EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR
Document: ARB-2005-3/20 Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Date: 28 October 2005
Document codes: WT/DS265/33; WT/DS266/33; WT/DS283/14
Complainant: Thailand
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Australia, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, New Zealand, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Eswatini, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S., Côte d’Ivoire
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 3.3, 8, 9.1, 10.1  AgricultureArt. 3.1, 3.2  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR

ARB-2005-3/20

Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes

Award of the Arbitrator
A.V. Ganesan

W
ORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
APPELLATE BODY

Parties:

Australia
Brazil
European Communities
Thailand
 ARB-2005-3/20

 Arbitrator:

 A.V. Ganesan

I. Introduction
1. On 19 May 2005, the Dispute Settlement Body (t he "DSB") adopted the Appellate Body
Report
1 and the Panel Report2, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in .3 At the meeting of the DSB held on 13 June 2005, the European
Communities stated that it intended to comply w ith the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
this dispute, and that it would need a reasonable period of time in which to do so.4
2. On 9 August 2005, Australia, Brazil and Thailand (the "Complaining Parties") informed the
DSB that consultations with the European Commu nities had not resulted in an agreement on the
reasonable period of time for implementation. The Complaining Parties therefore requested that such
period be determined through binding arbitra tion, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU").5
3. On 30 August 2005, the Complaining Parties a nd the European Communities requested me to
act as Arbitrator, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of th e DSU, to determine the reasonable period of time
for implementation of the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. I accepted the

1Appellate Body Report, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R.
2Panel Report, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R.
3WT/DS265/29, WT/DS266/29, WT/DS283/10.
4WT/DSB/M/191, para. 19.
5WT/DS265/30, WT/DS266/30, WT/DS283/11.

appointment on 5 September 2005
6, and undertook to issue my award no later than 1 November 2005,
the period of time that had been agreed between the parties.
4. In a letter to me dated 6 September 2005, th e European Communities made certain requests
concerning the sequencing in the filing of submissi ons by the parties; allocation of time for the
opening statement of the European Communities at the or al hearing; and the date of circulation of the
arbitral award. By a letter dated 7 September 2005 7, Australia, Brazil and Th ailand were invited to
submit their views on the European Communiti es' requests, which views I received on
12 September 2005.8 I responded to these requests in a le tter dated 13 September 2005, in which I
undertook to issue my award no later than 28 October 2005.
5. The 90 day period following adoption of the Pane l and Appellate Body Reports has expired
on 17 August 2005. The parties have confirmed that my award, circulated no later than
28 October 2005, shall be deemed to be the award of the arbitrator for the purpose of Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU, notwithstanding the expiry of the 90 day period stipulated in Article 21.3(c).
6. The European Communities filed its written submission on 21 September 2005; the
Complaining Parties each filed its written subm ission on 28 September 2005. By a letter dated
4 October 2005, Thailand requested authorizati on to make a "typographical correction" to its
submission, such that it would add the word "relat ed" to the fifth sentence of paragraph 77 on page 23
of its submission, so that it would read "... 1.5 million farmers' and sugar-related
 workers' households"
(underlining added). By a letter dated 5 October 2005, I invited the other parties to comment on
Thailand's request. None of the other parties obj ected to Thailand's request. By a letter dated
7 October 2005, I authorized Thailand to make the requested correction to its submission.
7. An oral hearing was held on 10 October 2005. The parties presented oral arguments and
responded to the questions posed by me. During th e hearing, Brazil presented an additional exhibit,
and the European Communities presented two additional exhibits. Australia requested that I disregard
the European Communities' additional exhibits. I pr ovided the parties the opportunity to submit their
written comments on the exhibits at issue, if they so wished. Brazil and the European Communities
submitted their comments the day following the hearing, serving a copy to the other parties.

6WT/DS265/31, WT/DS266/31, WT/DS283/12.
7Letter from the Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat to the Parties, dated 7 September 2005.
8Joint letter from Australia, Brazil, and Thailand, dated 12 September 2005.

II. Arguments of the Parties
A. European Communities
8. The European Communities requests that I dete rmine the "reasonable period of time" for
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute to be 19 months
and 12 days from 19 May 2005, the date of adoptio n by the DSB of the Panel and Appellate Body
Reports, that is to say, a period of time expiring on 1 January 2007.
9
9. As a fundamental general principle, the Eur opean Communities emphasizes that "it is the
prerogative of the implementing Member to select the means of implementation [of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB] which it deems most appropriate"10, that "the implementing
Member is entitled to choose the method which it deems most appropriate" 11, and that "an Arbitrator
cannot prescribe any partic ular implementation method" 12, as "the selection of the implementing
measure ... is the prerogative of the implementing Member".13
10. The European Communities' assessment of th e "reasonable period of time" required for
implementation is based on the following seven sets of "particular circumstances" of the case.
11. First, the European Communities submits that "[t]he measures in the underlying panel
proceedings were contained in Council Regul ation 1260/2001 and im plementing and related
instruments"14, and that, therefore, implementation in the present case requires the adoption of a
regulation by the Council of the European Uni on (the "Council"), followed by the adoption of
implementing regulations by the European Commi ssion (the "Commission"). Under the present
Council Regulation 1260/2001, the Commission has no legal authority to "limit the exports of C sugar

9European Communities' written submission, para. 95.
10Ibid., paras. 22 and 36.
11European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14European Communities' written submission, para. 30.

on the ground that such exports exceed the reduction commitments."
15 As a result, according to the
European Communities, "to the extent that th e Commission has no control over the exports of
C sugar, it cannot ensure compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB." 16 T h e
European Communities also argues th at if it refuses to grant export licences for exporting C sugar, it
would act inconsistently with Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.17
12. The European Communities contends that even if the Commission had the authority to limit
export of C sugar, this circumstance would not be dispositive for the purpose of establishing the
"reasonable period of time" in the present dispute. This is because the European Communities, as the
implementing Member, is entitled to choose the means of implementation which it deems most
appropriate. Among "many different ways" availa ble to the European Communities to ensure
compliance with its reduction commitments, th e European Communities may legitimately choose a
method that acts "upon the underlying factors which, under the current regime, cause the subsidized
exports, such as the level of domestic prices, the vo lume of production quotas, or the availability of
alternative uses for sugar, rather than by placing restrictions on the exports themselves".18
13. The second set of particular circumstances, acco rding to the European Communities, is that,
as its sugar regime is "complex" and "all its components are ... closely connected and
interdependent"19, it considers that "[a]n implementation method which addresses the structural causes
of the subsidized exports of sugar would serve best the objectives of the Agreement on
Agriculture ..."20, even if it may require a longer implementati on period. Keeping this in view, after a
careful assessment of all the options available, the Commission has submitted a proposal to the
Council on 22 June 2005 for a new Council regulation, based on an approach that aims at "preserving

15European Communities' written submission, para. 33. (footnote omitted) The European
Communities' sugar regime provides for quota sugar and non-quota sugar. Quota sugar is composed of A quota
sugar and B quota sugar. Quota sugar is the maximum quantity of sugar eligible for domestic price support and
direct export subsidies. Quotas are allocated on an annual basis to individual European Communities Member
States who, in turn, allocate shares of their national quotas to individual undertakings. Sugar produced over and
above the A and B quota is referred to as C sugar; such sugar may not be sold on the domestic market and must
be exported. However, an undertaking may decide to "carry forward" C sugar into the next marketing year. In
that event, the undertaking need not export C sugar and may sell that C sugar in the next marketing year on the
domestic market as quota sugar. However, such carry fo rward of C sugar is subject to a quantitative limit; this
limit is currently set at 20 per cent of the A quota.
16European Communities' written submission, para. 35.
17Ibid., para. 33; European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
18European Communities' written submission, para. 36.
19Ibid., para. 40.
20Ibid., para. 41.

some level of support for the beet farmers and suga r producers while at the same time minimising the
production of exportable surpluses."
21 According to the European Communities, a "comprehensive
and coherent legal system" will have to be devised by the European Communities' legislator 22, but,
regardless of which specific option is ultimately c hosen, the implementing measures are "likely to be
technically complex".23
14. Thirdly, the European Communities submits that a Council regulation repealing, amending or
replacing the current Council Regula tion 1260/2001 would have to be based on Articles 36 and 37 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (t he "EC Treaty"). Consequently, the following
procedural steps are necessary: submission of a Commission proposal to the Council; opinions of the
European Parliament and of the Economic and So cial Committee of the European Community (the
"EESC") to the Council; consultations with the Af rican, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP") countries;
and, finally, the adoption of a regulation by the Council.
15. Following the normal procedure, the Commission proposal of 22 June 2005 will be examined
by several committees of the European Parliament24, and their reports will be debated in one or more
plenary sessions of the Parliament. The Euro pean Communities estimates that the European
Parliament will require at least six months from the reception of the proposal to deliver its opinion,
that is, until January 2006. In addition, although Articles 36 and 37 of the EC Treaty do not require
the consultation of the EESC, the EESC nevert heless will be consulted pursuant to a 2001 Co-
operation Protocol agreed between the Commission and the EESC, as the routine practice in such
matters. The European Communities estimates that the EESC will require six months to deliver its
opinion, that is, until January 2006.
16. Furthermore, the European Communities is obligated, by Article 12 of the Cotonou
Agreement between itself and the ACP countries, to consult ACP countries when it intends to take
measures "which may affect the interests of the ACP states".
25 Accordingly, the European
Communities has informed the ACP countries of the Commission proposal to the Council and has

21European Communities' written submission, para. 43.
22Ibid., para. 45.
23Ibid.
24The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI); the Committee on Budgets
(BUDG); the Committee on International Trade (INTA), and the Committee on Development (DEVE).
25European Communities' written submission, para. 61.

engaged in an "extensive consultation process".
26 This process will "add to the complexity of the
debate by the different [European Communities'] institutions involved and require additional time."27
17. As regards the adoption of the regulation by the Council, the European Communities
maintains that, although the Council may start de liberating on a Commission proposal while it is
being considered by the European Parliament and the EESC, the Council w ill require additional time
to take into account the opinions issued by those bodi es. Referring to the "potential complexity of the
implementing measures" and to "recent precedents c oncerning similar agricultural legislation", the
European Communities estimates th at the Council will require nine months to adopt formally the
relevant regulation, that is, until the end of March 2006.28
18. As regards the implementing regulations, th e European Communities emphasizes that the
Commission will have to enact "a comprehensiv e set of detailed" implementing regulations. 29 In so
doing, the Commission must follow a "comitology procedure[]", under which the Commission is
assisted by a "management committee" composed of representatives of the Member States and
chaired by a Commission representative. 30 Under that procedure, the Commission presents its
proposals to the management committee, which in tu rn provides its opinion; if a favourable or no
opinion is issued by the management committee, the Commission adopts the proposed regulation. If
the management committee issues an unfavourable opinion, the Commission nevertheless adopts the
regulation, but the Council may take a different decision from the Commission within a specified time
period.
19. The European Communities submits that, althoug h Commission staff may start preparing the
implementing legislation before adoption of the C ouncil regulation, they cannot finalize the texts and
launch the "comitology procedure" until the Council has taken a definitive decision. The Commission
will, according to the European Co mmunities, need three months in order to enact the implementing
regulations, that is, until the end of June 2006.31

26European Communities' written submission, para. 63.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., para. 68.
29Ibid., para. 69.
30Ibid., paras. 71–72.
31Ibid., para. 75.

20. The fourth set of "particular circumstances" in the present dispute, according to the European
Communities, are requirements concerning the publicati on and entry into force of the regulations at
issue. All regulations must be published in the O fficial Journal of the European Union. Although not
explicitly required by the EC Treaty, it is an "established legislativ e practice" that regulations which
must be implemented by the customs authorities are published "at least six weeks before their entry
into force and take effect from 1 January or, exceptionally, from 1 July".
32 This practice is based on a
Council Resolution of 27 June 1974. The European Communities argues that previous arbitration
awards have acknowledged the relevance of this practice for the determination of the reasonable
period of time.33 Moreover, it is also a "well-established legislative practice" that "significant changes
to the rules of a common market organization" take effect from the start of the following marketing
year, "so as to take account of production in course and avoid disrupting the market". 34 T h e
marketing year 2005/2006 of the European Communities runs from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006.
21. As the fifth set of "particular circumstan ces", the European Communities argues that the
European Communities' sugar regime is of a "longsta nding nature", because it has been in place since
the early 1970s, and is "essentially integrat ed" in the European Communities' policies. 35 As a result,
the implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB will have "a major impact" on the
European society and not just on the sugar industry. 36 It is therefore "unavoidable" for the European
Communities to consider the "continued viability" of the sugar regime as a whole. 37 In this context,
the European Communities refers to the "numer ous and very different implementation options" 38
available to it, the significance of sugar as an "e ssential component of the diet of the European
population"39, energy and environmental policies, as well as the relationship between the European
Communities and the ACP countries. These varied factors will show that the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB necessitates a "serious debate", both within and outside the
European Communities' legislature.40

32European Communities' written submission, para. 77.
33Ibid., para. 77, referring to Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Bananas III , para. 3 and Award of the
Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 50–51.
34European Communities' written submission, para. 78.
35Ibid., para. 81.
36Ibid.
37Ibid., para. 82.
38Ibid., para. 83.
39Ibid., para. 84.
40Ibid., para. 87.

22. As the sixth set of "particular circumstances", the European Communities refers to sugar beet
production already undertaken before the present di spute was decided by the Appellate Body in
April 2005. In Europe, beets are sown in Februa ry and March and harvested in the autumn. As a
result, decisions concerning the volume of beet and sugar to be produced in the marketing
year 2005/2006 had been agreed upon between farmer s and sugar producers before the DSB made its
recommendations and rulings. Revers ing their production decisions w ould be "very costly and often
materially impossible".
41 The European Communities points out that the Commission proposal of
22 June 2005 provides for levies to be imposed on the production of "surplus sugar", designed to
avoid the accumulation of sugar; however, it would be inappropriate to appl y those levies to sugar
produced from beet sown before the present dispute was decided. 42 In any event, even if such exports
were not allowed after 31 July 2006, its consequence might be that the European producers "would be
forced to make all their exports within a shorter pe riod of time", thereby "exacerbat[ing] the effects of
those exports", to the detriment of all sugar exporting countries.43
23. As the seventh, and final, set of "particular circumstances", the European Communities argues
that the reasonable period of time it suggests is "broad ly in line" with the time periods granted to the
European Communities in previous arbitration aw ards concerning "similar" legislative measures. 44
The European Communities refers to the awards in EC – Bananas III and EC – Tariff Preferences, in
which the reasonable period of time was 15 mont hs and 6 days, and 14 months and 11 days,
respectively. The longer reasonable period of tim e in the present case is necessary so as "not to
penalise production already undertaken" prior to the decision of the Appellate Body in April 2005.45

41European Communities' written submission, para. 88.
42Ibid., para. 90.
43Ibid., para. 91.
44Ibid., para. 92.
45Ibid., para. 94.

B. Complaining Parties
1. Australia

24. Australia disagrees with the reasonable pe riod of time proposed by the European
Communities. Australia provides three distinct scenarios to decide how the European Communities
could bring itself into compliance with its obligations under World Trade Organization ("WTO") law
and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the "shortest period possible within the legal
system" of the implementing Member. Under th e first scenario, the Eu ropean Communities can
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings by doing three things: by adopting a Commission
regulation that limits export licences such that the relevant commitment levels are not exceeded; by
adopting a second Commission regulation increasing the permitted carry forward of C sugar; and by
adopting a third Commission regulation to reduce the le vel of export availability of sugar. Under this
scenario, the required reasonable period of time is no more than six months and six days from the date
of adoption of the Appellate Body Report and the Pa nel Report by the DSB, that is to say, it would
expire on 25 November 2005.
46
25. Under the second scenario, should the Arbitrator fi nd that, contrary to Australia's assertions,
Commission regulations can be used to regulate, but not to limit the export of C sugar through export
licences, then the European Communities can adopt and implement a different set of Commission
regulations, spreading C sugar exports over the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 quantity commitment
marketing years; limiting export licences for quota sugar; increasing the permitted carry forward of
C sugar; and reducing the level of export availability of sugar.
47 The reasonable period of time under
this scenario is no more than six months and six days, that is to say, it would expire on
25 November 2005.48
26. The third scenario put forward by Australia is a pplicable "[i]f the Arbitrator finds ... that a
Commission Regulation cannot be used to control the export of C sugar at all" 49; under this scenario,
the European Communities can implement by adopting a Commission regulation limiting export
licences for quota sugar and adopting a Council regulation granting the Commission the authority to
control the export of C sugar; the Commission could subsequently adopt an implementing

46Australia's written submission, para. 201.
47Ibid., para. 166.
48Ibid., para. 203.
49Ibid., para. 163.

Commission regulation to impose such controls.
50 Under this third scenario , the reasonable period of
time is no more than 220 days and it would expire on 27 December 2005.51
27. Finally, in addition to the three scenarios put fo rward by it, Australia argues that, even on the
basis of the European Communities' submission th at a Council regulation on a new common market
organization ("CMO") in the sugar sector is required—which basis Australia considers "incorrect" 52—
the reasonable period of time should be shorter than that requested by the European Communities; it
should be no more than 11 months and 2 days and should expire on 21 April 2006.
28. Turning to Australia's specific arguments unde r these various scenarios, Australia argues that
the European Communities does not substantiate why a date "significantly in excess" of the
Article 21.3(c) guideline of 15 months is justifiable.53 Australia emphasizes that the reasonable period
of time in this dispute must be determined by re ference to the action needed to comply with the
recommendations and rulings in question, and not by reference to "any wider reform" that the
European Communities may choose to undertake in response to a WTO ruling.54
29. Australia argues that the European Communities has "full legal authority" under its existing
regime to regulate the levels of refunds, to de termine the quantity of "export availability of ...
C sugar" and to regulate such exports. 55 Contrary to the assertions of the European Communities, the
Commission has the authority, under the existing sugar regime, to suspend the granting of export
licences for exports of any sugar, including C sugar . The requirement in Article 13 of Council
Regulation 1260/2001 that C sugar mu st be exported is not an impediment to this authority, because
the relevant provision does not apply to all C sugar, but rather only to C sugar that is not carried
forward to the following marketing year. The curr ent limit on such carry forward, amounting to
20 per cent of the A quota56, has been established by the Commission and could either be increased or
"abolished entirely", without requiring a change to Council Regulation 1260/2001.57

50Australia's written submission., paras. 165–167.
51Ibid., para. 205. The reasonable period of time would expire on 25 December; the next working day
is 27 December 2005.
52Australia's written submission, para. 206.
53Ibid., para. 11.
54Ibid., para. 174.
55Ibid., para. 21.
56For a description of A, B, and C sugar, see supra, footnote 15.
57Australia's written submission, para. 122.

30. Should the Arbitrator find that, contrary to Au stralia's assertions, the current authority of the
Commission cannot be used to prevent or limit the export of C sugar, Australia argues that this
"would not serve as a barrier" to compliance by th e European Communities by means of Commission
regulations.
58 Commission authority under the existing regime can still be used to regulate such
exports. Although C sugar not carried forward must be exported within a defined time period, there is
no requirement to export C sugar within the year of its production . Under the existing regime,
producers have a period between the end of the ma rketing year and 31 December to export C sugar
not carried forward; in the event that C sugar production in any one year were to exceed the European
Communities' quantity commitment level, the Europ ean Communities has the legal authority to limit
export licences to that quantity commitment level; the balance of C sugar production not carried
forward could then be exported in the period 1 Oct ober to 31 December in the following marketing
year.
31. According to Australia, all of the above-referred measures can be adopted by the Commission
under the "management committee procedure". The time period for the Commission to adopt
measures in the sugar sector under this pro cedure in the past has been "very short". 59 U n d e r t h a t
procedure, the Commission presents proposals to th e management committee, which in turn provides
an opinion; if a favourable or no opinion is issued by the management committee, the Commission
adopts the proposed regulation. If the management committee issues an unfavourable opinion, the
Commission nevertheless adopts the regulation, but the Council may take a different decision from
the Commission within a specified time period. Australia argues that, for a range of regulations
adopted by the Commission in th e sugar sector under the "management committee procedure", the
average and median duration of the procedur e has been 23 days. Although the European
Communities could have, therefore, already impl emented the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB, Australia proposes that, "exceptionally and as a gesture to the [European Communities]", the
reasonable period of time should end four weeks from the date of the circulation of the arbitration
award.60 Thus, the reasonable period of time would expire on 25 November 2005. This reasonable
period of time is applicable for both the first and second scenarios for implementation set out in
Australia's written submission.

58Australia's written submission, para. 125.
59Ibid., para. 142.
60Ibid., para. 144.

32. In the event that the Arbitr ator were to consider "necessary to calculate ... periods"
61 for the
adoption of a new Council regulation amending the CMOs in the sugar sector, as well as for the
subsequent adoption of implementing Commission regulations, Australia refers to a "study of Council
[r]egulations adopted by the [European Commun ities] between 1 January 1998 and 31 July 2005
which amended existing common market or ganizations for agricultural products". 62 On the basis of
"median figure[s]" derived from this sample, Aust ralia argues that the a doption of a new Council
regulation should occur by 27 November 2005, and the entry into force of this regulation on
2 December 2005.
63 Subsequently, when adopting implementing regulations, the Commission should
be granted an additional 23 days to complete th e management committee procedure. The reasonable
period of time for this scenario should therefore expire on 27 December 2005.64
33. As stated above, in Australia's view, contrary to the European Communities' arguments, it is
not necessary, for purposes of implementa tion, to adopt a Council regulation creating an entire new
CMO for sugar; rather, according to Australia , it is sufficient to adopt a Council regulation amending
the existing CMO. Nevertheless, even if the reasonable period of time were calculated on the basis of
adopting a Council regulation creating a new CMO, the reasonable period of time should be shorter
than that suggested by the Europ ean Communities. Using a median figure from a sample of previous
Council regulations that created new CMOs, Australi a argues that a new Council regulation could be
adopted by 7 March 2006 and it could enter into fo rce by 29 March 2006. Subsequently, for adopting
implementing regulations, the Commission should n eed no more than 23 days to complete the
"management committee procedure". The reasonabl e period of time under this scenario should
therefore expire on 21 April 2006.
34. Australia, moreover, disputes that certain factors invoked by the European Communities
constitute "particular circumstances" within the m eaning of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, justifying a
longer reasonable period of time. Australia points out that arguments related to the likely impact on
the domestic industry have been rejected in prev ious arbitrations. The correction of possible
"structural market imbalances" should similarly not be taken into account in the determination of the

61Australia's written submission, para. 146.
62Ibid., para. 147.
63Ibid., para. 149.
64Ibid., para. 205. The reasonable period of time would expire on 25 December; the next working day
is 27 December 2005.

reasonable period of time.
65 Moreover, the present dispute does not present circumstances
comparable to those in Chile – Price Band System ; this is because export subsidies under the
European Communities' sugar regime do not have a "unique role and impact" on society, they do not
serve as a "cornerstone" of the European Comm unities' agricultural policy, and they are not
"fundamentally integrated" into the "central ag ricultural policies" of the European Communities. 66
Finally, the implementation period proposed by th e European Communities is not, as claimed by the
European Communities, "broadly in line" 67 with previous awards under Article 21.3(c) concerning
legislative measures of the European Communities; the reasonable periods of time granted in EC –
Bananas III and EC – Tariff Preferences were "only, at the most, around half as long" as the
"effective reasonable period of time" sought by the European Communities in this arbitration.68
2. Brazil
35. Brazil requests that the Arbitrator determine th e reasonable period of time to be six months
and six days, that is, until 25 November 2005, if implementation is brought about by administrative
action. Alternatively, if implementation requir es legislative measures, Brazil requests that the
Arbitrator determine the reasonable period of time to be seven months and eight days, that is, until
27 December 2005.
36. Brazil recalls that the European Communities is required to comply "in the shortest time
legally possible"69 and rejects the European Communities' ar gument that the implementation period
should be the period that it will take for the European Communities to reform its overall sugar regime.
Rather, implementation requires only the adoption of measures that will ensure that the European
Communities respects its export subsidy reduction commitment levels.
37. Brazil submits that the existing legal framework of the European Communities' sugar regime
permits the European Communities to comply within four weeks. Three principles of European
Communities' law are relevant in this respect: first, international agreements are binding on the
institutions of the European Communities and on its Member States; secondly, secondary legislation

65Australia's written submission, para. 185, referring to the European Communities' written submission,
para. 41.
66Australia's written submission, para. 192, referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band
System, paras. 46 and 48.
67Australia's written submission, para. 197, referring to the European Communities' written submission,
para. 92.
68Australia's written submission, para. 197.
69Brazil's written submission, heading IV.A.

of the European Communities must, as far as possibl e, be interpreted in a manner consistent with
these agreements; and thirdly, the management of agricultural policy is left "very largely" to the
Commission, acting under the implementing authority delegated to it by the Council.
70 In this respect,
Brazil argues that the Commission enjoys the author ity to suspend the grant of export licences for
sugar, "for the express reason of ensuring complia nce with the [European Communities'] obligations
under the Agreement on Agriculture "71; the Commission also enjoys the authority to amend the
existing rules to enable producers to carry forward, to the following marketing year, any C sugar that
cannot be exported in a given year.
38. With respect to export licences, Brazil ar gues that Article 22 of current Council
Regulation 1260/2001 "subjects all exports of sugar ... to an export licence and draws no distinctions
between A, B and C sugar". 72 Furthermore, the Commission is authorized to lay down detailed
implementing rules governing the conditions for gr anting export licences for all exports of sugar,
including C sugar. In 1995, the Commission a dopted rules to govern import and export licences
"among other reasons, to enable the [European Comm unities] to control the level of its exports of
subsidized sugar". 73 These rules are still in force and contain rules regulating the grant of export
licences for A, B and C sugar. The Commission does not require express authorization to control
exports of C sugar, provided that such controls are not prohibited by Council Regulation 1260/2001 or
implementing regulations, which is not the case. In this respect, Brazil also rejects the European
Communities' argument that Council Regulation 1260/2001 requires that C sugar be exported; rather,
C sugar can also be carried forward into the following marketing year.
39. With respect to the rules governing the carry fo rward of C sugar into the next marketing year,
Brazil argues that under Council Regulation 1260/2001 all C sugar could be carried forward. The
implementing rules concerning this provision are contained in a Commission regulation that limits the
carry forward to 20 per cent of the A quota; however, if it wishes, the Commission can "increase the
quantity of C sugar that can be carried forward fro m the current 20 [per cent] limit [or] eliminate
entirely the current ... restriction on carry-forward."
74 Indeed, previously, the relevant implementing
rules permitted producers to carry forward 100 per cent of their sugar production. If the Commission

70Brazil's written submission, para. 28.
71Ibid., para. 33. (original italics)
72Brazil's written submission, para. 34. (For a description of A, B, and C sugar, see supra,
footnote 15.)
73Brazil's written submission, para. 38.
74Ibid., para. 62. (original italics)

permitted full carry forward of C sugar, it could, in conjunction with a suspension of export licences,
ensure that subsidized sugar in excess of its quant ity commitment levels is not passed onto the world
market; rather, this sugar would remain within the Community and would "be[] absorbed internally in
the next marketing year".
75
40. Neither of these two measures—suspending the gr ant of export licences for A, B and C sugar,
as well as raising or eliminating the 20 per cent rest riction on the carry forward of C sugar—is, in
Brazil's view, particularly complex, and both ar e similar to measures that have been adopted
previously by the Commission. Both measures could be adopted under the "management committee
procedure" and could be adopted in "just four weeks". 76 Brazil notes that, for a range of
27 regulations adopted by the Commission in the suga r sector under this procedure, the length of the
procedure has varied between 14 and 43 days, with an average and median length of 23 days.
41. Brazil concludes that, on the basis of the Co mmission's existing authority, the European
Communities could secure compliance within a period of 28 days, to be counted from the date of the
adoption by the DSB of the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report. Brazil notes that, in fact,
the European Communities "did not take the necessary steps to implement within the shortest possible
period".77 Brazil therefore proposes, "exceptionally and as a gesture" to the European Communities,
that the reasonable period of time should end 28 days from the date of circulation of the arbitration
award, that is, on 25 November 2005.78
42. In the event that the Arbitrator decides th at the Commission's existing authority under
Council Regulation 1260/2001 does not permit the European Communities to secure implementation,
Brazil argues, alternatively, that a limited amen dment to Council Regulation 1260/2001 would permit
the European Communities to comply in seven months. Under this scenario, the European
Communities would have to "extend the existing [cont rol] system to apply expressly to C sugar", and
this involves "no more than a straightforward amendment of ... Regulation [1260/2001]".79
43. Although Brazil "generally agrees" with the pro cedural steps for the adoption of a Council
regulation, as explained by the European Communities, it disagrees with the asserted duration of this

75Brazil's written submission, para. 64.
76Ibid., para. 68.
77Ibid., para. 78.
78Ibid., para. 78.
79Ibid., para. 79.

procedure.
80 In providing its estimate on the basis of previous legislative procedures, the European
Communities refers only to the duration of procedures for the adoption of new CMOs, rather than
amendments to existing CMOs. The median period for the adoption of a new CMO is 9.2 months,
while it is 5.4 months for the adoption of an ame ndment to an existing CMO. Thus, the adoption of
an amending regulation is "considerably quicker" than the adoption of a new CMO. 81 Although the
reasonable period of time should be the short est possible period within which a Member can
implement in its domestic law, Brazil states that it does not object if the Arbitrator uses this median
figure for purposes of determining the reasonable period of time. This median period runs from the
date of the Commission proposal to the entry into force of the Council regulation and, consequently, it
should expire on 2 December 2005.
44. Furthermore, Brazil rejects the European Co mmunities' arguments on publication and entry
into force of the regulation. The alleged Europ ean Communities' practice of publishing regulations to
be implemented by customs authorities six weeks be fore their entry into force, and implementing
them only from 1 January or 1 July, is "not as widespread" as the European Communities claims 82;
Brazil lists 33 European Communities' regulations w hose implementation did not follow that practice.
Moreover, Brazil contends that the Council docum ent setting out this alleged practice does not
indicate that it applies to measures regulating impor t and export licences. Brazil also rejects the
argument that "significant changes to the rules of a common market organization should take effect, at
the earliest, from the start of the following marketi ng year, so as to take account of production in
course and avoid disrupting the market."83 Brazil refers to ten Council amendments to existing CMOs
that did not take effect at the commencement of th e marketing year. In any event, the changes that
implementation would entail are not "significant", as the European Communities suggests, because
the Commission already has significant authority to control sugar exports.84
45. Brazil acknowledges that, when the Council amends Council Regulation 1260/2001, the
Commission "will likely have to adopt" an implementing regulation. 85 The Commission could, as the
European Communities admits, "start preparing the implementing regulations before the adoption of

80Brazil's written submission, para. 83.
81Ibid., para. 88.
82Ibid., para. 94.
84Brazil's written submission, para. 102, referring to the European Communities' written submission,
para. 78.
85Brazil's written submission, para. 104.

the Council regulation", such that this regulation enters into force eight days after the Council
amending the regulation.
86 However, "exceptionally and as a gesture to the [European
Communities]", Brazil requests that the Arbitrator grant the European Communities the "full average
or median period" of 23 days for the completion of the management committee procedure, such that
the reasonable period of time expires on 27 December 2005.87
46. Brazil rejects that four additional factors invoked by the European Communities constitute
"particular circumstances" relevant to the determinat ion of the reasonable period of time in this case.
First, concerning the need for consultations with the ACP countries, Brazil argues that the European
Communities fails to substantiate how the ACP countri es will be affected by implementation. This is
because the European Communities' obliga tions to the ACP countries are to import certain quantities
of ACP sugar, whereas the European Communities' obligations in the present dispute relate to exports
of the European Communities' own subsidized sugar. Secondly, with respect to the alleged need for
debate within European society, Brazil argues that previous arbitrators have declined to accept that
domestic "contentiousness" and "po litical sensitivity" are a particular circumstance relevant under
Article 21.3(c).88 Thirdly, there is "no justification" for additional time for structural adjustment for
the [European Communities'] domestic industry. 89 Brazil submits that no arbitrator to date has
granted a Member additional time to enable its do mestic industry to make structural adjustments
facilitating the transition to a WTO-consistent regime ; a right to such a transition period does not
exist even under European Communities law. Fourthly , the duration of reasonable periods of time in
previous cases in which the European Communities was the implementing Member is "irrelevant".90
47. Finally, Brazil requests that, Brazil being a developing country Member, the Arbitrator pay
particular attention to the significance of prom pt compliance for Brazil's development objectives,
pursuant to Article 21.2 of the DSU. Brazil's sugar industry is an important part of its economy; the

86Brazil's written submission, para. 106, referring to the European Communities' written submission,
para. 74.
87Brazil's written submission, para. 110. The reasonable period of time would expire on 25 December;
the next working day is 27 December 2005.
88Brazil's written submission, para. 118, referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Canada –
Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 60; Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term, para. 58; and Award of the
Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 61.
89Brazil's written submission, heading IV.D(3).
90Ibid., heading IV.D(4).

European Communities' WTO-inconsistent subsid ized sugar exports "cost Brazil USD $ 494 million
annually".
91
3. Thailand
48. Thailand requests that the reasonable peri od of time for implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case be set at six months and six days, that is, until
25 November 2005, if implementation is effected by administrative action. Alternatively, should
legislative action be required, Thailand argues that the reasonable period of time be set at seven
months and eight days, that is, until 27 December 2005.
49. Thailand argues that the European Communities bears the burden of proof of demonstrating
that the duration of its proposed implementation period constitutes a reasonable period of time and
that it has not discharged this burden. The Eur opean Communities is required to implement within
the "shortest period possible within [its] legal system " by making changes to those aspects of its sugar
regime that were subject to the r ecommendations and rulings of the DSB. 92 The European
Communities "must not delay its immediate obliga tion to implement ... to facilitate any broader
review of its agricultural policy".93 According to Thailand, the relevant circumstances in this case "all
[militate] in favour of speedy implementation by the [European Communities]."94
50. Thailand argues further that the European Comm unities needs no additional time to consider
its implementation options. Thailand also takes issu e with the European Communities' argument that,
due to the complexity of the sugar regime, ther e are many different options available to it to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The fact that the European Communities
has already decided upon a proposed means of implem entation "suggests" that it has already engaged
in consultations with its domestic industry, the AC P countries and other interested parties, so that
there is no reason to permit further c onsideration of alternative options. 95 Similarly, the fact that
implementation may engender political debate is not a factor that can affect the determination of the
reasonable period of time. In addition, unlike in Chile – Price Band System , the European
Communities' measure is not one of "horizontal application affecting a number of agricultural

91Brazil's written submission, para. 140, referring to a study by Oxfam International.
92Thailand's written submission, heading IV.A.2.
93Ibid., para. 24.
94Ibid., para. 28.
95Ibid., para. 34.

products and their pricing", but ra ther it relates only to the Europe an Communities' sugar policy and
does not require any changes to policy regarding other agricultural products.
96
51. Thailand emphasizes that the European Communitie s' implementation obligations relate only
to the measure that was found inconsistent w ith WTO law and can be fulfilled promptly by
administrative means. Thailand argues that the onl y point of disagreement between the parties is
"whether the [European Communities] can control exports of C sugar by administrative means".97 By
"suspending export licences and enabling producers to ca rry-over [C sugar] that cannot be exported in
a given year to the next", the European Communities could secure "rapid and prompt compliance".98
52. Thailand argues that, contrary to the European Communities' assertions, the Commission does
have the authority under existing regulations to c ontrol the export of C sugar in a manner that would
enable it to comply with its reduction commit ments. Council Regulation 1260/2001 permits all
C sugar to be carried forward; decisions on limits on the carry forward of C sugar—like the current
limit of 20 per cent of the A quota—lie with the Commission, are "purely discretionary" 99, and are
currently found in a separate Commission regulation. 100 This shows that th e Commission enjoys "full
authority" under Council Regulation 1260/2001 either not to restrict the carry forward of C sugar or to
increase the quantity of C sugar that can be carried forward above the current limit of 20 per cent of
the A quota. 101 According to Thailand, the Commissi on can accomplish this by following the
management committee procedure under Council Regul ation 1260/2001. Similarly, according to
Thailand, the Commission could control exports by suspending the issuance of export licences for
A, B, and C sugar. There is no legal basis to the European Communities' assertion that the
Commissions' authority to suspend licences with respect to A and B sugar does not extend to C sugar.
Requiring C sugar to be carried forward and suspen ding export licences "together constitute the most
flexible and efficient means by which the [Eur opean Communities] can reduce the level of its
subsidised exports".102

96Thailand's written submission., para. 36.
97Ibid., para. 39.
98Ibid., para. 39.
99Ibid., para. 43.
100Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 65/82 of 13 January 1982.
101Thailand's written submission, para. 44.
102Ibid., para. 49.

53. In Thailand's view, the shortest period possibl e for the aforementioned administrative action
is the period required for the "manag ement committee procedure" under Council
Regulation 1260/2001, namely, one month. Unde r this procedure, the Commission submits a
proposal for a Commission regulation to the mana gement committee that must render an opinion
within a time-limit fixed by the Chairman of th at committee. If the committee renders a favourable
opinion, the Commission regulation is adopted imme diately; if the opinion is unfavourable, the
Commission nevertheless adopts the regulation, but the regulation is also referred to the Council,
which may take a different decision within one mo nth. There have been no unfavourable opinions
delivered in the management committee procedur e, and the average as well as median period for
completion of the procedure has been 23 days. Thailand considers that the management committee
procedure could "certainly" be completed within 28 days.
103 As a result, Thailand takes the view that
the European Communities could have implemente d the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
even before commencement of the present arbitration. However, "[a]s a practical matter", given that
the European Communities has not taken these steps, Thailand proposes that the reasonable period of
time end 28 days from the date of circulati on of the arbitration award, that is, on
25 November 2005.104
54. In Thailand's view, the European Communities ha s failed to prove that a legislative measure
to implement would take 12 months to enact. However, in the event that the Arbitrator considers that
the European Communities needs to ta ke legislative action to allow a greater proportion of C sugar to
be carried forward, Thailand submits that this can be achieved by a simple amendment to the existing
Council Regulation 1260/2001. An implementing Memb er's decision to "undertake broad systemic
reforms" does not justify a longer implementation period. 105 Moreover, Thailand argues that the
European Communities has overstated "significantly" the time required to implement by legislative
means.106 Thailand refers to a table submitted as an exhibit to the submissions of Australia, Brazil
and Thailand and argues that re gulations amending existing CMOs can be adopted in periods
considerably shorter than the median figure of 5.4 months. Nevertheless, Thailand states that it would
not object if the Arbitrator were to use this median figure as the basis for assessing the duration of the
reasonable period of time.

103Thailand's written submission, para. 58.
104Ibid., para. 60.
105Ibid., para. 63.
106Ibid., para. 64.

55. In Thailand's view, applying the period of 5.4 months to the date of the Commission proposal,
that is, 22 June 2005, the Council amendment could enter into force on 2 December 2005. Allowing
another 23 days for the Commission to adopt implem enting regulations, the reasonable period of time
should expire on 27 December.
107 Thailand also points out that a number of regulations to be
implemented by customs authorities have in the past entered into force on dates other than 1 January
or 1 July, and that therefore this plea of the European Communities has no validity.
56. Finally, Thailand argues that the particular circumstances in this case favour prompt
implementation. Referring to the special provi sions of Articles 21.2 and 21.8 of the DSU for
developing country Members, Thaila nd submits that the implementation of the rulings in this dispute
is "crucial" to Thailand's development objectives.108 Thailand argues that the WTO-inconsistent sugar
export subsidies maintained by the European Communities impose an annual loss of USD 151 million
on Thailand, affect approximately 1.5 million farm ers' and sugar-related workers' households and
have "very serious consequences for the Thai sugar industry". 109 Concerning the ACP countries'
interests, Thailand submits that the European Co mmunities should fully respect its commitments with
respect to these countries, but argues that these count ries' interests "cannot take priority over the
obligation of the [European Communities] to ensure prompt implementation." 110 Thailand also notes
that it has not "in any way" contested the prefer ential access enjoyed by the ACP countries and India
to the European Communities' market. 111 Furthermore, the European Communities should not be
permitted to use the alleged effects of its suga r regime reform on the ACP countries for "doing
nothing"112; the European Communities must be deemed to have taken into account the interests of
the ACP countries in announcing its proposal on 22 June 2005; as a result, no additional time need be
considered to permit further consultations with the ACP countries.
57. Thailand also argues that the reasonable period of time should not include a phase-in period,
during which European Communities sugar producers w ould be permitted to export out of quota until
1 January 2007. Previous arbitral awards under Ar ticle 21.3(c) have established that the fact that
implementation may require some structural adjust ments on the part of a domestic industry does not

107Thailand's written submission., para. 68. The reasonable period of time would expire on
25 December; the next working day is 27 December 2005.
108Thailand's written submission, heading IV.E.1.
109Ibid., para. 77.
110Ibid., para. 81.
111Ibid., para. 80.
112Ibid., para. 82.

constitute a "particular circumstance[]" within the meaning of that provision. Moreover, the European
Court of Justice has held that recipients of a s ubsidy are not entitled to a transition period on the
elimination of that subsidy; thus, even under the European Communities' own law, there is no
requirement to build in a transition period before changes to a subsidy programme take effect.
Thailand submits that, by requesting a phase-in pe riod, the European Communities is effectively
requesting a waiver for its obligati ons, pursuant to Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement").
III. Reasonable Period of Time
58. Pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, my task as arbitrator in this case is to determine the
"reasonable period of time" for the European Co mmunities to implement the recommendations and
rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar .
113 T h e
"reasonable period of time" will be calculated as from 19 May 2005, the date on which the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports relating to this dispute were adopted.
59. Article 21.3(c) of the DSU provides that, when the "reasonable period of time" is determined
through arbitration:
… a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period
of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations
should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report. However, th at time may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the particular circumstances. (footnote omitted)
In this regard, I would observe, as have other arb itrators before me, that, in arbitrations conducted
pursuant to Article 21.3(c), the implementing Member bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that
the period of time it seeks is a reasonable period of time within the meaning of Article 21.3 of the
DSU.
60. Before I proceed to determine the reasonable period of time for the European Communities to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, I set out the views of the
parties on certain general principles applicable to the determination of the reasonable period of time
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, as articulated in previous arbitration awards.

113See WT/DS265/29, WT/DS266/29, WT/DS283/10.

61. These governing principles at issue are:
– the reasonable period of time should be the shortest period of time possible within the
legal system of the implementing Member
114;
– the implementing Member must utilize all th e flexibility and discretion available within
its legal and administrative system in order to implement within the shortest period of
time possible; and
– the "particular circumstances" of the case must be taken into account in determining the
reasonable period of time.
62. While the parties agree with the first principle, they differ sharply on the implementing
measure with respect to which the "shortest period of time" is to be determined. The European
Communities places considerable emphasis on the proposition that "it is the prerogative of the
implementing Member to select the means of implementation which it deems most appropriate" 115,
and that, therefore, the "shortest period of time possible" must be determined with respect to the
implementation method chosen by the implementi ng Member. The European Communities submits
that it is not for the arbitrator, or the complaining parties, to impose any particular method on the
implementing Member on the ground that it would result in the fastest implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Acco rding to the European Communities, "[w]hen
previous Arbitrators have said that the 'reasonable period of time' is the 'shortest period of time' within
the legal system of the implementing Member, they referred to the procedure for the adoption of the
implementing measure, and not to the selection of the implementing measure, which is the prerogative
of the implementing Member."
116 Thus, in the view of the European Communities, it is not for the
arbitrator to select a particular method of impl ementation and determine the reasonable period of time
on the basis of that selection. Rather, the task of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) is to determine

114Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System, para. 34 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, US –
1916 Act, para. 32). See also Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones , para. 26; Award of the Arbitrator,
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , para. 47; Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 26; and
Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 25.
115European Communities' written submission, para . 22, referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Korea –
Alcoholic Beverages, para. 45; Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 43; Award of
the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System , para. 32; Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), paras. 48 and 53; Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 30; and Award of the
Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 26. (emphasis added)
116European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.

the "shortest period [of time] possible"
117 within which the Member can implement through the
method it has chosen, taking into account the time required to adopt the necessary legislative,
regulatory, and administrative measures.
63. In contrast, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand (t he "Complaining Parties") argue that "prompt
compliance" with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, as required by Article 21.1 of the
DSU, is fundamental to the functioning of the dispute settlement system 118; therefore, it is only when
"prompt compliance" is "impracticable" that th e implementing Member is entitled to a "reasonable
period of time" for implementation under Article 21.3 of the DSU. The shortest possible period of
time for implementation—the standard articulated by previous arbitrators, which flows from the
fundamental requirement in Article 21.1 of "prompt compliance"—must, therefore, be determined on
the basis of a method available to the implementing Me mber that is consistent with its legal system
and that would result in implementation within the s hortest period of time possible. Furthermore, the
scope of the implementation method must be c onfined to that required to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and it must not extend to extraneous objectives that the
implementing Member may seek to include in it. In the view of the Complaining Parties, the right of
a Member to choose the means of implementation is not unlimited, and should not be allowed to be
used by the implementing Member as a means to obtain a longer period of time for implementation.
64. As regards the second principle governing the dete rmination of the reasonable period of time
pursuant to Article 21.3(c), the European Communiti es contends that the requirement that a Member
use all flexibility available to it within its legal sy stem should not be interpreted to mean that an
implementing Member is required "to utilize an extraordinary procedure rather than the normal
procedure"119. The European Communities points out, furthe rmore, that, as previous arbitrators have
held, the reasonable period of time must include th e time required, not only for procedural steps that
are explicitly mandated by legal instruments, but also for procedural steps that constitute the normal
and "routine[]" legislative or administrative practices of the implementing Member.120

117Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System, para. 34 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, US –
1916 Act, para. 32). See also Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones , para. 26; Award of the Arbitrator,
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , para. 47; Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 26; and
Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 25.
118Australia's written submission, para. 4; Brazil's written submission, para. 13; Thailand's written
submission, para. 20.
119European Communities' written submission, para. 23. (original emphasis)
120Ibid., paras. 58–59. The European Communities relies on the statement of the Arbitrator in EC –
Tariff Preferences, para. 42.

65. In contrast, the Complaining Parties argue that , even where legislative and regulatory steps
are required for implementation, it is incumbent upon the implementing Member to utilize all the
discretion and flexibility available within its system to ensure fast implementation of its international
obligations.
66. As regards the third principle relating to the "particular circumstances" of the case within the
meaning of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the European Communities and the Complaining Parties agree
that "particular circumstances" are a relevant factor to be taken into account by the arbitrator in
determining the reasonable period of time. Howe ver, the parties differ on what constitutes such
"particular circumstances" for the purposes of the present dispute. The European Communities
requests that I take into account seven "particular circumstances"
121; the Complaining Parties
disagree. Furthermore, Brazil and Thailand argue that the arbitrator should pay "particular attention"
to their respective development interests, pursuant to Article 21.2 of the DSU. The divergence in
views is particularly acute with respect to th ree issues: first, the scope of the means of
implementation proposed by the European Commi ssion (the "Commission"), as contained in its
proposal to the Council of the European Union (the "Council") dated 22 June 2005; secondly, the
need for "serious debate" within European Communities society concerning the implementing
measures as well as the need to consult the African, Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP") countries122; and,
thirdly, the need for a transition period with respect to domestic production already undertaken.
67. The parties disagree sharply with respect to th e scope of the implementing measure needed in
this dispute. The essence of this disagreement is that, according to the Complaining Parties, the sole
obligation to be implemented by the European Co mmunities in this dispute is to limit the budgetary
outlay on export subsidies on sugar to € 499.1 million, and the quantity of subsidized exports of sugar
to 1,273,500 tonnes in any marketing year. This being so, the European Communities can simply use
an export licensing system to limit the quantity of exports in any marketing year to 1,273,500 tonnes.
The Complaining Parties argue that the Commission has the necessary legal and delegated authority
to do this under existing Council Regulation 1260/20 01. Moreover, even if the Commission does not

121The European Communities' seven "particular circumstances" are: (i) implementation requires the
adoption of a Council regulation and of implementing Co mmission regulations; (ii) the implementing measures
are complex; (iii) the implementation process involves a number of procedural steps that are mandated by legal
documents or by constitutional practice; (iv) there are requirements concerning the publication and entry into
force of the regulations at issue; (v) the impact of the measures on Euro pean society requires serious debate;
(vi) account must be taken of production undertaken or planned prior to the decision in the underlying dispute;
and, finally, (vii) reasonable periods of time awarded in previous awards concerning legislative measures of the
European Communities.
122European Communities' written submission, paras. 28 and 80.

already have the legal authority to control the e xport of C sugar, the Commission can simply acquire
such authority by means of an amendment to Council Regulation 1260/2001.
123
68. The European Communities observes that there are two "extreme[]" options available to it as
means of implementation, namely, "plac[ing] direct restrictions on the exports of sugar" 124, while
"leav[ing] the level of [domestic] support unmodified" 125, as propounded by the Complaining Parties
on the one extreme, and "dismantling the system of support for sugar or ... liberalising completely the
imports of sugar into the [European Co mmunities'] market" on the other extreme. 126 Between these
two extremes, after a "careful assessment of all the options available" 127, the European Communities,
in its proposal of 22 June 2005, has chosen an in termediate option which "aim[s] at preserving some
level of support for the beet farmers and sugar pr oducers while at the sa me time minimising the
production of exportable surpluses". 128 According to the Eur opean Communities, unless the
"structural causes of the subsidized exports of sugar" 129 are addressed by modifying the level of
support given for beet farmers and sugar producers, surplus production of sugar in the European
Communities cannot be avoided or controlled. Ther efore, the European Co mmunities considers that
the means of implementation set out in its proposal of 22 June 2005 is the most appropriate means for
implementation from the long-term point of view. In this connection, the European Communities
contends that, as recognized by both the Panel and th e Appellate Body in the underlying dispute, the
European Communities' sugar regime is "very complex" 130 and its various components are "closely
connected and interdependent". 131 More importantly, the Panel a nd the Appellate Body had found
that it is the operation of the European Communitie s' sugar regime as a whole that has led to the
subsidization of C sugar e xports within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture. The European Communities is, therefore, of the view that the means of implementation
it has chosen flows logically from the Panel and Appellate Body Reports.132

123The parties to this proceeding agree that the Commission has the authority to control exports of A
and B sugar.
124European Communities' written submission, para. 41.
125Ibid., para. 41.
126Ibid., para. 42.
127Ibid., para. 44.
128Ibid., para. 43.
129Ibid., para. 41.
130Ibid., para. 37.
131Ibid., para. 40.
132European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

69. Having considered the arguments of the parties on the general principle of "shortest period of
time possible" for implementation, I set out my views in this regard. I am in agreement with previous
arbitrators that it is not "the role of the arbitr ator under Article 21.3(c) to identify [or select] a
particular method of implementati on and to determine the 'reasonable period of time on the basis of
that method'".
133 Rather, the choice of the method of im plementation rests with the implementing
Member. However, the implementing Member do es not have an unfettered right to choose any
method of implementation. Besides being consistent with the Member's WTO obligations, the chosen
method must be such that it could be implemented within a reasonable period of time in accordance
with the guidelines contained in Article 21.3( c). Objectives that are extraneous to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the disp ute concerned may not be included in the method
if such inclusion were to prolong the implementa tion period. Above all, it is assumed that the
implementing Member will act in "good faith" in the selection of the method that it deems most
appropriate for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
70. Turning to the dispute underlying this arbitrati on, I note that the Appellate Body upheld "as a
result of its findings ... the Panel's finding ... th at the European Communities, through its sugar
regime, acted inconsistently with its ob ligations under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture".134 Under Articles 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the European Communities has
the obligation, inter alia, "not [to] provide export subsidies ... in excess of the budgetary outlay and
quantity commitment levels sp ecified [in its Schedule]." 135 With respect to C sugar, as noted earlier,
the export subsidy that was found to exist was a s ubsidy falling within the meaning of Article 9.1(c)
of the Agreement on Agriculture , the source of which was the domestic support given, under the
complex and integrated sugar regime of the Eu ropean Communities, for beet farmers and sugar
producers.

133Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling , para. 33. See also Aw ard of the Arbitrator, Korea –
Alcoholic Beverages , para. 45. In this regard, I also note, as the parties agree, that the question whether a
measure taken to comply by the implementing Member is in conformity with the obligations of the
implementing Member is a matter that falls under Article 21.5 of the DSU. I also note that under
Article 21.3(a), it is the implementing Member that proposes the reasonable period of time required by it to
implement through the measure it chooses to take.
134Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 346(f).
135Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that "[e]ach Memb er undertakes not to provide
export subsidies other than in conformity with this Ag reement and with the commitmen ts as specified in that
Member's Schedule."

71. I turn first to the argument of the Complaining Parties that limiting or prohibiting exports of
sugar, or of C sugar more specifically
136, by means of suspending the grant of export licences, is the
only option available to the European Communities to comply with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB in this dispute. The Complaining Parties have not succeeded in rebutting the arguments of
the European Communities that the latter could, besides limiting its exports of sugar, choose to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by "withdrawing or reducing the
subsidies"; "by repealing the requirements that make the subsidies export contingent"; or "by taking
measures to offset the subsidies (e.g. in the form of export duties)". 137 I do not therefore agree that
limiting or prohibiting the exports of sugar, or of C sugar more specifically, is the only option
available, or the most effective, for implementation in this dispute.
72. Given this conclusion, I need not decide here whether it is within the legal authority of the
Commission, as a matter of European Communities law under existing Council
Regulation 1260/2001, to suspend the granting of export licences with respect to C sugar. Similarly, I
need not address the European Communities' argument that, by suspending export licences with
respect to C sugar, the European Communities would be acting inconsistently with Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
73. As I held earlier with respect to the govern ing principle, the choice of the method of
implementation rests with the implementing Member. Given the facts of the dispute underlining this
arbitration, I am satisfied that the European Communities is not pursuing extraneous objectives in
addressing "the structural causes of the subsidized exports of sugar". 138 I therefore proceed to
determine the reasonable period of time required by the European Communiti es with respect to its
proposal of 22 June 2005.
74. I address first the arguments of the parties c oncerning the steps involved in the European
legislative process. The Complaining Parties agree, in principle, with th e European Communities on
the basic steps involved in the legislative process under Articles 36 and 37 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (the "EC Treaty"), namely: preparation of a proposal by the Commission
and its presentation to the Council; obtaining th e opinions of the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee of the European Co mmunity (EESC); adoption of a regulation by

136Under the European Communities' existing sugar regime, C sugar is exported without the benefit of
export refunds.
137European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.
138European Communities' written submission, para. 41.

the Council; and, finally, adoption of im plementing regulations by the Commission.
 139 The adoption
of the implementing regulations by the Commissi on is governed by the so-called "management
committee procedure".140
75. However, a disagreement exists as to whethe r, under the so-called "management committee
procedure", the Commission may start preparing the implementing regulations before the adoption of
the Council regulation. The European Commun ities acknowledges that the Commission can start
preparing such regulations before the Council has fo rmally adopted the Council regulation; however,
the Commission "cannot finalise the texts and la unch the formal inter-service procedure and the
comitology procedure until the Counc il has taken a definitive decision". 141 In contrast, Brazil argues
that a Commission proposal can be finalized by the Commission, and approved by the management
committee, before adoption of the Council regulation.
142
76. The European Communities' legislative system is characterized by "considerable flexibility",
in the sense that no mandatory minimum time periods are imposed for any particular step in the
legislative process as outlined by the European Communities. 143 Furthermore, as acknowledged by
the European Communities, it is po ssible that certain steps of the legislative process may proceed in
parallel. Thus, for instance, the European Commun ities agrees that the Council may start deliberating
a Commission proposal, which is still being consider ed by the European Parliament and the EESC.
However, the European Communities argues, in th is regard, that the Council will "in any event
require additional time in order to take due account of the opinions issued by those bodies".144
77. I take note of the "flexibility" available that the Council could begin its examination of the
Commission proposal of 22 June 2005 before it rece ives the opinions of the European Parliament and

139Australia's written submission, paras. 145–156; Brazil's written submission, para. 82; Thailand's
written submission, paras. 61–70. The Complaining Pa rties do not agree with the European Communities'
arguments that additional time is required for purposes of consulting ACP countries. I address this point in
paragraphs 80–81, infra.
140Under the "management committee procedure" or "comitology procedure", the Commission is
assisted by a "management committee" composed of representatives of th e Member States and chaired by a
Commission representative. Under that procedure, the Commission presents its proposals to the management
committee, which in turn provides its opinion on the proposa l. In the event that a favourable or no opinion is
issued by the management committee, the Commission adopts the proposed regulation. In the event that the
management committee issues an unfavourable opinion, the Commission nevertheless adopts the regulation, but
the Council may take a different decision from the Commission within a specified time period.
141European Communities' written submission, para. 74.
142Brazil's written submission, para. 108.
143The same observation was made by the Arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 36.
144European Communities' written submission, para. 67.

the EESC.
145 This could save some time as compared with the Council examining the Commission
proposal only after receiving the opinion of the European Parliament and the EESC. 146 I agree,
however, with the European Communities that, even if the Council has begun examination of the
Commission proposal prior to receiving the opinions of the European Parliament and the EESC, it
will still require time to consider these opinions after it has received them. As the Arbitrator in EC –
Tariff Preferences noted, "[i]f no such time were provided for this, it would defeat the purpose of
seeking the opinions."147
78. I also note that the European Communities agrees that, under the "management committee
procedure", the Commission could begin preparing its implementing regulations prior to the adoption
of a Council regulation. 148 The European Communities points out that the staff of the Commission
"may start preparing the implementing regulations before the adoption of the Council regulation" 149;
however, the Commission cannot finalize the text and present it to the management committee, for
purposes of obtaining the opinion of that committee, "until the Council has taken a definitive
decision".150 In this respect, the Complaining Parties submitted an exhibit indicating three instances
where the management committee delivered its opinion before the Council adopted the relevant
regulation. The European Communities responds that, although the management committee may be
invited by the Commission to deliver its opinion be fore the Council regulation has been adopted, this,
nevertheless, remains an extraordinary procedur e in the practice of the European Communities'
institutions.151
79. I agree with previous arbitrators that an im plementing Member is not required to adopt
"extraordinary legislative procedures" in every case. 152 In this respect, I am not persuaded by the
argument of the Complaining Parties that, although the instances cited by them are few, the flexibility
suggested by them should not be re garded as "extraordinary". In this respect, I take note of the

145This flexibility was also noted by the Arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 43.
146I note that, according to the time limit proposed by the European Communities, both these opinions
will be available to the Council at about the same time, namely, January 2006.
147Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 43.
148European Communities' written submission, para. 74.
149Ibid.
150Ibid.
151European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
152Award of the Arbitrator, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, para. 32; Award of the Arbitrator, US –
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 74. Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 42.

requirement that the opinion of the management committee would have to be sought again in the
event that the Council, in adopting the regulation, modified the original Commission proposal.
153
80. Another aspect of the European Communities' legislative procedure on which the parties
disagree concerns the need to consult ACP countri es. The European Communities argues that it is
obliged, under the Cotonou Agreement between itself and the ACP countries, to consult ACP
countries on measures that may "affect the interests" of those countries. 154 This requirement to
consult the ACP countries "throughout the legislativ e process", as well as the need "to consider and
respond to their submissions", will, according to th e European Communities, "add to the complexity
of the debate ... and require additional time".155
81. I do not question the need for the European Communities to consult the ACP countries under
the Cotonou Agreement on "measures which may affect the interests of the ACP states". 156 However,
the European Communities has not demonstrated why this should have an impact so as to require
additional time for the European Communities to implement the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB. I observe, first, that implementation by the European Communities in this dispute relates to its
export subsidy commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture , whereas the ACP countries enjoy
preferential market access to the European Communities' ma rket. Secondly, the European
Communities did not provide sufficient information on what consultations have taken place with the
ACP countries, nor on past experience on how consul tations with ACP countries had an impact on the
European Communities' legislative process. The European Communities has not provided me with
information sufficient to substantiate its asserti on that consultations with the ACP Countries will
necessitate additional time for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.157
82. I now turn to the disagreement between the parties concerning the time needed for the
legislative procedure in this case. In this respect, I note that the European Communities estimates that
the Council will adopt a Council regulation at th e end of March 2006 and that, thereafter, the

153At the oral hearing, the European Communities stated that the opin ion rendered by the management
committee before the adoption of a Council regulation would be "conditional" on the Council adopting the
Commission proposal without modifications.
154European Communities' written submission, para. 61. The Cotonou Agreement is a partnership
agreement between, on the one hand, the European Communities and, on the other hand, the ACP countries; it
relates to political, trade, and development issues.
155European Communities' written submission, para. 63.
156Ibid., para. 61.
157I discuss the relevance, under Article 21.2 of the DSU, of the interests of ACP countries in para. 102,
infra.

Commission will need three months to enact the necessary implementing regulations, that is, until the
end of June 2006.
158 In contrast, the Complaining Parties argue that the Council could adopt a
regulation by 2 December 2005 and that the Commi ssion could adopt implementing regulations by
27 December 2005. The Complaining Parties base their estimate on the adoption of a "narrow" 159 and
"straightforward ... amend[ment]" 160 to the existing European Communities' sugar regime 161, rather
than on a broader reform of that regime, as pr opounded by the European Communities. Australia 162
and Brazil 163 have also argued that, even on the basis of a broader reform of the European
Communities, the Council should adopt a regula tion by 29 March 2006 and the Commission should
adopt implementing regulations by 21 April 2006.
83. The Complaining Parties have presented several tables containing information about the
duration of prior legislative procedures of the European Communities based on Articles 36 and 37 of
the EC Treaty. On the basis of a sample of previous regulations amending an existing common
market organization ("CMO") for agricultural prod ucts, and on the basis of another sample of
previous regulations adopting a new CMO for agricultural products, the Complaining Parties argue
that the relevant median periods are 5.4 months for the adoption of an amendment to an existing
CMO, and 9.2 months for the adoption of a new CMO.
84. As I have stated earlier, limiting or prohibiting exports of C sugar by means of suspending the
grant of export licences is not the only option ava ilable to the European Communities to comply with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in th is dispute. Accordingly, I do not base my
determination of the reasonable period of time ex clusively on the procedure for adopting such an
amending regulation as suggested by the Complaining Parties, or on the basis of the evidence
concerning the duration of the adoption process for such amending regulations.
85. At the same time, I note that the information submitted by the Complaining Parties shows that
the average time for the adoption of a Council regulation and of implementing Commission

158The period of time between the date of the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports—that
is, 19 May 2005—and 30 June 2006 is 13 months and 11 days.
159Brazil's written submission, para. 81.
160Thailand's written submission, para. 65.
161This amendment, according to the Complaining Parties, shoul d be limited to granting the
Commission the legal authority to limit exports of C suga r by means of suspending the granting of export
licences.
162Australia's written submission, para. 206.
163At the oral hearing, Brazil stated that it agreed with Australia in this respect.

regulations establishing a new CMO for agricultural products is 11.4 months, and the median figure
is 9.2 months. The European Communities has not contested the validity of this data, but emphasizes
the complexity and sensitivity of the present dispute. I note that these time periods are shorter than
those suggested by the European Communities in this arbitration pr oceeding for the completion of its
legislative process.
164 I also agree with Thailand that an average or median figure "inherently
represent[s] more than the shortest possible period of time necessary within [an implementing
Member's] legal system". 165 Even granting that the circumstances of adoption of previous Council
regulations may have been different and that the pr oposal at issue here may involve a different degree
of complexity, it would appear that the European Communities can use the flexibility and discretion
in its legal system to ensure that the rele vant Council regulation, as well as the Commission
implementing regulations, are enacted more speedil y than the proposed timel ine it has suggested.
Indeed, the fact that the legislative process at hand is intended to bring the European Communities
into compliance with its international obligations reinforces the need for the European Communities
to use all flexibility and discretion that may be available to it within its legal system.
86. I now turn to the other "particular circumstances" 166 alleged by the European Communities:
first, the alleged complexity of the implementing measures; secondly, the need for a serious debate in
European society; thirdly, that it would be "appropriate" to permit European Communities sugar
producers to export C sugar until 1 January 2007; fourthly, the requirements concerning the
publication and entry into force of regulations; and, fifthly, the reasonable periods of time determined
in previous arbitration awards concerning legislative measures of the European Communities.
87. The European Communities contends that the reasonable period of time must be determined
taking into account that the implementing measures are "complex". 167 The European Communities
submits that its sugar regime is "a very comple x regulatory regime, consis ting of many different
support mechanisms"168 that are "closely connected and interdependent" 169; as a result, the European

164The period between 22 June 2005, the date on which the Commission presented its proposal to the
Council, and 30 June 2006, the date suggested by the European Communities as the end point of its legislative
process, is 12 months and 8 days. Moreover, a legislative process ending on 30 June 2006 represents a period of
13 months and 11 days from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute, that
is, 19 May 2005.
165Thailand's written submission, para. 70.
166See supra, footnote 121.
167European Communities' written submission, para. 45.
168Ibid., para. 37.
169Ibid., para. 40.

Communities has "many different options in order to implement the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB".
170 Regardless of which specific option is ultimately chosen, "the content of the
implementing measures is likely to be technically complex".171
88. As previous arbitrators have noted, the comp lex nature of implemen ting measures can be a
relevant factor for the determination of the reas onable period of time under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU.172 But the degree of complexity of an implementing measure depends on the facts of the case. I
am not persuaded that the standard of "compl exity" is, as the European Communities appears to
suggest, reached every time that implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
requires more than "simply ... rewrit[ing] an isol ated legal provision or ... repeal[ing] without more
the whole measure at issue". 173 As an example of "complexity" of an implementing measure, I refer
to the one given by the arbitrator in Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , namely where
"implementation is accomplished through extensive new regulations affecting many sectors of
activity".174 Although I acknowledge that the sugar regi me of the European Communities has many
components that are interrelated, I am not convin ced that the Commission proposal of 22 June 2005
possesses such a level of "complexity" as to wa rrant the granting of any additional time for
implementation.
89. The next argument of the European Communities is that the impact of the implementation
measures on European society requires a "serious debate" because the European Communities' sugar
regime is of a "long-standing nature", is "essen tially integrated" in the European Communities'
policies and, in some cases, "go[es] back ... to the Napoleonic wars of the early XIX century". 175 The
European Communities relies on a finding of the arbitrator in Chile – Price Band System in
contending that this "particular circumstance[]" should have a bearing on th e determination of the
reasonable period of time. The Complaining Parties respond that the need for "serious debate" or the
"political sensitivity" of the subject matter cannot be regarded as a "particular circumstance[]" for

170European Communities' written submission, para. 40.
 171Ibid., para. 45.
172Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 50; Award of the Arbitrator, US –
173European Communities' written submission, para. 45.
174Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , para. 50; see also Award of the
Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), footnote 67 to para. 60.
175European Communities' written submission, para. 81.

extending the reasonable period of time required for implementation
176; this is all the more so,
according to the Complaining Parties, as implementati on required in this dis pute consists only in the
prevention of subsidized exports taking pl ace beyond the European Communities' reduction
commitments.
90. Previous arbitrators have consistently held th at the "contentiousness" or "political sensitivity"
of the measure to be implemented is not a "par ticular circumstance[]" that is relevant under
Article 21.3(c).177 In any event, I am not persuaded that the European Communities' export subsidies
on sugar are characterized by a degree of politic al contentiousness that would fundamentally
distinguish these measures from any other measure that is likely to be the subject of a WTO dispute. I
do not consider that the measures at issue in th is dispute raise concerns comparable to those
recognized by the arbitrator in Chile – Price Band System . Thus, in my view, the European
Communities' reliance on the award of the arbitrator in Chile – Price Band System is misplaced; the
measure in that dispute had a "unique role and impact on Chilean society", was "fundamental[ly]
integrat[ed] into the central agricultural policies of Chile", and had a "pri ce-determinative regulatory
position in Chile's agricultural policy".178
91. I turn now to the European Communities' contention that production already undertaken
before the dispute in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar was decided should be given consideration as a
"particular circumstance[]". More specifically, the European Communities argues that "it would be
appropriate to allow the European Communities' exporters to conti nue to export out of quota sugar
until 1 January 2007 without being subject to the paym ent of the 'surplus' levies provided [for] in the
Commission proposal."179 The Complaining Parties consider it unwarranted to grant an additional six
months as a transition period to enable the dom estic industry to export the sugar it has already
produced. The Complaining Parties submit that previous arbitrators have rejected arguments that
additional time should be granted for "struc tural adjustment" of the domestic industry.
180 Brazil and

176Australia's written submission, para. 196; Braz il's written submission, paras. 118 and 122;
177See Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term , para. 58; and Award of the Arbitrator, US –
178Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System, para. 48.
179European Communities' written submission, para. 90.
180Australia's written submission, paras. 181–191; Brazil's written submission, para. 124; Thailand's
written submission, paras. 87–88.

Thailand also argue that, even under the Euro pean Communities' own law, subsidies may be
discontinued without advance notice to the affected industry.
181
92. I agree with the views put forth by the Complaining Parties. In my view, the European
Communities effectively requests a transitional period following the withdrawal or modification of a
WTO-inconsistent measure, so that the domestic industry may adjust to such withdrawal or
modification. As previous arbitrators have held, the perceived need for such "structural adjustment"
or phase-in periods for the domestic producers does not constitute a "particular circumstance[]" within
the meaning of Article 21.3(c) and, as such, canno t have an impact on the determination of the
reasonable period of time under that provision. 182 In my view, allowing such a transitional period
would have the effect of including in the reasonabl e period of time action that is extraneous to
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
93. I turn next to the European Communities' argument concerning the entry into force of its
implementing measures. The European Comm unities argues that the Council regulation under
discussion must enter into force on 1 July 2006 becau se "it is an established legislative practice that
regulations which must be implemented by the cu stoms authorities should be published at least six
weeks before their entry into force and take ef fect from 1 January, or exceptionally, from 1 July". 183
This practice is based on a Council resolution fro m 1974. In addition, the European Communities
also argues that it is a "well-established legislative practice" that significant changes to the rules of a
CMO should take effect from the start of the following marketing year.184
94. In response, the Complaining Parties have submitted two tables showing 33 Council and
Commission regulations that, according to the Comp laining Parties, "appear to fall within the
[European Communities'] description of the Council's long-standing practice"185; however, in the case
of these regulations, the alleged European Commun ities' practice was not followed, in that the
relevant regulations did not enter into force on 1 January or 1 July, and were not published six weeks
prior to their entry into force. The European Communities does not dispute the data submitted by the

181For this proposition, Brazil and Thailand rely on the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
Case C-14/01, Molkerei Wagenfeld Karl Niemann . (See Brazil's written submission, para. 99; Thailand's
written submission, para. 89.)
182Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Autos , para. 23; Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Hides
and Leather, para. 41.
183European Communities' written submission, para. 77.
184Ibid., para. 78.
185Brazil's written submission, para. 96.

Complaining Parties; however, it argues that this practice has been in place since 1974 and that, as a
result, a long list of exceptions can be expected to exist.
186
95. In my view, the statistical information submitte d by the Complaining Parties suggests that a
degree of flexibility exists with respect to the pr actice alleged by the European Communities. I am
aware that the arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences regarded this administrative practice of the
European Communities as a relevant factor in determining the reasonable period of time for
implementation.187 However, unlike in that case, the Co mplaining Parties have presented clear
evidence that the practice has not been followed in a number of instances. The European
Communities has not explained why, in this particular case, the European Communities cannot make
use of the flexibility it appears to have with respect to this particular administrative practice.
96. With respect to the European Communities' ar gument that there is a "well established
legislative practice"188 that significant changes to the rules of a CMO should take effect from the start
of the following marketing year, I note that the Eu ropean Communities has not directed my attention
to any factual evidence in support of this claim. In contrast, the Complaining Parties have submitted
evidence that casts doubt on the existen ce of the "legislative practice" in the form of a table with ten
Council amendments to existing CMOs that, according to the Complaining Parties, did not take effect
at the start of the marketing year. I am therefor e of the view that the European Communities has not
discharged its burden of proof with respect to this is sue. Therefore, the alleged "legislative practice"
that "significant changes to the ru les of a common market organizati on should take effect ... from the
start of the following marketing year"189 is not a "particular circumstance[]" that I propose to take into
account in determining the reasonable period of time.
97. I now turn to the fifth "particular circumstan ce[]" suggested by the European Communities as
affecting the determination of the reasonable peri od of time to comply, namely, the periods of time
awarded in previous arbitration awards conc erning legislative measures of the European
Communities. In my view, Article 21.3(c) requires an arbitrator to take into account the "particular
circumstances" of the case before the arbitrator. Although an arbitrator could derive some useful
guidance from previous arbitration awards in this regard, the facts and circumstances of
implementation in one dispute may, and in mo st instances will, di ffer from the facts and

186European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
187Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 50.
188European Communities' written submission, para. 96.
189Ibid., para. 78.

circumstances of implementation in another dispute. As a result, I decline to consider as a "particular
circumstance[]" here the reasonable periods of time awarded in previous arbitration awards
concerning legislative measures of the European Communities, exclusively on the ground that the
present arbitration also involves implementation by the European Communities by means of a
legislative measure.
98. Finally, I turn to the parties' arguments c oncerning Article 21.2 of the DSU. Brazil and
Thailand argue that I should pay "[p] articular attention", within the meaning of that provision, to their
respective interests as developing WTO Members, and have submitted extensive evidence with a view
to demonstrating those interests. The European Communities agrees that the scope of Article 21.2 of
the DSU is not limited to developing country Members as implementing, rather than as complaining,
parties to a dispute. Rather, the European Communi ties argues that Article 21.2 is also applicable to
developing country Members who are not parties to a dispute.
190 The European Communities does
not appear to dispute the development interests of Brazil and Thailand, nor the evidence submitted by
Brazil and Thailand. Instead, the European Comm unities argues that a consequence of a shorter
implementation period, combined with the susp ension of export C sugar as advocated by the
Complaining Parties, "could be" an increase in the world market price of sugar 191, and that would
adversely affect the interests of sugar importing developing countries. The European Communities
also argues that these interests, as well as the intere sts of ACP countries, are also interests within the
meaning of Article 21.2 to which I should pay "[p]articular attention".
99. I find that previous arbitrators have not explicitly resolved the question whether the phrase
"developing country Members" in Article 21.2 refers exclusively to the implementing Member, or
whether it also applies to developing country Members other than the implementing Member such as,
for instance, the complaining Member, third parties to the dispute, or any developing country Member

190European Communities' statement at the oral hearing and response to questioning at the oral hearing.
191The European Communities has submitted a study according to which the Complaining Parties do
not have the necessary production cap acity to replace the European Commun ities as a supplier of sugar to the
world market by December 2005, in th e event that the European Communities were to suspend its exports of C
sugar. According to the European Communities, this ci rcumstance would lead to a higher world market price
for sugar, which in turn would adversely affect the developing countries that are importers of sugar. (European
Communities' statement at the oral hearing and response to questioning at the oral hearing.)

of the WTO.
192 I consider that Article 21.2 is to be in terpreted as directing an arbitrator to pay
"[p]articular attention" to "matters affecting the interests" of both an implementing and complaining
developing country Member or Members. 193 I note that Brazil, the European Communities and
Thailand explicitly agree on this point. 194 In arriving at this conclusion, I agree with the arbitrator in
US – Gambling that the text of Article 21.2 does not limit its scope of application to an implementing
developing country Member.195 I also note that Articles 21.7 and 21.8 refer to circumstances in which
a "matter ... has been raised by a developing co untry Member" or "the case is one brought by a
developing country Member"; this suggests that, where the drafters of the DSU wished to limit the
scope of a provision to a particular category or gr oup of developing country Members, they did so
expressly.196
100. Having concluded that I am enjoined by Article 21.2 to pay "[p]articular attention" to matters
affecting the interests of Brazil and Thailand as complain ing parties in this dispute, I turn to consider
the specific arguments of Brazil and Thailand in th is respect. Brazil argues that its sugar industry
constitutes more than a fifth of its total agribusin ess gross domestic product; that a study in 1997
concluded that the sugar industry was "responsible for creating more than 654,000 direct and 937,000
indirect jobs in Brazil" and directly employed 764,593 persons in Brazil 197; that the sugar industry
has added importance because it is often located in rural areas and has a tradition of socially
responsible employment; and that the European Communities' exports of s ubsidized sugar have a
"detrimental effect on prices in the export market". 198 Thailand argues that the European

192Previous arbitrators have considered that the interests of an implementing developing country
Member of the WTO fall within the scope of Article 21.2. (Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Autos ,
para. 24; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages , para. 45; and Award of the Arbitrator,
Argentina – Hides and Leather , para. 51.) The Arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences stated explicitly that he
was not required to resolve the question whether Article 21.2 also applied to interests of developing Member
countries not parties to the arbitra tion. (Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 59.) The
Arbitrator in US – Gambling stated explicitly that he was not required to resolve the question whether
Article 21.2 applied to a complaining developing country Member. (Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling,
para. 62.)
193As noted in paragraph 104, infra, it is not necessary for me to decide whether Article 21.2 is
applicable to developing countries that are not parties to the arbitration proceedings.
194Brazil's written submission, para. 137; European Communities statement at the oral hearing and
response to questioning at the oral hearing; Thailand's written submission, para. 74.
195Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling, para. 59.
196For instance, Article 3.12 also explicitly refers to a situation in which "a complaint based on any of
the covered agreements is brought by a developing country Member against a developed country Member".
Article 12.10 refers to "consultations involving a measure taken by a developing country Member" and a
"complaint against a developing country Member".
197Brazil's written submission, para. 138.
198Ibid., para. 140.

Communities' sugar exports have a "depressive ef fect ... on the world market price for sugar".
199
Thailand also refers to adverse consequences flow ing from continued subsid ized exports from the
European Communities on "1.5 million farmer s' and sugar-related workers' households".200 Thailand
also argues that a large portion of its sugar-pr oducing areas are located in parts of Thailand with
annual incomes below the average annual income of Thailand. Both Brazil and Thailand submit
evidence in support of their respective arguments.
101. Upon perusal of the evidence, I am satisfi ed, overall, that Brazil and Thailand have
demonstrated their interests as developing count ry Members for purposes of Article 21.2 and that
these interests are relevant for my determination of the reasonable period of time in this arbitration.
102. With respect to the developmen t interests of the ACP countries 201, I am aware of the
preferential market access to the European Communities' market that the ACP countries enjoy under
the Cotonou Agreement. However, the rather limited evidence before me does not enable me to glean
in which specific manner the ACP countries w ill be affected by implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this disput e. Therefore, I have no precise basis on which
to rely in order to pay "[p]articular attention" to the interests of the ACP countries in determining the
reasonable period of time in this arbitration.
103. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence before me that would demonstrate whether or how the
interests of other developing country Members who are exporters or importe rs of sugar would be
affected by the implementation of the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB. The European
Communities has not specifically identified such othe r developing country Members in its submission
or at the oral hearing.

199Thailand's written submission, para. 75.
200Ibid., para. 77.
201With respect to ACP countries that were involved in the dispute as third parties with enhanced rights
and that are least-developed countr ies, the European Communities refers to Article 24.1 of the DSU.
Article 24.1 provides that, "[a]t all stages of ... dispute settlement procedures involving a least-developed
country Member, particular consideration shall be give n to the special situation of least-developed country
Members." Specifically, Members are to exercise "due restraint" in raising matters under dispute settlement
procedures involving a least-developed country Member; where nullification or impairment is found to result
from a measure taken by a least-developed country Member , complaining parties "shall exercise due restraint in
asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations
pursuant to [dispute settlement] procedures".

104. Accordingly, it is not necessary for me, in the sp ecific circumstances of this arbitration, to
decide whether Article 21.2 is also applicab le to developing country Members that are not parties to
the arbitration proceedings under Article 21.3(c).
105. Finally, I note that the parties expressed vari ous views on a question raised by me during the
oral hearing: if the reasonable period of time expires in the course of a marketing year, how would
this circumstance affect budgetary and quantity lim itation commitments of the implementing Member
for that marketing year, assumi ng that these commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture apply
to a marketing year as a whole? Brazil and th e European Communities stated expressly that the
resolution of this issue does not fall within the manda te of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU and that it is not of relevance for determini ng the reasonable period of time under that Article. I
do not consider it necessary to address this issue.
106. On the basis of the above considerations, I de termine that the "reasonable period of time" for
the European Communities to implem ent the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute
is 12 months and 3 days from 19 May 2005, which w as the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports. The reasonable period of time will therefore expire on 22 May 2006.

Signed in the original at Geneva this 18th day of October 2005 by:

A.V. Ganesan
Arbitrator