RUSSIA - MEASURES CONCERNING TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 5 April 2019
Document codes: WT/DS512/R
Complainant: Ukraine
Respondent: Russia
Third parties: Australia, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Moldova, Norway, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. V:2  GATT 1994  Protocol of Accession, Art. V:4, V:5, XI:1, X:1, X:2, X:3(a)  GATT 1994

RUSSIA - MEASURES CONCERNING TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT
REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel, as amended 4
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures Concerning BCI 9
ANNEX B
PROCEDURAL RULINGS
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Enhanced Third-Party Rights Ruling 12
Annex B-2 Confidentiality Ruling 16
Annex B-3 Admissibility Ruling 30
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
UKRAINE
Contents Page
Annex C-1 First executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 33
Annex C-2 Second executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 43

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Contents Page
Annex C-3 First executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 53
Annex C-4 Second executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 60
ANNEX D
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Australia 69
Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 73
Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Canada 76
Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of China 81
Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 84
Annex D-6 Executive summary of the arguments of Japan 89
Annex D-7 Executive summary of the arguments of Moldova 94
Annex D-8 Executive summary of the arguments of Singapore 99
Annex D-9 Executive summary of the arguments of Turkey 103
Annex D-10 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States 106
ANNEX E
INTERIM REVIEW
Contents Page
Annex E-1 Interim Review 112

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Footwear, , adopted 12 January 2000, DSR
2000:I, p. 515
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R and
Corr.1, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003
Australia – Apples Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/R, adopted 17 December
2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS367/AB/R, DSR
2010:VI, p. 2371
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation
of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR
1998:VIII, p. 3327
Argentina – Import Measures Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R /
WT/DS445/AB/R, adopted 26 January 2015, DSR 2015:II, p. 579
Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate
Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443
Canada – Periodicals Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p.
449
Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada –
Feed-in Tariff Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating
to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R,
adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 2013:I, p. 7
Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain
Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of
Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted
27 September 2004, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
Chile – Price Band System Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R, adopted 23
October 2002, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R /
WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – Broiler Products Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Measures on Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/R
and Add.1, adopted 25 September 2013, DSR 2013:IV, p. 1041
China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-
SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping
Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-
SSST") from Japan / China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping
Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-
SSST") from the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 /
WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October 2015, DSR
2015:IX, p. 4573
China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January
2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum,
WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29
August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
China – Rare Earths Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R and Add.1 /
WT/DS432/R and Add.1 / WT/DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29
August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS431/AB/R /
WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV, p. 1127
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R /
WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012,
DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
Dominican Republic – Import and Sale
of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting
the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R,
adopted 19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador
II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
US)
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,
adopted 11 December 2008, and Corr.1 / European Communities –
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and Corr.1, adopted 22 December 2008,
DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7165
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6
– EC)
Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 24 March 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2237
EC – Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R,
WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR
2005:XIX, p. 9157
EC – Computer Equipment Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R,
WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, DSR
1998:V, p. 1851
EC – IT Products Panel Reports, European Communities and its member States –
Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products,
WT/DS375/R / WT/DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September
2010, DSR 2010:III, p. 933
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures
Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products,
WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Selected Customs Matters Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs
Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR
2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Tariff Preferences Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, p. 925
EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R,
adopted 1 June 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685
Japan – Agricultural Products II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p.
277

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1
November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97
Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US) Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of
High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,
WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p.
6675
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and
Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR
2006:I, p. 3
Peru – Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
31 July 2015, DSR 2015:VI, p. 3403
Peru – Agricultural Products Panel Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/R and Add.1, adopted 31 July
2015, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS457/AB/R, DSR
2015:VII, p. 3567
Russia – Railway Equipment Panel Report, Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Railway Equipment and Parts Thereof, WT/DS499/R and Add.1,
circulated to WTO Members 30 July 2018 [appealed by Ukraine 27
August 2018]
Russia – Tariff Treatment Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and
Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/R, Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2,
adopted 26 September 2016, DSR 2016:IV, p. 1547
US – 1916 Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000,
DSR 2000:X, p. 4793
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R,
adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XX, p. 10127
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/R, adopted
28 November 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS282/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXI, p. 10225
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December
2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19
February 2009, DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
US – Continued Zeroing Panel Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application
of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R, adopted 19 February 2009,
as modified as Appellate Body Report WT/DS350/AB/R, DSR
2009:III, p. 1481
US – Cotton Yarn Appellate Body Report, United States – Transitional Safeguard
Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R,
adopted 5 November 2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6027
US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China,
WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII,
p. 3027
US – FSC Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000,
DSR 2000:III, p. 1619

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R,
adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand
and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May
2001, DSR 2001:IX, p. 4051
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)
(Article 21.5 – EU)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the European Union, WT/DS353/RW and Add.1, circulated
to WTO Members 9 June 2017 [appealed by the European Union 29
June 2017]
US – Line Pipe Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe
from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002, DSR
2002:IV, p. 1403
US – Nicaraguan Trade GATT Panel Report, United States – Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, L/6053, 13 October 1986 (unadopted)
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina,
WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p.
3257
US – Orange Juice (Brazil) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews
and Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice
from Brazil, WT/DS382/R, adopted 17 June 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p.
3753
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6
November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Sugar Quota GATT Panel Report, United States – Imports of Sugar from
Nicaragua, L/5607, adopted 13 March 1984, BISD 31S/67
US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 –
Mexico)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, WT/DS381/AB/RW
and Add.1, adopted 3 December 2015, DSR 2015:X, p. 5133
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European
Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001, DSR
2001:II, p. 717
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R,
adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323

JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections, Case
Concerning the Northern Cameroons, (Cameroon v. United
Kingdom) (1963) ICJ Reports, p. 15
Case Concerning Oil Platforms International Court of Justice, Merits, Case Concerning Oil
Platforms, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America) (2003) ICJ Reports, p. 161
Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua
International Court of Justice, Merits, Case of Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v.
United States of America) (1986) ICJ Reports, p. 14
Certain Expenses of the United Nations

International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, (United Nations) (1962) I.C.J.
Reports, p. 151
Nuclear Tests Case International Court of Justice, Questions of Jurisdiction and/or
Admissibility, Nuclear Tests Case, (Australia v. France) (1974)
ICJ Reports, p. 253
Prosecutor v. Tadić International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić, (1995), Case No IT-94-1-A

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
1982 Decision Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement
2014 Belarus-Russia
Border Bans on Transit of
Resolution No. 778
Goods, or 2014 Belarus-
Russia Border Bans
Prohibitions on transit from Ukraine across Russia, through
checkpoints in Belarus, of goods subject to veterinary and
phytosanitary surveillance and which are subject to the import bans
implemented by Resolution No. 778, along with related
requirements that, as of 30 November 2014, such veterinary goods
destined for Kazakhstan or third countries enter Russia through
designated checkpoints on the Russian side of the external customs
border of the EaEU and only pursuant to permits issued by the
relevant veterinary surveillance authorities of the Government of
Kazakhstan and the Rosselkhoznadzor, and that, as of 24
November 2014, transit to third countries (including Kazakhstan) of
such plant goods takes place exclusively through the checkpoints
across the Russian state border
2016 Transit Bans on
Non-Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods
Bans on all road and rail transit from Ukraine of: (a) goods that are
subject to non-zero import duties according to the Common
Customs Tariff of the EaEU, and (b) goods that fall within the scope
of the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778, which are
destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. Transit of such
goods may only occur pursuant to a derogation requested by the
Government of Kazakhstan or the Government of the Kyrgyz
Republic, which is then authorized by the Russian Government, in
which case, the transit is subject to the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements (below)
2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements
Requirements that all international cargo transit by road and rail
from Ukraine destined for the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz
Republic, through Russia, be carried out exclusively from the
Belarus-Russia border, and comply with a number of additional
conditions related to identification and registration cards at specific
control points on the Belarus-Russia border and the Russia-
Kazakhstan border
A350 Airbus A350 Aircraft
April 1989 Decision Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement System Rules and
Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989, L/6489, 13 April 1989
BCI Business Confidential Information
CIS-FTA Treaty on a Free Trade Area between the members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, done at St Petersburg, 18
October 2011, retrieved from:
http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/762/TOA/English/FTA%20CIS_Text%2
0with%20protocols.docx
Covered agreements Agreements listed in Appendix 1 (of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes)
CU Customs Union
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

Title IV (Trade and Trade-Related Matters) of the Association
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of
the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, L 161/13, Vol. 57, 29
May 2014, ISSN 1977-0677

Abbreviation Description
De facto measure Restrictions on the traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine
through the territory of the Russian Federation to countries in
Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus other than the Republic of
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic by de facto applying Decree
No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the territory of Ukraine
to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic
Decree No. 1 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1, "On
measures to ensure economic security and national interests of the
Russian Federation in international cargo transit from the territory
of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through
the territory of the Russian Federation", dated 1 January 2016
Decree No. 319 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 319, "On
Amendments to the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016", dated 1 July 2016
Decree No. 560 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 560, "On the
application of certain special economic measures to ensure security
of the Russian Federation", dated 6 August 2014
Decree No. 643 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 643, "On
amendments to the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016 'On measures to ensure
economic security and national interests of the Russian Federation
in international cargo transit from the territory of Ukraine to the
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the territory of the
Russian Federation'", dated 30 December 2017
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes
EaEU Eurasian Economic Union
EaEU Treaty Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, done
at Astana, 29 May 2014, retrieved from:
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCKAZ85
_LEG_1.pdf
EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement
Association Agreement between the European Union and its
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part,
Official Journal of the European Union, L 161, Vol. 57, 29 May
2014, ISSN 1977-0677
GATS General Agreement on Trade and Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATT 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System

(Russian translation: Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya
Sistema)
Helms-Burton Act Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
ICJ International Court of Justice
Import Licensing
Agreement
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures

Abbreviation Description
ITO International Trade Organization
LA/MSF Launch aid / member State financing
PJSC Notice Public Joint-Stock Company "Russian Railways" Notice on assessing
the fee for placing/removal of GLONASS seals at Moskovskaya,
Privolzhskaya, Yugo-Vostochnaya (South-Eastern) Railways, dated
17 May 2016
PJSC Order Public Joint-Stock Company "Russian Railways" Order No. 529r, "On
approval of the procedure for installing (removing) of the
identification means (seals) operating on the basis of the
technology GLONASS", dated 28 March 2016
Plant Instruction Instruction No. FS-AS-3/22903 of the Federal Service for Veterinary
and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor), dated 21
November 2014
Ramírez – López Treaty Treaty on Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea
Resolution No. 1 Resolution No. 1 of the Government of the Russian Federation, "On
measures related to the implementation of the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016", dated
1 January 2016
Resolution No. 778 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 778,
"On measures for implementation of the Decree of the President of
the Russian Federation No. 560 of 6 August 2014 'On the
application of certain special economic measures to ensure security
of the Russian Federation'", dated 7 August 2014
Rosselkhoznadzor Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary
Surveillance
Russia's Accession
Protocol
Protocol of the Accession of the Russian Federation,
WT/MIN(11)/24; WT/L/839, 17 December 2011
Russia's Working Party
Report
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian
Federation to the WTO, WT/ACC/RUS/70 and WT/MIN(11)/2, dated
11 November 2011
SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TPRM Trade Policy Review Mechanism
TRIPS Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Ukraine's 2016 Trade
Policy Review Report
Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Ukraine,
Government Report prepared by Ukraine, WT/TPR/G/334
UN Charter Charter of the United Nations, done at San Francisco, 24 October
1945, UN Treaty Series Vol. 1, p. XVI
UN General Assembly General Assembly of the United Nations
US Draft Charter United States, Department of State, "Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization of the United Nations", Publication
2598, Commercial Policy Series 93, September 1946
Veterinary Instruction Instruction No. FS-NV-7/22886 of the Federal Service for
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor),
dated 21 November 2014
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, 23 May

Abbreviation Description
WTO World Trade Organization
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel Exhibit Short Title (where
applicable)
Full Title
UKR-1, RUS-1 Decree No. 1 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1, "On
measures to ensure economic security and national interests
of the Russian Federation in international cargo transit from
the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of
Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation",
dated 1 January 2016
UKR-2, RUS-2 Decree No. 319 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 319,
"On amendments to the Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016 'On measures to
ensure the economic security and national interests of the
Russian Federation in international cargo transit from the
territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of
Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation'",
dated 1 July 2016
UKR-3, RUS-4 Resolution No. 1 Resolution of the Government of Russian Federation No. 1,
"On measures related to the implementation of the Decree of
the President of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January
2016", dated 1 January 2016
UKR-4 Resolution No. 732 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
732, "On amendments to some acts of the Government of
the Russian Federation", dated 1 August 2016
UKR-5 Resolution No. 388 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
388, "On introduction of amendments to Appendix to the
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
1 of 1 January 2016", dated 30 April 2016
UKR-6, RUS-5 Resolution No. 147 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
147, "On approval of requirements to the identification
means (seals) including the ones functioning on the basis of
the technology of global satellite navigation system
GLONASS", dated 27 February 2016
UKR-7 PJSC Order Order of PJSC "Russian Railways" No. 529r, "On approval of
the procedure for installing (removing) of the identification
means (seals) operating on the basis of the technology
GLONASS", dated 28 March 2016
UKR-8, RUS-6 Resolution No. 276 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
276, "On the procedure of exercising control over the
international road and rail cargo transit from the territory of
Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan or the
Kyrgyz Republic through the territory of the Russian
Federation", dated 6 April 2016
UKR-9, RUS-3 Decree No. 560 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 560,
"On the application of certain special economic measures to
ensure security of the Russian Federation", dated 6 August
2014
UKR-10, RUS-7 Resolution No. 778 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
778, "On measures for implementation of the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 560 of 6 August 2014
'On the application of certain special economic measures to
ensure security of the Russian Federation'", dated 7 August
2014
UKR-11 Resolution No. 830 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
830, "On amendments to the Resolution of the Government
of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778",
dated 20 August 2014
UKR-12 Resolution No. 625 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
625, "On amendments to the Resolution of the Government
of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778",
dated 25 June 2015

Panel Exhibit Short Title (where
applicable)
Full Title
UKR-13 Resolution No. 842 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
842, "On amendments to the Resolutions of the Government
of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778 and
dated 31 July 2015 No. 774", dated 13 August 2015
UKR-14 Resolution No. 981 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
981, "On amendment of the Annex to the Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014
No. 778", dated 16 September 2015
UKR-15 Resolution No. 1397 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
1397, "On amendment of Item 1 of Resolution No. 778 of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014",
dated 21 December 2015
UKR-16 Resolution No. 157 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
157, "On amendment of the Annex to the Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014
No. 778", dated 1 March 2016
UKR-17 Resolution No. 472 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
472, "On amendment of the Annex to the Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014
No. 778", dated 27 May 2016
UKR-18 Resolution No. 608 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
608, "On amendments to the Resolution of the Government
of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778",
dated 30 June 2016
UKR-19 Resolution No. 897 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
897, "On amendment to Annex to the Russian Federation
Government Resolution dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated
10 September 2016
UKR-20 Resolution No. 1086 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
1086, "On amendment of the Annex to the Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014
No. 778", dated 22 October 2016
UKR-21, RUS-10 Veterinary Instruction Instruction No. FS-NV-7/22886 of the Federal Service for
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance
(Rosselkhoznadzor), dated 21 November 2014
UKR-22, RUS-11 Plant Instruction Instruction No. FS-AS-3/22903 of the Federal Service for
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance
(Rosselkhoznadzor) dated 21 November 2014
UKR-47

Federal Law No. 410-FZ of the Russian Federation, "On
Suspending by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on a Free
Trade Area with respect to Ukraine", dated 30 December
2015
UKR-53 European Commission
Press Release
Press release "The trade part of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement becomes operational on 1 January 2016", dated
31 December 2015, European Commission, available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6398_en.htm
UKR-58 Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union,
done at Astana, 29 May 2014, available at:
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCK
AZ85_LEG_1.pdf
UKR-70 Resolution No. 790 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
790, "On amendments to the Resolution of the Government
of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778",
dated 4 July 2017
UKR-71 Decree No. 293 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 293,
"On extending certain special economic measures in the
interest of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation",
dated 30 June 2017
UKR-75

Instruction No. FS-EN-7/19132 of the Federal Service for
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance
(Rosselkhoznadzor), dated 10 October 2016

Panel Exhibit Short Title (where
applicable)
Full Title
UKR-76 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 628,
"About suspension of validity by the Russian Federation of
the free trade area concerning Ukraine", dated 16 December
2015
UKR-78 UNIAN Information
Agency Article
UNIAN Information Agency, "Putin signed and amended the
law on the suspension of the FTA with Ukraine", dated 30
December 2015, available at:
https://economics.unian.net/finance/1226612-putin-
podpisal-zakon-o-priostanovlenii-zst-s-ukrainoy.html
UKR-80 RBK article RBK, "Putin suspended the free trade agreement with
Ukraine", dated 16 December 2015, available at:
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/12/2015/567178fe9a7947944e
73b0a4
UKR-84 Print-screen of the website of the President of the Russian
Federation, "The law on suspension of the FTA agreement
with Ukraine is signed", dated 30 December 2015, available
at: kremlin.ru/acts/news/51091
UKR-88 Official Site of the Rosselkhoznadzor, "Regarding Regulation
by Rosselkhoznadzor of Quarantined Plant Products Transit",
dated 24 November 2014
UKR-89 UN General Assembly
Resolution No.
68/262, 27 March
2014
UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/262 "Territorial
integrity of Ukraine", 27 March 2014, A/RES/68/262
UKR-91 UN General Assembly
Resolution No.
71/205, 19 December
2016
UN General Assembly Resolution No. 71/205 "Situation of
human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)", 19 December 2016,
A/RES/71/205
UKR-94 Resolution No. 1292 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
1292, "On amendments to the Annexes to Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August 2014 No.
778", dated 25 October 2017
UKR-98, RUS-13 Decree No. 643 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 643,
"On amendments to the Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016 'On measures to
ensure economic security and national interests of the
Russian Federation in international cargo transit from the
territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of
Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation'",
dated 30 December 2017
UKR-102 The Regions of Central
Asia, Eastern Asia and
Caucasus
Map of Central Asia, Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia,
and the UN Classification of Countries by Region, Income
Group, and Subregion of the World
UKR-111 EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement
Association Agreement between the European Union and its
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other
part, Official Journal of the European Union, L 161, Vol. 57,
29 May 2014, ISSN 1977-0677
UKR-112 Notice concerning the provisional application of the
Association Agreement between the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member
States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part,
Official Journal of the European Union, L 311/1, 31 October
2014
RUS-8 Federal Law No. 281-
FZ
Federal Law No. 281-FZ of the Russian Federation, "On the
Special Economic Measures", dated 30 December 2006
RUS-12 Federal Law No. 390-
FZ
Federal Law No. 390-FZ of the Russian Federation, "On
Security", dated 28 December 2010
RUS-14

Telegram of "Ukrzaliznytsia" (Ukrainian Railways) No. CZM-
14/946, dated 6 June 2014

Panel Exhibit Short Title (where
applicable)
Full Title
RUS-15 Print-screen of the website of the State Border Guard Service
of Ukraine, retrieved from: https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news/na-
lyganshhini-stvorjujutsja-zagoni-prikordonnoi-samooboroni/
RUS-16

Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 20, "On
approval of the list of checkpoints through the state border of
Ukraine, through which the goods are imported in transit
mode", dated 20 January 2016
RUS-17

Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 106-r,
"On the closure of checkpoints across the state border",
dated 18 February 2015
RUS-18 Telegram of "Ukrzaliznytsia" (Ukrainian Railways) No. CZM-
14/1134, dated 8 July 2014
RUS-19 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1147,
"On the prohibition of importation of products originating in
the Russian Federation into the customs territory of Ukraine",
dated 30 December 2015
RUS-20 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 133/2017, "On the
Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of
Ukraine 'On application of personal special economic and
other restrictive measures (sanctions)'", dated 28 April 2017
RUS-22 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 58/2018, "On the
decision of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense
Council 'Urgent measures on security of the national interests
of the state in the sphere of aircraft engine building'", dated
1 March 2018
RUS-23

Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 57/2018, "On entry
into force of the Decision of the Council on National Security
and Defense of Ukraine of 1 March 2018, 'On application of
personal special economic and other restrictive measures
(sanctions)'", dated 6 March 2018
RUS-24 Resolution No. 959 Resolution of the Russian Federation No. 959, "On imposition
of import customs duties in respect of goods, originating from
Ukraine", dated 19 September 2014

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by Ukraine
1.1. On 14 September 2016, Ukraine requested consultations with the Russian Federation (Russia)
pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU) and Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)
with respect to the measures and claims set out below.1
1.2. Consultations were held on 10 November 2016 between Ukraine and Russia. These
consultations failed to resolve the dispute.2
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 9 February 2017, Ukraine requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 4.7
and Article 6 of the DSU, and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 with standard terms of reference.3 At its
meeting on 21 March 2017 , the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to
Ukraine's request in document WT/DS512/3, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.4
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Ukraine in document
WT/DS512/3 and to mak e such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5
1.5. On 22 May 2017, Ukraine requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the
panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of th e DSU . On 6 June 2017 , the Director -General accordingly
composed the Panel as follows6:
Chairperson: Professor Georges Abi-Saab

Members: Professor Ichiro Araki
 Dr Mohammad Saeed

1.6. Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea,
Moldova, Norway, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey and the United States notified their
interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.3.1 General
1.7. The Panel held an organizational meeting with the parties on 28 June 2017.
1.8. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures 7 and timetable8
on 12 July 2017.
1.9. The Panel held a first substantive meeting w ith the parties on 23 and 25 January 2018.
A session with the third parties took place on 25 January 2018. The Panel held a second substantive
meeting with the parties on 15 May 2018.

1 WT/DS512/1 and WT/DS512/1/Corr.1.
2 WT/DS512/3.
3 Ibid.
4 See WT/DSB/M/394.
5 WT/DS512/4.
6 Ibid.
7 The Panel's Working Procedures were revised on 11 January 2018. See the Panel's
Working Procedures, adopted on 12 July 2017, as revised on 11 January 2018, in Annex A-1.
8 The timetable for the Panel proceedings was revised on 31 January 2018 and on 17 January 2019.

1.10. On 31 July 2018, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel
issued its Interim Report to the parties on 29 January 2019. The Panel issued its Final Report to the
parties on 28 March 2019.
1.3.2 Additional Working Procedure s for the Protection of Business Confidential
Information
1.11. After consultation with both parties, the Panel adopted Additional Working Procedures
concerning the protection of Business Confidential Information (BCI), on 25 August 2017.9
1.3.3 Request for enhanced third party rights by certain third parties
1.12. On 10 November 2017, Australia, Canada and the European Union jointly requested the Panel
to grant to all of the third parties certain additional third-party rights in these proceedings. The Panel
invited the parties and other third parties, on 20 November 2017, to comment on the joint request.
On 1 December 2017, Ukraine, Russia and certain of the other third parties (Brazil, China, Japan,
Singapore and the United States) provided comments on the joint request. In a communication
dated 9 January 2018, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided to grant
the following enhanced third-party rights to all of the third parties:
a. The right to attend the portions of the party session of the first substantive meeting at
which the parties deliver their opening oral statemen ts, and closing oral statements,
respectively; and
b. The right to receive the provisional written versions of the parties' opening oral statements
and closing oral statements, respectively, at the portions of the party session of the
first substantive meeting at which those statements are delivered, as well as the final
versions of such oral statements at the end of the day on which they are delivered.
1.13. The Panel's decision is set out in Annex B-1.
1.3.4 Russia's request for a preliminary ruling
1.14. In its first written submission, Russia requested that the Panel issue a ruling, no later than
the date for filing the parties' second written submissions, that the category of measures identified
in Ukraine's first written submission as the "2014 transit ban s and other transit restrictions" is
outside the Panel's terms of reference.10
1.15. On 13 March 2018, the Panel issued a communication to the parties in which it advised that
it had decided to address the issue of whether the 2014 transit ban s and other transit restrictions
are outside the Panel's terms of reference , together with the merits, and would therefore defer its
ruling on that issue until the issuance of the Report.11
1.16. The Panel's ruling on whether the 2014 transit bans and other transit restrictions are outside
the Panel's terms of reference , and other issues concerning the Panel's terms of reference, is
addressed in Section 7.7 of this Report.
1.3.5 Russia's complaint of alleged breaches of confidentiality by a third party
1.17. In a letter to the Panel dated 14 Ma rch 2018, Russia complained that the European Union,
a third party in this dispute, had violated confidentiality obligations under various provisions of the
DSU and of the Working Procedures by publishing the European Union's third-party submission and
third-party statement on the website of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade.12
By communication dated 16 March 2018, the Panel invited the European Union and any other
third parties, as well as Ukraine, to provide any comments on Russia's complaint by 21 March 2018.
Accordingly, on 21 March 2018, the European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the United States

9 See the Panel's additional Working Procedures concerning BCI in Annex A-2.
10 Russia's first written submission, para. 31.
11 Communication of the Panel to the parties, dated 13 March 2018.
12 Russia's letter to the Chair of the Panel, dated 14 March 2018.

and Ukraine each provided comments on Russia's complaint. On 23 March 2018, the Panel invited
Russia to respond to these comments by 4 April 2018. On that date, Russia provided its response.
1.18. On 16 May 2018, the Panel issued a ruling in which it declined to take any action in respect
of the published European Union third -party submission and third-party statement on the grounds
that it did not consider that such publication violated the confidentiality obligations under Article 18.2
of the DSU, the Working Procedures or any other applicable confidentiality obligations. Particularly,
the Panel did not agree with the proposition that legal arguments and opinions of parties in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings were inherently confidential, or capable of designation as confidential
information under the third sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU. The Panel's ruling is set out in
Annex B-2.
1.3.6 Other procedural complaints
1.19. In an email message dated 28 March 2018, Ukraine alleged that Russia had failed to file
Exhibit RUS-20 (UKR) in accordance with paragraph 25 of the Working Procedures because it filed
this exhibit by means of reference to a web link. In a communication to the parties dated
6 April 2018, the Panel noted that Russia had promptly submitted a paper version of
Exhibit RUS-20 (UKR) by 5 :00 p.m. on the due date for submission, and that in accordance with
paragraph 25(b) of the Working P rocedures, Exhibit RUS -20 (UKR) therefore formed part of the
factual record in this dispute. The Panel also noted that, due to the size of the exhibit, the PDF file
containing Exhibit RUS-20 (UKR) could not be attached to an email message. The Panel theref ore
requested Russia to provide Exhibit RUS -20 (UKR) to Ukraine in one of the other formats set forth
in paragraph 25(b) of the Working Procedures, namely, on a USB key, a CD-ROM or a DVD.
1.20. In an email message dated 18 May 2018, Russia complained that Ukraine had failed to file
Exhibits UKR -106 (BCI) through UKR -115 in accordance with subparagraph (a) of the
Panel's invitation to the second substantive meeting dated 27 April 2018. Russia submitted that,
owing to this failure, the Panel should not accept and consider these exhibits. In a communication
to the parties dated 22 May 2018, the Panel declined Russia's request, observing that while the
electronic versions of the exhibits were not provided to Russia or submitted to the
Dispute Settlement Registry until 18 May 2018, Ukraine had previously served paper copies of
Exhibits UKR-106 (BCI) to UKR -115 on Russia and on the Panel on 15 May 2018, at the second
substantive meeting. The paper copies of those exhibits constitute the official versions of those
exhibits for purposes of the record of the dispute under paragraph 25(b) of the Working Procedures.
1.21. During the second substantive meeting on 15 May 2018, Russia alleged that Ukraine had
untimely filed Exhibit UKR -106 (BCI) in a manner inconsistent with para graph 7 of the
Working Procedures. Russia rejected Ukraine's assertion that Exhibit UKR-106 (BCI) was "necessary
for purposes of rebuttal" and requested, in a letter dated 13 June 2018, that the Panel strike
Exhibit UKR-106 (BCI) from the record. In a communication to the parties dated 23 July 2018, the
Panel granted Russia's request, observing that, in the first round of arguments, Ukraine's arguments
concerning the existence of the measures in question related to the legal existence of the measures
in Rus sia's legal system without reference to any specific instances of application ,
i.e., Ukraine's arguments related to the existence of the measures "as such ". At the second
substantive meeting, Ukraine reiterated its "as such" argument while also submitting the contested
exhibit concerning the application of the measure, in one instance, as evidence in support of its main
argument. In the Panel's view, this did not make such evidence "necessary for the purposes of
rebuttal" within paragraph 7 of the Working Procedures. The Panel's ruling is set out in Annex B-3.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1. This dispute concerns various measures imposed by Russia on transit by road and rail through
the territory of Russia, as well as the publication and administration of those measures. A dditional
information concerning the measures and the factual background against which they were adopted
is set forth in Sections 7.3 and 7.7 of this Report.
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. Ukraine requests that the Panel find that the measures at issue are inconsistent with
Russia's obligations under the first sentence of Article V:2, the second sentence of Article V:2, Article

V:3, Article V:4 and Article V:5 of the GATT 1994, and with paragraph 2 of Part I of the Protocol of
Accession of the Russian Federation (Russia's Accession Protocol) 13, which incorporates
commitments in paragraph 1161 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the
Russian Federation to the WTO (Russia's Working Party Report) 14; as well as Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994 and commitments in paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report, as incorporated
into its Accession Protocol by reference ; Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 and commitments in
paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report , as incorporated into its Accession Protocol by
reference; commitments in paragraph 1427 of Russia's Working Party Report, as incorporated into
its Accession Protocol by reference; and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. Ukraine further requests,
pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the Panel recommend that Russia bring its measures into
conformity with its WTO obligations.
3.2. Russia invokes Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 and requests the Panel, for lack of
jurisdiction, to limit its findings to recognizing that Russia has invoked a provision of Article XXI of
the GATT 1994, without engaging further to evaluate the merits of Ukraine's claims. Russia considers
that the Panel lacks jurisdiction to evaluate measures in respect of which Article XXI of the
GATT 1994 is invoked.
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel
in accordance with paragraph 19 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C-1
and C-4). They are also reiterated where relevant in the Panel's analysis.
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, Moldova,
Singapore, Turkey and the United States are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in
accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes D -1
through D-10). Turkey made oral arguments to the Panel but did not submit written arguments.
Bolivia, Chile, India, Korea, Norway, Paraguay and Saudi Arabia did not s ubmit written or oral
arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 29 January 2019. Both parties submitted
written requests for review of precise aspects of the Interim Report on 14 February 2019. Neither
party requested an interim review meeting. On 28 February 2019, both parties submitted written
comments on each other's written requests for review.
6.2. The parties' requests made at the interim stage, as well as the Panel's discussion and
disposition of those requests, are set out in Annex E-1.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Overview of Ukraine's complaints
7.1. Ukraine's main complaints may be succinctly stated as follows:
a. Since 1 January 2016, Ukraine has not been able to use road or rail transit routes across
the Ukraine-Russia border for all traffic in transit destined for Kazakhstan. Rather, under
Russian law, such traffic may only transit from Ukraine across Russia from the
Belarus-Russia border, and is also subject to additional conditions related to identification
seals and registration cards, both on entering and on leaving Russian territory, at specific
control points on the Belarus -Russia border and the Russia-Kazakhstan border
respectively. As of 1 July 2016, all traffic in transit destined for the Kyrgyz Republic has
been subject to the same restrictions.

13 WT/MIN(11)/24 and WT/L/839, dated 17 December 2011.
14 WT/ACC/RUS/70 and WT/MIN(11)/2, dated 17 November 2011.

b. Since 1 July 2016, traffic in transit by road and rail from Ukraine, which is destined for
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, is not permitted to transit across Russia at all
(i.e. not even via the Belarus -Russia border) for particular categories of goods. The
categories of goods are: (i) those subject to customs duties greater than zero according
to the Common Customs Tariff of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), and
(ii) goods listed in an annex to Resolution No. 778 of the Government of the
Russian Federation (Resolution No. 778) 15 and which originate in specific countries that
have imposed economic sanctions on Russia .16 Although there is a procedure which
exceptionally permits transit of these goods from Ukraine to Kazakhstan and to the
Kyrgyz Republic (through a derogation procedure involving a request by the Governments
of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic and an aut horization granted by
Russian authorities), it is unclear how this derogation procedure operates and to date, no
such derogations have been granted.
c. The transit restrictions referred to in paragraph 7.1(a) above, and the transit bans referred
to in paragraph 7.1(b) above, are also applied by Russian authorities to traffic in transit
by road or rail from Ukraine which is destined not only for Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic, but also for Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
d. Finally, as of 30 November 2014, transit from Ukraine of goods subject to veterinary
surveillance which are listed in Resolution No. 778 is not permitted through Belarus.
Rather, such goods with a final destination of Kazakhstan and third countries may transit
across Russia only from specific checkpoints on the Russian side of the external customs
border of the EaEU and only pursuant to permits issued by the relevant veterinary
surveillance authorities of the Government of Kazakhstan and pursuant to permits issued
by the Ru ssian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance
(Rosselkhoznadzor). Transit to third countries (including Kazakhstan) of plant goods which
are listed in Resolution No. 778 shall also, as of 24 November 2014, take place exclusively
through the checkpoints on the Russian state border.17
7.2. Ukraine claims that the above -referenced transit restrictions and bans are inconsistent with
Russia's obligations under Article V of the GATT 1994 and related commitments in
Russia's Accession Protocol. Ukraine also claims that Russia has failed to publish and administer

15 Resolution No. 778 of the Government of the Russian Federation bans the importation of various
agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs, as listed in the Resolution, which originate from the
United States, EU Member States, Canada, Australia and Norway, which had imposed economic sanctions on
Russia. (Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 778, "On measures for implementation of
the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 560 of 6 August 2014 'On the application of certain
special economic measures to ensure security of the Russian Federation'", dated 7 August 2014,
(Resolution No. 778), (Exhibits UKR-10, RUS-7).)
16 On 13 August 2015, the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778 were extended to the listed
goods originating from Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Ukraine. (See Resolution of the
Government of the Russian Federation No. 842, "On amendments to the Resolutions of the Government of the
Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778 and dated 31 July 2015 No. 774", dated 13 August 2015,
(Resolution No. 842), (Exhibit UKR-13).) On 13 August 2015, the Russian Government adopted
Resolution No. 842 which, among other things, amends Resolution No. 778 to add further countries to the list
of countries whose exports are subject to the Resolution No. 778 import bans, including Ukraine. However,
with respect to Ukraine, Resolution No. 842 provides that the import bans shall be applied as of 10 days from
the date on which the Russian Government is notified of action by Ukraine to implement the economic part of
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (referred to in Resolution of the Russian Federation No. 959
"On imposition of import customs duties in respect of goods, originating from Ukraine", dated
19 September 2014, (Resolution No. 959), (Exhibit RUS-24)), but by no later than 1 January 2016. Another
resolution of the Russian Government, enacted on 21 December 2015, specified that the import prohibitions in
respect of the goods listed in Resolution No. 778 would apply to goods of Ukrainian origin as of
1 January 2016. (See Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1397, "On amendment of
Item 1 of Resolution No. 778 of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014", dated
21 December 2015, (Resolution No. 1397), (Exhibit UKR-15).) The duration of the import bans has been
extended a number of times, most recently by Resolution No. 790, which extends the import bans until 31
December 2018. (See Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 790, "On amendments to
the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 4 July 2017,
(Resolution No. 790), (Exhibit UKR-70).) For other amendments to Resolution No. 778, see fn 385 below.
17 For an explanation of the measures as identified by Ukraine in its panel request and as subsequently
identified in its first written submission, see paras. 7.264-7.275 below.

various instruments through which these measures are implemented in the manner required by
Article X of the GATT 1994 and by commitments in Russia's Accession Protocol.
7.2 Russia's response
7.3. Russia does not specifically address the factual evidence or legal arguments adduced by
Ukraine in support of its substantive claims under the GATT 1994 and Russia's Accession Protocol.
Rather, Russia argues that certain claims and measures are outside the Panel's terms of reference,
on the bases that: (a) Ukraine's panel request does not comply with the requirements of Article 6.2
of the DSU, and (b) Ukraine has failed to establish the existence of one of the challenged measures.
7.4. Principally, however, Russia asserts that the measures are among those that Russia considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, which it took, "[i]n response to the
emergency in international relations that occurred in 2014 th at presented threats to the
Russian Federation's essential security interests ".18 Russia invokes the provisions of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, arguing that, as a result, the Panel lacks jurisdiction to further
address the matter. Accordingly, Russia submits that the Panel should limit its findings in this dispute
to a statement of the fact that Russia has invoked Article XXI(b)(iii), without further engaging on
the substance of Ukraine's claims.19
7.3 Factual background
7.5. The issues that arise in this di spute must be understood in the context of the serious
deterioration of relations between Ukraine and Russia that occurred following a change in
government in Ukraine in February 2014. Both parties have avoided referring directly to this change
in government and to the events that followed it. It is not this Panel's function to pass upon the
parties' respective legal characterizations of those events, or to assign responsibility for them, as
was done in other international fora. At the same time, the Panel considers it important to situate
the dispute in the context of the existence of these events.
7.6. Ukraine had, since 18 October 2011, been a party to the Treaty on a Free Trade Area between
the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS -FTA)20, wi th Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Moldova and Armenia. 21 On 29 May 2014, Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EaEU Treaty)22, with Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic joining in January and August of 2015,
respectively. The EaEU Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2015.23
7.7. While it took part in the initial negotiations to establish the EaEU, Ukraine decided, following
on the " Euromaidan events", not to join the EaEU Treaty. Instead, it elected to seek economic
integration with the European Union.24 Accordingly, on 21 March 2014, the newly sworn-in Ukrainian
Government signed the political part of the "Association Agreement between the European Union
and its Mem ber States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part" (EU -Ukraine Association
Agreement).25 The objectives of the EU -Ukraine Association Agreement are to facilitate Ukraine's
closer political and economic integration with Europe. 26 The economic part o f the EU -Ukraine

18 Russia's first written submission, paras. 16, 19, 33 and 74; and closing statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 6.
19 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 45-47.
20 Treaty on a Free Trade Area between the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
done at St Petersburg, 18 October 2011, retrieved from:
http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/762/TOA/English/FTA%20CIS_Text%20with%20protocols.docx.
21 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 19. The CIS-FTA entered into force on 20 September 2012.
(Ibid.)
22 Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, done at Astana, 29 May 2014, retrieved
from: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCKAZ85_LEG_1.pdf, (Exhibit UKR-58).
23 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 21.
24 Ibid. paras. 16, 20 and 24.
25 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Ukraine, of the other part, Official Journal of the European Union, L 161, Vol. 57, 29 May 2014, ISSN
1977-0677, (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement), (Exhibit UKR-111), p. 170. See also Ukraine's first written
submission, para. 24.
26 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, (Exhibit UKR-111), p. 6.

Association Agreement provides for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between
the European Union and Ukraine. 27 This part of the EU -Ukraine Association Agreement was signed
on 27 June 2014.
7.8. In March 2014, Ukraine, along with c ertain other countries, introduced a resolution in the
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN General Assembly) , which welcomed the continued
efforts by the UN Secretary-General and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
as well as other international and regional organizations, to support "de -escalation of the situation
with respect to Ukraine ".28 The UN General Assembly recalled "the obligations of all S tates under
Article 2 of the Charter to refrain in their international relations f rom the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means ".29 A subsequent UN General Assembly Resolution in December 2016
condemned the "temporary o ccupation of part of the territory of Ukraine", i.e. the "Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol " by the Russian Federation, and reaffirmed the
non-recognition of its "annexation".30 This resolution makes explicit reference to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which apply in cases of declared war or other armed conflict between
High Contracting Parties.31
7.9. The events in Ukraine in 2014 were followed by the imposition of economic sanctions against
Russian entities and persons by certain countries.
7.10. On 7 August 2014, Russia imposed import bans on specified agricultural products, raw
materials and food originating from countries that had imposed sanctions against it (initially, the
United States, European Uni on Member States, Canada, Australia and Norway). 32 Russia also
imposed certain restrictions in connection with the transit of goods subject to these import bans,
prohibiting their transit through Belarus, and permitting their transit across Russia only thro ugh

27 The DCFTA is contained in Title IV of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. (EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement, (Exhibit UKR-111), pp. 13-137.) This part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement provides for
the progressive formation of a free trade area covering goods and services. (Ibid. Article 25, p. 13.) In its
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, Ukraine explains that the "economic part" of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement contains a "free trade agreement establishing the Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (DCFTA)". (Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 60.) The
Panel refers to the DCFTA unless it specifically means the economic part of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement.
28 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/262 "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine", 27 March 2014,
A/RES/68/262, (UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/262, 27 March 2014), (Exhibit UKR-89), p. 2. This
Resolution—introduced by Ukraine, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Canada and Costa Rica—was supported by
100 UN Member States, with 11 voting against (including Russia), 58 abstentions and 24 absent. (UN General
Assembly Official Records, A/68/PV.80, 80th meeting, 27 March 2014, p. 17.)
29 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/262, 27 March 2014, (Exhibit UKR-89), p. 1.
30 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 71/205 "Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)", 19 December 2016, A/RES/71/205, (UN General Assembly
Resolution No. 71/205, 19 December 2016), (Exhibit UKR-91). This Resolution received 70 votes in favour,
26 against (including Russia) and 77 abstentions. (UN General Assembly Official Records, A/71/PV.65,
19 December 2016, pp. 40-41.)
31 Ibid. p. 2. The specific reference is to the prohibitions on the occupying Power compelling protected
persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. (See Article 130 of the Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva, 12 August 1949, UN Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 135; and Article 147 of the
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva, 12 August 1949, UN
Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 287.)
32 These import bans are imposed by Resolution No. 778, (Exhibits UKR-10, RUS-7). The import bans
had been authorized by the President of the Russian Federation the previous day through Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 560, "On the application of certain special economic measures to
ensure the security of the Russian Federation", dated 6 August 2014, (Decree No. 560), (Exhibits UKR-9,
RUS-3). Decree No. 560 established the original parameters for the Russian Government to impose import
bans on certain agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating in the countries that had decided
to impose economic sanctions against Russian legal entities or individuals, or joined in such a decision.
Decree No. 560 was subsequently extended by Decree No. 320 of 24 June 2015, Decree No. 305 of
29 June 2016 and Decree No. 293 of 30 June 2017. Decree No. 560 was in force until 31 December 2018.
(Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 293, "On extending certain special economic measures
in the interest of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation", dated 30 June 2017, (Decree No. 293),
(Exhibit UKR-71).) Both parties advised in the interim review stage that Decree No. 560 has since been further
extended until 31 December 2019 by Decree No. 420, which was adopted by the President of the
Russian Federation on 12 July 2018.

designated checkpoints on the Russian side of the external border of the EaEU. These 2014 transit
restrictions are among those challenged by Ukraine in this dispute.33
7.11. In September 2014, following discussions with Russia, both the European Union and Ukraine
agreed to postpone the application of the economic part of the EU -Ukraine Association Agreement
until 31 December 2015. 34 Also in September 2014, the Russian Government adopted
Resolution No. 959, which provided that Ukrainian goods would be subject to tariffs at the EaEU
rates as of 10 days from the date on which the Russian Government was notified of action by Ukraine
to implement the economic part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.35
7.12. On 13 August 2015, the Russian Government adopted Resolution No. 842 which, among other
things, amended Resolution No. 778 to add further countries to the list of countries whose ex ports
are subject to the Resolution No. 778 import bans, including Ukraine. However, with respect to
Ukraine, Resolution No. 842 provided that the import bans would be applied from the effective date
of Resolution No. 959 (referred to above) , but no later than 1 January 2016. 36 Subsequent
negotiations between the European Commission, Ukraine and Russia, aimed at achieving solutions
to Russia's concerns about the DCFTA, had failed by December 2015.37 On 21 December 2015, the
Russian Government adopted Resolution No. 1397, which provided that the import bans in respect
of the goods listed in Resolution No. 778 would apply to goods of Ukrainian origin as of
1 January 2016.38 The European Union and Ukraine have provisionally applied the DCFTA as of
1 January 2016.39
7.13. In response to the provisional application by the European Union and Ukraine of the economic
part of the EU -Ukraine Association Agreeme nt, the Russian State Duma passed a law on
22 December 2015, effective as of 1 January 2016, purporting to suspend the CIS-FTA with respect
to Ukraine.40 The Russian State Legal Department stated that Russia's suspension of the CIS -FTA
with respect to Ukraine was due to the entry into force of the economic part of the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement "without reaching a legally binding agreement that would meet

33 See para. 7.1.d above.
34 RBK, "Putin suspended the free trade agreement with Ukraine", dated 16 December 2015, available
at: http://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/12/2015/567178fe9a7947944e73b0a4, (RBK article), (Exhibit UKR-80); and
Press Release, "The trade part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement becomes operational on
1 January 2016", dated 31 December 2015, European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6398_en.htm (European Commission Press Release), (Exhibit UKR-53). As stated above in fn
27, the "economic part" of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement contains a free trade agreement establishing
the DCFTA. (See Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 60.) The EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017, following the deposit of the last instrument of
ratification or approval. (See Official Journal of the European Union L 193/1, 25 July 2017.) In October 2015,
the Russian Prime Minister was reported as stating that Russia's position was that Ukraine could not
simultaneously participate in free trade areas with both Russia and the European Union. Russia considered that
this situation would pose a threat of re-export of European goods in the guise of Ukrainian goods. (RBK article,
(Exhibit UKR-80).)
35 Resolution No. 959, (Exhibit RUS-24), p. 2. A Ukrainian news agency report in December 2015 also
referred to statements by the Russian Prime Minister that, if Ukraine chose to belong to a trade zone different
from the CIS-FTA, it would lose the zero-tariff benefits of the FTA with Russia and that, as of 1 January 2016,
tariffs on imports into Russia of Ukrainian goods would be 6% on average. (UNIAN Information Agency, "Putin
signed and amended the law on the suspension of the FTA with Ukraine", dated 30 December 2015, available
at: https://economics.unian.net/finance/1226612-putin-podpisal-zakon-o-priostanovlenii-zst-s-ukrainoy.html,
(UNIAN Information Agency Article), (Exhibit UKR-78).)
36 Resolution No. 842, (Exhibit UKR-13).
37 RBK article, (Exhibit UKR-80); and UNIAN Information Agency Article, (Exhibit UKR-78).
38 Resolution No. 1397, (Exhibit UKR-15).
39 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 25. Ukraine refers to the European Commission Press
Release, (Exhibit UKR-53). The political part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which was signed on
21 March 2014, has been provisionally applied since 1 November 2014. (Notice concerning the provisional
application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, Official Journal of the
European Union, L 311/1, 31 October 2014, (Exhibit UKR-112).)
40 Federal Law No. 410-FZ of the Russian Federation, "On Suspending by the Russian Federation of the
Treaty on a Free Trade Area with respect to Ukraine", dated 30 December 2015, (Exhibit UKR-47); and
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 628, "About suspension of validity by the
Russian Federation of the free trade area concerning Ukraine", dated 16 December 2015, (Exhibit UKR-76).
See also UNIAN Information Agency Article, (Exhibit UKR-78).

the interests of Russia" and the fact that "such an act constitutes a fundamental change of
circumstances, which were essential for Russia at the conclusion of the [CIS-FTA]."41
7.14. Russia is also alleged by Ukraine to have banned imports of various Ukrainian goods since
2013, according to a request for consultations filed by Ukraine in October 201742, in connection with
the following alleged Russian measures:
a. a general ban on the importation of Ukrainian juice products, including baby food (since
July 2014);
b. a ban on the importation of alcoholic beverages, beer and beer beverages produced by
three Ukrainian producers (since August 2014);
c. a ban on the importation of confectionary products produced by a specific confectionary
producer (since July 2013) as well as a more general ban on imports of all
Ukrainian confectionary products (since September 2014); and
d. a ban on the importation of wallpaper and wall coverings produced by four
Ukrainian producers (since April 2015).43
7.15. In the same request for consultations, Ukraine also challenges what it refers to as transit bans
on Ukrainian juice products and confectionary products, which are said to apply as a result of the
import bans, "separately and in addition to" the transit bans at issue in this dispute, which also affect
the same products.44
7.16. Also, as of 1 January 2016, Russia:
a. imposed customs duties at the EaEU rates on imports of goods from Ukraine45;
b. included goods of Ukrainian origin within the import bans on agricultural products,
raw materials and food that it had imposed since August 2014 under Resolution No. 7 78
in response to countries that had imposed sanctions against it46; and
c. imposed certain restrictions and bans on transit, namely: (i) restrictions on transit by road
and rail from Ukraine, destined for Kazakhstan (and subsequently, for the
Kyrgyz Republic), requiring that such transit from Ukraine across Russia may occur only
from Belarus and subject to additional conditions related to identification seals and
registration cards, both on entering and on leaving Russian territory , at specified control
points on the Belarus -Russia border and the Russia-Kazakhstan border, respectively 47;
and (ii) "temporary" bans on transit by road and rail from Ukraine of:
i. goods which are subject to non -zero import duties according to the
Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU; and

41 Print-screen of the website of the President of the Russian Federation, "The law on suspension of the
FTA Agreement with Ukraine is signed", dated 30 December 2015, available at: kremlin.ru/acts/news/51091,
(Exhibit UKR-84). See also fn 34 above.
42 WT/DS532/1, dated 19 October 2017. The Panel refers to Ukraine's request for consultations in
WT/DS532/1 solely as factual background but does not link it to Ukraine's complaint in the present dispute.
(See Article 3.10 of the DSU).
43 See WT/DS532/1, dated 19 October 2017, paras. 1, 13, 16, 23, 34, 48 and 55. The alleged
WTO-inconsistencies include Articles I:1, V, X and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, various provisions of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), provisions of Russia's Accession Protocol, and the
Agreement on Trade Facilitation. (Ibid. paras. 13, 15, 22, 31, 33, 43, 45, 47, 54, 65 and 67.)
44 WT/DS532/1, dated 19 October 2017, paras. 17 and 49.
45 Resolution No. 959, (Exhibit RUS-24).
46 Resolution No. 1397, (Exhibit UKR-15).
47 See para. 7.1.a above.

ii. goods which fall within the scope of the import bans on agricultural products,
raw materials and food imposed pursuant to Resolution No. 778, which are destined
for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic.
7.17. The 2016 transit restric tions and bans in item (c) above are among the measures that are
challenged by Ukraine in this dispute.48
7.18. Russia, for its part, has separately alleged that Ukraine has imposed economic sanctions
against Russia since 2015, as is evident from the following:
a. A request for consultations filed by Russia in May 2017 49, which alleges that Ukraine has
imposed import bans o n Russian food products, spirits and beer, cigarettes, railway and
tram track equipment, diesel -electric locomotives, chemicals and certain plant products ,
which were allegedly adopted by Ukraine on 30 December 2015. 50 The consultations
request also covers a number of other measures allegedly adopted by Ukraine in 2016,
including: (i ) restrictions on the importation or distribution of printed materials,
motion pictures, TV programs and other video products originating from Russia 51;
(ii) the exclusion of Russi an-used vehicles from an excise duty reduction on used
vehicles52; (iii) a number of personal, economic, and other sanctions in respect of Russian
persons (e.g. preventing movement of capital from Ukraine in respect of legal entities with
Russian shareholding, blocking of assets, bans on doing business) 53; and

48 See para. 7.1.b above.
49 WT/DS525/1, dated 1 June 2017. The alleged WTO-inconsistencies include Articles I:1, III:4, X and
XI:1 of the GATT 1994; Articles II, III, XI, XVI and XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS); and various provisions of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (Import Licensing
Agreement), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and
the TBT Agreement as well as aspects of Ukraine's WTO Accession Protocol. (Ibid. paras. 2 and 4-8.) The Panel
refers to Russia's request for consultations in WT/DS525/1 solely as factual background but does not link it to
Ukraine's complaint in the present dispute. (See Article 3.10 of the DSU.)
50 WT/DS525/1, p. 1. Russia refers in its consultations request to Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine No. 1147, "On the prohibition of importation of products originating in the Russian Federation into
the customs territory of Ukraine", dated 30 December 2015, (Exhibit RUS-19), as amended; and Resolution
No. 28 of 20 January 2016 "On Amendments to the List of Goods Originating in the Russian Federation and
Prohibited for Imports into Ukraine", which has not been submitted as an exhibit in this dispute. (Ibid. p. 1.)
51 Ibid. pp. 2 and 7. Russia's consultations request refers to Law No. 1780-VII of 8 December 2016,
"On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine in relation to Restricting Access to Foreign Printed Materials with
Anti-Ukrainian Content to the Ukrainian Market" and Law No. 159-VIII of Ukraine, dated 5 February 2015 and
Law No. 1046-VIII of Ukraine, dated 29 March 2016 "On Amendments to Article 15-1 of Law of Ukraine
"On Cinematography"". (Ibid.)
52 Ibid. pp. 3-4. Russia's consultations request refers to Law No. 1389-VIII of 31 May 2016,
"On Amendments to Subsection 5 of Section XX "Transitional Provisions" of the Tax Code of Ukraine regarding
the Promotion of Development of the Used Vehicles Market". (Ibid. p. 3.)
53 Ibid. pp. 4-7. Russia's consultations request refers to (a) Resolution No. 829-R of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 11 September 2014, "On Proposals for application of Personal Special and Other
Restrictive Measures"; (b) Law No. 1005-VIII of 16 February 2016 "On Enactment of Certain Laws of Ukraine
Aimed at the Improvement of the Privatization Process"; (c) Decree No. 756 of the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade of Ukraine, dated 28 April 2016, "On Application of Special Economic Sanctions –
Temporary Suspension of Foreign Economic Activity within the Territory of Ukraine – In Respect of Foreign
Economic Entities"; (d) Decree No. 63/2017 of the President of Ukraine, dated 16 March 2017, "On Decision of
the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 15 March 2017 'On Application of Personal Special
Economic and other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)'"; (e) Resolution No. 12 of the Board of the National Bank
of Ukraine, dated 21 February 2017, "On Amendments to Certain Regulations of the National Bank of Ukraine";
(f) Resolution No. 25 of the National Bank of Ukraine, dated 21 March 2017, "On Amendments to Resolution of
the National Bank of Ukraine of 1 October 2015 No. 654"; and (g) Resolution No. 399 of the National Bank of
Ukraine, dated 1 November 2016, "On Amendments to Resolution [of] the National Bank of Ukraine of 1
October 2015 No. 654". Russia's consultations request also refers to Decree No. 133/2017 of the President of
Ukraine, dated 15 May 2017, "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 28 April
2017 "On Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)"".
(WT/DS525/1, pp. 4-7.) In its second written submission in this dispute, Russia refers to Decree of the
President of Ukraine No. 133/2017, "On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
'On application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)'", dated 28 April 2017,
(Exhibit RUS-20). Russia states that this Decree contains a consolidated list of special economic measures
(i.e. sanctions) applied by Ukraine in respect of Russian legal and natural persons. (Russia's second written
submission, para. 28.)

(iv) the suspension of accreditation of journalists and representatives of certain Russian
mass media.54
b. Russia's contentions that Ukraine has restricted transit of banned Russian goods through
designated checkpoints at the Russia-Belarus border.55
c. Russia's contentions that sanctions imposed by Ukraine in respect of Russia have
expanded in 2018, with Ukraine allegedly banning the exportation of certain Ukrainian civil
aviation products, among other things.56
7.19. Russia also asserts that Ukraine suspended traffic through certain railway corridors on the
Ukraine-Russia border in June 2014, and suspended traffic through certain checkpoint s on the
Ukraine-Russia border in May and July of 2014 and then in February 2015.57
7.4 Order of analysis
7.20. This is the first dispute in which a WTO dispute settlement panel is asked to interpret
Article XXI of the GATT 1994 (or the equivalent provisions in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement)).58
7.21. Ukraine presents its case as an ordinary trade dispute in which Russia has imposed measures
that are inconsistent with certain of its obligations under the GATT 1994 and commitments in
Russia's Accession Protocol.
7.22. Russia, on the other hand, considers that the dispute involves obvious and serious national
security matters that Members have acknowledged should be kept out of the WTO, an organization
which is not designed or equipped to handle such matters. Russia cautions that involving the WTO
in political and security matters will upset the very delicate balance of rights and obligations under
the WTO Agreements and endanger the multilateral trading system.
7.23. Consistent with this position, Russia does not present arguments or evidence to rebut
Ukraine's specific claims of inconsistency with Articles V and X of the GATT 1994, or commitments
in Russia's Accession Protocol. Russia's case is confined to arguments that certain measures and
claims are outside the Panel's terms of reference, and its overarching argument that the Panel lacks

54 WT/DS525/1, dated 1 June 2017, p. 7. Russia's consultations request refers to
Resolution No. 185-VIII of the Verhovna Rada, "On the Temporary Accreditation Suspension of Journalists and
Representatives of Certain Russian Mass Media by Public Authorities", dated 12 February 2015. (Ibid.)
55 Russia's second written submission, para. 27 (referring to Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine No. 20, "On approval of the list of checkpoints through the state border of Ukraine, through which the
goods are imported in transit mode", dated 20 January 2016, (Exhibit RUS-16).)
56 Ibid. para. 29 (referring to Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 58/2018, "On the decision of the
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council 'Urgent measures on security of the national interests of the
state in the sphere of aircraft engine building'", dated 1 March 2018, (Exhibit RUS-22); and Decree of the
President of Ukraine No. 57/2018, "On entry into force of the Decision of the Council on National Security and
Defense of Ukraine of 1 March 2018 'On application of personal special economic and other restrictive
measures (sanctions)'", dated 6 March 2018, (Exhibit RUS-23)).
57 Ibid. para. 25. Ukraine suspended traffic through railway corridor 8 "Chervona Mohyla" (or
"Krasnaya Mogila") by way of a telegram from the Ukrainian railway company Ukrzaliznytsia, in which the
latter invoked Article 29 of the Railway Code of Ukraine, on the basis of "force majeure circumstances".
(Ibid. (referring to "Telegram of "Ukrzaliznytsia" (Ukrainian Railways) No. CZM-14/946", dated 6 June 2014,
(Exhibit RUS-14).) Ukraine suspended traffic through the Izvaryne checkpoint by the Ministry of Revenue and
Duties of Ukraine. (Ibid. (referring to "Print-screen of the website of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine", retrieved from: https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news/na-lyganshhini-stvorjujutsja-zagoni-prikordonnoi-
samooboroni/, (Exhibit RUS-15).) Ukraine suspended traffic through the checkpoint Uspenskaya-Kvashino in
accordance with the telegram of Ukrzaliznytsia, also on the basis of "force majeure circumstances". (Ibid.
(referring to "Telegram of 'Ukrzaliznytsia' (Ukrainian Railways) No. CZM-14/1134", dated 8 July 2014,
(Exhibit RUS-18).) Finally, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine suspended traffic through 23 checkpoints on the
Ukraine-Russia border. (Ibid. (referring to Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 106-r, "On the
closure of checkpoints across the state border", dated 18 February 2015, (Exhibit RUS-17).)
58 See Article XIVbis of the GATS and Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement.

jurisdiction to address any of the issues in this dispute owing to Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.24. The novel and exceptional features of this dispute, including Russia's argument that the Panel
lacks jurisdiction to evaluate the WTO-consistency of the measures, owing to Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, require that the Panel first determine the order of analysis that
it deems most appropriate for the present dispute .59 Accordingly, the Panel considers that it must
address the jurisdictional issues first before going into the merits.
7.25. The Panel must therefore determine , first, whether it has jurisdiction to rev iew
Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.60 If the Panel finds that it does not, then
it will be unable to make findings on Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with Articles V and X of the
GATT 1994 and with commitments in Russia's Accession Protocol.
7.26. As the Panel explains in greater detail in Section 7.5.3 below, Russia's argument that the
Panel lacks jurisdiction to address the matter is based on its interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of
the GATT 1994, i.e. as being totally "self-judging". Consequently, in order to address
Russia's jurisdictional objection, the Panel must first interpret Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.5 Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
7.5.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.27. Russia asserts that there was an emergency in international relations that arose in 2014,
evolved between 2014 and 2018, and continues to exist. 61 Russia asserts that this emergency
presented threats to Russia's essential security interests. 62 Russia argues that, under
Article XXI(b)(iii), both the determination of a Member's essential security interests and the
determination of whether any action is necessary for the protection of a Member's essential security
interests are at the sole discretion of the Member invoking the provision.63
7.28. While Russia acknowledges that the Panel was established with standard terms of reference
under Article 7.1 of the DSU 64, it argues that the Panel nevertheless lacks jurisdiction to evaluate
measures taken pursuant to Article XXI of t he GATT 1994.65 In Russia's view, the explicit wording
of Article XXI confers sole discretion on the Member invoking this Article to determine the necessity,
form, design and structure of the measures taken pursuant to Article XXI. 66 Russia considers that

59 The Appellate Body has stated that panels are free to structure the order of their analysis as they see
fit, unless there is a "mandatory sequence of analysis which, if not followed, would amount to an error of law"
or would "affect the substance of the analysis itself". (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports, para. 109. See also Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in
Tariff Program, para. 5.5.)
60 See also Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36.
61 Russia's first written submission, para. 16; and opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 26.
62 Russia's first written submission, para. 16. Russia characterizes the situation that gave rise to the
need to impose the transit measures at issue in this dispute as an internationally wrongful act, or an unfriendly
act of a foreign state or its bodies and officials, which involved unilateral actions applied in respect of Russia,
particularly by the European Union and Ukraine "in violation of the UN Charter and that are impairing the
authority of the UN Security Council". (Russia's second written submission, paras. 19 and 21.) Russia also
maintains that the original circumstances that led to the imposition of the challenged measures "were publicly
available and known to Ukraine". (Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 30.
See also Russia's second written submission, para. 18.)
63 Russia's first written submission, para. 47; and closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 16. See also Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 22-23; and response
to Panel question No. 1 after the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 1-3.
64 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 45. Moreover, Russia alleges that
certain measures and claims are outside the Panel's terms of reference owing to alleged defects in Ukraine's
panel request and in Ukraine's demonstration of the existence of certain measures. (See ibid. paras. 6-28.)
65 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46. See also Russia's first written
submission, para. 7.
66 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46.

the issues that arise from its invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) go beyond the scope of trade and
economic relations among Members and are outside the scope of the WTO:
[T]he WTO is not in a position to determine what essential security interests of a
Member are, what actions are necessary for protection of such essential security
interests, disclosure of what information may be contrary to the essential security
interests of a Member, what constitutes an emergency in international relations, and
whether such emergency exists in a particular case.67
7.29. Russia regards Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 as preserving the "right" of each Member to
react to wars and other emergencies in international relations in the way that the Member itself
considers necessary. Any other interpretation of Article XXI(b) would "result in interference in [the]
internal and external affairs of a sovereign state".68 Accordingly, it is sufficient for a Member to state
that the measures taken are actions that it considers necessary for the p rotection of its
essential security interests, taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.
A Member's subjective assessment cannot be "doubted or re -evaluated by any other party" or
judicial bodies as the measures in question are no t ordinary trade measures regularly assessed by
WTO panels.69
7.30. Russia therefore submits that the Panel should limit its findings to recognizing that Russia has
invoked Article XXI of the GATT 1994, "without engaging in any further exercise, given that this
panel lacks jurisdiction to evaluate measures taken with a reference to Article XXI of the GATT".70
7.31. Ukraine interprets Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as laying down an affirmative defence for
measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with GATT obligation s.71 Ukraine rejects the notion
that Article XXI provides for an exception to the rules on jurisdiction laid down in the GATT 1994 or
the DSU.72 Ukraine considers that the Panel has jurisdiction to examine and make findings and
recommendations with respect to each of the provisions of the covered agreements cited by either
Ukraine or Russia, in keeping with the Panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU and the
general standard of review under Article 11 of the DSU.73 Ukraine also considers that, if Article XXI
of the GATT 1994 were non-justiciable, it would imply that in a dispute involving a measure that is
WTO-inconsistent, the invoking Member, rather than a panel, would decide the outcome of the
dispute by determining that the WTO -inconsistent me asure is nonetheless justified. In
Ukraine's view, such unilateral determination by an invoking Member would be contrary to
Article 23.1 of the DSU.74
7.32. Ukraine argues that Russia, by merely referring to an emergency in international relations
that occurred in 2014, fails to discharge its burden to show the legal and factual elements of a
defence under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, namely, that there was a serious disruption in
international relations constituting an emergency that is alike a war that is sufficiently connected to
Russia so as to result in a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to its essential security interests
and therefore to justify each and every measure at issue as being necessary to protect those

67 Russia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6. Russia also argues that the
Panel, and the WTO more generally, "being trade mechanisms are not in a position to determine whether
sovereign states are at war. Similar logic applies to 'other emergency in international relations'. Only sovereign
states may declare the status of their relations with other sovereign states." (Ibid. para. 13.)
68 Ibid. para. 12.
69 Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 23. See also Russia's second
integrated executive summary, para. 31. Russia therefore considers that Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994, as
well as Article XXI(a) are "self-judging". (Russia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 11.)
70 Ibid. para. 20.
71 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 95. Ukraine points to the fact that
the phrase "[n]othing in this Agreement", which introduces Article XXI, is the same phrase that introduces the
general exceptions provision in Article XX. (Ibid.)
72 Ibid. para. 96. Ukraine also notes that the DSU does not contain a provision providing for a security
exception, nor does any other provision of the GATT 1994 or of the other WTO covered agreements offer a
basis for excluding Article XXI from the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body. (Ibid.)
73 Ibid. paras. 98-99.
74 Ibid. paras. 103-107.

interests.75 Ukraine also argues that Russia's allegation that the basis for the measures and the
original circumstances leading to their imposition were publicly available and known to Ukraine is of
no consequence in determining whether Russia has satisfied its burden of proof. 76 Ukraine submits
that the facts before the Panel show that Decree No. 1 was adopted due to the entry into force of
the economic part of the EU -Ukraine Association Agreement, and that the text of the instruments
implementing the 2014 measures shows that these were taken "[i]n view of detection of gross
violations during the transit of such goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus".77 Finally,
Ukraine argues that the determination of whether the action was taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations under subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) is to be objectively
made by the Panel.78
7.33. Ukraine argues that, although the text of Article XXI( b) expressly states that it is for the
invoking Member to decide what action it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests, this does not mean that the Member enjoys "total discretion".79 Had the
standard been "total discretion", there would have been no reason to include separate paragraphs
in Article XXI and to distinguish between different types of security interests that may be invoked in
order to justify a measure that is otherwise inconsistent with the GATT 1994. 80 Furthermore, a
panel's objective assessment must include an examination of whether a Member invoking Article XXI
has done so in good faith, notwithstanding the absence of an introductory paragraph similar to the
chapeau to Article XX.81
7.34. As to the standard of review under Article XXI(b)(iii), Ukraine argues that a panel's objective
assessment must include an examination of whether the invoking Member has applied Article XXI in
good faith and therefore has not abused the invocation "to pursue protectionist objectives or to apply
a disguised restriction on trade".82 Ukraine argues that, based on the ordinary meaning of the text
of Article XXI(b) and similar to the analysis under the subparagraphs of Article XX, justification under
Article XXI also requires that there be a rational relationship between the action and the protection
of the essential security interest at issue. 83 This analysis involves a considerat ion of the structure,
content and design of the challenged measures. The phrase "for the protection of its essential
security interests" should be interpreted in the light of the case law on Article XX of the GATT 1994
(in particular, regarding Article XX( a) on the protection of public morals) to mean that "all
WTO Members have the right to determine their own level of protection of essential security
interests", from which it would follow that a panel must not second-guess that level of protection.84
However, it is for panels rather than for Members to interpret the phrases "for the protection of its
essential security interests" and "which it considers necessary" in accordance with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law. 85 In light of those interpretations, a panel must then
establish: (i) whether the interests or reasons advanced by a defendant in connection with the
measures at issue can reasonably be considered as falling within the meaning of the phrase
"its essential security interests" and (ii) whether the measures at issue are directed at safeguarding

75 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 150 and 158; and opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 64. See also Ukraine's second written submission,
paras. 133-136 and 138.
76 Ukraine's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6; and second written submission,
para. 137. Moreover, Ukraine argues that Russia may not rely on Article XXI(a) of the GATT 1994 to evade its
burden of proof under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994. (See Ukraine's closing statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 11; and second written submission, paras. 159-163.)
77 Instruction No. FS-NV-7/22886 of the Rosselkhoznadzor, dated 21 November 2014, (Veterinary
Instruction), (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10). See also Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 27, 32-33, and 58;
78 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 148-149.
79 Ibid. para. 135.
80 Ibid. paras. 109-110; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the second meeting,
para. 5.
81 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 122-123.
82 Ibid. paras. 122 and 125. (fn omitted)
83 Ibid. paras. 137-139.
84 Ibid. para. 141. Ukraine submits that it is "not contested in these proceedings that it is for each
WTO Member to define what matters affect its national security and what level of protection it pursues. Each
WTO Member's position might be different and may evolve over time. Both matters fall outside the scope of
review of a panel." (Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 2 following the second meeting of the Panel,
para. 78.)
85 Ukraine considers that not every security interest will be an "essential" security interest.
(Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel. paras. 143-145.)

the defendant's security interests, meaning that there is a rational relationship between the action
taken and the protection of the essential security interest at issue. 86 If a panel finds that the
Member's measure is taken "for the protection of its essential security interests", a panel would then
review whether, based on the facts available, the defendant "could reasonably arrive at the
conclusion that the measures taken are necessary for protecting its essential security interests".87
7.5.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.35. Australia argues that Article 7 of the DSU vests the Panel with jurisdiction to examine and
make findings with respect to each of the relevant provisions in the covered agreements that Ukraine
and Russia have cited.88 Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, which Australia
considers to be an exception to Members' obligations under the GATT 1994, places the provision
squarely within the Panel's jurisdiction.89
7.36. Australia regards the language "which it considers necessary" in the first part of Article XXI(b)
to indicate that it is for a Member to determine both its essential security interests and the actions
it considers necessary for their protection. However, this deference to the determinations of a
Member does not preclude a panel from undertaking any review of a Member's invocation of
Article XXI(b).90 Rather, in reviewing the "necessity" of an action under Article XXI(b), a panel is
limited to determining whether the Member in fact considers the action necessary, for example, by
reference to the Member's statements and conduct. Australia considers that although the nature and
scope of review of the "necessity" aspect is limited, a panel does have a broader role in determining
whether that (necessary) action was taken "for the protection of " a Member's essential security
interests. In Australia's view, to arrive at such a determination, a panel should examine if there is a
"sufficient nexus" between the action taken and the Member's essential security interests.91
7.37. Brazil argues that, by invoking Article XXI, Russia did the opposite of excluding the
Panel's jurisdiction: it obliged the Panel to examine the provision by bringing it into the "matter" at
hand.92 Moreover, an exclusion of jurisdiction would deprive the complainant of its right to a decision
and would be contrary to Article 3.3 of the DSU. 93 Brazil considers Art icle XXI to be an
affirmative defence. Brazil interprets Article XXI(b) as containing both a "subjective" component,
i.e. a judgment regarding the necessity of a measure, and an "objective component", which relates
to the presence of at least one of the ci rcumstances listed in subparagraphs (i) through (iii). 94
Although the language "which it considers" in the first part of Article XXI(b) confers a great deal of

86 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 2 following the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 76-80. See
also Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 following the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 8 and 10.
87 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 2 following the first meeting of the Panel, para. 81. Ukraine
submits that the wording of the phrase "which it considers necessary" suggests that the standard of review
cannot be the same as the standard of review with respect to the necessity test under Article XX of the
GATT 1994. (Ibid.) In its closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel (at para. 5) and in its response
to Panel question No. 1 following the second meeting of the Panel (at para. 11), Ukraine uses the term
"plausibly" (rather than reasonably) to describe this standard of review.
88 Australia's third-party submission, paras. 8-10.
89 Australia's third-party statement, paras. 2 and 9.
90 Ibid. para. 11.
91 Ibid. paras. 15 and 17. (emphasis original) Australia submits that, if action taken by a Member is not
capable of making some contribution to protecting its essential security interests, it would be reasonable for a
panel to determine that the action was not in fact taken for such a purpose under Article XXI(b).
(Ibid. para. 18.)
92 Brazil's third-party statement, para. 8.
93 Ibid. para. 9. Brazil refers to "the negotiation history" of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 and state
practice to argue that it was never the intention of the Members that the WTO in general or the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism in particular would be the proper venue to "discuss security matters".
(Brazil's third-party submission, para. 5.) However, Brazil notes that Members were at the same time mindful
that Article XXI could be "improperly used to prevent measures of a strictly commercial nature from being
challenged in the dispute settlement mechanism". (Ibid. para. 6.) Brazil concludes that, in order to strike a
balance, "there was an option to limit the circumstances in which Article XXI may be invoked, which seems to
indicate that it was a common understanding that differences regarding the application of Article XXI would not
necessarily fall outside the purview of a Panel, should a Member consider that those circumstances were not in
place." (Ibid.)
94 Brazil's third-party statement, para. 16. Brazil argues that a panel should begin its analysis by
determining whether one or more of the circumstances in subparagraphs (i) through (iii) are present. If none
are present, then the panel need not proceed with the rest of the analysis. (Ibid. para. 17.)

discretion on the Member regarding the necessity of the measure, a panel must nevertheless review
the Member's motivation for invoking Article XXI(b)(iii) to ensure that there is some connection
between the measure and the state of war or other emergency in international relations, and whether
there is a "plausible link" between the measure and the purpose stated in the Member's motivation
for imposing the measure.95
7.38. Brazil considers that, unlike the determination of whether an action relates to
fissionable materials, traffic in arms, or war, in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of Article XXI(b), the
question of what constitutes an emergency in international relations is "quite subjective and quite
difficult to discern without entering into a discussion on what constitutes a Member's national
security interest".96 Nevertheless, Brazil considers that the invoking Member bears the burden of
adducing evidence that the challenged measures constitute action taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations.97 An invoking Member must also demonstrate some degree of
connection between the measure and the state of war or other emergency in international relations,
and whether there is a plausible link between the measure that the Member wishes to justify and
the purpose stated in its motivation.98
7.39. Canada argues that if Article XXI of the GATT 1994 is invoked by a Member in a dispute, then
its applicability is justiciable unless consideration of the Article has been excluded from a
panel's terms of reference.99 Canada further observes that the DSU provides that panels do not have
the discretion to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by their terms of reference,
nor do they have the discretion not to discharge the obligations imposed on them by Article 11 of
the DSU.100 While Canada considers that Article XXI is an exception which can be invoked by a
Member to justify measures that would otherwise not be consistent with its WTO obligations, it also
regards Article XXI as "structurally and textually different from Article XX ".101 It therefore cautions
against importing tests developed in the jurisprudence to interpret provisions such as Article XX.102
7.40. Canada interprets Article XXI(b)(iii) as providing for a " subjective" standard, according to
which the invoking Member determines the interests, actions and necessity of actions, as well as the
satisfaction of the conditions in subparagraph (iii).103 While Canada considers the subjective standard
and the particularly sensitive nature of the subject matter of Article XXI to mean that
an invoking Member must be accorded a "high level of deference" by a panel, it also considers that
an invoking Member must substantiate (albeit at a low standard) its good faith belief that the
elements for its invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) exist.104
7.41. China argues that the Panel has jurisdiction to review Russia's invocation of Article XXI of the
GATT 1994 on the basis of the Panel's standard terms of reference and Articles 7.1 and 7.2 of the
DSU.105 China considers that Russia has invoked Article XXI as a defence to Ukraine's claims of
inconsistency.106 China urges the Panel to exercise extreme caution in its assessment of
Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii), in order to maintain the delicate balance between
preventing abuse of Article XXI and evasion of WTO obligations, on the one hand, and not prejudicing
a Member's right to protect its essential security interests, including a Member's "sole discretion"
regarding its own security interests, on the other hand.107 China refers to the principle of good faith

95 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 28-30.
96 Ibid. para. 8. For this reason, and in light of the absence of a common understanding of the scope of
rights and obligations under Article XXI, Brazil cautions the Panel against "any interpretation that could impair
a Member's ability to decide on the need to adopt the measures necessary to protect its national security".
(Ibid. para. 9.)
97 Brazil submits that Article XXI(a) of the GATT 1994 should not be interpreted as precluding the need
for a Member to motivate its recourse to the exceptions of Article XXI(b). (Brazil's third-party statement,
para. 26.)
98 Ibid. paras. 28-29.
99 Canada's third-party statement, para. 4.
100 Canada's letter to the Chairman of the Panel, dated 14 November 2017.
101 Canada's third-party statement, para. 6.
102 Ibid. para. 5.
103 Ibid. para. 6.
104 Ibid. para. 8.
105 China's third-party statement, paras. 3-5.
106 Ibid. para. 6.
107 China's third-party statement, para. 18.

embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and argues that Members
invoking Article XXI(b) should adhere to the principle of good faith.108
7.42. The European Union argues that Article XXI of the GATT 1994 does not provide for an
exception to the rules on jurisdiction laid down in the DSU o r to the special rules on consultations
and dispute settlement contained in Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994.109
7.43. Given the absence in Article XXI of an equivalent to the chapeau in Article XX, the analysis of
Article XXI should consider whether a measure addresses the particular interest specified, and that
there is a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected.110 The European Union
argues that the terms "which it considers" in the first part of Article XXI(b) qualify only the term
"necessary". Therefore, the existence of a war or other emergency in international relations in
subparagraph (iii) should be interpreted to refer to objective factual circumstances which can be
fully reviewed by panels.111 While "essential security interests" should be interpreted so as to allow
Members to identify their own security interests and their desired level of protection, a panel should,
on the basis of the reasons provided by the invoking Member, review whether the interests at stake
can "reasonab ly" or "plausibly" be considered essential security interests. 112 A panel must also
review whether the action is "capable" of protecting a security interest from a threat. The
European Union considers that the terms "which it considers" imply that "in principle" each Member
may determine for itself whether a measure is "necessary" for the protection of its essential security
interests.113 A panel should nevertheless review this determination, albeit with due deference, to
assess whether the invoking Member can plausibly consider the measure necessary and whether the
measure is "applied" in good faith. This requires the invoking Member to provide the panel with an
explanation as to why it considered the measure necessary. 114 Finally, the European Union argues
that, when assessing the necessity of the measure and the existence of reasonably available
alternatives, a panel should ascertain whether the interests of third parties which may be affected
were properly taken into account.115
7.44. Japan argues that consideration of Russia's invocation of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 is
within the Panel's terms of reference. 116 However, Japan also considers that Article XXI of the
GATT 1994 is an "extraordinary provision" in that it recognizes the vital importance of
Members' essential security interests, and the fundamental nature of their sovereign right to pursue
such vital interests. This is reflected in the "deferential language" used in the provision. This being
so, it may impose an "undue burden" on the WTO dispute settlement sys tem to require panels to
review a Member's invocation of Article XXI. Japan therefore urges the parties to make every effort
to seek a mutually acceptable solution "in order to maintain the effective functioning of the WTO".117
7.45. Japan also notes the critical importance of national security interests to
Members' fundamental sovereignty and the risk of the Panel adopting any interpretation that could
impair a Member's ability to decide on the need to adopt measures necessary to protect its national
security.118 Japan therefore urges the Panel to "grant appropriate deference to the
Members' judgement as to the necessity of taking actions to protect their essential security

108 China's third-party statement, para. 19.
109 European Union's third-party submission, para. 14; and third-party statement, para. 4.
The European Union argues that the "matter" before the Panel in this case includes the defence under
Article XXI invoked by Russia, as the Panel does not have special terms of reference.
(European Union's third-party statement, para. 4.) The European Union further argues that it would be
contrary to the objectives of the DSU reflected in Articles 3.2 and 23 to interpret Article XXI of the GATT 1994
as being non-justiciable because it would mean that the invoking Member would unilaterally decide the
outcome of a dispute. (Ibid. para. 5.)
110 Ibid. para. 11.
111 Ibid. para. 14.
112 Ibid. para. 17.
113 Ibid. para. 21. The European Union submits that the term "necessary" in Article XXI(b) should be
given the same meaning as in Article XX. (Ibid.)
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. para. 23. The European Union argues that this is required by the preamble of the
Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement (1982 Decision). (Ibid.)
116 Japan's third-party submission, para. 30.
117 Japan's third-party statement, paras. 7-8.
118 Ibid. para. 10 (referring to Australia's third-party submission, para. 25; and
Brazil's third-party submission, para. 9).

interests".119 At the same time, Japan acknowledges that subparagraph (b)(iii) carefully
circumscribes the situations that would allow Members to invoke a defence based on each
Member's essential security interests. In addition, in Japan's view, considering the object and
purpose of the GATT 1994 and the preparatory work for the ITO Charter, the discretion accorded to
Members in deciding upon the actions that are necessary to protect their essential security interests
is "not unbounded and must be exercised with extreme caution".120
7.46. Moldova disagrees with Russia's argument that the mere invocation of A rticle XXI(b)(iii)
prevents WTO panels from reviewing trade issues that would otherwise be WTO -inconsistent.121
Moldova therefore considers that, while Members have the right to define for themselves their
essential security interests, and declare the necessity of protecting those interests, WTO panels have
the right to review whether such Members apply WTO -inconsistent measures in good faith and in
accordance with the requirements of Article XXI.122
7.47. Moldova considers that the Panel needs to assess whether the invoking Member "genuinely
believes" that the measure taken is necessary to protect such Member's essential security interests.
Moldova argues that the jurisprudence concerning the "necessity" of a measure sought to be justified
under Articles XX(a), (b) or (d) of the GATT 1994 could be relevant to a panel's assessment of the
necessity of action under Article XXI(b). Accordingly, Moldova argues that a panel assessing whether
an action is "necessary" for purposes of Article XXI(b) should undertake a "weighi ng and balancing
exercise", which considers the importance of the essential security interests or values at stake, the
extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade
restrictiveness, complemented by an analysis of w hether the measure is "apt to make a material
contribution to the achievement of its objective ".123 Such an exercise should also include a
determination of whether a WTO -consistent alternative measure is reasonably available to the
invoking Member. 124 A panel should also determine if the measures at issue protect
"essential security interests", which must meet a higher standard than, and can be distinguished
from, "non -essential security interests ".125 Moldova considers that the invoking Member should
demonstrate to a panel that "in addition to establishing the objective prerequisites in Article XXI(b)[]
regarding the existence of an essential security interest", the measure does not "intentionally serve
protectionist purposes".126
7.48. Singapore argues that the Panel has jurisdiction to consider Russia's invocation of Article XXI,
on the basis of the Panel's standard terms of reference and Articles 7.1 and 7.2 of the DSU. 127
Singapore considers that the language "it considers necessary" in the first part of Article XXI(b)
indicates that the invoking Member is allowed to determine "with a significant degree of subjectivity"
what action it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests. 128 Singapore contrasts
this "self-judging" aspect of Article XXI(b) with the text of Article XX. 129 Singapore argues that the
"key" phrase "it considers necessary" in the first part of Article XXI(b) has been deliberately drafted
to give a Member wide latitude to determi ne both the action necessary for the protecti on of its

119 Japan's third-party statement, para. 10.
120 Ibid. para. 11.
121 Moldova's third-party submission, para. 18.
122 Ibid. para. 21. Moldova points to the creation of the WTO as an international organization with a
binding dispute settlement system administered by the DSB and the fact that the only mechanism for
"opting-out" of the application of the obligations under the covered agreements is through the mechanism
envisaged in Article XIII:1 of the WTO Agreement, which Russia did not invoke when it acceded to the WTO.
(Ibid. paras. 23-24.)
123 Moldova's third-party statement, para. 19.
124 Ibid. para. 22.
125 Ibid. para. 20.
126 Ibid. para. 21.
127 Singapore's third-party statement, paras. 8-11.
128 Ibid. paras. 13-14. Singapore argues that WTO provisions which involve some margin of appreciation
for a Member, such as the determination of the appropriate level of protection under the SPS Agreement, are
not "anywhere close" to being as express and definitive regarding their "self-judging" nature as Article XXI(b).
Therefore, a higher level of deference—i.e. a "significant margin of appreciation"—should be accorded to a
Member's chosen level of protection, assessment of risk and the necessity of the measure taken for the
protection of its essential security interests. (Ibid. paras. 18-19.)
129 Given the textual differences between Articles XX and XXI, Singapore does not agree with an
interpretation of Article XXI(b) which seeks to apply to that provision the analytical framework or necessity test
developed under Article XX. (Singapore's third-party statement, para. 15.)

essential security interests (including the nature, scope and duration of the measure) and the
necessity of the measure.130 Singapore argues that a "significant margin of appreciation" should be
accorded to a Member's assessments of its chosen level of protection and risk, as well as the
necessity of a measure taken for the protection of its essential security interests.131
7.49. On the other hand, Singapore considers that Members should exercise their discretion under
Article XXI(b) in accordance with the principle of good faith and the doctrine of abuse of rights.
Thus, a Member must, in good faith —albeit subjectively —consider that there is a threat to its
essential security interest and that its chosen action is necessary for the protection of that essential
security interest.132 Singapore also argues that the determination of the existence of an "emergency
in international relations" under subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) is "inherently subjective", with
the sensitivities implicated in a Member's assessment of its security threats being equally applicable
to a determination of whether an "emergency in international relations" exists.133 Singapore submits
that, even if the Panel were to conduct a "more intrusive " review of a Member's invocation of
Article XXI(b), it should be limited to an examination of whether the disputed measure was
implemented in a "non -capricious manner", rather than conducting an examination that
"approximates an objective substantive review".134
7.50. Turkey argues that the text of Article XXI(b), especially the clause "which it considers
necessary" means that "to a very large extent", it is left to the judgment of the invoking Member to
determine which measures it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.
However, while the language of Article XXI leaves the determination of whether action is necessary
for the protection of essential security interests to the Member taking the action, this discretion is
not unqualified. Turkey regards the term "essential", which qualifies "security interests", to indicate
an intention to draw a boundary to prevent abuses of power such as sheltering commercial measures
behind the security exception. 135 Suggesting that the Panel should be guided by the general
exception rules of the GATT 1994, Turkey considers that a complain ing Member should make its
prima facie case of inconsistency, and then the respond ing Member should put forward, inter alia,
its argument that the measure can be ju stified under Article XXI. A panel, when reviewing the
responding Member's invocation of Article XXI, should consider the "large margin of discretion"
accorded to the invoking Member.136
7.51. The United States , in a letter to the Chair of the Panel submitted on the due date for
third-party submissions, argues that the Panel "lacks the authority to review the invocation of
Article XXI and to make findings on the claims raised in this dispute".137 The reason advanced is that
every WTO Member retains the authority to determine for itself those matters that it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, as "reflected" in the text of Article XXI
of the GATT 1994.138 The United States describes this as an "inherent right" that has been repeatedly
recognized by GATT contracting parties and WTO Members.139
7.52. In its subsequent submissions, the United States clarifies that it considers the Panel to have
jurisdiction in the context of this dispute "in the sense that the DSB established it, and placed the
matter raised in Ukraine's complaint within the Panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the
DSU".140 However, it considers that the dispute is "non-justiciable" because there are no legal criteria

130 Singapore's third-party statement, para. 13.
131 Ibid. para. 19.
132 Ibid. para. 21. Singapore also argues that responses to threats to essential security interests involve
the subjective judgment of a Member and depend on the particular context and circumstances involved.
(Ibid. paras. 16-17.)
133 Ibid. para. 23.
134 Ibid. para. 22.
135 Turkey's third-party statement, para. 7.
136 Ibid. para. 8.
137 Letter from the United States to the Chair of the Panel, dated 7 November 2017, para. 4.
138 Ibid. para. 2.
139 In addition, the United States asserts that "[i]ssues of national security are political matters not
susceptible for review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement." (Ibid.)
140 United States' third-party statement, para. 4; and response to Panel question No. 1, para. 17. The
United States distinguishes between "jurisdiction"—meaning, in the present context, the "extent of power of
the Panel under the DSU to make legal decisions in this dispute"—and "justiciability", in the sense of whether
an issue may be subject to findings by the Panel under the DSU. The United States also defines "justiciability"

by which the issue of a Member's consideration of its essential security interests can be judged. 141
The United States bases its position on its interpretation of the text of Article XXI, specifically, the
"self-judging" language of the chapeau in Article XXI(b) " which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests ".142 For the United States, the "self-judging" nature of
Article XXI(b)(iii) establishes that its invocation by a Member is "non -justiciable", and "is therefore
not capable of findings by a panel" , obviating the possibility of making recommendations under
Article 19.1 of the DSU in this dispute.143
7.5.3 Whether the Panel has jurisdiction to review Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
7.53. The Panel recalls that i nternational adjudicative tribunals, including WTO dispute settlement
panels, possess inherent jurisdiction which derives from the exercise of their adjudicative function.144
One aspect of this inherent jurisdiction is the power to determine all matters arising in relation to
the exercise of their own substantive jurisdiction.145
7.54. Article 1.1 of the DSU provides that the rules and procedures of the DSU shall apply to
disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements
listed in Appendix 1 (the covered agreements). The covered agreements include, inter alia, the
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, including the GATT 1994, more particularly Articles XXII
and XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU. Article 1.2 of the DSU provides that the rules and
procedures of the DSU shall apply subject to such special or additional rules on dispute settlement
contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to the DSU. Appendix 2 of the
DSU does not refer to any special or additional rules of procedure applying to disputes in which
Article XXI of the GATT 1994 is invoked.
7.55. The Panel recalls that Ukraine requested the DSB to establish a panel pursuant to the
provisions of the DSU and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994. On 21 March 2017, the DSB established
the Panel in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference as provided in
Article 7.1 of the DSU. Article 7.2 of the DSU requires that the Panel address the relevant provisions
in any covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.146
7.56. Given the absence in the DSU of any special or additional rules of procedure applying to
disputes involving Article XXI of the GATT 1994, Russia's invocation of Article X XI(b)(iii) is within
the Panel's terms of reference for the purposes of the DSU.
7.57. Russia argues, however, that the Panel lacks jurisdiction to review Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii). For Russia, the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by a Member renders its actions
immune from scrutiny by a WTO dispute settlement panel. Russia's argument is based on its

as whether a matter is capable of being adjudicated, or suitable for adjudication. (United States' third-party
statement, para. 3; and response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 16-19.)
141 United States' response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 18 and 22.
142 United States' third-party statement, paras. 5, 11-12 and 34-36. (emphasis original) Additionally, in
response to a question from the Panel, the United States argues that Members agreed to remove the
invocation of the essential security exception from multilateral judgment when they agreed to the
"self-judging" text included in Article XXI. (United States' response to Panel question No. 1, para. 22; and
General US Answer to questions from the Panel and the Russian Federation, paras. 1-15.)
143 United States' response to Panel question No. 1, para. 17. See also United States' third-party
statement, paras. 2-3, 5 and 7.
144 See International Court of Justice, Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, Nuclear Tests Case
(Australia v. France) (1974) ICJ Reports, pp. 259-260; and International Court of Justice,
Preliminary Objections, Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) (1963)
ICJ Reports, pp. 29-31. The Appellate Body has stated that WTO panels have certain powers that are inherent
in their adjudicative function. (See Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 45.)
145 This is known as the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in German, or compétence de la compétence
in French. The Appellate Body has held that panels have the power to determine the extent of their jurisdiction.
(See Appellate Body Reports, US – 1916 Act, fn 30 to para. 54; and Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US),
para. 36.)
146 See also Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 49. The Appellate Body has
also stated that, as a matter of due process and the proper exercise of the judicial function, panels are
required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to a dispute. (Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36.)

interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) as "self-judging".147 According to this argument, Article XXI(b)(iii)
carves out from a panel's jurisdiction ratione materiae actions that a Member considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations. Russia's jurisdic tional plea is that, based on its interpretation of
Article XXI(b)(iii), it has met the conditions for invoking the provision.
7.58. As previously noted, the Panel's evaluation of Russia's jurisdictional plea requires it, in the
first place, to interpret Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 in order to determine whether, by virtue
of the language of this provision, the power to decide whether the requirements for the application
of the provision are met is vested exclusively in the Member invoking the provision, or whether the
Panel retains the power to review such a decision concerning any of these requirements.
7.5.3.1 Meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
7.59. The Panel begins by recalling that Article 3.2 of the DSU recognizes that interpretive issues
arising in WTO dispute settlement are to be resolved through the application of customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. It is well established —including in previous WTO disputes
—that these rules cover those codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention). Article 31(1) provides:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its o bject and
purpose.
7.60. Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 is part of the "Security Exceptions" set forth in Article XXI,
which provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
7.61. The introduction to Article XXI states that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed"
followed by three paragraphs that are separated by the conjunction "or". Paragraph (a) of Article XXI
describes action that may not be required of a Member, and paragraphs (b) and (c) describe action
which a Member may not be prevented from taking, notwithstanding that Member's obligations
under the GATT 1994.

147 See Russia's first written submission, paras. 5-6 and 40-48; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 46; and closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 8 and 12.

7.5.3.1.1 Whether the clause in the chapeau of Article XXI(b) qualifies the determination
of the matters in the enumerated subparagraphs of that provision
7.62. Paragraph (b) of Article XXI includes an introductory part (chapeau), which qualifies action
that a Member may not be prevented from taking as that "which [the Member] considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests".
7.63. The text of the chapeau of Article XXI (b) can be read in different ways and can thus
accommodate more than one interpretation of the adjectival clause "which it considers ".
The adjectival clause can be read to qualify only the word "necessary", i.e. the necessity of the
measures for the protection of "its essential security interests"; or to qualify also the determination
of these "essential security interests"; or finally and maximally, to qualify the determination of the
matters described in the three subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) as well.
7.64. The Panel starts by testing this last , most extensive hypothesis, i.e. whether the adjectival
clause "which it considers" in the chapeau of Article XXI(b) qualifies the determination of the sets of
circumstances described in the enumerated subparagraphs of Article XXI(b). The Panel will leave for
the moment the examination of the two other interpretive hypotheses, which bear exclusively on
the chapeau.148
7.65. As mentioned above, the mere meaning of the words and the grammatical construction of the
provision can accommodate an interpretation in which the adjectival clause "wh ich it considers"
qualifies the determinations in the three enumerated subparagraphs. But if one considers the logical
structure of the provision, it is apparent that the three sets of circumstances under subparagraphs (i)
to (iii) of Article XXI(b) operate as limitative qualifying clauses; in other words, they qualify and limit
the exercise of the discretion accorded to Members under the chapeau to these circumstances. Does
it stand to reason , given their limitative function , to leave their determination e xclusively to the
discretion of the in voking Member? And what would be the use , or effet utile, and added value of
these limitative qualifying clauses in the enumerated subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) , under such
an interpretation?
7.66. A similar logical query is whether the subject -matter of each of the enumerated
subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) lends itself to purely subjective discretionary determination.
In answering this last question, t he Panel will focus on the last set of circumstances, envisaged in
subparagraph (iii), to determine whether, given their nature, the evaluation of these circumstances
can be left wholly to the discretion of the Member invoking the provision , or is designed to be
conducted objectively, by a dispute settlement panel.
7.67. As previously noted, the words of the chapeau of Article XXI(b) are followed by the three
enumerated subparagraphs, which are relative clauses qualifying the sentence in the chapeau,
separated from each other by semicolons. They provide that the action referred to in the chapeau
must be:
i. "relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived";
ii. "relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment";
iii. "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations".
7.68. Given that these subject matters—i.e. the "fissionable materials …", "traffic in arms …", and
situations of "war or other emergency in international relations " described in the enumerated
subparagraphs—are substantially different, it is obvious that these subparagraphs establish
alternative (rather than cumulative) requirements that the action in question must meet in order to
fall within the ambit of Article XXI(b).
7.69. The connection between the action and the materials or the traffic described in
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) is specified by the phrase "relating to". The phrase "relating to", as used

148 See Section 7.5.6 below.

in Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, has been interpreted by the Appellate Body to require a "close
and genuine relationship of ends and means" between the measure and the objective of the Member
adopting the measure.149 This is an objective relationship between the ends and the means, subject
to objective determination.
7.70. The phrase "taken in time of" in subparagraph (iii) describes the connection between the
action and the event s of war or other emergency in international re lations in that subparagraph .
The Panel understands this phrase to require that the action be taken during the war or other
emergency in international relations. This chronological concurrence is also an objective fact,
amenable to objective determination.
7.71. Moreover, as for the circumstances referred to in subparagraph (iii), the existence of a war ,
as one characteristic example of a larger category of "emergency in international relations", is clearly
capable of objective determination. Although the confines of an "emergency in internation al
relations" are less clear than those of the matters addressed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), and of
"war" under subparagraph (iii), it is clear that an "emergency in international relations" can only be
understood, in the context of the other matters addressed in the subparagraphs, as belonging to the
same category of objective facts that are amenable to objective determination.
7.72. The use of the conjunction "or" with the adjective "other" in "war or other emergency in
international relations" in subparagraph (iii) indicates that war is one example of the larger category
of "emergency in international relations ". War refers to armed confl ict. Armed conflict may occur
between states (international armed conflict), or between governmental forces and private ar med
groups, or between such groups within the same state (non -international armed conflict). The
dictionary definition of "emergency" includes a "situation, esp. of danger or conflict, that arises
unexpectedly and requires urgent action", and a "pressing need … a condition or danger or disaster
throughout a region".150
7.73. "International relations" is defined generally to mean " world politics ", or "global political
interaction, primarily among sovereign states".151
7.74. The Panel also take s into account, as context fo r the interpretation of an "emergency in
international relations" in subparagraph (iii), the matters addressed by subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of
Article XXI(b), which cover fissionable materials, and traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war, as well as traffic in goods and materials for the purpose of supplying a military establishment.
While the enumerated subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) establish alternative requirements, the
matters addressed by those subparagraphs give rise to similar or convergent concerns, which can
be formulated in terms of the specific security interests that arise from the matters addressed in
each of them . T hose interests, like the interests that arise from a situation of war in
subparagraph (iii) itself, are all defence and military interests, as well as maintenance of law and
public order interests. An "emergency in international relations" must be understood as eliciting the
same type of interests as those arising from the other matters addressed in the enumerat ed
subparagraphs of Article XXI(b).
7.75. Moreover, the reference to "war" in conjunction with "or other emergency in international
relations" in subparagraph (iii) , and the interests that generally arise during war, and from the
matters addressed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), suggest that political or economic differences
between Members are not sufficient , of themselves, to constitute an emergency in international

149 Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, para. 136; China – Raw Materials, para. 355; and
China – Rare Earths, para. 5.90.
150 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press 2007),
Vol. 2, p. 819. The Panel observes that in the GATT 1994, the term "emergency" is used in only two places.
First, the term is employed in Article XXI(b)(iii) as part of the phrase "other emergency in international
relations". Second, the term appears in the title of Article XIX, which refers to "emergency action on imports of
particular products". The word "emergency" is not, however, used in the text of Article XIX itself.
151 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edn, B.A. Garner (ed.) (West Group 2004), p. 836. The same concept is
used in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which provides that "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." (Charter of the United Nations,
done at San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1 UN Treaty Series XVI, available at:
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/Part/un_charter.pdf.)

relations for purposes of subparagraph (iii) . Indeed, it is normal to expect that Members will, from
time to time, encounter political or economic conflicts with other Members or states. While such
conflicts could sometimes be considered urgent or serious i n a political sense, they will not be
"emergencies in international relations" within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) unless they give
rise to defence and military interests, or maintenance of law and public order interests.
7.76. An emergency in internationa l relations would , therefore, appear to refer generally to a
situation of armed conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened tension or crisis, or of general
instability engulfing or surrounding a state.152 Such situations give rise to particular types of interests
for the Member in question, i.e. defence or military interests, or maintenance of law and public order
interests.153
7.77. Therefore, as the existence of an emergency in international relations is an objective state of
affairs, the determination of whether the action was "taken in time of" an "emergency in international
relations" under subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) is that of an objective fact, subject to objective
determination.
7.78. As a next step, the Panel considers whether the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) also
supports an inter pretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) which mandates an objective review of the
requirements of subparagraph (iii).
7.79. Previous panels and the Appellate Body have stated that a general object and purpose of the
WTO Agreement, as well as of the GATT 1994, is to promote the security and predictability of the
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements and the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade.154 At the same time, the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreements provide that,
in specific circums tances, Members may depart from their GATT and WTO obligations in order to
protect other non -trade interests. For example, the general exceptions under Article XX of the
GATT 1994 accord to Members a degree of autonomy to adopt measures that are otherwise
incompatible with their WTO obligations, in order to achieve particular non -trade legitimate
objectives, provided such measures are not used merely as an excuse to circumvent their GATT and
WTO obligations. These concessions, like other exceptions and esca pe clauses built into the
GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreements, permit Members a degree of flexibility that was considered
necessary to ensure the widest possible acceptance of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreements.
It would be entirely contrary to the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system
established by the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreements, including the concessions that allow for
departures from obligations in specific circumstances, to interpret Article XXI as an outright
potestative condition, subjecting the existence of a Member's GATT and WTO obligations to a mere
expression of the unilateral will of that Member.
7.80. In the Appendix to this Report, the Panel surveys the pronouncements of the
GATT contracting parties and WTO Members to determine whether the conduct of the
GATT contracting parties and the WTO Members regarding the application of Article XXI reveals a
common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of this provision. The Panel's survey reveals
differences in position s and the absence of a common understanding regarding the meaning of
Article XXI. In the Panel's view, this record does not reveal any subsequent practice establishing an

152 This interpretation of an emergency in international relations is consistent with the preparatory work,
referred to in paragraph 7.92 below, which indicates that the United States, when proposing the provision of
the Geneva Draft of the ITO Charter that was carried over into Article XXI of the GATT 1947, and in referring to
an "emergency in international relations", had in mind particularly the situation that existed between 1939 and
1941. During this time, the United States had not yet participated in the Second World War, yet owing to that
situation, had still found it necessary to take certain measures for the protection of its essential security
interests.
153 This understanding is well-entrenched historically in diplomatic practice. See, e.g. Article 11 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League … [i]n case any
such emergency should arise …". (Covenant of the League of Nations, done at Paris, 28 June 1919, League of
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 108, p. 188.)
154 See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 82; EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 433; Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47; and
EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 243.

agreement between the Members regarding the interpretation of Article XXI in the sense of
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.155
7.81. It is notable, however, that a significant majority of occasions on which Article XXI(b)(iii) was
invoked concerned situations of armed conflict and acute international crisis, where heightened
tensions could lead to armed conflict, rather than protectionism under the guise of a security issue.
It therefore appears that Members have generally exercised restraint in their invocations of
Article XXI(b)(iii), and have endeavoured to separate military and ser ious security-related conflicts
from economic and trade disputes. The Panel does not assign any legal significance to this
observation, but merely notes that the conduct of Members attests to the type of circumstance which
has historically warranted the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii).
7.82. In sum, the Panel considers that the ordinary meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii), in its context and
in light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement more generally, is that
the adjectival clause "which it considers" in the chapeau of Article XXI(b) does not qualify the
determination of the circumstances in subparagraph (iii). Rather, for action to fall within the scope
of Article XXI(b), it must objectively be found to meet the requirements in one of th e enumerated
subparagraphs of that provision.156
7.5.3.1.2 Negotiating history of Article XXI of the GATT 1947
7.83. This conclusion that the Panel has reached based on its textual and contextual interpretation
of Article XXI(b)(iii), in the light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement,
is confirmed by the negotiating history of Article XXI of the GATT 1947.157
7.84. The Panel recalls that the GATT 1947 arose out of a proposal by the United States to establish
an International Trade Organization (ITO) , an organization through which the United States and
other countries would harmonize policies in respect of international trade and employment. 158 The

155 It is to be noted that statements of position of individual GATT contracting parties made prior to
April 1989 should be understood in the context of the positive consensus rule that then applied to the
establishment of dispute settlement panels, the setting of their terms of reference, and the adoption of panel
reports. In a Decision of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES taken in April 1989, the contracting parties agreed
to implement a number of improvements to the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures, including the
establishment of panels or working parties at the Council meeting following that at which the request first
appeared on the Council's regular agenda, unless at that meeting the Council decided otherwise.
(See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement System Rules and Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989,
L/6489, 13 April 1989, section F(a) (the April 1989 Decision). See also ibid. section F(b) on the establishment
of panels and working parties with standard terms of reference.) For the application of the April 1989 Decision
to a 1991 request by Yugoslavia for the establishment of a panel to examine certain measures imposed by the
European Communities, see paras. 1.63-1.66 of the Appendix to this Report.
156 The Panel notes that Ukraine and Russia both referred to the interpretations of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) of security exceptions in bilateral treaties between Nicaragua and the United States (in
Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua), and between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the United States (in Case Concerning Oil Platforms) in the course of their arguments. (Ukraine's second
written submission, paras. 81-91; and Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
paras. 28-40.) The Panel considers that the conclusions of the Court in both cases were limited to the specific
provisions of the bilateral treaties under consideration. In Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua, the Court did not purport to interpret Article XXI of the GATT 1947, but merely referred to
the provision a contrario in order to highlight the absence of the adjectival clause "which it considers" from the
security exception at issue (International Court of Justice, Merits, Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (1986) ICJ Reports, p. 116.) Similarly, in
Case Concerning Oil Platforms, the Court's conclusions were limited to a security exception lacking the same
adjectival clause. (International Court of Justice, Merits, Case Concerning Oil Platforms, (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America) (2003) ICJ Reports, p. 183.) Consequently, the Panel does not consider these
cases to be material to its interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
157 The Appellate Body has previously had recourse to the preparatory work of the ITO Charter as a
supplementary means of treaty interpretation in order to confirm the meaning of corresponding provisions in
the GATT 1994. (See, e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Japan –Alcoholic Beverages II, fn 52, DSR 1996:I, 97,
p. 104; Canada – Periodicals, p. 34, DSR 1997:I, p. 449; and US – Line Pipe, para. 175.)
158 Preparatory work on the ITO Charter began in November 1945 with the issuance by the
United States of a document entitled "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment".
(See United States, Department of State, "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment",
Publication 2411, Commercial Policy Series 79, November 1945, p. 1.) In February 1946, the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for an international conference on trade and

text of the ITO Charter was negotiated over four sessions between October 1946 and March 1948.
Towards the end of the first negotiating session (held in London between October and
November 1946), the Preparatory Committee decided to give prior effect to the tariff provisions of
the ITO Charter by means of a general tariff agreement which would provisionally apply amo ng a
subset of ITO members until the ITO Charter entered into force.159 The provisions of the general tariff
agreement were to be taken from the provisions of the ITO Charter then being negotiated .160 The
texts of the ITO Charter and of the general tariff agreement were negotiated in parallel through the
second negotiating session (held in New York between January and February 1947) and the third
negotiating session (held in Geneva between April and October 1947).
7.85. The United States originally proposed, in a draft submitted to the Preparatory Committee in
September 1946, the inclusion of a single general exceptions clause that would apply to the
General Commercial Policy chapter of the ITO Charter. 161 The clause began with "[n]othing in
Chapter IV of this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member
of measures" followed by paragraphs that included a number of the general exceptions later
appearing in Article XX of the GA TT 1947, as well as others later reflected in Article XXI of the
GATT 1947 (specifically paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (k)).162
7.86. The draft of the ITO Charter prepared at the New York negotiating session in February 1947
(the New York Draft) similarly contain ed a single general exceptions clause in the chapter on
General Commercial Policy.163 Article 37 of the New York Draft provided that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
Chapter V shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member
of measures:

employment, and established a Preparatory Committee of 19 countries to prepare a draft charter of the ITO.
(See United States, Department of State, "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the
United Nations", Publication 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93, September 1946, foreword (US Draft
Charter).)
159 See, e.g. Preparatory Committee on the International Conference on Trade and Employment,
Procedures for Giving Effect to Certain Provisions of the Proposed ITO Charter by Means of a General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Among the Members of the Preparatory Committee, Report of the
Sub-Committee on Procedure to Committee II, E/PC/T/C.II/58, pp. 12-14.
160 Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, E/PC/T/33, Annexure 10, "Multilateral Trade-Agreement Negotiations, Procedures for Giving
Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter of the International Trade Organization by Means of a General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Among the Members of the Preparatory Committee", section B, p. 48 and
section K, p. 51. According to the Report, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade "should conform in
every way to the principles laid down in the Charter and should not contain any provision which would prevent
the operation of any provision of the Charter". (Ibid.)
161 Article 32 of the US Draft Charter. (US Draft Charter, Chapter IV "General Commercial Policy",
section I "General Exceptions", "General Exceptions to Chapter IV", Article 32, p. 24.)
162 Ibid. The US Draft Charter also included a clause in Chapter VI "Intergovernmental Commodity
Arrangements" providing that any "justiciable issue" arising specifically from any ruling of the Conference
interpreting Article 32, paragraphs (c), (d), (e) or (k), dealing with security, could be referred as a dispute to
the ICJ. (Ibid. Article 76, pp. 45-46.)
163 The first draft of the ITO Charter resulting from the London round of negotiations in November 1946,
the London Draft, merely included a placeholder for a general exceptions clause to Chapter V on General
Commercial Policy, Article 37, which was "[t]o be considered and drafted at a later stage". (Report of the First
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/33,
Appendix "Charter of the International Trade Organization of the United Nations", p. 33.) The London Draft did,
however, contain a general security exception clause in Chapter VII on Inter-Governmental Commodity
Arrangements, as well as a clause providing for referral to the ICJ on the security paragraphs of Article 37
specifically. (Ibid. Article 59, p. 37 and Article 86, p. 41.) The partial draft of the general tariff agreement
concluded at this stage also included a placeholder envisaging the possibility of a general exceptions clause
modelled after Article 37 of the ITO Charter. (Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/33, Annexure 10, "Multilateral Trade-Agreement
Negotiations, Procedures for Giving Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter of the International Trade
Organization by Means of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Among the Members of the Preparatory
Committee", Article IV, p. 52.)

(a) Necessary to protect public morals;
(b) For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if corresponding
domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country;
(c) Relating to fissionable materials;
(d) Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
(e) In time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating to the
protection of the essential security interests of a Member;
…
(k) Undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.164
7.87. The separation of these exceptions into two distinct claus es was first suggested during the
third negotiating session in Geneva. In May 1947, the United States proposed that the security
exceptions that appeared in the clause be moved to the end of the ITO Charter so that they would
be general exceptions to the whole Charter and not just the chapter on General Commercial Policy.165
The United States also proposed that this new provision contain the introductory language "[n]othing
in this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforc ement by any Membe r of
measures", which would then be followed by the list of paragraphs transferred from Article 37.166
7.88. The specific language for the new security exceptions that would apply throughout the whole
of the Charter was developed from a proposal submitted by the United States delegation at the
Geneva negotiating session in July 1947.167
7.89. According to Vandevelde's study of the internal documents of the United States delegation
negotiating the ITO Charter, the US delegation arrived at the language of this proposal aft er
deliberating as to whether an ITO member should effectively be able to avoid any Charter obligation
by the unilateral invocation of its essential security interests, or whether any element of the security
exceptions should be subject to review by the Organization.168 The members of the delegation were

164 Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/34, pp. 31-32. The New York Draft also retained a slightly modified version of
the security exception to the chapter on Inter-Governmental Commodity Arrangements, as well as the clause
providing for referral to the ICJ on a provisional basis. (Ibid. Article 59, pp. 43-44 and Article 86, pp. 51-52.)
The draft of the general tariff agreement concluded at this stage contained substantially the same general
exceptions clause in relation to the chapter on General Commercial Policy. (Drafting Committee of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Draft General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, E/PC/T/C.6/85, Article XX, pp. 31-32.) The draft of the general tariff agreement did not,
however, contain a clause providing for referral of security issues to the ICJ. (Ibid. Article XXIV, p. 34.)
165 United States Delegation, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/W/23, p. 5; and United States Delegation, Second Session of
the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Draft Charter,
E/PC/T/W/153, Article XIX, p. 9.
166 United States Delegation, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/W/23, p. 5. The draft of the general tariff agreement concluded
as of 24 July 1947 reflected these developments, including a general exceptions clause separated into two
subsections, one containing those justifications later reflected in Article XX of the GATT 1947 (including the
language of the chapeau to Article XX of the GATT 1947) and the other containing those justifications later
reflected in Article XXI of the GATT 1947 and preceded by the new introductory language proposed by the
United States. (Report of the Tariff Negotiations Working Party, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
E/PC/T/135, Article XIX, pp. 53-54.)
167 United States Delegation, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/W/23, p. 5.
168 See K. Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaties, (Oxford University Press 2017), pp. 145-154. Vandevelde's study of the history of
US postwar FCN Treaties includes a chapter on the ITO Charter. As stated in the introduction to his book,

divided between those who wanted to preserve the United States' freedom of action in relation to
its security interests by providing that each ITO member would have independent power to interpret
the language of the exception 169, and those who believed that such a means for unilateral action
would be abused by some countries and destroy the efficacy of the entire Charter. 170 At issue was
whether the proposed draft should provide that nothing in the Charter would p reclude any action
"which [a member] may consider to be necessary and to relate to" the various enumerated topics,
such as fissionable materials, traffic in arms or an emergency in international relations, or whether
the original language from Article 37 o f the New York Draft, which used the phrase "relating to"
should be retained.171
7.90. Those favouring the position that some elements of the security exceptions should be subject
to review by the Organization considered that the risk of abuse by some countries outweighed
concerns regarding the scope of action left to the United States by the Charter. 172 One delegate
advocating this position stated that "it would be far better to abandon all work on the Charter" than
to place a provision in it that would, "under the simple pretext that the action was taken to protect
the national security of the particular country, provide a legal escape from compliance with the
provisions of the Charter".173
7.91. After a vote, those favouring the above position prevailed.174 Their position, that the scope of
unilateral action accorded to a Member invoking the security exception s would be limited to the
necessity of the measure and would not extend to the determination of the other elements of the

Vandevelde's research relied on materials on the negotiating histories of US postwar FCN Treaties and of the
ITO Charter which are maintained in the US National Archives and Research Administration (NARA) facility in
College Park, Maryland, USA. (K. Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Treaties, (Oxford University Press 2017), pp. 5-9.)
169 Vandevelde recounts that the US delegation considered and rejected a proposal drafted by the
US War Department's representative on the US delegation to add a new paragraph to the proposed security
exception. The new paragraph would have provided that each ITO member would have independent power of
interpretation of the language of the exception, and that the provisions of Article 86 of the Charter relating to
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter would not apply to the security exception.
(K. Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Treaties, (Oxford University Press 2017), p. 148 (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee
for the International Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4,
NARA, Record Group 43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva
1947) April-June 20, 1947").)
170 Ibid. p. 149 (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International
Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group
43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20,
1947").
171 The language, "and to relate to", was considered to make clear that the invoking member could take
unilateral action, while the original language from Article 37 of the New York Draft, which used the phrase
"relating to", was considered to indicate that the determination to be made by an ITO member was limited to
whether a measure it adopted was necessary, and not also whether the measure related to the enumerated
topics. (Ibid. p. 148 (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International
Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group
43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20,
1947").)
172 Ibid. p. 149 (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International
Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group
43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20,
1947").
173 Ibid. (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International Conference
on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group 43,
International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20,
1947").
174 Ibid. p. 149 (referring to Second Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International
Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group
43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20,
1947"). Vandevelde records that some members of the US delegation reasoned that, as a practical matter, the
United States would not need a right to engage in unfettered unilateral action. (Ibid. (referring to Second
Meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Trade and Development Geneva,
Minutes of Delegation Meeting, July 4, NARA, Record Group 43, International Trade Files, Box 133, Folder
marked "Minutes US Delegation (Geneva 1947) April-June 20, 1947").)

provision, was reflected in the United States' proposal of 4 July 1947. The proposed Article 94 of the
ITO Charter provided that:
Nothing in this Charter shall be construed to require any Member to furnish any
information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests, or to prevent any Member from taking any action which it may consider to be
necessary to such interests:
a) Relating to fissionable materials or their source materials;
b) Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
c) In time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating to the protection
of its essential security interests;
d) Undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security.175
7.92. The United States delegation's interpretation of its proposal for the security exception is
reflected in discu ssions of the provision during the Geneva negotiating session on 24 July 1947.
In response to a question from the delegate for the Netherlands as to the meaning of the term
"essential security interests" and "emergency in international relations" 176, the del egate for the
United States replied:
I suppose I ought to try and answer that, because I think the provision
[subparagraph (e) of Article 37 of the New York Draft] goes back to the original draft
put forward by us and has not been changed since.
We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security exception which we
thought should be included in the Charter. We recognized that there was a great danger
of having too wide an exception and we could not put it into the Charter, simply by
saying: "by any Member of measures relating to a Member's security interests" because,
that would permit anything under the sun. Therefore we thought it well to draft
provisions which would take care of real essential security interests and, at the same

175 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Draft Charter, E/PC/T/W/236, Annex A, p. 13. The United States proposed that this new article
replace the national security exceptions applicable to both the chapter on General Commercial Policy and the
chapter on Inter-Governmental Commodity Arrangements. (Ibid.)
176 The delegate's specific questions were:

What do we mean—"emergency in international relations"? Is that "immediate", through a war?—
or what is the "emergency in international relations"?
The second point that is troubling me here is, what are the "essential security interests" of a
Member? I find that kind of exception very difficult to understand, and therefore possibly a very
big loophole in the whole Charter.
For instance, I might say that at present we have a time of emergency as a number of Peace
Treaties have not yet been signed and that therefore it might still be essential to have as much
food in my country as possible. This would then force us to do everything to develop our agriculture,
notwithstanding all of the provisions of this Charter. This example might be a little far fetched, but
I only give it here to prove what is really worrying me about this subparagraph of which I still
cannot get the proper meaning.
(Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July 1947, E/PC/T/A/PV/33, p. 19
(as corrected by Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim Report of Thirty -Third Meeting of Commission A,
E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.2).)

time, so far a s we could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption of
protection for maintaining industries under every conceivable circumstance.
With regard to subparagraph (e), the limitation, I think, is primarily in the time . First,
"in time of war". I think no one would question the need of a Member, or the right of a
Member, to take action relating to its security interests in time of war and to determine
for itself—which I think we cannot deny—what its security interests are.
As to the second provi sion, "or other emergency in international relations, " we had in
mind particularly the situation which existed before the last war, before our own
participation in the last war, which was not until the end of 1941. War had been going
on for two years in Eu rope and, as the time of our own participation approached, we
were required, for our own protection, to take many measures which would have been
prohibited by the Charter. Our exports and imports were under rigid control. They were
under rigid control because of the war then going on.177
7.93. Ultimately, the delegate for the United States emphasized the importance of the draft security
exceptions, which would allow ITO members to take measures for security reasons, but not as
disguised restrictions on international trade:
I think there must be some latitude here for security measures. It is really a question
of a balance. We have got to have some exceptions. We cannot make it too tight,
because we cannot prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On
the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries
will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose.
We have given considerable thought to it and this is the best we could produce to
preserve that proper balance.178
7.94. During that same discussion, the delegate for Australia questioned the possible effect of
moving the security exceptions to the end of the Charter , away from the provisions providing for
consultations and dispute settlement . In particular, the delegate questioned whether this would
mean that the security exceptions would not be subject to consultations and dispute settlement.
The delegate for the United States responded as follows:
… I think that the place of an Article in the Charter has nothi ng to do with whether or
not it comes under Article 35 [predecessor to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947].
Article 35 is very broad in its terms, and I think probably covers any action by any
Member under any provision of the Charter. It is true that an action taken by a Member
under Article 94 could not be challenged in the sense that it could not be claimed that
the Member was violating the Charter ; but if that action, even though not in conflict
with the terms of Article 94, should affect another Member, I should think that that
Member would have the right to seek redress of some kind under Article 35 as it now
stands. In other words, there is no exception from the application of Article 35 to this
or any other Article.179

177 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July 1947,
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, pp. 20-21 (as corrected by Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim Report of Thirty-Third Meeting of
Commission A, E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.3, pp. 20-21). (emphasis added) See also Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim
Report of Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.1; and Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim
Report of Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.2.
178 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July 1947,
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, p. 21.
179 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July 1947,
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, pp. 26-27. See also ibid. p. 30; and Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the

7.95. The delegate for Australia stated that it should be clear that the terms of the proposed
Article 94 would be subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 35 (predecessor to
Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1947) and on the basis of the assurance from the delegate for the United
States that this was so, stated that Australia did not wish to make any reservation to Article 94.180
7.96. The version of Article 94 of the Geneva Draft of the ITO Charter, adopted on 22 August 1947,
was entitled "General Exceptions" and contained wording nearly id entical to that appearing in
Article XXI of the GATT 1947:
Nothing in this Charter shall be construed
(a) to require any Member to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to its essential security interests, or
(b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.181
7.97. By September 1947, these developments were also reflected in the draft text of the
general tariff agreement in a separate provision entitled "Security Exceptions", which mirrored the
language of Article 94 of the Geneva Draft of the ITO Charter.182

United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim Report of Thirty-Third Meeting
of Commission A, E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.3, p. 1 (referring to p. 29 of the Verbatim Report).
180 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July 1947,
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, p. 28; and Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 July
1947, E/PC/T/A/SR/33, pp. 4-5. Later in July 1947, the Sub-Committee on Chapters I, II and VII also deleted
the clause providing for referral to the ICJ on the security subparagraphs. (Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the Legal Drafting
Committee on Chapters I, II and VIII (Part A – Introduction), E/PC/T/139, pp. 23-34.) Throughout
August 1947, the proposed text was subject to several additional amendments by a Legal Drafting Committee
and then by Commission A, including restructuring the provision to introduce the three subparagraphs to
paragraph (b), as well as adding the words "directly or indirectly" to subparagraph (b)(ii). (See Second Session
of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the Legal
Drafting Committee on Chapters I, II and VIII (Including Noting and Membership of the Executive Board),
E/PC/T/159, pp. 41-42; Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Summary Record of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of Commission A Held on Tuesday,
12 August 1947, E/PC/T/A/PV/36, pp. 16-21; and Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Summary Record of the 40th (2) Meeting of Commission A Held
on Friday, 15th August 1947, E/PC/T/A/SR/40(2), pp. 9-11.)
 181 Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/186, p. 56.
182 The draft of the general tariff agreement prepared as of 30 August 1947 included a general
exceptions clause separated into two subsections, one containing those justifications later reflected in
Article XX of the GATT 1947 (including the language of the chapeau to Article XX) and the other containing
language identical to that in Article 94 of the Geneva Draft of the ITO Charter. (Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the Legal
Drafting Committee of the Tariff Agreement Committee on Part II of the General Agreement, E/PC/T/189,
Article XIX, pp. 47-49.) In September 1947, these subsections were separated into Articles XX and XXI, and
entitled "General Exceptions" and "Security Exceptions", respectively. (Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Tariff Agreement Committee, Redraft

7.98. The Panel considers that the foregoing negotiating history demonstrates that the drafters
considered that:
a. the matters later reflected in Article XX and Article XXI of the GATT 1947 were considered
to have a different character, as evident from their separation into two articles;
b. the "balance" that was struck by the security exceptions was that Members wo uld have
"some latitude" to determine what their essential security interests are, and the necessity
of action to protect those interests, while potential abuse of the exceptions would be
curtailed by limiting the circumstances in which the exceptions could be invoked to those
specified in the subparagraphs of Article XXI(b); and
c. in the light of this balance, the security exceptions would remain subject to the
consultations and dispute settlement provisions set forth elsewhere in the Charter.
7.99. The Panel is also mindful that the negotiations on the ITO Charter and the GATT 1947 occurred
very shortly after the end of the Second World War. The discussions of "security" issues throughout
the negotiating history should therefore be understood in that context.
7.100. The negotiating history therefore confirms the Panel's interpretation of Article XXI(b) of the
GATT 1994 as requiring that the evaluation of whether the invoking Member has satisfied the
requirements of the enumerated subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) be made objectively rather than
by the invoking M ember itself . In other words, ther e is no basis for treating the invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 as an incantation that shields a challenged measure from all
scrutiny.
7.5.3.1.3 Conclusion on whether the clause "which it considers" in the chapeau of
Article XXI(b) qualifies the determination of the matters in the enumerated
subparagraphs of that provision
7.101. The Panel concludes that the adjectival clause "which it considers" in the chapeau of
Article XXI(b) does not extend to the determination of the circumstances in e ach subparagraph.
Rather, for action to fall within the scope of Article XXI(b), it must objectively be found to meet the
requirements in one of the enumerated subparagraphs of that provision.
7.5.3.2 Conclusion on whether the Panel has jurisdiction to review Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
7.102. It follows from the Panel's interpretation of Article XXI(b), as vesting in panels the power to
review whether the requirements of the enumerated subparagraphs are met, rather than leaving it
to the unfettered discretion of the invoking Member, that Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 is not
totally "self-judging" in the manner asserted by Russia.
7.103. Consequently, Russia's argument that the Panel lacks jurisdiction to review Russia's
invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) must fail. The Panel's interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) also means
that it rejects the United States' argument that Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) is "non -
justiciable", to the extent that this argument also relies on the alleged totally "self-judging" nature
of the provision.183

of the Final Act, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Protocols in Light of Discussions Which Have
Taken Place in the Committee, E/PC/T/196, pp. 50-53. See also Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the
Tariff Agreement Committee, E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, pp. 23-26.)
183 Another way of making the argument that a Member's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) is
non-justiciable is by characterizing the problem as a "political question", as was also advanced by the
United States. The ICJ has rejected the "political question" argument, concluding that, as long as the case
before it or the request for an advisory opinion turns on a legal question capable of a legal answer, it is
duty-bound to take jurisdiction over it, regardless of the political background or the other political facets of the
issue. (See, for example, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, (United Nations) (1962) I.C.J. Reports, p. 155. See also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

7.104. Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) being within the Panel's terms of reference under
Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, as further elaborated and modified by the DSU, the Panel finds that
it has jurisdiction to determine whether the requirements of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 are
satisfied.
7.5.4 The measures at issue and their existence
7.105. In the preceding Section, the Panel found that it has jurisdiction to review
Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii). The Panel recalls that Russia also argues that certain
measures and claims are outside the Panel's terms of reference because Ukraine's panel request
does not comply with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
7.106. For presentational purposes, and in order not to interrupt the analysis of Article XXI, the
Panel defers the exposition of its examination of the terms of reference to Section 7.7 of the Report.
For the reasons provided in that Section, the Panel finds that the following measures are within its
terms of reference (the measures at issue):
a. 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements : Requirements that all international cargo transit by
road and rail from Ukraine destined for the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic,
through Russia, be carried out exclusively from Belarus, and comply with a number of
additional conditions related to identification seals and registration cards at specific control
points on the Belarus-Russia border and the Russia-Kazakhstan border.184
b. 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods: Bans on all road and
rail transit from Ukraine of: (i) goods that are subject to non-zero import duties according
to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU; and (ii) goods that fall within the scope of the
import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778, which are destined for Kazakhstan or the
Kyrgyz Republic. 185 Transit of such goods may only occur pursuant to a derogation
requested by the Governments of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic which is authorized
by the Russian Government , in which case, the transit is subject to the 2016 Belarus
Transit Requirements (above).
c. 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods: Prohibitions on
transit from Ukraine across Russia, throug h checkpoints in Belarus, of goods subject to
veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance and which are subject to the import bans
implemented by Resolution No. 778, along with related requirements that , as of
30 November 2014, such veterinary goods destined for Kazakhstan or third countries enter
Russia through designated checkpoints on the Russian side of the external customs border
of the EaEU and only pursuant to permits issued by the relevant veterinary surveillance
authorities of the Government of Kazak hstan and the Rosselkhoznadzor, and that, as of
24 November 2014, transit to third countries (including Kazakhstan) of such plant goods
take place exclusively through the checkpoints across the Russian state border.186
7.107. Ukraine has presented evidence of the existence of the above-referenced measures, and the
Panel is satisfied that these measures exist. 187 This being so, the next question is whether these
measures are inconsistent with Russia's obligations under Articles V and X of the GATT 1994 and
commitments in Russia's Accession Protocol, or whether there can be no such inconsistency in the
circumstances, because the measures were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations", and meet the other possible conditions of the chapeau of Article XXI(b).

Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić (1995),
Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 23-25.) Moreover, the Panel notes that in Mexico –Taxes on Soft Drinks, the
Appellate Body expressed the view that a panel's decision to decline to exercise validly established jurisdiction
would not be consistent with its obligations under Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, or the right of a Member to
seek redress of a violation of obligations within the meaning of Article 23 of the DSU. The Panel therefore
considers that this way of characterizing the problem as a basis for the Panel to decline to review Russia's
invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) is also untenable. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks,
para. 53.)
184 See para. 7.357.a below.
185 See para. 7.357.b below.
186 See para. 7.357.c below.
187 See fns 381-383, 385 and 387 below, and paras. 7.265-7.267, 7.269.a and 7.353 below.

7.108. The Panel notes in this regard the particularity of the exception specified in Article XXI(b)(iii).
This provision acknowledges that a war or other emergency in international relations involves a
fundamental change of circumstances which radically alters the factual matrix in which the
WTO-consistency of the measures at issue is to be evaluated. The Panel considers that an evaluation
of whether measures are covered by Article XXI(b)(iii), as measures "taken in time o f war or other
emergency in international relations" (unlike measures covered by the exceptions under Article XX)
does not necessitate a prior determination that the y would be WTO-inconsistent if they had been
taken in normal times, i.e. if they were not taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations. This is because, for the reasons explained in Section 7.5.6, there is no need to determine
the extent of the deviation of the challenged measure from the prescribed norm in order to evaluate
the necessity of the measure, i.e. that there is no reasonably available alternative measure to
achieve the protection of the legitimate interests covered by the exception which is not violative, or
is less violative, of the prescribed norm.
7.109. The Panel thus considers that, once it has found that the measures at issue are within its
terms of reference and that Ukraine has demonstrated their existence, the most logical next step in
its analysis is to determine whether the measures are covered by subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b),
i.e. whether the measures were in fact taken during time of war or other emergency in international
relations. Only if the Panel finds that the measures were not taken in time of war or other emergency
in international relations would it become necessary to determine the consistency of the measures
with the provisions of Articles V and X of the GATT 1994, which are the subject of Ukraine's claims.
7.110. Accordingly, the Panel next determines whether the measures at issue fall within the scope
of subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b), as measures taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations.
7.5.5 Whether the measures were "taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations" within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b)
7.111. The Panel recalls its interpretation of "emergency in international relations" within the
meaning of subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) as a situation of armed conflict, or of latent armed
conflict, or of heightened tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state.188
7.112. Russia, in its first written submission, refers to an emergency in international relations that
occurred in 2014 , which led Russia to take various actions, including imposing the measures at
issue.189 Russia affirms that the events constituting the emergency in international relations are well
known to Ukraine and that this dispute raises issues concerning politics, national security and
international peace and security.190 It also explains that one reason for formulating its invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) in such general terms is that it is trying to "keep the issues such as wars,
insurrections, unrests, international conflicts outside the scope of the WTO which is not designed for
resolution of such crises and related matters".191
7.113. Ukraine argues that Russia has not adequately identified or described the 2014 emergency,
and has therefore not discharged its burden of proof.192
7.114. In its opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, Russia posed a
"hypothetical question" as to whether c ircumstances similar to those listed would amount to an

188 See para. 7.76 above.
189 Russia's first written submission, para. 16.
190 See, e.g. Russia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6; and closing statement
at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 3.
191 Russia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 5.
192 Ukraine professes not to know what Russia means when it refers to an emergency in international
relations that arose in 2014, stating that Ukraine and the Panel "are still left in the dark as to what particular
emergency in international relations causes the Russian Federation to adopt the measures at issue in order to
protect its essential security interests". (Ukraine's second written submission, para. 142. See also
Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 64.) Russia, on the other hand, insists
that Ukraine knows very well what emergency it is referring to. (Russia's opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 30; and closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 4.)

emergency in international relations under subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b).193 These hypothetical
circumstances, as formulated by Russia, are:
a. Unrest within the territory of a country neighbouring a Member, occurring in the immediate
vicinity of the Member's border;
b. The loss of control by that neighbouring country over its border;
c. Movement of refugees from that neighbouring country to the Member's territory; and
d. Unilateral measures and sanctions imposed by that neighbouring country or by other
countries, which are not authorized by the United Nations, similar to those imposed against
Russia by Ukraine.194
7.115. When asked by the Panel how closely the hypothetical sit uation described above reflec ted
the actual situation on the ground, the Russian representative explained that Russia had referred to
the hypothetical "in order not to introduce again some information that Russia cannot disclose ".195
The Russian representative then referred to a paragra ph from Ukraine's 2016 Trade Policy Review
Report196 which, according to the Russian representative, explains, in Ukraine's words , "what is
going on and how real these whole hypothetical questions are ".197 The paragraph refers to "the
annexation of the Autonom ous Republic of Crimea and the military conflict in the east" as factors
that had adversely affected Ukraine's economic performance in 2014 and 2015.198
7.116. Ukraine objects to Russia's use of Ukraine's 2016 Trade Policy Review Report , noting that
prior panels h ave refused to attach importance to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) of
Members in considering the arguments of a party in dispute settlement proceedings.199
7.117. Paragraph A(i) of the TPRM states that the TPRM is "not … intended to serve as a basis for
the enforcement of specific obligations under the covered Agreements or for dispute settlement
procedures". In two prior disputes, panels have rejected a complainant's reference to the report
drawn up by the WTO Secretariat as part of the respondent's Trade Policy Review. In both instances,
the reference was used as the basis for an argument that a measure was WTO-inconsistent.200

193 Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 24.
194Ibid.
195 Russian representative's oral response to the second question at the second meeting of the Panel.
196 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Ukraine, Government Report prepared by Ukraine,
WT/TPR/G/334. Trade Policy Reviews are conducted by the Trade Policy Review Body based on two
documents: a policy statement (report) by the Member under review and a comprehensive report drawn up by
the WTO Secretariat on its own responsibility.
197 Russian representative's oral response to the second question at the second meeting of the Panel.
198 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Ukraine, Government Report prepared by Ukraine,
WT/TPR/G/334, para. 1.13.
199 Ukrainian representative's oral comments on Russian representative's oral response to the
Panel's second question at the second meeting of the Panel; and Ukraine's combined response to Panel
question Nos. 2 and 3 after the second meeting, para. 16 (referring, in particular, to paragraph A(i) of Annex 3
to the WTO Agreement).
200 In Canada – Aircraft, the complainant referred to the report drawn up by the WTO Secretariat in
connection with Canada's Trade Policy Review to argue that Investissement-Québec assistance to the regional
aircraft industry conferred a "benefit" by "provid[ing] export guarantees for projects considered too risky by
private financial institutions". Recounting the objective in paragraph A(i) of the TPRM, the panel "attach[ed] no
importance to the [TPR] of Canada in considering [the complainant's] arguments concerning
Investissement-Québec assistance to the regional aircraft industry". (Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft,
paras. 9.267 (quoting Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Canada, Report by the Secretariat,
WT/TPR/S/53, p. 59), and 9.274-9.275). In Chile – Price Band System, the complainant argued that the
Price Band System at issue was in the nature of a variable tariff, and for this purpose, referred to the report
drawn up by the WTO Secretariat in connection with Chile's Trade Policy Review, which stated that "[t]he price
stabilization mechanism works as a variable levy since the duty imposed on these goods varies according to
their import price." (Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 4.47.) The panel stated that, in the light of
paragraph A(i) of the TPRM, "such a Report should not be taken into account in the context of dispute
settlement proceedings." (Ibid. fn 664 to para. 7.95.)

7.118. The Panel notes that the Russian representative referred to the relevant paragraph from
Ukraine's 2016 Trade Policy Review Rep ort in order to show that the hypothe tical situation put
forward in Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel has been referred to by
Ukraine—in another context, it is true —as being "the annexation of th e Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the military conflict in the east". Russia therefore used the reference to paragraph 1.13
of Ukraine's 2016 Trade Policy Review Report solely to further identify the situation that it had
presented in its first written submission in the following genera l terms: "the emergency in
international relations that occurred in 2014 that presented threats to the
Russian Federation's essential security interests ".201 Russia had also previously asserted that the
circumstances that led to the imposition of the measures at issue were publicly available and known
to Ukraine.202 Russia did not refer to the relevant paragraph of Ukraine's 2016 Trade Policy Review
Report as evidence that Ukraine (or Russia, for that matter) characterizes that situation as an
emergency in international relations for the purposes of the present proceedings. The Panel therefore
does not consider that paragraph A(i) of the TPRM applies to this situation, or that the Panel is
thereby precluded from taking into account Russia's reference to paragraph 1.13 of Ukraine's 2016
Trade Policy Review Report.
7.119. Accordingly, Russia has identified the situation that it considers to be an emergency in
international relations by reference to the following factors: (a) the time-period in which it arose and
continues to exist, (b) that the situation involves Ukraine, (c) that it affects the security of
Russia's border with Ukraine in various ways, (d) that it has resulted in other countries impos ing
sanctions against Russia, and (e) that the situation in question is publicly known. The Panel regards
this as sufficient, in the particular circumstances of this disput e, to clearly identify the situation to
which Russia is referring, and which it argues is an emergency in international relations.
7.120. Therefore, the Panel must determine whether this situation between Ukraine and Russia that
has existed since 2014 constitutes an emergency in international relations within the meaning of
subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b).
7.121. The Panel notes that it is n ot relevant to this determination which actor or actors bear
international responsibility for the existence of this situation to which Russia refers. Nor is it
necessary for the Panel to characterize the situation between Russia and Ukraine under international
law in general.
7.122. There is evidence before the Panel that, at least as of March 2014, and continuing at least
until the end of 2016, relations between Ukraine and Russia had deteriorated to such a degree that
they were a matter of concern to the international community.203 By December 2016, the situation
between Ukraine and Russia was recognized by the UN General Assembly as involving armed
conflict.204 Further evidence of the gravity of the situation is the fact that, since 2014, a number of
countries have imposed sanctions against Russia in connection with this situation.205
7.123. Consequently, the Panel is satisfied that the situation between Ukraine and Russia since
2014 constitutes an emergency in international relations, within the meaning of subparagraph (iii)
of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994.

201 Russia's first written submission, para. 16.
202 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 30.
203 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/262, 27 March 2014, (Exhibit UKR-89).
204 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 71/205, 19 December 2016, (Exhibit UKR-91). This resolution
makes explicit reference to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which apply in cases of declared war or other
armed conflict between High Contracting Parties. (Ibid. p. 2.)
205 Russia responded to these actions on 7 August 2014 by passing Resolution No. 778 and imposing
sanctions on countries that had imposed sanctions against Russia. (Resolution No. 778, (Exhibits UKR-10,
RUS-7).) Decree No. 560 established the original parameters for the Russian Government to impose import
bans on certain agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating in the states that had decided to
impose economic sanctions against Russian legal entities or individuals, or joined in such a decision.
(Decree No. 560, (Exhibits UKR-9, RUS-3).) Resolution No. 778 originally imposed import bans on listed
agricultural products, raw materials and food originating from the United States, EU Member States, Canada,
Australia and Norway. Decree No. 560 was subsequently extended by Decree No. 320 of 24 June 2015,
Decree No. 305 of 29 June 2016 and Decree No. 293, (Exhibit UKR-71). It was in force until 31 December
2018. Both parties advised in the interim review stage that Decree No. 560 has since been further extended
until 31 December 2019 by Decree No. 420, which was adopted by the President of the Russian Federation on
12 July 2018.

7.124. It thus remains for the Panel to determine wh ether the measures taken by Russia with
respect to Ukraine were "taken in time of" the emergency in inte rnational relations. In this regard,
the Panel notes that t he 2016 Belarus Transi t Requirements were i ntroduced by Russia on
1 January 2016, the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods were
introduced on 1 July 2016 , and t he 2014 Belarus-Russia Borde r Bans on Transit of
Resolution No. 778 Goods were introduced by Russia in November 2014. All of the measures were
therefore introduced during the emergency in international relations and thus were "taken in time
of" such emergency for purposes of subparagraph (iii).
7.125. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Panel concludes that each of the measures
at issue was "taken in time of " an emergency in international relations, within the meaning of
subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994.
7.5.5.1 Conclusion
7.126. The Panel finds as follows:
a. As of 2014, there has existed a situation in Russia's relations with Ukraine that constitutes
an emergency in international relations within the meaning of subparagraph ( iii) of
Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994; and
b. each of the measures at issue was taken in time of this emergency in international relations
within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994.
7.5.6 Whether the conditions of the chapeau of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 are
satisfied
7.127. The Panel recalls that, in paragraph 7.63 above, it posited that the adjectival clause "which
it considers" in the chapeau of Article XXI(b) can be read to qualify only the "necessity" of the
measures for the protection of the invoking Member's essential security interests, or also the
determination of these "essential security interests", or finally and maximally, to qualify as well the
determination of the sets of circumstances described in each of the subparagraphs of Article XXI(b).
In paragraph 7.101 above, the Panel rejected the last of these possible interpretations.
7.128. The Panel has yet to address the remaining two possible interpretations of Article XXI(b).
In other words, the question remains whether the adjectival clause "which it considers" in the
chapeau of Article XXI(b) qualifies both t he determination of the invoking Member's essential
security interests and the necessity of the measures for the protection of those interests, or simply
the determination of their necessity.
7.129. Russia argues that the adjectival clause means that both the determination of a
Member's essential security interests, and the determination of the necessity of the action taken for
the protection of those interests, is left entirely to the discretion of the invoking Member. Several of
the third parties also consider that Members have wide discretion to identify for themselves their
essential security interests.206 Ukraine argues that, while all Members have the right to determine
their own level of protection of essential security interests, that does not mean that a Member may
unilaterally define what are essential security interests. 207 According to Ukraine, it is for panels,
rather than for Members, to interpret the term "essential security interests", which forms part of the
WTO covered agreements, in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law.208 Consistent with its interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii), Ukraine argues

206 See Australia's third-party statement, paras. 9-21; Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 4-5 and
8-9; third-party statement, paras. 21-30; and response to Panel question No. 6; Canada's third-party
statement, paras. 6-8; and response to Panel question No. 6, para. 8; China's third-party statement, paras.
18-19; and response to Panel question No. 6, para. 6; Japan's third-party submission, paras. 32-38;
Singapore's third-party statement, paras. 14-19; United States' third-party statement, paras. 1, 11-12, 34-35;
and response to Panel question No. 6, para. 31.
207 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 141-142.
208 Ibid. para. 142. For similar views expressed by third parties, see European Union's third-party
submission, paras. 49-55 and 61-63; and third-party statement, paras. 17-23; Moldova's third-party

that Russia has failed to identify the essential securit y interests that are threatened by the 2014
emergency, and has not explained or demonstrated the connection between the measures and its
essential security interests. 209 While Russia also argued that , pursuant to Article XXI(a) of the
GATT 1994, it cannot be required to further explain its actions, beyond what it has decl ared in its
first written submission and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, Ukraine considers
that Russia cannot invoke Article XXI(a) of the GATT 1994 to evade its burden of proof under Article
XXI(b)(iii).210
7.130. "Essential security interests" 211, which is evidently a narrower concept than
"security interests", may generally be understood to refer to those interests relating to the
quintessential functions of the state, namely, the protection of its territory and its population from
external threats, and the maintenance of law and public order internally.
7.131. The specific interests that are considered directly relevant to the protection of a state from
such external or internal threats will depend on the particular situation and perceptions of the state
in question, and can be expected to vary with changing circumstances. For these reasons, it is left,
in general, to every Member to define what it considers to be its essential security interests.
7.132. However, this does not mean that a Member is free to elevate any concern to that of an
"essential security interest". Rather, the discretion of a Member to designate particular concerns as
"essential security interests" is limited by its obligation to interpret and apply Article XXI(b)(iii) of
the GATT 1994 in good faith. The Panel recalls that the obligation of good faith is a general principle
of law and a principle of general international law which underlies all treaties, as codified in
Article 31(1) ("[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith …") and Article 26 ("[e]very treaty … must
be performed [by the parties] in good faith") of the Vienna Convention.212
7.133. The obligation of good faith requires that Members not use the exceptions in Article XXI as
a means to circumvent their obligations under the GATT 1994. A glaring example of this wo uld be
where a Member sought to release itself from the structure of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements" that constitutes the multilateral trading system 213 simply by re -labelling trade
interests that it had agreed to protect and promote with in the system, as "essential security
interests", falling outside the reach of that system.

submission, paras. 21, 27-35 and 37-41; third-party statement, paras. 10-18 and 20-22; and response to
Panel question No. 6, paras. 18 and 20-24.
209 Ukraine's second written submission, para. 156. Ukraine argues that it is not enough for Russia to
assert that, as measures affecting transit rather than imports, there is no protectionist motive behind the
measures. According to Ukraine, Russia must show that the issues are designed to protect Russia's essential
security interests. (Ukraine's second written submission, para. 158.)
210 See Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 43-44; closing statement at
the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 6, 10-11 and 18; and opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, paras. 21-23. See also Ukraine's second written submission, para. 161. Ukraine notes also that none of
the measures which Russia seeks to justify under Article XXI(b)(iii) was notified to Members in accordance with
paragraph 1 of the 1982 Decision. (Ibid. para. 162.) The 1982 Decision is discussed in para. 1.28 of the
Appendix to this Report.
211 The term "essential security interests" appears in Article XXI of the GATT 1994, Article XIVbis of the
GATS, Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, Article 10.8.3 of the TBT Agreement and Article III:1 of the Revised
Agreement on Government Procurement. The term "national security" appears in Articles 2.2, 2.10, 5.4 and
5.7 of the TBT Agreement, and Article III:1 of the Revised Agreement on Government Procurement.
212 See generally, Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, para. 158; US – FSC, para. 166;
US – Cotton Yarn, para. 81; and US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 101. The Appellate Body has provided specific
examples of the reflection of the principle of good faith, for example, in the chapeau to Article XX of the
GATT 1994 (Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, para. 158); in the exercise of a Member's judgment in good
faith under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU (Appellate Body Reports, Peru – Agricultural Products,
paras. 5.15-5.28; and US – FSC, para. 166); in the concept of reasonableness in paragraph 2 of Annex II of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement (Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 101); and in the general
applicability of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention to all WTO obligations (Appellate Body Report,
US – Cotton Yarn, para. 81).
213 See the third recital of the preamble of the WTO Agreement and the second recital of the preamble
of the GATT 1994.

7.134. It is therefore incumbent on the invoking Member to articulate the essential security interests
said to arise from the emergency in international relations sufficiently enough to demonstrate their
veracity.
7.135. What qualifies as a sufficient level of articulation will depend on the emergency in
international relations at issue. In particular, t he Panel considers that the less characteristic is the
"emergency in international relations" invoked by the Member, i.e. the further it is removed from
armed conflict, or a situation of breakdown of law and public order (whether in the invoking Member
or in its immediate surroundings), the less obvious are the defence or military interests, or
maintenance of law and public order interests, that can be generally expected to arise. In such cases,
a Member would need to articulate its essential security interests with greater specificity than would
be required when the emergency in international relations involved, for example, armed conflict.
7.136. In the case at hand, the emergency in international relations is very close to the "hard core"
of war or armed conflict. While Russia has not explicitly articulated the essential security intere sts
that it considers the measures at issue are necessary to protect, it did refer to certain characteristics
of the 2014 emergency that concern the security of the Ukraine-Russia border.214
7.137. Given the character of the 2014 emergency, as one that has been re cognized by the
UN General Assembly as involving armed conflict, and which affects the security of the border with
an adjacent country and exhibit s the other features identified by Russia, the essential security
interests that thereby arise for Russia cannot be considered obscure or indeterminate.215 Despite its
allusiveness, Russia's articulation of its essential security interests is minimally satisfactory in these
circumstances. Moreover, there is nothing in Russia's expression of those interests to suggest that
Russia invokes Article XXI(b)(iii) simply as a means to circumvent its obligations under the
GATT 1994.
7.138. The obligation of good faith, refer red to in paragraphs 7.132 and 7.133 above, applies not
only to the Member's definition of the essential security interests said to arise from the particular
emergency in international relations, but also, and most importantly, to their connection with the
measures at issue. Thus, as concerns the application of Article XXI(b)(iii), this obligation is
crystallized in demanding that the measures at issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in
relation to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are not implausible as measures
protective of these interests.
7.139. The Panel must therefore review whether the measures are so remote from, or unrelated to,
the 2014 emergency that it is implausible that Russia implemented the measures for the protection
of its essential security interests arising out of the emergency.
7.140. The Panel recalls that the 2016 measures (i.e. the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and
the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods): (a) restrict transit by road
and rail from Ukraine which is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic from transiting directly
across the Ukraine -Russia border, requiring instead that such traffic detour through Belarus, and
meet additional conditions relating to identification seals and registration cards at specific control
points; and (b) prohibit altogether such transit for certain classes of goods unless such transit is
exceptionally authorized.216

214 See para. 7.114 above.
215 Russia also attempts to show that it genuinely has national security interests that it considers to be
under threat. For example, Russia emphasizes that the 2016 measures were expressly enacted in accordance
with a 2006 law authorizing the imposition of economic sanctions for national security reasons,
Federal Law No. 281-FZ. This 2006 law, entitled "On the Special Economic Measures" authorizes the President
of the Russian Federation, acting on the basis of proposals of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, to
impose economic sanctions where circumstances require the "immediate reaction to an internationally wrongful
act or to an unfriendly act of a foreign state …, when such act poses a threat to the interests and security of
the Russian Federation". (Federal Law No. 281-FZ of the Russian Federation, "On the Special Economic
Measures", dated 30 December 2006, (Federal Law No. 281-FZ), (Exhibit RUS-8).) The Panel considers that
this demonstrates that the 2016 measures were adopted by Russia as a response to acts considered by the
President of the Russian Federation and the Security Council of the Russian Federation to pose a threat to
Russia's interests and security.
216 See paras. 7.1.a, 7.1.b, 7.16.c, 7.106.a and 7.106.b above.

7.141. Ukraine characterizes the 2016 measures as retaliation by Russia for Ukraine's decision to
pursue economic integration with the European Union (through the EU -Ukraine Association
Agreement which includes a DCFTA ) rather than with Russia thr ough the EaEU. Ukraine does not
indicate whether it considers that decision, and consequently the 2016 measures, to be related also
to the emergency in international relations that had arisen in early 2014 .217 While the evidence
presented by Ukraine establishes that the 2016 measures were direct or immediate responses to
the entry into force of the DCFTA between the Europ ean Union and Ukraine, this is only a partial
explanation of the background to Russia's adoption of the 2016 measures.
7.142. The Panel considers that there is a clear correlation between the change in government in
Ukraine in early 2014, the newly sworn -in government's decision to sign the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in March 2014, the deterioration in Ukraine's relations with
Russia (as evidenced by the March 2014 UN General Assembly resolution concerning the territorial
integrity of Ukraine), and the sanctions that have been imposed against Russia by several
countries.218 In other words, Ukraine's decision to pursue economic integration with the
European Union rather than with the EaEU cannot reasonably be seen as unrelated to the events
that followed, and led to the emergency in international relations, during which Russia took a number
of actions in respect of Ukraine, including the adoption of the 2016 measures.
7.143. The 2014 measures (i.e. the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No.
778 Goods) operate to ban transit of goods subject to Russian sanctions from transiting across
Russia from its border with Belarus. 219 These bans were imposed specifically to prevent
circumvention of the import bans that Russia had imposed under Resolution No. 778. 220
The Resolution No. 778 import bans were responses taken by Russia in August 2014 to the sanctions
that other countries had imposed against it earlier in 2014 in response to the emergency in
international relations.
7.144. Moreover, all of the measures at issue restrict the transit from Ukraine of goods across
Russia, partic ularly across the Ukraine -Russia border, in circumstances in which there is an
emergency in Russia's relations with Ukraine that affects the security of the Ukraine -Russia border
and is recognized by the UN General Assembly as involving armed conflict.
7.145. In these circumstances, the measures at issue cannot be regarded as being so remote from,
or unrelated to, the 2014 emergency, that it is implausible that Russia implemented the measures
for the protection of its essential security interests arising out of that emergency. This conclusion is
not undermined by evidence on the record that the general instability of the Ukraine-Russia border
did not prevent some bilateral trade from taking place along parts of the border.221
7.146. This being so, it is for Russia to determine the "necessity" of the measures for the protection
of its essential security interests. This conclusion follows by logical necessity if the adjectival clause
"which it considers" is to be given legal effect.222
7.147. The Panel has been referred to EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) in which the
arbitrators interpreted the phrase "if that party considers" in Articles 22.3(b) and 22.3(c) of the DSU
as providing a margin of appreciation to the party which was nevertheless subject to review by th e
arbitrators.223 The arbitrator's decision regarding the scope of review under Article 22.3 of the DSU
was based on the fact that the discretion accorded to the complaining party under the relevant
subparagraphs of that provision was subject to the obligati on in the introductory words to
Article 22.3 of the DSU, which provides that "[i]n considering what concessions or other obligations

217 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 24 and 26-31.
218 See paras. 7.7-7.12 above.
219 For a description of the 2014 measures, see para. 7.106.c. above and paras. 7.326-7.327 below.
220 For an explanation of the relationship between the sanctions imposed against Russia and the
Resolution No. 778 import bans, see paras. 7.9-7.12 and 7.16.b and fns 15, 16 and 32 above.
221 See, e.g. Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 36; and response to
Panel question No. 4 after the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
222 This is also confirmed by the negotiating history of Article XXI. (See para. 7.92 above.)
223 Decision by the Arbitrator, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC). See Ukraine's opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 133; and second written submission, para. 168;
European Union's third-party submission, paras. 62-64; and third-party statement, paras. 21-22; and
United States' third-party statement, para. 16.

to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the foll owing principles and procedures".224 There is
no equivalent obligation anywhere in the text of Article XXI that expressly conditions the discretion
accorded to an invoking Member under the chapeau of Article XXI(b).
7.5.6.1 Conclusion
7.148. The Panel finds that Russia has satisfied the conditions of the chapeau of Article XXI(b) of
the GATT 1994.
7.5.7 Overall conclusion
7.149. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Russia has met the requirements for invoking
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 in relation to the measures at issue, and therefore the measures
are covered by Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.6 Ukraine's claims of WTO-inconsistency of the measures at issue
7.6.1 Introduction
7.150. In this Section, the Panel addresses Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with Articles V and X
of the GATT 1994 and commitments in Russia's Working Party Report, as incorpo rated into its
Accession Protocol by reference.
7.151. Russia does not present rebuttal arguments or evidence regarding Ukraine's claims , as it
considers that the measures at issue are "consistent with the provisions of the WTO Agreement,
including the GATT and the Accession Protocol" on the basis of its invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of
the GATT 1994.225
7.152. The Panel recalls the statement of the Appellate Body in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses that
nothing in the DSU requires panels to consider or decide issues that are not "absolutely necessary
to dispose of the particular dispute" between the parties .226 Indeed, the Appellate Body cautioned
that to do so would "not be consistent with the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system" to secure
a "positive solution to a dispute" under Article 3.7 of the DSU.227
7.153. Having found that the measures were taken in time of an "emergency in international
relations" (and meet the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), the Panel does not consider it necessary
to additionally examine their WTO-consistency in a different factual context and on a different legal
basis, i.e. as if the measures at issue had not been taken in time of an "emergency in international
relations".
7.154. However, the Panel is mindful that, should its findings on Russia's invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) be reversed in the event of an appeal, it may be necessary for the Appellate Body
to complete the analysis. Accordingly, in Section 7.6.2, the Panel proceeds to analyse those aspects
of Ukraine's claims which, were it not for the fact that the measures were taken in time of an
"emergency in international relations" (and met the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), would enable
the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis.228
7.155. Additionally, Russia has invoked Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 in relation to all
contested provisions of the WTO Agreement, including commitments in its Accession Protocol .
Accordingly, in Section 7.6.4, the Panel addresses whether Article XXI(b)(i ii) may be invoked by
Russia in relation to commitments in its Accession Protocol.229

224 See Decision by the Arbitrator, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), para. 52.
225 Russia's first written submission, paras. 9 and 76. See ibid. paras. 33, 37, 48 and 74.
226 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19, DSR 1996:I, 323, p. 339.
227 Ibid.
228 See, e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, para. 124; and EC – Asbestos, para. 78.
229 In this Section, when referring to Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with particular commitments in
Russia's Accession Protocol, the Panel will, for ease of reference, refer to such claims according to the
paragraph of Russia's Working Party Report which sets forth the commitment. Paragraph 2 of Part I of

7.6.2 Article V:2 of the GATT 1994
7.6.2.1 Article V:2, first sentence
7.6.2.1.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.156. Ukraine argues that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s, the 2016 Transit Ban s on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods, and the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit
of Resolution No. 778 Goods do not guarantee freedom of transit through the territory of Russia for
traffic in transit coming from Ukraine and/or going to Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, and
therefore, that the measures are inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2.
7.157. Ukraine argues that the measures at issue violate the first sentence of Article V:2 of the
GATT 1994 by restricting freedom of transit in an "absolute manner".230 In Ukraine's view, where a
Member completely prohibits traffic in transit from a neighbouring country from transiting through
its territory, such a measure will "necessarily" be inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2.231
Ukraine additionally contends that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and 2016 Transit Bans on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods preclude the use of all routes across the
Ukraine-Russia border, routes that are "direct" and therefore necessarily qualify as "routes most
convenient for international transit".232 Ukraine considers that the following factors may be relevant
to the determination of which routes are most convenient for international transit: ( a) the mode of
transport; (b) the length of the transit route; (c) access to the transit route; (d) any administrative
formalities and charges associated with the route ; (e) the operator's right to choose a mode of
transport; (f) the cost of using a transit route; and ( g) the provenance, destination and
characteristics of the goods.233
7.158. Ukraine also claims that the restriction on entry and exit through certain checkpoints along
the Belarus -Russia border and the Russia -Kazakhstan border under the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements is inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2. Ukraine argues that the restriction
on entry and exit removes the "freedom to choose the most convenient route ".234 Ukraine also
considers that the additional conditions related to identification seals and registration card s that
form part of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s "impose an additional burden" on traffic in
transit and thereby do not guarantee freedom of transit as required by the first sentence of
Article V:2.235
7.159. Ukraine similarly considers that the authorization requirement under the derogation
procedure of the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods does not
guarantee freedom of transit as required by the first sentence of Article V:2.236 Ukraine considers
that transit of the non-zero duty goods and Resolution No. 778 goods "is as good as prohibited" due
to the burdensome nature of this requirement. 237 Ukraine also argues that the restriction on entry
and exit through certain checkpoints along the Estonia -Russia, Finland-Russia and Latvia -Russia
borders under the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Ban s on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods is
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2 because it makes "certain most convenient routes
unavailable for traffic in transit".238
7.160. Finally, the Panel notes Ukraine's interpretive argument, developed at the first meeting of
the Panel, that "where a measure is applied to goods transiting via the most convenient routes of

Russia's Accession Protocol incorporates by reference the paragraphs of Russia's Working Party Report that are
listed in paragraph 1450 of that Report, including paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428.
230 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 236.
231 Ibid. paras. 237 and 240.
232 Ibid. paras. 237-238; and Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 77.
Ukraine recalls Canada's statement that what constitutes the most convenient route(s) "can … only be
determined having regard to all of the circumstances relevant to the traffic in transit, including, for example,
the 'conditions of the traffic'". (Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 78.)
233 Ibid.
234 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 249.
235 Ibid. para. 252.
236 Ibid. paras. 253-255.
237 Ibid. para. 254.
238 Ibid. para. 246.

passage and is found to violate other parts of Article V of the GATT 199 4, including the second
sentence of Article V:2, then such a measure is also inconsistent with the obligation of a Member to
guarantee the freedom of transit via the most convenient routes " pursuant to the first sentence of
Article V:2.239 Ukraine has noneth eless advanced several independent arguments alleging
inconsistency with the first sentence of Article V:2.
7.161. As previously noted 240, Russia does not present any arguments in response to Ukraine's
specific claims of inconsistency with the first sentence of Article V:2.
7.6.2.1.2 Main arguments of third parties
7.162. Brazil disagrees with Ukraine that a finding of inconsistency with the first sentence of
Article V:2 will necessarily follow from a finding of inconsistency with any other paragraph of Article V
of t he GATT 1994 .241 For example, Brazil suggests that inconsistency with the obligation in
Article V:4 to ensure that "[a]ll charges and regulations … shall be reasonable" will not necessarily
entail inconsistency with the first sentence of Article V:2.242 Brazil also does not believe that the
imposition of certain procedural controls or restrictions on traffic in transit will automatically result
in inconsistency with Article V:2.243
7.163. Canada agrees with Ukraine that a finding of inconsistency with the first sentence of
Article V:2 will necessarily follow from a finding of inconsistency with any other paragraph of
Article V, as these other paragraphs "more precisely define the scope and limits of the right, and
therefore the corresponding obligations embodied in that freedom".244 Canada submits that
Article V:2 does not prevent Members from imposing certain restrictions and burdens on traffic in
transit, and does not equate to an unqualified right of free passage.245 Canada also considers that it
is at least "conceivable" that a transit route that involves entry and transit via the territory of a third
country could nevertheless amount to a route that is the "most convenient" route.246
7.164. The European Union disagrees with Ukraine that a finding of inconsistency with the first
sentence of Article V:2 will necessarily follow from a finding of inconsistency with any other
paragraph of Article V, and points to disparities in scope between the first sentence of Article V:2
and other paragraphs of Article V. 247 The European Union also considers that the Panel need not,
and should not, decide this question in the abstract for the purpose of resolving this dispute.248 The
European Union considers that the following factors may be relevant to the determination of which
routes are "most convenient for international transit": geography; the mode of transport (by road,
rail, water, air, or pipelines); the specificity of the different types of goods that are in transit; the
total number of tr ansit routes; their varying convenience for international transit from the
perspective of a reasonable trader; and criteria such as distance, time, safety, as well as road and
infrastructure quality.249 The European Union also states that the first sentence of Article V:2 not
only requires the availability of the most convenient routes but also the absence of restrictions for
using these routes. 250 Finally, the European Union considers it to be "hardly conceivable" that an
indirect route requiring a detour through Belarus for Ukrainian carriers destined for Kazakhstan and
the Kyrgyz Republic could qualify as a route "most convenient for international transit".251

239 Ukraine's second written submission, para. 32. See also Ukraine's opening statement at the first
240 See paras. 7.3 and 7.22-7.23 above.
241 Brazil's response to Panel question No. 8, p. 5.
242 Ibid.
243 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 13-14.
244 Canada's third-party submission, paras. 10 and 17; and response to Panel question No. 8, para. 10.
245 Canada's third-party submission, para. 21.
246 Canada's third-party statement, para. 12. Canada additionally stated that a determination of which
route constitutes the "most convenient" route should have regard to all of the circumstances, such as the
means of transit, the products in transit, differentials in the distances using different routes, any resulting
differentials in cost and time, and any other "conditions of traffic". (Ibid. para. 11 (referring to
Japan's third-party submission, para. 12).)
247 European Union's response to Panel question No. 8, paras. 25-28.
248 Ibid. para. 29.
249 European Union's third-party statement, paras. 31-38.
250 Ibid. para. 37.
251 Ibid. para. 38.

7.165. Japan disagrees with Ukraine that a finding of inconsistency with the first sentence of
Article V:2 will necessarily follow from a finding of inconsistency with any other paragraph of
Article V.252 However, Japan agrees with Ukraine that a measure that blocks all access into the
territory of a Member wo uld likely be inconsistent with Article V:2 unless the measure could be
justified on some basis other than Article V of the GATT 1994.253 Japan clarifies, however, that the
first sentence of Article V:2 does not require unqualified, unrestricted access, but only guarantees
freedom of transit via those routes most convenient for international transit.254 Japan also proposes
that once a complaining Member makes a prima facie case that there are other routes that are more
convenient than those designated by the re spondent Member, the burden of proof should shift to
the respondent Member to explain why it considers the designated routes "most convenient" for
international transit.255 Japan submits that whether a given route is "most convenient" must be
determined having regard to objective factors such as "the means of transit, available routes,
distances or costs".256
7.6.2.1.3 Analysis
7.166. The first sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that:
There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each [Member], via the routes
most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of
other [Members].
7.167. Ukraine advance s several arguments in support of its claims of inconsistency with the
first sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994 .257 The Panel will only address those arguments
necessary to enable the Appellate Body to complete the analysis .258 The Panel first examine s
Ukraine's argument that "where a WTO Member prohi bits traffic in transit from the territory of
another country with which it shares a border, such a measure necessarily does not guarantee
freedom of transit" as required by the first sentence of Article V:2.259
7.168. The Panel notes that the first sentence of Article V:2 creates an obligation for each Member
to guarantee freedom of transit "through the territory of each [Member] … for traffic in transit to or
from the territory of other [Members] ".260 The use of the conjunction "or" logically creates two
separate obligations under the first sentence of Article V:2. Namely, each Member is required to

252 Japan's response to Panel question No. 8, para. 17.
253 Japan's third-party submission, para. 4.
254 Ibid. para. 5.
255 Ibid. para. 9.
256 Ibid. para. 12.
257 Ukraine advances the following alternative arguments:
(a) inconsistency with any other paragraph of Article V of the GATT 1994 will necessarily result in
inconsistency with Article V:2 (Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 198 and 224);
(b) the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods preclude the use of the "direct" and therefore "most convenient" routes
(Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 230, 232 and 236-238);
(c) the cumulative effect of the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods and
the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods is to block all transit over the
Belarus-Russia border (Ukraine's first written submission, para. 238);
(d) the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods are, in effect, bans on all
traffic in transit because the scope of the bans and the government authorization requirement are so
burdensome as to render such transit near impossible (Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 253-255);
(e) the requirement to enter via certain checkpoints under each measure makes certain "most
convenient routes" unavailable for traffic in transit (Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 246 and 249);
(f) the additional conditions related to identification seals and registration cards attached to the 2016
Belarus Transit Requirements impose an additional "burden" on traffic in transit and thereby do not guarantee
freedom of transit (Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 251-252); and
(g) the authorization requirement attached to the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution
No. 778 Goods does not guarantee freedom of transit. (Ukraine's first written submission, para. 254.)
258 The Panel recalls that a panel has the "discretion to address only those arguments it deems
necessary to resolve a particular claim". (Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 135. (emphasis original)
See also Appellate Body Reports, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, paras. 124-125; and
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, paras. 134-135.)
259 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 237.
260 Emphasis added.

guarantee freedom of transit through its own territory for traffic in transit to the territory of any
other Member, or from the territory of any other Member.
7.169. The immediate context provided by the other provisions of Article V also informs the
interpretation of the first sentence of Article V:2. The Panel recalls that Article V:1 defines the term
"traffic in transit" as any "goods … [whose] passage across such territory … is only a portion of a
complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the [Member] across whose
territory the traffic passes". This informs the scope of Article V:2 by suggesting that each Member
incurs obligations in relation to "traffic in transit" only during the portion of the journey when such
traffic passes through that Member's territory.
7.170. Similar to Article V:2, Articles V:3, V:4 and V:5 also employ the terms "traffic in transit" and
the terms "to" or "from" in relation to the territory of other Members. 261 However, Article V:6
distinctly creates an obligation to accord to "products which have been in transit" treatment no less
favourable than that which would have been accorded had the products been transported "from their
place of origin to their destination". The difference in terminology between Article V:6 and the other
paragraphs of Article V suggests that the terms "from" and "to" as used in Articles V:2 through V:5
have a distinct meaning from the terms "from [the] place of origin" and "to [the place of] destination"
as used in Article V:6. This is also supported by the text of the second sentence of Article V:2, which
draws an explicit distinction between places of "origin", "departure", "entry", "exit" and "destination".
7.171. The text and context of Article V:2 thus suggest that the phrases "from the territory" and
"to … the territory" in the first sentence of Article V:2 should be construed as referring to the place
of entry and place of exit of the traffic in transit, and not the place of origin or destination.
7.172. Accordingly, under the first sentence of Article V:2:
a. Each Member is required to guarantee freedom of transit through its territory for any traffic
in transit entering from any other Member, and
b. Each Member is required to guarantee freedom of transit through its territory for traffic in
transit to exit to any other Member.
7.173. To establish inconsistency with the first sentence of Article V:2, i t will consequently be
sufficient to demonstrate either that a Member has precluded transit through its territory for traffic
in transit entering its territory from any other Member, or exiting its territory to any other Member,
via the routes most convenient for international transit.
7.174. As a result, where a measure prohibits traffic in transit from another Member from entering
at all point s along a shared land border, the measure will necessari ly be inconsistent with the
first sentence of Article V:2.
7.175. The 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements mandate that all international cargo transit by road
or rail from Ukraine which is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic shall be carried out
exclusively from Belarus and comply with a number of additional conditions related to identification

261 See Article V:3 ("traffic coming from or going to the territory" of other Members), Article V:4 ("traffic
in transit to or from the territories" of other Members) and Article V:5 ("traffic in transit to or from the
territory" of other Members) of the GATT 1994.

seals and registration cards at specific control points on the Belarus -Russia border and the
Russia-Kazakhstan border.262
7.176. The 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods ban road and rail
transit departing from Ukraine and destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic of : (a) goods
that are subject to non -zero import duties according to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU;
and (b) goods that fall within the scope of the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 7 78 of the
Government of the Russian Federation , unless such transit is requested by Kazakh or Kyrgyz
authorities and authorized by Russian authorities, in which case such transit is subject to the 2016
Belarus Transit Requirements.263
7.177. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods ban the transit
of all goods subject to veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance and that fall within the scope of the
import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778 through Russia from checkpoints in Belarus, and instead
require that such veterinary goods destined for Kazakhstan or third countries enter Russia through
designated checkpoints along the external border of the EaEU and be subject to clearance by the
appropriate Kazakh or Russian authorities , and that such plant goods destined for Kazakhstan or
third countries enter Russia exclusively through the same checkpoints.264
7.178. For reasons explained in Section 7.7, the only aspect o f the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border
Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods within the Panel's terms of reference is the application
of the bans to transit from Ukraine.265 The Panel recalls that all transit departing from Ukraine and
destined for Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic has, since 2016, been subject to the 2016 Belarus
Transit Requirements. Nevertheless, the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution
No. 778 Goods would still, according to the terms of the instruments implementing t he measure,
apply to transit from Ukraine and destined for places other than Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
7.179. Applying the aforementioned definition of "traffic in transit" as outlined in Article V:1266, the
goods covered by the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements, the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty
and Resolution No. 778 Goods , and the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Bans on Transit of
Resolution No. 778 Goods qualify as "traffic in transit" for the purposes of Article V:2 of the
GATT 1994.
7.180. Addressing next whether the measures prohibit traffic in transit from another Member from
entering at all point s along a shared land border, t he 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements , by

262 See para. 7.357.a below. For additional information regarding these measures, see
paras. 7.265-7.267 below. The primary legal instruments implementing these measures are Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 1, "On measures to ensure economic security and national interests of
the Russian Federation in international cargo transit from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the
Republic of Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation", dated 1 January 2016, (Decree No. 1),
(Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-1) as amended by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 319, "On
amendments to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016 'On measures to
ensure the economic security and national interests of the Russian Federation in international cargo transit
from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian
Federation'", dated 1 July 2016, (Decree No. 319), (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2). Section 1(a) of Decree No. 1, as
amended by Decree No. 319, applies to road and rail cargo transportation "from the territory of Ukraine to the
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic through the territory of the Russian Federation".
The Panel construes section 1(a) of Decree No. 1 as applying to both (a) transiting cargo via road or rail which
begins its journey in the territory of Ukraine and is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, and (b)
transiting cargo via road or rail which begins its journey in another country and then transits through the
territory of Ukraine, and is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic.
263 See para. 7.357.b below. For additional information regarding these measures, see
paras. 7.266-7.267 and paras. 7.347-7.349 below. As the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods also apply to road and rail transit "from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the
Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic", the Panel similarly construes this measure as applying to
both: (a) transiting cargo via road or rail which begins its journey in the territory of Ukraine and is destined for
Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic; and (b) transiting cargo via road or rail which begins its journey in another
country and then transits through the territory of Ukraine, and is destined for Kazakhstan or the
Kyrgyz Republic. (See fn 262 above.)
264 See para. 7.357.c below. For additional information regarding these measures, see paras. 7.269.a,
7.326-7.328 and 7.341-7.354 below, as well as fns 385, 387, 456, 458 and 482 below.
265 See paras. 7.354-7.355 and 7.357.c below.
266 See para. 7.169 above.

mandating that traffic in transit may only enter Russia from Be larus, expressly prohibit traffic in
transit from entering Russia from Ukraine.
7.181. The 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods expressly prohibit
traffic in transit from entering Russia from Ukraine. Additionally, even where transit is exceptionally
authorized under the derogation procedure , such traffic in transit is still required to enter Russia
exclusively from Belarus, and is therefore expressly prohibited from entering Russia from Ukraine.
7.182. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods, as applied to
traffic in transit from Ukraine of Resolution No. 778 goods , prohibit traffic in transit from entering
Russia from the territory of any Member other than those countries from which entry is exclusively
permitted, as listed in the measure.267
7.6.2.1.4 Conclusions
7.183. The Panel concludes that, had the measures been taken in normal times, i.e. had they not
been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met the other conditions of
Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that the following measures were
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994:
a. the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements, because these measures prohibit traffic in transit
from entering Russia from Ukraine;
b. the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods , because these
measures prohibit traffic in transit from entering Russia from Ukraine; and
c. the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods , because
these measures prohibit traffic in transit from Ukraine from entering Russia from any
Member other than those countries from which entry is exclusively permitted, as listed in
the measure.
7.184. The Panel declines to address Ukraine's additional arguments that the measures are
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2.
7.6.2.2 Article V:2, second sentence
7.6.2.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.185. Ukraine argues that the second sentence of Article V:2 prohibits Members from making any
distinction which is based on the place of "origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any
circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or other means of transport ".268
Ukraine argues that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements violate the second se ntence of Article
V:2 by impermissibly making distinctions based on the place of departure and entry
(the Ukraine-Russia border), the place of exit (the Russia -Kazakhstan border), and the place of
destination (Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic) of the traffic in transit.269 Ukraine argues that the
2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods violate the second sentence of
Article V:2 by impermissibly making distinctions based on the place of origin (goods originating from
countries listed in Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine, and g oods that are subject
to an import duty other than zero under the Common Customs Code of the EaEU), the place of
departure and entry (the Belarus-Russia border, under the derogation procedure), the place of exit
(the Russia-Kazakhstan border), and the place of destination (Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic)
of the traffic in transit.270 Ukraine also considers that the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit
of Resolution No. 778 Goods violate the second sentence of Article V:2 because they make

267 Under the Veterinary Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10), entry for such goods is exclusively
permitted at nine identified checkpoints on the border between Russia, on the one hand, and Finland, Estonia,
Latvia and Ukraine, on the other hand. For more detail, see paras. 7.269.a and 7.341-7.354 below and fns 456
and 458 below.
268 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 259.
269 Ibid. paras. 281-282.
270 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 283-284.

impermissible distinctions based on the place of origin ( goods originating from countries listed in
Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine )271, the place of entry (a limited number of
checkpoints on the external border of the EaEU) , and the place of destina tion (imposing different
permit requirements depending on whether the goods are destined for Kazakhstan or third countries)
of the traffic in transit.272
7.186. As previously noted 273, Russia does not present any arguments in response to
Ukraine's specific claims of inconsistency with the second sentence of Article V:2.
7.6.2.2.2 Main arguments of third parties
7.187. Canada agrees with Ukraine that the second sentence of Article V:2 prohibits Members from
making any distinction which is based on the place of origin, departure, entry, exit, destination and
any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, vessels , or other means of transport. 274
Canada additionally submits that the closed list in the second sentence of Article V:2 suggests that
any measures that discriminate based o n other criteria should instea d be dealt with under
Article V:5.275
7.188. Japan also agrees with Ukraine that the second sentence of Article V:2 prohibits Members
from making any distinction which is based on the place of origin, departure, entry, exit, destination
and any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, vessels or other means of transport. 276
Japan also proposes that the objective structure, design and operation of the measure, and not the
subjective judgment of the Member imposing the measure, should be examined to conclude whether
any such distinctions have been made.277
7.6.2.2.3 Analysis
7.189. The second sentence of Article V:2 provides that:
No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin,
departure, entry, exit or destination, or any circumstances relating to the ownership of
goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.
7.190. The 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements mandate that all international cargo transit by road
or rail departing from Ukraine and destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic must enter Russia
exclusively from Belarus and comply with a number of additional conditions related to identification
seals and registration cards at specific control points on the Belarus -Russia border and the
Russia-Kazakhstan border.
7.191. The 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s expressly apply only to traffic in transit departing
from Ukraine (thereby making distinctions based on the place of departure) which is destined for
Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic (thereby making distinctions based on the place of destination)
and require that such traffic enter Russia only from Belarus (thereby making distinctions based on
the place of entry). The additional conditions relat ed to identification seals and registration cards
apply only to traffic in transit that is subject to the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s. These
conditions also involve the same prohibited distinctions.
7.192. The 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods ban road and rail
transit departing from Ukraine and destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic of : (a) goods
that are subject to non -zero import duties according to the Comm on Customs Tariff of the EaEU;
and (b) goods that fall within the scope of the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778, unless

271 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 275 and 280.
272 Ibid. paras. 276-279; and response to Panel question No. 12 after the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 135.
273 See paras. 7.3 and 7.22-7.23 above.
274 See Canada's third-party submission, para. 24.
275 Ibid. para. 25.
276 Japan's third-party submission, paras. 18-19.
277 Ibid. para. 19.

such transit is requested by Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities and authorized by Russian authorities ,
in which case such transit is subject to the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements.
7.193. The 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods expressly apply only
to traffic in transit departing from Ukraine (thereby making distinction s based on the place of
departure) which is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic (thereby making distinctions
based on the place of destination). The 2016 Transit Bans apply to the transit of particular goods,
namely, goods that are subject to customs duties o n their importation to the EaEU and goods that
originate in countries that are listed in Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine (thereby
making distinctions based on the place of origin). Additionally, even if traders exceptionally receive
authorization, such traffic in transit is still subject to the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and
thus required to enter Russia exclusively from Belarus (thereby making distinctions based on the
place of entry).
7.194. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods ban the transit
of all goods subject to veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance and that fall within the scope of the
import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778 through Russia from checkpoints in Belarus, and instead
require that such veterinary goods destined for Kazakhstan or third countries enter Russia through
designated checkpoints along the external border of the EaEU and be subject to clearance by the
appropriate Kazakh or Russian authorities , and that such plant goods d estined for Kazakhstan or
third countries enter Russia exclusively through the same checkpoints. The 2014 Belarus-Russia
Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods (to the extent that they fall within the Panel's
terms of reference) apply to traffi c in transit from Ukraine and destined for places other than
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.278
7.195. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods, as applied to
traffic in transit from Ukraine of Resolution No. 778 goods , require such traffic in transit to enter
Russia from certain countries on the external border of the EaEU (thereby making distinctions based
on the place of entry). 279 The measure applies to goods originat ing from countries listed in
Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine (thereby making distinctions based on the place
of origin). The additional conditions relating to entry through designated checkpoints and clearance
apply only to traffic in transit subject to the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution
No. 778 Goods. These conditions also involve the same prohibited distinctions.
7.6.2.2.4 Conclusions
7.196. The Panel concludes that, had the measures been taken in normal times, i.e. had they not
been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met the other conditions of
Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that the following measures were
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994:
a. the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements, because these measures make distinctions based
on the place of departure (Ukraine) , the place of destination (Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic) and the place of entry (Belarus, where entry is exclusively permitted) of
the traffic in transit;
b. the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods , because these
measures make distinctions based on the place of departure (Ukraine) , the place of
destination (Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic), the place of origin ( countries listed in
Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine) and the place of entry (Belarus, where
entry is exclusively permitted) of the traffic in transit; and
c. the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods , because
these measures make distinctions based on the place of entry ( certain countries from
which entry is exclusively permitted, as listed in that measure ) and the place of origin
(countries listed in Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine) of the traffic in
transit.

278 See paras. 7.177-7.178 above. For more detail, see paras. 7.341-7.353 below.
279 See fn 267 above.

7.6.3 Remaining claims under the GATT 1994 and Russia's Accession Protocol
7.6.3.1 Introduction
7.197. Having found that the measures were taken in time of an "emergency in international
relations" (and meet the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), the Panel has not considered it necessary
to examine the WTO -consistency of the measures as if they had been taken in a different factual
context or on a different legal basis. 280 However, in the event of the Panel's findings on
Article XXI(b)(iii) being revers ed on appeal, the Panel has considered those aspects of
Ukraine's claims which would enable the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis.
7.198. In particular, the Panel has examined whether, had the measures been taken in normal
times, i.e. had they not be en taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met
the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that the
measures at issue were inconsistent with the first and second sentence s of Article V:2 of th e
GATT 1994. The Panel has outlined the key features of the measures at issue, and concluded that
the measures would have been prima facie inconsistent with these provisions, for the reasons
outlined in Section 7.6.2.
7.199. The Panel has already concluded that, had the measures been taken in normal times, every
aspect of them would have been prima facie inconsistent with either the first or second sentence of
Article V:2 of the GATT 1994, or both. Ukraine's claims under Articles V:3, V:4 and V:5 challenge
the same aspects of the measures. 281 The Panel considers that addressing these claims would not
add anything to the ability of the Appellate Body to complete the analysis, nor add anything to the
ability of the DSB to make "sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings"282 in the event that
the Appellate Body were to make findings of inconsistency with either the first or second sentence
of Article V:2, or both.
7.200. In relation to Ukraine's remaining claims, the Panel recalls the statement of the
Appellate Body in Argentina – Import Measures that it failed to see how a finding relating to " the
publication of [a] WTO-inconsistent measure would contribute to securing a positive solution to this
dispute".283 Accordingly, where a measure is found to be WTO-inconsistent, findings relating to the
publication or administration of the same measure are unlikely to be necessary or useful in resolving
the matter.284 Ukraine's claims under Articles X:1, X:2 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 challenge the
same measures, or constituent legal instruments implementing aspects of these measures. The
Panel considers that addressing these claims would not add anything to the ability of the
Appellate Body to complete the analysis, nor add anything to the ability of the DSB to make
"sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings" 285 in the event that the Appellate Body were to
make findings of inconsistency with the first or second sentence of Article V:2, or both . These
considerations are equally applicable to Ukraine's claims under paragraphs 1426, 1427 and 1428 of
Russia's Working Party Report, which all relate to the publication or administration of the same
contested measures.

280 See paras. 7.153-7.154 above.
281 See summary of Ukraine's arguments below.
282 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 223 (quoted in Appellate Body Reports,
US – Wheat Gluten, para. 180; and US – Lamb, para. 191). See also Appellate Body Report,
Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 98.
283 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.200. The panel in
Argentina – Import Measures elected to exercise judicial economy in respect of Japan's claims under Article X:1
of the GATT 1994 in circumstances where it had already determined that the challenged measures were
inconsistent with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, reasoning that it did not consider additional findings
of inconsistency in relation to the same measure under Article X:1 "necessary or useful in resolving the matter
at issue". (See ibid. para. 5.188.) The Appellate Body upheld the panel's exercise of judicial economy and the
panel's reasoning, noting that as Argentina would "have to modify or withdraw the TRRs measures to comply
with the recommendations under Articles III:4 and XI:1, the TRRs measure—in its current form and with its
current content—will cease to exist". (Ibid. para. 5.200.)
284 Since Argentina – Import Measures, several panels have exercised judicial economy over claims
under Article X:3(a) where a measure has already been held to violate other substantive provisions of the
GATT 1994. (See, e.g. Panel Reports, Peru – Agricultural Products, para. 7.501; and
Russia – Railway Equipment, para. 7.939.)
285 See fn 282 above.

7.201. As a result, the Panel does not consider it necessary to address Ukraine's remaining claims
under Articles V:3, V:4, V:5, X:1, X:2 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and paragraphs 1426, 1427 and
1428 of Russia's Working Party Report . Accordingly, the Panel has only summarized the relevant
arguments of the parties and third parties in the following Section of the Report.286
7.6.3.2 Article V:3
7.6.3.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.202. Ukraine argues that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit Bans on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods impose "unnecessary delays or restrictions" on traffic
in transit, and therefore, that these measures are inconsistent with Article V:3.
7.203. In Ukraine's view, a measure will be inconsistent with Article V:3 whenever it subjects traffic
in transit to any delays or restrictions which that are go beyond what is necessary "to put traffic in
transit under a transit procedure in order to ensure that the goods move through the territory (and
eventually leave th e territory)".287 Ukraine contends that , in examining whether such delays or
restrictions are "unnecessary", the Panel should consider : (a) the trade restrictiveness of the
measure, (b) the degree of contribution of the measure to the achievement of its objective , and
(c) whether less restrictive alternative measures are reasonably available.288
7.204. Ukraine consequently argues that the following aspects of the measures at issue subject
traffic in transit to "unnecessary delays or restric tions" in the sense of Article V:3. 289 First, Ukraine
argues that the limitation to certain designated checkpoints under the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements and the 2016 Transit Ban s on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods is
unnecessary to ensure that goods are put under an appropriate transit procedure, as this objective
could be equally achieved at other existing control points .290 Second, Ukraine argues that the
requirement of government authorization under the 2016 Transit Ban s on Non -Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods is an "unnecessary" restriction because it has no clear relationship to the
objective of ensuring that goods undergo an appropriate transit procedure.291 Finally, Ukraine argues
that the identification seals and registration card conditions attached to the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements constitute "unnecessary" restrictions and delays because such traffic in transit must
already undergo the identification procedures required by the EaEU.292
7.205. As previously noted293, Russia does not present any arguments in response to Ukraine's
specific claims of inconsistency with Articles V:3, V:4 and V:5 of the GATT 1994.
7.6.3.2.2 Main arguments of third parties
7.206. Brazil proposes that whether delays or restrictions are "necessary" under Article V:3 must
be examined on a case -by-case basis, including assessing "the trade restrictiveness of the
procedures, its degree of contribution to the public interest at stake and the risk of non-fulfilment".294
Brazil also considers that restrictions or dela ys can be "necessary" to achieve legitimate objectives
that are not exclusively related to transit regulation, such as in "force majeure" circumstances.295

286 The Panel has, however, addressed the relationship between paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working
Party Report and Article V:2 of the GATT 1994 in Section 7.6.4.2.2. Nonetheless, the relevant arguments of the
parties and third parties in relation to this paragraph are summarized in the following section.
287 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 303. See also Ukraine's second written submission, para. 46.
288 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 319.
289 Ukraine argues that each of the measures place "restrictions" on transit and cause "delays" related to
re-routing. (Ibid. paras. 342-344.)
290 Ibid. paras. 345-349.
291 Ibid. para. 350.
292 Ibid. paras. 351-364. See also Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 12 after the first meeting of
the Panel, para. 135.
293 See paras. 7.3 and 7.22-7.23 above.
294 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 14-15.
295 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 14; and response to Panel question No. 10.

7.207. Canada disagrees with Ukraine's interpretation of the scope of Article V:3.296 Canada argues
that the delays and restrictions covered under Article V:3 are those imposed as part of requiring
"that traffic in transit be registered with [Members'] customs authorities", including "the formalities
and documentation requirements that are part of entering the traffic at the proper customs
house".297
7.208. The European Union also disagrees with Ukraine's interpretation of the scope of Article V:3.
The European Union argues that the delays and restrictions covered under Article V:3 are those that
specifically result from the application of customs laws and regulations.298
7.6.3.3 Article V:4
7.6.3.3.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.209. Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with Article V:4 are confined to one aspect of the
2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods . Specifically, Ukraine argues
that the authorization requirement under the derogation procedure of the 2016 Transit Bans on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods constitutes an "unreasonable regulation" imposed on
traffic in the sense of Article V:4.299
7.210. In Ukraine's view, whether a regulation is "unreasonable" should involve an analysis of :
(a) the rationale or purpose of the measure , and ( b) whether the means used to achieve that
rationale are "adequate and fair ".300 Ukraine consequently argues that : (a) it is unreasonable to
make access for traffic in transit entirely dependent on the discretion of the government of the
country of destination, ( b) it is unreasonable to implement a measure that does not provide any
information about what conditions ne ed to be satisfied in order to secure authorization, and
(c) the measure goes beyond what is required to ensure that goods move through and eventually
leave the territory of the transit Member.301
7.6.3.4 Article V:5
7.6.3.4.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.211. Ukraine argues that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s, the 2016 Transit Ban s on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods, and the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit
of Resolution No. 778 Goods accord less favourable treatment to traffic in transit from Ukraine
compared to third countries, and therefore, that the measures are inconsistent with Article V:5.
7.212. Ukraine proposes that , to establish inconsistency with Article V:5, it must be shown that :
(a) the measure is a "regulation" that is "related to or associated with" traffic in transit; (b) there
has been differential treatment accorded to traffic in transit from or to any Member as compared to
third countries ; (c) there has been "less favourable treatment", or a detrimental impact on the
conditions of competitio n, for traffic in transit from the contesting Member ; and (d) there is a
"genuine relationship" between the measure at issue and the adverse impact on competitive
opportunities.302
7.213. Applying the foregoing analysis, Ukraine argues that each of the measures is inconsistent
with Article V:5. Ukraine argues that the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit
Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods accord differential treatment on the basis of
whether the traffic in transit has come from Ukraine and is going to Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic.303 Ukraine also argues that the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution
No. 778 Goods and the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods

296 Canada's third-party submission, paras. 31-32.
297 Ibid. paras. 33 and 36. (footnotes omitted)
298 European Union's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 32.
299 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 366 and 393.
300 Ibid. paras. 384-385.
301 Ibid. paras. 400-404.
302 See ibid. paras. 409-431.
303 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 444 and 448-449.

accord differential treatment on the basis of whether the traffic in transit has originated from a
Resolution No. 7 78 country, as amended to include Ukraine, or is destined for Kazakhstan .304
Ukraine argues that this differential treatment alters the conditions of competition for traffic in transit
from Ukraine as compared to third countries, and therefore accords "less favourable treatment" by:
(a) creating delays and additional costs related to rerouting, ( b) imposing additional costs such as
those related to identification and registration cards, and (c) impeding access to the export market
for which the goods are destined.305
7.6.3.5 Article X of the GATT 1994
7.6.3.5.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.214. Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with Article X of the GATT 1994 are confined to certain
instruments that implement aspects of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit
Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods . Ukraine argues that these measures fall
within the scope of Article X:1 because they affect the transportation of goods, and fall within the
scope of Article X:2 because they have "regard to" or are "connected with" importation or
exportation.306
7.215. More specifically, Ukraine claims that the following legal instruments implementing aspects
of the measures above were not published promptly as required by Article X:1 of the GATT 1994:
a. Public Joint -Stock Company " Russian Railways " Order No. 529r of 28 March 2016
(PJSC Order)307 and the Public Joint -Stock Company " Russian Railways " Notice of
17 May 2016 (PJSC Notice) 308, both of which implement aspects of the 2016 Belarus
Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778
Goods. Ukraine argues that th ese legal instruments were inadequately published for the
purposes of Article X:1, as they were only published on the website and print version of
the business magazine "RZD-Partner Documents", to which only paying subscribers have
access.309
b. Decree No. 319 310, which extended the geographical scope of the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements to traffic in transit from Ukraine destined for the Kyrgyz Republic, and
imposed the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods. Ukraine
argues that this legal instrument was not published promptly for the purposes of

304 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 445-447 and 449.
305 Ibid. paras. 451 and 453-454. The Panel also notes that Ukraine initially proposed that any
inconsistency with the second sentence of Article V:2 would necessarily demonstrate "less favourable
treatment" for the purposes of Article V:5; however, Ukraine later appears to have withdrawn this argument.
(See Ukraine's second written submission, para. 61.)
306 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 521, 523-524 and 564.
307 Order of PJSC "Russian Railways" No. 529, "On approval of the procedure for installing (removing) of
the identification means (seals) operating on the basis of the technology GLONASS", dated 28 March 2016,
(PJSC Order), (Exhibit UKR-7). The PJSC Order implements the requirements of the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements (set forth in paragraph 1(b) of Decree No. 1) to affix identification seals on road and railway
transport of traffic in transit from Ukraine destined for Kazakhstan (and the Kyrgyz Republic) on entry into
Russia and to remove such seals on exit from Russia, as elaborated by Resolution of the Government of the
Russian Federation No. 276, "On the procedure of exercising control over the international road and rail cargo
transit from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic
through the territory of the Russian Federation", dated 6 April 2016, (Resolution No. 276), (Exhibits UKR-8,
RUS-6) (as amended by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 732, "On amendments to
some acts of the Government of the Russian Federation", dated 1 August 2016, (Resolution No. 732),
(Exhibit UKR-4)). (Ukraine's first written submission, para. 107.) See also Decree No. 1, (Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-
1).
308 This notice sets forth the fee for the placement and removal of the GLONASS identification seals, as
required by the instruments listed in fn 307 above. (Ukraine's first written submission, para. 105.)
309 See ibid. paras. 530-539.
310 Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2).

Article X:1, as this instrument was brought into effect on 1 January 2016, while it was
published only on 3 July 2016.311
7.216. Ukraine claims that the following legal instruments were enforced prior to their official
publication, contrary to Article X:2 of the GATT 1994:
a. The PJSC Order 312, because this legal instrument was inadequately published for the
purposes of Article X:2, as it was only published on the website and print version of the
business magazine "RZD-Partner Documents", to which only paying subscribers have
access.313
b. Decree No. 319314, because this instrument was enforced on 1 January 2016, while it was
officially published only on 3 July 2016.315
c. Decree No. 643316, which amended Decree No. 1317, so as to extend the duration of the
2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s and the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods, because this instrument was enforced on 30 December 2017,
while it was only officially published on 4 January 2018.318
7.217. Ukraine claims that the following legal instruments are administered in an unreasonable
manner, contrary to Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994:
a. Decree No. 1, as amended by Decree No. 3 19 and Decree No. 643 , which imposes the
2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s and the 2016 Transit Bans on Non -Zero Duty and
Resolution No. 778 Goods , because Russia has administered these instruments at the
Belarus-Russia border without providing reasoned explanations to traders.319
b. Decree No. 319320, because the derogation procedure under this instrument contains no
criteria governing the exercise of Russia's discretion to permit derogations from the bans,
thereby permitting the possibility of arbitrary administration.321
7.218. Russia argues that the scope of Article X is limited to "issues of importation, exportation,
internal sale and transportation ", and does not intersect with " the scope of Article V of the GATT
which is limited to issues of transit".322

311 See Ukraine's first written submission. paras. 541-543. See also Ukraine's response to
Panel question No. 12 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 135.
312 PJSC Order, (Exhibit UKR-7).
313 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 581.
314 Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2).
315 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 583-584.
316 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 643, "On amendments to the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016 'On measures to ensure economic security and
national interests of the Russian Federation in international cargo transit from the territory of Ukraine to the
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation", dated
30 December 2017, (Decree No. 643), (Exhibits UKR-98, RUS-13). Decree No. 643 extended the duration of
Decree No. 1, and therefore the duration of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements and the 2016 Transit Bans
on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods.
317 Decree No. 1, (Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-1).
318 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 61-63; and second written
submission, para. 64. See also Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 12 after the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 135.
319 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 643-647.
320 Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2).
321 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 648-650 and 653-654. See also Ukraine's response to Panel
question No. 12 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 135.
322 Russia's response to Panel question No. 11 after the first meeting of the Panel, p. 4.

7.6.3.5.2 Main arguments of third parties
7.219. Brazil argues that measures within the scope of Article V will typically qualify as
"requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports" within the sense of Article X:1.323
7.220. Canada argues that the term "affecting th eir … transportation" in Article X:1 should be
construed as referring to measures affecting the transportation of "products", as included in the
phrase "classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes", not "imports or exports"
as included in the preceding phrase "requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or
exports".324 Canada argues that this broader construction of Article X:1 is supported by the
object and purpose of Article X, which is to promote transparency in relation to measures of general
application relating to trade.325
7.221. The European Union also argues that the term "affecting their … transportation" in Article X:1
should be construed as referring to measures affecting the transportation of "products", not "imports
or exports".326 The EU agrees that this broader construction of Article X:1 is supported by the object
and purpose of Article X, which is to promote transparency in relation to measures of general
application relating to trade.327 The European Union notes in support of this proposition the title of
Article X, which reads "Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations".328 The European Union
additionally argues that, in the specific context of Article X, the term "imports" should be interpreted
as "covering any goods that physically enter into the territory of the Member concerned", although
conceding that in other provisions of the GATT, the term "imports" must be understood as excluding
traffic in transit.329
7.222. Japan argues that me asures within the scope of Article V will typically qualify as
"requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports" within the sense of Article X:1, or
alternately, as measures affecting the "distribution" or "transportation" of imports or exports.330
7.6.3.6 Russia's Accession Protocol
7.6.3.6.1 Paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report
7.6.3.6.1.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.223. Ukraine argues that the first sentence of paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report
"confirms the application of Article V of the GATT 1994" to any Russian measures governing the
transit of goods.331 Consequently, Ukraine argues that it will be sufficient to establish that Russia
has acted inconsistently with Article V to demonstrate inconsistency with paragraph 1161.332
7.224. Russia does not present any arguments in response to Ukraine's claims of inconsistency with
paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report.
7.6.3.6.2 Paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report
7.6.3.6.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.225. Ukraine argues that paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report applies to a broader
category of legal instruments than Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 in that it applies to any measures
"pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property rights ".333 Nonetheless,

323 Brazil's response to Panel question No. 14, p. 7.
324 Canada's response to Panel question No. 14, paras. 22-23.
325 Ibid. para. 24.
326 European Union's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 42.
327 Ibid. paras. 37 and 40.
328 Ibid. para. 39.
329 Ibid. para. 43.
330 Japan's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 33.
331 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 164.
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid. paras. 490-491 and 517.

Ukraine submits that measures that fall within the scope of Article s V and X:1 of the GATT 1994
necessarily pertain to or affect "trade in goods" within the scope of paragraph 1426. 334
Ukraine further argues that paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report and Article X:1 of the
GATT 1994 "contain the same substantive obligation of prompt publication", and consequently that
inconsistency with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 will automatically imply inconsistency with
paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report.335
7.6.3.6.3 Paragraph 1427 of Russia's Working Party Report
7.6.3.6.3.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.226. Ukraine argues that Russia has violated the commitments in paragraph 1427 of
Russia's Working Party Report because it has failed to publish , prior to their adoption, 20 legal
instruments that implement aspects of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements, the 2016 Transit
Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods , and the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Bans
on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods.
7.227. More specifically, Ukraine claims that the following legal instruments were not published
before adoption as required by paragraph 1427 of Russia's Working Party Report:
a. The PJSC Order336, which implements aspects of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements
and the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods. Ukraine
argues that this legal instrument was inadequately published for the purposes of
paragraph 1427, as it was only published on the website and print version of the business
magazine "RZD-Partner Documents", to which only paying subscribers have access.337

334 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 518; and response to Panel question No. 11 after the first
335 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 499 and 516-518.
336 PJSC Order, (Exhibit UKR-7).
337 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 603 and 605.

b. Several resolutions implementing the measures at issue338, as well as Decree No. 643.339
These instruments implement various aspects of the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements,
the 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods , and the 2014
Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods. Ukraine argues that
each of these legal instruments was published either after or on the date of their adoption,
which Ukraine defines as the date on which the finalized measures were approved within
the territory of the Russian Federation.340
7.6.3.6.4 Paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report
7.6.3.6.4.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.228. Ukraine argues that, as with paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report , measures
that fall within the scope of Article V and Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 necessarily pertain to or affect
"trade in goods" within the scope of paragraph 1428.341 Ukraine further claims that paragraph 1428
"expands the scope of application and the substantive publication requirement of Article X:2 of the

338 These resolutions are:
(a) Resolution No. 778, (Exhibits UKR-10, RUS-7);
(b) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 830, "On amendments to the
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 20 August 2014,
(Resolution No. 830), (Exhibit UKR-11);
(c) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 625, "On amendments to the Resolution
of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 25 June 2015,
(Resolution No. 625), (Exhibit UKR-12);
(d) Resolution No. 842, (Exhibit UKR-13);
(e) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 981, "On amendment of the Annex to
the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated
16 September 2015, (Resolution No. 981), (Exhibit UKR-14);
(f) Resolution No. 1397, (Exhibit UKR-15);
(g) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1 "On measures related to the
implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016" , dated
1 January 2016, (Resolution No. 1), (Exhibits UKR-3, RUS-4);
(h) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 147, "On approval of requirements to
the identification means (Seals) including the ones functioning on the basis of the technology of global satellite
navigation system GLONASS", dated 27 February 2016, (Resolution No. 147), (Exhibits UKR-6, RUS-5) (as
amended by Resolution No. 732, (Exhibit UKR-4);
(i) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 157, "On amendment of the Annex to
the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated
1 March 2016, (Resolution No. 157), (Exhibit UKR-16);
(j) Resolution No. 276, (Exhibits UKR-8, RUS-6);
(k) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 388, "On introduction of amendments
to Appendix to the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 1 January 2016", dated
30 April 2016, (Resolution No. 388), (Exhibit UKR-5);
(l) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 472, "On amendment of the Annex to
the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated
27 May 2016, (Resolution No. 472), (Exhibit UKR-17);
(m) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 608, "On amendments to the
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 30 June 2016,
(Resolution No. 608), (Exhibit UKR-18);
(n) Resolution No. 732, (Exhibit UKR-4);
(o) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 897, "On amendment to Annex to the
Russian Federation Government Resolution dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 10 September 2016,
(Resolution No. 897), (Exhibit UKR-19);
(p) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1086, "On amendment of the Annex to
the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated
22 October 2016, (Resolution No. 1086), (Exhibit UKR-20);
(q) Resolution No. 790, (Exhibit UKR-70); and
(r) Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1292, "On amendments to the Annexes
to Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August 2014 No. 778", dated 25 October 2017,
(Resolution No. 1292), (Exhibit UKR-94).
339 Decree No. 643, (Exhibits UKR-98, RUS-13). (Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 12 after the
first meeting of the Panel, para. 135.)
340 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 595 and 604-606; and opening statement at the first
341 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 548.

GATT 1994" because paragraph 1428 prohibits measures from becoming "effective" prior to
publication while Article X:2 prohibits measures from being "enforced" prior to "official"
publication.342 As Ukraine considers that a measure can only be "enforced" once it has been made
"effective", Ukraine consequently contends that "a violation of Article X:2 automatically impl ies a
violation of paragraph 1428 ."343 Ukraine pr oceeds to argue that the contested instruments are
inconsistent with paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report for the same reasons that they
are inconsistent with Article X:2 of the GATT 1994.344
7.6.4 Applicability of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 t o commitments in Russia's
Accession Protocol
7.6.4.1 Introduction
7.229. Ukraine makes several claims of inconsistency with Russia's Accession Protocol based on
commitments contained in paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party
Report.345 The Panel has already concluded that the measures at issue are covered by
Article XXI(b)(iii), and consequently that it is not necessary to address each of Ukraine's claims of
inconsistency with Articles V and X of the GATT 1994. The applicability of Article XXI(b)(iii) to those
provisions of the GATT 1994 is explicitly contemplated by the introduction to Article XXI, which
provides that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed".
7.230. Conversely, n either panels nor the Appellate Body have previously considere d the
applicability of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 to commitments in the Accession Protocol of any
acceding Member. 346 Several disputes have, however, previously considered the applicability of
Article XX of the GATT 1994 to individual commitments i n China's Accession Protocol. The Panel
considers these disputes to be relevant insofar as they inform its analysis of the relationship between
a Member's Accession Protocol and provisions of the GATT 1994.
7.231. The Appellate Body has held that the relationshi p between provisions in
China's Accession Protocol and provisions in the WTO Agreement must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.347 In some disputes, this analysis has led to a determination that Article XX of
the GATT 1994 could be invoked to justify a br each of an independent obligation under
China's Accession Protocol 348, while in others, the same analysis led to a determination that
Article XX could not be invoked in rela tion to the contested provision .349 In China – Rare Earths,

342 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 569-570.
343 Ibid. para. 571.
344 Ibid. para. 585.
345 As noted in footnote 229, these paragraphs are incorporated into Russia's Accession Protocol by
reference. (See Russia's Accession Protocol, para. 2 of Part I; and Working Party Report, para. 1450.)
346 The Panel recalls that in prior disputes involving the interpretation of China's Accession Protocol,
panels and the Appellate Body proceeded on the assumption that paragraph 1.2 of that Protocol served to
make certain obligations enforceable under the DSU where this issue was not contested by the parties.
(Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, fn 422. See also Appellate Body Reports, China – Auto Parts,
paras. 213-214; and Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.85.) The Panel observes that paragraph 2 of
Part I of Russia's Accession Protocol is identical in all relevant respects to paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession
Protocol. Both paragraphs provide that the WTO Agreement to which each Member accedes "shall be the
WTO Agreement" as "rectified, amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as may have entered
into force" before the relevant date of accession, and also provide that the Protocol "shall be an integral part of
the WTO Agreement". Moreover, neither Ukraine nor Russia has contested the enforceability of the provisions
of Russia's Accession Protocol and Working Party Report under the DSU. Consequently, the Panel proceeds on
the premise that the commitments in paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report
are enforceable under the DSU.
347 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 5.50 and 5.57.
348 For instance, in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body addressed
whether Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 applied to a provision on trading rights in paragraph 5.1 of
China's Accession Protocol. (Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,
paras. 214-215.) The Appellate Body concluded that China could rely upon the introductory clause of
paragraph 5.1 of its Accession Protocol to justify any violation as necessary to protect public morals in China,
within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. (Ibid. para. 233.) For the analysis of the Appellate Body
on this issue, see ibid. paras. 216-233.
349 For instance, in China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body examined whether Articles XX(b) and
XX(g) of the GATT 1994 applied to paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol, which obliged China to
eliminate export taxes and charges. (Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 278.) The

the Appellate Body held that the specific relationship between individual provisions in
China's Accession Protocol and provisions of the GATT 1994 must be ascertained "through scrutiny
of the provisions concerned, read in the light of their context and object and purpose, with due
account being taken of the overall architecture of the WTO system as a single package of rights and
obligations, and any specific provisions that govern or shed light o n the relationship between the
provisions of different instruments".350 The Appellate Body also noted that such an assessment must
be predicated on a "thorough analysis of the relevant provisions on the basis of the customary rules
of treaty interpretation, as well as the circumstances of each dispute".351
7.232. The Panel considers that the approach outlined by the Appellate Body in China – Rare Earths
is equally applicable to the relationship between Russia's Accession Protocol and Article XXI(b)(iii)
of the GATT 1994. In the Panel's view, the architecture of the WTO system confers a single package
of rights and obligations upon Russia, of which the GATT 1994 and its Accession Protocol are
constituent parts. In particular, where obligations under Russia's Accession Protocol are closely
linked to obligations under the GATT 1994, the Panel considers that this constitutes a strong
argument for the applicability of Article XXI(b)(iii) to such commitments.
7.233. The Panel proceeds to apply the analytical framework outlined by the Appellate Body to
determine the applicability of Article XXI(b) (iii) to the commitments in individual provisions of
Russia's Working Party Report. 352 In doing so, the Panel considers: (a) the text of each provision,
as well as any express textual references, or lack thereof, to the GATT 1994 or other covered
agreements; (b) the context provided by other relevant provisions in Russia's Accession Protocol
and Working Party Report; (c) the content of each provision and its relationship to obligations under
the GATT 1994; (d) the overall architecture of the WTO system as a s ingle package of rights and
obligations; and (e) the specific circumstances of this dispute.353
7.6.4.2 Paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report
7.6.4.2.1 Paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report and Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994
7.234. Paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report provides, in relevant part, that:
The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed that the Russian Federation
would apply all its laws, regulations and other measures governing transit of goods
(including energy), such as those governing charges for transportation of goods in
transit by road, rail and air, as well as other charges and customs fees imposed in
connection with transit, including those mentioned in paragraphs 1155 and 1156 in
conformity with the provision of Article V of the GATT 1994 and other relevant provisions
of the WTO Agreement.
7.235. Paragraph 1161 requires Russia to apply certain measures in "conformity with the provisions
of Article V of the GATT 1994 and other relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement".354 The explicit
textual reference to "other relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement" provides support for the
applicability of other provisions of the covered agreements. Additionally, the ordinary meaning of
the term "relevant" is whether such provisi ons have a " bearing on" or are "connected with" the
matter, or are "legally pertinent or sufficient".355 Applying this definition, the Panel considers that
other provisions of the covered agreements will be "relevant" to paragraph 1161 provided that they
have a demonstrable legal bearing upon Article V of the GATT 1994. Article XXI(b)(iii) clearly falls

Appellate Body concluded that China could not rely on Articles XX(b) and XX(g) in relation to paragraph 11.3.
(Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 307.) For the analysis of the Appellate Body on this
issue, see ibid. paras. 279-306.
350 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.55. (emphasis added)
351 Ibid. para. 5.57.
352 Ibid. paras. 5.50 and 5.57.
353 Ibid. para. 5.74.
354 Emphasis added.
355 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.), (Oxford University Press, 2003),
Vol. 2, p. 2522.

within this definition, as it is directly applicable to Article V of the GATT 1994 through the phrase
"[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed".
7.236. The immediate context provided by the other provisions of Russia's Working Party Report
also informs the interpretation of paragraph 116 1, particularly those discussions under the shared
subheading "Regulation of Trade in Transit ". The Panel observes that, for instance, in
paragraph 1160 of Russia's Working Party Report, the representative for Russia confirmed that in
relation to certain bans on transit, "in general, such provisions were applied for reasons of safety,
health or national security."356 There is no r ecord of any Members contesting or objecting to this
assertion.
7.237. Finally, the content of paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report and its relationship
to obligations under the GATT 1994 is also relevant to the Panel's analysis.357 The Panel observes
that the commitments in paragraph 1161 and obligations under the GATT 1994 are closely linked in
that paragraph 1161 requires Russia to apply measures governing transit of goods "in conformity"
with Article V of the GATT 1994. If Article XXI(b)(iii) were inapplicable to this provision, this could
thus potentially allow Ukraine to succeed on a claim of inconsistency with commitments in Russia's
Accession Protocol, and not an identical claim under the GATT 1994.
7.238. For these reasons, the Pan el considers that Russia can rely on the phrase "other relevant
provisions of the WTO Agreement" in order to justify any inconsistency with the commitments in
paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report as necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" within the meaning of
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.6.4.2.2 Paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report and Article V:2 of the GATT
1994
7.239. The Panel recalls its conclusion that, had the measures been taken in normal times, every
aspect of them would have been prima facie inconsistent with either the first or second sentence of
Article V:2 of the GATT 1994, or both. Based on the foregoing analysis, t he Panel considers that
paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report merely reiterates Russia's commitments under
Article V of the GATT 1994. Moreover, the Panel recalls that Ukraine's claims under paragraph 1161
of Russia's Working Party Report are substantively identical to Ukraine's claims under Article V.358
7.240. The Panel therefore considers that, had the measures been taken in normal times, i.e. had
they not been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met the other
conditions of Article XXI(b)), the measures would have also been prima facie inconsistent with
paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report to the extent that they would also be prima facie
inconsistent with either the first or second sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994, or both.
7.6.4.3 Paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report and Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994
7.241. Paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report provides, in relevant part, that:
The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed that from the date of accession,
all laws, regulations, decrees, decisions, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of

356 Emphasis added.
357 The Panel recalls that in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body observed
the close interlinkage between the obligations assumed under paragraph 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol and
the GATT 1994, given that paragraph 5.1 was "clearly concerned with trade in goods". (Appellate Body Report,
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 226. (emphasis original)) The Appellate Body additionally
noted that paragraph 5.1 should not "be interpreted in a way that would allow a complainant to deny China
access to a defence merely by asserting a claim under paragraph 5.1 and by refraining from asserting a claim
under other provisions of the covered agreements relating to trade in goods that apply to the same or closely
linked measures". (Ibid. para. 229.) This was material to the Appellate Body's conclusion that China could rely
on Article XX(a) as a defence to its obligations under paragraph 5.1 of its Accession Protocol. (Ibid. para. 233.)
358 Ukraine's only argument of inconsistency with paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report is
that a demonstration of inconsistency with Article V of the GATT 1994 will also demonstrate inconsistency with
paragraph 1161. (See Ukraine's first written submission, para. 164.)

general application pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual
property rights, whether adopted or issued in the Russian Federation or by a competent
body of the CU, would be published promptly in a manner that fulfils applicable
requirements of the WTO Agreement, including those of Article X of the GATT 1994,
WTO GATS Agreement, and the WTO TRIPS Agreement.
7.242. Paragraph 1426 re quires Russia to publish certain measures promptly in a manner that
"fulfils applicable requirements of the WTO Agreement , including those of Article X of the
GATT 1994".359 The explicit textual reference to "applicable requirements of the WTO Agreement"
provides support for the applicability of other provisions of the covered agreements. The text of
paragraph 1426 also explicitly refers to Article X of the GATT 1994 as an ex ample of a provision
containing such "applicable requirements". The ordinary meaning of the term "applicable" is whether
such requirements are "able to be applied ( to a purpose etc.)", or are "relevant", "suitable" or
"appropriate".360 The ordinary meaning o f the term "requirement" is "[ s]omething called for or
demanded", or "a condition which must be complied with ".361 In the Panel's view, just as Article X
of the GATT 1994 is specified to contain "applicable requirements" to paragraph 1426,
Article XXI(b)(iii) clearly contains "applicable requirements" to Article X of the GATT 1994. This
follows from the fact that Article X is subject to Article XXI(b)(iii) through the phrase "[n]othing in
this Agreement shall be construed".
7.243. Other provisions of Russia's W orking Party Report also inform the Panel's interpretation of
paragraph 1426. In particular, the Panel contrasts the language used in paragraph 1426 with that
used in paragraph 1427. Paragraphs 1426 and 1427 both create obligations relating to the
publication of certain measures "pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual
property rights". However, unlike paragraphs 1161, 1426 and 1428, paragraph 1427 specifically
omits any textual reference to "relevant provisions" or "applicable requi rements" of the
"WTO Agreement", and instead includes its own specific reference to "cases of emergency" and
"measures involving national security ". In the Panel's view, the absence of any equivalent textual
reference in paragraph 1427 further underpins th e significance of the phrase "applicable
requirements of the WTO Agreement" in paragraph 1426.
7.244. Finally, the content of paragraph 1426 and its relationship to obligations under the
GATT 1994 are also relevant to the Panel's analysis. The Panel observes that the commitments in
paragraph 1426 and obligations under the GATT 1994 are closely linked in that paragraph 1426
contains the same requirement to ensure that measures relating to trade in goods are "published
promptly" as that contained in Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.362 If Article XXI(b)(iii) were inapplicable
to this provision, this could thus potentially allow Ukraine to succeed on a claim of inconsistency
with commitments in Russia's Accession Protocol, and not an identical claim under the GATT 1994.
7.245. For these reasons, the Panel considers that Russia can rely on the phrase "in a manner that
fulfils applicable requirements of the WTO Agreement" in order to justify any inconsistency with the
commitments in paragraph 1426 of Russia's Working Party Report as necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" within
the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.

359 Emphasis added.
360 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2003),
Vol. 1, p. 102. (emphasis original)
361 Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 2542.
362 Paragraph 1426 creates a commitment to publish promptly "all laws, regulations, decrees, decisions,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application pertaining to or affecting trade in goods,
services, or intellectual property rights", whereas Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 creates an obligation to publish
promptly "[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made
effective by any [Member], pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or
to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports
or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance,
warehousing, inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use". While the scope of the provisions differs,
both impose obligations on Russia relating to the publication of measures concerning trade in goods.

7.6.4.4 Paragraph 1427 of Russia's Workin g Party Report and Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994
7.246. Paragraph 1427 of Russia's Working Party Report provides, in relevant part, that:
The representative of the Russian Federation further confirmed that, except in cases of
emergency, measures involving national security, specific measures setting monetary
policy, measures the publication of which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise
be contrary to the public interest, or prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of
particular enterprises, public or private, the Russian Federation would publish all laws,
regulations, decrees (other than Presidential decrees), decisions and administrative
rulings of general application pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or
intellectual property r ights, prior to their adoption and would provide a reasonable
period of time, normally not less than 30 days, for Members and interested persons to
comment to the responsible authorities before the relevant measure was finalized or
submitted to the competent CU bodies.
7.247. Paragraph 1427 omits any reference to "relevant provisions" or "applicable requirements" of
"the WTO Agreement" or the GATT 1994, but instead refers specifically to exceptions to the
obligations undertaken in that paragraph for "cases of emergency" and "measures involving national
security".
7.248. The context provided by the other provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements informs
the Panel's interpretation of paragraph 1 427.363 In particular, paragraph 1427 creates obligations
relating to measu res "pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property
rights". Consequently, the Panel considers the use of the term "emergency" across those covered
agreements relating to trade in goods, services and intellectual property rig hts to be material to
its understanding of the phrase "cases of emergency" in paragraph 1427. In this respect, Panel notes
that the only context in which the word "emergency" is consistently used across the GATT 1994, the
GATS and the TRIPS Agreement is in creating a general exception for actions taken by a Member
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests "taken in time of
war or other emergency in international relations ".364 This suggests that an "emergency in
international relations" is the type of "emergency" contemplated in paragraph 1427 of
Russia's Working Party Report.
7.249. The content of paragraph 1427 and its relationship to obligations under the GATT 1994 are
also relevant to the Panel's analysis. Unlike paragraphs 1161 and 1426, paragraph 1427 distinctly
creates several commitments which have no direct counterpart in the GATT 1994.365 The scope of
the measures covered by paragraph 1427 also differs from Articles X:1 and X:2 of the GATT 1994.366

363 The Panel recalls that, in China – Rare Earths, the Appellate Body concluded that paragraph 1.2 of
China's Accession Protocol served to make that Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements part of "a single
package of rights and obligations with respect to China as a WTO Member". (Appellate Body Reports,
China – Rare Earths, para. 5.72.) The Appellate Body consequently noted that any analysis of the individual
provisions in China's Accession Protocol should take into account "the overall architecture of the WTO system
as a single package of rights and obligations and any other relevant interpretive elements". (Ibid. para. 5.74.)
364 See Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 ("taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations"); Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement ("in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use"), and Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement
("taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations"); and Article III:1 of the GATS ("except in
emergency situations"), Article X:1 of the GATS ("on the question of emergency safeguard measures"), and
Article XIVbis:1(b)(iii) of the GATS ("taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations").
365 The text of paragraph 1427 creates at least three separate obligations to: (a) publish the covered
measures prior to their adoption; (b) provide a reasonable period of time, normally not less than 30 days, for
Members and interested persons to comment to responsible authorities before such measures are finalized or
submitted to the competent CU bodies; and (c) take any such comments into account. However, in the specific
circumstances of this dispute, Ukraine has only argued that Russia has acted inconsistently with its obligation
to publish certain legal instruments prior to their adoption. (See Section 7.6.3.6.3 above.)
366 Paragraph 1427 concerns any "laws, regulations, decrees (other than Presidential decrees), decisions
and administrative rulings of general application pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or
intellectual property rights", whereas Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 only concerns any measures of general
application "effecting an advance in duty, or other charges on imports under an established and uniform
practice, or impose a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the
transfer of payments therefor". (For the scope of Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, see fn 362 above.)

However, the commitments in paragraph 1427 and obligations under the GATT 1994 are still closely
linked to the extent that both impose obligations on Russia relating to the publication of measures
concerning trade in goods.
7.250. For these reasons, the Panel considers that Russia can rely on the phrase "except in cases
of emergency" in order to justify any inconsistency with paragraph 1427 of Russia's Working Party
Report as necessary for the protection of its essential security interests taken in time of an
"emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.6.4.5 Paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Part y Report and Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994
7.251. Paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report provides that:
The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed that, from the date of accession,
no law, regulation, decree, decision or administrativ e ruling of general application
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property rights,
whether adopted or issued in the Russian Federation or by a competent body of the
[Customs Union (CU)], would become effective prior to pu blication, as provided for in
the applicable provisions of the WTO Agreement, including the GATT 1994,
the WTO GATS Agreement, and the WTO TRIPS Agreement. The Working Party took
note of this commitment.
7.252. Paragraph 1428 requires Russia to ensure that certain measures do not become effective
before publication "as provided for in the applicable provisions of the WTO Agreement, including the
GATT 1994".367 As mentioned above, the ordinary meaning of the term "applicable" is whether such
provisions are "able to b e applied ( to a purpose etc.)", or are "relevant", "suitable" or
"appropriate".368 The ordinary meaning of the term "provided" is "on the condition, supposition, or
understanding that" or "it being stipulated, or arranged that".369 Consequently, the Panel considers
that the ordinary meaning of the text of paragraph 1428 could support two possible interpretations.
First, the phrase "as provided for" could be construed as merely stating that obligations equivalent
to paragraph 1428 are also stipulated in "applicable provisions of the WTO Agreement". Conversely,
the phrase "as provided for" could be construed as specifying that other provisions of the
WTO Agreement are "applicable" to the obligations in paragraph 1428.
7.253. Other provisions of Russia's Working Party Report also inform the Panel's interpretation of
paragraph 1428. In particular, the Panel has already examined the textual differences between
paragraphs 1426 and 1427. 370 The Panel considers that this analysis is equally applicable to the
differences between paragraphs 1427 and 1428. In the Panel's view, the absence of any equivalent
textual reference in paragraph 1427 underpins the significance of the phrase "the applicable
provisions of the WTO Agreement" in paragraph 1428.
7.254. Finally, the content of paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report and its relationship
to obligations under the GATT 1994 is also relevant to the Panel's analysis. Unlike paragraphs 1161
and 1426, paragraph 1428 distinctly commits Russia to ensure that the covered measures are not
made effective before publication, which has no explicit counterpart in the GATT 1994. The scope of
the measures covered by paragraph 1428 also differs from Articles X:1 and X:2 of the GATT 1994.371
However, the commitments in paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report and the obligations
under the GATT 1994 are still closely linked to the extent that both impose obligations on Russia
relating to the publication of measures concerning trade in goods.

367 Emphasis added.
369 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2003),
Vol. 2, p. 2382.
370 See para. 7.243 above.
371 Paragraph 1428 concerns any "laws, regulations, decrees, decisions or administrative rulings of
general application pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services or intellectual property rights", whereas
Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 concerns any measures of general application "effecting an advance in duty, or
other charges on imports under an established and uniform practice, or impose a new or more burdensome
requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor". (For the scope of
Article X:1, see fn 362 above.)

7.255. For these reasons, the Pane l considers that Russia can rely on the phrase "as provided for
in the applicable provisions of the WTO Agreement " in order to justify any inconsistency with the
commitments in paragraph 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report as necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" within
the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.6.4.6 Conclusion
7.256. The Panel considers that Russia could justify any inconsistency with the commitments in
paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report as necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests taken in time of an "emergency in international relations"
within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
7.257. The Panel also considers that, had the measures been taken in normal times, i.e. had they
not been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met the other conditions of
Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that the measures were inconsistent
with paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party Report to the extent that they would also be prima
facie inconsistent with either the first or second sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994, or both.
7.258. The Panel does not consider it necessary to address further Ukraine's claims based on
commitments in paragraphs 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report.
7.7 Panel's terms of reference and the existence of the measures
7.259. In this Section of the Report, the Panel addresses a number of issues related to its terms of
reference and to the existence of the measures at issue.
7.7.1 Identification of the measures and claims, and their relationship to each other
7.260. In its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, Russia argued that Ukraine's panel
request fails to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU in a number of respects:
a. Ukraine's panel request fails to make clear how the measures in each o f the two distinct
groups set forth in the panel request operate together.372
b. The panel request does not adequately explain which treaty provisions are alleged to be
infringed by each of the challenged measures in the two distinct groups.373
c. Ukraine's first written submission presents the challenged measures in a completely
different manner from the presentation in its panel request, i.e. "as four individual
measures that are not connected and do not operate together". Russia considers that, as
respondent, it was placed in an uncertain situation in presenting its defence because it
was required to guess what the Panel would identify as the measures at issue on the basis
of the Panel's interpretation of the substance of the alleged violation.374
7.261. Russia thus argu ed that Ukraine's panel request, both in general, and in particular with
respect to the identification of the specific measures, fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2
of the DSU.375
7.262. Ukraine responded that its presentation of the specific measures at issue in two separate
sections of its panel request does not necessarily mean that the measures identified within each

372 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 15-16. More specifically, Russia
argues that Ukraine's panel request fails to establish the "nexus" between the measures within each distinct
group. (Ibid. para. 21. See also Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 7-8.)
373 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 15-16. See also Russia's opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 8.
374 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 19-20 (referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 136). See also Russia's opening statement at the
second meeting of the Panel, para. 9.
375 See Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 23.

section must be presumed to operate together.376 Nor is there any requirement in Article 6.2 of the
DSU for a complainant to identify ho w all of the measures at issue operate together unless it is
necessary in order to present the problem clearly. 377 In addition, Ukraine argued that
Russia's complaint regarding the reorganization of the presentation of the measures in
Ukraine's first written submission does not address why the descriptions of the measures in the
panel request were not sufficiently clear. Ukraine argued that the measures as described in its first
written submission correspond fully to the measures as identified in its panel re quest.378
Finally, Ukraine argued that the panel request plainly connects the specific measures at issue with
the relevant provisions of the covered agreements that Ukraine claims have been infringed.379
7.263. In what follows, the Panel first describes the presentation of the measures and claims in
Ukraine's panel request, and in Ukraine's first written submission, respectively, before addressing
Russia's arguments that the panel request does not satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the
DSU.
7.7.1.1 Presentation of the measures and claims in Ukraine's panel request
7.264. Ukraine's panel request refers separately to a "first group of measures" and the "legal basis
for the complaint" in respect of those measures (section II of the panel request), and a
"second group of measures " and the "legal basis for the complaint" in respect of those measures
(section III of the panel request).
7.265. Section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request, which is entitled "First Group of Measures", states
that Russia has imposed measures concerning traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine to the
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, through the territory of Russia. These measures mandate
that all international cargo transit by road and rail transport from the territory of Ukraine to the
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, through the territory of Russia, be carried out exclusively
from the territory of Belarus and comply with a number of additional conditions related to
identification seals and registration card s at specific permanent or mobile c heckpoints. It is also
noted in this section that the above -referenced measures apply as well to traffic in transit from
Ukraine destined for the Kyrgyz Republic, as of 1 July 2016.380
7.266. Section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request further identifies as a measure a ban on all road and
rail transit of : (a) goods that are subject to non -zero import duties according to the
Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU, and (b) goods falling under the 2014 import bans set forth in
the list annexed to Resolution No. 778.381
7.267. Section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request then sets forth the legal instruments through which
it understands the above -referenced measures to be imposed. These instruments include
Russian Presidential Decrees (Decree No. 1 and Decree No. 319, which amends Decree N o. 1), as

376 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 42; and
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 18.
377 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 42.
378 Ibid. para. 63.
379 Ibid. paras. 65-68.
380 Request for the establishment of a panel by Ukraine, WT/DS512/3 (Ukraine's panel request), section
II.A., p. 2.
381 Resolution No. 778 imposes bans on the importation of various agricultural products, raw materials
and foodstuffs, as listed in the Resolution and originating from the United States, EU Member States, Canada,
Australia, and Norway. (See Resolution No. 778 , (Exhibits UKR-10, RUS-7).) On 13 August 2015, the import
bans imposed by Resolution No. 778 were extended to the listed goods originating from Albania, Montenegro,
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Ukraine . (S ee Resolution No. 842 , (Exhibit UKR -13).) Another resolution of the
Russian Government, enacted on 21 December 2015, specified that the import prohibitions in respect of the
goods listed in Resolution No. 778 would be applied to Ukraine as of 1 January 2016. (See Resolution No. 1397,
(Exhibit UKR-15). See also Russia's openin g statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6. )
On 1 January 2016, the date of the amendment of Resolution No. 778, the European Union and Ukraine had
agreed to apply provisions of the DCFTA that are part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. (Ukraine's first
written submission, para. 25.) The duration of the imp ort bans has been extended a number of times, most
recently by Resolution No. 790, which extends the import ban until 31 December 2018. (See Resolution No. 790,
(Exhibit UKR-70).)

well as a resolution of the Russian Government implementing Decree No. 1 (Resolution No. 1, also
dated 1 January 2016).382, 383
7.268. With respect to the "legal basis of the complaint", section II.B. of Ukraine's panel request
states that the measures identified in section II.A. are inconsistent with a number of provisions of
Articles V, XI:1 and X of the GATT 1994, along with paragraphs of Russia's Working Party Report ,
as incorporated into Russia's Accession Protocol by reference.384 In addition to identifying the claims
of WTO-inconsistency, this section of Ukraine's panel request provides a brief explanation as to why
the measures in question are considered inconsistent with the cited provisions of the covered
agreements.
7.269. Section III.A. of Ukr aine's panel request identifies a second group of measures, which it
describes as "other measures concerning traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine through the
territory of the Russian Federation ". These other measures are further described in th ree
sub-categories.
a. The first sub -category encompasses measures requiring that, from 30 November 2014,
transit of goods subject to veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance, and which are
included in the list approved by Resolution No. 778, dated 7 August 2014, and subsequent
amendments, be generally prohibited through checkpoints of the Republic of Belarus. 385
Additionally, transit of such goods destined for Kazakhstan may only take place upon
permits issued by the Committee of Veterinary Control and Surveillance of the Ministry of
Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan (indicating the Russian checkpoints on the
external border of the EaEU), while transit of the same goods destined for third countries
can take place only upon permits issued by the Rosselkhoznadzor.386 Ukraine's panel
request then provides a list of the various legal instruments by which it understands Russia
to impose the measures in this first sub-category.387
b. The second sub -category is described as "restrictions on the traffic in transit fro m the
territory of Ukraine through the territory of the Russian Federation to countries in
Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic by de facto applying Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from
the territory of Ukraine to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic".388
c. The third sub-category refers to "any other related measures adopted and/or applied by
the Russian Federation concerning traffic in transit f rom the territory of Ukraine to

382 Decree No. 1, (Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-1); Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2); Resolution No. 1,
(Exhibits UKR-3, RUS-4) (as amended by Resolution No. 388, (Exhibit UKR-5); and Resolution No. 732, (Exhibit
UKR-4)).
383 Section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request also identifies the following legal instruments through which
the measures identified in section II.A. are imposed: Decree No. 560, (Exhibits UKR-9, RUS-3),
(as subsequently extended by Decree No. 320 of 24 June 2015 and Decree No. 305 of 29 June 2016);
Resolution No. 147, (Exhibits UKR-6, RUS-5) (as amended by Resolution No. 732, (Exhibit UKR-4));
PJSC Order, (Exhibit UKR-7); and Resolution No. 276, (Exhibits UKR-8, RUS-6) (as amended by
Resolution No. 732, (Exhibit UKR-4)). Both parties advised in the interim review stage that Decree No. 560 has
since been further extended until 31 December 2019 by Decree No. 420, which was adopted by the President
of the Russian Federation on 12 July 2018. Section II.A also identifies Resolution No. 778, (Exhibits UKR-10,
RUS-7) and its amendments. (See fn 385 below for a full list of amendments to Resolution No. 778.)
384 Ukraine's panel request, section II.B., pp. 3-4.
385 Resolution No. 778 is amended by the following resolutions of the Government of the
Russian Federation: (a) Resolution No. 830 , (Exhibit UKR -11); (b) Resolution No. 625, ( Exhibit UKR -12);
(c) Resolution No. 842, (Exhibit UKR -13); (d) Resolution No. 981, (Exhibit UKR -14); (e) Resolution No. 1397,
(Exhibit UKR -15); (f) Resolution No. 157, (Exhibit UKR -16); (g) Resolution No. 472, (Exhibit UKR -17);
(h) Resolution No. 608, (Exh ibit UKR-18); (i) Resolution No. 897, (Exhibit UKR -19); (j) Resolution No. 1086,
(Exhibit UKR-20); and (k) Resolution No. 790, (Exhibit UKR-70).
386 Ukraine's panel request, section III.A., p. 4.
387 Ibid. p. 5. Ukraine's panel request identifies the followi ng legal instruments through which Russia
imposes these measures: Veterinary Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10); Instruction No. FS-AS-3/22903 of
the Rosselkhoznadzor dated 21 November 2014, (Plant Instruction), (Exhibits UKR -22, RUS -11); and any
additional measures that prolong, replace, amend, implement, extend or apply these measures, as well as other
related measures. (Ukraine's panel request, section III.A., p. 5.)
388 Ibid.

countries in Central/Eastern Asia and Caucasus through the territory of the
Russian Federation, including measures that implement, complement, add to, apply,
amend or replace any of the measures mentioned in section II.A. or section III.A ".389
The introductory words to this sub -category of the panel request indicate that this
sub-category is necessitated by Russia's alleged "fundamental lack of transparency
concerning some of the measures at issue" and "failure to observe the t ransparency and
publication obligations" under the GATT 1994 and its Accession Protocol.390
7.270. With respect to the "legal basis of the complaint" for the second group of measures so
identified, section III.B of Ukraine's panel request states that these measures are inconsistent with
a number of provisions of Articles V, XI:1 and X of the GATT 1994, along with various paragraphs
of Russia's Working Party Report, as incorporated into Russia's Accession Protocol by reference .391
In addition to identifying the claims of WTO-inconsistency, this section of Ukraine's panel request
provides a brief explanation as to why the measures in question are considered inconsistent with
the cited provisions of the covered agreements.
7.7.1.2 Presentation of the measures and claims in Ukraine's first written submission
7.271. In section IV of its first written submission, Ukraine presents four "categories" of measures,
as opposed to the arrangement under two "groups of measures" in its panel request. 392 The four
categories of measures in section IV of Ukraine's first written submission (and the terminology
chosen by the Panel to describe these categories of measures) are:
a. "2016 general transit ban and other transit restrictions" (the 2016 Belarus Transit
Requirements);
b. "2016 product-specific transit ban and other transit restrictions" (the 2016 Transit Bans
on Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods);
c. "De facto application of the 2016 general and product-specific transit bans in Decree No. 1,
as amended, to traffic in transit destined for Mongo lia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan" (the de facto measure); and
d. "2014 transit bans and other transit restrictions" (the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans
on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods).393
7.272. Ukraine considers that the first category of measures, which the Panel refers to as the 2016
Belarus Transit Requirements , corresponds fully to the measures identified in section II.A. of
Ukraine's panel request as the requirements that international cargo transit by road and rail from
the territory of Ukraine destined for the territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic, through the territory of Russia, be carried out exclusively from the territory of
Belarus, and comply with a number of additional conditions related to identification seals and
registration cards at specific permanent or mobile checkpoints.394
7.273. The second category of measures, which the Panel refers to as the 2016 Transit Bans on
Non-Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods, Ukraine considers to correspond fully to the measures
identified in section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request as the ban on all road and rail transit of : (a)
goods that are subject to non -zero import duties according to the Common Customs Tariff of the
EaEU, and (b) goods that fall within the scope of the import ban s imposed by Resolution No. 778 ,
including the exceptional derogation procedure for such goods.395
7.274. The third category of measures, the de facto measure, Ukraine considers to correspond to
the measures identified in the second sub-category of the second group of measures in section III.A.

389 Ukraine's panel request, section III.A., p. 5.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid. section III.B., pp. 5-6.
392 Ukraine's first written submission, section IV, entitled "The measures at issue".
393 Ibid. para. 54.
394 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 63.
395 Ibid.

of Ukraine's panel request, namely, "restrictions on the traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine
through the territory of the Russian Federation to countries in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus
other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic by de facto applying Decree No. 1
and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the territory of Ukraine to third countries other than the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic".396
7.275. The fourth category of measures, which the Panel refers to as the 2014 Belarus -Russia
Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods , Ukraine considers to correspond to the
measures identified in the first sub -category of the second group of measures in section III.A of
Ukraine's panel request, namely, the 2014 prohibitions on the "transit of goods subject to veterinary
and phytosanitary surveillance and which are included in the list approved by Resolution … No. 778
… through the checkpoints of the Republic of Belarus", along with special checkpoint and permit
requirements for such goods destined for Kazakhstan and other countries.397
7.276. In section V of its first written submission, Ukraine presents its arguments of
WTO-inconsistency of each of the categories of measures.398 This discussion is arranged on the basis
of the claims of inconsistency with : (a) Article V of the GATT 1994 and paragraph 1161 of
Russia's Working Party Report; (b) Articles X:1 and X:2 of the GATT 1994 and paragraphs 1426,
1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report; and (c) Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.399 Within
the discussion of the claims of inconsistency with the specific provisions (and subparagraphs of those
provisions), Ukraine discusses serially the relevant categories of measures alleged to infringe the
specific provisions.400
7.7.2 Whether Ukraine's panel request satisfies the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU
7.277. The relevant portion of Article 6.2 of the DSU reads:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the com plaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly.
7.278. Article 6.2 of the DSU has two distinct requirements, namely: (a) the identification of the
specific measures at issue; and (b) the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint.401 Article 6.2 defines the scope of the dispute between the parties, thereby establishing
and delimiting the panel's jurisdiction and serving the due process objective of notifying the
respondent, and the third parties, of the nature of the case. 402 Moreover, in order to "present the
problem clearly", within the meaning of Article 6.2, a panel request must "plainly connect" the
challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) claimed to have been infringed so that a respondent
can "know what case it has to answer, and … beg in preparing its defence".403 Compliance with the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU must be demonstrated on the face of the panel request.
Consequently, defects in the panel request cannot be cured by the subsequent submissions of the
parties.404

396 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 43 and 63.
397 Ibid. para. 63.
398 Ukraine's first written submission, section V, entitled "WTO-inconsistency of the measures at issue".
399 Ukraine did not pursue its claims under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 in its first written submission.
400 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 156 et seq.
401 As the Appellate Body has held in previous disputes, these two requirements constitute the "matter
referred to the DSB", which forms the basis of a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU.
(Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6; and
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.39.)
402 Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6; and
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.39.
403 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 162. (fns omitted)
404 Nevertheless, subsequent submissions, such as the complainant's first written submission, may be
consulted to the extent that they may confirm or clarify the meaning of the words used in the panel request.
(Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.9;

7.279. In what follows, for each of the measures identified in Ukraine's panel request in the first
and second groups of measures, the Panel determines whether the identification of the measures
and claims satisfies the requirements of Article 6.2.
7.7.2.1 First group of measures – identification of the specific measures at issue and the
legal basis of the complaint
7.280. Section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request identifies the following measures:
a. Requirements that international cargo transit by road and rail from the territory of Ukraine
destined for the territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, through
the territory of Russia, be carried out exclusively from the territory of Belarus, and comply
with a number of additional conditions related to identification seals and registration cards
at specific permanent or mobile checkpoints.
b. A ban on all road and rail transit of : (i) goods that are subject to non-zero import duties
according to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU, and (ii) goods that fall within the
scope of the import ban imposed by Resolution No. 778.
7.281. The specific measures within this group appear to be connected by the fact that they are
implemented through a common set of legal instruments, namely, Decree No. 1, and
Decree No. 319, which amended Decree No. 1 in material respects.405
7.282. The Panel considers that the identification of each of the measures within the first group of
measures in section II.A. satisfies the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
7.283. Russia contends that the legal basis for the compl aint in respect of the above -mentioned
measures is provided only in respect of the group of measures, rather than for each of the measures
within the group.406 Russia does not explain why it reads Ukraine's panel request in this manner and
the Panel does not share that reading. The opening words of section II.B. of Ukraine's panel request,
entitled "Legal Basis for the Complaint", read: "Ukraine considers that the measures identified in
section II.A. are inconsistent with the following WTO provisions ". Ukraine's use of the term "the
measures" rather than "group of measures" makes clear that the claims of WTO -inconsistency that
follow are made in relation to each of the measures within the first group of measures identified in
section II.A. of Ukraine's panel request.
7.284. The Panel therefore considers that the panel request adequately describes the legal basis of
the complaint in relation to the measures identified within the "first group of measures" for each of
the claims made in section II.B. of Ukraine's panel request.
7.7.2.2 Second group of measures – identification of the specific measures at issue and
the legal basis of the complaint
7.285. As previously noted 407, t he measures identified in the second group of measures in
section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request comprise:
a. 2014 prohibitions on transit, from Ukraine across the territory of Russia and through
checkpoints of the Republic of Belarus, of goods that are subject to veterinary and
phytosanitary surveillance and that fall within the scope of the import bans imposed by
Resolution No. 778, along with requirements that the transit of any such goods destined
for Kazakhstan and other third countries occur on the basis of permits issued by the
appropriate Kazakh or Russian veterinary and p hytosanitary surveillance authorities and
through designated checkpoints;

405 See para. 7.267 above.
406 Russia's second written submission, para. 10.
407 See para. 7.269 above.

b. the "de facto application of Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the territory
of Ukraine to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic"; and
c. related transit measures that implement, complement, add to, apply, amend or replace
any of the measures identified in both sections II.A and III.A. of Ukraine's panel request,
of which Ukraine may not be aware owing to Russia's alleged failure to comply with its
transparency and publication obligations.
7.286. The Panel agrees with Russia that it is difficult to discern a relationship among the measures
within this second group that would warrant them being grouped together, especially since the
third sub-category of measures (in item c. above) also covers measures related to those within the
first group of measures in section II.A. of the panel request. However, Ukraine's decision to group
these measures together in its panel request does not of itself render the identification of the
measures unclear.
7.287. The Panel next considers whether the identification of the measures within each
sub-category of the second group of measures in section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request satisfies
the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
7.7.2.2.1 First sub-category of measures
7.288. The first sub-category of the second group of measures (item a. in paragraph 7.285 above)
are prohibitions, put in place in November 2014, on transit from Ukraine across Russia, through
checkpoints in Belarus, of goods subject to veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance and that are
subject to the import ban implemented by Resolution No. 778, along with related requirements that
the transit of any such goods destined for Kazakhstan or other third countrie s occur through
designated Russian checkpoints and that all such goods be subject to clearance and on the basis of
permits issued by the appropriate Russian or Kazakh veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance
authorities. Specifically, Ukraine challenges these measures as they affect transit from the territory
of Ukraine through the territory of Russia.408
7.289. The Panel concludes that Ukraine's panel request clearly identifies the first sub -category of
the second group of measures.
7.7.2.2.2 Second sub-category of measures
7.290. In its panel request, Ukraine describes the measure in item b. in paragraph 7.285 above as
the de facto application of "Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the territory of Ukraine
to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic". The Panel refers
to this measure as the "de facto measure" in the remainder of this discussion.
7.291. At the Panel's request, the parties engaged specifically on whether the identification of the
de facto measure in Ukraine's panel request satisfied the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.409
Therefore, although the Panel is addressing this issue in the context of evaluating Russia's more
general objection that none of the measures or claims was sufficiently precisely identified, it is
necessary to refer to arguments that the parties made more specifically about the de facto measure.

408 See the first sentence in section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request, and the underscored sentence
prior to the paragraph beginning "Second" in section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request. (Ukraine's panel
request, pp. 4-5.)
409 The Panel raised this issue on its own motion, through a question that it posed to the parties in
advance of the first meeting. (See Communication to the parties, "Request for discussion of specific issues to
be included in the parties' oral statements", dated 12 January 2018, Question No. 2.) The Appellate Body has
previously referred to the widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of
its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any dispute that comes
before it. (Appellate Body Reports, US – 1916 Act, para. 54 and fn 30 thereto; Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 36; and EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 791; and
Panel Reports, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, paras. 7.19-7.20;
EC – IT Products, para. 7.196; China – Broiler Products, para. 7.515; and US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd
complaint) (Article 21.5 – EU), para. 7.358.)

7.7.2.2.2.1 Arguments of Russia
7.292. Russia argues that Ukraine's description of the de facto measure in its panel request is
insufficiently clear for purposes of Article 6.2 of the DSU.410 Russia considers that it is not possible
to determine the geographical scope of application of the de facto measure from the reference in
the panel request to "countries in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus other than the
Republic of Kazakhstan", taking into account the number of countries covered by such a
description.411 In addition, the description of the de facto measure in the second sub-category of the
second group of measures (set forth in paragraph 7.26 9.b above), in combinat ion with the third
sub-category of the second group of measures (set forth in paragraph 7.26 9.c above) does not
enable the respondent to discern whether the measure is written or unwritten, or whether it is being
challenged on an "as such" or "as applied" basis.412 Russia considers that the measure in question
constitutes "an imprecise open-ended list with the possibility for the claimant to put any new element
on the table".413
7.7.2.2.2.2 Arguments of Ukraine
7.293. Ukraine argues that the measure that it challenges, which it d escribes in its first written
submission as the "de facto application of the 2016 general and product -specific transit bans in
Decree No. 1, as amended, to traffic in transit destined for Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan" was identified in its panel request in a manner that satisfies the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU.414 Ukraine argues that there is no requirement under Article 6.2 of the DSU
to identify in a panel request whether a measure is written or unwritten, or is challenged o n an "as
such" or "as applied" basis. 415 Moreover, the measure as described in the second sub -category of
the second group of measures (in section III.A. of the panel request) is clearly distinct from the
general and product -specific transit bans and other r estrictions identified in the first group of
measures in section II.A. of the panel request. 416 According to Ukraine, the measure described in
the second sub -category of the second group of measures in section III.A. of the panel request,
through the phrase "by de facto applying Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the
territory of Ukraine to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic"
was clearly identified as a distinct measure comprising "the application in f act of the measures
introduced by Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to traffic in transit destined for territories other
than those covered by Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1".417
7.294. Ukraine also rejects the argument that the reference in the panel request t o the legal
instruments in question being applied to transit destined for territories in "Central and Eastern Asia
and the Caucasus other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic" amounts to an
"open-ended list" of measures that fails to mee t the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. 418
In Ukraine's view, on the basis of the United Nation's definitions of the regions in question, the
geographical specification in the second sub-category of the second group of measures identified in
section III.A. of the panel request clearly referred to traffic destined for "Tajikistan; Turkmenistan;
Uzbekistan; China; Hong Kong China; Macao, China; Chinese Taipei; the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea; Japan; Mongolia; the Republic of Korea; Georgia; Azer baijan; and Armenia".419

410 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 23.
411 Ibid. para. 22. See also Russia's second written submission, paras. 14-15.
412 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 22.
413 Ibid. See also Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 13.
414 Ukraine's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 53; and response to Panel
question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 12.
415 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 45.
416 Ibid. para. 49.
417 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 51. Ukraine
argues that, contrary to Russia's understanding, "the matter before the Panel includes the de facto application
of Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1, and thus the restrictions on traffic in transit imposed by both
instruments" and not "any measure affecting traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine to countries in
Central/Eastern Asia and Caucasus". (Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
para. 24.)
418 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 58-60.
See also Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 24.
419 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 59-60; and
Map of Central Asia, Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the UN Classification of Countries by Region,

This is not an open -ended list, and the fact that Ukraine elected, in its first written submission, to
demonstrate the existence of the measure with respect to transit destined for a subset of those
destinations, does not affect the conclusion that the geographical specification in the panel request
was not open ended.420
7.7.2.2.2.3 Analysis
7.295. Section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request identifies the de facto measure in the following
manner:
[R]estrictions on the traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine through the territory
of the Russian Federation to countries in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus other
than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic by de facto applying
Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the terr itory of Ukraine to third
countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.421
7.296. This identification refers explicitly to transit restrictions that arise out of the application of
Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1. The transit restrictio ns effected through Decree No. 1 and
Resolution No. 1 are described in the first three paragraphs of section II.A. of Ukraine's panel
request, and concern the requirements that international cargo transit by road and rail from the
territory of Ukraine dest ined for the territory of Kazakhstan, through the territory of Russia, be
carried out exclusively from the territory of Belarus, and comply with a number of additional
conditions related to identification seals and registration cards at specific control points.
7.297. Before evaluating the description of the de facto measure in Ukraine's panel request, the
Panel recalls the level of scrutiny that panels must apply in determining whether a panel request
meets the specificity requirement under Article 6.2 of the DSU. The Appellate Body has stated that
the identification of the specific measures at issue, pursuant to Article 6.2, is different from a
demonstration of the existence of such measures, which would require that a complainant present
relevant arguments and evidence in its submissions.422 While a measure cannot be identified without
some indication of its contents, the identification of a measure within the meaning of Article 6.2
need only be framed "with sufficient particularity so as to indicate the nature of the measure and
the gist of what is at issue".423 Thus, according to the Appellate Body, an examination regarding the
specificity of a panel request does not entail substantive consideration as to what types of measures
are susceptible to challenge in WTO dispute settlement.424
7.298. The standard outlined above was developed by the Appellate Body in US – Continued Zeroing
in the process of reversing the panel's finding in that dispute that an examination of the specificity
of a panel request would entail a consideration of the types of measures susceptible to
WTO dispute settlement. The panel had found that the panel request did not satisfy the requirement
in Article 6.2 to identify the specific measures at issue because it failed to "demonstrate the existence
and the precise content of the purported measure" and because "the continued application" of
anti-dumping duties resulting from 18 anti -dumping duty orders did not constitute a measure for
the purposes of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 425 The Appellate Body considered that the
panel request had sufficiently linked together the following three elements in seeking to identify the
measures at issue426:

Income Group, and Subregion of the World, (The Regions of Central Asia, Eastern Asia and Caucasus),
(Exhibit UKR-102).
420 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 61.
421 Ukraine's panel request, section III.A., p. 5.
422 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 169.
423 Ibid. (emphasis added)
424 Ibid.
426 Ibid. para. 166.

a. The panel request made "explicit reference" to the duties at issue, imposed through
18 anti-dumping duty orders, each on a "specific product" exported from "a specific
country"427;
b. The panel request indicated that the complainant was challenging the "continued
application" of the anti-dumping duties pursuant to certain administrative proceedings428;
and
c. The panel request stated that the duties at issue were calculated at levels "in excess of
the anti -dumping margin which would result from the correct application of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement". The complainant stated specifically in its panel request tha t
the respondent's investigating authority "systematically" used the zeroing methodology in
all types of reviews pertaining to anti -dumping duties and relied on margins calculated
with the zeroing methodology in sunset reviews.429
7.299. The Appellate Body conclud ed that, with these three elements, taken together, the
respondent could reasonably have been expected to understand that the complainant was
challenging the continued application of the zeroing methodology in successive proceedings, through
each of the 18 anti-dumping duty orders.430
7.300. Given these facts, the Panel understands the panel request in US – Continued Zeroing to
have identified the measures at issue "with sufficient particularity so as to indicate the nature of the
measure and the gist of what is at issue" because it explicitly: (a) provided an indication that the
measure was applied to determine the duties imposed on products from "specific countr[ies]";
(b) identified the unwritten measure at issue (i.e. the zeroing methodology); (c) specified the basis
on which the measure was challenged (i.e. "the continued application of … anti -dumping duties"
according to the zeroing methodology and the "systematic[]" use of the zeroing methodology); and
(d) identified the legal instruments in which that methodology was used (i.e. "18 anti-dumping duty
orders").
7.301. Reading the standard developed by the Appellate Body in US – Continued Zeroing as tied to
the precise aspects of the panel request in that dispute, the Panel does not consider that
Ukraine's identification of the de facto measure in its panel request satisfies Article 6.2 of the DSU.
As the Panel will explain further below, the panel request in this dispute does not identify with
sufficient precision: (a) the destinations of the goods that are subject to the de facto measure,
(b) the nature of the de facto measure as an unwritten measure, (c) the nature of the de facto
measure as a single measure, (d) the "as such" character of its challenge concerning the de facto
measure, and (e) the legal instruments underpinning the de facto measure. These aspects of
Ukraine's panel request, taken together, lead to the conclusion that Ukraine has not identified the
de facto measure with requisite sufficient particularity.
7.302. In the present dispute, the de facto measure is described as involving the application of the
restrictions in Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1, to traffic in transit from Ukraine, for third-country
destinations in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus , ot her than Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic. Ukraine considers that the regions of Central Asia, Eastern Asia and the Caucasus
cover the following countries: Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; China; Hong Kong, China;
Macao, China ; Chinese Taipei; the D emocratic People's Republic of Korea; Japan; Mongolia;
the Republic of Korea; Georgia; Azerbaijan; and Armenia. 431 In support , Ukraine submits :
(a) a UN map of Central Asia that identifies the countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,

427 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 165. The 18 anti-dumping duty orders at
issue were also listed in the annex to the European Communities' panel request, and a citation was included for
each order. (Ibid.)
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid. The complainant also stated in its panel request that it "ha[d] identified in the annex to this
request a number of anti-dumping orders where duties are set and/or maintained on the basis of the
above-mentioned zeroing practice or methodology with the result that duties are paid by importers … in excess
of the dumping margin which would have been calculated using a WTO consistent methodology". (Ibid.)
430 Ibid. para. 166.
431 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 60; and The
Regions of Central Asia, Eastern Asia and Caucasus, (Exhibit UKR-102).

Tajikistan, Turkmen istan a nd Uzbekistan as "Central Asia" 432; (b) a map of "the Caucasus and
Central Asia" produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that identifies, in addition to the
Central Asian countries identified in the UN map, the countries of Georgia, Armenia a nd
Azerbaijan433; and (c) excerpts from a publication of the Population Division of the UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs that classifies countries by region, income group and sub region. In
that publication, the region of "Eastern Asia" is classified to cover China; "China, Hong Kong [special
administrative region]"; "China, Macao [special administrative region]"; "China, Taiwan Province of
China"; "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "; "Japan"; "Mongolia" and the "Republic of
Korea".434 That publication also identifies Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan as being part of "Central Asia" , which is classified, al ong with countries in
"Southern Asia", as part of "South-Central Asia".435 However, there is no reference in this publication
to the region referred to as "the Caucasus". Rather, the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
are presented as part of "Western Asia", along with Turkey, Cyprus, Iraq and the various Gulf States
and countries of the Middle East.
7.303. On the basis of the maps submitted by Ukraine, it appears that the countries included within
the regions of "Central Asia, Eastern Asia and the Caucasus" cover those that share land bor ders
with Russia to the Southeast (Geo rgia and Azerbaijan), and to the East (Chin a, Mongolia and
North Korea), as well as those that share land borders with Kazakhstan. Indeed, aside from Ukraine
and Belarus, the only countries w ith which Russia shares land borders that would be specifically
excluded from the geographical scope of the de facto measure, as identified in Ukraine's panel
request, are the European Union (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and Norway.
7.304. Transit measures by their nature apply to goods that fall within the definition of "traffic in
transit" under Article V:1 of the GATT 1994.436 Owing to the requirement that the passage of such
traffic in transit across the territory of a Member begin and end in a territory other than the territory
of that Member, the destination of the goods in question is ordinarily an important component of a
transit measure.437 Moreover, when a Member alleges that a transit measure is in fact being applied
to traffic in transit destined for countries other than those set forth in the measure itself, and that
this application constitutes a separate, unwritten transit measure, it is even more important that the
destinations in question be precisely identified.438
7.305. Given the nature of the measure as a transit measure, which is unwritten and consis ts of
the de facto application of a written measure that applies to transit destined for two countries, to
what appears to be potentially as many as 15 countries in regions as large and diverse as " Central
and Eastern Asia and Caucasus other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic", the

432 The Regions of Central Asia, Eastern Asia and Caucasus, (Exhibit UKR-102), p. 2. (pagination of PDF
file)
433 Ibid. p. 3. (pagination of PDF file)
434 Ibid. p. 5. (pagination of PDF file)
435 Ibid. (pagination of PDF file)
436 Article V:1 of the GATT 1994 provides that "[g]oods … shall be deemed to be in transit across the
territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or without trans-shipment,
warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey
beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic
passes."
437 This is particularly so when a complainant brings a claim under the second sentence of Article V:2 of
the GATT 1994, which provides that "[n]o distinction shall be made which is based on … the place of …
destination."
438 In EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body explained that, because
the very existence and precise contours of a measure that is unwritten may be uncertain, complainants are
expected to identify such measures in their panel requests as clearly as possible. (Appellate Body Report,
EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 792.) In this appeal, the Appellate Body concluded,
on its own motion, that the United States' challenge to an unwritten LA/MSF programme was not identified as a
specific measure in the United States' panel request and was therefore outside the panel's terms of reference.
The Appellate Body considered that the references in the United States' panel request to individual provisions
of LA/MSF could not, at the same time, be read to also refer to a distinct measure consisting of an unwritten
LA/MSF Programme. (Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 790,
792 and 795.)

Panel has serious doubts as to whether Russia would have been able to understand the nature of
the measure and the gist of what was at issue.439
7.306. Ukraine argues that the reference in its panel request to the countries in Central and
Eastern Asia and Caucasus other than those of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic
is not an "open -ended list", but a clear reference to Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; China;
Hong Kong, China; Chinese Taipei; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Japan; Mongolia; the
Republic of Korea; Georgia; Azerbaijan; and Armenia. 440 Ukraine states that Mongolia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are part of the "countries in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus",
and that the reference to these countries in its first written submission thus confirms the wording
used in its panel request. 441 The Panel agrees with Ukraine that it was free, in its first written
submission, to elect to show the existence of the de facto measure with respect to transit destined
for only a subset of countries that it had previously clearly identified in its panel request. However,
the present issue involves the question of whether the superset of destination countries that
comprises the de facto measure was sufficiently clearly identified in the panel request in the first
place. The reference to " countries in Central and Eastern Asia and Caucasus" in Ukraine's panel
request operates more like a placeholder for countries that Ukrai ne would later specify in its
first written submission. This vagueness in the description of the destination countries in the
panel request renders the identification of the de facto measure insufficiently precise to meet the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
7.307. Additionally, the Panel notes that Ukraine's panel request does not explicitly state whether
the de facto measure identified in the second sub -category of the second group of measures in
section III.A. of its panel request is: (a) an unwritten measure, (b) a single measure (as opposed to
multiple measures), or (c) being challenged on an "as such" basis. Those aspects of the measure
and the way it is being challenged are not clarified until Ukraine's first written submission.
Ukraine's panel request identifies the de facto measure by noting that Russia "imposes restrictions"
on traffic in transit "by de facto applying Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the
territory of Ukraine to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic". The use of the terms "restrictions" and "de facto applying" could reasonably be
interpreted to mean that Ukraine challenges individual instances of the de facto application of
Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1. It is not until Ukraine's first written submission that it becomes
apparent that Ukraine challenges a single, unwritten measure (consisting of the de facto application
of Decree No. 1 as amended, beyond the scope of its explicit terms) on an "as such" basis.
7.308. The omission of the "as such" character of Ukraine's challenge concerning the de facto
measure is particularly important considering the Appellate Body's statements in US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews . In that dispute, the Appellate Body urged complainants to be
"especially diligent" in setting out "as such" claims in their panel requests "as clearly as possible".442
The Appellate Body added th at it would expect that "as such" claims "state unambiguously" the
specific measures of municipal law challenged by the complainant and the legal basis for the
allegation that those measures are WTO-inconsistent. Through "such straightforward presentations
of 'as such' claims", panel requests should leave respondents "in little doubt" that another Member
intends to challenge those measures "as such".443

439 The Panel notes that other panels have found measures to be insufficiently specified for purposes of
Article 6.2 of the DSU where they were described too broadly in a panel request. For example, in
Australia – Apples, New Zealand's panel request referred to both "measures specified in and required by
Australia pursuant to the Final import risk analysis report for apples from New Zealand" and, "in particular" to
a list of 17 requirements spelled out in the report and identified in the panel request through bullet points.
(Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.1446.) The panel found that "given the length and complexity of
Australia's [report]", the broad reference in New Zealand's panel request to "measures specified in and
required by Australia pursuant to the [report]" failed to satisfy the requirement of sufficient clarity in the
identification of the specific measures at issue set forth in Article 6.2 of the DSU. (Ibid. para. 7.1449.)
440 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 58-60. See
also Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 24.
441 Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 62.
442 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 173.
(emphasis original)
443 Ibid.

7.309. Although the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding in that dispute that the measure at
issue was identified with sufficient precision pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body
did so on the specific basis that: (a) the panel request explicitly stated that it was challenging the
"irrefutable presumption" found in "US law as such"444; (b) the wording and logic of the panel request
demonstrated that the complainant would establish the WTO -inconsistency of the specific US legal
provisions embodying the "irrefutable presumption" 445; and (c) the relevant measure was listed
under a shared heading with other "as such" claims, so such a heading could not have been limited
to "as applied" claims.446
7.310. In the present dispute, the panel request does not specify the "as such" challenge concerning
the de facto measure in such a manner. First, as stated above, the pa nel request does not specify
the "as such" nature of Ukraine's challenge concerning the de facto measure. Second, the wording
of the relevant section of Ukraine's panel request, as reproduced in paragraph 7.295 above, does
not suggest whether Ukraine aims to establish the WTO-inconsistency of the de facto measure as a
measure of general and prospective application or as individual instances of application. Third, the
heading for section III.A. of the panel request, entitled "The Measures at Issue", and the descriptions
of the measures above and below the de facto measure, do not indicate whether Ukraine intended
to challenge any other measures on an "as such" basis.
7.311. Finally, the Panel observes that the de facto measure is identified in Ukraine's panel request
as comprising the de facto application of one set of legal instruments (Decree No. 1 and
Resolution No. 1), while it is described in Ukraine's first written submission as comprising the
de facto application of a different set of legal instruments (Decree No. 1, as amended). Decree No. 1
"as amended" can be understood to mean Decree No. 1 as amended by Decree No. 319.
Decree No. 319 introduced amendments to Decree No. 1, effective as of 1 July 201 6, to
(a) extend the requirement that all international cargo transit by road and rail from Ukraine destined
for Kazakhstan enter Russia via Belarus and be subject to additional conditions related to
identification seals and registration cards, to international cargo transit by road and rail destined for
the Kyrgyz Republic; and (b) impose a ban on road and rail transit of goods that are subject to non-
zero import duties according to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU, as well as goods falling
within the scope of the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778.
7.312. Ukraine did not refer to Decree No. 319 in the section of its panel request that identifies the
de facto measure. The Panel considers that the failure to refer specifically to Decree No. 319 in the
identification of the de facto measure in the second group of measures in section III.A. of
Ukraine's panel request could reasonably have led Russia to conclude that Ukraine was only
challenging the de facto application of restrictions on transit effected by Decree No. 1 and
Resolution No. 1. This is reinforced by the fact that Ukraine's panel request did explicitly refer to
Decree No. 319 in the first group of measures in section II.A. In the circumstances, Russia could
reasonably have inferred that the a bsence of a reference to Decree No. 319 in the identification of
the second group of measures in section III.A. of the panel request was deliberate.447
7.313. This is further supported by the fact that the identification of the de facto measure in the
second sub-category of the second group of measures in section III.A. of the panel request uses the
term "restrictions" rather than "bans ". The referen ce to Decree No. 319 in s ection II.A. of the
panel request, by contrast, describes this i nstrument as involving a "ban ". The use of the word
"restrictions" rather than "bans" to describe the de facto measure could also reasonably have led
Russia to conclude that the de facto measure was concerned with the de facto application of the
restrictions on transit (i.e. the restrictive conditions requiring that transit from Ukraine occur

444 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 165. (emphasis
original)
445 Ibid. para. 166.
446 Ibid. para. 167.
447 Although the third sub-category of the second group of measures described in section III.A. of the
panel request refers to amendments to any of the measures mentioned in sections II.A. and III.A., this
sub-category is prefaced by the explanation that this inclusion is necessary owing to Russia's failure to comply
with the transparency and notification obligations under the GATT 1994 and Russia's Accession Protocol in
respect of some of the measures. The existence and content of Decree No. 319 was clearly known to Ukraine
at the time of its panel request, as it specifically refers to this instrument in the context of its discussion of the
first group of measures in section II.A. Therefore, in the circumstances, it would not have been reasonable for
Russia to infer, from the references to amendment measures in the third sub-category of measures described
in section III.A., that Ukraine was referring to the amendments to Decree No. 1 effected by Decree No. 319.

exclusively through Belarus and the "additional restrictive conditions" such as the application of
identification seals and the use of registration cards , all of which are referred to in Decree No. 1),
rather than the ban on transit of: (a) goods that are subject to non-zero import duties according to
the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU, and (b) goods falling within the scope of the import ban
imposed by Resolution No. 778.
7.314. The Panel recognizes that Ukraine's apparent expansion of the scope of the de facto measure
in its first written submission, to include the de facto application of Decree No. 319 in addition to
Decree No. 1, does not strictly affect the question of whether the measure was described with the
requisite clarity in Ukraine's panel request. As previously noted, compliance with the requirements
of Article 6.2 of the DSU must be demonstrated on the face of the panel request. The Panel makes
the observations above only to indicate that, even if it had concluded that Ukraine's panel request
identified the de facto measure with sufficient specificity to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU, the Panel considers that the de facto measure Ukraine describes in its first written
submission is different from the measure it identifies in its panel request.
7.315. The Panel finds that the identification of the de facto measure in Ukraine's panel request
fails to satisfy the requirements of Ar ticle 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures at is sue
and is therefore outside the Panel's terms of reference.
7.7.2.2.3 Third sub-category of measures
7.316. The third sub-category of the second group of measures (item c. in paragraph 7.285 above)
covers any related transit measures that implement, complement, add to, apply, amend or replace
any of the measures identified in both sections II.A and III.A. of Ukraine's panel request of which
Ukraine may not be aware owing to Russia's alleged failure to comply with its transparency and
publication obligations. 448 The legal instruments listed in Ukraine's panel request and of which
Ukraine clearly was aware (for example, Decree No. 319, which amended Decree No. 1), would not
fall within this sub-category.
7.317. The Panel concludes that Ukraine's panel request clearly identifies the third sub-category of
the second group of measures.
7.7.2.2.4 Identification of the legal basis of the complaint
7.318. Russia also contends that the legal basis for the complaint in respect of the measures
comprising the second group of measures is provided only in respect of the group, rather than for
each of the measures within the group. 449 The opening words of section III.B. of Ukraine's panel
request, entitled "Legal Basis for the Complaint", read: "Ukraine con siders that the measures
identified in section III.A. are inconsistent with the following WTO provisions ". As with the similar
objection made by Russia in respect of the first group of measures, Ukraine's use of the term
"the measures" rather than "group of measures" makes clear that the claims of WTO-inconsistency
that follow are made in relation to each of the measures within the second group of measures
identified in section III.A. of Ukraine's panel request.450
7.319. The Panel therefore considers that the panel request adequately describes the legal basis of
the complaint in relation to the measures identified within the "second group of measures" for each
of the claims made in section III.B. of Ukraine's panel request.
7.7.2.3 Conclusions on w hether Ukraine's panel request satisfie s the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU
7.320. The Panel finds that the identification of the de facto measure in Ukraine's panel request
fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures at issue
and is therefore outside the Panel's terms of reference.

448 See Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 25-26. Ukraine argues
that the use of the phrase "related measures" has not changed the essence of the measures that fall within the
Panel's terms of reference. (See ibid. para. 27.)
449 Russia's second written submission, para. 10.
450 See para. 7.283 above.

7.321. The Panel finds that the identification of the other measures in Ukraine's panel request
satisfies the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures at issue.
7.322. The Panel finds that Ukraine's panel request adequately describes the legal basis of the
complaint in relation to the measures identified within the "first group of measures" for each of the
claims made in section II.B., and in relation to the measures identified within the "second group of
measures" for each of the claims made in section III.B., of Ukraine's panel request.
7.323. The Panel finds that Russia has failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request does not
present the problem clea rly, as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU, because, in Russia's view, the
panel request does not make clear how the measures that comprise each of the two distinct "groups
of measures" set forth in the panel request operate together, or adequately explain which treaty
provisions are alleged to be infringed by each of the challenged measures i n the two groups of
measures.
7.7.3 Whether the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778
Goods are within the Panel's terms of reference
7.324. In this Section, the Panel addresses Russia's additional argument that the category of
measures described in Ukraine's first written submission as the "2014 transit bans and other transit
restrictions", and by the Panel as the "2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No.
778 Goods " (2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans )451, are outside the Pane l's terms of reference
because these measures were no longer in existence at the time of Ukraine's panel request.
7.325. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans are the alleged bans identified in the first sub-category
of the second group of measures in section III. A. of Ukraine's panel request 452, namely, the
2014 prohibitions on transit from Ukraine across Russia, of goods subject to veterinary and
phytosanitary surveillance, and which are included in the list approved by Resolution No. 778,
through checkpoints of the Republic of Belarus, along with special checkpoint and permit
requirements for such goods destined for Kazakhstan and other countries.453
7.326. To recall, i n August 2014, the Russian Government passed Resolution No. 778, which
temporarily bans the importation into Russia of various agricultural products, raw materials and
foodstuffs set forth in a list annexed to the Resolution that originate from certain countries, including
the United States, EU Member States, Canada, Australia and Norway , that had imposed sanctions
against Russia.454 The list of products to which the import ban applies has also been modified several
times.455
7.327. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans provide that veterinary and plant goods subject to the
import bans under Resolution No. 778 may only transit through designated checkpoints located on
the Russian side of the external border of th e EaEU.456 The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans are
implemented by instructions contained in two letters issued by the Rosselkhoznadzor:
Instruction No. FS-NV-7/22886, dated 21 November 2014, ( the Veterinary Instruction), which

451 In the previous Sections of this Report, the Panel refers to "2014 transit bans and other transit
restrictions" as the "2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods". In this Section,
however, for ease of reference, the Panel will refer to these measures as the "2014 Belarus-Russia Border
Bans".
452 See Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, para. 63.
453 For a description of the 2014 measures, see paras. 7.1.d and 7.106.c above, and paras. 7.326-7.327
below.
454 See para. 7.10 above.
455 Resolution No. 830 , (Exhibit UKR -11); Resolution No. 981, (Exhibit UKR -14); Resolution No. 157 ,
(Exhibit UKR -16); Resolution No. 472 , (Exhibit UKR -17); Resolution No. 897 , (E xhibit UKR -19);
Resolution No. 1086, (Exhibit UKR-20); and Resolution No. 1292, (Exhibit UKR-94).
456 See para. 7.269.a above . The Panel interprets the Plant Instruction in the context of the
contemporaneous Veterinary Instruction, given that both instruments were issued on the same date by the same
government authority, in reference to the same ban on products under Resolution No. 778. The Panel therefore
considers that "the checkpoints" referred to in the Plant Instruction, properly construed, must be those
checkpoints listed in the Veterinary Instruction. This interpretation of the two Instructions was also put forward
by Ukraine in its panel request, in which Ukraine asserted that the entry of both veterinary and plant goods was
only allowed "through the checkpoints located at the Russian part of the external border of the Customs Union".
(Ukraine's panel request, Section III.A., p. 4.) For more detail, see fn 458 below.

applies to veterinary goods covered by Resolution No. 778 as of 30 November 2014 457; and
Instruction No. FS-AS-3/22903, dated 21 November 2014, (the Plant Instruction), which applies to
plant goods covered by Resolution No. 778 as of 24 November 2014.458
7.328. Russia, in its first written submission, requested a preliminary ruling that the
2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans are outside the Panel's terms of reference.459 Russia considers that
these alleged bans did not exist at the date of Ukraine's request for consultations
(21 September 2016), or at the date of its request for establ ishment of a panel
(10 February 2017).460 Russia argues that the Veterinary Instruction and the Plant Instruction were
"superseded" by Decree No. 1, dated 1 January 2016, and by Resolution No. 1 , also dated
1 January 2016.461 According to Russia, Decree No. 1 therefore "effectively abolished any
requirements that were set out in the Letters of Rosselkhoznadzor in question in respect of
Ukraine".462 In its opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, Russia clarified
its argument as follows:
a. When the Veterinary Instruction and Plant Instruction were adopted, Ukraine was not
included in the list of countries whose goods were subject to Resolution No. 778. Therefore,
the 2014 measures "could not [apply] and were not applied to the goods from Ukraine".463
b. Resolution No. 778 was amended on 1 January 2016 to add Ukraine to the list of countries
whose goods were subject to Resolution No. 778. However, also on 1 January 2016,
Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 were adopted to permit the transit o f goods from
Ukraine across Russian territory only through "the checkpoint situated on the state border
of the Russian Federation inside its Russia-Belarus sector".464
c. Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1, as measures adopted by the Government of the
Russian Federation, are superior in the Russian legal hierarchy to the instructions issued

457 Veterinary Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10).
458 Plant Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-22, RUS-11). The Veterinary Instruction specifically prohibits transit
across Russia through Belarussian checkpoints, owing to the detection of "gross violations" during the transit of
Resolution No. 778 goods through the Republic of Belarus, and limits entry to nine identified checkpoints on
the border between Russia, on the one hand, and Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine, on the other hand.
(Veterinary Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10).) The Plant Instruction, conversely, simply states that the
transit of phytosanitary goods covered by Resolution No. 778, destined for third countries including
Kazakhstan, will take place "exclusively through the checkpoints across the state border of the
Russian Federation". (Plant Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-22, RUS-11).) The Plant Instruction does not, on its
face, refer to prohibiting transit across Russia through Belarussian checkpoints, or the nine checkpoints
identified in the Veterinary Instruction. However, in an official statement issued by the Rosselkhoznadzor, it
was explained that the Plant Instruction was intended to prevent the "illegal delivery of quarantined products
from the territory of Belarus" and "false transit by the Belarusian and Kazakhstani competent services".
(Official Site of the Rosselkhoznadzor, "Regarding Regulation by Rosselkhoznadzor of Quarantined Plant
Products Transit", dated 24 November 2014, (Exhibit UKR-88).)
459 Russia's first written submission, para. 31; and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 6.
460 Russia's first written submission, paras. 3, 27 and 30; and opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, para. 6.
461 Russia's first written submission, para. 26. Decree No. 1 provides that all road and railway cargo
transportation from Ukraine to Kazakhstan, through the territory of Russia, shall be carried out only from the
territory of Belarus and shall be subject to additional conditions related to identification seals and registration
cards, at specific control points to be established by the Russian Government. Decree No. 1 was amended in
various respects by Decree No. 319 on 1 July 2016, including by extending the restrictions on traffic in transit
from Ukraine, destined for Kazakhstan, to traffic in transit from Ukraine, destined for the Kyrgyz Republic.
Decree No. 319 also imposed a temporary prohibition on the transit from Ukraine, across the territory of
Russia, of goods that would be subject to import duties above zero if imported into Russia, as well as goods
covered by Resolution No. 778. (Decree No. 1, (Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-1); and Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2,
RUS-2).) Decree No.1 has been extended to apply until 30 June 2018 by Decree No. 643, (Exhibits UKR-98,
RUS-13).
462 Russia's first written submission, para. 26.
463 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5.
464 Ibid. para. 6.

by the Rosselkhoznadzor, which is a Federal Service reporting to t he Government of the
Russian Federation.465
7.329. Accordingly, Russia argues that there has "not been a single day when the measures
contained in the Letters of Rosselkhoznadzor were applied to the transit of goods from Ukraine".466
7.330. Ukraine, in its first written su bmission, acknowledges that the Veterinary Instruction was
formally amended by Instruction No. FS-EN-7/19132 of the Rosselkhoznadzor on 10 October 2016,
to provide that "traffic in transit of goods that are subject to control by the state veterinary
surveillance, from the territory of Ukraine into the territor [ies] of the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Kyrgyz Republic must be carried out according to [Resolution No. 1]".467 While conceding that
veterinary goods covered by Resolution No. 778 "moving specifically from" the territory of Ukraine
to the territories of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are accordingly no longer subject to the
Veterinary Instruction, Ukraine argues that the Veterinary Instruction continues to apply to traffic in
transit not covered by Resolution No. 1. 468 Ukraine further argues that if neither instruction ever
applied with respect to Ukraine, there would have been no need to adopt Instruction No. FS -EN-
7/19132, providing that the traffic in transit of veterinary goods from the territory of Ukraine into
the territories of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic must be carried out in accordance with
Resolution No. 1.469 Consequently, according to Ukraine, (a) veterinary goods covered by Resolution
No. 778 transiting from countries other than Ukraine, and (b) veterinary goods covered by
Resolution No. 778 transiting from Ukraine but to destinations other than Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz
Republic, remain subject to the Veterinary Instruction.470
7.7.3.1 Whether the existence of the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans goes to the Panel's
terms of reference
7.331. Russia argues that the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans do not have any legal effect with
respect to transit from Ukraine, and therefore that the measures do not exist, and are accordingly
outside the Panel's terms of reference . Russia's request for a ruling that the 2014 Belarus-Russia
Border Bans are outside the Panel's terms of reference relies on what it considers to be a "general
rule" in WTO jurisprudence, according to which "the measure covered by a panel's terms of reference
must be a measure in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel ."471 It refers to the
Appellate Body Report in EC –Chicken Cuts in support of this proposition.472
7.332. The EC – Chicken Cuts dispute involved two original measures that had been explicitly
identified in the complaining parties' panel requests. The issue for the panel and Appellate Body was
whether two subseq uent measures, which had come into existence after the date of the panel
requests and therefore had not been explicitly identified in the panel requests, were nevertheless
within the panel's terms of reference. In this specific context, the Appellate Body stated that the
term "specific measures at issue" in Article 6.2 of the DSU suggests that:
[A]s a general rule, the measures included in a panel's terms of reference must be
measures that are in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel. However,

465 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6.
466 Ibid.
467 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 59 and 244; and Instruction No. FS-EN-7/19132 of the
Rosselkhoznadzor, dated 10 October 2016, (Exhibit UKR-75). See also Ukraine's opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, paras. 9-11.
468 Ukraine's first written submission, paras. 59 and 244. Ukraine similarly argues that Decree No. 1 and
Resolution No. 1 would supersede the Plant Instruction, but only to the extent of a conflict between them,
because Presidential decrees and Government resolutions are superior to agency instructions in the Russian
legal hierarchy, and in this case, the relevant decree and resolution were also promulgated later in time.
(Ukraine's first written submission, para. 60; and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 13.)
469 Ukraine's second written submission, para. 18.
470 Ukraine's first written submission, para. 244; and opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 11.
471 Russia's first written submission, para. 25.
472 Ibid. (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156).

measures enacted subsequent to the establishment of the panel may, in certain limited
circumstances, fall within a panel's terms of reference.473
7.333. In other words, in EC – Chicken Cuts, the terms of reference issue arose because the two
subsequent measures had not been explicitly identified in the complainants' panel requests (owing
to the fact that they did not then exist). The question was whether they were nevertheless
sufficiently identified in the panel requests for purposes of Article 6.2 of the DSU on account of their
relationship to two original measures that had been explicitly identified in the panel requests.
7.334. The situation before this Panel is therefore different from the situation in EC – Chicken Cuts.
The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Ban s are identified in Ukraine's panel request. 474 The issue is
whether these measures in fact existed at the relevant time.
7.335. It is clearly established that the issue of the existence of a measure goes to the merits of a
case. It is not a jurisdictional issue. In EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , the
European Communities sought a preliminary ruling that alleged launch aid / member State financing
(LA/MSF) subsidies to support the development of the Airbus A350 aircraft (A350) were outside the
panel's terms of reference because the subsidies did not exist at the time of the United States' panel
request for the establishment of a panel. The panel noted that the dispute between the parties
concerned the factual question of whether there were any LA/MSF measures in existence with
respect to the A350 at the time of the panel request. The panel stated that, where the existence or
non-existence of a challenged measure is a disputed question of fact, it is not an appropriate matter
for determination in a preliminary ruling. The panel therefore addressed this issue in its evaluation
of the United States' substantive claims.475
7.336. In US – Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's view that, in order to
successfully raise claims against a measure, the complaining Member must first demonstrate the
existence and the precise content of the measure, according to the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU.476 The Appellate Body explained that the identification of the specific measures at issue,
pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, is different from a demonstration of the existence of such
measures. Only in respect of the latter would the complaining party be expected to present relevant
arguments and evidence during the panel proceedings to show the existence of the measures.477
7.337. The Appellate Body's approach in US – Continued Zeroing was followed by the panel in
US – Orange Juice (Brazil), which rejected the United States' request for a ruling that Brazil's alleged
"continued zeroing" measure was outside the panel's terms of reference because the measure as
described in the panel request did not satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2. The panel considered
that it was reasonably clear from the description of the measure in its panel request that the
complainant challenged the United States' "continued use" of "zeroing procedures" as
"ongoing conduct". The panel noted that, in order for it to rule on the United States' request for a
preliminary ruling, there was no need for it t o go further, and pronounce on whether such
"ongoing conduct" was susceptible to challenge in WTO dispute settlement, or decide whether the
alleged "ongoing conduct" measure actually existed.478
7.338. In Russia – Tariff Treatment, Russia sought a preliminary ruling that one of the measures,
concerning a particular tariff line, did not exist at the time of the establishment of the panel.
The panel quoted the Appellate Body's statement in US – Continued Zeroing , adding that a
complaining party is not required to establish the existence of a specific measure at issue in its panel

473 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156. (underlining added; footnote omitted)
474 In its first written submission, Ukraine clarifies that its reference to the Plant Instruction in its panel
request contained a typographical error. (See Ukraine's first written submission, fn 77 to para. 55; and opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 18.) Russia also seems to have understood that particular
reference to be a typographical error. (See Russia's first written submission, para. 24.)
475 See Panel Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 7.108-7.117.
476 Panel Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 7.50.
477 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 169. See also Ukraine's response to
Panel question No. 1 after the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 21-22, where, in connection with arguments
concerning a different measure, Ukraine refers to the Appellate Body's statement in US – Continued Zeroing to
support its argument that Article 6.2 of the DSU does not require that the existence of the measures at issue
be demonstrated in a panel request.
478 Panel Report, US – Orange Juice (Brazil), paras. 7.41-7.42.

request. Rather, such demonstration is to be made in the complaining party's written submissions
and at a panel's meetings with the parties.479
7.339. In conclusion, the existence of the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans is an issue that goes to
the merits of the case, rather than to the delimitation of the scope of the terms of reference.
7.7.3.2 Whether Ukraine has established the existence of the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border
Bans in its panel request
7.340. The Panel next considers whether Ukraine has established that the
2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans in fact existed at the time of its panel request. The answer to this
question depends on whether Ukraine has established that the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Ban s
continue to have legal effect with respect to transit from Ukraine, notwithstanding the promulgation
of Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 on 1 January 2016. In this respect, Ukraine argues that there
is no evidence before the Pane l expressly or implicitly of the repeal of the 2014 Belarus-Russia
Border Ban s, and that, to demonstrate the existence of these measures at the time of the
establishment of the Panel, Ukraine is not required to provide evidence of actual application of these
transit measures.480
7.341. As noted previously, the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Ban s are implemented by two
Rosselkhoznadzor instruction letters of November 2014. 481 The Veterinary Instruction prohibits, as
of 30 November 2014, the transit of veterinary goods cov ered by Resolution No. 778 and destined
for Kazakhstan or third countries across Russian territory through checkpoints in the territory of
Belarus. Rather, transit of such goods must take place through specific checkpoints located on the
Russian side of the external border of the EaEU.482 The Plant Instruction does not, on its face, prohibit
the transit of plant goods covered by Resolution No. 778 across Russian territory from checkpoints
in the territory of Belarus, but instead requires that, as of 24 November 2014, transit of such goods
destined for third countries, including Kazakhstan, occur exclusively through "the checkpoints across
the state border of the Russian Federation".483
7.342. The parties agree that goods of Ukrainian origin were not originally subject to
Resolution No. 778 and thus, that neither the Veterinary Instruction nor the Plant Instruction
originally applied to transit of goods of Ukrainian origin. However, the Veterinary Instruction and
Plant Instruction by their terms nevertheless applied to the transit from Ukraine of goods covered
by Resolution No. 778 (i.e. specified veterinary and plant goods originating from countries listed in
Resolution No. 778).
7.343. The Russian Government subsequently amended Resolution No. 778 so that it also applied
to the specified veterinary and plant goods of Ukrainian origin, as of 1 January 2016.484 At the same
time, the Russian President promulgated Decree No. 1, which is entitled "On the measures ensuring
economic security and national interests of the Russian Federation in the cases of international
transit cargo transportation from the ter ritory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of
Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation ". Decree No. 1 requires that, as of
1 January 2016, transit from Ukraine destined for Kazakhstan could only enter Russian territory from

479 Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, Annex A-1, para. 6.7.
480 See Ukraine's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 6-7.
481 See para. 7.327 above.
482 The introduction to the Veterinary Instruction provides that the prohibition on transit of veterinary
Resolution No. 778 goods across Russia from the checkpoints in the territory of Belarus is necessitated by the
"detection of gross violations during the transit through the territory of the Republic of Belarus" of veterinary
Resolution No. 778 goods. (Veterinary Instruction, (Exhibits UKR-21, RUS-10).)
483 However, see fns 456 and 458 above.
484 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 5-6; and Ukraine's second
written submission, para. 14. This was effected through two resolutions of the Government of the Russian
Federation: (a) Resolution No. 842, (Exhibit UKR-13), which added Ukraine to the list of countries whose
veterinary and plant goods were subject to Resolution No. 778, but with a proviso that the import ban applying
to such goods of Ukrainian origin would be applied from the effective date of paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 959
of the Government of the Russian Federation, dated 19 September 2014, but no later than 1 January 2016;
and (b) Resolution No. 1397, (Exhibit UKR-15), which amended Resolution No. 778 to provide that the import
ban on specified veterinary and plant goods would be applied to Ukraine from 1 January 2016.

the te rritory of Belarus, and subject to additional conditions related to identification seals and
registration cards as well as control points to be established by the Russian Government.485
7.344. The parties agree that, to the extent that there is any inconsistency between the
Veterinary and Plant Instructions, on the one hand, and Decree No. 1, on the other, the latter would
prevail, owing to the fact that it is superior in the Russian legal hierarchy.486
7.345. The Veterinary and Plant Instructions concern th e transit of goods subject to
Resolution No. 778 that are destined for Kazakhstan and other third countries. The requirements in
those instructions (i.e. that such goods may not enter Russia through Belarus and can only enter
through certain designated checkpoints situated on the Russian state border) would be superseded,
as regards transit from Ukraine of such goods, by the requirement in Decree No. 1 that all transit
from Ukraine (which would include goods covered by Resolution No. 778 transiting across R ussia
from Ukraine) that is destined for Kazakhstan (and from 1 July 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic), be
carried out exclusively from the territory of Belarus, and comply with the additional conditions related
to identification seals and registration cards, at specific control points, as set out in Decree No. 1.
7.346. Therefore, it is clear that, as of 1 January 2016, the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans did
not apply to transit from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778 that are destined for
Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. The question is whether the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans
continued to apply to transit from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778 that are destined
for countries other than Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. The Panel considers that the answer to
that question depends on the scope of application of the amendment to Decree No. 1 effected by
Decree No. 319, namely, the temporary prohibition on the transit of goods covered by Resolution
No. 778.
7.347. Decree No. 319 not only expanded the restrictions applying to transit from Ukraine destined
for Kazakhstan to apply to transit from Ukraine destined for the Kyrgyz Republic. It also introduced
what is referred to as a "temporary" prohibition on the transit of goods covered by Resolution No.
778.487 The terms of this amendment to Decree No. 1, introduced by Decree No. 319, are as follows:
To introduce a temporary prohibition for motor road and railroad transportation of goods
covered in the Russian Federation by the rates of import customs duties specified in the
Common Customs Tariff of the [EaEU] different from zero and the goods included into
the list of agricultural produce, raw materials and foodstuffs endorsed by the
Government of the Russian Federation in pursuance of Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation No. 560 of August 6, 2014 on the Application of Individual Specific
Economic Measures for the Purposes of Security of the Russian Federation.488
7.348. The prohibition introduced by Decree No. 319 is not, by its express terms, confined to transit
from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778, or to the transit of goods covered by
Resolution No. 778 that are destined for any particular countries. If the prohibition appli ed to the
transit of goods covered by Resolution No. 778 regardless of the country from which the goods
entered Russia, or the country of destination, the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans would, since 1
July 2016, have been entirely superseded by Decree No. 1, as amended by Decree No. 319.
7.349. However, the title to Decree No. 1 (as amended by Decree No. 319) expressly states that it
applies to transit from Ukraine which is destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore,
the Panel considers that the scope of the prohibition on the transit of goods covered by Resolution
No. 778, effected by Decree No. 319 above, is limited to transit from Ukraine of such goods where
the destination of the goods is either Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, and not other destinations.

485 Decree No. 1, (Exhibits UKR-1, RUS-1). Decree No. 1 was amended by Decree No. 319 to extend
these requirements to Ukrainian traffic in transit destined for the Kyrgyz Republic, as of 1 July 2016.
(Decree No. 319, (Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2).) The control points were established by Resolution No. 1,
(Exhibits UKR-3, RUS-4).
486 See, e.g. Ukraine's first written submission, para. 60; and Russia's first written submission, para. 26.
487 The temporary prohibition introduced by Decree No. 319 also applies to the transit of goods that are
subject to non-zero import duties according to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU. (Decree No. 319,
(Exhibits UKR-2, RUS-2).)
488 Decree No. 1, as amended by Decree No. 319, (Exhibit RUS-1), section 1.1. (underlining original)

7.350. This being so, it appears that Decree No. 1, as amended by Decree No. 319, does not entirely
supersede the legal operation of the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Ban s with respect to the transit
from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans would
continue to apply to the transit from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778 that are
destined for countries other than Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic.
7.351. The Panel's conclusion that the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans have some residual legal
effect as regards transit from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778, notwithstanding the
promulgation of Decree No. 1 and Decree No. 319, is complicated somewhat by Ukraine's allegation
that the Russian authorities are de facto applying the measures implemented by Decree No. 1, as
amended, to traffic in transit from Ukraine which is destined for Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. Clearly, if this were the case, the scope of operation of the 2014 Belarus-Russia
Border Bans would, in fact, be even more limited owing to the corresponding expansion in the scope
of operation of Decree No. 1, as a factual matter.
7.352. However, the Panel has ruled that the de facto measure is outside its terms of reference.489
Therefore, the Panel does not reach any conclusion as to whether Ukraine has established, as an
evidentiary matter, that Decree No . 1 is in fact being applied to transit from Ukraine of goods
destined for these other countries.
7.353. The Panel therefore co ncludes that, while Decree No. 1 (as amended by Decree No. 319)
supersedes the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans as they apply to the transit from Ukraine of goods
covered by Resolution No. 778 that are destined for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, Decree
No. 1, as amended, does not by its terms affect the legal operation of the
2014 Belarus-Russia Border Ban s as they apply to transit from Ukraine of goods covered by
Resolution No. 778 that are destined for countries other than Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Repu blic.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that Ukraine has established that, as of the date of
Ukraine's panel request (10 February 2017) , the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Ban s continued to
exist, notwithstanding the adoption of Decree No. 1 (as amended by Decree N o. 319), in that they
had legal effect with respect to transit from Ukraine of goods covered by Resolution No. 778 destined
for countries other than Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic.
7.354. For the sake of clarification, the Panel would add that it is aware that the
2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans also apply to transit, from countries other than Ukraine, of goods
covered by Resolution No. 778. However, Ukraine's panel request confines its challenge to the transit
restrictions in the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans to those that apply to "traffic in transit from the
territory of Ukraine through the territory of the Russian Federation". This limitation is clear from the
underscored paragraph tha t summarizes the effect of the instruments that implemen t the first
sub-category of the second group of measures in section III.A.:
As a result of the restrictions imposed by these Instructions combined with the
restrictions imposed by Decree No. 1, the go ods falling within the scope of these
Instructions are prohibited for transit from the territory of Ukraine through the territory
of the Russian Federation to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz
Republic.490
7.355. Owing to this limitation in Ukraine's panel request, the only aspects of the
2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans that are within the Panel's terms of reference are those that apply
to transit from Ukraine.
7.7.4 Summary of the Panel's findings on the measures that are within its terms of
reference
7.356. In this Section of the Report, the Panel finds that the de facto measure, i.e. the measure
referred to in the second sub -category of the second group of measures in section III.A. of
Ukraine's panel request as "de facto applying Decree No. 1 and Resolution No. 1 to transit from the

489 See para. 7.315 above.
490 Ukraine's panel request, section III.A., p. 5. (underlining original; italics added) See also ibid.
section III.A., first sentence, p. 4.

territory of Ukraine to third countries other than the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic", is outside its terms of reference.
7.357. The Panel finds that the following measures are within its terms of reference:
a. The 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements: Requirements that all international cargo transit
by road and rail from Ukraine destined for the Republic of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz
Republic, through Russia, be carried out exclusively from Belarus, and comply with a
number of additional conditions related to identification seals and registration cards at
specific control points on the Belarus-Russia border and the Russia-Kazakhstan border.
b. The 2016 Transit Bans on Non-Zero Duty Goods and Resolution No. 778 Goods : Bans on
all road and rail transit from Ukraine of: (a) goods that are subject to non -zero import
duties according to the Common Customs Tariff of the EaEU, and (b) goods that fall within
the scope of the import bans imposed by Resolution No. 778, which are destined for
Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. Transit of such goods may only occur pursuant to a
derogation requested by the governments of Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic which is
authorized by the Russian Government, in which case, the transit is su bject to the 2016
Belarus Transit Requirements (above).
c. The 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods: Prohibitions
on transit from Ukraine across Russia, through checkpoints in Belarus, of goods subject to
veterinary and phyt osanitary surveillance and which are subject to the import bans
implemented by Resolution No. 778, along with related requirements that, as of 30
November 2014, such veterinary goods destined for Kazakhstan or third countries enter
Russia through designated checkpoints on the Russian side of the external customs border
of the EaEU and only pursuant to permits issued by the relevant veterinary surveillance
authorities of the Government of Kazakhstan and the Rosselkhoznadzor, and that, as of
24 November 2014, transit to third countries (including Kazakhstan) of such plant goods
take place exclusively through the checkpoints across the Russian state border.
8 CONCLUSIONS
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:
a. With respect to the Panel's jurisdiction to review Russia's invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii)
of the GATT 1994, the Panel finds that:
i. it has jurisdiction to determine whether the requirements of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994 are satisfied.
b. With respect to the measures and claims within the Panel's terms of reference , the Panel
finds that:
i. the identification of the de facto measure in Ukraine's panel request fails to satisfy the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures at issue and is
therefore outside the Panel's terms of reference.
ii. the identification of the other measures in Ukraine's panel request satisfies the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures at issue.
iii. Ukraine's panel request adeq uately describes the legal basis of the complaint in
relation to the measures identified within the "first group of measures" for each of the
claims made in section II.B., and in relation to the measures identified within the
"second group of measures" for each of the claims made in section III.B., of Ukraine's
panel request.
iv. Russia has failed to establish that Ukraine's panel request does not present the
problem clearly, as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU.

c. With respect to the existence of the 2014 Bela rus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of
Resolution No. 778 Goods as of the date of Ukraine's panel request, the Panel finds that:
i. Ukraine has established that, as of the date of Ukraine's panel request
(10 February 2017), the 2014 Belarus-Russia Border Bans on Transit of Resolution No.
778 Goods continued to exist , notwithstanding the adoption of Decree No. 1 (as
amended by Decree No. 319).
d. With respect to whether Russia has met the requirements for invoking Article XXI(b)(iii)
of the GATT 1994, the Panel finds that:
i. as of 2014, there has existed a situation in Russia's relations with Ukraine that
constitutes an emergency in international relations within the meaning of
subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994;
ii. each of the measures at issue was ta ken in time of this emergency in international
relations within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994;
iii. Russia has satisfied the conditions of the chapeau of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994;
and
iv. accordingly, Russia has met the requirements for invoking Article XXI(b)(iii) in relation
to the measures at issue, and therefore the measures at issue are covered by
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.
8.2. The Panel also concludes as follows:
a. With respect to Ukraine's claims under the first sentence of Article V:2 of the GATT 1994,
the Panel considers that, had the measures been taken in normal times, i.e. had they not
been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met the other
conditions of Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that:
i. the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirement s were inconsistent with the first sentence of
Article V:2, because these measures prohibit traffic in transit from entering Russia
from Ukraine;
ii. the 2016 Transit Ban s on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods were
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2 , because these measures prohibit
traffic in transit from entering Russia from Ukraine; and
iii. the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Ban s on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods were
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article V:2 , because these measures prohibit
traffic in transit from Ukraine from entering Russia from any Member other than those
countries from which entry is exclusively permitted, as listed in the measure.
b. With respect to Ukraine's claims under the second sentence of Article V:2 of the
GATT 1994, the Panel considers that, had the measures been taken in normal t imes,
i.e. had they not been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and met
the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie case that:
i. the 2016 Belarus Transit Requirements were inconsistent with the second sentence of
Article V:2, because these measures make distinctions based on the place of departure
(Ukraine), the place of destination (Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic), and the
place of entry (Belarus, where entry is exclusively permitted) of the traffic in transit;
ii. the 2016 Transit Ban s on Non -Zero Duty and Resolution No. 778 Goods were
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article V:2 , because these measures make
distinctions based on the place of departure (Ukraine) , the place of destination
(Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic), the place of origin ( countries listed in
Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine) and the place of entry (Belarus,
where entry is exclusively permitted) of the traffic in transit; and

iii. the 2014 Belarus -Russia Border Ban s on Transit of Resolution No. 778 Goods were
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article V:2 , because these measures make
distinctions based on the place of entry ( certain countries where entry is exclusively
permitted, as listed in that measure) and the place of origin ( countries listed in
Resolution No. 778, as amended to include Ukraine) of the traffic in transit.
c. With respect to Ukraine's remaining claims under the GATT 1994, the Panel does not
consider it necessary to address Ukraine's claims under Articles V:3, V:4, V:5, X:1, X:2
and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.
d. With respect to Ukraine's claims under Russia's Working Party Report, as incorporated into
its Accession Protocol by reference, the Panel considers that:
i. Russia could justify any inconsistency with paragraphs 1161, 1426, 1427 and 1428 of
Russia's Working Party Report as necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" within the meaning
of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994; and
ii. With respect to Ukraine's claims under paragraph 1161 of Russia's Working Party
Report, the Panel considers that, had the measures been taken in normal times,
i.e. had they not been taken in time of an "emergency in international relations" (and
met the other conditions of Article XXI(b)), Ukraine would have made a prima facie
case that the measures were inconsistent with paragraph 1161 to the extent that they
would also be prima facie inconsistent with either the first or second sentence of Article
V:2 of the GATT 1994, or both; and
iii. The Panel does not consider it necessary to address further Ukraine's claims based on
commitments in paragraphs 1426, 1427 and 1428 of Russia's Working Party Report.
8.3. Having found that Russia has not acted inconsistently with its obligations under the GATT 1994
or with commitments in Russia's Accession Protocol, the Panel makes no recommendation to the
DSB pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.

APPENDIX – SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT CONCERNING ARTICLE XXI OF THE GATT 1947
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Russia has directed the Panel to analyse the "historic perspective" in order to support its
interpretation of Article XXI. 1 In particular, Russia has drawn the attention of the Panel t o the
following documents: (a) statements made by Czechoslovakia in 1949, in the context of its dispute
with the United States over certain export controls; (b) statements made by Ghana in 1961, in the
context of opposing Portugal's accession to the GATT 1 947; (c) statements made by the
European Communities and the United States in 1982, in the context of the dispute between the
European Communities and Argentina over certain import measures; (d) statements made by the
United States in 1985, in the context of its dispute with Nicaragua over an embargo on Nicaraguan
goods; and (e) statements made by the European Communities in 1991, in the context of the dispute
between the European Communities and Yugoslavia over the withdrawal of certain preferences.2
1.2. The Panel recalls that in interpreting the terms of a treaty in accordance with the customary
rules of interpretation, it is empowered to consider any "subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation".3 The Panel
also recalls that pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU, it is empowered to seek information from "any
relevant source" in making its findings. 4 Accordingly, the Panel has conducted a survey of the
discussions referred to it by Russia and related documents in order to examine the attitudes of
GATT contracting parties and WTO Members on occasions when matters pertaining to Article XXI
were addressed in the context of the GATT and WTO. 5 The Panel's conclusions on this survey are
contained in paragraphs 7.80 and 7.81 of the Panel Report.
1.3. The Panel wishes to note that it does not consider that certain documents referred to it by
Russia establish any relevant conduct of "the parties" in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention. In particular, the Panel notes that statements made by Ghana to justify the
imposition of an import ban against Portugal in 1961 were made prior to Portugal's accession, during
which the parties had not yet assumed any obligations to one another under the GATT 1947.6 In the
Panel's view, invocations of Article XXI by a contracting party in order to defend measures taken
against a non-contracting party, as well as any invocations of Article XXI by non-contracting parties
during accession n egotiations, cannot establish a pattern of practice between "the parties" in the
sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, the Panel has omitted from this

1 Russia's first written submission, para. 40. This Appendix uses the term "European Communities" to
refer to both the European Economic Community and the European Community prior to 2009, and the term the
"European Union" to refer to the European Union after 2009. On 1 November 1993, the Treaty on European
Union (done at Maastricht, 7 February 1992) entered into force. On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (done at Lisbon,
13 December 2007) entered into force. On 29 November 2009, the WTO received a Verbal Note (WT/L/779)
from the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities stating that, by
virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, as of 1 December 2009, the European Union replaces and succeeds the
European Community.
2 Ibid. paras. 41-46.
3 Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that: "[t]here shall be taken into account, together
with the context: ... [a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation."
4 Article 13 of the DSU provides that: "[p]anels may seek information from any relevant source and may
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter."
5 This document examines the subsequent conduct of GATT contracting parties and WTO Members in
GATT and WTO fora from the period of 1 January 1948 (entry into force of the GATT 1947) to 6 June 2017
(composition of the Panel in this dispute). By including documents in this survey, the Panel does not intend to
attribute any legal significance to the type of document examined or the contents of any such documents. The
Panel notes only that it has examined such documents in order to conclude that this record does not reveal any
subsequent practice establishing an agreement between the Members regarding the interpretation of
Article XXI in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. (See para. 7.80 of the Panel Report.)
6 See, e.g. GATT Contracting Parties, Nineteenth Session, Summary Record of the Twelfth Session held
on 9 December 1961, SR.19/12, p. 196.

survey such invocations of Article XXI made in the context of accession negoti ations to the
GATT 1947 and WTO Agreement.7
1.4. Additionally, the Panel observes that on several occasions, GATT contracting parties and
WTO Members have unilaterally invoked Article XXI in the context of notifying measures to various
GATT and WTO bodies.8 The Panel recalls the statements of the Appellate Body in EC – Chicken Cuts
that it is unlikely that a "concordant, common and discernible pattern" of practice can be established
from the pronouncements of one or very few parties to a multilateral treaty.9 The Panel also recalls
the Appellate Body's caution about deducing agreement, without more, from "a lack of reaction" or
protest by other Members.10 Accordingly, the Panel does not consider that it can ascribe any weight
to the silence of other GATT contracti ng parties and WTO Members as to these notifications. The
Panel has consequently omitted from this survey such unilateral invocations of Article XXI except
where they provoked debate.
1.5. The following Section proceeds to summarize the relevant conduct of GATT contracting parties
and WTO Members, subsequent to the conclusion of the GATT 1947, when matters pertaining to
Article XXI were addressed in the context of the GATT and WTO.
SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES AND WTO MEMBERS
United States v. Czechoslovakia (1949)
1.6. In 1948, the United States enforced its "Comprehensive Export Schedule" by imposing export
controls on US exports going to certain parts of Europe. 11 At the time, the United States licensed
products in short supply or of military signif icance to Western European countries that were
participating in the Marshall Plan, but exports of such products to Eastern European countries that
did not participate in the Marshall Plan became subject to export controls. Czechoslovakia fell into
the group of non-participating Eastern European countries, for which reason products destined for
its borders were subject to export licensing controls. The United States explained that one of the
purposes of the export control regime was "to prevent the shipment to Eastern Europe of things that
would contribute significantly to the military potential of that region".12 Czechoslovakia asserted that
the United States' use of the term "military potential" referred to "an entirely different thing" than
what was covered by the terms of Article XXI(b)(ii), in particular, the term "military establishment".
Czechoslovakia claimed that the US export control measure was inconsistent with the basic principles
of Articles I and XIII of the GATT. Czechoslovakia also requested all relevant information concerning
the administration of restrictions and the distribution of licences by the United States pursuant to
Article XIII.13 In response, the United States referred to Articles XXI(b)(i) and XXI(a) of the GATT.
The United States stated that it considered it to be "contrary to its security interest —and to the

7 See, e.g. GATT Contracting Parties, Twenty-Sixth Session, Report by the Working Party on the
Accession of the United Arab Republic, L/3362, paras. 20-22; GATT Contracting Parties, Accession of Thailand,
Questions and Replies to the Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime (L/4803), L/5300, pp. 5 and 18-26; and
GATT Contracting Parties, Accession of Saudi Arabia, Questions and Replies to the Memorandum on the Foreign
Trade Regime (L/7489 & Add.1), L/7645/Add.1, pp. 27 and 32.
8 See, e.g. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification by Thailand, G/TBT/Notif.95/123, p. 1
(referring to consumer protection and national security as its objective and rationale for undertaking a
particular measure); and Committee on Market Access, Notification Pursuant to the Decision on Notification
Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions by the Seychelles, G/MA/QR/N/SYC/1, pp. 23, 25, 35, 36, 45 and 49.
9 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 259.
10 Ibid. para. 272.
11 GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Statement by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation
Mr. Zdenèk AUGENTHALER to Item 14 of Agenda (CP.3/2/Rev.2), GATT/CP.3/33, p. 3 (referring to the official
publication of the US Department of Commerce – "Comprehensive Export Schedule" No. 26, issued on
1 October 1948, p. 18.)
12 Ibid. p. 5. (referring to the statement of Mr. Willard L. Thorp made at the General Assembly in Paris
on 4 November 1948).
13 Ibid. pp. 5-6. Czechoslovakia stated that the notion of "war or military potential" is an extremely
elastic notion, embracing the reserves of man-power and economic resources of a country including the extent
to which both have been militarized. In addition, this concept also embraces a time element, that is, not only
the possibility to develop military strength but also the degree of actual preparedness. Thus, according to
Czechoslovakia, Article XXI should be interpreted narrowly so as to avoid a situation in which "practically
everything may be a possible element of war potential". (Ibid.)

security interest of other friendly countries—to reveal the names of the commodities that it considers
to be most strategic".14
1.7. At the June 1949 meeting of the GATT Council, Czechoslovakia requested a decision on whether
the United States had failed to carry out its obligations under the GATT through its administration
of the export licenses.15 The United Kingdom expressed the view that "every country must be the
judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security. On the other hand, every
contracting party should be cautious not to take any step which might have the effect of undermining
the General Agreement".16 Pakistan stated that Article XXI embodied "exceptions to all other
provisions of the Agreement, [and] should stand by itself notwithstanding the provisions of other
Articles including Article I, and therefore the case called for exami nation only under the provisions
of that Article".17 Cuba stated that Czechoslovakia's request should be dismissed because it lacked
a factual basis. Moreover, Cuba considered that the United States had justified its case under Article
XXI "whose provisions overrode those of Article I".18
1.8. In response to Czechoslovakia's request for a decision under Article XXIII, only Czechoslovakia
voted in the affirmative.19 Czechoslovakia noted that it did not consider that the contracting parties
had made a legally valid decision or correct interpretation of the General Agreement, and that it
would regard itself free to take any steps necessary to protect its further interests.20
United States – Suspension of Obligations with Czechoslovakia (1951)
1.9. In 1951, the United States requested the GATT Council to formally dissolve its reciprocal
obligations with Czechoslovakia under the GATT 1947 , and to withdraw the benefits of
trade-agreement tariff concessions from Czechoslovakia .21 The United States justified this request
by arguing that the assumption that it was in its and Czechoslovakia's mutual interests to promote
the movement of goods, money and people between them was no longer vali d.22 Although the
United States did not formally refer to Article XXI of the GATT 1947, it argued that "manifestations
of Czechoslovak ill -will" towards the United States and the progressive integration of
Czechoslovakia's economy into the Soviet bloc had led the United States to request that the GATT
obligations between the two countries be dissolved .23 Czechoslovakia considered the
United States' request to be "another attempt [by the United States] to achieve political ends by
means of economic pressure".24 Czechoslovakia was of the view that the "General Agreement should
not be misused for the enforcement of political intentions" and for "forceful, unilateral imposition of
a foreign will, by means of the violation of agreements".25

14 GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Reply by the Vice Chairman of the United States Delegation,
Mr John W. Evans, to the Speech by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation under Item 14 on the Agenda,
GATT/CP.3/38, pp. 2-3 and 9-11. In addition, the US delegate provided dollar estimates of approved
Czechoslovakian licences for different products such as electrical equipment and machinery to demonstrate
that the United States had been highly selective in imposing controls for security reasons and had not denied
licences where the product was for peaceful use. (Ibid.) See also GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session,
Reply of the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation, Mr. Zdenèk AUGENTHALER, to the Speech of the
Vice-Chairman of the USA Delegation, Mr. John W. Evans, under Item 14 of the Agenda, GATT/CP.3/39,
pp. 2-3.
15 See GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting held on
8 June 1949, GATT/CP.3/SR.22, p. 4.
16 Ibid. p. 7; and GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Corrigendum to the Summary Record of the
Twenty-Second Meeting, GATT/CP.3/SR.22/Corr.1.
17 GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting held on
8 June 1949, GATT/CP.3/SR.22, p. 6.
18 Ibid. p. 5.
19 Ibid. p. 9. The vote was one affirmative, 17 negative, three abstentions and two absents. (Ibid.)
20 Ibid. p. 10.
21 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Statement by the United States, Termination of Obligations
between the United States and Czechoslovakia under the Agreement, GATT/CP.6/5, p. 1.
22 Ibid. According to the United States, Czechoslovakia had persecuted and harassed American firms,
imprisoned American citizens, and confiscated the property of American citizens without justification. (Ibid.)
23 Ibid.
24 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Termination of Obligations between the United States and
Czechoslovakia under the Agreement, Statement by Czechoslovakia, GATT/CP.6/5/Add.1, p. 2.
25 Ibid. p. 3.

1.10. The GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES declared that the United States and Czechoslovakia were
free to suspend, each with respect to the other, the obligations of the GATT.26
United States – Imports of Dairy Products (1951)
1.11. In 1951, the Netherlands and Denmark each circulated a memorandum to the
GATT contracting parties noting the imposition by the United States of certain import controls on
dairy products under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act. 27 Section 104 stated that these
import controls were "necessary for the prote ction of the essential security interests and economy
of the United States in the existing emergency in international relations ".28 The Netherlands and
Denmark considered these restrictions to be inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT 1947. 29 In
response, the United States circulated a memorandum noting that these objections had been
formally communicated to Congress.30 The United States also included two statements made to the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee by the Assistant Secretary of State and Und er Secretary
of Agriculture recommending the repeal of Section 104 .31 The Assistant Secretary of State had
asserted to the Committee that "the restrictions required by Section 104 appear to the Department
clearly to violate the provisions of the [GATT] ."32 The Under Secretary of Agriculture also noted to
the Committee that "[i]t seems unlikely that we will be able to convince these [objecting] countries
that certain imports, which would at most have a limited effect on our agriculture, would endanger
the essential security interests and economy of the United States." 33 The Under Secretary stated
additionally that "if we use the security exception of the [GATT] to justify protection of a few selected
products, this would give other countries a good excuse for using the same exception to justify any
protective barriers by which they may wish to limit their imports of our farm products."34
1.12. At the September 1951 meeting of the GATT contracting parties, the Netherlands and
Denmark reiterated their objections to the me asure.35 Denmark also noted that it agreed with the
remarks of the Canadian representative in an earlier speech that "it was obvious that defence
production and national security would seem to have little connection with the import control of
cheese."36 Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Australia, France, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom and
Sweden also noted their opposition to the measure. 37 Canada asserted that it was difficult "to find
any grounds for the action whatsoever ".38 The United States did not contest that the measure
infringed the GATT 1947, and responded that Section 104 had been recommended as a last-minute

26 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 21 – Termination of Obligations between the United
States and Czechoslovakia under the Agreement, Declaration Proposed by the Delegation of the United States,
GATT/CP.6/5/Add.2.
27 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Imports Restrictions on Dairy Products into the
United States, Memorandum submitted by the Netherlands Delegation, GATT/CP.6/26; GATT Contracting
Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the United States,
Memorandum submitted by the United States Delegation, Addendum, GATT/CP.6/28/Add.1, p. 1; and
GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the United
States, Memorandum submitted by the Danish Delegation, GATT/CP.6/28. See also GATT Contracting Parties,
Sixth Session, Summary Record of the First Meeting held on 17 September 1951, GATT/CP.6/SR.1, p. 4.
28 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 - Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the
United States, Memorandum submitted by the Danish Delegation, GATT/CP.6/28, para. 3.
29 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Imports Restrictions on Dairy Products into the
United States, Memorandum submitted by the Netherlands Delegation, GATT/CP.6/26, p. 3; and
GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the
United States, Memorandum submitted by the Danish Delegation, GATT/CP.6/28, para. 3.
30 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Item 30 – Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the
United States, Memorandum submitted by the United States Delegation, Addendum, GATT/CP.6/28/Add.1,
p. 1.
31 Ibid. pp. 4 and 7.
32 Ibid. p. 3.
33 Ibid. p. 6.
34 Ibid.
35 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting held on
24 September 1951, GATT/CP.6/SR.10, pp. 3-4.
36 Ibid. p. 4.
37 Ibid. pp. 4-7. Czechoslovakia also noted that while it did not particularly suffer from the measure in
question, it hoped that the contracting parties would always be prepared to defend the spirit of the GATT.
(Ibid. p. 7.)
38 Ibid. p. 6.

amendment by a committee "whi ch had limited acquaintance with international problems ".39 The
United States asserted that the measure should be regarded as an "isolated incident and must not
be held as an indication of any reorientation of the basic policy of the United States ".40 The
United States noted that vigorous efforts were being made by the executive branch to secure the
repeal of the measure, and asked that its government be given the opportunity to complete this
action.41 The Council agreed to keep this matter on its agenda.42
1.13. At the October 1951 meeting of the GATT contracting parties, a resolution was adopted
affording the United States a reasonable period of time to repeal the measure, subject to a reporting
obligation.43 In 1952, the United States provided a report noting that Section 104 had been revised
but not repealed.44 At the October 1952 meeting of the GATT contracting parties, several contracting
parties expressed their continuing opposition to the measure. 45 The United States acknowledged
that the measure was inconsistent with the GATT 1947 and noted that it would not object to other
contracting parties withdrawing reasonably necessary concessions. 46 The GATT CONTRACTING
PARTIES agreed to convene a Working Party to examine the issue.47 In November 1952, the Working
Party reco mmended that the GATT contracting parties authorize the Netherlands to impose a
retaliatory quota on wheat flour from the United States. 48 This recommendation was adopted as a
resolution at the November 1952 meeting of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES.49
1.14. The GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES re -authorized this retaliatory quota on an annual basis
until 1959, pursuant to the recommendations of subsequent Working Parties.50

39 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting held on
24 September 1951, GATT/CP.6/SR.10, pp. 7-8.
40 Ibid. p. 8.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. p. 9.
43 GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting held on
27 October 1951, GATT/CP.6/SR.27, p. 8. For the draft resolution, see GATT Contracting Parties, Sixth Session,
Item 30 – Resolution of the Contracting Parties on the United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products
imposed under Section 104 of the United States Defence Production Act, Proposal by the Chairman after
Consultation with Interested Delegations, GATT/CP.6/51. For the adopted resolution, see GATT Contracting
Parties, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions of the Contracting Parties at the Special Session held on
March-April 1951 and the Sixth Session held on September-October 1951, GATT/CP/130, pp. 14-15.
44 See GATT Contracting Parties, United States' Restrictions on Dairy Products, Report by the United
States Government pursuant to the Resolution of 26 October 1951, L/19, p. 1. See also GATT Contracting
Parties, United States' Restrictions on Dairy Products, Supplementary Report by the United States Government
pursuant to the Resolution of 26 October 1951, L/19/Add.1.
45 See GATT Contracting Parties, Seventh Session, Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting held on
28 October 1952, SR.7/10, pp. 2-8. The Netherlands, New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, Italy, Norway, Cuba,
Australia, United Kingdom, India, Czechoslovakia and South Africa expressed objections to the measure, and
Pakistan expressed gratitude that the United States had taken some steps to mitigate the effects of the
restrictions. (Ibid.)
46 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
47 Ibid. p. 9.
48 Working Party 8 on Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2, Report to the Contracting Parties, L/61,
p. 3. The Netherlands had requested that it be allowed to impose an upper limit of 57,000 metric tons on the
import of wheat flour, but the Working Party recommended that the Netherlands impose an upper limit of
60,000 metric tons. (Ibid. pp. 1-3.)
49 GATT Contracting Parties, United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products, Draft Resolution, L/59;
and GATT Contracting Parties, Seventh Session, Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting held on
8 November 1952, SR.7/16, p. 7.
50 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Communication from the United States,
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/40, fn 4 to p. 9. See also GATT Contracting Parties, United States Restrictions on Dairy
Products, Resolution Proposed for Adoption by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, L/154; GATT Contracting Parties,
United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products, Resolution of 5 November 1954, L/280; GATT Contracting
Parties, Tenth Session, Report of the Working Party, Waiver Granted to the United States in Connexion with
Import Restrictions Imposed under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act, L/464;
GATT Contracting Parties, Eleventh Session, Waiver Granted to the United States in Connexion with Import
Restrictions Imposed under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act, Report of the Working
Party, L/590; GATT Contracting Parties, Twelfth Session, United States Import Restrictions on Agricultural
Products, Report by the Working Party on Agricultural Waivers, L/754; and GATT Contracting Parties,
Thirteenth Session, United States Import Restrictions on Agricultural Products, Report by the Working Party on
Agricultural Waivers, L/918.

United States – Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (1968)
1.15. In 1968, the United Kingdom and Japan submitted a notification to the Committee on Trade
in Industrial Products expressing concern that certain powers given to the President of the
United States under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 could disrupt foreign trade. 51 During the
Committee's first examination of the notified barriers in 1969 52, Japan expressed concern over the
"lack of a definition of 'security'" and "the wide discretion as to form of action and the lack of a time-
limit for carrying out investigations" u nder the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 53 The United States
responded that the legislation "was in conformity with Article XXI", and pointed out that "the
existence of an institutional framework for national security cases could be regarded as a safeguard,
since it ensured full consideration of the merits of each case before action was taken."54 In 1970, at
the next examination of these notifications by a Working Group convened for this purpose, the
Working Group concluded that there was a "divergence of view a s to the meaning and scope of
certain essential concepts in the GATT, in particular … the scope of some of the exceptions …
especially Articles XX and XXI".55
1.16. In 1970, the Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions was notified of a global quota
maintained by the United States on petroleum oil products. 56 At the April 1970 meetings of the
Joint Working Group57, the European Communities and Canada asserted that they considered these
restrictions to be inconsistent with the GATT 1947.58 The European Communities did not accept that
these restrictions could be justified by national security considerations and considered that the
restrictions had been applied to the benefit of the petroleum industry of the United States .59 The
European Communities also asserted that a recent US Task Force had given arguments against the
maintenance of the system for security reasons.60 The United States responded that the restrictions
had been applied under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 "in accordance with
Article XXI", given the "high degree of industrialization of the United States as well as its remoteness
from some major oil supplying countries".61

See also GATT Contracting Parties, Report of the Working Party on Italian Import Restrictions, L/1468,
paras. 5-6. In 1961, a Working Party was convened to examine a variety of Italian import restrictions and
prohibitions. Before the Working Party, Italy asserted that prohibitions or restrictions on certain items were
justified under the "provisions of Article XX or Article XXI of the General Agreement". (Ibid. para. 5.) The
Working Party did not respond specifically to this invocation, but noted in general that they deplored "the
continued use of discriminatory restrictions for which no justification could be found". (Ibid. para. 6.)
51 Committee on Industrial Products, Inventory of Non-Tariff Barriers, COM.IND/4, pp. 231-232. The
notification referred to "escape clause tariff action", or the powers under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to
increase the rate of import duty on any item in order to effect additional protection of a domestic industry.
(Ibid. p. 231.)
52 See Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Note by the Secretariat on the Meeting of the
Committee held 19-25 June 1969, COM.IND/W/7, para. 1.
53 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, First Examination of Part 4 of the Inventory of
Non-Tariff Barriers, Part 4 – Specific Limitations on Imports and Exports, COM.IND/W/12, p. 269.
54 Ibid. pp. 269-271.
55 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Draft Report of Working Group 4 on Non-Tariff Barriers,
Examination of Items in Part 4 of the Illustrative List (Specific Limitations on Trade), Revision,
Spec(70)48/Rev.1, para. 4; and Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Report of Working Group 4 on
Non-Tariff Barriers, Examination of Items in Part 4 of the Illustrative List (Specific Limitations on Trade),
COM.IND/W/49, para. 5.
56 Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Import Restrictions, Addendum, Industrial Products,
L/3377/Add.2, pp. 1-2; and Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Working Group 4, Specific Limitations,
COM.IND/W/28, p. 4. The United States had limited imports to 12 per cent of domestic production. (See Joint
Working Group on Import Restrictions, Notes on Individual Import Restrictions, COM.IND/W/28/Add.1, p. 49.)
Notifications could be provided to the Joint Working Group by countries maintaining the restrictions as well as
their trading partners. (Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Report of the Joint Working Group on
Import Restrictions, L/3391, para. 5.)
57 Ibid. para. 1.
58 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Notes on
Individual Import Restrictions, COM.IND/W/28/Add.1, p. 49. During these meetings, there was also debate on
whether certain restrictions maintained by Japan and Switzerland on various fissile chemical elements could be
justified under Article XXI. (Ibid. pp. 71 and 73.)
59 Ibid. p. 49.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.

1.17. Although the Council agreed that the Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions should
continue its review of import restrictions, the Joint Working Group did not meet again after 1970.62
Austria – Penicillin and Other Medicaments (1970)
1.18. In 1970, the Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions was notified of certain restrictions
maintained by Austria on penicillin, tyrothricin and related medicaments, which took the form of
either import licensing restrictions or quotas. 63 At the April 1970 meetings of the
Joint Working Group64, a question was posed to Austria as to "what part of Article XXI might cover
this restrictio n".65 Austria responded that it regarded the restriction to be necessary under
Article XXI(b)(ii) of the GATT 1947 "in order to have available a local source of supply in case of
emergency".66 In 1971, these restrictions were considered again by the Group of Three.67
The Group of Three noted Austria's explanation that the restrictions were maintained for defence
reasons, but concluded that as "other countries find it possible to do without restrictions, it should
… be possible for Austria to do the same ".68 In 1972, these restrictions were considered again by
the Group on Residual Restrictions.69 At the January 1972 meeting of the Group, the United States
recalled the recommendation of the Group of Three that Austria should eliminate the restrictions on
these products "as other countries did not find it necessary to maintain them for security or other
reasons".70 At the July 1972 session of the Committee on Trade and Development, in the context of
discussions on the Second Report of the Group of Three 71, Austria asserted that it would not be
possible to liberalize imports of these products "for reasons previously stated", but noted that
"sympathetic consideration would be given in this connexion to any trade problems faced by
developing countries."72

62 See Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Past GATT Activities Relating
to Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Background Note by the Secretariat, NTM/W/2,
para. 13.
63 Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Import Restrictions, L/3377, pp. 23-24; and Committee
on Trade in Industrial Products, Working Group 4, Specific Limitations, COM.IND/W/28, p. 6. The Joint Working
Group's documents from April 1970 and November 1970 label these restrictions as "global quotas", but
documents from June 1970 label these as "discretionary licensing" restrictions. (Joint Working Group on Import
Restrictions, Import Restrictions, L/3377, pp. 23-24; Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Working
Group 4, Specific Limitations, COM.IND/W/28, p. 6; and Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Joint
Working Group on Import Restrictions, Table of Import Restrictions (Chapters 25-99), COM.IND/W/28/Rev.2,
p. 8.) Later documents from the Group on Residual Restrictions appear to clarify that these products were
subject to either import licensing restrictions or global quotas. (See Group on Residual Restrictions, Additional
Products Suggested for Examination, Note by the Secretariat, COM.TD/W/140, p. 14; and Group on Residual
Restrictions, Proceedings of the Meeting of the Group held on 24-25 January 1972, Note by the Secretariat,
COM.TD/85, para. 58.)
64 Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Report of the Joint Working Group on Import
Restrictions, L/3391, para. 1.
65 Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions, Notes on Individual Import Restrictions,
COM.IND/W/28/Add.1, p. 95.
66 Ibid. Although the Council agreed that the Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions should
continue to annually or biennially review such import restrictions, the Joint Working Group did not meet again
after 1970. (See Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Past GATT Activities
Relating to Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Background Note by the Secretariat,
NTM/W/2, para. 13.)
67 See Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Past GATT Activities Relating
to Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Background Note by the Secretariat, NTM/W/2,
para. 14. The Group of Three was convened by the Committee on Trade and Development, and consisted of
the Chairman of the contracting parties, the Chairman of the Council and the Chairman of the Committee on
Trade and Development. (See Committee on Trade and Development, Report of the Committee on Trade and
Development to the Contracting Parties, L/3487, para. 9.)
68 Group of Three, Preliminary Report of the Group of Three, W(71)2, p. 23; and Group of Three,
Report of the Group of Three, L/3610, p. 21.
69 Group on Residual Restrictions, Note on Proceedings of the Meeting of the Group held on
24-25 January 1972, Prepared by the Secretariat, COM.TD/85, para. 1.
70 Ibid. para. 58.
71 The Group of Three had noted in their Second Report that Austria had not "found it possible so far to
liberalize imports of penicillin, tyrothricin and medicaments as recommended in L/3610". (Group of Three,
Second Report, L/3710, p. 20.)
72 Committee on Trade and Development, Proceedings of the Twenty-First Session, Note Prepared by

1.19. Austria continued to maintain certain restrictions on penicillin and related medicaments until
December 1990, when these were abolished as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations at the
request of the United States.73
Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear (1975)
1.20. In 1975, Sweden notified the GATT Council of its intention to introduce a global import quota
system for leather shoes, plastic shoes and rubber boots . Sweden advised that it was introducing
this system "in order to allow time to remedy the serious dif ficulties that have arisen in this sector
of the industry", referring to downward trends in the Swedish shoe industry that had begun in the
1960s and had accelerated during the 1970s.74 Sweden considered that the reasons underlying this
development were the relatively high production costs in Sweden, combined with the traditional
liberal trade policy pursued by the Swedish Government, which thereby encouraged and made
possible a very substantial increase in the volume of imports. Sweden considered that " [t]he
continued decrease in domestic production has become a critical threat to the emergency planning
of Sweden's economic defence as an integral part of its security policy ."75 Sweden's security policy
necessitated the maintenance of a minimum domestic produc tion capacity in vital industries , such
capacity being considered by Sweden to be " indispensable in order to secure the provision of
essential products necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or other emergency in international
relations".76 At the October 1975 meeting of the GATT Council, several contracting parties expressed
concern at the Swedish decision, taken at a time of high unemployment in their own countries. 77
They noted that Sweden had not provided a detailed economic justification for the me asures, and
expressed doubts as to the justification for these measures under the GATT. 78 Sweden responded
that it considered the measure to be taken in conformity with "the spirit of Article XXI", but added
that it did not wish to deprive contracting parties of the possibility to consult and therefore declared
its readiness to consult bilaterally with interested contracting parties even if such a consultation was
not formally required by Article XXI. 79 Many delegations reserved their rights under the GATT and
took note of Sweden's offer to consult.80
1.21. In March 1977, Sweden notified the GATT Council that it intended to terminate the quotas in
respect of leather shoes and plastic shoes as of 1 July 1977.81
European Communities v. Argentina (1982)
1.22. In 1982, Argentina brought to the GATT Council's attention the suspension by the European
Communities, Canada a nd Australia of imports from Argentina .82 Argentina noted that there had

73 See Committee on Trade and Development, Action by Governments Relevant to the Provisions of
Part IV, Addendum, COM.TD/W/170/Add.7, p. 2; Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff
Measures, Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures (Industrial Products), Part IV, Specific Limitations, NTM/INV/IV,
Inventory Number IV.A.4; Group of Negotiations on Goods, Communication from Austria, Uruguay Round –
Market Access, MTN.GNG/NG1/W/63, p. 2; and GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Austria, Report
by the Secretariat, C/RM/S/19A, para. 46.
74 Communication from Sweden, Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, L/4250, paras. 1
and 3.
75 Ibid. para. 4. See also GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 31 October 1975, C/M/109, p. 8;
and GATT Council of Representatives, Thirty-First Session, Report on Work since the Thirtieth Session, L/4254,
pp. 17-18.
76 Communication from Sweden, Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, L/4250, para. 4.
See also GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 31 October 1975, C/M/109, p. 9.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. See also GATT Council of Representatives, Thirty-First Session, Report on Work since the
Thirtieth Session, L/4254, p. 18.
79 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 31 October 1975, C/M/109, p. 9.
80 Ibid. See also GATT Council of Representatives, Thirty-First Session, Report on Work since the
Thirtieth Session, L/4254, p. 18.
81 Communication from Sweden, Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Addendum,
L/4250/Add.1. Relatedly, at the December 1983 meeting of the Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other
Non-Tariff Measures, it was recorded by the Secretariat that some delegations wondered "how a discriminatory
restriction, such as that imposed by one contracting party on imports of footwear, could be compatible with the
provisions of Article XXI". (Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Meeting held on
5-8 December 1983, Note by the Secretariat, NTM/5, para. 27.)
82 Communication from Argentina, Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic
Reasons, L/5317.

been no pronouncement by the UN Security Council authorizing the application of Article XXI(c) of
the GATT.83 Argentina stated that the measures adopted by the European Communities (other than
the United Kingdom), Canada and Australia were entirely without justification, coming from countries
with which the Argentine Republic had maintained relations. Such measures therefore constituted a
hostile act and "flagrant economic aggression".84 Further, such measures were not derived from any
"economic or commercial issue", but from the unjustified interference in a long -standing territorial
dispute in the region of the Malvinas Islands. 85 Argentina stated that the measures adopted by the
United K ingdom similarly had no justification, even under Article XXI(b) of the GATT, since the
Security Council resolution which had recognized that there was a breach of the peace situated the
problem solely in the region of the Malvinas Islands, and consequently the metropolitan territory of
the United Kingdom was not affected.86 The European Communities, Canada and Australia issued a
joint communication stating that they had taken the measures at issue in light of the situation
addressed in UN Security Council Resolution 502, on the basis of their "inherent rights of which
Article XXI of the General Agreement is a reflection".87
1.23. At the May 1982 meeting of the GATT Co uncil, Argentina reiterated that the measures were
not applied for "economic and trade reasons", but were based on reasons of a "political nature and
were meant to exert political pressure on the sovereign decisions of Argentina in order to intervene
in a conflict in which only one of the countries was involved ".88 Argentina stressed that
UN Security Council Resolution 502 had not asked for or authorized the adoption of any measures
such as the trade sanctions taken, nor were the measures justified under Art icle XXI.
Argentina considered that the "concerted coercive action" taken by a number of economically
powerful countries violated the letter and the spirit of the GATT. 89 The European Communities
stressed that the measures were taken on the basis of their inherent rights, of which Article XXI was
a reflection, and did not require notification, justification or approval, as confirmed by 35 years of
implementation of the GATT.90 Canada stated that the situation which had necessitated the measures
needed to be r esolved by appropriate action outside the GATT, as the GATT had neither the
competence nor the responsibility to deal with the political issue that had arisen. Canada also noted
that Article XXI did not contain a definition of "essential security interests ", and that many
contracting parties had taken the same or similar actions for political reasons. In the present case,
the action had been taken to encourage a peaceful settlement by temporarily suspending the normal
operation of some provisions of the GATT. Canada considered that the fact that the action had been
taken was not really unprecedented; what was unprecedented was the examination of the action in
the GATT.91 Australia endorsed the statements of the European Communities and Canada, and stated
that the Australian measures were in conformity with the provisions of Article XXI(c), which did not
require notification or justification.92
1.24. Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Zaire, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Pakistan, Romania and
Poland expressed opposition to, or concern at, what they considered was a dangerous precedent
involving the use by contracting parties of trade and economic measures for non-trade reasons, and
which were not justified under the GATT. 93 India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Hungary and

83 Communication from Argentina, Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic
Reasons, L/5317, para. III.
84 Ibid. para. IV.
85 Ibid. Argentina referred in this regard to UN Resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49 (XXXI).
(Ibid.)
86 Ibid. para. V.
87 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, Australia and Canada, Trade
Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, L/5319/Rev.1, para. 1(b).
88 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 7 May 1982, C/M/157, p. 2.
89 Ibid. p. 4.
90 Ibid. p. 10.
91 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
92 Ibid. p. 11.
93 Ibid. pp. 4-9. For example, Brazil drew attention to subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b), and stated
that the present case could set a dangerous precedent if the measures were considered necessary for the
protection of essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations,
because such interests had not been demonstrated. While this matter could be considered to be an emergency
in international relations, Brazil stressed that this was the case only in respect of the region in question, as
defined by the Security Council, whose action had a bearing on the GATT in light of Article XXI(c). Brazil also
stated that it was difficult to accept that the countries in question, except for one, were taking this action in
protection of their essential security interests. (GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 7 May 1982,

Czechoslovakia considered more generally that the GATT Council should approach the issues in this
case with caution. 94 Japan also considered that the interjection of political elements into GATT
activities would not facilitate the Organization's carrying out of its functions.95
1.25. The Philippines noted that UN Security Council Resolution 502 referred only to Argentina and
the United Kingdom, while the joint communication issued by the European Communities, Canada
and Australia gave the impression that the European Communities, Canada and Australia had taken
these measures in the exercise of their inherent rights, of which Article XXI was a reflection. The
Philippines questioned this argument as applied to the European Communities, which was not a
contracting party to the GATT 1947.96 Spain considered that the actions of the United Kingdom could
be justified under Article XXI(b)(iii), but had doubts that the same could be said for other States,
which were not technically in the same position as the United Kingdom with respect to Argentina.97
1.26. The United States considered that, regrettably, contracting parties had in the past used
sanctions involving trade in the context of their security interests as they perceived them. However,
the GATT had never been the forum for r esolution of disputes whose essence was security and not
trade, and for good reasons, such disputes had seldom been discussed in the GATT, which had no
power to resolve political or security disputes. Trade measures could not be "split off" as if taken in
a vacuum, since the specific justification of international measures could not be discussed in the
context of broadly embargoed trade.98 The United States also expressed the view that the GATT, by
its own terms, left it to each contracting party to judge wh at was necessary to protect its essential
security interests in time of international crisis. This was wise, since no country could participate in
the GATT if in doing so it gave up the possibility of using any measures, other than military, to
protect its security interests.99 New Zealand questioned whether the GATT was the appropriate body
in which the circumstances that had led to the imposition of economic sanctions should be debated.
New Zealand stated that it has also imposed sanctions on Argentina for reasons similar to those
given by the European Communities, Canada and Australia. New Zealand considered that it ha d an
inherent right as a sovereign state to take such action and that such actions were in conformity with
New Zealand's rights and obligati ons under the GATT. 100 Singapore expressed the view that the
wording of Article XXI allowed a contracting party the right to determine the need for protection of
its essential security interests, while also recognizing the danger of a broad interpretation of
Article XXI.101 Norway also considered that the European Communities, Canada and Australia did
not contravene the GATT in taking the measures in question.102
1.27. At the June 1982 meeting of the GATT Council, Argentina formally requested an interpretation
of Article XXI of the GATT 1947: (a) to know whether Article XXI exempted contracting parties from
obligations regarding notification and surveillance procedures; (b) to determine the natural rights
which could be inherent for contracting parties and had been invo ked in relation to Article XXI in
general; (c) to establish whether any contracting party, including one not involved in a problem
between two other contracting parties, could interpret "per se" that there existed an emergency in
international relations as referred to in Article XXI(b)(iii) and consequently take unilateral measures;
and (d) to determine whether one or more contracting parties could take action under Article XXI(c)
without the prior existence of a specific provision adopted by the United Nat ions authorizing the
application of restrictive trade measures.103 This proposal was supported by a number of contracting
parties.104 Canada did not support the proposal, expressing the view that the case of Ghana was the
only appropriate precedent for the present case , and asserting that it provided an example of the

C/M/157, p. 5.) Pakistan did not consider the situation addressed by UN Security Council Resolution 502 to be
an "extreme" emergency in international relations, of the sort permitted under the spirit of the GATT. (GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 7 May 1982, C/M/157, p. 7.)
94 Ibid. pp. 7-9.
95 Ibid. p. 9.
96 Ibid. p. 7.
97 Ibid. p. 6.
98 Ibid. p. 8.
99 Ibid. p. 8.
100 Ibid. p. 9.
101 Ibid. p. 7.
102 Ibid. p. 10.
103 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29-30 June 1982, C/M/159, pp. 15-16.
104 Brazil, Cuba, India, Uruguay, Colombia, Spain, Peru, Romania, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, the Philippines
and the Dominican Republic (with Venezuela and Ecuador as observers). (Ibid. pp. 17-18.)

notion of national security being interpreted in a broad sense by the government of that country.105
Australia doubted the need for an interpretation of Article XXI, given its infrequent use thus far. 106
The United States considered that debate in the Council would not serve a useful purpose, stressing
that the GATT had no role in a crisis of military force.107 Japan, New Zealand and Norway similarly
expressed doubts that a note interpreting Article XXI would lead to useful results. 108
The European Communities suggested that if the Council were to adopt a decision, the proposal
should have a chance of obtaining a consensus. 109 The Chair subsequently reported that informal
consultations with delegations to arrive at suggestions for resolving the matter had not resulted in
conclusions that could lead to such suggestions.110
The 1982 Decision regarding Article XXI
1.28. On 29 November 1982, the contracting parties adopted a Ministerial Declaration in which the
contracting parties decided, in drawing up their work program and priorities for the 1980s, to
"abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, f or reasons of a non -economic character, not
consistent with the General Agreement ".111 On 30 November 1982, the
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted a Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement
(1982 Decision), setting forth procedural guidelines for the application of Article XXI, until such time
as the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES might decide to make a formal interpretation of Article XXI.112
Under the 1982 Decision, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES note d that: (a) the exceptions
envisaged in Article XXI "constitute an important element for safeguarding the rights of contracting
parties when they consider that reasons of security are involved"; (b) recourse to Article XXI could
constitute an element of disruptio n and uncertainty for international trade, and "affect benefits
accruing to contracting parties under the GATT"; and (c) consequently, "in taking action in terms of
the exceptions provided in Article XXI", contracting parties should take into consideration the
interests of third parties which might be affected. The GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES therefore
undertook to ensure that contracting parties should be informed to the fullest extent possible of
trade measures taken under Article XXI, and note d that all contracting parties affected by action s
taken under Article XXI retained their full rights under the GATT.113
United States – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua (1983)
1.29. In 1983, the President of the United States announced that the United States would be
reducing Nicaragua's allocation of the total import quota for sugar. The President stated that by
denying to Nicaragua a foreign exchange benefit, the United States "hoped to reduce the resources
available to [Nicaragua] for financing its military build -up, and its support for subversion and
extremist violence in the region".114 This announcement was subsequently implemented pursuant to
the President's authority under the Tariff Schedules of the United States to give due consideration
to the interests of domestic producers in the sugar market.115
1.30. Following the announcement, Nicaragua requested consultations with the United States,
arguing that the measure would create "serious adverse trade effects".116 The consultations did not
achieve a mutually satisfactory solution, and Nicaragua subsequently requested the establishment
of a panel. 117 At the July 1983 meeting of the GATT Council, the United States stated that "[t]he
motives for the measure were not strictly trade considerations; and it followed that any examination

105 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29-30 June 1982, C/M/159, p. 18. For the statements of
Ghana referred to by Canada, see, e.g. GATT Contracting Parties, Nineteenth Session, Summary Record of the
Twelfth Session held on 9 December 1961, SR.19/12, p. 196.
106 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29-30 June 1982, C/M/159, p. 19.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. p. 20.
109 Ibid. p. 21.
110 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 2 November 1982, C/M/162, p. 18.
111 GATT Contracting Parties, Thirty-Eighth Session, Ministerial Declaration adopted on 29 November
1982, L/5424, p. 3.
112 Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement of 30 November 1982, L/5426.
113 Ibid.
114 GATT Panel Report, US – Sugar Quota, L/5607, para. 2.3.
115 Ibid.
116 Communication from Nicaragua, US – Sugar Quota, L/5492.
117 Communication from Nicaragua, US – Sugar Quota, Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Nicaragua,
L/5513.

of this matter in purely trade terms would be sterile or disingenuous." 118 The United States also
questioned the utility of resolving this issue by establishing a panel, stating that "[a] political solution
could resolve the trade aspect of this dispute; but a GATT panel could not appropriately examine or
assist in the resolution of the political or security issues that lay at its core."119 India considered that
the Council should follow established GATT practice and establish a panel, as Nicaragua had
requested a panel after fulfilling the proper procedures and that "[i]t was not for the Council to judge
the merits of the case at this stage."120
1.31. The Council agreed to establish a panel121, and the panel's composition and terms of reference
were announced at the October 1983 meeting of the GATT Council.122
1.32. Before the panel, Nicaragua argued that the United States had violated Articles II, XI and XIII
and Part IV of the GATT 1947 by reducing its sugar quota below the level agreed upon in the United
States schedule of concessions. 123 Nicaragua also cited the "fundamental principle" embodied in
paragraph 7(iii) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration that "no contracting party should use trade
measures to exert pressure for the purposes of solving non-economic problems."124 In response, the
United States argued that it was "neither invoking any exceptions under the provisions of the
General Agreement nor intending to defend its actions in GATT terms ".125 In the view of the
United States, while the action did affect trade, it was not taken for trade -policy reasons. 126
Consequently, any attempt to discuss the issue in purely trade terms, "divorced from the broader
context of the dispute", would be disingenuous. 127 The panel considered that within its terms of
reference, it could examine the measures "solely in the light of the relevant GATT provisions,
concerning itself with only the trade issues under dispute", and therefore did not consider
Article XXI.128 The panel proceeded to conclude that the reduced sugar quota was inconsistent with
the United States' obligations under Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, and exercised judicial economy
over Nicaragua's other claims.129
1.33. At the March 1984 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua commended the panel's findings
and added that it had been perplexed by "the US reasons for adopting the measure, the refusal to
have recourse to exceptions provided under the General Agreement, and the questioning of the
GATT's competence to examine this case".130 Nicaragua "wondered what would the United States
consider to be the competent forum for discussing the justification of a measure designed to restrict
access to a market which had the effect of reducing export earnings".131 The United States reiterated
its view that examination of the matter in purely trad e terms within the GATT was disingenuous,
noting that "the reduction in Nicaragua's sugar imports had not secured any economic or trade
benefit for the United States ."132 The United States added that while it would not object to the
adoption of the report, a resolution of its broader dispute with Nicaragua would be required before
it would remove the contested measure. 133 Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina considered that the
US measure had contravened the Ministerial Declaration134, and Cuba, the Dominican Republic and
Switzerland criticized the United States for using economic measures to secure political objectives.135
Several contracting parties including Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil and the United Kingdom, on
behalf of Hong Kong reiterated the importance o f positively resolving the case through the

118 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 12 July 1983, C/M/170, p. 12.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. p. 13. Colombia, Spain, Brazil, Singapore, Argentina, Switzerland and Finland (on behalf of the
Nordic countries) supported Nicaragua's request for a panel. (Ibid.)
122 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 3 October 1983, C/M/171, p. 12.
123 GATT Panel Report, US –Sugar Quota, L/5607, para. 3.1.
124 Ibid. para. 3.9.
125 Ibid. para. 3.10.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid. para. 3.11.
128 Ibid. para. 4.1.
129 Ibid. paras. 4.3-4.6.
130 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 13 March 1984, C/M/176, p. 8.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid. p. 9.
135 Ibid. p. 10.

GATT's dispute settlement system.136 Argentina added that it could not understand why the Panel
had not examined the motivations for the measure outside of trade considerations, and that it
"regretted that the Unit ed States had been unable to advance any argument based on the
General Agreement to justify its measure ".137 Poland stated its firm belief that no measure having
adverse trade implications for another contracting party could be dismissed as irrelevant for the
GATT.138
1.34. The Council took note of these statements and adopted the panel's report.139
1.35. At the May 1984 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua noted that the United States had
recently increased its total sugar import quota without allocating any share of th is increase to
Nicaragua.140 Nicaragua asked the United States to inform the Council of its intentions regarding the
recommendations of the contracting parties. The United States maintained its earlier position that
the lifting of the measures would first re quire a "resolution of the broader dispute ".141 At the
November 1984 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua noted that not only had the United States
failed to implement the panel's recommendations, it had once again applied a measure limiting
Nicaragua's su gar quota .142 Nicaragua noted that "[i]f the measure corresponded to security
considerations, Nicaragua wondered why the United States had not invoked Article XXI." 143 The
United States maintained its previous position.144 The Council took note of these statements.145
European Communities v. Czechoslovakia (1985)
1.36. In 1985, Czechoslovakia notified the Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff
Measures that it considered Italy and the United Kingdom to be maintain ing a discriminatory
embargo on exports of certain electronic products to Czechoslovakia. 146 The United Kingdom and
Italy asserted that the measures were maintained under Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1947. 147 In
1986, Czechoslovakia submitted an additional notif ication, responding to the United Kingdom that
"the imports of computers and related equipment … mentioned in the Czechoslovak notification are
not related to either fissionable materials or traffic in arms or to traffic in other goods carried on for
the purposes of supplying a military establishment."148 Czechoslovakia also asserted that "[t]he two
contracting parties in this case cannot be said to be in a state of belligerency or other emergency
situation."149 Czechoslovakia considered that the United Kingdom had not demonstrated "a genuine
causal link between its security interests and the trade action taken", and therefore did not consider
the action to be in conformity with the GATT 1947.150

136 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 13 March 1984, C/M/176, pp. 8-9.
137 Ibid. p. 9.
138 Ibid. p. 10.
139 Ibid. p. 11. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, Poland, India, Norway on behalf of the
Nordic countries, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom on behalf of Hong Kong, Hungary, Portugal,
Peru, Jamaica, Austria, Egypt, Romania, Switzerland, Chile, Singapore, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Canada, Trinidad
and Tobago, Senegal and Zaire supported the adoption of the panel's report. (Ibid. p. 9.)
140 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 15-16 May 1984, C/M/178, p. 27.
141 Ibid. Argentina and Cuba expressed their concern with the United States' failure to comply with the
recommendations. (Ibid. pp. 27-28.)
142 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 6-8 and 20 November 1984, C/M/183, p. 65.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid. Several contracting parties such as Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Hungary, India, Uruguay and
Poland expressed their concern with the United States' ongoing failure to comply with the recommendations.
(Ibid. pp. 65-66.)
145 Ibid. p. 66.
146 Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures
(Industrial Products), Addendum, NTM/INV/I-V/Add.10, Inventory Numbers IV.B.17.1 (p. 59 of PDF file) and
IV.B.18 (p. 61 of PDF file). Czechoslovakia characterized the measure maintained by Italy as an "embargo" on
exports of electronic systems to Czechoslovakia, and the measure maintained by the United Kingdom as an
embargo on exports of computers and related equipment. Italy responded that there was no embargo, but an
inter-ministerial Committee which examined each export license application. (Ibid.)
147 Ibid.
148 Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures
(Industrial Products), Addendum, NTM/INV/I-V/Add.12, Inventory Number IV.B.18 (p. 9 of PDF file).
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.

United States v. Nicaragua (1985)
1.37. In 1985, the United States circulated a communication stating that it had imposed a complete
import and export embargo on Nicaragua and declared a national emergency due to the
extraordinary threat to national security posed by Nicaragua's policies and actions .151 At a special
meeting of the GATT Council requested by Nicaragua in May 1985, Nicaragua argued that this
measure "violated both the general principles and certain specific provisions" of the GATT 1947. 152
Nicaragua argued that the US Administration, in declaring a national emer gency to deal with a
perceived threat by Nicaragua, seemed to have lost any sense of proportion and was trying to
override the principles of international trade.153 Nicaragua said that it was absurd to suggest that it
could pose a threat to the national security of the United States, pointing to the relative power and
size of the two countries as well as the absence of any "armed conflict between the United States
and Nicaragua".154 Nicaragua also noted that "the United States, in stating to the Se curity Council
that its measures were principally intended to prevent Nicaragua from having the benefit of trading
with the United States, had thereby acknowledged that this was not a matter of national security
but one of coercion."155
1.38. The United States stated that it took the measures for "national security" reasons and that
the measures fell within the exception contained in Article XXI(b)(iii). 156 The United States
emphasized that Article XXI left it to each contracting party to judge what measures it cons idered
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. 157 According to the United States, it
was not for the GATT to approve or disapprove this judgement.158 The United States also considered
that GATT , as a trade organization, had "no compet ence to judge such matters" and that its
effectiveness in addressing trade issues would only be weakened if it became a "forum for debating
political and security issues".159 Nicaragua responded that Article XXI "was not to be applied in an
arbitrary fashion " and required " some correspondence between the measures adopted and the
situation giving rise to their adoption".160 Nicaragua also considered that "since this matter involved
commercial and trade measures, the GATT, as the institution responsible for the c onduct of
international trade, should express a view on this issue."161
1.39. Cuba, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Portugal
considered that the measures taken by the United States were incompatible with Article 7(iii) of the
1982 Ministerial Declaration162, and Poland, Chile, Hungary, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Jamaica

151 Communication from the United States, US – Nicaraguan Trade, L/5803. The measures were
embodied in an Executive Order issued by President Reagan, and comprised: (a) a prohibition on all imports
into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin; (b) a prohibition on all exports from the
United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua; (c) a prohibition on Nicaraguan air carriers engaging in air
transport to or from points in the United States, and transactions relating thereto; and (d) a prohibition on
vessels of Nicaraguan registration from entering the United States' ports, and a prohibition on transactions
related thereto. (Communication from the United States, US – Nicaraguan Trade, L/5803, p. 2.)
152 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, p. 2. Nicaragua specifically alleged
that the US measures contravened Articles I, II, V, XI, XIII, XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII of the GATT 1947.
Nicaragua also alleged that US measures violated the spirit and provisions "of the UN Charter, the resolutions
of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the decisions of the [ICJ], the Charter of the Organization of
American States, and other international instruments, including the Bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation". (Ibid. p. 4.)
153 Ibid. p. 3.
154 Ibid. Nicaragua also criticized the refusal from the United States to enter into dialogue, as well as
"the US policy of force, serious threats of increased military aggression and disregard of international legal
provisions and of the bodies and tribunals responsible for ensuring their observance". (Ibid. p. 2.)
155 Ibid. p. 4. Nicaragua argued that "the measures had been taken as a form of coercion for political
reasons, and formed part of a US policy of political, financial, trade and military aggression against Nicaragua",
which included the mining of the country's ports and campaigns to prevent the harvesting of coffee and other
products. (Ibid. p. 2.)
156 Ibid. p. 4.
157 Ibid. pp. 4-5.
158 Ibid. p. 5.
159 Ibid. pp. 4-5.
160 Ibid. p. 16.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid. pp. 5-7, 9, 10 and 12. See also Ministerial Declaration adopted on 29 November 1982, L/5424
(1982 Ministerial Declaration). Paragraph 7(iii) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration provides that the GATT
CONTRACTING PARTIES, in drawing up the work programme and priorities for the 1980s, undertake,

and China, as an observer, criticized the use of economic measures to secure political objectives.163
Argentina and Brazil additionally asserted that the measures were incompatible with the Charter of
the United Nations (UN Charter), and Argentina cited incompatibility with the 1982 Decision.164
1.40. Cuba, Poland and Chile asserted that the GATT was the proper forum for discussing disputes
with trade implications.165 Poland noted that this was required to ensure that "GATT's conciliatory
functions and responsibilities have practical meaning." 166 Chile did not consider that an invocation
of Article XXI implied that the trade consequences of measures taken under it could not be discussed
under the GATT.167 Hungary noted that while ideally politics and trade should be kept separate, a
total separation was not realistic and was "evidenced by the provisions in the General Agreement
covering cases in which political and commercial considerations were in opposition".168
1.41. Canada conversely considered that "this was fundamentally not a trade issue", and urged the
two parties to seek a solution outside of the GATT context. 169 The European Communities stated
that its concern was to protect the GATT multilateral system from being damaged by any
ill-considered development of a situation that could neither be dealt with nor settled in the GATT
framework.170 The European Communities agreed that the GATT was not t he appropriate forum
because the US measures were only part of a broader situation and the GATT had never had the
authority or competence to settle "disputes essentially linked to security".171 Japan agreed that even
though "the issue now before the Council obviously had a trade aspect, that aspect stemmed from
deep roots and it had to be admitted that GATT was not competent to grapple with those roots".172
1.42. Spain and Czechoslovakia considered that the measures taken by the United States could not
be justified under the provisions of Article XXI. 173 Cuba and Peru argued that Nicaragua could not
possibly threaten the security of the United States, and Cuba considered that the United States was
"putting forward various political pretexts, including a reference to Article XXI " in order to "punish
Nicaragua for not serving US interests".174 Cuba asserted that "recourse to Article XXI had to be
backed by certain facts" to effectively guarantee against an abuse of t he GATT system. 175
Brazil noted that the right to invoke Article XXI "should only be exercised in the light of other
international obligations such as those assumed under the UN Charter ".176 Czechoslovakia stated
that the United States' interpretation of Article XXI would enable any contracting party wanting to
justify introduction of certain trade measures against any other contracting party to simply refer to
Article XXI and declare that its security was threatened. On the contrary, Czechoslovakia considered
that Article XXI "dealt with emergency situations and therefore had to be applied according to the
specific provisions in paragraphs b(i), (ii), or (iii)".177
1.43. India argued that "a contracting party having recourse to Article XXI(b)(iii) should be able to
demonstrate a genuine nexus between its security interests and the trade action taken; the security
exception should not be used to impose economic sanctions for non-economic purposes".178 India did
not consider that the United States had established such a nexus.179
1.44. Sweden agreed with the United States that it was "up to each country to define its essential
security interests under Article XXI", but noted that "contracting parties should be expected to

individually and jointly "to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a non-economic
character, not consistent with the General Agreement".
163 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, pp. 5-15.
164 Ibid. pp. 6-7. The 1982 Decision is discussed in paragraph 1.28 of this Appendix.
165 Ibid. pp. 5-8.
166 Ibid. p. 8.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid. p. 12.
170 Ibid. p. 13.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid. p. 14.
173 Ibid. pp. 9-10.
174 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
175 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, p. 5.
176 Ibid. pp. 7-8.
177 Ibid. p. 10.
178 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
179 Ibid. p. 11.

exercise their rights under that Article with utmost prudence."180 Finland, Switzerland, Norway,
Iceland, Egypt and Portugal expressed similar views. 181 Sweden further considered that the
United States had not shown such prudence in choosing to give "a too far -reaching interpretation"
of Article XXI.182 The European Communities agreed that Article XXI "left to each contracting party
the task of judging what was necessary to protect its essential security interests", but noted that
such discretion should be exercised in a spirit of "responsibility, discernment, moderation, ensuring
above all that discretion did not mean arbitrary application".183
1.45. Australia stated that the United States was permitted under Article XXI "to take action of this
kind with no requirement to justify such action" , noting that the UN Security Council was the
appropriate forum for the discussion of such issues. Nevertheless, Australia believed that contracting
parties should avoid any action which could threaten GATT's credibility and undermine attachment
to the principles of an open multilatera l system. Australia considered that, while in principle,
Nicaragua retained its GATT rights, in practical terms the US action had rendered this right
inoperative.184 Canada expressed a similar view.185
1.46. Nicaragua circulated a draft decision to the contracting parties for their consideration, but the
Council agreed to defer any determination on this matter to its next meeting. 186 Nicaragua
subsequently requested consultations with the United States in relation to this matter. 187 At the
July 1985 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua requested the establishment of a panel. 188 The
United States reiterated the futility of resolving this issue through GATT procedures, as the trade
effects of the measure had already been acknowledged and the export embargo had removed any
opportunity for Nicaragua to retaliate. 189 The United States considered Nicaragua's request for a
panel as "a further attempt … to politicize GATT ".190 The United States also contended that under
Article XXI(b) a panel "could neither examine the national security reasons for the US action, nor
determine the appropriateness of invoking the security exception ".191 The European Communities
considered that each party had to judge on its own whether to invoke Article XXI. The
European Communities questioned what a panel could do in this case, since it could not interpret
Article XXI and the United States had already recognized trade prejudice. 192 The
European Communities said that it could not oppose a contracting party's request for a panel,
provided the t erms of reference clearly did not include interpretation of Article XXI. 193 Canada
expressed full agreement with the United States that only the individual contracting party itself could
judge questions involving national security, noting that a panel could not make that judgment. 194
Nevertheless, Canada considered that measures taken under Article XXI could have trade effec ts
which could be considered by a GATT panel. Canada considered that every contracting party had a
right to request and to receive a hearing of a panel on any GATT-related issue, even where a panel
was unlikely to be able to make a useful finding. Canada agreed that a panel would serve no useful
purpose in the present case, since nullification and impairment of benefits had already been admitted
and Nicaragua had no means to retaliate under Article XXIII:2. 195 The Council agreed to engage in
informal consultations and defer any determination on this matter to its next meeting.196

180 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, p. 10.
181 Ibid. pp. 11-15.
182 Ibid. p. 10.
183 Ibid. p. 13.
184 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
185 Ibid. p. 12.
186 Ibid. p. 17.
187 Communication from Nicaragua, US – Nicaraguan Trade, L/5847.
188 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 17-19 July 1985, C/M/191, p. 41. Colombia, Argentina,
Poland, Uruguay, Peru, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Spain, Romania, Jamaica, India, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Trinidad and
Tobago and Czechoslovakia, as well as Venezuela and Mexico as observers, supported Nicaragua's request to
establish a panel. (Ibid. p. 42.)
189 Ibid. p. 41.
190 Ibid. p. 42.
191 Ibid. p. 43.
192 Ibid. p. 44.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid. p. 45.
195 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 17-19 July 1985, C/M/191, p. 45.
196 Ibid. p. 46.

1.47. At the October 1985 meeting of the GATT Council, t he United States agreed to the
establishment of a panel on the condition that it "could not examine or judge the validity of or
motivation for the invocation of Article XXI :(b)(3) by the United States ".197 At the March 1986
meeting of the GATT Council, the panel was established with the aforementioned carve-out from its
terms of reference.198
1.48. Before the panel, Nicaragua argued that the embargo imposed by the United States had
deprived Nicaragua of benefits under Articles I:1, II, V, XI:1, XIII, XXIV, XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII
of the GATT 1947. 199 Nicaragua argued that the embargo therefore constituted a prima facie
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement.
Nicaragua stressed that whether the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) was justified or not, benefits
accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement had been seri ously impaired or nullified as a
result of the embargo. Nicaragua argued that it had been recognized both by the drafters of the
General Agreement and by the contracting parties that an invocation of Article XXI did not prevent
recourse to Article XXIII. Nicaragua said that it had no reason to expect that an embargo would cut
off all trade relations with the United States when the United States' tariff concessions were
negotiated (i.e. between 1949 and 1961) and that the embargo had in fact nullified or impaired the
benefits accruing to Nicaragua under all of the trade -facilitating provisions of the General
Agreement.200
1.49. The United States reiterated its position that its actions were valid under Article XXI, but that
the panel could not in any event examine th e validity of, nor the motivation for, its invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) within its terms of reference. 201 The United States agreed that a measure not
conflicting with obligations under the General Agreement could be found to cause nullification and
impairment, and that an invocation of Article XXI did not prevent recourse to the procedure of
Article XXIII. However, the United States argued that nullification or impairment could not be
presumed in cases in which Article XXI was invoked.202 Rather, this was dependent on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, including the expectations that the contracting party bringing
the complaint could reasonably have had when it negotiated its tariff concessions. The United States
did not consider it meaningful for the Panel to propose in the present case a ruling on the question
of whether nullification or impairment could be caused through measures under Article XXI.203
1.50. The panel stated that it had not considered the question of whether the terms of Article X XI
precluded it from examining the validity of the United States' invocation of that Article because this
examination was precluded by its mandate.204 The panel concluded that as it was not authorized to
examine the justification for the United States' invocation of a general exception to the obligations
under the General Agreement , "it could find the United States neither to be complying with its
obligations under the General Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its obligations under that
Agreement."205 In examining the embargo in the li ght of Article XXIII:1(b), the p anel noted the
question of whether the nullification or impairment of the trade opportunities of Nicaragua through
the embargo constituted a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Nicaragua within the
meaning of Article XXIII:1(b). In the pane l's view, this question raised basic interpretive issues
relating to the concept of non -violation and nullification and impairment which had not been
addressed by the drafters of the GATT or decided by the contracting parties. Against this background,
the panel felt that it would only be appropriate for it to propose a ruling on these issues if such a

197 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 10 October 1985, C/M/192, p. 6.
198 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 12 March 1986, C/M/196, p. 7. The agreed terms of
reference were as follows: "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, of the understanding
reached at the Council on 10 October 1985 that the Panel cannot examine or judge the validity of or motivation
for the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(3) by the United States, of the relevant provisions of the Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/211-218), and of the
agreed Dispute Settlement Procedures contained in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (BISD 29S/13-16), the
measures taken by the United States on 7 May 1985 and their trade effects in order to establish to what extent
benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement have been nullified or impaired, and to make such
findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in further action in this matter". (Ibid.)
199 GATT Panel Report, US – Nicaraguan Trade, L/6053 (unadopted), para. 4.3.
200 Ibid. para. 4.8.
201 Ibid. para. 4.6.
202 Ibid. para. 4.9.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid. para. 5.3.
205 Ibid.

ruling would enable the contracting parties to draw practical conclusions from it in the case at
hand.206 The panel reasoned that, as long as the embargo was not found to be inconsistent with the
General Agreement, the United States would be under no obligation to follow a recommendation by
the contracting parties under Article XXIII:2 to withdraw the embargo.207 Moreover, even if it were
found that the embargo nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Nicaragua independent of whether
it was justified under Article XXI, the contracting parties could, in the circumstances of the present
case, take no decision under Article XXIII:2 that would re-establish the balance of advantages which
had accrued to Nicaragua under the General Agreement prior to the embargo. In the ligh t of all
these considerations, the p anel decided not to propose a ruling on the basic question of whether
actions under Article XXI could nullify or impair GATT benefits of the adversely affected contracting
party.208 However, the panel noted that embargoes such as those imposed by the United States,
independent of whether they were justified under Article XXI, ran counter to the basic aims of the
GATT 1994 and encouraged each contracting party to "carefully weigh[] its security needs against
the need to maintain stable trade relations".209
1.51. At the November 1986 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua expressed disappointment
that the panel report had neither determined the level of nullification or impairment of
Nicaragua's rights under the GATT 1947, nor made any specific recommendations.210 Nicaragua also
noted that it "remained clear that the United States had imposed the embargo not for reasons of
security, but for political coercion" and noted that the case involved a "clear misuse of Article XXI".211
Nicaragua requested that the Council recommend a removal of the embargo, authorize special
support measures to compensate Nicaragua for damage caused by the emb argo, and prepare an
interpretive note on Article XXI which would reflect the elements of this case. 212 Nicaragua also
asked that in making such recommendations, the Council give consideration to the ruling of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) "as pro of that the conditions necessary for invoking Article XXI
had not been met".213 Nicaragua added that it could not support the adoption of the report until the
Council was in a position to make such recommendations.214
1.52. The United States said that the panel had reached sound conclusions in a difficult situation
and recommended that the Council adopt the report. 215 The United States stated that it continued
to believe that this dispute should never have been brought to GATT. There were and had been
many instances of trade sanctions that had been imposed by various contracting parties for reasons,
it could be surmised, of national security. Rarely had those situations even been raised in GATT, and
never before had a party insisted on a panel, because contracting part ies, including those against
whom sanctions had been imposed, had tacitly recognized that GATT, by its traditions, its
competence, and the terms of Article XXI, could not help resolve such matters, and that pressing
the issue would only weaken GATT's intended role.216 In this regard, the United States observed that
"GATT was not a forum for examining or judging national security disputes. When a party judged
trade sanctions to be essential to its security interests, it should be self-evident that such sanctions
would be modified or lifted in accordance with those security considerations." 217 The United States
also agreed with the panel's decision not to address the "novel and delicate question of nullification
and impairment in a situation of Article XXI trade s anctions" when the outcome of such question
"could create a precedent of much wider ramifications for the scope of GATT rights and obligations

206 GATT Panel Report, US –Nicaraguan Trade, L/6053 (unadopted), para. 5.6.
207 Ibid. para. 5.9.
208 Ibid. para. 5.11.
209 Ibid. para. 5.16.
210 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 5-6 November 1986, C/M/204, p. 7. Uruguay, Nigeria,
Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, Hungary, Trinidad and Tobago, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland,
India, Mexico and Tanzania, as an observer, supported Nicaragua's request to lift the embargo. Uruguay,
Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania supported Nicaragua's
request to take measures to compensate Nicaragua. Uruguay, Nigeria, Argentina, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and Romania supported a re-examination of Article XXI in depth during the Uruguay Round
negotiations. (Ibid. p. 10.)
211 Ibid. p. 8.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid. p. 7.
214 Ibid. p. 17.
215 Ibid. pp. 8-10.
216 Ibid. p. 8.
217 Ibid.

but which would serve no useful purpose in the particular matter before the [p]anel".218 The
United States considered that nullification or impairment in situations where no GATT violation had
been found was a "delicate issue, linked to the question of 'reasonable expectations'."219 According
to the United States, applying the concept of "reasonable expectations" to a case of trade sanctions
motivated by national security considerations would be "particularly perilous", since at a broader
level, those security considerations would nevertheless enter into expectations.220
1.53. Chile noted that "Article XXI should be invoked only when absolutely necessary to protect
national security interests, and not to punish another contracting party." 221 Nigeria stated that
Article XXI could only be invoke d "in cases of a state of war or emergency", and that neither was
the case with the US embargo as "[t]he ICJ had found no evidence that Nicaragua's policies
threatened the United States and thus had found no justification for the embargo." 222
Argentina asserted that it was clear to the international community at large that Article XXI had
been improperly invoked and that "the ICJ had confirmed that the US embargo was not compatible
with GATT."223 Peru rejected the use of trade measures for political coercion "unless such action was
approved by the UN Security Council" and noted that the UN General Assembly had condemned the
embargo.224 Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Czechoslovakia expressed similar views. 225
Sweden expressed concern that the restricted terms of reference in this dispute should not prejudice
the mandate of future panels, noting that panels "should be able to examine all relevant
GATT Articles, including Article XXI".226 Jamaica also expressed concern that the restricted terms of
reference had been agreed upon without prior examination by the contracting parties.227
1.54. Hungary argued that Article XXI provided discretion to the contracting parties to judge
whether circumstances warranted its invocation, but noted that "the most powerful trading nations
should demonstrate the greatest self -restraint."228 The European Communities reiterated its view
that the United States "alone had the sovereign right to determine its national security interests",
and noted that Article XXI was an "essential safety valve" which the European Communities did not
support being subject to further interpretation, discussion, or negotiation either in the Council or in
the new round.229 That said, the European Communities also considered that the discretionary rights
inherent in Articl e XXI should not be arbitrarily invoked. 230 Several GATT contracting parties also
reiterated views expressed at earlier meetings of the Council.231
1.55. The Council concluded that it could not adopt the panel's report without consensus, but agreed
for the Chair to engage in informal discussions and to keep this matter on its agenda.232
1.56. At the April 1987 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua reiterated its position that it could
not support the adoption of the report until the Council was in a position to make
recommendations.233 It noted that such recommendations would need to consider the decisions of
other fora, in particular, the ICJ "which had concluded that the embargo was not necessary to protect
any US security interest, as well as Resolutions 40/188 and 41/164 o f the United Nations General

218 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 5-6 November 1986, C/M/204, p. 9.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid. p. 10.
222 Ibid. pp. 10-11. Nigeria also noted that "[a]ny action which clearly undermined the United Nations
Charter had to be seen as a gross abuse of rights conferred by the General Agreement." (Ibid.)
223 Ibid. p. 11.
224 Ibid. p. 13.
225 Ibid. pp. 12-14.
226 Ibid. pp. 11-12.
227 Ibid. p. 15.
228 Ibid. p. 13.
229 Ibid. p. 16.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid. pp. 11-15. Sweden reiterated its view that it was the sole prerogative of each
GATT contracting party to determine whether or not to invoke Article XXI. Peru and Poland reiterated their
opposition to the use of trade measures for political reasons. India reiterated its view that a contracting party
having recourse to Article XXI should be able to demonstrate a genuine nexus between its security interests
and the trade action taken. Japan reiterated its view that the roots of the present dispute were too deep to be
addressed in the context of the General Agreement. (Ibid.)
232 Ibid. p. 17.
233 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 April 1987, C/M/208, pp. 17-18.

Assembly which called for the immediate cessation of the embargo ".234 Nicaragua also argued that
certain amendments that the United States had proposed to UN document A/C.2/41/L.2 suggested
that it did consider the GATT to have c ompetence to rule on this matter. 235
The United States maintained its earlier position that resolution of this matter did not lie within the
GATT and that the p anel's findings confirmed this position. The United States reiterated that with
respect to this an d other similar issues brought before the Council in the past, the GATT, by its
traditions, its competence, and the terms of Article XXI itself, could not resolve cases where trade
sanctions were imposed for national security reasons .236 The Council agreed to engage in informal
consultations and defer any determination on this matter to its next meeting.237
1.57. At the July 1987 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua circulated a draft decision adopting
the panel report, but recommending that the United States take into consideration the negative
trade effects of the embargo and authorizing contracting parties wishing to do so to grant trade
concessions to Nicaragua.238 Nicaragua reiterated its view that "no one believed that Nicaragua was
a threat to any country's security" and that it "could not accept that the United States had the right
to invoke Article XXI and still less to impose the embargo ".239 The United States maintained its
earlier position that resolution of this matter did not lie within the GATT and condemn ed
Nicaragua's draft resolution as politically motivated. 240 The United States also asserted that the
panel's report had found that "the United States was under no obligation to remove the embargo",
and reiterated its position that the United States "had act ed in full conformity with its GATT rights
and obligations ".241 The Council agreed to engage in informal consultations and defer any
determination on this matter to its next meeting. 242 At the November 1987 meeting of the
GATT Council, Nicaragua noted that the President of the United States had proposed that the
embargo be renewed for an additional six months. 243 Nicaragua expressed its intention to request
that the contracting parties implement paragraph 21 of the Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance at its Forty -Third Session.244 The Council took
note of these statements.245
1.58. At the June 1989 meeting of the GATT Council, Nicaragua noted that the President of the
United States had sent a message to Congress in April 1989 extending the national emergency and
economic sanctions against Nicaragua indefinitely. 246 Nicaragua also read out an official
United States document stating that trade sanctions were an essential element of the United States
policy regarding Nicaragua, and that, in the United States' view, present conditions in Nicaragua did
not justify the lifting of trade sanctions.247 Nicaragua noted that this document "did not refer to the
protection of the United States' essential security interests, but exclusively to Nicaragua's internal
matters" and thus "infringed the fund amental principles of the United Nations Charter and other
instruments of international law" and could not be justified under Article XXI.248 Nicaragua called on

234 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 April 1987, C/M/208, p. 17.
235 Ibid. p. 18.
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 15-17 July 1987, C/M/212, pp. 24-25. Cuba supported the
adoption of this decision, and the European Communities, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Austria, Japan,
Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries, Israel, Turkey, Singapore, Yugoslavia and Indonesia requested the
continuation of informal consultations aimed at seeking a consensus solution to this matter. An alternate text,
adopting the panel report but solely recommending that other parties grant trade concessions to Nicaragua,
was circulated by six Latin American countries. (Ibid. pp. 25-28. See also Communication from Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, US –Nicaraguan Trade, C/W/525.)
239 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 15-17 July 1987, C/M/212, p. 28.
240 Ibid. p. 25.
241 Ibid. p. 26.
242 Ibid. p. 29.
243 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 10-11 November 1987, C/M/215, p. 40.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid. Several contracting parties including Nicaragua, the United States, Brazil, Cuba, Argentina,
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Romania and Uruguay reiterated their views on the matter at the Fourth Meeting of
the Forty-Third Session. (See GATT Contracting Parties, Forty-Third Session, Summary Record of the Fourth
Meeting held on 2 December 1987, SR.43/4, pp. 12-16.)
246 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 21-22 June 1989, C/M/234, p. 37.
247 Ibid. The document went on to state that, if Nicaragua fulfilled its Esquipulas commitments and held
free, fair and open elections, this might resolve the emergency which had led the US Administration to impose
trade sanctions. (Ibid.)
248 Ibid. p. 38.

the contracting parties to "impose a limit on the irresponsibility with which the United States had
claimed to interpret the provisions of Article XXI ".249 Nicaragua also noted that it still could not
support the adoption of the panel's report, as to do so would create a dangerous precedent by
denying Nicaragua the right to have its complaint examined in accordance with Article XXIII:2.250
The United States expressed surprise that Nicaragua had brought this issue back to the Council some
two and a half years after the first consideration of the panel report, and renewed its request for the
adoption of the panel's report, as it believed no other resolution of the matter was realistic. 251 The
United States also asserted that the panel "had confirmed that the United States was within its rights
to invoke Article XXI".252 The Council took note of these statements.253
1.59. In March 1990, Nicaragua circulated a communication noting that the United States had lifted
the embargo and other economic measures on Nicaragua. 254 At the April 1990 meeting of the
GATT Council, Nicaragua welcomed the removal of the embargo, but noted th at the dispute had
demonstrated that the GATT "did not have mechanisms to establish a proper balance between rights
and obligations".255 The United States stated that "in light of changed circumstances and recent
events, the conditions which had necessitated action under Article XXI of the General Agreement
had ceased to exist" and it had consequently terminated the embargo. 256 The United States also
noted its intention to restore Nicaragua's sugar allocation. 257 Cuba stated that the embargo "had
been imposed for political reasons and its lifting was a reminder of its political nature and coercive
character".258 The Council took note of the statements.259
1.60. The panel report in United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua was never adopted.260
Negotiating Group on GATT Articles
1.61. The Negotiating Group on GATT Articles also reviewed Article XXI in meetings in November
1987 and June 1988 , on the basis of communications submitted by Nicaragua 261, a Secretariat
background note262 and a communication subm itted by Argentina.263 The Negotiating Group was
unable to agree on any of the proposals regarding Article XXI, and the Chairman's Report to the
Group of Negotiations on Goods did not list Article XXI among the provisions that it was
considering.264

249 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 21-22 June 1989, C/M/234, p. 41.
250 Ibid. p. 40.
251 Ibid. p. 38.
252 Ibid. The European Communities reiterated its view that invocation of Article XXI was at the
discretion of governments but that this "did not necessarily mean an arbitrary step or measure". (Ibid. p. 40.)
253 Ibid. p. 42. In a Decision of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES taken in April 1989, the contracting
parties agreed to implement a number of improvements to the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures,
including the establishment of panels or working parties at the Council meeting following that at which the
request first appeared on the Council's regular agenda, unless at that meeting the Council decided otherwise.
(See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement System Rules and Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989,
L/6489, 13 April 1989 (the April 1989 Decision), section F(a). See also ibid., section F(b) on the establishment
of panels and working parties with standard terms of reference.) The procedural rules adopted under the
April 1989 Decision applied to the GATT Council discussions concerning European Communities v. Yugoslavia
(1991), discussed below, and the Helms-Burton legislation in 1996 (see discussion in United States v. Cuba
(including Helms-Burton Act) (1962-2016), while the equivalent rules under the DSU applied to the situation
involving Nicaragua and Honduras (also discussed further below).
254 Communication from Nicaragua, US – Nicaraguan Trade, L/6661.
255 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 3 April 1990, C/M/240, p. 31.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid. p. 32. The European Communities reiterated its view that discretionary but not arbitrary use of
Article XXI was to be recommended. (Ibid.)
259 Ibid.
260 See GATT Council, Status of Work in Panels and Implementation of Panel Reports, Report of the
Director-General, C/172, p. 1.
261 Communication from Nicaragua, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, MTN.GNG.NG7/W/34; and
Communication from Nicaragua, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, MTN.GNG.NG7/W/39.
262 Article XXI, Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, MTN.GNG.NG7/W/16.
263 Communication from Argentina, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, MTN.GNG.NG7/W/44.
264 Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, Chairman's Report to
the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG7/W/73.

Negotiations Leading to the Adoption of the April 1989 Decision (1988-1989)
1.62. As stated above 265, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES jointly agreed, in adopting the
April 1989 Decision, that any panel or working party would be established at the GATT Council
meeting following the meeting at which the request first appeared on the Council's regular agenda,
unless at that meeting the Council decided otherwise. 266 Prior to the adoption of the April 1989
Decision, trade ministers considered a proposal which provided that, where the Council could not
agree on whether a matter fell within the scope of Article XXIII of the GATT, a panel would make a
recommendation on the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary matter, with bracketed text stating
"including the question of whether the mat ter is appropriate for resolution through the panel
process".267 By 6 December 1998, a Secretariat note stated that this language in the proposal was
to be deleted. The final draft text of the report from the Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting
omitted this language and included only the text that formed part of the April 1989 Decision; namely,
that "a decision t o establish a panel or working party shall be taken at the latest at the Council
meeting following that at which the request first appeared as an item on the Council's regular
agenda".268
European Communities v. Yugoslavia (1991)
1.63. In 1991, the European Communities circulated a communication stating that it had suspended
the benefit of certain trade concessions that had been granted to Yugoslavia on a preferential
basis.269 The European Communities referred in this context to its "vigorous efforts over recent
months to put a stop to bloodshed in Yugoslavia", including promoting cease-fire agreements which
unfortunately had not led to the "full cessation of hostilities ".270 The European Communities stated
that the measures had been taken upon consideration of its "essential security interests and based
on GATT Article XXI", as it was faced with "continuing risks of political instability in this region of
Europe, with potentially destabilizing consequences elsewhere ".271 In response , Yugoslavia
circulated a communication noting that it did not presently claim that the measures violated any
GATT provisions as "the majority do not relate to the contractual obligations under the GATT or could
be justified under Article XXI".272 However, Yugoslavia did express concerns about the negative trade
effects of the measure as well as the use of punitive economic measures to secure political
objectives.273 Yugoslavia also requested that it be notified of any additional measures pursuant to
the 1982 Decision, and noted that it reserved its rights under the GATT.274
1.64. Following this communication, Yugoslavia requested consultations with the
European Communities in relation to these and certain other measures.275 The consultations did not

265 See fn 253 of this Appendix.
266 See the April 1989 Decision, section F(a). See also ibid., section F(b) on the establishment of panels
and working parties with standard terms of reference.
267 Group of Negotiations on Goods, Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting at Ministerial
level, Montreal, December 1988, MTN.GNG/13, pp. 59-60.
268 Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988, Trade
Negotiations Committee, MTN.TNC/7(MIN), 9 December 1988, p. 29; Mid-Term Meeting, Trade Negotiations
Committee, MTN.TNC/11, 21 April 1989, p. 27.
269 Communication from the European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the European
Communities against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, L/6948, p. 1. The measures comprised:
(a) the suspension of the bilateral trade agreement between Yugoslavia and the European Communities,
(b) the reapplication of certain quantitative limitations on textile products from Yugoslavia, (c) withdrawal of
Generalized System of Preferences benefits from Yugoslavia, (d) suspension of the trade concessions granted
to Yugoslavia as part of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and (e) suspension of
bilateral trade agreements between Member States of the European Communities and Yugoslavia. (Ibid. p. 2.)
270 Ibid.
271 Communication from the European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the European
Communities against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, L/6948, p. 2.
272 Communication from Yugoslavia, Trade Measures Against Yugoslavia for Non-Economic Reasons,
L/6945, p. 2.
273 Communication from Yugoslavia, Trade Measures Against Yugoslavia for Non-Economic Reasons,
L/6945, pp. 2-3.
274 Ibid. p. 3. Yugoslavia also noted that it reserved its right to propose that the GATT contracting
parties issue a "formal interpretation" on Article XXI under this Decision. (Ibid.)
275 Request for consultations under Article XXIII:1 by Yugoslavia, EEC - Trade Measures Taken For
Non-Economic Reasons, DS27/1. In addition to the measures notified by the European Communities,
Yugoslavia also challenged a decision to apply selective positive measures in favour of "those parties which

achieve a mutually satisfactory solution, and Yugoslavia subsequently requested the establishment
of a panel.276 In its request, Yugoslavia asserted that the measures were taken "for purely political
reasons" and were inconsistent with the GATT and paragraph 7(iii) of the
1982 Ministerial Declaration.277 Yugoslavia stated that the measures could not be justified under
Article XXI, as the situation in Yugoslavia did not correspond to the "notion or meaning" of
Article XXI(b) and Article XXI(c), and no relevant UN body had authorized economic sanctions
against Yugoslavia.278 At the February 1992 meeting of the GATT Council, Yugoslavia reiterated its
request for a GATT panel.279 The European Communities queried whether the withdrawal of
preferences violated Article I of the GATT, and noted that as the situation was delicate and
continually evolving, its primary objective was not to hamper the peace processes that had been
engaged in securing a political solution in Yugoslavia. 280 The European Communities stated that it
was willing to engage in consultations, but that t he establishment of a GATT panel "could only
exacerbate the problem ".281 Yugoslavia's request for the establishment of a GATT panel was
supported by Chile, Cuba, and Venezuela.282 India also supported the request. It asserted that trade
measures for non -economic reasons should only be taken within the framework of a
UN Security Council decision, and noted that Yugoslavia's request "encompassed an issue which was
covered by GATT provisions".283 The Council agreed to revert to this matter at its next meeting.284
1.65. At t he March 1992 meeting of the GATT Council, Yugoslavia reiterated its request for a
panel.285 Yugoslavia asserted that the continued discrimination by the European Communities was
wrong, as the peace process in Yugoslavia was proceeding well and the non -economic reasons
underlying the measure s had "completely changed".286 The European Communities acknowledged
the right of Yugoslavia to request the establishment of a panel , but considered the timing to be
inopportune as the European Communities was "deeply involved" in the ongoing peace process and
did not consider that a panel established at the present time would aid that process. 287
The European Communities recognized that under the April 1989 Decision, a panel had to be
established at the second Council meeting at which it was requested, unless at that meeting the
Council decided otherwise. The European Communities queried whether, given that the measures
had been taken for non -economic reasons, a different course of action could be taken, such as
establishing the panel but "delaying its activation subject to further clarity in the situation ".288 The
European Communities also reserved its right to reflect further on what the standard terms of
reference should be in disputes involving measures taken for non -economic reasons.289
The United States affirmed Yugoslavia's right to request a panel, but noted that the problems that
had given rise to the measures were not capable of resolution by the Council and should be resolved
politically.290 Canada expressed similar views. 291 New Zealand noted that while the GATT process
needed to be observed, the "trends in the political situation" should be ascertained before any GATT

contribute to progress towards peace". Yugoslavia asserted that this additional measure created a dangerous
precedent for GATT practice. (See Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Yugoslavia, EEC - Trade Measures Taken For
Non-Economic Reasons, DS27/2, pp. 1-2.)
276 Request for consultations under Article XXIII:1 by Yugoslavia, EEC - Trade Measures Taken For
Non-Economic Reasons, DS27/1, p. 1. The request for establishment of a GATT panel was made pursuant to
Article XXIII:2 and also paragraphs C.1 and F(a) of the April 1989 Decision. (See fn 253 of this Appendix.)
277 See Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Yugoslavia, EEC - Trade Measures Taken For Non-Economic
Reasons, DS27/2, p. 2. Yugoslavia specifically alleged that the measures contravened, inter alia, Articles I and
XXI of the GATT 1947. (Ibid.)
278 Ibid. p. 2.
279 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 18 February 1992, C/M/254, p. 35. Chile, Cuba, Venezuela
and India supported Yugoslavia's request for the establishment of a panel. (Ibid. pp. 35-36.)
280 Ibid.
281 Ibid. p. 36.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
285 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 18 March 1992, C/M/255, p. 14. India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela all made statements supporting Yugoslavia's right to the
establishment of a panel. (Ibid. pp. 15-17.)
286 Ibid. p. 14.
287 Ibid.
288 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 18 March 1992, C/M/255, p. 15. The European
Communities asserted that the April 1989 Decision was silent on this issue. (Ibid.)
289 Ibid. pp. 15 and 18.
290 Ibid. p. 15.
291 Ibid.

consideration of the measures.292 Argentina asserted that Yugoslavia had the right to have a panel
examine any question relating to the application of GATT provisions, including "measures taken for
non-economic reasons and invoked under Article XXI ".293 Mexico affirmed Yugoslavia's right to
request a panel, but noted that the GATT was "perhaps not the most appropriate forum to discuss
those issues, much less to solve them".294 Japan affirmed Yugoslavia's right to request a panel, but
noted that the circumstances were "rather unique" and that its preferr ed approach was for the
parties to seek a solution through dialogue. 295 Tanzania affirmed Yugoslavia's right to request a
panel, but noted that it would not want to see a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia impaired by
GATT dispute settlement procedures.296
1.66. The Chair of the GATT Council stated that the Council had to decide on the establishment of
a GATT panel in light of the rules in the April 1989 Decision. The Chair recalled a previous
understanding that, under the rules in the April 1989 Decision, a contractin g party had the right to
a panel at the second Council meeting following that at which the request first appeared as an item
on the Council's regular agenda, unless at that meeting, the Council decided otherwise. The Chair
therefore proposed that the Counc il agree to establish a panel with standard terms of reference
unless, as provided for in the April 1989 Decision, the parties agreed to other terms of reference
within 20 days.297 The GATT Council agreed to establish a panel with standard terms of ref erence
unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 298 The panel did not proceed owing to the subsequent
dissolution of the State of Yugoslavia.
Nicaragua v. Honduras and Colombia (1999)
1.67. In 1999, Nicaragua imposed a tax on all goods and services imported, manufactured or
assembled, coming from or originating in Honduras and Colombia, and cancelled licences for all
fishing vessels under Honduran and Colombian flags, as a response to the ratification of the bilateral
Treaty on Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea (Ramírez -López Treaty) between those
states.299 In January 2000, Colombia requested consultations with Nicaragua in relation to these
measures.300 These co nsultations did not achieve a mutually satisfactory solution, and in
March 2000, Colombia requested the establishment of a panel.301
1.68. At the April 2000 meeting of the DSB, Colombia reiterated its request for a panel. 302
Nicaragua responded that the Ramírez -López Treaty infringed its "sovereign rights in the
Caribbean Sea by imposing limits unilaterally, illegally and arbitrarily through reciprocal recognition
by Honduras and Colombia of their expansionist aims in the Caribbean Sea to the detriment of
Nicaragua's territorial rights ".303 Nicaragua considered that Colombia and Honduras had created
"serious international tension" in the form of despatching Honduran troops at its northern border
and conducting military manoeuvres by deploying war planes and ships in th e region of its
continental shelf.304 Nicaragua asserted that the Organization of American States had recognized
the "state of serious international tension" by appointing a special envoy to assess the situation. 305
Accordingly, Nicaragua considered that its m easures were consistent with " Article XXI o f the
GATT 1994 and Article XIV bis of the GATS , which reflected a state's inherent right to protect its

292 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 18 March 1992, C/M/255, p. 17.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid. pp. 17-18.
298 Ibid. p. 18.
299 Request for the establishment of a panel by Colombia, Nicaragua – Measures Affecting Imports from
Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS188/2, p. 1; and Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on
7 April 2000, WT/DSB/M/78, p. 12.
300 Request for consultations by Colombia, WT/DS188/1.
301 Request for the establishment of a panel by Colombia, WT/DS188/2. Colombia specifically alleged
that the measures were inconsistent with Articles I and II of the GATT 1994, as well as Articles II and XVI of
the GATS. (Ibid. p. 1.)
302 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 7 April 2000, WT/DSB/M/78, item 4.
303 Ibid. para. 51.
304 Ibid. para. 52. Nicaragua also referred to complaints made by Miskito communities bordering
Honduras and the increase in the defence budget of Honduras adopted by the Congress of the Republic. (Ibid.)
305 Ibid. para. 53.

security, and therefore constituted a general exception to multilateral trade rules ".306 Nicaragua
noted that it had not adopted the measures for trade purposes or to protect domestic industry, but
rather to safeguard its essential security interests .307 Nicaragua recognized Colombia's right to
request establishment of a panel, but doubted the u tility of having a panel examine the matter,
asserting that "it had been customary practice in the WTO that the contracting party applying the
measure should be the sole judge in matters that concerned its essential security interests, in
particular if such interests could be threatened by any actual or potential danger. "308 According to
Nicaragua, if the panel "gave itself powers that belonged to political fora that could result in a
dangerous and unacceptable precedent".309 Nicaragua was also of the view that, "before establishing
a panel to examine this matter, the General Council should take a decision on the competence of
panels to deal with highly political issues and should make a formal interpretation of Article XXI of
GATT 1994."310 Honduras disputed Nicaragua's assertions regarding the movement of troops and
military equipment. Honduras also noted that the DSU provided it with the possibility of restoring its
rights, but considered the subject of maritime limits to fall outside of the mandate of the WTO .311
The DSB agreed to revert to this matter at its next meeting.312
1.69. At the May 2000 meeting of the DSB, Colombia reiterated its request for a panel.313 Nicaragua
reiterated its position that Article XXI of the GATT 1994 "could not be subjected to an examination
by a panel", and asserted that the 1982 Decision had given the Ministerial Conference and
General Council "exclusive authority" to interpret Article XXI to the exclusion of any other body. 314
Japan, Canada, the European Communities and Honduras expressed the view that issues of national
security were sensitive and should be addressed with great caution. 315 The European Communities
asserted that the panel could examine the facts to determine whether the matter concerned a
national security issue or a trade policy measure.316
1.70. The DSB agreed to establish the panel317, but the panel was never composed.318
1.71. In July 2006, in the context of the Trade Policy Review of Nicaragua, Colombia noted that
Nicaragua had suspended the application of the tax to goods and services impo rted from or
originating in Honduras since March 2003. 319 Colombia argued that this made the "discrimination of
Nicaragua's trade policy against Colombia much more obvious", and asked to have the trade practice
put on record in the conclusions of the Trade Policy Review.320 Nicaragua maintained that the tax
was applied in conformity with Article XXI of the GATT 1994 in order to protect Nicaragua's essential
security interests.321
India v. Pakistan (2002)
1.72. During the 2002 Trade Policy Review of Pakistan, India asserted that Pakistan had consistently
denied MFN status to India in violation of the basic principles of the GATT 1994 and the WTO. 322

306 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 7 April 2000, WT/DSB/M/78, para. 54.
Nicaragua specifically argued that the measures were fully justified under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
and Article XIVbis:1(b)(iii) of the GATS Agreement. (Ibid. para. 60.)
307 Ibid. para. 55. Nicaragua also asserted that there had been no nullification or impairment under
Article II of the GATT 1994 because Nicaragua had not exceeded its scheduled tariff ceilings. (Ibid. para. 60.)
308 Ibid. para. 58.
309 Ibid. para. 59.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid. para. 61.
312 Ibid. para. 62.
313 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 18 May 2000, WT/DSB/M/80, para. 26.
314 Ibid. paras. 29-30.
315 Ibid. paras. 32-35.
316 Ibid. para. 35.
317 Ibid. para. 40.
318 See Note by the Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/34, p. 60.
319 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Nicaragua, Minutes of Meeting held on
24 and 26 July 2006, WT/TPR/M/167, para. 35.
320 Ibid.
321 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Nicaragua, Minutes of Meeting held on
24 and 26 July 2006, WT/TPR/M/167, para. 131.
322 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Pakistan, Minutes of Meeting held on
23 and 25 January 2002, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/95/Add.1, p. 21.

Pakistan responded that the India -Pakistan relationship had to be viewed in the context of the
"difficult political relations between the two countri es over the course of the past 50 years ".323
Pakistan noted that after the 1965 war, trade and diplomatic relations had been terminated by both
sides, and the subsequent process of normalization had been slow and on an item -by-item basis
through limited trad e and shipping routes. 324 Pakistan therefore considered that both India and
Pakistan had acted consistently with Article XXI(b)(iii) by treating each other as exceptions to
MFN principles.325
1.73. At the 2008 Trade Policy Review of Pakistan, India reiterated that Pakistan was denying MFN
status to India, to which Pakistan responded that trade relations between India and Pakistan were
continuously liberalizing and improving.326
United States v. Brazil (2003)
1.74. In 2003, the United States circulated a communication to the Committee on Import Licensing
raising concerns about Brazil's import licensing system for certain lithium compounds and the
compatibility of the system with the Import Licensing Agreement.327 The United States disagreed
with the inclusion of these lithium c ompounds in a measure regulating goods related to the
production of nuclear energy, as the United States domestic industry had reported that these lithium
compounds had no nuclear application but were rather used as a raw material in various commercial
products.328 The United States therefore requested that Brazil provide additional information about
the operation of the system. 329 The United States repeated these concerns at the October 2003
meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing.330 The Committee took note of these statements.331
In 2004, Brazil circulated a communication responding to the questions of the United States, in
which Brazil asserted that the restrictions were maintained because lithium could have an application
in the production of nuclear energy.332 At the September 2004 meeting of the Committee on Import
Licensing, the United States observed that the explanation given by Brazil was "tenuous", as it did
not demonstrate that the lithium compounds had any nuclear application outside of its "common
commercial use".333 The United States asserted that in practice, these licensing requirements acted
as quantitative restrictions and noted that Brazil's response "engendered some suspicion that there
might be other more protectionist reasons for the requirement ".334 The United States noted that it
would circulate further questions to Brazil in writing, and Brazil responded that such questions would
be conveyed to its government.335 The Committee took note of these statements.336

323 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Pakistan, Minutes of Meeting held on
23 and 25 January 2002, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/95/Add.1, p. 21.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
326 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Pakistan, Minutes of Meeting held
16 and 18 January 2008, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/193/Add.1, pp. 101-102. Pakistan expressed similar views at
its 2015 Trade Policy Review. (Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Pakistan, Minutes of Meeting
held 24 and 26 March 2015, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/311/Add.1, pp. 17 and 52.)
327 Committee on Import Licensing, Brazil's Import Licensing Requirements for Chemical Products and
Goods Related to Nuclear Applications, Questions from the United States to Brazil, G/LIC/Q/BRA/1. Article XXI
of the GATT 1994 applies to the Import Licensing Agreement by reference through Article 1.10 of that
Agreement.
328 Ibid. p. 1.
329 Ibid. p. 2.
330 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of the Meeting held on 2 October 2003, G/LIC/M/18, p. 8.
331 Ibid.
332 Committee on Import Licensing, Brazil's Import Licensing Requirements for Chemical Products and
Goods Related to Nuclear Applications, Replies from Brazil to Questions from the United States,
G/LIC/Q/BRA/2, p. 2.
333 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 September 2004, G/LIC/M/20,
pp. 2-3.
334 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 September 2004, G/LIC/M/20,
p. 3.
335 Ibid. pp. 3-4. The United States circulated a communication reiterating these concerns and posing
further questions in November 2004. (See Committee on Import Licensing, Questions from the United States to
Brazil, Brazil's Import Licensing Requirements for Lithium Compounds, G/LIC/Q/BRA/3.)
336 Ibid. p. 4.

1.75. At the June 2005 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing, the United States noted that
they had not yet received a response to their questions.337 Brazil reiterated that the restrictions were
justified because of the potential risks and uses of lithium compounds "including for nuclear ends".338
The Committee took note of these statements. 339 At the June 2006 meeting of the Committee on
Import Licensing, the United States noted that they had still not received a response to their
questions, as recently circulated with supplementary questions. 340 The United States also asserted
that "it seemed clear that none of the requests for information that the U.S. was making, involved
the national security provisions of Article XXI of the GATT 1994, since the information was requested
for commercial purposes."341 Brazil responded that there had been no change in its policy, but that
it had taken note of the concerns of the United States. 342 The Committee took note of these
statements.343 Similar views were expressed at subsequent meetings of the Committee on Import
Licensing until 2009.344 In 2009, Brazil circulated a communication to the Committee on Import
Licensing responding to the questions of the United States, in which Brazil reiterated that "since
some lithium compounds have an application in the production of nuclear energy", this restriction
"was treated as a matter of national security".345
1.76. At the October 2009 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing, the United States
thanked Brazil for its response.346 At the April 2010 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing,
the United States thanked Brazil again and noted that it did not have further questions at the time.347
European Union v. Brazil (2013)
1.77. During the 2013 Trade Policy Review of Brazil, the European Union posed a question to Brazil
regarding its import licensing restrictions on nitrocellulose. 348 The European Union asserted that
industrial nitrocellulose was a different product from military -grade nitrocellulose, and argued that
as the former was a safe product which did not pose any problems related to national security, it
was not justifiable to impose a de facto import ban on the product. 349 Brazil responded that it did
not necessarily agree that industrial nitrocellulose posed no problems related to security, as low
concentrations of the product could be used as an explosive. 350 Brazil noted that i t was however
currently reviewing its legislation on controlled products.351
1.78. At the April 2014 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing, the European Union
reiterated its concerns about Brazil's import licensing scheme for nitrocellulose. 352 The
European Union argued that the Brazilian producer of nitrocellulose benefited from the restrictions
as a monopoly supplier in the closed local market. 353 The European Union also stressed that the
"essential security exceptions in the provision of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 were to be applied on

337 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 June 2005, G/LIC/M/21, p. 3.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid. p. 5.
340 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 June 2006, G/LIC/M/23, p. 3.
See also Committee on Import Licensing, Questions from the United States to Brazil, Brazil's Import Licensing
Requirements for Lithium Compounds, G/LIC/Q/BRA/3/Add.1.
341 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 June 2006, G/LIC/M/23, p. 4.
342 Ibid. p. 3.
343 Ibid. p. 4.
344 See, e.g. Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 2 April 2007, G/LIC/M/25,
p. 3; Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 28 April 2008, G/LIC/M/27, pp. 5-6;
Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 20 October 2008, G/LIC/M/28, pp. 3-4; and
Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 30 April 2009, G/LIC/M/29, p. 8. Brazil also
emphasized that controls on lithium products in other countries were not uncommon, and maintained that this
was a matter of national security due to the application of lithium compounds in the production of nuclear
energy. (See Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 20 October 2008, G/LIC/M/28, p. 4.)
345 Committee on Import Licensing, Replies from Brazil to Questions from the United States,
Brazil's Non-Automatic Import Licensing Procedures, G/LIC/Q/BRA/13, p. 1.
346 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 19 October 2009, G/LIC/M/30, pp. 6-7.
347 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 12 July 2010, G/LIC/M/31, pp. 5-6.
348 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Brazil, Minutes of Meeting held on
24 and 26 June 2013, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/283/Add.1, p. 103.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
352 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 April 2014, G/LIC/M/39, p. 17.
353 Ibid.

traffic in implements of war and to goods for the purpose of supplying a military establishment, but
not to the non-military industrial sector."354 The European Union requested that Brazil remove the
licensing requirements and asked for additional information regarding grants of such licenses over
the last five years.355 Brazil took note of these comments and asked that the European Union provide
its comments and questions in writing.356 The Committee took note of these statements.357
1.79. The European Union subsequently circulated a communication to the Committee on Import
Licensing containing these questions to Brazil.358 At the October 2014 meeting of the Committee on
Import Licensing, the European Union reiterated its concerns and further asserted that industrial
nitrocellulose was only used for "commercial purposes such as for applications like printing inks,
wood lacquer, or nail varnish".359 Brazil responded that it disagreed with the European Union's view
that industrial and military nit rocellulose were substantially and chemically different products, as
regardless of its intended use, "the product poses risks ".360 The Committee took note of these
statements.361 Brazil contemporaneously circulated a communication responding to the
European Union's questions in which Brazil asserted that nitrocellulose was a hazardous material at
any concentration, and controls on the product were therefore legitimate for "security and safety
reasons".362 Similar views were expressed at subsequent meetings of the Committee on Import
Licensing363, and the European Union circulated further questions to Brazil in 2016. 364 Discussions
between the European Union and Brazil on this issue continued into 2018.365
United States v. Cuba (1962-1996)
1.80. In 1962, the United States imposed an embargo prohibiting imports into the United States of
all products of Cuban origin, in addition to all goods imported via Cuba, and ordering a continuing
prohibition on all exports from the United States to Cuba.366 In 1968, Cuba submitted a notification
to the Committee on Trade in Industrial Products stating that the embargo constituted a non -tariff
barrier which adversely affected Cuba's trad e.367 During the Committee's first examination of the
notified barriers in 1969 368, Cuba emphasized that the embargo differed from the previously
examined trade barriers because it was not limited to particular products or particular commercial
interests, but instead was "designed to reduce a small country to submission by starvation".369 The
United States responded that the embargo had been imposed for reasons of "individual and collective
self-defense" and to "promote nat ional and hemispheric security", and invoked Article XXI as

354 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 April 2014, G/LIC/M/39, p. 17.
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Committee on Import Licensing, Questions from the European Union to Brazil Regarding the
Importation of Nitrocellulose, Questions from the European Union to Brazil, G/LIC/Q/BRA/18.
359 Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 20 October 2014, G/LIC/M/40, p. 8.
360 Ibid. p. 9.
361 Ibid.
362 Committee on Import Licensing, Replies from Brazil to Questions from the European Union,
Questions from the European Union to Brazil Regarding the Importation of Nitrocellulose, G/LIC/Q/BRA/19,
p. 3.
363 See Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 April 2015, G/LIC/M/41, p. 6;
Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 20 October 2015, G/LIC/M/42, pp. 6-7; and
Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 April 2016, G/LIC/M/43, pp. 7-8. Brazil
subsequently emphasized the risk that nitrocellulose posed to human health as another justification for the
measure. (Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 April 2015, G/LIC/M/41, p. 6.) Brazil
also asserted that nitrocellulose was reportedly employed in certain criminal activities, such as ATM robberies.
(Committee on Import Licensing, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 April 2016, G/LIC/M/43, p. 8.)
364 Committee on Import Licensing, Questions from the European Union to Brazil, G/LIC/Q/BRA/20. For
Brazil's response, see Committee on Import Licensing, Replies from Brazil to the European Union,

365 See, e.g. Committee on Import Licensing, Follow-Up Questions from the European Union to Brazil,
Import Licensing System of Brazil, G/LIC/Q/BRA/22; and Committee on Import Licensing, Replies from Brazil
to Questions from the European Union, Import Licensing System of Brazil, G/LIC/Q/BRA/23.
366 GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, United States, Statement by Cuba, Spec(90)4, p. 2.
367 Committee on Industrial Products, Inventory of Non-Tariff Barriers, COM.IND/4, pp. 228-229.
368 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Note by the Secretariat on the Meeting of the Committee
held 19-25 June 1969, COM.IND/W/7, para. 1.
369 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, First Examination of Part 4 of the Inventory of
Non-Tariff Barriers, COM.IND/W/12, p. 311.

justification for its actions. 370 Cuba responded that the invocation of Article XXI was inadequate
because the United States had unilaterally adopted coercive measures without securing any
authorization from the international legal community, in particular the UN Security Council.371
1.81. In 1986, Cuba circulated a communication expressing concern over a measure imposed by
the United States removing quotas for sugar imports unless the supplying country guaranteed that
it would not import sugar from Cuba for re-export to the United States.372 At the May 1986 meeting
of the GATT Council, Cuba argued that this measure vio lated the GATT and stated that the
United States was undermining free trade, not only by harming Cuba, but also by trying to hamper
its normal trade with third countries. 373 The United States responded that the measure was a
reflection of the long-standing trade embargo against Cuba which the United States had maintained
for national security reasons.374 Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Uruguay all opposed the measure , considering it to be politically motivated, coercive and
discriminatory.375 The Council took note of the statements.376
1.82. In 1987, in the context of the meetings of the United Nations Con ference on Trade and
Employment, the Cuban Vice -Minister for Foreign Trade made a statement asserting that the
embargo imposed by the United States violated the objectives and principles of the GATT, including
those enumerated in Articles I, II and V and P art IV. 377 The Vice -Minister also noted that the
United States had unjustifiably invoked Article XXI, "since it is no secret that Cuba has not
threatened, is not threatening nor will ever threaten the United States: on the contrary, the latter
country has threatened and is threatening our security through sabotage, spying, violation of our
land, sea and air frontiers, and has organized and supported armed aggression against our people
as on the occasion of the mercenary landing at the Bay of Pigs".378
1.83. In 1988, in the context of the discussion of the United States embargo against Nicaragua at
the Fourth Meeting of the Forty -Third Session, Cuba noted that the United States had justified its
embargoes against both Nicaragua and Cuba on grounds of national security. 379 Cuba responded
that "[i]f two small countries could pose a threat to an enormous military and economic power such
as the United States, many countries might find themselves subject to similar measures by that
country."380 Cuba called on the contracting parties to recognize the rights of Nicaragua.381
1.84. In 1989, in the context of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the United States submitted a
report to the GATT Council summarizing its domestic trade framework. 382 In this report, the
United States cited "U.S. fore ign policy and national security goals" and the President's "wartime
and national emergency powers" as the justification for the Office of Foreign Assets Control's
administration of the economic embargo against Cuba. 383 In response, Cuba circulated a
communication stating that the embargo contradicted the United States' commitments under the

370 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, First Examination of Part 4 of the Inventory of
Non-Tariff Barriers, COM.IND/W/12, p. 311.
371 Ibid. Cuba based its arguments upon its reading of paragraph (c) of Article XXI. (Ibid. p. 313.)
372 Communication from Cuba, United States – Measures Affecting Cuban Sugar Exports, L/5980.
373 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 22 May 1986, C/M/198, p. 33. Cuba specifically argued
that the US measures violated Part IV and GATT Articles dealing with quantitative restrictions,
non-discrimination and most-favoured-nation treatment. (Ibid.)
374 Ibid. p. 34.
375 Ibid. p. 33.
376 Ibid. The same contracting parties reiterated these views at the First Meeting of the Forty-Second
Session in 1986. (See GATT Contracting Parties, Forty-Second Session, Summary Record of the First Meeting
on 24 November 1986, SR.42/1, pp. 11-13.)
377 GATT Contracting Parties, Forty-Third Session, Cuba, Statement by Mr. Alberto Betancourt Roa, Vice
Minister, Ministry of Foreign Trade, SR.43/ST/10, p. 7.
378 Ibid.
379 GATT Contracting Parties, Forty-Third Session, Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting on
2 December 1987, SR.43/4, p. 14.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
382 GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, United States, Report by the United States of
America, C/RM/G/3.
383 Ibid. p. 81.

GATT 1947 and paragraph 7(iii) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration. 384 Cuba also asserted that the
invocation of Article XXI by the United States was inappropriate, "[s]inc e Cuba has not provoked
any 'national emergency ', there is no 'wartime' nor any serious international tension." 385
Cuba expressed similar views on several subsequent occasions between 1990 and 1996.386
United States v. Cuba (including Helms-Burton Act) (1996-2016)
1.85. In 1996, Cuba circulated a Communication noting the adoption by the United States of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms -Burton Act).387 Cuba argued that
the objective of the Helms-Burton Act was to "intimidate the world business community and prevent
it from participating in the ever-widening economic opportunities for foreign investment" in Cuba.388
Cuba also asserted that the measure constituted a violation of its sovereignty by attempting to
legislate on its internal matters, namely, the property of Cuban nationals. 389 At the March 1996
meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, Cuba argued that the Helms-Burton Act was incompatible
with various provisions of the GATT 1994 and other WTO Agreements. 390 The United States
responded that it had recognized the need to take strong measures after the recent shooting down
of two unarmed US civilian aircraft by the Cuban government, and asserted that "persons who
knowingly and intentionally did business in Cuba using confiscated property were furthering wrongs
committed against the former owners of this property, and were undermining the interests of the
USA and its citizens ".391 Canada stated that the Helms -Burton Act was not a "useful tool" for
achieving democratic reform in Cuba and noted that the legislation "was designed to chill investment
in Cuba".392 The Council for Trade in Goods took note of these statements. 393 Several Members
reiterated their views at the April 1996 meeting of the General Council.394
1.86. In May 199 6, the European Communit ies requested consultations in respect of the
extraterritorial application of the United States' trade embargo against Cuba under the
Helms-Burton Act and related US legislation and regulations.395 These consultations did not achieve
a mutually satisfactory solution, and the European Communit ies subsequently requested the
establishment of a panel. 396 At the October 1996 meeting of the DSB, the European Communities

384 GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, United States, Statement by Cuba, Spec (90)4, p. 5.
Cuba specifically cited incompatibility with Articles II, XI:1, XIII:1, XXXVI and XXXVII of the GATT 1947.
(Ibid. pp. 5-6.)
385 Ibid. p. 5.
386 See, e.g. GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on
11-12 March 1992, C/RM/M/23, pp. 26-27; GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on
29 September – 1 October 1992, C/M/259, pp. 77-78; GATT Council, Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
United States, Minutes of Meeting held on 16-17 February 1994, C/RM/M/45, p. 24; and Communication from
Cuba, Analysis of the Effects of the Embargo Imposed by the Government of the United States of America
against Cuba, L/7525.
387 Communication from Cuba, United States - Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
WT/L/142. The Helms-Burton Act, amongst other things, empowered the President to "encourage" other
countries to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba, withheld payments to international financial
institutions which approved loans to Cuba, and denied entry into the United States for companies with certain
investments and assets in Cuba. (See Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural
Products, Non-Tariff Barriers - Requests, Communication from Cuba, TN/MA/NTR/2, pp. 6-7.)
388 Ibid. p. 2.
389 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Non-Tariff
Barriers-Requests, Communication from Cuba, TN/MA/NTR/2, pp. 2-3.
390 Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of Meeting held on 19 March 1996, G/C/M/9, pp. 3-4.
Cuba specifically alleged that the measure was incompatible with the principles of MFN treatment, Article XI
and Part IV of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the commitments
of the United States to ensure freedom of access in trade in services. (Ibid.)
391 Ibid. p. 6.
392 Ibid. p. 5. Mexico, Chile, the European Communities, Nicaragua and India also expressed concern
about the Helms-Burton Act, and in particular its extra-territorial implications. (Ibid. pp. 5-6.)
393 Ibid. p. 6.
394 General Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 16 April 1996, WT/GC/M/11, pp. 5-9. Bolivia, Canada,
the European Communities, Mexico, India, Nicaragua, Madagascar, Jamaica, the Philippines, Australia,
Switzerland, Norway, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Japan, Sri Lanka and Iceland expressed their concern
about the Helms-Burton Act, and in particular its extra-territorial implications. (Ibid. pp. 5-10.)
395 Request for consultations by the European Communities, United States – The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/1.
396 Request for the establishment of a panel by the European Communities, WT/DS38/2 (European
Communities' panel request), pp. 1-2. The other challenged measures included: (a) denial of access to the US

reiterated its request for a panel, noting that its concern with the legislation "was not its objectives,
but the extra-territorial means chosen to achieve those objectives ".397 The United States asserted
again that the Helms-Burton Act was a response to the shooting down of two civilian aircraft by the
Cuban government.398 The United States described this incident as the latest in a series of actions
taken by the Cuban government over the past 35 years that had directly affected US interests, and
noted that the Helms -Burton Act, other US laws and regulations, as well as the Cuban e mbargo
which dated from the 1960s "reflected the abiding US foreign policy and security concerns with
regard to Cuba pursued by eight US Presidents ".399 The United States asserted that the
Helms-Burton Act was "designed to promote a swift transition to democracy in Cuba" and noted that
the European Communities had not suggested that the US policy with regard to Cuba generally, or
the Helms-Burton Act in particular, was motivated by trade protectionism.400 The United States noted
that several of the challenged measures had been in force for years or decades, and had been
expressly justified by the United States under the GATT 1947 as measures taken in pursuit of its
essential security interests.401 The United States questioned the utility and des irability of pursuing
this issue through the WTO, arguing that the WTO had been established to manage "trade relations",
not "diplomatic or security relations" with negligible trade and investment effects. 402 The
United States refused to join a consensus to establish a panel, and urged the European Communities
to explore other options. 403 Cuba asserted that the Helms -Burton Act was incompatible with the
GATT 1994, but noted that it would reply to the "political statement" by the United States in other
fora such as the UN General Assembly. 404 The DSB agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.405
1.87. At the November 1996 meeting of the DSB, the European Communities reiterated its request
for a panel. 406 The United States maintained its earlier position, and noted that it did not believe
that a panel would lead to a resolution of the dispute, but rather, would pose serious risks to the
WTO as a nascent organization. 407 Cuba responded that unlike the United States, Cuba had never
launched an invasion, or initiated any military actions or intelligence operations against the
United States.408 Cuba asserted that if anything, "Cuba would be in a better position than the US to
resort to Article XXI of the GATT 1994 ."409 Cuba noted, however, that the DSB was not the
appropriate forum to enumerate an endless list of such grievances.410
1.88. The DSB agreed to establish the panel with standard terms of reference. 411 In 1997, the
European Communities requested that the panel suspend proceedings while a mutually agreeable

tariff rate quota for sugar (through a prohibition on the allocation of any of the sugar quota to a country that
was a net importer of sugar unless that country certified that it did not import Cuban sugar that could indirectly
find its way to the US); (b) denial of transit of EC goods and vessels of EC Member States through US ports
where the vessels carried goods or passengers to or from Cuba, or carried goods in which Cuba or a Cuban
national had any interest; (c) prohibiting US persons from financing transactions involving confiscated property
owned by a US national; (d) a right of action in favour of US citizens to sue EC citizens and companies in US
courts to obtain compensation for Cuban properties "trafficked" by such EC citizens or companies and
confiscated by the Cuban Government from persons who were US nationals; and (e) denials of visas and
exclusion from the US of persons (including the spouses, minor children and agents of such persons) involved
in confiscating or "trafficking" in confiscated property owned by US nationals or persons. (European
Communities' panel request, pp. 1-2.)
397 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 16 October 1996, WT/DSB/M/24, p. 6.
Australia, Bolivia, Canada, India and Switzerland also expressed their concern about the potential
extra-territorial application of the Helms-Burton Act. (Ibid. pp. 7-9.)
398 Ibid. p. 6.
399 Ibid. pp. 6-7.
400 Ibid. p. 7.
401 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 16 October 1996, WT/DSB/M/24, p. 7.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid. p. 7.
404 Ibid. p. 8.
405 Ibid. p. 9.
406 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 20 November 1996, WT/DSB/M/26, p. 2.
New Zealand and Norway expressed their concerns regarding the extraterritorial application of the measures.
(Ibid. pp. 2-3.)
407 Ibid. p. 2.
408 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
409 Ibid. p. 3.
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid. p. 2.

solution was negotiated.412 The European Communities and the United States subsequently reached
an Understanding that the United States would consult with Congress with a view to obtaining a
waiver for the European Communities from the Helms-Burton Act.413 The panel's authority lapsed in
April 1998.414 At the April 1998 meeting of the DSB, Cuba expressed its continuing conviction that
the measures were illegal and reserved its right to revert to this matter.415
1.89. Cuba and the United States have reiterated their views about the Helms-Burton Act and the
embargo more generally on several subsequent occasions.416
CONCLUDING REMARKS
1.90. As discussed in paragraphs 7.80 and 7.81 of the Panel Report , the Panel considers that the
foregoing survey of the pronouncements of the GATT contracting p arties and WTO Members does
not reveal any subsequent practice establishing an agreement between the Members regarding the
interpretation of Article XXI in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.

WT/TPR/M/56/Add.1, p. 25.
414 Note by the Secretariat, Lapse of the Authority for Establishment of the Panel, WT/DS38/6.
415 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 April 1998, WT/DSB/M/45, pp. 15-16.
416 See, e.g. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 June 1998, WT/DSB/M/46,
pp. 17-18; Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on
12 and 14 July 1999, Addendum, Outstanding Responses to Questions, WT/TPR/M/56/Add.1, p. 25; Trade
Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on
14 and 17 September 2001, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/88/Add.1, p. 242; Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy
Review, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on 14 and 16 January 2004, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/126/Add.3,
p. 117; Negotiating Group on Market Access, Non-Tariff Barriers Imposed by the United States Impeding and
Prohibiting Cuba's Trade, Communication from Cuba, TN/MA/W/71, pp. 1-12; Negotiating Group on Market
Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Non-Tariff Barriers - Requests, Communication from
Cuba, TN/MA/NTR/2, pp. 6-7; Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of
Meeting held on 22 and 24 March 2006, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/160/Add.1, pp. 162-166; Trade Policy Review
Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on 9 and 11 June 2008, Addendum,
WT/TPR/M/200/Add.1, p. 165; Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Record of
Meeting held on 29 September and 1 October 2010, WT/TPR/M/235, pp. 58-59; Trade Policy Review Body,
Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of Meeting held on 16 and 18 December 2014, Addendum,
WT/TPR/M/307/Add.1, p. 221; and Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, United States, Minutes of
Meeting held on 19 and 21 December 2016, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/350/Add.1, pp. 159-160.