EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 28 April 2005
Document codes: WT/DS265/AB/R; WT/DS266/AB/R; WT/DS283/AB/R
Complainant: Thailand
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Australia, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, New Zealand, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Eswatini, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S., Côte d’Ivoire
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 3.3, 8, 9.1, 10.1  AgricultureArt. 3.1, 3.2  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR

AB-2005-2

Report of the Appellate Body

W
ORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
APPELLATE BODY

European Communities, Appellant/Appellee
Australia, Appellant/Appellee
Brazil, Appellant/Appellee
Thailand, Appellant/Appellee

Barbados, Third Participant
Belize, Third Participant
Canada, Third Participant
China, Third Participant
Colombia, Third Participant
Côte d'Ivoire, Third Participant
Cuba, Third Participant
Fiji, Third Participant
Guyana, Third Participant
India, Third Participant
Jamaica, Third Participant
Kenya, Third Participant
Madagascar, Third Participant
Malawi, Third Participant
Mauritius, Third Participant
New Zealand, Third Participant
Paraguay, Third Participant
St. Kitts & Nevis, Third Participant
Swaziland, Third Participant
Tanzania, Third Participant
Trinidad & Tobago, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

 AB-2005-2

 Present:

 Ganesan, Presiding Member
 Janow, Member
 Taniguchi, Member

I. Introduction
1. The European Communities appeal s certain issues of law and legal interpretations contained
in the Panel Reports, European Communities − Export Subsidies on Sugar (the "Panel Reports"). 1

1Complaint by Australia , , 15 October 2004; Complaint by Brazil , ,
15 October 2004; Complaint by Thailand, , 15 October 2004.

The Panel was established
 2 to consider complaints by Australia, Brazil, and Thailand (the
"Complaining Parties") regarding export subsidi es for sugar and sugar-containing products accorded
under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 ("EC Regulation 1260/2001") and
related instruments (together, the "EC sugar regime").
2. EC Regulation 1260/2001 is valid for the marketing years 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 and
establishes, inter alia: quotas for sugar production; an inte rvention price for raw and white sugar,
respectively; a basic price and a minimum price for beet for quota sugar production; quota (that is,
"A" and "B") sugar as well as non-quota (that is, "C") sugar
 3; import and export licensing
requirements; producer levies; and preferential import arrangements. Furt hermore, the EC sugar
regime provides "export refunds" to its sugar exporte rs for certain quantities of sugar, other than
C sugar. These "refunds", which are direct expo rt subsidies, cover the difference between the
European Communities' internal market price and th e prevailing world market price for sugar. Non-
quota sugar (that is, C sugar) must be exported, unl ess it is carried forward, but no "export refunds"
are provided for such exports. The factual aspects of the EC sugar regime are set out in greater detail
in the Panel Reports.4
3. The Complaining Parties claimed before th e Panel that, under the EC sugar regime, the
European Communities provided ex port subsidies for sugar in excess of its reduction commitment
levels specified in Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule 5, in violation of certain
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (the "SCM Agreement") governing export subsidies.6 The Complaining Parties alleged that
such subsidies in excess of th e European Communities' reduction co mmitment levels were provided

2On 9 July 2003, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand each made a separate request for the establishment of
a panel (WT/DS265/21; WT/DS266/21; and WT/DS283/2 (attached as Annexes 1, 2, and 3 to this Report,
respectively)). On 29 August 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB"), pursuant to Article 9.1 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"), established one
single panel to examine these three complaints. At the request of the European Communities, pursuant to
Article 9.2 of the DSU, the Panel issued three separate, but identical reports, one for each Complaining Party.
3The EC sugar regime establishes two categories of production quotas: one for A sugar and one for
B sugar. These quotas constitute the maximum quantities eligible for domestic price support and direct export
subsidies. C sugar is simply sugar produced in excess of A and B quotas. There is no difference in physical
characteristics between A, B, and C sugar. Likewise, th ere is no difference in phys ical characteristics between
A, B, and C beet. C beet is simply beet used for C sugar production. Unlike for A and B beet, there is no
minimum guaranteed price for C beet.
4See Panel Reports, paras. 3.1-3.15.
5Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule is attached as Annex 4 to this Report.
6The provisions of the covered ag reements alleged by the Complaining Parties to be violated are
Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a), 9.1(c), and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement.

to exports of C sugar as well as to sugar equivale nt in volume to sugar imported into the European
Communities under preferential arrangements with certain African–Caribbean–Pacific countries
 7
(the "ACP Countries") and India.
4. The Panel Reports were circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") on
15 October 2004. The Panel concluded, at paragraph 8.1 of the Panel Reports, that:
(a) the European Communities' budgetary outla y and quantity commitment levels for
exports of subsidized sugar are determined with reference to the entry specified in
Section II, Part IV of its Schedule, and the content of Footnote 1 thereto in relation to
these entries is of no legal effect and does not enlarge or otherwise modify the
European Communities' specified commitment levels;
(b) the European Communities' quantity commitm ent level for exports of sugar pursuant
to Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture is 1,273,500 tonnes per year,
effective from the marketing year 2000/2001;
(c) the European Communities' budgetary outlay commitment level for exports of sugar
pursuant to Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture is €499.1 million per
year, effective from the marketing year 2000/2001;
(d) the Complaining Parties have provided prima facie evidence that, since 1995, the
European Communities' total exports of s ugar exceed its quantity commitment level.
In particular, in the marketing year 2000/2001, the European Communities exported
4,097,000 tonnes of sugar, that is, 2,823,500 tonnes in excess of its commitment level;
(e) there is prima facie evidence that the European Communities has been providing
export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture
to what the European Communities considers to be exports of "ACP/India equivalent
sugar" since 1995; and
(f) there is prima facie evidence that the European Communities has been providing
export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
to its exports of C sugar since 1995.

7The third participant ACP countries in this appeal are: Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana,
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts & Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trinidad &
Tobago.

5. In a communication dated 2 December 2004, Australia, Brazil, the European Communities,
and Thailand informed the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") of a "procedural
agreement" concluded between these four parti es regarding the 60-day period provided for in
Article 16.4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(the "DSU")
8 for the adoption or appeal of the Panel Reports. The parties requested the DSB to
postpone the consideration of the Panel Reports and to agree to th e extension of the time period in
Article 16.4 of the DSU until 31 January 2005. At a meeting held on 13 December 2004, the DSB
took note of these requests and agreed that it woul d adopt the Panel Reports on or before 31 January
2005, unless the DSB decided by consensus not to do so , or a party notified the DSB of its decision to
appeal.9
6. On 13 January 2005, the European Communities no tified the DSB of its intention to appeal
certain issues of law covered in the Panel Reports and certain legal interpre tations developed by the
Panel, pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Appeal 10 pursuant to Rule 20 of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the "Working Procedures").11
7. After consultation with the Appellate Body Secretariat, the European Communities and
Australia, Brazil, and Thailand agreed, in letters filed on 19 January 2005, that it would not be
possible for the Appellate Body to circulate its Re port in this appeal within the 90-day time limit
referred to in Article 17.5 of the DSU. The European Communities and Australia, Brazil, and
Thailand accordingly confirmed that they would deem the Appellate Body Report in this proceeding,
issued no later than 28 April 2005, to be an Appella te Body Report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5
of the DSU.12
8. On 20 January 2005, the European Comm unities filed an appellant's submission. 13 O n
25 January 2005, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand each notified the DSB of an intention to appeal
certain issues of law covered in the Panel Reports and certain legal interpre tations developed by the
Panel, pursuant to Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Other Appeal 14

8WT/DS265/24, WT/DS266/24, WT/DS283/5.
9WT/DSB/M/179, paras. 8-9.
10WT/DS265/25, WT/DS266/25, WT/DS283/6 (attached as Annex 5 to this Report).
11WT/AB/WP/5, 4 January 2005.
12On 24 January 2005, the Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB that the expected date of
circulation of its Report was 28 April 2005 (WT/DS265/26, WT/DS266/26, WT/DS283/7).
13Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedures.
14WT/DS265/27; WT/DS266/27; and WT/DS283/8 (attached as Annexes 6, 7, and 8 to this Report,
respectively).

pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures . On 28 January 2005, Australia, Brazil, and
Thailand each filed an othe r appellant's submission.
15 On 7 February 2005, Australia, Brazil, the
European Communities, and Thailand each filed an appellee's submission. 16 On the same day,
Canada, China, New Zealand, and the United States each filed a third participant's submission, and
Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
St. Kitts & Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trin idad & Tobago filed a joint third participant's
submission as the "ACP Countries". 17 On the same day, Colombia, Cuba, India, and Paraguay
notified their intention to appear at the oral hearing as third participants.18
9. On 28 January 2005, the Appellate Body received an amicus curiae brief from the
Association of Central American Sugar Industries (Azucareros del Istmo Cent roamericano (AICA)).
The Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal (the "Division") did not find it necessary to take this
amicus curiae brief into account.
10. By letter dated 10 February 2005, Canada requested authorization from the Division, pursuant
to Rule 18(5) of the Working Procedures, to correct a "typographical error" in its third participant's
submission.19 On 15 February 2005, the Division, pursuant to Rule 18(5) of the Working Procedures,
invited all participants and third participants to comment on Canada's request. None of the
participants objected to Canada's request. On 17 February 2005, the Division authorized Canada to
correct the error in its third participant's submission, identified in its letter of 10 February 2005.
11. On 17 February 2005, Mauritius informed the Appellate Body that the ACP Countries were
proposing to retain, for the oral hearing before the Appellate Body, the services of a legal counsel that
had also been retained by two associations for European sugar and beet producers. Australia
commented on the letter from Mauritius by letter date d 23 February 2005, noting that "representation
of 'the ACP' in the oral hearing by counsel concurrently engaged by private sector bodies in respect of
the same dispute could raise concerns about a pe rceived or apprehended conflict with the basic
principle that appearance and representation before the Appellate Body is limited to Members and
their counsel."
20 In response to Australia's comments, Mauritius confirmed, in a letter dated
28 February 2005, that its legal counsel appearing on its behalf at the hearing "would be doing so

15Pursuant to Rule 23.3 of the Working Procedures.
16Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
17Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
18Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
19Letter from Canada to the Presiding Member of the Division.
20Letter from Australia to the Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat.

solely as representatives of the WTO Member ACP th ird participants, and not as representatives of
either the ACP (which includes WTO Members who are not participants in this dispute) or of the
counsel's other private clients."
21
12. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 7 and 8 March 2005. The participants and third
participants presented oral arguments (with the ex ception of Colombia, Cuba, India, and Paraguay)
and responded to questions posed by the Members of the Division hearing the appeal.

II. Arguments of the Participants and the Third Participants
A. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant
1. The Panel's Terms of Reference
13. The European Communities appeals the Panel's find ing that the alleged payments in the form
of low-priced sales of C beet to C sugar producers were within the Panel's terms of reference. 22
According to the European Communities, in rejec ting the European Communities' assertion that this
"claim" was not within its terms of reference, the Panel misinterpreted the notions of a "claim" and an
"argument".
14. The European Communities submits that a simple reference to the measure at issue as the
export subsidies granted under EC Regulation 1260/ 2001, or even more vaguely, under the EC sugar
regime, is not sufficient for identification of the " specific measure at issue", as required by Article 6.2
of the DSU. This is because the operational pr ovisions of EC Regulation 1260/2001 are contained in
as many as 51 articles, with seven annexes a nd numerous paragraphs and sections, and those
provisions lay down a regulatory regime of great complexity.
23
15. Furthermore, according to the European Commun ities, "[e]ven assuming that a reference to
[EC] Regulation 1260/2001 or to the EC sugar re gime were 'specific' enough, the panel requests
would still fail to 'provide a brief summary of the lega l basis' [of the complaint] that is 'sufficient to
present the problem clearly' ", as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. 24 To meet that requirement, the
Complaining Parties should have identified in thei r panel requests, "albeit in summary form, each of

21Letter from Mauritius to the Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat.
22European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 40 (referring to Panel Reports, paras. 7.18-
7.37).
23Ibid., para. 60.
24Ibid., para. 62.

the export subsidies which they considered to be provided by [EC] Regulation 1260/2001".
25 T h e
Complaining Parties identified an alleged export subs idy with respect to "payments" in the form of
sales of C sugar, but their panel requests contained no suggestion to the effect that the sales of C beet
at low prices also posed a "problem", let alone explain how such a "problem" would arise. 26
Therefore, according to the Europ ean Communities, in respect of sales of C beet at low prices, the
panel requests did not "present[] the problem clearly", as required by Article 6.2.27
16. The European Communities also argues that the provision of Article 10.3 of the Agreement
on Agriculture relating to burden of proof does not exclude or limit the application of Article 6.2 of
the DSU. According to the European Communities, "[t]he issue of who bears the burden of proof
must not be confused with the distinct and previous issue of who must state the claims in a dispute." 28
Referring to the Appellate Body Report in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) ,
the European Communities argu es that a complaining party is required to identify all alleged export
subsidies in order to have complied with the requirements in Article 6.2 of the DSU.
2. Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule
17. The European Communities appeals the Panel's finding that Footnote 1 to Section II,
Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule ("Footnote 1") is "of no legal effect".29
18. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in finding that the ordinary meaning
of the terms of Footnote 1 does not indicate any limitation on export subsidies that may be provided
to sugar of ACP and Indian origin. 30 According to the European Communities, "[h]ad the Panel
properly examined the context of the second sentence [of Footnote 1], it would have realised that the
reference to 1.6 million tonnes is intended as a limitation." 31 The European Communities emphasizes

26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., para. 72.
29Ibid., para. 79; Panel Reports, para. 7.222.
30The text of Footnote 1 reads:
Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin on which the
Community is not making any reduction commitments. The average of
export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1,6 mio t.

that "[i]f Footnote 1 is simply an exclusion, ther e would be no need to insert the second sentence, and
no reason to refer to the 1.6 million tonnes as the average during [the] 1986-1990 base period."
32
19. The European Communities argues that the Pane l failed to consider "uncontested evidence
showing that the EC had treated the lower of the level of ACP/India imports and 1.6 million tonnes as
a limitation on its ability to provide export subsidies on exported sugar." 33 The Panel also erred in
finding that the notifications by the European Communities to the WTO Committee on Agriculture
were relevant to the issue of whether there is a li mitation in Footnote 1. According to the European
Communities, the notifications simply reflected the meaning of Footnote 1 that the European
Communities was assuming no reduction commitments with respect to its exports of sugar of ACP
and Indian origin.
20. The European Communities submits that the Pa nel erred in its conclusion that Footnote 1
covers only re-exports of sugar of ACP/Indian origin and that it does not cover an amount of
subsidized sugar "equivalent" to the amount of s ugar imported from those countries. The European
Communities points out that the term "export" in the phrase "average of export" in the second
sentence of Footnote 1 must have the same meaning as "exports" in the first sentence, and that this
clearly shows that Footnote 1 refers to "the equi valent quantity of ACP/India sugar that had been
imported".34
21. The European Communities further requests the Appellate Body to find that the Panel erred in
finding that Footnote 1, interpreted as a limitation, is inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 9.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture . The European Communities asserts, first, that Article 3.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture does not require a Member to have scheduled both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitments. The European Communitie s submits that paragraph 11 of the "Modalities
Paper" 35 refers to scheduling both such commitments , but that obligation was assumed by the
participants in the negotiations; it was not carried over into the Agreement on Agriculture. Referring
to the text of Article 3.3, the European Communities points out that the use of the word "and" in that
Article is simply as a conjunctive and it does not imply a requirement that WTO Members undertake
both budgetary outlay and quantity commitments. A ccording to the European Communities, "[t]he
obligation in Article 3.3 is only to provide Article 9.1-listed subsidies in conformity with whatever

32European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 97. (footnote omitted)
33Ibid., para. 101.
34Ibid., para. 115. (footnote omitted)
35Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Bi nding Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the
Market Access Group, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993.

commitments are found in a Member's schedule."
36 The European Communities submits that the
same applies to Articles 9.2(a) and 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture, "which both mention
the existence of the two forms of commitments, wit hout implying that a Member must always have
scheduled both."37
22. Turning to the chapeau of Article 9.1, th e European Communities asserts that "[t]he
normative content of Article 9.1 ... is not to impo se reductions, but to define the scope of those
subsidies which are permitted within commitment levels." 38 The European Communities adds that,
even assuming that there is an obligation in Article 9.1 to reduce export subsidy commitment levels,
the European Communities has complied with this obligation by reducing "the overall ceiling of its
commitments [for sugar] over the implementation period".39
23. Finally, the European Communities submits that, even assuming arguendo that Footnote 1 is
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture , "there is no hierarchy between the export subsidy
commitments in a Member's schedule and the Agreement on Agriculture ."40 According to the
European Communities, a finding that one provision or set of provisions prevails over another should
be made only where explicit permission exists to set aside all or part of a treaty. Such a possibility
would exist in situations covered by the General interpretative note to Annex 1A to the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the " WTO Agreement") or in situations
covered by the report of the GATT panel in US – Sugar , which held that a Member could not
derogate in its Schedule from other obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(the "GATT").
24. The European Communities, moreover, disagrees with the Panel that Article 8 of the
Agreement on Agriculture can be interpreted to mean that "a Member's Schedule cannot provide for
non-compliance with provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture ".
41 According to the European
Communities, Article 8 merely provides that a Member must respect both the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture and its Schedule. The European Communities adds that the Panel did not
point to any other provision that would support its finding that the Agreement on Agriculture would
prevail over a provision contained in a Schedule.

37Ibid., para. 139.
38Ibid., para. 148.
39Ibid., para. 149.
40Ibid., para. 156.

3. Payments under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture

(a) Payments in the Form of Below-cost Sales of C Beet
25. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in finding that sales of C beet are
"financed by virtue of governmental action" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), and sets out four
arguments in its appeal from th e Panel's finding. First, the European Communities argues that the
Panel misconstrued the phrase "by virtue of gove rnmental action". The European Communities
refers to findings of the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US)
and Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) , and argues that the Panel
"misconstrued" the phrase "by virtue of " 42 to mean that an export subsidy exists because
governmental action "enable[s]" beet growers to finance and make payments.43
26. Secondly, the European Communities argues that the Panel failed to cite evidence in support
of its assertion that a "significant" percentage of farmers are "likely to finance sales of C beet below
the costs of production as a result of participation in the domestic market in selling high priced A and
B beet".
44 Instead, according to the European Commun ities, even by the Complaining Parties' own
evidence, profits obtained with the sales of A and B beet would be "largely insufficient" to cover all
the fixed costs of producing C beet. 45 The sales of A and B beet were profitable only in two of the
three most recent marketing years, and the profits account for "barely 13 and 27 per cent" of all the
fixed costs of producing C beet. 46 Moreover, the price of C beet in the last ten years did not cover
even the marginal cost of producing C beet. According to the European Communities, this shows that
the production of C beet is not "financed by virtue of governmental action", but instead is largely the
result of other factors independent of governmental action.
27. Thirdly, the European Communities submits that governmental action in the European
Communities' beet market is less pervasive than in the Canada – Dairy dispute. European
Communities authorities do not exercise a comparable de gree of control in the beet market. Although
the EC sugar regime fixes minimum prices for A and B beet, it leaves the beet growers "totally free"
to decide whether or not to produce C beet, to plan their production as they wish, and to agree on

42European Communities' appellant's submission, heading VI.C.1.
43Ibid., para. 268.
45Ibid., para. 279.
46Ibid.

C beet prices with the sugar producers.
47 C beet growers are also free to use or sell C beet for other
purposes such as animal fodder, alcohol, or yeast, wh ile C sugar produced with C beet can be carried
forward. No such flexibility or alternatives existed in the Canada – Dairy dispute.
28. Fourthly, according to the Europ ean Communities, the Panel disregarded factors that do not
involve governmental action, but that do affect in a significant way the supply and prices of C beet,
such as yield fluctuations and the "unint ended" nature of a "substantial part"
48 of C beet production,
agronomic factors, the possibility that high prices for A and B beet may finance other alternative
crops, as well as the differences between dairy and b eet farming. The Panel either did not address
these factors or dismissed them without proper cons ideration. In the European Communities' view,
given the role of these other factors, the "nexus " between "governmental action" and the alleged
payments cannot be considered "tight" enough for a finding that sales of C beet are financed by virtue
of governmental action.
49
(b) Payments in the Form of "Cross-subsidization"
29. The European Communities appeals the Panel's fi nding that the producers of C sugar receive
export subsidies through "cross-subsidization" with in the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement
on Agriculture.50 According to the European Communities, cross-subsidization does not constitute a
"payment" as it does not involve a "transfer of resources" to the sugar producers. 51 The existence of a
transfer of resources "implies, by definition, the presence of two different parties, one which grants
the resources and another which receives them". 52 In contrast, the Panel's interpretation of "cross-
subsidization" involves "an internal allocation of each sugar producer's own resources" instead of a
"transfer of resources". 53 The European Communities submits that the Panel's interpretation of
Article 9.1(c) "would effectively read out of that provision the requirement that there must be a
'payment on the export' and turn it into a prohibition of low priced exports" or a "sort of blunt anti-
dumping instrument".
54 According to the European Communiti es, "[o]n the Panel's own theory", the
only relevant transfer of resources in the presen t case would take place from European Communities'

48Ibid., para. 287.
49Ibid., paras. 264, 268, and 291.
50Panel Reports, para. 7.314.
52Ibid., para. 183.
53Ibid., para. 179.
54Ibid., para. 180.

consumers to the sugar producers.
55 However, the Panel failed to examine that aspect and did not
ascertain whether the price paid by the European Communities' consumers was above any objective
benchmark.
30. The European Communities further contends that "cross-subsidization" cannot be considered
to provide a subsidy because the "transfer of res ources" confers no benefit on the sugar producers. 56
Further, the Panel erred in finding that Article 9. 1(c) does not require the de monstration of a benefit
for a measure to constitute a payment within the m eaning of that provision. "[T]he existence of a
'benefit' is always inherent in the notion of 'subs idy', so that there can be no subsidy without the
corresponding benefit." 57 The European Communities argues th at the Panel's conclusion regarding
cross-subsidization is not supported by the findings of the Appellate Body in Canada − Dairy. The
Appellate Body in Canada − Dairy did not hold that "cross-financing" or "cross-subsidization" by the
milk producers was in itself a payment, but rather found the payment to exist in the sale of export
milk to cheese producers.58 The European Communities also submits that the Panel's interpretation of
Article 9.1(c) has no equivalent in the SCM Agreement and that there is "no apparent reason" why
agricultural products should be subject to stricter disciplines than other products.59 Finally, according
to the European Communities, the Panel's interpretation was not envisaged by the drafters of the
Agreement on Agriculture; in this context, the European Commu nities refers to price support systems
for sugar in other WTO Members and argues that the Panel's interpretation would have "sweeping and
totally unintended consequences".60
31. The European Communities also di sagrees with the Panel's finding that the alleged payments
are made "on the export". 61 The European Communities affirms that the Panel's finding that the
payments were "on the export" is based on a misint erpretation of that requirement. The European
Communities states that "the term 'on the export' must be read as meaning 'contingent on' exports,
rather than simply 'in connection with' or to the 'advantage' of exports."62 The European Communities
argues that the alleged payments are not contingent on exports of C sugar, given that there is no
requirement to produce C sugar in order to benefit from the support provided to A and B sugar.

56Ibid., para. 191.
57Ibid., para. 193.
58Ibid., para. 198.
59Ibid., para. 201.
60Ibid., para. 205.
61Ibid., para. 170.
62Ibid., para. 222.

32. Finally, the European Communities alleges that the Complaining Parties did not even claim
that "cross-subsidization" was a "payment".
63 Therefore, the Panel acted inconsistently with
Article 11 of the DSU by making a finding with r espect to a claim that was not advanced by the
Complaining Parties. As a "subsidiar[y]" allega tion, the European Communities contends that the
Panel failed to take into consideration that the cost of production of C sugar is significantly lower than
that of A and B sugar because the C beet price is lower than the minimum prices for A and B beet.64
4. Nullification or Impairment
33. The European Communities objects to the Panel's conclusion that the alleged violations of the
Agreement on Agriculture resulting from exports of C sugar nullify or impair benefits accruing to the
Complaining Parties. According to the European Communities, the "benefits" that could be nullified
or impaired consist of "expectations of improved competitive opportunities". 65 In the European
Communities' view, "until recently, the Complainants shared the EC's understanding that the C sugar
regime does not provide export subsidies." 66 The Complaining Parties "had no expectations of
improved competitive opportunities that would come from the EC reducing its exports of C sugar."67
Consequently, a violation, even if established, "does not result in the nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing to the Complainants".68
34. The European Communities points out that a finding of violation would result in "unjust
enrichment" of the Complaining Parties. 69 The purpose of dispute settlement proceedings is "not to
present some Members with a windfall profit at the expense of another".70
35. The European Communities furt her argues that the Panel e rroneously relied on panel and
Appellate Body findings in US − Superfund , EC − Bananas III , and Turkey − Textiles , without
understanding the important differences between t hose cases and the present dispute. The European
Communities had not argued that the Complaining Parties' trade position would not, or only
minimally, improve if the EC sugar regime were fo und to violate WTO rules, as the Panel asserted;

64Ibid., heading V.D.
65Ibid., para. 370 (quoting GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund , para. 5.19; and Appellate Body
Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 251-253).
66Ibid., para. 370.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Ibid., para. 373.
70Ibid.

on the contrary, the European Communities argued that the trade effects of the Panel's ruling would
be "significant" as it would give the Complain ing Parties "a considerable windfall profit".
71 T h e
European Communities also takes issue with the Panel's finding th at the European Communities did
not rebut the evidence with regard to the amount of trade lost by the Complaining Parties as a result of
the EC sugar regime. The European Communities subm its that, "that is precisely what past cases say
is unacceptable to prove lack of nullification or impairment." 72 The Panel's approach amounts to
saying that there is no way to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment of benefits.73
36. The European Communities requests the Appella te Body to reverse the Panel's finding
concerning nullification or impairment of the be nefits accruing to the Complaining Parties under
the Agreement on Agriculture . The European Communities further submits that the Appellate Body
should "[a]t least ... reverse the Panel's finding to the extent that the current volume of subsidised
exports does not exceed 79 per cent of the quantity of subsidised exports made during the base
period."
74
5. Article 3.10 of the DSU and the Principle of Good Faith
37. The European Communities appeals the Panel's finding that the Complaining Parties acted
consistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU and w ith the principle of good faith. The European
Communities considers that "[t]he circumstances of this dispute are such that the exercise by the
Complainants of their right to bring a claim agai nst the C sugar regime is manifestly unreasonable
and, therefore, inconsistent with Article 3.10 of the DSU." 75 According the European Communities,
the alleged breach of its reduction commitments was "the result of an excusable scheduling error on
the part of the EC" because other Members, includi ng the Complaining Parties themselves, had made
the same errors.76
38. The European Communities alleges that, in d ealing with its objection based on estoppel, the
Panel "misconstrued and misapplied" the principle of estoppel. 77 The European Communities
maintains that the Panel "cited no authority for the assertion that silence can give rise to estoppel only

72Ibid., para. 378. (original underlining)
73Ibid., para. 379.
74Ibid., para. 381.
75Ibid., para. 325.
76Ibid., para. 326.
77Ibid., para. 341.

if there is a 'legal duty to speak'."
78 With respect to the Panel's finding that the Complaining Parties'
silence could not be held against other WTO Me mbers, the European Co mmunities maintains that
estoppel may operate exclusively between two Me mbers because it does not alter the substantive
rights under the WTO Agreement.
39. The European Communities also points out that it did not request the Panel to "force" 79 the
Complaining Parties to agree to a correction of its Schedule of Concessions. As explained by the
European Communities, the intention of this obser vation was to show why the Complaining Parties
had acted inconsistently with Article 3.10 of th e DSU. The European Communities emphasizes that
"[a] good faith Member which recognises that anot her Member has made an excusable scheduling
mistake ... would not seek to exploit that mistake in order to secure a very considerable advantage".
80
The European Communities' contentio n before the Panel was that "by bringing the claim that exports
of C sugar exceed the EC's commitments, rather than seeking the correction of the EC's schedule, so
as to include C sugar in the base quantity, as a go od faith partner would have agreed to do, the
Complainants were acting inconsistently with Ar ticle 3.10 [of the] DSU and the principle of good
faith."81
B. Arguments of Australia – Appellee
1. The Panel's Terms of Reference
40. Australia agrees with the Panel that the Compla ining Parties' arguments relating to payments
on C beet fell within the Panel's terms of reference. Australia submits that the European Communities
wrongly characterizes a "payment" as a "measure". Australia points out that it did not claim that a
"payment", in itself, was an export subsidy, but rather, that the European Communities was in
violation of its WTO obligations because it provi ded subsidies in excess of its reduction commitment
levels on sugar and sugar-containi ng products. Australia further affirms that the Panel correctly
applied the distinction between "claims" and "ar guments", and agrees with the Panel that "the
Complainants did not have to detail how and why such exports were being subsidized."82

79Ibid., para. 361.
80Ibid., para. 362.
81Ibid., para. 363.

2. Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule

41. Australia agrees with the Panel that F ootnote 1 is inconsistent with the Agreement on
Agriculture and cannot be regarded as a second com ponent of the European Communities' export
subsidy commitments on sugar. Australia emphasi zes that the inclusion of Footnote 1 in the
European Communities' Schedule was not negotiated a nd that "[t]here is no evidence of any relevant
exchanges between the parties or any other form of negotiation, let alone agreement on this subject
matter."83 Australia further maintains that the seco nd sentence of Footnote 1 does not indicate
"a ceiling or other limitation on these exports".84
42. Australia submits that the findings of the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy do not provide
support to the European Communities' contention that Footnote 1 should be read to impose a limit on
subsidization. Australia explains that, unlike in the present case, in Canada – Dairy, the United States
and Canada held "lengthy negotiations" regarding reciprocal market access for dairy products.85
43. Australia sees no reason why the principle enunciated by the GATT panel in US – Sugar and
by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III —namely, the principle that Members may incorporate
into their Schedules acts yielding rights under the GATT, but not acts diminishing obligations under
that Agreement—should not apply in the present ca se. Moreover, Australia agrees with the Panel
that, unless explicitly authorized, scheduled commitm ents "cannot overrule or conflict" with the
obligations contained in the covered agreements.86
3. Payments under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
(a) Payments in the Form of Below-cost Sales of C Beet
44. Australia argues that the European Communiti es "misrepresent[s]" the reasons for C beet
production.87 According to Australia, yield variations would not lead to C beet production in the
absence of high prices for quota sugar and the "web of supporting regulations". 88 Furthermore, there
is no demonstrated agronomic benef it that would induce growers to grow large quantities of beet at a
substantial financial loss. Rather, the production an d processing of below-cost C beet is financed and

84Ibid., para. 164.
87Ibid., heading VI.B.1.
88Ibid., para. 372.

driven by the structure of the EC sugar regime, in cluding the incentive to ensure receipt of full-quota
sugar revenue, the needs of sugar processors, and incentives for producing above-quota beet.
Although growers and processors have some fl exibility when negotiating their contractual
arrangements for C beet, that flexibility is limited.
45. Australia submits that the payments in the form of below-cost sales of C beet are "financed by
virtue of governmental action". In Australia's view , "governmental action", in this dispute, finances
the "payments" as the "other factors" identifie d by the European Communities do not explain the
"persistent production and sale of below cost C beet".
89 Furthermore, in challenging the Panel's
finding that a significant percentage of growers of C beet are likely to finance sales of C beet as a
result of selling high-priced A and B beet, the Eu ropean Communities intro duces new material that
had not been provided to the Panel. Moreover, the European Communities erroneously examines
the relevant figures for the European Communities " as a whole ".90 According to Australia, the
examination of figures as a whole is inappropriate because those growers that actually produce C beet
have greater profits from A and B beet, and lower fi xed costs of growing C beet to cover with those
profits.
46. Australia also argues that governmental control in the EC sugar regime is not less pervasive
than in the situation present in Canada – Dairy . The European Communities, in Australia's view,
implies that European Communities' growers have more choice as to what they produce and where
they market their production than do Canadian da iry farmers. However, the incentives provided
through the EC sugar regime "dominate the growers' choices".91
(b) Payments in the Form of "Cross-subsidization"
47. Australia argues that the European Communiti es misrepresents the cost of production of
C sugar, compared to A and B sugar. Australia points out that, since C sugar is always produced
jointly with A and B sugar, the average total cost of producing C sugar is identical to the average total
cost of producing A and B sugar. Likewise, the averag e total cost of growing beet is the same for A,
B, and C beet. 92 The fact that the price for C beet is lowe r than that of A and B beet is not relevant,
because the cost of producing sugar includes the cost of all of the economic resources used in beet

89Australia's appellee's submission, heading VI.C.2.ii.
90Ibid., para. 404. (original emphasis)
91Ibid., para. 410.
92Ibid., para. 252.

production, transport, and processing. The lowe r beet prices for C beet only "lessen the degree"
93 of
cross-subsidy between quota sugar and C sugar, but they do not eliminate the cross-subsidy. Australia
further contends that the European Communities mi srepresents the reasons for C beet and C sugar
production. Producers plan production so as to ensu re quota receipt and avoid losing quota for future
seasons. In addition, C sugar may be produced so that farmers and processors can profit from
producing it at marginal cost, given that its fixed cost is covered by quota revenue.
48. Australia further argues that the "purely noti onal ['payment']" identified by the European
Communities is "but one link in th e chain connecting the EC sugar re gime to the below cost exports
of C sugar". 94 According to Australia, in the light of the Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New
Zealand and US) jurisprudence, the export of sugar at be low the average total cost of production
constitutes a "decisive element" in examining whet her an Article 9.1(c) export subsidy exists. 95 In
Australia's view, the average total cost of production is the appropriate benchmark in this case; and
the use of the world market price as the benchm ark, as suggested by the European Communities,
would be "illogical" in this dispute, because Europ ean Communities exporters must sell their sugar at
the prevailing world market price.96
49. Australia further submits that the Panel was correct in finding that the term "on the export", in
Article 9.1(c), does not mean "contingent on export performance". In any event, even if the phrase
"on the export" did mean "contingent on exports", as submitted by the European Communities, such a
test would also be satisfied in the present case, b ecause C sugar must be exported unless it is carried
forward. Australia notes also that the European Communities has not appealed the Panel's finding
that the payments at issue, namely, payments in the form of "cross-subsidization", are "financed by
virtue of governmental action".
50. In response to the other arguments advan ced by the European Communities, Australia
contends that Article 9.1(c) does not require the iden tification of a benefit; there is no risk of blurring
the distinction between domestic support and export subsidies; there is no risk of Article 9.1(c) being
turned into a "blunt anti-dumping instrument" 97; there is no requirement to identify an "equivalent"
obligation in the SCM Agreement ; and "cross-subsidization" is not a novel concept. Finally,
Australia submits that the European Communities do es not properly indicate, in its Notice of Appeal,

95Ibid., para. 272.
96Ibid., para. 278.
97Ibid., heading V.C.3.iii.

a claim under Article 11 of the DSU with respect to the Panel' s finding on "cross-subsidization", and
that, in any event, such a claim would be without merit.
4. Nullification or Impairment

51. Australia notes that the European Communities doe s not contest on appeal its burden of proof
to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment set out in Article 3.8 of the DSU. The
European Communities also does not contest that there would be a presumption of nullification or
impairment in respect of the export subsidies applie d to ACP/India equivalent sugar. In Australia's
view, there are no "special factors" that would justif y applying a different standard to C sugar than to
ACP/India sugar.98
52. Australia submits that a panel may not qualif y the extent of any "adverse impact" under
Article 3.8 of the DSU, or find that there is no such "adverse impact" on the grounds that Australia
"could not have expected that the EC would conform to its obligations". 99 Australia agrees with the
Panel that the protection of "legitimate expectations" could not be used to de termine the existence of
nullification or impairment. 100 Moreover, Australia submits, the European Communities incorrectly
ascribes to Australia an expectation that the Eur opean Communities would not take any measure to
reduce its exports of C sugar. There is no "evi dentiary basis" for the European Communities'
assertion that there was any "shared ... understandi ng" between the European Communities and the
Complaining Parties.101 In any event, legal expectations " accrue from legal treaty rights", not from
"what might ... be a Member's own assessment at any point in time". 102 Australia also argues that the
European Communities' interpretation of Article 3.8 of the DSU would "strip Article 3.8 of its object
and purpose"103; the European Communities' interpretati on would also imply that "adverse impact"
should be "rebated in full" against future "wi ndfall" accruing to the Complaining Parties once the
European Communities has implemented its obligations. 104 Finally, Australia contends that the fact

99Ibid., para. 588.
100Ibid., para. 589.
101Ibid., para. 596.
102Ibid.
103Ibid., para. 614.
104Ibid., para. 617.

that it may be difficult to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8
"reflects the treaty status" of this presumption.
105
5. Article 3.10 of the DSU and the Principle of Good Faith
53. Australia refers to the European Communities' assertion that the Complaining Parties were
seeking to exploit "an 'excusable scheduling error' in order to secure a manifestly unfair advantage".106
Australia emphasizes, in this respect, that the Euro pean Communities made modifications to its sugar
regime subsequent to 1995 and that the European Communities "has no basis upon which to implicate
Australia and the other Complainants in the violation of [the European Communities'] obligations."107
54. Australia supports the Panel's conclusion that the principle of estoppel cannot be applied in
WTO dispute settlement. With respect to the cont ent of estoppel, Australia submits that estoppel
"cannot apply as to a statement of a legal situation".108 Australia points to the European Communities'
assertion that it was reasonable to infer from the Compla ining Parties' lack of reaction at the time of
the conclusion of the WTO Agreement that they shared the European Communities' understanding
that exports of C sugar did not benefit from export subsidies. According to Australia, this assertion
does not go to a question of fact, but rather to the legal issue of whether C sugar exports were
subsidized. It follows, in Australia's view, that th ere is no basis for estoppel to be applied in this case,
and "[e]ven if there were, the EC's subsequent modifications of its [suga r] regime would have
changed the factual basis upon which the estoppel rested, putting an end to it." 109 Accordingly, the
Appellate Body should find that "the EC's claim th at the Complainants have been estopped is without
basis as not coming within the terms of that principle." 110 Such a finding, according to Australia,
"would not require the Appellate Body to rule on wh ether estoppel could be applied in relation to the
WTO Agreement".111

106Ibid., para. 455.
107Ibid., para. 482.
108Ibid., para. 510.
109Ibid., para. 512.
110Ibid., para. 513.
111Ibid., para. 514.

6. The European Communities' Notice of Appeal

55. Australia argues that the European Communities' Notice of Appeal does not satisfy the "due
process requirements" of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures .112 Australia submits that the
European Communities does not quote, in its Notice of Appeal, specific conclusions or findings of the
Panel on which it seeks review; fails to distinguish between a conclusion and a finding or fails to
identify the findings in question; does not list, for each claim, the provisions that the Panel allegedly
erred in interpreting or applying; and, finally, erroneously refers to a part of its Schedule as
"a provision of a covered agreement". 113 In Australia's view, these issues are "fundamental defects
that deny due process" to the Complaining Parties.114
C. Arguments of Brazil – Appellee
56. Brazil submits that the European Communities fa ils to demonstrate that the Panel's legal
conclusions are in error, and requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's conclusions and reject
the European Communities' appeal.
1. The Panel's Terms of Reference
57. Brazil recalls that Article 6.2 of the DSU requir es a complaining party to identify the specific
measures at issue and provide a brief summary of th e legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present
the problem clearly. Brazil submits that its panel re quest in this case went beyond the requirement of
Article 6.2 of the DSU by identifying the subs idizing measure and providing evidence of the
European Communities' subsidies to excess suga r exports. Brazil adds that the European
Communities has not demonstrated any prejudice resulti ng from a lack of specificity in Brazil's panel
request, nor has it offered any supporting particulars in its appellant's submission.
2. Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule
58. Brazil argues that a Member must specify in its Schedule both budgetary outlay and quantity
commitment levels in respect of export subsidi es falling within the ambit of Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture . If either of the two types of commitments is not specified, there is no
reduction commitment within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture. Brazil submits that the
European Communities acknowledges that Footnote 1 constitutes a departure from the general

113Ibid., para. 24(d).
114Ibid., para. 25.

obligations imposed on Members by the Agreement on Agriculture . Consequently, in Brazil's view,
the European Communities' attempt to exclude subs idized exports of ACP/India equivalent sugar
from its reduction commitments must fail, because Article XVI:5 of the WTO Agreement explicitly
prohibits reservations unless the multilateral agreement concerned provides otherwise.
59. Brazil supports the Panel's rejection of the Eu ropean Communities' claim that Footnote 1
was "negotiated" with other Members.
115 Furthermore, according to Brazil, GATT and WTO
jurisprudence has recognized the pr inciple that Members may yield rights and grant benefits but may
not use their Schedules to diminish their reduction commitment obligations. Brazil further notes that
the Agreement on Agriculture does not authorize Members to s ubject their reduction commitments
to individualized terms and conditions, in contrast to Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and
Article XVI:1 of the GATS that allow for such c onditions and qualifications. Even assuming that
Footnote 1 were a legitimate part of the European Communities' Schedule, the text of Footnote 1 is,
according to Brazil, "merely informative" and does not support the interpretation suggested by the
European Communities to authorize the subsidizati on of ACP/India "equivalent" sugar exports. The
European Communities seeks, imperm issibly, to have the Appellate Body read into the text of
Footnote 1 a meaning that does not follow from the or dinary meaning of the terms in that Footnote.
The International Court of Justic e has explained that the principle of effectiveness cannot justify
attributing meaning to provisions that woul d be contrary to their letter and spirit.
116 Moreover,
assuming arguendo that Footnote 1 is ambiguous, the principle of contra proferentem requires that
any ambiguity be construed against the European Co mmunities, as the drafter is held responsible for
any inaccuracies or ambiguities.117
3. Payments under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
(a) Payments in the Form of Below-cost Sales of C Beet
60. Brazil agrees with the Panel's findings that gove rnmental action results in profitable sales of
C beet below their total cost of production. Br azil submits that, although the European Communities
makes "extensive factual assertions" concerning altern ative uses for C beet other than C sugar, it does
not explain why, if more attractive alternative market s for C beet exist, growers continue to sell their

115Brazil's appellee's submission, paras. 38-41 (referrin g to Panel Reports, paras. 7.203, 7.213, 7.216,
7.218, and 7.220).
116Ibid., para. 50 (referring to International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Second Phase), 1950, ICJ Reports, 221, at 229).
117Ibid., paras. 57-58.

beet to C sugar producers for less than the cost of producing that beet.
118 Brazil also maintains that
there was "ample evidence" in the record to support the Panel' s conclusion that a significant
percentage of farmers are likely to finance sales of C beet below total cost of production "as a result
of participation in the domestic market". 119 Brazil also rejects the Eu ropean Communities' argument
that the Panel confused a regulation merely enabling payments to occur with a regulation that finances
those payments; Brazil points to the Panel's finding that the European Communities "controls
virtually every aspect of domestic beet and sugar supply and management".
120
61. Brazil further contends that Table 9 in the European Communities' appellant's submission—
intended to show that "there are other factors which explain the farmers' decision to produce
C beet"—"is highly misleading and misrepresents the data it cites as a source". 121 For instance, the
European Communities has created an "erroneous subs titute" for the fixed cost set out in that table. 122
In any event, in Brazil's view, th e European Communities admits that the Panel was correct in finding
that profits from A and B beet support the sale of C beet below its total cost of production by stating
that "the profits obtained with sal es of A and B beet would be largely insufficient to cover all the
fixed costs of producing C beet." 123 Brazil argues that profits from the sales of A and B beet do not
need to cover all fixed costs of producing C beet in order to cross-subsidize those sales, rather, these
profits need only cover some of the fixed costs of C beet. According to Brazil, "[s]o long as the price
obtained for C beet covers its marginal cost and makes a contribution to the coverage of fixed costs,
it is more profitable for a grower to produ ce and sell the C beet than not to do so." 124 Brazil submits
that, as a result, even the European Communities' own argument supports the Panel's conclusion.125
(b) Payments in the Form of "Cross-subsidization"
62. Brazil agrees with the Panel that C sugar receiv es a "payment on export" that is "financed by
virtue of governmental action". Brazil argues that the European Communities admits the facts

119Ibid., para. 104 (quoting European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 266, in turn quoting
Panel Reports, para. 7.291).
121Ibid., para. 106.
line (f)).
added by Brazil)
124Ibid., para. 108. (original emphasis)
125Ibid.

necessary to support the Panel's conclusion, becau se the European Communities never challenged the
"detailed economic data and two economic analyses" that the Complaining Parties submitted to the
Panel.
126 The European Communities, in Brazil's view, attempts to revisit the economic issues "under
the guise of legal argument".127
63. With respect to the European Communities' argument that "cross-subsidization does not
transfer any resources to the sugar producers" and is therefore not a "payment", Brazil submits that the
financial resources generated by A and B quota suga r make C sugar production profitable, even when
sold below its average total cost of production. An "economic resource" 128, namely money, is being
transferred from domestic consumers, by virtue of governmental action, to C sugar producers.
Furthermore, the export sale of C sugar involves a pa yment to the buyer. According to Brazil, for
purposes of WTO disciplines, "it does not matter that the recipient of the payment – or an export
subsidy – is located in a third country."
129 The export sale is economically possible and profitable to
the C sugar producer only because of the payments that the C sugar producer receives, including
payments from European sugar consumers in the form of high prices for A and B sugar resulting from
the EC sugar regime; payments-in-kind in the form of C beet below its total cost of production; and
direct export refunds on A and B quota sugar and ACP/India sugar.
64. Brazil furthermore disagrees with the European Communities' contention that the Panel made
no finding concerning the appropriate benchmark. According to Brazil, the Panel relied on the
Appellate Body Report in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) , which identified
and used the proper benchmark, namely, average to tal cost of production. Brazil submits that the
European Communities' arguments concerning the SCM Agreement are not relevant to the Panel's
conclusions under the Agreement on Agriculture , because it is not necessary to allege or prove a
benefit as a separate element in a di spute concerning payment under Ar ticle 9.1(c). Brazil also
submits that the European Communities cannot justif y its own violations of its WTO obligations by
pointing to alleged violations by other WTO Members.
65. Finally, according to Brazil, the Panel correctly applied the standard for the term "on the
export" contained in Article 9.1(c). The Europ ean Communities' arguments incorrectly characterize
the Panel's finding on this issue. The Panel's fi ndings do not blur the distinction between domestic

127Ibid., para. 67.
128Ibid., para. 69.
129Ibid., para. 71.

and export subsidies. Brazil contends that the fact that there is no requirement to produce C sugar is
not relevant to the question whether the sale of C sugar involves a payment on export financed by
virtue of governmental action.
4. Nullification or Impairment

66. Brazil observes that the European Communities' rationale that nullification or impairment
depends on "expectations of improved competitive opportunities" is an argument that "sets GATT and
WTO jurisprudence on its head".130 In Brazil's view, the European Communities points to GATT and
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports that held that the concept of nullification or impairment
encompassed "expectations of improved competitiv e opportunities", but concludes erroneously that
"only"131 expectations of improved competitive opportun ities are included in that concept. Brazil
refers to the result of an Oxfam study concluding that the EC sugar regime caused immediate losses of
US $494 million to Brazil in 2002, which, in Braz il's view, constitutes "serious" nullification or
impairment of actual trade. 132 Brazil argues that the European Communities did not challenge that
evidence.133
5. Article 3.10 of the DSU and the Principle of Good Faith
67. Brazil supports the Panel's conclusion that th e Complaining Parties were not estopped from
bringing claims against export subsidies provided to exports of C sugar. With respect to Article 3.7 of
the DSU, Brazil states that it exercised its judgem ent and concluded that action would be "fruitful"
within the meaning of that provision.
D. Arguments of Thailand – Appellee
1. The Panel's Terms of Reference
68. Thailand maintains that in appealing the Pane l's finding that "the Complainants' claims
relating to the 'alleged' payments in the form of low priced sales of C beet to EC sugar producers were
within the Panel's terms of reference" 134, the European Communities is, in fact, appealing a finding

131Ibid. (original emphasis)
132Ibid., para. 122.
134Thailand's appellee's submission, para. 119 (quoting European Communities' appellant's submission,
para. 40).

that the Panel did not make. Specifically, accordi ng to Thailand, the Panel at no point identified
"payments" in the form of low-priced sales of C beet as a "claim" within its terms of reference.
69. Thailand further submits that, in any event, in claiming that export subsidies were granted in
excess of the quantity commitments under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture ,
Thailand was under no obligation to refer to the term "payments". Instead, it was required "to claim
only that the export subsidies were granted in excess of the EC's quantity commitments under
Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture".
135 Thailand submits that, in the light of the
burden of proof rule set out in Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , its panel request
articulated sufficiently the claims it was requi red to make under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement
on Agriculture.
70. Thailand recalls the European Communities' alle gation that "the Panel misinterpreted the
notions of claims and argument". 136 In this regard, Thailand submits that "[t]he EC attempts to
separate the issue of what must be proven in a pr oceeding in which Article 10.3 is invoked and what
must be claimed in a proceeding in which vi olations of Articles 3. 3 and 8 are alleged." 137 Thailand
relies upon the finding of the Appellate Body in Korea – Dairy to argue that an examination under
Article 6.2 of the DSU must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, as the requirements of this
provision "will differ from agreement to agreement, and provision to provision".138
2. Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule
71. Thailand agrees with the Panel's interpretation of Footnote 1. Thailand points out that the
issue to be resolved by the Appe llate Body is whether Footnote 1 ope rates to "enlarge or otherwise
modify"139 the European Communities' export subsidy co mmitment levels. Regarding the issue of
whether Footnote 1 includes a budgetary outlay commi tment, Thailand submits that the European
Communities' position is not clear, given that, in its appellant's submission, it does not contest the
Panel's finding on this matter. Therefore, Thailand assumes that the European Communities no longer
holds the position that Footnote 1 expresses a budgetary outlay commitment level.

136Ibid., para. 132.
137Ibid., para. 134.

72. Thailand submits that the Appellate Body should reject the European Communities' allegation
that Footnote 1 operates as a "second component" of the European Communities' Schedule. Instead,
according to Thailand, the second sentence of Footnot e 1 "merely contains a factual statement" and
not a limitation as argued by the European Communities.
140 Thailand argues that, "[i]f the EC had
intended to set out in [Footnote 1] one component of a binding reduction commitment, it would not
have used merely descriptive language." 141 Thailand opines that the interpretation proposed by the
European Communities would result in "the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there", in
violation of the Appellate Body's finding in India – Patents (US) .142 Thailand alleges that "the EC
asks the Appellate Body to substitute the phrase ' making a reduction commitment' for the phrase
'not making any reduction commitment.'" 143 According to Thailand, the European Communities
further asks the Appellate Body to read the phrase "the average of exports in the period 1986-1990
amounted to 1.6 million t" to mean that "[t]he EC commits not to subsidise more than 1.6 million
tonnes of sugar of ACP/India equivalent sugar per year".144
73. With respect to the European Communities' cha llenge to the Panel's decision to rely on the
notifications to the WTO Committee on Agricultu re, Thailand submits that these objections are
"without any practical consequence".145 Thailand emphasizes that the European Communities did not
notify the export subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent sugar to the WTO Committee on
Agriculture and did not explain clearly its reasons for failing to report those subsidies.
74. Thailand supports the Panel's reliance on the pr inciple articulated by the GATT panel in
US – Sugar to conclude that "a Member's schedule 'cannot provide for non-compliance with the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture'." 146 Thailand asserts that, contrary to the European
Communities' contentions, the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III has already ruled that the
principle applied in US – Sugar is valid for "concessions" as well as for "commitments". 147

141Ibid.
142Ibid., paras. 36-37 (quoting Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 45).
143Ibid., para. 37. (original emphasis)
144Ibid.
145Ibid., para. 42.
147Ibid., para. 61.

Therefore, Thailand requests the Appellate Body to "r eject the EC's attempt to put into question this
well-established principle of WTO law".
148
75. Furthermore, Thailand disagrees with the Eur opean Communities' assertion that Article 8 of
the Agreement on Agriculture does not oblige Members to comply with the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture in addition to their reduction commitments. Thailand requests the
Appellate Body to dismiss the European Comm unities' argument that Article 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture does not express a "hierarchy" between the Agreement on Agriculture and WTO
Members' Schedules.149 Thailand states that the European Communities' position is that, "in certain
circumstances, such as the present, it is possible to comply with the Agreement on Agriculture or the
schedule."150 In Thailand's view, "[t]his amounts to subs tituting the negotiated term 'and' [in Article 8
of the Agreement on Agriculture ] with the word 'or' and is, conse quently, a clear departure from the
text."151
3. Payments under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
(a) Payments in the Form of Below-cost Sales of C Beet
76. Thailand submits that, if the Appe llate Body were to conclude that C sugar exports involve a
subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), it would no longer need to examine whether those
exports are also subsidized through payments in th e form of below-cost C beet sales. Subsidiarily,
Thailand argues that the Panel correctly found that below-cost sales of C beet were "financed by
virtue of governmental action" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.
According to Thailand, most, if not all, of the objections raised by the European Communities fall
outside the scope of appellate review, as they relate to factual matters and to the Panel's discretion to
weigh and assess evidence. However, Thailand argues, the Appellate Body has "consistently
expressed reluctance"152 to review the weighing and assessing of evidence by panels, and it should not
"depart[] from this line of reasoning". 153 Thailand also notes that the European Communities, in
attempting to demonstrate that profits on A and B b eet are insufficient to cover the fixed costs of
C beet, is introducing new factual evidence that had not been provided to the Panel.

150Ibid., para. 63. (original emphasis)
151Ibid.
152Ibid., para. 148.
153Ibid., para. 150.

77. Should the Appellate Body find the European Comm unities' appeal to be within the scope of
appellate review, Thailand argues that the Panel app lied the correct legal standard as clarified by the
Appellate Body. In the alternative, Thailand requ ests the Appellate Body to complete the Panel's
legal analysis on the basis of the factual findings of the Panel, but, in doing so, should not consider the
facts that the European Communities "is attempting to bring up for the first time".
154
78. According to Thailand, in concluding that th ere was a "demonstrable link" and "clear nexus"
between elements of the EC sugar regime and the below-cost sales of C beet, the Panel correctly
weighed and assessed the evidence before it. The European Communities' assertion that the
governmental action in the European Communities' beet market is less pervasive than in Canada –
Dairy is "irrelevant and, in any case, inaccurate".
155 Thailand also rejects the European Communities'
assertion that, because of other factors (such as yield variability, the productio n of alternative crops,
or the differences in the nature of fixed costs be tween dairy and beet farming), the requisite nexus
between governmental action and below-cost sales of C beet is not present in this dispute. Thailand
notes that the European Communities has provided no evidence to support its propositions in this
regard.
(b) Payments in the Form of "Cross-subsidization"
79. Thailand requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's conclusion that the European
Communities failed to demonstrate that it was not pr oviding export subsidies on C sugar in the form
of "cross-subsidization". In Thailand's view, th e European Communities' argument that the "cross-
subsidization" identified by the Panel constitut es merely an "internal allocation of each sugar
producer's own resources" 156 and a "notional payment" 157, "attempts to turn an issue of vocabulary
into an issue of substance". 158 The "internal" transfer of resources in the form of profits on A and
B sugar identified as "payments" by the Panel is the "counterpart" of the "external" transfer of
resources in the form of the below-cost sale to the external customer identified as a "payment" by the
Complaining Parties.159

155Ibid., heading C.3(c)(ii).
157Ibid. (referring to European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199).
158Ibid., para. 69.
159Ibid.

80. Thailand submits that the term "payments" under Article 9.1(c) requires, in the present case, a
comparison of the average cost of production of s ugar in the European Communities with the average
return on export sales of C sugar. According to uncontested evidence before the Panel, European
Communities' sugar producers sell C sugar at prices fa r below that sugar's total cost of production.
Thailand also rejects the European Communities' argument that Article 9.1(c) is limited to "payments"
conferring benefits on domestic producers. If this were so, the scope of Article 9.1(c) would be
limited to agricultural products that farmers sell to domestic processors before their disposal on the
export market. According to Thailand, "[t]he 'pay ments' need not confer a benefit upon a recipient
located within the EC".
160
81. Thailand also agrees with the Panel that the payments made on the export of C sugar are
"financed by virtue of governmental action". Th e Panel correctly found that European Communities'
sugar producers are able to recover most, or all, of their fixed costs by producing and selling quota
sugar in the protected domestic market or with e xport refunds in the world market. The beneficiaries
of sugar production quotas are protected from al l potential sources of competition from foreign
suppliers or new domestic suppliers and sell sugar at high intervention prices set by law that yield
high returns. Another reason why sugar producers fi nd it profitable to produce and export C sugar is
because they attempt to ensure th e full utilization and preservation of their allotted quotas of A and B
sugar. As a result, the EC sugar regime "enc ourages overproduction of sugar, segregates the export
market for C sugar completely from the domestic market, generates the profits used to fund the export
of that sugar, and imposes sanctions for failure to export that sugar."161
82. Furthermore, Thailand maintains that payments made by C sugar producers are made "on the
export" of that sugar within the meaning of Article 9.1(c). A payment can be regarded as a payment
"on the export" only if a WTO Member causes it to be a payment on the export. Thailand endorses
the findings of the Panel that, under the EC suga r regime, C sugar must be exported. Finally,
Thailand rejects the European Communities' argume nts that the Panel's findings would require WTO
Members to dismantle their price-support systems or to prevent dumping by private parties.
4. Nullification or Impairment
83. With reference to the European Communities' claim on nullification or impairment, Thailand
submits that the European Communities is advanc ing "a novel legal theory, according to which a
WTO-inconsistent measure does not nullify or impa ir benefits accruing under a covered agreement if

160Thailand's appellee's submission, heading II.B.2(d).
161Ibid., para. 99.

it could be anticipated."
162 Thailand contends that the "most fundamental benefit" accruing to a WTO
Member under the provisions of the covered agreemen ts is "the benefit of their observation in good
faith by the other Members", and that "[t]his be nefit accrues to Members independently of the
existence of legitimate expectations of improved conditions of competition." 163 Hence, in Thailand's
view, the Panel correctly relied on the Appellate Body's finding in India – Patents (US) to conclude
that the principle of "legitimate expectations" cannot be used to rebut the existence of nullification or
impairment. Thailand argues that the Panel was correct in finding that the European Communities
failed to meet its burden of proof under Article 3.8 of the DSU in this regard.
5. Article 3.10 of the DSU and the Principle of Good Faith
84. Thailand affirms that the Panel correctly found that the Complaining Parties did not act
inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU and th e principle of good faith. Thailand agrees with the
Panel's conclusion that, in the absence of bad faith , Article 3.7 of the DSU does not authorize panels
to question a WTO Member's decision to initiate dispute settlement proceedings. In Thailand's
opinion, the Appellate Body should reject the Eu ropean Communities' allegation that the Panel
"misconceived the relationship between Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU". 164 In this respect,
Thailand submits that "[t]he Panel could not have looked at the question of whether the complainants
had initiated dispute settlement proceedings in good faith, without referring to Article 3.7 of the
DSU."165 Thailand also urges the Appellate Body to dismiss the European Communities' assertion
that the Panel failed to act in accordance with Article 7.2 of the DSU.
85. Thailand requests the Appellate Body to reject the European Communities' arguments
regarding the principle of estoppel. Thailand alle ges that "[t]he logical extension of the EC's
argument is that in this case, there are two categories of rights that can be enforced: those owed to the
original Members, and those owed to new Members." 166 Thailand states that the Panel was correct in
concluding that "[the principle of] estoppel is not mentioned in the WTO Agreement, or the DSU, and
that it has never been applied by any panel or the Appellate Body." 167 In relation to the European
Communities' statement that estoppel may be based on silence, Thailand responds that "[i]n the

163Ibid., para. 203.
164Ibid., para. 172 (quoting European Communities' appellant's submission, heading VIII.C.2).
165Ibid., para. 172.
166Ibid., para. 183.

context of estoppel, silence can only amount to re presentation in 'exceptional circumstances' and
where there is a duty or obligation to object."
168
E. Claims of Error by Australia – Appellant
86. Australia appeals the Panel's decision to dec line examination of Australia's claims under
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement , and the Panel's conseque nt failure to make a
recommendation in accordance with Article 4.7 of that Agreement.
87. Australia submits, first, that the Panel' s decision, that the findings under the Agreement on
Agriculture should be sufficient to fully resolve the matter at issue, is based on a misinterpretation of
"what needs to be done" to bring a prohibite d export subsidy into conformity with the SCM
Agreement.169 Furthermore, it is an incorrect applicati on of the principle of judicial economy as set
forth in Australia – Salmon.170 Australia emphasizes that a recommendation under Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement would have entitled Australia to take countermeasures under Article 4.10, and
would have precluded the need for recourse to the procedures of Article 21 of the DSU in order to
establish a reasonable implementation period. Austra lia adds that a finding that, under Article 3.2 of
the SCM Agreement , the European Communities is granting and maintaining prohibited subsidies,
would have led to a recommendation that subsidi es in excess of reduction commitments under the
Agreement on Agriculture be withdrawn within a specified time period.
88. Secondly, with regard to the question whether the Panel was entitled to make a
recommendation to withdraw the measure and to specify a time period in accordance with the
provisions of Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement in the circumstances before it 171, Australia submits
that, having found Australia's claims under the SCM Agreement to be within its terms of reference ,
the Panel should have addressed those claims in accordance with Article 7.2 of the DSU and applied
the special and additional rules and procedures of the SCM Agreement to its findings and
recommendations.

168Thailand's appellee's submission, para. 191 (referring to International Court of Justice, Temple of
Preah Vihear Case , 1962, ICJ Reports, p. 62; and Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II , footnote 79 to
169Australia's other appellant's submission, para. 21.
170Ibid., paras. 16-26 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 226).
171According to Australia, the Panel gave inappropriate weight to the finding of the panel in Canada –
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) that "[t]here is some issue as to whether this Panel is entitled to
make such a recommendation and to specify such a time period in the circumstances before it". (Australia's
other appellant's submission, para. 27 (quoting Panel Reports, para. 7.384, in turn citing Panel Report, Canada –
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 6.99))

89. Thirdly, Australia asserts that the Panel mischaracterized its rights under the SCM Agreement
as being limited to obtaining more rapid compliance.
172 Indeed, the Panel's erroneous exercise of
judicial economy deprives and diminishes Australia's rights under the SCM Agreement and under
various provisions of the DSU.173 Australia further disagrees with the Panel's statement that Australia
did not present its claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement as unambiguously as it presented its
claims under the Agreement on Agriculture .174 Australia points out that the European Communities
did not assert or seek a ruling that Australia's claims under the SCM Agreement were not sufficiently
clear or unambiguous.
90. Australia requests the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis on the basis of factual
findings by the Panel and the undisputed facts on th e Panel record, and rule on Australia's claims
under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement . In addition, Australia requests the Appellate
Body to make the recommendation provided for in Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
91. For the Appellate Body to complete the anal ysis, Australia argues that the export refund
payments paid by the European Communities with r espect to exports of ACP/India equivalent sugar
constitute direct export subsidies within the meaning of item (a) of the Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies in the SCM Agreement (the "Illustrative List") and therefore come within the definitional
scope of Article 3.1(a) of that Agreement. Austra lia adds that the factual findings made by the Panel
in regard to Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture can be used to support a finding that the
European Communities is also providing export subs idies within the meaning of item (a) of the
Illustrative List.
92. Australia further argues that the EC sugar regime 's different treatment of sugar beet destined
for the production of A and B sugar, as compared w ith beet used to produce C sugar, constitutes an
export subsidy under item (d) of the Illustrative List th at is prohibited by Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement. In the alternative, Australia argues that the EC sugar regime provides a subsidy to
C sugar within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement , as income or price support to
C sugar, and that a benefit is thereby conferred within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.

172Australia's other appellant's submission, paras. 44-47; Panel Reports, para. 7.384.
173Australia's other appellant's submission, paras. 48-51 (referring to Articles 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 11, and 19.2
of the DSU).
174Ibid., paras. 52-66 (referring to Panel Reports, para. 7.386).

F. Claims of Error by Brazil – Appellant
93. Brazil requests the Appellate Body to find that the Panel erred in finding that it was not
necessary to examine the Complaining Parties' claims that "the EC's support for A, B and C sugar, and
for ACP/India equivalent sugar, involves prohibite d export subsidies under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of
the SCM Agreement".
175 Should the Appellate Body agree that the Panel erred in exercising judicial
economy, Brazil requests the Appellate Body to comp lete the legal analysis "to determine that the
EC's support for A, B and C sugar, and for ACP/I ndia equivalent sugar, involves export subsidies
within the meaning of Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement".176 If the Appellate Body finds
this to be the case, Brazil requests the Appellate B ody to recommend that the prohibited subsidies be
withdrawn within a specified time period, as required by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
94. In Brazil's view, panels must decide whether to exercise judicial economy in the light of the
particular implementation obligatio ns that would apply if a claim were upheld. Brazil notes that in
previous disputes, where the Appellate Body has examined the exercise of judicial economy, the
relevant implementation obligations were those in Article 19.1 of the DSU. Brazil agrees with the
Panel that, in those previous rulings, the Appellate Body sought to ensure that a panel's findings are
sufficiently complete "as to what needs to be done, rather than on when it needs to be done". 177 The
reason is that, under Article 19.1 of the DSU, panels are required to recommend only what needs to be
done "to bring the measure into conformity".
95. Brazil emphasizes that the situation is different where a panel upholds a claim under Article 3
of the SCM Agreement. Under that provision, a panel is required to specify the time period within
which the measure must be withdrawn. Thus, wh en implementation occurs under Article 4.7, the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB "are concerned with both what needs to be done ... and
most importantly when it needs to be done".178
96. Brazil further contends that the Panel diminished Brazil's rights under the covered agreements
by depriving Brazil of its right to have the dispute resolved in terms of the implementation obligations
in Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement and of its right to seek countermeasures, in appropriate
circumstances, under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.

175Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 11.
176Ibid.
177Ibid., paras. 4 and 25 (quoting Panel Reports, para. 7.384). (emphasis added by the Panel)
178Ibid., para. 33. (original emphasis)

97. With respect to its request for the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis, Brazil
submits that export refund payments for A and B quota sugar and ACP/Indi a equivalent sugar
involve a direct transfer of funds "to firms, to the exporting industry and to producers of sugar",
and, therefore, constitute "financial contributions" by a government, within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement .
179 According to Brazil, these export refunds confer a
"benefit" and "are contingent in law upon export".180
98. Brazil further submits that the production of C sugar involves a "financial contribution" under
Article 1.1(a)(1) and "income or price support" w ithin the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM
Agreement. Brazil asserts that the financial contribu tion and the income or price support confer
"benefits" through the provision of additional cro ss-subsidized resources and through an income and
price-support mechanism that maximizes producers' re venues. According to Brazil, this subsidy is
"contingent upon export performance" because C suga r cannot be sold domestically and "must be
exported".181
99. Finally, Brazil submits that the EC sugar regi me mandates a minimum price for A and B beet
that is inevitably higher than the price for C beet, for which there is no mandated price. The EC sugar
regime, therefore, mandates higher prices for beet th at is used to produce domestic sugar than it does
for C beet used to produce sugar that must be expor ted. Thus, in terms of item (d) of the Illustrative
List, sugar producers do not have alte rnative sources of beet available at prices that are as favourable
as those for C beet. The provision of C beet for production and export of C sugar is, therefore,
inconsistent with item (d) of the Illustrative List.
G. Claims of Error by Thailand – Appellant
100. Thailand submits that the Panel erred in its exercise of judicial economy with respect to
Thailand's claims under the SCM Agreement. Should the Appellate Body agree, Thailand requests
the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis of Thailand's claims under the SCM Agreement
and recommend the European Communities to withdr aw the export subsidies granted in excess of its
export subsidy reduction commitments within a specified time period, as required by Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement.

179Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 56.
180Ibid. (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 157).
181Ibid., para. 9.

101. Thailand submits that the Panel' s exercise of judicial economy deprived Thailand of its rights
under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. Referring to its status as a developing country, Thailand
submits that a recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement would preclude the need for
recourse to a "costly arbitration procedure" unde r Article 21 of the DSU in order to establish a
reasonable implementation period.
182 Moreover, Thailand submits that, by not making the findings
necessary to enable the DSB to discharge its responsibilities under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement,
the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, which requires panels to make such
findings "as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations provided for in the covered
agreements". According to Thailand, the Pane l declined to address Thailand's claims brought
under the SCM Agreement based on a distinction between substantive and procedural rights and
obligations. However, Thailand submits that Article 11 of the DSU does not recognize such a
distinction.
102. Thailand requests the Appellate Body to comple te the legal analysis and rule on Thailand's
claims under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement . Thailand affirms that, in the present
case, there are sufficient undisputed facts and factua l findings on record to enable the Appellate Body
to complete the legal analysis.183
103. With respect to quota sugar and ACP/India e quivalent sugar, Thailand points out that the
European Communities did not contest before the Pa nel that it grants export refunds within the
meaning of Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture .184 Thailand submits that these subsidies
are provided directly by the government to the sugar industry and that they are contingent upon export
performance. Therefore, in Thailand's view, they are covered by item (a) of the Illustrative List and
are, therefore, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
104. With regard to C sugar, Thailand contends th at the export subsidies granted by the European
Communities are export subsidies within the meaning of item (d) of the Illustrative List. Thailand
submits that the relevant question is not whether the European Communities "mandates" beet farmers
to provide C beet to sugar producers, rather, as Th ailand sees it, the question is whether the European
Communities "mandates" beet farmers to provide C beet "on terms or conditions more favourable

182Thailand's other appellant's submission, para. 15.
183Ibid., paras. 52-53.

than for the provision of like or directly competitiv e products". Thailand refers to the findings of the
panel in Canada− Dairy (Article 21.5 − New Zealand and US II), in support of its position.
185
H. Arguments of the European Communities – Appellee
105. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's decision to
exercise judicial economy with respect to the Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement.
106. Referring to the report of the Appellate Body in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,
the European Communities asserts that "judicial economy does not concern the manner in which a
panel's decision to exercise its discretion affects eventual implementation, but rather whether the
findings in question are sufficient to resolve a dispute as to the consistency of a measure with the
covered agreements."186 Thus, according to the European Comm unities, it is "a panel's findings of
consistency which 'resolve a dispute'". 187 Findings and recommendations under Articles 3 and 4 of
the SCM Agreement were therefore not necessary in this case.
107. The European Communities asserts "subsidiarily" 188 that, even assuming that the Panel erred
in exercising judicial economy, the Appellate Body should find that the export subsidy provisions of
the SCM Agreement are not applicable to export subsidies maintained under the Agreement on
Agriculture. The European Communities emphasizes that a recommendation to "withdraw" a subsidy
cannot be "reconciled" with the right to grant an export subsidy under the Agreement on
Agriculture.189 The European Communities adds that the phrase "except as provided in the
Agreement on Agriculture" in Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement means that "all export subsidies
granted in respect of agricultural products, irresp ective of whether they are consistent with the
Agreement on Agriculture, are not to be considered prohibited by Article 3.1". 190 Quoting the
Appellate Body Report in EC – Bananas III 191, the European Communities submits that, "[i]t is
quite clear that the Agreement on Agriculture has very specific provisions dealing with
export subsidisation, and that this is th e 'same matter' as dealt with in the SCM Agreement ."192

185Thailand's other appellant's submission, paras. 69-70.
186European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 15. (emphasis added)
187Ibid., para. 14.
188Ibid., heading II.C.4.
189Ibid., para. 51.
190Ibid., para. 64.
192Ibid., para. 70.

Consequently, the SCM Agreement should not be applied in this case. The European Communities
finds further support for its view in Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture . In addition,
according to the European Communities, applying the more stringent procedural and remedial rules of
Article 4 of the SCM Agreement to subsidies maintained under the Agreement on Agriculture would
nullify the perception that the Agreement on Agriculture has only initiated the process of reform of
subsidies in the agricultural sector.
108. In any event, according to the European Commun ities, in the circumstances of this dispute,
the Appellate Body would not be in a position to co mplete the legal analysis on the claims raised
under the SCM Agreement . This is because the Panel did not make sufficient factual findings to
enable the Appellate Body to do so and, even assumi ng that it did, the different rules on the burden of
proof in the SCM Agreement and in the Agreement on Agriculture would mean that the Appellate
Body would have to reassess the evidence that was be fore the Panel in order to determine whether the
Panel would have reached the same factual finding had the burden of proof been on the Complaining
Parties.
109. Turning to the Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement , the European
Communities contends that the Complaining Parti es' panel requests did not properly identify the
claims based on item (d) of the Illustrative List, and that such claims are, therefore, outside the Panel's
terms of reference. In any event, the EC sugar regime does not "mandate" the provision of C beet to
sugar producers or the terms on which C beet is sold to them. Instead, "[t]he prices for C beet
are freely agreed between the growers and the sugar producers."
193 In addition, the European
Communities submits that "the EC price cannot be neither more nor less favourable than the world
market price, for the simple reason that no such comparison between prices is possible" 194 because
there is no world market for beet.
110. The European Communities also su bmits that Brazil and Australia did not claim or establish,
respectively, a prima facie case before the Panel that the EC sugar regime provides C sugar
contingent upon exports with subsidies in the form of income or price support. Minimum prices for A
and B beet do not confer a benefit on sugar produ cers. Furthermore, according to the European
Communities, the alleged "cross-subsidization" to C s ugar is not a "financial contribution", within the

193European Communities' appellee's submission, para . 92 (referring to the European Communities'
response to Question 31 posed by the Panel).
194Ibid., para. 105. (original emphasis)

meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement , and export refunds on A and B sugar do not
confer a benefit on C sugar.
I. Arguments of the Third Participants
1. ACP Countries
195
111. The ACP Countries disagree with the Panel's finding that Footnote 1 is of no legal effect.
According to the ACP Countries, the Panel failed to c onsider the context of Footnote 1 in finding that
Footnote 1 does not provide for any commitme nts for "equivalent" amounts of sugar from ACP
countries and India. The ACP Countries submit that the Panel should have considered the
relationship between Footnote 1 and the Sugar Pr otocol, and protected the rights and legitimate
expectations of the ACP Countries by interpre ting Footnote 1 as having legal effect. The ACP
Countries further emphasize the adverse economic c onsequences that could arise from the Panel's
findings with regard to Footnote 1 and C sugar.
112. The ACP Countries further argue that, had the Panel correctly reviewed the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture relating to the granting of export subsidies, it would have found that
Articles 3.3 and 8 are framed around what is actually specified in Members' Schedules in terms of
quantity or budgetary outlay commitments limiting s ubsidization in the sense of Article 3.1 of
the Agreement on Agriculture . Article 9.2(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture , which provides
interpretative context for Articles 3.1 and 3.3, defines the obligation involved in reduction
commitments as a "ceiling", and not as the level to which export subsidies must be reduced.196
113. With respect to the resolution of a possible conflict between scheduled commitments on the
one hand, and obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture on the other, the ACP Countries
submit that Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture gives equal weight to both the rules and the
specific scheduled commitments. The ACP Countries argue that the principle articulated by the
GATT panel in US – Sugar applies where a Member, through a condition in its Schedule, contradicts
its pre-existing substantive obliga tions under other covered agreements , or purports to exclude the
application of the substantive obligations contained in the Agreement on Agriculture. In such cases,

195The third participant ACP countries in this appeal are: Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana,
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts & Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trinidad &
Tobago.
196ACP Countries' third participant's submission, para. 29.

giving effect to the scheduled conditions may have major systemic implications. This needs to be
distinguished from the mere effect of a footnote in a scheduled commitment, as in this dispute.
114. The ACP Countries argue that the Panel's findings with respect to non-quota beet and sugar
imply that the same source of finance under the EC sugar regime appears to be responsible for
concurrently financing—directly and/or indirectly —two sets of payments on the same exports. It
would be legally problematic to uphold both these pr opositions, as the Panel has done. Furthermore,
in examining whether the required nexus and degree of governmental action in the financing of the
alleged payments on exports exist, the Panel places undue reliance on Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 –
New Zealand and US) , even though there are major differences between the EC sugar regime and the
facts that were at issue in that case. For example, private entities are key players in the European
Communities' sugar market and, under the EC sugar regime, it is not governments that pool, allocate,
and distribute revenues from domestic sales to producers.
2. Canada

115. Canada argues that the Appellate Body s hould reverse the Panel' s interpretation of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . According to Canada, th e Panel failed to consider
"fully" the relationship between subsidies disciplines and the "specific rules" set out in the Agreement
on Agriculture , and that "Members are faced with an impossible task to distinguish between
permissible domestic support and the now exceptionally broad class of export subsidies".197
116. In Canada's view, "cross-subsidization" is not ap plicable in an analysis of "payments" within
the meaning of Article 9.1(c). There is nothing in Article 9.1 that suggests that a payment analysis
should involve "a far-reaching review of possible side-effects of potentially unrelated financial
transactions".198 To the extent that a cross-subsidization analysis is used, it should be limited to an
analysis of governmental action.
117. Canada further submits that the existence of a benefit is "essential" to a subsidy finding. 199
The Panel erroneously "read[] out" the benefit requirement from subsidies under Article 9.1(c). 200

197Canada's third participant's submission, para. 50.
198Ibid., para. 16.
199Ibid., heading II.A.2(a)ii.
200Ibid., para. 17.

However, "benefit" is a "fundamental component of a finding of subsidization", whether or not that
finding occurs in an agricultural or industrial context.
201
118. Canada also objects to the Panel's interpretati on of the term "on the export". The Panel's
reliance on Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 in this context was incorrect, and the Panel failed to
account for the context of Article 9.1(c). In addition, the Panel's factual finding s in respect of C beet
production and its reliance on those findings demonstrat e that the Panel, in fact, believed that "export
contingency must be required for Article 9.1(c) to apply." 202 Canada submits that "contingency"
suggests that a subsidy must be conditional or dependent upon export performance; it is not sufficient
to suppose that "a payment was made in mere anticipation that exports could result."203
119. Finally, Canada submits that there is a "pr essing need to revisit the so-called 'cross-
subsidization' standard".204 Canada argues that it is not clear how Members may distinguish between
domestic support and export subsidies and that th e Panel has failed to determine the appropriate
dividing line between these two types of support. In applying a "broad standard" of cross-
subsidization while "denying" the requirement of contingency, a panel can find a violation of
Article 9.1(c) "solely on the basis of unrelated payments made through various actors that may or may
not be acting with governmental direction".205
3. China
120. China focuses its comments on the issue of the Pane l's terms of reference. China recalls that
the Appellate Body found in US – Carbon Steel that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires the complaining
party to identify the specific measures at issue and to provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. Referring to the Appellate Body Report in Korea
– Dairy, China submits that a "claim" is an assertion th at the respondent party has violated, nullified,
or impaired the benefits arising from an identified treaty provision. 206 "Arguments", in contrast, are
adduced by a complaining party to demonstrate that the responding party's measure is indeed in
breach of an identified treaty provision. China adds that the panel in Japan – Film spelt out that the

201Canada's third participant's submission, para. 21.
202Ibid., para. 34. (original emphasis)
203Ibid., para. 36 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft , para. 172; and Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 48).
204Ibid., heading II.B.
205Ibid., para. 47.
206China's third participant's submission, para . 16 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy,
para. 139).

sufficiency of a panel request depends on whether the ability of the respondent to defend itself was
prejudiced.
207
4. New Zealand
121. New Zealand agrees with the Panel's finding that C sugar receives export subsidies within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . New Zealand submits that the
inconsistency with Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture resides in the governmental
requirement to export C sugar, not in the fact th at exports are conducted at prices below cost of
production. Therefore, New Zealand argues that the Appellate Body should dismiss the European
Communities' characterization of the Panel's interpretation of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture as being "a 'broad prohibition' on exports below cost of production". 208 The European
Communities' contention that the Panel's ruling convert s a payment under Article 9.1(c) into a "blunt
anti-dumping mechanism" is also without foundation. Dumping reflects the choice on the part of an
individual exporter to sell at below its cost of production. However, in the present case, governmental
action creates strong incentives for surplus production and requires export of this surplus production.
122. New Zealand contends that the Panel correctly concluded that there was a "payment" within
the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Below-cost sales of C beet constitute
"payments", a finding from which the European Co mmunities does not appeal. New Zealand also
asserts that there is a transfer of resources to the production and export of C sugar, and that "revenue
is foregone vis-à-vis the proper value [which constitutes] a 'payment'." 209 New Zealand also affirms
that the Panel correctly concluded that "benefit" is not a required element under Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
123. In New Zealand's view, in ruling that the paym ent was "on the export" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c), the Panel correctly placed "gr eat emphasis on the ... legal requirement to export
C sugar".210 Furthermore, New Zealand submits that the emphasis of Article 9.1(c) is whether the
actual payment is on the export, not whether the European Communities' price support as a whole is
contingent on C sugar being exported.

207China's third participant's submission, pa ras. 18-19 (referring to Panel Report, Japan – Film ,
para. 10.8).
208New Zealand's third participant's submission, para. 3.06 (referring to European Communities'
appellant's submission, para. 200).
209Ibid., para. 3.23.

124. New Zealand furthermore submits that th e Appellate Body should uphold the Panel's
conclusion that the payments are "financed by virt ue of governmental action" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . The Panel correctly identified a variety of "actions"
through which the European Communities "regulat es, controls and supervises its domestic sugar
market in a way that results in the financing of C sugar exports".
211 New Zealand also identifies
"similarities ... that are striking" between the governmental action in Canada – Dairy and
governmental action in the present case. 212 In addition, the Panel correctly found that growers and
sugar producers are encouraged to produce C beet and C sugar in order to ensure that they fill their
production quotas on A and B sugar. In New Zeal and's view, in the absence of the European
Communities' regulation of its sugar regime, "C s ugar would not be produced, payments to export[s]
of C sugar would not occur, and export sales of C sugar would not occur."213
5. The United States
125. With regard to the legal status of Footnote 1, the United States asserts that the Panel properly
concluded that, in the event of any conflict between the Agreement on Agriculture and Footnote 1,
the former would prevail. 214 The United States also submits that WTO Members may yield rights in
their Schedules, but they may not diminish their obligations under the GATT. The United States finds
support for its position in the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bananas III and the report of the
GATT panel in US – Sugar.
126. The United States submits that Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture supports the
proposition that in the event of a conflict between the Agreement on Agriculture and the provision of
a Schedule, the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail.
215 The United States maintains that
"Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the Agreement on Agriculture
and other agreements, including the GATT 1994" and that by agreeing on the terms of Article 21 of
the Agreement on Agriculture, "Members ... provided a rule for how to handle any such conflicts." 216
The European Communities' Footnote is part of the GATT 1994 and, therefore, by virtue of

211New Zealand's third participant's submission, para. 3.40.
212Ibid., para. 3.41.
213Ibid., para. 3.45.
214United States' third participant's submission, para. 15.
215Ibid., para. 16.
216Ibid.

Article 21, the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail over Footnote 1. The United States also
draws attention to paragraph 3 of the Marrakesh Protocol to reinforce this point.
217
127. Regarding the concept of estoppel, the United St ates submits that "[n]owhere in the DSU or
the other covered agreements is there a reference to 'estoppel'." 218 According to the United States,
" '[e]stoppel' is not a defense that Members have agre ed on, and it therefore should not be considered
by the Appellate Body."219
128. The United States submits that the argumen t advanced by the European Communities
regarding "lack of good faith" under Article 3.10 of the DSU should be dismissed by the Appellate
Body. According to the United States, Article 3. 10 of the DSU "is not a general incorporation of
'good faith' principles of public international law, whatever the precise contours of those might be". 220
Rather, Article 3.10 sets out an "understanding" of Members to engage in good faith in the dispute
settlement procedures. 221 The United States also submits that "[a] choice by a Member not to
challenge or complain about another Member's meas ure at any given point in time, including during
the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, does not precl ude a future challenge. Nor does such a failure
to object at one point in time render a later objection in bad faith."222

217United States' third participant's submission, para. 17.
218Ibid., para. 5.
219Ibid., para. 9.
220Ibid., para. 6.
221Ibid.
222Ibid., para. 8. (footnote omitted)

III. Issues Raised in This Appeal
129. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
(a) whether the Panel erred in finding, in para graph 7.37 of the Panel Reports, that the
alleged "payments", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, in the form of low-priced sales of C beet
223 to sugar producers, fell
within the Panel's terms of reference;
(b) whether the Panel erred in finding, in para graphs 7.191, 7.198, 7.222, and 8.1(a) of
the Panel Reports, that Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European
Communities' Schedule ("Footnote 1") is of no legal effect and does not enlarge or
otherwise modify the European Communities' commitment levels specified in that
Schedule;
(c) whether the Panel erred in finding, in para graph 7.292 of the Panel Reports, that the
alleged payments in the form of low-pri ced sales of C beet to sugar producers are
"financed by virtue of governmental action", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of
the Agreement on Agriculture;
(d) whether the Panel erred in finding, in para graph 7.334 of the Panel Reports, that the
production of C sugar receives a "payment on the export financed by virtue of
governmental action", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, in the form of transfers of financial resources through cross-subsidization
resulting from the operation of the European Communities' sugar regime;
(e) whether, as a result of its findings under (c) and (d) above, the Panel erred in finding,
in paragraph 8.1(f) of the Panel Reports, that there is prima facie evidence that the
European Communities has been providing e xport subsidies, within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, to its exports of C sugar since 1995;

223The European Communities' sugar regime establishes two categories of production quotas: one for
A sugar and one for B sugar. These quotas constitute the maximum quantities eligible for domestic price
support and direct export subsidies. C sugar is simply sugar produced in excess of A and B quotas. There is no
difference in physical characteristics be tween A, B, and C sugar. Likewise, there is no difference in physical
characteristics between A, B, and C beet . C beet is simply beet used for C sugar production. Unlike for A and
B beet, there is no minimum guaranteed price for C beet.

(f) whether the Panel erred in finding, in para graphs 7.374 and 8.4 of the Panel Reports,
that the European Communities' violations of the Agreement on Agriculture nullified
or impaired the benefits accruing to the Complaining Parties under the Agreement on
Agriculture;
(g) whether the Panel erred in finding, in pa ragraph 7.74 of the Panel Reports, that
Australia, Brazil, and Thailand (the "Compl aining Parties") acted in good faith, under
Article 3.10 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (the "DSU"), in the initiation and conduct of the present dispute
settlement proceedings and have not been est opped, through their actions or silence,
from alleging that the European Communities' exports of C sugar are in excess of its
export subsidy reduction commitments;
(h) whether the Panel erred, in paragraph 7.387 of the Panel Reports, in exercising
judicial economy and declining to examin e the Complaining Parties' claims under
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(the "SCM Agreement"); and
(i) whether certain aspects of the European Communities' Notice of Appeal
 224 satisfy the
requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the
"Working Procedures").
130. We proceed to analyze these issues in the order set out above.

IV. The Panel's Terms of Reference
131. The Panel found that production of C sugar r eceives two forms of "payments" within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture: (i) below total cost of production sales of
C beet to C sugar producers; and (ii) transfers of financial resources to C sugar producers through
cross-subsidization from sales of A and B sugar. 225 With respect to its challenge concerning the
Panel's terms of reference, the European Communitie s' appeal is limited to the Panel's refusal to

224Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities, WT/DS265/25, WT/DS266/25,
WT/DS283/6, 13 January 2005 (attached as Annex 5 to this Report).
225Panel Reports, paras. 7.270 and 7.338.

dismiss, as falling outside its term s of reference, the Complaining Pa rties' allegations that C sugar
receives "payments" in the form of low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producers.
226
A. Panel Findings and Arguments on Appeal
132. The Panel was established with standard terms of reference 227, specifically:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered
agreements cited by Australia in document WT/DS265/21, by Brazil
in document WT/DS266/21 and by Thailand in document
WT/DS283/2, the matters referred therein to the DSB by Australia,
Brazil and Thailand, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB
in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for
in those agreements.
228

The documents referred to in the Panel's terms of reference are the Complaining Parties' requests for
the establishment of a panel.229
133. Before the Panel, the European Communities argued that the Complaining Parties "should
have identified, in their panel requests, the specific measures of the European Communities' sugar
regime which, in their view, provided the alle ged export subsidies" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture .230 According to the European Communities, each
alleged "payment" should, therefore, have been spec ifically identified by the Complaining Parties in
their panel requests. 231 The European Communities contended be fore the Panel that sales of "C beet
at prices below the minimum prices for A and B beet " were not identified as a "payment" in the panel
requests of the Complaining Parties and that, theref ore, this "payment" fell outside the Panel's terms
of reference.232 Before the Panel, the European Communities also argued that Brazil's claim regarding
the other form of "payment"—namely, "payment" from European Communities ' consumers to sugar
producers in the form of "artificially high" dom estic prices for A and B sugar—was not properly
identified in Brazil's panel request. But, as stated earlier, the European Communities' appeal with
respect to the Panel's terms of reference is limited to the sales of C beet to sugar producers.

226European Communities' appellant's submission, para . 40 (referring to Panel Reports, paras. 7.18-
7.37).
227Panel Reports, para. 1.5.
228Ibid., para. 1.6.
229WT/DS265/21; WT/DS266/21; and WT/DS283/2 (attached as Annexes 1, 2, and 3 to this Report).
230Panel Reports, para. 7.18. (emphasis added)
231See ibid., heading VII.B.1(d).
232Ibid., paras. 4.12 and 7.20.

134. After reviewing those parts of the Complaining Parties' panel requests that "identified the
measures at issue and the violations claimed to have occurred"
233, the Panel found that:
... for Australia and Brazil the m easures are the "subsidies in excess
of the EC's reduction commitment levels under Council Regulation
No. 1260/2001", while for Thailand the measures are the "export
subsidies accorded under Counc il Regulation No. 1260/2001" on
sugar. The violations claimed by the Complainants are essentially
the same, that is that the Europ ean Communities is providing export
subsidies for sugar in excess of its commitment level and
consequently the European Communities is acting inconsistently with
its obligations under Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a) and 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture or, alternatively, Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture . In the Panel's view, although the
Complainants drafted their panel requests using slightly different
terms, each of the complaining parties' panel request has identified
essentially the same measures – subsidies accorded under Council
Regulation 1260/2001 for the EC sugar regime – and the same
alleged violation – that the European Communities exceeds its
budgetary outlays and quantity comm itments contrary to Article 3
and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
234 (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)

135. The Panel held that the Complaining Parties have satisfied the requirements of Article 3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture with respect to their claims under that provision by alleging, first, that the
European Communities has exported sugar above its commitment level, and secondly, that such
exports of sugar were subsidized. The Panel also held that the Complaining Parties did not have to
detail in their panel requests how and why such exports were subsid ized. Moreover, the Panel noted
that the Complaining Parties "did indicate some aspe cts of the export subsidization" of sugar in their
panel requests by referring to Articles 9.1(a) and 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.235
136. The Panel concluded that the panel requests "complied with the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU in that they adequately identified the measur es at issue and the violations claimed to have
occurred, i.e. that the European Communities' exports of subsidized sugar exceeded the European
Communities' commitment level contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture ."236
The Panel stated that, consequently, the Complain ing Parties' "argumentation that C sugar receives

233Panel Reports, para. 7.12.
234Ibid., para. 7.16.
235Ibid., para. 7.30.
236Ibid., para. 7.36.

advantages from various subsidies and payments, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture, is not outside the Panel's terms of reference."
237
137. On appeal, the European Communities contends that the alleged "payments" in the form of
low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producer s fell outside the Panel's terms of reference. 238 According
to the European Communities, each of the payments alleged by the Complaining Parties "constituted a
different claim", and, as the panel requests made no me ntion of the alleged "payments" in the form of
sales of C beet at low prices, this claim fell outside the Panel's terms of reference. 239 The European
Communities also argues that the identification of th e measure at issue in the panel requests as "the
export subsidies granted under [C ouncil] Regulation [(EC) No.] 1260/ 2001 or, even more vaguely,
under the 'EC sugar regime' " was not sufficient for purposes of complying with the requirement of
Article 6.2 of the DSU, because that provision requires "not just the identification of a 'measure', but
of the 'specific measure at issue'."240 According to the European Co mmunities, the mere reference to
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 ("EC Re gulation 1260/2001") or to the European
Communities' sugar regime did not put the European Communities on notice that the Complaining
Parties intended to challenge, as an export subsidy, low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producers.
241
When asked whether the European Communities considered each alleged payment to be a "specific
measure at issue", or a "specific claim", the Euro pean Communities clarified during the oral hearing
that, in its view, each form of payment under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
constitutes a "specific measure at issu e" within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Therefore, in
order to comply with Article 6.2, the panel requ ests should have identified separately each form of
export subsidy alleged by the Complaining Parties.242
138. In reply, the Complaining Parties argue that their panel requests sufficiently identified the
"specific measures at issue" and stated the legal b asis of their complaint so as to present the "problem
clearly", as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. 243 They also refute th e European Communities'
assertion that their panel requests covered only certa in forms of "payments". Moreover, Australia

237Panel Reports, para. 7.37.
239Ibid., para. 48.
240Ibid., paras. 56-57. (original emphasis)
241Ibid., para. 61.
242The European Communities added that, to the extent that each payment alleged by the Complaining
Parties is a specific measure, it may be the subject of a claim. (European Communities' response to questioning
at the oral hearing)
243Australia's appellee's submission, paras. 81 and 86; Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 21;
Thailand's appellee's submission, paras. 140-141 and 143.

argues that the European Communities attempts to redefine a "claim" as a "measure". According to
Australia, a "claim" is one of inconsistency with th e provisions of a covered agreement. A "measure"
is not a "claim", but rather, the basis for the "claim".
244
139. The Complaining Parties also contend that, with respect to claims under Articles 3 and 8 of
the Agreement on Agriculture, a complaining Member is not requ ired to identify each alleged export
subsidy in its panel request. Rather, it is suffici ent to allege that the responding Member has exported
an agricultural product in quantities exceeding its qu antity commitment level and has granted export
subsidies with respect to such excess quantities.245
B. Article 6.2 of the DSU
140. Before addressing the Panel's terms of referenc e and the panel requests in this dispute, we
consider the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU in general as they relate to the determination of a
panel's terms of reference.
141. A panel's terms of reference are determined by the "specific measures at issue" and the "legal
basis of the complaint" (that is, "claims") stat ed in the complaining Member's request for the
establishment of a panel.246 Article 6.2 of the DSU provides that a panel request shall:
... identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary
of the legal basis of the complain t sufficient to present the problem
clearly.

142. The Appellate Body observed in Thailand – H-Beams that:
Article 6.2 of the DSU calls for sufficient clarity with respect to the
legal basis of the complaint, that is, with respect to the "claims" that
are being asserted by the complaining party . A defending party is
entitled to know what case it has to an swer, and what violations have
been alleged so that it can begin preparing its defence. 247 (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted)

245Complaining Parties' responses to questioning at the oral hearing; Thailand's appellee's submission,
para. 126.
246Article 7.1 of the DSU.
247Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 88.

143. In US – Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body explained that:
The requirements of precision in the request for the establishment of
a panel flow from the two essential purposes of the terms of
reference. First, the terms of reference define the scope of the
dispute. Secondly, the terms of reference, and the request for the
establishment of a panel on which they are based, serve the due
process objective of notifying the parties and third parties of the
nature of a complainant's case. When faced with an issue relating to
the scope of its terms of reference, a panel must scrutinize carefully
the request for establishment of a panel "to ensure its compliance with
both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU."
... [C]ompliance with the requireme nts of Article 6.2 must be
demonstrated on the face of the request for the establishment of a
panel. ... [C]ompliance with the re quirements of Article 6.2 must be
determined on the merits of each case, having considered the panel
request as a whole, and in the light of attendant circumstances.
248
(original emphasis; footnotes omitted)

144. In addition, the Appellate Body clarified in EC – Bananas III that Article 6.2 of the DSU
"requires that the claims, but not the arguments, must all be specified sufficiently in the request for
the establishment of a panel".249
C. Alleged "Payments" in the Form of Low-priced Sales of C Beet to Sugar Producers
145. We turn to an examination of the panel requests insofar as they relate to "payments" in the
form of sales of C beet to sugar producers.
146. Looking at the panel requests, we note that Australia stated in its panel request:
Australia is particularly concerne d at the subsidies provided by the
EC for "C sugar" exports under th e EC sugar regime. Under the
regime, producers of C sugar are able to sell C sugar on the world
market at below the total average cost of production through cross-
subsidisation of C sugar from quot a sugar profits. By financing
payments on the export of C sugar, the EC exceeds its export subsidy
reduction commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.

248Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, paras. 126-127.
249Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 143. (original emphasis)

Australia considers that the provision of the above subsidies and the
relevant elements of the EC sugar regime are inconsistent with the
EC's obligations under the following provisions:
– Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a), 9.1(c), and alternatively, 10.1 of the
 Agreement on Agriculture[.]
 250

147. Similarly, Brazil stated in its panel request:
Payments in the form of high prices provided to growers and
processors by the EC sugar regime finance the production and export
of C sugar at prices below its total cost of production.251

Therefore, according to Brazil:
The amount of sugar thus subsidized, alone or in combination
with other export subsidies for sugar provided by the EC, exceeds
the export subsidy reduction comm itment levels and, as such,
constitutes a violation of the EC's ob ligations under Articles 3.3, 8,
9.1(a) and (c), or, alternatively, Article 10.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
252

148. Finally, Thailand stated in its panel request:
By virtue of the EC sugar regime, exporters of C-sugar are able to
export such sugar at prices below the average cost of production.
The EC therefore accords export subs idies to C-sugar in the form of
payments on the export of sugar fina nced by virtue of governmental
action.

As a result, the EC provides export subsidies for sugar in excess
of its reduction commitments and co nsequently acts inconsistently
with its obligations under Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a) and 9.1(c) ... or,
alternatively, Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
253

250Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Aust ralia of 9 July 2003, WT/DS265/21 (attached as
Annex 1 to this Report), p. 2.
251Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil of 9 July 2003, WT/DS266/21 (attached as
Annex 2 to this Report), p. 2, item (i).
252Ibid., p. 2.
253Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Tha iland of 9 July 2003, WT/DS283/2 (attached as
Annex 3 to this Report), pp. 1-2.

149. We note, first, as did the Panel, that the pane l requests of all the Complaining Parties have
clearly identified the "specific measures at issue" as the subsid ies accorded under EC Regulation
1260/2001 and related instruments (the "EC sugar regime"), and the alleged violations as the
European Communities' exports of subsidized sugar in excess of th e European Communities'
commitment levels in contravention of Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
150. Secondly, we note that all three panel requests refer specifically to C sugar and identify as an
area of concern the subsidized exports of C suga r in excess of the European Communities' reduction
commitment levels. Thirdly, we observe that all three panel requests clearly explain, although in
different terms, that C sugar is being exported at below its total av erage cost of production and that
this occurs due to the subsidies provided under the EC sugar regime for C sugar, which subsidies arise
from the profits made by sugar producers on sales of A and B sugar. Fourthly, we note that Brazil's
panel request specifically refers to payments in the form of "high prices paid to growers and
processors by the EC sugar regime", which, in the case of growers, could only mean the high prices
provided for A and B beet by the EC sugar regime.
151. Lastly, and more importantly for consideration of the issue at hand, all three panel requests
specifically allege that the export subsidies provided for C sugar exports violate the obligations of the
European Communities under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . The panel requests
clearly draw attention to the allegation of the Complaining Parties that the export subsidies in question
for C sugar exports are in the form of "payments" fa lling within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
152. We agree with the European Communities that the panel requests did not specifically identify
that low-priced sales of C beet by growers to pr oducers was one form of such alleged "payments".
Nevertheless, we consider that , taken as a whole, the panel requests should have informed the
European Communities that the Complaining Parties were alleging in their panel requests that C sugar
exports below total average cost of production were being enabled by subsidies in the form of
"payments" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . C beet being a
critical input for C sugar production, and C beet not being eligible for a minimum guaranteed price,
unlike A and B beet, the panel requests should have alerted the European Communities that one form
of such alleged "payments" could be low-priced sales of C beet by growers to producers.
153. The European Communities argues that the Appellate Body Report in Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) supports its position that a complaining Member must at least
identify or specify sufficiently in its panel request "all the ' claimed export subsidies'", although it is

not necessary that a complaining party make a prima facie case that the elements of the claimed
export subsidy are present.
254 The European Communities conc ludes from the Appellate Body's
reasoning in that appeal that:
Article 10.3 [of the Agreement on Agriculture ] transfers to the
defending party the burden of proof with respect to the "export
subsidization aspect" of the complaining party's claim. But, before
such transfer can take place, it is necessary that the complaining party
states that part of the claim.
255

154. We are unable to agree with the European Communities on the conclusion drawn by it from
the Appellate Body Report in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) . The
Appellate Body made those observations in the c ontext of discussing the burden of proof requirement
under Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , and not in the context of examining the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Article 6.2 of the DSU and Article 10.3 of the Agreement on
Agriculture address different matters and apply at differe nt stages of panel proceedings. A panel
request, on its face, must comply with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, whereas
Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture relates to a Member's duty to adduce evidence to
substantiate its assertions during the course of the panel proceedings . The Appellate Body did not
require, in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) , that a panel request identify the
details of each and every claimed export subsidy.
155. For these reasons, we agree with the Panel th at the Complaining Parties' panel requests
"complied with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU in that they adequately identified the
measures at issue and the violations claimed to ha ve occurred, i.e. that the European Communities'
exports of subsidized sugar exceeded the Europ ean Communities' commitment level contrary to
Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture."
256
156. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.37 of the Panel Reports, that the
alleged "payments", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture ", in the
form of low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producers, fell within the Panel's terms of reference.

254European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 77 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 76). (emphasis added by the European Communities)
255Ibid., para. 76 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand
and US II), paras. 70-71).
256Panel Reports, para. 7.36.

V. Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule
A. Introduction
157. We turn next to examine the European Communities' appeal with respect to the Panel's
finding that "the content of Footnote 1 ... is of no legal effect" and that, as a consequence, for exports
of sugar, the European Communities' quantity comm itment level is 1,273,500 tonnes per year and its
budgetary outlay commitment level is €499.1 million per year, with e ffect from the marketing year
2000/2001.
257
158. Our analysis of this issue proceeds as follows. First, we set out the European Communities'
export subsidy commitments regarding sugar. Sec ondly, we summarize the Panel's analysis and the
European Communities' arguments on appeal. Thir dly, we examine the meaning of Footnote 1.
Fourthly, we consider the conformity of Foot note 1 with Members' obligations under the Agreement
on Agriculture . Finally, we examine the relationshi p between Members' Schedules and the
Agreement on Agriculture.
B. The European Communities' Export Subsidy Commitments Regarding Sugar
159. The export subsidy commitments made by the Eu ropean Communities with respect to sugar,
as specified in Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Schedule 258, are as follows: (i) the
"base quantity level" (the average of the quantity of subsidized exports of sugar during the base period
1986-1990) was 1,612,000 tonnes, a nd this quantity level would be progressively reduced to
1,273,500 tonnes in the year 2000 as the "final quantit y commitment level" for sugar; and (ii) the
"base outlay level" (the average of the budgetary outlay on subsidized exports of sugar during the base
period 1986-1990) was €779.9 million, and this budgetary outlay le vel would be progressively
reduced to €499.1 million in the year 2000 as the "final [budgetary] outlay commitment level" for
sugar.259 There is no dispute in this case regarding these figures pertaining to quantity and budgetary
outlay commitment levels for sugar as specified in the European Communities' Schedule.

257Panel Reports, para. 8.1(a)-(c).
258Section II, Part IV of the European Communities' Sc hedule, which includes Footnote 1, is attached
as Annex 4 to this Report.
259European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 19, Table 1.

160. According to the European Communities, thes e export subsidy commitments are "further
elaborated"
260 in Footnote 1 to the European Communities' Schedule, which states:
Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin on which
the Community is not making any reduction commitments. The
average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1,6 mio t.

161. At issue in this dispute is the meaning of Footnote 1, its conformity with the European
Communities' obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture, and its implications for the European
Communities' export subsidy reduction commitments for sugar.
C. The Panel's Analysis and the European Communities' Appeal
162. The Panel opined that the ordinary meaning of the terms of Footnote 1 "does not indicate any
'limitation on export subsidies for sugar [of ACP/Indian origin]' to 1.6 million tonnes" and that the
Panel "fail[ed] to see any commitment 'limiting subsidization'" in Footnote 1.
261 The Panel added that
it "[did] not find any evidence that the European Communities itself was of the view, during the entire
implementation period [of the Agreement on Agriculture ], that ACP /Indian sugar was another
'component' of its commitments."262 The Panel concluded that:
... the ordinary meaning of the terms [of Footnote 1] indicates that the
European Communities is not making a commitment limiting
subsidization on exports of sugar of ACP/India origin. On the
contrary, the terms of Footnote 1 indicate that the European
Communities is making a statement that exports of subsidized sugar
of ACP/Indian origin will not be subject to the reduction
commitments provided for in Articles 3, 9.1 and 9.2(b)(iv) of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
263

261Panel Reports, para. 7.169.
262Ibid., para. 7.178 (referring to Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture).
263Ibid., para. 7.179.

163. In sum, the Panel found that:
... the ordinary meaning of the terms of Footnote 1 does not indicate
any commitment or concessions constituting a limitation on export
subsidization or any other type of commitment authorized by the
Agreement on Agriculture which could in any way enlarge or
otherwise modify the European Communities' commitment level
specified in Section II, Part IV of its Schedule. Rather, Footnote 1
constitutes a unilateral statement by the European Communities that,
with regard to exports of ACP/ India sugar, it is not making any
reduction commitment. Moreover, Footnote 1, if it were to constitute
such a limitation on subsidization, would only benefit sugar of
ACP/Indian origin per se, contrary to the European Communities'
suggestion that 1.6 million tonnes of sugar refer to an amount
"equivalent" to the amount imported from ACP countries and
India.
264

164. After analyzing the meaning of Footnote 1, the Panel proceeded to find that, even if
Footnote 1 could be interpreted as providing for a li mitation on subsidization in the form of a ceiling
up to a maximum of an additional 1.6 million tonnes of sugar, as alleged by the European
Communities:
... the content of Footnote 1 ... is inconsistent and conflicts with
Articles 3, 8, 9.1 and 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture and
as such cannot be read harmoniously with the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture : it does not provide for any budgetary
outlays, and subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent sugar have
not been subject to any reduction. Footnote 1 cannot therefore
constitute a second component of the European Communities' overall
commitment level for export subsidies on sugar.
Consequently, ... the content of Footnote 1 is of no legal effect and
does not enlarge or otherwise m odify the European Communities'
quantity commitment level specified in ... its Schedule to be
1,273,500 tonnes of sugar per year, or its budgetary outlay
commitment of €499.1 million per year, with effect since
2000/2001.
265

165. On appeal, the European Communities submits th at the Panel erred in its interpretation of
Footnote 1 as well as of Articles 3, 8, and 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture . The European
Communities also argues, in the alternative, that th e Panel's finding is in error because "there is no

264Panel Reports, para. 7.183.
265Ibid., paras. 7.197-7.198. See also paras. 7.221-7.222.

rule of law giving the Agreement on Agriculture precedence over provisions in a Member's
schedule."
266 We address each of these arguments in turn below.
D. Interpretation of Footnote 1
166. A preliminary question for our consideration is what rules apply in interpreting export subsidy
commitments specified in a Member's Schedule under the Agreement on Agriculture . We observe
that Article II:7 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994") provides
that the "Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of
this Agreement." Furthermore, Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that "export
subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member's Sc hedule ... are hereby made an integral part of
[the] GATT 1994."
167. The applicable rules for interpreting the provisions of the GATT 1994 are the "customary
rules of interpretation of public international law". 267 The Appellate Body has held that these rules
are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 268 (the " Vienna Convention "). As
provisions of a Member's Schedule are "part of the terms of the treaty", they are subject to these same
rules of treaty interpretation. 269 Accordingly, these rules apply in interpreting Footnote 1. We note
that no participant or third participant in this appeal contests the applicability of these rules in
interpreting Footnote 1.
168. Bearing this in mind, we turn now to interpret Footnote 1 in the light of the arguments raised
on appeal by the participants.

267Article 3.2 of the DSU.
268Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679. In US –
Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated:
[The] general rule of interpretation [as set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties] has attained the status of a rule of
customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law" which the
Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply in
seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other
"covered agreements" of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement").
(Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 16) (footnotes omitted)
269Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84. See also Appellate Body Report, EC –
Bananas III, para. 154.

1. The Meaning of Footnote 1

169. The European Communities argues that, while the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment
levels for sugar included in its Schedule constitute the first co mponent of its export subsidy
commitment on sugar, Footnote 1 constitutes a di stinct second component of its export subsidy
commitment on sugar. According to the Europ ean Communities, the first sentence of Footnote 1
means that the European Communities is not maki ng any export subsidy re duction commitments on
the export of sugar equivalent in volume to its a nnual imports of sugar from ACP countries and India.
In turn, the second sentence of Footnote 1 means that the volume of such exports of sugar will be
limited to the lower of its actual imports from ACP countries and India or 1.6 million tonnes. Thus,
according to the European Communities, Footnote 1 provides for an additional subsidized export of
up to 1.6 million tonnes of sugar, as well as a separat e commitment to "limit" such subsidization to
1.6 million tonnes or the actual imports of sugar fro m ACP countries and India, whichever quantity is
lower.270 Furthermore, the European Communities argues, as it did before the Panel, that the words
"exports of sugar of ACP/Indian origin" in the fi rst sentence of Footnote 1 do not mean "re-exports"
of sugar of ACP/Indian origin, but mean "e xports" of sugar by the European Communities
"corresponding" to its imports of sugar from ACP countries and India.
170. On appeal, the European Communities contends that "[i]t is the second sentence which is vital
to understanding Footnote 1" 271, and that, in ascertaining the meaning of Footnote 1, the Panel
completely disregarded the second sentence and read it out of the Footnote. In particular, the Panel
failed to note that the word "export" in the second sentence must be given the same meaning as the
word "exports" in the first sentence. More importan tly, the Panel ignored the pointed reference in the
second sentence to the period 1986-1990, which was the base period adopted in the negotiations for
reduction commitments. The European Communities argues:

270It is not in dispute that these additional exports of sugar are given the same type of "export refunds"
as exports of A and B sugar in respect of which the Me mber's Schedule gives the budgetary outlay and quantity
commitment level reduction commitments. It is also not disputed by the European Communities that, in respect
of the additional exports covered by Footnote 1, the commitment contained in Footnote 1 is only to "limit" the
quantity of subsidized exports to 1.6 million tonnes or the actual quantity of imports from ACP countries and
India; there is no commitment, with respect to thes e additional exports, either to "reduce" the quantities of
exports from a base level or to indicate the base level budgetary outlay and to limit or reduce that outlay.

The reference to the period 1986-1 990 (which was the base period
for the reduction commitments) is telling. If Footnote 1 is simply an
exclusion, there would be no need to insert the second sentence, and
no reason to refer to the 1.6 million tonnes as the average during [the]
1986-1990 base period. This is a dir ect parallel to the base quantities
in the table itself, which represent "the annual average" of subsidised
exports in the 1986-1990 period. Th is parallelism explains why the
footnote refers to the "average of export".
272 (footnotes omitted)

171. The European Communities thus contends that , had the Panel given proper meaning to both
sentences of Footnote 1, it would have found that , by virtue of the first sentence, the European
Communities is not making any export subsidy reduction commitments on its export of ACP/India
equivalent sugar and that, by virtue of the sec ond sentence, the European Communities is "limiting"
its subsidization of such exports to the annual aver age of the subsidized exports in the base period
1986-1990, which was 1.6 million tonnes.
172. In reply, the Complaining Parties submit that the Panel was correct in its interpretation of
Footnote 1 that:
... the ordinary meaning of the terms [of Footnote 1] indicates that the
European Communities is not making a commitment limiting
subsidization on exports of sugar of ACP/India origin. On the
contrary, the terms of Footnote 1 indicate that the European
Communities is making a statement that exports of subsidized sugar
of ACP/Indian origin will not be subject to the reduction
commitments provided for in Article s 3, 9.1 and 9.2(b)(iv) of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
273

Specifically, with reference to the second sentence of Footnote 1, Australia argues that "[t]he second
sentence merely states that the average of expor ts during the period 1986-1990 was 1.6 million tonnes
[and it] makes no promises or predictions regarding the level of future exports."274 Brazil submits that
"[t]he second sentence merely discloses what the av erage of those exports was during the period 1986
to 1990."275 In a similar vein, Thailand contends th at the second sentence "contains no normative
term expressing a commitment, nor does it contain any term reflecting the idea of a ceiling."276

273Panel Reports, para. 7.179.

173. We begin our interpretative analysis by recalling the text of Footnote 1:
Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin on which
the Community is not making any reduction commitments. The
average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1,6 mio t.

174. We address, first, the question whether a plain reading of Footnote 1 suggests that the
European Communities is undertaking a commitment to "limit" its subs idization of "exports of sugar
of ACP and Indian origin". On its face, the fi rst sentence does not indicate that the European
Communities is undertaking any such commitment. On the contrary, the first sentence suggests two
things: first, the budgetary outlay and quantity level commitme nts specified in the European
Communities' Schedule for sugar do not "include" su gar of ACP and Indian origin; and secondly,
with respect to exports of s ugar of ACP and Indian origin, the European Communities is not
undertaking "any reduction commitments" either by way of budgetary outlay or quantity commitment.
It is, therefore, to the second sentence of Footnote 1 that we need to turn to see whether it suggests
any commitment to "limit" subsidization on the expor ts of sugar of ACP and Indian origin. A plain
reading of the second sentence does not indicate that it "imposes a limit on the volume of sugar [of
ACP and Indian origin] which can be exported with a subsidy".
277 The second sentence, in its plain
language, only states that the average of exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin in the period 1986-
1990 amounted to 1.6 million tonnes. We see the European Communities as arguing that "an
examination of the terms of Footnote 1, in its context, and in light of its object and purpose" 278 would
show that Footnote 1 imposes a limit on the volume of subsidized exports of sugar of ACP and Indian
origin.
2. First Sentence of Footnote 1: "Sugar of ACP and Indian Origin"
175. We therefore turn to the question whether the fi rst sentence of Footnote 1, interpreted in its
context, shows that it "was intende d to cover equivalent exports" 279, that is, exports of sugar
equivalent in volume to the European Communities' imports of ACP and Indian sugar. Before the
Panel, the European Communities argued that Footnote 1 refers to a quantity of sugar "equivalent to"
the amount of sugar imported from ACP countries and India.280 The Panel concluded that:

278Ibid.
279Ibid., para. 113.
280Panel Reports, para. 7.180.

... the ordinary meaning of the terms of Footnote 1 does not provide
that an amount of subsidized sugar "equivalent" to the amount of
sugar imported from ACP/India will be maintained for export. In the
Panel's view, the Footnote appears to require that the sugar exports
excluded from export reduction commitments actually be sugar of
ACP and Indian origin, as stated in Footnote 1. Payment of export
subsidies on an equivalent am ount of sugar sourced from the
European Communities does not co me within the terms of the
Footnote.
281 (original emphasis)

176. On appeal, the European Communities argues that:
... it was well known to all parties at the time of conclusion of the
WTO Agreement that the EC did not grant export refunds only on the
re-export of sugar originally of ACP/Indian origin, but granted export
refunds for a quantity equivalent to su ch exports. This is reflected in
the drafting of Footnote 1, which, in the second sentence, refers to
the "average of export" as being 1. 6 million tonnes. This is not a
reference to ACP/India raw sugar imported and subsequently re-
exported. Rather, it is a referenc e to the equivalent quantity of
ACP/India sugar that had been imported. ... Consequently, it is clear
that Footnote 1 covers refunds on exports equivalent to imports.
282
(footnotes omitted)

177. The European Communities also submits that it presented the Panel with undisputed evidence
that it had "consistently treated Footnote 1 as imposing a limit at the lower of an amount equivalent
to [European Communities'] imports of ACP/Indian [origin] sugar or 1.6 million tonnes".283
178. The European Communities further contends that, "[ t]o the extent that it is necessary to have
recourse to supplementary means of interpretati on, ... the negotiating history supports the EC's
interpretation."284 The European Communities finds support for its position in various documents that
allegedly reflect the understanding of GATT Contr acting Parties, before the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, as to the European Communities' e xport subsidy commitments. In particular, the
European Communities refers to a letter dated 4 March 1992, in which it stated that it "ha[d] not
included the volume of sugar corresponding to its imports of sugar from ACP countries". 285 T h e

281Panel Reports, para. 7.180.
284Ibid., para. 120.
285Ibid., para. 116 (quoting letter dated 4 March 1992, providing the supporting tables on which the
European Communities' export subsidy commitments were based (Exhibit EC-5 submitted by the European
Communities to the Panel)). (emphasis added)

European Communities also refers to evidence submitted by Australia to the Panel, which, in the
European Communities' view, confirms that Footnote 1 should be read to refer to exports of a quantity
of sugar that is equivalent to the volu me of imports from ACP countries and India.
286 In particular,
the European Communities relies on an Australian memorandum dated 31 January 1994 that describes
Footnote 1 as covering "direct export restitutions (corresponding to [the European Communities']
imports of sugar from ACP countries and India)".287
179. Finally, the European Communities argues that, since the base quantity figure of 1,612,000
tonnes included in its Schedule did not include th e figure of 1.6 million tonnes of ACP/India sugar
mentioned in the second sentence of Footnote 1, and since it does not export or re-export ACP/India
sugar as such, the exports mentioned in the first se ntence could only be exports of sugar equivalent in
volume to its imports of sugar from ACP countries and India.
180. Like the Panel, we are not persuaded by these arguments, which rely on the presumed
knowledge of other Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on the export subsidy
practices of the European Communities with respect to ACP/India sugar. 288 We note that the
Complaining Parties have rebutted the interpreta tions put forward by the European Communities on
the terms, context, and negotiating history of Footnote 1. 289 We also wish to note that the European
Communities was unable to clarify at the oral hear ing, why, having written the aforementioned letter
in March 1992, it did not consider it necessary to use that same language in Footnote 1 in the
December 1993 text, or to use language that plainl y shows that the exports referred to were those
equivalent in volume to the sugar that was importe d from ACP countries and India. In any event, we
are of the view that the European Communities' submissions do not alter the plain meaning of the first
sentence of Footnote 1, so as to make it cover th e exports of sugar equiva lent in volume to the
European Communities' imports of sugar from ACP countries and India.
3. Second Sentence of Footnote 1: Limitation of Subsidization of ACP/India
Sugar
181. We next address the question whether the second sentence of Footnote 1, interpreted in its
context, contains a commitment on the part of the European Communities to "limit" its subsidization

286See European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 121-122 (citing Exhibits ALA-3 and
ALA-8 submitted by Australia to the Panel; and Panel Reports, footnote 511 to para. 7.208).
287Ibid., para. 121 (quoting Exhibit ALA-8 submitted by Australia to the Panel; and Panel Reports,
footnote 511 to para. 7.208).
288See Panel Reports, para. 7.180 and footnotes 488-489 thereto.
289Australia's appellee's submission, paras. 158-159.

of exports of sugar to the lower of its imports from ACP countries and India or 1.6 million tonnes.
The European Communities relies on the following f our main arguments in support of its assertion
that the second sentence imposes such a limitation. First, Footnote 1 excludes ACP/India sugar from
the budgetary outlay and quantity level commitments sp ecified in its Schedule, and, therefore, the
base quantity level of 1,612,000 tonnes specified in its Schedule excludes the figure of 1.6 million
tonnes contained in the second sentence of Footnote 1. The latter figure thus pertains solely to
exports of ACP/India sugar, as the word "export" in the second sentence has the same meaning as the
word "exports" in the first sentence of Footnote 1.
182. Secondly, the reference to the period 19 86-1990 in the second sentence is "telling"
290, as this
is the base period for export subsidy reduction commi tments. The reference to "the average of
export" in the base period in the second sentence must be given proper meaning in its context. Such a
meaning can be given only if the second sentence is regarded as "limiting" subsidization to a
maximum of 1.6 million tonnes, the average of the subsidized exports of ACP/India sugar during the
period 1986-1990.
183. Thirdly, the "undisputed evidence" with respect to the European Communities' export subsidy
practice shows that it has consistently "limited" its subsidization to the actual imports from ACP
countries and India or 1.6 million tonnes, whichever was lower.291
184. Lastly, other WTO Members, including the Comp laining Parties, were fully aware that the
European Communities was exporting additional quantities of sugar (over and above its scheduled
commitments) equivalent to its imports from ACP co untries and India, and that it was "limiting" its
subsidization of those exports to the actual level of its imports from those countries.
185. The European Communities, ther efore, argues that the second sentence of Footnote 1, if
interpreted properly in its context, clearly show s that it imposes a "limitation" on exports of sugar
equivalent in volume to its imports of sugar fro m ACP countries and India up to a maximum of 1.6
million tonnes (the average of its base period subsidi zed exports of such sugar) or its actual imports
from those countries. If the second sentence is read merely as a piece of information, as the Panel and
the Complaining Parties do, then, according to the European Communities, it would be tantamount to
reading the sentence out of the text and ignoring it entirely.

291Ibid., para. 88.

186. Here again, we are not convinced by the argu ments of the European Communities. The fact
that the second sentence makes a specific reference to the average of such exports in the base period
does not necessarily lead to an infe rence that there is a commitment in the sentence to "limit" the
quantity of subsidization to that level, particular ly when the first sentence says that the European
Communities is not making "any reduction commitmen ts". Nor does the practice of the European
Communities providing subsidies on exports equivalent to its actual imports from ACP countries and
India lead to an inference that that practic e flows from a commitment contained in the second
sentence of Footnote 1. We are also not persua ded by the argument that, because the first sentence
excludes any reduction commitments and the second sentence refe rs to the average of the export in
the base period (the starting point for any reduction commitment), the second sentence can only imply
a commitment to "limit" the subsidization to the base level quantity.
187. Lastly, we see merit in the Panel's reference to the notification practice of the European
Communities to the WTO Committee on Agriculture to conclude that this practice does not support
the interpretation advanced by the European Co mmunities. If Footnote 1 does contain a commitment
on the part of the European Communities with respect to the export subsidies provided by it on
exports of sugar equivalent in volume to its actual imports from ACP countries and India or 1.6
million tonnes (albeit such a commitment is only a "limitation" commitment and not a "reduction"
commitment), we fail to see why the European Communities did not notify the WTO Committee on
Agriculture of the status of its compliance with that commitment throughout the period of
implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture . The fact that the European Communities did not
do so undermines its interpretation of the second sentence of Footnote 1.
188. For all these reasons, we find that Footnote 1, by its terms, does not contain a commitment on
the part of the European Communities to "limit" its subsidization of exports of sugar to a quantity
equivalent to its actual imports of sugar from ACP countries and India or 1.6 million tonnes,
whichever is lower. Nor do we find that an inte rpretation of Footnote 1 that takes into account the
arguments advanced by the European Communities l eads to the conclusion that Footnote 1 contains
such a commitment to "limit" subsidization of exports of ACP/India sugar.
E. Conformity of Footnote 1 with Obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture
1. Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture

189. We have found that Footnote 1 does not cont ain a commitment "limiting" subsidization of
exports of ACP/India equivalent sugar. However, in view of the extensive argumentation advanced

by the European Communities, we proceed to an anal ysis of the conformity of Footnote 1 with the
obligations prescribed by Articles 3, 8, and 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture. For this analysis, we
assume arguendo that Footnote 1 does contain the export subsidy commitment claimed by the
European Communities, namely, Footnote 1 reflec ts a commitment on the part of the European
Communities to "limit" the export subsidies on ACP/I ndia equivalent sugar. We note that the Panel
also conducted a similar analysis.
292
190. We begin this analysis with respect to the conf ormity of Footnote 1 with Article 3.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture . The European Communities asserts that Article 3.3 does not require a
Member to schedule both budgetary outlay and quantity commitments in respect of export subsidies
listed in Article 9.1 According to the European Communities, "[n]owhere in the Agreement on
Agriculture is there an obligation for Members to sch edule commitments in the form of both
budgetary outlay and quantity commitments." 293 Neither Article 3.3, nor Article 8 or 9.1, nor indeed
the Agreement on Agriculture as a whole, addresses this question. 294 The European Communities
emphasizes that "Article 3.3 has as its function the prohibition of the provision of export subsidy in
excess of commitment levels "295 and that the obligation contained in it is simply "not to exceed ...
'budgetary outlay and quantity commitments specified' in a Member's Schedule ".296 But neither
Article 3.3, nor indeed Article 8 or 9.1, specifi es how those commitments must be expressed in a
Member's Schedule. According to the European Communities, the use of the word "and" in
Article 3.3 "does not imply a commitment that is only valid if it comports both a budgetary and a
quantitative aspect. It simply is a conjunctive betw een the two different forms of commitments ... .
The word 'specified' refers to what is specified in the [Member's] schedule, without requiring that both
forms of commitments be specified."297
191. In sum, the European Communities contends that "[t]he obligation in Article 3.3 is only to
provide Article 9.1-listed subsidies in conformity with whatever commitments are found in a
Member's schedule."298 Such commitments may be budgetary outlay or quantity commitment or both,
as a Member may choose to specify in its Schedule. According to the European Communities, the

292Panel Reports, paras. 7.185 ff.
294Ibid., para. 136.
295Ibid., para. 135. (emphasis added)
296Ibid., para. 139. (emphasis added)
297Ibid.
298Ibid., para. 140. (emphasis added)

question of how commitments should be expressed is "one of scheduling" and is addressed in
paragraph 11 of the "Modalities Paper" and not in the Agreement on Agriculture.
299
192. We begin our analysis of this issue by recalling the text of Article 3.3 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, which reads:
Incorporation of Concessions and Commitments

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of
Article 9, a Member shall not provide export subsidies listed in
paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or
groups of products specified in Sec tion II of Part IV of its Schedule
in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels
specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of
any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.

193. By its terms, Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the granting of export
subsidies (listed in Article 9.1) in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels
specified in a Member's Schedule. Article 3.3 do es not, however, explicitly state that export subsidy
commitments must be specified in a Member's Schedule in terms of both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitment levels. At the same time, Ar ticle 3.3 does not explicitly state that a Member
may specify its commitment level in terms of either of the two forms of commitments. In our view,
the use of the conjunctive "and", and the corresponding u se of the word "levels" in the plural, suggest
that the drafters of the Agreement intended that bo th types of commitments must be specified in a
Member's Schedule in respect of any export subsidy listed in Article 9.1. Had the drafters intended
that a Member could specify one or the other of the two forms of commitments, they would have
chosen the disjunctive "or" and correspondingly used the word "level" in the singular. Given the
choice, Members would choose only one or the other type of commitment, but not both, so as to
minimize their obligations. Therefore, it appears to us that the drafters intended to ensure that export
subsidy commitments are specified in Members' Schedules in terms of both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitments, by using the word "and" as well as the word "levels" in the text of Article 3.3.
194. We find contextual support for the above interpretation in Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement
on Agriculture, which provides:

299European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 136. We address the "Modalities Paper" later
in this Report. (See infra, paras. 198-199 and 204)

(iv) the Member's budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the
quantities benefiting from such subsidies, at the conclusion of the
implementation period, are no greater than 64 per cent and
79 per cent of the 1986-1990 base period levels, respectively. For
developing country Members these percentages shall be 76 and 86
per cent, respectively.

This provision prescribes the export subsidy commitment levels to be reached at the conclusion of the
implementation period (and to be maintained ther eafter), and those commitment levels are expressed
in terms of both budgetary outlays and quantities. We do not see how a Member could comply with
Article 9.2(b)(iv), or for that matter Article 9. 2(a), without having specified its export subsidy
commitments in terms of both budgetary outlays and quantities. We also consider it significant that
both Article 9.2(b)(iii) and Article 9.2(b)(iv) use the expression "budgetary outlays for export
subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies ". (emphasis added) This shows the
drafters' recognition of the need to address the budgetary outlays and quantities together.
195. The European Communities contends that the "same logic" with respect to the use of the word
"and" as a conjunctive applies equally to Article 9.2(a) and Article 9.2(b)(iv), and thus these
provisions only mention the existence of both forms of commitments, without implying that Members
must always schedule both.
300 We disagree. The European Commu nities' contention runs counter to
the plain language of these provisions. Substituting the word "or" for "and" in these provisions would
undermine the achievement of the specific commitment levels envisioned therein.
196. Our interpretation that Article 3.3 (as well as Article 9.2) requires that export subsidy
commitments in a Member's Schedule must be expressed in terms of both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitment levels is also in cons onance with the object and purpose of the Agreement on
Agriculture. We note, as did the Panel 301, that the third paragraph of the Preamble to the Agreement
recognizes that the "long-term objective" of WTO Me mbers, in initiating a reform process to deal
with the distortions in the world agricultural ma rkets, is "to provide for substantial progressive
reductions in agricultural support and protection". Purs uant to this objective, the fourth paragraph of
the Preamble expresses the commitment of the WT O Members "to achieving binding commitments"
in the three specified areas, including "export co mpetition". An interpretation that export subsidy
commitments must be expressed in a Member's Schedule in terms of both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitment levels is more in harmony wi th the objectives stated in the Preamble to the

301Panel Reports, para. 7.136.

Agreement than an interpretation that a Member is only obliged to fulfil "whatever commitments"
302 it
chooses to specify in its Schedule.
197. We are also of the view that if an export subs idy commitment were allowed to be specified in
only one form, budgetary outlay or quantity, as a Member may choose, and its conformity were
measured on the basis of that one commitmen t alone, it would undermine the export subsidy
disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture. As we noted above, the draf ters recognized the need to
deal with budgetary outlays and quantities together in order to restrain subsidized exports. A
commitment on budgetary outlay alone provides little predictability on export quantities, while a
commitment on quantity alone could lead to subs idized exports taking place that would otherwise
have not taken place but for the budgetary support. This is especially so given that the Agreement on
Agriculture has initiated a reform process in an environmen t of high levels of export subsidies taking
the form of budgetary outlays and quantities. We are, therefore, not persuaded by the optimistic
assumption of the European Communities that if one or the other form of commitment is fulfilled, it
will, "in conjunction with preva iling market conditions and other factors", automatically act as a
ceiling for the non-assumed commitment.303
198. We now turn to the arguments of the Eur opean Communities relating to the so-called
"Modalities Paper" 304, which was used by the Members during the Uruguay Round negotiations in
scheduling their commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture . The European Communities
refers to the "Modalities Paper" in two ways. First, it contends that the obligations to schedule both
forms of commitments, namely, budgetary outlay and quantity commitments, and to subject those
commitments to reduction ("reducti ons commitments"), were set out only in paragraph 11 of the
"Modalities Paper", but those obligations were not "carried over" into the Agreement on
Agriculture.305 Secondly, with respect to "incorporated products", paragraph 9 of Annex 8 to the
"Modalities Paper" permitted only one form of co mmitment, namely, budgetary outlay, to be
scheduled. The European Communities does not cont end that ACP/India equivalent sugar is an
incorporated product, but argues that the treatment of incorporated products is relevant to the legal
question whether there is an obligation in the Agreement on Agriculture to have both budgetary
outlay and quantity commitments. 306 The European Communities has, however, not identified any

303Ibid., para. 141.
304Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments, Note by the Chairman of the
Market Access Group, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993.
305European Communities' appellant's submission, pars. 136-137.
306European Communities' statement at the oral hearing.

provision of the "Modalities Paper" that perm its the scheduling of commitments for a non-
incorporated product like sugar in terms of only budgetary outlay or quantity.
199. We do not find it necessary to decide in th is appeal on the relevance of the "Modalities
Paper". The "Modalities Paper" is not an agreem ent among the WTO Members and, by its terms,
cannot be the basis of dispute settlement under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the " WTO Agreement "). Furthermore, as the Appellate Body noted in
EC – Bananas III, "the Agreement on Agriculture makes no reference to the Modalities document".
307
We also note that the treatment of incorporated products, or scheduling of commitments with respect to
incorporated products, is not an issue in this dispute. We cannot, therefore, consider the question of an
analogy being drawn from treatment of incorporat ed products for the scheduling commitments in
respect of non-incorporated products. In any event, we fail to see how the "Modalities Paper" supports
the contention of the European Communities that Members could choose to specify only one form of
commitment for sugar, and that such a commitment need not be a "reduction commitment".308
200. For all these reasons, we agree with the Panel that Article 3.3 requires a Member to schedule
both budgetary outlay and quantity commitment leve ls in respect of export subsidies listed in
Article 9.1 of the Agreement of Agriculture .309 As Footnote 1 does not contain a budgetary outlay
commitment in respect of export subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent sugar, we hold that it is
inconsistent with Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
2. Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture
201. We now turn to address the question whether Footno te 1 is consistent with Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
202. The Panel first noted that the chapeau of Artic le 9.1 provides that "[t]he following export
subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under th is Agreement" and that Section II, Part IV of
Members' Schedules is entitled "Budgetary Outlay and Quantity Reduction Commitments ".310 T h e
Panel found that "Article 9.1 ... makes clear that in the absence of a specific exemption contained in
that Agreement, all export subsidies coming within the definitions of 9.1(a) – 9.1(f) have to be subject

307Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 157.
309Panel Reports, paras. 7.137-7.138.
310Ibid., para. 7.133. (original emphasis)

to reduction commitments."
311 The Panel further noted that, for Members that took advantage of the
flexibility under Article 9.2(b), Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that, "at
the end of the implementation period, the Schedule must provide for budgetary outlay and quantity
commitments no greater than 64 and 79 per cent of their respective base period levels." 312 The Panel
noted that "[this] was the case of the European Communities". 313 Therefore, according to the Panel,
"export subsidies contained in Section II, Part IV of a Member's Schedule ought to have been subject
to the reduction commitments provided for in Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture." 314
203. The European Communities asserts that "[t]he nor mative content of Article 9.1 ... is not to
impose reductions, but to define the scope of tho se subsidies which are permitted within commitment
levels."315 The European Communities further argues th at Article 9.2(b)(iv) does not set out a
generally applicable requirement that budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels must be
reduced by the coefficients mentioned in that provision. Instead, according to the European
Communities, those coefficients are "triggered" on ly in "very specific situations arising in the
implementation period", permitting Article 9.2(b) to be used.316
204. As it argued with respect to the obligation under Article 3.3, the European Communities
contends that the reduction commitm ents, being a scheduling issue, are addressed only in paragraph
11, and, in turn, in Annex 8 of the "Modalities Paper". 317 According to the European Communities,
the reduction commitments were agreed to in the "Modalities Paper", but they are "not operated by
Article 9.1".318
205. We note, first, that it is not in dispute in this case that the European Communities provides
export subsidies to ACP/India sugar identical to those given for A and B sugar and that these
subsidies fall within the meaning of Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture.319 The European
Communities also does not dispute the Panel's stat ement that the European Communities has availed
itself of the flexibility provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv).

311Panel Reports, para. 7.133.
312Ibid. (original emphasis)
313Ibid.
314Ibid.
316Ibid., para. 147.
317Ibid., paras. 24-26.
318Ibid., para. 147.

206. The chapeau of Article 9.1 says that the subs idies listed in that Article "are subject to
reduction commitments under this Agreement". The export subsidies given to ACP/India equivalent
sugar, which admittedly fall within the ambit of Article 9.1(a), are therefore subject to reduction
commitments. Furthermore, as noted by the Panel, the provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) apply to
Members that take advantage of the flexibility pr ovisions of Article 9.2(b). Article 9.2(b)(iv)
specifies the reduction levels to be achieved at the conclusion of the implementation period with
respect to both budgetary outlays and quantities. The provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) lend contextual
support to the view that export subsidies listed in Article 9.1 are subject to reduction commitments.
320
We further note that Article 9.2(a)(i) and (ii) also make it clear that both budgetary outlay and
quantity commitments specified in a Member's Schedule for each year of the implementation period
are "reduction" commitments. It follows that the export subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent
sugar are subject to reduction commitments in terms of Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
207. The European Communities adds that, even assuming that Article 9.1 imposes an obligation
to reduce export subsidy commitments, the European Communities has complied with that obligation,
as "the EC has reduced the overall ceiling of its commitments over the implementation period", and as
it "has ensured that the Article 9.1 subsidies it provides remain within its commitment levels".
321 We
are not persuaded by the arguments of the Europ ean Communities. Footnote 1 explicitly states that
the European Communities is not making "any reduction commitments" in respect of ACP/India sugar
(in terms of either budgetary outlay or quantity). Moreover, we see no evidence that, overall, taking
A, B, and ACP/India equivalent sugar together, the European Communities has reached the prescribed
commitment levels, both in terms of budgetary outlay and quantity prescribed by the Agreement on
Agriculture. We, therefore, do not see Footnote 1 as complying with Article 9.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
208. The ACP Countries 322 have argued that "limiting subsid ization", without reducing budgetary
outlays or quantity, is permissible under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which says that
"[t]he domestic support and expor t subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member's Schedule
constitute commitments limiting subsidization". (emphasis added) According to the ACP Countries,
"the basic obligations of the Agreement with respect to a scheduled product such as sugar are found in

320In our view, the reduction commitment levels to be achieved at the conclusion of the implementation
period, as specified in Article 9.2(b)(iv), apply equally to all Members whether they avail themselves of the
flexibility provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv), or not.
322The third participant ACP countries in this appeal are: Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana,
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts & Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trinidad &
Tobago.

Articles 3.3 and 8. These paramount provisions are framed around and are directly linked to what is
specified by the respective member limiting subsidization in the sense of requirements in Article 3.1
of the Agreement."
323 In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the ACP Countries also
emphasized that Article 3.1 permits "limiting" subsidization, and only what is specified in a Member's
Schedule governs its obligation with respect to subsidization.
209. We are not persuaded by this argument. We do not see Article 3.1 as permitting a Member to
limit subsidization to whatever commitment it chooses to specify in its Schedule without regard to
Members' obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture . Rather, with respect to export subsidy
commitments, we see Article 3.1 as requiring a Memb er to limit its subsidization to the budgetary
outlay and quantity reduction commitments speci fied in its Schedule in accordance with the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture . This is also clear from the provisions of Article 9.2(a)
of the Agreement, which requires adherence by a Me mber in each year of the implementation period
to the budgetary outlay and quantity "reduction commitments", as specified in the Member's
Schedule.
210. For all these reasons, we agree with the Panel that Footnote 1 is inconsistent with Article 9.1
of the Agreement on Agriculture.324
F. The Relationship Between Members' Schedules and the Agreement on Agriculture
211. We now address the arguments of the Europ ean Communities on the relationship between
Members' Schedules and the Agreement on Agriculture . In particular, we examine whether the
claimed commitment in Footnote 1 "limiting" subsidi zation of exports of sugar can prevail over the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture , despite such a commitment being inconsistent with
Articles 3.3 and 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We begin by recalling the Panel's findings on
this point and the European Communities' arguments on appeal.
212. Referring to the Appellate Body Reports in EC – Bananas III , EC – Poultry , and Chile –
Price Band System, and to the GATT panel report in US – Sugar, the Panel found that:

323ACP Countries' statement at the oral hearing. (emphasis added)
324Panel Reports, para. 7.190.

... GATT and WTO jurisprudence indicate that WTO Members may
use entries in their schedules of concession to clarify and qualify the
"concessions" they individually agr ee to assume in their Schedules
but not to reduce or conflict with the obligations they have assumed
under the GATT or the WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on
Agriculture.
325 (original emphasis)

213. The Panel noted that "the jurisprudence cited above deals with tariff concessions and [that]
this includes market access commitments with in the meaning of Article 1(g) of the Agreement on
Agriculture."326 The Panel acknowledged that expor t subsidy commitments under the Agreement on
Agriculture are "different from tariff and other market access concessions". 327 The Panel, however,
took the view that:
... the principle that scheduled commitments cannot overrule or
conflict with the basic obligations contained in a WTO multilateral
trade agreement, unless explicitly authorized, remains valid and
applicable to export subsidy commitments scheduled in Section II,
Part IV of Members' Schedules.
328

In support of its position, the Panel stated that "this same principle"—that scheduled commitments
cannot conflict with the obligations contained in a WTO multilateral trade agreement—"is recognized
in Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture ".329 In the Panel's view, "Article 8 makes clear that a
Member must at all times comply with the Agreement on Agriculture (and its Schedule)." 330
According to the Panel, it follows that "a Me mber['s] Schedule cannot provide for non-compliance
with provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture."331
214. The European Communities submits that, even assuming arguendo that Footnote 1 is
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture , "there is no hierarchy between the export subsidy
commitments in a Member's schedule and the Agreement on Agriculture ."332 The European
Communities also argues that the Panel erred in relying on the findings of the GATT panel in

325Panel Reports, para. 7.157 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 154;
Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 98; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System , para. 272;
GATT Panel Report, US – Sugar, paras. 5.2 and 5.3).
326Ibid., para. 7.158.
327Ibid.
328Ibid.
329Ibid., para. 7.159.
331Ibid.
332European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 156. We address the issue of hierarchy below.

US – Sugar .
333 The European Communities, moreover, disag rees with the Panel that Article 8 of the
Agreement on Agriculture can be interpreted to mean that "a Member's Schedule cannot provide for
non-compliance with provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture ".334 According to the European
Communities, Article 8 merely provides that a Member must respect both the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture and its Schedule, but it does not prescribe the hierarchy between the two.
We examine each of these arguments in turn.
215. Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture , entitled "Export Competition Commitments",
reads:
Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise
than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as
specified in that Member's Schedule.

216. It is clear from the plain wording of Article 8 that Members are prohibited from providing
export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture and the
commitments as specified in their Schedules. T hus, compliance with both is obligatory. As
compliance with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture is obligatory, it is clear that the
commitments specified in a Member's Schedule must be in conformity with the provisions of the
Agreement. Only then would the export subsid ies be in compliance with the requirements of
Article 8.
217. We turn to the European Communities' argume nt that the Panel erred in relying on the
findings of the GATT panel in US – Sugar. In that case, the United States, as the responding party,
argued that, because Article II:1(b)335 of the GATT 1947 contemplated the possibility of making tariff
concessions "subject to terms, conditions or qualifi cations", the United States was entitled to reserve
the right to impose quantitative restrictions that woul d otherwise be prohibited by Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1947.336 The GATT panel in US – Sugar rejected this argument, noting that:

333European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 161-162.
335Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 provides that the products described in Members' Schedules of
Concessions:
... shall, on their importation into the te rritory to which the Schedule relates,
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that
Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set
forth and provided for therein.
336GATT Panel Report, US – Sugar, paras. 3.7 and 5.1.

Article II gives contracting parties the possibility to incorporate into
the legal framework of the Ge neral Agreement commitments
additional to those already contai ned in the General Agreement and
to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce their
commitments under other provisions of that Agreement .
 337 (emphasis
added)

218. The European Communities submits th at the principle articulated in US – Sugar , while
dealing the with specific terms of Article II:1 of the GATT 1947, cannot be "transferred" to the
Agreement on Agriculture as that Agreement has "no language ... with a comparable content". 338
According to the European Communitie s, the principle enumerated in US – Sugar applies "only ... if
it can be derived from the various provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture".339
219. We do not agree with the European Communities. The GATT panel in US – Sugar did not
rely solely on the language of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1947 in making its ruling, as the European
Communities suggests. Instead, the panel's reasoning was that, in the absence of a specific provision
that would entitle Members to depart from their obligations under the GATT 1947, Members were not
entitled to do so. Thus, the GATT panel in US – Sugar concluded:
Article II:1(b) does not permit cont racting parties to qualify their
obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement and that
the provisions in the United States GATT Schedule of Concessions
can consequently not justify th e maintenance of quantitative
restrictions ... inconsistent with the application of Article XI:1.340

220. Similarly, in this case, we find no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that
authorizes Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that Agreement.
Indeed, as we have noted, Article 8 requires that , in providing export subsidies, Members must
comply with the provisions of both the Agreement on Agriculture and the export subsidy
commitments specified in their Schedules. This is possible only if the commitments in the Schedules
are in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. Thus, we see no basis for the
European Communities' assertion that it coul d depart from the obligations under the Agreement on
Agriculture through the claimed commitment provided in Footnote 1.

339Ibid.

221. In any event, we note th at Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that: "[t]he
provisions of [the] GATT 1994 and of other Multilatera l Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO
Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement." In other words, Members
explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the Agreement on Agriculture and the
GATT 1994, and explicitly provided, through Article 21, that the Agreement on Agriculture would
prevail to the extent of such conflicts. Similarly, the General interpretative note to Annex 1A to the
WTO Agreement states that, "[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the [GATT 1994] and a
provision of another agreement in Annex 1A ..., the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to
the extent of the conflict." The Agreement on Agriculture is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO
Agreement.
222. As we noted above, Footnote 1, being part of the European Communities' Schedule, is an
integral part of the GATT 1994 by virtue of Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore,
pursuant to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture , the provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture prevail over Footnote 1. We, therefore, do not agree with the European Communities that
"there is no hierarchy between the export subsid y commitments in a Member's schedule and the
Agreement on Agriculture."
341
223. As a separate matter, we note that the Europ ean Communities asserts that Footnote 1 was
"negotiated" with its partners in the Uruguay R ound negotiations and that it has been "respected". 342
Accordingly, Footnote 1 forms part of the treaty ratified by the WTO Members. Similarly, the ACP
Countries allege that Footnote 1 "was negotiate d and agreed upon" or acquiesced in by the
Complaining Parties before the end of the Uruguay Round.
343 The Panel found, however, that "[t]he
evidence and submissions produced by all parties s how that the Complainants did not agree to any
European Communities' deviations from the Agreement on Agriculture."344 The Panel concluded that
"participants in the Uruguay Round and WTO Memb ers did not agree to the European Communities'
inclusion of Footnote 1 as an agreed departure from the European Communities' basic obligations
under the Agreement on Agriculture ."345 Accordingly, we see no basis in the Panel Reports for the
contention of the European Communities and the ACP Countries that the Complaining Parties or the

342Ibid., footnote 77 to para. 114.
343ACP Countries' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
344Panel Reports, para. 7.210.
345Ibid., para. 7.220.

WTO Members negotiated or agreed to Footnote 1 as a departure from the European Communities'
obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture.
346
G. Conclusion
224. For all these reasons, we find that, even assuming that Footnote 1 constitutes a "commitment"
expressing a limitation on export subsidization of AC P/India equivalent sugar, Footnote 1 does not
contain both quantity and budgetary commitments and is, therefore, inconsistent with Article 3.3 of
the Agreement on Agriculture . In addition, Footnote 1 is inconsistent with Article 9.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture , because exports of ACP/India equivalent sugar are not subject to
reduction commitments. As Footnote 1 is inconsistent with th e provisions of Articles 3.3 and 9.1, it
follows that Footnote 1 is also inconsistent with Article 8 of the Agreement.
225. We do not agree with the Panel that Footnote 1 "is of no legal effect". 347 However, we agree
with the Panel that Footnote 1 does not have the le gal effect of enlarging or otherwise modifying the
European Communities' commitment levels as specified in its Schedule.
226. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.191, 7.198, 7.222, and 8.1(a) of
the Panel Reports, that Footnote 1 does not enlarge or otherwise modify the European Communities'
commitment levels as specified in its Schedule.

VI. Payments under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
A. Preliminary Remarks
227. Before the Panel, the Complaining Parties clai med that the EC sugar regime involved various
types of "payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of
governmental action" within the mean ing of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . The
Panel stated that the Complaining Parties claimed that the EC sugar regime:

346We acknowledge the arguments of the ACP Countries regarding the importance of sugar production
for the economies of the ACP countries, as well as th e significance that the ACP countries attach to their
preferential access to the Eu ropean Communities' market. Howeve r, we are unable to regard these
considerations as relevant for our legal interpretation of Footnote 1 and its consistency with the European
Communities' obligations under Articles 3, 8, and 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
347Panel Reports, paras. 7.198 and 7.222.

... involves a series of payments incl uding: (a) payment in the form
of below costs C beet sales to C sugar producers/exporters;
(b) payment in the form of cross-subsidization resulting from the
profits made on sales of A and B sugar used to cover the fixed costs
of the production/export of C sugar; (c) payment in the form of
exports of C sugar below total costs of production; and (d) payments
in the form of high prices paid by consumers.
348 (footnote omitted)

228. The Panel limited its examination to the first two of the four types of alleged export subsidies
set out above. The Panel found, with respect to the first type of "payment", that "C sugar producers
receive payment on export by virtue of government al action through sales of C beet below the total
costs of production to C sugar producers." 349 As for the second type of "payment", the Panel found
that "producers/exporters of C sugar ... receive pa yments on export by virtue of governmental action
... in the form of transfers of financial resour ces, through cross-subsid ization resulting from the
operation of the EC sugar regime". 350 Thus, the Panel found that both types of "payments" examined
by it are "payments on the export ... financed by vi rtue of governmental action", within the meaning
of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture , and that, therefore, they constitute exports
subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1. The Panel then concluded that the European
Communities had not demonstrated, pu rsuant to Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , that
exports of C sugar exceeding the European Co mmunities' commitment levels since 1995 are not
subsidized.351
229. The European Communities appeal s certain aspects of the Panel's findings with respect to
these two alleged export subsidies. In our consid eration of the European Communities' appeal, we
examine, first, the Panel's finding that the sales of C beet by beet growers to C sugar producers
constitute an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c); and secondly, whether what the
Panel described as "cross-subsidization" constitutes an export subsidy within the meaning of that
provision.
B. Do Sales of C Beet Involve Export Subsidies within the Meaning of Article 9.1(c)?
230. The Panel made three distinct fi ndings in concluding that sales of C beet by beet growers to
sugar producers constitute an expor t subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement
on Agriculture. The Panel held, first, that sales of C beet involved "payments", because C beet was

348Panel Reports, para. 7.252.
349Ibid., para. 7.293.
350Ibid., para. 7.338.
351Ibid., para. 7.339.

being sold at prices below its average total cost of production
352; secondly, that these payments were
"on the export "353; and, thirdly, that these "payments" were " financed by virtue of governmental
action".354 The European Communities does not appeal the first and second of these Panel findings.
Rather, the European Communities a ppeals the third Panel finding, that is, that "payments" in the
form of sales of C beet are "financed by virtue of governmental action".
231. In making the contested finding, the Panel stated first that a "demonstrable link" and "clear
nexus" between the financing of the payments and the governmental action must be established in
order for the "payment" to qualify as a payment "financed by virtue of governmental action". The
Panel then found that "a significant percentage of farmers of C beet are likely to finance sales of
C beet below the costs of production as a result of [their] participation in the domestic market in
selling high priced A and B beet." 355 The European Communities, acco rding to the Panel, controls
virtually every aspect of domestic beet and sugar supply and management. In particular, the price and
supply of A and B beet are fixed with a view to ensuring a stable and adequate income to beet
growers; C beet (which is over-quota beet), genera lly speaking, can be used only in the production of
C sugar, that is, over-quota sugar. 356 Financial penalties are imposed by the European Communities
on producers that divert C sugar into the domestic market. The Panel considered this "controlling
governmental action" to be "indispensable" to the transfer of resources from consumers and tax payers
to sugar producers and, through them, to A and B beet growers.357
232. On appeal, the European Communities argues that the Panel applied a test whereby the phrase
"financed by virtue of governmental action" w ill be satisfied where governmental action merely
"enable[s]" the beet growers to finance and make payments. 358 The European Communities also

352Panel Reports, para. 7.270. We note that the Panel found that "[t]here is uncontested evidence that
C beet is sold to C sugar producers at prices well below its cost of production " and that "[t]he European
Communities does not contest the cost of production figures and related data". ( Ibid., paras. 7.265 and 7.267)
(emphasis added) We note that the Panel did not, in the Panel Reports, disclose the actual cost of production
data, due to the confidential nature of that data.
353Ibid., para. 7.279. (original emphasis)
354Ibid., para. 7.292. (original emphasis)
355Ibid., para. 7.291.
356Ibid., para. 7.283.
357Ibid., para. 7.291. We note that, according to the Co mmission of the European Communities, C beet
is being sold at prices ranging between € 10-20 per tonne. (Commission of the European Communities,
"Common Organisation of the Sugar Market: Description", Exhibit COMP-8 submitted by the Complaining
Parties to the Panel, section 3.2, p. 10) The price of € 10-20 per tonne for C beet may be contrasted with the
minimum prices for A and B beet of € 46.72 and € 32.42 per tonne, respectively. (Articles 4-5 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001)

argues that the Panel incorrectly assumed that beet growers "finance" the sales of C beet by profits
from sales of A and B beet and that governmental action in the European Communities' beet market is
"less pervasive"
359 than in Canada – Dairy . The European Communities also argues that the Panel
disregarded certain "other factors" that affect the supply and prices of C beet, but do not involve
governmental action.360
233. Our analysis begins with the text of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture , which
provides:
Export Subsidy Commitments
1. The following export subsidies are subject to reduction
commitments under this Agreement:

(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are
financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge
on the public account is involved, including payments that are
financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural
product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the
exported product is derived[.]

234. The Appellate Body has previously addressed Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
in Canada – Dairy, as well as in the compliance proceedings in that dispute, namely, Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) and Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) .
In those disputes, the Appellate Body interpreted the various elements of the phrase "financed by
virtue of governmental action".
235. With respect to "governmental action", the A ppellate Body found that "[t]he essence of
'government' is ... that it enjoys the effective power to 'regulate', 'control' or 'supervise' individuals, or
otherwise 'restrain' their conduct, thro ugh the exercise of lawful authority."
361 The Appellate Body
also held that Article 9.1(c) does not place any qu alifications on the types of "governmental action"
that may be relevant under that provi sion. The governmental action need not involve a government
"mandate" or other "direction".362

359European Communities' appellant's submission, heading VI.C.3.
360Ibid., heading VI.C.4.
362Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras. 127-128.

236. Addressing the word "financed", the Appellate Body held that this word generally refers to
the "mechanism" or "process" by which financial resources are provided, such that payments are
made.
363 Article 9.1(c), by stating "whether or not a charge on the public account is involved",
expressly provides that the government itself need not provide the resources for producers to make
payments. Instead, payments may be made and funded by private parties.364
237. With respect to the words "by virtue of", the Appellate Body has previously held that there
must be a "nexus" or "demonstrable link" between the governmental action at issue and the financing
of payments. 365 The Appellate Body clarified that no t every governmental action will have the
requisite "nexus" to the financing of payments. 366 For instance, the Appellate Body held that the
"demonstrable link" between "governmental action" and the "financing" of payments would not exist
in a scenario in which "governmental action ... establish[es] a regulatory framework merely enabling
a third person freely to make and finance 'payments'." 367 In this situation, the link between the
governmental action and the financing of payments w ould be "too tenuous", such that the "payments"
could not be regarded as "financed by virtue of governmental action" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c).368 Rather, according to the Appellate Body, there must be a "tighter nexus" between
the mechanism or process by which the payments are financed (even if by a third person) and
governmental action. 369 In this respect, the Appellate Body clarified that, although governmental
action is essential, Article 9.1(c) contemplates that "payments may be financed by virtue of
governmental action even though significant aspects of the financing might not involve
government."
370 Thus, even if government does not fund the payments itself, it must play a
sufficiently important part in the process by whic h a private party funds "payments", such that the
requisite nexus exists between "governmental action" and the "financing".371 The alleged link must be

363Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 132.
364Ibid., paras. 87 and 132.
365Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 113; Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 130.
366Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 131.
367Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) , para. 115. (emphasis
added)
368Ibid.
369Ibid.
370Ibid., para. 114.
371Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 133.

examined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the particular character of the governmental
action at issue and its relationship to the payments made.
372
238. Turning to the specific circumstances of the pr esent dispute, we note that, in its finding that
"payments" in the form of sales of C beet below its total cost of production are "financed by virtue of
governmental action", the Panel relied on a number of aspects of the EC sugar regime. The Panel
considered, inter alia, that: the EC sugar regime regulates prices of A and B beet and establishes a
framework for the contractual relationships between beet growers and sugar producers with a view to
ensuring a stable and adequate income for beet growers 373; C beet is invariably produced together
with A and B beet in one single line of production 374; a significant percentage of beet growers
are likely to finance sales of C beet below the total cost of production as a result of participation in
the domestic market by making "highly remunerative" sales of A and B beet 375; the European
Communities "controls virtually every aspect of dom estic beet and sugar supply and management",
including through financial penalties imposed on sugar producers that divert C sugar into the domestic
market 376; the European Communities' Sugar Manage ment Committee "overviews, supervises and
protects the [European Communities'] domestic sugar through, inter alia, supply management"377; the
growing of C beet is not "incidental", but rather an "integral" part of the governmental regulation of
the sugar market 378; and C sugar producers " have incentives to produce C sugar so as to maintain
their share of the A and B quotas", while C beet gr owers "have an incentive to supply as much as is
requested by C sugar producers with a view to r eceiving the high prices for A and B beet and their
allocated amount of ... C beet".379
239. We agree with the Panel that, in the circumstan ces of the present case, all of these aspects of
the EC sugar regime have a direct bearing on whet her below-cost sales of C beet are financed by
virtue of governmental action. As a result, we ar e unable to agree with the European Communities'
first argument on appeal, namely, that the Panel app lied a test under which an Article 9.1(c) subsidy

372Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) , para. 134
(referring to Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 115).
373Panel Reports, para. 7.283. We recall that the Panel found that the price of C beet is approximately
60 per cent of the C sugar world market price. (Ibid., paras. 7.265 and 7.283)
374Ibid., para. 7.283. The Panel also stated, in paragraph 6.10 of the Panel Reports, that "there is no
independent production of C beet."
375Ibid., para. 7.291.
376Ibid.
377Ibid.
378Ibid., para. 7.290.
379Ibid., para. 7.288. (original emphasis)

was deemed to exist "simply because [governmental] action 'enabled' the beet growers to finance and
make payments".
380 Rather, we believe that the Panel relied on aspects of the EC sugar regime that go
far beyond merely "enabling" or "permitting" beet growers to make payments to sugar producers.
Indeed, in our view, there is a tight nexus between the European Communities' "governmental action"
and the financing of payments in the case before us. We have no doubt that, without the highly
remunerative prices guaranteed by the EC sugar regime for A and B beet, sales of C beet could not
take place profitably at a price below the total cost of production.
240. The European Communities' second argument on appeal is that the Panel incorrectly
"assumed" that a "significant" percentage of beet growers are "likely to finance sales of C beet below
the costs of production as a result of participation in the domestic market in selling high priced A and
B beet".
381 In our view, had the Panel been confront ed with the allegations and the evidence the
European Communities provides in its appellant's submission, the Panel would have been under an
obligation to examine them. Howeve r, the European Communities did not argue before the Panel
that sales of A and B beet are "largely insufficient to cover all the fixed costs of producing C beet", in
the manner in which it is arguing this point on appeal.382
241. The Appellate Body previously held, in Canada – Aircraft , that new arguments are not
excluded from the scope of appellate review "simply because they are new". 383 However, in that case,
the Appellate Body also said:
... for us to rule on [the] new argume nt [at issue], we would have to
solicit, receive and review new facts that were not before the Panel,
and were not considered by it. In our view, Article 17.6 of the DSU
manifestly precludes us from engaging in any such enterprise.
384

242. In this respect, we note that the European Co mmunities supports its argument on appeal with
a table containing calculations (Table 9 in its appellant's submission 385). This table was not placed

381Panel Reports, para. 7.291.
382European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 279. The European Communities, in response
to questioning at the oral hearing, confirmed that it had not made this assertion before the Panel and that Table 9
of its appellant's submission, which provides data and ca lculations in support of this assertion, had not been
included in its written submission to the Panel. The Euro pean Communities explained at the oral hearing that it
was making its assertion on appeal "in response to the Panel finding".
384Ibid.
385Table 9 is in paragraph 279 of the European Communities' appellant's submission. See also supra,
footnote 382.

before the Panel, but uses data drawn from Exhi bits presented to the Panel by the Complaining
Parties. We also note that the Complaining Parti es, in their respective appellee's submissions and at
the oral hearing, contested the accuracy of some of the calculations, as well as certain concepts
underlying the European Communities' calculations.
386
243. We note that, in its analysis of whether the be low-cost sales of C beet were "financed by
virtue of governmental action", the Panel consid ered the key aspects of the EC sugar regime and
concluded that "C beet growers can use the profits made on the sales of A and B beet to cross-
subsidize the sale of C beet"
387 and that "a significant percentage of farmers of C beet are likely to
finance sales of C beet below the costs of produc tion as a result of participation in the domestic
market in selling high priced A and B beet."388 The European Communities, by means of the data and
calculations contained in Table 9, is, in essence, challenging the manner in which the Panel weighed
and assessed the evidence in coming to the conclusion that C beet growers finance sales of C beet as a
result of participation in the highly regulated dom estic market. We have carefully reviewed the
Panel's finding, as well as the European Communities' arguments and supporting calculations, and do
not find fault with the Panel's analysis, much less a fault that would justif y our interfering with the
Panel's appreciation of the evidence.
244. We now turn to the European Communities' argument that governmental action under the
EC sugar regime is "less pervasive" than governmental action in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New
Zealand and the US II) .389 We do not consider it inherently useful to compare the governmental
action at issue and the governmental action in the context of a different dispute. The issue before us is
not a comparison between two governmental regimes, but rather, whether "payments" under the EC
sugar regime are "financed by virtue of governme ntal action". As the Appellate Body stated in
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and the US) , "the existence of ... a demonstrable link
[between governmental action and the financing of payments] must be identified on a case-by-case
basis, taking account of the particular governmental action at issue and its effects on payments made
by a third person." 390 In any event, we have already review ed the aspects of the EC sugar regime on

386In particular, the European Communities, on the one hand, and the Complaining Parties, on the other
hand, disagreed as to which cost items should properly be included in the category of "fixed costs". (See
European Communities' appellant's submission, footnote 242 to Table 9, para. 279; Brazil's appellee's
submission, paras. 106-109; and Thailand's appellee's submission, paras. 153 and 161)
387Panel Reports, para. 7.283.
388Ibid., para. 7.291.
389European Communities' appellant's submission, heading VI.C.3.
390Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and the US) , para. 115.
(emphasis added)

which the Panel relied to make its finding, includi ng the "European Communities['] control[] [of]
virtually every aspect of domestic beet and sugar supply and management"
391, and found the EC sugar
regime to be pervasive. Hence, the Panel correctly concluded that the "payments" at issue are being
"financed by virtue of governmental action".392
245. The European Communities further argues that the Panel disregarded or improperly dismissed
"other factors" that affect the supply and prices of C beet, but that do not involve governmental action.
The existence of such factors, in the European Co mmunities' view, signifies that "the 'nexus' between
'[governmental] action' and the alleged payments cannot be considered 'tight' enough for a finding that
the sales of C beet are financed 'by virtue of' [governmental] action."
393
246. We are not persuaded by the European Communitie s' arguments. First, we note that, before
the Panel, the European Communities provided only limited argumentation and evidence on these
factors.394 It would also appear that, with respect to at least one of these alleged "other factors"—the
differences between dairy and sugar beet productio n—the European Communities did not provide
any factual evidence to the Panel to support its assertion. 395 In any event, we do not see the relevance
of a comparison between beet production and dair y production for examining whether below-cost
sales of C beet are financed by virtue of govern mental action. As regards the remaining "other
factors" identified by the European Communities, we also note that, in addressing the European
Communities' arguments, the Panel referred to a number of these "factors", namely: "yield ...
movements"396; whether the growing of C beet was "incidental" or "unintended" in nature 397; and the
issue of gross profit margins of alternative crops. 398 Hence, in our view, the Panel considered the
arguments and the evidence presente d by the European Communities, but did not attach the same
significance to them as did the European Communities.
247. Secondly, the issue of the alleged "other fact ors" affecting the supply and price of C beet
appears to be at least partially linked to the Euro pean Communities' argument that the production of
C beet is, in part, "unintended". In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the European

391Panel Reports, para. 7.291.
392See supra, para. 239.
394European Communities' responses to Questions 30 and 65 posed by the Panel.
395European Communities' response to Question 30(c) posed by the Panel; and European Communities'
appellant's submission, paras. 215 and 262.
396Panel Reports, para. 7.286.
398Panel Reports, para. 7.286.

Communities stated that two "types" of production of C beet exist: one part of the production of
C beet is due to "profit reasons", namely, where beet growers are trying to obtain an additional profit
because they are able to se ll C beet above marginal costs and their fixed costs are covered by sales of
A and B beet or of other products
 399; and another part of C beet production, by contrast, is
"unintended" and is the result of "other factors", in particular, yield variations. Hence, it is clear that a
part of C beet is produced because beet growers ar e able to obtain "additional profit" by selling such
beet below its average total cost of production, but above its marginal costs, while covering their fixed
cost by means of sales of A and B beet (or other products).400
248. In this regard, it also bears pointing out that the European Communities did not contest the
Panel's finding that production of C sugar represents 11 to 21 per cent of the European Communities'
overall production of A and B sugar and that, corr espondingly, C beet represents the same proportion
of the production of A and B beet. C beet is an important input for C sugar production. We also recall
that C beet is being sold at prices that are a pproximately 60 per cent of the C sugar world market
price, which is well below its average total cost of production. 401 In our view, the continued
production of such large volumes of over-quota beet, at prices well below its cost of production, could
not take place but for governmental action. In this respect, it is useful to note that the Panel found that
"the European Communities fails to explain why large numbers of [European Communities'] farmers
are engaged in growing C beet if such production only serves to deliver losses" and "the European
Communities ... fails to explain why farmers would ma intain, within a mix of farming activities, any
sectoral production for which expected revenue is pe rsistently less than the cost of production ... of
C beet."402
249. As a result, we find no fault with the Panel' s weighing and appreciation of the evidence and
with the Panel's conclusion that the "payments" at issue are "financed by virtue of governmental
action" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture . In this regard, the

399The European Communities did not specify what such "other products" may be, in its appellant's
submission, or in response to questioning at the oral hearing.
400With respect to this issue, moreover, the Europ ean Communities, in its appellant's submission as
well as at the oral hearing, referred to an estimate that "unintentional" C sugar production (and, by implication,
also C beet production ) is equal to about 6 per cent of the total quota production. (European Communities'
appellant's submission, footnote 212 to para. 262) Hence, "intended" C beet production—C beet production due
to "profit reasons"—would have, over the past years, fluctuated between 5 and 15 per cent of the overall
production of quota beet. In other words, it would appear that C beet representing between 5 and 15 per cent of
the European Communities' total quota production is produced "intentionally" by beet growers.
401We understand that the production of one tonne of sugar requires approximately eight tonnes of beet.
(Australia's appellee's submission, footnote 165 to para. 253 and footnote 168 to para. 254)
402Panel Reports, para. 7.286.

European Communities, pursuant to Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , bears the burden
of demonstrating that no export subsidies within the m eaning of Article 9.1(c) exist. It was therefore
for the European Communities to have submitted befo re the Panel adequate evidence with respect to
"other factors" affecting the production and supply of C beet. The Panel weighed and appreciated the
evidence and found that the European Communities did not do so.
250. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragr aph 7.292 of the Panel Reports,
that the alleged payments in the form of low-pri ced sales of C beet to sugar producers are "financed
by virtue of governmental action", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
C. Do "Payments" in the Form of "Cross- subsidization" Cons titute Export Subsidies
within the Meaning of Article 9.1(c)?
1. Introduction

251. We now turn to address the Panel's finding that pa yments in the form of "cross-subsidization"
resulting from the EC sugar regime confer an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of
the Agreement on Agriculture.
252. The Panel stated that the Complaining Parties claimed that the EC sugar regime:
... involves a series of payments incl uding: (a) payment in the form
of below cost C beet sales to C sugar producers/exporters;
(b) payment in the form of cross-subsidization resulting from the
profits made on sales of A and B sugar used to cover the fixed costs
of the production/export of C sugar; (c) payment in the form of
exports of C sugar below total costs of production; and (d) payments
in the form of high prices paid by consumers.
403 (footnote omitted)

253. As we stated earlier, the Panel limited its exam ination to the first two alleged payments. The
Panel found that "cross-subsidization", "in the form of transfers of financial resources from the high
revenues resulting from sales of A and B sugar, for the export production of C sugar", constitutes an
export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.404
254. The European Communities argues on appeal that th is finding of the Panel is in error because
(i) "cross-subsidization" does not constitute a "pay ment", because it does not involve a "transfer of

403Panel Reports, para. 7.252.
404Ibid., paras. 7.314 and 7.338.

resources" to the sugar producers; and (ii) the alleged "payment" is not made "on the export" of
C sugar, because the sugar producers are not required to produce or export C sugar.
405 The European
Communities also argues that the Panel acted incons istently with Article 11 of the DSU by making a
finding with respect to a claim that the Complaining Parties "neither made nor argued".406
255. We begin our consideration of this issue by setting out the text of Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture, which provides:
Export Subsidy Commitments
1. The following export subsidies are subject to reduction
commitments under this Agreement:

(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are
financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge
on the public account is involved, including payments that are
financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural
product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the
exported product is derived[.]

256. Our analysis of this issue proceeds as follo ws. We examine, first, whether "cross-
subsidization" constitutes a "payment" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) and, secondly, whether
any such payment is "on the export of an agricultura l product" within the meaning of that provision.
We then go on to consider the European Communities' claim with respect to Article 11 of the DSU.
Finally, we address Australia's claim that, if the Appellate Body were to reverse the Panel findings
under Article 9.1(c), the European Communities' measures would fall under Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
2. Whether "Cross-subsidization" Constit utes a "Payment" within the Meaning
of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
257. In finding that "cross-subsidization" cons titutes a "payment" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture , the Panel addressed a number of factors. Recalling
the Appellate Body's finding in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), the Panel used
the average total cost of production benchmark for C sugar and noted that C sugar was sold on the
world market at prices "well under" the average total cost of production every year from 1992/1993 to

406Ibid., para. 171. We note that the Complaining Parties agree with the Panel's finding on "cross-
subsidization" and contend that the Panel addressed, in essence, their arguments, albeit using different language.
(See infra, Section VI.C.5)

2002/2003.
407 The Panel observed that "the price charge d for C sugar does not even remotely cover
its cost of production." 408 The Panel also found that "to the exte nt that the fixed costs of A, B and C
[sugar production] are largely paid for by the prof its made on sales of A and B sugar, the EC sugar
regime provides the advantage which allows EC sugar producers to produce and export C sugar at
below total cost of production." 409 The Panel concluded that there was a "payment" "in the form of
transfers of financial resources from the high reve nues resulting from sales of A and B sugar, for the
export production of C sugar, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture."410
258. The European Communities argues that the alleged "cross-subsidization" does not involve a
"transfer of resources" to the sugar producers, but rather, is: "an internal allocation of each sugar
producer's own resources" 411; the alleged "cross-subsidization" provides no benefit to the sugar
producers; and the Panel's interpretation is not supported by the findings of the Appellate Body in the
Canada – Dairy disputes. The European Communities also submits that the Panel's interpretation
turns Article 9.1(c) into "a prohibition of low pr iced exports" and a "sort of blunt anti-dumping
instrument".412
259. The Appellate Body interpreted Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture in the appeal
in Canada – Dairy , as well as in the compliance proceedings in that dispute, Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) and Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) .
In those disputes, the Appellate Body held that the word "payment" in Article 9.1(c) denotes "a

407Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
408Ibid. The Panel also observed that:
The EC has not contested the Complainants' evidence that C sugar is sold at
prices that give the producers a positive contribution to net income even
though those prices are approximately *** per cent below average total cost
of production. Accordingly, the evidence clearly establishes that a
"significant proportion" of EC producers –and one hundred per cent of those
producing C sugar – make export sales of C sugar at prices below the
average total cost of production.
(Ibid., footnote 618 to para. 7.301)
409Ibid., para. 7.310. (footnote omitted) The Panel had before it data submitted by the Complaining
Parties that were confidential in nature. (See supra, footnote 352) In this respect, we are also bound by the
confidential nature of the data. We find it useful, howeve r, to point out that the effective world market price
relied on by the Panel is not even one third of the European Communities domestic market price.
410Panel Reports, para. 7.314.
412Ibid., para. 180.

transfer of economic resources"
413 and that the ordinary meaning of the word "payment"
"encompasses 'payments' made in forms other than money". 414 The Appellate Body also found that
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture describes an "unusual form of subsidy" 415, in that
"payments" can be made by private parties and need not be made by a government. 416 The Appellate
Body has also held that the notion of payments covers "a diverse range of practices involving
monetary transfers, or transfers-in-kind"417; the "payments" may take place in "many different factual
and regulatory settings" 418; it is necessary to consider the "particular features" of the alleged
"payments"419; and the standard for determining the existence of "payments" under Article 9.1(c)
must be identified after careful scrutiny of the factual and regulatory settings of the measure.420
260. In addition, in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) and Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) , the Appellate Body held that, in the circumstances of those
disputes, the determination of whether payments were made depended on a comparison between the
price of a particular product—commercial export milk ("CEM") in those cases—and an "objective
standard or benchmark which reflects the proper value of [that product] to [its] provider ".421 I n
those disputes, the Appellate Body found that the standard for determining the proper value of CEM
was the average total cost of production, as th is standard represented the economic resources the
producer invested in the milk that was an input to the production of dairy products. If CEM was sold
at less than its proper value—namely, its averag e total cost of production—"payments" were made,
because there was a transfer of the portion of economic resources that was not reflected in the selling
price of CEM.
261. In the dispute before us, the Panel applied this benchmark, namely, the average total cost of
production for sugar. On appeal, in this context, the European Communities does not take issue with
the Panel's use of the average total cost of produc tion benchmark in order to ascertain the existence of

414Ibid., para. 112.
415Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 87.
416Moreover, "payments" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) need not be funded from government
resources, provided they are "financed by virtue of governmental action". (Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 114)
417Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 87.
418Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 76.
419Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 87.
420Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 76.
421Ibid., para. 74. (emphasis added)

"payments".
422 Rather, the European Communities argues th at the "payments" identified by the Panel
are not "payments" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), because they const itute only an "internal
allocation" of the sugar producer's resources a nd do not provide the sugar producer with new
additional resources. 423 The European Communities submits th at the existence of a "transfer of
resources" implies, by definition, the presence of two different parties, "one which grants the
resources and another which receives them".424
262. We note, first, that Article 9.1(c) does not qualify the term "payments" by reference to the
entity making, or the entity receiving the payment. This may be contrasted with, for instance,
Articles 9.1(a) and 9.1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture , which specifically refer to the entities
making and also, in the case of Article 9.1(a), to the entity receiving the alleged export subsidy.
Moreover, Article 9.1(c), on its face, does not qualif y the meaning of the term "payments", other than
by requiring that the alleged "payments" be "on the export of an agricultural product" and "financed
by virtue of governmental action".
263. As we noted above, the European Communities su bmits, first, that a "payment" within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) requires, by definition, th e presence of two distinct legal entities. We agree
with the European Communities that a "payment", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), certainly
occurs when one entity transfers economic resourc es to another entity. For instance, the Panel
found—and the European Communities did not appeal the Panel's finding—that beet growers transfer
economic resources to sugar producers by means of belo w-cost sales of C beet. In this instance, two
distinct economic operators exist, and the "payment" is made by one to the other.
264. This, however, does not imply that the term "payment" necessarily requires, in each and every
case, the presence of two distinct entities. In othe r words, contrary to th e European Communities'
argument, we do not see, a priori, any reason why "payments", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c),
cannot include, in the particular circumstances of this dispute, transfers of resources within one

422In its statement at the oral hearing, the Europe an Communities referred to the cost of production
benchmark for the purposes of Article 9.1(c) and the implications of thereof for domestic support systems.
424Ibid., para. 183.

economic entity.
425 The "payment" in this case is not merely a "purely notional "426 one but,
rather, reflects a very concrete transfer of ec onomic resources to C sugar production. In the
specific dispute before us, C sugar is being sold on the world market by European Communities' sugar
producers/exporters at a price that does not "even remotely" 427 cover its average total cost of
production.428 In the light of the enormous difference between the price of C sugar and its average
total cost of production, we do not see how the "payment" identified by the Panel was "purely
notional".
429
265. The European Communities' approach is, in our view, too formalistic. To illustrate, one could
envisage a scenario under which the producers of C s ugar are legally distinct from the producers of
A and B sugar. 430 In this situation, the European Co mmunities' approach could recognize that a
"payment" under Article 9.1(c) could exist because there would be a transfer of economic resources
between different parties.431 If, however, these same producers of A, B, and C sugar were integrated
producers and organized as single legal entities, a payment under Article 9.1(c) would not exist,
because the transfer would be merely "internal" . We do not believe that the applicability of
Article 9.1(c) should depend on how an economic entity is legally organized.
266. Accordingly, we do not share the European Co mmunities' objections to the Panel's findings
on "cross-subsidization" in the case before us. In this respect, we are also mindful of the fact that, in
the ordinary course of business, an economic opera tor makes a decision to produce and sell a product
expecting to recover the total cost of production and to make profits. Clearly, sales below total cost of
production cannot be sustained in the long term, unless they are financed from some other sources.

425In any event, we also note that the Panel did not describe "cross-subsidization"—the "payment" at
issue—as consisting merely of an "internal allocation", within one single economic entity, of that entity's
resources. Rather, the Panel considered the cumulativ e advantages that sugar producers receive from the
operation of the EC sugar regime to be a key component of the "payment" in the form of cross-subsidization.
The Panel went on to state that "to the extent that the fixed costs of A, B and C [sugar production] are largely
paid for by the profits made on sales of A and B sugar, the EC sugar regime provides the advantage which
allows ... sugar producers to produce and export C sugar at below total cost of production." (Panel Reports,
para. 7.310) (footnote omitted) The Panel concluded that "this cross-subsidization constitutes a payment in the
form of a transfer of financial resources." (Ibid.)
426European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199. (emphasis added)
427Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
428We also recall that C sugar production represents "11-21 per cent of the total EC sugar production".
430This scenario assumes that the economic circumst ances of sugar production are the same as in a
scenario where A, B, and C sugar producers are legally integrated.
431We note that, in paragraph 7.294 of the Panel Repo rts, the Panel referred to such a hypothetical
scenario.

This is especially true when the vo lume of the loss-making sales is substantial. It may be noted that
between 1997 and 2002, C s ugar exports varied between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes
432, with the sales
price not "even remotely" covering the average total cost of production of sugar.433
267. Finally, we believe that the Panel did not err wh en it applied, in ascertaining the existence of
"payments" under Article 9.1(c), the average total co st of production benchmark, which the Appellate
Body held was appropriate in the circumstances in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and
US). Given the huge volumes of C sugar exports and the price at which C sugar is being sold on the
world market, we concur with the Panel that such production quantities cannot be deemed
"incidental".434 We note in this context that C sugar represents between 11 and 21 per cent of the
European Communities' total quota production, an d that between 1997 and 2002, exports ranged
between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes. As we have al ready noted, C sugar is being sold on the world
market for prices that do not "even remotely" cover its average total cost of production.435
268. Having addressed, and rejected, the European Co mmunities' argument that the Panel's finding
is in error, because the "payment" at issue is only an "internal allocation" of resources and it is
"notional", we turn to another argument put forw ard by the European Communities. The European
Communities argues that, because the alleged "c ross-subsidization" involves no "transfer of
resources" to the sugar producers, it confers no benefit upon these producers and, therefore, cannot
be considered to provide a subsidy.
436 The European Communities disag rees with the Panel's finding
that Article 9.1(c) does not require the demonstr ation of a benefit for a measure to constitute a
"payment" within the meaning of that provision.

432European Communities' response to Question 36 posed by the Panel.
433Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
434Ibid., paras. 7.290 and 7.320.
435Ibid., para. 7.301. We recognize that commercial en tities, in the normal course of their business,
make sales at "marginal" profit by covering only the variable costs of the "marginal" production, after having
covered all the fixed costs through other sales. However, where such "marginal" sales are the result of
government subsidies, an examination is required of the nature and extent of these sales. Such examination
should take into consideration, inter alia , the magnitude of the "marginal" sales, the degree to which the
marginal sales are below total cost of production, the period over which such sales take place (that is, whether in
the short term or on a regular and sustained basis), and the nature of the regulatory regime, which underpins
such sales. In particular, on this last point, the ex amination should consider whether the regulatory regime
requires exportation of the subsidized product or export of the product in which the subsidized product is
incorporated. As we stated in Canada – Dairy, the facts and circumstances of each case and the features of the
regulatory regime must be examined carefully to determ ine that the total average cost of production benchmark
used in Canada – Dairy would appropriately apply to the export subsidies at issue in the case under
examination. In the circumstances of this dispute, with respect to export of C sugar, which, under the EC sugar
regime must be exported, we are of the view that the application of this benchmark to C sugar (as well as to
C beet) is appropriate.

269. The chapeau of Article 9.1 provides: "The fo llowing export subsidies are subject to reduction
commitments". Hence, Article 9.1 sets forth a list of practices that, by definition, involve export
subsidies. In other words, a measure falling within Article 9.1 is deemed to be an export subsidy
within the meaning of Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture . We observe that Article 9.1(c)
requires no independent enquiry into the existence of a "benefit".
270. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragr aph 7.334 of the Panel Reports,
that, in the particular circumstances of this dis pute, the production of C sugar receives a "payment on
the export financed by virtue of governmental acti on", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture , in the form of transfers of financ ial resources through cross-subsidization
resulting from the operation of the EC sugar regime.
271. We turn next to examine whether the Panel w as correct in finding that the "payment" in the
form of "cross-subsidization" is "on the export", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c).
3. Whether "Payment" in the Form "Cross-subsidization" is "On the Export"
within the Meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture
272. The Panel concluded that the "payment" in the form of "cross-subsidization" was a payment
"on the export" of C sugar within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. The
Panel based its finding on the fact that C sugar, unl ess carried forward, must be exported. The Panel
stated that "[b]ecause of that legal requirement, a dvantages, payments or subsidies to C sugar, that
must be exported, are subsidies 'on the export' of that product." 437 The Panel also added that "[t]he
only reason why producers of C sugar export C suga r, is because they are prohibited from introducing
such sugar into the domestic market, facing heavy penalties pursuant to Article 13 of the
EC Regulation [1260/2001] if they do."438
273. The European Communities argues that the Pane l misinterpreted the requirement that a
payment be "on the export" of an agricultural produc t, as contained in Article 9.1(c). The European
Communities argues that this term must be read as meaning "contingent on" exports, rather than "in
connection with" or to the "advantage" of exports . The European Communities contends that, under a
proper interpretation of the requirement "on the export", this requirement is not satisfied in the present

437Panel Reports, para. 7.321.
438Ibid.

case because "the sugar producers are entirely free to decide whether or not to produce C sugar and, in
fact, many do not produce any C sugar at all."
439
274. We note, first, that the Panel interpreted th e phrase "on the export" in the context of its
analysis of "payments" in the form of below-cost sales of C beet, and not in the context of examining
"payments" in the form of cross-subsidization. In relation to below-cost sales of C beet, the Panel
stated that "payments" "on the export" need not be "contingent on" the export but, rather, need be
"in connection" with exports. 440 When analyzing whether "payments" in the form of "cross-
subsidization" were "on the export", the Panel did not use the same reasoning. Instead, the Panel
based its findings on the following reasoning:
C sugar [can] only be sold for ex port. If not reclassified, C sugar
"may not be disposed of in the Community's internal market and
must be exported without further processing." Because of that legal
requirement, advantages, payments or subsidies to C sugar, that must
be exported, are subsidies "on the export" of that product.441 (footnote
omitted)

275. We agree with the Panel. Under Article 13(1) of EC Regulation 1260/2001, C sugar "must be
exported".442 It follows that payments in the form of "cross-subsidization" are, by definition,
"payments" "on the export".
276. The European Communities argues that there is no requirement to produce sugar under the
EC sugar regime and hence payments in the form of "cross-subsidization" are not "on the export"
within the meaning of Article 9.1(c). In our vi ew, the Panel neither suggested that there is a
requirement to produce C sugar, nor relied on such a requireme nt for its conclusion that "payments"
in the form of "cross-subsidization" are "on the export". Rather, the Panel relied on the fact that,
under EC Regulation 1260/2001, C sugar, once produced, must be exported.
277. The European Communities refers to the possibility, under EC Regulation 1260/2001, to store
and "carry forward" C sugar to the next marketing year, up to an amount equivalent to 20 per cent of
the A sugar quota. We are not persuaded that the pos sibility to store and "carry forward" C sugar has
a bearing on the criterion "on the export" in this dispute. According to the European Commission,

440Panel Reports, para. 7.275.
441Ibid., para. 7.321 (quoting Article 13(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001).
442Of course, C sugar may also be carried forward, in which case it will count as part of a producer's
sugar quota in another marketing year.

C sugar "carried forward" is "treated as A sugar produced by [a producer] as part of that year's
production".
443 Moreover, when "carried over" sugar is sold on the European Communities domestic
market, the sugar producers must pay to beet growers "the guaranteed prices" that apply only to quota
beet and not to C beet. 444 It would appear, therefore, that carrying C sugar forward, for all practical
purposes, is in effect a reclassification of C sugar into quota sugar. As a result, we do not believe that
the possibility to "carry forward" C sugar invalidates the Panel's finding that "payments" in the form
of "cross-subsidization" are "on the export" of C sugar.
278. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragr aph 7.322 of the Panel Reports,
that "the payment on C sugar production in the form of [a] transfer of financial resources through
cross-subsidization resulting from the oper ation of the EC sugar regime is on [the] export within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture." (original emphasis)
279. We wish now to address the European Comm unities' concern that upholding the Panel's
finding that the payments at issue are "on the export" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) would lead
to "blur[ring] the distinction between the disciplines on domestic support and on export subsidies,
which is an essential feature of the Agreement on Agriculture "
445 and would "allow ... virtually any
form of domestic support" to be "characterize[d] as an 'export subsidy'".446 As the Appellate Body has
previously stated, WTO Members are entitled to provide " domestic support" to agricultural producers
within the limits of their domestic subsidy commitments. 447 We observe, however, that the Appellate
Body has also held that economic effects of WT O-consistent domestic suppor t may "spill over" to
benefit export production. Such spill-over effects may arise, in particular, in circumstances where
agricultural products result from a single line of production that does not distinguish between
production destined for the domestic market and production destined for the export market.448
280. In this respect, the Appellate Body has cauti oned that, "if domestic support could be used,
without limit, to provide support for exports, it wo uld undermine the benefits intended to accrue

443Commission of the European Communities, "Common Organisation of the Sugar Market:
Description", Exhibit COMP-8 submitted by the Complaining Parties to the Panel, section 3.2, p. 10.
444Ibid.
446Ibid., para. 240. We also note that, at the oral hearing, Canada stated that the Panel's approach to the
term "on the export" would mean exposing "bona fide" domestic support to challenge.
447Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) , para. 88. (original
emphasis)
448Ibid., para. 89.

through a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments."
449 We believe that these statements are
relevant to the present case. In this case, we note that C sugar is produced and exported in huge
quantities, and that there is a considerable differe nce between the world market price and the average
total cost of production of sugar in the Europ ean Communities. As we have noted above, the
subsidized production and export of C sugar is no t the incidental effect of the domestic support
system, but is a direct consequence of the EC sugar regime.450
281. We also disagree with the European Communities' argument that the Panel's finding blurs the
distinction between domestic s upport and export subsidies; we disagree, because the European
Communities' legislation requires the exportation of C sugar, a nd prices obtained for C sugar on the
world market are significantly below the average to tal cost of production of sugar in the European
Communities. In our view, European Communities' legislation leaves the sugar producer wishing to
sell C sugar with no choice but to export, short of the limited option of "carry over". We also note
that the operation of the EC sugar regime enab les sugar producers to cover the fixed costs of
producing sugar and to sell C suga r profitably, even though the prices obtained for C sugar are
significantly below the average total cost of production of sugar.
282. Thus, we do not consider that our interp retation erodes the boundary between "domestic
support" and "export subsidies" recognized under the Agreement on Agriculture . Rather, our
interpretation respects the boundary between the two and operates to ensure that Members provide
domestic support and export subsidies in conf ormity with their obligations under the Agreement on
Agriculture. As we noted earlier, our interpretation is based on the specific facts and circumstances of
this dispute.
283. We also reject the European Communities' allegation that, by upholding the Panel's finding,
our interpretation of Article 9.1(c) would turn this provision into "a prohibition of low priced
exports".
451 Article 9.1(c) addresses "payments on the expor t ... financed by virtue of governmental
action". What is at issue is whether the produc t receives an export subsidy within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c), and not merely whether exports sales are being made at low prices.

449Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 91.
450C sugar production ranges between 11 and 21 pe r cent of the European Communities total quota
production. (Panel Reports, para. 7.290) Exports of C sugar range between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes.
(European Communities' response to Question 36 posed by the Panel) As the Panel stated, "the price charged
for C sugar does not even remotely cover its cost of production." (Panel Reports, para. 7.301)

4. The European Communities' Claim under Article 11 of the DSU

284. The European Communities argues that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU because it erroneously "attributed to the Compla inants the allegation that 'cross-subsidization'
was a type of 'payment'". 452 Moreover, "[b]y making a finding with respect to a claim which
the Complainants had never articulated ..., the Pane l ... acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU."453
285. The Complaining Parties disagree with the Eu ropean Communities' characterization of the
Panel's findings on "cross-subsidization". The Co mplaining Parties acknowledge that they did not
explicitly use the term "cross-subsidization" when referring to "payments" within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c), but contend that, by referring to "cross-subsidization" as a "payment" under that
provision, the Panel addressed the substance of the payments identified by the Complaining Parties
and merely used different language.454
286. We have already upheld the Panel's finding that the Complaining Parties' "argumentation that
C sugar receives advantages from various subsid ies and payments, within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture , is not outside the Pane l's terms of reference." 455 We
also recall the Appellate Body's statement in EC – Hormones that:
... nothing in the DSU limits the faculty of a panel freely to use
arguments submitted by any of the parties -- or to develop its own
legal reasoning -- to support its ow n findings and conclusions on the
matter under its consideration.
456

In our view, the Panel did not act inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by developing its own
reasoning as to why the EC sugar regime gives ri se to export subsidies within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c).

453Ibid., para. 256. (footnote omitted)
454Australia's appellee's submission, paras. 263 and 266; Thailand's appellee's submission, para. 69;
Brazil's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
455Panel Reports, para. 7.37.

5. The European Communities' Arguments Concerning the Cost of Production
of C Sugar
287. The European Communities argues th at, even if the Appellate Body were to conclude that
"cross-subsidization" may constitute a "payment" w ithin the meaning of Article 9.1(c), the Panel's
finding is "seriously flawed". 457 The European Communities contends that, in ascertaining the
existence of "payments", the Panel erred in using as a benchmark the average total cost of production
of all sugar. According to the European Commun ities, the Panel should have used, instead, the
average total cost of producing C sugar, because the beet used in the production of C sugar is
purchased at prices that are "generally lower" than the minimum prices for A and B beet.458
288. The average total cost of production of sugar in cludes the cost of all economic resources used
in sugar production, which means the cost of a ll economic resources invested in beet production,
transport, and processing of beet into sugar, which is only notionally classified into A, B, and C sugar.
It is for this reason that the Panel emphasized that "[s]ugar is sugar whether or not produced under an
EC created designation of A, B or C sugar." 459 The Panel further emphasized that "A, B or C sugar
are part of the same line of production" 460 and that "[t]here is no independent production of
C sugar."461 It follows, in our view, that the average to tal cost of production of C sugar must be the
same as the average total cost of production of a ll sugar. The European Communities' argument is
flawed because the price of C beet does not determine the average to tal cost of production of C sugar.
For these reasons, we do not agree with the European Communities that the Panel's use of the average
total cost of production of all sugar as a benchmark for ascertaining the existence of payments was
flawed in the particular circumstances of this case.
289. The European Communities furt her argues that the Panel "effectively double counted the
subsidies allegedly granted upon the exports of C sugar". 462 As we understand it, the European
Communities is of the view that, having found that payments in the form of low-priced sales of C beet
confer a subsidy to sugar producers, the Panel erre d in taking those same payments into account in
order to establish the existence of payments in th e form of "cross-subsidi zation". We do not agree
with the European Communities. Based on our reading of the Panel Reports, we understand the

458Ibid., para. 258.
459Panel Reports, para. 7.310.
460Ibid.
461Ibid., paras. 6.10 and 7.306.

Panel's findings relating to payments in the form of "cross-subsidization" to C sugar to be distinct
from the Panel's findings relating to C beet as a form of payment under Article 9.1(c). Accordingly,
we do not consider the Panel to have "double counted" the subsidies granted by the European
Communities on exports of C sugar.
463
6. Overall Conclusion
290. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragr aphs 7.340 and 8.3 of the Panel
Reports, that the European Communities acted incons istently with its obligations under Articles 3.3
and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture by providing export subsid ies on sugar in excess of its
commitment levels specified in its Schedule.

VII. Australia's Claim under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture
291. Australia requests that, if the Appellate Body finds that the European Communities' export
subsidies on C sugar are not export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement
on Agriculture, the Appellate Body should find that (i) the European Communities has not established
that no export subsidy, whether lis ted in Article 9 or not, has been granted in respect of C sugar
exports; and (ii) the European Communities is a pplying other export subsidies in a manner that
results in, or threatens to lead to circumvention of export subsidy commitments, inconsistently with
the provisions of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.464
292. As we have concluded that the European Communities is granting export subsidies with
respect to C sugar within the meaning of Article 9. 1(c), the condition on which Australia's request is
premised does not arise. There is, therefore, no reason for us to rule on Australia's request.

VIII. Nullification or Impairment
293. The European Communities argues that the Panel er red in finding that the alleged violations
of the Agreement on Agriculture resulting from the European Communities' exports of C sugar
nullify or impair benefits accruing to the Complaining Parties under that Agreement. 465 According to
the European Communities, "until recently, the Comp lainants shared the EC's understanding that the

7.374).

C sugar regime does not provide export subsidies."
466 Therefore, the Complaining Parties "had no
expectations of improved competitive opportunities that would come from the EC reducing its exports
of C sugar."467 Australia and Thailand respond that the Pane l was correct in finding that the existence
of nullification or impairment does not depend on "legitimate expectations".468 Brazil submits that the
European Communities did not challenge evidence th at Brazil presented to the Panel to demonstrate
that "the EC sugar regime caused immediate losses of US $494 million to Brazil alone in 2002"469 and
thus nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Brazil.
294. Having found that the European Commun ities acted inconsistently with the Agreement on
Agriculture by providing export subsidies on sugar in excess of its commitment levels 470, the Panel
found that the European Communities had failed to rebut the presumption, pursuant to Article 3.8 of
the DSU, that this inconsistency had an adverse impact on the Complaining Parties.
471 In particular,
the European Communities' "reliance on the Compla inants' general expectations or lack thereof" 472
was insufficient to rebut that presumption. The Pa nel also held that the European Communities had
not submitted "sufficient factual evidence to suggest that the Complainants did not suffer an 'adverse
impact'" as a result of the violation.473
295. We begin our analysis by noting that Article 3.8 of the DSU provides:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that
there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an
adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement,
and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.

296. Thus, pursuant to Article 3.8, where a Member has acted inconsistently with a covered
agreement, the inconsistency is presumed to nullify or impair benefits accruing to other Members. In
such a case, the burden falls on the defending Member to rebut this presumption by demonstrating

466European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 370. (footnote omitted)
467Ibid.
468Australia's appellee's submission, paras. 589 and 594; Thailand's appellee's submission, para. 204.
469Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 122. (footnote omitted)
470Panel Reports, paras. 7.340 and 8.3.
471Ibid., paras. 7.374 and 8.4.
472Ibid., para. 7.370.
473Ibid., para. 7.373.

that the inconsistency did not result in nullificati on or impairment. We observe that Article 3.8
equates the concept of "nullification or impair ment" with "adverse impact on other Members",
although the DSU does not define "adverse impact".
297. In the present appeal, we have already uphe ld the Panel's finding that the European
Communities acted inconsistently with the Agreement on Agriculture by providing export subsidies
on sugar in excess of its commitment levels.
474 Accordingly, a presumption arises under Article 3.8
that the European Communities has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the Complaining
Parties, and it is up to the European Communities to rebut this presumption.
298. We note that the Complaining Parties provided evidence to the Panel suggesting that the
EC sugar regime caused them losses, for example, of US $494 million for Brazil and US $151 million
for Thailand in 2002. 475 The Panel specifically found that "the European Communities has not
rebutted the evidence submitted by the Complainants w ith regard to the amount of trade lost by the
Complainants as a result of the EC sugar regime." 476 The European Communities has not attempted
to rebut this evidence on appeal. The European Communities, instead, appear s to suggest that, to
rebut the presumption of nullification or impairme nt, it need only demonstrate that the Complaining
Parties "could not have expected that the EC w ould take any measure to reduce its exports of
C sugar."477
299. The text of Article 3.8 of the DSU suggests that a Member may rebut the presumption of
nullification or impairment by demonstrating that its breach of WTO rules has no adverse impact on
other Members. Trade losses represent an obvious example of adverse impact under Article 3.8.
Unless a Member demonstrates that there are no adverse trade effects arising as a consequence of
WTO-inconsistent export subsidies, we do not believe that a complaining Member's expectations
would have a bearing on a finding pursuant to Artic le 3.8 of the DSU. Therefore, the European
Communities has failed to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment pursuant to Article 3.8
of the DSU.
300. In these circumstances, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.374 and 8.4 of the
Panel Reports, that the European Communities' violations of the Agreement on Agriculture nullified
or impaired the benefits accruing to the Complaining Parties under the Agreement on Agriculture.

474Supra, para. 290.
475Panel Reports, para. 7.363.
476Ibid., para. 7.372.

IX. Article 3.10 of the DSU and the Principle of Good Faith
301. We turn next to address the European Commun ities' assertion that the Panel erred in finding
that, by claiming that exports of C sugar were in breach of the European Communities' commitments,
the Complaining Parties did not act inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU "and, more generally,
with the requirements of the principle of good faith".
478 We begin by noting that this aspect of the
European Communities' appeal is limited to claims against exports of C sugar.479
A. Panel Findings and Appeal by the European Communities
302. The Panel found that the Complaining Parties "h a[d] acted in good faith in the initiation and
conduct of the present dispute proceedings". 480 The Panel emphasized that the Complaining Parties
"were entitled to initiate the present WTO proceedings as they did and at no point in time have they
been estopped, through their actions or silence, from challenging the EC sugar regime which they
consider WTO inconsistent."481 The Panel explained that:
... it is not possible to identify any facts or statements made by the
Complainants where they have ad mitted that the EC measure was
WTO consistent or where they have promised that they would not
take legal action against the European Communities. In the Panel's
view the "silence" of some of the Complainants cannot be equated
with their consent to the European Communities' violations, if any.
Moreover, the Complainants' silenc e cannot be held against other
WTO Members who, today, could decide to initiate WTO dispute
settlement proceedings against the European Communities.
482

303. The European Communities appeals the Panel's findings on two grounds. First, it argues that
the Panel failed to address the European Communities' allegation th at the Complaining Parties acted

478European Communities' appellant's submission, para . 295 (referring to Panel Reports, paras. 7.54-
7.75 and 7.348-7.354).
479In its Notice of Appeal, the European Communities notified that it seeks review of:
5) The conclusion, and the related legal findings and interpretations,
set out in paragraphs 7.61-7.75 and 7.348-7.354 of the Panel reports, that, by
claiming that exports of C sugar were in excess of the EC's commitment
levels the Complainants did not act in consistently with Article 3.10 DSU
and the principle of good faith.
Thus, the European Communities has not appealed the Pane l's findings with regard to whether the Complaining
Parties acted in good faith in bringing claims against export subsidies provided to sugar of ACP/Indian origin.
480Panel Reports, para. 7.74.
481Ibid.
482Ibid., para. 7.73.

inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU "and, more generally, with the requirements of the
principle of good faith".
483 The European Communities submits that, by not addressing that
allegation, the Panel "failed to make an obj ective assessment of the matter", as required under
Article 11 of the DSU, and "failed to address the rele vant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by the parties", as required by Article 7.2 of the DSU. Secondly, the European Communities contends
that the Panel erred in finding that the Complaining Parties were not precluded or estopped from
bringing their claims in relation to C sugar.
B. Whether the Panel Failed "to Address" th e European Communities' Claim that the
Complaining Parties Acted Inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU and the
Principle of Good Faith
304. The European Communities alleges that the Pa nel failed to address its allegation that the
Complaining Parties acted inconsistently with Artic le 3.10 of the DSU and the principle of good faith
by exercising their rights under the DSU in an " unreasonable" and "abusive manner" by "seeking to
exploit what would be, at most, an excusable sched uling error in order to secure a manifestly unfair
advantage".
484 The European Communities acknowledges, however, that the Panel addressed its
arguments regarding the "related, but distinct" issue of whether the Complaining Parties were
"estopped" from bringing a claim against C sugar.
 485 The Complaining Parties, in contrast, take the
view that the Panel's findings on estoppel also a ddressed the European Comm unities' claims relating
to Article 3.10 of the DSU and good faith.
305. We understand the Panel to have addressed the European Communities' arguments on
Article 3.10 of the DSU and good faith together with the European Communities' arguments
regarding estoppel. We note, for instance, that, at th e outset of its analysis, the Panel referred to the
"parties' arguments in respect to good faith and estoppel".486 In summarizing those arguments, the
Panel referred, inter alia , to the European Communities' conten tion that "the Complainants were
acting inconsistently with the general principle of good faith and with their obligation[s] under
Article 3.10 of the DSU ".487

483European Communities' appellant's submission, para . 295 (referring to Panel Reports, paras. 7.54-
7.75 and 7.348-7.354).
484Ibid., para. 316.
485Ibid., para. 342.
486Panel Reports, para. 7.54. (emphasis added)
487Ibid., para. 4.150.

306. Based on its analysis
 488, the Panel concluded that:
... the Complainants have acted in good faith in the initiation and
conduct of the present dispute proceedings . ... The Complainants
were entitled to initiate the present WTO proceedings as they did and
at no point in time have they been estopped, through their actions or
silence, from challenging the EC s ugar regime which they consider
WTO inconsistent.
489 (emphasis added)

307. We consider in subsection C below the issue wh ether the principle of estoppel applies in the
context of WTO dispute settlement. Here, we observe that, to the extent that this concept applies at
all, it is reasonable for a panel to examine estoppel in the context of determining whether a Member
has engaged "in these procedures in good faith", as re quired under Article 3.10 of the DSU. Hence,
not only do we believe that the Panel's examination did not fail to address the European Communities'
contention on Article 3.10 and good faith, but th e Panel made no error in addressing this issue
together with the issue of estoppel. We therefore see no error in the Panel's approach. Consequently,
we also find no fault with the Panel's analysis under Article 7.2 or Article 11 of the DSU.
308. We turn next to address the European Commun ities' argument that the Complaining Parties
were estopped from bringing claims against C sugar.
C. Whether the Complaining Parties were Estopped from Bringing Claims Against
C Sugar
309. The Panel cautioned that "it is far from clear whether the principle of estoppel is applicable to
disputes between WTO Members in relation to their WTO rights and obligations." 490 The Panel
added that "[t]he principle of estoppel has never b een applied by any panel or the Appellate Body." 491
The Panel went on to opine that, assuming, for the sake of argument, that estoppel could be invoked in
WTO dispute settlement:

488Panel Reports, paras. 7.61-7.73.
489Ibid., para. 7.74.
490Ibid., para. 7.63.
491Ibid. The panels in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and Guatemala – Cement II did,
however, refer to the pr inciple of estoppel. (See ibid., paras. 7.71-7.72) The panel in EC – Asbestos also
referred to estoppel. (Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.60)

Brazil's and Thailand's silence concerning the European
Communities' base quantity levels as well as with respect to the
ACP/India sugar Footnote does not amount to a clear and
unambiguous representation upon which the European Communities
could rely, especially considering that, in the Panel's view, there was
no legal duty upon the Complainants to alert the European
Communities to its alleged violations. Furthermore, it is not possible
to identify any facts or statements made by the Complainants where
they have admitted that the EC measure was WTO consistent or
where they have promised that they would not take legal action
against the European Communities. In the Panel's view the "silence"
of some of the Complainants cannot be equated with their consent to
the European Communities' violations, if any.
492

310. We agree with the Panel that it is far from cl ear that the estoppel principle applies in the
context of WTO dispute settlement. Indeed, on appeal , the participants and third participants have
advanced highly divergent views on the concept itself and its applicability to WTO dispute settlement.
311. The European Communities argues that estoppel is a general principle of international law,
which follows from the broader principle of good faith . As such, estoppel is "one of the principles
which Members are bound to observe when engaging in dispute settlement procedures, in accordance
with Article 3.10 of the DSU." 493 Regarding the content of estoppel, the European Communities
argues that "[e]stoppel may arise not only from express statements, but also from various forms of
conduct, including silence, where, upon a reaso nable construction, such conduct implies the
recognition of a certain factual or juridical situation."
494 Australia, in contrast, submits that the
principle of estoppel is not applicable in WTO dis pute settlement. With respect to the content of
estoppel, Australia submits that estoppel cannot "a pply as to a statement of a legal situation". 495
Brazil agrees with the Panel that the European Communities' claims regarding estoppel were "without
merit".496 Similarly, Thailand maintains that the Panel was correct in concluding that the principle of
"estoppel is not mentioned in the WTO Agreement, or the DSU, and that it has never been applied by
any panel or the Appellate Body."497 The United States emphasizes that "[n]owhere in the DSU or the
other covered agreements is there a reference to 'estoppel'." 498 Moreover, according to the United

492Panel Reports, para. 7.73.
493European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 333. (footnote omitted)
494Ibid., para. 335. (footnote omitted)
498United States' third participant's submission, para. 5.

States, "'[e]stoppel' is not a defense that Member s have agreed on, and it therefore should not be
considered by the Appellate Body."
499
312. The principle of estoppel has never been app lied by the Appellate Body. Moreover, the
notion of estoppel, as advanced by the European Co mmunities, would appear to inhibit the ability of
WTO Members to initiate a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. We see little in the DSU that
explicitly limits the rights of WTO Members to bring an action; WTO Members must exercise their
"judgement as to whether action under these procedures w ould be fruitful", by virtue of Article 3.7 of
the DSU, and they must engage in dispute se ttlement procedures in good faith, by virtue of
Article 3.10 of the DSU. This latter obligation co vers, in our view, the entire spectrum of dispute
settlement, from the point of initiation of a case through implementation. Thus, even assuming
arguendo that the principle of estoppel could apply in the WTO, its application would fall within
these narrow parameters set out in the DSU.
313. With these considerations in mind, we examin e the arguments of the European Communities
on this issue. Even assuming, for the sake of argum ent, that the principle of estoppel has the meaning
that the European Communities ascribes to it, a nd that such a principle applies in WTO dispute
settlement, we are not persuaded, in the circumst ances of this case, that the Complaining Parties
would be estopped from bringing claims against C sugar.
314. The European Communities argu es that the Complaining Parties are estopped from bringing
their claims against C sugar because their "lack of r eaction to the non-inclusion of C sugar in the base
quantity, together with the other undisputed fact s and circumstances ..., clearly represented to the EC
that the Complainants shared the understanding that the C sugar regime did not provide export
subsidies."
500 Furthermore, according to the European Communities, it "could legitimately rely upon
that shared understanding in order not to include exports of C sugar in the base levels."501
315. We observe, first, that the Panel specifically found that "it is not possible to identify any
facts or statements made by the Complainants wh ere they have admitted that the EC measure was
WTO consistent or where they have promised th at they would not take legal action against the

499United States' third participant's submission, para. 9.
501Ibid.

European Communities."
502 We consider this finding to be based on the Panel's weighing and
appreciation of the evidence.
316. Secondly, the European Communities suggests that it "could legitimately rely" 503 upon an
alleged "shared understanding" between "all the participants in the Uruguay Round" 504 in deciding not
to include exports of C sugar in the base quantity le vels in its Schedule. We recall that the Panel
found no evidence of any such "s hared understanding" in this case. Thus, as we see it, the European
Communities has no basis on which to now assert that it could have legitimately relied upon such
alleged "shared unders tanding" in deciding not to include expor ts of C sugar in the base quantity
levels in its Schedule.
317. For these reasons, we reject, as did the Panel, the European Communities' allegation that the
Complaining Parties were estopped from bringing their claims against C sugar.
318. We turn next to the European Communities' contention that the Complaining Parties acted
inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU and the principle of good faith.
D. Whether the Complaining Par ties Acted Inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the DSU
and the Principle of Good Faith
319. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to "rule that, by bringing the claim
that exports of C sugar breach the EC's commitmen ts, the Complainants acted inconsistently with
Article 3.10 [of the] DSU and, more generally, with the principle of good faith, to the extent that such
breach would result from the non-inclusion of C sugar in the base quantity from which the
commitments were calculated."
505 We are unable to agree with the European Communities. We see
nothing in the Panel record to suggest that th e Complaining Parties acted inconsistently with
Article 3.10 of the DSU or the principle of good faith. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that the
Complaining Parties acted in good faith.
320. For all these reasons, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraph 7.74 of the Panel Reports,
that the Complaining Parties acted in good faith, un der Article 3.10 of the DSU, in the initiation and
conduct of the present dispute settlement proceedi ngs and have not been estopped, through their

502Panel Reports, para. 7.73. (emphasis added)
504European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

actions or silence, from alleging that the European Communities' exports of C sugar are in excess of
its export subsidy reduction commitments.

X. Judicial Economy
A. The Panel's Analysis and the Arguments on Appeal
321. Having found that the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture , the Panel found that it could, in principle, "also
examine the Complainants claims th at the [EC sugar] regime, or pa rts thereof, constitute an export
subsidy inconsistent w ith Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, in accordance with the Panel's terms of
reference".
506 The Panel noted, however, that "[t]he question that arises is whether the Panel should
examine these claims, or whether it should rather apply the principle of judicial economy."507
322. Quoting from the Appellate Body Report in Australia – Salmon, the Panel took the view that
it need address only "those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member
with those recommendations and rulings 'in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members'."508
323. Turning to the issue before it, the Panel opi ned, first, that, "by fully implementing a
recommendation by the DSB to bring the European Co mmunities' sugar regime into conformity with
its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture, [the European Communities would] also preclude
any finding in the context of a review procedure under Article 21.5 of the DSU that the regime is
inconsistent with the export subsidy disciplines of the SCM Agreement."509 Thus, the Panel
considered that its findings under the Agreement on Agriculture "should be sufficient to fully resolve
the matter at issue". 510 Secondly, the Panel disagreed with the Complaining Parties that it should
address the claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement so that it could then recommend that
the prohibited subsidies be withdrawn "without de lay" within the time period specified by it, as
required by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement . The Panel stated that it did not believe that the

506Panel Reports, para. 7.381.
507Ibid. (original emphasis)
508Ibid., para. 7.382 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 223, in turn quoting
Article 21.1 of the DSU).
509Ibid., para. 7.383.
510Ibid.

Appellate Body's reasoning in Australia – Salmon "requires it to decide claims not necessary to the
full resolution of the matter before the Panel merely in order to obtain what might – but would not
necessarily be – more rapid compliance."
511 Referring to findings of the panel in Canada – Dairy
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), the Panel opined that there was, in any event, "some issue"512 as
to whether it was entitled to make a recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement .
Thirdly, the Panel found that the Complaining Parti es had not set forth their claims under Article 3 of
the SCM Agreement "in quite as clear and unambiguous a manner as under the Agreement
on Agriculture ".513 The Panel explained that "the im portant questions presented under the SCM
Agreement in this dispute would be best decided in a case where they have been further argued by the
parties."514 The Panel added that many of the Co mplaining Parties' references to the SCM Agreement
"were made in the context of their claims under the Agreement on Agriculture ".515 Based on this
analysis, the Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to the Complaining Parties' claims under
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.516
324. On appeal, the Complaining Parties submit that the Panel erred in exercising judicial
economy with respect to their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement . The Complaining
Parties allege that, in exercising judicial economy, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of
the DSU.517 They further argue that the Panel erred in exercising judicial economy because it failed to
consider the remedies that would have been available to the Complaining Parties under the SCM
Agreement, had their claims under Article 3 of that Agreement succeeded. Referring to previous
WTO jurisprudence on judicial economy, the Complain ing Parties assert that a panel is required to
examine a claim where "this is n ecessary to shape the course of im plementation through 'sufficiently
precise' recommendations and rulings of the DSB".518

511Panel Reports, para. 7.384.
512Ibid.
513Ibid., para. 7.386.
514Ibid. In its assessment of the Complaining Parties' claims, the Panel did not indicate what, in its
view, were those "important questions", except for the question whether the Panel was entitled to make a
recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
515Ibid., para. 7.386. (original emphasis)
516Ibid., para. 7.387.
517Australia's other appellant's submission, paras. 5-6; Thailand's other appellant's submission,
para. 80. Brazil does not contend that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
518Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 22. S ee also Australia's other appellant's submission,
paras. 30 and 43; and Thailand's other appellant's submission, paras. 29-30.

325. The Complaining Parties request, should the A ppellate Body agree that the Panel erred in
exercising judicial economy, the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis to determine whether
the European Communities has acted inconsistent ly with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement by providing prohibited export subsidies to sugar. The Complaining Parties also request,
should the Appellate Body find that the Eur opean Communities has acted inconsistently, the
Appellate Body to recommend that the prohibited s ubsidies be withdrawn without delay, as required
by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
519
326. The European Communities contends that the Panel did not err in exercising judicial
economy.520 Quoting the statement of the Appellate Body in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain
Imports that a panel may "refrain from making mu ltiple findings that th e same measure is
inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency,
would suffice to resolve the dispute "521, the European Communities asser ts that "judicial economy
does not concern the manner in which a panel's de cision to exercise its discretion affects eventual
implementation, but rather whether the findings in question are sufficient to resolve a dispute as to
the consistency of a measure with the covered agreements ."522 Even if the Panel did err in exercising
judicial economy, the European Communities submits that the Appellate Body should find that the
export subsidy provisions of the SCM Agreement are not applicable to export subsidies maintained
under the Agreement on Agriculture .523 In any case, the European Communities contends that the
Appellate Body is not in a position to complete the analysis of this issue.524
B. Exercise of Judicial Economy in WTO Dispute Settlement Generally
327. We begin our analysis by recalling the Appellate Body's observations in Canada – Wheat
Exports and Grain Imports , summarizing the circumstances in which panels may exercise judicial
economy in WTO dispute settlement:

519Australia's other appellant's submission, para. 68; Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 11;
Thailand's other appellant's submission, para. 7.
521Ibid., para. 14 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports ,
para. 133). (emphasis added by the European Communities)
522Ibid., para. 15. (emphasis added)
523Ibid., para. 75.
524Ibid., para. 81.

The practice of judicial economy, which was first employed by a
number of GATT panels, allows a panel to refrain from making
multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various
provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of
inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute. Although the
doctrine of judicial economy allows a panel to refrain from
addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute, it
does not compel a panel to exercise such restraint. At the same
time, if a panel fails to make findings on claims where such findings
are necessary to resolve the dispute, then this would constitute a false
exercise of judicial economy and an error of law.
525 (original
emphasis; footnotes omitted)

328. We also recall the Appellate Body's statement in Australia – Salmon , that a panel is under a
duty "to address those claims on whic h a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member
with those recommendations and rulings".526
C. Did the Panel Err in Exercising Judicial Economy with Respect to the Claims under
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement?
329. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the question of whether the Panel failed to
discharge its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU, by declining to rule on the Complaining Parties'
claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.
330. Article 11 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
... a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements,
and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements.

331. Thus, in addition to ruling on the matter before it, a panel is required to "make such other
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
the covered agreements." Such "other findings" coul d, for instance, relate to implementation, to the

525Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133.
526Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 223 (quoted in Appellate Body Report, US –
Lamb, para. 191).

extent that such findings "will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements".
332. Under Article 19.1 of the DSU, where a panel "concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity
with that agreement". (footnote omitted) The pane l is not required to make a recommendation as to
how the Member should implement its obligations or as to the timeframe for implementation.
However, Article 19.1 also provides that "[a] panel or [the] Appellate Body may suggest ways in
which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations." (emphasis added)
333. Pursuant to Article 1.2 of the DSU
527, the situation is different for disputes brought under
Part II of the SCM Agreement . The SCM Agreement contains "special rules and additional
procedures on dispute settlement" in respect of subsidies prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement. In particular, Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides:
If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the
panel shall recommend that the s ubsidizing Member withdraw the
subsidy without delay. In this rega rd, the panel shall specify in its
recommendation the time-period within which the measure must be
withdrawn.

334. Thus, where a panel finds that a complaining Member has established that the subsidy
in question is prohibited within the meaning of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement , it shall
make an additional recommendation as described in Article 4.7. Upon adoption, this additional
recommendation—that the subsidizing Member "wit hdraw the subsidy without delay"—will become
a recommendation or ruling of the DSB.
335. In this case, the Panel's findings under Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture
were not sufficient to "fully resolve" the dispute. This is because, in declining to rule on the
Complaining Parties' claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement , the Panel precluded the
possibility of a remedy being made available to the Complaining Parties, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement, in the event of the Panel finding in favour of the Complaining Parties with respect to

527Article 1.2 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to
such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement
contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this
Understanding.
We note that the SCM Agreement is contained in Appendix 2 to the DSU.

their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement .
528 Moreover, in declining to rule on the
Complaining Parties' claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel failed to discharge its
obligation under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to make "such other findings as will assist the DSB
in making the recommendations or in giving the ru lings provided for in th e covered agreements",
namely, a recommendation or ruling by the DSB pursu ant to Article 4.7. This constitutes false
judicial economy and legal error.
D. Completing the Panel's Legal Analysis
336. Having found that the Panel exercised false judicial economy by not examining the
Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement, we now consider the Complaining Parties'
request that the Appellate Body complete the le gal analysis and determine that the European
Communities has acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement by
providing prohibited export subsidies for ACP/Indi a equivalent sugar and C sugar. Should the
Appellate Body find that the European Communities has acted inconsistently, the Complaining Parties
request the Appellate Body to recommend that the prohibited subsidies be withdrawn without delay,
as required by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. 529 By contrast, the European Communities argues
that, in the event that the Appellate Body rever ses the Panel's decision to exercise judicial economy,
and further concludes that the SCM Agreement can be applied cumulatively with the Agreement on
Agriculture, in the circumstances of this dispute, the Appellate Body would not be in a position to
complete the analysis in the absence of sufficient factual findings by the Panel.
337. In several previous disputes, the Appellate Body examined an issue "not specifically
addressed by the panel, in order to complete the le gal analysis and resolve the dispute between the
parties".530 However, the Appellate Body has declined to complete the legal analysis where "the
factual findings of the panel and the undisputed fact s in the panel record" did not provide a sufficient
basis for the legal analysis by the Appellate Body. 531 Moreover, as Article 17.6 of the DSU limits
appeals to "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel",

528To address the claims of the Complaining Parties under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel
would have had to examine, as a prelim inary matter, whether Article 3 of the SCM Agreement applies to the
export subsidies in this dispute.
529Australia's other appellant's submission, para. 68; Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 11;
Thailand's other appellant's submission, para. 7.
530Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 117 (citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Gasoline, pp. 19 ff, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 18 ff; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals , pp. 23 ff, DSR
1997:I, 449, at 468 ff ; Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry , paras. 154 ff; and Appellate Body Report, US –
Shrimp, paras. 123 ff).

the Appellate Body has also prev iously declined to complete the legal analysis of a panel in
circumstances where that would involve addressing claims "which the panel had not examined at
all".
532 In addition, the Appellate Body has indicated that it may complete the analysis only if the
provision that a panel has not examined is " closely related "533 to a provision that the panel has
examined, and that the two are "part of a logical continuum".534
338. Turning to the specific case before us, we note that the Complaining Parties argue that their
claims under the SCM Agreement are closely related to their claims under the Agreement on
Agriculture.535 We are not persuaded, however, that Articles 3, 8, and 9.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, on the one hand, and Articles 3.1(a), 3.2, and items (a) and (d) of the Illustrative List of
the SCM Agreement, on the other hand, are "closely related" , because the issues presented under the
two Agreements are different in several respects.
339. Furthermore, in the instant case, we note that the Panel made reference to the limited
arguments made by the Complaining Parties under the SCM Agreement:
[T]he Complainants [had] not set forth their claims under Article 3 of
the SCM Agreement in quite as clear and unambiguous a manner as
under the Agreement on Agriculture. Rather, [they] focused on their
claims under the Agreement on Agriculture.536

Although, on appeal, the Complaining Parties did argue their claims under the SCM Agreement to
some extent, they did not address, in a sufficient manner, the question whether Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement applies to export subsidies listed in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture that are
provided to scheduled agricultural products in excess of a responding Member's commitment levels.
We believe that, in the light of Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the chapeau of
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement , the question of the applicability of the SCM Agreement to the

532Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 79 and 82 (cited in Appellate Body Report, US –
Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 343). See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 107.
533Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 79. (original emphasis)
534Ibid. (citing Appellate body Report, Canada – Periodicals , p. 24, DSR 1997:I, 449, at 469).
(emphasis added in EC – Asbestos)
535See Brazil's other appellant's submission, para. 49; and Thailand's other appellant's submission,
para. 56.
536Panel reports, para. 7.386.

export subsidies in this dispute raises a number of complex issues.
537 We also consider that, in the
absence of a full exploration of these issues, comple ting the analysis might affect the due process
rights of the participants.
340. Moreover, we do not have the requisite factual fi ndings to complete the legal analysis. In
particular, we do not have sufficient facts before us, as would be necessary to specify the period of
time for withdrawal, as required by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. We note in this respect that,
when specifying what period would represent "wit hout delay", panels ha ve taken into account, inter
alia, "the nature of the measures and the difficulties likely to be faced in implementing the
recommendation".538 Based on our reading of the Panel Repor ts and the Panel record, we fail to see
any evidence therein regarding the nature of the measures that would be required to "withdraw" the
subsidy, which would permit us to make a recommendation under Article 4.7. Hence, even if we
were able to examine the Compla ining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement and, even if we
were to conclude that the SCM Agreement applies in the circumstances of this dispute and that the
European Communities acted inconsistent ly with its obligations under the SCM Agreement , we

537These issues include, for instance, whether the Agreement on Agriculture contains "specific
provisions dealing specifically with the same matter" (Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras. 532-
533 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 155; and referring to Appellate Body Report,
Chile – Price Band System , para. 186)); whether the SCM Agreement applies to the subsidy as a whole, or
whether it applies to the subsidy onl y to the extent that the subsidy exceeds the responding Members'
commitment levels as specified in its Schedule; and whether, in the event the SCM Agreement applies, a panel
could make a recommendation to withdraw the subsidy in whole, or whether that recommendation would apply
to the subsidy only to the extent that it exceeds the responding Member's commitment levels.
538Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft , para. 8.5. See also Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and
Guarantees, para. 8.4; Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 11.6-11.7; and Panel Report, US – FSC, paras. 8.6-
8.8. We further note that the panel in Brazil – Aircraft determined that:
... taking into account the nature of th e measures and the procedures which
may be required to implement our recommendation, on the one hand, and
the requirement that Brazil withdraw its subsidies 'without delay' on the
other, we conclude that Brazil shall withdraw the subsidies within 90 days.
(Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft , para. 8.5) Agreeing with the panel's recommendation, the Appellate Body in
the same case noted that:
... there is a significant difference between the relevant rules and procedures
of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Article 21.3
are not relevant in determining the period of time for implementation of a
finding of inconsistency with the prohibited subsidies provisions of Part II
of the SCM Agreement.
(Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 192)

would not necessarily be in a position to make a recommendation under Article 4.7 as to the time
period for withdrawal of the subsidy.
539
341. For all these reasons, we are not in a position, a nd we therefore decline, to complete the legal
analysis and to examine the Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement left unaddressed
by the Panel.

XI. The European Communities' Notice of Appeal
342. Australia contends that the European Commun ities' Notice of Appeal does not satisfy the
"due process requirements" of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures 540 for four main reasons.
First, the European Communities does not "quote" 541, in its Notice of Appeal, the specific Panel
findings or conclusions that it appeals. Secondl y, with respect to some claims, the European
Communities fails to distinguish between a conclusion and a finding, or fails to identify the findings
in question. Thirdly, the Europ ean Communities does not list, for each claim, the provisions that the
Panel is alleged to have erred in interpreting or applying. Finally, the European Communities
erroneously refers in its Notice of Appeal to a part of its Schedule as "a provision of a covered
agreement".542 Australia requests the Appellate Body to "rule whether the EC Notice of Appeal
complies with the due process standard for appellate review".543

539In this respect, we note that the European Communities has stated that:
... the Complainants never explained why a 90 day period would be
appropriate and more importantly the Panel never enquired, and
consequently made no findings on the relevant Community procedures
which would have to be undertaken to revise the sugar CMO.
Consequently, there are no factual findings on the record permitting the
Appellate Body to make a recommendation without denying the EC's due
process rights to justify the most appropriate period of time for
implementation.
(European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 29)
541Ibid., para. 24.
542Ibid.
543Ibid., para. 625(c). We note that Australia's appellee's submission does not contain an explicit
request that the Appellate Body dismiss any of the European Communities' claims on the ground that they fall
outside the scope of the appeal due to alleged deficiencies in the Notice of Appeal. In response to questioning at
the oral hearing, Australia confirmed that it makes no request to have the app eal dismissed on "technical
grounds". Rather, Australia indicated that its purpose in asking for a ruling was to obtain clarification
regarding Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures.

343. Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures provides:
Commencement of Appeal

(2) A Notice of Appeal shall include the following information:

(d) a brief statement of the nature of the appeal,
including:
(i) identification of the alleged errors in the
issues of law covered in th e panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel;
(ii) a list of the legal provision(s) of the covered
agreements that the panel is alleged to have erred in
interpreting or applying; and
(iii) without prejudice to the ability of the
appellant to refer to othe r paragraphs of the panel
report in the context of its appeal, an indicative list of
the paragraphs of the panel report containing the
alleged errors.

344. In its Notice of Appeal, the European Commun ities "seeks review" of six "conclusion[s]" and
"related legal findings and interpretations" set out in certain specified paragraphs of the Panel Reports.
The European Communities summarizes the substance of each contested conclusion and the related
legal findings and interpretations. The Notice of App eal also contains a list of the legal provisions of
the covered agreements that the Pa nel is alleged to have erred in interpreting or applying. In our
view, the Notice of Appeal gives adequate notice to the Complaining Parties of the content of its
appeal so as to allow them to make a proper defence, as required by Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working
Procedures.
345. For these reasons, we find that the European Communities' Notice of Appeal satisfies the
requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures.

XII. Findings and Conclusions
346. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) upholds
 the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.37 of the Panel Reports, that the alleged
"payments", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, in
the form of low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producers, fell within the Panel's terms
of reference;
(b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.191, 7.198, 7.222, and 8.1(a) of the Panel
Reports, that Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the European Communities'
Schedule does not enlarge or otherwise modify the European Communities'
commitment levels specified in that Schedule;
(c) upholds
 the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.292 of the Panel Reports, that the alleged
payments in the form of low-priced sales of C beet to sugar producers are "financed
by virtue of governmental action", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture;
(d) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7. 334 of the Panel Reports, that the
production of C sugar receives a "payment on the export financed by virtue of
governmental action", within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, in the form of transfers of financial resources through cross-subsidization
resulting from the operation of the European Communities' sugar regime;
(e) upholds, as a result of its findings under (c) and (d) above, the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 8.1(f) of the Panel Reports, that there is prima facie evidence that the
European Communities has been providing e xport subsidies, within the meaning of
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, to its exports of C sugar since 1995;
(f) upholds, as a result of its findings under (b), (c), (d), and (e) above, the Panel's
finding, in paragraphs 7.340 and 8.3 of the Panel Reports, that the European
Communities, through its sugar regime, acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture;

(g) upholds
 the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.374 and 8.4 of the Panel Reports, that the
European Communities' violations of the Agreement on Agriculture nullified or
impaired the benefits accruing to the Complaining Parties under the Agreement on
Agriculture;
(h) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.74 of the Panel Reports, that the
Complaining Parties acted in good faith, under Article 3.10 of the DSU, in the
initiation and conduct of the present disput e settlement proceedings and, assuming
arguendo that estoppel applies, have not been estopped, through their actions or
silence, from alleging that the European Communities' exports of C sugar are in
excess of its export subsidy reduction commitments;
(i) finds
 that the Panel erred, in paragraph 7. 387 of the Panel Reports, in exercising
judicial economy, and thereby failed to di scharge its obligation under Article 11 of
the DSU with respect to the Complaining Parties' claims under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement, but is not in a position, and therefore declines , to complete the legal
analysis and to examine the Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement
left unaddressed by the Panel; and
(j) finds that the European Communities' Notice of Appeal satisfies the requirements of
Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
347. The Appellate Body recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European
Communities to bring Council Regulation (EC) No . 1260/2001, as well as all other measures
implementing or related to the European Communities' sugar regime, found in this Report, and in the
Panel Reports as modified by this Repo rt, to be inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture, into
conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.

Signed in the original at Geneva this 9th day of April 2005 by:

 A.V. Ganesan
 Presiding Member

 Merit E. Janow Yasuhei Taniguchi
 Member Member

ANNEX 1

11 July 2003
 (03-3752)
 Original: English

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Australia

 The following communication, dated 9 July 2003, from the Permanent Mission of Australia to
the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

 My authorities have requested me to submit th e following request for the establishment of a
panel on behalf of Australia.

 On 27 September 2002 Australia requested c onsultations with the European Communities
(EC) pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), Article XXII:1 of the Genera l Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),
Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Ar ticles 4 and 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) with r espect to the EC's Common Organization of the
Markets in sugar and its application and implementation. The request was circulated to Members on
1 October 2002 in document number WT/DS265/1. Consultations were held on 21 and 22 November
2002 but unfortunately did not result in resolution of the dispute.

 Consequently, Australia requests that a Panel be established pursuant to Article 4.7 and
Article 6 of the DSU, Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1994, Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and
Article 4.4 and Article 30 of the SCM Agreement.

 The measures that are the subject of this re quest are the subsidies provided by the EC in
excess of its reduction commitment levels on sugar and sugar containing pr oducts including sugar
cane and sugar beet, processed and unprocessed cane and beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose in
solid form, molasses resulting from the extraction of refining of sugar, isoglucose, inulin syrup and
the other products listed in Article 1 of Counc il Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on
the European Communities' Common Organization of th e markets in sugar sector (Official Journal of
the European Communities, 30 June 2001, L178/1-45).

 The above-mentioned subsidies are accorded through the EC sugar regime, which is
contained in a number of EC regulations including Council Regulation No 1260/2001 and related EC
regulations, administrative policies, rules, decisi ons and other instruments including instruments pre-
dating the above regulation, and their implementati on. These various instruments will be referred to
as "the EC sugar regime".

 In addition to setting down the conditions attachi ng to imports of sugar, the EC sugar regime
provides conditions attached to the production, supply and exports of sugar, including domestic
support and export subsidies. Sugar is classified in to quota and non-quota sugar. Non-quota sugar is
known as C sugar. The sugar regime provides for the reclassification from quota to C sugar and from
C sugar to quota sugar. Sugar classified as C sugar cannot be disposed of in the EC market.

 Australia is particularly concerned at the subs idies provided by the EC for "C sugar" exports
under the EC sugar regime. Under the regime, producers of C sugar are able to sell C sugar on the
world market at below the total average cost of production through cross-subsidisation of C sugar
from quota sugar profits. By financing payments on the export of C sugar, the EC exceeds its export
subsidy reduction commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.

 Australia is also particularly concerned at the provisions of the EC sugar regime which accord
direct subsidies contingent on export performance for quantities of approximately 1.6 million tonnes
of sugar which are additional to the budgetary outlays and quantities of subsidised exports notified by
the EC to the Committee on Agriculture under the provisions of Article 18.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. In the application of those provisi ons, the EC significantly exceeds its budgetary outlays
and quantity commitments for export subsidies on sugar under the Agreement on Agriculture.

 By granting export subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1.1(a)(1)(i), 1.1(a)(1)(iv),
1.1(a)(2) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement that are not permitted by the Agreement on Agriculture,
the EC also acts inconsistently with its obliga tions under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement.

 Australia considers that the provision of the a bove subsidies and the rele vant elements of the
EC sugar regime are inconsistent with the EC's obligations under the following provisions:

– Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a), 9.1(c), and altern atively, 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture;

– Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the Agreemen t on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

 Australia therefore requests the establishment of a Panel in accordance with Article 7 of the
DSU.

 I would be grateful if you would place this item on the agenda for the next DSB meeting
scheduled for 21 July 2003.

ANNEX 2

11 July 2003
 (03-3760)
 Original: English

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES –EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil

 The following communication, dated 9 July 2003, from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to
the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

 On 27 September 2002, Brazil requested cons ultations with the European Communities
("EC") pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the Ge neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT
1994"), Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture , and Articles 4.1 and 30 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agre ement"), with respect to export subsidies
provided by the EC to its sugar industry. That request was circulated to Members in document
WT/DS266/1,
 G/L/570, G/AG/GEN/53, G/SCM/D48/1, dated 1 October 2002. Consultations were
held in Geneva on 21 and 22 N ovember 2002, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory
solution. Unfortunately, these consultations failed to resolve the dispute.

 Therefore, pursuant to Articles 4.7, 6 and 7 of the DSU, Article 19 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, Articles 4.4 and 30 of the SCM Agreem ent, and Article XXIII:2 of the GATT, Brazil
hereby requests the establishment of a panel.

 The specific measures at issue in this dispute are the subsidies provided and maintained by the
EC, in excess of the EC's reduction commitment levels for sugar, under Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the European Communities' common organi zation of the markets
in the sugar sector
1, and pursuant to all other legislation, regulations, administrative policies and
other instruments relating to the EC regime for sugar, including the rules adopted pursuant to the
procedure referred to in Article 42(2) of Counc il Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001,
and any other provision related thereto. These are referred to as the "EC sugar regime". The products
at issue are those listed in Article 1 of the Regula tion, including cane or beet sugar and chemically
pure sucrose in solid form, molasse s resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar, isoglucose and
inulin syrup. These products are referred to collectively as "sugar".

1 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organization of the markets
in the sugar sector, OJ L 178/1-45, 30.6.2001, p. 1.

 The EC provides export subsidies for sugar in excess of its reduction commitment levels
specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule of Concessions (Schedule CXL-European
Communities), in violation of the Agreement on Agri culture and the SCM Agreement. In particular,
Brazil is concerned with two categories of subsidized EC exports:

(i) The EC sugar regime guarantees a high price fo r the sugar that is produced within production
quotas. This is termed "A and B sugar". S ugar produced in excess of these quotas is termed
"C sugar". Sugar classified as C sugar cannot be sold internally in the year in which it is
produced, and must, in principle, be exported. Payments in the form of high prices provided
to growers and processors by the EC sugar regime finance the production and export of
C sugar at prices below its total cost of production.

(ii) The EC grants export subsidies to an amount of white sugar ostensib ly equivalent to the
quantity of raw sugar that the EC imports unde r its preferential arrangements. This amount,
reportedly, is approximately 1.6 million tons.

 The EC unjustifiably excludes these subsidi es from the calculation of its total amount of
export subsidies that it provides for sugar. The amount of sugar thus subsidized, alone or in
combination with other export subsidies for suga r provided by the EC, exceeds the export subsidy
reduction commitment levels and, as such, constitu tes a violation of the EC's obligations under
Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1 (a) and (c), or, alternatively, Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. By
granting export subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1.1(a)(1)(i) and (iv), 1.1(a)(2), and 1.1(b) of
the SCM Agreement, that are not permitted by the Agreement on Agriculture, the EC also acts
inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.

 Brazil asks that this request for the establishm ent of a panel be placed on the agenda of the
next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, which is scheduled to take place on 21 July 2003.

ANNEX 3

11 July 2003
 (03-3757)
 Original: English

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Thailand

 The following communication, dated 9 July 2003, from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to
the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

 On 14 March 2003, pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Dis putes (the "DSU"), Article XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"), Artic le 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and
Articles 4 and 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM
Agreement") the Kingdom of Thailand ("Thailand") requested consultations with the European
Communities (the "EC") with respect to export subsid ies provided by the EC in the sugar sector. The
request was circulated to Members on 20 Marc h 2003 in document WT/DS283/1. The EC and
Thailand held consultations in Geneva on 8 April 2003 with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory
resolution of the matter, but failed to resolve the dis pute. Pursuant to Articles 4.7 and 6 of the DSU,
Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994, Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Articles 4.4 and
30 of the SCM Agreement, Thailand therefore request s the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") to
establish a panel to examine the following matter.

 The measures at issue are the export subs idies for sugar and sugar-containing products
accorded under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organization
of the markets in the sugar sector published in th e Official Journal of the European Communities on
30 June 2001 (L 178/1-45) and related legal inst ruments. The Council Regulation and the related
legal instruments and administrative actions will be referred to below as the "EC sugar regime". The
products at issue are those listed in Article 1 of the Council Regulation, including cane or beet sugar
and chemically pure sucrose in solid form, molasses resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar,
isoglucose and inulin syrup. These products will be referred to below as "sugar".

 Under the EC sugar regime, sugar that is produced within production quotas ("A" and "B"
quotas) is guaranteed a high intervention price. Sugar produced in excess of those quotas ("C-sugar")
must in principle be exported. By virtue of the EC sugar regime, exporters of C-sugar are able to
export such sugar at prices below the average cost of production. The EC therefore accords export
subsidies to C-sugar in the form of payments on the export of sugar financed by virtue of
governmental action.

 Furthermore, under its sugar regime, the EC gr ants export refunds to an amount of white
sugar that the EC claims to be equivalent to the quantity of raw sugar imported under preferential
import arrangements. The export refunds cover the difference between the world market price and the
high prices in the EC for the products in question, thus making it possible for those products to be
exported. The export refunds constitute direct subsidies contingent on export performance.

 Under the Agreement on Agriculture, the EC undertook budgetary outlay and export quantity
reduction commitments with respect to sugar. In determining its budgetary outlays for export
subsidies for sugar and the quantities benefiting fro m such subsidies, the EC does not take into
account exports of C-sugar and exports of an amount of white sugar equivalent to the quantity of raw
sugar imported under preferential import arrangements. As a result, the EC provides export subsidies
for sugar in excess of its reduction commitments and consequently acts in consistently with its
obligations under Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1(a) and 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture or, alternatively,
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. By gr anting export subsidies within the meaning of
Articles 1.1(a)(1)(i) and (iv), 1.1(a)(2), and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, that are not permitted by
the Agreement on Agriculture, the EC also acts inconsistently with its obligations under
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.

 I would appreciate it if this request for the establishment of a panel were placed on the agenda
for the meeting of the DSB scheduled for 21 July 2003.

SCHEDULE CXL – EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
This Schedule is authentic only in the English language
PART IV – AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: COMMITMENTS LIMITING SUBSIDIZATION
(Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture)
SECTION II: Export Subsidies: Budgetary Outlay and Quantity Reduction Commitments

Description
of products
and tariff
item numbers
at HS six
digit level

Base
outlay
level

Mio
ECU
Calendar/
other year
applied

Annual and final outlay
commitment levels
1995 – 2000

Mio ECU
Base
Quantity

000 t
Calendar/
other year
applied

Annual and final quantity
commitment levels
1995 – 2000

000 t
Relevant
Supporting
Tables and
document
reference
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Sugar (1) 779,9 733,1 686,3 639,5 592,7 545,9 499,1 1.612,0 1.555,6 1.499,2 1.442,7 1.386,3 1.329,9 1.273,5

(*) See Annex
(1) Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin on which the Community is not making any reduction commitments. The average of export in the period 1986 to 1990
amounted to 1,6 mio t.

Note: For the purpose of this Appellate Body Report, references on this page to products other than sugar have been deleted.

ANNEX 4

ANNEX 5

13 January 2005

(05-0190)
 Original: English

Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities
under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)

 The following notification, dated 13 January 2005, from the Permanent Delegation of the
European Commission, is being circulated to Members.

Pursuant to Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ("DSU") and Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate review, the European
Communities ("EC") hereby notifies its decision to a ppeal to the Appellate Bo dy certain issues of
law covered in the reports of the Panel established in response to the requests from Australia, Brazil
and Thailand in the disputes (WT/DS265/R,
WT/DS266/R and WT/DS283/R).

The European Communities seeks review of:

 1) The conclusion, and the related legal findings and interpretations, contained in
paragraphs 7.12-7.16 and 7.24-7.37 of the Panel reports, that the alleged "payments"
in the form of sales of C beet were within the terms of reference of the Panel.

 2) The conclusion, and the related legal findi ngs and interpretations set out in paragraphs
7.120 to 7.222, 7.235 to 7.238 and 8.1(a), (b) and (c) of the Panel reports that
Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the EC's Schedule has no legal effect and that, as a
consequence, the EC's quantity commitment level for exports of sugar is 1,273,500
tonnes and the EC's budgetary outlay commi tments is €499.1 million from marketing
year 2000/2001.

 This conclusion is based on the following erroneous findings:

- that Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture require in all
circumstances that a Member specify both budgetary and quantity
commitments;

- that Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the EC's Schedule is not a
commitment limiting subsidisation, and does not cover exports equivalent to
the volume of ACP/India sugar imported into the EC;

- that even if Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV of the EC's Schedule is a
commitment limiting subsidisation it would remain inconsistent with the
Agreement on Agriculture; and
- that the jurisprudence of US – Sugar Headnote applies to export subsidy
commitments
 3) The conclusion, and the related lega l findings and interpretations, set out in
paragraphs 7.251-7335 and 8.1(f) of the Pane l reports, that exports of C sugar benefit
from export subsidies falling within Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.

This conclusion is based on the following erroneous findings:

- that so-called "cross-subsidization" constitutes a payment on the exports of C
sugar, which provides an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c);

- that the supply of C beet is a paymen t on the exports of C sugar financed by
virtue of Government action, which provides an export subsidy within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c).

 4) The overall conclusion, and the related le gal findings and interpretations set out in
paragraphs 7.336-7.340, 8.2 and 8.3 of the Pa nel reports, that the EC exported sugar
in excess of its commitment levels in mark eting year 2000/2001 and, therefore, has
acted inconsistently with Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

 This conclusion is based on the erroneous conclusions mentioned above under 1), 2)
and 3).

 5) The conclusion, and the related lega l findings and interpretations, set out in
paragraphs 7.61-7.75 and 7.348-7.354 of th e Panel reports, that, by claiming that
exports of C sugar were in excess of the EC's commitment levels the Complainants
did not act inconsistently with Article 3.10 DSU and the principle of good faith.

 6) The conclusion, and the related lega l findings and interpretations, set out in
paragraphs 7.366-7.374 and 8.4 of the Pane l Reports that the alleged violations
resulting from the exports of C sugar nullif y or impair benefits accrued to the
Complainants under the Agreement on Agriculture.

The provisions of the covered agreements which th e European Communities consider to have been
erroneously interpreted or applied by the Panel include:

• Section II, Part IV of the EC's Schedule;
• Articles 3.3, 8 and 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture;
• Articles 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 9.2, 11 and 12.7 of the DSU.

ANNEX 6

25 January 2005

 (05-0314)
 Original: English

Notification of an Other Appeal by Australia
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 25 January 2 005, from the Delegation of Australia, is being
circulated to Members.

Appellate Body in accordance with the provisi ons of paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"), Australia hereby notifies
its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body on the basis of errors both in certain issues of law covered
in the report of the Panel on (WT/DS265/R) (the
"Panel Report") and in certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel in the Panel Report.

2. Australia seeks appellate review of:

(a) the Panel's decision, as set out in paragr aphs 7.380-7.387 and in paragraphs 6.14-6.15
of the Panel Report, to exercise judi cial economy and to decline to examine
Australia's claims under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"); and
(b) the Panel's consequent failure to ma ke a recommendation in accordance with the
provisions of Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.

3. The Panel's decision was based on the following errors of law and legal interpretation:

(i) that the Panel's findings under the Agreement on Agriculture should be sufficient to
fully resolve the matter at issue (paragraph 7.383);
(ii) that there was some issue whether the Panel was entitled to make a recommendation
to withdraw the measure and to specify a time period in accordance with the
provisions of Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement in the circumstances before it
(paragraph 7.384);

(iii) that the Panel was not required to rule on Australia's claims under the SCM
Agreement "merely in order to obtain what might – but would not necessarily be –
more rapid compliance" (paragraph 7.384);
(iv) that the Panel's exercise of judicial economy did not diminish Australia's rights within
the meaning of Article 19.2 of the DSU (paragraph 7.385); and
(v) the additional considerations in its decisi on to exercise judicial economy, being, in its
view, that Australia focused on its claims under the Agreement on Agriculture and
had not set forth its claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement in quite as clear and
unambiguous a manner as under the Agreement on Agriculture (paragraphs 6.15 and
7.386).

4. In deciding to exercise judicial economy in respect of Australi a's claims under the SCM
Agreement, the Panel deprived Australia of its rights in regard to:

- a recommendation, in accordance with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, that those export
subsidies on sugar found inconsistent with the SCM Agreement be withdrawn without delay;
- a recommendation, in accordance with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, specifying a time-
period for withdrawal of the export subsidies in question;
- taking countermeasures in accordance with the provisions of Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement in the event that the subsidies in questio n were not withdrawn within the specified
time-period; and
- the application of special or additional ru les and procedures, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 1.2 and Appendix 2 of the DSU.

5. The Panel's decision to exercise judicial economy also serves to diminish Australia's rights
under, and is inconsistent with, the provisions of Articles 1.2, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7 and 19.2 of the
DSU. The Panel's decision is also inconsistent with the Panel's duty under Article 11 of the
DSU to make such findings as will assist th e DSB in making the recommendations or in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.

6. Australia requests that the Appellate Body reve rse the Panel's legal fi ndings and conclusions
in respect of the exercise of judicial economy in regard to the provisions of the SCM
Agreement. Australia further requests the Appellate Body to preserve Australia's rights under
Articles 4.7 and 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, in accordance with Articles 1.2, 3.2 and 19.2 of
the DSU, by ruling - on the basis of factual findings by the Panel and the undisputed facts on
the Panel record - on Aust ralia's claims under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement
and to make the recommendation provided for under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.

7. Australia cites paragraphs 6.14-6.15 and 7.380- 7.387 of the Panel Report as an indicative list
of paragraphs containing relevant errors in issues of law and legal interpretation developed by
the Panel. Australia also cites paragraphs 3.4, 3.8, 4.2-4.3, 4.102-4.121, 4.177, 4.232-4.266,
7.234, 7.237, 7.375-7.381 and 8.1(e) of the Panel Report as an indicative list of paragraphs
relevant to its request in paragraph 6 above of this Notice of Other Appeal.

8. Australia cites the following legal provisions of the covered agreements as those that the
Panel erred in interpreting or applying:

- SCM Agreement: Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2, 4.7 and 4.10;
- Agreement on Agriculture: Article 21.1; and
- DSU: Article 1.2 and Appendix 2; Articles 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 11 and 19.

ANNEX 7

25 January 2005

 (05-0324)
 Original: English

Notification of an Other Appeal by Brazil
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 25 January 2005, from the Delegation of Brazil, is being
circulated to Members.

 Pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17.4 of the U nderstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (“ DSU”) and Rule 23 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
Brazil appeals certain issues of law and le gal interpretation in the Panel Report in (WT/DS266/R).

1. Brazil claims that the Panel committed legal error in the exercise of the principle of judicial
economy, in paragraph 7.387 of the Panel Report, by declining to examine Brazil’s claim that
the regimes for A, B and C sugar, and for ACP/ India equivalent sugar, involve the provision
of export subsidies prohibited by Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”).

2. The Panel’s finding is based on an erroneous in terpretation and applica tion of Article 4.7 of
the SCM Agreement and Article 19.1 of the DSU. The Panel erred in deciding to exercise
judicial economy on the basis of the implemen tation obligations in Article 19.1 of the DSU.
These obligations would not apply if Brazil’s claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement
were upheld. Instead, in that event, the recommendations and rulings of the DSB would be
determined pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.

3. As a result of these errors, the Panel also erred in its interpretation and application of Article
19.2 of the DSU by nullifying the right of Brazil to resolve a dispute concerning prohibited
export subsidies in terms of the implementation obligations available under Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement . The Panel has also erred under Article 19.2 of the DSU by nullifying
Brazil’s right, in the event of a failure by the European Communities to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, to avail itself of the remedies and
procedures foreseen by Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.

4. Brazil claims, therefore, that the Panel erred in the exercise of the principle of judicial
economy and also in the interpretation a nd application of Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement
and Articles 19.1 and 19.2 of the DSU. Brazil intends to argue th at the Panel’s findings in,
inter alia, paragraphs 7.383 – 7.387 of the Panel Report contains these errors.

5. In the event that Appellate Body reverses the Panel’s exercise of judicial economy, Brazil
requests that the Appellate Body complete the legal analysis by examining Brazil’s claims
under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement on the basis of Panel’s factual findings
and the uncontested facts of record.

ANNEX 8

25 January 2005

 (05-0322)
 Original: English

Notification of an Other Appeal by Thailand
under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

 The following notification, dated 25 January 2005, from the Delegation of Thailand, is being
circulated to Members.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Appellate Body 's Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
Thailand hereby notifies its decision to appeal to th e Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in
the Panel Report ( Complaint by Thailand) ,
WT/DS283/R, (the "Panel Report") and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel in that
Report.

Thailand seeks appellate review of:

(a) the Panel's decision, set out in paragraphs 7. 380-7.387 and in paragraphs 6.14 -6.15 of the
Panel Report, not to make findings on the claims of Thailand under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM Agreement"); and

(b) the Panel's consequent failure to make a r ecommendation in accordance with Article 4.7 of
the SCM Agreement.

The Panel's decision was based on the following erroneous findings:

- that the Panel's rulings under the Agreement on Agriculture should be sufficient to fully
resolve the dispute between the parties (para. 7.383 of the Panel Report);
- that there was "some issue" as to whether the Panel was entitled to make a recommendation in
accordance with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement in the circumstances before it (para. 7.384
of the Panel Report);
- that the Panel was not required to rule on the Complainants' claims under the SCM
Agreement "merely in order to obtain what might - but would not necessarily be - more rapid
compliance" (para. 7.384 of the Panel Report);

- that the Panel's exercise of judicial economy did not diminish the rights of the Complainants
with the meaning of Article 19.2 of the U nderstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") (para. 7.385 of the Panel Report); and
- that an additional consideration relevant to th e Panel's decision to exercise judicial economy
was that the Complainants focu sed their claims on the Agreement on Agriculture and did not
set forth their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement in quite as clear and
unambiguous manner as under the Agreement on Agriculture (paras. 6.15 and 7.386 of the
Panel Report).

The Panel's decision not to rule on Thailand's claims under the SCM Agreement has deprived
Thailand of the remedies available under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, including Thailand's right
under Article 4.7, first sentence, to a recommendati on that those export subsidies on sugar that are
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture be withdrawn without delay;
Thailand's right under Article 4.7, second sentence, that the Panel specify the time-period within
which those subsidies must be withdrawn; and Tha iland's right to take countermeasures in accordance
with the criteria and procedures set out in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement in the event that the
European Communities fails to withdraw those subsidies.

The Panel's failure to accord Thailand its right s under Articles 4 of the SCM Agreement is
inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, which require panels a nd the Appellate Body not
to "... diminish the rights ... provided in the cove red agreements". The Panel's failure to provide a
recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreemen t is also inconsistent with a panel's duty
under Article 11 of the DSU to "make ... findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements".

Thailand requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's legal findings and conclusions on
judicial economy. It further requests the Appellate Body to preserve Thailand's rights under Article
4.7 and 4.10 of the SCM Agreement in accordance w ith Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU by ruling,
on the basis of the factual findings by the Panel and the undisputed facts in the Panel record, on the
claims that Thailand made under Articles 3.1( a) and 3.2 of SCM Agreement and making the
recommendation provided under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.

The provisions of the covered agreements th at Thailand considers the Panel to have
erroneously interpreted or applied include, in addition to those cited above:

- Articles 1.2 and Appendix 2 to the DSU;
- Articles 3.4, 3.7, and 19.1 of the DSU; and
- Articles 13(c)(ii) and 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.