CHINA – DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: Addendum
Date: 28 February 2019
Document codes: WT/DS511/R/Add.1; WT/DS511/R.
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: China
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, EU, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 3.2, 6.3, 7.2(b)  Agriculture

CHINA – DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS
REPORT OF THE PANEL
Addendum
This addendum contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A Working Procedures of the Panel 4
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 10
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 35
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 62
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 65
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 67
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Colombia 71
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ecuador 72
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 74
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 76
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia 78
Annex C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 80
Annex C-10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Kazakhstan 83
Annex C-11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 86
ANNEX D
RAW DATA
Contents Page
Annex D Raw Data as presented by the parties 90

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A Working Procedures of the Panel 4

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
ADOPTED ON 11 AUGUST 2017
1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working
Procedures shall apply.
General

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be k ept confidential.
Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter
"party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as
confidential information submitted to the Pa nel by another Member which the submitting Member
has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written
submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential
summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest
in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter
"third parties"), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.
4. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation
when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members
of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance with
the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the
proceedings.
Submissions

5. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a
written submission in which its presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with
the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second
substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adop ted by
the Panel.
6. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity
and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If the United States
requests such a ruling, China shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission.
If China requests such a ruling, the United States shall submit its response to the request prior to
the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the
request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
7. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes o f rebuttal, answers
to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure
shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel
shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual
evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.
8. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party
or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO work ing language of the submission at the
same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits
upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised
promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the
submission which contains the translation in question. T he Panel may grant an extension to this
deadline. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the gr ounds of objection
and an alternative translation.

9. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its
submissions in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions attached as Annex 1,
to the extent that it is practical to do so.
10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course
of the dispute. For exa mple, exhibits submitted by the United States could be numbered USA -1,
USA-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered USA-5, the first
exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered USA-6.
Questions

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing,
including prior to each substantive meeting.
Substantive meetings

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each
meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.
13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite the United States to make an opening statement to present its case
first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite China to present its point of view. Before each
party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with
a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpr etation is needed,
each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary.
Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its
opening statement as well a s its closing statement, i f any, preferably at the end of the
meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the first working day following the
meeting.
b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to
ask each other questions or mak e comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing,
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the
Panel.
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an
opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive
a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such qu estions
within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with the United States presenting its statement first.
14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall ask China if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If
so, the Panel shall invite China to present its opening statement, followed by the United
States. If China chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Pane l shall invite the United
States to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall
provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version
of its statement. In the event that interpretati on is needed, each party shall provide
additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make
available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well
as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no
later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to
ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing,
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the
Panel.
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an
opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive
a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such quest ions
within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement
first, presenting its closing statement first.
Third parties

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to
the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted
by the Panel.
16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first
substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list
of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no l ater than 5.00 p.m. the previous
working day.
17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order . Third
parties present at the third -party session and intending to present their views orally at
that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third -parties with provisional
written versions of their statements before they take the floor. T hird parties shall make
available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their
statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m.
of the first working day following the session.
c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the
opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any
matter raised in the third parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in
writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party
to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall
then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing,
within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it
wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in
writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
Descriptive part

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the
Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties a nd third parties, which
shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve
as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the
case.

19. Each party shall submit an integrated executive summar y of the facts and arguments as
presented to the Pa nel in its written submissions and oral statements, in accordance with the
timetable adopted by the Panel . This summary may also include a summary of responses to
questions. Each party's integrated executive summary shall not exceed 30 pages. The Panel will not
summarize in the descriptive part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties' responses to
questions.
20. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary of its arguments as presented
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This
summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive
summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.
Interim review

21. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.
22. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit
written comments on the other party's written request for review, in accordance with the timetable
adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party's written
request for review.
23. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept
strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.
Service of documents

24. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the
DS Registry (office No. 2047).
b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel.
Exhibits may be filed in 4 copies on CD-ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS Registrar
shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall
constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
c. Each party and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits
to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format,
either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided
by e -mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to
****.****@wto.org, ****.****@wto.org and ****.****@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD
is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.
d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party.
Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance
of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document
submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and
third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time
it provides each document to the Panel.
e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies
on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on
the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents
to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipient party or
third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.
f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the
interim report and the fina l report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When

the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a
document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the
record of the dispute.
25. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with
the parties.

ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 10
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 35

ANNEX B-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION

1. Each year, the People's Republic of China ("China") provides a significant level of domestic
support to its agricultural producers through a variety of subsidy programs and other measures. This
dispute addresses a single means of agricultural support, "market price support " ("MPS"), which
China utilizes to support farmer incomes and increase production for basic agricultural products,
including wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. Through this form of support alone, China has
provided support far in excess of its WTO commitments. The level of domestic support China
provided to its agricultural producers in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 exceeded the level set out in
Section I of Part IV of China's Schedule of Concessions on Goods ("CLII"). China's level of domestic
support in favor of agricultural producers has therefore breached Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture ("Agriculture Agreement") for the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.
2. China's MPS programs announce on an annual basis an applied administered price that will
be available to farmers either immediately upon initiation of each year 's program, as for corn, or
when market prices drop below the applied administered price, as for wheat, Indica rice, and
Japonica rice. This appl ied administered price is provided or furnished to farmers in the major
producing provinces during the period immediately following harvest. By guaranteeing farmers an
established price for their commodities, China's MPS programs for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice,
and corn ensure that commodity prices in the relevant provinces are maintained at the Chinese
government's chosen support level.
I. CHINA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF MARKET PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS

3. Per the annual policy direction in the Document Number 1 and regulatory framework
provided by the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation , China issued annual announcements of
minimum prices for wheat, Indica rice (early season and mid-to-late season), and Japonica rice, and
implementation plans for purchasing those grains harvested in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 at the
established prices. Together these instruments form the wheat, Indica rice, and Japonica rice MPS
Programs. China has also maintained similar MPS Programs for corn announced through an annual
notice in the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.
A. China's Wheat Market Price Support Program

4. Wheat is China's second most prevalent crop, after rice, and China is one of the world's top
wheat producers. Between 2005 and 2015, wheat production in China increased by 25 percent, with
production in 2015 reaching 130.19 million metric tons ("MT") annually.
5. China issues two documents each harvest year to implement the MPS Program for wheat.
First, prior to the planting of winter wheat, China announces the annual "minimum purchase price"
in a Notice on Raising the Wheat Minimum Purchase Price or Notice on Announcing the Wheat
Minimum Purchase Price ("Wheat MPS Notices"). This is China's applied administered price for wheat.
China's National Development and Reform Commissi on ( "NDRC"), Ministry of Finance ( "MoF"),
Ministry of Agriculture ( "MoA"), State Administration of Grain, and the Agricultural Development
Bank of China jointly issue the annual Wheat MPS Notices.
6. The Wheat MPS Notices are directed to China's "development and reform commissions, price
bureaus, finance departments (bureaus), agricultural departments (bureaus, commissions, offices),
grain bureaus, and Agricultural Development Bank of China branches in all provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities dir ectly under the central government. " The Wheat MPS Notices state
that "each locality is required to earnestly and properly carry out dissemination work for the grain
minimum purchase price policy." The 2015 Wheat MPS Notice states that "[i]n order to protect the
interests of farmers and prevent 'low grain prices hurting farmers,'" the Notice is provided to "guide
farmers to plant rationally, and promote the stable development of grain production."
7. Second, the NDRC, MoF, MoA, State Administration of Grain, Agricultural Development Bank,
and China Grain Reserves Corporation ("Sinograin") publish a Notice on Issuing the Wheat and Rice

Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan, "in order to implement and fulfill the spirit of the
[2015 Document Number 1]." Attached to the notice is a detailed Wheat and Rice Minimum Purchase
Price Implementation Plan (the "Wheat MPS Implementation Plans ") that is issued "in accordance
with the relevant provisions in the [2004 Grain Distribution Regulation]."

8. The annual Wheat MPS Implementation Plans reaffirm the applied administered price
initially announced in the Wheat MPS Notices , noting that this is "the at -depot price of direct
purchases [of wheat] from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots respons ible for making
purchases at the minimum purchase price." The Wheat MPS Implementation Plans subsequently set
forth the parameters of that season 's MPS Program for wheat including: (1) the geographic scope,
(2) characteristics of qualifying wheat, (3) rele vant timeframe, (4) the roles and responsibilities of
the numerous Chinese government entities involved in implementing, and financing the MPS
Program.
9. Each year to implement the Wheat MPS Program, local offices of Sinograin and the
Agricultural Developme nt Bank of China must identify and authorize "entrusted purchasing and
storage depots" in each affected province. These depots or warehouses must satisfy a number of
specific criteria to be eligible to participate in the program. Further, "the total depot storage capacity
volume of the entrusted purchasing and storage depots within each county shall be linked to the
forecast volume of grain purchases at minimum purchase prices in that locality."
10. Under the Wheat MPS Program, "entrusted purchasing and storage depots . . . are required
to announce, on a board in a prominent location at the purchasing site, policy information relating
to the implementation of the minimum purchase price for each grain variety, . . . including the
purchase price, quality standards, deduction methods for weight increase of moisture and impurities,
the purchase settlement method, and the implementation period, so that farmers can transact in
'grain with peace of mind.'"
11. The Wheat MPS Implementations Plans clarify that entrusted purchasing and storage depots
"must not" "refuse grain sold by farmers that meets the standard; " "will promptly settle the grain
sales price with the farmer, and must not issue IOUs to the farmers." Further, entities charged with
making purchases "shall actively enter the market to purchase new grain."
12. Purchase and administration costs under the MPS Program for wheat are financed through
loans "secured by a directly affiliated enterprise of [Sinograin], [in the form of] a loan uniformly
from the Agricultural Development Bank of China, at the locality [of the depots]." Further, ownership
"rights belong to the State Council, and the grain must not be put to use nor mortgaged without
approval by the state. " The wheat held by the entrusted purchasing and storage de pots will
eventually be sold "according to the principle of selling at profitable prices, rationally formulate base
sales prices, and auction [the grain] at public auctions on grain wholesale markets or online."
13. The Chinese instruments setting out the MPS Programs for wheat instruct central and
provincial government officials to initiate a program of wheat purchases on an annual basis. The
MPS Programs ensure that farmers in the six major wheat producing provinces are able to make
sales of qualifying wheat at the announced applied administered price, if the prevailing domestic
market price falls below the applied administered price. As described below, the MPS Programs for
Indica rice and Japonica rice operate in a similar manner.
B. China's Indica Rice and Japonica Rice Market Price Support Programs

14. China is the world 's largest rice market, accounting for nearly a third of global production
and consumption. Between 2005 and 2015, total rice production in China increased by 15 percent,
with production in 2015 reaching 208.23 million MT annually.
15. China issues two documents each harvest year to implement the MPS Programs for Indica
rice and Japonica rice. China first issues an annual Notice on Raising the Rice Minimum Purchase
Price or Notice on Announcing the R ice Minimum Purchase Price ("Rice MPS Notices ") each year,
which defines the "minimum purchase price" or applied administered price for three products: early-
season Indica rice, mid -to-late season Indica rice, and Japonica rice. NDRC, MoF, MoA , State
Administration of Grain, and the Agricultural Development Bank jointly issue the annual Rice MPS
Notices.

16. The Rice MPS Notices are directed to China's "development and reform commissions, price
bureaus, finance departments (bureaus), agriculture de partments (bureaus, commissions, and
offices), grain bureaus, and Agricultural Development Bank of China branches of all provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government. " The Rice MPS
Notices are issued in January or February, which is well in advance of planting. The Rice MPS Notices
state that "[a]s it is currently the middle of the preparatory spring plowing period, all localities are
required to earnestly and properly carry out dissemination work for the grain min imum purchase
price policy." The Rice MPS Notices continue that the announced price is to "guide farmers to plant
rationally, and promote the stable development of grain production."
17. Second, the NDRC, in conjunction with the MoF, MoA, State Administration of Grain,
Agricultural Development Bank of China, and Sinograin, publish an annual Notice on Issuing the
Wheat and Rice Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan, "in order to implement and fulfill the
spirit of the [2015 Document Number 1]. " Attached to the notice is a detailed Wheat and Rice
Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan (the "Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS
Implementation Plans") that is issued "in accordance with the relevant provisions in the [2004 Grain
Distribution Regulation].

18. Typically, the early Indica rice Implementation Plan is released first, and a joint mid-to-late
Indica rice and Japonica rice plan follows during the later planting season. In other instances, the
Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans are announced in the same document as
the Wheat MPS Implementation Plan, as was the case for 2015.
19. The annual Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans reaffirm the applied
administered price initially announced in the Rice MPS Notices, noting that this is "the at-depot price
of direct purchases [of rice] from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots responsible for
making purchases at the minimum purchase price. " The Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS
Implementation Plans subsequently set forth the parameters of that season's MPS Program for wheat
including: (1) the geographic scope, (2) characteristics of qualifying Indica rice or Japonica rice, (3)
relevant timeframe, and (4) the roles and responsibilities of the numerous Chinese government
entities involved in implementing, and financing the MPS Program.
20. Each year to implement the Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Programs, local offices of
Sinograin and the Agricultural Development Bank of China must identify and authorize "entrusted
purchasing and storage depots. " These depots or warehouses must satisfy a number of specific
criteria to be eligible to participate in the program. Further, "the total depot storage capacity volume
of the entrusted purchasing and storage depots within each county shall be linked to the forecast
volume of grain purchases at minimum purchase prices in that locality."
21. When the Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Programs are activated, "entrusted purchasing
and storage depots . . . are required to announce, on a board i n a prominent location at the
purchasing site, policy information relating to the implementation of the minimum purchase price
for each grain variety, [this information] will include the purchase price, quality standards, deduction
methods for weight increase of moisture and impurities, the purchase settlement method, and the
implementation period, so that farmers can transact in 'grain with peace of mind.'"
22. The Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans clarify that entrusted
purchasing and storage depots "must not" "refuse grain sold by farmers that meets the standard, "
"will promptly settle the grain sales price with the farmer, and must not issue IOUs to the farmers."
Further, entities charged with making purchases "shall actively enter the market to purchase new
grain."
23. Purchase and administration costs under the MPS Program for rice are financed through
loans "secured by a directly affiliated enterprise of [Sinograin], [in the form of] a loan uniformly
from the Agricultural Development Bank of China, at the locality [of the depots]." Ownership "rights
belong to the State Council, and the grain must not be put to use nor mortgaged without approval
by the state." The Indica rice and Japonica rice held by the entrusted purchasing and storage depots,
will eventually be sold "according to the principle of selling at profitable prices, rationally formulate
base sales prices, and auction [the grain] at public auctions on grain wholesale markets or online."

24. The Chinese instruments setting out the M PS Programs for Indica rice and Japonica rice
instruct central and provincial government officials to initiate a program of Indica rice or Japonica
rice purchases on an annual basis. The MPS Programs ensure that farmers in the identified major
rice produci ng provinces are able to make sales of qualifying rice at the announced applied
administered price, if the prevailing domestic market price falls below the applied administered price.
The MPS Program for corn operates in a similar manner.
C. China's Corn Market Price Support Program

25. China is the world 's second largest producer of corn. Since 2005, China 's corn production
has increased 38 percent. Corn is primarily grown in northern and northeastern China.
26. As described in China's Document Number 1, the measures related to corn procurement are
part of a "temporary" program to procure and store corn. To implement market price support for
corn, China issues a single document titled the Notice on Issues Relating to National Temporary
Reserve Purchases of Corn in the Northeast Region (the "Notice on Purchases of Corn"). The Notices
on Purchases of Corn are issued jointly by NDRC, the State Administration of Grain, MoF, and
Agricultural Development Bank of China, and provide details on the available applied administ ered
price, geographic scope, timing, and requirements of the Corn MPS Program.
27. The Corn MPS Programs provide that the applied administered price is to be available in
three Northeast provinces – Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang – and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region. The Notices on Purchases of Corn for 2012 through 2015 provide the applied administered
prices in the referenced provinces and autonomous region. This price is "the at-depot purchase price
of direct purchases from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots."
28. The Corn MPS Program operates from when the Notice on Purchases of Corn is issued
typically in late November or early December until April 30 of the following calendar year. This is the
period immediately following the corn harvest in northeastern China.
29. The Corn MPS Program provides that the applied administered price is for "domestically
produced corn produced in 2015, meeting the quality standards for national at -grade product," or
"Grade 3" corn. The applied administered price is "the at-depot purchase price of direct purchases
from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots." Corn that meets a lower or higher grade may
also be purchased and "[p]rice differences between adjacent grades will be controlled at 0.02 yuan
per jin [half kilogram]."
30. Sinograin is "entrusted by the state to act as the primary policy implementation entity," and
in particular "will make open purchases of farmers ' surplus grain and prevent the occurrence of
farmers' 'difficulty selling grain. '" Aspects of the work are also delegated to the provincial
governments who may issue their own implementing measures.
31. The Notices on Purchases of Corn further provide that "COFCO, Chinatex, and [ Aviation
Industry Corporation of China ("AVIC")], as the supplemental forces for [Sinograin], are entrusted
by [Sinograin] to undertake purchasing and storage tasks, and will independently take on loans from
the Agricultural Development Bank of China. " Other warehouses and granaries may be designated
as "purchasing and warehouse sites " by joint decision of local subsidiaries of Sinograin, and the
Agricultural Development Bank of China, as well as local grain administration authorities. Further,
permanent and temporary storage facilities may be built by Sinograin and provincial officials where
there is determined to be a need for additional storage.
32. Each identified "purchasing and warehouse site" throughout the Northeast region is "required
to openly post and purchase in accordance with stipulated prices." Further, they must "ensur[e] that
grain standards and quality and price policies are posted and standard sample products are
displayed." While assuring that these requirements are followed, the sites will also "make open
purchases of farmers' surplus grain and will prevent the occurrence of 'difficulty selling grain' among
farmers."
33. The Chinese instruments setting out the MPS Programs for corn instruct central and
provincial government officials to initiate a program of corn purchases on an annual basis. The MPS

Programs ensure that farmers in the northeast provinces are able to make sales of qualifying rice at
the announced applied administered price, once notice of the program has been issued.
II. CHINA MUST MAINTAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT EXPRESSED AS CURRENT TOTAL AMS
AT LEVELS BELOW CHINA'S FINAL BOUND COMMITMENT LEVEL WHEN CALCULATED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGRICULTURE AGREEMENT

34. China may, like other Members of the WTO, maintain domestic support programs, including
market price support programs, as long as the domestic support provided under those programs
does not exceed the Member 's fixed commitment levels. The basic obligations in the Agriculture
Agreement regarding domestic support are set forth as follows: (1) Article 3.2 states that: "[s]ubject
to the provisions of Article 6, a Member shall not provide support in favour of domestic producers in
excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV of its Schedule; " (2) Article 6.3
states that: "[a] Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its domestic support reduction
commitments in any year in which its domestic support in favour of agricultural producers expressed
in terms of Current Total AMS does not exceed the corresponding annual or final bound commitment
level specified in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule"; and (3) finally, Article 7.2(b) states that:
"[w]here no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, the Member shall not
provide support to agr icultural producers in excess of the relevant de minimis level set out in
paragraph 4 of Article 6."
35. The Agriculture Agreement thus frames a WTO Member 's obligation to limit domestic
support: first, the Member's individual commitment recorded in Section I of Part IV of the Member's
Schedule, and second, the de minimis level of support that may be provided by a Member to its
producers of basic agricultural products, without including the value of that product-specific AMS in
the calculation of Current Total AMS.
36. China scheduled a "Final Bound Commitment Level " of "nil" in Section I of Part IV of its
Schedule of Concessions on Goods ( "China's Schedule CLII "). China's consistency with this
commitment is measured in terms of its Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Current
Total AMS), which is the sum of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) provided to each
basic agricultural product.
37. Pursuant to Article 1(a) of the Agriculture Agreement, the AMS for each basic agricultural
product must be "calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of support material
incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule." Article 1(h), in turn, provides that
a Member's "Total AMS" for a given year refers to "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour
of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic
agricultural products, all non-product-specific agreement measurements of support and equivalent
measurements of support for agricultural products. " Pursuant to Article 6.4 of the Agriculture
Agreement, a Member 's Current Total AMS does not include product -specific AMS values that are
less than or equal to the relevant de minimis level of support. For China, the de minimis level of
support equals 8.5 percent of the total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the
relevant year.
38. Therefore, to determine China 's Current Total AMS for each year, the Panel first must
calculate the product-specific AMS for each basic agricultural commodity, and compare that value to
the total value of production for that agricultural product. To the extent that the product -specific
AMS for a particular basic agricultural product exceeds China's de minimis level of 8.5 percent, the
full value of the product-specific AMS would be included in China's Current Total AMS. Because China
has committed to a level of domestic support of "nil" or zero, in the event the product-specific AMS
for any basic agricultural product exceeds the de minimis level of 8.5 percent, China will have
breached Articles 3.2 and 6.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.
Market Price Support
39. Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement identifies support that "shall" be included in a
Member's AMS calculation. It states that "an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) shall be
calculated on a product -specific basis for each basic agricultural product receiving market price
support, non -exempt direct payments, or any other subsidy not exempted from the reduction

commitment ("other non-exempt policies")." Thus, the Agriculture Agreement states that "market
price support" in favor of basic agricultural products is a form of non-exempt domestic support and
must be included in a Member's AMS calculation.

40. The Agriculture Agreement does not expressly define the term "market price support;" it is
useful to consider the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms of "market price support " to
understand the scope of domestic support programs contemplated by this term. A "market" is the
physical or geographic place where commercial transactions take place, or the business of buying
and selling, including the rate of purchase or sale, of a particular good or commodity. "Price" is
defined as "a sum in money or goods for which a thing is or may be b ought or sold." "Support" is
defined as "the action of holding up, keeping from falling, or bearing the weight of something " or
"the action of contributing to the success of or maintaining the value of something."
41. Relevant to the consideration of the term "market price support," the dictionary also supplies
a number of definitions of compound terms. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, defines "market
price" as "the current price which a commodity or service fetches in the market." Further, it defines
"price support" as "assistance in maintaining the levels of prices regardless of supply and demand."
42. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms, as well as the compound phrases
indicates that "market price support" is the provision of assistance in holding up or maintaining the
price for a product in the market, regardless of supply and demand. In the context of Annex 3,
paragraph 1, an AMS for "each basic agricultural product " includes the provision of assis tance in
holding up or maintaining a market price for that agricultural product.
43. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 provides the methodology for calculating the specific type of support
at issue in this dispute – market price support. Paragraph 8 states that "market price support shall
be calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price and the applied administered
price multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price." The
paragraph goes on to provide that "[b]udgetary payments made to maintain this gap, such as
buying-in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS."
44. Thus, the calculation of market price support is based on the price gap between the "applied
administered price" identified in the domes tic support measure and the "fixed external reference
price," multiplied by the quantity of eligible production.
Applied Administered Price
45. The Agriculture Agreement does not define the term "applied administered price ". It is
therefore necessary to evalu ate the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms of "applied
administered price." Specifically, "applied" is defined as to "put to practical use; having or concerned
with practical application. " This definition suggests an actual or real life action. With respect to
"administered," "administer" is defined as to "carry on or execute (as office, affairs, etc.), " to
"execute or dispense, " or to "furnish, supply, give (orig. something beneficial to). " Finally, as
described above, "price" is defined as "a sum in money or goods for which a thing is or may be
bought or sold" or its "value or worth."
46. Considering these definitions, the "applied administered price " is the price a Member
dispenses or furnishes to support a particular basic agricultural product. Paragraph 8 also refers to
"the" applied administered price, suggesting that this price is known and discernable. The applied
administered price is thus price set or established by the government and is, as such, distinguishable
from a prevailing domestic marke t price. The "applied administered price" is the price the Chinese
government provides for each of the basic agricultural products and is identified for each product
and each year in the Chinese legal instruments implementing the program (Relevant data available
at U.S. First Written Submission, Table 6; Exhibits US-20 – US-23, US-39 – US-42, US-52 – US-55).
Fixed External Reference Price
47. The "fixed external reference price " is a static reference value defined by the Agriculture
Agreement in Annex 3, paragraph 9. This states that the price "shall be based on the years 1986 to
1988" and "may be adjusted for quality differences as necessary. " These fixed external reference

prices can be determined using o fficial Chinese customs data from these years (Relevant data
available at U.S. First Written Submission, Table 7; Exhibit US-65).
Eligible Production
48. The third element of the market price support calculation methodology contained in Annex
3, paragraph 8, of the Agriculture Agreement directs that the established price gap be multiplied "by
the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price." The ordinary meaning
of the terms indicates that "eligible production " is all of the produ ction entitled or permitted to
receive the administered price. Specifically, the ordinary meaning of "eligible" is "[f]it or entitled to
be chosen for a position, award, etc. " Thus, the "quantity of production eligible " is a portion or
amount of the commodity produced that is entitled to receive the applied administered price. It is
the amount of agricultural production that has the rightful claim to receive the applied administered
price, whether or not that amount of production actually received the specified applied administered
price.
49. The Appellate Body in Korea – Beef considered the meaning of the phrase "quantity of
production eligible to receive the applied administered price " and reached a similar understanding.
The Appellate Body stated that "production eligible to receive the applied administered price" has "a
different meaning in ordinary usage from 'production actually purchased. '" The Appellate Body
further defined "eligible" as that which is "fit or entitled to be chosen." It noted that "a government
is able to define and limit 'eligible' production," and that "[p]roduction actually purchased may often
be less than eligible production. " Thus, "eligible production " within the meaning of Annex 3,
paragraph 8 of the Agriculture Agreement is production, which is fit or entitled to receive the
administered price, whether or not the production was actually purchased.
50. Because under China 's programs all production in identified provinces is fit or entitled to
receive the applied administered price, the "quantity of production eligible " is drawn from
China's National Bureau of Statistic and Ministry of Agriculture official wheat, rice, and c orn
production volumes (Relevant data available at U.S. First Written Submission, Table 8; Exhibits US-
18, US-73 – US-75).
III. CHINA'S MPS PROGRAMS FOR WHEAT, INDICA R ICE, JAPONICA RICE, AND CORN
PROVIDE GREATER THAN DE MINIMIS LEVELS O F DOMESTIC SUPPORT A ND THUS
RESULT IN CHINA EXCE EDING ITS DOMESTIC S UPPORT COMMITMENT FO R 2012,
2013, 2014, AND 2015
51. China's MPS Programs for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn are "market price
support" measures as contemplated by Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement. As a preliminary
matter, China has notified its Wheat and Rice MPS Programs on the "Product Specific Aggregate
Measure of Support: Market Price Support" supporting table "DS:5" of its annual notification. These
programs are notified as "product-specific." Therefore, China itself has stated that the MPS Programs
for wheat, Indica rice, and Japonica rice operate as product-specific "market price support" and has
characterized these programs as such to WTO Members.
52. Further, China's MPS Programs for wheat, Indi ca rice, Japonica rice, and corn constitute
"market price support" within the meaning of Annex 3, because each Program exhibits an "applied
administered price" and "quantity of production eligible." Specifically, China announces for each MPS
Program the "minimum procurement price " at which designated state -owned enterprises will
purchase wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. This annually announced "minimum
procurement price " constitutes an "applied administered price, " because it is the known or
discernable price China dispenses or furnishes for each basic agricultural product, regardless of the
price that would be otherwise determined by the market. This offers price support to Chinese farmers
in the designated regions.
53. China's MPS Programs also each establish a "quantity of eligible production. " The MPS
Programs specify that production in designated provinces is eligible for support, and in those
provinces the state-owned enterprises will purchase all proffered product. Therefore, the portion or
amount of the commodity produced that is entitled to receive the administered price is identified in
the MPS Programs as all production produced in the identified provinces.

54. For these reasons, China's MPS Programs for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice and corn are
"market price support " programs for the purposes of the Agriculture Agreement and must be
evaluated per the methodology set forth in Annex 3.
55. As described above, Annex 3, paragraph 8, of the Agriculture Agreement provides the
calculation methodology for market price support as:
(Applied Administered Price – Fixed External Reference Price) * Quantity of Production Eligible = AMS
56. Based on the values for each element of the "market price support" calculation, as well as
the "total value of production" data, China has provided support in excess of its de minimis level for
each of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn solely through its market price support programs
for the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Accordingly, China has acted inconsistently with its
obligations pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement on the basis of the level of
domestic support provided through China's market price support measures in favor of wheat, Indica
rice, Japonica rice, and corn, viewed separately or collectively. Therefore, the United States requests
that the panel issue the mandatory recommendation for China to bring its measures into conformity
with the Agriculture Agreement.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE U.S. COMMENTS ON CHINA'S CHALLENGE TO THE PANEL'S TERMS OF
REFERENCE, U.S. ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL, AND THE U.S.
RESPONSES TO THE PANEL'S FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS
57. [Summaries of the U.S. comments on China 's challenge to the Panel 's terms of reference,
the U.S. oral statements at the first substantive meeting, and the U.S. Responses to the Panel's First
Set of Questions are reflected in the Executive Summ ary of the U.S. First and Second Written
Submissions.]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S. SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION
I. DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHINA TO ITS CORN PRODUCERS IN 2012 THROUGH 2015 IS
PROPERLY WITHIN THE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
58. During this panel proceeding, China has not denied that it provided domestic support to corn
producers from 2012 through 2015 in excess of its Final Bound Commitment Level. Instead, China
erroneously argues that the Panel is precluded from examining and making findings and
recommendations on China's provision of domestic support to its corn producers from 2012 through
2015. China argues that the annual legal instruments through which China provided domestic
support to its corn producers in 2015 have "expired," and on that basis the provision of domestic
support provided to Chinese corn producers from 2012 through 2015 is outside the Panel's terms of
reference.
59. China's arguments misunderstand "the matter" at issue in this dispute, and the nature of
domestic support challenges generally, which necessarily relate to past action by a responding
Member. As explained below, the United States properly identified the matter at issue in its panel
request – the only matter as of the date of panel establishment that would permit an examination,
and a finding of WTO-inconsistency. The DSU thus requires the Panel to examine and make findings
and a recommendation regarding China 's provision of domestic support during th e relevant years.
The expiration of annually -issued legal instruments through which China provided such support in
the relevant years does not alter the Panel's terms of reference. Moreover, China's non-transparency
prevents it from demonstrating that China ceased to provide domestic support to its corn producers
in excess of its commitment level prior to the establishment of the Panel.
60. The "matter" to be resolved is that described in Article 7.1 of the DSU. This provision states
that a panel's terms of reference are "[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name
of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by
the [United States] in [its panel request] …, and to make such findings as will a ssist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreements ". With
respect to Article 7.1 of the DSU, the Appellate Body has stated: "[a] panel's terms of reference are
governed by the request for the establishment of a panel. In other words, the panel request identifies
the measures and the claims that a panel will have the authority to examine and on which it will

have the authority to make findings. " Accordingly, the matter that the DSB places within a panel 's
terms of reference for its examination is defined by the complaining Member's panel request.
61. Thus, as set out in the U.S. panel request and explained in prior submissions, the United
States has challenged China's provision of domestic support to its agricultural producers during the
years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 as inconsistent with China 's Final Bound Commitment Level of
"nil" and in breach of Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement. The panel request describes
four measures at issue: the "domestic support provided by China" (or "China's domestic support in
favor of agricultural producers") in each of the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. It also describes
eight affirmative claims, i.e., the United States challenges that the levels of domestic support
provided for each of the four years exceeds China's final bound commitment level in breach of Article
3.2 and of Article 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement. These four measures and eight claims constitute
the "matter" that the DSB has charged the Panel with examining through its terms of reference.
62. In addition to identifying the "matter," the U.S. panel request also includes additional
information that previews the main arguments the United States will advance in its First Written
Submission to demonstrate its claims. Prior panels and the Appellate Body have explained that there
is a significant difference between the claims identified in a panel request, which establish the panel's
terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the argume nts supporting those claims, which
are set out and clarified progressively in the written and oral submissions. The United States has
identified both in its panel request.
63. The U.S. panel request is best understood by parsing the constituent parts of the t hree
sentences in the U.S. panel request. The italicized language identifies the measures, the bolded
language identifies the claims, and the underlined language previews the arguments put forward by
the United States.
The United States considers that China has acted inconsistently with its
obligations pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement
because the level of domestic support provided by China exceeds China 's
commitment level of "nil" specified in Section I of Part IV of China 's
Schedule CLII . In particular, China's domestic support in favor of agricultural
producers, expressed in terms of its current Total Aggregate Measurement of
Support ("Total AMS"), exceeds China's final bound commitment level in 2012,
2013, 2014, and 2015 on the basis of domestic support provided to producers of,
inter alia , wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. The United States further
considers that, to the extent applicable, these measures are inconsistent with
China's obligation under Article 7.2(b) of the Agriculture Agreement
because, in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, China provides domestic support for
wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn in excess of its product-specific de minimis
level of 8.5 percent for each product.
64. The first sentence includes the measures and claims. The second sentence previews that the
claims will be demonstrated on the basis of a specific argument. The third sentence includes an
alternative claim and argumen t. As the Appellate Body recognized in EC – Selected Customs ,
"nothing in Article 6.2 prevents a complainant from making statements in the panel request that
foreshadow its arguments in substantiating the claim. If the complainant chooses to do so, these
arguments should not be interpreted to narrow the scope of the measures or the claims. "
Accordingly, the U.S. panel request includes both the matter referred to the DSB under Article 7 of
the DSU, and a preview of the arguments supporting those claims that the United States advanced
progressively in its written and oral submissions.
65. Therefore, contrary to China 's claims that the Panel is precluded from examining China 's
provision of domestic support to its corn producers in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Pa nel's
function pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU is to make an objective assessment of "the matter" before
it – the same "matter" that the DSB has put within the Panel 's terms of reference. In this dispute,
in light of the U.S. panel request and Article 7.1 of the DSU, the Panel must make an objective
assessment as to whether China 's provision of domestic support to Chinese agricultural producers
in each of the relevant years exceeded China 's commitment level and thereby breached its
commitments under the Agriculture Agreement.

A. China's Rebuttal Arguments Do Not Establish that the Measures and
Claims Identified in the U.S. Panel Request Fall Outside the Panel's Terms of
Reference
66. In China's Response to the Panel 's Questions, China makes a number of false statements
and advances arguments unsupported by the DSU and the Agriculture Agreement. First, China
argues that "domestic support" and the "level of domestic support " are not measures but a "legal
concept," and therefore are insufficient to present the problem clearly under Article 6.2 of the DSU.
In supporting its argument, China tries to draw a parallel between "domestic support" covered by
the Agriculture Agreement and "subsidies" disciplined under the SCM Agreement. Further, it argues
that the "level of domestic support" is not a measure, but an unspecified reference to a numerical
value that fails to "identify the specific measures that are alleged to have contributed to the level of
domestic support." China's arguments are in error and must fail principally because the United States
properly identified the measure at issue in its panel request.
67. The United States has not identified the measure in its panel request as simply the "level of
domestic support" or "domestic support." China has failed to provide the complete and accurate
identification of the measure included in the U.S. panel request. As stated repeatedly, the measure
at issue is "China's domestic support in favor of agricultura l producers " (also expressed as the
"domestic support provided by China"), and the panel request then lists legal instruments through
which that support is provided. The measure is therefore neither a numerical value, nor a legal
concept but action by China. As China itself noted in its answer, the measure at issue in a dispute
may be any act or omission attributable to the responding Member. The United States, indeed,
identified the measure as "China's domestic support in favor of agricultural producers" and "domestic
support provided by China." Thus, the United States identified a specific measure at issue – an act
attributable to China – in its panel request.
68. Moreover, contrary to China's argument, a comparison between domestic support under the
Agriculture Agreement and a subsidy under the SCM Agreement does not support China 's position
that the provision of domestic support by China is insufficient to identify the specific measure at
issue. Unlike the Agriculture Agreement, the SCM Agreement proh ibits Members from providing
certain types of subsidies, known as prohibited subsidies, and seeks to neutralize adverse trade
effects on the interests of another Member, through serious prejudice actions and authorizing the
use of countervailing measures. Conversely, the Agriculture Agreement neither prohibits any specific
form of domestic support, nor seeks to counter any negative effects of the provision of support. The
Agriculture Agreement simply seeks to limit the amount of domestic support provided by a Member
and requires that the Member calculate and notify the amount of support given in accordance with
certain methodologies.
69. In addition, China seems to conflate terms of reference issues with issues to be resolved on
the merits. The question of whet her the measures identified in the panel request can breach an
obligation under a covered agreement is a substantive issue to be addressed and resolved on the
merits. China's argument that "domestic support" and "level of domestic support" are legal concepts
not only misstates the U.S. identification of the measure, but asserts that these "concepts" cannot
breach the Agriculture Agreement themselves. The Panel should examine whether the measure
identified by the United States (the provision of domestic support by China) breaches the Agriculture
Agreement as part of its review of the merits.
70. In a final attempt to persuade the Panel, China baselessly argues that the right to challenge
"domestic support " or the "level of domestic support " would deprive the respondent of its due
process rights to know the case it must answer, result in uncertainty about the steps it must take
to bring its measure into conformity, and permit a complaining Member to inappropriately broaden
the scope of any compliance proceeding. China's concerns are unfounded. First, as explained above,
the United States did in fact identify the specific measure at issue. Second, the concern China
advances is not present in this dispute. The U.S. panel request, in addition to identifying "China's
domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, " also sets out the instruments through which
the support is provided (and the United States has not sought to rely on any other instruments). It
further listed the agricultural produ cts through which China 's breach would be demonstrated (and
the United States has not sought to prove its case on the basis of other products). Thus, China's
concern may apply to another dispute and another panel request, but the circumstances China
concerns itself with are not present here. Typically, original panels do not dictate to respondents
how to bring their measures into conformity; rather, a panel 's recommendation is simply to bring

measures into conformity with the covered agreement. Respondents have the flexibility to choose
how to comply with a panel 's recommendation. Therefore, despite China 's arguments, the U.S.
identification of "China's domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, " including domestic
support to China's corn producers, is not contrary to the DSU and would not permit challenges to
unidentified measures.
71. Second, China mischaracterizes the nature of a domestic support challenge. To overcome
an objection that its terms of reference argument renders domestic support unchallengeable, China
goes so far as to argue that a complaining Member could bring an AMS claim before the necessary
data is available to prove a breach. China's statement reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
WTO AMS commitments and would, indeed, render such commitments beyond challenge. A
Member's domestic support commitments, in terms of their Final Bound Commitment Level, apply
with respect to domestic support provided over a full calendar, marketing, or financial year.
Therefore, the question of whether a WTO Member is in breach of its domestic support commitments
necessarily involves a retrospective examination of the level of domestic support, calculated as
Current Total AMS provided over a period of time. Where a challenge involves market price support
programs, the complaining party must produce, among other things, data related to a country's total
annual production volume and average farm -gate prices for the full years at issue in order to
establish the level of domestic support provided and then compare that support to a Member's AMS
commitments.
72. With respect to the market price support at issue in this dispute, data for both annual
production and prices for each product were necessary for the United States to examine whether
China had exceeded i ts Final Bound Commitment Level. And, importantly, the United States and
other WTO Members do not have access to the necessary data until China itself releases it to the
public. The complete data required for the United States to analyze China 's compliance with WTO
rules for the year 2015 were not publicly available until November 2016 – nearly a year after the
end of the relevant time period. Therefore, the United States filed its request for establishment of a
panel as soon as was feasible, on December 5, 2016, less than a month after the complete data
became available.
73. Under these circumstances, China 's argument that the United States is precluded from
challenging China's provision of domestic support to its corn producers for 2012-2015 would, indeed,
frustrate the ability of the United States or any other WTO Member to challenge China's provision of
domestic support in excess of its WTO commitments. If the Panel were precluded from examining
past provisions of domestic support simply because a program has allegedly changed, given the
retrospective nature of domestic support obligations, simple changes to a legal instrument would
preclude challenges to a Member's domestic support without the Member having achieved conformity
of its support with its WTO obligations. The Panel should not endorse a legally erroneous approach
that would also open such a loophole in WTO rules. Instead, consistent with the DSU and the
Agriculture Agreement, the Panel should consider China's domestic support provided through annual
legal instruments during the years at issue, as set out in the U.S. panel request and therefore within
the Panel's terms of reference.
74. Such an analysis is exactly what the panel and Appellate Body did in Korea – Beef.
Specifically, in Korea – Beef, the United States and Australia requested the DSB to establish a panel
on April 15, 1999 and July 12, 1999, respectively, and the panel was established on May 26, 1999.
The panel and Appellate Body issued findings concerning domestic support provided in 1997 and
1998 – that is, the two years prior to the complaining parties ' requests for panel establishment.
Moreover, in examining whether Korea's provision of domestic support in 1997 and 1998 exceeded
its domestic support commitments, the panel reviewed annual legal instruments that were no longer
in effect at the time the DSB established the panel to examine the matter raised in the requests for
panel establishment.
75. The U.S. approach in this dispute is the same as that taken in Korea – Beef, the only prior
WTO dispute addressing market price support programs. In both, a complaining party seeks to
demonstrate a Member's breach of its domestic support commitments through the domestic support
provided through the legal instruments capable of examination. Accordingly, the Panel should
approach the domestic support China confers, and the time-bound legal instruments it employs, no
differently than did the panel and Appellate Body in Korea – Beef. Failing to do so would ignore the
fact that Current Total AMS is deter mined annually, as well as ignore the annual nature of market
price support programs in China.

B. China's Rebuttal Arguments Do Not Establish that the Panel Is Precluded From
Making Findings and Recommendations On the Measures Identified in the U.S.
Panel Request
76. The United States has explained that it is not challenging a measure that had expired prior
to panel establishment, but rather is challenging the domestic support provided by China. China has
not alleged or demonstrated that the legal instruments through which it provided domestic support
in 2016 had removed any WTO-inconsistency as of the date of panel establishment. Therefore, the
replacement of the annual 2015 corn legal instrument with another instrument for 2016 is not
relevant. To the extent the 2015 corn support legal instrument is considered to have "expired," it
would be appropriate for the Panel to make findings and recommendations in light of the Panel 's
terms of reference and the DSU provision (Article 19.1) requiring a recommendation for any measure
within the panel's terms of reference found to be WTO-inconsistent.
77. The Appellate Body reports in China – Raw Materials demonstrate that expiry of an annual
legal instrument should not deprive the complaining party of a finding and recommendation on a
WTO-inconsistent measure within a panel's terms of reference. The situation in this dispute is similar
to that in China – Raw Materials, which also dealt with a series of annual Chinese measures. The
Appellate Body held that with respect to annual in struments that implement a measure (in that
dispute, export duties or quotas), a panel should make findings on a recurring measure, as evidenced
by annual legal instruments that may have been superseded in the course of the dispute. In so
doing, both the panel and Appellate Body examined the measure as it existed at the time of panel
establishment. The Appellate Body noted that if complainants were precluded from challenging
measures of an annual nature that may have expired during the course of the panel proceedings, it
would create a loophole in the system. Complainants could find themselves 'taking aim' at 'appearing
and disappearing targets, ' and responding parties could evade a panel's scrutiny by removing
measures during the panel proceedings and reins tating them in the future without any
consequences.
78. In the present dispute, China argues that Raw Materials is not applicable because the annual
legal instruments that implement the provision of domestic support for corn in 2015 allegedly expired
before panel establishment. However, as explained above, China is incorrect that the expiration of
an annual legal i nstrument for a particular year prevents a panel from making findings on the
domestic support provided through that instrument in the relevant year – the U.S. panel request
sets out the only "matter" that existed and demonstrated China's WTO -inconsistent support as of
that date. Moreover, in the context of domestic support, China's argument creates the very loophole
the panel and Appellate Body in Raw Materials sought to avoid.
79. Most of the instruments identified in the U.S. panel request are annual in nature – both for
corn and for wheat and rice. China has indicated that it does not argue that the market price support
programs for wheat or rice have expired. As China explained at the first panel meeting and in its
answers to the Panel's questions, the rice and wheat programs essentially operate in the same way
the export duties and quotas in Raw Materials operated – i.e., they consist of an ongoing legislative
framework and a series of annual measures that identify the specific applied administered price and
implementation plans for each year in which the MPS program operates. However, China has not
explained why the Panel should view the instruments for corn any differently, or why the differences
between the annual legal instruments for corn in 2015 an d 2016 mean that the expiration of the
2015 legal instruments extinguishes the Panel's authority with respect to the provision of support
during 2012-2015.
80. Specifically, China does not dispute that all of the annual legal instruments for rice and wheat
issued in 2012 through 2015 in fact expired prior to the establishment of the panel. Therefore, China
appears to suggest that the continued existence of the ongoing legal framework measures, including
the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation, preserves the Panel's authority to make findings regarding
the provision of domestic support for rice and wheat in the relevant years. But China's argument
does not support finding that corn domestic support has "expired", for two reasons.
81. First, the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation provides authority for China to implement market
price support for corn, as well as for wheat and rice. The annual legal instruments for each product
covers one year (and therefore could be argued to "expire" with that year). There is no logical basis
to distinguish rice and wheat from corn, then, and to think that the authorizing framework that
applies to the three products provides a basis for the Panel's terms of reference for rice and wheat,

but not for corn. China's approach would lead to the very "disappearing target" dilemma the panel
and Appellate Body in Raw Materials warned against.
82. Second, China's argument apparently relies on the absence of a regulatory framework
pursuant to which the corn instruments were enacted. But, if the mere absence of an ongoing legal
framework meant that the expiration of annual instruments precluded a panel from making findings,
this again would allow the same "disappearing target" danger – a constantly moving target that
required a complainant to continually update its analysis in hopes of keeping up with the changing
measures. Moreover, such a finding would encourage Members to reduce the level of transparency
in their systems and instead rely on annual, and even ad hoc , legal instruments alon e – a
development that would only add to a complainant's difficulty in bringing a successful challenge.
83. As the United States has explained previously (and again in the next section of this
submission), the fact is we do not know – and the Panel therefo re cannot properly evaluate – the
factual and legal situation in China in 2016. Under such circumstances, and given the nature of
challenges to a Member's AMS, to avoid prejudicing U.S. rights to meaningful findings and
recommendations with respect to the provision of domestic support in 2012-2015, including through
support for corn, the Panel must make findings on the matter as articulated in the U.S. panel request.
That the specific legal instruments upon which those findings would be based may have expired does
not alter the matter at issue or exclude the relevant measures from the Panel's terms of reference.
84. In addition to being required to examine the "matter" before it, if the Panel finds China's
provision of domestic support to be inconsistent with China's obligations, it must, pursuant to Article
19.1 of the DSU, recommend that China bring its measure(s) into conformity with the Agriculture
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 11, therefore, the Panel must make an objective assessment as to
whether Chi na's provision of domestic support to Chinese agricultural producers in each of the
relevant years is in excess of its commitment level and thereby breaches China's commitments under
the Agriculture Agreement. If the Panel finds China's provision of domestic support to be inconsistent
with China's obligations, it must, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, recommend that China bring
its measure(s) into conformity with the Agriculture Agreement.
85. Thus, a panel is required to make a recommendation on any measure that it finds to be
inconsistent with China's WTO obligations; and such a recommendation is the right of a complainant
under the DSU. Therefore, if this Panel finds that China has provided domestic support in excess of
its AMS commitments for any of the relevant years, the Panel must recommend that China bring the
measure(s) into compliance with its obligations.
C. China Has Not Demonstrated That Its Market Price Support Program for Corn
"Expired," or That It Ceased to Provide Domestic Support for Corn in Excess of
Its Commitment Level in 2016
86. As explained in the preceding section, the matter at issue before the Panel is whether China's
provision of domestic support to its agricultural producers from 2012 through 2015 is inconsistent
with its do mestic support commitments. Based on the U.S. panel request and the nature of AMS
disputes, the expiration of specific legal instruments through which the United States has
demonstrated that China has breached its Final Bound Commitment Level does not prec lude the
Panel from making findings on this matter. For completeness, however, the United States also
explains in this section why China also has failed to show that its market price support program for
corn had "expired" by the time of the Panel's establi shment, or that it ceased to provide domestic
support for corn in excess of its commitment level in 2016.
87. First, China asserts at some length that after the "expiry" of the 2015 corn market price
support instrument, it moved to a system of "market-oriented purchase" by "market players," where
all types of entities may decide to make purchases "on their own initiative." According to China, the
2016 corn purchasing instruments are " seeking to achieve a market-based price discovery." China
supports this assertion with the text of the 2016 corn purchasing instruments. However, the market-
based aspirations espoused in the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase are simply not sufficient to
demonstrate that China no longer provides domestic support for corn in excess of its commitments.
The United States notes that seeking market-based price discovery is not the same as eliminating
price support policies for corn, and "reform" of the price support program is not the same as

termination. On its face, the n, the instrument China identifies does not support its assertion that
market-price support had "expired" or been withdrawn.
88. The aspirations and policy "reform" reflected in the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase
Notice and other 2016 policy statement s are in fact similar to those identified in the 2004 Grain
Opinion and 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation, pursuant to which China's market price support for
wheat and rice are implemented. For instance, the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation states that
the "state encourages market entities of various forms of ownership to engage in grain business
operations, so as to promote fair competition" and that the "grain price is formed principally by
market supply and demand." But the 2004 Grain Distribution Reg ulation also provides that, "to
protect the interests of grain farmers, the State Council may decide, when necessary, to implement
minimum purchase prices in the main grain-producing regions." In this manner, though China's 2016
Northeast Region Corn Purch ase Notice calls for "advancing corn purchasing and storage system
reform," this reform is similar to the "marketization reform in grain purchasing and sales" pursued
in 2004.
89. This dichotomy between encouraging "market -oriented purchases" and maintain ing
government control also is apparent on the face of the 2016 corn purchasing instruments and
reflected in China's responses to the Panel's Questions. The 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase
Notice cites as its goal facilitating a situation where farmers "sell corn according to the fluctuating
market price," and that "market entities of all types [are] independently entering the market to
make purchases." However, China's 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice simultaneously
provides that relevant regions must "comprehensively organize the branches of central government-
owned enterprises under jurisdiction and local backbone grain enterprises to lead the way in entering
the market for purchasing." The 2016 instrument further states that "[r]elevant central government-
owned enterprises such as COFCO and AVIC must fully utilize their own channels and advantages to
launch marketized purchasing, striving not to go lower than the policy-based purchasing amount of
the previous year, and properly bring into play their guiding and driving role." All of this is to "prevent
the occurrence of farmers having "difficulties in selling grain.'" Therefore, while the 2016 measure
does encourage "all types" of entities to enter the market, it also recognizes and provides for the
continuing role of state -owned enterprises tasked with ensuring the market operates properly to
compensate farmers and avoid difficulty selling corn by purchasing substantial volumes of newly
harvested corn. Thus, direction towards increased "marketization" does not, and has not in the past,
meant that the Chinese government cannot continue to engage in the provision of domestic support
through government purchasing, including at support prices.
90. The provincial implementation measure from Heilongjiang, the 2016 Notice on Proper Handling
of Corn in Heilongjiang , similarly recognizes the separate roles of private actors beginning to
"marketize" the corn market, and state-owned enterprises tasked with driving the market by making
purchases at levels similar to prior years. For instance, the regional implementing instrument states
that "all types of entities can enter the market to purchase the corn as they wish." To that end, the
provincial government is both "encouraging multiple market players to ac tively purchase and sell
corn in the market," and "mak[ing] overall plans on coordinating the branches of central enterprises
and major local grain enterprises in the administrative regions to take the lead to purchase corn in
the market." Specifically, the instrument provides that "[a]ssociated branches of central enterprises,
such as COFCO, Chinatex Corporation, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, etc. shall make full
use of their own advantages and channels to carry out the market -oriented purchase, work harder
to ensure the purchase volume [is] no less than that of the policy -based purchase last year, and
play a leading role in stabilizing the market and guiding the expectations." Thus, while the instrument
released at the provincial level by Heilongjiang suggests a desire for private enterprises to enter the
market and purchase corn, it also recognize the need for state -owned enterprises to guide the
market through continuing purchasing activities and ensuring that farmers are able to sell their corn.
91. Second, China argues in its responses to Panel Question 2(b) that prices for corn are now
determined by the market and "reflect[] the market forces of supply and demand." To support this
assertion, China cites to an NDRC press release reporting that "[c]orn prices are based on the
market," and reflect "reasonable price differences resulting from regional differences and corn quality
differences." The United States notes that the press release was published on June 23, 2017, seven
months after the U.S . panel request. The NDRC press release contains no citations or data, and
therefore consists of a series of unsubstantiated assertions. This new exhibit provides no information
that is pertinent to the Panel's assessment of "the matter" as of the date of panel establishment.

92. Moreover, that China permitted prices for corn to decline from artificially high levels does not
demonstrate that China has instituted a "market-based price discovery mechanism," or that Chinese
corn prices have "linked up with the international market." To the contrary, Chinese corn prices have
remained above international prices for corn throughout 2016 and 2017 as illustrated by Exhibit US-
94. Further, the GAIN Reports cited by China further illustrate the continuing differentia l between
Chinese domestic prices for corn and international prices. According to the GAIN Reports, the "spot
market" for corn in early December 2016 provided a price of 1,681 RMB or $244 per ton. The Report
compares these Chinese port prices to the U.S. c orn import price in December 2016 which "landed
at Chinese ports is about 1,500 RMB per ton ($218)," and other competing grain imports such as
U.S. sorghum, which costs 1,690 RMB or $205. Thus, the lack of an applied administered price
communicated to priv ate market actors and farmers does not mean that the domestic price is
market-based, or that the purchases made by state -owned enterprises were not done at support
prices.
93. Third, China makes a number of other erroneous assertions regarding its 2016 corn purchasing
instruments and activities. In particular, China states that that the 2016 instruments "are not
designating enterprises to purchase corn." As the United States described in its response to Panel
Question 2(a)-(c), the central and provincial level instruments implemented in 2016 mirrored prior
corn market price support instruments in all relevant policy and logistical elements – including the
designation of state-owned enterprises, such as Sinograin, COFCO, and AVIC, to purchase corn. Like
in prior years, private entities may also purchase corn, but designated state-owned enterprises have
a "guiding and driving role." These state -owned enterprises "must fully utilize their own channels
and advantages to launch marketized purchasing, striving not to go lower than the policy -based
purchasing amount of the previous year." Further, both the 2015 and 2016 corn purchasing
instruments also provide for financing through the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and
making available storage for purchased grain.
94. Next, China erroneously asserts that "there is no purchase of corn by government entities
after 30 April 2016," and that "the Chinese government does not have statistics" regarding purchases
after the expiry of the TRPR. However, as described in the response of the United States to Panel
Question 2(a)-(c), Sinograin, a state-owned enterprise also charged with making purchases between
2012 and 2015, reported that it purchased 21.41 million metric tons of corn during the 2016/17
harvest through 743 Sinograin depots in the northeast region. According to Sinograin, this was 21
percent of the production in northeast China and 70 percent of the volume procured by state-owned
enterprises. Describing its activities, Sinograin further reported that "[i] n circumstances where
purchasing entities have decreased, the strength of the market is insufficient, and there is downward
pressure on prices, [Sinograin headquarters] does not push prices even lower; it actively enters the
market to expand the number of depots and accelerate the rate of purchasing to send a strong signal
to stabilize and guide market expectations." Moreover, in addition to the statistics kept by state -
owned enterprises, such as Sinograin, the 2016 corn purchasing instruments direct certai n
recordkeeping and reporting activities. The 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice, states that
"[a]ll relevant regions must . . . strengthen situation analysis and evaluation, closely track market
changes, regularly announce information such as grai n purchasing progress and market price
trends." Thus, it appears that records regarding purchasing and pricing activity are held by the
Chinese government through its provinces and state-owned enterprises.
95. Finally, the United States notes that it is Ch ina that argues that its market price support for
corn "expired" in 2016, and therefore it is for China to demonstrate that this claim is supported by
the record facts. To make this argument China must demonstrate that as of the date of panel request
it ha d ceased to provide support for corn in excess of its commitments. China has made this
assertion, but as described above and in the U.S. response to the Panel's Question 2, it was not
clear at the time of panel request and it is not clear now that China ha s ceased to provide support
prices to Chinese corn farmers, or that it no longer provides support in excess of its commitment
levels.
II. CHINA HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE UNITED STATES' CLAIM THAT CHINA BREACHED ITS DOMESTIC
SUPPORT COMMITMENTS

96. China attempts to rebut the U.S. showing that China has exceeded its permitted levels of
domestic support by arguing that it is permitted to use an alternative approach to the computation
of the product-specific AMS. Specifically, China argues that the methodolo gy contained in Annex 3
of the Agriculture Agreement is only a "fallback" option, and that the Supporting Tables attached to

Part IV of its Schedule of Concessions contain agreed China -specific methodologies that supplant
the methodology required by the Agriculture Agreement. However, China's position is unsupported
by the text and structure of the relevant covered agreements, including China's Protocol of
Accession.
97. China, like all WTO Members, committed to abide by the rules outlined in the Agricultu re
Agreement, as well as maintain a level of domestic support at or below its Final Bound Commitment
Level of "nil." Paragraph 1.3 of China's Protocol of Accession specifically states: " [e]xcept as
otherwise provided for in this Protocol , those obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements
annexed to the WTO Agreement that are to be implemented over a period of time starting with entry
into force of that Agreement shall be implemented by China as if it had accepted that Agreement on
the date of its entry into force." The Agriculture Agreement is one of the listed Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, and with which China has agreed to comply.
98. Consistent with Paragraph 1.3 Members also agreed in China's Accession Protocol to cert ain
modifications of the calculation methodology for Current Total AMS. Specifically, pursuant to
paragraph 235 of China's Working Party Report, incorporated by reference into China's Protocol of
Accession, China agreed that, for purposes of Article 6.4, it would maintain product-specific domestic
support at or below a de minimis level of 8.5 percent of the total value of production for each basic
agricultural product and that China would not have recourse to Article 6.2.
99. In contrast to Paragraph 235, P aragraph 238 of the Working Party Report records that
Members did not agree with all elements of the methodology and policy classifications used in China's
Supporting Tables. Specifically, Members asked China to clarify methodological issues contained in
its Supporting Tables, and, China agreed to clarify the methodological issue in the context of its
notification obligations under the Agriculture Agreement. This demonstrates that WTO Members did
not view China's Supporting Tables as reflecting new rights o r obligations of China to which they
were "agreeing."
100. Therefore, for China, as for other Members, Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agriculture
Agreement mandates the methodology for calculating the value of the type of domestic support at
issue in this dispute – market price support. Paragraph 8 states that "market price support shall be
calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price and the applied administered price
multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price."
101. China has argued that the Panel can look to information contained in its Supporting Tables to
identify China-specific methodologies for identification of the fixed external reference price and the
quantity of eligible producti on, and that these methodologies supplant the "fallback" obligations
contained in Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement. Specifically, China argues that "Articles 1(a)(ii)
and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture … specifically designate the 'constituent data and
methodology' as the elements from the supporting tables that give rise to domestic-support-related
rights and obligations in the calculation of Current (Total) AMS." China relies on the Appellate Body
report in Korea – Beef to argue that there is no hierarchy between the relevant provisions of Annex
3 and a Member's constituent data and methodology. China's arguments misunderstand the
relationship between the Agriculture Agreement and a Member's Schedule of Concessions and
Supporting Tables, as well as the role and status of information contained in Supporting Tables under
the Agriculture Agreement.
102. The Agriculture Agreement provides the ways in which the information contained in a
Member's Supporting Tables may be used in the calculation of a Member's Current Total AMS, but it
does not give rise to domestic -support related rights and obligations in the calculation of Current
Total AMS. The Agriculture Agreement directs the reliance of a Member's Supporting Table to provide
Member-specific factual information used to understand a Member's agricultural sector. Specifically,
Article 1(b) states that "basic agricultural product" "is defined as the product as close as practicable
to the point of first sale as specified in a Member's Schedule and in the related supporting material."
Similarly, the definition of "year" provided by the Agriculture Agreement in Article 1(i) "refers to the
calendar, financial or marketing year specified in the Schedule relating to that Member." Thus, the
Agriculture Agreement directs the use of a Member's Supporting Table to glean Member -specific
factual information for purposes of identifying the basic agricultural products in the Member's
territory and definition of year for a particular program; it does not create inde pendent rights and
obligations.

103. Where the Agriculture Agreement does not expressly direct recourse to information contained
in the Supporting Tables, the information may be used only as provided in Articles 1(a) and 1(h).
Specifically, Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agriculture Agreement states that the product -specific AMS must
be "calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account
the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of support material incor porated by
reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule." Article 1(h), in turn, provides that a Member's "Total
AMS" refers to "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers,
calculated as the sum of all aggregate measureme nts of support for basic agricultural products, all
non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and equivalent measurements of support
for agricultural products." For a given year, the "Current Total AMS" must be calculated in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6, and with the constituent data and
methodology used in the supporting material."
104. The inclusion of the phrase "in accordance with" in Article 1( a)(ii) indicates that a
product-specific AMS calculation must be conducted "consistent with" the methodology provided in
Annex 3. Conversely, the use of the phrase "taking into account" in reference to constituent data
and methodology requires a panel to "take into consideration, [or] notice" that information. This
indicates that the Panel must consider any relevant constituent data and methodology, but may not
accord a higher degree of consideration to that information than it does the methodology in Annex 3.
105. Contrary to China's argument, the Appellate Bo dy report in Korea – Beef supports this
understanding. In that dispute, the Appellate Body noted the distinction reflected in the text of
Article 1(a)(ii) between the phrases "in accordance with" and "taking into account," and found that
the ordinary meaning of the phrases suggests a hierarchy attributing a "more rigorous standard" to
Annex 3, than to constituent data and methodology. The Appellate Body did not limit this statement
regarding the supremacy of Annex 3 to those circumstances in which no constituent data and
methodology were provided by a Member; nor would the text of the Agriculture Agreement have
supported such a view. Rather, the text of the Agriculture Agreement suggests that, when
performing the calculation of AMS for a particular product p ursuant to Annex 3, the data and
methodology contained in the supporting material may provide additional information relevant to
the calculation of support for the specific product at issue , but it does not permit Members to use
alternative methodologies in its Supporting Table.
106. When discussing how a panel should treat a conflict between Annex 3 and a Member's
constituent data and methodology, China states that "the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef did not
resolve the question of any hierarchy between th e relevant provisions of Annex 3 and a Member's
constituent data and methodology . . . the Appellate Body therefore explicitly left open the question
of a hierarchy, and even entertained the possibility that the hierarchy could be in favor of the
constituent data and methodology." Contrary to China's argument, the Appellate Body in Korea –
Beef did address the apparent hierarchy between Annex 3 and a Member's constituent data and
methodology, and did not find that Article 1(a)(ii) permitted a panel to favor a Member's constituent
data and methodology.
A. The Legal Status of a Member's Supporting Table Is the Same regardless of
When the Member Joined the WTO
107. China also argues that the constituent data included in a Member's Supporting Tables has a
different legal status depending on whether the Member is an original Member or a recently acceding
Member. Specifically, China argues that, "for each original Member of the WTO, . . . based on the
incorporation by reference of a Member's supporting tables into that Member's Schedule of
Concessions, the supporting tables constitute an integral part of the GATT 1994." However, in
contrast to original WTO Members, China argues that for "later-acceded Members . . . the supporting
tables are an integral part of the terms of that Member's accession to the WTO, under Article XII:1
of the Marrakesh Agreement." This is false, and China's argument must fail for two reasons.
108. First, China's Schedule of Concessions, including Part IV, does not form part of China's
Accession Protocol. Rather, as stated in Part II, paragraph 1 of China's Protocol of Accession: "[t]he
Schedules annexed to this Protocol shall become the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments
annexed to the GATT 1994." This is consistent with the treatment of other WTO Members' Schedules
of Concessions, which also form part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT
1994"). Thus, it is clear that China's Schedule of Concessions is not part of the Accession Protocol,
but the GATT 1994.

109. Second, Article 21, paragraph 1 of the Agriculture Agreement clarifies the relationship
between the Agriculture Agreement and the GATT 1994. It states t hat the "provisions of the
GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WT O Agreement shall
apply subject to the other provisions of this Agreement." In other words, where there is a conflict
between the provisions of the Agriculture Agreement and the GATT 1994, the Agriculture Agreement
would prevail.
110. In the EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar dispute, the panel and the Appellate Body agreed that
"WTO Members may use entries in their Schedules of Concession to clarify and qualify the
'concession' they individually agree to assume," but they may not "reduce or conflict with obligations
they have assumed under the GATT or WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Agriculture."
This echoed prior statements by a GATT 1947 panel in US – Sugar suggesting that a "Schedule[] of
Concessions" is for Members to "incorporate . . . acts yiel ding rights under the General Agreement
but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement." Therefore, where, as here, a Member's
Schedule conflicts with the obligations of the Agriculture Agreement, the provisions of that Schedule
must fail, and the Panel must apply the applicable provisions of the Agriculture Agreement instead.
111. We note that the European Union relies on EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar to suggest that a
Member may deviate from agreements found in the covered agreement in its Sch edule where the
deviation "does not 'reduce' per se the commitments of the newly acceded Members under the
Agriculture Agreement." That is, the European Union suggests that a panel must evaluate the
apparent change to the Member's commitment to determine w hether it in fact "reduces" the
commitment, or only alters it. However, the European Union fails to provide the legal basis for such
a position, much less explain how or why in practice such a rule could operate. Similar to China's
arguments, the European Union's argument would mean that every WTO Member could in theory be
bound by as-of-yet unknown commitments, different from those reflected in the texts of the covered
agreements as agreed by WTO Members, and different from the commitments of every other W TO
Member.
112. The only vehicle through which China could accede to a commitment not consistent with the
obligations of the Agriculture Agreement was its Accession Protocol, including any paragraphs of the
Working Party Report incorporated by reference into that Protocol. Absent such a commitment, China
must comply with the obligations of the Agriculture Agreement like any other WTO Member must,
including the methodological obligations contained in Annex 3 with respect to the calculation of
market price s upport. For these reasons, the Supporting Tables thus do not, and could not,
themselves set out any legally permissible deviation from the Agriculture Agreement.
113. Even aside from the fact that China may not alter an Agriculture Agreement commitment
through its Schedule or Supporting Table, we note that China's Supporting Tables contain no
reference to an article in the Agriculture Agreement, nor any express language indicating that the
Membership agreed to alter a commitment specifically for China. Compare the language included in
China's Supporting Table to the language used in China's Working Party to deviate from the de
minimis amount outlined in Article 6.4 of the Agriculture Agreement.
114. When WTO Members agreed to provide China with an obligation different from the Agriculture
Agreement, they clearly referenced the legal obligation to be modified by name. The Working Party
Report thus clearly evinces that WTO Members agreed to provide China with a different de minimis
than that provided for in the Agriculture Agreement, and agreed that China would not have recourse
to Article 6.2 of the Agriculture Agreement. In contrast, China's Supporting Table contains no similar
reference. On the face of the Supporting Table, there is no indication that the WTO Members agreed
to modify any legal obligation (because there was no agreement), and there is no reference to Annex
3 or any other provision in the Agriculture Agreement. Accepting China's argument would create a
situation where, again, Members would not know what other Members' obligations are, because
numerous implicit methodologies could be drawn from the data and descriptions provided in a
Member's Supporting Tables. Such an interpretation lacks any legal basis and would lead to absurd
and unworkable results.
115. This dilemma becomes apparent when looking more closely at China's arguments regarding
the quantity of eligible production. China argues that the Panel should use the procurement amounts
for purposes of calculating MPS for the programs at issue here, because it used procurement for the
programs in existence when it calculated its base AMS. However, the description provided in the
Supporting Table does not make clear how the China's mark et price support programs operated,

including whether the programs limited purchases to a specific amount. Were the latter to be true,
total production would not have been the appropriate value to use for eligible production.
116. China argues that any differences between the programs does not matter, because constituent
data and methodology apply to products, and not measures. However, China fails to explain how
this view supports its arguments. With respect to eligible production, for example, China argues that
the Panel must calculate market price support based on the calculation of the market price support
program (measure) in its Supporting Tables. China therefore appears to suggest that while the
methodology in the Supporting Tables relates to a parti cular program, the methodology now must
necessarily be used with respect to all market price support measures for the same product
regardless of the differences between the market price support programs at issue. However, if
constituent data and methodolog y apply to products and not measures, then the more logical
consequence of this view would be that China's use of an alternative methodology with respect to
the calculation of a particular program simply does not reflect the type of constituent data and
methodology the Panel must take into account in determining China's current product -specific AMS
for the relevant products. Regardless, as the United States has explained, China may not rely on
constituent data and methodology where the methodology is incons istent with the requirements of
the Agriculture Agreement.
117. Moreover, not knowing how a program described in China's Supporting Tables works, it is
unclear on what basis the Panel would be able to determine that the values used in that calculation
reflect the intention by the Members to alter the market price support methodology for purposes of
calculating China's product -specific and Current Total AMS. That is, the Panel cannot determine
based on the record before it whether the calculation provided in the Supporting Table is consistent
with Annex 3 or not. Therefore, based on the vague factual descriptions provided in the Supporting
Table alone, China asks the Panel to assume an intention on the part of the WTO Membership to
amend an obligation under the Agriculture Agreement as it applied to China only.
118. The situation regarding the fixed external reference price is no different. China used a value
in its Supporting Tables for purposes of calculating Base Total AMS and now asks the Panel to derive
from that usage an intention by the Members to alter the terms of China's accession. Not only would
such an exercise be inconsistent with the terms of China's Accession Protocol, it would create
significant uncertainty with respect to Members' obligations, not only under the Agriculture
Agreement, but under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and any number of
other Agreements.
119. The second concern raised by China's argument is the disparity it would create between
original and acceding Members to the WTO. Without a clear indication in the legal texts, a Member
like China acceding to the WTO six years after the conclusion of the Uruguay round would have been
able to do so on terms significantly more production - and trade-distorting than original Members.
That is, were China able to use a quantity of eligible production limited only to the quantity actually
procured, China's freedom to distort would be compounded, as the effect of such support might be
provided to total production, but the c alculation would only need to reflect a small portion of that
support. China thus could have an identical program to another Member like India, but,
unconstrained by the same obligations as those other Members, be able to provide significantly more
support to its producers, increasing consequent production and trade effects. China has provided no
argumentation that would allow such an interpretation in the absence of the clear, and legally
confirmed intention of WTO Members, and the Panel should reject China's arguments accordingly.
120. Accordingly, the Panel should reject China's interpretations of the relevant Agreements,
because they lack any legal basis and would give rise to serious concerns regarding the status and
content of the WTO commitments of all Members.
B. China Has Not Demonstrated the Existence of a Subsequent Practice or
Subsequent Agreement Regarding the Use of an Alternative Fixed External
Reference Price For Newly Acceding WTO Members
121. In addition to its argument that both its quanti ty of eligible production and its fixed external
reference price were modified by virtue of information contained in its Supporting Table, China has
now argued in its responses to questions that the "practice of Members to use, for later -acceded
Members, a different base period, including for the fixed external reference price, constitutes a

subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention."
122. The use of post-1986-1988 fixed external reference prices by recently acceding Members does
not fit within the definition of subsequent practice or subsequent agreement per Article 31(3) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"). Article 31(3) of the VCLT provides, in relevant
part, that with respect to the general rule of interpretation "[t]here shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any su bsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
123. That is, Article 31(3) directs that a panel shall take into account that subsequent practice
"which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding [the] interpretation" of the treaty.
Therefore, for the practice of WTO Members to be relevant to the Panel's interpretive exercise, the
practice must relate to the interpretation of a relevant provision of the Agriculture Agreement. In this
dispute, the Panel is charged with interpreting and applying China's obligations under Article 3.2 and
6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement regarding Current Total AMS. The Agriculture Agreement provides
instructions for the calculation of each of China's product-specific AMSs, and then its Current Total
AMS, in Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), and by extension in Annex 3 and Article 6.
124. The heart of the interpretative concern is Annex 3, paragraph 9 of the Agriculture Agreement,
which states the "fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988." The text
of Annex 3 is clear in requiring Members to calculate market price support for purposes of product-
specific AMS using a fixed external reference price of 1986-1988. Customary rules of interpretation
do not permit an interpreter to use context, or a subsequent practice or agreement, to reach an
interpretation inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the provision in question, such
that they create a derogation or exception from the provisions of the treaty. Rather, these sources
of interpretation must be used to determine the particular meaning of the terms as used in the
relevant provision.
125. The Appellate Body in EC – Bananas (Article 21.5) made a simi lar finding with respect to
subsequent agreements. It noted that Article 31(3)(a) relates to the situation where an agreement
specifies how existing rules or obligations in force are to be "applied;" the term does not connote
the creation of new or the extension of existing obligations. Therefore, a subsequent practice, like a
subsequent agreement, cannot have the legal effect of changing the obligation set out in a covered
agreement.
126. China has shown no subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of Annex 3, paragraph
9, because it has pointed to no text in any supporting table that even refers to that provision and it
has pointed to no "agreement" that speaks to an "interpretation" of that provision. Moreover, a panel
cannot refer to subsequent practice in order to develop an interpretation of a legal provision that
applies to some Members only, and not to other Members. China appears to suggest that the alleged
subsequent practice would support different meanings of the text of the Agriculture A greement for
different Members. But while a legal provision may be susceptible to multiple interpretations, the
interpretative exercise cannot change depending on the Member in question. This would lead to an
illogical result, whereby each Member may be subject to potentially very different obligations.
127. Therefore, the Panel should reject China's argument that the use of an alternative fixed
external reference price for newly acceding WTO member amounts to a subsequent practice or
subsequent agreement under the VCLT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. ORAL STATEMENTS AT
THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH THE PANEL
I. CHINA ERRS IN CLAIMING THAT THE PANEL MUST CALCULATE CHINA'S CURRENT AMS CONSISTENT
WITH CHINA'S BASE AMS
128. Throughout this dispute, China has argued that China's "Current Total AMS" for subsequent
years must be calculated consistently with the calculation of its "Base Total AMS," as set out in its
Supporting Tables. China asserts that "the same constituent data and methodology, including the
same fixed external reference prices and the same methodology for determining eligible production,

must be used to calculate both Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS." While China insists that
the Agriculture Agreement and its Supporting Tables can be interpreted harmoniously, it is clear that
China is suggesting that a Member's Supporting Table can supplant the calculation requirements
provided in the Agriculture Agreement for calculation of AMS and Current Total AMS wi th country-
specific methodologies. This would both contradict the Agriculture Agreement and significantly
expand China's ability to provide domestic support while other WTO Members are subject to different
rules. The text of the WTO Agreements simply does not support this understanding.
129. The Agriculture Agreement defines the terms "AMS," "Base Total AMS," and "Current Total
AMS," and sets out specific instructions and methodologies for the calculation of "AMS" and "Current
Total AMS." The Agriculture Agreement does not impose specific requirements on the calculation of
AMS during a base period or Base Total AMS. Indeed, Base Total AMS is not relevant as an obligation
of a Member; rather, that calculation provided a basis for the Annual and Final Bound Commitment
Levels that are the subject of a Member's commitments under Article 3.2 and 6.3. Naturally, then,
the Agriculture Agreement nowhere requires "consistency" between the calculation of Current Total
AMS and the calculation of Base Total AMS.
130. First, turning to AMS, it is described in Article 1(a). AMS is the annual level of non -exempt
domestic support, expressed in monetary terms, provided to the producers of the basic agricultural
product or non -product-specific support provided in favor of the agricultural producers generally.
Romanette (i) of Article 1(a) states that AMS " with respect to support provided during the base
period" is "specified in the relevant tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV
of a Member's Schedul e." From the plain text, it is clear that Article 1(a)(i) does not set out or
mandate any calculation for AMS during the base period, but rather identifies where the value of
such support is recorded for the base period. Romanette (ii) addresses AMS "with respect to support
provided during any year of the implementation period and thereafter." As we described earlier,
Article 1(a)(ii) does require a calculation. Each product -specific AMS in a subsequent year will be
"calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account
the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by
reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule."
131. Thus, Article 1(a)(ii) provides a calculation requ irement for AMS in the subsequent years,
while Article 1(a)(i) provides no such requirement for AMS provided during the base period. Nothing
in the Agreement suggests that the method a Member used to calculate AMS in the base period
would have the effect o f nullifying the obligation to calculate AMS in the subsequent years "in
accordance with" Annex 3, and "taking into account" constituent data and methodology. As
previously explained, "taking into account" does not require calculation consistent with or in
conformity with information contained in the Supporting Tables. Rather, it requires a Panel to give
consideration to country-specific "constituent data and methodology" – including the types of basic
agricultural products grown in that Member's territory, the "year" relevant for domestic support, or
whether supported products have unique attributes that affect the calculation of support such as
multiple growing seasons, processing practices or requirements, or issues of quality – when
calculating AMS.
132. The AMS or AMSs described in Article 1(a) are discrete component parts of a Member's Total
AMS. Specifically, if individual AMSs exceed the de minimis level when calculated in accordance with
Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement, each such product -specific AMS (and if applicable a non -
product specific AMS) must be included in the "Total AMS." Total AMS refers to a different stage in
the computation of domestic support – namely, the summing of component parts. Article 1(h)
defines Total AMS as the "sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers,
calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products, all
non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent measurements of
support for agricultural products."
133. The definition of Total AMS informs the definition of both "Base Total AMS" and "Current Total
AMS." Specifically, Article 1(h)(i) states that Base Total AMS, all domestic support provided in favor
of agricultural producers in the "base period," is "as specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule."
134. Critically, again, Article 1(h) does not provide a calculation methodology for determining the
value of Base Total AMS; it indicates where the value of such support can be found. As the Appellate
Body observed in Korea – Beef, "Base Total AMS, and the commitment levels resulting or derived

therefrom, are not themselves formulae to be worked out, but simply absolute figures set out in the
Schedule of the Member concerned."
135. Separately, in romanette (ii), Article 1(h) provides the definition and calculation directions for
"Current Total AMS." Current Total AMS is "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of
agricultural producers . . . actually provided during any year of the implementation period and
thereafter." The Current Total AMS is "calculated in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement, including Article 6, and with the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of
supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule." Thus, Article
1(h)(ii) provides both a definition of Current Total AMS and instructions for the calculation of Current
Total AMS.
136. Nothing in the text of the Agriculture Agreement p rovides, as suggested by China, that Base
Total AMS calculations that may (or may not) be contained in a Member's Supporting Tables can
supplant the rules in Article 1(h) to calculate "Current Total AMS." Because no particular calculation
or rules for such a calculation is required to establish Base Total AMS, naturally, the Agreement
nowhere suggests that consistency is required between the calculations. Rather, constituent data
and methodology reflected in these documents may provide country-specific data and methodologies
to inform, but not alter, the calculation requirements set out in Article 1(h).
137. China's proposed methodology is not consistent with the calculations contained in its
supporting tables. Not only do China's arguments regarding "consistency" between the calculations
of Base Total AMS and Current Total AMS fail because they are legally unfounded, but China's
proposed market price support calculations are not in fact "consistent" with the calculations actually
utilized in its Supporting Tables. This is a critical point, and fatal to China's case. Recall that China
has been asserting that its Current Total AMS must be calculated using the same methodology as in
its Schedule. But, on closer inspection, China did not in fact use a "fixed external reference price"
based on the years 1996 to 1998 for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn in its original Base
Total AMS. To recall, China asserts that the "fixed external reference price for wheat is 1698.1 Yuan
per ton , as set out in Appendi x DS 5 -3 to Rev.3." Similarly, citing an appendix to DS -5 of its
Supporting Tables, China provides a "fixed external reference price of 2343.0 yuan per ton for Indica
rice and a fixed external reference price of 3290.6 yuan per ton for Japonica rice. China broadly
notes "China's FERP for corn may be found in Rev.3." China further clarifies in its second written
submission that "Rev.3 . . . includes FERPs for China that apply to certain products," and that
"[t]hese FERPS are (i) based on a three-year base period of 1996-1998; (ii) based on China's status,
during that period, as a net exporter or net importer of the product at issue; and, (iii) fixed."
138. However, China's calculation of its Base Total AMS was not based on a "fixed external
reference price" or the values drawn from Appendix DS 5 -3 or Appendix DS 5 -4 of its Supporting
Tables. Instead, China's market price support calculations for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and
corn in its DS 5 Supporting Table used three different, annual "exter nal reference price[s]"
corresponding to each year of the base period. The fifth column in China's Support Table is labeled
"external reference price" – not "fixed" external reference price; and the values contained in that
column reflect three different p rices, one for each year. According to footnotes 17 and 18 to the
Supporting Table, these "external references prices" were calculated based on CIF prices for wheat,
and on FOB prices for Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. Rather than use a fixed external reference
price covering 1996 -1998, as China has asserted to the Panel, China's market price support
calculations thus compared a 1996 applied administered price to a 1996 external reference price, a
1997 applied administered price to a 1997 external reference price, and a 1998 applied administered
price to a 1998 external reference price. The values of market price support calculated in these
tables were included in China's DS 4 Table calculating its Base Total AMS. To illustrate, in the row
covering wheat, for each year from 1996 -1998, there is a separate price. So, it is not the same
average price that would reflect a fixed external reference price.
139. Thus, Table DS 5, which contain the actual calculations of market price support for wheat,
Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn, reveals that the calculation of market price support during the
base period did not utilize a "fixed" external reference price at all. Rather, the calculation appears
to reflect an evaluation of market price support using the price gap between an applied administered
price and the average FOB or CIF unit value for the basic agricultural product in the specific year in
question.

140. Were this methodology applied to the calculation of market price support in this dispute,
China's support would be determined based on the gap between the applied administered price for
wheat in 2015, for example, and the average CIF prices for Chinese wheat imports in 2015, and
similar external reference prices would be needed for each year from 2012 to 2014. China does not
argue that a Panel may calculate market price support in this way, and Annex 3, which requires the
use of a "fixed external reference price . . . based on the years 1986 to 1988," does not permit such
a calculation methodology.
141. China draws its proposed "fixed external reference price" for each product, not from the
Supporting Tables that informed its market price support (DS 5) and Base Total AMS (DS 4)
calculations, but from a separate appendices included in its Rev. 3 containing values that appear not
to have been used in the original calculation process. These appendices provide the underlying
calculation for China's year-by-year external reference price calculation, including the import/export
volumes, import/export values, CIF/FOB prices, and calculated CIF/FOB unit prices. The charts also
contain an average of these values, but this is not utilized elsewhere in the document, and in
particular to calculate the AMS for each product for each year.
142. For this reason, Chi na's demand for consistency between the Base Total AMS and Current
Total AMS seems misplaced. First, nothing in the text of the Agriculture Agreement provides, as
suggested by China, that Base Total AMS calculations contained in a Member's Supporting Table s
can replace the binding commitments in the Agreement to calculate "Current Total AMS" in
accordance with Annex 3. Second, in any event, China's own Supporting Tables did not use the data
or methodology suggested by China in its actual calculation of market price support and Base Total
AMS. Rather, the Agriculture Agreement sets forth the requirements for calculating Current Total
AMS in subsequent years and this includes recourse to country -specific data and methodology
reflected in a Member's Supporting Tables to the extent that it informs, but does not alter, the
calculation requirements.
II. CHINA HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE PANEL IS PRECLUDED FROM ISSUING FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHINA'S PROVISION OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT TO CORN PRODUCERS IN
2012 THROUGH 2015

143. China has not demonstrated that its Corn MPS Program had "expired" prior to the Panel's
establishment; nor has China shown that it ceased to purchase corn at administratively determined
prices during the 2016/17 harvest. First, t he introduction of a direct payment program for corn
producers does not demonstrate that China no longer purchases corn at an administratively
determined price. Second, while China asserts that its 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchasing Notice
provides for "market-oriented" purchases by "market players," where all types of entities may decide
to make purchases on their own initiative, the 2016 Notice directs the same state-owned enterprises
who were engaged in corn purchases in prior years to "striv[e] not to go lower than the policy-based
purchasing amount of the previous year."
144. Although not required in order to satisfy the obligations of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the United
States has continued to seek additional information and instruments related to China's 2016-17 corn
purchase programs for the Panel's reference. The additional information found suggests that China
had not ceased to provide market price support in 2016. First, despite China's statements regarding
the transition to the use of a "market price" for government purchases of corn in 2016, the United
States has identified a notice of administered prices issued by Sinograin to certain purchasing
locations in Inner Mongolia on October 16, 2016. Entitled, Notice on Activating 2016 Autumn Grains
Corn Purchase Work (Exhibit US-101), this document – released one month after the "reformed"
purchasing instruments – announces the prices at which government purchases will be made, and
directs local grain depots to display or post the available prices for new, standard grain corn in that
area. This announcement read together with the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice
(Exhibit US-87) are very similar in form and content to the 2012 – 2015 Corn MPS Programs.
145. Second, Exhibit US -102, entitled Jilin Notice on Further Proper Handling of Corn Purchases
and Sales Work issued by the Jilin Province Grain Bureau, a provincial branch of the State
Administration of Grain, directs Sinograin and other state -owned enterprises to enter the corn et
and make c orn purchases, in order to counteract negative market trends, including falling corn
prices.

146. Third, Exhibit US-103, a May 2017 transcript of a live broadcast interview of the Jilin Province
Grain Bureau Vice Director confirms that Sinograin's Jilin p rovince subsidiary has given full play to
its role of macro -control and as a 'stabilizing instrument' and 'ballast.'" Taken together, these
documents suggest that China has not "ceased" government purchases of corn at pre-set prices.
U.S. RESPONSES TO THE PANEL'S SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS
Summary of U.S. Response to Panel Question 74
147. Generally, other Member's Supporting Tables may be considered "context" in instances where
they assist in the interpretation as directed by Article 31 of the VCLT.
148. We also note that while other Members' Schedules may be looked to as context, they are only
one source of context. Typically, interpreters look first to the "immediate context" of a term or
provision, including for instance the rest of the particular provision at issue, the other provisions of
the relevant WTO Agreement, other similar provisions in other Agreements, and the overall structure
of the Agreement, which may be considered along with the Agreement's object and purpose.
149. Contrary to China's arguments, customary rules of interpretation do not permit an interpreter
to use context to reach an interpretation inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the
provision in question, such that they create a derogation or exception from the provi sions of the
agreement. Importantly, when China points to certain other Members' Supporting Tables as context,
it does not and cannot assert that those Supporting Tables provide context for the calculation of
current AMS and Current Total AMS. Rather, it c an only point to certain other Members' use of a
different time period for purposes of calculating base AMS. Thus, to the extent these Supporting
Table provide context, they do not provide relevant context – that is, context for the understanding
of the particular calculation as described in the provision of the Agreement on Agriculture in question.
150. More relevant context is provided by China's Accession Protocol and Working Party Report.
The clear intention to alter the calculation methodology for China for future years, including a China-
specific de minimis support level, was recorded in paragraph 235 of the Working Party Report and
incorporated into China's Accession Protocol. This demonstrates how WTO Members altered a WTO
obligation when they intended to alter that obligation. Paragraph 235 does not contain any alteration
to the Article 1(a)(ii) or Annex 3 current AMS obligations. China's Supporting Table is not the
appropriate vehicle to alter a WTO obligation and contains no text suggesting a n intention to alter
an obligation.
Summary of U.S. Response to Panel Question 75
151. China has no reduction commitments and has an ongoing Final Bound Commitment Level of
"nil." China is obligated to maintain Current Total AMS, when calculated in accordance with Annex 3
and Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement, at a zero level.
U.S. COMMENTS ON CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE PANEL'S SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS
Summary of U.S. Comments on China's Response to Panel Question 52
152. China erroneously argues that Sinograin acted as a market player and subsequently "adjusted
its prices" to reflect market prices reflected in Exhibits CHN-111-B – CHN-127-B. However, Sinograin
is a state-owned enterprise directed by the State Council to actively enter the corn market and make
purchases at amounts not lower than the prior year. Moreover, nothing in the documents presented
by China indicates that Exhibit US-101 did not implement mandatory purchases at pre-set prices, or
that this announcement was "replaced" with subsequent n otices. Rather, the documents placed on
the record by China appear to be internal price monitoring documents devoid of any indication of its
authenticity and status, rather than directions to purchase at a particular price as provided for in
Exhibit US-101.
Summary of U.S. Comments on China's Response to Panel Question 83
153. China asserts that constituent data and methodology "must be used consistently, where
pertinent, for the calculation of that Member's Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS."

154. China misstates the requirements of Articles 1(a) and 1(h) of the Agriculture Agreement.
Articles 1(a) and 1(h) prioritize consideration and use, not of what data and methodology were used
to evaluate different programs at the time of accession, but rathe r the calculation requirements
provided by the text of the Agriculture Agreement. This is made explicit by the hierarchy provided
in Article 1(a)(ii). Article 1(a)(ii) does not use the same language or instruction to describe both
elements of calculation, as suggested by China. Rather, it specifies Members are to calculate the
value of AMS "in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement," and that Members
are to calculate AMS "taking into account the consistent data and methodology used in the tables of
supporting material." Article 1(h)(ii) governing the calculation of Current Total AMS in subsequent
years presents a similar hierarchy.
155. Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) do not limit the application of constituent data "to the same
measures that already existed during the base year." Instead, the text limits the application by first
plainly stating that the calculation in subsequent years must be consistent with the text of the
Agriculture Agreement. The subsequently used data and methodology may not be not inconsistent
with the requirements of the Agriculture Agreement. The reference to constituent data and
methodology does not, as suggested by China, permit the use of a methodology that was accurate
for a program in the base period (such as the using a pre-set maximum procurement volume as the
quantity of eligible production) to calculate the value of support provided through a different program
that requires a different evaluation pursuant to the requirements of Annex 3.
156. In support of the application of "methodology" used to evaluate different domestic support
measures that operated under different legal requirements and parameters, China again falls back
on its demand for "consistency." China suggests that a calculation not based on th is historic
methodology used to evaluate a different program would "involve substantial distortions," and
"would become a meaningless apples -to-oranges comparison." China's argument is again withou t
merit.
157. Consistency from year-to-year and, crucially, amongst Members is provided by observing the
requirements of the Agriculture Agreement, including Annex 3 and Article 6, regardless of the
domestic support program, agricultural product, or Member at issue. Consistency with the
requirements of the Agriculture Agreement with regard to quantity of production eligible to receive
the applied administered price and with regard to the fixed external reference price is what ensures
a meaningful evaluation, and is the basis for evaluating the value of domestic sup port provided in
any year after accession.
158. Finally, with regard to the statements of the panel and the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef,
China suggests that the Appellate Body "shared the panel's understanding of . . . the need for
consistency with Base AMS." The United States does not share China's reading the Appellate Body's
statements. Specifically, the Appellate Body's footnote citing to the panel report in Korea – Beef
appears to indicate that while the panel and Appellate Body both agreed they did not need to reach
the issue of how to address constituent data and methodology, the Appellate Body disagreed with
the panel's broad statements regarding consistency between the calculation of Base Total AMS and
Current Total AMS. Specifically, the Appellate Body asserted that a hierarchy exists between the text
of the Agreement and a Member's constituent data and methodology, and this would appear to
directly refute China's proposed blanket requirement for "consistency."

ANNEX B-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
This dispute arises against the background of the complexity and special characteristics of
the agricultural sector of the People's Republic of China ("China"). It concerns the nature and scope
of China's right to provide domestic support for its wheat, rice and corn farmers. It also raises
important systemic issues regarding the interpretation and application of the methodology for the
calculation of aggregate measurement of support ("AMS"), under the terms of both (i) Annex 3 of
the Agreement on Agriculture and (ii) a Member 's negotiated and agreed "constituent data and
methodology", as found in the Member-specific Supporting Tables incorporated by reference in Part
IV of each Member 's Schedule. For Members that have acceded to the World Trade Organization
("WTO") subsequent to the Uruguay Round, such as China, these "constituent data and
methodology" are of particular relevance because they are also part of those M embers' terms of
accession, and a basis upon which China and other later -acceded Members have undertaken their
domestic support reduction commitments.
In its submissions to the Panel, China has rebutted U.S. claims, under Articles 3.2, 6.3 and
7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture , that China 's AMS from market price support for wheat,
indica rice and japonica rice exceeds China 's domestic support reduction commitments. China has
also demonstrated that alleged market price support for corn, under China 's Temporary Purchase
and Reserve Policy ( "TPRP"), expired prior to panel establishment, and is thus outside the Panel 's
terms of reference. Accordingly, the Panel is precluded from making any findings or
recommendations with respect to the TPRP for corn.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
China's past and present domestic support policies for its agricultural sector, and the
direction in which they are evolving, can be understood only against the background of the particular
challenges facing China. First and foremost amongst t hose is the unique challenge of ensuring a
sufficient, stable, reliable and affordable supply of food for China's population of 1.38 billion people,
the largest in the world. In meeting the challenge of ensuring food security, consistent with its WTO
obligations, China employs a variety of agricultural policy measures, including public stockholding.
While China imports large volumes of grains – in 2016, 167 million tons – the bulk of China's
food requirements is supplied by China 's domestic agricultural sector. That sector is dominated by
small-scale family farms, relying predominantly on family labor, and other smallholder farms.
Indeed, for a large part of China's population, these small-scale household farms constitute the main
source of both income and other means to support their livelihood, including through the
consumption of agricultural commodities grown on their family farms. To appreciate the importance
of China's agricultural policies, China notes that, in 2016, its rural popu lation accounted for 590
million people. Of that rural population, many are involved in the production of wheat, rice and corn,
the agricultural products at issue in this dispute. Thus, China's agricultural policies necessarily affect
the well-being of a significant proportion of its population, and accordingly have an important impact
on the stability and the sustainable development of China's society and economy.
These complex and important policy considerations are enshrined in China 's regulation of
the marketing and distribution of basic agricultural products, including for wheat, rice and corn. At
the same time, China 's agricultural policies for wheat, rice and corn are moving towards a
comprehensive opening of those grain markets.
China's unique agricultural challenges stand in sharp contrast to the situation in the United
States and other large agricultural commodity-exporting countries, where agricultural production is
dominated by very large and highly mechanized farm operations. Indeed, the average size of a U.S.
farm is several hundred times larger than the average size of a farm in China. The advantage of
large-sized U.S. farms is further enhanced by the United States ' USD 19.1 billion AMS entitlement.

Together, scale and substantial amounts of domestic support have enabled U.S. farmers to produce
large volumes of agricultural products, and to sell them cheaply. As a result, the United States is a
net exporter of agricultural products, including for corn and wheat. By contrast, China is a ne t
importer of grains.
China and the WTO Membership negotiated and agreed China 's domestic-support-related
commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture against this background. China's objective in
those negotiations was to ensure it retained the flexibility to provide domestic support for food
security purposes, and to encourage Chinese farmers to remain on their farms to grow the staple
crops, including wheat, rice and corn, necessary to feed China's large population.
Like most developing countries, China was not in the position to declare a Base Total AMS
for its 1996 -1998 base period. Accordingly, China accepted a domestic support reduction
commitment of "nil", limiting domestic support to levels below its de minimis threshold. China was
further required to accept a de minimis threshold of 8.5% of the value of production of each basic
agricultural product, instead of the 10% level for developing countries, provided for under Article 6.4
of the Agreement on Agriculture . In exchange, China secu red agreement to use "the amount
purchased" as the measure of "eligible production" in the context of market price support measures.
In addition, China uses fixed external reference prices from its 1996-1998 base period. These agreed
commitments, which are included in China's "constituent data and methodology " in its Supporting
Tables in WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, or "Rev.3", are incorporated in China's Accession Protocol.
Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has relied on, inter alia, the negotiated and
agreed constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 to devise its agricultural policies consistent with
its domestic support reduction commitments. Specifically, in 2004, China implemented reform of its
agricultural policies, adopting a market -oriented grain policy, with direct government intervention
into the market authorized only in exceptional circumstances to protect farmers from the effects of
significant fluctuations in supply and demand. For example, under the minimum procurement price
("MPP") pro grams for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice, which apply in certain provinces,
purchases occur only when market prices fall below the established MPP level. The MPP program is
not available when prices are above that level. Moreover, prior to 2016, Chin a implemented the
TPRP for corn in four northeast provinces/regions, designed to meet food security purposes. In 2016,
China reformed the TPRP and enacted market -based reforms. China's new corn measures involve
the use of direct payments to farmers growing corn, with the amount of payments determined by
historic benchmarks. The measures further seek to limit the production of corn.
III. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE UNDER THE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
The United States' panel request defines the Panel's terms of reference. It identifies as the
specific measures at issue, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, the MPP programs for wheat, indica
rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) TPRP for corn. Consistent with its identification of the
measures at iss ue, the United States presented arguments and evidence in its First Written
Submission.
However, upon China's showing, in its own First Written Submission, that the TPRP for corn
had expired prior to panel establishment, and was, thus outside the Panel's terms of reference, the
United States attempted to re -define the "measures at issue " in this dispute as the "levels of
domestic support", or "domestic support" in each of the years 2012-2015.
The Panel must make its own objective assessment of its terms of reference, and of the
measures at issue. In so doing, the Panel must reject the United States ' attempt to unilaterally re-
define, following establishment of the Panel and its terms of reference, the "measures at issue" in
these proceedings. As explained in the next section, the Panel must also find that the expired TPRP
for corn is outside its terms of reference.

A. The United States ' challenge in this dispute is limited to alleged market
price support under the MPP for wheat, indica rice and jap onica rice, and
the (albeit expired) 2012-2015 TPRP for corn
The starting point of any WTO dispute is the identification of an act or omission by a Member
as a specific "measure at issue", within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU. It is that measure
which is the object of claims of inconsistency with one or more of the provisions of the covered
agreements. And it is that measure that may, if found to be inconsistent, become subject to
recommendations, under Article 19.1 of the DSU.
Accordingly, the core requirements that any panel request must fulfill, consistent with Article
6.2, are the identification of the specific "measures at issue " and the claims raised. These
requirements "serve the due process objective of notifying the parties and third parties of the nature
of a complainant's case".1
China has established that, properly construed, the U.S. panel request identifies the legal
basis of the complaint , i.e., the claims at issue as follows: "[t]he level of domestic support China
provides is in excess of its commitment level of 'nil'", resulting in an alleged inconsistency with
Articles 3.2, 6.3 and 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture.2
The U.S. panel request then proceeds to identify the specific measures at issue. It explains
that "[t]he legal instruments through which China provides domestic support in favor of agricultural
producers, including support in favor of producers of wheat, indica rice, japonica rice, and corn,
operating collectively or separately, includ e, but are not limited to "3 a list of individually specified
legal instruments. These legal instruments permit the identification of the following specific
measures at issue: the MPP programs for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice and the (albeit expired)
TPRP for corn.
Thus, the U.S. panel request identifies as the measures at issue the MPP programs for wheat,
indica rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) 2012-2015 TPRP for corn. Contrary to the U.S.
assertion, the MPP and TPRP measures identified do not constitute mere "additional information",
"argument" or "evidence" to provide a preview of the U.S. case – they comprise and delimit the
specific "measures at issue".
Indeed, while the United States erroneously parses out the text of the U.S. panel request
into alleged "measures", "claims" and "arguments", the United States is forced to accept that its
panel request
sets out the instruments through which the support is provided (and
the United States has not sought to rely on any other instruments).
It[s panel request] further listed the agricultural products through
which China's breach would be demonstrated (and the United States
has not sought to prove its case on the basis of other products).4
Thus, the United States accepts that its case is limited to alleged market price support provided by
the MPP programs for wheat and rice and the (albeit expired) TPRP for corn, as the specific measures
under its panel request. Not surprisingly, these are also the sole measures for which the U.S.
submissions assert, based on argument and evidence, alleged inconsistencies with the covered
agreements.
The United States further attempts to support its erroneous argument that its panel request
covers "domestic support", by arguing that that it "does not seek a finding that any particular legal
instrument … is in breach of China 's commitments … because the existence or maintenance of a
market price support program or any other legal instrument would not itself necessarily lead to the
breach of a domestic support commitment".5 Yet, the U.S. argument does not support its position.

1 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126.
2 United States, first written submission, para. 15, citing WT/DS511/8, p. 1 (second substantive
paragraph) (underlining added).
3 WT/DS511/8, p. 1 (second substantive paragraph) (emphasis added).
4 United States, second written submission, para. 27.
5 United States, response to Panel Question 5, para. 32.

Instead, the U.S. argument is a mere reflection of the fact that the U.S. claims are of an "as applied"
nature, rather than "as such". As the Appellate Body explained in US – Continued Zeroing, "the
distinction between 'as such' and 'as applied' claims does not govern the definition of a measure for
purposes of WTO dispute settlement ".6 Thus, the U.S. clarif ication that it is challenging certain
measures "as applied", as opposed to "as such", has no bearing on the identification of the measures
at issue, and certainly does not establish that the measure at issue must be "domestic support".
B. Identification of "domestic support" as the specific measure at issue would
fail to meet the "specificity requirements" of Article 6.2 of the DSU
In any event, the U.S. identification of "domestic support" as the measure at issue would
fail to meet the specificity requirements under the DSU. As the Appellate Body explained in US –
Continued Zeroing, "the specificity requirement means that the measures at issue must be identified
with sufficient precision so that what is referred to adjudication by a pan el may be discerned from
the panel request".7
China has explained that the reference to the legal concept of "domestic support" cannot be
used to identify a specific measure. Instead, it characterizes an otherwise specifically identified
measure under WTO law. This is consistent with the fact that the legal concept of "domestic support"
itself covers many different forms of domestic support, including: different forms of "amber box",
"blue box", and "green box" domestic support measures. The United States is forced to recognize
that domestic support does not specifically identify any particular measure at issue. It explains that
"the Agriculture Agreement gives WTO Members the flexibility to provide domestic support in various
forms".8 In these circumstances, a mere reference to "domestic support" is insufficient to meet the
specificity requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU.
While the Appellate Body has accepted that "there may be circumstances in which a party
describes a measur e in a more generic way ", the Appellate Body nonetheless required that such
generic characterization "allow[] the measure to be discerned ".9 Indeed, the inability of the legal
concept "domestic support" under the Agreement on Agriculture to allow the measure at issue to be
discerned is similar to that of the legal concept of a "subsidy", under the SCM Agreement – both of
which are used to characterize a specific measure under the substantive provisions at issue, but are
insufficient to identify a specific measure under Article 6.2.
Finally, in re -defining "domestic support " as the "measure at issue ", the United States
reduces the specifically identified and enumerated legal instruments in its panel request to mere
"evidence". As mere evidence of an alleged breach (and not identifications of the measures at issue),
the Panel would be precluded to rely on that evidence to inform the meaning and scope of the U.S.
reference to "domestic support" as the alleged measure at issue. That is, the Panel cannot rely on
that evidence to inform its understanding of the meaning and scope of the term "domestic support"
in a manner that permits that term to meet the specificity requirements under Article 6.2. In those
circumstances, The Panel would have to find that the U.S. panel request, in its entirety, fails to meet
the specificity requirements.
The United States does not address any of China 's arguments set out above. Instead, it
simply asserts that "domestic support" can be a measure at issue because it fulfills o ne relevant
requirement – namely that it constitutes action by China. Yet, to constitute a "measure at issue",
any challenged "act or omission" by a Member must, additionally, be identified in a panel request
with the required level of specificity.
In short, if the Panel were to find that the U.S. panel request identified "domestic support"
as the "measure at issue ", that request would fail to meet the specif icity requirement under
Article 6.2, and the Panel would have to deny the U.S. claims in this dispute. By contrast, the Panel
would be able to consider the particular measures and claims that an objective assessment of the
U.S. panel request reveals, as set out above. This is a further reason on which the Panel should
reject the United States' post-hoc rationalization of its panel request, which the United States only
adopted following China's demonstration that the U.S. panel request inappropriately challenges the

6 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 179.
7 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 168.
8 United States, second written submission, para. 28 (emphasis added).
9 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 116.

expired TPRP for corn.
C. Permitting claims against a measure identified as "domestic support" raises
serious systemic concerns
Moreover, accepting "domestic support " as the "measure at issue " raises due process
concerns. Under Article 19.1 DSU, a panel may make recommendation only with respect to
"measures at issue ", and it is with respect to those measures that an implementing Member is
required to achieve compliance. Thus, the scope of any recommendation is constrained by the
specific measures identified in a panel request.
In these proceedings, the United States appears to seek a recommendation that China bring
its "domestic support" into conformity, without limiting that recommendation to those market-price-
support-related measures that have been the sole focus of the United States' case before the Panel.
Specifically, the U nited States argues that the recommendation should cover "domestic support",
and that "[t]he Panel need not include a further characterization of the measures in its
recommendation".10
The United States errs. Under Article 3.7 of the DSU , WTO dispute settlement must
contribute to a "positive solution to the dispute ". This objective requires a panel to inform a
respondent, through specific findings, of the particular measures that have resulted in particular
WTO inconsistencies. Pursuant to a recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU, a respondent is
then under an obligation to remedy the WTO inconsistencies identified, by bringing the measures
found to have resulted in the WTO inconsistencies into conformity with its WTO obligations. The
particular findings of WTO inconsistencies that form the basis for a recommendation are framed with
reference to the specific arguments and evidence provided by the parties, and cannot relate to
specific measures or claims not covered by the parties ' arguments and evidence. Otherwise,
recommendations could cover specific measures that may potentially fall under the umbrella of
"domestic support", but for which the respondent has not had a chance to defend itself. This would
violate the respondent's due process rights.
Accordingly, a panel's recommendation must identify, and must be limited to, the particular
measures (amongst those properly before a panel) that the panel has found to have resulted in
particular WTO inconsistencies, based on the parties' arguments and evidence.
D. Conclusion
The U.S. panel request reflects a deliberate choice to challenge the MPP programs for wheat,
indica rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn. That choice has
consequences – China's due process rights and the jurisdiction of the Panel mean that the United
States cannot, belatedly, broaden the scope of the measures at issue.
IV. THE TPRP FOR CORN EXPIRED PR IOR TO PANEL ESTABLI SHMENT AND IS THEREF ORE OUTSIDE THE
PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
China has further established that its TPRP for corn expired prior to panel establishment,
and is therefore outside the Panel's terms of reference. Yet, the United States asserts, erroneously,
that the expiry of the TPRP for corn prior to panel establishment did not affect the Panel 's terms of
reference, and that, in any event, the TPRP continues to exist.
A. Factual background
From 2012 to 2015, China 's Central Government provided for a TPRP for corn in Liaoning,
Jilin, and Heilongjiang Provinces and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The TPRP for corn
was established through annual TPRP Notices issued by several national -level government
authorities. These TPRP Notices set out the geographic and temporal scope of the TPRP, and
determined the TPRP price at which designated entities offered to purchase corn during a defined
period of time. For example, the 2015 TPRP Notice set a TPRP purchase price of RMB 1 yuan per jin
for "grade 3" corn offered for purchase at certain purchasing and storage depots in the Jilin, Liaoning,

10 United States, response to Panel Question 59, para. 39.

Heilongjiang Provinces and the Inner Mongolia Region . This price was available for a purchasing
period that lasted from 1 November 2015 to 30 April 2016.
In announcing the discontinuation of the TPRP for corn, on 28 March 2016, the deputy
director of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People 's Republic of China
("NDRC") explained that the TPRP for corn had encountered "prominent problems ", including a
"heavy financial burden".11 Similarly, a Ministry of Finance ("MOF") Opinion explained that "the corn
temporary purchase and reserve system does not fit into the current situation ".12 Starting with the
2016 harvest, China "has made the reform of the [TPRP], pursuant to the principle of 'Price formed
by market and decoupling of price and subsidy '", involving the expiry of the TPRP and the
introduction of "'market-oriented purchase ' plus ' direct subsidies '".13 Such direct payments are
available to producers of corn in the fo ur provinces/region, subject to certain requirements to limit
production.
B. Under Article 6.2 of the DSU, measures that have expired prior to panel
establishment generally fall outside a panel's terms of reference
Under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the general rule is that a measure that no longer exists at the
time of panel establishment is outside a panel 's terms of reference. For example, in EC – Chicken
Cuts, the Appellate Body noted that a measure at issue must be "in existence at the time of the
establishment of the panel".14 Likewise, in China – Raw Materials, the panel noted that "the date of
a panel's establishment is critical in deciding which measures may be included in a panel's terms of
reference".15 And in EC – Biotech, the panel held that "the question [that this panel] is mandated to
answer is whether on the date of its establishment, … the European Communities applied a general
de facto moratorium on approvals".16
China explained that, for expired measures, there is one notable except ion to the general
rule that a measure at issue, under Article 6.2, must exist at the time of panel establishment.
Specifically, a measure that has expired prior to panel establishment may be properly before a panel
where it is demonstrated that it continu es to affect the operation of a covered agreement. The
burden of prove to establish that the expired measure continues to affect the operation of a covered
agreement falls on the complaining Member. Here, the United States has not even attempted to
meet that burden.
Instead, the United States simply ignores the well-established case law in favor of asserting
that failure to make a recommendation on the matter that the DSB referred to the Panel would
deprive the United States of its rights under the DSU . In particular, the United States argues that
"[t]he alleged expiry of a legal instrument does not change the matter the DSB put within the Panel's
terms of reference, nor does it make another matter susceptible to examination by the Panel".17 In
short, the United States argues that, since the "matter" referred to this Panel includes the expired
TPRP measure, the Panel must review that measure. Yet, while the United States may have intended
to place an expired measure before the Panel, its expiry before panel establishment means that that
measure was never properly part of the matter referred to the Panel by the DSB. The case law is
clear – a measure that has expired at the time of panel establishment is not properly before a panel.
In its Second Writte n Submission, the United States appears to have recognized the
existence of the general rule, when referring to situations where an expired measure has been
replaced by a new measure that is of the "same essence". The United States argues that "a panel
should make findings on a recurring measure".18 Indeed, consistent with the case law on expired
measures, a "recurring" measure could be properly before a panel in a situation where a specifically
listed measure has expired prior to panel establishment, but where that measure has been replaced

11 The State Council, News Report "Corn Temporary Purchase and Reserve System will be Shifted to a
'Market-oriented Purchase' and 'Direct Subsidies'", available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-
03/28/content_5059171.htm (last viewed 26 October 2017) (English translation), (Exhibit CHN-74-B).
12 MOF Opinion, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN-73-B), Section I.
13 Notice on Proper Handling of Corn Purchase Work in Northeast China This Year (2016) (Guo Liang
Tiao [2016] No. 210), 19 September 2016 (English translation), (Exhibit CHN-80-B), p. 1.
14 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156.
15 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.19.
16 Panel Report, EC – Biotech, para. 7.1301 (underlining added).
17 United States, response to Panel Question 11, para. 56.
18 United States, second written submission, para. 39 (emphasis added).

by is a new measure that is of the "same essence " as the expired measure. In fac t, in those
circumstances, the measure at issue has not truly expired. Yet, on the facts of this case, the United
States has not, and cannot, demonstrate that the TPRP for corn has been replaced by a measure
that is of "the same essence". China turns to these factual issues in the next section.
The United States also argues that domestic support cases are somehow unique, allegedly
because "a dispute challenging the conformity of a Member 's domestic support with its domestic
support commitments necessarily involves a retrospective analysis".19 In making this argument, the
United States confuses the distinction between the existence of a measure, and the existence of
evidence necessary to show a WTO inconsistency.
With respect to the existence of a measure, there is nothing inherently different about claims
involving domestic support measures compared to claims involving other measures. That is, nothing
warrants a carve -out from the case law on expired measures. In particular, domestic support
measures do not necessarily involve annual measures that would always have expired, as the United
States initially argued. In fact, domestic support measures often involve long -standing programs
supporting agriculture through payments or other support. Annual measures may also form part of
an ongoing program. This was precisely the situation in US – Upland Cotton where the United States
provided annual marketing loan payments pursuant to a multi-year marketing loan program.
Moreover, with respect to the eviden ce, China explained that domestic support measures
are not the only type of measure for which an assessment of their WTO consistency may involve
consideration of historic evidence. Indeed, while a domestic support measure must exist at the time
of panel establishment, its WTO consistency may be assessed in light of (i) evidence predating panel
establishment, (ii) evidence contemporaneous with panel establishment, or (iii) the most recent
evidence, depending on their availability. These considerations apply across many types of measures
and disputes. Yet, the need for evidence that may predate panel establishment, to enable assessing
the WTO consistency of a measure, does not remove the requirement for the measures to exist at
the time of panel establishment.
Finally, systemic concerns arise were the Panel to accept the U.S. argument that panels are
required to make findings and recommendations on expired measures. Accepting the U.S. argument
would result in purely declaratory judgments. Yet, WTO dispute settlement is not designed to deliver
declaratory judgments.20 Rather, it is designed to secure a positive solution to the dispute. The Panel
must, thus, avoid a declaratory judgment.
Contrary to the U.S. assertions, this would not prejudice the United States. This is because
the United States has no right to purely declaratory judgment. To recall, in US – Certain EC Products,
the Appellate Body held that panels may not make recommendations with respect to expired
measures. It explained that this rule exists because there is an "obvious inconsistency" between, on
the one hand, a finding that a measure has expired, and, on the other hand, a panel 's
recommendation that such expired measure be brought into conformity with the applicable WTO
obligations, including through its withdrawal.21
The United States' reliance on the panel report in EC – Biotech and the Appellate Body report
in China – Raw Materials does not change that finding. Indeed, the United States mischaracterizes
EC – Biotech as standing f or the proposition that panels may make recommendations on expired
measures. In fact, the opposite is true. The panel in EC – Biotech made recommendations with
respect to an unwritten general de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech products – which it
found existed at the time of panel establishment . In the face of uncertainty whether the measure
continued to exist, or had subsequently ceased to exist during the panel proceedings, as the
European Communities asserted, the panel made a recommendation "to the extent that[] that
measure ha[d] not already ceased to exist ".22 This is evidently different from the situation here,
where the evidence demonstrates that the TPRP for corn has expired prior to panel establishment.
With respect to China – Raw Materials, the United States fails to appreciate that the concern
to which it referred, involving an "endlessly moving target" loophole, is resolved through the case

19 United States, response to Panel Question 4, para. 21.
20 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19.
21 Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 81.

law, including China – Raw Materials itself. That case law permits challenges of, and event ually
recommendations on, measures (including programs and "series of measures") that continue to exist
at the time of panel establishment or measures that have "replaced" them, where they are of the
"same essence". However, contrary to the U.S. assertions, neither the case law in general, nor China
– Raw Materials in particular, stand for the proposition that a panel must, or even may, make
recommendations with respect to measures (i) that did not exist at the time of panel establishment
or (ii) that expired during panel proceedings, in situations where those measures have not been
"replaced" by new measures that are of the "same essence". In other words, China – Raw Materials
does not permit, let alone require, panel s to make recommendations with respect to expired
measures.
In these circumstances, the Panel should conclude that the TPRP for corn, which expired
prior to panel establishment, is outside the Panel's terms of reference.
C. The evidence demonstrates that the TPRP for corn has expired
As noted above, the TPRP for corn expired prior to panel establishment. China has
established that, in its place, and starting with the 2016 harvest, China began providing direct
payments to producers of corn in the four provinces/region, subject to certain requirements to limit
production, and established a market -based price discovery mechanism, with prices reflecting the
supply-demand relationship.
Initially, the United States asserted that the 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn continues to exist
because China allegedly had merely "reformed" its corn policy. The United States errs. In China, a
policy "reform" generally refers to a fundamental change in that policy, resulting in the
discontinuation of the previously existing policy. Indeed, the MOF Opinion that announced the new
corn measures described these measures as a "reform of market economy system, emphasizing the
decisive role of the market in the allocation of grain resources and better performing the role of
government".23 Indeed, the fundamental "reform" that occurred in China's domestic support for its
corn producers was to abolish the previous fixed TPRP prices and introduce a new direct payment
program for producers of corn. As the NDRC official announcing the reform explained, it would result
in a "price formed by the market and decoupling of price and subsidy "24 – i.e., the absence of an
applied administered price, under "the principle of 'Price formed by market and decoupling of price
and subsidy'".25
Outside this litigation, the United States fully agrees. Indeed, since early 2016, the United
States Department of Agriculture ( "USDA") has consistently explained, in report after report, that
China abandoned the TPRP. Even in this litigation, the United S tates admits that purchases under
the TPRP ended on 30 April 2016.26
Nonetheless, the United States makes vague allegations about the existence of an applied
administered price for corn during 2016 and beyond. Confusing the question before the Panel further,
the United States also asserts that it is China 's burden to "demonstrate that it had withdrawn or
modified its support so as to come within its domestic support commitments for corn by the time of
panel establishment".27 That U.S. assertion reflects a misunderstanding of the general principle on
the burden of proof. Since the United States, and not China, asserts that there continues to exist an
applied administered price in the new corn measures, the United States carries the burden to provide
evidence to substantiate this assertion. Absent such evidence, there is no legal basis for the United
States to claim that the Panel must make findings and recommendations regarding the TPRP.
In fact, evidence from before panel establishment demonstrates that the key elements of
the reform consisted of three major new components: (i) the establishment and operation of a direct

23 MOF Opinion, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN-73-B), Section I.
24 The State Council, News Report "Corn Temporary Purchase and Reserve System will be Shifted to a
'Market-oriented Purchase' and 'Direct Subsidies'", available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-
03/28/content_5059171.htm (last viewed 26 October 2017) (English translation), (Exhibit CHN-74-B); MOF
Opinions, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN-73-B), Section I.
25 Notice on Proper Handling of Corn Purchase Work in Northeast China This Year (2016) (Guo Liang
Tiao [2016] No. 210), 19 September 2016 (English translation), (Exhibit CHN-80-B), p. 1.
27 United States, responses to Panel Questions 4 and 9, paras. 25, 48-49.

payment program for eligible Northeast corn producers based on historic areas planted to corn, and
not connected to the price for c orn; (ii) the establishment and implementation of a series of
measures designed to limit production of corn in the provinces/region adopting the new corn
measures; and, (iii) the implementation of policies seeking to achieve a market -based price
discovery mechanism for corn, resulting from a market with diversified purchasers and sellers, and
multi-channel distribution, of corn.
The USDA recognized the production -limiting effects of the new corn direct payment
program, as implemented in China 's Northeast region, noting a drop in corn harvested area and
expectations of further decline. Similarly, price developments in China's corn market since the 2016
introduction of the production-limiting direct payment program are consistent with a market-based
price discovery mechanism and the absence of market price support.
The United States also argued that the TPRP for corn continued to exist based on allegedly
significant similarities between the 2015 TPRP Notice and a 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase
Notice. Issued following the expiry of the TPRP for corn, the 2016 Notice requires provincial/regional
governments to encourage market participants to purchase corn and to collaborate in the orderly
purchasing, financing, storage, and warehousing of corn in the Northeast region. That is, the 2016
Notice sets out government tasks to support the new market-based price discovery mechanisms.
Crucially, while mischaracterizing the alleged policy objective of the 2016 Notice as involving
purchase work similar to that under the TPRP price, the United States ignores entirely the absence
of any applied administered price from the 2016 Notice. Instead, the United States asserts irrelevant
similarities. Yet, there are fundamental differences between the 2015 TPRP Notice and the 2016
Notice that reflect the core of the fundamental reform in China's TPRP for corn, which resulted in the
absence of a Government -determined TPRP price at which designated entities purchase corn. For
example, while the United States highlights that, under the 2015 TPRP Notice, China Grain Reserves
Corporation ("SinoGrain") was "entrusted by the State"28 to perform purchases at the TPRP price, it
remains silent regarding the absence of any such entrustment under the 2016 Notice. Indeed, the
new corn measures established a market-based price discovery mechanism , and the 2016 Notice
repeatedly references criteria and elements to be adopted to create and sustain that mechanism.
These references are found throughout the 2016 Notice, but are entirely absent from the 2015 TPRP
Notice. In these circumstances, the 2016 Notice contradicts the U.S. assertion of a continued
existence of the TPRP for corn.
Late in the proceedings, the United States then purported to have found evidence of China's
alleged continued application of an applied administered price for corn. As support, the United States
produced a notice by SinoGrain 's Inner Mongolia Branch to its depots in Inner Mongolia,
communicating prices at which to purchase corn.
The United States errs in asserting that it has identified an applied administered price for
corn. In fact, the document identified by the United States consists of a set of different, market-
based purchase prices at which SinoGrain's Inner Mongolia Branch offered, on 14 October 2016, to
purchase corn at various of its depots in the Inner Mongolia Region. That is, rather than constituting
evidence of an applied administered price, the document identified by the United States involved an
offer, at a particular point in tim e, to purchase corn at varying market-based prices in different
locations in the Inner Mongolia Region.
Moreover, China has established that this offer by one of many purchasers of corn in China
(SinoGrain) was superseded by later market-based offers from the same entity to purchase corn at
different market -based prices. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that SinoGrain 's market -
based price offers change from time to time, and reflect changing market prices in line with market
developments. Indeed, after 30 April 2016, SinoGrain had no mandate from the Chinese Government
to purchase corn at an applied administered price. Thus, and contrary to the U.S. assertion, the
SinoGrain branch notice identified by the United States is not based on any authori ty or legal basis
flowing from the 2016 Notice.
By way of background, the evidence demonstrates that SinoGrain headquarters issues, from
time to time, notices with guidance prices for corn purchases to its provincial/region branches. Those
guidance prices take into account market price information observed, collected and published by

28 United States, response to Panel Question 55, para. 23.

China's State Administration of Grain, similarly to the manner in which U.S. corn traders take into
account information on corn prices continuously published by the USDA. Moreover, these guidance
prices are not determinative of prices offered by each SinoGrain depot. Instead, each of the four
SinoGrain's branches in China 's Northeast region enjoys discretion to set, through consecutive
branch notices, the prices at which its local depots offer, from time to time, to purchase corn, based
on local market conditions. Each SinoGrain depot in these four provinces/region then offers to
purchase corn at the market -based price set for it in the most recent branch notice. That is,
depending on evolving market conditions, one set of prices offers will be superseded by a later set
of prices offers, adjusted either upwards or downwards, reflecting market developments. In short,
China has established that SinoGrain's purchase price offers are consistent with local market prices.
While SinoGrain has, at present, no mandate from the Chinese Government to purchase
corn at an applied administered price , purchasing corn remains one of its core business activities.
Consistent with the fact that, after 30 April 2016 and under the new corn measures, the Chinese
corn market is characterized by a market -based price discovery mechanism, SinoGrain follows a
market-based process to purchase corn at market prices. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that,
in making fluctuating price offers, SinoGrain follows a common and well-established practice that is
consistent with that adopted by large commodity traders worldwide. Like SinoGrain, those traders
inform potential sellers of corn of the price at whic h they would, from time to time, purchase corn .
Specifically, China demonstrated that other major purchasers of corn in China similarly publish price
offers to purchase corn, and that those price offers fluctuate based on market developments. China
further established that it is a common practice in the United States for small and large purchasers
of corn to publish announced prices at which they will purchase corn.
Thus, China demonstrated that the announcement of offered purchase prices by SinoGrain
and other corn purchasers in China is a completely normal, expected, and necessary element of a
functioning price-discovery mechanism. That announcement does not establish the existence of an
applied administered price, as the United States argues. With SinoGrain's prices indistinguishable
from market prices, the United States cannot show the existence of an applied administered price.
Accordingly, it cannot show that the TPRP for corn continues to exist.
D. Conclusion
In sum, the Panel should conclude that the 2012-2015 TPRP for corn, which expired prior to
panel establishment, is outside the Panel's terms of reference.
V. THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CHINA'S DOMESTIC SUPPORT F OR WHEAT AND
RICE VIOLATES ARTICLES 3.2, 6.3, AND 7.2 OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
A. Factual background on China's MPP for wheat and rice
Pursuant to China 's 2004 Grain Opinion and 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation , China
implemented market price support in the form of minimum procurement price ("MPP") programs for
wheat, indica rice and japonica rice for each of the years 2012-2016. These programs are established
through annual MPP Notices that are adopted jointly by a number of different entities, including the
NDRC, MOF, Ministry of Agriculture ("MOA"), and State Administration of Grain ("SAG"). The annual
MPP Notices set the annual level of the MPP for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice of particular
quality grades, with MPP prices defined for a standard Grade 3 and adjusted for Grades 1 -2 and 4-
5.
The same entities that adopt the MPP Notice also introduce annual MPP Implementation
Plans. These Implementation Plans inform implementing authorities 29 of, inter alia, the geographic
scope, relevant timeframe, rules on the activation and deactivation of the MPP programs, and the
characteristics of qualifying wheat and rice.
With respect to the geographic scope of the MPP programs in 2012-2016, the MPP program
for wheat covered six wheat -producing provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, Henan and
Hubei); the MPP programs for indica rice and japonica rice covered (i) five early -season indica rice

29 These include the provincial Development and Reform Commissions, Price Bureaus, Departments
(Bureaus) of Finance, Agriculture Departments (Bureaus, Commissions, Offices), Administrations of Grain, and
autonomous regions and municipalities.

producing provinces (Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Guangxi); and, (ii) eleven mid-to-late season
indica and japonica rice producing provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Sichuan).
Under the MPP Implementation Plans, the time period during which the MPP programs may
be implemented during the applicable year is limited. For example, purchases of wheat under the
MPP program may take place between May 21 to September 30 of each applicable year; MPP
purchases of early-season indica rice may take place between 16 July and September 30 of each
applicable year; and for purchases of mid-to-late season indica rice and japonica rice, the timeframes
differ depending on the province. For Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and
Sichuan Provinces, the MPP program is implemented between mid-September and 31 January, and
for Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang Provinces, it is implemented between October/November and
February/March.
Moreover, purchases under the MPP programs are not activated during the ent irety of the
implementation period. The MPP Implementation Plans provide that purchases at the MPP are
activated only "when the grain market price drops to the minimum procurement price stipulated by
the government".30 Purchases are deactivated when the ma rket price rises again above the MPP.
It follows that the MPP programs retain, as the guiding principle, market-based price discovery and
purchases by market actors, and intervene only where market prices drop below the MPP. Thus, and
consistent with the 2004 Grain Opinion and 2004 Regulation on Grain Distribution, the grain price is
formed principally by supply and demand, except when a "material change occurs in the relationship
between supply and demand of grain".31 Thus, the actual application of the MPP program is further
limited to (i) the timeframe during which prices are found to fall below the MPP; and (ii) areas within
its geographic scope where prices were found to have fallen below the MPP price.
As noted above, the MPP applies to wheat, indica rice and japonica rice of particular qualities.
Specifically, only purchases of in-grade grains may occur – i.e., wheat or rice that is of Grades 1 to
5 of China's National Grain Standard. Out-of-grade grains – i.e., wheat and rice that is of a quality
lower than Grade 5 – may not be purchased under the MPP programs.
Despite the existence of the MPP programs, the vast majority of wheat and rice is sold on
the market. Indeed, purchases under the wheat MPP program did not exceed 25% of total production
in the covered provinces (or 22% of total production in China), and purchases under the rice MPP
programs did not exceed 20% of total rice production in the covered provinces (or 16% of total
production in China).
As an important background fact, China further notes that, similarly to the situation in many
other developing countries, small-scale farms in China typically consume a significant portion of the
staple foods that they produce, including wheat and rice. It follows that the total amount of wheat
and rice available to be sold by farmers on the market or under the MPP programs is smaller than
the total amount of wheat and rice actually produced. Based on data from China's Rural Statistical
Yearbook, between 9-18% of total wheat production in China in 2012 -2015, and between 17-22%
of total rice production was consumed or retained by Chinese farmers, and not available for purchase
in the marketplace.
B. Legal argument
Contrary to the U.S. claims, China's market price support, under its MPP programs for wheat,
indica rice and japonica rice, is consistent with its domestic support commitments under Articles 3.2,
6.3 and 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Under Articles 3.2 and 6.3, Members shall not provide overall annual domestic support for
their agricultural producers, calculated as Current Total AMS, in excess of their Member -specific
domestic support reduction commitments, as set out in Part IV of their Schedules. Those domestic
support reduction commitments, in turn, result from a Member -specific calculation of Base Total
AMS – i.e., Total AMS during each Member's base period. Article 7.2(b) further clarifies that, where

30 See, e.g., 2015 Wheat & Rice Implementation Plan, (Exhibit CHN-28-B), Article 6; 2016 Wheat & Rice
Implementation Plan, (Exhibit CHN-32-B), Article 8.
31 Regulation on the Administration of Grain Distribution, 2004 (English translation), (Exhibit CHN-9-
B), Article 27.

a Member's domestic support reduction commitment is "nil", as in the case of China, that Member
shall not provide domestic support in excess of its de minimis level. For China, paragraph 235 of its
Working Party Report, as incorporated into China's Accession Protocol, sets that de minimis level at
8.5% of the total value of production of each basic agricultural product.
As summarized below, the United States has failed to establish that China 's Current AMS,
calculated for each of its market price support measures for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice,
exceeds China's de minimis support level of 8.5% of the total value of production of each of these
products. Accordingly, the United States has failed to establish that China 's Current Total AMS
exceeds China's "nil" domestic support reduction commitment. Below, China first summarizes its
arguments regarding general concepts for the calculation of AMS, in particular the role of a Member's
constituent data and methodology, before turning to the AMS calculation for market price support
at issue here, and any applicable conflict rules. China then provides the resulting AMS calculations.
1. The role of a Member 's constituent data and methodology in the
calculation of Current AMS
China has established that, in calculating Current AMS and Current Total AMS under Articles
1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture, the United States errs by relying solely on the
provisions of Annex 3. Pursuant to Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), that calculation must consider both
(i) the framework for the calculation of AMS set out in Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and
(ii) China 's constituent data and methodology, included in its Supporting Tables in Rev.3.
Consideration of, addi tionally, China 's constituent data and methodology has important
consequences for two key variables in the calculation of Current AMS from China 's market price
support for wheat and rice. As discussed in more detail below, these variables are (i) China 's fixed
external reference prices for these products, taken from China 's Member-specific 1996-1998 base
period, and (ii) China's methodology for the determination of the amount of "eligible production" as
"amount purchased", both as detailed in China's Supporting Tables in Rev.3.
Under customary rules of treaty interpretation, it is well-established that "a treaty should be
interpreted as a whole",32 and that a treaty interpreter must not read out entire aspects of a treaty.
Moreover, "a treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives
meaning to all of them, harmoniously ".33 Application of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty
interpretation also requires a treaty interpreter to avoid, where possible, reading two provi sions of
the same treaty as conflicting. As set out below, a holistic and harmonious reading of Annex 3 and
China's constituent data and methodology is possible. Nonetheless, below, China also addresses the
applicable conflict rule.
a. Articles 1(h)(ii) and 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture require
a holistic and harmonious interpretation
The requirement to interpret a treaty holistically and harmoniously, and not to read out
entire aspects of that treaty, applies with even greater force where, as here, the treaty requires that
two provisions be considered together. As noted, the starting point of the interpretive exercise
determining the applicable calculation rules for Current AMS and Current Total AMS are
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture, which define Current AMS and Current
Total AMS. For purposes of their calculation, Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) direct a treaty interpreter
to consider and give meaning to two sources of treaty text : (i) Annex 3; and, (ii) a Member 's
"constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by
reference in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule". Thus, the Panel must attempt to adopt a holistic
and harmonious interpretation that gives meaning to both.
b. The meaning of "constituent data and methodology " in Articles
1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii)
China considers it useful to begin by exploring the meaning of the phrase "constituent data
and methodology". That phrase covers those data and metho dologies in a Member 's Supporting
Tables that are characteristic, formative, essential, and integral for the calculation of both Base and

32 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 81.
33 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 81 and footnote 72 thereto (emphasis in
original).

Current AMS and Base Total AMS and Current Total AMS. Under Articles 1(a)(i) and 1(h)(i) both
"constituent data " and "constituent methodology ", applied together with other elements of the
Supporting Tables, gave rise to a Member 's Base AMS and Base Total AMS (collectively referred to
as "Base (Total) AMS"), and, thus, that Member's domestic support reduction commitments. Under
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), both remain relevant for, and must be applied in, the calculation of a
Member's Current AMS and Current Total AMS (collectively referred to as "Current (Total) AMS").
That is, Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS are calculated by reference to the same Member-
specific constituent data and methodology in a Member's Supporting Tables.
In this respect, China explained that "constituent data and methodology " must be able to
constitute an unchanging element (either a data point or a methodology) that carries over from the
calculation of Base (Total) AMS to the calculation of Current (Total) AMS. As detailed below, for
China's market price support for wheat and rice, the term (i) "constituent data" applies to: (a) the
numerical value of the fixed external reference prices based on data from the 1996 -1998 base
period, and (b) the conversion rate of 70% for paddy -rice-based data into milled -rice-based data.
In turn, (ii) "constituent methodology " applies to: (a) the metho dology for the determination of
eligible production as "amount purchased ", and (b) the methodology for converting paddy -rice-
based data into milled-rice-based data.
Although, the Parties provided similar definitions of "data", "methodology" and "constituent",
and agreed that "constituent" qualifies "data" and "methodology", the U.S. interpretation of
"constituent data and methodology " effectively fails to give any meaning to the phrase.
Fundamentally, the United States takes the flawed view that "constituent data and methodology "
are only of historical, and/or factual interest, and not relevant for the calculation of Current (Total)
AMS. While the United States provides a few examples of what it considers to be constituent data
and methodology, the se examples are largely covered under other provisions. For example, the
United States refers to the definition of the "basic agricultural product" and the "year" for which AMS
is to be calculated. Yet, both are covered separately by Articles 1(b) and 1(i) of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
If the role of constituent data and methodology were, as the United States argues, either
non-existent or extremely limited, there would have been no need for Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii)
to refer to them as one of two elements necessary for, and relevant to, the calculation of Current
(Total) AMS from present domestic support. Accordingly, the U.S. position effectively reduces the
references to "constituent data and methodology" to nullity, contrary to the customary rules of treaty
interpretation, and Article 3.2 of the DSU.
c. The ordinary meaning of "in accordance with " and "taking into
account" in Articles 1(h)(ii) and 1(a)(ii)
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) also speak to the relationship between the framewor k for the
AMS calculation in Annex 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology. That relationship
must be determined based on the ordinary meaning of the terms "in accordance with" and "taking
into account" in Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), in their context, and in light of the object and purpose
of the Agreement on Agriculture. In addition, there is limited guidance from the findings of the panel
and the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef – although on the facts of that dispute, Korea had no relevant
constituent data and methodology for beef.
Article 1(a)(ii) provides that Current AMS is "calculated in accordance with the provisions of
Annex 3 …, and taking into account the constituent data and methodology". Article 1(h)(ii) uses only
the phrase "in accordance with", providing that Current Total AMS shall be "calculated in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6 [which includes Annex 3], and with the
constituent data and methodology". China has established that, contrary to the U.S. view, the term
"in accordance with" applies to both sources of treaty text referenced. The dictionary meaning of "in
accordance with" is "in agreement or harmony with, in conformity to, according to".34 That is, under
Article 1(h)(ii), Current Total AMS must be calculated "in agreement or harmony with" both (i) the
framework of Annex 3 and (ii) "the constituent data and methodology". The same requirement flows
from Article 1(a)(ii ), which also uses the phrase "in accordance with " when referring to Annex 3.
Indeed, in Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body confirmed the meaning of the term "in accordance with",

34 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "in accordance with, n.", pp. 2-3, available at:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1170? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN-53).

and also recognized that Article 1(h)(ii) attributes equal importance to both sources of treaty text.35
Article 1(a)(ii) uses the phrase "taking into account" when referring to "the constituent data
and methodology". The meaning of "to take into account" is "to include something in an account or
reckoning".36 Thus, similarly to Article 1(h)(ii), Article 1(a)(ii) also emphasizes the role of "the
constituent data and methodology" in calculating AMS.
In short, Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) require the Panel to give meaning to both Annex 3 and
the constituent data and methodology, in a holistic and harmonious manner. Contrary to the U.S.
arguments, they are not conflict rules that give, in all circumstances, precedence to Annex 3 over a
Member's constituent data and methodology. In any event, questions of hierarchy become relevant
only where a conflict existed between Annex 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology,
which does not arise on the facts of this dispute.
d. Current AMS and Current Total AMS are part of the same overall
calculation
The relationship between Annex 3 and a Member's constituent data and methodology is also
defined by the fact that Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) are part of the same overall calculation. They
do not involve different assessments, as the United States argues in an attempt ultimately to remove
China's constituent data and methodology from the calculation of Current AMS. Instead, Annex 3
and a Member's constituent data and methodology must each be given the same meaning and the
same weight in the calculation of both AMS and Total AMS.
As China has explained, the notion of AMS, which expresses domestic support in monetary
terms, is built into each of the concepts of AMS, Total AMS, Current Total AMS and Base Total AMS.
As the panel in Korea – Beef held, "all these concepts, e.g. domestic support, AMS, Current Total
AMS, and total domestic support and the provisions of Articles 1(a), 1(h), 3.2, 6.4, and 7.2 are
organically and inextricably linked ".37 It follows that AMS must be calculated in the same manner
for purposes of both AMS and Total AMS. This requirement flows also from the fact that Total AMS
is defined, in Article 1(h), as the sum of the AMS calculations for each basic agricultural product
(along with non-product-specific AMS), subject only to de minimis exclusion rules under Article 6.4.
In the summing -up that results in Total AMS, each AMS component remains unaltered, however,
and is not re-calculated, demonstrating that calculating both AMS and Total AMS is part of the same
overall calculation.
Indeed, both AMS and Total AMS, whether calculated for the base period or for current
domestic support, are elements of the same overall calculation of a level of domestic support. In the
case of Base AMS and Base Total AMS, the AMS components are part of the calculation that yielded
a Member's Base Total AMS and the resulting annual and final bound commitment levels, including
where the reduction commitment is "nil". And, in the case of Current AMS and Current Total AMS,
they are part of the calculation that assesses whether a Member's domestic support in any year after
the base period has exceeded that Member's domestic support reduction commitments, in violation
of Articles 3.2 and 6.3.
Thus, contrary to the U.S. assertions that both are separate exer cises, there is no basis to
require one set of calculations for Current AMS, under Article 1(a)(ii), and another set of calculations
for the same Current AMS that is summed up into Current Total AMS, under Article 1(h)(ii) (subject
only to de minimis exclusions).
e. The relevant context, and object and purpose of the Agreement,
reflecting the requirement for consistency in the calculation of Base
(Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS
Further illuminating the role of a Member 's constituent data and method ology in the
calculation of Current AMS and Current Total AMS is the need for consistency in the calculation of
(i) Base (Total) AMS and (ii) Current (Total) AMS. That need for consistency flows from relevant

35 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, footnote 111.
36 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "to take account of, n.", pp. 21-22, available at:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1194? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN-54).

context and the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture. The need for consistency is an
important element in the Panel's consideration of the role, in calculating Current AMS from China 's
market price support for wheat and rice, of China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3.
Specifically, it is relevant for the identification of the appropriate fixed external reference prices
sources from data reflecting the China 's 1996 -1998 base period; the methodology for the
determination of eligible production as "amount purchased"; and, the metho dology for converting
paddy-rice-based data into milled-rice-based data, reflecting a conversion rate of 70%.
Beginning with context, Articles 1(a)(i) and 1(h)(i) refer to AMS and Total AMS during the
base period "as specified in the relevant tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in
Part IV of a Member's Schedule" and "as specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule", respectively.
Thus, they refer to the same Member-specific Supporting Tables that, pursuant to Articles 1(a)(ii)
and 1(h)(ii) include constituent data and methodology as elements of the calculation of Base AMS
and Base Total AMS.
The calculations of Base (Total) AMS in those Supporting Tables reflect the framework in
Annex 3 and Member-specific constituent data and methodologies. Indeed, paragraph 5 of Annex 3
explains that Annex 3 also served as a framework for the calculation of the Base (Total) AMS, as
recorded in a Member 's Supporting Tables. Paragraph 5 stipulates that "[t]he AMS calculated as
outlined below [i.e., in paragraphs 6 -13 of Annex 3] for the base period shall constitute the base
level for the implementation of the reduction commitment on domestic support ". As a result, a
Member's Base (Total) AMS will generally reflect the framework set out in Annex 3. Accordingly, the
United States errs in arguing that Base AMS calculations occurred in a legal vacuum, allegedly
because "the Agreement does not provide a specific calculation methodology".38 Instead, Base AMS
calculations were guided by the framework in A nnex 3 (as set out in paragraph 5 thereof)
and included Member -specific constituent data and methodology (as noted in Articles 1(a)(ii)
and 1(h)(ii)).
China also rebutted the related, and equally erroneous, U.S. argument that there is no
requirement for consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS because
the former is of historical interest only. As set out above, the U.S. position is contradicted by the
Agreement on Agriculture. Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) signify that the choices Members made in the
calculation of Base (Total) AMS have consequences in the calculation of Current (Total) AMS.
Specifically, while Base AMS and Current AMS differ with respect to the time period for which they
are calculated, they are calculated using the same calculation framework under Annex 3 and the
same constituent data and methodology. Thus, contrary to the U.S. assertion, they are "inextricably
linked",39 and the constituent data and methodology from the calculation of Base (Total) AMS remain
relevant for the calculation of Current (Total) AMS.
Further relevant context is provided by the domestic support provisions in the Agreement
on Agriculture – i.e., Articles 6.1, 6.3, 7.1, 20, title of Annex 2, paragraph 1 of Annex 3. They each
refer to domestic support reduction commitments. Similarly, recital 3 of the Agreement's preamble
provides that the object and purpose of the Agreement, with regard to domestic support, is to
achieve "progressive reductions in agricultural support".
Consistency with the objective to reduce domestic support requires that compliance with a
Member's domestic support reduction commitments is assessed in a meaningful manner – i.e., in a
manner that permits drawing conclusions about a Members' reduction of its domestic support. This
requires consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS (which reflects domestic support during
the base period and served as the basis for a Member's domestic support reduction commitments)
and Current (Total) AMS (which reflects current domestic support). A lack of consistency in the
calculation of both would undermine the usefulness of the Current (Total) AMS calculation as a proxy
for the level of current domestic support, relative to a Member 's domestic support reduction
commitments, which flow from Base (Total) AMS. Indeed, the panel in Korea – Beef explicitly
recognized this need for consistency.40 The Appellate Body found no error in the panel's findings.41
As China has shown, failure to use, where pertinent, consistently the same constituent data

38 United States, response to Panel Questions 62, para. 46.
41 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, paras. 113-114 ( footnote 49), and 118.

and methodology together with the framework of Annex 3 leads to substantial distortions in the
calculation of Current (Total) AMS, relative to Base (Total) AMS. Specifically, if constituent data and
methodology used for the calculation of Current (Total) AMS differed from those used for the
calculation of Base (Total) AMS, AMS calculations would become meaningless apples-to-oranges
comparisons that reveal nothing about actual reductions in domestic support. Variations in the
constituent data and methodology mean that one cannot know whether, for example, a Member 's
compliance with its reduction commitments results from (i) actual reductions in its domestic support,
or (ii) simply from the use of different constituent data and methodology.
Importantly, where different constituent data and methodology are used, a reduction in AMS
may be found, and may mask actual levels of domestic sup port that either remain unchanged or
have even increased. These distortions are illustrated by the exaggerating effect on China's Current
AMS of the United States ' application of (i) entirely new fixed external reference prices for wheat
and rice, based on 1986-1988 (rather than 1996-1998) data; and, (ii) a different methodology for
the determination of "eligible production".
While the United States, at times, recognized these distortions, and argued that constituent
data and methodology may be used wh ere a Member continues to apply the same program, there
is no basis for that narrow reading of the consistency requirement. In any event, the United States
appears to have abandoned that argument.
In short, the requirement for consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current
(Total) AMS that flows from the text and context in Articles 1(a) and 1(h), the context of paragraph
5 of Annex 3, and the design and architecture of the Agreement on Agriculture. It follows that the
framework in Annex 3 and a Member's constituent data and methodology must be used consistently
in the same manner when a Member continues more broadly to use certain forms of domestic
support for a basic agricultural product for which its Supporting Tables include relevant constituent
data and methodology. The United States ' negation of the need for such consistency is without a
basis in the Agreement on Agriculture.
Finally, and contrary to the U.S. assertion, China has established that the need for
consistency applies irrespective of whether a Member has a "positive" or a "nil" domestic support
reduction commitment. Under the terms of the Agreement on Agriculture, and contrary to the U.S.
assertions, both constitute reduction commitments. Thus, China's commitment level of "nil" is an
ongoing domestic support "reduction" commitment. Indeed, absent a reduction commitment, the
domestic support disciplines of Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture would not apply
to China.
f. Constituent dat a and methodology are an important basis for a
Member's domestic support reduction commitments
The considerations above highlight that a Member 's domestic support reduction
commitments arise, in important part, from its Member-specific constituent data and methodology.
Ignoring those constituent data and methodology in assessing compliance with individually
negotiated and Member -specific domestic support reduction commitments, as the United States
does, would be tantamount to re -writing that Member 's commitments. Moreover, using different
constituent data and methodology would undermine the utility of Current AMS calculations as a
means to assess compliance with Member-specific domestic support reduction commitments.
i. For later -acceded Members their c onstituent data and
methodology are also part of their Accession Protocols
The implications of the United States ' attempt at reading out a Member 's constituent data
and methodology are aggravated for later -acceded Members, such as China. For those Mem bers,
their constituent data and methodology are not only part and parcel of their domestic support
reduction commitments, but also of their "terms of accession", under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh
Agreement. Contrary to the U.S. assertions, China 's Supporting Tables in Rev.3, which include its
constituent data and methodology, are part of China's Accession Protocol. Specifically, Annex 8
thereto includes China's Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods ( "Schedule"), which
incorporates Rev.3. Indeed, China's Schedule notes that it "result[ed] from the negotiations between
the People's Republic of China and WTO Members [and that it] is annexed to the Protocol of Accession

of China ".42 As part of China's Accession Protocol, Rev.3 enjoys the same legal status as the
Accession Protocol.
The United States further errs in arguing that China 's Schedule, including Rev.3, lost its
status as part of China's Accession Protocol because it became annexed to the GATT 1994. The legal
status of Rev.3 as part of China's Accession Protocol is not affected by its integration into the GATT
1994. As noted, Schedules of Concessions in an accession protocol form part of the "terms of
accession", under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement. They are an integral part of the package
of rights and obligations under which that Member acceded to the WTO, and can never lose their
status as "terms of accession".
ii. The constituent data and methodology give rise to China 's
domestic support commitments
China's constituent data and methodology gave rise to binding commitments, as part of
China's domestic support reduction commitments. Contrary to the U.S. assertions, they do not
"alter" or "supplant" those commitments. Instead, they are themselves China 's negotiated and
agreed "terms of accession ". China has explained that the U.S. position rests on an erroneous
understanding of the relationship between an Accession Protocol and the Agreement on Agriculture.
When a new Member accedes to the WTO under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, it does
not agree to undertake pre -existing commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture , as those
commitments stood prior to its accession. Instead, it accedes to the Agreement on Agriculture
subject to individually negotiated and agreed commitments that are set out in the "terms of
accession" under the Accession Protocol.
For China, this is confirmed by paragraphs 1.2 and 12.1 of China 's Accession Protocol.
Paragraph 1.2 confirms that the Accession Protocol, including the domestic -support-related
commitments, "shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement". Paragraph 12.1 then stipulates
that "China shall implement the provisions contained in China 's Schedul e of Concessions and
Commitments on Goods and, as specifically provided in this Protocol, those of the Agreement on
Agriculture". Thus, China is required to implement the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture
subject to the terms of its Accession Prot ocol. That is, China's Accession Protocol does not "alter"
domestic support reduction commitments; it gives rise to those commitments.
Moreover, China has rebutted the U.S. arguments that aim to invalidate the binding nature
of China's constituent data and methodology. First, China has demonstrated that paragraph 1.3 of
China's Accession Protocol does not speak to the question of substantive commitments China
allegedly undertook as those commitments stood prior to its accession. Instead, it relates to potential
transition periods, and explains that, unless specifically stated, China is not entitled to them. Second,
China explained that paragraph 238 of China's Working Party Report does not reflect a disagreement
between China and its negotiating partne rs as to China 's constituent data and methodology that
would invalidate them. Rather, paragraph 238 records concerns regarding certain policy
classification of certain "green box " support unrelated to China 's domestic support reduction
commitments. Finally, China has explained that the case law from EC – Sugar regarding the role of
schedules in undertaking commitments is inapposite. This is because Rev.3 is part of China 's
Accession Protocol, and because, in any event, the scheduling rules for export subsidy and domestic
support commitments are very different in light of the Member -specific nature of domestic support
reduction commitments, including the ability to use Member -specific constituent data and
methodology that give rise to these commitments.
2. The appropriate methodology to calculate Current (Total) AMS for
China's market price support measures for wheat and rice
Having set out the general interpretative framework, and the need for consistency in the
calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS, China turns to demonstrating the
importance of using its own constituent data and methodology, where relevant. Specifically, China
now turns to the AMS calculations required for market price support pursuant to paragraph 8 of
Annex 3, and identifies on the basis of a holistic and harmonious interpretation the data and

42 WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.1 (emphasis added).

methodologies to be used in those calculations.
To begin, AMS from market price support is to be calculated on the basis of the difference
between the fixed external reference price ( "FERP") for the product at issue and its applied
administered price ( "AAP"), multiplied by the quantity of eligible production. Most of these input
factors have been the subject of intense debate.
a. The appropriate fixed external reference prices based on data from
1996-1998
China has demonstrated that its FERPs must be sourced from its 1996 -1998 base period.
This result flows from a holistic and harmonious interpretation, consistent with the customary rules
of treaty interpretation, of all relevant provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, in light of relevant
context and the object and purpose of the treaty.
By contrast, the United States takes the view that China's FERPs must be identified reflecting
a 1986-1988 base period. For the United States, this flows from the alleged clarity and plain meaning
of a few words in paragraph 9 of Annex 3, ignoring the rest of the Agreement on Agriculture and
China's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3. The United States errs, and ba ses its
interpretation on only a subset of relevant materials. China established that the case law provides
numerous examples where consideration of all relevant text, context and the objective and purpose
of the treat result in interpretations of a provis ion, or select words in a provision, that go beyond
the alleged clarity of those words.
Thus, in approaching the interpretative task of identifying the relevant base period for
Chinas' FERPs, the Panel's first task is to identify what it is being called upon to interpret. Only then
is it meaningful to discuss how that interpretative exercise must proceed. Contrary to the U.S.
assertion, the Panel is not called upon to interpret a few words in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 in clinical
isolation from all the other provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Instead, the Panel is required to interpret, holistically and harmoniously, all provisions of the
Agreement that deal with the determination of the base period for the FERPs, in the light of relevant
context and the object and purpose of the Agreement. This involves consideration of Articles 1(a)
and 1(h), as well as paragraphs 5 and 9 of Annex 3, and additionally China 's constituent data and
methodology in Rev.3, along with the context from other Members' Supporting Tables, as included
in those Members' Schedules, and the need to ensure consistency in the calculation of Base (Total)
AMS and Current (Total) AMS, which flows from the design and architecture of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
Following the correct interpretative approach, China has established that the proper, holistic
and harmonious interpretation of these provisions establishes a single rule regarding the
identification of the applicable base period for Members ' domestic support commitments, including
for their FERPs. That single rule requires each Member to use a three -year base period for
establishing its domestic support reduction commitments, including for the identification of the
applicable FERPs to be used in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS. Under
that single rule, the three -year base period must be sufficiently proximate to the time of the
Member's accession.

Consistent with the context provided by Members ' Supporting Tables, this single rul e is
implemented through different modalities. For original Members, the base period proximate to the
time of the creation of the WTO is generally 1986-1988, as memorialized in paragraph 9 of Annex 3
and in those Members ' Supporting Tables. For each of the 36 later-acceded Members, there are
Member-specific three-year base periods that are each proximate to the time of accession of the
later-acceded Member concerned, as agreed in the relevant accession protocol between that Member
and the WTO, and as memori alized in each of those later -acceded Members' Supporting Tables.
Specifically, of the 36 Members that acceded to the WTO after the conclusion of the Uruguay round,
all43 used a three-year base period for the calculation of Base (Total) AMS that was proxim ate to
their accession, and later than 1986 -1988. And all 10 later -acceded Members that maintained
market price support measures during their Member-specific base periods drew their FERPs from the
same base period used to calculate Base (Total) AMS. For China specifically, that base period is
1996-1998, as indicated in its Supporting Tables, which are also part of its Accession Protocol.
Indeed, each of the draft Schedules China prepared during the five -year negotiating period from
1997 to 2001 consistently used the most recent three-year time period, and none used 1986-1988.
No Member objected to this approach.
Thus, the context provided by other Members ' Supporting Tables reinforces the
interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions that China has advanced in these proceedings,
whereby (i) original Members were generally required to use a 1986-1988 base period, including for
their fixed external reference prices, while (ii) later -acceded Members were required to use a later
base period, including for their fixed external reference prices, that was proximate to the time of
their accession. That is, for Members that acceded after the Uruguay Round, includi ng China, this
context supports the conclusion that they are not required to calculate their FERPs on the basis of a
1986-1988 base period; instead, they must use the base period in their respective Schedules – i.e.,
for China, 1996 -1998, as set out in Rev .3. China considers that the Panel should give significant
weight to this context.44
Moreover, the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture demonstrates the error
in the United States' treatment of the 1996-1998 base period, resulting from the above interpretative
exercise, as relevant only for the calculation of Base (Total) AMS, but not Current (Total) AMS. This
U.S. argument ignores the role and purpose of FERPs and the requirement for consistency in the
Agreement. To recall, a FERP acts as a benchmark to permit an assessment of a Member's Current
AMS from market price support relative to its Base AMS from market price support, in line with that
Member's domestic support reduction commitments. A WTO Member must calculate its Current
(Total) AMS consistently by using the same constituent data and methodology it used to calculate
its Base (Total) AMS, including the same FERPs. Otherwise, it would be subjected to AMS
commitments it did not undertake, in violation of Article 3.2 of the DSU.
The existence of the single rule that the three -year base period, including for the FERPs,
must be sufficiently proximate to the time of the Member 's accession is consistent with a 2010
Technical Note by the WTO Secretariat, which explains that, "[w]hereas a fixed period (1986-1988)
was established for commitments on domestic support and export subsidies undertaken in the
Uruguay Round, the base periods for Members acceding under Article XII of the WTO Agreement
have been determined on an individual ba sis".45 Indeed, for later -acceding Members, a 1996
Technical Note from the WTO Secretariat on the accession process emphasizes that acceding
governments should calculate an "external reference price" from data "normally for each of the last
three years".46
China further notes that forcing each of the 36 later -acceded Members, including China, to
calculate, going forward, Current AMS using different FERPs has important systemic consequences.
During none of the accession negotiations did the United States, or any other Member, suggest that

43 There is one exception, Bulgaria, which arose from the particular factual situation regarding its
accession.
44 China also notes that, alternatively, the Panel could perhaps view the Schedules of later-acceded
Members as evidence of a common, concordant and consistent "subsequent practice" relating to the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Panel's conclusions under both
approaches would remain unchanged. Indeed, resort to subsequent practice merely confirms, and does not in
any way modify, the meaning that results from a holistic and harmonious interpretation employing other tools
of treaty interpretation.
45 WT/ACC/10/Rev.4, p. 25.
46 WT/ACC/4, pp. 3-4 (emphasis added).

a 1986-1988 base period had to be used, including for the FERPs. Doing so now forces later-acceded
Members to comply with commitments not undertaken, in violation of not only Article 3.2 of the
DSU, but also each of their respective accession protocols. Moreover, for several of these Members,
there may be no 1986 -1988 data from which to draw FERPs, given that several countries at issue
did not even exist in 1986-1988. Rather than using proxy data, as the United States suggests, under
the proper interpretation, those Members should simply use their own FERPs in their Supporting
Tables.
Finally, the United States errs in arguing that China's three-year average FERPs were not
"used" in its Supporting Tables, and must t herefore be ignored when calculating Current AMS.
China's FERPs appear in Rev.3 as the three-year average of external references prices during China's
1996-1998 base period. Moreover, in calculating Base AMS, China used the data for the external
reference prices for each of the three years of its 1996-1998 base period. Specifically, for each year
of the 1996-1998 base period, China used the external reference price from the year at issue. Thus,
the U.S. allegation that "China did not 'use' these data points (or methodologies) in the calculation
of its market price support"47 is unavailing.
Indeed, China 's approach is consistent with the need to use constituent data and
methodology for the calculation of both Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS. China calculated
Base AMS using annual 1996-1998 external reference prices. It continues to calculate Current AMS
using FERPs that reflect the average of those same external reference prices. This ensures
consistency as China's FERPs are fixed and serve as external reference prices situated in the 1996-
1998 base period.
b. The appropriate applied administered prices
The dictionary meaning of an "administered price " refers to a price "determined not by
market forces but by administrative action".48 The dictionary meaning of "applied" includes "brought
to bear, made effective, acting at a point or place ".49 Thus, the AAP refers to the price, as set or
established by a government, at which a Member effectively provides market price support for the
producers of a basic agricultural product. Similarly, the United States observed that an AAP must be
"known and discernible", and that it is a "price set or established by a government and …, as such,
distinguishable from a prevailing market price".50
The requirement for a comparison between the AAP and the FERP means that "both the FERP
and the AAP must be calculated at an equivalent stage of processing or converted accordingly".51 As
paragraphs 8 and 9 of Annex 3 require the FERP to be fixed – limiting permissible adjustment to
those for quality differences – any adjustment to make the required price/product comparison must
be made to the AAP. Thus, the United States errs in adjusting the FERP. Instead, as China has
demonstrated that relevant adjustments mus t be made to the AAP and the amount of eligible
production. China addresses the Parties' debate regarding the appropriate conversion factor in the
context of identifying the basic agricultural product, below.
c. The appropriate methodology for determining eligible production
Under paragraph 8 of Annex 3, calculating AMS from market price support requires that the
difference between the FERP and the AAP be multiplied by the quantity of eligible production. In the
case of China's market price support for wheat and rice, the methodology to determine that amount
is included as a constituent methodology in its Supporting Tables. Specifically, in calculating Base
AMS for wheat and rice, China determined "eligible production" as the "amount purchased".

47 See United States, response to Panel Question 79, para. 136.
48 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "administered, adj.", available at:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/2532? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN-60).
49 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "applied, adj.", available at:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9713? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN-61).
50 United States, first written submission, para. 97 (emphasis added).

By way of background, Rev.3 records the "amount purchased" methodology as having been
used for both market price support measures that China maintained during the base period for wheat
and rice. Specifically, it explains that "eligible production for State Procurement Price" refers to "the
amount purchased by state-owned enterprises from farmers at state procurement price for the food
security purpose", and that "eligible production for Protective Price" refers to "the amount purchased
by state-owned enterprises from farmers at protective price in order to protect farmer's income".52
Indeed, each of the draft Schedules China prepared during the five -year negotiating period from
1997 to 2001 consistently used this methodology for the determination of the am ount of eligible
production. Throughout the 14 working party meetings and numerous informal consultations, there
is no record of any WTO Member disputing this methodology. Instead, the use of purchased amounts
to determine eligible production is part of th e custom-made package that China and all Members
agreed to as part of China's "terms of accession".
Contrary to the erroneous U.S. argument, China 's methodology for the determination of
"eligible production" is not only of historical interest since it was applied to the measures that existed
during the 1996-1998 base period. Instead, it remains relevant as a constituent methodology under
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture for the calculation of China 's Current
AMS and Current Total AMS from market price support for wheat and rice. Moreover, and contrary
to the U.S. assertions, it is a constituent methodology because it sets out a method for the
determination of eligible production that applies consistently across the tw o different market price
support measures that China maintained at the time for wheat and rice. Thus, and contrary to the
U.S. assertions, it was not tied to, and applicable for, only those specific measures.
The U.S. error in concluding that China's constituent methodology in Rev.3 may be ignored
results in the U.S. reliance on solely the dictionary definition of the term "eligible". For that, the
United States points to the findings of Appellate Body in Korea – Beef, arguing on that basis that
"eligible" refers to the total amount of production in the geographic area where a market price
support measure operates.
The United States errs. Exclusive reliance on an undefined term in Annex 3 could only be
warranted in situations in which there is no relevant constituent data and methodology for the
product at issue. That was precisely the situation in Korea – Beef, where Korea's Schedule did not
contain relevant constituent data and methodology for beef . By contrast, market price support for
wheat and rice was included in China 's calculation of its Base Total AMS, and there are relevant
constituent data and methodology. Indeed, unlike the situation in Korea – Beef, the constituent data
and methodology incorporated in China's Supporting Tables contains a specific methodology for the
determination of the amount of eligible production for the products at issue.
In these circumstances, the Panel must consider the text in paragraph 8 and China 's
constituent methodology, relevant context and the object and purpose of the treaty. Adopting this
approach, WTO panels and the Appellate Body consistently look beyond a few words considered in
isolation in one provision, and consider relevant context and the object and purpose of the treaty to
arrive at a meani ng that may qualify or depart from the literal meaning of those few words used,
when considered alone.
Indeed, unlike the United States' interpretative approach (which is based solely on the text
of paragraph 8 and ignores all other elements of the interpretative exercise), China's interpretation
is arrived at by appropriately considering, in a holistic and harmonious manner, all elements of the
interpretive exercise under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention – i.e., all applicable text, the context
and the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture.
To begin, paragraph 8 refers to "the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied
administered price". As the Appellate Body held in Korea – Beef, the dictionary meaning of "eligible"
is "fit or entitled to be chosen ".53 To recall, i n that dispute, the Appellate Body focused its
interpretation on the dictionary meaning of the term "eligible", because Korea had no constituent
data and methodology f or beef. Thus, where there is no further relevant text or context – and in
particular in the absence of relevant constituent data and methodology – "eligible" production may
be determined based on production that is "fit or entitled to be chosen ". It is ag ainst that legal

52 WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, note 19.
53 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, para. 122.

standard then that the specific facts surrounding the measure at issue must be assessed.
Thus, the United States misunderstands the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef. Contrary to the
U.S. assertions, the Appellate Body did not find that , where a Member 's market price support
measures do not declare any quantity of production as "eligible" to receive the applied administered
price, the default "interpretation" requires use of "total production" as "eligible production", when
calculating market price support under paragraph 8 of Annex 3. Instead, the legal standard in the
absence of any relevant constituent data and methodology continues to be production that is "fit or
entitled to be chosen".
 In the circumstances of this dispute, t he Panel must also take into account China 's
constituent methodology in Rev.3, determining the amount of "eligible production" as "the amount
purchased". China has established that, contrary to the U.S. position, a holistic and harmonious
interpretation of (i) paragraph 8 of Annex 3 and (ii) the constituent data and methodology in Rev.3
is possible. Indeed, paragraph 8 does not prescribe in detail how "eligible production " must be
identified, and does not specify a singular methodology for doing so.
China's interpretation that eligible production for its market price support for wheat and rice
must be determined based on "the amount purchased " flows, in particular, from the context and
object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture, which require consistency in the calculation of
Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS – i.e., a proper apples-to-apples comparison in assessing
compliance with China's domestic support reduction commitments. Indeed, and contrary to the U.S.
assertion, China's interpretation of "eligible production" ensures that China is held to the domestic
support reduction commitments that it agreed with the Membership, and recorded in its Accession
Protocol.
In short, and as China has explained in detail, considering all the ele ments of the
interpretative exercise – i.e., the texts and context of Articles 1(a) and 1(h), as well as paragraphs
5 and 8 of Annex 3, and, China's constituent methodology in Rev.3, and in light of their context and
the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture – the proper interpretation of the
methodology for the determination of the amount of "eligible production" for China's market price
support for wheat and rice is "amount purchased". Thus, when calculating AMS from China's market
price support for wheat and rice, it is necessary to apply a methodology for determining eligible
production based on the "amount purchased".
The United States also sought to support its arguments for a methodology to determine
"eligible production" as "total production" based on alleged market effects of market price support
measures. Yet, the United States finally recognized that the Agreement on Agriculture does not
"seek[] to counter any negative effects of the provision of support".54 This confirms China's position
that the calculation of AMS from market price support is not linked to, and does not measure, the
"effects" of such measures. Indeed, reading an "effects" test into the rules on the calculation of a
Member's AMS would be inconsistent with the Agreement's definition of AMS as a measure of a
Member's "annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms" under Article 1(a).
d. The relevant basic agricultural products
For each calculation of Current AMS, it is necessary to identify the relevant basic agricultural
product, for which that calculation must be undertaken. The United States argues that, pursuant to
paragraph 7 of Annex 3, AMS must be calculated at the "point of first sale " of an agricultural
commodity – i.e., for the product that leaves the farm.
Yet, as China has explained, Article 1(b) and paragraph 7 of Annex 3 require AMS to be
calculated for "the product as close as practicable to the point of first sale as specified in a Member's
Schedule and in the related supporting mate rial".55 Thus, as the United States accepts elsewhere,
Article 1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture defines the basic agricultural product, for which AMS is
to be calculated, by reference to a Member 's Supporting Tables, as included in its Schedule. There
is no requirement that the "basic agricultural product" "specified" in a Member's Supporting Tables
is the product at the beginning of the processing chain, as sold at the point of first sale. Rather, that
product is simply as specified in a Member 's Supporting Tables, and may be processed. It is that

54 United States, second written submission, para. 25.
55 Emphasis added.

product, for which data need to be sourced as close as practicable to the point of its first sale.
In these proceedings, issues regarding the identification of the relevant basic agricultural
product hav e arisen principally in the context of rice. The United States erroneously calculated
Current AMS for each of paddy indica rice and paddy japonica rice. By contrast, China's Supporting
Tables in Rev.3 identify the basic agricultural rice products as milled indica rice and milled japonica
rice. Specifically, for both types of rice, China 's FERPs in Rev.3 are expressed in terms of
HS10063000 – i.e., "semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed". Similarly,
China's Base AMS in Supporting Table DS:5 was calculated for milled indica rice and milled japonica
rice. Pursuant to Articles 1(b) and paragraph 7 of Annex 3, China 's Current AMS must, therefore,
similarly be calculated on the basis of milled indica rice and milled japonica rice.
As noted, where certain variables for the calculation of AMS from market price support are
reported for a form of processing other than that of the basic agricultural product, these variables
need to be converted to represent the basic agricultural product. Relevant conversion rates may be
included in a Member's constituent data and methodology in their Supporting Tables.
As relevant to these proceedings, China 's AAPs and amounts of eligible production are
reported in terms of paddy rice. To convert these price and volume data into milled rice equivalents,
China's Supporting Tables in Rev.3 used a single 70% conversion rate, which is derived from volume-
based data. As constituent data, the Panel should apply this same conversion rate. This conversion
rate is, moreover, reasonable, appropriate, and consistent with an objective assessment of the facts.
It reflects a milling rate applicable between paddy rice and milled rice and is acknowledged and
accepted, including by the OECD and the USDA. Use of a volume-based conversion rate is self -
evidently reasonable and appropriate for a volume -based conversion, such as for the amount of
eligible production. Use of that same conversion rate is also reasonable and appropriate for the
price-based conversion for the AAP, where precise data is unavailable, as the United States accepts.
Indeed, the volume/quantity effect of further processing rice is the predominant factor affecting the
price of rice at different levels of processing.
By contrast, the United States uses a 60% price conversion rate for its conversion of FERPs
into paddy rice data. It derived this conversion rate from a ratio between (i) the retail price for paddy
rice and (ii) the price of polished rice in the Chinese retail market. Using polished rice, the United
States selected the most processed product, with the highest price, among the varieties of rice falling
under HS10063000, thereby distorting the applicable conversion rate. The U.S. proposed conversion
rate is further inappropriate, beca use it adjusts not only the level of processing, but also the level
of trade of the data concerned.
In sum, the Panel should use the 70% conversion rate included in China 's constituent data
and methodology to convert data on the AAP and the eligible production, and to ensure that both
data are expressed at the equivalent level of processing as the rice FERPs in Rev.3.
e. China's de minimis level
Under paragraph 235 of China's Working Party Report, which is incorporated in China 's
Accession Protocol, China is entitled to a de minimis level of 8.5% of the total value of production
for each basic agricultural product, instead of the 10% that apply for other developing M embers
under Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Thus, as long as China's product-specific domestic
support for a basic agricultural product is equivalent to, or less than, 8.5% of the total value of
production of that product, China is not requir ed to include such support in its Current Total AMS
under Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agreement, and complies with its domestic support reduction
commitments, including under Article 7.2(b).
f. Total value of production of a basic agricultural product
China's de minimis assessment requires calculating AMS as a percentage of the total value
of production for the basis agricultural product at issue. As noted above, pursuant to Article 1(b),
the relevant basic agricultural product is identified in a Member's Supporting Tables. Paragraph 7 of
Annex 3 further provides that "AMS shall be calculated as close as practicable to the point of first
sale of the basic agricultural product concerned". Similarly, the total value of production of the basic
agricultural product must be calculated "as close as practicable to the point of first sale " of the

product concerned. Thus, the total value of production for wheat and rice should be calculated by
multiplying the total amount of wheat, milled indica rice and milled japonica rice produced in China
with the producer price for these products, determined as the weighted average of market prices
and government administered prices. This approach is consistent with the manner in which total
value of production is determined in Rev.3.
3. In case the Panel finds a conflict, the Accession Protocol, including
Rev.3, prevails over the Agreement on Agriculture
If the Panel were to disagree that a harmonious interpretation of Annex 3 and China 's
constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 is possible, and were to find a conflict for any of the data
or methodologies to be used, China has explained that its constituent data and methodology in Rev.3
prevail to the extent of that conflict. To recall, China's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3
are part of its Accession Protocol and, thus, the Marrakesh Agreement. Accordingly, when resolving
a conflict between China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 and the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture , the appli cable conflict rule is that in Article XVI:3 of the Marrakesh
Agreement. Article XVI:3 provides as follows: "In the event of a conflict between a provision of this
Agreement [ i.e., the Marrakesh Agreement] and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict". Accordingly,
in the event of a conflict, Rev.3 would prevail over the Agreement on Agriculture, to the extent of
that conflict.
The United States recognizes that application of this conflict rule means that precedence
must be given to the Accession Protocol. Indeed, it properly relies on the same mechanism to support
its argument that the applicable de minimis support level for the calculation of China's Current Total
AMS is 8.5%, rather than the 10% otherwise applicable under Article 6.4(b) of the Agreement on
Agriculture. According to the United States, this result flows from paragraph 235 of China's Working
Party Report, as included in China 's Accession Protocol , which prevails to the extent of its conflict
with Article 6.4(b).
China further rebutted all three alleged conflict rules that the United States considers apply
so as to displace China's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3. First, China explained that the
alleged hierarchy in Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture does not exist, and that, in any
event, Article 1(a)(ii) does not constitute a conflict rule. Second, China explained that Article 21.1
of the Agreement on Agriculture is applicable only to conflicts between the GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Agriculture. It does not apply in case of conflict between a "term of accession" and
the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture . For later-acceded Members, Article XVI:3 of the
Marrakesh Agreement, as a higher level conflict rule, takes priority over any other conflict rule in
the covered agreements. Indeed, to the extent that a conflict rule in a Multilateral Trade Agreement,
such as Article 21.1, were to suggest a different conflict resolution from that dictated by Article
XVI:3, that rule would itself be in conflict with Article XVI:3, which would prevail. Third and finally,
China explained that, likewise, the case law from EC – Sugar regarding conflicts between a Schedule
and a covered agreement does not apply in case of a conflict between a "term of accession" and the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture.
4. Conclusion
In sum, either through a holistic and harmonious interpretation, or on the basis of the
applicable conflict rule, the Panel must recognize the role of China 's constituent data and
methodology, and use them, as identified above, in the calculation of China 's Current (Total) AMS
for wheat and rice.
C. China's AMS calculation for market price support for wheat and rice
1. China's domestic support for wheat for 2012 -2016 is within its 8.5
percent de minimis commitment level
Having identified the legal errors in the U.S. approach to calculating AMS from market price
support for wheat, provided under the MPP for wheat, China then set out the accurate calculations.
Specifically, in its AMS calculations, China used the appropriate 1996-1998 FERP for wheat, as
included in Rev.3, rather than the flawed FERP used by the United States, based on 1986-1988 data.

Moreover, like the United States, China sourced the AAP for wheat from the annual wheat MPP
measures for each of the years 2012-2016. Finally, and again consistent with Rev.3, China used as
the amount of eligible production the amount of wheat that was a ctually purchased under the MPP
program in each of years 2012 -2016, instead of the, legally incorrect, total amount of wheat
production in the MPP provinces, as used by the United States.
China demonstrated that its AMS from market price support for wheat in each of these years
was less than 8.5% of the total value of wheat production in China. Specifically, China's product-
specific AMS from market price support for wheat, as a percentage of the total value of production
in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, is 3.02%, 1.54%, 5.51%, 4.54%, and 6.56, respectively. 56
Each of these values is below the de minimis level of 8.5% of the total value of China 's wheat
production. Thus, China's market price support for wheat is consistent with its domestic support
reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture.
2. China's domestic support for indica rice and japonica rice for 2012 -
2016 is within its 8.5 percent de minimis commitment level
As explained above, the United States advanced an incorrect interpretative approach to the
identification of many of the relevant elements of the calculation of AMS from market price support
for indica rice and japonica rice. Accordingly, the United States ' AMS calculations are seriously
flawed, reflecting the flawed legal bases on which they are built.
To begin, the United States calculated AMS for the wrong basic agricultural rice product –
i.e., for paddy indica rice and paddy japonica rice. Yet, a proper interpretation of Articles 1(b) and
paragraph 7 of Annex 3, along with Rev.3, compels the conclusion that, for China, AMS for rice must
be calculated for each of milled indica rice and milled japonica rice. Accordingly, the Panel should
rely on China's AMS calculations for these products.
Correcting for further U.S. errors, China calculated AMS using the appropriate 1996-1998
FERPs for milled indica rice and milled japonica rice, as included in Rev.3. These FERPs replace the
flawed FERPs used by the United States, which are, erroneously, converted into paddy indica rice
and paddy japonica rice, and based on 1986-1988 data, rather than data from China 's 1996-1998
base period. Like the United States, China sourced the AAP for paddy indica rice and paddy japonica
rice from the annual MPP indica rice and japonica rice measures for each of the years 2012 -2016.
However, China converted these values into milled indica rice and milled japonica rice values, using
the appropriate 70% conversion rate. Finally, and consistent with Rev.3, China used as the amount
of eligible production the amount of indica rice and japonica rice that was actually purchased under
the MPP programs in each of years 2012-2016, instead of the total amount of indica rice and japonica
rice production in the MPP provinces, as used by the United States. Again, China converted the
amount of paddy indica rice and paddy japonica rice purchased into milled indica rice and japonica
rice equivalents, using the appropriate 70% conversion rate.
On the basis of the appropriate calculations, China's product-specific AMS from market price
support for milled indica rice, as a percentage of the total value of production in 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015, and 2016, was 0.02%, 5.52%, 4.08%, 3.91%, and 3.00%, respectively.57 Moreover, China's
product-specific AMS from market price support for milled japonica rice, as a percentage of the total
value of production in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, was 0.99%, 4.74%, 6.95%, 7.84% and
8.26, respectively.58 Each of these values is below the de minimis level of 8.5% of the total value
of China's milled indica rice and milled japonica rice production. Thus, China's market price support
for indica rice and japonica rice is consistent with its domestic support reduction commitments under
the Agreement on Agriculture.
In the alternative, China also calculated AMS from market price support for indica rice and
japonica rice combined. China's product -specific AMS from market price support for rice, as a
percentage of the total value of rice production in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 is 0.36%,
4.87%, 4.82%, 5.00%, and 4.55%, respectively. 59 Each of these values is below the de minimis
level of 8.5% of the total value of China 's rice production. Again, China's market price support for

56 China, first written submission, para. 273 (Table 22) and Exhibit CHN-88 (Table 22).
57 China, first written submission, para. 261 (Table 17) and Exhibit CHN-88 (Table 17).
58 China, first written submission, para. 261 (Table 18) and Exhibit CHN-88 (Table 18).
59 China, first written submission, para. 264 (Table 19) and Exhibit CHN-88 (Table 19).

rice is consistent with its domestic support reduction commitments under the Agreement on
Agriculture.
VI. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the summarized above, and set out in detail in its submissions, China requests the Panel
to find as follows:
• For wheat, indica rice and japonica rice, China requests the Panel to find that the United
States has failed to establish that China provided domestic support in excess of its de
minimis commitment level of 8.5% of the value of production, and therefore has failed
to establish that China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.2, 6.3, and 7.2(b) of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
• For corn, since the TPRP expired in 2016, and thus before panel establishment, China
requests that the Panel find that this measure falls outside the Panel 's terms of
reference.

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 62
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 65
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 67
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Colombia 71
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ecuador 72
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 74
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 76
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia 78
Annex C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 80
Annex C-10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Kazakhstan 83
Annex C-11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 86

ANNEX C-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF AUSTRALIA
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Australia's submissions in this dispute have focused on the relationship between a Member 's
Schedule and obligations in WTO Agreements; as well as the legal interpretation of key provisions
in the Agreement on Agriculture, including the methodology used to calculate market price support,
the meaning of "production eligible" in Annex 3, and the reference period for the "fixed external
reference price".
2. In Australia 's view, the Agreement on Agricul ture provides clear and precise direction for
calculating market price support, including the reference period to be used for a fixed external
reference price. In Korea – Beef,1 the WTO Appellate Body has also provided clear and unambiguous
guidance on what is meant by the term "production eligible" in Annex 3.
3. As relevant context for interpreting the provisions at issue, it is important to recall that the
Agreement on Agriculture provides "a framework for the long-term reform of agricultural trade and
domestic policies, with the aim of leading to fairer competition and a less distorted sector" .2 The
Agreement not only places rules and limitations on domestic agricultural support by Members, it also
aspires to reduce domestic support. The Agreement on Agr iculture recognises Members' long term
objective of "provid[ing] for substantive progressive reductions in agricultural support"3 and contains
commitments by Members to continue reforms to reduce support.4
4. Accordingly, Australia is of the view that any outcome in this dispute that would effectively
allow Members, including China, to increase levels of domestic support would be in direct conflict
with the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture.
II. Relationship between a Member's Schedule and obligations in WTO Agreements
5. Much of China's legal argument in this dispute centres on the status of WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3
(hereafter referred to as 'Rev. 3') a document included as a reference under the heading "Relevant
Supporting Tables and document" in Part IV of China's Schedule. China argues that the document
should be considered treaty level text.
6. In Australia's view, Rev. 3 is not in itself a Schedule, it is merely a reference in a Schedule
which provides an illustration of domestic support in China at the time of its accession.
7. Even if the Panel were to take a different view on the status of Rev.3, Australia observes that
Members cannot use Schedules to unilaterally modify their obligations under the WTO Agreements.5
In particular, informat ion in a document referenced in one Member 's Schedule cannot be used to
override legal obligations in the Agreement on Agriculture.
III. Calculating market price support
8. In Australia's view, the Agreement on Agriculture provides clear and unequivocal guidance for
calculating market price support. It provides that AMS should be "calculated in accordance with the
provisions of Annex 3" and " taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the
tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule".
9. In this dispute, the US has put forward its estimations of China 's market price support using
the provisions of Annex 3, whereas China argues that the "constituent data and methodology" in
Rev. 3 is the more relevant authority. While both of these sources are valid for calculating market

1 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef.
2 WTO, "Agriculture gateway" available online at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm, accessed on 19 January 2018.
3 Preamble, Agreement on Agriculture.
4 Article 20, Agreement on Agriculture.
5 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras. 212-213 and 220.

price support, the Agreement on Agriculture makes clear that their status under the WTO Agreement
is not equal.
10. The phrase "in accordance with" indicates that the calculation of domestic support must
comply with the provisions of Annex 3. By contrast, the phrase "taking into accoun t" requires that
consideration be given to a Member 's Schedule, without specifying the weight such consideration
should be accorded. This interpretation has been affirmed by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various
Measures on Beef.6
11. In Australia's view, two points are therefore clear: (i) reference to Annex 3 is mandatory; and
(ii) the relevance of a Member's Schedule is of a lesser nature and, at the very least, subsidiary to
Annex 3. As such, there is no direct obligation on the Panel to accept or apply the constituent data
and methodology in China's Schedule. The Panel is only required to "consider" it. However, in any
event, the requirements of Annex 3 override any methodology contained in a Member 's Schedule
(or contained in a reference within a Member's Schedule).
IV. The meaning of "production eligible"
12. In Australia's view, the Appellate Body 's findings in Korea – Beef make clear that, absent
exceptional circumstances, "production eligible" is all production "fit or entitled" to be purchased and
will generally equate to total production.7
13. Accordingly, in applying the text of the WTO Agreement to the facts in this dispute, Australia
considers that the relevant values to be used for "eligible production" in the calculation for market
price support should be the value of total production of each given commodity in the identified
provinces.
14. China submits that this definition of "production eligible" does not apply and the Panel should
instead rely on the definition of "eligible production" in Rev. 3.8 The Rev. 3 definition limits eligible
production to "the amount purchased by state-owned enterprises from farmers".
15. China's alternative definition of "eligible production" – which seeks to limit eligible production
to the amount actually purchased – cannot be accepted for three reasons.
16. First, the definition does not reflect the economic impact of market price support programs,
which provides producers with the "assurance that their products can be marketed at least at the
support price".9 Given this assurance, the price distorting effect of market price support takes place
the moment a product is eligible to be purchased by the government.
17. Second, the definition is contrary to the terms of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as
interpreted and applied by the Appellate Body in Korea –Beef.10 Since a Member cannot use its
Schedule to reduce or modify commitments under WTO Agreements, China 's proposed alternative
definition is not legally valid – even if Rev. 3 had the status of a Schedule.
18. Third, limiting eligible production to the actual amount purchased would permit Members to
underreport the level of domestic support they provide and, as a consequence, effectively allo w
Members to increase such support. Any outcome that would lead to increased levels of domestic
support would undermine the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture to not only limit
domestic support but also to reduce it.
V. The reference period for the "fixed external reference price"

6 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 111.
7 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120. The Panel in Korea – Various
Measures on Beef had earlier specified that the actual amount purchased by a government is not relevant, nor
are the government outlays involved: Panel Report Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 827.
8 China's first written submission, paras. 196-203.
9 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 827.
10 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120. The Panel in Korea – Various
Measures on Beef had earlier specified that the actual amount purchased by a government is not relevant, nor
are the government outlays involved: Panel Report Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 827.

19. The methodology for calculating market price support is set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of
the Agreement on Agriculture. One of the figures to be inserted into the formula is the "fixed external
reference price".
20. Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 specifies that "the fixed external reference price shall be based on the
years 1986 to 1988". The text in the Agreement on Agriculture is mandatory and unambiguous.
21. In this dispute, China asserts that an alternative reference period – namely, the years 1996-
1998 – applies in calculating China's market price support. China argues this on the basis that: this
is the period used in Rev. 3 (the supporting material referenced in China's Schedule); WTO Members
accepted this period as one of the terms of China 's accession to the WTO; this approach would be
in accordance with a technical note by the WTO Secretariat for acceding Members 11; and all
accessions since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 have used base periods other than 1986-88.
22. In Australia's view, the text of the Agreement is clear. The Agreement on Agriculture specifies
that the fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988; and neither China's
Accession Protocol nor its Working Party Report specifies that an alternative reference period to
1986-88 must be used. While the documents and practice put forward by China in support of an
alternative reference period highlight key policy considerations, they do not constitute a legal basis
on which to apply a later reference period.
23. In Australia's view, if WTO Members determine that a new reference period should apply for
acceding Members this should be provided for explicitly – either through amen dment of the
Agreement on Agriculture or express provision in relevant Accession Protocols.

11 (WT/ACC/4, pp3-4) which provides that "in order to calculate a product-specific AMS for these
products, relevant tables from Supporting Tables DS:5 and DS:7 should be used" and that an "external
reference price" is to be calculated from data "normally for each of the last three years"

ANNEX C-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL
I. CHINA'S CLAIM REGARDING THE TPRP CORN MEASURE (ARTICLES 6.2 AND 7.1 OF
THE DSU)
1. China argues that the Temporary Purchase and Reserve Policy ( "TPRP") for corn, which was
applied between 2012 and 2015, does not constitute a "measure at issue" under Article 6.2 of the
DSU because the TPRP had been terminated by the time the United States requested the
establishment of the Panel, and would thus fall outside the Panel 's t erms of reference under
Article 7.1 of the DSU1.
2. Brazil understands, however, that if a measure no longer in effect is still relevant to the
dispute, the Panel should exercise caution before deciding to exclude it from its terms of reference.
An excessively restrictive interpretation of the measures cons idered to be within the terms of
reference could undermine the ability of the dispute settlement system to bring about a positive
solution to the dispute, in conformity with Article 3.7 of the DSU. Brazil notes that, in the present
case, the parties do no t seem to dispute that the TPRP was in force between 2012 and 2015 and
that such market price support subsidy was used to calculate China 's Current Total AMS for those
years. Thus, Brazil understands that the TPRP should be considered by the Panel for a pr oper
assessment of this case.
II. CALCULATION METHODOLOGY ON CHINA'S DOMESTIC PRICE SUPPORT MEASURES
FOR WHEAT, CORN AND RICE
3. In Brazil 's view, the Panel in the present dispute is challenged to set a proper balance
regarding the relation between Annex 3 and a Member's "data and methodology", on the basis of
Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Brazil considers that the analysis by the Panel
concerning the calculation of China's market price support should focus separately on the concep ts
of FERP and eligible production.
4. With regard to the FERP, Brazil recalls China 's argument about the principle set out in WTO
Document WT/ACC/4 (a WTO Secretariat note providing guidance for acceding Members), which
provides that "[i]n order to calcul ate a product-specific AMS, an 'external reference price' is to be
calculated from data 'normally for each of the last three years '"2. As China accession to the WTO
occurred in 2001, the base period of 1996 -1998 instead of 1986-1988, as disposed in paragraph 9
of Annex 3 of the AoA, could be considered acceptable. Besides, utilizing the most recent data
available for the calculation of the FERP consists of a common practice among Members that have
joined the WTO after 1995.
5. About the calculation of eligible production, China claims its constituent data and methodology
set out in its schedule should be "taken into account". In accordance with that document, China 's
eligible production for wheat and rice should be "the amount purchased" by state owned enterprises.
This proposed methodology, however, conflicts with the established definition of "eligible
production", which comprises the whole set of production that could potentially be purchased by the
government as defined by the Member's municipal rules. In that sense, the Appellate Body found in
Korea – Beef that "production eligible to receive the applied administered price " in paragraph 8 of
Annex 3 has a different meaning in ordinary usage than "production actually purchased"3.
6. Brazil notes that any disposition on a Member 's data and methodology regarding eligible
production cannot modify its obligations under the AoA, in line with the findings by the Appellate

1 China's First Written Submission, para. 323.
2 China's First Written Submission, para. 48.
3 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120.

Body in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar : "we find no provision under the AoA that authorizes
Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that Agreement"4.
7. In conclusion, Brazil views that, in order to maintain a harmonious interpretation of the
covered agreements, the concept of "eligible production" cannot have different meanings depending
on the Members ' Schedules. A Member could, however, insert elements of clarification in its data
and methodology regarding its understanding of "eligible production " only to the extent it is
commensurate with the established definition of said term.

4 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 220.

ANNEX C-3
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Canada presents its views on three issues in this case. First, it is an accepted custom that
acceding Members use m ore recent reference years than 1986 to 1988. Second, for the definition
of eligible production, the text of the Agreement on Agriculture must take priority over the supporting
tables where there is any contradiction. Third, the proper methodology for dete rmining eligible
production for market price support is to use the amount "fit or entitled" to be purchased, which can
be the total production of the product if no limitations are imposed.
II. ACCEDING MEMBERS MAY USE A MORE RECENT R EFERENCE PERIOD FOR THE
FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE
2. While paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture refers to the years 1986 to
1988 for the reference period, this does not prevent Members acceding to the WTO under Article XII
of the Marrakesh Agreement from using a more recent base period. It is fair and reasonable to use
more recent and up-to-date information for acceding countries, as data going back to 1986 may not
be available, and acceding countries may not have been formally independent or even existed a t
that time. Members have consistently and uniformly applied the practice of Article XII acceding
Members using the three most recent years in reporting the fixed external reference price. As such,
this constitutes an international custom in the context of Paragraph 9 of Annex 3.
3. Article 3.2 of the DSU requires the DSB to resolve disputes in accordance with the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law. The Appellate Body has on numerous occasions
recognized the relevance and application of customary international law in WTO dispute settlement1.
4. In this instance, the WTO Membership has applied a consistent practice over the course of
thirty-six post -Uruguay Round accessions. Every acceding Member that reported data in its
constituent data and methodology used a more recent base period with respect to Supporting Table
DS:5. In all of the supporting tables of all acceding Members, the only acceding Member that ever
used a 1986 to 1988 base period in its supporting tables was Bulgaria, which is explained by the
fact that it acceded so soon after entry into force of the WTO Agreement as the second newly
acceding Member. However, even Bulgaria provided data up to 1990 where it was available for one
table. The first acceding Member, Ecuador, did not report any support programs and therefore had
no data in supporting tables.
5. Thus, in every instance of accession following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round over more
than 20 years, there has been a consistent and uniform practice among Members. All Members were
aware of this practice and consented to it, or at the very least acquiesced to this practice. During
the thirty-six accession processes, no Member has objected to the use of the three most recent
reference years.
6. Moreover, the re cognition by the Membership that this practice was required under the
Agreement on Agriculture is demonstrated by Members' consistent use of the Technical Note by the
Secretariat on Information to be Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture
in accessions2. Members have consistently referred to this document during accession processes and
the requirement to use the three most recent years of available data and concluded thirty -six
accessions with no stated objection to the use of those reference years. The uniform, consistent use
of the three most recent years for the relevant reference period following the conclusion of the

1 See e.g. Appellate Body reports, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), paras. 301-
316; EC – Hormones, paras. 120-125; US – Line Pipe, para. 259.
2 Information to be provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture – Technical Note
by the Secretariat, WT/ACC/4.

Uruguay Round shows that Members considered this practice to be consistent with the Agreement
on Agriculture.
7. During the Uruguay Round itself, the years 1986 to 1988 were chosen as three recent
representative years in order for the fixed external reference price to reflect the actual extent of
support provided as accurately as possible 3. The continued use of t he three most recent years by
acceding Members represents the application of that same principle.
8. This consistent and uniform practice of every WTO Member in every accession process,
accompanied with the opinio juris of Members that this practice was consistent with the Agreement
on Agriculture, shows that Members have adopted a customary rule of using the three most recent
years for the reference period for acceding Members. This custom applies only with respect to
Members acceding under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 remains
applicable to original Members under Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement.
III. THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT ON ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION TAKES PRIORITY OVER
CHINA'S SUPPORTING TABLES
9. There is an apparent contradiction between the supporting tables and the text of Annex 3 in
respect of China's use of production actually purchased in China's supporting tables rather than the
quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price as required under paragraph
8 of Annex 3. However, in this case there is no consistent, uniform practice that implies that all
WTO Members intended to allow for China to employ a methodology for calculating eligible
production in a manner different from Annex 3 an d different from the requirements for other
WTO Members. As such, there is no customary norm with respect to eligible production that could
modify the obligation under the Agreement on Agriculture.
10. The text of Article 1(a) of the Agreement on Agricultu re sets out the meaning of Aggregate
Measurement of Support or AMS. Article 1(a)(ii) specifies that support shall be calculated in
accordance with Annex 3, which is an integral part of the Agreement. It also provides that the
constituent data and methodolo gy incorporated by reference into the Member 's schedule must be
taken into account when calculating AMS. In defining Total AMS, Article 1(h)(ii) also makes reference
to the constituent data and methodology, stating that Total AMS shall be calculated "in ac cordance
with" the Agreement on Agriculture and the constituent data and methodology.
11. The Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef examined these provisions and found
that the relationship between Annex 3 and the constituent data and methodol ogy was one of an
"apparent hierarchy"4. It found that the provisions of Annex 3 take priority over the constituent data
and methodology used in a Member's supporting tables5.
12. In Canada 's view, this approach is reasonable. Annex 3 of the Agreement on A griculture
provides an explicit requirement for how market price support is to be calculated. As per Article 21.2,
Annex 3 is an integral part of the Agreement on Agriculture. The supporting material incorporated
by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, however, is not an integral part of the Agreement.
13. A Member cannot use its Schedule to reduce its commitments nor to depart from its obligations
under the Agreement 6. Logically, this principle also applies to supporting tables incorporated by
reference into a Member's Schedule. China, like all other WTO members, must abide by the terms
of the treaty, including paragraph 8 of Annex 3. Upon its accession to the WTO, China agreed to
comply with the entire WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Agriculture. China cannot
reduce its obligations or commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture or any other agreement
through the supporting tables incorporated by reference into its Schedule. As the Appellate Body
found in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, "we find no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture
that authorizes Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that
Agreement."7 Thus, China cannot justify departing from its obligations under Annex 3 of the

3 See e.g. GATT documents MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/12, para. 11 (Exhibit CAN-1);
MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/15, para. 11 (Exhibit CAN-2); and MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/16, para. 4 (Exhibit CAN-3).
4 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 112-113.
5 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 114.
6 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras. 217-220.
7 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 220.

Agreement on Agriculture on the basis of an endnote to a supporting table incorporated by reference
into its Schedule.
14. China's commitment in paragraph 238 of the Working Party Report to provide "further
methodological clarification" to its supporting tables ("Rev.3") supports these tables must be of a
lower precedence than Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. A document that is expressly
acknowledged as containing methodological issues that require further clarification cannot have the
same status as binding treaty text. Paragraph 238 of the Wor king Party Report notes China 's
commitment that the issues requiring methodological clarification "would be addressed in the context
of China's notification obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture". However, any subsequent
unilateral notification made by China on applicable methodology cannot have the power to modify
China's treaty obligations. Therefore, contrary to China's argument that Rev.3 must be considered
as having equal value to the treaty text 8, the reference to Rev.3 in paragraph 238 of t he Working
Party Report clearly supports Canada's argument that this should not be the case.
15. Of course, Members are required to take the supporting tables into account, as required by
Article 1(a)(ii). However, in the event of a contradiction between the Agreement and the supporting
material incorporated by reference in a Member 's Schedule, the text of the Agreement must take
priority.
IV. ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION MEANS PRODUCTION "FIT OR ENTITLED" TO RECEIVE THE
APPLIED ADMINISTERED PRICE
16. The definition of eligible production must be the same for all Members. The provisions of the
covered agreements must be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner, giving meaning to
all applicable provisions harmoniously 9. Having an interpretation that would allow for a different
definition of eligible production for China alone would be inconsistent with this principle. Moreover,
it would result in an inconsistent application of market price support disciplines.
17. In examining the meaning of eligible production , the Appellate Body in Korea – Various
Measures on Beef found the following: under paragraph 8 of Annex 3, "production eligible to receive
the applied administered price" means "production that is 'fit or entitled' to be purchased rather than
production that was actually purchased" 10. "Production actually purchased may often be less than
eligible production"11.
18. While in Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the measure in question applied to a fixed,
announced quantity of production that was eligible for p urchase, the findings and principles from
that case remain applicable in the present dispute. The object and purpose of the Agreement on
Agriculture includes the objective of providing for "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural
support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time resulting in correcting and preventing
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets"12. The panel in Korea – Various Measures
on Beef noted specifically that the purpose of disciplining the prov ision of market price support
related to "the effect of a government policy measure on agricultural producers of a basic product
rather than the budgetary cost of that measure borne by government"13.
19. This is because the distortive effect produced by a market price support measure occurs when
the applied administered price is announced. The existence of a minimum support price provides
economic guarantees to producers, which affects the market. The effect continues to exist as long
as producers of the product benefit from the assurance of the minimum support price. As a result,
the quantity of production actually purchased may have no relevance to these distortive effects.
20. This is why the reasoning in Korea – Various Measures on Beef is applicable to the present
dispute. If, as in the facts of Korea – Various Measures on Beef, a government limits the quantity of
production eligible for purchase at the applied administered price to a fixed quantity, then the
distortion of the market for that product wil l be limited in scope to that quantity. As the Appellate

8 China's first written submission, paras. 104-158.
9 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 570.
10 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120.
11 Ibid.
13 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 827.

Body found, "in establishing its program for future market price support, a government is able to
define and limit 'eligible' production"14. However, if the government does not set any limitations,
then the signal to the market is that all production is "fit or entitled" to receive the applied
administered price. Thus it is reasonable and appropriate in this situation that all production should
be reported as eligible production.
21. The Appellate Body's interpretation of eligible production, meaning production "fit or entitled"
to be purchased, allows for a logical and harmonious application to different factual circumstances
of any given market price support program. The facts related to the particular measure establish
how eligible production is determined. For example, if there is an announcement that the
administered price will be applied only to a given quantity, then that defines the production eligible
to receive that price for the purposes of paragraph 8 of Annex 3. As another example, if the measure
operates only in certain regions, then the quantity of eligible production may be limited to production
in those regions.
22. However, the amount of grain used by farmers for their own consumption is irrelevant to the
quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price. Farmers consuming their
own products are not isolated from the market or from the market price support program. If there
are no limitations on th e amount of production eligible to receive the applied administered price,
then the government has distorted the market in a way that affects all production. If the applied
administered price is high enough, a farm household could sell part or all of their production and
then buy cheaper alternative foodstuffs. The fact that some production might not have been sold or
that some farmers might consume some of their own production is irrelevant to the distortions
caused by the market price support program, whi ch is what the Membership negotiated these
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture to discipline.
23. The quantity of production consumed by farmers is thus not independent of the price policy.
The quantity of eligible production is about production. There are no exceptions in the Agreement
on Agriculture for production that is not sold, because all of the production can potentially be sold.
The text of the Agreement is clear: all production eligible to receive the applied administered price
shall be in cluded in the calculation for market price support. All production eligible to receive the
applied administered price is covered by the market price support program regardless of how or
whether it is sold, and therefore it must be considered in calculating the product-specific AMS.
24. The disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture seek to reduce and prevent restrictions and
distortions in agricultural markets. The legal test is not whether an individual farmer would
personally benefit from a market price support program by selling at a higher price. The question is
whether the production is affected by the market distortions caused by the market price support
program. The Agreement on Agriculture requires that all eligible production be considered in the
calculation because the price distortions affect the entire market if no limit is imposed on the amount
of production that is eligible to receive the applied administered price.
25. The question in each case is how to determine "the quantity of production e ligible to receive
the applied administered price". To ensure a harmonious interpretation of the covered agreements
vis-à-vis each WTO Member, the core elements of eligible production need to be respected when it
is being applied to particular measures, in accordance with the principles elaborated upon in Korea –
Various Measures on Beef. Namely, the quantity of production must be considered "fit or entitled"
to receive the applied administered price.
26. The reasoning and findings in Korea – Various Measures on Beef are consistent with the text
of the Agreement on Agriculture and its object and purpose. Therefore, the Panel must examine how
China has defined and limited eligible production in its market price support measures. If there are
no limitations on purchases of a particular product, then the total quantity of production must be
considered "fit or entitled" to receive the applied administered price, regardless of the actual
purchases made by the government.

14 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120.

ANNEX C-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COLOMBIA
1. The government of Colombia intervened in this case given its systemic interest in the
application of several provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore, Colombia provided its
views on some of the legal claims discussed before the Panel.
2. While not taking a final position on the specific merits of this case, Colombia acknowledged
the importance of the issues discussed for the clarification of the obligations under the Agreement
on Agriculture presented by the Parties to the dispute. In particular, with respect to the issue of the
methodology for calculating the amount of "market price support", Colombia encourage this Panel
to carefully review the scope and clarify two important concepts: (i) the "fixed external reference
price"; and, (ii) "eligible production ", with respect to Paragraphs 9 and 8 of Annex 3 of the
aforementioned Agreement.
3. With respect to the former, Colombia submitted that the "fixed external reference price " for
China should be based on its Accession Protocol documented in the Working Party on the Accession
of China, Document WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3. of 19 July 2001. The average contained therein reflects
the prices of 1996-98. Although this reference period may deviate from that specified in Paragraph
9 of Annex 3, reliance thereon appears relevant in the case at hand.
4. The principle of lex specialis prescribes that the law governing a specific subject matter takes
precedence over a more general provision. Here, the conflict betwee n China's Accession Protocol,
constituting an integral part of its WTO obligations, and Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 may be resolved by
reference to this principle. It appears that China 's obligations concerning the establishment of a
"fixed external reference price" would, thus, be governed by the more specific rule, its Accession
Protocol. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, it is not feasible to necessarily rely on the period
specified in Paragraph 9 concerning acceding members as opposed to original WTO members. Data
for the period of 1986 -88 may be may be incomplete or inaccessible for national authorities.
Therefore, in the case of China, the reference period should be that of 1996-98.
5. Furthermore, Colombia submitted that the appropriate "fixed external reference price" should
be adjusted taking into account the prices of goods at the same level of trade. Under Paragraph 9,
this is contained within the wider formulation that "[t]he fixed external reference price may be
adjusted for quality differences as necessary." In the case of rice, if the "applied administered price"
was provided for unmilled rice by China, then the "fixed external reference price" should be adjusted
to "unmilled rice", even though the accession document (Rev 3) does not reflect this difference.
6. Lastly, with respect the concept of "eligible production ", Colombia submitted that, in the
absence of a pre-announced limit on the quantity to be bought, all production is eligible to receive
the applied administered price. In the case of China "eligible production", thus, includes all selected
provinces where the measures of support are available.
7. The Panel's findings in Korea-Various Measures on Beef paragraph 827 support this approach.
In that case it was stated that "eligible pr oduction (…) should comprise the total marketable
production of all producers which is eligible to benefit from the market price support, even though
the proportion of production that is actually purchased by a governmental agency may be relatively
small or even nil". The Appellate Body confirmed this approach in Paragraph 120 of its Report. Hence,
eligible production in the case at hand includes all the production fit to receive the support, whether
actually bought or not, whether consumed on-farm or not.

ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF ECUADOR
1 GENERAL ISSUES
Ecuador considers that the specific calculations for certain products should be applicable to all
equally, for example in the case of products that are not included in the Part IV of a Member 's
Schedule. The Appellate Body or the Panel reports which have been prepared after analysis and
investigation, provide recommendations that should be taken into account as a kind of opinio juris
and in turn be a guide on similar cases, therefore the panel in the case Korea - Beef has already
ruled that the calculation method of Annex 3 should be applied only in cases where the product is
not in Part IV of the Members' agenda.
2 QUANTITY OF ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION (QEP)
Ecuador considers that if a requirement was imposed on China to accede to the WTO and it was
complied with, it is perfectly valid and applicable. The requirement imposed on China is what
determines if it 's eligible production on the basis of the quantit y of production compared with a
market price support measure, which is detailed in document WT / ACC / CHN / 38 / Rev.3, issued
in September 2001. If China had the faculty to establish these measurement parameters, they
should be taken into account at the time of calculations and not those parameters which are
applicable to other countries. China must follow its obligations adopted as agreed while it was
negotiating it's accession.
The issue that a certain amount of grain production is for it 's own consump tion is relevant since
taking into account the size and the population of China it can be interpreted that the levels of
measurement of their total production will be on a larger scale at the moment of making the
calculation. However, by stating that a per centage does not go to the market, the situation may
change because the calculations are not directly proportional when talking about the total production
of grains versus grains destined for trade and for the market.
3 FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE (FERP)
In the document of Accession of China to the WTO WT / ACC / CHN / 38 / Rev.3 it is observed that
the calculations are made in-the period 1996-1998, the accession document was approved, besides
being used for references in other cases, so it is tacitly understood that the period that is used in
the cases of China is the one mentioned above. It must be considered as well that no other Member
and also Ecuador has expressed opposition to the period of time for reference, especially for those
members who acceded to the WTO after 1995.

4 CALCULATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
The legal status of the document WT/ACC/CHIN/38/rev.3, when incorporated in the original list
submitted by China as a list of concessions acquires the same legal status as the lists annexed to
the its Accession Protocol.
Regarding the tables presented, Ecuador considers that they are not incompatible with the
regulations, statements and of the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore, the tables presented cannot
modify the commitments made, nor can they be used as lists to modify agreements.
The Agreement of Agriculture on its Annex 3 determines that the market price support should
be:
- Market price support: market price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed
external reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity of
production eligible to receive the applied administered price. Budgetary payments made to
maintain this gap, such as buying-in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS

- The fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall
generally be the average f.o.b. unit value for the basic agri cultural product concerned in a
net exporting country and the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural product
concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed reference price may be
adjusted for quality differences as necessary.

Therefore, any methodology and trade measure under the Agreement of Agriculture should be based
on Annex 3 definitions and calculations.

ANNEX C-6
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEMBERS' SCHEDULES AND THE AOA
1. The commitments limiting subsidization undertaken by Members pursuant to the AoA are
included in Part IV of each Member 's Schedule and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. The
Appellate Body addressed comprehensively the issue of the relationship between the commitments
on subsidization included in a Member 's Schedule and the provisions of the AoA in EC – Export
Subsidies on Sugar. There, the Appellate Body confirmed that, just like under the GATT 1994, there
is "no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that authorizes Members to depart in their
Schedules from their obligations under that Agreement"1.
2. Therefoire, the domestic support commitments specified in the Schedules (including the
supporting documents incorporated by reference in the Schedules, such as WT/AC/CHN/38/Rev. 3)
must be in conformity with the provisions of the AoA and do not allow Members to depart from the
obligations imposed by those provisions.
II. WHAT IS THE RELEVANT PERIOD FOR CALCULATING THE FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE?
3. The reference in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 to the years 1986 -1988 does not prevent those
Members acceding to the WTO after its establishment from specifying in their Schedules a more
recent base period, agreed by all Members as part of the accession process. The calculation of the
current AMS must "take into account"/be "in accordance with" such more recent base period, as
required by Article 1(a)(ii) and Article 1(h)(ii) of the AoA. The reference in paragr aph 9 of Annex 3
to the years 1986 -1988 reflects the fact that this was the period which had been used by the
participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations for the purposes of quantifying their base AMS in
accordance with the Modalities Paper. For that re ason, the requirement to use that period is
addressed primarily to the original Members of the WTO.
4. In the EU's view, it would be unreasonable to require that the accession terms of new Members
continue to be negotiated on the basis of data which, by now, are more than 30 years old. Moreover,
the use of more recent data does not "reduce" per se the commitments of the newly acceded
Members under the AoA, unlike in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar . As observed by the Appellate
Body in Korea – Beef, there is no reason why the FERP for a more recent period should be necessarily
higher than the FERP for the years 1986-1989. Moreover, in the case of China, the same period has
been used consistently for calculating both the applied administered price and the FERP for the base
AMS and the FERP used in the current AMS.
5. For those reasons, the reference to the years 1986-1989 in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 must be
understood dynamically. In other words, where a newly acceded Member has used a more recent
period for calcu lating the base AMS in its Schedule, as agreed during the accession process, the
current AMS must be based on that period, provided that such period has the same basic
characteristics, in respect of that Member, as the years 1986 -1988, in respect of the or iginal
Members. In particular, that period should pre -date as closely as possible to the date of accession
and be sufficiently representative. This interpretation of paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the AoA is
comforted by well -established WTO practice. As pointe d out by China, the Schedules of each and
every one of the thirty -six Members that have acceded to the WTO since the establishment of the
WTO specify base periods other than 1986-88 for the purposes of Supporting Table DS:5.
III. WHAT IS THE RELEVANT "ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION"?
6. For the reasons explained by the United States and not contested by China, the ordinary
meaning of 'eligible production ' is all of the production entitled or permitted to receive the
administrative price, regardless of the quantity actually purchased by the Government. That reading

1 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 220

is confirmed by the fact that the words "production eligible" are followed in paragraph 8 by the words
"to receive … " and not by other terms that would point to the quantities actually purchased, such
as "that received …" or "actually receiving …". That reading, moreover, reflects the rationale or
purpose of market price support policies (or of the various arrangements that governments may put
in place to provide market price support to producers of basic agricultural products), which is to
maintain the price of the whole production of a certain product at a desired level.
7. The Appellate Body explicitly confirmed these findings of the Panel by stating that:
We share the Panel 's view that the words "production eligible to
receive the applied administered price" in paragraph 8 of Annex 3
have a different meaning in ordinary usage from "production actually
purchased ". The ordinary meaning of "eligible" is "fit or entitled to
be chosen". Thus, "production eligible" refers to production that is
"fit or entitled" to be purchased rather than production that was
actually purchased. In establishing its p rogram for future market
price support, a government is able to define and to limit "eligible"
production. Production actually purchased may often be less than
eligible production.2
8. In essence, since the notion of 'market price support ' seeks to gauge t he effects of a
government policy measure on agricultural producers of a basic product and, as a matter of fact,
these effects depend on the production that may be purchased at the administered price (and not
solely or necessarily on the quantity actually purchased), it follows that the notion of 'eligible
production' must refer to production that is "fit or entitled" to be purchased, rather than production
that was actually purchased,
9. As regards China 's argument that it is entitled to calculate market price support by using
actual purchases, because it used actual purchases in its calculations in the tables of supporting
material in its Schedule, the European Union would note, first of all, that the meaning of footnote
19 to Rev. 3 is by no means unequivocal. More importantly, as indicated in paragraphs 237 and 238
of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China some Members raised concerns with regards
to the Supporting Tables in Rev.3. Furthermore, if a Member were authorised to calculate market
price support basing itself merely on the actual production purchased by the Government, it would
almost systematically underestimate its AMS. Indeed, it is only where the quantity actually
purchased tallies with the eligible production that that Member wo uld not underestimate its AMS,
whereas in all other frequent situations China 's approach would allow a Member to underestimate
its AMS, even though the support it provides benefits the marketable production as a whole.
10. It follows that China's line of defence would allow a Member not simply to clarify and qualify
the commitments that it has undertaken at the moment of accession but rather "to reduce or conflict"
with the obligations already imposed on it by the provisions of the AoA, and notably by paragraph 8
of Annex 3, as they result from their ordinary meaning, rationale and previous case law.

2 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, para. 120.

ANNEX C-7
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF INDIA
1. India welcomes the opportunity to present its views to the Panel on certain systemic issues
arising for interpretation under the Agreement on Agriculture ( "AoA"). India 's views in this
submission are limited to the issue of assessment of "production eligible to receive the applied
administrative price ", for the purposes of calculation of Aggreg ate Measurement of Support
("AMS") in the AoA.
2. India notes that the First Written Submission of the United States as well as the Third Party
Written Submissions by Australia, Brazil, Canada and EU have relied on Korea-Beef to state that
"production eligible to receive the applied administered price" has a different meaning in ordinary
usage from "production actually purchased"1 and that "eligible production" within the meaning of
Annex 3, Paragraph 8 of the AoA is production which is fit or entitled to receive the administered
price, whether or not the production was actually purchased. 2 Australia has further stated that
'production eligible' is all production 'fit or entitled' to be purchased and will generally equate to
total production."3
3. In India's view, these submissions, while relying on the findings of Korea-Beef, have not
considered the facts and circumstances of that dispute, which provide context and rationale for
the findings. The findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in Korea-Beef were specific to a
circumstance when there was a declaration by Korea of an eligible quantity for purchase at the
support price, which was held to be the "eligible production". The panel and the Appellate Body
considered this declared quantity to constitu te "eligible production ", which was different from
what Korea eventually procured under the facts of that dispute. In its reasoning, the Appellate
Body relied on the ordinary meaning of "eligible" and explained that this referred to what is "fit
or entitled to be chosen", and further that "production eligible" refers to production that is "fit or
entitled" to be purchased rather than production that was actually purchased. This was in the
context of the announcement made by Korea in the facts of that dispute, to purchase a specified
quantity of cattle for the 1997 calendar year.4
4. In India 's third -party submission, India has explained that there would be situations
wherein there is no specification of any quantity; but a mere listing of crops that a government
may or may not procure. Not all countries, for instance, pre-determine the quantity of production
that may be procured, since this will be based on the needs and resources available, which may
vary across time and geographical areas. The quant ity eligible for procurement is therefore
determined only at the time when such procurement is required and made.
5. Being a complex and sensitive issue, the manner in which to administer domestic support
for agriculture is not always determined at the fed eral level in all countries, but often at the
regional/ sub -federal levels, leading to wide variations in procurement models. Sometimes
Members simply list crops/products, and not the quantities that would be procured, thereby
leaving determination of quantity eligible for procurement to the time of such procurement, which
may be done at the sub-federal level. There are also instances when numerous products are listed
in a Member's listing of price support, but these may not be procured at all. In such situations, it
is simply illogical to state that all quantities of the specific product that is produced, will be eligible
for procurement. Such a proposition is absurd and unrealistic, since it may be virtually impossible
to extend the price support to the entire production.
6. Australia argues that "the price distorting effect of a product takes place the moment it is
eligible to be purchased" which is why "any consideration of the product distorting effect of market

1 Para 103, First Written Submissions by the United States, referring to Korea – Beef (AB), para. 120.
2 Para 103, First Written Submissions by the United States, referring to Korea – Beef (Panel), para. 827
(noting that "eligible production for the purposes of calculating the market price support component of current
support should comprise the total marketable production of all producers which is eligible to benefit from the
market price support, even though the proportion of production which is actually purchased by a governmental
agency may be relatively small or even nil").
3 Para 22, Third Party Submission of Australia
4 Korea-Beef (AB), para. 121

support must be taken at that point." 5 Clearly, in situations where the total production is never
procured, and there is no expectation even among producers that the total production will ever
be procured, there is no question of any price distorting effect arising from the market support
till the time that procurement actually takes place. It would be highly incongruous to suggest,
then, that the mere listing of crops would cause a price -distorting effect equivalent to the
procurement of the entire quantity produced!
7. In India's view, it is cruc ial to recognise the multiplicity of political and economic realities
underlying agricultural policies of various countries, especially developing countries, instead of
assuming that there is one immutable "economic reality" that should inform all asessmen ts of
domestic support requirements.
8. The interpretation of "eligible production" in Korea-Beef cannot therefore be extended to
be applied in the abstract in cases when there is no declaration of quantity of production to be
procured. Such a reasoning is not only devoid of any basis in actual procurement practices of
countries but could lead to an anomalous result of considering all production of a particular
product in a Member's territory as "eligible production"- a proposition that can only be considered
as fanciful for most Members.
9. India reiterates that the term "eligible production " necessitates the specification of a
quantity that is eligible. The absence of any specification of a quantity for procurement cannot
mean that the entire production of the listed crop would constitute 'eligible production'. Rather,
the reality of the situation would be that what is eligible for procurement is determined only at
the time that a procurement needs to be made.
10. In addition, it is significant to undersco re that the term used in the AOA is 'production
eligible to receive the applied administered price ' and not 'crops/ products eligible to receive
the applied administered price '. A mere listing of crops, which, if considered as eligible for
procurement, would receive the applied administered price, cannot be interpreted to mean that
all production of such crops would be eligible for procurement.
11. In conclusion, India would like to state that the reasoning in Korea-Beef should be viewed
in light of the very specific context in which it arose – one where there is a difference between
the Korean Government 's declaration of an "intent" and its actual procurement of beef. The
identification of such "intent" in other cases may require application of a more context -specific
methodology where there is no declaration of intent by specifying eligibility in quantitative terms.
It is important to take into consideration context-specific evidence such as the actual procurement
practices of Members, and their notifications under Article 18 of the AoA. It follows that if there
is no conflict between any declared quantity and actual procurement, and the price support is in
effect available only for the quantities procured, then it follows that only what is actually procured
is entitled to the price support.
12. India requests the panel to carefully scrutinize and consider the interpretive issues under the
AoA which would benefit from further clarification in light of the present dispute.

5 Para 28, Third Party Submission of Australia

ANNEX C-8
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF INDONESIA
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Indonesia exercises its rights to participate as a third party in this case due to its systemic
concern on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the covered agreement at issue in
this dispute, in particular Paragraph 9 Annex 3 and Paragraph 8 Annex 3 of the Agreement on
Agriculture ("AoA").
II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF "FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE"
2. As indicated in Indonesia's third party statement, Indonesia highlights the interpretive issue
of the terms which will clarify the obligation of WTO Member according to the AoA. In this case,
Indonesia pays attention to the terms of: (1) "Fixed External Reference Price " as set out in the
Paragraph 9 Annex 3; and (2) "Eligible Production" as indicated through Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of
the AoA.
3. In order to calculate the market price support provided by particular Member, the Annex 3
Paragraph 8 of the AoA provides that "market price support shall be calculated using the gap between
a fixed external reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity
of production eligible to receive the applied administered price....".
4. Consequently, the reference to the fixed external reference price provided under the
Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 states that "the fixed external reference price shall be based on the years
1986 to 1988 and shall generally be the average f.o.b. unit valu e for the basic agricultural product
concerned in a net exporting country and the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural
product concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed external reference
price may be adjusted for quality differences as necessary."
5. In their written submission, China has argued that the United States has erroneously referred
to the fixed external reference price based on the prices of 1986 -1988. Indonesia took note that
China has relied on its Part IV of China's Schedule's notification (Rev.3) that the reference shall be
the 1996-98 average of FOB and CIF prices given as export and import unit values.1
6. Indonesia is on the view that it is necessary for the Panel to analyze and pay to attention the
methodology to execute the adjustability nature of the fixed external reference price as set out under
the last sentence of Paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Consequently , Panel should also determine the
conditions in order to deem the adjustment as "necessary" for the reference of Fixed External
Reference Price. The interpretation itself will be the key element to examine the arguments provided
by the Parties in this case.
III. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF "ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION"
7. In the calculation of Market Price Support, the term of "production eligible to receive the
applied administered price" has also been the key component. Meanwhile, the AoA itself does not
provide any particular definition to constitute the term. As the result of the uncertainty, the
interpretation of the term has been varied among Members according to their own policies.
8. Indonesia highlighted the arguments of the United States derived from the Korea-Beef case
on the methodology to interpret "eligible production". In the Appellate Body report, it is stated that
the "quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price" was different from the
"production actually purchased". In this regard, Indonesia requested for the Panel to put caution on
applying the jurisprudence on this present case.
9. Indonesia would like to draw the attention on the nature of rulings made by the Appellate Body
during the Beef case. In the case, th e Korean government has declared specific quantities of the

1 Communication from China. Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3.
19 July 2001.

products to be purchased. Meanwhile, this may not be the case for all WTO Members. There are
some conditions in which the government cannot make the declaration of quantity to be purchased
at earlier stage due to certain reasons. On the other hand, WTO Members, especially those with
large production and geographical coverage, may face a circumstance where the amount of
production eligible for purchase in an administered price does not cover the to tal production of the
product.
10. In this regard, Indonesia supported the argument in Paragraph 8 of India 's Third Party
Submission that "the interpretation of 'eligible production' in Korea-Beef cannot therefore be applied
as a 'one size fits all' approach even in cases there is no declaration of quantity of production to be
procured."
11. Accordingly, Indonesia requested the Panel to examine the interpretation of the aforesaid
term, in order to clarify the WTO Members' obligation under the Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the AoA.

ANNEX C-9
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN
I. ORAL STATEMENT
A. The Status of Support Tables Referenced in China's Schedules
1. In this dispute, the United States and China appear to have a difference in opinion regarding
the methodology for calculating China's aggregate measurement of support (or "AMS"), based on
their different views on the relationship between the text of the Agreement on Agriculture and the
document referenced to as "Relevant Support Tables" in China's Schedules. This difference in views
raises the issue of the proper status of this document as "the constituent data and methodology "
referenced to in China's Schedule.1
2. As a general matter, it is Japan 's view that a Member 's Accession Protocol, including the
Working Party Report and Schedules, is "an integral part of the WTO Agreement"2 and as such their
meaning must be discerned and ascertained in accordance with "customary rules of interpretation
of public international law."3
3. The Appellate Body in EU – Computer Equipment recognized that the underlying principle
that accords this status to these Member 's Schedules is that, "while each Schedule represents the
tariff commitments made by one Member, they represent a common agreement among all
Members."4 Thus the terms contained in "the constituent data and methodology" incorporated in a
Member's Schedule may be viewed as representing the agreement of all Members.
4. In the present case, however, there may not have been an agreement among all Members
regarding the supporting tables that formed the basis of the commitments contained in China 's
Schedules. Specifically, as the EU pointed out in its third party submission, the Working Party Report
on the Accession of China recognized that "the document still contained issues which required further
methodological clarification relating to policy classification, " and that China would address this
clarification in the context of its notification obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture.5 It is
not clear whether such clarification was made, or if it was, whether all Members concerned have
agreed on the clarification offered by China.
B. Whether the Temporary Purchase and reserve Policy for Corn Forms Part of
the Specific Measure at Issue that Falls Within the Terms of Reference
5. China contends that the TPRP for corn for the period 2012 to 2015 was terminated and
replaced with another measure as of 2016, and therefore, is not a "measure at issue " under
Article 6.2 of the DSU.6 Accordingly, it is China's view that the measure falls outside of the Panel 's
terms of reference. The United States, on the other hand, argues that the TPRP is not itself a specific
measure at issue, but rather, a series of legal instruments issued annually through which China
provides domestic support to corn producers. 7 Moreover, acco rding to the United States, the
retrospective nature of agricultural domestic support commitments necessitates an examination of
the level of domestic support provided over a period of time. 8 Thus, the Parties appear to disagree
on whether the TPRP is itse lf a "measure" that was not in existence at the time of panel
establishment, or part of a series of legal instruments that form the basis for the measure at issue.

1 China's First Written Submission, para. 90 (referencing U.S. First Written Submission, para. 90).
2 Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, p. 2.
3 DSU Article 3.2
4 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109 (emphasis in original); see also China's
First Written Submission, para. 155.
5 EU Third Party Written Submission, para. 37 and footnote 23.
6 China's First Written Submission, paras. 286-289 and 325-342.
7 Comments of the United States on China's Challenge to the Panel's Terms of Reference, para. 15.
8 Comments of the United States on China's Challenge to the Panel's Terms of Reference, paras. 8-10
and 17.

6. As noted by China, as a general rule, "the measures included in a panel 's term of reference
must be measures that are in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel."9
7. However, Japan agrees with the United States that the specific nature of the obligations in
question may affect the way that a measure's consistency with those ob ligations is analyzed. For
example, in India – Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body observed that "the obligation in Article
6.1 [of the SPS Agreement] does not apply only at one specific point in time … but is, instead, an
ongoing one ." Given this ongoing nature of the obligation, the Appellate Body continued, SPS
measures are required to "be adjusted over time so as to establish and maintain their continued
suitability in respect of the relevant SPS characteristics of the relevant areas ."10 Thus, when the
obligation is one of an ongoing nature, an analysis of a measure 's consistency with the obligations
would necessarily require a dynamic – rather than a static – inquiry as to whether the measure has
been "adjusted over time" to ensure the measure's "continued suitability."
8. Even where a legal instrument ceases to exist, an examination of the legal instrument may
still be relevant to the resolution of the matter in issue in the dispute. 11 For example, the United
States notes that "[t]he nature of domestic support commitments, including the need for data on
the amount and value of production for purposes of calculating market -price support and the
applicable de minimis exemption, necessitates a backward -looking analysis of data covering a
previous time period."12
9. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the substance of the TPRP to the extent that the operation
of the TPRP affects measures at issue which were identified in the United States' panel request.
II. RESPONSE TO PANEL QUESTIONS
10. First, as regards Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Japan considers that "constituent
data and methodology" is important in clarifying the methodology used to calculate product-specific
AMS. However, as articulated in Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, "the provisions of GATT
1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Ag reements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply
subject to the provisions of [the Agreement on Agriculture]. " Therefore, Japan considers that the
methodology set out in Annex 3 should not be regarded as only a fall back option.
11. Second, as regards the methodology for determining eligible production, paragraph 238 of the
Working Party report on the Accession of China recognized that "the document still contained issues
which required further methodological clarification relating to the policy classification. " Therefore,
all WTO Members did not agree with all elements of the methodology and policy classifications. As
eligible production is not explicitly excluded from this category, Japan considers it proper to include
eligible production as part of the methodology and policy classification that required further
clarification.
12. Third, Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides a single definition of "eligible
production" as "production eligible to receive the applied administered price. " Moreover, the
methodology for calculating market price support set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 does not differ
for each country. Therefore, Japan does not believe that the definition of "eligible production" differs
by country.
13. However, whether production consumed on the farm should be included in the calculation of
the quantity of eligible production may differ based on the circumstances of each country, because
the manner in which the numerical value of market price support is captured may be different for
each country, given the differences in product characteristics, circumstances surrounding production
and distribution, and the policy design of market price support in each country.
14. Fourth, when it comes to China's Schedule of Concessions, i.e. the legal instrument "Schedule
CLII – People's Republic of China ", "an agreed terms of China 's accession to the WTO " is what is

9 China's First Written Submission, para. 327 and footnote 340 (referencing Appellate Body Report,
EC-Chicken Cuts, para. 156).
10 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products, para.5.132.
11 See China's First Written Submission para. 330 and footnote 343 (referencing Panel Report,
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 6.13 and Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19).
12 Comments of the United States on China's Challenge to the Panel's Terms of Reference, para. 2.

stated in Part II, paragraph 1, of China's Accession Protocol, which reads "[t]he Schedules annexed
to this Protocol shall become the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments annexed to the GATT
1994". In other words, by having been annexed to China's Accession Protocol, China's Schedule was
made "an integral part of" the GATT 1994. Assuming that the supporting table referenced in Section
I of Part IV of China's Schedule which contains the use of the 1996 – 1998 period is a part of China's
Schedule, then, the question is whether the terms of the GATT 1994 can prevail over, or modify, the
terms of the Agreement on Agriculture.
15. The relationship between the Agreement on Agriculture and other multilateral trade
agreements including the GATT 1994 is expressly regulated by Article 21 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, which provides "[t]he provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilater al Trade
Agreements in Annex A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement". As the Appellate Body explained,
Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the
Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994, and explicitly provided,
through Article 21, that the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail to the
extent of such conflicts.13
16. Thus, contrary to what China appears to posit, the supporting table referenced in China 's
Schedule cannot change, modify or replace the terms actually used in the relevant provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture, including the terms used in paragraph 9 of Annex 3.
17. This does not mean that the supporting tables referenced in a Member 's Schedule have no
interpretive value in ascertaining the meaning of provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture. Indeed,
Article 1(a) (ii) of the Agreement of Agriculture expressly provides the AMS "during any year of the
implementation period or thereafter" is "calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of
this Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables".
18. Japan further recalls that, in Chile – Price Band System, the Appellate Body stated that "[t]he
Schedule of one Member, and even the scheduling practice of a number of Members, is not relevant
in interpreting the meaning of a treaty provision, unless that practice amounts to 'subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty ' within the mea ning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention."14 Thus according to the Appellate Body, the scheduling activity or practice which
"amounts to 'subsequent practice '" shall be taken into account, together with the context, in
interpreting relevant provisions of covered agreements, including paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Japan
notes, in this respect, that more than 30 accession Members have already used a base period other
than 1986-1988, and it might be difficult for some new accession Members to obtain data from
1986-1988. Indeed, some countries were not in existence at that time.
19. Therefore, to the extent the use of a period other than 1986 -1988 in the scheduling activity
of newly acceding Members' Accession Protocols amounts to "subsequent practice" in the application
of [Annex 3, paragraph 9, of the Agreement on Agriculture] which shows the common understanding
of WTO Members , such practice is certainly relevant to the interpretation of that particular
provision.15

13 Appellate Body Report, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 221.
14 Appellate Body Report, Chile-Price Band System, para.272
15 Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 provides "The fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986
to 1988 …". (emphasis added) Japan notes that, in interpreting Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate
Body observed "[a] thing is commonly said to be 'based on' another thing when the former 'stand' or is
'founded' or 'built' upon or 'is supported by' the latter" and "[a] measure … based on the same standard might
not conform to that standard, as where only some, not all, of the elements of the standard are incorporated
into the measure." Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para.163.

ANNEX C-10
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF KAZAKHSTAN*
Distinguished Chairman, Members of the Panel,
Kazakhstan appreciates the opportunity to express its view on certain aspect of systemic importance
for Kazakhstan. In particular, we would like to present our view with respect to interpretation of
accession terms of Members acceded to the WTO under Article XII of Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter - Marrakesh Agreement) as applied to
determination of base period for the purposes of calculation of market price support ((hereinafter -
MPP), and specifically fixed external reference prices.
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) prescribes that the "covered
agreements", i.e. WTO Agreements, should be clarified in acc ordance with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. As we know, the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law are codified in the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties1 (hereinafter – "Vienna Convention"). We would like to turn the attention of the Panel to
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Paragraph 2 of the Article stipulates that when a treaty specifies
that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty,
the provisions of that other treaty prevail. Article 30 sets out to resolve conflicts arising from
successive treaties, i.e., an earlier and a later treaty both of which are in force. No distinction is
made as to the types of treaties. Article 30 extends in its scope beyond the notion of conflicts and
incompatibility by addressing more generally the rights and obligations of States parties to
successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter and in particular the priority among them2.
Kazakhstan considers that in the context of the obligations and commitments of China acceded under
Article XII Marrakesh Agreement, the Accession Protocol encompassing inter alia Schedules of Tariff
Concessions (hereinafter – Schedule) and Report of the Working Party on Accession of China to the
WTO must be regarded as a later treaty while the Marrakesh Agreement itself with its Annexes,
including Agreement on Agriculture, must be treated as an earlier treaty within the meaning o f
Article 30 Vienna Convention.
If the Panel agrees with this approach, two questions inevitably arise:
- What are the provisions of the two treaties, which could be found incompatible?
- Whether they are incompatible?

Kazakhstan further proposes its analysis in the context of determination of the base period for the
purposes of calculation of MPP, including fixed external reference prices.
What are the provisions of the two treaties, which could be found incompatible?
Paragraph 9 Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture prescribes that fixed external reference price
shall be calculated based on the years of 1986 to 1988. Whereas in Part IV of China's Schedule, the
fixed external reference price in calculation of MPP is based on the years of 1996 to 1998.
It is clear that there are two approaches contained in the documents pertaining to the same subject
matter, i.e. China's agricultural domestic support commitments which could be found incompatible.
Whether they are incompatible?
After finding the two provisions, the most important question is whether they are incompatible? To
answer this question we would like to turn the attention of the Panel to the ordinary meaning of the

* Kazakhstan requested that its oral statement be treated as its executive summary.
1 Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.
2 Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Mark E. Villiger, Brill Online
Books and Journals, http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004180796_036, page 402

word "incompatible". From the definitions suggested by online dictionaries3 it can be drawn that the
word "incompatible" implies that two or more things cannot coexist, i.e. cannot exist together or at
the same time.
In the context of the present example, the question is whether the requirement to use fixed external
prices based on 1986-1988, as required by Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, or those based
on the years of 1996 to 1998, as applied in Part IV of China's Schedule. In order to be incompatible
or to be incapable of coexisting, onl y one of these two parameters would be valid because of
competing nature of their application.
Annex 3 explicitly points to the years of 1986 to 1988. This is straightforward. The question now is
whether the WTO commitments of China stipulate that fixed external reference prices of 1996-1998
are equally valid to render period of 1986 to 1988 "incompatible".
With respect to this issue we would like to refer to the relevant case law developed by the WTO
jurisprudence, in particular to the finding of the Panel in its Report "China — Measures Related to
the Exportation of Various Raw Materials"4 (hereinafter – "China - Raw Materials") and to the Report
of the Appellate Body "China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and
Molybdenum" (hereinafter – "China - Rare Earth Metals")5.
In "China — Raw Materials", in a finding not appealed by any party to the dispute, the Panel explained
that the terms of accession protocols are integral parts of the WTO Agreement6:
"Accession to the WTO is achieved through negotiation with other WTO Members.
Pursuant to Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, accessions take place 'on terms to
be agreed' between the acceding Member and the WTO membership. Most accession
processes take several years to complete and lead to detailed negotiated provisions. The
terms of each WTO Member 's accession are set out in its Accession Protocol and
accompanying Working Party Report. The negotiated agreement between the WTO
membership and the accedin g Member results in a delicate balance of rights and
obligations, which are reflected in the specific wording of each commitment set out in
these documents….
WTO Members' accession protocols are considered to form integral parts of the WTO
Agreement"7.
The Appellate Body in "China - Rare Earth Metals" reaffirms the findings of the Panel:
"In sum, Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides the general rule for
acceding to the WTO. Its first sentence stipulates that accession is to be accomplished
on "terms" to be agreed between the acceding Member and the WTO, and its second
sentence makes clear that such accession applies to the entire package of WTO rights
and obligations, consisting of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed thereto..."8.

In both cases the adjudicators confirm that the accession package, i.e. Accession Protocol together
with its Annexes shall be applied in its entirety forming integral parts of the WTO Agreement .
Likewise, we assert that it cannot be true that one part of the accession terms applies and another
part is not valid. In the context of this dispute, Part IV of China's Schedule indicates the level of its
commitment with respect to Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Part IV of China 's
Schedule refers to the document WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3 (hereinafter – Rev.3). In this case, it is
evident that the two base periods in Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Part IV of China's
Schedule are incompatible.

3 Online Oxford Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/incompatible, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incompatible
4 Document WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R of 5 July 2011.
5 WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R of 7 August 2014.
6 The explanation is drawn from the WTO Analytical Index — Guide to WTO Law and Practice:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_03_e.htm#articleXIIB1f
7 Ibid para. 7.112
8 Ibid para. 5.34

In the light of Article 30 of Vienna Convention and the logic of the WTO jurisprudence, WTO Members
should find the base period for calculation of fixed external reference price of China in the same
document, i.e. in Table DS:5 "Product-Specific Aggregate Measurement of Support: Market Price
Support" of Rev. 3. Therefore, fixed external reference prices of China should be based on the years
of 1996 to 1998.
In conclusion, Kazakhstan would like to call the attention of the Panel that the outcome of this
dispute is of systemic importance and would affect the membership terms of more than 30 Members
acceded under Article XII of Marrakesh Agreement since all these Members follow the same practice
as China applies in its domestic support calculations, including Kazakhstan.
This concludes our statement.
Thank you!

ANNEX C-11
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1. The Russian Federation would like to present, as a third party in this dispute, the summary of
its arguments that mostly relate to the issues concerning the determination of representative period
used to calculate the fixed external reference price (FERP).
2. The Russian Federation would like to highlight the systemic nature of the issues raised in this
dispute and their importance for those Members that acceded after the Uruguay Round with an AMS
reduction commitment in their Schedules.
3. According to Article XII of the WTO Agreement "any State […] may accede to this Agreement,
on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO ". The terms of accession, contained in the Protocol
of Accession, the Report of the Working Party, and the Schedules of commitments, including the
Base Total AMS, constitute an integral part of the WTO Agreement.
4. During the accession process the same representative period is used to calculate the fixed
external reference price, the level of market price support, product-specific AMS and the Base Total
AMS. Such representative period, according to the WTO Secretariat 1, normally comprises the last
three representative years. We would like to draw the attention of the Panel that the amount of the
Base Total AMS depends on the level of market price support calculated during the accession process,
and consequently on the fixed external reference price. It would be illogical and inc oherent to first
calculate the Base Total AMS using the last three representative years, and then, upon the accession
and thereafter, to calculate Current Total AMS and market price support using another reference
period. In such circumstances the amount of Current Total AMS cannot be compared with the amount
of the Base Total AMS due to the fact that they were calculated on different terms and different
basis. The situation of using different representative period to calculate the fixed external reference
price, and as the result – Base Total AMS and Current Total AMS, could lead to the impairment of
the right of a Member that acceded to the WTO after the Uruguay Round to provide the level of
support within the agreed limits and based upon the terms it has agreed.
5. In its First Written Submission the United States claims that the fixed external reference price
shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 as it is set out in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement
on Agriculture.2
6. In view of the Russian Fed eration the period of 1986 – 1988 referred to in paragraph 9 of
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture was the basis for calculating fixed external reference price
for the founding WTO Members due to the fact that this period was chosen during the Uruguay
Round as the most recent representative period. For all Members (except one) that acceded to the
WTO after 1995 the most recent representative period was the period other than 1986 – 1988 (for
instance, for the Russian Federation this period was from 2006 to 2008, for China – from 1996 to
1998).
7. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that the interpretation of a treaty shall take into
account "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation ". From the perspective of the Russian Federation,
subsequent practice of calculating fixed external reference price demonstrates that all WTO Members
during the accession processes agreed that for acceding Members the FERP could be based on the
years other than 1986 to 1988. This is demonstrated by the supporting materials incorporated by
reference in Part IV of Members ' Schedules and, thereby, reflecting all WTO Members' agreement
on all aspects of acceding Member's rights and obligations. Such subsequent practice is also reflected

1 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII, Information to be
Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture, WT/ACC/22/Add.1, 1 August 2014.
2 The United States' First Written Submission, paras. 98, 113.

in the Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat on Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII3, which
says that the info rmation on product -specific AMS measures, including the information on market
price support, is normally used for each of the last three years . This document, as it was pointed
out by the Secretariat, took into account the evolution of accession practices. 4 Notifications of the
acceded WTO Members, including China, and review process within the work of the Committee on
Agriculture on examination of those notifications also support this understanding.
8. Turning to practice, there were Members of the Working Party on the accession of the Russian
Federation to the WTO (which consisted of 65 Members) that stated that the more recent reference
period should be used to calculate the domestic support level as it is more adequate and statistically
relevant. This common understanding was reflected throughout our accession process, inter alia, in
some of the statements of the Working Party 's Members. One Member of the Working Party
expressed its view that "the base period used to establish commitments will need to be based on a
recent three year period which reflects current agricultural support programs".5 Moreover, other
Member of the Working Party on the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO said that "there
is a general understanding that the Russian accession should be based on the methodology included
in the WT/ACC/4 WTO document "6 and that "it is intended that new Members initiate negotiations
departing, at least, from figures based on volume and budgetary outlays related to the base period
mentioned in the WT/ACC/4 WTO document "7. It should also be noted that in the document
WT/ACC/4 the structure of methodology to calculate domestic support measure that affects the
producer price implies that the fixed external reference price shall be provided for each of the last
three years
9. The definition of Aggregate Measurement of Support set out in Article 1(a)(ii) of the
Agreement on Agriculture clearly demonstrates that Annex 3 is not the only source for
AMS calculation – "constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material
incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule" shall also be taken into account.
10. In the view of the Russian Federation, the logic used by the panel and the Appellate Body in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef shows that if agricultural products were included in corresponding
supporting materials incorporated in Member's Schedule, calculation of AMS shall be based not only
on Annex 3 but also shall take into account "constituent data and methodology".8 Since wheat and
rice were included in China's supporting materials, the "constituent data and methodology" shall be
considered in this dispute.
11. From the perspective of the Russian Federation, "constituent data and methodology " in this
context refers to the period for calculation of the fixed external reference price. The Appellate Body
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef examined the issue of determination of basic period for
calculation of market price support for beef. Accord ing to the Appellate Body, since beef was not
included in Korea's supporting materials, then the reference period for it shall be 1986 – 1988, and
not 1989 – 1991 as for those agricultural products which were included in Korea 's corresponding
tables.9 In a similar vein, since wheat and rice were included in China 's supporting materials, the
period of 1996 – 1998 shall be used to calculate the fixed external reference price for these
products.10
12. Therefore, the Russian Federation believes that for Members acceded to the WTO after the
Uruguay Round the basic period for fixed external reference price calculation should be the period

3 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII, Information to
be Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture, WT/ACC/22/Add.1, 1 August 2014,
para. 15.
4 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Information to be Provided on Domestic Support and Export
Subsidies in Agriculture, WT/ACC/4/Rev.1, 1 August 2014.
5 WT/ACC/RUS/23/Add.1, p. 1.
6 WT/ACC/RUS/17/Add.1, p. 13.
7 WT/ACC/RUS/17/Add.1, p. 14.
8 Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, paras. 811-812,
830. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, paras. 113-
114, 117-118.
9 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, paras.
113-114, 117-118.
10 WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3.

used in the tables of supporting materials incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member 's
Schedule, rather than the period used in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

ANNEX D
RAW DATA
Contents Page
Annex D Raw Data as presented by the parties 90

ANNEX D
RAW DATA
1.1. The following tables contain data for the products forming part of the United States' complaint,
i.e. wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice and corn, as presented by the parties 1, and revised in some
cases by the Panel, where necessary.2 This information is presented without prejudice to the Panel's
findings in sections 7 and 8 of the Panel Report or of the calculati ons performed in tables 10-16 of
the Panel Report.
1.1 Wheat
 Source Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 20163
Total national
production
China million
tons 121.023 121.926 126.208 130.185 128.845
US million
tons 121.024 121.926 126.208 130.185 -
Producer price US/China ¥/ton 2,166.20 2,356.20 2,411.80 2,328.60 2,232.60
Production by
province

Hebei US million
tons 13.377 13.872 14.299 14.350 14.333
Jiangsu US million
tons 10.488 11.013 11.604 11.740 11.196
Anhui US million
tons 12.940 13.320 13.936 14.110 13.859
Shandong US million
tons 21.795 22.188 22.638 23.466 23.446
Henan US million
tons 31.774 32.264 33.290 35.010 34.660
Hubei US million
tons 3.708 4.168 4.216 4.209 4.282
Total US million
tons 94.082 96.825 99.983 102.885 101.776
Out-of-grade
percentage
Hebei China percentage 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jiangsu China percentage 2.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.0
Anhui China percentage 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0
Shandong China percentage 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Henan China percentage 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hubei China percentage 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AAP US/China ¥/ton 2,040.00 2,240.00 2,360.00 2,360.00 2,360.00
1996-1998 FERP
(c.i.f. price) China ¥/ton 1996-1998 Average 1996-1998
1,885.00 1,629.60 1,579.80 1,698.13
1986-1988 FERP
(c.i.f. price) US ¥/ton 431.114
Quantity procured
under measures
Hebei China million
tons 0.774 0 0 0.591 3.1765
Jiangsu China million
tons 5.319 3.61 6.708 5.474 4.0765
Anhui China million
tons 4.126 2.9315 6.648 3.97 5.515

1 See United States' response to Panel question No. 96, (Exhibit USA-106); China's response to Panel
question No. 96, (Exhibit CHN-146).
2 These revisions involved adjusting certain of the original figures presented by the parties to express
them in a common unit (renminbi/ton and million tons), and to present quantities using the same number of
decimal places (where useful).
3 All 2016 data was provided by China.
4 Only one value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, Table
7: Fixed External Reference Price.

 Source Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 20163
Shandong China million
tons 1.769 0 0.032 1.242 3.109
Henan China million
tons 9.815 0.698 10.423 8.948 12.1415
Hubei China million
tons 1.369 0.939 1.534 0.559 0.492
Total amount
procured China million
tons 23.172 8.182 25.345 20.784 28.5105
1.2 Rice
 Source Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total national rice
production US/China million
tons 204.236 203.612 206.507 208.225 207.075
Total rice
production in
covered provinces
US/China million
tons 159.34 160.09 162.06 164.14 162.73

1.2.1 Japonica rice
 Source Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total national
production
China million tons 68.011 67.803 68.767 69.339 68.956
US million tons 64.539 64.341 65.256 65.760 -
Producer price US/China ¥/ton 2,919.60 2,936.60 3,035.20 2,951.20 2,935.40
FERP (f.o.b. prices -
milled) China ¥/ton 1996-1998 Average 1996-1998
3,682.90 2,862.10 3,326.90 3,290.63
1986-1988 FERP
(f.o.b. price) (unmilled
equivalent)
US ¥/ton 546.625
Production by province
Liaoning US million tons 5.078 5.069 4.515 4.677 -
Jilin US million tons 5.320 5.633 5.876 6.301 -
Heilongjiang US million tons 21.712 22.206 22.510 21.997 -
Jiangsu US million tons 16.360 16.551 16.461 16.811 -
Anhui US million tons 2.422 2.364 2.431 2.592 -
Total US million tons 50.892 51.823 51.793 52.378 -
Out-of-grade
percentage
Liaoning China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Jilin China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Heilongjiang China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -
Jiangsu China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 -
Anhui China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
AAP (unmilled) US/China ¥/ton 2,800.00 3,000.00 3,100.00 3,100.00 3,100.00
Quantity of paddy rice
purchased under the
measures

Liaoning China million tons 0 0.351 0.175 0 0
Jilin China million tons 0.057 0.713 0.58 1.1675 0.133
Heilongjiang China million tons 3.842 10.625 15.025 16.897 17.7745

5 Only one average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission,
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.

 Source Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Jiangsu China million tons 0 1.352 1.796 1.089 1.5765
Anhui China million tons 0.063 0.481 0.615 0.965 1.478
Hubei China million tons 0 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.0265
Total China million tons 3.962 13.541 18.211 20.137 20.989

1.2.2 Indica rice
1.2.2.1 Early-season

Data
provided
by
Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total national
production US million tons 33.291 34.145 34.012 33.687 -
Producer price
(early-season) US/China ¥/ton 2,622.00 2,603.20 2,681.60 2,687.40 2,602.60
1996-1998 FERP
(f.o.b. prices -
milled)
China ¥/ton 1996-1998 Average 1996-1998
 3,082.10 2,033.00 1,913.90 2,343.00
1986-1988 FERP
(f.o.b. price)
(unmilled equivalent)
US ¥/ton 470.836
Production by
province
Anhui US million tons 1.320 1.308 1.283 1.092 -
Jiangxi US million tons 8.002 8.280 8.201 8.119 -
Hubei US million tons 2.089 2.228 2.387 2.523 -
Hunan US million tons 8.187 8.605 8.548 8.589 -
Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region US million tons 5.449 5.552 5.433 5.288 -
Total million tons 25.047 25.973 25.852 25.611 -
Out-of-grade
percentage
Anhui China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Jiangxi China percentage 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -
Hubei China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Hunan China percentage 1.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 -
Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region China percentage 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -
AAP (unmilled) US/China ¥/ton 2,400.00 2,640.00 2,700.00 2,700.00 -
Quantity of paddy
rice purchased under
the measures

Anhui China million tons 0.0000 0.0665 0.0870 0.0400 0.0215
Jiangxi China million tons 0.0000 3.3340 2.1450 1.4500 1.3065
Hubei China million tons 0.0000 0.0985 0.0600 0.0960 0.0485
Hunan China million tons 0.0000 2.2000 1.9420 1.4300 1.1890
Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region China million tons 0.0000 0.0360 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
Total China million tons 0.0000 5.7350 4.2450 3.0160 2.5655

6 Only one average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission,
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.

1.2.2.2 Mid-late-season

Data
provided
by
Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total national
production US million
tons 106.406 105.136 107.239 108.739 -
Producer price (mid-
season Indica) US/China ¥/ton 2,697.40 2,627.20 2,658.00 2,601.60 2,603.40
Producer price (late-
season Indica) US/China ¥/ton 2,769.40 2,713.40 2,838.20 2,787.00 2,768.40
1996-1998 FERP
(f.o.b. prices -
milled)
China ¥/ton
1996-1998 Average 1996-1998

3,082.1
0
 2,033.00 1,913.90 2,343.00
1986-1988 FERP
(f.o.b. price)
(unmilled equivalent)
US ¥/ton 470.837
Production by
province

Jiangsu US million
tons 2.641 2.672 2.658 2.714 -
Anhui US million
tons 10.193 9.951 10.232 10.910 -
Jiangxi US million
tons 11.758 11.760 12.051 12.153 -
Henan US million
tons 4.926 4.858 5.286 5.315 -
Hubei US million
tons 14.425 14.539 14.908 15.584 -
Hunan US million
tons 18.130 17.011 17.792 17.859 -
Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region US million
tons 5.971 6.010 6.228 6.090 -
Sichuan US million
tons 15.354 15.490 15.261 15.526 -
Total million
tons 83.398 82.291 84.416 86.151 -
Out-of-grade
percentage
Jiangsu China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Anhui China percentage 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 -
Jiangxi China percentage 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Henan China percentage 0.0 3.0 2.2 1.1 -
Hubei China percentage 0.0 4.0 0.7 0.0 -
Hunan China percentage 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.7 -
Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region China percentage 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -
Sichuan China percentage 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 -
AAP (unmilled) US/China ¥/ton 2,500.00 2,700.00 2,760.00 2,760.00 -
Quantity of paddy
rice purchased under
the measures

Jiangsu China million
tons 0.0000 0.1565 0.1310 0.0985 0.0050
Anhui China million
tons 0.0000 3.9235 2.8050 3.1585 1.9705
Jiangxi China million
tons 0.0790 2.1660 1.3700 0.9480 0.6000
Henan China million
tons 0.0000 1.8160 1.2480 1.4550 1.5695
Hubei China million
tons 0.0000 2.5780 1.7800 2.9635 2.0895

7 Only one average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission,
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.

Data
provided
by
Units 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Hunan China million
tons 0.0000 1.3820 1.2630 0.9105 0.7965
Sichuan China million
tons 0.0000 1.2970 1.0810 0.6540 0.4645
Total China million
tons 0.079 13.319 9.678 10.188 7.4955
1.3 Corn

Data
provided
by
Units 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total national
production US million
tons 205.614 218.489 215.646 224.632
Producer price US/China ¥/ton 2,222.60 2,176.20 2,237.00 1,884.60
1996-1998 FERP
(f.o.b. price) China ¥/ton 1996-1998 Average 1996-1998
1581.40 1075.80 939.20 1,198.80
1986-1988 FERP
(f.o.b. price) US ¥/ton 366.078
Production by
province
Heilongjiang US million
tons 28.879 32.164
33.434

35.441
Jilin US million
tons 25.788 27.757
27.335

28.057
Liaoning US million
tons 14.235 15.632
11.705

14.035
Inner Mongolia US million
tons 17.844 20.697
21.861

22.508
Total US million
tons 86.746 96.250 94.335 100.041
Out-of-grade
percentage
Heilongjiang US/China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jilin US/China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Liaoning US/China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Inner Mongolia US/China percentage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AAP Heilongjiang US ¥/ton 2,100.00 2,220.00 2,220.00 2,000.00
AAP Jilin US ¥/ton 2,120.00 2,240.00 2,240.00 2,000.00
AAP Liaoning US ¥/ton 2,140.00 2,260.00 2,260.00 2,000.00
AAP Inner Mongolia US ¥/ton 2,140.00 2,260.00 2,260.00 2,000.00
Quantity of corn
purchased under the
measures

Heilongjiang China million
tons 0.326 6.205 8.369 21.897
Jilin China million
tons 0.130 4.777 7.874 11.780
Liaoning China million
tons 0.030 15.903 25.402 34.530
Inner Mongolia China million
tons 2.334 16.353 23.047 57.149
Total China million
tons 2.820 43.236 64.690 125.356

Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.