RUSSIA – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON LIGHT COMMERCIAL VEHICLES FROM GERMANY AND ITALY REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: Addendum
Date: 27 January 2017
Document codes: WT/DS479/R/Add.1; WT/DS479/R.
Complainant: EU
Respondent: Russia
Third parties: China, India, Japan, South Korea, U.S., Brazil, Turkey, Ukraine
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 6.5.1, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2, 1, 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

RUSSIA – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON LIGHT COMMERCIAL
VEHICLES FROM GERMANY AND ITALY
REPORT OF THE PANEL
Addendum
This addendum contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning business confidential
information
A-7
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-2
Annex B-2 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation B-11
Annex B-3 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-21
Annex B-4 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the
Russian Federation
B-31
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil C-2
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan C-6
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Turkey C-11
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine C-13
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States C-15
ANNEX D
PRELIMINARY RULING
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Preliminary Ruling on the panel's jurisdiction under Article 6.2 of the DSU dated

D-2

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ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning business confidential
information
A-7

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ANNEX A-1
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Adopted on 1 December 2015
1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions o f the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working
Procedures shall apply.
General

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential.
Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter
"party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as
confidential information submitted to the Panel by another Member whi ch the submitting Member
has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written
submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential
summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest
in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter
"third parties"), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before
it.
4. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation
when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all
members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in
accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the
confidentiality of the proceedings.
Submissions

5. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a
written submission in which its presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the
second substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable
adopted by the Panel.
6. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity
and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If the European Union
requests such a ruling, Russia shall submit its response to the request in its first written
submission. If Russia requests such a ruling, the European Union shall submit its r esponse to the
request prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel
in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good
cause.
7. Each party shall submit all factual evi dence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers
to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure
shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel
shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual
evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.
8. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party or
third party shall submit a translation into the WTO working language of the submission at the
same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such ex hibits
upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised
promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following

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the submission which contains the translation in ques tion. The Panel may grant exceptions to this
procedure upon a showing of good cause. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed
explanation of the grounds of objection and an alternative translation. Should a party be aware of
any inaccuracies in the translations of the exhibits submitted by that party, it shall inform the
Panel and the other party promptly, and provide a new translation.
9. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the
course of the dispute. For example, exhibits submitted by the European Union could be numbered
EU-1, EU-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered EU-5, the
first exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered EU-6.
10. Each party and third party is invited to make its submissions in accordance with the WTO
Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions, attached as Annex 1, to the extent that it is practical to do
so.
Questions

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing,
including prior to each substantive meeting.
Substantive meetings

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its del egation in advance of each
meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.
13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite the European Union to make an opening statement to present its
case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite Russia to present its point of view. Before
each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the
meeting with a provisional written version of its st atement. In the event that
interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters,
through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other
party the final version of its opening statement a s well as its closing statement, if any,
preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the
first working day following the meeting.
b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to
ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing,
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other part y to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the
Panel.
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an
opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to
receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such
questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with the European Union presenting its stat ement
first.
14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall ask Russia if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first.
If so, the Panel shall invite Russia to present its op ening statement, followed by the
European Union. If Russia chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Panel shall invite

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the European Union to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the
floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional
written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party
shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each
party shall make available to th e Panel and the other party the final version of its
opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the
meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the
meeting.
b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to
ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing,
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by th e
Panel.
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an
opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to
receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such
questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to
present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement
first, presenting its closing statement first.
Third parties

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to
the first substan tive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable
adopted by the Panel.
16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first
substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each thir d party shall provide to the Panel the list
of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous
working day.
17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order. Third
parties present at the third -party session and intending to present their views orally at
that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third-parties with provisional
written versions of their statements before they take the floor. Third parties shall make
available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their
statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than
5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the session.
c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the
opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any
matter raised in the third parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in
writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party
to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall
then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in
writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to
respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

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Descriptive part

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third partie s in the descriptive part of the
Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which
shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve
as a substitute for the subm issions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of
the case.
19. Each party shall submit an integrated executive summar y of the facts and arguments as
presented to the Panel in its first written submissions, first opening and closing oral statements
and responses to questions following the first substantive meeting, and a separate integrated
executive summary of its written rebuttal, second opening and closing oral statements and
responses to questions following the second substantive meeting, in accordance with the timetable
adopted by the Panel. Each integrated executive summary shall be limited to no more than
15 pages. The Panel will not summarize in a separate part of its report, or annex to its report, the
parties' responses to questions.
20. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary of its arguments as presented
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
This integrated executive summary may also include a summary of r esponses to questions, if
relevant. The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.
21. The Panel reserves the right to request the parties and third parties to provide executive
summaries of facts and arguments presented by a party or a third party in any other submissions
to the Panel for which a deadline may not be specified in the timetable.
Interim review

22. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.
23. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit
written comments on the other party's written request for review, in accordance with the timetable
adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other pa rty's written
request for review.
24. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept
strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.
Service of documents

25. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with
the DS Registry (office No. 2047).
b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the
Panel. Exhibits may be filed in 2 copies on CD -ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The
DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper
version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
c. Each party and third p arty shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it
submits to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft
Word format, either on a CD -ROM, a DVD or as an e -mail attachment. If the electronic
copy is provided by e -mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy
to xxxxx.xxxxx@wto.org and xxxxx.xxxxx@wto.org . If a CD -ROM or DVD is provided, it
shall be filed with the DS Registry.

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d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on t he other party.
Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance
of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any
document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all o ther third parties. Each
party and third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required
at the time it provides each document to the Panel.
e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies
on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on
the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents
to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipi ent party or
third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.
f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the
interim report and the final report, as well as of other docume nts as appropriate. When
the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a
document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the
record of the dispute.
26. The Panel reserves the rig ht to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with
the parties.

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ANNEX A-2
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL CONCERNING
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Adopted on 14 January 2016
The following procedures apply to any business co nfidential information (BCI) submitted in the
course of the Panel proceedings in DS479.
1. For the purposes of these Panel proceedings, BCI includes
a. any information designated as such by the party submitting it that was previously
treated as confidential by the investigating authority in the anti-dumping investigation
at issue in this dispute unless the Panel decides it should not be treated as BCI for
purposes of these Panel proceedings based on an objection by a party pursuant to
paragraph 3 below.
b. any other information designated as such by the party submitting it, unless the Panel
decides it should not be treated as BCI for purposes of these Panel proceedings based
on an objection by a party pursuant to paragraph 3 below.
2. Any information that is availa ble in the public domain may not be designated as BCI . In
addition, information previously treated as confidential by the investigating authority in the anti -
dumping investigation at issue in this dispute may not be designated as BCI if the person who
provided the information in the course of th at investigation agrees in writing to make the
information publicly available.
3. If a party or third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party
should have been designated as BCI and objects to its submission without such designation, it
shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where
relevant, the third parties, together with the reasons for the objection. Similarly, if a party or third
party considers that the other pa rty or a third party designated information as BCI which should
not be so designated, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other
party, and, where relevant, the third parties, together with the reasons for the objection. The
Panel, in deciding whether information subject to an objection should be treated as BCI for
purposes of these Panel proceedings, will consider whether disclosure of the information in
question could cause serious harm to the interests of the originator(s) of the information.
4. No person may have access to BCI except a member of the Secretariat or the Panel, an
employee of a party or third party, or an outside advisor to a party or third party for the purposes
of this dispute.
5. A party or third party having access to BCI in these Panel proceedings shall not disclose that
information other than to persons authorized to have access to it pursuant to these procedures.
Any information designated as BCI under these procedur es shall only be used for the purposes of
this dispute. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees and/or
outside advisors comply with these procedures to protect BCI.
6. An outside advisor of a party or third party is not permitted access to BCI if that advisor is an
officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or import of the
product(s) that was/were the subject of the investigation at issue in this dispute , or an officer or
employee of an association of such enterprises. All third party access to BCI shall be subject to the
terms of these working procedures.
7. The party submitting BCI shall mark the cover and/or first page of the document containing
BCI, and each page of the document, to indicat e the presence of such information. The specific
information in question shall be placed between double brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]. The
first page or cover of the document shall state "Contains Business Confidential Information ", and
each page of the document shall contain the notice "Contains Business Confidential Information" at
the top of the page.

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8. Any BCI that is submitted in binary -encoded form shall be clearly marked with the statement
"Business Confidential Information" on a label of the st orage medium, and clearly marked with the
statement "Business Confidential Information" in the binary-encoded files.
9. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a
statement shall inform the Panel before making it t hat the statement will contain BCI, and the
Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures
are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to
the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 7.
10. Any person authorized to have access to BCI under the terms of these procedures shall store
all documents containing BCI in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such
information.
11. The Panel will not d isclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized
under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of
conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the
Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does
not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.
12. Submissions containing BCI will be included in the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in
the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.

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ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-2
Annex B-2 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation B-11
Annex B-3 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-21
Annex B-4 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the
Russian Federation
B-31

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ANNEX B-1
FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
1 INTRODUCTION
1. In this integrated executive summary, the European Union ( "EU") summarizes the facts and
arguments presented to the Panel in its first written submission, its opening and closin g oral
statements at the first substantive meeting and its responses to the Panel 's and Russia 's
questions.
2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE MEASURES AT ISSUE
2. On 3 October 2011 Sollers -Elabuga LLC ("Sollers") filed an Application requesting the
imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of light commercial vehicles ("LCVs") from Germany,
Italy and Turkey on the territory of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.
3. The product concerned is LCVs of gross vehicle weight from 2.8 tonnes to 3.5 tonne s, van-type
bodies and diesel engines with cylinder capacity not exceeding 3.000 cc, designed for the transport
of cargo of up to two tonnes (cargo all -metal van version) or for the combined transport of cargo
and passengers (combi cargo and passenger van version) falling under HS code 8704 21 3100 and
HS code 8704 21 9100 and imported in the Customs Union from Germany, Italy and Turkey.
4. The applicant argued that its output during the first half of 2011 amounted to 85.2% of the
total production of the like product, and identified another producer of the like product, Gorkovsky
Avtomobilny Zavod ("GAZ") for the period concerned.
5. The anti-dumping investigation was initiated on 16 November 2011. The dumping investigation
period ("DIP") is from 1 July 2010 unti l 30 June 2011. The injury investigation period ("IIP") is
from 1 January 2008 until 31 December 2011. By Notice of 16 November 2012 the Department of
Internal Market Defence ("DIMD") of the Eurasian Economic Commission ("EAEC") extended the
duration of the investigation for 6 months, until 16 May 2013.
6. On 14 May 2013 the DIMD introduced anti -dumping duties on imports of LCVs from Germany,
Italy and Turkey on the territory of the Customs Union. The Decisio n entered into force on
15 June 2013. The anti -dumping duties are 29.6% for imports from Germany, 23% for imports
from Italy and 11.1% for imports from Turkey. The Decision is based on the Report "Findings from
the anti-dumping investigation relating to light commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Ita ly,
Poland and Turkey and imported into the common customs territory of the Customs Union ' of the
Domestic Market Protection Department of the Eurasian Economic Commission" ("the Report").
3 LEGAL ARGUMENT
3.1 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD A greement: failure to properly determine
the domestic industry
7. Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement, provisions which are inextricably linked,
the "domestic industry" should be defined as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the
like products, or as those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products. Domestic producers may be left out
from the definition of "domestic industry" on the basis of the two limitative reasons provided for in
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. The possibility to define the
domestic industry as producers producing a major proportion of the total domestic production is
not unfettered. The Appella te Body has specified that these limits are of a quantitative and
qualitative nature. The proportion relied upon by the investigating authority should be
representative of the domestic industry as a whole and be unbiased, without favouring the interest
of any interested party, or group thereof. The investigating authority must ensure that the way in

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which the domestic industry is defined does not introduce a material risk of skewing the economic
data and, consequently, distorting its analysis of the state of the industry.
8. By excluding GAZ from the definition of "domestic industry", the DIMD acted in a biased
manner, potentially leading to a risk of materially distorting the injury analysis and, thus, violating
the obligations under Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement.
9. First, without providing any reasons for it, the DIMD defined the product concerned by this
investigation very narrowly: LCVs with diesel engine. This definition was designed to conform
precisely to the type of products that Sollers was a ssembling in the Special Economic Zone when
the application was filed (in particular, Fiat Ducato with diesel engines). LCVs with diesel engine
were also the product being made and sold by GAZ during the investigation period. Sollers already
noted that GAZ was producing two models of LCVs which fell under the product concerned during
the IIP and DIP.
10. Second, DIMD was well aware that GAZ, the leader in the overall LCVs market in Russia, was
a producer engaged in the full production cycle ("producer") manufa cturing the product concerned
(in particular, LCVs with diesel engine) in Russia and directly competing with Sollers. GAZ's
production amounted, on average, to 12.1% of the total production during the period of
investigation (i.e. the remaining production not accounted for by Sollers). Evidence on the record
showed that GAZ, with its petrol and diesel models, was the undisputed leader in the overall LCV
market in Russia in 2010, with 51.4% share in that market, thanks to its main models Gazelle and
Sobol, whereas Fiat was the third with a share of 9.6%. In fact, evidence on the record showed
that the overall market share of GAZ increased by 13% between the second half of 2010 and the
first half of 2011 (i.e. the DIP), while Sollers' market share decreased by 11% during the same
period, as a consequence of the fact that the price of the Gazelle Diesel was even lower than
Sollers' Fiat Ducato Diesel. Being such a market leader of LCVs in Russia, it could be expected
that, in principle, GAZ's economic data could have shown a somehow different picture from that
portrayed by Sollers in its Application. Thus, an undistorted injury analysis would have to take
data pertaining to GAZ, the overall market leader, into account.
11. Third, the DIMD failed to take into account important qualitative differences between GAZ and
Sollers which could have consequences for the injury analysis. Indeed, GAZ manufactures LCVs
from the beginning of the production cycle, whereas Sollers assembled Fiat Ducato from semi -
knocked down sets imp orted from Italy. In this sense, GAZ may be regarded as a domestic
"producer" of the product concerned, whereas Sollers would rather be an "assembler", bringing the
LCV into existence in Russia from mainly imported parts. This in an important distinction t hat may
have a bearing on the injury analysis. While the truly domestic producer may be more stable in its
production cycle by adjusting its production costs and prices to market demand, an assembler of
LCVs is more at the mercy of the value of the importe d parts and other exogenous commercial
considerations, without being able to quickly adapt its assembly operations to the evolution of the
market. This may put "assemblers" in a more delicate situation than "producers".
12. Another relevant factor distinguishing the situation between GAZ and Sollers is that, while the
former is based in Russia and is subject to the regular economic conditions in Russia, Sollers is
based in the Special Economic Zone of Elabuga ("SEZ"). Despite the benefits it enjoyed in the SEZ,
Sollers was still losing market share against a very efficient producers and GAZ remained in a very
strong position as a market leader for the overall LCV market.
13. As a consequence of such an incorrect definition of the domestic industry, the DIMD's injur y
determination was also based on an incorrect data set, in violation of Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement.
3.2 Claim under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement: selection of non -
consecutive periods of non-equal duration in the injury and causation analyses
14. By selecting non-consecutive periods of non -equal duration for the examination of the trends
for the whole domestic industry, the DIMD's injury determination was not based on an objective
examination of positive evidence, contrary to the obl igations under Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement.

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15. According to the panel in Mexico – Olive Oil an examination can only be "objective" if it is
based on data which provide an accurate and unbiased picture of what it is that one is examining.
An investigating authority must ensure that in examining the evidence in the context of its injury
determination an accurate and unbiased picture is provided (See also Panel Report, China – X-Ray
Scanners). The use of non -equal, non-consecutive periods by an investigating authority, absent
any justification to do so, fails to provide such an accurate and unbiased picture.
16. The use of non-equal, non-consecutive periods interrupts the logical and temporal progression
of the analysis which is done for a period of one year. Mor eover, it changes the logical temporal
sequence of the analysed half-year periods without any explanation for the necessity to do so. The
DIMD failed to provide an explanation as to why the use of non -equal, non-consecutive periods
was necessary in this case.
17. The information in question should have been provided on an equal and consecutive basis, so
that meaningful trends can be observed on the basis of which the investigating authority could
come to the conclusion in its injury determination. Indeed, in o rder to present such an accurate
and objective picture of the information, the DIMD should have examined the information on the
basis of a sequence of measurements of the same variable collected over time (i.e. a trend). For
instance, the DIMD could have provided trends on the basis of consistent annual comparisons (e.g.
by comparing 2009, 2010 and 2011 with 2008, and also comparing the DIP on an annual basis
with 2008). However, the EAEC further distorted its injury and causation analyses by
predominantly examining information on the basis of the data of the respective preceding period,
i.e. without comparing the data of each year, including the year 2011, with 2008 on a consecutive
annual basis.
18. Since the DIMD relied on an examination of non -equal, non -consecutive periods for the
purpose of gauging the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and assessing
whether the injury found to exist is caused by the dumped imports, the DIMD's injury
determination is further inconsistent with Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
3.3 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement: failure to make an objective
examination based on positive evidence of whether the effect of the allegedly dumped
imports was to prevent domestic price increases , which otherwise would have occurred,
to a significant degree
19. According to the AD Agreement, an investigating authority's inquiry regarding the last price
effect listed in Article 3.2 (i.e. price suppression) must provide it with a meaningful understandin g
of whether subject imports have explanatory force for the significant depression or suppression of
domestic prices that may be occurring in the domestic market, without disregarding any evidence
that may call into question such explanatory force. Such an alysis under Article 3.2 requires a
dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of
the dumped imports and those of domestic like products over the duration of the investigation
period and needs to consider whether the price effects, including price suppression, is "significant".
This understanding, in turn, provides a building block for the authority to determine whether
subject imports, through their price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry w ithin the
meaning of Article 3.5 (Appellate Body Report in China – GOES and China – HP-SSST (EU)).
Indeed, the analysis under Article 3.2 concerns the relationship between subject imports and
domestic prices, whereas the analysis under Article 3.5 concerns the causal relationship between
the subject imports and the material injury to the domestic industry.
20. The DIMD failed to make an objective analysis based on positive evidence when considering
whether the effect of the dumped imports was to prevent domesti c price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree (i.e. price suppression). It failed to examine
whether the subject imports had explanatory force for the occurrence of significant suppression of
domestic prices.
21. DIMD incorrectly based its analysis on the year 2009 to show price suppression, while this
year cannot – according to the DIMD's own description – be considered to be a "normal year".
Second, the DIMD relied on data expressed in USD to suggest there was price suppress ion,
ignoring the developments in the exchange rate. Third, the DIMD did not show that the dumped
imports have "explanatory force" for the alleged price effects, failing to examine whether the

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market would be ready to absorb further price increases. Fourth , the DIMD did not explain and
demonstrate why the alleged price suppression would be "to a significant degree".
22. Because the DIMD failed to make an objective analysis based on positive evidence when
considering whether the effects of the dumped imports was to prevent domestic price increases,
Russia violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
3.4 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement: state of the domestic
industry
23. The DIMD failed to make a proper evaluation of all injury factors in c ontext and thus failed to
reach a reasoned and adequate conclusion with respect to the impact of dumped imports on the
domestic industry. As a result, the EAEC failed to make a determination of injury on the basis of an
"objective examination" of the discl osed factual basis (Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry).
Therefore, the DIMD's determination of injury is inconsistent with Russia's obligations under
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 AD Agreement.
24. WTO panels and the Appellate Body have consistently held that, accordin g to Articles 3.1 and
3.4, investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence,
the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor having a bearing on the state of
the industry and the weight to be attached to it (Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel). In
assessing the state of the domestic industry, investigating authorities must evaluate all factors
listed in Article 3.4 and any other relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the dome stic
industry in the case at hand. This analysis cannot be limited to a mere identification of the
"relevance or irrelevance" of each factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the
state of the industry. The analysis must explain in a sat isfactory way why the evaluation of the
injury factors set out under Article 3.4 leads to the determination of material injury, including an
explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction do not undermine the
conclusion of material injury (Panel Report, Korea – Paper AD Duties).
25. When examining the state of the domestic industry in the Customs Union, the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement. First, the DIMD did not base its
examination of various injury factors on positive evidence, as demonstrated by the contradictions
between the DIMD's findings and the evidence put forward by Sollers.
26. Second, the DIMD failed to make a proper evaluation of all injury factors in context and thus
failed to reach a reasoned and adequate conclusion with respect to the impact of dumped imports
on the domestic industry. It made contradictory observations and failed to consider a number of
facts on the record relating to the state of the domestic industry that contradi ct the alleged
negative trends in the domestic industry during the dumping investigation period.
27. The evidence on the record, if considered in an objective and even-handed manner, as well as
evidence regarding factors that the DIMD failed to examine, demon strate that Sollers performed
extraordinarily well at the beginning of the analysed period (2008 -2009), with abnormal profit
levels that were due to consumers' preferences of purchasing cheaper domestic products. When
the effects of the financial crisis started to fade out (in 2010 and 2011), Sollers returned to normal
profitability levels, in view of the competition in the market. Returning to normality is not a state
of material injury. When the trends of production and sales of each year are compared to the base
year of 2008, it becomes apparent that those factors showed positive trends, even in 2011. In
addition, the DIMD found material injury at a time and in a situation where a company was
materially dissolving, i.e. leaving the production operations o f the Fiat Ducato to move to another
cooperation. This may be a challenging moment in business. However, this is not a state of
material injury in an anti-dumping context.
28. Finally, the DIMD also failed to examine several injury factors, listed in Article 3 .4 of the AD
Agreement, i.e. the magnitude of the margin of dumping, the return on investments, the actual
and potential negative effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital or investments.

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3.5 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement: causation
29. Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, investigating authorities are called
upon to make a determination that the material injury found was caused by the dumped imports.
Moreover, investigating authorities have to examine any kn own factors other than the dumped
imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by
these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Investigating the authorities'
establishment of the facts has to be proper and their evaluation of those facts unbiased and
objective so that the investigating authority's explanations are reasonable and supported by the
evidence cited.
30. The DIMD found that dumped imports displaced similar goods produced by the domest ic
industry. The DIMD stated that, while volumes of dumped imports decreased during 2009
compared to 2008, "in 2010, during the investigated period, and in 2011, the share of imports in
total consumption in the territory of the Customs Union was rising ste adily, in the context of the
proportional reduction of the share of the like product manufactured in the territory of the
Customs Union".1
31. Three main facts challenge the DIMD's conclusion of a causal link between the dumped import
volume and the material injury. First, facts on the record reveal that imports recovered from the
financial crisis and merely reached the pre-crisis level in 2011. Second, the domestic market share
of Sollers and GAZ combined remained very high (at 57% in 2011). Third, the reduct ion in
domestic share between 2009 and 2011 was less than half of the increase of the market share of
dumped imports. All this evidence on the record demonstrates that the DIMD failed to properly
examine the causal relationship between dumped import volume and injury.
32. Evidence on the record even showed that domestic prices were below import prices during the
DIP. This further contradicts the DIMD's finding that the "dumped imports significantly prevented
the growth of prices for the same Products produced b y the domestic industry in the Customs
Union". The DIMD failed to address how higher import prices could be the cause of suppressing an
increase in domestic prices. Given that these domestic prices were below the import prices, Sollers
had still a margin t o further increase its domestic prices. The fact that import prices were higher
than domestic prices during the DIP strongly suggests that the subject imports were not
responsible for the alleged price suppression (Panel Report, China – GOES). This point w as
repeatedly raised by interested parties, but was not elaborated on by the DIMD.
33. In addition, the DIMD strongly relied on the fact that the domestic producer's costs increased
by 42.7% between 2009 and 2011 whereas its prices merely rose by 6.4%. Leaving aside the
issue that this finding was not based on an objective assessment of the evidence, the DIMD failed
to address whether Sollers could pass on such a cost increase to its prices. The EU already
stressed that the DIMD could not assume that producers can continuously increase their prices and
that the domestic market would be willing to absorb these increases.
34. The DIMD failed to examine the relevance of other known factors. Sollers' own misguided
business decisions that created self-inflicted harm; the termination of Sollers' cooperation with Fiat
in early 2010; the domestic competition between Sollers and GAZ in the domestic market of LCVs;
the difficulties in accessing finance; and the discontinuation of the government programme
supporting sales of c ars at the end of 2010, are known factors, other than the dumped imports,
that the DIMD failed to properly examine and that caused the injury that Sollers suffered during
the DIP. These factors were "known" to the investigating authority since they were ra ised by the
participants in the investigation. They are factors "other than dumped imports" since they were
not related at all to the imports. These factors were injuring the domestic industry at the same
time as the dumped imports ( Appellate Body Report, EC – Pipe Fittings). As consequence, Russia
violated its obligation under Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement by failing to examine the relevance of
such factors.
35. For the reasons explained above, the DIMD's causality analysis is inconsistent with Russia's
obligations in Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.

1 Report (Exhibit EU-22), Section 5.1.

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3.6 Claim under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement: Treatment of Information
as Confidential without Showing Good Cause and without Providing a Meaningful
Summary
36. The Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China) considered that Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the AD
Agreement "set[s] out specific rules governing an investigating authority's acceptance and
treatment of confidential information". Article 6.5 imposes two conditions in order for the
investigating authority to be obliged to treat information submitted by the parties to an
investigation as "confidential". The first condition is split up in two alternatives. Authorities must
treat information as confidential (i) if it is "by nature" confidential or if it is "provided on a
confidential basis" and (ii) "upon good cause shown".
37. Article 6.5.1 establishes an "alternative method" for communicating the content of confidential
information "so as to satisfy the right of other parties to the investigation t o obtain a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the confidential information, and to defend their interests".
Under Article 6.5.1, an investigating authority is under an obligation to require that (i) a non -
confidential summary of the information is furnished, and (ii) to ensure that the summary contains
sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the information submitted in confidence.
Whether the summary contains "sufficient detail" depends on the confidential nature of the
information at issue, but "it must permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information withheld to allow the other parties to the investigation an opportunity to respond and
defend their interests" (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China)).
38. Only in "exceptional circumstances", the information may be "not susceptible of summary". In
such "exceptional circumstances", the reasons why summarization is impossible must be provided
in a statement. The investigating authority must scrutinize such st atement. The Appellate Body
has stressed that it is not enough for a party simply to claim that providing a summary "would be
burdensome or costly". Rather, it must be shown that "no alternative method of presenting that
information can be developed that w ould not, either necessarily disclose the sensitive information,
or necessarily fail to provide a sufficient level of detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence". Without such scrutiny by the inv estigating
authority of the non -confidential summary, or of the statement explaining why "exceptional
circumstances" make summarisation not possible, the "due process rights of other parties to the
investigation are not fully respected" (Appellate Body Rep ort, EC – Fasteners (China) ). The
jurisprudence also explains that the obligations to perform an objective assessment of good cause
and require meaningful non -confidential summaries do not depend on "whether or not the
underlying issue was contested in the investigation", and that a "lack of contestation is not an
excuse for the absence of any assessment."2
39. Throughout the anti-dumping investigation, the DIMD treated a wide range of information as
confidential. However, no good cause was required to be show n for such confidential treatment,
nor did the DIMD properly assess whether there was good cause. There is no evidence in the
Report or in any related documents of any objective assessment of whether good cause was shown
for confidential treatment, or even that the DIMD at any point required the parties seeking
confidential treatment to explain and provide reasons as to why the information at issue should be
treated as confidential (Appellate Body Report, China — HP-SSST (Japan)).
40. Regarding the claims related to Sollers' Application , its non-confidential version that was
made available to interested parties contains a wide range of information that is treated as
confidential. The DIMD 's treatment of that confidential treatment violates the AD Agreement in
several ways.
41. First, Sollers did not show any "good cause" for the confidential treatment of this information,
and the DIMD did not require Sollers to provide such good cause, or properly assess an alleged
"good cause". The Appellate Body has stressed that t he requirement to show "good cause" applies
to both information that is "by nature" confidential and that which is provided to the authority "on
a confidential basis" (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) ). For this reason, Russia
violated Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement.

2 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.61; Panel Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), para. 7.46.

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42. Second, no meaningful summary of this information, and no explanation of why such a
summary would not be possible, was provided by Sollers or required by the EAEC. For this reason,
Russia violated Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement.
43. In addition, some of the information that is treated as confidential, notably in the non -
confidential version of Sollers ' questionnaire responses, seems not to be confidential by nature.
This is an additional violation of the obligations under Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement. It should
be stressed, however, that the other violations just described (no good cause shown, required or
properly assessed, and an absence of either a meaningful summary or an explanation of why a
summary would not be possible) apply to those points as well.
44. Regarding the claims related to Sollers' questionnaire responses , their non -confidential
version3 of 3 March 2012, as updated on 31 January 2013, contains a wide range of information
that is treated as confidential. Sollers di d not show any "good cause" for this confidential
treatment and the DIMD did not require Sollers to provide nor did it properly assess whether
Sollers had shown such "good cause". For this reason, Russia violated Article 6.5 of the AD
Agreement.
45. Furthermore, Sollers did not provide, and the DIMD failed to require Sollers to provide, a
meaningful summary of this information, and no explanation was provided or required on why a
summary would not be possible. There is nothing more than a mere indication that the information
is "[CONFIDENTIAL]". For this reason, Russia violated its obligation in Article 6.5.1 of the AD
Agreement.
46. The EU also makes equivalent claims of violations of Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the AD
Agreement, mutatis mutandis , regarding the conf idential treatment of information in the non -
confidential versions of Turin -Auto's questionnaires responses , along with their u pdate of
31 January 2013 and amendment of 13 February 2013, as well as in Sollers ' written comments
after the hearing of 6 April 2012. The EU also challenges under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 the
confidential treatment of the questionnaire response of GAZ, Sollers ' letter of 25 December 2012,
the letter of the 'Association of Russian Automakers ' of 11 February 2013 and GAZ 's letter of
6 March 2013.
47. In light of the foregoing, the EU submits that the DIMD 's treatment of confidential information
violated the obligations under Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement, by treating as confidential certain
information that is neither confidential by natu re nor provided on a confidential basis and by
treating information as confidential without requiring a good cause to be shown and without
properly assessing whether such good cause was shown, and under Article 6.5.1 of the AD
Agreement, by failing to requ ire interested parties providing confidential information to either
provide non-confidential summaries thereof that would permit a reasonable understanding of the
information submitted in confidence, or to indicate and state the reasons why that informatio n is
not susceptible of summary.
3.7 Claim under Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement: Failure to disclose all essential facts
under consideration that formed the basis for the decision by the EAEC
48. The Appellate Body has noted that at the heart of Article 6.9 is the "requirement to disclose,
before a final determination is made, the essential facts under consideration which form the basis
for the decision whether or not to apply definitive measures". A timely and complete disclosure is
essential for preserving the ability of interested parties to defend their interests, in particular by
enabling them to challenge omissions or the use of incorrect facts (Appellate Body Report, China –
GOES).
49. The "essential facts" are those facts that are significant in the proces s of reaching a decision
as to whether or not to apply definitive anti -dumping measures. The facts may be those "salient
for a decision to apply definitive measures, as well as those that are salient for a contrary
outcome" (Appellate Body Report, China – GOES). The body of essential fact s to be disclosed
under Article 6.9 concerns the facts "under consideration" by the investigating authority in
determining whether (or not) to apply measures, including but not limited to the facts that support

3 If not otherwise indicated, the European Union's references to Sollers' "questionnaire responses" relate
to both the Questionnaire Response of 3 March 2012 and the Update of 31 January 2013.

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the final de termination to apply measures (Panel Report, China - HP-SSST (EU)). Essentially, in
order to apply such definitive measures, an investigating authority must find dumping (including,
depending upon the authority's findings, the determination of normal value , export price and the
fair comparison between normal value and export price, the home market and export sales being
used and the calculation methodology used to determine the dumping margin), injury and a causal
link between the dumping and the injury to the domestic industry. Therefore, what constitutes an
"essential fact" must be understood "in the light of the content of the findings needed to satisfy
the substantive obligations with respect to the application of definitive measures under the Anti -
Dumping Agreement, as well as the factual circumstances of each case" (Appellate Body Report,
China – GOES). When confidential information constitutes "essential facts" within the meaning of
Article 6.9, the disclosure obligations under that provision should be met by disclosing non -
confidential summaries of those facts. 4 If an essential fact is treated as confidential, and either
Article 6.5 or Article 6.5.1 is not complied with, the investigating authority infringes Article 6.9 by
wrongly treating this information as confidential.
50. First, the DIMD failed to inform Volkswagen and Daimler of the essential facts under
consideration underlying the determinations of the existence of dumping.
51. Volkswagen and Daimler did not receive an individual confidential dumping di sclosure. They
could only examine the non -confidential version of the Draft Report by the DIMD. The opportunity
of these interested parties to inspect the facts that formed the basis of the calculation of the
normal value by the EAEC was therefore limited to the EAEC Draft Report of 28 March 2013. The
EU understands that the DIMD attempted to justify this on the basis of an alleged lack of
cooperation in the investigation.
52. Partial non -cooperation in the context of an anti -dumping investigation can have lega l
consequences, including the use of facts available (Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement) and even
adversely affect the outcome of the investigation for the non -cooperating party (Article 7 of
Annex II to the AD Agreement). It does not, however, remove the ri ghts of any interested party
under Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement. Even if Volkswagen and Daimler failed to provide certain
information to the DIMD, they should nevertheless have been informed of the essential facts under
consideration.
53. The DIMD failed to disclose to Volkswagen and Daimler the essential facts under consideration
that formed the basis for the calculation of the normal value of LCVs for Volkswagen and Daimler,
those that formed the basis for the calculation of the export price, as well as th e source of the
information concerning import volumes and values.
54. Second, in the sections of the Draft Report dealing with DIMD 's analysis of injury and of the
existence of a causal link, the DIMD failed to disclose the essential facts under consideration to the
interested parties.
55. In the section of the Draft Report dealing with DIMD 's injury analysis, a wide range of
essential facts is entirely omitted. In the absence of any additional individual confidential
disclosure, it was therefore impossible for the interested parties to be adequately informed of the
essential facts under consideration which form the basis of DIMD's determination of injury.
56. The section of the Draft Report concerning the causal link between dumping and injury
similarly omits a wide r ange of essential facts. In the absence of any additional individual
disclosure, it was therefore impossible for the interested parties to be adequately informed under
the standard set by Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement. The Draft Report also does not prov ide a
source for the information on the volume and value of imports of LCVs which formed the basis for
DIMD's decision whether to apply definitive measures, in respect of t he existence of injury
(Section 4 of the Draft Report). The Draft Report thus failed to disclose the "essential facts under
consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures".
Therefore, the Russia violated the obligation under Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement.

4 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 247; Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.321.

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3.8 Russia's anti -dumping measures on L CVs from the Germany and Italy further are
inconsistent with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the AD Agree ment and Article VI of the
GATT 1994
57. In light of the abovementioned violations of the AD Agreement, the measures at issue are also
inconsistent with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the AD Agreement, as well as with Article VI of the
GATT 1994.

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ANNEX B-2
FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1 BURDEN OF PROOF
1. The Russian Federation maintains that the European Union failed to meet i ts burden of proof to
establish prima facie case of violation. In this respect, we recall that prima facie case must be
based on evidence and legal argument. The Appellate Body made it clear that " [a] complaining
party may not simply submit evidence and ex pect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO -
inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party simply allege facts without relating them to its legal
arguments."1
2. We recall the findings of the Appellate Body in US-Hot-Rolled Steel that "an objective
examination" requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or
group of interested parties, in the investigation". 2 This interpretation provides a standard for
objective examination requirement.
3. Specifically, in this dispute the European Union claims that the DIMD acted in a biased manner.
At the same time the European Union failed to prove the existence of bias. In our view, bias
implies an intent that results in a situation that is more favourable to any interested party or group
of interested parties. Therefore, in order to prove the existence of a bias, the existence of a
reference standard which is unbiased has to be clearly demonstrated.
2 DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
4. The European Union asserts that " [t]he EAEC therefore deliberately excluded GAZ from the
definition of "domestic industry", despite the fact that GAZ was a known producer of the like
products which participated throughou t the investigation" .3 The European Union also argues that
"the EAEC acted in a biased manner, favouring the interests of Sollers, and thus introducing a
material risk of skewing the economic data and, consequently, distorting its analysis of the state of
the industry".4
5. With respect to alleged failure of the DIMD to provide "a satisfactory explanation as to why it
was not necessary to include GAZ within the definition of "domestic industry" and thus examining
directly or specifically its economic data", w e maintain that the issue of explanation is clearly
outside the scope of obligations under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
2.1 The DIMD did not "exclude" GAZ from the definition of the domestic industry
6. The European Union's arguments are based upon the presumption that GAZ was actively
participating in the investigation.5 This presumption is flawed because it does not take into account
the fact that GAZ's questionnaire reply contained multiple deficiencies, which was the reason why
the data pertaining to GAZ could not be used in the injury analysis.
7. In this respect, the Russian Federation recalls that the following approach to defining the
domestic industry was used in the anti -dumping investigation at issue. The domestic industry, as
referring to domestic producers of the like product, was defined, when the investigating authority
defined the like product. Two domestic producers of the like product, namely GAZ and Sollers,
were known to the investigating authority in the course of the anti-dumping investigation. From
the outset, both producers could be included into the definition of the domestic industry for the

1 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 140.
2 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193.
3 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 44.
4 Ibid, para. 46.
5 First Written Submission by the European Union, paras. 44-45.

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purpose of the injury analysis. The MIT sent questionnaires for domestic producers of the like
product in the territory of the Customs Union to both of them, i.e. sought information from both of
them. However, both the MIT and the DIMD were unable to rely on the data submitted by GAZ
given the multiple deficiencies and inconsistencies in the questionnaire reply.
8. Specifically, t he questionnaire reply did not contain information on total costs per unit of
production of the like product for the first half of 2010, capacity utilization, investments. The
questionnaire reply contained substantial errors and inaccurate data (namely, wi th regard to total
costs per unit, volume of production). Moreover, the analysis of the questionnaire reply raised
serious doubts whether some of the information did relate only to the product concerned.
9. The Russian Federation maintains that the situation when the deficient data from one of the
domestic producers of the like product cannot be used in the injury analysis is not the same as the
"exclusion" of the domestic producer from the definition of the domestic industry in the meaning of
Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
2.2 The DIMD did not introduce the material risk of skewing the economic data and,
consequently, distorting the analysis of the state of the domestic industry
10. Further, the European Union made a number of incorrect assertions wi th respect to "bias of
the DIMD, favouring the interests of Sollers", and alleged "introduction of the material risk of
skewing the economic data and, consequently, distorting analysis of the state of the industry". 6
The Russian Federation is of the view t hat bias implies an intent that results in a situation that is
more favourable to any interested party or group of interested parties. We maintain that the
European Union has not presented sufficient and accurate evidence to make a prima facie case of
bias and alleged material risk of distortion.
11. First, the European Union incorrectly asserts that GAZ was the "undisputed leader" in the
overall LCV market. The European Union operated with mixed figures that include the data on
LCVs with gasoline engines which fall outside the scope of the like product, as defined in the anti -
dumping investigation at issue.
12. Second, the European Union alleges that there are important differences between the
domestic producers "which could have consequences for the injury analysi s".7 Specifically, the
European Union alleges that Sollers is rather an "assembler" than a "producer"8 in contrast to GAZ
that may be regarded as a domestic "producer". The European Union also alleges that "Sollers'
activities in Elabuga were not of suffic ient economic importance" 9 due to the rules of origin
requirements. Finally, the European Union considers favourable conditions in Special Economic
Zone of Elabuga to be "another relevant factor distinguishing the situation between GAZ and
Sollers".10 At the same time the European Union does not provide sufficient evidence as to how
these alleged distinctions could have affected the injury analysis.11
13. The Russian Federation maintains that there is no obligation in the Anti -Dumping Agreement
to consider these allegedly "important" distinctions when defining the domestic industry. If that
were the case, it would create uncertainty and significant impediments in the course of the anti -
dumping investigation.12
2.3 The DIMD's injury determination is not distorted, as it is based on a very high
proportion that substantially reflects the total domestic production
14. The DIMD's injury determination was based on 87 .9% of total domestic production of the like
product. We recall that the Appellate Body in EC-Fasteners (China) emphasised that "a very high

6 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 46.
7 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 50.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, para. 55.
10 Ibid, para. 56.
11 See First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 53-58.
12 Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel,
paras.15-16.

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proportion that "substantially reflects the total domestic production" will very likely satisfy both the
quantitative and the qualitative aspect of the requirements of Articles 4.1 and 3.1".13
15. We maintain that 87.9% of total domestic production qualifies for "a major proportion" of total
domestic production and is a very high proportion that substantially reflects the total domestic
production in the meaning of Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
3 SELECTION OF PERIODS FOR THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES
3.1 The DIMD did not select non-consecutive periods of non-equal duration
16. First, contrary to what the European Union alleges, the DIMD did not select non -consecutive
periods of non -equal duration. The DIM D has analysed the dat a for the period from
1 January 2008 to 31 December 2011 for the purposes of the injury and causation analysis. The
DIMD has consequently considered the data for the entire period from 1 January 2008 to
31 December 2011 in relation to respective calendar years, namely 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. In
addition to year -to-year comparison, the DIMD analysed the change of the data for the half -year
sub-periods (the periods from 1 July 2010 to 31 December 201 0 and 1 January 2011 to
30 June 2011) as compared to the data for the comparable periods of the respective previous
year. The analysis of the data for the half -year sub-periods was supplementary to the analysis of
the data for the entire period of investigation from 2008 to 2011. This metho d was uniformly used
with regard to all injury factors.
3.2 The European Union failed to demonstrate that the DIMD 's injury and causation
analysis does not involve the objective determination based on positive evidence
17. Second, there is nothing in the European Union's argument capable of supporting its assertion
that the investigating authority in this case made a determination that does not involve an
objective examination based on positive evidence. The European Union failed to demonstrate how
the alleged selection of the periods can lead to a result that would be more favourable to any
interested party or how the DIMD has favoured the interests of any party to the investigation.
18. To support its claim under Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the Eu ropean Union
criticizes the analysis conducted by the DIMD. The European Union suggests an alternative
methodology for the DIMD that "could give an accurate and objective picture". However, the
proposed method offers overlaps in the periods that distort th e overall picture over the entire
period in its progression. In our view, such method simply cannot be used.
4 PRICE SUPPRESSION
19. The European Union submits that the DIMD failed to make objective analysis based on
positive evidence when considering price suppression due to a number of reasons. First, the
European Union states that the DIMD incorrectly based its analysis on the year 2009. It is
convinced that "the 2009 profit level was abnormally high i.e. it represents a significant increase of
233% from the level of the profit in 2008". The Russian Federation completely disagrees with this
assertion and emphasizes that the European Union mistakenly based its conclusion on relative
indicators. In fact, profit increased substantially in relation to 2008 to r each its normal level in
2009. The rate of return used in the analysis was based on the year when the influence of dumped
imports on the market was minimal and the domestic industry could reasonably expect to achieve
such profitability taking into account macroeconomic indicators and economic performance of the
relevant sector.14 The European Union insists that the DIMD "should have based itself on the year
2008 rather than the abnormal year 2009"15 without providing any evidence as to why the analysis
based on 2009 was biased while the analysis based on 2008 would not have been.
20. Second, the European Union claims that the DIMD "mixed up data expressed in USD and RUB
without any explanation in its price suppression analysis". 16 The European Union does not show

13 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (Article 21.5 - China), para. 5.303.
14 Responses by the Russian Federation to the Questions from the Panel after the First Substantive
Meeting with the Parties, question 31, para.79-80.
15 Opening Oral Statement by the European Union, para. 39.
16 First Written Submission by the European Union, para.136.

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where alleged mixing up took place in price effects analysis and how it deteriorated the results of
that analysis. The Russian Federation is convinced that the evaluation of price data in the same
currency provides for the objectivity of the analysis and it cannot be regarded as biased approach.
21. Third, the European Union claims that the DIMD "failed to explain and demonstrate why it was
dumped imports that had brought about the alleged price suppression". 17 It erroneously argues
that "import and domestic pr ices were moving in the "contrary directions" 18 while, in fact, gap
between imports and domestic prices was tightening. The European Union based its conclusion on
erroneous and inconsistent analysis.19 Moreover, the European Union insists that the DIMD shoul d
have analysed import prices excluding customs duties. The Russian Federation is of the view that
exclusion of customs duties would undermine price comparability and lead to the breach of
obligation under Article 3.1 of Anti-Dumping Agreement.
22. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to examine "whether the market could take
further increases" of domestic prices. 20 It believes that price suppression analysis involves such
assessment.21 The Russian Federation supposes that Article 3.2 of Anti -Dumping Agreement does
not establish the obligation to determine whether market could absorb price increases. Taking into
account the fact that the DIMD did not have any evidence which could call into question the ability
of the market to absorb prices (especially w hen import prices were higher than domestic prices)
the Russian Federation maintains that the DIMD did not violate the obligations in terms of price
suppression analysis.
23. Finally, the European Union claims that the DIMD "failed to explain and demonstrate why the
alleged price suppression would be "to a significant degree". 22 Furthermore the European Union
insists that the investigating authority must determine the significance of price suppression on the
basis of the list of factors. 23 The Russian Federation believes that Anti -Dumping Agreement does
not oblige the investigating authority to make such inquiry. Neither such interpretation of
Article 3.2 has been confirmed by the WTO case law. 24 The Russian Federation is convinced that
the DIMD fulfilled the obli gations under Article 3.2 in terms of consideration of significant price
suppression.
5 STATE OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
5.1 The DIMD based its evaluation of injury factors on positive evidence
24. The DIMD evaluated the factors " profits" and "inventories" on the basis of positive evidence.
The Report contains aggregated profit and profitability figures for the Sollers group which were
calculated on the basis of data provided by Sollers and its related trading house Turin Auto, and
the inventories reflected in the Report are the inventories held by Sollers.
25. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to base its evaluation of profits and
inventories on positive evidence. The evidence which the European Union adduced to support its
claim is flawed. The European Union made incorrect comparisons of data from the Report with data
from the Sollers' Application and/or its Questionnaire Reply, and then pointed to discrepancies,
which otherwise would not have occurred. Accordingly, the European Union failed to make a prima
facie case.

17 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 136.
18 Ibid. para.150.
19 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para.181, Opening Oral Statement by the
Russian Federation, para.35.
20 First Written Submission by the European Union, para.154.
21 Opening Oral Statement by the European Union, para.44.
22 First Written Submission by the European Union, para.136.
23 Ibid. para.157.
24 Opening Oral Statement by the Russian Federation, para. 40-43, Responses by the Russian
Federation to the Questions from the Panel after the First Substantive Meeting with the Parties, question 26,
para. 71.

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5.2 The European Union's claim that the DIMD failed to make an objective evaluation of
factors and indices having a bearing on the domestic industry is not substantiated
26. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to make a proper ev aluation of factors
because the Report does not always include comparisons of data for the year of 2011 to 2008. The
European Union, first, overlooked the relevant parts of the Report in which the DIMD compared the
evolution of production and sales from 20 08 to 2011, and, second, made additional derivations of
figures to complete the tables in the Report, which did not add any objectivity to the picture of the
evolution of the factors over time.
27. The European Union's claim that the objectivity of the DIMD's analysis is hindered by the split
of periods lacks factual basis. The DIMD did not "split" its analysis into two periods, which explains
why the European Union failed to adduce any evidence from the text of the Report to substantiate
its claim.
28. As to the European Union's claims regarding disclosure of the figures for profits and regarding
the ability of the market to absorb a price increase, these claims ar e outside the scope of
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.3 The DIMD properly took into account all facts and arguments on the record relating
to the state of the domestic industry
29. The European Union claims that the DIMD should have analysed certain evidence from
statements made by interested parties in the context of market shares. The se statements do not
contain any positive evidence relating to the overall evolution of market shares that should have
been objectively examined by the DIMD under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. At the same time, the DIMD thoroughly con sidered in the Report the overall evolution
of market shares, and examined and dismissed in the context of the causation analysis the
alternative explanation of what caused the drop in production and, consequently, market shares of
the domestic industry in 2011 which was referred to by an interested party.
30. The European Union believes that the DIMD should have analysed the evolution of stocks of
independent dealers. Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires that an investigating
authority analyse in ventories without prescribing how inventories should be treated in this
analysis. The DIMD analysed stocks held by the producer and the analysis was based on positive
evidence. Unlike the data relating to independent dealers, the data used by the DIMD were
verifiable, as required by Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.4 The DIMD examined all factors listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
31. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to evaluate the return on investments, the
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital or investments.
The Russian Federation submits that the DIMD evaluated the above factors. The results of the
DIMD's evaluation were set forth in the confidential version of the Report.
32. The European Union could have understood from the evidence on the record that the DIMD
evaluated the factors at issue but the results of such evaluation were not set forth in the public
version of the Report for confidentiality reasons. The record sh ows that the DIMD requested the
information which it needed for the evaluation of the said injury factors and that this information
was submitted in confidential form.
33. Setting forth the results of the examination of some of the factors listed in Article 3 .4 only in
the confidential version of the final report does not amount to a violation of Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As the Appellate Body has observed, "Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement do not regulate the manner in which the results of the "evaluation" of
each injury factor are to be set out in the published documents". Article 3.4 contains an obligation
to evaluate all fifteen factors, which is, according to the Appellate Body, "distinct from the manner
in which the evaluation is to be set out in the published documents". Hence, Article 3.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement does not require that the results of the evaluation of each injury factor be set
forth in the non-confidential version of the final report. The A ppellate Body has also held that "the
requirement in Article 3.1 that an injury determination be based on "positive" evidence and involve

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an "objective" examination of the required elements of injury does not imply that the
determination must be based only on reasoning or facts that were disclosed to, or discernible by,
the parties to an anti-dumping investigation".
34. The European Union also claims that the DIMD did not evaluate the factor ''the magnitude of
the margin of dumping''. The European Union's clai m is unsubstantiated. The DIMD apparently
evaluated the magnitude of the margin of dumping in the context of the analysis of whether a
cumulative assessment of the effects of imports under Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
is appropriate.
35. The evaluation of the injury factor ''the magnitude of the margin of dumping'' differs from the
evaluation of the other listed injury factors, which are factual indicators of an industry's condition.
What distinguishes the magnitude of the margin of dumping from th e other listed factors is that it
is a potential cause of the domestic industry's condition. The requirement of substantive
compliance contained in Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement does not preclude the
investigating authority from making an apparent evaluation of the factor ''the magnitude of the
margin of dumping'' at its initial stage in the context of the analysis of whether a cumulative
assessment of the effects of imports under Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement is
appropriate. The magnitude of the margin of dumping is further implicitly analysed in the context
of the analysis of domestic prices.
6 CAUSATION
6.1 Volume Effects
36. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to properly examine the causal relationship
between the volume of dumped imports and the injury. The European Union did not provide an
alternative explanation of facts as a whole with relation to a causal link in the light of which the
DIMD's explanation would not seem adequate. The reasoning in the Report is coheren t and
internally consistent. The DIMD provided adequate and reasonable explanation that the dumped
imports, through the effects of dumping and by reason of a substantial increase in their volumes in
2010 and 2011, have captured a share of the growing marke t which would not have happened in
the absence of dumping. The European Union 's explanations, in turn, are placed outside of the
context of market developments, such as trends in consumption, evolution of market shares and
profitability of the domestic ind ustry, and evolution of the share of dumped imports in the total
volume of imports.
6.2 Import prices
37. The European Union claims that with respect to import prices the EAEC wrongly attributed the
observed effects on the domestic industry to the dumped impo rts. It supports the claim by
strongly relying on the arguments against the objectivity of the price suppression analysis
conducted by the DIMD.25
38. The Russian Federation emphasizes that the DIMD properly analysed the trends of imports
prices including customs duties and domestic prices and objectively used 2009 as a benchmark for
price suppression analysis. Therefore, it provided for the unbiased consideration of the effect of
dumped imports on domestic prices which is the part of the causation determination.26
6.3 Non-Attribution
39. The European Union argues that the findings of the DIMD with respect to termination of the
license agreement between Sollers and Fiat and competition from GAZ are inconsistent with the
investigation record. In fact, both factors were adequately considered by the DIMD and specifically
addressed in the Report.

25 First Written Submission by the European Union, paras.274-290.
26 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 301-308.

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40. The European Union also claims that certain allegedly "known" factors were not examined at
all.27 The Russian Federation maintains that such factors were not clearly raised before the
investigating authority. Moreover, the factors, referred to by the European Union, are unfounded
because they are not supported by accurate evidence. 28
7 CONFIDENTIALITY
41. The European Union makes a number of claims related to confidentiality of infor mation under
Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
42. Specifically, the European Union claims that a wide range of information was treated by the
DIMD as confidential despite any "good cause" shown by Sollers and Turin -Auto or required to be
shown by the DIMD and that there is no evidence that the DIMD properly assessed whether there
was "good cause". The Russian Federation states that the DIMD required Sollers and Turin -Auto to
provide "good cause" for information submitted in confidence. The requirement to provide
justification for confidential treatment was established under the CU law and special instructions of
the investigating authority. As nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifies how (in what form
or manner) an investigating authority shall require the party submitting confidential information to
show "good cause" for confidential treatment, the Russian Federation considers that the way how
the DIMD required the good cause to be shown is consistent with Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.
43. The European Union also argues that the DIMD treated as confidential certain information that
is not confidential by nature because it cannot be considered as such or because it is expected to
be reasonably available, if not public. In the v iew of the Russian Federation, the European Union
failed to make a prima facie case in this respect because it bases its claim on allegations
unsupported by evidence or tries to substantiate its claim on irrelevant references to some
websites.
44. In respect of Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Union claims that for
a wide range of information no meaningful summaries were provided by submitting party or
required by the DIMD, nor any explanation of why such summaries were provided. The Ru ssian
Federation considers that the European Union 's claim under Article 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement is unsubstantiated. The European Union in developing its arguments focused on the
text, while the tables (which the text refers to) on the same page of the document actually contain
information that permits a reasonable understanding of the substance of confidential information.
At the same time, the text provides a description of data contained in the tables and could not be
considered separately. A pparently, the European Union failed to look at the documents in their
entirety and simply took the pieces of information out of context. The Russian Federation sees no
violation of Article 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because non -confidential summaries of
confidential information were provided (except for the cases where summarization of confidential
information was not possible) and such summaries permit a reasonable understanding of the
confidential information.
45. In addition, the European Union cl aims that the DIMD omitted from the non -confidential file
certain documents that were provided to the DIMD during the investigation and were relied upon
by the DIMD and referred to in the Report. With respect to GAZ's Questionnaire Reply, we recall
that th e investigating authority could not rely upon this document due to its deficiencies and
inconsistencies. The Russian Federation states that the European Union failed to substantiate the
claim by accurate evidence, because the other documents mentioned by t he European Union were
in the public record.29
46. In sum, the Russian Federation considers that the DIMD acted consistently with Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

27 First Written Submission by the European Union, paras.305-307.
28 See Responses by the Russian Federation to the Questions from the Panel after the First Substantive
Meeting with the Parties, paras. 91-103.
29 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 676-681.

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8 ESSENTIAL FACTS
47. The issue of proper and fair disclosure demonstrates the clear relationship between Article 6.9
and Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. This relationship is due to the mechanism for
protection of confidential information, as set forth in the Anti -Dumping Agreement with respect to
confidential data. 30 In thi s respect, the Russian Federation agrees with the findings in China-
Broilers and China-GOES that "when confidential information constitutes "essential facts" within
the meaning of Articles 6.9 and 12.8, the disclosure obligations under these provisions sho uld be
met by disclosing non-confidential summaries of those facts."31
8.1 Determination of Dumping
48. The Russian Federation would like to pay attention to the fact that for the purpose of the
determination of margin of dumping for the German exporting produ cers the DIMD used the
volume and the value of imports of LCVs produced by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG because
only those companies exported LCVs from Germany during the period of the investigation at
issue.32
49. The Russian Federation states that Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG were non -cooperating
parties who failed to provide information requested in the questionnaire or even to respond to the
questionnaire.33 Pursuant to Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement the investigating authority
is not obliged to pr ovide a non-cooperating party, whose dumping rate was based on confidential
data of the third parties, with confidential individual dumping disclosure. 34 Since the calculation of
the margin of dumping for the German exporting producers was based on confiden tial facts
available, which were not submitted by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG, those companies could
defend their interests on the basis of non -confidential summary of confidential determination of
dumping35 and information in their possession.36
50. The DIMD e xplained to Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG the reasons of impossibility of
individual disclosure of the volume and the value of imports of LCVs produced by these companies
in its additional disclosure letter.37 Moreover, the Russian Federation is of the view that aggregated
data, which were calculated on the basis of confidential information pertaining to two interested
parties, shall be always treated as confidential under Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement.38
Hence, such aggregated data could not be disclosed to all interested parties in the non-confidential
version of the Draft Report.
51. The non -confidential version of the Draft Report adequately and fully disclosed all the
essential facts in connection with the data underlying the determination of dumping concerning the
German exporting producers (e.g. the methodology and the source of data used to determine
normal value and export price; the weighted average normal value and export price for LCVs

30 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras 722-724, 737-738, 799-800, 941-942;
Closing Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 21-22.
31 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 247. Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.410. See also
Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.321.
32 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 765, 832.
33 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 703-704, 707, 726, 742, 754, 809, 820,
877, 878; Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel,
para. 77; Closing Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 24.
34 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 710, 741, 766, 803, 833; Opening Oral
Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 79, 81; Closing
Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 23.
35 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 710, 741, 760, 766, 803, 827, 833;
Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 79-80;
Closing Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 23.
36 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 747-750, 771-772, 777-778, 787, 808-
811, 814-816, 838-839, 853-854, 872, 877-915; Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the
First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 82, 84.
37 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 786-787, 871-872; Opening Oral
Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 82.
38 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 767-782; 834-867.

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produced by the German exporting producers; the formula f or calculation of dumping margin,
etc.).39
8.2 Determination of Injury
52. Regarding the essential facts related to the determination of injury the Russian Federation
outlines that the DIMD did not disclose in the Draft Report aggregate data pertaining to one or two
domestic companies.40 The Russian Federation is of the view that disclosing a confidential data in
the Draft Report could lead to unauthorized disclosure of confidential information which was
submitted by one of the two domestic producers. 41 The types of information excluded from the
Draft Report are generally those that might be treated as confidential relating inter alia to
profitability, costs, production and sales data.42
53. The non-confidential version of the Draft Report contained sufficiently -detailed disclosure of
the essential facts under consideration that formed the basis for the determination of injury. 43 The
Russian Federation outlines that each summary of redacted confidential data contains at least one
of the following: (i) the year -on-year pe rcentage changes; (ii) year-on-year percentage point
changes; (iii) the mix of the year -on-year percentage changes or year -on-year percentage point
changes and textual explanation of changes; (iv) textual description of trends with respect to the
injury factor.44 Moreover, the non -confidential summaries of some of the confidential information
can be ascertained in terms of the relationships with other data in non -confidential version of the
Draft Report.45
9 THE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE ON L CVS FROM GERMANY AND ITALY IS CONSISTENT
WITH ARTICLES 1 AND 18.4 OF THE ANTI -DUMPING AGREEMENT AN D ARTICLE VI OF
THE GATT 1994
54. The European Union claims that in light of the abovementioned alleged violations of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement the anti -dumping measures on light com mercial vehicles from Germany and
Italy are also inconsistent with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, as well as with
Article VI of the GATT 1994.46
55. Thus, the European Union 's claim of inconsistency of the Russian anti -dumping measure on
LCV from Germany and Italy with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and
Article VI of the GATT 1994 is clearly consequential and in this respect dependent on all other
claims.
56. Since all other claims made by the European Union are to be rejected, the Russian Federation
respectfully asks the Panel to reject the European Union's claim under consideration.

39 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 709-710, 726-730, 746-751, 770, 777,
786-787, 808-817, 838, 842, 845, 848, 853, 857, 859, 862, 892, 894, 898, 901, 922-925; Opening Oral
Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 82-83.
40 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 947-948, 959, 975, 988, 1002, 1016;
Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 87-88.
41 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 947-948; 959-963, 973-978, 987-992,
1002-1003, 1016- 1017; Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of
the Panel, paras. 87-88.
42 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 946, 954, 961, 976, 989, 1002, 1016;
Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 87.
43 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 945, 953, 956-957, 964-970, 979-984,
992-998, 1004-1012, 1018-1014; Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive
Meeting of the Panel, paras. 89-90.
44 First Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 89, 94, 96, 103, 104, 106, 109, 956, 968,
983, 996, 1006, 1007, 1018, 1019; Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive
45 Opening Oral Statement of the Russian Federation at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel,
para. 90.
46 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 452.

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10 CONCLUSION
57. The Russian Federation respectfully requests the Panel to reject all of the European Union's
claims and arguments in their entiret y, finding instead that, the Russian Federation acted
consistently with all its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.

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ANNEX B-3
SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
1 INTRODUCTION
1. In this int egrated executive summary, the European Union ("EU") summarizes the facts and
arguments presented to the Panel in its second written submission, its opening and closing oral
statements at the second substantive meeting and its responses to the Panel 's and Russia's
questions.
2 RUSSIA'S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING
2. Russia requests the Panel to rule that the EU 's claims under Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement ("AD Agreement") are outside the Panel 's terms of reference insofar as they concern
the issue of causal link between dumping and injury.
3. This request should be rejected. The EU 's panel request, paragraph 8, clearly covers the
disclosure of essential facts related to the causal link between dumping and injury. Moreover, the
EU's panel request, p aragraph 8, just like Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, refers generally to all
essential facts which formed the basis of the anti -dumping measure with the word "including".
Therefore, the language of the panel request was not limited to dumping and injury. Thus, even if
the issue of causal link was somehow said to fall outside the scope of the determination of injury,
despite the clear language of the AD Agreement, it would still be covered by the language of the
panel request.
3 CLAIMS RELATING TO THE DIMD'S INJURY DETERMINATION
3.1 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement: failure to properly determine
the domestic industry
3.1.1 The definition of the domestic industry as Sollers only violates Articles 4.1 and 3.1
of the AD Agreement
4. According to Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, the domestic industry is defined for the purpose
of the AD Agreement either as the domestic producers as a whole, or those of them whose
collective output represents a major proportion of total domestic production. Hence, Article 4 .1
provides two options for defining the domestic industry. Further, Article 4.1 specifies two
exceptions that permit an investigating authority to exclude certain domestic producers that would
otherwise fall within the definition, from the domestic indust ry. No other options for excluding
producers from the domestic industry exist and thus no other exclusions are permissible under
Article 4.1.
5. Russia confirms that the Department of Internal Market Defence ("DIMD") considered that both
Sollers-Elabuga LLC ("Sollers") and Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod ("GAZ") were "producers of the
like product". Russia also confirms that GAZ produced the product concerned during the period
under investigation. Nonetheless, according to Russia's clarifications, the DIMD exclud ed GAZ from
the definition of the domestic industry, since "the domestic industry was eventually defined as not
including GAZ".
6. This directly violates the obligation under Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. Indeed, GAZ was
not excluded under one of the two e xceptions listed in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of Article 4.1.
Rather, Russia claims that the reason for limiting the domestic industry to Sollers only, and
excluding GAZ, was the "absence of correct and verifiable data" for GAZ. A WTO Member breaches
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement if it excludes a known producer from the definition of domestic
industry in view of any other reasons not specified in Article 4.1, or if it excludes consciously a
known producer of the product considered to be like, for instance, in EC – Salmon (Norway).

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3.1.2 Alleged deficiency of GAZ's questionnaire response
7. Russia considers that the DIMD was justified in excluding this known producer from the
domestic industry definition on the basis of a number of factual arguments. Russia alleges t hat
GAZ's questionnaire response was deficient.
8. Yet, the Report "Findings from the anti -dumping investigation relating to light commercial
vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey and imported into the common customs
territory of the Custo ms Union ' of the Domestic Market Protection Department of the Eurasian
Economic Commission" ("the Report") does not contain any information that GAZ failed to provide
the requested information. Russia acknowledges this explicitly. In fact, the questionnaire reply that
Russia provided as an exhibit in these proceedings contains data on all injury factors. It is
apparent from the Report that GAZ participated throughout the investigation.
9. The EU considers that, if the DIDM has defined domestic industry on the basis of Sollers only,
relying on data outside such definition is contrary to Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. Indeed, as
stated in Panel Report in EC – Bed Linen, once the domestic industry is defined, it is not possible
to use information in the injury analysis that does not belong to the defined domestic industry.
3.1.3 If the DIMD relied on a "major proportion" option in Article 4.1, the DIMD ignored
the qualitative elements of the domestic industry
10. In its responses to the Panel's questions, Russia now argue s that GAZ does not belong to the
defined domestic industry in the first place. However, e ven if the DIMD defined the domestic
industry as a "major proportion of the total domestic production", under the second option of
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, it still violated Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement because
it ignored the qualitative components of the domestic industry definition.
11. The E U has explained in its responses to the Panel's questions t hat the obligations in
Articles 3.1 and 4.1 must b e read together, since the former provides relevant context for the
latter. Indeed, reading the obligations in Articles 3.1 and 4.1 together, the Appellate Body in EC –
Fasteners (Article 21.5) "read the requirement in Article 4.1 that domestic producers' output
constitute a 'major proportion' as having both quantitative and qualitative connotations".
Therefore, the authority may not leave out from the definition of the domestic industry producers
that have relevant qualitative characteristics by relying on the "major proportion" option.
12. Thus, the DIMD could not limit its injury analysis to the domestic industry by focusing on
Sollers only, on the basis that it constitutes a "major proportion of the total domestic production".
Even if the proportion chosen to define the domestic industry is high, this does not mean that the
qualitative aspects can automatically be disregarded by the investigating authority.
3.1.4 Distinctions between Sollers and GAZ show that GAZ was genuinely a domestic
producer with relevant qualitative characteristics distinct from Sollers
13. Russia takes issue with the EU argument that Sollers is more adequately described as an
"assembler", whereas GAZ is a true "producer" of light commercial vehicles ("LCVs"). Russia
suggests that the EU did "no t provide any evidence with respect to the consequences of including
GAZ into the injury analysis".
14. The EU has explained that an investigating authority has the obligation to ensure that the
definition is "representative of the domestic industry as a whole and be unbiased". As a producer,
GAZ has relevant qualitative characteristics that are different from Sollers, as an assembler.
Sollers assembled the Fiat Ducato from semi -knocked down sets imported from Italy. In contrast,
GAZ produces LCVs from the very beginning of the production cycle. This is an important
qualitative difference.
15. Whilst an investigating authority may not be required to examine the composition of the
domestic industry as "assemblers" or "full producers" in all cases in order to avoid a violation of
Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement, in the present case where there were only two domestic
producers of the product concerned (one, a full producer, and the other an assembler), the EU
considers that the DIMD should have included GAZ in its definition of domestic industry.

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3.1.5 GAZ was the undisputed leader in the LCV market
16. Russia further suggests that the EU arguments that GAZ was the undisputed leader in the
overall LCV market is flawed because the "alleged leadership does not relate to the market of LCVs
with diesel engines that were identified as the product under consideration and the like product".
17. However, the evidence that is now before the Panel, as well as Russia's response to the EU's
questions, shows that GAZ was producing the like product from the beginning of the injury
investigation period (starting in 2008).
3.2 Claim under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement: Selection of non -
consecutive periods of non-equal duration in the injury and causation analysis
3.2.1 The DIMD's selective use of time periods is inconsistent with the legal obligations
in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
18. The EU disagrees with Russia that the AD Agreement does not provide any guidance as to
how the periods for the injury and causation analysis must be defined. Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement does impose limits on the manner in which an investigating authority selects time
periods. An investigating authority must not depict the state of the domestic industry in a manner
that lacks accuracy and i nvolves bias. If the investigating authority deviates from the usual
collection of data by year, it must explain the reasons for doing so, to take away any reasonable
doubts with regard to its selection of time periods.
19. The Appellate Body in Mexico – Beef and Rice has stressed that when an investigating
authority selects certain time periods for its injury determination such that the most negative side
of the state of the industry is shown, it did not provide an "accurate and unbiased picture" of the
domestic industry, and thus failed to make an "objective examination" as required by Article 3.1 of
the AD Agreement.
20. Thus, the DIMD had to be particularly cautious, given that the presentation of the evidence by
half-years in 2010 and 2011 was done by the pet itioner (Sollers) itself in its application, and also
without providing any valid reason to do so.
3.2.2 The DIMD relied on non -consecutive periods of non -equal duration to support its
conclusions on injury
21. Russia ignores major parts of the Report when it sugges ts that the injury conclusions were
principally based on year -by-year comparisons, and not on the consideration of non -consecutive,
non-equal time periods. The DIMD has split up the injury investigation period in its evaluation of
each injury factor, contrasting the developments in the time period 2008-2010 and the time period
second half 2010-first half 2011 (in which the DIMD did not compare consecutive time periods, but
"jumped" six months). Russia suggests that the reason for relying on non-consecutive time periods
for its injury analysis, is the "need to eliminate the possible time lag in the injury suffered by the
domestic industry of the CU as a result of dumped imports of Products in the 2nd half of 2010".
22. While the EU considers that in abstract ter ms there may be reasons for such an approach,
such as the seasonality of the product at issue, nowhere in its Report did the EAEC explain
whether or why there was, in fact, a time lag between the allegedly dumped imports and injury, or
why precisely a six month time lag was expected. The EU wonders what the reason was to split the
POI as the DIMD did, other than to show artificially negative trends, inter alia, that Sollers incurred
losses already towards the end of the POI. Indeed, if the DIMD had consider ed the POI as a full
year, rather than to split it up in two halves, it would have found that for the full POI, no losses
were made.
3.2.3 The DIMD failed to make an end -point to end -point analysis of all factors it
examined
23. The EU has explained that, in order t o make an objective evaluation based on positive
evidence, the DIMD had to assess the trends in the injury analysis by making both an analysis of
the trend during the period of data collection by means of an end -point to end -point comparison

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(2008-2011), and year-by-year (or half year -by-half year) comparison of equal time periods. This
is necessary to provide an accurate and unbiased picture of the state of the domestic industry, and
thus an objective examination.
24. Russia does not identify any other instan ces where the DIMD made a longer term trend
analysis for the entire injury investigation period (2008 -2011). The other examples that Russia
provides in its responses only focus on 2009-2011. The EU reconstructed based on the public
version of the Final Rep ort the 2008 -2011 trends which were omitted by the DIMD. The EAEC
could have well provided those trends but consciously decided to omit them in the tables,
presumably in an attempt to disguise the lack of objectivity in the presentation of the data.
3.2.4 The selection of non-consecutive periods of non-equal duration by the DIMD leads
to a picture that is biased and lacks objectivity
25. The EU disagrees with Russia's allegation that the EU has not demonstrated why the DIMD 's
selection of non -successive periods of no n-equal duration failed to provide an objective
examination of the positive evidence. Although the EU considers that there is no obligation for the
complainant to positively demonstrate that an investigating authority was biased, it has shown in
detail the contrast between the DIMD 's selective use of time periods, on the one hand, and what
an objective picture of the developments in the domestic industry would look like.
26. Whereas, under the DIMD 's approach, there was a suggestion that during the POI, i.e. f rom
the second half of 2010 to the first half of 2011, the domestic industry underwent negative
developments, placing the POI in the context of the longer -term developments from 2008 to 2010
shows quite a different, positive, picture. The figures presente d by the EU show how domestic
sales volumes, domestic production volume, domestic prices and domestic market shares, all
showed a positive trend from 2008 to 2011, in that year reaching a level significantly above that of
2008.
27. The EU further disagrees wit h Russia that, in the present case, any deficiency caused by the
consideration of non-equal and non-consecutive periods in the POI does not undermine the injury
and causation analysis because the data for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2011
was analysed on an annual basis, which allegedly sufficed to establish the existence of the material
injury and the causal link in an objective manner. Precisely in a situation where the POI includes
two calendar years the investigating authority should contextualise the data shown in the POI with
the other trends observed for the injury period. Otherwise, it is not possible to show attribution.
3.3 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement: The DIMD did not make an
objective examination based on po sitive evidence when considering alleged price
suppression to a significant degree
3.3.1 2009 was not a "normal year" and could not be used by the DIMD without any
adjustment as the basis for calculating prices that would otherwise have occurred
28. The DIMD failed to make an objective assessment, based on positive evidence, of the price
suppression because it took as "reasonable rate of return" the profit level during a year (2009)
that was, according to the DIMD itself, marked by the financial and economic crisis a nd consumer
preference for domestic LCVs. Russia ignores that fact that the DIMD itself considered 2009 to be
exceptional.
29. The EU noted the enormous profit increa se from 2008 to 2009 with 233.8 %. Likewise, the EU
showed on the basis of the actual data pro vided in the confidential version of the Final Report how
the 2009 profit levels were extremely high when compared to the quasi -similar levels reached by
Sollers in 2008 and 2010 respectively. Moreover, a number of injury indicators such as the
production and sales volume, the capacity utilisation, the employment, the investment went down,
and the cost of production clearly shows that 2009 was not an ordinary year in which the domestic
industry was healthy.

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3.3.2 The DIMD relied on data expressed in USD to sugges t there was price
suppression, while ignoring the impact of the exchange rate developments
30. The DIMD relied on data expressed in USD to suggest there was price suppression, while
ignoring the impact of the exchange rate developments. The DIMD calculated onl y the domestic
and the import prices in USD while other data related with the cost of production, the profit and
loss analysis and the injury analysis are shown in RUB. Russia alleges that the conversion of
domestic prices in USD was needed because it enabled the comparison of prices of imports and
domestic sales in the same currency.
31. However, in the absence of any explanation for the reasons for this approach taken by the
DIMD, the EU raised concerns with regard to the objectivity of this analysis. As can be seen from
the figures provided by the EU, the trend expressed in RUB shows a constant and relatively
moderate increase in the domestic prices throughout the period considered. In contrast, the same
trend expressed in USD showed a decline of domestic pri ces at the beginning of the period
considered (which was caused by the exchange rates) and higher change in the increase of
domestic prices. This ultimately served to support the DIMD 's allegation that Sollers could not
increase domestic prices to pass on its costs of production, i.e. by showing how domestic prices
had constantly increased throughout the period.
3.3.3 The DIMD did not show that the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the
alleged price effects
32. The EU questions that the dumped imports coul d have "explanatory force" for evolution of
domestic prices. First, import prices remained above domestic prices during the entire POI. The
fact that import prices were higher than domestic prices (regardless of the currency used to
express those prices) during the POI suggest that other factors, unrelated to subject imports, were
responsible for the alleged price suppression.
33. Second, the considerable increase in domestic prices between 2008 and 2009, and again
between 2010 and 2011, in combination with qu ality problems experienced by the Fiat Ducato
LCVs assembled by Sollers and the significant raise in costs of production (due to the raising costs
of raw materials), should have lead the DIMD to examine whether consumers would be willing to
absorb further price increases. When making its price suppression analysis, an investigating
authority must examine elements that may explain the significant price suppression, such as
market circumstances that indicate that consumers would, in any event, not be willing to accept
further price increases.
34. Third, further questioning the explanatory force of the dumped imports for the domestic price
effects is the presence of GAZ as a strong competitor in the market for LCVs. Russia has confirmed
that the DIMD was aware of the fact that GAZ produced the product concerned during the period
under investigation. By failing to examine and engage with this evidence in its analysis, which
challenges the "explanatory force" of dumped imports for the price effects, the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement.
3.3.4 The DIMD did not explain and demonstrate why the alleged price suppression
would be "to a significant degree"
35. The DIMD did not explain and demonstrate why the alleged price suppression would be "t o a
significant degree". Russia considers that under Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement "the investigating
authority is not obliged […] to conduct the thorough analysis in order to determine whether price
suppression is significant".
36. However, if the consider ation of the impact of the dumped imports on the prices involves a
finding of price suppression – as in this case – that finding must involve a consideration of the
"significance" of the price suppression, i.e. important, notable, or consequential. This is
demonstrated by the very words of Article 3.2, which requires price suppression to be "to a
significant degree".
37. In response to the Panel's question where in the EAEC's report, the DIMD would have
analysed or make conclusions regarding the significance o f price suppression, Russia does nothing

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more than refer to Section 5.2 of the Report. However, this Section, dealing with the "impact of
dumped imports on the prices of the like product in the customs union market", does not contain
any consideration of w hether the degree of price suppression was "important, notable, or
consequential". Merely stating that it was "significant" does not meet the required rigour of the
inquiry under Article 3.2.
3.4 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement: State of the Domestic
Industry
3.4.1 The DIMD's assessment of the state of Sollers is not based on positive evidence
38. The EU has pointed to inconsistencies between the evidence that Sollers provided and the
evidence that the DIMD relied upon for its conclusions regarding the state of Sollers. First, with
regard to profits, the EU has shown that profit figures in Table 4.2.5 of the EAEC's report different
significantly from the figures in Table 6.2.1 of Sollers' questionnaire responses. In response,
Russia provides a formul a purporting to explain how the figures were calculated. However, this
formula does not clarify the significant differences between the data in the Report and in Sollers '
Application and Questionnaire Response.
39. Second, in respect of stocks, the EU has arg ued in its first written submission that the figures
on inventories in Table 11.4.3 of Sollers' application did not match the figures on stocks in
Table 4.2.2 of the EAEC Report. Russia responds by claiming that Table 11.4.3 of Sollers'
application "contai ns data on stocks of the Applicant and independent dealers". According to
Russia, the DIMD must not include data from independent dealers and this would explain the
differences in Table 4.2.2 of the EAEC Report, which would be based on Table 4.4 of Sollers '
updated questionnaire response. However, the EU still fails to understand how Table 4.4 of Sollers'
updated questionnaire response relates to Table 4.2.2 of the Report. Table 4.4 provides
information on Sollers' stocks in the form of indexes, splitting u p the information in half -years
starting from 2009 and setting the first and second half of 2009 as 100.
3.4.2 The DIMD made contradictory observations in its examination of the evidence and
ignored certain facts and arguments on the record relating to the stat e of the domestic
industry
40. The EU has also demonstrated how the DIMD's observations that the domestic industry was
suffering injury are contradicted by the evidence on the record that shows how the domestic
industry's situation showed improvements when com paring the 2008 and 2011 data. While Russia
does not dispute that domestic product, volume and prices indeed developed positively, it seeks to
contrast the growth rate of production and sales with the slower growth rate of domestic
consumption. However, Russia failed to explain and neither did the DIMD consider why it should be
expected that consumption of the domestic product would follow the growth in production and
prices.
41. The EU has also pointed out that the evidence on profits and losses contradicts t he DIMD's
findings that the domestic industry was suffering injury because of dumped imports during the
POI. Russia responds by noting "the DIMD based its conclusion of material injury on the fact of
losses and negative profitability rather than on the amount of losses". However, the mere
suggestion that some undisclosed amount of "losses" would have happened during a small part of
the POI is not sufficient to support a conclusion of material injury.
3.4.3 The DIMD failed to examine all factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement
42. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement contains a mandatory list of fifteen factors that an
investigating authority must always evaluate in every investigation. The DIMD failed to examine in
the EAEC's Report the magnitude of the margin o f dumping, the return on investments, the actual
and potential negative effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital or investments.
43. With respect to the margin of dumping, Russia admits that this was "not explicitly explained".
Russia argues that it suffices that the margin of dumping was discussed in the section of the report
where it was determined whether the margin of each country was more than 2% – and thus the
conditions for assessing the cumulative impact of the dumping were met.

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44. The EU disagrees. The panel in China – X-Ray Equipment made clear that a "simple listing of
the margins" in other sections of the determination "is not sufficient evidence that the magnitude
of the margin of dumping was evaluated in the context of examining the stat e of the domestic
industry". Those issues would not normally be addressed under the analysis referred to by
Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement, and were certainly not addressed by the DIMD 's simple
statement that "the dumping margin for each country exceeds 2 %". This statement does not
constitute or show evidence of any evaluation or assessment.
45. Further, with respect to the EU's argument that the DIMD failed to examine the domestic
industry's return on investments, actual and potential effects on cash flow an d the ability to raise
capital or investments, Russia alleges that it is sufficient to meet the requirement of Article 3.4
that financial accounts were requested by the DIMD and submitted by Sollers in confidential form.
According to Russia, the fact that data was requested and received from the domestic industry can
be indicative that the relevant information has been evaluated, although the results of such
evaluation were not set forth in the published document".
46. The EU disagrees. First, the Panel should not base its assessment under Articles 3.1 and 3.4
of the AD Agreement on the confidential version of the Report that was submitted by Russia as
Exhibit RUS -14 only during WTO proceedings, to the extent that the same information was not
apparent from the non-confidential version of the Report on which the EU based its claims. In the
alternative, even if the Panel were to consider the confidential Report as part of the evidence, the
EU still considers that the analysis laid down in the confidential Repor t is inconsistent with
Articles 3.4 and 3.1.
47. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement requires investigating authorities to examine the role,
relevance and relative weight of each factor mentioned in that provision. This obligation cannot be
fulfilled by simply requesting or even obtaining information concerning a given factor. Rather, this
information must be analysed and interpreted by the authority.
3.5 Claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement: The DIMD did not properly
establish a causal link between the dum ped imports and the material injury to the
domestic industry
3.5.1 The DIMD failed to properly examine the causal relationship between dumped
imports and injury
48. The EU has demonstrated that the DIMD failed to demonstrate a causal link between the
dumped imports and the material injury to the domestic industry. In respect of import volume, the
EU explained that the evidence on the record indicated that the increase in the volume of imports
was not significant when seen in the context of domestic consumption, dome stic sales volume and
the market share held by the domestic industry. In response, Russia argues that "[i]t does not
seem less plausible […] that these decreases in domestic market share happened because of the
effects of dumping". However, merely stating that it is "plausible" does demonstrate a causal link
between the import volumes and the injury to the domestic production. Under Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement, it must be demonstrated that the subject imports have caused the injury to the
domestic industry.
49. With respect to import prices, the EU explained that the DIMD failed to demonstrate the
necessary "linkage" between decreasing import prices and the alleged price suppression. The
DIMD makes statements on the difference between the import prices and domestic prices, but
does not explain how higher import prices show that the import prices caused price suppression.
Russia does not address this point. It merely states that the DIMD made an objective and
unbiased conclusion that there was no price under cutting and no price depression. Russia's
argument does not respond to the fact that the DIMD did not demonstrate any causal link between
the evolution of the import prices and the domestic prices.
3.5.2 The DIMD failed to properly examine the relevance of other known factors
50. Pursuant to Article 3.5, the DIMD's establishment of the facts had to be proper and the
evaluation of the facts had to be unbiased and objective such that the explanations are reasonable
and supported by the evidence. The EU has listed several known factors that explained the state of

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Sollers during the POI and that the DIMD either failed to properly examine, or did not examine at
all. A first factor that the DIMD did not properly examine was the termination of the licensing
agreement betwe en Fiat and Sollers. A second non -attribution factor that the DIMD did not
properly examine was the competition by GAZ during the POI.
51. The EU has also identified three other factors that explain the state of Sollers. First, the EU
pointed to the arguments by the interested parties that the difficulties by Sollers were, to a great
extent, self-inflicted because of the quality problems with respect to the Fiat Ducatos assembled
by Sollers. Another factor that the DIMD failed to examine is the difficulty enco untered by Sollers
in obtaining financing for its joint venture with Fiat. Finally, the DIMD also failed to examine the
discontinuation of the local car manufacturers programmes.
4 PROCEDURAL CLAIMS
4.1 Claim under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement: Tr eatment of Information
as Confidential without Showing Good Cause and without Providing a Meaningful
Summary
52. The DIMD failed to require a showing of good cause or to assess whether such good cause is
shown, and to require or provide a meaningful summary o r an explanation of why a summary
would not be possible. In some instances, the EU is also challenging the confidential treatment of
certain information that does not appear to be confidential.
53. The DIMD took no specific action to require good cause in thi s investigation. Russia also
considers that no action to assess whether good cause is shown needs to be taken when
confidential treatment is accepted. This is contrary to the jurisprudence. If the published report
and its supporting documents do not show t hat an assessment took place, there is no legal basis
to for confidential treatment. With respect to meaningful summaries, interested parties should not
be required to examine "documents in their entirety. " It must be clear what constitutes the
summary of which omitted information. Any subsequent explanations and calculations by Russia
cannot compensate for the DIMD's failings.
4.1.1 The meaning of the terms "significant" and "significantly" in Article 6.5 of the AD
Agreement
54. The EU agrees with Russia in general terms that disclosing a piece of information would not
necessarily "be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor " or "have a significantly
adverse effect", and that a document should normally be treated as confidential by nature only
when its di sclosure would risk causing a great harm. Whether any of this is the case must be
objectively assessed by the investigating authority. This assessment should be apparent from the
documents provided to interested parties. Simply marking certain pieces of in formation as
"CONFIDENTIAL" or omitting them does not show such an assessment.
4.1.2 The nature of the investigating authority 's obligation to require and assess good
cause
55. As the EU has explained, the documents provided by the DIMD do not show that the
interested parties concerned provided any good cause for confidential treatment, that the DIMD
ever required them to do so or objectively assessed whether good cause exists. At a minimum,
Article 6.5 requires investigating authorities to objectively assess wheth er a party has shown good
cause for the confidential treatment, and to require the parties to provide the good cause if they
failed to do so. It may not always be necessary for the investigating authority to issue a separate
document detailing its good cau se assessment, or separately determining good cause for each
piece of confidential information. In this case, however, there is simply no evidence anywhere on
the record that good cause was shown, required or assessed.
4.1.3 The relevance of the alleged absence of objections to confidential treatment or the
adequacy of summaries by interested parties
56. In any investigation, due process requires that the interested parties are able to participate,
that their views are taken into account, and that any summaries of information provided are clear

- B-29 -

and understandable. Yet, this cannot mean that interested parties waive their due process rights if
they do not immediately object to a particular document (which in this case they did, as the record
demonstrates). If WTO proceedings are brought on the basis of Article 6.5 or Article 6.5.1, it must
be possible for a panel to examine whether the confidential treatment and the summaries provided
were proper, as Russia concedes.
4.2 Claim under Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement: Failur e to disclose all essential facts
under consideration that formed the basis for the decision by the EAEC
57. The EU claims that the EAEC Draft Report failed to disclose or meaningfully summarize a
number of essential facts underlying the determinations of dump ing (import volumes of LCVs
produced by Volkswagen AG and Daimler AG respectively; export volumes and weighted average
export prices of LCVs produced by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG respectively; source for the
information on the volume and value of imports of LCVs), material injury (consumption, production
and sales volumes of LCVs in the Customs Union; information on Sollers' profits and profitability;
source for the information on the volume and value of imports of LCVs) and causation
(consumption and production volumes of LCVs in the Customs Union; numerical data on the ratio
of dumped imports versus consumption and production, prices, rate of return, profits and other
issues; rate of return on sales of goods which would have occurred in the absence of dumped
imports; market share held by GAZ in 2011). Moreover, the exhibits to Russia 's first written
submission, in particular the alleged confidential version of the EAEC Report, reveal additional
violations of Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, relevant for the assessment of mandatory injury
factors.
58. Whether a fact is essential is an objective question, depending on the role of the fact in the
determinations that must be made by the authority. It is not for the authority to list which facts it
subjectively c onsiders essential. All such facts must be disclosed, or at least meaningfully
summarized. This is equally true when "facts available " are used. The due process rights of
interested parties will be infringed by definition if essential facts are not disclos ed, and there is no
need to additionally show whether or not interested parties can defend their interests.
4.2.1 The relationship between Articles 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement
59. The EU disagrees with Russia 's statement that "in order to establish a cons equential violation
of Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement with regard to confidential essential facts, it is necessary to
carry out two separate analyses of Article 6.5 and Article 6.9. " There is no need for a separate
claim, or finding of violation, under Ar ticle 6.5. It is only where a separate Article 6.5 or
Article 6.5.1 claim has been made, and a panel found a violation of those provisions, that one
could truly speak of a "consequential" violation (in practical terms, rather than because Article 6.9
necessarily depends on the correct treatment of information as confidential or not).
4.2.2 The treatment of so -called "non-cooperating producers" under Article 6.9 of the
AD Agreement
60. Article 6.9 requires investigating authorities to disclose essential facts to all interested parties.
No distinction is made in that respect between parties that the authority considers as
"cooperating" and "non-cooperating". Any disclosure, whether general or specific, and whether it
contains information on confidential matters or not , must be sufficiently detailed to enable the
interested party concerned to defend its interests. All this is equally true when essential facts were
not obtained from an interested party but from another public authority, such as a customs
authority. Just because an individual dumping margin is not calculated for a so -called "non-
cooperating" party based on its own data, it does not follow that such a party does not have an
interest in essential facts pertaining to it.
4.2.3 Russia's treatment of Daimler 's and Volkswagen's letter requesting additional
disclosure of information on the calculation of dumping margins
61. Russia notes that the joint letter of Volkswagen Group Rus and Mercedes -Benz requested
disclosure of data derived from customs statistics that was tre ated as confidential. Nevertheless,
the DIMD failed to disclose such information, even as regards the sales to Volkswagen Group Rus

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and Mercedes-Benz Rus. Russia seems to acknowledge that no summary of these essential facts
was provided.
4.2.4 Russia's arguments regarding the non -disclosure of essential facts related to the
determination of dumping and injury
62. With respect to the determination of dumping, Russia 's first written submission discusses
various calculation methodologies that could be used by interested parties to enhance their
understanding of the information that was not disclosed. The EU does not consider that this
approach is sufficient to provide a meaningful summary that would disclose essential facts.
63. First, there are numerous points in which Rus sia's explanations depart from what is apparent
in the Draft Report, or merely reinforce the EU's conclusion that essential facts were not disclosed.
Second, merely disclosing the "methodology" of a calculation does not necessarily constitute a
meaningful summary, since it does not enable a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information. In the case at hand, no meaningful methodology was provided. Third, the disclosure
requirement under Article 6.9 cannot be met by requiring interested parties to piece together
information from various documents submitted by other interested parties and combine them with
what is disclosed by the investigating authority.
64. Similar considerations hold true for the DIMD 's failure to disclose facts related to the
determination of injury. On several issues, the DIMD failed to disclose essential facts, replacing
them with entirely uninformative summaries.
4.2.5 Additional undisclosed essential facts
65. The EU has argued that the Panel should not consider the confidential Report that was
submitted by Russia as Exhibit RUS -14 (BCI). In the alternative, the EU claims that the
confidential Report still fails to comply with Articles 3.4 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
66. In addition, were the Panel to consider the confidential Report, the EU submits the following.
When compared to the Draft Report, the confidential version of the Report reveals that additional
facts which formed the basis for the finding of material injury were determined and assessed by
the DIMD, but were not disclosed to the interested parties. No attempt was made to provide a
meaningful summary of this information; in fact, much of it was omitted without even being
marked as confidential. With respect to these essential facts, Russia has therefore violated
Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, for the reasons already explored by the EU.

- B-31 -

ANNEX B-4
SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The European Union still has failed to establish that the Russian Federation has vio lated any
provision of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. The European Union continues to
propose that the DIMD should have used approaches and methodologies in the anti -dumping
investigation at issue that have no legal basis in the WTO law and jurisprudence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
2. The Russian Federation maintains that it is well -established in the WTO jurisprudence that the
Anti-Dumping Agreement requires taking into account all information upon which the investigating
authority relied in order to reach its final determination, whether or not this information forms part
of the non -confidential or disclosed record of the investigation. 1 As confirmed by the Appellate
Body in Thailand – H-Beams, "Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i) require a panel to examin e the facts made
available to the investigating authority of the importing Member. These provisions do not prevent
a panel from examining facts that were not disclosed to, or discernible by, the interested parties at
the time of the final determination". 2 In addition, the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway)
acknowledged that the standard of review specified in Article 17.5(ii) does not mean that a panel
is limited to " the information actually set forth or specifically referenced in the determination at
issue".3
3. Therefore, the European Union cannot reasonably claim that the Panel should base its
judgement on "the facts expressed in the non -confidential EAEC's report and supporting
documents for which the Report shows a sign of existence".4
III. DEFINITION OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
4. The European Union's untenable interpretations of Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement completely ignore the existence of objective reasons for defining the domestic industry
as a "major proportion" of total domestic produc tion. In addition, the European Union's approach
to definition of the domestic industry that implies that such a definition shall remain fixed
throughout an anti-dumping investigation undermines the "objective examination" standard that is
required by Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
A. The European Union's arguments fail to address the objective reasons behind the
DIMD's definition of the domestic industry for the purposes of injury determination
5. The Russian Federation believes that practical c onstraints of obtaining necessary information
may prevent the investigating authority from defining the domestic industry for the purposes of
injury analysis as all known domestic producers of the like product. The role of the investigating
authority in seeking information from known domestic producers may be limited due to the factual
circumstances of the anti-dumping investigation.
6. To recall, the reason why the data pertaining to GAZ could not have been used in the injury
analysis is related to deficienc ies and inconsistencies in the data submitted by GAZ. The
investigating authority expressed its willingness to include GAZ into the domestic industry for the
purposes of the injury analysis (sent a questionnaire for the producer of the like product in the

1 See Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.45, Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams,
paras. 115-118.
2 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 118.
3 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.837. See also Appellate Body Report, US –
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 161-165.
4 Opening Oral Statement by the European Union at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel with
the Parties, para. 5.

- B-32 -

CU5, sought clarifications regarding the Questionnaire Reply and informed GAZ on inconsistencies
in the data6). However, neither clarifications, nor corrected data were received by the investigating
authority.
7. Given the inability to use the data pertainin g to GAZ in the injury analysis, the domestic
industry for the purposes of the injury determination was defined a s Sollers that accounted for
87.9% of total domestic production of the like product. Such definition of the domestic industry is
based upon a "major proportion" option and is in conformity with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement.
8. The Russian Federation maintains that a "major proportion" of total domestic production is a
legitimate way for defining the domestic industry for the purpose of the injury analysis.
B. The European Union erred in its interpretation of Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement
9. The European Union suggests that "allowing investigating authorities to define "domestic
industry" on the basis of the question naire responses as "deficiency" or any other reason not
foreseen in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement risks materially distorting the injury determination".7
10. This interpretation proposed by the European Union renders useless a "major proportion"
option provi ded in Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and leaves the issue of known
producers that do not respond to the questionnaire or provide deficient data that cannot be used in
the injury analysis unresolved. In addition, Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains the
requirement of objective examination based on "positive evidence". Appellate Body has clarified
that "[t]he word "positive" means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective
and verifiable character, and that it mu st be credible".8 In this respect, the investigating authority
shall not base its injury determination on evidence that is not verifiable and not credible.
C. The WTO law does not require that the definition of the domestic industry shall
remain fixed throughout the anti-dumping proceedings
11. The European Union further notes that "the domestic industry should be defined as soon as
possible in the course of the investigation" 9 and "once the domestic industry is defined, relying on
one of the two options in A rticle 4.1, the investigating authority must not adjust this definition as
the injury analysis proceeds on the basis of difficulties in collecting data". 10 In this respect, the
Russian Federation notes that the WTO law and jurisprudence do not prescribe to follow an
approach suggested by the European Union.
12. In the general context, at the outset of an anti-dumping investigation the domestic industry is
identified when the like product is defined. Panel in EC - Salmon (Norway) stated that "Article 4.1
makes cl ear that the starting point for the identification of the domestic industry is the "like
product".11 Hence, the scope of domestic producers that form part of the domestic industry is
limited to the domestic producers of the like product. Hence, at the outse t all known domestic
producers of the like product constitute the domestic industry.
13. At the same time if the definition of the domestic industry had to be fixed at a particular point
in time at the outset of an anti -dumping investigation and could not be changed, as the
investigation proceeds, this would contradict the requirements of Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. In this regard, the Russian Federation maintains that the definition of the domestic
industry is an evolving concept. The definitio n of the domestic industry can be changed in the
course of the proceedings, as the investigating authority may be faced with new factual evidence
that may trigger a redefinition of the domestic industry (e.g. existence of the domestic producers

5 See Report, Exhibit RUS-12. Section 1.2.
6 Exhibit RUS-30 (BCI).
7 Responses to the 2nd Set of Questions by the European Union, para. 3.
8 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 192.
9 Responses to the 2nd Set of Questions by the European Union, para. 1.
10 Ibid., para.4.
11 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.64.

- B-33 -

that were n ot known to the investigating authority, absence of full and credible questionnaire
response from known domestic producers, etc.).
14. Therefore, the European Union's interpretation that implies impossibility to redefine the
domestic industry for the purposes of injury analysis should be rejected.
IV. SELECTION OF PERIODS FOR THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES
15. The Russian Federation maintains that the European Union has misinterpreted the DIMD 's
injury and causation analysis and, therefore, presented incorrect and incomplete picture of the
injury and causation analysis conducted by the DIMD in the course of the investigation. In fact, the
DIMD has analysed the data for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2011. Such
analysis has been conducted on a yea r-to-year basis, i.e. by comparing particular indicators as of
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. The data for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2011 has
been analysed consistently in relation to each indicator throughout the entire Report.12
16. Further, rel evant WTO jurisprudence 13 shows that in order to make a prima facie case of
violation of Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement a complaining party should correctly
identify the reference standard which excludes the possibility (risk) of favouring the in terests of
any interested party, or group of interested parties, in any investigation and specify how exactly
the injury analysis at issue does not meet the above reference standard and thus may favour
those interests.14
17. As far as the European Union 's claim is concerned, the European Union bears the burden to
identify how an investigating authority should select the periods for the analysis in general
(reference standard) and specify in which way the DIMD 's selection of periods for analysis could
have favour ed the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the
investigation.15
18. The standard suggested by the European Union (comparison the data for 2009, 2010 and
2011 and also the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 on an annual ba sis with 2008) cannot
be considered as the appropriate reference standard as such standard involves the overlap
between the periods analysed.16
19. The Russian Federation further submits that there is no logical connection between the
European Union's argument regarding the failure by the DIMD to systematically make an end-point
to end-point analysis of all of the economic indicators and the European Union 's claim. The above
argument does not deal with the selection of periods at the initial stage of the proces s of injury
determination. Rather, it touches upon the analysis of economic indicators for the periods already
selected.17
20. Based on the above, the European Union has failed to make a prima facie case of violation by
the DIMD of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3. 5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Therefore, the
European Union's claim shall be dismissed.
V. PRICE SUPPRESSION
21. The European Union submits that the DIMD failed to make objective analysis based on
positive evidence when considering price suppression. The European Union gives up its claim that
the DIMD "should have based itself on the year 2008 rather than the abnormal year 2009". 18 The
European Union is now convinced that rate of return of 2009 should have been adjusted
downwards by the DIMD. The Russian Fe deration stresses out that the DIMD accessed the

12 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 56-58.
13 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 196, 204.
14 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 76.
15 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 77.
16 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 80.
17 Responses to the 2nd Set of Questions by the European Union, para. 23.
18 Second Written Submission by the European Union, para. 97, Opening Oral Statement by the
European Union, para. 39.

- B-34 -

conditions of the Russian economy. These conditions clearly show that the rate of return in 2009
could be considered reasonable.19
22. The European Union insists that 2009 was not a "normal year" and could not be used by the
DIMD for the price suppression analysis because, according to the European Union, 2009 was an
exceptional year. In order to support this standing the European Union simply refers to the market
situation in 2009 without providing any clear expl anations as to how it could make for the
"abnormality" of the rate of return in 2009. The Russian Federation emphasizes that the DIMD
took the economic crisis as well as the recovery after the crisis into account in its analysis 20,
therefore, this factor co uld not in any way undermine the objectivity of the price suppression
analysis.21
23. The European Union tries to show that there was some biased approach in the analysis of
prices in USD. 22 The Russian Federation is convinced that the claim of the European Unio n is
unfounded as the European Union failed to demonstrate the ground on which it could be concluded
that use of USD undermined the objectivity of price suppression analysis. The DIMD actually took
the factor of currency fluctuations into account while con ducting the analysis. 23 There was no
significant difference between price trends expressed in RUB and USD that could distort the
analysis.24
24. European Union also challenges the explanatory force of dumped imports for the occurrence
of price suppression.25 The Russian Federation recalls that the DIMD demonstrated the explanatory
force of dumped imports for the occurrence of price suppression in the Report.26
25. The European Union's misunderstanding of the explanatory force stems from its conviction
that there was s ignificant gap between import and domestic prices and that price suppression
implies that import prices should be higher than domestic prices.27 The Russian Federation reminds
that difference between import and domestic prices decreased during the entire an alysed period.28
Therefore, the European Union makes unfounded allegation and, at that, tries to substantiate it by
referring to the comments of the interested parties29 taken from the context and not related to the
issues raised by the European Union in con nection with the explanatory force of dumped imports
for price suppression.30
26. On the basis of foregoing, the Russian Federation concludes that the European Union failed to
provide evidence that the DIMD failed to make an objective analysis based on positiv e evidence
when considering whether the effects of the dumped imports was to prevent domestic price
increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree and its claim should be
rejected.
VI. STATE OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
A. The DIMD based its evaluation of injury factors on positive evidence
27. With regard to profits, the European Union argues that the formula provided by the Russian
Federation, which explains how the profit figures set out in the Report were calculated, does not
clarify the significant differences between the data in the Report and in Sollers' Application and
Questionnaire Response. This formula contains six elements, namely the volume of sales, the price
and the cost for Sollers and its trading house separately. The Eur opean Union, for some reason,

19 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 102-103.
20 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para.109.
21 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para.111.
22 Second Written Submission by the European Union, paras. 100-110.
23 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 93.
24 Ibid., paras. 94-96.
25 First Written Submission by the European Union, para.156.
26 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 113-118.
27 Responses to the 2nd Set of Questions by the European Union, question 67, para. 18.
28 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para.117.
29 Second Written Submission by the European Union, para.116,117, Opening Oral Statement by the
European Union at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel with the Parties,para.39, Responses to the 2nd
Set of Questions by the European Union, question 67, para.19.
30 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 121,123.

- B-35 -

fails to take into account that the aggregated profit figure depends not only on Sollers' volume of
sales, price and cost but also on the corresponding figures of its trading house.
28. With regard to stocks, the European Union claims that the DIMD failed to conduct an objective
examination because the DIMD, when determining the stocks of the domestic industry in the
Report, used the data on stocks of the producer and did not rely on stocks of the trading house.
This claim is unsub stantiated since the European Union has not even attempted to demonstrate
that the DIMD's examination was thereby not conducted in an unbiased manner, without favouring
the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation.
29. The Russian Federation emphasises that Article 3.4 of the Anti –Dumping Agreement does not
prescribe the methodology to be used by an investigating authority in its evaluation of the injury
factors. The Russian Federation underlines that Article 3.4 o f the Anti –Dumping Agreement
requires that there be an analysis of inventories and the DIMD included such an analysis in its
evaluation of the state of the industry.
30. The European Union also alleges that the DIMD did not rely on positive evidence in its analysis
of stocks held by Sollers because the figures in the Report do not correspond to the relevant non -
confidential data provided by Sollers. The European Union's allegation lacks any factual basis since
the European Union simply failed to extract the req uired information from the relevant non -
confidential data.
B. The DIMD made a proper evaluation of the overall development and interaction
among injury factors taken together
31. The European Union has not provided plausible alternative explanations of the ev idence on
the record in the light of which the explanations given by the DIMD are not reasoned or adequate.
The European Union highlights upward trends in the internal evolution of certain injury factors,
whereas discounting the factor "profits", which runs contrary to the picture of "normality" in the
state of the industry portrayed by the European Union. The highlighted trends, including
production and sales levels, are depicted by the European Union in isolation from other market
developments, such as tr ends in the levels of dumped imports and consumption. As a result, any
relative changes are disregarded by the European Union.
32. With reference to the European Union's allegation that the selection of the non -equal, non-
consecutive periods in the injury and causation analysis tainted the EAEC's analysis since it failed
to provide an accurate and unbiased picture of the relevant information, we have shown that when
the data are provided for consecutive half -year periods, the injury to the domestic industry and
the explanatory force of the subject imports for the state of the domestic industry are pronounced,
and the observations made on the basis of these data are in line with the conclusions made in the
Report.
C. The DIMD examined all the injury factors list ed in Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement
1. The magnitude of the margin of dumping
33. The European Union claims that the DIMD failed to examine the magnitude of the margin of
dumping in its injury analysis.
34. Contrary to the European Union, the magnitu de of the margin of dumping was apparently
examined by the DIMD in the context of establishing that the conditions for cumulative assessment
of the effects of the dumped imports of a product from more than one country were fulfilled. This
initial stage of the evaluation of the magnitude of the margin of dumping at the least implicitly
indicates that the evaluation of the factor occurred.
35. The contribution of the magnitude of the margin of dumping to the impact of the dumped
imports on the domestic industry w as further implicitly examined in the context of the analysis of
domestic prices. The DIMD implicitly evaluated the magnitude of the margin of dumping in the
context of the analysis of the effect of the prices of dumped imports on the domestic prices. The
determination of "a significant adverse effect", which the prices of the dumped imports had on the

- B-36 -

domestic prices and profits, reflects the results of the evaluation of the magnitude of the margin of
dumping.
2. Return on investments, actual and potentia l negative effects on cash flow and ability
to raise capital or investments
36. The European Union alleges that the DIMD failed to examine return on investments, actual
and potential negative effects on cash flow and ability to raise capital or investments. Co ntrary to
the European Union's allegation, the DIMD analysed these injury factors, which is reflected in the
confidential version of the Report. Setting out the results of evaluation of the injury factors at
issue only in the confidential version of the Re port does not amount to a violation of Articles 3.1
and 3.4 of the Anti–Dumping Agreement since Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains
an obligation to evaluate the listed injury factors, and Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
does not p reclude the investigating authority from using confidential reasoning or facts in the
analysis.
VII. NON-ATTRIBUTION
37. With regard to non -attribution analysis, the European Union asserts that the
Russian Federation provided ex post argumentation that "is of no relevance since it does not
explain how the DIMD examined this known factor".31
38. The Russian Federation maintains that when the allegation on the "known factor other than
the dumped imports" in the meaning of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains factual
errors that undermine its relevance in the non -attribution analysis, this factor proves to be
unfounded and there is no point in its further consideration in the non -attribution analysis. This is
the case with alleged "known factor other tha n the dumped imp orts" mentioned by the
European Union, namely the so -called "local car manufactures programme" that allegedly expired
in 2010.
39. The European Union also stated that "Russia ignores that the quality problems and their
impact on the state of Sollers were not only raised by PCA, but also by Daimler, who submitted, as
part of its comments, detailed test reports of the Fiat Ducato showing significant quality
problems".32 However, the DIMD did not ignore these comments but concluded that the
information on testing described in Auto Review falls short of being credible and does not meet the
requirement of being "positive evidence".
VIII. CONFIDENTIALITY
40. With regard to confidentiality claim of the European Union, the Russian Federation believes
that any document on the investigation record should be read consequentially and in its entirety.
In contrast, the European Union's allegations on confidential treatment of information submitted in
confidence have shown another approach. Mostly, the contested p ieces of information are simply
taken by the European Union out of context.
A. The DIMD properly assessed the "good cause"
41. In the investigation at issue the DIMD assessed the reasons for withholding the information
from the public file and was satisfied with the "good cause" shown. Hence, no further clarifications
or explanations were required.
42. We maintain that the Anti -Dumping Agreement could not be understood as to require an
investigating authority to explain why an investigating authority accepted any piece of information
submitted by the interested parties in the course of the anti -dumping investigation. Such
explanations would go beyond the requirements of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. While the good
cause alleged is to be reviewed by an investigating authority on a case-by-case basis, i.e. for each
request for the confidential treatment, that does not mean that a separate or detailed explanation

31 Second Written Submission by the European Union, para. 170.
32 Second Written Submission by the European Union, para. 168.

- B-37 -

of an investigation authority 's decision whether to accept a particular request, or not, must be
furnished in each case.
B. The EU failed to make a prima facie case with regard to customs statistics
43. To recall, the reason for treating customs statistics as confidential was to avoid disclosing the
sales volumes used to calculate the volumes of imports of the prod uct under investigation. The
European Union, assuming that customs statistics in principle is publicly available and cannot, or
even must not, be confidential, failed to make a prima facie case because it based its claim on
allegations unsupported by evide nce or tried to substantiate its claim on irrelevant references to
some websites.
44. Specifically, to support its claim the European Union provides simply the following allegations:
"[t]o a significant extent, this information is publicly available. It does n ot appear to be
confidential by nature, and it was not indicated that it was provided on a confidential basis". 33 In
its First Written Submission the European Union also refers to some web-sites where "a wide range
of customs statistics" or "comprehensive c ustoms statistics" "is made available". 34 With respect to
the annexes to the Sollers' Application, the European Union did not even attempt to prove the
publicity or "non-confidentiality" of the documents and information contained in the annexes.
45. The assertions of the European Union fall short of being substantiated enough and, therefore,
must not be accepted.
IX. ESSENTIAL FACTS
46. The European Union 's claim at issue touches upon sensitive systemic issues of Article 6.9 of
the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 35 The ex planations of obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement, proposed by the European Union 36, contradict the existing WTO
jurisprudence. Such interpretations would lead to reduction in the level of cooperation by
interested parties who would be against the disclosure of their sensitive confidential information,
which is not susceptible of summary, in the different form of summary.
47. Pursuant to Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement the investigating authority is not
obliged to disclose of data which (i) were not provided by parties to the investigation37; (ii) were in
the possession of the investigating authority 38; (iii) would permit to calculate specific confidential
information pertaining to another interested party 39; (iv) not permitted to be disclosed under
Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement 40. Therefore, before the assessing the adequacy of
disclosure of "essential facts" it is necessary to understand the circumstances in which particular
disclosure took place.41
A. Determination of Dumping
48. The Russian Federation states that the European Union still has not met its burden to
establish that disclosure provided in the non -confidential version of the Draft Report and in the
additional disclosure letter were inadequate. 42 The DIMD in its D raft Report disclosed the
necessary information for the interested parties (including Daimler AG, Volkswagen AG and the
European Union) to scrutinise the calculation of the export price and normal value for the German

33 Opening Oral Statement of the European Union, para. 79.
34 First Written Submission by the European Union, para. 341, footnote 316.
35 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 323-372; Closing Statement of the
Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 11.
36 Second Written Submission by the European Union, paras. 289, 292, 295-296.
37 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 367-372; Opening Statement of the
Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 73.
38 Ibid.
39 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 359-366; Opening Statement of the
Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 71, 75.
40 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 338-340, 363; Opening Statement of
the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 72, 75.
41 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 323.
42 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 310-318.

- B-38 -

exporting producers and assess the suitability and accuracy of the data concerning import volumes
and values.43
49. In spite of the fact that the individual volumes of imports and individual weighted average
export price of LCVs produced by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG are not susceptible of summar y
in the form of range 44, the Draft Report contains meaningful and detailed non -confidential version
of the dumping margin calculation for the German exporting producers. 45 Moreover, the interested
parties could defend their interests by submitting informati on on the actual volume of imports and
customs value of LCVs produced by them and imported into the Customs Union and using linear
relationship between the individual volumes of imports of LCVs for Daimler AG and the individual
volumes of imports of LCVs f or Volkswagen AG and between the individual weighted export price
for Daimler AG and the individual weighted average price for Volkswagen AG.46
B. Determination of Injury and Causality
50. Turning to the issue of essential facts related to the determination of injury and causality the
Russian Federation notes that the European Union did not make a prima facie case because it did
not reinforce its claim with demonstration of clear violation of Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement caused by action or inactio n of the DIMD. 47 In particular, the Russian Federation sees
no European Union's attempts to understand the substance of non -confidential version of the
determination on injury and causality. All the Russian Federation can see is that the European
Union is trying to justify its claim without substantive analysis of disclosure of each essential fact.48
51. The Draft Report contains sufficiently -detailed disclosure of the essential facts under
consideration that formed the basis for the determination of injury and causality.49 Each summary
of redacted confidential data contains at least one of the following: (i) the year-on-year percentage
changes; (ii) year-on-year percentage point changes; (iii) the mix of the year -on-year percentage
changes or year -on-year percent age point changes and textual explanation of changes;
(iv) textual description of trends with respect to the injury factor. 50 Moreover, in order to get a full
picture of the determination of injury and causality the interested parties should read the Draft
Report in its entirety. 51
52. Besides, the Russian Federation is of the view that if some facts are not central to the
determination of injury, such facts do not constitute essential fact s within the meaning of
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.52
X. CONCLUSION
53. For these reasons, along with those that were set forth in the Russian Federation's written
submissions, oral statements, responses to questions and comments, the Russian Federation
respectfully requests the Panel to reject all of the European Un ion's claims and arguments in their
entirety.
Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 73.
44 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 421-448,455-467; Opening Statement
of the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, paras. 71, 75.
45 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 391-420, 449-454; Opening Statement
of the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 73.
46 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 421-448, 455-465; Opening Statement
of the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, para. 71.
47 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 319-322.
48 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 321.
49 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, paras. 476, 479-623.
50 Second Written Submission by the Russian Federation, para. 470.
51 Closing Statement of the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel,
para. 11.
52 Opening Statement of the Russian Federation at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel,
para. 78; Responses by the Russian Federation to the Questions from the Panel after the Second Substantive
Meeting with the Parties, paras. 61-63.

- C-1 -

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil C-2
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan C-6
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Turkey C-11
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine C-13
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States C-15

- C-2 -

ANNEX C-1
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL
1 Brazil focused its participation in these panel proceedings on five main aspects considered in its
Third Party Submission, in its participation in the Third Party Session and in the answers to the
Panel's questions.

2 The first problem addressed by Brazil is the definition of the domestic industry under
Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the "Anti-Dumping Agreement"1.

3 Brazil commented in its TPS and in the answers to the Panel that the use of the term excluded
by the EU was n ot in conformity with its strict technical meaning. For Brazil, whenever the
investigating authority excludes certain producer from the concept of domestic industry, it is doing
so as authorized by Article 4.1 (i) of the ADA, which allows the investigating authority to exclude
certain producers from the concept of domestic industry whenever the producers are "related to
the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product"2.

4 In the present case, if GAZ had been excluded from the definition of "domestic industry", for not
qualifying specifically as a domestic producer, this company would not be included in the
calculation of the collective output of the like product. In this scenario, Sollers would, thus, have
held one hundred per cent of market share of the product at analysis.

5 Considering this view, Brazil believes that what happened in the investigation was not an
exclusion as foreseen in Article 4.1 (i) of the ADA, but rather a possible disregard to the data that
was sent by GAZ to the EAEC.

6 Brazil did not contest that a proper definition of domestic industry under Article 4.1 of the ADA
is of paramount importance in order to ensure the accuracy of an injury determination. However,
in order to assess whether the investi gating authority acted so as to give rise to a material risk of
distortion in defining the domestic industry one should not read in Article 4.1 of the ADA
obligations that are not there, namely obligations that would result from a combined interpretation
of Articles 4.1 and 3.1, as proposed by the EU.

7 Taking into account that the imposition of anti -dumping duties on the importation of dumped
imports would benefit the domestic industry as a whole, it is certainly preferable that the
"domestic industry" def ined by an investigating authority encompasses every single producer, as
set forth in the first sentence of Article 4.1. However, this provision clearly establishes that, in face
of difficulties in obtaining reliable data from the producers as a whole, it is possible for the
investigating authority to rely solely on a major proportion of the domestic producers. As Brazil
stressed in the answers to the Panel, it is important that the investigating authority acts in a way
to gather a complete set of data rela ted to every producer, but that is not possible sometimes and
an investigation based on a major proportion is apt.

8 Brazil does not dispute that data from the domestic producer(s) eventually left out of the
"domestic industry" definition may also be releva nt for the purposes of the injury analysis as they
may (partially or totally) reflect the state of the industry. In the same line, Brazil does not contest
that the more producers are included in the "domestic industry", the more ample the economic
data set is and, therefore, the injury analysis is potentially more accurate.

9 In Brazil's understanding, however, there is no obligation in the text of Article 4.1 of the ADA
that would invalidate prima facie an investigation based on a less ample set of data that represent,
notwithstanding, a major proportion of the market share, as suggested by the EU . Under
Article 4.1 of the ADA, the statistical determination of a "major proportion" by itself provides the
amount of data required to ensure an accurate injury a nalysis. Therefore, there is no obligation to
carry out a "qualitative" investigation, which, as argued by the EU, would result from a combined
interpretation of Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the ADA.

1 EU's First Written Submission, para. 33.
2 Article 4.1(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

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10 Brazil reaffirms its understanding that a market share of 87. 9% could certainly qualify as a
major proportion in the sense of Article 4.1.

11 Brazil took issue as well with the EU 's contention that in defining the "domestic industry" for
the purposes of the injury analysis, the investigating authority should take int o consideration
differences in production process mainly in terms of the value added along the process and
whether the domestic producer benefits or not from preferential regime. Once the like product is
defined, producers engaged in its production are by definition the domestic industry.

12 Once again, it seems that the EU is conflating the standards under A rticle 3.1 and 4.1 of the
ADA trying to evaluate the consistency of the definition of "domestic industry" adopted by the
investigating authority with the lens of Article 3.1. It is Brazil 's view that nothing in Article 4.1 of
the ADA requires this type of qualitative assessment. For the purposes of defining the "domestic
industry" it is irrelevant whether or not the producer benefits from a preferential tr eatment or is a
manufacturer or an assembler of the like product.

13 This particular distinction has no grounds in the text of the ADA and would represent a major
challenge for investigating authorities worldwide. It would be necessary, for instance, to cre ate
different categories of companies producing a specific product inside the territory of a member,
divided by levels of local content and value added in the local chain of production. That would
definitely render impracticable every investigation and the results of the margin of dumping would
be even more biased. The same reasoning is true is respect to rules of origin3. Nowhere in the ADA
there is an obligation to assess the origin of the product. Likewise, the fact that a producer may
benefit from preferential regime is irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.1 of the ADA as this kind
of consideration does not have a bearing on the defining of the "domestic industry" in Article 4.1 of
the ADA.

14 Brazil agreed with Russia that the ADA "does not provide a ny guidance as to how the periods
for the injury and causation analysis [should be defined] nor does it require the investigating
authorities to divide the period into sub -periods of a particular length "4. However, it was also
recognized that the discretion of the investigation authority is not unlimited. As indicated in Brazil's
answers to the Panel, the important is that the periods are chosen by the investigating authority
as to permit verifying whether the dumping found was causing injury to the domestic industry.

15 Brazil understands that once the investigating authority has made a decision about the
dumping and injury periods, and once it has determined the length of the time periods that it
wishes to compare, every injury factor to be taken into accoun t must be assessed in the chosen
timeframe. The key aspect in assessing the trends in the injury analysis is to ensure that the
investigating authority is comparing periods of the same duration, it does not matter whether it is
a period of two years, a ful l calendar year or half -year/half-year, and all the concurring factors
must be analyzed in the same period.

16 In Brazil's view, the kind of incoherence identified by the EU in the analysis made by the EAEC,
if clearly demonstrated, would be inconsistent wit h Art. 3.1 of the ADA and, by consequence, with
Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, and would jeopardize the objectiveness of EAEC's determination.

17 The use of different timeframes to assess the evolution of injury factors could only amount to
an objective assessm ent if the investigating authority provided a proper justification for the
practice adopted. In Brazil's view, the absence of explanation to justify the practice and the use of
different approaches during the injury analysis, depending on the factual situa tion at hand, do not
seem to be in accordance with the obligation to make an objective examination as required by
Article 3.1 of the ADA.

18 Brazil considers that each of the aspects listed in Article 3.4 of the ADA must be considered
during the investigati on of injury. If the investigating authority does not have sufficient data or
information regarding a specific issue, the report must indicate what was the reason that
conducted to the absence of one of the aspects listed.

3 EU's First Written Submission, para. 55.
4 Russia's First Written Submission, para. 124.

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19 Brazil supported that relevant f actors raised by interested parties must be accompanied by a
reasonable amount of evidence that minimally supports the "relevance" of the claim. Mere
unfounded allegations are not sufficient to prove the presence of other factors that were injuring
the domestic industry.

20 Furthermore, Brazil also upheld that an investigating authority should make this statement.
Otherwise, a doubt would arise of whether the investigating authority really found that the party
did not present relevant evidence or whether it deliberately avoided addressing the issue. If the
latter is the case, and the authority deliberately excluded the analysis of a relevant known factor
that might be causing injury, the investigating authority did not objectively examine the positive
evidence before it and violated Art. 3.1 of the ADA.

21 In this particular it is also imperative to stress that the approach of the investigating authority
in respect to the level of information it demands to analyze a relevant factor must be uniform. If
an intere sted party presents two relevant factors accompanied by the same overall level of
information, Brazil demonstrated its opinion that the investigating authority could not consider
only one of those factors. The absence of comments by the investigating autho rity justifying the
exclusion would result in a breach of the obligation set forth in Article 3.5 of the ADA.

22 According to the case -law5, in Article 6.5 of the ADA, an investigating authority is entitled to
treat information received as confidential unde r two circumstances: (a) information which is by
nature confidential; and (b) information which is provided on a confidential basis. It has already
been clarified that the "good cause " requirement applies to both circumstances 6 and that "the
requisite 'good cause ' must be shown by the interested party submitting the confidential
information at issue"7.

23 For Brazil, if an interested party presents confidential information without a justification and if
the investigating authority accepts treating this inform ation as confidential without requiring any
justification to be placed into the files, there would be a clear violation of Article 6.5 of the ADA.

24 If the confidential information is submitted with a justification – the "good cause" –, then two
situations might be possible: (i) the investigating authority rejects the justification. In this case,
the provisions of Article 6.5.2 apply, including footnote 18; or (ii) the investigating authority
accepts the justification. The "good cause" requirement is not met simply by a request from the
interested party, since the very nature of the "good cause" requires analysis by the investigating
authority and its agreement that a "good cause" has been effectively presented. The fact that the
investigating authority accep ted to treat the information as confidential implies that the
investigating authority agrees with the justification. In other words, it means that the investigating
authority is convinced that the justification presented meets the good cause requirement.

25 It must be pointed out, however, that there is nothing in the ADA establishing that the
investigating authority has to issue a special document or to place in any report an "objective
assessment […] of whether good cause was shown for confidential treatmen t". The requirement of
Article 6.5 is that a "good cause" is presented by the interested party. For confidentiality to be
granted, the investigating authority must be satisfied that the justification presented fulfill the
"good cause" requirement.

26 Another issue raised by the EU is the treatment of information that is not confidential by
nature as confidential information. Although there seems to be nothing in Article 6.5 of the ADA
preventing a "good cause" from being presented by any interested party – and accepted by the
investigating authority – for "information that is publicly available ", it seems awkward to have
situations in which being an interested party in an antidumping investigation entails access to less
information that if the interested party was not part of the investigation. The fact that the publicly
available information is not fully reflected into the files would unduly limit transparency, due
process and the ability of interested parties to defend themselves.

27 It is the Brazil's view that aggregate information or information that refers to the market as a
whole – like exports, imports, production, sales and inventories – should not be treated, as a rule,

5 Panel Report, Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.219.
6 Panel Report, EC — Fasteners (China), para. 7.452.
7 Panel Report, Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.220.

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as confidential information. If, by any reason, an interested party believes that co nfidentiality is
needed for publicly available information, the standard of the "good cause" requirement should be
very high and very careful consideration should be given by the investigating authority. There
must be a balance between requests for confide ntiality by an interested party and the necessity of
ensuring transparency for all interested parties. Confidentiality should not be used as a tool to
diminish transparency.

28 If information is treated as confidential – because the investigating authority i s convinced that
a "good cause" has been shown –, then it falls upon the investigating authority to require the party
submitting the confidential information to provide a non -confidential summary in such a level of
detail that would not prevent other inter ested parties from understanding the substance of the
information submitted in confidence. It falls also upon the investigating authority to demonstrate
that its obligation of requesting the non-confidential summary has been dully fulfilled.

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ANNEX C-2
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN
A. Price Effect Analysis under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement
1 First, Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement require an investigating authority to
examine "the volume of the dumped imports" (the "volume effect") and "the effect of the dumped
imports on prices in the domestic market for like products" (the "price effect") as the initial step of
analyses in its injury and causation determination under Article 3. With regard to the pri ce effect
inquiry, Article 3.2 specifies three paths through which dumped imports may give rise to a price
effect, i.e., (i) price undercutting; (ii) price depression; and (iii) price suppression.

2 While Article 3.2 does not prescribe any particular meth odologies to assess such price effects 1,
the Appellate Body in China – GOES clarified, with respect to price depression and suppression
under the second sentence of Article 3.2, that an investigating authority is required to consider the
relationship between subject imports and prices of like domestic products, so as to understand
whether subject imports provide explanatory force for the occurrence of significant depression or
suppression of domestic prices.2

3 In considering whether subject imports provide explanatory force for the occurrence of price
suppression or depression, an investigating authority typically begins its analysis with an
examination of price developments or trends of subject imports and domestic like products over
the period of investiga tion (the "POI") and compares them to see whether the observed price
trends of subject imports and domestic like products moved in the same or similar direction over
the POI. However, the mere coincidence in direction and/or extent of price development or trend
hardly establishes price depression or suppression. As the Appellate Body pointed out in China –
GOES:

[I]t would not be sufficient to identify a downward trend in the price of like domestic
products over the period of investigation when considering significant price
depression, or to note that prices have not risen, even though they would normally be
expected to have risen, when analyzing significant price suppression. Rather, an
investigating authority is required to examine domestic prices in conj unction with
subject imports in order to understand whether subject imports have explanatory
force for the occurrence of significant depression or suppression of domestic prices.3
Thus, the investigating authority must further consider relevant factors and , in particular look into
the cause of the coincidence in direction and/or extent of price development or trend and,
specifically, the dynamic interaction between subject imports and domestic products through the
market competition between them. The investigating authority must analyze and explain, based on
the positive evidence on the record, that subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence
of significant depression or suppression of the domestic like products including evidence of the
above dynamic interaction. Were it not for any parallel, however, such difference in price
development or trend between subject imports and domestic like products would likely suggest the
lack of relationship between them, let alone the lack of dynamic interacti on. Faced with such
contrary evidence, the investigating authority would be required to make further inquiry with
positive evidence to conclude nevertheless that subject imports have explanatory force for the
occurrence of suppression of domestic prices.

4 The text of Article 3 and the Appellate Body 's prior findings support this view. The assessment
of price suppression under Article 3.2 appears to require a counterfactual analysis, as it provides
"which otherwise would have occurred ". Japan notes here that , in a counterfactual analysis, the
investigating authority should compare the observed actual prices with counterfactual prices,
which would have occurred if the subject imports were introduced into the domestic market at

1 See Panel Report, EC –Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.278; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 7.328; and
China – GOES, para. 7.546. See also Russia’s First Written Submission, para. 157.
2 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 154.
3 Ibid. para. 138.

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normal value. To complete this an alysis, the investigating authority must objectively examine
various factors including a reasonable rate of return and actual costs of production. Also, it may
examine, depending on the case and method used in the comparison, whether the market could
have absorbed the price increase.

5 Second, in the examination of whether the subject imports have explanatory force for the
occurrence of significant price suppression, the investigating authority must analyze the
development or trend of price of subject impor ts and domestic like products, based on the
assessment of price data and other information during the entire POI. This is because the price
development or trend between subject imports and domestic like products and the interaction
between them can only be ascertained by assessing all the relevant price data and other relevant
information.

6 Findings based on the authority 's picking and choosing of certain data in non -consecutive
periods, while ignoring data in other periods, would be contrary t o the requi rement under
Article 3.1. As the panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice found, "such an examination
on the basis of an incomplete set of data cannot be objective, nor does the selective use of certain
data for the injury analysis constitute a prop er establishment of the facts on which to base the
determination".4 The statement of the Appellate Body in China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-
SSST (EU) is instructive in this regard, although the case was in the context of price undercutting :
"Article 3.2 requires a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship
between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic like products over the duration of
the POI".5

7 Finally, all the analysis of the investigating authority m ust be based on positive evidence as
required by Article 3.1. The investigating authority then must provide a reasoned and adequate
explanation in a published report on how it analyzed the factual situation of the present case based
on the positive evidenc e on the record. 6 Further, as the Appellate Body explained, where the
authority is faced with elements other than subject imports that may explain the significant
depression or suppression of domestic prices, the authority is also required to consider rele vant
evidence pertaining to such elements for purposes of understanding whether subject imports
indeed have a depressive or suppressive effect on domestic prices. 7 For example, when a price
development or trend in subject imports and domestic prices diverg es in its direction at a certain
point in time during the POI, this would imply that elements other than subject imports affect the
domestic prices. The investigating authority must then assess the implication of this fact carefully
and explain why and how , notwithstanding such evidence, there still exists positive evidence that
would outweigh such negative evidence and warrant the finding of depressive or suppressive effect
on domestic prices for the entire POI.

B Definition of the "Domestic Industry" under Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement
8 Japan is of the view that the basis of the definition of the domestic industry must be all
domestic producers of the like product, and not a part thereof, as explained in detail below.

4 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.81.
5 Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.160 (emphasis
added).
6 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 131.
7 Ibid. para. 152. Japan agrees that an investigating authority must consider "elements other than
subject imports that may explain the significant price suppression" in the context of the price effects analysis,
separate from and independent of the non-attribution analysis mandated by Article 3.5. On the one hand, in
the context of the price depression and suppression inquiry, an investigating authority must analyze "what
brings about such price phenomena" and examine whether such phenomena are an effect of subject imports.
As such, the analysis conducted by the investigating authority includes "element{s} other than subject
import{s} that may explain the significant price suppression." On the other hand, Article 3.5 analysis concerns
the causal relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry and, by virtue of the
phrase "through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraph 2 and 4", the examination of the causal
relationship under Article 3.5 encompasses "all relevant evidence" before the authority, including the volume of
subject imports and their price effects listed under Article 3.2, as well as all relevant economic factors
concerning the state of the domestic industry listed in Article 3.4. As such, the examination under Article 3.5
covers a broader scope than the scope of the elements considered in relation to price depression and
suppression under Article 3.2.

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9 Article 3.1 provides that injury determinations must be based on the objective examination of
both (a) the volume effect and the price effect, and (b) the consequent impact of dumped imports
on "domestic producers" of the like product. The obligation to conduct objective assessment set
forth in Article 3.1 requires an investigating authority to assess the significance, if any, of
information it is made aware of during the process of defining the domestic industry for its
assessment of injury.8 In this sense, Articles 3.1 and 4.1 "are inextricably linked".9

10 Accordingly, the definition of the domestic industry must be such that it enables the authority
to make an objective examination of the impact of the dumped imports on all domestic producers.
Should an investigating authority act in a biased manner in defining the domestic industry, thereby
distorting the injury analysis, the determination of the domestic industry would be in violation of
the obligations under Articles 3.1 and 4.1.

11 Article 4.1 defines the domestic industry in two ways , either as "the domestic producers as a
whole of the like products" or "to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes
a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products ".10 In either case, the
definition in a given investigation must allow the authority to make an objective examination of the
injury of all domestic producers under Article 3, so as not to introduce a material risk of distortion
to the injury determination. 11 The volume of production during the POI is an important factor to
define the domestic industry, but the volume alone will not be decisive. As the Appellate Body
pointed out, "when the domestic industry is defined as the domestic producers whose collective
output constitutes a major proportion of to tal domestic production, a very high proportion that
'substantially reflects the total domestic production ' will very likely satisfy both the quantitative
and qualitative aspect of the requirements of Articles 4.1 and 3.1".12 The Appellate Body continued
"if the proportion of the domestic producers ' collective output included in the domestic industry
definition is not sufficiently high that it can be considered as substantially reflecting the totality of
the domestic production, then the qualitative element becomes crucial in establishing whether the
definition of the domestic industry is consistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 ".13 As such, the
investigating authority must define the domestic industry quantitatively as well as qualitatively to
reflect accurately the total domestic production.

12 With regard to the qualitative aspect of the requirement of Articles 4.1 and 3.1, the
investigating authority must consider various factors. Japan recognizes that the qualitative
reflection of the total domestic production requires the investigating authority to ensure that the
economic situation of the defined domestic industry represents the economic situation of domestic
producers as a whole. To this end, the investigating authority must assess, for example, whether
the particular method to select domestic producers to be included in the domestic industry is
neutral and unbiased so as not to give rise to a material risk of distortion, or whether and to what
extent the products made by the domestic producers within the sco pe of the domestic industry
interact with the products made by domestic producers not included in the domestic industry in
the market at issue.

C Transparency and Due Process Rights of Interested Parties under Article 6 of the AD
Agreement
13 The AD Agreement ensures the due process rights of interested parties in investigations.14 The
due process rights of adequate and sufficient opportunities of interested parties to defend their
interest stand on the transparency of information during the investigation. Without adequate
disclosure of information, interested parties would not be able to understand the substantive
issues in a given investigation, and thus would not be able to make an effective defense. Unless
interested parties provide relevant information th roughout the defense process, the authority
would not be able to make an appropriate determination based on enough information. In
particular, an insufficient or inappropriate disclosure of essential facts would prevent the interested
parties from understa nding the substantive issues in the investigation , which would be the basis

8 See Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.413.
9 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.408.
10 See Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, para. 7.322; China – Broiler Products,
11 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 414.
12 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.303 (emphasis added).
13 Ibid. (emphasis added).
14 See Article 6 of the AD Agreement.

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for the authority's assessment and from making comments on the authority 's determination. This
precludes the authority from making analysis properly. Thus, the transparency is impo rtant from
the perspective not only of protecting the right of interested parties but also of ensuring the
appropriateness of the authority's determination.

14 Article 6.9 concerns "the disclosure of 'facts' in the course of such investigations 'before a final
determination is made'".15 Facts that must be disclosed as essential facts are those that "form the
basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measure. " The Appellate Body clarified on this
point:

An authority must disclose such facts, in a coherent way, so as to permit an interested
party to understand the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive
measures. In our view, disclosing the essential facts under consideration pursuant to
Article[] 6.9 [] is paramount for ensuring the ability of the parties concerned to defend
their interests.16
As such, the disclosure of essential facts is a critical process to secure the transparency and due
process rights of the interested parties , and must be made in such depth that interested part ies
are able to comment on the factual basis of the determination.

15 The essential facts include the factual elements of dumping margin calculation, such as normal
value, export price and comparison s to reach the dumping margins. The panel in China – Broiler
Products confirmed that the disclose of such must include:

the underlying data for particular elements that ultimately comprise normal value
(including the price in the ordinary course of trade of individual sales of the like
product in the home marke t or, in the case of constructed normal value, the
components that make up the total cost of production, selling and general expenses,
and profit); export price (including any information used to construct export price
under Article 2.3); the sales that were used in the comparisons between normal value
and export price; and any adjustments for differences which affect price
comparability.17
Indeed, no interested parties would be able to comment on the dumping determination without
knowing the authority's factual basis for dumping determination.

16 Japan also notes that Article 6.9 does not permit a Member to make a distinction between
"cooperating" and "non-cooperating" interested parties regarding the disclosure of the essential
facts.

17 Where a fact contains c onfidential information, "the investigating authority could meet its
obligations under Article 6.9 through the use of non -confidential summaries of the 'essential' but
confidential facts. "18 Accordingly, the adequacy of the disclosure of essential facts in such case
would be in fact questions of the confidential nature of the information covered under Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1.

18 The treatment of confidential information under Article 6.5 and 6.5.1, however, would not
apply to a party from which the relevant inf ormation originates. That treatment would be required
only with respect to the parties other than the party which submitted the information. As the panel
in Korea – Certain Paper found, "[t]he notion of confidentiality, as elaborated upon in Article 6.5 . .
. is about preserving confidentiality of information that concerns one interested party vis-à-vis the
other interested parties ".19 Therefore, "confidentiality cannot be used as the basis for denying
access to information against the company which submitte d the information ".20 The actual facts,
not a non -confidential summary, therefore, are required to be disclosed to the party who
submitted the information on which such facts are based.

15 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
16 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
17 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.91. See also Panel Report, China – Autos (US),
paras. 7.72-7.73.
19 Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper, para. 7.201.
20 Ibid.

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19 In connection with the injury determination, Article 6.9 requires the authority to disclose facts,
not the authority 's assessment of facts. As the panel in China – GOES found, "it is insufficient
merely to state a general finding and conclusion regarding non -subject imports, namely that as a
proportion of total imports into China, non-subject imports 'continued to drop' and therefore were
not a cause of injury to the domestic industry. " 21 Confirming such findings, the Appellate Body
stated "the essential facts that MOFCOM should have disclosed in respect of the 'low price ' of
subject imports include the price comparisons between subject imports and the like domestic
products. … because they were required for an understanding of the occurrence of price
undercutting, which served as a basis for MOFCOM's price effects finding".22

22 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 247.

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ANNEX C-3
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF TURKEY
1 INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairperson, Distinguished Members of the Panel.

1. The Republic of Turkey (hereinafter referred to as "Turkey") would like to thank the Panel for
the opportunity to present this Oral Statement as a Third Party in the current proceedings.
2. As stated in our third party written submission, Turkey exercises its third party rights under
Article 10 of the DSU in this case not only because of its systemic interest in the co rrect
interpretation of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (hereinafter
referred to as "Anti-Dumping Agreement "), but also its substantial trade interests that is
negatively affected by the measures at issue in this dispute. Tur key provided a written submission
to the Panel on 29 January 2016. In this Oral Statement, Turkey does not wish to reiterate the
arguments stated in its written submission but Turkey would like to briefly elaborate some
important parts of its written submission.
2 CLAIMS UNDER ARTICLES 3.1 AND 4.1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
3. In its written submission Turkey argued that the accurate definition of the "product under
consideration" and "like product " constitutes the very foundation of a coherent and unbia sed
determination of the "domestic industry". Indeed, it is indispensable to conduct an objective injury
analysis in line with the overarching principles stipulated in Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.1
4. Since, Article 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement defines the "domestic industry" as either the
domestic producers as a whole or those domestic producers whose output constitutes a major
proportion of the product under consideration, Turkey considers that the investigating authority is
under the obligation to identify the domestic producers of the like product as precisely as possible.
5. In a dumping investigation, however, the issue whether the investigating authority has put
"reasonable" effort to identify all domestic producers is a question that must be addressed on a
case-by-case basis. Accordingly, assessing whether "reasonable effort " was shown depends, on
different factors; inter alia , the structure of the market, number of the market players, the
percentage of registered production facilities and willingness of the domestic producers to declare
their output data.
6. Finally, the risk of distortion of the injury analysis can be mitigated if the universe of all
domestic producers is defined as entirely and accurately as possible and the "domestic industry" is
defined with a view of reaching an objective picture of the injury based on positive evidence.2
3 CLAIMS UNDER ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT
7. Considering the claims and arguments on the period of investigation Tu rkey reiterates its
position that maintaining symmetry between the "period of dumping determination" and "period of
injury determination" is imperative to ensure an objective and even -handed analysis on injury and

1 Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China,
WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012, para. 7.315; Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Automobiles from the United States, WT/DS440/R, adopted 18 June 2014, para. 7.211.
2 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron
and Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 July 2011, para. 414; Panel Report, China –
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/R,
adopted 25 September 2013, para. 7.413.

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causation. As underlined in its written su bmission3, Turkey is of the view that the rules set in the
Recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices reflect this rationale clearly.
8. Turkey understands that the "price effect" analysis is one of the fundamental components of a
coherent in jury and causation assessment. As confirmed by the case law, the concepts of
"explanatory force" and "dynamic price assessment" are significant instruments to strengthen the
legal discipline of Article 3.2 and drive the investigating authority to inquire f urther the link
between the state of the domestic industry and the price impact of the dumped imports. Turkey,
however, opines that examinations to satisfy the requirements of these concepts may not be
always straight forward or easily handled. Turkey ackn owledges that investigating authority is
under the obligation to achieve this complicated work with a view of acting in line with the
principles of Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.4
9. As regards the legal discipline stipulated in Article 3.4 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement, Turkey
underlines that the investigating authority is expected not only to analyze the trend of individual
factors but also to establish the cross -connections between factors that will depict a more
complete and precise picture of the domestic industry 's state. Furthermore, Turkey understands
that the Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement implicitly directs the investigating authority to
evaluate economic indicators of the domestic industry in a holistic manner without singling out or
giving less emphasis to those indicators that display affirmative outcomes on the viability of the
domestic industry.
10. Finally, as underscored in case law 5 Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates two
separate paths of evaluation to reach the conclusion that causality is present between the dumped
imports under consideration and injury of the domestic industry. From a practitioner 's point of
view, Turkey acknowledges that "causality" analysis is one of the most challenging parts of an
investigation. In that context, Turkey opines that while the investigating authority is expected to
show the link between the dumped imports and injury, it is equally responsible to examine
whether the "other known factors " are in such a magnitude that they r ender the link between
dumped imports and injury irrelevant.
4 CONCLUSION
11. Mr. Chairperson, distinguished Members of the Panel, with these comments, Turkey would like
to contribute to the legal debate of the parties in this case, and express again its app reciation for
this opportunity to share its views on this relevant debate, regarding the interpretation of Anti -
Dumping Agreement.
12. We thank you for your kind attention and remain at your disposal for any question you may
have.

3 Turkey's Third Party Written Submission, para. 29.
4 Ibid, paras. 34, 35.
5 Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled
Electrical Steel from the United States, WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012, para. 151.

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ANNEX C-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF UKRAINE
1. In its written submission and oral statement Ukraine provided comments on certain legal issues
involving the consistency of the anti-dumping measures applied by Eurasian Economic Commission
("EAEC") with Articles 3 .1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 6.5, 6.5.1, 6.9, and 12.2 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti -dumping
Agreement") and Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994").
2. Ukraine considers that the fact that EAEC excluded "Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod " from the
definition of the domestic industry on the grounds that it provided lacking or deficient information
violates provisions of Articles 3.1, 4.1, and 6.6 of Anti-dumping Agreement.
3. First, Article 6.6 places "the burden of satisfying oneself of the accuracy of the information on
the investigating authority" 1 with a sole exception of circumstances provided in Article 6.8 and
Annex II to Anti -dumping Agreement following t he extensive procedures provided therein.
Moreover, Panel in US – Hot-Rolled Steel explicitly stated that "where information is actually
submitted in time to be verified, and actually could be verified, we consider that it should generally
be accepted".2 Therefore, declaring a producer non -cooperating and disregarding its information
after finding it deficient shall not be done without making an extensive effort to verify the provided
information.
4. Second, Ukraine considers that deviation from specific defi nition of the domestic industry may
result in a violation of Article 4.1. Specifically, the Panel in Argentina – Poultry Anti -Dumping
Duties states" if a Member were to interpret the term differently in the context of an anti -dumping
investigation, that Member would violate the obligation set forth in Article 4.1".3 As Article 4.1 sets
out explicably only two specific circumstances that permit an investigating authority to deliberately
exclude producers from the domestic industry (one for related producers and one for definition of
separate competitive markets), the investigating authority shall include every producer into
domestic industry unless it has very strong reasons for the opposite.
5. Third, the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China) provided plainly that "excluding a whole
category of producers of the like product" is an example of behaviour that creates a risk of
"distortion in defining the domestic industry" 4 and results in a lack of objective examination
contrary to provisions of Article 3.1. Ukr aine fails to understand how EAEC could have conducted
objective examination by intentionally ignoring a producer as non -cooperating and limiting its
definition of the domestic industry with applicant only even though the other producer fully
participated in the investigation.
6. In connection to the fact that the Russian Federation excluded examination of certain factors
(namely, the return on investments, the actual and potential negative effects on cash flow and the
ability to raise capital or investments) Ukraine notes that it was not consistent with several
provisions of Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7. Ukraine finds it important to understand the precise scope of explanations of the Appellate
Body in Thailand – H-Beams. While the Appellate Body explained that ther e is "no justification for
reading these obligations [of Article 12] into the substantive provisions of Article 3.1"5 and that the
determination made by the investigating authority under Article 3.1 must not be "based only on
reasoning or facts that were d isclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to an anti -dumping
investigation"6, Ukraine considers that these conclusions applied only to the factual basis and
reasoning that is the basis for investigating authority's conclusions: nothing in Article 3.1 or 3.4

1 Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.57.
2 Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.55.
3 Panel report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, para. 7.338
4 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners, para. 414.
5 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 110.
6 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 111.

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could justify making the whole examination of the required elements of injury confidential and
excluding it from the public report.
8. Moreover, such exclusion should also violate requirements of Article 12.2 Anti -dumping
Agreement that reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures should be included into
public notice with "due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential
information". The findings of the investigating authority are not such information.
9. Therefore, Ukraine considers that excluding findings of the investigating authorities on
obligatory factors from the public record violates both Article 3.4 and 12.2 of Anti -
dumping Agreement.

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ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1 THE EUROPEAN UNION' S CLAIMS REGARDING A RTICLES 3.1 AND 4.1 OF THE AD
AGREEMENT
1. The United States agrees with the EU that Article 4.1 must be r ead in conjunction with
Article 3.1. Article 4.1 establishes that the "domestic industry" can be defined as either (1) the
"domestic producers as a whole of the like products, " i.e., all domestic producers, or (2) a subset
of domestic producers "whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production " of the lik e products. Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not
require that all domestic producers be included in the domestic industry, nor does it articulate a
minimum limit on the percentage of domestic production that must be included to constitute a
"major proportion" of the total domestic production of those products.
2. Although undefined in the AD Agreement, the term "major proportion" must be interpreted in
the context of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement sets forth two
overarching obligations that apply to multiple aspects of an authority 's injury determination. The
first overarching obligation is that the injury determination be based on "positive evidence." The
second obligation is that the injury determination involves an "objective examination " of the
volume of the dumped imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic industry.
3. The United States recalls that the plain language of Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement
should guide the Panel's analysis. The Panel should consider whether the authority, consistent with
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, defined the domestic industry as "domestic producers as a
whole," or instead defined the domestic industry as those producers whose production constitutes
a "major proportion" of total domestic production of the like product. If the Panel determines that
the authority's definition of the domestic industry is composed of "domestic producers as a whole,"
then the inquiry may end. The Appellate Body stated in EC – Fasteners (China) that "[t]he risk of
introducing distortion will not arise when no producers are excluded and the domestic industry is
defined as 'the domestic producers as a whole. '" If, however, the Panel concludes that the
domestic industry is claimed to b e composed of domestic producers that constitute a "major
proportion" of total domestic production, then the inquiry does not end.
4. In this case, the Panel should consider whether the authority, consistent with Article 3.1,
defined the domestic industry in a fair and unbiased manner. A flawed definition of the domestic
industry can distort an authority 's material injury analysis. For a material injury determination to
be based on "positive evidence and involve an objective examination, " the authority must r ely
upon a properly defined domestic industry to perform the analysis. The Appellate Body has
recognized that a proper definition of the domestic industry is critical to ensuring an accurate and
unbiased injury analysis
5. The Panel is to evaluate whether the authority's definition of the domestic industry introduces a
distortion to the analysis and, in doing so, it should consider the existence of an inverse
relationship between the proportion of producers included in the domestic industry and the
absence of a risk of material distortion in the assessment of injury.
2 THE EUROPEAN UNION 'S CLAIMS REGARDING A RTICLES 3.1 AND 3.2 OF THE AD
AGREEMENT
6. The United States agrees with the views expressed by the parties that the obligations of
Article 3.2 must be c onsidered in conjunction with the overarching obligations of Article 3.1.
Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement outlines the examination that authorities must conduct to
determine the price effects of dumped imports on the domestic market. The plain text of
Article 3.1 makes clear that these obligations extend to an authority's price effects analysis.
7. First, the United States observes that Article 3.2 requires that an authority "consider" the
volume and price effects of the relevant imports. Article 3.1 provide s important context for

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Article 3.2 and serves to frame the level of scrutiny and analysis required of an authority to meet
the obligation to "consider" the price effects of dumped imports. Article 3.1 dictates that one
element of a determination of injury i s the effect of dumped imports on price in the domestic
market. Thus, an authority's finding on price effects has broad significance, and contributes to the
ultimate determination of injury. For that reason, the authority must provide an evidentiary basis
for its finding on price effects.
8. Second, the United States agrees with the EU that, in assessing price suppression, the
authority may not confine its consideration to an analysis of domestic prices. Rather, the plain text
of Article 3.2 envisions an inq uiry into the relationship between subject imports and domestic
prices. Article 3.2 introduces the obligations on price effects by clarifying that the nature of the
inquiry is to understand the "effect of the dumped imports on prices. " An authority's analysis of
the three delineated price effects – price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression –
must necessarily be in reference to the dumped imports.
3 CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.4 OF THE AD AGREEMENT
9. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement specifies an authority 's obligation to ascertain the impact of
dumped imports on the domestic industry. The United States observes that Article 3.4 imposes an
obligation on the authority to conduct an "examination" of the impact of the dumped imports on
the domestic industry. The text of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement expressly requires investigating
authorities to examine the "impact" of subject imports on a domestic industry, and not just the
state of the industry.
10. As recognized by Articles 3.1 and 3. 2 of the AD Agreement, subject imports can influence a
domestic industry 's performance through price effects, as where subject imports depress or
suppress domestic like product prices. Thus, to examine the impact of subject imports on a
domestic industry, an authority would need to consider the relationship between subject imports –
including subject import price undercutting, and the price depressing or suppressing effects of
subject imports – and the domestic industry's performance during the period of investigation. Such
an examination would necessarily encompass trends over the entire period of investigation
because correlations between subject import trends and domestic industry performance trends
over time would be highly relevant to an authority's impact analysis, and such trends would clearly
constitute "relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry."
11. Thus, in examining "the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic
industry" pursuant to A rticle 3.4 of the AD Agreement, an authority must consider whether
changes in the state of the industry are the consequences of subject imports and whether subject
imports have explanatory force for the industry 's performance trends. The "examination"
contemplated by Article 3.4 must be based on a "thorough evaluation of the state of the industry "
and it must "contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of relevant factors led to
the determination of injury."
12. The manner in which an authority c hooses to articulate the "evaluation" of economic factors
may vary. Article 3.4 does not dictate the methodology that should be employed by the authority,
or the manner in which the results of this evaluation are to be set out. The United States observes
that the Panel must be able to discern that the authority 's examination of the impact on the
domestic industry – an examination that necessarily includes an evaluation of relevant economic
factors – is based on positive evidence and an objective examination
4 CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE AD AGREEMENT
13. As with Articles 3.2 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement, the Appellate Body has recognized that it is
appropriate to read the obligations of Article 3.5 in conjunction with Article 3.1 of the AD
Agreement.
14. The first sentence of Article 3.5 sets out the general requirement for a demonstration that
dumped imports are causing injury under the AD Agreement, and contains an explicit link back to
Articles 3.2 (volume and price effects) and 3.4 (impact on domestic industries). If the volume or
price effects findings are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2, or the impact findings
are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4, an Article 3.5 causal link analysis relying on

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such finding s would fail. That is, if an authority relies on a price effects finding to support its
impact and injury determinations, its decision must be supported by positive evidence on these
counts. In such circumstances, a failure to demonstrate price effects or significant impact would
constitute a failure to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury, as required by the first
sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
15. Recent panels have reached this very understanding. The panel in China – Autos (US)
explained "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a determination of causation consistent
with the requirements of Articles 3 and 15 of the Anti -Dumping and SCM Agreements,
respectively, in a situation where an important element of that determin ation, the underlying price
effects analysis, is itself inconsistent with the provisions of those Agreements. " The panel properly
recognized that a final injury determination is the product of multiple intermediate determinations,
each of which must be supported by positive evidence and an objective examination.
16. The third sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement provides that, in addition to examining
the effects of the dumped imports, an authority must examine other known factors which at the
same time are injuring the domestic industry. Under Article 3.5, the premise of a non -attribution
analysis is that there is at least one known factor other than the dumped imports that is injuring
the domestic industry. As the Appellate Body h as found, if a known factor other than dumped
imports is a cause of injury, the third sentence of Article 3.5 requires the authority to engage in a
non-attribution analysis to ensure that the effects of that other factor are not attributed to the
dumped im ports. If there are no other known factors other than the dumped imports that are
injuring the domestic industry, Article 3.5 does not require an authority to conduct a non -
attribution analysis. Indeed, in such circumstances, the authority can appropriatel y attribute all
injury to the dumped imports.
17. The AD Agreement does not specify the particular methods and approaches an authority may
use to conduct a non -attribution analysis. The question of whether an investigating authority 's
analysis is consistent w ith Article 3 should turn on whether the authority has in fact evaluated
these factors and whether its evaluation is supported by positive evidence and reflects an objective
examination, as required by Article 3.1.
5 THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLE 6 OF THE AD AGREEMENT
A. Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of t he AD Agreement Require Designation of Confidential
Information and Public Summaries
18. The United States considers that Article 6.5 requires that investigating authorities ensure the
confidential treatment of information. Article 6.5.1 then balances the need to protect confidential
information against the disclosure requirements of other Article 6 provisions by requiring that, if an
investigating authority accepts confidential information, it shall require that confidential
information is summarized in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information. Furthermore, footnote 17 of the AD Agreement contemplates one
mechanism by which authorities can balance thes e competing interests, which is through a
narrowly-drawn protective order.
19. Under Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement, investigating authorities must treat as confidential
information that is "by nature" confidential or that is provided "on a confidential basis ," and for
which "good cause " is shown for such treatment. Without taking a position on the appropriate
classification of the export and import statistics, the U.S. agrees with the parties' observations that
any information which is by nature confidential may be treated as confidential upon a showing of
good cause.
20. The Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China) supported this view when it explained that a
party must show good cause for confidential treatment at the time the information is submitted,
after whi ch the investigating authority "must objectively assess the 'good cause ' alleged for
confidential treatment, and scrutinize the party 's showing in order to determine whether the
submitting party has sufficiently substantiated its request. " An investigating authority that accepts
confidential information from an interested party must ensure that a non -confidential summary of
such information is provided to other parties. Such a summary must convey a "reasonable
understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence."

- C-18 -

21. The United States also notes that Article 6.5 does not obligate the investigating authority to
provide a separate or detailed explanation whenever the authority accepts a claim of confidential
treatment. Further, nothing in th e standard of review employed in trade remedy disputes leads to
an unwritten obligation for an authority to provide such explanations.
22. In many trade remedy proceedings, the merits underlying the grant of confidential treatment
will be plain on the face of the record of a proceeding. For example, the authority may set up a
procedure in which parties requesting confidential treatment may certify that specific information
is confidential because it is not publicly available and the release will cause harm to the submitter.
Where a party submits such a request, for example, involving sensitive information such as costs,
or prices given to specific customers, the good cause for confidential treatment is plainly evident.
In such situations, it would be a major de parture from the text of the AD Agreement to require a
separate and detailed explanation whenever an authority accepts a plainly reasonable request for
confidential treatment.
23. The United States observes that the Panel should first determine if the investi gating authority
appropriately designated information as confidential. The Panel should then determine whether an
investigating authority that accepted confidential information ensured that a summary of that
confidential information was provided to other p arties in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the information.
B. Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement Requires Disclosure of Essential Facts
24. The United States agrees with the views expressed by Russia and the EU that A rticle 6.9
requires that the investigating authority disclose to interested parties the "essential facts" forming
the basis of the investigating authority 's decision to apply anti -dumping duties. The meaning of
"essential facts" in this context is informed by the description that these facts "form the basis for
the decision whether to apply definitive measures " and the requirement that they be disclosed "in
sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests. " Indeed, the ability of interested parties to
defend their interests lies at the heart of the disclosure obligation of Article 6.9.
25. Without a full disclosure of the essential facts under consideration in the underlying dumping,
injury, and causation determinations, it would not be possible for a party to identify whether the
determinations contain clerical or mathematical errors or even whether the investigating authority
actually did what it purported to do. The panel 's analysis in China – Broiler Products provide
further guidance regarding "essential facts" that must be disclosed to interested parties. In that
dispute, the panel stated that, under Article 6.9, "the 'essential facts' underlying the findings and
conclusions relating to (dumping, injury, and a causal link)…must be disclosed. " As to the
determination of the existence and margin of dumping specifically, the panel reasoned that the
investigating authority must disclose data used in: (1) the determination of normal value
(including constructed value); (2) the determination of export pric e; (3) the sales that were used
in the comparison between normal value and export prices; (4) any adjustments for differences
which affect price comparability; and (5) the formulas that were applied to the data.
26. The calculations relied on by the investigating authority to determine normal value and export
prices, as well as the data underlying those calculations, constitute "essential facts" forming the
basis of the investigating authority's imposition of final measures within the meaning of Article 6.9.
Without such information, no affirmative determination could be made and no definitive duties
could be imposed. Additionally, if the interested parties are not provided access to these facts used
by the investigating authority on a timely basis, they cannot defend their interests.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT
27. Regarding the interpretation of the domestic industry, Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement defines
the "domestic industry " as referring to the industry as a whole, or those producer s whose
production constitutes a "major proportion" of the total domestic production. For the purpose of
our comments today, we focus on the latter situation, where an authority seeks to define the
domestic industry as a "major proportion" of domestic production. Under such circumstances, the
"major proportion " requirement is to be read in conjunction with the overarching obligation of
Article 3.1. That provision requires that a final material injury determination be based on "positive
evidence" and an "objective examination " of the facts. To result in such a determination, the

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authority's definition of the domestic industry must be unbiased so as not to give rise to a material
risk of distortion.
28. An investigating authority's need to define the domestic i ndustry is a critical early step to the
injury analysis. The definition of the domestic industry affects several of the intermediate
conclusions that flow into the final determination. Thus, a definition of the domestic industry that
introduces a material risk of distortion may have broad repercussions on the injury determination
and subsequent impact and causation analyses.
29. The Appellate Body has opined that the "major proportion" obligation of Article 4.1 has both
quantitative and qualitative connotation s. The Appellate Body has suggested an inverse
relationship between the proportion of producers represented in the domestic industry and the
absence of a risk of material distortion. The United States does not take issue with the concept of
an inverse relationship; to consider the issue in this manner can be a helpful analytical tool. But,
the United States stresses that Article 3.1 stands on its own. The conceptual framework articulated
by the Appellate Body cannot be used to excuse an authority from its o bligation to define the
domestic industry in a manner that is unbiased and does not favor the interests of one party over
another. For this reason, an authority must take care to define the domestic industry in a manner
that satisfies the "major proportion" requirement of Article 4.1 and Article 3.1's obligation that the
definition be unbiased and objective so as not to give rise to a material risk of distortion.
30. The United States will next address a narrow aspect of the legal obligation found in Article 3.2
of the AD Agreement. The article requires an investigating authority to "consider" the volume and
price effects of dumped imports. The AD Agreement does not define how an authority is to
"consider" the volume and price effects of the relevant imports
31. The United States submits that the requirement "to consider" price effects in Article 3.2, read
in the context of Article 3.1, requires an authority to identify an evidentiary basis for a finding on
price effects and conduct an examination that provides a m eaningful understanding of those
effects. The text does not require an authority to make a definitive determination on price effects,
but a passive recitation of the facts will not suffice. The context of Article 3.1, and the primary role
of the price effe cts analysis in the injury determination, dictate that an authority is to articulate a
finding of price effects that is based on positive evidence and an objective examination.

- D-1 -

ANNEX D
PRELIMINARY RULING
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Preliminary Ruling on the Panel's jurisdiction under Article 6.2 of the DSU dated
20 April 2016
D-2

- D-2 -

ANNEX D-1
PRELIMINARY RULING ON THE PANEL'S JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 6.2 OF THE DSU
20 April 2016
1 INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
1.1. The Russian Federation requests a preliminary ruling on whether certain claims addressed by
the European Union in its first written submission are within the scope of the request for the
establishment of a panel in this dispute and therefore within the jurisdiction of this Panel.

1.2. According to the Russian Federation, in its Request for Consultations of 26 May 2014 1 and
Request for the Establishment of a Panel of 1 6 September 2014 2, the European Union claimed
that, inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the Russian Federation failed
to inform the interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis of
the decision to impose anti -dumping measures, including facts underlying the determinations of
the existence o f dumping, the calculation of the margins of dumping and "the determination of
injury".3 In its first written submission, the European Union argued that the Russian Federation
had violated its obligations under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to disclose
to the interested parties the essential facts under consideration that formed the basis for the
determination of "a causal link between the dumping and the injury" .4 In the Russian Federation's
view, this is a "new claim" that was not i ncluded in either the consultations request or the panel
request. As such, it impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute and changed "the essence of
the complaint".5 The test established by the Appellate Body in respect of Article 6.2 of the DSU is
"the ability of the respondent to defend itself". 6 The panel request does not meet this test in
relation to the claim regarding the determination of causality. Therefore, the Russian Federation
requests a preliminary ruling that this claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Panel.7

1.3. The European Union responds that the "phrase 'determination of injury' in the EU’s
consultation and panel requests should be read in light of Article 3 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement
… [which] is entitled 'Determination o f injury'."8 Paragraph 5 of Article 3 deals with causation and
non-attribution, and thus, for the European Union, the phrase "determination of injury" includes
these elements. The European Union considers that paragraph 1 of the panel request refers to
"injury determination" in the same sense – that is, as including causation and non -attribution.9
Finally, paragraph 8 of the panel request is drafted in a non-exhaustive manner.10

2 THE GOVERNING LAW
2.1. Articles 7 and 6.2 of the DSU set out the jurisdiction of the Panel. Article 7 of the DSU
provides that, unless the parties agree otherwise, the terms of reference of a panel are set out in
the DSB document establishing that panel. These terms of reference are, in turn, based on the
request for the establishme nt of the panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU , which states in relevant
part:

The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a

1 WT/DS479/1; G/L/1070; G/ADP/D103/1; 26 May 2014 (hereinafter consultations request).
2 WT/DS479/2; 16 September 2014 (hereinafter panel request).
3 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 6. (emphasis added)
4 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 684. (emphasis added)
5 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 685.
6 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 127.
7 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 688; See also Russian Federation's second written
submission, paras. 306-309.
8 European Union's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 2; second written submission, paras. 7-14.
9 Ibid., para. 4.
10 Ibid., para. 5.

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brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly.
2.2. Previous panel and Appellate Body reports have clarified these provisions, and it is now well
understood that:

a. A panel has the inherent jurisdiction to determine whether a matter falls within its terms
of reference.11
b. Where a matter or a claim does not satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2, it is not
within the jurisdiction of the panel.12
c. A defect in the panel request may not be "cured" in later submissions.13
d. To determine whether a matter or a claim falls within the terms of reference of the
panel, the panel request should be read in its entirety.14
e. The use of terminology such as "including" "cannot operate to include any and all other
claims not specifically included in the request".15
f. Article 6.2 protects a Member's due process interests in the course of litigation. 16 At the
same time, the procedural rules of the WTO should not be used as litigation
techniques.17
3 ANALYSIS
3.1. The Russian Federation argues that the European Union referred only to "injury
determination" but not to "causation" or "non -attribution" in the context of its claim s under
Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement (Article 6.9 claims) as set out in the consultation
request and panel request. For this reason, the Russian Federation considers that the aspect of the
European Union's Article 6.9 claims related to causation and non -attribution falls outside the
Panel's jurisdiction.

3.2. In its panel request the European Union set out the following claims:

1. Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, because, by selecting non -
consecutive periods of non -equal duration for the examination of the trends for the
whole domestic industry, Russia's injury determination was not based on an
objective examination of positive evidence. …
4. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, because Russia failed to conduct an
objective examination, based on positive evidence, of the causal relationship
between the imports under investigation and the all eged injury to the domestic
industry. Russia also failed to conduct an objective examination, based on positive
evidence, of factors other than the imports under investigation which have been
injuring the domestic industry, and therefore improperly attributed the injuries caused
by these other factors to the imports under investigation. …
8. Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, because Russia failed to inform the interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis of the decision
to impose antidumping measures , including the essential facts underlying the

11 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 45.
12 Panel Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, para. 288; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
para. 126.
13 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 143.
14 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 127.
15 Appellate Body Reports, India – Patents (US), para. 90; and EC – Fasteners (China), para. 597.
16 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126.
17 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 166.

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determinations of the existence of dumping and the calculation of the margins of
dumping and the determination of injury.18
The European Union specifically identified both causatio n and non -attribution in the claim related
to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement set out in paragraph 4 of its panel request. While no
specific reference is made to either causation or non-attribution in paragraph 8, which sets out the
Article 6.9 c laims, the reference to the determination of injury is introduced by the word
"including". The European Union argues that in paragraph 1 of the panel request mention is made
of Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in respect of the "injury determinati on". For this
reason, both here and in paragraph 8, the term "injury determination" should be read to include
causation and non-attribution.

3.3. The Russian Federation's argument raises a concern that the absence of any specific
reference to causation and non-attribution in paragraph 8 of the panel request risks a measure of
imprecision in the scope of the European Union's Article 6.9 claim s. In this regard, we recall the
findings of the panel in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports:

Due process requires that the complaining party fully assume the burden of identifying
the specific measures under challenge.
…
In our view, it is a corollary of the due process objective inherent in Article 6.2 that a
complaining party, as the party in control of th e drafting of a panel request, should
bear the risk of any lack of precision in the panel request.19
At the same time, however, we recall that to determine whether a claim meets the due process
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, it must be viewed in th e context of the panel request as a
whole. As well, in any claim the measure at issue and the legal basis of the complaint impart
meaning to one another.

3.4. In this context, we make the following two observations. First, the use of the same term in
different places in the same document implies, absent indications to the contrary, that it should be
understood to have the same scope throughout the document, and there is nothing in the panel
request to suggest that this should not be the case here: follo wing on from paragraph 1 of the
panel request, subsequent references to the "injury determination" in the context of a claim
referring to Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, or 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement suggest to us that the
term may properly be understood to include all the relevant elements of an injury determination
set out in those provisions, including causation and non -attribution. Accordingly, "injury
determination" when used in paragraph 8 should be understood to have the same scope as when
used in par agraph 1 – that is, to also include the causation and non -attribution aspects of
Article 3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement . Second, paragraph 8 closely tracks the text of
Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in referring to "essential facts under cons ideration
which form the basis of the decision to impose antidumping measures". The decision to impose
anti-dumping measures rests on consideration of all the relevant elements of the determination of
injury set out in Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.5. In our view, it is clear that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement covers all elements of
a decision to impose an anti -dumping measure, and that this also includes causation and non -
attribution.20 Moreover, we note that in setting out the s cope of its obligation under Article 6.9 of

18 Emphases added. These are substantially similar to the corresponding paragraphs of the consultation
request.
19 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, paras. 24-25. (emphasis added)
20 Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SST, para. 5.130: "In order to apply a definitive measure, an
investigating authority must find dumping, injury to the domestic industry, and a causal link between the
dumping and the injury." See also Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 241: "We agree with the Panel
that, '[i]n order to apply definitive measures at the conclusion of countervailing and anti-dumping
investigations, an investigating authority must find dumping or subsidization, injury and a causal link'". And
panel Report, China – Autos (US), para 7.71:
In order to apply definitive measures at the conclusion of AD investigations, an IA must find
three key elements: (i) dumping; (ii) injury; and (iii) a causal link. Therefore, the "essential

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the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its first written submission, the Russian Federation referred to the
panel's findings in China – Broiler Products:

In this regard the panel in China – Broiler Products has noted tha t the investigating
authority must find three key elements in order to apply definitive measures: (i)
dumping, (ii) injury and (iii) causal link . Therefore, the "essential facts "
underlying the findings and conclusion relating to these elements form the
basis of the decision to apply definitive measures and must be disclosed.21
This demonstrates that the Russian Federation was or should have been aware that in the panel
request in this case, the term "determination of injury" in paragraph 8 was to be underst ood to
encompass the elements of causation and non -attribution. The use of the term "determination of
injury" without specifying the elements of causal link or non -attribution does not detract from the
clear Article 6.9 legal requirement.

4 CONCLUSION
4.1. The Russian Federation has failed to establish that the claim of the European Union under
Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in relation to alleged failure to disclose essential facts
concerning causation and non -attribution is a "new claim" that falls outside the jurisdiction of the
Panel.

facts" underlying the findings and conclusions relating to these elements form the basis for the
decision to apply definitive measures, and must be disclosed.
21 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 718. (emphasis added) See also Russian
Federation's second written submission, at para. 327 (in the section dealing with the interpretation of
Article 6.9): "It is a clear that a definitive measure is applied if dumping and injury caused by dumping are
found." (emphasis added)