INDIA – MEASURES CONCERNING SUGAR AND SUGARCANE REPORTS OF THE PANELS
Document: Appendix This supplement contains the Appendix to the Reports of the Panels to be found in documents WT/DS579/R, WT/DS580/R, and WT/DS581/R.
Date: 14 December 2021
Document codes: WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1; WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1; WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1; WT/DS579/R; WT/DS580/R; WT/DS581/R.
Complainant: Brazil
Respondent: India
Third parties: Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, EU, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Panama, Russia, Thailand, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 3.2, 3.3, 6.3, 7.2(b), 8, 9.1, 10.1  Agriculture

INDIA – MEASURES CONCERNING SUGAR AND SUGARCANE
REPORTS OF THE PANELS
Appendix

This supplement contains the Appendix to the Reports of the Panels to be found in documents
, , and

 • •

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. In the circumstances of these disputes, we consider it appropriate to assess India's compliance
with Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture by determining whether India's product-specific
AMS to sugarcane producers for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19 was in excess of the
amount that India is permitted to provide pursuant to the Agreement.1 We recall that, according to
the complainants, India's product-specific AMS to sugarcane producers consists of: (i) market price
support; and (ii) non -exempt direct payments or other non -exempt policies. 2 This Appendix
addresses India's alleged market price support to sugarcane producers.
1.2. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the A greement on Agriculture describes the methodology for
calculating the level of market price support provided by a Member. Under paragraph 8, "market
price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price [FERP] and
the applied administered price [AAP] multiplied by the quantity of production eligible [QEP] to receive
the applied administered price". This can be expressed mathematically as:
Market price support = (FERP – AAP) * (QEP)

1.3. In support of their claim under Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture, the complainants
apply the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 to determine India's market price support
to sugarcane producers during each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018-19. With respect to each
component of the calculation, the complainants present considerable evidence and argumentation .
Regarding the FERP, the complainants note that, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Annex 3, the FERP may
be adjusted for quality differences.3 On that basis, the complainants calculate an adjusted FERP for
different States and seasons, using the methodology set out in India's Supporting Tables identified
in its Schedule.4 As to the AAP, the complainants assert that India's Central Government, as well as
certain State Governments, set mandatory minimum prices for sugarcane that constitute AAPs within
the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture.5 In order to calculate both the adjusted FERP and the
amount of the AAP, the complainants provide evidence of the "recovery rate" (i.e. the "amount of
sugar that can be extracted from sugarcane" 6) in different States. 7 Regarding the QEP, the
complainants provide evidence of the total sugarcane production in different States in India.8 Using
these data, the complainants apply the paragraph 8 methodology to calculate the total market price
support that India provided to sugarcane producers for each season from 2014-15 to 2018-19.9
1.4. India argues that the mandatory minimum prices identified by the complainants do not
constitute market price support, within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture, because they

1 See para. 7.11 of the Panel Report. We recall that, for the reasons explained in fn 75 to para. 7.9 of
the Panel Report, it is unnecessary for us to address the complainants' claims under Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
2 See para. 7.19 of the Panel Report.
3 Brazil's first written submission, para. 146; Australia's first written submission, para. 161; Guatemala's
first written submission, para. 146.
4 Brazil's first written submission, para. 148; Brazil's Calculation of India's Domes tic Support for
Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 161-162; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP"
spreadsheet; Guatemala's first written submission, para. 147; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit
GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet.
5 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 2 4-48, 135-139 and 156; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 23-61 and 153-156; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 37-72 and 140-144.
6 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 40. See also Brazil's first written submission, para. 32;
Australia's first written submission, para. 28.
7 Brazil's first written sub mission, Table C-1; Australia's first written submission, Table 16; Guatemala's
first written submission, Table 2.
8 Brazil's first written submission, Table C-8; Australia's first written submission, Table 17; Guatemala's
first written submission, Table 8.
9 See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3));
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)); Guatemala's Calculations
of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)).
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do not entail government purchase or procurement of the sugarcane .10 India does not, however,
contest the accuracy of the evidence or calculations provided by the complainants.11
1.5. In paragraphs 7.37 to 7.61 of the Panel Report, we have addressed the parties' disagreement
over whether market price support, within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture, can only
exist where there is government purchase or procurement of the relevant agricultural product. We
have concluded that there is no such requirement, and that the existence of market price support
depends on the existence and amount of the FERP, AAP, and QEP.12 In this Appendix, we address
the existence and amount of the FERP, AAP, and QEP, and apply the paragraph 8 methodology to
determine the amount of market price support for sugarcane producers, if any, that India maintained
during each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19.
1.6. We proceed by first describing the relevant legal instruments through which India allegedly
provides market price support. We then examine the existence and amount of the AAP, the FERP,
and the QEP. Finally, we apply the calculation methodology set out in paragraph 8 in order to
determine the amount of market price support , if any, that India provided to sugarcane producers
during each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19.
2 RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
2.1. The complainants assert that India maintains mandatory minimum prices payable by
purchasers of sugarcane. The complainants identify two sets of such mandatory minimum prices:
(i) the "Fair and Remunerative Price" (FRP), allegedly set by the Central Indian Government 13; and
(ii) certain State -Advised Prices (S APs) set by six individual State Governments within India.14
According to the complainants, in States where an SAP is applied, the sugar producers are required
to pay the SAP instead of the FRP when the former is higher than the latter.15
2.2. India does not contest, as a factual matter, the complainants' description of the FRP and SAPs.
2.3. Having reviewed the evidence and assertions of the parties, we find that India maintain s
mandatory minimum prices for sugarcane, payable by sugar producers (i.e. sugar mills and factories
that process sugarcane into sugar), in the form of: (i) the FRP, set on an annual basis by the Central
Indian Government; and (ii) various SAPs, set on an annual basis by certain State Governments in
India. We also understand that, in States where an SAP is applied, sugar producers are required to
pay whichever is the higher price as between the FRP and SAPs.16 For the sake of clarity, we consider
it useful to identify, below, the content and operation of the FRP and SAPs.
2.1 Fair and Remunerative Price
2.4. The FRP is established by, and maintained through, the following legal instruments : the
Essential Commodities Act of 195517 ("Essential Commodities Act"); the Sugarcane (Control) Order

10 See paras. 7.20, 7.30, and 7.38 of the Panel Report.
11 According to India, its silence with respect to certain aspects of the complainants' arguments should
not be construed as assent. (India's responses to questions from the Panel at the first meeting of the Panel)
12 See para. 7.59 of the Panel Report.
13 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 25 -34 and 134 -155; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 23-39 and 166-173; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 37-50 and 137-165.
14 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 35 -48 and 156 -160; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 41-61 and 174-180; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 51-72 and 137-165.
15 Brazil's first written submission, para. 35; Aus tralia's first written submission, para. 41 ; Guatemala's
first written submission, para. 140.
16 As clarified by the Supreme Court of India, sugarcane prices fixed by State governments are "statutory
prices" and must be complied with by the sugar mills. (Judgment of the Supreme Court of India, U.P. Co-operative
Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association & Ors. Etc., 5 May 2004, (Exhibit JE-49), para. 39)
Furthermore, India confirms that "prices that may be set by State orders or enactments do not operate
cumulatively with the FRP. If the SAP is higher than the FRP, sugar mills procure sugarcane at the SAP and not
at the sum of the FRP and SAP." (India's response to Panel question No. 67)
17 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE-43).
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of 196618 ("Sugarcane Control Order"); and various notifications published in the Official Gazette by
the Department of Food and Public Distribution.19
2.5. The Essential Commodities Act empowers the Central Government to issue orders "for the
control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce, in certain
commodities".20 Section 3, titled "Powers to control production, supply, distribution, etc., of essential
commodities", grants the power to the Central Government to regulate, inter alia, the production
and sale of sugar and sugarcane.21
2.6. The Sugarcane Control Order cites Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act as its legislative
basis.22 Clause 2 of the Sugarcane Control Order, titled "Definitions", defines the "fair and
remunerative price of sugarcane" as "the price f ixed by the Central Government under clause 3,
from time to time, for sugarcane". 23 Clause 3 is titled "Fair and remunerative price of sugarcane
payable by producer[s] of sugar".24 Clause 3(1) explains that the Central Government " may, after
consultation with such authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit, by notification in the
Official Gazette, from time to time, fix the fair and remunerative price of sugarcane to be paid by
producers of sugar or their agents for the sugarcane p urchased by them".25 Clause 3(2) indicates
that "[n]o person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or his agent, and no
such producer or agent shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane, at a price lower than that
fixed under sub-clause (1)."26
2.7. As indicated, pursuant to Clause 3(1) of the Sugarcane Control Order, the precise amount of
the FRP is set out in the relevant notification published in the Official Gazette, and such notifications
may be made "from time to time" . From our review of the evidence, we understand that these
notifications are published annually and set the FRP for specific sugar seasons.27
2.8. We also note that notifications appear to follow a particular pattern in setting the price for a
given sugar season. Based on the evidence before us, we understand that the FRP for each sugar
season generally consists of: (i) a base or minimum price that is payable regardless of how low the
recovery rate of the sugarcane may be, and (ii) a premium rate that is added to the base price, on
an incremental basis, depending on the margin by which the sugarcane recovery rate exceeds a
certain threshold (or "basic") recovery rate.28 We understand that the recovery rate of sugarcane is

18 Sugarcane (Control) Order, (Exhibit JE-45).
19 See e.g. Notification of 1 October 2015, (Exhibit AUS -19); Notification of 30 September 2016,
(Exhibit AUS-20); and Notification of 27 September 2017, (Exhibit AUS-22).
20 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE-43), preamble, p. 2.
21 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE-43), Section 3, pp. 3-7.
22 Sugarcane (Control) Order, (Exhibit JE-45), preamble, p. 55.
23 Sugarcane (Control) Order, (Exhibit JE-45), Clause 2(cc), p. 56.
24 Sugarcane (Control) Order, (Exhibit JE-45), Clause 3, p. 57. (footnote omitted)
25 Sugarcane (Control) Order, (Exhibit JE -45), Clause 3(1), p. 57. Clause 3(1) also elaborates on the
factors to be taken into account by the Central Government when fixing the FRP, namely: (a) the cost of
production of sugarcane; (b) the return to the grower from alternative crops and the general trend of prices of
agricultural commodities; (c) the availability of sugar to the consumer at a fair price; (d) the price at which sugar
produced from sugarcane is sold by producers of sugar; (e) the recovery of sugar from sugarcane; (f) the
realization made from sale of by-products such as molasses, bagasse and press mud or their imputed value; and
(g) reasonable margins for the growers of sugarcane on account of risk and profits.
26 Sugarcane (Control Order), (Exhibit JE-45), Clause 3(2), p. 58. The Sugarcane Control Order defines
"producer of sugar" as "a person carrying on the business of manufacturing sugar by vacuum pan process a nd
at its own option, ethanol either directly from sugarcane juice or from molasses, including B-Heavy molasses, or
both". (Ibid. Clause 2(i), p. 57)
27 We come to this conclusion based on our review of the evidence identified in fns 31-35 to para. 2.9
below.
28 To use an example, we understand that for the 2012-13 sugar season the relevant Notification sets out
the mandatory minimum price as follows: a base price of INR 170 per 100 kilograms, with an additional premium
of INR 1.79 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% increase in the recovery rate above a basic (threshold) recovery
rate of 9.5% . (Order of 22 October 2013, (Exhibit AUS -17), p. 22) Sugarcane farmers therefore received a
minimum price of INR 170 per 100 kilograms of sugarcane, regardless of the actual rate of recovery. In addition,
if the recovery rate of a particular farmer's product exceeded 9.5%, then the sugar producer was obliged to pay
to the sugarcane farmer an additional INR 1.79 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% increase above the ba sic
recovery rate. Thus, if a farmer's sugarcane had a recovery rate of 10%, the farmer would be paid
INR [170 + (5*1.79) = 178.95] per 100 kilograms of sugarcane.
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"the proportion of sugar produced by weight of cane processed, usually expressed as a
percentage".29
2.9. Based on our rev iew of the evidence, we note that, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to
2018-19, the FRP was:
a. For the 2014-15 sugar season: INR 220 per 100 kilograms 30, at a basic recovery rate
of 9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.32 per 100 kilograms for every 0 .1%
increase in recovery rate31;
b. For the 2015-16 sugar season: INR 230 per 100 kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of
9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate32;
c. For the 2016-17 sugar season: INR 230 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate33;
d. For the 2017-18 sugar season: INR 255 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.68 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate34; and
e. For the 2018-19 sugar season, the FRP was structured slightly differently: a base price
of INR 275 per 100 kilograms was set at a threshold recovery rate of 10%, with a
premium of INR 2.75 for each 0.1% increase in recovery rate above 10%; for sugarcane
with a recovery rate between 9.5% and 10%, the price was reduced by INR 2.75 for
every 0.1% decrease in recovery rate below 10%, down to a minimum lower threshold
level of 9.5%; finally, for sugarcane with a recovery rate equal to or lower than 9.5%,
a base price of INR 261.25 per 100 kilograms was set.35
2.2 State-Advised Prices
2.10. The complainants identify SAPs in six States in India: Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Tamil Nadu,
Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Before describing the content and operation of these six SAPs, we
note that five of these States (Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakh and) maintain

29 Brazil's first written submission, para. 32 (referring to Exhibit JE -48). See also Australia's first written
submission, para. 28 (referring to Exhibit JE -48); and Guatemala's first written submission, para. 40 and fn 54
thereto. India does not contest this explanation.
30 We note that India's notifications of the FRP consistently use the unit of value of quintals. We understand
that a quintal is a unit of weight and one quintal signifies one hundred (100) kilograms. (See Brazil's first written
submission, fn 3 to Table 1; Australia's first written submission, p. 27; Guatemala's first written submission,
p. v). For our purposes, we convert all measurements of weight to kilograms and (where necessary) tonnes.
31 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP 2014 -15 season, 14 February 2014, (Exhibit JE-2); Notification
of 1 October 2015, (Exhibit AUS-19).
32 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2015 -16 season, 2 February 2015, (Exhibit JE -4); Press
Release, Press Information Bureau, 16 January 2015, (Exhibit JE -3); Notification of 30 September 2016,
(Exhibit AUS-20).
33 Notification of 27 September 2017, (Exhibit AUS-22); CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2016-17 Sugar
Season, (Exhibit JE -5). We are aware that the complainants also adduce a newspaper report that indicates a
different amount with respect to the premium rate. (See "Govt keeps cane FRP unchanged at Rs 230 per qtl for
2016-17", India Today, 6 April 2016, (Exhibit JE -47)) We agree w ith the parties that we should give greater
weight to the official government sources than to this newspaper report. We also note India's confirmation of the
FRP for the 2016-17 season through responses to questions. (See parties' responses to Panel question No. 68)
34 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2017-18 season, 1 June 2017, (Exhibit JE-7); Press Release,
Press Information Bureau, 24 May 2017, (Exhibit JE-6).
35 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2018 -19 sugar season, 20 July 2018, (Exhibit J E-9); Press
Release, Press Information Bureau, 18 July 2018, (Exhibit JE-8). We are aware that the complainants also adduce
additional evidence that do es not contain certain of the details of the FRP as set out in Exhibits JE-8 and JE-9.
(See Press Release, Press Information Bureau, 31 July 2018, (Exhibit AUS -15); Fair and Remunerative Price of
Sugarcane in the Country, ISMA, (Exhibit JE-11)) We agree with the complainants, however, that these Exhibits
do not necessarily contradict Exhibits JE-8 and JE-9 and, in any event, we consider Exhibits JE-8 and JE-9 to be
sufficiently probative to establish the content of the FRP for the 2018 -19 sugar season. (See complainants'
responses to Panel question No. 69)
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SAPs that distinguish among different "varieties" of sugarcane. We understand that the term
"varieties" essentially refers to different types of sugarcane based on their "maturity period and
quality".36
2.2.1 Bihar
2.11. The State of Bihar enacted the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act in
1981 ("Bihar Sugarcane Act").37 The Bihar Sugarcane Act contains detailed provisions regulating the
supply and purchase of sugarcane by sugar producers. Section 42(2) of the Bihar Sugarcane Act
stipulates that the State of Bihar may determine the minimum price to be paid by factories 38 to
sugarcane producers and that such price shall not be less than the price set under the Sugarcane
Control Order.39 The Act further states that "[t]he owner of the [sugar factory] shall make payment
of the price of cane supplied to it immediately after the supply and on failing to do shall be liable to
pay interest at the rate prescribed." 40 Chapter VI of the Act also provides for penalties, inc luding
imprisonment, for violations of the provisions of the Act.41
2.12. We note that the SAP in Bihar, for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, was42:
Bihar SAP (INR per 100 kg)
Varieties 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Un-recommended/lower43 varieties 250 250 260 260 265
Central/general/normal varieties 260 260 280 280 290
Early/premium varieties 270 270 300 300 310

2.2.2 Haryana
2.13. Until 1966, the State of Haryana was part of the State of Punjab. Pursuant to the Punjab
Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Haryana Amendment Act, 2004 ("Haryana
Amendment Act"), Haryana continues to apply the Punjab Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and
Supply) Act of 1953 ("Punjab Sugarcane Act") .44 Specifically, we understand that t he Haryana
Amendment Act makes the entirety of the Punjab Sugarcane Act applicable in the State of Haryana,

36 See India's response to Panel question No. 70(a). We also note Guatemala's explanation that "sugarcane
of early and mid-varieties receives a higher SAP than sugarcane of normal varieties or unrecommended varieties
… because the variety, or type, of sugarc ane has a major impact on sugar recovery rates." (Guatemala's first
written submission, para. 53 (referring to Priyanka Singh, Manmohan Singh and BL Sharma, "Variation in sugar
content between early and mid -late maturing sugarcane varieties across the crus hing period in sub -tropical
India", Proceedings of the International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists , volume 29, 2016,
(Exhibit GTM-22))) Furthermore, "[s]ugarcane is considered to be mature and ready for harvest when the cane
juice has over 16% sucrose and 85% purity. Early - and mid-varieties attain this level faster than normal or
unrecommended varieties and, therefore, also have higher recovery rates." (Ibid.)
37 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-50).
38 The Bihar Sugarcane Act defines a "factory" as: "any premises, including the precincts thereof in any
part of which sugar is manufactured by the means of vacuum -pan process; or any other sugar or sugarcane
based products manufactured by any other technique or process based on sugarcane which includ es sugarcane
based Ethanol plant, Rectified Sprit plant and Co -generation plant". (Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50),
Section 2(j), p. 1)
39 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-50), Section 42(2), p. 19. Specifically, Section 42(2) states, inter alia,
that "[t]he State Government may before the beginning of the crushing season, taking in to consideration the
interest of the cane growers and the likely realisation from the sugarcane products determine by notification in
the official gazette, the price of can e payable by the occupiers of the factories to the cane growers for cane
supplied to them in the crushing year concerned".
40 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-50), Section 43(4), p. 20.
41 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-50), Chapter VI, pp. 23-26.
42 For 2014-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018-19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-52), p. 57, Annex
Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017-18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-
53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2016 -17, see also Not ification by the Bihar Government, 24 November 2016
(English translation), (Exhibit JE-54-B)) For 2018-19, see Riga Sugar Company Limited, Annual Report 2018-19,
(Exhibit JE-55), p. 4.
43 We note that: for 2014-15, the three categories of varieties are identified, in ascending order of price,
as "un -recommended", "central", and "early" varieties; for 2016 -17 and 2017 -18, "central" varieties was
replaced with "general" varieties; and for 2018-19, the three categories are, in ascending order of price, "lower",
"normal", and "premium" varieties. (See the evidence referred to in fn 42 to para. 2.12 above)
44 See Haryana Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE -56), p. 10, Section 1(1) and (2); Punjab Sugarcane Act,
(Exhibit JE-59).
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except for Section 14, which it replaces, and a particular clause i n Section 20.45 Hereafter, we use
the term "Haryana Sugarcane Act" to refer to the Act that currently applies in Haryana (i.e. the
Punjab Sugarcane Act as modified by the Haryana Amendment Act).46
2.14. Under Section 14 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act, the State Government may, among other
things, issue orders regulating the purchase, supply and price of sugarcane in an assigned area. 47
Section 20 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act authorizes the State Government to "make rules to carry
out the provisions of this Act"48, including "the method by which the minimum price of cane is to be
fixed under this Act" and "the payment of the price for cane". 49 The Haryana Sugarcane Act also
stipulates that "[a]s soon as the cane is supplied to a factory, the occupier of such factory shall be
liable to pay the price of cane so supplied" 50 and any violation of the Act (or any rule issued
thereunder) is an offence punishable by imprisonment, a fine, or both.51
2.15. In accordance with Section 20 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act, the Haryan a Government
enacted the Haryana Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Rules, 1992 ( "Haryana
Sugarcane Rules"). Section 12 of the Haryana Sugarcane Rules indicates that "[a]n occupier of a
factory or agent or purchasing agent of a factory or any person employed by him shall not purchase
cane for a factory or pay for it at a price below the minimum price."52
2.16. We note that the SAP in Haryana, for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, was53:
Haryana SAP (INR per 100 kg)
Varieties 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Normal/late54 varieties 300 300 310 320 330 / 33555
Mid varieties 305 305 315 325 335
Early varieties 310 310 320 330 340

2.2.3 Punjab
2.17. As mentioned above, Section 20 of the Punjab Sugarcane Act provides that "[t]he Government
may make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act", including "the method by which the minimum
price of cane is to be fixed under this Act", and "the payment of the price for cane." 56 Under
Section 9(1) of the Punjab Sugarcane Act, "[a]ny person contravening any of the provisions of [this]
Act or any rule made there under, for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall be punishable
with [a] fine, which may extend to two thousand rupees."57
2.18. In accordance with Section 20 of the Punjab Sugarcane Act, the State Government of Punjab
adopted the Punjab Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Rules, 1958 ("Punjab Sugarcane

45 Haryana Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE-56), pp. 10-11.
46 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-56), pp. 1-11.
47 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), Section 14, p. 5. An "assigned area" is defined as "an area
assigned to a factory under [the Haryana Sugarcane] Act". (Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56),
Section 2(1), p. 1)
48 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-56), Section 20, pp. 8-9.
49 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-56), Section 20(i) and (l), pp. 8-9.
50 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-56), Section 15-A(2), p. 6.
51 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-56), Section 9(1), p. 4.
52 Haryana Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE-57), Section 12, p. 57.
53 For 2014-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018-19 sugar season, (Exhibit JE-52), p. 57, Annex
Table 2.2. For 2015-16 to 2017-18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53),
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018-19, see Notification by the Haryana Government, 8 March 2019, (Exhibit AUS-
63); and State of Haryana, Budget 2019-20: Explanatory Memorandum, (Exhibit JE-58).
54 We note that for 2014-15 and 2015-16, the three categories of varieties are identified, in ascending
order of price, as "normal", "mid", and "early", whereas for 2016-17 to 2018-19, "normal" varieties was replaced
with "late" varieties. (See the evidence identified in fn 53 to para. 2.16 above)
55 Exhibit JE-58, an explanatory memorandum concerning the Haryana State Budget, indicates that the
2018-19 SAP for "late" varieties was INR 330 per 100 kilograms, while Exhibit AUS-63, an official notification of
the SAP by the Government of Haryana, indicates an SAP of INR 335 per 100 kilograms for all varieties other
than "early" varieties. While we tend to consider an official notification to be more probative than an explanatory
memorandum concerning the State Budget, we nevertheless do not consider it necessary to resolve this specific
factual issue for the purposes of resolving the present disputes. (See fn 105 to para. 3.20 below)
56 Punjab Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-59), Section 20, p. 5.
57 Punjab Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-59), p. 3.
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Rules").58 Section 12 of the Punjab Sugarcane Rules is titled "Minimum Price" and states, inter alia
that "[a]n Occupier or agent or purchasing agent or any person employed by him shall not purchase
cane for a factory … at a price below the minimum price, if any fixed by law."59
2.19. We note that the SAP in Punjab, for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, was60:
Punjab SAP (INR per 100 kg)
Varieties 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Normal/late/lower61 varieties 280 280 285 295 29562
Mid/medium varieties 285 285 290 300 300
Early/advance varieties 295 295 300 310 310

2.2.4 Tamil Nadu
2.20. Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949 ("Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act")
stipulates that:
The Government may, at any time before the commencement of a crushing season,
after consulting the Advisory Committee, by notification, specify either generally or in
respect of any factory, either the price which the occupier of a factory shall be bound
to pay for any sugarcane purchased by him during the season or the method of
calculating such price:
Provided that the Government may specify different prices or different methods
of calculating the prices of different varieties of sugarcane.63
2.21. Compliance with the sugarcane price is mandatory pursuant to Section 13 of the Act .
Violations are punishable with a fine, imprisonment or both.64
2.22. We note that the SAP in Tamil Nadu for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2017-18 was:

58 Punjab Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE-60), preamble, p. 1.
59 Punjab Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE-60), Section 12(1), p. 4.
60 For 2014-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018-19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-52), p. 57, Annex
Table 2.2. For 2015-16 to 2017-18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53),
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018 -19, see Notification by the Punjab Government, 28 November 2019,
(Exhibit JE-61); and "Punjab Govt to pay Rs 25 per quintal directly to cane farmers", The Tribune, 6 December
2018, (Exhibit AUS-66), p. 2.
61 We note that: for 2014 -15 and 2015-16, the three categories of varieties are identified, in ascending
order of price, as "nor mal", "mid", and "early"; for 2016 -17 and 2017-18 "normal" varieties was replaced with
"late" varieties; and for 2018-19 the three categories are referred to as either "late", "mid" and "early" or "lower",
"medium", and "advance/early". (See the evidence referred to in fn 60 to para. 2.19 above)
62 We note that th e State Government Notification of the SAP for the 2018 -19 season indicates that
"Sugarcane Medium and Lower varieties rates will be equal to advance/early varieties after 15th January".
(Notification by the Punjab Government, 28 November 2019, (Exhibit JE-61)) In response to questions seeking
clarity regarding this aspect of the SAP, Brazil indicates that "India is in the best position to set out the meaning
of the explanatory note". (Brazil's response to Panel question No. 71(d), para. 82) Australia states that it "is not
able to explain the meaning of the note". (Australia's response to Panel question No. 71(d), para. 68) Guatemala
considers that the explanatory note "appears to mean that the higher 'advance and early varieties' SAPs would
be applicable to medium and lower varieties after 15 January 2019". (Guatemala's response to Panel question
No. 71(d), para. 65) India states that "the complainants are best placed to explain the calculations adopted by
them". (India's response to Panel question No. 71(d)) In light of this lack of clarity regarding the meaning of the
explanatory note, we refrain from adjusting the SAP rates on the basis of that note.
63 Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-67), Section 12(1), p. 42. A "factory" is defined as "any premises,
including the precincts thereof, wherein ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the
preceding twelve months and in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the production
of sugar by means of vacuum pans is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power".
(Ibid. Section 2(c), p. 36)
64 Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-67), Section 13(2)(b), pp. 42-43.
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a. For the 2014-15 sugar season: INR 265 per 100 kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of
9.5%, with an additional premium of either INR 2.21 or INR 2.32 per 100 kilograms for
every 0.1% increase in recovery rate65;
b. For the 2015-16 sugar season: INR 285 per 100 kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of
9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate66;
c. For the 2016-17 sugar season: INR 285 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate67; and
d. For the 2017-18 sugar season: INR 285 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.68 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1%
increase in recovery rate.68
2.23. In October 2018, Tamil Nadu adopted the Tamil Nadu Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase
Price) Act, replac ing the SAP with a system of "revenue sharing based sugarcane price". 69 We
therefore understand that Tamil Nadu did not maintain any SAP for the 2018-19 sugar season.
2.2.5 Uttar Pradesh
2.24. Section 16(1) of The Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953
("Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act") states that "[t]he State Government may, for maintaining supplies,
by order, regulate- (a) the distribution, sale or purchase of any cane … in any reserved area or
assigned area; and (b) purchase of cane in any area other than a reserved or assigned area. "70
Section 17(1) provides that "[t]he occupier of a factory shall make such p rovision for speedy
payment of the price of cane purchased by him as may be prescribed".71 Under Section 17(2), "the
occupier of a factory shall be liable to pay immediately the price of the cane so supplied". 72 Failure
to comply with the obligations under the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act is punishable by a fine,

65 Order of 14 January 2015, (Exhibit JE -62); CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season,
(Exhibit JE-52), p. 57, Annex Table 2.2. This amount includes transport costs. We n ote that, according to the
Indian Government publication Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, the premium rate was
INR 2.21 per 100 kilograms, whereas the official Order by the Government of Tamil Nadu indicates a premium
rate of INR 2.32 per 100 kilograms. We tend to consider the official Order by the Government of Tamil Nadu to
be more probative than the Price Policy for Sugarcane publication. We note, however, that since the average
recovery rate in Tamil Nadu during the 2014-15 sugar season did not exceed the basic recovery rate stipulated
in the SAP, it is not necessary to resolve this issue. (See para. 3.11 below)
66 CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3; Order
of 11 January 2016, (Exhibit JE-63). This amount includes transport costs.
67 CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3; Order
of 5 January 2017, (Exhibit JE-64). This amount includes transport costs.
68 CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. This
amount includes transport costs. We note that the complainants also adduce two Tamil Nadu Government Orders
that refer to the SAP for the 2017-18 sugar season, but which do not identify any premium rate. We agree with
Australia that this is most likely because those Government Orders "relate to Tamil Nadu's production incenti ve
payment" and "the premium was not relevant to the calculation of the production incentive payment". (Australia's
response to Panel question No. 71(c), para. 65) We also note that the amount of the premium is not directly
relevant to the present disputes, as the average recovery rate in Tamil Nadu during the 2017 -18 sugar season
did not exceed the basic recovery rate. (See para. 3.11 below)
69 Tamil Nadu Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase Price) Act, 2018, (Exhibit JE-65), p. 96. See also Order
of 17 September 2018, (Exhibit JE-88).
70 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-68), Section 16(1), p. 104.
71 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -68), Section 17(1), p. 105. A "factory" is defined as "any
premises including the precincts thereof wherein twenty or more workers are working or [sic] on any day during
the preceding twelve months and in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the production
of sugar by means of vacuum pan process or ethanol either directly from sugarcane juice or molasses, including
B-Heavy molasses, or both as the case may be, is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with the aid of
mechanical power." (Ibid. para. 3(j), p. 93)
72 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-68), Section 17(2), p. 105.
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imprisonment, or both.73 The Supreme Court of India has interpreted the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane
Act as granting the State Government "the regulatory power … to fix the price of the sugarcane".74
2.25. We note that the SAP in Uttar Pradesh, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19,
was75:
Uttar Pradesh SAP (INR per 100 kg)
Varieties 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Rejected/normal76 varieties 275 275 300 310 310
Normal/mid varieties 280 280 305 315 315
Early varieties 290 290 315 325 325

2.2.6 Uttarakhand
2.26. We understand that t he State of Uttarakhand was previously part of the State of Uttar
Pradesh. The Uttarakhand Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) (Amendment) Act, 2013
("Uttarakhand Amendment Act"), indicates that the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act , as amended,
applies in Uttarakhand. 77 Since Sections 16 and 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act were not
amended by the Uttarakhand Amendment Act, we understand that these provisions are also
applicable in Uttarakhand.
2.27. We note that the SAP in Uttarakhand, for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, was78:
Uttarakhand SAP (INR per 100 kg)
Varieties 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Rejected varieties n/a n/a 302 306 n/a
General/normal79 varieties 280 280 307 316 317
Early varieties 290 290 317 326 327

3 APPLIED ADMINISTERED PRICE
3.1 General
3.1. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture identifies the "applied administered
price" (AAP) as one of the components of the methodology to calculate market price support.
3.2. The complainants submit that the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs because they fix mandatory
prices for sugarcane that differ from the market price and which must be paid by sugar producers.80
Based on the operation of the measures, the complainants assert that the amount of the FRP and
the SAP in Tamil Nadu depend, in part, on the recovery rate of the sugarcane being purchased.81 In

73 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE-68), Section 22, p. 110.
74 Judgment of the Supreme Court of India, U.P. Co-operative Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar
Mills Association & Ors. Etc., 5 May 2004, (Exhibit JE-49), para. 26.
75 For 2014-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2 018-19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57,
Annex Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season,
(Exhibit JE-53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3; and Notification of 26 October 2017 (English translation),
(Exhibit JE-70-B). For 2018-19, see Notification of 1 December 2018 (English translation), (Exhibit JE-69-B).
76 We note that: for 2014 -15 to 2017-18, the CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane publications refer to the
three categories of varieties, in ascending order of p rice, as "rejected", "normal", and "early". For 2017-18, the
Notification by the Government of Uttar Pradesh refers to "mid" varieties instead of "normal" varieties. For
2018-19, the three categories, in ascending order of price, are: "normal", "mid", and "early" varieties. (See fn 75
to para. 2.25 above)
77 Uttarakhand Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE-71), preamble, p. 1.
78 For 2014-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018-19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-52), p. 57, Annex
Table 2.2. For 2015-16 to 2017-18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019-20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-53),
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018 -19, see Notification of 20 December 2018 (English translation),
(Exhibit JE-72-B).
79 For 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2018-19, the SAP distinguishes between "general" and "early" varieties. For
2016-17 and 2017-18, the SAP refers to, in ascending order of price, "rejected", "normal", and "early" varieties.
80 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 137 -139 and 156; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 153-156; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 140-144.
81 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 32-34 and 43 and Figure 5; Australia's first written submission,
paras. 29-30 and 55; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 40 and 54.
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order to determine the precise amount of the average FRP applicable in different States, as well as
the average SAP in Tamil Nadu, the complainants provide data regarding the average sugarcane
recovery rates in different States and seasons.82 With respect to the other States that apply SAPs,
the complainants assert that it is reasonable and appropriate to rely on the "middle" category of
varieties in determining the amount of the AAP.83
3.3. India argues that the FRP and SAPs do not constitute market price support within the meaning
of the Agreement on Agriculture because they do not entail any government purchase or
procurement of sugarcane.84 India does not provide any additional arguments c ontesting whether
the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3. India also does
not contest the complainants' assertions regarding different recovery rates in India, nor does it take
issue with the complainants' calculations of the amount of the AAP in different States in India.85
3.4. We have addressed, as a matter of legal interpretation, India's arguments regarding the
definition and scope of market price support in paragraphs 7.37 to 7.61 of the Panel Report. We
have concluded that the existence of market price support does not require the government to
purchase or procure (i.e. through government expenditure or revenue foregone ) the relevant
agricultural product . With that threshold issue already resolved, we examine here th e specific
question of whether the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3.
3.5. We recall from our discussion of the scope of market price support that t he AAP refers to a
price for a basic agricultural product that is determined by the administrative action of the
government and not by market forces. 86 Based on our description of the FRP and SAPs above, we
understand that the FRP and SAPs constitute mandatory minimum purchase prices for sugarcane,
determined by the Cent ral and State Governments respectively, and which sugar producers
(i.e. sugar mills and factories processing sugarcane into sugar ) are statutorily obligated to pay to
sugarcane producers (i.e. sugarcane farmers) . In our view, such mandatory minimum purchas e
prices constitute prices that are independent of market forces , and are set and maintained by
administrative action o f the Indian Central and State Governments. 87 We therefore conclude that
the FRP and SAPs do indeed constitute AAPs within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3.
3.6. Turning to the amount of the AAP, we agree with the complainants that, since the amount of
the FRP (and one SAP) actually paid to sugarcane farmers varies depending on the sugarcane
recovery rate88, in order to accurately reflect the amount of the AAP it is necessary to rely on data
regarding actual recovery rates in India to calculate the average FRP (and SAP) payable in India.
Since the average recovery rate in different States and seasons may differ, and since the SAPs are
specific to certain States, the amount of the AAP may be different in different States. We therefore
consider it appropriate to assess individual AAPs for different States in India, for each season.
3.7. We proceed with our analysis in four steps: (i) we first review the data and arguments provided
by the parties regarding average seasonal recovery rates in different States in India; (ii) taking that
data into account, we examine the complainants' assertions regarding the average FRP applicable in
different States and seasons (including the extent to which the average recovery rate affects the
FRP through the incremental premium) ; (iii) we assess the complainants' assertions regarding the
relevant AAP in the six States that applied an S AP; and (iv) we summarize our findings regarding
the amount of the AAP in each State during the 2014-15 to 2018-19 sugar seasons, for purposes of
applying the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

82 See e.g. complainants' response to Panel question No. 65.
83 Complainants' responses to Panel question 70(b).
84 See paras. 7.20, 7.30 and 7.38 of the Panel Report.
85 India's only comment with respect to the complainants' assertions regarding the SAPs is that the
complainants have failed to demonstrate "why the SAPs qualify as an [AAP] under paragraph 8 of Annex 3 in
view of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex 3". (India's response to Panel question No. 70(c))
86 See para. 7.52 of the Panel Report.
87 With respect to the SAPs, paragraph 3 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that
"[s]upport at both the national and sub-national level shall be included" in the calculation of a Member's AMS.
88 We recall that the FRP, and the SAP in Tamil Nadu, stipulate a basic threshold recovery rate, at or below
which a minimum price must be paid regardless of how low the actual recovery rate drops. If the sugarcane
recovery rate exceed s that threshold rate, the amount of the AAP increase s according to t he premium rate.
(See paras. 2.9 and 2.22 above)
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3.2 Recovery rates
3.8. In support of their assertions regarding the average recovery rates in 11 Indian States during
the 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 sugar seasons , the complainants refer to "Price Policy for Sugarcane:
2020-21 Sugar Season", a publication by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP),
which is part of the Indian Government's Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare .89 Regarding
the other States, for which these documents provide no data, the complainants rely on the threshold
recovery rates set out in the FRP for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 as a proxy to
represent the recovery rate in these States.90
3.9. India does not comment on the complainants' assertions regarding recovery rates.
3.10. We note that the Price Policy for Sugarcane document is published on an annual basis by the
Indian Government through the CACP. In our view, these documents constitute a reliable source for
us to determine the average seasonal recovery rates in different States in India. We also agree with
the complainants that it is appropriate to rely on the most recent publication on the basis that it is
likely to contain the most accurate and up-to-date information.91
3.11. Based on our review of the evidence, we find that the average sugarcane recovery rate s
during the 2014-15 to 20 18-19 sugar seasons, for each of the 11 States for which State-specific
data are available, were as follows92:
Recovery rates in individual States (%)
State 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Andhra Pradesh 9.72 9.31 9.34 9.43 9.33
Bihar 9.10 9.69 9.08 9.54 10.35
Gujarat 10.48 10.37 10.56 10.51 10.65
Haryana 9.89 9.39 10.19 10.46 10.31
Karnataka 10.90 10.59 10.28 10.57 10.25
Maharashtra 11.67 11.19 11.19 11.09 10.07
Punjab 9.37 10.01 9.34 9.74 10.10
Tamil Nadu 8.10 8.47 9.08 8.50 8.90
Telangana 10.47 10.83 10.32 10.84 10.21
Uttar Pradesh 9.49 10.51 10.26 10.73 10.91
Uttarakhand 9.15 9.52 8.20 10.18 10.91

3.12. We note that the data adduced by the complainants is not comprehensive. Other than the 11
individual States identified above, the Price Policy for Sugarcane documents only provide an average
recovery rate for "All India" ; they do not indicate the average recovery rate for other States in
India.93 However, given that the amount of the average FRP applicable in those other States depends
on the recovery rate, it is necessary to determine the average recovery rates in these other Indian
States in order to accurately calculate India's market price support to sugarcane producers.
3.13. The complainants submit that the most reasonable approach to determining the average
recovery rates for these other States is to use, as a proxy, the basic (threshold) rates set out in the

89 See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 65 (referring to CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane:
2020-21 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-167), p. 81, Annex Table 2.6). The complainants also adduce the CACP Price
Policy for Sugarcane publications for the 2018 -19 and 2019 -20 sugar seasons. The complainants submit,
however, that the most recently published edition of the CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane is likely to be the most
accurate. (See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 64)
90 Complainants' responses to Panel question No. 66.
91 Complainants' responses to Panel question No. 64.
92 See CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2020-21 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE-167), p. 81, Annex Table 2.6.
Our findings correspond to the average recovery rates asserted by the complainants. (See Brazil's Calculation of
India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, ( Exhibit BRA-1 (revised-3)), "C1 Recovery" spreadsheet; Australia's
Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "RecoveryRates" spreadsheet;
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "Recovery" spreadsheet)
93 According to Guatemala, "the sugar recovery rates of all the other States … are not published".
(Guatemala's first written submission, fn 68 to Table 2)
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FRP for each sugar season .94 The complainants note that the 11 States for which there are data
account for the overwhelming majority of sugar production in India, such that it would be
inappropriate to use either the "All India" average or an average of these 11 States.95
3.14. We agree with the complainants that using either the "All India" recovery rates or a simple
average of the 11 States identified above would be inappropriate, in light of the substantial
proportion of India's sugar production that is realized in these 11 States.96 We note that India has
not contested the complainants' reliance on the threshold rates set out in the FRP as a proxy for the
recovery rate of the other States. Taking into account that the FRP is determined by the Indian
Central Government following consultations with relevant authorities, bodies and associations, and
on the basis of multiple relevant factors 97, we consider it reasonable to use the basic threshold
recovery rates set out in the FRP as a proxy to represent the average recovery rate of those other
States for which there is no data.
3.15. We therefore use a recovery rate of 9.5% to represent the average recovery rate for "Other
States" during the 2014 -15 to 2017-18 seasons and 10% to represent the average recovery rate
during the 2018-19 season.98
3.3 AAP based on the FRP
3.16. For the reasons explained above, we consider that the FRP and SAPs constitute relevant AAPs
within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In order to quantify
the AAP, and taking into account that the FRP paid to individual sugarcane producers varies
depending on the recovery rates of their sugarcane, we consider it necessary to calculate the average
FRP received by sugarcane producers in different States and seasons. In States that did not apply
an SAP, the average FRP would represent the AAP, for purposes of applying the paragraph 8
methodology. For States that do apply an SAP, we consider it useful to calculate the average FRP in
order to verify whether the amount of the SAP is higher than the amount of the average FRP.99
3.17. We therefore proceed to calculate the average FRP applicable in different States in India
during each season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, for the purposes of determining the relevant AAP100:

94 See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 66.
95 See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 66. According to Brazil's calculations, sugar
production in these 11 States accounts for 96.6% of India's total sugar production. (Brazil's response to Panel
question No. 66, para. 49) Australia observes that, since the States other than the 11 predominant States "are
generally less well -suited to growing cane, it is reasonable to expect those Other States to have
lower-than-average recovery rates." (Australia's response to Panel question No. 66, para. 43)
96 See para 5.6 below.
98 See para. 2.9 above. We recall that the FRP for the 2018 -19 sugar season essentially contained two
basic recovery rates: 9.5% and 10%. The complainants consider that 10% is an appropriate recovery rate to
use as a proxy for "Other States". (See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane,
(Exhibit BRA-1 (revised -3)), "C1 Recovery" spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations,
(Exhibit AUS-1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "RecoveryRates" spreadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS
(Exhibit GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "Recovery" spreadsheet) India has not contested that approach. In
light of the structure of the FRP for 2018-19, we agree with the complainants' approach.
99 We recall our understanding that sugar producers are obliged to pay whichever minimum price is higher,
as between the FRP and the SAP. (See fn 16 to para. 2.3 above)
100 For the base FRP, FRP basic recovery rate, and premium rate, see para. 2.9 above. For the State
recovery rate, see paras. 3.11-3.15 above. The amount of excess, if any, is calculated by subtracting the FRP
basic recovery rate from the State recovery rate. The actual premium paid is calculated by multiplying the amount
of excess by the premium rate, divided by 0.1 (to account for the fact that the premium is paid on an incremental
basis for each 0.1% that the State recovery rate exceeds the FRP basic recovery rate). The AAP (represented by
the average FRP) is the sum of the base FRP and the actual premium paid, represented in INR per tonne and
rounded to two decimal places (for the sake of precision). We note that o ur calculations accord with the
calculations performed by the complainants. (See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane,
(Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C2 -C6 AAPs (FRPs)" spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations,
(Exhibit AUS-1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "AAP" spreadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit
GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "AAP (FRP)" spreadsheet)
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2014-15 AAP based on the average FRP
State
Base FRP
(INR/100
kg)
State
recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess (%)
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg)
AAP
(INR/t)
Andhra Pradesh 220 9.72 9.5 0.22 2.32 5.104 2,251.04
Bihar 220 9.10 9.5 -0.4 2.32 0 2,200.00
Gujarat 220 10.48 9.5 0.98 2.32 22.736 2,427.36
Haryana 220 9.89 9.5 0.39 2.32 9.048 2,290.48
Karnataka 220 10.90 9.5 1.4 2.32 32.48 2,524.80
Maharashtra 220 11.67 9.5 2.17 2.32 50.344 2,703.44
Punjab 220 9.37 9.5 -0.13 2.32 0 2,200.00
Tamil Nadu 220 8.10 9.5 -1.4 2.32 0 2,200.00
Telangana 220 10.47 9.5 0.97 2.32 22.504 2,425.04
Uttar Pradesh 220 9.49 9.5 -0.01 2.32 0 2,200.00
Uttarakhand 220 9.15 9.5 -0.35 2.32 0 2,200.00
Other States 220 9.5 9.5 0 2.32 0 2,200.00

2015-16 AAP based on the average FRP
State
Base FRP
(INR/100
kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Andhra Pradesh 230 9.31 9.5 -0.19 2.42 0 2,300.00
Bihar 230 9.69 9.5 0.19 2.42 4.598 2,345.98
Gujarat 230 10.37 9.5 0.87 2.42 21.054 2,510.54
Haryana 230 9.39 9.5 -0.11 2.42 0 2,300.00
Karnataka 230 10.59 9.5 1.09 2.42 26.378 2,563.78
Maharashtra 230 11.19 9.5 1.69 2.42 40.898 2,708.98
Punjab 230 10.01 9.5 0.51 2.42 12.342 2,423.42
Tamil Nadu 230 8.47 9.5 -1.03 2.42 0 2,300.00
Telangana 230 10.83 9.5 1.33 2.42 32.186 2,621.86
Uttar Pradesh 230 10.51 9.5 1.01 2.42 24.442 2,544.42
Uttarakhand 230 9.52 9.5 0.02 2.42 0.484 2,304.84
WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1

2015-16 AAP based on the average FRP
State
Base FRP
(INR/100
kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Other States 230 9.5 9.5 0 2.42 0 2,300.00

2016-17 AAP based on the average FRP
State Base FRP
(INR/100 kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount
of excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Andhra Pradesh 230 9.34 9.5 -0.16 2.42 0 2,300.00
Bihar 230 9.08 9.5 -0.42 2.42 0 2,300.00
Gujarat 230 10.56 9.5 1.06 2.42 25.652 2,556.52
Haryana 230 10.19 9.5 0.69 2.42 16.698 2,466.98
Karnataka 230 10.28 9.5 0.78 2.42 18.876 2,488.76
Maharashtra 230 11.19 9.5 1.69 2.42 40.898 2,708.98
Punjab 230 9.34 9.5 -0.16 2.42 0 2,300.00
Tamil Nadu 230 9.08 9.5 -0.42 2.42 0 2,300.00
Telangana 230 10.32 9.5 0.82 2.42 19.844 2,498.44
Uttar Pradesh 230 10.26 9.5 0.76 2.42 18.392 2,483.92
Uttarakhand 230 8.20 9.5 -1.3 2.42 0 2,300.00
Other States 230 9.5 9.5 0 2.42 0 2,300.00

2017-18 AAP based on the average FRP
State Base FRP
(INR/100 kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Andhra Pradesh 255 9.43 9.5 -0.07 2.68 0 2,550.00
Bihar 255 9.54 9.5 0.04 2.68 1.072 2,560.72
Gujarat 255 10.51 9.5 1.01 2.68 27.068 2,820.68
Haryana 255 10.46 9.5 0.96 2.68 25.728 2,807.28
Karnataka 255 10.57 9.5 1.07 2.68 28.676 2,836.76
Maharashtra 255 11.09 9.5 1.59 2.68 42.612 2,976.12
Punjab 255 9.74 9.5 0.24 2.68 6.432 2,614.32
WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1

2017-18 AAP based on the average FRP
State Base FRP
(INR/100 kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Tamil Nadu 255 8.50 9.5 -1 2.68 0 2,550.00
Telangana 255 10.84 9.5 1.34 2.68 35.912 2,909.12
Uttar Pradesh 255 10.73 9.5 1.23 2.68 32.964 2,879.64
Uttarakhand 255 10.18 9.5 0.68 2.68 18.224 2,732.24
Other States 255 9.5 9.5 0 2.68 0 2,550.00

2018-19 AAP based on the average FRP
State Base FRP
(INR/100 kg)
State recovery
rate (%)
FRP basic recovery
rate (%)
Amount of
excess
Premium rate
(INR/100 kg)
Actual premium
paid (INR/100 kg) AAP (INR/t)
Andhra Pradesh 261.25 9.33 9.5 -0.17 +2.75 0 2,612.50
Bihar 275 10.35 10 0.35 +2.75 9.625 2,846.25
Gujarat 275 10.65 10 0.65 +2.75 17.875 2,928.75
Haryana 275 10.31 10 0.31 +2.75 8.525 2,835.25
Karnataka 275 10.25 10 0.25 +2.75 6.875 2,818.75
Maharashtra 275 10.07 10 0.07 +2.75 1.925 2,769.25
Punjab 275 10.10 10 0.1 +2.75 2.75 2,777.50
Tamil Nadu 261.25 8.90 9.5 -0.6 +2.75 0 2,612.50
Telangana 275 10.21 10 0.21 +2.75 5.775 2,807.75
Uttar Pradesh 275 10.91 10 0.91 +2.75 25.025 3,000.25
Uttarakhand 275 10.91 10 0.91 +2.75 25.025 3,000.25
Other States 275 10 10 0 +2.75 0 2,750.00
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3.4 AAP based on the SAPs
3.18. The complainants submit that , as a general matter, in States where SAPs are i n force, the
SAP is higher than the FRP and should be used as the relevant AAP. 101 In those States where the
SAP distinguishes between different "varieties" of sugarcane , in the absence of specific data
regarding the amounts of the different varieties produced in different States, the complainants assert
that it is reasonable and appropriate to rely on the "middle" SAP (i.e. the price that is neither the
lowest nor the highest) as the relevant AAP.102
3.19. India does not contest the complainants' assertions regarding the amounts of the SAPs to be
used as AAPs.103
3.20. We recall that four States, namely Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, set SAPs that
distinguished between three varieties of sugarcane for each sugar seas on from 2014 -15 to
2018-19.104 For these four States, we agree with the complainants that it is reasonable to use the
SAP set for the middle category of sugarcane varieties. We consider this appropriate for the following
reasons. First, the parties have bee n unable to adduce data indicating the different quantities of
production of different varieties of sugarcane , and, in such circumstances , it is not possible to
calculate an appropriate weighted average SAP . Second, given that the SAPs contemplate three
different varieties, and that these varieties reflect the maturity period of the sugarcane, it seems
reasonable to us that a representative proportion of the relevant sugarcane will fall within the middle
category. Third, alternative approaches, such as usin g a simple average, or the highest or lowest
SAP, would, in our view, be a less accurate approach given that the middle SAP was presumably
determined by the State Governments in order to reflect a meaningful proportion of production .
Finally, India has no t presented any reasons to doubt the appropriateness or accuracy of this
approach.105
3.21. We recall that the SAP in Uttarakhand differentiated between two categories of sugarcane
varieties for the sugar seasons 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2018-19, and differentiated between three
categories of sugarcane varieties for the sugar seasons 2016-17 and 2017-18.106 For the latter two
seasons, we consider it appropriate to use the middle category as the relevant AAP, for the reasons
explained above.107 We note that, during these seasons, the relevant middle category was "normal"
varieties. We further note that, during th ese two seasons, "normal" varieties were distinguished
from "rejected" and "early" varieties. For the three sugar seasons for which the SAP only
distinguished between two categories, we note that the categories were "general" and "early". We
also observe that the SAPs for all seasons identified "early" varieties as a specific category of
varieties. Since "early" varieties were separately identified in all five sugar seasons, we understand
that the "general" varieties category captures both the "normal" and the "rejected" varieties of
sugarcane. We also consider that, based on its plain meaning, the category of "general" varieties is
likely to have been applicable to a greater proportion of sugarcane than the category of "early"
varieties of sugarcane. We therefore consider it appropriate, in quantifying the AAP in Uttarakhand
during the 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2018-19 sugar seasons, to rely on the "general" varieties price.
3.22. Finally, we recall that Tamil Nadu, during the 2014-15 to 2017-18 sugar seasons, applied an
SAP that was similar in structure to the FRP , in that the amount of the SAP depended on the
sugarcane recovery rate. We note, however, that under the Tamil Nadu SAP for each sugar season,
the premium rate was only payable if the recovery rate exceeded 9.5%.108 We have found that the
average recovery rate in Tamil Nadu did not exceed 9.5% in any season from 2014-15 to 2017-18.109

101 Brazil's first written submission, para. 35; Australia's first written submission, para. 41; G uatemala's
first written submission, para. 72.
102 Complainants' responses to Panel question No. 70(b).
103 See para. 3.3 above.
104 See paras. 2.12, 2.16, 2.19, and 2.25 above.
105 As a consequence of our decision to rely on the middle category of varieties, we note that it is not
necessary for us to resolve ambiguities or lack of clarity in the evidence regarding the least and most expensive
varieties. (See in particular fn 55 to para. 2.16 above)
106 See para. 2.27 above.
107 See para. 3.20 above.
108 See para. 2.22 above.
109 See para. 3.11 above.
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Consequently, the appropriate AAP in Tamil Nadu is, in our view, equivalent to the basic price
identified in the SAP, without needing to take into account the premium rate.
3.23. Based on the foregoing, we consider that the relevant AAPs based on the SAPs are as
follows110:
AAP based on the SAPs (INR/t)
State 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Bihar 2,600.00 2,600.00 2,800.00 2,800.00 2,900.00
Haryana 3,050.00 3,050.00 3,150.00 3,250.00 3,350.00
Punjab 2,850.00 2,850.00 2,900.00 3,000.00 3,000.00
Tamil Nadu 2,650.00 2,850.00 2,850.00 2,850.00 N/A
Uttar Pradesh 2,800.00 2,800.00 3,050.00 3,150.00 3,150.00
Uttarakhand 2,800.00 2,800.00 3,070.00 3,160.00 3,170.00

3.5 Summary
3.24. We note that, for all States that apply an SAP, the AAP based on the SAP is always higher
than the AAP based on the FRP.111 We recall that, in States where an SAP is applied, sugar producers
are required to pay whichever is the higher price as between the FRP and SAPs. 112 Accordingly, in
applying the methodology contained in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, we
consider that, for those States that apply an SAP, the AAP must be based on the SAP. For all other
States and seasons, the average FRP constitutes the relevant AAP.
3.25. To summarize, for the purposes of applying the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of
Annex 3, we consider it appropriate to rely on the following AAPs113:
AAP (INR/t)
State 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Andhra Pradesh 2,251.04 2,300.00 2,300.00 2,550.00 2,612.50
Bihar 2,600.00 2,600.00 2,800.00 2,800.00 2,900.00
Gujarat 2,427.36 2,510.54 2,556.52 2,820.68 2,928.75
Haryana 3,050.00 3,050.00 3,150.00 3,250.00 3,350.00
Karnataka 2,524.80 2,563.78 2,488.76 2,836.76 2,818.75
Maharashtra 2,703.44 2,708.98 2,708.98 2,976.12 2,769.25
Punjab 2,850.00 2,850.00 2,900.00 3,000.00 3,000.00
Tamil Nadu 2,650.00 2,850.00 2,850.00 2,850.00 2,612.50
Telangana 2,425.04 2,621.86 2,498.44 2,909.12 2,807.75
Uttar Pradesh 2,800.00 2,800.00 3,050.00 3,150.00 3,150.00
Uttarakhand 2,800.00 2,800.00 3,070.00 3,160.00 3,170.00
Other States 2,200.00 2,300.00 2,300.00 2,550.00 2,750.00

4 FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE
4.1. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that one component of the
calculation of market price support is the "fixed external reference price" (FERP). Paragraph 9 of
Annex 3 elaborates that the FERP is "based on the years 1986 to 19 88 and shall generally be the
average f.o.b. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net exporting country and
the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net importing country

110 See paras. 2.12, 2.16, 2.19, 2.22, 2.25, 2.27, 3.20, and 3.22 above. We convert INR per 100
kilogrammes to INR per tonnes, to accord with our calculations of the AAP based on the FRP.
111 Compare paras. 3.17 and 3.23 above.
112 See para. 2.3 above.
113 See paras. 3.17 and 3.23 above. We note that the complainants use these same AAPs in applying the
methodology set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. (See Brazil's Calculation of
India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA-1 (revised-3)), "C14-C20 AAPs (FRP+SAP)" spreadsheet;
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "AAP" spreadsheet;
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "AAP (FRP & SAP)"
spreadsheet)
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in the base period." A dditionally, under paragraph 9, the FERP "may be adjusted for quality
differences as necessary".
4.2. The complainants note that India's Supporting Tables, contained in document G/AG/AGST/IND
and identified in India's Schedule, indicate an FERP of INR 156.16 pe r tonnes.114 The complainants
observe that the FERP in India's Supporting Tables was calculated based on a recovery rate of
8.5%.115 Noting that recovery rates in India today are higher than 8.5% the complainants consider
that, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Annex 3, the FERP should be adjusted for "quality
differences" in order to reflect the different recovery rates in different States today.116 By replacing
the recovery rate of 8.5% (used in India's Supporting Tables) with updated average recovery rates
for different States and seasons, the complainants calculate adjusted FERP s for different States for
each season from 2014-15 to 2018-19.117
4.3. India does not comment on the complainants' assertions regarding the FERP, nor does India
object to the complainants' calculation of adjusted FERPs on a State-specific and seasonal basis.
4.4. In light of Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture118, we consider it appropriate to take into
account the FERP set out in India's Supporting Tables, identified in India's Schedule119, to determine
the amount of market price support provided to sugarcane producers for the 2014-15 to 2018-19
sugar seasons. We note, in this respect, that Supporting Table A of India's Schedule indicates an
FERP for sugarcane of INR 156.16 per tonne.120
4.5. We also observe that Supporting Table A sets out the "Calculation Details for estimating AMS
for Sugarcane". The methodology for calculating the FERP identified in India's Schedule entailed,
inter alia, dividing a "Computed International price of Sugar in terms of Sugarcane"121 by 11.76 to
determine the "Estimated External reference price of Sugarcane at 8.5% recovery". A clarifying note
indicates that "[t]he computed international price[] of sugar, less conversion costs, is converted to
sugarcane using a re covery rate of 8.5% for comparison with [the] domestic support price of
sugarcane".122 This calculation was performed for all three sugar seasons from 1986 -87 to
1988-1989, as well as the average rate over those three seasons. The average "Estimated External
reference price of Sugarcane at 8.5% recovery" is indicated as INR 156.16.123
4.6. It is uncontested by the parties that the "recovery rate" referred to in India's Supporting
Table A is a reference to the proportion of sugar that can be recovered from sugarcane. In our view,
a difference in the recovery rates of different sugarcane is indeed a relevant "quality difference"
within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Consequently, we agree with the complainants that,
pursuant to paragraph 9 of Annex 3, it is a ppropriate to adjust the FERP on the basis of any

114 Brazil's first written submission, para. 103; Australia's first written submission, paras. 158-160;
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 145 and 147. (referring to G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 28, column 4)
115 Brazil's first written submission, para. 104; Australia's first written submission, para. 160; Guatemala's
first written submission, paras. 145 and 147.
116 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 146-147; Australia's first written submission, paras. 161-162;
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 146-147.
117 Brazil's first written submission, para. 148; Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for
Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet; Australia's first written submission, para. 162;
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP" spreadsheet;
Guatemala's first written submission, para. 147; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45
(revised 12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet.
118 Pursuant to Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture, a Member's AMS during and after the
implementation period is to be "calc ulated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated
by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule". Similarly, Article 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture
indicates that the calculation of a Member's Total AMS, for any year during or after the implementation period,
is to be "in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6, and with the constituent data
and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's
Schedule".
119 Part IV, Section I of India's Schedule states, under the heading "Relevant Supporting Tables and
document reference": "AGST/IND: Supporting Tables refer."
120 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 28.
121 The "Computed International price of Sugar in terms of Sugarcane" was calc ulated for each season
from 1986-87 to 1988-89, by subtracting the "most efficient conversion cost of Sugar from Sugarcane" from the
"International Price of Sugar". (G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29)
122 G/AG/AGST/IND, note 3 on p. 29.
123 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29.
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differences in recovery rates from the 8.5% rate used to calculate the FERP in India's Supporting
Table A. We also agree with the complainants that, in light of Article 1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, any such adjustment should adhere as closely as possible to the methodology set out
in India's Supporting Table A. Finally, since recovery rates may differ across different States in India,
as well as over different seasons, we also agree with the complainants that an adjusted FERP should
be calculated for different States and seasons.124
4.7. We recall our findings regarding the relevant recovery rates in different States in India during
the sugar seasons 2014 -15 to 2018-19.125 We also note that India's Supporting Table A indicates
the average Computed International Price of Sugar for the three sugar seasons from 198 6-87 to
1988-89 as INR 1836.38 per tonne.126 In our view, it is consistent with the methodology set out in
India's Supporting Table A for us to calculate adjusted FERPs for different States by multiplying the
average Computed International Price of Sugar indicated in India's Supporting Table A (i.e.
INR 1836.38) by the average recovery rate in those States.127
4.8. We therefore calculate the relevant FERPs for different States and seasons as follows128:
FERP
 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
State
Comp.
int.
price of
sugar
(INR/
tonne)
Rec.
Rate
(%)
FERP
(INR/
tonne)
Rec.
Rate
(%)
FERP
(INR/
tonne)
Rec.
Rate
(%)
FERP
(INR/
tonne)
Rec.
Rate
(%)
FERP
(INR/
tonne)
Rec.
Rate
(%)
FERP
(INR/
tonne)
Andhra
Pradesh 1836.38 9.72 178.50 9.31 170.97 9.34 171.52 9.43 173.17 9.33 171.33
Bihar 1836.38 9.10 167.11 9.69 177.95 9.08 166.74 9.54 175.19 10.35 190.07
Gujarat 1836.38 10.48 192.45 10.37 190.43 10.56 193.92 10.51 193 10.65 195.57
Haryana 1836.38 9.89 181.62 9.39 172.44 10.19 187.13 10.46 192.09 10.31 189.33
Karnataka 1836.38 10.90 200.17 10.59 194.47 10.28 188.78 10.57 194.11 10.25 188.23
Maharashtra 1836.38 11.67 214.31 11.19 205.49 11.19 205.49 11.09 203.65 10.07 184.92
Punjab 1836.38 9.37 172.07 10.01 183.82 9.34 171.52 9.74 178.86 10.10 185.47
Tamil Nadu 1836.38 8.10 148.75 8.47 155.54 9.08 166.74 8.50 156.09 8.90 163.44
Telangana 1836.38 10.47 192.27 10.83 198.88 10.32 189.51 10.84 199.06 10.21 187.49
Uttar
Pradesh 1836.38 9.49 174.27 10.51 193.00 10.26 188.41 10.73 197.04 10.91 200.35
Uttarakhand 1836.38 9.15 168.03 9.52 174.82 8.20 150.58 10.18 186.94 10.91 200.35
Other States 1836.38 9.50 174.46 9.50 174.46 9.50 174.46 9.50 174.46 10 183.64

124 We also consider that this is a useful and relevant approach to take in light of the data adduced by the
complainants, which provides recovery rates for different States, as well as the fact that the AAP in India varies
across different States and seasons. (See para. 3.6 above)
125 See paras. 3.11 and 3.15 above.
126 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29.
127 We are aware that the Fixed External Reference Price for sugarcane indicated in Supporting Table A of
India's Schedule was calculated by dividing the Computed International Price for Sugar by 11.76, rather than
multiplying by 0.085. The complainants submit that this difference is not relevant to the determination of an
adjusted FERP in these disputes. Brazil also states that, in its view, dividing by 11.76 was reasonable, given that
"the price of 1 kg of sugar would equal the price of approximately 11.76 kg of sugarcane, … rounded to two
decimal places". India, for its part, submits that "dividing a figure by 11.76 is indeed equal to calculating 8.5 per
cent of that figure". (See parties' responses to Panel question No. 62(b)) For our purposes, we note that
Supporting Table A clearly indicates that this calculation was intended to "convert" an international reference
price for sugar into a reference price for sugarcane, using the average recovery rate in India of 8.5%.
(G/AG/AGST/IND, note 3 on p. 29)
128 For the computed international price of sugar, see India's Schedule, Supporting Table A
(G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29). Our findings regarding rel evant recovery rates are set out at paras. 3.11 and 3.15
above. The FERPs for different States and seasons are determined by calculat ing the decimal equivalent of the
recovery rate (i.e. dividing by 100) and multiplying the result by the computed international price of sugar. We
note that India's Schedule identifies an FERP accurate to two decimal places. (See G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29) In
applying the paragraph 8 methodology, the complainants, however, rely on precise FERP figures. (See Brazil's
Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA-1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet;
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, ( Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP" spreadsheet;
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet)
We recall that Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that AMS shoul d be calculated " taking
into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated " in
Members' Schedules. For our purposes, we consider it appropriate to rely on an FERP that is accurate to two
decimal places, in accordance with the constituent data and methodology contained in India's Schedule.
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5 QUANTITY OF ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION
5.1. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that one of the components
in the calculation of market price support is the "quantity of production eligible to receive the applied
administered price". We refer to this as the "quantity of eligible production" (QEP).
5.2. The complainants note that paragraph 8 of Annex 3 refers to the quantity of production
"eligible" to receive the AAP and not the quantity of production that "actually" receives the AAP.129
The complainants argue that all sugarcane produced in India is eligible to receive the FRP. 130 The
complainants also assert that, in States where an SAP applies, all sugarcane produced in that State
is eligible for the SAP. 131 Since there is no limitation in India's legal framework on the quantity of
sugarcane that is required to be purchased at the AAP, the complainants submit that all production
of sugarcane is eligible to be purchased at the AAP.132 The complainants provide data regarding the
quantity of sugarcane production in India on a State-specific and seasonal basis.133
5.3. India does not contest the complainants' assertions regarding the QEP.
5.4. We recall that paragraph 8 of Annex 3 refers to the "quantity of production eligible to receive
the applied administered price". 134 In our view, this shows that the QEP signifies the amount of
production that is eligible to receive the AAP, and not the amount of production that actually received
the AAP. We note that our approach finds support in findings made in past disputes on the same
issue.135 We further note that India does not contest this understanding of the QEP.
5.5. In our view, the evidence adduced by the parties regarding the content and operation of the
FRP and SAPs confirms the complainants' assertion that there is no limitation on the quantity of
sugarcane that is eligible to be purchased at the AAP in India.136 We therefore turn to determine,
based on the evidence adduced by the complainants, the total quantity of sugarcane production in
relevant States for each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19.
5.6. Based on our review of the evidence, we find that the relevant QEPs for different States and
seasons were as follows137:

129 Brazil's first written submission, para. 109; Australia's first written submission, paras. 12 4-130;
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 123-126.
130 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 150 -152; Australia's first written submission, para. 16 4;
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 150-152.
131 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 156 and 159; Australia's first written submission, para. 164;
Guatemala's first written submission, para. 152.
132 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 150-152; Australia's first written submission, paras. 164-165;
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 150-152.
133 For the seasons from 2014 -15 to 2016 -17, the c omplainants refer to Directorate of Sugarcane
Development, Sugarcane in India: State wise Production (Exhibit JE-140). For the 2017-18 and 2018-19 seasons,
the complainants refer to Department of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare: 1st advance estimates for 201 9-20,
(Exhibit JE-141). (Brazil's first written submission, fn 376 to Table C-8; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations,
(Exhibit AUS-1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "Production" spreadsheet; Guatemala's response to Panel question
No. 72; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "QEP" spreadsheet)
(Australia also refers to First Advance Estimates of Production of Foodgrains for 2019-20, Ministry of Agriculture
and Farmers Welfare, 23 September 2019 (Exhibit AUS -49) (Australia's first written submission, fn 575 to
Table 17))
134 Emphasis added.
135 See Panel Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 831; China – Agricultural Producers,
para. 7.296; and Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 120.
136 See sections 2.1 and 2.2 above.
137 For the sugar seasons 2014-15 to 2016-17, see Directorate of Sugarcane Development, Sugarcane in
India: State wise Production (Exhibit JE-140). For the 2017-18 and 2018-19 sugar seasons, see Department of
Agriculture & Farmers Welfare: 1st advance estimates for 2019 -20, (Exhibit JE -141). Where there are
discrepancies between Exhibits JE-140 and JE-141, for instance with respect to the data for the 2017 -18 sugar
season, we have relied on the most recent data (i.e. Exhibit JE -141) on the basis that the most up -to-date
statistics are likely to be more accurate. (See parties' responses to Panel question No. 64) We also note that the
data in Exhibit JE-140 is indicated in "lakh tonnes". We understand from the complainants that one lakh refers
to one hundred thousand (i.e. 100,000). (Brazil's first written submission, fn 3 to Table 1; Australia's first written
submission, p. 27; Guatemala's first written submission, p. v) India does not contest this understanding. We
further note that the residual "other" States entries in Exhibits JE -140 and JE-141 refer to States different from
WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1

QEP (thousands of tonnes)
State 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Andhra Pradesh 9,987 9,353 7,830 7,789.6 8,091.2
Bihar 14,034 12,649 13,036 13,824.6 11,660.9
Gujarat 14,330 11,120 11,950 12,072.1 12,036.4
Haryana 7,169 6,692 8,223 9,632.9 7,570.6
Karnataka 43,776 37,834 27,378 31,135.2 42,006.3
Maharashtra 84,699 73,680 52,262 82,984.0 92,442.6
Punjab 7,039 6,607 7,152 8,023.7 7,773.7
Tamil Nadu 28,093 25,494 18,988 17,154 16,207.6
Telangana 3,343 2,405 2,061 2,604.5 2,800
Uttar Pradesh 133,061 145,385 140,169 177,033.3 179,714.8
Uttarakhand 6,165 5,886 6,477 6,271.4 6,329.3
Other States 10,634 11,343 10,544 11,379.6 13,523.4

6 CALCULATION OF MARKET PRICE SUPPORT
6.1. Having determined the individual components of the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, we proceed to apply that methodology to calculate the
amount of market price support provided to sugarcane producers in different States and seasons .
We also sum up these State totals to determine the total market price support provided to all
sugarcane producers in India during each season.
6.2. For the reasons set out in this Appendix, we conclude that India provided market price support
to sugarcane producers, during each sugar season from 2014-15 to 2018-19, as follows138:
Market price support (2014-15 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Andhra Pradesh 178.50 2,251.04 9,987 20,698.46
Bihar 167.11 2,600.00 14,034 34,143.18
Gujarat 192.45 2,427.36 14,330 32,026.26
Haryana 181.62 3,050.00 7,169 20,563.42
Karnataka 200.17 2,524.80 43,776 101,763.00
Maharashtra 214.31 2,703.44 84,699 210,826.82
Punjab 172.07 2,850.00 7,039 18,849.95
Tamil Nadu 148.75 2,650.00 28,093 70,267.62
Telangana 192.27 2,425.04 3,343 7,464.15
Uttar Pradesh 174.27 2,800.00 133,061 349,382.26
Uttarakhand 168.03 2,800.00 6,165 16,226.10
Other States 174.46 2,200.00 10,634 21,539.59
Total – All India 903,750.80

the "Other States" for which we require data. We therefore calculate the relevant figures for our purposes by
subtracting the sum of production for the relevant individual States from the "Grand Total"/"All -India" figures
indicated in Exhibits JE-140 and JE-141. In this respect, we observe that the figures indicated in Exhibits JE-140
and JE-141 regarding the "Grand Total"/"All-India" sugar production are further substantiated by First Advance
Estimates of Production of Foodgrains for 2019-20, 23 September 2019, (Exhibit AUS-49). Finally, we note that
our determination of the relevant QEP figures corresponds to the figures identified by the complainants. (See
Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C8 Production"
spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "Production"
spreadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "QEP"
spreadsheet)
138 See paras. 3.25, 4.8, and 5.6 above. We calculate market price support (i.e. MPS) by multiplying the
difference between the FERP and the AAP by the QEP, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, and dividing the result by 1,000 to yield a figure representing millions of INR, rounded
to two decimal places. The amount of market price support for "Total – All India" is calculated by summing the
various amounts of market price support provided in each State during each season. We recognize that the
results of our calculations differ marginally from the results of the complainants' calculations. We understand
that these differences result from our reliance on an FERP rounded to two decimal figures, in accorda nce with
the FERP set forth in India's Schedule, rather than the precise FERP figures relied upon by the complainants.
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Market price support (2015-16 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Andhra Pradesh 170.97 2,300.00 9,353 19,912.82
Bihar 177.95 2,600.00 12,649 30,636.51
Gujarat 190.43 2,510.54 11,120 25,799.62
Haryana 172.44 3,050.00 6,692 19,256.63
Karnataka 194.47 2,563.78 37,834 89,640.47
Maharashtra 205.49 2,708.98 73,680 184,457.14
Punjab 183.82 2,850.00 6,607 17,615.45
Tamil Nadu 155.54 2,850.00 25,494 68,692.56
Telangana 198.88 2,621.86 2,405 5,827.27
Uttar Pradesh 193.00 2,800.00 145,385 379,018.70
Uttarakhand 174.82 2,800.00 5,886 15,451.81
Other States 174.46 2,300.00 11,343 24,110.00
Total – All India 880,418.99

Market price support (2016-17 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Andhra Pradesh 171.52 2,300.00 7,830 16,666.00
Bihar 166.74 2,800.00 13,036 34,327.18
Gujarat 193.92 2,556.52 11,950 28,233.07
Haryana 187.13 3,150.00 8,223 24,363.68
Karnataka 188.78 2,488.76 27,378 62,968.85
Maharashtra 205.49 2,708.98 52,262 130,837.39
Punjab 171.52 2,900.00 7,152 19,514.09
Tamil Nadu 166.74 2,850.00 18,988 50,949.74
Telangana 189.51 2,498.44 2,061 4,758.70
Uttar Pradesh 188.41 3,050.00 140,169 401,106.21
Uttarakhand 150.58 3,070.00 6,477 18,909.08
Other States 174.46 2,300.00 10,544 22,411.69
Total – All India 815,045.69

Market price support (2017-18 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Andhra Pradesh 173.17 2,550.00 7,789.6 18,514.55
Bihar 175.19 2,800.00 13,824.6 36,286.95
Gujarat 193 2,820.68 12,072.1 31,721.62
Haryana 192.09 3,250.00 9,632.9 29,456.54
Karnataka 194.11 2,836.76 31,135.2 82,279.44
Maharashtra 203.65 2,976.12 82,984.0 230,070.65
Punjab 178.86 3,000.00 8,023.7 22,635.98
Tamil Nadu 156.09 2,850.00 17,154 46,211.33
Telangana 199.06 2,909.12 2,604.5 7,058.35
Uttar Pradesh 197.04 3,150.00 177,033.3 522,772.25
Uttarakhand 186.94 3,160.00 6,271.4 18,645.25
Other States 174.46 2,550.00 11,379.6 27,032.69
Total – All India 1,072,685.61

Market price support (2018-19 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Andhra Pradesh 171.33 2,612.50 8,091.2 19,751.99
Bihar 190.07 2,900.00 11,660.9 31,600.22
Gujarat 195.57 2,928.75 12,036.4 32,897.65
Haryana 189.33 3,350.00 7,570.6 23,928.17
Karnataka 188.23 2,818.75 42,006.3 110,498.41
Maharashtra 184.92 2,769.25 92,442.6 238,902.18
Punjab 185.47 3,000.00 7,773.7 21,879.31
Tamil Nadu 163.44 2,612.50 16,207.6 39,693.38
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Market price support (2018-19 sugar season)
State FERP
(INR per tonne)
AAP
(INR per tonne)
QEP
(thousands m/t)
MPS
(millions INR)
Telangana 187.49 2,807.75 2,800 7,336.73
Uttar Pradesh 200.35 3,150.00 179,714.8 530,095.76
Uttarakhand 200.35 3,170.00 6,329.3 18,795.81
Other States 183.64 2,750.00 13,523.4 34,705.91
Total – All India 1,110,085.53