UNITED STATES – FINAL DUMPING DETERMINATION ON SOFTWOOD LUMBER FROM CANADA (WT/DS264)
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 13 April 2004
Document codes: WT/DS264/R
Complainant: Canada
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: China, EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 4, 5, 9  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994Art. 18  Anti-dumping

UNITED STATES – FINAL DUMPING DETERMINATION
ON SOFTWOOD LUMBER FROM CANADA
(WT/DS264)

Report of the Panel

I. INTRODUCTION
A. COMPLAINT OF CANADA
1.1 On 13 September 2002, Canada requested cons ultations with the Government of the
United States pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXII of the GATT 1994 and Article 17 of the
AD Agreement, concerning the Final Determination of sales at less than fair value with respect to
certain softwood lumber products from Canada published in the Federal Register on 2 April 2002, and
amended on 22 May 2002, pursuant to section 735 of the Tariff Act.1
1.2 On 11 October 2002, Canada and the United Stat es held the requested consultations, but
failed to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter.
1.3 On 6 December 2002, Canada requested the establishment of a panel to examine the matter.2
B. ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL
1.4 At its meeting on 8 January 2003, the DSB established a Panel in accordance with Article 6 of
the DSU and pursuant to the request made by Canada in document
1.5 At that meeting, the parties to the dispute al so agreed that the Panel should have standard
terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following:
"[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by Canada in document , the ma tter referred by Canada to the DSB in
that document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements".
1.6 On 25 February 2003, the parties agreed to the following composition of the Panel:
3
Chairman: Mr. Harsha V. Singh
Members: Mr. Gerhard Hannes Welge
 Mr. Adrián Makuc
1.7 The Panel was formally composed on 4 March 2003.
1.8 The European Communities, India and Japan reserved their third-party rights.
C. PANEL PROCEEDINGS
1.9 The Panel met with the parties on 17-18 June 2003 and 11-12 August 2003. The Panel met
with third parties on 18 June 2003.
1.10 On 16 January 2004, the Panel provided its inte rim report to the parties. See Section VI,
infra.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 On 2 April 2001, an anti-dumping application was filed with DOC and the ITC by the
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Committ ee, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and

1 WT/DS/264/1.
2 WT/DS/264/2.
3 WT/DS/264/3.

Joiners and the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union, with the
subject merchandise certain softwood lumber products imported from Canada.
2.2 On 23 April 2001, DOC initiated the investiga tion and published the Notice of Initiation on
30 April 2001.
4 Due to the large number of exporters of the subject merchandise, DOC limited its
investigation to the six largest producers and expor ters of Canadian softwood lumber, namely, West
Fraser, Slocan, Tembec, Abitibi, Canfor and Weyerhaeuser Canada.
2.3 The scope of the investigation was defined in the Notice of Initiation as follows:
"[t]he products covered by this investigation are softwood lumber, flooring and siding
(softwood lumber products). Softwood lu mber products include all products
classified under headings 4407.1000 , 4409.1010, 4409.1090, a nd 4409.1020,
respectively, of the HTSUS, and any softwood lumber, flooring and siding described
below. These softwood lumber products include:

(1) Coniferous wood, sawn or chipped lengt hwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not
planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding six millimeters;
(2) Coniferous wood siding (i ncluding strips and friezes for parquet flooring, not
assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, gr ooved, rabbeted, cham fered, V-jointed,
beaded, molded, rounded or the like) along any of its edges or faces, whether or not
planed, sanded or fingerjointed;
(3) Other coniferous wood (including stri ps and friezes for parquet flooring, not
assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, gr ooved, rabbeted, cham fered, V-jointed,
beaded, molded, rounded or the like) along any of its edges or faces (other than wood
mouldings and wood dowel rods) whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed; and
(4) Coniferous wood flooring (including st rips and friezes for parquet flooring, not
assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, gr ooved, rabbeted, cham fered, V-jointed,
beaded, molded, rounded or the like) along any of its edges or faces, whether or not
planed, sanded or fingerjointed".
5
2.4 The period of investigation for the dumping de termination was established as 1 April 2000 to
31 March 2001.
2.5 DOC issued its Preliminary Determination on 31 October 2001, which was published in the
Federal Register on 6 November 2001. 6 It issued a determination on the scope of the products
covered by the investigation on 12 March 2002, and held a hearing on the matter on 19 March 2002.7
2.6 The final anti-dumping duty order was publishe d in the Federal Register on 2 April 2002 8,
and amended on 22 May 2002 9, imposing anti-dumping duties, ranging from 2.18 per cent to
12.44 per cent on Canadian softwood lumber producer s and exporters. The final scope of the anti-
dumping order included a number of product exclusions.10

4 Exhibit CDA-9, Initiation, p. 21328 et seq.
5 Id., p. 21329.
6 Exhibit CDA-11, Preliminary Determination, p. 56062 et seq.
7 Exhibit CDA-1, Final Determination, Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 99, p. 15539.
8 Id., p. 15539, et seq.
9 Exhibit CDA-3, Amended Final Determination. See para. 7.139, infra, for the amended scope of the
final anti-dumping duty order.
10 Ibid.

III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CANADA
3.1 Canada requests the Panel in its first written submission to:
(a) find that the Petition filed by the US domestic industry did not contain "such
information as [was] reasonably available" to the Petitioner, nor did it contain
adequate and accurate evidence of dumping sufficient to justify the initiation of the
investigation, thereby rendering the initiati on inconsistent with US obligations under
Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement;
(b) find that DOC failed to terminate the investig ation for lack of sufficient evidence of
dumping thereby rendering the conduct of the dumping investigation inconsistent
with US obligations under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement;
(c) find that DOC erroneously determined th ere to be only one like product and product
under consideration, thereby rendering the c onduct of the investigation inconsistent
with US obligations under Articles 2, 3, 4.1, 5, 6.10 and 9 of the AD Agreement;
(d) find that DOC applied a number of im proper methodologies in calculating normal
value and export price that resulted in unf air comparisons between the two, thereby
rendering dumping determinations inconsistent with US obligations under Articles 1,
2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. In particular DOC:
(i) failed to make due allowance for differences that affected price
comparability, in particular differe nces in physical characteristics
(i.e., thickness, width and length) of softwood lumber products;
(ii) illegally "zeroed" negative margins of dumping;
(iii) failed to calculate and/or allocate reasonable amounts for administrative,
selling and general expenses in computing costs for specific exporters,
including an improper allocation for financial expenses and for litigation
settlement expenses involving product liab ility claims for a non-investigated
product;
(iv) failed to apply reasonable amounts for by-product revenues from the sale of
wood chips, as offsets in calculating costs; and
(v) failed to offset a difference in price comparability arising from futures
contracts profits after concluding that such a difference existed.
(e) find that the United States acted incons istently with its obligations under
Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the
AD Agreement;
(f) recommend to the DSB that the United States bring its measure into conformity with
its obligations under the WTO, that it re voke the anti-dumping order in respect of
softwood lumber from Canada, and that it re turn the cash deposits collected pursuant
to an illegal investigation and an illegal determination of dumping.

B.
UNITED STATES
3.2 The United States requests that the Panel reject Canada's claims in their entirety.11
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1 The arguments of the parties are set forth in th eir written and oral submissions to the Panel,
and in their answers to questions and in their co mments thereon. The parties' arguments as presented
in their submissions are summarised in this sec tion. The summaries are based on the executive
summaries submitted by the parties. The parties' written answers to questions and comments thereon
are set forth in the Annexes to this Report. (See list of annexes at page vii, supra)
A. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA
4.2 The following are Canada's arguments in its first written submission:
4.3 On 21 March 2002, for the first time in the long-standing softwood lumber dispute between
Canada and the United States, a final dumping find ing was announced against Canadian imports of
softwood lumber into the United States.
4.4 More particularly, on 2 April 2002, DOC's 12 final affirmative determination of dumping
against certain softwood lumber products from Canada was published in the Federal Register. 13 The
"softwood lumber products" covered by DOC's single-determination were defined extremely broadly,
and covered multiple tariff classifications and diverse products ranging from standard dimension
framing lumber used in home construction, to en gineered wood products such as finger-jointed
flangestock, and further manufactured products in cluding mattress box spring frame components, as
well as railroad ties, shelving, siding, decking, flooring and moulding.
4.5 Notwithstanding that there are hundreds of Cana dian exporters of softwood lumber to the
United States, only six Canadian exporters namely, West Fraser, Slocan, Tembec, Abitibi, Canfor and
Weyerhaeuser Canada (6 mandatory respondents or r espondents) were assessed individual margins of
dumping.14 The average margin of dumping for these 6 respondents was used to establish the "all
others" rate for all other exporters.15

12 DOC is the investigating authority in the United States that determines whether dumping exists.
13 Exhibit CDA-1, Final Determination. The notice was accompanied by DOC's IDM (Exhibit
CDA 2), dated 21 March 2002. On 22 May 2002, the United States published the Amended Final
Determination (Exhibit CDA-3).
14 Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement provides that:

"[t]he authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known
exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number
of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such a
determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable
number of interested parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the
basis of information available to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest
percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be
investigated."

In the Final Determination, the six mandatory respondents were assessed the following margins of
dumping: Abitibi – 12.44 per cent; Canfor – 5.96 per cent; Slocan – 7.71 per cent; Tembec – 10.21 per cent;
West Fraser – 2.18 per cent; Weyerhaeuser – 12.39 per cent ( Exhibit CDA-3, Amended Final Determination).
15 An "all others" margin of dumping of 8.43 per cent was applied to all other Canadian exporters of
certain softwood lumber products. Ibid.

4.6 Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 allows Members of the WTO to impose anti-dumping duties to
"offset or prevent dumping". Article 1 of the AD Agreement requires that anti-dumping measures be
applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to
investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement.
4.7 Canada requested consultations with the United States on 13 September 2002 pursuant to
Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXII of GATT 1994 and Article 17 of the AD Agreement. Consultations
were held on 11 October 2002. Un fortunately, those consultations fa iled to settle the dispute. On
19 December 2002, Canada made its first Panel Request pursuant to Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU,
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and Article 17 of the AD Agreement. The DSB established the Panel on
8 January 2003. The terms of reference of the Panel are as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
4.8 In the Final Determination, DOC committed a num ber of fundamental errors that render the
imposition of anti-dumping duties on softwood lumber from Canada by the United States inconsistent
with US obligations under both GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement:
(a) the Petition16 filed by the US domestic industry did not contain "such information as
[was] reasonably available" to the Petitioner 17, nor did it contain adequate and
accurate evidence of dumping sufficient to ju stify the initiation of the investigation,
thereby rendering the initiation inconsiste nt with US obligations under Articles 5.2
and 5.3 of the AD Agreement;
(b) DOC failed to terminate the investigation fo r lack of sufficient evidence of dumping
thereby rendering the conduct of the dumpi ng investigation inconsistent with US
obligations under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement;
(c) DOC erroneously determined there to be only one like product and product under
consideration, thereby rendering the conduct of the investigation inconsistent with US
obligations under Articles 2, 3, 4.1, 5, 6.10 and 9 of the AD Agreement; and
(d) DOC applied a number of improper methodologies in calculating normal value and
export price that resulted in unfair comparisons between the two, thereby rendering
dumping determinations inconsis tent with US obligations under Articles 1, 2.1, 2.2,
2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. In particular DOC:
(i) failed to make due allowance for differences that affected price
comparability, in particular differe nces in physical characteristics
(i.e., thickness, width and length) of softwood lumber products;
(ii) illegally "zeroed" negative margins of dumping;
(iii) failed to calculate and/or allocate reasonable amounts for administrative,
selling and general expenses in computing costs for specific exporters,
including an improper allocation for financial expenses and for litigation
settlement expenses involving product liab ility claims for a non-investigated
product;

16 The "Petition" is the written appli cation filed on behalf of the domestic industry in the United States
to initiate a dumping investigation.
17 The major applicant (or "Petitioner", as referred to in the United States) was the "Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports Executive Committee", an association of US softwood lumber producers established for the
purposes of pursuing trade actions against Canadian soft wood lumber products. The petition was also filed by
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners; a nd the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy
Workers International Union.

(iv) failed to apply reasonable amounts for by-product revenues from the sale of
wood chips, as offsets in calculating costs; and
(v) failed to offset a difference in price comparability arising from futures
contracts profits after concluding that such a difference existed.
4.9 With respect to Canada's first claim regarding the failure of DOC to initiate the investigation
in accordance with US WTO obligations, the Petiti oner offered no specific evidence related to any
particular company in Canada to show actual dumping. The Petitioner provided no evidence of actual
Canadian producer prices or costs to support its dum ping allegations. Yet, evidence showed that one
of the leading members of the petitioning coalition's Executive Committee, IP, wholly owned
Weldwood, one of the major Canadian exporters of softwood lumber to the United States. The
Petitioner had in its possession and control Weldw ood data. For this reason alone, DOC ought to
have concluded that the Petitioner had in its po ssession detailed and better data on actual Canadian
producer prices and costs, and that, therefore, the Petition did not contain such information as was
reasonably available to the Petitioner. DOC's deci sion to initiate the investigation was based on the
Petitioner's misrepresentation that it did not have access to such information, and, therefore, that it
was entitled to rely on other less probative informati on to support its dumping allegation. Even when
DOC learned of the existence of such information, DOC failed to seek to obtain such information.
DOC itself admitted that it did not seek further information.
18
4.10 An objective investigating authority evaluating all of this evidence could not have determined
that the Petition contained (i) such information as w as reasonably available to the Petitioner, or (ii)
adequate and accurate evidence of dumping sufficient to initiate the investigation. Failure to meet
these two requirements meant that DOC had an obliga tion not to initiate the investigation, and where
the investigation had already been initiated, DOC had an obligation to terminate it upon learning of
the deficiencies in the information put forward by the Petitioner, or, at the very least, to address the
deficiencies in the Petition. The WTO has ruled that an applicant cannot provide just any information
or documentation to justify the initiation of an investigation.19
4.11 Notwithstanding the disparate nature of differe nt softwood lumber pr oducts covered by the
Petition, DOC determined there to be only one "p roduct under consideration" and one "like product"
(i.e., all "softwood lumber products"). DOC, ther efore, conducted only one investigation on all
softwood lumber products ranging from dimensional lumber to further manufactured products and
even engineered wood products. The exporter parti es to the investigation (i.e., the respondents)
requested DOC to determine that certain products were so distinct from the general category of
"softwood lumber" that they deserved to be recognized as distinct "products under consideration" and
"like products" from softwood lumber, with differe nt attributes, requiring distinct analysis and
treatment. DOC either ignored these requests or dism issed them without proper justification. DOC's
finding that all softwood lumber products are pa rt of a "continuum of products" is an obvious
contradiction to the evidence of record, and is contrary to the AD Agreement.
4.12 DOC further erred by failing to make due allowa nce in normal values for physical differences
in softwood lumber products to maintain price comp arability and to ensure a fair comparison between
normal value and export price. The evidence before DOC showed that the value of softwood lumber
varies depending on the size of the product (including differences in thickness, width and length), and
DOC itself acknowledged this to be the case. 20 There was, therefore, no justification for ignoring

18 Exhibit CDA-4, NAFTA Anti-Dumping Panel Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 158.
19 Regarding the standard of sufficiency of evidence to justify initiation of an investigation, the panel in
Mexico – Corn Syrup , para. 7.94, considered "instructive" the panel's reference in Guatemala – Cement I,
para. 7.55 to the GATT panel's decision in US – Softwood Lumber II that "‛sufficient evidence' clearly had to
mean more than mere allegation or conjecture, and could not be taken to mean just 'any evidence.'"
20 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 8, p. 51 when it states that:

these differences, and comparing prices for differe nt-sized products without adjusting for such
product differences. An objective investigating au thority evaluating the evidence could not have
determined that size differences in softwood lumb er were irrelevant and that adjustments were,
therefore, not necessary. The WTO has ruled that a ll differences affecting price comparability must
be accounted for.21
4.13 In EC – Bed Linen , the Appellate Body found the practi ce of "zeroing" negative margins of
dumping to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The Appellate Body held that the requirement in
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement to compare weighted average normal values and weighted average
export prices of "all comparable transactions" precl udes the practice of "zeroing" by which negative
margins of dumping are disregarded. 22 The Appellate Body also ruled that "zeroing" results in an
"unfair comparison" between normal value and export price, and is, therefore, inconsistent with
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. DOC admits that it "zeroed" negative margins of dumping in the
anti-dumping investigation against all softwood lumber imports from Canada. 23 As a result, the
dumping margins found by DOC for each company i nvestigated and the "all others rate" were
inflated. The US practice is inconsiste nt with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement for the
same reasons the Appellate Body condemned the EC's practice in EC – Bed Linen.
4.14 A number of other calculations, comparisons a nd determinations made by DOC rest on
impermissible interpretations of the AD Agreement, were made without a proper establishment of the
facts and/or were based on an evaluation of the facts that was neither unbiased nor objective.
Accordingly, these methodologies and the ultimate dete rminations cannot be upheld by the Panel in
light of the applicable standard of review under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement.
4.15 DOC computed costs of production for individual softwood lumber products both for
purposes of determining whether sales in the Canadi an domestic market were made at prices below
costs of production under Article 2.2.1 of the AD Agreement and for purposes of computing normal
value under Article 2.2 when there were no sales of softwood lumber in the Canadian domestic
market or where such sales did not permit a pr oper comparison. In computing such costs of
production DOC was obligated to include reasonable amounts for SG&A costs.
4.16 The AD Agreement provides that such costs must be calculated on the basis of records kept by
the exporter and/or data made available by the exporter to the investigating authority during the
course of the investigation. In each case, the am ounts for SG&A costs must be based on actual data
and must reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration in the country of origin. Where cost allocations become necessary, the investigating
authority must consider all available evidence on th e proper allocation of costs. Thus, G&A expenses

"[s]pecifically, in this case, where products have differences in dimension (i.e., length, width
or thickness) we recognize that these physical differences could result in differences in market
value."

21 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 176-177, where the Appellate Body found that
"Article 2.4 expressly requires that 'allowances' be made for ' any other differences which are also demonstrated
to affect price comparability". (emphasis added) There are, therefore, no di fferences "affec[ting] price
comparability" which are precluded, as such, from being the object of an "allowance". See also Panel Report,
Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, paras. 6.113-6.116, where the panel found that the investigating authority "acted
inconsistently with Article 2.4 by failing to make adjustments for physical di fferences affecting price
comparability".
22 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 66. See also Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings,
where the panel found at para. 7.218 that: "[r]egardless of the magnitude of its effects, "zeroing" constitutes a
violation of the obligations imposed by Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement per se".
23 See Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 12, pp. 65-66 and Exhibit CDA-5, NAFTA Anti-Dumping
Panel Hearing Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 231-233.

not associated with the production or sale of the product must not be included in the calculation of the
exporter's costs. DOC committed several egregious erro rs in its calculations, which, in all instances,
resulted in an inflation of individual exporters' costs of production and margins of dumping.
4.17 In regard to Abitibi, DOC allocated financia l expense to softwood lumber that did not
"reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration". DOC incorrectly deemed financial costs to be allocable to all aspects of Abitibi's
operations in proportion to cost of sales, notwith standing un-rebutted evidence that all its production
and sale of non-subject products, including ne wsprint, pulp and value-added papers, were
significantly more capital intensive relative to cost of sales than was lumber.
4.18 DOC's calculations of Tembec's "administra tive, selling and general costs" were not
reasonable in that they were not based on actual da ta that Tembec had provided to DOC in relation to
the production and sale of the product under consideration. Instead, DOC calculated these costs based
on the production of all products produced worl dwide by Tembec, the major proportion of which
consisted of pulp, paper and chemicals, which incu rred significantly different G&A expenses than the
production and sale of softwood lumber in Canada.
4.19 In regard to Weyerhaeuser Canada, DOC allocat ed a portion of certain charges associated
with the settlement of legal claims of Weyerh aeuser Company's (Weyerhaeuser Canada's parent
company) sales of hardboard siding (not a softwood lu mber product) in the United States, as part of
Weyerhaeuser Canada's G&A costs. These costs bore no relationship whatsoever to Weyerhaeuser
Canada's cost of production of softwood lumber. As the record demonstrates, the litigation settlement
expenses were not a company-wide expense that related to the production and sale of softwood
lumber; rather they were related to the production and sale of an unrelated product, hardboard siding.
4.20 DOC treated revenue offsets from wood chip sales from West Fraser and Tembec in a manner
that did not "reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration," as required under Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. In West Fraser's case, DOC
failed to calculate revenues from wood chip sales on th e basis of records kept by the company, even
though those records showed that West Fraser's sales were made at "market prices" and reasonably
reflected the costs associ ated with the production and sale of softwood lumber. In Tembec's case,
DOC rejected fully documented actual market pri ces from arm's length transactions entered into by
Tembec with third parties, and instead used internal transfer prices that were arbitrary and well below
market prices.
4.21 Finally, DOC improperly refused to allocate Sl ocan's futures contract revenues that were
related to the production and sale of softwood lumber . DOC was required to make an adjustment to
take into account these revenues. DOC was require d to account for these revenues, as an offset to
financial or selling expenses, or through some other reasonable method.
4.22 It is clear that the investigation should not ha ve been initiated. Moreover, rectification of
other errors reveal either that imports of Canadi an softwood lumber into the United States are not
being dumped, or that the margins of dumping established by DOC for each respondent and the "all
others rate" have been artificially inflated. Conse quently, the United States acted inconsistently with
its obligations under Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the
AD Agreement. The Panel should, therefore, recommend to the DSB that the United States bring its
measure into conformity with its obligations unde r the WTO, that it revoke the anti-dumping order in
respect of softwood lumber from Canada, and that it return the cash deposits collected pursuant to an
illegal investigation and an illegal determination of dumping.

B. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
4.23 The following are the arguments of the United States in its first written submission:
4.24 Pursuant to a properly initiated investiga tion, Commerce concluded, in its Final
Determination published on 2 April 2002, that soft wood lumber from Canada was being sold in the
United States for "less than fair value". 24 Commerce found dumping with respect to each of the six
Canadian respondents accounting for the largest am ount of production in Canada: (1) Abitibi, (2)
Canfor, (3) Slocan, (4) Tembec, (5) West Fraser, and (6) Weyerhaeuser Canada.25
4.25 In general, Canada's claims of error in th e initiation and conduct of the softwood lumber
investigation concern the sort of fact-bound decisions that any investigating authority must make in
the course of an anti-dumping investigation. Am ong other things, Canada challenges how Commerce
defined the scope of the product it investigated, how it determined the sufficien cy of the evidence to
initiate an investigation, and how it calculated various costs and adjustments. The claims are
disparate, but they share a common theme. In much of its argument, Canada is asking the Panel to
place itself in the shoes of Commerce and make new determinations, as if it were the investigating
authority. As such, these claims are inconsistent with the applicable standard of review.
26
4.26 An anti-dumping proceeding is a complex matter, involving hundreds, if not thousands, of
individual decisions that come together to yield a fina l determination. It is not inconceivable that two
different investigating authorities would look at the same facts and reach different conclusions.
Recognizing that possibility, the AD Agreement provides that an authority's proper establishment of
the facts and unbiased and objective evaluation "sha ll not be overturned" "e ven though the panel
might have reached a different conclusion".27 Nevertheless, in this dispute, Canada raises a number of
claims that effectively ask this Panel to subs titute its evaluation of the facts for Commerce's
evaluation of the facts. Canada has even sought to introduce new claims not contained in its Panel
Request and new evidence not made available to Commerce in the underlying investigation.
4.27 The Panel first should rule, as a preliminary ma tter, that certain claims Canada makes in
connection with its argument concerning the scope of the "product under consideration" are beyond
the Panel's terms of reference. In its Panel Request, Canada claimed th at Commerce "erroneously
determined there to be a single like product (under US law, termed 'class or kind' of merchandise)
rather than several distinct like products", and that this determination violated Articles 2.6, 4.1, 5.1,
5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.28 In its first written
submission, Canada adds to this claim, now alleging that "in defining the 'product under
consideration'," Commerce violated all of Article 2 of the AD Agreement (not just Article 2.6),
Article 3, all of Article 4 (not just Article 4.1), all of Article 5 (not just Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and
5.8), Article 6.10, and Article 9." 29 Canada's expansion of its claim through its first written
submission is fundamentally at odds with the require ment that a complaining Member state its claims
clearly in its panel request, citing the particular provisions it alleges to have been violated. 30 T h a t
requirement "defin[es] the terms of reference of a panel and ... inform[s] the respondent and the third
parties of the claims made by the complainant".31 Here, Canada did not claim violations of provisions

24 Exhibit CDA-1, Final Determination, and Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, as amended (Exhibit CDA-3).
"Fair value" is the US law term corresponding to "norma l value," as that term is used in Article VI of the GATT
1994 and in the AD Agreement.
25 Exhibit CDA-3, Amended Final Determination.
26 Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement.
27 Ibid.
28 WT/DS264/2, para. 2.
29 Canada first written submission, paras. 115 and 142.
30 Article 6.2 of the DSU states that a request for a panel "shall ... identify the specific measures at issue
and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".
31 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124.

other than those cited in its Panel Request. Acco rdingly, the Panel should decline to consider the
additional claims raised for the first time in Canada's first written submission.
4.28 As a second preliminary ruling, the Panel shoul d decline to consider Exhibit CDA-77. In
introducing this exhibit, Canada improperly asks th e Panel to consider evidence that was not made
available to Commerce in the underlying investigati on. Specifically, this evidence consists of a
regression analysis performed by one of the Canadi an respondents that purports to manipulate certain
data used in Commerce's normal value and net realizab le value calculations. It is presented here to
support Canada's claim that Commerce erred in not making due allowance for particular physical
differences in softwood lumber that Cana da alleges affect price comparability.
32 However, it was not
made available to Commerce during the underlying investigation. Under Article 17.5(ii) of the
AD Agreement, a panel's review of an anti-dumping investig ation is to be based upon "the facts made
available in conformity with appropriate domes tic procedures to the authorities of the importing
Member". Consideration of Canada's new evidence is inconsistent with that provision. Further, in
asking the Panel to consider this new evidence, Cana da effectively is asking the Panel to undertake its
own establishment and evaluation of the fact s, contrary to Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement .
Accordingly, the Panel should decline to consider Exhibit CDA-77.
4.29 The standard of review applicable to the presen t dispute is set forth in Article 17.6 of the
AD Agreement. With respect to findings of fact, Article 17.6(i) provides that the question is whether
an investigating authority's establishment of the f acts was proper and whether its evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective. Conversely, the question is not whether a panel would have
established the facts or evaluated those facts in the same way as the investigating authority. As the
Appellate Body and other panels re peatedly have observed, a panel's role is not to find and evaluate
facts de novo.33
4.30 With respect to interpretations of the AD Agreement , the question under Article 17.6(ii) is
whether an investigating authority's interpretation is permissible. Article 17.6(ii) acknowledges that
there may be provisions of the AD Agreement that "admit[] of more than one permissible
interpretation". Where that is the case, and wher e an investigating authority has adopted one such
interpretation, the panel should find that interpretation to be consistent with the AD Agreement.34
4.31 Canada's first claim is that Co mmerce should have declined to initiate its investigation (or
terminated the investigation once it did initiate) be cause the application for relief by US softwood
lumber producers (in US law terms, "the petition") di d not include certain information alleged to have
been reasonably available to the petitioners (sp ecifically, cost and price data for Weldwood, a
subsidiary of petitioner IP). The Panel should rej ect this argument, because the applicable standard
for initiation under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement (and for continuation of an investigation under
Article 5.8) – the "sufficient evidence" standard – was met. There is no obligation under the AD
Agreement for an investigating authority to decline to initiate or to decline to continue an investigation
on the grounds that the application did not include evidence beyond what is sufficient to warrant
initiation or continuation.
4.32 In this case, petitioners included in their petition evidence from mu ltiple, independently
reliable sources demonstrating prices for which soft wood lumber was being sold in Canada, costs of
production of softwood lumber in Canada, and prices for which softwood lumber was being sold for

32 Canada first written submission, para. 148, note 139.
33 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 55; Appellate Body Report, Thailand
– H-Beams, paras. 114 and 117; Panel Report, US – Steel Plate, para. 7.6.
34 Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.341 and note 223:

"[w]e recall that, in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement, if an interpretation
is 'permissible', then we are compelled to accept it".

export to customers in the United States. This evidence demonstrated, first, that softwood lumber was
being sold in Canada for prices belo w cost of production. Accordingl y, pursuant to Article 2.2 of the
AD Agreement , the evidence substantiated reliance on c onstructed (normal) value as a basis for
determining whether there was dumping of softwo od lumber. Second, the evidence in the petition
demonstrated that export prices for softwood lumber were below constructed normal value – i.e., that
softwood lumber was being dumped in the United States.
4.33 The Weldwood data could not ha ve contradicted the data included in the petition, or
otherwise detracted from its adequacy and accuracy. At most, the Weldwood data would have given
Commerce information about a single producer in a ma rket consisting of hundreds of producers. This
would have been in addition to the country-wide da ta from diverse sources actually included in the
petition. Whatever a single company's data migh t have shown, it could not have negated the
sufficiency of the country-wide data actually in the petition demonstrating dumping of the subject
product.
4.34 Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement does not require Commerce to reject a petition that excludes
some data, even though the data included are suffici ent to warrant initiation of an investigation, and
even though the excluded data could not have nega ted the sufficiency of the included data. The
question for Commerce in deciding whether to initiate an investigation is set forth in Article 5.3. That
question is whether the evidence in the petition is su fficient to warrant initiation. Similarly, under
Article 5.8, the question whether to continue or terminate an investigation hinges on sufficiency.
Canada's suggestion that the AD Agreement contains a standard for in itiation and continuation of an
investigation other than sufficient evidence is unfounded and should be rejected.
4.35 Canada's second claim is that Commerce defined the scope of the "product under
consideration" (by which Canada appears to mean the product under investigation – in this case,
softwood lumber) too broadly. Canada cites no provision of the AD Agreement governing the way in
which an investigating authority defines the pr oduct under investigation. Instead, it asserts the
existence of an obligation to explain how differe nt articles within the product under consideration
"closely resemble each other"
35, contends that Commerce violated that obligation, and maintains that
violation of that obligation violated various articles of the AD Agreement (several of which were not
identified in Canada's panel request, and none of which provide rules for identifying the product under
investigation).
4.36 The short answer to Canada's scope argumen t is that there is no obligation under the
AD Agreement to define the "product under considera tion" in the manner Canada proposes. The
absence of an obligation is demonstrated by the diverse practice of WTO Members, including Canada.
Without an obligation there can be no violation.
4.37 Furthermore, the test actually applied by Commerce in defining the scope of the product
under consideration in this case was clearer and more detailed than the vague "close resemblance" test
that Canada proposes. In determining whether pa rticular products were properly within the scope,
Commerce considered (1) the general physical charact eristics of the product, (2) the expectations of
the ultimate purchaser, (3) the ultimate use of the pr oduct, (4) the channels of trade in which the
product is sold, and (5) the manner in which the product is advertised and displayed. With respect to
the particular softwood lumber products that Cana da claims should have been excluded – Western
Red Cedar, Eastern White Pine, softwood lumber bo ards used in bed frames, and softwood lumber
boards used in finger-jointed flangestock – Commerce evaluated the five factors and found the
resemblances to other examples of softwood lumber sufficiently great to preclude subdivision into
multiple products under consideration.

4.38 Canada's third claim is that, in comparing (nor mal) value to export price, Commerce violated
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by not adjusting for differences in the dimensions of softwood
lumber. The Panel should reject this claim, because Canadian respondent s failed to show that
differences in the dimension of the softwood lumber compared in this case affected price
comparability. Commerce's decision not to make due allowance absent such a showing did not
violate Article 2.4.
4.39 Article 2.4 requires that, in comparing expor t price and normal value, an investigating
authority make "[d]ue allowance" for certain differences in the particular products being compared.
The requirement to make due allowance appli es only to "differences which affect price
comparability," and the determination whether to make due allowance is to be made "in each case, on
its merits". Other panels have explained that due allowance for physical or other differences that
affect price comparability is not automatic.
36 Any claimed adjustment must be established on a case-
by-case basis and is warranted only to the extent the differences affect price comparability.
4.40 In this case, the evidence made available to Commerce did not su bstantiate an adjustment for
dimensional differences. Commerce did take dime nsions – along with eight other categories of
physical traits – into account in developing "mat ching" criteria (i.e., criteria for determining which
articles to compare in the first place). Applying th ese criteria, Commerce compared transactions with
identical product characteristics wherever possible. Where an identical match was not available for a
given transaction, Commerce relied on a tran saction with the next most similar product
characteristics. This process minimized product physical differences, including dimensional
differences, in the transactions being compared. U ltimately Commerce concluded that "there appears
to be little, if any difference in home market prices that is attributable to differences in dimensions of
the products compared, especially where those dimensional differences were minor".37
4.41 In stark contrast to the investigating authority in Argentina — Ceramic Tiles 38, a case on
which Canada relies heavily 39, the investigating authority in the present case sought and evaluated
extensive data regarding many physical characteris tics, including dimensional differences. However,
the Canadian respondents failed to make the requ isite showing that the dimensional differences
affected price comparability. Therefore, under Artic le 2.4, Commerce was not required to make any
adjustment for such differences.
4.42 Canada's fourth claim is that, in combini ng individual dumping margins to determine an
overall dumping margin, Commerce did not prope rly take account of non-dumped products,
inconsistent with Article s 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement . The Panel should reject this claim,
because Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 do not address the manne r in which particular model-specific or level-
of-trade-specific dumping margins, for example, are combined to determine an overall dumping
margin. Moreover, by arguing that the phrase "all co mparable export transactions" refers to "[a]ll
sales of goods falling within the scope of an investigation" 40, Canada deprives the term "comparable"
in Article 2.4.2 of any meaning, instead making it equivalent to the term "all", which immediately
precedes it.
4.43 The comparison obligations contained in Article 2.4.2 are "[s]ubject to the provisions
governing fair comparison in paragraph 4". Thus , Article 2.4 provides explicit context for the
methods for establishing the existence of dumping under Article 2.4.2. This context means that, under
the instruction in Article 2.4.2 to compare "weight ed average normal value with a weighted average

36 See, e.g., Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings , para. 7.158; Panel Report, Egypt – Steel Rebar,
para. 7.352.
37 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 8.
38 Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles.
39 See, e.g., Canada first written submission, para. 150.
40 Id., para. 171.

of prices of all comparable export transactions", not all export transactions will be equally comparable
with all normal value transactions. Consequently , once the comparison has been identified pursuant
to Article 2.4, it would be improper to compare a weighted average normal value with respect to one
model or one level of trade to a weighted average of prices for a different model or different level of
trade. Yet, Canada's prescription for combining particular dumping margins for purposes of
developing a single, overall dumping margin would require precisely that, contrary to Articles 2.4.2
and 2.4.
4.44 That Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4 do not mandate a pa rticular method for combining model-specific,
level-of-trade-specific individual dumping marg ins to establish a single, overall margin is
corroborated by the negotiating history of the AD Agreement. The negotiating history demonstrates
that the question whether to address the methodolog y at issue here was squarely presented to the
negotiators, and that the text was not modified (as compared to the AD Agreement's predecessor, the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code ) to prohibit this methodology. Further, the negotiating history
demonstrates that insertion of the word "compara ble" into Article 2.4.2 was intended precisely to
ensure that the term "all" not be interpreted as im plying that average export price is to be established
on the basis of sales both within and outside of the category of comparison.
4.45 Canada's claim relies exclusively on th e Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen .
The United States was not a party to that dispute and is not bound by the report in that matter. As the
Appellate Body has explained, dispute settlement re ports "are not binding, except with respect to
resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute".
41 Moreover, the Appellate Body
Report in EC-Bed Linen did not address several of the textual arguments presented by the
United States in this matter. That is additional reason not to treat that Report as dispositive.
4.46 Finally, Canada makes six company-specific claims, five of which relate to Commerce's
calculations of cost of production and constructed (normal) value, and one of which relates to
Commerce's denial of a claim for an adjustment for differences in terms and conditions of sale. These
claims improperly urge the Panel to adopt alternativ e evaluations of the facts, rather than demonstrate
that Commerce improperly established the facts or evaluated them in a biased and non-objective way.
4.47 Commerce computed cost of production for indi vidual softwood lumber articles for purposes
of (a) determining whether sales in the Canadian dom estic market were made at prices below cost of
production, and (b) computing normal value, in accordance with Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement ,
when there were no sales of softwood lumber in the Canadian domestic market or when such sales did
not permit a proper comparison. In computing th ese costs, Commerce included reasonable amounts
for SG&A costs, as provided under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1.
4.48 Canada argues that, in calculating G&A costs, Co mmerce violated Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1,
2.2.2, and 2.4 of the AD Agreement. Many of Canada's arguments erroneously assume that
Commerce applied its standard cost calculation methodologies to individual lumber producers without
determining the appropriateness of these methodologies in light of the circumstances of each
producer. However, as discussed at length in th e Final Determination, Commerce only applied its
standard methodologies after careful consideration of the facts in each case.
4.49 As a general matter, Canada's claims that Commerce's calculations of normal value violated
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement are misplaced. Article 2.4 relates to a fair comparison between

41 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Alcoholic Beverages, p. 14 (footnote omitted); see also, Appellate
Body Report, US – Shrimp , paras. 107-109 (extending the reasoning of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages to
Appellate Body reports); Panel Report, Argentina - Poultry, para. 7.41 (panel not bound by adopted WTO panel
reports).

normal value and export price once normal value has been properly determined . Article 2.4 does not
relate to what is at issue here – i.e., the proper determination of normal value in the first instance.
42
4.50 In calculating cost of production for Abitibi, Co mmerce allocated financial costs (i.e., interest
on borrowed funds) based on COGS (the same a llocation method used for all respondents).
Commerce made this allocation after considerin g Abitibi's arguments that its lumber producing
division was less asset-laden than its other divisions . Commerce used a COGS allocation, rather than
the allocation urged by Abitibi, because the COGS allo cation better reflected the fact that financial
costs are general costs, relating to the overall cash needs of the company as whole. Also, Commerce
determined that its method better accounted for the fact that money is fungible – that is, that borrowed
funds may be used to purchase assets or fund ongoi ng operations. Moreover, Commerce's allocation
method accounted for differing asset values, inasmuch as more asset-laden divisions would have
higher depreciation expenses, which would increase the cost of manufacturing products in those
divisions, resulting in a proportionately greater alloca tion of financial cost than to less asset-laden
divisions.
4.51 In calculating cost of production for Tembec, Commerce determined a reasonable amount for
G&A costs based on Tembec's books and records that were shown to be in accordance with Canadian
GAAP, consistent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. Canada argues that, instead of relying
on Tembec's books and records, Commerce should have relied on a separate statement of division-
specific costs. However, as that separate statement was unaudited and never shown to be in
accordance with Canadian GAAP, Commerce appropriate ly declined to rely on it. Finally, G&A
costs are, by definition, company-wide costs, rather than costs attributable to a particular product or
division. Thus, it was proper for Commerce to re ly on Tembec's company-wide books and records,
rather than a separate, division-specific statement.
4.52 In calculating cost of production for Weyerh aeuser Canada, Commerce included within G&A
costs an apportioned amount of litigation settlement costs reported in the books and records of the
company's parent, the Weyerhaeuser Company. Ca nada argues that these costs related to production
of goods other than softwood lumber and, therefore, should not have been allocated to the cost of
producing softwood lumber. However, litigation cost s are quintessential general costs, relating to a
company as a whole. In this case, the litigation co sts were incurred years after production of the good
at issue (hardboard siding) and could not reasonably be considered a cost of producing that good.
Indeed, Weyerhaeuser Company's own audited financial statement treated these costs as general costs.
Thus, it was appropriate under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 for Commerce to allocate a portion of
Weyerhaeuser Company's company-wide legal cost s to Weyerhaeuser Canada's cost of producing
softwood lumber.
4.53 In calculating respondents' costs of production of softwood lumber, Commerce treated sales
of wood chips (a by-product in the production process) as an offset, reducing a given respondent's
total cost of production. Canada claims that Commerce erred in its calculation of the wood chip offset
for respondents West Fraser and Tembec. In bot h cases, Commerce's calculation was consistent with
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement and should be upheld.
4.54 In the case of West Fraser, the issue for Comme rce was how to measure sales of wood chips
by the company to affiliated companies. To dete rmine whether sales to aff iliates reflected market
prices for wood chips, Commerce compared those sal es to West Fraser's sales to non-affiliated
entities, as recorded in West Fr aser's records. Commerce found that West Fraser's sales to non-
affiliated entities were at market prices and that these sales, therefore, represented an appropriate
benchmark for determining whether sales to affiliate d entities were at market prices. Applying this
benchmark, Commerce found certain of West Fraser's sales to affiliated entities (in Alberta) to be at
market prices, and relied in part on those sales in calculating the offset. Commerce found other sales

42 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.140.

to affiliated entities (in BC) not to be at market prices, and made adjustments based on the benchmark
of non-affiliated sales. Consistent with Article 2.2.1.1, Commerce made its calculation based on data
from the producer's own records.
4.55 In the case of Tembec, the issue was how to measure the value of transfers of wood chips
between divisions within the company. Comme rce analyzed the wood chip sales transactions
between Tembec's sawmills and its pulp mill division to evaluate whether the in ternally set transfer
prices were reasonable. Commerce found that prices recorded in Tembec's books for the transfer of
wood chips between Tembec divisions reasonably refl ected the actual cost of producing wood chips
and, therefore, consistent with Article 2.2.1.1, relied on those prices in establishing a wood chip offset
for Tembec.
4.56 Finally, Canada argues that Commerce failed to properly account for profits from respondent
Slocan's sales of lumber futures contracts. In Commerce's investigation, Slocan requested two
directly contradictory treatments for these profits. Fi rst, Slocan asked that the profits be treated as an
offset to direct selling expenses in the US market, as an adjustment for the conditions and terms of
sale. Alternatively, Slocan asked that the profits be treated as an offset to financing costs in the
calculation of cost of production. However, as Commerce found, Slocan's futures contract profits
were not directly related to any particular sales of softwood lumber and, therefore, were not an
appropriate basis for adjustment under Slocan's firs t theory. On the other hand, since the profits
amounted to sales revenue (albeit, not direct sales revenue), they would not have been an appropriate
basis for offsetting cost of production. As Slocan fa iled to substantiate an offset under either theory,
Commerce properly declined to grant an offset.
4.57 For the foregoing reasons, the US requests the Panel to reject Canada's claims in their
entirety.
C. FIRST ORAL STATEMENT OF CANADA
4.58 In its first oral statement, Canada made the following arguments:
4.59 The Panel's role pursuant to Article 17.6(i) is to determine whether Commerce properly
established the facts and evaluated the facts in an objective and unbiased manner. By reviewing the
record pursuant to Article 17.6(i), the Panel is not engaging in a de novo review. The rule of
Article 17.6(ii) only comes into play when a Panel c oncludes that there is "more than one permissible
interpretation," after the application of the customary rules of treaty interpretation codified in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. An approach of total defere nce is inconsistent with the
WTO jurisprudence on this issue.
1. Initiation and Termination of the Investigation
4.60 Articles 5.2 and 5.3 are separate obligations. U nder Article 5.2, the investigating authority
must decide whether to accept or reject the applic ation on the basis of whether it contains such
information as is reasonably available to the appli cant on dumping, injury and causation. Only once
the investigating authority has determined that the requirements of Article 5.2 have been met, can it
move on to Article 5.3 to conduct a further examinat ion of the information in the application to assess
whether it is adequate and accurate and, therefore, sufficient to initiate the investigation.
4.61 Article 5.2(iii) requires that, if the information is of a kind or category of information set out
in Article 5.2 and it is reasonably available to the app licant, then it is of the kind or category that must
be included in the application. Article 5.2(iii) requires information on prices; it does not allow an
applicant to pick and choose what information on prices it provides. Actual transaction prices for
sales of lumber in the relevant markets was "reasona bly available" to the Pe titioner and ought to have
been provided to the investigating authority. The application did not contain transaction-specific

evidence identifying a single Canadian exporter or provide any specific examples of price or cost.
The Petitioner's claim that such information was not "reasonably available" is simply not credible and
should never have been accepted by Commerce.
4.62 Commerce also initiated the investigation b ased on insufficient evidence of dumping,
contrary to Article 5.3. Article 5.3 requires that an investigating authority objectively judge whether
the application contains sufficient evidence of dumpi ng, injury and causal link between the two. The
investigating authority cannot simply accept the ev idence in the application. Had Commerce fulfilled
this obligation, it would have di scovered that the Petitioner failed to provide extremely important
information. A further examination of the informat ion in the application should have revealed that
one of Canada's largest producers, Weldwood, is wholly owned by the leader of the Petitioner, IP.
Weldwood's data, if obtained, woul d have provided specific instances of Canadian and US prices and
Canadian costs for the identical merchandise, and would have enabled Commerce to properly assess
the adequacy and accuracy, and, th erefore, the sufficiency of th e information provided in the
application.
4.63 The information included in the application essentially amounted to nothing more than
surrogate or secondary information considering wh at could and should have been provided. For
instance, it was demonstrated that the Random Lengths data contained in the application commingled
Canadian and US producer prices, and, thus, were not representative of Canadian sale prices. An
objective and unbiased investigating authority could not have concluded that there was "sufficient
evidence" of dumping to initiate.
4.64 Pursuant to Article 5.8, the investigating aut hority must terminate the investigation as soon as
it is satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping or injury to justify proceeding with the
case. This obligation applies both prior to initiation and throughout the investigation. A Canadian
respondent informed Commerce of the nature of the relationship between Weldwood and IP, two days
after initiation. Commerce did nothing with this information. Commerce also rejected Weldwood's
subsequent attempt to file data regarding actual sales transactions. Thus the United States failed to
comply with Article 5.8.
2. Like Product and Product under Consideration
4.65 Commerce defined the "product under considera tion" and the "like product" as "all softwood
lumber" and conducted a single anti-dumping investig ation. Commerce's broad definitions did not
identify a cohesive group of products that share common characteristics for either the "product under
consideration" or the "like product". Conseque ntly, Commerce did not meet the requirements of
Article 2.6.
4.66 The Article 2.6 definition of "like product" lim its its scope and diversity. When, as here, the
scope and diversity of the "product under considera tion" is overly broad, the "like product" may be
neither identical to, nor have characteristics clos ely resembling, the product under consideration and
the requirement of Article 2.6 cannot be satisfied . The terms "product under consideration" and the
"like product" must be limited to a single grou p of products sharing common characteristics.
Otherwise Article 2, which describes the dumping comparison between the "like product" and the
"product under consideration" would allow dumping co mparisons between sales of products that have
no close resemblance to each other. Similarly, Artic les 3, 4 and 5 would permit injury analyses that
would cover multiple industries.
4.67 Canada's interpretation of Article 2.6 would not yield dozens or hundreds of discrete products.
The United States found that at least 90 per cent of the products covered in the "product under
consideration" consist of commod ity dimension lumber. The application presented data only on the
pricing of standard 2x4 SPF products that the United States has characterized as "representative
softwood lumber products". The "product under consideration" should ha ve been limited to

commodity dimension lumber, which is a defined and cohesive group of products according to the
applicable legal criteria in the United States of physical characteristics, end uses, purchaser
expectations, channels of distribution, advertisi ng and display, and price. Instead, Commerce added
in another 10 per cent of products that do not r esemble commodity dimension lumber, including
especially the four products in dispute.
4.68 Commerce erroneously identified isolated charac teristics of different products within the
"product under consideration" and then determined whether there was a comparable "like product"
with the same isolated characteristics within the dive rse group. This test, as applied, is not legally
permissible under Article 2.6 because it fails to limit the anti-dumping investiga tion to a grouping of
imported products that all share characteristics closely resembling each other. Bed frame
components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine, and Western Red Cedar do not share
common characteristics with commodity dimension lumber, and are substantially unlike 90 per cent
of the products in the application.
3. Failure to Account for Dimensional Differences
4.69 When comparing normal value to export price, Article 2.4 requires an adjustment for all
differences that affect price comparability. Differe nces in physical characteristics are identified as a
difference affecting price compar ability. The United States incorr ectly argues that the evidence
before Commerce did not support the conclusion that dimension affected price. The record before
Commerce consisted of complete sales data for the six largest producers in Canada, showing all prices
of all different products differentiated by dime nsion, among other charact eristics. These data
demonstrated that dimensional differences affected price. Canadian companies and US petitioners
agreed on this point.
4.70 Indeed, Commerce determined that, when co mparing domestic and export selling prices
between markets, products had to be matched based on width, thickness, and length, among other
matching criteria. Given that the only differences that matter for matching purposes are those that
affect price, Commerce effectively determined that dimensional differences affected price
comparability. It conducted itself accordingly duri ng the investigation. Commerce's position that
dimension affects price for matching but not for th e adjustment for dimensional differences indicates
a failure of objectivity.
4.71 Despite acknowledging that physical differences co uld result in differences in market value,
Commerce concluded that there was no information on the record by which it could calculate an
adjustment for differences in dimension based either on cost or value. Thus it did not say that such an
adjustment was not warranted, but that it could not calculate one. Commerce also asserted that the
adjustment it could not calculate would, in any event, be minor. However, Article 2.4 makes no
distinction for minor price effects, nor is there evidence that the price effects were minor.
4.72 The United States presented two diversionary argu ments. First, it argues that Article 2.4
applies only when there is a particular pattern in the pricing. That prices do not match in a single
procession of lower prices for smaller pieces and higher prices for larger pieces of softwood lumber is
irrelevant to the premise that dimensions affect price. Second, the United States argues that price
differences based on dimension fluctuated. Article 2. 4 does not require a uniform price differential as
a precondition to "due allowance" for differences wh ich affect price comparability. The issue is
whether differences in physical characteristics affe ct price comparability and thus have a distorting
effect. Moreover, since annual average prices for each product of each exporter were compared, an
annual average adjustment could reasonably have been made, and was required to be made by
Article 2.4. Commerce did not consider fluctua tion in prices to be an obstacle for other price
comparison purposes. Just as annual average export prices and normal values were computed, so too
could Commerce have calculated an annual average adjustment for dimensional differences between
two non-identical products.

4. Zeroing of Negative Margins
4.73 Canada has demonstrated that the US practice of "zeroing" negative margins of dumping
contravenes Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. The United States is now saying that the
interpretation by the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen is a misinterpretation of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2
and that the Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen should not be relied upon by the Panel.
However, the United States itself has acknowledged th at adopted reports should be taken into account
where they are relevant to any subsequent dispute, especially where a report of the Appellate Body is
concerned. The zeroing methodology applied by Commerce in this case is the same as was
considered by the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen.
4.74 The United States looks to the negotiating history of the AD Agreement. However, pursuant
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention , the negotiating history of the text of an agreement is only
relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation. In Canada's view, the text itself of Articles 2.4
and 2.4.2 is clear and the Appellate Body so found in EC – Bed Linen.
5. Company-specific Issues
4.75 Under Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 a cost is "associated with" and data will "pertain to"
production where the cost and data relate to th e costs for producing and selling the product.
Article 2.2.1.1 also requires that "[a]uthorities sh all consider all available evidence on the proper
allocation of costs, including that which is made available by the exporter and producer..". Article 2.4
requires that the comparison between export price an d normal value shall be "fair". Commerce failed
to meet these requirements.
4.76 Commerce miscalculated Abitibi's interest expe nses to softwood lumber by (1) failing to
comply with its obligations under Article 2.2.1.1 to "consider all available evidence on the proper
allocation of costs", and by (2) failing to comply with its obligations under Article 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 to
use a methodology that resulted in an allocation that "reasonably reflects" the costs "associated with"
and "pertaining to" the "production and sale of soft wood lumber". The US submission confirms that
Commerce did not consider the merits of the reco rd evidence regarding Abitibi in selecting its COGS
allocation methodology. Moreover, the record ev idence establishes that a COGS-based allocation
was distortive and over-allocated interest expenses to Abitibi's softwood lumber operations relative to
its non-investigated products – pulp, paper, and newsprint.
4.77 In calculating Tembec's G&A expenses, Commerce rejected G&A data from Tembec's FPG
(which was accurate and reliable and used by Commerce for all purposes except for calculating G&A)
in favour of company-wide G&A data that overwhe lmingly reflected the cost of producing pulp,
paper and chemicals worldwide, not only softwood lumber produced in Canada. In doing so,
Commerce failed to calculate a G&A amount that "r easonably reflected" Tembec's cost of production
and sale of softwood lumber contrary to Article 2.2. 1.1 and included costs in Tembec's G&A that did
not pertain to Tembec's cost of producing and selling softwood lumber contrary to Article 2.2.2.
4.78 For Weyerhaeuser Canada, Commerce imprope rly included an amount for litigation
settlement costs incurred by Weyerhaeuser Compa ny for claims related to its hardboard siding
products sold in the United States in prior year s. The G&A expense Commerce calculated did not
reasonably reflect Weyerhaeuser Canada's costs for producing and selling softwood lumber, but
included data that pertained to the production a nd sale of other products than softwood lumber,
contrary to Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. Commerce incorrectly found that Weyerhaeuser Company
treated the settlement claims as G&A on its records. The US first written submission does not point
to any relationship between the hardboard sidi ng settlement costs and Weyerhaeuser Canada's
softwood lumber production.

4.79 For Tembec, Commerce improperly established a by -product offset by relying on internal
transfer prices that were significantly lower than unaffiliated sales prices. In doing so, Commerce
acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 because the record evidence clear ly established that the
internal prices were undervalued. The significan t difference between internal prices and market
prices cannot be attributed to profit as the US purpor ts. By-products have neither profits nor costs
and Commerce made no findings about profits. The US assertions that Tembec provided inadequate
and "self-serving" data on purchases from unaffiliated companies are untrue and were never raised by
Commerce. Commerce had the burden to advise Tembec if it found any data were inadequate.
4.80 For West Fraser, Commerce improperly rejected data recorded on West Fraser's books for
wood chip sales made to affiliated parties in BC on the grounds that the sales underlying those data
were made at inflated non-market prices. This was not an unbiased and objective examination of the
record as a whole and resulted in a determination of costs, contrary to Article 2.2.1.1. Commerce
ignored 99.7 per cent of the record evidence on BC market prices in finding incorrectly that West
Fraser's affiliated sales were not reflective of BC market prices. The United States blames West
Fraser for Commerce's own failure in evaluating the evidence. The tiny quantity of West Fraser's
unaffiliated chip sales in BC on which Commerce relied was self-evident and Commerce's own
verification report shows that it was put on notice by West Fraser's officials that over half of those
sales were made early in the period of investigati on, when prices were lowest. Commerce also re-
valued certain sales to an affiliated pulp mill that Commerce verified reflected market prices.
Commerce never raised an issue that any of th ese data was selectively provided and West Fraser
never had the opportunity to provide any further evidence.
4.81 In calculating Slocan's costs and margin of dumping, Commerce ignored revenues generated
from Slocan's futures contracts and failed to make an adjustment for a diffe rence that affected the
price comparability of Slocan's sales, contrary to Ar ticle 2.4. Alternatively, Commerce calculated an
amount for Slocan's financial costs that failed to reasonably reflect its costs for producing and selling
lumber contrary to Article 2.2.1.1. Commerce co mpletely discarded these data, effectively rejecting
data on Slocan's records despite an express finding that those records related to Slocan's lumber
activities. This was neither an unbiased nor objective evaluation of the facts.
D.
FIRST ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
4.82 The following summarizes the United States' argu ments in its first oral opening and closing
statements:
1. Opening Statement of the United States of America at the First Meeting of the Panel
4.83 In its first written submission, the US requests tw o preliminary rulings. First, Canada has, in
its first written submission, improperly added to the li st of provisions it claimed in its Panel Request
were violated by virtue of Commerce's definition of the product under consid eration. In response,
Canada protests that it has not added an y claims but only "additional arguments". 43 However,
statements that actions were "inconsistent with US obligations" under particular articles of a WTO
agreement plainly amount to claims under those articles.
4.84 The requirement that treaty provisions forming the basis of a claim be expressly identified in
a panel request is by now well-established. The A ppellate Body made a finding on this exact issue in
its recent report in US – Carbon Steel.44
4.85 Canada purports to rely on the Appellate Body report in Korea – Dairy . In that case, the
Appellate Body took it as a given that listing of the treaty provisions at issue was "a minimum

43 Canada response to the US preliminary objections, paras. 2 and 13.
44 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 172.

prerequisite".
45 The factors that Canada cites in paragr aph 6 of its 10 June 2003 response come into
play only if that minimum prerequisite has been met, which was not the case here.
4.86 The United States' second request for a prelim inary ruling is with respect to Canada's
improper introduction in its first submission of f acts not available to Commerce in the underlying
investigation. Specifically, Canada put before th e Panel Exhibit CDA-77, a regression analysis. This
analysis was prepared by respondent Tembec six m onths after the investigation was completed.
Canada's attempt to have the Panel consider this ex hibit is simply not consistent with Article 17.5(ii)
of the AD Agreement.
4.87 Canada claims that respondents did not present the exhibit to Commerce, because
Commerce's decision to deny a price-based adjustment for dimensional differences was "unexpected".
That claim is not credible. Commerce's requireme nts for establishing such an adjustment are clear
from its questionnaire and its regulations. Had the Tembec regression been presented to Commerce
during the investigation, Commerce could have evalua ted it to clarify and identify the data used as
well as the fundamental assumptions employed.
4.88 Contrary to Canada's assertion 46, this regression analysis is not the "exact same type of
document" that was at issue in the EC – Bed Linen case. At issue in EC – Bed Linen was a table
summarizing the declarations of industry support, ev idence that had always been available to the EC
investigating authority.47 The regression analysis is not a mere summary table.
4.89 On Canada's challenge to Commerce's initiati on of its investigation, the standard, in
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, is "whether there is sufficient ev idence to justify the initiation of an
investigation". A similar sufficiency standard gove rns a determination of whether to terminate an
investigation under Article 5.8. Neither provision requires evidence greater than sufficient evidence.
4.90 Canada relies primarily on Article 5.2, arguing that an investigating authority should decline
to initiate an investigation unless the application contains all information reasonably available to the
petitioners regarding dumping, injury, and causal link. However, Article 5.2 describes the contents of
an application for a dumping investigation. It does not contain a standard for accepting or rejecting an
application. That standard is set forth in Article 5.3.
4.91 Canada rests its argument on the reference in the chapeau of Article 5.2 to "such information
as is reasonably available to the a pplicant" on matters listed in the f our sub-paragraphs that follow.
Canada improperly reads the word "all" into this phrase. In fact, the reference to information
"reasonably available" simply sets a limitation on what is expected of petitioners. Yet, Canada turns
this limitation into a limitless obligation.
4.92 The evidence of dumping in the softwood lu mber petition was sufficient to support
initiation.48 The evidence included country-wide, indust ry-wide cost and price data from multiple
reliable sources. 49 The information that Canada claims was improperly excluded could not have
altered the adequacy and accuracy of the information actually included.
4.93 On "product under consideration", Canada rests its argument primarily on Article 2.6 of the
AD Agreement. Yet, Article 2.6 contains no obligation at all on how an investigating authority is to

45 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124.
46 Canada response to the US preliminary objections, para. 27.
47 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, paras. 6.42-6.43 and Annex 2-2 thereto.
48 Canada does not challenge the sufficiency of the application with regard to injury and causal link.
Accordingly, the US confines its discussion to evidence of dumping.
49 US first written submission, paras. 50-62.

define the product under consideration in an inv estigation. That understanding of Article 2.6 is
reflected in the diverse practices of many WTO Members, including Canada itself.
4.94 Under Article 2.6, the existence of a "product u nder consideration" is ta ken as a given. No
matter how an investigating authority defines the pr oduct under consideration, that becomes the basis
for determining whether other products are "like products".
4.95 Canada appears to turn the text of Article 2. 6 on its head. Instead of taking "product under
consideration" as the starting point, Canada seems to take "like product" as the starting point and
argue that "like product" constrains how an investigating authority defines the product under
consideration.
4.96 Canada contends that the Canadian responde nts were entitled to an adjustment to home
market softwood lumber prices whenever the produc ts compared had any dimensional differences.
However, the Canadian respondents were unable to substantiate price adjustment claims during the
investigation.
4.97 Consistent with Article 2.4, Commerce ma kes price adjustments for differences in the
physical characteristics of merchandise when a party demonstrates that a physical difference between
the product sold in the US market and the product sold in the foreign market has an effect on prices.
But such an Article 2.4 adjustment is not automatic.50
4.98 In the majority of product comparisons, Co mmerce compared softwood lumber products of
identical thickness, width and length. If identic al products were not available for comparison,
Commerce matched products with the most similar dimensional characteristics available.
4.99 On the question of calculation of the overall dumping margin for a given producer,
Article 2.4.2 does not require Commerce to offset a dumping margin found on one particular model
with non-dumping amounts found on anot her model. When the criteria of Article 2.4 are considered,
not all export transactions will be equally comparab le with all normal value transactions. Moreover,
Canada's concept of a "negative margin" or an offset appears nowhere in the AD Agreement.
4.100 Under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code , many Contracting Parties made dumping
calculations by comparing weighted-average normal values to individual export transactions, granting
no offset for any export transaction that was not du mped. Article 2.4.2 required Members to change
the dumping margin calculation, but not in the way Canada asserts. With respect to the methodology
at issue here, Article 2.4.2 requires Members to establish margins of dumping by comparing
weighted-average normal values with weighted averages of "all comparable export transactions".
4.101 Rather than calculating dumping margins for each individual export transaction, as before,
Members are now required to weight average "all comparable export transactions" – in other words,
all export transactions of the same model sold at the same level of trade. Improperly focusing on the
word "all" deprives the term "comparable" of any meaning. It also nullifies the opening phrase in
Article 2.4.2, which reads: "Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4".
4.102 Canada relies heavily on the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bed Linen. While that Report
dealt with the calculation of the overall dumping margin by the EC, the Report is not an interpretation
of the AD Agreement with any broader applicability. Taking a fresh look at the issues is particularly
appropriate in this case, because the United States was not a party to the EC – Bed Linen dispute, and
that Report does not address many of the textual arguments presented by the United States in its first
written submission.

50 Panel Report, EC – Tubes or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158.

4.103 Canada makes a number of company-specific claims. The AD Agreement provides only
general guidance on how an investigating authority is to establish a producer's cost of production.
There are no specific rules on issues such as a llocation of general and administrative costs and
calculation of offsets. What Canada seeks is to have the Panel re-weigh the evidence.
2. Closing Statement of the United States of America at the First Meeting of the Panel
4.104 Canada's acknowledgement that facts are always relevant in considering the issues presented
underscores that this Panel is not considering questi ons in the abstract but in a particular factual
context.
4.105 On its requests for preliminary rulings, the United States noted with interest Canada's
statement that it will be submitting a seven page expert's memorandum explaining the methodology
applied to create Exhibit CDA-77. The very fact th at Canada's expert requires seven pages to explain
the methodology underscores the US point that the exhibit is new evidence.
4.106 There has been some discussion of standard of review. Contrary to Canada's assertion, the
United States does not advocate "total deference" . US discussion on this point has emphasized the
highly fact-specific nature of the issues presente d and observed that re-weighing the evidence, as
Canada has urged, finds no basis in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement.
4.107 On Commerce's methodology for calculating an overall dumping margin for a given producer,
Canada took issue with US relian ce on negotiating history as additiona l support for US interpretation
of Article 2.4.2. Canada argues that, in light of EC – Bed Linen, the ordinary meaning of Article 2.4.2
is clear, but is contrary to US interpretation, and, therefore, US recourse to negotiating history is not
appropriate. The flaw in this reasoning is the premise that the meaning of Article 2.4.2 is clear simply
because the Appellate Body has spoken to the question.
4.108 On initiation, as Canada acknowledged during US discussion of Guatemala – Cement , no
panel has found an obligation on investigating authorities separate from the obligation under
Article 5.3. This is with good reason, as Article 5.2 imposes no such obligation.
4.109 Also on initiation, discussion before the Panel highlighted the flaw in Canada's contention
that Commerce did not rely on "actual transactions" in its decision to initiate. It did rely on actual
transactions, as reflected in published data and affidavits from US producers.
4.110 When asked about its own practice regardi ng initiation, Canada stated that once the
investigating authority is seized of jurisdiction ove r an investigation, it does not "look back" to the
petition. That strikes us as being at odds with the rule of continuous evaluation of a petition that
Canada advocates under Article 5.8.
4.111 With respect to product under consideration, Canada argues that the concept "like product"
delimits the concept "product under consideration". But, it is undeniable that, under Article 2.6,
"product under consideration" is the point of refe rence for defining like product. Under Canada's
interpretation, there is no logical end to this loop.
4.112 Moreover, in its presentation, Canada went beyond arguing that Article 2.6 imposes limits
and asserted where those limits should have been dr awn in this case. Without any basis in the AD
Agreement, it purported to identify a "core" category comprising "90 per cent of the products
covered," and alleged that "Commerce added in anothe r 10 per cent of products". 51 In telling the
Panel where to draw the line, Cana da is improperly urging the Panel to find facts as if it were the
investigating authority.

51 Canada first oral (opening) statement, paras. 34 and 35.

4.113 Canada suggests that the absence of any limits on an investigating authority's definition of the
"product under consideration" could lead to "absur d result[s]". However, the absurd circumstances
that Canada hypothesizes simply are not at issue here.
4.114 Regarding Canada's claim for an adjustment for differences in dimension, Canada has made
several misleading and unsubstantiated assertions. For example, Canada's oral statement claims that,
"[t]he United States contravened Article 2.4 by not taking into account dimension of softwood lumber
in comparing export price to normal value". Ho wever, Commerce took dimension into account by
accepting dimension in its model match methodology.
4.115 Similarly, Canada argues that all the parti es, including the US petitioners, asserted that
dimension affected price 52, but cites to no record evidence of this. The parties did not express a
common view. Canada now concedes that "the market established prices based on the supply and
demand for each product, not because one product is smaller or larger than the other".53
4.116 Canada argues that the United States must be found to have concluded, in effect, that
differences in dimension affected price comparab ility because Commerce accept ed dimension in its
product matching hierarchy. However, Commerce' s matching criteria do not dictate what price
adjustment it must make. Canada confuses two sep arate decisions made by Commerce. The product
matching decision is made early in the investigation, before facts relevant to price comparability are
gathered and evaluated.
E. SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA
4.117 In its second written submission, Canada made the following arguments:
1. Initiation and Termination of the Investigation
4.118 In initiating and later failing to terminate the i nvestigation, Commerce violated Articles 5.2,
5.3 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
4.119 The United States violated Article 5.2 because Commerce initiated the investigation in spite
of the undisputed fact that the Applicant had info rmation about costs, as well as home market and
export prices reasonably available to it that it did not provide to Commerce as part of its
"Application".
4.120 The United States asserts that Article 5.2 do es not impose an obligation on investigating
authorities. The US position is untenable because the AD Agreement only concerns obligations on
Members. Its position is also belied by the decision in US – 1916 Act (Japan) in which the
United States itself was held to violate Article 5.2.
4.121 The United States also asserts that a breach of Article 5.2 has no consequences and that the
sole obligation on investigating authorities under the combination of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 is to ensure
that an application contains sufficient eviden ce to justify initiation. To the contrary, a Vienna
Convention analysis of Article 5.2 demonstrates that it is an independent obligation and further, that
the failure to comply with Article 5.2 means that an investigating authority cannot initiate an
investigation.
4.122 The United States violated Article 5.3 because an objective investigating authority could not
have found that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiating the investigation based on the
Application. Under Article 5.3, Commerce was re quired to assess whether the evidence provided by

52 Id., para. 54.
53 Id., para. 59.

the Applicant on home market prices, export prices, and costs were adequate, accurate and therefore
sufficient, to justify initiation.
4.123 The Applicant's cost data were flawed in at least four ways: first, the Applicant based its
allegations of BC and Quebec producers' costs on US surrogate companies that were not
representative of Canadian companies based on size ; second, Commerce initiated the investigation
without any evidence before it of how the Appli cant calculated the manufacturing costs of the US
surrogate companies for the SPF species or of how co mpany costs were then a llocated to the specific
products for which the cost models had been constr ucted; third, both the BC and Quebec cost models
used data from less than a full year despite the kn own seasonality of lumber mills' operations; fourth,
there were no home market prices for western SPF availa ble to test whether sales of this product were
below cost.
4.124 The home market and export price information in the Application were also insufficient to
justify initiation. Commerce initiated the investigati on despite the fact that the Application contained
no evidence of any actual sales transactions involvi ng identified Canadian companies either in the
domestic Canadian market or the American export ma rket. Despite US assertions to the contrary, the
Application contained no evidence of western SPF transaction prices in BC. The evidence on prices
consisted of estimates from an industry publicatio n and unsubstantiated anecdotal reports in two
affidavits. Such evidence is not sufficient to justify initiation.
4.125 The United States violated Article 5.8 becau se Commerce failed, after initiation, in its
ongoing obligation to assess the sufficiency of the evidence of dumping in the light of the Weldwood
information provided to it and to terminate the in vestigation as an objective investigating authority
would have. Contrary to the US view, the obligation in Article 5.8 cannot be made to depend on an ex
post facto assessment of the relative merits of information, particularly where, as here, the information
at issue has never been analyzed.
2. Like Product
4.126 An application for the imposition of anti-dumping duties must identify the proposed "product
under consideration". Article 2.6 expressly requires that a like product be "identical" to the product
under consideration, i.e., alike in all respects to th e product under consideration, or in the absence of
such a product, another product which, although not a like in all respects, h as characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration.
4.127 The plain language of Article 2.6 suggests a mul ti-step process. First, the investigating
authority must identify the characteristics of the product under consideration. Second, it must identify
the characteristics of each product proposed for inclusion in the like product. Third, it must determine
whether the characteristics of each are identical or, if not, then closely resembling those of the product
under consideration.
4.128 Commerce never defined the characteristics of the product under consideration, nor did
Commerce compare the characteristics of each chal lenged product with those of the product under
consideration as a whole. Instead, Commerce identif ied as subsets of the product under consideration
various softwood lumber products. It then comp ared isolated characteristics of each challenged
Canadian product to isolated characteristics of products selected from within the "product under
consideration", considered to be "like" the challe nged products. That analysis failed to establish the
single, closely resembling, "like product" requi red by Article 2.6. No "close resemblance"
exemplified by a set of shared common charact eristics, was established between the challenged
products and the product under consideration.
4.129 The United States uses the Diversified Products criteria to determine whether the product
under consideration described in an anti-dumpi ng petition comprises one or multiple "classes or

kinds" of merchandise but subordinated these criteria to a "no clear dividing line"/"continuum" test.
For bed frame components, finger-jointed flangestoc k, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Cedar,
the United States examined whether each of these clo sely resembled a limited (and varying) subset of
products belonging to the product under consid eration (i.e., those products "nearby on the
continuum").
4.130 Commerce found a single product under considera tion based on the common "characteristic"
of the diversity – non-commonality – of the products sought to be covered by the applicant. A proper
like product analysis in respect of the US market was never done.
4.131 The ordinary meaning of "characteristics closely resembling those of the product under
consideration" requires a comparison of the characteristics of the putative like product to the
characteristics of the product under consideration. In order to determine the ordinary meaning of
"characteristics closely resembling those of the pr oduct under consideration", one must compare the
characteristics of the putative like product to th ose of the product under consideration. The
characteristics, defined as essential or distinctive traits , must be those of the "like product," and must
be "very nearly identical" to the characteristics of the "product under consideration". This
understanding is consistent with that expressed in the panel decision in Indonesia – Autos , in the
context of the term "like product" in the SCM Agreement.
4.132 Article 2.6 establishes a preference for "alike in all respects". This context reinforces the
ordinary meaning of "characteristics closely resemb ling". When the products are not "alike in all
respects," then their characteristics (i.e., essential or distinctive traits) must resemble each other so
closely (i.e., as near as can be) that the products are nearly identical.
4.133 The application requirements in Article 5.2(i) and (iv) and the industry support requirements
of Article 5.4 depend upon the definition of the "like product". Were the like product defined too
broadly, then it would lead to irrational results.
4.134 The "continuum" or "no clear dividing line" test is contrary to the plain meaning of
Article 2.6. It tests only whether the item claimed to be a separate product shares some characteristics
with some other item in the "diversity of product". It does not test whether the item claimed to be a
separate product has characteristics (i.e., essential or distinctive traits) that closely resemble those of
the product under consideration.
4.135 A failure to define the like product in accordance with the criteria of Article 2.6 means also
that the product under consideration has not been properl y defined. This leads to other violations of
the AD Agreement. The investigating authority must assess industry support and the other application
requirements of Articles 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 separately for each like product. Should those requirements
not be met with respect to a like product, the inves tigating authority may not initiate an investigation
with respect to the product under consideration a nd must redefine the scope of the product under
investigation. The improper definition of the like pr oduct, contrary to Article 2.6, would also vitiate
the investigation, the establishment of dumping, the calculation of the anti-dumping margins and the
imposition of anti-dumping duties in respect of th e product under consideration, in violation of
Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement. Therefore, a failure to define like products in
accordance with the requirements of Article 2.6 must be corrected.
3. Due Allowance for Dimension Differences
4.136 Dumping is a measure to counter price discrimination between markets. To measure price
discrimination, one must compare prices that are co mparable, such that any difference in the price of
goods in two markets cannot be attributed to other f actors, such as differences in taxes, or physical
differences in the products compared. In the absence of such a "fair comparison," in which
differences in products are adjusted, one cannot possibl y measure price discrimination. Article 2.4 of

the AD Agreement expressly requires not only a "fair compar ison (...) between the export price and
the normal value", but also that "[d]ue allowan ce shall be made in each case, on its merits, for
differences which affect price comparability, includ ing differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical char acteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability".
4.137 The present case involves the requirement of "due allowance" for differences in physical
characteristics; specifically, differences in the thic kness, width, or length (collectively, "dimension")
of products sold in the United States and Canada that Commerce compared without any adjustment
and thus without "due allowance". With respect to differences in physical characteristics, Article 2.4
imposes an affirmative obligation upon the investigating authority; it does not establish an evidentiary
standard for an individual respondent in domestic proceedings.
4.138 In making price-to-price comparisons, Articles 2.1 and 2.6 require the investigating authority
to compare identical products sold in the importing country and in the home market, and permits
comparisons of prices of non-identical products only if identical products cannot be compared. When
prices of identical products are compared, there is no issue. When prices of non-identical products are
compared, "due allowance" for the difference must be made under Article 2.4.
4.139 The United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 in making price comparisons of
products with differences in dimension that Co mmerce quite explicitly identified as non-identical
products, yet treating them as if they were identi cal by failing to make an adjustment for such
dimensional differences.
4.140 Commerce used each of the three dimension char acteristics to distinguish between identical
and non-identical products. Based on its so-called "m atching criteria", Commerce regarded lumber
products to be identical only if they were identical with respect to all elev en characteristics, which
included the same thickness, the same width, and the same length.
4.141 Dimension affects both supply and demand, and thus price. The physical dimensions of a
particular lumber product affect the use to which the lumber can be put, thereby creating different
demand for different dimensions. On the supply side , the raw materials used to produce lumber vary
in diameter and length, and trees of different diam eter and length will have different costs and yield
lumber of different dimension. Dimension thus affects both demand and supply, which, elementary
economics teaches, necessarily affects price and price comparability.
4.142 The United States provides to the Panel computer output showing a sample of average gross
unit prices of random products in the Canadian home market for different respondents in the
proceedings before Commerce. The United States also points the Panel to the gross prices in the
home market, which are rather meaningless as they are unadjusted for other differences affecting price
comparability, including differences in freight char ges, volume discounts, selling expenses, and the
like among individual sales. In any event, in every instance in which products vary only by
dimension, the prices to which the United States looks differ. They are never the same.
4.143 Canada has also provided the Panel with further graphical representations of Commerce's own
pricing data (using the meaningful, net prices after adjustments) as well as statistical representations
of Commerce's Tembec data, demonstrating, thro ugh regression analyses, that dimension affects
price. In addition, instead of the random product examples Commerce selected, Canada provided
examples of non-identical products Commerce actua lly compared, along with their net Canadian
prices. These charts and graphs of data alr eady before Commerce are simply illustrative and
cumulative.
4.144 Commerce unwaveringly accepted thickness, widt h, and length as important matching
characteristics throughout its investigation, from its questionnaire, to its Preliminary and Final

Determinations. Because Commerce refused to compute either a cost-based or price-based
adjustment for differences in dimension, Commerce refused to compare prices of any products that
differed in any dimension characteristics. No one subsequently challenged or disputed this express
factual finding that dimension affected price, nor did Commerce abandon it in its Final Determination.
4.145 The very same evidence that established that th ickness, width, and length should be used as
matching characteristics, and their order in the matc hing hierarchy, establishes that an adjustment was
necessary before prices of non-identical products could be compared.
4.146 Based on its failure to adjust for dimensi onal differences, Commerce made a substantial
number of non-identical comparisons that, in turn, significantly distorted the margins Commerce
computed using such comparisons. Canada also provided examples of some of the non-identical
comparisons Commerce actually made. This informat ion quickly dispels the suggestions made by the
United States that few non-identical comparisons were made, that the dimensional differences in these
comparisons all were "minor", and that these "minor " differences did not impact price comparability.
Commerce did not do any analysis.
4.147 The data first show that, for each company, Commerce made significant numbers of non-
identical comparisons. Indeed, for two compan ies, the number of non-identical comparisons
exceeded the number of identical comparisons. Mo re importantly, for every company, the dumping
margin calculated for non-identical companies fa r exceeded the margin cal culated for identical
comparisons. For every single company, the non- identical margin was at least double that for
identical comparisons. In some cases it was four to seven times as high.
4.148 Canada has established its prima facie case that Commerce compared prices of products
Commerce itself defined as non-identical, without due allowance for physical differences as required
by Article 2.4. Canada has also supplied ev idence, from the record before Commerce, that
dimensional differences affect price comparability, a nd that all parties before Commerce agreed that
this was so.
4.149 The argument that Canadian respondents did not meet the burden of proof is an ex post facto
justification for the Commerce determination and, as such, cannot be considered by the Panel. The
Panel is to review the decision "made at the time of the determination as set forth in a public notice or
in any other document of a public or confidentia l nature", as was confirmed by the panel in Argentina
– Poultry.
4.150 The United States offers no alternative explan ation for the fact it implicitly acknowledges,
i.e., that lumber products of differe nt dimension exhibited different prices at any given time. There is
no alternative theory for why the prices of softw ood products of different dimension differ – other
than that dimension affects price comparability.
4.151 The US argument that the eviden ce showed that prices for different dimension lumber "were
not stable or predictable" cannot derive from any failure of the Canadian respondent companies to
provide evidence or analysis. Thus, the United Stat es, without notice to the parties, established a
specific evidentiary burden, inconsistent with Article 2.4 that would be virtually impossible to meet.
4.152 The fact that neither Canadian nor US pri ces for any investigated lumber product were
predictable or stable over the POI did not prev ent Commerce from comparing prices for purposes of
measuring dumping, and it cannot be allowed to prevent Commerce from making due allowance for
product differences, particularly, where, as here, the comparisons made are of annual weighted-
average prices. Commerce has not required showings of consistent and pred ictable price differences
for any of the other product characteristics for which it did make an adjustment for product
differences.

4.153 Commerce had the necessary evidence; it simp ly resisted basing any adjustment for
dimension on differences in value (price).
4. Commerce's Practice of "Zeroing" Violated Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement
4.154 Commerce violated Article 2.4.2 in calculati ng margins of dumping for Canadian lumber
when it changed to zero any intermediate stage margins resulting from comparisons in which export
price exceeded normal value. In conducting this zer oing, it failed to consider fully "all comparable
export transactions" as required by Article 2.4.2 in conducting its comparison of weighted average
export price with weighted average normal value.
4.155 The mechanics of the US practice as describ ed by Canada are not contested by the
United States, and were acknowledged by Commerce during the investigation. Furthermore, the
United States has not denied that its practice is identical to that engaged in by the EC and found by the
Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen to be inconsistent with the terms of Article 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD
Agreement.
4.156 The terms "[a]ll comparable export transactions" require inclusion of export transactions that
result in positive intermediate margins as well as tho se that result in negative intermediate margins.
The US practice of zeroing, which introduces an ar tificial distinction betw een positive and negative
intermediate margins, fails to account for all comparable export transactions, in violation of
Article 2.4.2. By converting intermediate ma rgins from model comparisons to zero where export
price exceeds normal value, the United States gives l ess weight to these models and transactions in
conducting its overall comparison. C onverting negative margins to zero in effect decreases the true
export price, which was greater than normal value to a value equal to the normal value.
4.157 Furthermore, zeroing fails to compare a "weight ed average" normal value with a "weighted
average" of prices of all comparable export transac tions, as required by Article 2.4.2. Due to the
conversion of some intermediate margins to zero, the overall margin of dumping that results does not
reflect an actual average, in violation of Article 2.4.2.
4.158 However, the US claim that Article 2.4.2 only addresses intermediate stage calculations is
contradicted by the express terms of Article 2.4.2, which establishes a single standard for the margin
calculation applicable to all stages of the calculation.
4.159 When Article 2.4.2 is read in conjunction with the terms of Article 2.1, the implausibility of
the US interpretation of Article 2.4.2, as limited to intermediate stage calculations, is revealed. These
margins, aptly describ ed by the Panel in EC – Bed Linen as margins of price difference, are of only
secondary importance to Article 2.4.2. To suggest that they are the sole concern of its requirements is
to ignore the most basic purpose of these provisions: to set rules governing how investigating
authorities are to determine margins of dumping.
4.160 The same claim made by the United States in th is case was considered and rejected by the
Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen . Adopted Appellate Body repor ts should be taken into account
where, as in this case, they are relevant to a subsequent dispute.
4.161
The AD Agreement expressly provides that a comparison be made of weighted averages of
US price and normal value for "all comparable expor t transactions". The ordinary meaning of these
terms supports a finding that zeroing violates the AD Agreement. Any ambiguity or manifest
absurdity that the United States might claim derive s not from the text but from its own unilateral
interpretation of Article 2.4.2.
4.162 Canada's interpretation of Article 2.4.2 does not deprive the term "comparable" of operative
meaning. Canada agrees with the United States th at Article 2.4.2 applies to intermediate stage

comparisons. For those comparisons, "comparable" ensures that model-specific comparisons only
include transactions meeting the requirements of "price comparability" contained in Article 2.4.
"[All]" ensures that all the transactions meeting those requirements of comparability are used.
4.163 For final stage comparisons, "comparable" describes the transactions compared at the
intermediate stage and the nature of the transactions within the like product. "[All]" operates to ensure
that all transactions are considered, and none ar e excluded. The United States argued in its first
written submission that Article 2.4.2 "mak[es] plain that not all export transactions are 'comparable'."
The United States now claims that all export tran sactions are comparable, although not "equally
comparable". If all export transactions were comp arable, then it would be hard to understand how the
inclusion of the word "comparable" could, as the United States contended in its first written
submission, demonstrate that the word "all" has a limited application, namely only to a subset of
transactions which are "comparable". Ultimately , the United States fails to refute Canada's
demonstration that Commerce's overall comparison, including at the final stage of the process, did not
result in a "fair comparison" within the meaning of Article 2.4.
5. Company-specific Issues
(a) The Allocation of Interest Expense for Abitibi
4.164 In making this claim, Canada does not ask that the Panel choose between methodologies as
the United States contends. Rather, Canada argues that Commerce failed to meet its express
obligations under Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. At the outset, in its determin ation, Commerce offers
generic rationales that fail to show that it considered the evidence before it. Abitibi demonstrated that
its newsprint and pulp and paper operations were far more cap ital intensive and required more
financing than its lumber operations and that this difference was not captured in a COGS allocation.
It also demonstrated that including depreciation expense in COGS in no way corrects this distortion or
in any way adjusts for differences in asset requireme nts. Commerce was not guided in its selection of
an allocation methodology by the specific evidence that had been submitted in this case. The
evidence showed that the investigating authority: (1) mandated an allocation methodology at the
outset of a case before even gathering information, (2) failed to make case-specific factual findings,
(2) applied generic reasoning in defence of its me thodology, and (4) asserted that established practice
would be followed because it is cons istent and predictable. This c onstitutes a failure to "consider all
available evidence on the proper allocation of costs" as required by Article 2.2.1.1.
4.165 Further, Abitibi's assets are predominantly long-term and the asset requirements of its
different business segments are very different, which differences are not reflected in COGS. The fatal
problem with a COGS methodology is that it consid ers only current expenses, and effectively ignores
the true, full costs of long-term capital assets. Further, the Panel must consider that Abitibi will sell
the lumber soon after it is produced and then get pa id. Thus, unlike capital assets which need to be
financed for the full year and longer, current pr oduction expenses only need to be financed until
payment is received. Thus, the "cash needs" or capital needed to finance current expense is an
amount much less than the annual total of tho se expenses because it takes into account inventory
turnover time. This is shorter for lumber than ot her products Abitibi sells. In ignoring this for
Abitibi, Commerce grossly over-weighted current expe nses in its allocation, since the working capital
"cash needed" to finance current expenses over one year is not the total of such expenses, but rather
that total divided by the inventory turnover time. Failure to consider these factors resulted in an
interest expense that was not related to Abitibi' s cost to produce softwood lumber, contrary to
Article 2.2.1.1.
4.166
Commerce's COGS methodology also skewed the allocation of interest expenses to lumber in
this case because Abitibi's lumber operations require 7.6 per cent of the company's total assets and
therefore 7.6 per cent of its total financial expense. By allocating to lumber 13.6 per cent of total

expense, as demonstrated, Commerce included costs that did not "pertain to" the production and sale
of lumber contrary to Article 2.2.2.
4.167 To date, the United States has failed to addr ess any of the factual evidence or arguments
presented above. It has responded by offering genera lizations that do not withstand scrutiny, or by
mischaracterizing Canada's or Abitibi's arguments.
(b) The Allocation of G&A Expenses for Tembec
4.168 The United States continues to seek to ju stify Commerce's findings by arguing that
Commerce's method was predictable and therefore more reliable, that the FPG data were unreliable
because they were unaudited and divisional da ta. These arguments do not support Commerce's
rejection of the FPG's data as a basis for determining Tembec's G&A.
4.169 Article 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement requires Commerce to calculate G&A expenses based on
actual data pertaining to the production and sales of the like product. The G&A expenses from both
the FPG and the overall company are verified and on the record (i.e., they both satisfy the "actual
data" requirement). Commerce defended the use of Tembec's company-wide data by stating that its
"consistent and predictable method is to calculate the rate based on the company-wide G&A costs
incurred by the producing company…" In this case, however, its method effectively required reliance
on data that did not pertain to the production an d sale of softwood lumber and distorted Tembec's
margin of dumping in violation of Article 2.2.2. It also resulted in the calculation of costs that were
not "associated with" the actual cost to Tembec for producing and selling softwood lumber, contrary
to Article 2.2.1.1.
4.170 Commerce calculated Tembec's G&A rate b ased on the company-wide G&A expenses even
though Tembec submitted documented evidence th at its pulp and paper operations incurred
significantly higher G&A expenses than its lumber operations, as well as evidence on the reliability of
the FPG data. Using the more accurate and reflective data from the FPG would have resulted in lower
costs which, ultimately, would have resulted in a lower margin for Tembec. The United States now
offers, as an additional defence of its practice, that Tembec's FPG G&A data were "not audited" and
not kept in accordance with Canadian GAAP. First, this defence is a post hoc rationalization of
Commerce's determination. Second, as elaborated in Canada's response to question 54 of the Panel,
the FPG data were audited. Finally, the FPG data were maintained in accordance with GAAP.
(c) The Allocation of G&A Expenses for Weyerhaeuser
4.171 The United States argues that the hardboard siding charge is a general expense attributable to
Weyerhaeuser Canada's cost of producing softwood. The United States' only support for this claim is
that the hardboard siding expense is really a "leg al" expense. However, the USD130 million charge
for hardboard siding settlements does no t reflect lawyer salaries, copying of briefs, travel to court, or
other types of "legal" expenses that are often consider ed to be "general". As described on page 51 of
Weyerhaeuser Company's financial statement, the ha rdboard siding charge was unique. The charge
was specifically meant to fund future claims relate d to hardboard siding. The expense was not even
incurred in the year Weyerhaeuser Company took the charge; it was simply meant to reflect the
contingency on its books. In rea lity, the expense affected one line of business, in the United States,
that was unrelated to Canadian softwood lumber – nothing more.
4.172 The United States further tries to justify Comm erce's classification of the hardboard siding
expense as a general expense based on the claim that doing so is "supported by Weyerhaeuser
Company's own books and records" and that We yerhaeuser Company describes the expense as
"generally incidental to its business". On th e contrary, Weyerhaeuser Company's consolidated
financial statement provides separate line items for Weyerhaeuser Company's SG&A expenses and its
hardboard siding settlement expense. The evid ence also demonstrates only one other line-item

expense (the integration expense) was included in Commerce's G&A calculation. Further, the
language that the costs are "generally incidental to its business", as the full quote demonstrates, was
referenced in terms of pending and threatened environmental litigation.
4.173 Finally, the United States hinges its entire argument on the belief that Canada cannot
demonstrate that the settlement charge relates to the production and sale of hardboard siding. Such an
approach is inconsistent with Articles 2.2.2 and 2.2.1.1, the findings of the panel in Egypt – Steel
Rebar, and Commerce's own practice. As stated in Egypt – Steel Rebar , a cost may be attributed to
the production and sale of the like product only if the facts of the case point out that the cost was
associated with the product under investigation. A pplied to the hardboard siding settlement charge,
the United States may not base its decision to incl ude the charge on the fact that Weyerhaeuser
Company did not demonstrate that the charge relate s to production activity, or that it normally treats
these types of expenses in this manner. The har dboard siding expense is a settlement fund concerning
a product unrelated to the like product, produced in the United States by Weyerhaeuser Company.
Accordingly, the hardboard siding expense did not "pertain to" the production and sale of softwood
lumber as required by Article 2.2.2. Nor did incl uding this expense result in a cost that "reasonably
reflected" Weyerhaeuser Canada's costs "associated with" the production and sale of softwood lumber
in accordance with Article 2.2.1.1. US findings in this regard were neither a proper establishment of
the facts nor an evaluation of the facts that was unbiased and objective.
4.174 The US arguments also fail to properly iden tify Weyerhaeuser Company's burden during the
investigation. Weyerhaeuser Company was required to demonstrate that the expense was not related
to the production and sale of Canadian softwood lumber, nothing more. Commerce never requested
additional information to add to this record evid ence. Finally, the US argument violates Commerce's
own practice. When Commerce calculates G&A for a parent company that owns the producer or
exporter under investigation, as here, Commerce has recognized that G&A expense items are not
considered fungible in nature. The United Stat es never addresses this policy in its first written
submission or response to the Panel's questions. Th e record in this case demonstrates that for other
"general" expenses, Commerce in fact followed this policy.
(d) West Fraser's By-product Revenue Offset
4.175 Canada argues that Commerce improperly igno red relevant record evidence concerning
99.7 per cent of BC wood chip prices. In response, the United States characterizes Canada's claim as
an "argument that Commerce should have preferred one source of evidence," and alleges that such an
argument is a "request to find facts de novo". This characterization is incorrect. Canada argues that
Commerce was required to consider all relevant record evidence. A panel must "consider whether all
the evidence was considered, including facts which might detract from the decision actually reached"
in determining whether an investigating authority was unbiased and objective. The United States also
is incorrect in alleging that Canada is seeking a de novo review of the record evidence. Canada has
made a prima facie case showing that the evidence on BC market prices is inconsistent with
Commerce's determination that West Fraser's chip sal es to affiliated parties were made at inflated
prices. It falls within the Panel's competence to find that this determination does not constitute an
"unbiased and objective" evaluation of that evidence.
4.176 Canada demonstrated that the data Comme rce relied upon did not provide a reasonable
benchmark for BC market prices. Canada showed th at the majority of West Fraser's wood chip sales
to unaffiliated parties were made through the McBride mill pursuant to a pre-existing contract early in
the POI, when prices were lowest. Canada also showed that the volume of West Fraser's sales to
unaffiliated parties represented just 0.28 per cent of West Fraser's total BC wood chip sales.
4.177 First, the United States argues that these are ne w arguments that were not advanced by West
Fraser itself. As Commerce used a country-wide comparison in its Preliminary Determination,
however, there was no reason why West Fraser would have argued that its sales to unaffiliated parties

in BC were too small or unrepresentative. Sec ond, the United States asserts that Commerce acted
reasonably because West Fraser's unaffiliated transa ctions within BC were found to be commercial
transactions. As record evidence shows that the ma jority of West Fraser's BC sales to unaffiliated
parties were made during the first two months of the POI, when prices were lowest, the average price
of those sales cannot reflect market prices for the POI. Third, the Unite d States claims that "[s]o long
as the wood chip transactions were commercial in na ture, the actual volume of those transactions is
irrelevant". This assertion, however, is not consis tent with an investigating authority's obligations
under the AD Agreement. Under Commerce's interpretation, even one non-representative arm's length
transaction could serve as a reasonable benchmark for market prices for a POI of an entire year.
Finally, the United States observes that Canada has not made arguments concerning West Fraser's
unaffiliated sales from its PIR sawmill. That observati on is correct, and the reason for this is simple:
unaffiliated sales from PIR did not distort Commerce's analysis.
4.178 Commerce applied inconsistent benchmarks to Canfor and West Fraser in determining
whether their respective chip sales to unaffiliated parties were made at market prices. The
United States defends this action by arguing "[unaff iliated] sales in BC made by West Fraser were of
its own product mix, and thus the best evidence of th e value of an offset in West Fraser's process".
This argument is a false, post hoc justification for Commerce's dissimilar treatment of West Fraser.
Commerce did not find that West Fraser's wood ch ip sales to unaffiliated parties provided a better
benchmark because they reflect West Fraser's "own product mix", and identified no evidence that
West Fraser's wood chips somehow differed from those of Canfor or other producers.
4.179 Canada also showed that Commerce re-valued cer tain chip sales made by West Fraser to an
affiliate, QRP, even though Commerce recognized that those sales had been made at market prices. In
response, the United States argues Canada is reque sting the Panel to find that data from QRP was
"more relevant". Canada does not argue that these da ta were "more relevant". Rather, Canada argues
that Commerce unreasonably revalued wood chip sal es made by this large sawmill to an affiliated
customer, even though Commerce itself specifically recognized that the prices QRP paid West Fraser
were not inflated. The US argument does not address this inconsistency. At the very least, this
evidence must be considered in determining wh ether the finding was based on an unbiased and
objective evaluation of the record evidence as a whole.
(e) Tembec's By-product Revenue Offset
4.180 Commerce had two alternatives for the data it w ould use to calculate Tembec's by-product
revenue offset. Commerce had to c hoose between using internal transf er prices or unaffiliated prices
for wood chip purchases. Commerce used one appr oach for Tembec and the opposite approach for
West Fraser for the same overall purpose: artificially inflating both companies' margins.
4.181 The United States argues that "the difference betw een the (...) internal surrogate for cost and
the external market price is the equivalent of "p rofit" in the normal setting where costs and sales
prices are known".
 This post hoc rationalisation must be rejected. The difference between internal
prices and market prices cannot be attributed to pr ofit. By-products, by definition, have neither
profits nor costs. Furthermore, Commerce made no findings about profits.
4.182 Canada submits that market price is the appropriate benchmark for valuing by-product
revenue offsets. Article 2.2.1.1 requires Commerce to base its cost calculations on the records kept
provided that they "reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the
product". The internal transfer pricing in Tembec 's books and records does not reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production of softwood lu mber because the wood chip pricing therein does
not reasonably reflect the market value of the by-product.
4.183 There are three flaws in the US argument that Tembec made its best assessment of a surrogate
for cost when it set its internal transfer price. First, Commerce made no such finding. Second, there

is no record evidence upon which such a finding c ould have been made. Third, the argument assumes
that Tembec's accountants would assign a cost to a by-product when GAAP provides that no costs are
assigned to by-products.
4.184 The United States claims that "there ar e no easy methods to assess value under such
conditions" and that, because Co mmerce used the company's own valuation, it determined a
reasonable figure for by-product revenue.
 These claims were not advanced by Commerce in the IDM,
and they are not correct. It would have been very easy to assess the value of the wood chips by using
the records kept by Tembec of its unaffiliated sales and purchases of wood chips.
(f) Slocan's Futures Revenue Offset
4.185 Commerce rejected Slocan's position that futures revenue formed part of direct selling
expenses. In doing so, Commerce asserted that it did not consider the revenue to "result from and
bear a direct relationship to [a] particular sale in question". This is not correct. Article 2.4 requires
that "[d]ue allowance shall be made … for di fferences which affect price comparability". The
ordinary meaning of this provision cannot support the US interpretation. Article 2.4 does not refer to
"particular sales transactions", and no reasonable interpretation of the textual language of this
provision would read in such a specific requirement.
4.186 The United States argues that Article 2.4 presumes a request for adjustment and a
demonstration of effect on price comparability. Th is interpretation contradicts the ordinary meaning
of Article 2.4. The United States was required to ma ke due allowance for all differences that affected
price comparability. In this context, the "differe nces" referred to include the "conditions and terms of
sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics and any other differences".
4.187 Article 2.4 provides a non-exhaustive list of differe nces that affect price comparability. It is
apparent that there is a broad requirement to adju st for any differences affecting price comparability.
Moreover, Article 2.4 clearly envisages overlap between the "differences" under this provision. In
other words, it would not matter whether Slocan sepa rately demonstrated that its futures revenue was
a "condition of sale" in the US market. Slocan's futures trading activity was either a "condition" of
US sales, an "other difference" affecting price comparability, or both.
F. SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
4.188 In the second written submission, the United St ates addresses points raised by Canada at the
first substantive meeting and in Canada's 30 June responses to the Panel's questions. The
United States asserts that statements made by Ca nada at the first substa ntive meeting and in its
responses do nothing to change the conclusion the Panel should reach. With respect to each claim, the
United States contends that Canada either has failed to identify an obligation implicated by
Commerce's action, or, where it has identified an obligation, it has failed to demonstrate how
Commerce's actions were inconsistent with that oblig ation, and it has asked the Panel to engage in de
novo fact-finding.
1. Initiation
4.189 Canada's argument regarding Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement is flawed for at least two
reasons. First, Canada incorrectly reads into th at provision an obligation on investigating authorities
independent of the obligation under Article 5.3 to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
initiate an investigation. Where Article 5 impo ses an obligation on investigating authorities, the
obligation is unmistakable. By contrast, Article 5.2 makes no reference at all to the authorities, but
simply describes the contents of an application. This fact is not inconsequential given that this
description of the application's contents necessarily informs the inquiry into accuracy and adequacy
and sufficiency under Article 5.3.

4.190 The second flaw in Canada's argument is that it improperly reads the word "all" into the
phrase "such information as is reasonably available". It suggests that the exclusion of any reasonably
available information from the application, no matte r how minor, would be grounds for declining to
initiate, even if the information included in the a pplication were sufficient to demonstrate dumping,
injury, and causal link.
4.191 Under Article 5.3, Canada disputes the suffi ciency of the evidence supporting initiation and
argues that the Weldwood data would have provi ded a superior basis for deciding whether to
initiate.
54 However, the Weldwood data necessarily w ould have represented the experience of only a
single company, rather than the diverse cost and pric e data actually set forth in the application. But,
even assuming, arguendo, that Canada's assessment in this respect is correct, it has no bearing on the
question before this Panel.
4.192 The evidence that Commerce reli ed upon to initiate included data from the lumber industry
publication Random Lengths. Canada incorrectly asserts that Random Lengths "commingles"
Canadian and US data. Its assertion that the Random Lengths data are "not actual transaction prices"
but "informal estimates" is also incorrect. More over, Canada's questioning of the reliability of
Random Lengths data is contradicted by its own reliance on that very same source.55
4.193 Canada also argues that the application de monstrated dumping of only a limited number of
categories of lumber. 56 Canada's argument assumes the correctness of its own claim regarding the
product under consideration; that is, it assumes that each "category" of softwood lumber in fact
constitutes a separate "product under consideration" and thus requires a separate demonstration of
dumping for purposes of initiation. However, Ca nada's product-under-consideration argument has no
basis in the AD Agreement.
4.194 Finally, Canada argues that Commerce's initiatio n was tainted by a lack of evidence of home
market sale prices in BC.
57 The application contained evidence of home market sales below cost in
Quebec. This provided a basis for using cons tructed value to establish normal value. The AD
Agreement does not require investigating authorities to conduct separate cost tests on different
markets within "the domestic market of the exporting country".
4.195 Commerce's establishment of the facts with respect to softwood lumber costs was also proper.
Canada's claim that the application "fail[ed] to have costs of significant or representative producers" is
incorrect for two reasons. 58 First, with respect to the vast majo rity of costs, data from US mills were
used only to provide production factors, which were then valued using data Canada does not dispute
are representative of Canadian costs of production. 59 Second, the US mills whose data were used in
the cost model were themselves significant and representative producers of softwood lumber.
4.196 Finally, Canada's allegation that "Commerce re lied upon an average freight cost from Quebec
to the United States including in that average an estimate for freight cost from the Maritime
provinces"60 is demonstrably false. The cited affidavit provides separate per-MBF freight rates for
shipment to Boston from four regions, one of which is the Maritime Provinces.61

54 See, e.g., Canada first written submission, paras. 86, 95, and 99; Canada response to question 9 of the
Panel, paras. 45-49.
55 Canada response to question 4 of the Panel, paras. 6-7.
56 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, paras. 28-30.
57 See, e.g., Canada response to question 19 of the Panel, para. 61.
58 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, paras. 34-35.
59 See US first written submission, paras. 53-54 and exhibits cited therein.
60 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, para. 40.
61 Exhibit CDA-41, Petition Exhibit VI.C-9, para. 4.

2. Product under Consideration
4.197 Canada has not identified an obligation arising out of Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement that the
United States violated in this case. Canada's shift from one theory to another reflects its inability to
identify any violation.
4.198 This is underscored by its 30 June 2003 response to a question on this very subject. Canada
first attempts to parse the phrase "characteristics closel y resembling" in Article 2.6. It concludes that
the phrase "must mean that the essential, distinctive traits of one product must be very nearly identical
to the essential, distinctive traits of the other product". 62 In fact, this conclusion is not borne out by
the definitions of key terms Canada cites.
4.199 Canada then proceeds to posit a problem that might occur if the product under consideration
in a given case were defined too broadly, usin g a hypothetical case comprising automobiles and
bicycles.63 There are several problems with this hy pothetical example. First, whatever the
appropriate analysis of an investigation that mi ght treat automobiles and bicycles as a single product
under consideration would be, that is not the case pr esented here. Second, Canada's own analysis of
its hypothetical begs the question of how Article 2.6 directs an authority to determine the appropriate
number of products under consideration in a given case. Third, Canada fails to consider the
implications that a narrow definition of product under consideration would have on the very same
standing and injury determinations to which it alludes.
3. Due Allowance for Dimensional Characteristics
4.200 Commerce acted consistently with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in its consideration of the
dimensional characteristics of softwood lumber. Ca nada contends that the respondent companies had
no notice of Commerce's intent to consider whether or not a price adjustment should be granted for
dimensional differences. 64 Its claim of procedural unfairness – specifically, that the United States
violated Article 6 of the AD Agreement – is a new claim that falls outside the Panel's terms of
reference.
4.201 In its response to the Panel's questions, Cana da provided a seven-page consultant's report
(contained in Exhibit CDA-129) to explain the re gression analysis contained in Exhibit CDA-77.
Canada's reason for presenting the regression analysis (and the consultant's background report) for the
first time in this dispute, instead of during the inv estigation, is that "no one reasonably doubted that
the inclusion of dimension for model matching w ould not mean its inclusion in adjustments for
physical differences".65 Canada's position is belied by the record. The parties' submissions during the
investigation evidence their awar eness that whether or not an adjustment would be made for
differences in dimension was an open question.
4.202 Canada misinterprets Commerce's inclusion of physical characteristics in the product
matching methodology as an acknowledgement that di mensional differences had an effect on price
comparability, requiring "due allowance" under Article 2.4.66 However, Commerce cannot be deemed
to have concluded that dimension affected pr ice comparability simply by having made a product
matching determination. Commerce accepted that dimensional characteristics were significant for
product matching purposes, at the behest of the parties, but without scrutiny of the price or cost data
specifically relevant to dimension. Even assuming arguendo, that Commerce implicitly
acknowledged that dimension affects price comparability, it made the due allowances that Article 2.4

62 Canada response to question 20 of the Panel, para. 64.
63 Id., para. 65.
64 Canada response to question 4 of the Panel, paras. 4 and 5.
65 Id., para. 4.
66 Canada response to question 22 of the Panel, para. 86.

requires by comparing products on the basis of criteria that included dimension. In contrast to the
Argentina authority in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles , by conducting a model-by-model comparison, and
matching not only identical softwood lumber dimensi ons, but also, where identical dimensions were
not available for matching, the most similar dimensions possible, Commerce fully accounted for
dimensional differences.
4.203 For "affect price comparability" under Article 2.4 to have any meaning, there must be some
connection established between the di fferences in physical characteristics at issue and prices. As the
respondents were aware, differences in dimensio n did not yield variable cost of manufacturing
differences, and therefore Commerce did not have the means to connect differences in price with
differences in dimension according to its norma l practice. The connection between physical
differences and price had to be established in some other fashion in order to justify an adjustment.
4.204 This is not a case in which Commerce either fa iled to ask for data, or asked for data the
respondents never provided, and therefore record evidence does not exist. Commerce reached its
conclusion based on a review of the information contained in the respondents' cost and sales databases
conducted in the normal course of the investigation.
67
4.205 In response to the Panel's request to the Un ited States for the "number of comparisons" of
softwood lumber made involving different dimensi ons, Canada provided its ow n distorted response.
First, Canada presented only the number of compar isons made, without weighting the results by
volume.68 Because the dumping margins are calculated according to the volume of US sales, a simple
number of comparisons does not reflect the relative significance of the identical, similar, and
constructed value comparisons in the margin.
4.206 Canada also provided several charts showing price differences in the Canadian market for
several softwood lumber products. However, the pri ce differences reflected in those charts may not
be attributable to differences in dimension, but to the fact that the sales were made outside the
ordinary course of trade.
69 Other comparisons on the record show no discernible pattern between
dimension and price. They show minimal price di fferences for differences in dimension, significant
fluctuations, and smaller lumber pieces selling for higher prices than large lumber pieces. This other
record evidence demonstrates the selective nature of Canada's charts.
4. Calculation of Overall Dumping Margin
4.207 On the issue of Commerce's calculation of th e overall dumping margin, the issue is whether
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement contain an affirmative obligation for Members to offset
margins of dumping established after comparing weighted-average normal values to weighted
averages of all comparable export transactions with any non-dumping amounts found in such
comparisons. There is no basis for such an obligation in the AD Agreement.
4.208 While it is clear that Canada disagrees with th e United States on the existence of such an
obligation (for purposes of this dispute), it is not clear that the disagreement extends beyond this
dispute. Canadian administrative practice shows that Canada's interpretation of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2
is similar to the United States' interpretation. 70 It is not clear how Canada reconciles its interpretation
of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 for purposes of its own i nvestigations with its interpretation of those
provisions in the present case.

67 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 4, note 60.
68 Canada response to question 25 of the Panel, para. 97.
69 See Exhibit US-76, pp.1-4 illustrating this point.
70 See Exhibit US-78, "Margins of Dumping" section of "Statement of Reasons, Concerning the making
of a final determination of dumping with respect to Fresh Tomatoes, Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America, Excluding Tomatoes for Processing".

4.209 Further, Canada has stated positions th at are: (a) inconsistent with the EC – Bed Linen Report
and (b) internally inconsistent. First, after relying heavily on the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bed
Linen, Canada is now espousing positions at odds with that report. Canada now agrees with the
United States that a two-stage process for determin ing whether a producer or exporter has engaged in
dumping is appropriate under Ar ticles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.71 However, the Appellate
Body, in arriving at its finding in EC – Bed Linen found "nothing in Article 2.4.2 to support the notion
that, in an anti-dumping investigation, two different stages are envisaged or distinguished [...], nor to
justify the distinctions [...] among types or models of the same product on the basis of these 'two
stages'".72 Thus, Canada now appears to agree w ith the United States that the reasoning in EC – Bed
Linen does not account for the need to make multiple comparisons in order to comport with
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.
4.210 Second, Canada is not completely consistent in its position regarding a two-stage dumping
analysis. In particular, at paragraph 109 of its r esponse to question 31 of the Panel, Canada seems to
take the position that a two-stage analysis is required by the AD Agreement . Yet, in the same
response, and without citation or explanation, Ca nada claims that "the resulting dumping margin
should be the same whether the authority ca rries out its calculation in one stage or two" 73 and that, in
this case, the first stage "divided the single like product into multiple models as an expedient that
permitted appropriate compar isons between identical or most similar products". 74 (emphasis added)
Nowhere does Canada reconcile these positions.
4.211 Although Canada took issue with the appropria teness of the United States' reference to
negotiating history of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement 75, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention expressly provides for recourse to the negotiating history in order to confirm the ordinary
meaning of treaty terms in their context and in li ght of the treaty's object and purpose. Canada does
not refute the substance of the relevant negotiating history.
5. Company-specific Issues
4.212 Canada misconstrues Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement as mandating particular
methodologies other than the methodologies Commerce actually used. In fact, Articles 2.2.1.1 and
2.2.2 provide investigating authorities with genera l guidance as to the calculation of production costs
and constructed value.
4.213 Canada raises the issue whethe r Commerce's decision to allocate Abitibi's financial costs
using a COGS methodology was consistent with Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. Commerce fully
considered Abitibi's "asset-based" allocation proposal , but disagreed that assets alone should govern
how financial costs were allocated. 76 Canada argues that the COGS allocation is unreasonable, not
because it fails to include a value for capital assets, but because it fails to consider all assets to a
sufficient degree.77 For example, Canada argues that th e COGS methodology fails to consider non-
depreciable assets. However, the record reflects that the vast majority of Abitibi's assets – and all of
its "capital assets" – were depreciable assets.78
4.214 Whether or not Abitibi's asset-based cost allocation methodology was a reasonable alternative
to Commerce's COGS methodology is not the issue be fore this Panel. However, even on its own
terms, Canada's argument is flawed, because it is based on the unsubstantiated premise that Abitibi's

71 Canada responses to questions 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Panel, paras. 101, 105-107, and 109.
72 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 53.
73 Canada response to question 31 of the Panel, para. 110.
74 Id., para. 111.
75 Canada first oral (opening) statement, paras. 67-68.
76 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 15.
77 Canada response to question 52 of the Panel, para. 146.
78 Exhibit CDA-82, Abitibi's Consolidated Financial Statement, p. 35.

financial costs relate solely to its assets. Be cause money is fungible, financial costs cannot be
attributed to any one expenditure – whether to as set purchases or to any other particular investment.
79
Rather, and consistent with Canadian GAAP's tr eatment of financial costs as a general cost,
Commerce concluded that financial costs relate to Abitibi as a whole and are reflective of Abitibi's
overall borrowing needs.
4.215 Canada raises the issue whether Commerce's calculation of Tembec's G&A costs – based on
the company-wide costs reported in Tembec's aud ited financial statement – was inconsistent with
Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. Ca nada cites to no authority for the proposition that, as an accounting
matter, a company can incur G&A costs on a divisional basis.
4.216 Canada was unable to provide evidence that Tembec's "divisional G&A" was in accordance
with Canadian GAAP.80 Instead, Canada argues that an assertion in an unaudited portion of Tembec's
financial statement establishes that the "divisi onal G&A" is in accordance with Canadian GAAP. 81
However, this note to the audited financial statemen ts does not address directly Tembec's treatment of
its G&A costs, nor does the reco rd establish that Tembec's "div isional G&A" was among the items
audited.82 Canada argues that, because Tembec's overall G&A cost was audited, the G&A cost that
Tembec attributed to various divisions must also have been audited 83, but that conclusion does not
logically follow. The fact that an audited financial statement properly records a company's total G&A
costs does not mean that the comp any's internal allocation of those costs among divisions has been
audited.
4.217 Regarding Weyerhaeuser Canada's G&A costs , Canada appears to reason that G&A costs
that are not related exclusively to the production and sale of softwood lumber must not be included in
a calculation of those production costs.84 This reasoning misapprehends the very nature of G&A cost.
General expenses are, by definition, expenses incurre d for the benefit of a corporate group as a whole
and are not specific to one or another product line. A requirement that general expense be directly
related to the good produced would make it impossi ble to allocate general expense within a company
that produces many goods because a direct relations hip would never be identifiable. This would
render meaningless the requirement of Article 2.2 that "a reasonable amount for administrative,
selling and general costs" be included in a company's cost calculation.
4.218 In previous submissions, the United States has re ferred the Panel to Note 14 of Weyerhaeuser
Company's audited financial statement, explaining the general nature of the company's litigation
costs.85 In its most recent submission, Canada repli es that the statement in Note 14 "was not made in
the context of the hardboard siding claim". 86 However, Note 14 plainly is attached to the line item in
Weyerhaeuser Company's financial statement pertai ning to the hardboard siding litigation. Canada
also adds that Note 14 "neither attributes the e xpenses to any particular portion of Weyerhaeuser's
business nor the business as a whole. It simply acknowledges that the company incurred certain
costs".87 But, this is not a basis for excluding the co st from G&A costs. If it were, then litigation
expenses and other expenses that are general in na ture would avoid inclusion in calculation of a
company's total SG&A cost simply by virtue of their characterization on a company's books and
records.

79 US first written submission, paras. 192-193.
80 Canada response to question 53 of the Panel, paras. 149-154.
81 Id., para. 149.
82 Exhibit US-12, Tembec's Annual Report, "Auditors' Report," p. 34.
83 Canada response to question 53 of the Panel, para. 150.
84 See, e.g., Canada response to question 60 of the Panel, paras. 163-64.
85 See US response to question 41 of the Panel, para. 65, note 41, citing Exhibit CDA-101,
Weyerhaeuser 2000 Annual Report, note 14, p. 75.
86 Canada response to question 60 of the Panel, para. 164.
87 Ibid.

4.219 Canada maintains that these costs had a "clear association with the production and sale of
non-like product…" 88 What Canada does not explain is how litigation occurring years after a good's
production can be clearly associated with its production.
4.220 The AD Agreement is silent as to how investigating authorities should calculate by-product
offsets to production costs. Article 2.2.1.1 addresses the "costs associated with the production and
sale" of the product under consideration and does not address consideration of the "market value" of
offsets to those costs. "Market value" is different from "cost". Market value will include the cost of a
good, but it will also include other elements, such as selling expenses and profit.
4.221 Applying market value as a benchmark, Commerce determined that West Fraser's BC
affiliated transactions did not reasonably reflect the value of the wood chips. 89 Thus, Commerce
valued the by-product offset for both affiliated and unaffiliate d transactions using the "average sales
price" for wood chips derived from the unaffiliated BC transactions.90
4.222 Canada now acknowledges that West Fraser ne ver argued to Commerce that some of its
unaffiliated (McBride mill) transactions were unr epresentative of a market value for wood chips. 91 It
argues that, because West Fraser had a large amount of affiliated transactions during the period of
investigation, it is "self-evident" that Commerce should have questioned the use of West Fraser's
unaffiliated transactions for valuing wood chips in BC. 92 However, West Fraser's unaffiliated
transactions were significant in number and value. Even if the quantity of transaction had been
smaller, this fact, in and of itself, would not ha ve called into question the commercial nature of the
unaffiliated transactions.
4.223 Canada also argues that Commerce should have compared the values of West Fraser's wood
chips to the values of all wood chips on the record, including t hose values reflected in the books and
records of Tembec, Canfor, Abitibi, and Weyerhauser Canada. 93 Canada cites to no provision of the
AD Agreement requiring that analysis.
4.224 Finally, Canada argues that Commerce "blindly adhered" to its methodology for valuing
affiliated transactions. 94 However, Commerce's methodology in BC (and applied to Alberta
transactions as well) was based on an objective review of the firm's books and records.95
4.225 In the case of Tembec, the question is Commerce' s valuation of interdivisional transfers of
wood chips. A value for an interdivisional transf er of a by-product recorded on a company's books
and records may be a reasonable reflection of the "costs associated with the production and sale" of
the by-product, even if that value is less than market value. In this case, Commerce determined that
the price paid by Tembec's pulp mills to its sawmills was a reasonable amount.96
4.226 Canada claims that Tembec's inter-divisional transactions were "arbitrary". 97 B u t , n o
provision in the AD Agreement requires an investigating author ity to replace a company's own
valuation of inter-divisional transfers of a product with the market value for sales of the same product.
Costs of production are commonly lower than the mark et value of a product, due to profit paid by an
unaffiliated purchaser to its supplier.

88 Canada response to question 58 of the Panel, para. 159.
89 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11. See also US first written submission, paras. 218-229.
90 Ibid.
91 Canada response to question 65 of the Panel, para. 168, note 168.
92 Ibid.
93 Canada response to question 66 of the Panel, paras. 170-171.
94 Id., paras. 170 and 172.
95 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11.
96 Id. See also US first written submission, paras. 230-244.
97 Canada response to question 71 of the Panel, para. 179.

4.227 With respect to Slocan, Canada asserts that Commerce should have made some adjustment
for futures contract profits, even though Slocan itsel f failed to substantiate ei ther of the alternative
treatments it sought. As the panel in Egypt – Steel Rebar noted, responding parties have an obligation
to assert and to justify the information and arguments required to prove their claims.
98 Slocan
requested two alternative and directly contradictor y treatments of its hedging profits, but the evidence
did not support either claim.99
4.228 Neither Slocan nor Canada has explained how Slocan's futures contracts could "affect" any
specific prices to US customers, given that no sale or shipment of softwood lumber and no payment
for lumber actually occurred under the contracts.
100 Canada has not identified a sale of lumber to a
customer in the United States for which Slocan's futures contracts were a condition and term of
sale.101 Absent such a showing in the investigation, there was no basis fo r an adjustment for
differences in conditions and terms of sale under Article 2.4.
4.229 Commerce also found, consistent with Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement , that the futures
contracts were not linked to production, since the profits amounted to sales revenue (even though they
were not tied to any particular sale of lumber in the United States). Thus, Commerce properly
declined to use selling revenue to offset finance expenses included in Slocan's production costs.102
G. SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF CANADA
4.230 In its second oral statement, Canada made the following arguments:
1. Initiation and Termination of the Investigation
4.231 The United States breached the AD Agreement because the investigation was initiated and
then continued in a manner that did not respect US obligations under Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8.
4.232 The panel in Guatemala – Cement I held that, even though the evidence needed to justify
initiation is not the same as that needed to justif y a preliminary or final determination, the "subject
matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to make a
preliminary or final determination of dumping". (emphasis in original)
4.233 The United States has claimed that the applica tion "contained data on cost of production,
home market sales, and export price for many co mpanies in the two largest lumber-producing
provinces in Canada". However, the United States has now conceded this statement is untrue.
4.234 Commerce initiated the investigation without an y domestic sales info rmation from BC – by
far the largest lumber-producing province in Cana da. The sole allegation of dumping against BC
producers was based on a constructed value comparis on. Article 2.2.1 permits an authority to
disregard price-to-price comparisons and resort to constructed value comparisons "only if" the
authority has properly determined that home market sales are made below cost. As there were no BC
home market prices, Commerce had no legal basis for using the BC constructed value comparison as
evidence of dumping to justify initiation.
4.235 With respect to Quebec, the decision to initiate was improper because the estimate of
producers' costs rested on assertions and not on evid ence. When the appli cant's Quebec home market
sales information is compared with its export price information, there is no dumping. Initiation rested

98 Panel Report, Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.3.
99 See Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 21.
100 See US first written submission, paras. 249-250.
101 Ibid.
102 Id., para. 252.

on constructed value comparisons, which, in turn, rested on the Applicant's estimate or model of
Quebec producer costs.
4.236 There were no data on how costs of productio n were incurred by Canadian mills before
Commerce at initiation. The Applicant's cost m odel was based, in significant part, on information
from two US mills chosen as surrogates to model the costs of Quebec mills.
4.237 The Applicant noted that softwood lumber manufacturing costs vary significantly by producer
based on a number of identified factors. Commerce failed to ensure that the two US surrogate mills
chosen were representative of Quebec mills, at least regarding the factors identified by the Applicant.
The Applicant simply asserted, and Commerce accepted, that the US surrogate mills were
representative. Commerce had no evidence before it to support such a conclusion.
4.238 Further, the Applicant did not provide any info rmation on how the costs of the US surrogate
mills were allocated to the products at issue.
4.239 The United States, hiding behind the pretense of confidentiality, has not provided the Panel
with any information that was before Commerce ab out the two US surrogate mills. These US mills
were at the heart of Commerce's decision to initiate . Canada has not seen, and the Panel still does not
have before it, basic information in the hands of the United States, such as th e names of the US mills
and what Commerce knew about those mills. The United States has responde d to Canada's claims
with nothing but assertions.
4.240 The cost information that form ed the basis of Commerce's decision to initiate was neither
accurate nor adequate. Therefore, it was not sufficient to justify initiation under Article 5.3.
4.241 Turning to Article 5.2, these are the facts: the United States has admitted that the Application
contained information indicating that Weldwood, a major Canadian producer, was owned by the
Applicant IP; the Weldwood-IP relationship establish es that actual cost and price information from a
major Canadian producer was readily available to the Applicant; and the Applicant did not provide
such information to Commerce. The undisputed facts establish a breach of Article 5.2.
4.242 Concerning Article 5.8, given the lack of actual Canadian transaction price and cost data in
the Application, Commerce was required to consid er the Weldwood information. Any other result
renders ineffective the ongoing obligation to terminate an investigation in Article 5.8.
2. Zeroing
4.243 The logic of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen is clear. However, the United States
argues that this clearly established interpretation sh ould be rejected. Yet the United States does not
deny that its practice is identical to that formerly used by the EC, until ruled inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2.
4.244 In its essence, the US argument attempts to take Article 2.4.2 out of context, to read meaning
into individual words when a plain reading of the whole of the article establishes a meaning that the
United States does not wish to support. The plai n meaning of "all comparable export transactions"
requires inclusion of export transactions that resu lt in positive margins as well as those that result in
negative margins.
4.245 The Appellate Body, in EC – Bed Linen , noted that the language of Article 2.4.2 did not
fragment the margin calculation process, as the United States suggests it does. Article 2.4.2, seen in
the light of Article 2.4, requires that Members conduct a fair comparison of all comparable export
transactions when determining the margin of dumpi ng, regardless of methodology. Article 2.4.2 is

not limited to a particular methodology, or to a particular stage of a methodology. Rather, it is general
in its terms, applying universally to dumping comparisons.
4.246 The United States asks this Panel to turn to nego tiating history. The text of Article 2.4.2 is
clear and requires no resort to negotiating history. Besides, the negotiating history does not sustain
the US position.
3. Like Product
4.247 The Application in this case covered a wide range of products. It covered not only
construction lumber, but also each of the four products at issue – bed-frame components, finger-
jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and West ern Red Cedar. Under Article 2.6, Commerce was
obligated to determine the corresponding "like produc t" produced in the United States. It must do so,
among other reasons under Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5. 4, to assess the thoroughness and accuracy of the
application and the level of industry support.
4.248 The plain and controlling language is the text of Ar ticle 2.6. By virtue of this provision, it is
necessary that all products within the like product have identical or closely resembling characteristics.
Thus, the investigating authority must either de termine that the like product and the product under
consideration are "identical in all respects", or determine that the like product has "characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consideration".
4.249 Thus the investigating authority must identify the characteristics of th e product claimed to be
a separate like product, identify the characteristics th at define the product under consideration, and
compare the characteristics of the claimed separa te like product to those of the product under
consideration. This is not what Commerce did.
4.250 The United States can only offer its so-called "class or kind" analysis, pursuant to the
Diversified Products criteria, as its Article 2.6 determination. That determination contains no relevant
analysis or determination justifying its treatment of all softwood lumb er products in the United States
as like the product under consideration.
4.251 In this case, the United States subordinated its use of the Diversified Products criteria to a "no
clear dividing line"/"continuum" test and used such cr iteria only to examine whether characteristics of
each of the challenged products resembled some char acteristics of an isolated product chosen for its
similarity to the challenged products. Commerce found a single like product based on the common
"characteristic" of the very diversity – the great variety – of the products that the applicant sought to
cover. The effect of the test applied by Commer ce was that the more that was included in the product
under consideration, the more likely there would be discrete characteristics somewhere within that
great pool of products to match against some disputed product.
4.252 The United States never tested, as it was required to do under Article 2.6, whether bed-frame
components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine or Western Red Cedar were identical to
the product under consideration, or had character istics closely resembling those of the product under
consideration.
4.253 Commerce's failure to compare, in a consistent manner, bed-frame components, finger-jointed
flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Ce dar to all of the products covered by the product
under consideration is a breach of Article 2.6. Th ese four imported products do not closely resemble
the rest of the product under consideration, and thus Commerce should have considered separately
whether the application was adequate to initiate an investigation of them.
4.254 Once Commerce recognized that there were mu ltiple, distinct "like products" supposedly
corresponding to the product under consideration, there should have been several consequences.

Under Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, the investigating authority must examine the sufficiency of the
application and the level of industry support sep arately for each of these distinct like products.
Commerce did neither.
4. The Adjustment for Dimension Required by Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement
4.255 In the underlying investigation, the Applicant asser ted that, to develop a useful price analysis,
"[a] very
 precise comparison of products is necessary". It then specified products by thickness, width
and length, among others, as factors essential to pri ce analysis. The ITC, in the injury inquiry,
determined that "lumber prices generally differ s ubstantially depending on gr ades and dimensions".
Canadian and US producers alike commented that th ickness, width and length affect prices at which
they sell lumber. Industry publications showed diffe rent values for lumber of different dimensions.
Commercial invoices specify dimension. The pricin g data collected by Commerce from each of the
six companies investigated show each producer selli ng lumber of different dimensions for different
prices. The evidence of record for the impact of di mension was incontrovertible. In contrast, there is
no evidence to support the notion that dimension does not affect price.
4.256 Commerce made a significant number of price comparisons between products sold in the
United States and Canada that differed in dimens ion, whether measured by volume or number of
comparisons. The facts establish a prima facie breach of the requirement of Article 2.4 that the
investigating authority make due allowance for di fferences in physical characteristics affecting price
comparability. The United States does not refute the se facts. Instead, the Un ited States appears to
assert that there are exceptions to the requirement of Article 2.4. The United States argues that
Article 2.4 does not apply when there has been an attempt to match products by model; the
differences among the products are minor; or the pr ice relationships among physically different
products are not "stable or predictable". Alterna tively, the United States suggests that the Canadian
respondents did not meet their burden of providing a "means to connect" differences in price to
differences in dimension. None of these putative exceptions or requirements can be sustained.
4.257 First, the "due allowance" requirement in Article 2.4 is comprehensive. It does not permit an
authority to ignore differences remaining after model matching, or otherwise. Second, as to "minor"
differences in physical characteristics, Canada has already shown that Article 2.4 contains no such
exception. Third, nothing in the language of Article 2.4 permits an investigating authority to limit due
allowance to those differences that "affect price co mparability in a stable and predictable manner".
Finally, the new putative "means to connect" requirement is an ex post facto rationalization by the
United States of its refusal to make an adjustment.
5. Company-specific Issues
4.258 For Abitibi, Canada has demonstrated th at Commerce's reasons for using a COGS
methodology contain no analysis of Abitibi's evid ence and cannot meet the standard imposed by
Article 2.2.1.1 or the Appellate Body's ruling in US – Cotton Yarn that an authority consider all facts .
Canada has also demonstrated that the COGS a pproach, as applied to Abitibi, is contrary to
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. Interest expen se is a function of two things: the amount of money
needed to produce a product, and the amount of time for which that money is needed. Cash is needed
to fund both current manufacturing costs and asset acquisitions. Commerce's COGS methodology,
however, considers the financing of only current manufacturing costs, and does not fully consider
financing needs, nor accurately reflect the length of time for which that financing is required. A
COGS-based allocation does not reflect all cash n eeds in general, or the relative cash needs of
Abitibi's product lines in particular. In Abitibi's ca se, the asset category was far more significant –
Abitibi had to finance CAN$11 billion in assets but only CAN$4 billion in current manufacturing
costs. Moreover, Abitibi's production of pulp, pa per and newsprint required significantly greater
assets than did its production of softwood lumber. A total asset-based allocation, by comparison,
considers not just fixed or capital assets but th e financing of all current manufacturing expenses plus

all assets. It also considers the amount of time th at money is needed for each type of expense. All
current production expenses are fully taken into account because every expense incurred to produce a
good is included in the value of assets. Given Abitib i's facts, the COGS methodology resulted in an
allocation of financial expenses that were not asso ciated with and did not pertain to the production
and sale of softwood lumber.
4.259 For Tembec, Commerce improperly rejected FPG G&A data to establish G&A expense, using
company-wide data instead. The FPG's data we re actual amounts pertaining to the production of
softwood lumber, including a portion of company h eadquarters G&A expense. There is no evidence
to suggest that Tembec used distortive procedur es to allocate the company-wide expenses to the
division nor did Commerce point to any. Commerce rejected those recorded data, not because of any
fault with the data itself, but because it has a st andard practice of using company-wide G&A data.
The majority of Tembec's products were pulp, paper and chemicals, were sold outside North America
and incurred proportionately higher G&A expenses comp ared to lumber. Commerce, therefore, did
not use an alternative reasonable set of data – it chose distorted costs that overstated G&A attributable
to lumber and calculated costs that failed to "p ertain" only to softwood lumber, contrary to
Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. US arguments for rejec ting the FPG data are undermined by the fact that
Commerce used divisional data for all lumber cost calculations except G&A a nd financial expenses.
Further, the United States ignores the fact th at different business segments producing different
products can incur G&A, in addition to G&A for the company as a whole, and record it as Tembec
does. The US position that the FPG data were unusab le because they were unaudited has no basis in
Article 2.2.1.1. A note in Tembec's financial repor t indicates that the data were maintained in
accordance with GAAP. Moreover, Commerce itself ne ver made any reference to the statements
being unaudited in its Final Determinati on, and the Panel should disregard this ex post facto
justification by the United States.
4.260 For Weyerhaeuser, Commerce included a hardboard siding cost, related exclusively to
Weyerhaeuser US's production and sales activities in the United States, in Weyerhaeuser Canada's
G&A cost for softwood lumber, contrary to Articl es 2.2.2 and 2.2.1.1. Canada has shown that
Weyerhaeuser Company's records did not treat the hardboard siding expense as G&A allocable to all
of its subsidiaries. Cost Verification Exhib it 26 breaks down the elements of Weyerhaeuser
Company's G&A expense and does not include the ha rdboard siding expense. Moreover, Canada has
shown that whether a cost is G&A does not elim inate the need to show a connection between a
portion of that cost and the product under investigation, as required by Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. An
expense must at the very least relate to the cost of producing and selling the product. The US position
assumes that any G&A cost, including all those incurred by companies merely affiliated with the
producer or exporter in question, benefits the company as a whole and is allocable to all subsidiaries.
This also breaches the Article 2.2 requirement that the amount allocated for G&A must be
"reasonable". In this instance, the hardboard expense related only to the production and sales
activities of Weyerhaeuser US in the United States, and was not a G&A expense incurred on behalf of
its subsidiaries. Finally, the United States never res ponds in any of its submissions to the fact that
Commerce's traditional practice has been to exclude unrelated parent company G&A, finding on
numerous occasions that not all G&A is fungible.
4.261 The by-product offset claims turn on the level of reliance that should be placed on the
records of a producer. In relation to West Fraser , the United States asserts that it was acceptable for
Commerce to use unrepresentative unaffiliated sales as the basis for rejecting all of West Fraser's
records for affiliated sales in BC. In contrast, th e United States insists that it must use Tembec's
records even though its internal transfer prices were set far below market value.
4.262 Canada first turns to the by-product offset claim relating to West Fraser. Article 2.2.1.1 states
that the records kept by a producer are the preferre d source for cost of production data provided that
these records reasonably reflect the cost of produc tion. The cost of production is calculated by
aggregating the costs and offsets associated with th e production of the product under consideration.

As a consequence, the records relating to the cost s and offsets that comprise the cost of production
must also be accurate. Commerce rejected West Fr aser's records for affilia te wood chip sales in BC
after determining that they did not reflect market va lue. The issue in this case is whether an unbiased
and objective investigating authority could have fo und that these affiliate wood chip sales did not
reflect market value.
4.263 The United States continues to emphasise that West Fraser never argued that its unaffiliated
sales were unrepresentative. This argument, however, is incorrect. In fact, West Fraser's officials
stated at verification that McBride sales were unrepresentative of the period of investigation.
Moreover, Commerce's conduct also led West Fraser to believe that it had accepted these affiliated
transactions.
4.264 The United States also asserts that Commerce reviewed West Fraser's unaffiliated transactions
and found them to be commercial transactions that reflected a market value. There is no evidence of
any such "review" by Commerce. Commerce's own verification report shows that it was aware that
the majority of West Fraser's unaffiliated sales we re suppressed by a long-term contract. The record
also shows that unaffiliated sales from McBride o ccurred only during the first two months of the
period of investigation, when wood chip prices were at their lowest. If Commerce had reviewed this
evidence, it could not have concluded that these sales were representative of "market value".
4.265 The second by-product offset claim relates to Tembec. Commerce's reliance on Tembec's
records to calculate the by-product offset for wood chips violates Article 2.2.1.1. In the underlying
investigation, Commerce ignored verified record evidence concerning the market value of wood
chips. Instead, Commerce relied on Tembec's internal transfer prices that were set far below market
value.
4.266 Article 2.2.1.1 requires an investigating authority to calculate costs and offsets that reasonably
reflect the cost of production of the product under cons ideration, in this case softwood lumber. When
calculating costs, the offsets to those costs, such as those for by-products, must be reflected
accurately. Thus, to reasonably reflect the cost of production for softwood lumber, it is necessary to
determine the value for the by-products, which is their market price.
4.267 The United States asserts that Commerce is only re quired to determine the "surrogate" cost of
an offset in inter-divisional transfers. The US position ignores the critical distinction between a by-
product and a co-product. By-pr oducts do not have their own costs, nor do they generate their own
profits. If they did, there would be no practical difference between by-products and co-products. The
US position is also inconsistent with Article 2.2.1. 1 because the fiction of a "surrogate" cost for an
offset ignores the requirement that the costs must reasonably reflect the cost of production of the
product under consideration. The offset for by-produc ts is market value. Article 2.2.1.1 does not
waive this requirement for internal transfers.
4.268 Article 2.4 requires Commerce to make due allo wance for any differences that affect price
comparability. Slocan provided Commerce with evidence concerni ng the revenues it earns through
futures hedging activities in the US market. Th ese futures contracts affect price comparability
between the Canadian and US markets. Commerce's failure to make any adjustment for these
revenues is inconsistent with Article 2.4.
4.269 Article 2.4 is open-ended and requires an investigating authority to adjust for any difference
that affects price comparability. Moreover, Article 2.4 also envisages overlap between a listed
difference and any "other" difference under this provision. Footnote 7 provides "that some of the
above factors [in Article 2.4] may overlap …". Applied to the present situation, Slocan's futures
activities may constitute a "condition" of sale, an "o ther" difference affecting price comparability, or
both. The relevant point is that Slocan sought an ad justment for an identified difference. Even if the

concept of "direct selling expenses" as defined under US domestic law has a more restrictive meaning,
it is irrelevant and not before this Panel.
H.
SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
4.270 In its second oral opening and closing statem ents, the United States made the following
arguments:
1. Opening Statement
4.271 At this stage in the proceedings, the United St ates recognizes that the issues have been laid
out in great detail and are well known to the Panel. However, in its responses to questions and in its
rebuttal submission, Canada has made numerou s statements that (1) wrongly assert that the
United States concedes or acknowledges certain points; (2) take US statements out of context; or (3)
otherwise mischaracterize the arguments of the United States. The effect of these misstatements is to
seriously distort the facts and issues. The Un ited States will address Canada's most significant
misstatements to clarify the facts and the issues in this dispute.
4.272 First, it is necessary to revisit briefly the issue of the appropriate standard of review. In the
first written submission of the United States, the United States recalled the explanation of the
Appellate Body and several panels that Article 17.6(i) precludes de novo review of an investigating
authority's findings of fact. The United States also noted that, notwithstanding this limitation, Canada
seemed to be asking the Panel to decide certain questions as if it were the investigating authority. For
example, the United States pointed to Canada's reque st that the Panel examine "whether the authority
has given proper weight to the facts". In the US answers to the Panel's questions, the United States
identified other instances in which Canada appears to be asking for de novo review of Commerce's
findings of fact. The United States cited, for example, Canada's presentation to the Panel of a
regression analysis that was not before Commerce in the softwood lumber investigation, along with a
seven-page expert's memorandum. The United St ates also cited arguments Canada made in
connection with certain company-specific calculation i ssues. Now, in its rebuttal submission, Canada
accuses the United States of arguing "that Commerce has absolute discretion and must be accorded
absolute deference on questions of fact". 103 This accusation is patently false. The United States has
never urged the standard Canada alleges.
4.273 On the question of Commerce's initiation of the softwood lumber investigation Canada has
made arguments under Articles 5.2, 5.3, and 5.8 of the AD Agreement . Canada argued that
Commerce violated Article 5.2 by initiating on the basis of an application that lacked certain
information alleged to be reasonably available to one of the applicant companies. The US response
was two-fold. First, the United States argued that Article 5.2 does not impose an obligation on
investigating authorities independent of the obligati on under Article 5.3 to "examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of an investigation". Where various paragraphs of Article 5 impose obligations
on investigating authorities, they do so in unmistakabl e terms. Article 5.2 contains no such mandate.
It describes the contents of an application and th ereby provides context for an authority's obligation
under Article 5.3.
4.274 Second, the United States argued that Canada im properly read into Article 5.2 a requirement
that an application contain all information reasonably available to the applicant on the subjects
enumerated in that provision. However, Article 5. 2 states only that "[t]he application shall contain
such information as is reasonably available to the applicant" on certain specified matters. The phrase
"such information as is reasonably available" does not mean all information that is reasonably
available.

4.275 In its rebuttal submission, Canada made sever al statements regarding the US argument on
Article 5.2 that call for reply. First, Canada incorrectly asserted that Commerce "admits knowing at
the time of initiation" that the Application "did not contain certain highly pertinent transaction-
specific information, reasonably available to the Applicant in violation of Article 5.2". 104 The
statement from which Canada infers this supposed admission is not an admission of the relevance of
the Weldwood data, nor of any obligation on the investigating authority under Article 5.2.
4.276 Second, Canada erroneously characterizes the US argument as rendering Article 5.2 a nullity.
Canada argues that, unless Article 5.2 imposes a fre e-standing obligation on in vestigating authorities
it is "reduced to redundancy and inutility". This theo ry fails to read Article 5.2 in its context. In
particular, it fails to consider the relationship betw een Article 5.2 and Article 5.3. By specifying the
information that must be contained in an applica tion, Article 5.2 informs the sufficiency inquiry an
authority must undertake pursuant to Article 5.3. Therefore, Article 5.2 is not rendered a nullity, as
Canada contends.
4.277 In its rebuttal submission, Canada argues that if a document purporting to be an "application"
under Article 5.1 does not contain "such information as is reasonably available to the applicant" on
the matters described in Article 5.2, then it is not in fact an "application" and cannot serve as the basis
for initiation by way of "application". 105 This is a variation on Canada's argument that an
investigating authority must prove a negative be fore initiating. Aside from its impracticability,
Canada's suggestion would require a pre-initiation investigation that simply is not contemplated by
the AD Agreement.
4.278 Next, the United States responds to Canada's conten tion that its interpretation of Article 5.2 is
supported by the panel report in US – 1916 Act (Japan).106 The report in that matter is not relevant to
this dispute and certainly does not support the pr oposition that Article 5. 2 imposes an independent
obligation on investigating authorities. The panel in the US – 1916 Act (Japan) dispute said nothing
about obligations of investigating author ities under Article 5.2. It spoke of a complainant respecting
obligations under that provision.
4.279 As a final note on this provision, the United St ates observe that Canada persists in its
argument that Article 5.2 requires an applicant to provide all information reasonably available to it on
the specified subjects. It bases this assertion enti rely on the word "such" in the phrase "such
information as is reasonably available to the applican t". Nothing in the definition of that word even
suggests the word "all". Thus, even if the Panel were to find an obligation on investigating authorities
under Article 5.2, that obligation would not be violat ed by an initiation based on an application that
did not contain all information reasonably available to the applicant.
4.280 Canada has also argued that Commerce initiate d the softwood lumber investigation based on
insufficient evidence of dumping, in violation of Article 5.3. On rebuttal, Canada raises new
objections to the evidence of dumping in the application. For example, Canada misleadingly asserts
that there was no actual cost data for purposes of initia tion. It is true that, in evaluating the petition,
Commerce relied on usage factors from US mills. However, all significant production costs were
valued on the basis of actual cost data from Canadi an sources. Canada's claim that the usage factor
data in the petition were "not representative" is equally misleading. Canada purports to measure
representativeness of the data in the application re lative to the six companies that were ultimately
examined during the investigation. But, the selection of companies after initiation to serve as
respondents has nothing to do with the data relied on prior to initiation. Commerce's decision to
initiate was based on costs and prices for a broad range of producers. Canada also continues to assert
that the application contained insufficient ev idence on prices to justify initiation, dismissing

104 Id., para. 10.
105 Id., para. 21.
106 Id., paras. 16, 24.

applicant's use of Random Lengths data by questioning whether they represent actual transactions.
The United States has responded to this allegati on in prior submissions, demonstrating that Random
Lengths data do represent actual transactions.
4.281 Finally, Canada continues to argue that Co mmerce violated Article 5.8 by declining to
evaluate "the Weldwood data or an y other data that may have been available in the light of the
ongoing sufficiency of evidence requirement".
107 This argument is flawed for several reasons. First,
the United States explained that these data could not have negated the sufficiency of the data on which
Commerce relied at the time of initiation because th ey reflect the experience of a single company,
whereas the data actually relied upon for initiation re flected the experience of a broad cross-section of
Canada's lumber producing and exporting industry. Second, Canada ignores the fact that Weldwood's
data were submitted two months af ter the initiation of the investigation, as a "voluntary" response.
The data were received concurrent ly with the submissions of the si x examined Canadian respondents,
each of whose data demonstrated dumping. In light of the evidence of dumping obtained during the
investigation, it is not at all clear how Canada believes the United States violated its obligation under
Article 5.8. That provision requires terminati on of an investigation "as soon as the authorities
concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify
proceeding with the case". Yet, here, the eviden ce accumulated during the investigation reenforced
rather than weakened the basis for concluding that there was dumping. Canada seems to argue that,
having received the Weldwood data, Commerce should ha ve looked back to determine whether there
would have been sufficient evidence to initiate ha d the data been included in the petition. But,
Article 5.8 contains no such look-back requirement.
4.282 Turning to Canada's product-under-consideration claim , Canada claims that Commerce's
identification of "softwood lumber products" as a single product under consideration amounted to a
violation of Article 2.6. The United States has re sponded by explaining that Article 2.6 contains no
obligation on how an investigating authority is to identify the product under consideration in an anti-
dumping investigation. This point is underscored by the fact that, in pending negotiations, certain
WTO Members have proposed that there should be such an obligation. Such a proposal would be
superfluous if the obligation already existed. Even Canada acknowledges that the support for its
theory is mere inference, rather than any express rule.
108
4.283 In its rebuttal submission, Canada focuses on two US statements. In each case, Canada
mischaracterizes the statement, reading it in is olation and assigning a significance clearly not
warranted when the statement is read in context. First, Canada focuses on the US statement that "[a]s
part of its analysis in determining whether 'cl ear dividing lines' exist within the product under
consideration identified within the pe tition, Commerce reviews [the] five [ Diversified Products ]
factors".109 Canada asserts that this means th at Commerce "subordinated its use of the Diversified
Products criteria to a 'no clear dividing line'/'continuum' test". 110 But, Canada misunderstands the
analysis that was actually applied. It is clear from both the Scope Memorandum and the Final
Determination that Commerce applied the Diversified Products criteria to each of the four products at
issue. In other words, Commerce's assessment of whether there are "clear dividing lines" between
products is part of the Diversified Products analysis, not subordinate to that analysis.
4.284 The second statement on which Canada focuses in its rebuttal is Commerce's statement that
"[p]aradoxically, it is as much the diversity of lumber production as the characteristics that all
softwood lumber have in common that leads us to continue to treat all softwood lumber as a single
class or kind of merchandise". 111 Canada erroneously takes a p assing observation by Commerce and

108 Id., para. 70.
110 Id., paras. 70, 87.
111 Id., paras. 71, 87.

treats it as if it were the very foundation for Commerce's d ecision. Read in context, it is clear that this
is not the case. Commerce expressly acknowledged th at it could not base its determination on the
diversity of characteristics among lumber products. Rather, it recognized an obligation under its own
practice to apply the Diversified Products factors.
4.285 Moreover, even on its own terms, Canada's product-under-consideration claim must fail.
Canada infers from Article 2.6 a rule governing the definition of th e product under consideration.
Although none of the key terms in Article 2.6 refe r to the quality of two things being identical,
Canada somehow infers a requirement "that the essen tial, distinctive traits of one product must be
very nearly identical to the essential distinctive traits of the other product". 112 (emphasis added) Not
only is such a requirement entirely absent from Article 2.6, even an inference of such a requirement is
not supported by the language of Article 2.6.
4.286 Finally, in its rebuttal submission, Canada seeks support for its position from the panel report
in Indonesia – Autos.113 Its reliance on that case is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, and most
importantly, the panel in Indonesia – Autos was not reviewing an investigating authority's
determination under the standa rd in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement . Second, unlike the present
case, there was no question in Indonesia – Autos as to the identity of the product under consideration.
4.287 The next issue is Canada's "due allowance for physical differences" claim . Canada's claim
under Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement is that Commerce was required to make calculation
adjustments to account for certain dimensional diffe rences in the transactions it compared. But
Canada omits critical pieces of the puzzle which, when put in their proper place, reveal that width,
thickness and length were taken into account in the product comparisons.
4.288 Canada's submissions also contain significant di stortions of fact and mischaracterizations of
the US position. For example, Canada continues to grossly misrepresent the impact on the margin of
the non-identical dimensional comparisons made. Understood correctly, the vast majority of
comparisons weighted by volume were of identical softwood lumber products, thereby significantly
limiting the impact of these non-identical comparisons . Second, Canada mistakenly claims that the
United States has created a new, unattainable standa rd for establishing price adjustments for physical
differences, requiring a showing of stable prices. Canada has entirely misread the US submissions. In
doing so, it is asking this Panel to find that Articl e 2.4 mandates an automatic price adjustment for
physical differences, irrespective of the impact of such differences on price comparability. As the
panel in Egypt – Rebar explained, under Article 2.4, a due allowa nce is warranted only if an effect on
price comparability is demonstrated.
114
4.289 What the United States has argued, and what Canada is unable to refute, is that prices of
softwood lumber products of different dimensions relative to each other must show some discernible
relationship. The only specific evidence Canada arguably provided demonstrating an effect on price
comparability is a regression analysis based on data of one respondent company. It was presented for
the first time to this Panel, and thus, as the Unite d States explained in prior submissions, may not be
considered by the Panel in its examination, under Ar ticle 17.5(ii). For all physical characteristics,
except dimension, Commerce had cost data to connect the physical differences to the impact on price,
pursuant to its normal methodology. Therefore, Commerce's treatment of dimension was necessarily
distinct from its treatment of other physical char acteristics. Because the Canadian respondents failed
to demonstrate that dimensional differences affected price comparability, Commerce was not required
to make a price adjustment under Article 2.4.

113 Id., paras. 78-81 (discussing Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos).
114 Panel Report, Egypt–Steel Rebar, para. 7.352.

4.290 The United States turns now to Canada's claim regarding calculation of the overall dumping
margin. Canada has failed to establish that the AD Agreement requires Members to offset dumping
margins with non-dumping amounts found in distinct comparisons. Throughout this proceeding, the
United States has maintained that (1) Articles 2.4 a nd 2.4.2 do not create an offset obligation; (2) the
EC – Bed Linen Appellate Body Report is not binding on th e Panel, and the Panel should not rely on
it; and (3) the negotiating history confirms the US in terpretation, that Article 2.4.2 was crafted to
address the symmetry of comparisons in dumping calculations, not the offset issue.
4.291 In its rebuttal submission, the United States dem onstrated that Canada effectively is seeking
to isolate different parts of the phrase "all comp arable export transactions" for different purposes.
Under Canada's theory, the term "comparable" export transactions would apply in the first stage of the
dumping calculation, and "all" export transactions woul d apply in the second stage. In its rebuttal
submission, rather than explain or justify this position, Canada takes a new position. Now, it would
have the Panel find that the meaning of each term – "all" and "comparable" – changes depending on
the stage of the calculation. Canada's theory that the same word takes on a different meaning
depending on the stage of the dumping calculation at issue finds no support in ordinary rules of treaty
interpretation.
4.292 Moreover, Canada's new theory fails to address the fact that under Article 2.4.2 there are three
alternative bases for establishing dumping margins. Two of those bases provide for comparisons
using individual export transactions. The availab ility of these transaction-specific options makes it
clear that Article 2.4.2 applies to the first stage of the calculation – that is, prior to the establishment
of an overall margin. At the same time, it is e qually clear that Article 2.4.2 does not address how
these transaction-specific margins are to be combined to establish an overall margin. Under Canada's
argument, the first basis for establishing dumping margins – the weighted average-to-weighted
average basis – would apply to both stages of the calcula tion. However, the other two bases for
establishing dumping margins plainly apply only to the first stage. Thus, Canada's theory leads to an
interpretation of Article 2.4.2 in which the scope of the obligation differs depending on the basis for
establishing dumping margins. Yet, the provision itself does not support such differential
interpretation.
4.293 With respect to the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bed Linen, the United States has just two
points to make. First, Canada mistakenly asserts th at the United States has not denied that its practice
is identical to the EC's practice addressed in EC – Bed Linen. Here again, Canada mischaracterizes a
statement by the United States where the United Stat es explained that, without access to the details of
the EC calculation, the US could not assess the simila rities or differences in the practices. Second,
Canada argues that as an adopted Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen should be taken into
account where it is relevant. As discussed in th e US first written submission, the concept of stare
decisis does not apply to WTO disputes.
115 This Panel is not bound to follow EC – Bed Linen . Like
the panel in Argentina – Preserved Peaches 116, the Panel should not refrain from re-evaluating an
adopted report where appropriate. The United States respectfully suggests that, in this case, such re-
evaluation is appropriate. The Panel should find that EC – Bed Linen is not persuasive.
4.294 With respect to the negotiating history of Article 2.4.2, there are two points to make. First,
Canada does not dispute that the AD Agreement negotiations clearly distinguished between two
separate issues: (1) the symmetry of comparisons, and (2) whether offsets would be required when
combining the results of comparisons. Canada improperly seeks to use language addressing the
symmetry issue to create an obliga tion with respect to o ffsets. Second, Canada suggests that the
United States' reference to the negotiating history is based upon an ambiguity or manifest absurdity,
which Canada claims derives from "the Unite d States' own unilateral interpretation of

115 US first written submission, paras. 173-177.
116 Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches, para. 7.24.

Article 2.4.2".117 To the contrary, the United States refers to the negotiating history to confirm the
ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 2.4.2. Given Canada's own practice and the practice of other
Members in calculating overall dumping margins 118, the US interpretation can hardly be described as
"unilateral".
4.295 Finally, in its rebuttal submission, Canada ass erts that offsets are required by the "fair
comparison" language in Article 2.4. However, Canada has not articulated the basis for this
argument, other than its reliance on EC – Bed Linen . The fair comparison language does not stand
alone but is contained within Article 2.4. That provision tells an authority how to achieve a fair
comparison by making due allowance for differences in comparisons which affect price
comparability. By making Article 2.4.2 subject to Article 2.4, the Members ensured that any
transactions being compared, either individually or as a weighted average, would have been identified
and, as appropriate, adjusted in accordance with the pr ovisions of Article 2.4. Nothing in Article 2.4
requires an offset of non-dumped amounts against dumping margins.
4.296 Canada makes a number of company-specific claims . Throughout these claims, Canada
argues that the United States ignored record ev idence and instead, blindly applied standard
methodologies. Commerce applied its standard met hodologies only after careful consideration of the
record evidence. In addition, it is important to ma ke clear that Commerce did in fact depart from its
standard methodologies, and in significant respects, where the facts warranted.
4.297 In its first written submission, Canada argue d that the COGS methodology for allocating
Abitibi's financial expenses was unreasonable, because it ignored the lower capital asset
requirements of its softwood lumber division. Ca nada now argues that an allocation based on COGS
that included depreciation costs was unreasonable, because it did not consider asset values to a
sufficient degree. Specifically, Canada argues that financ ial costs must be allocated based solely on
total asset values. However, Canada's argume nt only has merit if one accepts the underlying
assumption that financial costs are related only to assets. The United States rejects this assumption
because of the fungibility of money, a concept with which Canada explicitly agrees. COGS includes
all the direct production costs associated with pr oducing goods, as well as accounting for most assets
through the inclusion of depreciation expenses. Depreciation expenses reasonably account for
Abitibi's assets because, as Canada admits, the vast majority of Ab itibi's assets are capital assets that
are depreciated.
4.298 Canada also argues that Commerce over-allocated general costs for Tembec. Canada rests its
argument on the fact that Commerce refused to base Tembec's G&A costs on division-specific
accounting records. As the United States has explai ned, Commerce properly rejected this argument,
because general costs relate to the company as a whol e rather than a particular product or division.
Moreover, even if the United States assumed that gene ral costs could be attributed to divisions within
a company, neither Tembec nor Canada has presented any evidence to suggest that Tembec's division-
specific internal books were a reasonable basis upon which to calculate cost s. First, Tembec's
division-specific records were not audited. Moreve r, unlike audited financial statements, internal,
division-specific records are not intended as objective measures of a company's performance.
4.299 Canada also argues that Commerce over-allocated G&A expenses when it allocated a portion
of litigation costs incurred by Weyerhaeuser Canada's parent company to softwood lumber.
Canada argues that even if these settlement costs were general costs, they did not pertain to softwood
lumber. Canada's argument is inconsistent with the basic definition of "general cost," because general
costs do not pertain more or less to a particular produ ct but instead relate to a company as a whole. It
is uncontested that Weyerhaeuser Canada's pare nt company performed functions on behalf of
Weyerhaeuser Canada. Thus, consistent with this fact, Commerce included an apportioned amount of

118 US second written submission, paras. 60-63.

the parent company's G&A expenses, including a porti on of the litigation costs, within Weyerhaeuser
Canada's G&A, resulting in a reasonable allocati on of Weyerhaeuser Company's general costs to
softwood lumber consistent with the AD Agreement.
4.300 During the period of investigation, West Fraser sold wood chips to affiliated companies in
BC. In determining whether a company's records reasonably reflect costs associated with production
and sale of a product, Commerce considers whether transactions between affiliated parties occurred at
arm's length prices. Here, it concluded that West Fraser's affiliated sales did not occur at arm's length
prices. Thus, it relied on West Fraser's unaffiliated sal es of chips in valuing the offset. It found these
sales to non-affiliates to be arm's-length commercial transactions at market prices and, as such, the
best benchmark for West Fraser's affiliated sales. Canada now acknowledges that West Fraser indeed
never argued to Commerce that some of its unaffiliated (McBride mill) transactions were
unrepresentative of a market value for wood chips. It now argues that, because West Fraser had a
large amount of affiliated transac tions during the period of investig ation, it is "self-evident" that
Commerce should have questioned the use of West Fr aser's unaffiliated transactions for valuing those
wood chips in BC. Contrary to Canada's assertions , however, West Fraser's unaffiliated transactions
were significant in number and value relative to We st Fraser's total wood ch ip sales. Moreover, the
mere existence of a large volume of affiliated tran sactions in BC during the period of investigation
does not call into question the legitimacy of the mark et value of wood chips that West Fraser sold to
unaffiliated parties. Nor are they called into questio n by the fact that sales from one of the two mills
occurred early in the period of investigation, pursuant to a pre-existing contract.
4.301 Canada also challenges how Commerce measur ed the value of transfer prices of Tembec's
wood chips between its divisions. Commerce analyzed the wood chip sales transactions between
Tembec's sawmills and its internal pulp mill division to evaluate whether the internal transfers of
wood chips were reasonable approximations of th e wood chips' cost. Commerce found that those
internal transfer prices were reasonable and not preferential. Canada claims that Tembec's inter-
divisional transactions were "arbitrary". In fact, Canada's only real argument is to insist that the
United States acted in a biased and non-objective ma nner by not assessing all costs on a market value
basis.
119 But no provision in the AD Agreement requires an investigating authority to replace a
company's own valuation of inter-divisional transfers of a product with a market value for sales of the
same product. Costs of production are lower than a market value of a product, due to profit paid by
an unaffiliated purchaser to the producer. Once Co mmerce determined that the difference between
the market value and the inter-div isional transfer value of Tembec's wood chips was reasonable, the
analysis ended, and Article 2.2.1.1 did not require Commerce to do more.
4.302 Commerce properly accounted for Slocan's lumber futures hedging profits , finding,
consistent with Article 2.4, that these futures he dging profits are not a part of any conditions and
terms of sale of lumber to the United States. I ndeed, these profits had no connection with any sales
transaction or any customer. Neither Slocan nor Ca nada has explained how the futures contracts at
issue were terms and conditions related to particular sales of lumber in the United States. Absent such
a showing in the investigation, there was no basis for an adjustment for differences in conditions and
terms of sale under Article 2.4. Commerce also found, consistent with Article 2.2 of the
AD Agreement, that the futures contracts were not linked to production, since the profits amounted to
revenue related to sales (even though they are not tied to any particular sale of lumber in the
United States). Canada asserts that Commerce should have done something, even though Slocan itself
failed to substantiate either of the alternative treatments that it sought.120 As the panel in Egypt – Steel
Rebar noted, responding parties have an obligation to assert and to justify the information and the
arguments required to prove their claims. 121 Contrary to Canada's ass ertions, there is no undefined

119 Canada responses to questions 70 and 72 of the Panel, paras. 178 and 180.
120 Canada second written submission, paras. 340-342.
121 Panel Report, Egypt– Steel Rebar, para. 7.3.

duty to grant adjustments that ha ve been neither requested nor de monstrated by the respondent. 122
Therefore, Commerce properly did not grant the two offsets requested by Slocan.
2. Closing Statement
4.303 The United States seeks to make clear its position on the recommendation Canada is asking
the Panel to make that the United States revoke the anti-dumping duty order and return all cash
deposits collected.123 Canada apparently is seeking a sugg estion rather than a recommendation, under
Article 19.1 of the DSU. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel , the panel rejected a request by Japan similar to
Canada's request in this case. 124 Since the US measures at i ssue already conform to the WTO
agreements, there is no need for either a recomme ndation or a suggestion. However, even under
Canada's claims and arguments in this dispute, Canada's request for a suggestion would go beyond
anything relevant to implementing a recommenda tion and instead seeks action nowhere called for
under the WTO.
4.304 Stepping back to consider the big picture, the United States is struck by a pattern, in which
Canada initially takes one position, then alters that position following US responses demonstrating the
flaws in the initial position. This is particularly noticeable when it comes to initiation, product under
consideration, and calculation of an overall dumping margin.
4.305 The inconsistency in Canada's argumentation is telling, because Canada appears to have
brought this case without knowing whether and how th e United States violated its WTO obligations.
This should give the Panel pause. For the reas ons set forth in US submissions and statements,
applying the Article 17.6 standard of review, the Panel should find Commerce's initiation and conduct
of the lumber investigation to have been consistent with WTO obligations.
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1 The arguments of the EC and Japan are set fort h in their written and oral submissions to the
Panel, which are summarized below. The summar ies are based on the executive summaries that the
EC and Japan submitted to the Panel. The third parties' written answers to questions posed by the
Panel are set forth in the Annexes to this report ( see list of annexes at page vii, supra). India, also a
third party in this dispute, did not make any written and oral submissions to the Panel, nor it answered
to questions posed by the Panel.
A. THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.2 In its third party written submission, the EC made the following arguments:
1. The Legal Scope of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement
(a) The Obligations under Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement
5.3 In its first written submission, Canada did not identify the specific paragraph of Article 5.2 of
the AD Agreement which the United States has allegedly violat ed. Canada thus seems to infer from
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement a general and overall obligati on to provide any "reasonably
available" information.
5.4 The EC would oppose such an interpretation of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. Taking into
account the wording and the structure of the provision it is evident that Article 5.2 of the

122 US responses to questions 81 and 84 of the Panel, paras. 132-138, and 146.
124 Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 8.5-8.14.

AD Agreement does not contain an obligation of the applicant to provide any information that is
reasonably available but only to the extent that it would fall under one of the paragraphs (i) to (iv).
5.5 While the EC acknowledges that Article 5.2(i) or (ii) of the AD Agreement ("identity of the
applicant" and "identity of each known exporter" resp ectively) could be pertinent in a case where one
of the companies subject to the anti-dumping investiga tion is a wholly-owned subsidiary of one of the
applicant companies it would, however, take no vi ew given the rather peculiar circumstances of the
case.
(b) Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement Only Imposes an Obligation on the Applicant
5.6 Canada argues that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement imposes an obligation on the
investigating authority. The EC takes issue with this conclusion. Subject of Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement is "the application". Under the third sentence of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement the
application shall contain information that is "reasona bly available to the applicant". Thus, according
to the wording of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement the obligation is solely addressed to the petitioner.
5.7 In this context, Article 5.1 of the AD Agreement provides also relevant guidance. Under this
provision an application should be made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry". Therefore, any
objective requirements that the application has to meet should be discharged by the domestic industry,
i.e., the applicant.
5.8 The Guatemala – Cement I Panel Report, quoted by Canada, does not support Canada's
argument. The Panel merely stated that an inves tigating authority may be "allowed" to reject an
application. However, such a possibility to reject an application does not imply that there is any
obligation under Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement on the investigating authority to do so.
Furthermore, in the r espective passage of the Guatemala – Cement I Report the panel concluded that
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement imposes a requirement "on the applicant", while Article 5.3 of the
AD Agreement is addressed to the "investigating authorit y". The panel thus made clear that the
content of the obligation and the addressees are different and should be distinguished.
5.9
The EC notes that the question of whether Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement imposes an
obligation on the investigati ng authority has been briefl y addressed in the recent case Argentina –
Poultry. While the panel declined to rule on this matte r, as both parties affirmatively agreed to such
an obligation, the EC, for the reasons set out above, considers that Article 5.2 imposes no such
obligation on the investigating auth ority. As the EC will explain below, the issue must be addressed
under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
5.10 Canada maintains that the United States violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by relying
solely on the evidence and information in the ap plication and by failing to objectively judge that
information. Even if the applicant had provi ded all "reasonably available" information under
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, this was insufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.
5.11 In the EC's view, Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement imposes a comprehensive obligation on the
investigating authority to determine whether the in itiation of an investigation would be justified in
view of the objectively available evidence. This obligation does not only encompass an examination
of the application and whether it fulfils for instan ce the requirements under Article 5.2 or Article 5.4
of the AD Agreement but it may also require the investigatin g authority to take further steps in
assembling the necessary evidence before initiating an investigation.
5.12 In this respect, the EC would concur with the panel findings in the recent Argentina – Poultry
case under paragraph 7.60.

5.13 Furthermore, the EC would agree with the panel findings in Guatemala – Cement I , whereby
the question of the existence of "su fficient evidence " in a particular case has to be adjudicated in the
light of the standard set in Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement.
5.14 As a third party, the EC does not comment on whether the DOC effectively discharged its
obligations under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
2. The Scope of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement
5.15 Canada argues that the United States did not abide by its obligations under Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement because DOC did not terminate the inves tigation on the ground of insufficient
evidence. Even if DOC had initiated the inves tigation in accordance with Article 5.3 of the
AD Agreement it should have terminated the examination at a later stage in the light of the insufficient
evidence on the commercial relationship and the cost and pricing data.
5.16 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement thus distinguishes two scenarios:
• either the application did not contain sufficie nt evidence in which case it should be rejected;
or
• during the investigation it becomes apparent th at evidence is insufficient thus requiring a
prompt termination of the proceedings.
5.17 Regarding the first alternative, the EC would agree with the panel findings in Mexico – Corn
Syrup whereby Article 5.8 does not impose additional substantive obligations beyond those in
Article 5.3 on the authority in connection with the initia tion of the investigation. That is, if there is
sufficient evidence to justify initia tion under Article 5.3, there is no violation of Article 5.8 in not
rejecting the application.
5.18 To put it differently, the EC concurs that before an investigation is initiated Articles 5.3 and
5.8 of the AD Agreement have the same scope of application w ith regard to the question of whether
there is "sufficient evidence".
5.19 As to the second alternative, i.e., after the initia tion of the investigation, it is evident that the
investigation must reveal "sufficient evidence" of dumping, injury and a causal link to proceed with
the investigation and, eventually, to impose measur es. If the investigation fails to produce this
evidence the authorities should terminate the exam ination as promptly as possible. Under this
scenario, the question of whether "sufficient evidence" exists would have to be adjudicated in a more
flexible way depending on the respective state of investigation.
3. The Practice of "Zeroing" – Violation of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement
5.20 The EC submits that the Panel should find that the US practice of "zeroing" is incompatible
with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. The European Communities considers that the US
methodology for determining the numerator for the purposes of the weighted average margin
calculation in no way differs from the EC "zeroing" methodology already found to be incompatible
with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in EC – Bed Linen. The EC compared the weighted
average normal value and export price of different pr oduct types within the like product. It attributed
a zero value to any types for which the resulting dum ping margin was negative, while aggregating the
positive dumping margins and dividing them over th e total value of the export sales to obtain a
percentage rate of dumping. It, thus, allowed no "offset" for negative dumping across product types.
The United States has done exactly the same in this case.

5.21 The United States does not dispute the similarity of the two methodologies, but confines itself
to rejecting the precedential value of the decision of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen and
attempts to reargue the case. Alt hough the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Bed Linen only binds
the parties to that case, the Appellate Body expects Panels to take account of the legal clarifications
concerning Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Of course, the panels and the Appellate Body
may reconsider or refine certain legal interpretations on the basis that certain legal arguments were not
made by the parties and therefore not addressed by the Appellate Body. However, the arguments
advanced by the United States in a ddition to those already addressed in EC – Bed Linen to defend its
"zeroing" methodology are not of such a nature.
5.22 Most of the arguments have already been addressed by the Appellate Body, in particular those
relating to the relevance of the product definition. As a new argument, the United States seeks to
question the interpretation by the Appellate Body of the first symmetrical method set out in
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement by arguing that Canada's arguments lead to an anomalous result in
so far as it would lead to a prohibition of "zeroi ng" in the first symmetrical method of comparison
while the use of "zeroing" would be left to the discretion of Members in the two other methods.
Furthermore, the United States argue that the negotia tors did not intend to address the offset issue.
Those arguments cannot be accepted.
5.23 "Zeroing" is prohibited when resorting to th e first symmetrical method of comparison as a
result of the word "all" in the sentence "a comp arison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions" in Article 2.4.2 of the
AD Agreement (emphasis added). The second and third me thodology, however, concern situations
not relevant to this case. Cana da's claim is explicitly confined to the first symmetrical methodology
(weighted average normal value/weighted average e xport prices). The EC further notes that, in any
case, the use of the third methodology is only allowe d in well defined circumstances and is subject to
strict conditions.
5.24 As to the reference to the negotiating history of the AD Agreement, the EC considers that
according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention , there is no need for considering the negotiating
history of a text where the interpretation ther eof can be based on the letter as is the case for
Article 2.4.2, first paragraph. Therefore, the arguments advanced by the United States are of no
relevance to the matter before this Panel.
B. T
HIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF JAPAN
5.25 In its third party written submission, Japan made the following arguments:
1. Article 2 of the AD Agreement Prohibits the Authorities from Zeroing Negative Margins
5.26 Japan agrees with Canada that use of dumpi ng margins with "zeroed-out" negative margins
for the purpose of "dumping" determination is inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The practice of
"zeroing" selectively calculates margins only for th ose sales of products with positive margins and
rejects sales with negative margins. This methodol ogy thus creates an artificially high margin. As
discussed below, the existence of dumping marg ins, which is the basis of the "dumping"
determination under the AD Agreement, must be established by making a "fair comparison" across all
product types under consideration, not some of these types.
5.27 Article 2.1 defines that a product is dumped if th e export price is lower than its normal value.
"A product" under Article 2.1 incorporates all types of the product that are subject to a particular anti-
dumping proceeding, not some types of the product. The Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen
confirmed this. See paragraph 53 of the EC – Bed Linen Appellate Body Report.

5.28 Article 2.1 informs the interpretation of Artic le 2.4 and the "fair comparison" and "price
comparability" requirements. Essentially these require ments mean that the establishment of dumping
margins under Article 2.4 must be made by evaluating the product under consideration as a whole, not
just a portion of the product. The Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen, id., paragraph 58, stated
"[h]aving defined the product at issue and the ' like product' on the Community market as it did, the
European Communities could not, as a subsequent stage of the proceeding, take the position that some
types or models of that product had physical character istics that were so different from each other that
these types or models were not 'comparable'. All ty pes or models falling within the scope of a "like"
product must necessarily be 'comparable'".
5.29 The practice of zeroing in establishing dumping ma rgins of a product under consideration,
therefore, is inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with Article 2.1 thereof.
5.30 The established practice of DOC is, however , to apply the zeroing methodology to the
calculation of dumping margins. The DOC's dump ing determination, which is based on dumping
margins used by DOC, thus is inconsistent with Article 2.4 in conjunction with Article 2.1 thereof.
5.31 Importantly, if zeroing had not been applied in th is case, certain Canadian respondents in this
softwood lumber case would have had de minimis dumping margin. See Exhibit CDA-3, and
Canada's first written submission, footnote 3. This could affect not only DOC's "dumping" analysis
but also the "injury" determination, including the finding of "dumped imports", by the ITC under
Article 3 of the AD Agreement.
2. DOC's Calculation of Selling, Administrative and General Expenses is Inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1. of the AD Agreement
5.32 Japan respectfully requests that this Panel carefully review whether DOC satisfied its burden
to find that respondents' SG&A in their ordinary accounting records did not reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production and sale of so ftwood lumber. Japan also respectfully requests
that the Panel carefully examine whether DOC co rrectly considered and evaluated all evidence
submitted by respondents when DOC calculated the respondents' SG&A.
5.33 As Canada correctly argued, Article 2.2.1.1 requires the authorities to base costs calculation
on the "records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in
accordance with the generally accepted accounting prin ciples". The authorities, however, may decide
to deviate from these accounting records if the au thorities find that these records do not "reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production a nd sale of the product under consideration," as
provided in Article 2.2.1.1. In order for the au thorities to reject a respondent's accounting records,
therefore, the authorities must first determine based on the accounting records of a specific respondent
on a case-by-case basis that the respondent's record s do not "reasonably reflect" the costs of the
product under consideration.
5.34 In the instant case, DOC would have acted in consistently with Article 2.2.1.1, if DOC
requested Canadian softwood lumber respondents to recalculate their SG&A in a predetermined
methodology without first reviewing their recorded SG&A.
5.35
 Furthermore, also as Canada correctly stated , Article 2.2.1.1 provides "[a]uthorities shall
consider all available evidence on the proper alloca tion of costs, including that which is made
available by the exporter or producer in the course of the investigation...". Thus, the authorities are
required to base their determination on the proper allocation of costs, including the SG&A, upon
reviewing all evidence made available by respondents.
5.36 In this connection, Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement provides that the authorities'
establishment of facts must be proper and their evaluation of the facts must be unbiased and objective.

Although this Article is directed to the panel, th e obligation of unbiased and objective evaluation of
facts applies equally to the authorities because the panel reviews the authorities' evaluation of facts
through this standard. See Appellate Body Report in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paragraph 56.
5.37 The authorities, therefore, must determine the SG&A based on all evidence submitted by
respondents, and on unbiased and objective evaluation of facts. If DOC applied its pre-determined
methodology to a particular respondent without re viewing any evidence submitted by the respondent,
such application would be inconsis tent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with
Article 17.6(i) thereof.
3. DOC's Practice on Valuation of by-products Revenues is Inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement
5.38 Japan agrees with Canada that the DOC's establis hed practice with respect to valuation of by-
products revenues, as applied to this case, is inconsistent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
Japan considers that the DOC's valu ation practice of by-products sales prices to affiliated parties is
inconsistent with Article 2.2.1. 1 in conjunction with Article 17.6(i) thereof because the DOC's
practice works only unfavourably to respondents.
(a) DOC's Established Practice on Valuation of Sales of by-products to Affiliated Parties
5.39 It is a DOC's established practice that, where a respondent evaluates by-product value based
on sales prices from the respondent to its affiliated party ("affiliated sales price") in its cost accounting
records, DOC considers whether it should adjust the recorded by-products value based on the
weighted-average sales price of identical by-p roduct from a respondent to unaffiliated parties
("unaffiliated sales price"). DOC disregards the recorded by-product value based on the affiliated
sales price, and instead uses an unaffiliated sales price, if the affiliated sales price is higher than the
unaffiliated sales price. DOC performs this revalua tion, even if the respondent's accounting records
are in accordance with the GAAP of the respondent's country. DOC, however, does not adjust the
recorded by-product value, if the recorded affilia ted sales price is lower than the unaffiliated sales
price.
5.40 The value of by-product revenues offsets th e total production cost of the product under
consideration. See Canada's first written submission, paragr aph 233. Thus, the lower the amount of
the offset, the higher the cost of production of the product under consideration. Thus, DOC's
established practice to adjust by-product value works only to increase respondents' cost of production.
(b) The Limit on the Authorities' Discretion under the AD Agreement
5.41 The authorities have discretion to recalculate th e respondent's recorded cost of production in
certain situations under Article 2.2.1.1, as discu ssed above. This discretion, however, is not
unlimited. The AD Agreement does not confer unfettered discretion on the authorities to pick and
choose whatever the methodology they fit. As discus sed in the previous section, such discretion must
be exercised based on proper establishment of f acts and on an unbiased and objective evaluation of
established facts as set forth in Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement
. The Vienna Convention ,
Article 26, further requires that the discretion must be exercised in good faith.
5.42 To be unbiased, objective and fair, the authoriti es must exercise its di scretion in an even-
handed manner without favouring the in terest of any particular party in an anti-dumping proceeding.
In this regard, the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel explained at paragraph 148 "[i]f a
Member elects to adopt general rules to prevent distortion of normal value through sales between
affiliates, those rules must reflect, even-handedly, the fact that both high and low-priced sales between
affiliates might not be 'in the ordinary course of trad e.'" The Appellate Body also stated in the other

context at paragraph 193 "[i]n short, an 'objective examination' requires that the domestic industry,..., be
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party".
5.43 This rule in the AD Agreement, as explained by the Appellate Body, squarely applies to the
authorities' discretion on how to construct a respondent's cost of production.
(c) DOC's Valuation of Wood Chips, to which DOC Applied its Established Practice, is
Inconsistent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement
5.44 DOC's established practice, as applied to this so ftwood lumber case, is contrary to this even-
handed rule. Canada demonstrated that DOC applied its established practice in the instant case. DOC
re-evaluated the respondents' cost of production onl y when a recorded affiliated sales price of the
wood chips, a by-product, was higher than the unaffiliated sales price of wood chips. DOC did not re-
evaluated the recorded affiliated sales price when the affiliated sales price was lower than the
unaffiliated sales price. ( See Canada's first written submission, paragraphs 237-265) DOC's practice
thus works only to increase the respondents' cost of production.
5.45 If DOC considers that the unaffiliated sales price mu st be the appropriate benchmark to value
by-products, DOC then should substitute the unaffilia ted sales price for all affiliated sales prices,
irrespective of whether the affiliated sales price was either higher or lower than the unaffiliated sales
price. DOC's picking and choosing method, which was designed only to increase the cost of
production and to increase the likelihood of DOC's finding of dumping in favour of the domestic
industry, is not even-handed, and does favour the domestic industry. Such practice is beyond the
permissive exercise of DOC's discretion, and thus is, and was, as applied to this instant case,
inconsistent with the authorities' obligations under Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in conjunction
with Article 17.6(i) thereof.
5.46 For the reasons set forth above, Japan respect fully requests this Panel to review the
inconsistency of DOC's practices with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with
Article 2.1, as well as with Article 2.2.1.1, in conjunction with Article 17.6(i).
C.
THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.47 The EC, in its oral statement, made the following arguments:
1. Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement
5.48 Canada argued that the United States initiated its investigation contrary to Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement because the applicant did not provide all "re asonably available" information, i.e., the
commercial relationship between the various companies and the pricing and cost data of the exporting
company.125
5.49 The EC disagrees with such an interpretation of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. As already
explained in its third party submission the EC cons iders that neither the wording nor the context does
lend support for the idea that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement imposes a direct obligation upon the
investigating authority.
5.50 First, the EC would highlight that under the th ird sentence of chapeau of Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement the application "shall contain such in formation as is reasonable available to the
applicant" (emphasis added). Accordingly, Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement provides for minimum
requirements for an application that only the applican t can fulfil. The language of Article 5.2 of the

125 Canada first written submission, paras. 89 et seq.

AD Agreement thus demonstrates that the requirements ther eunder are addressed to the applicant but
not to the investigating authority.
5.51 Second, Article 5.1 of the AD Agreement elucidates that the application is made "by or on
behalf of the domestic industry". Therefore, any shortcoming of the application falls within the
sphere of responsibility of the applicant but not of th e investigating authority. The authority is simply
not responsible for submitting an application that fulfils the requirements under Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement.
5.52 The EC would therefore concur with the US position that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement
does not impose a specific obligation on investigating authorities.
126
2. Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement
5.53 Canada claimed that the United States violated its obligations under Article 5.3 of the
AD Agreement because the application did not contain "suffi cient evidence" to justify the initiation of
the investigation.127
5.54 The EC would refrain from commenting on the s ubstance of this claim. However, from a
systemic point of view, the EC would submit that Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement is a pivotal
provision in determining whether the investigatin g authorities correctly initiated an anti-dumping
investigation. In this context, other requirements for the application, such as those referred to under
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, may also become relevant. Thus, in order to discharge its
obligations under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement the investigating will also have to take into account
whether the application contains all necessary information as required under Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement.
3. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement
5.55 Canada claimed that even if the US authoriti es had initiated the investigation in accordance
with Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement it should have terminated the ex amination at a later stage in the
light of the insufficient evidence on the commercia l relationship and the cost and pricing data. 128 In
Canada's view the United States, therefore, vi olated its obligations under Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement.
5.56 The EC would recall that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides for two alternative
scenarios: Either the application did not contai n sufficient evidence from the outset or during the
investigation it becomes apparent that evidence is insufficient.
5.57 As concerns the first alternative, the EC would agree with the Panel findings in Mexico –
Corn Syrup which determined that Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement did not impose an additional
substantive obligation beyond those in Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.129
5.58 With regard to the second alternative, the investigating authorities are called upon to decide at
the end of the anti-dumping investigation whether the imposition of anti-dumping measures would be
justified or not. This necessitates a determinati on on whether the investigation reveals "sufficient
evidence" of dumping, injury and a causal link.

126 US first written submission, paras. 73 et seq.
127 Canada first written submission, paras. 100 et seq.
128 Ibid.
129 Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, para. 7.99; confirmed by Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II,
paras. 8.72 et seq.

5.59 The EC would note that once an investigati on has been initiated (in accordance with
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement) these questions typically evolve in the course of the investigation.
Therefore, an obligation to terminate an ongoing investigation under Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement
due to lack of "sufficient evidence" should be interp reted in a more flexible manner. This view is
corroborated by the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement which provides that any
termination is contingent upon whether the "authorities concerned are satisfied that there is no
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case" (emphasis
added). Accordingly, investigati ng authority have a considerable margin of discretion whether to
terminate an investigation due to lack of sufficient evidence or not.
4. The Practice of "Zeroing" – Violation of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement
5.60 Turning now to the US "practice of zeroing", the EC understands that the scope of this
complaint does not concern the US statute per se . Canada only appears to attack the practice of
"zeroing" as relevant for original investigations.
5.61 The EC considers that the US methodology for determining the numerator for the purposes of
the weighted average margin calculation in no way differs from the EC "zeroing" methodology
already found to be incompatible with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in EC – Bed
Linen.130 The EC compared the weighted average norma l value and export price of different product
types within the like product. It attributed a zer o value to any types for which the resulting dumping
margin was negative, while aggregating the pos itive dumping margins and dividing them over the
total value of the export sales to obtain a percentage rate of dumping. It, thus, allowed no "offset" for
negative dumping across product types. The United States has done exactly the same in this case.
5.62 The United States does not dispute the similarity of the two methodologies, but confines itself
to rejecting the precedent value of the decision of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen and attempts
to reargue the case. 131 Although the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Bed Linen only binds the
parties to that case, the Appellate Body expects Pa nels to take account of the legal clarifications
concerning Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Of course, panels and the Appellate Body
may reconsider or refine certain legal interpretations on the basis that certain legal arguments were not
made by the parties and therefore not addressed by the Appellate Body. However, as already
explained in its written brief the EC considers that none of the arguments advanced by the
United States in addition to those already addressed in EC – Bed Linen to defend its "zeroing"
methodology are of such nature.
5.63 As regards the US arguments re lating to the product definition 132, the EC notes that the
Appellate Body clarified that the rules governin g comparison under Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD
Agreement are legally separate from those concerning the definition of the product under
consideration (and the like product according to Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement).
5.64 It is true that a broad determination of th e product under consideration and the like domestic
product may lead the authority to make multiple comparisons, some of which can show negative
dumping margins. However, the prohibition of zeroi ng by virtue of Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2, first
paragraph of the AD Agreement, as interpreted in EC – Bed Linen , ensures that negative dumping
margins found for some product types will offset the positive dumping margin of others when the
margin of dumping is established for the product under consideration as a whole . As noted by the
Appellate Body, to address in particular dumping of certain types or models of products, the
United States investigating authorities "could ha ve defined, or rede fined the product under

130 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 47.
132 US first written submission, paras. 160-164.

investigation in a narrower way".
133 Yet, once the product under consideration has been defined
broadly as in this investigation, a margin of dumping based on the first symmetrical method of
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement must take full account of negative amounts of dumping.134
5.65 As to the textual, contextual arguments and those relating to the negotiating history 135, the EC
refers to its third party brief.136
5.66 In short, the EC fully supports Canada's request that the Panel should find that the US practice
of "zeroing" is incompatible with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.
D. THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF JAPAN
5.67 Japan, in its oral statement, made the following arguments:
1. The Basic Principle of Good Faith
5.68 Japan would like to bring the attention of this Panel to the bedrock principle of good faith
under Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention . As the Appellate Body has repeatedly
recognized, Members are obliged to perform their WTO treaty obligations in good faith. 137 In US –
Hot-Rolled Steel, for example, the Appellate Body stated that the "organic principle of good faith" is
"a general principle of law and a principle of genera l international law, that informs the provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement ..".138 I n US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body has explained that this
general principle "prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights" 139, and that the exercise of a state's
right should be " fair and equitable as between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure
for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed". 140 (emphasis in original)
As clarified by the Appellate Body, the basic princi ple of good faith requires the authorities to act in
an even-handed manner that respects fundamental fairness.141
5.69 One of the expressions of this principle is Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement. While this
Article instructs the Panel to review whether the authorities evaluated facts in an unbiased and
objective manner, this Article, at the same time, "i n effect defines when investigating authorities can
be considered to have acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement in the course of their
"establishment" and "evaluation" of the relevant facts". 142 The principle of good faith therefore
requires the authorities to exercise its discretion in an even-handed, fair, unbiased and objective
manner under the AD Agreement.143
5.70 This basic principle of good faith is particularly important in the interpretation and application
of the AD Agreement because the authorities exercise substantial discretion under the AD Agreement.
Keeping this in mind, individual issues should be reviewed.

133 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 62.
134 The EC does not address the issue of product definition in this submission, but reserves its position.
135 US first written submission, paras. 161 and 167 et seq.
136 EC third party submission, paras. 36-39.
137 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para. 110 and note 117; Panel Report, US – Hot-
Rolled Steel, para. 101.
138 Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 101.
139 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 158.
140 Id., note 156, quoting B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals (Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1953), p. 125.
141 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 148 and note 142. See also Appellate Body
Report, EC – Hormones, para. 133.
142 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 56.
143 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), as modified by the Appellate Body, paras. 132-
133.

2. Prohibition of Zeroing
5.71 Japan demonstrated in its third party written submission that the zeroing practice is
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with Article 2.1 thereof.
5.72 It appears that the United States ignored the si gnificance of the chapeau of Article 2.4. The
general obligation of "a fair comparison" set fort h in the chapeau is another expression of the basic
principle of good faith and fundamental fairness with respect to the calculation of the margin of
dumping. In order for a comparison to be "fair", the authorities may not exercise its discretion in a
manner that gives "unfair advantage" to one inte rested party. DOC's practice of zeroing, which
replaces negative margins with zero to calculate the margin of dumping of a product, works only to
create and inflate the margin of dumping. This practice cannot be viewed as "fair" under Article 2.4
of the AD Agreement, nor consistent with the basic principle of good faith.
5.73 The United States seems to argue that Article 2. 4.2 provides for calculation of the margin of
dumping only on a model-specific basis.
144 The United States attempted to justify this argument,
reading that the term "margin" in Article 2.4.2 out of context.
5.74 Japan disagrees. The AD Agreement requires the authorities to establish a single margin of
dumping of a product, and accordingly to determine "dumping" of "a product", on a company-specific
basis. This requirement is explicit in Article 6. 10, which states "[t]he Authorities shall, as a rule,
determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation".145 (emphasis added) The Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen (Recourse
to Article 21.5 DSU) confirmed this, stating "'dumping is a de termination made with reference to a
product from a particular producer [or] exporter[.]'" 146 Japan also would like the Panel to recall that
Article 2.1 informs Article 2.4 that the "fair comp arison" must be made with respect to the product
under consideration as a whole , as discussed in Japan's written submission. In sum, the AD
Agreement requires the authorities to calculate the margin of dumping for the product under
consideration as a whole on a company-specific basis, not on a model-specific basis.
5.75 The term "margins" in Article 2.4.2 is not an indication that the practice of zeroing is
permitted. A multiple comparison method provided in Article 2.4.2 may be used in the margin
calculation process as a matter of the administrative convenience to take into account the differences
in physical characteristics among several models of a product. 147 Such multiple comparisons are,
however, just in the middle of the entire process to calculate an individual margin of dumping for an
exporter/producer. At the end, the authorities mu st aggregate all of these intermediate margins
obtained from multiple comparisons to arrive in a single margin for a producer. The principle of good
faith, as expressed in Article 2.4 which was informed by Article 2.1, requires that the authorities
calculate the margin in an even-handed manner wi thout giving unfair advantage to one interested
party. Article 2.4.2 is also subject to this princi ple, as the chapeau of this Article expressly provides
"subject to the provisions governing the fair compar ison in paragraph 4". The practice of zeroing,
which ignores all negative margins and uses only positiv e margins for such calculation, is against the
basic principle of good faith and Article 2.4.
5.76 Finally, the argument by the United States on "c omparable" products is without merits. The
authorities may not be permitted to argue in a segment of the proceeding that "product under
consideration" consisted of multiple types because they are not "compa rable", and then argue in other
segments of the proceeding that these types constitutes a comparable single product. Throughout the

144 US first written submission, paras. 150-155.
145 Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement.
146 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 143, quoting the original Panel
Report, para. 6.136.

investigation in question, the United States treate d the various models of softwood lumber as "a
product" under Article 2.1 and as the like product under Article 2.6, or in US term "a class or kind of
merchandise".
148 The United States also based its determin ation of the US domestic industry and its
injury on the like product of softwood lumber, a single product. In the US first written submission,
responding to Canada's claim that certain typ es of softwood lumber differ from others, the
United States argued "none of these products we re so essentially different from other products
covered by the investigation as to warrant drawi ng 'clear dividing lines' between those products".
149
The United States then may not be allowed to argue conveniently only in the zeroing issue that the
certain types of softwood lumber must be treated differently from other types.
5.77 As such, Japan submits that the Panel reject arguments by the United States, and this Panel
find that the zeroing practice is prohibited under Article 2.4 in conjunction with Article 2.1.
3. Calculation of Selling, General and Administrative Expenses
5.78 The second issue that Japan would like to address is the SG&A calculation methodology
adopted by DOC. Again, Japan would like to em phasize that the authoriti es are required to conduct
an anti-dumping investigation in an even-handed, fair, unbiased and objective manner. In this
connection, Article 2.2.1.1 requires the authorities to "consider all available evidence on the proper
allocation of costs". Consequently, to act in a fair and objective manner, the authorities must
determine the proper allocation method of SG&A upon reviewing all evidences presented by an
exporter or producer. The requirement for the author ities to base its determination of the allocation
method on all evidence presented by a producer mean s that the determination must be made on a
company-specific basis.
5.79 In this investigation, it appears that the United States preferred to apply its established
"standard methodology"
150, which allocates financial expenses based on COGS. The United States
argues that the COGS method is proper. The US argument, however, missed the point. The question
here is not whether the COGS method is proper. The question is whether DOC determined an
appropriate method to calculate SG&A based on all the evidence on a company-specifi c basis, or
DOC applied its own established method without considering all the evidence.
5.80 Japan respectfully requests that the Panel re view DOC's application of its own SG&A
calculation methodology to Canadian respondents from this viewpoint.
4. Revaluation of by-product
5.81 Finally, Japan submits that DOC's revaluati on of by-product, wood chip, for the purpose of
the production cost of softwood lumber is contrary to Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement and the
good faith obligation.
5.82 It appears that the United States misunderstands the limit on the authorities' discretion under
Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement . Article 2.2.1.1 permits the authorities to deviate their
production cost calculation from the respondent's r ecorded costs, if the recorded costs do not
reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production of the product under consideration.
Article 2.2.1.1 does not confer complete and unfettere d discretion to the authorities to determine what
"reasonably reflect" the production of the product unde r investigation. As discussed during the first
substantive meeting and in Japan's third party wr itten submission, the basic principle of good faith,
which informs the provisions of the AD Agreement, including Article 2.2.1.1, obliges the authorities

149 Id., para. 105.
150 Id., para. 191.

to exercise their discretion in an even-handed and fair manner without giving "unfair advantage" to
one interested party.
5.83 DOC, applying its established practice in this case, determined that certain respondents'
recorded wood chip valu es based on sales price to affiliated parties did not "reasonably reflect" the
production of softwood lumber. DOC made such revaluation, however, only where the recorded
value was higher than the sales price to unaffiliated pa rties. In such case, DOC lowered the recorded
chip value down to the sales price to unaffiliated pa rties. DOC did not reva luate the recorded wood
chip value, where the re corded value was lower than the sal es price to non-affiliated parties.
According to the United States, such "understated" value is not unreasonable. 151 As the wood chip
value offsets the production cost of softwood lumber, DOC's affiliated party rule, as applied to this
case, is designed to work only to increase the produc tion cost of softwood lumber, and thus increase
the margins of dumping of respondents.
5.84 The basic principle of good faith and fundamental fairness target precisely this situation: the
authorities' practice, which creates an "unfair advantag e" to one interested party. To act in good faith
and to avoid creating an "unfair advantage," the au thorities' decision standard must be even-handed
and fair to all parties. DOC's practice, as applied to this softwood lumber case, is contrary to this
good faith obligation.
5.85 Moreover, DOC's practice did not take account of usual variation of prices in the marketplace.
The Appellate Body has explained in US – Hot-Rolled Steel , "the sales price may be lower than the
"ordinary course" price, if the purpose is to sh ift resources to the buyer, who then receives goods
worth more than the actual sales price". 152 DOC's practice simply re-eva luated the chip costs without
considering any other factors affecting the sales price to affiliated party. The DOC's practice thus has
no justification.
5.86 DOC's application of its own method to re-e valuate the wood chip value is, therefore,
impermissible exercise of its discretion under Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with
Article 17.6(i) thereof and the basic principle of good faith and fundamental fairness. Japan thus
submits that the Panel find that the DOC's practi ce as applied to this case is inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1.
5. Conclusion
5.87 As such, Japan asks this Panel to find that the United States violated its WTO obligations
under Articles 2.4 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with Articles 2.1 and 17.6(i)
thereof, and the basic principle of good faith and fundamental fairness.
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 On 30 January 2004, both Canada and the Un ited States submitted written requests for the
Panel to review precise aspects of the Interim Re port issued on 16 January 2004. As Canada did not
direct us to the record to substantiate its comment s and proposals regarding changes to the text of the
Interim Report, we requested Cana da on 4 February 2004 to identify exactly where in the record
support for its requested adjustments to the Inte rim Report could be found. Canada submitted its
response on 6 February 2004. On 9 February 2004, both parties submitted written comments on the
other party's request for interim review. Neither party requested an interim review meeting. The

151 Id., para. 241.
152 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 141.

Panel has carefully reviewed the arguments and pr oposed amendments to the text of the Interim
Report, and addresses them ad seriatim, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU.
153
6.2 The United States requests us to amend paragraph 7.32 of the Interim Report to reflect the
fact that the regression analysis was in fact never submitted to DOC. Canada did not comment on
this issue.
6.3 We agree with the United States and, accordingly, amended paragraph 7.32 of this Report.
6.4 Canada requests us to make some amendments to the fifth sentence of paragraph 7.159; fifth,
sixth and seventh sentences of paragraph 7.171; and fifth sentence of paragraph 7.173 of the Interim
Report regarding our examination of "Claim 5: Artic le 2.4 – Adjustment for Differences in Physical
Characteristics". Canada asserts that our descrip tion of DOC's methodology used at the preliminary
stage was not accurate and proposed wording to correct it. The United States asserts that, through its
proposed changes to the above-cited paragraphs of th e Interim Report, Canada apparently intended to
clarify that certain similar product matches were po ssible and were made by DOC in the Preliminary
Determination. In the view of the United St ates, Canada's proposed changes do not accurately
describe the methodology used by DOC at the prelim inary stage. In particular, the United States
asserts that Canada's proposals are unclear and mislead ing, because they fail either to identify the
similar matches that DOC made in the Preliminary Determination or to adequately explain that similar
matches were made only where DOC was able to qua ntify an appropriate adjustment. Bearing in
mind the alleged purpose of Canada's comments, the United States requests us not to accept the
changes proposed by Canada but suggests some adju stments to the above-referred paragraphs of the
Interim Report.
6.5 The gist of Canada's comment is that DOC's approach at the preliminary stage be reported
accurately in certain paragraphs of this Report. We agree with this comment and made certain
changes, which can be found in paragraphs 7.159, 7.171, and 7.173, infra, of this Report. Footnotes
310-312, 323-325 and 329, infra, have been added to those paragraphs to indicate the source of the
information referred to in those paragraphs.
6.6 Regarding "Claim 6: Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 – Zeroing", the United States requests us to delete
footnote 341 of the Interim Report (footnote 361 of th is Report). The United States argues that it is
not within the Panel's terms of reference to rule on whether an offset for non-dumped comparisons is
required when determining the overall margin of dumping under the transaction-to-transaction and
weighted average normal value-to-individual export transaction methodologies set forth in
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement . In the view of the United States, that question need not be
answered to resolve this dispute. The United St ates asserts that the statement contained in the
footnote is of additional concern because it states a conclusion without setting forth any reasons for
that conclusion. Finally, the United States asser ts that the discussion in footnote 341 seems to
misconstrue the US references to the transaction- to-transaction and weighted average normal value-
to-individual export transaction methodologies. Thus, the United States asserts that the purpose of the
references that it made to those two methodologies in its submissions to us was "simply to illustrate
that Article 2.4.2 contemplates multiple stages to arrive at a single anti-dumping duty margin and
speaks only to alternative methodologies for performing the first stage."
154 Canada asserts that
Article 11 of the DSU gives the Panel full scope to express, in footnote 341, its views as to whether
zeroing would be permitted in the determination of a margin of dumping based on the other two
methodologies referred to in Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. In Canada's view, a panel is free to
set forth its interpretation of parts of a provision that are not the object of litigation when such
interpretation is useful or necessary for the interp retation of the provision in question – in the case at

153 Section VI of this Report entitled "Interim Review " therefore forms part of the findings of the final
panel report, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU.
154 US Comments on the Interim Report, par. 6.

issue, Article 2.4.2 – as a whole. In the view of Canada, the Panel's statement in footnote 341 is
connected logically and directly to the Panel's explanation of its legal reasoning. Therefore,
footnote 341 should not be removed. Canada further argues that, it was the United States, in
paragraph 151 and following of its first written submission, that referred to the other two
methodologies provided for in Artic le 2.4.2 and first raised the issue of the relevance of these
methodologies. Finally, Canada argues that, the United States is making a legal argument seeking to
have the Panel reconsider a substa ntive position related to the core of submissions on this matter.
Canada submits that this goes beyond the scope of the requirement of Article 15.2 of the DSU that a
request for review pertain to "precise aspects of the interim report".
6.7 We have considered the parties' comments and ha ve adjusted the text of the relevant footnote
(see note 361, infra, in this Report). We are of the view that we are not precluded by any provisions
of the DSU to make the comments as reflected in this footnote.
6.8 With respect to "Claim 7: Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 – Allocation of Financial
Expenses: Abitibi", Canada requests us to amend the sixth sentence of paragraph 7.227 of the
Interim Report. Canada asserts that the parties' positions, in relation to Abitibi's net interest
allocation, are not reflected in that sentence. In its first written submission, Canada submits that the
United States asserted that "Abitibi's theory (...) incorrectly assumed that fixed-asset purchases are the
principal activities of a company requiring working capital".
155 Canada contends that the US position
assumes that net interest allocation is limited to fixe d assets. In contrast, Canada asserts that it argued
that allocated net interest expense was based on total assets, which included non-fixed assets such as
inventories and accounts receivable. 156 Canada proposes the addition of a sentence to that paragraph
to reflect the parties' position. The United States asserts that Canada is correct that Abitibi's
allocation methodology was based on total assets, not fixed assets. In the view of the United States,
the Panel should nonetheless reject Canada's propo sed adjustment, because it states incorrectly and
without citation that it was DOC's position that Abiti bi's interest expense allocation methodology was
based on fixed assets, instead of total assets. In fact, DOC discussed Abitibi's methodology with
regard to "assets", not "fixed assets". 157 The United States asserts that Canada does not dispute this
point in its letter dated 6 February 2004. In this letter Canada refers only to a statement in the US first
written submission about the theory underlying Abitibi' s argument on allocation of interest expense.
That sentence does not purport to describe how Abitibi allocated interest expense, according to the
United States. To clarify the sixth sentence in paragraph 7.227 accurately, the United States proposes
that the Panel simply strike the term "fixed."
6.9 At the outset, we note that paragraph 7.227 of th e Interim Report (identical paragraph in this
Report) falls under the section "Factual Background". This section purports to report facts that are
relevant to our examination of the issues before us , rather than the arguments of the parties. The
purpose of the sixth sentence et seq. is therefore only to describe how Abitibi computed the portion of
the company's net interest expense related to lumber assets and operations in its questionnaire
response. Keeping this in mind, we do not consid er it appropriate to include in this section the
different positions of the parties on the issues at st ake. The arguments are reflected in the section
"Arguments of the parties". 158 In addition, the description of the methodology contained in the sixth
sentence et seq. of paragraph 7.227 of the Interim Report was taken directly from Abitibi's
questionnaire response.159 Thus, we regard this to be the most objective description of how Abitibi
proposed DOC to determine the portion of that compan y's net interest expense related to lumber. For
the foregoing reasons, we have not made any changes to paragraph 7.227 of this Report.

156 Canada second written submission, para. 212; and Canada response to question 52 of the Panel,
para. 146.
157Final Determination, Comment 15, (Exhibit CDA-2).
158 See paras. 7.230-7.232, infra.
159 Exhibit CDA-83, Abitibi's Questionnaire response, p. D-44.

6.10 In addition to the above, the United States requests us to clarify that the statement contained
in the third sentence of paragraph 7.243 of the Interim Report (identical paragraph in this Report), that
DOC allocated 13.6 per cent of the total amount fo r financial expense to softwood lumber, was an
assertion made by Canada. Canada did not comment on this point.
6.11 After examining the comment of the United States, we have concluded that it is appropriate to
make the requested amendment to paragraph 7.243 of this Report.
6.12 Regarding "Claim 8: Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1. 1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 – Dete rmination of General &
Administrative Expenses: Tembec", Canada asserts that the fifth sentence of paragraph 7.246 of the
Interim Report (identical paragraph in this Report) contains a clerical error which has modified the
meaning of this sentence. According to Canada, th e internal divisional financial statements included
all amounts for G&A costs charged by Tembec to each of its divisions, plus a properly allocated
portion of overall corporate G&A. Thus, Canada requests us to replace the word "some" in "including
some amounts for G&A costs that are charged directly by Tembec" with the word "all".
160 I n s o
requesting, Canada refers us to a citation in paragraph 209 of its first written submission. The United
States asserts that Canada's proposed insertion of the word "all" in the fifth sentence is misleading. In
the view of the United States, Canada did not pr ovide evidence that the FPG divisional G&A properly
included all the G&A attributable to softwood lumber. The United States asserts that Canada's
citation, in its 6 February 2004 le tter, to its own first written submi ssion does not change the fact that
there was an absence of evidence in the record on this point. The United States, however, appears to
propose that the term "some" is deleted.
6.13 After considering the comments of the parties, we are of the view that the words "some", as
reflected in paragraph 7.246 of the Interim Report (i dentical paragraph in this Report), and the word
"all", as proposed by Canada now, might be underst ood to contain a value judgement on the part of
the Panel. In light of our discussion of this issue in paragraphs 7.250-7.269, infra, which goes to the
heart of the claim, we have replaced the word "som e" with the neutral word "those" in the fifth and
seventh sentences of paragraph 7.246, infra, of this Report. In addition to the above, we have added
footnotes 382 and 383 to paragraph 7.246 of this Report to indicate the source of the information
referred to in that paragraph.
6.14 Canada also refers to minor clerical errors in the fifth sentence in paragraph 7.246 of the
Interim Report and requests us to co rrect them, that is, to add the word "its" and to change the term
"division" to "divisions". The United States agrees.
6.15 We have therefore corrected the errors and have changed the wording accordingly ( see fifth
sentence of paragraph 7.246, infra, of this Report).
6.16 In addition, Canada requests us to replace the words "[i]ns tead of" in the seventh sentence of
paragraph 7.246 of the Interim Report, by the words "[i]n addition to". 161 The United States agrees
with this request.
6.17 We agree with Canada's proposal and made the requested change to the seventh sentence of
paragraph 7.246 of this Report.
6.18 Canada requests us to add in paragraph 7.299 of the Interim Report (identical paragraph in
this Report) – addressing "Claim 10: Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4 – Reasonable Amounts for
By-Product Revenues from the Sale of Wood Chips: Tembec and West Fraser" – that Tembec had
submitted information on arm's length sales by its sawm ills. In support of its request, Canada refers
to statements contained in paragraphs 256 a nd 302 of its first and second written submissions,

161 Canada refers to Exhibit CDA-160, Tembec's Case Brief, p.4.

respectively. Canada also refers to DOC's di scussion and analysis found in Tembec's Cost
Verification Report. 162 T h e United States asserts that, although it is true that Tembec submitted
examples of sales by some of its sawmills to unaffiliated purchasers of wood chips produced by its
sawmills, as DOC explained in the IDM, these reporte d sales and comparisons with other prices were
selectively chosen by Tembec and were not based on a sample chosen by DOC. The United States
that, if the Panel were to make a modification based on Canada's proposal, the modification should
make clear comparisons with other prices were selectively chosen by Tembec.
6.19 We note Canada's statement in paragraph 256 of its first written submission that "Tembec (...)
makes arm's length sales of wood chips at market pri ces in Western Canada." The correctness of this
statement is not disputed by the United States. B earing this in mind, we agree with the change, as
shown in paragraph 7.299 of this Report, infra. We note the US request that we add a reference to the
fact that Tembec had submitted a selective number of examples of arm's length sales by its sawmills
to unaffiliated purchasers. The United States direct s us to DOC's findings in Comment 11 of the
IDM.163 However, the only reference we could find in the section containing DOC's findings on this
issue to data selectively provided by Tembec con cerns information regarding prices for wood chip
purchases made by its pulp mills from unaffiliated parti es. For this reason, the addition proposed by
the United States has not been accepted.
6.20 For the sake of clarity, we have made minor adjustments to paragraphs 7.24, 7.30, 7.98,
7.168, 7.255, 7.260, 7.263, 7.285, 7.331, 7.344, 7.366, and 7.373-7.374 of the Interim Report (which
correspond to paragraphs 7.24, 7.30, 7.98, 7.168, 7. 255, 7.260, 7.263, 7.285, 7.333, 7.336, 7.368 and
7.376-7.378 of this Report, respectively). Moreove r, we have slightly amended and moved the fifth
sentence of paragraph 7.312 of the Interim Report (i dentical paragraph in this Report) to paragraph
7.317 of this Report. We have also amended paragraph 7.316 of the Interim Report (identical
paragraph in this Report) in order to take into account our interpretation of the obligation imposed by
the proviso of Article 2.2.1.1, as set forth in para graphs 7.236-7.237 of the Interim Report (identical
paragraphs in this Report). As a consequence of our amendments, we have also adjusted "Section
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations".
6.21 In addition to the above-cited amendments , we have added and amended a number of
footnotes to indicate sources of the information of re cord. Footnote 406, settin g forth the scope of
the examination undertaken by the Panel, has been added to this Report. Finally, we have deleted
some footnotes which we considered redundant.
6.22 Finally, we have made some typographical and style-related improvements to the Interim
Report.
VII. FINDINGS
A. I
NTRODUCTION
7.1 Canada challenges DOC's final anti-dumping dut y determination with respect to certain
softwood lumber from Canada published in the Federal Register on 2 April 2002 164, as amended on
22 May 2002. 165 Canada asserts numerous claims against the Final Determination. Canada's first
seven claims refer to the AD Agreement . The first three claims relate to the initiation and non-
termination of the anti-dumping investigation. With respect to these claims, Canada alleges violations
of Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement. Canada's fourth claim is that DOC erroneously
determined that there was a single "like pr oduct", in violation of Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement and

162 Exhibit CDA-112, Tembec's Cost Verification Report, p. 23-25.
163 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, pp. 57-62.
164 Exhibit CDA-1, Final Determination.
165 Exhibit CDA-3, Amended Final Determination.

that this non-compliance with Article 2.6 caused non-compliance with other substantive obligations of
the AD Agreement, e.g., Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4. The fifth claim is that DOC erred by failing, in
comparing non-identical types, to make "due allowan ce" for certain physical differences in softwood
lumber products to maintain price comparability and to ensure a fair comparison between normal
value and export price, in violation of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. The sixth claim relates to
DOC's "zeroing" of margins in comparisons where the export price was higher than the normal value,
a methodology which Canada claims is incons istent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.
The seventh claim consists of six company-specific issues. Canada claims that DOC (i) failed to
calculate and/or allocate reasonable amounts for administrative, selling and general expenses in
computing costs for specific exports, including an improper allocation for fina ncial expenses and for
litigation settlement expenses involving product liab ility claims for a non-investigated product; (ii)
failed to apply reasonable amounts for by-product re venues from the sale of wood chips as offsets in
calculating costs; and (iii) failed to offset a di fference in price comparability arising from futures
contracts profits after concluding that such a diffe rence existed, in violation of the provisions of
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement. Canada also claims that the above-
described violations constitute violations of the US obligations under Articl es 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the
AD Agreement, as well as Article VI of GATT 1994.
7.2 As we noted in Canada's first written submission that the provisions allegedly violated by the
United States in some instances did not include all the provisions cited in the Panel Request, we
requested Canada to confirm the provisi ons forming the basis of its claims.
166 We therefore limit our
analysis and findings only to those provisions which we re referred to in Canada's restatement of its
claims.167
B. GENERAL ISSUES
1. Rules of Treaty Interpretation
7.3 Article 3.2 of the DSU indicates that Members recognize that the dispute settlement system
serves to clarify the provisions of the covered ag reements "in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public internati onal law". Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention 168, which is
generally accepted as reflecting such customary rules, reads as follows:
"[a] treaty shall be interp reted in good faith in accordan ce with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose".
7.4 It is clear that interpretation must be based, fi rst and foremost, on the text of the treaty, while
context and object and purpose may also play a role.
169 It is also well-established that these principles
of interpretation "neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there
or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended".
170 Furthermore, panels "must be
guided by the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention, and must not add to or
diminish rights and obligations provided in the WTO Agreement".171

166 Question 1 of the Panel to Canada.
167 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel.
168 Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.
169 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , p. 11. The Appellate Body has recently
emphasized the importance of the "ordinary meaning" of the terms used in the treaty text in, for example, Appellate
Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ).
170 Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 45.
171 Id., para. 46.

2. Standard of Review
7.5 In light of the claims and arguments made by the parties in the course of these Panel
proceedings, we recall, at the outset of our examinat ion, the standard of review we are required to
apply to the matter before us.
7.6 Article 11 of the DSU172 sets forth the appropriate standard of review, in general, for panels
for all covered agreements. Article 11 imposes upon panels a comprehensive obligation to make an
"objective assessment of the matter", an obligation which embraces all aspects of a panel's
examination of the "matter", both factual and legal.
7.7 Furthermore, Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement sets forth the special standard of review
applicable to anti-dumping disputes. It provides with regard to factual issues that:
"in its assessment of the facts of the matte r, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective . If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objectiv e, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evalua tion shall not be overturned". (emphasis
added)
7.8 Assuming that we conclude that the establishmen t of the facts with regard to a particular
claim in this case was proper, we then may consid er whether, based on the evidence before the US
authorities at the time of the determination, an unbiased and objective investigating authority
evaluating that evidence could have reached the c onclusions that the US authorities reached on the
matter in question.
173
7.9 Article 17.6(i) requires us to determine whether the investigating authority's establishment of
the facts was proper, and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. What is
clear from this is that we are precluded from establis hing facts and evaluating them for ourselves, that
is, we may not engage in a de novo review. However, this does not limit our examination of the
matters in dispute, but only the manner in which we conduct that examination. In this regard, we keep
in mind that Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement establishes that we are to examine the matter based
upon "the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities
of the importing Member".
7.10 With respect to questions of the interpretation of the AD Agreement, Article 17.6(ii) provides:
"the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with

172 Article 11 of the DSU, entitled "Function of Panels", states:

"[t]he function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Acco rdingly, a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case
and the applicability of and conformity with th e relevant covered agreements, and make such
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements…"

173 We note that this is the same standard as that applied by the panels in Argentina – Poultry , paras.

the Agreement if it rests upon one of t hose permissible interpretations ". (emphasis
added)
7.11 Article 17.6(ii) requires us to apply the customar y rules of interpretation of treaties, which are
reflected in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention . As noted above, Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. Thus, our task is
in this respect no different from the task of all pane ls in interpreting the text of the WTO agreements
pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU. What Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement adds is an explicit
acknowledgement that the relevant provision/s of the AD Agreement may admit of more than one
permissible interpretation, and an instruction that, if this process of treaty interpretation leads us to the
conclusion that the interpretation of the provision in question put forward by the defending party is
permissible, we shall find the measure in conformity with the AD Agreement if it is based on that
permissible interpretation.
7.12 Together, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement set out the standard of
review we must apply with respect to both the f actual and legal aspects of our examination of the
claims and arguments raised by the parties.
174 Therefore, we see our task as not to perform a de novo
review of the information and evidence on th e record of the underlying final anti-dumping
determination, nor to substitute our judgment for th at of the US authorities, even though we might
have arrived at a different determination were we examining the record ourselves.
3. Burden of Proof
7.13 We recall that, in WTO dispute settlement pro ceedings, the burden of proof rests with the
party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. 175 Canada as the complaining party
must therefore make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO
agreements, which the respondent mu st refute. We also note, however , that it is generally for each
party asserting a fact, whether complainant or respondent, to provide proof thereof. 176 In this respect,
therefore, it is also for the United States to provi de evidence for the facts which it asserts. We also
recall that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of e ffective refutation by the other party,
requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima facie case. The
role of the Panel is not to make the case for either party, but it may pose questions to the parties "in
order to clarify and distil the legal arguments".177
4. Presentation of Facts in Proceedings
7.14 During these proceedings we were on a number of occasions directed, through footnotes, to
annexes attached to the relevant submissions, in a general way, without clear and precise indications
of exactly where in the annex at issue the referen ced evidence could be found. Because some of the
annexes contained lengthy documents, it was not al ways easy to find the evidence referenced.
Furthermore, the arguments and/or facts were some times presented in the annexes, rather than in
submissions themselves.
7.15 In our view, an annex to a submission should serve only to direct the reader to the underlying
substantiating evidence of what has been presented in the main document, or in other words, to enable
the reader to verify the facts. We therefore requ ested the parties during the first substantive meeting
with the parties to "present the facts and legal argu ments in their written and oral statements so that
they are understandable and exhaustive by themselves" and that "the references to annexes should not

174 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, paras. 54-62.
175 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, et seq.
176 See note 175, supra.
 177 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 136.

add facts or arguments only contained in those annexes, but just give the possibility to confirm what
was contained in the main presentations".
7.16 We are of the view that panels should not be expected to ferret out the facts and arguments
from annexes to submissions, even in fact-intensive cases such as the one at issue. Parties should
present the relevant facts and make their legal ar guments in submissions which are exhaustive in
themselves, with annexes attached thereto only to substantiate the facts and/or arguments already
presented in the submissions to which they are attached.
C.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
1. Introduction
7.17 The United States raised two preliminary objections, but did not request us to rule on them
on a preliminary basis. The two objections raised are: (i) that Canada has included in its first written
submission claims with respect to a number of provisions of the AD Agreement that were not included
in its Panel Request 178 and are therefore outside our terms of reference 179, and (ii) that Canada has
introduced certain new evidence in the context of these proceedings which was not before the
investigating authority during the course of the investigation.180
2. Terms of Reference
(a) Factual Background
7.18 In paragraph 2 of its Panel Request181, Canada states that:
"[DOC] erroneously determined there to be a single like product (under US law,
termed "class or kind" of merchandise) rather than several distinct like products,
thereby failing to assess domestic industry su pport in respect of each distinct like
product and failing to assess the sufficiency of evidence of dumping in respect of each
distinct like product, thereby resulting in violations by the United States of
Articles 2.6, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 [of the AD Agreement] and Article VI:1 of
the GATT 1994 . The like product and industry support determinations by [DOC]
were made without a proper establishment of the facts, were based on an evaluation of
the facts that was neither unbiased nor objective and do not rest on a permissible
interpretation of the [ AD Agreement ]. Accordingly, the like product and industry
support determinations by Commerce cannot be upheld in light of the applicable
standard of review under Article 17.6".182 (emphasis added)
7.19 In its first written submission, concerning the "like product" determination, Canada requests
the Panel to find that:
"DOC erroneously determined [there] to be only one like pr oduct and product under
consideration, thereby, rendering the conduc t of the investigation inconsistent with
US obligations under Articles 2, 3, 4.1, 5, 6.10 and 9 [of the AD Agreement ]…" 183
(emphasis added)

178 WT/DS264/2. This document is included in Annex D to this Report.
180 Id., para. 22.
181 WT/DS264/2.
182 Ibid.

(b) Arguments of the Parties
7.20 The United States asserts that Canada claims in paragraph 2 of its Panel Request that the
United States has violated Articles 2.6, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:1 of GATT 1994. However, according to the United States, Canada has added claims in its
first written submission, by alleging that the following provisions of the AD Agreement have also
been violated: Article 2 (not just Article 2.6), all of Article 4 (not just Article 4.1), all of Article 5 (not
just Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8), as well as Articles 3, 6.10, and 9.
184 The United States
considers that these claims fall outside the Panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU. The
United States points to Article 6.2 of the DSU, which states that a panel request "shall (...) identify the
specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly". The United States cons iders that a panel request must always identify
the treaty provisions claimed to have been violated 185 and that, if a claim is not specified in the panel
request, it cannot be subsequently "cured" by a co mplaining party's argumentation in its submissions
to a panel. 186 The United States therefore requests us to ru le that Canada's claims of violations of
provisions other than those set forth in its Panel Request are beyond our terms of reference.
7.21 Canada contends that it has not added new claims in addition to those contained in its Panel
Request by referring to additional provisions of the AD Agreement in its first written submission.
Rather, Canada has made arguments in support of the claim clearly identified in its Panel Request
(i.e., the over-broad product coverage of the inv estigation resulting from an improper application of
Article 2.6 "like product" definition). Canada ass erts that in order to address whether and how the
definition of Article 2.6 delimits the scope and range of different pr oducts an investigating authority
may cover in a single investigation, the Panel must explore the full context of Article 2.6, including
the manner in which the term "like product" is used throughout the AD Agreement. The additional
provisions referred to in its first written submis sion provide context for the interpretation of
Article 2.6 and arguments for its claim that DOC erred in finding only one "like product" and
conducting only one investigation. Furthermore, Canada asserts that the United States did not suffer
any identifiable prejudice as Canada has not supplem ented its claim or altered the nature of the
alleged error in the Panel Request. The legal basi s for Canada's claim in its first written submission
remained Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement and the United States was clearly able to respond to
Canada's arguments.187 Canada therefore requests us to reject the US preliminary objection.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.22 The issue that we need to decide is whether the provisions of the AD Agreement identified in
Canada's first written submission as allegedly being violated by the United States, but which were not
included in Canada's Panel Request, are within our terms of reference.
7.23 In examining this matter, we note the following differences between the provisions of the AD
Agreement quoted by Canada in its Panel Request with regard to the "like product" issue and those
provisions claimed by Canada as being violated in its first written submission, and in its subsequent
replies to questions 1 and 85 of the Panel to confirm which provisions have allegedly been violated by
the United States:

184 US first written submission, para. 17 which refers to Canada first written submission, paras. 11, 115,
118, 119 and 142.
185 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124, and also Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen ,
para. 6.17.
186 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 143.
187 Canada response to the US preliminary objections, para. 15, and note 5 thereto.

Panel Request188 First Written Submission 189 Replies to questions 1 and 85
Article 2.6 Article 2 Article 2.6
- Article 3 -
Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 Article 5 Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 190
- Article 6.10 -
- Article 9 -
* This table refers to those provisions of the AD Agreement falling within the terms of reference of the Panel
regarding the "like product" issue only
7.24 In examining these differences, it appears to us, on its face, that Canada has, in its first written
submission, alleged violations of Articles 2 and 5 as a whole, rather than only the sub-sections
claimed to have been violated in the Panel Request. In Canada's first written submission, violations of
provisions not included at all in the Panel Request, specifically Articles 3, 6.10 and 9, are also alleged.
We note that, in its restatement and confirmation of its claims contained in its replies to questions 1
and 85, respectively, Canada has limited the scope of its claim to an alleged violation of Article 2.6
and, "e.g., Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4".191
7.25 It is now well-established that a panel's terms of reference are governed by the panel request.
These terms of reference define the scope of th e dispute, and serve the due process objective of
notifying the parties and third parties of the nature of the complainant's case. 192 I t i s a l s o w e l l -
established that the identification of the treaty provision in the panel request is the minimum
prerequisite for defining the terms of reference.
 193 Finally, we note that defects in a panel request

188 WT/DS264/2.
189 This table reports the provisions claimed by Canada as being violated in Canada first written
submission, Section IV. Relief Requested, paras. 279(3) and 280, rather than those referred to by the
190 We note that, in its response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(iii), Canada claims that:

"[n]on-compliance by the investigating authority with the obligation contained in Article 2.6
has also caused non-compliance with other substantive obligations of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, e.g., Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4".

191 Ibid.
 192 We note the Appellate Body statement in US – Carbon Steel that:
"… pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU, a panel's terms of reference are governed by the request
for establishment of a panel. Article 6.2 of the DSU sets forth the requirements applicable to
such requests.

The requirements of precision in the request for the establishment of a panel flow from the
two essential purposes of the terms of reference. First, the terms of reference define the scope
of the dispute. Secondly, the terms of reference, and the request for the establishment of a
panel on which they are based, serve the due process objective of notifying the parties and
third parties of the nature of a complainant's case. When faced with an issue relating to the
scope of its terms of reference, a panel must scrutinize carefully the request for establishment
of a panel "to ensure its compliance with both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU".
(Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, paras. 124-127)

193 As the Appellate Body stated in Korea – Dairy:
"[i]dentification of the treaty provisions claimed to have been violated by the respondent is
always necessary both for purposes of defini ng the terms of reference of a panel and for
informing the respondent and the third parties of the claims made by the complainant; such

cannot be "cured" in subsequent submissions to a panel. Thus, a statement in a written submission
can be "consulted in order to confirm the meaning of the words used in the panel request and as part
of the assessment of whether the ability of the resp ondent to defend itself was prejudiced", but not to
"cure" deficiencies in the panel request, or to a dd additional provisions of a treaty allegedly being
violated or to add additional sub-sections of a provision included in the panel request.
194
7.26 Canada does not contest that additional provisions of the AD Agreement have been included
in its first written submission that were not identifie d in its Panel Request with regard to its claim on
the scope of the investigation. However, Canada asserts that these "additional provisions" are cited
only in support of its claims as set out in the Panel Request, and to put the interpretation of the
provisions allegedly being violated in context.
7.27 We also note that, in response to our request to Canada to list the provisions of the AD
Agreement allegedly violated by the United States 195, Canada states, with regard to its claim 196 on the
"like product" and "product under consideration" issue, that:
"[t]his claim is grounded in Article 2.6. (...) Non-compliance by the investigating
authority with the obligation contained in Article 2.6 has also caused non-compliance
with other substantive obligations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, e.g., Articles 5.1,
5.2, and 5.4".197
7.28 From this statement by Canada, it is clear to us that Canada does not request us to make
findings on the additional provisions cited in its fi rst written submission with regard to the claim
under paragraph 2 of its Panel Request.
7.29 The Appellate Body has made it clear that th e minimum requirement that a complainant has
to meet is the identification of the treaty provisions at issue, and that any deficiencies in this regard
cannot be "cured" at a later stage. We note Canada's clarification that the additional provisions of the
AD Agreement identified in its first written submission, in addition to those quoted in its Panel
Request, are not the basis for additional claims, but ar e merely quoted in support of its arguments and
to give context to the interpretation of the Article 2.6. We also note Canada's confirmation that the
legal basis for its claim regard ing the "like product" issue is an alleged violation of " e.g., Articles 5.1,
5.2, and 5.4" of the AD Agreement.

identification is a minimum prerequisite if the legal basis of the complaint is to be presented at
all". (Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para. 124)

194 As the Appellate Body explained in US – Carbon Steel:
"compliance with the requiremen ts of Article 6.2 must be demonstrated on the face of the
request for the establishment of a panel. Def ects in the request for the establishment of a
panel cannot be "cured" in the subsequent submissions of the parties during the panel
proceedings. Nevertheless, in considering the sufficiency of a panel request, submissions and
statements made during th e course of the panel pro ceedings, in particular the First Written
Submission of the complaining party, may be consulted in order to confirm the meaning of the
words used in the panel request and as part of the assessment of whether the ability of the
respondent to defend itself was prejudiced. Moreover, compliance with the requirements of
Article 6.2 must be determined on the merits of each case, having considered the panel request
as a whole, and in the light of attendant circumstances". (footnotes omitted) (Appellate Body

195 Question 1 of the Panel to Canada.
196 WT/DS264/2, Claim under para. 2 of the Panel Request.
197 Canada responses to questions 1 and 85 of the Panel.

7.30 We therefore find that the alleged violation of Articles 2 (with the exception of Article 2.6), 3,
5 (with the exception of Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8), 6.10 and 9 of the AD Agreement do not fall
within the scope of our mandate as set out in the Panel Request.
3. Introduction of Evidence that was not before the Investigating Authority
(a) Factual Background
7.31 Canada claims that the United States has violated Article 2 of the AD Agreement in that DOC
failed to make due allowance for differences that af fect price comparability when comparing prices of
products sold in the United States and prices of produ cts with different physical characteristics sold in
Canada. In support of its claim Canada attached a document, Exhibit CDA-77, purporting to
substantiate its view that the record data show that the relevant physical differences between the
products affect price comparability. Exhibit CDA-77 is a regression analysis of the record data,
produced by Tembec, one of the respondent companies.
7.32 However, Exhibit CDA-77 was not submitted to DOC during the investigation. The record of
the underlying investigation shows that DOC a nnounced the Final Determination in March 2002,
whereas the document now submitted to us as Exhib it CDA-77, appears to have been prepared for
Tembec on 4 October 2002, that is, 6 months after the conclusion of the investigation.
(b) Arguments of the Parties
7.33 The United States asserts that Exhibit CDA-77 did not form part of the record of the
underlying investigation, and therefore does not cons titute "facts made available in conformity with
appropriate domestic procedures to the author ities of the importing Member" as required by
Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement . According to the United States, Exhibit CDA-77 contains a
statistical regression which was created more than six months after the investigation was
completed.
198 The United States asserts that "Exhibit CDA-77 presents newly derived data calculated
and reorganized in a different ma nner than was available to the US investigating authority in the
original investigation".199 As the information contained in Exhibit CDA-77 was not made available to
the investigating authority in conformity with the appropriate domestic procedures during the
investigation, the United States asserts that consider ing it would be inconsistent with Article 17.5(ii).
In addition, the United States contends that, in ask ing us to consider this new evidence, Canada
effectively is requesting the Panel to undertake its own establishment and evaluation of the facts,
contrary to Article 17.6(i). The United States therefore requests us to decline to consider
Exhibit CDA-77.
7.34 Canada responds that, although Exhibit CDA-77, as such, was not on the record when DOC
made its final determination, all of the underlying data used in the regression analysis were on the
record before DOC. 200 Thus, according to Canada, Articles 17.5(ii) and 17.6(i) do not prevent us
from considering Exhibit CDA-77. The purpose of submitting Exhibit CDA-77 was to enable the
Panel to determine whether DOC's establishment of the facts was proper and whether its evaluation of
the facts before it was unbiased and objective, pursua nt to Article 17.6(i). Canada asserts that a
similar issue arose before the EC – Bed Linen panel, which found that, although Article 17.5(ii)
requires a panel to examine the matter based upon the facts made available in conformity with
appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member, it does not require that a
panel consider those facts exclusively in the format in which they were originally available to the
investigating authority.201 Canada also argues that, if the United States had respected its obligation

198 The lumber regression analysis contained in Exhibit CDA-77 is dated 4 October 2002.
200 Canada response to the US preliminary objections, para. 20.
201 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, paras. 6.41-6-43.

under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement "to give all parties notice of the information which the
authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider
relevant in respect of the investigation.."., Exhib it CDA-77 would have been put on the record of the
investigation prior to the Final Determination by DOC.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.35 The issue that we need to decide is whether Exhibit CDA-77 is properly before us as evidence
to substantiate Canada's claim with regard to an Article 2.4 adjustment for physical differences
affecting price comparability, that is, whether E xhibit CDA-77 complies with the requirements of
Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement.
7.36 Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement provides that:
"[t]he DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine
the matter based upon:

 (…)

 (ii) the facts made available in confor mity with appropriate domestic procedures to
the authorities of the importing Member".

7.37 Article 17.5(ii) makes clear that we must exam ine the matter before us based on facts made
available to DOC in accordance with the US do mestic procedures, and that we cannot base our
findings on any other facts not complying with this requirement. Thus, we agree with a previous
panel that we "may not, when examining a claim of violation of the AD Agreement in a particular
determination, consider facts or evidence presented (… ) by a party in an attempt to demonstrate error
in the determination concerning questions that were investigated and decided by the authorities,
unless they had been made available in conformity with the appropriate dom estic procedures to the
authorities of the investigating country during the investigation ".
202 (emphasis added; footnote
omitted) If this were not the case, we find it difficult to envisage how an investigating authority could
be expected to have taken these facts into consideration when making its relevant determinations – the
very reason why facts are submitted to an investigating authority.
7.38 Canada does not dispute that CDA-77 was subm itted to DOC only on 4 October 2002, that is,
more than 6 months after DOC published its Final Determination. It argues, however, that the
underlying data on which Exhibit CDA-77 was based were taken from the database that DOC used in
calculating the dumping margin for Tembec 203, and that it therefore contains no new facts – the facts
of the case are therefore similar to those in EC – Bed Linen. We therefore need to determine whether
Exhibit CDA-77 contains facts that were not befo re DOC and therefore constitutes evidence in its
own right, and whether the relevant finding of the panel in EC – Bed Linen is applicable to the case in
hand.
7.39 It is undisputed that Exhibit CDA-77 contains the results of a regression analysis performed
by a consultant on instruction from Tembec, one of the mandatory respondent Canadian companies.
We note that multiple regression is a statistical me thod for studying the relationship between a single
dependent variable and one or more independent variables.204 The use of regression allows the user to
infer whether there is a positive, inverse (negativ e) or no relationship betw een the explanatory and
dependent variables. The procedure also enables the relationship to be me asured – how will a unit
change in the independent variable affect the value of the depende nt variable. The method involved

202 Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.6.
203 This fact is not contested by the United States.
204 Allison, Paul A., Multiple Regression: A Primer (Pine Forge Press, 1998).

in establishing this relationship is fitting a line thr ough the set of points made by the independent or
explanatory variables. The line is fit by mini mising the squared distance between itself and the
points. This methodology is called the Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) and was used to
produce Exhibit CDA-77. 205 When a regression analysis is done, one has a choice whether it should
involve a single equation or more, whether the model is linear or non-linear. Furthermore, there is a
choice of the explanatory variables to be included in the analysis.
7.40 In our view, a regression analysis involves an an alysis of data which could be done in many
different ways, and the choices made may have a significant impact on the conclusions drawn. A
regression analysis is not mere data which can be take n at face value. Rather, further clarification is
required, and an evaluation must be made of the proba tive value of such an analysis in light of such
factors as the data chosen, the precise methodology used and the variables selected. It is the role of an
investigating authority to perform such an evaluatio n of the evidence placed befo re it, and the role of
a panel to review whether the investigating authorit y's evaluation was proper in light of the standard
of review set forth in Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement. For us to consider a regression analysis
that was not placed before the investigati ng authority would require us to perform a de novo review
rather than to determine whether the investigatin g authority's evaluation of the facts was proper.
Thus, while a regression analysis may be based upon data which are "evidence" before an
investigating authority, we consider that the re sult of a regression analysis using those data is
"evidence" in its own right, distinct from the underlying data on which it is based.
7.41 Canada relies upon the panel report in EC – Bed Linen for the proposition that Article 17.5(ii)
does not preclude a panel from reviewing data which are presented to it in a different format than they
were presented to the investigating authority. 206 We note, however, that th e exhibit at issue in that
dispute was a recapitulative table of the declarations of support for the application received from other
domestic EC producers. The exhibit was therefore a "marshalling" of the already submitted evidence
and not a manipulation thereof. It seems clear to us that that factual situation differs substantially
from the facts of this case: the ev idence at issue was before the investigating authority during the
investigation itself, and the very same information was submitted to the panel in a different format
only – nothing was added to it, nor was anything s ubtracted from it. It was therefore merely a
"mechanical" exercise. The same cannot be said of the evidence in Exhibit CDA-77 – we note that
the memorandum by the consultant who developed the regression analysis explaining how Exhibit
CDA-77 was developed, covers seven pages, explaining the methodologies employed and the
different options used. 207 This, in itself, confirms to us that Exhibit CDA-77 contains more than the
mere data which were already before DOC. We are therefore of the view that Canada's reliance on
EC – Bed Linen is misplaced.

205 Exhibit CDA-129, Memorandum on the Regression Analysis, p. 2.
206 The panel in EC – Bed Linen found that:

"Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement provides that a panel shall consider a dispute under the
AD Agreement 'based upon: … the facts made available in conformity with appropriate
domestic procedures to the authorities of th e importing Member'. It does not require,
however, that a panel consider those facts ex clusively in the format in which they were
originally available to the investigating authority. Indeed, the very purpose of the submissions
of the parties to the Panel is to marshal the relevant facts in an organized and comprehensible
fashion in support of their arguments and to elucidate the parties' positions. Based on our
review of the information ... we conclude that the Exhibit in question does not contain new
evidence. Thus, we conclude that the form of the document, ( i.e., a new document) does not
preclude us from considering its substance, which comprises facts made available to the
investigating authority during the investigation. There is in our view no basis for excluding
the document from consideration in this proceeding, and we th erefore deny India's request".
(emphasis in original) (Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 6.43.)

207 Exhibit CDA-129, Memorandum on Regression Analysis.

7.42 Canada contends that the regression analysis contained in Exhibit CDA-77 could not have
been submitted earlier, as the parties were not put on notice by DOC that it might determine to
exclude dimension of softwood lumber as a factor requiring a price-based Article 2.4 adjustment,
contrary to DOC's recognition, at the preliminary de termination stage, of the need for an adjustment
for dimension.
208 Canada requests us to "bear in mind th e US obligations under Article 6.1 of the AD
Agreement to give all parties notice of the information which the authorities require and ample
opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the
investigation".209 If, however, Canada believed that the United States improperly limited the evidence
that was placed in the record of the underlying investigation on this issue, the proper course of action
would have been to assert a claim in that regard. Canada did not, however, advance any such claim in
its Panel Request. As there is no such claim under Ar ticle 6.1 within our term s of reference, we will
not further consider Article 6.1.
7.43 We therefore find that the evidence submitted to us as Exhibit CDA-77 represents facts which
were not made available in conformity with appropr iate domestic procedures to the authorities of the
importing Member in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement, and we
will not take it into consideration.
D. C
LAIM 1: ARTICLE 5.2 – APPLICATION DID NOT C ONTAIN INFORMATION "REASONABLY
AVAILABLE TO THE APPLICANT"
(a) Factual Background
7.44 DOC received an application for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation concerning
certain softwood lumber products from Canada. Th e application contained certain information on
prices at which the product in question was sold when destined for consumption in Canada, on the
constructed value of the product, as well as on export prices of softwood lumber exported from
Canada to the United States. The application w as examined by DOC and in the process a deficiency
letter was sent to the applicant with the request to submit additional data a nd provide clarifications
with respect to certain matters. The applicant r esponded to the request by submitting additional data
and clarifications.
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.45 Canada asserts that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement requires that an application for initiation
of an anti-dumping investigation contain such info rmation on prices "as is reasonably available to the
applicant". Canada asserts that the applicant misrepresented to DOC that it: (1) did not have access to
Canadian producer transaction prices for softwood lumber sales in Canada; (2) had only limited
information on prices at which Canadian softwood lumber was exported to the United States and
(3) did not have access to detailed Canadian prod ucer costs of production. Specifically, Canada
asserts that, because Weldwood is a wholly-owned s ubsidiary of an Executive Committee member of
the Coalition, sales price and cost data of a major Ca nadian exporter were "reasonably available to the
applicant". Canada further alleges that the record subsequently established that four members of the
Coalition had in fact imported softwood lumber from Canada. There was therefore no justification for
failing to include the pricing and cost data on actua l sales of softwood lumber in Canada and to the
United States, and no need for the applicant to constr uct prices or costs of Canadian softwood lumber
sales to support the application. Because the applica tion did not include all the information that was
reasonably available to the applicant, it failed to me et the requirements of Article 5.2. Canada also
argues that DOC's failure to seek further information (i.e., actual price and cost data), including its
blind acceptance of the applicant's claim that it did not have such information, although aware of the
relationship between Weldwood and IP, did not co mply with the obligation under Article 5.2 to

208 Canada response to the US preliminary objections, para. 21.
209 Id., para. 22.

ensure that the application contains information wh ich is "reasonably available" to the applicant.
According to Canada, an unbiased and objective inv estigating authority woul d not have concluded
that the applicant had submitted information that was "reasonably available" to it.
7.46 The United States argues that the information submitted by the applicant was sufficient to
support a decision to initiate an investigation and that the Weldwood cost and price data to which
Canada refers could not have detracted from the sufficiency of the evidence in the application.
According to the United States, Article 5.2 does not require that an applicant submit certain
information which is reasonably available to it in th e application if the information submitted as part
of the application is sufficient to support initiation of an investigation. The United States also asserts
that the information on prices which the applicant di d submit was more representative of the prices of
the Canadian exporters of softwood lumber produc ts than that of only one Canadian producer,
Weldwood, would have been, had it been submitted, or required to be submitted.
7.47 As a third party, the EC argues, firstly, that Article 5.2 does not contain an obligation for the
applicant to submit to the investigating authority any information reasonably available, but only to the
extent that it falls under one of the elements identifie d under the paragraphs (i) to (iv) of Article 5.2,
and secondly, that Article 5.2 imposes an obligation only on the applicant, but not on the investigating
authority.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.48 The issue before us is whether the application for the initiation of the investigation underlying
this dispute is consistent with Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. It seems to us that the relevant threshold
issue is whether an application that contains information on all the specific items specified in Article 5.2
may nevertheless be inconsistent with Article 5.2 because additional info rmation regarding those
specific items and which was reasonably available to the applicant was not included in the application.
Once we have resolved this question, we will review the information in the application with a view to
determining whether it included the required information.
7.49 As a starting point, we note that Article 5.1 of the AD Agreement provides that:
"[e]xcept as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence,
degree and effect of any al leged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application
by or on behalf of the domestic industry".

7.50 The application is therefore normally the starting-point in the process, activated by the domestic
industry of the importing country, for examining whether "an investigation to determine the existence,
degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated" by the investigating authority.
7.51 We next examine the requirements, established by Article 5.2, with which an Article 5.1
written application to initiate an investigation must comply. Bearing in mind the rules of treaty
interpretation referred to in section B.1, supra, we start our analysis with the text of Article 5.2,
looking at the ordinary meaning of the provision. Article 5.2 reads in relevant part as follows:
"[a]n application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury
within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and
(c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple
assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant eviden ce, cannot be considered sufficient to
meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such
information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following:
 (i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the
domestic production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written

application is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall
identify the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all
known domestic producers of the like pr oduct (or associations of domestic
producers of the like product) and, to the extent possible, a description of the
volume and value of domestic production of the like product accounted for by
such producers;
 (ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the
country or countries of origin or expo rt in question, the identity of each
known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the
product in question;
 (iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined
for consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin
or export (or, where appropriate, info rmation on the prices at which the
product is sold from the country or countries of origin or export to a third
country or countries, or on the cons tructed value of the product) and
information on export prices or, where appropriate, on the prices at which the
product is first resold to an independent buyer in the territory of the importing
Member;
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports,
the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market
and the consequent impact of the im ports on the domestic industry, as
demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of
the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3".
7.52 From the wording of the chapeau of Article 5.2, it is clear that "an application … shall
include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury … and (c) a causal link between the dumped imports and
the alleged injury". (emphasis added) The ma ndatory requirement that evidence of dumping be
included in the application is therefore quite clear. Furthermore, it is also clear that a simple assertion
of dumping which is not substantiate d by relevant evidence, "cannot be considered sufficient to meet
the requirements of this paragraph". Article 5.2 fu rther provides that "[t]he application shall contain
such information as is reasonably available to the applicant" on the matters set out in sub-
paragraphs (i)-(iv).
7.53 Canada initially asserted that the applicant did not submit "all of the information that was
reasonably available to it" with respect to cost and price evidence.
210,211 "The Petition, therefore, did not
contain "such information as [was] reasonably available to the applicant" concerning prices at which
Canadian softwood lumber was being sold in the US and Canadian markets".
212 From these statements,
we infer that Canada initially argued that an application should contain all information which is
reasonably available to the applicant. 213 However, from its subseq uent submissions we do not
understand Canada to further pursue the argument that the word "such" in "such information as is
reasonably available to the applicant" means "all" or "any" information as is reasonably available to the
applicant.
214 Nevertheless, for the sake of certainty, we set out below the reasons why we do not believe

211 We do not understand Canada to dispute that the application contained information referred to in sub-
paragraphs (i) to (iv) of Article 5.2. Canada contes ts the adequacy and accuracy of some of the information
contained in the application. This issue is addressed under Claim 2, infra.
212 Canada first written submission, para. 97. In the same vein, WT/DS264/2, para. 1(a).
213 Similar understanding is expressed by the United States and the EC. ( See US second written
submission, para. 8 and EC third party submission, paras. 7-8)
214 Canada second written submission, paras. 18-25.

that Article 5.2 requires an applicant to submit "all" information on the matters identified in Article 5.2
as is reasonably available to it.
7.54 We note that the words "such information as is reasonably available to the applicant", indicate
that, if information on certain of the matters listed in sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) is not reasonably
available to the applicant in any given case, then the applicant is not obligated to include it in the
application. It seems to us that the "reasonably available" language was intended to avoid putting an
undue burden on the applicant to submit information which is not reasonably available to it. It is not, in
our view, intended to requir e an applicant to submit all information that is reasonably available to it.
Looking at the purpose of the application, we are of the view that an application need only include such
reasonably available information on the relevant matters as the applicant deems necessary to substantiate
its allegations of dumping, injury and causality. As the purpose of the application is to provide an
evidentiary basis for the initiation of the investigat ive process, it would seem to us unnecessary to
require an applicant to submit all information reasonably available to it to substantiate its allegations.215
This is particularly true where such information might be redundan t or less reliable than, information
contained in the application. Of course, this does not mean that such inform ation will necessarily be
sufficient to justify initiation under Article 5.3 – that is a separate question, not encompassed by the
issue before us here, but which is the subject of our examination in paragraphs 7.71-7.127, infra.
7.55 We therefore disagree with Canada's initial view that the inclusion of the term "reasonably
available" places an additional requirement on an applicant. In light of our analysis above, it is clear that
Article 5.2 requires that an application contain relevant evidence of dumping, injury and causation and
that it sets forth a list of the types of information it must contain. We believe that the words "reasonably
available" mean that the specified information must be submitted to the extent reasonably available to
the applicant. It is therefore a modulation of the requirement to provide such information in light of its
availability, so as to make the application compliant with Article 5.2 even if it does not include all the
specified information if such information was simply not reasonably available to the applicant.
7.56 Canada's interpretation would require us to co nclude that the "reasonably available" language
serves to toughen the obligation, to such an extent that, even if all specified information is provided, the
application would not meet the requirements of Article 5.2 if all relevant information that is "reasonably
available" is not provided in the application. If this is what the drafters had intended, they could have
included "shall contain all such information as is reasonably available", rather than "such information".
We are of the view that the drafters had good reasons why they did not include the word "all" in the text
as it would mean that an investigating authority would have to review even the best-documented
application to make sure some additional information could not have been provided. In this very case,
with Canada stating that the applicant companies do regular business with Canadian companies which
results in thousands of transactions 216, it would have meant that the applicant had to submit
information and documents covering all these transacti ons. Furthermore, the investigating authority
would then be required to review the information covering all these transactions for purposes of the
initiation of an investigation, and furthermore, to ascertain whether all transactions were covered by
this process. In our view, such a requirement would render the provision totally unworkable.
7.57 Considering the requirements of Article 5.2, we are of the view that we have to establish, when
considering the specific facts of this case, whether the application contained information on the matters
specified in Article 5.2, in partic ular as required by sub-paragraph (iii) thereof, and not whether it
contained all such information as is reasonably available to the applicant.

215 If the requirement were to be that all informati on reasonably available to the applicant must be
submitted in the application, it could lead to absurd results in that the applicant might be required to submit a
large volume of information for purposes of the initiation of the investigation.
216 Canada first oral (opening) statement, para. 17.

7.58 We note that Article 5.2(iii) requires in this case that the application should contain
information on prices at which softwood lumber is sold when destined for consumption in Canada –
or, where appropriate, information on the construc ted value of softwood lumber in Canada – and
information on export prices to the United States.
7.59 We therefore now turn to the specific facts of this case to determine whether the required
information was contained in the application. On 2 April 2001, DOC received an application
containing the following information:
217
• Information on prices in the Canadian market:
- Average MBF prices 218 for WSPF sold in BC during the last three quarters of 2000;219
- MBF prices, as published in Random Lengths, a reputable industry publication, for
the year immediately preceding the application for ESPF kiln dried, 2"x4" by
thickness and width, in various lengths, delivered to Toronto.220
• Information on export prices based on Random Lengths data on multiple sales of WSPF for
delivery to the United States:221
- An overall average of weekly prices re ported throughout the period of 1 April 2000
through 31 March 2001, for a softwood lumber product: kiln-dried WSPF 2x4s
"standard and better" in random lengths de livered to two major markets, Chicago and
Atlanta, respectively;
- An average transaction price for kiln-dried WSPF 2x4 "standard and better" in
random lengths delivered to Chicago during the week ending 19 January 2001;
222
- A price quotation affidavit from a knowledgeable industry source testifying on an
offer from a US trading company for Cana dian WSPF kiln-dried random length 2x4s
from BC for sale in March 2001, at a delivered price to a specified destination in the
US market.223 The affidavit contained information on the historical mark-up received
by lumber wholesalers (5 per cent), and on the likely means of shipment;224
- A "lost sales" affidavit from a US lumber producer, reporting four separate instances
in which the affiant lost sales on 15 Decemb er 2000, to potential customers in the

217 Exhibit CDA-9, Initiation, p. 21328.
218 "MBF prices" are prices per thousand board feet. A "board foot" is a three dimensional unit
described as the quantity of lumber contained in a piece of lumber 1 inch thick, twelve inches wide, and 1 foot
long, or the equivalent in other dimensions. (Exhibit CDA-37, Application, p. III-9.)
219 Exhibit CDA-10, Initiation Checklist, p. 7. Inform ation sourced from the BC Ministry of Forest's
published market pricing system lumber values.
220 Id., pp. 7-8.
221 Exhibit CDA-10, Initiation Checklist, pp. 6-7.
222 Ibid., and CDA-41, Application – Fr eight Affidavit. The appli cant originally based the WSPF
freight adjustment on the same freight expense they had used for the much shorter distance between Quebec and
Boston for the ESPF adjustment. In the application amendments of 10 April 2001, the applicant submitted
another, allegedly "more accurate, but still very conserva tive", rate for freight between BC and US destinations
(Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments). The rate is regarded as "conservative" because it is calculated
based on a shorter distance than distances from any BC point of origin to the markets to which the WSPF
products were delivered.
223 Exhibit CDA-10, Initiation Checklist, pp. 7-8, and Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments.
224 In calculating that ex-f actory price, the applicant made an ad justment by backing out the freight
between less-distant locations, resulting in removing less than the actual freight charge would likely have been.

United States (the buyers) because those bu yers reported that "Quebec producers"
offered the same product at a price which was lower than the affiant's offering price.
The terms were the same for both the Canadian and the US product;225
- Random Lengths data on export prices on multiple sales of ESPF during the period
April 2000 to March 2001 for delivery to two different US localities:226
(i) A POI average of weekly reported prices for kiln-dried ESPF 2x4s in random
lengths delivered to Boston and the Great Lakes region, respectively;
(ii) A POI average of weekly reported prices for kiln-dried ESPF 2x4 8-foot
studs delivered to Boston and the Great Lakes region, respectively;
(iii) An average transaction price fo r kiln-dried ESPF 2x4 8-foot PET studs
delivered to Boston during the week of 19 January 2001.227
• Information on the constructed value of the product:
- Provincial stumpage charges in BC and Quebec in 2000; 228
- Data on harvesting costs in BC from a 1999 independent study by a consultant of BC
sawmills;229
- Data on harvesting costs for Quebec during the last quarter of 2000, from a market
research report;230
- Data on direct labour costs for BC and Quebec, from surveys of sawmills by the BC
government and Canadian Federal government, respectively;231
- Data on electricity costs from a Canadian Federal Government survey of electrical
suppliers;232
- Data on per-unit financial expenses from the public 2000 financial statements for
Canadian lumber producer Tembec;233
- Press-clippings from daily newspapers in various Canadian cities describing
widespread below-cost sales of softwood lumber in Canada;234
- An amount for profit was substantiated by the public financial statements of Tembec,
a major Canadian producer – the same fina ncial statements used when calculating the
cost of production.235

225 Exhibit CDA-10, Initiation Checklist, pp. 7-8.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Exhibit US-4, Application – Exhibit VI.C-2; and Exhibit US-59, Application – Exhibit VI.D-2.
229 Exhibit US-5, Application – Exhibit VI.D-4; and Exhibit US-6, Application – Exhibit VI.D-5.
230 Exhibit US-7, Application – Exhibit VI.C-4.
231 Exhibit US-8, Application – Exhibit VI.C-5; and Exhibit US-9, Application – Exhibit VI.D-6.
232 Exhibit US-10, Application – Exhibit VI.C-6; and Exhibit US-11, Application – Exhibit VI.D-7.
233 Exhibit US-12, Application – Exhibit VI.B-1; Exhibit US-13, Application – Exhibit VI.B-2; and
Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments (revised Tembec financial calculations from Exhibit VI.B).
234 Exhibit CDA-37, Application – Volume III; Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments; and
Exhibit US-14, Application – Exhibit III-14.

7.60 Based on this information the applicant calcu lated estimated margins of dumping, ranging
from 22.5 per cent to 72.9 per cent.
236
7.61 We consider it evident from the above enumerati on that the application in this investigation
contained information on prices at which softwood lumb er is sold when destined for consumption in
Canada, on the constructed valu e of softwood lumber in Canada, and on export prices to the
United States. In light of our conclusions regardi ng the requirements of Article 5.2, we therefore find
that the application contained the information require d by Article 5.2(iii). Accordingly, we conclude
that Canada has failed to establish that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 5.2.237
E. CLAIM 2: ARTICLE 5.3 – ALLEGEDLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY INITIATION OF AN
INVESTIGATION
(a) Factual Background
7.62 DOC received an application requesting it to initiate an anti-dumping investigation
concerning allegedly dumped imports of softwood lumber from Canada. The application contained
certain information on prices at which the prod uct in question was sold when destined for
consumption in Canada, on the c onstructed value of the product, as well as on export prices of
softwood lumber products exported from Canada to the United States. The application did not
contain any price or cost information from Weld wood, a significant Canadian producer and exporter
to the US which is wholly owned by IP, one of the applicant companies, nor did it contain any export
price information on any imports of the subject pr oduct by other applicant companies from Canadian
exporters. The application was examined by DOC and in the process a deficiency letter was sent to
the applicant with the request to submit additional data and provide clarifications with respect to
certain matters. The applicant responded to the request by submitting additional data and
clarifications. DOC subsequently prepared a doc ument in which it explained its analysis of the
application and the basis for its decision to initiate the investigation.
(b) Arguments by the Parties/Third Parties
7.63 Canada claims that DOC did not properly examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
information provided in the application and did not properly determine, based on the facts before it,
that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation, in violation of
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
7.64 Canada asserts that an unbiased and objective i nvestigating authority would have known that
certain highly pertinent transaction-specific informat ion reasonably available to one of the applicant
companies (IP) through its wholly-owned Canadian company, Weldwood, was not submitted, as the
application contained a Canadian newspaper artic le referring to the relationship between the two
companies.
238 Canada also asserts that, given the magnitude of the cross-border trade in lumber and
the well-recognised fact of cross-border ownershi p, DOC ought to have concluded on further
examination of the application that the eviden ce on dumping was inadequate, as the applicant
companies had access to more price and cost information. Furthermore, Canada posits that, at least
four members of the Executive Committee of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, one of the
applicants, purchased and imported softwood lumber products from three of the mandatory Canadian
respondents during the period of the investiga tion and therefore had access to export prices.
239 It was

235 Exhibit US-12, Application – Exhibit VI.B-1; Exhibit US-13, Application – Exhibit VI.B-2; and
Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments.
236 Exhibit CDA-37, Application – Volume III.
237 In light of our findings, we need not and do not address the question, raised by the EC, as to whether
Article 5.2 imposes an obligation on the Member or on the applicant itself.
238 Confirmed by the United States in its response to question 12 of the Panel, para. 12.
239 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, para. 17 and Canada second written submission, note 7.

therefore clear that the applicant had actual transactio n prices and cost data reasonably available to it
that were not provided to DOC in its application, a fact that DOC should have been aware of when it
examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether
there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation.
7.65 According to Canada, price and cost informa tion were required to justify initiation under
Article 5.3. Finding support for its position in the Guatemala – Cement I and Guatemala – Cement II
panels, Canada is of the view that an investigati ng authority must have regard to the manner in which
the applicant justifies its allegation of dumping in order to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence of dumping to justify initiation. 240 That is, Canada asserts that, as Article 2.2 permits a
dumping margin to be based on a constructed value comparison (as was done in the investigation at
issue) only where there are no sales of the like produc t in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic
market of the exporting country, and as Article 2.2. 1 sets out how the cost calculation is to be done,
DOC was required to assess whether the evidence provi ded by the applicant on each of the relevant
elements – home market prices, export prices and costs – was adequate, accurate and sufficient, to
justify initiation under Article 5.3.241
7.66 Canada states that using the applicant's Random Lengths price data for Quebec, a comparison
of all of the Quebec ex-factory price data for ESPF (2X4, Studs&Btr, KD, RL and 2X4-8', PET, KD)
products sold in Quebec and in the United States, s hows that the US price was consistently higher
during the period and that there was therefore no price-to-price dumping demonstrated by the
evidence in the application.
242 There was, therefore, no basis upon which to initiate the investigation
without adequate and accurate cost data. 243 Canada also challenges the accuracy and adequacy of
certain information submitted by the applicant as evidence to substantiate the allegation of dumping.
7.67 According to the United States, the information actually included in the application provided
sufficient evidence to fo rm the basis for initiation of the investigation 244, and the Weldwood data –
that Canada alleges were reasonably available to the applicant – could not have negated the
sufficiency of the data included in the application.245
7.68 The United States asserts that the Weldwood data would have represented only the experience
of a single company and would not have represented the diverse cost and price experience actually set
forth in the application. The Weldwood data may or may not have constituted evidence of dumping.
Whichever conclusion the data supported, they could not have changed the fact that other information
in the application constituted evidence of dumping. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the
Weldwood data were of a better quality than the data contained in the application, this has no bearing
on the question before the Panel – Article 5.3 does not speak to the quality of the data that form the
basis for initiation other than requiring that they be accurate and adequate and there be sufficient
evidence to justify initiation. According to the United States, the data submitted by the applicant were
sufficient for purposes of initiating an investigation.
7.69 According to the United States, DOC examin ed the application closely for purposes of
evaluating the accuracy and adequacy of the informa tion submitted to it, compared the application's
assertions to the evidence submitted in support of tho se assertions, and analyzed the application step-
by-step to ascertain whether there was sufficient evid ence to initiate an investigation. As a result of
this process, DOC required the applicant to prov ide additional data and clarifications. DOC

240 Canada second written submission, paras. 30-32.
241 Id., paras. 34-35.
242 Id., para. 37 and Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, para. 33 and note 32 thereto. In the
footnote, Canada compares the prices to substantiate its point.
243 Id, para. 38.
244 US first written submission, paras. 52-62, and US response to question 13 of the Panel, para. 14.
245 US first written submission, paras. 65-69, and US response to question 16 of the Panel, paras. 25-30.

summarized its analysis of the application in a nineteen-page analysis memorandum after having
conducted its own independent anal ysis, which included adjustments to the applicant's margin of
dumping calculations. DOC satisfied itself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence of
dumping submitted to it and found that the info rmation submitted was sufficient to support the
decision to initiate the investigation.
7.70 As a third party to this dispute, the EC submits that Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement obliges
an investigating authority to determine whether the initiation of an investigatio n would be justified in
view of the objectively available evidence. This obligation not only encompasses an examination of
the application and whether it fulfils for instance the requirements under Articles 5.2 or 5.3 of the AD
Agreement, but may also require the investigating aut hority to take further steps to assemble the
necessary evidence before initiating an investigation. The EC therefore agrees with the Panel in
Argentina – Poultry that it is not merely the accuracy and the adequacy of the evidence per se which
is the legal standard under Article 5.3, but the sufficiency of that evidence.
246 The EC also agrees
with the panel in Guatemala – Cement I that the existence of "sufficient evidence" in a particular case
has to be adjudicated in the light of the st andard set forth in Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement and
that the quantum and quality of evidence required at th e time of initiation is less than that required for
a preliminary, or final, determination of dumping, injury, and causation, made after investigation.247
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.71 The issue which we need to address under this claim is whether DOC acted consistently with
the requirements of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement when it decided that there was sufficient
evidence to initiate the investigation. In other words, could an unbiased an d objective investigating
authority have concluded that the application contained accurate and adequate evidence sufficient to
justify the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation?248 We need, therefore, to address the nature of
the obligation contained in Article 5.3 before we consider the facts of the case in light of these
obligations to determine whether Article 5.3 has been violated by the United States.
7.72 We start our analysis by looking at the text of Article 5.3, which provides as follows:
"[t]he authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided
in the application to determine whether th ere is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation".
7.73 As Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement deals with the information required to be submitted as
evidence to substantiate the allegation of dumping, and in light of our finding that the United States
did not violate the provisions of Ar ticle 5.2, we need to address the c ontext of Article 5.3, as well as
the relationship between Article 5.2 and Article 5.3.
7.74 We note that a number of panels have addressed the different obligations contained in and the
functions of Article 5.2 and Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Article 5.2 provides that the written
application shall contain certain evidence of dumpi ng, injury and causality in the form of specified
information to be submitted to the extent such evid ence is reasonably available to the applicant. At
this stage, the only requirement is that information described in the sub-paragraphs of Article 5.2 has
been included in the application. This does not mean that the investigation can be initiated on the
basis of compliance with Article 5.2 only, as Article 5. 3 makes it clear that a further step is required,
that is, that the investigating authority has to examine the accur acy and adequacy of the evidence

247 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement I, para. 7.57; confirmed in Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup,
paras. 7.94, et seq.
248 There is no assertion in this case that DOC obtained any information independently; thus, its
decision to initiate was based solely on the information in the application.

provided in the application to determine whether ther e is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of
the investigation. It is therefore clear that, an application might satisfy the requirements of
Article 5.2, but not necessarily those of Article 5.3 as the evid ence contained in the application might
be judged by the investigating authority not to be sufficient to form the basis for initiating the
investigation. Although we recognize that, because the Appellate Body reversed the panel's
conclusions in Guatemala – Cement I on the issue of whether the dispute was properly before it, that
panel's conclusions in this regard have no legal status, we find its statements on this issue instructive
and we agree with it when it states that:
"… the fact that the applicant has provided, in the application, all the information that
is "reasonably available" to it on the factors set forth in Article 5.2(i) - (iv) is not
determinative of whether there is sufficien t evidence to justify initiation. Rather,
Article 5.3 establishes an obligation that extends beyond a determination that the
requirements of Article 5.2 are satisfied"
249,
and:
"Article 5.3 is a requirement imposed on the investigating authority: once it has
accepted the application, that is, determined that it contains evidence on dumping,
injury, and causal link, as well as "such info rmation as is reasonably available to the
applicant" on the factors set forth in Article 5.2 (i) - (iv), the investigating authority
must undertake a further examination of the evidence and information in the
application. If the investigating authority were to determine that the evidence and
information in the application was not accura te, or that it was not adequate to support
a conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of an investigation,
the investigating authority would be precluded from initiating an investigation. Thus,
the decision to initiate is made by refe rence to the objective sufficiency of the
evidence in the application, and not by reference to whether the evidence and
information provided in the application is all that is reasonably available to the
applicant."
250
7.75 Although the information contained in the application therefore forms the basis for the
determination of sufficiency of the evidence for pu rposes of the initiation of the investigation, an
investigating authority is not precluded from gathering information itself to ensure that it is satisfied
that it has sufficient evidence before it, although it is not obliged to do so.251
7.76 In this case, we have found that the requirement s of Article 5.2 have been satisfied, as set
forth in paragraph 7.61, supra. The next question we therefore ha ve to address is whether DOC was
entitled to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation. We
note that DOC did not gather information on its own, in addition to the information in the application
as submitted to it, but that it based its decision to initiate the investigation on the information in the
application, as supplemented by additional informat ion and clarifications submitted by the applicant
as requested by DOC.
7.77 Before addressing the issue of what constitutes sufficient evidence, we first need to address
the question of "sufficient evidence" of what? In this regard, we find the first part of Article 5.3
instructive, where it states that "[t]he authoriti es shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application", as well as the chapeau of Article 5.2 which states that "[a]n
application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury ... and (c) a causal link
between the dumped imports and the alleged injury". We are therefore of the view that, although

249 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement I, para. 7.49.
250 Id., para. 7.50. (emphasis in original omitted)
251 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, para. 8.62.

Article 5.3 contains no express reference to evid ence of dumping, evidence on the three elements
necessary for the imposition of an anti-dumping measur e may be inferred into Article 5.3 by way of
Article 5.2. Article 5.2 makes it clear that the application has to contain evidence on dumping, injury
and causation, while Article 5.3 requires the investig ating authority to satisfy itself as to the accuracy
and adequacy of the evidence to determine that is sufficient to justify the initiation of the
investigation. Reading Article 5.3, in the context of Article 5.2, the evidence mentioned in Article 5.3
can only mean evidence of dumping, injury and causation.
7.78 What constitutes sufficient evidence to justify th e initiation of an anti-dumping investigation,
is not defined in the AD Agreement. However, in addressing this issue, we consider it appropriate to
follow the approach taken by previous panels whic h have examined claims under Article 5.3 of the
AD Agreement in that we will determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority
would have found that the application contained suffi cient information to justify the initiation of the
investigation.
252
7.79 Having regard to our standard of review, we shall therefore examine whether an objective and
unbiased investigating authority, looking at the fact s before DOC at the time of the initiation of the
investigation, could properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify
the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. In making this determination, Article 5.3 requires an
investigating authority to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application.
Clearly, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence is relevant to the investigating authority's
determination whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
However, it is not merely the fact of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence per se which is the
legal standard under Article 5.3, but the sufficiency of that evidence.253 In analysing the sufficiency of
evidence, we agree with previous panels that statements and assertions unsubstantiated by any
evidence do not constitute sufficient evidence within the meaning of Article 5.3.254
7.80 We note that, although Article 5.2 does not defi ne the term "dumping", Article 2 provides
guidance regarding the meaning of that term for the purpose of the AD Agreement. We agree with the
findings of the Guatemala – Cement II panel on this issue 255, which were also followed by the panel
in Argentina – Poultry, that, in order to determine whether ther e is sufficient evidence of dumping, an
investigating authority cannot entirely disregard the elements that configure the existence of that
practice as outlined in Article 2.256 This does not, of course, mean that an investigating authority must
perform a full-blown determination of dumping in order to initiate an investigation. Rather, it means
simply that an investigating authority should take into account the general parameters as to what
dumping is when inquiring about the sufficiency of the evidence. The re quirement is that the
evidence must be such that an unbiased and objectiv e investigating authority could determine that
there was sufficient evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 to justify initiation of an
investigation. We will therefore follow the same appr oach in our analysis of Canada's claims. With
these considerations in mind, we now turn to the examination of Canada's claim.
7.81 According to Canada, cost and price informa tion were required to justify initiation of the
investigation under Article 5.3. Canada is basi ng this assertion on the c ontextual relevance of
Article 2 of the AD Agreement to an interpretation of Article 5.3, as discussed in paragraph 7.80,
supra. An investigating authority must therefore have regard to the basis of the allegation of dumping
in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation. As the

252 Panel Reports, Mexico – Corn Syrup, paras. 7.91-7.110; Guatemala – Cement II , paras. 8.29-8.58;
and Argentina – Poultry, paras. 7.60-7.89.
254 Panel Reports, Guatemala – Cement II, paras. 8.51-8.53; and Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.60.
255 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, para. 8.35.

applicant in this case alleged that sales in Canada were made below cost, they submitted information
regarding constructed (normal) value in support of its allegation that dumping existed.
7.82 According to Canada, Article 2, and specifically Article 2.2, permits a dumping margin to be
calculated based on a constructed (normal) value wh ere there are no sales of the like product in the
ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country. In order to disregard home
market sales, Article 2.2.1 requires that there be an analysis of costs and a determination that the
home market sales "are at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable
period of time". These provisions provide context fo r the sufficiency determination under Article 5.3
in this case. Therefore, Canada argues, DOC was required to assess whether the evidence provided by
the applicant on each of the relevant elements – hom e market prices, export prices and costs – were
adequate, accurate and therefore sufficient, to justify initiation under Article 5.3. In Canada's view, an
objective investigating authority could not have determined that the evidence on each of the necessary
elements provided by the applicant was sufficient to justify initiation.
7.83 Although we agree that Article 2 provides context for the interpretation of Article 5.3, we are
of the view that a clear distinction should be ma de between the determination of a margin of dumping
according to the requirements of Article 2.2 for purposes of a preliminary or a final determination,
and the evaluation of evidence of dumping for purpo ses of determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiation of an investigation. We note that several panels have noted the
difference between evidence required to initiate an anti-dumping investigation and evidence required
to make an affirmative determination of dumping. For example, in Guatemala – Cement II, the panel
stated:
"[w]e do not mean to suggest that an investigating authority must have before it at the
time it initiates an investigation evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2
of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final
determination. An anti-dumping investiga tion is a process where certainty on the
existence of all the elements necessary in order to adopt a measure is reached
gradually as the investigation moves forward".257

7.84 We agree with the above position taken by panels on this issue, namely that the quantity and
quality of the evidence required to meet the threshold of sufficiency of the evidence is of a different
standard for purposes of initiation of an investigation compared to that required for a preliminary or
final determination of dumping.
7.85 In applying these considerations to the case before us, the issue we need to address is
therefore whether an unbiased and objective investig ating authority, could have come to the same
conclusion as DOC did, after examining the evidence on which DOC relied for purposes of
determining the sufficiency of the evidence before it in terms of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
7.86 We will first examine the issue regarding the Weldwood data. We reca ll that Canada argues
that the price and cost data of Weldwood, which were reasonably available to the applicant company
"IP", should have been su bmitted in the application.
258 Canada implies that the Weldwood data were
of a superior quality to that which were contai ned in the application and on which DOC based its
decision to initiate the investigation. The positio n of the United States is that the information
contained in the application was examined by DOC and found to be sufficient to justify the initiation

257 Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II , para. 8.35. See also Panel Reports, Argentina – Poultry ,
para. 7.67 (finding evidence that sales in a major market of exporting country, though not the entire country,
was sufficient for initiation); and Guatemala – Cement I , para. 7.64 (evidence at initiation need not be of same
quantity or quality as would be necessary to support preliminary or final determination).
258 The United States did not argue that the Weldwo od data was not reasonably available to the
applicant.

of the investigation. According to the United St ates, the Weldwood data related only to one specific
company and could therefore not detract from the more representative data which were actually
submitted and which formed the basis for the DOC' s decision regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify initiation of the investigation.
7.87 We recall our finding above that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement requires that the application
shall contain such information which is reasonably av ailable to the applicant to substantiate its claim
of, inter alia , alleged dumping, meaning that the application need not contain all information
reasonably available to the applicant, but only information to support a prima facie case. We further
note that Article 5.3 requires that the investig ating authority "shall examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of the investigation". From the wording of Article 5.3, it is clear that the
requirement is that there should be sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation. The
requirement is therefore not to examine whether more probative evidence is reasonably available to
the investigating authority, but whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have
found that the evidence before it is sufficient to justify initiation of the investigation.
7.88 The application contained certain cost data which were constructed on the basis of part
Canadian data and part US data and in formation, and price data sourced from Random Lengths, a
reputable industry publication. Canada posits that actual Canadian cost data and price information
were available through Weldwood. We note that th e Weldwood data would ha ve related to only one
company, whereas the Random Lengths price information covered a large number of transactions by
different sellers and could therefore be regarded as more representative. As the Weldwood data were
not examined by the DOC, it is not known whether it would have shown dumping or not. Even if it is
assumed that it would have shown no dumping, we are of the view that, in principle, it could not have
detracted from the sufficiency of the data actually submitted in the application and the decision of
DOC to base its initiation decision on that evidence. Ho wever, if the data in the application had been
shown to suffer from inadequacy and inaccuracy to such an extent that an unbiased and objective
investigating authority could not have found that the application in this case contained sufficient
evidence to justify its decision to initiate the inv estigation, the Weldwood da ta would have become
relevant.
7.89 Canada claims that, in a number of instances, the price and cost information which was
submitted to DOC, and on which it relied to dete rmine whether the eviden ce was sufficient, was
challengeable to such an extent that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not have
found that the evidence before it was sufficient to ju stify the initiation of the investigation and that
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement was therefore violated by the United States.
7.90 Although we are mindful when examining Canada's assertions regarding the sufficiency of
the evidence on which DOC based its decision to initiate an investigation, that we are not to do a de
novo review of the facts, we are of the view that, co nsidering Canada's challenge of various aspects of
the cost and price evidence, we need to examine the specific facts of this case in some detail in order
to determine whether an unbiased and objective inv estigating authority could have come to the same
conclusion that DOC did.
7.91 According to Canada, the cost evidence in th e application was flawed in a number of ways
which rendered it insufficient to support the decision to initiate the investigation:
(i) Efficiencies of scale of Canadi an sawmills in cost calculation
7.92 The applicant did not provide actual cost data for significant or representative Canadian
producers, but based the allegations regarding the cost of BC and Quebec producers on four US mills'
costs as surrogates. Canada asserts that reliance on the data regarding these four mills was justified

by "nothing more than unsubstantiated assertions about the appropriateness of the mills chosen". 259
DOC accepted the cost data on the basis on the applic ant's assertions. Canada asserts that these mills
were not representative of Canadian mills based on size, as the US companies chosen as surrogates for
Quebec costs were less than one-ten th the size of any of the six largest Canadian companies and
smaller than over 75 per cent of all Canadian comp anies that export to the United States. The US
mills therefore could not have had the efficiencies of scale of the Canadian companies, and the
applicant's cost model therefore overestimated the costs which resulted in an inflated constructed
(normal) value calculation.
7.93 The United States responded that, with respect to the majority of the costs, data from US mills
were used only to provide production factors, which we re then valued using cost data of a Canadian
producer. Canada does not dispute that these cost data were representative of Canadian costs of
production. However, with regard to certain cost fa ctors, US data were used as the basis, and then
adjusted to reflect Canadian costs. According to the United States, the US mills whose information
was used as surrogates in this calculation were th emselves significant and representative producers of
softwood lumber in the United States, two in a lu mbering area in the eastern United States, and two in
a major lumbering area in the western United States. Given the great disparity in size of lumber mills
in both Canada and the United States, a particular US mill need not be among the largest to be both a
significant and representative producer of softwood lumber for purposes of being used as a source of
data representative of an equally broad range of Canadian mills.
7.94 In considering this issue, we are mindful that we are dealing with the initiation of an
investigation, and furthermore, we keep in mind the Article 17.6 standard of review that we have to
apply. It seems to us that Canada's argument revolves mainly around its assertion that the Canadian
mills are much larger, and therefore have greater e fficiencies of scale than the US mills could have.
Although we agree that efficiency of scale does ha ve an impact on cost, we also note that the
applicant stated in the application that "softwood lumber manufacturing costs vary significantly by
producer depending upon a number of factors, such as each producer's level of efficiency, type of
equipment, physical location and wood fibre source material".
260
7.95 In light of the nature of the lumber industr y in both the United States and Canada, and the
dynamic interrelationship of the different cost elemen ts, we are of the view that it would almost be
impossible for an applicant to be able to submit information to address all these variables for purposes
of the initiation of an investigation. We are th erefore of the view that an unbiased and objective
investigating authority could have accepted the eviden ce of the four surrogate mills in the context of
the normal value calculation in the application, and therefore find that DOC did not err in concluding
that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation on this basis.
(ii) Calculation / allocation of costs
7.96 Canada states that DOC initiated the investiga tion without any evidence before it of how the
applicant calculated the cost of manufacturing of the US surrogate companies for the SPF species or
of how company costs were then allocated to the specific products (2x4 kiln-dried dimension or stud
lumber) for which the cost models had been constr ucted. The United States responds that, as most
costs were calculated on a per-species, per-MBF basis, the applicant followed the normal industry
practice, and also that the issue of precisely how to allocate costs to products is not an issue that
needed to be definitively resolved pr ior to initiation of the investigation. 261 Canada challenges this
statement and asserts that DOC never made such a finding.262

260 Exhibit CDA-134, Application – Exhibit VI.A, p. 4-5.
261 US second written submission, p. 9.
262 Canada second oral (opening) statement, para. 19.

7.97 Recalling the fact that this issue relates to th e initiation of the investigation and the standard
of review which we have to apply, we are of the view that it cannot be expected from an investigating
authority to do a cost allocation in the same way as it is required to do when making a preliminary or
a final determination of dumping. We agree with the United States that the issue of precisely how to
allocate costs to different products is not an issue that needs to be defin itively resolved prior to
initiation of an investigation – the cost allocation in any anti-dumping investigation is normally of a
very contentious nature, as is also evident from this case. We therefore find that DOC did not err in
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation on this basis.
(iii) Period covered by the cost model data
7.98 Canada states both the cost models cons tructed for Quebec and BC relied on certain
manufacturing and cost data for less than a full y ear (2000). Canada contends that the failure to
capture costs associated with a full operating cycle for the purposes of initiation is clearly insufficient.
Canada asserts that home construction, and thus dimensional and stud lumber sales, is a seasonal
business. According to Canada, such reliance on a period less than one fiscal year is misleading and
provides a distorted view of unit production costs. There is no evidence on the record of any analysis
by DOC of the adequacy of these "abbreviated" cost reporting periods.
263 The United States
responded that the application contai ned cost data from four US mills , of which data for one covered
the whole year, and taken as a whole, the data fro m these four mills covered the entire calendar year
2000.264 The applicant also explained why each of th e four companies provided data for particular
months, mainly because those were the only periods for which the specific companies had audited
data available.265
7.99 In considering this issue, we note that DOC ha d cost data which, ta ken together, covered a
whole year, and the cost data of one company co vered the whole period. Although Canada implies
that the seasonality of the lumber industry would affect the information to such an extent as to render
it insufficient, Canada has not proffered any arguments or evidence to substantiate this view so as to
enable us to come to a conclusion that an unbi ased and objective investigating authority could not
have found that the information available to it was su fficient to justify initiation on this basis. We
therefore find that DOC did not err in concludi ng that there was suffici ent evidence to justify
initiation on this basis.
(iv) Home market sales informa tion for Quebec as a basis to c onclude that c onstructed value
could be used to establish normal value for purposes of initiation
7.100 Canada asserts that, as DOC rejected the pr ice information on western SPF submitted by the
applicant as support for the allegation that western SPF softwood lumber was being sold below cost,
there were no home market prices for western SPF availa ble to test whether sales of this product were
below cost.266 As there were no home market prices, or surrogate prices, for sales of western SPF,
there was no basis for a finding that these sales we re below the calculated costs – therefore DOC
could not objectively have based its decision to ini tiate the investigation on the constructed value
comparison for eastern SPF offered by the applicant. The United States responds that Canada's
argument incorrectly implies that the quality and qu antity of evidence at initiation should be the same
as at the conclusion of an investigation. As the application contained evidence of home market sales
below cost in Quebec, it provided a basis for using constructed value to establish normal value.

263 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, para. 36.
264 The mills provided cost data for the followi ng periods: East-1: July-December 2000, East-2:
January-September 2000, West-1: July-December 2000, West-2: January-December 2000.
265 Exhibit CDA-135, Application – Exhibit VI.C-1 and Exhibit CDA-136, Application –
Exhibit VI.D 1.
266 DOC rejected the submitted price information, sourced by the applicant fr om the BC Ministry of
Forestry's published market pricing system, as the applicant did not indicate that the prices were restricted to
sales in Canada only. (Exhibit CDA-9, Initiation, p. 21330)

7.101 The issue that we need to address in this instance is whether the home market sales
information for Quebec was sufficient as a basis to conclude that constructed value could be used to
establish normal value for purposes of initiation. In other words, is the information on eastern SPF
sufficient as a basis to determine that a constructed (normal) value should be calculated for all subject
softwood lumber products. We note that a si milar issue was addressed by the panel in Argentina –
Poultry when it considered whether an application containing data on home market prices in a
particular region of the exporting country was suffici ent, or whether additional price data should have
been submitted. The panel concluded that "it is su fficient for an investigating authority to base its
decision to initiate on evidence concerning domestic sales in a major market of the exporting country
subject to the investigation, without necessar ily having data for sales throughout that country". 267
Although we are conscious that the facts of Argentina – Poultry differ from the facts of the case at
hand, we nonetheless consider that they are sufficientl y analogous to be relevant to our analysis here.
We note that eastern SPF softwood lumber products c onstitute one of the two major categories into
which the subject product was divide d, and we are of the view that there is no requirement that
evidence of dumping of all categories or sub-sets of the imported product is necessary to justify a
decision to initiate. We therefore find that DOC di d not err in concluding that there was sufficient
evidence to justify initiation on this basis.
(v) Evidence on prices of domestic sales transactions
7.102 According to Canada, DOC initiated the investiga tion despite the fact that the application did
not contain evidence of actual sales transactions involving identified Canadian companies in the
domestic Canadian market. The evidence on prices consisted of estimates from an industry
publication, Random Lengths , which in some instances commingled Canadian and US price data.
Canada states that the Random Lengths data could therefore not have been regarded as sufficient to
justify the initiation of the investigation. The Unite d States contests these allegations and asserts that
the Random Lengths data are based on actual prices and that the data do not commingle US and
Canadian data.
7.103 We note that there is no disagreement between the parties regarding the reliability of the
Random Lengths data as such. Rather, they disagree as to wh ether the data refer to prices or informal
estimates of prices, and whether they commingle US and Canadian price data.
7.104 We note that Random Lengths explains how it determines the reported price information as
follows:
"[t]he staff conducts hundreds of telephone interviews w ith sellers and buyers each
week. (…) Information is also obtained via e-mail and fax.
Based on information gathered from these sources, we determine the prices that
appear in the Random Lengths price Guide. These prices reflect sales from producers
to their customers.
Because of these variables, a price reporte d in Random Lengths is not the only price
at which an item has traded. Each price shown falls within the range of prices
reported by our sources. A reported price is a representative trading level for the item
just prior to publication. The reported prices reflect levels at which stock has actually
traded between manufacturers and their customers.
But keep in mind that there is no single pri ce that can fully describe the market for an
item at a given moment, let alone on weekly basis. (…) Only through our telephone

interviews can the many variables be tr acked and accounted for in determining the
representative prices that are reported in the Price Guide"
268,
and:
"[a] price reported by Random Lengths is a benchmark, or indicator, of the general
trading level of an item at the time of publication.
A reported price is not an arithmetic average of the prices reported to the Random
Lengths staff. It is not the price for th e item for the week following publication (that
is, it is not a projected price for future transac tions). It is not the only price at which
transactions took place during the week of publication.
Prices reported in Random Lengths represent transactions between manufacturers and
their customers.".269
7.105 After considering these explanations on how the Random Lengths price information is
actually collected and reflected in the weekly publica tion, we are of the view that the published price
information, although it reflects a number of sales, and is not related to a specific sale, does reflect
actual sales prices that indicate price levels at wh ich softwood lumber has actually traded between
manufacturers and their customers. Thus, in our view, the Random Lengths data certainly qualifies as
the type of price information contemplated in Article 5.2(iii) of the AD Agreement . We are
furthermore of the view that, in the case of a commodity product, such as softwood lumber, a
reputable industry price publication, covering a wide range of products, with price data over a period
of time, might be preferable as a more representati ve source of price inform ation than price data
sourced from a single exporter or importer.
7.106 Canada also asserts that the Random Lengths data commingle US data with Canadian data
270,
as Random Lengths defines eastern SPF as:
"[l]umber of the Spruce-Pine-Fir group produced in the eastern provinces of Canada,
including Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Also used in references to some lumber
produced in the northeastern United States".271
7.107 The United States counters this statement by re ferring to a letter received from the publishers
of Random Lengths which states:
"[e]astern S-P-F prices reported in the weekly Random Lengths Price Guides are
representative of lumber produced in the Eastern Canadian provinces".272
7.108 According to the United States, this defi nition itself reflects the fact that the primary meaning
of the term SPF is limited to certain Canadian-produ ced lumber. Its use as a "term of the trade" in
connection with US-produced lumber is not only sec ondary, but also separate. As confirmation of
this interpretation by the United States, the United States referred to a letter from Random Lengths
which had been placed on the record of the case in a submission made by the applicant, which states:
"[w]e do receive information about production and prices of S-P-F dimension coming
out of mills in the New England states. However, as we discussed, the current

268 Exhibit CDA-133, Random Lengths – How Reported Prices are Determined, p. 1.
269 Id., p. 6.
270 Canada first oral (opening) statement, para. 23.
271 Exhibit CDA-147, Application – Exhibit III.9, p. 114.
272 Exhibit US-1 mistakenly included a different submission made by the applicant on the same date.
The United States provided the correct record document to the Panel as Exhibit US-60, p. 79.

grading rules require that this output be designated as "SPF-S". (…) While "SPF-S"
sales and prices can and do affect "Eastern S-P-F" prices and markets, we focus our
information gathering and price reporting on Eastern S-P-F coming out of Eastern
Canadian sawmills".
273
7.109 Canada interprets the word "focus" as i ndicating an "unexplained degree of focus on
Canadian data" which would lead an objective inv estigating authority to determine that these data
should be rejected in considering whether to initiate an anti-dumping investigation.274
7.110 According to the United States, however, the combination of evidence shows that Random
Lengths recognizes a market distinction between Ca nadian-produced and US-produced SPF and does
not commingle data on the Canadian-produced "Eastern S-P-F" with data on US-produced (Eastern)
"S-P-F-south" lumber.275
7.111 Taking the facts into account, as well as that th is issue relates to the initiation of the
investigation, and as it is clear to us that the inv estigating authority considered this matter carefully,
and requested clarification from the applicant 276, with which it was satisfied, we are of the view that
an unbiased and objective investigating authority co uld reasonably have concluded that the potential
for commingling of the data did not detract from its reliability for purposes of initiation.
7.112 We therefore find that DOC did not err in c oncluding that there was sufficient evidence to
justify initiation on this basis.
(vi) Affidavits containing export price information
7.113 Canada asserts that the two affidavits on expor t price information submitted by the applicant
and relied upon by DOC for purposes of initiation of th e investigation were inadequate. With respect
to the affidavit containing BC price information, the "price quote" refers to a price quote for western
SPF from a trading company and does not identify an y individual Canadian producer or exporter as
the supplier of the product. 277 According to Canada, neither a Canadian producer/exporter, nor a US
company affiliated with a Canadian producer/export er provided the quote. With respect to the
affidavit containing a "price quote" for Quebec sales, it does not identify a Canadian producer as the
seller of the merchandise, identifies no buyer and contains little information about the terms of the
sale.278 According to Canada, these price quotes are lit tle more than unsubstantiated assertions which
an objective investigating authority would have rejected as a basis for initiation of an investigation.
7.114 The United States asserts that the affidavit c ontaining the BC price information was made by
a knowledgeable industry source testifying to an offer from a US trading company for Canadian
western SPF kiln-dried random length 2x4s from the interior of BC for sale in March 2001 at a
delivered price to a specified destination in the US market.
279 The affidavit also contained
information on the historical mark-up received by lumber wholesalers, and on the likely means of
shipment. The "lost sales" affidavit regarding pr ice information from Quebec was, according to the
United States, from a US lumber producer reporting f our separate instances in which the affiant lost
sales on 15 December 2000 as the potential buyers reported that Quebec producers offered eastern
SPF kiln-dried 2x4s in mid-December 2000 at the boar d foot price as reflected in the affidavit, which

273 Ibid.
275 US response to question 15 of the Panel, para. 23.
276 Exhibit CDA-86, Letter from DOC to the applicant requesting information/clarification; and Exhibit
CDA-40, Applicant's response.
277 Exhibit US-16, Application – Exhibit VI.D-14.
278 Canada second written submission, paras. 55-56.
279 US first written submission, para. 59; Exhibit CDA-10, Initiation Checklist; and Exhibit US-16,
Application – Exhibit VI.D-14.

was lower that the affiant's price, with the term s of sale being the same, being FOB-Boston for both
products.
7.115 As it is not clear to us whether the Canadian cl aim rests on the fact that the affidavits were
relied upon as evidence, or on the fact that certain in formation in the affidavits was not disclosed to
interested parties, we will address both issues.
7.116 We consider first the question whether an a ffidavit can be regarded as evidence regarding
prices for purposes of the decision whether to in itiate an investigation. We note that the AD
Agreement does not prescribe the nature and form of the information or evidence applicants are
required to submit, and which the investigating authority must consider in deciding whether to initiate
an investigation. We note the statement by the United States that:
"[a]ffidavits from pe rsons in the industry are frequen tly used in petitions to present
company or industry information. The relia bility of the information derives not only
from the fact that it is sworn testimony, but also, in a different sense, from the fact
that an affiant's professional position and expe rtise in the industry gives that person
access to such information and permits that person to speak credibly to general
industry practices";
280
and that:
"'[l]ost sales' affidavits are another common way of establishing prices of
merchandise imported into the United States. One way in which a producer may
learn of non-published prices being quoted by foreign competitors in the U.S. market
is when habitual customers advise that th e same goods are available at a given lower
price from the foreign competitor. Such communications may permit the domestic
producer to try to match that price, but if it is unable to sell that low, this can also
become evidence of both export prices and injury."
281
7.117 We note that the AD Agreement does not contain any guidance on this issue and that
affidavits are accepted in the legal systems of ma ny jurisdictions as evidence. In light of the
explanations submitted by the United States, we th erefore see no reason why affidavits regarding
price information may not be cons idered as relevant evidence in deciding whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation.
7.118 On the second issue, that is, the non-disclosure of certain information regarded as confidential
by the investigating authority, we note the following explanation submitted by the United States:
"[a]s is generally the case, to avoid reta liation, the name, affiliation, location and
other potential identifying characteristics of the affiant, as well as proprietary details
with respect to the transactions at issue are given only in the Business Confidential
versions of the exhibits. The United Stat es has provided only the public versions of
such documents, as they are sufficient to demonstrate the nature of the evidence
contained in the Business Confidential versions, and because Canada has never
contested the bona fides of the confidential affiant."282
7.119 We note that Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement specifically requires the non-disclosure of
confidential information, as follows:

280 US first written submission, para. 61, note 60.
281 Id., para. 60, note 62.
282 Id., para. 59, note 60.

"[a]ny information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure
would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure
would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or
upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or which is provided
on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be
treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without
specific permission of the party submitting it." (footnote omitted)

7.120 Canada has made no assertion that the informa tion that was not disclosed was incorrectly
deemed confidential by the DOC in this instance. Nor has Canada provided us with any evidence or
arguments that would suggest that the information c ontained in the affidavits is untrue and therefore
not reliable. In examining the affidavits at issue
283, we note that the information disclosed, indicates
the dates, the products, the origin of the products as Canada, the terms of sale and prices. The only
information deleted from the confidential versions of the affidavits are the names of the affiants, their
positions, their employers, and, in one case, who made the offer to sell. In our view, all the
information material to the issue has been disclosed. In these circumstances, we can see no basis for a
conclusion that the obligatory non-disclosure of cer tain confidential information in the affidavits
somehow undermined their reliability or relevance as evidence of prices. If Canada is of the view that
the affidavits contain false or misleading informati on, we are of the view that they should have
pursued the matter in the appropriate forum in the United States. Canada did not submit any evidence
to this effect. We therefore find that DOC did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence
to justify initiation of the investigation on this basis.
(vii) Price information covered only two categories of softwood lumber
7.121 Canada claims that the application containe d price information only on two of the seven
categories of softwood lumber identified by the a pplicant. The seven categories are: (1) studs;
(2) boards; (3) dimension lumber; (4) timbers; (5) stress grades; (6) selects, and (7) shop. 284
Pricing information and dumping calculations in the application, and on which DOC based its
decision to initiate an investigation, covered only two narrowly defined products, namely, SPF 2x4
kiln-dried dimension lumber, and SPF kiln-dried stud lumber, although the applicant requested DOC
to initiate an investigation coveri ng numerous softwood lumber products. 285 Canada therefore asserts
that the evidence was not sufficient for purposes of an Article 5.3 determination.
7.122 The United States asserts that, as there is no ob ligation to treat each "category as a separate
product under consideration, it ha d no obligation to find evidence of dumping in each category in
order to initiate an investigation."286
7.123 Article 5.3 requires that, at initiation, there must be sufficient evidence of dumping of the
product as a whole that an unbiased and objective inv estigating authority could conclude that there
was sufficient evidence to justify initiation. Clear ly, evidence of dumping regarding an insignificant
sub-set of the imported product would not be suffici ent in this context, an argument not made by
Canada. We note that, in the case at hand, the categories for which pricing information was
submitted, including 2x4s kiln-dried dimension softwood lumber and 2x4 kiln-dried studs, falls within
commonly traded softwood lumber product categories which together form the product under
investigation.
287 We therefore find that DOC did not err in concluding that there was sufficient
evidence to justify initiation on this basis.

283 Exhibits US-16, Application – Exhibit VI.D-14, and Exhibit CDA-45.
284 Exhibit CDA-36, Application – Volume I.
285 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, para. 29.
287 US first written submission, paras. 52 and 58.

(viii) Information on freight costs
7.124 Canada asserts that the application did not c ontain adequate information regarding freight
costs.
288 Although freight is a significant component of the price for lumber, Canada asserts that the
application lacked reasonably obtainable Canadian freight information from either of the two
Canadian national railways and inst ead relied on freight information that was not even for Canadian
rail or international freight. Canada cites the following examples in support of its allegation:
• In the case of Quebec, DOC relied upon an average freight cost from Quebec to the
United States including in that average an estimate for freight cost from the Maritime
provinces. In doing so, it included freight co sts unrelated to transport between Quebec and
the United States. 289 There was also no evidence to s upport the applicant's allegation that
truck rather than rail is used by Quebec producers to ship lumber.
• In the case of BC, DOC relied on an affidavit i ndicating that rail freight charges incurred for
what appears to be a Southern-Yellow-Pine sh ipment which weighs considerably more than
the WSPF for which the applicant purported to be creating a cost model.290
7.125 The United States responds that the relevant exhi bit simply provided a rate for truck freight,
one of the shipment methods used, based on the affiant's experience in using truck freight for
softwood lumber in the region in question. As no evidence was submitted to DOC that the producers
ship lumber only by rail, or predominantly by rail, the evidence was adequate for purposes of
initiation. With regard to the allegation about th e differences in weight between western SPF and the
heavier southern Yellow Pine, the United States assert s that the affidavit provided a rail freight rate
for softwood lumber.291 The United States stated further th at it was not necessary for DOC to search
out information on the relative weights of different gr oups of pines, all of which are softwood lumber,
for purposes of initiation of an investigation. 292 On the issue of the freight costs from the Maritime
Provinces, the United States contends that the fre ight affidavit that Canada relies upon provides
separate per-MBF freight rates for shipment to Boston from four regions, one of which is the
Maritime Provinces. The average per-MBF freight cost DOC relied upon for sales from Quebec to
the United States was US$29, the average of the co st for shipment from Northern Quebec, Southern
Quebec and the Gaspe Peninsula (also part of Queb ec). Had the cost for the Maritime Provinces been
included, the average would have been US$30 per MBF.293
7.126 We note that nothing before the investigating authority indicated that only rail was used to
transport softwood lumber, or even that rail was mo stly used. In these circumstances, we consider
that an objective and unbiased investigating aut hority could reasonably ha ve relied on information
regarding truck freight rates in the context of an initiation determination. In addition, it seems clear
that the inclusion of some freight costs for transpor t of US produced lumber did not materially affect
the information relied upon. We therefore conc lude that an unbiased and objective investigating
authority could reasonably have concluded that the information was sufficient to justify initiation on
this basis. We therefore find that DOC did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to
justify initiation on this basis.

288 Canada response to question 8 of the Panel, paras. 39-42.
289 Exhibit CDA-41, Application – Exhibit VI.C-9.
290 Exhibit CDA-40, Application Amendments, Attachment 1 "Average MBF per rail car is 92,160
MBF. Average weight is approximately 195,000 lbs", and Exhibit CDA-51, Request for Termination, pp. 29-
30.
292 We also note the following statement by the United States in para. 31 of its second written
submission: "…the freight calculation was conservatively ba sed on costs for transport over significantly shorter
distances than those for delivery of the US sales in the application (including from the interior of BC to Chicago
(at least 1800 miles) and to Atlanta (at least 2444 miles))".

(ix) Conclusion
7.127 After examining Canada's assertions regarding the sufficiency of the information contained in
the application and on which DOC based its decision to initiate the investigation, and considering our
comments above regarding the nature of the obligations under Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD
Agreement, we conclude that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have concluded
that there was sufficient evidence on dumping in the application to justify the initiation of the
softwood lumber anti-dumping investigation at issue. We therefore find that the United States has not
violated the provisions of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
F. C
LAIM 3: ARTICLE 5.8 – "SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE" OF DUMPING AT AND AFTER
INITIATION OF INVESTIGATION
(a) Factual Background
7.128 DOC initiated the anti-dumping investigation on the basis of the evidence submitted to it by
the applicant and did not terminate the investiga tion once it became known to DOC that Weldwood, a
major Canadian producer and exporter of softwood lumber, was wholly-owned by IP, one of the
applicant US producers.
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.129 Canada argues that Article 5.8 applies both prior to initiation and throughout the
investigation. Canada claims that DOC failed, after initiation, in its ongoing obligation to assess the
sufficiency of the evidence of dumping and to terminate the investigation. 294 Canada asserts that,
although evidence might have been judged sufficient at the time of initiation, it does not mean that
throughout the investigation there necessarily is su fficient evidence to justify proceeding with the
investigation. DOC was notified by the respondents of the deficiencies in the application resulting
from the omission of the Weldwood pricing informati on. An objective judgement of the sufficiency
of the evidence of dumping required DOC to take into account the impact of this omission, which was
not done. The relevance of evidence should not be prejudged without first having given proper
consideration to that evidence. Canada theref ore claims that DOC acted inconsistently with
Article 5.8 as an objective judgement of the suffici ency of the evidence was not done once the more
probative information was brought to the attention of DOC.
7.130 The United States asserts that, as the Weldwood data were not necessary to support either
DOC's initiation, or its continuation, of the inves tigation, Canada's claim that DOC was required to
terminate the investigation once DOC became awar e of the IP/Weldwood relationship, and therefore
the availability of Weldwood price information, ha s no support in Article 5.8. According to the
United States, the application contained sufficien t information to justify the initiation of the
investigation and the availability of the Weldwood data did not and could not render inadequate the
information initially provided to DOC by the ap plicant. DOC's decision not to terminate the
investigation is therefore consistent with Article 5.8.
7.131 According to the EC, as third party to the proceedings, Article 5.8 distinguishes two
scenarios: either the application did not cont ain sufficient evidence in which case it should be
rejected; or during the investigation it becomes appa rent that evidence is insufficient thus requiring a
prompt termination of the proceedings. On th e first scenario, the EC argues that before an
investigation is initiated Articles 5.3 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement have the same scope of application
with regard to the question of whether there is 'su fficient evidence'. As to the second alternative, i.e.,
after initiation, it is evident that the investigation mu st reveal "sufficient evidence" of dumping, injury
and a causal link to proceed with the investigation. If the investigation fails to produce this evidence,

the authorities should terminate the examination as pr omptly as possible. Under this scenario, the
question of whether "sufficient evidence" exists woul d have to be adjudicated in a more flexible way
depending on the respective state of investigation.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.132 The primary issue before us, is whether Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement imposes an ongoing
obligation on an investigating authority to exam ine the sufficiency of the evidence on which its
decision to initiate the investigation was based duri ng subsequent stages of the investigation and to
terminate the investigation, if it has concluded that the evidence on which the initiation decision was
based, was not sufficient in light of additional information which has come to light.
7.133 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides in relevant part as follows:
"[a]n application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case."

7.134 From the wording of Article 5.8, it is clear that it addresses two situations. The first one
addressing the situation where the application is to be rejected before the initiation of the
investigation, and the second dealing with the term ination of the investigation after it has been
initiated. In addressing the first part of Canada's cl aim, relating to the initiation of the investigation,
we note that a similar issue, was addressed by the panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup. That panel stated
the following regarding the obligations under Ar ticle 5.8, after having found no violation of
Article 5.3:
"[i]n our view, Article 5.8 does not impose additional substantive obligations beyond
those in Article 5.3 on the authority in connection with the initiation of the
investigation. That is, if there is su fficient evidence to justify initiation under
Article 5.3, there is no violation of Article 5.8 in not rejecting the application."
295
7.135 We agree with this statement. As we f ound that an unbiased and objective investigating
authority could have found that there was suffici ent evidence to justify the initiation of the
investigation, and that the United States has therefore not violated Article 5.3, we find that the
United States has not violated Article 5.8 with regard to the initiation of the investigation.
7.136 We now turn to the second part of Canada's claim, that is, whether DOC should have
terminated the investigation on the basis that more "probative" evidence available in the form of the
Weldwood data, rendered the evidence on the basi s of which DOC justified the initiation of the
investigation insufficient, and th at the investigation should have been terminated in terms of
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
7.137 When examining the plain meaning of the relevant text of Article 5.8, we note that it states
that "an investigation shall be terminated as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there
is not sufficient evidence of dumping ". (emphasis added) In our view, this means that the
investigating authority has to terminate the inv estigation, as soon as it is satisfied that its investigation
shows that there is not sufficient evidence of dum ping. We can however find no basis to conclude
that Article 5.8 imposes upon an investigating aut hority a continuing obligation after initiation to
continue to assess the suffi ciency of the evidence in the application and to terminate the investigation
on the grounds that other information undermines the sufficiency of that evidence. Once an
investigation has been initiated on the basis of su fficient evidence of dumping, the application has

295 Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, para. 7.99; confirmed by Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II,
paras. 8.72 et seq.

served its purpose. Logically, the continuing obligation to terminate an investigation where an
investigating authority is satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence to ju stify proceeding must be
based on an assessment of the overall state of the ev idence deduced before it in the investigation, not
on an assessment of the continuing sufficiency of the information in the application. We are of the
view that it could not have been the intention of th e drafters of Article 5.8 that its interpretation could
result in that an investigation could have been initia ted on the basis of sufficient evidence, but that the
very same investigation had to be terminated if additional evidence was made available by the
respondents at a later stage, while the evidence bei ng gathered during the course of the investigation,
indicates dumping.
7.138 Canada's claim of a violation of Article 5.8 therefore fails.
G. C
LAIM 4: ARTICLE 2.6 - "LIKE PRODUCT" AND "PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION"
(a) Factual Background
7.139 The final scope of the anti-dumping duty order was determined by DOC to be as follows:
"[t]he products covered by this order are softwood lumber, flooring and siding
(softwood lumber products). Softwood lu mber products include all products
classified under headings 4407.1000, 4409.1010, 44 09.1090 and 4 409.1020,
respectively, of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), and
any softwood lumber, flooring and siding described below. These softwood lumber
products include:

 (1) coniferous wood, sawn or chipped lengthwise, slice or peeled,
whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness
exceeding six millimetres;

 (2) coniferous wood siding (including strips and friezes for parquet
flooring, not assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, grooved,
rabbeted, chamfered, v-jointed, b eaded, molded, rounded or the like)
along any of its edges or faces, whether or not planed, sanded or
finger-jointed;

 (3) other coniferous wood (including strips and friezes for parquet
flooring, not assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, grooved,
rabbeted, chamfered, v-jointed, b eaded, molded, rounded or the like)
along any of its edges or faces (other than wood mouldings and wood
dowel rods) whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed; and

(4) coniferous wood flooring (including strips and friezes for parquet
flooring, not assembled) continuously shaped (tongued, grooved,
rabbeted, chamfered, v-jointed, b eaded, molded, rounded or the like)
along any of its edges or faces, whether or not planed, sanded or
finger-jointed."
296
(b) Arguments of the Parties
7.140 Canada claims that DOC erroneously determined there to be a single like product
notwithstanding the disparate nature of the softwood lumber products covered by the investigation.
This claim is grounded in Article 2.6, in particular , the ordinary meaning of the words "characteristics

296 Exhibit CDA-3, Amended Final Determination, p. 36068.

closely resembling". Canada's position is that th e group of products within the "like product" as
defined by DOC did not have "characteristics closel y resembling" those of the group of products in
the "product under consideration". The facts of the case before DOC demonstrated that bed frame
components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Cedar did not have
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration and, therefore, should have
been dealt with separately. Non-compliance by the investigating authority with the obligation
contained in Article 2.6 has also caused non-comp liance with other substantive obligations of the AD
Agreement, e.g., Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4.
297
7.141 Canada asserts that an application must iden tify the proposed "product under consideration".
Article 2.6 expressly requires that a like product be "i dentical" to the product under consideration, or
in the absence of such a product, another produc t which, although not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. According to Canada, the
plain language of Article 2.6 suggests a multi-step approach: First, the investigating authority must
identify the characteristics of the product under consideration. Second, it must identify the
characteristics of each product proposed for inclusion in the like product. Third, it must determine
whether the characteristics of each are identical or, if not, then closely resembling those of the product
under consideration.
7.142 According to Canada, DOC never defined the characteristics of the product under
consideration, nor did DOC compare the characterist ics of each challenged product with those of the
product under consideration as a whole. Instead , DOC identified as subsets of the product under
consideration various softwood lumber products. It then compared is olated characteristics of each
challenged Canadian product to isolated characteris tics of products selected from within the "product
under consideration", considered to be "like" th e challenged products. That analysis failed to
establish the single, closely resembling, "like pr oduct" required by Article 2.6. No "close
resemblance" exemplified by a set of shared common characteristics was established between the
challenged products and the product under consideration.
7.143 Canada further asserts that a failure to defi ne the like product in accordance with the criteria
of Article 2.6 means also that the product under cons ideration has not been properly defined. This
leads to other violations of the AD Agreement. The investigating authority must assess industry
support and the other application requirements of Ar ticles 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 separately for each like
product. Should those requirements not be met w ith respect to a like product, the investigating
authority may not initiate an investigation with respect to the product under consideration and must
redefine the scope of the product under consideration.
7.144 According to the United States, Canada cites no provision of the AD Agreement governing
the way in which an investigating authority must define the product under investigation. Therefore
Canada has not identified an obligation arising out of Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement that the
United States violated in this case. Instead, it asser ts the existence of an obligation to explain how
different articles within the product under consideration "closely resemble each other" and asserts that
DOC has violated that obligation. 298 The United States posits that the AD Agreement contains no
rules on how the product under investigation should be defined and that Canada has therefore not
made a prima facie case of a violation of a provision of the AD Agreement.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.145 We first note that Canada's claim, as set out in its Panel Request, is posited on violations of
Articles 2.6, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of GATT 1994.299

297 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(iii).
299 WT/DS264/2.

However, in response to a question from the Panel, Canada restated its claim as based on Article 2.6
of the AD Agreement only, with consequential violations of "e.g., Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4".300
7.146 We note that Article 2.6 is a definitional article, and as such it is not clear to us that it contains
in itself obligations on Members, or in any event that it could be the basis for an independent
violation. On the other hand, it appears to us that Canada's claim is predicated on the proposition that
DOC took an approach to the definition of like product which deviated from that in Article 2.6. Thus,
a threshold and potentially dispositive issue is whet her DOC in fact took an approach to like product
which deviated from that of Article 2.6. In the ev ent that we were to determine that it did not,
Canada's claim would fail with regard to the consequential violations. 301 Accordingly, we turn to an
examination of Article 2.6.
7.147 Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:
"[t]hroughout this Agreement the term "lik e product" ("produit similaire") shall be
interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which,
although not alike in all respects, has charac teristics closely resembling those of the
product under consideration."

7.148 From the wording of Article 2.6, it is clear th at it addresses the issue of the definition of the
product which is to be regarded as "alike" to th e product under consideration. The question then
arises as to what is the product referred to as the "product under consideration"?
7.149 We find guidance on this issue in the wording of Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement , which
provides in relevant part as follows:
"[f]or the purpose of the Agreement, a produc t is to be considered as being dumped,
(...) if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less that
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country." (emphasis added)
7.150 We note that similar terminology is us ed in the relevant provisions of the AD Agreement
dealing with the injury analysis – Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement states that:
"[a] determination of injury ... shall be based on positive evidence and involve an
objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of
the dumped imports on prices in th e domestic market for like products , and (b) the
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products."
(emphasis added)
7.151 More generally, the term "domestic industry" in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement is defined in
relevant part as referring to "domestic producers as a whole of the like product , or to those of them
whose collective output of the products cons titutes a major proportion of the total domestic
production of those products…". Similarly, Article 5. 4 provides that an investigation is not to be
initiated unless the investigating authority determines , "on the basis of an examination of the degree
of support for, or opposition to, the ap plication expressed by domestic producers of the like product "
that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. (emphasis added,
footnote omitted)

300 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(iii).
301 In light of this, we will not address at this stag e the exact provisions included in our mandate with
regard to the alleged consequential violations (see paras. 7.22-7.30, supra).

7.152 In our view, this means that the "like product" , for purposes of the dumping determination, is
the product which is destined for consumption in the exporting country. The "like product" is
therefore to be compared with the allegedly dumpe d product, which is generally referred to in the AD
Agreement as the "product under consideration".
302 In the case of the injury determination (and the
determination of domestic industry support for the ap plication), the word "like product" refers to the
product being produced by the domestic industry allege dly being injured by the dumped product. In
both instances it is clear that the starting point can only be the product allegedly being dumped and
that the product to be compared to it for purposes of the dumping determination, and the product the
producers of which are allegedly being injured by the dumped product, is the "like product" for
purposes of the dumping and injury determinations, respectively.
7.153 Article 2.6 therefore defines the basis on whic h the product to be compared to the "product
under consideration" is to be determined, that is , a product which is either identical to the product
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which has characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consid eration. As the definition of "like product"
implies a comparison with another product, it seems clear to us that the starting point can only be the
"other product", being the allegedly dumpe d product. Therefore, once the product under
consideration is defined, the "like product" to the product under consideration has to be determined on
the basis of Article 2.6. However, in our analysis of the AD Agreement , we could not find any
guidance on the way in which the "product under consideration" should be determined.
7.154 DOC defined the product allegedly being dumped, and therefore the "product under
consideration", as certain softwood lumber, floori ng and siding (softwood lumber products), as fully
described in the Notice of Initiation.
303 During the course of the investigation, DOC considered a
number of requests to exclude certain products from the investigation. According to the
United States, these scope-related "requests could be classified into one of two categories: (1) scope
exclusion requests, and (2) scope exclusion request s premised upon the theory that various products
constitute separate classes or kinds of merchandise when analyzed under the Diversified Products
criteria, and as such, are outside the scope of the petition". 304 As a result of these requests, certain
softwood lumber products were excluded from the scope of the investigation. 305 DOC did not,
however, exclude bed frame components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western
Red Cedar from the scope of the investigation.
7.155 We note that Canada is not claiming that any of the individual softwood lumber products,
constituting collectively the product under consider ation, were not identical, or not having
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration when taken on an
individual basis. In fact, we do not understand Ca nada to argue that, havi ng determined the product
under consideration, DOC defined the "like product" di fferently in any respect. Canada's argument is
rather that the range of products included in the scope of the investigation, being the product under
consideration, was so broad that all the indi vidual products, constituting collectively the "like
product", were not alike to each and every of the products collectively forming the product under
consideration as they did not have characteristics closely resembling those of each and every of the

 302 See also footnote 2 to the AD Agreement which states:

"[s]ales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting
country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal
value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the sales of the product under consideration
to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence
demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to
provide for a proper comparison". (emphasis added)

303 Exhibit CDA-9, Initiation.
304 Exhibit CDA 2, IDM, p. 139.
305 Id., p. 141 and note 391.

individual products constituting collectively the pr oduct under consideration. In particular, it
considers that DOC should for this reason have excluded bed frame components, finger-jointed
flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Cedar from the scope of the investigation.
7.156 As stated in paragraph 7.153, supra, we could find no explicit guidance in the AD Agreement
as to how the investigating authority should define the product under consideration. In this case,
DOC defined the product under consideration, certain softwood lumber, on the basis of a technical
definition involving narrative description and tariff classification. For the purpose of establishing
normal value, DOC based itself upon goods destined for consumption in the exporting country which
fell within exactly the same definition. Similarl y, when considering whether the application was
made by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry, DOC identified the domestic industry on the basis of
the same definition. Canada has not identifie d any instance in which DOC has defined the like
product differently than it has defined the product u nder consideration. Specifically, Canada has not
suggested that there was any difference between the product under consideration and the like product
in respect of bed frame components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red
Cedar. In other words, having defined the "product under consideration", it seems to us that DOC has
used an identical definition for the "like product". 306 In particular, both the product under
consideration and the like product included the pr oducts Canada argues should have been excluded
from the investigation. On its face, therefore, it would appear that DOC has defined the "like product"
in this investigation in a manner consistent with the definition found in Article 2.6.
7.157 Canada has a different interpreta tion of Article 2.6. In effect, Canada considers that, rather
than comparing the overall scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of the like
product, Article 2.6 requires that each individual ite m within the "like product" must be "like" each
individual item within the "product under considerati on". This in effect means that there must be
"likeness" within both the product under considerati on and within the like product. As Canada itself
has stated, "[t]he terms 'product un der consideration' and 'like produc t' must be limited to a single
group of products sharing characteristics". 307 Once again, however, we see no basis to imply such a
condition into the AD Agreement. While there might be room for discussion as to whether such an
approach might be an appropriate one from a policy pe rspective, whether to require such an approach
is a matter for the Members to address through nego tiations. It is not our role as a panel to create
obligations which cannot clearly be found in the AD Agreement itself.
7.158 In light of our analysis, we conclude that the DOC's approach to "like product" was not
inconsistent with the definition of "like product" in Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement. We further note
that all Canada's claims regarding this issue ar e dependent upon the proposition that DOC deviated
from the approach to "like product" set forth in Arti cle 2.6. Accordingly, we conclude that Canada
has failed to establish that the Unite d States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.6, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 by failing to exclude bed frame
components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Cedar from the scope of
the investigation.308

306 As opposed, for example, to defining the product under consideration as lighters and the like
product as including both lighters and matches.
307 Canada first oral (opening) statement, para. 33.
308 We note that Canada's arguments regarding an alleged violation of Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement
with regard to the non-exclusion of these products from the scope of the investigation as not being "like
products" are based exclusivel y on the application of the Diversified Products Doctrine, a legal concept
developed through US domestic courts of law as a me thodology to assist DOC in defining the product under
consideration in each investigation. As we have found that the AD Agreement does not contain any guidance on
how the product under investigation should be defined, and as the Diversified Products Doctrine is a domestic
legal doctrine in the United States, there is no need fo r us to address the issue whether DOC followed its
domestic procedures with regard to these products.

H. C
LAIM 5: ARTICLE 2.4 – ADJUSTMENT FOR DIFFERENCES IN PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
(a) Factual Background
7.159 At the outset of the investigation, DOC establis hed – in consultation with the parties – the
distinguishing physical characteristics of softwood lumber in order to match products sold in the
home market with those exported to the United Stat es. These characteristics were as follows: (1)
product category; (2) species; (3) grade group; (4) grade; (5) moisture content; (6) thickness;
(7) width; (8) length; (9) surface finish; (10) end trimming; and, (11) further processing. Only
where lumber shared the above 11 characteristics was a particular type considered to have identical
physical characteristics. In the Preliminary Determination, DOC carried out price-to-price
309
comparisons of identical types of softwood lumber. For comparisons of non-identical types, DOC
first attempted to adjust normal value by the ne t difference in the variable manufacturing costs
associated with the differences in the physical characteristics of the two products compared. 310
However, there were a number of actual physical differences between products for which respondents
were unable to identify a cost difference. 311 In view of the above, DOC determined that "it [was] not
appropriate to match products that do not have the following identical physical characteristics: grade,
thickness, width and length."312 For those characteristics where the cost allocations did not generate a
difference in variable manufacturing costs, DOC constructed (normal) values which were then
compared to the export prices for the respective ty pes reported in the exporters' databases. DOC's
approach changed at the definitive stage. At the request of some Canadian exporters, DOC acceded to
extend price-to-price comparisons to non-identical types. Several Canadian exporters argued that,
were DOC to compare non-identical types, DOC should make an adjustment for differences in
thickness, width, and length (or collectively "differences in dimension"). 313 For the reasons explained
in the IDM, DOC did not make this adjustment:
 "[a]s the parties have noted, this case involves among the most complex product
comparisons [DOC] has faced. Where we do not have identical home market sales
within the ordinary course of trade, we ha ve attempted to base normal value on sales
of the most similar product and we have attempted to adjust for such physical
differences where we have adequate informa tion to do so. Section 773(a)(6)(C)(ii) of
the Act provides for an adjustment to nor mal value for differences in the physical
characteristics of the products being compared. The statute grants [DOC] discretion to
determine a suitable method to calculate a difmer adjustment and does not restrict
[DOC]'s selection of an appropriate methodology to any particular approach. See,
e.g., NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States , Slip Op. 2002-07 (CIT, January 24,
2002) at 130.

309 By "price-to-price" we refer to comparisons of normal values based on home market (Canadian)
lumber prices with export prices to the United States.
310 Exhibit CDA-11, Preliminary Determination, p. 56,066. See also Exhibit CDA-2, Comment 8,
p. 51.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
313 The standard unit of measure in the North American lumber industry is a "board foot". A board foot
is the equivalent of a piece of wood 1 inch thick, 12 inches wide, and 1 foot long. In other words, a board foot is
1 square foot of lumber, 1 inch thick. Softwood lumber is therefore commonly measured and sold in terms of
volume, usually in thousand board feet, MBF, rather than in pieces of any give n dimension (Exhibit CDA-30,
"Buying and Selling Softwood Lumber", p. 2). It should also be noted that lumber is extracted from logs, the
lumber is then converted into lumber products in a sawm ill. The different lumber products resulting from this
production process are joint products, as a single process yields multiple products simultaneously. How a piece
of lumber is eventually deconstructed into its composite products will to some degree depend, inter alia, on
market demand. In other words, the same piece of lumber can be deconstructed into different sets of products,
depending on the demand and prices of the products which can be produced from the piece of lumber.

As explained in the Preliminary Determination and in Policy Bulletin 92.2:
Differences in Merchandise; 20% Rule (July 29, 1992), [DOC] has "rarely been able
to determine the direct price effect of a difference in merchandise". As a result,
difmer "adjustments are based almost exclusively on the cost of the physical
difference". [DOC] ordinarily calculates its difmer adjustment on the basis of
differences in the variable costs of manufacturing between products given that, in the
typical antidumping investigation, [DOC] ha s found that such data approximates the
effect that differences in physical characteristics have on product prices.
Nevertheless, in addressing comments to its proposed regulations in 1997, [DOC]
specifically retained language preserving, as an option, the use of market value in
measuring a difmer. We acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which a
difmer based on market value may be appropriate. Specifically in this case, where
products have differences in dimension (i.e., length, width or thickness) we recognize
that these physical differences could result in differences in market value. However,
we have concluded in this case that there is no information on the record by which we
can calculate a difmer adjustment to account for differences in dimension based either
on cost or value.
We disagree with certain respondents' sugg estions on how to quantify a value-based
difmer adjustment in this case. First, we note that the Random Lengths data do not
cover all of the products for which an adjust ment would be required. Second, as we
stated in the Preliminary Determination, we do not believe it would be appropriate to
use the respondents' prices as a basis for calculating a difmer adjustment where there
were home market sales outside the ordi nary course of trade during the POI for
certain products involved here. To do so w ould adjust normal values back to prices
already determined to be outside the ordinary course of trade, the whole reason why
we would be disregarding such prices and comparing to a similar product. Therefore,
no value-based difmer adjustment could be calculated for many of the comparisons
based on POI sales.
(…)
In the Final Determination, as a consequence of our having made a value-based cost
allocation for wood and sawmill costs (see Comment 4), [DOC] is now able to make a
difmer adjustment for differences in grade. As a result, the only physical differences
remaining for which a difmer adjustment was potentially necessary were differences
in dimension. Regarding dimensions, howev er, we have determined that no difmer
adjustment is appropriate, given that there is no basis for calculating a difmer for
dimensions based on value or cost. There are no cost-based differences with which to
calculate a difmer for dimensional differe nces. Also, for the reasons discussed above,
we have not used a value-based difmer. Howe ver, in this case, to the extent that we
compared products having different dime nsions, those differences were generally
small. Furthermore, as Abitibi argued, th e record shows that lumber prices for
different products fluctuated in relation to each other over the course of the POI.
Consequently, there appears to be little, if an y, difference in home market prices that
is attributable to differences in dimens ions of the products compared, especially
where those dimensional differences were minor.
As a result of [DOC]'s revised methodology, we have made many more comparisons
to similar products than in the Preliminary Determination. In an effort to match sales
of similar merchandise before resorting to constructed value, a nd consistent with
Cemex, [DOC] has made no adjustment for differences in dimension among similar
products. We agree with West Fraser and Slo can that such an approach is appropriate
in these circumstances.

(…)
Therefore, for all the reasons discussed above, we have not made a value-based
difmer adjustment for the final determination".
314 (footnotes omitted)
(b) Arguments of the Parties
7.160 In the view of Canada, Article 2.4 provides that, in its comparison between export price and
normal value, the investigating authority must make due allowance in every instance for differences
which affect price comparability, including physical differences. Canada contends that the fact that
lumber size affected the price per board foot at which softwood lumber products were sold was
undisputed by all parties. Canada asserts that DOC did not conclude that differences in dimension
could not affect market value. In the view of Canada , DOC's decision not to grant an adjustment was
based on the fact that DOC allegedly had no basis to adjust for physical differences between products
based on market value rather than because it had not been demonstrated that those differences in
dimension affected price comparability. Canada assert s that it was DOC's respon sibility to obtain the
necessary information to make a fair comparison. In the view of Canada, DOC's premise "that there
is no information on the record by which we [DOC] can calculate a difmer" is false. In this regard,
Canada contends that the record is replete w ith transaction and pricing data from the Canadian
exporters that would permit the calculation of the adjustment based on differences in market values.
7.161 The United States acknowledges that Article 2.4 requires that due allowance be made for
certain differences that affect price comparability. However, the United States asserts that Article 2.4
unambiguously provides that due allowance will be ma de in "each case, on its merits" for differences
that are "demonstrated" to affect price comparability . The United States asserts that the Canadian
exporters failed to demonstrate that differences in dimension of softwood lumber had an effect on
price comparability in this case. In response to an argument of Canada, the United States asserts that
DOC cannot be deemed to have c oncluded that dimension affected price comparability simply by
having made a product matching de termination. For the words "affect price comparability" under
Article 2.4 to have any meaning, the United States claims that there must be some connection
established between the differences in physical char acteristics at issue and prices. This connection
could not be established in this case. The United States asserts that DOC reached its conclusion based
on a review of the information contained in respondent s' cost and sales databas es. The United States
argues that Canada has tried to refute DOC's determination by selectively pointing to certain record
data. In the view of the United States, DOC's conc lusion in the Final Determination that differences
in prices were not attributable to differences in dimension, especially where those differences were
minor, is supported by the record.
7.162 Canada asserts that DOC's administrative record reveals that it performed no analysis
whatsoever of the non-identical comparisons generated by its product matching methodology.
According to Canada, DOC never looked at any specific non-identical comparison pair or pairs it used
to analyze pricing or other data relating to those two products in order to ascertain whether the actual
product differences involved affected price comparability. Canada argues that the US argument that
the Canadian respondents failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to the demonstration that
differences in dimension affected price comparability constitutes ex post justification which cannot be
considered by the Panel.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.163 In its Final Determination, DOC made pr ice-to-price comparisons between certain non
-
identical types of softwood lumber without adjus ting for differences in dimension. Canada argues
that Article 2.4 required DOC to grant an adjustme nt because those differences in dimension affected

314 Exhibit CDA 2, IDM, Comment 8, pp. 50-53.

price comparability. 315,316 The issue before us is therefor e whether the United States did not act
consistently with its obligati ons under Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement when it did not grant the
adjustment for differences in dimensions requested by the exporters where price-to-price comparisons
of non-identical types were made.
7.164 Article 2.4 provides in pertinent part:
"[a] fair comparison shall be made betw een the export price and the normal value.
(…) Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which
affect price comparability, including differe nces in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences
which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability. (…) The authorities shall
indicate to the parties in question what in formation is necessary to ensure a fair
comparison and shall not impose an unreason able burden of proof on those parties".
(footnote omitted)
7.165 Article 2.4 requires that, where there are differences between export price and normal value
which affect the comparability of these prices, "[d]ue allowance shall be made" for those differences.
We note that a difference in physical characteristics is one of the factors which may affect the
comparability of prices.
317 We agree with the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings that the
requirement to make due allowance for such differences, in each case on its merits , means that the
authority must at least evaluate identified differences – in this case, differences in dimension – with a
view to determining whether or not an adjustment is required to ensure a fair comparison between
normal value and export price under Ar ticle 2.4, and make an adjustme nt where it determines this to
be necessary on the basis of its evaluation. We consider that Article 2.4 does not require that an
adjustment be made automatically in all cases where a difference is found to exist, but only where –
based on the merits of the case – that difference is demonstrated to affect price comparability. An
interpretation that an adjustment would have to be made automatically where a difference in physical
characteristics is found to exist would render the te rm "which affect price comparability" nugatory. 318

315 We do not understand Canada to claim that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 in
not making an adjustment for differen ces in physical characteristics when identical types or models were
compared.
316 Although there are references in Canada's subm issions to the allocation of costs in the case of
thickness, length and width (cost vs. value based allocatio n), we do not understand Canada to have challenged
DOC's decision on that matter. (Canada comments on US responses to questions from the Panel, Comments to
US response to question 102, note 25)
317 The panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings found that:

"[d]ifferences in taxation are explicitly listed as a factor that must be taken into account under
Article 2.4 to the extent they may affect price comparability, and for which due allowance
shall be made, in each case, on its merits". (emphasis added) (Panel Report, EC – Tube or
Pipe Fittings, para. 7.157)

318 The principle that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty is well-
established in WTO dispute settlement. See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, para. 23. In
EC – Bed Linen, the Appellate Body reversed a finding of the panel on the ground that that panel "in effect,
reads the requirement of calculating a "weighted average" out of the text in some circumstances. In those
circumstances, this would substantially empty the phrase "weighted average" of me aning". (Appellate Body
Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 75) Thus, we are precluded from adopting an interpretation of a provision in the
AD Agreement which would substantially empty it of meaning. In the case before us, adopting an interpretation
that an adjustment must be made automatically in all cases where a given difference is found to exist would, in
our view, empty the phrase "which affect price comparabi lity" of any meaning. We must therefore reject such
an interpretation.

Further, such an interpretation would make little sen se in practice, as not all differences in physical
characteristics necessarily affect price comparability.
319
7.166 In addition, the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings found that:
"[t]he issue of which specific "allowances" should be made in any case depends very
much on the particular facts of the case. The last part of the last sentence of
Article 2.4, that the authorities "shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof" on
interested parties, does not remove the burde n from interested parties to substantiate
their assertions concerning claimed adjustment s. In a similar vein, an investigating
authority in possession of the requisite information substantiating a claimed
adjustment would not be justified in rejecting outright that claimed adjustment.
Thus, while it is incumbent upon the inv estigating authorities to ensure a fair
comparison,154 so also is it incumbent upon inter ested parties to substantiate their
assertions concerning adjustments as constructively as possible. The duty of an
investigating authority to ensure a fair comparison cannot, in our view, signify that an
investigating authority must accept any claimed adjustment. Rather, the investigating
authority must take steps to achieve clar ity as to the adjustment claimed and then
determine whether and to what extent that ad justment is merited. On this basis, we
examine Brazil's claim under Article 2.4.
154 We recall the view of the Appellate Body that the obligation to ensure a fair comparison
under Article 2.4 "lies on the investigating author ities" and not on exporters. Appellate Body
Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 40, para. 178."320
7.167 We agree with the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings that the requirement in the last
sentence of Article 2.4 that the authorities "sha ll not impose an unreasonable burden of proof" on
interested parties does not remove the burden from in terested parties to substantiate their assertions
concerning claimed adjustments. In line with the views expressed by that panel, we consider that
Article 2.4 requires that investigating authorities ensu re a fair comparison, and that interested parties
substantiate their assertions concerning adjustme nts as constructively as possible. Based on our
understanding of Article 2.4, we consider that the dut y of an investigating authority to ensure a fair
comparison cannot signify that an investigating authority must grant any claimed adjustment. On the
other hand, we are of the view that an investig ating authority in possession of the requisite evidence
substantiating a claimed adjustment would not be ju stified in rejecting that claimed adjustment.
Finally, bearing in mind the text of Article 2.4, we consider that this provision does not impose on
investigating authorities any particular method fo r examining whether any given difference affects
price comparability.
7.168 Before proceeding with the anal ysis, we recall that we have considered the comments of both
parties with respect to whether certain evidence pr esented by the parties in this dispute was properly
before us and that we have concluded in paragraph 7.43, supra, that we are precluded from taking into
consideration the regression analysis contained in Exhibit CDA-77. As Exhibit CDA-186 also
contains a regression analysis that neither Canada nor the respondents had submitted to DOC in the
context of the investigation, we will not consid er Exhibit CDA-186 for the same reasons we have
rejected Exhibit CDA-77. In its submission of 5 September 2003, we unders tand Canada to question
whether the charts submitted by the United States as Exhibits US-42, 43, 76 and 81 are properly

319 For example, a difference in colour between tw o cars is undeniably a difference in physical
characteristics, but that difference would not necessarily have any impact either on the price of the cars nor their
cost. The United States has provided its own example in its response to question 27 of the Panel, para. 43.
320 Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings , paras. 7.157-7.158. In the same vein, see the views
expressed by the panel in Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.352.

before us.321 When examining this argument of Canada , we keep in mind our findings contained in
paragraph 7.41, supra. As it is clear to us that these charts display in graphical form data which was
before DOC during the course of the investigation, we are of the view that these exhibits fall within
the same category of evidence as discussed by the panel in EC – Bed Linen . We therefore find that
Exhibits US-42, 43, 76 and 81 are properly before us.
7.169 In this dispute, Canada argues that the fact that differences in dimension affected price
comparability, where non-identical types or models were compared, was never an issue in the context
of the investigation. Canada asserts that, from the very outset, all parties and all US investigating
agencies involved 322 agreed that differences in dimension affected price comparability. The
United States, on the other hand, argues that neither the Canadian exporters – in the context of the
investigation – nor Canada – now be fore us – demonstrated that differences in dimensions affected
price comparability. The parties thus disagree on whether the exporters demonstrated that the
differences in dimensions, where non-identical typ es were compared, affected price comparability
between the non-identical types compared.
7.170 As previous panels have noted, Article 2.4 requires a fact-based, case-by-case analysis. This
is what we will do. We will start setting out the relevant facts as submitted by the parties and,
subsequently, we will examine them in light of our understanding of the obligations imposed by
Article 2.4, as set forth in paragraphs 7.165-7.167, supra. In so doing, we must be mindful of our
standard of review and not perform a de novo review of the facts.
7.171 Following initiation, DOC established – in consu ltation with the parties – the distinguishing
physical characteristics of softwood lumber in orde r to match products sold in Canada with those
exported to the United States. These characteristics included, inter alia, thickness, width, and length.
Exporters were requested to cons truct code numbers in accordance with the agreed product matching
mechanism for each distinct product. Therefore, e ach code number represented a type with physical
characteristics differing from products falling under any other code number. Exporters were
requested to prepare and submit their cost and sales databases containing information on a per-type
basis. At the preliminary stage, DOC carried out comparisons of identical types of softwood lumber.
For comparisons of non-identical types, DOC first attempted to adjust normal value by the net
difference in the variable manufacturing costs a ssociated with the differences in the physical
characteristics of the two products compared. 323 However, there were a number of actual physical
differences between products for which respondent s were unable to identify a cost difference. 324 In
view of the above, DOC determined that "it [was] not appropriate to match products that do not have
the following identical physical characteris tics: grade, thickness, width and length." 325 For those
characteristics where the cost allocations did not generate a difference in variable manufacturing
costs, DOC constructed (normal) values which we re then compared to the export prices for the
respective types reported in the exporters' databases. The issue of the adjustment for differences in
dimensions when comparing non-identical types was therefore not relevant at that stage.
7.172 In their subsequent comments, various res pondents argued that DOC should move away from
constructed (normal) values and compare non-identical types, making the necessary adjustments
where required. The United States asserts that DOC considered the exporters' comments and accepted
them.326 In so doing, DOC examined whether the adjust ment for differences in dimensions would be

321 Canada comments on the US responses to questions from the Panel, Comments to US response to
question 97, para. 9 and note 11.
322 These agencies are the ITC and DOC.
323 Exhibit CDA-11, Preliminary Determination, p. 56066. See also Exhibit CDA-2, Comment 8, p. 51.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
326 A detailed explanation of how the determination of which non-identical types should be compared
for the purposes of the final determination can be found in the US response to question 25 of the Panel, paras.
34-39.

justified. In this regard, we note that, accordi ng to US law and practice, DOC will first try to
determine whether a given difference yields variab le cost of manufacturing differences. If so, a
difference in price can be connected with the differen ce at issue and an adjustment will be granted.
However, where a given difference does not yield variable cost of manufacturing differences, DOC
examines whether there are differences in market value between the non-identical types compared. In
the case before us, the United States asserts that DOC determined that ther e were no differences in
variable cost of manufacturing between non-identical types compared, i. e., between types compared
having different dimensions. DOC also examined whether there were differences in market value, but
it concluded that "in this case that there is no info rmation on the record by which we can calculate a
difmer adjustment to account for differences in dimension based either on cost or value".
327 I n
analysing the respondents' request for an adjustment , DOC also found that "in this case, to the extent
that we compared products having different dime nsions, those differences were generally small.
Furthermore, as Abitibi argued, the record shows that lumber prices for different products fluctuated
in relation to each other over the course of the POI. Consequently, there appears to be little, if any,
difference in home market prices that is attributable to differences in dimensions of the products
compared".328 Quoting the excerpts just cited, the United States argues that DOC could not find that
the differences in dimensions were demonstrated to affect price comparability; hence, the rejection of
the exporters' request for an adjustment.
7.173 We note that the situation before us is not one in which the investigating authority did not
undertake any step in order to ensure a "fair" compar ison, as set forth in Article 2.4. Indeed, DOC, in
agreement with, inter alia, respondents, identified the physical factors which could have an impact on
prices and compared, where possible, identical typ es, that is, types having identical physical
characteristics – including identical dimensions – bot h at provisional and definitive stages. At the
provisional stage DOC decided that, because it could not find that certain differences in physical
characteristics (grade and the dimensional charact eristics at issue) yielded variable cost of
manufacturing differences, it would not compare non-identical types.
329 That is, it would for instance
not compare two types belonging to the same pr oduct category; species; and grade group; and having
the same moisture content; thickness; width; le ngth; surface finish; end trimming; and, further
processing characteristics but having different grade. For those characteristics where the cost
allocations did not generate a di fference in variable manufacturing costs, DOC constructed (normal)
values which were then compared to the export prices for the respective types reported in the
exporters' databases.330 It is also clear to us that DOC changed its approach between the provisional
and definitive stages at the request of certain respondents. For the purpose of the Final
Determination, where there were no identical type s, DOC compared non-identical types. It is
undisputed that, in these instances, adjustments we re made to account for differences in physical
characteristics other than differences in dimensions. For all these differences, the United States
argues DOC could determine, based on differences in variable cost among the compared non-identical
types, that differences in physical characteristi cs affected price comparability and, consequently,
made an adjustment to compare "apples-to-apples". Th is is not disputed by Canada. All of the above
shows to us that DOC made significant efforts in order to ensure that , for a very large portion of the
comparisons made, a fair comparison was carried out, in spite of the difficulty of the exercise because
of the many types involved. The issue before us is therefore very limited, in that it affects only a
small share of the comparisons made at the definitive stage – those of non-identical types only.
331 It is

327 See para. 7.159, supra.
328 Ibid.
329 Exhibit CDA-11, Preliminary Determination, p. 56066.
330 We do not understand Canada to have argued that DOC had not made the required adjustments
under Article 2.4 when comparing constructed (normal) values and export prices.
331 Comparisons of non-identical types represented less than 20 per cent of the total volume exported
by respondents. The precise figure cannot be provided for confidentiality reasons. (US response to question 25
of the Panel, para. 40)

only with respect to these non-identical comparison s that we are called to determine whether the
United States acted in conformity with Article 2.4.
7.174 Nor is the situation before us one in whic h the respondents were passive. Quite on the
contrary. In its answer to a question from us limite d to the issue of the demonstration that differences
in dimension affected price comparability, Canada has referred to (and provided copies of) more than
20 submissions made by parties in the course of the investigation. 332 In addition, Canada provided
references of submissions made by the applicant as well as references to documents issued by DOC
and ITC in the context of the investigation. The amount of comments and information before the
investigating authority was therefore considerable. In our view, the situation before us is therefore
quite different from that examined by the panels in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles and Egypt – Steel
Rebar.
7.175 Having set the factual framework under which we are to conduct our examination, we must
examine relevant evidence in order to determin e whether, based on it, an unbiased and objective
investigating authority could have concluded that no adjustment was warranted for differences in
dimensions when non-identical types of softwood lumber were compared.
7.176 Bearing in mind the discussion in the IDM cited in paragraph 7.159, supra, we are in no
doubt that DOC "applied its mind" to the facts before it. In particular, DOC examined first whether
differences in dimensions yielded variab le cost of manufacturing differences. 333 T h i s t e s t d i d n o t
yield any difference. DOC next examined th e sales databases submitted by the respondents,
concluding that "in this case, to the extent that we compared products havi ng different dimensions,
those differences were generally small. Furthermor e, as Abitibi argued, the record shows that lumber
prices for different products fluctuated in rela tion to each other over the course of the POI.
Consequently, there appears to be little, if any, differen ce in home market prices that is attributable to
differences in dimensions of the products compared". 334 In support of these conclusions, the
United States has provided us with copies of some comparisons looked at by DOC. These are
included in Exhibits US-42, 43, 76 and 81. We consider that DOC's finding with respect to the
fluctuation of lumber prices for the different typ es which are compared therein is supported by those
charts. A discernible pattern of price differences is in our view necessary for a conclusion that a given
difference affects price comparability. If, as here, prices of types compared fluctuated against each
other, criss-crossing themselves in many instances, without following any established pattern, we fail
to see how an unbiased and objective investigati ng authority could be obligated to come to a
conclusion that differences in dimension affect pric e comparability. Bearing this in mind, we are of
the view that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could have concluded that data before
DOC did not demonstrate that the remaining differe nces in dimensions affected price comparability
because those data did not demonstrate how dimensi ons affected price comparability nor that there
was a pattern or standard devia tion that would have allowed an adjustment to be made as the
correlations ran by DOC showed different results and random as well.

332 Canada response to question 22 of the Panel, para. 87 and Exhibit CDA-142, Respondents' Record
Data regarding DIFMER.
333 We note, in this regard, the following statement contained in the IDM:

"[w]e do not consider it appropriate to use a value-based cost allocation method for allocating
different costs to a large number of varying products with only minor physical differences
(e.g., the hundreds or even thousands of differing combinations of dimensions and grade of
lumber cut from logs) and no cl ear significant differ ences in value. Where minor differences
in values occur among products having minor physical differences and are inconsistent due to
frequent and inconsistent price fluctuations, an y resulting cost differences would be artificial
and meaningless". (Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 4, note 60)

334 See para. 7.159, supra.

7.177 This conclusion is not altered by Canada's response to questi on 22 of the Panel, in which
Canada refers us to a number of documents in support of its arguments . We have carefully examined
them. A first group of documents, relating to the product matching mechanism, contains submissions
of respondents and applicant and various communica tions of DOC. A second group of submissions
contains requests for guidance on what additional da ta should be submitted in order to permit the
calculation of value-based adjustments for differen ces in physical characteristics. A third group
contains specific comments on breaks in commercia l value of softwood lumber products and on
comparisons of prices of individual lumber products . Finally, Canada refers to ITC and DOC's
Preliminary Injury and Dumping Determination, respectively.
7.178 With respect to the first group, while Canada ma y be correct that, if dimension did not affect
price comparability, there would have been no reason to include dimension in the product matching
mechanism, we find that the question whether those differences are actually demonstrated to affect
price comparability must be determined in light of positive evidence before investigating authorities.
Thus, even if Canada's argument were correct, a concession at such an early stage of the investigation
would not preclude the investigating authority to change its position if positive evidence were to point
to another conclusion. In any event, the issue befo re us is not whether dimensional differences in the
abstract could affect price comparability, but whether those remaining dimensional differences that
existed after DOC engaged in product matching were demonstrated to affect price comparability.
7.179 As far as the second group of submissions is concerned, it is undisputed that DOC had
sufficient data before it during th e investigation to examine whethe r differences in dimensions were
demonstrated to affect price comparability. We do not consider that there could be data more
probative than the actual data on costs and prices of respondents for the POI, and it is undisputed that
those were before DOC. In any case, we note that respondents submitted historical average price data
as well as Random Lengths data. Thus, we do not consider that DOC acted unreasonably in not
giving guidance on which other additional data could be submitted.
7.180 Regarding the third group, Abitibi, Slocan and the applicant commented on breaks in
commercial value of softwood lumber products, especia lly with respect to length. Those exporters
proposed the establishment of length bands. In our view, the linkage of commercial value
considerations and length groupings was a step in the direction of demonstrating that, at least,
differences in length could have affected pri ce comparability. However, we note that, when
comparing non-identical types for the purpose of the Final Determination, DOC first attempted to
compare within the bands agreed with exporte rs, and matched across le ngth bands only when a
similar match was not available within the band.
335 Thus, in our view, DOC addressed the concerns
of the exporters in that regard.
7.181 Furthermore, Abitibi referred to price comparis ons of specific models. Abitibi submitted two
graphs with monthly average prices during the POI for four different grades of types 2x4x8 and
2x6x16. "For example, at the beginning, of the pe riod, in April 2000, Abitibi's average net price for
No. 2 grade 2x4x8 was around [[****]] whereas the No. 2 2x6x16 price was [[****]]. The
comparable figures for economy grade were [[**** ]] for the smaller size and [[****]] for the
larger".
336 It is obvious that, in submitting the referred charts, Abitibi was in fact assessing data it had
submitted in its databases. Howeve r, we consider that what Abitibi did, was, at most, to advance a
possible methodology to marshal the cost and prici ng data previously subm itted. Canada has not
argued, nor shown to us, that Abitibi requested DOC to analyse the data before it in the manner in
which Abitibi had presented it, that is on a monthl y-basis, nor the reasons why DOC should have
analysed it in such a manner.

335 US response to question 25 of the Panel, para. 38.
336 For confidentiality reasons, information inside the brackets has been erased.

7.182 Finally, Canada refers to several statements by DOC and ITC that – it considers – concede
that the dimensional differences at issue here affected price comparability. Specifically, Canada
refers to DOC's finding in the Preliminary Determination that "there are several significant differences
in physical characteristics which affect price..."
337 and to the ITC's statement in its Preliminary Injury
Determination that "[s]oftwood lumber prices genera lly differ substantially depending on grades and
dimensions".338 We note that the first statement refers to differences in physical characteristics
generally, and the second to grade and dimension togeth er. Both are abstract statements about such
differences, rather than specific statements about the particular dimensional differences remaining
after DOC performed product matching. We cannot c onclude on the basis of these general statements
that those US agencies had conceded that the pa rticular differences in dimension remaining for non-
identical matches were demonstrated to affect price comparability.
7.183 In sum, we do not consider that the above -examined communications show that it was
demonstrated in the investigation that the remaining differences in dimension which were not resolved
by product matching affected price comparability. In our view, exporters could have been more
forthcoming in suggesting ways in which DOC should have marshalle d the data before it. 339 Had the
respondents argued that DOC should have examined data in a particular way, in light of the specific
facts of the case, and had DOC analysed that data in an unreasonable manner, thus determining that
differences in dimension were not demonstrated to have affected price comparability, we might have
found that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4. This, however, we do not find to be
the case.
7.184 For the foregoing reasons, and keeping in mind th e standard of review we are bound to apply
to the examination of the matter before us, we find that Canada has not established that the
United States acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in not granting the
requested adjustment for differences in dimension.340

337 Exhibit CDA-11, DOC's Preliminary Determination, p. 56066.
338 Exhibit CDA-31, ITC's Preliminary Determination, p. 16.
339 In so concluding, we note that Canada is of the view that the United States should have conducted
its examination differently. In particular, Canada takes issue with the US approach of using individual
transaction data in the charts presented in Exhibits US-43, 76 and 81. We ar e of the view that the United States
used one of the possible methodologies to assess the data it had received from respondents. We understand
Canada to argue that it would have been more appropri ate to use monthly or annual average price data because
"averages smooth out data fluctuations caused by the different mechanisms and times at which prices are set in
relation to invoice date". (Canada first written submissi on, para. 148; Exhibit CDA-76, POI Average Prices for
Different Lengths and Widths; and Canada comments to the US response to question 97 of the Panel, para. 11)
However, Article 2.4 does not mandate the use of any particular methodology. Furthermore, we have found in
para. 7.176, supra, that an objective and unbiased investigating au thority could have concluded that data before
DOC did not demonstrate that differences in dimensions affected price comparability. If Canada – or the
respondents – considered that DOC should have examined the data in another manner, they should have
motivated to DOC why their proposed methodology should have been used.
340 Canada asserts that:

"[t]he United States had an affirmative duty under Article 6 to notify Canadian parties that it
did not intend to use dimension for price because it had put the Canadian parties on notice to
the contrary in the questionnaires and in every other aspect of the investigation. All requisite
data for the analysis were on the record. The Canadian parties had no reason to submit
analyses of the data to prove a point on which Commerce and all parties seemed to have
agreed. Had Commerce put the parties on notice about this issue, as required under
Article 6.1, the respondents would have prepared and filed with Commerce analyses similar to
the Tembec Regression Analysis, which in any ev ent is derived entirely from record evidence
and could have as easily been performed by Commerce itself if it had doubts about the
importance of dimension". (Canada response to question 4 of the Panel, para. 5)

I. C
LAIM 6: ARTICLES 2.4 AND 2.4.2 – ZEROING
(a) Factual Background
7.185 In the anti-dumping investigation underlying this dispute, DOC divided the product under
investigation into groups of identical, or broa dly similar, product types. After making certain
adjustments within each product type, DOC calculat ed a weighted average normal value and export
price for each product type, and then compared th e weighted averages for each product type. This
process resulted in multiple values, one for each product type. In some instances this comparison
showed that the weighted average export price for a specific product type was less that the weighted
average normal value, while in other instances, th e comparison showed that the weighted average
export price was greater than the weighted average normal value. These values were then aggregated
to produce one single value, the margin of du mping for the product under investigation for each
investigated exporter. In the aggregation process, a value of "zero" was attributed to those product
comparisons where the weighted average export pric e was greater than the weighted average normal
value. DOC then aggregated the positive values from the individual product type comparisons, that
is, those instances where the we ighted average export price was lower than the weighted normal
value, and divided the result by the total value of e xports, to arrive at a weighted average margin of
dumping.
7.186 For ease of reference of the reader, but without gi ving any legal status to the concept, we will
follow the approach of the parties by referring to those instances where the export price is greater than
the normal value, as "negative dumping margins" or "negative dumping". 341 We will refer to the
process of attributing a "zero" value to the indivi dual product type comparisons where the weighted
average export price is greater than the weighted average normal value for th e same product type as
"zeroing".
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.187 Canada asserts that the methodology used by the United States in the underlying
investigation did not fully take into account "all co mparable export transactions", in violation of the
requirements of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Canada notes that the practice of "zeroing",
followed by DOC in this case, is identical to that used by the EC, which in EC – Bed Linen was found
to be inconsistent with that Article. In addition, Canada claims that the methodology applied by DOC
did not produce a fair comparison as required by Article 2.4 because it did not in fact average all
values.

7.188 Although Canada agrees with the United States that Article 2.4.2 does not preclude an
intermediate stage of comparing export prices w ith normal values on a product type basis before
aggregating these values to determine an overall margin of dumping , Canada is of the view that
Article 2.4.2 establishes a single standard for th e calculation of a margin of dumping which is
applicable to all stages of the calculation, whether inte rmediate or final. Canada therefore asserts that
Article 2.4.2 requires that all export transactions have to be taken fully into consideration throughout
the process of calculating the overall margin of dumping and not only in the first stage.

Canada has not invoked in its Panel Request an Article 6.1 violation with respect to DOC's
determination at issue and consequently a claim based thereon is clearly outside the Panel's terms of reference.
Hence, we refrain from ruling on whether the United Stat es has acted inconsistently with Article 6.1 or any
other provision in Article 6 of the AD Agreement.
341 We note that there might be differences on how this methodology is applied by different
investigating authorities. However, when we refer to the term "zeroing", we refer to the methodology as applied
by the DOC in the underlying anti-dumping investigation as described by DOC in Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, pp. 65-
66.

7.189 The United States replies that Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 do not address the manner in which
particular model-specific or level-of-trade-specific dumping margins are to be combined to determine
an overall dumping margin. The United States asserts that, by arguing that the phrase "all comparable
export transactions" refers to "[a]ll sales of goods falling within the scope of an investigation,"
Canada deprives the term "comparabl e" in Article 2.4.2 of any meaning, instead making it equivalent
to the term "all", which immediately precedes it. In the view of the United States, the comparison
obligations contained in Article 2.4.2 are "[s]ubject to the provisions governing fair comparison in
paragraph 4". Thus, Article 2.4, which provides explicit context for the methods for establishing the
existence of dumping under Article 2.4.2, means that, under the instruction in Article 2.4.2 to compare
"a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export
transactions," not all export transactions will be eq ually comparable with all transactions used for
normal value purposes. Consequently, once the comparison has been identified pursuant to
Article 2.4, it would be improper to compare a we ighted average normal value with respect to one
model or level of trade to a weighted average of prices for a different model or level of trade.
According to the United States, Canada's prescrip tion for combining particular dumping margins for
purposes of developing a single, overall dumping margin would require precisely that, contrary to the
requirements of Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4.
7.190 The United States further argues that the use of plural term "margins" in Article 2.4.2 operates
to limit the scope of that provision to intermedia te stage calculations only, which confirms its
interpretation of Article 2.4.2. The United States also argues that the purpose of an anti-dumping
investigation is to determine whether or not dumping exists, and that the AD Agreement does
therefore not require that "positive" margins of dumping be offset by "negative" margins of dumping.
7.191 In the view of Canada, the term "margins" refers to the overall dumping margin for a
product, as there is no language in Article 2.4.2 th at suggests that the overall dumping margin would
not be among the "margins" referred to in Article 2.4. 2. Canada also finds support for its position in
the function of Article 2. Thus, reading Article 2. 4.2 in conjunction with Article 2.1, Canada states
the "margins of price difference" calculated in the first stage are of secondary importance to
Article 2.4.2, as the sole concern of that provi sion is to set rules governing how investigating
authorities are to determine margins of dumping. Ca nada asserts that the US reading of Article 2.4.2
would lead to the absurd result that an investig ating authority could carefully consider positive and
negative margins at the intermediate stage, a nd then discard all but the single highest positive
dumping margin in establishing the overall margin for each exporter. Canada also argues that zeroing
is by definition inconsistent with the calculation of a "true "weighted average"".
342
7.192 In the view of the United States, Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4 do not mandate any particular method
for combining model-specific, level-of-trade-sp ecific individual dumping margins to establish a
single, overall margin. According to the United States, this is corroborated by the negotiating history
of the AD Agreement. In the view of the United States, that negotiating history demonstrates that the
question whether to address zeroing was presented to the negotiators, and that the draft text, as
compared to the AD Agreement 's predecessor, the GATT Anti-Dumping Code , was not modified to
prohibit this methodology. Further, the negotiatin g history demonstrates that insertion of the word
"comparable" into Article 2.4.2 was intended precisely to ensure that the term "all" not be interpreted
to imply that an average export price is to be est ablished on the basis of sales both within and outside
of the category of comparison.
7.193 Canada asserts that the negotiating history does not support the US view. In the first place,
contrary to the US assertion, Canada contends that participants in the negotiations did not view the
term "all" as a mere "drafting e rror" and understood the text to prohibit zeroing. With respect to the
US interpretation of the purpose of the inclusion of the term "comparable", Canada states that the US
assertion that its concerns with regard to zeroi ng were satisfied by the addition of the term

342 Canada response to question 28 of the Panel, para. 102.

"comparable" offers no indication of how the rest of the participants in the negotiations viewed the
addition of this term. Canada also disagrees with th e US view that its interpretation of Article 2.4.2
deprives the term "comparable" of any meaning. Canada agrees that "Article 2.4.2 applies to
intermediate stage comparisons". For such comp arisons, "comparable" ensures that model-specific
comparisons only include transactions meeting the requirements of "price comparability" contained in
Article 2.4, while "[a]ll" ensures that all transactions meeting those requirements are utilized.
7.194 Referring to the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen , Japan asserts that the US practice
is inconsistent with Article 2.4, read in conjunction with Article 2.1, of the AD Agreement.
7.195 The EC asserts that the US methodology for determining the numerator for the purposes of
the weighted average margin calculation in no way differs from the EC "zeroing" methodology,
already found to be incompatible with Articles 2.4 an d 2.4.2. The EC requests the Panel to reject the
arguments put forward by the United States concerning the compatibility of that methodology with
the AD Agreement.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.196 The issue before the Panel is whether the me thodology used by DOC in the underlying anti-
dumping investigation whereby it attributed a valu e of zero to those instances where the weighted
average export price was greater than the weight ed average normal value when aggregating the
different values determined for the different produc t types to compute the overall margin of dumping,
is consistent with the obligations imposed by Artic le 2.4.2 and the "fair comparison" requirement in
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement.
343,344
7.197 Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement provides in relevant part as follows:
"[s]ubject to the provisions governing fair comparison in [Article 2.4], the existence
of margins of dumping during the investig ation phase shall normally be established
on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual
export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account

 343 We note that, in the IDM, DOC justified its use of the methodology at issue by referring to
Sections 771(35)(A) and 771(35)(B) of the US Tariff Act as follows:

"[t]hese sections, taken together, direct [DOC] to aggregate all individual dumping margins,
each of which is determined by the amount by which normal value exceeds export price or
constructed export price, and to divide this amount by the value of all sales. The directive to
determine the "aggregate dumping margins" in section 771(35)(B) makes clear that the
singular "dumping margin" in section 771(35)(A) applies on a comparison-specific level, and
does not apply on an aggregate basis". (Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 12, p. 66)

We do not understand Canada to challenge the abov e-referred sections of the US statute but DOC's
application of zeroing when determining the overall margin of dumping for the Canadian exporters involved in
the softwood lumber investigation. For this reason, we do not examine the consistency of Sections 771(35)(A)
and 771(35)(B) with relevant provisions of the AD Agreement.
344 We do not understand Canada to dispute that DOC was entitled to make adjustments within each
product type to ensure an "apples-to-apples" comparison within that product type, calculate a weighted average
normal value and a weighted average export price for each product type, and compare the two.

appropriately by the use of a weight ed average-to-weighted average or
transaction-to-transaction comparison."
7.198 Article 2.4 provides in relevant part that:
"[a] fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditi ons and terms of sale, taxation, levels
of trade, quantities, physical characteristi cs, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability."
7.199 Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement provides that a fair comparison shall be made between
export price and normal value, and sets out specific parameters for how such comparisons are to be
made. The two sub-paragraphs of Article 2.4 deal with specific aspects of the comparison of normal
value and export price. Article 2.4.1 – which is no t at issue in this disput e – provides rules for the
conversion of currencies, when such conversion is necessary for the purposes of a comparison under
Article 2.4. Article 2.4.2 establishes that, subject to the requirement of a fair comparison, dumping
margins should normally be established on the basis of a comparison between a weighted average
export price to a weighted average normal value, or on the basis of a transaction-to-transaction
comparison. A comparison between a weighted average normal value to individual export
transactions is allowed only in limited circumstances.
7.200 The issue before us is whether zeroing is a llowed when an investigating authority is
calculating an overall margin of dumping under the first – weighted average-to-weighted average –
methodology set forth in Article 2.4.2. We note that, in practice, the issue of zeroing arises in the
context of the weighted average-to-weighted av erage methodology only where the investigating
authority engages in so-called "m ultiple averaging", that is, where it sub-divides the product under
investigation into groups and performs a weighted average-to-weighted average comparison for each
group. Specifically, the issue of zeroing arises in the context of aggregating the results of these
multiple comparisons into an overall margin for each exporter/producer for the product under
investigation. Where only a single weighted average-to-weighted average comparison is performed, it
seems to us that the issue of zeroing per se could not arise (although there might still be issues about
the manner in which the averaging was performed).
7.201 In this case, DOC engaged in multiple aver aging on the basis of differing physical
characteristics of the product under investigati on. As mentioned in paragraph 7.159, supra, DOC
identified eleven physical characteristics and, with some exceptions, performed weighted average-to-
weighted average comparisons only on the basis of transactions involving merchandise which shared
these physical characteristics (this could be characte rized as multiple averaging based on product type
or model). Although multiple averaging based on di fferent types or models may be particularly
common, multiple averaging may also be used in other contexts. For example, an investigating
authority might perform multiple averaging in respect of sales made at different levels of trade (e.g.,
retail versus wholesale) or on the basis of sub-periods of the period of investigation
345 (the latter may
arise in cases where hyper-inflationary economies ar e involved). Thus, an investigating authority
might well resort to multiple averaging to ensure comparability even in a case of absolute product
homogeneity, i.e., where all of the product under inves tigation is identical and is being compared to
transactions involving identical goods in the market of the exporting country.
7.202 There is no dispute between the parties as to the appropriateness or consistency with the AD
Agreement of this multiple averaging approach to calculating dumping margins per se . To the

345 Panel Report, US – Stainless Steel, paras. 6.105-6.136.

contrary, Canada acknowledges that multiple averaging is permissible.
346 However, in light of the
fact that multiple averaging is a prerequisite for the issue of zeroing to arise in the context of applying
the weighted average-to-weighted average methodology, and taking into account the arguments of the
parties and the reasoning developed by the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen347, we consider that we
must examine the issue of multiple averaging if we are to arrive at reasoned conclusions regarding the
question of zeroing in the context of a weight ed average-to-weighted average comparison
methodology.
7.203 We begin our analysis with Article 2.4.2, wh ich provides that the existence of margins of
dumping shall normally be establis hed "on the basis of a comparis on of a weighted average normal
value with a weighted average of all comparable export transactions". (emphasis added) The word
"comparable", in its ordinary meaning, indicates that a weighted average normal value is not to be
compared to a weighted average export price that includes non-comparable export transactions, but only
to comparable export transactions. Further, we are required as treaty in terpreters to assume that when
the drafters included language in the treaty, that they intended that language to have some meaning.348 If
the drafters had intended to require that the existence of a dumping margin for a product always be
calculated by comparing a single weighted average normal value and a single weighted average of prices
of all export transactions, we do not believe that they would have included th e word "comparable" in
Article 2.4.2, as that word would serve no purpose in the text. The fact that the word "comparable" was
added to the text of Article 2.4.2 towards the end of the negotiating process, confirms our view that it
was included for a purpose and should not simply be disregarded as surplus verbiage.349
7.204 We are as treaty interpreters of course required to give meaning to all the terms of a treaty, and
we must therefore arrive at an interpretation of Article 2.4.2 that gives meaning both to the words "all"
and "comparable". In our view, however, there is no need to choose between the two terms. Rather, the
phrase "all comparable export transactions" would in its ordinary meaning appear to signify that
Members may only compare those export transactions which are comparable, but that it must compare
all such transactions. Thus, the term "all" plays an important role in the provision by ensuring that
Members do not exclude relevant transactions from their comparisons.
7.205 We note that a number of panels have expressed the view that multiple averaging is permitted
by Article 2.4.2. The issue h as been considered by both the US – Stainless Steel and Argentina –
Ceramic Tiles panels. Both panels concluded that multip le averaging was permitted by Article 2.4.2
in appropriate circumstances.
350

346 Canada response to question 30 of the Panel, para. 106 and Canada second written submission, para.
143.
347 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, paras. 46-66.
348 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 23 where it is stated that:

"... [o]ne of the corollaries of the 'general principle of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention
is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty".

349 The insertion of the word "comparable" into Article 2.4.2 represented the only modification to the
draft text of the Article between the date of the Draft Fi nal Act and the text as adopted at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, reflecting the current Article 2.4.2. (See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991) We agree with the panel in
US – Stainless Steel that this suggests that its inclusion was not merely incidental but reflected careful
consideration by the drafters. (Panel Report, US – Stainless Steel, para. 6.111, note 114)
 350 Panel Report, US – Stainless Steel, para. 6.111, where it is stated that:

"[t]he inclusion of the word "comparable" is in our view highly significant, as in its ordinary
meaning it indicates that a weighted average normal value is not to be compared to a weighted
average export price that incl udes non-comparable export transactions. It flows from this

7.206 We do not consider that, by definition, "all types or models falling within the scope of a 'like'
product must necessarily be comparable" 351, nor more generally that all export transactions of the
product under investigation will necessarily be compar able to the home market sales against which a
comparison is to be made. Leaving aside the issue of the meaning of likeness, the fact that Article 2.4
explicitly provides for due allowan ces to be made for differences that affect price comparability
means to us that, in the absence of such adjustments, certain transactions may not be comparable. In
other words, the very reason due allowance may be necessary is precisely because the transactions
might not otherwise be comparable. This lack of comparability could be due to differences in
physical characteristics – a basis for allowance that is specifically identified in Article 2.4 – but
Article 2.4 tells us that non-comparability could also arise from differences in conditions and terms of
sale, levels of trade, quantities and other unspecified differences. 352 Thus, we do not believe that the
significance of the reference to "comparable" expor t prices can simply be discounted on the grounds
that the products/transactions must "necessarily be comparable".353
7.207 Of course, one way to ensure comparability is to make due allowance for certain differences,
but given the inclusion of the term "comparable" in Article 2.4.2 we are not convinced that this
method, however important, is the exclusive means allowed by the AD Agreement to ensure
comparability. Nor, from a practical perspective, do we believe that such an approach would be
desirable. In theory, of course, any difference between products/transactions can be accounted for by
adjustments. In many cases, however, it may be di fficult to determine whether a difference affects
price comparability such that an adjustment is required, much le ss to establish the amount of the
adjustment that would be appropriate. While some differences, such as differences in taxation, may
be easy to quantify and adjust for, adjustments for differences in physical characteristics may be
complex and highly uncertain, depending upon the numbe r and extent of the differences in physical
characteristics, and the extent to which those reflect differences in costs of production. The issue of
whether or not DOC should have made due allo wance for differences in dimension, addressed
elsewhere in this Report, is a demonstration of how complex adjustment questions may be. The
quantification of other types of ad justments, such as for differences in level of trade, may be even
more problematic. It is therefore not surprising that many investigating authorities – and respondent
exporters – prefer to limit to the extent possible the need for such adjustments by performing their
comparisons on the basis of groups of transactio ns sharing common characteristics. Thus, we
consider that the use of multiple averaging is co nsistent with the overall objective of Article 2.4,
which is to ensure a fair comparison when comparing export price to normal value.
7.208 We find further support for our view from the fa ct that Article 2.4.2 allows dumping margins
to be calculated on the basis either of weighted -average-to-weighted-average or transaction-to-
transaction comparisons. When an investiga ting authority uses a transaction-to-transaction
methodology, it is in a position to select the most similar products/transactions possible for

conclusion that a Member is not required to co mpare a single weighted average normal value
to a single weighted average ex port price in cases where certain export transactions are not
comparable to transactions that represent th e basis for the calculation of the normal value".
(footnote omitted)

See also Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.99, where it is stated that:

"[w]e consider that the use of types or models is a valid method of ensuring a fair comparison
between normal value and export price under Article 2.4".

351 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 58.
352 We are also of the view that the authorization in Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement to use certain
sampling techniques where "the number of (...) types of products" is too large, confirms our interpretation that
there may be differences in physical characteristics be tween products being compared, and should dispel those
doubts entirely.
353 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 58.

comparison, and may therefore be able to minimize the extent of the adjustments that need to be
made. We consider it unlikely that the drafters w ould have agreed to allow comparisons only at the
most aggregated level (a single weighted-average -to-weighted-average comparison) or the most
disaggregated level (transaction-to-transaction) while disallowing the intermediate approach of
multiple averaging. Rather, it seems more likely to us that the intention of the drafters in specifying
that Members shall normally be restricted to a we ighted-average-to-weighted-average or transaction-
to-transaction approach was to make clear that a weighted-average-to-transaction approach – a
methodology that was widely used before the current AD Agreement came into effect – was only
permitted in the limited circumstances specified in the second sentence of Article 2.4.2.
7.209 We are, of course, aware that Article 2.4.2 pr ovides for the establishment of the existence of
margins of dumping on the basis of a comparison of a weighted-average-normal-value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable e xport transactions, i.e., that the reference to "a"
comparison is in the singular rather than in the plural. We note however that the second methodology
(transaction-to-transaction) also refers to " a comparison of normal value to export prices on a
transaction by transaction basis", yet the subsequent reference to export prices makes clear that in
such a methodology investigating authorities are not restricted to establishing dumping margins by
comparing one single normal value transaction to a si ngle export price, but by definition will, in any
case in which there is more than one transaction, be performing multiple comparisons of individual
transactions. As for the reference to " a weighted average normal value", this use of the singular may
be understood to mean that each group of "comparabl e" export transactions is to be compared to a
single weighted-average-normal-value.
7.210 Our analysis of multiple averaging does not rely upon the reference in Article 2.4.2 to the
establishment of "margins of dumping". Although it c ould be argued that this phrase is in the plural
precisely because multiple averaging produces a dumping margin for each category of
product/transaction compared, it could just as well be th e case that it is in the plural because in many
cases there will be multiple exporters or producers. We consider however that, assuming that the
reference to "margins of dumping" means the ma rgin of dumping for the product under investigation
as a whole
354, our analysis above supports the conclusion that multiple averaging is nevertheless not
prohibited by Article 2.4.2. In particular, while it may well be that the reference to "margins of
dumping" is a reference to the overall margin for th e exports of the product under investigation, this
would mean simply that Article 2.4.2 provides gui dance with respect to the methodologies used for
determining the existence of such margins. 355 It would not, in our view, compel the conclusion that
such overall margins could not be derived on the basis of multiple averaging.
7.211 In light of our analysis above, we conclude, and ag ree with the parties to this dispute, that the
use of multiple averaging is not prohibited by the AD Agreement.
7.212 Having found that multiple averaging, per se, is not prohibited by the AD Agreement, we next
consider whether the methodology applied by DOC in this case when aggregating the values
generated from multiple averaging, in which "neg ative dumping" was attributed a zero value, is
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2.
7.213 Bearing in mind our conclu sion in paragraph 7.211, supra, regarding multiple averaging, we
will now consider the obligations of an investiga ting authority when calculating a weighted-average-

354 As the Appellate Body concluded in para. 53 of its Report in EC – Bed Linen.
355 We note further that Article 2.4.2 requires that the "existence of margins of dumping during the
investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal
value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions . . . ". (emphasis added) We note
that the ordinary meaning of the word "basis" is "the underlying support for a process". ( The Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 113) This suggests to us that, while the
determination of the existence of margins of dumping must be based on weighted average-to-weighted average
comparisons, Article 2.4.2 was not intended to spell out in detail all elements of that calculation.

normal-value and a weighted-ave rage-export-price in accordance with Article 2.4.2 of the AD
Agreement when the product under investigation is di vided into sub-categories based on types or
models, levels of trade or other differences. The question of zeroing arises in the process of
aggregating the weighted averages for the differe nt types or models, levels of trade or other
differences, into a single, overall margin of dumping. With regard to this process, parties express
diverging views as to whether Article 2.4.2 applies to the determination and comparison of weighted
average normal values and weighted average export pr ices only for each of the types or models (the
so-called "first stage") – as the United States argues – or whether it also applies to the aggregation of
the results for each of the comparisons made (the so-called "second-stage") – as Canada argues. 356
Thus, the United States asserts that the text "all co mparable export transactions" in Article 2.4.2 is –
because of the insertion of the word "comparable" – applicable only to the first stage of the
calculation process. The United States argues that Ar ticle 2.4.2 does not apply to the second stage in
the calculation process; thereby not disallowing the u se of zeroing by an investigating authority.
Canada does not dispute that there are two stag es, as asserted by the United States. However, it
disagrees with the US argument that Article 2.4.2 does not discipline the second stage.
7.214 In our examination of this question, we keep in mind the Appellate Body's findings with
regard to the issue of whether Article 2.4.2 cont emplates whether the calculation of the margin of
dumping, as envisaged in Article 2.4.2, can be divided into two distinct stages 357, as well as the
parties' submissions on this issue. In our view, whether Article 2.4.2 contemplates one or two stages
in the calculation of the overall margin of dumpi ng and whether the term "comparable" in "all
comparable export transactions" relates only to the first stage or to both – in case there were two
stages – are related questions. We note that the calculation of the margin of dumping is a process
which starts with the determination of the normal va lue, and it continues with the establishment of the
export price. Both prices are subsequently adjusted in order to ensure a "fair comparison", as required
by Article 2.4. Finally, these two values – normal value and export price – are compared, for the
purpose of computing the overall margin of dumping. Thus, in our view, a determination of the
margin of dumping in an anti-dumping investigation could be sub-divided into a whole range of steps
or stages, forming a coherent process. At issue are the last two steps in this process of calculating the
overall margin of dumping. We do not consider th at the question before us is whether there are
several steps or stages contemplated in Article 2.4. 2 and, if this is the case, whether the obligation
imposed by Article 2.4.2 with respect to the calculation of the margin of dumping under the weighted-
average-to-weighted-average methodology applies to the first stage only because of the term
"comparable" in "all comparable export transactions". Rather, we are of the view that the question
before us is whether an investigating authority is allowed to partially exclude from the aggregation
process those results of comparing types or models for which the weighted-average-normal-value was
determined to be less than the weighted-average-export-price in the aggregation process.
7.215 It is clear that Article 2.4.2 requires that all comparable export transactions have to be taken
into account when the weighted aver age normal value is compared to the weighted average of prices
of all comparable export transactions. We note th at this interpretation of the requirement of
Article 2.4.2 is the same as that of the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen.
358
7.216 Through the use of zeroing, it is clear to us that the entirety of the prices of some export
transactions, i.e., those export transactions where th e weighted-average-export-price is greater than
the weighted-average-normal-value, in the second stage of the process, are not taken into account. 359

356 The two "stages" are described by the United States in its response to question 109 of the Panel,
para. 52.
357 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 53.
358 Id., para. 55.
359 The panel in EC – Bed Linen explained how zeroing affects prices of the export transactions to
which is applied:

Recalling our view that the calculation of the marg in of dumping is a continuous process, we fail to
understand why the negotiators of the AD Agreement would have included an obligation in the
provisions of the AD Agreement (the term "all" in "all comparable export transactions"), if, in the very
next step of the calculation process – through zeroing – investigating authorities were to be allowed to
ignore this very same obligation (certain values whic h they were obligated to take into account in the
first stage of the process). In other words, we do no t interpret the requirement of Article 2.4.2 to bear
only on the first stage of the process, but rather vi ew that obligation as applying to the process as a
whole. We are of the view that, if the drafters ha d intended that Article 2.4.2 applies only to the first
stage of the process, they would have made this clear. The United States has not advanced any
argument explaining why an interpretation that Article 2.4.2 is applicable to the pre-aggregation stage
should be accepted by us, apart from the argument that the AD Agreement does not contain any
requirements as to the second stage of the process. We find this argumentation of the United States
not convincing.
7.217 Considering the requirement of Article 2.4.2 th at the existence of margins of dumping has to
be established for softwood lumber on the basis of a comparison of the weighted-average-normal-
value with the weighted average of prices of a ll comparable export transactions, that is, for all
transactions involving all types of the product under investigation, we are of the view that the
United States did not take into account all compar able export transactions when DOC calculated the
overall margin of dumping in the investigation at issue.
7.218 The United States also argues that:
"[t]hus, interpreting the language of the fi rst methodology [average-to-average] as
requiring authorities to offset dumping margin s implies that the negotiators addressed
the offset issue with respect to that me thodology, but not the other two [transaction-
to-transaction and average normal value-to-individual transaction export price],
leaving the issue to the Members' discreti on when utilizing either of the other two
methodologies. Canada offers no interpretation of Article 2.4.2 that justifies such an
anomalous result, nor does it offer any expl anation as to why the negotiators might
have intended to create such an anomaly."
360
7.219 We note that Canada has not raised any claim with regard to DOC's use of "the other two
methodologies". Thus, it is not within the Panel's terms of reference to rule on whether zeroing can,
or cannot, be used when determining the overa ll margin of dumping under the other comparison

"[b]y counting as zero the results of comparisons showing a "neg ative" margin, the European
Communities, in effect, changed the prices of the export transactions in those comparisons. It
is, in our view, impermissible to "zero" such "n egative" margins in esta blishing the existence
of dumping for the product under investigation, since this has the effect of changing the
results of an otherwise proper comparison. This effect arises because the zeroing effectively
counts the weighted average export price to be equal to the weighted average normal value for
those models for which "negative" margins were found in the comparison, despite the fact that
it was, in reality, higher than the weighted average normal value. This is the equivalent of
manipulating the individual export prices coun ted in calculating the weighted average, in
order to arrive at a weighted average equal to th e weighted average normal value. As a result,
we consider that an overall dumping margin calculated on the basis of zeroing "negative"
margins determined for some models is not based on comparisons which fully reflect all
comparable export prices, and is therefore calcu lated inconsistently with the requirements of
Article 2.4.2". (Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 6.115)

 We agree with the above explana tion of how zeroing manipulates the outcome of what should be a
determination of dumping which, up to the point of aggregation of the margins of dumping, is consistent with
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.4.1 of the AD Agreement.
360 US first written submission, paras. 158-159.

methodologies set forth in Article 2.4.2, i.e., tr ansaction-to-transaction and weighted average normal
value-to-individual transaction export price.361
7.220 Finally, the United States asserts that the negotiating history of the AD Agreement confirms
that the calculation of the margin of dumping using zer oing is consistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2.
Canada disagrees.
7.221 We note that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary me ans of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."

7.222 We also note that the Appellate Body has consistently found that:
"[a] treaty interpreter must begin with, a nd focus upon, the text of the particular
provision to be interpreted. It is in the wo rds constituting that provision, read in their
context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be
sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or
where confirmation of the correctness of the r eading of the text itself is desired, light
from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought."362
7.223 As we consider that the meaning imparted by the text of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement
itself, is neither equivocal nor inconclusive as to wh ether zeroing is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of
the AD Agreement , we do not deem it necessary in the case before us to have recourse to the
negotiating history in order to confirm the correctness of our reading of the text of that provision.

361 Although we are mindful that we are not calle d upon to decide whether zeroing is allowed or
disallowed under the transaction-to-transaction and weighted-average-normal-value to individual export
transaction methodologies, we are of the view that the use of zeroing when determining a margin of dumping
based on the transaction-to-transaction methodology woul d not be in conformity with Article 2.4.2 of the AD
Agreement. As for the use of zeroing when determining a margin of dumping based on the third (weighted
average-to-individual) methodology, we note that this methodology is exceptional in nature and can only be
used in specific defined situations. Without intending to express any view as to the permissibility of zeroing
when this third methodology is used, we do not agree with the United States that it would be an "anomaly" if
zeroing were prohibited in the case of average-to-ave rage comparisons but not in the exceptional case of
weighted average-to-individual comparisons.
362 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 114. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
paras. 61-62, where it is stated that:

"… we recall that Article 3.2 of the DSU recogn izes that interpretative issues arising in WTO
dispute settlement are to be resolved through the application of customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. It is well settled in WTO case law that the principles
codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna
Convention") are such customary rules.

… the task of interpreting a treaty provision must begin with its specific terms ". (emphasis
added)

7.224 We therefore find that the United States has violated Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement by
not taking into account all comparable export transactions when DOC calculated the overall margin of
dumping as Article 2.4.2 requires that the existence of margins of dumping has to be established for
softwood lumber on the basis of a comparison of the weighted-average-normal-value with the
weighted average of prices of all comparable expor t transactions, that is, for all transactions involving
all types of the product under investigation.
7.225 Canada raises a separate claim of violation of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. In support of
its claim, Canada argues that "[a] "fair comparison" requires equitable, unbiased treatment of all
transactions being compared. Zeroing does not produce a fair comparison because it arbitrarily
eliminates certain transactions from the calculation, r esulting in a margin that does not equally reflect
all transactions".
363 The United States disagrees.364
7.226 Having found in paragraph 7.224, supra, that the methodology applied by DOC when
calculating the overall margin of dumping in the in vestigation on certain softwood lumber products
from Canada is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement, we consider that it is neither
appropriate, nor necessary for us to rule on Canada's Article 2.4 claim.
J. CLAIM 7: ARTICLES 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 AND 2.4 – ALLOCATION OF FINANCIAL
EXPENSES: ABITIBI
(a) Factual Background
7.227 In its questionnaire, DOC requested Abitibi to calculate financial expenses based on DOC's
normal methodology. In its response, Abitibi did not follow DOC's instructions and used a different
methodology. Abitibi argued that lumber production requires fewer assets, and thus less financing,
than other products. 365 Abitibi also asserted that the standa rd terms of sale for lumber require
prompter payment than do the terms of sale for ne wsprint, paper and pulp products. Thus, Abitibi
contended that the assets and financing needs of lu mber were significantly less than those of pulp,
value-added papers, and ne wsprint. In order to compute the portion of the company's net interest
expense related to lumber assets and operations, Abitibi first allocated net interest expense to the fixed
assets of each of the company's divisions based on average assets balances for the year 2000. Abitibi
then divided the interest associated with its lumber operations by the lumber division COGS for year
2000. Finally, Abitibi multiplied the resulting ratio by the total cost of manufacturing for each
product reported in its cost of production database to derive the reported per-unit net interest expense.
7.228 DOC rejected Abitibi's approach and, consiste nt with its "established practice", derived
financial costs attributable to softwood lumb er production through a proportionate allocation among
all goods, as explained in the following excerpt from the IDM:
"[DOC] disagree[s] with Abitibi that [it] should depart from its established practice of
calculating the financial expense ratio based on the financial expenses and cost of
goods sold from the parent company's audite d consolidated financial statements (i.e.,
based on the concept that money is fungible). Because there is no bright-line
definition in the Act of what a financial e xpense is or how the financial expense rate
should be calculated, [DOC] has developed a consistent and predictable practice for
calculating and allocating financial expenses. This method is to calculate the rate as

363 Canada response to question 108 (b) of the Panel, paras. 59-61.
364 US comments on Canada's responses to question 104 of the Panel, para. 7.
365 Thus, in year 2000, lumber sales were CDN$63 8 million, requiring assets of CDN$859 million,
meaning that each dollar of assets pr oduced CDN$0.74 in sales. Newsprint, however, required assets of
CDN$7,276 million to produce CDN$3,438 million in sales, or a ratio of 0.47. Value-added paper and pulp
required assets of CDN$3,120 million to produce sales of CDN$1,601 million, for a ratio of 0.51. (Exhibit
CDA-83, Abitibi's Questionnaire Response, p. D-45)

the percentage of net interest expense over cost of sales, based on the consolidated
financial statements of the r espondent's parent company. Further, the record of this
investigation does not support the conclusion that [DOC]'s methodology distorts the
allocation of Abitibi's financial expenses. Setting aside Abitibi's assumptions that the
debt of the company only relates to asset s belonging to the pulp and paper activities,
[DOC]'s method addresses Abitibi's concern th at those activities are more capital
intensive. Specifically, those activities w ould have a higher depreciation expense on
their equipment and assets. Thus, when the consolidated financial expense rate is
applied to the cost of manufacturing of lu mber products, less interest will be applied
because the total cost of manufacturing for lumber products includes a lower
depreciation expense. In view of the above factors, [DOC has] used the verified cost
of goods sold including depreciation submitte d as part of Abitibi's revised financial
expense ratio calculation to allocate th e company's net financial expenses."
366
(footnote omitted)
7.229 Thus, DOC determined the amount for financ ial expense for softwood lumber as follows:
First, DOC determined Abitibi's total financial co st. Second, DOC took total financial cost and
compared it, as a ratio, to Abitibi's total COGS. Thir d, this ratio was applied to the total cost of
manufacturing for the product under investigation (sof twood lumber) in order to calculate a financial
expense specific to that product.
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.230 Canada asserts that, in disregarding Abitibi's proposed methodology and calculating the
financial expense ratio as it did, DOC failed to "consider all available evidence on the proper
allocation of costs", as required by Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. In addition, Canada asserts
that, in light of the facts before DOC, th e methodology used by DOC over-allocated Abitibi's
company-wide interest expense to softwood lumber by attributing to softwood lumber interest
expense that related to other products manufactured by Abitibi, and thus failed to result in an
allocation that "reasonably reflects the costs asso ciated with the production and sale of the product
under consideration" for Abitibi in cont ravention of Article 2.2.1.1. In support of this claim, Canada
identifies a number of problems with the methodology used by DOC. First, it does not include the
full value of long-term capital assets, nor does it include non-depreciable capital assets at all. Second,
unlike capital assets which need to be financed for the full year and longer, current production
expenses do not need to be financed for the full one -year period that DOC considered. According to
Canada, they need to be financed until payment is received. Finally, Canada argues that the
methodology used by DOC resulted in an inflated inte rest expense that included cost data on financial
expense that did not "pertain to production and sales" of softwood lumber, as required by
Article 2.2.2.
7.231 The United States replies that the theory underlying the use of the methodology applied by
DOC to determine the amount for financial expense is that financial costs should be allocated based
on the overall expenses incurred by a company to produce products, because financial costs are
directly related to a company's working capital requ irements. In the view of the United States, the
methodology used by DOC is reasonable, as required by Article 2.2. Specifically related to Canada's
claim, the United States asserts that DOC consider ed Abitibi's arguments on the calculation of the
amount for financial expense, but ultimately disag reed with them, and as explained in the IDM
allocated Abitibi's financial cost based on its own methodology. The United States notes that DOC
found in the IDM that, because money is fungible, a company can use proceeds for a variety of
corporate purposes, and it is irrelevant which cash outlay came from a specific loan or sales
transaction. What is relevant is the company's overall need to borrow money to fund its overall
production operations (i.e., equipment purchases as well as cost of production inputs). Contrary to

366 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 15, p. 77.

Canada's arguments that DOC ignored the asset-l aden nature of Abitibi's non-lumber producing
divisions, the United States asserts that DOC found in the IDM that DOC's methodology addresses
Abitibi's concern that those activities are more ass et-intensive. Specifically, those activities would
have a higher depreciation expense on their equipm ent and assets. Thus, when the consolidated
financial expense rate is applied to the cost of manufacturing of lumber products, less interest will be
applied because the total cost of manufacturing for lumber products includes a lower depreciation
expense. Thus, the United States argues that the methodology applied by DOC to allocate financial
costs to Abitibi's softwood lumber production w as based on a proper establishment, and on an
unbiased and objective evaluation, of the facts.
7.232 Japan asserts that Article 2.2.1.1 imposes an oblig ation on an investigating authority to
accept a respondent's accounting records for the production and sale of the product under
consideration, including SG&A, unless that authority finds that those records do not "reasonably
reflect" the costs. In the view of Japan, a determin ation of an investigating authority to depart from
the respondent's records must, therefore, be based on its review of the accounting records of a specific
respondent on a case-by-case basis. Japan furthe r asserts that, an investigating authority must
determine the amounts for SG&A costs based on al l evidence submitted by respondents, and on an
unbiased and objective evaluation of the facts. Japan argues that, if DOC applied a pre-determined
methodology to a particular respondent without revi ewing any evidence submitted by that respondent,
such application would be inconsis tent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in conjunction with
Article 17.6(i) thereof.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.233 We note that in the Panel Request Canada claims violations of Articles 2 of the AD
Agreement and VI:1 of the GATT 1994 .
367 However, in its restatement of claims and in its
submissions to the Panel, Canada only asserts violati ons of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4
with respect to Abitibi's determination of the amounts for financial expense for softwood lumber. 368
Accordingly, we will limit our examination to those claims.
7.234 Bearing this in mind, we note that DOC derive d the amounts for financial costs attributable to
Abitibi's softwood lumber production through a proportionate allocation among all goods produced by
that company, based on COGS. 369 Canada raises several claims in respect of these facts. First,
Canada asserts that, in selecting its alloca tion methodology for calculating the amounts for
financial/interest costs, DOC failed to "consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of
costs", as required by Article 2.2.1.1. Second, Canada argues that, in determining the amounts for
financial costs as it did, DOC over-allocated Abitibi's group-wide interest expense to Abitibi's cost of
production and sale for softwood lumber by attrib uting to softwood lumber amounts for financial
expense that related to Abitibi's other products, a nd thus failed to result in an allocation that
"reasonably reflects the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration" for Abitibi, as required by Article 2.2.1.1. Third, the application of DOC's
methodology resulted in an inflated amount for inter est costs because it included actual cost data on
financial expense that did not "pertain to produc tion and sales" of softwood lumber, in breach of
Article 2.2.2.
7.235 Because Canada's first two claims relate to Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement , we first
examine the nature of the obligations in that article. Article 2.2.1.1 provides in pertinent part:
"costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the

367 WT/DS264/2, para. 3(c).
368 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi).
369 See paras. 7.227-7.229, supra.

generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration. Authorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation
of costs, including that which is made av ailable by the exporter or producer in the
course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically utilized
by the exporter or producer... "
7.236 Article 2.2.1.1 contains a number of obligations relating to an investigating authority's cost
calculations for the purpose of determining whether home market sales are in the ordinary course of
trade and for calculating a constructed (normal) value. First, it provides guidance regarding the
preferred data source for performing such calculations. Specifically, Article 2.2.1.1 requires that costs
be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided
that such records are in accordance with the GAAP of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the productio n and sale of the product under consideration. Where records are
not kept in accordance with the GAAP of the exporti ng country or do not reas onably reflect the costs
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration, an investigating authority
may calculate costs on another basis.
370 Second, Article 2.2.1.1 requires th at investigating authorities
consider all available evidence on the proper allo cation of costs including that which is made
available by respondents in the context of an anti-dumping investigation, provided that such
allocations have been historically utilised by the exporter or producer. Third, and not at issue here,
Article 2.2.1.1 provides for the adjustment of costs under certain circumstances.
7.237 In our view, Article 2.2.1.1 imposes certain pos itive obligations on investigating authorities,
including the obligation to calculate costs on the b asis of records kept by the exporter or producer
under investigation and to consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs. Neither of
these obligations is absolute, however, as in both cases the obligati ons apply only if (" provided")
certain conditions are met. The role of these conditions is therefore not to impose positive obligations
on Members, but to set forth the circumstances under which certain positive obligations do or do not
apply. Thus, Article 2.2.1.1 does not in our view require that costs be calculated in accordance with
GAAP nor that they reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product
under consideration. Rather, it simply requires that costs be calculated on the basis of the exporter or
producer's records, in so far as those records are in accordance w ith GAAP and reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration. Similarly,
Article 2.2.1.1 does not require that all allocations made by an investigating authority have been
historically utilised by the exporter or producer; rath er it simply provides that investigating authorities
must consider all available evidence on the proper a llocation of costs, including that made available
by respondents, insofar as such allocations have been historically utilised by the exporter or producer.
Bearing this in mind, we shall examine Canada's arguments relating to Article 2.2.1.1.
7.238 We note that DOC stated in the IDM that it had developed "a consis tent and predictable
practice for calculating and allocating financial expenses". 371 We also note that, in the questionnaire,
DOC directed Abitibi to calculate the finance expense ratio on the basis of that methodology. 372
Canada asserts that DOC failed to make case-speci fic findings, applied gene ric reasoning in defence
of its methodology and asserted that its established practice would be followed because it is consistent
and predictable. In the view of Canada, this proves that DOC failed to "consider all available
evidence on the proper allocation of costs", as required by Article 2.2.1.1. After having carefully read
the relevant portion of the IDM 373, we are in no doubt that DOC made case-specific factual findings
with respect to Abitibi's financial expense determin ation. We do not consid er that using generic
reasoning in support of a specific determination cons titutes, in and of itself, a reason which would

370 See, in this regard, paras. 169 and 170 of Canada second written submission.
371 See para. 7.228, supra.
372 We do not understand the United States to contest these facts.
373 See para. 7.228, supra.

justify a conclusion that the United States has failed to comply with Article's 2.2.1.1 requirement that
"[a]uthorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs". In our view,
reasoning – whether generic or specific – is similarl y valid and both can be used in support of any
given conclusion. In the case before us, the IDM shows that not only generic but also specific
reasoning was used by DOC in support of its c onclusion as to how financial expense should be
allocated, as discussed in further detail below. Canada's next argument concerns DOC's alleged
assertion that "established practice would be followe d because it is consistent and predictable".
374
DOC stated in the IDM that: "[b]ecause there is no br ight-line definition in the [Tariff] Act of what a
financial expense is or how the financial expense rate should be calculated, [DOC] has developed a
consistent and predictable practice for cal culating and allocating financial expenses". 375 Having
examined this statement in context, we consider th at what DOC stated in the IDM is that it disagreed
with Abitibi that DOC should depart from its estab lished practice of calculating the amounts for
financial costs based on the financial expense a nd COGS from the parent company's consolidated
financial statements. The statement contained in the IDM that DOC has developed "a consistent and
predictable practice for calculating and allocating fina ncial expenses" does not prove in our view that
DOC's "established practice would be followed in Abitibi's case because it is consistent and
predictable." This brings us to the examination of Canada's assertion that DOC did not make case-
specific factual findings for Abitibi on this matter. There are several references in the IDM that
indicate to us that DOC considered at the time of determination evidence and arguments put forth by
Abitibi on the issue at stake. First, DOC asserts th at the "record of this investigation does not support
the conclusion that [DOC's] methodology distorts the allocation of Abitibi's financial expenses".
Such a statement could not be made without DOC having examined the evidence and considered the
arguments relevant to the issue at issue. An ex amination of the ensuing discussion in the IDM shows
that DOC considered the main argument that Abitibi put forward in support of its proposed allocation
methodology, i.e., that DOC should allocate fina ncial expense on the basis of an asset-based
methodology. Finally, Canada argues that DOC c ould not have complied with its obligations under
Article 2.2.1.1 without assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology used by DOC
and asset-based allocation methodologies in light of the evidence submitted by Abitibi. In our
discussion of Article 2.2.1.1 in paragraphs 7.236-7.237 supra, we have set out our understanding with
respect to the obligations imposed by that provision. In our view, Article 2.2.1.1, when stating that
"[a]uthorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs", does not require
that investigating authorities compare various a llocation methodologies to assess their advantages and
disadvantages but to "consider" all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs. We find that
DOC met the requirement set forth in Article 2.2.1.1.
7.239 For the foregoing reasons, we cannot agree w ith the arguments submitted by Canada and
therefore we reject Canada's contention that th e United States failed to "consider all available
evidence on the proper allocation of costs".
7.240 The second issue before us is whether the United States is in breach of Article 2.2.1.1 by
failing to make an allocation of financial expen se to softwood lumber which "reasonably reflects the
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration". Specifically,
Canada argues that DOC over-allocated Abitibi's group- wide interest expense to Abitibi's cost of
production and sale for softwood lumber by attrib uting to softwood lumber amounts for financial
expense that related to Abitibi's other products. The parties agree on that Article 2.2.1.1 does not
impose on investigating authorities any particular methodology for the purpose of allocating costs.
376
7.241 In examining this issue, we first recall our findi ngs with respect to the obligations imposed by
Article 2.2.1.1 in paragraphs 7.236-7.237, supra, in particular our conclusion that we do not consider
that Article 2.2.1.1 imposes positive obligations on investigating authorities other than those explicitly

375 See para. 7.228, supra.
376 Canada response to question 38 of the Panel, para. 117 and US first written submission, para. 182.

provided therein. Canada asserts before us that "a COGS allocation methodology for interest expense
cannot meet the requirements of Article 2.2.1.1 because it cannot establish interest expense for Abitibi
that "reasonably reflects the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration"."
377 In our view, Article 2.2.1.1 does not impose the obligation that Canada seeks us to
find. The proviso of Article 2.2.1.1 requires, in our view, that costs must normally be determined on
the basis of the records kept by the producer or exporter under investigation provided that such
records reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration. Hence, even if Canada's contention that the methodology used by DOC in order to
calculate the amounts for financial costs for Ab itibi over-allocated financial expense to softwood
lumber were to be correct, we would be unable to conclude, on that basis, that DOC's methodology
cannot meet the requirements of Article 2.2.1.1. Fo r the foregoing reasons, we must reject Canada's
claim.
7.242 Furthermore, even if Article 2.2.1.1 had contai ned such an obligation, we should still dismiss
Canada's claim under Article 2.2.1.1. This provision establishes that authorities must consider "all
available evidence on the proper allocation of costs, including that which is made available by the
exporter or producer in the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been
historically utilized by the exporter or producer". (emphasis ad ded) Canada has not argued that the
allocation methodology proposed had been "historically utilized" by Abitibi.
378 In addition, the
methodology proposed by Abitibi had a number of shortcomings. 379 During the course of the
proceedings, it has become evident to us that DOC's methodology could also be criticised. 380 O n
balance, however, it is evident to us that both methodologies have shortcomings and advantages and
hence, it is up to the investigating authority, as a trier of facts, to decide which one of the possible
methodologies would lead to the most accurate result. This is a determination that, we believe, a panel
cannot overturn without involving a de novo review. In any case, Canada bears the burden to prove that
the methodology used by the United States had lead to unreasonable results and that an unbiased and
objective investigating authority could not have calculated the amounts for finance expense for softwood
lumber for Abitibi on the basis of the methodology used by DOC. We are of the view that Canada has
not met this burden. Hence, even if Canada's argument had found support in the text of Article 2.2.1.1 –
which as we found in paragraph 7.241, supra, does not, we would have rejected it on this ground.
7.243 Canada argues that the calculation of the amounts for financial expense was not based on
"actual data pertaining to production and sales" of softwood lumber, as required by Article 2.2.2 of
the AD Agreement . Canada asserts that, based on evid ence from Abitibi's financial statement,
Abitibi's lumber operations required 7.6 per cent of the company's total assets; hence, softwood
lumber should have been allocated 7.6 per cent of the company's total financial expense. However,
Canada asserts that DOC allocated 13.6 per cent of the total amount for financial expense to the
product under consideration; thus ignoring the ev idence submitted by Abitibi that financial expense
was incurred in relation to assets. In so doing, Canada asserts that DOC attributed to softwood lumber
amounts for financial expense that did not "pertain " to the production and sale of softwood lumber,
contrary to Article 2.2.2.
7.244 The issue before us is therefore whether, in determining the amount for financial expense in
the manner DOC did, DOC attributed to softwood lu mber interest costs beyond those "pertaining to"

378 In fact, based on the information made available to us in the context of these proceedings, it would
appear that this allocation methodology was develo ped by Abitibi for the purposes of the anti-dumping
investigation at issue. Thus, Canada acknowledges that "Canadian GAAP do not permit companies to report
interest expenses incurred by business segment or product. Instead, all financial expenses must be aggregated
and reported separately as a distinct line item on the Income Statement". (Canada second written submission,
para. 183)
379 See e.g. US second oral (opening) statement, para. 68.
380 See e.g. Canada response to question 116 of the Panel, paras. 89-97.

softwood lumber.
381 We understand Canada's argument to r est on the fact that DOC determined the
amounts for financial expense for softwood lumber based on an improper allocation methodology.
However, bearing in mind our conclusion in paragraph 7.241, supra, we consider that, based on the
facts before DOC at the time of determination, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could
have computed the amount for financial expense to be attributed to softwood lumber on the basis of
the methodology used by DOC for Abitibi. Having reached this conclusion, and taking into account
that Canada has not advanced any other argument in support of its claim under Article 2.2.2, we
conclude that Canada has not established that th e United States acted inconsistently with that
provision in determining the amount for financ ial expense for softwood lumber based on the
methodology used by DOC.
7.245 Finally, Canada claims violations of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement. With
respect to Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1, Canada asserts th at an incorrect calculation of costs impacts the
determination of which sales may be used in establis hing normal value contrary to Article 2.2.1, as
well as the calculation of constructed (normal) value, contrary to Article 2.2. With respect to
Article 2.4, Canada asserts that, where the calculatio n of costs results in an improper normal value, a
fair comparison will not be possible in violation of Article 2.4. Thus, we understand Canada's claims
under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 to rest upon a finding of violation of either Article 2.2.1.1 or 2.2.2 or
of both. Having concluded that, in determining the amounts for financial expense to be attributed to
softwood lumber, the United States did not violate Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2, we find that Canada's
dependent claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 fail.
K. C
LAIM 8: ARTICLES 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 AND 2.4 – DETERMINATION OF GENERAL &
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES: TEMBEC
(a) Factual Background
7.246 Tembec divides its operations into five separat e divisions. One of those divisions, the FPG,
consists primarily of saw mill operations which produce inter alia softwood lumber. In its
consolidated audited financial statement for the year 2000, as reflected in its Annual Report, Tembec
reports an amount for SG&A costs for the compan y as a whole. The Annual Report also contains
certain segmented information for the five divisions, but does not break out G&A costs by division.
However, internal divisional financial statemen ts kept by Tembec report separate amounts for G&A
expenses for each division, including those amounts for G&A costs that are charged directly by
Tembec to each of its divisions, plus an allocat ed portion of the corporate-level G&A. DOC's
questionnaire requested that the exporter calculate the G&A ratio by dividing total company-wide
G&A expenses by total company-wide COGS.
382 In addition to calculating the G&A ratio as
requested by DOC, Tembec calculated the G&A rati o by dividing the total amount of G&A expenses
for the FPG – which included those amounts for G&A co sts directly charged to that division and an
allocated portion of the corporate-level G&A expenses – by the total cost of sales (minus packing) for
the FPG divisional data. 383 That is, instead of calculating the G&A ratio on the basis of company-
wide data, Tembec did so on the basis of divisional data (FPG). For the reasons set out in detail infra,
DOC rejected Tembec's proposed G&A calculati on methodology and determined Tembec's G&A
ratio using a factor derived from its company-wide financial earnings statement:
"[t]he statute at sections 773(b)(3)(B) and 773( e)(2)(A) directs [DOC] to calculate an
amount for selling, general and admini strative expenses based on actual data
pertaining to the production and sale of the merchandise under consideration. The

381 It is not disputed by parties that the financial expense at issue is part of the SG&A costs referred to
in Article 2.2.2.
383 Exhibit CDA-159, Tembec's Questionnaire Response, Section D, p. D-28. See also Exhibit US-73,
Tembec's Cost Verification Report, p. 26.

antidumping law does not prescribe a specific method for calculating the G&A
expense rate. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, the determination of a reasonable
and appropriate method is left to the di scretion of [DOC]. Because there is no
definition in the Act of what a G&A expen se is or how the G&A expense rate should
be calculated, [DOC] has developed a c onsistent and predictable practice for
calculating and allocating G&A expenses. Th is consistent and predictable method is
to calculate the rate based on the company-wide G&A costs incurred by the producing
company allocated over the producing company's company-wide cost of sales and not
on a divisional or product-specific basis. This practice is identified in [DOC]'s
standard section D questionnaire, which inst ructs that the G&A expense rate should
be calculated as the ratio of total company- wide G&A expenses divided by cost of
goods sold. See Section D Questionnaire, page D-14. This approach is consistent
with Canadian GAAP's treatment of such period costs and recognizes the general
nature of these expenses and the fact that they relate to the activities of the company
as a whole rather than to a particular production process. [DOC]'s methodology also
avoids any distortions that may result if, for business reasons, greater amounts of
company-wide general expenses are allocated disproportionally between divisions.
Therefore, we normally calculate the G&A expense rate based on the respondent's
unconsolidated operations plus, if applicab le, a portion of G&A expenses incurred by
affiliated companies on behalf of the respondent.
Tembec deviated from [DOC]'s normal methodology and calculated its G&A
expenses using an internal accounti ng methodology, under which the company
charged some G&A expenses directly to each of its divisions. However, Tembec
divisions are not separate entities that require consolidation but merely separate
business units that make up a single corporati on. Thus, we agree with petitioners that
we cannot consider the divisional P&L st atements as "unconsolidated financial
statements". For the final determination, we have based Tembec's G&A expense rate
calculation on Tembec Inc's company-wide income statement."
384 (footnote omitted;
emphasis added)
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.247 Canada asserts that the approach adopted by DOC in order to determine the amounts for
G&A costs for Tembec resulted in a distorted alloca tion of costs associated with the production of
softwood lumber. Canada asserts that, by re jecting the verified evidence from Tembec and
calculating G&A expenses based on costs incurred on a company-wide basis, DOC allocated G&A
expenses in a manner that did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale
of softwood lumber, in violation of Article 2.2.1.1. In this respect, Canada asserts that DOC did not
engage in an unbiased and obj ective evaluation of the facts presented by Tembec in selecting the
methodology for allocating G&A costs in violation of Article 2.2.1.1. Canada further argues that, in
adopting the above methodology, DOC acted inconsiste ntly with Article 2.2.2. Referring to the
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Canada states that DOC's use of company-wide expenses resulted
in the inclusion of amounts for G&A costs pertaining to the production of non-investigated products
and accordingly, failed to result in total cost figures that accurately represented the cost of producing
softwood lumber. Canada requests the Panel to reject the US argument that Tembec's FPG data were
not "audited" and not kept in accordance with Canadian GAAP as ex post rationalization. In any case,
Canada argues that the FPG divisional data were audited and maintained in accordance with GAAP.
7.248 The United States replies that DOC refused Tembec's proposed methodology on two
grounds. First, DOC determined that, because the division-specific amount at issue was un-audited, it
was inherently less reliable than audited books and r ecords that had been certified to be consistent

384 Exhibit CDA-2, Comment 33, pp. 105-106.

with Canadian GAAP. According to the United St ates, there was greater certainty that audited
GAAP-consistent books and records would "reasonably reflect the costs" of softwood lumber.
Second, DOC determined that relying on division-speci fic costs was inconsistent with the very nature
of G&A expenses, which are, by definition, compa ny-wide expenses. The United States takes issue
with Canada's statement that "[t]he G&A factor derived from the FPG includes a properly allocated
portion of corporate G&A…"
385 In the view of the United States, implicit in this statement is an
acknowledgement that the division-specific data, on th eir own, were an inaccurate basis for allocating
G&A. That number had to be supplemented by a portion of company-wide G&A to come up with a
"derived" G&A amount for the FPG. With respect to the status of the FPG data, the United States
asserts that Canada has been unable to provide evidence that Tembec's FPG divisional G&A records
were kept in accordance with Canadian GAAP.
7.249 Japan makes general comments on Canada's SG&A-re lated claims which are contained in
paragraph 7.232, supra.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.250 Tembec requested DOC to determine the am ounts for G&A costs based on its internal
accounting methodology, under which the company charged some G&A expenses directly to each of
its divisions. In application of DOC's normal practice and DOC's treatment of all other respondents in
the investigation, DOC calculated the G&A expense rate for softwood lumber by allocating Tembec's
company-wide G&A costs over its production of all products based on company-wide COGS, and
disregarded the FPG G&A figures on the basis of which Tembec had calculated the amounts for G&A
costs for softwood lumber in its questionnaire res ponse. In determining the amounts for G&A costs
based on the company-wide rate, Canada asserts that DOC overstated the costs of producing softwood
lumber, resulting in a cost of production that did not reasonably reflect costs associated with Tembec's
production of softwood lumber, contrary to Article 2. 2.1.1, and included costs that did not pertain to
the production and sale of softwood lumber, contra ry to Article 2.2.2. In adopting such a
methodology, Canada asserts that DOC also violated Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement.
386
7.251 Canada argues that the record demonstrated that the FPG G&A data more accurately
"pertained to" the production of softwood lumber. By contrast, in the view of Canada Tembec's
company-wide data could not be said to "pertain to" the production and sale of the like product in
Canada because those figures repres ent the company's world-wide production of a broader range of
products. Canada asserts that DOC's method effectivel y required reliance on data that did not pertain
to the production and sale of softwood lumber and di storted Tembec's margin of dumping in violation
of Article 2.2.2. In addition, Canada argues th at DOC's methodology resulted in the calculation of
costs that were not "associated with" the actual cost to Tembec of producing and selling softwood
lumber, contrary to Article 2.2.1.1. The United St ates replies that DOC determined that relying on
division-specific costs was inconsistent with th e very nature of G&A expenses, which are, by
definition, company-wide expenses.
7.252 We note that parties have differing views regardi ng the nature of the obligations contained in
Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2, and, in particular, rega rding the manner in which an investigating authority
is to derive the amounts for G&A costs for the pr oduct under investigation. In essence, Canada

386 We note that, in the Panel Request, Canada claims violations of Articles 2 of the AD Agreement and
VI:1 of the GATT 1994. (WT/DS264/2, section 3(c)) In its restatement of claims, however, Canada only claims
violations of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement – in addition to those under Articles 2.2.1.1 and
2.2.2 – with respect to this specific claim. (Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi)) For the
foregoing reasons, we will refrain from addressing claims not contained in the restatement of claims and from
ruling on those claims.

contends that Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 obliged DOC to base its G&A calculations for softwood
lumber on product-specific G&A costs, at least to th e extent possible, and that DOC was thus obliged
to calculate the amounts for G&A costs for softw ood lumber on the G&A data for the narrower FPG
division rather than on the G&A data for the company as a whole. The United States on the other
hand considers that G&A costs are by definition co mpany-wide, and that neither Article 2.2.1.1 nor
2.2.2 requires an investigating aut hority to link particular G&A expen ses to particular products. We
note, however, the US argument that DOC's determ ination not to use the FPG divisional G&A data
was justified under Article 2.2.1.1 because the FP G records did not reasonably reflect the (G&A)
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.
7.253 Article 2.2.1.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the
generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration. Authorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation
of costs, including that which is made av ailable by the exporter or producer in the
course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically utilized
by the exporter or producer... "
7.254 In accordance with this provision, costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records
kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that, inter alia, such records are in
accordance with the GAAP of the exporting country.
387 Data which are not GAAP-compliant might be
found not to be reliable and, hence, not be used as the basis for the cost calculation.
7.255 We note that DOC calculated the amounts for G&A costs for Tembec dividing the company-
wide G&A by the total COGS, as explained in the IDM (see paragraph 7.246, supra). We do not
understand Canada to argue that the use of this methodology is per se inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1. In any case, we do not read in Artic le 2.2.1.1 a requirement that the determination of
the amounts for G&A costs must be done in any particular manner or based on any particular
methodology.
7.256 Furthermore, we note that the respondent re quested DOC to determine the amount for G&A
costs using an "internal accounting methodology", as stated in the IDM. 388 The United States asserts
that, because the division-specific amount at issue w as unaudited, it was inherently less reliable than
audited books and records that had been certifie d to be in accordance with Canadian GAAP.
According to the United States, there was greater certa inty that audited GAAP-consistent books and
records would "reasonably reflect the costs". Cana da notes that Tembec had argued in its Case Brief
that the G&A based on data from the FPG was most accurate. According to Canada, data from both
the FPG division and the overall company, both fully audited and compiled according to GAAP, were
on the record and verified by DOC officials. In addition, Canada argues that the US assertion that
Tembec's FPG divisional G&A data were not aud ited and not kept in accordance with Canadian
GAAP constitutes post hoc rationalization. Canada asserts that, in the context of the investigation,
DOC considered the FPG data reliable for all costs purposes, except for the calculation of the amounts
for G&A costs.
7.257 DOC justified its decision not to calculate Tembec's amount for G&A costs on the basis of the
methodology proposed by the exporter on two bases.
389 First, DOC calculates the amount for G&A

387 See paras. 7.236-7.237, supra.
388 See para. 7.246, supra.
389 It is stated in relevant portion of the IDM (see para. 7.246, supra) that:

based on the respondent's unconsolidated operations plus, if applicable , a portion of G&A expenses
incurred by affiliated companies on behalf of the respondent. In the case of Tembec, DOC found that
"Tembec['s] divisions are not separate entities that require consolidation but merely separate business
units that make up a single corporation". DOC's second justification is that using its methodology
"avoids any distortions that may result if, for business reasons, greater amounts of company-wide
general expenses are allocated disproportionally between divisions".
7.258 We are therefore faced with a situation where DOC, in the course of the investigation, had
examined the methodology proposed by Tembec and, on several grounds, DOC rejected it and used
another methodology to determine the amounts fo r G&A costs for Tembec's softwood lumber
operations. DOC's arguments, as we understand them, revolve around the issue of the incompleteness
of the amounts for G&A costs resulting from the a pplication of the methodology proposed by the
exporter. In other words, they reflect the inv estigating authority's concern that amounts for G&A
costs calculated from G&A data for the FPG divi sion, including an allocated amount from the
corporate G&A, might not include all the G&A costs associated with the production and sale of the
product under consideration. Hence, the resulting amounts for G&A costs would not reflect all the
G&A costs pertaining to the production and sale of softwood lumber. We can imagine situations
where, for various reasons, a company might decide to charge a certain G&A cost item to a particular
division, even where other divisions might benef it from that particular item. A good example to
illustrate this, might be car park costs. The car pa rk is used by divisions A and B. The costs of the
car park are recorded in the books of division A and do not form part of the corporate G&A costs. In
the event of an anti-dumping investigation targeting a product manufactured by division B, an amount
for G&A costs based on data on G&A costs from division B plus a duly apportioned part of the
corporate G&A costs, in our view, would not incl ude all G&A costs associ ated with the production
and sale of the product subject to investigation. For the foregoing reasons, we do not consider that
rejecting a methodology that would have the effect of excluding certain G&A cost items from the
calculation of the amounts for G&A costs for the pr oduct under investigation would not be consistent
with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. In our view, a determination as to whether such a rejection
would be consistent or not with Article 2.2.1.1 can only be made after carefully considering the
specific facts before an investigating authority.
7.259 In the case before us, we recall that DOC found that "Tembec['s] divisions are not separate
entities that require consolidation but merely se parate business units that make up a single
corporation".
390 This finding has not been contested by Canada. The question before us is to
determine whether Tembec had demonstrated that the G&A data from the FPG division, including an
allocated portion from G&A's corporat e expenses, was complete. We have examined in particular
Exhibits CDA-95, 96 and 149. The "Revised Calc ulation of the G&A Ratio for the FPG Division",
contained in Exhibit CDA-95 shows that G&A cost data for that division was verified and that some

"[DOC's] methodology (…) avoids any distortions that may result if, for business reasons,
greater amounts of company-wide general expenses are allocated disproportionally between
divisions. Therefore, we normally calculate th e G&A expense rate based on the respondent's
unconsolidated operations plus, if applicable, a portion of G&A expenses incurred by
affiliated companies on behalf of the respondent.
Tembec deviated from [DOC]'s normal methodology and calculated its G&A expenses using
an internal accounting methodology, under which the company charged some G&A expenses
directly to each of its divisi ons. However, Tembec divisions are not separate entities that
require consolidation but merely separate business units that make up a single corporation.
Thus, we agree with petitioners that we cannot consider the divisional P&L statements as
"unconsolidated financial statements". For the final determination, we have based Tembec's
G&A expense rate calculation on Tembec Inc's company-wide income statement". (footnote
omitted)
390 See para. 7.246, supra.

items were traced to Tembec's year 2000 Annual Report. A verification sheet containing a breakdown
of SG&A cost items for each of the five divi sions – including the FPG – is also included in
Exhibit CDA-95. While the total amounts for SG&A costs for the FPG division contained in this
verification sheet coincide with the total amounts for SG&A costs fo r the FPG division used in the
"Revised Calculation of the G&A Ratio for the FPG Division", this does not sh ow that there were no
G&A costs under any of the other four divisions that pertained to the production and sale of the product
under investigation. Canada has not pointed to any evidence on the record to that effect. We therefore
conclude that DOC was entitled to depart from Tembec's FPG division-specific records and calculate the
amounts for G&A costs based on Tembec's audited company-wide G&A data.391,392
7.260 We therefore find that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have
determined the amounts for G&A expenses for so ftwood lumber as DOC did and hence reject
Canada's claim that the United States acted in violation Article 2.2.1.1.
7.261 Canada claims that Tembec's company-wide G&A data, a portion of which was allocated to
softwood lumber, could not "pertain to" the productio n and sale of the like product in Canada because
those figures represent Tembec's worldwide production, including products other than those subject to
investigation and that the United States has therefore violated Article 2.2.2. For this reason, Canada
argues that DOC's methodology resulted in reliance on data which did not pertain to the production
and sale of softwood lumber. The United States replies that DOC determined that relying on division-
specific costs was inconsistent with the very natu re of G&A expenses, which are, by definition,
company-wide expenses.
7.262 Article 2.2.2 provides in relevant part:
"[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2, the am ounts for administrative, selling and general
costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in
the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under
investigation".
7.263 We consider that the text of the provision is self-explanatory: investigating authorities are
required to calculate the amounts for, inter alia , G&A costs based on actual data pertaining to
production and sale in the ordinary course of trade of the like product. Article 2.2.2 does not provide
for any particular methodology in order to determine those amounts.
393 Canada focuses on the terms
"pertain to" in that provision. In our view, it is important however to start our examination from the
term "general and administrative costs". We note that this provision does not define "general" and
"administrative" costs nor does it state which cost items should be considered to be "general" or
"administrative" costs.394 The term "general" is defined as " 1 b including or affecting all or nearly all
parts or cases of things". 395 Thus, "general costs" would be costs affecting all or nearly all products

391 The parties disagree as to whether or not the di visional statements – including that of the FPG –
were audited. While this might have been relevant, after a careful examination of Tembec's Annual Report
contained in Exhibits CDA-94 and 148 and US-12 we cannot conclude that the divisional statements were
audited.
392 Canada argues that DOC considered the FPG data reliable for all costs purposes, except for the
purpose of calculating the amounts for G&A costs. We do not consider that this argument would alter our
conclusion, even if Canada's statement were to be correct . The fact that DOC might have used cost data from
the FPG division for purposes other than calculating the amounts for G&A costs does not constitute an
acknowledgement on the part of DOC that the FPG division G&A records were complete. We are of the view
that, if they had been complete, Tembec would not have had to allocate a portion of the corporate G&A to the
FPG division in order to arrive at the amounts for G&A costs for softwood lumber.
393 See in this regard Canada response to question 38 of the Panel, para. 117.
394 As the parties' arguments revolve around the te rms "general" and "adminis trative" costs, we will
focus our examination on those concepts and will not examine the term "selling" costs.
395 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 564.

manufactured by a company. On the other hand, "administrative" is defined as "concerning or
relating to the management of affairs".
396 "Administrative" costs are therefore costs concerning or
relating to the management of the company's affairs. Bearing this in mind, we consider that such
costs can only have a bearing on all the products manufactured by a company, although in varying
degrees. Thus, by their nature, G&A costs are costs that will normally affect all products produced or
sold by a company. In this regard, Canada has stated before us that:
""Administrative, selling and general costs" (...) are costs that are not directly
attributable to the product under investigation or any particular product. They
• include such costs as management salaries and other corporate-level
expenses that benefit all products that a company (or division within a
company) may produce rather than specific products.
• are usually listed on a company's consolidated financial statement, as a
separate line item labelled G&A or SG&A. They are recorded as an
aggregate amount and are not attributed to specific products.
• must be allocated to the product under investigation. Where the
company that produces the investigated product is the subsidiary of
another company, an amount of the parent company's G&A that is
attributable to the subsidiary's production of the investigated product
will be allocated to it. These are typically referred to as "headquarters"
expenses and are costs that would be incurred by the subsidiary if the
parent did not exist (i.e., accounting staff salaries, information
technology expenses, etc.). Only G&A costs that actually relate to the
investigated product can be allocated to it. An over-allocation of G&A
expense that is incurred in relation to its other products results in an
inflation of overall costs for the product at issue."
397 (emphasis added)
7.264 Canada acknowledges that, inter alia , G&A costs "benefit all products that a company (or
division within a company) may produce rather than specific products". This confirms our
interpretation about the terms "G&A costs". In add ition, Canada asserts that they "are not directly
attributable to the product under investigation or [to] any particular product". This is a reflection of
the nature of those costs: because they are intended to affect a plurality of products, businesses, etc.
within a company, it is normally not possible for a company to attribute these costs directly to any
particular product. It is clear that these are costs actually incurred by a company and, hence, that must
be recovered by that company in order to make a pr ofit. However, due to the very nature of these
costs it is normally not possible to ascertain the preci se contribution by each product to these costs. If
a company were able to ascertain the precise cont ribution to these costs by a particular product, one
would normally have expected the company to treat these costs as part of the cost of production of
that product.
7.265 We next examine the term "pertain to" within the meaning of the chapeau of Article 2.2.2.
"Pertain" is defined as "1 a relate or have reference to".398 In our view, a meaningful interpretation of
the term "pertain[ing] to" must take into account the nature of those costs because, as Canada
acknowledges, they "are not directly attributable to the product under investigation or [to] any
particular product". Thus, it would appear to us th at, unless a particular G&A cost can be tied to a
particular product manufactured by a company, G&A costs – because normally they cannot be
attributed to any particular product but are costs incurred by the company in the production and sale
of goods – pertain or relate to all of those goods . Canada's argument that G&A costs "benefit all
products that a company (or division within a comp any) may produce rather than specific products"

396 Id., p. 18.
398 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1021.

supports our view. If G&A costs benefit the production and sale of all goods that a company may
produce, they must certainly relate or pertain to those goods, including in part to the product under
investigation.
7.266 The next issue we address is the attribution of G&A costs to discrete products produced or
sold by a given company. Article 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement does not provide any guidance on this
issue. Different investigating au thorities use different allocation keys. In the case before us, the
United States used as an allocation key the followi ng: total company-wide G&A divided by the total
company-wide COGS, thereby obtaining the G&A rati o for Tembec. This was then multiplied by the
cost of production for softwood lumber in order to obtain the amounts for G&A costs for softwood
lumber. As we do not understand Canada to have challenged the allocation methodology per se used
by the United States, but the use of company-wide G&A data, we will refrain from ruling on whether
that allocation methodology is consistent with Article 2.2.2.
399
7.267 Canada claims that DOC cal culated an amount for G&A costs based on (company-wide)
G&A data which, at least in part, did not pertain to softwood lumber in violation of Article 2.2.2.
Canada refers to the fact that the figures used by DOC to calculate the G&A ratio "represent the
worldwide production, 70 per cent of which is made up of paper, pulp and chemicals". 400 Canada
argues that DOC should have used instead the G&A ratio provided by Tembec. However, we have
found in paragraph 7.260, supra, that DOC was entitled not to use the data as proposed by Tembec
because of concerns regarding its completeness. Canada has not argued that there was any specific
general or administrative cost item that – in its vi ew – did not "pertain to" softwood lumber. Rather,
Canada's contention is of a general nature: company-wide figures "represent the worldwide
production, 70 per cent of which is made up of pape r, pulp and chemicals". As we have noted above
and acknowledged by Canada, G&A costs – because of their nature – are in principle intended to have
a bearing on all the products produced and sold by a specific company. For this reason, we consider
that, unless a producer/exporter can demonstrate that the product under investigation did not benefit
from a particular G&A cost item, an investigating authority is not precluded to attribute at least a
portion of that cost to the product under investigati on. The general assertions of the type made by
Canada cannot, in our view, qualify as a demonstrat ion that the amounts for G&A costs as allocated
by DOC did not relate to softwood lumber in any wa y. We therefore find that the United States did
not violate Article 2.2.2 by determining the G&A ratio – and the resulting amounts for G&A for
softwood lumber – based on Tembec's company-wide G&A data. 401 Canada's claim under
Article 2.2.2 therefore fails.
7.268 We next address Canada's claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement .
With respect to Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1, Canada as serts that an incorrect calculation of costs under
Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 impacts the determinati on of which sales may be used in establishing
normal value contrary to Article 2.2.1, as well as the calculation of constructed (normal) value,
contrary to Article 2.2. Regarding Article 2. 4, Canada argues that any action taken by the
investigating authority that is inconsistent with Artic les 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 would result in an
"unfair comparison" between normal value and expor t price, in violation of Article 2.4 of the AD
Agreement.

399 The methodology proposed by Tembec differs from the one used by DOC in that the numerator
would include Tembec's FPG G&A data plus an allocated portion of the "corporate headquarters" G&A data
instead of the total company-wide data. In turn, Tembec's denominator would have included the FPG's COGS
rather than the total company-wide COGS.
401 We do not understand Canada to argue that the United States could not have complied with the
requirement just discussed because Tembec's company-wide figures re present the company's world-wide
production, i.e., production and sales outside Canada.

7.269 We recall that, in paragraphs 7.260 and 7.267, supra, we have concluded that Canada has not
established that the United States has acted inconsis tently with Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 of the
AD Agreement. Given that Canada's claims of violation of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 are premised on
violations of Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2, we c onclude that Canada has not established that the
United States acted inconsistently with its oblig ations under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement.
402
L. CLAIM 9: ARTICLES 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 AND 2.4 – DETERMINATION OF GENERAL &
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES: WEYERHAEUSER
(a) Factual Background
7.270 In its questionnaire response, Weyerhaeuser Canada, one of the Canadian producers subject to
investigation, reported G&A costs incurred by We yerhaeuser Canada as well as G&A costs incurred
by Weyerhaeuser Company (Weyerhaeuser Canada's parent company located in the United States),
which, in its view, related to the production and sale of Canadian softwood lumber, the product under
investigation. Charges concerning the settlement of legal claims relating to hardboard siding were not
included in the G&A costs which Weyerhaeuser Co mpany reported in its questionnaire response. 403
These legal claims originated from sales of hard board siding in the US between 1981 and 1999.
Following verification of the exporter's response, DOC suggested that the amount for settlement of
those claims (US$130 million) might be more appr opriately included in Weyerhaeuser Company's
G&A expenses, rather than in that company's COGS as reflected in the IDM:
"[s]ettlement claims are not a cost of goods sold, which is the base [DOC] typically
uses to allocate G&A expenses. Instead , these costs represent the settlement of
claims against products sold in prior year s. We note that these costs are included on
the consolidated financial statements unde r the forest products group companies.
While the costs relate to non-subject pr oduct, hardboard siding, [DOC] typically
allocates business charges of this nature over all products because th ey do not relate
to an production activity, but to the compan y as a whole. We recognize that one time
charges like this are ultimately a cost of doing business for the company. Therefore,
we have included them in the headquarters G&A, but allocated them over all products
in deriving the rate."404
7.271 Thus, DOC concluded that the costs relating to the settlement of legal claims on hardboard
siding should be included in Weyerhaeuser Company's G&A, and allocated them over all products –
including softwood lumber – in deriving the amounts for G&A costs for Weyerhaeuser Canada.
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.272 Canada argues that DOC calculated an inflated amount for the G&A costs included in
Weyerhaeuser Canada's cost of producing softwood lu mber, contrary to Article 2.2.2, by including in
its G&A calculation a US$130 million charge incurre d by Weyerhaeuser Company's for costs related
exclusively to hardboard siding, a product Weye rhaeuser Company produced and sold in the
United States. In the view of Canada, that co st did not "pertain to" Weyerhaeuser Canada's
production and sale of Canadian softwood lumber. Ca nada claims that the finding of the panel in
Egypt – Steel Rebar that Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 advocate a "relationship test" between costs and the
production and sale of the like product at issue supports its argument. In addition, Canada argues that

 402 Accordingly, we need not address the United States' argument, based upon the findings of the Egypt
– Steel Rebar panel (para. 7.333), that Article 2.4 relates only to the comparison of export price and normal
value, and does not regulate the establishment of the normal value as such.
 404 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 48b, pp. 133-134.

DOC improperly ignored Weyerhaeuser Company's books and records and established amounts for
G&A costs for Weyerhaeuser Canada that did no t "reasonably reflect" its cost for producing and
selling softwood lumber, contrary to Article 2.2.1.1. In the view of Canada, Weyerhaeuser Company
did not treat this settlement cost as a general expe nse on its records, nor di d it reasonably reflect the
cost for producing or selling Canadian softwood lumber.
7.273 The United States replies that DOC found that the cost s concerning the settlement of the
hardboard siding claims were incurred years after the production of the hardboard siding at issue and
were not part of the production process for that produ ct. Therefore, those costs could not properly be
considered a cost uniquely allocable to hardboard siding production, but that it was a cost "of doing
business" to the company as a whole. In additi on, the United States contends that Weyerhaeuser
Company treated those expenses as a general cost in its audited financial statement. The United
States asserts that DOC explained that it "typically allocates business charges of this nature over all
products because they do not relate to [a] producti on activity, but to the company as a whole". The
United States asserts that DOC's decision on this i ssue is supported by Weyerhaeuser Company's own
books and records, which include these litigation se ttlement costs as a general cost, as opposed to a
COGS. The United States argues that the inclus ion of litigation costs reported on a consolidated
financial statement in G&A costs does not contradict the reasoning of Egypt – Steel Rebar.
7.274 Japan submits general comments on Canada's SG&A -related claims which are contained in
paragraph 7.232, supra.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.275 The first issue before us is whether DOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.2 of the AD
Agreement in attributing a portion of the charges for the settlement of hardboard siding claims to the
G&A amount calculated for softwood lumb er, the product under consideration.
405 Canada raises a
separate claim under Article 2.2.1.1 and consequential claims based on Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of
the AD Agreement.406
7.276 We start our examination with Canada's Article 2.2.2 claim. Canada asserts that the
United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2. 2 by including cost data that did not "pertain to"
the production and sale of the product under investigation. In support of its claim, Canada asserts that
the respondent argued before DOC that the hardboa rd siding cost was not general in nature and
therefore not attributable to the company as a whole. In addition, Canada asserts that the charge at
issue was a cost that did not pertain to the prod uction and sale of softwood lumber in Canada for
Weyerhaeuser Canada and therefore it should not ha ve been taken into account when determining the
amounts for SG&A costs to be attributed to soft wood lumber's production and sale, i.e., the product
under consideration. The United States disagrees.

405 We do not understand Canada to dispute the consistency with the AD Agreement of the
methodology used by DOC in order to determine the amounts for G&A costs for Weyerhaeuser Canada. Nor do
we understand Canada to dispute the consistency of DOC's inclusion in the calculation of the amounts of G&A
expenses for softwood lumber of certain G&A expenses not booked in Weyerhaeuser Canada's records, but in
its parent company's (Weyerhaeuser Co mpany) records. We note that, in fact, Weyerhaeuser Canada included
these items itself in its response to the questionnaire as G&A expenses which, in part, pertained to the
production and sale of the like product. (Canada seco nd written submission, para. 230, first bullet point)
Finally, we note Canada's assertion that it does not argue before us that the hardboard siding settlement expense
should have been classified as a cost related to th e production of hardboard siding rather than as a G&A
expense. (Canada second written submission, note 220)
406 We note that, in the Panel Request, Canada claims violations of Articles 2 of the AD Agreement and
VI:1 of the GATT 1994. (WT/DS264/2, section 3(c)) In its restatement of claims, however, Canada only claims
violations of the provisions cited in para. 7.275, supra, i.e., Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the AD
Agreement. (Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi)) For the foregoing reasons, we will refrain
from addressing claims not contained in the restatement of claims and from ruling on those claims.

7.277 Before considering the facts in the dispute before us, we must examine the relevant provisions
of the AD Agreement in order to determine what obligations are imposed on investigating authorities.
In this regard, we note that Article 2.2 provides in relevant part:
"[w]hen there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the
domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market
situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting
country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison , the margin of dumping shall
be determined by comparison (...) with the cost of production in the country of origin
plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for
profits." (emphasis added, footnote omitted)
7.278 We note that this general provision concerns the establishment of an appropriate proxy for the
price of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting
country when that price cannot be used. Furthermore, if an investigating authority resorts to the last
methodology contained in Article 2.2 – the construction of normal value – a reasonable amount for
SG&A costs must be used.
7.279 The chapeau of Article 2.2.2 provides that:
"[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2, the am ounts for administrative, selling and general
costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in
the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under
investigation."
7.280 The text of the provision is self-explanatory: i nvestigating authorities are required to calculate
the amounts for, inter alia, G&A costs based on actual data pert aining to production and sale in the
ordinary course of trade of the like product. We recall our views expressed in paragraphs 7.263-
7.265, supra, with respect to our interpretation of the terms "general" and "administrative" costs in the
chapeau of Article 2.2.2, as well as on the nature of su ch costs. In particular, we recall that such costs
normally have a bearing on all the products manufactu red by a company, although in varying degrees.
By their nature, G&A costs are costs that, in our view, will normally affect all products produced or
sold by a company. Canada's comments, cited in paragraph 7.263, supra, support our views. Thus,
Canada acknowledges that G&A costs "benefit all products that a company (or division within a
company) may produce rather than specific products" and that they "are not directly attributable to the
product under investigation or any particular product".
407 We also recall that Article 2.2.2 does not
provide for any particular methodology in order to determine those amounts.408
7.281 We further recall our finding that, unless a producer/exporter can demonstrate that the product
under investigation did not benefit from a particular G&A cost item, an investigating authority is not
precluded from attributing at least a portion of that cost to the product under investigation. 409 Both in
the underlying investigation before DOC and in the proceedings before us, it is being asserted that the
charge at issue does not pertain to the productio n and sale of the product under investigation.
Canada's arguments – and the underlying facts upon which those arguments are based – in this claim
thus differ significantly from those in Tembec's claim, where Canada put forward only general
arguments in support of its assertion that the amounts for G&A costs calculated for softwood lumber
could not be considered to be based on actual data "pertain[ing] to" the production and sale of
softwood lumber.
410

408 See in this regard Canada response to question 38 of the Panel, para. 117.
409 See para. 7.267, supra.
410 Ibid.

7.282 Bearing in mind our understanding of this pr ovision, we must first examine Canada's
arguments that the US$130 million charge could not be considered a "general" cost within the
meaning of Article 2.2.2, and that the charge wa s not treated as a "general" cost on Weyerhaeuser
Company's records. The examination of each of thes e issues requires us to address the facts involved.
We recall that our standard of review is set out in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement . In the case
before us, we must determine whether the inves tigating authority's evaluation of the facts was
unbiased and objective.
7.283 As stated in paragraph 7.276, supra, parties disagree on whether the cost at issue is a
"general" cost within the meaning of Article 2.2.2. The United States argues that the hardboard siding
expense is a "general" cost because it does not relate to the production and sale of hardboard siding.
In addition, the United States defines "general" costs as ""all expenses incurred in connection with
performing general and administrative activities. Examples are executives' salaries and legal
expenses"."411 (emphasis in original) Canada contends th at the expense at issue was not part of the
"legal expenses" of Weyerhaeuser Company, but an "unique charge". 412 Canada further asserts that
Weyerhaeuser Company's consolidated financia l statement provides separate line items for
Weyerhaeuser Company's SG&A cost s and the settlement of legal claims relating to hardboard
siding.413
7.284 Article 2.2.2 does not define "general" costs nor does it state which cost items should be
considered to be "general" costs. 414 However, we recall that the term "general" is defined as " 1 b
including or affecting all or nearly all parts or cases of things". 415 Thus, "general" costs are costs
affecting all or nearly all products manufactured by a company. In our view, and based on this
definition, it is difficult to determine whether the ch arge at issue is a "general" cost. It could be
argued that because the charge arises from the sale of hardboard siding, a product which was not
subject to investigation, that charge could not possibly affect all products manufactured by
Weyerhaeuser Company or its subsidiaries. Howeve r, it could also be argued that because of the
large amount of the charge, the impact that it mi ght have for instance on the brand name of the
company as such, etc. such a charge might affect the lumber operations of the company or perhaps
even the company as a whole.
7.285 We do not believe that we are required to define that term "general cost" for the purpose of
resolving the dispute before us. Article 2.2 re fers to three elements constituting a constructed
(normal) value, namely cost of production; SG&A costs; and profits. As stated in footnote 405,
supra, we do not understand Canada to pursue in this dispute the exporter's argument that the expense
at issue was a cost related to the production of hardboard siding.
416 Canada has not claimed that the
charge at issue should be considered part of the expor ter's "profits", nor can we conclude that. In our
view, the expense at issue can therefore only be pa rt of the company's SG&A costs. We therefore
agree with DOC's treatment of the expense at issu e as part of Weyerhaeuser Company's G&A costs.
In reaching this conclusion, we have taken into account the following comment of Canada:
"the [US$]130 million charge for the ha rdboard siding settlements does not reflect
lawyer salaries, copying of briefs, travel to court, or other types of "legal" expenses
that are often considered to be "general". Weyerhaeuser itself [treated] the[] (..) legal

413 Canada second written submission, para. 238 et seq.
414 We do not refer to "selling" and "administrativ e" costs because parties have focused on the term
"general" costs only.
415 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 564.
416 Canada second written submission, para. 230, note 220.

expenses [in question] as "general", and they were included in G&A both in the
company's financial statement and for Commerce's G&A calculation."
417
7.286 In addition, Canada refers to the uniqueness of this charge based on the fact that
Weyerhaeuser Company's consolidated financia l statement provides separate line items for
Weyerhaeuser Company's SG&A cost s and the settlement of legal claims relating to hardboard
siding.418 In our view, the fact that the co st at issue is reported separately is per se not a convincing
argument. There might be several reasons for re porting this cost separately, especially in the
published financial statements of the company, for example, to increase the transparency regarding a
specific non-recurring cost item of a significant amount for the benefit of third parties. Of course,
bundling a charge such as the one at issue with other G&A costs could give the misleading impression
to any third party (e.g. investors) that G&A cost s have extraordinarily increased during the year under
review. The uniqueness of the charge at issue, i. e., the fact that it was specifically meant to fund
future claims, in our view, does not determine whether this is a "general" cost or not. Unique charges
such as the set-up of a new line for the production of the product under consideration during the
period of investigation are acknowledge d in Article 2.2.1.1 to be part of the cost of production of the
product under consideration. Similarly, extraordin ary items which cannot be considered part of the
cost of production but of the SG&A costs of a comp any must be able to be taken into account in the
calculation of the margin of dumping, provided that other requirements in the AD Agreement , in
particular Article 2.2.2, are met.
7.287 For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that an unbiased and objective investigating
authority could have treated the cost item at issue as part of the "general" costs of the exporter under
consideration.
7.288 Canada's next argument is that the cost item at issue did not relate to the production and sale
of softwood lumber, i.e., to the product under consideration. Canada is of the view that:
"Article 2.2.2 requires that G&A be b ased on costs "pertaining to production and
sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer
under investigation" [emphasis added]. Expenses will "pertain" to the production and
sale of a product where they "belong or be attached to, spec. (a) as a part, (b) as an
appendage or accessory ..."
As noted, in Egypt – Steel Rebar , the panel clearly stated this obligation as a
relationship test: that a cost may be attributed to the production and sale of the like
product only if the facts of the case point out that the cost was associated with the
product under investigation."
419 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original)
7.289 Applied to the specific facts of the case, Canada asserts that:
"[the] facts (...) demonstrate that the expen se is associated with hardboard siding, not
Canadian softwood lumber. The hardboard siding expense is a settlement fund
concerning a product unrelated to the like product, produced in the United States by
Weyerhaeuser US. Accordingly, the hardboard siding expense did not "pertain to"
the production and sale of softwood lumber as required by Article 2.2.2.

418 See para. 7.283, supra.
 419 Canada second written submission, paras. 244-245. See also paras. 166 and 174 of Canada second
written submission.

.... there is no evidence on the record to demonstrate that the hardboard siding
expense is even remotely related to th e production and sale of Canadian softwood
lumber."420
7.290 By contrast, the United States has consistently argued that "[g]eneral expenses are, by
definition, expenses incurred for the benefit of a corporate group as a whole and they are not specific
to one or another product line. A requirement that general expense be directly related to the good
produced would make it impossible to allocate gene ral expense within a company that produces many
goods because a direct relationship would never be identifiable".421
7.291 The question before us is to determine wh ether an unbiased and objective investigating
authority could have concluded th at the hardboard siding charge pertained to the production and sale
of softwood lumber. We are of the view that, if it is determined that a given cost item relates to the
production and sale of the product under consideration, even if it relates only partly to the product
under consideration, a portion of that cost could be attributed to the product under consideration.422
7.292 We note that Canada has asserted before us th ere is no evidence on the record to demonstrate
that the hardboard siding expense is even remote ly related to the production and sale of Canadian
softwood lumber. By contrast, the United States has stated that DOC found that one-time charges like
the one at issue are a cost of doing business for th e company. The United States further argues that
the link between the litigation cost at issue and production of hardboard siding was attenuated because
(1) the litigation was not part of the production proc ess of hardboard siding and (2) the expense was
incurred anywhere from one year to as long as eighteen years after production and sale of the
hardboard siding.
423
7.293 Bearing in mind the facts before us, i.e., that the expense related to hardboard siding that was
produced and sold between one and eighteen years before the period of investigation and that the legal
settlement cost did not relate to the production pr ocess as such of hardboard siding, facts not being
contested by Canada, we consider that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have
refused to treat that charge as part of the cost of production of hardboard siding. Having reached that
conclusion, and that this item was correctly character ized as a "general" expense, we consider that
DOC was not unreasonable in concluding that the charge at issue was not a cost exclusively
attributable to hardboard siding but also benef iting the production and sales of all other products
manufactured and sold by Weyerhaeuser Company. We are therefore of the view that an unbiased
and objective investigating authority could, in li ght of the facts before DOC at the time of
determination, have determined th at a portion of the charge at issue pertained to the production and
sale of the product under consideration. For the fo regoing reasons, we reject Canada's claim that the
United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement.
7.294 We note the statement in Weyerhaeuser Compan y's year 2000 financial statement that the
hardboard siding legal claim "is a claims-based settle ment, which means that the claims will be paid
as submitted over a nine-year period with no minimum or maximum amount".
424 We further note that
DOC took into account the entire amount of the charge, i.e., the US$130 million, in the calculation of

420 Canada second written submission, paras. 245 and 247.
421 US second written submission, para. 84. The United States has also acknowledged that it:

"does not disagree with the general proposition that the words "associated with" and
"pertaining to" suggest some relationship between G&A costs and costs of producing and
selling the product under consideration". (US response to question 63 of the Panel, para. 121)

422 See para. 7.281, supra.
423 US response to question 62 of the Panel, para. 117.
424 Exhibit CDA-166, Weyerhaeuser's Annual Report 2000, p. 51.

the G&A ratio for the period under investigation.
425 It appears from the reco rd that the legal claims
will be paid as submitted over a nine-year period. It might therefore be questionable whether an
unbiased and objective investigating authority could have allocated the total amount of the claim, that
is, US$130 million, to a one-year period, the period of investigation, only, even when, as is the case
here, Weyerhaeuser Company itself booked the entire litigation cost to one year only. However,
Canada has not argued before us on the consistency of this allocat ion methodology in the context of
this claim. We therefore refrain from examining and ruling on this issue.
7.295 Canada also claims that the United States vi olated Article 2.2.1.1 by improperly ignoring
Weyerhaeuser's books and records and establishing G& A costs for Weyerhaeuser Canada that did not
"reasonably reflect" its costs for producing and selling softwood lumber. In support of its claim,
Canada argues that Weyerhaeuser Company did not tr eat this settlement fund as a general cost on its
records as it was a separate line item in its corporate financial st atement, nor should this expense be
treated as a general legal cost. Canada asserts th at Weyerhaeuser Company characterized its general
legal expenses as G&A costs in its financial statement. Canada ar gues that the exporter recorded the
hardboard siding expense as a separate line item – not in G&A – and given its clear association with
the production and sale of non-like product, should not have been included in the calculation of the
amounts for G&A costs in this case. By including a portion of the legal settlement charge at issue in
Weyerhaeuser Canada's cost calculation, Canada as serts that DOC computed a cost that did not
"reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale" of softwood lumber.
7.296 In examining this claim, we recall that in our view Article 2.2.1.1 imposes the obligation on
the investigating authority to calculate costs based on the records kept by the exporter provided that
certain conditions set therein are met.
426 We recall that, in our view, an unbiased and objective
investigating authority could have concluded, based on the data before DOC at the time of
determination, that the cost at is sue was a "general" cost. We furthe r found that such an investigating
authority, bearing those facts in mind, could have concluded that the cost at issue was not linked to
any particular product and, hence, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have
allocated a portion of the charge to softwood lumber, as DOC did. Bearing this in mind, and that the
amount of the charge was taken by DOC from the records kept by the exporter – which is not disputed
by Canada, we cannot agree with Canada in that DOC improperly ignored Weyerhaeuser's books and
records and established amounts for G&A costs for Weyerhaeuser Canada that did not "reasonably
reflect" its costs for producing and selling softwood lumb er. Hence, we must reject Canada's claims
based on Article 2.2.1.1.
7.297 Canada raises several consequential claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement. Having rejected the claims on which th ey are dependent in paragraphs 7.293 and
7.296, supra, we must also reject Canada's claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4.
M. C
LAIM 10: ARTICLES 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 AND 2.4 – REASONABLE AMOUNTS FOR BY -PRODUCT
REVENUES FROM THE SALE OF WOOD CHIPS: TEMBEC AND WEST FRASER
(a) Factual Background
7.298 Wood chips are produced as a by-product in the process of producing softwood lumber.
These wood chips are subsequently sold by the saw mills to pulp mills through different types of
transactions. In the calculation of the cost of production of softwood lumber, DOC took into account
the income from sales of wood chip s as an offset to softwood lumber 's cost of production, i.e., it
reduced the cost of producing softwood lumber. This claim concerns the determination of reasonable
amounts from the sales of wood chips made by West Fraser and Tembec.

425 US response to question 124 of the Panel, para. 75.
426 See paras. 7.236-7.237, supra.

7.299 Tembec's sawmills sold wood chips to Temb ec's own pulp mills through interdivisional
transactions, i.e., through sales within the same company. In reporting its cost of producing softwood
lumber, Tembec argued against the use of the internal transfer price for wood chips as an offset to the
cost of producing softwood lumber because the internal transfer price did not allegedly reflect market
prices. Tembec submitted information to DOC on ar m's length purchases of wood chips made by its
pulp mills and arm's length sales by its Western sawmills. West Fraser, on the other hand, sold most
wood chips to affiliated parties in BC. Only a negl igible volume was sold by two of its sawmills in
BC (McBride and PIR) to unaffiliated parties. W est Fraser submitted data for wood chip purchases
made by one of its affiliated pulp mills in BC, QRP, to show that prices paid by QRP for wood chips
purchased from unaffiliated parties were in line with prices paid by QRP to West Fraser's sawmills.
7.300 We note that DOC stated in the IDM that:
"[w]e agree with the petitioners that, u nder section 773(f)(2) of the Act, [DOC] may
disregard transactions between affiliated par ties if they do not fairly reflect the
amount usually charged in the market under consideration. When a respondent sells
the same by-product to affiliated and unaff iliated parties at different prices, [DOC]
considers the prices received from unaffiliate d parties by the respondent to be at
arm's-length and to represent market prices. (…)
Specific to Canfor, the verified informati on shows that the fair market value that
Canfor's mills obtain for sales of wood chip s to unaffiliated purchasers is clearly
distorted due to its contractual agreements. Since Canfor did not have any sales of
wood chips to unaffiliated parties in B.C., we have compared Canfor's sales of wood
chips to affiliated parties in B.C. to the weighted-average market price of the other
respondents' wood chip sales in B.C. Based on this comparison we find that Canfor's
sales of wood chips to affiliated parties in B.C. during the POI were made at arm's-
length prices and no adjustment is necessary for the final determination.
With respect to West Fraser, for purposes of the final determination, we have
compared West Fraser's sales of wood ch ips to affiliated and unaffiliated parties
separately for Alberta and British Columbia. Based on this comparison we find that
West Fraser's sales of wood chips to affilia ted parties in Alberta during the POI were
made at arm's-length prices. We also find, however, that West Fraser's sales of wood
chips to affiliated parties in British Columb ia during the POI were not made at arm's-
length prices. Thus, for sales of wood chips in British Columbia, we used the average
sales price for wood chips received from una ffiliated parties to value the sales to
affiliated parties and adjusted West Fr aser's by-product offset for the final
determination.
(…)
With respect to Tembec, the facts of this case differ slightly in that the wood chip
transactions are between divisions of the same legal entity. Our practice with regards
to transactions between divisions within the same legal entity is to use the actual cost
of the input. Due the fact that wood chips are a by-product of the production of
softwood lumber, there is no separately iden tifiable cost associated with the wood
chips that are transferred between Tembec divisions. Therefore, we analyzed the
wood chip sales transactions between Tembec 's sawmills and its internal divisions to
evaluate whether the internally set transfer prices are reasonable.
Based on the comparison of Tembec's B.C. saw mills' internally set transfer prices for
wood chips to the B.C. sawmills' chip sales to unaffiliated purchasers, we concluded
that the internally set transfer prices are not preferential. Accordingly, we relied on

the B.C. transfer prices for the final determination. For Tembec's Quebec and Ontario
wood chip sales we do not have usable market price data for Tembec. However, since
we have determined that its B.C. mill s do not sell wood chips to other Tembec
divisions at preferential prices, we deem it reasonable to conclude that their Ontario
and Quebec saw mills did not receive preferential prices for its internally transferred
wood chips. Thus, we relied on their internal transfer prices for the final
determination.
(…)
For West Fraser and Tembec we also disagree that the documentation presented at
verification demonstrated that the prices it received from its affiliates for sales of
wood chips reflected market prices. While we acknowledge that the documentation
submitted at verification showed that certa in affiliated pulp mills selected by these
respondents paid similar prices to their sawmills and to unaffiliated parties for
purchases of wood chips, we note that the comparisons provided by each respondent
were selectively provided by the compani es and not based on a sample chosen by
[DOC]. These comparisons represented onl y a portion of the total wood chip
purchases by both Tembec and West Fraser's pulp mills and there is no record
evidence to determine what the results might be if all mills were included."
427
(footnotes omitted)
(b) Arguments of the Parties/Third Parties
7.301 Canada asserts that, in failing to use reasonable amounts for by-product revenues from the
sale of wood chips as offsets in calculating the cost of production of softwood lumber for Tembec and
West Fraser, the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement . With respect to Tembec , Canada argues that Article 2.2.1.1 requires investigating
authorities to disregard the exporter's records where they do not reasonably reflect the costs associated
with the production and sale of the product under cons ideration. Canada asserts that Article 2.2.1.1
reflects the requirement that market price is the appropriate benchmark for valuing by-product
revenue offsets, or the calculation of the cost of the main product will be either overstated or
understated. According to Canada, the internal Te mbec transfer prices as contained in its records and
relied upon by DOC do not reasonably reflect the ma rket value of wood chip sales, because Tembec
discounts internal wood chip sales below market values. The records, therefore, do not reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of softwood lumber. Accordingly, Canada
argues that DOC was obligated to disregard such in ternal transfer prices and determine revenues from
wood chip sales on the basis of representative market va lues. In sum, Canada asserts that DOC's use
of Tembec's internal transfer prices as an offset did not "reasonably reflect" the costs associated with
the production and sale of softwood lumber and violated Article 2.2.1.1. In addition, DOC's use of
Tembec's internal transfer prices in lieu of market values, while disregarding West Fraser's affiliated
sales prices, also violates DOC's obligation to exer cise discretion in an even-handed manner. Finally,
Canada asserts that by-products, by definition, ha ve neither profits nor costs. Moreover, Canada
points out that the argument of the United States th at "the difference between the [internal surrogate
for cost and the external market price] is the equi valent of "profit" in the normal setting where costs
and sales prices are known" is ex post rationalization, which the Panel must reject.
7.302 As far as West Fraser
 is concerned, Canada puts forw ard four arguments against DOC's
conclusion that West Fraser's affiliated party sales occurred at "non-arm's length" (i.e., at inflated)
prices. First, Canada argues that DOC's determination w as inconsistent with the evidence as a whole
concerning market prices in BC. In determining whether West Fraser's sales to affiliates were made at
inflated prices, DOC used as its benchmark for market prices only West Fraser's BC wood chip sales

427 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11, pp. 59-62.

to unaffiliated parties, and ignored the evidence of market prices charged by the other respondents for
their sales to non-affiliates in BC. Second, the benchmark used by DOC for determining whether
West Fraser's sales to affiliates were made at inflat ed prices was unreliable. Canada asserts that DOC
relied on West Fraser's tiny quantity of sales to una ffiliated parties as its benchmark for BC market
prices. In addition, Canada asserts that over half of the very low volume of sales used by DOC for the
benchmark were made early in the POI by West Fr aser's McBride mill, when chip prices were lowest
and not reflective of BC prices during the entire POI. Third, Canada claims that DOC applied
different benchmarks for two respondents – Canfor a nd West Fraser – that were similarly situated.
Finally, Canada contends that DOC disregarded the figures reported in West Fraser's records even
though the verified data demonstrated that its high est priced sales to an affiliate – QRP – had been
made at market prices. Presented with the facts on the record, Canada claims that an unbiased and
objective investigating authority would not have made the determination made by DOC, selectively
disregarding West Fraser's recorded figures for sal es which were at market prices and arbitrarily
employing different standards for different respondents.
7.303 As a matter of introduction, the United States asserts that, in calculating respondents' cost of
producing softwood lumber, DOC treated sales of wood chips as an offset, reducing a given
respondent's total cost of production. The United States asserts that DOC's calculation of the wood
chip offset for West Fraser and Tembec was consistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement. Consistent with Article 2.2.1.1, the Unite d States contends that DOC determined that
the transfer prices between Tembec 's BC sawmills to various Tembec-owned pulp mills reasonably
reflected Tembec's actual costs asso ciated with wood chip producti on. The United States asserts that
there was no evidence in the record before DOC s upporting Canada's contention that Tembec's inter-
divisional wood chip sales were "set arbitrarily to provide an internal preference". With respect to
Canada's argument that DOC should have used th e weighted average sal es price received from
Tembec's non-affiliates, the United States asser ts that that would have been proper under
Article 2.2.1.1 only if Tembec's books and records di d not reasonably reflect the costs associated with
wood chip production. The United States disagrees with Canada's argument that "Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement reflects the requirement that market price is the appropriate benchmark
for valuing by-product revenue off sets". In the view of the United States, Article 2.2.1.1 addresses
the "costs associated with the production and sale" of the product under consideration and does not
address consideration of the "market value" of offset s to those costs. The United States asserts that
market value will include the cost of a good as we ll as other elements such as selling expenses and
profit.
7.304 In the case of West Fraser, the United States notes that Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement is
silent as to how to assess affiliated party transactions relating to costs. The United States asserts that
DOC considers whether transactions between affiliated parties occurred at arm's length prices. This is
what, according to the United States, DOC did when determining the value to be attributed to West
Fraser's BC sales of wood chips to its affiliated pa rties. To the specific arguments advanced by
Canada, the United States replies as follows. With respect to Canada's first argument, the United
States asserts that the eviden tiary preference expressed by Canada directly contravenes
Article 2.2.1.1, which instructs investigating author ities to rely on an exporter's or producer's records
where they are available. To Canada's second ar gument, the United States replies that it was not
raised by West Fraser in the context of the inves tigation before DOC. The United States asserts that
the facts before DOC did not show that the volum es sold by the two West Fraser-owned BC sawmills
to unaffiliated parties were "too low". In addition, West Fraser made no argument that the long-term
contract by which one of its mills made sales dur ing the investigation peri od did not represent valid
market prices, nor did it make any argument about th e arm's length nature of the sales made from its
PIR's sawmill. Regarding Canada's argument on the different treatment granted to Canfor and West
Fraser, the United States asserts that Canfor was not similarly situated to West Fraser. With respect to
Canada's last argument, the United States asserts that DOC found that West Fraser submitted to DOC
only selective examples of the secondary evidence on which Canada says DOC should have relied.
The United States argues that West Fraser failed to place the entirety of its affiliated pulp mill

purchases on the record. Thus, even assuming that th is evidence might have been relevant and more
probative than West Fraser's own data, the United States considers that that omission prevented DOC
from assessing any sales other than the self-serving examples selectively chosen by West Fraser.
Referring to the Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, the United States argues that Article 2.4 is
concerned exclusively with the comparison betwee n normal value and export price, not with the
determination of normal value. For the foregoing r easons, DOC's determination of an offset for West
Fraser's wood chip sales was based on a proper est ablishment of the facts and an objective and
unbiased evaluation of those facts. Accordingly, it should be upheld under the standard of review in
Article 17.6(i).
7.305 Japan asserts that Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement allows the authorities to deviate from
a respondent's recorded cost of production if these records do not "reasonably reflect the costs
associated with the production and sale of the produc t under consideration". This discretion must be
exercised in good faith based on a proper establishment of facts and on an unbiased and objective
evaluation of those facts. Referring to the Appellate Body Report in US – Hot-Rolled Steel
428, Japan
asserts that, to be unbiased, objective and fair, the authorities must exercise their discretion in an
even-handed manner without favouring the interests of any particular party. Japan asserts that DOC's
established practice, as applied in this investigation, is contrary to the even-handed rule. Japan further
argues that DOC's revaluation of by-product revenues is contrary to a good faith obligation derived
from Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention and the Appellate Body Reports in US – Hot-
Rolled Steel and US – Shrimp.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.306 This claim relates to the valuation of by-pro duct revenues for Tembec and West Fraser, two
of the Canadian respondents. The sawing of l ogs into softwood lumber, i.e., the product under
consideration, generates by-products such as saw dust, wood chips, etc. Parties acknowledge that
these products have commercial value and can be sold to generate revenues. For instance, wood chips
are sold to pulp mills in order to produce paper. It is undisputed that DOC took into account the
revenue from by-products – including wood chips – in calculating the cost of production for Tembec
and West Fraser in this investigation. 429 Specifically, DOC treated the revenues obtained from the
sale of these by-products as income that was used to offset the cost of production of softwood
lumber.430 Thus, the only issue before us is the valuation of these by-product revenues, and
specifically the revenues from wood chips. This issue of valuation is significant to the calculation of
the margin of dumping, as a higher valuation of wood chip revenue means a lower cost of production
for softwood lumber, and a lower cost of produ ction generally will entail a lower margin of
dumping.431

428 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel , paras. 148 and 193. Japan also refers to the
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 132-133.
429 For the purpose of resolving this dispute, we are therefore not required to examine in – and decide
on – which circumstances an investigating authority should offset the cost of production of the product under
consideration with revenues from by-products generated in its process of production.
430 That is, DOC reduced the exporters' cost of production of softwood lumber by the by-product
revenue.
431 This is true for several reasons. First, a lower cost of production will likely mean more sales found
to be in the ordinary course of trade. A higher number of sales in the ordinary course of trade would normally
result in a lower normal value, which would lower the amount of any margin of dumping. Should an
investigating authority construct (normal) value in acc ordance with Article 2.2, a lower cost of production
would result in a lower constructed (normal) value, which would also lower the amount of any margin of
dumping. A higher valuation of wood chip revenue would therefore normally be in the interest of an exporter.
Conversely, a lower valuation of wood chip revenue would result in a higher cost of production, which would
make a finding of sales outside the ordinary course of trade more likely. The lower the number of sales in the
ordinary course of trade, the higher the normal value should normally be, which would raise the amount of any

7.307 The issue before this Panel is the extent to which DOC was required to, or precluded from,
deriving wood chip revenue from valuations in the records of the producers in question. In the case of
West Fraser, DOC declined to value wood chip revenue based on sales to affiliated parties, while, in
the case of Tembec, DOC relied upon internal transf ers to value wood chip revenue. Canada, in
effect, argues that DOC should have done precisely the opposite. With respect to West Fraser,
Canada asserts that DOC was required by Article 2. 2.1 to use the values included in that company's
records for sales of wood chips to affiliated parties in BC. With respect to Tembec, by contrast,
Canada argues that, because the va lues recorded in Tembec's books for internal transfers of wood
chips were set below prevailing market prices, DOC was required by Article 2.2.1.1 to disregard those
values, "since to use th[at] figure[] would result in a calculation that does not reasonably reflect the
true cost of producing an d selling softwood lumber". 432 In Canada's view, DOC's actions were
inconsistent with an unbiased and objective evaluation of the record evidence as a whole and, as such,
were inconsistent with the standards set out in Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
7.308 At the outset, we note that, with respect to the claims that will be examined in
paragraphs 7.314-7.348, infra, Canada claims in its Panel Request violations of "Article 2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement , including Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and paragraph 7 of Annex I, and
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994". 433 In addition, Canada asserts that "[a] fair comparison was
therefore not made by Commerce between the export price and the normal value and a distorted
margin of dumping was calculated, thereby resulting in violations by the United States of Articles 2.4
and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ".
434 With respect to Tembec and West Fraser's claims
relating to the valuation of by-pr oduct revenues, we understa nd Canada to assert in its restatement of
claims, however, that the United States allegedly vi olated Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4 only. 435
Bearing this in mind, in our exam ination in paragraphs 7.314-7.348, infra, we will refrain from
addressing claims not contained in the restatement of claims and from ruling on those claims.
7.309 We note that the main legal basis for Canada's cl aim is Article 2.2.1.1. Before analysing the
specific facts for each of the companies, we ha ve to set out our general understanding of the
obligations imposed by Article 2.2.1.1 on investigating authorities with respect to the determination of
costs, in general, and, in particular, concerning th e valuation of by-product revenues. Article 2.2.1.1
provides in relevant part that:
"costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the
generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration."
7.310 As noted in paragraphs 7.236-7.237, supra, Article 2.2.1.1 requires that costs be calculated on
the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records
are in accordance with the GAAP of the exporting c ountry and reasonably reflect the costs associated
with the production and sale of the product under c onsideration. Where records are not kept in
accordance with the GAAP of the exporting country or do not reasonably reflect the costs associated
with the production and sale of the product under cons ideration, an investigating authority may depart
from records kept by the exporter. We recall that Article 2.2.1.1 does not in our view require that

margin of dumping. A higher cost of production would also lead to a higher constructed (normal) value, which
would also raise the amount of any margin of dumping. This would therefore not be in the interest of an
exporter.
433 WT/DS264/2, para. 3(d).
434 Ibid.
435 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi). In addition, we note that Canada has not
advanced any arguments in support of other possible claims of violation other than those examined in this
Section of the Report.

costs be calculated in accordance with GAAP nor that they reasonably reflect the costs associated
with the production and sale of the product under consid eration. It simply requires that costs be
calculated on the basis of the exporter or producer's records, in so far as those records are in
accordance with GAAP and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the
product under consideration. Canada appears to have a similar understanding of the obligations under
Article 2.2.1.1.
436
7.311 We note furthermore that there is no reference in the text of that provision to the issue of by-
products, much less to the methodology that should be u sed in order to value them. Both parties agree
that Article 2.2.1.1 does not prescribe any particular methodology for calculating cost of production.437
In particular, we note Canada's statement that Article 2.2.1.1:
"does not set out a specific test or methodology for determining whether transactions
between affiliated parties can reasonably be used in determining a respondent's costs
for producing and selling the product under consideration. (…) Canada believes that
transactions between affiliated parties ar e subject to the general requirements of
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, as such, must be disregarded by
an administering authority where a respondent 's records for those sales would lead to
a calculation of costs that do not "reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product under consid eration". Otherwise, such recorded
data should be used in the determination of costs of production."
438
7.312 We agree with the parties. We are of the view that, if negotiators had intended to include in
the AD Agreement an obligation for an investigating authority to select a particular methodology
when determining a by-product revenue offset, su ch an obligation would be found in Article 2. 439
This does not mean that an investigating authority's decision on the valuation of by-product revenue is
not subject to the disciplines of the AD Agreement . We recall that Article 2.2.1.1 requires an
investigating authority to calculate costs on the b asis of records kept by an exporter or producer
provided that such records inter alia reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale
of the product under consideration. We fail to see how an unbiased and objective investigating authority
could find that records regarding by-product revenue reasonably reflect the co sts associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideratio n if those records do not reasonably reflect the
extent to which the existence of the by-product reduces the costs to the producer.

436 Canada acknowledges that Article 2.2.1.1 expresses

"a clear preference for the use of actual transaction data from records kept by an exporter. An
investigating authority may only disregard such data where the transactions do not accord with
GAAP and do not reasonably reflect costs asso ciated with the production and sale of the
product at issue. Canada believes that transactions between affiliated parties are subject to the
general requirements of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, as such, must be
disregarded by an administering authority where a respondent's records for those sales would
lead to a calculation of costs that do not "reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideration". Otherwise, such recorded data
should be used in the determination of costs of production". (Canada response to question 39
of the Panel, para. 119)

437 Canada response to question 38 of the Panel, para . 117; US response to question 41 of the Panel,
para. 69.
438 Canada response to question 39 of the Panel, pa ra. 119. In a similar vein, in para. 107 of its
response to question 44 of the Panel the United States ar gues that "Article 2.2.1.1 provides no specific guidance
on the question of determining the reasonableness of the costs of by-products or by-product offsets".
439 We note that the Appellate Body has repeatedly rejected arguments of parties adding to covered
agreements obligations or conditions which, in the view of the Appellate Body, could not be found in the text of
those agreements. See, for instance, Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-Rolled Steel and EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, paras. 166 and 77, respectively.

7.313 Bearing the above general comments in mind, we will examine separately the tests and
conclusion of DOC with respect to West Fraser and Tembec.
(i) Tembec
7.314 DOC concluded that the values entered into Temb ec's records for internal transfers of wood
chips were reasonable. In so doing, DOC rejected Tembec's arguments that the values recorded in its
books for internal transfers were well below market prices, and that DOC should therefore value the
internally transferred wood chips in accordance with actual market prices from arm's length
transactions entered into by Tembec with third par ties. Canada asserts that, in valuing wood chip
revenue on the basis of the values recorded in Te mbec's books, DOC contravened Article 2.2.1.1 by
using records kept by the exporter which did not reasonably reflect the co sts associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideration. In addition, Canada argues that an incorrect
calculation of costs impacts the determination of which sales are useable in establishing normal value
contrary to Article 2.2.1, as well as the calculati on of constructed (normal) value, contrary to
Article 2.2. Finally, Canada argues that, where th e calculation of costs results in an improper normal
value, a fair comparison will not be possible and Article 2.4 will also be violated.
440
7.315 In examining the above issue, we first note that parties have not argued that Tembec's records
were not in compliance with Canadian GAAP. Ra ther, the parties' arguments revolve around the
words "reasonably reflect the cost s associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration". The United States asserts that DOC examined in the context of the underlying
investigation the reasonableness of the valuation of the by-product revenue offset, as reported in
Tembec's records. DOC concluded that it was reasonable and rejected Tembec's assertion that by-
product revenues on Tembec's books did not reasonabl y reflect market prices for wood chips because
they were internal transfer prices artificially set for accounting purposes. Canada disagrees, and
argues that Article 2.2.1.1 mandates rejection of an exporter's records where calculation of costs for
the product under consideration would be overstated or understated if the investigating authority were
to use those records as a basis for the purpose of determining the cost of production for the product
under consideration.441 In the view of Canada, that would occur where the company's books do not
reflect the market value of by-pro duct sales, as was the case for Tembec. In sum, Canada considers
that the use of Tembec's internal transfer pr ices in calculating cost of production violates
Article 2.2.1.1.
7.316 We note that Article 2.2.1.1 establishes that costs shall normally be determined on the basis of
the records kept by the exporter concerned, provide d that such records are in compliance with GAAP
principles of the exporting country and reasonably re flect the costs associated with the production and
sale of the product under consideration. We have examined in detail the obligations contained in
Article 2.2.1.1 in paragraphs 7.236-7.237, supra. We therefore recall our interpretation of
Article 2.2.1.1 that the role of the conditions set forth in the proviso of Article 2.2.1.1 is not to impose
positive obligations on Members, but to set fo rth the circumstances under which certain positive
obligations do or do not apply. Recalling our inte rpretation referred to above, we therefore do not
agree with Canada's claim that Article 2.2.1.1 "m andates rejection of an exporter's records where
calculation of costs for the product under consider ation would be overstate d or understated if the
investigating authority were to u se those records as a basis for the pur pose of determining the cost of
production for the product under consideration." Canada's claim therefore fails.
7.317 Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that Article 2.2.1.1 imposes on an investigating authority a
positive obligation as Canada has argued above, rath er than a proviso, we could not agree with
Canada that the facts before us support Canada's claim, as our analysis below shows.

440 See para. 7.308, supra.
441 Canada response to question 70 of the Panel, para. 178.

7.318 We start our examination noting that Article 2.2.1.1 does not require that any particular
methodology be used by an investigating authority to assess whether records "reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration". We further note that
DOC used the following test in order to determin e the reasonableness of Tembec's recorded valuation
for internal transfers of wood chips:
"[i]n determining a "reasonable" amount for valuing the by-product offset in
interdivisional transactions, [DOC] uses the same methodology that it uses for
valuing costs in interdivisional transactions. As a standard corporate practice,
interdivisional transfer values reflect ac tual costs of production (since the company
does not need to include a profit in its price to itself). With respect to by-products,
absent any independent costs, [DOC] normally takes the internal value assigned by
the company to a by-product as a surrogate for an appropriate value for the by-
product, and then tests that value for reasonableness … Because [DOC] normally
values interdivisional transfers at actual cost, which is less than market value
(because of the existence of profit in market value), a value assigned to a by-product
is also commonly less than market value.
Canada argues that this makes no sense, b ecause if a by-product has no cost, then
there can be no "profit". However, even a by-product with no independent cost can
be assigned a company's best assessment of a surrogate cost. This is what Tembec
did when it set its internal transfer price."
442 (emphasis in original)
7.319 Canada's first argument concerns the fact th at the methodology used in the case of Tembec
was different from that used in West Fraser's dete rmination. Canada asserts that this methodology
cannot be applied in an even-ha nded manner "as it would penalize co rporations that consume their
own by-products rather than selling them to affiliated or unaffiliated purchasers".443
7.320 It is undisputed that two different methodologies were used by DOC for the purpose of
determining the reasonableness of the valuation of by-product (wood chip) revenues in West Fraser's
records, on the one hand, and Tembec's records, on the other. We note that West Fraser and Tembec
were in different factual situations. While Tembec was a single entity including, inter alia, sawmills
and pulp mills, West Fraser was divided in legally separate companies. For this reason, we do not
consider that DOC discriminated against Tembec by treating it differently from West Fraser. In
addition, we note the assertion made by the United States that the methodology used in the case of
Tembec is the same DOC uses for valuing costs in in terdivisional sales. This has not been disputed
by Canada. Thus, DOC's treatment of Tembec is consistent with its approach with respect to cost
valuations when faced with interdivisional sales. Th is being the case, we are unable to conclude that
DOC acted in a biased, non-objective or non-even-h anded manner in applying a methodology to
Tembec different from that used with respect to West Fraser.
7.321 Canada argues that Article 2.2.1.1 requires that a by-product offset must reasonably reflect
the market value for the by-product at issue; otherwise, the cost of production of the main product – in
our case, softwood lumber – would be either overstated or understated.
444 The United States
disagrees.445 We do not find any textual basis in Article 2.2.1.1 on which we could conclude – as

442 US response to question 42 of the Panel, paras. 97-98. See also US response to question 129 of the
Panel, para. 85.
444 Canada responses to questions 44 and 70 of the Panel, paras. 123 and 178, respectively. See also
445 The United States asserts that:

"Article 2.2.1.1 addresses the "c osts associated with the production and sale" of the product
under consideration and does not address consideration of the "market value" of offsets to

Canada argues – that, for the requirements of Article 2.2.1.1 to be met, it is necessary that the by-
product revenue offset reflect the market value of those by-products. 446 Nor, has Canada pointed to
any justification. 447 For this reason, we do not consider that DOC was precluded from using the
actual cost of the input – as it appeared in Temb ec's records – as the benchmark for valuing the by-
product revenue offset in the case of Tembec. 448 Nor, we consider that using the actual cost of the
input in case of transactions between divisions of the same legal entity – where this is done in a
consistent and non-discriminatory fash ion – is inconsistent with Artic le 2.2.1.1 or shows any bias or
non-objectiveness on the part of an investigating authority.
7.322 DOC outlined in the IDM the methodology used in order to examine whether the valuation
recorded in Tembec's books was reasonable. 449 In particular, we note that the methodology used in
this case – the actual cost of the input – was the normal test that DOC applies with regard to
transactions between divisions within the same legal entity. 450 The United States explained in its
submissions before us that it determined that th e value recorded in Temb ec's books for internal
transfers of wood chips was reasonable once DOC had taken into account "the critical factor of the
amount of profit. (...) In th[e] case [of Tembec], an adjustment for profit led to the conclusion that
prices for inter-divisional transfers [[***********]] from prices to non-affiliates. In fact, once
[DOC] took into account profit and the varying quality and types of wood chips, it determined "no
preferential prices" existed".451 In other words, after applying that test DOC concluded that the value
recorded for the internal transfer s of wood chips was reasonable. Canada asserts that this constitutes
post hoc rationalization that must be rejected. In additi on, Canada contends that the reference to costs
and profits in the case of by-products finds no suppor t in accounting. First, we note that Canada has
not raised any claim under Articles 6.9 or 12.2 of the AD Agreement. Thus, we are precluded from
examining the consistency of DOC's determination in light of the obligations imposed under those
provisions. Furthermore, we note that the methodolog y used by DOC is outlined in the IDM. While
we would have preferred that more information had been disclosed in the IDM, we are of the view
that the information contained therein is suffici ent for us to review the consistency of DOC's
determination. We note, in this regard, that DOC's pr actice is to use the "actual cost of the input". As
noted by the United States, the "actual cost of the input" will normally be lower than the market value
– as in the case of Tembec. Bearing this in mind, we fail to see how DOC could have determined that
the valuation for internal transfers of wood chips recorded in Tembec's books was reasonable – as the
IDM shows DOC determined in the context of th e investigation at issue – when compared to

those costs. "Market value" is different from "cost". Commerce has used market value as a
benchmark for determining the reasonableness of prices paid by a company to purchase a by-
product from an affiliated company. It also has used market value as a benchmark for
determining the reasonableness of values assigned to a by-product in interdivisional-
transactions. However, this does not mean that a "reasonable amount" will equal "market
value". Market value will include the cost of a good, but it will also include other elements,
such as selling expenses and profit". (emphasis in original) (US second written submission,
para. 92)

446 Indeed, to accept Canada's argument that Article 2.2.1.1 requires an investigating authority to ensure
that the by-product offset reasonably reflects the market value "would require us to read into the text words
which are simply not there. Neither a panel nor the Ap pellate Body is allowed to do so". (Appellate Body
447 Although we asked Canada to explain its statement that Article 2.2.1.1 requires that market price is
the appropriate benchmark for valuing by-product revenue offsets, it did not provide any convincing basis on
which we could conclude that Article 2.2.1.1 contains such a requirement. (Canada response to question 70 of
the Panel, para. 178)
448 We recall that the United States normally values interdivisional transfers at actual cost, as stated in
449 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11.
450 Id., pp. 60-61.
451 US first written submission, para. 243. Confidentia l information contained in the bracketed section
has been removed.

Tembec's BC sawmills' wood chip sales prices to unaffiliated purchasers, if DOC had not taken into
account, at the time of determination, the amount for profit.
7.323 Canada argues that by-products neither have costs nor do they yield profits. We do not
understand the United States to argue that by-products have costs. Indeed, the IDM reads: "[d]ue to
the fact that wood chips are a by-product of the production of softwood lumber, there is no separately
identifiable costs associated with the wood chips that are transferred between Tembec divisions.
Therefore, we analysed the wood chips sales transa ctions between Tembec's sawmills and its internal
divisions to evaluate whether the internally set transfer prices are reasonable".
452 While the IDM
could have been more explicit on this point, we are satisfied with the explanations of the United States
that the internal transfer price was treated as a surrogate for cost.453 Canada may be correct in that for
accounting purposes by-products do not have a cost. However, we are of the view that when selling
wood chips the producer must, at least, recover cer tain costs it may incur w ith respect to the by-
product. This could include inter alia storage and transport of the by-product at issue to the
purchasers' premises. Even though for accoun ting purposes this may not be "costs", strictu sensu, for
the purposes of the cost determination in an an ti-dumping investigation we do not consider it
unreasonable for an investigating authority to treat t hose items as costs. In addition, DOC appears to
have taken into account other factors (the varyin g quality and types of w ood chips) when assessing
the reasonableness of the valuation of internal transfers in Tembec's books. With respect to the profit,
we recall that the United States has asserted that inte rdivisional transfer values reflect actual costs of
production, since a company does not need to include a profit in its price to itself. 454 Canada has not
disputed this. As in the case of costs, we are not convinced by Canada's arguments that by-products
may not yield profits. While for accounting purposes Ca nada may be correct in its statement, we do
not consider that this would invalidate a determ ination that the difference between an amount booked
in the exporter's records for in ternal transfers of by-products – the surrogate for costs – and the
amount received for sales in the open market – i.e., to unaffiliated parties – can be treated as profit in
the context of an anti-dumping determination. Article 2.2.1.1 would not seem to support Canada's
position.
7.324 For the foregoing reasons, we consider that an unbiased and objective investigating authority
could have used the actual cost of the input as recorded in Tembec's books as a benchmark for valuing
internal transfers of wood chips. We further c onsider that an unbiased and objective investigating
authority, based on the facts before DOC at the time of determination, could have determined that the
valuation in Tembec's books for internal transfer s of wood chips was not unreasonable. Hence, we
reject Canada's claim that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1.
7.325 Canada claims that an incorrect calculation of costs impacts the determination of which sales
may be used in establishing normal value, contrary to Article 2.2.1, as well as the calculation of
constructed (normal) value, contrary to Article 2.2. It further argues that the use of an amount for
costs of production that does not reasonably reflect costs for producing and selling the product under
investigation results in an improper calculation of normal value which in turn results in an unfair
comparison between that normal value and export price for purposes of Article 2.4.455
7.326 We have, however, determ ined that Canada has not established that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1. Hence, we cannot agree with the premise on which Canada bases
the alleged violations, i.e., that DOC calculated the cost of production for Tembec incorrectly. For the

452 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11, p. 61.
453 US response to question 42 of the Panel, para. 98.
454 See para. 7.316, supra.
455 Canada response to question 51 of the Panel, paras. 144-145.

foregoing reasons, we consider that Canada has not established that the United States acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement.456
(ii) West Fraser
7.327 Unlike Tembec's case, DOC reject ed the valuation in West Fraser's books for sales of wood
chips to affiliated parties (pulp mills) in BC. DOC re-valued those sales transactions based on the
price of wood chips in West Fraser's unaffiliated transactions. In so doing, Canada asserts that DOC
acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement . As in the case of Tembec, Canada
claims consequential violations of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement.457
7.328 The main issue is therefore whether, in re-v aluing West Fraser's revenue from sales of wood
chips to affiliated parties instead of using the value recorded in West Fraser's books, DOC acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1. 458 In examining this issue, we recall that Article 2.2.1.1
establishes that "costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer under investigation" provided certain conditi ons are met. In the case at issue, the United
States explains that:
"[i]n determining whether a company's r ecords reasonably reflect costs associated
with production and sale of a product, [DOC ] considers whether transactions between
affiliated parties occurred at arm's length prices. It did that analysis [in the case of
West Fraser] and concluded that affiliated sales did not occur at arm's length prices.
Accordingly, it relied on unaffiliated sales in valuing the West Fraser's wood chip
offset."
459 (footnote omitted)
7.329 We do not understand Canada to argue that the test applied by the United States is per se
inconsistent with Article 2.2.1.1. 460 For the purpose of resolving this dispute, we therefore assume
that the AD Agreement did not preclude DOC from carrying out an arm's length test in order to
determine whether prices of wood chips charged to a ffiliated parties are reliable, and therefore can be
used as an offset to the cost of production of the product under consideration. We understand
Canada's argument to be that, had DOC taken in to account information available on the record, it
could not have disregarded the revenue for sales of wood chips to affiliated parties in BC appearing in
West Fraser's books. It is our task to exam ine whether, as claimed by Canada, based on the
information on the record at the time of determ ination, an unbiased and objective investigating
authority could not have determined that the valua tion of sales of wood chips to affiliated parties in
BC contained in West Fraser's records was unreasonable.
7.330 In the course of the investigation, West Fraser put forth two arguments in support of its
contention that DOC should use the revenue booked by West Fraser from sales of wood chips to

 456 Accordingly, we need not address the United States' argument, based upon the findings of the Egypt
– Steel Rebar panel (para. 7.333), that Article 2.4 relates only to the comparison of export price and normal
value, and does not regulate the establishment of the normal value as such.
457 See para. 7.314, supra.
458 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi).
460 Canada asserts that it:

"does not dispute that a determination of non-arm's length pricing could support a
determination that books and records containing such prices might not reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration. In such an
instance, the investigating authority might legitimately resort to alternative data and disregard
the books and records". (Canada first written submission, para. 243)

affiliated parties as an offset to so ftwood lumber's cost of production.
461 First, Canada asserts that, to
show that its affiliated sales were made at market prices, West Fraser provided DOC with monthly
data for the year 2000 for wood chip purchases made by one of its affiliated pulp mills, QRP. In the
view of Canada, these data showed that the prices QRP paid to West Fraser – for wood chip sales
from "West Fraser Mills" in Quesnel, BC – were consis tent with the prices QRP paid to its principal
unaffiliated chip supplier. Canada asserts that DOC offi cials not only verified the above information
but also requested – and verified – additional in formation regarding sales made to affiliated and
unaffiliated purchasers by West Fraser's Blue Ridge (Alberta) and PIR (BC) sawmills. Canada asserts
that, in its Case Briefs, West Fraser argued that th e mill-specific information that had been verified,
showed that West Fraser's wood chip sales to affiliate d parties had in fact been made at market prices.
Second, Canada asserts that, immediately after DOC issued its Final Determination, West Fraser
submitted a letter to DOC arguing that its use of West Fraser's " de minimis" volume of unaffiliated
wood chip sales in BC as its exclusive benchm ark for BC market prices constituted ministerial
error.
462 West Fraser argued that, because its unaffiliated party chip sales in BC were " de minimis",
DOC should have evaluated whether West Fraser's affiliated party sales were made at arm's length
prices using the same method used for affiliated ch ip sales made by Canfor, which was similarly
situated to West Fraser in that Canfor had no chip sales to unaffiliated purchasers in BC. 463 W e s t
Fraser requested DOC to compare the price of West Fraser's wood chip sales to affiliated purchasers
with the weighted average price of the other respondents' unaffiliated chip sales in BC.464
7.331 We found the following statement in the IDM rele vant to our examination of Canada's first
argument:
"[f]or West Fraser and Tembec we also disagree that the documentation presented at
verification demonstrated that the prices it received from its affiliates for sales of
wood chips reflected market prices. While we acknowledge that the documentation
submitted at verification showed that certain affiliated pulp mills selected by these
respondents paid similar prices to thei r sawmills and to unaffiliated parties for
purchases of wood chips, we note that the comparisons provided by each respondent
were selectively provided by the compani es and not based on a sample chosen by
[DOC]. These comparisons represented only a portion of the total wood chip
purchases by both Tembec and West Fraser's pulp mills and there is no record
evidence to determine what the results might be if all mills were included."
465
(emphasis added)
7.332 We note that Canada has not contested DOC's st atements that West Fraser did not provide all
the information on the sample chosen by DOC. 466 Nor has Canada pointed to any justification of
record for West Fraser's non-submission of the sample data requested by DOC. We do not consider
that it could be required from an unbiased and objec tive investigating authority to use the partial
information submitted by West Fraser in order to carry out the arm's length test, especially where no
explanation is provided as to why the in formation requested could not be submitted. 467 Bearing all
these facts in mind, we consider that Canada h as not established that the United States has acted

461 Canada response to question 37 of the Panel, Annex I, pp. A8-10.
462 Exhibit CDA-161, Comments Regarding Ministerial Errors, pp. 4-6.
463 Id., p. 6.
464 Ibid.
465 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11, pp. 61-62.
466 Rather, Canada argues that, had DOC considered the information provided by the exporter
inadequate, then DOC should have notified West Fraser of this fact. (Canada second written submission,
para. 290)
467 In so concluding, we have taken into account Canada's argument that West Fraser provided DOC
with information by QRP to illustrate that, if West Fras er's highest priced sales to affiliated parties were not
made at inflated prices, then its lower priced sales si milarly could not have been made at inflated prices.
However, Canada has not pointed to any evidence on the record in support of its assertions.

inconsistently with Article 2.2.1. 1 in not using the data provided by the exporter concerning QRP.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Canada's first argument.468
7.333 In examining Canada's second argument, we note that, in its Comments Regarding Ministerial
Errors, West Fraser requested DOC not to use the average prices of the McBride and PIR sawmills to
unaffiliated parties in BC as a benchmark against which the average price of wood chips sales to
affiliated parties would be compared. Furthermore, we note that the Final Determination and the IDM
were issued before the submission of West Fraser's Co mments Regarding Ministerial Errors. 469
Bearing these facts in mind, we do not consider that it could be required from an unbiased and
objective investigating authority to take into account West Fraser's comments. The fact that, at that
stage, DOC could still have made changes to the Final Determination – under the form of correction
of ministerial errors
470 – does not alter our conclusion. Article 5.10 of the AD Agreement imposes
strict deadlines on investigating authorities for investig ations to be concluded. In our view, the right
of exporters to submit new data or arguments mu st therefore respect that fundamental principle
enshrined in the AD Agreement . Bearing in mind the timing of West Fraser's submission and the
substantive nature of its comments, we consider th at DOC was not required to reopen its investigation
to analyse the comments submitted by the exporter. In sum, we are of the view that Canada has not
established that the United States acted inc onsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in
disregarding West Fraser's arguments contained in its Comments Regarding Ministerial Errors.471
7.334 In reaching this conclusion, we have taken into account Canada's comment that, in light of the
methodology used by DOC at the preliminary stage for the purpose of valuing the by-product revenue
offset, "there was no reason why West Fraser would have (or should have) argued that its sales to
unaffiliated parties in British Columbia were too small or unrepresen tative to constitute reliable
evidence of market prices in British Columbia."
472 (emphasis in original)
7.335 In this regard, it is stated in the IDM that:
"West Fraser maintains that chip prices vary significantly by region and that any
comparison in the aggregate is meaningless. West Fraser contends that it explained at
verification that chip prices vary signifi cantly between British Columbia and Alberta
and that they therefore should not be compared directly."473
7.336 In addition, it is stated in West Fraser's Cost Verification Report that:
"[DOC] noted that the schedule for wood chips was divided between sales in Alberta
and sales in British Columbia. For sales in Alberta, the average affiliated per-unit
sales value of CAN$ [****] compared to an average unaffiliated per-unit sales of
CAN$ [****]. For the sales in British Colu mbia, the average affiliated per-unit sales

468 While issues relating to the rejection of data and use of facts available by an investigating authority
might fall under the coverage of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement, Canada has not made any claim
under that provision.
469 The IDM and the Final Determination were published on 21 March 2002 (Exhibit CDA-2, IDM,
cover page) and 2 April 2002 (Exhibit CDA-1, Final Determination), respectively. West Fraser's Comments
Regarding Ministerial Errors are contained in a letter addressed to DOC dated 9 April 2002 (Exhibit CDA-161,
Comments Regarding Ministerial Errors).
470 We note that the concept of "ministerial errors" is not contained in the AD Agreement. Rather, it
reflects a practice of the United States.
471 We note that a recent panel expre ssed a similar view. (Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry,
paras. 7.196-7.197)
473 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 11, p. 57.

value of CAN$ [****] compared to an av erage unaffiliated per-unit sales of CAN$
[****]."
474
7.337 The excerpt quoted from West Fraser's Cost Verification Report refers to a schedule
contained in an exhibit collected at verificati on – several months before the IDM and the Final
Determination were issued – and included in E xhibit CDA-106. This exhibit reports separately inter
alia the volume of wood chips sold by type of cust omer (affiliated and unaffiliated) made by each of
West Fraser's sawmills in Canada. Totals (incl uding volume and value) for sales to affiliated and
unaffiliated parties are grouped by region, i.e., Alberta and BC.
7.338 We consider that, when arguing during the veri fication that any comparison in the aggregate
is meaningless and that BC and Alberta should not be compared directly because wood chip prices
vary significantly between those two regions, West Fraser could have anticipated that, if DOC
accepted its argument, it might have considered comparing prices of wood chips sold by West Fraser's
BC sawmills to affiliated parties in BC with prices of sales made by those sawmills to unaffiliated
parties in that region. Based on its own data, W est Fraser could already have seen during verification
that the volume of wood chips sold to unaffiliated parties in BC during the POI was tiny (0.28 per
cent of total wood chips sales in BC). For the foregoi ng reasons, we reject Canada's argument that
West Fraser did not make certain specific argume nts until a late stage in the investigation because
there was no reason why West Fraser should have done so before.475
7.339 Even if, arguendo, we were to consider West Fraser's arguments, we would be unable to
conclude that the United States acted inc onsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. First,
Canada argues that the volume of wood chips sold by West Fraser to unaffiliated parties in BC was
tiny. The United States replies that, so long the wood chip transactions were commercial in nature,
the actual volume of those transactions is irrelevant.
7.340 In our view, the volume of wood chips sold does not determine, in and of itself, whether those
transactions constitute an appropria te benchmark against which the av erage price of wood chips sold
to affiliated parties can be compared. Canada a ppears to acknowledge this fact implicitly when it
states that it did not make any arguments concerning West Fraser's sales from its PIR sawmill because
sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties made by PIR 476 "were not made at inflated prices" and "did
not distort DOC's analysis".477
7.341 Canada argues that its McBride sawmill sold wood chips to unaffiliated parties early in the
POI and pursuant to a long-term contract, and thus did not reflect market prices for the POI as a
whole.478 In support of its argument, Canada cites the following excerpt from West Fraser's Cost
Verification Report:
"[c]ompany officials explained that the McBride mill had a long-term contract in
effect for chip sales when the mill was purchased and that all sales occurred during
April and May 2000. They explained that the sales value of chips increased in
May 2000 and that they were obligated to sell the chips at the lower contracted
price."479

474 Exhibit CDA-110, West Fraser's Cost Verification Report, p. 23. Confidential information
contained in the bracketed sections has been removed.
475 In any case, we note that Canada has not raised in the Panel Request any claim under Article 6 of
the AD Agreement.
476 We recall that this is one of the two sawmills ow ned by West Fraser which had sales of wood chips
to unaffiliated parties in BC during the POI.
479 Exhibit CDA-110, West Fraser's Cost Verification Report, p. 23.

7.342 The United States replies that West Fraser made no argument that the long-term contract by
the McBride mill did not represent valid market pric es, nor did it make any argument about the arm's
length nature of the sales made from its other mill in BC (PIR).
7.343 We recall that West Fraser sold wood chips to unaffiliated parties from two sawmills in BC,
namely McBride and PIR. We understand Canada to argue that DOC should not have relied on
McBride's sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties in its arm's length determination because:
• McBride's sales to unaffiliated parties were ma de pursuant to a long-term contract that
prevented raising wood chips prices to its (u naffiliated) customer when market prices for
wood chips rose; and
• McBride's sales to unaffiliated parties took place when chip prices were lowest and not
reflective of BC prices during the entire POI.480
7.344 With respect to the contract, Canada explained that prices under the long-term contract of the
McBride mill were recalculated on a quarterly basis in order to reflect developments in market prices
for wood chips during the previous quarter. 481 Bearing in mind that prices were periodically
recalculated, we do not consider that the terms of the contract are per se sufficient justification for a
conclusion that prices of wood chips sold by McBr ide to unaffiliated parties were not reliable.
Canada's second argument has to do with the timing of McBride's sales to unaffiliated prices. Thus,
Canada asserts that they took place at the beginning of the POI, when wood chips prices were at their
lowest. This has not been contested by the United States. We note that West Fraser's average price of
wood chips to unaffiliated parties in BC was calcu lated based on sales of wood chips to unaffiliated
parties made by the McBride and PIR sawmills. Therefore, the average price of wood chips to
unaffiliated parties included not only data of McBride but also of PIR. Canada has argued and shown
that all sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties in BC made by McBride took place in the first two
months of the POI, but has not directed us to any information on the record on the timing and
conditions of sale of PIR. We are therefore unable to determine whether the average price calculated
by DOC for sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties was impacted at all by McBride's data to such
an extent that an unbiased and objective investigatin g authority could not have averaged McBride and
PIR's sales data, as DOC did. Having reached this conclusion, we reject Canada's argument.
7.345 In addition, West Fraser argued during the i nvestigation that DOC should have evaluated
whether West Fraser's affiliated party sales were made at arm's length prices using the same method
used for affiliated chip sales made by Canfor. Th is treatment was justified because, according to
West Fraser, both companies were in similar situati ons. Canada therefore argues before us that DOC
should not have applied different benchmarks for West Fraser and Canfor. The United States
contends that Canfor was not similarly situated to West Fraser. The United States asserts that West
Fraser had sales to unaffiliated parties in BC, while Canfor did not. In addition, the United States
argues that sales in BC made by West Fraser were of its own product mix, and thus the best evidence
of the value of an offset in West Fraser's pro cess. By contrast, Canfor had no sales in BC, and
therefore, the best evidence of the value of an offset for Canfor was other companies' arm's length
sales in that market.
7.346 We note that Canada has not disputed the fact that, while Canfor did not have any sales of
wood chips to unaffiliated parties in BC during the PO I, West Fraser did. In our view, the factual
situations of Canfor and West Fraser are therefore si gnificantly different. In Canfor's case, there were
no sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties in BC; he nce, the investigating authority was left with
no choice but to use data other than that of the exporter itself in order to carry out the arm's length

481 Canada asserted that "[t]he McBride contract se t prices at the beginning of each calendar quarter
based on market conditions in the previous quarter". (Canada response to question 132 of the Panel, para. 120)

test. In West Fraser's case, there was data available for the exporter concerned albeit corresponding to
a small portion of West Fraser's total sales of wood chips in BC (0.28 per cent). Canada has not
established that the average price data corresponding to sales of wood chips to unaffiliated parties in
BC was unreliable. Hence, we do not consider that , based on the facts before us, it could be required
from an unbiased and objective investigating authority to have treated Canfor and West Fraser in the
same manner. For this reason, we reject Canada's argument.
7.347 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Canada's claim that, in re-valuing West Fraser's revenue
from sales of wood chips to affiliated parties, instea d of using the value recorded in West Fraser's
books, the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1.
7.348 With respect to Canada's claims regarding viol ations of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the AD
Agreement, we note that Canada advances arguments identical to those mentioned in paragraph 7.325,
supra, in support of those claims. This being th e case and having found that Canada has not
established that the United States acted inc onsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement in re-
valuing West Fraser's prices of wood chips sold to a ffiliated parties in BC, we conclude that Canada
has not established that the United States acted incons istently with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4 of the
AD Agreement. For this reason, we reject Canada's claims of violation of Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.4.
N. C
LAIM 11: ARTICLES 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 AND 2.4 – DIFFERENCE IN PRICE
COMPARABILITY ARISING FROM PROFITS ON FUTURES CONTRACTS: SLOCAN
(a) Factual Background
7.349 Canada's claim concerns DOC's treatment of Slocan's profits and losses from lumber futures
hedging contracts traded on the CME. Slocan ente red into two types of lumber futures hedging
contracts during the POI. Under the first type of contract, Slocan actually delivered the lumber under
the terms of the futures contract. These transactions were included in Slocan's reported sales and are
not in dispute. Other contracts were sold/traded "before and instead of physical delivery". 482 T h e
revenues obtained through these operations were recorded in Slocan's books as lumber selling
activity. In response to DOC exporters' questionna ire, Slocan reported the net revenue earned on
futures contracts as an offset to direct selling expe nses. DOC rejected the claimed adjustment in its
Preliminary Determination on the ground that that income was investment revenue, rather than a
direct selling expense; hence, it should not be treat ed as a sales specific deduction/addition. After
DOC's Preliminary Determination, Slocan restated its claim for an adjustment to direct selling
expenses or, in the alternative, requested DOC to ac count for futures profits and losses as an offset to
financial expenses. In its Final Determination, DOC rejected Slocan's request as follows:
"[a]ny sales of subject merchandise that occurred during the POI as a result of a
futures contract have been included in Slo can's reported sales list. However, we have
not included in our analysis profits on the sale of a futures contracts that did not result
in the shipment of subject merchandise. Su ch profit is realized from Slocan's position
on the CME and as a producer of softwood lumber, but not from its actual sale of
subject merchandise.
We also have not applied these profits as an offset to Slocan's direct selling expenses.
Section 773(a)(6)(C)(iii) of the Act directs [DOC] to make circumstance of sales
adjustments only for direct selling expenses and assumed expenses.
Section 351.410(c) defines dir ect selling expenses as "expenses . . . that result from
and bear a direct relationship to the partic ular sale in question". Accordingly, where
no sale of subject merchandise occurred, there can be no circumstance of sale
adjustment for direct selling expenses.

Slocan suggests that as an alternative, [DOC] apply the profits as an offset to Slocan's
financial expenses. In support of this argument, Slocan disputes [DOC]'s statement in
its preliminary determination calculation memo that these profits are "investment
revenues" by stating that Slocan is engaging in hedging rather then speculative
activity, and that sales on the futures mark et are integral parts of the company's
normal sales and distribution process. While we agree that Slocan's lumber futures
hedging activity is related to its core business of selling lumber as opposed to
speculative investment activity, it is for th is very reason that we disagree that the
futures contracts are related to Slocan's financing activity. As such, the futures profits
should not be used to offset the company's interest expense".
483
(b) Arguments of the Parties
7.350 Canada asserts that DOC used two directly contradictory lines of reasoning to disregard the
profits. At the preliminary stage, Canada asserts that DOC had determined that revenue from trading
softwood lumber futures contracts was investment revenue, and for that reason, rejected Slocan's
claimed adjustment. At the definitive stage, DOC refused to treat those profits as an offset to Slocan's
financial expenses, by stating that they related to Slocan's core business of selling lumber rather than
to any investment activity. In the view of Canada , at a minimum, one of these determinations cannot
stand and is, therefore, based on an evaluation of the facts which is neither unbiased nor objective.
Bearing in mind DOC's finding that Slocan's lumber futures hedging activity is related to its core
business of selling lumber as opposed to speculative investment activity, Canada argues that DOC
should have granted Slocan an adjustment to direct selling expenses. Canada asserts that Article 2.4
supports its claim. Canada conte nds that Article 2.4 does not require any price adjustment to be
directly related to a particular sales transaction. Canada argues that Article 2.4 required the
United States to make due allowance for all diffe rences that affected price comparability. Canada
contends that Slocan's futures trading activity was either a "condition" of US sales, an "other
difference" affecting price comparability, or both. Canada asserts that it was DOC's responsibility to
decide how to classify Slocan's futures revenue and how to make "due allowance" for its effect on
price comparability. Should DOC have been of the vi ew that Slocan's request for such an adjustment
was not founded, then Canada asserts that DOC could have made the adjustment by offsetting
Slocan's financial expense by the income derived fr om futures contracts. Canada asserts that DOC's
failure to make the requested adjustment to selling expense was inconsistent with the US obligation to
use a reasonable amount for SG&A costs under Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement. Canada asserts that
an objective and unbiased investigating authority ev aluating the evidence before DOC could not have
reached the conclusion that no adjustment was required to offset Slocan's futures contract revenues.
7.351 The United States replies that DOC found that Slocan's lumber hedging activity is linked to
overall selling activities and reduction of Slocan's e xposure to price changes. The United States
asserts that hedging is only indirectly linked to selling activities, because there is no actual sale and
delivery of lumber to a buyer. Because the revenue from trading softwood lumber futures contracts
could not be directly related to sales of softw ood lumber, the United States asserts that DOC was
justified in finding that Slocan's futures hedging cont racts are not direct selling expenses. Bearing in
mind that futures profits were recorded as lumber sales revenues rather than production expenses, the
United States argues that DOC was justified in rejec ting Slocan's request for the futures profits to
offset financial expenses.
(c) Evaluation by the Panel
7.352 Canada claims that, based on the facts before it, DOC's refusal to grant Slocan an adjustment
under Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement for the net revenue it earned through its trading of softwood
lumber futures contracts on the CME, resulted in the United States being in violation of its obligations

483 Exhibit CDA-2, IDM, Comment 21, pp. 92-94.

under Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. Canada claims that, if we concluded that the United States
has not violated Article 2.4, we should find that DOC should have accounted for that revenue when
determining the constructed (normal) value and that the United States, by not doing so, has violated
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2. From the re cord, it is clear to us that DOC did not dispute the
existence of this revenue and that DOC accepted th at the revenue was earned from hedging activities,
rather than from speculation in futures contracts. The issue before us, is to determine whether DOC
should have made an adjustment under Article 2.4 to take the ne t revenue from Slocan's futures
contracts into account, and if we find in the nega tive, to determine whether the United Stated has
acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1. 1 and 2.2.2 in not having taken that income into
account in the dumping calculation. We note that the revenue at issue was generated by the buying
and selling of futures contracts that did not result in the shipment of subject merchandise.
484
7.353 We understand Canada's first ar gument to be that DOC should have granted an adjustment
under Article 2.4, either under the language "conditi ons and terms of sale" or "any other differences
which are also demonstrated to af fect price comparability". The United States asserts that it was not
demonstrated that the differences at issue affected price comparability. In addition, the United States
argues that the futures contracts at issue were not conditions and terms of sal e related to particular
sales transactions of lumber.
7.354 Article 2.4 provides, in relevant portion, as follows:
"[a] fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. (…)
Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect
price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale (…) and any
other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability." (emphasis
added; footnote omitted)
7.355 We recall our discussion of the obligations impo sed by this provision in paragraphs 7.165-
7.167, supra, and in particular, the Appellate Body statement in US – Hot-Rolled Steel that:
"Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that, where there are
"differences" between export price a nd normal value, which affect the
"comparability" of these prices, "[d]ue allowance shall be made" for those
differences". The text of that provision gi ves certain examples of factors which may
affect the comparability of prices: "differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other
differences". However, Article 2.4 expressl y requires that "allowances" be made for
"any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability".
(emphasis added) There are, therefore, no differences "affect[ing] price
comparability" which are precluded, as such, from being the object of an
"allowance"".
485 (emphasis in original)
7.356 An examination of a request for an Article 2.4 adjustment should therefore start with a
determination of whether a difference between the export price and the normal value exists. That is, a
difference between the price at which the like produc t is sold in the domestic market of the exporting
country and that at which the allegedly dumped prod uct is sold in the importing country. Ultimately,
this provision requires that differences exist between two markets. If there is no difference affecting
the products sold in the markets concerned, for instance, where the packaging of the allegedly dumped
product and that of the like product sold in the domes tic market of the exporting country is identical,
in our view, an adjustment would not be required to be made by that provision.

484 Thus, our examination and conclusions below do not cover Slocan's sales on the CME that resulted
in the shipment of subject merchandise.
485 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 177.

7.357 The identified differences concerning the products sold in the two markets must affect the
comparability of normal value and export price for the oblig ation to make due allowance to apply.
Article 2.4 does not define what comparability means, but includes a non-exhaustive list of factors
which may affect price comparability. Comparability is a term which, in our view, cannot be defined
in the abstract. Rather, an investigating authorit y must, based on the facts before it, on a case-by-case
basis decide whether a certain factor is demonstrat ed to affect price comparability. We can imagine
of situations where although differences exist, they do not affect price comparability. For instance,
this could occur where in the exporting country all cars sold are painted in red, while cars exported are
all black. The difference is obvious; in fact, it is one of those differences listed in Article 2.4 itself – a
difference in physical characteristics. However, there might be no variable cost difference among the
two cars because the cost of the paint – whether re d or black – might be the same. If instead of
differences in cost, we were looking at market valu e differences, we might reach the same conclusion
if, either the seller or the purchaser, would be willing to sell or purchase at the same price, regardless
whether the car is red or black.
486
7.358 It is also important to note that there are no differences "affect[ing] price comparability"
which are precluded, as such, from being the object of an allowance. In addition, we consider that the
obligation on an investigating aut hority is to examine the merits of each claimed adjustment and to
determine whether the difference affects price co mparability between the allegedly dumped product
and the like product sold on the domestic market of the exporting country.487
7.359 Recalling the standard of review which we are applying and the requirement that we are not
to perform a de novo review, we will examine the submissions of the parties to determine whether an
unbiased and objective investigating authority could have concluded that, based on the facts before
DOC at the time of determination, the granting of an Article 2.4 adjustment was required.
7.360 The first issue that must be ex amined, is whether there were differences affecting the normal
value and the export price in the two markets comp ared, i.e., the United States and Canada. It is
undisputed that Slocan's hedging activities took place in the United States only, that is, on the CME.
Neither party has argued that Slocan hedged softwood lumber futures contracts in Canada.
7.361 We note that Canada asserts that:
"[a]s Slocan demonstrated during the inv estigation, particularly in Verification
Exhibit 21, hedging through futures trading activity affects all sales in a particular
market. Slocan Sales Verification Exhibit 21 Random Length--An Introductory
Hedge Guide, at VE2381 to VE2384 (Exhibit CDA-119). Slocan has greater
flexibility to respond to changes in pri ce trends because it knows in advance the
minimum price that a certain percentage of its sales, will achieve. This affects the
other prices that Slocan is willing to offer and accept in that market.";
488
and that:

486 In our view, whether a particular factor affect s price comparability might be considered from the
point of view of the purchaser. The question is whether a purchaser would be willing to make a price
differentiation between two products. For example, would a purchaser be prepared to pay more for a car painted
black than for the very same car when painted red, a lthough the costs for both cars are identical? In other
words, if the behaviour of the purchaser would change, depending on the colour of the car, it could be
considered that that difference in physical characteristics, that is, the difference in colour, affects price
comparability.
487 In addition to these comments, we recall that we have set out our understanding of Article 2.4 in
paras. 7.165-7.167, supra.
488 Canada second written submission, para. 336, note 356.

"at verification [Slocan] demonstrated the effect on price comparability by proving
that Slocan was a "hedger" in the lumber market and that the purpose and effect of
hedging contracts is to affect prices in the ma rket by shielding against fluctuations in
price. Given the demonstrated purpose of hedging activity, [DOC]'s factual
determination that "Slocan's lumber futur es hedging activity is related to its core
business of selling lumber" was a determination that futures revenue affected
prices."
489 (emphasis in original)
7.362 Canada argues that Slocan demonstrated that its hedging activity in the United States affected
price comparability. In support of this contenti on, we understand Canada to assert that Slocan's
hedging activity only occurs in th e United States and that the hedgi ng activity was a deliberate effort
to affect the pricing of its products sold in the US market only.
7.363 We note that the revenue at issue does not arise from particular sales transactions of softwood
lumber as such, but rather that it is generated from th e sale of the contracts, to be executed at a future
date, themselves. This means that the very same contract can be so ld and bought, or even re-bought
by the original seller, a number of times before it is actually resulting in the physical delivery of the
softwood lumber. We also note that it is stated in the DOC Verification Report of Slocan that:
"[e]very futures contract that Slocan en ters into carries an obligation to deliver
'physicals' – actual lumber – unless the contract is offset.
When a futures contract expires without being offset, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) is the customer. Slocan ships the goods as directed by the CME.

Slocan engages in futures trading in order to hedge, not to speculate. The purpose of
hedging is to reduce the risk of holding lumber inventory."490
7.364 Although the CME is located in the United Stat es, the sellers and buyers of the futures
contracts can also be located in Canada itself, as is the case with Slocan. Furthermore, we also note
that eventual delivery of the softwood lumber in te rms of the futures contracts can also take place in
Canada.491 Although we are aware that the revenue at issue has been generated through futures
contracts which were offset and that no deliver y has taken place, the product which forms the object
of the contract can find its way back to the Canadi an domestic market. In light of the above, it seems
to us that questions can be raised as to whether the effect of Slocan's hedging activities can be isolated
to the US market only, and that it therefore aff ects price comparability between the normal value and
the export price. In addition, we note that the "greater flexibility to respond to changes in price
trends" referred to by Canada in its submissions before us cannot, in our view, be isolated to the
market of the country in which hedging takes place, i.e., the United States. Other than unsubstantiated
assertions that "affects the other prices that Slocan is willing to offer and accept in th[e US] market",
Canada has not presented evidence showing that he dging activities only impacted the setting of prices
at which softwood lumber products are sold in the United States. In other words, Canada has not
convinced us that the "price stability" effect implied in its submissions of the hedging activities did
not play a role in the price setting of softwood lu mber products when sold in Canada or any other

489 Id., para. 342, note 363.
490 Exhibit CDA-119, Slocan's Cost Verification Report, p. VE02361.
491 Id., p. VE02366, when it is stated that:

"[i]f your firm should wish to take delivery and it is in the U.S. or Canada east of the western
boundaries of North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma, and the
western boundary of Manitoba, Canada, the freight is the lowest published freight rate for 73-
foot flatcars from Prince, British Columbia to your location."

market where Slocan sells them. We are therefore of the view that Canada has not established that
there are "differences" between export price and nor mal value, which affect the "comparability" of
these prices.
7.365 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that an unbiased and objective investigating authority
could have concluded that the adjustment requested by Slocan under Article 2.4, whether under the
"conditions and terms of sa le" or under the "any other differenc es" language, was not warranted and,
hence, that such an investigating authority could have refused granting that adjustment. We therefore
reject Canada's claim that the United States act ed inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the AD
Agreement.
7.366 In the alternative, Canada argues that, in acco rdance with Article 2.2.1.1, DOC should have
offset financial expense with the futures profits in determining the constructed (normal) value.492 The
United States disagrees. In the view of the Unite d States, it would have been inappropriate for DOC
to disregard the treatment of those profits in Slocan 's books and, instead, treat them as offsets to cost
of production.
7.367 Article 2.2.1.1 reads as follows:
"[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2, costs sh all normally be calcul ated on the basis of
records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records
are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting
country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the
product under consideration. Authorities sha ll consider all available evidence on the
proper allocation of costs, including that wh ich is made availabl e by the exporter or
producer in the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been
historically utilized by the exporter or producer, in particular in relation to establishing
appropriate amortization a nd depreciation periods and allowances for capital
expenditures and other development costs. Unless already reflected in the cost
allocations under this sub-paragraph, costs shall be adjusted appropriately for those
non-recurring items of cost which benefit future and/or current production, or for
circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are affected by start-up
operations." (footnote omitted)
7.368 We recall our understanding of the obligations imposed under Article 2.2.1.1 in paragraphs
7.236-7.237, supra. We recall that Article 2.2.1.1 provides that costs must normally be calculated on
the basis of records kept by the exporter, provided that such records are in accordance with the
generally accepted accounting principles of the ex porting country and reasonably reflect the costs
associated with the production and sale of the produ ct under consideration. In addition, it establishes
that investigating authorities must consider all av ailable evidence on the proper allocation of costs,
including that which is made available by the exporte r or producer in the course of the investigation,
provided certain conditions are met. Canada asserts that, consistent with Article 2.2.1.1, DOC should
have offset financial expense with the futures profit s in determining the constr ucted (normal) value.
In light of our analysis of the obligations contai ned in Article 2.2.1.1, we do not consider that
Canada's argument relate to any of the obligations imposed in Article 2.2.1.1. Having rejected the
sole basis on which Canada supported its claim of an Article 2.2.1.1 violation, we must reject
Canada's claim.
493

492 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi).
493 In addition, we note that Slocan treated this income as "sales revenue" rather than as a COGS or a
SG&A item. For DOC to have treated it differently – either as a COGS or SG&A item – Slocan should have
argued and shown in the context of the investigation that there were reasons for DOC to depart from "the
records kept by the exporter", which we do not have any indication it did. Failing to do so, the proviso of

7.369 Canada argues that DOC's failure to grant an adjustment was inconsistent with the US
obligations under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement.
494 With respect to its Article 2.2
claim, Canada argues that that provision requires an investigating authority to use a reasonable
amount for SG&A expenses.
7.370 Article 2.2 reads as follows:
"[w]hen there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the
domestic market of the exporting country or when (…) such sales do not permit a
proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with
(…) the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for
administrative, selling and general costs and for profits." (footnote omitted)
7.371 In accordance with this provision, the margin of dumping can in certain circumstances be
determined by comparing the export price with the constructed (normal) valu e. This constructed
(normal) value is to include the cost of production in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount
for SG&A costs, and for profits. While this provision requires that the amount for SG&A costs to be
included in the constructed (normal) value must be reasonable, Canada has not argued on which grounds
we should find that the amounts for SG&A costs de termined by DOC were no t reasonable. Canada
merely claims that Article 2.2 ha s been violated by the United St ates, without providing a basis and
arguments for its claim. We recall that, in our finding in paragraph 7.13, supra, we stated that it is for
Canada, which has challenged the consistency of the US measure, to bear the burden of demonstrating
that the measure is not consistent with – in this particular case – Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement.
Furthermore, we recall that the role of a panel is not to make the case for either party. Canada has
failed to present arguments in support of its cl aim that unreasonable amounts for SG&A costs were
used by DOC in the case at issue when constructing (normal) value. We therefore reject Canada's
claim that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.
7.372 Canada has not advanced any argument in suppor t of DOC's alleged violation of Article 2.2.2
of the AD Agreement . We recall that the role of a panel is not to make the case for either party.
Canada has failed to present arguments in support of its claim. We therefore reject Canada's claim.495
7.373 Finally, Canada raises a consequential claim unde r Article 2.2.1. Canada asserts that an
incorrect calculation of costs impacts the determ ination of which sales are useable in establishing
normal value, contrary to Article 2.2.1. This claim must be rejected because Canada has not
established that DOC determined costs incorrectly (see paragraph 7.368, supra).

Article 2.2.1.1 requires that "costs shall be determined on the basis of the records kept by the exporter", which
we find DOC did. Thus, DOC acted in line with the mandate set forth in Article 2.2.1.1.
494 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vi). We note that, in the restatement of claims,
Canada did not include Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement as one of the provisions allegedly violated by the
United States. In view of this, we consider that the Ar ticle 2.1 claim is not before us and, hence, we will not
examine it.
495 In any case, we understand that Slocan had not treated in its records this income as a SG&A item
but rather as a "sales revenue". As discussed in paragraphs 7.236-7.237, supra, Article 2.2.1.1 expresses a
preference for the costs to be determin ed on the basis of the records kept by the exporter. In this instance,
Canada is requesting us to find that DOC should have departed from the records kept by Slocan and treat the
income at issue as part of the compan y's SG&A costs. However, we recall that Slocan did not treat the revenue
at issue as a SG&A item but rather as a "sales revenue". For us to conclude along the lines of Canada's request,
we are of the view that Slocan shou ld have argued and demonstrated that there were reasons, based on the
proviso of Article 2.2.1.1, for DOC to depart from Slocan 's records, that is to treat the income at issue as a
SG&A item rather than as a "sales revenue". Canada has not pointed to any evidence on record showing that
Slocan did so in the context of the investigation.

O. CLAIM REGARDING ARTICLE VI OF GATT 1994 AND ARTICLES 1, 9.3 AND 18.1 OF THE AD
AGREEMENT
(a) Arguments of the Parties
7.374 Canada argues that, by improperly initiating and continuing the investigation, failing to
properly determine the "like product", failing to make an adjustment for physical differences which
affected price comparability, zeroing negative margins and improperly calculating each respondent's
costs, the United States applied inflated margin s of dumping to Canadian softwood lumber products
and applied a measure against dumping that was c ontrary to Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994.
(b) Evaluation by the Panel
7.375 Under this claim, we understand Canada to argue that, because the United States has acted
inconsistently with certain provisions of the AD Agreement by improperly initiating and continuing
the investigation, failing to properly determine the "like product", failing to make an adjustment for
physical differences which affected price comp arability, zeroing negative margins and improperly
calculating each respondent's costs – which constitute separate claims examined in Sections VII.D-
VII.N, supra – the United States has also acted inconsiste ntly with Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD
Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994.496 This is therefore a consequential claim.497
7.376 At the outset, we note that, in its Panel Request , a reference to Article 9.3 can only be found
in section 3 thereof. This section covers Canada's claims examined in Sections VII.H-VII.N of this
Report only. Bearing this in mind, and that there is no general reference to a violation of Article 9.3
elsewhere in the Panel Request, we are of the view that our examination and findings with regard to
Article 9.3 must be restricted to the claims examined in Sections VII.H-VII.N of this Report.
7.377 Our decision on this claim of violation of various provisions of the AD Agreement and of
GATT 1994 will depend entirely on our findings with resp ect to the claims to which this claim is
related. We recall that in Sections VII.D-VII.N, supra, we have ruled that, in using "zeroing" in
determining the existence of margins of dumping, the United States has acted inconsistently with
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement and that we have dismissed th e remaining claims of Canada.
Bearing in mind our conclusions with regard to the claims examined in those Sections and what is
stated in paragraph 7.376, supra, we find that:
• Canada's claim of violation of Articles 1 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of
GATT 1994 predicated on claims that we have rejected in Sections VII.D-VII.G fails; and that
• Canada's claim of violation of Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of
GATT 1994 predicated on claims that we have rejected in Sections VII.H, VII.J-VII.N also
fails.
7.378 With respect to the claim regarding " zeroing" – examined in Section VII.I, supra, we recall
that we have decided that the United States has not acted consistently with Article 2.4.2 of the AD
Agreement. It is therefore with respec t to this claim that we must determine whether – as Canada
argues – the United States "applied a measure against dumping that was contrary to Articles 1, 9.3 and
18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994". We note that a panel "need only address

496 Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1 (vii).
497 We understand that this is a consequential or de pendent claim based on the arguments that Canada
has put forward in support of the alleged violations of Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement , and
Article VI of GATT 1994. (See para. 7.374, supra and Canada response to question 1 of the Panel, para. 1(vii))

those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute".
498 In light
of the dependent nature of Canada's clai m, we see no useful purpose to deciding it. 499 In particular,
deciding such dependent claim will provide no additional guidance as to the steps to be undertaken by
the United States in order to implement our reco mmendation regarding the violation on which it is
dependent. In light of the foregoing, we consider it not necessary to examine Canada's claim under
Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 In light of our findings, supra, we conclude that in the investigation at issue:
(a) the United States has acted inconsistently with:
(i) Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in determining the existence of margins of
dumping on the basis of a methodology incorporating the practice of
"zeroing";
(b) the United States has not acted inconsistently with:
(i) Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement in determining that the application contained
such information as is required by Article 5.2;
(ii) Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by determining that there was sufficient
evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the investigation;
(iii) Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement by not rejecting the application prior to
initiation of the investigation, or by not terminating the investigation, due to
the alleged insufficiency of the evidence on dumping;
(iv) Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement by determining there to be only a single like
product and product under consideration;
(v) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by not granting an adjustment for differences
in physical characteristics (differences in dimensions), as requested by some
respondents;
(vi) Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement in its calculation
of the amounts for financial expense for softwood lumber in the case of
Abitibi;
(vii) Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement in its calculation
of the amounts for general and administrative costs for softwood lumber in the
case of Tembec;
(viii) Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement in its calculation
of the amounts for general and administrative costs for softwood lumber in the
case of Weyerhaeuser;

498 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19.
499 We note that a similar approach was followed by the panels in Argentina – Poultry, paras. 7.369-

(ix) Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement in its calculation of
the amounts for by-product revenue from the sale of wood chips as offsets for
Tembec and West Fraser;
(x) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by not granting Slocan an adjustment for the
net revenue earned on its trading of softwood lumber futures contracts, or
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, and 2.2.2 by not taking this net revenue into
account when determining the constructed (normal) value;
(xi) Articles 1 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994 with
respect to Canada's claims referred to in paragraphs 8.1.(b)(i)- 8.1.(b)(iv),
supra;
(xii) Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994
with respect to Canada's claims re ferred to in paragraphs 8.1.(b)(v)-
8.1.(b)(x), supra.
(c) in light of the findings in Sections 8.1(a) and 8.1(b), supra, we apply judicial
economy and do not rule on Canada's claims under:
(i) Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement ("fair comparison") in respect of zeroing;
and
(ii) Articles 1, 9.3 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994
with respect to the matter referred to in paragraph 8.1.(a)(i), supra.
B.
NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
8.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Ac cordingly, we conclude that to the extent the
United States has acted inconsisten tly with the provisions of the AD Agreement , it has nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to Canada under that Agreement.
C. RECOMMENDATION
8.3 In its Panel Request, Canada requested us to recommend the Dispute Settlement Body that
"the United States revoke the anti-dumping order in respect of softwood lumber from Canada". 500 In
addition to the revocation of the measure at issue, in its first written submission Canada requested us
to suggest that the United States could implement the Panel's recommendation by "return[ing] the
cash deposits collected pursuant to an illegal i nvestigation and an illegal determination of
dumping".
501
8.4 In considering Canada's request, we first recall that Article 19.1 of the DSU provides in
relevant part that:
"[w]hen a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or

500 WT/DS264/2.
501 Canada first written submission, para. 550. See also Canada second oral (opening) statement, para.
112.

Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement
the recommendations". (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
8.5 In light of the findings in paragraph 8.1, supra, we therefore recommend that the Dispute
Settlement Body request the United States to bring its measure into conformity with its obligations
under the AD Agreement.
8.6 By virtue of Article 19.1, panels have discre tion ("may") to suggest ways in which a Member
could implement the relevant recommendation. However, a panel is not required to make a
suggestion should it not deem it appropriate to do so. We do not consider it a ppropriate to make any
recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Body in this regard.

IX. DISSENTING OPINION BY ONE MEMB ER OF THE PANEL REGARDING
CANADA'S CLAIM ON ZEROING

9.1 Although I join my colleagues on this Panel with respect to the findings on all other claims
before us, I must respectfully disagree with the find ings regarding zeroing (Claim 6). In my view,
Canada has not established that zeroing is incons istent either with the specific provisions of
Article 2.4.2 or with the general "fair comparison" requirement of Article 2.4. At a minimum, I
consider that the United States' interpretation of Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4 as not prohibiting zeroing is a
permissible one. Accordingly, I would find that th e United States did not act inconsistently with
Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4 by reason of the zeroing of negative margins in the investigation underlying this
dispute.
9.2 At the outset, I recall the standard of review that governs the work of panels (and the
Appellate Body) when examining claims that a Member has violated the AD Agreement .
Article 17.6(ii) provides that, where a provision of the AD Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, a measure shall be found to be in conformity with that provision if it rests
upon one of those permissible interpretations. Thus, our task is not to choose our preferred
interpretation of Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement , but to determine whether the
interpretation advanced by the United States is perm issible, under the rules of treaty interpretation
applicable in WTO dispute settlement. Should we so find, then we must rule that the United States'
actions in zeroing in this investigation are in conf ormity with Articles 2.4.2 and 2.4. In my view,
Article 17.6(ii) applies at every step of our anal ysis: if any essential step in our reasoning depends
upon an interpretation which is only one of multiple permissible ones, then we cannot find that the
United States has acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement.
9.3 Although I disagree with my colleagues' findings on zeroing, I agree with their intermediate
conclusion that multiple averaging is permitted by Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. In my view,
this is not a question of multiple permissible interpre tations, but rather of the correct interpretation of
that provision. My colleagues have fully expl ained the bases for their conclusions on multiple
averaging, including the need to give meaning to the word "comparable", particularly given its
inclusion in the text at a late stage in the nego tiations; the appropriateness of reading the phrase "all
comparable export transactions" as a whole in a ma nner which gives meaning to all elements; the
relevance of the concept of "price comparability" in respect of Article 2.4 adjustments as context for
understanding the term "comparable" in Article 2.4.2; the obvious illogic of interpreting Article 2.4.2
to require that comparisons be made either at th e most aggregated (average to average) or least
aggregated (individual to individual) level, while prohibiting comparisons at intermediate levels of
aggregation
502; and the consistency of multiple averaging with the overall objective of Article 2.4,

502 It is difficult to understand why an investigatin g authority would be required either to compare the
entire product under investigation to the entire foreig n like product or individual export transactions to

which is to ensure a fair comparison. I woul d only add that the use of the term "margin s of dumping",
although not conclusive as to whether multiple averag ing is allowed, represents an additional element
in the overall picture supporting the conclusion that multiple averaging is permitted.
9.4 While I see no need to repeat my colleagues' reasoning, I would like to emphasize the critical
importance of multiple averaging in insuring a fair comparison. There will be differences between
home market and export transactions in virtually all anti-dumping investigations. These differences
may arise from, inter alia, physical differences, differences in level of trade, or date of sale. 503 While
these differences may in principle be taken into acc ount through adjustments, in many cases it simply
will not be possible to identify and quantify their precise effects on price comparability. Further,
there are a variety of different ways to get at the issue of price comparability and the making of
adjustments. In the case of a wide variety of typ es or dates of sale, for example, even identifying
which of the many groups should represent the sta ndard towards which adjustments should aim will
be unclear. Multiple averaging eliminates the need to consider such adjustments, thus reducing the
influence of subjective judgment on outcomes. In my view, therefore, multiple averaging not only is
not prohibited by the AD Agreement, but it is generally the most appropriate, fairest, most precise,
most predictable, and in many cases the only possible way to insure a fair comparison. 504 We have to
assume that the negotiators were aware of this as they negotiated the AD Agreement.
9.5 The reader may ask why it is ne cessary in this Report to discuss the permissibility of multiple
averaging. After all, the parties agree that mu ltiple averaging is permissible under Article 2.4.2 505,
and the third parties have not contended otherwise. 506 The reason the discussion is relevant here is
that Canada relies upon the Appellate Body ruling on zeroing in EC – Bed Linen in this dispute, and
in my view that ruling is predicated, at least im plicitly, on the conclusion that multiple averaging is
prohibited by Article 2.4.2. 507 The Appellate Body's reasoning, which seems ultimately to be based
on the view that by zeroing the EC calculated a wei ghted average that did not fully reflect the prices
of some export transactions and thus fell afoul of the requirement to compare a weighted average
normal value with a weighted average of all comparable export transactions, simply cannot be squared
with a finding that multiple averaging is permitted. Thus, if multiple averaging is permitted – and the
parties, my colleagues and I all agree that it is – one cannot simply rely upon the Appellate Body
Report in EC – Bed Linen to conclude that zeroing is prohibited. Rather, we must consider whether
there is some alternative basis to conclude that zeroing is prohibited by Article 2.4.2.

individual home market transaction, while not being allowed to compare groups of export transactions to groups
of comparable home market transactions.
503 For purely practical reasons it can be excluded that the need for multiple averaging in the case of
multiple models or types can be eliminated by conductin g separate investigations for every model or type, since
even a product under investigation which is defined in a seemingly narrow fashion, such as television sets or
ball bearings of a specific dimension, may involve innumerable models or types.
504 At the second meeting of the Panel with the partie s, we asked representatives of both parties how
often they had come across a case where there was only one step to do, i.e. where there was only one model, one
level of trade and one period. The US representative responded that he was unaware of any investigation that fit
that description, while the Canadian representative stated that he had experienced "one or two" single-stage
cases.
505 Canada argued before the Panel that its interp retation of Article 2.4.2 "... does not prohibit the
establishment of margins of dumping with respect to particular models of a product." Canada response to
506 Japan noted that "[a] multiple comparison method provided in Article 2.4.2 may be used in the
margin calculation process as a matter of administrative convenience to take into account th e differences in
physical characteristics among several models of a product." (Japan's third party oral statement, para. 5.75,
supra)
507 Thus, the Appellate Body stated that "[a]ll types or models falling within the scope of a "like"
product must necessarily be "comparable", and export transactions involving those types or models must
therefore be considered "comparable export transactions" within the meaning of Article 2.4.2." (Appellate Body

9.6 My colleagues have attempted to develop su ch an alternative to the reasoning found in EC –
Bed Linen. They have concluded that the obligation to include in the weighted average export price
"all comparable export transactions" applies not only to the comparison stage but also to the
aggregation of the results of multiple compar isons. They consider that through zeroing the
United States partially excluded from the aggregati on process the results of comparisons for types for
which the weighted average normal value was less than the weighted average export price. They
conclude that the United States therefore violated Article 2.4.2 by not taking into account all
comparable export prices when calculating the over all margin of dumping. I must respectfully
disagree.
9.7 It will be recalled that, when an investigating authority engages in multiple averaging, it first
divides the subject merchandise (and the forei gn like product) into groups based upon common
characteristics (which may relate to physical characteri stics, level of trade, date of sale, etc). It
calculates a weighted average normal value and e xport price for each group, and then compares the
weighted averages in order to determine the extent of the dumping, if any, for that group. The result
will be multiple margins of dumping (or amounts of dumping, if one prefers), one for each group. In
order to determine an overall margin for the product under investigation, however, it will be necessary
in some way to aggregate the results from the comparisons for each group. An analogous process will
be involved where an investigating authority perfo rms its calculations on a transaction-to-transaction
basis. In that case as well, the investigating auth ority will derive margins (or amounts) of dumping
for a number of specific transactions, and will then have to aggregate those margins in order to
determine an overall margin of dumping for the product.
9.8 There is no doubt that, as the investigating authority in the case of multiple averaging is
calculating weight-averaged normal values and export prices for each group, it is required in the
investigation phase to respect Article 2.4.2. This includes the obligation under Article 2.4.2 to include
in each of the average-to-average comparisons "all comparable export transactions". In this case,
however, there is no suggestion that DOC has failed to include any comparable export transactions in
any of the average to average comparisons DOC made in this case. Nor is there any indication that
DOC failed to fully take into account any export transaction in the conduct of each average to average
comparison. Based on the record before us, it must be considered that each and every one of the
export transactions considered by DOC was fully taken into account when performing the comparison
between normal value and export price for a given type. Rather, the claim of Canada, and the
reasoning of my colleagues on this Panel, is base d upon the view that the United States breached the
obligation to include "all comparable export tr ansactions" as a result of the manner in which the
United States aggregated the results of its multiple comparisons.
9.9 It seems to me that my colleagues are trying to reconcile two mutually incompatible positions.
They conclude that Article 2.4.2 does not require that the overall margin of dumping for a product be
calculated on the basis of a single weighted averag e export price and single weighted average normal
value. At the same time, they seem to conclude th at the ultimate result of the aggregation of multiple
average to average comparisons must be the sa me as if DOC had conducted a single average to
average comparison, or in any event that once it has performed multiple averages DOC is required to
average those averages, using negative dumping marg ins to offset positive margins. In my view,
these conclusions are unconvincing. Article 2.4.2 a llows multiple averaging, and the obligations of
Article 2.4.2 relate to each of the average to aver age comparisons performed. This is all the guidance
that can be determined from the text of Article 2.4.2. I can see nothing in Article 2.4.2 that
specifically dictates how those "intermediate" margins are to be aggregated in order to calculate an
overall margin of dumping for the investigated product for a given exporter, any more than I can see
anything in Article 2.4.2 that prescribes how the r esults of transaction-by-transaction comparisons are
aggregated.
9.10 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the AD Agreement is silent as to aggregation not only
with respect to the first (average-to-average) comp arison methodology. I note as a matter of relevant

context that Article 2.4.2 is equally silent as to how to aggregate the results of transaction-by-
transaction comparisons under the second methodology set forth in that provision. Article 2.4.2
provides that the existence of margins of dumping may be established "by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction by transaction basis". Clearly, nothing in Article 2.4.2 gives
specific guidance on how the results of individual tr ansaction comparisons are to be aggregated, and
the textual basis relied on by my colleagues for prohibiting zeroing when aggregating the results of
multiple average-to-average comparisons ("all co mparable export transactions") on its face does not
apply to the transaction-by-transaction methodology. It is therefore clear that Article 2.4.2 does not
prohibit zeroing in the context of the transaction-by-transaction methodology.
508 It would be very odd
indeed for the drafters to have prohibited zeroing wh en aggregating the results of multiple average to
average comparisons, while allowing it to be used when aggregating the results of comparisons
performed on a transaction by transaction basis.509
9.11 The use of multiple averaging must have been widely known to negotiators, as the practice
was the norm under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code . The negotiators should also have been
fully aware of the zeroing issue.510 They certainly should have realized that simply requiring average-
to-average or transaction-by-transaction comparisons would not resolve the issue of aggregation in the
subsequent stage. But if the drafters did not intend to prohibit zeroing, then what is the purpose of
Article 2.4.2? In my view, Article 2.4.2 was intende d to address a related but distinct issue from that
of zeroing, i.e., the question of average to individual comparisons. Prior to the Uruguay Round, many
investigating authorities compared individual export tr ansactions to an average normal value. On its
face, the purpose of Article 2.4.2 seems to be to re quire that, except in specified situations, there be
symmetry in the comparisons made by investigating authorities, i.e., that Members either compare on
an average to average or a transaction to transaction basis. Only where particular conditions are met
may a Member perform a comparison of prices of individual export transactions to an average normal
value.
9.12 I recall that, under Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement, a panel may not find a measure to be
inconsistent with a provision of the AD Agreement if that measure is based on a permissible
interpretation of that provision. In this case, I cons ider that the US interpretation of Article 2.4.2 as
not prohibiting zeroing is a permissi ble one. Thus, for the reasons set forth above, I would find that
the application by DOC of "zeroing" in this case was not inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
AD Agreement.
9.13 Some may be troubled by the prospect that no specific rules exist regarding the manner in
which the results of multiple average to average (and transaction-by-transaction) comparisons may be
aggregated. The general provision of Article 2.4 is however still available, as discussed infra. In any
event, the establishment of an anti-dumping margin is a highly complex exercise. Although Article 2
of the current AD Agreement is more detailed that its Tokyo Round predecessor, many aspects of
margin calculation are not specifically addressed. If Members consider that the issue of how to
aggregate the results of multiple comparisons is a l acuna that needs to be filled, then they should
negotiate such rules in the appropriate forum. Di spute settlement involves the interpretation of rules

508 Nor, for the reasons set forth in paras. 9.14 to 9.24 infra, would zeroing be prohibited under a
general "fair comparison" requirement under Article 2.4.
509 My colleagues decline to address the issue of zeroing in the context of individual to individual
transactions on the grounds that it is not within the Panel's terms of reference. While it is certainly true that no
such claim is before us, I believe that the language in Article 2.4.2 regarding transaction to transaction
comparisons is highly relevant context for interpreting other parts of Article 2.4.2.
510 In fact, the EC and Japan were involved in a high -profile dispute with respect to zeroing throughout
the later stages of the anti-dumping negotiations, beginning with a request for consultations on 8 July 1991 and
culminating in the circulation of a Panel Report in EC –Audio Cassettes . (Panel Report, EC – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan , 28 April 1995, ADP/136.) This Report was never
adopted.

agreed by Members. It cannot and must not be used as a substitute for rule-making through
negotiation.
9.14 Canada also claims that the United States has violated the "fair comparison" requirement of
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by the application of zeroing in this case, because zeroing
unjustifiably operates to give greater weight to transactions included in the averaging process for
which the export price is less than the normal value th an to those for which the export price is greater
than the normal value. Canada finds support for its position in a statement by the Appellate Body in
EC – Bed Linen .
511 Having found that zeroing was inconsiste nt with Article 2.4.2, my colleagues
exercised judicial economy and declined to rule on this claim. In light of my view that Article 2.4.2
does not prohibit zeroing, however, it is appropriate for me to proceed to a consideration of this
alternative claim by Canada.
9.15 I recall that Article 2.4 provides that "[a] fa ir comparison shall be made between the export
price and the normal value." There has not to date been any substantial analysis in WTO dispute
settlement as to the precise legal role of this la nguage, including whether it establishes an independent
legal obligation or rather serves only to inform interpretation of other operative provisions of
Article 2. Much less has there been any significant consideration of the manner in which it is to be
interpreted and applied.
512 Nor did the parties provide significant argumentation on this issue. That
said, the first sentence of Article 2.4 appears to be drafted in a manner which implies that it is
independently operational and legally binding 513, and I will thus proceed on that assumption for the
purposes of my consideration of this claim.
9.16 In terms of approach, I believe that a clai m based on a highly general test such as "fair
comparison" should be approached with caution by tr eaty interpreters. The concept of fairness in the
abstract is highly subjective, and a too-ready re liance on the "fair comparison" requirement could
result in interpretations that were highly unpredictable. Further, I am not inclined to accept that the
drafters intended that the Members abdicate their responsibility to negotiate rules in this area and
leave the rule-making function in the hands of th e dispute settlement system. Taking this into
account, I approach Article 2.4's "fair comparison" requi rement with two elements in mind. First, any
conception of "fairness" (and "unfairness") should be solidly rooted in the context provided by the
AD Agreement (and perhaps the WTO Agreement more generally). Second, given the subjectivity of
the concept of fairness, the principles of Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement regarding permissible
interpretations are particularly relevant.
9.17 Canada has made only general statements re garding why the application of the zeroing
methodology by DOC in this case failed to produce a "fair comparison". In response to a question
from the Panel on this issue, Canada responded that a comparison conducted on the basis of zeroing
cannot be considered to produce a "fair comparison" within the meaning of Article 2.4, because it
unjustifiably operates to give greater weight to transactions included in the averaging process for
which the export price is less than the normal value, than to those for which the export price is greater
than the normal value.514 In response to another question to Canada regarding the benchmark against

511 "We are also of the view that a comparison be tween export price and normal value that does not
take fully into account the prices of all comparable export transactions – such as the practice of "zeroing" in this
dispute – is not a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value, as required by Article 2.4 and
2.4.2." (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para.55)
512 The Appellate Body has stated that "Article 2.4 sets forth a general obligation to make a "fair
comparison" between export price and normal value. This general obligation that, in our view, informs all of
Article 2, but applies, in particular , to Article 2.4.2 which is specifically made 'subject to the provisions
governing fair comparison in [Article 2.4]'." (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para.59)
513 As compared with the drafting of its predecessor provision in the Tokyo Round AD Code ,
Article 2.6, which provided that ""[i]n order to affect a fa ir comparison . . . the two prices shall be compared at
the same level of trade . . . .".
514 Canada response to question 108(a) of the Panel.

which Canada would test whether a comparison is fair or unfair515, Canada responded in general terms
and did not explain how it applied its "benchmark" to this case.
9.18 In my view, Canada's explanation amounts to little more than an assertion that because
zeroing (when combined with multiple averaging) may result in a margin of dumping which is higher
than that which would have resulted from compar ing a single weighted average export price to a
single weighted average normal value, it does not produce a fair comparison. If Article 2.4.2 required
that a margin of dumping be based on a single average to average comparison, then Canada's assertion
that greater weight was given to some transactions th an to others might be correct (if superfluous). It
has however been established that multiple averaging is not prohibited by Article 2.4.2 (as of course
neither is a transaction-by-transaction methodology). I further note that Canada does not contend that
DOC gave greater weight to certain export transacti ons than to others in its performance of each
average-to-average comparison. Nor did DOC fail to take into account any export transactions, as the
overall amount of dumping found was divided over the full amount of all export transactions in order
to calculate a margin of dumping. Rather, Canada is simply arguing that it is unfair not to provide
credit for negative dumping margins, apparently pu rely because this results in a higher dumping
margin than would be the case if such credit were given.
9.19 I note that the differing views of the parties rega rding interpretation of Article 2.4 appear to
reflect an underlying difference regarding the con cept of "dumping". One school of thought is that
"dumping" relates to the average pricing behaviour of an exporter/producer over time. For those who
hold this view, the fact that a particular export transaction is made at a price that is below the price of
a comparable transaction in the home market of the exporting country (or is below cost) does not
necessarily mean that dumping has occurred, if anothe r export transaction is made at a price which is
higher than the home market price. They believe th at exporters should be given "credit" for selling
above normal value, and consider zeroing to be illogi cal. Others consider that any time a particular
export transaction occurs at a price that is below the price of a comparable transaction in the home
market of the exporting country (or is below cost), dumping has occurred. From this perspective,
overall margins of dumping are calculated simply because it is impractical to calculate and impose
anti-dumping duties with respect to each export tr ansaction, and the idea that such a transaction
should not be viewed as dumped merely because another export transaction occurs at a higher price
makes no sense.
9.20 The difference between these two approaches ca n be understood on the basis of a simple
example. Assume there are two home market sales and two export sales of a product during the
period of investigation. Both home market sales are made at a price of 100. One of the export sales is
made at a price of 50, the other at a price of 150. Under one school of thought, what is relevant is
average pricing behaviour. Since the average nor mal value and average export price are both 100,
there is no dumping and no duties should be imposed. Under the second school of thought, one of the
two sales was at a dumped price while the other w as not. Duties should therefore be collected on the
dumped sale. However, a dumping margin should be calculated that would reflect that only some
sales were dumped. Using zeroing, the total amo unt of dumping (50) woul d be divided by total
export sales (200), resulting in a 25 per cent margin . Imposition of a 25 per cent duty on the two
export transactions would result in the collection of duties in the amount of 50, the same amount of
duties as would have been collected had dumping been determined and duties assessed for each
transaction.
516
9.21 Arguments may be advanced for each of the c onceptual approaches identified above. For the
"average pricing behaviour" advocates, it is simply not consistent with commercial reality to expect
that exporters will be able to fine-tune their pr icing on a transaction by transaction basis to avoid

515 Question 108(b) by the Panel.
516 See EC – Audio Cassettes (unadopted) for an analysis of th e "fair comparison" requirement which
reflects this analytical approach.

dumping. Advocates of the alternative approach ar gue that the harm caused to domestic producers by
a dumped transaction – e.g., the loss of a sale or sale at a lower price than would have otherwise
occurred – is not undone simply because another export transaction is made at greater than normal
value, nor is the damage caused by dumping of a particular type or model undone simply because
another model is sold at greater than normal value. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses.
9.22 My task is not of course to decide which conceptual approach I prefer, but to examine
whether the AD Agreement shows such a preference. The Agreement does not contain any preamble
or statement of object and purpose
517, and in my view there is no basis to conclude that the Agreement
is premised on the "average pric ing behaviour" approach. In fact, an early GATT Group of Experts
Report on antidumping noted that "the ideal method . . . was to make a determination in respect of
both dumping and material injury in respect of each single importation of the product concerned . . .",
and this could be taken to suggest the contrary. 518 The fact that the AD Agreement permits the use of
variable duties as a basis for duty co llection is a further basis to conclude that, at a minimum, the
AD Agreement is not premised exclusively on an "a verage pricing behaviour" approach.519,520 Thus, I
fail to see how it may be concluded, based upon the AD Agreement itself, that a calculation
methodology that does not reflect the "average pric ing behaviour" approach is unfair in the sense of
Article 2.4.
9.23 I am aware that the Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen expressed the view that zeroing is
inconsistent with the "fair comparison" requirement in Article 2.4. I note however that this statement
is obiter dictum, as Article 2.4 was not part of a claim before the Appellate Body. More importantly, I
note that the Appellate Body did not set out any of its reasoning underlying this statement. I do not
consider that I would be acting in a manner consis tent with my obligations under Article 11 of the
DSU to perform a "objective assessment of the matter" if I were simply to find in favour of Canada on
the basis of such an unsupported statement.

517 Article VI of GATT 1994 does however state that "dumping . . . is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury . . . ."
518 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties , Second Report of the Group of Experts adopted by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES on 27 May 1960, BISD 9 th Supp. p. 194. It is clear that under the "ideal method"
identified in the Report non-dumped transactions would neither be subject to anti-dumping duties nor used to
offset dumped transactions. In thei r Report, the Group of Experts however concluded that such a method was
"clearly impracticable", in particular as regards injury, a nd for this reason a pre-selec tion system – i.e. a system
where the margin of dumping for future imports is estab lished, at least provisionally, on the basis of a prior
period – seemed to be the most satisfactory. This "pre -selection" approach is the basis for virtually all anti-
dumping systems today. The application of an ad valorem duty for a product, calculated based on the
transaction-by-transaction methodology comparison method in paragraph 2.4.2 combined with the aggregation
of the results of the individual comparisons using zeroing , is mathematically equivalent and would result in the
collection of anti-dumping duties on the product as a whole in the same amount as if the "ideal method" had
been applied. Zeroing when aggregating the results of multiple comparisons under a multiple averaging
approach would of course generally result in collection of a lower amount of total duties than the "ideal
method".
519 Under a "variable duty" approach to duty coll ection, a Member that has established in an
investigation that injurious dumping exists does not impose an ad valorem or specific duty, but rather imposes
duties on a transaction by transaction basis where the export price is below the normal value determined during
the investigation. Under such a system, the fact that on e transaction occurs at a price in excess of normal value
does not excuse the exporter from paying duties on another transaction that occurs at a price that is less than
normal value. This approach which is referred to in Article 9.4(ii) of the AD Agreement as a "prospective
normal value", has recently been found to be consistent with the AD Agreement. See Panel Report, Argentina –
Poultry, paras. 7.345 – 7.367.
520 It is also interesting to note that, when under Ar ticle 9.4 an investigating authority is called upon to
determine a rate for un-investigated exporters, it is no t required to give credit for any "negative dumping" by
investigated exporters. Thus, the AD Agreement does not in this context even consider the possibility that
negative margins should be taken into account when aggregating the results of dumping calculations for selected
exporters or producers in order to establish a margin of dumping for un-investigated exporters or producers.

9.24 For the foregoing reasons, and taking into account the standard of review under
Article 17.6(ii), I would conclude that Canada has not established that the application of zeroing in the
underlying investigation methodology was inconsis tent with the United States' obligation under
Article 2.4 to conduct a "fair comparison."