a certain number of different "models" or "types" of that product. Next, the European
Communities calculated, for each of these models, a weighted average normal value and a weighted average
export price. Then, the European Communities compared the weighted average normal value with the weighted
average export price for each model. For some models, normal value was higher than export price; by
subtracting export price from normal value for these models, the European Communities established a " positive
dumping margin" for each model. For other models, normal value was lower than export price; by subtracting
export price from normal value for these other models, the European Communities established a " negative
dumping margin" for each model. Having made this calculation, the European Communities then added up the
amounts it had calculated as "dumping margins" for each model of the product in order to determine an overall
dumping margin for the product as a whole . However, in doing so, the European Communities treated any
"negative dumping margin" as zero – hence the use of the word "zeroing". Then, having added up the "positive
dumping margins" and the zeroes, the European Communities divided this sum by the cumulative total value of
all the export transactions involving all types and models of that product. In this way, the European
Communities obtained an overall margin of dumping for the product under investigation.
210 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 31, indicates that: "According to Article 2(11) of
the basic Regulation, for each exporting producer, the we ighted average normal value by type was compared
with the weighted average export price". The European Communities therefore conducted a model-by-model
analysis in its dumping calculation. We do not understand Brazil to be contesting the consistency of such an
analysis per se.
211 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 9.

7.216 The European Communities did not fully take in to account the actual values pertaining to
certain export transactions in establishing the margin of dumping. We therefore find that the
European Communities violated Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to consider
the weighted average of "all comparable export transactions".
7.217 We find support for this finding in the EC-Bed Linen dispute, where the Appellate Body
upheld the panel's finding in that case that the practice of "zeroing" does not fully take into account
the prices of "all comparable transactions" as required by Article 2.4.2.
212
7.218 We do not find relevant, for the purposes of examining whether a violation of Articles 2.4 and
2.4.2 occurred, the EC assertion that the practice of "zeroing" had limited impact on the dumping
margin (2.73%) and is therefore of little significance. Regardless of the magnitude of its effects,
"zeroing" constitutes a violation of the obligations imposed by Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement per se.
To the extent that this EC argument relates to the issue of “nullification and impairment of benefits”
we examine it infra.
7.219 Having made this finding, we do not believe it is necessary to consider whether this also
constitutes a breach of the obligation to ensure a "fair comparison" under Article 2.4.
11. Issues 12 and 15: import volume trends and cumulation
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.220 Brazil argues that the European Communities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by failing to consider properly on the basis of "positive evidence" and after an
"objective examination" whether there had been a significant increase in dumped imports from Brazil
before proceeding to a cumulative analysis under Article 3.3. For Brazil, a positive injury
determination requires that there is either a volume or price effect, or both. 213 Brazil submits that the
volume analysis requires a consideration whether there has been an increase in the volume of imports
and a consideration whether the increase is "significant". Brazil submits that the data before the EC
authorities demonstrated that the volume of imports from Brazil actually decreased during the POI.
For Brazil, as the European Communities did not satisfy the requirements of Article 3.2, it was
prevented from making any findings under the subsequent paragraphs of Article 3.
7.221 With respect to the EC cumulative analysis, Brazil alleges that the European Communities
acted inconsistently with its obligations under: "Articles 3.1 and 3.3 to determine, on the basis of
“positive evidence” and after an “objective examination” that the cumulative assessment of the effects
of the dumped imports was appropriate, as it reversed the burden of proof and assumed in favour of
cumulative assessment; Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by not identifying, on the basis of “positive evidence”
and after an “objective examination”, that the dumped imports per each Member had the effects
which it then may assess cumulatively; Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by reducing the conditions of competition
determination to the like product determination under Article 2.6; Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by failing to
address, on the basis of “positive evidence” and after an “objective examination”, dissimilarities in the
conditions of competition such as the differences in the product concerned, the trends of import
volumes and prices, the level of trade and the segmentation of the market; and Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by
failing to determine, on the basis of “positive evidence” and after an “objective examination” that the
channels of distribution were “the same or similar."
214
7.222 The European Communities argues that Article 3.2 does not require positive findings on
both (or either) of the factors mentioned in Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (significant

212 Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen, supra, note 148, para. 55.

volume increase and significant price undercutting, depression or suppression) before an injury
determination can be made. Nor does it require that the investigating authorities actually record the
results of their consideration as to whether there had been a significant increase. In the EC view,
when the rules on cumulation in Article 3.3 have been properly invoked, the obligations in Article 3.2
apply to all cumulated imports taken together and there is no need to consider volume and price
effects under Article 3.2 on a country-by-country basis. In any event, the European Communities
submits that the EC authorities did effectively consider the issue of significant volume increase of
imports from Brazil in isolation. The European Communities argues that the investigating authorities
may cumulate imports when considering whether there has been significant price undercutting under
Article 3.2, but that, in any event, the European Communities also considered whether there had been
a significant increase in imports from Brazil in isolation. Moreover, the EC decision to cumulate was
consistent with Article 3.3 in light of the “comparable” conditions of competition present between
imports from Brazil and other third countries, as well as between imports from Brazil and the product
concerned.
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.223 The United States agrees with the European Communities that it is not necessary for an
individual authority to consider the significance of the volume and price effects of imports from each
individual subject country before it may cumulate imports under Article 3.3.
215 The plain language of
Article 3.3, which sets out specific criteria for conducting a cumulative analysis, contradicts Brazil's
argument. Given the specific textual prerequisites for cumulation, there is no basis for Brazil’s
argument that Article 3.3 imposes other unmentioned prerequisites for cumulation. The United States
agrees with the European Communities that Article 3.2 requires only that the investigating authorities
consider the volume and price effects of the dumped imports. Since it is not even necessary to find
significant volume and price effects in order to reach an overall affirmative injury determination, there
is no basis in the Agreement for Brazil to argue that these findings are somehow necessary where an
investigating authority is considering whether to undertake a cumulative assessment.
7.224 The United States disagrees with Brazil that the "conditions of competition" provision
requires a similarity in significant import volume and price effects trends over the IP. Members have
discretion under Article 3.3 to develop appropriate criteria and analytical frameworks for assessing
whether cumulation is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition among imports and
between imports and the domestic like product. However, those criteria and analyses must bear a
reasonable relationship to the inquiry into whether the various products compete in the domestic
market of the importing Member. Isolating one's focus on a comparison or identification of
similarities in import and price trends falls short of addressing the competition inquiry.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
(i) Article 3.1
7.225 The Panel first recalls that Article 3.1 sets forth an overarching obligation that informs the
other paragraphs of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.1 states:
3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be
based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the
volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on
domestic producers of such products.

215 US oral statement, Annex D-6, para. 12.

7.226 The term "positive evidence" relates to the quality of the evidence upon which the authorities
may rely in making a determination. The word "positive" may be understood as meaning that the
evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.
While the term "positive evidence" focuses on the facts underpinning and justifying the injury
determination, the term "objective examination" is concerned with the investigative process itself.
We see the term "examination" as relating to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into
and, subsequently, evaluated. Thus, this term relates to the conduct of the investigation generally.
The qualifying term, "objective", indicates that the "examination" process must conform to the
dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. We understand that an
"objective examination" requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group
of interested parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an
"objective examination" recognises that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any
lack thereof, of the investigative process.
 216
(ii) Article 3.2
7.227 We examine Brazil’s claims with respect to “cu mulation”. In the underlying investigation,
Tupy contested "cumulation" on the basis of differences in import pricing and import volume (both
absolute and relative to domestic market share) between Brazilian imports and imports from other
countries concerned, as well as between Brazilian imports and the EC product. The European
Communities nevertheless cumulated the effect of imports from multiple countries (in particular,
those from Brazil, Czech Republic, Japan, China, Korea and Thailand) in its injury analysis.
217
7.228 We understand Brazil to argue that the requirements of Article 3.2 must be satisfied on a
country-by-country basis as a precondition for cumulation. Brazil denies the propriety of
"cumulation" in this case, arguing that an analysis of trends in the imports from Brazil in isolation
shows that, in fact, imports from Brazil decreased during the IP. For Brazil, there was no "significant
increase" in volume of imports from Brazil within the meaning of Article 3.2 and this precludes the
possibility to cumulate under Article 3.3.
7.229 The European Communities, by contrast, stresses that provided the conditions of Article 3.3
are fulfilled, the investigating authority may conduct a cumulative analysis of volume and price
effects under Article 3.2, and is not first required to conduct a country-by-country assessment under
Article 3.2.
7.230 The parties therefore differ in their interpretation of the legal obligations in Article 3.2 (in
particular, the interpretation of the obligation to "consider whether there has been a significant
increase in dumped imports") and in their views of the legal relationship between this obligation
under Article 3.2 and the possibility of conducting a cumulative assessment of the effects of imports

216 We refer to Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 40, paras. 192-193.
217 The relevant part of the Definitive Regulation reads: "…the investigation has confirmed that the
conditions of cumulation, as set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, are met since for all the countries
concerned dumping margins above the de minimis level and volume of the imports negligible have been found.
Furthermore, as concerns the conditions of competition between, on the one hand, the imported products and, on
the other hand, the imported products and the like Community product, these were found to be comparable.
Indeed, the investigation showed that, in all cases, the imported products and those of the Community industry
have the same physical and technical characteristics, that the pricing trends are similar, significantly
undercutting the Community industry's prices, and that all imported products as well as the Community-
produced products are sold through the same or similar channels of distribution. …"

of a product from more than one country that are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping
investigations under Article 3.3. 218
7.231 The threshold issue that we must address is how the obligations in Article 3.2 and 3.3
interrelate, and in particular, whether an investig ating authority is permitted to conduct a cumulative
assessment relating to the effect of dumped imports from different sources if it concludes that the
requirements of Article 3.3 are fulfilled or must first conduct an assessment of imports from each
individual source under Article 3.2 in order to determine whether it may conduct a cumulative
assessment at all. Here, we observe that, if the requirements concerning the decision whether or not
cumulate are contained exclusively in Article 3.3 (and Article 3.1), the European Communities would
be under no obligation to consider individual countries' volume and price trends with respect to
imports from Brazil in isolation prior to or in conjunction with its cumulative analysis. Rather, a
cumulative analysis allows the consideration under Article 3.2 of the volume of cumulated imports
under investigation, as opposed to individual countries' imports. Brazil’s arguments concerning the
need to examine trends of imports from individual countries would therefore have no legal relevance.
Under this approach, the Article 3.2 analysis of price undercutting and price effects would effectively
occur subsequently to the Article 3.3 cumulation determination. If the European Communities’
finding that cumulation was appropriate and met the standards of Article 3.3, then it was consistent
for the European Communities to consider the significance of price undercutting and other price
effects for imports from all cumulated countries. This, of course, depends upon the interpretation of
the criteria in Article 3.3. We must, therefore conduct an analysis of the elements in Article 3.3,
recalling that Article 3.3 permits cumulation only under certain enumerated circumstances.
7.232 Our analysis of this issue begins with the language of the provision itself. Article 3.3. states:
"3.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously
subject to anti-dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively
assess the effects of such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of
dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de
minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of imports from each
country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports
is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products
and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like
domestic product."
7.233 Article 3.3 provides for cumulative assessment of the effects of the dumped imports of a
product from different sources and explicitly identifies the criteria that must be fulfilled in order to do
so. Under this provision, an investigating authority may proceed to a cumulative analysis only if:
1. Dumping margins for each individual country are more than de minimis; 2. the volume of imports
from each country is not negligible; and 3. a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is
appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions
of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.
7.234 Brazil argues that the price and volume considerations under Article 3.2 are essential to
inform an investigating authority of the underlying conditions of competition under which the dumped
imports are competing with each other and with the like domestic product. 219 We therefore

218 We do not understand Brazil to contest that the conditions of 3.3(a) are fulfilled -- i.e. the margin of
dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in
paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible.
219 Brazil second written submission, paragraph 190.

understand Brazil to argue that Article 3.3 requires an investigating authority to conduct the
Article 3.2 analysis on an individual country-by-country basis in considering whether cumulation is
justified under Article 3.3. We disagree. Article 3.3 indeed contains a condition requiring attention to
the “volume” of imports. The obligatory condition contained in Article 3.3 with respect to the volume
of imports from individual countries is that the volume of such imports must not be negligible. Thus,
an investigating authority may not cumulate imports that are individually found to be of negligible
volume (and, indeed, the provisions of Article 5.8 concerning termination would presumably apply).
This is the only explicit reference to “volume” in the text of Article 3.3. We find no other express
references relating to volume in Article 3.3 and declin e to read into the treaty text terms that are not
there. In particular, the text of this provision contains no additional requirement that authorities shall
also consider whether there has been a significant increase in imports country-by-country before
progressing to a cumulative assessment. Ind eed, such a requirement would undermine the very
concept of a cumulative analysis. We therefore consider that there are no other, additional, mandatory
obligations relating to the assessment of import vo lumes in Article 3.3 flowing from the text of the
provision.
7.235 We find contextual support for our view that, contrary to Brazil’s argument, an Article 3.2
analysis of individual countries' volume and price is not necessary as a pre-condition for cumulation
in other provisions of Article 3, and that the “effects” that may be considered cumulatively post-
cumulation include the volume and price effects referred to in Article 3.2. Article 3.3 refers to
circumstances under which an investigating authority may "cumulatively assess the effects of such
imports…" (emphasis added) The provision therefore focuses upon the assessment of effects of
imports. Article 3.2 refers to "the effect of the dumped imports on prices" (emphasis added).
Article 3.2 does not utilise the term "effects" with regard to volume, nor does Article 3.1, which refers
in paragraph (a) to volume and price effects of imports and, in paragraph (b), to the "consequent
impact" of the volume and price effects of imports. However, Article 3.4 calls for an examination of
"the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic indu stry". Read in the context of Article 3 as a
whole, it is clear that the term “effects” as used in Article 3.3 refers to volume and price effects, as
well as the impact of imports on the domestic industry. This interpretation is confirmed by reference
to Article 3.5, which refers to the “effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 ”. (emphasis
added) These considerations support our view that both the volume and price analyses required under
Article 3.2 constitute consideration of the effects of dumped imports which could qualify under
Article 3.3 for cumulative assessment.
7.236 Brazil's claim that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article 3.3 by
improperly cumulating the effects of dumped imports and its claim that the European Communities
failed to consider under Article 3.2 whether there had been a significant increase in the volume of
dumped imports from Brazil are inextricably linked. In particular, Brazil's claim under Article 3.2 is
predicated on the assumption that the European Communities was obligated to examine the volume of
dumped imports on a country-by-country basis. Ho wever, we have found that Brazil's claim with
respect to cumulation of the effects of dumped imports did not prevail. Given our disposition of
Brazil's claim concerning cumulation, we therefore do not consider it necessary to address Brazil's
claim that the European Communities had failed to establish that there had been a significant increase
in the volume of dumped imports from Brazil alone.
(iii) Article 3.3(b): “appropriate” in light of the “conditions of competition”
7.237 We examine the nature and scope of the requirement in Article 3.3(b) that a cumulative
assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and
the like domestic product.
7.238 One of the conditions in Article 3.3 is that an investigating authority may only conduct a
cumulative assessment of the effects of imports if it "determine[s]" that such a cumulative assessment

is “appropriate" in light of the "conditions of competition". We examine each of these textual
elements in turn.
7.239 The ordinary meaning of the word “determine” is to “find out or establish precisely” or to
“decide or settle”. 220 We agree with Brazil that the requirement to make a “determination” that
cumulation is appropriate precludes an investig ating authority from simply assuming that the
cumulative assessment is appropriate. 221 Rather, an investigating authority must consider the facts
before it and make a reasoned finding that cumulation is appropriate on the basis of the particular
circumstances. In this regard, we do not accept the argument of Brazil that the European
Communities has simply presumed that cumulation is appropriate. We discern from the Provisional
and Definitive Regulations that the European Communities has considered that facts before it and
determined that cumulation is appropriate.222
7.240 The ordinary meaning of the term "appropriat e" refers to something which is "especially
suitable or fitting". 223 "Suitable", in turn, is defined as "fitted for or appropriate to a purpose,
occasion…" 224 or "adapted to a use or purpose".225 "Fitting" is defined as "of a kind appropriate to the
situation".226 Based on the plain meaning of the term, cumulation must be fitting in the particular
case. While the term "appropriate" therefore requires that a decision be made that is adapted to -- and
is indeed made in light of -- the precise situation in question and the facts on the record of the
investigation before the investigating authority, it does not in and of itself say anything specifically
about the exact conditions of competition that must exist in order to justify a decision to cumulate.
Rather, the concept of "appropriateness" is used. The term is consistent with an intent not to prejudge
what the circumstances might be in the context of a given case. It is necessary for such
appropriateness to be judged on a case by case basis, particularly as the number of countries' imports
subject to investigation may vary. There is an element of flexibility, in that there are no
predetermined rigid factors, indices, levels or requirements.
7.241 Moreover, the language of the provision makes it clear to us that it is for the investigating
authority to determine whether cumulation is "appropr iate". In light of the general wording of the
provision and the nature of the term "appropriate", an investigating authority enjoys a certain degree
of discretion in making that determination on the basis of the record before it. However, it is clear to
us that cumulation must be suitable or fitting in the particular circumstances of a given case in light of
the particular conditions of competition extant in the marketplace.
7.242 We understand the phrase "conditions of competition" to refer to the dynamic relationship
between products in the marketplace.
227 The phrase “conditions of competition” in Article 3.3 is not
accompanied by any sort of qualifier (for example, “identical” or “similar”). The term is unqualified.
While we note that a broadly parallel evolution and a broadly similar volume and price trend might
well indicate that imports may appropriately be cumulated, we find no basis in the text of the

220 Oxford English Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1991).
72.
223 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994). See e.g. Decision by the Arbitrator, United States
– Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement ("US – FSC ( Article 22.6 – US) "),
WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, paras. 5.9 ff.
224 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).
225 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).
226 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).
227 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Korea –
Alcoholic Beverages "), WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:1, 3, para.
114.

Agreement for Brazil’s assertion that “only a comparable evolution and a similarity of the
significantly increased import volumes and/or the significant price effects…would indicate that these
imports might have a joint impact on the situation of the domestic industry and may be assessed
cumulatively”. Moreover, the provision contains no express indicators by which to assess the
“conditions of competition”, much less any fixed rules dictating precisely and exhaustively the
relative percentages or levels of such indicators th at must be present. Unlike the lists of factors that
guide an authority’s examination under, for example, Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, Article 3.3 does not
provide even an indicative list of factors that might be relevant in the assessment called for under that
provision, in particular, the assessment of “conditions of competition”. 228 We note that Article 3.2
explicitly concentrates on volume and price trends, and that Article 3.3 is neither specific nor limited
in this way. Thus, while price and volume considerations may well be relevant in this context, we
find no explicit reference thereto in Article 3.3(b). We further examine price and volume
considerations in this specific case below.
7.243 The overarching obligation in Article 3.1 applies also to the determination made in Article
3.3, requiring an investigating authority to base its determination of appropriateness to cumulate on an
"objective examination" of “positive evidence”. On this basis, we proceed to our analysis of Brazil’s
claims with respect to the cumulative assessment conducted by the European Communities.
7.244 Brazil has focused its challenge concerning the “conditions of competition” in this dispute on
four elements in the EC cumulation determination—the consideration of the imported and domestic
product, volume, price and channels of distribution. In particular, Brazil alleges breaches by the
European Communities of Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by reducing the conditions of competition
determination to the like product determination under Article 2.6; Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by failing to
address, on the basis of “positive evidence” and after an “objective examination”, dissimilarities in the
conditions of competition like the differences in the product concerned, the trends of import volumes
and prices, the level of trade and the segmentation of the market; and Articles 3.1 and 3.3 by failing to
determine, on the basis of “positive evidence” and af ter an “objective examination” that the channels
of distribution were the same or similar."
a. Like product definition
7.245 Brazil asserts that the EC analysis of conditions of competition is a "tautology" and no more
than a repetition of the EC "like product" analysis. For Brazil, the European Communities approach
leads to the conclusion that Article 3.3(b) has no effect as the test required under the said article is
only a repetition of the test under Article 2.6, and that this is against the principle of effective treaty
interpretation. Brazil argues that the European Communities did not conduct an objective
examination of the conditions of competition (such as the issues of different products (black heart vs.
white heart), different pricing strategies and market segmentation).
7.246 Article 2.6 sets out the definition of "like product" for the purposes of the Agreement, as
follows:
Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be
interpreted to mean a product which is identi cal, i.e. alike in all respects to the
product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product

228 In this regard, we take note of Exhibits EC-8 through 11 containing submissions made by certain
Members as part of discussions in the Ad Hoc Group on Implementation within the ADP Committee, which we
observe reflect somewhat divergent practices of Members. These discussions show, at a minimum, that price
and volume are not accepted by all Members as appropriate indicators of the “conditions of competition” (as
they arguably reflect the outcome of competition and not whether competition is occurring). It appears,
therefore, that Members themselves have not yet arrived at a common understanding of the content of these
terms. Indeed, we note that this is a topic which has been proposed for negotiations and it is not our task to
presuppose the outcome of those negotiations.

which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those
of the product under consideration.
7.247 We emphasise that Article 2.6 establishes the like product for the purposes of the entire
investigation. Thus, an investigating authority is required to keep the like product consistent in its
dumping and injury determinations.
7.248 Article 3.3(b) explicitly requires an examination of the conditions of competition not only
between the imported products from different sources but also between the imported products and the
like domestic products. We understand that the reference in Article 2.6 to "the product under
investigation" parallels the reference in Article 3.3(b) to "the imported products". It is therefore
natural that an injury investigation would focus upon the like product and the relationship in the
domestic marketplace between the like product and the imported product concerned. We therefore
examine whether the European Communities maintained this consistency in its investigation.
7.249 In its assessment of the conditions of competition in the context of its cumulation
determination, the European Communities submits to us that its practice, which it asserts it applied
also in this case, is to examine the following criteria: like product finding; the significance of the
import volume level; the development and level of the prices of imports and their undercutting or not
of the Community industry; and similarity of sales channels.229 The Definitive Regulation specifically
addresses arguments made by Tupy in the investigation with respect to the "conditions of
competition",230 which refer to volume and price trends as well as channels of distribution and market
perception. In confirming the provisional decision on cumulation, the general conclusion on
cumulation in the Definitive Regulation, in the contex t of conditions of competition, states that the
imported products and those of the Community i ndustry have "the same physical and technical
characteristics" that the pricing trends are "s imilar, significantly undercutting the Community
industry's prices, and that all imported products as well as the Community-produced products are sold
through the same or similar channels of distribution….". These passages indicate to us that the
European Communities examined the relationship in the marketplace between the product produced
by the Community industry and the imported product under consideration. This formed the basis of
its investigation of conditions of competition.
7.250 Having defined the like product and the product concerned as it did for the purposes of this
investigation, the European Communities was bound to conduct its injury investigation on this basis.
This is not a question of redundancy or “tautology”, as suggested to us by Brazil, but rather one of
required consistency for the purposes of the dumping and injury determination. In addition, the
European Communities specifically examined Brazil's allegations with respect to the "variants of the
product concerned", price and market considerations, and reached specific determinations on each of
these factors.
7.251 On the basis of these considerations, we consider that Brazil has not established that the
European Communities violated its obligations in relation to cumulation under Articles 3.3 and 3.1 in
this manner.
b. Volume
7.252 Brazil's allegation with respect to import volume and cumulation focuses on dissimilarities in
import volume trends, in both absolute and relative terms, between imports from Brazil and other
countries concerned. Brazil asserts that the requirements of Article 3.2 must be satisfied on a country-
by-country basis for the exporting countries as a pre-condition for cumulation, as Article 3.2

230 Definitive Regulation, paras 72-75.

considerations are essential to inform an investigating authority of the manner in which dumped
imports compete with each other and with the like domestic product. According to Brazil, the
differing import volumes and market shares indicate that the imports concerned were not competing
on the same or at least very similar terms. Th e European Communities contends that there is no
requirement in the Agreement to give close attention to import volume trends when considering
cumulation, and that its examination of import volu mes was, in any case, sufficient to meet the
requirements of Articles 3.3 and 3.1.
7.253 As we observed earlier, the text of Article 3.3 contains no specific mandatory factors that are
required elements in the “conditions of competition” analysis. Given that the text of Article 3.3(b)
contains no explicit reference to any particular factors or indicators by which to assess the conditions
of competition, including, in particular, no explicit reference to import volume trends – let alone
identical or similar import volume trends – we find no basis in the text for Brazil’s argument and do
not consider that an investigating authority is required to conduct a country-by-country import
volume examination as a precondition for deciding whether or not a cumulative assessment is
appropriate within the meaning of the “conditions of competition” element of Article 3.3(b). While a
parallel increase or decrease in volume of imports from various sources may well indicate competition
among these imports, it will not necessarily do so: products with non-parallel volume trends may also
be competing in certain circumstances.
7.254 The facts on the record of the investigation indicate that the volume of imports from Brazil
was 4,188 tonnes in the IP, corresponding to a 6.9% share of the market. The EC investigating
authority qualified this as "substantial" and "far from negligible". Brazil argues that the European
Communities based its decision with respect to volume on the appraisal that this was "far from being
negligible".
7.255 This statement was not the only one pertaining to import volumes made by the EC
investigating authority in the context of determining that cumulation was "appropriate". In examining
the conditions of competition between Brazilian imports and imports from other countries concerned,
the European Communities also examined the relati ve trends in the development and level of the
volume of imports.231 We discern from the determination that the EC investigating authority collected
and examined import volume data in the context of its Article 3.3 determination and that it examined
the trend of Brazilian imports relative to those of other countries, and observed certain divergences in
those relative trends. However, as we have already stated, the Agreement does not impose a
requirement of identity or similarity in import volume trends as a pre-condition for cumulation.
7.256 In light of the EC examination of import trends on the basis of the information on the record
of the investigation, we do not find that the EC treatment of import volumes as part of its cumulation
determination violates Article 3.3 or Article 3.1.
c. Price
7.257 Brazil's allegation with respect to pricing and cumulation focuses on dissimilarities in trends
of import prices, in particular, from the Czech Re public and China, in relation to those of Brazil.
Brazil submits that the European Communities improperly cumulated and that this was not on the
basis of an objective examination of positive evidence.
7.258 We take note of Brazil's arguments that a cumulative assessment of price effects cannot
reasonably be supposed to be appropriate where th e price of imports from Brazil is 44% higher than
from China and 22% higher than from the Czech Republi c, particularly in light of the increase in the
volume of imports from these countries over the IIP and the "aggressive" competition between these

231 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 140-144; Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19,
recitals 70-75, 85.

imports and the EC product. We further note Brazil's arguments that the European Communities
failed to comply with the requirement of an obje ctive examination by refraining from applying its
finding of "price sensitivity" in the context of its cumulation determination; that the European
Communities failed to conduct an objective examination as it only dealt with pricing trends in its
disclosures in relation to the extent of price increases and decreases year on year and at no stage does
it consider the "fundamental and highly significant" differences in pricing structure as between each
of the countries concerned over the course of the IIP other than to say that "Brazilian prices,
throughout the IIP, were above the prices of the Czech Republic, China, Korea and Thailand and
below the prices found for Japan"; and that th e European Communities has failed to examine the
implications of Tupy's membership in EMAFIDA, the European malleable fittings association.
7.259 We recall our earlier statement that Article 3.3 contains no express indicators by which to
assess the “conditions of competition”, much less any fixed rules dictating precisely the relative
percentages or levels of such indicators that must be present. The provision does not contain any
guidance concerning whether or how pricing should or must be examined as part of the conditions of
competition element of a cumulation determination, and does not set out any requirement that "price
sensitivity" and differences in pricing structure are a required component of a conditions of
competition analysis under Article 3.3. While a parallel increase or decrease in price of imports from
various sources may well indicate competition among these imports, it will not necessarily do so:
products with non-parallel price trends may also be competing in certain circumstances.
7.260 The European Communities addressed pricing in the Disclosure preceding the Definitive
Regulation, finding that Brazilian prices, throughout the IIP, were above the prices of the Czech
Republic, China, Korea and Thailand and below the prices found for Japan. The European
Communities stated that the evolution of prices showed that between 1995 and 1996 all prices of
imports from the countries concerned went up (except for Japan and China with a slight decline), that
they slightly increased between 1996 and 1997 (except for the Czech Republic and Brazil which
decreased), all prices again going down betwee n 1997 and 1998, (except for China which remained
stable) whereas between 1998 and the IP in some cases they increased (Brazil, Japan, and more
considerably, Thailand), in one case slightly decreased (China) and in one case remained stable
(Czech Republic). The European Communities found that Brazilian prices had, on the basis of the
export transactions made during the IP, considerably undercut the prices of the Community industry
during the IP by around 40%, whereas the undercutting found for the other countries concerned
ranges from between around 16% (Japan) to 68% (China). On this basis, the European Communities
concluded that, “although the prices of the Brazilian imports and of the imports from the other
countries concerned were not in all cases identical during the IIP, which is not required by the Basic
Regulation, the difference among them was not such as to justify a non cumulative assessment.”
7.261 The data on the record of the investigation largely bears out the EC statement that between
1996 and the IP the prices of exports originating in Brazil "almost continually decreased". A 2%
increase between 1998 and the IP, nor that average prices of imports from Brazil were 6% higher
from 1996 to the IP than in 1995, renders the EC examination as reflected in this statement not
objective and not based on positive evidence. An unbiased and objective authority could have made
this finding on the basis of the evidence on the record.
7.262 On the basis of the above considerations, and in light of the explanations offered by the
European Communities in its determination, we do not find that the European Communities violated
its obligations under Article 3.3 or 3.1 in respect of its treatment of pricing or of price sensitivity in its
conditions of competition determination.

d. Channels of distribution
7.263 Brazil alleges that the European Communities violated Article 3.3 and 3.1 in its treatment of
channels of distribution in the context of its cumulation determination because its statement that all of
the countries concerned operate within the same or similar channels of distribution is not based on an
objective examination of positive evidence. Brazil observes that the record as disclosed to date does
not demonstrate that the European Communities found what it alleges to have found concerning
similarity in channels of distribution, in particular, in light of the fact that the European Communities
granted, in the context of the dumping determination, an adjustment to normal value because OEM
exports were made at a different level of trade.
7.264 The Definitive Regulation states:
"All the countries concerned operate within the same or similar channels of distribution , as
confirmed by the fact that some traders imported or purchased the product under
consideration from both various countries concerned and the Community producers."
232
7.265 Article 3.3 does not expressly require that "levels of trade" are a component of a conditions of
competition analysis. Nor does it contain any guidance concerning how levels of trade should be
examined as part of the conditions of competition element of a cumulation determination. This is in
stark contrast to the provisions of Article 2 concerning the dumping determination and, in particular,
to Article 2.4, which requires due allowance to be made for differences in level of trade in order to
ensure a fair comparison between the normal value and export price. Furthermore, unlike a dumping
determination that compares prices in the markets of the exporting and importing Member, an injury
analysis focuses rather on how the importing and domestic products compete in the importing
Member's market. Thus, the fact that the Eu ropean Communities granted an allowance in the
dumping determination would not necessarily mean that levels of trade need be taken into account in
the same way in the conditions of competition aspect of a cumulation analysis.
233 An unbiased and
objective authority could have made this finding on the basis of the evidence on the record.
7.266 In light of these considerations, we do not find that the European Communities violated its
obligations under Article 3.3 or 3.1 in respect of its treatment of channels of distribution in its
cumulation determination.
(iv) Conclusion concerning Article 3.3(b)
7.267 We have found that the phrase “conditions of competition” in Article 3.3 contains no express
indicators by which to assess the “conditions of competition”, much less any fixed rules dictating the
relative percentages or levels of such indicators that must be present, or even any indicative
guidelines.
234 Thus, there is, at a minimum, no express requirement in the phrase “conditions of
competition” to examine volume and price effects. We have examined each of the four elements
forming the foundation for the EC determination that a cumulative assessment was appropriate in this
case and challenged by Brazil (like product definition; volume; price; channels of distribution). 235
While Brazil has clearly come to a different conclusion, we recall our standard of review and consider
that an unbiased and reasonable authority could have determined that cumulation was appropriate in

232 Definitive Regulation, BRL-19, recital 73.
233 The Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation indicates that the European Communities
granted an adjustment to normal value for differences in levels of trade with regard to sales made to an OEM EC
purchaser, on the basis that "the company did not sell on its domestic market to OEM customers". Exhibit BRL-
16, p. 7.
234 We recall again that Members have not arrived at a common understanding of, and indeed are
currently discussing, the nature of the obligations in Article 3.3(b). See supra, note 228.
235 We refer to our findings supra, paras. 7.251, 7.256, 7.262 and 7.266.

the circumstances of this case. We therefore conclude that the European Communities has not
violated its obligations under Article 3.3 with respect to cumulation.
12. Issue 13: no proper consideration of price undercutting
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.268 Brazil argues that the European Communities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement as it failed properly to consider, on the basis of positive evidence, whether
Brazilian imports had significantly undercut the prices of the like product in the European
Communities. Brazil submits that the European Communities’ consideration of price undercutting did
not relate to the “dumped imports”, in terms of Article 3.2, as the European Communities calculated
the undercutting margin only in respect of “an unwarranted selection” of transactions where it found
undercutting (and disregarding or "zeroing" negative undercutting margins) and where there was a
corresponding product type produced in the European Communities. Moreover, Brazil asserts that as
the "manipulative" EC methodology increases not on ly the likelihood of a determination of price
undercutting, but also its magnitude, it is inherently unfair and does not constitute an "objective
examination" under Article 3.1.
236
7.269 The European Communities argues that Brazil’s allegations would call for a mechanical
application to Article 3.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement of the interpretation of Article 2.4.2 made in
EC – Bed Linen. However, in the EC view, there are significant differences in these provisions which
militate against such a mechanical application. In any event, according to the European Communities,
the practical result of “zeroing” in the price undercutting analysis in this case was de minimis (0.01%).
The European Communities also submits that Brazil's allegation concerning the limitation of the
calculation of undercutting to directly comparable types is groundless and was not made during the
course of the investigation. Article 3 contains no precise obligations relating to how an investigating
authority is to conduct a price undercutting analysis, and the EC analysis took into account over 60%
of Tupy's exports to the European Communities by volume and over 70% by value.
(b) Arguments of the third parties
7.270 The United States agrees with the European Communities that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
does not prescribe any particular methodology for addressing whether “there has been a significant
price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the
importing Member.” In the absence of any such prescription, the investigating authorities may make
price comparisons by any methodology that assures an unbiased and objective examination. In
particular, nothing in Article 3.2 requires investigat ing authorities, in considering the significance of
undercutting, to apply the methodology set out in Article 2 for determining dumping and dumping
margins. The purposes and obligations addressed in each of these provisions are distinct and there is
no basis in the text of the Agreement to treat them interchangeably.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.271 Brazil bases its claim on Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the requirements of
"objective examination" and "positive evidence" in Article 3.1. Our analysis of this claim begins with
the text of Article 3.2. It states:
"3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the

236 Brazil response to Panel question 86 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.

importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the
investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of
the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress
prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily
give decisive guidance."
7.272 It is clear to us that the European Communities has considered price undercutting by dumped
imports from Brazil, in that it has examined the exis tence and extent of such price undercutting. It is
apparent from the Provisional and Definitive Regulations that the EC investigating authority has given
attention to and taken into account whether there has been significant price undercutting by the
dumped imports.
7.273 Brazil's allegations, however, concern the manner in which the European Communities
considered price undercutting, and the methodology applied. We therefore examine Brazil's
allegation that the EC's consideration of price undercutting, applying a methodology involving a
"zeroing" of sales at "non-undercutting" prices was not based on "positive evidence" and did not
constitute an "objective examination" within the meaning of Article 3.1. We recall the text and our
discussion of that provision, supra.
7.274 With respect to the requirement of posit ive evidence, the EC undercutting methodology
compared, for each type of malleable fittings, the weighted average ex-works prices of the
Community producers to the weighted average export prices of each exporting producer concerned.
On this basis, “the undercutting margins found per country, expressed as a percentage of the
Community industry prices, are all significantly above 20%".
237 With respect to the nature of the facts
underpinning the undercutting analysis, the European Communities examined actual data concerning
pricing, which by its nature was objective and verifiable character.
7.275 We understand Brazil to assert, with respect to “zeroing”, that the EC methodology did not
take into account the effect of the “dumped imports” as a whole and will more likely lead to a
determination of price undercutting and increase the extent of injury determined to exist. In Brazil's
view, the EC methodology is inherently prejudicial and unfair. Brazil asserts that "a generalised
obligation of fairness is a logical benchmark for the injury determination under Article 3"
238 and that
"all of the particular methodologies applied by the investigating authorities which operate against the
basic principles of good faith and fairness are in violation of Article 3.1".239
7.276 The text of Article 3.2 refers to domestic “price s” (in the plural rather than singular). This
textual element supports our view that there is no requirement under Article 3.2 to establish one single
margin of undercutting on the basis of an examination of every transaction involving the product
concerned and the like product. In addition, the text of Article 3.2 refers to the “dumped imports”,
that is, the imports of the product concerned from an exporting producer that has been determined to
be dumping.
240 Thus, investigating authorities may treat any imports from producers/exporters for
which an affirmative determination of dumping is made as "dumped imports" for purposes of injury
analysis under Article 3. There is, however, no requirement to take each and every transaction
involving the “dumped imports” into account, nor that the “dumped imports” examined under Article
3.2 are limited to those precise transactions subject to the dumping determination. This view is
supported by the absence of a specific provision concerning time periods in the Agreement; an
importing Member may investigate price effects of imports in an injury investigation period which

237 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 149.
239 Brazil response to Panel question 103 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.
240 See Panel Report, EC-Bed Linen, supra, note 77, para. 6.139.

may be different than the IP for dumping. These considerations do not, of course, diminish the
obligation of an investigating authority to conduct an unbiased and even-handed price undercutting
analysis.
7.277 We take note of the shared view of the parties that "the Panel should accord a considerable
discretion to the investigating authorities to choose a methodology which produces a meaningful
result while avoiding unfairness". 241 One purpose of a price undercutting analysis is to assist an
investigating authority in determining whether dumped imports have, through the effects of dumping,
caused material injury to a domestic industry. In this part of an anti-dumping investigation, an
investigating authority is trying to discern whether the prices of dumped imports have had an impact
on the domestic industry. The interaction of two variables would essentially determine the extent of
impact of price undercutting on the domestic industry: the quantity of sales at undercutting prices;
and the margin of undercutting of such sales. Sales at undercutting prices could have an impact on the
domestic industry (for example, in terms of lost sales) irrespective of whether other sales might be
made at prices above those charged by the domestic industry. The fact that certain sales may have
occurred at "non-underselling prices" does not eradicate the effects in the importing market of sales
that were made at underselling prices. Thus, a requirement that an investigating authority must base
its price undercutting analysis on a methodology that offset undercutting prices with "overcutting"
prices would have the result of requiring the in vestigating authority to conclude that no price
undercutting existed when, in fact, there might be a considerable number of sales at undercutting
prices which might have had an adverse effect on the domestic industry.
7.278 We recall Brazil's rejection of the EC statement that "the examination of price undercutting is
not an end in itself",
242 recalling that in order to determine the level of anti-dumping measures to be
imposed, the European Communities calculates two margins — one for dumping (in this case,
34.80%), and one for injury (an undercutting margin (39.78%), and an underselling margin (82.08%)).
In this respect, we observe that whereas the dumping margin is alone determinative in a dumping
determination, price undercutting is not alone determinative in an injury determination; rather, it
forms part of the overall assessment of injury to the domestic industry and is conducted so as to
provide guidance to the investigating authorities in the context of this assessment of injury and
causation. While this certainly gives no basis or justification for an arbitrary or non-even-handed
examination,243 particularly in light of the fact that the Agreement contains no specific conditions or
criteria or methodology, it permits an investigating authority a degree of discretion in carrying out the
price undercutting assessment.
7.279 In our view, the application of a methodology that reflects the full impact of price
undercutting on the domestic industry does not contravene Articles 3.1 or 3.2. Brazil asserts that the
European Communities methodology will inevitably increase the likelihood of a price undercutting
finding of a higher level of injury determination. We disagree. The EC methodology will not create
undercutting where there is no single incidence of undercutting: rather, it will reflect the undercutting
that occurs and the frequency and magnitude of that undercutting.

243 We recall in this connection the following statement made by the Appellate Body in Hot-Rolled
Steel, supra, note 40 underlining the importance of an even-handed examination: "However, the investigating
authorities' evaluation of the relevant factors must respect the fundamental obligation, in Article 3.1, of those
authorities to conduct an "objective examination". If an examination is to be "objective", the identification,
investigation and evaluation of the relevant factors must be even-handed. Thus, investigating authorities are not
entitled to conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that, as a result of the fact-
finding or evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is injured. "

7.280 We find relevant in this context the analysis of a previous (unadopted) panel report 244, under
similar provisions of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Agreement, which states:
"…The Panel therefore considered whether as a result of the averaging methodology
contested by Japan the EC had failed to conduct an objective examination with
respect to price undercutting.
The Panel observed that the consideration of the existence of significant price
undercutting as envisioned by Articles 3:1 and 3:2 was not an abstract exercise, but
rather related to the process of determining whether dumped imports had, through the
effects of dumping, caused material injury to a domestic industry. In the view of the
Panel, the extent to which price undercutting would have an impact on a domestic
industry would be a function of two variables, the number of sales at undercutting
prices, and the extent of the undercutting of such sales. The number of sales at
undercutting prices was particularly important, because it would provide an indicator
of the likely number of sales lost by the domestic industry. The margin of
undercutting of such sales was relevant to the extent that in non-price sensitive
products a small margin of undercutting might not play a decisive role in purchasers'
decision-making. The Panel further observed that the calculation of an average
margin of undercutting for all sales, whether or not at undercutting prices, might not
be the most effective manner to assess the impact of price undercutting on a domestic
industry, as it limited the ability of the investigating authority independently to
examine these two variables. Nevertheless, average margins of undercutting could
provide data of utility in considering the existence of significant price undercutting.
Japan had not claimed that the calculation of average margins of undercutting was
inconsistent with the Agreement. Rather, Japan's claim …was that the EC in this case
should have used a weighted average to weighted average methodology, which did
not "zero" sales at overcutting prices, for determining an average margin of
undercutting. Put in the context of Japan's claim regarding the failure of the EC to
conduct an "objective examination," Japan's argument could be that the EC failed to
consider relevant evidence by disregarding the extent to which some sales were at
prices in excess of those charged by the domestic industry. However, the Panel did
not find this argument convincing. Specifically, the Panel considered that in the
event that certain sales were at undercutting prices, such sales could have an impact
on the domestic industry (for example, in terms of lost sales) irrespective of whether
other sales might be made at prices above those charged by the domestic industry.
Thus, to require an investigating authority to base its analysis of undercutting on
weighted average margins of undercutting which offset undercutting prices with
"overcutting" prices would require the investigating authority to conclude that no
undercutting existed when in fact there might be substantial volumes of sales at
undercutting prices which might contribute toward material injury suffered by a
domestic industry….”

244 We recall the following statement by the Appellate Body concerning unadopted Tokyo Round-era
Panel reports: "we agree with the Panel's conclusion in that same paragraph of the Panel Report that unadopted
panel reports "have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed through
decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members". Likewise, we agree that "a panel
could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be
relevant". Appellate Body Report, Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II
 "), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, p. 14,
DSR 1996:I, 97.

For the reasons stated above, the Panel concluded that the EC's affirmative injury
determination was not inconsistent with Articles 3:1 and 3:2 of the Agreement by
reason of the methodology used by the EC to calculate an average margin of price
undercutting".245
7.281 We disagree with Brazil's assertion that this unadopted panel report can provide no useful
guidance because it preceded the Panel and Appellate Body reports in EC-Bed Linen. We note that
the provision under consideration by the Panel and the Appellate Body in the EC - Bed Linen dispute
was Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that the part of the particular anti-dumping
investigation in question was the calculation of the dumping margin. Therefore, those reports do not
relate specifically to the matter before us here. By contrast, we deal here with a price undercutting
analysis under Article 3.2 and 3.1 in the context of the "injury" stage of this anti-dumping
investigation. Unlike Article 2 (in particular Article 2.4.2) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which
contains specific requirements relating to the calculation of the dumping margin, Article 3.2 requires
the investigating authorities to consider whether price undercutting is "significant" but does not set
out any specific requirement relating to the calculation of a margin of undercutting, or provide a
particular methodology to be followed in this consider ation. In view of the stark contrast in the text,
context, legal nature and rationale of the provisions, we are firmly of the view that the Panel and
Appellate Body's reasoning in the EC-Bed Linen dispute cannot be directly transposed here.
7.282 We therefore find that the European Communities has not violated its obligations in Article
3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to this aspect of its price undercutting methodology.
7.283 It remains for us to address Brazil's observation that if the European Communities' method
violates Article 3.1, the European Communities' allegation of insignificance is meaningless. As we
have found that the European Communities has not violated its obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2,
we do not consider the EC assertion that the practical result of “zeroing” in its price undercutting
analysis in this case was de minimis (0.01%) and that "the use of a methodology which did not affect
the outcome of the examination under Article 3.2 in this investigation cannot be considered
incompatible with that provision simply because the use of that methodology might affect the
outcome in other investigations".
7.284 Our findings above are also relevant for Brazil’s allegation that the European Communities
violated Article 3.2 by limiting its price undercutting examination to “matching” models. Article 3.2
contains no explicit required methodology for a price undercutting examination. Moreover, there is
no obligation to establish one single margin of undercutting nor to examine each and every transaction
involving the like product. The European Communities based its price undercutting analysis on
certain transactions involving the like product. We do not find a breach with respect to this aspect of
the EC price undercutting analysis. In light of our finding, we do not consider the relevance of Tupy
allegedly not having raised this issue in the underlying anti-dumping investigation.
7.285 For these reasons, we find that the European Communities has not acted inconsistently with
its obligations under Article 3.2 and 3.1 in its price undercutting examination.
13. Issue 14: no proper calculation of alleged undercutting margins
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.286 According to Brazil, the European Communities refused, in the context of price comparison
under Article 3.2, an adjustment for differences in production methods between “white-” vs. “black-
”heart varieties of the product at issue. Brazil argues that the finding by the European Communities

245 Panel Report, EC-Audio-Cassettes (unadopted), ADP/136, para. 436-439.

of significant price undercutting is therefore inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement to make an "objective examination" on the basis of "positive evidence" of the
price effect as: by manipulating product control numbers it "compelled" the product concerned and
the like product to be comparable; by refusing to neutralise differences between the product
concerned and the like product it did not ensure that the products were comparable; and because its
conclusions with regard to cost of production and market perception are not supported by the facts.
7.287 The European Communities submits that the EC authorities acknowledged that the
production costs of white and black heart fittings were not identical but nevertheless compared such
products’ prices. The European Communities submits that cost-of-production differences do not
themselves prejudice price comparisons; interchangeability as evidenced by consumer perception is
the deciding factor. The European Communities ex amined the cost differences and found that they
are due only to higher energy use and that this was not significant. The European Communities found
no significant difference in market perception.
(b) Arguments of the third parties
7.288 The United States submits that there is no legal requirement under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement for an authority to adjust prices before comparing them for the purposes of addressing
injury. On the contrary, Article 3.1 refers to the examination of prices in the domestic market. Thus,
the Agreement instructs authorities to examine and compare the actual prices that the products sold
for in the investigating Member’s market; it does not permit a comparison of fictitious prices. A
comparison as advocated by Brazil (of the prices of the imports from Brazil, which were all black
heart fittings, with those of exported black heart fittings produced by the EC producers) would not
have met the requirements of Article 3.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.289 The Panel examines Brazil's allegation that the investigation and finding by the European
Communities of significant price undercutting is inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement as no adjustment was made for differences in production methods between
“white-” vs. “black-” heart varieties of malleable fittings.
7.290 Brazil has clarified that this claim relating to alleged differences in production method/cost of
production/selling price, market perception and physical characteristics of "black heart" and "white
heart" grades of the product concerned is based on its view that, although Article 3 does not contain
explicit provision for adjustment or allowances, "the basic principles of good faith and fundamental
fairness mean that adjustments or allowances should be made if they are necessary to ensure price
comparability.246 Brazil refers to the context for Article 3.2 provided by Article 2.6 which obliges
investigating authorities to compare products that are identical and asserts that, only in the absence of
identical products, should authorities resort to a comparison of similar products. Brazil asserts that
the comparison between the actual import price of a black heart fitting and the actual domestic
industry price of a white heart fitting without any adjustments or allowances would not constitute an
"objective examination" under Articles 3.2 and 3.1.
7.291 Article 3.1 requires the competent authorities to conduct an objective examination, of, inter
alia, “the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products.” The
Agreement thus directs the investigating authority to conduct a price comparison of the prices of sales
of the like product and the imported product in the investigating Member’s domestic market. This
necessarily requires that the like products actually sold in the domestic market be compared.

246 Brazil response to Panel question 103 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.

7.292 Moreover, as we have observed, the Agreement contains no explicit legal requirement or
required methodology for an Article 3.2 analysis. Unlike Article 2, in relation to dumping, Article 3
contains no specific guidance as to the methodology an investigating authority may use to consider
price undercutting. We are conscious that the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an "objective
examination" on the basis of "positive evidence" is that the investigating authorities examination
conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. T h e
investigating authority must therefore ensure an even-handed treatment of the information and data on
the record of the investigation. However, in view of the stark contrast in the text, context, legal nature
and rationale of the provisions in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relating to the calculation
of the dumping margin and Article 3 relating to the injury analysis, we decline to transpose wholesale
the more detailed methodological obligations of Arti cle 2 concerning dumping into the provisions of
Article 3 concerning injury analysis.
7.293 Furthermore, because in the price undercutting analysis, the investigating authority is
examining injury caused by dumped imports, to the extent a product competes with another product
and affects domestic sales of that product, there might well be different bases for deciding whether or
not to make an adjustment in the context of th e dumping and price undercutting analyses. In a
dumping determination, one focus of adjustments may be on differences in costs that a
producer/exporter might reasonably be expected to reflect in his prices; by contrast, the focus in a
price undercutting analysis may be on differences between the imported and domestic like product
that have a perceived importance to customers.
7.294 The Definitive Regulation indicates that the EC investigating authority considered the
arguments of Tupy that "adjustments should be made in the price comparison between imported
products (black heart fittings) and the Community produced product (in general white heart fittings)
on the grounds of different perception of the market and of the difference in the production process (in
particular in the annealing process, since white heart malleable fittings have a higher cost of
production because of the greater energy consumption than black heart malleable fittings), which was
reflected in selling prices”.
247 The Definitive Regulation further indicates that the European
Communities rejected both of these arguments. The EC investigating authority found that no
difference in market perception was discernible, in any event not in terms of pricing differences.248
7.295 The European Communities cites evidence in support of its statements in the Definitive
Regulation that average energy costs as a percentage of total manufacturing costs for the black heart
and white heart products are very low and differ very little. 249 The European Communities found no
difference, or at least no significant difference, in market perception on the basis of its evaluation of
the facts of record, which largely bear out its statements.

247 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 86.
248 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 87, states: "…it has been found that …in those
instances in which both black and white heart malleable fittings were sold by the same party, and therefore any
distinction in market perception should have been observable, no such distinction was actually observed, in any
event not in terms of pricing differences. As to the users of the product under consideration, the investigation
has confirmed that they do not differentiate between white heart of black heart fittings…" The Definitive
Regulation also states (para. 17): "…the investigation ha s shown that there is no difference in market perception
distinguishing between white heart fittings and black heart fittings as in all respects other than carbon content
they have closely resembling characteristics, the same end-uses and are thus interchangeable. This has been
confirmed by the fact that the importers/traders which purchase both black heart malleable fittings from the
countries concerned and white heart malleable fittings produced by the Community industry, sell them to users
without making a distinction between the two grades of material. As to the users of the product under
consideration, the investigation has confirmed that they do not differentiate between white heart or black heart
fittings to any significant degree."
249 Exhibit EC-13. See Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recitals 88 and 89.

7.296 Thus, the European Communities gathered and evaluated facts in respect of the alleged
differences in cost of production and market perception between black and white heart variants of the
products concerned, and came to the conclusion that differences in cost of production were not
significant and that there was no significant difference in consumer perception. A reasonable and
objective authority could have reached this determination on the basis of the record of this
investigation. It is not our task to substitute our judgement for that of the investigating authority.
7.297 Conscious of our standard of review and given the EC investigating authority's establishment
of the relevant facts and consideration of the issue on the basis of these facts leading to its finding that
the market did not differentiate between black heart and white heart fittings and differences in cost of
manufacture reflected in the evidence on the record of the investigation pertaining to relative
proportion of energy cost in total production costs, we find that the European Communities did not
violate Articles 3.2 and 3.1 in not granting an adjustment for price comparability in its comparison of
prices of sales of black heart and white heart fittings in the context of its consideration of price
undercutting.
14. Issue 16: injury
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.298 Brazil initially argued that the European Communities failed to evaluate all of the listed
Article 3.4 factors; and only partially evaluated nine of the fifteen factors (which disclosed an
insufficient basis for a positive finding of injury). Brazil also asserted that the European Communities
failed to examine independently "growth", as this examination is only implicitly deductible from other
injury factors. Following the submission by the European Communities of Exhibit EC-12 as part of
the EC first written submission, Brazil alleged that the published or disclosed record of the
investigation contained no evaluation of productivity; return on investments; cash flow; wages;
margin of dumping; and ability to raise capital and that the European Communities' purported
evaluation of these factors, as contained in Exhibit EC-12 was either inadmissible in these Panel
proceedings, or, if admissible, then nevertheless inadequate for the purposes of Article 3.4. Brazil
also submits that the European Communities failed to evaluate certain other relevant, non-listed
factors having a bearing upon the state of the industry within the meaning of Article 3.4. Brazil
disagrees with the EC analysis and conclusions concerning price sensitivity; profitability;
investments; and inventories. Brazil also alleges that the European Communities failed to provide a
"persuasive explanation" as to whether and how positive movements in certain injury factors were
outweighed by negative movements in others. Moreover, the EC finding was not based on positive
evidence, as the European Communities considered on ly the end points -- rather than the trends -- of
those factors examined.
7.299 The European Communities argues that the outcome of the EC authorities' investigation of
individual factors -- insofar as they produced sign ificant results -- is recorded in the Provisional and
Definitive Regulations. The European Communities submits Exhibit EC-12 -- an internal
Commission "file note" -- that, it argues, explicitly demonstrates the European Communities also
considered other Article 3.4 factors that Brazil alleges were ignored except for one: "actual and
potential negative effects on … growth". The European Communities argues that while no separate
record was made of its evaluation of "growth", its consideration of this factor is implicit in its analysis
of the other factors. With respect to Brazil's allegations concerning other non-listed factors, the
European Communities asserts that Brazil blurs the distinction between the obligations under Article
3.4 (injury factors) and 3.5 (causation), and that "outsourcing" has no relevance under Article 3.4.
250
The European Communities submits that its injury determination was made following an objective
examination on the basis of positive evidence and that it satisfies the requirements of Article 3.4 and
3.1.

(b) Arguments of third parties
7.300 Chile endorses Brazil's argument that, as panels and the Appellate Body have found on
several occasions, most recently in Thailand – H-Beams , Article 3.4 requires an investigating
authority to consider and evaluate all listed factors as well as other relevant factors, and requested
clarification of Brazil's arguments with respect to "trends" in import volume.
7.301 Japan submits that the European Communities violated its obligations under Articles 3.1 and
3.4 as it failed to address all relevant injury factors and failed to fully evaluate those it did address.
Further, these factors failed to provide a sufficient basis for a positive injury finding. Japan submits
that the European Communities has accordingly also violated Article VI of the GATT 1994 and
Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
(i) Basis of Panel examination
7.302 The Panel begins its examination of Brazil's claims regarding the EC injury determination n
with the text of the relevant treaty provisions. Article 3.4 provides:
“The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilisation
of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance.”
7.303 The overarching obligations in Article 3.1 also apply. We recall the text and our discussion
of that provision, supra.
7.304 We first recall and agree with the findings of previous panels
251 and the Appellate Body 252
that Article 3.4 contains a mandatory - rather than illustrative -- list of factors and that all of the
factors explicitly listed in Article 3.4 must be addressed in every investigation. Neither party
questions this understanding.253
7.305 Rather, the parties differ on the nature of the examination that is required in relation to each
individual factor, and the exigencies of the obligation to conduct an "objective examination" on the
basis of “positive evidence".

251 See e.g., Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey ,
WT/DS211/R, para. 7.36. Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-
Type Bed Linen from India ("EC – Bed Linen" ), WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS141/AB/R, para.6.159, and the Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States ("Mexico – Corn Syrup" ),
WT/DS132/R and Corr.1, adopted 24 February 2000, para. 7.128.
252 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Thailand- H-Beams, para.128.
253 EC first written submission, para. 348. Brazil first written submission, p. 180.

(ii) Did the European Communities address each listed Article 3.4 factor?
7.306 We examine whether the EC investigating authority addressed each listed Article 3.4 factor in
the record of the investigation. In so doing, we wish to recall our understanding, addressed earlier,
that we are required by the Agreement to take into account confidential or non-disclosed information
that an investigating authority relies upon in order to reach its final determination in assessing the
European Communities' compliance with Article 3.4, including, in particular, the information
submitted exclusively in these Panel proceedings in Exhibit EC-12. However, we would be remiss
not to emphasise that we deplore the fact that this information, or an accurate non-confidential
summary of any confidential information contained therein, was not disclosed to interested parties
during the investigation. Most fundamentally, we find it extremely troubling that it is not discernible
from the published Provisional and Definitive Regulations that the European Communities considered
this information at the time it made its determination.254
7.307 We also wish to emphasise the difficulties for a WTO panel of having to review a Member's
anti-dumping determination on the basis inter alia of a document for which there is no
contemporaneous and verifiable written indication that it actually existed during the time of the
investigation. We took steps to assure ourselves of the validity of this document and of the fact that it
forms part of the contemporaneous written record of the EC investigation. We enquired as to the
manner in which the statements in Exhibit EC-12 were derived from the information sources
identified in Exhibit EC-12. The European Communities gave an account of the methodology and the
sources of information on the basis of which the statements in Exhibit EC-12 were made.
255 W e
further asked the European Communities to confirm and substantiate to us that Exhibit EC-12 was
written within the time period of the investigation.256 The European Communities confirmed that this
was the case. We also asked the European Communities whether there were any worksheets or
investigation notes which formed the basis for Exhibit EC-12 and asked the European Communities to
provide them or to explain why these were not provided. The European Communities replied that:
"The conclusions recorded in Exhibit EC-12 are based on worksheets, but these contain highly
confidential business information relating to the performance of individual EC producers and the EC
would prefer not to release them."
257 In this respect, Article 18.2 of the DSU contains rules protecting
the confidentiality of written submissions and information submitted to the Panel. These rules oblige
Members to maintain the confidentiality of any submissions or information submitted, or received, in
Panel proceedings.258 We therefore do not consider the stated confidentiality of any such worksheets
would have been undermined had the European Communities submitted them in these Panel

254 This undermines the obligations in Article 12 concerning the published determination of an
investigating authority. It further goes against the significance attached to the existence of a contemporaneous
written indication of the existence of certain documents at the time of the investigation and of the final
determination by the panels in Panel Report, EC- Bed Linen , supra, note 77; Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand
– H-Beams "), WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS122/AB/R,
paras. 7.136 ff and Panel Report, Panel on Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal Resins from
the United States ("Korea – Resins "), adopted 27 April 1993, BISD 40S/205, in particular paras. 208-213 and
225-228.
255 EC response to Panel question 109 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3.
256 See Panel question 20 and EC response thereto following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8.
We further asked (Panel question 19 following the second Panel meeting) whether there were any worksheets or
investigation notes which formed the basis for Exhibit EC-12 and asked the EC to provide them or to explain
why these were not provided. The European Communities replied that: "The conclusions recorded in Exhibit
EC-12 are based on worksheets, but these contain highly confidential business information relating to the
performance of individual EC producers and the EC would prefer not to release them." See Annex E-8.
257 EC response to Panel question 19 following the second Panel meeting, Annex E-8.
258 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft ("Canada – Aircraft "), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1377, para. 147.

proceedings. Nevertheless, the European Communities assures us that these worksheets exist. In this
respect, we presume that WTO Members participate in good faith in dispute settlement proceedings.
7.308 Having carefully considered all of these factors, we are compelled to include Exhibit EC-12
in our examination of Brazil's claims under Article 3.4. We wish to emphasise, however, that in our
view, Members should make every effort to ensure that it can be discerned from their published
notices or separate public reports that all required elements of analysis required under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement were in fact considered. In this way, not only are the obligations of public notice
more likely to be fulfilled, but the task of a reviewing panel, which, pursuant to Article 17.5 and 17.6,
is limited to determining, based on the facts before the investigating authority at the time, whether its
establishment of facts was proper and its evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective, is
facilitated.
7.309 The only listed Article 3.4 factor that Brazil alleges was not explicitly addressed at all by the
European Communities during the investigation was "growth". We therefore consider whether the
European Communities failed to abide by its Article 3.4 obligation by failing to include a separate and
independent treatment of "growth" in the record of the investigation.
7.310 The Agreement requires that each listed Article 3.4 factor be addressed. As to the manner in
which each factor must be addressed, it is clear that a formalistic "checklist" approach – which would
require that each factor be explicitly and independently addressed in each determination on the basis
of the precise terms used in the relevant provision -- would be highly desirable in that it would
increase an investigating authority’s (and a panel's) confidence that all factors were considered.
However, we find no such obligation in text of the provision and consequently do not believe that this
is a required approach to analysis under Article 3.4. The provision requires substantive, rather than
purely formal, compliance. The requirements of this provision will be satisfied where it is at least
apparent that a factor has been addressed, if only implicitly. No separate record was made of the
"evaluation of actual and potential negative effects on … growth". The European Communities itself
does not contest this.
259 However, the European Communities did address, in the course of the
investigation, certain other listed factors, including sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investment and capacity utilisation. Fo r each of these factors, the European Communities
traced developments from 1995 through the end of the IP. This examination touched upon the
performance and relative diminution or expansion of the domestic industry. For example, the
Provisional Regulation (recital 150) indicates that there was a decrease in EC production in 1995 and
1996, and an increase between 1996 and the IP, while EC production capacity, sales volume,
profitability and market share decreased. The facts on the record of the investigation and taken into
account in the EC injury analysis indicate to us that, in its examination of other injury factors-- in
particular, sales, profits, output, market share, productivity and capacity utilisation – satisfy us that, in
addressing developments in relation to these other factors in the manner that it did in this particular
investigation, the European Communities implicitly addressed the factor of "growth".
7.311 We therefore find that the European Communities did not violate its obligations under
Article 3.4 in its treatment of "growth" and that it at least addressed each of the listed Article 3.4
factors.
(iii) Did the European Communities adequately evaluate the listed Article 3.4 factors?
a. approach to assessment of adequacy of the European Communities' evaluation
7.312 We examine next the adequacy of the analysis conducted by the European Communities of
each of the listed factors. Brazil argues that the EC analysis of the Article 3.4 factors is partial and

inadequate and that, in particular with regard to the factors addressed exclusively in Exhibit-EC-12,
the examination is not a well-reasoned and meaningful analysis of the state of the industry and
therefore fails to satisfy Article 3.4. The European Communities submits that its evaluation of the
factors is sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 3.4.
7.313 The focus of this part of our examination is therefore whether the treatment of the listed
Article 3.4 factors in the EC investigation and determ ination is sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of Article 3.4 concerning the "evaluation" of the listed factors having a bearing on the state of the
industry. Our starting point, is, as always, the relevant treaty text. Article 3.4 states, in pertinent part:
"The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry… (emphasis added).
7.314 The term "evaluate" is defined as: "To work out the value of …; To reckon up, ascertain the
amount of; to express in terms of the known;" 260 "To determine or fix the value of; To determine the
significance, worth of condition of us ually by careful appraisal or study." 261 These definitions reveal
that an "evaluation" is a process of analysis and assessment requiring the exercise of judgement on the
part of the investigating authority.262 It is not simply a matter of form, and the list of relevant factors
to be evaluated is not a mere checklist.263 As the relative weight or significance of a given factor may
naturally vary from investigation to investigation, the investigating authority must therefore assess the
role, relevance and relative weight of each factor in the particular investigation. Where the authority
determines that certain factors are not relevant or do not weigh significantly in the determination, the
authority may not simply disregard such factors, but must explain their conclusion as to the lack of
relevance or significance of such factors. 264 The assessment of the relevance or materiality of certain
factors, including those factors that are judged to be not central to the decision, must therefore be at
least implicitly apparent from the determination. Silence on the relevance or irrelevance of a given
factor would not suffice.
265 Moreover, an evaluation of a factor, in our view, is not limited to a mere
characterisation of its relevance or irrelevance.266 Rather, we believe that an "evaluation" also implies
the analysis of data through placing it in context in terms of the particular evolution of the data
pertaining to each factor individually, as well as in relation to other factors examined.267 268
7.315 We examine whether the European Communities' determination is consistent with the
requirements of Article 3.4 to evaluate all listed factors and with Article 3.1.
b. time periods and "trend" analysis
7.316 We first recall the importance in the process of this evaluation of placing data relating to
developments with respect to each injury factor in context, both in terms of their own individual
development and vis-à-vis developments in other factors examined. 269 Thus, a meaningful

260 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
261 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary online: http://www.m-w.com.
262 Panel Report, Egypt – Rebar, supra note 251 .
263 We find support for our view in Appellate Body Report, US-Lamb, para. 104.
264 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen para. 6.162.
265 Ibid., para. 6.168.
266 We find support for this view in Panel Report, Thailand-H-Beams.
267 Panel Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 62, paras. 7.232, 7.233.
268 Thus, we agree with the view of the Appellate Body that “Articles 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that the
investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be
attached to each potentially relevant factor and the weight to be attached to it. In every investigation, this
determination turns on the "bearing" that the relevant factors have "on the state of the [domestic] industry".” See
Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 40, para 197.
269 This approach is suggested by the Panel Report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 62.

investigation must also take into account the actual intervening trends in each of the injury factors and
indices -- rather than just a comparison of "end-points". There must a streamlined, genuine and
undistorted picture drawn from the facts before the in vestigating authority. Only on the basis of such
a thorough and dynamic evaluation of data capturing the current state of the industry in the
determination would a reviewing panel be able to assess whether the conclusions drawn from the
examination are those of an unbiased and objective authority.
7.317 Brazil alleges that the European Communities failed to conduct an analysis of the intervening
trends of certain injury factors (production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share,
inventory, profitability and employment), and instead merely analysed the “end-points” of these
injury factors. Brazil observes that, in particular wi th respect to profitability, but also with respect to
certain other factors, developments in 1996 and 1997 do not sustain the observation that there was a
decline in the condition of the domestic industry.
7.318 The European Communities states that the “injury investigation period” was 1 January 1995-
to the end of the IP, and that this period was devoted to “the examination of trends in the context of
the injury analysis” and that it had made clear that developments and trends preceding the IP were
used only "in order to have a better understanding of findings relating to the IP". Further, the
European Communities submits that it is not limited to its own summary of its own data set out in the
Provisional and Definitive Regulations, that the relevant year-by-year data had been disclosed to
interested parties and that in all cases the mid-year figures showed a more or less steady movement
from one end point to the other.
7.319 The IP established by the European Communities ran from April 1998 to March 1999. In the
context of its injury analysis, the European Comm unities gathered and analysed data for the period
1995 through the end of the IP (this is referred to by the European Communities as the "Injury
Investigation Period" or "IIP". We understand Brazil to allege variously that the European
Communities concentrated its analysis of certain factors (for example, profitability) on the period
beginning in 1996 (rather than 1995) and that, in some cases, placed excessive emphasis on
developments in the period coinciding with the IP thereby providing a misleading picture of the state
of the industry. Brazil also alleges that the EC evaluation of individual injury factors does not
constitute positive evidence supporting an objective examination leading to an affirmative injury
finding as they do not reveal a declining trend.
7.320 We have discussed above the use of the investigation period in an anti-dumping
investigation.
270 We find reference in the text of the Agreement to the concept of an investigation
period. However, we note that neither Article 3, nor any other provision of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, contains any specific rule as to the time periods to be covered by the injury or dumping
investigations, nor any relationship between or overlap of those time periods. The only provisions we
can discern that provide guidance as to how the effects on the domestic industry of the dumped
imports are to be gauged are (as cross-referenced in Article 3.5), Articles 3.2 (volume and price
effects of dumped imports), and Article 3.4 (impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry).
Neither of these provisions specifies particular time periods for these analyses.271
7.321 The Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping
Investigations272 states, inter alia , that the period of data collection for dumping investigations
normally should be twelve months, and in any case no less than six months, ending as close to the
date of initiation as is practicable; and that the period of data collection for injury investigations
normally should be at least three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed

270 Supra, paras. 7.100 ff.
271 We find support for our view in Panel Report, Egypt-Rebar, supra, note 251.
272 G/ADP/6, adopted 5 May 2000 by the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices.

for a lesser period, and should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping
investigation. From this, we take it that it is de sirable that there be a substantial coincidence in the
period of investigation for dumping and the period during which injury was found.
7.322 Given these considerations about time periods, we take note of the following statement in the
Definitive Regulation:
“(98) …it should be noted firstly, that dumping and the injury
suffered by the Community industry must be found during the IP. In
order to establish whether such injury exists, inter alia , the
developments and trends found in the years preceding the IP are only
used in order to have a better understanding of findings relating to
the IP. In this current case, since the investigation period started in
April 1998, it has been deemed appropriate, in order to obtain a
meaningful picture of the evolution of the injury indicators, to take
into account at least three calendar years (1995-1997) prior to the IP.
Secondly, even if 1996 were taken as reference year, the result of the
injury analysis would not change. On the contrary, the injury suffered
by the Community industry would be even more evident in the
development of certain injury indicators as profitability and stocks.
The other injury indicators would have followed the same negative
trend, with the exception of the investments, and of the production
volume, the increase of which however resulted in higher stocks….
(102) As a general remark it must be underlined that the injury
suffered by the Community industry must be assessed by reference to
the IP. As to the earlier years and the trends established over these
years, they explain the background underlining the injury
established.”
7.323 In this case, the European Communities examined the situation of the domestic industry
during the IP, as well as data for the years 1995-1998. There was thus a substantial coincidence in the
period of investigation for dumping and the period during which injury was found. In particular,
whether the European Communities refers to events at the outset of the IP by referring to either 1995
or 1996, the European Communities consistently appraises the interrelation of factors during the IP.
7.324 Moreover, we have examined the record data and the EC evaluation thereof on the record of
the investigation in relation to th e injury factors deemed relevant by the European Communities and
therefore evaluated more comprehensively in their determination: production; production capacity;
capacity utilisation; sales volume; market share; sales prices; stocks; profitability; employment; and
investments. The European Communities has gathered data from 1995 through the end of the IP for
all of these factors. We do not find that the EC approach of focusing its injury examination on the IP
and emphasising that the injury suffered by the domestic industry had to be found during the IP
provided a misleading "snapshot" of the EC producers’ economic situation at the end of the
Investigation Period that failed to place the IP situation in its temporal context. We also do not find
that the EC evaluation of the developments with respect to certain injury factors is generally biased or
not objective and not on the basis of positive evidence. We also do not believe that the European
Communities did not pay attention to trends in its injury analysis. For example, data on the record of
the investigation show that market share went fr om 70% in 1995 to 71% in 1996 and then to 62% in
the IP.
273 The European Communities evaluation in the Provisional Regulation (recital 154) is as
follows: "The Community industry's share on the Community market decreased from 70% in 1995 to
around 62% in the IP, i.e. by around 8 percentage points. This downward trend started after 1996, in

273 Provisional Regulation, recital 154.

which year the Community industry's market shares had reached a peak of around 71%." The
European Communities therefore explicitly acknowledged the upward trend from 1995 to 1996 and
then traced the downward trend of the data pertaining to this factor through the IP. We hold a similar
view with respect to the other factors referred to by Brazil in this context.
c. certain data on which the European Communities based its injury evaluation
7.325 With respect to the factors examined in Exhibit EC-12, Brazil alleges that the factual basis for
the injury determination is flawed. In particular, Brazil argues that the European Communities did not
request the domestic industry to provide detailed "like product specific" information regarding return
on investment, wages, cash flow and ability to raise capital and this precluded the European
Communities from making an "objective examination" based on "positive evidence". Brazil also
alleges that the European Communities' "simulations" in Exhibit EC-12 regarding, in particular, return
on investments, cash flow and ability to raise capital, are "of no value" in analysing the EC producers'
performance, "not because the issues of return on investments, cash flow and ability to raise capital
were not relevant but because of the EC’s oversimplified methodology". 274 The European
Communities responds that the nature of the evidence used in Exhibit EC-12 was "no different in
character" from that used in regard to the other Article 3.4 factors that the EC authorities carried
out",275 in that it consisted primarily of information obtained directly from EC producers, including
their audited accounts.
7.326 We recall that an injury assessment under Article 3.4 deals with the state of the domestic
industry as a whole. The Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "injury" means "material injury to
a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry ".276 (emphasis added) The focus of an injury determination is
therefore the state of the "domestic industry". 277 The domestic industry consists of the producers of
the "like product". Article 3.6 states:
"The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic
production of the like product when available data permit the separate identification
of that production on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers'
sales and profits. If such separate identification of that production is not possible, the
effects of the dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination of the production
of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for
which the necessary information can be provided."
7.327 Brazil submits that Article 3.6 provides that the effect of the dumped imports ‘shall be
assessed in relation to the domestic production of the like product’. According to Brazil, the
European Communities has never claimed that ‘separate identification of that production was not
possible’ and, in view of the other injury factors specifically pertaining to the like product, was not
able to do so. It is clear that, while data and information pertaining specifically to the "like product"
is to be used to the extent possible, the Agreement also envisages resort to a broader spectrum of data
where separate identification of like product specific data is not possible. It is therefore permissible
for an investigating authority to assess the effect s of the dumped imports by the examination of the
production of a broader range of products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary
information can be provided if like-product-specific information is not available. This is clear from
the text of Article 3.6. Brazil observes that the European Communities states that Exhibit EC-12 asset
data was “allocated on the basis of the turnover” from annual accounts, but that that the audited accounts

276Footnote 9 to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
277 Appellate Body Report, United States - Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 40, paras. 189-190.

are used to provide the financial picture of a company on the final day of its financial year, which does
not necessarily correspond with the end of the investigation period on 31 March 1999. Despite the lack
of perfect coincidence, this would result in at least a 9-month overlap which would allow for
simultaneity of analysis and the time periods used would largely coincide and give an indication of the
state of the industry during the period.
7.328 In addition, while the investigating authority must consider all information submitted to it by
interested parties in an investigation, it may al so supplement such information, where necessary, in
order to ensure that its investigation is comprehensive. While the questionnaire did not expressly
identify the Article 3.4 factors in the precise terms used in the Agreement and did not request the
submission of information from EC producers on these factors specifically, we understand the
European Communities to have based its appraisal of the factors concerned largely on audited annual
accounts of the EC producers. In the absence of "like product specific data" on the record of the
investigation, we do not consider that the use by the European Communities of data derived from
audited annual accounts of companies on the basis of turnover contaminates the factual basis on
which the injury analysis is based. In light of these considerations, we do not consider that the
European Communities has breached its obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 to conduct an objective
examination on the basis of positive evidence in this regard.
d. adequacy of EC evaluation of injury factors
7.329 We do not find in Article 3.4 a requirement that each and every injury factor, in isolation,
must necessarily be indicative of injury. Rather, an examination of the impact of the dumped imports
on the domestic industry under Article 3.4 includes an evaluation of all relevant economic factors
having a bearing on the state of the industry to produce an overall impression of the state of the
domestic industry. We therefore examine whether, in light of the overall development and interaction
among injury indicators collectively, the record data overall would preclude a finding by an unbiased
and objective investigating authority that the domestic industry was injured.
7.330 The European Communities found material injury during the period of investigation on the
basis, in particular, of declines in production, production capacity, sales and market share.
278 Brazil
asserts that capacity utilisation, which increased from 64% in 1995 to 67% in the IP does not indicate
injury. Taken in isolation , we agree that this might not indicate injury. However, the European
Communities conclusion on injury refers to the dependent relationship between the increase in
capacity utilisation and the reduction in production capacity, which decreased by 14% between 1995
and the IP, from 85,000 to 73,000 tonnes. The European Communities pointed out that: "This
development should be seen in the light of the fact that in 1996 a production plant in Germany ceased
its activity." We disagree with Brazil’s argument, made inter alia in connection with production and
stocks, that once an investigating authority has evaluated actual injurious trends in these factors and
this is sufficient for the purposes of reaching a finding of injury there would also be an obligation also
to evaluate potential injurious trends.
7.331 The European Communities also stated that th e Community industry suffered a "significant
loss" of employment. The underlying data on the record of the investigation largely support the EC
statements.
279 The lack of an explicit reference in this context to the 6% decline in consumption does
not undermine this finding.

278 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 160.
279 The information before the investigating authority regarding the numbers employed in the industry
is as follows: 1995: 2,532; 1996: 2,399; 1997: 2,414; 1998: 2,393; IP 2,370. The Provisional Regulation
contains the following evaluation: "Employment in the Community industry decreased from 2532 employees in
1995 to 2370 employees in the IP, a decrease of around 6%. This decline should be seen in the light of the
attempts undertaken by the Community industry to restructure and reduce its costs. In fact, the investigation has

7.332 The European Communities also found a decline in investments, as well as an increase of
stocks. Brazil criticises the EC treatment of investment – including the observation that “the
Community industry suffered ... a decline in investments” -- as being biased and not based on positive
evidence and suggests that the European Communities should have placed its analysis in a broader
context, by associating it with turnover. Brazil submits that no matter how the issue of investments is
measured, even the absolute figures indicated that the EC producers' investments increased from 1996
onwards. Brazil posits that normally an increase in investments indicates merely a commercial
strategy of allocation of financial resources to the business.
280 Brazil also observes that the absolute
value of the EC producers’ investments decreased by 7% between 1995 and the IP. 281 The European
Communities explained that this was caused by the restructuring of the industry in 1995. The
European Communities identified certain benefits that flowed from this restructuring in 1996. A 37%
increase in investment as a percentage of turnover between 1998 and the IP is not irreconcilable with
this. The European Communities addressed in its determination the reasons for this.
282 With respect
to the EC finding on an "increase of stocks" 283, on the basis of the EC producers' non-confidential
responses to the questionnaire and confidential data provided in the course of these Panel proceedings,
Brazil submits that the data on stocks contains discrepancies that undermine the EC claim to have
made the injury determination on the basis of positive evidence. 284 The European Communities
explains that these increases in stocks amount to approximately 1% in 1996, 1.4% in 1997 and 4% in
1998, and that the European Communities believes that these amounts are due to the inclusion of
scrap in the gross production reported to the European Communities. We underline the importance
for an investigating authority to base its determination on accurate information. However, we do not
consider that discrepancies of this magnitude erode the factual basis for the EC evaluation of stocks in
this case.
7.333 The European Communities places its evaluation of each of these factors within the context of
its own internal evolution and in terms of its relationship with movements in other injury factors. The
overall record data with respect to those factors deemed relevant by the European Communities
support the EC evaluation of these factors.
7.334 Brazil emphasises that the fact that domestic producers raised their prices over the IIP does
not indicate injury. The information on the record concerning certain injury indicators, including

shown that the production process of malleable fitting s is highly labour intensive." Provisional Regulation,
recital 158.
282 Provisional Regulation, recital 159 states: “The Community industry decreased its investment from
around ECU 20.4 million in 1995 to around ECU 17 million in the IP, i.e. by around 16%. Within this period,
there are important differences. For instance, between 1998 and the IP, investments increased, from ECU 12.7
million to ECU 17 million. It is worth noting that the level of investments is rather significant during the whole
IIP, in particular in 1995, coinciding with the restructuring efforts realised that year, as mentioned above. This
shows that the Community industry is still viable and is not ready to abandon this segment of production, in
particular as these investments were mostly destined to rationalise the production process.”
283 The Provisional Regulation, recital 156 also stated: “The closing stocks of the Community industry
increased from around 16,300 tonnes a in 1995 to around 17,400 tonnes in the IP, i.e. by around 6%. The rise of
the stock volume has been particularly strong as from 1996, in line with the increase of the Community
industry's production and decreasing sales volume.” The Provisional Disclosure indicated the following year-
by-year data: 1995 16,330 tonnes ; 1996 : 14,647 tonnes : 1997 13,101 tonnes ; 1998 16,010 tonnes ; IP 17,376
tonnes.
284 According to Brazil, the discrepancies based on stock reconciliation between "input" (opening stock,
production and purchases) and "output" (i.e. domestic sales, exports and closing stocks) was 653 in 1996, 687 in
1997 and 2120 tonnes in 1998.

price,285 in isolation, may not necessarily indicate an injurious situation. The European Communities
conducted a price analysis. 286 However, it is apparent to us that the European Communities did not
conclude that its domestic industry had reduced its prices over the IP, nor that prices, in and of
themselves, were indicative of injury to the domestic industry. We note in this respect the
relationship referred to by the European Communities in its determination between prices and market
share287 and sales volume.288 We also note the impact on profitability of the developments in price
and volume referred to by the European Communities in its determination. 289 We discern from the
determination that the European Communities concluded that the price pressure of the imports
concerned had an impact on the volume of the sales and on the market shares of the Community
industry rather than on its price level.290 The European Communities reasoned that “when faced with
low-priced imports originating in the countries concerned, the Community industry had the possibility
of either maintaining its prices with a risk of losing market shares, or following the low prices of the
dumped imports with the aim of maintaining the sales volumes. It decided to maintain its prices, but
the consequence on the sales volume had an impact on the profitability, which turned negative after
1996”.
7.335 With respect to Brazil’s assertion that the European Communities does not evaluate, in the
context of "factors affecting domestic prices" whether the EC producers were tending to sell on a
long-term rather than on-spot basis, whether there were any changes in the patterns of trade (e.g.
outsourcing) in this respect and/or whether there were any changes in the cost structure of the EC
industry, Article 3.4 requires an evaluation of “factors affecting domestic prices” (not “all” factors
affecting domestic prices). We consider that th is requirement is inextricably linked to the
requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 to conduct an objective examination of the effects of dumped
imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, which must involve a consideration of
whether there has been significant price undercutting or price depression or suppression. We derive

285 The information before the investigating authority indicated that the domestic industry’s prices, in
indexed form, went from 100 in 1995 to 105 (1996 & 1997) to 108 (1999 & IP), whereas prices of imports from
countries concerned went from 100 (1995) to 104 (1996) to 99 (1997 &1998) to 95 (IP), Annexes III to the
Disclosures Preceding the Provisional and the Definitive Re gulations. With respect to this factor, the Definitive
Regulation, recital 103 states: "As regards more specifically the development of the Community industry's sales
prices, the investigation has shown that the rise of 5 % between 1995 and the IP of the average sales price of the
Community industry occurred in two phases, one between 1995 and 1996, when the whole market experienced a
general price increase, and the second one between 1997 and 1998, when only the Community industry and
other third countries raised their prices, while the prices of the countries concerned decreased significantly."
286 Provisional Regulation, recitals 147 to 149, and 155; and Definitive Regulation, recitals 86 to 94.
287 Data on the record of the investigation show that market share went from 70% in 1995 to 71% in
1996 and then to 62% in the IP. Provisional Regulation, recital 154. The EC evaluation was as follows: "The
Community industry's share on the Community market decreased from 70% in 1995 to around 62% in the IP,
i.e. by around 8 percentage points. This downward trend started after 1996, in which year the Community
industry's market shares had reached a peak of around 71%."
288 The record data indicate that between 1995 and 1996 the sales volume of the Community industry
decreased by 8.7%. Between 1997 and 1998 the sales volume decreased by 7.6%. More exactly, the sales data
on the record of the investigation are as follows: 1995: 45,456 tonnes; 1996: 41,486 tonnes; 1997: 41,866
tonnes; 1998: 38,670 tonnes; IP 37,722 tonnes. The Provisional Regulation, recital 153, states the following:
"The sales volume of the Community industry decreased from around 45,500 tonnes in 1995 to around 37,700
tonnes in the IP, i.e. by around 17%. It should be pointed out that the Community industry's sales decreased in a
time period during which the market contracted, while the countries concerned were able to expand their sales
volume by around 32%."
289 In this respect, the record data indicates the following concerning profits: 1995: -2.2; 1996: 1.4;
1997; -0.9; 1998: -0.2; IP: -0.9. The European Communitie s stated that profitability of the domestic industry
decreased from 1.4% to –0.9% between 1996 and the IP. Provisional Regulation, recital 157. The record
evidence largely reflects the EC appraisal, including the increase between 1995 and 1996, and is not
irreconcilable with the EC observation that demand was lowest in 1996 which was “a year in which the whole
sector suffered from difficult market conditions”.
290 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit-19, recital 103.

from this that an investigating authority must conduct a price analysis as required by Articles 3.1 and
3.2 (which contains no explicit requirement for an analysis of terms of sale, patterns of trade or cost
structures). We see no basis in the text of the Agreement for Brazil’s argument that would require an
analysis of factors affecting domestic prices beyond an Article 3.2 price analysis, and observe that
certain of the factors potentially affecting price may be more in the way of causal factors to be
analysed under Article 3.5, rather than under 3.4. In our view, Article 3.4 focuses on factors
indicative of the state of the industry, or of the effects on the industry, rather than factors having an
effect thereon.
291 Thus, whether or not an evaluation of causal factors is adequate is matter to be
examined under Article 3.5. We address Brazil’s allegations concerning causation below.
7.336 Brazil objects to the EC finding that: “The market for malleable fittings is highly price
sensitive, the price level being the crucial element of choice considered by the users, as has been
confirmed by the co-operating importers and users” (emphasis added). 292 Brazil argues that the EC
made this finding "in spite of the fact that the prices of imported fittings had not affected the prices in
the EC industry". 293 We recall our earlier observation that the European Communities did not
conclude that its domestic industry had reduced its prices over the IP, nor that prices, in and of
themselves, were indicative of injury to the domestic industry. However, the European Communities
placed price developments in the context of developments in other factors, that is, market share and
profitability, in order to reach its affirmative injury finding.
294 We note that the information on the
record of the underlying investigation indicates that each of the co-operating importers and one of the
two co-operating users explicitly referred to “price” as a relevant determinant. The information on the
record largely bears out the EC statements.
7.337 We have examined the injury indicators which the European Communities found relevant and
significant for its injury determination. The Euro pean Communities found material injury during the
period of investigation on the basis, in particular, of declines in production, production capacity, sales
and market share. 295 Moreover, the European Communities stated that the Community industry
suffered a "significant loss" of employment and a decline in investments, as well as an increase of
stocks. It also determined that the increase in capacity utilisation depended on reduced production
capacity. Furthermore, it placed its evaluation of factors affecting domestic prices in the context of
developments in market share and profitability. We have observed that the European Communities
places its evaluation of each of these factors within the context of its own internal evolution and in
terms of its relationship with movements in other injury factors and that the record data with respect
to those factors deemed relevant by the European Communities overall bears out the EC evaluation of
these factors.
7.338 We examine the adequacy of the EC evaluation of the remaining factors listed in Article 3.4:
ability to raise capital, margin of dumping, productivity, return on investments, cash flow and wages.
7.339 Brazil alleges that the European Communities’ examination of these factors reflected in
Exhibit EC-12 is not “a well-reasoned and meaningf ul analysis” of the state of the EC industry
persuasively explaining how the evaluation of certa in relevant factors in Exhibit EC-12 led to the
determination of injury. Brazil submits that Exhi bit EC-12 informs the reader that an examination
was conducted somewhere else (although where this examination was made is, according to Brazil,
totally unclear) and that Exhibit EC-12 is presumably just a summary of that examination, if it did

291 We find support for our view that Article 3.4 deals with effects rather than causes in Panel Report,
Egypt – Rebar, supra note 251. See our more detailed examination of this infra.
292 Provisional Regulation, recital 164.
294 Supra, para. 7.334.
295 Provisional Regulation, recital 160.

take place at all. Brazil also makes specific allegations with respect to each of the factors referred to
in Exhibit EC-12.
7.340 The European Communities submits that the document explains the analysis that was carried
out by the EC authorities. That explanation, in response to Brazil’s questions and comments, has been
"supplemented" in these proceedings. The document does not purport to be issued under Article 12,
so the criteria of that Article are irrelevant. The European Communities states, in addition:
"In the case of four of these factors (productivity, return on investments, cash flow
and wages) the EC authorities' conclusion was that the developments during the IIP
were in line with one or more of the other factors, so that there was no point in
recording them independently in the Regulation. As regards "ability to raise capital"
the verdict was that the industry was not suffering problems. Finally, on the margin
of dumping, the note records that "given the volume and the prices of the imports,
this impact cannot be considered negligible."296
7.341 We recall the last sentence of Article 3.4, which provides that: the list of factors in Article 3.4
"is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance". We
observe that Exhibit EC-12 begins with the phrase: "After having examined all the injury factors, we
came to the following conclusions as concerns the particular injury factors set out below…". It then
contains brief observations on the following Article 3.4 factors: return on investments; wages;
productivity; cash flow, ability to raise capital and magnitude of the actual margin of dumping and
presents underlying data through tables and graphs relating to the developments in each of the
individual factors. The document also identifies the sources of the data. The development of each
factor is traced individually as well as in terms of its relationship to other evaluated factors. There is a
statement indicating the reason why the European Communities did not attribute relevance or weight
to each of the factor. The European Communities did not rely on these factors as a relevant basis for
its injury determination, and has indicated that this is so. The last sentence of Article 3.4 envisages
such a situation.
7.342 In light of the overall development and interaction among injury indicators collectively, the
record data overall would not preclude a finding by a reasonable and objective investigating authority
that the domestic industry was injured. We therefore consider that the European Communities did not
violate its obligations under Articles 3.4 or 3.1 in its evaluation of injury factors.
(iv) Factors not listed in Article 3.4
7.343 The Article 3.4 obligation to evaluate factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic
industry "is not confined to the listed factors, but extends to "all relevant economic factors".
297 In this
context, we note that in its argumentation in support of its claim of violation of Article 3.4, Brazil has
alleged that the European Communities paid inadequate attention in its injury determination to export
performance and outsourcing as well as the relative cost structure of the domestic industry (including
the substantial difference in cost of production between the product concerned produced and sold by
the EC producers (‘white heart fittings’) and the product concerned imported from Brazil (‘black heart
fittings’) being significantly higher in the manufacture of white heart fittings).298.

296 EC second oral statement.
297 Appellate Body Report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 40.
298 Brazil first written submission, paras. 727-729. We understand that despite references by Brazil in
its injury argumentation to certain other elements, such as the impact on profitability of investments and
depreciation charges associated with rationalization (e.g. Brazil first written submission, para. 713), Brazil's
allegations with respect to these elements are limited to its Article 3.5 claim on causation.

7.344 In this respect, a firm distinction must be drawn between the causation and injury elements of
an investigation. The phrase “having a bearing on” in Article 3.4 can mean “relevant to or having to
do with” the state of the domestic industry. 299 This is consistent with a view that the factors in
Article 3.4 are indicative of the state of the industry, or of the effects on the industry, rather than
factors having an effect thereon. Contextual considerations support this reading of the ordinary
meaning of the text. In particular, the wording of the last group of factors in Article 3.4 is “actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories…”. In addition, Article 3.5 cross-refers to the
“effects” of dumping as set forth in … [Article 3.4]”. We thus disagree with Brazil’s assertions300 that
the implications of outsourcing including imports from other third countries are indicators of the state
of the domestic industry, as opposed to potential causal factors influencing or having an impact upon
the state of the domestic industry. Whether or not an evaluation of causal factors is adequate is a
matter to be examined under Article 3.5. We address Brazil’s allegations concerning causation below.
7.345 For all of these reasons, we find that the European Communities has not violated its
obligations under Articles 3.4 or 3.1.
(v) Claims under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 relating to the injury analysis
7.346 We recall the distinction between the substantive obligations of Article 3 and the “framework
of procedural and due process obligations” established by Article 6 and Article 12. 301 To the extent
that Brazil's allegations relate to the non-disclosure of injury information during the investigation, we
examine these under Article 6. 302 We examine Brazil's claims concerning the alleged inadequacy of
the EC published determinations under Article 12 (Issue 19, infra).
7.347 We understand Brazil to assert that the EC breached Articles 6.2 and 6.4 by not providing
Tupy with a full opportunity to properly defend its interests under Article 6.2 nor timely opportunities
to see all relevant information in violation of Article 6.4 with respect to those injury factors referred to
only in Exhibit EC-12.
7.348 We begin our examination with the text of Articles 6.2 and 6.4. Article 6.2 requires that:
"Throughout an anti-dumping investigation all intere sted parties shall have a full opportunity for the
defence of their interests…" Article 6.4 requires that: "The authorities shall whenever practicable
provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the
presentation of their cases, …, that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation". We
recall that the European Communities also gathered and analysed data with respect to the injury
factors referred to exclusively in Exhibit EC-12, but essentially concluded that this data was "in line"
with other data (that was disclosed) and that there was no "value added" to the substance of their
investigation in the analysis of these factors. Ther efore, this information was considered not relevant
and was not specifically relied upon by the EC in reaching the anti-dumping determination. Tupy was
therefore not deprived of timely opportunities to see information relevant to its case nor of an
opportunity for defence of its interests.
7.349 For these reasons, we find that the European Communities has not violated Articles 6.2 or 6.4
with respect to the information on injury factors referred to exclusively in Exhibit EC-12.

299 See Webster’s New World Dictionary. We find support for this view in Panel Report, Egypt-Rebar,
supra, note 251, paras. 7.62-7.63.
300 See, for example, Comments by Brazil on EC response to Panel Question 23 following the second
Panel meeting.
301 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, supra, note 81, paras. 107 et seq.
302 We examine Brazil's claim with respect to non-disclosure of export performance information infra,
under "Issue 17: causation".

15. Issue 17 - causation
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.350 Brazil submits that the European Communities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement establishing causation of injury where no injury existed, by not adequately
examining known factors other than dumped imports which were at the same time causing injury to
the domestic industry and by not establishing whether injury caused by known factors other than
allegedly dumped imports was not attributed to allegedly dumped imports. In addition to challenging
the European Communities' causation methodology (the "significant contribution test"), Brazil also
objects to the adequacy of the EC examination of certain specific factors, in particular, Brazil focuses
in this regard on seven other "known" factors th at it argues were raised in the investigation
303: (i)
margins analysis (relationship between dumping and undercutting margins, including Tupy's
"competitive advantage" over EC producers which enabled it to sell at lower prices (as it produced
"black heart fittings" with a different cost of production than the "white heart fittings" produced by
EC producers); (ii) EC producers' poor export performance; (iii) imports from the countries not
subject to the investigation; (iv) outsourcing; (v) rationalisation efforts; (vi) substitution of the product
concerned; and (vii) the difference in the cost of production and the market perception between the
two variants of the product concerned.
7.351 The European Communities stresses that it is not the Panel's task to conduct a de novo
examination. The European Communities defends the consistency of its causation methodology with
Article 3.5, asserting that the process of allocating injuries to causes need not be embarked upon in the
case of a factor which made no significant contribution to injury. 304 The European Communities
states that factors (i) and (vii) referred to by Brazil were not "known" factors as they were not raised
by interested parties in the course of the underlyi ng investigation. Further, the remaining factors
referred to by Brazil were properly and adequately evaluated under Article 3.5 through an objective
examination based on positive evidence under Article 3.1.
(b) Arguments of third parties
7.352 Chile endorses the view of the Appellate Body in US-Hot-Rolled Steel,305 which Chile takes
to mean that the obligation in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is for an investigating
authority to evaluate the subject imports and any other factor causing injury to the domestic industry
at the same time, distinguish among these effects and attribute to each factor its effects.
7.353 Japan submits that the European Communities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 because it failed
to ensure that injury from factors other than imports was not attributed to imports. Japan submits that
the European Communities has accordingly also violated Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.354 As always, the Panel begins its analysis of Brazil's claims with the text of the relevant treaty
provisions. Article 3.5 provides:
“3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this

303 See Brazil's response to Question 125 of the Panel following the first meeting, Annex E-1.
304 EC response to Panel question 129 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-3, para. 177,
referring to recital 113 in the Definitive Regulation, which states: "any substitution effect cannot have
significantly contributed to the injury suffered by the Community industry as evidenced by the relatively stable
consumption established in the course of the present investigation."
305 Supra, note 40, para. 228.

Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry.”
7.355 The obligations of Article 3.1 also inform the requirements for the Article 3.5 evaluation. We
recall the text of that provision and our understanding of the obligations imposed thereby, discussed
above.
306
7.356 Article 3.5 requires investigating authorities, as part of their causation analysis, first, to
examine all "known factors", "other than dumped imports", which are causing injury to the domestic
industry "at the same time" as dumped imports. Second, investigating authorities must ensure that
injuries which are caused to the domestic industry by known factors, other than dumped imports, are
not attributed to the dumped imports.
7.357 We first consider whether the European Communities failed to consider "known" factors, other
than imports, that were causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time. There is no difference
of views between the parties that factors (ii) through (vi) above were "known". However, the EC argues
that the onus under Article 3.5 lies on interested parties to raise issues during the course of the
investigation. The EC thus asserts that "known" factors encompass those factors raised by interested
parties in the course of the investigation and, contrary to Brazil's assertions, submits that Tupy did not
raise certain of these factors in the investigation: "margins analysis" and "differences in the cost of
production and market perception between white- and black-heart variants of the product concerned".
7.358 We therefore examine the nature of the Article 3.5 obligation in terms of the range of factors an
investigating authority must examine under Articl e 3.5, and in particular, what constitutes a "known"
factor within the meaning of this provision.
7.359 Article 3.5 requires that the demonstration of the causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the injury to the domestic industry "shall be based on an examination of all relevant
evidence before the authorities", and that the authorities must also examine other "known" factors.
The obligation imposed by Article 3.5 is therefore to examine any other known factors which at the
same time are injuring the domestic industry. This provision makes clear that it is mandatory to
consider "known" factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry and to ensure that any such injury is not attributed to those imports. The phrase
"factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia…" (emphasis added) further makes it
clear that the list contained in the provision is indicative.
307 We understand that "known" factors
under Article 3.5 include those causal factors that are clearly raised before the investigating
authorities by interested parties in the course of an anti-dumping investigation.308

306 Supra, paras. 7.225 ff.
307 See also Panel Report, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 62.
308 We find support for this approach in previous panel reports, in particular, Panel Report, Thailand -
H-Beams.

7.360 In the light of these considerations, we consider whether the "margins analysis" and the
differences in cost of production and market perception between black- and white-heart variants were
"known" factors within the meaning of Article 3.5.
7.361 We understand Brazil to argue before us that Tupy had raised in the investigation the
arguments that Tupy had a comparative advantage over EC producers in that the cost of production of
"black heart" fittings (imported from Brazil) was less than that of "white heart " fittings (sold in the
European Communities by EC producers) that this cost difference between these two variants of the
product concerned was reflected in the subsequent selling prices due to the differing market
perception. For Brazil, these elements form the basis for two allegedly "known" causal factors: first,
the "margins analysis" relating to the relative competitiveness (cost efficiency) and comparative
advantage of the Brazilian exporter over the EC producers based on a comparison of the injury and
dumping margins; and second, the cost difference between the Brazilian exporter and the EC industry
based on the comparison of prices.
309
7.362 We asked Brazil to identify where in the record of the investigation – in the context of
causation — Tupy had raised these arguments before the EC investigating authority. The portions of
the record of the investigation cited by Brazil in response 310 to our questioning indicate that Tupy
raised the differences between black heart and white heart variants of the product concerned in terms
of the cost of production and in market perception in the course of the investigation in the context of
injury (and dumping) – and, in particular, with respect to non-comparability or claimed adjustments
for price comparability in the price undercutting analysis. The European Communities did investigate
the alleged differences in cost of production and market perception between white and black heart
variants of the product concerned and made factual findings that the difference in cost of production
was minimal and that there was no significant difference in market perception. In light of these
findings, these factors, although “known” to them in the context of the dumping and injury analysis,
would not be a "known" causal factor, that is, a factor that the European Communities was aware
would possibly be causing injury to the domestic industry. We therefore find that the European
Communities did examine these factors, and, in light of its findings, did not perceive of them as
“known” causal factors.
7.363 We next examine whether the European Communities has ensured that injuries which are
caused to the domestic industry by known factors other than dumped imports, are not attributed to the
dumped imports. Brazil's allegations raise two general issues: first, Brazil alleges that the European
Communities' causation methodology (which Brazil refers to as the "significant contribution test") is per
se inconsistent with Article 3.5; second, Brazil alleges that the EC's specific examination of each of the
other known factors is inadequate to fulfil the requirements of Article 3.5. We consider each of these in
turn.
7.364 Brazil submits that irrespective of the other existing causes of injury, the European
Communities determines the injury margin as a total difference between the price of the dumped
imports and the EC producers’ actual or target price without eliminating the injurious effects of other
known factors. Brazil alleges that the European Communities is not methodologically able to ensure
that the injuries caused by those other known factors are not attributed to the dumped imports. The
European Communities states that it adequately separated and distinguished between the effects of
known causal factors.
7.365 We therefore examine the nature of the non-attribution requirement in Article 3.5, which
applies in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the
domestic industry "at the same time".

309 We sought clarification on these points from Brazil in Panel question 124 following the first Panel
meeting. See Annex E-1.
310 Brazil's response to Panel Question 125 following the first Panel meeting, Annex E-1.

7.366 Under Article 3.5, an investigating authority must examine whether a causal relationship
exists between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry, and, in so doing, the
investigating authority must appropriately separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the other
factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports so as not to attribute the effects of the other
factors to the dumped imports. 311 However, the Agreement sets out no particular required nor
preferred methodology as to how such a causation analysis must be conducted. Therefore, WTO
Members may apply any causation methodology, provided that it appropriately separates and
distinguishes the injurious effects of dumped imports from the injurious effects of the other known
causal factors and therefore satisfies the obligations in Article 3.312
7.367 In its determination, the European Communities id entified certain factors, other than dumped
imports, that were potentially causing injury to the domestic industry including imports from third
countries not subject the investigation; decline in consumption and substitution. With respect to each
of these factors individually, the European Communities conducted a separate examination and found
either that it “is not such as to have contributed in any significant way to the material injury suffered
by the Community industry”(decline in consumption);
313 that it made “no significant contribution”
(export performance) or that "no significant influence" could have resulted (own imports of the
product concerned),314 that it cannot have significantly contributed to injury (substitution),315 or (in the
case of imports from the countries not subject to the investigation) “even if imports from other third
countries may have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Community industry, it is hereby
confirmed that they are not such to have broken the causal link between the dumping and the injury
found”).316 The European Communities concluded that any other factors that may have contributed to
the injury to the domestic industry were "not such as to have broken the casual link" between dumped
imports and injury.
317
7.368 These aspects of the EC determination indicate to us that the European Communities analysed
individually the causal factors concerned and identified the individual effects of each of these causal
factors. With respect to each of the factors, the European Communities concluded that the extent of
the contribution to injury was not significant, or, in one case, extrapolated that, even if the effect were
significant, it would not be such as to “break the causal link” between dumped imports and material
injury. The European Communities' overall conclusion was that none of these factors had an effect
that was such to have broken the causal link between dumped imports and material injury.
7.369 We are certainly aware of the theoretical possibility that a causation methodology which
separates and distinguishes between individual injury factors may not accommodate the possibility
that multiple “insignificant factors” might collectively constitute a significant cause of injury such as

311 We find support for our view in Appellate Body Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel , supra,
note 40.
312 We recall, in this respect, the statement of the Appellate Body in para. 224 of its Report in
United States – Hot-Rolled Steel , supra, note 40: "We emphasize that the particular methods and approaches by
which WTO Members choose to carry out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of
dumped imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors are not prescribed by the Anti-
Dumping Agreement . What the Agreement requires is simply that the obligations in Article 3.5 be respected
when a determination of injury is made."
313 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 176.
314 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 174.
315 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 175-176.
316 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 111
317 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 177.

to sever the link between dumped imports and injury. 318 However, the EC methodology -- which we
understand to separate and distinguish between the effects of each of these causal factors and the
dumped imports including through an examination as to whether the extent of the effects of each
causal factor are such that it is necessary to separate and distinguish its effects -- does not leave the
effects of those factors entirely lumped together and indistinguishable.
7.370 For these reasons, and given that Article 3.5 requires no particular methodology, we find that
Brazil has not established that the causation methodology applied by the European Communities in
this investigation constitutes, in and of itself, a violation of Article 3.5.
7.371 It remains for us to examine whether the European Communities met its obligations with
respect to each of the "known" factors in the invest igation in its causation determination identified by
Brazil: export performance; imports from third countries and outsourcing; substitution and
rationalisation.
(i) export performance
7.372 Brazil asserts that the European Communities violated Article 3.5 and 3.1 by failing to
separate and distinguish the effects of EC producers' export performance and by failing to conduct an
objective examination of this factor on the basis of positive evidence.319 320

318 The panel in Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat
Gluten from the European Communities (" US – Wheat Gluten "), WT/DS166/R, paras. 8.136- 8.153, adopted
19 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS166/AB/R, found that a similar causation
methodology that focused upon whether increased imports were a "substantial cause" was inconsistent with the
requirements under Article 4.2 of the Safeguards Agreement with respect to causation. That panel reasoned that
such a methodology weighed each other factor individual ly against imports to determine whether such factor
was "a more important cause of injury" and then excluded that factor as a "cause of injury" when that factor did
not alone satisfy that standard. For that panel, a demons tration that a given causal factor did not make an equal
or greater contribution to serious injury than imports did not demonstrate that such factor made no contribution
at all to serious injury. The Appellate Body overturned this finding, but did not squarely address the consistency
of the causation methodology at issue in that case. Rather it found that the United States had failed adequately
to evaluate the complexities of a particular causal factor (Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (" US – Wheat Gluten
 "),
WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001, paras. 60-92). Similarly, in Appellate Body Report, United States –
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia ("US –
Lamb "), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001; Appellate Body Report, United States –
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea ("US – Line
Pipe "), WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002; and Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note
40 (dealing with a the consistency of a similar causation under Article 3.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement) the
Appellate Body either did not squarely address the consistency of the causation methodology at issue, or apparently
implicitly condoned it by rather focusing on the adequa cy of particular aspects of the investigating authority's
causation analysis. The Appellate Body has observed that dispute settlement reports dealing with causation under
the Safeguards Agreement can provide guidance with respect to causation under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
vice versa (Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe , para. 214).
319 Before the European Communities submitted the EC producers' export figures in these Panel
proceedings, Brazil initially asserted that given that the European Communities did not disclose the EC
producers export figures and that the verified export volume of the EC industry deviates from the Eurostat,
Brazil assumed that the European Communities' determination in this respect was not sufficiently based on
positive evidence for the European Communities to have discharged its obligations further to Article 3.5.
However, following submission by the European Communi ties in these Panel proceedings of the confidential
export data, Brazil observed that the EC producers’ export volume decreased by 17% between 1995 and the IP.
Brazil also notes this decrease represents an absolute volume of 1,283 tonnes, i.e. around 3% of the EC
producers’ production, around 7% of the EC producers’ stocks and around 6% of the imports from the countries
concerned in the IP (Brazil second written submission, para. 320)

7.373 The European Communities denies both of these allegations. The European Communities
submits in these Panel proceedings the confidential export-volume data for the years 1995 through
1998 and the IP that were before the EC investigating authority.
7.374 The Panel observes that Tupy brought to the attention of the EC investigating authority the
impact that it perceived of the EC producers’ decreased exports on inventories in the course of the
investigation on the basis of Eurostat data (which Brazil argues showed, inter alia, that exports fell by
22% from 1995 to 1998).
321
7.375 In the investigation, the European Communities addressed the arguments made by Tupy with
respect to the export volume trends, including th e divergences between Eurostat data (submitted by
Tupy) and the data collected and verified by the European Communities in the course of the
investigation.322
7.376 The confidential export volume data that formed part of the record of the underlying
investigation and that were submitted by the European Communities in these Panel proceedings
support the cited statements made by the European Communities in the investigation, including with
respect to its relationship with Eurostat data. The European Communities identified the injury
indicator most affected by export performance (stock levels) and reasoned that on the basis that of the
proportion of sales outside the Community as compared to the sales on the EC market it could not be
concluded that the decrease of sales outside the Community significantly contributed to increased
stocks.
7.377 Concerning Brazil's allegation that the EC’s conclusion regarding export performance is not
based on positive evidence since the data supplied by EC producers, and verified by the EC
authorities, show variances from Eurostat data, the European Communities reflected its preference to
use verified data, where possible, in the Definitive Disclosure.
323
7.378 In light of the confidential export performance data on the record of the investigation and the
assessment based thereon as reflected in these statements, we do not find that the European
Communities has violated its obligations to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive

320 Brazil recalls (in paragraphs 316 and 317 of its second written submission) that Tupy had argued
that poor export performance had contributed to the increase in stock levels. In response, the European
Communities had replied as follows in the Transparency Letter (Exhibit BRL-18 at 6.4): "...firstly, the data on
the sales outside the Community included in the questionnaire replies of the Community industry and verified
by the Commission services, do not confirm the figures provided by Tupy, the decrease of those sales being
lower and regarding lower volumes. Secondly, on the basis of the proportion of the sales outside the
Community as compared to the sales on the Community market, it cannot be concluded that the decrease of the
sales outside [t]he Community significantly contributed to the increase of stock levels." Brazil argues that the
stock data used by the European Communities was inaccurate and thus the facts concerning the consequential
effects of dumped imports on the EC domestic industry were not properly established on the basis of positive
evidence. We recall our finding supra, that the EC stock data did not undermine the factual basis for the EC
evaluation under Article 3.4. Our finding necessarily also holds for the purposes of our analysis here.
321 See Fifth Submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-17, para. 3.8.3.
322 The relevant passage from the EC transparency letter reads as follows: "…reference is made to the
trends of the export volumes of the Community industry between 1995 and 1998 in connection with the
evolution of stocks. In this respect it has to be noted that, firstly, the data on the sales outside the Community
included in the questionnaire replies of the Community industry and verified by the Commission services, do
not confirm the figures provided by Tupy, the decrease of those sales being lower and regarding lower volumes.
Secondly, on the basis of the proportion of sales outside the Community as compared to the sales on the
Community market, it cannot be concluded that the decr ease of the sales outside [t]he Community significantly
contributed to the increase of the stock levels.”
323 Disclosure preceding the Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-16.

evidence with respect to export performance as a causal factor, nor that the EC failed to separate and
distinguish the effects of this causal factor.
7.379 Brazil has also made an allegation concerning non-disclosure of EC producers’ exports and
purchases of the product concerned over the Injury Investigation Period, which precluded Tupy from
being able to properly defend its interests, in violation of Article 6.2 and from having timely
opportunities to see all relevant information in violation of Article 6.4. The EC states that this
information was confidential and therefore not disclosed to interested parties.
7.380 We begin with the text of the relevant legal provisions. Article 6.2 requires that: "Throughout
the anti-dumping investigation all interested partie s shall have a full opportunity for defence of their
interests". The text of that provision also makes clear that this general obligation in Article 6.2 "must
take account of the need to preserve confidentiality". Similarly, the text of Article 6.4 states that:
"The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities to see all information … that
is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5…" (emphasis added). We note that this information had
been considered as confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 and, on the basis of Brazil's Panel
request and argumentation in these Panel proceedings, we do not understand that Brazil has invoked
Article 6.5 of the Agreement in this connection. We therefore do not find that the European
Communities has breached Article 6.2 or 6.4 in this respect.
(ii) imports from third countries and “outsourcing”
7.381 Brazil submits that Tupy consistently argued during the investigation that there were exports
from certain other third countries entering the EC in volumes no less than those of some of the
Countries Concerned – in particular, Bulgaria, Poland and Turkey -- and at prices, which seemed to
significantly undercut the prices of the EC producers (as well as Brazilian prices).
324 Brazil also
argues that, in parallel with, and as a reason for, the increased imports from the other third countries,
Tupy raised in the investigation that certain EC producers were in a process of outsourcing their
production of the product concerned to other countries and then importing into the EC market from
those countries. The domestic industry thereby caused injury to itself by giving away market share.
In the opinion of Brazil, it was incumbent upon the EC further to its obligations under Article 6.6 to
satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information submitted to it by Tupy with regard the extent to
which the EC producers were outsourcing their production of the like product to non-EC countries
and therefore contributing to the declining sales and market share of the EC industry.
7.382 The European Communities contends that it appropriately examined imports from these
countries and concluded that they were not a significant causal factor. The European Communities
concluded that, although imports from third countries (including Turkey, Bulgaria and Poland) may
have contributed to the material injury suffered by the EC industry, they were not such to have broken
the causal link between the dumping and the injury found.
325
7.383 The Panel notes that the Provisional Regulation326 and the Definitive Regulation both contain
statements in respect of volume and price of imports from other third countries not subject to the
investigation. The Definitive Regulation states:327

324 E.g. First and Third submissions of Tupy in the EC investigation.
325 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 111.
326 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 167 and 168:
“Some interested parties, based on Eurostat information, alleged that any injury suffered by the
Community industry had been caused by imports from third countries not covered by the proceeding,
in particular Turkey, Bulgaria and Poland.
According to this information, import volumes of malleable fittings from all other countries
decreased from around 6,200 tonnes in 1995 to around 5,300 in the IP. i.e. by around 14%, while
market shares were relatively stable through out the period with a slightly decreasing trend,

"According to Eurostat, during the IIP, imports from other third countries decreased
in volume by around 14% while market shares decreased by around one percentage
point. As to the prices, they increased on average by around 15% and were 17%
higher than the average prices of the imports from the countries concerned."
7.384 The Provisional and Definitive Regulations also address individual developments pertaining
to imports from Turkey, Bulgaria and Poland.
7.385 With respect to imports from Poland, Brazil observes that the volume of imports from Poland
increased by 23% over the Injury Investigation Period and that its market share went from 3.8% to
5%, and that unit prices, although increasing by 11% over the same period, were significantly lower
(42%) than the EC producers' prices. Brazil object s to the EC's characterisation of these trends. In
particular, Brazil objects to the EC statement in these Panel proceedings that the EC investigating
authority "has not attributed any injury to these imports (since there was none)". 328 In view of the EC
conclusion on price sensitivity 329 (which Brazil however contests), Brazil submits that the EC's
conclusion that the imports from Poland had not caused any injury could not have been based on an
objective examination of positive evidence.330
7.386 Brazil also recalls that Tupy had emphasised:331
“…that the Commission fails to note that most of the Polish imports comprise of galvanised
fittings whereas most of the Brazil’s imports do not. Galvanised fittings are more expensive
to produce and are priced at considerable different levels, with galvanised fittings fetching
much higher prices. Moreover, exporters sell to all levels of trade and especially lower
levels whereas Tupy only sells to the highest level. When the impact of these differences is
calculated, there can be no escape from concluding that the Polish imports are significantly
cheaper than those of Brazil…"
7.387 The European Communities' evaluation of the developments relating to imports from
Poland
332, as well as its evaluation of imports from third countries as a whole, were set out in the
Provisional Regulation333 and the Definitive Regulation. It is clear to us from the determination that
the EC examined imports from Poland and considered the arguments made by Tupy in the course of
the investigation. While the record evidence indicates an increase in imports from Poland from 1995
through the IP of 23%, it also indicates that they peaked in 1997 and then declined somewhat in 1998
and the IP. The unit price rose by 11% from 1995-IP.

representing around 10% in 1995 and around 9% in the IP. As regards the weighted average prices of
imports from other third countries, as reported by Eurostat, they increased from 1.93 ECU/kg to 2,22
ECU/kg. It is to be noted that they were significantly higher than the weighted average prices of the
countries concerned during the whole IIP."
327 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 107.
328 Brazil refers to EC first written submission, para. 361.
329 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 164.
331 Fourth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-13.
332 The data relied upon in the investigation indicated the following import volumes from Poland:
1995: 2,497; 1996: 2,993; 1997: 3,209; 1998: 3,137; IP 3,063; and the following price pattern: 1995: 2.03;
1996: 2.08; 1997: 2.18; 1998: 2.24; IP 2.26.
333 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 171: "Concerning imports from Poland, their
market share remained relatively stable during the IIP at around 4-5%, although increasing in absolute terms
from around 2.500 tonnes in 1995 to around 3.000 tonnes in the IP. However, in the IP, the unit price was
significantly higher than the weighted average prices of the countries concerned."

7.388 An analysis of injury and causation does not necessarily concentrate on developments of
factors in isolation. Rather, a factor is to be assessed in terms of its own evolution as well as placed in
the context of developments in other factors, in or der to produce an integrated evaluation of the state
of the domestic industry as a whole and the causes of this state. Seen in their context, this data largely
supports the EC statement that “market share rema ined relatively stable during the IIP at around 4-
5%, although increasing in absolute terms from around 2,500 tonnes in 1995 to around 3,000 tonnes
in the IP”. Similarly, the record evidence confirms the EC statement concerning the price of imports
from Poland (that is, in the IP, the unit price was significantly higher than the weighted average prices
of the countries concerned). We recall that Poland was not under investigation for selling the product
at dumped prices in the EC market. We further recall our discussion of the EC's finding of "high price
sensitivity (supra. para. 7.336).
7.389 The EC authorities also took account of the alleged variance with respect to the product under
examination, and explained to Tupy that “the allegation concerning the mix of malleable fittings
originating in Poland is in fact not substantiated and not susceptible to be verified since Eurostat data
do not have such a level of detail”.
334 Under Article 6.6, the EC inve stigating authority is obligated
during the course of the investigation to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information supplied by
interested parties upon which their findings are based. The European Communities indicated that it
had considered the allegation by Tupy, which the European Communities observed had not been
substantiated, and that it relied on Eurostat data that its level of specificity also did not reflect Tupy's
allegation. The European Communities' reliance on Eurostat data with respect to imports from
Poland, a country not subject to the investigation for dumped imports, does not, in our view,
constitute a violation of Article 3.5 or 3.1 nor 6.6 of the Agreement.
7.390 With respect to imports from Bulgaria, the Provisional
335 and Definitive 336 Regulations
address developments in import volume and price. The Provisional Regulation also indicates that the
European Communities examined evidence concerning imports from Bulgaria "in the framework of
the analysis of the complaint prior to the Initiation of the proceeding". On the basis of this evidence,
the European Communities found that "no dumping appeared to exist" with the consequence that no
investigation concerning Bulgaria could be initiated.337 While it is clear from the record evidence that
there was a substantial increase in imports from Bu lgaria in absolute terms (from 43 to 1109 tonnes,
1995-IP), the European Communities specifically referred to this and also placed this factor in context
by noting the market share was 1.8% in the IP. The European Communities also evaluated the price
developments, noting inter alia that the during the IIP their price increased by around 11% and, in the
IP, price was 5% higher than the weighted average price of the imports concerned.338 339
7.391 It was first and foremost for the EC authority to appraise and evaluate the evidence before it.
Tupy had made available to the EC factual information in support of its allegations that certain
Applicants (Georg Fischer, Atusa and Woeste) we re “outsourcing” certain product types or segments
of the product concerned from certain countries, including Bulgaria, in its submissions throughout the
investigation, including after the Provisional Regulation The EC assessment was that it provided no
significantly new evidence to cause it to revisit its initial assessment. This much is discernible from
the determination.

334 Transparency Letter’, Exhibit BRL-18, point 7.1.
335 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 170.
336 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 109.
337 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 7-8.
338 See fourth submission of Tupy in the EC investigation, Exhibit BRL-13, p.2, para. 3.
339 The Provisional Regulation, recital 174, states: "…the investigation has shown that one Community
producer did import the product concerned from one third country. However, since these volumes were very low
and represented only a negligible pan [ sic] of its sales in the Community, no significant influence on the
situation of that Community producer could have resulted from these imports."

7.392 There is no indication on the record of the EC investigation as cited to us by Brazil 340 that
Tupy raised imports specifically from Egypt in relation to imports of the product concerned. The
record of indicates that Tupy raised the issue of imports from Egypt in connection with its opposition
to the exclusion of unthreaded products from the definition of "like product" and thus from the scope
of the investigation. In addition, the EC Provisio nal Regulation indicates that the EC investigated
volumes and prices of imports from "all other third countries" not subject to the investigation.341 None
of them was found to have been a significant cause of injury.
7.393 As concerns imports from Turkey, the Provisional Regulation states:."… imports from
Turkey were stable at almost negligible levels during the entire IIP. As regards import volumes, they
were 553 tonnes in 1995 and 632 tonnes in the IP, while market shares were stable at around 1%
during the whole IIP. Concerning the unit price, according to Eurostat it was higher than the imports
concerned throughout the whole IIP". 342 The Definitive Regulation also addresses developments in
import volume and price indicating that during the IP, the weighted average price of imports was
around 10% higher than the weighted average price of the imports concerned and market share
remained stable at around 1% of Community consumption. Moreover, the Definitive Regulation
notes that the investigation confirmed that imports by certain Community producers had occurred,
these were minimal by comparison with EC-produced sales of the EC producers concerned, and did
not affect the status of such EC producers as part of the domestic industry. The Notice of Initiation
indicates that, while Turkey was listed in the appl ication, the EC decided to exclude it at the outset
from the investigation as its market share was de minimis.
343 The record also indicates that Tupy
raised the issue of imports from Turkey in connection with inter alia its opposition to the exclusion of
unthreaded products from the definition of "like product" and thus from the scope of the investigation.
7.394 Brazil also argues that the European Communities' alleged non-reaction to the request made
by Tupy that the EC request the Turkish authorities to confirm information relating to outsourcing
arrangements between a Community producer (Georg Fischer) and a Turkish producer. is a failure to
abide by the obligations of an objective and unbiased authority. We find no basis in the Agreement
for Brazil’s argument that the EC was required to pursue the issue of imports from Turkey (a country
not subject to the investigation) in the particular manner requested by an interested party.344
7.395 The EC evaluation of the injurious effects of other factors, including imports from third
countries, is in its general conclusion on causation. 345 In the Definitive Regulation, the European
Communities made a finding specifically in respect of imports from third countries, concluding that
such imports did not sever the causal link between dumped imports and injury. 346 We discern from
the determination that the European Communities ha s considered this factor and its effects and
concluded that it did not make a significant contribution to injury. Our view is not that the EC did not
"investigate" the issue, but rather that it evaluated the evidence in light of the volume and price effects
of these imports in the context of other developments affecting the domestic industry, in order to
make its determination.
7.396 Brazil underlines that certain Community producers had a “controlling influence” over certain
producers in other countries and therefore could dictate their commercial decisions. According to
Brazil, the EC industry outsourced production and then inflicted injury upon itself.

340 Fourth submission of Tupy, Exhibit BRL-13, para. 3.
341 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 168.
342 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 169.
343 Notice of Initiation, supra, note 5, recital 1.
345 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 177.
346 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 111.

7.397 Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which governs the concept of “domestic industry”
for the purposes of an anti-dumping investigation, calls for an examination of ownership and control
relationships among companies, including relationships between producers and exporters or importers
located in the territories of other countries, as well as an examination of producers who are also
importers of the allegedly dumped product. The definition of “domestic industry” is a keystone of the
anti-dumping investigation. In this case, the Eu ropean Communities examined whether or not it was
required or appropriate under Article 4(1) to exclude certain producers from the definition of domestic
industry. The EC concluded that it was not.347
7.398 The consequence of outsourcing would be an in crease in the volume of imports from third
countries, and any loss of market share would fl ow from imports from the companies to whom
production had been outsourced. The imports from the third countries in which these companies were
located would include the production resulting from any “outsourcing”. An examination of the effects
of those imports would take into account any effects of elements subsumed within those imports. In
any event, the EC also examined claims by interested parties of imports made by domestic producers
themselves and came to the conclusion that, in light of their relatively small magnitude, these imports
did not affect the status of EC producers, nor did they constitute a significant cause of injury.
7.399 In light of the data on the record of the invest igation, in particular relating to the price and
volume of imports from third countries not subject to the investigation – in particular Poland, Turkey
and Bulgaria -- and the EC assessment based thereon, we do not find that the European Communities
has violated its obligations to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence with
respect to imports from other countries not subject to the investigation or “outsourcing” as a causal
factor, nor that the European Communities failed to separate and distinguish the effects of this causal
factor.
(iii) rationalisation
7.400 Brazil argues that the EC causation assessment was flawed as the evolution of production and
production capacity, as well as the decrease of employment and the lack of profitability, were caused
by the EC industry’s "voluntary" decision to rationalise production at the beginning of and during the
IP. Brazil asserts that the EC did not base its determination on positive evidence and failed to
appropriately separate and distinguish the effects of this causal factor.
7.401 The European Communities contends that the investigating authority investigated and
distinguished the effect of the rationalisation on the basis of an objective examination of positive
evidence.

347 The Provisional Regulation states: "Furthermore, it was claimed by some interested parties that
certain Community producers imported the product concerned from other third countries. The investigation has
shown, as regards one producer, that they indeed made such imports. However, these imports were minimal by
comparison with the Community produced sales on the Community market. Therefore, this company in its core
activity clearly remained a producer in the Community. With respect to the others, the allegations have not been
confirmed. " The European Communities indicated that it had investigated the nature of investments of the EC
industry, but that Tupy's allegations had not been substantiated or confirmed (Exhibit BRL-18, para. 6.14). In
the Disclosure preceding the Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-18, para. 6.1, the European Communities
indicates that it "did thoroughly investigate the sales structure of Atusa and of all the other Community
producers as well" but that "[t]he result of this investigation did not however require any modification" of the
EC findings. The questionnaires to EC producers indi cate that the EC requested information on corporate
structure and relationships, for example, of Atusa (Exhibit BRL-41) and of Georg Fischer (Exhibit BRL-39).
While we do not mean to suggest that an Article 4 examination would necessarily be sufficient also for the
purposes of the causation analysis required by Article 3.5, it sets the parameters of the investigation of "injury"
caused by "dumped imports".

7.402 The Panel recalls that under Article 3.5, injury must not be attributed to other known factors
causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports. We therefore examine
Brazil’s allegation about rationalisation in light of this obligation.
7.403 The European Communities expressly acknowledged in its determination the restructuring
efforts of the industry in 1995 and, in response to Tupy's arguments made before it, also indicated its
appraisal that this had a negative impact on production, employment and profitability and required
significant investments in 1995.
348 The EC also indicated that the record data reflected rising
production and profitability flowing from the re structuring in the following year, 1996. The
determination then indicates that this positive trend, which the EC would have expected to continue in
view of the rationalisation efforts, did not in fact continue. We understand Brazil to question
numerous aspects of this evaluation, including: that although the EC stated that the “contraction of the
sales of the Community industry entailed a rise of its stocks and a decline of its profitability, which,
although rising between 1995 and 1996, then decreased by 2.3 percentage points between 1996 and
the IP to [0.9%]” it did not draw the "obvious" causal connection with the price rises by the EC
producers and their declining market share; that the EC made no attempt to ascertain why the EC
producers' prices were increasing and whether or not those increases were related to costs associated
with the rationalisation; and the alleged failure by the European Communities to discuss and identify
what were the “further benefits which could reasonably have been expected to accrue to the
Community industry” as a result of its rationalisation efforts to which the European Communities
refers in the Definitive Regulation. In this la tter respect, Brazil points out that the Community
producers increased their prices over the IIP and submits that it is inappropriate "that anti-dumping
duties be levied on exports to the EC originating in Brazil if they are to be used to protect a market
from bearing the losses and costs associated with voluntary restructuring…” which are then
transferred on to end users through escalating sales prices, in a market which by the EC’s own
analysis is “highly price sensitive”.
349 We examine these allegations seriatim.
7.404 First, with respect to the alleged failure by the European Communities to acknowledge a
causal link between rationalisation and the price increases and declining market share, we note that
the European Communities stated that the “decrease of the production was particularly strong from
1995 to 1996”.
350 It then mentions: “a plant manufacturing malleable fittings in Germany had to be
closed”, and that the development in production capacity “should be seen in the light of the fact that in
1996 a production plant in Germany ceased its activity”; and that the development of employment
“should be seen in the light of the attempts undertaken by the Community industry to restructure and
reduce its costs”. We discern from the determination that the European Communities did evaluate the
relationship between restructuring and producti on, production capacity and employment during the
injury investigation period, and placed the developments in the IP within this context.
7.405 Brazil seems to argue that, in its causation analysis, the European Communities underplays or
omits to state that the impact of rationalisation effort s. Provided that it is clear that a determination
takes a given factor into account, it is immaterial where in the determination such attention is
indicated. Where it is clear that an investigating authority evaluates a given causal factor in
substance, it is not essential that this evaluation must, in form, appear in a section entitled "causation"
in the determination. Provided that it is clear that there has been consideration of whether or not a
decline in certain injury factors was attributable to a given causal factor rather than to dumped
imports, an appropriate analysis separating and distinguishing between and among the effects of
causal factors may still occur. In this case, the use by the European Communities of the terms "the
effects of" and the “results of these restructuring efforts” (emphases added) indicates to us that the EC
did consider this to be a factor influencing the state of the domestic industry, rather than solely a

348 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 101.
349 Reference is made to Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 165.
350 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 150, 151 and 158.

factor indicative of the state of the domestic industry. That the European Communities did not
identify effects of rationalisation in the latter part of the IP is reconcilable with the view that the
European Communities thought that this factor was not causing injury to the domestic industry at the
same time as the dumped imports.
7.406 Second, with respect to alleged failure by the European Communities to ascertain the reason
for the EC producers' price increases, the determin ation examines the rationale underlying the price
increases, which occurred in conjunction with a loss in sales volume and market share. 351 We discern
from the determination that the European Communities addressed the price increases made by the EC
producers and offered its evaluation of the salient facts in this regard.
7.407 With respect to Brazil's allegation that the Definitive Regulation was misleading and not
based on positive evidence in stating "as from 1996 … the Community industry began to suffer a
continuous decline of its sales volume … throughout the rest of the IIP", 352 the record data show a
drop in sales volume level from 1995 to 1996 and from 1997 through the IP. 353 We consider that the
underlying data, overall, bear out the EC evaluation of this factor. We do not consider that the fact
that there was a small increase in sales volume from 1996 to 1997 renders the EC evaluation of this
factor as reflected in the statement in the Definitive Regulation misleading, particularly as the phrase
"the rest of the IIP" appears to indicate a reference to the subsequent or later part of the IIP and thus
particularly when considered in an evaluation of the declining trend in the part of the IIP most closely
associated with the dumping IP.
7.408 Given these considerations, we do not consider that Brazil has established that the European
Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 3.5 and 3.1 in respect of its
findings concerning rationalisation.
(iv) substitution
7.409 Brazil argues that Tupy consistently asserted in the underlying investigation that the main
cause of any injury suffered by the Community industry was the substitution of fittings made of
materials such as copper and plastic for those made of malleable cast iron and included substantiating
evidence that even the EC industry considered this to be the case. However, Brazil alleges, by not
properly examining the issue of substitution and by assuming that the decrease in consumption did not
cause significant injury to the EC industry, the EC's examination was not "objective and not based on
"positive evidence". Although it was demonstrated to the European Communities that even the EC
industry itself considered substitution to be a major cause of their difficulties during the Injury
Investigation Period, and has thus caused or contributed to the fall in consumption of 6% between
1995 and the IP, the EC took an opposite view and concluded in the Definitive Regulation that (i)
consumption had not decreased (as it had been “relatively stable”), and (ii) being so, it “cannot have
significantly contributed to the injury suffered by the Community industry”. Accordingly, Brazil
argues that the conclusion made by the European Communities regarding substitution was unreliable,
erroneous and contradictory.
7.410 The European Communities responds that the EC authorities enquired into these issues and
reported their findings in both the Provisional and the Definitive Regulations. The fact that the
substitution of malleable fittings by copper or plastic fittings mainly took place in the 1980s (a fact
generally known in the market) was communicated repeatedly, not only by producers, but also by
certain users and importers, during the verification visits. In any case, the issue of substitution is of
relevance only as a factor affecting demand, and the European Communities made an unchallenged

351 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 103.
352 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 102.
353 The sales volume data on the record of the investigation are as follows: 1995: 45,456 t; 1996:
41,486 t; 1997: 41,866 t; 1998: 38,866 t; IP: 37,722 t.

factual finding, reflected in the Provisional Regulation that consumption decreased by 6% over the IIP
and judged that this was not a significant cause of injury.
7.411 The Panel recalls that the non-attribution requirement of Article 3.5 applies only when
another known factor is impacting upon the Community industry "at the same time" as the dumped
imports. Tupy raised the issue of substitution as a cause of injury to the domestic industry on several
occasions during the underlying investigation. The European Communities considered these
submissions and addressed them in detail in its Provisional
354 and Definitive 355 Regulations,
concluding that, inter alia, any injury caused by substitution had occurred previous to the IIP and that
this factor was not injuring the domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports.
7.412 These EC statements concerning the temporal non-coincidence of any injury caused by
substitution and by the dumped imports were based on the EC investigating authority's assessment of
the evidence before it. Furthermore, and in any event, any substitution would be reflected in
developments in demand for/consumption of the product concerned. In this regard, we note the
factual finding made by the European Communities that consumption decreased by 6% over the
IIP
356, and its assessment that this was not such as to have contributed significantly to the injury
sustained by the domestic industry. 357 We do not understand Brazil to dispute the linkage between
the effects of any substitution and trends in consumption. Indeed, Brazil itself emphasises this
linkage.
358 We recall our examination of the EC causation methodology itself supra.
7.413 Given these considerations, we do not consider that Brazil has established that the European
Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 3.5 and 3.1 in respect of its
findings concerning substitution.
(d) Conclusion on non-attribution to other “known” factors under Article 3.5
7.414 We have taken careful note of the factors raised by Brazil as "other known factors" within the
meaning of Article 3.5. We have also reviewed the analysis of these factors undertaken by the EC
investigating authority, in the light of the relevant underlying record data. In this respect, we recall, in
particular, the importance of the distinction between substantive obligations under Article 3.5 of the
Agreement and the transparency obligations relating to the disclosure and publication of data and
information under Articles 6 and 12 of the Agreement.
359
7.415 As we indicate above, we have made factual findings that the European Communities did
explicitly address in its determination the "other factors" identified by Brazil which had been raised
by Tupy in the underlying investigation. Having examined the data on the record of the underlying
investigation, and the EC’s evaluation of this data, in light of the text of the provisions of the

354 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recitals 175-176.
355 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 113 states: "The issue has been further investigated
and it has been confirmed that indeed the substitution of cast iron by different materials, such as copper and
plastic, took place mainly in the 1980's. Afterwards, the substitution effect slowed down and the utilisation of
malleable fittings remained stable, in particular for those uses where physical durability, resistance as well as a
specific tensile strength and elongation are required. Therefore, any substitution effect cannot have significantly
contributed to the injury suffered by the Community industry as evidenced by the relatively stable consumption
established in the course of the present investigation.”
356 Provisional Regulation, Exhibit BRL-12, recital 163.
357 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recital 113: "...any substitution effect cannot have
significantly contributed to the injury suffered by the Community industry as evidenced by the relatively stable
consumption established in the course of the present investigation."
359 Appellate Body Report, Thailand- H-Beams, supra, note 81.

Agreement, we do not find that the European Communities’ consideration of those factors, including
its conclusions about them, were biased or not objective.
7.416 As we stated earlier, 360 we are bound by Articles 17.5 and 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement to consider, on the basis of the evidence that was before the investigating authority during
the investigation, whether the establishment of the facts in respect of any factor was improper, and
whether the evaluation of any factor was biased or non-objective. We are thus precluded from
conducting our own de novo review of the record evidence, and from reaching our own conclusions
about each factor and the existence of injury and causation overall and substituting those for the
conclusions of the EC. We are, rather, to consider whether the conclusions reached in the
investigation could have been reached by an objective and unbiased investigating authority on the
basis of its analysis of the evidence of record at the time of the determination. For the reasons
discussed above, we find that this standard has been met, and thus that Brazil has not established that
the EC’s evaluation of injuries caused by factors other than the dumped imports was inconsistent with
Article 3.5.
16. Issue 19 –Information on matters of fact and law
(a) Information relating to the exploration of possibilities of constructive remedies (relating to
Issue 1)
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.417 Brazil argues that the European Communities has acted inconsistently with Articles 12.2. and
12.2.2 by failing to include or sufficiently set forth in their published notices certain findings and
conclusions reached on issues of fact and law. Brazil states that it agrees with the European
Communities that the obligation in Article 12.2 relates only to the findings and conclusions reached
on all issues of fact and law considered “material” by the investigating authorities and that the
findings and conclusions do not include all underlying evidence. In particular, Brazil asserts that the
European Communities violated Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 by not making public its findings and
conclusions with regard to the exploration of possibilities of constructive remedies under Article 15.
Brazil asserts that the fact that there is no mention in the Definitive Regulation that the possibility of
an undertaking had been explored with regard to the Brazilian exporter (in contrast to the references
to Czech, Korea, Thai and Japanese exporters) demonstrates that the European Communities did not
itself consider that it had discussed the possibility of price undertakings with Tupy.
7.418 The European Communities generally argues that the "findings and conclusions" as referred
to in Article 12.2 do not include all the underlying evidence. Moreover, Article 12.2 only requires
Members to address those issues which are "considered material by the investigating authorities".
This criterion is affected by the investigating authorities' experience and the matters raised by a party
during the investigation. The European Communities argues that it has complied with its obligations
under Article 15 by pursuing a price undertaking through diplomatic channels and that the EC's policy
not to publish details of negotiations or discussions on undertakings unless they are successful was
reinforced by the nature of the diplomatic discussions which are confidential within the meaning of
Article 6.5.
(ii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.419 The Panel begins with the text of the relevant provision. Article 12.2 reads:
12.2 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination,
whether affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to

360 Supra, para. 7.6.

Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a
definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating
authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and
to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.
7.420 Article 12.2.2 reads:
12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of
an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.
7.421 We examine whether or not the absence of any reference to any of the aspects relating to the
exploration of possibilities of constructive remedies under Article 15 considered by Brazil to be
"material" -- including the absence of any reference to Brazil in the section of the Definitive
Regulation dealing with price undertakings -- constitutes a violation of Article 12.2.
7.422 Article 12.2 requires the publication of "findings and conclusions on all issues of fact and law
considered material by the investigating authorities ", so that it would seem that there is a degree of
subjectivity and discretion on the part of the investigating authorities envisaged here. That being said,
however, the Agreement imposes certain objective requirements that would necessarily require
reflection in the published report of the investigation and thus consider whether we are dealing with
such requirements here.
7.423 Article 12.2 provides that the findings and conclusions on issues of fact and law which are to
be included in the public notices, or separate report, are those considered "material" by the
investigating authority. The ordinary meaning of the term of "material" is "important, essential,
relevant".
361
7.424 We understand a "material" issue to be an issue that has arisen in the course of the
investigation that must necessarily be resolved in order for the investigating authorities to be able to
reach their determination. We observe that the list of topics in Article 12.2.1 is limited to matters
associated with the determinations of dumping and injury, while Article 12.2.2 is more generally
phrased (“all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the
imposition of final measures, or the acceptance of a price undertaking”). Nevertheless, the phrase
“have led to”, implies those matters on which a factual or legal determination must necessarily be
made in connection with the decision to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty. While it would
certainly be desirable for an investigating authority to set out steps it has taken with a view to
exploring possibilities of constructive remedies, such exploration is not a matter on which a factual or
legal determination must necessarily be made since, at most, it might lead to the imposition of
remedies other than anti-dumping duties. We believe that contextual considerations also support this
interpretation since, the only matters referred to “in particular” in subparagraph 12.2.2 are, in addition

361 Concise Oxford Dictionary.

to the information described in subparagraph 2.1, the reasons for acceptance or rejection of relevant
arguments or claims, and the basis for certain decisions.
7.425 While Article 15 is indeed an integral part of the Agreement, we do not view the elements of
Article 15 as being of this nature. We therefore do not consider the European Communities erred by
not treating these elements as "material " within the meaning of that term used in Article 12 and thus
do not view it as having erred by not having included these in its published final determination.
7.426 Moreover, we note that the text of Article 12.2 covers, inter alia, “any preliminary and final
determination” of dumping and injury, and specifically, “any decision to accept an undertaking
pursuant to Article 8”. In this regard, as the European Communities did not take a decision to accept
(or reject) an undertaking, the specific obligation under Article 12.2 to explain that an undertaking had
been accepted or rejected would also not apply in this case.
7.427 In addition, Article 12.2.2 explicitly mentions that the obligations it contains are subject to the
requirement to maintain confidentiality. To the extent that any communications between the EC and
Brazilian governments were not disclosed by the European Communities in its final published
determination on the basis of confidentiality concerns, we can not find this to be a violation of
Article 12.2.
7.428 For these reasons, we find that the European Communities did not violate its obligations
under Article 12.2 in this regard.
(b) Information relating to Article 3.4 injury factors (relating to Issue 16)
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.429 Brazil alleges that the European Communities violated Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 by not making
public its findings and conclusions with regard to all of the mandatory injury factors under
Article 3.4.362
7.430 The European Communities argues that the Definitive Regulation generally addresses the
evaluation of all Article 3.4 factors by stating that not all of these factors need to be analysed in the
same way. In addition, the EC found that the factors concerned were generally in line with other
Article 3.4 factors and did not therefore need to be mentioned in the public determination.
(ii) Arguments of third parties
7.431 Japan argues that: by failing to describe all elements that European Communities considered
in its injury determination in the Definitive Regulation, the European Communities violated
Article 12.2.2; the lack of any findings or conclusions regarding certain Article 3.4 factors in the
public notices violates Article 12.2.2. Japan submits that the European Communities has accordingly
also violated Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.432 Article 12.2 requires that the authorities set forth, in sufficient detail, the findings and
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities.
We have addressed the meaning of "material" above. 363 In addition, Article 12.2 contains a textual
link to "paragraph 2.1" of Article 12. Among the items specified in Article 12.2.1 are "(iv)
considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3." We have found that

363 Supra, para. 7.424.

Article 3.4 requires that an investigating authority must assess the role, relevance and relative weight
of each factor in a particular investigation, and must explain their conclusions as to the lack of
relevance or significance of factors determined not to be relevant or of significant weight. 364 We
therefore consider that Article 12.2, and the explicit textual link to paragraph 12.2.1 require that it
must be discernible from the published determination that an investigating authority reflect this
explanation as to the lack of relevance or significance.
7.433 In this case, it is not directly discernible from the published Provisional or Definitive
Determination that the European Communities addresse d or explained the lack of significance of the
following factors in its injury determination: ability to raise capital; productivity, return on
investments; cash flow and wages. The relative significance of these factors is addressed exclusively
in the internal "note to file" Exhibit EC-12.
7.434 The Definitive Regulation indicates that Tupy "argued that the determination of the impact of
the dumped imports was not valid since certain injury factors set out in Article 3.4" had not been
examined. The European Communities rejected this line of reasoning on the basis that "the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the basic Regulation do not require that each factor be analysed in
exactly the same way" and that, in the specific case, "all the relevant factors considered as having a
bearing on the state of the industry have been taken into account in the context of the injury
assessment."
365 We do not consider this general reference by the European Communities to its
perception of its obligations under the Agreement to reflect any explanation of the relative
significance of the particular Article 3.4 factors concerned here.
7.435 We therefore find that the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Article 12.2 and Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in that it is not directly
discernible from the published Provisional or Definitive Determination that the European
Communities addressed or explained the lack of significance of certain listed Article 3.4 factors.
(c) Information relating to EC producers' export performance (relating to Issues 16 and 17)
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.436 Brazil submits that the European Communities violated Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 by not
making public its findings and conclusions with regard to the EC producers' export performance.
7.437 The European Communities argues that Brazil's claim relates to disclosure rather than
publication of information and therefore is not within the scope of Article 12.
(ii) Arguments of third parties
7.438 Japan argues that the European Communities’ failure to provide an explanation of why it
rejected Brazil’s claim concerning poor export performance violates Article 12.2.2 Japan submits that
the European Communities has accordingly also violated Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Evaluation by the Panel
7.439 We refer to our discussion of the relationship between Article 12.2 and Article 3.4 above. We
have found that "export performance" was not a "relevant" factor within the meaning of Article 3.4.
We therefore do not pursue Brazil's Article 3.4-related allegation under Article 12.2.

364 See supra, para. 7.314.
365 Definitive Regulation, Exhibit BRL-19, recitals 95-96.

7.440 With respect to Brazil's allegation that th e European Communities failed to publish
information relating to export performance in relation to its causation analysis under Article 3.5, we
recall that the European Communities disclosed to Tupy during the investigation its finding that on
the basis that of the proportion of sales outside the Community as compared to the sales on the EC
market, it could not be concluded that the decrease of sales outside the Community significantly
contributed to increased stocks.
7.441 We have discussed above the meaning of the term "material" in Article 12.2. The fact that the
European Communities disclosed this finding to Tupy does not necessarily render it "material".
Furthermore, the information disclosed to Tupy indicates that the European Communities did not
consider this to be a significant causal factor and therefore not one necessarily relevant as a basis for
its causation determination.
7.442 Members are certainly encouraged to include in their published determinations all
considerations underlying their causation determination. However, the failure to do so with respect to
an element that is not required to be addressed cannot be a violation.
7.443 In addition, Article 12.2.2 explicitly mentions that the obligations it contains are subject to the
requirement to maintain confidentiality. To the extent that the European Communities did not publish
actual export performance data on the basis of confidentiality concerns, we can not find this to be a
violation of Article 12.2.
7.444 For these reasons, we do not find that the European Communities violated its obligations
under Article 12.2 or 12.2.2 in respect of information relating to export performance.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. C
ONCLUSION
8.1 In light of our findings above, we conclude that:
(a) The European Communities has acted inconsistently with its obligations under:
(i) Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in “zeroing” negative dumping
margins in its dumping determination; and
(ii) Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 in that it is not directly discernible from the published
Provisional or Definitive Determination that the European Communities
addressed or explained the lack of significance of certain injury factors listed
in Article 3.4.
(b) The European Communities has not acted inconsistently with its obligations under:
(i) Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to explore possibilities
of constructive remedies;
(ii) Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
in imposing an anti-dumping measure in this case following the devaluation
of the Brazilian currency at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the IP; or
Articles 11.1 or 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing definitive
anti-dumping measures in this case or by not, simultaneously with that
imposition, self-initiating a review fo llowing the devaluation of Brazil's
currency that occurred at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the IP.

(iii) Article 2.2 or 2.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by including data
relating to "low volume" sales in the construction of normal value; nor by
including data from sales of certain product types within the definition of
"like product" in constructing normal value.
(iv) Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article VI (in particular,
paragraphs 2 and 4) of the GATT 1994 in not granting an adjustment in
relation to the IPI Premium Credit;
(v) Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article VI (in particular,
paragraphs 2 and 4) of the GATT 1994 by the methodology it applied in
calculating the PIS/COFINS adjustment;
(vi) Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by denying an adjustment with
respect to packing costs, by failing to indicate to Tupy what information was
necessary to ensure a fair comparison or by imposing an unreasonable burden
of proof on Tupy in respect of packing costs;
(vii) Article 2.4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as Brazil has failed to establish
that Article 2.4.1 provides a legal basis for its claim concerning the currency
conversions for adjustments, or under Article 6.4 by failing to provide timely
opportunities for Tupy to see information relevant to the presentation of its
case with respect to exchange rate conversion for adjustments;
(viii) Articles 3.3 or 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to
cumulation assessment, nor under Article 3.2 as Brazil’s claim under Article
3.2 was predicated on the assumption that the European Communities was
obligated to examine the volume of dumped imports on a country-by-country
basis;
(ix) Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by "zeroing" negative
undercutting margins and focusing on transactions relating to matching
models in considering price undercutting;
(x) Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in not granting an
adjustment for price comparability in its comparison of prices of sales of
black heart and white heart fittings in the context of its consideration of price
undercutting;
(xi) Articles 3.4 or 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its evaluation of injury
factors as in light of the overall development and interaction among injury
indicators collectively, the record data overall would not preclude a finding
by a reasonable and objective investigating authority that the domestic
industry was injured;
(xii) Articles 6.2 or 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the
information on injury factors referred to exclusively in Exhibit EC-12 as this
information was considered not relevant and was not specifically relied upon
by the EC in reaching the anti-dumping determination.
(xiii) Articles 3.5 or 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in examining whether
each factor constituted, individually, a significant cause of injury, nor in its
assessment of the causal link between dumped imports and injury;

(xiv) Articles 6.2 or 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in not disclosing
confidential information relating to EC producers’ exports and purchases of
the product concerned;
(xv) Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by relying on Eurostat data with
respect to imports from Poland, a third country not under investigation for
dumped imports of the product concerned; or
(xvi) Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by not referring in
the published determination to elements relating to the exploration of
possibilities of constructive remedies under Article 15, including the absence
of any reference to Brazil in the section of the Definitive Regulation dealing
with price undertakings; nor in respect of information relating to EC
producers’ export performance.
B. NULLIFICATION AND IMPAIRMENT
8.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement.
8.3 The European Communities asserts that in respect of Brazil’s claims under Issue 9 (“No
proper currency conversion”) and Issue 10 (“No proper basis to assess PIS/COFINS indirect taxes”) it
has shown that even were the European Communities found to have infringed the obligations invoked
by Brazil, the implications for the anti-dumping duties imposed on Tupy were in the latter case
imperceptible, and in the former actually sligh tly beneficial to Tupy. Furthermore, the European
Communities continues, in relation to Issue 13, the results of applying "zeroing" to the calculation of
undercutting margins were so slight that it is inconceivable that the use of this methodology could
have affected the conclusion that injury had been caused by the dumped imports. As such, these
infringements could not have nullified or impaired any benefit accruing to Brazil, directly or
indirectly, under the Agreement. The European Communities therefore submits that, should we find
infringements arising from these claims only, no finding of nullification or impairment would be
appropriate.
366
8.4 As we have not found violations of the obligations referred to in this context by the European
Communities, we do not consider this issue any further.
8.5 Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent the European Communities has acted
inconsistently with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , it has nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to Brazil under that Agreement.
C. RECOMMENDATION
8.6 The European Communities submits that, in initiating the review of the anti-dumping
measures on malleable fittings which it initiated in December 2001367, which review will, according to
the European Communities, reflect the views of the Appellate Body on the zeroing of dumping
margins, the European Communities also provided th e opportunity for Tupy to demonstrate that its
assertions regarding the consequences of devaluation were in fact correct. The European
Communities submits that, even were the Panel to find that the European Communities had acted in
breach of its WTO obligations by applying "zeroing" in the calculation of Tupy’s dumping margin, or
by not re-examining Tupy’s margin of dumping following the devaluation, the European

366 EC second oral statement, paras. 162-165.
367 EC response to the Panel question 144, Annex E-3.

Communities would, by initiating this review, have done what was necessary to remedy this situation
so that there would be no need for us to make recommendations in this regard. The European
Communities refers to the distinction made by the panel in India – Automotive Sector between a
panel’s finding of infringement and its recommendation to the DSB. 368 The European Communities
therefore requests the Panel to make no recommendation in respect of Tupy’s claims in this regard,
irrespective of its findings on the issue of infringement.
8.7 In light of our finding that the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Article 2.4.2 by applying "zeroing" in its dumping determination, we have carefully considered
these arguments of the European Communities. The EC measure referred to in our terms of reference
and that that we have found to be inconsistent with the EC obligations under the Agreement remains
in force.
8.8 We therefore recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European
Communities to bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
8.9 Brazil requests that we exercise our discretion under Article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest ways
in which the European Communities could implement our recommendation. Specifically, Brazil
requests us to suggest that, the European Communities repeal its anti-dumping duty order and
reimburse all anti-dumping duties collected thereunder.
8.10 Article 19.1 of the DSU provides that:
"In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways
in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations".
8.11 By virtue of Article 19.1 of the DSU, a panel has discretion to ("may") suggest ways in which
a Member could implement the recommendation that the Member concerned bring the measure into
conformity with the covered agreement in questi on. Clearly, however, a panel is by no means
required to make a suggestion should it not deem it appropriate to do so. Thus, while we are free to
suggest ways in which we believe the European Communities could appropriately implement our
recommendation, we decide not to do so in this case.

368 Panel Report, India — Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector , WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R,
adopted 5 May 2002, paras. 8.25 et seq.

IX. BRAZIL'S PANEL REQUEST

8 June 2001
(01-2945)
Original: English

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil
The following communication, dated 7 June 2001, from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to
the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.
On 21 December 2000, Brazil requested consultations with the European Communities (the
EC) further to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (the DSU), Article XXIII of the Ge neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the
GATT 1994) and Article 17 of the Agreement on Im plementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the AD Agr eement) concerning the anti-dumping measures
prevailing in the EC in respect of imports of malleab le cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating in
Brazil, including the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation carried out by the EC which led to
the imposition and collection of definitive and provisional anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron
tube or pipe fittings from Brazil (the Investigation) and the imposition and collection of provisional
and definitive duties.
The above request for consultations was notified to the Dispute Settlement Body and was
subsequently circulated to WTO Members 369 and those consultations were held in Geneva on
7 February 2001. As consultations failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution and further to
Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article 17 of the AD Agreement and Article 6 of the DSU Brazil
respectfully requests the establishment of a panel to examine the matter.
The EC initiated the Investigation by publishing a notice of initiation on 29 May 1999 in the
Official Journal of the European Communities 370 and provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed
by the EC by way of Commissi on Regulation (EC) No 449/2000 371, dated 28 February 2000 (the

369 (WT/DS219/1).
370 OJ C 151, 29.5.1999, p.21.
371 Commission Regulation (EC) No 449/2000 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of
malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating in Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, the People's Republic
of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and accep ting an undertaking offered by an exporting producer in
the Czech Republic of 28 February 2000 - OJ L 55, 29.2.2000, p.3.

Provisional Regulation). The imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties and the collection of
provisional duties was affected by way of Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2000 372, dated
11 August 2000 (the Definitive Regulation).
In the opinion of Brazil the EC has acted and is acting in a manner which is inconsistent with
its obligations under the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement in that benefits accruing to Brazil either
directly or indirectly under the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 have been nullified or impaired by
the EC and/or the achievement of objectives of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 are being
impeded by the EC.
The actions of the EC including but not limited to the initiation of the Investigation and the
imposition and collection of provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties has significantly impacted
upon Brazil's exports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings to the EC.
Brazil believes that the initiation of the Investigation, and the imposition and collection of
provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties referred to above by the EC are actions which are
inconsistent with the following provisions of the AD Agreement and of the GATT 1994:
Provisions of the GATT 1994:
(i) Article I
(ii) Article VI
Provisions of AD Agreement:
(a) Article 1
(b) Article 2, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.6
(c) Article 3, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6
(d) Article 4.1(i)
(e) Article 5, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7 and 5.8
(f) Article 6, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.6, 6.10 and 6.12
(g) Article 7, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 7.1 and 7.5
(h) Article 9, especially (but not exclusively) Articles 9.1 and 9.2
(i) Article 11, especially (but not exclusively) Article 11.1
(j) Article 12, especially (but not exclusively) Article 12.2
(k) Article 15
Brazil considers the following actions and/or determinations and/or omissions of the EC to be
or to have been inconsistent with GATT 1994 and/or with the AD Agreement.
All references herein to "Tupy" are references to the Brazilian exporter Industria de Fundição
Tupy Ltda and, unless otherwise specified, all references to "Articles" are references to articles of the
AD Agreement unless otherwise stated.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
1. The EC failed to comply with its obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994 and under the
AD Agreement, particularly but not exclusively with Articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 thereof in that it

372 Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2000 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting
definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings
originating in Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, the Pe ople's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and
Thailand of 11 August 2000 – OJ L 208, 18.8.2000, p.8.

adopted the anti-dumping measures concerned against Brazil through the Provisional
Regulation and the Definitive Regulation whereas, particularly following the devaluation of
the Brazilian Real as of January 1999 there has been no justification whatsoever for the
adoption of these measures. In view of th e EC's own findings where properly assessed,
following the devaluation no dumping nor injury could have been properly established with
regard to the imports of the product concerned originating in Brazil.
2. At the time of the initiation of the Investigation there was no dumping of the product
concerned originating in Brazil and therefore the application did not include evidence of
dumping and therefore of a causal link between dumping and injury (Article 5.2). The
application therefore did not include sufficient evidence of dumping (and therefore of a causal
link between dumping and injury) for the purpose of the initiation of the Investigation
(Article 5.3), particularly as the allegation of injury pertained to actual material injury being
sustained by the domestic industry and not to the threat of material injury being sustained by
the domestic industry.
3. The product originating in Brazil was determ ined to have been dumped by the EC in a
manner which was not compatible with its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 as at the time of
the relevant determinations of dumping and injury the export price of the product was not less
than the price of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, when destined for
consumption in Brazil (Article 2.1) and it follow s that there could not therefore have been a
causal link between the product originating in Brazil and the injury said to be being sustained
by the domestic industry (Article 3.5). The EC further failed to discharge its obligations
under Article 9 in that it collected anti-dumping duties other than in respect of imports of the
product concerned from Brazil which were dumped and causing injury (Article 7.5 and
Article 9.2).
4. The EC has furthermore therefore failed to discharge its obligations under Article 1 insofar as
it has levied anti-dumping measures other than in the circumstances provided for in Article VI
of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to the Investigation, which was not conducted (for these
among other reasons) in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
5. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 5 in that (for example) the application
did not contain a complete description of the volume and value of domestic production of the
like product accounted for by the applicants (Article 5.2(i)) and did not set out information
(for instance) as to the wages, stocks and investments of the applicants, which information
should have been more than reasonably available to them (Article 5.2(iv)). The EC also
failed to satisfy itself as to the accuracy a nd adequacy of the evidence set out in the
application with regard the imports of the product concerned from certain countries not
ultimately subject to the Investigation (Article 5.3).
6. The EC did not consider evidence of both dumping and of injury simultaneously in its
decision whether or not to initiate the Investigation and during the course of the Investigation
as there was at no stage sufficient positive evidence of dumping and of injury to domestic EC
producers before the EC (Article 5.7) and in any event the EC should have rejected the
application submitted to it when it became evident that it contained insufficient positive
evidence of injury, in particular, to justify proceeding with the case (Article 5.8).
7. The EC was not in a position to determine whether or not the application has been made by or
on behalf of the domestic industry (Article 5.4) particularly owing to its failure to investigate
the extent to which certain of the applicants were themselves importers of the product
concerned (Article 4.1 and Article 6.6) and furthermore the EC had not received a properly

documented application and did not notify Brazil prior to proceeding to initiate the
Investigation (Article 5.5).
8. The EC failed to discharge its obligations under Article 6 in that, inter alia, it failed to satisfy
itself as to the accuracy of certain information submitted to it by Tupy in connection with the
taxation credit adjustment, the packing allowance adjustment, the advertising and promotional
expenses adjustment, the importation of the product concerned by domestic EC producers
from countries not subject to the Investigation, the impact of substitution and the market
perception of the distinction between so-called black heart and white heart variants of the
product concerned (Article 6.6) and thereby also denied Tupy the full opportunity for the
defence of its interests in these among other respects (Article 6.2)
9. The EC resorted to the sampling of product types for the purpose of deciding on the extent of
the taxation credit adjustment where the sample chosen was neither statistically valid nor
necessary owing to the impracticability of conducting an examination of all product types
concerned and no attempt was made by the EC to decide upon what sample, if any, might be
appropriate in this respect in consultation with and with the consent of Tupy (Article 6.10).
10. Tupy was not provided with timely opportunities to see all information that was relevant to
the presentation of its case particularly in that the EC did not properly disclose its
methodology and calculations with regard to the currency conversions made in the dumping
determination (Article 6.4).
11. If the EC considered whether or not there had been a significant increase in allegedly dumped
imports from Brazil onto the EC market such consideration was not apparent from the
Definitive Regulation and if the EC examined all of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4 it
did not make this apparent in the Provisional Regulation and in the Definitive Regulation or
in any separate reports thereto (Article 12.2).
12. The EC failed to set out in the Definitive Regulation or otherwise make available in a separate
report all relevant information on the matters of fact and law with regard to the injury caused
to domestic EC producers by factors other than the dumped imports that were made known to
it such as (for instance) with regard to imports of the product concerned from third countries
not subject to the Investigation, the substitution of the product concerned with replacement
products, imports of the product concerned into the EC under product code sub-headings
other than 7307 1910 and the outsourcing initiatives, poor export performance and price
increases of EC producers during the injury investigation period (Article 12.2).
13. The EC also failed to set out in the Definitive Regulation or otherwise make available in a
separate report all relevant information on the matters of fact and law connected with the
dumping, injury and causation determinations made in the light of the devaluation of the
Brazilian Real in January of 1999 (Article 12.2).
14. The EC failed to set out in the Definitive Regulation or otherwise make available in a separate
report all relevant information on the matters of fact and law connected with its decision to
cumulate imports of the product concerned from Brazil with the imports of other countries
subject to the Investigation, its assessment of the impact of factors of causation known to it,
its decision to undertake sampling for the purpose of determining the extent of the taxation
credit adjustment to be granted, its decision not to grant the taxation credit adjustment and
other adjustments necessary for a fair comparison to be effected between the export price and
the normal value, its decision to deploy the use of zeroing in the context of its assessment of
the price effects of imports of the product concerned and the considerations relevant to the
comparability of models in its underselling and undercutting calculations (Article 12.2).

15. The EC failed to give reasons for its acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments and claims
made to it be Tupy, including but not limited to those made in relation to the taxation credit
claim, its decision to exclude in particular Poland, Bulgaria and Turkey from the scope of the
Investigation, its decision to limit the ambit of the Investigation to product code
CN 7307 1910 only, its decision that there was no distinction in the market between so-called
black heart and white heart variants of the product concerned, its decision that the interests of
certain of the applicants in certain third countries and their imports of the allegedly dumped
product should not affect the definition of the Community industry, its decision that
cumulation was appropriate, and its decisions that substitution of the product concerned,
imports of the product concerned from third countries and the outsourcing initiatives, poor
export performance and price increases of EC producers during the injury investigation period
had no impact upon causation (Article 12.2)
16. The EC did not provide timely opportunities for industrial users of the product under
investigation and for representative consumer organisations to provide information which was
relevant to the Investigation insofar as it did neither sought such information other than from
two national gas companies (Article 6.2) nor accepted it when it was provided by Tupy with
particular reference to the distinction in the market between so-called black heart and white
heart variants of the product concerned (Article 6.6) and ample opportunity was not afforded
to Tupy to submit in writing all the evidence that it considered relevant to the Investigation in
this respect (Article 6.1).
DUMPING ISSUES
17. The EC determined that certain product types should have their normal values constructed as
their sales volumes were unrepresentative and therefore did not permit a proper comparison
further to Article 2.2 as sales on the domestic market of the like product did not constitute 5%
or more of the sales of the product types concerned to the EC. Despite having itself
established that data relating to such sales did not permit a proper comparison with the
exported product type further to Article 2.2 the EC proceeded to use the profit margins
associated with these same product types in the construction of a figure for selling, general
and administrative costs and for profits did not make adjustments for differences which
affected price comparability to ensure a fair comparison (Article 2.4).
18. The definition of the "like product" under Article 2.6 does not include product types which
start with codes "68" and "69" which are sold on the domestic market in Brazil (owing to their
differing physical characteristics and intended uses) as other products had characteristics
more closely resembling those of the product under consideration. Data pertaining to sales of
product types on the domestic market starting with such codes was unlawfully used by the EC
in the construction of the selling, general and administrative expenses and the profit margin in
respect of product types sold on the European market (Articles 2.2 and 2.4).
19. In omitting to verify whether the claim of Tupy with regard to the packing allowance was
valid the EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 2 in that a fair comparison could
not then be effected between the export price and the normal value as Tupy was denied an
appropriate adjustment on account of the differing and heightened packing costs incurred by it
in connection with its domestic sales as compared with its packing costs in the context of
exports of the product concerned to the EC (Article 2.4).
20. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 2 in that it denied to Tupy an
adjustment which was necessary for a fair comparison to be effected between the export price
and the normal value in that it did not grant to Tupy an adjustment on account of its increased
advertising and promotional expenses on the domestic Brazilian market as compared to its

comparatively low advertising and promotional expenses in connection with its exports to the
EC (Article 2.4).
21. The EC did not make the currency conversions required under Article 2 for the purpose of
effecting a fair comparison between the export price and the normal value in particular as it is
clear that with regard to certain transactions no information was available to the EC as to the
applicable currency conversion rates as at the dates on which the material terms of sale for the
transaction(s) in question were established (Article 2.4).
22. The EC failed to make adjustments on account of the physical characteristics of the product
concerned (and the distinction between its so-called black heart and white heart variants as
issues impacting upon price comparability) and so failed to effect fair comparisons in these
respects between the export price and the normal value (Article 2.4).
23. The EC resorted to the sampling of product types for the purpose of deciding on the extent of
the adjustment to be made on account of the tax credit adjustment where the sample chosen
was neither statistically valid or necessary owing to the impracticability of conducting an
examination of all product types concerned and in so doing failed to effect a fair comparison
further between the export price and the normal value (Article 2.4).
24. In violation of Article VI:4 of the GATT 1994 the product subject to the Investigation
originating in Brazil has been subjected to anti-dumping duties on export to the EC by reason
of the exemption of that product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined
for consumption in Brazil and/or by reason of the refund of duties or taxes borne by the like
product on the Brazilian market to Tupy in accordance with the prevailing domestic Brazilian
legislation. The EC also denied Tupy an appropriate taxation credit adjustment in respect of
duties and taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in Brazil
(Article 2.4).
25. The EC "zeroed" negative dumping margins which had been calculated for some product
types of Brazilian origin exported to the EC during the investigation period with the effect of
such zeroing being that the EC did not offset the margins of dumping which were calculated
to be negative as against those margins of dumping which it calculated to be positive. A fair
comparison was not therefore made by the EC between the export price and the normal value
and a distorted margin of dumping was calculated (Article 2.4).
INJURY AND CAUSATION ISSUES
26. The EC did not consider whether there had been a significant increase in dumped imports
from Brazil either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the EC. The
EC considered that the volume (in absolute terms) of Brazilian imports of the product
concerned on the EC market had always been significant it was unnecessary for the EC to
consider whether or not there might be a significance in any increase in Brazilian imports
during the injury investigation period. Alth ough the EC considered in the Provisional
Regulation whether there had been a significant increase in dumped imports either in absolute
terms or relative to production or consumption in the EC for the countries which had been
cumulated Article 3.3 does not mandate a cumulative assessment of the significance of the
volume increases of imports from the countries subject to investigation under Article 3.2 and
each country subject to an anti-dumping investigation must have the significance of the
volume increase (if any) in its imports during the course of the injury investigation period
individually considered (Article 3.2).

27. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 3.1 and Article 3.2 in that it did not,
inter alia , consider (with a basis of positive evidence) the effect of the allegedly dumped
imports on prices, whether there had been a significant price undercutting by the allegedly
dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product in the EC, or whether the effect
of such imports was to depress prices to a significant degree, or prevent price increases which
would otherwise have occurred to a significant degree in that:
(i) it calculated an underselling figure in respect of which the calculations it provided
included only those transactions in which underselling was found (which amounts to
the use of "zeroing") and therefore does not relate to the "dumped imports" as
referred to in Article 3.2, and;
(ii) it did not consider whether or not as a matter of fact there had been price suppression,
and;
(iii) it did not consider whether or not as a matter of fact the market perception of the
distinctions between so-called black heart and white heart variants of the product
might require the making of appropriate adjustments, and;
(iv) no finding of price depression by the EC was possible as the prices charged by the
domestic EC producers in fact increased over the same period as was referred to with
regard the (cumulated) trend of the decreasing prices of the imports from Brazil, and;
(v) with reference to the EC's determination of price undercutting this again was not
made in relation to "the dumped imports" as a whole but rather with regard to a
selection of product types displaying positive undercutting margins (see also
Article 3.6).
28. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 3.1 and Article 3.3 in that (for
instance) it cumulated the imports of the product concerned originating in Brazil with those of
the other countries subject to the Investigation where a cumulative assessment of the effects
of the imports from the other countries subject to the Investigation was not appropriate (and
could not have been based on positive evidence) either in the light of the conditions of
competition between imports of Brazilian origin and the other imported products subject to
the Investigation, nor in the light of the conditions of competition between the imports of the
product concerned from Brazil and the like Community product owing to significant
disparities both in pricing structures and volumes of imports as between the countries subject
to the Investigation, particularly bearing in mind the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in
January of 1999.
29. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 3.1 and Article 3.4 and its finding of
injury was not based on positive evidence in that (for instance) it did not examine all the
non-exhaustive 15 individual factors and indices going to the issue of injury within the
meaning of the AD Agreement in its analysis of the alleged injury caused to the domestic
industry as it analysed only partially merely the following eight (8) factors in the list set out in
Article 3.4:
(i) actual and potential decline in sales (though no explicit mention is made of potential
decline in sales and although no proper consideration has been given to the up-going
trend of sales of outsourced products);
(ii) profits (although no proper consideration has been given to the growing sales of
outsourced products);

(iii) market share (although no proper consideration has been given to the growing market
share supplied by outsourced products);
(iv) productivity (although no proper consideration has been given to the growing
productivity in relation to outsourced products);
(v) utilization of capacity (although no consideration has been given to the growing
utilisation of capacity used for outsourced products);
(vi) inventories (although no consideration has been given to the improved trend of
inventories of outsourced products);
(vii) employment (although no consideration has been given to the positive employment
data in the context of outsourced products).
30. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 3.1 and Article 3.5 in that (for
instance) it attributed injury said to have been sustained by domestic EC producers to imports
of the product concerned of Brazilian origin despite the fact that as of January 1999 the
devaluation of the Brazilian Real had made it impossible for imports originating in Brazil to
be causing injury to the domestic EC industry and despite the fact that injury sustained by the
domestic EC industry was readily attributable to the rationalisation, outsourcing efforts and
poor export performance of EC producers. The EC did not ensure that injury caused to the
domestic EC industry by imports of the product concerned (in significant quantities and at
prices significantly below those prevailing in respect of imports of the product concerned
when of Brazilian origin) from countries including, inter alia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Poland,
was not attributed to imports of the product concerned from Brazil.
31. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 3.1 and Article 3.5 in that (for
instance) it did not ensure that injury caused to the domestic EC industry by substitution of
the product concerned by replacement products, by imports made by domestic EC producers
from other third countries not subject to the Investigation (and with which they have close
relations) and by such factors as the poor export performance, and the outsourcing and
rationalisation efforts of domestic EC producers throughout the injury investigation period,
was not attributed to imports of the product concerned from Brazil.
32. Owing to its failure to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of information submitted to it by Tupy
in connection with the importation of the product concerned by domestic EC producers from
countries not subject to the Investigation (in violation of Article 6.6) the EC also failed to
discharge its obligations under Article 4 in not removing the producers concerned from the
definition of the domestic industry.
DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES
33. The EC did not afford Brazil the requisite special regard as a developing country throughout
the course of the Investigation in that, inter alia, it denied Tupy adjustments under Article 2.4
on account only of its inability to appropriately assess the merits of such adjustments – such
as that relating to the tax credit adjustment claim (for reasons that demonstrated a lack of
regard for the manner of the administration of the Brazilian taxation system) and continued to
hold Brazilian imports responsible for causing injury to domestic EC producers despite a
currency devaluation of the Real as of January 1999 that meant that even by the EC's
(erroneous) calculations Tupy was no longer dumping on the EC market. The EC further
decided to cumulate imports originating in Brazil with the imports of other countries subject
to the Investigation despite the above-mentioned devaluation of the Real (Article 15).

34. Despite the concluding sentence of Article 9.1 the EC nonetheless decided to apply the full
extent of the dumping duty determined rather than afford Brazil, as a developing country,
consideration on account of the devaluation in its currency in January of 1999 (Article 15).
35. The EC neither explored nor communicated either to Brazil or to Tupy the possibility that it
might pursue constructive remedies over and above the possibility of the imposition of
anti-dumping duties (Article 15).
OTHER ISSUES
36. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 7 in that, inter alia, it did not judge the
Provisional Regulation to be necessary for the prevention of injury during the course of the
Investigation (Article 7.1) or if it did so it did not make this apparent from the Provisional
Regulation (Article 12.2) and in any event any such determination would not have been
unbiased and objective as at the time of the imposition of provisional measures the
devaluation in the value of the Brazilian Real entailed that there was not dumping of the
product concerned of Brazilian origin, nor was it foreseeable that there could be during the
course of the Investigation.
37. The EC did not make any attempt, with a view to discharging its obligations under
Article 9.1, to afford Brazil as a developing country the consideration of having the level of
the duty applied to Tupy's exports dictated by the level of the injury caused to domestic EC
producers by Tupy's exports rather than with reference to the (erroneously calculated)
dumping margin and furthermore the EC collected duties in respect of imports of the product
concerned originating in Brazil where it was clear that the product concerned was not being
dumped (owing to devaluation) and therefore that it was unlawful to collect those duties
(Articles 9.1 and 9.2.)
38. The EC did not discharge its obligations under Article 11 in that the EC had not established
(based on positive evidence) that there was dumping and injury to domestic EC producers
within the meaning of the AD Agreement being caused by exports of Brazilian origin. The
EC was not therefore justified in imposing an ti-dumping duties, nor in maintaining them to
counteract imports of a product neither dumped nor causing injury (Article 11) and
furthermore despite a submission requesting a review of the measures in question made by
Tupy shortly after the Definitive Regulation on 13 July 2000 setting out the reasons why the
maintenance of anti-dumping duties was inappropriate no such reviews has yet taken place
(Article 11.2).
39. Brazil respectfully requests that this item be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the
Dispute Settlement Body, scheduled to be held on 20 June 2001, and that a panel be
established with standards terms of reference as set out in Article 7 of the DSU.