UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 7 April 2005
Document codes: WT/DS285/AB/R
Complainant: Antigua and Barbuda
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Canada, Taiwan, EU, Japan, Mexico, China
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. VI, VIII, XVI, XVII, XI  Services (GATS)

UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF
GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES

AB-2005-1

Report of the Appellate Body

APPELLATE BODY

United States, Appellant/Appellee
Antigua, Appellant/Appellee

Canada, Third Participant
European Communities, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Mexico, Third Participant
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
 Kinmen and Matsu, Third Participant
 AB-2005-1

 Present:

 Sacerdoti, Presiding Member
Abi-Saab, Member
Lockhart, Member

I. Introduction
1. The United States, and Antigua and Barbuda (" Antigua"), each appeals certain issues of law
and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (the "Panel Report").
1 The Panel was established to
consider a complaint by Antigua concerning certain measures of state and federal authorities that
allegedly make it unlawful for suppliers located outside the United States to supply gambling and
betting services to consumers within the United States.2
2. Before the Panel, Antigua claimed that certain restrictions imposed by the United States
through federal and state laws resulted in a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services from Antigua.3 Antigua contended that such a "total prohibition" was contrary to
obligations of the United States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the "GATS"). In
particular, Antigua asserted that the GATS Schedule of the United States includes specific
commitments on gambling and betting services. Antigua argued that, because the United States made
full market access and national treatment commitmen ts (that is, inscribed "None" in the relevant
columns of its GATS Schedule), the United States, in maintaining the measures at issue, is acting

1WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004.
2Panel Report, para. 1.1.
3Ibid., paras. 6.154, 6.156-6.157.

inconsistently with its oblig ations under its GATS Schedule
4, as well as under Articles VI, XI, XVI,
and XVII of the GATS.5
3. On 17 October 2003, after receiving Antigua's first written submission to the Panel and before
filing its own first written submission, the Unite d States requested the Panel to make certain
preliminary rulings, including a ruling that Antigua had failed to make a prima facie case that
specific United States measures are inconsistent with the GATS. 6 In particular, the United States
argued that a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services could not
constitute a "measure". 7 According to the United States, by challenging such an alleged "total
prohibition", rather than the laws and regulations underlying that prohibition, Antigua had failed to
satisfy its burden as the complaining party to "iden tif[y] … specific measures that are the subject of
[its] prima facie case." 8 The Panel denied the United States' request on the ground that it was
premature, given that Antigua had "two sets of written submissions and two panel hearings to
convince the Panel that it [had] established a prima facie case."9
4. In its oral and written submissions to the Panel, the United States maintained its objections to
the Panel's consideration of Antigua's claims on the basis of an alleged "total prohibition", reiterating
its argument that Antigua had failed to establish a prima facie case.10 In the Panel Report, circulated
to Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on 10 November 2004, the Panel
addressed this argument by "identify[ing] the measures that the Panel [would] consider in determining
whether the specific provisions of the GATS that Antigua [had] invoked have been violated." 11 The
Panel determined, first, that Antigua was not entitle d to rely on the alleged "total prohibition" as a
"measure" in and of itself. 12 The Panel then determined that the following laws of the United States

4Panel Report, para. 2.1(a).
5Ibid., para. 2.1(b).
6Panel's Decision on the Request for Preliminary Rulings, para. 49, attached as Annex B to Panel
Report, p. B-13.
7Panel's Decision on the Request for Preliminary Rulings, para. 51, attached as Annex B to Panel
Report, p. B-14.
8Panel's Decision on the Request for Preliminary Rulings, para. 50, attached as Annex B to Panel
Report, p. B-13. (footnote omitted)
9Panel's Decision on the Request for Preliminary Rulings, para. 40, attached as Annex B to Panel
Report, p. B-9.
10United States' first written submission to the Panel, pa ras. 40-58; United States' statement at the first
substantive panel meeting, paras. 11-21; United States ' second written submission to the Panel, paras. 6-9;
United States' statement at the second substantive panel meeting, paras. 2-3 and 8-18.
11Panel Report, para. 6.148.
12Ibid., para. 6.185.

had been "sufficiently identified [by Antigua] so as to warrant a substantive examination by the
Panel"13:
(A) Federal laws:
(i) Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Wire Act");
(ii) Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Travel Act"); and
(iii) Section 1955 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Illegal Gambling
Business Act", or "IGBA").
(B) State laws:
(i) Colorado: Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
(ii) Louisiana: Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (Annotated);
(iii) Massachusetts: Section 17A of chapter 271 of the Annotated Laws of
Massachusetts;
(iv) Minnesota: Section 609.755(1) and Subdivisions 2-3 of Section 609.75 of
the Minnesota Statutes (Annotated);
(v) New Jersey : Paragraph 2 of Section VII of Article 4 of the New Jersey
Constitution, and Section 2A:40-1 of the New Jersey Code;
(vi) New York: Section 9 of Article I of the New York Constitution and Section
5-401 of the New York General Obligations Law;
(vii) South Dakota: Sections 22-25A-1 through 22-25A-15 of the South Dakota
Codified Laws; and
(viii) Utah: Section 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code (Annotated).14
5. After evaluating Antigua's claims with respect to these federal and state measures, the Panel
concluded that:
(a) the United States' Schedule under the GATS includes
specific commitments on gambling and betting services
under sub-sector 10.D;
(b) by maintaining the following measures, ... the United States
fails to accord services and service suppliers of Antigua
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the
terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its
Schedule, contrary to Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2 of the
GATS:

13Panel Report, para. 6.219.
14See ibid., para. 6.249.

(i) Federal laws
(1) the Wire Act;
(2) the Travel Act (when read together with the
relevant state laws);
1072 and
(3) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when
read together with the relevant state laws).1073
(ii) State laws:
(1) Louisiana : § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat.
Ann.;
(2) Massachusetts : § 17A of chapter 271 of
Mass. Ann. Laws;
(3) South Dakota : § 22-25A-8 of the S.D.
Codified Laws; and
(4) Utah : § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
(c) Antigua has failed to demonstrate that the measures at issue
are inconsistent with Articles VI:1 and VI:3 of the GATS;
(d) The United States has not been able to demonstrate that the
Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the
relevant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act
(when read together with the relevant state laws):
(i) are provisionally justified under Articles XIV(a)
and XIV(c) of the GATS; and
(ii) are consistent with the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XIV of the GATS.
15
1072 That is, state laws that prohibit a "business enterprise involving
gambling". Such state laws would include but are not limited to § 14:90.3
of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts
Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-
1102(b) of the Utah Code.
1073 That is, state laws that prohibit a "gambling business ". Such state laws
would include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat.
Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the
South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.

15Panel Report, paras. 7.2(a)-(d).

6. The Panel further found that the following state laws are not inconsistent with of Article XVI:
(i) Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes 16; (ii) Section 609.755(1) and Subdivisions 2-
3 of Section 609.75 of the Minnesota Statutes (Annotated) 17; (iii) paragraph 2 of Section VII of
Article 4 of the New Jersey Constitution, an d Section 2A:40-1 of the New Jersey Code 18; and (iv)
Section 9 of Article I of the New York Constitu tion and Section 5-401 of the New York General
Obligations Law.19 The Panel decided to exercise judicial economy with respect to Antigua's claims
under Articles XI and XVII of the GATS. 20 The Panel accordingly recommended that the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") request the United States to bring the measures that the Panel had identified
as GATS-inconsistent into conformity with the United States' obligations under the GATS.21
7. On 7 January 2005, the United States notified the DSB of its intention to appeal certain issues
of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel, pursuant
to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Appeal 22 pursuant to Rule 20 of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the " Working Procedures ").23 On 19 January 2005,
Antigua also notified the DSB of its intention to a ppeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel
Report and certain legal interpretati ons developed by the Panel, pursua nt to paragraph 4 of Article 16
of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Other Appeal 24 pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures.
On 14 January 2005, the United Stat es filed its appellant's submission. 25 Antigua filed an other
appellant's submission on 24 January 2005. 26 The United States and Antigua each filed an appellee's
submission on 1 February 2005. 27 O n t h a t s a m e d a y , t h e E u ropean Communities, Japan and the
Separate Customs Territory of Ta iwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ea ch filed a third participant's
submission.28 Also on 1 February 2005, Mexico notifie d the Appellate Body Secretariat of its

16Panel Report, para. 6.383.
17Ibid., paras. 6.397-6.398.
18Ibid., para. 6.402.
19Ibid., para. 6.406.
20Ibid., para. 7.2(e).
21Ibid., para. 7.5.
22Notification of an Appeal by the United States, WT /DS285/6, 13 January 2005 (attached as Annex I
to this Report).
23WT/AB/WP/5, 4 January 2005.
24Notification of Other Appeal by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/7, 16 February 2005;
WT/DS285/7/Corr.1, 17 February 2005 (attached as Annexes II and II(a), respectively, to this Report).
25Pursuant to Rule 21(1) of the Working Procedures.
26Pursuant to Rule 23(3) of the Working Procedures.
27Pursuant to Rule 22 and Rule 23(4) of the Working Procedures.
28Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.

intention to make a statement at the oral heari ng as a third participant, and Canada notified its
intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.
29
8. The oral hearing was held on 21 and 22 February 2005. The participants and third
participants each made an oral statement (with the exception of Canada and the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu) a nd responded to questions put to them by the
Members of the Division hearing the appeal.
II. Arguments of the Participants and the Third Participants
A. Claims of Error by the United States – Appellant
1. Antigua's Prima Facie Case
9. The United States argues that Antigua did not make a prima facie case that any particular
United States measure is inconsistent with any pr ovision of the GATS. The United States therefore
requests the Appellate Body to find that the Pane l erred in law because it ne vertheless made findings
on Antigua's claims and thereby abso lved Antigua from establishing a prima facie case. The United
States further submits that the Panel made the case for Antigua with respect to three United States
federal laws and eight state laws and thus denied the United States a "fair opportunity" 30 to defend the
laws at issue, inconsistent with the Panel's obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
10. According to the United States, Antigua made its case on the basis that the measure at issue
was "the total prohibition on the cross-bor der supply of gambling and betting services." 31 The United
States emphasizes, Antigua never specifically alleged th at any particular law or laws violate Article
XVI of the GATS. The United States emphasizes that, Antigua never specifically alleged that any
particular law or laws violate Article XVI of the GATS. Thus, Antigua did not identify precisely
what measures it was challenging or provide evid ence and argumentation sufficient to establish a
presumption of inconsistency of any measures with any provision of the GATS.
11. The United States contends that the Panel rej ected Antigua's reliance on the alleged "total
prohibition" as the measure at issue in this dispute and properly found that it could not identify the
individual laws supporting Antigua's case where Anti gua itself had not. Nevertheless, according to
the United States, the Panel proceeded to review An tigua's submissions and exhibits and identify for
itself whether and how particular laws resulted in a prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
services. In so doing, the Panel exceeded the limits of its authority, and erred in the same way that the

29Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
31Ibid., para. 8 (quoting Antigua's first written submission to the Panel, para. 136). (emphasis omitted)

Appellate Body found the panels in Japan – Agricultural Products II and Canada – Wheat Exports
and Grain Imports to have erred. 32 The United States further contends that the Panel mistakenly
found support for its approach in the Appellate Body decisions in Canada – Autos and Thailand –
H-Beams.33 The Panel is said to have further erred in referring to a purported admission by the United
States that "federal and state laws are applied and enforced so as to prohi bit what it describes as the
'remote supply' of most gambling and betting services" 34, when the United States never conceded that
any particular measure had this effect. The Unite d States maintains that the approach taken by the
Panel in this case—namely identifying a subset of United States measures from the "remarkably
broad" list of "possibly relevant" 35 laws in Antigua's panel request, and assembling arguments
regarding their meaning, application and consiste ncy with Article XVI—unfairly deprived the United
States of any opportunity to respond and defend those specific measures.
12. In addition to alleging legal error on the basis that the Panel made findings on claims in the
absence of a prima facie case by Antigua, the United States asserts that the Panel did not comply
with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU. 36 Although the Panel explicitly recognized its lack
of authority to make the case for the complaining party, the Panel is said to have nevertheless
assumed the role of the complaining party in this dis pute. Moreover, the Panel did not merely "fill in
small gaps" in Antigua's claim, but rather, "created an entirely new approach to the case on behalf of
the complaining party".
37 In the submission of the United States, the "egregious" nature of the Panel's
approach to Antigua's claims gives rise to a separate and distinct error, namely that the Panel failed to
satisfy its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to "mak e an objective assessment of the matter before
it".38 The United States thus requests that the Appella te Body find that the Panel failed to satisfy its
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
13. For these reasons, the United States argues that the Panel erroneously concluded that: (i) it
"should consider" three federal laws and eight stat e laws in order to determine whether the United
States violated its obligations under the GATS; and (ii) Antigua had met its burden of proof that these
laws result in a prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services. "Separate and in

32United States' appellant's submission, paras. 12-14 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Agricultural Products II , paras. 125-131; and Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain
Imports, para. 191).
33Ibid., paras. 31-35 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos , para. 184; and Appellate Body
35Ibid., para. 38.
36Ibid., para. 39.
37Ibid., para. 42.
38Ibid., para. 39.

addition to" this error
39, the United States argues that the Panel' s resolution of Antigua's claims was
inconsistent with the Panel's obligations under Arti cle 11 of the DSU. Should the Appellate Body
find error on either ground, the United States request s that the Appellate Body determine that the
remaining Panel findings are "without legal effect".40
2. United States' Schedule of Specific Commitments
14. The United States appeals the Panel's finding th at the United States' Schedule to the GATS
includes specific commitments on gambling and betting services under subsector 10.D, entitled "other
recreational services (except sporting)". The Unit ed States maintains that it expressly excluded
"sporting", the ordinary meaning of which includes gambling, from the United States' commitment for
recreational services. In the United States' submissi on, the Panel misinterpreted the ordinary meaning
of "sporting" and improperly elevated certain prepar atory work for the GATS to the status of context
for the interpretation of the relevant United States' commitment.
15. According to the United States, in concluding that the ordinary meaning of "sporting" does
not cover gambling, the Panel misapplied the custom ary rules of treaty interpretation and disregarded
relevant WTO decisions. The Panel is said to ha ve disregarded numerous English dictionaries that
confirm that "sporting" in English includes activity pertaining to gambling and, thus, failed to give the
word "sporting" in the United States' Schedule this ordinary English-language meaning, as required
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention ").
41 Furthermore, the
United States contends that the Panel erred in rely ing on the meaning of the term "sporting" in French
and Spanish, because the cover page of the United Stat es' Schedule clarifies that "[t]his is authentic in
English only".42
16. The United States also asserts that the Panel erred in treating two documents, referred to in
the Panel Report as "W/120" 43 and the "1993 Scheduling Guidelines" 44, as context instead of as
negotiating documents that constitute preparatory wo rk. The United States points out that Members
never agreed to memorialize W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, and that the disagreement of
parties to the Uruguay Round services negotiations as to the content of these two documents prepared
by the Secretariat is apparent in the divergent approaches adopted by Members in scheduling their

39United States' appellant's submission, heading II.A.10, p. 23.
40Ibid., para. 3. (footnote omitted)
41Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.
43Services Sectoral Classification List: Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.
44Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164,
3 September 1993.

specific commitments. Therefore, the United States asserts, neither W/120 nor the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines reflects an "agreement between the parties" or an "agreement made by all participants",
within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention.
17. According to the United States, the character ization of these documents carries important
implications because, under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention , context has primary
interpretative significance, whereas preparatory work is merely a supplementary means of
interpretation. A panel may look to preparatory work only to confirm an interpretation made in
accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, or if such interpretation leaves the meaning
ambiguous or unclear or leads to a result that is ma nifestly absurd or unreasonable. In this case,
however, the Panel is said to have erred in us ing W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, which
are "mere preparatory work" 45, to support a meaning that is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the
"sporting" exclusion in the United States' Schedule. According to the United States, the Panel could
not have reached the conclusion that it did, had it treated the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120
as preparatory work.
18. In the United States' submission, the proper cont ext for its Schedule is the Schedules of other
WTO Members. Consistent with the principle of effective treaty interpretation, the absence of any
reference in the United States' Schedule to the United Nations' Provisional Central Product
Classification46 (the "CPC"), in contrast to other Schedules, must be given legal effect. Therefore, the
United States' Schedule must be interpreted acco rding to its ordinary meaning and cannot be
presumed to follow the meaning given to various terms by the CPC. Similarly, other Members'
Schedules confirm that at least one Member made a commitment for gambling and betting services in
subsector 10.E. Thus, the United States argues, the Panel erred in failing to find that, in the United
States' Schedule, gambling properly resides in 10.E—where the United States made no
commitment—rather than in the broad category of "recreational services" in 10.D.
19. The Panel is said, however, to have ignored the ordinary meaning of the United States'
Schedule, read in the proper context, and instead erroneously created a "presumption" that, unless the
United States "expressly" departed from W/120 and the CPC, it could be "assumed to have relied
on W/120 and the corresponding CPC references."
47 In this respect, the United States contends that
the Panel confused the structure of W/120 with the cross-references to the CPC contained in that
document, failing to recognize that Members, such as the United States, may have elected to adopt the
former without necessarily embracing the latter. Thus, the Panel is said to have been wrong in

46Provisional Central Product Classification, Statistical Papers, Series M No.77, United Nations (1991).
47United States' appellant's submission, para. 75 (quoting Panel Report, paras. 6.103-6.106).

construing any purported ambiguity against the Unit ed States and failing to acknowledge that there
was no mutual understanding between the parties to the services negotiations as to the coverage of
gambling in the United States' Schedule. In the United States' submission, such an approach, if
upheld, would allow Members to expand negotiated commitments through dispute settlement.
20. The United States therefore requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that the
United States undertook specific commitments on gambling and betting services in its GATS
Schedule. Should the Appellate Body reach this issue and reverse the Panel's finding, the United
States requests that the Appellate Body determine that the remaining Panel findings are "without legal
effect."
48
3. Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS – "limitations ... in the form of"
21. The United States challenges the Panel's finding that the United States acts inconsistently
with paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 by failing to accord services and service suppliers of
Antigua "treatment no less favourable than that provided for" in the United States' Schedule.
According to the United States, the Panel erre d in converting two of the prohibitions on specific
forms of market access limitations set out in Article XVI:2 into general prohibitions on any measure
having an effect similar to that of a "zero quota", regardless of form.
22. The United States contends that, in interpreting Article XVI, the Panel failed to give meaning
to the text and expanded the obligations set out in that provision. The Panel is said to have ignored
the fact that Article XVI "represents a precisely de fined constraint on certain problematic limitations
specifically identified by Members" 49 and that measures not caught by Article XVI remain subject to
disciplines set out elsewhere in the GATS, including in Article XVII and Article VI. According to the
United States, these errors are revealed in the Panel' s misinterpretation of s ub-paragraphs (a) and (c)
of Article XVI:2.
23. As to Article XVI:2(a), the United States argues that the Panel misunderstood the ordinary
meaning of this provision because the Panel ignored the requirement that limitations be "in the form
of numerical quotas". In particular, the United Stat es contends, the Panel erroneously found that "a
measure that is not expressed in the form of a numerical quota or economic needs test may still fall
within the scope of Article XVI:2(a)" if it has the "effect" of a zero quota. 50 In the United States'
submission, a limitation that has only the "effect" of limiting to zero the number of service suppliers,
or their output, does not satisfy the "form" requirements of Article XVI:2.

48United States' appellant's submission, para. 3. (footnote omitted)
49Ibid., para. 97.

24. As to Article XVI:2(c), the United States contends that the Panel did not come to the proper
ordinary meaning of this provision because it used an incorrect reading of the French and Spanish
versions as the basis for its interpretation, which is at odds with a plain reading of the English text.
This approach, which is contrary to Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention, is said to have led the
Panel to the erroneous conclusion that Article XVI: 2(c) refers to limitations "expressed in terms of
designated numerical units" and limitations "in the form of quotas", when in fact the absence of a
comma in Article XVI:2(c) requires these to be read together as a unitary requirement, namely,
limitations "expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas".
25. The United States submits that none of the Un ited States state and federal laws imposes a
limitation on the number of service suppliers "in the form of numerical quotas" or limitations on
service operations or output "expressed as designated num erical units in the form of quotas". Rather,
these laws represent domestic regulation limiting the characteristics of supply of gambling services,
not the quantity of services or service suppliers. More sp ecifically, these laws are "in the form of"
and "expressed" as non-numerical, non-quota criteria that restrict certain activities, rather than
restricting numbers of suppliers, operations, or output. As these laws match none of the "forms"
identified in Article XVI:2(a) or XVI:2(c), the Unit ed States argues that the Panel should have found
that these laws are not inconsistent with those provisions.
26. The United States contends that the Panel's in terpretation of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c)
would "unreasonably and absurdly"
51 deprive Members of much of their right to regulate services by
not allowing them to prohibit selected activities in sectors where commitments are made. The
approach to market access liberaliza tion reflected in the GATS is said not to provide an unlimited
right to supply services throughout each committed sect or or mode of supply. Such an approach
would be at odds, so it is argued, with the balan ce between liberalization and regulation reflected in
the Members' recognized right to regulate services. According to the United States, there is no reason
why a Member's imposition of nationality-neutr al limitations should violate Article XVI provided
that they do not take the form of numerical quotas or any other form prohibited by Article XVI:2.
Such limitations remain subject to other GATS pr ovisions, however, including Article VI. In this
regard, the United States also questions the Panel' s finding that Article XVI, and Article VI:4 and
VI:5, are mutually exclusive.
27. For these reasons, the United States requests that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's
findings that the United States failed to satisfy its obligations under Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of

the GATS. Should the Appellate Body so decide, the United States requests the Appellate Body to
determine that the remaining Panel findings are "without legal effect."
52
4. Article XIV of the GATS: General Exceptions
28. The United States appeals the Panel's findings th at the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act are not justified under paragraph (a) or (c) of Article XIV of the GATS
and are inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
(a) Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XIV: "Necessary"
29. According to the United States, the Panel err oneously interpreted the term "necessary" in
Article XIV(a) and XIV(c) to require the United States to "explore and exha ust reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternatives"53 that would ensure the same level of protection as the prohibition on
the remote supply of gambling and betting services. The United States contends that the Panel then
misunderstood this obligation, in conjunction with the specific market access commitments set out in
the United States' Schedule, as requiring the United States to hold consultations with Antigua before
and while imposing the prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services.
30. The United States underlines that the Panel errone ously read a "procedural requirement" of
consultation or negotiation into Article XIV(a) and XIV(c). 54 Such a requirement is said to find no
support in either the text of Article XIV or in pr evious decisions of GATT panels and the Appellate
Body. Pointing to Articles XII:5 and XXI:2(a) of the GATS, the United States asserts that the treaty
drafters were explicit when they intended to impo se a prerequisite of consultations before a Member
could take certain actions, and that no such explicit requirement is found in the text of Article XIV.
The United States also contends that, when exam ining whether a WTO-consistent alternative was
reasonably available, the Panel departed from pr evious GATT and WTO decisions interpreting the
term "necessary" under Article XX of the GATT and, in particular, from the decision of the Appellate
Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef .55 According to the United States, these decisions
clarified that alternatives that are only "theoretical" 56—such as a possible negotiated outcome
following consultations—cannot be regarded as "reasonably available".

52United States' appellant's submission, paras. 3 and 101. (footnote omitted)
53Ibid., para. 136.
54Ibid., para. 138.
55Ibid., paras. 147-152.
56Ibid., para. 152.

31. Furthermore, the United States argues that a possible negotiated outcome following
consultations does not qualify as a le gitimate "alternative" in this c ase because it could not ensure the
same level of protection vis-à-vis the remote s upply of gambling. If the United States were to
withdraw its prohibition and pursu e consultations instead, it could not guarantee that the risks
associated with the remote supply of gambling woul d not recur. Such an outcome, according to the
United States, cannot be reconciled with the finding of the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos that a
Member is not required to adopt a measure that would render that Member vulnerable to the very risks
sought to be avoided by the allegedly WTO-inconsistent measure.
32. The United States additionally contends that th e mere fact that a Member made a specific
commitment in its Schedule cannot, as the Pane l found, imply some obligation to carry out
consultations if that measure is to be justified unde r Article XIV. The Panel failed to explain how the
inscription of the term "None" in the United States Schedule provided textual support for its
conclusion. Moreover, according to the United Stat es, the Panel's finding of a prerequisite of
consultations is incompatible with the opening text of Article XIV, which provides that "nothing in
this Agreement"—including in the Schedules of Members—can prevent Members from adopting
measures that meet the requirements of Article XIV.
33. Finally, the United States asserts that the allege d failure to consult with Antigua was the sole
basis for the Panel's findings that the United Stat es' measures are not provisionally justified under
paragraph (a) or (c) of Article XIV. Without th e requirement of consultations, then, the Appellate
Body is left with the Panel's finding that the meas ures serve important interests and with the absence
of any finding on a reasonably available alternative measure. In this light, the United States argues,
the Appellate Body has sufficient basis to complete the analysis and conclude that the United States'
measures are provisionally justified under paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XIV.
34. For the foregoing reasons, the United States reque sts that, in the event that the Appellate
Body reaches the issues under Article XIV, it rever se the Panel's findings under Article XIV(a) and
XIV(c), complete the analysis, and find that th e Wire Act, the Travel, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act are "provisionally" justified under those provisions.
(b) The Chapeau of Article XIV
35. The United States claims that the Panel applie d the wrong legal standard when interpreting
the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS, becau se it required the United States to demonstrate
"consistent" treatment of foreign and domestic supply of services. The United States observes that the
chapeau prohibits "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" di scrimination, and "disguised restriction[s] on trade
in services". The United States argues that "inc onsistent" treatment as between services supplied

domestically and services supplied from other Members, in and of itself, does not necessarily
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction on trade in services.
57
36. The United States additionally contends that the Panel improperly made the rebuttal for
Antigua under the chapeau of Article XIV. The United States emphasizes that, in its analysis under
Article XIV, the Panel "recycled" certain evidence and argumentation brought forward by Antigua in
the context of its national treatment claim under Article XVII 58, as to which the Panel exercised
judicial economy. Given the distinct legal standard of the chapeau—in particular, its focus only on
discrimination that is "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable"—the United States argues that reliance on
Antigua's argumentation and evidence in relation to its national treatment claim is inapposite when
analyzing the United States' defence under Article XIV.
59
37. Furthermore, the United States alleges that, "[a]s a matter of law" 60, the fact that three
domestic service suppliers have not been prosecute d under United States law, and that an Antiguan
supplier has been prosecuted, does not rise to the level of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or
a "disguised restriction on trade" under the chapeau of Article XIV, and the Panel erred in finding
otherwise. In addition, the United States contends that a relatively small sampling of cases, where a
government has not prosecuted allegedly criminal acts, is not probative because "neutral
considerations", such as resource limitations, prevent prosecutors from pursuing all violations of the
law in a given jurisdiction.61
38. The United States also claims that the Panel faile d to satisfy its obligations under Article 11
of the DSU in its evaluation of the evidence relating to the chapeau of Article XIV. According to the
United States, the Panel erred in assessing the United States' enforcement of certain federal laws
because the Panel did not take into account "uncontr overted" evidence of the overall enforcement of
United States law. 62 The Panel is said to have also erred by failing to recognize that the Interstate
Horseracing Act ("IHA") could not repeal pre-exis ting criminal statutes, including those challenged
by Antigua and found by the Panel to be inconsistent with Article XVI of the GATS.
39. Should the Appellate Body reverse the Panel' s findings under the chapeau, the United States
requests that the Appellate Body complete the analysis and find that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and

58Ibid., para. 188.
59Ibid., para. 189.
60Ibid., para. 184.
61Ibid., para. 185.
62Ibid., para. 194.

the Illegal Gambling Business Act meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV and are thus
justified under Article XIV of the GATS.
5. "Practice" as a "Measure"
40. The United States challenges the Panel's finding, in the course of its analysis of the measures
at issue, that "practice" can be considered an autonomous measure that can be challenged "in and of
itself".63 The United States contends that, in arriving at this finding, the Panel erred in two respects.
First, it went beyond its terms of reference, as An tigua had not challenged any of the items that the
Panel indicated could be considered "practice". Secondly, the Panel based its conclusion that
"practice" can be challenged "as such" on a mischar acterization of prior WTO decisions with respect
to what constitutes a "measure" under WTO law. 64 The United States therefore requests that the
Appellate Body reverse this finding of the Panel.
B. Arguments of Antigua – Appellee
1. Antigua's Prima Facie Case
41. Antigua requests the Appellate Body to uphol d the Panel's findings that Antigua made a
prima facie case of GATS-inconsistency with respect to the relevant federal and state statutes.
Antigua argues that, although the Pa nel should have considered this case on the basis of the "total
prohibition" that the United States maintains against the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services, Antigua had in any event made out its case under Article XVI with respect to discrete federal
and state legislation.
42. Antigua contends that, after searching through United States federal and state laws to identify
those statutes it believed to be the source of th e prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services, it provided the Panel with the text and a summary of each statute. Antigua
referred in its submissions to specific laws, such as the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act, as prohibiting the cross-bor der supply of gambling and betting services.
Antigua emphasizes that it submitted evidence as to how the United States' authorities themselves
understood various laws as operati ng to prohibit the cross-border supply of gambling services. In
addition, Antigua referred the Pa nel to secondary sources that c onfirmed this understanding.
According to Antigua, the discussion and evidence it presented were sufficient to substantiate its

64Ibid., paras. 209-211 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review ,
para. 84; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products , paras. 12-16; and
Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157).

allegation that the United States acts inconsistently with Article XVI of the GATS as a result of this
prohibition.
43. Antigua contests the argument that the United St ates has been denied a fair opportunity to
defend itself in this case. The United States admitted on several occasions—including during
consultations—that the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services is prohibited.
Furthermore, the federal and state laws challenged by Antigua were identified at the outset of the
dispute in Antigua's panel request. As a result, Antigua contends, the United States was aware that it
would be expected to defend itself with respect to those laws.
44. As regards the United States' claim under Article 11 of the DSU, Antigua maintains that the
Panel did not exceed its authority in de termining that Antigua had established a prima facie case. In
arguing to the contrary, Antigua submits, the Unite d States fails to recognize the discretion afforded
panels in the assessment of parties' prima facie cases, as determined by relevant WTO decisions.
45. Antigua accordingly requests that the Appellate Body uphold the Panel's findings regarding
the United States measures identified by Antigua as the subject of its challenge.
2. United States' Schedule of Specific Commitments

46. Antigua requests the Appellate Body to uphold th e Panel's findings that the term "sporting"
does not include gambling and that, consequent ly, the United States undertook a specific market
access commitment in its Schedule with respect to gambling and betting services.
47. Antigua argues that when examining the words of a treaty, a treaty interpreter must seek to
determine the "common intention" of the parties. Although this should be done in accordance with
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, Antigua submits that this provision should be regarded as one
"general rule of interpretation" rather than a hierarchical sequence of tests.65
48. In Antigua's submission, the ordinary meaning of the word "sporting" does not include
gambling and betting services. Because a Schedule is a classification of mutually exclusive services
categories, an entry in such a classification can have only one meaning.
66 Thus, it is inappropriate to
interpret an entry in the United States' Schedule on the basis of the entry's divergent dictionary
definitions. In order to determine the ordinary m eaning of the term "sporting" in the United States'
Schedule, it is more appropriate to examine the term in the light of other classifications, such
as W/120, the CPC, other classification systems, and other WTO Members' GATS Schedules.

65Antigua's appellee's submission, para. 44 (quoting Article 31 of the Vienna Convention).
66Ibid., para. 50.

Antigua submits that the Panel properly analyzed these classifications and found that they do not
support the conclusion that "sporting" includes gambling, a result confirmed by the fact that the
United States could not point to any classification that uses the word "sporting" to refer to gambling.
49. Given that, as the Panel itself observed, GATS Schedules simply cannot be understood
without reference to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines , Antigua urges the Appellate Body to uphold the
Panel's findings that W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are "context" for the interpretation of
the United States' Schedule and Article XVI of the GATS. In addition, the revised Scheduling
Guidelines of 2001 should be considered a "subsequent agreement" and/or "subsequent practice", as
provided for in Article 31(3)(a) and 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention . According to Antigua,
the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines confirm that th e existing GATS Schedules were prepared in
accordance with the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120.
50. Antigua emphasizes that the United States' attemp t to distinguish the structure of the W/120
from the meaning of its categories is without merit. When a Member uses the structure of the W/120,
Antigua argues, it "inevitably" uses the content of its categories, unless this Member indicates
explicitly that it is di verging from that content with respect to a sector or subsector.
67 Antigua notes,
in this respect, that the United States' Schedule in cludes no such indication with respect to "sporting"
or "other recreational services".
3. Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS – "limitations ... in the form of"
51. Antigua requests the Appellate Body to u phold the Panel's findings with respect to
Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS. A ccording to Antigua, a good faith interpretation of
Article XVI:2 of the GATS, on the basis of its text , context, and object and purpose, reveals the flaws
in the United States' understanding, and supports the Panel's interpretation of the relevant provisions.
52. Antigua contests the United States' understanding of the coverage of Article XVI:2 as limited
to measures that take a certain "form", without re gard to the effects of those measures. Instead,
Antigua contends that the text of Article XVI: 2(a) and XVI:2(c) is intended to provide a broad
description of the types of measures caught by these provisions. For example, the word "whether" in
these provisions suggests an illustrative list of pr ohibited measures, while the absence of any
definition in the GATS of the terms "numerical quotas", "monopolies", "exclusive service suppliers",
or "economic needs test" supports the view that thes e terms cannot be used to restrict the scope of
Article XVI:2 to precisely defined "forms".68

68Ibid., para. 61.

53. Antigua emphasizes that the 1993 Scheduling Gu idelines and the Schedules of the United
States and other WTO Members confirm that the United States' "narrow"
69 interpretation does not
represent the common intention of the parties. Antigua finds support in other Members' Schedules,
including that of the United States, that list measures, including prohibitions, that are not caught by
the United States' interpretation of Article XVI:2.
70 According to Antigua, this context validates the
Panel's view that Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) capture measures that are equivalent to a zero quota.
4. Article XIV of the GATS: General Exceptions
54. Antigua submits that the Panel did not err in interpreting Article XIV of the GATS or in
applying its interpretation to the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act.
(a) Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XIV: "Necessary"
55. According to Antigua, the Panel correctly fo und that the United States had not established
that the laws in question were "n ecessary" within the meaning of Article XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the
GATS. Antigua argues that, contrary to the Unite d States' understanding of the Panel's conclusion,
the Panel determined that the United States had failed to meet its burden of proof as to the necessity of
the three federal laws, and that the lack of consu ltations with Antigua "was simply evidence of that
failure".71
56. With respect to Article XIV(a), Antigua subm its that the United States bore the burden of
proving that its three federal laws were "necessary" to protect its citizens from organized crime and
underage gambling in the context of the services from Antigua at issue in this dispute, but the United
States submitted no evidence in this regard. Similarly, as regards Article XIV(c), it was incumbent on
the United States to prove that the three federal st atutes were "necessary" to secure compliance with
the RICO statute in order to protect United States citizens against organized crime in the context of
gambling and betting services from Antigua. Again, Antigua asserts, the United States submitted no
evidence in this regard.
57. Antigua underlines that the United States would have met its burden of proof had it proven
that there were no WTO-consistent alternative me asures reasonably available that would provide the
United States with the same level of protection. Instead, the United States argued that it was for
Antigua or the Panel to establish that one or more reasonably available WTO- consistent alternatives

70Ibid. Antigua submits a summary of listed measures of several Schedules in Annex B of its appellee's
submission.
71Ibid., para. 76.

to prohibition existed.72 In Antigua's submission, such a reversal of the burden of proof would not be
justified in the light of previous WTO decisions examining affirmative defences.
(b) The Chapeau of Article XIV
58. Antigua recalls that it is for the party invoking an Article XIV defence to prove all elements
of the defence, including the requirements laid down in the chapeau of Article XIV. According to
Antigua, the United States did not accomplish this task.
59. Antigua submits that the Panel did not act in consistently with Article 11 of the DSU in
finding that, in the light of the evidence of: (i) the legality of inter-state remote access gambling
under the IHA; and (ii) the non-enforcement of la ws against major domestic suppliers of internet
gambling services, the United States had not met its bur den of proof. In particular, the IHA, on its
face, allows interstate betting on horseracing over the telephone and over the internet. The United
States' arguments regarding this statute amount to an assertion that the law has no legal effect and this,
submits Antigua, is simply "not credible".73
60. For these reasons, Antigua requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's findings that the
United States did not prove that the three federal la ws at issue were "necessary" within the terms of
Article XIV(a) or XIV(c) of the GATS.
5. "Practice" as a "Measure"
61. With respect to the Panel's finding that practice "can be considered as an autonomous measure
that can be challenged in and of itself" 74, Antigua submits that this finding is obiter dictum .75
Because, however, there may be circumstances under which the "practice" of a WTO Member should
be considered as a measure for purposes of dispute resolution, Antigua requests the Appellate Body to
dismiss the United States' appeal on this issue.
C. Claims of Error by Antigua – Appellant
1. The "Total Prohibition" as a "Measure"
62. Antigua argues that the Panel erred by failing to assess Antigua's claims on the basis of the
"total prohibition" of the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services in the United States.

72Antigua's appellee's submission, para. 89 (citing United States' appellant's submission, paras. 152-153
73Ibid., para. 106.
75Ibid., para. 109.

Antigua requests that the Appellate Body so find an d that it complete the analysis and find the "total
prohibition" to be inconsistent with Article XVI of the GATS.
63. According to Antigua, the Panel erroneously c oncluded that Antigua had not identified the
"total prohibition" as a "measure" in the panel request . Antigua states that its characterization of the
prohibition as "total" was "nothing but a description"
76 that did not alter the focus of Antigua's
challenge from the outset of the dispute, which was the undisputed prohibition on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services. Although it did not expressly state in the panel request that
the "total prohibition" is a measure "in and of itsel f", Antigua submits that it clearly identified the
"total prohibition" in the panel request in a ma nner consistent with panel requests previously
examined by panels and the Appellate Body. In the alternative, Antigua contends that any ambiguity
regarding its challenge to the "total prohibition", in and of itself, was resolved by reading its first
submission to the Panel.
64. Antigua also contests the Panel's legal conclusi on that, in any event, the "total prohibition"
does not constitute a measure that could be challe nged in and of itself in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. According to Antigua, the Panel misinterpreted US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review in finding that a measure must be an "instrument", and that the total prohibition "is a
description of an effect rather than an instrument containing rules or norms." 77 According to Antigua,
in that case, the Appellate Body regarded any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member as a
"measure".
65. In addition, Antigua argues that the United States admitted not only the existence of the "total
prohibition", but also its effect as prohibiting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services
in the United States. 78 The Panel's failure to accord weight to this admission is inconsistent with the
Panel's obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to "m ake an objective assessment of the facts of the
case". Antigua asserts that, on the basis of the United States' admission and the other evidence
submitted to the Panel, it had met its burden of proving the existence of the "total prohibition" and its
effect, and that it was entitled to proceed in making out a case that the "total prohibition", as such, is
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the GATS.
2. Article XVI:1 of the GATS – Conditional Appeal
66. Should the Appellate Body reverse the Panel' s legal interpretation of Article XVI:2(a)
and XVI:2(c) of the GATS, as requested by the Unite d States in its appeal, Antigua seeks reversal of

76Antigua's opening statement at the oral hearing.
77Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 24 (referring to Panel Report, para. 6.176).
78Ibid., para. 45.

the Panel's erroneous conclusion that Article XVI: 2 exhaustively defines those measures that would
be inconsistent with the obligation in Article XVI:1. As a result of the Panel's interpretation, Antigua
argues, a Member would be permitted to maintain me asures inconsistent with the broad prohibition in
Article XVI:1, provided only that they are not am ong those listed in Article XVI:2. Antigua submits
that such an interpretation reduces Article XVI:1 to an introductory clause with no legal effect of its
own, contrary to the principles of treaty interpre tation. Therefore, Antigua requests the Appellate
Body to find that the Panel erred in concluding that Article XVI:1 is limited by Article XVI:2 of the
GATS and to complete the analysis by concluding th at the United States' measures are inconsistent
with Article XVI:1, regardless of their consistency with Article XVI:2.
3. Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS – Measures Aimed at
Consumers
67. Antigua challenges the Panel's conclusion th at measures preventing consumers from using
services supplied by a service provider in another WTO Member are not inconsistent with sub-
paragraph (a) or (c) of Article XVI:2.
68. The Panel found that certain state laws of th e United States are not inconsistent with sub-
paragraph (a) or (c) of Article XV I:2 on the ground that they are not directed at "service suppliers",
nor to "service operations" and "service output", but, rather, are directed at service consumers. In
Antigua's submission, if the Panel were correct in its distinction between prohibitions directed at
consumers and those directed at suppliers, then a Member that has made a full commitment on
mode 1 would still be able to eliminate the possibility of cross-border supply of services, and thus
circumvent that commitment, by imposing restricti ons on the ability of its citizens to consume those
services. It is argued that this would be an "absurd" result.
79
69. Instead, for the same reasons that the Panel found that a prohibition on the supply of a service
falls within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c)—because it has the effect of a zero quota—
the Panel should have found that a prohibition on the consumption of a service also falls within those
provisions. A measure that imposes a prohibition on the consumption of services also has the effect
of a zero quota on "service suppliers", "service operations" and "service output" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c). Antigua submits that such an interpretation nevertheless preserves
Members' right to regulate because a Member that wants to maintain such a prohibition may continue
to do so, provided that the Member either clarifies this in its Schedule or leaves the sector unbound.
70. Accordingly, Antigua requests the Appellate B ody to reverse the findings of the Panel in
paragraphs 6.383, 6.398, 6.402, and 6.406 of the Panel Report.

79Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 57.

4. Article XIV of the GATS: General Exceptions

71. Antigua challenges the Panel's decision to consid er the defence raised by the United States
under Article XIV of the GATS. Antigua also argu es that the Panel erroneously relieved the United
States of its burden of proof with respect to Article XIV. In so doing, the Panel denied Antigua the
right to respond to the defence, contrary to pr inciples of due process and equality of arms, and
inconsistent with the Panel's duty under Article 11 of the DSU. In addition, the Panel erred in its
evaluation under paragraphs (a) a nd (c) of Article XIV, as well as under the chapeau of Article XIV.
Antigua contends that the Panel's errors in this regard include a failure to make an objective
assessment of the matter and the facts before it, contrary to Article 11 of the DSU.
(a) The Panel's Consideration of the United States' Defence
72. According to Antigua, the Panel should not have evaluated the United States' defence in this
proceeding. The United States' invocation of Article XIV only in its second written submission—and
even then in an ambiguous manner—constituted an "extraordinary delay" and a "simple litigation
tactic", contrary to the obligation in Article 3.10 of the DSU for parties to participate in dispute
settlement proceedings in good faith.
80 Antigua emphasizes that due process requires that a party be
given fair opportunity to respond to claims made and evidence submitted by the other party in a
dispute, and that the delay of the United States in invoking Article XIV prejudiced Antigua's ability to
rebut the defence. As an example of such pr ejudice, Antigua contends that the evidence and
argumentation relied upon by the Panel for much of its discussion under the chapeau was originally
presented by Antigua in the context of its claim unde r Article XVII of the GATS, relating to national
treatment afforded to "like" foreign service suppliers. In this regard, Antigua asserts that Article XVII
is "a different GATS provision altogether with completely different issues and context". 81 Therefore,
those arguments may not necessarily be the same as those Antigua would have advanced had it been
provided the opportunity required by due process.
(b) Burden of Proof
73. Antigua asserts that because Article XIV is an affirmative defence, the United States bears the
burden of proving it. Yet, in this case, the Panel made the defence for the United States and, in doing
so, failed to comply with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
74. With respect to Article XIV(a), Antigua claims that the Panel added defences that the United
States never made and created a c oherent argument in support of the United States' defence under this

80Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 72.
81Ibid., para. 76.

provision. Although the United States raised only two concerns regarding public morals or public
order—organized crime and underage gambling—the Panel examined Article XIV(a) in relation to
five concerns, including money laundering, fraud, and h ealth concerns. Thus, the Panel added to the
United States' defence three concerns that the United States itself never raised.82
75. Antigua argues that the Panel also erred in taking into account health concerns in its
Article XIV(a) discussion because such concerns ex pressly come under the scope of Article XIV(b).
With respect to Article XIV(c), Antigua contends that the United States did not identify sufficiently
the RICO statute and its relevance for the United States' defence under Article XIV(c). Finally,
Antigua claims that the Panel should not have addr essed the chapeau of Artic le XIV at all, because
the argumentation and evidence contained in the Panel's discussion under the chapeau was not
submitted by the United States in the context of its Article XIV defence.
(c) Paragraph (a) of Article XIV
76. With regard to Article XIV(a), Antigua submits th at the Panel erred in three respects: (i) it
failed to consider the entire text of Article XIV(a); (ii) it improperly assessed the United States'
defence under Article XIV(a), particularly in the light of the standard set out by the Appellate Body in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef; and (iii) it failed to make an objective assessment of the evidence
before it.
77. Antigua asserts that the Panel's analysis of Article XIV(a) is incomplete because, although the
Panel recognized the relevance of footnote 5 to Ar ticle XIV(a) when interpreting the provision, the
Panel failed to assess whether the interests that th e United States purports to protect through its
challenged measures meet the standard set forth in that footnote.
78. Furthermore, Antigua contends that the Panel mi sinterpreted the Appellate Body's decision in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef , with respect to the standards and the level of scrutiny to be
employed by a panel reviewing a defence. More specifically, in that decision, the Appellate Body
established a "weighing and balancing" test with three particular components to assess whether a
measure is "necessary". Yet, the Panel's analysis of the three components in this dispute falls short of
the demanding inquiry outlined by the Appellate Body in that decision. Mo st notably, according to
Antigua, in the absence of a factual finding that the United States' concerns as regards "remote"
gambling relate to "actually existing" risks, the measures at issue are not justifiable under
Article XIV(a).
 83

82Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 81.
83Ibid., para. 96.

79. Antigua also argues that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts and
evidence before it when applying the "weighing and balancing" test mandated by the Appellate Body
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef . First, in its analysis of whether the measures at issue are
designed to protect public morals or maintain public order, the Panel considered only evidence
submitted by the United States, without discussing or taking into account the contrary evidence
submitted by Antigua. Secondly, as to the importance of the interests or values protected, the Panel
"ignored" a contemporary assessment by the United States Supreme Court of the prevailing attitude in
the United States towards gambling, while taking into account Congressional hearings and political
statements made more than 40 years ago.
84 Thirdly, the Panel relied on no evidence at all when
concluding that the challenged measures contributed to the realization of the ends that the United
States claimed are pursued through those measures. Fi nally, with respect to the trade impact of the
measures, Antigua objects to the fact that none of the evidence cited by the Panel relates to factual
matters involving the cross-border gambling and betting services provided specifically by Antigua.
Antigua adds that "substantially all" of the evid ence on this particular issue is "unsubstantiated
statements of United States government employees or elected public officials"
85 that were taken into
account by the Panel without consideration of Antiguan evidence to the contrary.
(d) Paragraph (c) of Article XIV
80. Antigua argues that the Panel should not have considered the RICO statute in its evaluation of
the United States' defence under Artic le XIV(c) because the RICO statute is "wholly dependent" on a
violation of other federal or stat e laws for its effective operation. 86 The other federal statutes before
the Panel were found to be inconsis tent with the GATS, and the Panel determined that no state laws
were before it for considerati on under Article XIV(c). As a resu lt, Antigua reasons, no other laws
could form part of the Panel's evaluation under Artic le XIV(c). Furthermore, the societal interest
allegedly pursued by the RICO statute relates excl usively to organized crime, whereas the Panel had
already determined that organized crime does not cons titute a societal interest of particularly greater
significance in the context of the remote (as opposed to non-remote) supply of gambling services.

84Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 110.
85Ibid., para. 113.
86Ibid., para. 127.

81. Finally, Antigua claims that, as in its analysis under Article XIV(a), the Panel did not satisfy
its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU, because the Panel's conclusions we re premised either on
"unsubstantiated"87 or "conclusory" 88 statements of United States government officials, or on no
evidence at all.
(e) The Chapeau of Article XIV
82. With respect to the chapeau of Article XIV, An tigua argues that the Panel erred, first, in
deciding to continue its evaluation of the United States' defence under the chapeau, even though the
Panel had found that none of the fe deral laws was provisionally justified under paragraph (a) or (c) of
Article XIV. Secondly, Antigua contends that the Panel improperly "segmented" the gambling
industry and limited its discussion to the remote supply of gambling services. Instead, the Panel
should have examined how the United States addresses the supply of gambling services with respect
to the entire industry and compared this treatment with that given to foreign suppliers of gambling
services. Finally, Antigua alleges that the Panel fa iled to comply with its obligations under Article 11
of the DSU by again drawing its conclusions on the basis of "unsubstantiated assertions" 89 of the
United States, rather than on the "independent" 90 evidence submitted by Antigua, and thereby
effectively "shift[ing]"91 the burden of proof to Antigua.
83. For these reasons, Antigua requests the Appellate Body to find that the Panel erroneously
considered the defence by the United States under Ar ticle XIV and, in doing so, also relieved the
United States of the burden of justifying its measure s under Article XIV. In the alternative, Antigua
requests that the Appellate Body find that the Pa nel erred in its evaluation of the United States'
defence under paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XIV and the chapeau of Article XIV.
D. Arguments by the United States – Appellee
1. The "Total Prohibition" as a "Measure"
84. The United States agrees with the Panel that Antigua did not identify the "total prohibition" as
such in its panel request and that, even if Anti gua had properly identified it, a "total prohibition"
cannot be a "measure in and of itself" subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

87Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 133.
88Ibid., paras. 136-137.
89Ibid., para. 143.
90Ibid.
91Ibid., para. 144.

85. The United States submits that Antigua did not challenge, in its panel request, the "total
prohibition" as a distinct measure because the pa nel request makes clear that, in discussing a
"prohibition", Antigua was referring to the effect of one or more laws listed in the Annex. According
to the United States, therefore, the Panel correctly concluded that a challenge to the "total prohibition"
as a distinct measure was beyond its terms of reference.
86. The United States claims that the Panel's conc lusion—that the "total prohibition" cannot be
deemed a single and autonomous measure that can be challenged in and of itself—finds support in the
record in this dispute as well as in the Appellate Body's reasoning in past disputes. Both parties
agreed before the Panel that the alleged "total prohibition" was a description of the purported effect
of the laws at issue.
92 The effect of a measure may not it self become a "measure" subject to WTO
dispute settlement. The United States adds that the Panel's conclusion in this regard is also in line
with the Appellate Body's analysis in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , because in
this dispute, Antigua's interpretation of the effect of the United States law as a "total prohibition" has
no "normative value" in United States municipal law.93
87. The United States accordingly requests that th e Appellate Body reject Antigua's appeal
relating to whether Antigua may rely on the "total prohibition" as a measure challenged in and of
itself in this dispute. As a result, the United St ates submits, it is not necessary for the Appellate Body
to complete the analysis on the consistency of the "total prohibition" with Article XVI of the GATS,
as requested by Antigua.
2. Article XVI:1 of the GATS – Conditional Appeal
88. The United States requests that the Appellate Body uphold the Panel's finding that the only
limitations falling within the scope of Article XVI of the GATS are those listed in paragraph 2 of
Article XVI. According to the United States, Artic le XVI:2, on its face, exhaustively defines, by
means of a "closed list", the limitations that cannot be maintained by a Member that undertook a full
market access commitment.94 If, as Antigua suggests, Article XVI:1 alone prohibits any limitation to
the supply of services in the market of a Member, then all limitations would be covered by this
Article. Such an interpretation would render Article XVI:2 ineffective. Therefore, the United States
requests the Appellate Body to find that the Panel di d not err in its interpretation of the relationship
between Article XVI:1 and XVI:2 of the GATS.

93Ibid., para. 17.
94Ibid., paras. 27-28.

3. Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS – Measures Aimed at
Consumers
89. The United States supports the Panel's interpre tation that sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI:2 do not cover measures addressed to consumers of services rather than to service
suppliers or output. The United States emphasizes that sub- paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2
cover only the limitations that are precisely menti oned in their text—limitations on service suppliers,
operations, or output—and that a pr ohibition on consumers should not be read into the text of that
provision. Therefore, the United States requests th e Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's conclusion
that sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 do not cover measures directed towards consumers of
services.
4. Article XIV of the GATS
90. The United States requests that the Appellate Body reject Antigua's appeal with respect to
Article XIV of the GATS in its entirety. In particular, the United States asserts that the Panel
correctly decided to consider the United States' arguments under Article XIV, and the Panel did not
make the defence for the United States. The United States submits further that the Panel's evaluation
of the United States' "concerns" under paragraph (a) of Article XIV was consistent with previous
WTO decisions examining general exceptions, and th at the Panel properly recognized that the RICO
statute operated independently of other federal a nd state laws. With respect to the chapeau of
Article XIV, the United States contends that Anti gua has failed to identify how the Panel erred in
allegedly "segment[ing]" the industry.95
(a) The Panel's Consideration of the United States' Defence
91. According to the United States, the Panel pr operly considered the United States' defence
under Article XIV. The United States emphasizes that Antigua had sufficient opportunity to respond
to the defence after the United States invoked Artic le XIV in its second written submission to the
Panel. The United States argues that this is confir med by the fact that Antigua made no allegation of
prejudice to its interests as a result of the alle ged tardiness of the United States in raising its
Article XIV defence. The United States finds suppor t in the WTO decisions where it is established
that the complaining party can bring new arguments in its second submission or even later. 96

96Ibid., para. 37 (citing Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 145; and Appellate Body
Report, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 154-162).

(b) Burden of Proof
92. The United States agrees with Antigua that pa nels cannot make the case for a complaining
party. The United States argues that, contrary to Antigua's arguments, the United States met its
burden of proof and did not leave it to the Panel to prove the Article XIV defence. In addition, the
United States contests Antigua's submission that the Panel acted inconsistently with the principles of
due process and the equality of arms, and with Article 11 of the DSU.
93. The United States asserts that it provided eviden ce of how the relevant statutes were enacted
and the operation and purpose of each statute. The United States also contends that it made
arguments regarding the relevant legal standards under Article XI V and provided argumentation and
evidence that the specific measures satisfy the legal requirements of an Article XIV defence.
94. According to the United States, all five concer ns acknowledged by the Panel with respect to
gambling activities had been identified by the United St ates in its submissions to the Panel. Thus, in
recognizing these concerns, the Panel did nothing more than what the United States requested it to do.
With respect to the "health concerns", the United St ates asserts that the health risks associated with
addiction to gambling fall within the scope of prot ection of public morals and/or public order under
Article XIV(a), and the Panel was correct in so finding. Finally, regarding the chapeau of
Article XIV, the United States asserts that it did al lege that the United States' measures satisfy the
requirements set out in the chapeau of Article XIV and referred the Panel to evidence in support of its
claim.
97
(c) Paragraph (a) of Article XIV
95. The United States disagrees with Antigua's alle gations of error regarding certain aspects of
the Panel's analysis under paragraph (a) of Article XIV. The United States contends that it provided
specific evidence of grave threats to public morals and public order, and made an argument that the
evidence provided met the specific requirements of Article XIV(a), including its footnote 5.
According to the United States, the Panel fully un derstood and applied the requirements laid down in
footnote 5 of Article XIV, as is evident from its discussion in the Panel Report. Furthermore, the
Panel correctly applied the "weighing and balancin g" test from the Appellate Body's decision in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef. The United States argues that, in doing so, the Panel found, first,
that the concerns identified by th e United States "actually did exist" 98 with respect to the remote

97United States' appellee's submission, para. 48 (referring to United States' appellant's submission,
para. 187, and United States' second submission to the Panel, paras. 117-122).
98Ibid., para. 55.

supply of gambling services; secondly, that prohibiti ng this activity contributes to the realization of
the ends pursued; and thirdly, that potential alternatives to the measures at issue existed.99
(d) Paragraph (c) of Article XIV
96. In the same vein, the United States argues that the Appellate Body should dismiss Antigua's
appeal with respect to the Panel's findings under Article XIV(c). The United States contests Antigua's
characterization that the RICO statute depends on other laws for its effective operation, stating instead
that the RICO statute imposes criminal liability not only for gambling under state laws, but also for
other acts not related to gambling or to other pr ohibitions under the laws of the states. Thus,
according to the United States, the RICO statute "has independent meaning and protects independent
interests and values apart from any other law."
100 In addition, the United States argues, the "ends
pursued" by the RICO statute include remote supply of gambling as well as organized crime, and
Antigua is incorrect in its assumption that the "end s pursued" by a law being enforced must relate
only to the precise service to which the enforcemen t measure applies. Finally, the United States
asserts that Antigua's claims under Article 11 of the DSU do not meet the "high standard of
argumentation required of Article 11 claims"
101 and appear to hinge on the notion that the Panel was
wrong to give weight to statements by United States government officials and testimony before
Congress.
(e) The Chapeau of Article XIV
97. The United States requests that the Appellate Body dismiss Antigua's appeal with respect to
the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS. Accordi ng to the United States, Antigua did not explain in
its other appellant's submission where and how the Panel allegedly "segmented" the industry, nor did
Antigua provide a legal basis for its argument th at a panel may not segment an industry in its
evaluation. The United States also submits that Anti gua's claims with respect to the Panel's alleged
failure to comply with Article 11 of the DSU do not meet the "high standard" required of successful
claims under that provision relating to a panel's assessment of evidence.102

99This last finding is challenged by the United States in its appellant's submission. See supra,
paras. 29-34.
101Ibid., para. 76.
102Ibid., para. 80.

E. Arguments of the Third Participants
1. European Communities

98. The European Communities agrees with the Pane l's conclusions regarding the interpretation
of the United States' Schedule of specific commitm ents. The European Communities further supports
the Panel's conclusion that Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) of the GATS prohibit measures that have
the effect of a quota, even if they are not expressl y cast in the form of numerical ceilings. In the
European Communities' submission, however, the Pa nel erred in ruling that measures directed at
consumers may not be limitations w ithin the terms of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) and, therefore,
the Appellate Body should correct this finding. In addition, if the Appellate Body reaches the issue of
the Panel's interpretation and application of Ar ticle XIV of the GATS, the European Communities
would encourage it to review fully the Panel's reasoning.
99. The European Communities contests the United Stat es' challenge to the Panel's interpretation
of the United States' Schedule of specific comm itments. The European Communities asserts that
Members' Schedules form an integral part of the WTO Agreement and constitute an agreement of all
the Members. Therefore, the Panel correctly resorted to the interpretative rules of the Vienna
Convention when evaluating the United St ates' commitments in its Schedule. In particular, the
European Communities argues, the Panel correctly followed Article 33 of the Vienna Convention in
comparing the terms of the Schedule used in the French and Spanish texts.
100. The European Communities disagrees, however, w ith the Panel's characterization of W/120
and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines. According to the European Communities, the fact that Members
entrusted the GATT Secretariat with producing a do cument, and that Members used such a document
for negotiations, cannot render that document one produced by the Members themselves . Therefore,
the European Communities submits, W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are better understood
as "preparatory work" within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention . Nevertheless,
according to the European Communities, qualif ying W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as
preparatory work does not alter the Panel's conclu sion regarding the scope of the United States'
commitments.
101. The European Communities agrees with the Pane l that Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) cover
measures that are not expressly cast in the fo rm of numerical ceilings, because a contrary
interpretation would permit Members easily to evad e market access commitmen ts undertaken in their
Schedules. The European Communities argues, howev er, that the Panel erred in interpreting the
scope of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2. The European Communities contends that the
GATS covers not only measures regulating trade in services, but also those measures "affecting" trade

in services. Such a measure may include a prohibiti on on the consumption of a given service, which,
although directed at consumers, has the effect of restricting the activity of suppliers. The European
Communities finds no limitation in sub-paragraph (a) or (c) that suggests that measures may not be
covered "by reason of their impact".
102. Regarding Article XIV of the GATS, the Europ ean Communities contends that this Article
seeks to preserve the right of WTO Members to regulate the supply of services. The European
Communities contends that Article XIV is to be interpreted in the light of the pertinent acquis with
regard to Article XX of the GATT 1994, as the wording and function of the two Articles correspond
closely. Should the Appellate Body reach this i ssue, the European Communities requests that it make
a "full review" of the Panel's reasoning and of the ju stification for the Article XIV defence, based on
the uncontested facts and evidence on record.103
103. The European Communiti es asserts that consultations with other Members "cannot be an
absolute condition to justify a measure under GATS Article XIV". 104 Contrary to the finding of the
Panel, neither Article XIV nor the United States' market access commitment in its Schedule supports
such a conclusion. Nevertheless, a respondent ma y rely on a good faith attempt to negotiate a
resolution with other Members as evidence in support of its claim that it explored reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternatives before adopting a particular WTO-incons istent measure. According to
the European Communities, however, such evidence would be insufficien t, on its own, to show that
reasonable alternatives were exhausted.
104. With respect to the Panel's conclusions on the chapeau of Article XIV, the European
Communities emphasizes that evidence of a lim ited number of cases of non-enforcement against
domestic business operators in comparable situations would not ipso facto rebut a prima facie case
of consistency of a measure with the chapeau. The European Communities c ontrasts that situation
with one where a complaining party demonstrates a di scernible pattern of application of a measure to
the detriment of foreign operators in comparable situations. Although enforcement in all cases may
not be practicable for a number of legitimate reasons, Members' authorities can and should be
expected to intervene and correct enforcement th at has occurred on a discriminatory basis against
foreign operators.

103European Communities' third participant's submission, para. 49.
104Ibid., paras. 14 and 91.

2. Japan

105. Japan agrees with the Panel's conclusions rela ting to the commitments in the United States'
Schedule and the interpretation of Article XVI:1 a nd XVI:2. Japan contends that the Panel erred,
however, with respect to its interpretation and application of Article XIV.
106. Japan submits that W/120 and the 1993 Scheduli ng Guidelines are "context" or "preparatory
work" for the interpretation of Members' GATS Sche dules. In the absence of language in the United
States' Schedule expressly indicating a departure from W/120 or providing an alternative definition,
the Panel was correct to turn to W/120 and the corresponding CPC numbers in order to give meaning
to the terms in the United States' Schedule. In doing so, however, the Panel should not have referred
to French and Spanish translations of "sporting", because the United States' Schedule clearly indicates
it to be "authentic in English only". Neverthel ess, Japan supports the Panel's conclusion that the
United States undertook in its Schedule a commitment regarding gambling and betting services.
107. Japan submits that the Panel properly unders tood the relationship between Article XVI:1
and XVI:2, namely, that the limitations specified in Article XVI:2 are exhaustive of the measures
covered by Article XVI:1. In addition, Japan agrees with the Panel that measures having the effect—
even if not the form—of a quota may also be prohib ited by virtue of sub-pa ragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI:2, but that these provisions do not cover measures imposed on service consumers rather
than on "service suppliers", "service operations", or "service output".
108. Japan argues that the Panel erred in its in terpretation of Article XIV by imposing a
requirement that a Member must "explore and exhaust" 105 less trade-restrictive alternatives to the
measure at issue. Furthermore, the Panel erroneous ly concluded that a Member is obliged to engage
in multilateral consultations, in cluding with non-complaining Me mbers, to identify less trade-
restrictive alternatives prior to and during applica tion of the challenged measure. Japan submits that
these conclusions of the Panel, if upheld by th e Appellate Body, would undermine Members' rights
and obligations under the WTO Agreement.
109. According to Japan, the focus of GATT and WTO decisions regarding Article XX of the
GATT 1994 has been whether, as a matter of the obj ective evidence before the panel, reasonably
available alternative measures existed not the extent to which they have been explored before
adopting the challenged measure. The Panel, how ever, disregarded this approach and added the
"explore and exhaust" standard as a new "open-ended requirement". 106 According to Japan, this
resulted from the Panel's misinterpretation of the Appellate Body's decision in Korea – Various

106Ibid., para. 12.

Measures on Beef and the Panel's improper reliance on the unadopted report of the GATT panel in
US – Tuna (Mexico) . Japan emphasizes that this new requirement would go well beyond the
negotiated commitments of WTO Members.
110. Japan also disagrees with the Panel's findings that Members invoking the affirmative defence
of Article XIV must enter into multilateral consultations to identify less trade-r estrictive alternatives.
According to Japan, the Panel's approach is a "substantial departure"107 from the obligations contained
in the covered agreements and from the relevant GATT and WTO decisions.
3. Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu
111. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiw an, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu requests the
Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's findings that the prohibitions of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c)
include all measures that may have an "effect" on the Member's market access commitments.
Furthermore, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu requests that the
Appellate Body reverse the Panel's erroneous c onclusion under Article XIV(a) and XIV(c) that
Members are required to consult with other Members concerning possible alternative WTO-consistent
measures.
112. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu supports the United
States' reading of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c). Th e text of these provisions suggests that the treaty
drafters did not intend to cover all measures that can have an effect on market access. Although the
Panel appeared to recognize this understanding when it found that Article VI and Article XVI are
mutually exclusive provisions, the Panel "contradict[ed]"
108 itself by subsequently concluding that a
measure with any effect on market access falls within the scope of Article XVI:2. Furthermore, the
Panel disregarded the fact that the United States' measures " in totality regulate the means of supply
for a specific sector, rather than creating a quota system" for foreign service suppliers, as would be
required in order to bring the measures within the text of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c).109
113. In addition, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu disagrees
with the Panel's interpretation of the term "neces sary" in Article XIV(a) and (c) as requiring Members
to conduct consultations with other Members to id entify alternative WTO-consistent measures. The
Panel erroneously found that the standard for th e "necessity" test in paragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XIV is whether a reasonably available WTO- consistent alternative has been "explored and

107Japan's third participant's submission, para. 14.
108Third participant's submission of the Separate Cu stoms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, para. 6.
109Ibid., para. 9. (original emphasis)

exhausted"
110 by the Member in question. This interpre tation contravenes the Appellate Body rulings
in EC – Asbestos and Korea – Various Measures on Beef. Based on this erroneous understanding of
the "necessity" requirement, the Panel constructed a si milarly erroneous requirement of consultations.
In addition, the Panel erred in basing its conclusion, in part, on the fact that a commitment has been
undertaken in the United States' Schedule. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu asserts that Article XIV allows Members to deviate not only from their general
obligations, but also from their specific commitments, in order to pursue legitimate national objectives
through measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATS.
III. Issues Raised in This Appeal
114. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
(A) with respect to the measures at issue,
(i) whether the Panel erred in finding that the "total prohibition on the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services" alleged by Antigua was
neither capable of constituting an autonomous measure that can be
challenged in and of itself, nor identif ied as a measure in Antigua's request
for the establishment of a panel;
(ii) whether the Panel erred in examini ng the consistency of the following
measures with the United States' obligations under Article XVI of the GATS:
(a) Federal laws:
(1) Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the
"Wire Act");
(2) Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the
"Travel Act"); and
(3) Section 1955 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the
"Illegal Gambling Business Act", or "IGBA").

110Third participant's submission of the Separate Cu stoms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, para. 13.

(b) State laws:
(1) Colorado: Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes;
(2) Louisiana: Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
(Annotated);
(3) Massachusetts: Section 17A of chapter 271 of the Annotated
Laws of Massachusetts;
(4) Minnesota: Section 609.755(1) and Subdivisions 2-3 of
Section 609.75 of the Minnesota Statutes (Annotated);
(5) New Jersey: Paragraph 2 of S ection VII of Article 4 of the
New Jersey Constitution, and Section 2A:40-1 of the New
Jersey Code;
(6) New York: Section 9 of Article I of the New York
Constitution and Section 5-401 of the New York General
Obligations Law;
(7) South Dakota: Sections 22-25A-1 through 22-25A-15 of the
South Dakota Codified Laws; and
(8) Utah: Section 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code (Annotated);
(iii) whether, by undertaking such an examination of the above measures, the
Panel acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU;
(B) with respect to the United States' GATS Schedule,
(i) whether the Panel erred in finding that subsector 10.D of the United States'
GATS Schedule includes specific commitments with respect to gambling and
betting services;
(C) with respect to Article XVI of the GATS,
(i) whether the Panel erred in its interpreta tion of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI:2 of the GATS and, in particular:

(a) in finding that a prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and
betting services constitutes a "zero quota" on the supply of such
services by particular means, and that such a "zero quota" is a
limitation that falls within su b-paragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI:2;
(b) in finding that measures imposing criminal liability on consumers of
cross-border gambling and betting services are not inconsistent with
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 and, in finding for that
reason, that the relevant laws of the states of Colorado, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and New York are not inconsistent with those
provisions;

(ii) if the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's interpretation of sub-paragraphs (a)
and (c) of Article XVI:2, then whethe r the Panel erred in finding that the
restrictions on market access that are prohibited by Article XVI are limited to
those listed in Article XVI:2; and
(iii) whether the Panel erred in applying its interpretation of Article XVI to
relevant United States federal and state la ws so as to find them inconsistent
with the United States' obligations under Article XVI:1 a nd sub-paragraphs
(a) and (c) of Article XVI:2;
(D) with respect to Article XIV of the GATS

(i) whether, in considering the United Stat es' defence under Article XIV, and in
its analysis under that provision, the Panel failed to satisfy its obligations
under Article 11 of the DSU;
(ii) whether the Panel improperly allo cated the burden of proof under
Article XIV;
(iii) whether the Panel erred in finding that the United States did not demonstrate
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are necessary to protect
public morals or to maintain publ ic order within the meaning of
Article XIV(a);
(iv) whether the Panel erred in finding that the United States did not demonstrate
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are necessary to secure

compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
GATS, within the meaning of Article XIV(c); and
(v) whether the Panel erred in finding that the United States did not demonstrate
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA satisfy the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XIV.
IV. Measures at Issue
115. We begin with the participants' appeals relating to the measures at issue. First, we review the
Panel's finding that the "'total prohibition' on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services" (the "total prohibition"
111) cannot constitute an autonomous measure that can be challenged
per se.112 Next, we consider whether the Panel erred in stating that "'practice' can be considered as an
autonomous measure that can be challenged in and of itself". 113 Finally, we evaluate the United
States' allegation that Antigua failed to make a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article XVI
with respect to certain federal and state laws and that, therefore, the Panel should not have ruled on
these claims.
A. "Total Prohibition" as a Measure
116. In its panel request, Antigua identified the "total prohibition" as the "effect" of various United
States federal and state laws. 114 In its first written submission, Antigua claimed that it was not
necessary to show that these laws produced the e ffect of a "total prohibition" because the United
States Ambassador had acknowledged, during the DS B meeting considering Antigua's first panel
request, the existence of such a prohibition. 115 Therefore, Antigua asserted, "[t]he subject of this
dispute is the total prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services— and the
parties are in agreement as to the existence of that total prohibition."116
117. In the course of responding to a United States request for preliminary rulings, prompted by
alleged deficiencies in Antigua's description of the measures it was challenging, the Panel stated:

111The Panel refers throughout the Panel Report to th e "'total prohibition' on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services" as the "total prohibitio n". (See, for example, Panel Report, paras. 6.139
and 6.154) In this Report we use the term "total prohibition" in the same manner.
112Panel Report, para. 6.175.
113Ibid., para. 6.197.
114Request for Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/2, 13 June 2003, p. 1.
115Antigua's first written submission to the Panel, para. 136 (citing Minutes of the DSB Meeting held
on 24 June 2003, WT/DSB/M/151, p. 11).
116Ibid., para. 136. (original emphasis)

Antigua and Barbuda emphasised that it is effectively challenging the
overall and cumulative effect of various federal and state laws which,
together with various policy st atements and other governmental
actions, constitute a complete prohib ition of the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services.
117
In its responses to the Panel's first set of questi ons, and in its second written submission to the Panel,
Antigua asserted that it was challenging the "total prohibition" as a "measure in and of itself". 118
Antigua disputed the United States' contention th at the "total prohibition" could not constitute a
measure per se for purposes of WTO dispute settlement.119
118. In its report, the Panel found that, "in the ci rcumstances of this case", a "total prohibition"
could not constitute a "measure" per se.120 The Panel based its conclusion on three factors. First, the
Panel found that the "total prohibition" did not constitute an "instrument containing rules or norms".121
Secondly, the Panel stated that Antigua had not suff iciently identified the "total prohibition" in its
panel request as a measure at issue, including the preci se relevant United States laws that give rise to
this prohibition.122 Thirdly, the Panel stated that it "fail[ed] to see how the United States could be
requested to implement a DSB recommendation to br ing a 'prohibition' into compliance with the
GATS pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU when an imprecisely defined 'puzzle' of laws forms the
basis of the 'total prohibition'."123
119. Antigua appeals the Panel's finding and emph asizes that Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS
defines a "measure" broadly, as do the Appellate Body's decisions in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews . Antigua also relies on the
alleged "concessions" 124 made by the United States Ambassador during DSB meetings in her
statements responding to Antigua's panel requests. An tigua argues that, in the light of this statement,
the Panel erred in not proceeding to evaluate Antigua's challenge on the basis of the "total
prohibition". Antigua therefore requests the Appe llate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that

117Panel's decision on the United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 17, Panel Report, p. B-4.
The Panel did not grant the United States' request to invite Antigua to file another submission detailing with
greater specificity the measures being challenged. The Panel also made no ruling relating to the "total
prohibition" as a measure per se.
118Antigua's response to Question 10 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, p. C-34; Antigua's second
written submission to the Panel, para. 8.
119Antigua's second written submission to the Panel, paras. 9-18.
120Panel Report, para. 6.175.
121Ibid., 6.176 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 81-
82 and 88).
122Ibid., paras. 6.177-6.180.
123Ibid., para. 6.182 (quoting Antigua's response to Question 32 posed by the Panel, Panel Report,
p. C-58).
124Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 48.

Antigua was not entitled to rely on the "total prohibition" as a measure per se in this dispute.
Antigua further requests the Appellate Body to comple te the analysis with respect to the consistency
of the "total prohibition" with Article XVI.125
120. The question before us, therefore, is whether an alleged "total prohibition" on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services constitutes a measure that may be challenged under the
GATS.126
121. The DSU provides for the "prompt settlement" of situations where Members consider that
their benefits under the covered agre ements "are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member".127 Two elements of this reference to "measures" that may be the subject of dispute
settlement are relevant. First, as the Appellate Bo dy has stated, a "nexus" must exist between the
responding Member and the "measure", such that the "measure"—whether an act or omission—must
be "attributable" to that Member. 128 Secondly, the "measure" must be the source of the alleged
impairment, which is in turn the effect resulting from the existence or operation of the "measure".
122. Similarly, consultations at the outset of a dispute are based on:
... measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken
within the territory [of the responding Member].129
This provision contemplates that "measures" th emselves will "affect" the operation of a covered
agreement. Finally, we note that this distinction between measures and their effects is also evident in
the scope of application of the GATS, namely, to "measures by Members affecting trade in
services".130
123. We are therefore of the view that the DSU a nd the GATS focus on "measures" as the subject
of challenge in WTO dispute settlement. To the extent that a Member's complaint centres on the
effects of an action taken by another Member, that complaint must nevertheless be brought as a
challenge to the measure that is the source of the alleged effects.

125Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 51.
126Panel Report, para. 6.175.
127Article 3.3 of the DSU. (emphasis added)
128Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81.
129Article 4.2 of the DSU.
130Article I:1 of the GATS.

124. Viewed in this light, the "total prohibition" described by Antigua does not, in itself, constitute
a "measure". As Antigua acknowledged before the Panel
131 and on appeal132, the "total prohibition" is
the collective effect of the operation of several state and federal laws of the United States. And it is
the "total prohibition" itself—as the effect of the underlying laws—that constitutes the alleged
impairment of Antigua's benefits under the GATS.
125. We note also that, if the "total prohibition" were a measure, a complaining party could fulfil
its obligation to identify the "specific measure at issue", pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, merely by
explicitly mentioning the "prohibition". Yet, without knowing the precise source of the "prohibition",
a responding party would not be in a position to prepar e adequately its defence, particularly where, as
here, it is alleged that numerous federal and state laws underlie the "total prohibition".
126. Therefore, we conclude that, without demonstrating the source of the prohibition, a
complaining party may not challenge a "total prohibition" as a "measure", per se , in dispute
settlement proceedings under the GATS. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph
6.175 of the Panel Report, that "the alleged 'tot al prohibition' on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services describes the alleged effect of an imprecisely defined list of legislative provisions
and other instruments and cannot constitute a single and autonomous 'measure' that can be challenged
in and of itself".
127. Antigua also contests the Panel's finding that Anti gua could not rely on the "total prohibition"
as a measure in this dispute because Antigua had failed to identify such a measure in its panel
request.
133 Having found that, in any event, the "total prohibition", as posited by Antigua, is not a
measure that can be challenged in itself, we need not rule on whether Antigua's panel request
identifies the "total prohibition" as a specific measure at issue in this dispute, as would be required by
Article 6.2 of the DSU.
128. Finally, Antigua challenges, under Article 11 of the DSU, the Panel's failure to accord
sufficient weight to the alleged United States admissi on as to the existence of a "total prohibition".
Antigua advances this contention in the context of its broader claim on appeal that the Panel erred in
not considering the "total prohibition" as "measure". Because, however, we have upheld this finding

131See page 1 of Antigua's Request for the Establishment of a Panel, supra, footnote 114; Antigua's
response to Question 10 posed by the Panel, Panel Repor t, p. C-34; Antigua's first written submission to the
Panel, paras. 140-143.
132Antigua's other appellant's submission, paras. 5, 43, and 45; Antigua's opening statement at the oral
hearing.
133Panel Report, para. 6.171.

of the Panel, we need not consider whether the Panel satisfied its duties under Article 11 of the DSU,
in its treatment of the alleged "admission" by the United States.
B. "Practice" as a Measure
129. In the course of examining what measures Antigua was challenging in this dispute, the Panel
relied on certain Appellate Body deci sions in support of its view that "'practice' can be considered as
an autonomous measure that can be challenged in and of itself". 134 The Panel then observed that
certain acts identified by Antigua could constitute "practices", as that term had been understood by the
panel in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review. However, based on Antigua's clarification in
its comments to the United States' request for prel iminary rulings, the Panel concluded that Antigua
was "not challenging [any] practice[] 'as such'".135
130. The United States challenges the Panel's view th at "practice" may be challenged in and of
itself.136 Antigua agrees with the Panel that "practi ce" can be challenged, as such, in WTO dispute
settlement, but submits that in this case "this issue appeared to be without any real context" and,
therefore, that the Appellate Body need not pronounce on it.137
131. We disagree with the participants' characteriza tion of the Panel's statement on "practice", in
paragraph 6.197 of the Panel Report, as a "finding" of the Panel. 138 The Panel itself acknowledged
that, in any case, Antigua was not challenging a practi ce, as such. In this light, the Panel's statement
on "practice", in our view, was a mere obiter dictum, and we need not rule on it.
132. We nevertheless express our disagreement w ith the Panel's understanding of previous
Appellate Body decisions. The Appellate Body has not, to date, pronounced upon the issue of
whether "practice" may be challenged, as such, as a "measure" in WTO dispute settlement.139

134Panel Report, para. 6.197 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, para. 97; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , para. 157; and Appellate Body Report, US –
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 162).
135Ibid., para. 6.198.
137Antigua's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
138See also Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 17, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 338.
139Indeed, this was said explicitly in paragraph 220 of the Appellate Body Report in US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews.

C. Antigua's Prima Facie Case
133. We examine next the United States' claim on appeal that Antigua failed to establish a prima
facie case of inconsistency with Article XVI of the GATS, with respect to the eight state laws and the
three federal laws that the Panel determined were the measures that it should examine.
134. Antigua's panel request listed nine federal la ws and eighty-four other laws from all fifty
states, as well as from the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin
Islands.
140 In seeking to identify, from this list, the measures that were the subject of Antigua's
claims, the Panel explained that it had:
... perused all of Antigua's submi ssions, including footnotes to those
submissions and exhibits submitte d by Antigua, with a view to
identifying which of the 93 laws lis ted in its Panel request we should
consider in determining whether or not the United States is in
violation of its obligations under the GATS.
141
135. The Panel found that certain state laws that had been mentioned by Antigua in its
submissions, but which were not identified in the panel request, were not properly before the
Panel.142 The Panel also found that certain state and federal laws, although mentioned in the panel
request, had been only briefly discussed in summaries attached to the texts of the laws submitted by
Antigua.143 In the Panel's view, these brief summaries were inadequate to explain how the laws
allegedly resulted in a GATS-inconsistent pr ohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
services.144
136. The Panel then reviewed laws that had been mentioned in the panel request and that were
discussed in Antigua's submissions. The Panel concl uded that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
IGBA were identified sufficiently by Antigua becau se Antigua's "discussions indicate[d] according to
which particular provisions and how the laws a llegedly result in a prohibition on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services." 145 On the same basis, the Pa nel determined that Antigua
had identified as part of its case certain laws of Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, South Dakota, and Utah.146

140See pages 3 to 7 of Antigua's Request for Establishment of a Panel, supra, footnote 114.
141Panel Report, para. 6.209.
142Ibid., para. 6.214.
143Ibid., para. 6.216.
144Ibid., para. 6.217.
145Ibid., para. 6.223.
146Ibid., paras. 6.226, 6.229, 6.232, 6.235, 6.239, 6.242, 6.245, and 6.248.

137. The United States contends that, in taking this approach, the Panel itself improperly made
Antigua's prima facie case of inconsistency with Article XVI of the GATS. The United States
claims that Antigua did not argue before the Panel how the laws eventually selected for review by the
Panel constituted a "total prohibition" on the cross- border supply of gambling services. Finally, the
United States argues, as Antigua's case throughout the panel proceedings was based on the existence
of a "total prohibition", Antigua's arguments focused on allegations that the "total prohibition" is itself
inconsistent with various provisions of the GATS. According to the United States, this meant that
Antigua failed to allege that any of the individual measures discussed by the Panel is inconsistent
with Article XVI of the GATS.
138. The complaining party bears the burden of proving an inconsistency with specific provisions
of the covered agreements.147 With respect to arguments and the production of evidence, we note the
following statement of the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel:
The party asserting that another party's municipal law, as such, is
inconsistent with relevant treat y obligations bears the burden of
introducing evidence as to the scope and meaning of such law to
substantiate that assertion. Such evidence will typically be produced
in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or legal instruments,
which may be supported, as appropriate, by evidence of the
consistent application of such la ws, the pronouncements of domestic
courts on the meaning of such laws , the opinions of legal experts and
the writings of recognized scholars.
148 (footnote omitted)
139. Where the complaining party has established its prima facie case, it is then for the
responding party to rebut it. 149 A panel errs when it rules on a cl aim for which the complaining party
has failed to make a prima facie case.150
140. A prima facie case must be based on "evidence and legal argument" put forward by the
complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the claim. 151 A complaining party may not

147Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 66.
148Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , para. 157 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Wool
Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 335).
149Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 98; Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 335.
150Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 129.
151Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 16, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 336. (emphasis
added) As not every claim of WTO-inconsistency will consist of the same elements, "the nature and scope of
evidence required to establish a prima facie case 'will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to
provision, and case to case'". (Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 159 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 335))

simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency.
152 Nor
may a complaining party simply allege facts without relating them to its legal arguments.
141. In the context of the sufficiency of panel requests under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate
Body has found that a panel request:
... must plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the
provision(s) of the covered agreements claimed to have been
infringed, so that the respondent party is aware of the basis for the
alleged nullification or impairme nt of the complaining party's
benefits.
153
Given that such a requirement applies to panel reque sts at the outset of a panel proceeding, we are of
the view that a prima facie case—made in the course of submissions to the panel—demands no less
of the complaining party. The evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie case, therefore,
must be sufficient to identify the challenged meas ure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO
provision and obligation contained therein, and expl ain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the
measure with that provision.
142. Antigua's case focused on Article XVI:2 of the GATS and, in particular, its sub-paragraphs
(a) and (c). The relevant provisions provide:
2. In sectors where market-ac cess commitments are undertaken,
the measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on
the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire
territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers
whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the
requirements of an economic needs test;

(c) limitations on the total number of service operations
or on the total quantity of service output expressed in
terms of designated numerical units in the form of
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test
.... (footnotes omitted)

152In Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para. 191, the Appellate Body made a similar
observation in the context of an appeal under Article 11 of the DSU:
… it is incumbent upon a party to identify in its submissions the relevance
of the provisions of legislation—the evidence—on which it relies to support
its arguments. It is not sufficient merely to file an entire piece of legislation
and expect a panel to discover, on its own, what relevance the various
provisions may or may not have for a party's legal position.
153Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162.

143. This text suggests that Antigua was required to make its prima facie case by first alleging
that the United States had undertaken a market access commitment in its GATS Schedule; and,
secondly, by identifying, with supporting evidence, how the challenged laws constitute impermissible
"limitations" falling within Article XVI:2(a) or XVI:2(c).
144. In the present case, the Panel determined that An tigua could not pursue its claim on the basis
of the "total prohibition" as the measure at issue. 154 In our view, the Panel was correct in so
concluding.155 In order for the Panel properly to continue with its analysis, then, Antigua was
required to make its prima facie case with respect to specific federal and state laws identified in its
panel request.
145. In its written submissions to the Panel, Anti gua asserted that the United States had "made a
full commitment [in its GATS Schedule] to th e cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services"156 along with references to the relevant sector of that Schedule. 157 This assertion, in our
view, satisfies the first requirement of Antigua's prima facie case under Article XVI:2.158
146. As to the second requirement of the prima facie case, Antigua's claims under sub-paragraphs
(a) and (c) of Article XVI:2, as regards individual laws rather than the "total prohibition", are set out
in the following paragraph from its second written submission to the Panel:
The individual legislative and regulatory provisions, applications
thereof and related practices that make up the United States' total
prohibition are also caught by both Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) as
separate "measures" ....
• Federal laws specifically pr ohibiting "cross-border" supply
function like an establishment requirement and are therefore
the equivalent of a zero quota for cross-border supply
• State laws that prohibit all gambling, in combination with
other state laws that exempt specifically authorised gambling
without providing a possibility for Antiguan operators to
obtain an authorisation to supply gambling services on a
cross-border basis, are the equivalent of a zero quota for
cross-border supply
• Several state laws or regulations explicitly establish numerical
quotas

154Panel Report, para. 6.171.
155Supra, paras. 120-126.
156Antigua's first written submission to the Panel, para. 181.
157Ibid., paras. 160-163.
158Supra, para. 143.

• Several laws or regulations expressly grant exclusive or
special rights to operators of domestic origin
• Several state laws require the physical presence of the
operator within the territory of the state and, in doing so,
constitute a zero quota for cross-border supply.
159 (footnotes
omitted)
147. We begin our examination of the challenged me asures with the three federal laws, namely,
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. We observe that Antigua submitted the texts of these
statutes and explained its understanding of them. 160 In support of its argument that the three federal
statutes prohibited certain kinds of cross-border supply of gambling services, Antigua submitted to the
Panel a report by the United States General Accounting Office 161on internet gambling, and a letter
from a Deputy Assistant Attorney General of th e Department of Justice informing an industry
association of broadcasters that internet gambling violates the three federal statutes.162
148. In addition, as we noted above 163, Antigua, in its second written submission, alleged the
"[f]ederal laws" prohibiting cross-border supply to be inconsistent with Article XVI. The United
States argues that Antigua never "specifically allege d" the inconsistency of the three specific federal
statutes with Article XVI. 164 Although, Antigua did not expressly mention these statutes by name
when alleging inconsistency with Article XVI, we are of the view that, in the context of Antigua's

159Antigua's second written submission to the Panel, para. 37. The footnotes omitted from this excerpt
contain no reference to specific laws of the United States.
160Antigua's statement at the first substantive panel meeting, para. 21, 10 December 2003; Antigua's
written submission in response to the United States' requ est for preliminary rulings, footnote 18 to para. 18, 22
October 2003. See also Antigua's response to Question 12 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, p. C-36
(discussing prosecutions under the Wire Act and the Tr avel Act); and Exhibit AB-82 submitted by Antigua to
the Panel (containing texts of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA).
161United States General Accounting Office, Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues , p. 11
(December 2002), Exhibit AB-17 submitted by Antigua to the Panel (descr ibing the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the IGBA).
162Letter from John G. Malcolm to National Association of Broadcasters, 11 June 2003, Exhibit AB-73
submitted by Antigua to the Panel.
163Supra, para. 146.

previous statement clearly identifying these three statutes165 and the Panel's subsequent questioning on
these particular measures166, the reference to "[f]ederal laws" clear ly covered the Wire Act, the Travel
Act, and the IGBA. As a result, in our view, An tigua's arguments and evidence were sufficient to
identify the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA, and to make a prima facie case of their
inconsistency with sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2.
149. As to the eight state laws reviewed by the Panel, we note that Antigua made no mention of
them in the course of its argument that the United States acts inconsistently with Article XVI of the
GATS. In none of Antigua's submissions to th e Panel was the way in which these measures operate
explained in a manner that would have made it appare nt to the Panel and to the United States that an
inconsistency with Article XVI wa s being alleged with respect to these measures. Thus, we see no
basis on which we can conclude that Antigua su fficiently connected the eight state laws with
Article XVI and thereby established a prima facie case of inconsistency with that provision.
150. In Antigua's first written submission to the Pane l and in its opening statement at the first
substantive panel meeting, none of the eight stat e laws was named in the context of Antigua's
substantive claims. 167 In its second written submission, Anti gua alleged merely that "state laws"—

165Antigua's statement at the first substantive pane l meeting, para. 21, 10 December 2003. In its
opening statement at the first substantive panel meeting, Antigua discussed "three federal statutes", which it
identified as follows:
• The 'Wire Act' (18 U.S.C § 1084), which prohibits gambling
businesses from knowing ly receiving or sendi ng certain types of
bets or information that assist in placing bets over interstate and
international wires;
• The 'Travel Act' (18 U:S:C § 1952), which imposes criminal
penalties for those who utilize interstate or foreign commerce with
the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity,
including gambling considered unlawful in the United States;
• The 'Illegal' Gambling Business Act' (18 U.S.C § 1955), which
makes it a federal crime to operate a gambling business that
violates the law of the state where the gambling takes place
(provided that certain other criteria are fulfilled such as the
involvement of at least five people and an operation during more
than 30 days).
Each of these three laws separately prohibits the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services from Antigua.
166Question 32 posed by the Panel to Antigua, Panel Report, p. C-58, where the Panel noted: "In its first
oral statement (para. 21), in arguing that a prohi bition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services exists, Antigua points to three federal laws, namely the Wire Act (18 USC § 1084), the Travel Act (18
USC § 1952) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 USC § 1955)."
167Two of the state measures considered by the Panel—Section 9 of Article 1 of the New York
Constitution and Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes—are mentioned by Antigua in its first
written submission. (Antigua's first written submission, pa ra. 149) However, they are mentioned solely for the
purpose of supporting Antigua's assertion that the reason certain measures were identified in its panel request
but not in its request for consultations was a typographical error. No description is given of the laws or how
they might be inconsistent with Article XVI.

without further specification—are inconsis tent with Article XVI:2(a) and/or (c).
168 Antigua did,
however, make a cross-reference to a preceding sec tion in its submission detailing the operation of
various state laws. 169 Y e t , none of the state laws considered by the Panel is mentioned in that
section. Rather, the discussion relates primarily to other states' laws 170, addresses laws that are not in
Antigua's panel request171, or speaks only in general terms.172
151. In our view, certain general statements ma de by Antigua in its second written submission
were insufficient to permit the Panel to proceed on the basis that Antigua had established a prima
facie case regarding the eight state laws identified by the Panel. For example, Antigua's second
written submission contains a general discussion of st ate gambling laws, with footnote citations to,
 inter alia , a report by the United States General Accounting Office and a law review article. 173 The
law review article contains a discussion of state re gulation of gambling, with reference, primarily in
footnotes, to the laws of several states, including California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, and South
Dakota. As we understand it, the Panel followed this trail of footnote references, and then compared
the statutes cited in the footnotes of that law review article with Antigua's pa nel request to determine
whether Antigua had identified provisions of those statutes and, thereby, to ascertain which state law
Antigua intended to include as part of its claim. 174 This led the Panel to conclude that certain laws of
Louisiana and South Dakota were challenged by Antigua under Article XVI.
152. The Panel engaged in a similar multi-step an alysis in seeking to discern some connection
between the laws of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ne w York, and Utah, and Antigua's references in its
written submissions and various exhibits. 175 Yet we are unable to detect any connection, however
tenuous, between the relevant laws of Colorado and Minnesota, on the one hand, and the allegation of
inconsistency with Article XVI:2, on the other hand. Although Antigua did submit these laws in its

168Supra, para. 146.
169Antigua's second written submission to the Panel, para. 37 and footnotes 46-47 and 49 thereto (citing
paras. 22-24 and 28-29 of the same submission).
170See, for example, ibid., paras. 27-29 (discussing laws of, inter alia, Illinois, Iowa, and Nevada).
171See, for example, ibid., para. 27.
172See, for example, ibid., paras. 22 ("All states have adopted the same basic legal approach ….")
and 24 ("under the laws or the practice of every state").
173Ibid., footnotes 22 and 23 to para. 22 (citing United States General Accounting Office, Internet
Gambling: An Overview of the Issues (December 2002), Exhibit AB-17 submitted by Antigua to the Panel; and
Antonia Z. Cowan, "The Global Gaming Village: Interstate and Transnational Gambling", Gambling Law
Review, Vol. 7, pp. 255-257, Exhibit AB-119 submitted by Antigua to the Panel).
174Panel Report, paras. 6.228 and 6.244.
175Antigua's second written submission to the Panel, footnotes 46, 47, and 49 to para. 37 (citing
Antigua's second written submission, paras. 22-24 an d 27-29); and Antigua's second written submission,
footnotes 22 and 23 to para. 22 (citing, inter alia, Enclosure 1 to the Interim Report of the United States General
Accounting Office on Internet Gambling, entitled "Gambling Law in Five States and Their Effect on Internet
Gambling" (23 September 2002), Exhibit AB-84 submitted by Antigua to the Panel).

exhibits, we see no arguments in any submissions that would have clearly informed the Panel and the
United States how those two laws would form pa rt of Antigua's claims under Article XVI:2(a)
and XVI:2(c). It follows that, without providing a stronger link between the particular state law being
challenged and the obligation a lleged to have been infringed, Antigua failed to make a prima facie
case with respect to any of these eight state laws.
153. In our view, therefore, Antigua established its prima facie case of inconsistency with
Article XVI, only as to the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. In contrast, with respect to the
state laws—that is, certain laws of Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, South Dakota, and Utah—we are of the view that Antigua failed to identify how these laws
operated and how they were relevant to its claim of inconsistency with Article XVI:2.
154. Accordingly, we find that the Panel did not err in examining whether three federal laws—the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA—are c onsistent with the United States' obligations under
Article XVI of the GATS. We also find that the Panel erred in examining whether the following
eight state laws are consistent with the United States' obligations under Article XVI of the GATS:
• Colorado
: Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
• Louisiana: Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (Annotated);
• Massachusetts: Section 17A of chapter 271 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts;
• Minnesota: Section 609.755(1) and Subdivisions 2-3 of Section 609.75 of the Minnesota
Statutes (Annotated);
• New Jersey: Paragraph 2 of Section VII of Article 4 of the New Jersey Constitution, and
Section 2A:40-1 of the New Jersey Code;
• New York: Section 9 of Article I of the New York Constitution and Section 5-401 of the
New York General Obligations Law;
• South Dakota : Sections 22-25A-1 through 22-25A-15 of the South Dakota Codified
Laws; and
• Utah: Section 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code (Annotated).

155. Furthermore, because the Panel erred in ruling on claims relating to these state laws, where no
prima facie case of inconsistency had been made out by Antigua, we reverse the Panel's finding, in
paragraphs 6.421(b) and 7.2(b)(ii) of the Panel Report, that the following state laws are inconsistent
with Article XVI:1 and with sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2:
• Louisiana
: Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (Annotated);
• Massachusetts: Section 17A of chapter 271 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts;
• South Dakota: Section 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws; and
• Utah: Section 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code (Annotated).
156. We note that the United States also advances an appeal under Article 11 of the DSU in
relation to the Panel's assessment of Antigua's prima facie case. The United States argues that the
Panel failed to comply with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU, not merely because it made
an error in finding a prima facie case, but because of "the egregious nature of the departure by this
Panel from its assigned role of objective arbitrator." 176 We have already found error in the Panel's
examination of the aforementioned state laws177 on the basis that Antigua had not made a prima facie
case of inconsistency with Article XVI:2. Theref ore, in order to resolve this dispute, we need not
determine whether, in assessing Antigua's prima facie case, the Panel also failed to satisfy its
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
157. Finally, we note that, when making findings as to the Travel Act and the IGBA, the Panel
referred to "the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)" and "the Illegal
Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)".178 The Panel's reference to
"the relevant state laws" in its findings on two federal laws simply reflects the fact that these two
federal statutes explicitly incorporate certain crim inal behaviour, defined under state law, as an
element of the crimes under those federal statutes. 179 Thus, the Panel's findings as to the Travel Act
and the IGBA are not affected by our finding that the Panel should not have examined the GATS-
consistency of these eight state laws.

177Supra, para. 154.
178Panel Report, paras. 6.421, 6.535, 6.565, 7.2(b)(i), and 7.2(d).
179Ibid., paras. 6.367 and 6.375.

V. Interpretation of the Specific Commitments Made by the United States in its GATS
Schedule
158. The Panel found, at paragraph 7.2(a) of the Panel Report, that:
... the United States' Schedule under the GATS includes specific
commitments on gambling and betting services under
subsector 10.D.
180
The United States appeals this finding. Accordin g to the United States, by excluding "sporting"
services from the scope of subsector 10.D of its GATS Schedule, it excluded gambling and betting
services from the scope of the specific commitments that it undertook therein. The United States
argues that the Panel misinterpreted the ordinary meaning of the text of subsector 10.D, "Other
recreational services (except sporting)", and erro neously found that the ordinary meaning of
"sporting" does not include gambling. The United St ates also contends that the Panel erred in its
identification and analysis of the context in which th e terms of subsector 10.D must be interpreted. In
particular, the Panel is alleged to have mistakenly elevated certain documents used in the preparation
of GATS Schedules (W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Gu idelines) to the status of "context", when
they are in fact "mer e 'preparatory work'"
181, and, as such, cannot be relied upon when they suggest a
meaning at odds with the unambiguous ordinary meani ng of the text. According to the United States,
the Panel relied on an "erroneous presumption" th at, unless the United States "'expressly'" departed
from W/120, the United States could be "'assumed to have relied on W/120 and the corresponding
CPC references'".182 Finally, the United States argues, in the alternative, that the Panel should have
found that gambling falls under subsector 10.E, "Other", where the United States made no
commitment.
159. In the context of the GATT 1994, the Appella te Body has observed that, although each
Member's Schedule represents the tariff commitments that bind one Member, Schedules also
represent a common agreement among all Members.183 Accordingly, the task of ascertaining the
meaning of a concession in a Schedule, like the task of interpreting any other treaty text, involves
identifying the common intention of Members, and is to be achieved by following the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law, codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention.184

180See also Panel Report, para. 6.134.
182Ibid., para. 75 (quoting Panel Report, paras. 6.104 and 6.106).
183Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109.
184Ibid., para. 84.

160. In the context of the GATS, Article XX:3 exp licitly provides that Members' Schedules are an
"integral part" of that agreement. Here, too, the task of identifying the meaning of a concession in a
GATS Schedule, like the task of interpreting any other treaty text, involves identifying the common
intention of Members. Like the Panel
185—and, indeed, both the participants 186—we consider that the
meaning of the United States' GATS Schedule must be determined according to the rules codified in
Article 31 and, to the extent appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
161. The contentious issues in this appeal concer n whether the Panel erred in the way that it used
the Vienna Convention principles of interpretation in dete rmining the scope of the specific
commitments made by the United States in subsect or 10.D of its GATS Schedule, and whether the
Panel erred in the conclusions it drew on the basis of its approach.
A. Interpretation of Subsector 10.D According to the General Rule of Interpretation:
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
162. The United States' appeal focuses on the Panel' s interpretation of the word "sporting" in
subsector 10.D of the United States' GATS Schedule. According to the United States, the ordinary
meaning of "sporting" includes gambling and betting and the Panel erred in finding otherwise. We
observe first that the interpretative question a ddressed by the Panel was a broader one, namely
"whether the US Schedule includes specific commitments on gambling and betting services
notwithstanding the fact that the words 'gambli ng and betting services' do not appear in the US
Schedule."
187 In tackling this question, the Panel turned to Sector 10 of the United States' Schedule to
the GATS, which Antigua claimed included a sp ecific commitment on gambling and betting services,
and the United States claimed did not. The relevant part of the United States' Schedule provides:188

185Panel Report, para. 6.45.
186Antigua's and the United States' responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
187Panel Report, para. 6.41.
188The United States of America – Schedule of Sp ecific Commitments, GATS/SC/90, 15 April 1994
(the "United States' Schedule"). The "National Tr eatment" and "Additional Commitments" columns of the
United States' Schedule are omitted from this excerpt. The relevant part of the United States' GATS Schedule is
attached, in its entirety, as Annex III to this Report.

Sector or subsector Limitations on market access
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL, &
SPORTING SERVICES

A. ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES
(INCLUDING THEATRE, LIVE BANDS
AND CIRCUS SERVICES)
 1) None
 2) None
 3) None
 4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section

B. NEWS AGENCY SERVICES

 1) None
 2) None
 3) None
 4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section

C LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES, MUSEUMS
AND OTHER CULTURAL SERVICES

 1) None
 2) None
 3) None
 4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section

D. OTHER RECREATIONAL SERVICES
(except sporting)
 1) None
 2) None
 3) The number of concessions available for
commercial operations in federal, state and
local facilities is limited
 4) Unbound, except as indicated in the horizontal
section

163. In considering this section of the United States' Schedule, the Panel stated that it would begin
by "examining the ordinary meaning of vari ous key terms used in the US Schedule." 189 The Panel
examined the term "Other recreational services (e xcept sporting)" in subsector 10.D, as well as the
term "Entertainment services" in subsector 10.A. Having consulted the dic tionary definitions of
various words, the Panel found that "the ordinary meaning of 'sporting' does not include
gambling".190 The United States submits that the Panel could not have made this finding had it
properly followed Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.
164. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose." In order to identif y the ordinary meaning, a Panel may start with the

189Panel Report, para. 6.47.
190Ibid., para. 6.61. (original emphasis)

dictionary definitions of th e terms to be interpreted.
191 But dictionaries, alone, are not necessarily
capable of resolving complex questions of interpretation 192, as they typically aim to catalogue all
meanings of words—be those meanings common or rare, universal or specialized.
165. In this case, in examining definitions of "sporting", the Panel surveyed a variety of
dictionaries and found a variety of definitions of the word.193 All of the dictionary definitions cited by
the Panel define "sporting" as being connected to —in the sense of "related to", "suitable for",
"engaged in" or "disposed to"—sports activities. Some dictionaries also define "sporting" as being
connected to gambling or betting, but others do not. Of those that do, several note that the word is
mainly used in this sense in the phrase "a sporting man", or in a pe jorative sense, and some note that
the word is used in this sense onl y when the gambling or betting activities pertain to sports. Based on
this survey of dictionary definitions, as well as the fact that "gambling" does not fall within the
meaning of the Spanish and French words that correspond to "sporting", namely "déportivos" and
"sportifs"194, the Panel made its finding that "the ordinary meaning of 'sporting' does not include
gambling".195
166. We have three reservations about the way in which the Panel determined the ordinary
meaning of the word "sporting" in the United States' Schedule. First, to the extent that the Panel's
reasoning simply equates the "ordinary meaning" with the meaning of words as defined in
dictionaries, this is, in our view, too mechanical an approach. Secondly, the Panel failed to have due
regard to the fact that its recourse to dictionari es revealed that gambling and betting can, at least in
some contexts, be one of the meanings of the word "sporting". Thirdly, the Panel failed to explain the
basis for its recourse to the meanings of the Fren ch and Spanish words "déportivos" and "sportifs" in

191We note, in this regard, the words of the panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act:
For pragmatic reasons the normal usage ... is to start the interpretation from
the ordinary meaning of the "raw" text of the relevant treaty provisions and
then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object
and purpose.
(Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.22)
192Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 59; Appellate Body Report, Canada –
193The 13 different dictionary definitions consulted by the Panel are set out in paragraphs. 6.55-6.59 of
the Panel Report. Some of the definitions appear to contradict one another. For instance, the Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary definition quoted by the Panel defines "sporting" as both "characterized by sportsmanlike
conduct"; and "[d]esignating an inferior sportsman or a person interested in sport from purely mercenary
motives". (Panel Report, para. 6.55)
194Panel Report, paras. 6.59-6.60.
195Ibid., para. 6.61. (original emphasis)

the light of the fact that the United States' Sche dule explicitly states, in a cover note, that it "is
authentic in English only."196
167. Overall, the Panel's finding concerning the word "sporting" was premature. In our view, the
Panel should have taken note that, in the abstract , the range of possible meanings of the word
"sporting" includes both the meaning claimed by Antigua and the meaning claimed by the United
States, and then continued its inquiry into which of those meanings was to be attributed to the word
as used in the United States' GATS Schedule.
168. Nevertheless, even accepting that the Panel erred in reaching a conclusion regarding the
meaning of "sporting" at such an early stage of its analysis, this alone is not decisive of the United
States' appeal. This is because the Panel did not en d its analysis once it had considered the dictionary
definitions of "sporting". Rather, having found that the word "sporting" did not include gambling
and betting services, it examined whether other words in Sector 10 of the United States' Schedule did
serve to make a specific commitment on gambling and betting services. To do so, the Panel turned to
the terms "recreational services" and "entertainment services". Beginning again with dictionary
definitions, the Panel observed that "words such as 'recreational' and 'entertainment' could cover
virtually the same types of services activities". 197 The Panel expressed its view that "gambling and
betting have, a priori, the characteristics of being entertaining or amusing, or of being used as a form
of recreation." 198 Having thus consulted dictionaries for "the words 'Other recreational services
(except sporting)' and 'entertainment services'", th e Panel observed that these left "a number of
questions open" and did not "allow it to reach a definitive conclusion on whether or not the US
Schedule includes specific commitments on 'gambling and betting services' in sector 10". 199 T h e
Panel then turned to consider the context in wh ich the relevant terms from sector 10 of the United
States' Schedule are situated.
169. The United States contests the Panel's identifi cation and use of relevant context for the
interpretation of the commitment made by the United States in its Schedule. In particular, the United
States argues that the Panel erred in treating two documents from the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, namely W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, as relevant context within the
meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention.

196The cover note is included in the excerpt from th e United States' Schedule attached as Annex III to
this Report.
197Panel Report, para. 6.63.
198Ibid., para. 6.66.
199Ibid., para. 6.67.

170. The Panel found that:
... both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines were agreed upon
by Members with a view to using such documents, not only in the
negotiation of their specific commitments, but as interpretative tools
in the interpretation and appli cation of Members' scheduled
commitments. As such, these documents comprise the "context" of
GATS Schedules, within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention and the Panel will use them for the purpose of
interpreting the GATS, GATS schedules and thus the US
Schedule.
200
171. Before turning to the specifics of the United States' appeal, we observe that the second
paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention defines "context" as follows:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
172. We also consider it useful to set out, briefly, the nature of the two documents at issue.
On 10 July 1991, the GATT Secretariat ci rculated document W/120, entitled "SERVICES
SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION LIST". This follo wed the circulation of an informal note
containing a draft services sectoral classification list in May 1991, as well as the circulation of an
initial reference list of sectors (the "W/50") in April 1989.
201 A short cover note to W/120 explains
that the document reflects, to the extent possibl e, comments made by negotiating parties on the May
draft, and that W/120 itself might be subject to futu re modification. Otherwise, the document consists
of a table in two columns. The left column is entitled "SECTORS AND SUBSECTORS" and consists
of a list classifying services into 11 broad service sectors, each divided into several subsectors (more
than 150 in total). The right column is entitled "CORRESPONDING CPC" and sets out, for nearly
every subsector listed in the left-hand column, a CP C number to which that subsector corresponds. It
is not disputed that the reference in W/120 to "C PC" is a reference to the United Nations' Provisional

200Panel Report, para. 6.82.
201MTN.GNS/W/50, 13 April 1989.

Central Product Classification. 202 The CPC is a detailed, multi-level classification of goods and
services.203 The CPC is exhaustive (all goods and services are covered) and its categories are
 mutually exclusive (a given good or service may only be classified in one CPC category). 204 The
CPC consists of "Sections" (10), "Divisions" (69), "Groups" (295), "Classes" (1,050) and
"Subclasses" (1,811). Of the 10 "Sections" of the CPC, the first five primarily classify products.
They are based on the Harmonised Commodity Desc ription and Coding System, and are not referred
to in W/120. The second five Sec tions of the CPC primarily classify services, and all of the
references in W/120 are to sub-categories of these five Sections.
173. On 3 September 1993, the GATT Secretariat, in response to requests by the negotiating
parties, circulated an "Explanatory Note" designed to "assist in the preparation of offers, requests, and
national Schedules of commitments" and to ensure "comparable and unambiguous commitments" and
achieve "precision and clarity". 205 This document, known as the "1993 Scheduling Guidelines",
addresses two main questions: (i) what items should be put in a Schedule; and (ii) how they should
be entered. In addressing these questions, the Gu idelines provide examples as to the types of
measures that should be scheduled or need not be scheduled, and cover a variety of issues, including
the scope of coverage under each mode of supply, and the relationship between different modes when
making commitments on market access. The documen t also instructs Members as to the language to
use when making a specific commitment, 206 and includes a template indicating the overall structure,
and columns and rows that should constitute a Member's Schedule.
174. Bearing the above in mind, we see two main di fficulties with the Panel's characterization of
these documents as context . First, we see no basis for the Panel's finding that they "constitute an
agreement made between all the parties or an in strument[] made between some parties and accepted

202Provisional Central Product Classification, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77, United
Nations (1991). The United Nations Central Product Clas sification has been revised on several occasions. The
latest version is the Central Product Classification, Ve rsion 1.1, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77, United
Nations (2004).
203The main purposes of the CPC are to provide a framework for international comparison of statistics
dealing with goods, services, and assets and to se rve as a guide for developing and revising existing
classification schemes of products. (Preface to the CPC, p. V)
204See infra, paras. 200 and 201 for further details on the CPC, and for the way in which the CPC
classifies the services at issue in this dispute.
205Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164, 3
September 1993, at p. 1.
206For example, paragraphs 24 to 27 explain that: to indicate a full commitm ent, a Member should
enter "NONE"; to make no commitment, it should enter "UNBOUND"; and to make a commitment with
limitations, the Member should enter a concise descri ption of each measure, "indicating the elements which
make it inconsistent with Articles XVI or XVII".

by the others as such".
207 To reach this finding, the Panel reasoned that, although the documents were
"technically" drafted by the GATT Secretariat:
... they can be considered "agreement[s] ... made between all
[Members]" or ... "instrument[s] ... made by one or more [Members]"
but accepted by all of them as such within the meaning of Article
31:2(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convent ion. In this regard, it may be
recalled that the two documents were prepared by the – then – GATT
Secretariat, at the behest of the Uruguay Round participants. The
participants can thus be considered to be the "intellectual" authors of
the documents. Besides, both documents were the object of a series
of formal and informal consultations during which Members had the
opportunity to amend them and to include changes. Both were
circulated as formal "green band" documents with the agreement of
the participants.
208 (footnotes omitted)
175. We note that Article 31(2) refers to the agreement or acceptance of the parties. In this
case, both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines were drafted by the GATT Secretariat rather
than the parties to the negotiations. It may be true that, on its own, authorship by a delegated body
would not preclude specific documents 209 from falling within the scope of Article 31(2). However,
we are not persuaded that in this case the Panel could find W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
to be context. Such documents can be characterized as context only where there is sufficient evidence
of their constituting an "agreement relating to the treaty" between the parties or of their "accept[ance
by the parties] as an instrument related to the treaty".
176. We do not accept, as the Panel appears to have done, that, simply by requesting the
preparation and circulation of these documents and usi ng them in preparing their offers, the parties in
the negotiations have accepted them as agreements or instruments related to the treaty. Indeed, there
are indications to the contrary. As the United Stat es pointed out before the Panel, the United States
and several other parties to the negotiations clear ly stated, at the time W/120 was proposed, that,
although Members were encouraged to follow the br oad structure of W/120, it was never meant to
bind Members to the CPC definitions, nor to any other "specific nomenclature", and that "the

207Panel Report, para. 6.77.
208Ibid., para. 6.80.
209The Panel reasoned that assigning the task of drafting these documents to the Secretariat was simply
"the most practical and efficient way to work on such a matter" and that such delegation did not deprive the
parties to the negotiations of authorship. (Panel Report, para. 6.80)

composition of the list was not a matter for negotiations". 210 Similarly, the Explanatory Note that
prefaces the Scheduling Guidelines itself appears to c ontradict the Panel in this regard, as it expressly
provides that, although it is intended to assist "pers ons responsible for scheduling commitments", that
assistance "should not be considered as an authoritative legal interpretation of the GATS."211
177. The Panel also reasoned that:
.... both W/120 and the 1993 Schedu ling Guidelines were agreed
upon by Members with a view to using such documents, not only in
the negotiation of their specific commitments, but as interpretative
tools in the interpretation and application of Members' scheduled
commitments.212 (emphasis added)
In our opinion, the Panel's description of how th ese documents were created and used may suggest
that the parties agreed to use su ch documents in the negotiations of their specific commitments. The
Panel cited no evidence, however, directly supporting its further conclusion, in the quotation above,

210Note on the Meeting of 27 May to 6 June 1991 , MTN.GNS/42, para. 19 (24 June 1991) (quoted in
Panel Report, para. 3.41 and footnote 117 thereto). The paragraphs of this Note cited by the United States are
taken from the minutes from a meeting that was held after the Secretariat had circulated its first draft
classification list, but before the final version of W/120 had been circulated. The content of those paragraphs is
as follows:
18. The representatives of the European Communities , Canada, Chile,
the United States, Japan, Poland, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries
and Mexico found that the proposed classification contained in the informal
note by the secretariat constituted an improvement over the list contained in
MTN.GNS/W/50. There was confirmati on of the agreement to base the
classification of services sectors and subsectors as much as possible on the
Central Product Classification (CPC) lis t. There was some agreement that
putting together a classification list of services was an on-going work which
required coordination with efforts undertaken in other fora. The
representative of Austria
 stressed the need to involve statistical experts in
the work since the classification list resulting from the GNS would in the
future serve as the basis for the compilation of statistics on services. The
representative of Japan
 said not only statistical but also sectoral experts
should take part in drawing up the list.
19. The representative of the United States did not wish to have
extensive discussions on the matter and stressed that the composition of the
list was not a matter for negotiations. This view was shared by the
representative of the European Communities
. The representatives of the
United States, Poland, Malaysia and Austria said that the list should be illus-
trative or indicative and not bind partie s to any specific nomenclature. The
representative of Malaysia suggested that it would be important to have the
definitions behind individual items in the list, especially where there was a
high degree of aggregation.
2111993 Scheduling Guidelines, p. 1.
212Panel Report, para. 6.82.

that the agreement of the parti es encompassed an agreem ent to use the documents "as interpretative
tools in the interpretation and application of Members' scheduled commitments."
178. In our opinion, therefore, the Panel erre d in categorizing W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines as "context" for the interpretation of th e United States' GATS Schedule. Accordingly, we
set aside this part of the Panel's examination of "context". There is, however, additional context
referred to by the Panel and the participants that we must consider, namely: (i) the remainder of the
United States' Schedule of specific commitments; (ii) the substantive provisions of the GATS; (iii)
the provisions of covered agreements other than the GATS; and (iv) the GATS Schedules of other
Members.
179. We begin by examining the immediate context in which the relevant entry is found, that is,
the United States' Schedule as a whole. The Unit ed States admits that it "generally followed
the W/120 structure in its Schedule of specific commitments."
213 The Schedule makes no reference
to CPC codes. The Schedule does, however, refer to W/120 in two instances 214, apparently in order to
make clear that the United States' commitment corresponds to only part of a subsector listed in W/120.
This suggests that, at least for some of its entries, the United States also expressly referred to W/120 in
order to define the content of a Schedule entry and, thereby, limit the scope of its specific
commitment.215 At the same time, the context provided by the United States' Schedule as a whole does
not indicate clearly the scope of the commitment in subsector 10.D.
180. We move, therefore, to examine the context pr ovided by the structure of the GATS itself.
The agreement defines "services" very broadly, as including " any service in any sector except
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority". 216 In addition, the GATS definition of
"sector" provides that any reference to a "sector" means—unless otherwise specified in a Member's
Schedule—a reference to all of the subsectors contained within that sector. 217 Many of the
obligations in the GATS apply only in sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific

213United States' response to Question 5 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, p. C-26. (original emphasis)
214Sector B of the Schedule is as follows "COMPUTER AND RELATED SERVICES
(MTN.GNS/W/120 a) - e), except airline computer reservation systems)"; and the entry in subsector F.r reads
"Publishing (Only part of MTN.GNS/W/120 category: 'r) Printing, Publishing')".
215The Panel made a similar point in paragraph 6.104 of the Panel Report and footnote 665 thereto.
216GATS Article I:3(b). (emphasis added)
217Article XXVIII provides that:
(e) "sector" of a service means,
(i) with reference to a specifi c commitment, one or more, or
all, subsectors of that service, as specified in a Member's
Schedule,
(ii) otherwise, the whole of that service sector, including all of
its subsectors;

commitments.218 To us, the structure of the GATS necessar ily implies two things. First, because the
GATS covers all services except those supplied in the exerci se of governmental authority, it follows
that a Member may schedule a specific commitment in respect of any service. Secondly, because a
Member's obligations regarding a particular servi ce depend on the specific commitments that it has
made with respect to the sector or subsector with in which that service falls, a specific service cannot
fall within two different sectors or subsectors. In other words, the sectors and subsectors in a
Member's Schedule must be mutually exclusive. 219 In the context of the United States' Schedule, this
means that, notwithstanding the broad language u sed in sector 10—for example, "recreational
services", "sporting", and "entertainment services"—, gambling and betting services can only fall—if
at all—within one of those service categories.
181. Looking beyond the GATS to other covered agreem ents, we observe that Article 22.3(f) of
the DSU provides that, for purposes of suspending c oncessions, "'sector' means ....(ii) with respect to
services, a principal sector as identified in the curre nt 'Services Sectoral Classification List' which
identifies such sectors". A footnote adds that "[t]he list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies
eleven sectors." This reference confirms the rele vance of W/120 to the task of identifying service
sectors in GATS Schedules, but does not appear to assist in the task of ascertaining within which
subsector of a Member's Schedule a specific service falls.
182. Both participants220, as well as the Panel, accepted that other Members' Schedules constitute
relevant context for the interpretation of subsector 10.D of the United States' Schedule. 221 A s t h e
Panel pointed out, this is the logical consequence of Article XX:3 of the GATS, which provides that
Members' Schedules are "an integral part" of the GATS. We agree. At the same time, as the Panel
rightly acknowledged, use of other Members' Schedules as context must be tempered by the
recognition that "[e]ach Schedule has its own intrinsic logic, which is different from the US
Schedule."
222
183. The United States relies on the Schedules of other Members as context seeking to establish
that: (i) because many Members refer to CPC codes in their Schedules but the United States does not,

218See, for example, Articles VI:1, VIII:1, XVI, and XVII of the GATS.
219If this were not the case, and a Member scheduled th e same service in two different sectors, then the
scope of the Member's commitment would not be clear where, for example, it made a full commitment in one of
those sectors and a limited, or no, commitment, in the other. At the oral hearing in this appeal, both the United
States and Antigua agreed that the entries in a Member's Schedule must be mutually exclusive. See also Panel
Report, paras. 6.63, 6.101, and 6.119.
220Antigua's and United States' responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
221In paragraph 6.97 of the Panel Report, the Panel st ated that it agreed "with the United States that
other Members' Schedules comprise the 'context' within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention."
222Panel Report, para. 6.98. By referring to other Members' Schedules here, we are not interpreting
such Schedules, but rather using them as "context" for the interpretation of the United States' Schedule.

the United States' Schedule cannot be "presumed" to follow the CPC; and (ii) scheduling gambling
and betting services in subsector 10.E (rather than 10. D) was one of several accepted approaches used
by Members.
223 We are not persuaded that the conclusi ons the United States argues must be drawn
from this context necessarily follow. It is true th at a large majority of Members used CPC codes in
their Schedules. It is also true that the United States did not use them. 224 However, the United States'
Schedule, like the Schedules of nearly all Members, generally follows the structure, and adopts the
language, of W/120.225 These structural and linguistic similaritie s lead us to conclude, contrary to the
United States submission, that the absence of refere nces to CPC codes does not mean that words used
in the United States' Schedule must have a different meaning and sc ope than the same words used in
the Schedules of other Members.
184. We also note that, unlike the United States, several Members specifically used the words
"gambling and betting services", or some approximation thereof, in their Schedules. 226 The fact that
the United States did not use any such specific la nguage tends, if anything, to undercut its assertion
that it intended to single out su ch services for exclusion from the scope of its commitment. Whether
or not they used the term "gambling and betting services" in their Schedules, several Members also
made clear, through reference to CPC codes, that they were making a commitment in respect of
"sporting services" and that the services falling w ithin the category "sporting services" did not
include gambling and betting services.227 Moreover, the United States did not point to any example in
another Member's Schedule where the category of "sporting services" clearly included gambling and
betting services.

223Before the Panel, the United States referred to the Schedules of Iceland and Senegal. (See
footnote 106 to para. 74 of the United States' first written submission to the Panel)
224The Panel observed, in an earlier discussion, that:
... most Members chose to refer to CPC numbers to define the scope of their
commitments: (i) only 17 schedules adopted a non-CPC approach; (ii) a
few schedules have a "mixed" approach, i.e. they include CPC numbers for
some sectors only.
225As we observed supra, para. 179, the United States admits that it generally followed the W/120
structure, and its Schedule specifically refers to W/120 in two instances.
226In most instances, the words appear to be used to exclude these services from the scope of the
commitment. See the Schedules of Austria (GATS/SC/7); Bulgaria (GATS/SC/122); Croatia (GATS/SC/130);
the European Communities (GATS/SC/31); Finland (GATS/SC/33); Lithuania (GATS/SC/133); Slovenia
(GATS/SC/99); and Sweden (GATS/SC/82). In two cases, however, the words appear to be used to make a
limited specific commitment. See the Schedules of Peru (GATS/SC/69) and Senegal (GATS/SC/75).
227See the Schedules of Australia (GATS/SC/6); Japan (GATS/SC/46); Liechtenstein (GATS/SC/83-
A); Switzerland (GATS/SC/83); and Thailand (GATS/SC/85).

185. We also find unpersuasive the arguments of the United States with respect to subsector 10.E,
"Other".228 Only one Member clearly scheduled gambli ng and betting services in subsector 10.E, and
it used specific words to do so. 229 Another Member specifically excluded "gambling and gambling
related services" from the scope of its commitment under subsector 10.A. 230 From these examples it
appears that different Members have dealt with gambling and betting services in different subsectors
of their Schedules. But the exampl es also suggest that Members have used specific language in order
to make clear the location of their commitments within their own Schedules. Furthermore, as the
Panel noted 231, the United States' argument that gambling and betting services fall under
subsector 10.E appears to contradict its argument that gambling and betting services are comprised in
the ordinary meaning of "sporting services" under su bsector 10.D. As we have observed above, the
same service cannot be covered in two different subsectors within the same Schedule.232
186. Overall, we find it significant that the entri es made by many Members in sector 10 of their
Schedules contain text additional to the text found in the headings and sub-headings used by the
United States (and used in W/120). Such Member s disaggregated their entries beyond the five
subsectors identified in W/120 as falling within sector 10. There is a broad range of ways in which
this was accomplished. Some Members used CPC codes with more digits than the codes used
in W/120, (that is, indicating a more disaggregated service category) and some used (either in addition
to the CPC codes or alone) precise wording to indicate that gambling and betting services were
somehow treated differently from other services in subsector 10.D. Several Members used CPC
codes to distinguish commitments with respect to sporting services from commitments with respect to
gambling and betting services. This context indicates that Members seeking to distinguish the
commitments they were making regarding gamb ling and betting services from other commitments
they were making in subsector 10.D used specifi c language and/or CPC codes to indicate this
distinction. This context does not, however, provide a definitive answer to the question whether, in
the United States' Schedule, gamb ling and betting services fall within the ordinary meaning of the
word "sporting", within the ordinary meaning of the term "other recreational services", or elsewhere.
187. The above examination leads us to the view that an examination of the term "Other
recreational services (except sporti ng)" in its context does not clearly reveal whether, in the United
States' Schedule to the GATS, gambling and be tting services fall within the category of "other

228Although subsector 10.E, "Other", figures in W/120, no such entry is included in the United States'
Schedule.
229Senegal listed "Gambling and betting services" under 10.E. However, Senegal also appears to have
made a relatively narrow commitment under 10.D, with respect to "Recreational Fishing" only.
230See the Schedule of Bulgaria. (GATS/SC/122)
231Panel Report, para. 6.101.
232Supra, para. 180.

recreational services" or within the category of "sporting services". Accordingly, we turn to the object
and purpose of the GATS to obtain further guidance for our interpretation.
188. The Panel referred to the requirement of "trans parency" found in the preamble to the GATS,
as supporting the need for precision and clarity in scheduling, and underlining the importance of
having Schedules that are "readily understandable by all other WTO Members, as well as by services
suppliers and consumers".
233 The Panel also referred to the Appellate Body Report in EC – Computer
Equipment as follows:
The Appellate Body found that "the security and predictability of 'the
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade' is an object
and purpose of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of
GATT 1994." This confirms the importance of the security and
predictability of Members' specific commitments, which is equally an
object and purpose of the GATS.
234 (footnote omitted)
189. We agree with the Panel's characterization of these objectives, along with its suggestion that
they reinforce the importance of Members' making clear commitments. Yet these considerations do
not provide specific assistance for determining wher e, in the United States' Schedule, "gambling and
betting services" fall. Accordingly, it is necessary to continue our analys is by examining other
elements to be taken into account in interpreting treaty provisions.
190. In addition to context, the third paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention directs a
treaty interpreter to take into account, inter alia, subsequent practice establishing the agreement of
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. Antigua argues that the "subsequent practice" of
Members demonstrates that W/120 and the Schedulin g Guidelines must be u sed to interpret the
United States' GATS Schedule.
235 Antigua asserts that such releva nt subsequent practice is found in
the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines 236, in a submission made by the United States regarding the

233Panel Report, para. 6.107.
234Ibid., para. 6.108.
235Antigua's response to Question 1 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, pp. C-1 to C-3.
236Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitm ents under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, S/L/92. The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines serve, in the current round of services negotiations, the same
function as the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines served in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The former reproduce
the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines almost in their entirety, and contain some additional provisions. The 2001
Scheduling Guidelines were adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001.

classification of energy services237, as well as in a publication by the United States International Trade
Commission ("USITC"). 238 The Panel did not reach these arguments by Antigua as it had
found W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines to be context.
191. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and Chile – Price Band System , respectively, the
Appellate Body referred to "practice" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) as:
... a "concordant, common and consistent" sequence of acts or
pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern
implying the agreement of the parties [to a treaty] regarding its
interpretation.
239
... a discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements implying an
agreement among WTO Members on the interpretation of [the
relevant provision]240
192. Thus, in order for "practice" within the mean ing of Article 31(3)(b) to be established:
(i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) those
acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision.
193. We have difficulty accepting Antigua's pos ition that the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines
constitute "subsequent practice" revealing a common understanding that Members' specific
commitments are to be construed in accordance wi th W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.
Although the 2001 Guidelines were explicitly adopted by the Council for Trade in Services, this was
in the context of the negotiation of future commitments and in order to assist in the preparation of
offers and requests in respect of such commitment s. As such, they do not constitute evidence of

237Antigua referred to document S/CSC/W/27, a proposal submitted by the United States concerning
the classification of energy services. (Antigua's first wr itten submission to the Panel, footnote 301 to para. 173)
Paragraph 2 of this document states that:
These numerous energy-related activities are closely interrelated and, taken
as a whole, can be said to comprise the "energy sector." Some of these
activities cut horizontally across existing GATS sectoral classifications
(W/120), such as business services, communications services, construction
services, financial services, and transportation services, among others.
Others may involve activities that are not yet specified in existing GATS
classifications, are deeply embedded in existing GATS classifications, or are
not within the scope of the GATS. (emphasis added)
238US Schedule of Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services , United States
International Trade Commission, May 1997, p. 25.
239Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , p. 13, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 106. The
Appellate Body, in that case, found that panel reports adopted by the GATT contracting parties do not constitute
subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
240Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 214.

Members' understanding regardi ng the interpretation of existing commitments. Furthermore, as the
United States emphasized before the Panel, in its Decision adopting the 2001 Guidelines, the Council
for Trade in Services explicitly stated that they were to be "non-binding" and "shall not modify any
rights or obligations of the Members under the GATS".
241 Accordingly, we do not consider that
the 2001 Guidelines, in and of themselves, constitu te "subsequent practice" within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
194. Nor do the two other documents relied on by Antigua constitute "s ubsequent practice".
Although they may be relevant in identifying the United States' practice, they do not establish a
common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements by Members as a whole. Nor do
they demonstrate a common understanding among Members that specific commitments are to be
interpreted by reference to W/120 and the 1993 Sc heduling Guidelines. Accordingly, we do not find
that Antigua has identified any relevant subsequent practice that can assist us in the interpretation of
subsector 10.D of the United States' Schedule.
195. The above reasoning leads us to the conclusion—contrary to the Panel
242—that application of
the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention leaves the meaning
of "other recreational services (except sporti ng)" ambiguous and does not answer the question
whether the commitment made by the United States in subsector 10.D of its Schedule includes a
commitment in respect of gambling and betting services. Accordingly, we are required, in this case,
to turn to the supplementary means of interpretation provided for in Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.
243

241United States' response to Question 39 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, pp. C-63 to C-64.
242The Panel concluded, at para. 6.110 of the Panel Report, that:
 The US Schedule, read in the light of paragraph 16 of the Scheduling
Guidelines, can be understood to in clude a specific commitment on gambling
and betting services under subsector 10.D ( Recreational services (except
sporting)). (original italics)
243The Panel also had recourse to such means in or der to "confirm" the meaning that it had reached
through application of Article 31. (Panel Report, para. 6.112)

B. Interpretation of Subsector 10.D in A ccordance with Supplementary Means of
Interpretation: Article 32 of the Vienna Convention
196. We observe, as a preliminary matter, that this appeal does not raise the question
whether W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guide lines constitute "supplementary means of
interpretation, including the prepar atory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion".
Both participants agree that they do, and we see no reason to disagree.244
197. The United States argues, however, that, because the "ordinary meaning" of subsector 10.D of
its Schedule is clear from an examination of the text, context (not including W/120 and
the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines) a nd object and purpose, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
have recourse to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention . We disagree. As we have explained, the
Panel erred in characterizing W/120 and the 1993 Sc heduling Guidelines as "context". Yet, we have
also seen that a proper interpretation pursuant to the principles codified in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention does not yield a clear meaning as to the scope of the commitment made by the United
States in the entry "Other recreational services (excep t sporting)". Accordingl y, it is appropriate to
have recourse to the supplemental means of in terpretation identified in Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention. These means include W/120, the 1993 Sche duling Guidelines, and a cover note attached
to drafts of the United States' Schedule.
198. Turning to the question of how the subsector 10.D entry "Other recreational services (except
sporting)" is to be interpreted in the light of W/ 120 and the Scheduling Guidelines, we consider it
useful to set out the relevant parts of both documents. The relevant section of W/120 is as follows:
SECTORS AND SUB-SECTORS CORRESPONDING CPC

10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL
AND SPORTING SERVICES
 (other than audiovisual services)
A. Entertainment services
 (including theatre, 9619
 live bands and circus services)

244Some of the reasoning employed by the Panel in order to conclude (erroneously in our view) that
these documents constituted "context" nevertheless confirms that they constitute "preparatory work", and are
relevant "circumstances" relating to the conclusion of the GATS within the meaning of Article 32:
... both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are "in connexion" with
the GATS. Both documents were drafte d in parallel with the GATS itself,
with the stated purpose of being used as "guides" for scheduling specific
commitments under the GATS ... In that sense, they can be considered to
have been "drawn up on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty".
(footnote omitted)
(Panel Report, para. 6.81)

B. News agency services
 962
C. Libraries, archives, museums and other
 cultural services 963
D. Sporting and other recreational services 964
E. Other
199. Thus, W/120 clearly indicates that its entry 10.D—"Sporting and other recreational
services"—corresponds to CPC Group 964. W/120 does not, however, contain any explicit indication
of: (i) whether the reference to Group 964 necessarily incorporates a reference to each and every
sub-category of Group 964 within the CPC; or (ii) how W/120 relates to the GATS Schedules of
individual Members.
200. With respect to the first issue, we observe that W/120 sets out a much more aggregated
classification list than the one found in the CP C. Whereas W/120 contains 12 sectors (11 and one
"other") and more than 150 subsectors, the CPC classification scheme is comprised of 10
Sections, 69 Divisions, 295 Groups, 1,050 Classes and 1, 811 Subclasses. The first draft classification
list prepared by the GATT Secretariat, W/50, explai ned that one of the reasons for selecting the CPC
as a basis for classification in the services negotiations was that such a product-based system "allows
a higher degree of disaggregation and precision to be attained should it become necessary, at a later
stage."245 Thus, the CPC's level of disaggregation was one of the very reasons it was selected as a
basis for a sectoral classification list. As the CPC is a decimal system 246, a reference to an aggregate
category must be understood as a reference to all of the constituent parts of that category. Put
differently, a reference to a three-digit CPC Group should, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, be understood as a reference to all th e four-digit Classes and five-digit Sub-classes that
make up the group; and a reference to a four-dig it Class should be understood as a reference to all of
the five-digit Sub-classes that make up that Class.
201. In the CPC, Group 964, which corresponds to subsector 10.D of W/120 (Sporting and other
recreational services), is broken down into the following Classes and Sub-classes:

246The CPC hierarchy consists of Sections designated by one-digit codes, Divisions designated by two-
digit codes, Groups designated by three-digit codes, Classes designated by four-digit codes, and Subclasses
designated by five-digit codes.

964 Sporting and other recreational services

 9641 Sporting services
 96411 Sports event promotion services
 96412 Sports event organization services
 96413 Sports facility operation services
 96419 Other sporting services

 9649 Other recreational services
 96491 Recreation park and beach services
 96492 Gambling and betting services
 96499 Other recreational services n.e.c.
Thus, the CPC Class that corresponds to "Sporting services" (9641) does not include gambling and
betting services. Rather, the Sub-class for gambling and betting services (96492) falls under the Class
"Other recreational services" (9649).
202. W/120 does not shed light on the issue of how it relates to individual Member's Schedules.
That issue is, however, addressed in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines:
HOW SHOULD ITEMS BE SCHEDULED?

15. Schedules record, for each sector, the legally enforceable
commitments of each Member. It is therefore vital that schedules be
clear, precise and based on a common format and terminology. This
section describes how commitments should be entered in schedules.

A. How to describe committed sectors and subsectors

16. The legal nature of a schedule as well as the need to evaluate
commitments, require the greatest possible degree of clarity in the
description of each sector or subsector scheduled. In general the
classification of sectors and subsectors should be based on the
Secretariat's revised Services
 Sectoral Classification List . [W/120]
Each sector contained in the Secretariat list is identified by the
corresponding Central Product Classi fication (CPC) number. Where
it is necessary to refine further a sectoral classification, this should be
done on the basis of the CPC or other internationally recognised
classification (e.g. Financial Services Annex). The most recent
breakdown of the CPC, including explanatory notes for each
subsector, is contained in the UN Provisional
 Central Product
Classification.

Example
: A Member wishes to indicate an offer or commitment in
the subsector of map-making services. In the Secretariat
list, this service would fall under the general heading
"Other Business Services" under "Related scientific and
technical consulting services" (see item l.F.m). By
consulting the CPC, map-making can be found under the
corresponding CPC classification number 86754. In its
offer/schedule, the Member would then enter the
subsector under the "Other Business Services" section of
its schedule as follows:
Map-making services (86754)
 If a Member wishes to use its own subsectoral classification
or definitions it should provide c oncordance with the CPC in the
manner indicated in the above example. If this is not possible, it
should give a sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity
as to the scope of the commitment . (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
203. The Scheduling Guidelines thus underline the importance of using a common format and
terminology in scheduling, and express a clear preference for parties to use W/120 and the CPC
classifications in their Schedules. At the same time , the Guidelines make clear that parties wanting to
use their own subsectoral classification or definitions —that is, to disaggregate in a way that diverges
from W/120 and/or the CPC—were to do so in a "su fficiently detailed" way "to avoid any ambiguity
as to the scope of the commitment." The example given in the Scheduling Guidelines illustrates how
to make a positive commitment with respect to a disc rete service that is more disaggregated than a
service subsector identified in W/120. It is reasona ble to assume that the parties to the negotiations
expected the same technique to be applied to exclude a discrete service from the scope of a
commitment, when the commitment is made in a subsector identified in W/120 and the excluded
service is more disaggregated than that subsector.
204. In our view, the requisite clarity as to the scope of a commitment could not have been
achieved through mere omission of CPC codes, partic ularly where a specific sector of a Member's
Schedule, such as sector 10 of the United States' Sche dule, follows the structure of W/120 in all other
respects, and adopts precisely the same terminology as used in W/120. As discussed above, W/120
and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines were prepared a nd circulated at the request of parties to the
Uruguay Round negotiations for the express purpose of assisting those parties in the preparation of
their offers. These documents undoubtedly served, t oo, to assist parties in reviewing and evaluating
the offers made by others. They provided a co mmon language and structure which, although not
obligatory, was widely used and relied upon. In su ch circumstances, and in the light of the specific
guidance provided in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, it is reasonable to assume that parties to the
negotiations examining a sector of a Schedule that tr acked so closely the language of the same sector

in W/120 would—absent a clear indication to the cont rary—have expected the sect or to have the same
coverage as the corresponding W/120 sector. This is another way of stating that, as the Panel
observed, "unless otherwise indicated in the Schedule, Members were assumed to have relied
on W/120 and the corresponding CPC references."247
205. Accordingly, the above excerpt from the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, together with the
linguistic similarities between the two subsectors, provide strong support for interpreting subsector
10.D of the United States' Schedule as correspondi ng to subsector 10.D of W/120, notwithstanding
the absence of CPC codes in the United States' Sc hedule. Subsector 10.D of W/120, in turn,
corresponds to Class 964 of CPC, along with its sub-categories.
206. We observe that another element of the prep aratory work of the GATS suggests that the
United States itself understood the Scheduling Guidelines in this way and sought to comply with them
in the drafting of its GATS Schedule. Several dr afts of the United States' Schedule included the
following cover note:
[E]xcept where specifically note d, the scope of the sectoral
commitments of the United Stat es corresponds to the sectoral
coverage in the Secretariat's Services Sectoral Classification List
(MTN.GNS/W/120, dated 10 July 1991).
248
207. These explanatory notes confirm that the Un ited States used W/120 and sought to follow
the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines. Although the United States emphasizes that this note did not form
part of the final version of the United States' GA TS Schedule, the reasons why the note was omitted
are unclear 249 and, in any event, the commitment made by the United States in subsector 10.D
remained the same in the drafts th at had this cover note and in the final version of the Schedule. In
other words, the other parties to the negotiations c ould not have been expected to understand that the
mere omission of the cover note from the final version of the United States' Schedule somehow
modified the scope of the commitment undertaken in Sector 10.
208. In our view, therefore, the relevant entry in the United States' Schedule, "Other recreational
services (except sporting)", must be interpreted as excluding from the scope of its specific
commitment services corresponding to CPC class 9641, "Sporting services". For the same reasons,

247Panel Report, para. 6.106.
248Communication from the United States of America – Draft Final Schedule of the United States of
America Concerning Initial Commi tments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.3, 7 December 1993. See also
MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.2, 1 October 1993.
249Before the Panel, and at the oral hearing in this appeal, the European Communities explained that
such notes were removed as part of the process of "technical verification" of schedules and that the United
States could not have unilaterally amended the scope of its commitments after 15 December 1993. See the
parties' responses to Question 3 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, pp. C-22ff.

the entry must be read as including within the scope of its commitment services corresponding to
CPC 9649, "Other recreational services", incl uding Sub-class 96492, "Gambling and betting
services".
209. Finally, we consider briefly the United States' ch allenge to the Panel's use, in interpreting the
United States' Schedule, of a document published by the USITC. The United States submits that the
Panel's reliance on this document "reflects a mis guided and erroneous atte mpt to exaggerate the
importance of a document that has no relevance under the customary rules of interpretation of
international law".
250
210. The Office of the United States Trade Represen tative delegated to the USITC responsibility
for maintaining and updating, as necessary, the Un ited States' Schedule. In 1997, the USITC
published an explanatory text that, inter alia , explained the relationship between United States'
Schedule entries and the CPC. One stated purpose of the document is to clarify " how the service
sectors referenced in the GATT Secretariat's list, the CPC System, and the U.S. Schedule
correspond".251 The table of concordance set out in that document clearly indicates that
subsector 10.D of the United States' Schedule "corresponds" to CPC 964.252
211. The Panel did not explain clearly how it used this document in interpreting the United States'
Schedule. The Panel considered that, although th e USITC Document did not constitute a "binding
interpretation", it nevertheless "has probative value as to how the US government views the structure
and the scope of the US Schedule, and, hence, its GATS obligations." 253 The document was dealt
with under the heading "Other supplementary means of interpretation". In this context, the Panel
observed that "Article 32 of the Vienna Convention is not necessarily limited to preparatory material,
but may allow treaty interpreters to take into consideration other relevant material". 254 Yet the Panel
also referred to the principle of "acquiescence" and to a commentator's statement that "Article 31:3(b)

250United States' appellant's submission, para. 83. (original emphasis)
251Panel Report, para. 6.132 (quoting from p.viii of the USITC document). (emphasis added by the
Panel) The USITC document also explains, on the same page, that:
In preparing national schedules, countries were requested to identify and
define sectors and subsectors in accordance with the GATT Secretariat's list,
which lists sectors and their respective CPC numbers. Accordingly, foreign
schedules frequently make explicit references to the CPC numbers. The
U.S. Schedule makes no explicit references to CPC numbers, but it
corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list.
252US Schedule of Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services , United States
International Trade Commission, May 1997, p. 25.
253Panel Report, para. 6.133.
254Ibid., para. 6.122.

[of the Vienna Convention] might also apply". 255 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, it is clear from
the Panel's reasoning that it used the USITC pub lication to "confirm" its interpretation of
subsector 10.D in the United States' Schedule. 256 In other words, the Panel's interpretation did not
depend on its treatment of the USITC document.
212. We have already determined that the Panel committed certain errors in interpreting the United
States' Schedule. Nevertheless, we have determ ined that a proper interpretation according to the
principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention leads to the same result that the
Panel reached, namely, that subsector 10.D of the United States' GATS Schedule includes a specific
commitment with respect to gambling and betting services. In the light of this finding, we need not
decide whether the Panel erred in its treatment of the USITC Document.
C. Summary
213. Based on our reasoning above, we reject the United States' argument that, by excluding
"sporting" services from the scope of its commitment in subsector 10.D, the United States excluded
gambling and betting services from the scope of that commitment. Accordingly, we uphold, albeit for
different reasons, the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.2(a) of the Panel Report, that:
... the United States' Schedule under the GATS includes specific
commitments on gambling and betting services under subsector
10.D.
VI. Article XVI of the GATS: Market Access
214. Article XVI of the GATS sets out specific oblig ations for Members that apply insofar as a
Member has undertaken "specific market access commitments" in its Schedule. The first paragraph of
Article XVI obliges Members to accord services and service suppliers of other Members "no less
favourable treatment than that provided for under th e terms, limitations a nd conditions agreed and
specified in its Schedule." The second paragraph of Article XVI defines, in six sub-paragraphs,
measures that a Member, having undertaken a specif ic commitment, is not to adopt or maintain,
"unless otherwise specified in its Schedule". Th e first four sub-paragraphs concern quantitative
limitations on market access; the fifth sub-paragrap h covers measures that restrict or require specific
types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and the
sixth sub-paragraph identifies limitations on the participation of foreign capital.

255Panel Report, para. 6.122 (referring in footnote to A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice ,
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 200).
256Ibid., para. 6.133.

215. The Panel found that the United States' Sche dule includes specific commitments on gambling
and betting services, and we have uphe ld this finding. The Panel then considered the consistency of
the measures at issue with the Un ited States' obligations under Article XVI of the GATS. The scope
of those obligations depends on the scope of the specific commitment made in the United States'
Schedule. In this case, the relevant entry fo r mode 1 supply in the market access column of
subsector 10.D of the United States' Schedule reads "None".
257 In other words, the United States has
undertaken to provide full market access, within the meaning of Article XVI, in respect of the services
included within the scope of its subsector 10.D co mmitment. In so doing, it has committed not to
maintain any of the types of measures listed in the six sub-paragraphs of Article XVI:2.
216. Before the Panel, Antigua claimed that, in maintaining measures that prohibit the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services, the United St ates is maintaining quantitative limitations that
fall within the scope of sub-paragra phs (a) and (c) of Article XVI and th at are, therefore, inconsistent
with the market access commitment undertaken in subsector 10.D of the United States' Schedule. The
Panel took the view that a prohibition on the supply of certain services effectively "limits to zero" the
number of service suppliers and number of service operations relating to that service. The Panel
reasoned that such a prohibition results in a "zero quota" and, therefore, constitutes a "'limitation on
the number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas' within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a)" and "a limitation 'on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity
of service output ... in the form of quotas' within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c)".258
217. In consequence, the Panel found that, by ma intaining the following measures, the United
States acts inconsistently with its obligations under Article XVI of the GATS:
(i) Federal laws
(1) the Wire Act;
(2) the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws);
 and
(3) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws).
(ii) State laws:
(1) Louisiana : Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (Annotated);
(2) Massachusetts : Section 17A of chapter 271 of the Annotated Laws of
Massachusetts;

257This notation is the opposite of the notation "Unbound", which means that a Member undertakes no
specific commitment.
258Panel Report, paras. 6.338 and 6.355.

(3) South Dakota : Section 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws; and
(4) Utah : Section 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code (Annotated).259
A. Preliminary Matters
218. The United States appeals both the Panel's interp retation of sub-paragr aphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI, as well as its application of those provisi ons to the measures at issue. We have already
determined that the Panel should not have made fi ndings under Article XVI with respect to certain
state laws because Antigua had not made out a prima facie case in respect of these measures. Having
already reversed the Panel's findings regarding these state laws 260, we need not consider them further
in our assessment of this part of the United States' appeal. Accordingly, our analysis below is limited
to a review of the Panel's interpre tation of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c ) of Article XVI:2, as well as to
its application of that interpretation to the three federal statutes at issue in this case.
219. We also note that the Notice of Appeal file d by the United States appears to indicate a
separate, independent challenge to:
The Panel's finding that a WTO Member does not respect its GATS
market access obligations under Artic le XVI:2 if it limits market
access to any part of a scheduled sector or subsector, or if it restricts
any means of delivery under mode 1 with respect to a committed
sector.
261
220. The United States did not, however, adduce any arguments in support of such a challenge in
its appellant's submission. Nor did the United States expressly refer to, or request us to reverse, any
paragraph of the Panel Report in which the "findi ng" referred to in the above excerpt is found.
Accordingly, we understand that the United States does not challenge separately the Panel's findings
as regards restrictions on the supply of part of a sector, or as regards restrictions on part of a mode of
supply (that is, on one or more means of supplying a given service). 262 In response to questioning at

259See Panel Report, paras. 6.421 and 7.2(b). The Pa nel's findings that specific measures afforded
treatment less favourable than that provided for in the United States' schedule are found in paragraphs 6.365,
6.373, 6.380, 6.389, 6.395, and 6.412.
260Supra, paras. 154 and 155.
261United States' Notice of Appeal, para. 3(c), supra, footnote 22.
262We understand the relevant findings to be those in paragraphs 6.287 and 6.290 of the Panel Report.
The Panel found that: (i) as regards a particular serv ice, a Member that has made an unlimited market access
commitment under mode 1 commits itself not to maintain measures that prohibit the use of one, several or all
means of delivery of that se rvice; and (ii) a Member that has made a market access commitment in a sector or
subsector has committed itself in respect of all services that fall within the relevant sector or subsector.

the oral hearing, the United States confirmed that its appeal focuses on the Panel's interpretation of
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2
263, and we shall limit our examination accordingly.
B. The Meaning of Sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI
221. The chapeau to Article XVI:2, and sub-paragraphs (a) and (c), provide:
In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the
measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the
basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory,
unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers
whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies,
exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an
economic needs test; ...
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations
or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of
designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test;
 9

9 Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member
which limit inputs for the supply of services.
222. In its appeal, the United States emphasizes that none of the measures at issue states any
numerical units or is in the form of quotas and that, therefore, none of those measures falls within the
scope of sub-paragraph (a) or (c) of Article XVI:2. The United St ates contends that the Panel erred in
its interpretation of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 by failing to give effect to certain
elements of the text of these provisions, notably to key terms such as "form" and "numerical quotas".
According to the United States, the Panel appear s to have been influenced by a "misguided" 264
concern that prohibitions on foreign service suppliers should not escape the application of Article XVI
simply because they are not expressed in numerical terms. The United States asserts that the Panel
ignored the fact that such prohibitions remain subject to other provisions of the Agreement, including
Articles XVII and VI, and contends that, in its approach, the Panel improperly expanded the
obligations in Article XVI. For the United Stat es, Members that have made a specific commitment
under Article XVI have committed themselves not to maintain the precisely defined limitations set out

263In response to a question on this issue at the oral hearing, the United States stated that its arguments
on these points are in the nature of "subsidiary" or "supporting" arguments. According to the United States,
these arguments illustrate why the Panel's interpretation of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI was
"unreasonable".

in Article XVI:2; Members have not committed themselves to eliminate all other limitations or
restrictions that may impede the supply of the relevant services.
1. Sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVI:2
223. In interpreting sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVI:2, the Panel determined that:
[a prohibition on one, several or all means of delivery cross-border]
is a "limitation on the number of service suppliers in the form of
numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) because it
totally prevents the use by service suppliers of one, several or all
means of delivery that are included in mode 1.
265
224. The United States submits that this interpretation ignores the text of sub-paragraph (a), in
particular the meaning of "form" and "numerical quotas", and erroneously includes within the scope
of Article XVI:2(a) measures that have the effect of limiting the number of service suppliers or
output to zero. Although the Panel opined that any other result would be "absurd", the United States
stresses the opposite—that a contrary result woul d be consistent with the balance between
liberalization and the right to regulate that is reflected in the GATS.
225. Article XVI:2(a) prohibits "limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form
of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic
needs test." In interpreting this provision we obser ve, first, that it refers to restrictions "on the
number of service suppliers", as well as to " numerical quotas". These words reflect that the focus of
Article XVI:2(a) is on limitations relating to numbers or, put differently, to quantitative limitations.
226. The United States urges us to give proper effect to the terms "in the form of" in sub-
paragraph (a) and, to that end, re fers to dictionary definitions to establish the meaning of "form" in
Article XIV(a). Yet even these definitions suggest a degree of ambiguity as to the scope of the word
"form". For example, "form" covers both the mode in which a thing "exists", as well as the mode in
which it "manifests itself". This suggests a broad meaning for the term "form".266
227. The words "in the form of" in sub-paragraph (a) re late to all four of the limitations identified
in that provision. It follows, in our view, that the four types of limitations, themselves, impart
meaning to "in the form of". Looking at these four types of limitations in Article XVI:2(a), we begin
with "numerical quotas". These words are not defined in the GATS. According to the dictionary

265Panel Report, para. 6.338.
266In footnote 166 to paragraph 105 of its appellant's submission, the United States refers to " The New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 1006, which defines 'form' inter alia as 'shape, arrangement of parts,' or
'[t]he particular mode in which a thing exists or manifests itself,' or, in linguistics, 'the external characteristics of
a word or other unit as distinct from its meaning".

definitions provided by the United States, the meaning of the word "numerical" includes
"characteristic of a number or numbers".
267 The word "quota" means, inter alia , "the maximum
number or quantity belonging, due, given, or perm itted to an individual or group"; and "numerical
limitations on imports or exports". 268 Thus, a "numerical quota" within Article XVI:2(a) appears to
mean a quantitative limit on the number of service s uppliers. The fact that the word "numerical"
encompasses things which "have the characteristic s of a number" suggests that limitations "in the
form of a numerical quota" would encompass limitati ons which, even if not in themselves a number,
have the characteristics of a number. Because zero is quantitative in nature, it can, in our view, be
deemed to have the "characteristics of" a number—that is, to be "numerical".
228. The second type of limitation mentioned in sub- paragraph (a) is "limitations on the number of
service suppliers... in the form of ... monopolies". Although the word "monopolies", as such, is not
defined, Article XXVIII(h) of the GATS defines a "monopoly supplier of a service" as:
... any person, public or private, whic h in the relevant market of the
territory of a Member is authorized or established formally or in
effect by that Member as the sole supplier of that service. (emphasis
added)
229. The term "exclusive service suppliers", which is used to identify the third limitation in
Article XVI:2(a) ("limitations on the number of service suppliers...in the form of exclusive service
suppliers"), is defined in Article VIII:5 of the GATS, as:
... where a Member, formally or in effect , ( a) authorizes or
establishes a small number of service suppliers and ( b) substantially
prevents competition among those suppliers in its territory. (emphasis
added)
230. These two definitions suggest that the referenc e, in Article XVI:2(a), to limitations on the
number of service suppliers "in the form of m onopolies and exclusive service suppliers" should be
read to include limitations that are in form or in effect, monopolies or exclusive service suppliers.
231. We further observe that it is not clear that "limitations on the number of service suppliers ... in
the form of ... the requirements of an economic needs test" must take a particular "form."269 Thus, this

267The United States, at footnote 167 to paragraph 105 of its appellant's submission, observes that the
"New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, at p. 1955, defines 'numerical' as '[ o]f, pertaining to, or characteristic
of a number or numbers; (of a figure, symbol, etc.) expressing a number.'"
268The United States' appellant's submission, footnote 167 to para. 105 (referring to the New Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2454).
269See the WTO Secretariat Note on "Economic Needs Tests", S/CSS/W/118, 30 November 2001,
para. 4.

fourth type of limitation, too, suggests that the words "in the form of" must not be interpreted as
prescribing a rigid mechanical formula.
232. This is not to say that the words "in the form of" should be ignored or replaced by the words
"that have the effect of". Yet, at the same time, they cannot be read in isolation. Rather, when viewed
as a whole, the text of sub-paragraph (a) supports th e view that the words "in the form of" must be
read in conjunction with the words that precede them—"limitations on the number of service
suppliers"—as well as the words that follow them, including the words " numerical quotas". (emphasis
added) Read in this way, it is clear that the thrust of sub-paragraph (a) is not on the form of
limitations, but on their numerical, or quantitative, nature.
233. Looking to the context of sub-paragraph (a), we observe that the chapeau to Article XVI:2,
refers to the purpose of the sub-paragraphs that follow, namely, to define the measures which a
Member shall not maintain or adopt for sectors where market access commitments are made . The
chapeau thus contemplates circumstances in which a Member's Schedule includes a commitment to
allow market access, and points out that the function of the sub-paragraphs in Article XVI:2 is to
define certain limitations that are prohibited unless specifically entered in the Member's Schedule.
Plainly, the drafters of sub-paragraph (a) had in mind limitations that would impose a maximum limit
of above zero. Similarly, Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 prohibits Members from imposing duties
"in excess of" the bound duty rate. Such bound duty rate will usually be above zero. Yet this does
not mean that Article II:1(b) does not also refer to bound rates set at zero.
234. It follows from the above that we find the following reasoning of the Panel to be persuasive:
[t]he fact that the terminology [of Article XVI:2(a)] embraces lesser
limitations, in the form of quotas greater than zero, cannot warrant
the conclusion that it does not embrace a greater limitation
amounting to zero. Paragraph (a) does not foresee a "zero quota"
because paragraph (a) was not drafted to cover situations where a
Member wants to maintain full limitations. If a Member wants to
maintain a full prohibition, it is assumed that such a Member would
not have scheduled such a sector or subsector and, therefore, would
not need to schedule any limitation or measures pursuant to
Article XVI:2.
270
235. As for the first paragraph of Article XVI, we note that it does not refer expressly to any
requirements as to form, but simply links a Member's market access obligations in respect of
scheduled services to "the terms, limitations and c onditions agreed and specified in its Schedule".

270Panel Report, para. 6.331.

Neither this provision, nor the object and purpose of the GATS as stated in its preamble
271, readily
assists us in answering the question whether the reference in Article XVI:2(a) to "limitations on the
number of service suppliers ... in the form of nume rical quotas" encompasses the type of measure at
issue here, namely, a prohibition on the supply of a service in respect of which a specific commitment
has been made.
236. In our view, the above examination of the words of Article XVI:2(a) read in their context and
in the light of the object and purpose of the GATS suggests that the words "in the form of" do not
impose the type of precisely defined constraint that the United States suggests. Yet certain
ambiguities about the meaning of the provision remain. The Panel, at this stage of its analysis,
observed that any suggestion that the "form" requirement must be strictly interpreted to refer only to
limitations "explicitly couched in numer ical terms" leads to "absurdity".
272 In either circumstance,
this is an appropriate case in which to have recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, such as
preparatory work.
237. We have already determined that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines constitute relevant
preparatory work. 273 As the Panel observed, those Guidelin es set out an example of the type of
limitation that falls within the scope of sub-paragr aph (a) of Article XVI:2, that is, of the type of
measures that will be inconsistent with Article XVI if a relevant commitment has been made and
unless the Member in question has listed it as a condition or limitation in its Schedule. That example
is: "nationality requirements for suppliers of services (equivalent to zero quota)".
274 This example
confirms the view that measures equivalent to a zero quota fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a).
238. For the above reasons, we are of the view that limitations amounting to a zero quota are
quantitative limitations and fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a).
239. As we have not been asked to revisit the othe r elements of the Panel's reasoning on this
issue—in particular its findings regarding limitations on market access in respect of part of a

271We recall that the Panel identified, as forming part of the object and purpose of the GATS:
transparency, the progressive liberalization of trade in services, and Members' right to regulate trade in services
provided that they respect the rights of other Members under the GATS. (Panel Report, paras. 6.107-6.109, and
6.314-6.317)
272In paragraph 6.332 of the Panel Report, the Panel reasoned that:
To hold that only restrictions explicitly couched in numerical terms fall
within Article XVI:2(a) would produce absurd results. It would, for
example, allow a law that explicitly provides that "all foreign services are
prohibited" to escape the application of Article XVI, because it is not
expressed in numerical terms.
273Supra, para. 196.
274See 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 6.

committed sector275, and limitations on one or more means of cross-border delivery for a committed
service276—we therefore, uphold the Panel's finding that:
[a prohibition on one, several or all means of delivery cross-border]
is a "limitation on the number of service suppliers in the form of
numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) because it
totally prevents the use by service suppliers of one, several or all
means of delivery that are included in mode 1.
277
2. Sub-paragraph (c) of Article XVI:2
240. In interpreting sub-paragraph (c) of Article XVI: 2, the Panel observed that the wording of the
provision "might perhaps be taken to imply that any quota has to be expressed in terms of designated
numerical units". 278 However, after further analysis and, in particular, after comparing the English
version of the provision with its French and Spanis h counterparts, the Panel found that sub-paragraph
(c) does not mean that any quota must be expressed in term s of designated numerical units if it is to
fall within the scope of that provision. Instead, according to the Panel, the "correct reading of
Article XVI:2(c)" is that limitations referred to under that provision may be: (i) in the form of
designated numerical units; (ii) in the form of quotas; or (iii) in the form of the requirement of an
economic needs test.279
241. The Panel then found that, where a specific co mmitment has been undertaken in respect of a
service, a measure prohibiting one or more means of delivery of that service is:
... a limitation "on the total number of service operations or on the
total quantity of service output ... in the form of quotas" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(c) because it ... results in a "zero quota" on
one or more or all means of delivery include[d] in mode 1.
280
242. The United States asserts that, in so finding, the Panel used an incorrect reading of the French
and Spanish texts to arrive at an interpretation that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the
English text. Specifically, the Panel relied upon the presence of commas in the French and Spanish
versions of the text—but not in the English versi on—in order to find that sub-paragraph (c) identifies
three types of limitations. The United States argues that, when properly interpreted, sub-paragraph (c)
identifies only two types of limitations. The United States adds that the measures at issue in this case

275Panel Report, para. 6.335.
276Ibid., para. 6.338.
277Ibid.
278Ibid., para. 6.343.
279Ibid., para. 6.344.
280Ibid., para. 6.355.

cannot in any way be construed as falling within the scope of either of the two limitations defined in
sub-paragraph (c).
243. Sub-paragraph (c) refers to the following measures:
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the
total quantity of service output expressed in terms of
designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test.

244. The Panel essentially determined that, notwithstanding the absence of a comma between
"terms of designated numerical units" and "in the form of quotas" in the English version, the phrase
should, in order to be read in a manner consistent with the French and Spanish versions, be read as if
such a comma existed—that is, as if expressed in "terms of designated numerical units" and "in the
form of quotas" were disjunctive phrases, each of which modifies the word "limitations" at the
beginning of the provision. The Panel relied on the fact that such a comma does exist in both the
French and Spanish versions of the provision.
281 The United States argues, however, based on a
detailed analysis of French grammar, that the existe nce of the comma in the French version is, in fact,
consistent with the absence of a comma in the En glish version, and that both versions mean that
Article XVI:2(c) identifies only two limitations.282
245. Ultimately, we are not persuaded that the key to the interpretation of this particular provision
is to be found in a careful dissection of the us e of commas within its grammatical structure.
Regardless of which language vers ion is analyzed, and of the imp lications of comma placement (or
lack thereof), all three language versions are grammatically ambiguous. All three can arguably be
read as identifying two limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of
service output. 283 All three can also arguably be read as identifying three limitations on the total
number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output. 284 The mere presence or
absence of a comma in Article XVI:2(c) is not determinative of the issue before us.

281The French version reads "limitati ons concernant le nombre total d'opérations de services ou la
quantité totale de services produits, exprimées en un ités numériques déterminées, sous forme de contingents ou
de l'exigence d'un examen des besoins économiques"; and the Spanish version reads "limitaciones al número
total de operaciones de servicios o a la cuantía total de la producción de servicios, expresadas en unidades
numéricas designadas, en forma de contingentes o me diante la exigencia de una prueba de necesidades
económicas".
282United States' appellant's submission, paras. 114-120.
283That is: (i) limitations ... expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas; or
(ii) limitations ... expressed in terms of the requirement of an economic needs test.
284That is: (i) limitations ... expressed in terms of designated numerical units; (ii) limitations ...
expressed ... in the form of quotas; or (iii) limitations ... expressed in terms of the requirement of ... an
economic needs test.

246. We find it more useful, and appropriate, to look to the language of the provision itself for its
meaning. Looking at the provision generally, we see that the first clause of sub-paragraph (c) deals
with the target of the limitations covered by that provision. There are two such types of limitations:
on the number of service operations; and on the quantity of service output. Both are quantitative in
nature. The second part of the provision provides more detail as to the type of limitations—relating
to those service operations or output—that fall within sub-paragraph (c). These are: "designated
numerical units in the form of quotas or the requireme nt of an economic needs test". The second part
of the provision clearly modifies the first part of the provision (service operations, service output).
Yet certain elements of the second part apply differen tly to the two elements of the first part. For
example, in its ordinary sense, the term "numerical units" is more naturally used to refer to "output"
than to "operations".
247. In our view, by combining, in sub-paragraph (c), the elements of the first clause of
Article XVI:2(c) and the elements in the second part of the provision, the parties to the negotiations
sought to ensure that their provision covered certain types of limitations, but did not feel the need to
clearly demarcate the scope of each such element. On the contrary, there is scope for overlap between
such elements: between limitations on the num ber of service operations and limitations on the
quantity of service output, for example, or between limitations in the form of quotas and limitations in
the form of an economic needs test. That sub-paragraph (c) applies in respect of all four modes of
supply under the GATS also suggests the limitations covered thereunder canno t take a single form,
nor be constrained in a formulaic manner. Noneth eless, all types of limitations in sub-paragraph (c)
are quantitative in nature, and all restrict market ac cess. For these reasons, we are of the view that,
 even if sub-paragraph (c) is read as referring to only two types of limitations, as contended by the
United States, it does not follow that sub-paragraph (c) would not catch a measure equivalent to a zero
quota.
248. To the extent that the above interpretation leaves a degree of ambiguity as to the proper
meaning of Article XVI:2(c), we consider it useful to resort to supplementary means of interpretation.
The market access obligations set forth in Article XV I were intended to be obligations in respect of
 quantitative , or "quantitative-type"
285, measures. The difficulties faced by the negotiating parties
concerned not whether Article XVI covered quantitative measu res—for it was clear that it did—but
rather how to "know where the line should be drawn between quantitative and qualitative
measures".286

285Statement by the Co-Chairman at the meeting of 17-27 September 1991, MTN.GNS/45, para. 16.
286Ibid.

249. We also consider it appropriate to refer to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as preparatory
work. These Guidelines set out an example of the type of measure covered by sub-paragraph (c) of
Article XVI:2. They refer to "[r]estrictions on broadcasting time available for foreign films"
287,
without mentioning numbers or units.
250. The strict interpretation of Article XVI:2(c) a dvanced by the United States would imply that
only limitations that contain an express reference to numbered units could fall within the scope of that
provision. Under such an interpretation, sub-paragr aph (c) could not cover, for example, a limitation
expressed as a percentage or described using words su ch as "a majority". It is neither necessary nor
appropriate for us to draw, in the abstract, th e line between quantitative and qualitative measures, and
we do not do so here. Yet we are satisfied that a prohibition on the supply of services in respect of
which a full market access commi tment has been undertaken is a quantitative limitation on the supply
of such services.
251. In this case, the measures at i ssue, by prohibiting the supply of services in respect of which a
market access commitment has b een taken, amount to a "zero quota" on service operations or output
with respect to such services. As such, they fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(c).
252. For all of these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.355 of the Panel
Report, that a measure prohibiting the supply of certain services where specific commitments have
been undertaken is a limitation:
... within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c) because it totally prevents
the services operations and/or service output through one or more or
all means of delivery that are included in mode 1. In other words,
such a ban results in a "zero quota" on one or more or all means of
delivery include in mode 1.
3. Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) – Prohibitions Directed at Consumers

253. Antigua also appeals the Panel's findings that certain measures that prohibit consumers from
purchasing cross-border gambling services are not ca ught by either sub-paragraph (a) or sub-
paragraph (c) of Article XVI:2. 288 The Panel applied its analysis of these provisions to find that four
state laws directed at persons who engage in gambling—that is, to consumers of gambling services

2871993 Scheduling Guidelines, p. 3.
288Panel Report, paras. 6.321 and 6.348-6.349.

as opposed to suppliers of gambling services—had not been shown to be inconsistent with the United
States' market access commitments.289
254. In paragraphs 149 to 155 of this Report, we expressed our view th at, with respect to the eight
state laws reviewed by the Panel, Antigua had failed to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency
with sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2. For this reason, we reversed the Panel's findings
that four of those state laws are inconsistent w ith Article XVI:1 and sub-pa ragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XVI:2.290 Having held that the Panel was not entitled to make findings on any of the eight
state laws, including with respect to the four state laws directed at consumers rather than suppliers
of gambling services, we need not, in resolving this a ppeal, consider the merits of Antigua's appeal of
the Panel's findings with respect to restrictions on service consumers as opposed to service suppliers.
C. Does the Second Paragraph of Article XVI Exhaust the Market Access Restrictions
that are Prohibited by the First Paragraph?
255. The Panel found that:
The ordinary meaning of the words, the context of Article XVI, as
well as the object and purpose of the GATS confirm that the
restrictions on market access that are covered by Article XVI are
only those listed in paragraph 2 of this Article.
291
256. Antigua conditionally appeals this finding. Its appeal is conditional upon the Appellate
Body's reversing the finding of the Panel, in paragr aph 7.2(b) of the Panel Report, that certain United
States federal and state laws are contrary to Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2 of the GATS. More
specifically, the appeal is made "in the event the Appe llate Body were to agree with the United States'
argument that GATS Articles XVI:2(a) and (c) only ap ply to limitations that are in form specified
exactly and expressly in terms of numerical quotas."
292 Having upheld the Panel's interpretation of
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c ) of Article XVI:2 and di smissed this ground of the United States' appeal, it
follows that the condition on which this aspect of Anti gua's appeal is made is not satisfied, and we
need not consider it further. We thus leave the issue of the relationship between the first and second
paragraphs of Article XVI to another day.

289Panel Report, paras. 6.382-6.383 (Colorado), 6.397-6.398 (Minnesota), 6.401-6.402 (New Jersey),
and 6.405-6.406 (New York).
290Supra, para. 155.
292Antigua's other appellant's submission, footnote 3 to para. 3. See also Antigua's other appellant's
submission, para. 55.

D. Application of Article XVI to the Measures at Issue
257. Having upheld the Panel's interpretation of Artic le XVI:2(a) and (c), we now consider its
application of that interpretation to the measures at issue in this case. In so doing, we consider, for the
reasons already explained, only that part of the Panel's analysis relating to the three federal laws, and
not its analysis relating to state laws.
258. The Panel's explanation of the three federal laws is set out in paragraphs 6.360 to 6.380 of the
Panel Report. It is, in our view, useful to set out briefly the relevant part of each statute, as well as the
Panel's finding in respect of that statute. The relevant part of the Wire Act states:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers
shall be fined under this title or im prisoned not more than two years,
or both.
293
259. With respect to this provision, the Panel found that "the Wire Act prohibits the use of at least
one or potentially several means of delivery included in mode 1" 294, and that, accordingly, the statute
"constitutes a 'zero quota' for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery." 295 T h e
Panel reasoned that the Wire Act prohibits ser vice suppliers from supplying gambling and betting
services using remote means of delivery, as well as service operations and service output through such
means. Accordingly, the Panel determined that "t he Wire Act contains a limitation 'in the form of
numerical quotas' within the meaning of Article XV I:2(a) and a limitation 'in the form of a quota'
within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c)."296
260. As regards the Travel Act, the Panel quoted the following excerpt:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent
to –
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or

293Section 1084(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code (quoted in Panel Report, para. 6.360).
294Panel Report, para. 6.362.
295Ibid., para. 6.363.
296Ibid.

(2) commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or
facilitate the promotion, ma nagement, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform --
(A) an act described in pa ragraph (1) or (3) shall
be fined under this title, im prisoned not more than 5
years, or both; or
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) As used in this section (i) "unlawful activity" means (1) any
business enterprise involving gambling ... in violation of the laws of
the State in which they are committed or of the United States.
297
261. The Panel determined that "the Travel Act pr ohibits gambling activity that entails the supply
of gambling and betting services by 'mail or any facilit y' to the extent that such supply is undertaken
by a 'business enterprise involving gambling' that is prohibited under state law and provided that the
other requirements in subparagraph (a) of the Travel Act have been met."
298 The Panel further opined
that the Travel Act prohibits service suppliers from supplying gambling and betting services through
the mail, (and potentially other means of deliver y), as well as services operations and service output
through the mail (and potentially other means of deliv ery), in such a way as to amount to a "zero"
quota on one or several means of delivery included in mode 1. 299 For these reasons, the Panel found
that "the Travel Act contains a limitation 'in th e form of numerical quotas' within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a) and a limitation' in the form of a quota' within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c)."300
262. The Panel considered the relevant part of the Illegal Gambling Business Act to be the
following:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or
owns all or part of an illegal ga mbling business shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section –

297Section 1952(a) and (b) of Title 18 of the United States Code (quoted in Panel Report, para. 6.366).
299Ibid., paras. 6.368-6.370.
300Ibid., para. 6.371.

(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which –
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political
subdivision in which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct,
finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part
of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous
operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has
a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
(2) 'gambling' includes but is not limited to pool-selling,
bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice
tables, and conducting lotteries, polic y, bolita or numbers games, or
selling chances therein.
301
263. The Panel then determined that because th e IGBA "prohibits the conduct, finance,
management, supervision, direction or ownership of all or part of a 'gambling business' that violates
state law, it effectively prohibits the supply of gambling and betting services through at least one and
potentially all means of delivery included in mode 1 by such businesses"; that this prohibition
concerned service suppliers, service operations and se rvice output; and that, accordingly, the IGBA
"contains a limitation 'in the form of numerical quotas ' within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) and a
limitation 'in the form of a quota' within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c)."302
264. The United States' appeal of the Panel's findi ngs with respect to the consistency of its
measures with sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 rests on two pillars: (i) that the Panel erred
in interpreting those provisions; and (ii) that the measures at issue do not contain any limitations that
explicitly take the form of numerical quotas or designated numerical units. The United States does
not appeal the Panel's findings as to the various activities that are prohibited under these statutes. We
have upheld the Panel's interpreta tion of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 and, in
particular, its determination that these provisions en compass measures equivalent to a zero quota. In
these circumstances, the fact that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA do not explicitly use
numbers, or the word "quota", in imposing their respective prohibitions, does not mean, as the United
States contends, that the measures are beyond the reach of Article XVI:2(a) and (c). As a result, there
is no ground for disturbing the above findings made by the Panel.
265. We have upheld the Panel's finding that the United States' Schedule to the GATS includes a
specific commitment in respect of gambling and betting services. 303 In that Schedule, the United

301Section 1955(a) and (b) of Title 18 of the United States Code (quoted in Panel Report, para. 6.374).
302Panel Report, paras. 6.376-6.378.
303Supra, para. 213.

States has inscribed "None" in the first row of the ma rket access column for subsector 10.D. In these
circumstances, and for the reasons given in this section of our Report, we also uphold the Panel's
ultimate finding, in paragraph 7.2(b)(i) of the Panel Report, that, by maintaining the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, the United States acts inconsistently with its
obligations under Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2(a) and (c) of the GATS.
VII. Article XIV of the GATS: General Exceptions
266. Finally, we turn to the Panel's analysis of the United States' defence under Article XIV of the
GATS. We found above that Antigua failed to make a prima facie case of inconsistency with
Article XVI in relation to the eight state laws examined by the Panel.304 The Panel found that no other
state laws had been sufficiently identified by An tigua as part of its claims in this dispute. 305 W e
therefore limit our discussion to the Panel's treatme nt of the defence asserted by the United States
with respect to the three federal laws—the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act ("IGBA")—under Article XIV.
267. The United States and Antigua each raises multiple allegations of error with respect to the
Panel's analysis under Article XIV. We begin with Antigua's claim that the Panel erred in examining
the merits of the United States' defence, notwithst anding that the United States did not raise it until its
second written submission to the Panel. Next, we cons ider the participants' allegations that the Panel
erred by taking it upon itself to construct the defence or rebuttal for the other party. We then turn to
the participants' claims of error in relation to th e Panel's analysis under pa ragraphs (a) and (c) of
Article XIV, and under the chapeau, or introductory paragraph, of Article XIV.
A. Did the Panel Err in Considering the United States' Defence Under Article XIV?
268. Antigua argues that "the Panel erred in its deci sion to consider the United States' defence in
this proceeding at all" and thereby failed to sa tisfy its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU. 306
Antigua points out that the United States did not raise its defence under Ar ticle XIV of the GATS
until its second written submission to the Panel, wh ich was filed on the same day as Antigua's second
written submission. Antigua submits that this dela yed invocation by the United States of its defence
was a "simple litigation tactic"307, and that, because the United States did not invoke the defence at an

304Supra, paras. 149-155.
305Panel Report, paras. 6.211-6.249.
306Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 72.
307Ibid.

earlier stage of the panel proceeding, Antigua was "deprived of a full and fair opportunity to respond
to the defence."
308
269. Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the le gal basis for a dispute, that is, the claims, be
identified in a panel request with specificity suffi cient "to present the problem clearly," so that a
responding party will be aware, at the time of the estab lishment of a panel, of the claims raised by the
complaining party to which it might seek to res pond in the course of the panel proceedings. In
contrast, the DSU is silent about a deadline or a method by which a responding party must state the
legal basis for its defence.309 This does not mean that a responding party may put forward its defence
whenever and in whatever manner it chooses. Ar ticle 3.10 of the DSU provides that "all Members
will engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute", which implies the
identification by each party of relevant legal and factual issues at the earliest opportunity, so as to
provide other parties, including third parties, an opportunity to respond.
270. At the same time, the opportunity afforded to a Member to respond to claims and defences
made against it is also a "fundamental tenet of due process". 310 A party must not merely be given an
opportunity to respond, but that opportunity must be meaningful in terms of that party's ability to
defend itself adequately. A party that considers it was not afforded such an opportunity will often
raise a due process objection before the panel. 311 The Appellate Body has recognized in numerous
cases that a Member's right to raise a claim 312 or objection 313, as well as a panel's exercise of
discretion314, are circumscribed by the due process rights of other parties to a dispute. Those due
process rights similarly serve to limit a responding party's right to set out its defence at any point
during the panel proceedings.

308Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 73.
309The issue before us, therefore, is distinct from that addressed by the Appellate Body in EC –
Bananas III , where a responding party challenged the panel's consideration of claims mentioned by certain
complaining parties in the panel request, but not supported by any arguments until the second written
submission before the panel. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 145-147; see also Appellate
Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 158-162) Here, we address a complaining party's challenge to a
defence invoked by the responding party.
310Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 278. See also Appellate Body Report, Chile –
Price Band System, para. 176.
311Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras. 165-166. See also Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-
Beams, para. 95.
312See, for example, Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 113; Appellate Body
Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 161; and Appellate Body Report, Thailand –
H-Beams, para. 88.
313Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 123; Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 50; Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 166; and Appellate Body Report, US –
1916 Act, para. 54.
314See, for example, Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act , para. 150; and Appellate Body Report,

271. Due process may be of particular concern in cases where a party raises new facts at a late
stage of the panel proceedings. The Appellate Bo dy has observed that, unde r the standard working
procedures of panels315, complaining parties should put forward their cases—with "a full presentation
of the facts on the basis of submissi on of supporting evidence"—during the first stage of panel
proceedings.316 We see no reason why this expectation would not apply equally to responding parties,
which, once they have received the first written subm ission of a complaining party, are likely to be
aware of the defences they might invoke and the evidence needed to support them.
272. It follows that the principles of good faith and due process oblige a responding party to
articulate its defence promptly and clearly. This w ill enable the complaining party to understand that
a specific defence has been made, "be aware of its dimensions, and have an adequate opportunity to
address and respond to it." 317 Whether a defence has been made at a sufficiently early stage of the
panel proceedings to provide adequate notice to the opposing party will depend on the particular
circumstances of a given dispute.
273. Furthermore, as part of their duties, under Article 11 of the DSU, to "make an objective
assessment of the matter" before them, panels must ensure that the due process rights of parties to a
dispute are respected.318 A panel may act inconsistently with this duty if it addresses a defence that a
responding party raised at such a late stage of the panel proceedings that the complaining party had no
meaningful opportunity to respond to it. To this e nd, panels are endowed with "sufficient flexibility"
in their working procedures, by virtue of Article 12.2 of the DSU, to regulate panel proceedings and,
in particular, to adjust their timetables to a llow for additional time to respond or for additional
submissions where necessary. 319
274. In the present case, the United States made no mention of Article XIV of the GATS until its
second written submission, filed on 9 January 2004. 320 Antigua did not refer to Article XIV in its
second written submission, filed on the same da y, although Antigua had, in its first written

315Appendix 3 to the DSU. We note that the Panel in this dispute operated under Working Procedures,
drawn up in consultation with the parties, that provided for "all factual evidence [to be submitted] to the Panel
no later than during the first substantive meeting, exce pt with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of
rebuttals or answers to questions." (Working Procedures of the Panel, Panel Report, p. A-2, para. 12)
316Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , para. 79. The first stage of panel
proceedings continues through the first substantive panel meeting, whereas the second stage continues thereafter
through the second substantive panel meeting.
317Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System , para. 164. See also Appellate Body Report,
EC– Tariff Preferences, para. 113.
318Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 174-177.
319See Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 272.
320In paragraph 87 of its second written submission to the Panel, the United States argued that the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and th e IGBA "meet the requirements of Article XIV, over and above the fact that they are
also consistent with the remainder of the GATS."

submission, referred to the possibility that the United States might seek to invoke Article XIV.
321
Both parties discussed issues relating to Article XIV in their opening statements at the second
substantive panel meeting on 26 January 2004.322
275. At the hearing in this appeal, Antigua acknowle dged that it "had the opportunity to respond"
to the United States' defence, and had "responded sufficiently", during its opening statement at the
second substantive panel meeting.323 When asked whether it had info rmed the Panel of any prejudice
resulting from the United States' allegedly late invocation of the defence, Antigua answered that it had
not so informed the Panel. Nevertheless, Antigua maintained at the hearing that it was prejudiced on
the grounds that the late invocation by the United St ates of its defence hampered the Panel's ability to
assess that defence, resulting in the Panel's making the defence for the United States.324
276. In these circumstances, we are of the view th at, although the United States could have raised
its defence earlier, the Panel did not err in deciding to assess whether the United States' measures are
justified under Article XIV. From the outset, Anti gua was apparently aware that the United States
might argue that its measures satisfy the requirements of Article XIV. Antigua admitted that it raised
no objection to the timing of the United States' defe nce before the Panel. Antigua also acknowledged
that it did have an opportunity to respond adequately to the United States' defe nce, albeit at a late
stage of the proceeding. For these reasons, we consid er that the Panel did not "deprive" Antigua of a
"full and fair opportunity to respond to the defence".325 We find, therefore, that the Panel did not fail
to satisfy its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU by entering into the merits of the United States'
defence under Article XIV.
B. Did the Panel Err in its Treatment of the Burden of Proof Under Article XIV?
277. In its analysis of issues arising under Article XIV of the GATS, the Panel drew extensively on
arguments made and evidence submitted by the parti es in connection with other issues in this case.
This approach of the Panel to Article XIV is th e subject of appeals by both Antigua and the United
States. Each alleges that the Panel erred in its treatment of the burden of proof.

321Antigua's first written submission to the Panel, para . 202 ("It is possible that the United States may
try during the course of this proceeding to invoke one or more of the general exceptions of Article XIV of the
GATS.").
322Antigua's statement at the second substantive panel meeting, paras. 68-83; United States' statement
at the second substantive panel meeting, paras. 74-76.
323Antigua's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
324Ibid.
325Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 73.

278. Antigua argues that the Panel acted inconsistent ly with its obligations under Article 11 of the
DSU because it "constructed the GATS Article XIV defence on behalf of the United States." 326 First,
with respect to Article XIV(a), Antigua cl aims that the United States identified only two interests
relating to "public morals" or "public order", name ly: (i) organized crime; and (ii) underage
gambling. Antigua argues that the Panel, however, identified an additional three concerns on its own
initiative: (i) money laundering327, (ii) fraud328, and (iii) public health.329 Secondly, Antigua contends
that the Panel erred in its analysis of the Unite d States' defence under the chapeau of Article XIV
because the United States' arguments assessed by the Panel were not taken from the United States'
submissions relating to Article XIV, but rather, fro m the United States' response to Antigua's national
treatment claim under Article XVII of the GATS.
279. In its appeal, the United States submits that it established its case that the Wire Act, the Travel
Act, and the IGBA are justified under Article XI V, but that the Panel improperly constructed a
rebuttal under the chapeau to that provision when Antigua itself had failed to do so. The United
States alleges, in particular, that the Panel di d so "by recycling evidence and argumentation that
Antigua had used to allege a national treatment violation under Article XVII as if those arguments had
been made in the context of the Article XIV chapeau."
330
280. We begin our analysis by referring to the Appellate Body's view that:
... nothing in the DSU limits the fa culty of a panel freely to use
arguments submitted by any of the parties - or to develop its own
legal reasoning - to support its own findings and conclusions on the
matter under its consideration.
331
281. However, a panel enjoys such discretion only with respect to specific claims that are properly
before it, for otherwise it would be considering a ma tter not within its jurisdiction. Moreover, when a
panel rules on a claim in the absence of evidence and supporting arguments, it acts inconsistently with
its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.332
282. In the context of affirmative defences, then, a responding party must invoke a defence and put
forward evidence and arguments in support of its assertion that the challenged measure satisfies the

326Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 80.
327Panel Report, paras. 6.499-6.505.
328Ibid., paras. 6.506-6.509.
329Ibid., paras. 6.510-6.514.
331Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 156. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Certain
EC Products, para. 123.
332Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 173.

requirements of the defence. When a responding pa rty fulfils this obligation, a panel may rule on
whether the challenged measure is justified under the relevant defence, relying on arguments
advanced by the parties or developing its own reasoning. The same applies to rebuttals. A panel may
not take upon itself to rebut the claim (or defence) where the responding party (or complaining party)
itself has not done so.
283. Turning to the issues on appeal, we begin with the three protected interests that the Panel
allegedly identified on its own in examining the United States' defence u nder paragraph (a) of
Article XIV, namely, health concerns, and combati ng money laundering and fra ud. In both its first
and second written submissions to the Panel, the Un ited States, in responding to one of Antigua's
claims under the GATS, identified five "concerns associated with the remote supply of gambling
[services]."
333 These "concerns" relate to: (1) organized crime 334; (2) money laundering 335;
(3) fraud336; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling 337; and (5) public health. 338 When
subsequently arguing that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are justified under
Article XIV(a), the United States explicitly refe rred back to the discussion, earlier in its second
written submission to the Panel, of all these interests except for that relating to public health.339
284. In other words, four of the five interests mentioned by the Panel were plainly discussed or
referred to by the United States as part of its de fence under Article XIV(a). The fifth interest—
relating to public health—was prominently identified by the United States in a previous discussion of
the protected interests relating to the remote suppl y of gambling services and, therefore, was not an
invention of the Panel. 340 In our view, the fact that this fifth interest was not explicitly raised again
in the context of the United States' Article XIV ar guments should not have precluded the Panel from

333United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 45.
334United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 10-11; United States' second written
submission to the Panel, paras. 46-49.
335United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 12-13; United States' second written
336United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 14-15; United States' second written
337United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 16-18; United States' second written
submission to the Panel, paras. 54-56.
338United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 19-21; United States' second written
submission to the Panel, paras. 52-53.
339See the United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 111 and footnote 139 thereto
(referring to the United States' second written submission, paras. 46-51); and para. 114 and footnote 143 thereto
(referring to the United States' second written submission, paras. 54-55).
340United States' first written submission to the Panel, Section III.A.4 ("Supply of gambling into private
homes, workplaces, and other environments creates additional health risks"); United States' second written
submission to the Panel, Section III.B.1.b.iv ("Remote gambling poses a greater and broader threat to human
health").

considering it as part of its analysis under Artic le XIV(a). We therefore dismiss this ground of
Antigua's appeal.
285. We turn now to the participants' arguments rela ting to the Panel's treatment of the burden of
proof in its analysis under the chapeau of Article XIV. Antigua had advanced a claim before the
Panel under Article XVII of the GATS, alleging th at the United States fails to accord to Antiguan
services and service suppliers, treatment no less fa vourable than that accorded to like domestic
services and service suppliers. 341 Throughout the panel proceedings, the United States disputed this
assertion, consistently arguing that United Stat es laws on gambling make no distinction between
domestic and foreign services, or between domestic and foreign service suppliers. 342 The Panel
exercised judicial economy with respect to Antigua's claim under Article XVII. 343 Nevertheless, in
the course of considering whether the Wire Act, th e Travel Act, and the IGBA satisfy the conditions
of the chapeau of Article XIV, the Panel examin ed arguments put by the parties in relation to
Antigua's Article XVII claim.344
286. On appeal, both participants contest the Panel's use of such arguments. Antigua contends that
the Panel's reliance on the United States' arguments on Article XVII demonstrates that the Panel
constructed a defence for the United States, whereas the United States points to the Panel's reliance on
Antigua's arguments on Article XVII as proof that the Panel improperly assumed Antigua's
responsibility to rebut the United States' defence.
287. In arguing its Article XIV defence before the Panel, the United States asserted that its
measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV because they do not discriminate at
all. In particular, the United States contended:

341Antigua's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 110-111, 117-118, 122-123, 125-128, and 188;
Antigua's second written submission to the Panel, para. 39 ; Antigua's statement at the first substantive panel
meeting, paras. 88-96; Antigua's statement at the second substantive panel meeting, paras. 61-67; Antigua's
response to Question 19 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, pp. C-45 to C-49.
342See, for example, United States' first written submission to the Panel, para. 102 ("relevant
restrictions on remote supply of gambling under U.S. la w, whether by Internet or other means, are based on
objective criteria that apply regardless of the national orig in of the service or servi ce supplier"); United States'
second written submission to the Panel, para. 61 ("As the United States has repeatedly pointed out, U.S.
restrictions on remote supply of gambling apply regardless of national origin"); United States' statement at the
first substantive panel meeting, para. 52 ("The United States again points out, as we have throughout this dispute
that U.S. restrictions applicable to Internet gambling and other forms of gambling services that Antiguan firms
seek to supply on a cross-border basis apply equally to those remote supply activities within the United
States."); United States' statement at the second subs tantive panel meeting, paras. 61-68; United States'
responses to Questions 19 and 21-22 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, pp. C-45 to C-49 and C-50 to C-51.
343Panel Report, para. 6.426.
344Ibid., para. 6.584. See also paras. 6.585-6.603.

The restrictions in [the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA] meet
the requirements of the chapeau. None of these measures introduces
any discrimination on the basis of nationality. On the contrary, as
the United States has repeatedly observed , they apply equally
regardless of national origin.
345 (emphasis added)
In our view, this statement by the United States, particularly the adverb "repeatedly", reflects an
intention to incorporate into its Article XIV defence its previous arguments relating to non-
discrimination in general, which we re made in response to Antigua's national treatment claim. We
therefore consider that the Panel did not err in referring to these arguments—originally made in the
context of Article XVII—in its Article XIV analysis.
288. With respect to Antigua's rebuttal of the arguments, we note that, contrary to the United
States' assertions, Antigua did contend that the thr ee federal statutes are applied in a discriminatory
manner and therefore fail to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV. In its opening
statement at the second substantive panel meeting, Antigua said:
Even were the United States to make out a provisional defence under
Article XIV, it is required to demonstrate that the three federal
statutes in question meet the additional requirements of the
"chapeau" of Article XIV. This is clearly not the case. … First, the
United States discriminates against Antigua services because they
cannot be supplied through distribution methods that are available for
the distribution of domestic services . This is an obvious
"unjustifiable discrimination".
346 (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
We consider that, in making this statement, An tigua effectively formulated an allegation of
discrimination, describing it as" clear[]" and "obvious". This must be understood as a reference to the
arguments that it had advanced in support of its na tional treatment claim. Accordingly, the Panel did
not err in evaluating, as part of its analysis under the chapeau to Article XI V, the extent to which
Antigua's arguments under Article XVII rebutted the defence advanced by the United States.
289. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not improperly assume the burden of constructing the
defence under Article XIV(a) for the United States. We also find that the Panel did not improperly
assume the burden of making a rebuttal to the United States' defence on behalf of Antigua.
290. Antigua also claims on appeal that the Pane l improperly constructed the defence for the
United States under paragraph (c) of Article XIV. Antigua argues that the United States "failed to

345United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 118.
346Antigua's statement at the second substantive panel meeting, para. 80.

sufficiently identify" 347 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (the "RICO
statute") as a law relevant to the Panel's examin ation of the challenged United States measures under
Article XIV(c). Antigua submits that the Panel shou ld therefore have refused to consider the RICO
statute in its assessment of the United States' Article XIV(c) defence. In the light of our analysis in
the next sub-section of this Report, it is not necessar y for us to determine whether the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the IGBA might also c onstitute measures falling under Article XIV(c). 348 In these
circumstances, we need not rule on Antigua's appeal relating to the Panel's treatment of the burden
of proof in its analysis under paragraph (c) of Article XIV.
C. The Panel's Substantive Analysis Under Article XIV
291. Article XIV of the GATS sets out the gene ral exceptions from obligations under that
Agreement in the same manner as does Article XX of the GATT 1994. Both of these provisions
affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these provisions even
if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other provisions of the
respective agreements, provided that all of the c onditions set out therein are satisfied. Similar
language is used in both provisions 349, notably the term "necessary" 350 and the requirements set out in
their respective chapeaux. Accordingly, like the Panel, we find previous decisions under Article XX
of the GATT 1994 relevant for our analysis under Article XIV of the GATS.351

347Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 121.
348Infra, para. 337.
349Notwithstanding the general similarity in language between the two provisions, we note that
Article XIV(a) of the GATS expressly enables Members to adopt measures "necessary to protect public morals
or to maintain public order", whereas the corresponding exception in the GATT 1994, Article XX(a), speaks of
measures "necessary to protect public morals". (emphasis added)
350See, for example, paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of Article XX of the GATT 1994:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
…
(d) necessary to secure compliance wi th laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enfo rcement, the enforcement of
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article
XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices.
351In this respect, we observe that this case is not only the first where the Appellate Body is called upon
to address the general exceptions provision of the GATS, but also the first under any of the covered agreements
where the Appellate Body is requested to address exceptions relating to "public morals".

292. Article XIV of the GATS, like Article XX of the GATT 1994, contemplates a "two-tier
analysis" of a measure that a Member seeks to justify under that provision.
352 A panel should first
determine whether the challenged measure falls w ithin the scope of one of the paragraphs of
Article XIV. This requires that the challenged measure address the particular interest specified in that
paragraph and that there be a sufficient nexus betw een the measure and the interest protected. The
required nexus—or "degree of connection"—between th e measure and the interest is specified in the
language of the paragraphs themse lves, through the use of terms su ch as "relating to" and "necessary
to".353 Where the challenged measure has been f ound to fall within one of the paragraphs of
Article XIV, a panel should then consider whethe r that measure satisfies the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XIV.
1. Justification of the Measures Under Paragraph (a) of Article XIV
293. Paragraph (a) of Article XIV covers:
... measures ... necessary to protect public morals or to maintain
public order. (footnote omitted)
294. In the first step of its analysis under this pr ovision, the Panel examined whether the measures
at issue—the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IG BA—are "designed" to protect public morals and to
maintain public order. 354 As a second step, the Panel dete rmined whether these measures are
"necessary" to protect public morals or to ma intain public order, within the meaning of
Article XIV(a).355 The Panel found that:
... the United States has not been able to provisionally justify, under
Article XIV(a) of the GATS, that the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when
read together with the relevant st ate laws) and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) are
necessary to protect public morals and/or public order within the
meaning of Article XIV(a). We, nonetheless, acknowledge that such
laws are designed so as to protect public morals or maintain public
order.
356 (footnotes omitted)
295. Our review of this conclusion proceeds in two pa rts. We address first Antigua's challenge to
the Panel's finding that the three federal statutes are "measures that are designed to 'protect public

352Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp , para. 147. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline ,
p. 22, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 20.
353Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 17-18, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 16.
354Panel Report, paras. 6.479-6.487.
355Ibid., paras. 6.488-6.534.
356Ibid., para. 6.535.

morals' and/or 'to maintain public order' in the United States within the meaning of Article XIV(a)."357
We then address the participants' respective challenges to the Panel' s finding that the three federal
statutes are not "necessary" to protect public morals and to maintain public order.
(a) "Measures … to protect public morals or to maintain public order"
296. In its analysis under Article XIV(a), the Panel found that "the term 'public morals' denotes
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation." 358 The
Panel further found that the definition of the term "o rder", read in conjunction with footnote 5 of the
GATS, "suggests that 'public order' refers to the prese rvation of the fundamental interests of a society,
as reflected in public policy and law." 359 The Panel then referred to Congressional reports and
testimony establishing that "the government of the Un ited States consider[s] [that the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the IGBA] were adopted to a ddress concerns such as those pertaining to money
laundering, organized crime, fraud, under age gambling and pathological gambling." 360 On this basis,
the Panel found that the three federal statutes are "measures that are designed to 'protect public
morals' and/or 'to maintain public order' within the meaning of Article XIV(a)."361
297. Antigua contests this finding on a rather lim ited ground, namely that the Panel failed to
determine whether the concerns identified by th e United States satisfy the standard set out in
footnote 5 to Article XIV(a) of the GATS, which reads:
[t]he public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine
and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental
interests of society.
298. We see no basis to conclude that the Panel fa iled to assess whether the standard set out in
footnote 5 had been satisfied. As Antigua acknowledges 362, the Panel expressly referred to footnote 5
in a way that demonstrated that it understood the requi rement therein to be part of the meaning given
to the term "public order". 363 Although " no further mention "364 was made in the Panel Report of
footnote 5 or of its text, this alone does not est ablish that the Panel failed to assess whether the
interests served by the three federal statutes satis fy the footnote's criteria. Having defined "public

357Panel Report, para. 6.487.
358Ibid., para. 6.465.
359Ibid., para. 6.467.
360Ibid., para. 6.486.
361Ibid., para. 6.487.
362Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 89.
363Panel Report, para. 6.467.
364Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 90. (original emphasis)

order" to include the standard in footnote 5, and th en applied that definition to the facts before it to
conclude that the measures "are designed to 'pro tect public morals' and/or 'to maintain public
order'"
365, the Panel was not required, in addition, to ma ke a separate, explicit determination that the
standard of footnote 5 had been met.
299. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6. 487 of the Panel Report, that "the
concerns which the Wire Act, the Travel Act a nd the Illegal Gambling Business Act seek to address
fall within the scope of 'public morals' and/or 'public order' under Article XIV(a)."
(b) The Requirement that a Measure be "Necessary" Under
Article XIV(a)
300. In the second part of its analysis under Article XIV(a), the Panel considered whether the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are "necessary" within the meaning of that provision. The Panel
found that the United States had not demonstrated the "necessity" of those measures.366
301. This finding rested on the Panel's determinations that: (i) "the interests and values protected
by [the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA] ser ve very important societal interests that can be
characterized as 'vital and important in the highest degree'" 367; (ii) the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and
the IGBA "must contribute, at least to some ex tent", to addressing the United States' concerns
"pertaining to money laundering, organized crim e, fraud, underage gambling and pathological
gambling"368; (iii) the measures in question "have a significant restrictive trade impact" 369; and
(iv) "[i]n rejecting Antigua's inv itation to engage in bilateral or multilateral consultations and/or
negotiations, the United States failed to pursue in goo d faith a course of action that could have been
used by it to explore the possibility of finding a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative."370

365Panel Report, para. 6.487.
366Ibid.
367Ibid., para. 6.492:
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear to us that the interests and values
protected by the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the
relevant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read
together with the relevant state laws) serve very important societal interests
that can be characterized as "vital and important in the highest degree" in a
similar way to the characterization of the protection of human life and health
against a life-threatening health risk by the Appellate Body in EC –
Asbestos. (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172)
368Ibid., para. 6.494.
369Ibid., para. 6.495.
370Ibid., para. 6.531.

302. Each of the participants appeals different asp ects of the analysis undertaken by the Panel in
determining whether the "necessity" requirement in Article XIV(a) was satisfied. According to
Antigua, the Panel failed to establish a sufficient "n exus" between gambling and the concerns raised
by the United States. 371 In addition, Antigua claims that th e Panel erroneously limited its discussion
of "reasonably available alternatives". In its app eal, the United States argues that the Panel departed
from the way in which "reasonably available alternat ive" measures have been examined in previous
disputes and erroneously imposed "a procedural requirement on the United States to consult or
negotiate with Antigua before the United States ma y take measures to protect public morals [or]
protect public order".372
303. We begin our analysis of this issue by ex amining the legal standard of "necessity" in
Article XIV(a) of the GATS. We then turn to the participants' appeals regarding the Panel's
interpretation and application of this requirement.
(i) Determining "necessity" under Article XIV(a)
304. We note, at the outset, that the standard of "necessity" provided for in the general exceptions
provision is an objective standard. To be sure, a Member's characterization of a measure's objectives
and of the effectiveness of its regulatory approach —as evidenced, for example, by texts of statutes,
legislative history, and pronouncem ents of government agencies or officials—will be relevant in
determining whether the measure is, objectively, "necessary". A panel is not bound by these
characterizations373, however, and may also find guidance in the structure and operation of the
measure and in contrary evidence proffered by the co mplaining party. In any event, a panel must, on
the basis of the evidence in th e record, independently and objectively assess the "necessity" of the
measure before it.
305. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the Appellate Body stated, in the context of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, that whether a measure is "necessary" should be determined
through "a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors". 374 The Appellate Body
characterized this process as one:

371Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 97.
373Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 66.
374Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.

... comprehended in the determinati on of whether a WTO-consistent
alternative measure which the Me mber concerned could "reasonably
be expected to employ" is available, or whether a less WTO-
inconsistent measure is "reasonably available".
375
306. The process begins with an assessment of the "rel ative importance" of the interests or values
furthered by the challenged measure. 376 Having ascertained the importance of the particular interests
at stake, a panel should then turn to the other f actors that are to be "weighed and balanced". The
Appellate Body has pointed to two factors that, in most cases, will be relevant to a panel's
determination of the "necessity" of a measure, a lthough not necessarily exhaustive of factors that
might be considered. 377 One factor is the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends
pursued by it; the other factor is the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.
307. A comparison between the challenged measur e and possible alternatives should then be
undertaken, and the results of such comparison should be considered in the light of the importance of
the interests at issue. It is on the basis of this "weighing and balancing" and comparison of measures,
taking into account the interests or values at stak e, that a panel determines whether a measure is
"necessary" or, alternatively, whether another, WTO-consistent measure is "reasonably available".378
308. The requirement, under Article XIV(a), that a measu re be "necessary"—that is, that there be
no "reasonably available", WTO-consistent altern ative—reflects the shared understanding of
Members that substantive GATS obligations should not be deviated from lightly. An alternative
measure may be found not to be "r easonably available", however, where it is merely theoretical in
nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure
imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical
difficulties. Moreover, a "reasonably available" a lternative measure must be a measure that would
preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to
the objective pursued under paragraph (a) of Article XIV.379
309. It is well-established that a responding party invoking an affirmative defence bears the burden
of demonstrating that its measure, found to be WTO-inconsistent, satisfies the requirements of the

375Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 166.
377Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.
378Ibid., para. 166.
379Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 172-174. See also Appellate Body Report, Korea –

invoked defence.380 In the context of Article XIV(a), this means that the responding party must show
that its measure is "necessary" to achieve objectives re lating to public morals or public order. In our
view, however, it is not the responding party's burden to show, in the first instance, that there are no
reasonably available alternatives to achieve its objec tives. In particular, a responding party need not
identify the universe of less trade -restrictive alternative measures a nd then show that none of those
measures achieves the desired objective. The WTO agreements do not contemplate such an
impracticable and, indeed, often impossible burden.
310. Rather, it is for a responding party to make a prima facie case that its measure is "necessary"
by putting forward evidence and arguments that enable a panel to assess the challenged measure in the
light of the relevant factors to be "weighed and balanced" in a given case. The responding party may,
in so doing, point out why alternative measure s would not achieve the same objectives as the
challenged measure, but it is under no obligation to do so in order to establish, in the first instance,
that its measure is "necessary". If the pane l concludes that the respondent has made a prima facie
case that the challenged measure is "necessary"—that is, "significantly closer to the pole of
'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution to'" 381—then a panel should
find that challenged measure "necessary" within the terms of Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
311. If, however, the complaining party raises a WTO- consistent alternative measure that, in its
view, the responding party should have taken, the responding party will be required to demonstrate
why its challenged measure nevertheless remains "necess ary" in the light of that alternative or, in
other words, why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, "reasonably available". If a responding party
demonstrates that the alternative is not "reasonably av ailable", in the light of the interests or values
being pursued and the party's desired level of prot ection, it follows that the challenged measure must
be "necessary" within the terms of Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
(ii) Did the Panel err in its analysis of the "necessity" of the
measures at issue?
312. In considering whether the United States' measu res are "necessary" under Article XIV(a) of
the GATS, the Panel began by considering the factors set out by the Appellate Body in Korea –
Various Measures on Beef as they apply to the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. Antigua
claims that the Panel erred in concluding, in the c ourse of its analysis of these factors, that the three
federal statutes contribute to protecting the interests raised by the United States.

380Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline , pp. 22-23, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 21; Appellate Body Report,
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 15-16, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 337; Appellate Body Report, US – FSC
(Article 21.5 – EC), para. 133.
381Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161.

313. The Panel set out, in some detail, how the United States' evidence established a specific
connection between the remote supply of gambling se rvices and each of the interests identified by the
United States
382, except for organized crime.383 In particular, the Panel found such a link in relation to
money laundering384, fraud385, compulsive gambling 386, and underage gambling. 387 Considering that
the three federal statutes embody an outright prohibition on the remote supply of gambling services388,
we see no error in the Panel's approach, nor in its fi nding, in paragraph 6.494 of the Panel Report, that
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA "must contribute" to addressing those concerns. 389
314. In addition, the United States and Antigua each appeals different aspects of the Panel's
selection of alternative measures to compare with th e Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. The
United States argues that the Panel erred in examining the one alternative measure that it did consider,
and Antigua contends that the Panel erred in failing to consider additional alternative measures.
315. In its "necessity" analysis under Article XIV(a) , the Panel appeared to understand that, in
order for a measure to be accepted as "necessary" under Article XIV(a), the responding Member must
have first " explored and exhausted " all reasonably available WTO-compatible alternatives before
adopting its WTO-inconsistent measure. 390 This understanding led the Pane l to conclude that, in this
case, the United States had "an obligation to cons ult with Antigua before and while imposing its
prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services". 391 Because the Panel found
that the United States had not engaged in such cons ultations with Antigua, the Panel also found that

382Panel Report, paras. 6.498-6.520.
383The Panel found that the United States had not submitted "concrete evidence" showing the
particular vulnerability of the remote supply of gambling services to involvement by organized crime.
Therefore, the Panel concluded, the United States ha d not demonstrated why the means used to regulate non-
remote supply of gambling services could not sufficiently guard against the risk of organized crime. (Panel
Report, para. 6.520)
384Panel Report, paras. 6.500-6.504.
385Ibid., paras. 6.507 and 6.508.
386Ibid., paras. 6.511-6.513.
387Ibid., paras. 6.516-6.518.
388Supra, paras. 258-263.
389The Appellate Body employed similar reasoning with respect to a prohibition on the import of
products containing asbestos. See Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 168:
By prohibiting all forms of amphibole asbestos, and by severely restricting
the use of chrysotile asbestos, the measure at issue is clearly designed and
apt to achieve that level of health protection.
390Panel Report, para. 6.528. (emphasis added) See also paras. 6.496, 6.522, and 6.534.
391Ibid., para. 6.531. See also para. 6.534.

the United States had not established that its measur es are "necessary" and, therefore, provisionally
justified under Article XIV(a).392
316. In its appeal of this finding, the United States argues that "[t]he Panel relied on the 'necessity'
test in Article XIV as the basis for imposing a procedural requirement on the United States to consult
or negotiate with Antigua before the United States may take measures to protect public morals [or]
protect public order".
393 The United States submits that the requirement in Article XIV(a) that a
measure be "necessary" indicates that "necessity is a property of the measure itself" and, as such,
"necessity" cannot be determined by reference to the efforts undertaken by a Member to negotiate an
alternative measure.394 The United States further argues that in previous disputes, the availability of
alternative measures that were "merely theoreti cal" did not preclude the challenged measures from
being deemed to be "necessary". 395 Similarly, the United States ar gues, the fact that measures might
theoretically be available after engaging in c onsultations with Antigua does not preclude the
"necessity" of the three federal statutes.
317. In our view, the Panel's "necessity" analysis was flawed because it did not focus on an
alternative measure that was reasonably available to the United States to achieve the stated objectives
regarding the protection of public morals or the maintenance of public order. Engaging in
consultations with Antigua, with a view to arriving at a negotiated settlement that achieves the same
objectives as the challenged United States' measures, w as not an appropriate alternative for the Panel
to consider because consultations are by definition a process, the results of which are uncertain and
therefore not capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case.
318. We note, in addition, that the Panel based its requirement of consulta tions, in part, on "the
existence of [a] specific market access commit ment [in the United States' GATS Schedule] with
respect to cross-border trade of gambling and betting services".396 We do not see how the existence of
a specific commitment in a Member's Schedule aff ects the "necessity" of a measure in terms of the
protection of public morals or the maintenance of public order. For this reason as well, the Panel
erred in relying on consultations as an alternative measure reasonably available to the United States.
319. We turn now to Antigua's allegation that th e Panel improperly limite d its examination of
possible alternative measures against which to compar e the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.
Antigua claims that the Panel "erred in limiting" its search for alternatives to the universe of existing

392Panel Report, paras. 6.533-6.535.
394Ibid., para. 142.
395Ibid., para. 152.
396Panel Report, para. 6.531.

United States regulatory measures.
397 Antigua also alleges that the Panel erred by examining only
those measures that had been explicitly identified by Antigua even though "Antigua was never given
the opportunity to properly rebut the Article XIV defence."398
320. We observe, first, that the Panel did not state that it was limiting its search for alternatives in
the manner alleged by Antigua. Secondly, although the Panel began its analysis of alternative
measures by considering whether the United States already employs measures less restrictive than a
prohibition to achieve the same objectives as the three federal statutes 399, its inquiry did not end there.
The Panel obviously did consider alternatives not currently in place in the United States, as
evidenced by its (ultimately erroneous) emphasis on the United States' alleged failure to pursue
consultations with Antigua. 400 Finally, we do not see why the Panel should have been expected to
continue its analysis into additional alternative m easures, which Antigua itself failed to identify. As
we said above 401, it is not for the responding party to identify the universe of alternative measures
against which its own measure should be compared. It is only if such an alternative is raised that this
comparison is required. 402 We therefore dismiss this aspect of Antigua's appeal.
321. In our analysis above, we found that the Panel erred in assessing the necessity of the three
United States statutes against the possibility of consultations with Antigua because such consultations,
in our view, cannot qualify as a reasonably availabl e alternative measure with which a challenged
measure should be compared. 403 For this reason, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.535
of the Panel Report, that, because the United States did not enter into consultations with Antigua:

397Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 103.
398Ibid., para. 104.
399See Panel Report, paras. 6.497-6.498. This type of approach was expressly encouraged by the
Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 172:
The application by a Member of WTO- compatible enforcement measures
to the same kind of illegal behaviour – the passing off of one product for
another – for like or at least similar products, provides a suggestive
indication that an alternative measure which could "reasonably be expected"
to be employed may well be available. The application of such measures for
the control of the same illegal behaviour for like, or at least similar, products
raises doubts with respect to the objective necessity of a different, much
stricter, and WTO-inconsistent enforcement measure. (original emphasis)
400Supra, paras. 315-318.
401Supra, para. 309.
402Supra, paras. 310-311.
403Supra, para. 317.

... the United States has not been able to provisionally justify, under
Article XIV(a) of the GATS, that the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when
read together with the relevant st ate laws) and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) are
necessary to protect public morals and/or public order within the
meaning of Article XIV(a).
322. Having reversed this finding, we must cons ider whether, as the United States contends
404, the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are pr operly characterized as "necessary" to achieve the
objectives identified by the United States and accepted by the Panel. The Panel's analysis, as well as
the factual findings contained therein, are useful for our assessment of whether these measures satisfy
the requirements of paragraph (a) of Article XIV.
323. As we stated above, a responding party must make a prima facie case that its challenged
measure is "necessary". A Panel determines whether this case is made through the identification, and
weighing and balancing, of relevant factors, such as those in Korea – Various Measures on Beef ,
with respect to the measure challenged. In this rega rd, we note that the Panel: (i) found that the three
federal statutes protect "very important societal interests" 405; (ii) observed that "strict controls may be
needed to protect [such] interests" 406; and (iii) found that the three federal statutes contribute to the
realization of the ends that they pursue. 407 Although the Panel recognized the "significant restrictive
trade impact" 408 of the three federal statutes, it expressly tempered this recognition with a detailed
explanation of certain characteristics of, and concer ns specific to, the remote supply of gambling and
betting services. These included: (i) "the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling
transactions"409; (ii) the "virtual anonymity of such transactions" 410; (iii) "low barriers to entry in the
context of the remote supply of gambling and betting services" 411; and the (iv) "isolated and
anonymous environment in which such gambling takes place". 412 Thus, this analysis reveals that the
Panel did not place much weight, in the circumstances of this case, on the restrictive trade impact of
the three federal statutes. On the contrary, the Panel appears to have accepted virtually all of the

405Panel Report, paras. 6.492 and 6.533.
406Ibid., para. 6.493.
407Ibid., para. 6.494.
408Ibid., para para. 6.495.
409Ibid., para. 6.505.
410Ibid.
411Ibid., para. 6.507.
412Ibid., para. 6.514.

elements upon which the United States based its assertion that the three federal statutes are
"indispensable".
413
324. The Panel further, and in our view, tellingly, stated that
... the United States has legitimate spec ific concerns with respect to
money laundering, fraud, health and underage gambling that are
specific to the remote supply of gambling and betting services, which
suggests that the measures in qu estion are "necessary" within the
meaning of Article XIV(a). 414 (emphasis added)
325. From all of the above, and in particular from the summary of its analysis made in
paragraphs 6.533 and 6.534 of the Panel Report, we understand the Panel to have acknowledged that,
 but for the United States' alleged refusal to accept An tigua's invitation to negotiate, the Panel would
have found that the United States had made its prima facie case that the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the IGBA are "necessary", within the meaning of Article XIV(a). We thus agree with the United
States that the "sole basis" for the Panel's conclusi on to the contrary was its finding relating to the
requirement of consultations with Antigua.415
326. Turning to the Panel's analysis of alternative measures, we observe that the Panel dismissed,
as irrelevant to its analysis, measures that did not take account of the specific concerns associated with
 remote gambling.416 We found above that the Panel erred in finding that consultations with Antigua
constitutes a measure reasonably available to the United States. 417 Antigua raised no other measure
that, in the view of the Panel, could be consider ed an alternative to the prohibitions on remote
gambling contained in the Wire Act, the Travel Ac t, and the IGBA. In our opinion, therefore, the
record before us reveals no reasonably availabl e alternative measure proposed by Antigua or
examined by the Panel that would establish that th e three federal statutes are not "necessary" within
the meaning of Article XIV(a). Because the United States made its prima facie case of "necessity",
and Antigua failed to identify a reasonably availabl e alternative measure, we conclude that the United
States demonstrated that its statutes are "necessary" , and therefore justified, under paragraph (a) of
Article XIV.

413Panel Report, para. 6.534.
414Ibid., para. 6.533.
416Panel Report, paras. 6.497-6.498.
417Supra, para. 317.

327. For all these reasons, we find that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are "measures
... necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order", within the meaning of paragraph (a)
of Article XIV of the GATS.418
(c) Allegations of Error Under Article 11 of the DSU
328. Antigua and the United States also challenge several aspects of the Panel's analysis under
Article XIV(a) as inconsistent with a panel's duty, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, to "make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, includ ing an objective assessment of the facts of the
case".
329. In several instances, Antigua claims that the Panel failed to comply with Article 11 of the
DSU because the Panel relied solely or primar ily on evidence submitted by the United States,
including statements of United States officials and the United States Congress, without taking into
consideration contrary evidence submitted by Antigua.
419 Antigua's arguments in this respect rely on
the fact that the Panel did not discuss or menti on certain pieces of evidence submitted by Antigua.
Although Antigua alleges an " unobjective assessment of Antiguan evidence" 420, it provides no
examples or arguments in support of this assertion to establish that the Panel somehow exceeded its
discretion.
330. As the Appellate Body has pointed out on several occasions:
Determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to
(that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and
parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the
discretion of a panel as the trier of facts.
 421
As a result, unless a panel "has exceeded the bounds of its discretion ... in its appreciation of the
evidence"422, the Appellate Body will not interfere with the findings of the panel.423
331. Antigua's arguments on this issue appear to us to amount to mere disagreement with the
Panel's exercise of discretion in selecting which evidence to rely on when making its findings. This is

418We address in the next sub-section of this Report the appeals raised by Antigua and the United States
under Article 11 of the DSU, with re spect to the Panel's analysis under Ar ticle XIV(a) of the GATS, and find
them to be either without merit or not necessary to rule on in order to resolve this dispute.
419Antigua's other appellant's submission, paras. 107-110 and 113-118.
420Ibid., para. 113. (emphasis added)
422Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten , para. 151. See also Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 181.
423Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 221 (referring in footnote to Appellate Body Report,
EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 170, and Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 142).

not a basis on which we may conclude, on appeal, that the Panel failed to make an "objective
assessment of the facts of the case".
332. Antigua additionally contends that the Panel act ed inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU
because it undertook no assessment of factual evidence relating specifically to Antiguan gambling
and betting services when evaluating whether the Wi re Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are
"necessary". To determine whether the statutes at issue are "necessary" under Article XIV(a), the
Panel was called upon to assess the relationship be tween, on the one hand, the United States'
restrictions on the remote supply of gambling, and, on the other hand, the "public moral"/"public
order" interests identified by the United States as the reasons for the restrictions contained in the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. The United States did not explicitly identify either the source of
supply or the foreign nature of the supply of gambling and betting services as a relevant concern. In
other words, the evidence put before the Panel by the United States s uggests that the nexus is with the
remote supply of gambling services, regardless of its source or the national origin of the suppliers.
Moreover, the statutes at issue make no distinction on their face as to gambling services from different
origins; the Panel found simply that the statutes prohibit the remote supply of gambling and betting
services.
424 As a result, there was no need for the Pane l to have analyzed evidence relating to the
supply of gambling services specifically from Antigua, and we see no error in the Panel's decision
not to make an assessment of the Antiguan industry.
333. The United States appeals, under Article 11 of th e DSU, the Panel's factual finding that the
United States rejected Antigua's invitation to enga ge in consultations to explore means by which
Antiguan gambling service suppliers might provide their services without contributing to the concerns
identified by the United States. 425 We have already found that th e Panel erred in concluding that
consultations were required in order for the three federal statutes to be considered "necessary" under
Article XIV(a). Therefore, in resolving this dispute, we need not rule on this claim on appeal.
334. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not fail to "make an objective assessment of the facts of
the case", as required by Article 11 of the DSU, with respect to its analysis under Article XIV(a) of
the GATS.

424Panel Report, paras. 6.361-6.362, 6.367, and 6.375. See also supra, para. 258-263.
425United States' appellant's submission, paras. 171-175.

2. Justification of the Measures Under Paragraph (c) of Article XIV
335. The Panel found, in paragraph 6.565 of the Panel Report, that:
... the United States has not been able to provisionally justify that the
Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together
with the relevant state laws) are necessary within the meaning of
Article XIV(c) of GATS to secure compliance with the RICO statute
… . (footnotes omitted)
336. The United States appeals this finding on the same grounds that it appeals the Panel's finding
that the United States had not established that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are within
the scope of Article XIV(a). The Panel's finding under Article XIV(c) rests on the same basis as its
finding under Article XIV(a), namely that the measures are not "necessary" because, in failing to
engage in consultations with An tigua, the United States failed to e xplore and exhaust all reasonably
available alternative measures. Given that we ha ve reversed this finding under Article XIV(a), we
also reverse the Panel's finding in paragraph 6.565 of the Panel Report on the same ground.
337. The United States requests us to complete the anal ysis and find that the Wire Act, the Travel
Act, and the IGBA are "necessary", within the meani ng of Article XIV(c), to secure compliance with
the RICO statute. We found in the previous section of this Report that the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the IGBA fall under para graph (a) of Article XIV. As a result, it is not necessary for us to
determine whether these measures are also justified under paragraph (c) of Article XIV.
3. The Chapeau of Article XIV

338. Notwithstanding its finding that the measures at issue are not provisionally justified, the
Panel examined whether those measures satisfy the re quirements of the chapeau of Article XIV "so as
to assist the parties in resolving the underlying dispute in this case."426 This examination is the subject
of appeals by both participants. Unlike the Panel, we have found the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and
the IGBA to fall within the scope of Article XIV( a). Therefore, we must now review the Panel's
examination under the chapeau.
339. The chapeau of Article XIV provides:

426Panel Report, para. 6.566.

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a mean s of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures [of the type specified in the subsequent
paragraphs of Article XIV]....
The focus of the chapeau, by its express terms, is on the application of a measure already found by
the Panel to be inconsistent with one of the ob ligations under the GATS but falling within one of the
paragraphs of Article XIV.
427 By requiring that the measure be applied in a manner that does not to
constitute "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination, or a "disguised restriction on trade in services",
the chapeau serves to ensure that Members' right s to avail themselves of exceptions are exercised
reasonably, so as not to frustrate the rights accorded other Members by the substantive rules of the
GATS.428
340. The Panel found that:
... the United States has not demonstrated that it does not apply its
prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse
racing in a manner that does not constitute "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on trade" in accordance with
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
429
341. In reviewing the Panel's treatment of the chap eau to Article XIV, we begin with Antigua's
allegations of error, and then turn to those raised by the United States, proceeding as follows: (a) first,
we examine Antigua's claim that the Panel should not have analyzed the United States' defence under
the chapeau; (b) secondly, we an alyze Antigua's allegation that the Panel erred by focusing its
discussion under the chapeau on the remote supply of gambling services rather than on the entire
gambling industry; (c) thirdly, we address the Unite d States' argument that the Panel articulated and
applied a standard under the chapeau that is inconsis tent with its terms; (d) fourthly, we review the
Panel's finding on the alleged non-enforcement of certa in laws against United States remote suppliers
of gambling services; and (e) finally, we examine whether, in its analysis under the chapeau of
Article XIV, the Panel fulfilled its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.

427Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 20.
428Ibid., p. 22, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 20-21.
429Panel Report, para. 6.608.

(a) Did the Panel Err in Making Findings Under the Chapeau of
Article XIV?
342. In deciding to assess whether the measures satis fied the requirements of the chapeau, the
Panel explained that, even though such an examinat ion was "not necessary", it wanted "to assist the
parties in resolving the underlying dispute in this case." 430 Antigua alleges that the Panel acted
inconsistently with the Appellate Body's decision in Korea – Various Measures on Beef in
determining whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA meet the requirements of the
chapeau after having found that they are were not provisionally justified.
343. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body stated, with respect to Article XX
of the GATT 1994, that:
Having found that the dual retail system did not fulfil the
requirements of paragraph (d), the Panel correctly considered that it
did not need to proceed to the second-tier analysis, that is, to examine
the application in this case of the requirements of the introductory
clause of Article XX.
431
Contrary to Antigua's submission 432, this statement does not impose a requirement on panels to stop
evaluating a responding party's defence once they have determined that a challenged measure is not
provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of the general exception provision.
344. Provided that it complies with its duty to asses s a matter objectively, a panel enjoys the
freedom to decide which legal issues it must address in order to resolve a dispute. 433 Moreover, in
some instances, a panel's decision to continue its legal analysis and to make factual findings beyond
those that are strictly necessary to resolve the dis pute may assist the Appellate Body should it later be
called upon to complete the analysis434, as, for example, in this case.
345. Therefore, the Panel did not err in examining wh ether the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
IGBA meet the requirements of the chapeau of Ar ticle XIV, even though the Panel had found these
measures not to fall within the scope of Article XIV(a) or XIV(c).

430Panel Report, para. 6.566.
431Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 156.
432Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 141.
433Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 87; Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts
and Blouses, p. 19, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 340; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 114.
434Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 118.

(b) Did the Panel Improperly "Segment" the Gambling and Betting
Industry in its Analysis?
346. In examining whether discrimination exists in th e United States' application of the Wire Act,
the Travel Act, and the IGBA, the Panel found th at "some of the concerns the United States has
identified are specific only to the remote supply of gambling and betting services."
435 As a result, the
Panel determined that it would ha ve been "inappropriate", in the context of determining whether
WTO-consistent alternative measures are reasonably available, to compare the United States'
treatment of concerns relating to the remote supply of gambling services, with its treatment of
concerns relating to the non-remote supply of such services. An tigua characterizes this approach as
an improper "segment[ation]" of the gambling indu stry, the result of which was to "exclude[] a
substantial portion of gambling and betting services from any analysis at all."
436
347. We have already observed that the Panel found, on the basis of evidence adduced by the
United States, that the remote supply of gambling services gives rise to particular concerns. 437 We
see no error in the Panel's maintaining such a dis tinction for purposes of analyzing any discrimination
in the application of the three federal statutes. Su ch an approach merely reflects the view that the
distinctive characteristics of the remote s upply of gambling services may call for distinctive
regulatory methods, and that this could render a comparison between the treatment of remote and non-
remote supply of gambling services inappropriate.
(c) Did the Panel Fail to Take Account of the "Arbitrary" or
"Unjustifiable" Nature of the Discrimination Referred to in the
Chapeau?
348. We consider next whether, contrary to the United States' allegations, the Panel accurately
described and applied the correct interpretation of th e chapeau of Article XIV. On the basis of the
arguments advanced by Antigua, the Panel examined certain instances of alleged discrimination in the
application of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.
438 In the course of this analysis, the Panel
found that the United States had not prosecuted cer tain domestic remote suppliers of gambling
services439, and that a United States statute (the Interstate Horseracing Act) could be understood, on its

435Panel Report, para. 6.498.
436Antigua's other appellant's submission, para. 142.
437Supra, para. 313.
438Panel Report, para. 6.584.
439Ibid., para. 6.588.

face, to permit certain types of remote betting on horseracing within the United States.440 On the basis
of these two findings, the Panel concluded that:
... the United States has not demonstrated that it applies its
prohibition on the remote supply of these services in a consistent
manner as between those supplied domestically and those that are
supplied from other Members. Accordingly, we believe that the
United States has not demonstrated that it does not apply its
prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse
racing in a manner that does not constitute "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on trade" in accordance with
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
441 (emphasis added)
349. The United States contends that the Panel's reasoning, in particular its standard of
"consistency", reveals that the Panel, in fact, assessed only whether the United States treats domestic
service suppliers differently from foreign service supp liers. Such an assessment is inadequate, the
United States argues, because the ch apeau also requires a determination of whether differential
treatment, or discrimination, is "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable".
350. The United States based its defence under the chapeau of Article XIV on the assertion that the
measures at issue prohibit the remote supply of gambling and betting services by any supplier ,
whether domestic or foreign. In other words, the United States sought to justify the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the IGBA on the basis that there is no discrimination in the manner in which the
three federal statutes are applied to the remote supply of gambling and betting services. 442 The United
States could have, but did not, put forward an additional argument that even if such discrimination
exists, it does not rise to the level of "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination.
351. In the light of the arguments before it, we do not read the Panel to have ignored the
requirement of "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discr imination by articulating the standard under the

440Panel Report, para. 6.599:
... the text of the revised statute does ap pear, on its face, to permit interstate
pari-mutuel wagering over the telephone or other modes of electronic
communication, which presumably would include the Internet, as long as
such wagering is legal in both states.
441Ibid., para. 6.607.
442Supra, para. 287.

chapeau of Article XIV as one of "consistency".
443 Rather, the Panel determined that Antigua had
rebutted the United States' claim of no discrimination at all by showing that domestic service
suppliers are permitted to provide remote gambling services in situations where foreign service
suppliers are not so permitted. We see no error in the Panel's approach.
(d) Did the Panel Err in its Examination of the Alleged Non-
Enforcement of the Measures at Issue Against Domestic Service
Suppliers?
352. In the course of examining whether the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are applied
consistently with the chapeau of Article XIV, the Pa nel considered whether these laws are enforced in
a manner that discriminates betwee n domestic and foreign service supp liers. Antigua identified four
United States firms that it claimed engage in th e remote supply of gambling services but have not
been prosecuted under any of the three federa l statutes: Youbet.com, TVG, Capital OTB,
and Xpressbet.com.
444 Antigua contrasted this lack of enforcement with the case of an Antiguan
service supplier that "had modelled [its] business on that of Capital OTB" but was nevertheless
prosecuted and convicted under the Wire Act. 445 In support of its argument that it applies these
statutes equally to domestic and foreign service suppliers, the United States submitted statistical
evidence to show that most cases prosecuted under these statutes involved gambling and betting
services solely within the United States.446
353. The Panel also "note[d] indications by the Un ited States" that prosecution proceedings were
pending against one domestic remote supplier of gambling services (Youbet.com), but stated that it
had no evidence as to whether any enforcement ac tion was being taken against the other three
domestic remote suppliers of gambling services identified by Antigua. 447 As to foreign service
suppliers, the Panel observed that it had evidence of the prosecution of one Antiguan operator for

443See Panel Report, paras. 6.578-6.581, where the Panel discusses Appellate Body decisions relating to
the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. In particular, we note the Panel's quotation of the relevant
portion of paragraph 150 of the Appellate Body decision in US – Shrimp, which states:
[under the chapeau, first,] the appli cation of the measure must result in
discrimination. As we stated in United States – Gasoline , the nature and
quality of this discrimination is different from the discrimination in the
treatment of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one
of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, III
or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in
character. (original emphasis; footnote omitted)
444Ibid., para. 6.585.
445Ibid., para. 6.585.
446Ibid., para. 6.586.
447Ibid., para. 6.588.

violations of the Wire Act. 448 The Panel found this evidence "inconclusive" and concluded that the
United States had not shown that it enforces its prohibition against the remote supply of gambling
services on the three domestic service suppliers in a manner consistent with the chapeau of
Article XIV.449
354. We observe, first, that none of the three fede ral statutes distinguishes, on its face, between
domestic and foreign service suppliers. 450 We agree with the Panel that, in the context of facially
neutral measures, there may nevertheless be situations where the selective prosecution of persons rises
to the level of discrimination. In our view, howev er, the evidence before the Panel could not justify
finding that, notwithstanding the neutral language of the statute, the facts are "inconclusive" to
establish "non-discrimination" in the United States' enforcement of the Wire Act. The Panel's
conclusion rests, not only on an inadequate ev identiary foundation, but also on an incorrect
understanding of the type of conduct that can, as a ma tter of law, be characterized as discrimination in
the enforcement of measures.
355. In this case, the Panel came to its conclusi on—that the United States failed to establish non-
discrimination in the enforcement of its laws—on the basis of only five cases: one case of
prosecution against a foreign service supplier; one case of "pending" prosecution against a domestic
service supplier
451; and three cases with no evidence of prosecution against domestic service
suppliers. From these five cases, the Panel in e ffect concluded that the United States' defence had
been sufficiently rebutted to warrant a finding of "inconclusiveness".
356. In our view, the proper significance to be attached to isolated instances of enforcement, or
lack thereof, cannot be determined in the absence of evidence allowing such instances to be placed in
their proper context. Such evid ence might include evidence on the overall number of suppliers, and
on patterns of enforcement, and on the reasons for par ticular instances of non-enforcement. Indeed,
enforcement agencies may refrain from prosecuti on in many instances for reasons unrelated to
discriminatory intent and without discriminatory effect.
357. Faced with the limited evidence the parties put before it with respect to enforcement, the
Panel should rather have focused, as a matter of law, on the wording of the measures at issue. These
measures, on their face, do not discriminate between United States a nd foreign suppliers of remote

448Panel Report, para. 6.588.
449Ibid., para. 6.589.
450Supra, paras. 258-263.
451Panel Report, para. 6.588.

gambling services.
452 We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.589 of the Panel
Report, that
... the United States has failed to demonstrate that the manner in
which it enforced its prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
and betting services against TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com is
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau.
(e) Did the Panel Fail to Comply with Article 11 of the DSU in its
Analysis of Video Lottery Termin als, Nevada Bookmakers, and the
Interstate Horseracing Act?
358. The United States and Antigua each alleges that th e Panel did not comply with its obligations
under Article 11 of the DSU in its analysis under th e chapeau of Article XIV. We examine first
Antigua's appeal relating to video lottery termin als and Nevada bookmakers, and then consider the
United States' appeal concerning the Interstate Horseracing Act.
359. The Panel examined Antigua's allegations that several states in the United States permit video
lottery terminals453, and that Nevada permits bookmakers to o ffer their services over the internet and
telephone.454 The Panel rejected both of these allegations . Antigua contends that the Panel made
these findings notwithstanding that Antigua had submitted evidence and the United States had
submitted none, and that, by so finding, the Panel effectively "reversed" the burden of proof.
455
360. Antigua is correct that the burden of proof is on the United States, as the responding party
invoking the Article XIV defence. Once the Unit ed States established its defence with sufficient
evidence and arguments, however, it was for An tigua to rebut the United States' defence. 456 I n
rejecting Antigua's allegations relating to vide o lottery terminals and Nevada bookmakers, we
understand the Panel to have dete rmined that Antigua failed to rebut the United States' asserted
defence under the chapeau, namely that its measures do not discriminate at all. Consequently, we do
not read the Panel to have reversed the burden of proof in these two instances, and we dismiss this
ground of Antigua's appeal.

452Supra, paras. 258-263.
453Panel Report, paras. 6.590-6.594.
454Ibid., paras. 6.601-6.603.
455Antigua's other appellant's submission, paras. 144-145.
456See supra, para. 282.

361. We now turn to the United States' Article 11 claim relating to the chapeau. The Panel
examined the scope of application of the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA"). 457 Before the Panel,
Antigua relied on the text of the IHA, which pr ovides that "[a]n interstate off-track wager may be
accepted by an off-track betting system" where consent is obtained from certain organizations. 458
Antigua referred the Panel in particular to the defi nition given in the statute of "interstate off-track
wager":
[T]he term ... 'interstate off-track wager' means a legal wager placed
or accepted in one State with respect to the outcome of a horserace
taking place in another State and includes pari-mutuel wagers, where
lawful in each State involved, placed or transmitted by an individual
in one State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted by
an off-track betting system in the same or another State , as well as
the combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools.
459 (emphasis
added)
Thus, according to Antigua, the IHA, on its face, authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not
 foreign service suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation to certain horse races. 460 To this
extent, in Antigua's view, the IHA "exempts" 461 domestic service suppliers from the prohibitions of
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.462
362. The United States disagreed, claiming that the IHA—a civil statute—cannot "repeal" 463 the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, or the IGBA—which are criminal statutes— by implication, that is, merely

457We understand the Panel to have predicated its exam ination of the IHA on its view that the services
under the IHA include services subject to the specific commitment undertaken by the United States in subsector
10.D of its Schedule.
458Section 3004 of Title 15 of the United States Code, Exhibit AB-82 submitted by Antigua to the
Panel. (emphasis added)
459Section 3002 of Title 15 of the United States Code, Exhibit AB-82 submitted by Antigua to the
Panel.
460Antigua submitted additional evidence in support of its reading of the IHA. See, for example, Panel
Report, footnote 1061 to para. 6.599 and footnote 1062 to para. 6.600 (citing, inter alia, Congressional Record,
House of Representatives Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, Second Session (26 October 2000)
146 Cong. Rec. H 11230, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess. (2000), Exhibit AB-124 submitted by Antigua to the Panel);
and United States General Accounting Office, Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues (December 2002),
Appendix II, Exhibit AB-17 submitted by Antigua to the Panel.
461Panel Report, para. 6.595 (quoting Antigua's statement at the first substantive panel meeting,
para. 92).
462The Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA prohibit a broad range of gambling and betting
activities when they involve foreign or interstate commerce. (Panel Report, paras. 6.362, 6.367, and 6.375)
463Panel Report, para. 6.597 (quoting United States' response to Question 21 posed by the Panel, Panel
Report, p. C-50).

by virtue of the IHA's adoption subsequent to that of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.
464
Rather, under principles of statutory interpretation in the United States, such a repeal could be
effective only if done explicitly, which was not the case with the IHA.465
363. Thus, the Panel had before it conflicting eviden ce as to the relationship between the IHA, on
the one hand, and the measures at issue, on the othe r. We have already referred to the discretion
accorded to panels, as fact-finders, in the assessment of the evidence. 466 As the Appellate Body has
observed on previous occasions, "not every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may
give rise to a question of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of
the facts."467
364. In our view, this aspect of the United States' appeal essentially challenges the Panel's failure
to accord sufficient weight to th e evidence submitted by the United States with respect to the
relationship under United States law between the I HA and the measures at issue. The Panel had
limited evidence before it, as submitted by the par ties, on which to base its conclusion. This
limitation, however, could not absolve the Panel of its responsibility to arrive at a conclusion as to the
relationship between the IHA and the prohibitions in the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.
The Panel found that the evidence provided by the Un ited States was not sufficiently persuasive to
conclude that, as regards wagering on horseracing, the remote supply of such services by domestic
firms continues to be prohibited notwithstanding the pl ain language of the IHA. In this light, we are
not persuaded that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts.
365. With respect to the Panel's anal ysis under the chapeau of Article XIV, the United States also
contends that the Panel failed to satisfy its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU in finding that "the
United States has failed to demonstrate that the manner in which it enforced its prohibition on the
remote supply of gambling and betting services agai nst TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com is
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau." 468 Having reversed this finding under the chapeau

464Panel Report, para. 6.595 (citing, inter alia , United States' first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 33-35); United States' second written submission to the Panel, para. 63; and United States' response to
Question 21 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, p. C-50. See also Panel Report, para. 6.597 (citing, inter alia,
United States' response to Question 21 posed by the Panel, Panel Report, p. C-50); and Presidential Statement
on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Stat e, the Judiciary, and Rela ted Agencies Appropriation
Act, 21 December 2000, Exhibit US-17 submitted by the United States to the Panel, pp. 3155-3156.
465United States' response to Question 21 posed by th e Panel, Panel Report, p. C-50; United States'
second written submission to the Panel, paras. 63-64.
466Supra, para. 330.
467Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 133. See also Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Apples, para. 222.
468Panel Report, para. 6.589.

of Article XIV469, we need not rule on the United States' additional ground of appeal, namely that, in
arriving at this finding, the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU.
366. I n s u m , w e find that none of the challenges under Ar ticle 11 of the DSU relating to the
chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS has succeeded.
(f) Conclusion under the Chapeau
367. In paragraph 6.607 of the Panel Report, the Panel expressed its overa ll conclusion under the
chapeau of Article XIV as follows:
... the United States has not demonstrated that it does not apply its
prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse
racing in a manner that does not constitute "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on trade" in accordance with
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
368. This conclusion rested on the Panel's findings relating to two instances allegedly revealing
that the measures at issue discriminate between domestic and foreign service suppliers, contrary to the
defence asserted by the United States under the chap eau. The first instance found by the Panel was
based on "inconclusive" evidence of the alleged non-enforcement of the three federal statutes.
470 We
have reversed this finding. 471 The second instance found by the Panel was based on "the ambiguity
relating to" the scope of application of the I HA and its relationship to the measures at issue. 472 We
have upheld this finding.473
369. Thus, our conclusion—that the Panel did not err in finding that the United States has not
shown that its measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau—relates solely to the possibility that
the IHA exempts only domestic suppliers of remote betting services for horse racing from the
prohibitions in the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. In contrast, the Panel's overall
conclusion under the chapeau was broader in scope. As a result of our reversal of one of the two
findings on which the Panel relied for its conclusion in paragraph 6.607 of the Panel Report, we must
modify that conclusion. We find, rather, that the United States has not demonstrated that—in the

469Supra, para. 357.
470Panel Report, paras. 6.589 and 6.607.
471Supra, para. 357.
472Panel Report, para. 6.607.
473Supra, paras. 364 and 366.

light of the existence of the IHA—the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act, and the IGBA are applied
consistently with the requirements of the chapeau. Put another way, we uphold the Panel, but only in
part.
4. Overall Conclusion on Article XIV

370. Our findings under Article XIV lead us to modify the overall conclusions of the Panel in
paragraph 7.2(d) of the Panel Report. 474 The Panel found that the United States failed to justify its
measures as "necessary" under paragraph (a) of Article XIV, and that it also failed to establish that
those measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau.
371. We have found instead that those measures satisfy the "necessity" requirement. We have also
upheld, but only in part, the Panel's finding unde r the chapeau. We explained that the only
inconsistency that the Panel coul d have found with the requirements of the chapeau stems from the
fact that the United States did not demonstrate th at the prohibition embodied in the measures at issue
applies to both foreign and domestic suppliers of remote gambling services, notwithstanding the
IHA—which, according to the Panel, "does appear, on its face, to permit" 475 domestic service
suppliers to supply remote betting services for horse racing. In other words, the United States did not
establish that the IHA does not alter the scope of ap plication of the challenged measures, particularly
vis-à-vis domestic suppliers of a specific type of remote gambling services. In this respect, we wish
to clarify that the Panel did not, and we do not, make a finding as to whether the IHA does, in fact,
permit domestic suppliers to provi de certain remote betting services that would otherwise be
prohibited by the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA.
372. Therefore, we modify the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.2(d) of the Panel Report. We
find, instead, that the United States has demonstrated that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA
fall within the scope of paragraph (a) of Article XIV, but that it has not shown, in the light of the IHA,
that the prohibitions embodied in these measures are applied to both foreign and domestic service
suppliers of remote betting services for horse racing. For this reason alone, we find that the United
States has not established that these measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau. Here, too, we
uphold the Panel, but only in part.

474See also Panel Report, para. 6.608.
475Ibid., para. 6.599.

VIII. Findings and Conclusions
373. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(A) with respect to the measures at issue,
(i) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6. 175 of the Panel Report, that "the
alleged 'total prohibition' on the cro ss-border supply of gambling and betting
services ... cannot constitute a single and autonomous 'measure' that can be
challenged in and of itself";
(ii) finds that the Panel did not err in examining whether the following three
federal laws are consistent with the United States' obligations under
Article XVI of the GATS:
(a) Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Wire Act");
(b) Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Travel
Act"); and
(c) Section 1955 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Illegal
Gambling Business Act");
(iii) finds that the Panel erred in examining whether eight state laws, namely,
those of Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, South Dakota and Utah, are consistent with the United States'
obligations under Article XVI of the GATS;
(B) with respect to the United States' GATS Schedule

(i) upholds, albeit for different reasons, the Panel's finding that subsector 10.D
of the United States' Schedule to th e GATS includes specific commitments
on gambling and betting services;
(C) with respect to Article XVI of the GATS,
(i) upholds the Panel's findings that a prohibition on the remote supply of
gambling and betting services is a "limitation on the number of service
suppliers" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a), and that such a prohibition
is also a "limitation on the total number of service operations or on the total
quantity of service output" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c);

(ii) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.2(b)(i) of the Panel Report, that,
by maintaining the Wire Act, the Tr avel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, the United States acts inconsistently with its obligations under
Article XVI:1 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2;
(iii) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7. 2(b)(ii) of the Panel Report, that
four state laws, namely, those of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and
Utah, are inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article XVI:1
and sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2; and
(iv) need not rule on the Panel's findings that restrictions on service consumers
as opposed to service suppliers are neither limitations on "service suppliers"
for the purposes of Article XVI:2(a), nor limitations on "service operations"
or "service output" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(c);
(D) with respect to Article XIV of the GATS

(i) finds that the Panel did not fail to satisfy its obligations under Article 11 of
the DSU by deciding to examine the United States' defence under
Article XIV;
(ii) as regards the burden of proof,
(a) finds that the Panel did not improperly assume either the burden of
establishing the defence under Article XIV(a) on behalf of the United
States or the burden of rebutting the United States' defence on behalf
of Antigua;
(b) need not rule on Antigua's appeal relating to the Panel's treatment of
the burden of proof in its an alysis under paragraph (c) of
Article XIV;
(iii) as regards paragraph (a) of Article XIV,
(a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.487 of the Panel Report,
that "the concerns which the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act seek to address fall within the scope of
'public morals' and/or 'public order'";

(b) reverses the Panel's finding that, because the United States did not
enter into consultations with Anti gua, the United States was not able
to justify the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act as "necessary" to protect public morals or to maintain
public order;
(c) finds that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act are "measures ... necess ary to protect public morals or
to maintain public order"; and
(d) finds that the Panel did not fail to "make an objective assessment of
the facts of the case", as required by Article 11 of the DSU;
(iv) as regards paragraph (c) of Article XIV,
(a) reverses the Panel's finding that, because the United States did not
enter into consultations with Anti gua, the United States was not able
to justify the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act as "necessary" to secure compliance with the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute; and
(b) need not determine whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act are measures justified under
paragraph (c) of Article XIV;
(v) as regards the chapeau of Article XIV,
(a) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 6.589 of the Panel Report,
that "the United States has failed to demonstrate that the manner in
which it enforced its prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
and betting services against TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com is
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau";
(b) finds that the Panel did not fail to "make an objective assessment of
the facts of the case", as required by Article 11 of the DSU; and
(c) modifies the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 6.607 of the Panel
Report and finds, rather, that the United States has not demonstrated
that—in the light of the existence of the Interstate Horseracing Act—

the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act
are applied consistently with the requirements of the chapeau;
(vi) as regards Article XIV in its entirety,
(a) modifies the Panel's conclusion in pa ragraph 7.2(d) of the Panel
Report and finds, instead, that the United States has demonstrated
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act are measures "necessary to protect public morals or maintain
public order", in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article XIV, but
that the United States has not shown, in the light of the Interstate
Horseracing Act, that the prohib itions embodied in those measures
are applied to both foreign and domestic service suppliers of remote
betting services for horse racing and, therefore, has not established
that these measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau; and
(E) with respect to the remaining allegations of error,

(i) need not , in the light of the above findings, rule on the claim relating to
Article 6.2 of the DSU 476, on the additional claims raised under Article 11 of
the DSU477, or on Antigua's conditional appeal of the Panel's finding that "the
restrictions on market access that are covered by Article XVI are only those
listed in paragraph 2 of this Article".
478
374. The Appellate Body recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States
to bring its measures, found in this Report and in th e Panel Report as modified by this Report to be
inconsistent with the General Agreement on Trade in Services , into conformity with its obligations
under that Agreement.

476Supra, para. 127.
477Supra, paras. 128, 156, 333 and 365.
478Supra, para. 256.

Signed in the original in Geneva this 23rd day of March 2005 by:

Giorgio Sacerdoti
Presiding Member

 _________________________ _________________________
 Georges Abi-Saab John Lockhart
 Member Member

ANNEX I

13 January 2005

(05-0113)
 Original: English

Notification of an Appeal by the United States

under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)

 The following notification, dated 7 January 200 5, from the Delegation of the United States, is
being circulated to Members.

Pursuant to Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the
United States hereby notifies its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law
covered in the Report of the Panel on (WT/DS285/R) ("Panel Report") and certain legal interpretations
developed by the Panel in this dispute.

1. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel’s legal conclusion that it
"should consider" the following laws "in determining whether or not th e United States is in violation
of its obligations" under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"),
1 including the
conclusion that Antigua and Barbuda ("Antigua") had met its burden of proof that these laws "result
in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services" 2: (1) the Wire Act (18
U.S.C. § 1084); (2) the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952); (3) the Illegal Gambling Business statute (18
U.S.C. § 1955); (4) Louisiana : § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.; (5) Massachusetts : § 17A of
chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws; (6) South Dakota : § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws;
(7) Utah: § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code; (8) Colorado : § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes; (9) Minnesota : §§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2-3 and 609.75 5(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann; (10)
New Jersey: paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code; and (11)
New York: § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. These conclusions are
in error and are based on erroneous findings on i ssues of law and related legal interpretations
regarding a complaining party’s initial burden of proving an alleged breach of Article XVI of the
GATS, and on the Panel’s failure to carry out its ob ligations under Article 11 of the DSU to make an
objective assessment of the matter before it. These errors are contained in, inter alia,
paragraphs 6.160-6.165, 6.199-6.249, 6.357-6.421, and 7.1-7.2 of the Panel Report.

1Panel Report, para. 6.209.
2Id., para. 6.249.

2. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel’s legal conclusion that the
U.S. schedule to the GATS in cludes specific commitments on gambling and betting services under
subsector 10.D, "other recreational services (except s porting)." This conclusi on is in error and is
based on erroneous findings on issu es of law and related legal inte rpretations with respect to the
provisions of the U.S. schedule to the GATS. These errors are contained in, inter alia,
paragraphs 6.49-6.138, 6.356, 6.527, and 7.2-7.4 of the Panel Report.

3. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel’s legal conclusion that the
United States fails to accord services and service suppliers of Antigua treatment no less favorable than
that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in the U.S.
schedule, contrary to Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2 of the GATS. This conclusion is in error and is
based on erroneous findings on issues of law and related legal interpretations with respect to
Article XVI of the GATS. These erroneous findings include, for example, the following:

(a) The Panel’s findings that any limitation that has the effect of limiting the number of
service suppliers in a sector or subsector is a limitation in the form of numerical
quotas within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a), and that "a measure that is not
expressed in the form of a numerical quota or economic needs test may still fall
within the scope of Article XVI:2(a)"
3;

(b) The Panel’s findings that any limitation that has the effect of limiting the number of
service operations in a sector or subsector is a limitation expressed in the form of
quotas within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c) of the GATS, and that a limitation that
is not "expressed in terms of designated numerical units" may nonetheless fall within
the scope of Article XVI:2(c);

(c) The Panel’s finding that a WTO Member does not respect its GATS market access
obligations under Article XVI:2 if it limits market access to any part of a scheduled
sector or subsector, or if it restricts any means of delivery under mode 1 with respect
to a committed sector; and

(d) The Panel’s findings that the Unite d States maintains such limitations.

These errors are contained in, inter alia, paragraphs 6.262-6.421 and 7.2-7.4 of the Panel Report.

4. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel’s legal conclusion that the
Wire Act, the Travel Act (together with the rele vant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business
statute (together with the relevant state laws) are not justified under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the
GATS and are inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS. These
conclusions are in error and are based on errone ous findings on issues of law and related legal
interpretations with respect to Article XIV of th e GATS, and on the Panel’s failure to ensure that
consultations shall be without prejudice to the ri ghts of the United States in dispute settlement
proceedings pursuant to Article 4.6 of the DSU. These errors are contained in, inter alia,
paragraphs 6.475-6.477, 6.488-6.535, 6.541-6.608, and 7.2 of the Panel Report.

5. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, of
the Panel’s finding that "the United States has declin ed Antigua’s invitation to engage in bilateral
and/or multilateral consulta tions and/or negotiations."
4 The Panel’s disregard for uncontroverted
evidence in the record, such as the fact that the United States engage d in bilateral consultations with
Antigua regarding Antigua’s concerns relating to U.S. gambling laws pursuant to Article 4 of the

3Id., para. 6.332.
4Id., para. 6.533.

DSU, is inconsistent with the Panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the matter before it.
These errors are contained in, inter alia, paragraphs 6.525-6.533 of the Panel Report.

6. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, of
the Panel’s finding that "the United States has fail ed to demonstrate that the manner in which it
enforced its prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services against TVG, Capital
OTB and Xpressbet.com is consistent with the requ irements of the chapeau" of Article XIV of the
GATS.
5 The Panel’s disregard for uncontroverted eviden ce in the record, such as statistical evidence
as to the overall treatment of domestic suppliers of remote gambling services as compared to that of
foreign suppliers, is inconsistent with the Panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the matter
before it. These errors are contained in, inter alia, paragraphs 6.585- 6.589 of the Panel Report.

7. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, of
the Panel’s finding that "the evidence presented to the Panel is inconclusive and that the United States
has not demonstrated that the [Interstate Horseraci ng Act], as amended, do es not permit interstate
pari-mutuel wagering for horse racing over the te lephone or using other modes of electronic
communication, including the Internet."
6 The Panel’s disregard for uncontroverted evidence in the
record, such as the consistent position of the U.S. Government that the IHA does not provide legal
authority or protection for remote supply of gambling services and settled U.S. law regarding
statutory construction, is inconsistent with the Panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the
matter before it. These errors are contained in, inter alia, paragraphs 6.595-6.600 of the Panel Report.

8. The United States seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel’s legal conclusion that
"practice," which the Panel defines as "a repeated pattern of similar responses to a set of
circumstances," can "be considered as an autono mous measure that can be challenged in and of
itself."
7 This conclusion is in error and is based on erroneous findings on i ssues of law and related
legal interpretations with respect to what constitutes a "measure" under Article 6.2 of the DSU. These
errors are contained in, inter alia, paragraphs 6.196-6.198 of the Panel Report.

5Id., para. 6.589.
6Id., para. 6.600.
7Panel Report, paras. 6.196-6.197.

ANNEX II

16 February 2005

(05-0613)
 Original: English

Notification of Other Appeal by Antigua and Barbuda
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of DSU, and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 19 Janua ry 2005, from the Delegation of Antigua and
Barbuda, is being circulated to Members.

Pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review , Antigua and
Barbuda ("Antigua") hereby notifies the Dispute Se ttlement Body (the "DSB") of the World Trade
Organisation (the "WTO") of its decision to appeal to the Appella te Body as an Other Appellant
certain issues of law covered in the Report of the Panel in (WT/DS285/R) (the "Final Report").

1. Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s legal conc lusion that Antigua was not entitled to rely on
what was referred to in the Final Report as the "total prohibition" as a "measure" under
Article XXVIII(a) of the General Agreement on Trad e in Services (the "GATS") and Article 6.2 of
the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Go verning the Settlement of Disputes (the
"DSU").
8 The Panel erred when it concluded that Antigua had not identified the "total prohibition" in
its Panel request. In making this finding, the Panel misinterpreted Antigua’s Panel request and
incorrectly interpreted and applied DSU Arti cle 6.2 and GATS Articles I:1, I:3(a), XXIII
and XVIII(a).

2. Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s legal conc lusion that, even if Antigua had identified the
"total prohibition" as a "measure" in its Panel requ est, Antigua was not entitled to rely upon the "total
prohibition" as a measure.9 In coming to this conclusion, the Panel developed and applied a three-part
test that is both unsupported by a nd inconsistent with DSU Article 6.2 and GATS Articles I:1, I:3(a)
and XXVIII(a). The Panel also erred by failing to objectively assess and ascribe any significance to
the United States’ admission that it maintained a "t otal prohibition" on the cross-border provision of
gambling and betting services, contrary to DSU Article 11.

8See Final Report, paras. 6.171, 6.169, 6.170 and 6.177. See also id., paras. 6.156 and 6.157.
9See id., paras. 6.171, 6.175–6.185. See also id., para. 197.

3. In the event the Appellate Body were find in favour of the United States in the review sought
by the United States pursuant to the third numbered paragraph of the United States’ Notice of Appeal
dated 7 January 2005 and reverse the conclusion of th e Panel in paragraph 7.2(b) of the Final Report,
Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s legal conclu sion that GATS Article XVI:1 is limited by GATS
Article XVI:2.
10 In making this determination, the Panel adopted a legally incorrect interpretation of
GATS Article XVI.

4. Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s legal c onclusion that measures that prohibit consumers
from using the gambling services offered by Antigua n operators through cr oss-border supply do not
violate GATS Articles XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c).
11 In making this determination, the Panel adopted a
legally incorrect interpretation of GATS Articles XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c).

5. Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s decision to consider the claimed defence of the United
States under GATS Article XIV, which was affirmativel y raised by the United States only at the last
session of the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties–too late in the proceeding to
allow for a fair opportunity by Antigua to re but the defence and for proper assessment and
adjudication of the claim by the Panel.
12 Additionally, the Panel in essence constructed and
completed the GATS Article XIV on behalf of the United States, thus relieving the United States of
its burden of proof. The consideration by the Pa nel of the Article XIV defence submitted by the
United States at such a late date in the proceeding, as well as the construction and completion of such
defence by the Panel on behalf of the United States, is contrary to the requirements of due process, the
principle of equality of arms and the terms of DSU Articles 3.10 and 11.

6. In the event the Appellate Body determ ines that the United States’ GATS Article XIV
defence was properly before the Panel, Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s application and
assessment of GATS Article XIV(a) to the defence, which was erroneous in a number of respects,
13
including without limitation (i) failure to properly consider the text of GATS Article XIV; (ii)
improper analysis and application of the t est developed by the Appellate Body in Korea – Measures
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (" Korea – Beef "); and (iii)
failure to make an objective assessment of the matters before it, including the facts, contrary to DSU
Article 11.

These errors are illustrated, for example, by:

(A) The failure of the Panel to take into consideration footnote 5 of GATS
Article XIV(a), which was mentione d in paragraphs 6.467 and 6.468 of the Final Report, but never
applied to the facts of the case nor mentioned again in the Final Report.

(B) The Panel giving total deference to the fi ndings of United States authorities in making
its assessment of (i) whether the applicable measu res are measures designed to protect public morals
or to maintain public order and (ii) the "necessary" test set out in Korea – Beef, and in each case not
examining the actual facts before it in making the a ssessments. With respect to (i), in its assessment
of the point, contained in paragraphs 6.479 thro ugh 6.487 of the Final Report, the Panel cites no
evidence to support its conclusions other than findi ngs or statements of the United States or its
authorities. With respect to (ii), first, in its assessment of the "importance of the interests or values
that the measures were designed to protect" aspect of the Korea – Beef test, contained in
paragraphs 6.489 through 6.492 of the Final Re port, the Panel cites no evidence to support its
conclusions other than findings or statements of the United States or its authorities and second, in its

10See id., paras. 6.298, 6.299 and 6.318.
11See id., paras. 6.382, 6.383, 6.397, 6.398, 6.401, 6.402, 6.405 and 6.406.
12See id., paras. 6.444, 6.583 and 6.584.
13See id., paras. 6.467–6.469, 6.474. 6.479–6.521, 6.533 and 6.535.

apparent differentiation of "remote" gambling services from "non-remote" gambling services,
contained in paragraphs 6.498 through 6.521 of th e Final Report, substantially all of the evidence
cited by the Panel in support of its conclusions ar e findings or statements of the United States or its
authorities
14 and a number of the findings are not supported by any evidence at all.

(C) The Panel, in its assessment of the "necessary" test set out in Korea – Beef, reaching
its conclusions regarding the "importance of the interests or values" and the differentiation of
"remote" gambling services based solely upon appa rent "concerns" of the United States without
requiring evidence–and without making any findin g–that the "concerns" we re justified under the
circumstances of this case. The United States submitted no evidence associated with Antiguan 15
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services of, inter alia (i) money laundering; (ii) fraud;
(iii) health concerns; (iv) underage gambling; or (v) organised crime (collectively, the "Five
Concerns").

(D) The failure of the Panel to make an objec tive assessment of the extent to which the
measures at issue actually contributed to the e nds ostensibly pursued by the measures. In
paragraph 6.494 of the Final Report, the Panel dismissed this prong of the Korea – Beef test by
concluding that because the United States measures prohibited the cross-border supply of gambling
services, the measures "must contribute, at least to some extent, to addressing those concerns."
However, the Panel failed to make any factual in quiry at all as to whether the measures actually
contribute to addressing the Five Concerns.

(E) The Panel ignoring or misapplying factua l evidence presented by Antigua. Antigua
submitted substantial third-party evidence regarding th e existence of the Five Concerns in the United
States domestic gambling market, regulatory schemes and other contexts in which goods or services
are provided on a cross-border or Internet-delivered basis.
16 Very little of this evidence was taken
into consideration by the Panel. The Panel erred by failing to consider this evidence (i) in the context
of determining exactly how material the "concer ns" of the United States are regarding problems
associated with the Five Concerns; (ii) to assess th e United States’ tolerance of problems associated
with the Five Concerns in its regulated domestic i ndustry; (iii) to determine whether any basis exists
for the differentiation of "remote" gambling ser vices from "non-remote" gambling services in respect
of the Five Concerns; (v) whether reasonable altern atives to prohibition were available to the United
States; or (vi) in contrast to the complete lack of similar evidence adduced by the United States in the
context of the provision of cross-border gambling services.

7. In the event the Appellate Body determ ines that the United States’ GATS Article XIV
defence was properly before the Panel, and furthe r in the event the Appe llate Body upholds the
"three-part" measure identification test developed by the Panel in paragraphs 6.215 through 6.249 of
the Final Report, Antigua seeks review of the Pane l’s finding that the United States had sufficiently
identified the United States’ "RICO" statute
17 for consideration under GATS Article XIV(c). 18 The
Panel’s finding is not supported by analysis under the "three-part" test, is not supported by any
evidence and is contrary to DSU Article 11.

14The only other evidence considered by the Panel in this discussion is an out-of-context reference to
some language in a report prepared for Antigua by certain experts (Final Report, para. 6.513) and extracts from
a statement made by a credit card company executive before the United States Congress (id., para. 6.518).
15Nor was any evidence submitted by the United States pertaining to any other jurisdiction.
16Note that this evidence was not presented in the context of GATS Article XIV due to the failure of
the United States to raise its GATS Article XIV defence until after all written submissions had been made, and
was extrapolated by the Panel from Antigua’s discussion of GATS Article XVII. See Final Report, para. 6.584.
See also paragraph 5 above.
1718 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
18See Final Report, paras. 6.548-6.551.

8. In the event the Appellate Body determ ines that the United States’ GATS Article XIV
defence was properly before the Panel, Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s application and
assessment of GATS Article XIV(c) to the defence, which was legally erroneous in a number of
respects,
19 including without limitation (i) in assessing the RICO statute, the Panel failed to properly
apply GATS Article XIV(c) as the Panel had already determined that the state statutes upon which the
RICO statute itself relies were not properly before the Panel; 20 (ii) in assessing the RICO statute, the
Panel failed to properly apply GATS Article XIV(c) as the Panel had already determined that with
respect to the one "concern" addressed by the RICO statute, organised crime, the United States had
not been able to demonstrate it was a spec ific concern related to "remote" gambling; 21 (iii) in
application of the "necessary" test under Korea – Beef , the Panel failed to make an objective
assessment of the matters before it, including the facts, contrary to DSU Article 11.

These errors are illustrated, for example, by:

(A) The Panel giving total deference to the fi ndings of United States authorities in making
its assessment of (i) whether the applicable measu res secure compliance with the RICO statute and
(ii) the "necessary" test set out in Korea – Beef , and in each case not examining the actual facts
before it in making the assessments. With respect to (i), in its assessment of the point, contained in
paragraphs 6.552 through 6.556 of the Final Repo rt, the Panel cited no evidence to support its
conclusions other than findings or statements of the United States or its authorities. With respect
to (ii), in its assessment of the "importance of the interests or values that the measures were designed
to protect" aspect of the Korea – Beef test, contained in paragraph 6.558 of the Final Report, the Panel
cited no evidence to support its conclusions other than findings or statements of the United States or
its authorities.

(B) The failure of the Panel to make an objec tive assessment of the extent to which the
measures at issue actually contributed to the ends pursued by the RICO statute. In paragraphs 6.559
and 6.560 of the Final Report, the Panel not only relie d solely on findings or statements of the United
States or its authorities in reaching its conclusions, but also failed to require or consider any evidence
that organised crime is a legitimate concern in the context of cross-border gambling services provided
from Antigua or that the measures actually contribu te to the suppression of organised crime and to
what extent they do so.

9. In the event the Appellate Body determ ines that the United States’ GATS Article XIV
defence was properly before the Panel, Antigua seeks review of the Panel’s application and
assessment of the "chapeau" of GATS Article XIV, which was erroneous in a number of respects,
22
including without limitation (i) the Panel’s determin ation to apply the chapeau in the absence of a
finding of a "preliminary justification" in favour of the United States under GATS Article XIV; (ii)
the Panel’s determination to examine only certain narrow segments of the gambling industry in its
assessment of the "discrimination" pr ong of the chapeau test set forth in United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R (" US – Shrimp "); and (iii) the
Panel’s failure to make an objective assessment of th e matters before it, including the facts, contrary
to DSU Article 11.

These errors are illustrated, for example, by:

19See id., paras. 6.550, 6.553–6.557, 6.560, 6.562 and 6.564.
20Id., para. 6.547.
21Id., para. 6.520.
22Id., paras. 6.567, 6.585–6.607.

(A) In the discussion regarding video lottery terminals in paragraphs 6.590 through 6.594
of the Final Report, the Panel (i) made a conclusion regarding "identification and age verification" in
connection with purchases at video lottery terminals that is not supported by any evidence; (ii)
ignored significant Antiguan evidence to the contrary; and (iii) shifted the burden of proof to Antigua
to "refute" the unproven claim of the United States as to "identification and age verification."

(B) In the discussion regarding Nevada bookmake rs in paragraphs 6.601 through 6.603 of
the Final Report, the Panel (i) made a conclusi on regarding the provision of gambling and betting
services through the Internet in Nevada that is no t supported by any evidence; (ii) ignored Antiguan
evidence to the contrary; and (iii) shifted the burden of proof to Antigua to refute the unproven claim
of the United States that Nevada bookmakers do not provide services via the Internet.

(C) The discussion regarding the letters from a state lottery association is without any
context at all.

ANNEX II(a)

17 February 2005

(05-0677)

Notification of Other Appeal by Antigua and Barbuda

under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of DSU, and under Rule 23(1) of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review

Corrigendum

 In numbered paragraph 1, the fi nal reference in the last sentence of the paragraph should be to
"GATS Article XXVIII(a)", and not to "GATS Article XVIII(a)", so as to read:

"In making this finding, the Panel misint erpreted Antigua’s Panel request and
incorrectly interpreted and applied DSU Ar ticle 6.2 and GATS Articles I:1, I:3(a),
XXIII and XXVIII(a)."

ANNEX III

GENERAL AGREEMENT GATS/SC/90
 15 April 1994
ON TRADE IN SERVICES (94-1088)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Schedule of Specific Commitments

(This is authentic in English only)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS

Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons

Sector or subsector Limitations on market access Limi tations on national treatment Additional commitments
II. SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS

10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL, &
SPORTING SERVICES

A. ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES
(INCLUDING THEATRE, LIVE
BANDS AND CIRCUS SERVICES)

1) None
2) None
3) None
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) None

B. NEWS AGENCY SERVICES 1) None
2) None
3) None
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) None

C. LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES,
MUSEUMS AND OTHER
CULTURAL SERVICES
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) None

D. OTHER RECREATIONAL
SERVICES (except sporting)
1) None
2) None
3) The number of concessions available
for commercial operations in federal,
state and local facilities is limited
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) None