IN US – STAINLESS STEEL (MEXICO) (DS344)
Document: Contents Page Annex E-1 Comments of the European Communities on the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (DS344) E-2 Annex E-2 Comments of the United Stat es on the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (DS344) E-3 Annex E-3 Comments of the European  Communities on the United States' Comments on the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (DS344) E-25 Annex E-4 Comments of the United States on the Comments of the European Communities on the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (DS344) E-28
Document codes: WT/DS350/R
Complainant: EU
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 11, 1, 11.1, 11.3, 11.2, 2  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1, VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX E

PARTIES' COMMENTS ON THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT
IN US – STAINLESS STEEL (MEXICO) (DS344)

Contents Page
Annex E-1 Comments of the European Communities on the Appellate Body
Report E-2
Annex E-2 Comments of the United Stat es on the Appellate Body Report E-3
Annex E-3 Comments of the European Communities on the United States'
Comments on the Appellate Body Report
E-25
Annex E-4 Comments of the United States on the Comments of the European
Communities on the Appellate Body Report
E-28

ANNEX E-1

COMMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON THE
APPELLATE BODY REPORT

The European Communities refers to the Panel's letter inviting the Parties to comment on the
Appellate Body Report in DS344. The Europ ean Communities observes that, as was entirely
foreseeable, the Appellate Body has once again c onfirmed that the correct interpretation of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement precludes the zeroing methodology used by the United States in the measures at
issue.
The European Communities agrees with the Appellate Body's analysis and respectfully invites
the Panel, in making an "objective assessment of the matter before it" under Article 11 of the DSU to
adopt the same approach. We draw the Panel's par ticular attention to the statement that "absent
cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a
subsequent case" (para. 160); and that "the relevan ce of clarification contai ned in adopted Appellate
Body reports is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a specific case" (para. 161).
The European Communities considers that, if the Panel were not to follow the Appellate
Body, its findings would inevitably be reversed on a ppeal. We therefore fail to see what useful
purpose could possibly be served by prolonging discussion of what has already been decided.

ANNEX E-2

COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE APPELLATE
BODY REPORT

TABLE OF REPORTS

Short Form Full Citation
US – Softwood Lumber V
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted
31 August 2004
US – Zeroing (EC) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins , WT/DS294/AB/R,
adopted 9 May 2006
US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/R, adopted 23 January 2007, as modified
by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS322/AB/R
US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing
and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/R, adopted 20 May 2008, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS344/AB/R
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/R, adopted
20 May 2008

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The United States thanks the Panel for the oppor tunity to address the Appellate Body report in
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) . In that report, the Appellate Body reversed the panel and found that
simple zeroing by the United States in periodic reviews is, as such, inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("AD Agreement") and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
1 The Appellate Body also reversed the panel
and found that the United States acted inconsisten tly with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 by applying simple zeroing in the five periodic reviews at issue. 2 The
United States has demonstrated in its submissions to the Panel, and at the Panel's substantive
meetings, that the text of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 do not prohibit zeroing in periodic
reviews. As set out more fully below, the Unite d States believes that the Appellate Body's most
recent report on the issue of zeroing in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is deeply flawed and should not
be treated as persuasive by this Panel.3

2. The Appellate Body Division that heard US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) would like this Panel
to abandon its obligation to unde rtake an objective assessment of the matter before it under Article 11
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU").
Instead, the Division has indicated that panels need to follow prior Appellate Body reports on zeroing,
all in the name of "security and predictability" of the WTO dispute settlement system and a "coherent
and predictable body of jurisprudence", even if such past reports add to or diminish the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreemen ts. There is no support in the DSU for the
Division's approach, which would undermine the secu rity and predictability of the multilateral trading
system and expand the legal effect of Appellate Body reports beyond what was agreed by Members.

3. The Division's finding that zeroing in periodic revi ews is inconsistent with Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement lacks a basis in the text of the covered agreements,
and contradicts what the negotiating history of the AD Agreement confirms. The Division claims that
its interpretation is the only permissible one unde r Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement, but in
reality, it represents a modification of the reasons for the prohibition on zeroing in periodic reviews,
thereby contradicting its conclusion that there is only one permissible interpretation. The United
States urges this Panel to find that the AD Ag reement and the GATT 1994 allow the calculation of
transaction-specific margins of dumping, and that there is no requirement for the provision of offsets
in the assessment proceedings at issue.

II. THE PANEL IN US – STAINLESS STEEL (MEXICO) PROPERLY FULFILLED ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DSU
4. Mexico argued on appeal that the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) acted inconsistently
with Article 11 of the DSU by "failing to follow well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence" on
the issue of zeroing.
4 Although the Appellate Body Division ultimately declined to make a finding on
Mexico's claim, in obiter dicta it expressed its deep concern over the panel's "departing from" prior
Appellate Body reports addressing the same legal issues. 5 The United States respectfully disagrees
with the Division's approach, which would transf orm Appellate Body reports into authoritative

1 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB) , para. 165(a). The United Stat es notes that the European
Communities ("EC") does not make an as such claim of inconsistency in the present dispute.
2 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 165(b).
3 The United States has attached copies of its statement at the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body
on the DSB's consideration for adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports in US – Stainless Steel
(Mexico) as Annex 1 to these comments and its separate written communication to the DSB on those reports as
Annex 2.
4 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 154.
5 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 161-62.

interpretations of the covered agre ements. Drawing similar conclusi ons to prior panel and Appellate
Body reports, the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) recognized the proper role of prior Appellate
Body reports in the WTO dispute settlement system, correctly understood what was required of it
under the DSU, and acted consistently with its obligations.

5. The panel, before proceeding to a consideration of Mexico's substantive claims, observed that
it was "not bound by previous Appella te Body or panel decisions that have addressed the same issue,
i.e. simple zeroing in periodic reviews, which is before us in these proceedings".
6 As the panel
affirmed, "[t]here is no provision in the DSU that requires WTO panels to follow the findings of
previous panels or the Appellate Body on the same issues brought before them. In principle, a panel
or Appellate Body decision only binds the parties to the relevant dispute." 7 The Division at first also
recalled the well-established understanding that there is no stare decisis in the WTO dispute
settlement system8, but then appears to have suggested the contrary.9

6. The panel was fully mindful of its obligati on under Article 11 of the DSU to undertake an
"objective assessment" of the matter before it. Recalling the panel report in US – Zeroing (Japan), the
panel noted that "the concern over the preservation of a consistent line of jurisprudence should not
override a panel's task to carry out an objective examination of the matter before it through an
interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law".
10 After a "careful consideration" of the matter before it, the panel
decided that "we have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of reasoning developed by
the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-consiste ncy of simple zeroing in periodic reviews". 11
Likewise, the panel concluded that "[i]n light of our obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to carry
out an objective examination of the matter referred to us by the DSB ... we have felt compelled to
depart from the Appellate Body's approach". 12 It is clear that the panel approached its job seriously,
that it conducted a very critical and thorough examination of prior Appellate Body reports on the issue
of zeroing, and that it did not lightly deviate from those reports.

7. The Division, in criticizing th e panel for departing from past Appellate Body reports, failed to
acknowledge that the panel did what was required under Article 11 of the DSU – that is, the panel
undertook an "objective assessment" of the matter before it.
13 The Division also suggested that:

consistency and stability in the inte rpretation of [Members'] rights and
obligations under the covere d agreements is essential to promote 'security and
predictability' in the dispute settlement system. ... The Panel's failure to follow
previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues
undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence
clarifying Members' rights and obligati ons under the covered agreements as
contemplated under the DSU.
14

The Division's discussion cannot be reconciled with the text of Article 3.2 of the DSU. The "security
and predictability" referred to in Article 3.2 is the "security and predictability" of the "multilateral

6 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.102.
7 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.102.
8 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB) , para. 158 (quoting Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB) , pp. 12-
15).
9 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), paras. 161-62.
10 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.105.
11 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.106.
12 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.106.
13 Ironically, the panel did offer "cogent reasons" for departing from prior Appellate Body findings on
zeroing, which makes the Division's criticism all the more misplaced according to the Division's own criteria.
14 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 161.

trading system", and not the "'security and pred ictability' in the dispute settlement system".
15 Under
Article 3.2, the DSB's recommendations and rulings "cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements". 16 Recommendations and rulings that add to or
diminish such rights and obligations undermine th e very security and predictability of the multilateral
trading system that is mentioned in Article 3.2. Wh at is more, to the extent such rulings are followed
without hesitation, the security and predictability of the agreements that Members negotiated will be
even further undermined.

8. The Division has essentially found that "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement
system and the need for "a coherent and predi cable body of jurisprudence" should trump other
provisions of the DSU, including the requirement under Article 3.2 that the DSB's recommendations
and rulings not add to or diminish Members' right s and obligations under the covered agreements, and
a panel's obligation under Article 11 to conduct an objective assessment. Indeed, carried to its logical
extreme, the Division's reasoning would mean the Appellate Body could ne ver change its mind or
should never have a dissenting opinion since either would detract from "security and predictability".

9. While the Appellate Body h as an undeniably important role in the WTO dispute settlement
system, the Appellate Body was not set up to i ssue authoritative interpretations on the covered
agreements; only the Ministerial Conf erence and General Council may do that.
17 The Division, in
discussing the Appellate Body's "distinct" role in the alleged "hierarchical structure" of the WTO
dispute settlement system 18, appears to downgrade the very impo rtant role of panels and panels'
fundamental responsibilities as agreed by Members in the DSU.

10. The United States wishes to r ecall that despite the Division's dicta to the contrary, prior
Appellate Body reports on zeroing are not bi nding. This Panel, like the panel in US – Stainless Steel
(Mexico), should undertake an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11
of the DSU.
19 We also ask this Panel to remain mindfu l of the proper interpretation of Articles 3.2
and 19.2 of the DSU and ensure that its findings do not add to or diminish the rights and obligations
of Members under the covered agreements. 20 The Panel should decline any invitation to adopt
uncritically the reasoning in Appellate Body reports si mply in the name of consistent jurisprudence or
"security and predictability".

III. THE APPELLATE BODY DIVISION'S REASONING IS FLAWED AND SHOULD
NOT BE FOLLOWED BY THIS PANEL
11. The United States is deeply troubled by the Appellate Body Division's evaluation of the issue
of zeroing. The question before the Division was wh ether the Members agreed to prohibit
zeroing as part of their WTO obligations. Any such agreement could only be manifest in the
text of the AD Agreement. However, the text of the AD Agreement is silent on the issue of
zeroing. Faced with agreement language that do es not address zeroing at all, let alone include a
broad prohibition on zeroing, the Division ha s drawn inferences that the text cannot support
about what it is that Members intended with respect to zeroing.

15 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 160.
16 Likewise, Article 19.2 ensures that the findings and recommendations of panels and the Appellate
Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements.
17 WTO Agreement, Art. IX:2.
18 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 161.
19 See, e.g., US First Written Submission, paras. 24, 28-29; US Opening Statement at First Substantive
Meeting of the Panel, paras. 4, 6, 9.
20 See, e.g. , US First Written Submission, paras. 28, 32; US Opening Statement at First Substantive
Meeting of the Panel, paras. 7-8.

12. The difficulties and problems of the Appella te Body's approach are illustrated by the
individual Appellate Body reports on the issue. Over several reports, the Appellate Body has
modified its analysis in mutually contradictor y ways. The Appellate Body's most recent effort
in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is no less flawed. In particular, the Appellate Body report
largely assumes its conclusion, relying not on the text of the AD Agreement but on language
from its previous reports remove d from its context. The Appellate Body's shifting rationales
throughout its successive zeroing reports detracts from its conclusion that under Article 17.6(ii)
of the AD Agreement, only one permissible in terpretation exists of the AD Agreement and
Article VI of the GATT 1994.21

The Appellate Body's Shifting Explanation for the Prohibition on Zeroing

13. In US – Softwood Lumber V , the Appellate Body interpreted the term "margins of
dumping" in the first sentence of Article 2.4.2 in an integrated manner with the phrase "all
comparable export transactions" to derive a concept of the "product as a whole" as
distinguished from sub-groups or models of a product. 22 The phrase "all comparable export
transactions" appears only in connection with average-to-average comparisons, but Article 2.4.2
also provides for the calculation of a margin of dumping on a transaction-to-transaction or
average-to-transaction basis. Thus, in US – Softwood Lumber V the Appellate Body had
concluded that zeroing was not permitted in the context of "multiple averaging", but did not
explain how zeroing could be prohibited in the context of "multiple comparisons" generally.
Indeed, it specifically refrained from making a finding concerning the other two methods of
comparison.

14. Then, in contrast to US – Softwood Lumber V , in US – Zeroing (EC) the Appellate Body
appeared to embrace a new interpretation, such that a new concept of the "product as a whole"
led to the conclusion that zeroing is prohibit ed whenever "multiple comparisons" are made. 23
Again, these phrases do not appear in the AD Agreement, but were derived from interpretations
based on the phrase "all comparable export tran sactions", which appears only in connection
with average-to-average comparisons in investi gations. In considering this, the panel in US –
Zeroing (Japan) found that the Appellate Body had provided:

[N]o explanation of this shift from the use of the "product as a whole"
concept as context to interpret the term "margins of dumping" in the first
sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in connection with multiple
averaging, on the one hand, to the use of this concept as an autonomous legal
basis for a general prohibition of zeroing, on the other. In this regard, we
note, in particular, that the Appella te Body does not discuss why the fact
that in the context of multiple avera ging the terms "dumping"and "margins
of dumping" cannot apply to a sub-group of a product logically leads to the
broader conclusion that Members may not distinguish between transactions
in which export prices are less than normal value and transactions in which
export prices exceed normal value.24

15. Then, in US – Zeroing (Japan) , the Appellate Body reinterpreted the "all comparable
export transactions" language to relate solely to all transactions within a model, and not across models
of the product under investigation. 25 Previously, the Appellate Body relied on the word "all" in "all

21 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 136.
22 US – Softwood Lumber V (AB), paras. 86-103.

comparable export transactions" as the textual basis for requiring the results of all model-average-to-
model-average comparisons to be included in th e margin of dumping in the average-to-average
context.26 The Appellate Body insisted that the word "all" was not necessary to its finding that a
single overall margin of dumping must be calculated and must include the results of all transaction-to-
transaction comparisons. Because the Appellate Body has concluded that there is a single permissible
interpretation of these provisions of the AD Agreement, the term "all" is either relevant, or it is not.
The Appellate Body cannot adopt one permissible in terpretation in one instance, and then adopt a
contradictory interpretation with regard to the same i ssue, and still continue to maintain that there is
only one permissible interpretation provided for in the text.

16. Finally, and most recently, in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , the Appellate Body, shifting its
emphasis yet again, relied on Article VI of th e GATT 1994, and on Articles 2.1 and 9.3 of the
AD Agreement, for its conclusion th at because "dumping" and "margins of dumping" carry one rigid,
identical meaning throughout the AD Agreement re gardless of the context in which the terms are
placed, transaction-specific calculations are prohibited.

17. In attempting to reach a desired result on the issue of zeroing, the Appellate Body's reasoning
varies from one dispute to the next. Such varying conclusions defy common sense. Considering the
text of the AD Agreement and the various contra dictory interpretations offered on the issue of
zeroing, this Panel, when making its own objective asse ssment of the matter before it, should find that
at the very least, an alternative interpretati on – that the AD Agreement does not prohibit the
calculation of dumping on a transaction-specific basis in assessment reviews – is permissible.

The Division's Flawed Reasons for the Prohibition on Zeroing in Periodic Reviews

18. The Division's finding that zeroing is inconsistent with Articles 9.3 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 lacks a textual basis and is without support in the negotiating history
of the Uruguay Round Agreements. The AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 do not prohibit the
calculation of transaction-specific antidumping margins, nor do they require offsets to be provided for
non-dumped transactions. The United States respectfully refers the Panel to, and incorporates the
comments set out in, the attached Communication of the United States to the Dispute Settlement
Body, dated 20 May 2008, in which we explain in more detail the errors in the Division's reasoning.27

IV. CONCLUSION
19. The United States thanks the Panel once agai n for the opportunity to comment on the recent
Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) . We respectfully ask the Panel to remain
mindful of its obligation to undertake an objective a ssessment as required by Article 11 of the DSU.
To the extent that the Panel takes the Appellate Body report into account, the United States believes
that for the reasons discussed above, and in the comments set out in the attached documents, the Panel
will find that report unpersuasive and incorrect, and will agree that the AD Agreement and the
GATT 1994 do not prohibit zeroing as applied in the assessment proceedings challenged by the EC.

26 US – Softwood Lumber V (AB), paras. 86-103.
27 See Annex 2.

ANNEX 1

US COMMENTS ON US – STAINLESS STEEL (MEXICO) (AB)

Oral Statement of the United States on the DSB's Consideration for Adoption of the

Reports of the Panel and Appellate Body in United States – Final Antidumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (WT/DS344)

 Mr. Chairman, the United States would first lik e to welcome the panel report being adopted
today. We commend the Panel for the professional job th at it performed in this dispute, for its careful
analysis of the relevant provisions of the An tidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 and for taking
so seriously its responsibility to Members to conduct an objective examination of the matter placed
before it.

 It is clear from the Panel's report that the Pane l did not lightly choose not to follow the earlier
Appellate Body reports on zeroing. It would have b een far simpler, not to mention I suspect far more
popular, for the Panel just to go along with what the Appellate Body had said on this subject.
However, the Panel clearly was deeply troubled by the flaws in the logic and approach of those
previous reports.

 In light of the Panel's careful examination a nd obvious struggle in attempting to reconcile the
agreed text of the WTO agreements with statements made by the Appellate Body in its prior reports, it
would have seemed that this Appellate Body Di vision would have felt ca lled upon to address most
carefully the issues raised and the Panel's concerns. Thus, it is even more troubling that the Appellate
Body Division on this appeal not only summarily rejected the Panel's points, but also took the Panel to
task simply for taking the Panel's duties to heart an d trying to ensure that the Panel's findings were
consistent with the agreed text of the WTO agreements.

 The United States is deeply troubled by the Appellate Body Division's response on two levels,
each of them posing serious systemic problems for us, the Members. First, once again a Division has
devised a new basis to justify findings against zero ing in reviews – this time that the margin of
dumping is exporter based and that somehow this precludes finding a margin of dumping with respect
to an individual transaction. The reasoning under th is approach continues to be deeply flawed and
fails to comport with the actual, agreed treaty text.

 Second, the Division has significantly depart ed from the established understanding of the
relationship between panel and Appella te Body reports and the role of the Appellate Body and that of
Members. This report purports to create a new legal effect for Appellate Body reports, one that would
appear to grant to the Appellate Body the very au thority to issue authoritative interpretations of the
covered agreements that is reserved by the WTO Agreement exclusively
 to Members.

 With respect to the first systemic level of con cern, let me simply note that there are numerous
flaws in the Appellate Body's reasoning in this latest report, including in particular its rejection of the
fact that the Uruguay Round negotiators did not agr ee to prohibit zeroing in assessment reviews. No
common understanding was reached on zeroing in the Uruguay Round because, despite extensive
efforts by many participants, proposals to prohi bit zeroing were firmly opposed by many others,
including several users of antidumping measures.

 However, if the Members of the WTO never agreed to ban zeroing, then the DSU does not
empower the Appellate Body to create new obligations that impose such a ban. The Appellate Body's
approach ought to be of concern to every singl e WTO Member, any one of which may someday be
called upon to defend its own laws and regulations, and every one of which will want to rely on the

negotiated outcome of the Uruguay Round, the Doha Round, or other WTO negotiations – and not be
held to rules found nowhere in those outcomes.

 We will not dwell on those points further th is afternoon. Instead, we have prepared a
written statement that addresses the continuing and evolving flaws with the Appellate Body's
analysis of zeroing; a copy will be available in the room after the meeting and will be circulated
to all delegations.

 The second level of systemic concern is of such enormous institutional significance for
the dispute settlement system that we are compelled to elaborate on our concerns today.

 In this dispute, the Panel correctly noted its obligations under DSU Articles 11, 3.2 and 19.1
and undertook its work in accordance with those obligations. And, in carrying out its task, this
Panel – like another panel before it – carefully considered, and ultimately disagreed with, the
various versions of the Appellate Body's reaso ning in prior disputes involving zeroing in
assessment reviews. On appeal, Mexico raised a claim under DSU Article 11.

 The first few paragraphs of the Appellate Body report's discussion of that appeal are
unexceptional. The Division first recalls the task of the Panel under DSU Article 11: to assist the
DSB in discharging its responsibilities, and to make an objective assessment of the matter, including
the applicability of and conformity with the covere d agreements. It further recalls that under DSU
Article 3.2, "the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system". And, it recalls that the original members of the
Appellate Body, in one of the very first appeals it he ard, clarified the status of prior adopted reports:
they are not binding, except with respect to the particular dispute between the parties, but they "should
be taken into account where they are relevant to a ny dispute". We have no quarrel with any of this,
and we believe that all Members share that view.

 The discussion then turns, however, in a signi ficantly different direction – one that no longer
relies on WTO Agreement text or even on prior adop ted reports. The discussion begins to use terms
such as "'security and predictability' in the dispute settlement system" – which is a misstatement of the
text, since the DSU only speaks to the dispute settle ment system providing security and predictability
to the "multilateral trading system". The discussion also asserts that the Panel's "failure to follow
previously adopted Appellate Body reports ... undermines the development of a coherent and
predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Me mbers' rights and obligations under the covered
agreements".

 The Division closes by expressing its concern a bout "the Panel's decision to depart from" the
Appellate Body's prior rulings on these issues, st ating that the Panel's approach has "serious
implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system".

 Mr. Chairman, with respect, the Appellate Body Division is mistaken. This second part of the
Appellate Body's discussion misperceives the WTO Ag reement and this Member-driven organization.
It is WTO Members that negotiate and agree to obligations, and we do so by consensus. We have also
established one and only one means for adopting binding interpretations of the obligations that we
agree to: Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt such interpretations.

 Yet the approach in this Appellate Body re port would appear to mean that Appellate Body
reports should be treated as authoritative interpretati ons of the covered agreements – they are to be
followed by panels regardless of whether a panel in a particular dispute agrees with those prior
reports. In other words, panels are simply to abdicate their responsibility to conduct an objective
assessment of the matters before them and should simply follow prior Appellate Body reports.

 This does a disservice to panels and the serious responsibility that the DSB assigns to them.

 What is more, WTO Members have made it clear – in fact, the DSU says it twice – that the
findings of panels and the Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations in the
covered agreements. Perhaps unlike some other institutions, the WTO does not rely on adjudication
to advance its objectives. However, this Appellate Body report's approach, including its references to
a "coherent and predictable body of jurispruden ce", would appear to transform the WTO dispute
settlement system into a common law system. But that was nowhere agreed among Members.

 And what is more, this Division raised a ll of these systemic concerns unnecessarily, some
might even say gratuitously. The report rejected Me xico's Article 11 appeal, so all of this discussion
was mere dicta by the Division.

 We do, of course, share the Appellate Body's interest in having similar cases treated similarly.
We expect that all Members do likewise. We do not, however, share this report's view that this means
that panels must follow Appellate Body reports in different disputes. Rather, to cite again to the
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body report, we would e xpect any panel to take account of
any other relevant adopted report, whether authored by the Appellate Body or by a different panel.

 To take account of an adopted report, of course, does not mean to follow it without hesitation.
To the contrary, to take account of such a report me ans to examine it, to consider it, and to engage
with its reasoning. We recall that an objective assessment is one that is critical and searching. Such
an assessment can lead, in fact, to further or greater clarification.

 Mr. Chairman, the WTO dispute settlement syst em functions properly when the rules that
Members established for that system are respected. One of those rules is that a panel must make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, includi ng an objective assessment of the "applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements". Whatever one's views of the substantive
issues in this dispute, there is no question but that the Panel did so here.

 We therefore strongly believe that the Appellate Body's concerns about the Panel's approach
are misplaced. Rather than pr esenting "serious implications" for the dispute settlement system, the
Panel's actions in this dispute affirm the strength of that system.

ANNEX 2

US COMMENTS ON US – STAINLESS STEEL (MEXICO) (AB)

Communication to the DSB by the United States on United States – Final Antidumping

Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (WT/DS344)

1. On 20 December 2007, the Panel in United States – Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico ("US – Stainless Steel") circulated its final report. In that report, the Panel engaged
in a lengthy analysis of the legal relationship under the WTO dispute settlement system between panel
reports and Appellate Body reports. The Panel recalled "that this is not the first case in the WTO in
which simple zeroing in periodic reviews has been challenged. The WTO-consistency of simple
zeroing in periodic reviews was questioned before the panels in US - Zeroing (EC) and US - Zeroing
(Japan). In both cases, the panels found this practice not to be inconsistent with the obligations set
out in the relevant provisions cited by the complaining parties. We also recall that the Appellate Body
reversed the decisions of both panels and found simple zeroing in periodic reviews to be WTO-
inconsistent."
1

2. Indeed, the Panel correctly noted "that, although adopted panel reports only bind the parties to
the dispute that they concern, the Appellate Body e xpects future panels to take them into account to
the extent that the issues before them are si milar to those addressed by previous panels".
2
Furthermore, the Panel accurately concluded "that even though the DSU does not require WTO panels
to follow adopted panel or Appellate Body reports, the Appellate Body de facto expects them to do so
to the extent that the legal issues addressed are similar".3

3. At the same time, the Panel stated:

We also note, however, that the panel in US - Zeroing (Japan), while recognizing
the need to provide security and predicta bility to the multilateral trading system
through the development of a consistent line of jurisprudence on similar legal
issues, drew attention to the provisions of Articles 11 and 3.2 of the DSU and
implied that the concern over the preservation of a consistent line of
jurisprudence should not override a panel's task to carry out an objective
examination of the matter before it through an interpretation of the relevant treaty
provisions in accordance with the customar y rules of interpretation of public
international law. We also share the concern raised by the panel in US - Zeroing
(Japan) regarding WTO panels' obligation to carry out an objective examination
of the matter referred to them by the DSB.
4

4. Despite all of this, the Pa nel finally concluded that:

After a careful consideration of the ma tters discussed above, we have decided
that we have no option but to respectfu lly disagree with the line of reasoning
developed by the Appellate Body regard ing the WTO-consistency of simple
zeroing in periodic reviews. We are cognizant of the fact that in two previous
cases, US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) , the decisions of panels that

1 Panel Report, para. 7.101.
2 Panel Report, para. 7.104.
3 Panel Report, para. 7.105.
4 Panel Report, para. 7.105.

found simple zeroing in periodic reviews to be WTO-consistent were reversed by
the Appellate Body and that our reasoning set out below is very similar to these
panel decisions. In light of our obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to carry
out an objective examination of the matter referred to us by the DSB, however,
we have felt compelled to depart from the Appellate Body's approach for the
reasons explained below.
5

5. These passages demonstrate the Panel's awar eness of likelihood that the Appellate Body
would reverse the Panel's findings while underscori ng the seriousness of the Panel's disagreement
with the prior Appellate Body reports. Despite that risk of reversal, the Panel ultimately concluded
that:

We are not convinced that the treaty provisions cited by Mexico, on which the
Appellate Body based its reasoning, necessarily compel a definition of 'dumping'
based on an aggregation of all export transactions.
6

In particular, the Panel was "troubled by the fact that the principal basis of the Appellate Body's
reasoning in the zeroing cases seems to be premised on an interpretation that does not have a solid
textual basis in the relevant treaty provisions". 7 Ultimately, the Panel stated that "we find the
Appellate Body's reasoning not to be convincing".8

6. The Panel correctly assessed the likelihood th at the Appellate Body would reverse its
findings. On 30 April 2008, the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal circulated its report 9,
reversing the Panel's findings.

7. The United States wishes to offer its views on the Appellate Body Division's report. In light
of the fact that the Appellate Body had previously re versed a panel's findings on this issue, despite the
panel's respectful (and unprecedented) disagreement with the Appellate Body and despite the US
comments offered on an even earlier Appellate Body report, the United States offers its comments
only after careful consideration – the United States does not offer these comments lightly.
10

8. At the outset, the United States would note that some Members have argued that zeroing is
"unfair". But many people do not know what zeroing is. A brief explanation may be helpful. If an
import is dumped, the Member collects a duty. If the import is not dumped, the Member collects
nothing. That is zeroing: treating a non-dumped import as – not dumped.

9. Thus, simple common sense confirms that zeroing does not "inflate" the margin of dumping
but rather simply treats non-dumped imports neutrally. That logic is reflected in Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement, which r ecognize that Members may calculate a margin
of dumping on a transaction-by-transaction basis, a nd, thus, collect duties on dumped imports, while
collecting no duties on non-dumped imports.

6 Panel Report, para. 7.117.
7 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
8 Panel Report, para. 7.121.
9 WT/DS344/AB/R.
10 For the comments of the United States on prior Appellate Body reports regarding the issues of
zeroing in assessment proceedings, see United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), Communication by the United States, WT/DS294/16 (17 May 2006); United
States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), Communication
from the United States, WT/DS294/18 (19 June 2006); and United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, Communication from the United States, WT/DS322/16 (26 February 2007).

10. Four times the DSB has been presented with the question of whether margins of dumping can
be calculated on a transaction-specific basis and zeroing is thus permissible in contexts such as
assessment proceedings. Four times panels – that have included in their membership antidumping
administrators and negotiators – have concluded that zeroing is permitted in such circumstances. Four
times the Appellate Body has disagreed. And each time that the Appellate Body has done so, it has
presented a new rationale for its position that does not withstand close scrutiny. Thus, it is not
surprising that two panels have taken the unprecedented step of examining, and then rejecting, the
Appellate Body's reasoning.

11. Panels have not been alone in critiquing the Appellate Body's reasoning. Academics –
including those who are not necessarily supporters of the antidumping remedy – have acknowledged
that the Appellate Body's findings have no sound basis in the text of the agreements, and they
recognize the danger to the WTO system of such extra-legal behaviour.
11 They rightly perceive that
whatever one's personal views on antidumping in gene ral, or zeroing in particular, if the Appellate
Body is perceived to be arrogating to itself the authority to make policy, it would pose a far greater
danger to trade than antidumping authorities declin ing to make adjustments for so-called negative
dumping margins. This is because the Antidumping Agreement, like all of the covered agreements,
reflects a balance of interests negotiated by the Members. When the Appellate Body alters the
negotiated balance, it acts beyond its authority and jeopardizes Members' confidence that the bargains
that are negotiated are the bargains that will be respected.

12. In this regard, the Appellate Body Division responsible for Stainless Steel has for the first
time suggested that if a panel should decline to fo llow Appellate Body reasoning – regardless of how
flawed that reasoning may be – the panel acts at odds with the "promotion of security and
predictability" and the "prompt settlement of disputes".
12 This Division's view of its role is deeply
disturbing. Members have agreed that the "dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element
in providing security and predictabilit y of the multilateral trading system". 13 The Appellate Body
Division misstates this provision by arguing that it refe rs to "'security and predictability' in the dispute

11 See e.g. Professor Chad P. Bown an d Professor Alan O. Sykes, The Zeroing Issue: A Critical
Analysis of Softwood V , revised version forthcoming in World Trade Review, ("[T]he legal foundation for the
Appellate Body's ruling is somewhat dubious, doubly so in the face of the standard of review applicable under
the ADA ... . The danger of such decisions is that they will undermine confidence in the Appellate Review
process and make it more difficult for WTO Members in the future to reach agreem ent on contentious issues."
(p. 30)) <http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/Bown-Sykes-ALI.pdf>; Terence P. Stewart, Amy S. Dwyer
& Elizabeth Hein, "Trends in the Last Decade of WTO Trade Re medy Decisions: Problems and Opportunities
for the WTO Dispute Settlement System ", 24 A RIZONA J. COMP. L. 251 (2007); Professor Roger P. Alford,
"Reflections on U.S.– Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body ", 45 C OLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 196 (2006-2007), ("The Appellate Body's report in US – Zeroing crystallizes some of the
concerns that have been expressed in the past regarding judicial excess in the WTO dispute settlement regime."
(p. 220 )); Professor Phoenix X.F. Cai, " Between Intensive Care and Crematorium: Using Standard of Review
to Restore Balance to the WTO ", 15 T ULANE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465 (2006-2007); Professor Richard H.
Steinberg, "Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints ", 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 247 (2004); Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, "Paved with good intentions: the dynamic effects of WTO
review of anti-dumping action ", 2 W ORLD TRADE REVIEW 373 (2003); John Greenwald, " WTO Dispute
Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation ", 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 113 (2003); John Ragosta, Navin
Joneja, and Mikhail Zeldovich, " WTO Dispute Settlement System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed ", 37 I NT'L
LAWYER 697(2003); Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, " The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement:
WTO Review of Domestic Anti-dumping Decisions ," 34 L. & POLICY INT'L BUS. 109 (2002-2003); Geert A.
Zonnekeyn, "The Bed Linen Case and its Aftermath ," 36 J. WORLD TRADE 993 (2002); Claude Barfield, Free
Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Fu ture of the World Trade Organization , 2 U. CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 403
(2001).
12 Appellate Body Report, para. 161.
13 DSU Article 3.2.

settlement system". 14 Instead, the dispute settlement system only provides "security and
predictability" to the multilateral trading system when the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), and the
panels and the Appellate Body that serve it, respect the parameters set out in Article 3.2 – that the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to, or diminish, the rights and obligations in the
covered agreements. Suggesting, as this Division did, that panels are required blindly to follow
erroneous Appellate Body conclu sions in the name of security and predictability is simply
inconsistent with Article 3.2. The Panel recognized this, and should be commended for its devotion to
Articles 3.2 and 11 of the DSU.

13. With that backdrop, it is important to examin e the particular reasoning used this time by the
Appellate Body Division and its approach to zeroing in assessment reviews.

A. T
HE APPELLATE BODY'S REJECTION OF NEGOTIATING HISTORY
14. On appeal, the United States explained that, even assuming arguendo there was any
ambiguity in the text regarding a prohibition on zeroing, an examination of the negotiating history
would confirm that Members did not agree to prohibit it. In light of the absence of a textual
prohibition on zeroing – neither "zeroing" nor "negative dumping margins" appears anywhere in the
Antidumping Agreement – one would have expected the Division to have wanted to consult the
negotiating history if the Division were consideri ng viewing the text as implicitly dealing with
zeroing. Surprisingly, however, the Division's view was that recourse to the negotiating history was
not "strictly necessary".
15 Moreover, although the Division did in the end examine the US
explanations of the negotiating history, the Divi sion's conclusions regardi ng the negotiating history
simply cannot be reconciled with that history.

The Tokyo Round Antidumping Code permitted zeroing

15. For example, in 1979, certain contr acting parties concluded the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT. Becau se the title is identical to the title of the WTO
agreement, and the agreement resulting from the Kennedy Round, we will refer to the 1979
Agreement by its colloquial name, the Tokyo Roun d Anti-Dumping Code ("Code"). As its name
indicates, drawing on Article VI of the GATT, th e Code set out further disciplines on the imposition
of antidumping measures, including disciplines on the assessment of antidumping duties. Signatories
twice brought disputes, arguing that zeroing was inconsistent with the Code. Those claims failed.

16. During the Uruguay Round, further disciplines were negotiated, resulting in yet another
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of th e GATT, which we will refer to as the Antidumping
Agreement. While some aspects of the Code we re radically altered, the provisions governing
assessment proceedings – found not to have prohibited zeroing – were not.
16 In fact, the two key
provisions were identical.

17. Article 8:3 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code provides that:

The amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.

18. Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that:

14 Appellate Body Report, paras. 160-161.
15 Appellate Body Report, para. 128.
16 For example, the United States has accepted that there is a colorable argu ment that Article 2.4.2
prohibits zeroing in average-to-average comparisons in investigations, through its use of the phrase "all
comparable export transactions". There was no corresponding provision in the Code.

The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.

19. Yet the Division examined the negotiating history and drew the extraordinary conclusion that
"we are not persuaded that the [Tokyo Round Code] provide[s] guidance as to whether simple zeroing
is permissible under Article 9.3. of the Anti-Dumping Agreement".
17 At least one panel had declined
to find a prohibition in Article 8.3 itself. That provision is directly incorporated into the Antidumping
Agreement as Article 9.3. Even in light of these facts, the Division concluded that Article 9.3 of the
Antidumping Agreement prohibits zeroing in assessment proceedings.
18

20. The Appellate Body Division's report finds that "the relevance of" th e panel reports under the
Code "is diminished by the fact that the" C ode was separate from the GATT 1947 and has been
"terminated". Both of these statement are quite puzz ling when referring to negotiating history. It is
completely unclear what legal significance attaches to the termination of a previous agreement that
served as part of the negotiating history of the An tidumping Agreement. By definition, negotiating
history is just that – it is "history" and so in the past. There is no requirement that negotiating history
only consist of agreements or documents still in forc e at the time an agreement is being interpreted.
And while the Code was separ ate from the GATT 1947, the negotiators of the Antidumping
Agreement relied on and drew from its provisions, so the interpretation of those provisions would be
directly relevant to understanding the Antidumping Agreement. The Marrakesh Agreement reflects
this understanding, noting in Article XVI:1 that the "WTO shall be guided by the decisions,
procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and
the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947". And ironically, later in its report the
Appellate Body Division extols the persuasive value of panel reports.

Article VI of the GATT did not bar zeroing

21. Japan was one of the contracting parties th at challenged zeroing – unsuccessfully – under the
Tokyo Round Code. While Japan challenged zeroing as being inconsistent with Article 2 of the Code,
and, consequentially, with Article 8:3, Japan did not challenge zeroing as be ing inconsistent with

17 Appellate Body report, para. 130.
18 The Division dismissed the relevance of panel reports interpreting the Tokyo Round Code because
those disputes involved Article 2.6 of that Code – the fair comparison provision – which changed in the
Antidumping Agreement. However, the Division failed to take into account that in EEC – Antidumping Duties
on Audiocassettes Originating in Japan, ADP/136 (28 April 1995) (unadopted). Japan did challenge zeroing
under Article 8.3 of the Code and did not prevail. EC – Audiocassettes, para. 11. This renders puzzling Japan's
comment that the negotiators did not include a prohibition on zeroing in Article 9.3 because they already
considered it to be prohibited. Appellate Body Report, para. 130. Even more surprising then is the Division's
reliance on that comment, which is plainly inconsistent with the historical record.
Likewise, it is surprising to the United States that the Division credits the EC's submission for the
proposition that "there is a 'strong indication of consensus that the interests of both parties in the asymmetry and
zeroing debate could be accommodated in the targeted dumping provisions that eventually became the second
sentence of Article 2.4.2". Appellate Body Report, pa ra. 130 (quoting EC Third Participant's Submission,
para. 226). The United States struggles to comprehend how, if the EC considered that the Antidumping
Agreement prohibits zeroing in all but the targeted dumping situation, the EC nevertheless continued to zero
until the EC – Bed Linen dispute, in which the DSB recommendations and rulings were adopted in 2001. EC –
Antidumping Duties on Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, DS141 (adopted 12 March 2001). If the EC were
sincere, then it would appear that the EC is acknowledging that it inte ntionally breached its WTO obligations
from 1995 to 2001.

Article VI:1. The same is true for Brazil in its dispute against the EEC involving Cotton Yarn. 19 The
latter is an adopted panel report and thus forms part of the GATT acquis.20

22. This history confirms that the Uruguay Round negotiators operated from a premise that
zeroing was not prohibited under Article VI of the GATT or Article 8:3 of the Tokyo Round Code.
Japan's view that the negotiators understood zer oing to be prohibited already is impossible to
reconcile with its own unsuccessful pursuit of pre- WTO dispute settlement on that very topic. The
EC did not agree that the text pr ohibited zeroing, as its defense in EC – Audiocassettes confirms.
Article 8:3 was directly incorporated into Article 9. 3 of the Antidumping Agreement. In this context,
there is simply no basis for the Appellate Body's conclusion that Article VI:1 of the GATT or Article
9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement prohibits zeroing in assessment proceedings.

23. In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Division has not based its "prohibition"
of zeroing on language that is differently phrased or new. It has based its prohibition on Article VI of
the GATT and Article 9.3, both of which existed (the latter as Article 8.3) at the time of the Tokyo
Round Code.

24. At best, there was no consensus that zeroing was already prohibited by the text of the
agreements in question. Given that fact, and the fact that Article 8:3 of the Tokyo Round Code is
replicated in Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agre ement, and the presence of Article 17.6(ii) of the
Antidumping Agreement, it is difficult to unders tand the Division's refusal to acknowledge the
relevance of the negotiating history.

25. The implications of the Division's creation of new obligations in the absence of textual
changes is particularly troubling as the Membership strives to conclude the Doha Round. What this
Division is saying to the Membership is that it is insuff icient to remain silent in the text in the face of
a disagreement in the negotiations. Such silence may be construed at some future date by the
Appellate Body as agreement to change the meaning of the text. Thus, if the disagreement cannot be
bridged with affirmative text, the continuing disagr eement should be reflected in text confirming the
lack of consensus - a task that is likely to prove difficult, if not impossible, for the negotiators.

26. If the Division did not rely on the negotiating hist ory, then the natural question is: what did it
rely on? The Division primarily relied upon a three-part analysis:

a) the margin of dumping is exporter related;
b) dumping and margin of dumping can only be found to exist at the level of multiple
transactions; and
c) it is obligatory to include all transactions, dumped and non-dumped, in those multiple
transactions.

B. T
HE APPELLATE BODY'S MISGUIDED EMPHASIS ON EXPORTER MARGINS OF DUMPING
27. The Division spends a significant portion of its report on the question of whether a margin of
dumping is exporter or importe r related. However, it is not clear why this matters or why it must be
exclusively one or the other. The Division itself acknowledges that any dumped price results from a
negotiation involving the exporter and the importer.

19 EEC – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Cotton Yarn from Brazil, ADP/137, 42S/17, adopted
by the ADP Committee 30 October 1995.
20 Further, even after implementation of the Antidumping Agreement, India's challenge to zeroing in
EC – Bed Linen did not involve a claim of inconsistency with Ar ticle VI, nor did Canada's challenge to zeroing
in US – Final Lumber AD Determination, WT/DS264, adopted 31 August 2004 ("Softwood Lumber"), or US –
Final Lumber AD Determination (21.5), WT/DS264, adopted 1 September 2006 ("Softwood Lumber (21.5)").

28. In any event, the question of whether a margin of dumping is exporter related does not resolve
the question of whether it can be determined on the b asis of individual transactions or must always be
determined on the basis of multiple transactions. A margin determined on the basis of an exporter's
action with respect to an individual transaction is no less exporter-related than one determined on the
basis of multiple transactions by that exporter.
21

29. The emphasis on "exporter-related" misses the point. The purpose of collecting antidumping
duties is to counteract dumping. Importers pay the duties. Thus, duties counteract dumping by
dissuading the importer from having any interest in a dumped price. The importer will try to avoid
dumped prices by recognizing that there is an e xport price below which the importer will derive no
benefit if negotiations with the exporter result in an even lower price. The antidumping duty, paid by
the importer, would erase any gain netted by such negotiation because the importer could not
profitably resell the merchandise at a price less than its normal value.

30. More importantly, the Division's conclusion a bout an exporter-wide margin of dumping is at
odds with Article 9.3.2. According to the Appellate Body, the exporter's margin of dumping,
calculated on the basis of all of that exporter's transactions, establishes the ceiling for assessment of
duties. Under Article 9.3.2, the importer may request a refund if that request is "duly supported by
evidence ...". If the amount of the liability is cappe d by the margin of dumping, and the margin of
dumping is calculated on the basis of the exporter's transactions, how can the importer duly support
its request with evidence? The impor ter only knows what that importer's own transactions are. Nor
does the importer necessarily have information about transactions handled by other importers.

31. In fact, the Division's affirmation that margins of dumping must be calculated on an exporter-
wide basis unwittingly authorizes Members with prospective ad valorem systems to decline to provide
full refunds. The importer best positioned to request a refund is an importer who has engaged in non-
dumped transactions. It can support its refund with evidence from its own transactions. But if
another importer has engaged in dumped transacti ons with the same exporter, those transactions will
offset the first importer's refund. Take an example: the margin of dumping for an exporter in the
investigation is 5 per cent. Normal value is 5 per cent higher than the export price. An importer
knows that all of his export prices have risen, some well beyond the 5 per cent differential. That
importer requests a refund. A second importer's export prices have all declined, some well beyond the
5 per cent differential. The result is that the fi rst importer does not get a refund. Moreover, the
second importer cannot provide evidence on which to b ase a request for a refund. He is only owed a

21 In this regard, it is interesting that the Division be gins its analysis with the concept of the exporter-
wide margin of dumping and only then proceeds to the transaction-specific margin of dumping. In its
discussion of whether a margin of dumping is exporter- or importer-specific, the report appears to collapse the
question of whether a dumping margin is exporter- or importer-specific with the question of whether such a
margin comprises multiple transactions. Thus, the report states that there is "nothing in Articles 5.8, 6.10, and
9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to suggest that it is permissible to interpret the term 'margin of dumping'
under those provisions as referring to multiple 'dumping margins' occurring at the level of individual importers".
However, the question the Division sought to address in that section of the report was not the issue of multiple
margins of dumping, but rather whether the margin is calculated for the exporter, rather than the importer.
There are also questions about the Division's interpre tation of the French and Spanish texts. At note
200 of the report, the Division states that the French version of Article 6.10 of the Agreement, "une marge de
dumping individual" translates into "'one' single margin of dumping". In fact, the French text translates into "an
individual margin of dumping". It does not refer to "one" margin or to one "single" margin of dumping. The
report's translation of the Spanish version is no better. The Spanish text – not reproduced in the footnote –
refers to "el margen de dumping que corresponda a cada exportador". This translates as "a margin of dumping
corresponding to each exporter". In any event, there is no reason Article 6.10 would refer to multiple margins.
Article 6.10 imposes an obligation to calculate an individual margin of dumping for each exporter, as opposed to
one margin for all exporters . It has nothing to do with the question of whether one may calculate multiple
margins of dumping for each such exporter.

refund on the basis of the first importer's transactions, evidence the second importer does not have and
cannot supply to the investigating authority to "dul y substantiate" his request. Thus, in requiring a
margin of dumping to be calculated on the b asis of all of the exporter's transactions, the Division has
authorized prospective systems to deny importers full refunds.

C. T
RANSACTION-SPECIFIC MARGIN OF DUMPING
32. The Division then devotes all of two paragraphs to the central question of whether the margin
can be at the transaction-specific level.22

33. As the United States has noted before, and as four panels have found, the calculation of a
transaction-specific margin of dumping for purposes of the assessment of antidumping duties is a
permissible interpretation of the Antidumping Agre ement. That a margin of dumping may be
calculated on a transaction-specific basis leads to the conclusion that authorities are not required to
offset a dumping margin calculated for one tran saction with a negative dumping margin calculated in
a separate transaction.

34. Canada agrees:

An investigating authority assesses anti dumping duties when the export price is
lower than the weighted-average normal value, but applies no anti-dumping
duties to non-dumped transactions when the opposite is true . It is not the same
as the practice of zeroing ... .
23

35. Put differently, a permissible interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement is that a Member
may calculate a margin of dumping on the basis of i ndividual transactions, is not obligated to provide
offsets for one transaction as compared to anothe r, and thus zeroing is not prohibited in such
circumstances. Under Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, if an interpretation is permissible,
a measure based on it must be allowed to stand.

36. If a margin of dumping can be calculated on the basis of an individual transaction, then the
exporter's margin of dumping is the same as the importer's antidumping liability, and the various
provisions of the Antidumping Agreement fit together neatly.
24 Article 6 and its focus on margins of
dumping for exporters – in which the Appellate Body has attempted to find a prohibition on zeroing
for purposes of antidumping duty assessment – melds seamlessly with Article 9 and its emphasis on
duty assessment for importers. It is useful to bear this concept in mind when evaluating the
conclusions of the Division that the Antidumping Ag reement prohibits the calculation of a margin of
dumping on a transaction-specific basis.

37. The Division states that:

[T]he notion that a "product is introduced into the commerce of another country
at less than its normal value" ... suggests to us that the determination of dumping
with respect to an exporter is properly ma de not at the level of individual export
transactions, but on the basis of the totality of an exporter's transactions of the
subject merchandise over the period of investigation.
25

22 Appellate Body Report, paras. 98-99.
23 Quoted in US – Softwood Lumber (21.5) (Panel), para. 5.55 (emphasis added).
24 The Appellate Body report acknowledges this fact, but in a footnote. See Appellate Body Report,
n.219.

38. There are two important aspects of this conc lusion, in particular, that require comment.

1. Lack of Textual Basis for Prohibition
39. What jumps out at the reader is that the Divi sion does not cite to any actual text that directs
the calculation of a margin of dumping at a pa rticular level (transaction-specific or multiple
transactions). Instead, the Division relies on a "notion" that "suggests" a particular result. However, a
"notion" that "suggests" a particular interpretation is not sufficient to conclude that the text of a
covered agreement prohibits particular action. This is especially true in the case of the Antidumping
Agreement, Article 17.6(ii) of which provides:

Where the panel finds that a relevant pr ovision of the Agreement admits of more
than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations.

40. Moreover, a closer examination of the la nguage upon which the Division's report relies does
not support its interpretation of Article VI:1 as pr ecluding the calculation of margins of dumping on a
transaction-specific basis. Article VI:1 provides:

a product is to be considered as bei ng introduced into the commerce of an
importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product
exported from one country to another ... is less than the comparable price ... for
the like product ... .

41. The Division fails to offer a meaningful explanation as to why this sentence precludes the
calculation of a margin of dumping on a transaction-sp ecific basis. Indeed, the ordinary meaning of
the text, read in context, does not support the conclusion that the only interpretation of Article VI:1 is
one involving multiple transactions.
26

42. The Division's reliance on the word "product" is misplaced. "Product" in Article VI is not
confined to meaning all transactions of that product. Such a reading cannot be reconciled with the use
of "product" in Article II:2(b) of the GATT 1994: "Nothing in this Article shall prevent any
contracting party from imposing at any time on the importation of any product:

(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the
provisions of Article VI... .

43. For a duty to be applied "on the importation of any product" it will be applied on a particular
transaction. A duty is not applied only after there have been multiple transactions. Nor would the
Division's reading of "product" work for the other elements of Article II:2.

44. The Panel considered carefully Mexico's ar guments, which relied on one of the lines of
reasoning advanced in prior Appellate Body reports ; namely, the notion that margins of dumping

26 If the Appellate Body were correct that the term "product" refers not to individual importations of the
product, but the "product as a whole", then it stands to reason that the term "product" would always appears in
the singular in the Antidumping Agreemen t. However, the term "product" does appear in the plural. Thus,
Article 2.3 refers to "the price at which the imported product s are first resold ... ". Si milarly, Article 2.5 refers
to "where products are not imported directly ...". Thus, the Appellate Body's view that "product" can only refer
to multiple importations of the product, as opposed to an individual importation, is simply not supported by the
text.

must be calculated on the basis of the "product as a whole". The Panel noted – as had other panels
before it – that the term "product as a whole" does not appear in the GATT 1994 or the Antidumping
Agreement.
27 The Panel also agreed with the following analysis of the US – Zeroing (Japan) panel:

We fail to see why the notion that a "product is introduced into the commerce of
another country" cannot apply to a particular export sale and would necessarily
require an examination of different export sales at an aggregate level.28

45. Thus, the Panel engaged in a careful analysis of the actual words in the relevant provision.
However, in lieu of explaining why the Panel's careful analysis was flawed, the Division simply
dismissed it – "Contrary to what the Panel indicates ..."
29 – without addressing any of the arguments
the Panel made. Indeed, the Appellate Body report offered no textual analysis of the provision.

46. Taken to its logical extreme, the Division's reading of Article VI:1 suggests that there is in
fact only one product, one normal value, and one export price, for all goods exported from the country
in question. Article VI:1 does not even use the term " exporter." There is no textual basis for the
Divisions' conclusion that Article VI:1 "suggests ... that the determination of dumping ... is properly
made ... on the basis of the totality of an exporter's transactions ...".
30

47. Indeed, it would require that no margin coul d be determined until a ll imports had stopped.
The Division appears to overlook this problem with its reference to the "totality of an exporter's
transactions of the subject merchandise over the period of investigation".
31 But that fails to address
the question of the relevant time period. Nothing in the text specifies the time period as being the
period of investigation, nor does the text specify the period to be used after the period of investigation.
The Division was imputing into the text words that are not there.

48. In summary, the Division was unsuccessful in its struggle to identify something in the text of
the GATT 1994 or the Antidumping Agreement that would support that the margin of dumping
cannot be transaction-specific.

2. Erroneous Reliance on Calculations in Other Proceedings
49. The Division also relied on "contextual" referenc es. For instance, it referred to the fact that
"whether an exporter is dumping can only be made on the basis of an examination of the exporter's
pricing behavior as reflected in all of its transactions over a period of time".
32 The Division also
refers to the "purpose" of an antidumping duty, which is to "counteract the injury caused or threatened
to be caused by 'dumped imports' to the domestic industry".33

50. However, to the extent that these arguments ar e relevant at all, they pertain to antidumping
investigations. The "determination of dumping" occurs in an investigation. The "determination of
injury" occurs in an investigation. The US – Stainless Steel appeal did not involve an investigation: it
involved an assessment proceeding.

27 For a more detailed discussion of the flaws in the "product as a whole" rationale, see United States –
Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), Communication by the
United States, 12 June 2006.
28 US – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (Panel), WT/DS322, adopted
29 Appellate Body Report, para. 98.
30 Appellate Body Report, para. 98 (emphasis added).
31 Appellate Body Report, para. 98.
32 Appellate Body Report, para. 98. As noted above, the idea that the text provides guidance as to this
period of time is mistaken.
33 Appellate Body Report, para. 98.

51. Panels, and the Appellate B ody itself, have repeatedly noted that different antidumping
proceedings serve "different purposes".
34 It is not clear why, even if the analysis of multiple
transactions is required in an i nvestigation, such analysis is also required in assessment proceedings,
which serve an entirely different purpose. As th e Appellate Body has stated, "[t]he disciplines
applicable to original investigations cannot, th erefore, be automatically imported into review
processes".35

52. Further, in a footnote, the Division addressed a report issued in 1960 by the Group of Experts,
which, as the name indicates, comprised a group of antidumping experts. According to the Group of
Experts, "the ideal method [for making a dumping determination] was to make a determination in
respect of each single importation of the product concerned".
36 Thus, as far back as 1960,
antidumping experts recognized that margins of dumping would ideally be calculated on the basis of
individual transactions. As a result, it is clear that a permissible interpretation of Article VI of the
GATT 1994 is to determine a margin of dumping on a transaction-specific basis.

53. The Division's basis for rejecting the interpre tation inherent in the Group of Experts statement
was the following: the Group of Experts rec ognized that such a method was impracticable,
particularly with respect to an injury determination
37, and perhaps most remarkably, that the WTO
Agreement entered into force "long after" the Group of Experts Report. In other words, the Division
considered that a report by experts far closer in ti me to the conclusion of the agreement at issue was
"of little relevance" because it was old. 38 This approach would appear to reverse the customary rules
of interpretation of public international law.

54. The Division appears to have misunderstood the relevance of the Group of Experts' statement.
That statement is relevant for purposes of understanding the permissible interpretation of Article VI.

55. The Division has failed to explain why the fact that a particular system is administratively
impracticable leads to the conclusion that Members necess arily agreed to another system with a
completely different concept of a margin of dumping, i.e , one that is numerically different. Members
did no such thing. Instead, they devised an administratively practicable system that allows them to
assess a duty with the same margin of dumping. Thus, investig ations may be conducted on the basis
of multiple transactions, and so may assessment proceedings and reviews.
39 Whether the system
described by the Group of Experts is possible or not , it provides critical insight into how the concept
of a margin of dumping has been viewed under the GATT 1947 and the WTO regime.

34 See, e.g., United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Germany (AB), WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2002, para. 87; United States – Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R, adopted
28 November 2005, para. 170; United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004, para. 359 (" US – OCTG from
Argentina"); United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, para. 106; Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Beef and Rice; Co mplaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 7.144, citing United States – Anti-dumping
Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above From Korea,
36 Appellate Body Report, n. 213.
37 Appellate Body Report, n. 213.
38 Appellate Body Report, para. 132.
39 The United States recalls that the basis for th e prohibition on zeroing in average-to-average
comparisons in investigations came not from the defin ition of dumping but from the language "all comparable
export transactions" in Article 2.4.2. Thus, the existence of multiple tran sactions does not of itself require
offsets.

56. As required by Article 17.6 of the Agreement, the question is whether a transaction-specific
margin of dumping is a permissible interpretation. The Panel report that respected the requirements
of Article 17.6.

57. Finally, the Division further bases its rejecti on of the concept of a transaction-specific margin
of dumping on the fact that it does not believe that such a margin "can be done" for purposes of
Articles 5.8, 6.10, 6.10.2, 9.4, 9.5, 11.2, and 11.3. The United States has not taken the position that a
margin of dumping must always be calculated on a transaction-specific basis, but rather that the
Agreement allows it to be calculated on a transaction-specific basis, and also allows it to be calculated
on the basis of multiple transactions. Thus, in an investigation using an average-to-average
comparison, there will of course be multiple tran sactions, and the overall margin of dumping will
ultimately be calculated on the basis of those transact ions. But the Division has failed to explain how
the text requires
 in every instance that the calculation be made on the basis of multiple transactions,
particularly in light of the negotiating history and practice under the GATT 1947, Tokyo Round Code,
and the WTO.

58. It is clear, therefore, that the text does not support the Division's view that Article VI prohibits
calculating a margin of dumping on a transaction-specific basis, and that its analysis is too summary,
conclusive, and dismissive of the contrary evid ence. In this light, it was unnecessary and largely
irrelevant for the Division to engage in the analysis under its third part of its analysis: whether it is
permissible when using multiple transactions to disregard the amount by which the export price
exceeds the normal value is unnecessary. Given that the text does not prohibit the calculation of
margins of dumping on a transaction-specific basis, there is no need to examine whether the text
expressly authorizes "disregarding" certain transactions.

D. P
ROSPECTIVE NORMAL VALUE SYSTEMS
59. Panels have repeatedly relie d on the existence of prospective normal value systems to confirm
that a margin of dumping may be calculated on a tran saction-specific basis. The first panel to do so
was in the Softwood Lumber (21.5) , where Canada – a Member with a prospective normal value
system – was the complaining party. In that dispute, Canada itself recognized that prospective normal
value systems operate on the basis of a transaction-specific margin of dumping, as noted in the
quotation from Canada in Section C above.

60. Each panel, including this Panel, that has found zeroing to be permissible on the basis of a
transaction-specific margin of dumping has explaine d that prospective normal value systems confirm
the calculation of margins of dumping on such a basis.

61. The Division errs in stating that "if the prospective normal value has been improperly
determined, a review can be requested ...".
40 The Division presumes that in PNV systems, a "proper"
PNV can be determined such that a retrospect ive review of all export transactions will be
unnecessary. This is despite the fact that the Division is imposing an obligation for imports priced
above the PNV to offset imports priced below the PNV. Under the Division's own view of zeroing,
whether the "proper" PNV has been determined or not, any transactions above even the "proper" PNV
would have to be offset against those below the "p roper" PNV in a review under Article 9.3.2. Thus,
the Division's arguments about zeroing are inconsistent with its arguments about PNV systems.
Moreover, this would simply transform a PNV system into a retrospective system.

62. In addition, the key elem ent of a prospective normal value system is that it uses a prospective
normal value, not a contemporaneous normal value. It informs the importer of the prospective normal

40 Appellate Body report, para. 121 (emphasis added).

value so that the importer has a basis for knowing whether the export price will suffice to eliminate
dumping. However, the Division's views on PNV systems undo that certainty by suggesting that the
prospective normal value is subject to retrospective recalculation.

63. There is a flaw even with this aspect of th e Division's analysis. Article 9.3.2 conditions a
request for a refund on a request by the importer, duly substantiated with evidence. Assuming such a
thing as a "proper" normal value exists, the importe r does not know what it is. The normal value is
established in the country of export. It would have been illogical for the Agreement to authorize an
importer to request a refund without any basis for know ing whether he is in fact entitled to any such
refund to begin with and to require him to do so on the basis of evidence that is not in his possession.

E. C
ONCLUSION
64. Like the panels before it, th e Panel in this dispute provided a very careful, text-based analysis
of whether zeroing is permitted in assessment procee dings. The Division should at a minimum have
conceded that there is more than one permissi ble interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement.
However, the Division instead:

• asserts that the text of Article VI prohibits zer oing, but without providing any textual analysis
of that provision;

• fails to recognize that, before the Division decided that zeroing was prohibited on the basis of
Article VI, five zeroing disputes had been brought and decided, under both the Tokyo Round
Code and the Antidumping Agreement, without a single Article VI claim;

• fails to recognize that zeroing had not been found inconsistent in assessment proceedings
under the Tokyo Round Code, despite Japan's claim to the contrary;

• fails to recognize that the key Tokyo Round Code provision at issue in that dispute was
incorporated wholesale into the Antidumping Agreement; and

• despite all these facts, concludes the negotiatin g history is of "little relevance" to the
questions in this dispute.

65. The Division's casual dismissal of the negotiating history and imputing into the agreed text
obligations that do not appear there should give ev ery Member pause, particularly at a time when
Members are negotiating a new set of rights and obligations and are, naturally, basing those
negotiations on the rights and obligations they know to be in existence today and relying on the fact
that they are only taking on those obligations that appear in the text they negotiate.

ANNEX E-3

COMMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON THE
UNITED STATES' COMMENTS ON THE APPELLATE BODY
REPORT

1. The European Communities hesitates to ma ke any comment at all on the United States'
comments on the Appellate Body Report in DS344. The legal arguments have been re-iterated so
many times; and the matter is so clearly decided, that one wonders about the usefulness of continuing
the exchange. Not least because the United States ' submissions are increasingly bereft of legal
argument, preferring in instead the endless repetition of: misrepresentations of the arguments; other
statements that are little more than slogans; and irre levant non-legal assertions. It appears to the EC
that the United States is just playing for time, under pressure from protectionist internal
constituencies, which is a matter of regret, and hardly consistent with the United States' DSU
obligations. However, in order to try to assist th e Panel to the greatest extent possible, here, once
again, are the pertinent points, as they emerge from the latest US submission.

2. First, the United States often repeats – as if it were a slogan – that reports cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations of Members. Two can play at that game. The
European Communities has explained that, in the view of the EC, the US position diminishes the
obligations of the US and the rights of the other WTO Members on the question of zeroing. Bandying
this slogan backwards and forwards does little to address, in legal terms, the legal claims that have
been made against the measures at issue, which legal claims and arguments the US continues to
simply ignore. Rhetoric such as this is no s ubstitute for proper legal ar gument – although one might,
from a litigator's perspective, have some sympathy with the US, since it is clear that, in legal terms,
the US has nothing left to say, which is why it resorts to this style of submission.

3. More specifically, the US simply ignores the other half of the equation: reports clarify the
existing provisions of the covered agreements in acco rdance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law . And Appellate Body reports deal specifically with "issues of law" and
"legal interpretations".
1 It is, of course, a basic feature of any law expressed in abstract terms, and
subjected to binding judicial review, that its mean ing will have to be clarified or interpreted in
subsequent litigation. That is the whole point of having a system of litigation, and specifically one
whose results are binding and should be unconditionally accepted. Together, these two statements
encapsulate a basic truth and feature about the law: we must have interpretation; we do not want
judicial legislation. To repeatedly cite one half of this equation is, of course, to say precisely nothing
in legal terms – and would not pass muster in a fi rst year law school paper – never mind a court of
international law.

4. In this respect, fundamentally, the US goes against one of the backbone principles of the
dispute settlement system, which is to provide "secu rity and predictability". What can bring more
security and predictability to the system than four Appellate Body reports co nsistently ruling against
zeroing? The US assertion that taking the Appellate Body's logic to the extreme would mean that the
Appellate Body would never change its mind because this would detract from "security and
predictability" is simply rhetoric. Indeed, the Appellate Body has articulated the possibility for
adjudicatory bodies to change previous legal interpretations in light of cogent reasons. Needless to
say, repeated attempts by the US to bring the same legal arguments do not amount to cogent reasons.

1 DSU, Article 17(6).

5. Second, the EC has noted the documents circul ated by the US to the DSB in relation to the
Appellate Body Report, as in past zeroing cases. The EC is not at all impressed by these documents.
The EC notes that Article 17(14) of the DSU, final sentence, states that the adoption procedure is
without prejudice to the rights of Members to 'expr ess their views' on an Appellate Body Report.
Naturally, one would not wish to preclude Member s from doing that in general terms. However,
the EC is of the view that it is hardly appropriate, pursuant to this provision, for a Member to circulate
a lengthy document that contains what is in rea lity a legal submission containing a re-hash of the
submissions previously made to the panel and the A ppellate Body. The EC takes the view that such
documents serve no useful purpose, and are hardly consistent with a Member's obligation to
unconditionally accept the report. It appears to the EC that the US appears to believe that by
"shouting" in procedural terms it might get its way. However, in the view of the EC, this kind of
activity – which amounts to little more than propagand a – has precisely the opposite effect: it simply
confirms that the US has no further legal arguments on which to rely.

6. Third, we note that the US repeatedly refers to the Appellate Body "division". It is not clear
what the US intent is here, but we have three comme nts. First, we note that the Appellate Body has
decided several cases on zeroing, in which the thr ee persons serving on the case, within the meaning
of Article 17(1) of the DSU, have been differe nt. Thus, these several reports do not represent the
views of one "division" – they represent the views of many individuals – and of the Appellate Body as
a whole. Second, and following on from the precedi ng point, Appellate Body reports are attributable
to the Appellate Body itself, and not a particular "d ivision" of the Appellate Body. In fact, according
to Rule 4 of the Appellate Body Working Pro cedures on collegiality, all Appellate Body Members
convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of po licy, practice and procedure and exchange views
before a division finalises a report. Third, the repo rts are in any event adopted by the DSB – that is,
the whole WTO Membership. Thus, the US' repeated references to the "division" simply serve no
useful purpose, and may and should be disregarded.

7. Fourth, on the question of "permissible interp retation" – another US slogan. The Appellate
Body has rightly clarified that this is a tie-breaker that operates after the application of the agreed
rules of interpretation of public international law. Nor could it be otherwise. As any lawyer would
confirm, it is possible to argue anything, however absurd or counter-factual it might be (as the US
submissions in the zeroing cases bear witness). Just because something is "possible or permissible" in
this sense does not make it consistent with the agreed rules of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention. The US view of this provision amounts to saying that the disciplines in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement might as well not be there at all – since, according to the US, it can interpret
them as it wishes. The WTO Members would not have gone to the trouble of negotiating bound tariff
rates and a set of complex agreements, if an importing Member could, in effect unilaterally, impose
additional anti-dumping duties at will, based on the US proposition that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
is a "hotch-potch of obscurity", and thus means all things to all persons. The Anti-Dumping
Agreement is not a religious tract. It is an international agreement that exhaustively regulates in
considerable detail the limited circumstances in whic h an anti-dumping duty ca n be applied, over and
above the bound tariff rate. Furthermore, the concept of "permissible interpretation" has nothing to do
with the US Chevron doctrine, which regulates the relationshi p between the legislature, executive and
judiciary within the US – a problem that has nothing to do with centralised and binding dispute
settlement in a multilateral organisation of 152 Members.

8. Fifth, the US repeatedly refers to the term "text" – another US slogan – as if to suggest that
the EC is not relying on the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In fact, the US appears to use this
term to refer either to the text containing the sp ecific obligation in question, or to the ordinary
meaning of that text – in both instances the usage is erroneous. The term "text" appears once in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and clearly refers at least to the entire
Anti-Dumping Agreement,
thus necessarily encompassing also the context and th e object and purpose. It is thus the EC that

bases its case on the text – all the text – of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement; and the US that seeks to ignore the text of those agreements.

9. Sixth, as the EC has explained at length, this case has nothing to do with "offsets" (it is no
defence to alter the claim, and then argue that th ere is no "text" prohibiting offsets). Nor does the
term "zeroing" fully capture the essence of the pr oblem, which is the selection of the relatively low-
priced export transactions as the only or preponderant basis of the calculation, without any relevant
targeting dumping pattern being identified. The US thus continues to simply refuse to respond to the
actual legal claims made against it.

10. Seventh, the US complains that the Appellate Body does not respect the will of the legislator.
But it is of course the US that flatly ignores the significance of the targeted dumping provisions,
within the context of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a whole.
Even when the truth of the matter is apparent from the implied admission in the US' own municipal
law (the SAA). And even when the US is incapa ble of rebutting the EC submissions regarding the
correct interpretation of the phrase "the existenc e of margins of dumping during the investigation
phase". Thus, it is the US, not the Appellate Body, which demonstrates an absence of any respect for
the will of the legislator.

11. Eighth, how it is that the US continues to make the bare assertion that its position is supported
by the negotiating history can only continue to astonish. The EC has explained precisely why the
opposite is the case; and the US has simply not responded.

12. Ninth, the US assertion that the Appellate Body has changed its analysis in different cases is
wholly without merit. What the Appellate Body has done is to limit itself in any given case to
interpreting the legal provisions that need to be in terpreted in order to resolve the specific dispute
before it. One does not have to decide everything be fore one can decide anything. In the context of
zeroing, there are different ways of expressing the same basic point, according the specific measure at
issue and the specific claims and arguments that have been made. Thus, what the Appellate has
demonstrated is a highly intelligent exercise of great judicial restraint. For the United States to
present this as "inconsistency" and, in the same breath, accuse the Appellate Body of judicially
legislating is ironic in the extreme.

13. In short, the US comments are, once again, the world turned on its head – this really is Alice
Through the Looking Glass stuff. So much so th at the US position hardly represents one articulated
within the context of a rules-based approach; it is just a veneer beneath which a thinly veiled power-
oriented expression of will is readily apparent. The EC expects it to be dealt with accordingly.

ANNEX E-4

COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE COMMENTS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT

TABLE OF REPORTS

Short Form Full Citation
US – Softwood Lumber
Dumping (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted
31 August 2004
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/R, adopted 20 May 2008, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS344/AB/R
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/R, adopted
20 May 2008

1. The United States thanks the Panel for this opportunity to provide these comments on the
comments of the European Communities ("EC ") on the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless
Steel (Mexico).

2. The EC asks the Panel, when making its "objective assessment" under Article 11 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), to "adopt the
same approach" as the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) . The EC drew "the
Panel's particular attention to the statement that 'absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will
resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case' (para. 160)".

3. In this regard, the United States recalls the finding of the panel in US – Stainless
Steel (Mexico): "We are cognizant of the fact that in two previous cases, US – Zeroing (EC) and US –
Zeroing (Japan), the decisions of panels that found simple zeroing in periodic reviews to be WTO-
consistent were reversed by the Appellate Body and that our reasoning set out below is very similar to
these panel decisions. In light of our obligation un der Article 11 of the DSU to carry out an objective
examination of the matter referred to us by the DS B, however, we have felt compelled to depart from
the Appellate Body's approach fo r the reasons explained below."
1 The United States appreciates that
the EC's approach would have the Panel here resolv e the legal question of zeroing in the same way as
the equivalent adjudicatory body – the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) – and depart from the
Appellate Body's approach.

4. As the Appellate Body itself has noted, and as the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
recognized, prior Appellate Body reports "are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties to that dispute".
2 To the extent that the reasoning in prior
Appellate Body reports is persuasive, those repor ts may be taken into account, but they have no stare
decisis effect under the DSU. Indeed, to find otherwi se would conflict with Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, under which only the Ministerial Conference and General Council may issue authoritative
interpretations under the covered agreements. The A ppellate Body cannot create such an authority in
itself.

5. The EC warns the Panel that if it were not to follow the Appellate Body, "its findings would
inevitably be reversed on appeal". However, the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) was also
"cognizant of the fact that in two previous cases, US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) , the
decisions of panels that found simple zeroing in periodic reviews to be WTO-consistent were reversed
by the Appellate Body and that our reasoning set out below is very similar to these panel decisions",
yet decided that its responsibility under DSU Article 11 to conduct an objective assessment meant that
it needed to depart from the Appellate Body's prio r reasoning. This Panel should also, in the EC's
words, "in making an 'objective assessment of th e matter before it' under Article 11 of the DSU …
adopt the same approach".
3

6. The EC also believes that "the Appellate Body has once again confirmed that the correct
interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement precludes the zeroing methodology used by the
United States in the measures at issue". As the Un ited States has demonstrated in its comments to the
Panel, the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is deeply flawed.
4 Its findings lack

1 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)(Panel), para. 7.106.
2 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) , para. 111 (quoting Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB) ); see also
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Panel), para. 7.102.
3 It also is presumptuous of the EC to assert with such certainty that the Panel would be reversed.
The EC is not the Appellate Body, and does not know what a different division of the Appellate Body would do
on appeal.
4 Comments of the United States on the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(WT/DS344), paras. 11-18 & Annex 2.

a basis in the text of the Antidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 and contradict the negotiating
history of the Antidumping Agreement. To the ex tent the Panel takes into account the Appellate
Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , we believe that for the reasons specified in our
comments, this Panel will find that report unpers uasive, as previous panels have found the prior
Appellate Body reports unpersuasive.

7. For all the reasons provided by the United St ates in its comments on the Appellate Body
report and these comments on the EC's comments, the United States respectfully requests the Panel to
find that the Appellate Body report is unpersuasive and, in conducting an objective assessment of the
matter before it, the Panel should depart from the Appellate Body's approach.