Document: WT/DS207/RW Page A-1 ANNEX A FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM PARTIES Contents Page Annex A-1 First Written Submission of Argentina (19 April 2006) A-2 Annex A-2 First Written Submissi on of Chile (3 May 2006) A-57
Date: 19 April 2006
Document codes: WT/DS207/RW
Complainant: Argentina
Respondent: Chile
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, EU, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, U.S.
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. XIX:1, II  GATT 1994Art. 4  AgricultureArt. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12  Safeguards

ANNEX A

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex A-1 First Written Submission of Argentina (19 April 2006) A-2
Annex A-2 First Written Submissi on of Chile (3 May 2006) A-57

TABLE OF REPORTS CITED

Short title Full title and reference
Chile – Price Band System Report of the Appellate Body " Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products " ,
adopted 23 October 2002.
Chile – Price Band System Report of the Panel " Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products " , adopted 23 October
2002.
Canada – Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Report of the Appellate Body " Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft ". Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
, adopted 21 July 2000.
EC – Sardines Report of the Appellate Body "European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines", , adopted 26 September 2002.
US – Sections 301-310 Report of the Panel " United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974", , adopted 22 December 1999.
US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act Report of the Panel "United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916" (Complaint
by Japan), , adopted 29 May 2000.

A.
INTRODUCTION
1. The Government of the Republic of Argentina wishes to thank the members of the Panel for
the opportunity to submit for their consideration the measures adopted by the Government of the
Republic of Chile for the alleged purpose of impl ementing the recommendations and rulings of the
Dispute Settlement Body in this dispute.
2. The Government of the Republic of Argentina requests the Panel to find that the price band
system that Chile applies to imports of wheat and wheat flour, as amended by Law 19.897 and
Exempt Decree No. 831/2003 (hereinafter the amende d PBS), is inconsistent – in itself and in its
application – with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , the second sentence of
paragraph (1)(b) of Article II of the GATT 1994, and paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
3. The Government of the Republic of Argentin a considers that the recommendations of the
DSB should be implemented promptly
1, fully and in accordance with the obligations assumed by
Members within the framework of the WTO. As the Republic of Argentina explains below, the
measures that the Republic of Chile has adopted for the alleged purpose of implementing the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute do not meet any of these requirements.
1. Background
4. On 23 October 2002, the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter the DSB) adopted the report of
the Appellate Body 2 and the Panel report, 3 as modified by the Appellate Body, in the case " Chile –
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Re lating to Certain Agricultural Products" ("Chile –
Price Band System").
5. In its Findings and Conclusions, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that Chile's
price band system was a border measure similar to variable import levies and minimum import
prices.4 The Appellate Body therefore upheld the Pane l's finding that Chile's price band system was
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.5 On the basis of these reports, the DSB
recommended that Chile should bring its price band sy stem, as found to be inconsistent with the
Agreement on Agriculture, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.6
6. On 6 December 2002, Chile requested that the determination of the reasonable period for the
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB be the subject of binding arbitration,
in accordance with Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the DSU).7
7. On 17 March 2003, the arbitrator's award determ ined that the reasonable period of time for
Chile to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB should be 14 months from the date
of adoption of the above-mentioned reports, a period which expired on 23 December 2003.8

1 As required by Article 21.1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU).
2 WT/DS207/AB/R.
3 WT/DS207/R.
4 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 288(c)(i).
5 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 288(c)(iii).
6 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 289.
7 WT/DS207/9.
8 WT/DS207/13.

8. On 25 September 2003, Chile published in the Official Journal Law No. 19.897 9 which
establishes rules on the importation of goods and amends Article 12 of Law No. 18.525 and the
Customs Tariff. On 4 October 2003, Chile published in the Official Journal Supreme Decree No. 831
of the Ministry of Finance 10 which regulates the implementation of Article 12 of Law No. 18.525, as
substituted by Article 1 of Law No. 19.897. 11 This Decree governs certain aspects of the PBS, the
amendments to which entered into force on 16 De cember 2003 for the products at issue in this
dispute, with the exception of edib le vegetable oils which ceased to be subject to the band system
from the date of publication of Law No. 19.897.12 Thus, Chile has implemented the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB only in relation to edible vegetable oils.
9. Argentina has argued strongly that these amendm ents to the PBS should also implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in relation to wheat and wheat flour.13
10. On 24 December 2003, Argentina and Chile concluded an Understanding regarding
procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU with respect to the present dispute.14
11. Early in 2004, bilateral negotiations were be gun with a view to achieving the implementation
of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in relation to wheat and wheat flour. In this
connection, during 2004 and 2005, various meetings were held in Geneva , Santiago de Chile and
Buenos Aires and a series of documents was exchange d with a view to achieving a mutually agreed
settlement of the dispute. This led to an understanding which Chile later repudiated. In relation to the
price band system for wheat and wheat flour, this understanding consisted – basically – in Chile
establishing an end date for the system.15
12. On 19 May 2004, Argentina initiated a recourse procedure under Article 21.5 of the DSU by
requesting consultations with Chile. 16 These consultations were held in Geneva on 17 June 2004 but
failed to lead to a settlement of the dispute.
2. Summary of claims and allegations
13. Argentina maintains that Chile has failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB and continues in breach of its obligations as a Member of the WTO.
14. This on the grounds that Chile's price band system, as amended in accordance with Law
No. 19.897 and Supreme Decree No. 831/2003, per se and in its specific application to imports of
wheat and wheat flour:

9 Exhibit ARG-1.
10 Exhibit ARG-2.
11 WT/DS207/15 of 22 September 2003, WT/DS207/15/Add.1 of 28 October 2003 and
WT/DS207/15/Add.2 of 21 November 2003.
12 Exhibit ARG-3: Circular Letter No. 292 of the National Customs Service of the Government of
Chile, Technical Subsecretariat and Classification Dept., of 14 October 2003. See also the statement made by
Chile at the DSB meeting on 7 November 2003 (WT/DSB/M/157, paragraph 20).
13 See, for example, the statements made by Argentina at the DSB meetings on 2 October, 7 November
and 1 December 2003 (WT/DSB/M/156, paragraphs 17 to 19; WT/DSB/M/157, paragraph 19;
WT/DSB/M/159, paragraph 19, respectively); 23 January, 17 February, 19 March, 20 April, 19 May and 22
June 2004 (WT/DSB/M/163, paragraph 18; WT/DSB/M/165 and WT/DSB/M/166, paragraph 18;
WT/DSB/M/167, paragraph 18; WT/DSB/M/169, paragraph 20; WT/DSB/M/171, paragraph 32). The
difference of opinion was also recorded in the document WT/DS207/16 of 7 January 2004.
14 WT/DS207/16.
15 Note that the present System has no end date. As indicated in the legislation amending the original
PBS, "…In 2014 the President of the Republic shall evaluate the modalities and conditions of application of the
price band system…" (emphasis added).
16 WT/DS207/17 of 25 May 2004.

 – Is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , since it is a border
measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price;

 – is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:(1)(b) of the GATT 1994, since
it constitutes "other duties or charges" not recorded in the corresponding column of
Chile's Schedule of concessions (No. VII);

 – is in breach of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Est ablishing the World
Trade Organization since, while it remains in for ce, Chile is not ensuring the
conformity of its laws, regulations and ad ministrative procedures with its obligations
under the WTO Agreements.

3. Structure of the submission
15. In Section B, Argentina gives a detailed description of the Chilean measures allegedly
intended to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the present dispute.
16. In Section C, Argentina puts forward the following arguments:
 – In Subsection I, Argentina shows that the amended PBS is in breach of Article 4.2 of
the Agreement on Agriculture;

 – in Subsection II, Argentina explains how the amended PBS is in consistent with the
second sentence of Article II:(1)(b) of the GATT 1994; and

 – Subsection III, Argentina argues that the amended PBS is in breach of Article XVI:4
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

17. Finally, in Section D Argentina presents its conclusions.
B.
THE FACTS
1. Measures intended to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
18. On 25 September 2003, Chile published in the Official Journal Law No. 19.897, 17 whose
Article 1 replaced Article 12 of Law No. 18.525. As notified by Chile, Law 19.897 established a
"new" price band system which entered into force on 16 December 2003 for the products at issue in
this dispute, namely, wheat and wheat flour.
18
19. Moreover, as also notified by Chile, 19 on 4 October 2003, Chile published in the Official
Journal Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Minist ry of Finance (hereinafter Decree 831/2003) 20
regulating the application of Article 12 of Law No. 18.525, as substituted by Article 1 of Law
No. 19.897, which governs certain fundamental aspects of the price band system.

17 See Exhibit ARG-1.
18 WT/DSB/M/156, paragraph 16.
19 WT/DS207/15/Add.1.
20 See Exhibit ARG-2.

20. The fact that both Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003 are measures adopted by Chile to
implement the recommendations and rulings of th e DSB was acknowledged by Chile in the status
reports its submitted to the DSB in fulfilment of its obligations under Art. 21.6 of the DSU.21
2. Products subject to Chile's price band system
21. In its original form, the PBS – established by Law 18.525 and amended by Laws 18.591,
18.573 and 19.772 – established price bands for each of the following product categories: (i) edible
vegetable oils, (ii) wheat and wheat flour, and (iii) sugar.22
22. Under the amended PBS, price bands are cal culated for wheat, wheat flour and sugar. 23 That
is to say, only edible vegetable oils have ceased to be subject to the PBS.24
3. The amended PBS as compared with the original PBS
23. Below, Argentina describes the various components of the Price Band System as amended by
Law 19.897 and Supreme Decree 831/2003, together with the functioning of the system, in each case
drawing a comparison with the original arrangements.
3.1. Total duties applicable
24. In the case of the PBS in its original form, the total amount of duty applied to the products
covered by the price band system consisted of two components: (i) an ad valorem duty that
reflected Chile's applied Most-Favoured Nation ("MFN") tariff rate; and (ii) a specific duty
determined for each importation by comparing a reference price with the upper or lower threshold of a
price band.25
25. In the amended PBS, both these types of duty: ad valorem and specific are also applied.26
3.1.1. Ad valorem duty
26. Under the original PBS, the ad valorem duty was the applied MFN rate which, under Chile's
flat-tariff regime, is the same for all products. The applied ad valorem rate in 2002 was 7 per cent. It
was applied to the transaction value of the imported product to achieve the ad valorem duty for that
product.27

21 See, for example, document WT/DS207/15/Add.3.
22 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 12.
23 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1: "Artic le 1.- Article 12 of Law No. 18.525 shall be
substituted by the following: "Article 12.- Specific duties are hereby established in United States dollars per
tariff unit and rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff, which
could affect the importation of wheat, wheat flour and sugar, as stipulated in this Law…" and Exhibit ARG-2,
Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 1.
24 "…(Chile) noted that the other products at issue in this dispute, namely edible vegetable oils and oil-
seeds, had been excluded from the Law and were, theref ore, no longer subject to the price band system".
WT/DSB/M/156, paragraph 16.
25 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 13.
26 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1 "…The duties that result from the application of this article,
added to the ad valorem duty …" and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decr ee No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of
Finance, Art. 14.
27 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 14.

27. In the "new" PBS, the ad valorem rate applied since December 2003 is 6 per cent. It is
applied to the transaction value of the imported product to achieve the ad valorem duty for that
product.
28
3.1.2. Specific duty
28. In their "old" form, the price bands provided u pper and lower thresholds that were used to
calculate the specific duty applicable to each importation of products subject to price band system.29
29. In the "new" PBS, the same method is employed.30
3.2. Period of application of the bands
30. Under the "old" PBS, the bands that applied to wheat and wheat flour were determined for the
period 16 December-15 December.31
31. The "new" PBS has an identical provision.32
3.3. Floor and ceiling of the bands
3.3.1. Periodicity

32. Under the original PBS, the lower and upper thr esholds of the price bands (hereinafter the
floor and ceiling prices, respectively) were determ ined on an annual basis through decrees issued by
the Chilean Executive. The floor and ceiling pri ces for each price band were calculated once a year,
once all the necessary elements were available, usually starting around February, as soon as the
"relevant" inflation index calculated by the Centra l Bank of Chile on the basis of national foreign
trade data had been published.33
33. Under the amended PBS, the floor and ceiling pri ces of the price bands have been determined
once only, for the entire period extending from 16 December 2003 to 15 December 2014. 34 That is to

28 According to the Chilean Customs web site. See Customs Tariff for Wheat and Wheat Flour (tariff
lines 1001.90.00 and 1101.00.00, respectively).
At: http://www.aduana.cl/p4_principal/antialone.html?
page=http://www.aduana.cl/p4_principal/site/edic/base/port/arancel.html, "Section II, Vegetable Products".
29 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 16
30 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1 "…For the determination of the duties and rebates up to the
annual period ending in 2007, the floor and ceiling prices used for wheat shall be taken into account… There
shall be established, on the one hand, specific duties when the reference price is below the floor price of 128
dollars for wheat… and, on the other hand, rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem Customs Tariff duties
when the reference price is above the ceiling price of 148 dollars for wheat… For the determination of the duties
and rebates from the annual period ending in 2008 and up to 2014, the floor and ceiling prices established above
shall be adjusted annually by multiplying the prices in force during the previous annual period by a factor of
0.985 in the case of wheat…", and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of
Finance, Articles 6, 13 and 14.
31 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 17.
32 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1: "…The amount of these duties and rebates shall be set…for
each annual period extending from 16 December to 15 December of the following year…", and Exhibit ARG-2,
Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 6.
33 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, footnote 25.
34 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1: "…For the determination of the duties and rebates up to the
annual period ending in 2007… For the determination of the duties and rebates from the annual period ending in
2008 and up to 2014, the floor and ceiling prices established above shall be adjusted annually by multiplying the

say, the floor and ceiling prices of the bands will be maintained, except for the fact that they have now
been established – in principle – for 11 years, whereas under the previous system they were
determined annually.
3.3.2. Calculation of the floor and ceiling prices

34. Under the "old" PBS, the floor and ceiling prices of each price band were determined as
follows. Average monthly international prices for each product category were compiled. The price
used for wheat was that quoted for Hard Re d Winter No. 2, FOB Gulf (Kansas Exchange).
35 The
price bands for wheat were calculated on the basis of the average monthly prices for the previous
60 months (5 years).36 These average prices were adjusted to account for international inflation using
an external price index calculated by Chile's Cent ral Bank. Law No. 18.525 stated that the average
prices should be adjusted according to the percentage variation in the average price index relevant for
Chile's foreign trade between the corresponding month and the last month in the year in which the
specific duties were determined.
37 Once adjusted for inflation, the compiled monthly prices were
listed in descending order and the "extreme" values we re eliminated. In the case of wheat, the prices
that represented the highest 25 per cent and the lowest 25 per cent of the prices compiled were
eliminated.38 After the "extreme" values had been eliminated, the remaining highest and lowest prices
were selected for the calculation of the price band thresholds (floor and ceiling prices). 39 Import costs
were then added to the "highest and lowest prices" previously selected in order to convert them to a
cost, insurance and freight ("CIF") basi s. These "import costs" included the ad valorem tariff and
costs such as freight, insurance, opening of a lett er of credit, interest on credit, taxes on credit,
customs agents' fees, unloading, transport to the plan t and wastage costs. No published legislation or
regulation set out how these "import costs" were calculated. 40 The adjusted prices constituted the
upper and the lower thresholds of the price band for the product in question.41
35. In the case of the amended PBS, the floor a nd ceiling prices have been established for the
entire period from 16 December 2003 to 15 Dece mber 2007 at US$128 per tonne and US$148 per
tonne, respectively. From 16 December 2007 to 15 December 2014, the floor and ceiling prices
indicated will be adjusted annually by multiplyi ng the prices in force during the previous annual
period by a factor of 0.985. The floor and ceiling prices resulting from this operation are set out in
Law 19.897 and in Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Ministry of Finance.
42

prices in force during the previous annual period…" and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the
Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 6.
35 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(a)(ii).
36 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(a) in fine.
37 At the hearing, Chile further explained that this price index also reflected domestic inflation and
foreign exchange rate fluctuations. Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(b)
and footnote 28.
38 For example, in the case of wheat, the 15 highest and the 15 lowest prices of the 60 compiled prices
are eliminated from the calculation. Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(c)
in fine.
39 For example, in the case of wheat and edible vegetable oils, of the 60 monthly prices compiled, the
16th and 44th highest monthly prices were selected for the calculation of the upper and the lower thresholds
respectively. See Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(d).
40 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 18(e).
41 Returning to the earlier example of wheat, the 16th highest monthly price (adjusted to reflect import
costs) would represent the upper threshold of the price band, and the 44th highest price (with the same adjustments
made) would represent the lower threshold of the price band. See Chile – Price Band System, Report of the
Appellate Body, paragraph 18(f).
42 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1: "…There shall be established, on the one hand, specific
duties when the reference price is below the floor price of 128 dollars for wheat… and, on the other hand,
rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff when the reference price

36. Thus, the general band system, with a floor and a ceiling in relation to a reference price plus a
specific duty determined in accordance with the di fference between these parameters, has been left
unchanged. That is to say, the floor and ceiling para meters and the reference price feature continue to
exist.
3.4. Reference prices
3.4.1. Periodicity
37. In the case of the PBS in its original form, the reference prices for each product category were
determined by the customs authorities on a weekly basis (every Friday for the following week).
43
38. Now, the customs authorities determine the refere nce prices six times in the course of each
twelve-month period extending from 16 December to 15 December of the following year, and keep it
fixed for two months at a time.44
3.4.2. Markets of concern
39. Under the "old" PBS, although there was no Chilean law or regulation specifying the
international "markets of concern" to be used for calculating the applicable reference prices,45 it seems
that the markets and qualities chosen were intende d to be representative of the products actually
"liable" to be imported into Chile. In the case of wheat, in calculating the reference price, Chile used
the lowest FOB price for that product in "any mark et of concern". It w as not clear whether Chile
would use the lowest FOB price for any quality of wheat as a reference price for all qualities of
wheat.46
40. Under the "new" PBS, Article 2 of Decree 831/2003 defines the reference price for the
application of duties and rebates, as the "…average of the daily international wheat prices…, recorded
in the markets of most concern…" 47
41. Under the "new" PBS, the market of most con cern for wheat, during the period of application
of duties and rebates extending from 16 December to 15 June of the following year, will be that for
Trigo Pan Argentino48 and the prices will correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product FOB
"Argentine port".49 In this connection, it should be pointed out that the legislation does not specify the
Argentine port in question, although the prices depend on which Argentine port is considered.50

is above the ceiling price of 148 dollars for wheat… Fo r the determination of the duties and rebates from the
annual period ending in 2008 and up to 2014, the floor and ceiling prices established above shall be adjusted
annually by multiplying the prices in force during the prev ious annual period by a factor of 0.985 in the case of
wheat…" and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 6.
43 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 21.
44 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1: "…The amount of these duties and rebates shall be set…six
times for wheat during each annual period extending from 16 December to 15 December of the following
year…" and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Articles 5 and 7, and
"Summary Table for the application of paragraph 2" (annex).
45 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 249.
46 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraphs 23 and 24.
47 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance.
48 Note of the Secretariat: literal translation of this quality would be "Argentine bread wheat".
49 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 8.
50 Exhibit ARG-4: Daily bread wheat prices quoted for various Argentine ports.

42. Likewise, during the application period extendi ng from 16 June to 15 December, the market
will be that for Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat and the prices will correspond to the daily prices quoted
for that product FOB Gulf of Mexico.
51
43. As in the case of the PBS in its original form, in no legislative or regulatory provision of the
amended PBS is it specified how or on what basis the international "markets of concern" and the
"qualities of concern" are selected.52
44. Nor is it clear whether Chile will apply the refe rence price determined in accordance with the
"new" PBS to any quality of wheat as a reference price for all qualities of wheat.
3.4.3. Adjustment of the reference price
45. Under the original PBS, the lowest "market of concern" price used to determine the weekly
reference price was not adjusted for "import costs", and thus was not converted from an FOB to a CIF
basis.53
46. The same applies to the reference prices in the amended PBS: the average "markets of
concern" price used to determine th e reference price is not adjusted fo r "import costs", and thus is not
converted from an FOB to a CIF basis.54
3.4.4. Absence of a link with the transaction value
47. Under the original PBS, the same weekly re ference price was applied to all goods falling
within the same product category, irrespective of the origin of the goods and regardless of the
transaction value of the shipment. 55 The reference price was thus unrelated to the transaction price of
the particular shipment.56
48. In the case of the amended PBS, the same bimonthly reference price is applied to all goods
falling within the same product category, irrespective of their origin and regardless of the transaction
value of the shipment.
49. Therefore, despite the fact that it is now determ ined at different intervals, under the present
system the reference price is still unrelated to the transaction value of the particular shipment.57
3.5. Specific duties and rebates
3.5.1. Date of application
50. Under the "old" PBS, upon arrival of the shipment the appropriate weekly reference price was
selected according to the date of embarkation.
58
51. As distinct from this, under the "new" PBS, the reference price and the duties or rebates
applicable to each import operation will be those in effect on the waybill date for the vehicle

51 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 8.
52 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 249.
53 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 250.
54 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 4.
55 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 21.
56 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, footnote 32.
57 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Articles 7, 13 and
14.
58 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29(a).

transporting the goods in question. In the case of electronic filing, the waybill date will be taken to be
the date of actual acceptance of the vehicle and the goods will be considered to have been presented at
the same time.
59
3.5.2. Calculation of specific duties
52. Under both "old" and "new" systems, the reference price is compared with the floor of the
relevant price band.
53. In the case of the "old" PBS, the specific duti es imposed were equal to the difference between
the annual price band floor and Chile's weekly reference prices.
54. Under the original system, if the weekly reference price fell between the floor and ceiling
values of the price band, no specific duty was levied. In such cases, only the ad valorem duty was
applied.60 The current system is the same in this respect.61
55. Under the original PBS, if the weekly reference price fell below the price band floor, a
specific duty equal to the difference between the floor price and the reference price was levied. 62
Expressed as a formula, the specific duty calculatio n – under the original PBS – can be written as
follows:
Specific duty = Band floor – Reference price

56. Under the "new" PBS, the specific duties impo sed are equal to the difference between the
floor of the price band (note that the relevant legislation does not specify whether the values in
question are FOB or CIF.) and the bimonthly reference prices based on FOB prices.
63
57. If the bimonthly reference price lies below the price band floor, a specific duty equal to the
difference between the floor price and the reference price, multiplied by a factor of one (1) plus the
general ad valorem tariff in force as established in the Customs Tariff , is levied.64 Expressed as a
formula, as in Article 14 of Decree 831/2003,65 the specific duty calculation can be written as follows:
Specific duty = (Band floor – Reference price) * ( 1 + ad valorem tariff )

58. Thus, the way in which the calculation of th e specific duties has b een changed leaves the
exporter worse off, inasmuch as the specific duties now generate a cost higher than that generated by
the previous method of calculation.

59 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, art. 17.
60 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29(b)(i).
61 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decr ee No. 831 of the Chilean Minist ry of Finance, Art. 13. The
legislation does not specify whether, in this case, the ad valorem duty will also be applied, although this could
be deduced from a reading of Art. 18 of Supreme Decree No. 831.
62 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29(iii).
63 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1, and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the
Chilean Ministry of Finance, Arts. 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14.
64 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1, and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the
Chilean Ministry of Finance, Articles 13 and 14.
65 See Exhibit ARG-2.

3.5.3. The factor for wheat flour
59. Under the original PBS, the specific duty or rebate for wheat flour was calculated by
multiplying the specific duties or rebates for wheat by a factor of 1.56.66
60. The same applies to the amended PBS.67
3.5.4. Calculation of the tariff rebate
61. Under the "old" PBS, if the weekly reference price was higher than the band ceiling, a rebate
equal to the difference between the ceiling of th e relevant price band and the reference price was
granted.68
62. Under the amended PBS, if the bi monthly reference price is higher than the band ceiling, the
rebate granted 69 is equal to the difference between the ceiling of the relevant price band and the
reference price multiplied by a factor of one (1) plus the general ad valorem tariff in force as
established in the Customs Tariff.70
63. Moreover, under both the "old" and the "new " PBS, the rebate is deducted from the
ad valorem applied MFN duty.71
64. As pointed out by a Chilean Senator during the discussion of the bill extending the system for
setting the duties and rebates for whea t flour, the rebates applied to the ad valorem duties mean that
Chilean domestic market prices will be lower than th e international prices if the latter lie above the
price band ceiling:
"… the prices of agricultural products have tended to rise and, consequently, the
domestic price for flour and wheat is curren tly lower than what it would be if there
were no price band… In the fat years we s hould be providing for the lean years,
thereby ensuring the necessary stability."72
3.6. Administration of the PBS
65. To make the price band system easier to admi nister, in the original PBS the annual decrees
that established the price bands included a table that set out a range of reference prices and the
specific duty or rebate that would be applied in th e case of each of those reference prices. Once the
reference price that applied for a particular week had been published, the corresponding specific price
band duty or rebate for that reference price could be found in the table.73

66 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, footnote 23.
67 See Exhibit ARG-1, Law 19.897, Art. 1 "…In the case of wheat flour, the duties and rebates
determined for wheat multiplied by a f actor of 1.56, shall be applied..." and Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree
No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 17.
68 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29(b)(ii).
69 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Articles 13, 14,
and 15.
70 See Exhibit ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 15.
71 See Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29(b)(ii), and Exhibit
ARG-2, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Arts. 13 and 15.
72 Senator Errázuriz, 24 January 1996, in "History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the
parliamentary debate. Law 19.446". Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 1997.
73 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 29.

66. Under the present system, Decree 831/2003 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance includes a
table giving the floor and ceiling prices of the PBS for the whole of the period from 16 December
2003 to 15 December 2014. Moreover, every two months (six times during each annual period) a
decree is published establishing the amount of the speci fic duties or rebates applicable. So far, the
bimonthly decrees appear not to indicate the refere nce price calculated for each period, as follows
from Exhibit ARG-5 which includes all the decrees relating to the amended PBS published to date.
74
C. ARGUMENTS
"…What is certain is that the bands will ha ve to go, and it is a good thing that the
country should get used to the idea that it will not be able to continue living with
price bands if it wants to join the major leagues of world free trade …
The international free trade agreements are unequivocal about wanting to see bands
abolished because they undoubtedly cause distortion" 75
67. An Article 21.5 procedure is intended to decide disputes "as to the existence or consistency
with a covered agreement of measures taken to co mply with the recommendations and rulings [of the
DSB]".
68. Argentina maintains that the Price Band Syst em as amended by Law No. 19.897 and Decree
831/2003 does not comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, so that Chile is
continuing to infringe its WTO obligations.
69. This is because the amended PBS, per se and as specifically applied to imports of wheat and
wheat flour:
 – Is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , since it is a border
measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price;

 – is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, since it
constitutes "other duties or charges" not recorded in the corresponding column of
Chile's Schedule of concessions (No. VII);

 – is in breach of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Est ablishing the World
Trade Organization since, while it remains in for ce, Chile is not ensuring the
conformity of its laws, regulations and ad ministrative procedures with its obligations
under the WTO Agreements.

I. THE AMENDED PBS IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 4.2 OF THE
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
70. Argentina maintains that the essence of the PBS was unaffected
 by the changes introduced by
Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003. In other words, these changes did not convert the price band

74 Exhibit ARG-5: Exempt Decrees No. 691/2003, No. 77/2004, No. 186/2004, No. 368/2004, No.
485/2004; No. 600/2004; No. 762/2004; No. 88/2005; No. 278/05; No. 466/2005; No. 569/2005; No.
706/2005; No. 873/2005; and No. 132/2006.
75 Senator Piñera, 24 January 1996, during the discussion of the bill extending the system for
establishing duties and rebates for wheat flour. In "History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the
parliamentary debate. Law 19.446". Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 1997.

system into a measure different from the price band sy stem that was in force before the changes were
introduced.76
71. The amended PBS is a border measure similar to a "variable import levy" and a "minimum
import price" within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
72. This is because the way in which the system is designed and the way it operates in its overall
nature are sufficiently similar to the characteristi cs of these two categories of prohibited measures as
to make the amended PBS, with its particular characteristics, a "similar border measure".
73. The particular configuration and interaction of the specific characteristics of Chile's price
band system generate certain market access conditi ons that lack transparency and predictability and
disconnect the Chilean market from international pr ice trends in a way that insulates the Chilean
market from the transmission of international prices and prevents enhanced market access for imports
of wheat and wheat flour.
74. Consequently, since it falls within the categor ies of measures prohibited by footnote 1, the
amended PBS is not an ordinary cu stoms duty and hence is a measure in consistent with Article 4.2 of
the Agreement on Agriculture which may not be maintained, resorted to, or reverted to.
1. WTO case-law applicable to the PBS
75. Below, Argentina notes certain Panel and Appellate Body findings relating to the PBS in its
original form that continue to be valid for the amended PBS also.
76. The relevant part of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture states:
"Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which
have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties".
77. Moreover, according to the relevant part of footnote 1 to that Article:
"These measures include…variable import levies, minimum import prices,…and
similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties…"
78. In this connection, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding77 to the effect that:
"… Chile's price band system is a border me asure similar to variable import levies
and minimum import prices within the mean ing of…Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture …"
79. Before arriving at this conclusion, the Appellate Body held that:
"A plain reading of Article 4.2 and footnot e 1 makes clear that, if Chile's price band
system falls within any one of the categories of measures listed in footnote 1, it is
among the "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into

76 This was confirmed by the Chilean Executive itself when it stated that "…Through this bill (Law
19.897) the Government has correct ed…formal aspects challenged [by the WTO] while fully protecting the
spirit of the bands …" (emphasis added). Nicolás Eyzaguirre, Chilean Minister of Finance, 6 August 2003. In
"History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the parliamentary debate. Law 19.897". Library of the
National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 2003.
77 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraphs 262 and 288(c)(i).

ordinary customs duties", and thus must not be maintained, resorted to, or reverted to,
as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement"
78
80. Moreover, the Appellate Body noted that:
"Thus, the obligation in Article 4.2 not to "maintain, resort to, or revert to any
measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary
customs duties" applies from the date Qof the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement—regardless of whether or not a Me mber converted any such measures
into ordinary customs duties before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The mere
fact that no trading partner of a Member singled out a specific "measure of the kind"
by the end of the Uruguay Round by requesting that it be converted into ordinary
customs duties, does not mean that such a measure enjoys immunity from challenge
in WTO dispute settlement. The obligatio n "not [to] maintain" such measures
underscores that Members must not c ontinue to apply measures covered by
Article 4.2 from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement."
79
81. Likewise, it added:
"The obligation in Article 4.2 "not [to] r esort to" can be understood as meaning that
Members must not introduce new measures "of the kind" that it has not had in place
in the past; the obligation "not [to] revert to" can be read in the sense that Members
may not, at some later stage after the entry into force of the WT O, re-enact measures
prohibited by Article 4.2. At the oral h earing, the participants agreed that the
obligations not to "resort to, or revert to" prohibited measures are less relevant to this
dispute than the obligation to "not maintain" such measures."80
82. The Appellate Body also found that the Chilean price band system could have the effect of
impeding the transmission of international price developments to the domestic market in a way
similar to that of other categories of prohibited measures listed in footnote 1.81
83. In this connection, the Appellate Body point ed out how the PBS prevented world prices from
being fully reflected in domestic prices:
"… Chile's price band system does not simply ensure a reasonable margin of
fluctuation of domestic prices. In our view , "such reasonable margin of fluctuation"
would mean that duties resulting from Chile's price band system would ensure that
declines in world prices would not be fully reflected in domestic prices. Therefore,
Chile's price band system does not merely moderate the effect of fluctuations in world
market prices on Chile's market because it does not ensure that the entry price of
imports to Chile falls in tandem with falli ng world market prices—albeit to a lesser
extent than the decrease in those prices. Nor does it tend only to "compensate" for
these price declines. Instead, specific duti es resulting from Chile's price band system
tend to "overcompensate" for them, and to el evate the entry price of imports to Chile
above the lower threshold of the relevant price band. In these circumstances, the
entry price of such imports to Chile under Chile's price band system is even higher

78 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 221.
79 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 212.
80 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, footnote 187.
81 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 246.

than if Chile simply applied a minimum import price at the level of the lower
threshold of a Chilean price band."82
84. The Appellate Body took the view that, in additio n to the lack of transparency and the lack of
predictability that were inherent in how Chile's price bands were established, there were similar
shortcomings in the way in which the other ess ential element of Chile's price band system—the
reference price—was determined. The duties resulti ng from Chile's price band system were equal to
the difference between the price band thresholds and the reference price. Chile set the reference price
on a weekly basis, and did so in a way that was neither transparent nor predictable.83
85. In relation to the lack of transparency and pred ictability of the PBS in its original form, the
Appellate Body noted that:
"Under Chile's price band system, the price used to set the weekly reference price is
the lowest f.o.b. price observed, at the time of embarkation, in any foreign "market of
concern" to Chile for "qualities of products actually liable to be imported to Chile".
No Chilean legislation or regulation speci fies how the international "markets of
concern" and the "qualities of concern" are selected. Thus, it is not by any means
certain that the weekly reference price is representative of the current world market
price. Moreover, the weekly reference pr ice used under Chile's price band system is
certainly not representative of an average of current lowest prices found in all
markets of concern. As a result, the pro cess of selecting the reference price is not
transparent, and it is not predictable for traders." 84
86. Moreover, the Appellate Body stated that, even if it were to be assumed that one feature of
Chile's price band system was not similar to the features of "variable import levies" and "minimum
import prices"" because the thresholds of Chile's pri ce bands varied in relation to – albeit historic –
world market prices rather than domestic target prices, this would not change its overall assessment of
Chile's price band system:
"... This is because specific duties resulting from Chile's pr ice band system are equal
to the difference between two parameters––the annua l price band thresholds and the
weekly reference prices applicable to the shipment in question …" 85
87. Before finding that the Chilean Price Band System "is a border measure similar to a variable
import levy and a minimum import price…" the Appellate Body affirmed that:
"… although there are some dissimilarities between Chile's price band system and the
features of "minimum import prices" and "variable import levies" we have identified
earlier, the way Chile's system is designed, and the way it operates in its overall
nature, are sufficiently "similar" to the f eatures of both of those two categories of
prohibited measures to 4make Chile's price band system—in its particular features—a
"similar border measure" within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2".
86

82 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 260.
83 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 247.
84 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 249.
85 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 251.
86 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 252.

88. In this connection, the Appellate Body stated that:
"... a finding that Chile's price band system as such is a measure prohibited by
Article 4.2 would mean that the duties resulting from the application of that price
band system could no longer be levied—no matter what the level of those duties may
be. Without a price band system, there could be no price band duties." 87 (Emphasis
added).
89. The changes introduced into the Chilean legislation did not convert the price band system into
a measure essentially different from that in effect before those changes were made. Consequently, as
shown below, the essence of the PBS remains intact and the comments and findings of the Appellate
Body relating to the original PBS apply in full to the amended PBS. In particular, the amended PBS
leads to insulation from the international market and is neither transparent nor predictable.
2. The amended PBS causes insulation from the international market
"… I would like to draw the attention of members to a fact that has not been brought
out or emphasized sufficiently in this debate. With this bill (Law 19.897) we are
fixing – not stabilizing – a price … for wh eat that stays the same for four years,
regardless of fluctuations in the international markets … price security is not just
for four years but up to 2014 … " (emphasis added).
 Jaime Campos, Chilean Minister of Agriculture,
 5 August 2003. 88

90. Below, Argentina will show that, regardless of the changes made, the PBS continues to
insulate Chile's market from fluctuations in intern ational prices in a way that is inconsistent with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
91. In various passages of its report, the Appellate Body held that the old PBS, in violation of
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, failed to transmit world market price developments to the
Chilean market in the same way as "ordinary customs duties".
89
92. Moreover, the Appellate Body maintained that in the old PBS the duties resulting from the
System ensured that falls in world prices were not fully reflected in domestic prices. The Appellate
Body added:
"... when international prices fall, and when the weekly reference prices are below
the lower thresholds of Chile's price bands, the total duties applied to particular

87 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 190, in fine.
88 "History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the parliamentary debate. Law 19.897". Library
of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 2003.
89 Inter alia:
"... Chile's price band system can still have the effect of impeding the transmission of international
price developments to the domestic market in a way sim ilar to that of other categories of prohibited measures
listed in footnote [of Art 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture]" ( Chile – Price Band System, Report of the
Appellate Body, paragraph 246, original emphasis).
"... the way in which Chile's weekly reference prices are determined contributes to giving Chile's price
band system the effect of impeding the transmission of international price developments to Chile's market."
(Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 250);
".. .the duties resulting from Chile's price band system…would not transmit world market price
developments to Chile's market in the same way as "ordinary customs duties". "( Chile – Price Band System,
Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 251; original emphasis).

shipments will, in many cases, result in an overall entry price of that shipment
that rises rather than falls …"
(Footnote: "This is so because, wh en the weekly reference price is
below the lower threshold of a Chilean price band, the specific duties
resulting from Chile's price band system are equal to the difference
between the lower price band threshold and the f.o.b. reference price,
while the total duties applied to a particular shipment are added to
that shipment's c.i.f. transaction value.")
"… Therefore, Chile's price band system does not merely moderate the effect of
fluctuations in world market prices on Ch ile's market because it does not ensure
that the entry price of imports to Chile falls in tandem with falling world market
prices—albeit to a lesser extent than the decr ease in those prices. Nor does it tend
only to "compensate" for th ese price declines. Instead, specific duties resulting
from Chile's price band system tend to "overcompensate" for them, and to
elevate the entry price of imports to Chile above the lower threshold of the
relevant price band . In these circumstances, the entry price of such imports to
Chile under Chile's price band system is even higher than if Chile simply applied
a minimum import price at the level of the lower threshold of a Chilean price
band. Therefore, we disagree with Chile that its price band system simply
"moderates the effect of fluctuations in international prices on Chile's market".
Chile's price band system tends to "overcompensate" for the effect of decreases in
international prices on the domestic market when weekly reference prices are set
below the lower threshold of the relevant price band—up to the level at which Chile's
tariff binding imposes a limit on the amount of duties that can be levied ...."
90
(Emphasis added, footnote omitted).
93. This passage from the Appellate Body's report is very illuminating with regard to how the
original PBS insulated the Chilean market from intern ational prices in a way that is inconsistent with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , since it formulates several findings relating to the
inconsistencies of the PBS. Mo reover, it is very important for understanding the operation of the
present PBS, since the Appellate Body's assertions all apply to the amended PBS also.
94. A careful reading of the passage cited shows that the Appellate Body makes four findings of
inconsistency with regard to the old PBS, namely:
 (1) The specific duties resulting from the Chil ean price band system tend to elevate the
entry price of Chilean imports above the price band floor;

 (2) the Chilean price band system tends to "overcompensate" for the effect of decreases
in international prices on the domestic mark et when weekly reference prices are set
below the price band floor;

 (3) the entry price of Chilean imports under Chile's price band system is even higher than
if Chile simply applied a minimum import price at the level of the price band floor;

 (4) the PBS does not merely moderate the effect of fluctuations in world market prices on
Chile's market because it does not ensure that the entry price of imports to Chile falls
in tandem with falling world market prices.

90 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 260.

95. As pointed out above, the changes made in the PBS did not convert the price band system into
a measure different from that in force before. In particular, the amended PBS continues to impede the
transmission of international price developments to the Chilean market. This is because the four
Appellate Body findings relating to the old PBS are equally valid for the amended PBS.
96. Below, Argentina will show how each of the four findings in paragraph 260 of the Appellate
Body's Report applies equally to the present Price Band System.
97. That is to say, Argentina will show that , like the original PBS, the amended PBS continues
elevating the entry price of imports to Chile above the price band floor; continues
"overcompensating" for the effect of decreases in international prices on the domestic market when
reference prices are set below the price band floor; continues making the entry price of Chilean
imports higher than if Chile applied a minimum impo rt price at the level of the price band floor, and
continues failing to ensure that the entry price of impor ts to Chile falls in tandem with falling world
market prices.
98. Thus, the amended PBS disconnects the Ch ilean market from international price
developments in a way that insula tes the Chilean market from the tran smission of international prices
and prevents enhanced access to its market fo r imports of wheat and wheat flour, in a manner
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
2.1. Specific duties resulting from the ame nded PBS tend to elevate the entry price of
imports to Chile above the price band floor

99. Below, Argentina will show mathematically – using the PBS formula contained in Law
19.897 and Decree 831/2003 – how specific duties r esulting from the amended PBS tend to elevate
the entry price of imports to Chile above the price band floor, just like the original PBS as noted by
the Appellate Body in its report. This will be demonstrated first for wheat and then for wheat flour.
(a) Entry price of wheat
100. The entry price of wheat imports to Chile – unde r the amended PBS – is equal to the result of
the following sum: the CIF value plus the amount of total duties in absolute terms. Total duties
include ad valorem duties (which, in accordance with Chile's General Customs Tariff, amount to 6 per
cent of CIF), plus specific duties (equal to the band floor pr ice less the reference price multiplied by
1 (one) plus the general ad valorem tariff in force as established in the Customs Tariff).
91
101. More graphically:
Entry price of
wheat under the
amended PBS
= CIF value + Total duties in absolute terms
 = CIF value + Ad valorem duties + Specific duty
 = CIF value + CIF
value * 6% + Specific duty

91 See Exhibits ARG-1 and ARG-2.

In its turn:

Specific duty92 = ( Band floor
price - Reference price ) * ( 1 +
General ad valorem
duty in force,
Customs Tariff

 = ( US$128 - Reference price ) * ( 1 + 6% )

102. Mathematically, this can be expressed as follows:
EP = CIF + 6% CIF + [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] [1]
where:
EP = entry price for wheat imports to Chile under the amended PBS
RefP = reference price
FP = floor price of the band in force
CIF = Cost, Insurance, Freight

103. To show that, under the amended PBS, the entry price tends to be higher than the band floor
price – currently set at US$128 per tonne – equation [1] can be reformulated as follows:

 EP = CIF + 6% CIF + [ (US$128 – RefP) * (1+6%) ]
 EP = 1.06 CIF + 1.06 (US$128 – RefP)
 EP = 1.06 CIF + US$135.68 – 1.06 RefP
 EP = US$135.68 + (1.06 CIF – 1.06 RefP)

104. For the entry price (EP) to be less than US$128 per tonne – that is to say, less than the floor
price (FP)- the reference price (RefP) must be greater than the CIF value by more than US$7.2453 per
tonne or, alternatively, the CIF value must be less than the reference price (RefP) by more than
US$7.2453 per tonne, as shown below:
 US$128 = US$135.68 + (1.06 CIF – 1.06 RefP)
 US$128 = US$135.68 + 1.06 (CIF – RefP)
 - (US$7.68) = 1.06 (CIF – RefP)
 - (US$7.2453) = CIF – RefP

 or, alternatively:

 RefP = CIF + US$7.2453 [2]
 CIF = RefP – US$7.2453 [3]

105. This means that whenever
 the CIF price of wheat imports to Chile is greater than the
reference price, or whenever the CI F price is less than that reference price by an amount that does not
exceed US$7.2453 per tonne and the reference price lies below the band floor, the amended PBS will
result in the specific duties tending to elevate the entry price of the imports above the band floor.
106. Therefore, the question is whether there is an y chance – with the Price Band active – of the
reference price exceeding the CIF price by more than US$7.2453 per tonne. In the case of wheat,
these chances are minimal.

92 In accordance with Article 14 of Dec. 831/2003.

107. In the first place, the chances are minimal becau se the CIF price tends to be greater than the
FOB price.
108. Secondly, in the case of wheat the chances of th e reference price being higher than the CIF
price by more than US$7.2453 per tonne are minimal basically because of the effective difference in
the calculation of the reference price and the CIF. The reference price, as under the old PBS, is
calculated on an FOB basis.
93 The CIF, as its name implies ("C ost, Insurance, Freight") consists of
the FOB plus freight and insurance. Thus, for the reference price to be higher than the CIF price by
more than US$7.2453 per tonne, the CIF price must fa ll so much that even with cost, freight and the
US$7.2453 of equations [2] and [3] included, the total is lower than the reference price itself. Thus,
the chances of the CIF price for wheat being lower than the reference price – calculated on an FOB
basis – by more than US$7.2453 per tonne are minimal.
109. As an example, the chart in Exhibit ARG-7 and the table in Exhibit ARG-8
94 show the
relationship between the CIF price and the referen ce price during the period of application of the
amended PBS. Clearly, when specific duties we re being applied – that is to say, between
December 2004 and April 2005 – the CIF price of wheat imported into Chile was never lower than the
reference price by more than US$7.2453 per tonne and therefore under the amended PBS the entry
price was always above US$128 per tonne.
110. Even if we consider the historical relations hip between the reference price established by
Chile and the CIF price per tonne of wheat over the period of application of the amended PBS – that
is to say, since 16 December 2003 – during all that time the CIF price per tonne of wheat not only was
not less than the reference price but always higher than the reference price.
111. In addition, for the purpose of confirming that the chances of the CIF price per tonne of wheat
being less than the reference price by US$7.2453 per tonne are minimal, Argentina offers as evidence,
in the table in Exhibit ARG-9, 95 the CIF prices per tonne of wheat imported to Chile since 1991,
together with the reference price that Chile woul d have set if the amended PBS had been in force
since that date, based on information from the Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias (Office of
Agricultural Studies and Policies) of the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture (hereinafter ODEPA).96 The
reference price was calculated using the average monthly FOB price of Trigo Pan Argentino from
1991 for the first half of the year and, for the sec ond half, the average monthly FOB price of Soft Red

93 The relevant part of Decree 831/2003 reads as follows:

"Article 7.- Reference price

The reference price for wheat shall be the average of the daily prices recorded on the markets indicated
in Article 8, during a period of 15 days reckoned retrospectively from the 10th of the month in which
the respective decree is published.

Article 8.- Market of most concern

The market of most concern for wheat, during the period of application of duties and rebates extending
from 16 December to 15 June of the following year shall be that for Trigo Pan Argentino and the prices
shall correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product FOB Argentine port
, and during the period
of application extending from 16 June to 15 December, that for Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat and the
prices shall correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product FOB Gulf of Mexico ." (Emphasis
added).
94 Exhibits ARG-7 and ARG-8: Self-compilation based on ODEPA data.
95 Source: Self-compilation based on ODEPA data.
96 The ODEPA data can be found at www.odepa.gob.cl.

Winter No. 2 wheat since 1991, in the same way as the reference price is currently established under
Decree 831/2003.97
112. The table in Exhibit ARG-9 shows the differe nce between the CIF price and the reference
price that would have existed during the peri od from January 1991 to December 2003, when Chile
established the amended PBS. Over this entire peri od, the CIF price of wheat imported to Chile was
less than the reference price by more than US$7.245 3 per tonne on only 13 occasions out of a total of
144 months. That is to say, during 91 per cent of the time between 1991 and 2003 the CIF price per
tonne stayed above the reference price that would have existed or, if it was less than the reference
price that would have existed, the difference was not greater than US$7.2453 per tonne.
113. The fact that since the amended PBS came into existence, the CIF price of a tonne of wheat
was never less than the reference price, and that during 91 per cent of the time between 1991 and
2003,98 the CIF price per tonne stayed above the referen ce price that would have existed (or, if it was
less than the reference price that would have exis ted, the difference was not greater than US$7.2453
per tonne) shows conclusively that the chances of the CIF price of a tonne of wheat being less than the
reference price by more than US$7.2453 per tonne on the basis of equations [2] and [3] are minimal.
114. Thus, Argentina has shown mathematically and em pirically that with the application of the
amended PBS the likelihood of the CIF price being less than the reference price by more than
US$7.2453 per tonne is minimal. Therefore, it can on ly be concluded that, owing to its mathematical
formulation, the amended PBS tends to elevate the entry price of wheat imports to Chile above the
price band floor, in the same way as the original PBS.
(b) Entry price of wheat flour
115. Following reasoning similar to that used in calculating the entry price for wheat imports,
under the PBS as amended by Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003, the entry price for wheat flour is
equal to the result of the following sum: CIF value plus ad valorem duties (which, in accordance with
the Chilean General Customs Tariff, amount to 6 per cent of the CIF) plus specific duties (equal to the
band floor price less the reference price multiplied by one plus the general ad valorem tariff in force
as established in the Customs Tariff) multiplied by a factor of 1.56.99
116. That is to say, the formula is the same as for the entry price for wheat save that, in the case of
flour, "…to this there shall be applied th e duties and rebates determined for wheat, multiplied by a
factor of 1.56".100 (Emphasis added).
117. Expressing the text of the previous paragraph as a formula gives:
Entry price for
wheat flour under
the amended PBS
= CIF value + Total duties in absolute terms
 = CIF value + Ad valorem duties + Specific duties
 = CIF value + CIF
value * 6% + Specific duties

97 See Exhibit ARG-2, Art. 8.
98 The figure rises to 92.4 per cent of the time if the period extending from January 2003 to March
2006, during which the CIF value per tonne was always greater than the reference price, is included.
99 See Exhibits ARG-1 and ARG-2.
100 See Exhibit ARG-2, Decree 831/2003, Article 16.

In its turn:

Specific
duty
101 = [ ( Band floor
price - Reference
price ) * ( 1 +
General
ad valorem tariff
in force
) ] * 1.56

 = [ ( US$128 - Reference
price ) * ( 1 + 6% ) ] * 1.56

118. Mathematically, this can be expressed as follows:
EPWF = CIF + 6% CIF + [ [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] * 1.56 ] [2]

where:
EPWF = entry price for wheat flour imports to Chile under the amended PBS
RefP = reference price
FP = band floor price in force
CIF = Cost, Insurance, Freight

119. To show that, under the amended PBS, the entry price for wheat flour tends to be higher than
the band floor price – currently set at US$128 – equation [1] can be reformulated as follows:
EPWF = CIF + 6% CIF + (US$128 – RefP) * (1+6%) *1.56
EPWF = 1.06 CIF + (US$128 – RefP) * 1.06 * 1.56
EPWF = 1.06 CIF + (US$128 – RefP) * 1.65
EPWF = 1.06 CIF + US$211.2 – 1.65 RefP

120. For the entry price for wheat flour (EPWF) to be less than US$128 per tonne – that is to say,
less than the floor price (FP) – the reference price (RefP) must be greater than the CIF value
multiplied by 0.64 plus US$50.42 per tonne or, alternatively, the CIF value must be less than the
reference price multiplied by 1.56 less US$78.49 per tonne, as shown below:
US$128 = 1.06 CIF + US$211.2 – 1.65 RefP
-(US$83.2) = 1.06 CIF – 1.65 RefP
1.65 RefP = 1.06 CIF + US$83.2
RefP = (1.06 CIF / 1.65 ) + ( US$83.2 / 1.65 )
RefP = 0.64 CIF + US$50.42 [ 2 ]

or, alternatively:
CIF = (1.65 RefP / 1.06 ) – ( US$83.2 / 1.06 )
CIF = 1.56 RefP – US$78.49 [ 3 ]

121. Therefore, as with the entry price for wheat, the question is whether there is any chance –
with the Price Band active – of the reference price being greater than the CIF value multiplied by
0.64 plus US$50.42 per tonne or the CIF value being less than the ref erence price multiplied by 1.56
less US$78.49 per tonne.
122. An analysis of this type would not be very usef ul since, according to Chile's own records, in
the past the chances of the entry pr ice for wheat flour being less than the band floor price are zero. In

101 See Exhibit ARG-2, Decree 831/2003, Article 14.

fact, ODEPA keeps records of wh eat flour imports since 1991. By taking the volumes and CIF
amounts of monthly wheat flour imports it is easily possible to obtain the monthly CIF price per tonne
for wheat flour since 1991.102 The fact is that – from 1991 to date – the CIF price per tonne has never
been less than the current and future band floor. If the CIF price per tonne was never less than the
band floor, then logically the entry price for imports to Chile could not have been less than that price,
since the entry price consists of the CIF price plus ad valorem duties and possibly specific duties.
123. Then, at first glance, the price band for wheat flour makes no sense. Why does Chile apply
the price band to wheat flour also if, in view of the same international market dynamics, the entry
price cannot be less than the band floor? The only possi ble conclusion is that there is an intent to add
a distortion to the market in wheat and wheat products (which include wheat flour) greater than that
already caused by the application of sp ecific duties to wheat imports, thereby further isolating the
Chilean wheat flour market from international markets.
124. To conclude, Argentina has shown that, in th e case of wheat, the chances of the CIF price
being lower than the reference price are minimal and, in the case of wheat flour, almost nil. Thus, on
the basis of equations [2] and [3] – for wheat and wheat flour – and the arguments set out above, it has
been shown that – as the Appellate Body found w ith respect to the "old" PBS – the amended PBS
tends to elevate the entry price of wheat and wheat flour imports to Chile above the price band floor.
2.2. The amended PBS tends to "overcompensate" for the effect of decreases in international
prices on the domestic market when the reference prices are set below the price band
floor

125. Below, Argentina will show that the amended PB S tends to "overcompensate" for the effect
of decreases in international prices on the domestic market when the reference prices are set below the
price band floor, as pointed out by the Appellate Body in relation to the original PBS.
126. This "overcompensation" of the effect of decreases in international prices on Chile's domestic
market takes place when, as the reference prices fall – in response to a fall in international FOB prices
during a 15-day period – and the bands are activated by applying specific duties, the entry price not
only does not decrease or remain the same but ofte n increases, so that the general entry price for
exports to Chile rises, instead of falling, as found by the Appellate Body in relation to the PBS in its
original form.
(a) Overcompensation in the case of wheat
127. First of all, the overcompensation in the case of wheat can be demonstrated mathematically.
128. We recall equation [1] which represents th e operation of the PBS in accordance with
Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003:
EP = CIF + 6% CIF + [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] [1]

where:
EP = entry price for imports to Chile under the PBS
RefP = reference price
FP = floor price currently in force
CIF = Cost, Insurance, Freight

102 Exhibit ARG-28.

129. Consider, for example, the reference price (RefP) for the band in January 2005. According to
ODEPA, RefP was US$114.50 per tonne.
103 The average CIF price for that month for a tonne of
wheat imported from Argentina was US$164.43 per tonne.104 By substituting these values in equation
[1] we obtain:
EP = US$164.43 + US$9.87 + [ (US$128 – US$114.50) * 1.06 ]
EP = US$164.43 + US$9.87 + US$14.31
EP = US$188.61

130. That is to say, for the reference price and CIF pr ice in question, the entry price for imports to
Chile was US$188.61 per tonne.
131. Now, for the sake of clarity, let us suppose that the reference price – which reflects the 15-day
average FOB price for Trigo Pan Argentino – falls by 10 per cent (being equal during the next
two months to US$103.05 per tonne) whereas the CIF price does not change or, after falling, returns
to the same level as in January 2005, following a ri se in the FOB price (as often happens), remaining
at US$164.43 per tonne. In this case, again using equation [1], we obtain:
EP = CIF + 6% CIF + [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] [1]
EP = US$164.43 + US$9.87 + [ (US$128 – US$103.05) * (1+6%) ]
EP = US$164.43 + US$9.87 + US$26.45
EP = US$200.75

132. That is to say, with the reference price 10 per cent lower and the CIF price unchanged, the
entry price for imports to Chile is US$200.75 per tonne . Comparing this with the previous entry price
of US$188.61 when the reference price was 10 per cen t higher, we can see that the overcompensation
effect has been mathematically proved.
133. As additional
 evidence, Argentina will give two examples of what actually happened during
the period of operation of the amended PBS when, in the months from December 2004 to April 2005,
the bands were activated and specific duties applied.
Example 1

134. The table below shows what happened when specific duties began to be applied on
16 December 2004 and reveals the actual effect of "overcompensation":
TABLE I

Band
ceiling
Band
floor
Reference
price
FOB price Trigo
Pan Argentino
CIF Customs
value Chile
Ad valorem
duty
Specific
duty
Entry
price
15-Dec-04 148 128 141.73 115.00 141.45 8.49 149.94
16-Dec-04 148 128 114.50 114.00 140.22 8.41 14.30 162.93
Values in US$ per tonne
Source: ODEPA (except for FOB price and CIF, source: SAGPyA)105

103 See Exhibit ARG-6.
104 Source: ODEPA.
105 ODEPA does not provide daily FOB prices for bread wheat, Argentine port (only monthly prices).
The historical FOB price for Trigo Pan Argentino reported by Argentina's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock,
Fisheries and Food (SAGPyA) is taken instead. In order to make the analysis as accurate as possible, the price
indicated in the table for 15 Decem ber 2004 corresponds to the Argen tine FOB price in effect 15 days
previously, since that is the approximate time taken by a cargo ship to sail from Argentina to Chile, including

135. On the basis of the FOB price of Trigo Pan Argentino for a shipment arriving in Chile on
15 December 2004, the reference price for that day (and the two previous months) was US$141.73 per
tonne. The entry price for imports to Chile on that day, on which no specific duties were applied, was
US$149.94 per tonne.
136. On the next day, 16 December 2004, Chile set a new reference price of US$114.50 per tonne,
19.21 per cent lower than the previous one. The FOB price of Trigo Pan Argentino for a shipment
arriving in Chile on that day was US$1 (one dolla r) per tonne less than on the previous day.
However, when the specific duties resulting from the PBS were applied, the entry price rose from
US$149.94 per tonne to US$162.93 per tonne.
137. This "overcompensation" (increase in the entry price of imports to Chile) occurred at the same
time as the transaction value decreased , which demonstrates the total disconnection of the amended
PBS from the transaction value and international prices.
Example 2

138. On 16 February 2005, Chile again set a new re ference price below the band floor and lower
than that in force during the previous two-month pe riod. Therefore, specific duties higher than those
for the previous period were applied. The fo llowing table summarizes what happened and again
reveals the actual effect of "overcompensation":
TABLE II

Band
ceiling
Band
floor
Reference
price
FOB price Trigo
Pan Argentino
CIF Customs
value Chile
Ad valorem
duty
Specific
duty
Entry
price
15-Feb-05 148 128 114.50 107 131.61 7.90 14.30 153.81
16-Feb-05 148 128 108.64 107 131.61 7.90 20.50 160.01
Values in US$ per tonne
Source: ODEPA (except for FOB and CIF prices, source: SAGPyA)106

139. On the basis of the FOB price of bread wheat, Argentine port, for a shipment arriving in Chile
on 15 February 2005, the reference price for that day (and the two previous months) was US$114.50
per tonne. The entry price for imports to Chile on that day, when specific duties amounting to
US$14.30 were applied, was US$153.81 per tonne.
140. On the next day, 16 February 2004, Chile set a new reference price of US$108.64 per tonne,
5.12 per cent lower than the previous one. However, the FOB price for Trigo Pan Argentino did not
change and therefore neither did the CIF price. Nevertheless, when the PBS specific duties were
applied, the entry price for Chile rose from US$153.81 per tonne to US$160.01 per tonne.

dockside loading and unloading times. To arrive at the CIF value the FOB value was multiplied by 1.23,
because the CIF value is generally (subj ect to periodic variations) 23 per cent higher than the FOB value for
wheat, calculating maritime freight from Buenos Aires to Chile at US$24 per tonne and 0.5 per cent for
insurance, on the basis of information provided by SA GPyA's Food and Agricultura l Market Directorate. The
calculations leading to the index 1.23 are presented in Exhibit ARG-25, taking as a basis the FOB prices,
Argentine port, reported by ODEPA and carrying out the above-mentioned calculation. It should also be noted
that insofar as the criterion used to arrive at the CIF value is solely for the purposes of the analysis, it being
understood that the freight and insurance values depe nd on numerous variables, the overcompensation can be
demonstrated independently of the relationship between the FOB and CIF values.
106 Same as before.

141. The entry price rose by more than 4 per cent without any change in the transaction value

which demonstrates, as in the previous case, the total disconnection of the PBS from the transaction
value and international prices.
142. Thus, Argentina has demonstrated – both math ematically and empirically – that when the
reference prices are set below the price band floor, the amended PBS tends to "overcompensate" for
the effect of decreases in international prices on the domestic market.
(b) Overcompensation in the case of wheat flour
143. As with wheat, the overcompensation in the case of wheat flour can first be demonstrated
mathematically.
144. We recall equation [2] which represents the operation of the PBS for wheat flour, in
accordance with Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003:
EPWF = CIF + 6% CIF + [ [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] * 1.56 ] [2]

where:
EPWF = entry price for wheat flour imports to Chile under the amended PBS
RefP = reference price
FP = floor price of the band in force
CIF = Cost, Insurance, Freight

145. Consider, for example, the reference price (RefP) that the band had in January 2005.
According to ODEPA, RefP was US$114.50 per tonne.
107 The average CIF price for that month per
tonne of imported wheat flour of all origins was US$198.14 per tonne. 108 Substituting these values in
equation [2], we obtain:
EPWF = US$198.14 + US$11.89 + [ [ (US$128 – US$114.50) * 1.06 ] * 1.56 ]
EPWF = US$198.14 + US$11.89 + [ US$14.31 * 1.56 ]
EPWF = US$232.35

146. That is to say, with the reference price and CI F price in question, the entry price for imports
to Chile was US$232.35.
147. Now, for the sake of clarity, let us suppose that the reference price – which reflects the 15-day
average FOB prices for Trigo Pan Argentino – falls by 10 per cent (staying for the next two months at
US$103.05 per tonne) and the CIF price does not change or, after falling, returns to the same level as
in January 2005 following a rise in the FOB price – as often happens – remaining at US$198.14 per
tonne. In this case, again using equation [2], we obtain:
EPWF = CIF + 6% CIF + [ [ (FP – RefP) * (1+6%) ] * 1.56 ] [2]
EPWF = US$198.14 + US$11.89 + [ [ (US$128 – US$103.05) * (1+6%) ] * 1.56 ]
EPWF = US$198.14 + US$11.89 + US$41.26
EPWF = US$251.28

148. That is to say, with the reference price 10 per cent lower and the CIF price unchanged, the
entry price for imports to Chile is US$251.28. Co mparing this with the previous entry price of

107 See Exhibit ARG-6.
108 See Exhibit ARG-28.

US$232.35 when the reference price was 10 per cent higher, we can see that the overcompensation
effect has been mathematically proved.
149. As additional evidence, Argentina will give two examples of what actually happened during
the period of operation of the amended PBS when, in the months from December 2004 to April 2005,
the bands were activated and specific duties were applied.
Example 1

150. The following table shows what happened when, on 16 December 2004, specific duties began
to be applied and reveals the actual effect of "overcompensation" on wheat flour:
TABLE III

Band
ceiling
Band floor Reference
price
FOB price
Argentine
wheat flour
CIF Customs
value Chile
Ad valorem
duty
Specific
duty
Entry
price
15-Dec-04 148 128 141.73 158 221.20 13.27 234.47
16-Dec-04 148 128 114.50 158 221.20 13.27 22.30 256.77
Values in US$ per tonne
Source: Self-compilation based on ODEPA data (except for the FOB price, source: SAGPyA and the CIF
price, source: FAIM).109

151. On the basis of the FOB price of wheat flour for a shipment arriving in Chile on 15 December
2004, the reference price for that day (and the prev ious two months) was US$141.73 per tonne. The
entry price for Chile on that day, when no specific duties were applied, was US$234.47 per tonne.
152. The next day, 16 December 2004, Chile set a new reference price of US$114.50 per tonne,
19.21 per cent lower than the previous one. However, the FOB price of wheat flour did not change
and, therefore, neither did the CIF price. Nevert heless, when the PBS specific duties were applied,
the entry price for imports to Chile rose from US$234.47 to US$256.77 per tonne.
153. This "overcompensation" occurred without any change in the transaction value
, which
demonstrates the total disconnection of the amended PBS from that value and international prices.
Example 2

154. On 16 February 2005, Chile again set a new re ference price below the band floor and lower
than that in force during the previous two-month period. Therefore specific duties higher than during
the previous period were applied. The following table summarizes what happened and again reveals
the actual effect of "overcompensation":

109 ODEPA does not provide daily FOB prices for wheat flour, Argentine port. Instead, the historical
FOB price reported by SAGPyA is taken. In order to make the analysis as accura te as possible, the price
indicated in the table for 15 Decembe r 2004 corresponds to the Argentine FOB price fo r wheat flour in effect 5
days previously, since that is the approximate time required for transport by land from Argentina to Chile. The
CIF value is calculated from the FOB value, plus land freight and insurance. Normally, in the case of wheat
flour, freight and insurance represent 40 per cent of the FOB value. This information was obtained from
examples of actual export operations provided by the Argentine Federation of the Milling Industry (FAIM) and
presented in Exhibit ARG-26. It should also be noted that, inasmuch as the criterion used to arrive at the CIF
value is solely for the purposes of the analysis, it being understood that the freight and insurance values depend
on numerous variables, the over compensation can be demonstrated independently of the relationship between
the FOB and CIF values.

TABLE IV

Band
ceiling
Band
floor
Reference
price
FOB price
Argentine
wheat flour
CIF
Customs
value Chile
Ad valorem
duty
Specific
duty
Entry
price
15-Feb-05 148 128 114.50 150 210.00 12.60 22.30 244.90
16-Feb-05 148 128 108.64 150 210.00 12.60 32.00 254.60
Values in US$ per tonne
Source: Self-compilation based on ODEPA data (except for the FOB price, source: SAGPyA and the CIF
price, source: FAIM).110

155. On 15 February, the reference price for that day (and the two previous months) was
US$114.50 per tonne. The entry price for imports to Chile on that day, when specific duties
amounting to US$22.30 per tonne were applied, was US$244.90 per tonne.
156. The next day, 16 February 2005, Chile set a new reference price of US$108.64 per tonne,
5.12 per cent lower than the previous price. However, the FOB price of Argentine wheat flour did not
change and, therefore, neither did the CIF price. Nevertheless, when the PBS specific duties were
applied, the entry price for Chile rose from US$244.90 to US$254.60 per tonne.
157. The entry price rose without any change in the transaction value
, which demonstrates, as in
the previous case, the overcompensation effect and the total disconnection of the PBS from that value
and international prices.
158. Thus, Argentina has shown – both mathematically and empirically – that when the reference
prices are set below the price band floor, the amende d PBS tends to "overcompensate" for the effect
of decreases in international prices on the domestic market.
2.3. The entry price of Chilean imports under th e amended PBS is higher than it would be if
Chile were to apply a minimum import price at price band floor level

"From the moment that the country's whea t producers are assured of a floor, through
the price band, the importation of wheat at a price lower than the floor price will be
prevented … " (Emphasis added).
111
159. Below, Argentina will show that, under the amended PBS, the entry price for wheat and
wheat flour imports is higher than it would be if Ch ile were to apply a minimum import price at price
band floor level.
160. In the present dispute, the Appellate Body found that:
"The term 'minimum import price' refers generally to the lowest price at which
imports of a certain product may enter a Member's domestic market."112
161. Thus, as noted by the Appellate Body, the establishment of a minimum import price at price
band floor level would mean that if the entry price of a particular product (i.e., the CIF price plus
ad valorem duties) were lower than that threshol d (US$128 per tonne or the corresponding amount)

110 Same as above.
111 Deputy Patricio Melero, 24 January 1996, during the debate on the bill extending the system for
establishing duties and rebates for wheat flour "History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the
parliamentary debate. Law 19.446". Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 1997.
112 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 236.

an additional charge equivalent to the difference would be imposed, so that the product in question
enters the Chilean market at the band floor price (currently US$128 per tonne).
(a) The case of wheat
162. In fact, during the period of application of the band (16-Dec-2004 / 15-Apr-2005) the CIF
price plus ad valorem duties was higher than the band floor (US$128), which makes it impossible to
compare the entry price for Chilean wheat imports if a minimum import price had been imposed at
band floor level with the price resulting from the amended PBS.113
163. However, the relationship between the two vari ables can be calculated by selecting a period
during which international prices were sufficiently low for it to be possible to show that the entry
price under the amended PBS is higher than that resu lting from the application of a minimum price at
price band floor level.
164. The period selected by Argentina as an illustration of this covers the months of March, April
and May 2000. According to the ODEPA data, this period was the only one between 1991 and 2003
during which the average CIF price of Chilean wheat imports – of all origins – plus ad valorem duties
(6 per cent) fell below the price band floor, a situation which enables the result of applying a
minimum price to be compared with the result of applying the amended PBS.
114
165. For this period – March to Ma y 2000 – we have calculated the reference prices and the
approximate specific duties that would have resulted if at that time, using the historical prices for that
period, the amended PBS as established by Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003 had been applied.
166. As previously described, the entry price wa s calculated in accordance with the following
formula taken from Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003:
Entry price under
the PBS = CIF value + Total duties in
absolute terms

 = CIF value + Ad valorem
duties + Specific duty

Ad valorem duties = CIF value * 6%

Specific duty
115 = ( Band floor
price - Reference price ) * ( 1 +
General ad valorem
tariff in force,
Customs Tariff

167. On the basis of this formula, in the following table we have reconstructed what would have
happened during that period if a minimum price had been applied at price band floor level as
compared with the application of the amended PBS. The model reproduces the entry price at which a
tonne of wheat exported from Argentina would have entered Chile:

113 Exhibits ARG-23 and ARG-24.
114 The average CIF value per tonne for the period March, April and May 2000 corresponds to imports
of wheat of all origins (source ODEPA). For comparison purposes, the ad valorem duty rate is assumed to be
the current rate (6 per cent).
115 In accordance with Article 14 of Dec. 831/2003, Exhibit ARG-2. In its turn, the amount of the
specific duties actually applied can be obtained from www.odepa.gob.cl.

TABLE V

Month Quotation
Average
international
reference
price116
Specific
duty Band floor Average
CIF price117
CIF +
ad valorem
Minimum
import price
at band
floor level
Entry price
resulting
from PBS
March
2000
FOB Argentine
port 106.22 23.09 128.00 115.80 122.75 128.00 145.83
April
2000
FOB Argentine
port 113.72 15.14 128.00 117.74 124.80 128.00 139.94
May 2000 FOB Argentine
port 126.29 1.81 128.00 120.55 127.78 128.00 129.59
Values in US$ per tonne.
Source: Own compilation based on ODEPA information.

168. As can be seen from Table V, a comparison of the entry price for wheat that would have
resulted from applying the amended PBS (using th e actual prices for the perigod March-April-May
2000) with the price resulting from the application of a minimum import price at price band floor
level shows that the entry price for import s to Chile under the amended PBS would have always been
higher than that which would have resulted if Chil e had applied a minimum import price at price
band floor level, that is at US$128.
169. To make the significance of this argument clearer for the Panel, in Exhibit ARG-10 we have
reproduced a chart (based on the numerical information in Table V) showing graphs of the PBS entry
price that would have been observed if the ame nded PBS had been applied during the period March-
April-May 2000. This chart also includes a gra ph representing the entry price for imports to Chile
with a minimum import price at band floor level wh ich would have been observed in cases in which it
could have been calculated and the entry price without the application of either the PBS or a minimum
price.
170. Clearly, in all cases
 the entry price for imports to Chile under the amended PBS is higher
than the entry price with a minimum import price at band floor level.
(b) The case of wheat flour
171. It is not difficult to show that in the case of wheat flour the entry price – under the amended
PBS – is higher than it would have been if Chile had applied a minimum import price at band floor
level. As wheat flour is a product of wheat, its price is naturally higher than that of wheat itself. If to
that price we add the specific du ties resulting from the PBS, it logica lly follows that in each case in
which the entry price of wheat – under the amende d PBS – was higher than the price resulting from
the application of a minimum import price, the entry price of wheat flour during the same period must
logically also have been higher than the price resulting from the application of a minimum import
price. Therefore, this must have been so both during the period in which specific duties were actually
activated between December 2004 and April 2005 and during the period in which it was calculated
how the amended PBS would have operated with international pri ces between March and May 2000
(Table V).
172. Accordingly, the entry price for wheat flour imports to Chile – under the amended PBS – is
higher than it would have been if Chile had applied a minimum import price at band floor level.

116 Based on the monthly FOB price for bread wheat, Argentine port. Source: ODEPA.
117 Source ODEPA.

173. Consequently, both in the case of wheat and in th at of wheat flour, the entry price of Chilean
imports, under the amended PBS, is higher than it would have been if Chile had applied a minimum
import price at price band floor level.
2.4. The amended PBS does not merely moderate th e effect of fluctuations in world market
prices on Chile's market because it does not ensure that the entry price of imports to
Chile falls in tandem with falling world market prices

174. Below, Argentina will show that the amended PBS does not merely moderate the effect of
fluctuations in world market prices on Chile's market because it does not ensure that the entry price of
imports to Chile falls in tandem with falling worl d market prices. Argentina will provide evidence of
what actually happened during the operation of the amended PBS when, between December 2004 and
April 2005, specific duties were applied.
(a) The amended PBS does not ensure that the en try price of wheat imports falls in tandem
with falling world wheat market prices
175. Exhibits ARG-11 and ARG-12 contain a table and a chart, respectively, showing what
happened in the case of wheat when specific duties were applied starting on 16 December 2004.
Clearly, as the FOB Argentine port prices were falling, the entry price, with the application of specific
duties, rose significantly, demonstrating once again a to tal disconnection from international price
developments.
176. Exhibits ARG-11 and ARG-12 show that, from 1 December 2004, the price of bread wheat
FOB Argentine port fell steadily, a trend that was maintained until approximately 4 January 2005.
Specifically, the initial FOB price on 1 December was US$119 per tonne, whereas at the end of the
trend, on 4 January 2005, the price was US$109 per tonne.
177. A study of the entry price trend for imports to Chile due to the operation of the PBS reveals
the exact opposite: the entry price rose. In fact, from 1 December the entry price for Trigo Pan
Argentino showed a tendency to fall which, the band not being active, reflected a downward trend in
FOB Argentine port prices. However, when the band was activated on 16 December 2004 and
specific duties were applied, the entry price fo r Chile rose suddenly from US$149.94 per tonne to
approximately US$162.93 per tonne. This was specifically due to the operation of the amended PBS
and the application of specific duties.
178. It may be concluded that, because of the distorting effect of the amended PBS, when
international prices fall the entry price for Chile ri ses. Therefore, the amended PBS does not ensure
that the entry price for wheat imports falls in tandem with falling world wheat market prices.
(b) The amended PBS does not ensure that the entr y price for wheat flour imports falls in
tandem with falling world wheat market prices
179. Exhibits ARG-13 and ARG-14 contain a table and a chart, respectively, showing what
happened in the case of wheat flour when specific duties were applied starting on 16 December 2004.
Clearly, as the FOB Argentine port prices for wheat flour fell, the Chilean entry price, with the
application of specific duties, rose, demonstrating a disconnection from international price
developments
180. As Exhibits ARG-13 and ARG-14 show, from 1 November 2004 (and indeed from before
that) the FOB Argentine port price for wheat flour fe ll steadily, a trend which was to continue until
approximately March 2005. Specifically, the initial FOB price for a shipment arriving in Chile by

land on 1 November 2004
118 was US$170 per tonne, whereas at the end of the trend in March 2005
the price was US$150 per tonne.
181. A study of the trend in the Chilean entry price as a result of the operation of the PBS reveals
the exact opposite: the entry price rose. In fact , from 1 November (and indeed from before that) the
Chilean entry price for Argentine wheat flour had a tendency to fall which, the band not being active,
reflected a downward trend in FOB Argentine port prices. 119 However, when the band was activated
on 16 December 2004 and specific duties were applie d, the Chilean entry price rose suddenly from
US$234.47 to US$256.77 per tonne. This was specifi cally due to the operation of the amended PBS
and the application of specific duties.
182. In addition, it should be noted that whereas duri ng most of January and all of February 2005,
specifically up until 1 March 2005, the FOB price of wheat flour – arriving in Chile by land –
remained at US$150 per tonne, on 16 February the entry price rose abruptly from US$244.90 to
US$254.60 per tonne, solely because of the incr ease in specific duties from US$22.30 to US$32.00
per tonne. It should be recalled that the appli cation of these specific duties was related not to
international wheat flour prices but to the internationa l prices of wheat. That is to say that the PBS is
also unable to ensure that, when wheat flour pri ces are stable, the Chilean entry price also remains
stable and does not increase as a consequence of va riables unrelated to the transaction value of flour,
as happened in February 2005.
183. Thus, the distorting effect of the amended PBS means that when international prices fall, the
Chilean entry price rises. Therefore, the amended PBS does not ensure that the price of wheat flour
imports falls in tandem with the falling prices of wheat flour on the world market.
184. Thus, there can be no doubt that the amended PBS does not merely moderate the effect of
fluctuations in world market prices on the Chilean ma rket, since it does not ensure that the entry price
of Chilean imports falls in tandem with falling world market prices.
185. To conclude, Argentina has shown, on the basis of evid ence, that, like the original PBS, the
"new" price band system continues to elevate the entry price of Chilean imports above the price band
floor, continues "overcompensating" for the effect of d ecreases in international prices on the domestic
market when the reference prices are set below the price band floor, continues causing the entry price
of imports to Chile to be higher than it would have been if Chile had applied a minimum import price
at price band floor level and continues not to ensure that the entry price of Chilean imports falls in
tandem with falling world market prices.
186. Consequently, the new Price Band System is disconnecting the Chilean market from
international price developments in such a wa y as to insulate the Chilean market from the
transmission of international prices and is prev enting enhanced access to the Chilean market for
imports of wheat and wheat flour.
187. By not fully reflecting falls in world prices in domestic prices and impeding the transmission
of international price developments to the Chile an market in much the same way as the other
categories of prohibited measures listed in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture
(in particular, a "minimum import pr ice" and a "variable import levy"), the "new" PBS i s
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

118 It was calculated that it would take approximately 4 to 5 days to transport the goods by land from
Argentina to Chile.
119 See Exhibits ARG-13 and ARG-14.

2.5. The floor and ceiling of the amended PBS insulate the Chilean market from
international price developments

188. In the PBS in its original form, the floor and ceiling prices of the price bands were set for a
whole year (from 16 December of one year to 15 December of the next) in accordance with world
prices (monthly average) over a prev ious five-year period (60 months). 120 In this respect, the floor
and ceiling prices of Chile's price bands varied as a f unction of world market prices. According to the
Appellate Body, the price bands could have the effe ct of impeding the tran smission of international
price developments to the domestic market in a way similar to that of other categories of prohibited
measures listed in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture .121 Similarly, the floor
and ceiling of the amended PBS also insulate the Chilean market from international price
developments.
(a) The floor and ceiling of the amended PBS insulate the Chilean market from
international price developments as a result of having been determined once only for the
entire period from 16 December 2003 to 15 December 2014
189. Under the "new" PBS the floor and ceiling prices have been set for the entire period from
16 December 2003 to 15 December 2007 at US$128 per tonne and US$148 per tonne, respectively.
Moreover, the new legislation stipulates that, fro m 16 December 2007 to 15 December 2014, these
floor and ceiling prices will be adjusted annually by multiplying the values in force during the
previous annual period by a factor of 0.985.
122
190. Thus, it can be said not only that the essence of the PBS has been unaffected by the changes
introduced but also that in its present form th e PBS impedes even more the transmission of
international price developments to the domestic ma rket, in much the same way as other categories of
prohibited measures listed in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since the floor
and ceiling prices of Chile's price bands no longer vary with either world market prices or historical
prices, but have been determined once only for the entire period from 16 December 2003 to
15 December 2014, without bearing any relation to internati onal prices. Argentina questions how, in
these circumstances, the new method of setting the floor and ceiling of the price bands can reflect
international price developments.
191. In other words, bearing in mind that the operation of the original system was based on the use
of moving averages for the previous 60 months for setting price band floor and ceiling prices,
Argentina considers that the present system will di stort the international price transmission process
even more, since the floor and ceiling prices will not be adjusted until 2007. Similarly, considering
that from that year onwards these parameters will be established on the basis of fixed coefficients,
thereafter isolating the system from fluctuations on the international markets for a further period of
seven years, Argentina believes that the new price band system could lead to even greater distortions.
(b) The floor and ceiling of the amended PBS insulate the Chilean market from
international price developments and are non-transparent insofar as from 2007 they will
be established on the basis of fixed coefficients
192. Chile has specified a factor of 0.985 for adju sting the band floor and ceiling prices during the
period from the end of 2007 to 2014. This mean s that the band floor and ceiling prices for each
annual period starting from 16 December 2007 will be the product of the floor and ceiling prices in
force up to 15 December of each year and an adjustment factor of 0.985.

120 Art. 12 of Law No. 18.525 and Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 17.
121 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 246.
122 Law 19.897, Art. 1, Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Art. 6.

193. The relevant part of Article 1 of Law 19.897 reads as follows:
"For the purpose of determining the duties and rebates from the annual period ending
in 2008 and up to 2014, the floor and ce iling prices established in the previous
paragraph shall be adjusted annually by multiplying the values in force during the
previous annual period by a factor of 0.985 in the case of wheat."
194. The results of applying a factor of 0.985 are set out in Article 6 of Decree 831/2003, which
states:
"The floor and ceiling prices for wheat during the period from December 2003 to
December 2014 shall be as follows:
Floor and ceiling prices for wheat, by period of validity
Period of validity Floor price Ceiling price
16-Dec-2003 to 15-Dec2007
16-Dec-2007 to 15-Dec-2008
16-Dec-2008 to 15-Dec-2009
16-Dec-2009 to 15-Dec-2010
16-Dec-2010 to 15-Dec-2011
16-Dec-2011 to 15-Dec-2012
16-Dec-2012 to 15-Dec-2013
16-Dec-2013 to 15-Dec-2014
128
126
124
122
120
118
116
114
148
146
144
142
140
138
136
134

195. First of all, the band floor and ceiling price adjustment factor of 0.985 does not provide for
the transmission of international prices to the Chilean market.
196. Whereas in the original PBS the band floor and ceiling prices varied as a function of historical
prices, under the amended PBS, thanks to the factor of 0.985, the floor and ceiling vary without any
relation to world market or historical prices. Neither do they vary as a function of the transaction
value, a characteristic shared by the entire PBS.
123
197. Chile has decided, apparently without referenc e to any criterion, that the floor and ceiling
prices, two fundamental elements (together with th e reference prices) for establishing the level of the
specific duties applicable to wheat and wheat flour , will decrease, as from December 2007, in a fixed,
automatic and autonomous manner.124 That is to say, the way in which the floor and ceiling prices are
to be adjusted bears no relation to international price developments.
198. Even if this relation were based on an assumed decline in the international prices of wheat
after 2007, it is baffling how Chile could, in 2003, predict the course of these prices over a period
beginning four (4) years later and ending eleven (11) years after the establishment of the amended
PBS.

123 Note that the Appellate Body held that even if it were assumed that one feature of Chile's price band
system was not similar to the featur es of "variable import levies" and "minimum import prices" because the
thresholds of Chile's price bands varied in relation to—alb eit historic—world market prices rather than domestic
target prices, this would not change its overall assessment of Chile's price band system (Report of the Appellate
Body, paragraph 251).
124 If this criterion existed, it would not prev ent the disconnection from international price
developments because of the way in which the factor 0.985 was established.

199. Secondly, the way in which the factor 0.985 was determ ined is not transparent. Chile has not
explained how it was calculated, or what basis there may be for this factor in the legislation that
established the amended PBS.
200. The Appellate Body noted how the way in whic h the bands were established in the original
PBS was inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture:
"... This lack of transparency and…predicta bility are liable to restrict the volume of
imports ... This lack of transparency and predictability will also contribute to
distorting the prices of imports by impeding the transmission of international prices to
the domestic market."
125

"In addition to the lack of transparency and the lack of predictability that are inherent
in how Chile's price bands are established , we see similar shortcomings in the way
the other essential element of Chile's price band system…is determined" 126 (emphasis
added).

201. Clearly, by not explaining the origin of the fa ctor 0.985 or the reasons for choosing it, Chile
has failed to satisfy the established transparency re quirements. As the Appe llate Body pointed out,
the lack of transparency preven ts enhanced market access for imports of agricultural products,
contrary to the object and purpose of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.127
202. Consequently, it is impossible to do other than conclude that the application of the factor
0.985 is contributing to the way in which the amended PBS disconnects the Chilean market from
international price developments, in a manne r inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
2.6. The reference prices insulate the Chilean market from international price developments

203. Under the amended PBS, reference prices are established every two months on the basis of
the average of the daily prices recorded in two mark ets specified in the Chilean legislation: the FOB
price of Trigo Pan Argentino , for the first half of each year, and the FOB price of Soft Red Winter
No. 2 Wheat, for the second half of each year.128
204. Thus, the reference prices remain invariable for successive two-month periods.129
(a) The reference prices insulate the Chilean mark et from international price developments
by staying unchanged for two months
205. Given that under the "old" PBS reference prices we re adjusted every week in accordance with
the lowest FOB price in any external "market of concern" dur ing the previous week, the amended
PBS disconnects the Chilean market from interna tional price developments even more than the
original PBS.

125 Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.
126 Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 247.
127 Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 258.
128 See Exhibit ARG-2, Art. 8.
129 See Exhibit ARG-2, Decree 831/2003, Annex, Summary Table for the application of paragraph 2.

206. Under the "new" PBS the reference prices used to calculate the specific duty for wheat and
wheat flour are set 6 times a year,
130 that is, with a period of validity of 2 months during which the
transmission of world market prices is disconnected.
207. Consequently, the "new" reference prices, and the "new" PBS that determines them, are not
only less representative of the world market but also impede the transmission of international price
developments to the Chilean market even more than the original reference prices and PBS.131
208. The charts in Exhibits ARG-15 and ARG-17 illustrate the development of the reference prices
and the prices of wheat FOB Argentina and FOB Gulf of Mexico, respectively, during the period of
validity of the amended PBS. For each period, the disconnection between the FOB prices and the
reference prices, after the reference price has been set for two months, is clearly discernible. The
tables that provided the information on which these charts are based can be found in Exhibits ARG-16
and ARG-18, respectively.
209. It is surprising to note the insulation from in ternational prices that actually occurred during
the period in which the operation of the PBS led to th e application of specific duties. It can be seen
both from the chart showing the relationship between the reference price and the Argentine port price
of bread wheat during the period of operation of the amended PBS (ARG-15) and from that showing
the relationship between the reference price and the Gulf of Mexico price of Soft Red Winter No. 2
wheat (ARG-17) that the disconnectio n occurs irrespective of the peri od of the year with respect to
which the relationship is considered. That is to say, the reference price is disconnected from the FOB
prices in the markets of concern both when the re ference price is based on the Argentine FOB price
and when it is based on the Gulf of Mexico FO B price, although the disconnection between the
reference price and the Argentine FOB price is even greater when the reference price is calculated on
the basis of the Gulf of Mexico FOB price and vice versa.
210. For example, if we consider the relationship between the reference price and the FOB price
for Trigo Pan Argentino (Exhibits ARG-15 and ARG-16), we find disconnections over the entire
period of validity of the amended PBS, but especial ly in February, early April, the end of May and
early June, July, August, early September, e nd of October and mid-December 2004 and end of
February, March, early April, end of July, end of August and beginning of September 2005.
211. Likewise, if we analyse the relationship between the reference price and the FOB price Gulf
of Mexico (Exhibits ARG-17 and ARG-18), we note disconnections over the entire period of validity
of the amended PBS, but especially at the end of January and beginning of February, April, end of
May and early June, July, September, and early Oc tober 2004, January, February, March, early April,
early August, early October and end of November 2005, and January and early February 2006.
212. As a specific example of this insulation (am ong many others), consider what happened when
the reference price was set at 108.64 US$/tonne between 16 February and 15 April 2005, on the basis
of the average of the daily prices for wheat FOB Argentine port. The reference price thus determined
and fixed for two months did not reflect in absolute terms the increasing trend of those same FOB
prices for Trigo Pan Argentino which, during that period, reached 140 US$/tonne,
132 close to the band
ceiling from which the PBS provides for the granting of rebates rather than the levying of specific
duties, which clearly reveals the enormous arbitrariness in the setting of the reference prices.

130 See Exhibit ARG-2 (Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance, Articles 5 and 7
and the "Summary Table for the application of paragraph 2" of the Annex) and Exhibit ARG-6 (History of the
application of the amended PBS).
131 This without prejudice to the inconsistencies f ound by the Appellate Body with respect to the
reference prices in the original PBS.
132 See Exhibit ARG-16.

213. In the case of wheat flour, the disconnection is even greater. Thus, as flour is a product of
wheat, its FOB price is naturally higher since to th e cost of the wheat the millers add the cost of
milling plus a profit margin. Accordingly, the FOB price of wheat flour is always higher than the
reference price calculated on the basis of wheat, as can be seen simply by glancing at the chart in
Exhibit ARG-19 and the table in Exhibit ARG-20. The substantial disconnection observed between
the FOB price of Argentine wheat flour and the re ference price on the basis of which the specific
duties are applied during the entire period of validity of the amended PBS speaks for itself and shows
the distortion faced by Argentine exporters of wheat flour when trying to enter the Chilean market.
The disconnection of the Chilean market from international price developments is therefore obvious.
(b) The reference prices insulate the Chilean mark et from international price developments
as a result of their being established on the basis of the average of the daily prices
recorded on only two predetermined markets
214. Under the new legislation, the reference price for wheat will correspond to the average of the
daily prices – during a 15-day period reckoned retr ospectively from the 10th day of the month of
publication of the corresponding decree – recorded on the Trigo Pan Argentino market, for the first
half of the year, and the Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat market, for the second half.
215. In fact, Article 8 of Supreme Decree 831/2003 states that:
"The market of most concern for wheat, during the period of application of duties and
rebates from 16 December to 15 June of the following year, shall be that of Trigo Pan
Argentino and the prices shall correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product
FOB Argentine port and, during the period of application from 16 June to 15
December, shall be that of Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat and the prices shall
correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product FOB Gulf of Mexico ."133
(Original emphasis).
216. First of all, as in the case of the PBS in its original form, there is no legislation or regulation
governing the amended PBS that specifies how or on what basis the "markets of concern" and
"qualities of concern" are selected. Therefore, the reference price selection process has not been
transparent.
217. This predetermination of the markets to be taken into account for establishing reference prices
means that the Chilean market is disconnected from international price developments. Thus, the
predetermination of the markets prevents Chile from ensuring that the reference prices are
representative of actual world market prices.134
218. In fact, bread wheat is sold on at least two other markets of concern, namely, Chicago and
Kansas.135 The fact that the legislation specifies that only two markets are to be regarded as being of
concern for the determination of reference prices disconnects Chile's domestic market from
international price developments.
219. Secondly, the selection of the daily price quoted for "Argentine port" bread wheat as the basis
for establishing the market of concern for the first half of the year is not transparent either, since the
prices vary with the choice of Argentine port.136

133 See Exhibit ARG-2.
134 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 249.
135 Based on SAGPyA data.
136 See Exhibit ARG-4.

(c) The reference prices distort the transmission of international prices to the Chilean
market by not having any link with the transaction value
220. The reference prices also distort the transmission of international prices to the Chilean market
because they have no link with the transaction value.
221. In this connection, the Appellate Body cite d the observations made by the Panel when it
described the particular reference pr ice used in Chile's price band syst em in its original form in the
following terms:
"The reference price used in the context of the Chilean PBS is clearly disconnected
from the actual transaction value ..."
137
222. In the case of the amended PBS, the same bimont hly reference price is applied to imports of
all products of the same category, irrespective of their origin and the transaction value of the
shipment.
223. Therefore, there is no link between the refere nce price and the transaction value of the
shipment in question under the present scheme either, a characteristic shared by the entire PBS.
2.7. The factor of 1.56 applied to the duties and rebates determined for wheat in order to
calculate the duties and rebates applicable to wheat flour insulates the entry price for
wheat flour from international price developments

224. The amended PBS is applied to wheat flour by imposing a surcharge in the form of specific
duties or rebates obtained by multiplying the specific du ties or rebates applied to wheat by a factor of
1.56.
225. Both Law 19.897, Article 1, and Decree 831/2003, Article 16,138 state:
"In the case of wheat flour the duties and rebates applied shall be those determined
for wheat multiplied by a factor of 1.56".
226. The specific duties applied to wheat flour, be ing equal to the duties applied to wheat
multiplied by a factor of 1.56, produce an even gr eater insulation of wheat flour from international
price developments than in the case of wheat.
227. There are several reasons for this:
228. Firstly, wheat flour exporters have to pay specific duties which not only bear no relation to
the transaction value but also bear no relation to the product in question, since they are calculated on
the basis of those applied to another product, namely, wheat.
229. Secondly, the way in which Chile determined the fact or 1.56 is not transparent, since in its
legislation Chile has neither explained nor justified in any way the basis on which it was established.
230. In this connection, it is worth noting the relevant observations of the Appellate Body:
"…significant for traders, also, are the lack of transparency of certain features of
Chile's price band system… These specific characteristics of Chile's price band

137 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 248.
138 See Exhibits ARG-1 and ARG-2, respectively.

system prevent enhanced mark et access for imports of agricultural products, contrary
to the object and purpose of Article 4"139
231. Thirdly, on the basis of the history of the Chilean legislation, it might be speculated that the
application of a factor to the specific duties estab lished for wheat in order to determine the specific
duties applicable to wheat flour could be base d on a price relationship derived from a technical
production ratio between wheat and wheat flour. Flour being a product of wheat, its price is naturally
higher since to the cost of the wheat the millers a dd the cost of milling plus a profit margin. This
relationship is valid at internationa l level. In the case of Argentina, if the FOB prices of bread wheat
and wheat flour 140 since the amended PBS came into force are taken into account, the average price
ratio is 1.3.141 That is, the price of wheat flour is approximately 30 per cent higher than that of wheat.
232. Moreover, this was the technical ratio establis hed by Chile in Law 19.193 which, in 1997,
extended the specific duties and tariff rebates of the pr ice band for wheat to wheat flour. At that time,
the Message of the Chilean Executiv e relating to the amendment of Article 12 of Law 18.525 stated:
"… It is proposed to establish specific duties and rebates on the importation of flour and calculate
their amount by multiplying the duties and rebates determined for wheat by the coefficient 1.3 which
is the technical production ratio …" 142 (Emphasis added)
233. However, successive amendments incorporated in the legislation led to increases in this
figure. Thus, Chile decided to raise the coefficien t first from 1.3 to 1.41 and finally to 1.56 without
any justification, thereby distorting – to an ever greater extent – the entry price for Chilean wheat
flour imports.
234. As noted by a Chilean legislator during the debate on the bill – later Law 19.446 – extending
the system for setting the duties and rebates for wheat flour:
"Has any justification been given for increa sing the factor from 1.41 to 1.56?
Absolutely none … The Executive has s ubmitted a measure without providing any
data that might support … the raising of the factor from 1.41 to 1.56 … "143
235. Thus, the factor of 1.56 used to multiply the duties and rebates determined for wheat in order
to calculate the duties and rebates applicable to wh eat flour is not transparent and is insulating the
entry price for wheat flour from international price de velopments to an even greater extent than that
for wheat, this being another specific feature of the amended PBS that is preventing enhanced access
to the Chilean market, in a manner inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
3. The amended PBS is neither transparent nor predictable
236. The amount of a duty is not the only concern of Chile's trading partners. As the Appellate
Body also concluded,144 the lack of transparency of certain f eatures of Chile's price band system; the
unpredictability of the level of duties; and the automaticity, the frequency, and the extent to which the
duties fluctuate, all characteristics carried ove r essentially unchanged into the amended PBS, are
significant concerns of the exporters.

139 Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 258.
140 Both are products whose markets are considered to be of concern to Chile in establishing the
reference prices of the amended PBS.
141 See Exhibit ARG-29.
142 " History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the parliamentary debate. Law 19.193 ".
Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 1997.
143 Senator Piñera, 24 January 1996. In "History of the Law. Compilation of official texts of the
parliamentary debate. Law 19.446". Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 1997.
144 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 258.

237. On this same point, the Appellate Body noted th at the lack of transparency and predictability
of the old PBS would also contribute to distorting the prices of imports by impeding the transmission
of international prices to the domestic market, in a manner inconsistent w ith Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
238. Thus, the Appellate Body observed that:
"… at least one feature of "variable import levies" is the fact that the measure itself
– as a mechanism – must impose the variability of the duties. Variability is inherent
in a measure if the measure incorporates a scheme or formula that causes and ensures
that levies change automatically and continuously . Ordinary customs duties, by
contrast, are subject to discrete chang es in applied tariff rates that occur
independently, and unrelated to such an underlying scheme or formula. …" 145
(Emphasis added)
239. The Appellate Body added:
"… [T]he presence of a formula causing automatic and continuous variability of
duties is a necessary , but by no means a sufficient, condition for a particular
measure to be a "variable import levy" with in the meaning of footnote 1. "Variable
import levies" have additional features th at undermine the object and purpose of
Article 4, which is to achieve improved market access conditions for imports of
agricultural products by permitting only the ap plication of ordinary customs duties.
These additional features include a lack of transparency and a lack of predictability
in the level of duties that will result from such measures . This lack of transparency
and this lack of predictability are liable to restrict the volume of imports. As
Argentina points out, an exporter is less likely to ship to a market if that exporter
does not know and cannot reasonably predict what the amount of duties will be . This
lack of transparency and predictability will also contribute to distorting the prices of
imports by impeding the transmission of international prices to the domestic
market."146 (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added)
240. From these statements by the Appellate Body it follows that:
 (a) The presence of a formula causing automatic and continuous variability of duties is a
necessary condition for a particular measure to be a "variable import levy" within the
meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; and, moreover,

 (b) the lack of transparency and the lack of predictability in the level of duties that will
result from the application of variable import levies are additional features that
undermine the object and purpose of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture ,
which is to achieve improved market acce ss conditions for imports of agricultural
products by permitting the application of ordinary customs duties only.

241. As already explained, the changes introduced into the PBS did not substantially convert the
price band system into a measure different from that pr eviously in force. In particular, variability is
inherent in the amended PBS since it incorporates a plan or formula that causes and ensures the
automatic and continuous modification of the levies and, moreover, lacks the required transparency
and predictability, in a manner inc onsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture . Thus,
the findings of the Appellate Body apply with equal force to the amended PBS.

145 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 233.
146 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.

242. Below, Argentina shows how the Appellate Body's finding apply to the current price band
system.
3.1. The amended PBS contains a formula that causes import duties to vary automatically
and continuously

"… I believe that with respect to the comp etitiveness of the … wheat sector…we are
seeking a reasonable formula for setting a floor that enables us to make productive
an activity … "147 (Emphasis added)
243. Firstly, Argentina will show that the PBS contains a formula that causes import duties to vary
and then that this variation is automatic and continuous, as specified by the Appellate Body.148
(a) The amended PBS contains a formula that causes import duties to vary
244. The relevant part of Article 1 of La w 19.897 amending Article 12 of Law 18.525 149 reads as
follows:
"There shall be established, on the one hand, specific duties when the reference price
is below the floor price of 128 dollars for wheat ..., and, on the other hand, rebates on
the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff when the
reference price is above the ceiling pri ce of 148 dollars ... The duties and rebates
referred to in this Article shall corres pond to the difference between the floor and
ceiling prices determined above and an FOB re ference price multiplied by a factor of
one (1) plus the general ad valorem duty in force for these products. The FOB
reference price shall consist of the average of the daily international prices for wheat
..., recorded in the markets of most concer n during a period of 15 calendar days ...
reckoned from the date fixed by the regulations for each decree".
245. Moreover, Section § 4 of Decree 831/2003150 states:
 § 4. Determination of specific duties and tariff rebates

Article 13.- Establishment of duties and rebates
 In each Supreme Decree issued under these regulations there shall be
established, with respect to the products forming its subject matter, specific duties,
when the reference price is below the floor price, and rebates on the amounts payable
as ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff, when the reference price is
above the ceiling price.

147 Senator Juan Antonio Coloma Correa, 6 August 2003. "History of the Law. Compilation of official
texts of the parliamentary debate. Law 19.897". Library of the National Congress. Santiago, Chile, 2003.
148 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 233: "… . Ordinary customs
duties, by contrast, are subject to discrete changes in applied tariff rates that occur independently, and
unrelated to such an underlying scheme or formula. The level at which ordinary customs duties are applied can
be varied by a legislature, but such duties will not be automatically and continuously variable. To vary the
applied rate of duty in the case of ordinary customs duties will always require separate legislative or
administrative action …"
149 See Exhibit ARG-1.
150 See Exhibit ARG-2.

 When the reference price is above the floor price but below the ceiling price,
this shall be recorded in the corresponding decree, which shall not establish duties or
rebates during the period in which it remains in force.
Article 14.- Calculation of specific duties
 The specific duties applicable to imports of wheat, refined sugar and raw
sugar shall correspond to the difference be tween the floor price and the reference
price of each product multiplied by a factor of one (1) plus the general ad valorem
tariff in force established in the Customs Tariff.
Specific duty
=
( Floor price in force
- reference price )

(1 + general ad valorem tariff in force, Customs Tariff)

Article 15.- Calculation of tariff rebates
 The rebates on amounts payable as ad valorem Customs Tariff duties,
applicable to imports of wheat, refined s ugar and raw sugar, shall correspond to the
difference between the reference price and the ceiling price of each product
multiplied by a factor of one (1) plus the general ad valorem tariff in force established
in the Customs Tariff.
Tariff rebate
=
( Reference price
- ceiling price in force )

(1 + general ad valorem tariff in force established in the
Customs Tariff)

Article 16.- Wheat flour
 In the case of wheat flour, the duties and rebates applied shall be those
determined for wheat multiplied by a factor of 1.56.
Specific duty or tariff rebate for wheat flour
=
Specific duty or tariff rebate for wheat

1.56

246. The cited paragraphs of Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003
151 clearly reveal the existence of a
formula on the basis of which the duties resulting from the PBS are established.
247. From the text of the two above-mentioned provisi ons it follows that, in mathematical terms,
the formula for calculating duties is:

151 See Exhibits ARG-1 and ARG-2, respectively.

Specific duty
for wheat152 = ( Band floor
price - Reference price ) * ( 1 +
General ad valorem
tariff in force,
Customs Tariff

 = ( US$128 - Reference price ) * ( 1 + 0.06 )

Specific duty
for wheat
flour153
= [ ( Band floor
price - Reference price ) * ( 1 +
General ad valorem
tariff in force,
Customs Tariff
) ] * 1.56

 = [ ( US$128 - Reference price ) * ( 1 + 0.06 ) ] * 1.56

248. Below, Argentina will show that this formula contained in the PBS causes variability of the
import duties payable on imports of wheat and wheat flour to Chile.
249. For this purpose, Argentina will cite three sources of evidence.
250. Firstly, Exhibit ARG-21 presents a table showing what the amount of specific duties would
have been if the current PBS had operated with the average prices reco rded between 1986 and the
present on the markets of concern for Chile. The election of 1986 led in July of that year to the
statutory establishment of the Price Band System in Chile.
154 Accordingly, for each year between
1986 and December 2003 the table includes the monthl y average Argentine port and Gulf of Mexico
FOB prices recorded for bread wheat and Soft Re d Winter No. 2 wheat, and the specific duty that
would have resulted from applying the amended PBS w ith international prices as recorded during that
period. To ensure the greatest possible similarity between this model and the amended PBS, for the
periods extending from January to June of each year the monthly average FOB prices for bread wheat,
Argentine Port have been taken, whereas for the periods extending from July to December each year
the monthly average FOB prices for Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat, Gulf of Mexico, have been used, in
accordance with the provisions of Ar ticle 1 of Law 19.897 and Article 8 of Decree 831/2003.
Moreover, from December 2003 the table includes th e real reference prices and specific duties
actually established and applied by Chile.155
251. To sum up, the table in Exhibit ARG-21 shows, on the basis of the actual and historical prices
recorded by Chile, the frequency and extent of th e fluctuations of the duties established under the
PBS. It can be seen how when international pr ices fall the amended PBS is activated and specific
duties, which display pronounced variability, are app lied. In fact, if the amended PBS had existed
throughout this period, the specific duties would have varied (and in some cases did vary) between a
minimum of US$0.58 and a maximum of US$64.50 per tonne.156
252. Secondly, to bring out the variability of specific duties under the PBS, Argentina presents
Exhibit ARG-22 which graphically illustrates the freque ncy and extent of the fluctuations in specific
duties that would have occurred if the amended PBS ha d been applied from July 1986, that is to say,
from the time that the Price Band System was first es tablished in Chile. The chart in this Exhibit is
based on the data contained in the table in Exhibit ARG-21. It should be noted that from December

152 See Exhibit ARG-2, Dec. 831/2003, Article 14.
153 See Exhibit ARG-2, Dec. 831/2003, Article 16.
154 The PBS was established by Law 18.525, Official Journal of the Republic of Chile, 30 June 1986.
See Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Panel, paragraph 2.2.
155 All the information needed to design this model was obtained from ODEPA (Exhibit ARG-6 and
www.odepa.gob.cl). The formula us ed corresponds to that of the amended PBS, in accordance with
Decree 831/2003 (Exhibit ARG-2).
156 See June 1999 and February 1991.

2003 onwards the reference prices and specific du ties used are the actua l values established and
applied by Chile under the amended PBS.
253. Thirdly, Argentina considers it useful to describ e the unpredictability, frequency and extent
of the fluctuations in specific duties in statistical terms. The fluctuations observed in the model
presented in the table in Exhibit ARG-21 can be accurat ely translated into numerical terms. For this
purpose, Argentina proposes to use a very simple statistical tool known as the standard deviation. The
standard deviation is "... the square root of the ar ithmetic mean of the squares of the deviations from
the mean ..."
157 of a population. That is, the square root of the average of the squares of the deviations
of specified data from the average of those data. In brief, the standard deviation makes it possible to
compare the degree of dispersion of a set of data abou t the mean. It tells us by how much the data of
a frequency distribution vary with respect to the aver age of those data. In symbolic form it can be
expressed as follows:

e (twice a day)
Temazapan (at might)

254. In this case, the average of th e specific duties that would have resulted if Chile had applied
the PBS from July 1986 onwards, in accordance with the table in Exhibit ARG-21, is US$18.74 per
tonne. The standard deviation of this same set of specific duties – in accordance with the formula
written out above – is US$13.53 per tonne. That is to say, the specific duties that Chile would have
established under the amended PBS would, on averag e, have been US$18.74, with an average
fluctuation of +/- US$13.53 per tonne. This variati on signifies an average fluctuation of +/- 72.20 per
cent.158 Considering that the average fluctuations of the FOB price, Argentine port, of bread wheat
and the FOB price, Gulf of Mexico, of Soft Red Winter No. 2 wheat from July 1986 to the present
were +/- 25.55 per cent and +/- 19.83 per cent, respectively,
159 an average fluctuation of +/- 72.20 per
cent is more than sizeable.
255. It is clear from both the table in Exhibit ARG-21 and the chart in Exhibit ARG-22 that the
frequency and extent of the fluctuations in the sp ecific duties that were established and would have
been established under the amended PBS are very s ubstantial. Consequently, Argentina cannot see
how a system that imposes a duty variability of this kind can offer the predictability required by wheat
and wheat flour producers in order to export their products to Chile. What is more, it is hard to
understand how a system that displays so much vari ability in the assessment of its duties can offer the
predictability that the Appellate Body considered a measure ought to offer to be consistent with
footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.160
(b) The amended PBS contains a formula that causes the import duties to vary automatically
256. Below, Argentina will demonstrate the automaticity of the specific duties resulting from the
PBS. According to the Spanish Academy, the defin ition of "automatic", insofar as relevant, is as
follows: "Said of a mechanism: which functions wholly or partially by itself ... which is activated
directly, and usually unfailingly, in specific circumstances".161

157 Blalock, H (1978) "Estadística Social", Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, page 93.
158 That is, ( US$13.14 / US$18.74 ) * 100.
159 Exhibit ARG-27.
160 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraphs 234, 258 and 261.
161 Dictionary of the Spanish Language of th e Spanish Academy, Twenty-second edition, at
http://www.rae.es/.

257. The PBS is a mechanism which functions by it self and is activated directly and, always,
unfailingly in specific circumstances. To show that it functions by itself, it is sufficient to recall that,
when operating in accordance with the formulas re produced above, the PBS is a mechanism which
spontaneously assesses specific duties and rebates. In Law 19.897 and in Article 13 of
Decree 831/2003 the "specific circumstances" in which it is activated are explained, namely, when the
reference price is below the band floor.
258. As for its functioning directly and unfailingl y, in Exhibits ARG-23 and ARG-24 Argentina
presents a table and a chart, respectively, wh ich show how the amende d PBS functioned when
specific duties were applied, that is to say, between 16 December 2004 and 15 April 2005.
259. The table in Exhibit ARG-23 gives all the variab les needed to illustrate the operation of the
PBS: the ceiling and the floor of the band at US$148 and US$128 per tonne (in accordance with
Article 6 of Decree 831/2003 for the peri od from 16 December 2003 to 15 December 2007
162),
reference prices, FOB price, CIF price, ad valorem duties (6 per cent), specific duties, entry price
without PBS (that is to say, the entry price that would exist if the PBS had not been applied during
this period), and the price resulting from the PBS. The FOB and CIF prices are the actual FOB and
CIF prices for bread wheat, Argentine port, on each of the specified dates. 163 The amount of
ad valorem duties and the specific duty resulting from the PBS, where appropriate, are calculated for
each CIF price and reference price. 164 The formulas used for calculating the values of the above-
mentioned variables are the same as those used previously and, moreover, are indicated in the table.
260. To make the operation of the PBS clearer, we have included the chart in Exhibit ARG-24
which reproduces graphs for the prices of bread wh eat FOB Argentine port, the reference prices, the
entry price for imports to Chile resulting from the PBS and the price which would have obtained if the
PBS had not been applied.
261. As the table and chart in question show, every time the reference price falls below the band
floor, specific duties which, added to the ad valorem duties, produce an increase in the amount of total
duty and hence the PBS entry price for imports to Chile are automatically, directly and unfailingly
generated.
262. In case the demonstration of the operation of the PBS in Exhibits ARG-23 and ARG-24
should not be considered sufficient to show that the PBS is an automatic, direct and unfailing
mechanism, in Exhibit ARG-6 Argentina presents a record of the operation of the amended PBS from
the time it came into force, i.e., from 16 December 2003. This record was provided by the Office of
Agricultural Studies and Policies of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of Chile itself. 165
Clearly, whenever the reference price of wheat fell below the band floor, specific duties were
automatically generated.166
263. In fact, it could not have been otherwise since both Law 19.897 and Decree 831/2003 make it
mandatory for specific duties to be established when the reference price is below the band floor. Thus,
the relevant part of Law 19.897 states that "specific duties must be established when the reference
price is below the floor price of 128 dollars for wheat. In the case of wheat flour, the duties and

162 See Exhibit ARG-2.
163 Based on historical prices recorded by SAGPyA, adjusted on the basis of the criterion indicated in
footnote 104.
164 Specific duties are applied if the reference price falls below the band floor price of US$128.
165 See http://www.odepa.gob.cl/
166 See the periods 16/Dec/04 – 15/Feb/05 and 16/Feb/05 – 15/Apr/05, when specific duties of 0.0143
US$/kg. and 0.0205 US$/kg. were applied to wheat, and 0.0223 US$/kg. and 0.0320 US$/kg. to wheat flour
with reference prices of US$114.50/tonne and US$108.64/tonne, respectively.

rebates determined for wheat multiplied by a factor of 1.56 shall be applied" (emphasis added). In its
turn, Article 13 of Decree 831/2003 reads: "In each Supreme Decree issued in accordance with this
regulation specific duties shall be established ... if the reference price is below the floor price ..."
(emphasis added).
167
264. Clearly, expressions of the type " must be established" and "shall be applied" mean that when
the reference price is below the floor price the a pplication of specific duties will be mandatory and
automatic. Therefore, the PBS is applied automatically, directly and unfailingly.
(c) The amended PBS contains a formula that causes import duties to vary continuously
265. The Appellate Body held that the second elem ent of the condition necessary for a particular
measure to be a "variable import levy" within th e meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture was that the variability of the duties be "continuous".168
266. Despite the fact that the variation of the specific duties is no longer weekly but bimonthly,
that variation is continuous.
267. In fact, in the right circumstances, that is to say, if the reference price is situated below the
band floor – as happened between D ecember 2004 and April 2005 – every two months an exporter of
wheat or wheat flour to the Chilean market will fa ce a specific duty different from that established
during the previous two-month period.
268. This is clear from the table and the chart in Exhibits ARG-23 and ARG-24, which illustrate
the operation of the amended PBS between 16 December 2004 and 15 April 2005.
269. Moreover, if we consider what can happen ove r a longer period of time, what an exporter
experiences is the continuous variability of the duties. This is apparent from the table and the chart in
Exhibits ARG-21 and ARG-22, which illustrate the va riability of the specific duties that would have
resulted if the present amended PB S had operated with the average prices recorded between 1986 and
the present on the markets of concern to Chile.
270. In short, Argentina has shown that the am ended PBS includes a formula that makes the
variability of the duties automatic and continuous. Thus, the am ended PBS satisfies the necessary
condition established by the Appellate Body for a me asure to be considered similar to a "variable
import levy".
3.2. The lack of transparency and the lack of predictability of the duty level that result from
the amended PBS are additional features that undermine the object and purpose of
Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture

271. The Appellate Body held that the lack of tran sparency and the lack of predictability of the
level of duties that result from the application of variable import levies are additional features that
undermine the object and purpose of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture , namely, to achieve
improved market access conditions for imports of agricultural products by permitting only the
application of ordinary customs duties.
169
272. As an example of a feature of the old PBS th at illustrated its lack of transparency and
predictability, the Appellate Body noted:

167 See also Articles 3 and 4 "shall be applied", Article 5 "the determination...shall be made", etc.
168 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.
169 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.

"... an exporter is less likely to ship to a market if that exporter does not know and
cannot reasonably predict what the amount of duties will be".170
273. Argentina will show that due to the operation of the amended PBS, it is perfectly possible for
an exporter to ship to Chile without being able reasonably to predict what the amount of duties
payable will be.
274. Annex 2 to Decree 831/2003 establishes the period s on the basis of which duties are to be
calculated and makes reference to the period for calculating the reference prices, the period of
publication of the decree, the period of validity of the specific duties and the corresponding markets of
most concern. The table in Annex 2 to Decree 831/2003 is reproduced below:
Periods for calculating
reference prices
Period of publication
of decree
Periods of validity of
specific duties or rebates Market of most concern
26 Nov–10 Dec
27 Jan–10 Feb
27 Mar–10 Apr
27 May–10 Jun
27 Jul–10 Aug
26 Sep–10 Oct
11-15 December
11-15 February
11-15 April
11-15 June
11-15 August
11-15 October
16 Dec–15 Feb
16 Feb–15 Apr
16 Apr–15 Jun
16 Jun–15 Aug
16 Aug–15 Oct
16 Oct–15 Dec
Trigo Pan Argentino
Trigo Pan Argentino
Trigo Pan Argentino
Soft Red Winter No. 2
Soft Red Winter No. 2
Soft Red Winter No. 2
(Emphasis added)

275. First of all , if an exporter of wheat or of wheat flour is asked by a customer to give a
quotation for a delivery to be made in more than two months time, it will be impossible for that
exporter to know the amount of the specific duties that might be applied. This constitutes a major
problem in the case of wheat since on that market the majority of sales are made under forward
contracts. In these circumstances, the uncertainty ge nerated by the amended PBS is transferred to the
exporter who has no predictable basis on which to make a quotation and hence a sale.
276. Secondly, even if a sale is made for delivery in less than two months, the exporter may still
be unable to predict the amount of specific duties.
277. For example, for a particular specific duty that is to apply from 16 April to 15 June
(highlighted), the reference prices will be calcu lated on the basis of the average of the daily
international prices for " Trigo Pan Argentino " recorded between 27 March and 10 April. The
Government of Chile will then have to publish the decree establishing the specific duties (or rebates,
where appropriate) between 11 and 15 April.
278. Suppose an Argentinean exporter exports wheat or wheat flour to Chile on 5 April. All that
the exporter will be able to predict at the time of exportation will be the band floor price, then set at
US$128. However, he will not be able to predic t the amount of duty payable in Chile. This is
because at the time of exportation the period for calculating the reference prices, one of the two
variables necessary for calculating the amount of specific duties, would not have ended. If the
shipment of wheat or wheat flour takes 11 days or more to arrive at the Chilean port, specific duties
calculated on the basis of a period partially subsequent to the time of embarkation will be applied. In
particular, the days 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 April will be relevant for the calculation of the reference price
and hence for the calculation of the amount of specif ic duties. However, having left Argentina on
5 April, during those five days the shipment of wheat or wheat flour will be en route for Chile. That
is to say, if the shipment arrives in Chile on 16 April or later , specific duties calculated on the basis
of a reference price based on the average of the da ily international prices for "bread wheat, Argentine
port" recorded between 27 March and 10 April will be applied. However, the exporter was aware
only of the prices recorded between 27 March and 5 April. Thus, the exporter will have lacked part of

170 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.

the period for calculating the reference price on the basi s of which he would have been able to predict
the amount of specific duties payable for precisely the period extending from 6 to 10 April. It should
be noted that the normal time required to tran sport maritime cargo from Argentina to Chile is
approximately 15 days.
279. Now let us take the hypothetical case of an e xporter who exports wheat or wheat flour from
the Gulf of Mexico area, the shipment arriving in Chile on 16 April. This exporter will find himself in
an even worse situation than the Argentinean exporter me ntioned above. A shipment from this area
will inevitably take longer to reach the Chilean por t than a shipment coming from Argentina. The
exporter in the Gulf of Mexico area will probably ha ve to make his shipment some time before 5
April in order for it to arrive at the same time as that of the Argentine exporter, i.e. 16 April. In these
circumstances, the Gulf of Mexico exporter will, at the very least, be unaware of a greater proportion
of the period for calculating the reference price on the basis of which he could have predicted the
amount of specific duties. It might also happen th at the Gulf of Mexico exporter exported his goods,
for example, on 26 March, that is to say, completely prior to the period for calculating the reference
prices (which, it should be recalled, extends from 27 March to 10 April). In this case, the exporter
will have absolutely no indication of, and no way of predicting, the amount of specific duties that
could be applied. Therefore, he will find himself in a situation even more disadvantageous than that
of the Argentinean exporter.
171
280. Thus, it has been shown that – under the amended PBS – it is perfectly possible for an
exporter of wheat or wheat flour not to know, and to be unable to predict, how much duty will be
payable when the shipment arrives at the customs office in Chile. Consequently, bearing in mind the
observations made by the Appellate Body in paragr aph 234 of its report, it is less likely that an
exporter will ship wheat or wheat flour to the Chilean market under these conditions.
281. Following the reasoning of the Appellate Body, th is lack of transparency and predictability
will also contribute to distorting the prices of imports by impeding the transmission of international
prices to the Chilean market. Thus, in lacking tr ansparency and predictab ility the PBS possesses the
additional features which, according to the Appellate Body, 172 undermine the object and purpose of
Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
282. In the light of the above, it can be stated, firstly, that the PBS fulfils the conditions necessary
for it be a measure in violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture within the terms of
footnote 1, since it contains a formula that makes the variability of duties automatic and continuous.
Secondly, the amended PBS possesses additional feat ures which undermine the object and purpose of
Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since it lacks the transparen cy and predictability necessary
for it to be possible to predict the level of duties that will result from its being applied.
283. As the Appellate Body observed, significant fo r traders are the lack of transparency; the
unpredictability of the level of duties; and the automaticity, the frequency, and the extent to which the
duties fluctuate since these charact eristics prevent enhanced market access for imports of agricultural
products, contrary to the object and purpose of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina
has shown that the amended PBS possesses every one of the features mentioned.
284. Consequently, the amended PBS is inc onsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture and is not an ordinary customs duty.

171 Without taking into account, moreover, the injury suffered by the Gulf of Mexico exporter in terms
of treatment less favourable than that received by the Argentine exporter.
172 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 234.

4. Conclusions concerning the inconsistency of the amended PBS with Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture
285. As has been shown, the amended PBS is a borde r measure similar to a "variable import levy"
and a "minimum import price" within the m eaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
286. This is because the way in which the system is designed and the way it operates in its overall
nature are sufficiently similar to the characteristi cs of these two categories of prohibited measures as
to make the amended PBS, with its particular characteristics, a "similar border measure".
287. The particular configuration and interaction of the specific characteristics of Chile's price
band system generate certain market access conditi ons that lack transparency and predictability and
disconnect the Chilean market from international pr ice trends in a way that insulates the Chilean
market from the transmission of international prices and prevents enhanced market access for imports
of wheat and wheat flour.
288. Consequently, since it falls within the categor ies of measures prohibited by footnote 1, the
amended PBS is not an ordinary cu stoms duty and hence is a measure in consistent with Article 4.2 of
the Agreement on Agriculture which may not be maintained, resorted to, or reverted to.
II. THE AMENDED PBS IS IN BREACH OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE II:1(B) OF THE GATT 1994
289. Argentina maintains that the amended PBS infri nges the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of
the GATT 1994, inasmuch as it constitutes "other duties or charges" not recorded in the appropriate
column of Chile's Schedule of concessions (No. VII).
290. Article II of the GATT 1994 states, in the sec ond sentence of paragraph 1(b), that the
products described in Part II of the Schedule relati ng to any contracting party, which are the products
of territories of other contracting parties, shall be "… exempt from all other duties or charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with the importation …" .
291. In its turn, paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the
GATT 1994 reads as follows:
"In order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from
paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature a nd level of any "other duties or charges"
levied on bound tariff items, as referred to in that provision, shall be recorded in the
Schedules of concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the tariff item to which they
apply …"
292. During the proceedings, Chile itself contended that "… the purpose of the second sentence of
Article II:1(b) and the Understanding on Article II:1(b) was to ensure that bindings on 'ordinary
customs duties' could not be circumvented by the creation of new types of duties or charges on
imports or by increasing existing 'other duties or charges'."
173 Argentina shares this view.
293. Insofar as the amended PBS is a border measur e similar to a variable import levy and a
minimum import price, it is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since it is a
measure other than an ordinary customs duty.

173 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 51.

294. Not being an ordinary customs duty, the ame nded PBS constitutes "other duties or charges"
not recorded in the appropriate column of Chile's Schedule of concessions (No. VII).
295. Therefore, if the amended PBS was not recorded but is nonetheless being levied,
174 it is in
breach of the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, pursuant to the Understanding on
the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.175
III. THE AMENDED PBS IS IN BREACH OF ARTICLE XVI:4 OF THE MARRAKESH
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
296. Paragraph 4 of Article XVI of the Agreemen t Establishing the World Trade Organization
reads as follows:
Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.
297. These annexed Agreements include both the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994.
298. As stated by the Appellate Body,
"… Moreover, as general context for all the covered agreements, Article XVI:4 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is of great
significance … This provision establishes a cl ear obligation for all WTO Members to
ensure the conformity of their existi ng laws, regulations, and administrative
procedures with the obligations in the covered agreements."176
299. As we have argued in the course of this doc ument, insofar as the amended PBS infringes both
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994, Chile has not ensured the conformity of its existing laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations under the covered Agreements.
300. Moreover, according to WTO case-law:
"As a general proposition, GATT acquis, confirmed in Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement and recent WTO panel reports, make abundantly clear that legislation as
such, independently from its application in specific cases, may breach GATT/WTO
obligations …" 177 (emphasis added).
301. Later, on the same subject, the Panel goes on to point out:
"… The three types of measures explicitly ma de subject to the obligations imposed in
the WTO agreements – 'laws, regulations and administrative procedures' – are
measures that are applicable generally; not measures taken necessarily in a specific
case or dispute. Article XVI:4, though not expanding the material obligations under

174 Chile – Price Band System, Report of the Panel, paragraph 7.107.
175 It should be noted that a panel established under Article 21.5 of the DSU can examine the
consistency of a measure intended to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB not only with the
provisions of the WTO Agreements invoked by the compla inant in the original proceedings but also with other
provisions that the complainant alleges for the first time in his Article 21.5 recourse. See Canada – Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 41.
176 EC – Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body, paragraph 213.
177 US – Sections 301-310, Report of the Panel, paragraph 7.41.

WTO agreements, expands the type of measures made subject to these
obligations."178
302. Likewise, the Panel noted that:
"Article XVI:4 goes a step further than Article 27 of the Vienna Convention.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention provid es that '"[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justifica tion for its failure to perform a treaty'.
Article XVI:4, in contrast, not only precl udes pleading conflicting internal law as a
justification for WTO inconsistencies, bu t requires WTO Members actually to ensure
the conformity of internal law with its WTO obligations".179
303. WTO case-law has also established that:
"… if a provision of an 'annexed Agreement' is breached, a violation of Article XVI:4
immediately occurs. GATT 1994 is one of the 'annexed Agreements' within the
meaning of Article XVI:4. Since we found that provisions of Article VI of the
GATT 1994 has been breached, we conclude th at, by violating this provision, the
United States violates Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement".
180
304. Thus, being inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the second
sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the am ended PBS is in breach of Article XVI:4 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization since, while it remains in force,
Chile is not ensuring the conformity of its laws, re gulations and administrati ve procedures with its
obligations under the WTO Agreements.
D. CONCLUSIONS
305. In light of the above, Argentina requests the Panel to find that Chile's Price Band System, as
amended by Law No. 19.897 and Supreme Decree No. 831/2003, per se and in its specific application
to imports of wheat and wheat flour:
 – Is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since it constitutes a
border measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price;

 – is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, since it
constitutes "other duties or charges" not reco rded in the appropriate column of Chile's
Schedule of concessions (No. VII);

 – is in breach of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Est ablishing the World
Trade Organization since, while it remains in force, Chile is not ensuring the
conformity of its laws, regulations and ad ministrative procedures with its obligations
under the WTO Agreements.

178 Ibid., paragraph 7.41(b), in fine.
179 Ibid., footnote 652.
180 US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, Report of the Panel, paragraph 6.287.

306. Consequently, Argentina respectfully request s the Panel to find that Chile has not
implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and is continuing to infringe its obligations
within the framework of the WTO.

TABLE OF REPORTS CITED

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel Report of the Appellate Body, Argentina – Measures Affecting
Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items,
WT/DS56/AB/R, adopted 22 April 2002.
Chile – Price Band System Report of the Panel, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R,
adopted 23 October 2002.
Chile – Price Band System Report of the Appellate Body, Chile – Price Band System and
Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products,
WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002.
EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) Report of the Panel, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties
on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by India, WT/DS141/RW, adopted 24 April
2003.
EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India, WT/DS141/AB/RW,
adopted 24 April 2003.
Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 –
Brazil)
Report of the Appellate Body, Canada – Measures Affecting the
Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the
DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 21 July 2000.
US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5
– Canada)
Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Final Countervailing
Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
WT/DS257/AB/RW, adopted 20 December 2005.
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil – Measures Affecting
Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997.
EC – Hormones Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February
1998.
US – Countervailing Measures on
Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 –
EC)
Final Report of the Panel, United States – Countervailing Measures
Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities,
WT/DS212/RW, adopted 27 September 2005.
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November
2001.

INTRODUCTION

1. Chile wishes to thank the members of the Pane l for the opportunity to state its case in this
dispute, prompted by Argentina's objection to th e measures adopted by Chil e to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter the "DSB").
2. The measures adopted in a timely and opportune manner by Chile were aimed at making the
necessary legal adjustments and Chile has therefore e liminated any inconsistency with Article 4.2 of
the Agreement on Agriculture and has fully implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings, as
will be shown in this submission.
3. To make the argument easier to follow, this subm ission is divided into five parts. The first
sets out the salient points of the case, including Argentina's claim and the Appellate Body's ruling.
4. The second part describes the measures implemente d by Chile in order to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings, namely Law No. 19.897 of 2003 and Chilean Ministry of
Finance Regulation No. 831 of 2003.
5. In the third part, Chile asserts and demonstrat es that Argentina may not bring certain issues
before this Panel since the proper time to rais e them was during the original proceedings and
Argentina failed to do so. Those issues are ther efore outside the terms of reference of this
Article 21.5 Panel. The fourth part sets out th e conclusions and recommendations of the DSB and
demonstrates how the changes under Law No. 19.897 fully comply with WTO requirements. As
further evidence, the final part of the submission demonstrates that, as a practical consequence of
changes to the system, there is no variable import levy or minimum import price, and there is no
measure similar to a variable import levy or to a minimum import price. The last two parts take up
Argentina's arguments and show how they fail, pointing out that they are, in many respects, inaccurate
and out of line with the conclusions and recommendations of the DSB.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Factual background
6. On 23 October 2002, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body
Report
1 in the dispute " Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products".
7. On 11 November 2002, Chile reported to the DS B that it required a reasonable period of time
to implement its recommendations and rulings. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, on
6 December 2002, Chile asked the DSB 2 to allow the determination of th is period to be the subject of
binding arbitration, in accordance with Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the "DSU").
8. On 17 March 2003, the award of the arbitrator 3 determined that the reasonable period of time
for Chile to implement the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB expired on 23 December 2003.
As of September 2003, Chile has submitted monthl y reports on progress in the implementation of the
DSB recommendations and rulings (September 20034, October 20035 and November 20036).

1 WT/DS207/AB/R.
2 WT/DS207/9.
3 WT/DS207/13.
4 WT/DS207/15.

9. On 24 December 2003, Argentina and Chile re ported to the DSB that an Understanding
regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of th e DSU with respect to this dispute had been
concluded.7
10. On 19 May 2004, Argentina requested consultations with Chile pursuant to paragraph 1 of the
Understanding between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile regarding procedures under
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU and Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994.8
11. On 29 December 2005, Argentina requested 9 that, if possible, this matter be submitted to the
original Panel with the standard terms of refe rence provided for in Article 7 of the DSU, in
accordance with the Understanding concluded betw een the two countries regarding procedures under
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU and Article 21.5 of the DSU, since there was disagreement as to the
existence or consistency with a covered agre ement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings [of the DSB].
12. Argentina requests that the Panel find that Chile has not taken measures to comply fully with
the DSB's rulings and recommendations of 23 October 2002. In particular, Argentina requests that the
Panel find that Chile's Price Band System (PBS ) is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture and the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and, hence, Article XVI:4 of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
2. Argentina's claims and allegations
13. On 19 April 2006, Argentina made its First Wr itten Submission in the Recourse by Argentina
to Article 21.5 of the DSU in " Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products ". In this submission, Argentina asserts that Chile has failed to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and continues in breach of its obligations as
a Member of the WTO.10
14. Argentina adds that the amendment to the law notified by Chile:11
• Is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , since it is a border
measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price;

• is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, since it
constitutes "other duties or charges" not recorded in the corresponding column of
Chile's Schedule of Concessions (No. VII); and,

• is in breach of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Est ablishing the World
Trade Organization since, while it remains in for ce, Chile is not ensuring the
conformity of its laws, regulations and ad ministrative procedures with its obligations
under the WTO Agreements.

5 WT/DS207/15/Add.1.
6 WT/DS207/15/Add.2.
7 WT/DS207/16.
8 WT/DS207/17.
9 WT/DS207/18.
10 Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina, paragraph 13.
11 Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina, paragraph 14.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY CHILE
1. Law No. 19.897 of 2003
15. On 25 September 2003, Chile published in the Official Journal Law No. 19.897
12 "amending
Article 12 of Law No. 18.525 and the Customs Tariff". The new Law, which entered into force on 16
December 2003, brought Chile's price band legislatio n into line with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings. The Law was supplemented by Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance 13
approving the implementing regulations for Article 12 of Law No. 18.525, as replaced by Article 1 of
Law No. 19.897 (hereinafter "the Regulations" or "Regulations of the Law").
16. As Chile has stated, all these implementation measures reflect the DSB's recommendations or
rulings both in form and in substance14 and thus constitute a measure which is WTO-consistent, and in
particular consistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
17. The relevant part of Article 1 of Law No . 19.897, which replaced Article 12 of Law
No. 18.525 on the importation of goods into the country, reads:
"Article 12.- Established hereunder are sp ecific duties in United States dollars per
tariff unit and rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the
Customs Tariff, which could affect the importation of wheat, wheat flour and sugar,
as stipulated in this Law.
The amount of these duties and rebates shall be established as provided for in this
Article by the President of the Republic, by way of a supreme decree issued by the
Chilean Ministry of Finance by order of the President of the Republic, six times for
wheat in the course of each twelve-month period extending from 16 December to
15 December of the following year, [...] in terms which, when applied to the price
levels attained by the products in ques tion on the international markets, allow
domestic market stability.
For the purpose of determining the duties and rebates up until the annual period
ending in 2007, the floor and ceiling prices for wheat [...], shall be considered in the
drafting of Chilean Ministry of Finance exempt decrees No. 266 [...], published in the
Official Journal of 16 May 2002, expressed in f.o.b. terms in United States dollars per
tonne. There shall be established, on the one hand, specific duties when the reference
price is below the floor price of US$128 for wheat [...], and, on the other hand,
rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the Customs
Tariff when the reference price is above the ceiling price of US$148 for wheat [...].
For the purpose of determining the duties and rebates as from the annual period
ending in 2008 and up to 2014, the floor and ceiling prices established in the previous
paragraph shall be adjusted annually by multiplying the values in force during the
previous annual period by a factor of 0.985 in the case of wheat. [...]. In 2014, the
President of the Republic shall evaluate the modalities and conditions of application
of the price band system, taking into cons ideration international market conditions,
the requirements of the industrial, produc tive and consumer sectors and Chile's trade
obligations at that date.

12 Exhibit CHL-1.
13 Exhibit CHL-2.
14 WT/DS207/15/Add.2.

The duties and rebates referred to in this Article shall correspond to the difference
between the floor or ceiling prices determin ed above and a f.o.b. reference price,
multiplied by a factor of one (1), plus the general ad valorem duty in force for these
products. The f.o.b. reference price sha ll consist of the average of the daily
international prices [...] recorded in th e most relevant markets over a period of
15 calendar days [...] reckoned from the da te fixed by the Regulations for each
decree.

The duties and rebates for wheat flour ar e based on those determined for wheat,
multiplied by a factor of 1.56.
The duties and rebates applicable to each import transaction shall be those in effect
on the date of the waybill of the vehicle transporting the goods in question.
The duties resulting from the application of this Article, added to the ad valorem
duty, shall not exceed the tariff rate bound by Chile under the World Trade
Organization for the goods referred to in paragraph 1, each import transaction being
considered individually and using the c. i.f. value of the goods concerned in the
transaction in question as a basis for calculation. The rebates established as a result of
the application of this Article shall in no circumstances exceed the amount
corresponding to the ad valorem duty payable on the importation of the goods. The
National Customs Service shall adopt th e measures necessary to enforce the
provisions of this paragraph.
The President of the Republic, by way of a supreme decree issued by the Chilean
Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Ministry of Agriculture, shall establish,
pursuant to this Article, the periods in wh ich specific duties and tariff rebates are to
be established and applied. Furthermore, the President shall establish the most
relevant markets for each product, the procedures and dates for calculating the
reference prices and other methodological factors necessary for the implementation of
this Article."

2. Operation of Law No. 19.897
18. The new Law applies to imports of wheat and wheat flour 15 and provides for the possibility of
(a) establishing the application of specific duties in United States dollars per tariff unit, or (b)
establishing rebates on the amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff.
Furthermore, Chilean legislati on provides for payment of the ad valorem duty alone, which currently
corresponds to six per cent of the value of the goods.16
19. The Chilean Executive, represented by the Presi dent of the Republic, is responsible for
establishing either such arrangement by means of a supreme decree issued and endorsed by the
Chilean Ministry of Finance by order of the President of the Republic. The Law requires the
administrative authority to determine the duties or rebates six times in the course of each twelve-
month period extending from 16 December to 15 December of the following year.

15 Law No. 19.897 also applies to imports of sugar, but the latter is not material to this dispute.
16 Payment of the ad valorem duty of six per cent is not provided for under price band legislation,
rather it is of general application, as established by Article 1 of Law No. 18.687.

3. Application of specific duties and rebates on amounts payable as ad valorem duties
20. Pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 19.897, th e authority granted to the Chilean Executive
permits it to establish, by means of a Chilean Mini stry of Finance decree, the application of specific
duties or rebates on the amount payable as ad valorem duties.
(a) Determination of specific duties
21. The Chilean Ministry of Finance decree establishes a specific duty consisting of an amount in
United States dollars per tariff unit (tonne) payable wh en the reference price established is less than
US$128 per tonne (or the price in effect in the annua l periods beginning with the one ending in 2008
and up until 2014).
22. The amount of specific duty established in eac h Chilean Ministry of Finance decree
corresponds to the difference between the f.o.b. pric e of US$128 (or the price in effect in the annual
periods beginning with the one ending in 2008 and up until 2014) and the reference price, also
expressed on a f.o.b. basis, multiplied by a factor of one (1), plus the general ad valorem duty (6%).
23. The specific duty plus the ad valorem duty must not exceed the tariff rate bound by Chile
under the World Trade Organization (31.5%), each im port transaction being considered individually
and using the c.i.f. value of the goods concer ned in the transaction in question as a basis for
calculation.
(b) Determination of rebates on amounts payable as ad valorem duties
24. The Chilean Ministry of Finance decree est ablishes a rebate on the amount payable as
ad valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff when the reference price is over US$148 per
tonne (or the price in effect in the annual peri ods beginning with the one ending in 2008 and up until
2014).
25. The rebates on amounts payable as ad valorem duties established in each Chilean Ministry of
Finance decree correspond to the diffe rence between the f.o.b. price of US$148 (or the price in effect
in the annual periods beginning with the one endi ng in 2008 and up until 2014) and the reference
price, also expressed on a f.o.b. basis, multiplied by a factor of one (1), plus the general ad valorem
duty (6%).
26. The rebate on the amount payable as ad valorem duties established for each import
transaction may not exceed the amount corresponding to the ad valorem duty established in the
existing Customs Tariff, calculated on the c.i.f. unit value of the goods.
(c) Wheat flour
27. In the case of wheat flour, Law No. 19.897 states that the applicable specific duty or rebate on
the amount payable as ad valorem duties established in each Chilean Ministry of Finance decree shall
be those determined for wheat, multiplied by a factor of 1.56.
(d) Determination of the reference values established under the Law
28. The prices US$128 and US$148 were the parameters defined by Chile for wheat when it was
required to amend its price band system in accord ance with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB. These prices will remain unchanged until the a nnual period ending in 20 07. As of the annual
period ending in 2008 and up until 2014, these amount s will be reduced on an annual basis by
multiplying the prices in force during the previous annual period by a factor of 0.985.

29. The floor and ceiling prices have therefore been established until 2014 as follows:
Table No. 117

Floor and ceiling prices for wheat, by period of validity
Period of validity Floor price Ceiling price
16.12.2003 to 15.12.2007 128 148
16.12.2007 to 15.12.2008 126 146
16.12.2008 to 15.12.2009 124 144
16.12.2009 to 15.12.2010 122 142
16.12.2010 to 15.12.2011 120 140
16.12.2011 to 15.12.2012 118 138
16.12.2012 to 15.12.2013 116 136
16.12.2013 to 15.12.2014 114 134

(e) Reference price
30. The reference price for determining both specifi c duties and rebates on the amount payable as
ad valorem duties is expressed as a f.o.b. value and consists of the average of the daily international
wheat prices recorded in the markets most relevant to Chile 18 over a period of 15 calendar days
counted backwards from the date set out in Regul ation No. 831 for each decree establishing specific
duties.
4. Regulations of Law No. 19.897
31. The final paragraph of Article 1 of Law No . 19.897 provides that the President of the
Republic, by way of a supreme decree issued by the Chilean Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the
Ministry of Agriculture, shall establish, pursuant to that Article, inter alia , the periods in which
specific duties and tariff rebates are to be established and applied.
32. Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Chilean Ministry of Finance 19, dated 26 September 2003 and
published in the Official Journal on 4 October 2003 , was issued under this provision and contains a
series of stipulations which reiterate and supplem ent those of the Law, thereby lending greater
transparency to the determination of the specific du ties or tariff rebates established in each Chilean
Ministry of Finance decree.
(a) Period of validity of each Chilean Ministry of Finance decree
33. The Regulations reiterate that all values applie d by Law No. 19.897, and provided for in the
Regulations thereto, are to be expressed on a f.o.b. basis in United States dollars. The Regulations
also sets out the period of validity of each Chilean Ministry of Finance decree establishing specific
duties or rebates on the amount payable as ad valorem duties, as follows:20
 – 16 December to 15 February;
 – 16 February to 15 April;
 – 16 April to 15 June;
 – 16 June to 15 August;
 – 16 August to 15 October; and

17 Article 6 of the Regulations of the Law.
18 The Regulations of the Law also establish the markets most relevant to Chile.
19 Exhibit CHL-2.
20 Article 5 of the Regulations of the Law.

 – 16 October to 15 December.

(b) Reference price
34. Further to Law No. 19.897, the Regulations
21 state that the reference price for wheat will
correspond to the average daily prices recorded in the most relevant markets over a period of 15
calendar days counted backwards from the tenth day of the month in which the decree is published.
(c) Most relevant market
35. Furthermore, the Regulations establish the most relevant markets for wheat in Chile and
provide that, during the application period extending from 16 December to 15 June of the following
year, the most relevant market will be that for Trigo pan argentino
22 and the prices will correspond to
the daily prices quoted for that product f.o.b. Argentine port . Likewise, during the application period
extending from 16 June to 15 December, the mo st relevant market will be that for soft red winter
wheat No. 2 and the prices will correspond to the daily prices quoted for that product f.o.b. Gulf of
Mexico.
(d) Date of application of duties and rebates
36. The Regulations 23 also provide that the specific duty or rebate on the amount payable as
ad valorem duties determined by the Chilean Ministry of Finance decree applicable to each import
transaction will be that in effect on the date of the waybill 24 of the vehicle transporting the goods in
question, that is to say, the date of importation of the goods.
(e) Limitations on the application of specific duties
37. Both Law No. 19.897 25 and its Regulations 26 establish limitations on the application of the
specific duty which the Chilean Ministry of Finance may set, and provide that specific duties, plus
ad valorem duties, must not exceed the tariff rate bound by Chile under the World Trade Organization
(31.5%), each import transaction being considered indi vidually and using the c.i.f. value of the goods
concerned in the transaction in question as a basis for calculation.
38. Both provisions add that Chile's National Customs Service shall adopt the necessary measures
to ensure compliance with this obligation.
(f) Summary of time-frames and relevant markets
39. An annex to the final part of the Regulations c ontains a summary of the periods of validity of
the Chilean Ministry of Finance decrees, the periods in which they must be issued, the periods to be
taken into consideration when calculating the refere nce price and the markets relevant to Chile for
each such decree, as follows:

21 Article 7 of the Regulations of the Law.
22 Note of the Secretariat: literal translation of this quality would be "Argentine bread wheat".
23 Article 17 of the Regulations of the Law.
24 In accordance with this same regulation, in the case of electronic filing, the waybill date will be taken
to be the date of actual acceptance of the vehicle and the goods will be considered to have been presented at the
same time, all pursuant to Article 37 of the Chilean Customs Ordinance.
25 Law No. 19.897, Article 1, paragraph 9.
26 Article 18 of the Regulations of the Law.

Reference price
calculation period
Decree publication
period
Period of validity
for specific duties or
rebates
Most relevant
market
26 November-10 December
27 January-10 February
27 March-10 April
27 May-10 June
27 July-10 August
26 September-10 October
11-15 December
11-15 February
11-15 April
11-15 June
11-15 August
11-15 October
16 December-15 February
16 February-15 April
16 April-15 June
16 June-15 August
16 August-15 October
16 October-5 December
Trigo pan argentino
Trigo pan argentino Trigo pan
argentino
Soft red winter wheat No.2
Soft red winter wheat No.2 Soft
red winter wheat No.2

5. Legality of taxation (Reserva Legal del Tributo)
40. Chilean legislation provides that taxes, incl uding Customs duties, may be established only by
a Congress-approved law, on the basis of what is known as the principle of legality of taxation
(reserva legal del tributo ). Because of this restriction on the Chilean Executive's authority to
establish Customs duties, the Chilean parliament en acted legislation – Law No. 19.897 – to provide
detailed specifications for and fully regulate the pr ocedure culminating in the issuance of a Chilean
Ministry of Finance decree establishing a specific duty or a rebate on the amount payable as
ad valorem duties.
41. Article 63.14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Chile
27 says:
Article 63. Only the following shall be matters of law:
(14) Other matters for which the Constitu tion indicates that the President of the
Republic has the exclusive power of initiative.
43. Article 65, paragraph 4, of the Constitution
28 states the following:
The President of the Republic shall also have the exclusive initiative for:
1. Imposing, eliminating, reducing or remitting taxes of any type or nature,
establishing exemptions or amending those in effect and determining their form,
proportionality or progression.
44. But application of the tax legality principle is not unqualified. Not all elements of taxation
have to be governed by statute, only those whic h are essential; for the remaining elements the Chilean
Executive has regulatory authority, albeit not unqualified authority. Although the law does not cover
the aspects of regulation that relate to procedural or formal matters specific to law enforcement, such
as place or date of payment, the tax must be dete rmined or determinable on the basis of its legal
origin, that is to say, the statute must either estab lish the tax obligation or set out criteria on which to
establish it.
45. Hence, although the former system for calcul ating price band duties and rebates was replaced
under the new Law by the issuance of Chilean Mi nistry of Finance decrees, the parameters for
establishing the duties remained, albeit duly amended. Although the specific duties and rebates on the
amount payable as ad valorem duties are presently established by a decree of the Chilean Ministry of
Finance and this authority could determine the leve l of domestic protection, even in accordance with
the aforementioned parameters, this is inadmissi ble under Chile's present legal system, since the
minimum constitutional parameters for determining the level of pr otection agreed by the economic
operators in the country must be maintained.

27 Exhibit CHL-3.
28 Exhibit CHL-4.

III. ARGENTINA'S CLAIMS IN RELATION TO THE SECOND SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE II:1(B) OF THE GATT 1994 AND THE FACTOR OF 1.56 APPLICABLE
TO WHEAT FLOUR ARE OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THIS
PANEL
1. Claim in relation to the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994
46. In both its request for the establishment of a Panel and its First Written Submission,
Argentina claims and tries to show that the am ended PBS is in breach of the second sentence of
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
29 As Argentina sees it, since the amended PBS is a border measure
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , it is a measure other than an ordinary
customs duty and therefore constitutes "other duties or charges" not recorded in the corresponding
column of Chile's Schedule of Concessions (No. V II); in other words, a measure inconsistent with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is automatically inconsistent with the second sentence of
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 in so far as the re spective Member has failed to include it in its
Schedule.
47. Notwithstanding the fact that Chile will demonstr ate that the regime in effect since the entry
into force of Law No. 19.897 is consistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and so is
not a measure that has to be converted into an or dinary customs duty, the Panel may not rule on this
claim by Argentina given that it falls outside its terms of reference.
48. This is in fact a claim which Argentina should have raised in the initial stages of this dispute.
Argentina, however, never questioned whether a measure contrary to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture could thereby be inconsistent with the s econd sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994, whereas it could have done so before the origin al Panel. On the contrary, Argentina claimed
throughout the original proceedings that the PBS was in breach of both Article 4.2 and the first
sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Even in the course of the proceedings before the
Appellate Body, when Chile rightly submitted that th e Panel had acted inconsis tently with Article 11
of the DSU by concluding that the PBS was inconsis tent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of
the GATT 1994, Argentina was unable to prove that it had raised (let alone pursued) a claim relating
to this second sentence. A review of paragraphs 155 and 162 and, in particular, 165 and 167 of the
Appellate Body report suffices to confirm that Argen tina did not in fact ever raise the claims it now
wishes to bring.
49. Argentina appears to use the analysis and conc lusions of the original Panel to support its
claim relating to the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. 30 However, the original
Panel's analysis and conclusion regarding the inc onsistency of the PBS with the second sentence of
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 were reversed by the Appellate Body31 and therefore do not stand.
50. Argentina wishes to raise at this late stage in the proceedings a claim which it could have
raised in the initial stages of the dispute, but did not. To entertain that claim now would seriously
affect Chile's due process rights and would subject a case warranting a full hearing to summary and
expedited proceedings.
51. It is useful to recall what was said in this respect in EC – Bed Linen (Ar ticle 21.5 – India) in
which India raised a claim it had made before the or iginal Panel, but had failed to pursue. This claim
was therefore dismissed and India did not appeal the finding.

29 Section II of the First Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina.
30 See footnote 173 to paragraph 295 of the First Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina.
31 Paragraph 288(a) of the Report of the Appellate Body.

52. In that dispute, the Article 21.5 Panel stated the following:
… a claim which, as a legal and practical ma tter, could have been raised and pursued
in the original dispute, but was not, cannot be raised on the same facts and legal
premises in an Article 21.5 proceeding to determine the existence or consistency of
measures taken to comply with the recommendation of the DSB in the original
dispute.32 (Emphasis added.)
53. That is to say, as the Panel itself stated, neither Article 21.5 of the DSU nor any other
provision entitles India to such a "second chance".33
54. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel, stating:
We conclude, therefore, that, in these Artic le 21.5 proceedings, India has raised the
same claim under Article 3.5 relating to "oth er factors" as it did in the original
proceedings. In doing so, India seeks to cha llenge an aspect of the original measure
which has not changed, and which the European Communities did not have to
change, in order to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings to make that
measure consistent with the European Communities' WTO obligations.
34
A complainant that, in an original proceeding, fails to establish a prima facie case
should not be given a "second chance" in an Article 21.5 proceeding, and thus be
treated more favourably than a complainant that did establish a prima facie case but,
ultimately, failed to prevail before the original panel, with the result that the panel did
not find the challenged measure to be inc onsistent with WTO obligations. Nor should
a defending party be subject to a second ch allenge of the measure found not to be
inconsistent with WTO obligations, mere ly because the complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case, as opposed to failing ultimately to persuade the original
panel.
35
55. The Panel Report in US – Countervailing Measures on Cert ain EC Products (Article 21.5 –
EC) stated that accepting the EC's claim (with regard to likelihood of injury) would amount to
providing it with "a second chance to raise a claim that it failed to ra ise in the original proceedings".36
The Panel was concerned that to allow such a possibility could undermine the principles of
fundamental fairness and due process, which would raise "serious issues regarding (the United States')
due process rights".37 It therefore concluded that the new cl aims by the EC were not properly before
the Panel.
56. In this dispute, we find ourselves in the very same situation: a claim which Argentina could
have raised and pursued in the original dispute, but failed to do so . Argentina has no right to such a
"second chance".

32 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Panel (WT/DS141/RW), paragraph 6.43.
33 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Panel (WT/DS141/RW), paragraph 6.43.
34 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS141/AB/RW),
paragraph 87.
35 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS141/AB/RW),
paragraph 96.
36 US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), Report of the Panel
(WT/DS212/RW), paragraph 7.74.
37 US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), Report of the Panel
(WT/DS212/RW), paragraph 7.76.

57. In view of these considerations, Chile respectfu lly requests that the Panel dismiss and refrain
from ruling on Argentina's claim alleging inconsiste ncy with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of
the GATT 1994, given that it is not properly before this Panel.
2. Claim in relation to the factor of 1.56
58. In Section I.C.2.6. of its First Written Submissi on, Argentina refers to the factor of 1.56
provided for under the PBS and applicable to the duti es and rebates determined for wheat in order to
calculate the duties and rebates applicable to wheat fl our. In the opinion of Argentina, this factor "is
not transparent and is insulating th e entry price for wheat flour from international price developments
to an even greater extent than that for wheat...".
38
59. The factor used to determine the duties and reba tes for wheat flour has been an element of the
Price Band System since 1993 39 and has, on several occasions, been brought into line with market
realities, the most recent such adjustment bei ng by means of Law No. 19.446, published in the
Official Journal on 8 February 1996 40, which set this factor at 1.56. That is to say, this factor was a
feature of the PBS which existed well before Argent ina challenged the system before the WTO at the
end of the year 2000.
60. However, although this factor had been in ex istence for almost a decade, Argentina never
questioned it as an element which made the PBS inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture or, for that matter, any other provision of the WTO Agreements. Quite simply no
mention is made of it in Argentina's submissions . Neither, therefore, was it the subject of a ruling by
either the original Panel or the Appellate Body. As a result, it did not form part of the DSB
recommendations and conclusions and Chile was not "obliged" to bring that aspect of the measure
into conformity with its WTO ob ligations, purely and simply because no such ruling of inconsistency
was ever made. In this respect, and in line with what the Appellate Body has stated on the matter,
Argentina may not in these proceedings raise a claim which should have been brought before the
Panel at the proper time.
61. The arguments and precedents mentioned in th e previous section are reproduced in full,
highlighting the conclusions of the Panel in the dispute US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC
Products (Article 21.5 – EC) , given that that dispute dealt precisely with the inadmissibility of
entertaining claims relating to aspects not of a "measu re taken to comply" but of the original measure,
and which were not raised in the original proceedings.
62. In this dispute, we once again find ourselves in the exact same situation: a claim which
Argentina could have raised and pursued in the original dispute, but failed to do so . Argentina has no
right to such a "second chance". To entertain this claim would mean challenging an aspect of the PBS
which was never analysed in the original pro ceedings – and in relation to which there was
consequently no finding of inconsistency (or of cons istency) forcing Chile to amend that particular
aspect of the PBS – and thus improperly limiting Chile 's due process rights. In other words, Chile
cannot be required to bring into conformity an aspect of the measure which was never found to be
inconsistent because Argentina, although it had the chance to claim inconsistency, failed to do so.

38 Paragraph 235 of the First Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina.
39 In paragraph 232 of its First Written Submission, Argentina mistakenly states that the factor in
question was established in Law No. 19.193 of 1997 and th at it was originally 1.31 (paragraph 233 of its First
Written Submission). In actual fact, this Law dates back to 1993 and the factor established was 1.41 (Exhibit
CHL-5).
40 Exhibit CHL-6.

63. In view of these considerations, Chile respectfu lly requests that the Panel dismiss and refrain
from ruling on the claim raised by Argentina relating to the factor of 1.56 used to determine the duties
or rebates for wheat flour, given that it is not properly before this Panel.
IV. THE CHANGES TO THE PRICE BANDS RENDER THEM CONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLE 4.2 OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
64. In this section, Chile will demonstrate that the amendments under Law No. 19.897 and its
Regulations are in keeping with the findings and conclusions of the Appellate Body and that Chile has
therefore complied with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body.
65. However, we will first address a particularly significant issue, namely the scope of the
Appellate Body's findings and conclusions.
1. Scope of the findings and conclusions of the Appellate Body
66. Argentina, in its First Written Submission, a ppears to read into the Appellate Body report
findings and conclusions where none exist. Furthe rmore, it seems to confu se certain concepts and
give equal weight to all obligations. For example, the lack of transparency and lack of predictability
in the level of duties, which the Appellate Bo dy states are features of variable import levies 41 and
therefore refer solely and exclusively to certain specific elements which existed under the Price Band
System, as will be discussed later on, and not to mere ly any feature, as argued by Argentina. In other
words, the conclusions of the Appellate Body cannot be broadly interpreted; quite the reverse, their
scope is restricted to what is clearly stated in its Report, otherwise the Member required to comply
would have no parameters for knowing what has to be implemented and how.
67. An analysis of the scope of the "measures taken to comply"
42 necessarily involves
examination of the recommendations and rulings cont ained in the original report(s) adopted by the
DSB.
68. In this context, the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada)
stated that "the first sentence of Article 21.5 is the express link between the "measures taken to
comply" and the recommendations and rulings of th e DSB. Accordingly, determining the scope of
"measures taken to comply" in any given case must also involve examination of the recommendations
and rulings contained in the original report(s) adopted by the DSB".43
69. Article 21.5 Panels must therefore necessarily examine the scope of the recommendations in
order to determine whether or not a Member h as complied with them. When conducting such an
examination, the Article 21.5 Panel must bear in mind the original terms of reference of both the
original Panel and the Appellate Body. 44 It will thus be able to identify the claims of both the

41 Paragraph 234 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
42 "Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather,
Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those "measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings"
of the DSB". Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS70/AB/RW,
paragraph 36.
43 US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), Report of the Appellate Body ,
WT/DS257/AB/RW, paragraph 68.
44 The Appellate Body in Brazil – Desiccated Coconut stated that " A panel's terms of reference are
important for two reasons. First, terms of reference fulfil an important due process objective -- they give the parties
and third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow them an
opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second, they establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the
precise claims at issue in the dispute", page 21.

complainant and the defendant, which can then either be upheld or dismissed, with a statement of the
reasons which led it to that particular conclusion.
70. When upholding (or dismissing) a claim, the Pa nel and the Appellate Body are required to
state the reasons which led them to do so. Often this means developing their own legal reasoning to
support their own findings and conclusions on the matter under their consideration.
45 That is to say,
they can uphold (or dismi ss) the claims, but for reasons or with arguments other than those adduced
by the complainant.
71. The recommendations and rulings of the DSB are precisely what constitutes a final
resolution to a dispute between the parties insofar as it b ears a relation to the particular claim and the
specific component of the measure. The Appellate Body has determined the following:
"We wish to recall that panel proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU are, as the
title of Article 21 states, part of the process of the " Surveillance of Implementation of
Recommendations and Rulings " of the DSB. This includes Appellate Body Reports.
To be sure, the right of WTO Members to have recourse to the DSU, including under
Article 21.5, must be respected. Even so, it must also be kept in mind that
Article 17.14 of the DSU provides not only th at Reports of the Appellate Body "shall
be" adopted by the DSB, by consensus, but also that such Reports "shall be ...
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute. ..." Thus, Appellate Body
Reports that are adopted by the DSB are, as Article 17.14 provides, "...
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute", and, therefore, must be treated
by the parties to a particular dispute as a final resolution to that dispute. In this regard,
we recall, too, that Article 3.3 of the DSU states that the "prompt settlement" of
disputes "is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO". 46 (Underlining
added.)
72. Thus, an adopted Appellate Body report must be treated as a final resolution to a dispute
between the parties.47 The Appellate Body based this conclu sion on Article 17.14 of the DSU, which
deals with the effect of adopted Appellate Body reports (as opposed to Panel reports). The relevant
part of Article 17.14 reads as follows:
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports
An Appellate Body report shall be adop ted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted
by the parties to the dispute unless the DS B decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to Members. This
adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their
views on an Appellate Body report. (Footnote omitted)
73. It follows that the conclusions of a Panel a nd/or the Appellate Body may not be broadly
interpreted; on the contrary, their scope must be restri cted to what is expressly stated in the report. An
express limitation is required on measures that ma y be subject to review in proceedings under

45 EC – Hormones , Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS48/AB/R, Footnote 74, paragraph 156, and
US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC) , Report of the Panel,
WT/DS212/RW, paragraph 123.
46 US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) , Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW,
paragraph 97.
47 The Appellate Body has stated that "All the same, in our view, an unappealed finding included in a
panel report that is adopted by the DSB must be treated as a final resolution to a dispute between the parties in
respect of the particular claim and the specific component of a measure that is the subject of that claim". EC –
Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS141/AB/RW, paragraph 93.

Article 21.5, namely "measures taken to comply w ith the recommendations and rulings of the DSB".
A Member's obligation is to comply with these, and not other, recommendations.
74. We are of the opinion that it is precisely such a final resolution to a dispute that establishes
the limitations on the claims that a Member may raise in Article 21.5 proceedings.
75. The Appellate Body has confirmed the existence of such limitations in several cases. It has in
fact affirmed that Article 21.5 Panels may not re-examine:
(a) Aspects of a new measure that were part of a previous measure that was the subject of
a dispute, and were found by the Appellate Body to be WTO-consistent ... and that
remain unchanged as part of the new measure".48
(b) Certain matters ("the particular claim and th e specific component of a measure that is
the subject of that claim") when the origin al Panel made findings in respect of these
matters and those findings were not appealed.49
76. Similarly, aspects of a measure that were not addressed by the DSB fall outside the scope of a
"measure taken to comply" in proceedings under Article 21.5.
77. The recommendations and rulings are therefore those which establish not only the framework
of compliance, but also the framework for possible Article 21.5 compliance review proceedings. This
does not mean that the Appellate Body's statement th at the "panel is not confined to examining the
"measures taken to comply" from the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances
that related to the measure that was th e subject of the original proceedings" 50 should be disregarded;
rather that, although the measure taken to comply co uld be analysed from a standpoint other than that
of the original Panel, the analysis must be b ased on the findings and conclusions of the original
proceedings.
78. Another important factor to be taken into c onsideration when disallowing the examination of
a new claim is due process rights. Unless there is precision as to what must be complied with, the
Member concerned will not know what is expected of it. In this case, to allow Argentina's argument
that the conclusions of the Appellate Body are to be interpreted in a broad and comprehensive manner
would give rise to generic and unspecific obligations and create uncertainty for Chile as to what it was
required to do within the reasonable period of ti me and expose it to censure for failing to take
measures which it was unaware it was required to adopt.
79. In this context, worthy of particular mention is the statement by the Article 21.5 Panel in US –
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products that allowing a new claim by a Member in
Article 21.5 proceedings may undermine the prin ciples of fundamental fairness and due process
because, in such instances, a substa ntive analysis of an original measure is not possible as these are
summary and expedited proceedings, there is no ne w period of time for compliance and the Member
would not have the opportunity to bring the measur e into conformity and would immediately risk
facing retaliation.51

48 US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW,
paragraph 89.
49 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), Report of the Appellate Body , WT/DS141/AB/RW,
paragraph 93.
50 Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS70/AB/RW,
paragraph 41.
51 US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), Report of the Panel ,
WT/DS212/RW, paragraphs 7.72-7.76.

80. The following example illustrates how Argen tina wishes to give the conclusions of the
Appellate Body a broad interpretation and a scope which do not correspond.
81. In paragraph 200 of its First Written Submission, Argentina transcribes two paragraphs of the
Appellate Body report (234 and 247) which, in its opinion, constitute grounds for claiming that any
lack of transparency leads to th e conclusion that the PBS is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture , because, says Argentina, the Appellate Body affirmed that "the lack of
transparency is preventing enhan ced market access for imports of agricultural products, contrary to
the object and purpose of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture".
52
82. An analysis of these paragraphs reveals, howev er, that what the Appellate Body stated was
quite different.
83. Paragraph 234 sets out the features of variable import levies, which include a lack of
transparency and a lack of predictability in the le vel of duties that will result from such measures.
However, such an analysis cannot stop there. That provision must, like all others, be read in context in
order to give meaning and a precise scope to the Re port and, in particular, to its conclusions and
recommendations. Thus, paragraph 247 of the Appellate Body Report is preceded by paragraph 246,
the relevant part of which reads:
Furthermore, we place considerable importance on the intransparent and
unpredictable way in which the "highest and lowest f.o.b. prices" that have been
selected are converted to a c.i.f. basis by adding "im port costs". As Chile concedes,
no published legislation or regulation set s out how these "import costs" are
calculated. (Footnote omitted.)
84. Therefore, paragraph 247, which begins by stating that "In addition to the lack of
transparency and the lack of predictability that are inherent in how Chile's price bands are
established, ...", necessarily refers to the conversion to a c.i.f. basis, plus import costs, of f.o.b. prices
and to the fact that there was no legislation or regulation indicating how to calculate those import
costs.
85. Moreover, Argentina omits the phrase "the reference price" from its transcription of
paragraph 247. What is the significance of that phrase? It limits the issue the Appellate Body takes in
the following paragraphs with the lack of transparen cy and predictability to that particular aspect of
the PBS in force at that time.
86. Finally, paragraph 258 of the Appella te Body Report, cited by Argentina 53, is instructive. In
full, it reads:
Moreover, contrary to what Chile argues, Chile's price band system is not necessarily
less trade-distorting. Nor does it insulate Chile's domestic market less than it would, if
Chile simply imposed duties at the bound tariff level of 31.5 per cent. As Argentina
stresses, the amount of a duty is not the only concern of Chile's trading partners. As
Argentina argues, significant for traders, also , are the lack of transparency of certain

features of Chile's price band system; the unpredictability of the level of duties; and
the automaticity, the frequency, and the exte nt to which the duties fluctuate. These
specific characteristics of Chile's price band system prevent enhanced market access
for imports of agricultural products, contrary to the object and purpose of Article 4.
(Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)

52 First Written Submission by the Republic of Argentina, paragraph 201.
53 First Written Submission of Argentina, paragraph 201.

87. That is to say, Argentina itself recognizes that th e lack of transparency is not general, but
pertains to certain characteristics, and the Appella te Body confirms that only specific characteristics
of the PBS are concerned.
88. Chile will demonstrate that the Appellate Body identified specific aspects of the PBS that
made the system a measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price. These
were the only aspects on which Chile was required to take action, as will be shown further on. The
above is without prejudice to the fact that, in Section V of this submission, it will also be
demonstrated that the amendments introduced do not have the effects that Argentina alleges and
which underlie its claim that the PBS continues to be inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement
on Agriculture.
2. Appellate Body analysis and Law 19.897 and its regulations
89. In view of the foregoing, Chile proposes to revi ew the conclusions of the Appellate Body as
set out in the latter's Report and not as construed by Argentina, and to compare them with the changes
introduced in Law 19.897 and its Regulations, thereb y demonstrating that Chile has complied, both in
form and in substance, with these conclusions.
(a) Variable import duties
90. In examining the ordinary meaning of the te rm, the Appellate Body notes that a "variable
levy" is an "import" duty, tax or charge (where it is assessed upon importation) and is liable to vary. 54
Variability alone is not conclusive, however, since an ordinary customs duty may also vary
periodically, provided that the changed rates remain below the tariff rates bound in the Member's
Schedule.
55
91. Thus, in the Appellate Body's view, the mere fact that an import duty can be varied cannot,
alone, bring that duty within the cat egory of "variable import levies" for the purposes of footnote 1.
At least one feature of "variable import levies" is the fact that the measure itself – as a mechanism –
must impose the variability of the duties. According to the Appellate Body, variability is inherent in a
measure if the measure incorporates a scheme or fo rmula that causes and ensures that levies change
automatically and continuously. Ordinary customs du ties, by contrast, are subject to discrete changes
in applied tariff rates that occur independently and unrelated to such an underlying scheme or
formula.
56
92. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the Appe llate Body's analysis is that the changes
introduced by Chile have put an end to the variability of the duties. Under the PBS structure in effect
until December 2003, specific duties were establis hed and varied automati cally and continuously
without legislative or administrative action being requ ired to fix them. In practical terms, the decree
setting the band and the specific duties (or rebates) to be applied using a given reference price was
issued for one year. The duty (or rebate, or neither of the two) was applied once the reference price,
established on a weekly basis, had been set. Two simultaneous transactions could therefore be subject
to different duties.
93. Under Law 19.897, however, a specific duty (or reba te, or neither) is fixed by legal directive
in the form of a decree issued by the Ministry of Finance and remains unchanged for two months,
during which the duty applies on all import transacti ons, without the slightest variation and regardless
of the transaction value, until it is changed or cancelled by a more recent administrative act.

54 Para. 232 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
55 Report of the Appellate Body in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, footnote 56, para. 46.
56 Para. 233 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

94. Argentina's Exhibit ARG 6 makes it easier to understand the above in that it shows the
specific duty applicable during the entire life of every decree issued by the Ministry of Finance.
95. The Appellate Body having noted that "the presence of a formula causing automatic and
continuous variability of duties is a necessary [...] c ondition for a particular measure to be a 'variable
import levy' within the meaning of footnote 1",
57 the fact that variability has been eliminated – to use
the Appellate Body's own words – in Law 19.897 m eans that this measure cannot be one of the
prohibited measures listed in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
96. We propose to set aside this analysis for the time being and focus on the second part of
paragraph 234, which states that even though auto matic and continuous variability of duties is a
necessary condition, it is "by no means a sufficient " one to conclude that a particular measure is a
"variable import levy". It should be emphasi zed that while part of Argentina's argument 58 relies on
this very paragraph, it disregards the phrase " but by no means a sufficient", thereby seeking to
challenge Chile's PBS on the claim of variability alone.
97. Since variability is a condition that is necessary but not sufficient, the Appellate Body
observes in paragraph 234 that variable import le vies have additional features, including lack of
transparency and lack of predictability in the level of duties that will result from such measures .
These are the features that are liable to restrict the volume of imports and also contribute to distortion
of the prices of imports by impeding the transmission of international prices to the domestic market.
98. This finding is of signal importance because it makes it easier to discern the logic behind the
Appellate Body's conclusion that the PBS in eff ect until December 2003 was a measure similar to a
variable import levy and a minimum import price. There are only two additional features: lack of
transparency and lack of predictability. On th is premise, the Appellate Body analyses a limited
number of features of the PBS in effect at the time. There is thus no overall lack of transparency or
predictability as Argentina makes out in its First Written Submission.
99. For the sake of clarity, it should be emphasized th at at the time of the original proceedings,
Argentina itself highlighted the fact that "significan t" ... "are the lack of transparency of certain

features of Chile's price band system" 59 (emphasis added), which confirms our earlier point that the
objection is not to some generalized lack of tran sparency. This was the understanding of the Panel
and the Appellate Body in focusing their analyses on certain features found to lack transparency.
100. The foregoing also shows how the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB should be
implemented and facilitates appreciation of some of th e errors of interpretation made by Argentina.
The fact that world prices are not transmitted to the domestic market, for example, may be a
consequence of the two features singled out by the Appellate Body, but it does not constitute a third
feature, as Argentina appears to contend. Argentin a likewise mistakenly claims that fixed floor and
ceiling levels and fixed coefficients for lowering floo r and ceiling levels in and of themselves insulate
Chile's market from international price developments – in so doing apparently implying that such
elements might be challenged per se. In fact, the Appellate Body's view is that insulation may result
from lack of transparency and predictability, but it does not constitute a feature challengeable as such
that could, on its own, lead to a finding of inconsistency.

57 Para. 234 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
58 Section C.3.1(a), (b) and (c) of the First Written Submission of Argentina.
59 Para. 258 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

(b) Minimum Import Prices
101. According to the Appellate Body, minimum import prices are not very different from variable
levies, except that their mode of operation is less complicated. The main difference between the two
is that variable levies are "generally based on the difference between the governmentally determined
threshold and the lowest world market offer price for the product concerned, while minimum import
price schemes generally operate in relation to the actual transaction value of the imports".60
102. Thus, variability is the difference between th e governmentally determined threshold and the
actual transaction value, which will differ from one transaction to another and will hence change the
duty without any legislative or administrative action.
103. A simple glance at the charts presented by Ar gentina shows how the specific duties remained
constant and made it impossible to maintain a mi nimum import price for the duration of Law 19.897
and its Regulations.
(c) Measure similar to a "variable import levy" and/or a "minimum import price"
104. After addressing the issue of variable import levies and minimum import prices, the Appellate
Body turns to an analysis of whether Chile's pric e band system is a border measure similar to such
measures. For the Appellate Body, it is a matter of determining whether Chile's price band system—
in its particular features—shares sufficient features with these two categories of prohibited measures
to resemble, or "be of the same nature or kind" and, thus, to be prohibited by Article 4.2.
61
105. The Appellate Body's first finding 62 concurs with that of the Panel that the PBS was a
measure similar to variable levies or minimum taxes ( impuestos mínimos), but in its view the Panel
placed too much emphasis on whether or not Chile's price bands were related to domestic target prices
or domestic market prices. According to the Appe llate Body, even though the bands were set in the
same way as had been done until December 2003, th e PBS could still impede the transmission of
international price developments to the domestic market (in a way similar to that of other categories
of prohibited measures listed in footnote 1).
106. To assess Chile's price bands, the Appellate Body therefore considers factors other than world
market prices, as reasoned below.
107. The prices that represent the highest 25 per cent as well as the lowest 25 per cent of the world
prices from the past five years are discarded in selec ting the "highest and lowest f.o.b. prices" for the
determination of Chile's annual price bands. The Appellate Body also places considerable importance
on the intransparent and unpredictable way in which th e "highest and lowest f.o.b. prices" selected are
converted to a c.i.f. basis by adding "import costs" . As Chile has conceded, no published legislation
or regulation sets out how these "import costs" are calculated.63
108. With the entry into force of Law No. 19.897, Chile abolished the calculation formula that
included discarding the highest 25 per cent as well as the lowest 25 per cent of world prices over the
past five years, while maintaining the values in effect in 2003 until 2007, gr adually reducing the level
of protection from 2007 onwards and culminating with the application of duties or rebates in 2014.

60 Para. 237 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
61 Para. 239 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
62 Para. 246 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
63 Para. 246 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

109. Pursuant to this Law, all prices are set as f.o. b., meaning that today there is no price or value
that converts an f.o.b. price to a c.i.f. basis, and it is no longer necessary to add "import costs", which
makes the system a great deal more transparent.
110. Chile has thus taken due account of the observations made by the Appellate Body.
111. The Appellate Body then turns to the "similar shortcomings" in the wa y in which reference
prices are determined
64 (in terms of lack of transparency and predictability 65) and specifically the fact
that reference prices are set on a weekly basis a nd in a manner that is neither transparent nor
predictable.
 (a) Setting of reference prices on a weekly basis and in a manner that is neither
transparent nor predictable. Addressed in paragraphs 247 and 2 51 of the Appellate
Body's Report.66

112. The Appellate Body notes that, under the PB S applied up to December 2003, when a
shipment arrived in the country the customs ag ent was required to (a) ascertain the date of
embarkation of the goods, (b) check the weekly refe rence price set for that date by the National
Customs Service, and (c) using that price, check the year's list of f.o.b. prices in order to select the
relevant specific duty. Two consignments arriving on the same day but subject to different reference
prices on account of the date on which they were shipped would be charged different specific duties.
113. Moreover, the price determined by Customs w as the lowest f.o.b. price observed in any
market of concern, which was not specified, mean ing that the reference price could even further
disconnect Chile from world market prices.
114. With the entry into force of Law No. 19.897, the reference price ceased to constitute one of
the elements needed by importers to ascertain the amount of duty payable upon import. As explained
earlier, the duty payable upon import is established by decree issued by the Ministry of Finance and
applies to all imports for as long as the decree in question remains in force.
 (b) The price used to set the weekly referen ce price was the lowest relevant f.o.b. price
observed, at the time of embarkation, in th e foreign "markets of concern" to Chile for
"qualities of products actually liable to be im ported to Chile". No Chilean legislation
or regulation specifies how the internationa l "markets of concern" and the "qualities
of concern" are selected ". As a result, the process of selecting the reference price is
neither transparent nor predictable for traders.67

115. Today, the mechanism for calculating the reference price is set forth in the Regulations, as are
the most relevant markets to be considered. The Re gulations stipulate that the most relevant markets
are "Trigo pan argentino" for the period 16 December to 15 June of the following year and " Soft Red
Winter No. 2 " wheat for the period 16 June to 15 Decemb er. The reference price will correspond to
the average daily prices recorded in those markets (f.o.b., Argentine port and f.o.b., Gulf of Mexico
port, respectively) over a period of 15 days counted back from the 10 th day of the month in which the

64 Para. 247 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
65 Section V explains why lack of predictability in the determination of duties and rebates was a major
shortcoming in the Appellate Body's view.
66 " ... Chile's weekly reference prices––is liable to distort—if not disconnect—that transmission (of world
market prices to Chile's market) by virtue of the way it is determined on a weekly basis" (emphasis and parenthesis
added).
67 Para. 249 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

relevant decree is published. 68 69 Chile has therefore taken due account of the Appellate Body's
observation.
 (c) "Moreover, unlike with the five-year average monthly prices used in the calculation
of Chile's annual price bands, the lowest "m arket of concern" price used to determine
the weekly reference price is not adjust ed for "import costs", and thus is not
converted from an f.o.b. basis to a c.i.f. basis". 70 Therefore, the way in which the
weekly reference prices are determined contributes to giving the PBS the effect of
impeding the transmission of international price developments to Chile's market.

116. Our first comment is that this account of how the reference prices were determined (also
explained in paragraph 26 of the Appellate Body's Re port) is wrong, since all prices (both those used
to calculate the bands and those used to determine the reference prices) were converted to c.i.f. prices.
The error probably stems from the fact that the a nnual decrees issued by the Ministry of Finance
(publishing the specific duties and rebates) included pr ices f.o.b. (prior to conversion) so as to make it
easier to apply the duties for each shipment, beca use the market prices used as a reference are
expressed in f.o.b. terms.
117. Without prejudice to the above, as a result of the changes introduced in 2003 all values used
are expressed in f.o.b. terms, that is, the reference prices are not converted to a c.i.f. basis. Thus, at no
stage is it possible to inflate or increase the amount of the specific duties, so the transmission of
international price developments to the domestic market is not impeded as the Appellate Body asserts.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE REGIME IN EFFECT UNDER LAW NO. 19.897
AND ITS REGULATIONS
118. The Report of the Appellate Body notes that the PBS in effect until 2003 was a measure
similar to a minimum import price and a variable import duty and was hence WTO-inconsistent.
119. As we understand it, the Appellate Body notes in its Report that the PBS was similar to a
minimum import price or a variable import duty, depending on the behaviour of domestic market
prices. The Appellate Body's reasoning is that in some way a minimum entry price for the product is
maintained in one way or another, whether (a) by imposing a minimum price, (b) by applying variable
duties to obtain the minimum price, or (c) both.
120. In the following section, Chile will demonstrat e that it applies neither a minimum import
price nor a variable import duty, since it does not main tain a domestic price for the products at issue,
and that, on the contrary, Law 19.897 ensures that international prices are transmitted to the domestic
market. It will also address Argentina's arguments concerning the overcompensation which it claims
was generated by the PBS and is still being generate d by the above Law. It will, moreover, provide
evidence that market access conditions in Chile improved as of December 2003.
1. Chile does not apply a minimum entry price
121. The parameters used for calculating the duties and rebates laid down in the Law are as
follows: Floor, ceiling and reference price ar e at f.o.b. level, in dollars per tonne.
71 The fact that
parameters have been changed to f.o.b. prices shows that the floor and ceiling values constitute
neither a minimum entry price nor a similar measure.

68 See Annex to Decree 831/2003.
69 Section V.4 explains why both are most relevant markets.
70 Para. 250 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
71 Article 1, Law No. 19.897 (Exhibit CHL 1).

122. Although Argentina's submission seeks to demonstrate the opposite,
72 in the normal course of
international trade fob. prices, which are the unit values for exported goods at the port of origin, are
always lower than c.i.f. prices, which are the unit values for imported goods at the port of destination,
for the same trade transaction. The difference betwee n the f.o.b. price and the c.i.f. price in a trade
transaction is that the latter also includes at least freight and transport insurance charges.
123. Under the PBS, the price band values were determined as import costs, the figures being
perfectly comparable to domestic transaction prices. In practice, the decision of wheat processors or
buyers as to where to purchase their wheat grain – from domestic producers or from importers –
depends on who offers the lowest price. This be ing customary (and reasonable) market practice, the
assertion that the PBS was intended to sustain the fl oor price is understandable, since the latter was
expressed as an import cost.
124. Under the Law, the floor and ceiling values are me rely parameters of a mathematical process,
and no trader could assume these to be expected values for domestic transactions.
125. The reference price, which is the other paramete r in the calculation process, is also expressed
in f.o.b. terms and is not directly comparable to the c.i.f. price, the entry cost, or the domestic price.
126. As the floor and the reference price are variab les expressed at f.o.b. level, the purpose of
calculating specific duties is obviously not to maintain an entry price; since neither the floor price nor
the reference price at any given point in time can be higher than, or equal to, the c.i.f. price for a
specified trade transaction.
127. This becomes even clearer in the light of the application mechanism. Any specific duties or
rebates that may be determined have a period of validity of two consecutive months, during which all
imports are subject either to the same specific duty or to a rebate, or to neither of the two.
128. The above is illustrated by the chart subm itted by Argentina as Exhibit ARG-12, which
provides a calculation of the entry price of wheat into Chile on the basis of f.o.b. prices. Over most of
the period covered by the chart – i.e. November 2004 to April 2005 – the f.o.b. price is below, and the
entry price lies above, the floor price.
129. This chart prompts two important comments. The first is that with this information Argentina
confirms that the floor price is not comparable to the entry price, given the different cost components
of importation.
130. Using the same data as those supplied by Argentina
73 – for the period 1 November 2004 to
29 April 2005 – we can see that the sum of the f.o.b. prices plus the specific duties, over the only four-
month period in which they were applied, is belo w the f.o.b. floor price for 46% of the 81 days
covered by Argentina. In other words, the eviden ce shows that it is impossible to maintain the floor
price. The following examples, based on the data from Argentina's exhibits, serve to illustrate the
above.

72 Paras. 99 to 124 of the First Written Submission of Argentina.
73 Strictly speaking, this calcula tion is based on the data from Ta ble ARG-11 adjust ed according to
those from Table ARG-16. According to the official so urce (SAGPyA), some of the data in Table ARG-11 are
incorrect. This does not affect the conclusions to be drawn from the ARG-12 chart, however.

 Example 1 Example 2
Date 20 January 2005 10 February 2005
 f.o.b. value (106) +
specific duty (7.82)
= 113.82
f.o.b. value (107) +
specific duty (14.3)
= 121.3
Band floor price 128 128
UNDERESTIMATION
by

US$14.18/tonne

US$6.7/tonne

131. The second and perhaps most important comment is that the entry price calculated by
Argentina behaves in a manner very similar to that of the f.o.b. price, which would suggest that
international price trends and variations are being transmitted to Chile's home market.
132. The data from Argentina's Exhibit ARG-12 alone lead to the conclusion that the floor price is
not a minimum entry price and that there is transmission of international prices or a connection
between the domestic and the international market.
2. Chile does not apply a variable import duty
133. The above demonstration that the floor price and the regime as a whole are neither similar nor
equivalent to a minimum import price (and hence are not inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture) therefore clearly shows that specific duties cannot constitute a variable
levy, as their purpose is not to sustain prices – whether entry prices, c.i.f. prices or domestic market
prices.
134. As the Appellate Body notes, the mere fact that a levy is variable does not mean that it is a
"variable import levy" (irrespective of the premis e that variability is by no means a sufficient
condition for a measure to be a variable import levy
74). A simple example suffices as a
demonstration. Indeed, it would be impossible to interpret the lowering of Chile's (MFN) general
ad valorem tariff between 1984 and 2003, under the country 's gradual trade liberalization policy, as
the application of a variable levy.
135. The table below lists the dates on which changes were made to Chile's ad valorem tariff,
lowered from 35% in 1984 to 6% from 2003 to date.
Chile: Development/MFN Tariff
Date MFN tariff (%)
22/09/1984 35
01/03/1985 30
29/06/1985 20
08/01/1988 15
25/07/1988 11
01/01/1999 10
01/01/2000 9
01/01/2001 8
01/01/2002 7
01/01/2003 6

74 Para. 234 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

136. The average rate of duty for the above period, cal culated solely on the basis of the data in the
table, was 15.1% with a standard deviation of 10.1, which means a coefficient of variation (or average
fluctuation – to use Argentina's words in its report
75) of 67%. The question that therefore needs to be
answered is whether Chile's general duty constitutes a variable levy under the WTO.
137. The obvious reply is no, which implies that this analysis – like the one regarding the
variability of duties 76 in Argentina's report, raises two problems – one of methodology and the other
of interpretation. In the latter case, as mentioned earlier, the fact of having a duty which varies, or has
varied, may be a necessary but is not a sufficient condition to affirm that such a duty qualifies as a
variable levy. As regards met hodology, the statistics calculated 77 are merely measures of dispersion
to show the distribution of sample data according to the mean (average). In other words, they serve to
illustrate the statistical distribution of a set of va lues but by no means to prove that the duties are
variable levies, as Argentina seeks to establish.
138. Although there is no WTO definition of the term 'variable duty', as the Appellate Body notes
in paragraph 229 of its Report, it is possible to offer a few economic interpretations.
139. A variable duty may be the kind of duty which is used to sustain a domestic or a minimum
entry price, as can be deduced from the Appellate Body's Report, and the characteristic of which
would be to gradually "adjust", with greater or lesser regularity, so as to prevent a decline in domestic
prices or even to raise them.
140. It should be pointed out that a calculation fo rmula is neither necessary nor sufficient to
achieve this, because the desired outcome would be secured regardless of whether or not application
was automatic.
141. Variable duties directly affect trade relati ons, altering relative prices (relationship between
domestic market prices and international market pr ices) in addition to the effects resulting from the
application of ordinary duties.
142. If the objective was to maintain a price level, the alteration would imply a permanent change
in relative prices in order to prevent domestic ma rket conditions from varying (price level) in the
event of a change in external or import prices prior to entry. Conversely, if the duties ensure that
relative prices remain stable, this means that the border measure allows external variations to be
transmitted to the domestic market, albeit to a different extent. That is to say, if international prices
rise so do domestic prices, and if the former decline, so will the latter.
143. In Chile today, the mere fact that the duties and rebates, or the non-application thereof, are
established for a sufficiently long period of time provid es certainty that any variations in international
prices that may occur over this period will be transmitted to domestic wheat prices.
144. Thus, the conclusion is that, if the floor price is not a minimum price, if the specific duties
and their method of application do not continuously entail import price corrections and if import
prices, as Argentina shows in Exhibits ARG-11 and ARG-12, follow a pattern similar to that of the
f.o.b. price of wheat, Chile's wheat import duties – even if they do undergo variations – do not
constitute a variable duty within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

75 Para. 254 of Argentina's first Submission.
76 Section C.I.3 of Argentina's first Submission.
77 Standard deviation is an absolute measure of dispersion, expressed in the same units of measurement
as the sample data. The coefficient of variation is a relative measure of dispersion relating standard deviation
and mean, and expressing standard deviation as a percentage of the mean.

3. Law No. 19.897 allows an effective transmission of price variations
145. Although arguments have already been put fo rward demonstrating the connection of the
domestic wheat market to the world market, a few questions need to be clarified so as to provide more
backing for the analysis.
146. In economic terms, price transmission from extern al markets to domestic or local markets is
understood to occur when the latter reflect intern ational market behaviour . In trade barrier-free
markets, domestic prices should evolve in tandem w ith external prices, albeit to a different degree
because of transfer, insurance and other costs invol ved in shipping the product from abroad to the
same location as that of the domestic product. In other words, domestic prices are higher than
international prices, but they exhibit similar behaviour.
147. In markets facing trade barriers, that is, ordi nary customs duties – whether calculated as a
percentage or set in a fixed amount – the situati on is the same, the duties constituting added costs to
trade.
148. The application of ordinary customs duties do es not ultimately affect the local market's
connection to the international market in term s of behaviour, but it does alter relative prices by
generating an increase in domestic prices that would not have occurred had the duties not been levied.
149. As regards the PBS, it has been argued that th e method used to calculate the floor and ceiling
prices on the basis of a time series of international prices prevented the market from being
disconnected from international price trends. True as this may be, the argument in question referred
solely to the band values and not to what happene d in the day-to-day course of trade and in the
domestic market over the year-long period in which they were applied.
150. The levying of specific duties on a weekly basis (52 times a year) made it possible to
compensate in the actual course of business for differences between transaction values and the floor
price, so that any ups and downs occurring in the tr ansactions were not able to be transmitted to the
domestic market.
151. Under the PBS, the volume of trading neither re flected all the benefits deriving from falls in
international prices nor was it affected by the cont ractions resulting from price increases: there was
one import price and the difference lay in the amount of the duties.
152. This is no longer the case today because the duty or rebate, or the non-application thereof,
operates in such a way as to allow the transmission of international price variations to the domestic
market. That is to say, once the duty has been fixe d, traders can capture the benefits of decreases in
international prices, because changes in world prices do not affect the duty that they are required to
pay.
153. It is the current implementation of Chile's wheat policy that allows this happen, as Argentina
shows on the basis of its own figures . The existence of pre-established floor and ceiling prices does
not alter the situation, basically because these ar e simply parameters that contribute to the
determination of duties, rebates, or the non-application thereof.
154. The graph below shows the trends in Chilean wheat prices and in f.o.b. prices of Trigo pan
argentino from January 2004 to February 2006. The pri ce curves indicate that, first, Chilean wheat
prices have varied and, second, the variation is ve ry similar to that of export prices of Argentine
wheat, confirming the connection of Chilean wheat prices to the international grain market.

155. This graph is an exact illustration of the points made by Argentina in Exhibit ARG-11, with
the series of f.o.b., c.i.f. and c.i.f.-plus-duties pr ices, and in Exhibit ARG-12, which shows the prices
in graph form. What clearly emerges is that the en try price of wheat exhibits the same behaviour as
its f.o.b. price, which demonstrates price tran smission and therefore the connection between the
Chilean and the international market.
4. Predictability in the assessment of duties and rebates
156. Specific duties and duty rebates are currently established by decree of the Minister of
Finance. As both the ad valorem duty and the floor and ceiling pri ces are known and fixed, only the
reference price needs to be obtained in order to de termine the amount of a specific duty or rebate, or
the non-application thereof.
157. The reference price currently results from a calculation of the average of wheat prices
recorded in known, public and relevant internatio nal markets, such as those of Argentina and the
United States; these prices are random variables that change every day and over the course of each
day, according to the behaviour of buyers and sellers in the market.
158. As those of most commodities, moreover, these prices display features that are typical of
continuous series of random data, including cycles, trends and s easonality. Although this may appear
complex, it is a matter of course for traders and the market in general.
159. In the case of wheat, for instance, seasonality affects market prices because harvesting is
concentrated over a short period of time, whereas grain utilization extends over a longer period. The
price of Argentine wheat normally declines betwee n December and February of each crop year and
begins to rise as supply contracts. In the case of the United States, harvesting is from May to July,
which is the time when prices are lowest.
160. The United States and Argentina both have comm odity exchanges for trading in financial
derivatives on wheat,
78 which include at least futures contracts. The prices under such contracts are
set for different transaction periods, including for sev eral months ahead (more than one year). For

78 For example, the United States' Chicago and Argentina's Rosario exchanges.
Domestic and International Prices of Wheat
(US$/tonne)
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
2004 2005 2006
Bread wheat, f.o.b. Argentine port Wheat, wholesale price

futures contracts, every closing quotation reflects what "the market" expects will happen to the price
of the commodity in question. Su ch transactions yield price data showing anticipated market trends
for different (specific) months, which normally include the current and the following marketing
season.
161. It is practically impossible for wheat traders not to know or not to use such information in
order to conduct their businesses, as Argentina appears to contend in its submission.79
162. Therefore, what is necessary in order to fo resee the amount of the specific duty is a wheat
trader's own skills in predicting prices and negotia ting sales or purchases. Hence, the specific duties
are just as predictable as the price of Argentine or United States wheat.
163. In practice, a great many grain transactions that provide for deferred delivery of the
commodity rely on futures markets prices as the ne gotiating basis, in conjunction with the trader's
own assessment of the course that prices are taking. In other words, traders have information that
enables them to predict wheat price levels in the short and medium terms, and hence information to
foresee the level of specific duties that might be levied on wheat imports to Chile in the near future.
5. Overcompensation
164. In its attempt to establish that the PBS is inc onsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture (Part C.I.), Argentina notes the following:80
The particular configuration and interacti on of the specific characteristics of Chile’s
price band system generate certain market access conditions that lack transparency
and predictability and disconnect the Chilean market from international price trends
in a way that insulates the Chilean mark et from the transmission of international
prices and prevents enhanced market access for imports of wheat and wheat flour.
165. However, Argentina confuses arguments and equates the Appellate Body's findings with other
elements addressed by the Appellate Body in its Report. Indeed, the characteristics of lack of
transparency and lack of predictability of the PBS in effect until December 2003 are part of the
conclusions of the Appellate B ody – and Chile has accordingly taken them into account – but the
reference to overcompensation, wh ich in Argentina's view results from the amended PBS, is wrong,
and overcompensation cannot, on its own, be inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, as Argentina erroneously claims.
166. The references cited by Argentina, in partic ular paragraph 260 of the Appellate Body's
Report, are out of context and do not correspond to the reasoning followed by the Appellate Body,
and are hence not part of its conclusions. They are actually part of the Appellate Body's analysis of
whether the Panel took proper account of the fact that the total amount of duties that may be levied as
a result of Chile's price band system is "capped" at the level of the tariff rate of 31.5 per cent
ad valorem bound in Chile's Schedule.81
167. Notwithstanding the above, for the sole purpo se of making matters clearer for the Panel
members Chile will now review some of the aspects addressed by Argentina, in order to demonstrate
that even if overcompensation were at issue in these Article 21.5 proceedings, Argentina's arguments
fail.

79 Section C.3.2.
80 Para. 73 of the First Written Submission of Argentina.
81 Para. 253 of the Report of the Appellate Body.

168. In its Report, the Appellate Body notes that the PBS could overcompensate for international
price variations and elevate the entry price of imports above the band floor.
82 Such a reading would
be possible were one to assume that the floor price was determined at a market level equivalent to the
cost of the imported product and for which the refe rence price used to calcu late the specific duty was
measured in f.o.b. terms, so that the differenc e between these values would be greater than that
needed to maintain the floor price, if the latter were a minimum import price.
169. But such a reasoning rests on a misconstruction of how the PBS operated. The values of the
specific duties and tax rebates were published in th e form of an annual decree containing tables, the
first column of which listed a series of possible f. o.b. prices, while the second contained the specific
duties or rebates applicable. Although the duties and rebates appeared to be calculated using the
f.o.b.-level reference price, this was not actually th e case. Both variables used in the calculation were
expressed in the same market level terms, namely import cost. 83 The tables listing the f.o.b. prices
used in the calculation were published because it was necessary to provide for effective application of
the PBS. In other words, it was easier for the Natio nal Customs Service to scan a table in order to
find the reference price expressed in the same terms th an it was to calculate, for every reference price,
the corresponding import cost at any given moment in time.
170. There is no overcompensation now either, as has b een claimed. It is actually even clearer
today that overcompensation is impossible, since the floor and ceiling prices and the reference price
are expressed at the same market level, i.e., as f.o.b. per tonne.
171. Moreover, the current floor and ceiling prices ar e expressed at a market level that is not
comparable to the c.i.f. prices, entry prices or impor t cost, meaning that there is plainly no advantage
to having these floor and ceiling prices as an object ive price to be maintained or a minimum entry
price.
172. The difference between a product's f.o.b. and c.i.f. price consists, at the very least, of freight
and transport insurance costs. Freight costs are an exogenous variable that lies beyond a market
operator's control, since they are highly dependent on fuel price trends. Therefore, using an f.o.b.
price as the floor price in no way guarantees a predetermined c.i.f. price level.

82 Para. 260 of the Report of the Appellate Body.
83 The calculation formula was as follows:
1. The specific duties (SD) were determined by subtracting from the floor value of the band the
import cost (IC) calculated for a consecutive list of possible f.o.b. prices below this floor value, and
were expressed in US$/kg.
SD = FLOOR – ICi
where "i" represents all import costs lower than the band floor, up to the amount calculated using an
f.o.b. price of US$50/tonne. The maximum duty was the rate whereby the amounts payable as
ad valorem customs duties plus specific duties were equivalent to the WTO bound tariff in percentage
terms.

2. The tax rebates (TR) were determined by su btracting from the import cost (IC) calculated for
a consecutive list of possible f.o.b. prices above the ceiling value of the band, and were expressed in
US$/tonne. The maximum tax rebate corresponded to the amount of the normal ad valorem duty
applicable.
TR = IC
j – CEILING
where "j" represents all import costs higher than the band ceiling, up to the point where the amount of
total final duties equals zero.

3. The tables of specific duties and tax rebates in cluded the f.o.b. price used to calculate the
import costs and indicated the corresponding amount of the duties or rebates. Such information was
published in the Official Journal through an annual decree containing the tables in question.

173. A number of other necessary import costs are added to the c.i.f. price in order to determine
the cost of the imported product or the import parity price. Such costs include customs duties, landing
and inspection services, the various import formalitie s and the transfer, insurance and financing costs
required to ensure that the product arrives at its place of use.
174. These costs are also beyond the control of ma rket operators although magnitude allows
economies of scale. So here again, using an f.o.b. price as the band floor in no way guarantees a pre-
determined level of product import price or the product's domestic price.
175. In economic terms, a product's impor t cost is made up of fixed costs unrelated to the price of
the product and of variable costs that depend on the transaction price, such as the ad valorem duty,
inspection costs, the commission payable to agents handling the transaction and credit interest due.
The import cost can be summarized by means of the following formula:
 I C i = a + b * FOBi,
where,
IC
i = import cost of product i;
a = sum of fixed costs;
b = aggregate of variable costs; and
FOBi = f.o.b. price of the product i.

176. In order to maintain an import cost, or parity or entry price the specific duty to be levied
would have to match the value of that import cost with the reference price import cost or the import
cost of a particular shipment, so that:
SD = ICfloor – ICrp, where "rp" represents the reference price.
 Replacing the above with the following gives:

SD = a + b * FOBfloor– (a + b * FOBrp)
SD = a + b * FOBfloor – a – b* FOBrp
SD = b * (FOBfloor – FOBrp)

177. As factor "b" has more components than just th e customs duty, it is obviously larger than the
ad valorem duty.
178. Thus, if "b" is larger than the ad valorem duty, a specific duty calculated solely on the basis of
f.o.b. values and Chile's ad valorem duty would unquestionably be lower than a duty obtained using
import costs.
SD = (1+ 0.06) * (FOBfloor– FOBrp)

179. Two conclusions can be drawn from the above. Fi rst, the floor value of the band expressed in
f.o.b. terms cannot be interpreted as a minimum entry price and is not a minimum entry price.
Second, the duty resulting from the formula applied by Chile is lower than would be required to
maintain a price at a higher level of the marketing ch ain – whether at c.i.f. or at import cost level.
Furthermore, considering that sev eral components of factor "b" are variables and lie beyond the
control of the authorities and market operato rs, applying the mechanism would lead to
undercompensation, if the objective were to maintain a price in the interest of domestic trade of the
product.
180. A further point which demonstrates that ther e cannot be overcompensation and that the
objective is not to maintain a parity price is th at today – unlike under the former PBS when duties

were assessed once a week (i.e. 52 times a year) – the duties or rebates assessed are valid for two
months (i.e. six a year), and during that period are completely disconnected from what may occur in
the reference, or any other, markets.
181. In other words, the duty or rebate, or non-appli cation thereof, is determined independently of
the prices of commercial transactions, allowing interna tional price variations to be transmitted to the
domestic market and ensuring that decreases in intern ational prices are reflected in the entry prices –
albeit to a lesser extent, since there are normally duties and other import costs to be paid.
182. This means that Chile's wheat policy is no differe nt in terms of behaviour than the application
of an ordinary customs duty.
6. Change in conditions of access as a result of Law No. 19.897
183. Law No. 19.897 and its Regula tions have improved conditions of access to the Chilean
market for wheat and wheat flour. This can be se en from the amount of time for which the duties and
rebates have been applied since the Law entered in to force. For comparison purposes, a simulation of
the operation of the PBS has been produced with th e reference price per week calculated on the basis
of the prices in effect. This was done by taking th e weekly average from Friday to Thursday of each
of the prices considered, selecting the lowest and comparing it with the floor and ceiling prices so as
to determine whether duties or rebates had applie d in the week following the calculation. This
method was applied to the period from 16 December 2003 to 13 January 2006.
84
Number of weeks of occurrence
Measure in force Former mechanism Law No.19.897
Specific duties 27 17
Tax rebates 27 35
No measure 55 57

184. The results show that under the system prio r to modification the time over which specific
duties would have been levied amounted to 27 week s, whereas in fact in the same time-frame it
amounted to only 17. In the case of tax rebates, un der the PBS they would have been applied in 27
weeks, whereas in fact there were 35 weeks with rebates.
185. In conclusion, the period of application of du ties under the new regime was shorter by 10
weeks, while that of rebates was longer by 8 w eeks, which represents an effective increase in
favourable conditions for grain imports compared to what might have occurred under the mechanism
prior to modification.
 Effects of the scheduled reduction of floor and ceiling prices

186. The scheduled reduction of the floor and ceiling pr ices is a scenario under which, irrespective
of international price levels, the amount of the sp ecific duties will increasingly diminish compared to
those currently being established, just as the probability of duties actually being assessed will
increasingly diminish.

84 Exhibit CHL-7.

187. Although this may be self-evident, we shall nevertheless use the calculation formula to
explain matters. If we take the current floor price of US$128/tonne and the floor price of
US$114/tonne that will apply in 2014, with an id entical reference price of, say, US$110/tonne, the
results are as follows:
SP2006 = 1.06 * (128 – 110) = 19.08
SP2014 = 1.06 * (114 – 110) = 4.24

188. The specific duty in 2014, using the same reference price, would be US$4.24/tonne compared
to the current specific duty, using that same refere nce price, of US$19.08 /tonne. In other words, the
specific duty in 2014 will be 78% lower than the duty that would be calculated for this year.
189. It should be noted, moreover, that in 2014 a ll f.o.b. reference prices ranging between 114 and
127 (both inclusive) will not trigger the assessment of specific duties, as would be the case today.
190. On the basis of the monthly series of prices of Trigo pan argentino , one can establish how
many times (months) these prices have stood below th e current floor level of 128 and below the level
due to apply in 2014, that is, 114.
191. Over the period January 1986-March 2006 (perio d of application of the price band policy),
the price of Trigo pan argentino stood 112 times (months) below the current floor of 128, i.e. on
46.1% of the occasions considered. The price st ood under 114, namely the floor for 2014, 58 times
(months), i.e. on 23.9% of the occasions considered. In other words, the probability of specific duties
being applied in the year 2014 becomes lower and lower.
192. Both of the above results – that is, the reduc tion of duties by 2014 and the lesser probability
of duty assessment – demonstrate that the current po licy has an in-built process of gradual reduction
of border protection of wheat.
CONCLUSION

193. With the entry into force of Law No. 19.897 a nd its Regulations, Chile complied in both form
and substance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, through the
establishment of a mechanism for the assessment of specific duties, using certain parameters which,
added to the general ad valorem duty (6%), help gradually to reduce protection in the domestic wheat
and milling sector. Contrary to Argentina's assertion in its First Written Submission, these parameters
– namely floor, ceiling and reference price – are est ablished in a transparent and predictable manner.
While the former are fixed and will undergo a pr ocess of liberalization as of 2008, the latter is
determined on the basis of the most relevant ma rkets for wheat, including Argentina itself – though
Argentina appears to ignore that relevance. This enables any Chil ean market operator to know ahead
of time not only how the duties will be calculated but also the amount in which they will be due.
194. As a result, and owing to its nature, mainly the f.o.b. basis on whic h both prices (floor and
ceiling and reference price) are determined, the ne w mechanism operates in such a way that it cannot
constitute a variable import levy or a minimum import price, or a measure similar to a variable import
levy or a minimum import price. This is evidenced by the figures and charts presented by Argentina
and confirmed by Chile's arguments in this submission.
195. In other words, as of December 2003 the Chil ean wheat and wheat flour market has been
connected to the international market, and protection levels – that is, the occurrence of duties and their
amount – will increasingly diminish, meaning that in addition to closer connection with foreign
markets, there will be a decrease in relative prices that will render Chile's wheat market more
competitive.

196. For the reasons set out above, the mechanism does not constitute one of the measures cited in
the footnote to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and, consequently, is not among the
measures required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.
197. Accordingly, Chile respectfully requests that the Panel:
(a) Reject Argentina's claim of inconsistency with the second sentence of Article II:1(b)
of the GATT 1994 and that relating to factor 1.56 for wheat flour, to the extent that
neither claim is properly before this Panel;
(b) Chile having complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, find that
the measure established under Law No. 19.897 and its Regulations is not a measure
similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import price and is therefore not
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; and,
(c) having established that Chile has not main tained a measure inconsistent with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, find that Chile is not in breach of
Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agre ement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.