UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION, MARKETING AND SALE OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 15 September 2011
Document codes: WT/DS381/R
Complainant: Mexico
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, EU, Guatemala, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. I:1, III:4  GATT 1994Art. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING
THE IMPORTATION, MARKETING AND SALE
OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS

Report of the Panel

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 24 October 2008, Mexico requested consultations with the United States pursuant to
Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and Article 14 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agre ement), in relation to certain measures taken by
the United States concerning the importation, marketi ng and sale of tuna and tuna products. Mexico
held consultations with the United States on 17 D ecember 2008. Unfortunately, these consultations
failed to resolve the dispute.
1.2 On 9 March 2009, Mexico requested the establishm ent of a panel pursuant to Articles 4 and 6
of the DSU, Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 14 of the TBT Agreement.
1.3 At its meeting on 20 April 2009, the DSB estab lished a panel pursuant to the request of
Mexico in document , in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.
1.4 The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Mexico in document
 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."
1.5 On 2 December 2009, Mexico requested the Director-General to determine the composition
of the panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU.
1.6 On 14 December 2009, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
 Chairman: Mr Mario Matus

 Members: Mr Franz Perrez
 Mr Sivakant Tiwari

1.7 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ch ina, Ecuador, the European Communities
1,
Guatemala, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela reserved
their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.8 Following the death of Mr Sivakant Tiwari on 26 July 2010, the parties agreed on a new
member of the Panel on 12 August 2010. Accordingly, the panel composition is now as follows:
 Chairman: Mr Mario Matus

 Members: Ms Elisabeth Chelliah
 Mr Franz Perrez

1 The European Communities reserved its third-party rights at the DSB meeting on 20 April 2009. On
1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community (done at Lisbon, 13 December 2007) entered into fo rce. On 29 November 2009, the
WTO received a Verbal Note (WT/L/77 9) from the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the
European Communities stating that, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisb on, as of 1 December 2009, the
European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community.

1.9 The Panel held its first substantive meeting with the parties on 18, 19 and 20 October 2010.
The session with the third parties was held on 19 and 20 October 2010. The second substantive
meeting was held on 16 and 17 December 2010.
1.10 On 2 February 2011, the Panel issued the descrip tive part of its Panel Report to the parties.
The Panel issued its interim report to the parties on 5 May 2011. The Panel is sued its final report to
the parties on 8 July 2011.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
A. T
HE MEASURES AT ISSUE
2.1 In its request for the establishment of a pane l, Mexico identified the following measures
adopted by the United States concerning the importa tion, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna
products:
(a) United States Code , Title 16, Section 1385 ("Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act");
(b) Code of Federal Regulations , Title 50, Section 216.91 ("Dolphin-safe labeling
standards") and Section 216.92 ("Dolphin-safe requirements for tuna harvested in the
ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] by large purse seine vessels");
(c) The ruling in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007).
2.2 This Section describes the main elements of these measures as the Panel understands them, in
light of the explanations provided by the parties in their submissions and in response to questions by
the Panel. It also briefly describes the "dolphi n-safe" scheme established under the Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP).
B. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DPCIA PROVISIONS
2.3 The Dolphin Protection Consumer Informati on Act (DPCIA) is codified in Title 16,
Section 1385 of the United States Code (USC). Regulations promulgated in accordance with the
DPCIA are codified in Title 50, Section 216 of the Federal Regulations. The core of the
US "dolphin-safe" labelling scheme is contained in subsection 1385(d)(1)-(3) of the DPCIA.
Paragraph (d) of Section 1385 of the DPCIA provisions regulates the use of the term "dolphin-safe"
when it appears on tuna products.2 This provision establishes, in relevant part, the following:
"(1) It is a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(15 USC 45) for any producer, importer, expor ter, distributor, or seller of any tuna
product that is exported from or offered for sale in the United States to include on the
label of that product the term "dolphin-safe" or any other term or symbol that falsely
claims or suggests that the tuna contai ned in the product were harvested using a
method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins if the product contains tuna
harvested--

2 Paragraphs (e) through (h) of Section 1835 refe r, respectively, to the enforcement of the DPCIA
provisions (para. (e)), the issuance of regulations to implement the provisions contained in Section 1835
(para. (f)), the preparation of a study by the Secretary of Commerce on the effect of the fishing technique known
as setting on dolphins (intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets) (para. (g)),
and the certification requirements for tuna products containing tuna caught in the ETP using a vessel with
363 metric tons or more carrying capacity (para. (h)).

(A) on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing;
(B) outside the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a vessel using purse seine nets--
(i) in a fishery in which the Secretar y has determined that a regular and
significant association occurs between dolphins and tuna (similar to the
association between dolphins and tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean),
unless such product is accompanied by a written statement, executed by the
captain of the vessel and an observer participating in a national or
international program acceptable to the Secretary, certifying that no purse
seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during
the particular voyage on which the tu na were caught and no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in the sets in which the tuna were caught; or
(ii) in any other fishery (other than a fishery described in
subparagraph (D)) unless the product is accompanied by a written statement
executed by the captain of the vessel ce rtifying that no purse seine net was
intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the particular
voyage on which the tuna was harvested;
(C) in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a vessel using a purse seine net unless
the tuna meet the requirements for being considered dolphin-safe under
paragraph (2);
or
(D) by a vessel in a fishery other than one described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C) that is identified by the Secretary as having a regular and significant mortality or
serious injury of dolphins, unless such product is accompanied by a written statement
executed by the captain of the vessel and an observer participating in a national or
international program acceptable to the Secretary that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which the tuna were caught,
provided that the Secretary determines that such an observer statement is necessary."
3
2.4 In turn, paragraph (h) of the DPCIA provisions establishes:
"(h) Certification by captain and observer
(1) Unless otherwise required by paragraph (2), the certification by the captain
under subsection (d)(2)(B)(i) of this sec tion and the certification provided by the
observer as specified in subsection (d)(2)(B)( ii) of this section shall be that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were
caught.
(2) The certification by the captain under subsection (d)(2)(B)(i) of this
section and the certification provided by the observer as specified under
subsection (d)(2)(B)(ii) of this section shall be that no tuna were caught on the trip in
which such tuna were harvested using a pur se seine net intentionally deployed on or
to encircle dolphins, and that no dolphins we re killed or seriously injured during the
sets in which the tuna were caught, if the tuna were caught on a trip commencing—

3 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5, para. (d)(1)(A)-(D).

(A) before the effective date of the initial finding by the Secretary under
subsection (g)(1) of this section;
(B) after the effective date of such initial finding and before the effective date of
the finding of the Secretary under subsecti on (g)(2) of this section, where the initial
finding is that the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins is having a
significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock; or
(C) after the effective date of the finding under subsection (g)(2) of this section,
where such finding is that the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins
is having a significant adverse impact on any such depleted stock."
4
2.5 The DPCIA provisions apply to tuna products. Paragraph (c) of Section 1385 defines the
term "tuna product" as "a food item which contains tuna and which has been processed for retail sale,
except perishable sandwiches, salads, or other products with a shelf life of less than 3 days".5
2.6 Subparagraph (d)(1) of Section 1385 of the DPCIA prohibits that tuna products carry the term
"dolphin-safe" or "or any other term or symbol that falsely claims or suggests that the tuna contained
in the product were harvested using a method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins", unless certain
conditions establish by the DPCI A provisions themselves are met.
6 The conditions that must be
fulfilled by tuna products in order to use the term "dolphin-safe" or make any analogous claims vary
depending on the manner in which the tuna contained in those products was caught.7
2.7 The DPCIA provisions refer to four criteria to establish five basic categories of circumstances
in which tuna may be caught. 8 These criteria are: location ( inside or outside the eastern tropical
Pacific Ocean or ETP); fishing gear ( with or without the use of purse seine nets); type of interaction
between tuna and dolphins schools ( there is or there is no regular or significant association between
tuna and dolphins schools) and the level of dolphin mortalities or injuries ( there is or there is no
regular and significant mortality or serious injury). The five categories that result from the combined
application of these criteria are described in subpara graphs (A) to (D) of subsection 1385(d)(1) of the
DPCIA provisions.
2.8 These subparagraphs refer to tuna caught:
A) On the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing;
B) Outside the ETP by a vessel using purse seine nets:
(i) in a fishery in which the US Secr etary of Commerce has determined that
there is a regular and significant tuna-dolphin association similar to the association
between dolphins and tuna in the ETP;
(ii) in any other fishery (other than a fishery described in subparagraph (D)).
C) In the ETP by a vessel using purse seine nets; and

4 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.
5 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.
6 This prohibition is reproduced in Section 216.91(a) of the Federal Code of Regulations.
7 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.
8 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.

D) In a fishery other than the ones describ ed in the previous categories that is
identified by the US Secretary of Commerce as having a regular and significant
mortality or serious injury of dolphins."
9
C. CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF THE TERM "DOLPHIN-SAFE" OR ANALOGOUS TERMS
2.9 Subsections 1385(d)(1)(2) and (h) of the DPCIA establish specific conditions for the use of
the term "dolphin-safe" or any analogous claims for each one of the categories described in
subparagraphs (B) through (D) of subsection 1385(d)(1) on tuna pr oducts. Tuna products containing
tuna caught under the scenario described in subpara graph (A) of subsection 1385(d)(1), i.e. tuna
caught on the high seas using driftnet fishing, may under no circumstances be labelled as
"dolphin-safe" or display any analogous claims . The documentary evidence required under the
DPCIA for the categories (B) through (D) is described below.
2.10 With respect to tuna products containing tuna caught outside the ETP by a vessel using purse
seine nets in a fishery in which the US Secretar y of Commerce has determined that a regular and
significant dolphin-tuna association exists (subparagra ph (B)(i)), the use of the term "dolphin-safe" or
any analogous term is conditional upon a written statement executed by the captain of the vessel and
an observer participating in a national or intern ational program acceptable to the Secretary of
Commerce, certifying that no purse seine net was in tentionally deployed on or used to encircle
dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna were caught and no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured in the sets in which the tuna were caught.
2.11 For tuna caught outside the ETP by a vessel using purse seine nets in any fishery, other than a
fishery described in subparagraph (D) of s ubsection 1385(d)(1) of the DPCIA provisions,
(subparagraph (B)(ii)), a written statement executed by the captain of the vessel is required, certifying
that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the
particular voyage on which the tuna was harvested.
2.12 For tuna harvested in the ETP by a vessel using purse seine nets (subparagraph (C)), the
conditions are:
 written statements executed by the captain and an observer approved by the International
Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) certifying that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were caught; and, if there is a previous
determination by the Secretary of Commerc e that the fishing technique of setting on
dolphins is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the ETP,
these statements must also certify that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or
used to encircle dolphins;

 a written statement executed by either the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary's
designee, or a representative of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),
or an authorized representative of a partic ipating nation whose national program meets
the requirements of the International Dolphi n Conservation Program (IDCP) stating that
there was an observer approved by the IDCP on board the vessel during the entire trip and
that such observer provided the corresponding certification;

 the written endorsement by each exporter, importer, and processor of the tuna; and

9 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.

 the above mentioned written statements a nd endorsements comply with regulations
promulgated by the Secretary which provide for the verification of tuna products as
dolphin-safe.

Vessels smaller than 363 metric tons carrying capac ity fishing in the ETP using purse seine nets are
not subjected to these requirements.
 10 Therefore, tuna caught in the ETP by this type of vessels may
be labelled "dolphin-safe" without the need to submit any documentary evidence.

2.13 Finally, for tuna caught in a fishery other than those described in
subsection 1385(d)(1)(A)-(C) that is identified by the US Secretary of Commerce as having a regular
and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins (subparagraph (D)), the use of the term
"dolphin-safe" or any analogous terms is subject to a written statement executed by the captain of the
vessel and an observer participating in a national or international program acceptable to the Secretary
of Commerce that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in
which the tuna were caught, provided that the Se cretary of Commerce determines that such an
observer statement is necessary.
2.14 In response to a question by the Panel, the United States provided the table below
11, outlining
the specific requirements for access to a "dolphin-safe" label, distinguishing between tuna caught
inside and outside the ETP and between different fishing methods.
12

10 United States' first written submission, para. 16. Indeed, Section 216.24(a)(2)(i) of Title 50 of the
US Code of Federal Regulations establishes:
(2)(1) It is unlawful for any person using a U.S. purse seine fishing vessel of 400 short tons (st)
(362.8 metric tons (mt) carrying capacity or less to intentionally deploy a net on or to encircle dolphins, or to
carry more than two speedboats, if any part of its fishing trip is in the ETP.
11 Exhibit US-59.
12 Question 9 from the Panel.

US Dolphin Safe Labelling Conditions

This table assumes the vessel is not on the high seas engaged in dr iftnet fishing for tuna. Tuna products containing tuna harv ested in this manner cannot be
labelled dolphin-safe under any circumstance.
i In addition to the other requirements reflected in this table, a condition for carrying an alternative dolphin-safe
label applicable to all tuna product, regardless of location or fishery/vessel type, is that no dolphins were killed or serious ly injured in the sets or other gear
deployments in which the tuna were caught.ii

Location Fishery/Vessel
type
Tuna-Dolphin (T-D)
association/Harm to
dolphins
Dolphin Safe Labeling Condition Authority
Inside the ETP Large iii purse seine [ETP has a T-D association] Written statements executed by the captain and observer providing the
certification [required under § 1385 (h)], and endorsed in writing by the
exporter, importer, and processor of the product, that
 – no tuna were caught on the trip in which such tuna were harvested
using a purse seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle
dolphins, and that
 – no dolphins were killed or serious ly injured during the sets in which
the tuna were caught
Written statement by Secretary or designee/IATTC representative/ authorized
representative of nation whose nation program meets the requirements of the
International Dolphin Conservation Program that
 – an IDCP ‐approved observer was on board the vessel during the
entire trip and provided the certification required under § 1385 (h)
above
§ 1385 (d)(1)(C);
§ 1385 (d)(2)(B);
§ 1385 (h)(2)(A)
Small purse seineiv [ETP has a T-D association] None § 1385 (d)(1)(C);
§ 1385 (d)(2)(A)
Non purse seine Regular and significant
mortality or serious injury to
dolphins
Written statement executed by the captain of the vessel and an observer
participating in a national or international program acceptable to the Secretary
that
 – no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear
deployments in which the tuna were caught, provided that the
Secretary determines that such an observer statement is necessary
§ 1385 (d)(1)(D)
No regular and significant
mortality or serious injury to
dolphins
None

Location Fishery/Vessel
type
Tuna-Dolphin (T-D)
association/Harm to
dolphins
Dolphin Safe Labelling Condition Authority
Outside the ETP Purse seine Regular and significant T‐D
association similar to
association in the ETP
Written statement executed by the captain of the vessel and an observer
participating in a national or international program acceptable to the
Secretary, certifying that
 – no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle
dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna were caught
and
 – no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets in which the
tuna were caught
§ 1385 (d)(1)(B)(i)
No regular and significant
T‐D association
Written statement executed by the captain of the vessel certifying that
 – no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle
dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna was
harvested
§ 1385 (d)(1)(B)(ii)
Non purse seine Regular and significant
mortality or serious injury to
dolphins
Written statement executed by the captain of the vessel and an observer
participating in a national or international program acceptable to the Secretary
(provided that the Secretary determines that such an observer statement is
necessary) that
 – no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear
deployments in which the tuna were caught
§ 1385 (d)(1)(D)

No regular and significant
mortality or serious injury to
dolphins
None
 i § 1385 (d)(1)(A).
 ii § 1385 (d)(3)(C)(i).
 iii Vessel greater than 400 short tons (362.8 metric tons) carrying capacity. US Code of Federal Regulations §216.91(a)(1).
 iv These vessels are 400 short tons (362.8 metric tons) or less carrying capacity and are not permitted to set on dolphins to catch tuna. AIDCP, Annex VIII, Exhibit Mex‐11;
50 CFR 216.24(a)(2)(i), Exhibit US‐23B; see also United States' first written submission, para. 16, fn.10.

D. THE CERTIFICATION REQUIRED FOR TUNA CAUGHT IN THE ETP
2.15 As described above, subparagraph (h)(1) of the DPCIA provisions establishes that, unless
otherwise required by paragraph (2), tuna harvested in the ETP by a vessel using purse seine nets may
be labelled "dolphin-safe" if the captain of th e vessel and an approved observer certify that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were caught.
2.16 However, subparagraph (h)(2) establishes that tuna harvested in the ETP by a large vessel
using purse seine nets may be labelled "dolphin-safe" if the captain of the vessel and an approved
observer certify that (i) no purse-seine net were intent ionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins
during the trip in which the tuna was caught, and (ii) no dolphins were killed or seriously injured
during the sets in which the tuna were caught. Subparagraph (h)(2) of the DPCIA provisions
conditions the applicability of subparagraph (h)(1) to the existence of a finding by the US Secretary of
Commerce that the intentional deployment on or enci rclement of dolphins with purse seine nets is not
having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the ETP. Subparagraph (g)
required the Secretary of Commerce to conduct this task in two stages resulting in an initial and a
final finding on the impact of setting on dolphins in the ETP.
13
2.17 On 7 May 1999, the Secretary of Commerce published its initial finding pursuant to the
DPCIA provisions. This initial finding concluded th at "there [was] insufficient information to
conclude that there has been a significant adverse impact on the depleted [dolphin] stocks" in the ETP
and that "there [was] no solid evidence in any of the scientific studies to date that links the apparent
failure of dolphin stocks to recover at the rate exp ected based on historical data to the current tuna
purse seine fishery practices".14
2.18 On 31 December 2002, the Secretary of Commerce ma de its final finding that "the intentional
deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets [was] not having a significant
adverse effect on any depleted dolphin stock in the ETP". 15 As a result of this finding,
subparagraph (h)(1) of the DPCIA provisions becam e momentarily applicable, having the effect of
limiting the certification required for tuna caught in the ETP with large vessels using purse seine nets,
to the corroboration that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna
were caught, cancelling the requirement contained in subparagraph (h)(2) that the certification of tuna

13 Paragraph (g) of the DPCIA provisions establish the characteristics of these findings as follows:
(1) Between March 1, 1999, and March 31, 1999, the Secretary shall, on the basis of the research
conducted before March 1, 1999, under section 1414a (a) of this title, information obtained under the
International Dolphin Conservation Program, and any ot her relevant information, make an initial finding
regarding whether the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets is having a
significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The initial
finding shall be published immediately in the Federal Register and shall become effective upon a subsequent
date determined by the Secretary.
(2) Between July 1, 2001, and December 31, 2002, th e Secretary shall, on the basis of the completed
study conducted under section 1414a (a) of this title, information obtained under the International Dolphin
Conservation Program, and any other relevant information, make a finding regarding whether the intentional
deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse impact on any
depleted dolphin stock in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The finding shall be published immediately in the
Federal Register and shall become effective upon a subsequent date determined by the Secretary.
14 US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Taking of
Marine Mammals Incidental to Comm ercial Fishing Operations; Tuna Pu rse Seine Vessels in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), Initial Finding", Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 88, May 7, 1999,
Exhibit MEX-26.
15 Exhibit MEX-29, p. 4.

caught in the ETP by a large purse seine vessel in clude a statement that no purse seine net was
intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins.
16
2.19 However, as a result of legal action by Earth Island Institute, a non-governmental
organization, alleging that the Secretary of Co mmerce had abused its powers in reaching the
conclusions reflected in the final findings, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated these
findings on 9 August 2004, declaring them "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion and contrary
to law". 17 The consequence of this judicial decision, in the view of the United States, is that "the
findings necessary for the subsection 1385(h)(1) certifi cation to apply do not ex ist, and therefore the
applicable certification for tuna caught using purse seine nets in the ETP remains the one set out in
subsection 1385(h)(2)" of the DPCIA provisions, in cluding the requirement that no purse seine net
was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins. 18 Mexico explained that "the U.S. law
does not permit revision of the DOC's justification fo r its findings nor re-consideration by the courts
of whether the change in the labeling standard can be implemented".19
2.20 Hence, under the DPCIA provisions that are curre ntly applicable, tuna harvested in the ETP
by a large vessel using purse-seine nets may be la belled dolphin-safe if the captain and an observer
approved by the IDCP certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in
which the tuna were caught and that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to
encircle dolphins during the same fishing trip. This certification must be accompanied by a written
statement executed by the Secretary of Commerc e (or designee), a representative of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission or an authori zed representative of a participating nation whose
national program meets the requirements of the IDCP, and the endorsement by the exporters,
importers and processors required in subparagra phs (d)(2)(B)-(C) of Section 1385 of the DPCIA
provisions.20
E. THE CERTIFICATION REQUIRED FOR TUNA CAUGHT OUTSIDE THE ETP
2.21 As explained above, subparagr aphs (d)(1)(B) and (D) of the DPCIA provisions establish
different categories of tuna harvested outside the ETP. These categories are:
 Tuna caught using purse seine nets in a fishery in which the US Secretary of Commerce
has determined that a regular and significant tuna-dolphin association exists similar to
the association in the ETP (§1385 (d)(1)(B)(i));

 Tuna caught using purse seine nets in a fishery in which there is no regular and
significant association between tuna and dolphins according to the US Secretary of
Commerce (§1385 (d)(1)(B)(ii)); and

16 Subparagraph (h)(2) provided that, where the initial finding is that the intentional deployment on or
encirclement of dolphins is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock, or after the
effective date of such finding, the cer tifications required shall be that no tuna were caught on the trip in which
such tuna were harvested using a purse seine net intentio nally deployed on or to encircle dolphins, and that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were caught, if the tuna were caught
on a trip commencing before the effective date of the initia l finding by the Secretary, after the effective date of
such initial finding and before the effective date of the finding of the Secretary.
17 Exhibit MEX-29, p. 24.
18 United States' first written submission, para. 22.
19 Mexico's first written submission, para. 88.
20 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.

 Tuna caught in a fishery other than the ones described in subparagraphs (d)(1)(A)-(C)
that is identified by the US Secretary of Commerce as having a regular and significant
mortality or serious injury of dolphins (§1385 (d)(1)(C)).21
2.22 As also mentioned above, the DPCIA provisions establish a specific set of conditions that
must be fulfilled by each one of these categories of t una in order to use the term "dolphin-safe" or to
make similar claims. In two of these instances (i.e. tuna caught in a fishery in which the US Secretary
of Commerce has determined that a regular and significant tuna-dolphin association exists, and in the
case of tuna caught in a fishery other than the on es described in subparagraphs (d)(1)(A)-(C) that is
identified by the US Secretary of Commerce as having a regular and significant mortality or serious
injury of dolphins), the applicability of the relevant requirements is conditioned on the existence of a
determination by the Secretary of Commerce that in the fishery in question there is regular and
significant tuna-dolphin association similar to the association in the ETP, or regular and significant
mortality or serious injury of dolphins.22
2.23 The United States has indicated that no fishery outside the ETP has been determined to have a
regular and significant association between tuna a nd dolphins similar to the association in the ETP. 23
Moreover, the United States has also explained that it has not made a determination that any non-
purse seine tuna fishery has regular and significant dolphin mortality.24
2.24 Therefore, although it remains a possibility, un der the DPCIA provisions, that the Secretary
of Commerce may determine that there is regular a nd significant dolphin-tuna association, or regular
and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins in fisheries outside the ETP, such
determinations have not been ma de until to date. Hence the "dolphin-safe" requirements for tuna
caught under the circumstances described in subparagr aphs (d)(1)(B)(i) and (d)(1)(D) of Section 1385
are not currently applied with respect to any fishery.
2.25 Consequently, the scenarios described in subpa ragraphs (d)(1) of Section 1385 that are
currently applicable are those described in:
(a) subparagraph (d)(1)(A), which refers to tuna caught on the high seas by driftnet
fishing;
(b) subparagraph (d)(1)(C), which refers to tuna caught in the ETP by a large vessel
using purse seine nets; and
(c) subparagraph (d)(1)(B)(ii), which refers to tuna caught outside the ETP in a fishery
that has not been the subject of a determination of regular and significant dolphin-
tuna association or of regular and significan t dolphin mortality or serious injury to
dolphins by the Secretary of Commerce. The "dolphin-safe" certification required for
this type of tuna must be provided by the captain of the vessel and, according to
subparagraph (d)(1)(B)(ii), must only state that no purse seine net was intentionally
deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the particular voyage on which the
tuna was harvested.
25

21 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.
22 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.
23 United States' first written submission paras. 38-39, see also United States' response to question 12
from the Panel.
24 United States' response to question 85 from the Panel.
25 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.

2.26 As further explained in the next section, the pa rties disagree on whether a certification that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured is required for the use of non-official labels or marks
(alternative labels) if they are carried by products containing tuna caught outside the ETP in a fishery
with no regular and significant dolphin-tuna asso ciation and no regular and significant dolphin
mortality or serious injury of dolphins.
F. O
FFICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE "DOLPHIN-SAFE" MARKS AND LABELS
2.27 Subparagraph (d)(3) of the DPCIA provisions establishes the following:
"(3) (A) The Secretary of Commerce shall develop an official mark that may be used
to label tuna products as dolphin-safe in accordance with this Act.
(B) A tuna product that bears the dolphin-safe mark developed under
subparagraph (A) shall not bear any other la bel or mark that refers to dolphins,
porpoises, or marine mammals.
(C) It is a violation of section 45 of title 15 to label a tuna product with any label
or mark that refers to dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals other than the mark
developed under subparagraph (A) unless—
(i) no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear
deployments in which the tuna were caught;
(ii) the label is supported by a track ing and verification program which is
comparable in effectiveness to the progra m established under subsection (f) of this
section; and
(iii) the label complies with all applicab le labeling, marketing, and advertising
laws and regulations of the Federal Trade Commission, including any guidelines for
environmental labeling."26
2.28 Under these provisions, producers wishing to display "dolphin-safe" claims on their tuna
products may thus choose between the official "dol phin-safe" mark developed by the Secretary of
Commerce under subparagraph (A) or an alternat ive mark or label of their own design under
subparagraph (C). If producers opt to use the official mark, their products may not bear any other
label or mark that refers to dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals.
2.29 Moreover, subparagraphs (C)(i)-(iii), establish speci fic requirements for the use of alternative
"dolphin-safe" labels or marks. According to th ese subparagraphs, tuna products may carry a label or
mark that refers to dolphins, porpoi ses, or marine mammals other than the official mark only if the
specific conditions described in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) are met.
2.30 The text of subparagraph (d)(3)(C) does not speci fy whether these requirements for the use of
alternative labels are additional to the requirements for the use of the official mark as set forth in
subparagraph (d)(1). In response to a question by the Panel, the United States asserted that tuna
products carrying an alternative label must comply with the specific requirements for the use of
alternative labels in addition to those set forth in subparagraph (d )(1), which are applicable to the use

26 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A, Exhibit US-5.

of the official mark or any alternative label. 27 The United States has thus indicated that
"section 1385(d)(3) provides that if tuna products are labeled with an alternative dolphin-safe label,
those tuna products may not contain tuna that was caught in a set in which dolphins were killed or
seriously injured (and this conditions [sic] applies re gardless of whether the tuna was caught inside or
outside the ETP)". 28 Mexico disputed this description of the law, arguing that the United States in
practice does not require that alternative labels be supported with a certification that dolphins were not
killed or seriously injured for any fishery outsid e the ETP, that the United States has no tracking or
verification program for this certification for tuna harvested outside the ETP, and that the major
producers do not claim that their dolphin-safe labels mean anything other than that purse seine nets
were not set on dolphins during the voyage in which the tuna were caught.
29
G. THE "DOLPHIN-SAFE" TRACKING AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
2.31 The US National Marine Fisheries Service (N MFS) has established the Tuna Tracking and
Verification Program (TTVP), for tracking and veri fying the "dolphin-safe" or "non-dolphin-safe"
condition of tuna caught in the ETP. 30 The provisions establishing this program are mainly contained
in Title 50, Sections 216.24 31 and 216.91-216.93 of the US Code of Federal Regulations. 32 Through
the use of the TTVP, the US government collects information from domestic tuna processors, US tuna
vessels, and importers of tuna products, to verify whether tuna products labelled dolphin-safe meet the
statutory conditions.33
2.32 As explained by the United States and Mexico, every import of every tuna product, regardless
of whether the "dolphin-safe" label is intended to be used, must be accompanied by a Fisheries
Certificate of Origin (NOAA Form 370). One copy of this form must be submitted to Customs and
Border Protection at the time of importation, a nd a second one to the TTVP. Moreover, US tuna
processors must submit monthly reports to the TTVP containing the dolphin-safe status, ocean area of
capture, catcher vessel, trip dates, carrier name, unl oading dates, and location of unloading of tuna for
both imported and domestic receipts. In addition, as part of the TTVP, the NMFS conducts periodic
cannery audits and "spot checks" of retail market product.34
2.33 According to the United States, if a product is found to be wrongfully labelled during a spot
check, the product will most likely be seized as eviden ce. Later on the US authorities may decide to
forfeit, destroy or in the case of imports, have th e product re-exported, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreover, sanctions fo r offering for sale or export tuna products falsely

27 See United States' response to question No. 8 from the Panel where the Unite d States stated that
"Section 1385(d)(1)-(2) applies to all tuna products regardless of whether those tuna products are labelled with
the official dolphin-safe label or an alternative dolphin- safe label" and that "[i]n ad dition, section 1385(d)(3)(C)
sets out additional conditions for use of an alternative dolphin-safe mark" (emphasis added). See also
United States' response to question No. 11 from the Panel, paras. 24-25.
28 See United States' second written submission, paras. 40-41.
29 See Mexico's second written submission, paras. 14-26.
30 Exhibit MEX-73.
31 Section 216.24 is not specifically identified by Mexi co in its request for establishment of a panel.
Paragraph (f) of Section 1385 of the DPCIA, which is challenged by Mexico, instructs the Secretary of
Commerce to issue regulations to implement the Dolphi n Protection Consumer Information Act, "including
regulations to establish a domestic tracking and verification program that provides for the effective tracking of
tuna labeled under subsection (d) of [Section 1385 ]. (Mexico's first written submission, Appendix A,
Exhibit US-5.)
32 Mexico's first written submission, Appendix B, Exhibits MEX-22, US-57 and US-58.
33 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 8.
34 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 9-10.

labelled "dolphin-safe" may be assessed against any pr oducer, importer, exporter, distributor or seller
who is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
35 Violators may also be prosecuted directly
under the DPCIA provisions or under federal provi sions establishing false statement or smuggling
prohibitions or federal labelling standards.36
H. THE "DOLPHIN SAFE" SCHEME ESTABLISHED UNDER THE AIDCP
2.34 The AIDCP establishes a "dolphin-safe" scheme that is separate from the US scheme.
2.35 The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Comm ission (IATTC) began in 1976 multilateral
endeavours that led to the creation of the Inte rnational Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP). 37
These efforts were later reflected in a series of multilateral agreements that were negotiated in
response to the evidence that many dolphins were dying in the ETP each year. These agreements
were the La Jolla Agreement (1992), the Panama Declaration (1995) and the AIDCP (1999). Both
Mexico and the United States are signatories to the La Jolla Agreement and the Panama Declaration
and parties to the AIDCP.38
2.36 In the Panama Declaration, signatories reaffirm the commitments and objectives of the La
Jolla Agreement and state their intention to conc lude a binding international agreement on dolphin
conservation in the ETP. The preamble to the Panama Declaration thus provides the following:
"Recognizing the strong commitments of na tions participating in the La Jolla
Agreement and the substantial successes realized through multilateral cooperation
and supporting national action under that Agreement, the Governments meeting in
Panama (…) announce their intention to form alize by January 31, 1996, the La Jolla
Agreement as a binding legal instrument (…). This shall be accomplished by
adoption of a binding resolution of the IA TTC or other legally binding instrument.
The adoption of the IATTC resolution or other legally binding instrument, that
utilizes to the maximum extent possible th e existing structure of the IATTC, is
contingent upon the enactment of certain changes in US law, as envisioned in
Annex 1 to this Declaration."
39
2.37 Annex 1 of the Declaration lists certain "envi sioned changes in United States law", including
the following in relation to labelling:
"the term "dolphin-safe" may not be used for any dolphin caught in the EPO by a
purse seine vessel in a set in which a do lphin mortality occurred as documented by
observers by weight calculation and well location."40
2.38 Mexico argued that the United States, as part of its international obligations under the Panama
Declaration was committed to change its "dolphin-safe" definition from "no encirclement of dolphins"

35 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 10. For instance, subsection 1385(e) of the
DPCIA provisions establishes:
"Any person who knowingly and willfully makes a statement or endorsement described in
subsection (d)(2)(B) [referring to the statements and endorsement required in the case of tuna caught in the ETP]
of this section that is false is liable for a civil penalty of not to exceed $100,000 assessed in an action brought in
any appropriate district court of the United States on behalf of the Secretary."
36 United States' response to Panel question No. 50, para. 120.
37 Mexico's first written submission, p. 2, para. 7; United States' first written submission, para. 76-80.
38 Mexico's first written submission, pp 15-17, paras. 49-50
39 Declaration of Panama, Exhibit MEX-20, p. 1.
40 Declaration of Panama, Annex 1, Exhibit MEX-20, p. 5.

to "no dolphin mortality or serious injury" 41. The United States disagreed with this characterization,
stating that the Panama Declaration does not commit the United States to amend its law or to take any
other action. In the US view, the Panama Declaration only stated th e signatories' intent to adopt a
binding dolphin conservation agreement if certain changes were made to US law.42
2.39 In 1998, signatories to the Panama Declarati on concluded negotiation of the AIDCP, which
entered into force in 1999. Through a comprehensiv e program of monitoring, tracking, verification,
and certification, featuring the use of independent observers on board tuna fishing vessels, the AIDCP
has maintained and reinforced the progress made afte r the adoption of the La Jolla Agreement and the
Panama Declaration, and dramatically reduced observed dolphin mortality in the ETP. 43 The AIDCP
is recognized to have made an important contribution to dolphin protection in the ETP.44
2.40 On 20 June 2001, the Parties to the AIDCP a dopted the "Resolution to Adopt the Modified
System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna". That resolution includes the following definitions:
"The terms used in this document are defined as follows:
a. Dolphin safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which there is no mortality or
serious injury of dolphins;
b. Non-dolphin-safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which mortality or serious
injury of dolphins occurs ..."
45
2.41 On that same date (20 June 2001), the Parties to the AIDCP also adopted the "Resolution to
Establish Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Ce rtification". That document states that "[t]he
terms used in this document are as defined in th e AIDCP System for Tracking and Verification of
Tuna". Accordingly the AIDCP Tuna Tracking and Verification Resolution's definitions of
"dolphin-safe" and "non-dolphin safe" apply with respect to the AIDCP resolution's rules on
dolphin-safe certification. The resolution established the procedures that would enable tuna caught
and tracked in accordance with the procedures to receive an "AIDCP dolphin-safe certification".
46 The
AIDCP Dolphin Safe Certification Resolution stat es that application of the procedures "shall be
voluntary for each Party, especially in the event that they may be in consistent with the national laws
of a Party".47
III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Mexico requests the Panel to find that the US measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.48

41 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 7
42 United States' first written submission, para. 77. The United States amended the DPCIA in 1997.
This amendment provided for a change in the dolphin-safe standard, contingent on the outcome of certain
scientific studies performed by the Department of Commerce. The results of these studies were challenged in
US courts, and an opinion was issued by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Earth Island v. Hogarth.
43 Mexico's first written submission, pp 17-19, paras. 49-50.
44 Mexico's first written submission, para. 7; United States first written submission, p. 3, para. 9; p. 74,
para. 52.
45 Mexico's first written submission, para. 229 and Exhibit MEX-55.
46 See Exhibit MEX-56, United States' first written submission, para. 83 and United States' second
written submission, para. 184.
47 AIDCP Dolphin Safe Certification Resolution,. MEX-56.
48 Mexico's first written submission, para. 263.

3.2 The United States requests the Panel to reject Mexico's claims that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2
and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
49
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES50
A. FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
1. Mexico
(a) Introduction
4.1 For over twenty years, yellowfin tuna caught by the Mexican fishing fleet in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific ("ETP") have been denied effectiv e access to the US market by virtue of various
GATT and WTO inconsistent measures. Sales of Mexican yellowfin tuna in the US market have been
severely restricted. Initially, the exclusion took the fo rm of an absolute embargo on the importation of
Mexican tuna and tuna products. Notwithstanding that the embargo was lifted, the United States
found a new way to prevent Mexican tuna from competing in the US market.
4.2 The essence of the current dispute relates to th e prohibition of the use of a US dolphin-safe
label on imports of tuna products from Mexico, while such a label is permitted to be used on tuna
products from other countries, including the United States.
4.3 Even though Mexico has maintained a sound and environmentally sustainable method for
fishing for tuna and participated in all multilate ral initiatives to protect dolphins while fishing for
tuna, Mexican tuna products are prohibited by the US measures from using a dolphin-safe label, while
tuna caught in other fisheries that have not adopte d comparable measures to protect dolphins are able
to benefit from a dolphin-safe label.
4.4 The US measures are inconsistent with the fu ndamental obligations of non-discrimination
contained in Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, because they grant other foreign tuna and tuna
products an advantage in the US marketplace that has not been accorded immediately and
unconditionally to Mexican tuna a nd tuna products, and accord Me xican tuna and tuna products
treatment less favourable than that accorded to US tuna and tuna products in the US marketplace.
4.5 Furthermore, the US measures are inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TB T Agreement") because they create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade, are not based on the relevant international standard, discriminate
against Mexican tuna products a nd tuna, and address objectives that can be addressed in a less trade-
restrictive manner.

49 United States' first written submission, para. 80.
50 This section on the arguments of the parties is based on the executive summaries submitted by the
parties to the Panel. The parties also responded to questions from the Panel. Those questions and answers are
not reflected in this section.

(b) Summary of facts and background information
(i) Tuna fishing
Tuna and dolphins
4.6 In the ETP, there is a natural association betw een tuna and dolphins. This means that schools
of tuna tend to aggregate and swim – to "associate" – near certain species of dolphins in ocean waters.
However, the association between tuna and dolphins is not unique to the ETP. Scientific research
indicates that there are associations of tuna with do lphins in other oceans of the world, including the
Eastern and Western Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, th e Central and Western Pacific, and the Gulf of
Mexico.
Tuna fishing and dolphins mortality in the ETP
4.7 Because the association between dolphins and tuna has long been observed in the ETP,
fishermen locate schools of underwater tuna by finding and chasing dolphins on the ocean's surface
and intentionally encircling them with purse seine ne ts to harvest the tuna underneath. In the early
years of fishing by setting on dolphins there was considerable incidental dolphin mortality.
4.8 When the United States enacted legislation impos ing restrictions on fishing in the ETP, the
US vessels soon began to fish for tuna elsewhere, outside the ETP. In the case of Mexico, there was
no reason for the Mexican fleet to relocate outside its natural and traditional fishing area within the
ETP. However, the problem was not ignored by th e Mexican fleet. Eventually, multilateral action was
taken by the United States, Mexico, and other countries in the region to reduce overall dolphin
mortality by establishing an international dolphin conservation program.
4.9 There is scientific evidence proving that outside the ETP, fishing results in the killing of
many dolphins and other cetaceans (i.e. bycatch), and no measures have been taken in those other
regions even remotely comparable to those taken for the ETP. Also, despite the fact that dolphins (and
other several species) are affected from fishery bycat ch in other oceans, the United States has chosen
to regulate fishing methods to protect dolphins exclusively with respect to tuna caught in the ETP.
Fishing methods
4.10 The most popular fishing method alternative to the method of setting purse-seine nets around
dolphins is "Fish Aggregating Devices", or "FADs". This method consists in casting shadows that
attract tuna and other fish species. The FAD sets attract and kill more immature tuna as well as a
variety of other bycatch, including sea turtles, sharks and other threatened and endangered species.
4.11 In contrast, because only mature yellowfin tuna are able to swim fast enough to "associate"
with dolphins, the method of fishing by setting on dolphins produces a large catch of mature tuna
appealing to the marketplace and little by-catch.
4.12 Furthermore, when using the dolphin set method, it is possible to virtually eliminate dolphin
mortalities if certain procedures recommended or required by the AIDCP are observed. Therefore, the
dolphin set method, when administered under the AIDCP, is the most environmentally sound method
for harvesting tuna.

(ii) Efforts to protect dolphins
Multilateral efforts
4.13 The international effort to provide for appropria te conservation of stocks of tuna, dolphins
and other species in the fisheries of the ETP had its origins in the Convention for the Establishment of
an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ("IATTC"). In 1976, the IATTC broadened its
responsibilities to include the treatment of problems arising from the tuna-dolphin relationship in the
ETP, which led to the creation of a program that would later be known as the International Dolphin
Conservation Program.
4.14 The multilateral endeavours of the IATTC were later encompassed in a series of multilateral
agreements that were negotiated in the wake of the "tuna-dolphin" controversy in the ETP, namely,
the La Jolla Agreement (1992), the Panama Declaration (1995), and the Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (1998). Bo th Mexico and the United States are parties to
all of these agreements.
4.15 The latter of them, the Agreement on the In ternational Dolphin Conservation Program
("AIDCP") comprises the most recent and comprehe nsive program to protect dolphins while fishing
for tuna. The AIDCP, which has been awarde d by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, is an unqualified success and has enorm ously reduced dolphin mortality to statistically
insignificant levels while promoting sustainabl e fishing practices. It was put into force on
15 February 1999.
4.16 Through this comprehensive program of monitoring, tracking, verification, and certification −
with its emphasis on having independent observers on board tuna fishing vessels − and former
international programs, the participating countries ha ve succeeded in dramatically reducing incidental
dolphin mortality to insignificant levels in the ETP.
Actions of the United States
4.17 The principal US law relating to the overall issue of the protection of dolphins and other
marine mammals is the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended (the "MMPA").
4.18 In 1988, the United States amended provisions of the MMPA to prohibit the import into the
United States of any marine product, and any fish or fish product harvested where there was not a
program comparable to that of the United States in minimizing the incidental taking of marine
mammals. Pursuant to these amendments, in Au gust 1990 the United States imposed an import
embargo on imports of tuna from Mexico (and othe r countries) for failure to achieve comparability
with US tuna harvesting standards that prohib ited setting on dolphins. Mexico challenged this
embargo in dispute settlement proceedings unde r the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") and prevailed, but the panel was never adopted.
4.19 In addition to the direct ban on imports, in 1990 the United States enacted legislation that
established a standard for labelling tuna products as "dolphin-safe". That law, known as the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990 ("DPCIA"), amended the MMPA.
4.20 According to this standard, with respect to t una harvested by a vessel using purse-seine nets
in the ETP, the DPCIA provided that the product coul d not be labelled "dolphin-safe" if caught on a
trip involving intentional deployment on, or enci rclement of, dolphins. Accordingly, Mexican tuna
and tuna products harvested while setting on dol phins are denied the "dolphin-safe" label in the
US marketplace, even if no mortality or serious injury of a marine mammal was observed.

4.21 Later, in 1997, in order to comply with the commitments of the Panama Declaration, the
US Congress enacted the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ("IDCPA"), which became
effective on February 15, 1999, The IDCPA ame nded the MMPA so that a country would be
permitted to export tuna fished from the ETP to the United States if it provided documentary evidence
that (a) it participates in the ID CP and is a member of the IATTC; (b) it meets its obligations under
the IDCP and the IATTC; and (c) it does not exceed specified dolphin mortality limits.
4.22 In the 1995 Panama Declaration it was also agr eed that the definition of "dolphin-safe" would
be changed from "no encirclement of dolphins" to "no dolphin mortality or serious injury. Thus, the
legislation also authorized a change in the "dol phin-safe" labelling standard, but not immediately or
automatically, but contingent on the outcome of studies it required the Department of Commerce
("DOC") to perform of "whether the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphin with purse-
seine nets is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the eastern tropical
Pacific Ocean". Thus, the standard would be ch anged in accordance with the US international
obligation unless there was clear evidence that the method of fishing was actually having a significant
adverse impact on dolphin stocks.
4.23 On May 1999 and December 2002, the DOC publis hed, respectively, its initial and final
findings pursuant to the IDCPA. In both findings, the DOC determined that there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that inten tional encirclement of dolphins w ith purse-seine nets was having a
significant adverse effect on "depleted dolphin stocks in the ETP".
4.24 Certain NGOs, challenged both the Initial and Final Findings. In both cases, the District Court
held that the DOC abused its discretion when it trig gered a change in the dolphin-safe label standard
on the ground that it lacked suffi cient evidence of no significant adverse impacts, and in both cases,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Districts Court´s Deci sion. The last ruling of
the Ninth Circuit, in 2007, is known as the Hogarth Ruling.
4.25 Therefore, and despite the international comm itment of the United States, the standard
remained unchanged.
4.26 It is instructive to note that despite the evidence that dolphin s and other marine mammals are
killed in fisheries in the US domestic waters, th e United States has not adopted requirements for the
dolphin-safe label for tuna or other fish caught in those fisheries remotely comparable to the standards
applied by the US regulations for the ETP.
(iii) The Mexican fishing fleet
4.27 Between 1980 and 1987, Mexico developed a fleet of 85,000 tons of carrying capacity, along
with an associated infrastructure and employme nt base. A number of coastal communities were
effectively built and sustained on the comparative advantage given by the strength of the tuna
resource along Mexico's coast, and the markets for that resource around the world.
4.28 Aware of the importance of protecting dolphins while fishing tuna, the Mexican fleet invested
large amounts of money in the dolphin protection e fforts such as training of captains and crews,
development of fishing gear less harmful to dolphi ns, research and monitoring programs, limiting its
fishing operations to daylight, and carrying an in dependent observer in every fishing trip of the
Mexican fleet. Those efforts contributed to the reduction of dolphin mortality to insignificant levels in
the ETP.

(iv) Adverse effects of the measure
4.29 The US measures have direct and indirect adverse effects. The direct adverse effect relates to
tuna products imported, distributed and sold in the US market. The US distribution and retail
networks for tuna products are acutely aware of the dolphin-safe issue and the fact that they will
encounter actions such as boycotts , promoted by certain economically interested NGOs, if they carry
tuna that is not designated as dolphin-safe. Large US grocery chains have indicated that they will be
unable to carry any Mexican tuna products unless th e tuna products bear a US government approved
dolphin-safe label. The indirect adverse is that the three major processors of tuna brands sold in the
United States – StarKist, Bumblebee, and Chicken of the Sea – refuse to purchase tuna caught in the
ETP including Mexican tuna because tuna products containing such tuna cannot be labelled as
dolphin-safe.
(c) Subject products
4.30 The subject products are tuna and tuna products.
4.31 "Tuna" include all species of tuna purchased by canneries for processing into tuna products
including Yellowfin, Albacore, and Skipjack, and "tuna products" are defined in Section 1385(c)(5) of
the DPCIA as "a food item which contains tuna an d which has been processed for retail sale, except
perishable sandwiches, salads, or other products with a shelf life of less than 3 days".
(d) Specific measures at issue
4.32 Although several US statutes, regulations and cour t decisions are involved, the most pertinent
measures are: the United States Code , Title 16, Section 1385 ("Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act"); the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 50, Section 216.91 ("Dolphin-safe labelling
standards") and Section 216.92 ("Dolphin-safe requi rements for tuna harvested in the ETP [Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean] by large purse seine vessels"); and the ruling in Earth Island Institute v.
Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007).
4.33 As it stands, because of the Hogarth ruling and the underlying statute and regulations,
Mexican tuna products containing tuna harvested by vessels using purse-seine nets in the ETP are
entitled to use the "dolphin-safe" label only if an AIDCP observer was on board the vessel, and both
the observer and the captain of the vessel certify "tha t no tuna were caught on the trip in which such
tuna were harvested using a purse-seine net intentiona lly deployed on or to encircle dolphins, and that
no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were caught …".
4.34 In contrast, if tuna products contain tuna harvested outside the ETP by a vessel using purse-
seine nets, those products are eligible for the "dolphi n-safe" label simply if th e captain of the vessel
executes a written statement certifying that "no purse-sei ne net was intentionally deployed on or used
to encircle dolphins during the particular voyag e on which the tuna was harvested". There is no
requirement of an observer. There is no requirement of participation in an international program
similar to the AIDCP. Moreover, there is no requireme nt of an attestation that no dolphins were killed
or seriously injured during the tuna fishing.
(e) Legal argument
4.35
 The US measures are inconsistent with Articles III:4 and I:1 of the GATT 1994 and
Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.

(i) GATT 1994
Mexico's claim under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
4.36 The US measures are laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, distribution and use of Mexi can tuna products and tuna imported into the
United States and accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products and tuna than that
accorded to the like products of US origin and, therefore, are incons istent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994. Accordingly, they afford protection to the production of like US tuna products and tuna.
Like products
4.37 In EC – Asbestos , the Appellate Body stated that "a determination of 'likeness' under
Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive
relationship between and among produc ts". Accordingly, the Mexican and US tuna and tuna products
are like product within the meaning of Article III:4 because Mexican and US tuna products directly
compete against each other in the US wholesale, distribution and retail market and Mexican and
US tuna directly compete against each other in the US cannery market.
4.38 In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body also observed that the Report of the Working Party on
Border Tax Adjustments outlined an approach for analysing "l ikeness" that has been followed and
developed since by several panels and the Appellate Body. The approach consists of employing four
general criteria outlined in the report. The Appellate Body stated that the panel must examine the
evidence relating to each of those four criteria and, then, weigh all of that evidence, along with any
other relevant evidence, in making an overall determination of whethe r the products at issue could be
characterized as "like". Accordingly Mexico analyses the four criteria as follows:
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the product: The physical properties of
Mexican tuna products are identical to tho se of US tuna products insofar as products
from both WTO Members comprise tuna meat in a retail-ready package. The physical
properties of Mexican tuna are identical to those of US tuna insofar as they are a
marine fish that is purchased by canneries for processing into tuna products.
(ii) the end-uses of the products: The end-uses of Mexican tuna products and
Mexican tuna are identical to US tuna products and tuna because tuna products from
both Mexico and the United States are destined for consumption by final consumers,
and tuna from both Mexico and the United States are destined for processing into
tuna products at a cannery.
(iii) consumers' tastes and habits: But for the regulatory distinction that is at the
core of this dispute (i.e., dolphin-safe), consumers' tastes and habits respecting
Mexican tuna products and tuna are identical to US tuna products and tuna.
(iv) the tariff classification of the products : The Mexican and US tuna products
and tuna are categorized under the same tariff classifications.
Law, regulation, or requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use
4.39 The US measures are set out in US legislati on and regulations as inte rpreted and applied by
the US judiciary. Mandatory criteria have been estab lished for the use of labels that contain the term
"dolphin-safe" or any other term or symbol that claims or suggests that the tuna contained in the

products were harvested using a method of fishi ng that is not harmful to dolphins. Thus, the
US measures clearly amount to a law, regulation or requirement within the meaning of Article III:4.
4.40 With regards to the term "affecting" used in Article III:4, the US measures "affect" the
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportatio n, distribution, or use of tuna and tuna products
because the participants – processors, wholesalers, reta ilers and consumers – in the US tuna and tuna
product market, are highly sensitive to issues related to dolphin mortality, and most of them will not
purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use tuna products and tuna that are not designated as
dolphin-safe or cannot be designated as dolphin-safe after processing.
Less favourable treatment
4.41 A measure accords less favourable treatment to imported products if it modifies the
conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of importe d products, or, in other
words, if it gives domestic like products a compe titive advantage in the market over imported like
products.
4.42 The less favourable treatment at issue is of a de facto rather than de jure character because the
US measures do not, on their face, discriminate on the basis of the foreign country that is the source of
particular tuna and tuna products but rather, they discriminate on the basis of where the tuna is
harvested and the fishing method. This has the effect of favouring US tuna and tuna products over like
Mexican tuna and tuna products because the fishi ng fleets of the two countries harvest tuna in
different ocean fisheries using different fishing methods.
4.43 The de facto less favourable treatment in this dispute occurs as follows:
 Reflecting the longstanding fishing practice of th e Mexican fishery, Mexican tuna are almost
exclusively caught in the ETP using purse-seine nets that are set upon dolphins. This is the
most environmentally responsible way to fish fo r tuna in the Mexican fleet's traditional tuna
fishing grounds. By virtue of the US measu res Mexican tuna products can never be
designated as dolphin-safe even though the Me xican fleet complies with the stringent
dolphin-safe requirements of the AIDCP.
 In contrast, the US fleet fishes outside of th e ETP using other fishing methods such as purse-
seine nets that are set upon FADs. Under the US measures, US tuna products that contain this
tuna can be designated as dolphin-safe even where marine mammal mortalities might, and
historically have been shown to occur and where other principles of bycatch reduction might
be compromised. Accordingly, by virtue of government intervention in the form of the
US measures, Mexican tuna products cannot be designated as dolphin-safe while US tuna
products can.
 It is an established feature of the US tuna pr oduct market that participants in the market are
sensitive to issues related to dolphin mortality and will make decisions on whether or not to
purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use tuna products on the basis of whether they are
designated as dolphin-safe. Accordingly, most US market participants will not purchase, offer
for sale, distribute or use Mexican tuna products but will purchase, offer for sale, distribute or
use US tuna products.
 Although the US measures apply to the labelling of tuna products, they have an indirect
discriminatory effect on Mexican tuna. By virtue of the US measures, tuna products
containing Mexican tuna cannot be designate d as dolphin-safe. As a consequence, fish
canneries located in US territory (e.g., Samoa) or producing tuna destined for the US market

will not accept Mexican tuna for processing in to tuna products. These canneries will,
however, accept US tuna that can be designated dolphin-safe once processed.
4.44 This de facto less favourable treatment between Mexican tuna products and like US tuna
products modifies the conditions of competition in th e relevant market – i.e., the US tuna products
market – to the detriment of imported Mexican tuna products. Similarly, the de facto discrimination
between Mexican tuna and like US tuna modifies the conditions of competition in the US cannery
market to the detriment of Mexican tuna. In this way, the US measures affecting these like products
provide less favourable treatment and thus violate th e national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994.
Mexico's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
4.45 The US measures are also an advantage, favour or privilege granted by the United States to
tuna products and tuna originating in certain WT O Members that has not been accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like products originating in Mexico and, therefore, are inconsistent with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
4.46 In the circumstances of this dispute, to determine whether there is a violation of Article I:1,
three questions must be answered: (i) are the im ported products concerned " like" products; (ii) does
the measure at issue confer an advantage, favour or privilege on products originating in any other
country; and (iii) was the advantage, favour or privilege granted "immediately and unconditionally" to
the like product originating in the territories of all other Members?
Like products
4.47 For the same reasons explained when analysin g "likeness" under Article III:4, tuna and tuna
products, irrespective of which country they orig inate, are like products within the meaning of
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
Advantage, favour or privilege on a product originating in other WTO Members
4.48 The advantage, favour or privilege in this dis pute is the right to designate tuna products as
dolphin-safe. Having a dolphin-safe designation provides a significant commercial advantage and is
clearly an "advantage", "favour" or "privilege".
4.49 This advantage, favour or privilege is confe rred upon tuna products a nd tuna originating in
those countries whose tuna fishing fleets do not fi sh in the ETP and those countries whose fishing
fleets fish in the ETP but use a different fishing method than the Mexican fleet.
Accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the
territories of all other Members
4.50 The US measures do not, on their face, discriminate on the basis of the foreign country that is
the source of particular tuna and tuna products, but rather they discriminate on the basis of where the
tuna is harvested and the fishing method. This has the effect of favouring tuna and tuna products from
some countries over others. Accordingly, the discrimination is de facto rather than de jure in
character, and occurs as follows:
 Reflecting the longstanding fishing practice of th e Mexican fishery, Mexican tuna are almost
exclusively caught in the ETP using purse-seine nets that are set upon dolphins. This is the
most environmentally responsible way to fish fo r tuna in the Mexican fleet's traditional tuna
fishing grounds. By virtue of the US measu res, Mexican tuna products can never be

designated as dolphin-safe even though the Me xican fleet complies with the stringent
dolphin-safe requirements of the AIDCP.
 In contrast, the fleets of other countries fish outside of the ETP using other fishing methods
such as purse-seine nets that are set upon FADs. They also fish in the ETP using methods
different from that used by the Mexican tuna fleet . Under the US measures, tuna products that
contain tuna originating from these countries' fleets can be designated as dolphin-safe and a
dolphin-safe label can be affixed to those produc ts. Accordingly, by virtue of government
intervention in the form of the US measures, Mexican tuna products cannot be designated as
dolphin-safe while tuna products originating in other countries can.
 It is an established feature of the US tuna pr oduct market that participants in the market are
sensitive to issues related to dolphin mortality and will make decisions on whether or not to
purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use tuna products on the basis of whether they are
designated as dolphin-safe. Thus, most US mark et participants will not purchase, offer for
sale, distribute or use Mexican tuna products but will purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use
tuna products originating in other countries.
 Although the US measures apply to the labelling of tuna products, they have an indirect
discriminatory effect on Mexican tuna. By virtue of the US measures, tuna products
containing Mexican tuna cannot be designate d as dolphin-safe. As a consequence, fish
canneries located in other WTO members will not accept Mexican tuna for processing into
tuna products. These canneries will, however, acc ept tuna in other countries that can be
designated dolphin-safe once processed.
4.51 This de facto discrimination between Mexican tuna products and like tuna products
originating in other countries modi fies the conditions of competition in the US tuna products market
to the detriment of imported products origin ating in a WTO Member, namely tuna products
originating in Mexico. Similarly, the de facto discrimination between Mexi can tuna and like tuna
originating in other countries modifies the conditions of competition in the US cannery market to the
detriment of tuna originating in Mexico. In this way, the US measures vi olate the most-favoured-
nation obligation in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
Conclusions
4.52 On the basis of the foregoing, the US measures are inconsistent with Articles III:4 and I:1 of
the GATT 1994. Moreover, on the basis of the relevant facts, none of the general exceptions in the
GATT 1994 apply to the US measures.
(ii) Claims under the TBT Agreement
4.53 The US measures are a technical regulation that is inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4
of the TBT Agreement.
The US measures constitute a technical regulation
4.54 The US measures constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement,
pursuant to its Annex 1.1. In this instance, th e "document" comprises the statutory and regulatory
provisions that make up the labelling provisions. Also , the document meets the three criteria in order
to fall within the definition of a technical regulation, as follows:

(i) It applies to an identifiable product or group of products: The identifiable
group of products to which the document a pplies, is "tuna product", as defined by
Section 1385(c)(5).
(ii) It lays down one or more characteristics of the product: The US measures
govern the conditions under which a tuna product can be labelled as "dolphin-safe".
This requirement is a product characteristic of the tuna product that is laid down by
the US measures.
(iii) Compliance with the product characteristics is mandatory: Under the
DPCIA, it is unlawful to include on the label of any tuna product offered for sale in
the United States the term "dolphin-safe" or any analogous term or symbol if the
product contains tuna harvested in the ETP by a large purse seine vessel using a
purse-seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle dolphins. This prohibition
against the use of the "dolphin-safe" label remains in force even when the
international standards of the AIDCP are met. Accordingly, the regulation is
mandatory. Furthermore, even if the labe lling scheme were not to be considered a
priori mandatory, it is de facto mandatory because the market conditions in the
United States are such that it is impossi ble to effectively market and sell tuna
products without a dolphin-safe designation.
The measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2
4.55 The US measures are a technical regulation that creates an unnecessary obstacle to
international trade, because its objective is not legi timate or, in the alternative, it is more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimat e objective taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create. Thus, they are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
The measures do not fulfil a legitimate objective
4.56 The evidence indicates that the US measures do not protect animal life or health or the
environment in the general sense. Rather, the measures fulfil the opposite of these legitimate
objectives by: (i) promoting the use of alternative fishing methods that result in enormously higher
bycatch and therefore wasteful depletion of ocean sealife; and (ii) by undermining the economic
incentive for countries and fishing fl eets to participate in a very successful multilateral environmental
agreement. The objective of the US measures is narrow er than the protection of animal life or health
or the environment, it is to preserve dolphin stocks in the course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP.
In Mexico's view, measures that trade off the life or health of different animal species and which
undermine broader environmental objectives th at are enshrined in a successful multilateral
environmental agreement cannot be found to "fulfil a legitimate objective" within the meaning of
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
4.57 In the alternative, even if su ch measures could in principle be found to fulfil a legitimate
objective, the US measures do not fulfil their stated objective of preserving dolphin stocks in the ETP,
for the following reasons:
 The protection of dolphins in the ETP tuna fishery and the consequent preservation of dolphin
stocks are governed by the highly successful AI DCP. The US measures do not add to that
protection, and all they accomplish is to bloc k imports of tuna products and tuna from the
signatory countries and, thereby, protect the US tuna industry and undermine the viability of
the AIDCP.

 The Hogarth court ruling goes against the re quirements of the AIDCP and against the
determination of the US administration, wh ich supported the view that the legitimate
environmental objective at issue − the preservation of dolphin stocks − is fulfilled by the
standard for dolphin-safe labelling agreed in the Panama Declaration.
 The statutory condition, unilaterally adopted by the United States – requiring that a
determination be made by the DOC based on a vague standard, without consultation with the
IATTC, and subject to reversal by courts without scientific expertise was designed primarily
to fulfil the objective of satisfying domestic political interests.
The US measures are more trade-restrictive than necessary taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create
4.58 In the alternative, if the US measures ar e found to fulfil a legitimate objective, the
US measures are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that legitimate objective taking into
account the risks nonfulfillment would create.
4.59 The preservation of dolphin stocks in the ETP tuna fishery is an important objective.
According to available scientific and technical info rmation, that objective is being fulfilled by the
AIDCP. The US measures do not further contribute to the achievement of this objective. In the
absence of the US measures, the preservation of dolphi n stocks in the ETP tuna fishery will continue
to be accomplished by the requirements and procedures of the AIDCP. Since the US measures are not
necessary, the fact they deny competitive opportu nities to Mexican tuna products and tuna and
thereby create trade restrictions means that they are more trade-restrictiv e than necessary within the
meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.4
4.60 The US measures are inconsistent with Ar ticle 2.4, because US dolphin-safe labelling
measures are not based on an existing relevant inte rnational standard, and th e relevant international
standard is an effective and appropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued.
AIDCP standard
4.61 On 20 June 2001, the Parties to the AIDCP a dopted the "Resolution to Adopt the Modified
System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna" and "the Resolution to Establish Procedures for
AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification". Both r esolutions define dolphin-safe tuna, as tuna captured
in sets in which there is no mortality or serious injury of dolphins.
The AIDCP standard is a relevant international standard
International standard
4.62 The AIDCP Standard is a standard for purposes of Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement because
it provides for common and repeated use rules expressly dealing with the characterization of tuna as
dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe, compliance with the standard is not mandatory, and it was
prepared and approved by the AIDCP member governments, which constitute a recognized body.
Relevant
4.63 The AIDCP standard is "relevant" within the meaning of Article 2.4 because it is used to
determine when tuna and tuna product can be cer tified as dolphin-safe and bear a dolphin-safe label,
and thus, it serves the exact same purpose as the US dolphin-safe label measures.

The United States failed to base its regulation on the relevant international standard
4.64 The United States failed to base its regulation on the relevant international standard because it
rejected its application in favour of a unilateral st andard, a setting of nets on dolphins standard. Also,
the US dolphin-safe labelling measures stipulate rules for labelling tuna that directly contradict the
guidelines contained in the AIDCP.
The relevant international standard does not constitute an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued
4.65 The US measures do not pursue a legitimate obj ective. However, in the event the Panel
concludes that the measures pursue a legitimate objective, the AIDCP Standard is an effective and
appropriate means for the fulfilment of a legitimate objective.
4.66 It is an effective means for achieving the pur sued objective of protecting dolphins because
with this standard, dolphin mortality in the ETP h as decreased 99%, and even United States agreed to
the standard itself. It is also an appropriate means for achieving the pursued objective of protecting
dolphins, because not only it has been effective in decreasing the dolphin mortality, but also it allows
the best method of fishing for tuna.
The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.1
4.67 The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, which imposes
national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatm ent obligations on technical regulations. As
discussed above, Mexico argues that the US measures are a technical regulation.
4.68 For the same reasons set out for Mexico's cl aim under GATT Article III:4, the US measures
do not accord products imported from the territory of any Member (namely, Mexico) treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin.
4.69 For the same reasons set out for Mexico's cl aim under GATT Article I:1, the US measures do
not accord products imported from Mexico treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products originating in any other country.
(f) Conclusions
4.70 On the basis of the foregoing, Mexico respect fully requests that the Panel find that the
US measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1 a nd III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2 and
2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
2. United States
(a) Introduction
4.71 The measures at issue in this dispute establish conditions under which the voluntary
"dolphin-safe" label may be used on tuna products. These conditions do not allow tuna products to be
labelled dolphin-safe if they contain tuna that was caught by intentionally encircling and deploying
purse seine nets on dolphins. This fishing techni que is commonly referred to as "setting on dolphins"
and involves chasing, encircling and deploying purse seine nets on dolphins to catch tuna that swim
beneath the dolphins. The US measures apply to tuna caught in any fishery where there is a regular
and significant association between tuna and dolphins and apply regardless of the origin of the tuna.
The only known fishery where there is a regular and significant association between tuna and dolphins
is the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).

4.72 Setting on dolphins to catch tuna has well-doc umented adverse impacts on dolphins in the
ETP. Not only are dolphins killed when encircled with purse seine nets to catch tuna (e.g., over
1000 dolphin were observed killed in sets with purse seine nets in 2009), but research indicates that
setting on dolphins to catch tuna causes a number of other adverse effects on dolphins, including
separation of mothers and their dependent calv es and reduced reproductive success due to stress.
Together these adverse effects have resulted in dolphin populations in the ETP that are small fractions
of their "pre-fishery" levels. Today, the population level of two main species of dolphins impacted by
dolphin fishing in the ETP – northeastern offshore s potted and eastern spinner dolphins – remain at
only 19 and 29 per cent, respectively, of the levels that existed befo re setting on dolphins became the
predominate technique to fish for tuna in the ETP.
4.73 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions ensure that when a dolphin-safe label appears on
tuna products in the United States it accurately conveys to consumers that the product does not
contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adver sely affects dolphins. Any tuna that is caught in
the ETP – including Mexican tuna – during a trip us ing a technique other than setting on dolphins and
in a set in which no dolphins were otherwise kille d or seriously injured is eligible to bear the
dolphin-safe label. The fundamental premise of Mexico's claims – that the US measures prohibit use
of the dolphin-safe label on Mexican tuna – is simply incorrect.
4.74 Mexico is also incorrect that the US measu res deny Mexico access to the US market. The
US measures set out a voluntary labelling scheme. Me xico can and does sell tuna in the US market
that is not labelled dolphin-safe. Moreover, tuna caught by one-third of Mexican purse seine vessels
that fish for tuna in the ETP is already eligible for the dolphin-safe label; yet Mexican processors do
not to use it. As detailed below, each of Mexico's legal claims fail.
4.75 In addition, although not relevant to the legal clai ms in this dispute, Mexico is incorrect that
the United States failed to abide by its "commitment ... to amend its law" to a llow tuna products that
contain tuna that was caught by setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphin-safe. The United States
agrees that the AIDCP has made an important c ontribution to dolphin co nservation in the ETP,
including that it has fostered the continued reduction in observed dolphin mortalities in the fishery.
However, this tells only part of the story. Dolphins continue to die, or be seriously injured, in the ETP
as a result of setting on dolphins to catch tuna. And, their populations remain depleted in the ETP.
And this is true even though the parties to the AI DCP and their fleets are generally adhering to their
dolphin conservation obligations under the AIDCP. So, while the AIDCP has been successful in
significantly reducing the number of observed dolphin mortalities in the ETP, dolphins continue to be
adversely affected and dolphin pop ulations have not yet demonstrat ed the recovery that would be
expected if adverse effects of setting on dolphins to catch tuna had been completely alleviated. The
United States has a right to ensure that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna
products contain tuna that was caught by a method that is "dolphin-safe" – that is, a method that does
not involve a fishing technique that adversely affect s dolphins – and to ensure that the US market is
not used to encourage fishing fleets to use fishing techniques that adversely affect dolphins.
(b) Legal argument
4.76 Mexico has failed to establish a prima facie case that the US measures are inconsistent with
US obligations under Articles I:1 and III:4 of th e GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement. First, the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not discriminate based on origin. Second, the
US dolphin-safe labelling are voluntary and therefor e do not constitute technical regulations falling
within the scope of the TBT Agreement. Accordingly, Mexico cannot even establish that Articles 2.1,
2.2, and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement apply to th e US measures. Third, the dolphin-safe labelling
provisions serve legitimate objectives; allowing tuna to be labelled "dolphin-safe" that is caught by
setting on dolphins would not fulfil these objectives. Accordingly, Mexico cannot sustain its claims
under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. (A lthough Mexico also included Article 2.3 of the

TBT Agreement it is panel request, Mexico appear s to have abandoned that claim as it is not
addressed in its submission.)
(i) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article III:4
4.77 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not discriminate based on origin and therefore do
not afford less favourable treatment to Mexican t una products as compared to like domestic products.
Because US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not a fford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna
or tuna products, Mexico has failed to establish a prima facie case that the US provisions are
inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
4.78 First, because the US provisions do not cond ition eligibility to use the dolphin-safe label on
the origin of the tuna product, the US provisions do not alter the conditions of competition to the
detriment of Mexican tuna or t una products. The US provisions provide that any tuna products –
regardless of origin – may use the dolphin-safe label if they meet the criteria for the label. Second,
one-third of the vessels in Mexico's tuna fleet is under 363 metric tons and tuna products containing
tuna caught by these vessels are already eligible under the US provisions to use the dolphin-safe label.
This in itself is evidence that the US provisions do not afford less favourable treatment to Mexican
tuna and tuna products based on origin. Third, th e US dolphin-safe labelling provisions afford use of
the dolphin-safe label equally to all tuna products that meet the conditions set out in those provisions.
It is that Mexican vessels have chosen and continue to choose to catch tuna by setting on dolphins that
makes tuna products containing tuna caught by these vessels ineligible for the dolphin-safe label.
4.79 The United States would like to point out that Mexico overstates the cost and difficulty of
using other techniques to catch tuna and in fact provides no evidence to support its claim that using
other techniques would require Mexican vessels to "incur considerable financial and other costs". The
same boats and much of the same gear used to set on dolphins to catch tuna may be used to catch tuna
using other techniques, specifically sets on floating objects and unassociated schools of tuna. Mexico
also overstates that the ETP is its "traditional fish ing grounds" and that fish ing for tuna in another
fishery would be too costly. While Mexican vessels have traditionally fished for tuna in the ETP, so
too do vessels flagged to a number of other coun tries, including the Unite d States. Mexico has
provided no evidence to substantiate its contention th at it would be too costly for Mexican vessels to
fish for tuna in other fisheries. Mexico's statements about the relative environmental impacts of
setting on dolphins to catch tuna as compared to other techniques to catch tuna in the ETP are
irrelevant and unfounded.
(ii) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article I:1
4.80 The US measures at issue are consistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. The
US measures do not accord any advantage to products of any other member that is not also
immediately and unconditionally accorded to produc ts of Mexico within the meaning of the
GATT 1994 Article I:1. Just as the US measures do not discriminate against Mexico within the
meaning of Article III:4, those measures are non-discriminatory within the meaning of Article I:1.
4.81 First, the US measures do not modify the conditions of competition because all tuna is subject
to the same conditions on use of the dolphin-safe la bel. The criteria for being eligible to use the
dolphin-safe label are origin neutral. Second, the US measures do not afford less favourable treatment
to Mexican tuna or tuna products. Tuna products containing tuna caught by some Mexican vessels are
already eligible under the US provisions to use the dolphin-safe label. Third, while Mexican vessels
have traditionally fished for tuna in the ETP, so t oo do vessels flagged to a number of other countries,
and Mexico does not explain why the origin neutra l rules disadvantage it. Mexico's arguments about
the relative environmental impacts of various fish ing techniques are irrelevant and unfounded. The
Article I:1 analysis in US – Tuna (Mexico) could not be more relevant, as the panel, responding to

essentially the same arguments from Mexico in that dispute, concluded that the dolphin-safe labelling
measures were not inconsistent with Article I:1. Finally, contrary to Mexico's assertion, the
advantage, favour, or privilege granted by the United States is the opportunity to use the dolphin-safe
label if the conditions on use of the dolphin-safe label are met.
(iii) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not technical regulations and therefore not
subject to Article 2 of the TBT Agreement
4.82 Measures that fall outside the definition of a t echnical regulation set out in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement are not subject to the obligation set out in Article 2 of the TBT Agreement. Because
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not meet the definition of a technical regulation, Article 2
does not apply and the US dolphin-safe labelling provis ions cannot be inconsiste nt with Articles 2.1,
2.2 or 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
4.83 The definition of a technical regulation in A nnex 1 of the TBT Agreement makes clear that
technical regulations are documents with which comp liance is mandatory and that "lay down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods" or "deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or la belling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method" or both. Article 4 and Annex 3 sets out Members' obligations with
respect to documents with which compliance is voluntary, whereas Article 2 sets out Members'
obligations with respect to documents with wh ich compliance is mandatory. Notably, both the
definition of standard and the definition of tec hnical regulation encompass "labelling requirements".
Whether a "labelling requirement" falls within the scope of standard or technical regulation thus
depends on whether compliance with that requirement is mandatory.
4.84 Mexico's assertions that the US dolphin- safe labelling provisions set out product
characteristics and are mandatory are incorrect. Fi rst, the US provisions specify the conditions under
which tuna products may be labe lled dolphin-safe. The US provisions do not specify the product
characteristics (or their related processes or producti on methods) that tuna products must meet (or not
meet) to be sold on the US market. Second, US provisions are not mandatory. The US provisions
constitute a voluntary labelling measure and such voluntary labelling measures are not covered by the
definition of a technical regulation. It is perfectly legal to sell tuna products in the United States that
are not dolphin-safe and that do not bear the dolphin-safe label. In fact, the GATT 1947 panel
reached the same conclusion when examining the DPCIA.
4.85 A voluntary labelling measure does not become a mandatory labelling requirement simply
because the measure requires that what is stated on the label to be truthful. The definition of a
standard makes clear that a standard, with which compliance is not mandatory, may address "labelling
requirements". The difference, then, between a st andard that addresses labelling requirements and a
technical regulation that addresses labelling require ments is that the former concerns voluntary
labelling schemes while the latter concerns manda tory labelling schemes. Confirmation that the
definition of a technical regulation only includes ma ndatory labelling requirem ents can be found in
the decisions and recommendations of the TBT Committee.
(iv) The US measures are not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
4.86 The analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreem ent is similar to the analysis of national
treatment and most favoured nation provision of the GATT 1994. Mexico relies solely on the
arguments it makes regarding the consistency of th e US measures with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994 for its arguments under TBT Agreement Artic le 2.1. The United States has articulated
above why Mexico's arguments under Articles I: 1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 fail, and Mexico's
arguments under TBT Agreement Artic le 2.1 fail for the same reasons. Thus, Mexico has failed to
establish that the US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.

(v) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement
4.87 The first sentence of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes the general rule that
Members shall ensure that technical regulations do not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade, while the second sentence of Article 2.2 explai ns that "for this purpose, technical regulations
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective". The preamble to the
TBT Agreement makes clear that each Member has the right to decide for itself which legitimate
objectives to pursue and to take measures to me et those objectives "at the levels it considers
appropriate," including with respect to measures to protect animal life or health or the environment
and to prevent deceptive practices.
4.88 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are to fulfil a legitimate objective within the
meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. The objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions are (1) ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products
contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adve rsely affects dolphins; and (2) to the extent that
consumers choose not to purchase tuna without the dol phin-safe label, the US provisions ensure that
the US market is not used to enc ourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins.
4.89 Mexico does not address whether the US provi sions fulfil the objective of ensuring that
consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a
manner that adversely affects dolphin and therefor e has not established a prima facie case that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that objective.
4.90 With respect to the objective of protecting dol phins, Mexico appears to believe that the
objective of protecting dolphins is not legitima te because the United States should have another
objective: preserving other marine species and the environment of the ETP as a whole. It is not for
Mexico, however, to decide what policy object ives the United States should pursue. Mexico's
argument also ignores the fact that the United St ates has in place a number of measures to protect
other marine species and the environment genera lly. The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions,
however, seek to protect dolphins; the US provisions need not also protect every other marine species
and the environment as a whole to serve a legitima te objective. Further, Mexico's argument ignores
that Article 2.2 expressly includes "protection of ... an imal ... life or health, or the environment" in its
illustrative list of legitimate objectives.
4.91 The objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna
products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins is also one that falls
within the illustrative list in Article 2.2, which refers to "prevention of deceptive practices". By setting
out conditions under which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe, the US provisions are
intended to prevent deceptive practices by ensuring th at tuna products are not falsely or misleadingly
labelled dolphin-safe when they are caught using a fishing practice that adversely affects dolphins.
4.92 Mexico argues, in the alternative, that even if the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions "could
in principle be found to fulfil a legitimate objec tive," the US measures do not fulfil that objective.
Mexico's argument is without merit. First, by limiting use of the dolphin-safe label to tuna products
that contain tuna that was not caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins, the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions ensure that when consumers purchase tuna products that are labelled dolphin-safe
they are not misled or deceived about the effect of the harvesting of that tuna on dolphins. Second, to
the extent customers choose not to purchase tuna products without the dolphin-safe label, the
US provisions help ensure that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to set on
dolphins. As the practice of setti ng on dolphins to catch tuna in the ETP decreases in frequency, the
associated adverse effects on dolphin populations decrease as well.

4.93 Mexico's contention that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions "will not influence or
modify the conduct of the ETP fishery" is unfounded. In fact, the demand for tuna products that do
not contain tuna that was caught by setting on dolphins is what prompted the US fleet to abandon this
fishing technique, as well as what may have prompted Ecuador's fleet to abandon this technique in
recent years. Ecuador's fleet continues to fish in the ETP, employing techniques other than setting on
dolphins to catch tuna, including yellowfin tuna.
4.94 Mexico also argues that the US dolphin-saf e labelling provisions have the effect of
"withdrawing the economic incentive for countries and fishing fleets to comply with the AIDCP" and
undermine the AIDCP, thereby detracting from dolphin pr otection. This is not supported by the facts.
First, the AIDCP was concluded two years after the 1997 amendments to the DCPIA were enacted.
Second, the current US dolphin-safe labelling provis ions have been in force since 1997, with all
parties including Mexico generally acting in compliance with their obligations under the AIDCP.
4.95 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that technical regulations shall not be "more
trade-restrictive than necessary" to fulfil a legitimate objective. Based on the text of Article 2.2, two
elements must be shown for a measure to be consid ered more trade-restrictive than necessary: (1) the
measure must be trade-restrictive; and (2) the meas ure must restrict trade more than is necessary to
fulfil the measure's legitimate objective.
4.96 With respect to the first element, Mexico concl udes that "measures that are 'trade-restrictive'
include those that impose any form of limitation of imports, discriminate against imports or deny
competitive opportunities to imports". The United St ates agrees that measures that impose limits on
imports or discriminates against them would meet the definition of a measure that is "trade-
restrictive". With respect to the second element, the ordinary meaning of the word "necessary" is
"that cannot be dispensed with or done without; re quisite, essential, needful... requiring to be done;
that must be done". A measure that is "more" trade-restrictive than "necessary" is therefore a measure
that restricts trade more than is needed or require d to fulfil the measure's objective. The word "more"
implies a comparison. This comparison in turn im plies that other reasonably available measures that
fulfil the measure's legitimate objective should be examined to determine whether the measure at
issue is "more" than what is required or necessary to fulfil that measure's objective.
4.97 Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement includes a provision similar to Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. Article 5.6 provides relevant cont ext for the interpretation of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention and confirms that
determining whether a measure is "more trade-rest rictive than necessary" within the meaning of
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement involves determini ng whether there is an alternative measure that
could fulfil the measure's objective that is significan tly less trade-restrictive. This interpretation is
confirmed by a 15 December 1993, letter from the Director-General of the GATT to the Chief
US Negotiator concerning the application of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
4.98 Thus, to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions are more trade-restrictive than
necessary, Mexico must establish that there is a r easonably available alternative measure that fulfils
the provisions' objectives that is significantly less trade-restrictive. Mexico has failed to do so.
4.99 First, contrary to Mexico's contentions, neither the AIDCP itself nor measures implemented
pursuant to it constitute a "reasonabl y available alternative" that could fulfil the legitimate objectives
of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. While the United States agrees that the AIDCP has made
an important contribution to dolphin protection in the ETP, despite the c onservation measures called
for under the AIDCP, dolphin populations rema in depleted and have not recovered. The
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions together with the measures called for under the AIDCP and other
provisions of US law form part of a comprehens ive US strategy to protect dolphins. Were the
United States to substitute one aspect of this comp rehensive strategy for another – for example forgo

the dolphin-safe labelling provisions in lieu of me asures called for under the AIDCP – this would
reduce the overall ability of the United States to protect dolphins. In addition, eliminating the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions in lieu of the AIDCP would not fulfil the objective of ensuring
that consumers are not misled or deceived about wh ether or not tuna products contain tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
4.100 Second, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions have a minimal impact on trade. As a
voluntary labelling scheme, the US provisions do not require tuna or tuna products exported to, or
sold in, the United States to be dolphin-safe or to be labelled dolphin-safe. And, nothing in the
US provisions prohibits tuna products that are not dolphin-safe and that are not labelled as such from
being exported to, or sold in, the United States. In fact, the United States imported US$ 13 million
worth of tuna and tuna products from Mexico 2009. Nor do the US provisions discriminate against
imports. To the extent the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions have had an impact on trade, it is not
because those measures themselves prohibit or otherw ise impose limitations on imports. It is because
consumers have a preference for tuna products that contain tuna that is not caught by setting on
dolphins.
4.101 In sum, Mexico has not established that the obj ectives of the US provisions are not legitimate
nor are more trade-restrictive than necessary. Fo r these reasons, Mexico has failed to establish that
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are more tr ade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective and therefore has failed to establish that the US provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.2.
(vi) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement
4.102 As the "relevant international standard" for pu rpose of its claims under Article 2.4, Mexico
cites the definition of "dolphin-safe" in an AIDC P resolution: "Resolution to Adopt the Modified
System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna". The definition of "dolphin-safe" in the AIDCP tuna
tracking resolution does not constitute a relevant international standard within the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement as it is not (1) a standard; (2) international; or (3) relevant.
4.103 The definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolution does not meet the definition of a
"standard" in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. First, it does not set out "rules, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes a nd production methods;" it sets out a definition for
purposes of an intergovernmental agreement. Th is definition does not itself establish any rules
regarding the characterization of tuna; it simply defines a term. Second, the definition of
"dolphin-safe" in the tuna tracking resolution is not contained in a "document approved by a ... body".
The AIDCP tuna tracking resolution is a document a pproved by the parties to the AIDCP, and neither
the AIDCP nor the parties to it constitute a "body" (i.e. a "legal or administrative entity that has
specific tasks and composition"). Third, assuming arguendo that the AIDCP was a "body" it does not
have recognized activities in standardization and, therefore, would not constitute a "recognized" body.
4.104 The definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolu tion also does not qualify as "international".
Only a limited number of countries participated in the adoption of the AIDCP resolutions, and the
AIDCP by its terms limits those who were elig ible to do so. These facts preclude the AIDCP
resolutions from qualifying as an "internationa l standard" under the TBT Agreement. The
TBT Agreement read together with ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 mean that an international standard is one
that is adopted by a body whose membership is ope n to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.

(Consensus is also required for a standard to qualify as an "international standard" under the
TBT Agreement.)
51
4.105 The definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolu tion is not "relevant". First, the definition
does not set out any rules, guidelines or characteristics for the labelling of tuna products. It, therefore,
does not bear upon, relate to or pertain to the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. It is also clear
from the text of the tuna tracking resolution that th e relevance of its definition of "dolphin-safe" is
limited to defining that term for purposes of the reso lution. Second, the definition of "dolphin-safe" in
the tuna tracking resolution defines "dolphin-safe" as tuna caught in a set in which no dolphins were
observed killed or seriously injured. The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, however, seek to
ensure that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins , which includes not only whether the tuna was
caught in a set in which dolphins were observed k illed or seriously injured but whether dolphins were
otherwise adversely affected. The definition of "dolphin-safe" in the tuna tracking resolution does not
relate or pertain to the objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.106 Use of the definition of "dolphin-safe in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolution would not be
effective or appropriate to ensure that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether the tuna
products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins or to protect
dolphins at the level the United States considers appropriate.
4.107 Mexico does not advance any arguments that, that definition is an effective or appropriate
means to meet the objective of the US provisions to ensure that consumers are not misled or deceived
about whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
For this reason alone, Mexico has failed to establish a prima facie case that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are an effective and appropriate means to fulfil the objectives of those provisions.
4.108 With respect to protecting dolphins, while the United States agrees that the AIDCP has made
an important contribution to pr otecting dolphins in the ETP, it only addresses part of the problem –
that is how to reduce dolphin mortality when setti ng on dolphins to catch tuna. Because it does not
prohibit setting on dolphins to catch tuna, it does not ensure that no dolphins are in fact killed or
seriously injured when dolphins are used to catch tuna (in fact, the AIDCP contemplates that up to
5000 dolphins may be killed using this techni que per year) and it does not address other adverse
effects of setting on dolphins to catch tuna. The same is true for the AIDCP resolutions Mexico cites.
4.109 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions have as their objective to protect dolphins in ways
that go beyond the protections provided for under the AIDCP. Thus, relying solely on the AIDCP or
its resolutions would not be an effective mean s of fulfilling the objective of the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions to protect dolphins above and beyond minimizing observed mortalities and
serious injuries as a consequence of setting on dolphins to catch tuna.
4.110 Relying on the AIDCP or the AIDCP resolutions would also not be effective to fulfil the other
objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions to ensure that consumers are not misled or
deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna th at was caught in a manner that adversely affects

51 The version of ISO/IEC Guide 2 ex plicitly referred to in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement is the sixth
edition, 1991. Since then, the sixth edition was cancelled and replaced by the seventh edition published in 1996
(ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1996, Standardization and related activities – General vocabulary); this in turn was cancelled
and replaced by the eighth edition – now in force – published in 2004 (ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization
and related activities – General vocabulary) (See G/TBT/GE N/38). It should be noted that for the definitions
referred to in the panel report, ther e were no differences between the 2004 edition of ISO/IEC Guide 2, and the
1991 edition. Therefore, references in this report are made to ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991.

dolphins because tuna caught in accordance with th e AIDCP may be caught by setting on dolphins.
The AIDCP and the resolution on tuna tracking would al so not be appropriate to fulfil the objective of
the US provisions as neither the AIDCP nor the r esolution on tuna tracking addresses the labelling of
tuna – that is, they are not suited for the purpose of ensuring that labels on tuna products contain
accurate information about the dolphin-safe status of those products.
(c) Conclusion
4.111 For the reasons stated above, the panel should re ject Mexico's claims that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2
and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
B. OPENING ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING
1. Mexico
(a) Introduction
4.112 The essence of this case concerns certain US measures that prohibit the use of a
"dolphin-safe" label on imports of tuna products from Mexico notwithstanding that these products
meet the definition of dolphin-safe under the go verning multilateral environmental agreement to
which both Mexico and the United States are party. Accordingly, the goal of protecting dolphins in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) has long sin ce been accomplished and the US measures are no
longer needed for that purpose because dolphins are now protected under a multilateral treaty.
4.113 The application of a dolphin-safe label to tuna products has significant commercial value in
the United States market. However, Mexican tuna products cannot benefit from that value. The
US measures are inconsistent with the fundamental obligations of non-discr imination and constitute
an unnecessary obstacle to international trade that is inconsistent with the TBT Agreement.
4.114 This dispute reflects an important concern to developing countries such as Mexico about the
use by developed countries of non-tariff barriers to impede imports.
(b) Tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
4.115 Where the Mexican fleet fishes in the ETP, ma ture yellowfin tuna tend to swim underneath
groups of dolphins. In the 1950s and 1960s, the US fishing fleet pioneered the method of circling
herds of dolphins with purse seine nets. Because ma ture yellowfin tuna are able to swim fast enough
to swim with dolphins, tuna fishing by setting on dol phins produces a large catch of mature tuna, and
there is very little bycatch of non-target sea life.
4.116 Although Mexican fleet was already using some techniques to protect dolphins, multilateral
efforts to reduce dolphin mortality in the ETP started with a non-binding international agreement
known as the La Jolla Agreement (concluded in 1992). Recognizing that the formalization of the La
Jolla Agreement into a legally binding instrument was the most effective way to normalize global
trade in tuna, in 1995 Mexico, the United Stat es and other countries concluded the Panama
Declaration, agreeing that if the United States (i) amended US laws on tuna imports to allow
yellowfin tuna to be imported from countries particip ating in the IDCP, and (ii) changed its labelling
definition of "dolphin-safe" from a "method of captu re" standard to the "non-mortality or serious
injury" standard established under the Panama Declar ation, they would then enter into a binding
international agreement to enhance and continue long-term cooperative multilateral dolphin protection
in the ETP. Based on assurances from the United States, in 1998 the participating countries
concluded the Agreement on International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), a binding

agreement for dolphin conservation and overall ecosyst em management in the ETP. No other fishery
in the world has ever adopted comparable techniques to protect dolphins or other bycatch.
4.117 Prior to the multilateral efforts to protect dolphi ns, the US fleet was estimated to be causing
the deaths of over 100,000 dolphins per year. Curren tly, the total mortality for all the fleets in the
ETP is approximately 1,000 per year. The availabl e evidence indicates that at least the same amount
or more dolphins are being killed outside the ETP in alternative fishing operations.
4.118 The techniques used to protect dolphins in th e ETP include backing down against the net and
causing the edges of the nets to create a channel through which the dolphins may escape; using divers
and personnel to assist the remaining dolphins; fitting the top portion of the purse-seine with a skirt of
mesh that prevents dolphins from catching their beaks or heads in the net; and prohibiting fishing after
sundown to ensure that dolphins within the net can be seen and safely removed. Importantly, every
vessel capable of setting purse-seine nets on dolp hins has an independent observer on board to
monitor whether any dolphin has been harmed and to ensure that all rul es of the agreement are
followed.
4.119 Instead of incurring the costs and responsibilities that have been shouldered by the Mexican
fleet, the US fleet gradually abandoned the ETP and moved to unregulated fisheries farther west in the
Pacific.
4.120 Other methods used for catch tuna by other fleets in the ETP and in other fisheries include: (i)
setting purse seine nets on logs or artificial Fish A ggregating Devices; (ii) setting purse seine nets on
free-swimming schools of tuna; (iii) long line fishi ng, and (iv) gillnets. These alternative methods
result in highly destructive bycatch of non-target species, including dolphins. In 1996, then-Vice
President Al Gore pointed out the deficienci es of other fishing methods highlighting the
"unacceptably" bycatch of several sp ecies. Yet, the United States wants Mexico to change its fishing
method to ones that are more environmentally da maging. The US action is a clear example of a
developed country member seeking to impose a unila teral standard on an activity of a developing
country occurring outside US borders.
(c) History of US restrictions on imports of Mexican tuna products
4.121 This is only the latest in a series of the rest rictions that the United States has imposed on
imports of Mexican tuna going back more than 20 years. Over this period the United States has,
through various means, denied meaningful access to Mexican tuna and t una products to the
US market.
4.122 During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States imposed a complete embargo on imports of
Mexican tuna. In 1991, Mexico initiated a GATT 1947 dispute settlement proceeding regarding that
embargo, and the panel ruled in Mexico's favour. However, the United States did not lift the embargo
on Mexico until 2000, when it acknowledged that Mexico had fulfilled its obligations under the
AIDCP. Despite the United States commitment to changing its dolphin-safe labelling regulation,
political interests and the US courts blocked the cha nge in the technical regulation. For the past 20
years Mexico has been extremely patient in wo rking cooperatively with the United States by
complying with all of the US-imposed conditions and waiting for the US political and court
procedures to be completed. In the meantime, the Mexican industry has borne all the costs and
burdens of implementing measures to ensure effec tive protection of dolphins in the ETP, and yet has
been unable to benefit from the use of the dolphi n-safe label in the US market. Meanwhile, the
United States has not even attempted to impose si milar obligations on fleets fishing in other ocean
areas; yet tuna from other fisheries is allowed to bear the dolphin-safe label.

4.123 By choosing to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally, the United States has undermined
the very purpose of the AIDCP, which has b een a very successful multilateral environmental
agreement. Thus, the US measures do not serve to enhance protection of dolphins and, to the
contrary, increase adverse impact on the ecosystem.
(d) The US measures
4.124 The measures comprise the legislation, the regula tions and the court decision referred to at
paragraphs 121 to 135 of Mexico's first written submission. The focus of the US measures is on large
purse seine vessels.
4.125 In all international fisheries, the greatest por tion of tuna caught commercially is captured by
large vessels using purse seine nets. In Mexico's case, approximately 95 per cent of its annual tuna
catch is from these large vessels. On this point the United States argues that "one third" of the
Mexican fleet is small vessels that do not set upon dol phins and can therefore qualify for the label. In
fact, this "one third" of Mexico's fleet accounts for less than five per cent of the annual catch.
4.126 Under the US measures, for tuna products made from fish caught in the ETP by large vessels
with purse seine nets there must be a certificati on that the tuna was not caught using the dolphin set
method and that no dolphins have been killed or ser iously injured during the set in which the tuna
were caught, among other requirements. This certif ication must be verified by an independent
observer who was onboard the vessel during the voyage . This requirement dis qualifies Mexican tuna
products from using the dolphin-safe label even though the tuna is caught in full compliance with the
requirements of the AIDCP, and an independent ob server certifies that no dolphins were harmed or
injured in the specific set in which the tuna were caught.
4.127 For tuna products produced from tuna caught in any other fishery by large vessels with purse
seine nets, the dolphin-safe label can be used if the ca ptain of the vessel has signed a certification that
"no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the particular
voyage on which the tuna was harvested". This means that no certification is required regarding
whether dolphins were killed or in jured for fisheries outside the ETP. Therefore, it does not matter to
the dolphin-safe designation if dolphins were killed or injured, as long as it is certified that the
dolphin set method was not used. The captains' cer tifications are unverifiable, since there is no
requirement for certifications by independent observers.
4.128 There is an obvious contradiction in the US approach to the issues in this dispute. The
United States, with Mexico and other countries, c oncluded the AIDCP to make tuna fishing in the
ETP dolphin-safe. Today dolphin mortality in the ETP is only a tiny fraction of what it was two
decades ago. But the United States now disregards this international success and the multilateral
process it helped create. It continues to pr event Mexican tuna products from being labelled
dolphin-safe.
(e) The US measures are discriminatory in viola tion of Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 and
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
4.129 Mexico's principal claims concern the discrimin atory nature of the US measures. In this
regard, the United States cites the unadopted 1991 GA TT panel report, claiming that it ruled on this
issue already. However, at the time of that dis pute, imports from Mexico were subject to a complete
embargo, and therefore there was no evidence pertaining to the de facto discriminatory effect of the
labelling measures in the US market. Mexico have that evidence now. In the US market for tuna
products, a dolphin-safe label is commercially valu able. Mexico has submitted evidence regarding
the necessity of a dolphin-safe label to market Mexi can tuna products through the major distribution
channels, and the value to the Mexican tuna industry of being able to affix the label to its tuna

products. This was confirmed by the then US Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environment in a statement submitted to the US court. He recognized that, without the
dolphin-safe label, the ability of fishermen to sell tuna in the US market is severely curtailed.
4.130 Mexico has a comparative advantage in fishi ng for tuna because mature yellowfin are found
near the Mexican coastline and adjacent waters. The large size of these tuna significantly increases the
efficiency of capture and processing. Furthermore, Mexican yellowfin tuna products are superior, in
terms of taste and quality, to products made from mo st other tuna species. Therefore, the Mexican
tuna industry has clear economic and quality advant ages over its competitors. Notwithstanding this
comparative advantage, Mexican tuna products are excluded from the major distribution channels in
the US market.
4.131 The US measures discriminate de facto against Mexican tuna products. De facto
discrimination occurs because of the economic and other circumstances related to certain products and
the application of a government measure in those circ umstances. This type of discrimination tilts the
balance of competitive opportunities against the imported products. The US measures discriminate
against Mexican tuna products because the Mexi can fleet fishes for tuna using dolphin sets and
therefore its tuna products are prohibited from havi ng the label while the fleets of other countries,
including the United States, fish using other methods and therefore are permit ted to use the label.
Thus, the US measure is attempting to pressure Me xico to make the choice between fishing grounds
and methods in order to be eligible for a dolphin-safe label.
4.132 The main distinguishing facts between this dispute and the many de facto discrimination
findings that have been made is that the measure in question relates to the production process methods
underlying the product rather than relating directly to the product and that the label is necessary to
access the principal distribution channels.
4.133 The same observations apply to Mexico's de facto most-favoured-nation discrimination
claims under GATT Article I:1 and Article 2.1 of th e TBT Agreement when the treatment accorded to
Mexican tuna products is compared to that accorded to tuna products from other countries.
4.134 The United States' narrow interpretation of these non-discrimination provisions would allow
developed country Members to structure their inte rnal measures so as to unilaterally impose their
regulations on other WTO Members, in particular developing country Members. One of the stated
objectives of the challenged measure is to encourage fi shing fleets such as those of Mexico to change
their fishing practices.
4.135 In fact, the United States actually imposes more liberal conditions for th e use of the labelling
standard in all fisheries other than the ETP becau se, in those other fisheries, no certification is
required that no dolphin were killed or seriously in jured and independent obser vers are not required.
This further magnifies the discrimination against Me xican tuna products because costs that must be
incurred by the Mexican fleet do not have to be incurred by the fleets of other countries.
4.136 The United States suggests that to be eligible for a dolphin-safe label the Mexican fleet could
use different fishing methods, minimizing the cost and ignoring the implication of switching to
alternative fishing methods, such as: (i) huge adver se environmental implicati ons and (ii) financial
costs.
4.137
The United States also argues that Mexico is a net importer of tuna products, that Mexico
could not export to the United States, and therefore cannot be discriminated against. This ignores the
fact that the yellowfin tuna caught by Mexico in the ETP is a high-quality tuna that could attract a
premium price in the US market and therefore make exports to the US market commercially
attractive.

4.138 Mexico has presented prima facie evidence that Mexican tuna products are excluded from the
major distribution channels in the United Stat es because of the prohibition against using the
dolphin-safe label, while the tuna products of the United States and other countries are allowed to use
the label and therefore are not excluded from those channels. That is sufficient for the panel to
conclude that the US measures do not provide national and MFN treatment.
(f) The US measures are inconsistent with the TBT Agreement
4.139 The US tuna measures are mandatory within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. The
US measures make it unlawful to include on the label of any tuna product offered for sale the term
"dolphin-safe" or any analogous term or symbol if the product contains tuna harvested in the ETP by a
vessel fishing with the dolphin set method, even when the international standards of the AIDCP have
been met.
4.140 In EC – Asbestos , the Appellate Body determined that product characteristics may be
prescribed or imposed in either a positive or a negative form. The dolphin-safe labelling rules meet
the latter criterion and therefore are mandatory. The situation is similar to that addressed by the
Appellate Body in EC – Sardines. However, the situation in this dispute is more extreme than in EC –
Sardines because if the label is not used, tuna products are largely excluded from the US market. For
these reasons, Mexico's approach is consistent with that of the Appellate Body in Asbestos and
Sardines.
(i) The US measures are inconsistent with TBT Article 2.2
4.141 The US tuna measures do not fulfil the objective of ensuring the consumers are not misled or
deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna th at was caught by a method that adversely affects
dolphins, because they allow tuna products to be labelled as dolphin-safe even if they contain tuna
from fishing sets in which dolphins were killed or injured, when the tuna was caught anywhere
outside the ETP. Most consumers would expect th e term dolphin-safe to mean that no dolphins were
killed or injured in harvesting the tuna, but the la bel does not mean that for tuna caught outside the
ETP. The US measures therefore mislead consumers. This is demonstrated by a recent national poll
conducted by a highly regarded polling firm. The poll indicated that 48% of the public believes that
dolphin-safe means no dolphins were injured or kill ed in the course of capturing the tuna (AIDCP
standard), 22% believes it means there is no dolphin meat in the can, and only 12% believe it means
dolphins were not encircled and then released in the capture of the tuna (US standard).
4.142 Moreover, the US measures encourage fishing fleets to use techniques that are not necessarily
safe for dolphins. There are substantial dolphin mort ality rates associated with those alternative
methods. Some of the evidence comes from the US government itself. It is well established that
dolphins are regularly killed in gillnets, both in US waters and elsewhere. Plainly dolphins are at risk
all over the world, from a variety of different fishing methods. In truth, the ETP is the fishery where
dolphins are best protected.
4.143 Thus, the US measures have the effect of di sadvantaging Mexican tuna products and the
Mexican industry, which the Unite d States agrees is in full comp liance with the AIDCP, while
allowing tuna products from many other countries to be misleadingly labelled dolphin-safe even if
dolphins were killed in the sets in which the tuna was caught. Thus, the US measures are more trade
restrictive than necessary to accomp any the stated objectives. If the objective is to encourage fishing
methods that do not cause adverse effects to dolphins the AIDCP standard would accomplish the
US goal in a less restrictive manner. Indeed, th e US government long agreed. It was the court
decision that prevented the United States from implementing its multilateral commitments.

(ii) The US measures are inconsistent with TBT Article 2.4
4.144 Mexico has shown that there is an interna tional standard defining the term dolphin-safe,
established through the AIDCP. The United States is a founding member of the AIDCP and agreed to
that standard. Yet the United States ultimately failed to base its own domestic standard on the
international standard to which it has agreed. Ac cordingly, the US measures are inconsistent with
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
(g) Conclusions
4.145 From the facts of this dispute and the evidence provided by Mexico it is clear that the tuna
measures maintained and adopted by the United Stat es discriminate against Mexican exports of tuna
products. The measures modify the conditions of competition, and do not fulfil a legitimate objective.
2. United States
(a) Introduction
4.146 The measures at issue in this dispute – co llectively referred to as the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions – establish conditions under which tuna products may voluntarily be labelled
dolphin-safe. These conditions ensure that when a do lphin-safe label appears on a tuna product in the
United States it accurately conveys to consumers that the product does not contain tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
4.147 Mexico alleges that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are inconsistent with
US obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). The Panel should reject Mexico's
claims.
4.148 First, Mexico has not adduced evidence sufficient to demonstr ate that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products as compared US tuna
products or tuna products of any other country. This is not surprising as the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions do not discriminate based on origin. Mexico, therefore, has not established that the
US provisions are inconsistent with Articles I:1 or III:4 of the GATT 1994.
4.149 Second, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions establish a voluntary labelling scheme.
Because the US provisions do not set out labelling requirements with which compliance is mandatory,
they do not meet the definition of a technical regul ation under the TBT Agreement and, therefore, are
not subject to Articles 2.1, 2.2, or 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
4.150 Third, even if the US dolphin-safe labelling pr ovisions were considered technical regulations,
they fulfil legitimate objectives that could not be fulfilled if the provisions permitted tuna caught by
setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphin-safe. Theref ore, even aside from the fact that they are not
considered technical regulations, the US provisions would not breach Articles 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.
4.151 Before turning to these points, we highlight a point that is central to this dispute: setting on
dolphins to catch tuna adversely affects dolphins. Intentionally setting on dolphins to catch tuna
results in both observed and unobserved dolphin morta lities. The effects on dolphins caused by this
fishing technique include death by starvation or from predation when dependent calves are separated
from their mothers during high-speed chases and acut e cardiac and muscle damage caused by the
exertion of avoiding pursuing speedboats and helic opters for prolonged periods. At least 5 million
dolphins were killed from 1959 to 1976 in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (or ETP) as a result of

being chased and encircled to catch tuna. Despite conservation measures adopted since that time,
populations of two primary species of dolphins in the ETP remain depleted, at only 19 and 35 per cent
of their pre-1959 levels. Moreover, there are no cl ear signs that these depleted dolphin populations
are recovering, and the best available science tells us that setting on dolphins to catch tuna is the most
probable reason that these populations remain depleted and show no clear signs of recovery.
(b) Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
4.152 Mexico has acknowledged that US dolphin-saf e labelling provisions do not, on their face,
afford less favourable treatment to imported tuna products, but instead claims that the US provisions
do so in fact.
4.153 Mexico has failed to show that the US provisi ons use the manner in which tuna is caught as a
means in fact to single out imports for treatment that is different than the treatment afforded domestic
products, let alone treatment that is less favourable . In this regard, Mexico wrongly identifies the
Appellate Body report in Korea – Various Measures on Beef as setting out the legal approach the
Panel should take in analysing Mexico's claim under Article III:4.
4.154 In this dispute, the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions on their face afford the same
treatment to imported and domestic tuna products. There is no reason to evaluate whether those
provisions cause a change in the conditions of competition to the detrim ent of imported products
without first examining whether those provisions in f act afford treatment that is different for imported
and domestic products.
4.155 Indeed, rather than the Korea – Various Measures on Beef report, the United States suggests
that the Panel may find it instructiv e to consider the panel report in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks as
well as the reports in the Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages , and Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes disputes. In those disputes, the challenged measures did not
on their face distinguish between domestic and impo rted products, but allegedly discriminated against
imports in fact.
4.156 In this dispute, Mexico has not adduced sim ilar evidence to show th at the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions – although origin neutral on their face – in fact use the manner in which the tuna
was caught to single out imports. It is not credible to argue that the US conditions for labelling tuna
dolphin-safe act as a proxy to distinguish between dom estic and imported tuna products, when most
imported products contai n tuna that was caught by methods other than setting on dolphins and are
eligible for, and in fact, use a dolphin-safe label.
4.157 While Mexico asserts that its fleet "almost exclus ively" sets on dolphins to catch tuna, this is
incorrect. One-third of Mexico's purse seine fleet exclusively uses techniques other than setting on
dolphins to catch tuna and therefore tuna caught by these vessels is eligible to use the dolphin-safe
label. The remaining two-thirds of Mexico's pur se seine fleet also opportunistically uses techniques
other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna, and the tuna caught by these vessels using those
techniques are also eligible to use the dolphin-safe label.
4.158 We also recall that the Appellate Body has found that the absence of a clear relationship
between the stated objectives of a measure and dis tinctions it draws between like products can be a
factor in determining whether those distinctions – which are on their face origin neutral – in fact
single out imports. In this dispute, however, there is a clear relationship between the objectives of the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions and the conditi ons under which tuna pr oducts may be labelled
dolphin-safe.

4.159 Mexico also contends that because the Mexican fishing fleet primarily fishes for tuna in the
ETP, the US provisions afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products. This is
also incorrect. First of all, it is the choice of fishing method and whether an y dolphins were killed or
seriously injured, not the place where the tuna w as caught, that determines whether tuna products are
eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe. Second, even if where the tuna was caught determined eligibility
to label tuna as dolphin-safe, there were 46 US purse seine vessels, of which 31 were full-time, that
fished for tuna in the ETP in th e year the statute was enacted in 1990. By comparison, in 1990
Mexico had 52 vessels that fished for tuna in th e ETP. Further, vessels from a number of countries
fish for tuna in the ETP. Tuna caught in the ETP therefore cannot be equated with tuna of Mexican
origin.
4.160 Mexico has also failed to show that the US provisions modify the conditions under which
domestic and imported tuna and t una products compete. The US provisions allow domestic and
imported tuna products the same opportunities to compete in the US market.
4.161 In this regard, the US provisions provide producers a choice. They can set on dolphins to
catch tuna, in which case they cannot label tuna pr oducts containing that tuna dolphin-safe, or they
can use other methods and ensure that no dolphins ar e killed or seriously injured in the set, in which
case they are eligible to label tuna products containing that tuna dolphin-safe.
4.162 Mexico appears to suggest that its proximity to the ETP gives it a competitive advantage
relative to the US and other countries in terms of fishing for tuna by setting on dolphins. Other
countries, including the United States, are similarly close to the ETP, including those areas of the ETP
where setting on dolphins to catch tuna occurs.
4.163 The possibility that Mexico's fleet may incur some costs to switch from setting on dolphins to
using other techniques to catch tuna is not evid ence that the US provision s afford less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna products.
(c) Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
4.164 Mexico has also failed to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. In examining whether the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were inconsistent w ith Article I:1, a 1991 panel under the GATT 1947 rejected Mexico's
claims. In particular, the panel found the US provi sions "applied to all countries whose vessels fished
in the [ETP] and thus did not distinguish betw een products originating in Mexico and products
originating in other countries".
4.165 Analysing whether a measure complies with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 involves among
other things consideration of (1) whether the measur e accords an advantage to products originating in
any Member and (2) whether that advantage is acco rded immediately and unconditionally to products
originating in any other Member.
4.166 With respect to the first consideration, Mexico wrongly identifies the "advantage" at issue in
this dispute. The US provisions grant the advantage of the opportunity to use the dolphin-safe label to
products that meet the conditions for using the dolphin-safe label. With respect to the second
consideration, Mexico has not established that th e conditions the US provisions establish for labelling
tuna products dolphin-safe – while origin neutral on their face – in fact act as a proxy to single out
imports from some countries over others as eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe.
4.167
In this regard, one-third of Mexico's purse sei ne fleet exclusively uses techniques other than
setting on dolphins to catch tuna and the remaining tw o-thirds of Mexico's fleet also opportunistically
uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna. Additionally, the technique of setting on

dolphins to catch tuna is not unique to the Mexican fishing fleet. The fishing fleets of Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Ve nezuela also have vessels that set on dolphins,
among other techniques, to catch tuna in the ETP.
4.168 As in the case with Mexico's argument unde r Article III:4, Mexico's argument that the
US provisions afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products because the
Mexican fleets primarily fish for tuna in the ETP should be rejected.
4.169 In this connection, it may be helpful for th e panel to consider another dispute where
complainants argued that a measure that was orig in neutral on its face in practice discriminated
against imports from certain countries as compared to others. In Canada – Autos , for example, the
Panel found that limiting eligibility for an import dut y exemption to certain importers in practice
discriminated against imports originating in certain countries and therefore breached Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994. In contrast to the situation in Canada – Autos , Mexican fishing vessels can choose to
meet the conditions that would make products containi ng their tuna eligible for the dolphin-safe label.
The fact that a significant portion of Mexico's fleet ha s chosen not to do so, cannot be attributed to the
US provisions or any failure of those provisions to afford Mexican tuna products an advantage they
accord to like products originating in other countries.
4.170 Mexico's arguments that it would be costly fo r Mexican vessels to adopt alternative fishing
techniques should be rejected for the same reas ons as they should be under Mexico's Article III:4
claim.
(d) Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
4.171 Mexico relies on the same evidence and argument to support its claim that the US provisions
afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna pr oducts as compared to domestic tuna products and
tuna products originating in other countries in breach of Article 2.1 as it does in respect of its
GATT 1994 Article III:4 and I:1 claims. As already revi ewed in today's statement, and in the US first
written submission, the Panel should reject Mexico 's claims under Articles III:4 and I:1 of the
GATT 1994. Moreover, US dolphin-safe labelling pr ovisions are not technical regulations and
therefore cannot breach Article 2.1.
(e) US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not tec hnical regulations under Articles 2.1, 2.2 or
2.4 of the TBT Agreement
4.172 With respect to Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement, there are several reasons why the
Panel should reject Mexico's claims , and we detail those reasons in the US first written submission.
Today, we will focus on the two primary reasons. One, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
not technical regulations and therefore are not subj ect to Article 2 of the TBT Agreement. As a
consequence, they cannot be incons istent with Articles 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. Two,
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions fulfil a legitimate objective that cannot be fulfilled by
allowing tuna products that contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphin-safe.
4.173 First, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not subject to Article 2 of the
TBT Agreement. Article 2 of the TBT Agreem ent concerns "technical regulations". The
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, however, are not "technical regulations". Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement defines a technical regulation as a "document that lays down product characteristics
or their related processes or production methods ... with which compliance is mandatory". As
elaborated in the US first written submission, under this definition two requirements must be met for a
measure to be a technical regulation: (1) the measu re must be either a document that lays down
product characteristics or their related processes or production methods, or a document that deals
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to

a product, processes or production method; and (2 ) compliance with the aforementioned product
characteristics, labelling requirements, etc. must be mandatory. The US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions do not meet the second element of this definition.
4.174 In this regard, it is useful to consider what "labelling requirements" as the term is used in
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement means. It does not mean that labelling is required in order that the
product can be sold; if it did that would render th e phrase "with which compliance is not mandatory"
in the definition of a standard inutile. Instead, ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 defines "requirement" as "a
provision that conveys criteria to be fulfilled". Thus, in the context of Annex 1 "labelling
requirements" means criteria or conditions that must be met in order for the labelling of a product to
conform with the standard or technical regulation.
4.175 Marketers of tuna products are free to choose whether to participate in the US labelling
scheme and regardless of that choice continue to se ll their products in the United States. Compliance
with the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions is, t hus, not mandatory within the meaning of Annex 1
of the TBT Agreement.
(f) US provisions are not inconsistent with Articles 2.2 or 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
4.176 The objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are (1) ensuring that consumers are
not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins; and (2) contributing to the protection of dolphins. The prevention of
deceptive practices and the protection of animal lif e or health are expressly identified as legitimate
objectives in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions squarely fall within these two objectiv es. As we explained in the US first written
submission, the United States is concerned about the ETP as a whole and has a number of programs
and measures in place to address conservation and ma nagement of marine resources in the ETP that
go beyond dolphin conservation. The US dolphin- safe labelling provisions cannot be "illegitimate"
simply because other environmental concerns also merit attention.
4.177 With regard to Mexico's claims under Article 2. 2, we disagree with Mexico's contention that
the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling provis ions could be fulfilled in the absence of the
US provisions, in particular because the AIDCP a nd measures implemented pursuant to it fulfil those
objectives. While the AIDCP has made an important contribution to dolphin conservation in the ETP,
setting on dolphins to catch tuna continues to adversely affect dolphins. If the US provisions
permitted tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphin-safe, the
US provisions would no longer fulfil the provisions' objectives.
4.178 We also note that Mexico's presentation of its Article 2.2 claims appears to be based not on
the text of Article 2.2 but instead on application of the legal approach used in deciding whether a
measure is "necessary" within the meaning of Ar ticle XX of the GATT 1994. The elements that go
into answering these respective questions differ and it would not be appropriate to apply the same
legal approach to both.
4.179 With regard to Mexico's claims under Article 2. 4, Mexico cannot establish that allowing tuna
caught by setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphi n-safe would be effectiv e and appropriate in
fulfilling the objectives of those provisions, even assuming for the sake of argument that the definition
of "dolphin-safe" in the AIDCP resolutions constituted a "relevant international standard".
4.180 Under the AIDCP resolutions – which Mexico wrongly cites as "relevant international
standards" – tuna caught by setting on dolphins ma y be considered dolphin-safe, notwithstanding the
evidence that setting on dolphins to catch tuna adve rsely affects dolphins. Allowing tuna products to

be labelled dolphin-safe based on the AIDCP resoluti on definitions would ther efore not be effective
or appropriate in fulfilling the objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.181 Further, Mexico's efforts to elaborate the re lative ecosystem impacts of various methods to
catch tuna are also not relevant to whether the US provisions are consistent with its WTO obligations.
The fact that methods of catching tuna other than setting on dolphins impact the ecosystem does not
mitigate the fact that setting on dolphins to catch tuna adversely affects dolphins.
(g) Amicus submission
4.182 We have reviewed the submission filed by the Humane Society International and the
American University, Washington College of Law and believe that it contains a number of pieces of
relevant and useful information that could assist the Panel in understanding the issues in this dispute.
C. C
LOSING ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING
1. Mexico
4.183 The US measures are a clear example of a de veloped country member seeking to impose a
unilateral standard on an activity of a developing c ountry occurring outside the US borders and render
meaningless a multilateral effort that is indeed achieving astonishing results in protecting dolphins.
4.184 A number of issues have been discussed duri ng our meeting. I would like to focus on a few
key points in my closing statement.
(a) Discrimination claims
4.185 Mexico's discrimination claims under Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement are at the core of Mexico's case.
4.186 As we have discussed, this is a classic example of de facto discrimination against a like
product. The dolphin-safe labelling measure has up set the balance of competitive opportunities for
imports of Mexican tuna products in favour of like US origin tuna products and tuna products of other
countries.
4.187 Whether some small portion of Mexico's production of tuna products could be eligible for the
dolphin-safe label is the not the applicable test un der the WTO's rules. The test is whether the
measure has upset the balance of competitive opportu nities. We have submitted prima facie evidence
that Mexico's high quality tuna products are excluded from the major distribution channels in the US,
while US-origin tuna products and tuna products from other c ountries have open access to those
channels.
4.188 Further, we have demonstrated that the dol phin-safe label has substantial value in the
marketplace. And when I say dolphin-safe label, I mean a label that conveys that dolphins were not
killed or seriously injured in the harvesting of the tu na in the can, which is what consumers believe it
means.
(b) Impermissible imposition of extraterritorial policies
4.189 As we have heard from the US the past several days, it wants to make access to its market
conditional on Mexico changing its fishing methods and/or fishing areas. This goes against
fundamental principles underlying the WTO because it would take away the comparative advantage
of the Mexican tuna industry.

4.190 As Mexico has explained, different fishing me thods require fishing in different areas, for
different types of fish. Mexico currently focuses on catching mature dolphin-safe tuna near its
coastline and in adjacent waters. FAD fishing woul d require moving to a different fishing area and
concentrating on catching lower value skipjack or l ess mature yellowfin. FAD fishing would result in
destructive bycatch of both immature tuna a nd non-target species including dolphins. It is not
economical or practical for vessels to shift back and forth from one system and region to another.
4.191 Yesterday the US suggested Mexico should sell sk ipjack in the US market. But other tuna
products companies sell yellowfin tuna products as "premium" products in the US market.
Apparently the US thinks it is acceptable for the Me xican brands to be excluded from that premium
market.
4.192 Regarding the negative impact of FAD fishing on tuna stocks, the US says Mexico could just
limit or suspend entirely fishing to preserve the fish ery. In other words, the US thinks that the
Mexican fleet should substantially reduce its fishing – which would be the result if the entire Mexican
fleet shifted to FAD fishing. So when the US says the objective of the labelling measure is to stop
dolphin sets, it seems to be saying that the Mexican industry should simply abandon tuna entirely.
4.193 Fundamentally, the US is trying to force "choices" on the Mexican industry through its
labelling measure. That should not be permissible under the TBT Agreement.
4.194 On the other hand, we also heard the US say yest erday that it is fine with Mexico continuing
to set on dolphins for tuna to be sold in Mexico. If the objective of the measure is to discourage
setting on dolphins, we don't understa nd how the US measure accomplishes that. The only thing it
accomplishes very well is to exclude Mexican tuna products from competing in the US market.
(c) Unilateral v. multilateral
4.195 One of the factors that makes this case unusual, and which highlights the egregious nature of
the US measures, is there is already an extremel y successful multilateral agreement that addresses the
precise objective of the US labelling measure. Unde r this agreement, dolphin deaths have already
been reduced to a rate of 0.02 per cent of the overall population-- which is well below what is
considered acceptable under the US law that regul ates the killing of marine mammals in fishing
operations in US domestic waters. (We reject th e highly exaggerated US claims about unobserved
mortalities and will submit in writing the reasons that backs Mexico's position.)
4.196 As we have explained in our written submissi on and during this hearing, the US has long
agreed that the AIDCP was successful, and that alte rnative methods of fishing were highly destructive
and undesirable. It ratified the treaty and appr oved legislation to implement its international
commitments. We have shown you former Vice Pr esident Gore's letter and court testimony from the
then responsible US government official. There is considerably more evidence available that the
US government agreed with Mexico over an exte nded period. Indeed, the US even changed its
dolphin-safe standard to match the AIDCP standard for a short time in 2002, before court litigation
led it to revert back to the original standard.
4.197 Now the US is telling you that it is not satisfied with the AIDCP. But it never came to the
IATTC and asked to use the AIDCP structure to investigate dolphin populations in the ETP, or
whether dolphin sets were causing stress to dolphins. W ith regard to this issue, it has simply ignored
the multilateral organization that the US played a leading role in establishing.
4.198 Unilateral trade-related actions such as the dolphin-safe labelling measures that have the
objective of pressuring developing countries into c onforming their behaviour to the dictates of
developed countries cannot be not to lerated under the WTO system. Thus, this case is important not

only to Mexico and the Mexican tuna industry, but also for the future operation of the WTO system.
Multilateral solutions – especially those that are as successful as the AIDCP – should not be ignored.
2. United States
4.199 As we've discussed these past days, it is clear that Mexico is able, and does sell, their tuna
products in the United States. Moreover, Mexican tuna products can be labelled dolphin-safe in the
United States. The label is not barrier to the US market.
4.200 The US provisions establish a voluntary origin -neutral labelling scheme. These provisions
apply the same conditions on use of the dolphin-safe la bel for tuna products regardless of origin. In
any fishery where there is a regular and significant association between tuna and dolphins, or regular
and significant dolphin mortality, the documentation required to substantiate dolphin-safe labels is the
same: the observer and the captain must certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the
set and no nets were set on dolphins during the fishing trip.
4.201 The purse-seine tuna fishery in the ETP is a fishery where not only is there a regular and
significant tuna dolphin association, but one that is intentionally expl oited on a wide-scale,
commercial basis by setting on dolphins to catch tuna. Dolphin deaths are a foreseeable and expected
consequence of this fishing technique, and this is why under AIDCP procedures each vessel that
fishes for tuna in this way is assigned a set numb er of dolphins that each vessel may be observed
killing each year.
4.202 And, observed dolphin mortalities only tell a small portion of the story. Setting on dolphins to
catch tuna has other detrimental impacts on dolph ins: separation of dependent calves from their
mothers, reduced reproductive success due to stress induced foetal mortality, acute cardiac and muscle
damage, to name a few. The best available science tells us that setting on dolphins to catch tuna is the
most probable reason why dolphin stocks in the ETP remain depleted, at less than 30 per cent of their
abundance levels before this fishi ng practice began, and is also why they are showing no clear signs
of recovery. In this case, Mexico has not shown that any difference in documentation is in fact a
means to afford different or less favourable treatment to Mexican imports.
4.203 In that regard, Mexico argues that the US provisions use fishing method and location as a way
to single out Mexican imports. The evidence however does not support that claim. At the time the
US provisions were adopted, 46 US and 52 Mexican purse seine vessels were registered to fish for
tuna in the ETP, and most of these vessels set on dolphins to catch tuna. Since then, US vessels
abandoned setting on dolphins to catch tuna to meet the conditions to label their tuna dolphin-safe.
On the other hand, the Mexican vessels that were set ting on dolphins chose to continue that practice,
and therefore not to meet the conditions to label their products dolphin-safe. Mexico cannot rely on
its vessels' choice not to meet the conditions to label their products dolphin-safe – a choice the
US fleet equally had to make – as a basis to argue the US provisions discriminate against Mexican
products.
4.204 Further undermining Mexico's contentions are th at one-third of its fleet does not set on
dolphins to catch tuna, and therefore products cont aining its tuna are eligible to be labelled
dolphin-safe. Up until 2002, tuna caught by these v essels was sold to US canneries and sold in the
US as dolphin-safe.
4.205 We also draw attention to the maps in Exhi bit MEX-65 that Mexico provided today. That
exhibit shows that Mexican vessels are fishing just off the coast of Mexico using methods other than
setting on dolphins to catch tuna, and the Mexican representative said today that 20 per cent of
Mexico's catch is caught using methods other than setting on dolphins. Exhibit MEX-65 also appears
to show that Mexican vessels are traveling just as fa r west to set on dolphins to catch tuna as it claims

it would have to travel south to fish for tuna not in association with dolphins. This evidence supports
the US position that the US provisions and the conditions they establish for use of the dolphin-safe
label are not singling out Mexican imports.
4.206 Mexico has also referenced the fact that th ere is dolphin by-catch and mortality in other
fisheries. The United States does not deny that dol phins may sometimes interact with a fishery and
dolphin mortality may occur outside the ETP. The United States is concerned about this, and as
discussed these past days and in the US first wr itten submission, the United States works with other
regional fisheries management organization to monitor and address these concerns. But other
fisheries where dolphin morality may occur do not involve the exploitation of a regular and significant
association between the target speci es and dolphins, and there is no information indicating mortality
levels on any similar order of magnitude to what has occurred in the ETP.
4.207 Finally, we would like to highlight a few of the key legal points discussed today.
4.208 First, the US provisions are not technical regulations. They establish conditions under which
tuna may be labelled dolphin-safe, compliance with which is not mandatory.
4.209 Second, even if the US provisions were tec hnical regulations, they fulfil a legitimate
objective. Those objectives are ensuring consumers have accurate information about whether tuna
products were caught in a manner that adversely aff ects dolphins, and ensuring that the US market is
not used to encourage the setting on dolphins to catch tuna.
4.210 Third, the AIDCP definitions Mexico cites are not international standards. They were not
adopted by a body within the meaning of that te rm under the TBT Agreement, and they were not
adopted by a recognized body that is open to all WTO Members.
4.211 Fourth, as Mexico acknowledges, the US provisi ons are origin-neutral on their face, and
Mexico has not shown that those provisions in fact single out imports for less favourable treatment.
4.212 Mr Chairman, this concludes my closing statem ent. We thank the Panel, members of the
Secretariat, and the interpreters for their time and attention in these proceedings.
D. S
ECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
1. Mexico
(a) Introduction
4.213 This dispute concerns US measures that unila terally impose conditions related to fishing
methods in order for tuna products to be labelled "dolphin-safe" and thereby enable those products to
access major distribution channels in the US mark et. These conditions conflict with and undermine a
highly successful multilateral environmental agreem ent, the AIDCP, which already addresses
concerns about dolphin mortality and injury. Notw ithstanding Mexico's compliance with the AIDCP,
the conditions imposed by the US measures prohibit the use of a dolphin-safe label on imports of
Mexican tuna products while permitting the label to be used on like tuna products from other
countries including the United States. As a consequence, Mexican tuna products that qualified as
dolphin-safe under the AIDCP are not allowed to be labelled dolphin-safe in the US market and,
therefore are not able to access the major dist ribution channels while tuna products of the
United States and other countries are.
4.214 The US measures are intended to extraterritoria lly pressure the Mexican tuna fleet to change
where it fishes for tuna and/or to change its fish ing method to alternative methods that are recognized

to cause substantial environmental harm. As its core, the protection of dolphins is what the
"dolphin-safe" label is all about. However, the US measures are not effective in providing additional
protection for dolphins in the ETP and, in fact, pr ovide no protection for dolphins outside the ETP
where other fishing methods are used. Thus, the US consumers cannot be sure that tuna that is
labelled dolphin-safe and sold in the United States is actually dolphin-safe.
4.215 The circumstances that created the need for th e US measures have been remedied by the
AIDCP and no longer exist. To the extent that the US arguments regarding other circumstances that
necessitate the US measures have any merit, the United States should have addressed those
circumstances multilaterally. Finally, there are less trade-restrictive alternative measures available to
the United States that can achieve the objectives that it seeks.
(b) Measures at issue
(i) The measures must be assessed cumulatively
4.216 In Mexico's view the US measures identifie d in its panel request and its First Written
Submission should be analysed as a whole. The a pplication of all the measures prohibits in a
discriminatory manner the use of a "dolphin-safe" label on imports of Mexi can tuna products and
modifies conditions of competition in the relevant market.
(ii) Functioning of the US measures
Application inside of the ETP
4.217 Under the US measures, for tuna products produced from fish caught in the ETP by large
vessels with purse seine nets there must be a certification that (i) the tuna was not caught using the
dolphin set method at any time during a particular fishing trip, and (ii) no dolphins have been killed or
seriously injured during the set in which the tuna were caught. This certification must be verified by
an independent observer who was onboard the vessel during the voyage. The requirement that the
tuna must not be caught using the dolphin set method automatically disqualifies Mexican tuna
products from using a dolphin-safe label even though such tuna is dolphin-safe under the AIDCP.
Application outside of the ETP
4.218 The dolphin-safe standard that the United Stat es applies to tuna harvested outside the ETP is
that "no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or to encircle dolphins during the fishing trip".
Outside the ETP there is no requirement to certify th at no dolphins were killed or seriously injured
while fishing for tuna.
4.219 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d) separates tuna caught outside the ETP into the following categories: (i)
caught on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing; (ii) caught using purse seine nets "in a
fishery in which the Secretary has determined that a regular and significant association occurs
between dolphins and tuna; (iii) caught using purse sei ne nets "in any other fishery", and (iv) caught
without use of purse seine nets in a fishery "ide ntified by the Secretary as having a regular and
significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins". Although not expressly mentioned in the statute,
for tuna caught without using purse seine nets in a fishery not identified as having a regular and
significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins, no certification at all is required. Also, for vessels
using purse seine nets that are smaller than 400 short tons no certification is required.
4.220 The key point is that, in the 20 years since the law was enacted, the United States has not
designated any non-ETP fishery as having a regular and significant association between tuna and

dolphins, or regular and significant dolphin mortalities. Thus, with respect to fishing by vessels using
purse seine nets, the only relevant category for non-ETP fisheries is the one for "any other fishery."
4.221 The United States asserts that the standard for a lternative labels in section 1385(d)(3)(C) ("no
dolphins killed or seriously injured") is being applie d cumulatively with the standard for the official
label in section 1385(d)(1)(B)(ii) ("no purse seine ne t was intentionally deployed on or used to
encircle dolphins"). That assertion is contradicted by Exhibit US-59, Form 370, and the practices of
the US producers of tuna products. In particular , neither Exhibit US-59 nor Form 370 describes a
standard for tuna caught in "any other fishery" that includes the "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" requirement, and each of the three major US producers of tuna products define "dolphin-safe"
as not setting on dolphins, with no mention of dolphins not being killed or seriously injured.
(c) Facts
(i) The US measures have the effect of excluding Mexican tuna products from the major
distribution channels
4.222 It is clear that the US dolphin-safe labelli ng measures have altered the conditions of
competition for Mexican tuna products. The US measur es have created a market distinction for tuna
products in the US market where the dolphin-safe labe l has an important commercial value. By virtue
of the US measures which prohibit the label on Me xican tuna products, those products are excluded
from the major distribution channels.
4.223 US imports have grown from $259 million in 2000 to $613 million in tuna products in 2009.
Mexico's exports have remained minimal througho ut this period. In 2009 US imports from Mexico
were only $7.5 million (1% of the US market for imported tuna products). This clearly shows an
adverse impact of the US measures on Mexican tuna products.
4.224 Although the United States asserts that imports' sh are of the US market of tuna products has
steadily increased since the US labelling provisions were enacted, in Mexico's view this assertion
applies only with respect to tuna caught outside th e ETP and/or using a fishing method other than the
dolphin set method. For tuna caught in association with dolphins there has not been any significant
growth or gains in market share.
4.225 The United States also asserts that Mexico h as vessels under 363 metric tons and therefore
tuna harvested by these vessels already meets th e conditions to be labe lled dolphin-safe under the
US measures. Yet, those vessels amount to less than 4% of the total catch of the Mexican tuna fleet
and these tuna is sold in the domestic market. With respect to the vessels above 363 metric tons that
sometime uses other techniques than setting on dolphins; the tuna caught with these techniques cannot
be labelled as dolphin-safe given that the US measure s require that the dolphin set method is not used
during an entire voyage.
(ii) Tuna fishing and effects on dolphins
4.226 In explaining its justification for the meas ures at issue, the United States relies on two
primary themes: first, that tuna fishing is resulti ng in the deaths of many thousands of dolphins more
than those that are recorded by the independent observers onboard each large purse seine vessel in the
ETP, and second, that even the approximately 1, 000 deaths observed annually in the ETP are too
many (and by implication should be reduced to zero).

US theory of unobserved mortalities
4.227 The entire premise of the US theory of unobserve d mortalities is that the populations of two
dolphin species that it has unilaterally determined as "d epleted" are not growing at the rate that would
be expected. To support this assertion, the United St ates continues to cite the old estimates as though
they were conclusive facts, and inexplicably fails to mention that those estimates were superseded by
a more recent report by the US Department of Commerce (2008), which not only had the benefit of
more recent field research, but also found errors in the underlying data relied upon by earlier reports.
The 2008 Report indicates that all three of the officially "depleted" dolphin stocks in the ETP were
estimated to be growing at rates considered to be near the 4-8 per cent maximum possible for
dolphins. This finding contradicts the United Stat es assertion that setting upon dolphins in a manner
consistent with the AIDCP is adversely aff ecting dolphin stocks through unobserved dolphin
mortality.
Purported US goal of no mortality
4.228 The United States makes the following statemen t: "[M]exico may be considering 1,239
dolphin deaths as "virtually" none, but with 1,239 dol phin deaths in 2009 it is not accurate to say that
dolphin mortality in the purse seine tuna fishery in the ETP has been virtually eliminated." The
implication of this assertion is that anything more than zero or a few mortalities is unacceptable.
4.229 The impact of bycatch on populations is measu red in relation to the size of the affected
populations. When asked by the Panel if a bycatch of 1000 dolphins per year was significant, in terms
of population recovery or conservation, the Unite d States recognized that given the relative size of
ETP dolphin populations, the death of 1,000 dolphins annually was not believed to be significant from
a population recovery perspective.

4.230 Finally, it is important to note that, although the US goal in the ETP is no mortality at all, the
United States tolerates the deaths of many marine mammals each year in fisheries that are under its
own control. Mexico notes that there is no scientific basis for the United States to claim that the death
of a marine mammal in a tuna fishery is more ha rmful than the death of a marine mammal in a
monkfish or other non-tuna fishery, or that dolphin mort alities are irrelevant if the tuna is not destined
for canning.
(iii) Unilateral action by the United States
4.231 The United States has adopted its own dolphin-safe labelling regime which diverges from and
undermines the regime adopted and implemented unde r the AIDCP. For Mexico and other countries,
the incentive to create an international binding ag reement was to gain commercially meaningful
access to the US A fundamental premise of the ne gotiation was that the United States would change
its law to provide that tuna products harvested in the ETP in accordance with the AIDCP would be
eligible for the US "dolphin-safe" label. Now, twelve years later, under current US legislation,
complying with the requirements of the AICDP is still not sufficient to allow Mexico to use the
"dolphin-safe" label. Mexico is not aware of an y action of any kind by the United States to address
this issue in the AIDCP, in an IATTC meeting, or in any other international regional fisheries
organization.
(iv) Effects on other species
4.232 Mexico understands that the United States is claiming that fishing on FADs is the most
ecologically responsible manner to harvest tuna. Th is is the first time that the United States has
officially promoted such a position, which conflic ts with the position of the United States when it
adopted the IDCPA. Mexico observes that the W estern and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

implemented a ban on FAD fishing during August and September 2009, and intended to extend the
ban to three months in future years. The US claim of support for increas ed FAD sets in the ETP
cannot be reconciled with its actions in the ICCA T and its concurrence with the FAD limitations
imposed by the WCPFC.
(v) Association between tuna and dolphins outside the ETP
4.233 The United States asserts that there is no regular and significant association between dolphins
and tuna outside the ETP and therefore that it is u nnecessary for the United States to pay attention to
whether dolphins are being killed or seriously injured outside the ETP.
No definition of "regular and significant"
4.234 The United States concedes that there is no defin ition of "regular and significant". If "regular
and significant" means "no mortalities", many fisheries, including the Western and Central Pacific
tuna fishery, should be designated. Thus, it is obvi ous that there is no scientific basis for the decision
not to evaluate whether other fisheries have a "re gular and significant association" with dolphins or
"regular and significant" dolphin mortalities.
Other regional fisheries management organizations
4.235 The United States greatly overstates the monitoring activities of the non-ETP regional
fisheries management organizations. Mexico ha s produced evidence that no regional fisheries
management organization other than the IATTC has had a comprehensive program for many years to
monitor bycatch of marine mammals.
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission ("IOTC")
4.236 The IOTC is still in the initial stages establishing programs to monitor bycatch. The October
2010 report of the IOTC Working Party on Ecosys tems and Bycatch recognizes that the paucity of
data makes any attempt to estimat e levels of bycatch very difficult. Thus, it is obvious that the
United States cannot justify relying on data from the IOTC as a basis for concluding that marine
mammals are unharmed in the Indian Ocean tuna fishery.
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("ICCAT")
4.237 The ICCAT also has very limited informati on on bycatch. It publishes a webpage listing
species that have been caught as bycatch, which includes 26 species of dolphins and whales. Of
those, 15 are indicated to have been caught in pur se seine nets. Thus, the United States cannot justify
relying on data from the ICCAT as a basis for c oncluding that marine mammals are unharmed in the
Atlantic tuna fishery – especially knowing that th e fishery "interacts" with at least 26 species of
marine mammals.
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission ("WCPFC")
4.238 Almost all US purse seine vessels fish for tuna in the Western Central Pacific Ocean. The
United States asserts that their independent obser vers witnessed 1,500 sets made by US vessels and
saw few interactions with dolphins, but left unexp lained whether the observers were specifically
trained to watch for dolphin interactions, where the observed vessels were fishing, whether the vessels
were using purse seine nets or longlines, and whet her or not the dolphins were killed or seriously
injured. To put the issue of bycatch in the WCPO in perspective, it is important to note that there were
approximately 100,000 purse seine sets in that fish ery in 2009, and there has been limited observer
coverage.

4.239 The WCPFC Secretariat has published an evaluation of the impact of the WCPO fishery
based on more extensive data. Several points are appare nt from this analysis. First, no data have been
publicly available on the overall interaction of this fishery with marine mammals. Second, observers
witnessed dolphin and whale sets being made, indicating that there is an association between tuna and
marine mammals in at least some parts of the WCPO. Third, the total number of purse seine sets
observed over eleven years (33,319) is approximately one third of the total number of purse seine sets
currently being made in the WCPO. As the 33,319 observed sets represent about one third of current
total sets, the implication is that the WCPO pur se seine fishery causes al most 2,200 marine mammal
mortalities annually. Because the observers were not trained for dolphin observation, and apparently
did not count serious injuries, it is likely that this figure underestimates the total.
4.240 Mexico is not aware that efforts have been ma de to analyse the impact this mortality might
have on dolphin populations in the WCPO by conducting abundance surveys, evaluate whether
dolphin populations in the WCPO are growing at expected rates, or study the indirect effects on the
WCPO dolphin populations caused by separation of mothers from calves and stress to dolphins
resulting from their interactions with WCPO fishing vessels.
Other regional fisheries – conclusions
4.241 Other regional fisheries management organizati ons are still in the early stages in monitoring
the impact of fishing operations on marine mammals. Accordingly, the evidence of dolphin
mortalities in these other fisheries presented by Me xico cannot be refuted by citing to inaction by
those fisheries management organizations. Also, th ere is considerable other evidence available of
significant marine mammal associations and mortalities in non-ETP fisheries, both for tuna and other
target species. Thus, it is clear that protections fo r marine mammals are needed globally and that it is
arbitrary for the United States to single out the ETP – and Mexico's tuna products industry – for
special negative treatment when the AIDCP remains the world's only successful multilateral
agreement for the protection of marine mammals, while there is substantial evidence of harm to
marine mammals in other fisheries at least comparable to that in the ETP.
(d) Legal argument
(i) General
The need to address all of Mexico's claims
4.242 It is essential to the effective resolution of this dispute that the Panel avoids judicial economy
and rules on all of the claims raised by Me xico under the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement
because of: (i) the nature of the measures at issue; ( ii) the fact that this is the first time that such
measures have been subject to dispute settlement und er the DSU; (iii) the di fferences in the wording
and potential application of the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement to the
measures; and (iv) the importance of the effective discipline of such non-tariff measures to developing
country Members such as Mexico.
Order in which the Panel should address Mexico's claims
4.243 It is logical for the Panel first to address Mexico's claims of discrimination under GATT
Articles I:1 and III:4 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. An examination of Mexico's other claims
under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement should then follow.

The disciplining of unilateral actions by WTO Members
4.244 The US measures challenged in this dispute de facto condition access to the principal
US distribution channels for tuna products on compliance with a fishing method that has been
unilaterally imposed by the United States. These me asures pressure the Mexican tuna fleet to use
alternative fishing methods in the ETP that are very destructive to the marine ecosystem. The
obligations in the WTO Agreements must not be interpreted so as to allow a WTO Member to
condition access to its domestic market based on co mpliance with that Member's unilateral policy
relating to actions outside its territory includi ng unincorporated process and production methods. The
only circumstances where such actions should be perm itted are where they can be justified under one
of the specific exceptions to the WTO obligations. None of those exceptions have been invoked by the
United States nor do any of them apply to the US measures.
"zero tolerance"
4.245 The United States justifies its measure by sayi ng, in essence, that a dramatic reduction of
dolphin mortality to a number that is already statis tically insignificant is not enough. Noting that the
TBT Agreement gives WTO members the right to set their own standards, the United States defends
its right to pursue a policy where no dolphin would die (zero tolerance). The argument by the
United States raises an important systemic i ssue. Members of the WTO are free under both the
TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement to consider various risk factors as they determine where to
set their standards for health and safety. But a st andard of zero tolerance would be unworkable in the
real world
(ii) Mexico's discrimination claims under Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement
Issues that are common to Mexico's discrimination claims
Like products
4.246 Both Mexico and the United States agree that the relevant products for the like product
analysis are "tuna products". The sole issue that has been raised regarding the like products issue is
whether, in the light of the US consumer prefer ences tuna products that are labelled dolphin-safe are
"like" tuna products that are not labelled dol phin-safe. Mexico has explained why consumer
preferences support Mexico's position that the products are like.
4.247 In addition, for a brief period in January 20 03 when the United States changed the definition
of dolphin-safe, a US distributor of Mexican tuna products was able to import Mexican tuna products
with a dolphin-safe label to a large US grocery chain. Later, when the dolphin-safe label was
prohibited for Mexican tuna products, the sales were no longer possible. The ability to sell Mexican
tuna products with the dolphin-safe label confirms that Mexican AIDCP dolphin-safe tuna products
and tuna products from the United States and other countries that are dolphin-safe under the
US measures are "like" from the perspective of US consumers and retailers.
Timeframe for examining the facts related to Mexico's de facto discrimination claims
4.248 Mexico's discrimination claims concern de facto discrimination. The US measures violate
Articles I:1, III:4 and 2.1 because their effect is to adversely modify the conditions of competition in
the US marketplace for Mexican tuna products when compared to like tuna products from the
United States and other countries. This denial of competitive opportunities is shown by the relevant
facts as they existed at the time of the establishment of the Panel.

4.249 The United States and European Union in its th ird party submission argue that the facts as
they existed when the US measures were first introduced in 1990 are relevant to Mexico's de facto
discrimination claim. In Mexico's view the Panel must examine the facts as of the date of the Panel's
establishment and determine whether there is de facto discrimination.
4.250 The unadopted GATT 1947 panel report in US – Tuna (Mexico) illustrates the importance of
the Panel examining the facts as they exist at the time of its establishment. As explained by Mexico, at
the time of the GATT 1947 panel, the United States had a trade embargo in place against Mexican
tuna. Thus, there was no evidence of the de facto discrimination and trade restrictive effects of the
challenged measures. The de facto discriminatory and trade restrictive effects are clearly occurring
today and it is the existence of those effects that gives rise to Mexico's request that the Panel rule
upon its claims of de facto discrimination in this dispute.
The facially neutral US measures de facto discriminate
4.251 Mexico and the United States agree that the US measures are, on their face, origin neutral.
They disagree, however, on whether the measures de facto discriminate. Basically, the United States
argues that the US measures provide that tuna produc ts of any origin that contains tuna that was
caught by setting on dolphins may not be labelled dolphin-safe and that the use of the dolphin-safe
label is equally prohibited for US tuna and tuna from other countri es if it was caught by setting on
dolphins. To support its arguments, the United States refers to the Panel Report in EC – Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products and the Appellate Body Report in Dominican Republic – Import and
Sale of Cigarettes.
4.252 The basic argument of the United States is that a measure that is "origin neutral" on its face is
by definition consistent with the national treatment obligation. The Appellate Body made it clear in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef that a measure can treat dom estic and like imported products
differently without violating the national treatment obligation. However, the Appellate Body did not
state that a measure that does NOT treat domestic a nd imported like products differently is, for that
reason, consistent with the national treatment obligat ion. That is precisely the effect of the supposedly
"origin neutral" measures at issue in this dis pute. Although presented in the context of national
treatment, this principle also applies to Mexico's most-favoured-nation discrimination claims.
4.253 The EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products panel report to which the
United States refers does not support its argument. In the Panel's view, Argentina did not provide
sufficient evidence of the alleged de facto discrimination. In this dispute, the issue of insufficient
evidence does not arise because Mexico h as provided prima facie evidence of the de facto
discriminatory effect of the US measures. The Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report does not imply that a measure will necessarily be consis tent with the national
treatment obligation if it has a detrimental effect unr elated to the foreign origin of the product. That
ruling must be understood in the context of the facts of that dispute. Those facts are readily
distinguishable from the facts in this case. In this dispute the discriminatory effect is not between
certain producers and importers but on the group of Mexican tuna products overall compared to the
group of like tuna products from the United States and, in the case of Mexico's MFN claims, other
countries. Also, the discrimination in this disput e does not depend on the characteristics of individual
importers but, rather, on the fishing practices of th e fleet that caught the tuna for exportation to the
United States in the form of tuna products.
4.254 Rather, the situation in this dispute is analogous to the facts in one of the seminal GATT 1947
non-discrimination reports, Belgium – Family Allowances . In that instance, the Panel found that a
Belgian law that levied a charge on foreign goods that were purchased by Belgian public bodies and
that originated in countries whose system of family allowances did not meet specific requirements, was

in violation of the non-discrimination obligations Articles I:1 and possibly III:2. There, as here, the
discriminatory treatment related to conditions that the foreign country did not meet.
Mexico's discrimination claims are not depe ndent on different treatment for fisheries
within and outside the ETP
4.255 Mexico raised the difference in regulation in the ETP and non-ETP fisheries to demonstrate
that the US measures do not fulfil either the first objective stated by the United States or the objective
that is reflected in the design, structure and ch aracter of the measures which is the protection of
dolphins. While differences in treatment may furt her exacerbate the discrimination being faced by
Mexican tuna products, the factual basis of Mexico's discrimination claims is that the prohibition
against the use of the dolphin-safe label on most Mexican tuna products denies competitive
opportunities to those products compared to like products from the United States and other countries.
US pressure on the Mexican fleet to change fishing areas and/or methods
4.256 The United States argues that Mexico overstates the cost and difficulty of using other
techniques to catch tuna and in fact provides no evidence to support its claim that using other
techniques would require Mexican vessels to "incur considerable financial and other costs". The
European Union understands that there are no technical or legal barriers preventing any of the WTO
Members bordering the ETP to fish tuna outside the ETP. Whether or not and to what magnitude costs
would be incurred by the Mexican tuna fleet to ch ange fishing areas or methods is immaterial to
Mexico's de facto discrimination claims.
4.257 Notwithstanding that there is no evidentiary burde n on Mexico to prove the costs associated
with changing fishing areas and/or methods, Mexi co has done so. These costs include: (i) catching
juvenile tuna which is both less commercially vi able and environmentally sustainable because of
smaller catches and depletion of stocks; (ii) cutting production dramatically or move to another region
to fish for different species of tuna, which is more commonly found in association with FADs to avoid
destroying the yellowfin fishery close to Mexico; (iii) traveling longer distances; (iv) catching less
economically valuable tuna (skipjack), and (v) obt aining licences which are expensive and, to date,
unobtainable.
Private actions
4.258 The United States is incorrect in asserting that the "limited demand for non dolphin-safe tuna
is a result of the retailers and consumer preferen ces for dolphin-safe tuna, not the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions". On this specific issue, th e United States has misconstrued the ruling of the
Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef.
4.259 The facts of this dispute are different from those in Korea – Various Measures on Beef;
however, the principles set out in this statement by th e Appellate Body are applicable to this dispute.
The US measures are restricting the conditions under which the "dolphin-safe" label may be used and,
therefore, are restricting the nature of the choice that can be made by US consumers. As a direct
consequence of the prohibition in the US measures, dolphin-safe labels other than those meeting the
specific conditions of the US measures cannot be u sed. Thus, US consumers are denied the option of
choosing Mexican tuna products that are labelled wi th the international AIDCP dolphin-safe label. In
this way, it is the government intervention in the fo rm of the US measures that adversely affects the
conditions of competition.

The relevance of consumer preferences and perceptions
4.260 Consumer preferences and perceptions are relevant in this dispute to the extent that having a
label that displays the words or a symbol signifyin g "dolphin-safe" is required to have access to the
major distribution channels for tuna products in the US market. Mexico has presented evidence
showing that a significant portion of the final consum ers of tuna in the United States identify the term
dolphin-safe with the notion that "no dolphins were injured or killed in the course of capturing tuna"
(AIDCP standard) rather than with the idea that the tuna was caught in a manner that does not
adversely affect dolphins (US standard).
4.261 Although the United States argues that consumers' preferences are identical in all segments of
the market, in Mexico's view there are differences between the preferences of canneries retailers and
final consumers. The US canneries do not buy tuna that is caught in the ETP using the dolphin set
method due to the regulatory distinctions created by the US measures. In April, 1990 the US canneries
announced their policies of not purchasing tuna caugh t in association with dolphins knowing of the
imminent enactment of the DPCIA. The continuati on of these policies is in the interests of the
canneries. Their major tuna operations are outside the ETP. Therefore, under the US measures, they
are able to apply the dolphin-safe label on their tuna products with the only requirement being that the
captain of the vessel sign a certification that "no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used
to encircle dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna was harvested."
4.262 With respect to the preferences of retailers and final consumers, both are identical in the sense
that they look for dolphin-safe labelled tuna produc ts. The retailers' interest is to sell tuna products
which is why they require a dolphin-safe label. With respect to final consumers, they look for tuna
products that are labelled as "dolphin-safe" which to them means that "no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured during the capture of tuna".
4.263 During the discussions of the IDCPA, Sena tor Ted Stevens recognized that the new
US legislation would guarantee US consumers that no dolphins were killed during the harvest of tuna
that is labelled as dolphin-safe. This was because under the existing US law, dolphins may have been
killed but as long as the tuna was not harvested by intentionally encircling dolphins it could be
labelled as dolphin-safe.
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
Advantage
4.264 The United States argues that the advantage, favour, or privilege at issue in this dispute is not
merely the right to label tuna products as dolphin-safe and that no Member has the right to
unconditionally label its products dolphin-safe under the US law. In the view of the United States, the
advantage, favour, or privilege is the opportunity to use the dolphin-safe label if the conditions on use
of the dolphin-safe label are met. These arguments conflates the concept of an "advantage, favour or
privilege" with the conditions that are imposed on th e granting of that advantage, favour or privilege.
Mexico has established that the dolphin-safe labe l, whether meeting the US conditions or the
international AIDCP standard, has commercial value in the US market in the sense that access to the
label enables tuna products to be sold in the principa l distribution channels of the US market. It is the
application of a dolphin-safe label that has value, not the conditions attached to that label.
4.265 The United States also to the GATT 1947 panel report in US – Tuna (Mexico) in support of its
argument. As explained by Mexico, the facts th at were before the GATT 1947 panel were very
different from those before this panel. At that ti me, the nature of the "advantage" was not apparent.
Today, the right to designate tuna products as dolphin-safe is an "advantage" because it provides
access to the major distribution channels in the US tuna products market.

Shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
4.266 In its third party submission and its responses to the question of the Panel, the European
Union argues that "the requirement of ‘unconditi onally' in Article I:1 of the GATT requires the
domestic measure to extend the advantage to all goods meeting the conditions prescribed in the
measure" and that it "requires the grant of the advant age only to those products of all WTO Members
that satisfy the same conditions". The European Union bases this interpretation on the report of the
panel in Canada – Autos.
4.267 As explained by the panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry , the panel in Canada – Autos
considered that the issue of whether an advantag e within the meaning of Article I:1 is accorded
"unconditionally" cannot be determin ed independently of whether it involves discrimination between
like products of different countries. Whether cond itions attached to an advantage granted in
connection with the importation of a product offend Article I:1 depends on whether or not such
conditions discriminate. In this dispute, the US measures make the advantage subject to conditions
with respect to the situation or conduct of Mexico. These conditions discriminate against tuna
products from Mexican in favour of tuna products from other countries. Accordingly, contrary to
Article I:1, the United States has granted an adva ntage to tuna products of other WTO Members and
has not accorded that advantage immediately and un conditionally to like tuna products of all other
Members, namely Mexico.
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
4.268 The United States argues that the fact that one-thi rd of Mexico's purse seine fleet exclusively
uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna and therefore tuna caught by these vessels
is eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe under the US provisions, is evidence that US provisions do not
use origin to distinguish between tuna products that are eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe. Mexico
has clarified these facts. Thus, even if the United St ates' interpretation of the applicable law and the
test that it proposes is accepted, approximately 96 pe r cent of Mexican tuna could not be labelled as
dolphin-safe when processed into tuna products and, therefore, could not access the principal
distribution channels in the US market. A similar high percentage, if not 100 per cent, of US tuna
products could be labelled as dolphi n-safe and could access those channels. These ratios demonstrate
that, even under the proposed US test, Mexican tu na products are singled out for less favourable
treatment.
4.269 However, the United States' interpretation of the applicable law and the proposed test is
incorrect. It is legally irrelevant that some Mexi can tuna products or even tuna products from other
WTO Members could be labelled as dolphin-safe a nd access the principal US distribution channels.
Such access does not eliminate the de facto discrimination that has been caused by the upsetting of the
balance of competitive opportunities between Me xican tuna products a nd like US products. A
Member cannot balance more favourable treatment of imported products in some instances against
less favourable treatment of imported products in other instances. For these reasons the de minimis
access that Mexican tuna products may have to the US market is immaterial to Mexico's
discrimination claim under Article III:4.
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
4.270 Mexico has presented detailed arguments on its claim under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. Mexico addresses all of the points raised in the United States' rebuttal arguments
above.

(iii) Other TBT Agreement claims
The US measures are a technical regulation
4.271 The position of the United States that the US dolphin-safe provisions identified by Mexico in
this dispute are "voluntary measures" and therefore do not meet the definition of a technical regulation
under Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement is without mer it. By virtue of the US measures, it is not
possible to label tuna products as dolphin-safe unde r more than one standard. In this way, the
US measures are mandatory and amount to a technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1.
4.272 In simple terms, in order to label a tuna pr oduct in the US with a dolphin-safe label, it is
necessary to comply with specific requirements pr ovided in the US measures. These requirements are
imposed in negative form (i.e. dolphin-safe tuna pr oducts offered for sale in the United States must
not possess certain characteristics). What makes the US measures in this dispute mandatory is not
whether a label is de jure required in order to sell tuna products in the US market. Rather, it is the fact
that the US measures restrict retailers, consumers and producers to a single choice for labelling tuna
products as dolphin-safe. There is no available option for US consumers to buy tuna products that
have been produced from tuna caught in accordance with the international AIDCP standard for the
protection of dolphins and is labelled as dolphin-safe under that standard.
4.273 The situation in this dispute is very simila r to that addressed by the Appellate Body in EC –
Sardines, in which the challenged measure provided th at only products prepared from Sardina
pilchardus could be marketed as preserved sardines. In other words, only products of that species
could have the word "sardines" as part of the name on the container. In this dispute, the US measures
cover two different types of tuna based on the fi shing method used to harvest them. Much like the
European measures in EC – Sardine s, the US measures provide that the only products that can have
the term dolphin-safe or a similar term or symbol are those that meet the US legal provisions.
4.274 It is also important to note in this regard that the US dolphin-safe labelling measure for the
ETP is backed by an extensive conformity assessmen t procedure to ensure that ETP tuna and tuna
products made from such tuna comply with the US requirements. The fact that there is such a
conformity assessment mechanism reinforces Mexico 's position that the measure is a technical
regulation and not a standard.
Article 2.2
The US measures do not fulfil their stated objectives
4.275 The US asserts that the US measures have two obj ectives: (i) to ensure that consumers are not
mislead or deceived about whether the tuna product contains tuna that was caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins; and (ii) to contribute to the protection of dolphins by ensuring that the
US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to set upon dolphins. There are several reasons why
the US measures do not fulfil these stated objectives.
4.276 First, the US measures are based on the assumption that the fishing method utilized by the
Mexican fishing fleet and regulated by the AIDCP adversely affects dolphins, while there is no
scientific evidence for that. As noted above, the mo st recent study of the Department of Commerce
indicates that dolphin stocks are recovering. Sec ond, tuna products that are labelled as dolphin-safe
under the US measures might contain tuna that wa s caught in a set where dolphins were killed or
seriously injured. Finally, the objective of encouraging foreign fishing fleets not to set upon dolphins
applies only to fleets fishing in the ETP. The fishing method of those fleets is governed by the AIDCP
and the US measures do not go any further than the AIDCP.

The fulfilment of the objectives using less trade restrictive measures
4.277 To the extent that the US measures fulfil any objectives, taking into account the risks of non-
fulfilment, those objectives could be fulfilled usin g less trade restrictive measures. A less trade
restrictive way of fulfilling the objectives would be to create dolphin-safe standards rather than a
technical regulation whereby the AIDCP standard could be recognized and a label complying with the
AIDCP standard used. In this way US consumers will be fully informed of all aspects of dolphin-safe
fishing methods and they can choose accordingly when purchasing tuna products from US retailers.
Article 2.4
4.278 The US argument that the AIDCP organization is not a "body" within the meaning of
Article 2.4 is without merit. National governme nts are "bodies," and the AIDCP is based on their
membership. The AIDCP has its own administration, which is implemented by the Secretariat of the
IATTC. The core purpose of the AIDCP organization is to establish standards for tuna fishing to
protect marine mammals. There is no support for the US claim that the AIDCP organization is not a
"recognized" or "standardizing" body for establishing when tuna caught in the ETP is dolphin-safe.
The United States is a founding member of the AIDCP. It fully participated in the creation and
establishment of the AIDCP's dolphin-safe standard. I ndeed, the very purpose of that standard was to
facilitate access to the US market.
4.279 Accordingly, the potential problems with a pplying Article 2.4 to standards in which a
Member has not participated raised by the United Stat es do not arise in this dispute. The issue raised
in this dispute is whether it is inconsistent w ith WTO obligations for a Member to maintain a
unilateral technical regulation that conflicts with an international standard to which the Member
expressly agreed.
(e) Conclusions
4.280 On the basis of the foregoing, Mexico respect fully requests that the Panel find that the
US measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1 a nd III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2 and
2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
2. United States
(a) Introduction
4.281 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions establish origin-neutral conditions under which tuna
products may voluntarily be labelled dolphin-safe. These conditions ensure that when a dolphin-safe
label appears on a tuna product that it does not cont ain tuna that was caught in a manner harmful to
dolphins. It is well-documented, and virtually uncontested by Mexico, that setting on dolphins to
catch tuna adversely affects dolphins. These well-documented adverse effects lie at the core of why
the US provisions condition the labelling of tuna products "dolphin-safe" on such products not
containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins.
4.282 The Panel should reject Mexico's claims that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
inconsistent with Articles I:1 or III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.

(b) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994
4.283 To establish its Article III:4 claim, Mexico must first establish that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions accord different treatment to imported and domestic tuna products and that any
such different treatment is based on origin. Then, if it establishes that the US provisions accord any
different treatment to imported a nd domestic tuna products, it must establish that the treatment
accorded imported tuna products is less favourable than the treatment accorded domestic tuna
products. Mexico may establish that the US do lphin-safe labelling provisions accord different
treatment to imported products based on origin either by demonstrating that the US provisions on their
face accord such different treatment or by demonstr ating that the US provisions – while origin-neutral
on their face – in fact accord such different tr eatment. As elaborated below, Mexico has not
established, either in law or in fact, that US dolphin-safe labelling provisions accord different
treatment, let alone less favourable treatment, to imported tuna products.
4.284 First, Mexico has failed to show that the US provisions accord any different treatment to
Mexican tuna products than the treatment accorded domestic products. Mexico's legal analysis skips
the threshold issue of different treatment and jumps immediately to the issue of whether the treatment
the US provisions accord alters the conditions of competition to the detrimen t of imported products.
Second, in order to establish that a measure accord s less favourable treatment within the meaning of
Article III:4, it must be shown that any different treatment accorded to imported products is based on
origin and that any different treatment is less favourable. Simply offering evidence that some
imported products are accorded different treatment than some like dom estic products is insufficient to
support an Article III:4 claim.
4.285 In other disputes where a party has claimed that a facially origin neutral measure in fact
discriminates based on origin, the complaining party has presented substantial evidence that what may
appear to be origin-neutral criteria in fact single out imports for different treatment. In this dispute,
Mexico has not adduced similar evidence to show that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions –
although origin neutral on their face – in fact use the manner or the place in which the tuna was
caught to single out imports. In fact, as review ed below, the evidence on the record leads to the
opposite conclusion.
4.286 First, approximately 84 per cent of the US mark et for canned tuna products is accounted for
by a combination of imported tuna products and domestic tuna products that contain imported tuna.
Of the $1.2 billion of US imports of tuna and tuna products, the vast majority contained tuna that was
caught by methods other than setting on dolphins and are eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe. Second,
one-third of Mexico's purse seine fleet exclusivel y uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to
catch tuna and therefore tuna products that contai n tuna caught by these vessels are eligible to be
labelled dolphin-safe. The remaining two-thirds of Mexico's purse seine fleet also opportunistically
uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna. In fact during the first meeting with the
Panel, Mexico acknowledged that 20 per cent of its fleet's catch is caught by techniques other than
setting on dolphins. Tuna caught by those vessels usi ng those techniques are also eligible to use the
dolphin-safe label. It is therefore incorrect that Mexican vessels "almost exclusively set on dolphins"
to catch tuna. It is also important to emphasize th at Mexican vessels have a choice of whether to set
on dolphins to catch tuna or to use other techniqu es to catch tuna. Mexico's large purse seine could
also catch tuna using other techniques and do so in the ETP. Third, at the time the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions were enacted, there were 46 US purse seine vessels along with 52 Mexican
vessels that fished for tuna in th e ETP. Most of the 46 US purse seine vessels authorized to fish for
tuna in the ETP that year set on dolphins to catch tu na and did not fully discontinue the practice until
years later. Thus, at that time the US dolphin- safe labelling provisions were enacted, tuna products
that contained tuna caught by US vessels were not eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe.

4.287 Mexico focuses on the fact that its fleet fi shes for tuna in the ETP to argue that the
US provisions discriminate against Mexican tuna produc ts. This argument should be rejected. First,
the United States imports significant amounts of tuna products that contain tuna caught in the ETP
and are labelled dolphin-safe. For example, in 2009 the United States imported $48 million worth of
canned tuna products (i.e., tuna in airtight contai ners) from Ecuador that contained tuna caught using
purse seine nets in the ETP. All of these imports we re eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe. Second,
tuna caught in the ETP cannot be equated with tuna of Mexican origin. The ETP is not a Mexican
fishery, but is a geographic region that encompas ses a fishery where Mexican vessels fish for tuna
along with vessels from many other countries. Further, the origin of tuna is not determined by where
it was caught but the flag of the vessel that caught it. Tuna caught in the ETP could be of Mexican
origin or of an origin of any country that has vessels fishing for tuna in the ETP.
4.288 In addition to failing to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions use the
conditions under which tu na products may be labelled dolphin-safe as a means to single out imports
for different and less favourable treatment, Mexico has also failed to establish that the US provisions
reflect any intent to afford protection to domestic production of tuna produc ts. Article III:1 of the
GATT 1994 provides relevant context for Article III:4 and sets forth that "the broad and fundamental
purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory
measures." Yet, when directly asked by the Pa nel for any evidence that the US provisions were
introduced with the objective of disturbing comp etition between imported a nd non-imported tuna or
affording protection to US tuna products, Mexico ha d no evidence to offer. Looking at the design,
structure and characteristics of the provisions, also reveals that the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions do not reflect any intent to afford prot ection to domestic production or discriminate against
Mexican tuna products. Further, unlike in Chile – Alcoholic Beverages there is a clear relationship
between the objectives of the US dolphin-safe la belling provisions and the conditions under which
tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe.
4.289 Mexico argues that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions "impose more liberal conditions
for use of the labelling standard in all fisheries ot her than the ETP because, in those fisheries, no
certification is required that no dolphin[s] were kille d or seriously injured and independent observers
are not required." Mexico claims that "at least the same amount or more dolphins are being killed
outside the ETP in alternative fishing operations" as inside the ETP as a result of fishing operations
there. Mexico further claims that fisheries outsi de the ETP are "U.S. fisheries" while the ETP is a
Mexican fishery and therefore that the different cond itions that apply with respect to those fisheries
supports its claim that the US provisions discrim inate against Mexican tuna products. Mexico's
arguments should be rejected.
4.290 First, to the extent there are any differen ces in documentation to substantiate dolphin-safe
claims they are calibrated to the risk that dolphins will be killed or seriously injured when tuna is
caught and are not evidence that the US dolphin- safe labelling provisions discriminate against
Mexican tuna products. Second, the so-called available scientific evidence Mexico cites to support its
assertion that the extent of dolphin mortality as a result of tuna fishing operations outside the ETP are
the same or greater outside the ETP do not in fact s upport that assertion. Third, to the extent Mexico's
claim relies on the different standards applied under the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions as
compared to those under the Marine Mammal Protec tion Act, such arguments are inapposite. The
issue before the Panel is whether the US dolphi n-safe labelling provisions accord imported tuna
products less favourable treatment. Comparing how fisheries are managed under the MMPA as
compared to how tuna products may be labelle d dolphin-safe under the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions does not shed light on that issue.
4.291 Mexico has also not shown that the US measures have modified the conditions of competition
to the detriment of imported tuna products. Unlike in Korea – Beef , the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions do not limit the marketing opportuniti es for imported tuna products. Imported tuna

products comprise a substantial share of the US ma rket for tuna products, and the US provisions do
not impose any choice on marketers of tuna products in terms of selling tuna products in the
United States. The limited demand for non-dolphin-saf e tuna products is a result of retailer and
consumer preferences for dolphin-safe tuna products, not the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.292 Mexico offers several arguments that purport to show the dolphin-safe labelling provisions
modify the conditions of competition to the detr iment of Mexican tuna products. These should be
rejected. Countries other than Mexico, including the United States, are sim ilarly close to the ETP,
including those areas of the ETP where setting on dolphins to catch tuna occurs. Evidence submitted
by Mexico shows that Mexico would not have to tr avel long distances, change its target species, or
significantly alter the duration of its trips in order to seize the opportunity to fish without setting on
dolphins in its own backyard. Mexico has not s ubstantiated its assertion that switching fishing
techniques would involve "considerable financial and othe r costs," particularly in light of the fact that
the same boats and fishing gear that is used to cat ch tuna by setting on dolphins can be used to catch
tuna using other techniques. To the extent ther e are costs associated with adopting alternative
techniques to catch tuna those would not be unique to Mexican vessels. Furthermore, producers often
must shoulder additional costs in conjunction with compliance with a government measure, and such
costs are not evidence that the US measures are consistent with Article III:4.
4.293 Mexico states that if its vessels were to expand its fishing for yellowfin tuna in a manner other
than by setting on dolphins, they would catch juven ile tuna rather than the mature tuna it currently
catches and exhaust the tuna stocks. However, this argument assumes that expanded fishing
operations by these vessels would be done in cont ravention of fisheries management measures
maintained under the auspices of the multilateral IATTC.
4.294 Mexico asserts that the US dolphin-safe labe lling provisions benefit US producers because
they "exclude[] Mexican brands from competing in the US market" and allow US canneries to "avoid
having to ensure that tuna they purchase fro m non-ETP sources was captured without killing or
seriously injuring dolphins." There is no basis for Mexico's assertion. First, the US provisions do not
exclude Mexican brand tuna products from the US market. Second, US canne ries use an alternative
dolphin-safe label on their tuna products and are therefore subject to the condition in
section 1385(d)(3) that tuna labelled dolphin-safe must not contain tuna caught in a set in which
dolphins were killed or seriously injured. Third, there is no benefit to US canneries of avoiding having
to ensure that the tuna they purchase is not caught in a set in which dolphins were killed or seriously
injured. Fourth, US canneries supported the DP CIA because consumers were concerned about
dolphins being harmed when tuna was caught and wanted assurances that tuna products did not
contain tuna that was caught in a manner harmful to dolphins.
4.295 When the DPCIA was enacted, the United States had 46 US purse seine vessels that fished for
tuna in the ETP of which 31 were doing so full-time. Both Mexican and US vessels fished in the ETP
by setting on dolphins at the time. Therefore, to the extent that the conditions of competition were
altered by the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, they were not changed to the detriment of
imports.
4.296 In sum, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisi ons accord no less favourable treatment to
Mexican tuna or tuna products than that accorded to tuna and tuna products of the United States.
Therefore, the US provisions are not inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
(c) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994
4.297 Mexico has also failed to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Mexico both wrongly identifies the advantage at

issue in this dispute and fails to establish th at the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions accord an
advantage to imported tuna products of other countries that they fail to accord to imported tuna
products of Mexico.
4.298 The issue of whether the US provisions fail to accord such an advantage was heard and
decided two decades ago when a 1991 panel under the GATT 1947 rejected Mexico's claims that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions were inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. The legal
and factual conclusions of the panel in US – Tuna Dolphin I were well reasoned and sound, and
nothing in the intervening time has changed to support a different conclusion.
4.299 Mexico appears to believe that the advantage Mexican products are being denied is the right
to carry the dolphin-safe label. That is incorrect . No product (whether of the United States or any
other Member) is entitled unconditionally to be labelled dolphin-safe under US law. Rather, the
advantage at issue in this dispute is the opportunity under US law to label tuna dolphin-safe if certain
conditions are met.
4.300 Mexico also appears to believe that a measure may be found inconsistent with Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994 simply by virtue of the fact that imported products from some countries qualify for an
advantage while others do not. This is not a co rrect reading of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. As
prior reports have expressed, whether conditions att ached to an advantage granted by a measure are
inconsistent with Article I:1 depends upon whether or not such conditions discriminate with respect to
the origin of products. Conditions that are origin-n eutral are not inconsistent with the obligation in
Article I:1 that any advantage granted to impor ted products originating in any Member shall
immediately and unconditionally be granted to like products originating in any other Member.
4.301 Mexico argues the US dolphin-safe labelling provisi ons, while origin neutral on their face, in
practice discriminate against Mexican tuna produc ts as compared to imports from other countries.
Yet, Mexico has not put forth evidence sufficient to substantiate its claim. In particular, Mexico has
not established that the conditions the US provision s establish for labelling tuna products dolphin-safe
– which Mexico acknowledges are origin neutral on th eir face – in fact act as a proxy to single out
imports from some countries over others as eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe. To the contrary, the
information on record in this dispute demonstrates that the US provisions do not fail to accord an
advantage to Mexican tuna products that they accord to imported tuna produc ts originating in other
countries.
4.302 As reviewed in connection with Mexico's claims under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994,
one-third of Mexico's purse seine fleet exclusivel y uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to
catch tuna and as Mexico acknowledged during the first meeting with the Panel, approximately
20 per cent of Mexican tuna catch is caught by techniques other than setting on dolphins.
Additionally, the technique of setting on dolphins to catch tuna is not unique to the Mexican fishing
fleet. The fishing fleets of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela
also have vessels that set on dolphins, among othe r techniques, to catch tuna in the ETP. Setting on
dolphins was a technique used by US vessels at the time the US provisions were adopted. These facts
are evidence that US provisions do not use the manner in which the tuna was caught as a proxy to
distinguish between tuna products that are eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe and those that are not
based on origin. It is the manner in which the tu na was caught not origin that determines whether
tuna products containing it may be labelled dolphin-safe.
4.303 Further, nothing prevents Mexico's fleet from expanding its use of techniques other than
setting on dolphins to catch tuna, including on account of the costs as noted above. To the extent
Mexico relies on the same arguments it made in the Article III:4 context to prove that the US labelling
provisions discriminate against Mexican, because they call for different documentation to substantiate
dolphin-safe claims,
 those arguments are without merit for the same reasons as discussed above. As in

the case with Mexico's argument under Article III:4, Mexico's argument that the US provisions
discriminate against Mexican tuna products because th e Mexican fleets primarily fish for tuna in the
ETP should likewise be rejected in the context of Mexico's Article I:1 claim.
4.304 In this case, unlike in Canada – Autos , limiting the use of the dolphin-safe label to tuna
products that do not contain tuna that was caught by setting on dolphins or in a set in which dolphins
were killed or seriously injured does not have the effect of limiting eligibility to use the dolphin-safe
label to imports originating in only certain countries. It is not the origin of the product, but whether
that product was caught in a manner that adversely affected dolphins that determines eligibility to use
the dolphin-safe label. In contrast to the situation in Canada – Autos , Mexican fishing vessels can
choose to meet the conditions that would make products containing their tuna eligible for the
dolphin-safe label.
4.305 In sum, the US measures do not accord an advant age, favour, or privilege to tuna or tuna
products originating in any other country that is not also accorded to Mexico. Therefore, the
US provisions are not inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
(d) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not technical regulations
4.306 Mexico has failed to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions constitute
technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. In particular, Mexico
has failed to establish that compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling prov isions is mandatory. A
labelling requirement with which compliance is ma ndatory is a measure that establishes conditions
under which a product may be labelled in a certain way and requires the product to be labelled in that
way in order to be marketed.
4.307 The principal flaw in Mexico's interpretation of the definition of technical regulation in
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement is that it conflate s the meaning of the term "labelling requirement"
with the phrase "with which compliance is mandatory ." In doing so, Mexico would render the phrase
"with which compliance is mandatory" and the phrase "with which compliance is not mandatory" in
the definition of a technical regulation and the defin ition of a standard, respectively, without effect.
Mexico's approach is inconsistent with the f undamental rule of treaty interpretation that an
interpretation of the terms of a treaty is to be prefe rred that gives full effect and meaning to each of its
terms.
4.308 Applying the correct interpretation of a technical regulation to the facts of this dispute reveals
that compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling pr ovisions is not mandatory within the meaning of
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. While the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions set out conditions
under which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-saf e, they do not require tuna products to be
labelled dolphin-safe to be marketed. In fact, tuna products that are not labelled dolphin-safe are
readily available on the US market.
4.309 Mexico advances that one way to distinguish between a labelling requirement that is
voluntary and one that is mandatory is whether the label contemplated in the labelling requirement is
the only label that may be used in the market. Ther e is no basis for Mexico's theory. First, it is not
based on the text of the TBT Agreement. Second, Mexico's theory conflates the meaning of the term a
"labelling requirement" with the meaning of th e phrase "with which compliance is mandatory" and
renders the latter without effect. Mexico also ar gues that "the fact [the U.S.] measures established
surveillance and enforcement procedures" is an additional point supportin g its position that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are mandatory. The information collected by the United States
and the surveillance activities it unde rtakes to ensure that tuna products labelled dolphin-safe are in
fact dolphin-safe are simply mechanisms that support the underlying labelling requirement established
in the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. They do not change the fact that the US provisions do not

require tuna products to be labelled in a certain way to be marketed in the United States and therefore
compliance with the labelling requirements set out in the US provisions is not mandatory within the
meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement.
4.310 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not like the measures in EC – Asbestos or EC –
Sardines, which concerned measures that fell within the sc ope of the first sentence of the definition of
a technical regulation; neither concerned labelling requirements.
4.311 Mexico's alternative argument that the US provisions are de facto mandatory should be
rejected. Contrary to Mexico's asserti ons, a labelling requirement cannot be " de facto" mandatory
simply based on private actors' preference for products labelled in a certain way. Some form of
government action must make it compulsory or obligat ory that for products to be marketed they must
be labelled in a certain way in order for compliance with a labelling requirement to be mandatory. In
this dispute, Mexico identifies no government action that makes compliance with the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions mandatory.
4.312 For the forgoing reasons, Mexico has failed to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions are technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement and
accordingly has failed to establish that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are subject to
Article 2 of the TBT Agreement. As a consequen ce, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions cannot
be found inconsistent with Article 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, and the Panel should
therefore reject Mexico's claims under those articles.
(e) The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement
4.313 Despite textual and contextual differences between Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994
and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Mexico re lies solely on the arguments it makes regarding the
consistency of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisi ons with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994
for its arguments under TBT Article 2.1. The Unite d States has articulated why Mexico's arguments
under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 fail, and Mexico's arguments under TBT Article 2.1
fail for the same reasons.
4.314 To establish a breach of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, a complaining party must
establish that the measure at issue is "more trade- restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective". A measure is "more trade-restrictive th an necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective" if (1)
there is a reasonably available alternative measure (2) that measure fulfils the objectives of the
measure at the level that the Member imposing the measure has determined is appropriate and (3) is
significantly less trade-restrictive. Mexico has not established any of these elements with respect to
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.315 It would not be appropriate to apply the same interpretive approach pa nels and the Appellate
Body have undertaken in connection with the word "necessary" as it appears in Article XX of the
GATT 1994 in analysing whether a measure is "more trade restrictive than necessary" within the
meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
4.316 Applying the proper interpretation of Article 2. 2 of the TBT Agreement to the facts of this
dispute, it is clear the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are no more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil their legitimate objectives. The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions fulfil the
objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain
tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins by establishing conditions under
which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe that are based on whether the tuna product contains
tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely a ffects dolphins. The US provisions also fulfil the

objective of protecting dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage setting on
dolphins to catch tuna. As the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna decreases, the associated
adverse effects on dolphins decrease as well.
4.317 With respect to the situation Mexico describes where a tuna product might contain tuna
caught in a set in which a dolphin was killed yet still be labelled dolphin-safe, this does not support
Mexico's contention that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions fail to full their objective of
ensuring consumers are not misled or deceived about whether the product contains tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. First, it is a hypothetical situation. Second,
Mexico has presented no evidence that such a hypotheti cal actually exists. In fact, the likelihood of
any such products being on the US market is low.
4.318 Rather than demonstrating that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not fulfil their
objectives of ensuring consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna
that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins, the documentation to support
dolphin-safe claims reflect that the US provisions to ok a balanced approach that weighed the risk of
products containing tuna caught in a manner that a dversely affects dolphins against the burden of
ensuring that by conditioning use of dolphin-safe labelling on an observer's statement that no dolphins
were killed or seriously injured. Such an approach that weighs costs and benefits is consistent with
well-established approaches to the introduction of govern ment measures. It is also consistent with the
TBT Agreement.
4.319 Mexico has failed to establish that there is a reasonably available alternative measure that
fulfils the provisions' objectives that is significantly less trade-restrictive. Neither the AIDCP nor the
AIDCP resolutions are alternatives that would fu lfil the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions. The AIDCP is an agreement that seek s to reduce observed dolphin mortalities and serious
injuries when dolphins are set upon to catch tuna . Thus, the AIDCP is not a substitute for provisions
that seek to protect dolphins by discouraging the prac tice of setting on them to catch tuna. In addition,
application of the procedures called for under the AIDCP would not fulfil the objective of ensuring
that consumers are not misled or deceived about wh ether tuna products contain tuna that was caught
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins, since those procedures do not address the labelling of tuna
products or dolphin-safe claims on tuna products.
4.320 Use of the definition of "dolphin-safe" referred to in the AIDCP resolutions would also not
fulfil the objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. First, that definition – if used as a
basis for the conditions under whic h tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe – would not ensure
that consumers are not misled or deceived about wh ether tuna products contain tuna that was caught
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins b ecause it would allow tuna products to be labelled
dolphin-safe if dolphins were set upon to catch the tuna. Second, these definitions – if used as a basis
for the conditions under which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe – would not contribute to
the protection of dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage the practice of
setting on dolphins to catch tuna, since they woul d permit tuna products to be labelled dolphin-safe
that were caught by setting on dolphins.
4.321 The Panel should also reject Mexico's claims that US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreemen t, because Mexico has not demonstrated that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions restrict trade, mu ch less that they restrict trade more than
necessary within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
4.322 Mexico claims that the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement because they are not based on relevant international standards. However, to
substantiate an Article 2.4 claim, the complaining party must establish that (1) there is a relevant
international standard; (2) that standard would not be an ineffective or inappropriate in fulfilling the

legitimate objective of the measure; and (3) the m easure at issue is not based on that standard.
Mexico has not established, however, that the AIDC P resolutions Mexico identifies – resolution on
tuna tracking and dolphin-safe certification – are rele vant international standards within the meaning
of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement or that they would not be ineffective and inappropriate to fulfil
the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.323 First, Mexico has not made any showing that the AIDCP resolutions meet the definition of a
standard set out in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. In particular, Mexico has not established that the
AIDCP resolutions provide for rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related process and
production methods or for an aspect covered under the second sentence such as a labelling
requirement, or that the definition of dolphin-saf e referred to in the AIDCP resolutions is for
"common and repeated use." It has also not established that the AIDCP resolutions were adopted by a
recognized body. The definition of dolphin-safe in the AIDCP resolutions a definition for purposes of
those resolutions. Neither resolution purports to establish a definition of "dolphin-safe" for general
application outside the context of the AIDCP resolu tions. To construe the definition of "dolphin-safe"
in the AIDCP resolutions as standards for "common a nd repeated use" would vastly expand the scope
of the term standard in the TBT Agreement and have serious implications with respect to Members'
rights and obligations under any interg overnmental resolution or agreement. The AIDCP resolutions
were adopted by the parties to the AIDCP, and Me xico has not established that the parties to the
AIDCP constitute a body as that term is define d for purposes of the TBT Agreement nor that the
parties to the AIDCP could be considered to have recognized activities in standardization.
4.324 The AIDCP resolutions are also not "internationa l" within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement. In particular, the AIDCP resolutions were not adopted by a body whose membership
is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Memb ers and therefore do not qualify as "international"
for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. Further, the definition of "dolphin-safe" in the
AIDCP resolutions are not "relevant." For example, that definition does not relate or pertain to the
objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisi ons aimed at ensuring that consumers are not
misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins and ensuring the US market is not used to encourage the practice of setting
on dolphins to catch tuna and thereby contribute to dolphin protection.
4.325 Mexico has also not put forth any evidence or argument that the definition of "dolphin-safe"
in the AIDCP resolutions would not be ineffective or inappropriate to fulfil the objective of ensuring
that consumers are not misled or deceived about wh ether tuna products contain tuna that was caught
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. For th is reason alone, Mexico has failed to establish a
prima facie case under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agre ement. With respect to the objective of the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions of ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage the
practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna and thereby contributing to the protection of dolphins,
Mexico has also not established that the definiti on of dolphin-safe in the AIDCP resolutions would
not be ineffective or inappropriate in fulfilli ng that objective. If the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were based on the defin ition of dolphin-safe in the resolu tions then tuna products that
contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins could be labelled dolphin-safe, and consumers would no
longer know whether tuna products la belled "dolphin-safe" contain tuna that was caught by setting on
dolphins and their purchases of tuna products that contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins could
serve to encourage a practice that adversely affects dolphins. Basing the US provisions on the
definition of "dolphin-safe" in the AIDCP resolutions would therefore not be effective or appropriate
in fulfilling the objective of the US provisions of contributing to dolphin protection.

(f) Conclusion
4.326 For the reasons stated above, the panel should re ject Mexico's claims that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2
and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
E. OPENING ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING
1. Mexico
(a) Introduction
4.327 This dispute concerns US measures that unila terally impose conditions related to fishing
methods in order for tuna products to be labelled "dolphin-safe" and thereby enable those products to
access major distribution channels in the US market.
4.328 Despite everything that has happened in the last 20 years, and all the lessons learned in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), the US continues to pursue unilateral policies put in place in 1990.
The Agreement on the International Dolphin Co nservation Program (AIDCP) has been highly
successful at reducing dolphin mortalities to levels that scientists describe as statistically insignificant.
In addition to protecting dolphins, the AIDCP also protects tuna stocks and the overall ecosystem of
the ETP by, inter alia, reducing bycatch associated with alternative fishing methods including FAD
fishing. Notwithstanding Mexico's compliance with the AIDCP, the US measures prohibit the use of a
dolphin-safe label on 96% of Mexican tuna producti on while permitting the label to be used on like
tuna products from other countries including the US resulting in 96% of Mexican tuna products being
effectively denied access to the US market.
4.329 The US measures are intended to unilaterally a nd extraterritorially pressure the Mexican tuna
fleet to change where it fishes for tuna and/or to change its fishing method to environmentally
unsustainable alternative methods. This undermines the environmental objectives of the AIDCP and,
if the US changes were implemented, would thr eaten the economic viability of the Mexican fishing
fleet which is an important part of Mexico's economy as a developing country member.
4.330 Mexico has presented a prima facie case with respect to all of its claims and requests that the
Panel rule on each of Mexico's claims and avoid the exercise of judicial economy.
(b) The US measures are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
4.331 Tuna products from virtually all other countries, including the two largest exporters Thailand
and the Philippines, are allowed to label their pr oducts dolphin-safe; by contrast, Mexican tuna
products are not. Due to the US measures, current imports of Mexican tuna products into the
US account for less than one per cent of all US impor ts of tuna products. The "advantage" in this
dispute is the right to designate tuna products as dolphin-safe. As set out by the Panel in Canada –
Autos, the obligation to accord "unconditionally" to third countries which are WTO Members an
advantage which has been granted to any other count ry means that the extension of that advantage
may not be made subject to conditions with respect to the situation or conduct of those countries. The
US measures make the advantage subject to conditi ons with respect to the situation or conduct of
Mexico (i.e., fishing methods for tuna) and thereby discriminate against tuna products from Mexico in
favour of like tuna products from other countries.
4.332 The facts in this dispute are analogous to those in Belgium – Family Allowances, in which the
panel condemned a measure which discriminated ag ainst imports depending on the type of family
allowance system that was in pl ace in the exporting country. Si milarly, in this dispute the

US measures discriminate against imports depending on the type of fishing method employed by the
exporting country.
(c) The US measures are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
4.333 The US arguments concerning Article III:4 improperly attempt to transform the discrete facts
of particular cases of less favourable treatment into supposed general requirements for all cases of less
favourable treatment. Moreover, the arguments re garding less favourable treatment raise profound
systematic implications for the WTO trading syst em. If embraced, these arguments would empty the
concept of de facto discrimination of all meaning and undermin e the national treatment principle that
is one of the fundamental cornerstones of the multilateral trading system.
(i) The US measures have modified the conditions of competition for Mexican tuna products
4.334 The US measures have severely restricted the abilit y of Mexican tuna products to be sold in
the US. The principal US distribution channels will not carry Mexican tuna products because they are
prohibited by the US measures from being labelled as dolphin-safe. Thus, the US measures modify
the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported Mexican tuna prod ucts. 96% of Mexico's
tuna production is, by virtue of these measures, deni ed access to the principal distribution channels in
the US market.
(ii) There is no legal basis for the two-part test for proving less favourable treatment under GATT
Article III:4 that is proposed by the US
4.335 There is no legal basis for the proposed US test that Mexico must establish that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions accord differe nt treatment to imported and domestic tuna
products and that any such different treatment is "based on origin". After fulfilling this first step,
Mexico must then establish that the treatment acco rded to imported tuna products is less favourable
than the treatment accorded to domestic tuna products. The only authority th at the US cites is the
Appellate Body report in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and that report does not support the
proposed test.
(iii) It is not necessary for Mexico to prove that the differential treatment that is accorded to
imported products is "based on origin"
4.336 The US argues that it is necessary for Mexico to prove that differential treatment is "based on
origin" in order for there to be less favourable treatment under Article III:4. The US misreads EC –
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products and Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of
Cigarettes and there is no legal basis for its assertion.
(iv) It is not necessary for Mexico to prove the US measures "single out imports for different
treatment"
4.337 The US argues that it is necessary for Mexico to demonstrate that what may appear to be
origin-neutral criteria in fact single out imports for different treatment. The reports cited by the
US (Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , Chile – Alcoholic Beverages , and Korea – Alcoholic Beverages )
do not stand for the proposition that imports must always be singled out for there to be less favourable
treatment. While singling out imports is one way to accord less favourable treatment it is not the only
way. The issue is not whether a measure singles out imports but rather whether a measure modifies
the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products.

(v) It is not necessary for Mexico to prove that "almost all" imports are disadvantaged
4.338 The US argues that Mexico must prove that "a lmost all" imports receive the less favourable
treatment and almost all like domestic products do not. While de facto discrimination may be obvious
in circumstances where almost all imports receive less favourable treatment and almost all like
domestic products do not, there is no legal requirement for Mexico to prove discrimination to this
extent.
4.339 From the perspective of imports, the "almost all" standard posed by the US is inconsistent
with the established principle that not all imports mu st receive less favourable treatment in order for
there to be discrimination: (i) a measure does not have to give rise to less favourable treatment for like
imported products in each and every case in orde r to accord treatment no less favourable; (ii) the
possible absence of less favourable treatment of like imported product in some instances does not
detract from the fact that there might be less favourable treatment in other instances; and (iii) a
Member cannot balance more favourable treatment of imported products in some instances against
less favourable treatment of imported products in other instances. From the perspective of like
domestic products it is equally clear that not all lik e domestic products have to be free of the less
favourable treatment in order for there to be discrimination.
(vi) The GATT 1947 Panel Report in Belgian Family Allowances supports Mexico's
discrimination claims
4.340 Citing the panel report in Indonesia – Autos as authority, the US argues that Belgian Family
Allowances stands for the proposition that if conferra l of an advantage within the meaning of
Article I:1 of the GATT is made conditional on any cr iteria then those criteria must be related to the
imported product itself and, on this basis, argues that it does not support Mexico's claims. Mexico
disagrees. Belgian Family Allowances stands for the proposition that a measure cannot condition an
advantage (e.g., access to the principal distribution ch annels for a product) upon certain actions by the
exporting WTO Member. The panel condemned a me asure which discriminated against imports
depending on the type of family allowance system th at was in place in the exporting country. In this
dispute, the US measures discriminate against im ports depending on the type of fishing method
employed by the exporting country. Thus, the facts of the two cases are analogous. Both relate to
actions undertaken by the exporting country.
(vii) The US measures afford protection to domestic production
4.341 Contrary to the argument of the US, Mexico does not have to establish that the US provisions
reflect any intent to afford protection to domes tic production of tuna products. The question of
whether a measure affords protection to domestic pr oduction is not a question of protectionist intent
but, rather, one of application of the measure . For purposes of assessing whether there is less
favourable treatment, the legal issue is what the effect of a measure is in the market, not why it is
enacted. Under Article III:4, the Appellate Body ha s specifically ruled that if there is less favourable
treatment of the group of like imported products, th ere is, conversely, protection of the group of like
domestic products.
(d) The US measures are inconsistent with the TBT Agreement
(i) The US measures are technical regulations
4.342
 The US argues that the principal flaw in Mexico 's interpretation of the meaning of "technical
regulation" is that it conflates the meaning of th e term "labelling requirement" with the phrase "with
which compliance is mandatory". This argument is completely without merit. The US misses the key
point of Mexico's argument. Simply stated, it is the limitation of "dolphin-safe" to a single standard

that makes the US measures a technical regulation. The US measures can be contrasted with a
situation where there are two standards for dolphin-safe—the US standard and the international
AIDCP standard—and either can be used provided that the requirements of the standard being used
are met and the designation of dolphin-safe that is being used is identified with the specific standard.
4.343 The US takes the narrow position that to be a technical regulation, a measure must require
that the product be labelled in a certain way in orde r to be marketed or sold in the domestic market.
Mexico agrees that this is one example of a techni cal regulation. However, it is not the only example.
The Appellate Body reports in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines make this clear. The situation in this
case is very similar to that addressed in EC – Sardines. In that case, sardines could not be marketed as
"preserved sardines" in the EU unless they compri sed certain species of fish; in this case tuna
products cannot be marketed in the US as "dolphin-safe" unless the dolphin set fishing method was
not used to catch tuna in the ETP. In both EC – Sardines and in this dispute, the products at issue—
sardines and tuna products—could be sold in th e domestic markets without the designations of
"sardines" or "dolphin-safe" although the market opportunities were limited, particularly in the
circumstances of this dispute.
4.344 Finally, if the US measures were not considered a priori mandatory, they have a mandatory
nature in a de facto manner. As Mexico has explained in detail, having a dolphin-safe label is essential
in order to market tuna products in the principal distribution channels in the US market.
(ii) The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
4.345 The US measures modify the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the
detriment of imported Mexican tuna products in favour of like tuna products from the US and other
countries. This is the basis for Mexico's claims that Article 2.1 has been violated.
(iii) The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
The meaning of "necessary"
4.346 The GATT and GATS jurisprudence illuminates th e ordinary meaning of "necessary" in three
important ways: (i) with regard to the continuum of necessity, (ii) with regard to reasonableness; and
(iii) with regard to the importance of the interests and values at stake. All three of these elaborations
apply to the meaning of the same term in Article 2. 2. Contrary to the argument of the US, the fact
that the term "necessary" in Articles XX and XIV is used in the context of whether it is necessary to
breach a provision of the GATT 1994 or the GATS rather than whether it is "more trade-restrictive
than necessary" in Article 2.2 does not render these interpretations inapplicable. Although the subject
matter of what is necessary differs between these provisions, the concept of necessity is the same.
This follows unavoidably from the appropriate use of the customary rules of treaty interpretation, as
mandated by Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
The US erroneously relies on Article 5.6 and footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement
4.347 When attempting to interpret the term "necessary," the US erroneously relies on Article 5.6 of
the SPS Agreement. The language of Article 5.6 an d its associated footnote differs significantly from
that of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and, therefor e, it is inappropriate to read into Article 2.2 the
concept that the measure must fulfil a legitimate obj ective "at the level that the Member imposing the
measure has determined appropriate". Moreover, readi ng into Article 2.2 this concept is inconsistent
with the last phrase in the second sente nce of Article 2.2, which reads " taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create". This is because the phrase contemplates a "necessary" measure meeting
a lower level of protection than determined by th e Member if such a lower level of protection is
appropriate in the light of the risks of non-fulfilment of the objective.

The application of Article 2.2 to the facts of this dispute
4.348 According to the US the stated objectives of the US measures relate solely to adverse effects
on dolphins that occur when nets are set upon dolphins . Under this approach, the US measures have
no objectives concerning adverse effects on dolph ins resulting from other fishing methods or
occurring in ocean regions other than the ETP. Mexico 's position is that Mexico's fishing methods do
not adversely affect dolphins and that the fishing methods of other fishing fleets do adversely affects
dolphins.
The US measures do not fulfil their objectives
4.349 Mexico continues to question the legitimacy of the objectives of the US measures, in
particular the objective to impose unilaterally and ex traterritorially the fishing methods preferred by
the US as a condition for access to th e principal distribution channels in the US tuna products market.
It is not "legitimate" for the US to use this mean s to get foreign tuna fleets to change their fishing
methods. Mexico also questions the "zero tole rance" standard that appears to underlie the
US measures. However, even assuming arguendo that the objectives of the US measures are
legitimate, the measures do not fulfil those objectives. The fundamental premise of the US measures
has not been substantiated. Thus, it cannot be sai d that the US measures "ensure that consumers are
not mislead or deceived about whether the tuna product contains tuna that was caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins". Thus, contrary to the stated objectives of the U.S., it cannot be said that
the US measures "ensure that tuna products labelled as dolphin-safe are in fact dolphin-safe" and that
the label "accurately conveys to consumers that the product does not contain tuna that was caught in a
manner that adversely affects dolphins". Finally, since the US measures essentially block from the
principal distribution channels tuna caught only in the ETP, the objective of encouraging foreign
fishing fleets not to set upon dolphins applies only to fleets fishing in the ETP. The fishing method of
those fleets is governed by the AIDCP and the US measures do not go any further than the AIDCP.
Thus, the US measures have no effect on encouraging foreign fishing fleets not to set upon dolphins.
The US measures are more trade restric tive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective taking into account of the risks non-fulfilment would create
4.350 To the extent that the US measures fulfil any objectives, taking into account the risks of non-
fulfilment, those objectives could be fulfilled using less trade restrictive meas ures. The risks of non-
fulfilment of the objectives is low because there is a very low if non-existent risk of adverse
consequences should the objectives not be carried out. This is because all of the objectives of the
US measures are already being fulfilled by the AIDCP, at least for the tuna products made from tuna
harvested in the ETP. For tuna products produced from tuna harvested outside the ETP, the stated
objectives are not being fulfilled. A less trade restri ctive way of fulfilling the objectives would be to
create dolphin-safe standards rather than a technical regulation whereby the AIDCP standard could be
recognized and a label complying with the AIDCP st andard used. At the same time, the different
US standard could be recognized and a label complying with that standard used. In this way
US consumers will be fully informed of all aspec ts of dolphin-safe fishing methods and they can
choose accordingly when purchasing tuna products from US retailers.
(iv) The US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
4.351 Focusing on the key points, the AIDCP resolution on certifying tuna as dolphin-safe
addresses the exact same issue as the US dolphin-saf e measure. The resolution is relevant within the
meaning of Article 2.4 and it is effective to meet the objective of informing consumers that dolphins
were not adversely affected. The US particip ated in the creation and adoption of the AIDCP
resolution and when it first announced its official label in 1999 it considered the international standard
to be relevant. The AIDCP is a group of national g overnments that acts collectively to set standards

for protecting dolphins in the ETP tuna fishery, and which uses the IATTC Secretariat as its
administering body. Finally, the US agreed to this standard, and is now trying to avoid it. For
purposes of this dispute, the AIDCP dolphin-safe standard is the relevant international standard.
2. United States
(a) Introduction
4.352 Mexico is essentially asking the Panel to find that Articles I:1 and III:4 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") require the United States to allow tuna products
that contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins to be labe lled dolphin-safe. Setting on dolphins to
catch tuna, however, is not safe fo r dolphins. It is for this reaso n that the US voluntary dolphin-safe
labelling provisions do not permit t una products that contain tuna ca ught by setting on dolphins to be
labelled dolphin-safe.
4.353 With respect to GATT 1994 Article III:4, Mexi co fails to present any evidence that the
US provisions afford any different treatment to impo rted tuna products as compared to domestic tuna
products. With respect to Article I:1, Mexico fa ils to present any evidence that the US provisions
afford any different treatment to Mexican products as compared to tuna products from other countries.
4.354 Mexico has also failed to establish that the US provisions set out labelling requirements with
which compliance is mandatory and has therefore fa iled to establish that the US provisions are even
technical regulations subject to Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. It also has not
established the other elements necessary to demonstrate a breach of those articles.
(b) Setting on dolphins adversely affects dolphins
4.355 The United States has provided ample evidence in its earlier submissions that setting on
dolphins has significant adverse effects on individua l dolphins. Dependent nursing dolphin calves are
often separated from their mothers during the high-sp eed chases. Without their mothers, these young
dolphins often starve to death or are killed by predators. Dolphins may also suffer other harms, some
of them cumulative, that may not be observed at the ti me of the set but manifest at some point later.
And these conclusions are uncontested by Mexico.
4.356 There is clear evidence that these adverse effe cts result in unobserved mortality and serious
injury of dolphins in the ETP and are attributable to the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna.
For example, Mexico does not refu te evidence that dolphin mortality is at least 14% greater than
observed dolphin mortality due to dependent calves that are separated from their mothers.
4.357 In terms of the effects on dolphin populations, the United States has also offered substantial
evidence that setting on dolphins is adversely a ffecting dolphins stocks. Mexico is wrong when it
argues that dolphin stocks are growing at rates that indicate population recovery. The most recent
assessment model was published in 2007. That repo rt shows median annual growth rates at 1.7 and
1.4 per cent, respectively, for offshore spotted and eastern spinner dolphin stocks in the ETP.
(c) ETP is unique
4.358 The ETP is the only ocean in the world where th ere is a regular and significant tuna-dolphin
association that is commercially exploited on a wide scale commercial basis to catch tuna. And, it is
the only ocean in the world for which the best available science indicates that the most probable
reason dolphin populations have remained depleted for over 20 years and show no clear signs of
recovery is because of that fishing method.

4.359 Mexico's assertions that there is substantial evidence of tuna-dolphin associations and harm to
marine mammals in other fisheries at least comparab le to that in the ETP are simply unfounded. The
additional information Mexico cites in its se cond written submission does not support that dolphin
mortality outside the ETP is comparable to dolphin mortality inside the ETP or that tuna and dolphins
associate outside the ETP in any way comparable to the way they do in the ETP.
(d) Access to US market
4.360 Mexico asserts that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions " de facto" condition access to
principal US distribution channels for tuna products on those products containing tuna caught using a
"fishing method unilaterally imposed by the United States". There is no basis for Mexico's assertion.
The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not requ ire tuna products to be labelled dolphin-safe to
be exported to or sold in the US market and in f act tuna products that are not labelled dolphin-safe are
sold in the United States.
4.361 Further, under the US provisions, there is no reason Mexico could not sell tuna products in
the United States that contain tuna caught by that portion of its fleet that does not set on dolphins with
a dolphin-safe label. In fact, at one point in time, Mexico did exactly this.
4.362 Mexico appears to equate the US provisions as "pressure" amounting to a requirement. There
is no basis for this. Further, it is retailers' a nd consumers' preference for dolphin-safe tuna, not the
US provisions, that affects the demand in the Unite d States for tuna products that contain tuna caught
by setting on dolphins. Mexico's arguments that th e US provisions created consumers' preference for
dolphin-safe tuna products are unsupported and ignore the history leading up to enactment of the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
(e) Article III:4 of GATT 1994
4.363 Regarding Mexico's claims under Article III:4, Mexico misconstrues the US argument. The
United States is not arguing that simply because a measu re is origin neutral on its face, it is consistent
with the obligation under Article IIII:4 to provide national treatment. Instead, what we have
explained in our previous submissions is that in order to establish that a measure affords less
favourable treatment to imported produc ts – either on its face or in f act – it must be shown that the
treatment afforded imported products is different than the treatment afforded like domestic products
and that any such different treatment is less favourable. Article III:4 does not prohibit different
treatment of products based on factors unrelated to th e foreign origin of the product. As Article III:1
makes clear, the general principle under Article III is that measures shall not be applied so as to afford
protection to domestic production.
4.364 Thus, in this dispute where Mexico concedes that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do
not on their face afford less favourable treatment to imported products, Mexico must show that the
US provisions use what appears to be an origin ne utral condition, for example, fishing technique, to
single out imported tuna products for treatment that is different and less favourable than treatment
accorded domestic tuna products.
4.365 Mexico fails to acknowledge the significance of the findings in EC – Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Products and Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes . In particular, Mexico
misses the key point made by the panel and Appellate Body in those reports: establishing that a
measure affords less favourable treatment to im ported products than to like domestic products
requires showing that any different treatment affo rded some imported products as compared to some
like domestic products is attributable to the foreign origin of the imported products.

4.366 As noted, Mexico has failed to establish that the facially origin-neutral conditions under
which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe in fact accord different treatment to imported tuna
products.
4.367 First, no tuna product may be labelled dolphin-safe if it contains tuna caught by setting on
dolphins. It is true that Mexico sets on dolphins to catch tuna, and that tuna products containing that
tuna cannot be labelled dolphin-safe. But those facts do not establish that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions use fishing technique as a proxy to treat imported tuna products differently (or
less favourably) than domestic tuna products.
4.368 Second, Mexico has expressly stated that its national treatment and most-favoured nation
claims are not based on any differences in documentation to support dolphin-safe claims.
4.369 Third, in our previous submissions, the United St ates reviewed the type of evidence put forth
in other disputes where seemingly origin-neutral criteria were in fact used to afford different treatment
to imported products. For example, in the Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks dispute, the facts
demonstrated that "almost 100 per cent" of imported products were s ubject to a higher tax rate than
like domestic products. In the Chile – Alcoholic Beverages dispute, the facts showed that 95 per cent
of imports were subject to the higher tax rate. In this dispute, the vast majority of imported tuna
products do not contain tuna that was caught by se tting on dolphins and are e ligible to be labelled
dolphin-safe.
4.370 Mexico has also failed to show that the US provisions modify the conditions of competition to
the detriment of imported products. First, to estab lish that a measure has modified the conditions of
competition to the detriment of imported products it is insufficient to show that the measure
introduced some change in the market; instead, it must be shown that the change the measure
introduced modified the conditions of competiti on as between imported products and like domestic
products.
4.371 Further, the US measures do not affect the ability of Mexican tuna products to be marketed in
the United States. That many retailers choose not to stock non-dolphin-safe tuna, and that there is
limited demand for non-dolphin-safe tuna products generally, is a result of retailer and consumer
preferences for dolphin-safe tuna products, not the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
4.372 Second, Mexico is wrong that the impact of the US provisions on Mexican tuna products
differed from their impact on domestic tuna products. For example, at the time the US provisions
were enacted 46 US purse seine vessels fished for tuna in the ETP as compared to 52 Mexican purse
seine vessels, and both primarily set on dolphins to catch tuna.
(f) Article I:1 of GATT 1994
4.373 With respect to its claim under Article I:1, first, Mexico appears to be conflating its
Article III:4 and Article I:1 claims. In partic ular, Mexico assumes that the "conditions of
competition" analysis that panels and the Appellate Body have taken in examining whether a measure
affords "less favourable treatment" under Article III:4 is equally applicable to examining whether a
measure fails to accord an advantage under Article I:1. This is not the case.
4.374 Second, Mexico has failed to put forward any evidence of the advantage the US provisions
allegedly accord tuna products orig inating in other countries that the US provisions allegedly fail to
accord Mexican tuna products. It has also not explained why, if the US provisions "pressure"
Mexico's fishing fleet to change its fishing practices or location, the US provisions do not similarly
pressure fishing fleets of other countries to change fishing methods or location.

4.375 The sole basis for Mexico's claim under Article I:1 is that Mexican tuna products contain tuna
caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, while tuna products originating in other countries contain
tuna caught using alternative me thods in other oceans. Howeve r, evidence submitted by the
United States shows that vessels of many count ries fish for tuna in the ETP both by setting on
dolphins and by using other methods, and that the orig in of tuna is determined by the flag of the
vessel that caught it, not where it was caught.
4.376 In this regard, Mexico misunderstands the reports in Canada – Autos and Colombia – Ports of
Entry. Those reports very clearly state – even in the passages Mexico quotes – that Article I:1 permits
Members to grant an advantage subject to cond itions, provided such conditions are not based on
origin. Contrary to Mexico's assertion, the fact s in this dispute are not analogous to those in Belgian
Family Allowances: the conduct of the government of Mexico, including the laws it has adopted, has
nothing to do with whether tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe.
4.377 We also recall that the GATT 1947 panel in US – Tuna (Mexico) already considered and
decided whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provis ions discriminate against Mexican tuna products
by conditioning the use of a dolphin-safe label on t una products not containing tuna caught by setting
on dolphins.
(g) Additional points raised by Mexico
4.378 Mexico has not identified how the text of Article I:1 or III:4 of the GATT 1994 prohibit the
type of "pressure" Mexico claims the US provisions exert on its fishing fleet. Evaluating whether or
not a measure might amount to "extra-territorial regul ation" is neither useful nor relevant to analysing
whether a measure is or is not consistent with these obligations.
4.379 Moreover, Mexico's assertion that the WTO Agreement prohibits a Member from
conditioning access to its market on products having been produced in a particular way, if true, would
have significant implications that go way beyond the issues in this dispute.
4.380 Mexico asserts, without any reference to provisi ons of the WTO Agreement or other relevant
sources, that the Panel should only consider facts as proposed at the time the Panel was established
when assessing if the US provisions violate Artic les I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Mexico's
argument should be rejected. There is no reason that the panel should ignore the evidence and
analysis that is clearly relevant to this dispute.
(h) TBT claims
4.381 Technical Regulation . Regarding Mexico's claims unde r the TBT Agreement, Mexico has
not established that the US dolphin-safe labelling pr ovisions are technical regulations and therefore
that the US provisions are even subject to the TBT provisions that Mexico alleges they breach.
4.382 Mexico continues to focus on the notion that because the US provisions make it unlawful to
label tuna products dolphin-safe if they contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins, compliance with
the US provisions is mandatory. Mexico's argu ment however conflates the meaning of the term
"labelling requirement" with the meaning of the phrase "with which compliance is mandatory". The
term "labelling requirement" appears in both the definition of a standard and the definition of a
technical regulation, with the di fference between a labelling requireme nt that is a standard and a
labelling requirement that is a technical regulati on being that compliance with the former is not
mandatory while compliance with the latter is. Th us, to establish that a labelling requirement is a
technical regulation, compliance with the conditio ns under which a product may be labelled in a
certain way must be mandatory.

4.383 Compliance with a labelling requirement is mandatory where the measure not only sets out
the conditions under which a product may be labelled in a particular way, but also requires the
product to be labelled in that way to be imported, sold or otherwise placed on a market. Were it
otherwise, as Mexico suggests, this would render e ither the term "labelling requirement" or the phrase
"with which compliance is not mandatory" in the definition of a standard without effect. It would also
render the phrase "with which compliance is mandato ry" in the definition of a technical regulation
without effect.
4.384 Mexico's arguments that compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions is
mandatory because they "restrict retailers, consum ers and producers to a single choice for labelling
tuna products dolphin-safe" finds no basis in the text of the TBT Agreement. Allowing products to be
labelled in a certain way that do not meet those conditions would defeat the purpose of the labelling
requirement.
4.385 Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement . Setting aside that Mexico has not established
that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are technical regulations, Mexico has also not
established the basic elements necess ary to substantiate its claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement. For example, w ith respect to its claim under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,
Mexico has not identified a reasonably available alte rnative measure that would fulfil the objectives
of the US provisions. There are a number of additional flaws in Mexico's arguments under Article 2.2
and 2.4.
4.386 First, Mexico's assertion that the US dolph in-safe labelling provisions are based on the
"assumption" that setting on dolphins to catch tuna adversely affects dolphins flatly contradicts the
evidence before this Panel as reviewed earlier in our statement. By conditioning the labelling of tuna
products on such products not containing tuna ca ught by setting on dolphins, the US provisions fulfil
their objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products
contain tuna caught in a manner harmful to dolphins.
4.387 Second, the hypothetical situation that Mexico describes under which a tuna product might be
sold as dolphin-safe that contains tuna caught in a set in which a dolphin was killed or seriously
injured is not evidence that the US provisions fail to fulfil their objective. Mexico's argument ignores
the reality that in adopting measures to fulfil le gitimate objectives it is appropriate for Members to
consider the costs of such measures in light of their benefits. Indeed, this is a means by which
Members can help ensure that their measures are no t more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil
their legitimate objectives.
F. C
LOSING ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING
1. Mexico
4.388 In this dispute Mexico has presented claims under GATT Articles I.1 and III.4 and
Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
4.389 We respectfully requests that the Panel rule on all of its claims, in particular the
discrimination claims under both Articles I:1 and III.4 of the GATT 1994.
4.390 Mexico reiterate that a lot of the discussion we had during this sec ond substantive meeting
with the panel related to the scientific issues of this dispute including the factual aspects of fishing
outside the ETP is not relevant to Mexico's discrimin ation claims. It is relevant only to Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement.

4.391 The evidence that Mexico has put forward is sound and accurate. Mexico has presented a
prima facie case with respect of all of its claims.
4.392 As discussed earlier today, we have presented an effective less trade restrictive alternative to
the US measures.
4.393 We would finally like to thank the Panel for your attention in this meeting, the Secretariat
staff for your support, and also the interpreters for your assistance.
2. United States
4.394 Mr Chairman, members of the Panel, thank you for the opportunity for closing remarks. We
will start by reviewing a couple of facts central to this dispute.
4.395 First, is the fact that it is not a requirement to access the US market to have tuna products
labelled dolphin-safe, nor for them to be dolphin-safe to enter US market. In fact, there is substantial
evidence that there are non-dolphin-safe tuna pr oducts on the US market and dolphin-safe products
not labelled dolphin-safe on the US market. Thus, th ere is clear evidence that a dolphin-safe label is
not a condition to access the US market.
4.396 A second factual element of critical importanc e is that setting on dolphins is harmful to
dolphins. There is clear evidence that it is harmfu l to dolphins, and Mexico has not contested this
evidence. The only evidence that Mexico has contested is at what rate dolphin populations are
growing. Mexico has concluded from the informati on it cites that dolphin populations are recovering.
We have discussed why this is not correct. And, th is relates to a broader issue regarding the facts
presented by Mexico in this dispute.
4.397 Throughout this proceeding the United States has cited a suite of published scientific papers,
which underwent rigorous peer-review and scrutiny, to describe the abundance and trends of ETP
dolphin stocks and the impacts of intentional chase a nd encirclement on these stocks. The results of
these papers, and the conclusions contained within, are robust and regarded throughout the scientific
community as setting a research standard, most notably for abundance estimation of dolphins using
ship-based survey methods.
4.398 We have observed during these hearings and in its written submissions that Mexico has
presented or interpreted available information in many cases without the necessary and proper context
provided by the authors. Instead, Mexico has selectively used portions of papers or data that, when
taken out of context or expressed without important uncertainties or caveats, appear to lend support to
its arguments, but in fact do not.
4.399 One example that we reviewed today was th e 2008 abundance estimate report, that Mexico
cited while omitting very clear caveats included in that report by its authors. Mexico has attempted to
devalue the scientific evidence presen ted by the United States in this dispute, but has not provided a
basis for these criticisms that finds support in the scientific literature. In an instance where Mexico
did present such criticism, in the form of a Na tional Research Council (NRC) Report regarding pre-
fishery abundance, Mexico omitted the fact that s ubsequent estimates of pre-fishery abundance have
been produced that addressed and accounted for potential deficiencies in these earlier estimates.
4.400 The third important factual point is that th e ETP is unique. The degree of occurrence and
exploitation of dolphins when fishing for tuna an d the impact on dolphins of that is orders of
magnitude higher in the ETP than in other oceans. This is because unlike in any other ocean in the
world, millions of dolphins are intentionally targeted to catch tuna; this simply does not occur in any
other ocean in the world.

4.401 Turning to a few legal points, regarding GATT 1994 Article III.4, we have talked a lot about
what less favourable treatment means. Mexico has not argued that the US provisions on their face
discriminate against Mexican tuna products. And, while we do not disagree that a facially neutral
measure can discriminate, Mexico has not shown that de facto discrimination exists in this dispute.
The United States has pointed to other disputes where de facto discrimination was found and pointed
out that the type of evidence that lead to the conc lusions in those disputes has not been presented by
Mexico in this dispute.
4.402 We have also provided the Panel with an anal ytical approach that we think is helpful in
looking at these issues, and one that is consistent with approaches taken in prior WTO reports. In
determining whether a measure affords less favour able treatment, one needs to determine what
treatment is being afforded impor ted products, and what treatment is being afforded like domestic
products. That treatment can then be looked at under a conditions of competition analysis to
determine if the treatment afforded imported products is less favourable than the treatment afforded
domestic products.
4.403 Mexico suggests starting with the conditions of competition analysis. Even if you followed
Mexico's approach, the results would be the same. The US provisions do not alter the conditions of
competition to the detriment of imported products. It is true, that pr ior to the US labelling provisions,
no standard for labelling tuna products dolphin-saf e existed, and thus, the US provisions when
adopted introduced a change in the market. Ho wever, that measure did introduce a change that
treated imported products any differently than lik e domestic products. The US provisions afforded
imported and domestic products the same opportunity to compete under the same conditions on use of
the dolphin-safe label. Mexico instead focuses on th e impact of the US measures. But even if that
were an appropriate approach, the evidence on the r ecord shows that the number of US and Mexican
purse seine vessels in the ETP that caught tuna by se tting on dolphins was relatively the same at the
time the US provisions were adopted. The fact th at US vessels and producers changed their fishing
method or location, and that Mexican vessels an d producers did not, is not evidence that the
US provisions altered the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported products.
4.404 With regards to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, we have discussed in the context of
Article III:4 why the approach Mexico has taken in attempting to show the US provisions discriminate
against Mexican tuna products is not valid, and Mexico's argumen ts under Article I:1 are without
merit for similar reasons.
4.405 With respect to Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement, we spent a lot of time discussing
the definition of a technical regulation, what it m eans for compliance to be mandatory, and what it
means to be a labelling requirement. For compliance with a labelling requirement to be mandatory, a
measure must set out conditions under which a product may be labelled in a certain way, and require
the product to be labelled to be placed on the ma rket. Mexico on the other hand asserts that a
labelling requirement is converted to a technical regulation when there is only a single set of
conditions under which a product may be labelled in a particular way. Mexico is essentially saying
that in order for the US dolphin labelling provision s to be voluntary, the US must permit products to
be labelled dolphin-safe even if they do not meet the conditions to be labelled dolphin-safe. This
leaves no room for a measure to be a "labelling requirement" and be voluntary. Yet, labelling
requirements are covered under both the definition of a standard, which provides that standards are
voluntary, and the definition of a technical regulati on, which provides that technical regulations are
mandatory.
4.406 Regarding Mexico's claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, I will not
discuss those in detail now, but do reiterate that Mexi co has failed to establish that the US provisions
are inconsistent with those articles and refer the Panel to the US written submissions.

4.407 Mr Chairman, members of the Panel, and members of the Secretariat assisting you, thank you
for your time and attention throughout these proceedings. This concludes my closing statement.
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES52
A. ARGENTINA
1. Oral statement of Argentina53
(a) Introduction
5.1 The Argentine Republic has expressed the wish to participate as a third party in these
proceedings given its systemic interest in the correct interpretation of the provisions at issue in this
dispute, under both the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the
GATT 1994.
(b) Analysis of the United States measures in the light of the TBT Agreement
(i) The US regulations on dolphin-safe labelling are technical regulations and are therefore
subject to the requirements of the TBT Agreement
The US regulations on dolphin-safe labelling are de jure technical regulations
5.2 Argentina considers that the regulations on dolphin-safe labelling constitute "technical
regulations" and come within the scope of applica tion of the TBT Agreement inasmuch as they meet
the three criteria laid down by the Appellate Body54 for definition as technical regulations.
5.3 The United States argues that the measure under consideration does not constitute a "technical
regulation" since one of these requirements is not me t, namely the requirement of being mandatory.
According to the United States, its dolphin-safe label ling legislation is a "standard", not subject to the
disciplines of Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT, but to Article 4 thereof.55
5.4 The Panel must determine the scope of the requirement of "mandatory" compliance under
paragraph 1 of Annex 1 to the TBT, and thus establish the boundary line between "technical
regulations" and "standards", which will have serious systemic implications.
5.5 A decision that excluded the possibility of applying the disciplines established by the TBT for
the issuance and implementation of technical regula tions in respect of any labelling requirement,
where the use thereof was voluntary, could open the way for the indiscriminate use of this type of
technical requirement for protectionist purposes, thereby defeating the object and purpose of the TBT.
It should be remembered that one of the objectives of the TBT is to prevent technical standards being
"applied in a manner which would constitute a mean s of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions preva il or a disguised restriction on international
trade".
56

52 This section of the arguments of the third par ties is based on the executive summaries submitted by
the third parties to the Panel, where available. Footnotes in this section are those of third parties.
53 This oral statement was originally made in Spanish.
54 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 67-70 and Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines ,
para. 176.
55 United States' first written submission, paras. 125-138.
56 Preamble, TBT Agreement.

5.6 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos elaborated on the scope of the term "mandatory" as
used in the first sentence of the definition of "technical regulation" contained in Annex 1 to the TBT.
57
In the same case, the Appellate Body also made it clear that the second sentence of the definition of
"technical regulation" contains a list of examples of the concept of "product characteristics" used in
the first sentence.58
5.7 From a combined reading of these two provisions , it is apparent that compliance with the
"labelling requirements" contained in a document must be mandatory in order for the document to be
considered a "technical regulation". In par ticular, a document which establishes "labelling
requirements", "with which compliance is mandatory", shall constitute a "technical regulation".
5.8 A distinction should be made between two sep arate situations to which compliance with
"labelling requirements" may apply: (a) the mandato ry or non-mandatory use of a label; and (b) the
requirements that must be met for the use of the la bel. Argentina considers that the words "labelling
requirements" and "with which compliance is mandatory" cover both situations in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of those terms.
5.9 There is no reason whatsoever to limit the ordi nary meaning of the words analysed to the
obligation to affix a label, excluding the "mandatory re quirements" that have to be met if it is decided
to affix a label. Therefore, provided that at least one of these two elements is of a "mandatory" nature,
the necessary requirement of mandatoriness will be me t so that the document in question can be
characterized as a "technical regulation".
5.10 In the case under consideration, the dolphin-safe label acts as a sort of "certification" that the
marketed product fulfils certain requirements laid down by law. With labels of this type, the
requirements that must be met by the product in orde r for it to be eligible for the label are always
mandatory.
5.11 Argentina considers that an interpretation of Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement of the kind
proposed by the United States, which would require the use of a dolphin-safe type label to be
mandatory in order for a document to be character ized as a "technical regulation", would turn any
label of this kind – the use of which, by definition, is voluntary – into a "standard", thereby depriving
the definition of "technical regulation" of any content.
5.12 In addition to the notion of mandatoriness, ther e is another element which, in Argentina's
view, distinguishes standards from technical regul ations: "standards" must be "approved by a
recognized body".
59 The United States has not demonstrated that this element is present in its
legislation on dolphin-safe labelling.
5.13 For the above reasons, Argentina considers that the dolphin-safe labelling requirements
established in US legislation constitute a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1 to the
TBT and that, consequently, they are governed by the provisions contained in Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4
of that Agreement.
The interpretation proposed by Argentina is supported by the Panel Report in EC – Sardines
5.14 Argentina considers that the instant case presents similarities with the EC – Sardines case,
and that the decisions of the Panel and the Appe llate Body in that case confirm the view that

57 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 68.
58 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
59 Paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement.

dolphin-safe labelling requirements constitute a "techni cal regulation". In that case, there was no
obligation on Peruvian producers to market their fish (" Sardinops sagax ") as "preserved sardines".
On the contrary, they could market their product freely, provided that it did not bear the mark
"preserved sardines".
60
5.15 As in the EC – Sardines case, Mexican producers are free to market their products in the
United States, provided that they do not use a label indicating that they are dolphin-safe. On the other
hand, if they wished to use the mark "dolphin-saf e", the product would have to satisfy a mandatory
requirement: that of having been caught in accordan ce with the conditions laid down in United States
law.
5.16 In both cases, the use of the mark (whether it be "dolphin-safe" or "preserved sardines")
entails enforcement of a document laying down the required characteristics of the product,
compliance with which is mandatory; in other words, a technical regulation.
5.17 On that occasion, the Panel was in no doubt ab out its decision that the regulation in question
did indeed constitute a "technical regulation", and that decision was not reversed by the Appellate
Body.
The United States regulations on dolphin-safe labelling have the effect of technical
regulations, because they operate "de facto" as such.
5.18 Argentina believes that the analysis of th e "mandatoriness" of the document under
consideration should not be conf ined to a determination of " de jure" mandatoriness, but should also
look at whether the use of that label is mandatory in fact (" de facto" mandatoriness). Argentina is of
the view that the document has the practical effect of a technical regulation and operates as such in
relation to market actors.
5.19 The labelling authorized on the basis of compliance with regulations laid down by a State
gives rise to a positive perception on the part of the consumer, who will then tend to allow his/her
purchasing decisions to be influenced by the labelling, even if it is voluntary.
5.20 Given the existence of labelling regulations, it is an established feature of the US tuna product
market that "most participants will not purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use tuna products" 61 that
fail to display the dolphin-safe label, but that they will purchase, offer for sale, distribute or use local
tuna products, and products from other sources, which are labelled dolphin-safe.
5.21 Thus, as Mexican tuna is a like product, th e regulations on positive dolphin-safe labelling
operate as a de facto technical regulation, compliance with which is a "mandatory" requirement for
the viable marketing of the product in the market where the regulation is in force.
(ii) The United States regulations on dolphin-safe labe lling are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement
The conditions for awarding the dolphin-safe labe l laid down by the United States regulations
are discriminatory
5.22 The regulations under considera tion lay down conditions for aw arding the dolphin-safe label
that discriminate between like products, whether of na tional origin or originating in other Members.

60 Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.3-7.4.
61 Mexico's first written submission, para. 165.

Argentina maintains that a method of granting a positive label based on a system or conditions of
production, as in the present case with regard to the u se of a specific type of fishing gear, results in
discrimination between like products.
5.23 The US regulations discriminate on the basis of where the tuna has been caught and the
fishing method employed. As the fishing fleets of the United States and other countries fish in
different seas and use types of fishing gear differe nt from those used by Mexico, the conditions for
awarding the dolphin-safe label established by the United States regulations have the effect of
favouring tuna products from the US and other countries over Mexican products. Consequently, these
regulations adversely alter the cond itions of competition in the US market, so that Mexican tuna is
de facto afforded less favourable treatment than that granted to the identical product of national origin
or originating in other countries. Thus, the regul ations are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
The mere existence of a positive label regulated by a State gives rise, per se, to discrimination
5.24 Argentina would emphasize that the mere exis tence of a positive label regulated by a State
gives rise, per se, to a perception which leads the consumer to incline towards the like product bearing
the label, whether it be of national origin or fro m some other WTO Member, to the detriment of the
imported like product which is not authorized to bear that label.
(iii) The AIDCP is not a "recognized body" with in the meaning of the second paragraph of
Annex 1 to the TBT, nor is it a "standardizing body"
5.25 Argentina considers that the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation
Program (AIDCP) should not be regarded as a "recognized body" under the terms of the second
paragraph of Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement. The agreement in question could not have that status
given that it does not meet the definition of an "international body" because it is not "open" to
participation by the relevant bodies of at least a ll WTO Members. On the contrary, the Agreement
provides for a specific accession procedure with specific criteria or conditions.
5.26 According to the "Decision of the [TBT] Comm ittee on principles for the development of
international standards, guides and recommendations w ith relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the
Agreement" (G/TBT/9), openness is one of the principles that should be observed in drafting
"international standards". The decision states that membership of an international standardizing body
should be open on a non-discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of all WTO Members.
5.27 The decision also states that, in the preparati on of standards, transparency, impartiality and
consensus, effectiveness and relevance, cohere nce and the development dimension should be
observed in addition to openness. Th e development dimension refers to the fact that the constraints
on developing countries' effective participation in th e elaboration of international standards should be
taken into account. Hence, the impartiality and ope nness of any international standardization process
requires that developing countries are not excluded de facto from the process.
5.28 Argentina notes that the membership of the AIDCP is neither open nor oriented towards
universality as befitting an institution authorized to approve "international standards". Consequently,
the fact that only a limited number of countries are pa rties to the AIDCP and that it is a "semi-closed"
agreement which does not provide for the particip ation of the relevant bodies of at least all
WTO Members, and that it imposes conditions on the participation of new States or regional
organizations, means that it cannot be categorized as a "recognized body" under the terms of the
TBT Agreement.

5.29 Similarly, the AIDCP is not a "standardizing body" 62 with recognized standardization
activities. In fact, the development of standards is not the principal function of the AIDCP, as it is in
other standardizing bodies such as the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius
5.30 In view of the foregoing, AIDCP resolutions could not constitute "relevant international
standards" within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, and WTO Members are not
obliged to bring their domestic legislation into line with those parameters.
(c) Conclusion
5.31 Argentina hopes that the above comments may be useful in the Panel's deliberations and help
arrive at an interpretation that is harmonious and in accordance with the aims and objectives of the
TBT Agreement and the GATT, avoiding forms of discr imination in international trade flows that are
unjustifiable in the light of the principles of the multilateral trading system.
B. AUSTRALIA
1. Third party submission and oral statement of Australia
(a) Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994
(i) Mexico's claim under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
5.32 Australia considers that whether a measure is "origin-neutral", while indicative, is not
determinative of whether a measure accords less fa vourable treatment to imported products. Rather,
the question the Panel must address for the purposes of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 is whether the
US dolphin-safe labelling measures modify the conditi ons of competition to the detriment of Mexican
tuna and tuna products.
63 The Appellate Body has said the focus of this investigation should be on
what appears to be the fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself.64
5.33 Australia submits that the Panel may look to a range of criteria to determine whether an
equality of competitive conditions exists, and shou ld examine those criteria in the light of the
fundamental effect the measure has on competition.65
(ii) Mexico's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
5.34 In Canada – Autos the Appellate Body confirmed that Ar ticle I:1 of the GATT 1994 covers
de facto as well as de jure discrimination.66 The Appellate Body in that case refused to accept the
proposition that measures which were on their face "o rigin-neutral" could not otherwise be in breach
of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.67
5.35 In this dispute, the question to be addressed by the Panel is whether in practice the
US dolphin-safe labelling measures accord an advant age to the tuna products of any other Member
that is not also immediately and unconditionally accorded to the tuna products of Mexico. More
particularly, can the US dolphin-safe labelling measur es, which accord an advantage to tuna products

62 "International standardization body" according to the Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 221.
63 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 135 and 137.
64 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 142.
65 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 142-147; Appellate Body Report,
EC – Asbestos, para. 123.
66 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 78.
67 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 78.

of all countries regardless of origin, provided thos e countries act in a certain way, nevertheless be
considered de facto discriminatory vis-à-vis Mexico? In this regard, Australia notes the statement of
the panel in Canada – Autos that "an advantage can be granted subject to conditions without
necessarily implying that it is not accorded 'unconditionally' to the like product of other Members".
68
(b) Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement
(i) Technical regulation
5.36 In Australia's view, the US dolphin-safe labelling measures set out "requirement(s)
concerning a product label" and are therefore a "l abelling requirement" that applies to a product,
process or production method within the definition of a technical regulation in paragraph 1 of
Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement.69
5.37 Australia notes the US dolphin-safe labelling measures do not require tuna products to be
labelled or to contain certain in formation on the label; nor do they prevent the sale in the
United States of tuna products containing tuna harvest ed in a particular manner or tuna products that
do not bear the "dolphin-safe" label. The measures regulate the circumstances in which the
"dolphin-safe" label may be used on tuna produ cts. Australia therefore considers that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not mandatory on their face and thus on this basis do not fall
within the definition of a "technical regulation" in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement.
5.38 Australia notes however Mexico's claim that th e US dolphin-safe labelling measures, if not
a priori mandatory, are nonetheless de facto mandatory.
70 Australia shares New Zealand's view 71 that
there may be circumstances where a government's ac tions in conjunction with an otherwise voluntary
measure effectively make compliance with the m easure mandatory. Australia also agrees with
New Zealand that "a measure that is not a priori mandatory will only constitute a 'technical
regulation' in cases where it is clearly warranted by the facts'" 72 In Australia's view, there must be
some factor in the measure itself or the governmental actions surrounding the measure which mean
for the relevant industry that a m easure which appears to be voluntary on its face is effectively made
"binding or compulsory".
73
5.39 In the circumstances of this dispute, Mexico 's argument would appear to require that the
effects in the market of consumer purchasing pr eferences flowing from information provided via the
"dolphin-safe" label be attributable to government as a mandatory measure. However, Australia
submits that consumer preferences alone cannot determine whether a labelling requirement is
voluntary or mandatory. Such a proposition would result in all labelling requirements falling within
the definition of a "technical regulation" and rende r meaningless the definition and disciplines of the
TBT Agreement applying to standards.

69 See Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) , para. 7.449;
Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
70 Mexico's first written submission, para. 203.
71 New Zealand's third party submission, para. 23.
72 New Zealand's third party submission, para. 23.
73 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 68.

(c) Mexico's claims under Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
(i) Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
5.40 In Australia's view, the analysis of "tr eatment no less favourable" developed under GATT
Article III:4 would assist in the interpreta tion of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 74 Australia
therefore considers that, like Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
"obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products ..."
in respect of technical regulations.75
5.41 Australia submits that when considering whet her Mexican tuna products have been accorded
"treatment less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel should have regard to
the test set out by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef in the context of
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, by examining whether the measures at issue modify the conditions of
competition in the US market to the detriment of imported Mexican tuna products. 76 Australia
considers that whether a measure is "origin-neutral", while indicative, is not in itself determinative of
whether a measure accords less favourable treatment to imported products.
5.42 Australia submits that the Panel could also obtain guidance from the Appellate Body's views
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef that "the intervention of some element of private choice does
not relieve [a Member] of responsibility under the GATT 1994 for the resulting establishment of
competitive conditions less favourable for the imported product …". 77 Thus, Australia considers a
relevant question for the Panel is whether, having regard to the evidence, the (alleged) inability of
Mexican tuna products to access the US "dolphin-safe" label is the result of governmental action 78
modifying the conditions of competition in the US ma rket to the detriment of Mexican tuna products,
having regard to the fundamental thrust and effect79 of the measures at issue.
(ii) Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
5.43 In Australia's view, the first sentence of Article 2.2 establish es the fundamental obligation of
Members with respect to "technical regulations" to "ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade" The second sentence of Article 2.2 explains that "[f]or this purpose, technical regulations shall
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary …". In other words, the second sentence of Article 2.2
sets out the conditions technical regulations must me et in order to satisfy the fundamental obligation
contained in the first sentence of Article 2.2.
Legitimate objective
5.44 Australia recalls the statement of the Panel in EC – Sardines that "Article 2.2 and [the]
preambular text affirm that it is up to the Member s to decide which policy objectives they wish to
pursue and the levels at which they wish to pursue them". 80 Australia submits that under Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement, as under Article 2.4, "there must be an examination and a determination on the

74 See also Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.464.
75 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 135, citing Appellate Body
Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 16-17.
76 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 137.
77 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 146.
78 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 149.
79 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 142.

legitimacy of the objectives of the measure".
81 There must be an assessment of whether the stated
objective(s)82 of a technical regulation put forward by th e respondent can be considered "legitimate"
within the meaning of Article 2.2. However, Aust ralia submits it is not relevant to this assessment
whether the objective(s) put forward by the Unite d States for the US dolphin-safe labelling measures
are considered appropriate.83
More trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective
5.45 Australia considers that the interpretation of the phrase "more trade r estrictive than necessary
to fulfil a legitimate objective" under Article 2.2 calls for a "weighing and balancing" of the elements
contained in that phrase, similar to that required in a "necessity" analysis under GATT Article XX.
5.46 Australia submits that the Panel's examinati on should focus on: (a) whether the measure is
trade restrictive; (b) whether the measure is "to fulfil" a legitimate objective; and (c) whether there are
other reasonably available alternatives that may be less trade restrictive while still fulfilling the
legitimate objective at the level of protection the Member considers appropriate.
5.47 Australia agrees with Mexico that measures that are "trade restrictive" include those that
impose any form of limitation on imports, discri minate against imports or deny competitive
opportunities to imports.84
5.48 In examining whether the US dolphin-safe labe lling measures are "to fulfil a legitimate
objective", Australia submits the relevant question is whether the measures carry out, or have the
capacity to carry out, their stated objectives. 85 In addressing this question, the evidence before the
Panel concerning the perceptions a nd expectations of US consumers relating to the meaning of the
"dolphin-safe" label and the criteria behind its use will be crucial. Australia submits a relevant
consideration is whether the evidence shows that consumers in fact understand the criteria behind the
"dolphin-safe" label and accordingly base thei r purchasing decisions not only on whether dolphins
were killed or seriously injured during harvesting, but also on whether the tuna contained in tuna
products was caught in a particular manner.
5.49 Australia submits that the question of whether th ere are other reasonably available, less trade
restrictive alternatives86 is pertinent to the Panel's consideration of whether a measure is "more trade
restrictive than necessary". Australia also considers that the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the
US dolphin-safe labelling measures (and possible alte rnatives to those measures) is a relevant
consideration for the Panel.87 Australia considers the level of protection considered appropriate by the
United States in relation to the US dolphin-safe labelling measures 88 and an examination of whether
the US dolphin-safe labelling measures form "part of a comprehensive strategy" to address the

81 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 286.
82 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 289.
83 See Mexico's first written submission, paras. 207-208.
84 Mexico's first written submission, para. 217. See also Panel Report, India – Autos , para. 7.265;
Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) , para. 7.330; Panel Report, EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 7.677.
85 See also United States' first written submission , para. 154.
86 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 170-174; Appellate Body Report, Korea –
Various Measures on Beef, paras. 165-166; Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.24; GATT Panel Report, US –
Section 337 Tariff Act, para. 5.26.
87 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
88 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , para. 15, citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Gambling, para. 311; sixth preambular paragraph, TBT Agreement.

protection of dolphins89 are also relevant factors in the Panel's consideration of whether there are other
reasonably available, less trade restrictive alternatives to the measures at issue.
Taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create
5.50 Australia submits that a finding as to whether a technical regulation is "more trade restrictive
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective" must be weighed against the risks non-fulfilment of the
particular legitimate objective would create. Such risks may differ depending on the nature of the
legitimate objective the measure is designed to fulfil and the level of protection a Member considers
appropriate. If the risks associated with non-fulfilm ent of a particular objective would be high, then
the measure may still be justified regardless of its trade-restrictiveness.
5.51 While the terms of GATT Article XX do not call expressly for an assessment of the "risks
non-fulfilment would create", Australia submits ther e are parallels with the "necessity" test adopted
by the Appellate Body in its consideration of GA TT Article XX, which includes consideration of the
importance of the interests or values at stake.90 Australia believes such consideration is relevant to the
determination of the issues in this dispute.
C. BRAZIL
1. Third party submission and oral statement of Brazil
(a) Introduction
5.52 Brazil offers comments on aspects of: (i) the definition of technical regulation in the
TBT Agreement; (ii) Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreem ent; (iii) Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement; (iv)
less favourable treatment under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; and (v) likeness.
(b) Definition of technical regulation
5.53 The parties disagree as to whether the challenged measures are a "technical regulation" as
defined in Annex 1(1) of the TBT Agreement . This definition is three-pronged. 91 Brazil will
comment on two prongs of this definition, i.e.: (1) a document that lays down product characteristics,
or their related processes and production methods, a nd may also include or deal exclusively with
certain requirements – including labelling requirements – as they a pply to a product, process or
production method; and (2) compliance with the requirements laid down in the document is
mandatory.
(i) "Product characteristics"
5.54 The United States argues that labels are not "p roduct characteristics" within the meaning of
the definition of "technical regulation". Conversely, Mexico argues that means of identification such
as labels are product characteristics.

89 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , paras. 154, 172, 211; see also United States' first
90 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 178.
91 TBT Agreement, Annex 1(1); and Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 67, 68 and 70.

5.55 Brazil notes that the Appellate Body has stated plainly that for purposes of the definition of a
technical regulation in Annex 1(1) of the TBT Agre ement, "labelling requirements" are an "example[]
of 'product characteristics'".
92
5.56 The suggestion was made that the pa nel and Appellate Body reports in EC – Sardines and
EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) support the proposition that to establish
whether a measure on labelling is a technical regulation, it is necessary to examine further whether the
label relates to product characteristics.93 Brazil believes this is an incorrect reading. In both cases, the
EU argued that the measure at issue did not lay down a labelling requirement. Addressing the EU's
arguments, the panels and Appellate Body also pr oceeded to consider whether the measure could
otherwise be seen as laying down product characteristics.94 Thus, they did not rule that a measure had
to lay down product characteristics in addition to laying down labelling requirements. To the
contrary, the panel in EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) stated that "[t]he
issue is not whether the content of the label refe rs to a product characteristic: the label on a product is
a product characteristic".95
(ii) Whether compliance is mandatory
5.57 Mexico and the United States disagree on whether compliance with the labelling requirements
at issue is mandatory. The Panel must examine this question with particular care, because it bears on
the distinction between technical regulations and standards, which is central to the TBT Agreement.
5.58 Two cases may provide guidance for examining the question of mandatory versus voluntary
labelling requirements. First, in EC – Sardines , the challenged measure provided that only products
consisting of Sardina pilchardus could be sold in the EU as "preserved sardines". Therefore, products
consisting of Sardinops sagax could not be sold as "preserved sard ines", but could be sold without
this label. The EU did not even dispute that its measure was "mandatory". But in arguing that the
measure did not apply to Sardinops sagax, it asserted that "[t]he only le gal consequence of the [EU]
Regulation for preserved Sardinops sagax [was] that they may not be called 'preserved sardines'."96 In
rejecting the EU's argument, the Appellate Body explained that a measure on labelling, or naming, has
an effect beyond the products that are allowed to bear a label or name. It said: "preserved products
made, for example, of Sardinops sagax are, by virtue of the EC Regulation, prohibited from being
identified and marketed under an appellation including the term 'sardines'."97
5.59 Second, in EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), the EU argued that
the labelling requirement was "not ... mandatory ... in order to market the relevant products in the
European Communities". 98 The panel noted that the EU had tried and failed to pursue a similar
argument in EC – Sardines . It found that, similar to EC – Sardines , the "negative implication" that
followed from the challenged labellin g requirement was that "products with a GI identical to a

92 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
93 Japan's third party submission, paras. 12-14.
94 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , paras. 187 and 190; Panel Report, EC – Sardines ,
paras. 7.37 and 7.39; and Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) ,
paras. 7.435, 7.437 and 7.448-7.450. In EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) , the EU
also suggested that labelling requirements had to apply to "characteristics of a product", a suggestion rejected by
the panel. Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), paras. 7.437 and 7.449.
95 Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) , para. 7.449 (emphasis in
the original).
96 EU's Appellant's Submission as quoted in Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 185.
97 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 184 (emphasis in the original). See also Appellate
Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 185; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 69.
98 Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.454.

Community protected name" that did not satisfy that requirement could not be marketed in the EU
bearing that GI . It followed that the requirement at issue was "an obligatory or mandatory
requirement".99
5.60 There appear to be parallels between these two cases and the present one. In the present case,
it appears that tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific with certain fishing methods cannot be sold
in the US bearing the "dolphin-safe" label, irrespective of whether these fishing methods could also be
dolphin-safe.
(c) Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
5.61 In Brazil's view, the following sequence of analysis may be useful in assessing conformity of
a measure with Article 2.2: (i) first, examining wh ether the objective stated by the regulating Member
is "legitimate"; (ii) second, if the stated objective is found to be legitimate, evaluating whether the
measure bears a rational link with the stated objective. If this is the case, (iii) the measure should be
subject to the "necessity test" that is provided under Ar ticle 2.2. Such a test entails an assessment of
whether the measure is more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objective in point.
This assessment includes consideration of the measure's effectiveness in fulfilling the asserted
objective; its degree of trade-restrictiveness; and reasonably available less trade-restrictive
alternatives. Article 2.2 also expressly provides that this "necessity test" must be informed by "the
risks non-fulfilment would create". Brazil comments on some of these elements below.
(i) Assessment of the pursued objectives
5.62 The Member imposing a technical regulation is entitled to define its objective or objectives.100
This does not mean that a panel has no role in dete rmining whether the objectives are "legitimate". In
EC – Sardines, under Article 2.4, the Appellate Body agreed that "there must be an examination and a
determination on the legitimacy of the objectives". 101 Article 2.2 contains a non-exhaustive list of
legitimate objectives. In this dispute, the United States asserts only objectives that fall within the list
of Article 2.2.
5.63 A panel should also examine whether the asser ted objective or objectives are actually those
being pursued by the Member with the measures at issue. This involves examining the link between
the measure and the stated objective. It might also involve, e.g. considering whether an objective has
been identified post hoc in the course of a WTO dispute.
(ii) The role of regional agreements under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
5.64 In discussing Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreem ent, Brazil cautions that the Panel should
exercise care in deciding whether an "international" standard exists. At the same time, where there is
an agreement between the parties to a disput e that pursues the same objectives pursued by a
challenged unilateral measure, this must be given importance, even if the agreement is only regional,
and not open to at least all WTO Members. Such a fact would be relevant, in particular, under
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.

99 Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), paras. 7.454-7.456.
100 This is, of course, a different question from that of which party bears the burden of proof under
Article 2.2. See Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 275-282.
101 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , paras. 286; and Panel Report, EC – Sardines ,
paras. 7.121-7.122.

5.65 Under Article 2.2, first, if the regulating Member's stated objective is already being pursued
through a regional agreement, and yet the Member c hooses to adopt a unilateral, distinct measure to
pursue the same objective, this might cast some doubts on the rational link between the unilateral
measure and the objective in question. Second, when a less trade restrictive alternative is embodied in
a regional agreement between, among ot hers, the parties to a dispute, such a fact must be given
special weight under Article 2.2. This woul d be consonant with the recognition, in the
TBT Agreement, that the harmonization of technical regulations and standards can be beneficial, by
facilitating the conduct of international trade.
102
(iii) Meaning of the phrase "trade restrictive"
5.66 First, the United States imports the "significantly" less trade restrictive standard from
footnote 3 to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, into Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. However,
this standard is dictated by the specific wording of footnote 3 to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. 103
The United States relies on a letter sent by the GATT Director-General to its Chief Negotiator in
support of its reading that this standard also app lies to the TBT Agreement. Brazil disagrees that a
letter sent by the then Director-Gener al to one party to the negotiations may, by itself, inform the
meaning of a multilateral agreement.
5.67 Second, the United States argues that because the ch allenged measures do not impede all tuna
trade from Mexico, they are not trade restrictive. It is well-established that a measure may be "trade
restrictive" without impeding all trade (or even any actual trade). The context provided by Article XI
of the GATT 1994 offers useful interpretive guidan ce. Panels have observed that the ordinary
meaning of "restriction" includes "a thing that rest ricts someone or something, a limitation on action,
a limiting condition or regulation". 104 They have found that a restri ction can exist when there is an
impact on competitive opportunities, and not necessarily on trade flows.105
5.68 Third, the United States argues that the only tr ade effects of the measures are caused by
consumers' choices. Yet by disciplining la belling schemes, the TBT Agreement recognizes the
importance of measures that operate through consumers' choices.
(iv) "Taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create"
5.69 Another interpretive issue raised by Article 2.2 is the meaning of the ending clause of the
second sentence, "taking account of the risks non -fulfilment would create", accompanied by an
illustrative list of "relevant elements of consideration" "in assessing such risks".
5.70 This clause appears to require, in particular, an examination of the nature and degree of the
risks that could occur if the legitimate objective were not fulfilled. In Brazil's view, an essential part
of this examination is to assess the importance of the legitimate objective. 106 For example, if the
legitimate objective were the protection of human lif e and health, then the risks of non-fulfilment
would likely be extremely high. If the objectives were different, the risks could be lower.

102 See TBT Agreement, Preamble, Article 2.4-2.6, and Annex 3, paras. F to H.
103 The US acknowledges that parties could not agree to include it in the TBT Agreement.
United States' first written submission, para. 168.
104 Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry , para. 7.235; Panel Report, India – Quantitative
Restrictions, para. 5.128. See also Panel Report, India – Autos , para. 7.270 (a restriction is not the same as a
prohibition).
105 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather , para. 11.20. See also Panel Report, Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres, para. 7.370; Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry , para. 7.240; and GATT Panel Report,
106 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.

5.71 The text of Article 2.2 (in particular, the present conditional "would create") indicates that the
risks of non-fulfilment must be taken into account at the time of preparing or applying a technical
regulation. The context of Article 2.3 supports this view. Article 2.3 provides that technical
regulations "shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no
longer exist ...", presupposing that an assessment of the circumstances "giving rise to" the adoption
was already conducted in the past.
5.72 The type of factors that Members must consider when conducting this assessment of risks
includes "available scientific and technical informat ion". In a case such as the present one, this could
include, for example, scientific studies of fishin g practices and their effects, a properly conducted
statistical sampling of consumer preferences, etc.
(d) "International standard" under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
5.73 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires that the Panel interpret, among others, the phrase
"international standards". Brazil offers comments on the interpretation of the adjective "international"
in this phrase, and on the systemic importance of the interpretation of the term "standards".
(i) "International"
5.74 The ordinary meaning of the term "internationa l" suggests that at a minimum, "different
nations" must have participated in the adoption of the standards. Relevant context is provided in
Annex 1(4) of the TBT Agreement, which defines an "international body or system" as a "[b]ody or
system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members". By contrast,
Annex 1(5) defines a "regional body or system" as one "whose membership is open to the relevant
bodies of only some of the Members". This suggests th at an international standard is one adopted by
a body "open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members".
5.75 The issue of membership has also been addressed in a Decision of the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade. The terms of the Deci sion further indicate that "international standards"
under Article 2 are those that emanate from bodies w hose membership is open to the relevant bodies
of at least all Members.107
5.76 Other relevant context for interpreting the scope of "international standard" is Article 2.5 of
the TBT Agreement. This provision lays down a rebuttable presumption that technical regulations
prepared, adopted or applied "in accordance with re levant international standards", do not create an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. The ex istence of this presumption lends support to the
view that for a standard to be "international", a nd therefore, to form the basis for a presumption of
conformity vis-à-vis all WTO Members, it must have been adopted by a body "open to the relevant
bodies of at least all Members".
(ii) The systemic importance of the term "standard"
5.77 There has been limited analysis in the case law of the definitio n of the term "standard" in
Annex 1(2) of the TBT Agreement. 108 Yet, this term is a threshold one in the TBT Agreement.
Beyond the requirements of Articles 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, which govern the relationship between
international standards and technical regulations, the interpretation of the term "standards" will
determine, crucially, the scope of application of the obligations in Article 4, and also, in part, the

107 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the D evelopment of Internati onal Standards, Guides
and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, paras. 3 and 6.
108 See Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.65.

scope of application of the provisions on conf ormity assessment in Articles 5 through 9, and
transparency in Article 10. Brazil therefore urges the Panel to interpret the term "standards" with
extreme care, taking into account the context provide d by other provisions of the TBT Agreement, as
required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(e) Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
5.78 As panels and the Appellate Body have repeat edly held, a measure violates Article III:4 when
it "modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported
products".
109 A measure that produces effects by influe ncing the choices of consumers may modify
the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported products.110
5.79 It is for the complainant to provide evidence that the challenged measures have modified the
conditions of competition to the de triment of imported products. This evidence may relate to actual
trade effects, but it need not do so.111
(f) Likeness
5.80 The parties in this case do not dispute that the products at issue are like. However, the EU
suggests that consumer preferences, alone , might cause products to be not like. 112 Brazil does not
concur with the view expressed by the EU. The Appe llate Body has set out a number of criteria that
have been used in analys ing likeness. In doing so, it has made clear that no single criterion can be
decisive. Instead, panels must estab lish whether products are like based on " all of the pertinent
evidence".113
D. CANADA
1. Oral statement of Canada
(a) Technical regulation
5.81 The second sentence of the definition of "technical regulation" sets out categories of subject
matter that are not examples of "product characteristics". Rather, these categories are independent of
those found in the first sentence. Thus, the Appellate Body's requirement that a "technical regulation"
must lay down one or more product characteristic s should be expanded. The construction of the
definition of "technical regulation" supports this interpretation.
5.82 First, the two sentences of the definition each contain a number of categories of subject matter
that address different aspects or characteristics of the product at issue. The categories in the first
sentence address characteristics intrinsic to the product itself and process or production methods
(PPMs) that are related to those intrinsic product characteristics. The categories in the second sentence
address characteristics extrinsic to the product; they encompass presentational or informational
aspects of the product.

109 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 137 (emphasis removed). See
also, e.g., GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.11.
110 See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 146; and Korea's third party
submission, paras. 4-5.
111 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 215.
112 European Union's third party submission, para. 29.
113 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 101-103 (emphasis in the original).

5.83 Second, the use of "also" and "deal exclusiv ely with" at the beginning of the second sentence
indicate that the categories covered by the second sen tence are additional to, and distinct from those
covered by the first sentence.
5.84 Third, the use of the word "it" as the subject of the second sentence instead of the word "they"
indicates that the subject of the second sentence is the "document" rather than the "product
characteristics". Thus, there is no connotation that the subject matter categories covered by the second
sentence are in some way related to or constitute "product characteristics".
5.85 Finally, the use of the disjunctive word "or" in the first sentence indicates that the first
sentence also refers to categories of subject ma tter that could be separate and distinct from one
another. Thus, there are categories within the firs t sentence, such as some PPMs, that may be the
subject of a technical regulation without constituting product characteristics.
(b) Relevant international standards
5.86 For the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreem ent, the documents that may be considered
"relevant international standards" should not be limited to only those documents emanating from
bodies with recognized activities in standardization
5.87 First, the ordinary meanings of the terms "b ody" and "recognize" in no way limit "recognized
bodies" to bodies with particular activities, such as the adoption of standards.
5.88 Second, the scope of what constitute "relevan t bodies" capable of adopting "international
standards" must reflect the fact that the drafte rs of the TBT Agreement chose the term "relevant
bodies" and not alternative terms such as "standard izing bodies" or "standards bodies" that were
already defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991.
5.89 Third, the explanatory note to the definition of "standard" in the TBT Agreement stating that
the "[TBT] Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus" suggests that the
TBT Agreement's definition of "standard" may be broader than just documents adopted by
international standardizing bodies.
5.90 Finally, a broader interpretation of the ty pes of entities may be considered "recognized
bodies" is supported by the object and purpose of th e TBT Agreement, which seeks to ensure that
Members' technical regulations do not become unnec essary obstacles to international trade or a form
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.
5.91 Limiting international "standards" to only those documents emanating from bodies with
recognized activities in standardization would be unduly restrictive, particularly in light of this object
and purpose.
5.92 However, this does not mean that any body may be considered a "recognized body". In
instances where the body that has created the alleged standard is not specifically a standardizing body,
the Panel should evaluate whethe r this body constitutes a "recognized body" in accordance with the
six principles for the development of interna tional standards espoused in the TBT Committee's
Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and
Recommendations.

E. C
HINA
1. Oral statement of China
5.93 China thanks the Panel for giving this opportunity to present its views in this proceeding.
China makes this third party oral statement becau se of its systemic interest in the correct and
consistent interpretation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). China reserves its right to make
further comments in the future.
5.94 First, China notes that although Mexico held that "the US measures are inconsistent with the
fundamental obligations of non-discrim ination contained in Articles I:1 ..." 114, the United States
claimed that its measures "do not accord any advantag e to products of any other member that is not
also immediately and unconditionally accorded to products of Mexico". 115 Therefore, China would
welcome the present Panel's clarification of the issu e of whether voluntary labels to origin-neutral
conditions constitutes "grant an advantage, favour, pr ivilege or immunity to a product originating in
another country" within the meaning of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
5.95 Secondly, China notes that Mexico asserted that the US failed to base its regulation on the
"Relevant International Standard". However, the United States claimed that the definition in the
AIDCP is not "standard", "international" or "relev ant". Consequently, China would appreciate if the
present Panel could clarify the definition of "relevan t international standard" in Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.
5.96 Thirdly, China notes that while Mexico claimed "the association between tuna and dolphins is
not unique to the ETP", but also "including the E astern and Western Atlantic, the Indian Ocean ..." 116,
the United States keep a contrary attitude on that. Therefore, China invites the present Panel to
address the question whether there are enough evidences demonstrating that ETP (Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean) is the only place where there is a regular and sustained association between dolphins
and yellowfin tuna.
F. E
UROPEAN UNION
1. Third party submission and oral statement of the European Union
(a) Article III:4 of the GATT 1994: "de facto less favourable treatment"
5.97 The European Union considers that the panel should not lightly assume that a measure having
an impact on the quantity of products importe d from another WTO Member necessarily implies a
de facto "less favourable treatment". The Appellate Body in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of
Cigarettes held that detrimental effects of a measur e on the quantity of imported products is not
sufficient for finding a de facto "less favourable treatment" if such effects can be explained "by
factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product". 117 The European Union notes
that all regulatory measures at least potentially affect existing trade flows or structures. The
GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement are not meant to eliminate regulatory diversity in itself. The
Panel needs to examine whether the measure affect s the competitive conditions to the detriment of
imported products. This requires the Panel to look at a range of criteria.

114 Mexico's executive summary of its first written submission, para. 4.
115 United States' first written submission, para. 120.
116 Mexico's executive summary of its first written submission, para. 6.
117 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 96.

5.98 In the present case, the European Union notes a number of facts that may support the view
that the potential effects of the "dolphin-safe" la belling conditions on tuna imports from Mexico are
"unrelated to the foreign origin of the product" . First, the United States introduced these labelling
conditions in 1990 when its domestic tuna fishing fleet was still using the "setting on dolphins"
fishing method. Second, the subsequent commercial decision of certain market actors outside of the
United States to maintain this fishing method should not affect the analysis. Third, it seems that tuna
imported from several other countries can be designated as "dolphin-safe" in the United States. Thus,
any potential negative effects on tuna imported fr om Mexico would be the result of the fishing
method applied and its perceived envi ronmental impact and not the result of the foreign origin of the
product. Fourth, should the US assertion that a third of tuna imports from Mexico qualifies for the
US "dolphin-safe" label prove accurate, it would pr ovide additional support to the view that the
measure does not accord "less favourable treatment" to imported products. Fifth, it seems that the
US fishing industry incurred costs when it switc hed to different fishing methods until around 1994
which Mexico's fishing industry did not incur. The latter advantage could offset potential
disadvantages Mexico's fishing industry could potentially suffer if it switched fishing methods today.
(b) Article I:1 of the GATT 1994: the notion of "unconditionally"
5.99 Contrary to Mexico's argument, the European Union considers that Article I:1 GATT 1994
obliges a WTO Member to extend to the products of all WTO Members an advantage granted to the
like products of a specific country only on the same terms and conditions as those with which the
advantage is granted to the products of that count ry. Otherwise, the WTO Member would be obliged
to grant to the like products of all WTO Members more advantages than the advantage granted to the
products of the specific country, i.e., that country would receive the advantage only for its products
that satisfy the conditions, while all WTO Memb ers would receive the advantage even for like
products that do not satisfy the conditions. This view is supported by the panel report in Canada –
Autos which stated that an advantage can be gr anted subject to conditions without necessarily
implying that it is not accorded "unconditionally" to the like product of other Members.
118 In the
present case, the United States would comply with its obligations under Article I:1 vis-à-vis Mexico if
it allowed Mexico's tuna the possibility to carry the "dolphin-safe" label on the same terms and
conditions as those imposed on the tuna of other countries.
(c) Article I:1 of the GATT 1994: the notion of "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity"
5.100 In the European Union's view, it is not clear whether subjecting the use of the voluntary
"dolphin-safe" label to specific labelling conditio ns constitutes "granting an advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity to a product originating in another country". The European Union notes that the
use of the label depends on the free choice of market operators and that the labelling conditions do not
seem to differentiate on the basis of the origin of the goods.
(d) Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994: the notion of "like products"
5.101 The European Union considers that the facts of this case may indicate that, to consumers'
minds and purchasing patterns, tuna that has been fished in a manner that harms dolphins may be
considered as a different product from tuna that has been fished in a manner that does not harm
dolphins. The segment of consumer demand for "dolphin -safe" tuna appears to be very important and
to probably outweigh by far the segment of consumer demand for "non-dolphin-safe" tuna. Mexico
recognizes that only "dolphin-safe" tuna can be commercialised successfully in the United States. This
is the reason why Mexico wishes to have tuna fished through "setting on dolphins" labelled as
"dolphin-safe".

118 See Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.24.

5.102 If, on the basis of its analysis of the facts, the Panel reaches the conclusion that consumers
tend to perceive "dolphin-safe" tuna as being diffe rent from "non-dolphin-safe" tuna and that their
consumption patterns confirm this difference in the perceptions, then the Panel should draw the
logical conclusion that one of the four criteria for the identification of "like products" has not been
satisfied.
(e) Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement: labelling requirements and product characteristics
5.103 The question whether the US labelling scheme is a "technical regulation" within the meaning
of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement raises several interpretative issues.
5.104 The first is the relationship between the firs t and the second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the
TBT Agreement. The European Union would note that it seems uncontested that the US labelling
scheme is a document dealing with "labelling requir ements as they apply to a product" within the
meaning of the second sentence of Annex 1.1. The parties present diverging views on whether the
matters addressed in the second sentence are examples of "product characteristics" within the meaning
of the first sentence (Mexico) or alternatives ther eto (United States). In the view of the European
Union, both interpretative approaches would seem to lead to the same conclusion, i.e. that a document
dealing with "labelling requirements" (if it appli es to identifiable products and is mandatory) is a
technical regulation. The wording of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement indicates that the term
"technical regulations" comprises documents dea ling with three categories of subject matter:
(1) documents laying down "product characteris tics", (2) documents laying down "processes and
production methods" relating to product characteris tics and (3) documents including or dealing
exclusively with "terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply
to a product, process or production method". In the vi ew of the European Union, it seems irrelevant
whether subject matter (3) is considered to be a sub-set of subject matter (1), as suggested by the
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos , or – with a view to the use of the words "it" and "also" in the
second sentence – an alternative category of subj ect matter which equally qualifies a document as a
"technical regulation".
5.105 The second issue is whether "labelling requirement s" must have a certain substantive content
in order to qualify the document as a "technical re gulation". Japan suggested that a panel must, in
addition to finding that a document deals with "l abelling requirements as they apply to a product",
also determine whether the labelling requirement la ys down "product characteristics". The European
Union finds it difficult to square this interp retation with the wording of Annex 1.1 of the
TBT Agreement. The second sentence of Annex 1.1 only requires that "labelling requirements" "apply
to a product, process or production method", and not th at they lay down product characteristics. Such
an additional substantive requirement does not see m to follow from the context within Annex 1.1,
either. If "labelling requirements" are seen as an independent subject ma tter, the term "product
characteristics" of the first sentence does not appl y in the second sentence. If "labelling requirements"
are considered to be examples of "product char acteristics", a document dealing with "labelling
requirements" will be a "document which lays down product characteristics" within the meaning of
the first sentence, without the need to examine its substantive content.
(f) Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement: mandatory compliance
5.106 The question is whether compliance with la belling requirements contained in a law is
"mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement if the labelling scheme leaves
economic operators the choice to market a product with or without the label, but obliges them to
comply with the labelling conditions once they choose to use the label. In the view of the European
Union, the following considerations are pertinent.

5.107 With regard to the ordinary meaning of the term "mandatory", compliance with labelling
requirements is "mandatory" if the labelling require ments are "compulsory", regulated "in a binding
or compulsory fashion" or effectively "prescrib ed or imposed". The European Union would be
reticent to deduce the "mandatory" nature of th e US labelling scheme from the mere fact that
economic operators in the United States are prohibite d "by law" from using the label if they do not
meet its conditions. Exclusively focusing on the form of the labelling scheme would appear
formalistic since the US labelling scheme is optional in the sense that it leaves economic operators the
freedom to choose whether they want to use th e label or not. Whereas the conditions under which
economic operators may bear the label are bindi ng, the use of the US labelling scheme is not
compulsory. In that sense, the measures at issue differ from labelling provisions which a law forces
economic operators to use for certain specified products.
5.108 In the view of the European Union, the me asures at issue differ significantly from those
addressed in EC – Sardines. Whereas a product could not be marketed as "preserved sardines" under
the EC Regulation if it contained fish from species other than Sardina pilchardus, the US labelling
scheme does not prevent economic operators from mark eting their products as "tuna" irrespective of
whether the fish was harvested in accordance with the "dolphin-safe" criteria of the DPCIA or not.
Consumers in the United States can identify tuna that was not harvested in accordance with the
DPCIA as "tuna".
5.109 The European Union would also caution against including within the scope of the term
"mandatory" labelling schemes whic h Mexico considers to be " de facto mandatory" because of
market conditions. Consumers in a given market may prefer, or even overwhelmingly prefer,
purchasing products that bear a certain label. But su ch consumer preferences do not make the use of
the label "compulsory" or effectively "prescribed or imposed". Certain legal concepts in the WTO
Agreements may extend to de facto situations. The problem with Mexico's proposed concept of
"de facto mandatory" labelling schemes is, however, that it is not based on the design or structure of
the measure, but on consumer preferences in the US market. As these factors are entirely outside the
control of the US legislator, the European Union w ould be reticent to extend the term "mandatory" to
such scenarios (i.e. consumer preferences) without any clear textual guidance from WTO provisions.
5.110 Within the context of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreemen t, Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement
defines a standard as a "document ... with which compliance is not mandatory" and which may deal
with "labelling requirements". The European Unio n would note that standards inherently contain
rules, guidelines or characteristics to be met by th ose adhering to the standard. If the requirement to
meet the specifications of a standard rendered the standard "mandatory", the definition of standards
would become devoid of effectiveness. Standards would, rather, be "voluntary" as long as economic
operators can choose whether they want to follow a particular standard or not. Thus, the mere fact that
economic operators choosing to use the US labelling scheme must comply with its conditions does not
necessarily render the labelling scheme mandatory . Another contextual argument follows from
Explanatory Note to Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreem ent which characterizes "technical regulations as
mandatory documents". This could indicate that te chnical regulations are documents the application
or use of which is mandatory. Finally, the TBT Committee decision of 1995 setting out that "all
mandatory labelling requirements" must be notified as technical regulations under Article 2.9 of the
TBT Agreement119 could be relevant context within the me aning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is likel y that the TBT Committee understood "mandatory
labelling requirements" in the same way as the GA TT Secretariat which had stated in 1992 that

119 See Decisions and Recommendations adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev. 9 of 8 September 2008, p. 17.

labelling requirements need to be notified if "it is mandatory for a product to bear a label if it is to
enter the domestic market".
120
5.111 The European Union considers that the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement of
reducing technical barriers to trade does not mand ate an overly broad interpretation of the term
"mandatory". The TBT Agreement onl y covers measures that fall with in the scope of one of three
categories "technical regulations", "standards" or "conformity assessment procedures" which are
defined with some detail. Even if a measure is no technical regulation because it is "voluntary", it may
still be a standard. It may also have to comply with the GATT 1994.
G. GUATEMALA
1. Oral statement of Guatemala
5.112 At the outset, on behalf of the delegation of Gu atemala, I would like express our appreciation
for this opportunity to present our views on the matters at issue.
(a) General remarks
5.113 Mexico claims that the essence of the current di spute relates to the prohibition of the use of a
US "dolphin-safe" label on imports of tuna products from Mexico, wh ile such a label is permitted to
be used on tuna products from other countries, including products from the United States. 121
According to Mexico, this prohibition adversely a ffects the importation of Mexican tuna and tuna
products and its internal sale and distribution in the US market. 122 Moreover, Mexico argues that
without a "dolphin-safe" label, the ability to sell Mexican tuna products into the US market is
restricted.123
5.114 In accordance with the US regulations at issue, tuna products may not be labelled
"dolphin-safe" if they contain tuna that was caught during a fishing trip in which purse seine nets were
intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphi ns or dolphins were killed or seriously injured in
the set in which the tuna was caught.124
5.115 Mexico vessels catch tuna using the "purse-se ine" net fishing method (also known as "setting
on dolphins"). Mexico asserts that this method is a sound and environmentally 1 sustainable method
for fishing tuna. 125 According to Mexico, the efforts of the Mexican fishing fleet contributed
substantially to the reduction of dolphin mortality to the levels less than 0.004%.126
5.116 On the contrary, the United States submits that the "purse-seine" net fishing method has
important adverse effects on dolphins. Among other arguments, the United States submits that this
method is harmful to dolphins because: dolphins ar e chased for up to 90 minutes before vessels are
able to surround the dolphins and the tuna below; dolphins may drown when trapped under the net; or
may be subjected to serious injury or death through entanglement in the net. Moreover, dolphin
mothers and nursing calves are often separated dur ing the high-speed chase and encirclement, and

120 TBT/Spec/23, quoted in: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards, and Processes and Production
Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11 of 29 August 1995, para. 19.
121 Mexico's first written submission, para. 4.
122 Mexico's first written submission, para. 6.
123 Mexico's first written submission, para. 8.
124 United States' first written submission, para. 14.
125 Mexico's first written submission, para. 7.
126 Mexico's first written submission, para. 109.

these calves die as a result of starvation, predation and other causes, even when their mothers are
released from sets alive.
5.117 The United States agrees with Mexico that the magnitude of observed dolphin mortality due
to setting on dolphins with purse seine nets has decreased significantly. However, according to the
US, observed mortality and serious injury fail to me asure the full impact that setting on dolphins to
catch tuna has on dolphins.127
5.118 The United States also submits that the US m easures at issue apply to tuna caught in any
fishery where there is a regular and significant association between tuna and dolphins and apply
regardless of the origin of the tuna.
5.119 Guatemala understands that the essence of this dispute is not a prohibition on the use of a
dolphin-safe label on tuna products from Mexico, as Mexico appears to characterize it. Guatemala
believes that the problem is of a factual nature. While Mexico believes that its fishing method (i.e.
setting on dolphins) is a sound and environmenta lly sustainable method for fishing tuna, the
United States, on the contrary, considers that such method has adverse effects on dolphins and,
consequently, the use of a dolphin-safe label w ould mislead consumers and encourage fishing
practices that the US considers prejudicial to dolphins.
5.120 Both Parties have submitted evidence supportin g their respective positio ns in this regard.
Some of the evidence includes inc onclusive studies. While Guatemala has not a final position on this
issue, my delegation recognizes that the task before the Panel is not simple at all. In any event,
Guatemala favours a solution that is both, consistent with the WTO Agreements and respectful of the
environment.
5.121 Now, I would like to make some brief comments on the legal arguments submitted by the
parties.
(b) Claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT of 1994
5.122 Regarding Mexico's claims on Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT of 1994, Guatemala
observes that Mexico recognizes that the US measures do not, on their face, discriminate "on the basis
of the foreign country that is the source of partic ular tuna and tuna products". Rather, Mexico says,
"they discriminate on the basis of where the tuna is harvested and the fishing method".
128 Mexico adds
that "the less favourable treatment at issue is of a de facto rather than de jure character".129
5.123 In the view of Guatemala, a de facto claim implies a higher burden of proof for the
complaining Party. In this particular case, Guatem ala believes that Mexico should demonstrate better,
among other aspects, how the competitive opportunities have been de facto modified as a
consequence of the measures at issue and why the fishing method used by Mexican vessels is
equivalent or better than the method used by US vessels (both, in terms of dolphin and other marine
mammals protection).
5.124 With respect to the place where the tuna is harvested, both Mexico and the United States
agree that, for reasons that are not fully understood by scientists, there is a natural association between
tuna and dolphins. 130 However, the United States contests that , contrary to Mexico's assertions, the

127 United States' first written submission, paras. 41, 53, 54 and 55.
128 Mexico's first written submission, para. 164 and 185.
129 Mexico's first written submission, para. 164 and 185.
130 Mexico's first written submission, para. 11. United States' first written submission, para. 37.

Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) is fundamentally different from all other oceans in that it is the only
ocean where tuna and dolphins have a known regular and significant association.
131
5.125 On this particular issue, Guatemala does not understand why the US measures contain
different provisions for fisheries in different oceans. Even if it were true that association between
dolphins and tuna only occurs in the ETP, Guatem ala does not see the need to have different
regulations for fisheries in different oceans. The ba sic requirement is that a tuna product may not be
labelled "dolphin-safe" if it contains tuna that wa s caught during a fishing trip in which purse seine
nets were intentionally deployed on or used to en circle dolphins or dolphins were killed or seriously
injured in the set in which the tuna was caught. If there is no association, then there is no possibility
that purse seine nets be intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins.
5.126 Therefore, Guatemala considers that the United States should make an effort to demonstrate
that the design of its law was not intended to make a differentiation in treatment. Specially, in the
light of some inconclusive studies regarding the possible association between dolphins and tuna in
other oceans besides the ETP.
(c) Claims under the TBT Agreement
5.127 In addition, there is disagreement between the pa rties as to whether the US measures at issue
are to be considered as technical regulation or as a standard.
5.128 Guatemala understands that the arguments turn around the mandatory or voluntary character
of these regulations, among others.
5.129 Guatemala observes that the US "dolphin-safe" labelling measures do not require tuna
products to be labelled or to indicate on the label the fishing method utilized. Guatemala also observes
that these measures do not prevent the sale in the Unite d States, even if the use of a fishing method
prevents the use of a "dolphin-safe" label.
5.130 In addition, Mexico makes the argument that th e US "dolphin-safe" labelling measures, if not
a priori mandatory, are nonetheless de facto mandatory "because the mark eting conditions in the
US are such that it is impossible to effectively market and sell tuna products without a dolphin-safe
designation".
132
5.131 Guatemala is not persuaded that there is a possi bility that a standard, because of its effects,
can be considered as a technical regulation. In any event, Guatemala is of the view that Mexico does
not appear to have demonstrated that the measure is de facto mandatory.
5.132 Moreover, Guatemala coincides with Australia that the actions of private individuals
(including consumers) cannot alter the nature of a measure. In any event, if Mexico would like to
pursue the claim that the measure is de facto mandatory, Mexico should demonstrate that the
mandatory nature of a measure is attributable to governmental actions; not to decisions by private
individuals.
5.133 Finally, Mr Chairman, Guatemala observes th at the United States argued that mandatory
labelling requirements and voluntary labelling requireme nts are set out in separate provisions of the
TBT Agreement. While mandatory labelling requireme nts must be notified under Article 2.9 of the

131 United States' first written submission, para. 38.
132 Mexico's first written submission, para. 203.

TBT Agreement, which addresses technical regulati ons, voluntary labelling requirements must be
published under Paragraph L of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, which addresses standards.133
5.134 Guatemala recognizes that notifications in the WTO do not prejudge the legal character of a
measure. However, Guatemala notes that the United States appears to have notified the regulations at
issue under Article 2.9.2 of the TBT Agreement. Guatemala does not know whether notification
G/TBT/Notif.00/5 of 10 January 2000 refers specif ically to the measures at issue. If it does,
Guatemala wonders why the US would notify a standard under the provisions foreseen for notification
of technical regulations. Did the United Stated consider at that time that these measures were
mandatory?
H. J
APAN
1. Third party submission of Japan
(a) Introduction
5.135 Japan's third party submission focuses on issues of principle, rather than factual issues. This
submission is limited to four issues before the Panel: factors determining whether the measure at issue
is a "technical regulation" as defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement on Tech nical Barriers to Trade
("TBT Agreement"); the proper interpretation and a pplication of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement;
factors relevant to determining whether an "i nternational standard" exists for the purposes of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement; and issu es regarding "less favourable treatment" under
Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994").
(b) The Panel should carefully apply the threshold de finition of "technical regulation" in Annex 1
of the TBT Agreement
5.136 To be a "technical regulation" , a document must fall within the definition in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement. As the Appellate Body stated in EC – Sardines , a document must: (i) apply to an
identifiable product or group of products; (ii) la y down one or more characteristics of the product
(intrinsic or related; positive or negative); and ( iii) compliance with the product characteristics must
be mandatory.
(i) The Panel should follow precedents regarding whet her the measures at issue are "documents
... with which compliance is mandatory"
5.137 Mexico has presented only summary allegations regarding whether the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act (DPCIA) is a "documen t with which compliance is mandatory". To
determine whether the US measures at issue are "tech nical regulations" for the purpose of Annex 1 of
the TBT Agreement, the Panel should apply th e criteria in Annex 1, as interpreted in EC –Sardines –
that is, it should determine whether these measures ha ve the effect of prescribing or imposing product
characteristics, such as features, qualities, attributes, or other distinguishing marks.
5.138 As the Appellate Body correctly noted in EC – Asbestos, a technical regulation can specify
product characteristics in either a positive or negative form. In EC – Sardines, the Panel reasoned that
by positively requiring the use of Sardina pilchardus in products with the trade description "sardines",
the EC regulation at issue also laid down product ch aracteristics in a negative form for all other fish,
by excluding them from being marketed as "sardin es". Japan would like to note that the key issue
before the Panel is whether the DPCIA and the othe r measures at issue legally prohibit the marketing

133 United States' first written submission, para. 137.

of certain tuna products under a par ticular trade description, even if they are entitled to use that trade
description, or even if their use of that trade de scription is legitimate. The Panel should examine
carefully whether the US measures at issue merely require the "dolphin-safe" indication on a label to
be truthful, or whether they preclude use of the "d olphin-safe" indication for tuna products that were
in fact harvested in a dolphin-safe manner.
(ii) The Panel should carefully consider whether th e measures at issue are a "document which
lays down product characteristics"
5.139 Mexico has made the blanket assertion that "a label on a product is a product characteristic",
arguing that the US measures "govern the cond itions under which a product can be labelled as
'dolphin-safe'" and that this requirement is a "product characteristic". But the analysis seen in the prior
TBT disputes to date contradicts such position; in determining whether a measure was a technical
regulation, they found that the mandatory labelling requirements at issue were technical regulations
because these requirements laid down product characteristics. The Panel cannot simply determine
that the measure is a labelling requirement and stop its analysis there.
5.140 Japan observes that the current dispute is the fi rst to apply the TBT Agreement to labelling of
a product in respect of the conditions under whic h the product or its content was produced, where
those conditions do not necessarily affect the produ ct as such. Therefore the Panel should carefully
consider to what extent it should mechanically appl y the findings in prior cases even if the facts and
circumstances of this case do not match with those findings.
(c) The Panel should treat a Member's identification of its "legitimate objectives" deferentially
5.141 Japan shares the view in paragraph 7 of the US first written submission that "It is not for
Mexico to choose for the United States whic h legitimate objectives it should pursue." The
TBT Agreement, like the GATT 1994, accords a degree of deference with respect to the domestic
policy objectives which Members wish to pursue.
5.142 A party claiming a violation of Article 2.2 bears the burden of proof in respect of all elements
of its claim. However, Mexico has not addressed the issue of the DPCIA as a truth-in-labelling
measure for the prevention of decep tive practices. Instead, Mexico argues that the US measures do
not fulfil a legitimate objective because they "do not protect animal life or health or the environment
in the general sense", and because they favour dolphins over other marine species.
5.143 Article 2.2 concerns the choice of means u sed to accomplish a legitimate objective.
Article 2.2 does not authorize a complaining party or the panel to substitute its own policy priorities
for those of the responding party. Nor does Article 2.2 authorize a panel to rule that the responding
party's objectives are not legitimate because they do not match those of the complaining party or the
panel.
(d) The Panel should take into account the principl es regarding "international standards" agreed
by the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee)
5.144 Mexico also asserts that the US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement because they are not based on the "A IDCP Standard", two definitions appearing in a
Resolution adopted on 20 June 2001 by the Parties to the Agreement on the International Dolphin
Conservation Program (AIDCP).
5.145 Japan submits that in this connection, the Pa nel should draw on the guidance provided by the
TBT Committee's Decision on "Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides
and Recommendations with Relation to Articl es 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement"

(G/TBT/1/Rev.9, Annex B)which makes it clear that membership of an international standardizing
body should be open on a non-discriminatory basis to relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members
and at every stage of standards development. No purported international standard should be
recognized as such if the principles recognized in the Decision were disregarded in its elaboration.
(e) The Panel should scrutinize carefully whether th e measures at issue accord less favourable
treatment of imported products within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
5.146 Mexico has also claimed that the US measure is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, and bears the burden of proving that clai m. The US response to this claim focuses
entirely on arguing that Mexican tuna and tuna pr oducts are not accorded "less favourable treatment",
asserting that the measures at issue do not modify the conditions of competition because all tuna is
subject to the same conditions on use of the dolphin -safe label. However, even measures that apply
facially identical treatment to domestic a nd imported like products may still discriminate de facto in
violation of Article III:4. Japan notes that the US measures may block certain Mexican tuna products
from using the words "dolphin-safe" or similar wordi ng even if tuna harvested by purse-seine fishing
is, at least in Mexico's view, not harming the dolphin population.
(f) Conclusion
5.147 Japan appreciates the opportunity to present its views in this dispute between Mexico and the
United States, and respectfully requests the Panel to consider these views of a systemic nature in
examining the facts and arguments presented by the parties.
2. Oral statement of Japan
(a) Introduction
5.148 Japan's oral statement focuses on three points that the Panel (1) must respect the distinction in
the TBT Agreement between mandatory technical regulations and voluntary measures; (2) should
examine the negotiating history of the TBT Agreemen t with care and as a whole, (3) should be aware
of the past practice in terms of order of analys is; and (4) the Panel should not read procedural
requirement in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
(b) The Panel must respect the distinction between mandatory and voluntary measures
5.149 The TBT Agreement provides separate a nd distinct obligations applying to mandatory
technical regulations on the one hand, and to voluntary standards on the other. The distinctive
characteristic of a "standard" is that private persons may choose freely whether to use the standard at
all, but if they use the standard, they must conform to the specifications that the standard provides.
The use the voluntary standard without meeting th e specification of the standard may constitute
deceptive description. However, the fact that a Member has a law prescribing that a deceptive
description is liable does not mean that all of the voluntary product standards in that Member's
territory are suddenly mandatory technical regulations . The Panel must respect the distinction in the
TBT Agreement between mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards.
(c) The Panel must evaluate the TBT Agreement's negotiating history with care, and as a whole
5.150 In discussing the TBT Agreement's application to labelling requirements, the US first written
submission (in footnote 141) relies in part on a se lective and unbalanced reading of the negotiating
history of the TBT Agreement. The negotiatin g history simply demonstrates that on these
fundamental issues, a variety of views were expressed during the Uruguay Round, as they remain
divided today. In order to interpret the provision on which there is no established interpretation, the

Panel can only follow the rules of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and have recourse to the preparatory work to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31 or to determine the meaning when such a reading leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure. If the Panel does use the preparatory work, it must use it not selectively, but
as a whole.
(d) The Panel should be aware of the past practice in terms of the order of analysis
5.151 The Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III first addressed the issue of the order of the analysis.
It found (in paragraph 204) that Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Agreement on
Import Licensing both applied to the measures at issue, but that the panel in that dispute "should have
applied the Licensing Agreement first, since this agreement dealt sp ecifically, and in detail, with the
administration of import licensing procedures". In EC – Asbestos , both the panel and the Appellate
Body examined Canada's TBT claims first. The same practice should be followed in this case.
(e) The Panel should not read procedural requirement in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
5.152 Brazil argues that the phrase in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, "taking account of the
risks non-fulfilment would create" read together with the last sentence of Article 2.2 imposes a
positive procedural requirement that a Member proposing a technical regulation must first assess the
risks that would arise if the legitimate objective were not fulfilled. In addition, in order to support its
argument, Brazil suggests that Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures("SPS Agreement") provi de the right model for Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.
5.153 Japan is of the opinion that Brazil's argume nts are not in line with the text of the
TBT Agreement because Article 2.2 simply requires th at the technical regulation shall not be trade
restrictive than necessary to fulf il a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment of
the legitimate objective would create. It does not require that a Member proposing a technical
regulation conduct a prior risk assessment of the type argued by Brazil.
5.154 As for the contextual argument in respect of the SPS Agreement, Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
Agreement do not support the Brazil's argument because of the clear differences of languages between
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement a nd Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Japan urges the Panel to
take a cautious approach to interpreting Article 2.2, and refrain from adding an obligation not
provided in the covered agreements.
I. K
OREA
1. Third party submission and oral statement of Korea
5.155 Korea addresses in its submission and oral statement (1) Mexico's Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 claim; and (2) Article 2 of the TBT Agre ement with regard to the interpretation of
technical regulation.
(a) Mexico's Article III:4 of the GATT1994 claim and trade effect
5.156 Mexico states that the United States Dol phin Safe measures " do not, on their face,
discriminate on the basis of the foreign country that is the source of particular tuna and tuna products.
Rather, they discriminate on the basis of where the tuna is harvested and the fishing method". Thus,
Mexico's Article III:4 claim, is a de facto claim, that the US measures have the effect of favouring
US tuna and tuna products over like Mexican tuna and tuna products.

5.157 Both party agree that in order to determine wh ether the United States measures at issue are in
violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, th e Panel must consider whether these measures
"modif[y] the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products".
Korea also notes that a measure, while origin-neu tral on its face, may modify the conditions of
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products, which means a de facto
discrimination.
5.158 One of the leading Appellate Body cases in the area of de facto Article III:3 violation claim is
Korea – Various Measures on Beef . While the circumstances and the structure of the measures
examined by the Appellate Body in that case are diff erent from the US measures at issue in this case,
the reasoning formulated by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef is equally
applicable to this case.
5.159 The critical factor in Korea – Various Measures on Beef was the Appellate Body's analysis of
the "thrust and effect" of measures at issue. The Appellate Body added that when the "effect" of the
measure manifested in a substantial disparity, the intervention of some element of private choice does
not relieve of responsibility under the GATT 1994 for the resulting establishment of competitive
conditions less favourable for the imported product than for the domestic product.
5.160 Based on the foregoing, in order to determin e whether the United States' Dolphin Safe
measures constitute a de facto violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel should ascertain
what was the "thrust and effect" of the adoption of these measures. And, to properly carry out such an
analysis, the Panel should inquire as to the prev ailing market conditions for Mexican tuna and
imported tuna just prior to the introduction of th e Dolphin Safe measures and how the introduction of
such measures affected the sales of these two like products in the US market.
(b) Technical regulation of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement
5.161 Both parties agree that Annex 1.1 of TBT Agreement prescribes a three part test for
determining whether the measure at issue constitutes a technical regulation: (1) it must apply to an
identifiable product or group of products; (2) it mu st lay down one or more characteristics of the
product; (3) compliance with the product characteristic must be mandatory. In this case, there is no
disagreement that the measures in question satisfy th e first criterion. The dispute is over the second
and third elements of Annex 1.1: (1) whether the labelling requirement at issue constitutes a "product
characteristic"; and (2) whether compliance with same is mandatory.
5.162 Korea submits that the second sen tence of Annex 1.1 should not be interpreted as providing
examples of "product characteristics" mentioned in th e first sentence. As a grammatical matter, the
singular "it" used in the second sentence of Anne x 1.1 cannot refer back to the plural "product
characteristics". Korea, however, does not agree w ith the view that the second sentence of Annex 1.1
should be interpreted as adding other "aspects" into the first sentence of Annex 1.1.
5.163 In Korea's view, the second sentence should in stead be interpreted as providing further
elaboration on how the first sentence should be interp reted. In other words, rather than broadening
the range of measures that may fall under the defin ition of "technical regulation," it notes that certain
measures that deal with "terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements" may
have the result of laying down product characteristics or their related processes and production
methods. As the Appellate Body pointed out in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines, the term 'technical
regulation" is not limited only to "feature and qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but may also
related 'characteristics', such as the means of iden tification, the presentation and the appearance of a
product".

5.164 Mexico claims that the compliance with the Un ited States Dolphin Safe regime is mandatory
because "it is unlawful to include on the label of an y tuna product offered for sale in the United States
the term 'dolphin-safe' or an analogous term or sym bol if the product contains tuna harvested in the
ETP by a large purse-seine vessel using a purse-seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle
dolphins". Korea is of the view that Mexico misconstrues the mandatory requirement set forth under
Annex 1.1 because the critical inquiry there is not whether the label requirement at issue set forth
mandatory components, but rather whether the obligation to affix a label regarding product, process or
production is mandatory. The US Dolphin Safe meas ures do require that certain conditions must be
met in order to affix the "Dolphin Safe" label, but affixing such label is not mandatory under the
US scheme and as such does not meet the third element of technical regulation.
5.165 Mexico also claims that "[e]ven if the labelling scheme were not to be considered a priori
mandatory, it is de facto mandatory because the market conditions in the United States are such that it
is impossible to effectively market and sell tuna products without the dolphin-safe designation".
Korea notes that there is no indication in the text of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement that members
intended to inject a de facto mandatory requirement element to the concept of technical regulations.
Moreover, even if that were to be the case, in Korea's view, Mexico appears not to be successful in
adducing evidence relevant to support its claim that "it is impossible to effectively market and sell
tuna products without the dolphin-safe label designation".
J. N
EW ZEALAND
1. Third party submission of New Zealand
(a) Introduction
5.166 New Zealand's participation as a third party in this dispute reflects its systemic interest in the
legal issues arising from the United States' measures that stipulate how tuna and tuna products qualify
for a dolphin-safe label for use in the United States. As an exporting nation, the proper
implementation of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement) is of
fundamental importance to New Zealand. The pot ential for technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures to constitute unnecessary barriers to trade is of great concern.
5.167 New Zealand recognizes the rights of WTO Memb ers to take measures necessary to ensure,
inter alia , the protection of animal health or the e nvironment, or for the prevention of deceptive
practices, at the levels they consider appropriate . However, any such measures are subject to the
disciplines of the WTO Agreements. With respect to technical regulations and standards, and
procedures for assessment of conformity with techni cal regulations and standards, New Zealand notes
the particular importance the TBT Agreement place s on ensuring that such measures do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade.
(b) The definition of technical regulation: Annex 1.1
(i) Coverage of labelling requirements
5.168 New Zealand considers that Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement provides for a wide range of
labelling measures to fall within the definition of "technical regulation". Such measures have the
potential to have a significant impact on trade, and allowing a large body of potentially trade
restrictive measures to escape th e strictest disciplines of the TB T Agreement (those disciplines
applicable to technical regulations) would undermine the objectives of the Agreement.
5.169 The definition of "technical regulation" is set out in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement.
Mexico and the United States differ in their interpretati on of this provision, particularly with regard to

the meaning of "product characteristic" and the re lationship between the two sentences of Annex 1.1.
New Zealand considers that the Appellate Body's decisions in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines
support a broad interpretation of "product characteri stic", and therefore, of the term "technical
regulation".
(ii) Is the United States' measure a "mandatory" regulation?
5.170 New Zealand notes that there is a distincti on between a mandatory requirement to label
(where a product must be labelled in order to be sold in a market) and a mandatory labelling
requirement (such as here, where regulations prescrib e requirements that are mandatory in the event
that a producer wishes to use a particular label). The measure in question in the present dispute is an
example of the latter type of requirement: there is no formal legal requirement that tuna be labelled
"dolphin-safe" in order to be sold on the United St ates market. However, if such a label is used, it
must comply with certain conditions as set out in the Dolphin Protection and Conservation
Information Act. The measure is therefore not a priori mandatory.
5.171 Annex 1.1 makes no mention of whether measures must be a priori mandatory, or whether a
de facto mandatory measure will qualify as a technical regulation. However, the TBT Agreement
divides the measures covered into those that are ma ndatory (technical regulations), and those that are
not (standards). Regulations and standards are subject to different obligations.
5.172 Given this difference, it is central to the app lication of the Agreement that a distinction be
maintained between mandatory and voluntary measures. In New Zealand's view, therefore, a measure
that is not a priori mandatory will only constitute a "technical regulation" in cases where it is clearly
warranted by the facts. For example, there may be situations where a Government's conduct is such
that it essentially makes compliance obligatory with what would otherwise be a 'standard' under the
TBT Agreement. New Zealand submits that the Panel should find that such an assessment would
require a close examination of the facts of each situation to ensure that the principles of the
TBT Agreement are being upheld.
(c) The definition of relevant international standard under Article 2.4
5.173 Pursuant to Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, Members must use international standards as a
basis for their technical regulations except wher e such standards would be an "ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the le gitimate objectives pursued , for instance because of
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems".
5.174 New Zealand notes that the management of living marine resources is subject to a specialized
international legal regime. It consider s that Regional Fisheries Management
Organisations/Arrangements are the appropriate bodies for managing shared fisheries, and reaffirms
the ability of countries to enact trade-related measures based on the decisions of those bodies.
5.175 The TBT Agreement does not include a definition of the term " international standard ".
However, in accordance with relevant and related definitions used in the TBT Agreement and relevant
ISO guidelines, New Zealand considers that, in orde r to constitute an "international standard" under
Article 2.4, a standard must be made by an intern ational body. Further, that international body must
fulfil two criteria. First, it must be an inte rnational body whose specified activities include
standardization. Second, it must be open to at least all me mbers of the WTO in order to provide for
their participation in the preparation and establishment of standards.

(i) The requirement that the standard be made by an international body
5.176 The conclusion that an international standard mu st be made by an international body derives
from the definition of "standard" in Annex 1.2 of th e TBT Agreement, in particular the requirement
that it be a "document approved by a recognized body" [emphasis added]. The definition of "standard"
is elaborated upon in an explanatory note to Annex 1.2, which refers to the topic of international
standards. It provides that "standards prepared by the international standardization community are
based on consensus …" [emphasis added]. An infere nce may be drawn from this explanatory note that
in the context of international standards as contem plated in Article 2.4, the recognized body in
question must be an international one. The concept of a "standardizing body" is also internationalized
in other provisions of the TBT Agreement, including in Article 2.6 and the Code of Good Practice in
Annex 3, which use the term "international standardizing body".
5.177 In light of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ordinary
meaning of the words "international standard" in Ar ticle 2.4 must be considered in their context,
which, in this situation, includes Annex 1.2, Article 2.6 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
New Zealand considers that the context within whic h Article 2.4 is situated therefore supports an
interpretation that an "international standa rd" is one that is prepared by an " international
standardizing body", even though this phrase was not specifically used in Article 2.4.
(ii) First criteria for the international body: specified activities of standardization
5.178 The term "body" is defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1999 as a "legal or administrative entity
that has specific tasks and composition".
134 With standardizing bodies in particular, the defining
specific task of the body is that it h as "recognized activities in standardisation". 135 New Zealand notes
that some international organizations that are not specifically established for the sole purpose of
setting standards may also have this function as part of their role, and considers that these
organizations may also act as standardizing bodies in some discrete situations. In the majority of
cases, however, standardizing bodies will have been established, at least partially, for the express
purpose of creating international standards.
(iii) Second criteria: openness to at least all Members of the WTO
5.179 The TBT Committee has provided a clear indication of the type of bodies that it considers to
be international standardizing bodies and the pr inciples that such bodies should embrace. The
principles considered to be important for interna tional standards development are set out in a 2000
TBT Committee Decision and include transparen cy, openness, impartiality and consensus,
effectiveness and relevance, c oherence, and to address the conc erns of developing countries". 136 In
particular, the TBT Committee Decision notes that "Membership of an international standardizing
body should be open on a non-discriminatory basis to relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members".
5.180 Support for the requirement of open membership can also be found in the TBT Agreement.
Annex 1.4 defines "international body or system" as a "body or system whose membership is open to
the relevant bodies of at least all Members". Article 2.6 requires Members to play a full part in "the
preparation by appropriate international standard izing bodies of international standards for products
for which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations". If membership of

134 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, paragraph 4.1.
135 See the definition of "standardising body" in ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, paragraph 4.3.
136 Decision on Principles for the Development of Interna tional Standard s, Guides and
Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, G/TBT/9,
13 November 2000, at paragraph 20 and Annex 4.

standardizing bodies is not open to all WTO Members then this hinders their ability to meet their
obligations under Article 2.6.
5.181 Requiring international standards to be made by international bodies with a specified activity
of standardization and to be open to all WT O Members supports the object and purpose of the
TBT Agreement, which includes harmonization of standards. Harmonization is facilitated where all
Members can be involved in the preparation of standa rds. The international nature of standards also
reduces the risk of a proliferation of inconsistent standards set by bodies with limited memberships. A
proliferation of such standards would also impact upon a Member's ability to participate in standard-
setting activities across all the necessary bodies, thereby undermining the Article 2.6 requirement.
5.182 Considering the sum of these various definitions and requirements, read in the light of the
context, object and purpose of the TBT Agreement, New Zealand submits that an "international
standard" under Article 2.4 must be a document approved by a recognized body, such body being an
international standardizing body within the defi nition provided by the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991, and
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members.
2. Oral statement of New Zealand
5.183 New Zealand's oral statement at the third party session at the first panel hearing focused on
the issues of whether a de facto mandatory measure could fall within the definition of technical
regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, and al so on the definition of international standard in
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. New Zealand co mmenced by outlining its interest in the current
dispute. As an exporting nation, the proper impl ementation of the TBT Agreement is of fundamental
importance to New Zealand, in light of the pot ential for technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures to constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade.
5.184 The key point made by New Zealand was that it considers that Annex 1.1 provides for a wide
range of labelling measures to fall within the definition of "technical regulation" and that are therefore
subject to the relevant TBT disciplines. Given the potential for labelling measures to significantly
impact on trade it is important that they are subject to the strictest disciplines in the TBT Agreement,
so as not to undermine the objectives of that Agreement.
5.185 With regard to the question of whether the measure at issue in the present dispute is
mandatory, New Zealand noted its view that Annex 1.1 does not exclude the possibility of a measure
being de facto mandatory. However, New Zealand recognized that the Panel should not make such a
finding lightly as to do so would risk rendering null and void the intended distinction between
mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standa rds provided for in the TBT Agreement. In light
of this, New Zealand submitted that a measure should only be deemed de facto mandatory where it is
warranted on the facts. For example, where a Gove rnment's conduct is such that it essentially makes
compliance obligatory with what would otherwise be a "standard" under the TBT Agreement.
5.186 On the definition of 'international standard' in Article 2.4, New Zealand noted that the
management of living marine resources is subjec t to a specialized international legal regime.
New Zealand considers that Regional Fisheries Ma nagement Organisations are the appropriate bodies
for managing shared fisheries, and reaffirmed the ability of countries to enact trade-related measures
based on the decisions of those bodies.
5.187 New Zealand explained that in accordance with relevant and related definitions in the
TBT Agreement and ISO guidelines, New Zealand c onsiders that an "international standard" under
Article 2.4 must be a standard made by an intern ational body. Furthermore, that international body
must be an international body that has recognized activities in standardization and that must be open
to at least all Members of the WTO. New Zealand explained that these criteria support the

harmonization of international standards, whic h is part of the object and purpose of the
TBT Agreement.
K. T
HAILAND
1. Oral statement of Thailand
5.188 Thailand will be brief in its intervention today.
5.189 Thailand makes this third party oral statement be cause of its interest in the interpretation and
application of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement").
5.190 We observe that there is a limited amount of jurisprudence on the proper interpretation and
application of the TBT Agreement. Because this Panel may have to make findings on TBT issues for
which there are currently no WTO rulings, and beca use Thailand is a developing-country Member
increasingly subject to other Members' TBT measures, we place much importance in this dispute. In
particular, we are interested in the proper inte rpretation and application of the phrase "more trade-
restrictive than necessary taking into account of th e risks non-fulfilment would create" as set out in
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Also of importance is the consideration of whether any specific
criteria must be applied by WTO Members seeking to implement TBT measures deviating from
existing or imminent international standards, as set forth in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
L. T
URKEY
1. Third party submission of Turkey
(a) Introduction
5.191 Turkey thanks the Panel for giving this opport unity to present its views in this proceeding.
Turkey is participating in this case because of it s systemic interest in the interpretation and
implementation of the Agreement on Technical Ba rriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Turkey will
present its views on particular issues raised by the complaining parties of this dispute on the
interpretation and implementation of the TBT Agreement.
5.192 Turkey is not in the intention to present an opinion on the specific factual context of this
dispute and takes no position what so ever as to the defence and allegations presented by the parties
on whether the specific measure at issue is inconsistent to the subject provisions of the WTO
Agreements. Turkey wishes to contribute, by expressing its opinion on some systemic issues
regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the TBT Agreement.
(b) Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
5.193 Within the WTO framework, the TBT Agreemen t is intended to ensure that technical
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to
international trade, while recognizing the right of members to take regulatory measures to achieve
their legitimate objectives.
5.194 First of all, for a regulation to be recognized as a technical regulation it has to contain the
criteria defined in the Annex 1 of the TBT Agre ement. Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, which
contains terms and definitions for the purpose of th e Agreement, describes a technical regulation as "a
document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods,
including the applicable administrative provisions, w ith which compliance is mandatory. It may also

include or deal exclusively with terminology, sy mbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements
as they apply to a product, process or production method."
5.195 As the Appellate Body identified in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines , order to mention a
technical regulation, a document must meet three criteria: (i) a document must apply to a specific
product or product group, (ii) the document must stat e one or more characteristics of the product and
(iii) compliance with the st ated characteristics of the product must be mandatory. 137 The requirements
regulated in this provision are conditions which the re gulation must carry in order to be recognized as
a technical regulation.
5.196 The first criterion determined in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement is that the regulation must
apply to a specific product or product group. Therefor e if a regulation applies a determinable specific
product or a product group then it can be assumed that the first criterion is met.
5.197 In regard to the second criterion that is the doc ument must state one or more characteristics of
the product, the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos Annex explained the "product characteristics" as
follows:
"… The 'characteristics' of a product include , in our view, any objectively definable
'features', 'qualities', 'attributes', or othe r 'distinguishing mark' of a product. Such
'characteristics' might relate, inter alia , to a product's composition, size, shape,
colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, density, or
viscosity. In the definition of a 'technical regulation' in Annex 1.1, the
TBT Agreement itself gives certain examples of "product characteristics" –
'terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements'. These
examples indicate that 'product characteristics' include, not only features and qualities
intrinsic to the product itself, but also rela ted 'characteristics', such as the means of
identification, the presentation and the a ppearance of the product. In addition,
according to the definiti on in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, a 'technical
regulation' may set forth 'applicable administrative provisions' for products which
have certain characteristics."
138
5.198 In this framework, Turkey is of the view th at this criterion can be deemed as met if a
regulation solely obliges labelling requirements.
5.199 The last criterion determined in the Annex is that compliance with the stated characteristics of
the product must be mandatory. This means that a technical regulation must regulate the
"characteristics" of products in a binding or co mpulsory manner. Mandatory means; required or
commanded by authority; obligatory. In this regard, in order to state that a characteristic defined in
the regulation is mandatory, it sufficient to show that without carrying that characteristic, it is legally
not possible to sale, export, import or produce that product.
5.200 On the other hand, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement are the provisions which define
conditions that a technical regulation must be in conformity with.
5.201 Article 2.2 states that technical regulations are not to be prepared with the aim or effect of
causing unnecessary obstacles to trade. It is also stated that they shall not be more trade restrictive
than they need to be, to fulfil a legitimate objective.

137 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 66-72; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines ,
para. 176.
138 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 67.

5.202 What is to be understood from the term "legitimat e objective" is also determined in the same
provision as; national security requirement, the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. Given that the list of "legitimate
objectives" stated in Article 2.2 is not exhaustiv e, members may protect other legitimate objectives
while using the measures prescribed under the TBT Ag reement. Nevertheless , regulatory measures
undertaken with the purpose to protect a member's legitimate objectives shall neither hinder the rights
of other WTO members nor what has been achieved through market access liberalization.
5.203 With regard to the interpretation of this pr ovision, Turkey is in the view that unnecessary
obstacles to trade can result when a regulation is more restrictive than necessary to achieve a given
policy objective, or when it does not fulfil a legitimate objective.
5.204 As highlighted in various Pane l and Appellate Body reports, in interpreting the necessity test
within the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994, a regulation is more restrictive than necessary
when the objective pursued can be achieved through alternative measures which have less
trade-restricting effects. In this context, this in terpretation could be consid ered in interpreting the
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
5.205 On the other hand, according to the provision in deciding whether a technical regulation is
more trade restrictive than necessary, it should al so be taken into account "the risks non-fulfillment
would create". In assessing such risks, relevant elem ents of consideration to be determined are
available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of
products. In Turkey's view, although the burden of proof rests upon the claimant who asserts a
violation of the Article 2.2, this would not be high threshold if a WTO Member do not indicate in a
sufficient manner, how and which scientific informati on has been taken into account in adopting such
technical regulation.
5.206 Last but not least, preamble of the TBT Agreement should also be considered in the
interpretation of TBT Agreement in general and Article 2.2 in pa rticular. Therefore, Regulatory
measures are permitted as long as they are not app lied in a manner which constitutes a means of
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" or a
"disguised restriction on international trade", and ar e otherwise in accordance with the provisions of
the TBT Agreement.
5.207 On the other hand, Article 2.4 states that "W here technical regulations are required and
relevant international standards exist or their comp letion is imminent, members shall use them, or the
relevant parts of them, as a basis for their tec hnical regulations except when such international
standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for inst ance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or
fundamental technological problems."
5.208 With this in mind, Article 2.4 contains an important obligation assumed by WTO Members
under the TBT Agreement. It also carries a right , as WTO Members are authorized to deviate from
international standards (or from parts of it) if these are ineffective or inappropriate for the
achievement of the legitimate objective pursued.
5.209 The term "relevant international standards" has been interpreted by the Appellate Body in the
EC – Sardines. As suggested by the Appellate Body, to be relevant the standard needs "to bear upon,
relate, or be pertinent to a technical regulation".
5.210 With regard to the meaning of the term "ineff ective or inappropriate" (Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement), the Appellate Body noted that it referred to two issues, effectiveness and
appropriateness. These two elements, although closel y related, were consider ed different in nature.

The Panel, as upheld by the Appellate Body, pointed out that the term " ineffective" referred to
something which was not "having the function of accomplishing", "having a result", or "brought to
bear", whereas the term " inappropriate" referred to something which was not "specially suitable",
"proper", or "fitting".
(c) Conclusion
5.211 Turkey appreciates this opportunity to present its views to the Panel. Turkey requests this
Panel to review the comments stated in this submission, in interpreting the TBT Agreement.
VI. INTERIM REVIEW
A. G
ENERAL
6.1 On 5 May 2011, we transmitted our interim report to the parties. On 26 May 2011, Mexico
and the United States requested the Panel to revi ew precise aspects of the Interim Panel Report
pursuant to Article 15.2 of the DSU and the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel. On
14 June 2011, both parties presented comments on each other's requests for review.
6.2 In its comments on the US request for review, Mexico argued that "many of the changes
proposed by the United States appear to be efforts to change the substantive findings of the Panel, to
enter into debate with the Panel, to have the Panel place special emphasis on US arguments, or to alter
the Panel's descriptions of Mexico's arguments. Moreover, many of the US comments are more in the
nature of requests for reconsideration which are not appropriate for this phase of the proceedings".
139
6.3 As stated on previous occasions by the Appellate Body, the interim review stage is not an
appropriate moment to introduce new and unanswered evidence.140 However, in our view, requests to
review precise aspects of the Panel's report may leg itimately include requests for "reconsideration" of
specific factual or legal findings, provided that su ch requests are not based on the presentation of new
evidence. We therefore did not find it necessary to exclude a priori from consideration any request
for review from either party on the sole basis that it would seek reconsideration by the Panel of some
of its determinations. We note in this respect that Mexico itself requested the Panel to reconsider its
decision to exercise judicial economy in relation to Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994 and sought
a review of certain aspects of the Panel's determinations.
6.4 With this preliminary observation in mind, we explain below how we took into account the
parties' specific requests for review in our final Report.
B. DESCRIPTIVE PART (SECTION II OF THE REPORT)
6.5 The United States requested some adjustments to the factual description of the US dolphin-
safe measures and of the AIDCP regime, in paragraphs 2.7, 2.8, 2.12, 2.15, 2.16, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21,
2.22, 2.23, 2.25, 2.35, and 2.38 in the Descriptive Part of the Report. Mexico objected to the
proposed changes, which it found either unnecessary or inappropriate. We adjusted the text of these
paragraphs as relevant in light of the parties' comments, with a view to clarifying the description of
the relevant facts.

139 Mexico's comments on the United States' comments on the interim report, para. 2.
140 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 301.

C. F
INDINGS
1. General (Section VII.A)
6.6 The United States proposed some adjustments to paragraphs 7.13 (and the associated
footnote) and 7.23 of the interim report. The Pane l adjusted the language in these paragraphs for
greater clarity and accuracy, taking into account also Mexico's comments on the US request.
2. Whether the measures at issue constitute a "technical regulation" within the meaning of
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement (Section VII.B.1)
6.7 The United States requested adjustments to paragr aphs 7.60, 7.72, 7.116 of the interim report
to improve the accuracy of the descriptions contai ned therein. The Panel accepted these changes to
the extent that they constituted clarifications. The United States also suggested additions to
paragraph 7.13 of the interim report to refl ect in more detail its arguments concerning
US commitments under the Panama Declaration. The Panel addressed this point in paragraphs 2.16 to
2.19 and referred the reader to it through footnote 196.
6.8 Mexico requested the Panel to review paragra phs 7.86, 7.165, 7.176, 7.180 of the interim
report "in accordance with the arguments and dir ect evidence presented by Mexico". Specifically,
Mexico suggests that references to evidence con cerning canneries and tuna in these paragraphs be
eliminated, in light of the fact that Mexico narro wed down its claims in the course of the proceedings
to tuna products only and do not include tuna. 141 In light of this, Mexico requests that the Panel focus
on the retailer and consumer consumption stages only. Mexico argues that it has put forward
evidence concerning the preferences of retailers an d consumers suggesting that if the AIDCP label
could be placed on its products, they would be accep table to major US retailers and a substantial
proportion of US consumers.
6.9 The United States commented that Mexico's re quest should be rejected. The United States
observed that, while Mexico did state in response to a question from the Panel that the like product
analysis should be limited to tuna products, it made arguments and presented evidence throughout the
proceedings that addressed the processing of tuna, not ju st tuna products. In the US view, the Panel's
findings properly reflect the scope of Mexico's cl aims, and Mexico does not explain why its narrowed
claims would preclude the Panel from taking evidence relating to the practices of canneries and tuna
producers into account.
142 In the US view, such evidence is rele vant not only in its own right but also
as indirect evidence of the preferences of consumers.
6.10 We first note that, as described in paragraphs 7.232 and 7.233, Mexico clarified in the course
of the proceedings that it was seeking findings under Articles III:4, I:1 of GATT and Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement only in relation of tuna products, and not tuna. For that reason, we made no findings
of law under these provisions in relation to tuna as such, and limited our findings in this respect to
tuna products.143
6.11 We also note, however, that the section of the Report containing the paragraphs referred to
above addresses the question of whether compliance w ith the measures at issue is "mandatory" within
the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. This question is not, as such, dependent on the scope
of Mexico's non-discrimination claims under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement (or under Article III:4
and I:1 of GATT 1994).

141 Mexico's comments on the United States' comments on the interim report, paras. 7-21.
142 See the United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 17.
143 See paras. 7.227 and 7.228.

6.12 We have adjusted the text of paragraph 7.87 and the associated footnote 265 in order to reflect
more clearly the manner in which Mexico presente d its arguments concerning canneries and tuna in
relation to the "mandatory" character of the measures.
6.13 Other references to the practices of canneries in this Section that Mexico seeks the removal of
(in paragraphs 7.165, 7.176 and 7. 177 to 7.180 of the interim report) relate to the separate opinion
contained in paragraphs 7.146 to 7.190 in the final report. Modifications made to this part of the
Report should therefore be understood as having been made by the author of the separate opinion.
6.14 Paragraph 7.167, which refers to Mexico's ar guments, has been modified to clarify the
manner in which Mexico referred to the practices of tuna processors in the context of its arguments
that the US measures are de facto "mandatory".
6.15 Paragraphs 7.176 and 7.177 to 7.180 of the interim report have not been modified because, in
the view of their author, references to the practices of canneries in relation to the purchase of tuna are
relevant to the determination made in this secti on, notwithstanding Mexico's decision to narrow down
the scope of its non-discrimination claims to tuna products only. This section of the separate opinion
addresses whether compliance with the US dolphin-safe provisions is de facto mandatory. As
observed above, an assessment of this question is not dependent on the scope of Mexico's
non-discrimination claims.
6.16 The specific question that the evidence relating to the practices of tuna processors helps to
inform in this context is wh ether the measures are mandatory by virtue of US actions rather than as a
result of the practices of the market. The eviden ce relating to tuna processors makes clear that
processors do not wish to purchase tuna that would no t be eligible for the la bel, although it would be
consistent with the terms of the measures to do so, an d that this is a choice that they voluntarily make.
In light of Mexico's observation that the analysis should focus on the reta iler and consumer level,
additional language has been included in paragr aph 7.185 to clarify the author's view on the
arguments highlighted by Mexico in its request fo r review. As explained in that paragraph, a
consideration of the decision of retailers not to car ry tuna products that are not eligible for the
dolphin-safe label confirms that it is the decisions of private actors themselves that give weight to the
dolphin-safe label on the US market and does not modi fy the conclusion reached in this section. As
explained in paragraph 7.180, in the view of the author of the separate opinion, such decisions of
private actors on the market in relation to a volunt ary standard do not turn such standard into a
"technical regulation" with which compliance is mandatory.
6.17 The author of the separate opinion declined to introduce an additional reference to Mexico's
arguments at paragraph 7.162 of the interim report, which reflects the author's assessment of the EC –
Sardines rulings.
3. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement (Section VII.B.2)
6.18 The United States suggested changes to paragraphs 7.224, 7.250, 7.303, 7.307, 7.309, 7.315,
7.316, 7.323 and 7.325 of the interim report to im prove the accuracy of the descriptions contained
therein. Both parties also requested a number of insertions in order to reflect in more detail their
arguments in the findings of the Panel. The Unite d States suggested additions to paragraphs 7.251,
7.253 and 7.342 of the interim report to reflect in mo re detail its arguments. Mexico objected to such
changes arguing that the United States was highlighti ng arguments that were irrelevant to the point
discussed, either seeing to convert them into Panel's findings or changing the focus of the
paragraphs making them confusing to read.
6.19 The Panel accepted such requests where it cons idered that they contributed to a better
understanding of the issues and added clarity to the findings. On that basis, the Panel made

adjustments to paragraphs 7.230, 7.256, 7.312, 7.314, 7.324, 7.329. 7.329, 7.331 and 7.353 of the final
report to reflect the arguments made in the course of the proceedings by both parties and clarify where
necessary its treatment of these arguments. The Panel declined, however, to make the requested
adjustments to paragraphs 7.303 and 7.253 of the in terim report, where it did not consider that the
proposed changes were useful to clarify or im prove the treatment of the issue addressed in
paragraphs 7.308 and 7.257 of the final report.
6.20 Mexico also requested the Panel to review para graphs 7.258, 7.284, 7.285, and 7.350 to 7.354
of the interim report, "in accordance with the argu ments and direct evidence presented by Mexico",
for the reasons outlined in paragraph 6.8 above. As described above, we acknowledge that Mexico
narrowed its non-discrimination claims, in the course of the proceedings, to tuna products, and not
tuna. However, we are not persuaded that this implies that we may not take into consideration
relevant evidence presented by the parties in the c ourse of the proceedings in relation to the practices
of tuna processors and tuna, to the extent that it may inform our assessment of whether the measures
at issue afford Mexican tuna products less favourable treatment within the meaning of Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement. Indeed, should we have ex cluded from consideration any evidence relating to
tuna rather than tuna products, we would also not have been able to take into account some of the
main facts at the core of Mexico's claims, including the fishing practices of its tuna fleet.
6.21 Paragraph 7.289 of the final report has been modified to clarify the manner in which the Panel
understands Mexico's arguments concerning the prac tices of tuna processors and how these should be
taken into consideration when analysing the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions consistency with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
6.22 In paragraphs 7.362 to 7.364, re ference is made to the practice of tuna processors for the
purposes of determining whether access to the label constitutes an advantage on the US market (for
tuna products). As explained in paragraph 7.364, the fact that major tuna processors respond to
dolphin-safe concerns by ensuring that they source only tuna that will make their tuna products
eligible for a dolphin-safe label is, in our view, ev idence that a dolphin-safe designation is considered
valuable on the US market, and that, conse quently, access to the label regulated under the
US dolphin-safe measures constitutes an advantage fo r tuna products on the US market. We see no
need to modify our determinations in this resp ect. However, in order also to address Mexico's
observation that the analysis should address the direct evidence provided by Mexico in relation to the
preferences of retailers and final consumers, we have added paragraph 7.290.
6.23 In paragraphs 7.350 to 7.354, reference is made to the practices of major tuna processors to
inform the relationship between the measures and the practices of operators on the market in relation
to the dolphin-safe issue. As described in paragraph 7.353, this contributes, in combination with other
elements, to the Panel's assessment of the situation of Mexican tuna products on the US market, in
particular the role of the measures and other factors in the limited presence of tuna products caught by
setting on dolphins, including Mexican tuna products , on the US market. For this reason, we do not
consider it necessary to eliminate these references on account of the fact that Mexico's claims are
limited to tuna products and do not extend to tuna. Nonetheless, we considered it useful to elaborate
further also on the elements highlighted by Mexico in relation to the preferences of retailers and
consumers of tuna products to clarify the basis for our findings in this respect. We therefore added
paragraph 7.364 to the final report.
6.24 Mexico also sought a review of paragraphs 7. 330, 7.334 and 7.335 of the interim report, to
reflect more fully its arguments on the costs of adaptation to the US measures. The United States
commented that the interim report already included Me xico's arguments about its efforts to adapt and

that it saw no reason to reiterate them. 144 We reviewed the relevant section in paragraphs 7.336 to
7.346 to reflect more fully the arguments presente d Mexico and accordingly also explained in more
detail our treatment of these arguments.
4. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement (Section VII.B.3)
6.25 We adjusted the text of paragraph 7.346 to improve its clarity, further to a request by the
United States and taking into account Mexico's comments.
6.26 The United States also requested adjustments to paragraphs 7.301, 7.302, 7.326, 7.327 of the
interim report. We declined to make these cha nges, which would have altered our assessment of the
relevant issues in a manner that we did not agree with.
6.27 The United States requested changes to paragraphs 7.381, 7.385, 7.397 and 7.403 of the
interim report that would have modified the Pane l's assessment of the objective of the US dolphin-
safe labelling provisions in relation to dolphin protecti on, to define it in terms of "ensuring that the
US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to set on dolphins " instead of "ensuring that the
US market is not used to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins ". For the reasons
explained in paragraphs 7.414 to 7. 425, we have understood this objective in the manner in which the
United States itself initially defined it, i.e. "protec ting dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not
used to encourage fishin g fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins". We
therefore declined to make the changes requested by the United States. However, we made some
adjustments to paragraphs 7.397, 7.402, 7.414 and 7.567 of the final report to clarify the manner in
which the United States described this objective in its different submissions to the Panel.
6.28 The United States requested the Panel to cite additional factual information in a footnote
concerning its arguments on dolphin mortalities in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)
(footnote 676 in the interim report). In support of this insertion, the United States cites an exhibit
presented by Mexico, which was not referred to by the United States in the part of its submissions that
the footnote addressed.
6.29 We note that it would have been appropriate fo r the United States to refer to the relevant
evidence in support of its factual assertions at the time of making such assertions, rather than in the
interim phase of the proceedings. 145 Nonetheless, we also note that the United States had referred to
this particular piece of evidence and the factual in formation contained therein in one of its comments
on responses to questions by Mexico on a related issue.146 For that reason, we accepted to refer to and

144 United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, paras. 42-43.
145 In its response to the Panel question No. 15, para. 49, the United States noted that:

"Reports on that fishery reveal that marine mammal take is relatively small. Based on
reporting from independent observers on U.S. vessels fishing for tuna in the Western Central
Pacific Ocean (WCPO), of the 1500 sets observed in 2008, there were 5 interactions with false
killer whales and one interaction with a short- finned pilot whale observed; there were no
observed interactions with other marine mammals."

This statement is accompanied by the following text in a footnote "Communication from Dr. Charles
Karnella, International Fisheries Admi nistrator, NOAA Fisheries Pacific Islands Regional Office, to Brad
Wiley, Foreign Affairs Specialist, NOAA Fisheries Offi ce of International Affairs on October 29, 2010". The
communication in question is not provided or otherwise explained.
146 See US comments to Mexico's response to Panel question No. 101 ("For example, Mexico cites data
on marine mammal interactions in the Western Central Paci fic Ocean, yet that data sh ow that over an eleven

address in our final Report the relevant evidence c ited by the United States. This is addressed in
paragraphs 7.524 to 7.529.
6.30 The United States requested that a new pa ragraph be added immediately following
paragraph 7.490 of the interim report to reflect its response to Mexico's arguments that there are
substantial dolphin mortality rates associated with fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins,
that scientific research indicates that there are associations of tuna with dolphins outside the ETP and
that despite the evidence that dolphins and other marine mammals are being killed in significant
numbers in ocean regions other than the ETP, no m easures have been taken in those other regions
comparable to those taken for the ETP.
147
6.31 Mexico objected to the proposed insertion, sta ting that the United States has proposed to add
almost an entire new page reciting arguments from its written submissions, repeating points addressed
elsewhere in the interim report. Nonetheless Mexico noted that, if the Panel decides to include the
new paragraph proposed by the United States, for purposes of maintaining balance in the manner in
which the Parties' arguments are described, it would e xpect the Panel to also re peat in detail Mexico's
responses to those US arguments.148
6.32 The Panel agreed to incorporate additional references to the pa rties' arguments (at
paragraphs 7.512 to 7.514) and consequently found it necessary to clarify also its treatment of these
arguments (at paragraphs 7.524 to 7.530 and 7.559 to 7.561).
6.33 The United States requested a modification of para graph 7.510 of the interim report to clarify
the requirements for access to an alternative label. The Panel clarified the language of this
paragraph and accordingly also clarified its treatment of this issue, at paragraphs 7.540 and 7.541.
5. Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement (Section VII.B.4)
6.34 With respect to the Panel's findings under Ar ticle 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel
adjusted the text of paragraphs 7.604, 7.605, 7.606 and 7.612 of the interim report in order to clarify
the description of United States' arguments in these paragraphs, at their request. The Panel also edited
the text of paragraphs 7.638 to 7.640 of the final re port to improve their clarity, further to a request of
the United States and taking into account comments by Mexico.149
6.35 The United States also sought changes to paragra phs 7.630 to 7.639 of the interim report in
relation to the interpretation of the terms "international standard" in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement.150 Mexico considered this to amount to a request for reconsideration of the Panel's
legal findings.151 However, as described above, we do not cons ider that it is inappropriate for a party
to seek a review of factual or legal determinations made by the Panel in the interim report, provided

year period 33,319 purse seine sets were observed and bycatch of 1315 marine mammals was reported, 46 of
which were reported killed.")
147 United States' comments on the interim report, para. 80.
148 Mexico's comments on the United States comments on the interim report, paras. 75-76.
149 United States' comments on the interim report, paras. 129, 130 and 134. Mexico objected to the
modification proposed in paragraph 7.641, considering that the proposed insertion would not provide further
clarity because the meaning was already clear (Mexico comments on the United States' comments on the interim
report, para. 108). Given the differences of view between the parties throughout the proceedings on the
meaning of the term "dolphin-safe", we saw value in cl arifying the context in which the terms "dolphin-safe"
and "non-dolphin safe" are used in this paragraph..
150 United States' comments on the interim report, paras. 131-133, 135-137.
151 Mexico comments on the United States' comments on the interim report, paras. 107 and 109-110.

that such request is based on evidence previously presented to the Panel. Accordingly, without
prejudice to its substantive merits, we do not consider the United States' request to be inadmissible.
6.36 As we understand it, the United States is seeki ng a review by the Panel of its determination
that the "international standard" in Article 2. 4 of the TBT Agreement should be understood with
reference to the definition of a "s tandard" contained in the TBT Agreem ent rather than with reference
to the definition of the same term in the ISO/IEC Guide 2.
6.37 For the reasons explained in paragraph 7.670, we are not persuaded that the definition of the
term "standard" in Annex 1.2 should be the primary basis for interpreting this term as contained in the
expression "international standard" in Article 2.4. Ra ther, we consider that the meaning of the term
"international standard" in that provision should be understood with reference to its definition in the
ISO/IEC Guide 2, including the term "standard" as also defined in the same Guide. We have
therefore declined to modify paragraphs 7.630 to 7.639 of the interim report as requested by the
United States, but adjusted the language of paragraphs 7.670 to clarify the basis for our determination.
6.38 However, we also note that, should the term "international standard" be interpreted with
reference to the of the terms "standard" and "i nternational body" as defined in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement as suggested by the United States, this would not alter our conclusion, for the
purposes of this dispute, that the AIDCP dolphin-saf e definition constitutes an international standard,
insofar as it is voluntary and is approved by parties to the AIDCP, whose membership is open to the
relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members.
6.39 The United States also sought a modification to paragraph 7.658 and footnote 852 of the
interim report, to remove the reference to the membership of the Antigua Convention.152 We declined
to make this change, on the basis that, as noted by Mexico, this reference is pertinent to the Panel's
consideration of whether membership in the AIDCP is open to the relevant national body of every
country.153 To the extent the membership of the AIDC P is linked to the Membership of the Antigua
Convention, the reference to the latter is pertinent.
6.40 The United States recommended the addition of a sentence in paragraph 7.667 of the interim
report to clarify the conditions of application of the "dolphin safe" certification under the AIDCP
resolutions.154 Mexico objected to this insertion on the basis that it does not directly relate to the issue
discussed in this paragraph and seeks to introduce ne w arguments. We have clarified the language in
paragraph 7.640 to clarify the point raised by th e United States. In paragraph 7.686 of the interim
report, the United States requested the addition of a reference to specific DMLs permitted in the
AIDCP.155 We did not find this addition to be necessary and therefore declined to introduce it.
6. Exercise of judicial economy on Mexico's claims under Articles I and III:4 of
GATT 1994 (Section VII.C)
6.41 Mexico requested the Panel to reconsider its d ecision to exercise judicial economy in regard
to findings under Article I:1 and III:4 of the GATT. 156 First, Mexico considered that in this case the
report has only resulted in a partial resolution of th e dispute and that the Panel has exercised false
judicial economy with respect to its discrimination claims because despite finding that the measures
were consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreem ent, the Panel declined to rule on Articles I:1

152 United States' comments on the interim report, para.138
153 Mexico comments on the United States' comments on the interim report, para. 110
154 United States' comments on the interim report, para. 139.
155 United States' comments on the interim report, para. 140.
156 Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 67.

and III:4 and therefore left open the question of discrimination.
157 The United States responded that
such assertion misses the point because the question as to the proper exercise of judicial economy is
not whether the complainant feels its concerns ha ve been resolved but rather whether the Panel
believes it has addressed the claims necessary to re solve the dispute. The United States considered
that the Panel acted within the scope of its discre tionary authority in deciding to exercise judicial
economy on Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994.158
6.42 Further, Mexico argued that finding that the US measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement does not, in itself fully resolve this dispute and referred to the panel's findings in
US – Poultry (China) , where despite its finding of inconsis tency under the SPS Agreement the Panel
refrained from exercising judicial economy with re spect of a claim under Article I of the GATT 1994
on the basis that there were different obligations embodied in both provisions and a finding only on
Article XI would not provide a positive solution to the dispute with respect to discrimination. 159
Mexico considered the same situation arises here w ith the Panel's findings under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement insofar as a finding of inconsiste ncy under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement does
not provide a positive solution to this dispute in respect of discrimination. 160 The United States
considers that the Panel's finding that the meas ures are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement does resolve the dispute because it says it does not understand the Panel to have
considered that these findings alone did but rather that the Panel appears to have fully examined
Mexico's non-discrimination claims, as well as its claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, and on this basis the Panel considered that it had resolved the dispute.
6.43 Mexico argued that although the three provisions deal with non-discrimination obligations,
each of them is different in langua ge, nature, scope and application and that that the TBT provisions
cannot be taken to replace, subsume or exclude provisions of the GATT and that thus, the Panel's
finding of consistency with Article 2.1 cannot be assumed to mean that the US measures are also
consistent with Articles I:1 and III:4. 161 In response the United States observed that Mexico
consistently referred the Panel to its arguments under the GATT provisions as the basis for its TBT
Article 2.1 claims and that it agreed with the Pane l that Mexico has not explained how its assertion of
differences in nature, scope, and application of the pr ovisions result in different rights and obligations
which would have different implica tions during implementation. It also noted that Mexico made this
same argument earlier in the proceedings and that it appeared from the report that the Panel had
already taken these arguments into consideration in deciding to exercise judicial economy. 162 The
United States considered Mexico misunderstood th e Panel's statement which it says was relying on
the fact that Mexico's arguments under Article 2. 1 of the TBT Agreement derived directly from its
arguments under the GATT 1994 provisions, and so the Panel could be comfortable in concluding that
in light of its findings under Article 2.1 of the TB T Agreement it need not reach Articles I:1 and III:4
of the GATT 1994. 163 In Mexico's view, the dissent by one member of the Panel on the threshold
issue of whether the US measures constitute a tec hnical regulation and are covered by Article 2.2

157 Mexico argued that if a Panel decides to exercise judicial economy, it must be consistent with the
aim of the dispute settlement system which is to resolve the matter referred to the DSB and to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. (Mexico's comments on the interim report, paras. 69-71). The United States noted that
"[t]he Appellate Body has consistently ruled that panels are not required to addre ss all the claims made by a
complaining party but rather a panel has discretion to determine which claims it must address in order to resolve
the dispute between the parties." (footnote omitted) (United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the
interim report, fn 25).
158 United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 59.
159 (footnote omitted) (Mexico's comments on the interim report, fn 24).
160 Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 73.
161 Mexico's comments on the interim report, paras. 71-72.
162 United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 60.
163 United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 62.

further highlights the importance of the Panel ruling on Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994. The
United States noted that where the Panel had alread y resolved the threshold issue in Mexico's favour,
the exercise of judicial economy was within the Panel's discretion.164
6.44 For the reasons explained in Section VII:C of this Report, we did not consider it necessary to
modify our decision to exercise judicial economy in respect of Mexico's claims under Articles I.1 and
III:4 of the GATT 1994. As explaine d in paragraph 7.748, we consid er that, in addressing all aspects
of Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement, includi ng, but not limited to, its discrimination claims,
we have addressed Mexico's claims in a manner suffici ent to resolve the dispute. We further note in
this respect that, despite having found a violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel
proceeded to examine Mexico's claim under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, in order to address
adequately the alleged breaches of the different legal obligations invoked by Mexico under the
TBT Agreement.
VII. FINDINGS
A. GENERAL
1. Procedural issue: Amicus curiae brief
7.1 Before the first substantive meeti ng, the Panel received an unsolicited amicus curiae brief
from Humane Society International and American University's Washington College of Law,
accompanied by a letter dated 6 May 2010.
7.2 On 28 June 2010, the Chairman of the Panel info rmed the parties and third parties that it
considered, in light of the Appellate Body's rulings in US – Shrimp, that it had the discretionary
authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it, and that it
would accordingly treat this submission as it deemed appropriate. The parties and third parties were
invited to provide any views they had in relation to the submission at the first substantive meeting.
The parties and third parties were also reminded of the possibility of incorporating part or all of the
information contained in the submission into thei r respective submissions and/or oral statements,
subject to the provisions of the DSU and the Panel's Working Procedures.165

164 United States' comments on Mexico's comments on the interim report, para. 61.
165 Letter from the Chairman of the Panel to the Parties dated 28 June 2010:

"I would like to inform you that the Dispute Settlement Registrar has received an unsolicited
amicus curiae brief from Humane Society Intern ational and American University's
Washington College of Law. The brief has been forwarded to the Panel. A copy of the brief
is attached.

Taking into account the determinations of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp
(WT/DS58/AB/R), the Panel considers that it has the discretionary authority either to accept
and consider or to reject information and a dvice submitted to it, and it will accordingly treat
this brief as it deems appropriate. The Parties and Third Parties are invited to offer any views
they may have in relation to the brief at the first substantive meeting.

The Panel reminds Parties and Third Parties that, if they so wish, they have the possibility of
incorporating part or all of the information contained in the brief into their respective
submissions and/or oral statements, subject to the provisions of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding and the Panel's working Procedures. "

7.3 At the first substantive meeting, the United Stat es requested the Panel to review and consider
the submission in its deliberations, in light of the relevant and useful information it contained which it
believed could assist the Panel in under standing the issues in this dispute.
166 In addition, in its
responses to the Panel's questions, the United States re ferred to some of the information contained in
the amicus curiae brief in support of its arguments. 167 Mexico did not comment on the filing of the
amicus curiae brief or on its content at the first substantive meeting.
7.4 The Panel subsequently invited both parties to comment on certain information presented as
an exhibit to the amicus curiae brief. In its response, Mexico observed that factual information
submitted through an amicus curiae brief could not be properly treated as part of the record of this
dispute.168 The United States responded that, although a pa nel is not required to consider information
submitted by amici, it may consider such information as it sees fit. In particular, the United States
noted that the Chairman of the Panel had invited the parties and third parties in this dispute to offer
views in relation to the amicus curiae brief filed.169
7.5 With respect to the question of whether the in formation contained in the brief may properly
be considered by the Panel, we first note that the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp observed that:
"The thrust of Articles 12 and 13, taken t ogether, is that the DSU accords to a panel
established by the DSB, and engaged in a dispute settlement proceeding, ample and
extensive authority to undertake and to c ontrol the process by which it informs itself
both of the relevant facts of the disput e and of the legal norms and principles
applicable to such facts. That authority, and the breadth thereo f, is indispensably
necessary to enable a panel to discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to
"make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and c onformity with the
relevant covered agreements ... "
170
7.6 In light of the "amplitude of the authority vested in panels to shape the processes of
fact-finding and legal interpretation"171, the Appellate Body ruled that:
"If, in the exercise of its sound discreti on in a particular case, a panel concludes
inter alia that it could do so without 'unduly delaying the panel process', it could grant

166 The United States mentions that the submission discusses the adverse impact on dolphins and
dolphin populations in the ETP resulting from the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna; explains that
fleet capacity in the ETP is the largest threat to tuna stoc ks in the ETP rather than particular fishing techniques;
reviews the substantial retailer and consumer interest in a dolphin-safe label that ensures that consumers are not
misled as to whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. It
also emphasized Humane Society International's nearly th ree decade involvement in the issues surrounding this
dispute. United States' opening oral statement of the first substantive meeting, para. 54.
167 In particular when responding to the Panel's question as to whether consumers' preferences were
determined by the fishing method, the United States re sponded that at the time the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were enacted, there was strong consumer sentiment that setting on dolphins to catch tuna was
unacceptable and that the amicus curi ae brief highlighted this sentiment. United States' response to Panel
question No. 40(a), para. 98. The United States also referr ed to the amicus curiae brief to support its assertion
that the ETP is fundamentally different from all other oceans in that it is the only ocean where tuna and dolphins
have a known regular and significant as sociation and the only ocean where su ch an association is exploited as
the foundation for a commercial fishery. See United States' response to Panel question No. 12(b), fn 18.
168 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 88, para. 5.
169 United States' comments on Mexico's response to Panel question No. 88. None of the third parties
offered any views with respect to the amicus curiae brief.
170 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 106.
171 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 108.

permission to file a statement or a brie f, subject to such conditions as it deems
appropriate. The exercise of the panel's discretion could, of course, and perhaps
should, include consultation with the parties to the dispute."172
7.7 Taking into account these determinations, as descr ibed above, the Panel informed the parties
prior to the first meeting that:
"Taking into account the determina tions of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp
(WT/DS58/AB/R), the Panel considers that it has the discretionary authority either to
accept and consider or to reject informa tion and advice submitted to it, and it will
accordingly treat this brief as it deems appropriate."
7.8 As also described above, the Panel invited the parties to comment on the brief at issue, in
accordance with the requirements of due process.
173
7.9 The Panel therefore considers that it has the authority to consider the information contained in
the submission filed by Humane Society International and American University's Washington College
of Law, and has done so to the extent that it deemed it relevant to the examination of the claim before
it. Where the Panel considered the information presented in and the ev idence attached to the amicus
curiae brief relevant, it has sought the views of the pa rties in accordance with the requirements of due
process. In addition, to the extent that one of the parties has cited the amicus curiae brief or cross-
referenced to the exhibits presen ted with such brief in its reasoning or responses to questions, as
described in paragraph 7.3 above, these elements form part of the submissions of that party in these
proceedings and the Panel deems appropriate refer to such information in its findings.
2. Examination of the measures together
7.10 In its request for the establishment of a pa nel, Mexico identified three separate legal
instruments: (i) United States Code, Title 16, Section 1385 –the "Dolphi n Protection Consumer
Information Act – DPCIA"–, (hereafter "the DPCIA") (ii) the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 50,
Section 216.91 –"Dolphin-safe labelling standards"– and Section 216.92 –"Dolphin-safe requirements
for tuna harvested in the ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] by large purse seine vessels"–
(hereafter "the implementing regulations ") and (iii) the judicial ruling in Earth Island Institute v.
Hogarth, 494 F. 3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter "the Hogarth ruling") as basis for its claims.
However, in the course of the proceedings, Mexi co referred to the measures as a whole under the
generic expression "US measures" 174, "labelling provisions" 175 or "labelling measures" 176,

172 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 107.
173 We also note that the Appellate Body recently followed a comparable procedure in similar
circumstances:
"On 15 December 2010, the Appella te Body received an unsolicited amicus curiae brief. After giving
the participants and the third participants an opportunity to express their views, th e Division hearing the appeal
did not find it necessary to rely on this amicus curiae brief in rendering its decision" (Appellate Body Report,
US – AD/CVD on certain products from China, para. 18).
174 See for instance Mexico's first written submission, paras. 155, 164, 165, 168, 169 and throughout
the written submission.
175 See for instance Mexico's first written submission, para. 195.
176 See for instance Mexico's first written submission, para. 240.

"US dolphin-safe labelling measures"
177 and "labelling scheme". 178 The United States has also
referred to the measures as the "US dolphin-safe labelling provisions"179 or the "labelling scheme".180
7.11 The Panel therefore asked Mexico to clarif y whether it considered that each measure
individually leads to each of the vi olations it identified, or whether it considered that the violations
arise from the measures in combination, and whether it was seeking from the Panel separate
determinations in relation to each measure. The Pa nel also afforded the United States an opportunity
to comment on this matter.
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.12 In response to the Panel's question, Mexico explained that it had identified three separate legal
instruments under this dispute, but that each inst rument is part of to the same measure: the
US dolphin-safe labelling regime.181 Mexico contends that "[a] meas ure can be made of up more than
one instrument. It is common in the domestic legal systems of many WTO Members for a measure to
comprise legislative provisions, regulatory provisions and other kinds of legal instruments".
182
7.13 Mexico further explained that the DPCIA is a law enacted by the US Congress which contains
the requirements to obtain a dolphin-safe label. The regulations codified under 50 CFR
Section 216.91 and 216.92 provide, Mexico says, the regulatory conditions imposed by the
US Department of Commerce for the use of dol phin-safe label on tuna and tuna products in
accordance with the DPCIA. Finally, Mexico noted that, as the United States had recognized, the
judicial ruling in Earth Island Institute vs. Hogarth "vacated the Secretary of Commerce's final
finding under Section 1385(g) that wo uld have permitted tuna products that contained tuna that was
caught by setting on dolphins to be labelled dolphins safe". 183 As a consequence of this interpretation
by the US Court, the US measure prohibits, Mexico argues, the use of a dolphin-safe label if the tuna
was caught in association with dolphins, and it does not matter that no dolphins were killed or injured
in the set in which the tuna was caught.184
7.14 In light of these observations, Mexico consider s that the measures should be analysed as a
whole through a "comprehensive analysis" leading to the conclusion that there are violations of
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articl es 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. 185
Mexico also specifies that it is neither asking for separate rulings for each measure, nor is it
suggesting that the Panel undertake an independent analysis of each measure.
186
7.15 The United States did not comment on Mexico's proposed approach.
(b) Analysis by the Panel
7.16 As described above, Mexico has identified three distinct legal instruments in its request for
establishment of a panel (the DPCIA, the implementing regulations, and the Hogarth ruling). In the

177 See for instance Mexico's first written submission, paras. 226 and 247.
178 See for instance Mexico's first written submission, para. 203.
179 See for instance United States' first written submissi on, paras. 97, 98, 100, 102, 103 and throughout
the written submission.
180 See for instance United States' first written submission, paras. 4, 16 and 55.
181 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, paras. 6-7.
182 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 8.
183 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 7 (footnote omitted).
184 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 7.
185 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 9.
186 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 10.

course of the proceedings, Mexico clarified that it seeks findings in relation to the combined operation
of these three instruments, rather than for each instrument individua lly. We must therefore consider
whether these various instruments taken together may be described as constituting the measures
before us.
7.17 We first recall that, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU, dispute settle ment proceedings under
the DSU may be initiated in "situations in which a Me mber considers that any benefits accruing to it
directly or indirectly under the covere d agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member" (emphasis added). With respect to the notion of "measure" in this context, the Appellate
Body has observed that:
"This phrase identifies the relevant nexus, for purposes of dispute settlement
proceedings, between the 'measure' and a 'Member'. In principle, any act or omission
attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of
dispute settlement proceedings. The acts or omissions that are so attributable are, in
the usual case, the acts or omissions of the or gans of the state, including those of the
executive branch."
187
7.18 In principle, therefore, any act or omission attr ibutable to a Member can be a measure for the
purposes of dispute settlement proceedings. We also note the Appellate Body's determination that
"the parties, and, in particular, the complainant, and the panel enjoy a certain latitude in defining the
relevant measures".188
7.19 In this instance, Mexico's claims relate to certain provisions of a law (the DPCIA) and of a
regulation (sections of the Federal Code), as well as to a federal court ruling (the Hogarth ruling), and
Mexico invites the Panel to consider these measure s as a whole and to make findings in relation to
them taken together. The United States has not objected to this approach.
7.20 In addressing this issue, we first note that it h as not been suggested in these proceedings that
any of these legal instruments taken in isolation would not constitute an "act or omission of the organs
of the state" attributable to the United States. We further note that the DPCIA and the implementing
regulations constitute legislative or regulatory act s of the federal authorities, while the court ruling
constitutes an act of the judicial branch. 189 Each of these normative instruments is a priori capable of
constituting a measure attributable to the Unite d States, which may be challenged in dispute
settlement proceedings under the DSU.
7.21 The question we must consider, however, is whether it is appropriate to consider these
measures jointly in our analysis of Mexico's cl aims, and make findings based on their combined
operation, rather than on the basis of each individual measure separately.

187 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 81 and footnote 79.
See also Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 171.
188 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 181.
189 We note that in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the panel examined whether discrimination arose from the
importation of used tyres through court injunctions. In US – Section 211 Appropriations Act the challenged law
contained provisions mandating that no US court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of
rights or trademarks made under certain circumstances. The panel noted that the only application of the
challenged law by US courts to date of which the parties were aware was the Havana Club Holdings, S.A. v
Galleon S.A. ( Havana Club Holdings, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 2000)). Panel Report, US –
Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 2.13.

7.22 In considering this issue, we find it useful to review how the various instruments cited by
Mexico function and relate to each other.
190 First, with respect to the DPCIA, the United States has
explained that the DPCIA, codified at 16 U.S. C. 1385, establishes the conditions for use of a
"dolphin-safe" label on tuna products.191 The DOC is legally bound to ensure, through the NOAA and
the NMFS, that the criteria set out in the statute are satisfied. 192 In addition, the United States has
defined the two sections of the Code of Fe deral Regulations as the "DPCIA implementing
regulations" and has stated that "[T]he DPCIA and implementing regulations are the source and
authority for understanding the conditions on labe lling tuna products dolphin-safe; NOAA Form 370
merely reflects what the law and regulations provide." 193 As explained by the United States,
Section 216.91 sets out conditions for the use of th e dolphin-safe label and Section 216.92 contains
provisions to ensure that tuna caught by certain vessels is labelled dolphin-safe only if the conditions
set out in the DPCIA have been met. 194 Given the hierarchical and operational link between the
DPCIA and the relevant sections of the Code of Fede ral Regulation, it is not clear that the latter could
be operational on their own or totally independently without the authority of the DPCIA.
7.23 Finally, the Court ruling challenged by Mexico, the Hogarth ruling, finds its origin in a
challenge to a Secretarial finding mandated by a provision in the DPCIA, which required a
determination as to whether the intentional deploy ment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse
seine nets was having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the ETP.
Therefore, in the absence of th e DPCIA and actions taken under it, the court ruling would not have
existed. In addition, the outcome of that Court ruling has had a direct impact on the rules that are
applied under the DPCIA, because the fulfilment of certain conditions foreseen in the DPCIA was
dependent on the results of the secretarial findings that were rendered void by the rulings.195
7.24 To summarize, together and collectively, th e various provisions in the different legal
instruments identified by Mexico, including the Hogarth ruling, set out the terms of the
US "dolphin-safe" labelling scheme, as currently applie d by the United States. We also note that the
United States does not object to Mexico's request to consider the various instruments together and that
it has articulated its defence in these proceedings on the basis of the measures taken together. In light
of these elements, we see merit in considering these closely related instruments together as a single
measure for the purposes of this dispute.
7.25 We also note that a comparab le issue has arisen in two cases relating to SPS measures
(Japan – Apples and Australia – Apples ), where the panels considered whether various requirements
imposed by Japan and Australia respectively, and embodied in different instruments, should be treated

190 Panel question No. 3.
191 United States' response to Panel question No. 3, paras. 3-6.
192 In that regard see Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.91.
193 United States' response to Panel question No. 7, paras. 19.
194 The United States has explained that: "Regulations pertaining to the use of dolphin-safe label are set
out in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Mexico challenges the provisions set out at 50 CFR 216. 91
and 216.92. These provisions reflect the conditions for use of the dolphin-safe label on tuna products set out in
the DPCIA. Consistent with the DPCIA, section 216.91 sets out the conditions for use of the dolphin-safe label
based on whether the tuna was caught in a fishery where there is a regula r and significant association between
tuna and dolphins or regular and significant mortalities or injuries of dolphins. Section 216. 91 also clarifies that
these conditions only apply to vessels in the ETP that have a carrying capacity greater than 362.8 metric tons,
and section 216.92 contains provisions to ensure that tuna caught by such vessels is labelled dolphin-safe only if
the conditions set out in the DPCIA have been met. Section 216.92 sets out the provisions applicable to
domestic and imported tuna separately, although the basic requirements are the same and seek to ensure that
claims that tuna is dolphin-safe comply with U.S. law." United States' first written submission, para. 31.
195 See paras. 2.16-2.19.

as a single measure or as a combina tion of several individual measures. 196 In these cases, in addition
to considering whether the different requirements might constitute a single measure for the purposes
of dispute settlement under the DSU 197, the panel also had to consider whether they constituted a
"phytosanitary measure" within the meaning of the SPS Agreement, an issue that is not before this
Panel. Nonetheless, we find that the test developed by the panel in Japan – Apples provides useful
guidance for our analysis. The panel in that cas e considered that the various requirements were
interrelated and cumulatively constituted the measures actually applied by Japan to the importation of
US apple fruit to protect against the entry, establishm ent or spread of fire blight within its territory. 198
That panel therefore saw no legal, logical or factua l obstacle to treating the requirements identified by
the United States as a single phytosanitary measure within the meaning of the SPS Agreement.199
7.26 Similarly, we see no "legal, factual or logical obstacle" 200 to treating the various interrelated
legal instruments identified by Mexico as the basi s for its claims in these proceedings as a single
measure for the purposes of our findings. Accordingl y, we will consider them together throughout
these findings. These measures taken together are hereafter referred to as "the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions".
3. Order of analysis of the claims
7.27 Mexico raises claims under two of th e covered agreements: GATT 1994 and the
TBT Agreement. We must therefore determine in the first instance the order in which it is appropriate
for us to address these claims.
(a) Arguments of the parties
7.28 In its written submissions, Mexico presented its arguments concerning GATT 1994 first, and
then its arguments under the TBT Agreement. The United States presented its arguments in the same
order.
7.29 In response to a question by the Panel, Mexico clarified that its principal claims concern the
discriminatory nature of the US measures and therefore it found it logical for the Panel to first address
its claims of discrimination under GATT Articles I:1 and III: 4 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement;
followed by an examination of its other claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
201
7.30 Mexico also acknowledged that it is an accepted practice, when addressing claims under both
the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement, to address the claims under the TBT Agreement first.
However, it considered the order of examination of a complaining Member's claims important in
situations where a panel exercises judicial economy in respect of one or more of the claims. Mexico
also held that although a panel has discretion to exercise judicial economy, if the panel fails to make
findings that are necessary to resolve the dispute it will constitute a false judicial economy and an
error of law.
202

196 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , para. 4.17. See also Panel Report, Australia – Apples ,
paras. 7.113-7.115.
197 The Panel therefore had to interpret Articles 6.2 and 19. 1 of the DSU to verify whether a matter
brought before the DSB could refer to several "measures". Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.11.
201 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 1-2.
202 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114, para. 68.

7.31 Citing the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bananas III , Mexico considered that in the case at
hand it was essential for an effective resolution of th e dispute that the Panel rule on all its claims
because of: "(i) the nature of the measures at issue; ( ii) the fact that this is the first time that such
measures have been subject to dispute settlement und er the DSU; (iii) the di fferences in the wording
and potential application of the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement to the
measures; and (iv) the importance of the effective discipline of such non-tariff measures to developing
country Members such as Mexico." Mexico emphasi zed that this final reason was particularly
important to developing countries who are, in its view, more exposed to the adverse effects of non-
tariff measures. Mexico concluded that for those reasons, the order of its claims was not important
and the Panel should examine all the claims in the logical order it had exposed.
203
7.32 Mexico further explained that it was necessary for the Panel to rule on its discrimination
claims under both the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreem ent because the nature, scope and application
of the claims under Articles I:1, III:4, and 2.1 are different and address different rights and obligations
which, in turn, will have different implications during the implementation phase of this dispute. 204
With respect to its claims under Articles 2.2 and 2. 4 of the TBT Agreement, Mexico specified that
these claims relate to aspects of the US measure s other than discrimination and are necessary to
address the trade restrictive effects of the US measures that exist independently of the
discrimination.205 It concluded that due to their different nature, scope and application, none of its
claims overlap and all are necessary to an effective resolution of the dispute.206
7.33 The United States, in line with its reasoning that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are
not technical regulations and therefore are not su bject to the provisions of the TBT Agreement,
considered it would be appropriate for the Pane l to analyse first Mexico's claims under the
GATT 1994.207
7.34 The United States agreed with Mexico that judicial economy gives panels discretion to refrain
from making findings which are not necessary to resolv e a dispute. However, it considered that the
reasons advanced by Mexico in this respect ap peared unrelated to whether exercising judicial
economy on any of Mexico's claims would fail to resolve the dispute.208
(b) Analysis by the Panel
7.35 The TBT Agreement and GATT 1994 are both found in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement,
which contains all the multilateral agreements on trade in goods that form part of the results of the
Uruguay Round.
7.36 The Appellate Body has commented on the task of the interpreter when considering two
agreements contained in Annex 1A, in casu, the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement:
"[T]he Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement "are both Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods c ontained in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (the 'WTO Agreement'), and, as such, are
both 'integral parts' of the same treaty, the WTO Agreement, that are 'binding on all
Members'". Furthermore, as the Appellate Body has explained, "a treaty interpreter

203 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 4-5.
204 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114, para. 69.
205 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114, para. 70.
206 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114, para. 71.
207 United States' response to Panel question No. 1, para. 1.
208 United States' comments on Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114, para. 46.

must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of
them, harmoniously".209
7.37 Similarly, the TBT Agreement and GATT 1994 are both "integral parts" of the WTO
Agreement and binding on all Members. The question we must consider, in reading the provisions of
the two agreements harmoniously, is whether it is appropriate to address the claims presented under
these two agreements in any particular order.
7.38 We first note that panels are in principle free to consider the claims before them in the manner
that they consider most appropriate to the resolution of the matter before them. 210 Nonetheless,
"panels must ensure that they pr oceed on the basis of a properly stru ctured analysis to interpret the
substantive provisions at issue".211 As the Appellate Body also expressed it:
"[I]n each case it is the nature of the rela tionship between two provisions that will
determine whether there exists a mandatory sequence of analysis which, if not
followed, would amount to an error of law. In some cases, this relationship is such
that a failure to structure the analysis in the proper logical sequence will have
repercussions for the substance of the analysis itself."
212
7.39 Thus, in light of the Appellate Body's guidance on this matter, we will examine the nature of
the relationship between GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreem ent so as to ascertain whether a particular
order of analysis of the claims is appropriate.
7.40 We note in this respect the Appellate Body's determination that:

209 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 549. We also note the Appellate Body's analysis
of the relationship between the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994:
The authors of the new WTO regime intended to put an end to the fragmentation that had
characterized the previous system. This can be seen from the preamble to the WTO Agreement
which states, in pertinent part:
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system encompassing the Genera l Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade
liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement also provides that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are "integral
parts" of the WTO Agreement, "binding on all Members". The single undertaking is further reflected in the
Articles of the WTO Agreement on original membership, accession , non-application, acceptance and
withdrawal. Furthermore, the DSU establishes an integrated dispute settlement system which applies to all the
"covered agreements", allowing all the provisions of the WTO Agreement relevant to a particular dispute to be
examined in one proceeding. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p.18.
210 The Appellate Body has thus determined that:
"As a general principle, panels are free to structure th e order of their analysis as they see fit. In so
doing, panels may find it useful to take account of th e manner in which a claim is presented to them by a
complaining Member. Furthermore, panels may choose to use assumptions in order to facilitate resolution of a
particular issue or to enable themselves to make additi onal and alternative factual findings and thereby assist in
the resolution of a dispute should it proceed to the appellate level".(Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat
Exports and Grain Imports, paras. 126).
211 As the Appellate Body found in US – Shrimp and Canada – Autos, panels that ignore or jump over a
prior logical step of the analysis run the risk of compromising or invalidating later findings. This risk is
compounded in the case of two legally interrelated provisions, where one of those provisions must, as a matter
of logic and analytical coherence, be analysed before the other, as is the case with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994.
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 127.
212 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 109.

"[A] provision of an agreement included in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement
(including the SCM Agreement), and a provision of the GATT 1994, that have
identical coverage, both apply, but … the provision of the agreement that 'deals
specifically, and in detail' with a question should be examined first."
213
7.41 In the present dispute, provisions of the TBT Agreement and of the GATT 1994 are both
invoked. As expressed in its Preamble, the TBT Agreement reflects Members' desire to "further the
objectives of GATT 1994". The Appellate Body observe d that "it does so through a specialized legal
regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures. For these measures, the TBT Agreement
imposes obligations on Members that seem to be di fferent from, and additional to, the obligations
imposed on Members under the GATT 1994".214
7.42 In addition, the Interpre tative Note to Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement clarifies that, in the
event of a conflict between a provision of th e GATT 1994 and a provision of another Annex 1A
Agreement, the latter will prevail to the extent of the conflict. In the present dispute, the provisions of
the TBT Agreement would therefore prevail over those of GATT 1994 in such a situation.
7.43 These considerations suggest to us that the TB T Agreement "deals in detail, and specifically"
with the matters that it addresses. Therefore, where claims under GATT 1994 are presented in
parallel with claims under the TBT Agre ement, claims under the TBT Agreement should be
considered first. This is not modified, in our view, by the fact that there is some uncertainty about the
extent to which the provisions invoked under the TBT Agreement are in fact applicable.
7.44 We note that this was also the approach followed by the panel in EC – Asbestos:
"According to the Appellate Body in European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ,215 when the GATT 1994 and another
Agreement in Annex 1A appear a priori to apply to the measure in question, the latter
should be examined on the basis of the Ag reement that deals 'specifically, and in
detail,' with such measures. In this particul ar case, as the parties do not agree on the
legal nature of the measure itself (technical regulation covered by the TBT Agreement
or general ban coming under the scope of th e GATT 1994 alone), it is difficult at this
stage to determine which Agreemen t, either the GATT 1994 or the TBT Agreement,
deals with the measure in question most sp ecifically and in the most detailed manner
without undertaking an in-depth examination of the measure in the light of each
Agreement.
In order to decide upon the order in which our consideration should proceed, in the
way suggested by the Appellate Body, the hypothesis should be that, if the Decree is
a 'technical regulation' within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, then the latter
would deal with the measure in the most specific and most detailed manner.
Consequently, in our view it must first be determined whether the Decree is a
technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. If this is the case, we
shall start considering this case by examining the ways in which the Decree violates

213 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 134.
214 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80.
215 (footnote original) Adopted on 25 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, hereinafter " European
Communities – Bananas", para. 204.

the TBT Agreement. If we find that the Decree is not a 'technical regulation', we shall
then immediately start to consider it in the context of the GATT 1994."216
7.45 We agree with the reasoning and approach refl ected in these findings and adopt them for the
purposes of our examination of Mexico's claims. In the present case, the GATT 1994 and the
TBT Agreement have both been invoked, and as in EC – Asbestos , the parties disagree whether the
measures at issue constitute technical regulations within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.
7.46 Accordingly, taking into account the specificity of the TBT Agreement and its precedence
over GATT 1994 in the event of a conflict between provisions of the two agreements, we find it
appropriate to consider first Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement.
7.47 This determination is without prejudice to th e question of whether the provisions of the
TBT Agreement invoked by Mexico are applicable to the measures at issue. We will consider this
question in the context of our examination under the TBT Agreement in Section B below. This
determination is also without prejudice to the question of exercise of judicial economy, which Mexico
has referred to in relation to the order of analysis of the claims, but which is, in our view, a distinct
matter, to be decided at a later stage of our analysis.
B. M
EXICO'S CLAIMS UNDER THE TBT AGREEMENT
7.48 Mexico has presented claims under Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. All three
of these provisions relate to "technical regulations". The United States, however, considers that the
measures at issue do not constitute "technical regulations" within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.
7.49 We must therefore determine, as a threshold matter, whether the measures at issue constitute a
"technical regulation", as this question determines the applicability of the provisions invoked by
Mexico under the TBT Agreement. If we determin e that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do
constitute a "technical regulation", we will then co nsider further Mexico's claims under each of the
three provisions that it has invoked.
1. Whether the measures at issue constitute a "technical regulation" within the meaning of
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement
7.50 Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as follows:
"Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method".
7.51 Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, we must interpret this term in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international la w. As recognized by the Appellate Body, these
customary rules of treaty interpretation have been codified in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention").
217

216 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.16–8.17.
217 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling , para. 159; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, p. 10; Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
read as follows:

7.52 The general rule of interpretati on contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention has been
construed by the Appellate Body as requiring that th e interpretation of a treaty provision be primarily
based on the text of the treaty provision itself.
218 The words contained in that text must be given their
ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty in question. 219
We also take note of the Appellate Body's conclusion that "[o]ne of the corollaries of the general rule
of interpretation in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all
the terms of a treaty".220
7.53 The Appellate Body has interpreted the definition of a "technical regulation" in EC – Asbestos
and EC – Sardines. These rulings provide useful guidance for our analysis in this case. In particular,
the Appellate Body established in EC – Asbestos a three-tier test for determining whether a measure is
a "technical regulation" under the TBT Agreement. 221 This test was then followed in EC –
Sardines.222 The three elements under this test are derived from the wording of the definition in
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement.223 Accordingly, a measure is a "technical regulation", if:
(a) the measure applies to an identifiable product or group of products;
(b) it lays down one or more characteristics of the product; and

Article 31
 General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the applicat ion of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law app licable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Article 32
 Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31 , or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is ma nifestly absurd or unreasonable.

218 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 11.
219 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17.
220 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 23.
221 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 66-70.
222 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176.
223 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176.

(c) compliance with the product characteristics is mandatory.
7.54 We therefore now consider whether the US measures challenged by Mexico constitute a
technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, on the basis of these
three elements, as articulated by the Appellate Body.
7.55 Accordingly, we will consider the following issues in turn:
(a) Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions apply to an identifiable group of
products;
(b) Whether they lay down one or more characteristics of these products;
(c) Whether compliance with them is mandatory within the meaning of Annex 1.
(a) Whether the measures apply to an identifiable product or group of products
7.56 Mexico notes that the term "tuna product" is de fined in Section 1385(c)(5) of the DPCIA.
Mexico also observes that the provisions of the DPCIA apply specifically to a "tuna product" as
defined by such provisions. Therefore, according to Mexico, the list of items identified by this
definition, constitute an "identifiable group of products" to which the document applies.224
7.57 The United States does not disagree with Mexico that the US dolphin-safe provisions apply to
an identifiable group of products (tuna products). However, as further discussed in the following
subsections, the United States disputes Mexico's assertion that such provisions set out product
characteristics and that they are mandatory regulations.225
7.58 We note that in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body clarified that while a technical regulation
must be applicable to an identifiable product or group of products, this did not mean that the product
or group of products needed to be expressly identified in the document:
"A 'technical regulation' must, of course, be applicable to an identifiable product, or
group of products. Otherwise, enforcement of the regulation will, in practical terms,
be impossible. ... However, in contrast to what the Panel suggested, this does not
mean that a 'technical regulation' must apply to ' given' products which are actually
named, identified or specified in the regulation. Although the TBT Agreement clearly
applies to 'products' generally, nothing in th e text of that Agreement suggests that
those products need be named or otherwise expressly identified in a 'technical
regulation'. Moreover, there may be pe rfectly sound administrative reasons for
formulating a 'technical regulation' in a way that does not expressly identify products
by name, but simply makes them identifiable – for instance, through the
'characteristic' that is the subject of regulation."
226
7.59 We must therefore determine whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions apply to an
identifiable product or group of products.
7.60 As described in Section II.A above, the DPCI A establishes the conditions under which tuna
products may be labelled dolphin-safe. The provision s of the DPCIA relate specifically to two types

224 Mexico's first written submission, para. 196.
225 United States' first written submission, para. 128.
226 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , para. 70. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines ,
paras. 176 and 180.

of goods: "tuna" and "tuna products ". They regulate the "tuna products" containing "tuna" that can
be labelled as dolphin-safe.
227 As noted above, the DPCIA defines "tuna products" in
Section 1385(c)(5) as "food items which contains t una and which has been processed for retail sale,
except perishable sandwiches, salads, or other products with a shelf life of less than 3 days".228
7.61 Section 216.3 of Title 50 of the Code of Fe deral Regulations identifies the definitions
applicable to Section 216, and makes the following cross-reference: "in addition to the definitions
contained in the MMPA and unless the contex t otherwise require, in this part 216 ... 'Tuna product'
means any food product processed for retail sale and intended for human or animal consumption that
contains an item listed in Section 216.24(f)(2)(i) or (ii), but does not include perishable items with a
shelf life of less than 3 days." Pursuant to S ection 216.24(f)(2)(i) and (ii), tuna products are those
products containing one of the listed species of tuna . By virtue of Section 216.3, this definition
applies to the regulations challenged by Mexico, i.e. Title 50, Sections 216.91 and 216.92.
7.62 In light of the above, the Panel agrees with Mexico that the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions apply to an "identifiable" product or gr oup of products, that is, "tuna products", as defined
in the DPCIA and in Section 216.3 of Title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions lay down one or more "characteristics" of
the products
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.63 Mexico argues that the US measures govern the conditions under which a tuna product can be
labelled as "dolphin-safe". According to Mexico, th is requirement is a produc t characteristic of the
tuna product that is laid down by the United States' measures.229
7.64 Mexico observes that the definition of "technical regulation" contained in Annex 1.1
expressly includes "marking or labelling requirements". Mexico also notes that the Appellate Body
has established that "a 'labelling requirement' is a product characteristic". Based on the Appellate
Body's ruling in EC – Asbestos , Mexico submits that "product characteristics" include, not only
features and qualities intrinsic to the product itself, bu t also related "characteristics", such as means of
identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product. Mexico also recalls that the panel in
EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) came to a similar conclusion and
considered that the label on a product is itself a product characteristic.
230
7.65 Mexico further clarifies that in presenting its claims under the TBT Agreement, it has applied
the interpretation of "technical regulation" set out by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos and EC –
Sardines. Mexico recalls that on those occasions, the Appellate Body ruled that the "heart of the
definition" of "technical regulation" under Annex 1. 1 is that a "document" must "lay down" "product

227 Exhibit US-5 and Appendix A of Mexico's first written submission.
228 Exhibit US-5 and Appendix A of Mexico's first written submission. The United States specifies in
its first written submission that tuna products include can ned or pouched tuna, whole frozen tuna, frozen tuna
steaks, frozen tuna filets, tuna loins for canning, tuna in glass jars, tuna burgers, fish balls and fish cakes that
contain tuna, and sushi grade frozen tuna.(United States' first written submission, fn 4). Mexico contends that
the most common form of tuna products is tuna in retail-ready cans or pouches. (Mexico's first written
submission, para. 116).
229 Mexico's first written submission, para. 198.
230 Mexico's first written submission, para. 197.

characteristics".231 Therefore, Mexico's position is that th e measures at issue "relate ... to a labelling
requirement that is a product characteristic".232
7.66 The United States contends that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not set out
product characteristics for tuna products. Instead , they specify the conditions under which tuna
products may be labelled dolphin-safe. Therefor e, although the United States recognizes that the
US dolphin-safe provisions "set out requirements that must be met for tuna to be labeled
dolphin-safe", it submits that the US dolphin-safe provisions do not specify the product characteristics
that tuna products must meet (or not meet) to be sold on the United States' market.
233
7.67 In this context, the United States argues that reading together th e first and the second
sentences of the definition of "technical regul ation" in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement makes it
clear that technical regulations are "documents w ith which compliance is mandatory and that 'lay
down product characteristics or their related process es and production methods' or 'deal exclusively
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method' or both".234
7.68 The United States submits that the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos "appears to mistakenly
have read the second sentence of Annex 1.1 of th e TBT Agreement as providing examples of 'product
characteristics' covered by the first sentence of the definition". Moreover, the United States submits
that the panel in EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) "repeated this same
mistake". According to the United States, the second sentence of the definition of "technical
regulation" does not contain examples of "product char acteristics"; it rather sets out aspects other than
product characteristics that may be the subject of a document with which compliance is mandatory
and thus fall within the definition of a "technical regulation".235
7.69 The United States discusses the relationship betw een the two sentences of Annex 1.1 in light
of the phrase "it may also or exclusively deal with". According to the United States, the word "it" in
this phrase refers back to the word "document" in the first sentence, "such that the document may in
addition or instead deal with asp ects that are not considered pr oduct characteristics such as
terminology or labelling requirement s". Furthermore, the United States claims that the Appellate
Body's interpretation of the second sentence of A nnex 1.1 appears to ignore the word "also".
According to the United States, the use of the word "also" supports the view that the second sentence
is additional to the first. Hence, the United St ates submits that the Appellate Body's approach
"appears not to give full effect to the terms of th e relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement" and,
therefore, should not be followed.236
7.70 The United States notes that the US dolphin-safe provisions "set out the requirements that
must be met for tuna to be labeled dolphin-safe". 237 However, the United States submits that this fact
and the fact that these provisions make it unlawful to sell tuna products that are labelled
"dolphin-safe" without complying with the app licable conditions under the DPCIA labelling scheme,
does not prove that the US dolphin-safe provisions cons titute a technical regulation. According to the
United States, these facts prove "[a]t most… that the U.S. dolphin-safe labelling provisions are

231 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 46, para. 118.
232 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 47, para. 127.
233 United States' first written submission, para. 129.
234 United States' first written submission, para. 126.
235 United States' first written submission, fn 141.
236 United States' first written submission, fn 141; see also, United States' first oral statement, para. 40.
237 United States' first written submission, para. 129, see also United States' second written submission,
para. 96.

'labelling requirements'".
238 It also submits that "the term 'l abelling requirement' should be construed
to have the same meaning in both the definition of a technical regulation and the definition of a
standard".239 Therefore, in the United States' view, the US dolphin-safe provisions "establish labelling
requirements with which compliance is not mandatory".240
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.71 The Panel recalls the definition of a "technical regulation" in Annex 1.1 of the
TBT Agreement, as set out in paragraph 7.50 above. We recall also the Appellate Body's finding that
a document meets the second element of its three-tier test for a "technical regulation" if it "lays down
one or more characteristics of the product". 241 Although this finding was made with reference only to
the core concept of "product characteristics" 242, we understand this second element of the test as
relating more generally to the subject matter of the measure, as defined in Annex 1.1. What we must
ascertain, therefore, in this part of our analysis, is whether the matter addressed in the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions falls within the scope of the su bject matters of a technical regulation, as defined
in Annex 1.1.
7.72 We note in this respect that both sentences of Annex 1.1 provide indications as to the subject
matter, or contents, of technical regulations. The first sentence establishes that a technical regulation
may lay down "product characteristics or their related processes and production methods" (emphasis
added). The second sentence ("It may also deal with …"), further elaborates on the subject-matter of
technical regulations, and enumerates some specific items that technical regulations may also "include
or deal exclusively with". As described by the Appellate Body:
"In addition, according to the definition in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, a
'technical regulation' may set forth the 'applicable administrative provisions' for
products which have certain 'c haracteristics'. Further, we note that the definition of a
'technical regulation' provides that such a regulation 'may also include or deal
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements'. (emphasis added) The use he re of the word 'exclusively' and the
disjunctive word 'or' indicates that a 'technical regulation' may be confined to laying
down only one or a few 'product characteristics'." (emphasis original)243
7.73 From these elements, it is clear, in our view, th at the subject-matter of a technical regulation
may be "confined", as the Appellate Body expressed it, to one of the elements enumerated in the
second sentence, including "labelling requirement s", "as they apply to a product, process or
production method".

238 United States' second written submission, para. 89.
239 United States' second written submission, para. 91.
240 United States' second written submission, para. 96.
241 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176.
242 "The heart of the definition of a 'technical regulation' is that a 'document' must 'lay down' – that is,
set forth, stipulate or provide – 'product characteristics. The word characteristic has a number of synonyms that
are helpful in understanding the ordinary meaning of that word, in this context. Thus, the characteristics of a
product include, in our view, any objectively definable 'feat ures', 'qualities', 'attributes', or other 'distinguishing
mark' of a product. Such 'characteristics' might relate, inter alia, to a product's composition, size, shape, colour,
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity. In the definition of a
technical regulation in Annex 1.1, the TBT Agreement itself gives certain examples of 'product characteristics' –
'terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements'." Appellate Body Report, EC – –
Sardines, para. 189.
243 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.

7.74 In the present case, Mexico and the United Stat es agree that the measures at issue establish
the conditions under which tuna produc ts may be labelled "dolphin-safe". 244 Both parties also
acknowledge that the US dolphin-safe labelling provis ions establish "labelling requirements" within
the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. 245 Moreover, they both consider that the term
"labelling requirements" has the same meaning in the definition of a "technical regulation" and the
definition of a "standard", 246 and that the meaning to be ascribed to the term "labelling requirement"
in this context is that of a set of criteria or conditions that must be met before a label can be used.247
7.75 We note that Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement does not contain a definition of the term
"labelling requirement". However, it provides that the terms used in the TBT Agreement have the
same meaning as the terms defined by the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, except if
otherwise provided in Annex 1. The ISO/IEC Gu ide 2: 1991 defines the term "requirement" as a
"provision that conveys criteria to be fulfilled". 248 The parties' own definition of the term "labelling
requirements" as explained in the previous paragraph is consistent with this definition.
7.76 In the present case, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions define the conditions that must
be met in order to bear a "dolphin-safe" label. In so doing, they "convey criteria to be fulfilled" in
order to qualify for such label. They therefore lay down "labelling requirements" within the meaning
of Annex 1.1. Further, we note that the second sente nce of Annex 1.1 refers to labelling requirements
"as they apply to a product, process or production method". We must therefore also determine
whether the labelling requirements laid down in th e US dolphin-safe labelling provisions apply to "a
product, process or production method".
7.77 In response to a question by the Panel in this respect, Mexico observed that this phrase means
"labelling requirements as they make use of or administer a product, process or production method",
and that if the second sentence is referred to, "t he labelling requirement in the US measures clearly
applies to a "product", namely tuna products"
249. The United States, for its part, considers that the
phrase "they apply to a product, process or production method" clarifies that the second sentence
covers terminology, symbols, packaging, marki ng and labelling requirements as they apply to a
product, process or production method", and that th e words "as they apply to" may be understood as
meaning terminology, symbols, packaging and marking requirements that "refer to, concern or relate
to a product, process or production method". In this dispute, the United States considers that its
dolphin-safe labelling provisions "concern both a product – tuna products – and a production
method".
250
7.78 We agree with the United States' characterizati on of the terms "as they apply to" as meaning
that the labelling requirements and other elements listed in the second sentence must relate to and
concern "a product, process or production method". We also note that there is no disagreement
among the parties that the labelling requirement s laid down in the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions "apply to" a product, namely tuna products. We agree with this determination. We are

244 Mexico's first written submission, para. 198; Mexico's second written submission, para. 1;
United States' first written submission, para. 129; United States' second written submission, para. 89.
245 The United States also considers, however, that , these labelling requirements are not "mandatory"
within the meaning of Annex 1.1 and thus do not fall with in the scope of this provision. This question is
considered separately in the next section.
246 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 48, para . 128; United States' second written submission,
para. 91.
247 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 48, para . 131; United States' second written submission,
para. 91.
248 See also para. 7.5 of ISO/IEC 2004 Guide 2, eight edition.
249 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 119, para. 86.
250 United States' response to Panel question No. 119, para. 43.

therefore satisfied that the measu res at issue lay down labelling re quirements, as they apply to a
product, process or production met hod and that the subject-matter of the measures therefore falls
within the scope of the second sentence of Annex 1.1.
7.79 We do not find it necessary to consider in additio n whether the labelling requirements in the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions also fall within the scope of the firs t sentence as "product
characteristics or related production or processing methods", since, as the Appellate Body has
observed, the terms of the second sentence make it clear that the subject-matter of a technical
regulation may be confined to one of the items enumerated in the second sentence.
251
(c) Whether compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions is "mandatory" within the
meaning of Annex 1.1
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.80 Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provisions constitute a mandatory regulation. 252
According to Mexico, the statutory and regulator y provisions that make up the dolphin-safe labelling
provisions, as interpreted by a court decision, cont ain mandatory language that specifies that it is
unlawful to include on the label of any tuna produc t offered for sale in the United States the term
"dolphin-safe" or any analogous term or symbol if the product contains tuna harvested in the ETP by a
large purse-seine vessel using a purse-seine net inte ntionally deployed on or to encircle dolphins. 253
Mexico argues that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions involve a prohibition on the use of the
"dolphin-safe" label, or the use of similar terms or symbols, on Mexican tuna products marketed in
the United States, and that this prohibition remains if force even when the international standards of
the AIDCP are met.
254 Thus, in Mexico's view, the DPCIA labelling requirements are imposed in a
negative form, i.e. the United States' measure requi re that "[t]una products offered for sale in the
United States must not possess certain characteristics ( i.e., distinguishing marks – the dolphin-safe
label or any other analogous label or mark) unless the prescribed requirements are met".255
7.81 According to Mexico, the mandatory language of the US dolphin-safe provisions is found in
the provisions that specify that it is unlawful to include on the label of any tuna product offered for
sale in the United States the term "dolphin-safe" or any analogous term or symbol if the product
contains tuna harvested in the ETP by a large pur se-seine vessel using a purse-seine net intentionally
deployed on or to encircle dolphins.256
7.82 Mexico clarifies that what makes the United Stat es' measures in this dispute mandatory is not
whether a label is de jure required in order to sell tuna products in the US market, but that the
measures restrict retailers, consumers and producers to a single choice for labelling tuna products as
dolphin-safe. According to Mexico, by virtue of the US dolphin-safe provisions it is not possible to
label tuna products as dolphin-safe under more than one standard.257

251 We note in this respect that the Appellate Body has also determined that "labelling requirements", as
well as other items described in the second sentence of Annex 1.1, constitute "product characteristics" within the
meaning of the first sentence.
252 Mexico's first written submission, para. 200; Mexico's second written submission, paras. 192-199.
253 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 46, para. 120.
254 Mexico's first written submission, para. 200; Mexico's first oral statement, paras. 3, 5, 23; Mexico's
second written submission, para. 195.
255 Mexico's first written submission, para. 202; Mexico's second written submission, para. 195.
256 Mexico's second written submission, para. 194; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 46,
para. 120.
257 Mexico's second written submission, para. 196.

7.83 Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provisi ons exclusively allow the application of the
dolphin-safe label on tuna products when certain requirements established by those provisions are
met. Therefore, "compliance with those requirements is the only way to be ab le to use a dolphin-safe
label". In Mexico's view, "there are no altern ative means to certify that a tuna product is
dolphin-safe". According to Mexico "[t]he fact th at the U.S. measures prohibit the utilization of any
other standards to certify that a tuna pr oduct is dolphin-safe gives these measures a de jure mandatory
distinction".258
7.84 Mexico adds that the mandatory language of the US dolphin-safe provisions is also found in
the enforcement provisions of the DPCIA. 259 Mexico contends that additional support for the
argument that the United States' measures are de jure mandatory is the fact that these measures
establish surveillance and enforcement procedures if an importer tries to import tuna products bearing
the dolphin-safe label when such products do not m eet the requirements set out in US dolphin-safe
provisions.260Alternatively, Mexico argues that even if th e labelling scheme were not to be considered
a priori mandatory, it is de facto mandatory because the market conditions in the United States are
such that it is impossible to effectively market and sell tuna products without a dolphin-safe
designation.261
7.85 On this basis, Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provisions satisfy the third condition
recognized by the Appellate Body for a technical regulation to be considered as such.262
7.86 According to Mexico, the application of a dolphi n-safe label to tuna products has "significant
commercial value" in the US mark et "given that consumers at each consumption stage demand this
label in order to sell or buy tuna products".263
7.87 Mexico argues that the measures have a direct adverse effect on tuna products imported and
sold in the US market, as US distribution and reta il networks for tuna products are acutely aware of
the dolphin safe issue and the fact that they will encounter actions such as boycotts, promoted by
certain economically interested NGOs, if they carry tuna that is not designated as dolphin safe.
Mexico argues that large US grocery chains have indicated that they will be unable to carry any
Mexican tuna products unless the tuna products b ear a US government approved dolphin safe label.264
Mexico also identifies indirect adverse effects on tuna caught by the Mexican tuna fleet.265
7.88 Mexico acknowledges that the United States' argument that carrying the dolphin-safe label is
voluntary and that it is legal to sell tuna products in the United States that do not bear this label, "may
be correct" from a de jure perspective. However, Mexico submits that, from a de facto perspective,
the label is essential if the tuna products are to be sold in the principal distribution channels in the
US market.266
7.89 Thus, Mexico claims, the US dolphin-safe provisions have "the effect of excluding Mexican
tuna products from the major distribution channels in the U.S. market and creating new barriers to

258 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 141-142.
259 Mexico's second written submission, para. 194.
260 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 143.
261 Mexico's first written submission, para. 203; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 147.
262 Mexico's first written submission, para. 202.
263 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 148.
264 Mexico's first written submission, para. 111.
265 Mexico indicates that the owners of the three majo r processed tuna brands sold in the United States
"refuse to purchase tuna caught in the ETP including Mexi can tuna because tuna products containing such tuna
cannot be labeled as dolphin-safe". Mexico's first written submission, para. 112.
266 Mexico's second written submission, para. 195.

trade". Therefore, Mexico argues that "com pliance with the requirements imposed by the
United States becomes mandatory for the Mexican tuna industry in order to access the U.S.
market".
267
7.90 Mexico further submits that the situation in this dispute is very similar to that addressed by
the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines . Mexico recalls that on that occasion, the challenged measure
provided that only products prepared from Sardina pilchardus could be marketed as preserved
sardines.268 Mexico argues that "[m]uch like the European measures in Sardines, the U.S. measures
provide that the only products that can have the te rm dolphin-safe or a similar term or symbol are
those that meet the U.S. legal provisions".269
7.91 The United States responds that the US dolphin-safe provisions are not mandatory. Instead,
the United States argues, they constitute a voluntary labelling measure not covered by the definition
of a "technical regulation" set out in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. 270 According to the
United States, the US dolphin-safe provisions do not require tuna prod ucts to be labelled
"dolphin-safe".271
7.92 In the US view, a document dealing with la belling requirements with which compliance is
mandatory is one that has the effect of prescribing or imposing labelling requirements affirmatively or
by negative implication. 272 In other words, "a labelling scheme would be mandatory if the labelling
scheme – or some other government action – pr ohibited products from being sold, imported,
distributed or otherwise marketed that were not labeled in that way". 273 Accordingly, the
United States submits that the US dolphin-saf e provisions do not prescribe or impose labelling
requirements because they do not require tuna products to be labelled or to contain certain information
on a label to be sold, imported, distributed or otherwise marketed. 274
7.93 The United States acknowledges that the US dol phin-safe provisions require that the label
may be used only for tuna products containing tuna that was not caught during a trip in which purse-
seine nets were deployed on or to encircle dolphins and in a set in which no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured. However, according to the Un ited States, a voluntary labelling measure does not
become a mandatory labelling requirement "simply because the measure requires what is stated on the
label to be truthful".275
7.94 The United States further submits that in its view , "inherent in the idea of a standard is that
there are certain conditions to be met in order to meet the standard". 276 In the United States' view, if
marketers of products were permitted to claim in a label that their pr oducts conformed to a particular
standard when those products did not meet the conditions to be labelled in that way, the utility of that
standard would be lost. 277 The requirement to meet these conditions does not result in the standard
becoming mandatory or a technical regulation. According to the United States, arguing otherwise

267 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 149.
268 Mexico's second written submission, para. 196.
269 Mexico's second written submission, para. 198.
270 United States' first written submission, para. 130.
271 United States' first oral statement, para. 40; United States' second written submission, paras. 88-95.
272 United States' first written submission, para. 131.
273 United States' response to Panel question No. 52, para. 125; United States' second written
submission, para. 88.
274 United States' first written submission, para. 132; United States' response to Panel question No. 52,
275 United States' first written submission, para. 134.
276 United States' first written submission, para. 135.
277 United States' first oral statement, para. 44.

would turn all labelling standards into technical regulations and render the definition of standard
inutile, because there would be no labelling requirement with which compliance could be considered
not mandatory.278
7.95 In the United States' view, Mexico's position "conflates the meaning of the term 'labelling
requirement' with the phrase 'with which compliance is mandatory'". 279 According to the
United States, "[w[hether compliance with a labe lling requirement is mandatory must turn on
something more than the mere fact that the labelling requirement sets out conditions under which
products may (or may not) be labelled in a certain way". 280 Therefore, the United States submits that
an approach that gives full effect and meaning to the term "labelling requirement" and the phrase
"with which compliance is mandatory" defines the term "labelling requirement" with which
compliance is mandatory as "a measure that est ablishes conditions under which a product may be
labelled in a certain way and requires the product to be labelled in that way in order to be marketed"
(emphasis in the original).281
7.96 In relation to Mexico's alternative claim that the DPCIA labelling requirements are de facto
mandatory, the United States submits two arguments. First, according to the United States, whether
compliance with a labelling requirement is mandato ry depends on whether some government action
makes compliance mandatory. 282 The United States contends that Mexico's argument that the
US dolphin-safe provisions have prevented Mexican tuna products from accessing the United States'
market is not based on these provisions or on any ot her measure or government action, but on retailer
and consumer preferences for tuna products that were not caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins.283 According to the United States, "consumer or retailer preferences alone cannot determine
whether a labelling requirement is mandatory". 284 Second, the United States argues that the fact that
some distribution channels in the United States do purchase and sell tuna products that are not
labelled "dolphin-safe" demonstrates that the DPCIA labelling provisions are not mandatory.
285
7.97 Consequently, the United States also reject s Mexico's alternative argument that the
US dolphin-safe provisions are de facto mandatory because major distribution channels for tuna
products would only purchase and sell dolphin-safe labelled tuna products.286
7.98 The United States also submits that the US dolphin-safe provisions are not like the measures
in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines . According to the United States, compliance with those
measures was mandatory because the products that did not possess the product characteristics set out
in the measures challenged in those cases, could not be sold in the territory of the European Union. 287
The United States emphasizes that under the US dolphin-safe provisions it is not prohibited to sell
tuna products that fail to m eet the DPCIA labelling conditions. 288 Furthermore, the United States

278 United States' first written submission, para. 135, United States' first oral statement, para. 42;
United States' response to Panel question No. 52, para. 125; United States' response to Panel question No. 56,
para. 128.
279 United States' second written submission, paras. 90 and 98.
280 United States' second written submission, para. 92.
281 United States' second written submission, paras. 93.
282 United States' second written submission, paras. 108-09.
283 United States' second written submission, para. 110; United States' response to Panel question
No. 52, para. 127.
284 United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 130.
285 United States' second written submission, para. 113; United States' response to Panel question
No. 57, para. 130.
286 United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 130.
287 United States' second written submission, para. 104.
288 United States' second written submission, para. 103.

submits that a further distinguishing factor is that the US dolphin-safe provisions do not prevent
marketers of tuna products from marketing them as tuna products.
289 Finally, the United States
observes that in the earlier disputes, the Appella te Body did not address the issue of mandatory
compliance with a labelling requirement.290
7.99 Accordingly, the United States concludes that compliance with the DPCIA labelling
provisions is not mandatory within the m eaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. 291 T h u s , t h e
United States submits, such provisions are not techni cal regulations and cannot be inconsistent with
the obligations set out in Article 2 of the TBT Agreement.292
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.100 As described in paragraph 7.53 above, the A ppellate Body has determined that the third
condition for a document to be considered a "technical regulation" is that compliance with the product
characteristics laid down in the document is "mandatory". 293 We must therefore now determine
whether compliance with the labelling requirement s established by the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions is "mandatory", as claimed by Mexico, or whether, as the United States argues, they
constitute "voluntary" labelling requirements.
7.101 To make this determination, we must first c onsider the meaning to be given to the term
"mandatory" in Annex 1.1.
Interpretation of the term "mandatory" in Annex 1.1
7.102 To recall, Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as a:
"Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory . It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method." (emphasis added)
7.103 We first note that dictionary definitions of th e term "mandatory" include "binding" as well as
"obligatory, compulsory, not discretionary"
294, or "required by law or mandate; compulsory". 295 This
suggests that the notion of "mandatory" may enco mpass the legally binding and enforceable character
of the instrument, and may also relate to its c ontents, prescribing/imposing a certain behaviour. We
also note that the ISO/IEC Guide 2 establishes th at the expression "mandatory requirement", should
be used to mean only "a requirement made compulsory by law or regulation".296

289 United States' second written submission, para. 104.
290 United States' second written submission, para. 105.
291 United States' first oral statement, para. 45.
292 United States' first written submission, para. 138.
293 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 66-70; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines ,
para. 176.
294 (OED online)
295 Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th ed.), p. 865.
296 We also note the following definitions in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:
"exclusive reference (to standards)": "r eference to standards that states that the only way to meet the
relevant requirements of a technical regulation is to comply with the standards referred to" (emphasis added).
"mandatory standard": "standard the application of which is made compulsory by virtue of a general
law or exclusive reference in a regulation".

7.104 In Annex 1.1, the term "mandatory" app ears in the phrase "with which compliance is
mandatory". In interpreting this expression, the Pa nel finds useful guidance in the following passage
of the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Asbestos:
"The definition of a technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement also
states that 'compliance' with the 'product characteristics' laid down in the 'document'
must be 'mandatory'. A 'technical regulation' must, in other words, regulate the
'characteristics' of products in a binding or compulsory fashion. It follows that, with
respect to products, a 'technical regulation' has the effect of prescribing or imposing
one or more 'characteristics' – 'features', 'qualities', 'attributes', or other 'distinguishing
mark'." (italics in the original, underlining added)
7.105 In this and subsequent cases, the Appellate Body further clarified that the product
characteristics laid down in a technical regulation may "be prescribed or imposed … in either a
positive or a negative form", which means that, for instance, "the document may require, positively,
that products must possess certain 'characteristics ', or the document may require, negatively, that
products must not possess certain 'characteristics'".297
7.106 As we understand it therefore, and as interpre ted by the Appellate Body, the notion of
"mandatory" "compliance" in Annex 1.1 relates both to the "binding" character of the instrument and
the fact that it prescribes certain characteristics or other features that the product must or must not
possess.
7.107 Taking the terms of Annex 1.1 in their context, we also note that the subject-matter of a
"technical regulation" and the subject-matter of a "s tandard" are defined in ve ry similar terms, and it
is essentially their "not mandatory" or "mandatory" character that distinguishes the two categories of
instruments. For instance, labelling requirements may be equally prescribed by technical regulations
and standards. 298 However, while technical regulations may prescribe such requirements in a
compulsory fashion, standards woul d only do so on a "not mandatory" basis. This difference is
expressed by the words "with which compliance is mandatory" in the definition of a "technical
regulation" in Annex 1.1 and the opposite language, i.e. "with which compliance is not mandatory"
(emphasis added), in the definition of a "standard" in Annex 1.2.
7.108 The Explanatory Note to Annex 1.2 further emphasizes that "[f]or the purpose of this
Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents"
(emphasis added). This Explanatory Note clarifie s the drafters' intention to make a distinction
between the definition of "standard" in the TBT Agreement and that contained in the ISO/IEC Guide
2, according to which standards may be voluntary or mandatory. The use of the term "voluntary" in
the Explanatory Note also sugg ests that the expression "not mandatory" in Annex 1.2 may be
understood as meaning in essence "voluntary". By implication therefore, a document that sets out
"voluntary" requirements would also not be consid ered to be "mandatory" within the meaning of
Annex 1.1.
299 Our interpretation of the term "mandatory" in Annex 1.1 should be duly informed by
this context.

297 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 69; see also Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines,
para. 176.
298 The Panel notes that according to the definitions provided by Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement,
"product characteristics", "related processes and production methods", "terminology", "symbols", "packaging",
"marking" and "labelling requirements" may be the subject of either technical regulations or standards.
299 We note that the reference to "mandatory" comp liance is not repeated in the second sentence of
Annex 1.1. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that this requirement applies to all instruments that would constitute
"technical regulations". As we understand it, the second sentence merely clarifies that the specific elements

7.109 Against this context, the Panel is mindful of the fact that the term "mandatory" expresses the
single characteristic that defines the key conceptu al distinction between two of the three types of
measures covered under the TBT Agreement (technical regulations and standards) and therefore plays
a central role in preserving the balance between the different sub-regimes coexisting within that
Agreement.
7.110 We also bear in mind the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement. This Agreement
establishes, in the words of the Appellate Body, "a specialized legal regime" that aims at furthering
the objectives of the GATT 1994.
300 This specialized set of provisi ons is intended to discipline very
specific categories of measures 301, namely, technical regulations , standards and conformity
assessment procedures . The TBT Agreement establishes clear thresholds that define the type of
measures that fall within the scope of each of these three categories of measures, and attach different
types and levels of obligations to each one. These thresholds are embodied by the definitions of
"technical regulation", "standard" and "conformity assessment procedure" contained in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.111 In sum, we consider that co mpliance with product characteris tics or their related production
methods or processes is "mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1, if the document in which they
are contained has the effect of regulating in a legally binding or compulsory fashion the characteristics
at issue, and if it thus prescribes or imposes in a binding or compulsory fashion that certain product
must or must not possess certain characteristics, terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labels
or that it must or must not be produced by using certain processes and production methods. By
contrast, compliance with the characteristics or othe r features laid out in the document would not be
"mandatory" if compliance with them was discretionary or "voluntary".
7.112 In light of these general observations, we now consider whether the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions impose or prescribe product characteristics, or more specifically, in this case, labelling
requirements, in a binding or compulsory fash ion, such that compliance with these should be
considered to be "mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1. In approaching this determination,
we also take note of the Appellate Body's observation, in EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines, that when
examining whether a measure is a technical regulation, "the proper legal character of the measure at
issue cannot be determined unless the measure is examined as a whole".
302
Whether the US dolphin-safe provisions are "mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1
7.113 Mexico submits two alternative arguments on this point. First, Mexico submits that the
US dolphin-safe provisions de jure establish mandatory labelling requirements. Alternatively, Mexico
asks the Panel to decide that, even if the US dolphin-safe provisions do not on their face require
certain product characteristics, they do so in a de facto manner. We will therefore consider these two

listed in it may form the subject-matter of a technical regulation, but is not intended to imply that a document
laying down such elements, with which compliance would not be mandatory, would be a technical regulation.
Indeed, such a reading would render meaningless the corresponding text in Annex 1.2. To the extent that there
is any ambiguity in this respect from the structure of An nex 1.1, the clear terms of the Explanatory Note resolve
it by clarifying that a technical regulation is defined as a mandatory document. This explanation applies to the
entirety of the definition of a technical regulation and provides direct guidance as well as context to the
interpretation of the terms of Annex 1.1.
300 See second paragraph of the Preamble of the TBT Agreement.
301 We find support for our understanding in the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Asbestos, it
concluded that "although the TBT Agreement is intended to 'further the obj ectives of GATT 1994', it does so
through a specialized legal regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures", para. 80.
302 Appellate Body Reports in EC – Asbestos, para. 64, and EC – Sardines, paras. 192-193.

aspects in turn, without prejudice, at this stag e of our analysis, to the question of whether de facto
"mandatory" compliance is covered by Annex 1.1.
7.114 At the outset, we find it useful to clarify the scope of our enquiry into whether the measures
establish de jure mandatory labelling requirements. In our view, compliance would be de jure
"mandatory" in a situation in which the mandatory character of the provisions would be discernable
from an examination of the terms or structure of the measures themselves. 303 In order to determine
whether the United States' measures de jure establish labelling requireme nts for tuna products, we
therefore need to determine whether the allege d mandatory character of the dolphin-safe labelling
requirements can be derived from the terms of the US dolphin-safe provisions themselves.
7.115 In approaching this question, we first recall our conclusion under the previous subsection that,
as acknowledged by both parties, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions lay down labelling
requirements within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TB T Agreement. The particular nature and
functioning of this type of instrument should, in our view, inform our understanding of what
"mandatory" compliance within the meaning of Annex 1.1 implies in relation to such requirements.
7.116 By hypothesis, both technical regulations and standards laying down "labelling requirements"
would establish the conditions that a product must comp ly with before being able to carry a certain

303 We are guided in this determination by certain rulings concerning the de facto vs. de jure distinction
in other contexts. We thus find the following passage of the Appellate Body's decision in Canada – Aircraft
very illustrative:

"Article 3.1(a) prohibits any subsidy that is contingent upon export performance, whether that
subsidy is contingent 'in law or in fact'. The Uruguay Round negotiators have, through the
prohibition against export subsidies that are contingent in fact upon export performance,
sought to prevent circumvention of the prohibition against subsidies contingent in law upon
export performance. In our view, the legal standard expressed by the word 'contingent' is the
same for both de jure or de facto contingency. There is a difference, however, in what
evidence may be employed to prove that a subsidy is export contingent. De jure export
contingency is demonstrated on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or
other legal instrument" (italics in the original, underlined added).Appellate Body Report,
Canada – Aircraft, para. 167.

Similarly, in Canada – Autos, the Appellate Body considered that:

"We start with what we have held previously. In our view, a subsidy is contingent 'in law'
upon export performance when the existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the
basis of the very words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument
constituting the measure. The simplest, and hence, perhaps, the uncommon, case is one in
which the condition of exportation is set out expr essly, in so many words, on the face of the
law, regulation or other legal instrument. We believe, however, that a subsidy is also properly
held to be de jure export contingent where the condition to export is clearly, though implicitly,
in the instrument comprising the measure. Thus, for a subsidy to be de jure export contingent,
the underlying legal instrument does not always have to provide expressis verbis that the
subsidy is available only upon fulfillment of the condition of export performance. Such
conditionality can also be derive d by necessary implication from the words actually used in
the measure." Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 100.

We note that these two determinations by the Appellate Body were made in relation to provisions
contained in a different agreement, i.e. the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. However, we
consider that they nonetheless provi de useful guidance, because it seems to us that the Appellate Body's
reasoning is not determined by the text of the partic ular provisions involved, but rather by the inherent
differences between a de jure and a de facto analysis.

label. However, as also recognized by both pa rties, this characteristic, which is common to
mandatory and voluntary labelling requirements, doe s not in itself make compliance with a labelling
requirement "mandatory" or "not mandatory".
304 The definitions described above make clear a basic
distinction between a "requirement", which refers to the conditions or criteria to be fulfilled in order
to comply with a document, and the notion of "mandatory" requirement as a condition made
compulsory by law.
7.117 Thus, a conclusion that compliance with certain labelling requirements is mandatory within
the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement must be based on considerations other than, or
beyond, the mere fact that such document establish es criteria for the use of a certain label. As
determined in paragraph 7.111 above, compliance with product ch aracteristics or their related
production methods or processes is "m andatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1, if the document in
which they are contained has the effect of regulatin g in a legally binding or compulsory fashion the
characteristics at issue, and if it thus prescribes or imposes in a binding or compulsory fashion that
certain product must or must not possess certain characteristics, terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labels or that it must or must not be produced by using certain processes and production
methods. In the context of a labelling requirement, therefore, the question we must consider is not
only whether the document lays down certain conditions for the use of a label, or prescribes a certain
content for a given label, but whether the document at issue regulates in a binding fashion these
conditions or content.
7.118 In the present dispute, Mexico does not a llege that the US dolphin-safe provisions positively
require, de jure, the use of the dolphin-safe label. Indeed, it is undisputed that the measures at issue
do not impose a positive requirement to label tuna pr oducts for sale on the US market as dolphin-safe.
Neither the statutory and regulatory provisions nor the court decision challenged by Mexico
305 contain
language that imposes the use of the dolphin-safe label for tuna products as a condition for these
products to be marketed in the United States.
7.119 Mexico argues, however, that these measures negatively require that "tuna products offered
for sale in the United States must not possess certa in characteristics" unless certain conditions are
met.306 Specifically, Mexico submits that the measures at issue involve a prohibition on the use of a
"dolphin-safe" label on Mexican tuna products marketed in the United States. 307 In Mexico's view,
this prohibition may be expressed as a requirement that "[t]una products offered for sale in the
United States must not possess certain characteristics ( i.e., distinguishing marks – the dolphin-safe
label or any other analogous label or mark) unless the prescribed requirements are met".308
7.120 Mexico further submits that "there are no altern ative means to certify that a tuna product is
dolphin-safe". According to Mexico "[t]he fact th at the U.S. measures prohibit the utilization of any
other standards to certify that a tuna pr oduct is dolphin-safe gives these measures a de jure mandatory
distinction".309
7.121 We find it necessary to consider in the first inst ance the terms of the measures, in order to
determine whether they support the view that they prescribe the labelling requirements at issue "in a
compulsory manner".

304 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 48, para . 131; United States' second written submission,
para. 91.
305 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 121-36.
306 Mexico's first written submission, para. 202.
307 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 23; Mexico's first written submission, para. 200.
308 Mexico's first written submission, para. 202.
309 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 141-142; Mexico's second written submission,
para. 196.

7.122 The introductory paragraph of subsection (d )(1) of the Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act, Title 16, Section 1385, establishes the following:
"(d) LABELLING STANDARD
(1) It is a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(15 U.S.C. 45) for any producer, importer, exporter, distributor, or seller of any tuna
product that is exported from or offered for sale in the United States to include on the
label of that product the term 'dolphin-safe' or any other term or symbol that falsely
claims or suggests that the tuna contai ned in the product were harvested using a
method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins if the product contains tuna
harvested …" (emphasis added)
7.123 The fishing techniques in connection with sp ecific geographical areas that do not qualify for
the use of a dolphin-safe designation on the product label are then described in various subparagraphs.
7.124 We understand this provision as establishing require ments in relation to the terms that may be
used "on the label of [any tuna product that is expor ted from or offered for sale in the United States]".
Specifically, it sets out the conditions for the use of a dolphin-safe designation on such labels:
producers may only identify tuna as "dolphin-safe", or more generally represent that their tuna has
been caught in conditions that are not harmful to dol phins, if they comply with the conditions set out
in subsection (d). In other words, in order for tuna products to be "exported from or offered for sale in
the United States" with a dolphin-safe designation, they need to comply with the requirements set out
in subsection (d) of the DPCIA.
7.125 In addition, Section 1385 (d)(3) of the DPCIA provides as follows:
"(A) The Secretary of Commerce shall devel op an official mark that may be used
to label tuna products as dolphin-safe in accordance with this Act.
(B) A tuna product that bears the dolphin-safe mark developed under
subparagraph (A) shall not bear any other label or mark that refers to dolphins,
porpoises, or marine mammals.
(C) It is a violation of section 45 of title 15 to label a tuna product with any label
or mark that refers to dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals other than the mark
developed under subparagraph (A) unless ..." (emphasis added).
7.126 This provision therefore further defines the c onditions under which reference may be made to
certain terms, i.e. "dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals", on a label for tuna products.
7.127 We also note that violations of these provisions are subject to specific enforcement measures.
Section 1385 (e) of the DPCIA, entitled "enforcem ent", reads: "Any person who knowingly and
wilfully makes a statement or endorsement described in subsection (d)(2)(B) that is false is liable for a
civil penalty of not to exceed $ 100, 000 assessed in an action brought in any appropriate district court
of the United States on behalf of the Secretary."
7.128 Together, the provisions at issue therefore regul ate the use of the term "dolphin-safe" and of
other related terms on labels for t una products offered for sale on the US market. They do so in a
binding and exclusive manner. The provisions at i ssue imply in particular that there is no possibility
for competing or alternative definitions of what is "dolphin-safe" on the US market, or for any claims
to be made relating to "dolphins, porpoises or marine animals", except in compliance with the criteria
set out in the measures.

7.129 We recall in this respect the Appellate Body's determination that a document laying down
product characteristics is "mandatory" when it "r egulates" these character istics "in a binding and
compulsory fashion", and "have the effect of prescr ibing or imposing" the product characteristics at
issue, either in a positive or in a negative fashi on. We bear in mind also the Appellate Body's
determination that "labelling requirements" constitute "product characteristics" in this context.
7.130 In the present case, the question to be addr essed is therefore whether the US measures
"regulate" the labelling requirements at issue "in a binding or compulsory fashion", and whether they
"have the effect of prescribing or imposing" the labe lling requirements at issue, either in a positive or
in a negative fashion.
7.131 In our view, to the extent that they prescribe, in a binding and legally enforceable instrument,
the manner in which a dolphin-safe label can be obt ained in the United States, and disallow any other
use of a dolphin-safe designation, the US tuna labelling measures "regulate" dolphin-safe labelling
requirements "in a binding or compulsory fashion". It is not compulsory to meet these requirements
and to bear the label, in order to sell tuna on the US market. The US measures therefore do not
impose any requirement to label, in a "positive" manner. However, they do prescribe and impose the
conditions under which a product may be labelled dolphin-safe. In particular, the measures prescribe
"in a negative form", to use the Appellate Body's terms, that no tuna product may be labelled
dolphin-safe or otherwise refer to dolphins, porpois es or marine mammals if it does not meet the
conditions set out in the measures, and thus impose a prohibition on the offering for sale in the
United States of tuna products bearing a label refe rring to dolphins and not meeting the requirements
that they set out.
7.132 We see a difference, in this respect, between the fact that compliance with the underlying
standard that provides access to the label (i.e. the use of certain fishing methods to harvest tuna) is not
obligatory, and the fact that the measures prescrib e in a binding manner the conditions for the use of
certain terms on labels for tuna products, on the basis of complian ce or absence of compliance with
that underlying standard.
7.133 In order to be marketed as dolphin-safe tuna, tuna products must be prepared exclusively from
fish caught in the specific conditions laid down in the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. Tuna
products containing tuna caught in a manner not comp lying with the specific conditions identified in
the regulation are, by virtue of the measures at issue, prohibited from being identified and marketed
under an appellation including the term "dolphin-safe" or other related designations.
7.134 We note that this situation bears a close rese mblance to that addressed by the Appellate Body
in EC – Sardines . The measure at issue in that case was an EC regulation on "preserved sardines",
which set out a number of prescriptions for the sale of such sardines, including the requirement that
they contain only one named species of sardines ( sardina pilchardus ), to the exclusion of others
(including sardinops sagax). In that case, as explained by the European Communities and expressly
noted by the Appellate Body, "the only legal c onsequence of the [EC] Regulation for preserved
sardinops sagax
 is that they may not be labeled 'preserved sardines'". 310 In other words, it was legally
possible to sell sardinops sagax on the EC market, as long as it was not sold under the appellation
"preserved sardines".
7.135 In that case, the Appellate Body observed th at "preserved products made, for example, of
sardinops sagax are, by virtue of the EC Regulation, prohibited from being identified and marketed
under an appellation including the term "sardines" (emphasis in original). 311 The Appellate Body

310 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 185.
311 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 184.

further observed that "Article 2 of the EC Regul ation provides that, to be marketed as "preserved
sardines", products must be prepared exclusively from fish of the species Sardina pilchardus ", and
determined that this requirement was a "product characteristic" intrinsic to preserved sardines that was
laid down in the EC Regulation. The Appellate Body then turned to the fact that compliance with the
Regulation was "mandatory" to conclude, overall, that it was a "technical regulation".
7.136 Similarly, the panel in EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) , in a
finding that was not appealed, determined that:
"The second indent of Article 12(2) makes a distinction between those products using
a GI identical to a Community protected name that satisfy the labelling requirement,
and those which do not. The negative implica tion that follows from this requirement
is that products with a GI identical to a Community protected name that do not satisfy
this labelling requirement must not use the indications PDO, PGI or equivalent
national indications and, to the extent that they fall within the protection granted to a
prior identical Community protected name, must not be marketed in the European
Communities using that GI. Therefore, the second indent of Article 12(2) is an
obligatory or mandatory requirement".
312
7.137 These rulings clearly suggest that the mere fact that it is legally permissible to place the
product on the market without using the designation that is regulated by the measures at issue does not
compel the conclusion that these measures are not "mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1,
where the measures effectively regulate in a binding ma nner the use of the appellation. Similarly, in
the present case, the legal consequence of the measures for tuna products not meeting the
requirements of the regulation is that they may not be labelled dolphin-safe. This implies that such
products are prohibited from being identified and marketed under this appellation.
7.138 We also note in this respect that, although the EC "preserved sardines" Regulation set out a
"naming" requirement rather than "labelling requi rements", the Appellate Body commented that it
effectively saw no difference between the tw o notions, both being "essentially "means of
identification" of a product" coming within the scope of the definition of "technical regulation". This
suggests that this is not a distinguishing factor in the analysis, that would modify its conclusions.
7.139 We also note the emphasis placed by the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines , on the role of
such measures in providing consumer information. 313 Similarly in the present case, the measures
serve the function of informing consumers about the manner in which the tuna was caught. They
regulate in a binding fashion the information that may be conveyed in this respect, as well as the
manner in which it may be conveyed.
7.140 Our consideration of these prior rulings thus c onfirms further our view that compliance with
the labelling requirements laid out in the US dolphi n-safe labelling provisions is "mandatory" within
the meaning of Annex 1.1.
7.141 In making this determination, we are mindful , as discussed in paragraph 7.109 above, that a
proper interpretation of the expr ession "mandatory" compliance in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement
must preserve the conceptual and functional distinc tion between technical regul ations and standards.

312 Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.456.
313 The Appellate Body noted that the European Communities itself underscores the important role that
a "name" plays as a "means of identification" when it argued before the Panel that one of the objectives pursued
by the European Communities through the EC Regulation is to provide precise information to avoid misleading
the consumer. Appellate Body Report, EC– Sardines, para. 191.

In this respect, we find it useful to hi ghlight that we are not suggesting that any situation in which
access to a label reflecting compliance with a particular standard is reserved for products that comply
with the specific requirements of that standard would amount to a situation in which a mandatory
technical regulation exists. In our view, the me asures at issue in the present case go significantly
beyond that.
7.142 First, the measures at issue are legally enforceab le and binding under US law (they are issued
by the government and include legal sanctions). Th is is an important component of the "mandatory"
character of the measures. This alone, however , might not necessarily distinguish them from any
standard that is protected against abusive or mi sleading use under general law, such as trademark
protection or laws against deceptive practices.
7.143 In addition, however, the measures at issue pr escribe certain requirements that must be
complied with in order to make any claim relating to the manner in wh ich the tuna contained in tuna
product was caught, in relation to dolphins. The m easures at issue regulate not only the use of the
particular label at issue, but more broadly the use of a range of terms for the offering for sale of tuna
products, beyond even the specific "dolphin-safe" appellation. The measures at issue thus prohibit the
use of other terms such as "porpoise" or "mar ine mammal" or any statement relating to dolphins,
porpoises or marine animals, whether misleading or otherwise, if the conditions set out in the
regulation are not met.
7.144 Furthermore, the measures embody compliance wi th a specific standard as the exclusive
means of asserting a "dolphin-safe" status for tuna products. The measures leave no discretion to
resort to any other standard to inform consumers ab out the "dolphin-safety" of tuna than to meet the
specific requirements of the measure. Effectively, the "dolphin-safe" sta ndard reflected in the
measures at issue is, by virtue of these measures, the only standard available to address the issue.
Through access to the label, the measures thus effectively regulate the "dolphin-safe" status of tuna
products in a binding and exclusive manner and prescribe, both in a positive and in a negative manner,
the requirements for "dolphin-safe" claims to be ma de. This distinguishes this situation from one in
which, for example, various competing standards ma y co-exist in relation to the same issue, with
different but related claims, each of which may be protected in its own right.
314
7.145 In light of all the above, we find that the me asures at issue establish labelling requirements,
compliance with which is mandatory. In light of our conclusion that the measures at issue establish
de jure mandatory labelling requirements, we do not fi nd it necessary to consider further Mexico's
argument that they are also de facto mandatory.
Separate opinion
7.146 One of the panelists is unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusions contained in
paragraphs 7.128 to 7.145 above. This section reflects the views of that panelist.
7.147 While I agree with the three-tier test for de termining whether a measure is a "technical
regulation" under the TBT Agreement as establis hed in principle by the Appellate Body in EC –
Asbestos and followed in EC – Sardines , I do not agree with the conclu sions of the majority that the
measures at issue meet the requirements of this test. According to that test, in order to be a technical

314 We note in this respect the following definitions of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: "exclusive reference (to
standards)": "reference to standards that states that the only way to meet the relevant requirements of a technical
regulation is to comply with the standards referred to" (emphasis added).
"mandatory standard": "standard the application of which is made compulsory by virtue of a general
law or exclusive reference in a regulation" (emphasis added).

regulation, (i) a measure has to apply to an identif iable product or group of products, (ii) it has to lay
down one or more characteristics of the product or related processes and production methods, and (iii)
compliance with the prescribed product characteristics or process and production method is
mandatory. Thereby, the second sentence of Annex 1. 1 of the TBT Agreement should not be read as
independent of the first sentence, it should rather be read as ensuring a broad understanding of the
term "technical regulation". The second sentence ma kes clear that according to the second criteria,
technical regulations are not limited to a narrow u nderstanding of "product characteristics" but that
they also include prescriptions with regard to "ter minology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method". Thus, a labelling requirement
that applies to a process or production method that is not directly related to the product can also be a
technical regulation as long as it meets the other two cr iteria of the test. I agree with the majority that
the measures at issue meet the first two requireme nts. However, I do not agree that the measures at
issue require mandatory compliance with the pr escribed product characteristics or process and
production method.
7.148 A treaty has to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in the li ght of its object and purpose (Article 31.1 of the Vienna
Convention). Moreover, a treaty should not be interprete d in a manner that leads to an unreasonable
result (Article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention). It is therefore important to construe Annex 1.1 of the
TBT Agreement in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and
in the light of the objective and purpose of the TBT Agreement and in a manner that does not make
void other provisions of the Agreement.
7.149 Annex 1.1 and 1.2 of the TBT Agreement use similar language, the second sentence is even
identical. Thus, both technical regulations and standards can include terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method. The main difference is that while comp liance with technical regulations is mandatory,
compliance with standards is not mandatory. In interpreting the phrase "with which compliance is
mandatory", it is important to reflect the context of that formulation, the objective and purpose of the
TBT Agreement, and the existence of Annex 1.2. An interpretation that conflates the requirement that
compliance with a technical regulation has to be ma ndatory with the term "labelling requirements" of
the second sentence or an interpretation that leaves no space to Annex 1.2 would not be reasonable.
7.150 According to the ordinary meaning of the term , labelling requirements are requirements that
must be fulfilled in order to be allowed to use a certain label. Any labelling scheme foresees such
requirements – in fact, if such requirements would not exist and if a certain label could be used
independent of whether specific requirements are fulfilled, the label would become meaningless.
Labelling schemes can be compulsory when the use of a certain label is compulsory to access the
market, or they can be voluntary when products can be marketed with or without the label. But
"labelling requirements", i.e. the requirements that are formulated to allow the use of a label, must be
met also within a voluntary labelling scheme. Ho wever, in difference to a compulsory labelling
scheme, within a voluntary scheme products have not to be labelled and have not to fulfil these
labelling requirements in order to be marketed, they can also be put on the market without that label
and without fulfilling these labelling requirements. In a voluntary labelling scheme, labelling
requirements are thus not mandatory for marketing products.
7.151 Both Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2 refer to labe lling requirements. Labelling requirements can
thus be technical regulations or standards. The criteria whether labelling requirements are a technical
regulation or a standard relates to the fact whethe r compliance is mandatory or not. In order to give
any sense to the term "labelling requirement" as used both in Annex 1.1. and 1.2, the requirement that
compliance is mandatory cannot relate to the obligati on to meet certain requirements to be allowed to
use the label, but to the question whether a labe lling scheme is compulsory – i.e. whether products
must use a label in order to be marketed – or vol untary – i.e. products may be marketed with or

without the label. As indicated by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos , a technical regulation must
"regulate the characteristics of products in a bi nding or compulsory fashion" and "a 'technical
regulation' has the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more 'characteristics' – 'features',
'qualities', 'attributes', or other 'distinguishing mark'".
315 A labelling requirement which is a technical
regulation would thus impose to a product the obliga tion to use the label and to fulfil the related
labelling requirements. If however compliance with th e labelling requirement and use of the label is
not mandatory, the labelling requirement has to be seen as a standard. Arguing that the mere fact that
a product is prohibited from using a label if it does not fulfil these standards makes compliance
compulsory would leave no space for voluntary labelling schemes as standards.
7.152 From the terms of the measures at issue, it appear s that they are legally binding, in that the
conditions set out in subsection (d) must be met if a "dolphin-safe" label is used, and the use of a label
in violation of these conditions would be subject to enforcement measures. The prohibition on the use
of alternative labels unless the conditions set out in subsection (d)(3)(C) are met is also legally
enforceable. This is a typical situation common to both voluntary and mandatory labelling schemes.
However, neither the use of the "dolphin-safe" labe l nor the use of the specific fishing techniques and
locations that condition access to the label is compul sory, either in a positive or negative manner (i.e.
their use is neither obligatory nor prohibited).
7.153 In other words, the measures do not impose a general requirement to label or not to label tuna
products as "dolphin-safe". It remains a voluntary and discretionary decision of operators on the
market to fulfil or not fulfil the conditions that give access to the label, and whether to make any
claim in relation to the dolphin-safe status of the tuna contained in the product. If an operator wishes
to make such claim, however, it must abide with the conditions laid down in the DPCIA and other
related measures. In short, the measures at issu e set out the requirements for dolphin-safe labelling,
but they impose no obligation to label (or not to la bel) tuna as "dolphin-safe". For this reason,
compliance with the labelling requirements at issu e is not "mandatory" within the meaning of
Annex 1.1.
7.154 The notion of "mandatory compliance" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 implies the
obligatory character of the characteristics prescribed in the measures, and not simply the legal
enforceability of the measures. A distinction should be made, in this context, between on the one
hand, the legally binding character of a document laying dow n labelling requirements and, on the
other hand, mandatory compliance with the conditions advertised through the use of the label. While
may well be necessary for the measures at issue to be legally enforceable, this is not necessarily
sufficient, in order to make them "mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1. Rather, the notion of
"mandatory compliance" relates more fundamentally to the fact that the measure at issue prescribes or
imposes compliance with specific requirements to allo w a product to be marketed, without allowing
discretion to depart from them.
7.155 This distinction is consistent with the essence of the core distinction made in the Agreement
between "mandatory" technical regulations and "vol untary" standards. The obligatory character of
compliance with the characteristics laid out in a tec hnical regulation contrasts with the discretion that
exists, under a "voluntary" (or "not mandatory") standa rd, for operators to comply or not comply with
the standard. The requirements to be allowed to use a label have to be clearly distinguished from the
obligation to use a label.
7.156 As described above, under the measures at issue, it is the voluntary decision of those
producers to label their products in a certain way wh at triggers the obligation to comply with such

315 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , paras. 68-69; see also Appellate Body Report, EC –
Sardines, para. 176.

standards. The fact that operators may be legally accountable for any misleading or false declarations
in the event that they choose to advertise compliance with a standard without in fact meeting its
requirements does not modify the essentially voluntary nature of such standard.
7.157 I note in this respect that governments may want to ensure that whenever a certain product
makes a claim in a label, such claim is reflective of the true characteristics of that product or the
actual related processes and methods involved in its production. For this reason, governments may
enact laws and regulations requiring that if a producer claims that its products are in compliance with
certain voluntary specifications, i.e. standards, that producer is under a duty to ensure that its products
actually meet those standards. For the same reas ons (i.e. consumer protec tion and fair competition),
those laws and regulations may require that produ cers do not use labels or symbols that may induce
the public to erroneously believe that the products carrying such labels or symbols comply with the
conditions for the use of other labels. The existence of such a legally binding norm that compels
producers to fulfil the promises they make in re lation to compliance with voluntary standards should
not transforms such standards into mandatory t echnical regulations. If it would, no space would be
left for labelling requirements as standards as foreseen in Annex 1.2.
7.158 For these reasons, the fact that compliance with the terms of the labelling requirements is
legally enforceable alone is not sufficient to re nder compliance with these requirements "mandatory"
within the meaning of Annex 1.
7.159 In the present case, the chapeau of subsection (d)(1) of the DPCIA, establish that it is a
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act to expor t from or to offer for sale in the United States
tuna products that " include on the label of that product the term ' dolphin-safe' or any other term or
symbol that falsely claims or suggests that the tuna contained in th e product were harvested using a
method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins", unless the conditions set out by that section itself
are met (emphasis added). In addition, subsection (d)(3) of this statute provides that "[i]t is a
violation of section 45 of title 15 to label a tuna pro duct with any label or mark that refers to dolphins,
porpoises, or marine mammals other than the mark developed under subparagraph (A)"
316 unless
certain conditions are met.317.
7.160 The chapeau of subsection (d)(1) of the DPCIA is intended to ensure that when a claim is
made on a label that certain conditions have been me t, the producers of the goods carrying that label
are bound to meet those conditions. In turn, subsec tion (d)(3), in combination with subsection (d)(1)
of the DPCIA, may be understood as a provision aimed at preventing deceptive practices in relation to
the use of the "dolphin-safe" label.
7.161 This conclusion is not modified by the limitations placed by the measures on the use of
alternative "dolphin-safe" marks or labels and on the use of certain terms. These aspects of the
measures should be understood in connection with the overall architecture of the measure, which aims
to ensure that any claims made in relation to the impact on dolphins of the catching of the tuna
contained in tuna products are consistent with the conditions se t out in the measures, and do not
mislead consumers. Most importantly, these provi sions do not render the "labelling requirement"
mandatory in the sense that the label must be used and that the requirements to use the label must be

316 Subparagraph (A) establishes: "The Secretary of Commerce shall develop an official mark that may
be used to label tuna products as dolphin-safe in accord ance with this Act". Theref ore, we believe that this
subsection may be read as follows: "[i]t is a violation of section 45 of title 15 to label a tuna product with any
label or mark that refers to dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals other than [the 'dolphin-safe' label]".
317 See paras. 2.27 to 2.30 above.

met in order to put tuna on the US market. In fact, as evidenced by the United States, tuna without the
label is marketed within the United States.
318
7.162 Mexico relies, in support of its claim that the measures at issue constitute a "mandatory"
technical regulation, on two prior decisions of the Appellate Body, namely EC – Asbestos and EC –
Sardines. I wish to point out important distinctions be tween the situations addressed in those disputes
and the present case.
7.163 In EC – Asbestos, the measure at issue did not contain any voluntary aspect. Asbestos and
asbestos-containing products were simply banned by the measure at issue. According to the Appellate
Body, this ban negatively imposed on all products the requirement not to contain asbestos. Therefore,
the producers and importers of asbestos and asb estos-containing products were not given an
alternative in order to market their products in th e territory of the European Union. The requirement
not to include asbestos in their products was imposed directly by the regulations at issue, and not by
the producers' or importers' own decision to become bound by such prohibition. Therefore, although
the decision of the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos provides useful guidance in relation to several
points in discussion in the present dispute, it does not offer conclusive assistance in relation to
whether legally enforceable provisions setting out the conditions of use of a label to advertise
compliance with a voluntary standard, or prohibiting the use of deceptive labels , turn such standard
into a technical regulation.
7.164 In EC – Sardines, the mandatory nature of the measures challenged in that case was not in
question.
319 In that case, the Appellate Body was th erefore not called upon to make a determination
concerning the interaction between mandatory and vo luntary requirements. The measures in that case
required the use of only the species Sardina pi lchardus in products marketed as "preserved
sardines".320 The Appellate Body found that "pr eserved products made, for example, of Sardinops
sagax [were], by virtue of the EC Regulation, prohibited from being identified and marketed under an
appellation including the term 'sardines'" (emphasis in the original). 321 In other words, the exporters
of preserved sardines containing any species of sardines other than Sardina pilchardus were not
allowed to market their products as "sardines". EC – Sardines did thus not involve a labelling
requirement but a naming requirement. And by not allowing to market certain preserved sardines as
sardines, these products were prohibited to enter the sar dine market at all. However, in difference to
EC – Sardines , Mexico is not prohibited from selling its t una as tuna to the United States. It is a
fundamental difference between the facts of that case and those of the present dispute that in this case
the measures lay down labelling requirements, which allow the operator to make claims reflecting
compliance with a particular standard. The US dol phin-safe provisions are intrinsically linked to
voluntary labelling scheme, which, in turn, is intended to reflect compliance with a particular standard
(a "dolphin-safe" standard). This is a factual circumstance with which neither the panel nor the
Appellate Body in EC – Sardines was confronted. They could, therefore, conclude that the measures
in question laid down product characteristics in a negative form without affecting the conceptual
differences between technical regulations and sta ndards. For these reasons, the Appellate Body's
decision in EC – Sardines does not offer conclusive guidance on whether legally enforceable
provisions imposing compliance with particular requ irements in order to claim compliance with a
standard though the use of a label, or prohibiting the use of deceptive labels relating to the same
matter, have the effect of turning a voluntary standard into a technical regulation.

318 See para. 7.345 below.
319 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 194.
320 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 179, quoting the Panel Report in that same dispute,
para. 7.45.
321 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 184.

7.165 As observed earlier, the US measures need to be considered as a whole. This requirement,
along with the duty to interpret the terms of the definition of the TBT Agreement in a way that does
not deprive the definition of a "standard" of its mean ing, compels to conclude that the legally binding
components of the US dolphin-safe provisions do not transform voluntary "dolphin-safe" labelling
requirements into mandatory technical regulations. In light of all the above, I conclude that the
US dolphin-labelling provisions do not establish de jure mandatory labelling requirements.
7.166 Mexico alternatively argues that the labelli ng scheme established by the US dolphin-safe
provisions is de facto mandatory "because the market conditions in the United States are such that it is
impossible to effectively market and sell tuna products without a dolphin-safe designation".
322In this
respect, as described above, Mexico has observed that the US distribution and retail networks for tuna
products are acutely aware of the dolphin safe issue a nd the fact that they will encounter actions such
as boycotts, promoted by NGOs, if they carry tuna that is not labelled as dolphin safe. Mexico argues
that large US grocery chains have indicated that they will be unable to carry any Mexican tuna
products unless they bear a US government-approved dolphin safe label. Mexico has also noted that
the three major tuna processors in the United States refuse to purchase tuna caught in the ETP
including Mexican tuna because tuna products c ontaining such tuna cannot be labelled as dolphin
safe.
323
7.167 Mexico observes that the use of the "dolphin-safe" label has "significant commercial value" in
the United States' market because "consumers at each consumption stage demand this label in order to
sell or buy tuna products". 324 Therefore, Mexico contends, the prohibition on having the dolphin-safe
label on Mexican tuna products has the effect of excluding Mexican tuna products from the major
distribution channels in the US market, and co mpliance with the requirements imposed by the
US dolphin-safe provisions becomes mandatory for the Mexican tuna industry in order to access the
US market.325
7.168 The United States responds that Mexico's contention that the US dolphin-safe provisions
have prevented Mexican tuna products from accessi ng the United States' market is not based on the
US dolphin-safe provisions themselves or on any other measure or government action that limits the
opportunity for Mexican tuna products to be imported, sold, distributed or otherwise marketed in the
United States. According to the United States, Mexi co's argument is based on retailer and consumer
preferences for tuna products that were not ca ught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. 326
Moreover, the United States argues that some dist ribution channels in the United States do purchase
and sell tuna products that are not labelled "dolphi n-safe", and that consumer or retailer preferences
alone cannot determine whether a labelling requirement is mandatory.327
7.169 In addressing this part of Mexico's claim, it needs to be considered, as a threshold matter,
whether the definition of a "technical regulation" in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement encompasses
situations in which the document at issue would be de facto rather than de jure mandatory.
7.170 Issues relating to the de facto or de jure coverage of specific obligations have been discussed
in the context of various provisions contained in the GATT 1994 328, the GATS 329 and other covered

322 Mexico's first written submission, para. 203.
323 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 111-112.
324 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 148.
325 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 149.
326 United States' second written submission paras. 110- 111; United States' response to Panel question
No. 52, para. 127.
327 United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 130.
328 See e.g. GATT panel reports, Belgium – Family Allowances; EEC – Imports of Beef , GATT panel
report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee and Japan – SPF Dimension Lumber (in relation to Article I of the

agreements, such as the SCM Agreement.
330 Although these precedents must be considered with
caution since they refer to provisions that notably di ffer in scope and nature from those contained in
the TBT Agreement, the reasoning behind those decisions may shed light on the question at issue here.
7.171 When the Appellate Body and previous pane ls have addressed the question of whether a
particular provision equally applies to de jure and de facto situations, they appear to have focused
both on the text of the provision in question and on the potential consequences of excluding the
possibility of applying that norm to de facto scenarios. The following passage of the Appellate Body's
decision in EC – Bananas III illustrates this approach:
"The question here is the meaning of 'treat ment no less favourable' with respect to the
MFN obligation in Article II of the GATS. ... The obligation imposed by Article II is
unqualified. The ordinary meaning of this provision does not exclude de facto
discrimination. Moreover, if Article II was not applicable to de facto discrimination,
it would not be difficult -- and, indeed, it would be a good deal easier in the case of
trade in services, than in the case of trade in goods -- to devise discriminatory
measures aimed at circumventing the basic purpose of that Article" (italics in the
original).
331
7.172 In the present case, the first task is therefore to assess whether the ordinary meaning of the
language used in the definition of technical regulation in the TBT Agreement allows or excludes the
possibility of de facto mandatory technical regulations. The relevant language is the term
"mandatory", or more broadly, the expression "with which compliance is mandatory" in Annex 1.1.
This formulation seems not to exclude the possibility that compliance has to be de facto mandatory.
7.173 Namely, it does not exclude that the mandatory character of the measure may result from a
combined effect of various measures or actions a ttributable to the Member in question, and not
necessarily exclusively from the specific instrument in which the "product characteristics or related
processes and production methods" are laid down. What is required is that compliance with the
characteristics laid down in the document be mandato ry. This does not necessarily prejudge whether
this mandatory character is contained in that instru ment itself. It does not exclude that voluntary and
non-mandatory labelling requirements may beco me mandatory as a result of "some other
governmental action"
332 or more generally, some other action attributable to the Member concerned.333
7.174 The question is therefore whethe r, despite the absence of a de jure requirement in the
measures at issue to use the "dolphin-safe" label in or der to market tuna products in the United States,
tuna products are nonetheless compelled to carry that label as a result of some other action attributable
to the United States.

GATT 1994); GATT panel report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery (in relation to Article III.4); GATT panel
report, Japan – Semi-Conductors and panel report Argentina – Hides and Leather (in relation to Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994).
329 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (in relation to Article II of GATS).
330 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos (in relation to Article 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement).
331 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 233; see also, Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Autos, paras. 139-43.
332 United States' response to Panel question No. 52, para. 125.
333 It would be conceivable, for example, that if a Me mber in fact grants certification in relation to one
particular standard as a means of complying with a regulatory requirement, but not in relation to other standards,
its actions may turn that formally voluntary standard, into a de facto technical regulation.

7.175 In summary, the "dolphin-safe" label may be considered de facto mandatory in order to
market tuna products in the United States, if doing otherwise becomes impossible, not because it
would contradict a mandatory provision in the measures, but because it would be prevented by a
factual situation that is sufficiently connected to the actions of the United States. Thus, this analysis is
two-fold. First, the impossibility of marketi ng tuna products in the United States without the
"dolphin-safe" label must be established. S econd, such impossibility must arise from facts
sufficiently connected to the US dolphin-safe provisions or to another governmental action of the
United States.
7.176 First, it has to be noted that tuna products are sold in the United States without the
"dolphin-safe" label. Not only hast the US submitte d evidence in this regard, Mexico has also not
challenged this fact. However, Mexico mainta ins that the dolphin-safe labelling scheme "is de facto
mandatory because the market conditions in the United States are such that it is impossible to
effectively market and sell tuna products without a dolphin-safe designation" (emphases added).
334 As
non-labelled tuna is sold in the US to a certain li mited extent, to "effectively" market has to mean
having access to the major distribution channels a nd not being limited to the limited market segment
that exists in the US for non-labelled Tuna.
7.177 To the extent that Mexico's argument is based on an impossibility of "effectively" marketing
and selling tuna products without a dolphin-safe designation, this would not, in my view, provide a
sufficient basis for a determination that compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling requirements is
"mandatory" within the meaning of Annex 1.1. Compliance with a voluntary technical document
such as a standard may substantially increase the chances of a product being effectively sold in a given
market. Conversely, failure to comply with such standard may have negative consequences for the
competitiveness of a product in that market. However, this fact alone would not alter the voluntary or
"not mandatory" nature of that standard, within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.
7.178 In explaining the adverse effects of the measures, Mexico argued that they have direct effects
on tuna products, because major retailers in the Un ited States refuse to buy tuna products that cannot
be labelled dolphin safe, and indirect effects on tuna caught by the Mexican fleet, because major
producers of tuna in the United States also refuse to purchase Mexican or other tuna caught in the
ETP because tuna product containing such tuna coul d not be included in t una products labelled
dolphin safe. 335 I agree with the United States, however, that these are decisions made by private
actors that do not necessarily involve the participati on of the State. Such private actions alone should
not be able to turn an otherwise voluntary norm into a technical regulation.
7.179 Therefore, Mexico would need to demonstrate that the decision made by these companies not
to buy tuna or tuna products that cannot be labelled dolphin-safe is the result of the application of the
US dolphin-safe provisions or of some other action by the United States. However, Mexico has failed
to substantiate such contention.
7.180 On the contrary, the United Sates has shown that the three major processors of tuna products
in the United States have adopted as their own comme rcial policies not to use tuna that has been
obtained by setting on dolphins".
336 In particular, the United States has presented as evidence the
dolphin-safe policy of the major US tuna compani es as it is published on their website. Bumble Bee's
policy is instructive in this respect:

334 Mexico's first written submission, para. 202.
335 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 111 and 112.
336 Exhibit US-32; Exhibit US-36; Exhibit US-37.

"What is Bumble Bee's Dolphin safe polic y? Bumble Bee Foods, LLC remains fully
committed to the 100% dolphin-safe policy we implemented in April 1990. This
policy guarantees the following:
– Bumble Bee will not purchase tuna from vessels that net fish associated with
dolphins. Our purchasing agreements re quire certification of dolphin-safe
fishing practices from all tuna suppliers ...
The U.S. Government Dolphin-Safe Regulati ons are in the process of being modified
through the International Dolphin Conserva tion Program. The new regulations will
allow for a less stringent U.S. Dolphin-Safe Regulation. Despite the new, less
stringent "compliance" criteria, Bumble Bee remains committed to and in compliance
with a "no encirclement" policy. The commi tment of Bumble Bee to dolphin-safety
will remain unchanged regardless of any changes to the dolphin-safe law.
We continue to adhere to our 100% dolphin-safe policy."
337
7.181 This evidence also suggests that these companies have been willi ng to maintain such policies
regardless of the potential legislative changes to the US dolphin-safe provisions, and in particular
regardless of the potential change of the US defi nition of "dolphin-safe", to adopt the definition
endorsed by the AIDCP, which Mexico argued the Un ited States should apply. Mexico submits that
what prompted those policies was the large number of dolphins being killed annually in the ETP at the
time these policies were first announced, and that this figure has substantially decreased.338 However,
even if Mexico's assertion is correct, it would not prove that these private actors' commercial policies
are determined by the existence or content of the US dolphin-safe labelling scheme. If Mexico's
allegation is correct, it would onl y prove that these companies define their purchase policies in
consideration of their own perception of the risks faced by the dolphin populations in the ETP.
7.182 In addition, it is relevant to note that the dolphin-safe policies of the major companies were all
implemented prior to the enactment of the first versi on of the DPCIA which is here challenged, that is
to say, prior to the United States having adopted the "strict" definition of dolphin-safe as absence of
setting on dolphins. 339 These policies were implemented in April 1990, seven months before the
enactment of the DPCIA. The Un ited States has noted that the amicus curiae brief submitted to the
Panel highlights that at the time of the enactment of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, there
was a strong consumer sentiment that setting on do lphins to catch tuna was unacceptable and that
something should be done to ensure that cons umers had a choice not to purchase products that
contained tuna caught in association with dolphins. 340 Indeed, the paragraphs of the amicus curiae
brief to which the United States refer and the e xhibits attached to the brief quoted in such
paragraphs support the conclusion that such polic ies were prompted by the lobbying exerted by
environmentalists rather than by the enactment of the DPCIA itself. According to a press article the
chairman of Heinz's StarKist Seafood Company, th e companies' dolphin-safe policy was attributable
to both "external influences –lobbying by environmen talists and a consumer boycott of tuna- and an
internal corporate debate. ... The consumer boycott, which included a growing number of
schoolchildren, seemed to argue for a dolphin-safe policy." 341 This evidence also explains the

337 Exhibit US-37.
338 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 43, para. 105.
339 Exhibit US-32; Exhibit US-36; Exhibit US-37, Exhibit US-38.
340 See United States' response to Panel question No. 40(a), para. 98 which cites paragraphs 18-20, 25,
62-64 of the amicus curiae brief which in turn refer to exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 attached to the amicus submission.
341 See United States' response to Panel question No 40(a), para. 98 which cites paragraphs 18-20, 25
and 62-64 of the amicus curiae brief which in turn refer to Exhibit Amicus EX-2.

nationwide boycott of tuna supported by schoolchildre n, celebrities and business leaders was due to a
"dolphin campaign video". A biologist footage shot during an undercover operation from October
1987 to January 1988 on a Panamanian vessel provide d film evidence that some purse-seiners were
indiscriminately slaughtering dolphins while harves ting the yellowfin tuna that swims beneath the
mammals. The evidence presented to the Panel suggest s that the broadcast of this documentary on
television triggered consumers' and civil society reactions.
7.183 Mexico argues that the three major tuna pro cessors in the United States have a commercial
interest in maintaining the US dolphin-safe pr ovisions as they stand today because they would
otherwise face competition from Mexican tuna product brands. 342 However, even assuming that such
economic interest does exist, this would not change the fact that this interest and the business
decisions taken on the basis of such interest remain within the sphere of private actions that are not
necessarily attributable to a measure by the Stat e. Private companies may have strong economic
interests that relate to voluntary standards, they may even make important business decisions on the
assumption that such standards will or will not remain applicable to their products. However, the
existence of those interests and the decisions b ased upon them do not change the voluntary character
of the standard.
7.184 Mexico also observes that large US retailers have indicated that they will be unable to carry
any Mexican tuna products unless the tuna produc ts bear a US government approved dolphin safe
label.343 In support of this contention, Mexico h as presented an affidavit from an officer of a
US company selling Mexican canned tuna in the US market and supporting material. This affidavit
states that for several years the company attempted to sell Mexican tuna products in major US grocery
chains, which have refused to buy the products b ecause they were not eligible for the dolphin-safe
label. The affidavit provides evidence that some of the major US chains have expressly indicated that
if the tuna product qualified to be labelled "dolphi n-safe", they would sell it and that the company's
inability to place the "dolphin-safe" label on the can s has directly affected its ability to sell the
Mexican brand in the United States.344
7.185 However, this evidence does not, in my view , support the conclusion that the decision of
retailers not to carry tuna products not eligible for a dolphin-safe label is the result of actions
attributable to the United States. Rather, this evid ence confirms that it is the decision of retailers on
the market not to carry tuna products unless they are eligible for US dolphin safe labelling. I note in
this respect that the affidavit refers to instances of removal of the products from the shelves following
interventions by an NGO, which suggests that retaile rs react to the dolphin-safe concern in a manner
comparable to that of the tuna processors referred to above, that is, that they make their decisions in
consideration of their perception of the acceptabilit y of the products to consumers rather than by
reason of the US measures themselves. One of the supporting documents provided by Mexico
expressly states that this is not a legal issue but an issue of "consumer acceptance".345
7.186 Based on the above, I find that Mexico has failed to demonstrate that the US dolphin-safe
provisions establish either de jure or de facto mandatory labelling requirements. Thus, I conclude that
the third condition for a document to be considered a technical regulation, i.e. that compliance with
the labelling requirements at issue is mandatory, has not been met in the present case. Therefore, the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions should not be seen as constituting technical regulations within

342 Mexico's first written submission, para. 113; see also Mexico's response to Panel question No. 43,
para. 109.
343 Mexico's first written submission, para. 111.
344 Exhibit MEX-58.
345 See Exhibit MEX-58.

the meaning of the TBT Agreement. Consequently, the provisions of Article 2 of the
TBT Agreement, including its paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 should not be applicable to the measures at issue.
7.187 Finally, I wish to make it clear that, in making this determination, no determination is made as
to whether the measures at issue might otherwis e fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement.
However, since Mexico did not submit any claims based on other provisions of the TBT Agreement,
no determinations in this regard can be made.
7.188 Notwithstanding this conclusion, I consider it appropriate to pursue the analysis of the
measures at issue as a technical regulation, on the b asis of the opinion of the majority of the Panel.
Without prejudice to my views with respect to this initial determination, I therefore associate myself
with the remainder of these findings.
2. Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement
7.189 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides:
"Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, pr oducts imported
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national or igin and to like pro ducts originating in
any other country."
7.190 Mexico claims that the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.1
because they afford treatment less favourable to Mexi can tuna products than to US tuna products and
tuna products originating in other countries. We fi rst set out our overall approach to the analysis of
this claim, in order to determine what must be established in order for Mexico to prevail in this claim.
(a) Overall approach
(i) Main arguments of the parties
7.191 In its first written submission, with respect to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Mexico
refers the Panel to the arguments it made in th e context of its claims under the GATT 1994.
According to Mexico, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement imposes national treatment and
most-favoured-nation treatment obligations on technical regulations. It is, Mexico argues, similar to
the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, except that it applies to both
national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligati ons. Mexico also observes that like Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 prohibits both de jure and de facto discrimination.
346
7.192 Mexico noted the following essential elements of an inconsistency with Article 2.1: (i) that
the measure at issue is a "technical regulation"; (i i) that products of national origin and products
originating in any other country are "like products" with respect to the imported products within the
meaning of that provision; and (iii) that th e imported products are accorded "less favourable"

346 ( footnote original ) In Canada – Autos , the Appellate Body observed that Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 covered both de jure and de facto inconsistency and, on this basis, found that a similar provision
that disciplined measures that favoured the use of domestic over imported goods (i.e., Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement) would also apply not only to de jure inconsistency but to de facto inconsistency. The same
reasoning applies to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement which is even more analogous to Article III:4 than
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreem ent. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry , WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, para. 140. (Mexico's first
written submission, fn 164).

treatment than that accorded to like products of nati onal origin and to like prod ucts originating in any
other country.347
7.193 With regard to the first element, Mexico re fers to earlier arguments and observes that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are a technical regulation.348
7.194 As far as the second element is concerned, Mexi co specifies that although the meaning of the
term "like products" in Article 2.1 has not been el aborated upon in WTO jurisprudence, given that the
language in Article 2.1 is similar to that in Artic le III:4 of the GATT 1994, it is reasonable to use the
four criteria used to determine likeness under Ar ticle III:4 discussed above, reviewed in the proper
context and in consideration of the object a nd purpose, to assist in determining likeness under
Article 2.1. In light of its conclusions in the context of Article III:4, Mexico asserts all criteria
indicate that tuna and tuna products are like products, irrespective of their originating country.349
7.195 Finally, Mexico also contends that for the r easons set out in its claim under Article III:4, the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not accord products imported from the territory of any
Member (namely, Mexico) treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin350 and for the reasons set out in its claim under GATT Article I:1, the measures do not accord
products imported from the territory of any Member (namely, Mexico) treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products originating in any other country 351 and therefore concludes the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.352
7.196 The United States presents its defence in line with Mexico's order of analysis. In addition, the
United States notes that Mexico relies solely on th e arguments it makes regarding the consistency of
the measures with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GA TT 1994 for its arguments under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. Observing that it had already articulated why Mexico's arguments under Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994 the United States contends that Mexico's arguments under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement also fail for the same reasons.
7.197 In light of the parties' references to their analyses under Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 in the context of their discussion of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel asked
them to elaborate on whether an analysis of "likeness" and "less favourable treatment" under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should be assumed to have exactly the sa me contours as the same
analysis under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Furthe r, if this is the case, the Panel asked the parties
to confirm whether this would imply that all inte rpretations developed by panels and the Appellate
Body in the context of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 are entirely transposable to Article 2.1. The
Panel also asked the parties to comment on the differences in the wording used under each provision.
7.198 Mexico responded that although the language used in Article 2.1 is different from that used in
Articles III:4 and I:1, both of these GATT 1994 pr ovisions offer guidance on how to interpret
Article 2.1.353 Further, Mexico explained that the essence of the non-discrimination obligations in the
GATT 1994 and other covered agreements is that like products should be treated equally, irrespective
of their origin. It also noted the importance of these provisions for Members, in the context of non-
tariff barriers such as the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. Accordingly, it is essential that the

347 Mexico's first written submission, para. 257.
348 Mexico's first written submission, para. 258.
349 Mexico's first written submission, para. 259.
350 Mexico's first written submission, para. 260.
351 Mexico's first written submission, para. 261.
352 Mexico's first written submission, para. 262.
353 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), paras. 172.

elements of these provisions, including the defi nitions of "like products" and "less favourable
treatment" be carefully interpreted and applied. Me xico argues that the long history of interpreting
and applying these terms in the context of Article III:4 and other provisions of the GATT 1994 should
be relied upon when interpreting Article 2.1 of th e TBT Agreement in order to maintain, Mexico
argues that the integrity of the non-discrimination obligations contained in that provision.
354
7.199 As for the term "like products", Mexico recalle d the Appellate Body's rulings on the need to
interpret this term as it appears in different provi sions of the covered agreements in light of the
context and the object and purpose of the provision at issue and the object and purpose of the covered
agreement in which the provision appears.355 In light of this jurisprudence, Mexico concludes that:
"Both Article III:4 and Article 2.1 apply to technical regulations so, at a general level,
their context is similar. Given that the specific language used in both Articles when
referring to the term 'like products' – i.e ., 'shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like produc ts of national origin' – is identical, the
immediate context of the term when used in the two provisions is also identical.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to give the term the same meaning under both
provisions. Thus, as stated in Mexico's First Written Submission, the four criteria
used to determine likeness under Article III: 4 should be used to determine likeness
under Article 2.1."356
7.200 Mexico considers it appropriate to give the term "treatment no less favourable" the same
meaning under both Article III: 4 of the GATT and Artic le 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. In that regard
it noted it is crucial that the term "treatment no less favourable" in Article 2.1 is interpreted and
applied with reference to the equality of comp etitive opportunities for imported products as compared
to like domestic products. Such competitive opportunities can be affected Mexico says, in a variety of
ways, not only by measures directly regulating produc ts and restricting imports but also by those that
indirectly affect imports. 357 Therefore Mexico concludes that the assessment for "treatment no less
favourable" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement s hould be the same as under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 i.e. whether a measure modifies the conditi ons of competition in the relevant market to
the detriment of imported products.358
7.201 Regarding the differences in wording betw een Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, Mexico noted that the language of Article I:1 provides that "any
advantage, favour, privilege or im munity granted by any [Member] to any product originating in ...
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
... the territories of all other [Members]" whereas Article 2.1 refers to "p roducts imported from the
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatme nt no less favourable than that accorded ... to like
products originating in any other country".359

354 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), paras. 173.
355 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products , WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, paragraphs 88-89. (Mexico's
response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), fn 77).
356 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 175.
357 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 177.
358 ( footnote original ) Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, paragraphs 91, 93
and 96; Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef ,
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, paragraphs 135, 137 and 144. (Mexico's
response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), fn 81).
359 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 179.

7.202 Although the language in the two provisions di ffers, Mexico notes that both set out most-
favoured-nation treatment obligations. It also observes that:
"The Appellate Body has observed that '[a]part from Article I:1, several 'MFN-type'
clauses dealing with varied matters are c ontained in the GATT 1994' and '[t]he very
existence of these other clauses demonstrat es the pervasive character of the MFN
principle of non-discrimination'. The provisions of the GATT 1994 referred to by the
Appellate Body when making this statemen t use very different language to express
the MFN obligation including language similar to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
as illustrated in GATT Article IX:1—i.e., 'treatment ... no less favourable than the
treatment accorded to like products of any third country'."
360
7.203 Mexico concludes that Article I:1 protects the competitive opportunities of imported products,
not trade flows, and imposes upon WTO Members th e obligation to treat like foreign products
equally, irrespective of their origin. In its view , the jurisprudence interpreting the obligation in
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is relevant to the interpretation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.361
7.204 In its second written submission, Mexico addresses several issues it considers common to all
its discrimination claims, the TBT Agreement a nd the GATT 1994, including the issue of likeness.
However, Mexico addresses separately the questi on of the "advantage accorded immediately and
unconditionally" under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Finally, as for Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, Mexico refers again to the arguments presented to support its claims under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
362
7.205 The United States observes that, notwithstanding the inapplicability of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement to the present dispute, an analys is of likeness and less favourable treatment under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should not be exactly same as under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 as there are important textual and contextual differences between the two. 363 One such
difference the United States observed is that Article 2.1 states that "Members shall require that in
respect of technical regulations, products impor ted from the territory of any Member shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin". The
United States emphasizes that Article 2.1 applies "in respect" of a technical regulation.364
7.206 The United States further observes that the language in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement differs regard ing the treatment afforded to imports from one
Member as compared to the treatment afforded imports of another Member. Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement refers to not affording "less favour able treatment" to imported products as compared
to like products originating in other countries, whereas Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 states that any
"advantage" or "privilege" granted to products originating in one country "shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally" to like products originating in other countries. These textual
differences should be taken into account when interpreting Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement respectively.

360 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 180 (original footnote omitted)
361 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 181.
362 Mexico's second written submission, paras. 125-191.
363 United States' response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 132.
364 United States' response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 132.

(ii) Approach of the Panel
7.207 Article 2.1 reads as follows:
"Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, pr oducts imported
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national or igin and to like pro ducts originating in
any other country."
7.208 This provision must be read in conjunction w ith the introductory passage of Article 2 ("With
respect to their central government bodies:"), which ma kes clear that the provisions of Article 2, and
thus the obligations it contains, relate only to the "central government bodies" of WTO Members.
This is further confirmed by the title of Article 2, which reads "Preparation, adoption and application
of technical regulations by central government bodies".
7.209 The terms of this provision thus suggest that a violation of Article 2.1 exists if two sets of
conditions are met:
(a) the measure is a technical regulation prep ared, adopted or applied by a Member's
central government bodies; and
(b) products imported from the territory of a Member are accorded "less favourable
treatment" than like products of national origin or originating in any other country in
respect of this technical regulation.
7.210 We have already determined above that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions constitute a
technical regulation. We must now, in addition, determine whether they fall within the purview of
Article 2 as a technical regulation prepared, adopted and applied by one or more "central government
body" of the United States.
7.211 Annex 1.6 of the TBT Agreement defines a "central government body" as a "central
government, its ministries and departments or any body subject to the control of the central
government in respect of the activity in question". The measures at issue in this dispute are a federal
US law (the DPCIA), a federal regulation (Sections of the US Federal Code), and a ruling by a federal
court of the United States (the Hogarth ruling). It has not been disputed that these constitute acts of
central government bodies of the United States.
7.212 We must now determine whether less favourable treatment is accorded to Mexican imported
products than to like products of US origin or like products originating in any other country with
respect to these measures. For th at purpose, we consider first whether the products at issue are "like
products". If we determine that they are, we will then need to consider whether "less favourable
treatment" is being afforded by the United Stat es, in respect of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions, to Mexican products than to like products originating in the United States or in any other
country.
(b) Whether the products at issue are like
7.213 As described above, Mexico cons iders that Mexican tuna products are "like" tuna products of
US origin and tuna products originating in any othe r country. The United States does not dispute this
determination. Nonetheless, we must ascertain that this condition is met, to discharge our duty of

making an objective assessment of the matter befo re us in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU. 365
We also note that it is for the party asserting a fact or claim to bear the burden of proving this fact or
claim
366, and that it is therefore for Mexico to put fo rward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption
that the tuna products at issue are "like".
7.214 In order to ascertain whether Mexico has demons trated that Mexican tuna products and tuna
products originating in any other country are "like" , we must first clarify the meaning of the terms
"like products" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
Meaning of the term "like products" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
7.215 Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU and as describ ed earlier, we must interpret the terms "like
products" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreemen t in accordance with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.
7.216 Mexico recalls the Appellate Body's rulings on the need to interpret the term "like products"
in light of the context and of the object and purpo se of the provision at issue and of the object and
purpose of the covered agreement in which the provision appears. 367 In light of these rulings, Mexico
concludes that it is appropriate to give the te rm the same meaning under Article III:4 of the GATT
and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Thus, as stat ed in Mexico's First Written Submission, the four
criteria used to determine likeness under Article III:4 should be used to determine likeness under
Article 2.1."368
7.217 Mexico also observes 369 that the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos explained that "a
determination of 'likeness' under Article III:4 is, fu ndamentally, a determination about the nature and
extent of a competitive relati onship between and among products" 370 and that "the scope of 'like' in
Article III:4 is broader than the scope of 'like' in Article III:2, first sentence. 371 Further, Mexico notes
that the Appellate Body in the same dispute also "observed that the Report of the Working Party on
Border Tax Adjustments outlined an approach for analyzing 'likeness' that has been followed and
developed since by several panels and the Appellate Body."372
7.218 The United States observes that an analysis of "likeness" and "less favourable treatment"
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should not be exactly the same as under Article III:4 of the

365 We note that this approach has been adopted by previous panels. In US – Anti-Dumping Measures
on PET Bags, the Panel thus noted:
"Notwithstanding the United States' decision not to co ntest Thailand's claim, we consider that we are
still bound by Article 11 of the DSU to make an "objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements".
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on PET Bags, para. 7.5.
366 "Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presum ption that what is claimed is
true, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption." Appellate Body
Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
367 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products , WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, paragraphs 88-89. (Mexico's
response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), fn 77).
368 Mexico's first written submission, para. 259; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b),
para. 175.
369 Mexico's first written submission, para. 146.
370 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC –Asbestos, para. 99.
371 (footnote original) Id.
372 (footnote original) Id., para. 101.

GATT 1994 as there are important textual and contextual differences between the two.
373 T h e
United States acknowledges that a determinati on of likeness under Article III:4 is essentially a
determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among products.
However, it offers no specific views on how the interpretation of the term "like products" in
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement might differ or not from that of the same term in Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994.
7.219 We first note that the terms "like products" a ppear in a number of provisions in the covered
agreements, including the non-discrimination obligations of Articles I:1, II:2, III:2 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994 and that panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted these terms in some of these
provisions. We note in this respect the Appellate Body's observation that:
"[W]hile the meaning attributed to the term 'like products' in other provisions of the
GATT 1994, or in other covered agreements, may be relevant context in interpreting
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the interpre tation of 'like products' in Article III:4
need not be identical, in all respects, to those other meanings."374
7.220 Similarly, the interpretation of the term "lik e products" in other provisions of the covered
agreements may provide relevant c ontext and guidance in interpreting the same term in Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement, but it need not be assumed that th is term must be interpreted identically in all
respects in both provisions. Rather, as expressed by the Appellate Body, "[i]n each of the provisions
where the term "like products" is used, the term must be interpreted in light of the context, and of the
object and purpose, of the covered agreement in which the provision appears".375
7.221 Dictionary definitions of the term "like" point to "[h]aving the same characteristics or
qualities as some other person or thing; of approximately identical shape, size, colour, character, etc.,
with something else; similar; resembling; analogous". 376 This suggests that products would be "like"
when they share common "characteristics or qualities" and resemble each other. However, as
observed by the Appellate Body, this dictionary definition alone does not resolve all issues of
interpretation, as it does not indicate which charact eristics or qualities are important, the degree to
which products must share such characteristic or qu alities, or from whose perspective this is to be
assessed.
377 The Appellate Body has thus compared the concept of "likeness" to an "accordion":
"The concept of 'likeness' is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The
accordion of 'likeness' stretches and squeezes in different places as different
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one
of those places must be determined by the pa rticular provision in which the term 'like'

373 United States' response to Panel question No. 58(a) and (b), para. 132.
374 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 89.
375 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 88.
376 Oxford English Dictionary online, at www.oed.com.
377 "First, this dictionary definition of 'like' does not indicate which characteristics or qualities are
important in assessing the 'likeness' of products under Article III:4. For instance, most products will have many
qualities and characteristics, ranging from physical proper ties such as composition, size, shape, texture, and
possibly taste and smell, to the end-uses and applications of the product. Second, this dictionary definition
provides no guidance in determining the degree or extent to which products must share qualities or
characteristics in order to be 'like products' under Article III:4. Products may share only very few characteristics
or qualities, or they may share many. Thus, in the abstract, the term 'like' can encompass a spectrum of differing
degrees of 'likeness' or 'similar ity'. Third, this dictionary definition of 'like' does not indicate from whose
perspective 'likeness' should be judged. For instance, ultimate consumers may have a view about the 'likeness' of
two products that is very different from that of the inventors or producers of those products." Appellate Body
Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 92.

is encountered as well as by the context a nd the circumstances that prevail in any
given case to which that provision may apply. …" 378
7.222 Accordingly, our understanding of how narro wly or broadly the accordion of likeness
"stretches and squeezes" for the purposes of our examination of Mexico's claims under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement in this case or, in other words, the "degree or extent to which products must share
qualities or characteristics" and the perspective from whic h this is to be examined in the case at hand,
must be informed by the fact that our examination takes place under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, as well as by the context and circumstances that prevail in this case.
7.223 We also note that the terms of this provision very closely mirror those of Article III:4, the
national treatment obligation in the GATT 1994, so that it may be possible to seek guidance from the
interpretation of that provision. At the same time, we are mindful that Article 2 of the
TBT Agreement does not contain an introductory paragraph comparable to Article III:1 of the
GATT 1994, setting out a "general principle" that would inform our understanding of the exact degree
or extent to which products must share qualities or characteristics so as to be considered like in the
context of Article 2, and the perspective from whic h this is to be examined. In the context of
Article III:4, the Appellate Body determined that:
"As products that are in a competitive relationship in the marketplace could be
affected through treatment of imports 'less favourable' than the treatment accorded to
domestic products, it follows that the word 'like' in Article III:4 is to be interpreted to
apply to products that are in such a compe titive relationship. Thus, a determination of
'likeness' under Article III:4 is, fundamenta lly, a determination about the nature and
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products."
379
7.224 Although this statement was made in the context of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, we find it
pertinent also to an interpretation of the terms "like products" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.225 The TBT Agreement applies to a limited set of measures, and our understa nding of its terms,
including the terms "like products" must be informed by this context. As expressed in the preamble
of the TBT Agreement, this Agreement reflects the intention of the negotiators to:
"[E]nsure that technical regulations and st andards, including packaging, marking and
labelling requirements, and procedures for as sessment of conformity with technical
regulations and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade."
To the extent that Article 2.1 contributes to a voiding "unnecessary obstacles to trade" arising from
undue discrimination with respect to technical regulations, it seeks to preserve the competitive
opportunities of products originating in any Member, in relation to t echnical regulations. Thus, the
term "like products" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement may be similarly understood as relating
to "the nature and extent of a competitive relationship" between and among products.

7.226 We further note, as the Appellate Body did in re lation to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, that
this does not necessarily imply that Members ma y not draw any regulatory distinctions, under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, between products th at have been determined to be like products.
380

378 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 21 (DSR 1996:I, p. 97 at 114).
379 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 99.
380 In EC – Asbestos the Appellate Body found that "… a Member may draw distinctions between
products which have been found to be 'like', without, for this reason alone, according to the group of 'like'

The question of the treatment to be given to prod ucts that are like is addressed separately in the
requirement of not affording treatment less favourable , which we consider in the next Section of our
Report.
7.227 With these determinations in mind, we now c onsider whether Mexican tuna products are like
tuna products of other origins, within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement . As a
preliminary matter, we must clarify what products are to be compared for the purposes of this
analysis.
Products at issue
7.228 In its request for the establishment of a pane l, Mexico refers to measures concerning the
importation, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products. 381 In its first written submission, Mexico
similarly identified the subject products as tuna and tuna products, and analysed the likeness under
Article III:4 of Mexican and US tuna and tuna products.382
7.229 In this context, Mexico explained that "t una" includes all species of tuna purchased by
canneries for processing into tuna products includi ng yellowfin, albacore, and skipjack, and "tuna
products" are defined in Section 1385(c)(5) as "a f ood item which contains tuna and which has been
processed for retail sale, except peri shable sandwiches, salads, or other products with a shelf life of
less than 3 days". 383 The most common form of tuna products, Mexico explained, is "tuna in retail-
ready cans or pouches."384
7.230 With reference to a US court decision, Mexico further explained that fresh tuna caught by
US flag vessels in international wa ters is of US origin, tuna caught by Mexican vessels is of Mexican
origin, and tuna caught by the vessels of other co untries take the origin of the flag country in
question.385 With reference to NAFTA rules of origin, Mexico also explained that the country where
processing occurs is the country of origin of a tuna product.386 In response to a question by the Panel,
the United States confirmed that in general, for tu na processed into canned or pouched tuna products ,
the country where the tuna is processed is the country of origin for that tuna product under the
US law.387 For tuna, the United States stated that the origin of tuna is not determined by where it was
caught but by the flag of the vessel that caught it.388
7.231 The Panel sought a clarification from both par ties whether the comparison for the likeness
analysis was between US and Mexican tuna in ge neral, between Mexican tuna caught in the ETP by

imported products 'less favourable treatment' than that accorded to the group of 'like' domestic products.
"Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100.
381 Mexico's request for the establishment of a Panel, WT/DS381/4.
382 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 114-120.
383 (footnote original) See Appendix A.
384 (footnote original) See e.g. : Starkist – http://www.starkist.com/template.asp?section=products
/index.html (Exhibit MEX-54); Bumble Bee – http://www.bumblebee.com/Products/Family/?Family_ID=1; and
Chicken of the Sea – http://chickenofthes ea.com/product_line_list.aspx?FID=3 and
http://chickenofthesea.com/product_line_list. aspx?FID=11 (Exhibit MEX-50).
385 Mexico's first written submission, para. 118.
386 Mexico's first written submission, para. 119.
387 United States' response to Panel question No. 112, fn 48. (footnote original) Rules of origin for fish
and fish products are codified in the U.S. tariff schedule. See, e.g., Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (2010), General Note 12(b) and 12(n)(v) for North American Free Trade Agreement rule of origin
for fish, Exhibit US-56.
388 United States' response to Panel question No.15 (a), para, 44.

setting on dolphins and US tuna caught otherwise, or between US dolphin-safe tuna and Mexican
dolphin-safe tuna.389
7.232 Mexico responded that the relevant products are Mexican and US tuna products in general. In
addition it observed that the method of fishing and geographic region in which the tuna are caught are
unincorporated PPMs that are not releva nt to the like products determination. 390 The United States in
turn clarified that the like products analysis unde r Article III:4 should compare US tuna products in
general and imported tuna products in general. 391 In its second written submission, Mexico also
referred to tuna products rather than tuna and tuna products. In light of Mexico's response, the Panel
asked Mexico to clarify further whether it was no longer seeking findings on tuna as distinct from
tuna products.
392 Mexico confirmed that its claims are lim ited to findings concerning tuna products,
specifying that the great majority of Mexican tuna products are made from tuna caught by the
Mexican fleet.393
7.233 In light of these clarifications, we understand Mexico to be seeking findings in relation to
tuna products and not in relation to tuna as such. Accordingly, the products to be compared for the
purposes of determining their likeness are US tuna products and Mexican tuna products, as well as
tuna products originating in any other country.
7.234 We also observe that Mexico has explained that although its challenge applies in respect of all
tuna products, for the purpose of demonstrating th e violation, it would use the most common tuna
product, which is tuna meat packag ed in retail ready cans and pouches. 394 Accordingly, we consider
Mexico's analysis in respect of these specific tuna products and our findings relate to these products.
Whether Mexican tuna products are like tuna pr oducts originating in the United States or any
other country
7.235 To demonstrate that Mexican tuna products and tuna products originating in the United States
or any other country are like, Mexico has follo wed the approach derived from the GATT Working
Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments. This approach is based on an analysis of four general
criteria, reflecting "four categories of 'characteristic s' that the products involved might share: (i) the
physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the
same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to wh ich consumers perceive and treat the products as
alternative means of performing par ticular functions in order to satis fy a particular want or demand;
and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes".
7.236 From this analysis, Mexico concludes that Me xican and US tuna products directly compete
against each other in the US wholesale, distribution and retail market and that similarly, Mexican and
US tuna directly compete against each other in the US cannery market. 395 It states that all relevant
evidence supports a finding that Mexican a nd US tuna products and tuna are like. 396 Mexico
underlines the panel's duty to "examine the evidence re lating to each of those four criteria and, then,

389 Panel question No. 74.
390 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 74, paras. 272-273.
391 United States' response to Panel question No. 74, para. 160.
392 Panel question No. 144.
393 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 144, paras. 119-120.
394 Mexico's first written submission, para. 147
395 Mexico's first written submission para. 153.
396 Mexico's first written submission para. 154.

weigh all of that evidence, along with any other relevant evidence, in making an overall determination
of whether the products at issue could be characterized as 'like'."
397
7.237 The United States does not address Mexico's asser tion that US and Mexi can tuna and tuna
products are "like" for the purposes of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Rather, it argues that the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions neither modify th e conditions of competition to the detriment of
Mexican tuna nor give a competitive advantage to US tuna and tuna products, insofar as they apply to
any tuna and tuna products regardless of their origin.398
7.238 We first note that the four general criteria u sed by Mexico as basis for its likeness analysis
have been endorsed by the Appellate Body as "tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the
relevant evidence"399 for the purposes of determining "likeness" in the context of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994. In that context, the Appellate Body also observed that "in this determination, '[n]o one
approach … will be appropriate for all cases'. 400 Rather, an assessment utilizing 'an unavoidable
element of individual, discretionary judgment' 401 has to be made on a case-by-case basis." We note in
this respect that the Appellate Body has also determined that:
"The kind of evidence to be examined in assessing the 'likeness' of products will,
necessarily, depend upon the particular pr oducts and the legal provision at issue.
When all the relevant evidence has been examined, panels must determine whether
that evidence, as a whole, indicates that the pr oducts in question are 'like' in terms of
the legal provision at issue."402
7.239 Similarly, in the context of an examination of likeness for the purposes of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, not only the provision to be applied, but also "the context and the circumstances that
prevail in any given case to which that provision ma y apply" have a bearing on the identification of
the appropriate approach.
7.240 In light of our earlier conclusions in paragra ph 7.223 above, and in the circumstances of this
case, we find it a priori appropriate to consider the four genera l criteria used by Mexico, to determine
whether Mexican and other tuna products are like within the meaning of Article 2.1 of
TBT Agreement. These elements are apt to provide information about the extent and nature of the
similarities between these products, so as to ascertain the nature a nd extent of their (actual or
expected) competitive relationship.
7.241 We take note also of the Appellate Body's obser vation, in the context of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 that "the adoption of a particular framewo rk to aid in the examination of evidence does
not dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all of the pertinent evidence". 403 T h i s
consideration applies similarly in the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.242 Mexico first submits that the physical proper ties of Mexican tuna products are identical to
those of US tuna products insofar as the products from both WTO Members comprise tuna meat in a
retail-ready package. Mexico further observes th at canned and pouched tuna meat from the various
tuna species compete against each other in the US tuna market, confirmation of this is that the largest

397 (footnote original) Id., para. 109.
398 United States' first written submission, para. 104.
399 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.
400 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.114.
401 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.113.
402 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 101–103.
403 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.

seller of tuna products in the United Stat es packages various species of tuna meat. 404 Mexico also
observes that, to the extent that there are physical differences in the species of the tuna meat, such
differences do not materially affect the competiti ve relationship between Mexican and US tuna
products because Mexican and certain US tuna products contain tuna meat from identical tuna species
such as yellowfin tuna and canned and pouched tu na meat from the various tuna species compete
against each other in the US market.405
7.243 It is not disputed that the physical characteristics and properties of Mexican tuna products and
of tuna products of US origin and tuna products or iginating in any other country are identical, in that
they all similarly contain tuna. The information cited in Mexico's submission suggests that tuna
products may be made from a variety of tuna species 406 We note in this respect that, in other parts of
its arguments, Mexico suggested that some speci es of tuna have more commercial value than
others.407 However, neither party has suggested or demonstrated that these various products would not
be in competition on the same market as a result, or that such variations would have an impact on the
extent to which Mexican and US tuna products comp ete with each other on the US market, such as to
make them unlike for the purposes of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.408
7.244 Mexico further observes that the end uses of Mexican tuna products and tuna products of
US or other origin are identical, insofar as tuna products are destined for consumption by final
consumers.409 We note that it is not disputed that US and Mexican tuna products have the same end
uses. We also note that it is not disputed that Mexican tuna products and tuna products from third
countries have the same end uses.
7.245 Mexico also observes that Mexican and US t una products and tuna are classified under the
same tariff subheading 1604.14 of the Harmonized System, which relates to "Tunas, Skipjack and
Bonito (Sarda Spp.) (Prepared or Preserved)". 410 That the tariff classification is identical for prepared

404 (footnote original) See http://www.starkist.com/template.asp?section=products/index.html.
Exhibit MEX-54.
405 Mexico's first written submission, para. 148.
406 "Classic" tuna products are made of chunk light tuna, chunk or solid white albacore tuna; "gourmet"
tuna products are made of select chunk light tuna. solid light tuna, yellowfin tuna and solid white albacore, see
http://www.starkist.com/template.asp?section=products/index.html. (Mexico's first written submission, fn 100).
407 See in particular Mexico's response to Panel question No.24 and 38 of the Panel, at fn 26 and
para. 43.
408 We note in this respect the observations of the Appellate Body, in the context of the second sentence
of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994, to the effect that a degree of variation is inevitable in the context of grouping
products for the purposes of a determination of whether they are "directly competitive or substitutable" under
that provision. Similarly, an assessment of "likeness" may involve a grouping of products with some degree of
variation in features. The key point, however, is to as certain whether these products are "like" the domestic
products to which they are being compared:
"… Some grouping is almost always necessary in cases arising under Article III:2, second
sentence, since generic categories commonly in clude products with some variation in
composition, quality, function and price, and thus commonly give rise to sub-categories. From
a slightly different perspective, we note that "grouping" of products involves at least a
preliminary characterization by the treaty interpreter that certa in products are sufficiently
similar as to, for instance, composition, quality, function and price, to warrant treating them as
a group for convenience in analysis. But, the use of such "analytical tools" does not relieve a
panel of its duty to make an objective assessment of whether the components of a group of
imported products are directly competitive or substitutable with the domestic products. …
Whether, and to what extent, products can be grouped is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case
basis." (Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 142-143).
409 Mexico's first written submission para. 150.
410 Mexico's first written submission, para. 152 and fn 102.

or preserved tuna of all species confirms that tuna products made from different species are, for
commercial purposes, in essence the same product.
7.246 In sum, an analysis of the first three Border Tax Adjustment criteria suggests that the products
at issue share common physical characteristics and properties, end uses and tariff classifications.
Indeed, they are in essence the same products, processed in a different country.
7.247 The fourth and final "general criterion" cons idered by Mexico is "consumer preferences",
which the Appellate Body has defined in the contex t of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 as the "extent
to which consumers are – or would be – willing to choose one product instead of another to perform
those end-uses".
411 Mexico considers that, but for the regulator y distinction that is at the core of the
dispute, consumers' tastes and habits are identical with respect to Mexican and US tuna products and
tuna.412 The United States does not challenge this conclusion.
7.248 We note that the European Union, in its thir d party submission, observed that the elements
presented to the Panel suggest that there may be di fferent consumer perceptions and preferences with
respect to dolphin-safe and not dolphin-safe tuna and t una products, and that this may have an impact
on whether the two types of products are like.413
7.249 The information presented to the Panel does suggest that US consumers have certain
preferences with respect to tuna products, based on their dolphin-safe status, and we do not exclude
that such preferences may be relevant to an assess ment of likeness. To the extent that consumer
preferences, including preferences relating to the manner in which the product has been obtained, may
have an impact on the competitive relations hip between these products, we consider it a priori
relevant to take them into consid eration in an assessment of the likeness. 414 However, we are not
persuaded that, in the circumstances of this case, a consideration of US consumer preferences relating
to the dolphin-safe status of tuna products should lead us to modify our conclusion with respect to the
likeness of US and Mexican tuna products and tuna products originating in any other country.
7.250 The basis for our analysis is a comparison between Mexican tuna products and tuna products
of US origin and tuna products originating in any other country, not between dolphin-safe and not
dolphin-safe tuna. A comparison on the basis of dol phin-safe status would imply that Mexican tuna
products are assumed not to be dolphin-safe while US tuna products and tuna products originating in
any other country would be assume d to be dolphin-safe. However, we see no basis for making such

411 Appellate Body Report, EC— Asbestos , para. 117.
412 Mexico's first written submission para. 151.
413 European Union's third party written submission, para. 28.
414 In EC – Asbestos, the European Communities had requested the Appellate Body to find the Panel's
approach had misconstrued the relationship between Articles III:4 and XX of the GATT 1994 by requiring the
likeness of two products be determined solely on the basis of commercial factors. In the EC's view, "If non-
commercial considerations may only be considered at the Article XX stage of the analysis, then the list of policy
for which regulators may distinguish between products is unduly limited to the categories listed in Article XX."
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel that consid ering evidence relating to the health risks associated
with a product, under Article III:4, nullifies the effect of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. It stated that "The
scope and meaning of Article III:4 should not be broadened or restricted beyond what is required by the normal
customary international law rules of treaty interpretation, simply because Article XX(b) exists and may be
available to justify measures inconsistent with Article III:4. The fact that an interpretation of Article III:4, under
those rules, implied a less frequent recourse to Article XX(b) does not deprive the exception in Article XX(b) of
effet utile." Evaluating evidence relating to the health risks arising from the physical properties of a product does
not, in the Appellate Body's opinion, prevent a measur e which is inconsistent with Article III:4 from being
justified under Article XX(b). The Appellate Body found the Panel erred in excluding the health risks associated
with chrysotile asbestos fibres from its examination of the physical properties of that product. Appellate Body
Report in EC – Asbestos, paras. 34 , 115 and 116.

an assumption at this stage of our analysis. 415 We also note that it has not been suggested that, to the
extent that US consumers would distinguish be tween different tuna products based on their
dolphin-safe status, they would not apply this distinction to all tuna products, whatever their origin.
As observed by Mexico, the preferences of US cons umers are identical, in respect of US and Mexican
tuna products and indeed, tuna pr oducts originating in any other country. In light of these elements,
we find that an examination of US consumer preferences in relation to the dolphin-safe status of tuna
products does not modify our conclusion that Mexi can tuna products are like tuna products of
US origin and tuna products originating in any other country.
7.251 We therefore conclude that Mexico has establis hed that Mexican tuna products are like tuna
products of US origin and tuna products origina ting in any other country within the meaning of
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
(c) Whether Mexican tuna products are afforded l ess favourable treatment than tuna products
originating in the United States and other countries in respect of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions
7.252 Having determined that Mexican tuna products a nd tuna products of US and other origins are
like products within the meaning of Article 2.1, we must now determine whether Mexican tuna
products are afforded less favourable treatment than tuna products of US and other origins in respect
of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.253 In its first written submission,
416 Mexico explained that the le ss favourable treatment arising
from the measures is a result of the following:
(a) Mexican tuna are almost exclusively caught in the ETP using purse seine nets set on
dolphins; Mexican tuna products containi ng this tuna cannot be designated as
dolphin-safe although the Mexican fleet compli es with the stringent requirements of
AIDCP;
(b) the US fleet fishes outside the ETP using other methods such as setting on FADs;
tuna products containing this tuna can be labelled dolphin-safe under the measures,
even where marine mammal mortality mi ght have occurred and bycatch reduction
might be compromised;
(c) accordingly, Mexican tuna products cannot be labelled dolphin-safe while US tuna
products can;
(d) it is established that participants in the US market are sensitive to "issues related to
dolphin mortality" and will make decisions on the basis of whether the products are
designated as dolphin-safe. Most participants will not purchase tuna products that are
not designated as dolphin-safe;

415 Indeed, such an assumption would imply that "dolphin-safe" tuna is defined as meaning exclusively
what the US measures at issue define it to mean, i.e. inter alia, tuna caught without setting on dolphins. This
definition is, however, disputed between the parties. Furthermore, as observed by the United States and
acknowledged by Mexico, not all of the tuna of Mexican origin is caught by setting on dolphins.
416 Mexico's first written submission, para. 165.

(e) accordingly, most US market participants will not purchase, offer for sale, distribute
or use Mexican tuna products but will pur chase US tuna products. The US measures
prevent Mexico and Mexican tuna indus try from taking action to re-balance the
competitive opportunities between Mexican a nd like US tuna products by labelling
their tuna products as dolphin-safe and prom oting the integrity and legitimacy of the
AIDCP standard;
(f) although the measures apply to tuna products , they have an indirect discriminatory
effect on Mexican tuna, because canneries will not accept Mexican tuna for
processing.
7.254 Subsequently, as we have clarified, Mexico e xpressly limited its claims to tuna products and
not tuna. As we understand it, therefore, the fina l element identified in (f) is no longer relevant to
Mexico's claim.
7.255 In its rebuttal submission, Mexico also clarifies that its discrimination claims "are not
dependant on demonstrating that the treatment of ETP and non-ETP fisheries is different" and that
"the factual basis of Mexico's discrimination claims is that the prohibition against the use of the
dolphin-safe label on most Mexican tuna products denies competitive opportunities to those products
compared to like product from the United States and other countries".
417
7.256 The United States argues that Mexico has failed to establish that the origin-neutral conditions
(the manner or the place in which the tuna was cau ght) under which tuna pr oducts may be labelled
dolphin-safe do actually accord different treatment to imported tuna products. Specifically, the
United States argues that Mexico has not adduced evidence to show that the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions – although origin neutral on their face – in fact use the manner or the place in which the
tuna was caught to single out imports. On th e contrary the evidence leads to the opposite
conclusion.
418
7.257 The United States considers that Mexico has failed to establish that the origin-neutral
conditions under which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe in fact accord different treatment
to imported tuna products. The United States considers in particular the following aspects:
(a) the overwhelming majority of tuna produc ts on the US market are imported and the
vast majority of those products are not caught by setting on dolphins419;
(b) Mexican vessels use methods other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna420;
(c) US vessels set on dolphins to catch tuna at the time the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were enacted421;
(d) that Mexican vessels fish in the ETP is not a basis to argue that the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions accord different treatment to Mexican tuna products; 422 a n d
finally

417 Mexico's second written submission, para. 150.
418 United States' second written submission, para. 21.
419 United States' second written submission, paras. 22-23.
420 United States' second written submission, paras. 24-27.
421 United States' second written submission, para. 28.
422 United States' second written submission, paras. 29-32.

(e) there is no evidence that the objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions is
to afford protection to domestic production.
7.258 The United States also explains why, in its view, to the extent that there are any differences in
documentation required to substan tiate dolphin-safe claims, they are calibrated to the risk that
dolphins may be killed or seriously injured when tuna is caught.423 In the US view, dolphin mortalities
outside the ETP are not comparable to dolphin mortalities and injury in the ETP. 424 The United States
further considers that the structure of the statute shows a clear relationship with its stated objectives
and does not support the conclusion that the dolphin- safe labelling conditions are applied in a manner
so as to afford protection.425
7.259 As far as the MFN component of its claim is concerned, Mexico refers to its arguments
presented under Articles I:1 and III: 4 of the GATT on the basis that "[t]his provision of the
TBT Agreement imposes national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment obligations on
technical regulations. It is similar to the natio nal treatment obligation in Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, except that it applies both national treat ment and most-favoured-nation obligations. Like
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 prohibits both de jure discrimination and de facto
discrimination".426
7.260 In that respect, Mexico observes, as in resp ect of its claim under Article III:4, that the
US measures do not, on their face, discriminate on the basis of the foreign country that is the source of
particular tuna and tuna products; rather, they discr iminate on the basis of where the tuna is harvested
and the fishing method. But this has the effect of favouring tuna and tuna products from some
countries over others because different countries ha rvest tuna in different ocean fisheries using
different fishing methods.
427 In its opinion, by reflecting the longstanding fishing practice of the
Mexican fishery, whilst the fleets of other countri es fish outside of the ETP using other fishing
methods such as purse-seine nets that are set upon FADs, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
de facto discriminate against Mexican tuna insofar as tuna products that contain tuna originating from
these countries' fleets can be designated as dolphin- safe and a dolphin-safe label can be affixed to
those products whilst Mexican tuna products cannot be designated as dolphin-safe.
7.261 Given the preference of the US market for products labelled as safe, Mexico asserts that the
US measures prevent Mexico and the Mexican tuna industry from taking action to re-balance the
competitive opportunities between Mexican tuna pr oducts and like products originating in other
countries by labelling their tuna products as dolphi n-safe and promoting the legitimacy and integrity
of the AIDCP standards, which in its view, has led to a situation whereby tuna and tuna products from
certain countries are prevalent in the US market, wh ile it is not commercially viable to sell imported
Mexican tuna products in the US market.428
7.262 Mexico concludes that due to the lack of dol phin-safe designation, fish canneries located in
other WTO Members will not accept Mexican tuna for processing into tuna products. These canneries
will, however, accept tuna in other countries that can be designated dolphin-safe once processed.
Therefore, for the same reasons as the one alleged under Article I:1 of the GATT, the US measures do

423 United States' second written submission, para. 38.
424 United States' second written submission, paras. 33-36.
425 United States response to Panel question No. 150, para. 106.
426 Mexico's first written submission, para.256.
427 Mexico's first written submission, para. 185.
428 Mexico's first written submission, para. 185.

not accord products imported from the territory of any Member (namely, Mexico) treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products originating in any other country.
429
7.263 According to the United States, the US dolph in-safe labelling provisions do not afford less
favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products vis-à-vis products of other origin insofar as they afford
the use of the dolphin-safe label equally to all tuna products that meet the conditions set out in those
provisions and deny that possibility equally to all tu na products that fail to meet those conditions. In
the United States' view, the fact that the US dol phin-safe labelling provisions prohibit tuna products
containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins – a t echnique that some Mexican vessels happen to use
– does not mean that the US provisions afford le ss favourable treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna
products. Instead, it means that Mexican vessels have chosen to set on dolphins to catch tuna and,
because of that choice, tuna products that contai n tuna caught by setting on dolphins by those vessels
do not meet the conditions necessary to use the dolphin-safe label, just as tuna products containing
tuna caught by vessels flagged to any other count ry, including the United States, do not meet the
conditions necessary to use the dolphin-safe label.
430
7.264 In response to a question by the Panel on whet her less favourable treatment under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement should be assumed to have exactly th e same contours as the same analysis
under Article III:4 of GATT 1994, Mexico noted th at the provision contains two non-discrimination
obligations applicable to technical regulations, one that is similar to the national treatment obligation
in Article III:4 and the other that is similar to the most-favoured-nation obligation in Article I:1,
although the language used in Article 2.1 is diffe rent from that used in Articles III:4 and I:1. 431 It
observed however that the immediate context of the term "treatment no less favourable" is identical in
Articles III:4 and 2.1 and that therefore, it is appr opriate to give the term the same meaning under
both provisions.432 In its view, it is crucial that the term "treatment no less favourable" in Article 2.1 is
interpreted and applied with re ference to the equality of competitive opportunities for imported
products as compared to like domestic products. Mexi co contends that such competitive opportunities
can be affected in a variety of ways, not only by measures directly regulating products and restricting
imports but by those that indirectly affect imports . In that regard, the concept of the equality of
competitive opportunities is flexible and protects the integrity of the non-discrimination obligations in
a broad range of factual circumstances, Mexico says.433
7.265 For that reason, Mexico concludes that the assessment for "treatment no less favourable" in
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should be th e same as under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 i.e.,
whether a measure modifies the conditions of compe tition in the relevant market to the detriment of
imported products. 434 Mexico acknowledges the different la nguage used in Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement but however notes that while the language in the
two provisions differs, both set out the MFN treatment obligations which is a cornerstone of the
GATT and one of the pillars of the WTO trading system.
435 Mexico finally recalls that Article I:1
protects the competitive opportunities of imported products, not trade flows and it imposes upon
WTO Members the obligation to treat like foreign pr oducts equally, irrespective of their origin and
that it is in the sense of the protection of competitive opportunities for imported products from one
WTO Member vis-à-vis like products from other WTO Members that the jurisprudence interpreting

429 Mexico's first written submission, para. 261.
430 United States' first written submission, para. 108.
431 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a), para 172.
432 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a), para 176.
433 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a), para 177.
434 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a), para. 178.
435 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a),para. 180.

the obligation in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is rele vant to the interpretation of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.436
7.266 In response, the United States emphasizes the text ual differences between Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement which it argues should be taken into account
when interpreting Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement respectively. It
holds that with respect to the U.S. arguments in connection with Mexico's claim under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement, Mexico did not present any evidence or argument in support of that claim that
differed from the evidence and argument it presented in connection with its claims under Article I:1 or
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, whereas the United States has demonstrated in its response to
Mexico's claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 that those claims are without merit.437
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.267 We must first clarify the meaning of the terms "less favourable treatment" in Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, before turning to a consideration of whether, in the present case, such less
favourable treatment is afforded to Mexican t una products with respect to the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions.
Meaning of "less favourable treatment" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
7.268 To recall, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides:
"Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, pr oducts imported
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national or igin and to like pro ducts originating in
any other country." (emphasis added).
7.269 As previously, we must interpret the terms "l ess favourable treatment" in this provision in
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public inte rnational law, which direct the
interpreter to determine the ordinary meaning of the terms, taken in their context, and in light of the
object and purpose of the treaty.
7.270 We note that the term "less favourable treatment ", like the term "like products", appears in
more than one provision of the covered agreements, and has previously been interpreted in the context
of some of these provisions, including Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and, to some extent, Article II
of the GATS. 438 We also note that these terms fulfil, in these various provisions, a comparable
function, i.e. they define the content of a non- discrimination obligation (e.g. MFN in the case of
Article II of the GATS, and national treatment in the context of Article III:4). Interpretations of the
same term in these other provisions may therefore pr ovide useful guidance for its interpretation in the
context of the TBT Agreement.
7.271 At the same time, as previously, we are mindful that the same terms may not have exactly the
same contours in various provisions of different c overed agreements, and that we must interpret the

436 Mexico's response to Panel's question No. 58(a),paras, 181-182.
437 United States' response to Panel's question No. 58 (a), para. 133.
438 See US – Gasoline (Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.10), Japan – Film (Panel Report, Japan –
Film, para. 10.379), Korea – Beef (Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef ,
paras. 135-137.), EC – Asbestos ( Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , para. 100), EC – Bananas III
(Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 231-234), Canada – Autos (Panel Report on Canada – Autos,
para. 10.254).

terms "less favourable treatment" in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement taking account of the specific
context in which they appear in this particular covered agreement. We note in this respect the
Appellate Body's observations concerning the inte rpretation of the MFN obligation contained in
Article II of the GATS, which is also expressed in terms of "less favourable treatment":
"The Panel interpreted Article II of the GATS in the light of panel reports interpreting
the national treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT. The Panel also referred
to Article XVII of the GATS, which is al so a national treatment obligation. But
Article II of the GATS relates to MFN treatment, not to national treatment.
Therefore, provisions elsewhere in th e GATS relating to national treatment
obligations, and previous GATT practice rela ting to the interpretation of the national
treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT 1994 are not necessarily relevant to
the interpretation of Article II of the GA TS. The Panel would have been on safer
ground had it compared the MFN obligation in Article II of the GATS with the MFN
and MFN-type obligations in the GATT 1994".
439
7.272 This observation suggests that the object of the specific provision at issue, as well as its
wording, must be given due consideration in interp reting the terms "less favourable treatment". This
is consistent with the requirements of the cust omary rules of interpretation, which require a
consideration of the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.
7.273 The relevant dictionary meanings of the word "treatment" suggest that it refers to the manner
in which something is addressed. 440 Dictionary definitions of the adjective "favourable" point to
something "positive", and a synonym is "advantageous". 441 The plain meaning of the term therefore
suggests that imports of any Member must not be d ealt with, in respect of technical regulations, in a
manner less advantageous, than the like products of national or any other foreign origin. Read in light
of the broader context of Article 2, less favourable treatment would arise "in respect of technical
regulations", if imported products originating in any Member were placed at a disadvantage,
compared to like domestic products and imported pr oducts originating in any other country, with
respect to the preparation, adoption or application of technical regulations.
7.274 This is consistent with the general concept ar ticulated by the Appellate Body that: "[t]he
essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated equally,
irrespective of their origin". 442 Although this statement was made in the context of an analysis of
Article I of the GATT 1994, in our view it sh eds light on the essence of non-discrimination
obligations in the covered agreements under Annex 1A generally (i.e. those agreements concerning
trade in goods), both MFN and national treatment.
7.275 In our view, such "equality" of treatment does not necessarily imply identity of treatment for
all products, but rather an absence of inequality to the detriment of imports from any Member. Here,
we see some commonality between this requirement and the non-discrimination obligations embodied
in Articles III:4 and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Under Article III:4, the Appellate Body thus
observed that:

439 ( footnote original ) In addition to Article I (the fundamental MFN provision of the GATT),
Articles III:7, IV(b), V:2 and V:5, IX:1 and XIII:1 are also MFN-type obligations in the GATT 1994. Appellate
Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 231.
440 Oxford English Dictionary Online, at www.oed.com.
441 Oxford English Dictionary Online, at www.oed.com.
442 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 190.

"[A] Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be
'like', without, for this reason alone, according to the group of 'like' imported products
'less favourable treatment' th an that accorded to the group of 'like' domestic
products."443
7.276 The same reasoning extends also to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The essence of the
measures covered under this provision is to set ou t certain product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods (or terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to products or relate d processes and production methods), that must be
complied with. Distinctions in treatment may theref ore arise in this context, but they must not be
designed or applied to the detriment of imports or imports of certain origins. In the context of
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, this question is also informed by the terms of the preamble, which
makes it clear that measures covered by the TBT Agre ement must not be "applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjus tifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail".
7.277 We also note that the obligation placed on Members is to " ensure that products ... shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable". This langua ge requires the achievement of "treatment no less
favourable", and not only "reasonable measures" to th at end, as is the case under Article 3 in relation
to technical regulations by local government bodies and non-governmental bodies.
7.278 In the light of these determinations, we now consider whether Mexican tuna products are
treated less favourably than US and/or other imported tuna pr oducts originating in any other country,
i.e. in essence, whether Mexican tuna products ar e at a disadvantage compared to tuna products
originating in the United States or in any other country, in respect of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions.
Whether less favourable treatment is afforded to Mexican tuna products than to tuna products
of US or originating in any other country
7.279 Mexico explains that the factual basis for its discrimination claim is that the "prohibition"
against the use of the dolphin-safe label on most Mexican tuna products denies competitive
opportunities to those products compared to like products from the United States and other
countries.444 As described above, Mexico explains that its products do not have access to the label
regulated by the measures, because Mexican tuna are caught "almost exclusively" in the ETP by
setting on dolphins, while US tuna products have access to the label, because the US fleet fishes
outside the ETP by other fishing methods. The "prohibition" that Mexico alleges therefore rests on an
assumption that its products fall under one (less desirable) regulatory category, i.e. tuna caught by
setting on dolphins, which is not eligible for the la bel under any circumstances, while those of the
United States and a number of other countries fall unde r another (more desirable) one, i.e. tuna caught
outside the ETP using other methods, which is eligible for the label.
7.280 In response to a question by the Panel concerni ng the basis for its claims, Mexico clarified
that its non-discrimination claims "are not dependant on demonstrati ng that the treatment of ETP and
non-ETP fisheries is different". 445 As we understand it, therefore, Mexico does not challenge any
differences in treatment arising from different re gulatory categories for tuna caught in different
fishing zones. Rather, Mexico's discrimination cl aim is based on the requirement of "no setting on

443 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100.
444 Mexico's second written submission, para. 150.
445 Mexico's response to Panel question No 145, para. 124.

dolphins" that conditions access to the US dolphin-safe label, wherever the fish is caught, and its
implications in practice for Mexican tuna products.
7.281 What Mexico argues, in essence, is that this distinction in fact operates so as to exclude most
Mexican tuna products from access to the label, wh ile most US tuna products and those of a number
of other countries, will benefit from it. As we unde rstand it, this argument rests on the following key
elements:
(a) that access to the label has a value on the mark etplace, such that it is an advantage to
have access to the label, and a disadvantage not to have access to it;
(b) that Mexican tuna products have no access (or virtually no access) to this added value
on the market, while US and other imported tuna products do, by virtue of the
different fishing practices of their respective fleets; and
(c) that, as a result, the measures modify the conditions of competition on the
marketplace to the detriment of Mexican tuna products.
7.282 With respect to the MFN component of its clai m, Mexico argues that the measures at issue
make the advantage of access to the label "subject to conditions with respect to the situation or
conduct of Mexico, and that these conditions discrim inate products from Mexico in favour of tuna
products of other countries".
446 It further argues that tuna products from "virtually all other countries,
including the two largest exporters Thailand and th e Philippines", are allowed to label their products
dolphin-safe, and that, by contrast, exporters of Mexican tuna products are not.447
7.283 As we have determined above, "less favourable treatment" would be afforded to Mexican tuna
products in respect of the measures if they were placed at a disadvantage compared to US and/or other
imported products with respect to the preparation, adoption or application of the US dolphin-safe
measures. Mexico's claim in the present case is that it is de facto deprived of the benefit of access to
the label, and thus at a competitive disadvantage on the US market because it fishes in the ETP by
setting on dolphins while the US and other fleets fish outside the ETP by other methods.
7.284 We agree that, to the extent that access to th e label would be an advantage granted by the
measures, and that Mexican tuna products were to be deprived of access to this advantage while US or
other imported tuna products or iginating in any other country had access to it, this would place
Mexican tuna products at a disadvantage on the US market and thus constitute "less favourable
treatment" within the meaning of Article 2.1 of th e TBT Agreement. We therefore must consider
whether (a) access to the label is an advantage and (b) Mexican tuna products are denied access to it
under the measures, so that they are disadvantaged on the US market as compared to US or imported
tuna products originating in any other country.
Whether access to the US dolphin-safe la bel constitutes an advantage on the
US market
7.285 As described in Section 7.53(c) above, the measures at issue do not require any tuna products
to be labelled "dolphin-safe", nor do they subject th e right to market tuna products on the US market
to meeting the conditions for the label. 448 Nonetheless, access to the label is controlled by compliance

446 Mexico's second written submission (Article I).
447 Mexico's opening oral statement at the second substantive meeting (Article I).
448 We note that the GATT 1947 US – Tuna panels examined embargoes on importation of tuna
products in addition to the dolphin safe labelling scheme.

with the terms of the measures. Therefore, to the ex tent that access to the label is an advantage on the
marketplace, this advantage is provided by th e measures themselves. The exact value of the
advantage provided by access to the label on the marketplace will depend on the commercial value
attributed to it by operators on the market, including retailers and final consumers.
7.286 The United States observes that its dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not impose any choice
on marketers of tuna products in terms of selling t una products in the United States, and that Mexico
has not identified anything in the provisions that would limit the marketing of tuna products that are
not dolphin-safe or are not labelled dolphin-safe. It argues that the limited demand for non-
dolphin-safe tuna products is a result of retailer and consumer preferences for dolphin-safe tuna
products, not the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
449
7.287 We agree with the United States that US consumers' decisions whether to purchase
dolphin-safe tuna products are the result of their own choices rather than of the measures. However,
as observed above, it is the measures themselves that control access to the label and allow consumers
to express their preferences for dolphin-safe tuna. An advantage is therefore afforded to products
eligible for the label by the measures, in the form of access to the label.450
7.288 We further note that it is undisputed that US consumers are sensitive to the dolphin-safe issue.
This is acknowledged by both Mexico and the United States 451, and is also confirmed by the evidence
presented with the amicus curiae brief to which the United States h as referred to in its answers to
questions.452 This evidence suggests that, following public campaigning by the environmental
organization "Earth Island Institute" in the late 1980s (including through film footage shot in 1987-88
showing the capture and killing of dolphins during a fishing trip where setting on dolphins was used),
tuna processors were under pressure to stop purchasing tuna caught in conditions that were harmful to
dolphins.453 The evidence presented to the Panel also s hows that major tuna processors reacted to
these dolphin-safe concerns, and that this led to cha nges in their purchasing policies as of April 1990.
These policies are still in place: such companies will not purchase tuna from vessels that fish in
association with dolphins.454
7.289 These elements suggest that the dolphin-safe la bel has a significant commercial value on the
US market for tuna products, as the only means through which dolphin-safe status can be claimed.
Indeed, the evidence that canners refuse to buy t una caught in association with dolphins suggest that
the pressure is sufficient to induce processors of t una products to avoid altogether tuna that would
make their final products ineligible for the label. While this is only indirect evidence as to the final
consumers' behaviours, it suggests that the producer s themselves assume that they would not be able
to sell tuna products that do not meet dolphin-safe requirements, or at least not at a price sufficient to
warrant their purchase.
7.290 In addition, Mexico has presented evidence concerning retailers' a nd final consumers'
preferences regarding tuna products. With respect to retailers, Mexico has presented an affidavit from
an officer of a US company selling Mexican canned tuna in the US market, in which it stated that for

449 United States' second written submission, para. 61.
450 See the panel's findings in Colombia – Ports of Entry , in the context of Article I, where an
"advantage" was granted in the form of "flexibility" to present import declarations in more favourable
conditions. See Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7.339-7.347.
451 Mexico's first written submission, para. 160 and response to Panel question No. 40 (b) United States'
response to Panel question No. 40 (a).
452 United States' response to Panel question No. 40(a), para. 98 which cites paras. 18-20, 25, 62-64 of
the amicus curiae brief which in turn refer to Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 attached to the amicus submission.
453 Exhibit Amicus curiae brief EX-2.
454 Exhibit US-32, Exhibit US-36 and Exhibit US-37.

several years the company attempted to sell Mexican tuna products in major US grocery chains which
have refused to buy the products because they were unable to sell the brand that was not eligible for
the dolphin-safe label. The affidavit provides evid ence that some of the major US chains have
expressly indicated that if the tuna product qualified to be labelled "dolphin-safe" they would sell it
and that the company's inability to place the "dolphin -safe" label on the cans has directly affected its
ability to sell the Mexican brand in the US.
455 This evidence confirms the value of the dolphin safe
label on the US market.
7.291 We therefore agree with Mexico that access to the label provides an advantage on the
US market. With this initial determination in mind, we now consider whether, as Mexico argues, its
tuna products are effectively denied access to the advantage provided by the label, while US and other
imported tuna products originating in any other country benefit from access.
Whether Mexican tuna products are denied access to the advantage offered by the
dolphin-safe label and are thereby disadvantaged, compared to tuna products
originating in the United States or in any other country
7.292 As described above, Mexico analyses the existenc e of less favourable treatment in terms of
comparing the treatment afforded to Mexican t una products made from tuna caught in the ETP by
setting on dolphins (not eligible for the label) and the treatment afforded to US tuna products made
from tuna caught by other methods (eligible for th e label) outside the ETP. Mexico's analysis is
therefore based on comparing the treatment currently received by most of its own tuna (which is
caught in conditions that do not entitle products made from it to the label) and that currently received
by most of the US tuna (caught in conditions that entitle products made from it to bear the label).
7.293 The United States, on the other hand, considers th at "the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
afford use of the dolphin-safe label equally to all t una products that meet the conditions set out in
those provisions and deny that possibility equally to all tuna products that fail to meet those
conditions".
456 This approach appears to assume that th e relevant comparison is whether within the
categories of tuna products entitled or not entitled to the label, there is any differentiated treatment
between Mexican tuna products and those products originating in the United States or in any other
country. However, Mexico's complaint lies in th e difference of treatment between products falling on
either side of the regulatory distinction, i.e. be tween products that are entitled to the label and those
that are not.
7.294 A comparison of treatment within each of the regulatory categories, although it may reveal
differences in treatment, cannot ther efore form the sole basis of the assessment of Mexico's claim in
this case. The analysis to be conducted must necessa rily, in this case, encompass a comparison of the
treatment afforded to imported products that have access to the label and domestic products that do
not have access to it. On the other hand, a comparison that considered only those imports that have no
access to the label and those domestic products that do have access to it may also be insufficient, if it
were to only reveal that some imports do not recei ve the better treatment afforded to some domestic
products.
7.295 In this respect, we find that the Appellate Body's suggestion, in EC – Asbestos , that an
enquiry into less favourable treatment involves a comparison of how the group of domestic like
products and the group of like imports are treated,
457 provides useful guidance. It suggests that the
starting point for the analysis should be the entire gr oups of both products identified as like products.

455 Exhibit MEX-58.
456 United States' first written submission, para. 109.
457 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100.

Accordingly, we approach this analysis on the b asis of a comparison between the treatment afforded
to the groups of US and Mexican tuna products as a whole, as well as Mexican tuna products
compared to tuna products originating in any other country, in order to assess the relative situation of
these products in respect of access to the dol phin-safe label regulated by the US dolphin-safe
provisions.
7.296 The parties have also debated the relevant timeframe for the assessment, and we therefore
find it useful to clarify this also as a preliminary matter.
7.297 The United States cites the panel report in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks in support of an
analysis of the measure at the time of its adoption, therefore comparing the impact the measure had on
domestic and imported like products at the time it was enacted rather than the actual trade effect the
measure has as of today on imported compared to domestic like products. Mexico objects to this
approach, arguing that the US measures violate th e non-discrimination provisions because their effect
is to adversely modify the conditions of competition in the US marketplace for Mexican tuna products
when compared to like tuna products from the Unite d States and other countries, and that such denial
of competitive opportunities is shown by the rele vant facts as they existed at the time of the
establishment of the Panel.
458 In particular, Mexico argues that it is not necessary for the Panel to
determine whether the US measures when introduced in 1990 de facto discriminated against Mexican
tuna products but that it must examine the fact s as of the date of the Panel's establishment and
determine whether, on the basis of those facts, there is de facto discrimination.459 Mexico also argues
that it is not possible, without a complete assessmen t of all relevant facts to determine whether there
was de facto discrimination at that time and hence it cannot be assumed that they were not de facto
discriminatory in 1990.460 Mexico also observes that the Europ ean Union's position as a third party in
the present dispute differs from its position in the context of the US – COOL dispute (DS386).461
7.298 Finally, Mexico considers that the unadopted GATT 1947 panel report in US – Tuna (Mexico)
further illustrates the importance of the Panel examin ing the facts as they existed at the time of its
establishment insofar as, at the time of the GATT 19 47 panel, the United States had a trade embargo
in place against Mexican tuna. As a result, Mexican tuna imports were blocked so there was no
factual basis upon which to assess the effects of the dolphin-safe labelling provisions in the
US market. In other words, there was no evidence of the de facto discrimination and trade-restrictive
effects of the challenged measures.
462 In Mexico's view, the de facto discriminatory and trade
restrictive effects are clearly occurring today and it is the existence of those effects that gives rise to
Mexico's request that the Panel rule upon its claims of de facto discrimination in this dispute.463
7.299 We first recall that our mandate requires us to consider the consistency of the measures in
accordance with our terms of reference. 464 These terms of reference are defined by Mexico's request

458 Mexico's second written submission, para. 132.
459 Mexico's second written submission, paras. 133134.
460 Mexico's second written submission, paras. 135.
461 Mexico explains that in US – COOL, the European Union argued, in response to an argument that
the Panel should consider historic facts that existed long before a Panel's establishment when assessing whether
de facto discrimination exists today, that the Panel must look at future facts insofar as "the immediate regulatory
shock" of a regulation does not, in itself, necessarily demonstrate less favourable treatment (see Mexico' rebuttal
submission, fn 88) (The Panel has not been provided with the European Union's third party submission in that
dispute).
462 Mexico's second written submission, para. 138.
463 Mexico's second written submission, para. 139.
464 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22 ("The matter referred to a panel for
consideration consists of th e specific claims stated by the parties to the dispute in the relevant documents
specified in the terms of reference").

for establishment of a panel. Accordingly, we are re quired to determine the existence of a violation as
of that time, and to make recomme ndations for compliance on that basis.
465 In the present case, our
task is therefore to determine whether, as of th e date of the establishment of this Panel, the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions violate the relevant provisions of the covered agreements.
7.300 However, this does not necessarily imply that past events are irrelevant to an assessment of
whether such a violation exists. It is quite possi ble that past events will shed light on the Panel's
assessment of the situation as of its establishment, and an understanding of the situation as it presents
itself today may legitimately be informed by its history. 466 There is, in our view, no reason to exclude
a priori such aspects from consideration, to the extent that they may inform a proper understanding of
the situation as of establishment of the Panel.
7.301 With these initial clarifications in mind, we now consider whether Mexican tuna products are
at a disadvantage, compared to tuna products of US and any other origin, with respect to access to the
US dolphin-safe label under the measures at issue.
7.302 Mexico argues that its fleet primarily catches tuna in the ETP by setting on dolphins (thereby
making it ineligible for the US label), while the US and other fleets catch tuna primarily outside the
ETP using other fishing methods. It is therefore the combination of the fishing method used and
geographical fishing zone exploited by different fl eets with the requirements of the measures that
results in what Mexico calls a "prohibition" on using the label for Mexican tuna products.
7.303 We therefore consider in turn the regulatory distinction upon which Mexico's claims rest (i.e.
the requirement of not setting on dolphins), the fish ing practices of the Mexican and other fleets, and
the relative situation of Mexican and other tuna products originating in any other country on the
US market, in order to determine whether Mexican t una products are at a disadvantage in respect of
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. Finally, we also address an additional argument by Mexico
to the effect that less favourable treatment is demons trated by the very nature of the measures at issue
and the "pressure" that they exert on Mexico to modify its fishing practices.
The regulatory distinctions at issue: setting on dolphins as opposed to not
setting on dolphins
7.304 As described in Section II above, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions involve a number
of regulatory distinctions, that form the basis fo r different substantive a nd documentary requirements
for the obtention of a "dolphin-safe" label, depending on the fishery involved, the type of vessel, and
the fishing method employed. As also described a bove, the key regulatory distinction of relevance to
Mexico's discrimination claims is the distinction between the treatment of tuna products containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins and the treatment of tuna products containing tuna caught by other
fishing methods. Both inside and outside the ETP, tuna is required not to be caught by setting on
dolphins for tuna products made from it to qualify for the US dolphin-safe label. 467 Because its fleet
sets on dolphins while the United States and a number other fleets do not, Mexico considers that this
requirement amounts to a "prohibition" on bearing th e label for Mexican tuna. We therefore first
consider this regulatory distinction in itself.

465 In accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, when a panel concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity
with that agreement.
466 We note that in the context of an assessment of "less favourable treatment" under Article III:4 of
GATT 1994, the Appellate Body's reference to whethe r the measure at issue "modifies" the conditions of
competition suggest that a consideration of the situation today as compared to what it was prior to the enactment
of the measure may be pertinent in assessing its impact. The same considerations apply in the present context.
467 Paragraph (d) of Section 1385 of the DPCIA.

7.305 We first note that, the fact that the measures distinguish between fish based on its capture
method rather than its origin, this distinction is not i nherently tied to the "national" origin of the fish.
The fishing method at issue, setting on dolphins, is accessible to any fleet operating in an area where
such method can be practised. Therefore, denying the label to tuna caught by "setting on dolphins"
does not, in itself, imply that "less favourable treat ment" is afforded to Mexican tuna products.
Indeed, any fleet operating anywhere in the world must comply with the requirement.
7.306 The evidence before the Panel suggests that settin g on dolphins occurs especially in the ETP,
because of the regular association observed between tunas and dolphins in that area.
468 However, we
note that Mexico itself has suggested that association between tunas and dolphins, and setting on
dolphins as a fishing method, is also practised outside of the ETP.
469 The evidence before us confirms
that such association and the practice of "setting" on dolphins has been observed in other areas of the
world, though not on the comme rcial scale observed in the ETP. 470 To the extent that setting on
dolphins is or can be practised outside the ETP, the impact of the requirement not to set on dolphins
would be felt also in those other fisheries.
7.307 We acknowledge that the requirement of not intentionally setting on dolphins as a condition
for access to the label may be more onerous in pr actice for those fleets operating in the ETP, to the
extent that the method is known to be regularly employed on a commercial scale in the ETP.
However, even assuming that access to the label may be more onerous for purse seine fleets fishing in
the ETP as compared to those fishing outside the ETP, this would in principle affect equally all fleets
fishing in the ETP. It is undisputed that, as a fisher y, the ETP is accessible to – and is in fact used by
– a number of fleets, including those of Bolivia , Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,

468 Although Mexico has pointed out that there may be association that occurs outside of the ETP and
setting on dolphins causing mortality or serious injury it has not challenged the United States' assertion that
association occurs in the ETP. Mexico's second writte n submission, para. 3 and Mexico's response to Panel
question No. 86.
469 "With regard to the U.S. argument that non-ETP tuna is not caught by setting nets on dolphins,
Mexico has already explained that there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Mexico has already submitted
evidence that dolphins and other marine mammals are being killed in substantial numbers outside the ETP by
other fishing methods. Mexico has further explained that for non-ETP tuna, the United States has no mechanism
to verify the accuracy of captains' certifications or the precision of non- U.S. canneries' tracking systems. If the
goal of the U.S. measure genuinely is to give consum ers accurate information on whether the specific tuna
products they are purchasing were caught in a manner harm ful to dolphins, the U.S. measure cannot fulfil that
objective for tuna products made from non-ETP tuna." Mexico's response to Panel question No. 156, para. 147.
470 "Vessels outside the ETP that may intentionally or incidentally trap dolphins in their nets do not
possess the training, the gear or the nets to safely release those dolphins." Mexico's response to Panel question
No. 28, para. 54.
"There is substantial evidence of significant inter actions between fishing vessels and dolphins outside
the ETP, but the United States has de voted no resources to investigating or monitoring those interactions."
Mexico's response to Panel question No. 86, para. 3.
Exhibit MEX-4: The association of yellowfin tuna with dolphins has been observed in all oceans of the
world.
Exhibit MEX-97 : List of bycatch sp ecies recorded as being ever cau ght by any major tuna fishery in
the Atlantic/Mediterranean proves that there is dolphin bycatch with the use of purse seine nets (however it does
not explicitly say whether the purse seine was set on dolphins).
Exhibit MEX-98: On the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery: "There is a relatively high level of
observer coverage in the equatorial purse-seine fishery, with 33,319 sets of observed in the last 11 years 1995-
2005. Marine mammals were caught in a very small proportion of these observed sets, mainly from sets
targeting tuna schools associated with either whales or dolphins.
Exhibit MEX-105 "... several interactions with species of special interest includi ng ... pilot whales ...
This could indicate that vessels are, intentionally or unintentionally, setting their nets around these species
dolphins". (note: pilot whales are dolphins)

Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Spai n, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela
471, In
addition, the technique of fishing in association w ith dolphins in the ETP is not exclusive to Mexico
since, as Mexico itself admits, it was the US fish ing fleet who pioneered the method of circling herds
of dolphins with purse seine nets and a number of other nations' vessels set on dolphins to catch tuna
in the ETP.472 Therefore, any fleet deciding to fish for tuna in the ETP could set on dolphins.
7.308 Mexico explained that it has developed its tuna fishery in the ETP and that almost the entirety
of its vessels have operated within that region. 473 Mexico has explained that the ETP is a "traditional
fishing ground" for it, due to its geographical proximity to the zone 474, and that its fleet catches tuna
"almost exclusively" in the ETP (by setting on dolphins ). We note however that, as described above,
a number of other fleets have also been fishing in the ETP for tuna. In fact, it appears that there are
vessels of more nationalities fishing for tuna in the ETP today than there were at the time of
enactment of the measures.475
7.309 Therefore, to the extent that the requirement of not setting on dolphins is based on a fishing
method that may be used by vessels of any nationa lity operating where this method can be practiced,
tuna of any nationality, including US and Mexican , as well as others, could potentially meet (or not
meet) the requirements for dolphin-safe labelling. As described above, the me asures at issue involve
further distinctions, in particular in the certifica tion requirements for different areas, depending on the
status of the fishery, the type of vessel and fish ing method used. However, Mexico has indicated that
these differences in treatment are not the factual basis for its discrimination claims. We therefore do
not address them in this context.
476
7.310 We also note that the eligibility of a tuna product of a given nationality to bear (or not) the
label does not necessarily depend on the manner in wh ich the fleet bearing the flag of the same
country operates, and on whether the fish caught by th at fleet is eligible to be included in dolphin-safe
tuna products. As mentioned earlier, the origin of a tuna product is determined not by the origin of
the fish that it contains but by its place of processing. 477 Accordingly, Mexican tuna products need
not be composed of Mexican tuna. Therefore, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that tuna of
Mexican origin might more likely not be eligible for the label because it would be caught in the ETP
by setting on dolphins, this would not necessarily impl y that products processed in Mexico would be
less likely to qualify for the label. This is beca use Mexican processors could choose to make their
products from tuna of other origins meeting the requi rements of the label. Mexico has asserted that
Mexican canners use Mexican tuna. 478 The evidence presented to the Pa nel suggests that this is the
case. According to the information submitted by Mexico, the Mexican tuna cannery industry is
vertically integrated, and the major Mexican tuna products producers and canneries own their vessels,
which operate in the ETP. Because of such integr ation Mexico contends that the effect of the
US measure is to limit the ability of Mexican brands of tuna products from competing with the brands
produced by canneries and canneries of third countries. 479 However, the integration of the Mexican

471 "The Active Purse Seine Vessel Register, which lists all purse seine vessels authorized to fish for
tuna in the ETP, includes vessels from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Spain, the Un ited States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela." (United States' response to Panel
Question No 15 para. 44 and fn 36 referring to Exhibit US-15).
472 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 7.
473 United States' response to Panel question No. 91, para. 24.
474 See Mexico's first written submission, paras. 165, 167, 186 and 188.
475 See Mexico's and the United States' responses to Panel questions Nos. 89 and 90.
476 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 145, para. 122.
477 See para. 7.230 above.
478 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 144, para. 120.
479 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 44, para. 108.

tuna industry does not mean that it must use Mexican tuna, or that it could not choose to require such
tuna to be caught in conditions that would make it eligible for the US label.
7.311 In sum, an examination of the requirement of not setting on dolphins embodied in the
US dolphin-safe provisions as a condition for access to the label does not suggest that this
requirement in itself, places Mexican tuna products at a disadvantage as compared to US and other
imported tuna products. Bearing in mind this initial determination, we now consider whether less
favourable treatment nonetheless arises from the a pplication of the measures, by reason of the
practices of the fleets.
Fishing practices of US and Mexican tuna fleets, and their impact on access
to the US dolphin-safe label for Mexican tuna products and tuna products
originating in the United States or in any other country
Practices of Mexican and other fleets
7.312 Mexico has explained that its tuna fleet fish es almost exclusively in the ETP by setting on
dolphins, in conditions meeting the requirements for "dolphin-safe" designation under the AIDCP, but
not meeting the requirements of the US measures for dolphin-safe labelling.
480 The United States
observes that Mexico's assertion that its fleet opera tes almost exclusively by setting on dolphins is
incorrect insofar as one third of Mexico's purse se ine fleet exclusively uses techniques other than
setting on dolphins to catch tuna (and therefore tuna products that contain tuna caught by these vessels
are eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe) 481 and the remaining two thirds of Mexico's purse seine fleet
also opportunistically uses techniques other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna. 482 The
United States also notes that Mexico has several non- purse seine vessels that fish for tuna in the ETP
that do not set on dolphins.483
7.313 The United States also argued that during the first meeting with the Panel, Mexico
acknowledged that 20 per cent of its catch is ca ught by techniques other than setting on dolphins. 484
The United States observes that tuna caught by thos e vessels using those techni ques are also eligible
to use the dolphin-safe label. The United States al so holds that Mexico does not substantiate its
assertion that the third of its fleet that comprises ve ssels of 363 metric tons carrying capacity or less
accounts for only 5 per cent or less of the Mexican fleet's total catch 485 and that it is incorrect for
Mexico to assert that "vessels [with 363 metric tons carrying capacity or less] are not economically
viable".486 Mexico responded that its fleet under 363 metric tons of carrying capacity amounts to less
than 4 per cent of the total catch of the Mexican t una fleet and this tuna is sold in the domestic
market.487 With respect to the vessels above 363 metric t ons that sometimes use techniques other than

480 Mexico's first written submission, para. 165.
481 (footnote original) U.S. first written submission, paras. 108. These are vessels that have a carrying
capacity of 363 metric tons or less and for which the AIDCP prohibits the setting on dolphins to catch tuna. See
id. para. 45, 91. (United States' second written submission, fn 24).
482 (footnote original) U.S. first written submission, paras. 68-69. (United States' second written
submission, fn 25).
483 See US response to Panel question No. 91, para. 14, noting that in 2010, the Mexican fleet
comprised 69 purse seine vessels and 158 non-purse seine vessels in the ETP, and some non-purse seine vessels
in the Caribbean, citing Exhibit US-16.
484 (footnote original) U.S. Closing Statement at the First Panel Meeting, para. 7. (United States' second
written submission, fn 26).
485 (footnote original) Mexico Opening Statement at the First Panel Meeting, para. 25; Mexico Answers
to the First Set of Questions from the Panel, para. 40. (United States' second written submission, fn 27).
486 United States' second written submission, fn 30 (footnote omitted).
487 Mexico's second written submission, para. 40.

setting on dolphins, Mexico explains that this tuna cannot be labelled as dolphin-safe given that the
US measures require that the dolphin set method not be used during an entire voyage.
488
7.314 Based on the above, we note that it is undisputed that at least two thirds of Mexico's purse
seine tuna fleet fishes in the ETP by setting on dolphi ns (therefore fishing for tuna that would not be
eligible to be contained in a "dolphin-safe" tuna product under the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions). We also take note of Mexico's i ndication that the portion of its fleet that the
United States identifies as catching tuna eligible to be included in dolphin-safe tuna products
(i.e. vessels under 363 metric tons) represents only a limited share of the total catch of the fleet,
although we also note that the exact figures are disputed.
489
7.315 With respect to the US fleet, the United Stat es has indicated that US vessels used to set on
dolphins to catch tuna at the time the US dol phin-safe labelling provisions were enacted. The
United States explains that there were, at the time, 46 US purse seine vessels along with 52 Mexican
vessels that fished for tuna in the ETP 490, most of which were authorized to set on dolphins to catch
tuna.491 The United States further indicates that US ve ssels did not fully discontinue the practice until
years later, in the mid-1990s.492
7.316 From these undisputed elements, it appears that the US fleet currently does not practice
setting on dolphins in the ETP. We note also th at two US full time purse seine vessels are currently
registered to fish in the ETP for 2010 but neither has sought or obtained a Dolphin Mortality Limit (or
DML) under the AIDCP, which implies that they are not allowed to set on dolphins. Mexico has also
observed that these two vessels are also registered in the WCPFC, which suggests that they are not
operating exclusively in the ETP.
7.317 From the above, it can be inferred that, as the practices of the US and Mexican tuna fleets
currently stand, most tuna caught by Mexican vessels, being caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins,
would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphi n-safe product under the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions. However, most tuna caught by US vessel s is potentially eligible for the label, provided
that it otherwise complies with the requirements of the measures.
7.318 Mexico also contends that US tuna products manufacturers source less than 1 per cent of their
supplies of tuna from the ETP and that virtually all tuna used in canned and pouched tuna products is
harvested by purse seine vessels.
493 Mexico accordingly conclud es that the US measures do not
impact the US fleet, or challenge existing commercial arrangements by the large canneries, and makes
it much easier for the United States to maintain the measures.
494
7.319 However, for the reasons explained below, we are not persuaded that it follows from these
facts that the United States affords Mexican tuna products "less favourable treatment" than to tuna
products originating in the United States or any other country in respect of the measures at issue.

488 Mexico's second written submission, para. 40.
489 United States' comments on Mexico's response to Panel question No. 148, para. 78.
490 (footnote original) U.S. Opening Statement at the First Panel Meeting, para. 20; IATTC, 1990
Annual Report, Exhibit US-54. (United States' second written submission, fn 37).
491 (footnote original) U.S. Opening Statement at the First Pa nel Meeting, para. 20. (United States'
second written submission, fn 38).
492 (footnote original) U.S. first written submission, para. 43. (United States' second written
submission, fn 39).
493 Mexico's second written submission, fn 14 and para. 37. Exhibit MEX-72.
494 Mexico's comments to United States' response to Panel question No. 92 (b), para. 16.

Relationship between the practices of fleets and access to the label
7.320 It is undisputed that, at the time of enactment of the measures, there were a number of vessels
of different fleets fishing in the ETP by setting on dolphins, including a number of US and Mexican
vessels. Each vessel operating in the ETP by setting on dolphins was therefore faced with the choice
of either continuing to fish in these conditions , and renouncing the benefit of the US dolphin-safe
label on the US market, or discontinuing this practi ce in favour of another fishery or another fishing
method in the ETP, and thus having access to the market for dolphin-safe tuna in the United States. In
this respect, as discussed earlier, the measures modi fied the conditions of operation on the market
equally for purse seine vessels of all origins.
7.321 In light of the information provided by the parties, it appears that both the US and Mexican
fleets were fishing in the ETP at the time of the en actment of the measures and that both were setting
on dolphins. Mexico has stated that in 1990, its fleet dominated the purse sei ne fishery in the ETP,
both in terms of carrying capacity and in terms of number of vessels. Mexico had an annual total
capacity of 35 to 40 per cent followed by the Un ited States, between 20 and 25 per cent. However,
following the adoption of the dolphin-safe policy, the number of major US vessels operating in the
ETP decreased.
495 According to the United States, in 1990, US purse seine vessels set on dolphins and
on unassociated sets (FADs and free swimming schools) in order to catch tuna in the ETP. Based on
NMFS staff knowledge, it suggests that in additi on to the United States, Mexico was amongst the
countries that had purse seine vessels in the ETP fishing for tuna by setting on dolphins and that
foreign vessels also used other t echniques such as unassociated purse sei ne sets, pole and line, troll,
longline and gillnet.
496
7.322 The United States has also explained that in 1990 , 49 per cent of its purse seine tuna fleet was
inside the ETP and in addition a large portion of the US non-purse seine vessels were outside the
ETP.
497 Mexico has not provided exact data on the portion of purse seine and non-purse seine vessels
it had operating in the ETP at the time of the enactme nt of the measure but has stated that since it has
developed its tuna fishery in the ETP, almost the entirety of its vessels have operated within that
region and that this remains today. 498 In light of the information provided by the United States on the
fishing techniques used in the ETP in 1990, it app ears that Mexico also had some non-purse seine
vessels operating in the ETP, such as baitboats. A bait boat is a vessel that fishes for tuna using hooks
and bait and can use among other things pole and line and troll to catch tuna.499
7.323 According to Mexico, in 1989, it had a total of 52 purse seiners operating in the ETP and a
total of 16 baitboats, while the United States had 53 purse seiners, 8 baitboats and 1 jigboat. 500 In
1990, Mexico had 52 purse seiners and 11 baitboats and the United States had 46 purse seiners and
6 baitboats.501 In 1991, Mexico had 49 purse seine vessel s operating in the ETP and 9 baitboats and
the United States had 23 purse seiners and 7 baitboats. From this information we observe that at the
time of the enactment of the measure, the majority of the US and Mexican fleets operating in the ETP
was composed of purse seiners. To the extent th at such vessels were capable of setting on dolphins 502,
all of them would have similarly had to adapt to the requirements of the US dolphin-safe provisions if
they wished to catch tuna eligible for inclusion in a dolphin-safe tuna product on the US market.

495 Mexico's response to question 89 (b) from the second substantive meeting, paras. 21-22.
496 United States' response to question 89 (b) from the second substantive meeting, para. 7.
497 United States' response to question 91 from the second substantive meeting, para. 11.
498 Mexico's response to question 91 from the second substantive meeting, para. 24.
499 United States' response to question 89 (b) from the second substantive meeting.
500 Exhibit MEX-109.
501 Exhibit MEX-110.
502 The prohibition for purse seiners smaller than 363 metric tons of carrying capacity to set on
dolphins is set forth in Annex VIII.6 of the AIDCP

7.324 To summarize, as of 1990 (enactment of the fi rst version of the DPCIA), Mexico and the
United States had a comparable number of purse seine vessels operating in the ETP, although it
remains unclear what proportion of those purse seiners was setting on dolphins (as opposed to
unassociated sets). In addition, the Mexican fleet had a higher number of baitboats (non-purse seine
vessels) than the US fleet had. On that basis, it appears that the Un ited States and Mexico were in a
comparable position with regard to their fishing pr actices in the ETP, in that both of them had the
majority of their fleet operating in the ETP com posed of purse seine vessels potentially setting on
dolphins. Both of these fleets had therefore to adapt their fishing methods in order to catch tuna
eligible for the US dolphin-safe label. We now c onsider how the practices of the different fleets
subsequently evolved in this respect.
7.325 As Mexico describes its own fishing techniques, it appears that its fleet concentrated on
improving the dolphin friendliness of its fishin g methods by continuing to set on dolphins, but
respecting the conditions of the AIDCP, which ente red into force in February 1999 as a successor of
the non-binding La Jolla Agreement, with the objec tive of reducing incidental dolphin mortalities in
tuna purse seine fishery rather than by abandoning this method and switching to another fishing
method. Mexico explains that its fleet fishes al most exclusively by setting on dolphins in accordance
with the AIDCP requirements. The United States ch allenges Mexico's assessment that its fleet fishes
almost exclusively by setting on dolphins, but does not dispute that most Mexican tuna is caught in
this manner.
7.326 It is worth noting also that some of the eviden ce presented to the Panel suggests that at least
some Mexican companies also abandoned setting on dolphins and sought to meet the "no setting on
dolphins" requirement (and defende d the maintenance of the current US standard before the
US Congress).
503

503 The United States submitted as evidence a statemen t which it states was made by the President of
Seafood Emporium Inc. to the US Congress, in which it supported the definition of the US dolphin-safe label
and expressed opposition to the proposed redefinition of dolphin-safe tuna, which includes the following:

"Passage of S. 1420 and H.R. 2823 will underm ine the efforts of Mexican tuna canneries that
have gone dolphin-safe by allowing companied and fishing owners in Mexico that do not have
dolphin-safe policies to flood the US market with their cheap tuna caught on dolphins. There
are currently several tuna companies in Mexico that are considering adopting dolphin-safe
policies, but are hesitant due to concern that the current US dolphin-safe definition will be
weakened.

By allowing tuna caught by net setting on dolphins to be labeled dolphin-safe, you remove the
incentive for those Mexican Flag tuna seiners that are currently operating dolphin-safe to fish
without setting nets on dolphins. Why should they make the effort not to set nets on dolphins
when their competition can intentionally set nets on dolphins and call their tuna dolphin-safe?

We fully support the environmental leads in Congress, especially Senator Boxer and Biden,
and Representatives Studds and Miller, who are totally opposed to weakening the current U.S.
definition of dolphin-safe. On behalf of the tuna companies in Mexico that have adopted
dolphin-safe policies which prohibit the setting of nets on dolphins, I strongly urge President
Clinton and the Members of Congress to oppose S. 1420 and H.R. 2823 and to co-sponsor S.
1460 and H.R. 2856."
United States' response to Panel's question No. 41, para. 105 and Exhibit US-39.

We note that Mexico disputed the reliability of this evidence, stating that it was "'an undated letter from
a purported trader in Mexican tuna products and that two of the cited companies were not in the tuna business,
and the third had gone out of business (See Mexico's s econd written submission, para. 41 and footnote 23). As

7.327 US vessels, on the other hand, gradually disc ontinued setting on dolphins to catch tuna, and
abandoned the practice entirely in 1994, four years after the enactment of the measures. The
United States indicated that some of its vessels re flagged and continued to set nets on dolphins to
catch tuna, while others began using other techniqu es to catch tuna either in the ETP or in other
oceans, mainly in the Western Central Pacific Ocean.
 504 Mexico observed in this respect that the
US fleet had already begun transitioning to the Western Pacific. 505 A report published in 1992 by the
US National Research Council notes in this respect that "the US tuna fleet in the ETP has become
very small, probably because of a variety of factor s, probably including the recent decision by major
canners to buy only "dolphin-safe" tuna.506
7.328 The information presented to the Panel suggests that other fleets operating in the ETP also
adapted in different ways. 507 The United States explains that non-US vessels also either continued to
set on dolphins to catch tuna or began to use other techniques to catch tuna either in the ETP or in
other oceans but that Mexican vessels remained in the ETP and continued to set on dolphins. 508 It
appears that certain fleets fishing in the ETP for tuna have chosen to catch tuna using other techniques
and do so in the ETP.
7.329 According to the evidence provided by Mexico , in 1989 Ecuador had 34 purse seiners and no
baitboats operating in the ETP 509, in 1990, it had 34 purse seiners and 7 baitboats 510, and in 1991 it
had 33 purse seiners and 6 baitboats; Spain had 2 purse seiners. Thus, at the time of the enactment of
the measures, the majority of Ecuador's fleet operating in the ETP was composed of purse seiners and
given that the AIDCP had not yet entered into fo rce and that therefore there was no prohibition for
small purse seine vessels to set on dolphins, arguab ly all of Ecuadorian purse seine vessels were
capable of setting on dolphins.
511 Thus, all of them would have had to adapt to the requirements of the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. According to the IATTC fourth quarter report for 2009
presented by Mexico, the Ecuadorian fleet represents 39 per cent of the ETP total fleet in terms of
number of vessels and 28 per cent in terms of carrying capacity. The Mexican fleet has 23% of
carrying capacity, and Venezuela and Panama each had 14%.
512 The ETP fleet is therefore currently
dominated by the Ecuadorian and Mexican fleets. However, during the years 1989-1990 the ETP fleet

we understand it, the United States represents that this statement was presented in hearings leading to the
congressional passage of the DPCIA, si milar to the statement by Representative Boxer, also referred to by the
United States (United States response to question No. 39, para. 99) and by the statement. We make no
determination relating to the activities of the companies referred to in this statement and their interest in this
respect, but we have no reason to assume that the ev idence presented by the United States does not reflect a
genuine statement to the US Congress as it purports to do.
504 United States' response to Panel question No. 18, para. 53.
505 Mexico argues that, in order to fish in that ar ea it is necessary to fish in the EEZ's of the member
nations of the Commission, which requires requesting licenses and paying fees. Mexico argues that despite the
high cost of the licenses, such licen ses are very difficult to obtain from th e relevant Island States and that
Mexican vessels have tried for 3 consecutive years to obtain a license with no success. Moreover, Mexico
observes that it has not been accepted as a Party in the WCPFC where its current status is "cooperating non
member". (Mexico's response to Panel question No 38, para. 89).
506 Exhibit MEX-2, p. 3.
507 Mexico notes that, of the various fleets operating in the ETP, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and Peru, are subject to a U.S. embargo on imports of
yellowfin tuna, imposed independently of the measures at issue here (Mexico's response to Panel question
No. 78, para. 275).
508 United States' response to Panel question No. 18, para. 53.
509 Exhibit MEX-109.
510 Exhibit MEX-110.
511 The prohibition for purse seiners smaller than 363 metric tons of carrying capacity to set on
dolphins is set forth in Annex VIII.6 of the AIDCP.
512 See Mexico's response to Panel question No. 89(a), para. 18. See also Exhibit MEX-108.

was dominated by the Mexican and the US fleets.
513 As pointed out by Mexico, the Mexican fleet was
the largest with 35-40 per cent of the annual total capacity.514
7.330 As far as the adaptation to the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions is concerned, Ecuador
decided to fish for tuna in the ETP using techniques other than setting on dolphins 515, exporting
$76.4 million of tuna products in airtight containers to the United States in 2009 516, all of which was
dolphin-safe517 and $48 million of which contained tuna caught in the ETP. 518 For comparison with
other years, the United States indicated that in 2006, tuna products in airtight containers from Ecuador
totalled $94.0 million (all dolphin-safe except for 11 importations; in 2007, $89.1 million dollars (all
of which was dolphin-safe) and $101.9 million do llars in 2008 (all dolphin-safe except for one
importation).519 The United States explained that Ecuador's fleet made the choice in 2010 to catch
tuna in the ETP exclusively using techniques other than setting on dolphins, and that for years it had
been using those other techniques to catch tuna a nd exporting those tuna products to the United States
that are labelled as dolphin-safe. 520 During the years 1989-1990, Ecuador's fleet represented around
19 per cent of the total ETP fishing fleet in terms of number of vessels, however it did not dominate
the ETP fleet as it does today. Ecuador itself explaine d, as a third party, that its fleet has done very
little to fish by setting on dolphins in the ETP, due to market restrictions on tuna caught by using this
technique, the high costs of the equipment required, the limited number of schools of tuna associated
with dolphins at the moment, and the low DMLs.521
7.331 These elements suggest that the various fleet s operating in the ETP by setting on dolphins
adapted in different ways to dolphin-safe concerns, the Mexican fleet having concentrated its efforts
on complying with the AIDCP requirements on observe r coverage and fishing gear and equipment.
As a result, Mexican (and any other) vessels that chose to continue to set on dolphins under the
AIDCP requirements were not eligible for dolphi n-safe labelling under the existing US measures,
while tuna caught without setting on dolphins remained eligible.
7.332 We note, in this respect, that countries party to the AIDCP and the fleets that sought to
respond to dolphin-safe concerns by complying wi th AIDCP requirements may have expected the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions eventually to evolve towards accepting tuna caught in
accordance with these requirements as "dolphin-safe". Indeed, this possibility was foreseen in the
Panama Declaration and the DPCIA itself. However, as described above, as a result of the rulings in

513 See Exhibits MEX-109 and MEX-110.
514 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 89(b), para, 21.
515 (footnote original) U.S. Answers to the First Set of Ques tions from the Panel (Question 17),
para. 52; NMFS, Foreign Trade and TTPV databases. In 2010, Ecuador made the choice to fish for tuna in the
ETP exclusively using techniques other than setting on dolphins, and has again made this choice for 2011. U.S.
Opening Statement at the First Panel Meeting, para . 32; U.S. first written submission, para. 40 &n.40.
(United States' second written submission, fn 34).
516 (footnote original) US Imports of Tuna 2005-2009 (Ecuador), Exhibit US-1C. (United States'
second written submission, fn 35).
517 United States' response to Panel question No. 17, para. 52 and United States' second written
submission, fn 35.
518 (footnote original) NMFS, Foreign Trade and TTPV databa ses. (United States' second written
submission, fn 36).
519 (footnote original) Imports of Tuna from Ecuador, Exhibit US-1C; NMFS, Tuna Tracking and
Verification Program Databases. (United States' response to Panel question No. 17 fn 49).
520 United States' second written submission, para. 79.
521 See Ecuador's response to Panel question No. 2.

Hogarth, this did not happen because the conditions for eseen in the DPCIA for this change to occur
were ultimately not fulfilled.522
7.333 We acknowledge that this circumstance may ha ve had a significant impact on the choice of
countries party to the AIDCP to enter into that agreem ent, and to require their fleets to adhere to its
provisions and on the choices made by fleets in adapti ng to dolphin-safe concerns, to the extent that
they had an interest in catching tuna that would be eligible for inclusion in dolphin-safe tuna products
for sale on the US market. However, the question before us is whether the US measures at issue
placed Mexican tuna products at a disadvantage, compar ed to US or other imported tuna products. In
this respect, we note that the choice facing the fleets of the United States, of Mexico and other foreign
origins was the same, and that US and other fleets operating in the ETP could equally have chosen to
continue to set on dolphins in the ETP under the conditions set out in the AIDCP, on the assumption
that the US measures may evolve towards an acce ptance of tuna caught in accordance with these
requirements as eligible for inclusion in a dolphin- safe tuna product in the United States. In that
respect, the situation arising from the measures was the same for both fleets. 523 Similarly, other tuna
fleets operating in international waters face the choi ce of determining, where to operate and in what
conditions, based on a variety of factors, including economic, geographical and environmental factors,
and the markets to which they would have access.
7.334 Based on the evidence before us, and taking into account the evolution in the practices of tuna
fleets over time, including since the enactment of the US dolphin-safe provisions, as described above,
we are not persuaded that any current discrepancy in their relative situations is a result of the
measures rather than the result of their own choices. In this respect, we note the observation of the
Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef that where it is the decision of private actors
rather than the governmental measure that results in the segregation of imported and domestic like
products, this would not be a breach of Article III:4 in sofar as what is addressed by this provision is
merely the governmental intervention that affe cts the conditions under which like goods, domestic
and imported, compete in the market. 524 Similarly, in the context of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, what must be considered is the treatment arising from the preparation, adoption and

522 See paras. 2.16 to 2.19 above.
523 The Panel is aware of the fact that from 1994 to 1997, US purse seine vessels were prohibited from
setting on dolphins in the ETP (United States' first written submission, fn 34). Indeed, the International Dolphin
Conservation Act (IDCA) imposed a general moratorium on the taking or importation of marine mammals or
marine mammal products and contemplated an exception for incidental taking of marine mammals in the course
of commercial fishing operations conducted under a permit issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service.
Such permit would be issued allowing up to a maximum allowable quota of dolphins to be taken annually. It is
in the context of a permit that had been accorded to th e American Tunaboat Associa tion that the prohibition of
setting on dolphins was imposed. (Exhibit US-12) While we note that such prohibition to set on dolphins was
imposed only to the US fleet because a determination ha d been made that the US pu rse seine fleet had reached
the maximum allowable quota mandated by the IDCA (International Dolphin Conservation Act), we observe
that the IDCA also imposed a ban on the importation of fish or products from fish caught with commercial
fishing technology that resulted in in cidental mortality or serious injury to ocean mammals in excess of the
United States' standards. In particular, the importation of yellowfin tuna harvested with purse-seine nets in the
ETP and products therefrom was prohibited unless the Secr etary of Commerce made an affirmative finding for
the nation that it complied with the United States' standards. On 10 October 1990, the US Government, pursuant
to court order, imposed an embargo on imports of su ch tuna from Mexico until the Secretary made a positive
finding based on documentary evidence that it did not ex ceed the percentage of admitted dolphin mortality.
Therefore, while the United States was prohibited from setting on dolphins, Mexican fleet was barred from
importing its tuna products to the United States. For that reason, we believe the US and the Mexican fleet were
both on equal footing with respect to the choice they had to make in terms of adapting their fishing techniques to
US labelling requirements. (See US – Tuna (Mexico), GATT Report, paras.2.3-2.7)
524 United States cites the Appellate Body Report in Korea – Various Measures Beef, para. 149.

application of the technical regulation by the Member taking the measure, rather than differences in
the impact of the measure that are attributable to the behaviour of private actors on the market.
Adaptation costs
7.335 Mexico also argues that the Mexican fleet woul d have to incur considerable financial and
other costs by changing its fishing method to be ab le to label its products as dolphin-safe. In its
second written submission, however, Mexico also conte nded that the nature and extent of such costs
that would be incurred by the Mexican tuna fleet to change fishing areas or methods is immaterial to
Mexico's de facto discrimination claims, given that access to the principal US distribution channels
for Mexican tuna products is being denied by the US measures."
7.336 Mexico explained that there are regional di fferences within the ETP in terms of oceanic
conditions, the tuna species that are available and th e most efficient methods of harvesting. Mexico
argues that substantial costs would derive from sw itching to alternative fishing methods such as FAD
fishing.
 525 It held that because FAD fishing concentr ates on less mature tuna, which are found near
the Mexican coast the vessels would have to travel much farther, which would entail very significant
additional costs. 526 Mexico explained that its fishing efforts primarily concentrated in the waters
adjacent to Mexico's coast (EEZ) where mature ye llowfin tuna can be found in association with
dolphins.527
7.337 In that area, Mexico argues, the yellowfin tuna not associated with dolphins is found in lesser
quantities and at juvenile stage of development and targeting juvenile yellowfin tuna not associated
with dolphins would be neither commercially viable nor sustainable because it would result in
significantly smaller catches that would have a negative impact on the tuna stocks. Mexico argues that
to avoid destroying the yellowfin fishery close to Mexico, the fleet would have to cut production
dramatically or move to another region to fish for a different species of tuna, skipjack, which is more
commonly found in association with FADs.
528
7.338 Moving from the ETP would imply substantial fina ncial costs, Mexico argues, as its vessels
would have to travel greater distances (12 to 15 days) before they could even begin to fish. Moreover,
vessels would have to focus on skipjack, which is le ss valuable. Mexico has specified that skipjack,
even mature, is smaller than yellowfin tuna, that the market considers it to be of lower quality, and
that its value is approximately 30 per cent lower than yellowfin tuna, per ton. Mexico concludes that
it would therefore be disadvantaged with respect to other fleets that fish in their adjacent waters.529
7.339 The United States responds that Mexico overstates the cost and difficulty of using other
techniques to catch tuna insofar as the same boats an d much of the same gear used to set on dolphins
to catch tuna may be used to catch tuna using other techniques, specifically sets on floating objects
and unassociated schools of tuna. The United States challenges Mexico's arguments that its proximity
to the ETP gives it a competitive advantage relative to the United States and other countries in terms
of fishing for tuna by setting on dolphins, observing that other countries, including the United States,
are similarly close to the ETP, including those ar eas of the ETP where setting on dolphins to catch
tuna occurs.

525 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, paras 84.
526 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 86.
527 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, paras. 84-86.
528 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 86.
529 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 88.

7.340 Mexico also argues that there would be signi ficant administrative complexities because of the
need to seek licences from the Pacific island nati ons to fish in their Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) and to comply with the rules of the applic able fishery commission. Mexico refers to the
Central and Western Pacific area, regulated by the Western and Central Pacific Commission
(WCPFC), which has established regul ations that prohibit fishing in the international waters. Mexico
adds that in order to fish in that area it is necessar y to fish in the EEZ's of the member nations of the
Commission, which in turn implies requesting licences and paying fees.
530
7.341 The European Union, as third party, asserts that there are no technical or legal barriers
preventing any of the WTO Members bordering the ETP to fish for tuna outside the ETP. Mexico
responds that this is not correct because licences w ould have to be obtained which are expensive and,
to date, unobtainable.
7.342 We do not exclude that costs of adaptation to a technical regulation may be pertinent to an
examination of whether less favourable treatment is being afforded with respect to a technical
regulation. However, the existence of adaptation costs, in itself, does not, in our view, imply the
existence of less favourable treatment. The existence of additional costs for some operators as a result
of factors such as existing practices also does not necessarily, in our view, imply that less favourable
treatment is being afforded in respect of the meas ures at issue, in violation of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.343 We first observe that, to the extent that Mexi co suggests that there would be ecological costs
associated with adapting to the US dolphin-safe provisi ons, in terms of sustainability of tuna stocks in
the ETP, we do not understand the US measures to require or expect any vessel to adopt unsustainable
fishing practices in order to comply with the requirements for dolphin-safe labelling.
531
7.344 We recognize that, to the extent that the Mexi can fleet would need to modify its fishing
techniques, or relocate to other fisheries, in order to comply with the requirements of the US dolphin-
safe provisions, this may entail some economic and fi nancial costs, taking into account the fact that
setting on dolphins is a particularly effective means of fishing for tuna in the ETP. 532 We also
acknowledge that, to the extent that, due to its geographical proximity to an area within the ETP
where setting on dolphins can easily be practiced, costs associated with travelling from one area of the
ETP to the other to catch tuna by methods othe r than setting on dolphins and possibly targeting
different types of tuna could be greater for Mexican vessels than for those of other fleets whose coasts
are not similarly close to those areas. To that extent, adapting to the US dolphin-safe standard could
in practice be more onerous for the Mexican fleet than for others who either did not exploit the
association with dolphins in the first place or for w hom relocating to another fishing area within the
ETP or elsewhere implies less additional distance.
7.345 However, we are not persuaded that this implie s that Mexican tuna products are being denied
access to the advantage provided by the US dolphi n safe labelling provisions or demonstrates the

530 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 89.
531 The United States has noted that it is concerned w ith the issue of ecosystem protection and seeks to
address it through various means, both domestically a nd internationally. (United States' response to Panel
question No. 64, para. 145).
532 See Exhibit MEX-2, pp. 2 and 3 ("Dolphin fishing usually catches large fish that are often sexually
mature and produces larger average catches than the other methods. Thus, redirecting the fishing away from
tuna associated with dolphins would be less efficient and would have a negative effect on the yield of the fishery
and perhaps on the conservation of tuna populations. Considering only the point of view of economics and
harvesting tuna, large tuna should be sought; fishermen should fish on dolphins and be discouraged from fishing
on logs or schools. However, dolphin fishing kills dolphins; to minimize the killing of dolphins, all fishing
should be directed away from dolphins. This dichotomy is the basis of the tuna-dolphin problem").

existence of "less favourable treatment" being afforded to Mexican tuna products by the US measures.
As observed in paragraph 7.376 below, it is possible that a technical regulation, by setting out certain
requirements that must be complied with, would aff ect different operators on the market differently,
depending on a range of factors such as their geogra phical circumstances, their existing practices or
their technical capacities. Such factors may have an impact on how easily products of various origins
will or will not be able to meet the requirements at issue. However, the existe nce of such differences
does not necessarily imply, in our view, that the m easures at issue discriminate against products of
certain origins in violation of Ar ticle 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. This is especially the case, in our
view, where the differential impact of the measures on products of different origins is the result of
external factors other than the origin of the products itself.
7.346 In the present case, such costs would be felt also, though perhaps to varying degrees
depending inter alia on the geographical location and existing practices of the fleets and their
commercial choices, by vessels of other fleets wishi ng to catch tuna eligib le for inclusion in a
dolphin-safe tuna product for sale on the US market. These consequences would therefore not, in our
view, be sufficient to amount to "less favourable treatment" within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. In addition, as discussed below, the practices of the national fleet do not necessarily
dictate the dolphin-safe status of tuna products of the same origin.
Fishing practices of fleets and origin of tuna products
7.347 We also recall that, as discussed above, tuna products are not necessarily made from tuna of
the same origin, so that processors of US, Me xican and other nationalities retain the choice of
sourcing their tuna from vessels of any origin fishing for tuna in conditions that meet the requirements
of the US measures, even if the Mexican fleet pr imarily choose not to fish in accordance with these
requirements.
7.348 For that reason also, we are not persuaded that it necessarily follows from the fishing
practices of the national fleet that the tuna products of the same origin are in the same situation. As
observed above, Mexico explains that the great ma jority of Mexican tuna products are made from
tuna caught by the Mexican fleet.
533 However, the United States has noted that if tuna products from
other countries, including the United States, were made with tuna caught by the Mexican vessels that
set on dolphins to catch the tuna, those (non-Mexican) tuna products would also be ineligible to be
labelled dolphin-safe. Indeed, the United States has also observed that, in 2009, two thirds of domestic
canned tuna was sourced from foreign vessels. It thus concludes that 84 per cent of the US market for
canned tuna in 2009 was accounted for by a co mbination of imported ca nned and domestic canned
tuna that contains imported tuna.534
7.349 Conversely, the United States argues, if Mexi can tuna producers choose to purchase tuna
from vessels other than large purse seine vessels that set on dolphins to catch the tuna, including large
purse seine vessels that use other gear types or fishing methods or small purse seine vessels that are
prohibited from setting on dolphins, those (Mexican ) tuna products could be eligible to use the
dolphin-safe label. The United States observes that nothing requires the Mexican canneries to use tuna
caught by Mexican vessels (indeed, Mexico is a net importer of tuna and tuna products), and that
Mexican vessels use other methods beyond dolphin setting to catch tuna.
535
7.350 We agree with the United States' observations. Th e fact that the Mexican tuna fleet fishes in
the ETP by setting on dolphins while the US fleet does not, in itself does not imply that tuna

533 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 144, para. 120.
534 United States response to Panel question No. 97, para. 21.
535 United States' comments to Mexico's response to Panel question No. 144, para. 64.

processors of Mexican and US origin are necessarily similarly affected, as Mexi co argues, in such a
manner that the relative situation of US and Mexican tuna products on the US market is affected. We
now consider the situation of Mexican tuna products on the US market.
Mexican tuna products on the US market
7.351 As described above, Mexico contends that it h as established that major grocery chains will
not carry Mexican brands unless they have the dolphin-safe label and that the United States does not
dispute that Mexican tuna products are not sold in major US distribution channels. 536 In support for
this assertion, Mexico has presented evidence that major retailers in the United States do not accept
for sale tuna that is not eligible for the label, and that they would accept for sale such products if they
were eligible for "dolphin-safe" labelling.537
7.352 The United States indicates that, although until 2002 Mexican tuna caught using methods
other than setting on dolphins by small purse seine vessels in the ETP was incorporated into tuna
products sold in the United States, and these produc ts may have been sold in major US grocery
retailers as dolphin-safe, there have been no imports of similar Mexican tuna products containing tuna
caught by such vessels since that time. 538 The United States points to specific instances of Mexican
tuna products sold in specialty stores. The Unite d States explains that Mexican tuna products not
labelled as dolphin-safe are sold in speciality grocery stores and on the Internet and that tuna products
originating in other countries that are not labe lled as dolphin-safe are sold in major distribution
channels, such as Walmart's Great Valu e Tuna, which is a product of Thailand. 539 We note that the
United States has also confirmed, however, that it is not aware of any major US grocery retailers that
sell tuna products that contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins.
7.353 In the course of the proceedings, the United States presented evidence suggesting that tuna
pouches (of the "Great Value" brand) that are not labelled dolphin-safe can be purchased from a major
US retailer, Walmart. The United States argues that re gardless of the source of the tuna, the fact that
the largest US food distributor sells a product not la belled dolphin-safe belied Mexico's assertion that
the label is necessary for tuna products to be sold in major distribution channels. 540 Mexico observes
however that the US Commerce De partment lists Great Value on its "dolphinsafe.gov" website as a
dolphin-safe brand, and that in any event Wal-Mart faces no market barrier in convincing itself to
carry its own brand. The United States confirmed th at the NMFS has verified that the pouches of that
brand meet the conditions under the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. 541 The United States also
argues that Mexico misconstrued the information on the US Commerce Department website, and that
Great Value tuna products are sold both with and without dolphin-safe labels. 542 In addition, the
United States contends that the tuna containe d in these Great Value pouches was not sourced from
vessels flagged to Mexico. To the extent that the pouches at issue contain tuna eligible for labelling
and thus meet the requirements for dolphin-safe labe lling, however, we are not persuaded that their

536 Mexico's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 102(b), para. 24.
537 An affidavit from an officer of a US company that has the right to sell canned tuna from a Mexican
producer in the US market submitted by Mexico states that for years this company attempted to sell the tuna
product in major US grocery but the chains have been pressured not to sell this brand of canned tuna because it
is not able to carry the "dolphin-safe" label in the U.S. market. It provides eviden ce that some of the major
US chains have expressly indicated that if the tuna product qualified to be labeled "dolphin-safe" they would sell
it and that the company's inability to place the "dolphin-safe" label on the cans has directly affected its ability to
sell the Mexican brand in the U.S. Exhibits MEX-58, MEX-64 and MEX-100.
538 United States' response to Panel question No. 102 (a), para. 24.
539 United States' oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 19.
540 United States' response to Panel question No. 102(b), para. 25.
541 United States' response to Panel question No. 95, para. 19.
542 United States' response to Panel question No. 107, paras. 26-28.

availability calls into question Mexico's assertion that major retailers will not carry tuna products that
are not eligible for the label.
7.354 More generally, the United States has explained that in 2009, US imports of fresh and frozen
tuna totalled $538 million (or 96 million kilos) and US imports of canned tuna totalled $613 million
(or 180.5 million kilos).
543 It has specified that imports of tuna and tuna products from countries with
purse seine vessels that fish for tuna in the ETP to talled $139 million and that imports of tuna and
tuna products from Mexico tota lled $13 million in 2009 of which $7. 5 million were tuna in cans,
pouches and other air-tight containers. 544 The United States has also observed that significant
amounts of domestic canned tuna co ntained imported tuna. For example, in 2009, two thirds of
domestic canned tuna was sourced from foreign vessels. It concludes that this means that 84 per cent
of the US market for canned tuna in 2009 was ac counted for by a combination of imported canned
and domestic canned tuna that contains imported tuna.545
7.355 Mexico does not challenge the United States' import data, nor does it challenge the contention
that the majority of imports of tuna products to the US market are not caught by setting on dolphins.
However, it argues that it is precisely those facts th at show the adverse impact the US measures have
on Mexican tuna. Mexico observes that in 2009, US imports of tuna products totalled $613 million.
However, it notes that Mexico's exports have remain ed minimal throughout this period, and in 2009
US imports from Mexico were only $7.5 million. Therefore, Mexican tuna products accounted for
only 1 per cent of the US market for imported tuna products, and an even smaller percentage of the
total US market.546
7.356 Mexico also does not challenge the assertion that the majority of imported products on the
US market are not caught by setting on dolphins but c onsiders that the rise in the import share applies
only with respect to tuna caught outside the ETP and/or using a fishing method other than the dolphin
set method. For tuna caught in association with dolp hins there has not been any significant growth or
gains in market share.
547 Mexico also asserts that because a substa ntial majority of the tuna products
allowed to carry the dolphin-safe label in the US market are from tuna sourced from the Western and
Central Pacific, there can be no doubt that the US provisions are for non-ETP tuna.548
7.357 An examination of these import figures, which are not disputed, suggests that the
United States imports a considerable proportion of the tuna that it consumes. These figures also
suggest that the vast majority of the tuna and tuna products found on the US market is made from tuna
caught without setting on dolphins, that is poten tially eligible for dolphin-safe labelling under the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, and that Me xican tuna products represent a very small
proportion of the tuna products found on the US mark et. However, we are not persuaded that these
elements, taken together, demonstrate that the measures place Mexican tuna products at a
disadvantage, compared to US and other tuna products to the detriment of Mexican tuna products.
7.358 We highlight, in this respect, that the question to be considered in examining a claim of less
favourable treatment is not simply whether the meas ure has some impact, or even some detrimental
impact on imports, but, rather, whether the measur es put the imported like products at issue at a

543 US Imports of Tuna 2009 (all countries), Exhibit US-2.
544 United States first written submission, para. 89.
545 United States response to Panel question No. 97, para. 21.
546 (footnote original) NOAA, Fisheries of the United States, Fisheries Statistics and Economics
Division, available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/ pls/webpls/trade_prdct_cntry_ind.results?qtype=
IMP&qyearfrom=2000&qyearto=2010&qprod_name=TUNA+%25+ATC+%28%25&qcountry=%25&qsort=
COUNTRY&qoutput= PRINTER. Exhibit MEX-88. (Mexico's second written submission, fn 19).
547 Mexico's second written submission, para. 38.
548 Mexico's second written submission, para. 23.

disadvantage compared to like products of national origin and like products originating in any other
country.549 In other words, what we must determin e in this case is whether the measures have
modified the relative position on the market of US and Mexican tuna products, to the detriment of
Mexican tuna products.
7.359 In this respect, the fact that Mexican impor ts represent only 1 per cent of tuna on the
US market, in itself, only indicates that Mexico ha s a relatively limited penetration on the US tuna
market. In the absence of further information as to what share of the US market Mexico might expect
to secure in the absence of the me asures at issue, we are not in a position to assess whether Mexico's
level of participation in the US tuna market refl ects a modification of the conditions of competition to
the detriment of Mexican tuna products or whethe r it simply reflects Mexico's expected level of
participation in the US market.550
7.360 Similarly, that the vast majority of the tuna imported by the United States is caught by
methods other than setting on dolphins support the view that it is more difficult to sell tuna that is
caught by setting on dolphins in the United States. Th is is consistent with the elements described
above relating to the value of access to the label on the market. However, this does not necessarily
imply that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions place Mexican tuna products at a disadvantage on
the US market in this respect, as compared to tuna products of US or other origins. Rather, as
observed earlier, this constraint would seem to apply equally to all tuna products on the market.
7.361 Furthermore, we note that the decisions by ma jor processors of tuna products not to purchase
tuna caught by setting on dolphins in fact predate the adoption of the first version of the DPCIA,
enacted 28 November 1990, which first defined dolph in-safe tuna harvested by a vessel using purse
seine nets in the ETP as tuna that is not caught on a trip involving intentional deployment on or
encirclement of dolphins measures at issue. Th is suggest that their decision was not necessarily
related to the adoption the measures.
7.362 One of the major tuna processors explains its dolphin-safe policy on its website as follows:
"Bumble Bee Foods, LLC remains fully committed to the 100% dolphin-safe policy
we implemented in April 1990. ... The US Government Dolphin-Safe Regulations
are in the process of being modified thr ough the International Dolphin Conservation
Program. The new regulations will allow for a less stringent US Dolphin-Safe
Regulation. Despite the new, less stringent 'compliance' criteria, Bumble Bee remains
committed to and in compliance with a 'no encirclement' policy. The commitment of
Bumble Bee to dolphin-safety will remain unchanged regardless of any changes to
the dolphin-safe law. We continue to strictly adhere to our 100% dolphin-safe
policy."551
7.363 This statement suggests that even if the US me asures were amended to allow the labelling of
tuna caught in accordance with the terms of the AIDCP (which authorizes setting on dolphins subject
to certain conditions and monitoring) certain tuna processors at least would not necessarily modify
their purchasing policies.
552 Indeed, according to the record of the hearing in the Senate before the

549 See para. 7.273 above.
550 In response to a question from the Panel in this respect, Mexico asserted that its share of the
US market should be higher and that latent demand should be taken into account, but it did not elaborate further
on the extent of such demand. (See Mexico's response to Panel question No. 94).
551 Exhibit MEX-47 (1).
552 The evidence presented with the Amicus curiae brief and referred to in the paragraphs to which the
United States has referred in its answers to questions suggests that the opposition of the tuna processing
companies to a change in the dolphin-safe standard is likely to be explained by the pressure that had been

Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries of the Co mmittee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
discussing the amendment of the DPCIA on 30 April 1996, which was cited in the paragraphs of the
amicus curiae brief to which the United States has refe rred to, tuna processing companies which had
taken "voluntary actions", despite not taking a form al position on any legislation, had clearly stated
their firm support for the existing definition of "dolphin-safe".
553
7.364 To the extent that these companies would ma intain their practices on the basis of their
perception of consumer preferenc es, independently of any change in the US standard, the causal
relationship between the US measures and the refusal of processors to purchase tuna caught by setting
on dolphins is unclear. Indeed, these elements sugg est that there is only a marginal relationship
between the measures themselves and the practices of tuna processors, and that what these companies
consider to be the determining factor in their deci sion is an absence of setting on dolphins, rather than
compliance with the terms of the US measures.
7.365 Mexico argues that access to the principal US distribution channels is being denied to
Mexican tuna products by the US measures, and that retailers, as well as consumers, would purchase
such tuna products if they were eligible for dolphin-safe labelling. 554 In support of this assertion,
Mexico presents an affidavit, suggesting that retaile rs would buy Mexican tuna products if they were
eligible for a label. This confirms the importance of dolphin-safe status to US retailers selling tuna
products. However, the terms of the affidavit do no t, in our view, make it clear, as Mexico suggests,
that the AIDCP label would be acceptable to the reta ilers as an alternative dolphin-safe certification.
The affidavit and supporting documen ts refer to eligibility for a "dolphin-safe" label. These
statements may therefore be understood to mean that the retailers at issue would be prepared offer the
products for sale if they met the conditions for dol phin-safe labelling under the existing US measures.
Indeed, the affidavit explains that retailers w ho initially carried a Mexican brand withdrew it from
sale following an intervention from an NGO. Another supporting document presented by Mexico
expressly indicates that the retailer at issue is not concerned with legal issues but with consumer
acceptance.
555
7.366 We also note that Mexico itself has indicated th at retailers are acutely aware of the dolphin-
safe issue and of the risk of facing actions such as boycotts if they carry tuna not eligible for a label.556
This suggests that retailers are sensitive to the dol phin-safe issue in a manner comparable to that of
the processors referred to above, i.e. that they do not wish to carry tuna products containing tuna

exerted since 1989-1990 by Earth Island Institute. According to a press article, official of Earth Island Institute
charged that Bumblebee Seafoods had broken its pledge to sell only "dolphin-safe" tuna because, among other
things, its parent company in Thailand had bought a cargo without getting documents to show it had been caught
using techniques that did not kill dolphins and launched newspaper advertisements the week of
8 December 1990 to urge a consumer boycott of Bumbleb ee tuna. Exhibit attached to the Amicus curiae brief
EX-2, NYT Article "A storm erupts over saving the dolphins". 8 December 1990.
553 "Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Boxer: ... Tuna processing companies listed (Starkist,
Bumblebee and Chicken of the Sea) and announced that they would only accept tuna that had been caught
without harassing dolphins. These voluntary actions dramatically and immediately transformed the two-decades
long controversy over using dolphins to catch yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) ... Members
of the U.S. tuna processing industry (canners) have not taken a formal position on any legislation, but StarKist,
BumbleBee and Van Camp (Chicken of the Sea), which constitute 100% of the U.S. industry and 25% of the
world market, have clearly stated their firm support for the current definition of 'dolphin-safe'." Exhibit attached
to the Amicus curiae brief EX-4. (United States' respon se to Panel question No. 40(a), para. 98 which cites
paragraphs 18-20, 25, 62-64 of the amicus curiae brief which in turn refer to exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 attached to
the amicus submission.).
554 Mexico's first written submission, para. 112.
555 See Exhibit MEX-58.
556 Mexico's first written submission, para. 111.

caught in association with dolphins that may lead to pressure from NGOs and negative perception
from consumers. A consideration of this eviden ce therefore does not modify our conclusion in
paragraph 7.364 that the elements before us suggest that there is only a marginal relationship between
the US measures and the practices of operators on the market, including retailers.
7.367 This conclusion is also not modified, in our view, by a consideration of the evidence
presented by Mexico in relation to consumers' unders tanding of the term "dolphin-safe". As reflected
in paragraph 4.141, Mexico subm itted an opinion poll indicating that 48% of the public believes that
dolphin-safe means no dolphins were injured or kill ed in the course of capturing the tuna (AIDCP
standard), 22% believes it means there is no dolphin meat in the can, and only 12% believe it means
dolphins were not encircled and then released in the capture of the tuna (US standard). According to
this poll, 59% of the public think the definition of dolphin-safe should mean that no dolphins were
injured or killed in the course of capturing t una, whereas only 10% believe it should mean dolphins
were not encircled and then released in the capture of the tuna. 557 However, the Panel is not persuaded
that this supports Mexico's view that retailers and consumers would accept tuna products made of
tuna labelled with the AIDCP label, or that tho se surveyed individuals who assume "dolphin-safe" to
mean that no dolphins were injured or harmed would consider that no dolphin was injured or harmed
if setting on dolphins was involved. We also note that the poll addresses consumer's perception of the
meaning of the term "dolphin-safe", rather than their interest in purchasing one or another type of tuna
based on its dolphin-safe status.
558 The results of this poll would therefore not provide a sufficient
basis, in our view, to conclude that consumers w ould consider tuna products made of tuna caught in
conformity with AIDCP requirements to be "dolphin-safe", nor do they provide a basis for concluding
that the US dolphin-safe provisions deny Mexican tuna products access to the US market.
7.368 We further note in this respect that some of the evidence presented to the Panel suggests that
90 per cent of the world's tuna companies have adopted a strict "no setting on dolphins" standard. 559
If this is the case, the proportion of tuna imported in the United States that is caught by other methods
than setting on dolphins may simply reflect the general distribution of the products on the world
market, rather than any specific features of the US market. Mexico observed that such claims were
unverifiable insofar as the organization making this claim, whose standard is largely copied on the
rules of the United States for the ETP, has no mech anism to authoritatively verify it. Mexico noted
that the Earth Island Institute (EII) reportedly requir es companies to pay annual or per-can/case fee to
be listed as "dolphin-safe" on Earth Island's lists but that it had no mechanism of verification –other
than to ask the companies to sel f-certify compliance. Mexico also emphasized that the United States
had not disputed that there was no manner in which it could verify claims that no dolphins were killed
or seriously injured during particular net sets outside the ETP because there are not trained,
independent observers on board fishing vessels outside the ETP and because no fisheries management
organization other than the IATTC requires vessels to keep tuna caught in sets that harmed dolphins
in a separate well, and not mix them with tuna caught in sets that did not harm dolphins. Finally
Mexico argued that the major three US distributors do not advertise that they comply with the EII
standard but rather that they define "dolphin -safe" to mean not setting nets on dolphins. We
acknowledge that the EII may not have an independ ent review mechanism to verify compliance with
the EII standard, which is stricter than the US st andard. However, compliance with the requirement of

557 Exhibit MEX-64.
558 The only question in the poll relating to purchasing preferences was expressed in terms of species
rather than dolphin-safe status (44/52% of respondents indicated that they look for albacore tuna, 3/2% looked
for skipjack and 6% for yellowfin). See Exhibit MEX-64.
559 Amicus Exhibit-28. As explained in paragraph 2.9 above, insofar as the Panel deemed this
information to be relevant for the purposes of its assessment, it invited Mexico to comment on it in order to take
full account of Mexico's right of response and defense in respect of due pr ocess considerations. Panel's question
No. 88.

absence of setting, which is the common denominator of the US and the EII standard, is certified
through the US procedures and the NOAA form.
560 The lack of review mechanism alone therefore
does not disprove the assertion that 90 per cent of the world's tuna companies catch tuna with methods
other than setting on dolphins.
"Pressure" to adapt to the US standard
7.369 Finally, Mexico contends that the US meas ures unilaterally exert pressure on the Mexican
fleet to change fishing areas and/or fishing methods, which Mexico argues is evidence of the de facto
discriminatory effect of the measures. 561 For Mexico, the fact that the US measures are aimed at
encouraging foreign fishing fleets such as those of Mexi co to change either their fishing areas or their
methods is further evidence of the link between the US measures and the WTO-inconsistent
discrimination. In its view, such an attempt at extraterritorial regulation by the United States is
inconsistent with the national treatment and most-favoured nation obligations562 and the obligations in
the WTO Agreements must not be interpreted so as to allow a WTO Member to condition access to its
domestic market based on compliance with that Memb er's unilateral policy relating to actions outside
its territory, including unincorporated processes and production methods (PPMs).563
7.370 Mexico observes that a stated objective of th e US measures is to use the US market to
encourage fishing fleets such as those of Mexico to change their fishing areas and/or practices.
Therefore it flows from that objective, according to Mexico, that the measures de facto condition
access to the principal US distribution channels for tuna products on compliance with a fishing
method that has been unilaterally imposed by the United States. 564 Moreover, Mexico considers that
merely because there may be alternative ways to obtain the dolphin-safe label and thereby access to
the principal US distribution channels does not alter the fact that Mexican tuna products caught using
the established fishing methods of the Mexican fleet are de facto treated less favourably. 565 F o r
Mexico, in its view, such an attempt at extraterrito rial regulation by the United States is inconsistent
with the national treatment and most-favoured nation obligations. 566 Mexico acknowledges that
conceivably, in some limited circumstances, a unila teral effort aimed at altering the behaviour of
another sovereign country coul d be justified under one of the specific exceptions to the

560 Mexico contends that the certification on Form 370 that nets were not intentionally set on dolphins
is not as verifiable for non-ETP vessels as for ETP vessels because certifications of the former are made only by
the vessel's captain, while certifications of the latter must be ratified by an independent observer on board the
vessel. See para. 4.127.
561 Mexico's second written submission, para. 151.
562 Mexico's second written submission, para. 148.
563 (footnote original) Unincorporated process and production methods (PPMs), which are also referred
to as non-product related PPMs, leave no trace in the final product and are not reflected in the physical attributes
of the product. The fishing methods at issue in this di spute are an example. They leave no trace in the tuna
products nor are they reflected in the physical attr ibutes of the tuna products. (Mexico's second written
submission, fn 80).
564 Mexico's second written submission, para. 116.
565 (footnote original) In Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , the Panel found that the fact
alternative commercially more attractive distribution channels were open to imports did not alter the fact that the
Canadian measure treated imported grain less favourably than like domestic grain. See Panel Reports, Canada –
Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September
2004, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS276/AB/R, paragraphs 6.213 and 6.295. In Canada –
Autos, the Panel found that where an advantage accorded to the sale or use of domestic products but not to the
sale or use of like imported products, it did not matter that the advantage could also be obtained by means other
than the sale or use of domestic products. See Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19 June 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, paragraph 10.87. (Mexico's second written submission, fn 121).
566 Mexico's second written submission, para. 148.

WTO obligations, however it emphasizes that none of those exceptions has been invoked by the
United States nor do any of them apply to the US measures.567
7.371 In considering Mexico's arguments on this point , we recall the Appellate Body's observation,
in US – Shrimp, that:
"It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance
with, or adoption of, certain policies (althoug h covered in principle by one or another
of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori
incapable of justification under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if
not all, of the specific exceptions of Artic le XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply."568
Although this statement was made in the context of an analysis under Article XX, it implies that the
fact that the measures at issue reflect a certain choi ce of policy or standard is not in itself a reason to
assume that a measure is WTO-inconsistent. The same considerations are pertinent, in our view, in
the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.

7.372 We also note that the US dolphin-safe labe lling provisions do not require the importing
Member to comply with any particular fishing method (these measures do not state, for example, that
no tuna may be imported if it originates in a countr y where tuna is caught by setting on dolphins).
Rather, it is the products themselves that need to comply with the requirements of the labelling
scheme, if they wish to benefit from the label and make dolphin-safe claims on the US market.
7.373 The United States describes one of the measures' objectives in terms of protecting dolphins by
ensuring that the US market is not used to encour age fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins.
569 However, we do not consider that in it self constitutes evidence of a discriminatory
effect of the measures. As described above, to th e extent that the measures at issue provide an
incentive for fleets setting on dolphins to discontinue that practice to gain a commercial advantage on
the US market, such incentive a pplies also to the US fleet and other tuna fleets operating in
international waters.
Conclusion
7.374 In conclusion, based on the evidence presented to us, we are not persuaded that Mexico has
demonstrated that the US dolphin-safe provisions afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna
products within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.375 That these measures may, through the operation of origin-neutral regulatory categories, have
a detrimental impact on certain imports does not, in our view, necessarily imply that the measures
afford less favourable treatment to such imported pr oducts within the meaning of Article 2.1. We
acknowledge, in this respect, that different products of various origin s may be affected differently by
a measure that lays down certain product charact eristics with which compliance is mandatory.
However, as observed above, what matters for the purposes of determining whether there is a
violation of Article 2.1 is not only the existen ce of some adverse impact on some imported products,
but whether the group of imported products is pl aced at a disadvantage, in this respect, compared to
the groups of like domestic and importe d products originating in any other country. We also note, in
this respect, the following findings of the Appellate Body in the context of Article III:4:

567 Mexico's second written submission, paras. 118 and 148.
568 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 121.
569 See the description of the US objectives in Section II.A below.

"[T]he existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a
measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable
treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances
unrelated to the foreign origin of the product."
570
7.376 In addition, as observed above with reference to the rulings of the Appellate Body in Korea –
Various Measures on Beef , in our view, the form of the analys is is the treatment afforded by the
measures themselves, rather than the consequences that arise as a result of the actions of private actors
on the market.
7.377 In the present case, as discussed above, it appears to us that the measures at issue, in applying
the same origin-neutral requirement to all tuna products, do not inherently discriminate on the basis of
the origin of the products, and that they also do not make it impossible for Mexican tuna products to
comply with this requirement, or, as Mexico puts it, "prohibit" the use of the label for Mexican tuna
products.
7.378 Rather, on the basis of the elements presented to us in these proceedings, it appears to us that
the impact of the US dolphin-safe provisions on different operators on the market and on tuna
products of various origins depends on a number of factors that are not related to the nationality of the
product, but to the fishing and purchasing practices , geographical location, relative integration of
different segments of production, and economic and marketing choices. In this context, any particular
adverse impact felt by Mexican tuna products on the US market is, in our view, primarily the result of
"factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product", including the choices made
by Mexico's own fishing fleet and canners.
3. Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement
7.379 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes:
"Members shall ensure that technical regula tions are not prepared, adopted or applied
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks,
relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products."
7.380 Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provision s are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement because they do not fulfil a legitimate objective or, in the alternative, to the extent
that the US measures fulfil any objectives, taking into account the risks of non-fulfilment, those
objectives could be fulfilled using less trade-restrictive measures.
571

570 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 96.
571 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 204-25; Me xico's first oral statement, para. 47; Mexico's
second written submission, paras. 200-210; Mexico's second oral statement, paras. 85-115.

7.381 The United States contends Mexico's arguments should be rejected insofar as it holds the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions fulfil a legitima te objective and are not more trade restrictive
than necessary to meet those objectives.572
7.382 In order to address Mexico's claim, we must first clarify how a violation of this provision may
be established. We note that Mexico's claim is ba sed on an absence of compliance with the terms of
the second sentence of Article 2.2. We note that th e parties appear to agree that the second sentence
of Article 2.2 gives meaning to the first sentence, but that they have proposed somewhat different
approaches to the establishment of a violation of the second sentence of Article 2.2.
7.383 In Mexico's view, a technical regulation creat es an "unnecessary obstacle to international
trade" if its objective is not legitimate or if the regulation is more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfil a legitimate objective taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. 573 According to
Mexico, two issues must be addressed under this provision: (i) whether the technical regulation fulfils
a legitimate objective; and (ii) whether it is not more trade-rest rictive than necessary to fulfil such
objective taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.574
7.384 In the United States' view, the second sentence of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement explains
what the first sentence of this provision means. 575 The United States submits that two elements must
be shown for a measure to be considered more trad e-restrictive than necessary: (i) the measure must
be trade-restrictive; and (ii) the measure must r estrict trade more than is necessary to fulfil the
measure's legitimate objective.576
7.385 The Panel first notes that this provision embodies one of the core objectives of the
TBT Agreement, namely "that technical regul ations ... do not create unnecessary obstacles to
international trade".577 The first sentence of Article 2.2 translates this general objective into a positive
obligation by requiring Members to ensure that their technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or
applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
7.386 The second sentence of Article 2.2 contains a mo re detailed obligation, i.e. that technical
regulations must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. The Panel also notes that the first and the second
sentences of this provision are connected by the e xpression "[f]or this purpose". In the Panel's view,
this expression indicates that complying with the requirements contained in the second sentence of
Article 2.2 serves the purpose of ensuring that technical regulations do not create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade.
7.387 Thus, the Panel agrees with the United States that "the second sentence of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement explains what the first sentence of this provision means".
578 In other words, the
second sentence of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreem ent establishes two requirements that technical
regulations must comply with in order not to c onstitute unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
A plain reading of the second sentence of Article 2.2 reveals that these requirements are:

572 United States' first written submission, para. 145.
573 Mexico's first written submission, para. 205.
574 Mexico's first written submission, para. 205.
575 United States' first written submission, para. 143.
576 United States' first written submission, para. 163.
577 The fifth preambular paragraph of the TBT Agreement expresses the WTO Members' desire to:
"[E]nsure that technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling
requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards do not
create unnecessary obstacles to international trade".
578 United States' first written submission, para. 143.

– Technical regulations must pursue a legitimate objective; and

– They must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that legitimate objective,
taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create.

7.388 Therefore, we agree with Mexico that the analysis of its claims under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement may be conducted in two steps.
579 First, to determine whether the US dolphin-safe
provisions fulfil a legitimate objective; and, second, if that is the case, to determine whether those
provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil such objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create.580 We also note that the burden rests on Mexico, as the complainant, to
demonstrate that the conditions are met, to conclude that a violation of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement exists.
7.389 On the basis of this approach, we now consid er Mexico's claims under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.
(a) Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions pursue a legitimate objective
7.390 As observed above, the burden of demonstrating that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, including that they are "more trade restrictive
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective" (emphasis added) rests on Mexico.
7.391 We note in this respect that in the context of its analysis under Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, the panel in EC – Sardines expressed the view that "it is incumbent upon the
respondent to advance the objectives of its tec hnical regulation which it considers legitimate". 581 We
also note, however, that the Appellate Body observed in this respect that the burden of proof was not
modified by considerations relating to the fact that it is the respondent that has adopted the technical
regulation at issue and thus was in the best position to ascertain its objectives:
"The TBT Agreement acknowledges the right of every WTO Member to establish for
itself the objectives of its technical regula tions while affording every other Member
adequate opportunities to obtain information about these objectives. That said, part of
the reason why the Panel concluded that th e burden of proof under Article 2.4 is on
the respondent is because, in the Panel's view, the complainant cannot "spell out" the
"legitimate objectives" of the technical regulation. In addition, the Panel reasoned that
the assessment of the appropriateness of a relevant international standard involves
considerations which are properly the province of the Member adopting or applying a
technical regulation.
In our opinion, these two concerns are not justified."582
7.392 Similarly under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agre ement, which also relies on the notion of
"legitimate objective" pursued by the measures, the bur den is on the complainant, i.e. in this case
Mexico, to establish the existence of a violation of this provision, including that the measures are
"more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective", and this necessarily involves a
determination of what such objective is and its legitimacy within the meaning of Article 2.2.583 As we

579 Mexico's first written submission, para. 205.
580 Mexico's first written submission, para. 205.
581 Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.120-7.121.
582 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 276-277.
583 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 282.

understand it, the Appellate Body's observations with respect to the complainant's role in discharging
its burden of proof are intended to make clear that a complainant is not relieved of its duty to present a
prima facie case by the fact that some aspects of the provisi on at issue relate to the objectives of the
measures, which are determined by the Member ta king the measure. This does not imply, however,
that the objectives of the measures as defined by that Member itself are not relevant to this
determination. It only assumes that the complainan t is expected to present its claims taking into
account the information at its disposal in this respect.
7.393 In the present case, in order to determine whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
pursue a legitimate objective, we must identify such objective, and ascertain its "legitimacy" within
the meaning of Article 2.2. In accordance with th e burden of proof described above, it is appropriate,
in our view, to consider in the first instance th e objective of the measure as described by Mexico.
Nonetheless, in order to make an objective assessment of the matter in accordance with Article 11 of
the DSU and ensure that the right of the defending Member to adopt measures in pursuance of certain
legitimate objectives in accordance wi th Article 2.2 is preserved, we must also consider in this
respect, the United States' description of its own obj ectives, in order to clarify as necessary what the
objectives of the measure are and the legitimacy of such objectives.
(i) The objectives pursued by the US measures
Arguments of the parties
7.394 Mexico argues that ascertaining the true objectiv es of a technical regulation rather than just
the stated or acknowledged objectives is an important part of the interpretation and application of
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. According to Mexico, the objective assessment required by
Article 11 of the DSU includes the facts pertaining to the objectives of the measures at issue. In
Mexico's view, in ascertaining the objectives of the US measures the Panel should consider the
"design, structure and characteristics of the measure". 584 Mexico submits that "the U.S. measures do
not protect animal life or health or the environmen t in the general sense". According to Mexico, the
objective of the US measures is much narrower, name ly, "to preserve dolphin stocks in the course of
tuna fishing operations in the ETP".585
7.395 The United States first submitted that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions are:
 – ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products
contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins; and

 – contributing to the protection of dolphins, by ensuring that the US market is not used
to encourage fishing fleets to catch t una in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins.586

7.396 According to the United States, these objectives ar e reflected both in the name of the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act itself as well as the findings of the US Congress specified in
that statute.
587

584 Mexico's first written submission, para. 211; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64,
paras. 213, 218, 220.
585 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 207-208.
586 See United States' first written submission, para. 146; United States' first oral statement, para. 47. .
587 United States' second written submission, para. 128.

7.397 The United States later described the second objec tive as ensuring that the US market is not
used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna "by setting on dolphins".
588
7.398 Mexico submits that the way in which the United States has represented the objectives has
created a moving target or evolving objectives. Mexico also argues th at the United States'
representation of the objectives confuses the objec tives with the methods necessary to achieve
them.589 As described above, Mexico further submits that the objective of the US measures is
narrower than the protection of animal life or health or the environment.590
7.399 The United States agrees with Mexico that the architecture and design of the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions as well as the findings of th e US Congress are relevant to ascertaining the
objectives of the US measures.591 The United States claims that the architecture, structure and design
of the US dolphin-safe provisions also reflect their stated objectives.592
Analysis by the Panel
7.400 As described above, there is some difference of views among the parties as to what objectives
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions seek to fulfil.
7.401 As described above, the United States itsel f initially identified two objectives of the
US dolphin-safe provisions:
 – ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products
contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins; and

 – contributing to the protection of dolphins, by ensuring that the US market is not used
to encourage fishing fleets to catch t una in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins.
593

7.402 The United States later expressed the second objective in terms of contributing to the
protection of dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch
tuna "by setting on dolphins".
594

588 See United States' response to Panel question No. 27, para. 66; United States' response to Panel
question No 64, paras. 146-147; United States' second written submission, paras. 36, 127-135, 156, 161, 188;
United States' second oral statement, paras. 54-55; United States' response to Panel question Nos. 111 and 147,
paras. 33 and 80.
589 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64, para. 207.
590 Mexico's first written submission, para. 208; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64, para. 214.
591 United States' second written submission, para. 129.
592 For instance, the United States observes that the US dolphin-safe provisions establish conditions
under which tuna products may be labelled dolphin-safe based on whether those products contain tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. In addition, the United States claims that the
US dolphin-safe provisions are designed in such a way that labelling tuna products dolphin-safe or with "any
other term or symbol that falsely claims or suggests that the tuna contained in the product were harvested using
a method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins" when the conditions for labelling products in that way are
not met is a violation of the US law prohibiting decep tive practices, United States' second written submission,
para. 129.
593 See para. 7.394 above.
594 See para. 7.395 above.

7.403 Mexico described the objective of the US measu res as being "narrower than the protection of
animal life or health or the environment", and sugg ested that the actual objective of these measures is
"to preserve dolphin stocks in the course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP".595
7.404 Mexico then further clarified that its contenti on is not that the two objectives of the measures,
as identified by the United States, "could not be found within the design and structure of the
US measures".596 Mexico rather argues that US dolphin-safe provisions pursue an additional
objective, i.e. "protecting dolphins", and that they fail to fulfil this objective.597
7.405 In light of these contentions, the Panel consid ers it necessary to seek to first clarify the
objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions. As the Appellate Body has recognized in the context of
Article XIV of GATS, a panel's analysis is not bound by a Member's characterization of the objectives
of its own measures. Such categorization must be made in an independent and objective fashion,
based on the eviden ce in the record.
598 The same considerations apply, in our view, in the context of
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
7.406 In this task, the Panel's analysis will be guided by the description of the objectives of the
measures by both parties, as well as by the structure and design of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
We note in this respect that the parties both consid er that the design, structure and characteristics of
the US dolphin-safe provisions themselves are rele vant to a clarification of their objectives. 599 We
wish to make clear, however, that at this stage of th e analysis our enquiry is limited to the question of
what the objective or purpose of the measures is, and does not seek to address the separate question of
what the measures actually do or do not do in pursuance of this objective.
7.407 We first note that Mexico has not suggested that the two objectives of the measures, as
identified by the United States, "could not be found within the design and structure of the
US measures". Accordingly, as we understand it, it is not disputed that the US dolphin-safe
provisions pursue objectives relating both to consumer information and to dolphin protection, both in
relation to the manner in which tuna is caught. We now consider further both aspects.
Consumer information objective
7.408 As described above, the United States has descr ibed the first objective of its measures as
"ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceive d about whether tuna products contain tuna that
was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins".
7.409 In relation to this objective, we first note that the title of the statute codifying the
US dolphin-safe provisions is "Dolphin Protection C onsumer Information Act". This title supports
the contention that this piece of legislation is inte nded to protect consumers from being deceived by
the information that is provided to them.
7.410 In addition, the US dolphin-safe provisions contain several findings of the US Congress that
underline their enactment. Subsection 1385(b) of the DPCIA establishes:

595 Mexico's first written submission, para. 208.
596 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 137, para. 110.
597 Mexico stated that "it appears to Mexico that these two objectives [referring to the objectives
identified by the United States] encompass a third incidental objective which relates to 'protecting dolphin'", see
Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64, para. 214.
598 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 304.
599 See Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64, paras. 213, 218-219 and United States' second
written submission, para. 129.

"The Congress finds that-
(1) dolphins and other marine mammals are frequently killed in the course of
tuna fishing operations in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean and high seas driftnet
fishing in other parts of the world;
(2) it is the policy of the United Stat es to support a worldwide ban on high seas
driftnet fishing, in part because of the ha rmful effects that such driftnets have on
marine mammals, including dolphins; and
(3) consumers would like to know if the t una they purchase is falsely labelled as
to the effect of the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins."
7.411 The third finding clearly refers to the inten tion of protecting consumers against deceitful
information. The legislator's goal seems to be to create the necessary controls to guarantee that the
information displayed by the labels used on tuna pr oducts is truthful about the effects on dolphins of
the fishing techniques applied to catch the tuna cont ained in those products. We note that this finding
does not make any express reference to any region or fishery in particular, nor does it refer to any
specific fishing technique.
7.412 Therefore, the structure and design of the US dolphin-safe provisions support the view that
one of their objectives is to ensure accurate inform ation to consumers of tuna products concerning the
harmful effects on dolphins resulting from fishing methods employed to catch the tuna contained in
those products.
7.413 Consequently, the Panel accepts the United States' contention that its measures aim, inter alia,
at "ensuring that consumers are not misled or decei ved about whether tuna prod ucts contain tuna that
was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins".
Dolphin protection objective
7.414 As described above, the United States initially described its second objective as "contributing
to the protection of dolphins, by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to
catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins" and later referred to it in terms of "contributing
to the protection of dolphins, by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to
catch tuna by setting on dolphins".
7.415 Mexico has suggested, however, that the US obj ective is "narrower than the protection of
animal life or health or the environment", and that the actual objective of these measures is "to
preserve dolphin stocks in the course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP"
600 and that they pursue an
"additional objective", i.e. "protecting dolphins".601
7.416 In relation to this objective, we first note th at the United States' own description of its
operation implies an end-and-means relation between two different elements, i.e. ensuring that the
US market is not used to encourage certain fishing techniques, in order to contribute to the protection
of dolphins. In other words, as we understand it, the ulterior objective is contributing to the protection

600 Mexico's first written submission, para. 208.
601 Mexico stated that "it appears to Mexico that these two objectives [referring to the objectives
identified by the United States] encompass a third incidental objective which relates to 'protecting dolphin'", see
Mexico's response to Panel question No. 64, para. 214.

of dolphins, whereas the means chosen to achieve this objective is to ensure that the US market is not
used to encourage certain fishing techniques.
7.417 With respect to the ulterior objective of contributing to the protection of dolphins, the Panel
notes that the US dolphin-safe provisions appear under Subchapter II of Title 16, Section 1385 of the
USC, entitled Conservation and Protection of Ma rine Mammals, which gives support to the
United States' assertion that the measures at issue are part of its policies relating to the protection of
marine mammals, including dolphins.602
7.418 Moreover, the first two findings of the US C ongress cited above also reveal a preoccupation
on the part of the US legislator with the prot ection of dolphins and other marine mammals. The
US Congress seemed concerned in particular about the harmful effects suff ered by these species
arising from two sources: tuna fishing operations in the ETP, on one hand; and driftnet fishing in the
high seas worldwide, on the other hand. In the Pane l's view, these findings suggest the existence of a
direct link between the enactment of the US dolphin-safe provisions and the US Congress' desire to
protect dolphins and other marine mammals. Th erefore, the structure and design of the
US dolphin-safe provisions support the United States ' argument that its measures are intended to
"protect dolphins".
7.419 Mexico has suggested that the actual objectiv e of these measures is "narrower" than the
protection of animal life or health or the environmen t and is in fact "to preserve dolphin stocks in the
course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP".
603 We note in this respect that the United States has
often referred in the course of the proceedings to its conviction that the dolphin populations in the
ETP remain depleted. 604 These references however, do not imply in our view that the US measures
aim exclusively to preserve dolphin stocks in the ETP as suggested by Mexico. As we understand
them, the United States' allegations that the dolphin stocks in the ETP remain depleted were rather
meant to substantiate its contention that setting on dolphins is harmful to dolphins. 605 Furthermore,
the text of the US dolphin-safe provisions establis hes certification requirements and conditions for
access to the dolphin-safe label also with respect to tuna caught outside the ETP. 606 Therefore, the
design and structure of the US dolphin-safe provisions themselves support the view that they aim at
protecting dolphins generally, in and outside the ETP. 607 Thus we disagree with Mexico's allegation
that the objectives of the measures, as reflected in the design and structure of the measures, are limited
"to preserve dolphin stocks in the course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP".
7.420 We also note that, in response to a question by the Panel, the United States explained that its
objective was not to achieve a specific number or rate of dolphin mortality, but rather generally to
reduce the adverse effects of setting on dolphins to ca tch tuna by ensuring that the US market is not

602 United States' first written submission, fn 69.
603 Mexico's first written submission, para. 208.
604 United States first written submission, paras. 9, 47; United States' first oral statement, para. 7;
United States' second written submission, paras. 2, 43; United States' second oral statement, para. 10.
605 United States' first written submission, paras. 46-59; United States' response to Panel question
606 Subsection 1835(d)(1)(B) and 1835(d)(1)(D).
607 We also note that Subsection 1835(h) of the US dolphin-safe provisions conditioned the change in
the certification requirements for tuna caught in the ET P by using purse seine nets to certifying that no dolphins
were killed or seriously injured, instead of that no purse seine net was used and that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured, to the existence of a finding by the Secretary of Commerce that se tting on dolphins was not
"having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock" (emphasis added). However, such
determination would have had effects only within the ETP. Thus, in principle, the requirement of certifying that
no dolphins were set upon would have remained possible in other fisheries if there was, for instance, a
determination that regular and significant association existed in that fishery.

used to encourage setting on dolphins. The United States added that "[s]eeking to protect dolphins
from these adverse effects might also be considered as seeking to conserve dolphin populations".
608
7.421 In this respect, we note that, as explained a bove, the US description of the manner in which it
sought to contribute to protecting dolphins through the measures has varied in the course of the
proceedings. Initially, the United States depicted its objective as contributing to the protection of
dolphins by "ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to use fishing
techniques that adversely affect dolphins " (emphasis added).
609 On other occasions, the United States
defined it as contributing to the protection of dolphins by "ensuring that the US market is not used to
encourage the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna" (emphasis added).
610 These differences
may have a bearing on later parts of our analysis. Hence, we consider it necessary to clarify this
aspect, in light of the structure and design of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
7.422 The operative paragraphs of the US dolphi n-safe provisions controlling the use of the
dolphin-safe label bar its use on tuna that was caught using driftnet fishing in the high seas, regardless
of whether any incidental killing or injury of dol phins or any other marine mammal occurred during
the fishing trip.611 As explained above in Section II of this Report, access to the dolphin-safe label is
also denied to tuna caught by a large vessel (with 363 metric tons or more carrying capacity) 612 in the
ETP by intentionally setting on dolphins or in a fish ing trip where dolphins were killed or seriously
injured, regardless of the fishing method used. 613 The use of the label is also prohibited for tuna
caught outside the ETP if dolphins were intentionally set upon 614; and in cases where an alternative
label is used 615, if dolphins were killed or seriously in jured, even if no setting on dolphins was
involved.616
7.423 Consequently, the use of both driftnets in the high seas as well as the fishing technique known
as setting on dolphins disqualify a tuna product from ac cess to the label. It seems that the reason
underlying this prohibition is the assumption that these two fishing techniques result in adverse effects
on marine mammals including dolphins. 617 The measures also go further than addressing setting on
dolphins by requiring that the tuna has not been caught in a set where dolphins were killed or
seriously injured, when the tuna was caught using purse seine nets in the ETP. 618 In addition, the
United States itself also describ es the measures as conditioning access to an alternative dolphin-safe

608 United States' response to Panel question No. 65(a), para. 151.
609 United States first written submission, paras. 6-9, 60, 146; United States' response to Panel question
610 United States first written submission, para. 28; United States' response to Panel question Nos. 64
and 65, paras. 146 and 150, respectively; United States second written submission, paras. 7, 36, 133.
611 Subsection 1385(d)(1)(A) of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
612 See para. 2.12 above.
613 Subsections 1385(d)(1)(C), 1385(d)(2) and 1385(h) of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
614 Subsections 1385(d)(1)(B) of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
615 As described in Section II.F of this Report, an "alternative label" under the DPCIA is a dolphin-safe
label developed by private individuals or companies, that is in compliance with the dolphin-safe labelling
requirements, but does not reproduce the official mark developed by the US Secretary of Commerce.
616 Subsections 1385(d)(3)(A) of the US dolphin-safe provisions.
617 The second finding of the US Congress expressly indicates that "the United States to support a
worldwide ban on high seas driftnet fishing, in part beca use of the harmful effects th at such driftnets have on
marine mammals, including dolphins" (emphasis added). The United States has also clarified that "setting on
dolphins to catch tuna adversely affects dolphins", Un ited States first written submission, paras. 46-57;
United States' first oral statement, para. 7; United States' second oral statement, paras. 7-13.
618 As described in para. 2.22 above, the same requirement would also apply outside the ETP if it were
determined that a regular and significant tuna-dolphin association exists.

label on the tuna not being caught in a set where dolphins were killed or seriously injured (in addition
to dolphins not having been set upon).
7.424 Thus, the structure and design of the US measures suggest that the US dolphin-safe provisions
do not seek to discourage only setting on dolphins. Th ey rather seem directed to discouraging, more
generally, the use of fishing techniques that have harmful effects on dolphins, as the United States
itself initially described it. This is also consiste nt with the manner in which the US objective relating
to consumer information is formulated.
7.425 Therefore, for the purposes of our analysis of Mexico's claims under Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, we accept the United States' repr esentation of the objectives of the US dolphin-safe
provisions as described in paragraph 7.401 above.
7.426 Finally, we note that there is a direct corre lation between the two objectives identified by the
United States. As explained by the United States itself:
"The objectives of the U.S. dolphin-safe labeling provisions are (1) ensuring that
consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that
was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins; and (2) to the extent that
consumers choose not to purchase tuna without the dolphin-safe label , the U.S.
provisions ensure that the U.S. market is not used to encourage fi shing fleets to catch
tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins" (emphasis added).619
7.427 To the extent that, as described, the US dolphin-safe provisions operate on the basis of
incentives created by consumer choice, achievement of the second objective seems to be dependant in
large part on the achievement of the first objec tive. Only if consumers can and do accurately
distinguish, under the measures at issue, tuna caught in conditions that are harmful to dolphins from
tuna caught in conditions that are not harmful to dolphins, can the use of such harmful fishing
techniques be discouraged on the US market through the use of the label.
(ii) Whether the objectives pursued by the United States are legitimate
Arguments by the parties
7.428 Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provisi ons promote the use of alternative fishing
methods that result in substantially higher bycatch and the depletion of ocean sealife. Mexico also
argues that the US measures undermine the economic incentive for countries and fishing fleets to
participate in the AIDCP, which has been recognized to be a very successful multilateral
environmental agreement.
620
7.429 Accordingly, Mexico claims that the US measu res "trade off" the protection of the life or
health of other animals and the protection of the environment in general against the professed
protection of the life or health of dolphins in the geographic confines of the ETP. 621 According to
Mexico, this trade-off undermines broader environmen tal objectives that are enshrined in the AIDCP.

619 United States first written submission, paras. 146, 158.
620 Mexico cited to the fact that AIDCP was awarde d the Margarita Lizárraga Medal by the Director
General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in November, 2005. The medal is awarded biennially
to a person or organization that serves with distinction in the application of the Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries (Mexico's first written submission, para. 207). Mexico also cited support for the AIDCP from
environmental NGOs (Mexico's first written submission, para. 90).
621 Mexico's first written submission, para. 209.

Therefore, Mexico submits, the US dolphin-safe provisions cannot be found to "fulfil a legitimate
objective" within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
622
7.430 The United States claims that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions fall within two
of the objectives expressly listed in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, namely, the "prevention of
deceptive practices"; and the "protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or
the environment".623
7.431 Moreover, the United States submits that the preamble of the TBT Agreement provides
relevant context for the words "legitimate objective" in Article 2.2. The United States considers that
the preamble makes it clear that each Member has the right to d ecide for itself which legitimate
objectives to pursue and to take measures to me et those objectives "at the levels it considers
appropriate", including with respect to measures to protect animal life or health or the environment
and to prevent deceptive practices.624
7.432 The United States claims that since dolphins ar e animals, protecting them is a legitimate
objective expressly contemplated under Article 2.2. Further, as dolphins comprise part of the
environment, protecting dolphins also constitutes protecting the environment.625
7.433 The United States disagrees with Mexico that th e US dolphin-safe provisions "trade off" the
protection of dolphin population in the ETP and the protection of the environment in general. In the
first place, the United Sates argues that it is neither for Mexico nor for a WTO panel, to decide what
policy objectives the United States should pursue. 626 The United States adds that nothing in the
TBT Agreement dictates that Members must prioritize one set of policy objectives over another.
7.434 Secondly, the United States disagrees with the implication of Mexico's suggestion that the
United States does not take measures to protect othe r marine species or the environment. However,
the United States submits, even assuming arguendo that such goals conflict, the decision over which
to pursue, and to what level, is completely for the United States to make. 627 According to the
United States, the US dolphin-safe provisions seek to protect dolphins and they do not need also to
protect every other marine species and the envi ronment as a whole to serve a legitimate objective. 628
The objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions cannot be "illegitimate" simply because other
environmental concerns also merit attention.629
7.435 In addition, the United States argues that the objective of ensuring that consumers are not
misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins, also falls within the illustrative list in Ar ticle 2.2, which refers to the "prevention of
deceptive practices". According to the United States , the US dolphin-safe provisions are intended to
prevent deceptive practices by ensuring that tuna products are not falsely or misleadingly labelled
dolphin-safe when they are caught using a fishing practice that adversely affects dolphins.630

622 Mexico's first written submission, para. 210.
623 United States' first oral statement, para. 47.
624 United States' first written submission, para. 145.
625 United States' first written submission, para. 151.
626 United States' first written submission, para. 148; United States' first oral statement, para. 47.
627 United States' first written submission, para. 149.
628 United States' first written submission, para. 150.
629 United States' first oral statement, para. 47.
630 United States' first written submission, para. 152.

Analysis by the Panel
7.436 Having clarified the objectives pursued by the US dolphin-safe provisions, we must now
ascertain whether these objectives are "legitimate" within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. As observed by the panel in EC – Sardines , although the elaboration of the
objectives of a measure is a prerogative of the Member establishing that measure, "[p]anels are
required to determine the legitimacy of those objectives". 631 The Appellate Body supported this
conclusion by stating that it shared the view of the Panel this part of the analysis "implies that there
must be an examination and a determination on the legitimacy of the objectives of the measure".632
7.437 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of legitimate objectives
under this provision. 633 This list includes, as the United States has pointed out, the "prevention of
deceptive practices" and the "protection of ... animal or plant life or health, or the environment". We
are satisfied that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions, as described in the previous section,
fall within the scope of these two categories of legitimate objectives. The objective of preventing
consumers of tuna products from being deceived by false dolphin-safe allegations falls within the
broader goal of preventing deceptive practices. Similarly, the protection of dolphins may be
understood as intended to protect animal life or health or the environment. In this respect, a measure
that aims at the protection of animal life or health need not, in our view, be directed exclusively to
endangered or depleted species or popu lations, to be legitimate. Article 2.2 refers to "animal life or
health" in general terms, and does not require that such protection be tied to a broader conservation
objective. We therefore read these terms as allo wing Members to pursue policies that aim at also
protecting individual animals or species whose sustainability as a group is not threatened.
7.438 Furthermore, for the reasons explained below, we also find that the US objectives relate to
genuine concerns in relation to the protection of the life or hea lth of dolphins and deception of
consumers in this respect. The evidence presente d by the parties amply demonstrates that dolphins
and other marine mammals may be adver sely affected by tuna fishing activities. 634 The Panel also
notes that certain fishing techniques seem to pose gr eater risks to dolphins than others. It is
undisputed, in particular, that the fishing method known as setting on dolphins may result in a
substantial amount of dolphin mortalities and serious injuries, especially when used without applying
certain fishing gear and procedures designed to reduce dolphin bycatch. The number of dolphins
killed in the ETP before the adoption of the controls established by the AIDCP
635, and the ensuing
degradation of the dolphins stocks in this area, are illustrative of the potentially devastating
consequences that tuna fishing activities may have on dolphins.
7.439 Both parties also share the view that consum ers of tuna products in the United States are
sensitive to these adverse consequen ces, and that this concern is reflected in the public's preference
for tuna products that are labelled dolphin-safe. 636 Moreover, the parties have also pointed out that
consumers have expectations about the harmfulness to dolphins of the fishing methods employed to

632 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 286.
633 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 286.
634 See e.g. Exhibits MEX-2, MEX-3, MEX-4, MEX-5, MEX-67, MEX-84, MEX-93, MEX-97,
MEX-98, MEX-99, MEX-105 (containing information relating to harm caused to dolphins resulting from
setting on dolphins and other fishing techniques); Exhibits US-4, US-10, US-19, US-20, US-21, US-22, US-24,
US-27, US-57, US-62, US- 75 (referring to the negative effects on dolphins arising from the practice of setting
purse-seine nets on them).
635 Mexico's first written submission, para. 50.
636 Mexico's second written submission, para. 165; United States' response to Panel question No. 40,
para. 97; United States' second written submission, para. 61. The parties disagree, however, on what meaning
consumers attribute to the terms "dolphin-safe".

catch tuna that is labelled dolphin-safe.
637 Thus, there is a possibility that consumers may be deceived
about whether the tuna contained in the products they purchase was caught using a method that is
harmful to dolphins.
7.440 Moreover, nothing prevents Members from us ing the incentives created by consumer
preferences to encourage or discourage particul ar behaviours that may have an impact on the
protection of animal life or health. Hence, the Pa nel considers that regulating the information that
appears on a label to ensure that consumers may safely exercise their preference is a legitimate
mechanism to ensure this purpose. Consequent ly, we find the objective of contributing to the
protection of dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing methods that
adversely affect dolphins to be legitimate.
7.441 In relation to Mexico's argument that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions conflict
with broader environmental objectives, such as prot ecting other marine species or sealife in general,
the Panel considers that it is a well-established pr inciple underlying the provisions of the GATT 1994
and the covered agreements, that Members enjoy th e right to determine the legitimate policies they
want to pursue.
638 In this regard, the Panel finds the following passage of the Appellate Body's
decision in US – Gasoline illustrative:
"WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies
on the environment (including its relations hip with trade), their environmental
objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as
concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the
requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements."
639
7.442 As established above, the US dolphin-safe provisi ons aim at protecting dolphins. That this
particular piece of legislation does not afford protection to other animals or marine species should not
be sufficient reason to consider the goal of the meas ure to be illegitimate. As the Appellate Body has
recognized, "certain complex public health or e nvironmental problems may be tackled only when a
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures".
640 The United States has
indicated that its measures are part of a comprehensive policy to protect dolphins. 641 Moreover,
Mexico has never argued that the US dolphin-safe provisions are the only instrument the
United States has put in place to protect marine life. It would be highly implausible to expect that a
single regulatory instrument should serve all the purposes that may be legitimately pursued by the
Members. Therefore, the Panel does not consider that the objective of cont ributing to the protection
dolphins of the US dolphin-safe provisions should be considered illegitimate because it does not cover
the protection of other marine species.
7.443 In the Panel's view, the objectives of protecting consumers from deceptive practices and
contributing to protecting dolphins by discouraging certain fishing practices do not go against the
object and purpose of the TBT Agreement, even in light of the existence of potentially conflicting
objectives that could also be recognized as legitimate.

637 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 49; Mexico's second written submission, para. 177;
United States' second written submission, para. 153.
638 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline , p. 28. See also, Panel Report, US – Shrimp , para. 7.26,
fn 629; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.13.
639 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 29.
640 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 151.
641 United States' first written submission, para. 171; United States' second written submission,
para. 157.

7.444 For these reasons, we find that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe provisions, as described
by the United States and ascertained by the Panel, ar e legitimate within the meaning of Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement.
(b) Whether the US dolphin-safe provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil
their objectives, taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment would create
(i) Approach of the Panel
Arguments by the parties
7.445 As stated above, Mexico claims in the alternative that if the US measures are found to fulfil a
legitimate objective, they are more trade-restrictiv e than necessary to fulfil that legitimate objective,
taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment would create.642
7.446 Mexico observes that the term "necessary" has been interpreted in the context of
Articles XX(b) and XX(d) of the GATT 1994 and Artic le XIV of the GATS. According to Mexico,
these previous interpretations should guide the Panel' s analysis of Mexico's claims under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. 643 Based on these previous interpretati on of the word "necessary" in the
above-mentioned provisions, Mexico argues that for a measure to be "necessary", the following
factors must be examined, weighed and balanced: (i) the importance of the interests or values at stake;
(ii) the extent of the contribution of the measure to the achievement of the measure's objective; (iii)
the trade restrictiveness of the measure; and (iv) whether there are reasonably available alternative
measures which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the
achievement of the objective.
644
7.447 Therefore, Mexico argues that in the context of the facts of this dispute, the phrase "technical
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive th an necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create" means that the US measures shall not be more trade-
restrictive (i.e. deny competitive opportunities to im ports of Mexican tuna products and tuna) than
necessary (i.e. in light of the importance of the obj ective of preserving dolphin stocks in the ETP tuna
fishery and the contribution of the US measures to the achievement of that objective, there are no
reasonably available less trade-restrictive measures that provide an equivalent contribution to the
achievement of the objective), taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create (i.e., in light of
the available scientific and technical information, the chance or possibility of adverse consequences
should the objective not be carried out).645
7.448 The United States considers that a measure that is "more" trade-restrictive than "necessary" is
a measure that restricts trade more than is n eeded or required to fulfil the measure's objective. 646 The
United States submits that the Panel should interpre t Article 2.2 based on the ordinary meaning of its
terms in their context in light of the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement, and look to
supplementary means of interpretation to confirm that interpretation. According to the United States,
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement provides relevant context for Ar ticle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
since the two provisions contain very similar language. According to the United States, the contextual
reference to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement confir ms that determining whether a measure is more
trade-restrictive than necessary w ithin the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement involves

642 Mexico's first written submission, para. 213, Mexico's first oral statement, para. 56.
643 Mexico's first written submission, para. 219.
644 Mexico's first written submission, para. 219.
645 Mexico's first written submission, para. 222; Mexico's first oral statement, para. 84.
646 United States' first written submission, para. 166.

determining whether there is an alternative measure that could fulfil the measure's objective that is
significantly less trade-restrictive.
647
7.449 The United States considers that the word "n ecessary" in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
appears in a very different context than the wo rd "necessary" in Article XX of the GATT 1994.
According to the United States, in Article XX(b) th e question is whether it is necessary for a Member
to breach its GATT obligations to protect human, animal or plant life or health. In Article 2.2, the
question is whether an otherwise WTO-consistent m easure restricts trade more than is necessary to
fulfil the measure's objective. 648 In Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, unlike under Article XX, it is
the complaining party that has the burden of establis hing that the measure is "more trade-restrictive
than necessary."649
7.450 The United States also argues that the analys is under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
entails comparing two alternatives that are WTO-c onsistent, while the alternatives being compared
under Article XX of the GATT 1994 are an alternative th at is WTO-inconsistent and another that is
WTO-consistent.650 The United States concludes that in light of the different context in which the
word "necessary" appears in Article 2.2 as compared to Article XX and the different circumstances
surrounding conclusion of those provisions, it would not be appropriate to apply the same meaning or
interpretive approach to both provisions.651
7.451 Mexico contends that when attempting to in terpret the term "necessary", the United States
erroneously relies on Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement and its associated footnote. 652 According to
Mexico, the United States uses these provisions and their related jurisprudence to include in the
definition of "necessary" in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement: (i) the concept that the measure must
fulfil a legitimate objective "at the level that th e Member imposing the measure has determined
appropriate"; and (ii) the qualifying term "significantly" in the phrase "not more trade restrictive".653
7.452 Although Mexico acknowledges that Article 5.6 and footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement
provide guidance for the interpretation of the phr ase "shall not be more trade restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective" in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, it observes that in
Article 2.2 there is no language similar to that of footnote 3 to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.654
Analysis by the Panel
7.453 Having determined that the US dolphin-safe labe lling provisions pursue legitimate objectives
within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agre ement, we must now determine whether they are
"more trade-restrictive than necessary" to fulfil such objectives, "taking account of the risks non-
fulfilment would create".
7.454 The terms of Article 2.2 suggest that some restrictions on international trade may arise from
the preparation, adoption or application of tec hnical regulations that pursue legitimate objectives

647 United States' first written submission, paras. 166-69; United States' first oral statement, para. 157;
United States' second written statement, para. 121.
648 United States' first oral statement, para. 49.
649 United States' response to question 69, para. 155.
650 United States' second written submission, para. 124.
651 United States' first oral statement, para. 49; United States' second written submission,
paras. 123-125.
652 Mexico's second oral statement, para. 79.
653 Mexico's second oral statement, para. 80.
654 Mexico's response to question 67 from the Pane l, para. 227; Mexico's second oral statement,
para. 82.

under the TBT Agreement. It further suggests that while a degree of "trade-restrictiveness" may be
justified, where it is "necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective", a measure could not be justified under
Article 2.2 if it is more trade restrictive than is necessary to ach ieve the objective at issue. What we
must determine, therefore, is in what circumstan ces a measure may be considered to be "more trade-
restrictive than necessary" under this provision. As observed above, a measure that would be "more
trade-restrictive than necessary" within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 2.2 would
create "unnecessary obstacles to trade" within the meaning of the first sentence.
7.455 Turning first to the question of what constitutes "trade-restrictiveness" in this context, we note
that Mexico argues that measures that are "trade r estrictive" include those that impose any form of
limitation of imports, discriminate against imports or deny competitive opportunities to imports655 and
that the United States agrees with Mexico that a measure that imposes limits on imports or
discriminates against them would meet the defin ition of a measure that is "trade-restrictive". 656 We
also agree.
7.456 We further note that the wording of the provisi on in terms of the measure "not" being "more"
trade restrictive than necessary implies that trade-restrictiveness is only permissible to the extent that
it is necessary to the achievement of the objective. A contrario, where it would be possible to achieve
the same objective through a less trade restrictive measure, then the measure at issue would be in
violation of Article 2.2, because it would then be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the
said objective.
7.457 We find support for this interpretation in past in terpretations of the terms of Article XX of the
GATT 1994. Most recently, in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body
summarized the approach it had developed in previous cases under Article XX of the GATT 1994 and
under Article XIV of GATS. It thus noted, inter alia , that in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , it had
described the process in the context of an an alysis of "necessity" under Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994:
"The Appellate Body observed that a pane l must consider the relevant factors,
particularly the importance of the interest s or values at stake, the extent of the
contribution made by the measure to the ach ievement of the relevant objective, and
the measure's trade restrictiveness. The Appellate Body stated that, if such an analysis
'yields a preliminary conclusion' that a meas ure is necessary, then the necessity of the
measure must be 'confirmed' by comparing the measure with possible alternatives, in
the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake."
657
7.458 Similarly, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the analysis involves an assessment of the
degree of trade-restrictiveness of the measure at issue in relation to what is "necessary" for the
fulfilment of the legitimate objective being pursue d, and this can be measured against possible
alternative measures that would achieve the same re sult with a lesser degree of trade-restrictiveness.
At the same time, we note that there are diff erences in the wording of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, as compared to Article XX of the GATT 1994 or Article XIV of the GATS, which
reflect also the different positions of the provisions within their respective agreements. In particular,
we note that Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement sets out a positive obligation, and is not formulated as
an exception.

655 Mexico's first written submission, para. 217.
656 United States' first written submission, paras. 164-165.
657 Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 241.

7.459 With reference to Mexico's observation that th e term "necessary" has been interpreted in the
context of Articles XX(b) and XX(d) of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the GATS and that such
interpretation should guide us in our interpretation of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, we note that
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement refers to technical regulations that are more trade restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, wher eas Article XX of the GATT 1994 refers to " measures
necessary" to protect public morals, to protect hum an, animal or plant life or health, to secure
compliance with laws or regulations.
7.460 Thus, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, unlike in Article XX of the GATT 1994, the
aspect of the measure to be justified as "necessary" is its trade restrictiveness rather than the necessity
of the measure for the achievement of the objectiv e. Given the fact that, under Article 2.2, the
"necessity" to be assessed is that of the "trade-rest rictiveness" of the measures rather than of the
measures themselves
658, we understand the term "necessary" in the second sentence of Article 2.2 to
mean essentially that the trade-r estrictiveness must be "required" for the fulfilment of the objective.
At the same time, we note that this question is dis tinct from that of the level of protection that the
Member seeks to achieve in relation to its objective. In this respect, we recall that the preamble of the
TBT Agreement makes clear that a Member is en titled to take measures "at the level it consider
appropriate", in pursuance of a legitimate objective unde r the Agreement. This implies, in our view,
that an assessment of whethe r any trade-restrictiveness arising under the measures at issue is
"necessary" within the meaning of Article 2.2 must be understood as an enquiry into whether such
trade-restrictiveness is required to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the Member at its chosen
level of protection.
7.461 We find further support for our interpretation of the terms of Article 2.2 in the text of
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, which contains la nguage very similar to that of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement:
"Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Artic le 3, when establishing or maintaining
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, Members shall en sure that such measures are not more

658 This is different from the situation under Article XX of GATT 1994. In US – Gasoline , the
Appellate Body thus determined that "[o]bviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided "less
favourable treatment" under Article III:4 before the Panel examined the "General Exceptions" contained in
Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. Th e chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the
'measures' which are to be examined under XX(g), and not the legal finding of 'less favourable treatment'."
Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 16. We also note the Appellate Body's observations in this respect in
China - Publications and Audiovisual Products:
"We turn next to China's allegation that the Panel committed a "logical error" in finding that the
provisions of its measures are not 'necessary' for essen tially the same reasons as the ones for which the Panel
found those provisions to be in violation of China's trading rights commitments. China suggests that the
restrictive effect of a measure could be relevant to a pane l's analysis of whether a measure is consistent with an
obligation, or its analysis of whether that measure can be justified under an exception, but that it could not be
relevant for both questions. We disagr ee. The fact that the restrictive eff ect of a measure is relevant in one
context does not preclude that it may also be relevant in the other. In analyzing whether the provisions of
China's measures are inconsistent with Article 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol, the Panel assessed whether the
provisions restrict the enterprises that may engage in importing. Thereafter, in analyzing whether the provisions
could be justified as 'necessary' under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, the Panel assessed to what extent the
provisions restrict those wishing to engage in importing, as well as how the restrictive effect comports with the
degree of contribution to the achievement of the objec tive, and the societal importance and value of the
legitimate objective concerned.
658 The restrictive effect of the provision was relevant to each of these distinct
analytical inquiries. Therefore, we do not believe that the Panel's approach constitutes circular reasoning. On the
contrary, it is the result of a proper sequential analysis.658

trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility."
7.462 In addition, footnote 3 to Article 5.6 sets forth:
"For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade-restrictive than
'required' unless there is another measure , reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility, that achie ves the appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade."
7.463 As explained by the Appellate Body, Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement establishes a three-
pronged test of Article 5.6 in which it must be demons trated, as one of the steps of such test, that the
alternative is significantly less trade restrictive than the SPS measure contested.659
7.464 We recall that the United States suggested th at this provision provides guidance for the
interpretation of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreemen t. We also note that Mexico recognizes this,
although it warns against unduly incorporating into Ar ticle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement language that
pertains to Article 5.6 of the SPS Ag reement and its corresponding footnote. 660 We are duly mindful
of the fact that each provision must be interpreted in its proper context and that a similarly worded
provision in a distinct covered agreement should not be assumed to have the same meaning as in
another context. Nonetheless, we find that footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement, and the clarification that
it provides concerning the meaning of the terms "not mo re trade restrictive than required" is pertinent
for the purposes of confirming our understanding of the corresponding terms of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement, which play, in the context of this agreement, a comparable role. We note, however,
that Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement makes no reference to a technical regulation being
"significantly" more trade restrictive than necessary. Without prejudice to what this term may imply
in the context of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreemen t, we note that Article 2.2 contains no such
qualification.
7.465 In light of the above, we find that in order to determine whether a measure is more trade
restrictive than necessary within the meaning of Ar ticle 2.2, we must assess the manner in which and
the extent to which the measures at issue fulfil their objectives, ta king into account Member's chosen
level of protection, and compare this with a potentia l less trade restrictive alternative measure, in
order to determine whether such alternative meas ure would similarly fulfil the objectives pursued by
the technical regulation at the Member's chosen level of protection. To the extent that a measure is
capable of contributing to its objective, it would be more trade-restrictive than necessary if an
alternative measure that is less trade-restrictive is reasonably available, that would achieve the
challenged measure's objective at the same level.
7.466 We also note that, in making this determinati on, we are required to take into account "the
risks that non-fulfilment would create". The final sen tence of Article 2.2 further clarifies that "[i]n
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia : available scientific and
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-used of products".

659 The Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon agreed with the panel that "Article 5.6 and, in particular,
the footnote to this provision, clearly provides a three-pronged test to establish a violation of Article 5.6. As
already noted, the three elements of this test under Article 5.6 are that there is an SPS measure which:
(1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility;
(2) achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection; and
(3) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested." Appellate Body Report,
Australia – Salmon, para. 194. It consistently followed this approach in Japan – Agricultural products II and in
Australia – Apples (para. 328).
660 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 67, para. 227; Mexico's second oral statement, para. 82.

7.467 As we understand it, this part of the text enjoin s us to consider, as part of our analysis, both
the likelihood and the gravity of potential risks (a nd any associated adverse consequences) that might
arise in the event that the leg itimate objective being pursued would not be fulfilled. We further
understand this to imply that an alternative means of achieving the objective that would entail greater
"risks of non-fulfilment" would not be a valid alternative, even if it were less trade-restrictive. This is
consistent, in our view, with the fact that each Me mber is entitled, as expressed in the preamble of the
TBT Agreement and as discussed above, to define its own level of protection.
7.468 Finally, we note that the burden on Mexico to demonstrate that the measures are more trade
restrictive than necessary includes the identification of a reasonably available alternative that is
capable of achieving the objective pursued by th e challenged measure at the same level as the
challenged measure, taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create. As is the case under
Article XX of the GATT 1994 and under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, it is, in our view, for the
complainant to make a prima facie case that the a lternative meets the requirements of the provision at
issue. As observed by the panel in Australia – Apples, "[t]he Appellate Body explained in EC –
Hormones that the complainant must establish a prima facie case by presenting "evidence and legal
arguments" sufficient to demonstrate that the defenda nt has breached its obligations with respect to a
specific provision.
661 In the context of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body
confirmed in a subsequent dispute that "[p]ursuan t to the rules on burden of proof ... it was for the
[complainant] to establish a prima facie case that ther e is an alternative measure that meets all three
elements under Article 5.6 in order to establis h a prima facie case of inconsistency with
Article 5.6".662 The same considerations similarly appl y in the context of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.469 On the basis of the above, we now consider whether Mexico has demonstrated that the
US dolphin-safe provisions are more trade restrictive than necessary, taking account of the risks non-
fulfilment would create. In light of the fact that, as described above, the US measures pursue two
related but distinct objectives, we consider this question from the perspective of each of these two
objectives in turn.
(ii) Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to
ensure that consumers are not misled or decei ved about whether tuna products contain tuna
that was caught in conditions that are harmful to dolphins
7.470 Mexico submits that the US dolphin-safe provi sions fail to fulfil their stated objective of
ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that was
caught by a method that adversely affects dolphins b ecause they allow tuna products to be labelled as
dolphin-safe even if they contain tuna from fishing sets in which dolphins were killed or injured,
when tuna was caught anywhere outside the ETP.
663
7.471 Mexico further claims that it has met the burde n of presenting prima facie evidence that there
is a reasonably available less trade-restrictive measure. 664 In Mexico's view, the United States could
create dolphin-safe standards rather than a technical regulation whereby the AIDCP standard could be
recognized and a label complying with the AIDCP st andard used. At the same time, the different
US standard could be recognized and a label complying with that standard used. In this way, Mexico

661 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.1104 (original footnote omitted).
662 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.1104 (original footnote omitted).
663 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 48.
664 Mexico's response to question 67 from the Panel, paras. 234-36.

argues, US consumers would be fully informed of all aspects of dolphin-safe fishing methods and
could choose accordingly when purchasing tuna products from US retailers.665
7.472 The United States submits that the US dolphin- safe provisions fulfil the objective of ensuring
that consumers are not misled or deceived about wh ether tuna products contain tuna that was caught
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins by est ablishing conditions under which tuna products may
be labelled dolphin-safe that are based on whether the tuna product contains tuna that was caught in a
manner that adversely affects dolphins. The United States further submits that specifically, tuna
products that contain tuna that was caught by setting on dolphins – a technique known to harm
dolphins – or in a set in which dolphins were observe d killed or seriously injured may not be labelled
dolphin-safe or with any other term or symbol that falsely claims or suggests that the tuna products do
not contain tuna that was caught in a manner harmfu l to dolphins. According to the United States, by
limiting use of the term dolphin-safe and any other term or symbol that claims or suggests that the
tuna products do not contain tuna that was caught in a manner that is harmful to dolphins, to those
products that contain tuna that was not caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins, the U.S.
provisions ensure that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna
that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
666
7.473 As we understand it, Mexico argues both that the US dolphin-safe provisions as they currently
exist and are applied fail to fulfil their objective, and that a less trade-restrictive alternative is
reasonably available to the United States to fulfil its objective, by allowing the AIDCP certification to
be recognized in addition to the existing US standa rd. As described above, to the extent that the
measures are capable of contributing to their objec tive, they would be more trade-restrictive than
necessary if an alternative measure that is less trad e-restrictive is reasonably available, that would
achieve the challenged measure's objective at the same level.
7.474 We recall that the United States has defined its consumer protection objective in terms of
"ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceive d about whether products contain tuna that was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins". While the articulation of this objective does not
expressly state what the intended "level of protection" to be achieved is, a certain level of protection is
embodied in the measure itself, and this is, in our view, what must form the basis for our assessment
of the proposed alternative. We must therefore fi rst clarify what the existing US measures achieve, in
terms of "ensuring that consumers are not misled" w ith respect to the manner in which tuna is caught,
and then compare that to what Mexico's proposed alternative would achieve in this respect.
7.475 On that basis, we first consider the manner and extent to which the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions fulfil the US objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about
whether tuna has been caught in a manner that ad versely affects dolphins, and then whether, as
Mexico claims, this objective could be similarly fulfilled by allowing the AIDCP standard to be
applied in addition to the existing US standard.
The contribution of the US dolphin-safe provisions to the US objective of ensuring that
consumers are not misled about whether the tuna contained in tuna products was caught in a
manner that adversely affects dolphins
7.476 As observed above, Mexico claims that the US dolphin-safe provisions fail to achieve their
objective of ensuring that the consumer is not mi sled about whether the tuna contained in tuna
products was caught in a manner that adversely affect s dolphins. In Mexico's view, the United States
presumes that dolphins are always harmed by dolphin sets in the ETP, even if no dolphins are killed

665 Mexico's second written statement, para. 210; Mexico's second oral statement, para. 115.
666 United States second written statement, para. 136.

or seriously injured, while it presumes that no dolphi ns or other marine mammals are harmed outside
the ETP.
667
7.477 According to Mexico, most consumers would exp ect the term "dolphin-safe" to mean that no
dolphins were killed or injured in harvesting the tuna. Nevertheless, Mexico submits, the dolphin-safe
provisions allow tuna products to be labelled as dol phin-safe even if they contain tuna from fishing
sets in which dolphins were killed or injured, wh en the tuna was caught anywhere outside the ETP.
According to Mexico, 48% of the public in the Un ited States believe that the term dolphin-safe means
no dolphins were injured or killed in the course of capturing tuna. 668 However, according to Mexico,
the US dolphin-safe label does not mean that for t una caught outside the ETP. Mexico submits that
for tuna products made from non-ETP tuna, the US dolphin-safe designation is meaningless and
conveys no useful information to consumers. 669 In Mexico's view, for non-ETP tuna products,
consumers are not accurately informed about whet her dolphins were "adversely affected". Thus,
Mexico concludes, the US measures mislead consum ers and for this reason cannot be fulfilling their
stated objective of protecting consumers.670
7.478 As we understand it, Mexico's argument is based on the fact that, under the US dolphin-
provisions, no certification that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured in the sets is required with
respect to tuna caught outside the ETP by methods other than setting on dolphins, 671 even though such
methods may in fact have resulted in significant ha rm to dolphins, and that this is misleading to
consumers.
7.479 In our view, the objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about
whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins can be
achieved if the dolphin-safe label a llows consumers to accurately distinguish between tuna that was
caught by using a fishing method that adve rsely affects dolphins and tuna that was not harvested in
such manner, and to make decisions on the basis of accurate information in this respect, when
purchasing tuna products. Therefore, the extent to which the US measures are able to fulfil this
objective is directly related to the extent to whic h they accurately identify (and distinguish between)
tuna that was caught in a manner that adversel y affects dolphins and tuna that was caught in
conditions that are not harmful to dolphins.
7.480 We must therefore determine whether the US dolphin-safe provisions grant access to the label
to tuna products containing tuna that was caught by methods that may or do in fact adversely affect
dolphins. This requires in the first instance a clar ification of the meaning of the expression "tuna …
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins" in this context. Once this is clarified, we will
need to consider the manner in which the measure s at issue distinguish between different fishing
methods in this respect.
7.481 The Panel notes that the only piece of evidence presented in these proceedings to ascertain
what US consumers in fact understand the terms " dolphin-safe" to mean is an opinion poll submitted
by Mexico.672 This poll shows that 48 per cent of the 800 individuals surveyed believe that "dolphin
safe" means that "no dolphins were killed or injure d" while 12 per cent believe that it means that
"dolphins were not encircled and then released to capture the tuna". The United States considers that

668 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 48-49; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 110, para. 65.
669 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 86, para. 4.
670 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 48; Mexi co's second written statement, para. 205; Mexico's
second oral statement, para. 98; Mexico's response to question 86 from the Panel, para. 4.
671 Section 1385 (d) of the AIDCP. See the description of the measures in Section II above.
672 Exhibit MEX-64.

the poll includes misleading questions and therefor e, does not support Mexico's contentions, because
respondents indicating that dolphin-safe means that no dolphins were killed or injured could include
respondents who believed that dolphin-safe means that dolphins were not set upon to catch the tuna.673
7.482 We note, in light of this poll, that it is not clear that US cons umers understand the term
"dolphin-safe" to mean the same as what the US dol phin-safe provisions define it to mean. We also
note that, to the extent that there are discrepan cies between the meaning of this term under the
measures and consumer perceptions, this may cr eate confusion and undermine the ability of the
measure to effectively ensure that consumers ar e not misled. However, as described above, our
enquiry should focus on the manner in which the me asures themselves allow or disallow access to a
dolphin-safe label, and through this, define the meani ng of the term "dolphin-safe" and the extent to
which this accurately reflects a distinction between situations in which dolphins are adversely affected
and situations in which this is not the case.
Meaning of the phrase "tuna caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins"
7.483 The US dolphin-safe provisions do not define th e notion of fishing methods that "adversely
affect" dolphins. As described above, however, these terms have been used by the United States itself
to describe the objectives of its measures and we have accepted the US characterization of its
objectives. The arguments and evidence presented to the Panel suggest that there are different ways
in which dolphins could be "adversely affected" by the manner in which tuna is caught, and the
measures themselves also provide some indications as to the type of harmful effects that may arise
and that are of concern in this context.
7.484 We first note that the Congress findings cited in paragraph 7.410 above refer to dolphins and
other marine mammals being "frequently killed" in the course of fishing operation in the ETP and in
other parts of the world. It is clear therefore th at the killing of dolphins in the course of fishing
operations is understood to constitute a situation in which dolphins are "adversely affected". In
addition, in relation to the technique of setting on dolphins, the United States has identified certain
negative impacts on dolphins beyond observed deaths and serious injuries.
674 These may be generally
described as unobserved consequences.675
7.485 We further note that, beyond injuries and deaths of individual dolphins, the evidence
presented to the Panel shows that concerns arise or may arise in respect of the conservation of dolphin
populations more generally. In this respect, in response to a request for clarification by the Panel as to
whether its objective in terms of pr otection of dolphins could be expressed in terms of a certain level
of mortality or whether it should be understood in terms of conservation of dolphin populations, the
United States indicated that :
"The objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provision that aims at protecting
dolphins includes protecting dolphins from all of these adverse effects [observed
mortalities and other effects of setting on dolphins]. It does not aim to achieve a

673 United States' response to Panel question No. 42, paras. 108-09.
674 See for example United States' first written submissi on, paras. 46-51, 54-59, United States' response
to the Panel questions Nos. 66, 34, 35, 36, 37, 5(a) and United States' second written submission, paras. 48-49.
675 The Panel understands the United States' use of the terms "observe d mortalities and injuries" as
referring to dolphin killings or serious injuries that are reported during (or immediately after the conclusion of)
dolphin-setting operations. Thus, to the extent that setting on dolphins also result in dolphin deaths or injuries
that are not observed or taken into account as observed killings or serious injuries, the other adverse effects
identified by the United States may be described as unobserved deaths of injuries of dolphins. Mexico disputes
the extent and the consequences of such unobserved consequences. This is discussed in paragraphs 7.494 to
7.505 below.

specific number or rate of dolphin morta lity, but rather generally to reduce the
adverse effects of setting on dolphins to catch tuna by ensuring that the US market is
not used to encourage setting on dolphins to catch tuna. Seeking to protect dolphins
from these adverse effects might also be considered as seeking to conserve dolphin
populations." (emphasis added)
676
7.486 Therefore, the adverse effects on dolphins ta rgeted by the US dolphin-safe provisions, as
described by the United States, relate to observe d and unobserved mortalities and serious injuries to
individual dolphins in the course of tuna fishi ng operations. In addition, as described by the
United States, to the extent that addressing such adve rse effects "might also be considered as seeking
to conserve dolphin populations", the US objectives also incorporate, at least indirectly,
considerations regarding the conser vation of dolphin stocks. Thus, in the Panel's view, the meaning
of the terms "adversely affect" dolphins, the cont ribution of the US dolphin-safe provisions to the
fulfilment of its stated objectives needs to be assesse d in light of all three of these dimensions of the
objectives pursued by the US dolphin-safe provisions.
7.487 With these clarifications in mind, we now consider the manner in which the US dolphin-safe
provisions allow or deny access to the dolphin-safe label to tuna products, in consideration of the
manner in which the tuna was caught and its potential to adversely affect dolphins.
7.488 As described in Section II:C above, the US dolphin-safe provisions deny access to a
dolphin-safe label to tuna caught by se tting on dolphins, wherever it is caught. 677 They also deny
access to the dolphin-safe label to tuna that was caught by using driftnets in the high seas. 678 In
addition, for tuna caught in the ETP by a vessel using a purse seine net with a carrying capacity of
more than 362.8 metric tons, the United States requi res a certificate that no dolphin was killed during
the sets in which the tuna was caught. Outside the ETP, however, the US measures allow access to
the label without such certification in all instances where the tuna was harvested by techniques other
than setting on dolphins, unless the tuna was caught in a fishery where it has been determined that
there is regular and significant tuna-dolphin association679, or regular and significant dolphin mortality
or serious injury of dolphins. 680 Since no such determinations have been made, access to the
dolphin-safe label is in practice available to tuna caught outside the ETP by any method other than
setting on dolphins or high seas driftnet without a requirement to certify that no dolphin was killed in
the sets in which the tuna was caught.
7.489 It appears from these elements that two fish ing methods (setting on dolphins and high seas
driftnet fishing) are specifically identified in th e US dolphin-safe provisions as disqualifying tuna for
access to the label, thus reflecting an assumption that these methods "adversely affect" dolphins. For
tuna caught by other methods, access to the label is subject to a certification that no dolphin was killed
in the sets in which the tuna was caught for tu na caught in the ETP, but not elsewhere. The
United States has also explained that if an alternativ e label rather than the official DOC label is used,
this is conditioned on no dol phin having been killed or seriously in jured, regardless of the type of
fishery.681

676 US response to Panel question No. 66(a), para. 151.
677 Subsections 1835(d)(1)(B) and 1835(d)(1)(C).
678 Subsection 1835(d)(1)(A).
679 Subsection 1835(d)(1)(B)(i).
680 Subsection 1835(d)(1)(D).
681 Subsection 1835(d)(3)(C)(i). See also the United States' own explan ation of the operation of this
provision, United States' second written submission, para. 40.

7.490 What we must consider, therefore, is the extent to which these distinctions, as contained in the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions and as applie d by the United States, allow consumers to
accurately distinguish between tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins and
other tuna, by ensuring that the label is available exclusively to products containing tuna that was not
caught "in a manner that adversely affects dolphins ". As described above , we understand adverse
effects on dolphins in this context to encompass observed as well as unobserved deaths and injuries,
with the understanding that, as described by the United States, this may be considered to also seek to
conserve dolphin populations.
Denial of access to the label for tuna caught by setting on dolphins (and high seas
driftnet fishing)
7.491 We first consider the two fishing methods in relation to which access to the label is denied,
i.e. setting on dolphins and high seas driftnet fishing. Mexico has not made any claim with respect to
high seas driftnet fishing.
7.492 With respect to setting on dolphins, the United St ates argues that it is uncontested by Mexico
that this fishing method adversely affects dolphins an d that, therefore, by conditioning the labelling of
tuna products to not containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins, the US provisions fulfil their
objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain
tuna caught in a manner harmful to dolphins.
682
7.493 We first note that both parties recognize that setting on dolphins may adversely affect
dolphins.683 The number of dolphins killed in the ETP before the adoption of the controls established
by the AIDCP, and the ensuing degradation of the dolphins stocks in this area, are well-
documented.684 Indeed, Mexico does not deny that dolphins may be killed or seriously injured during
purse-seine net fishing manoeuvres. 685 We also agree with the United States that the existence of the
DMLs established by the AIDCP shows that setti ng on dolphins, even in controlled conditions, may
result in some dolphin mortality. 686 In 2008, observed dolphin mortality in the ETP amounted to
1,168 dolphins, whereas in 2009, 1, 239 dolphins were obser ved killed or seriously injured when set
upon to catch tuna in the ETP. 687 The parties to the AIDCP agreed to limit total incidental dolphin
mortality in the purse-seine tuna fishery in th e ETP to no more than five thousand dolphins
annually.688 These limits have remained the same in recent years.689
7.494 In addition, as described above, the United St ates has argued that setting on dolphins has
adverse consequences for dolphins beyond observed mortalities or serious injuries, resulting from
repeated chase and encirclement of dolphins (refe rred to in paragraph 7.484 above as "unobserved"
consequences). Mexico disagrees with the United States about the magnitude and impact of such
unobserved consequences.

682 United States' second oral statement, para. 56.
683 Mexico's second written submission, para. 204; United States' first written submission, para. 52.
684 Mexico's first written submission, para. 50; Exhibit MEX-4, p. 4; Exhibit MEX-5, pp. 29-30;
Exhibit US-61, p. 124.
685 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 9.
686 Although Mexico argues that the number of dolphins being killed annually in the ETP (around
1000) does not have a significant adverse effect on dolphins from a population recovery perspective, it does not
deny that setting on dolphins even according to the AIDCP may still result in observed dolphin mortality or
serious injury, Mexico's second written submission, para. 204.
687 Exhibit US-24, p. 50; Exhibit US-66, p. 3.
688 Exhibit MEX-11, Article V.
689 Exhibit US-50, p. 1.

7.495 The United States notes that dolphins are likely to be repeatedly exposed to the dangers of
purse seine dolphin sets, and that millions of dolphins are chased and encircled each year as they are
set upon to catch tuna in the ETP.
690 The United States refers to a number of reports and studies,
including a report of the scientific research program mandated under the IDCPA which included
abundance estimation, ecosystem studies, stress and other fishery effect studies and stock
assessment.691 The stress studies in that report were required to be undertaken by the IDCPA and
consisted in four related research projects, a stress literature review, a necropsy study, a review of
historical data, and a field study involving the repeated chasing and capturing of dolphins.
7.496 From the review of scientific literature on str ess in mammals, the report concluded that tuna
purse seine operations involve well-recognized stresso rs in other wild mammals, and it is plausible
that stress resulting from chase and capture could co mpromise the health of at least some of the
dolphins involved. With respect to the stress studi es that included a combination of field experiments
the report concludes that they support the possib ility that purse seine fishing involving dolphins may
have a negative impact on the health of some indi viduals. However, it also noted that several lines of
research suggested potential physiolo gical mechanisms of stress effect s, but larger sample sizes and
baseline data for the affected speci es are needed to fully interpret th e findings. In particular, cow-calf
separation and potential muscle injury leading to delayed death warrant future study.
7.497 As far as mother-calves separation is concer ned, the study explains that unobserved calf
mortality that has been reported and studied from 1973 to 1990 potentially could be large, and
continuing at the present time, if mother-calf separat ion occurs during the chase portion of the fishing
operation; however it also specifies that whether, a nd if so how often, such separations occur during
the chase is unknown and that given these uncertainties, only a minimum estimate of unobserved calf
mortality is possible, with the cav eat that the actual mortality is likely to be larger by an unknown
amount.
7.498 The United States has also provided eviden ce regarding mortality of nursing calves
permanently separated from their mothers during fish ery operations in the ETP in a scientific article
published in 2007. This study finds that because dolphin calves are sometime s incapable of keeping
up with their mothers during chase and encirclement , they are sometimes separated from them and
vulnerable to starvation or predation. It also explai ns that despite the fact that observed mortality in
the ETP is currently low, dolphin stocks are not reco vering at expected rates because of the frequency
of sets on dolphins and unobserved mortality of nursing calves. 692 Finally, the United States has also
presented a scientific article regarding evidence of acute pre-mortem stress in chased and purse-seine
captured male dolphins.693 This article concludes that a 2- to 3-h purse-seine set on dolphins to catch
yellowfin tuna, including chase, net deployment, a nd closed net confinement, generates stressful
stimuli.
7.499 These studies therefore suggest that various adverse impacts can arise from setting on
dolphins, beyond observed mortalities, including cow-calf separation during the chasing and
encirclement, threatening the subsistence of the calf and adding casualties to the number of observed

690 The United States observes that on average, each northeastern offshore spotted dolphin is chased
10.6 times and captured 0.7 times per year, and each coastal spotted dolphin chased twice a year. See
United States' first written submission, para. 58; United States' second written submission, para. 49.
691 Exhibit US-19., US-21, US-22; see also Un ited States' first written submission, para. 54,
United States' response to Panel question no. 34, paras. 82-83. The United States also submitted studies
specifically addressing cow-calf separation (see Exhibits US-4, US-27 and US-28).
692 Exhibit US-4.
693 Exhibit US-11.

mortalities694, as well as muscular damage, immune a nd reproductive systems failures and other
adverse health consequences for dolphins, such as continuous acute stress.695
7.500 The Panel also notes that other studies question these conclusions. We note that, for instance,
it has been suggested that the cow-calf bond remained intact, even after repeated sets. 696 It has also
been suggested that there are no indications of compromised immune system, capture myopathy or
adverse impacts due to heat stress occurring as a result of dolphin chase and encirclement. 697 One of
the studies submitted by the United States, which in its opinion "represents the best information
available at this time" 698, concludes that "[w]hile the physiolo gical and behavioral changes [resulting
from the chase and encirclement of dolphins] may aff ect some individuals, they have not been shown
to be common enough to have population-level consequences".699 The same study, citing a "summary
of recent research" also concludes that "the purse- seine fishery has the capac ity to affect dolphins
beyond the direct mortality observed as bycatches".700
7.501 Mexico presents a 1992 study by the Committee on Reducing Porpoise Mortality from Tuna
Fishing, the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, The Commission on Life Sciences and
the National Research Council mandated by the MMPA, which found that:
"No specific information is available concerning the effects of the chase on the
biology of dolphins. The chase is likely to result in stress. Some herds have
developed strategies to avoid capture; others seem to have habituated to encirclement
and seem to have developed behavioral patterns that reduce their risks once in the net.
Further studies on physiological and behavioral impacts of the chase are obviously
needed."
701
7.502 Mexico also refers to a report prepared by the IATTC in response to the SWFSC report
mandated by the IDCPA. 702 This report concludes that "[t]he SWFSC Chase Encirclement Stress
Studies (CHESS) cruise conducted some studies examin ing various aspects of stress, and the results
of most of these studies were either negative ( no evidence of significant stress-related injury) or
equivocal."703

694 Exhibit US-4, p. 24.
695 Exhibit US-11, pp. 191, 201; Exhibit US-19, p. 5.
696 Exhibit MEX-67, p. 9 (containing a literature review on this subject).
697 Exhibit MEX-67, p. 9.
698 United States' second written submission, fn 70.
699 Exhibit US-21, p. 11.
700 Exhibit US-21, p. 11.
701 Dolphins and the Tuna Industry , a study by the Committee on Reducing Porpoise Mortality from
Tuna Fishing, the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, The Commission on Life Sciences and the
National Research Council mandated by the MMPA, (1992) Exhibit MEX-2, p. 114.
702 Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission Scientific Report on the Status of Dolphins Stocks in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. 2002. Exhibit MEX-67.
703 Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission Scientific Report on the Status of Dolphins Stocks in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. 2002. Exhibit MEX-67. This report summa rizes its findings in this respect
as follows:
"Evidence Refuting a Finding of a Significant Adverse Impact
The SWFSC Chase Encirclement Stress Studies (CHESS) cruise conducted some studies
examining various aspects of stress, and the re sults of most of these studies were either
negative (no evidence of signifi cant stress-related injury) or equivocal. The studies showing
no significant adverse impact are listed and described.
Behavioral studies – The study of the behavior of spotted dolphins encircled by purse seines
noted that these dolphins are well-habituated to set operations (Santurtún and Galindo 2002).

7.503 Mexico further argued that the US position in this proceeding seemed to contradict the
US actions in the multilateral forum of the AIDCP, and that the US theories of unobserved mortality
presented in this case are scientifically unsupporta ble and not applied to any other fishery in the
United States or the world.
704
7.504 From the above, it appears that there is a degree of uncertainty in relation to the extent to
which setting on dolphins may have an adverse im pact on dolphins beyond observed mortality.
Nonetheless, we consider that suffi cient evidence has been put forward by the United States to raise a
presumption that genuine concerns exist in this respect. The information presented to us in this respect
also suggests that this is a field of research in which the collection and analysis of information is
inherently difficult, but that efforts have been ongoing to better understand these issues, including in
the context of the implementation of the DPCIA. 705 We further note that such effects would arise as a
result of the chase in itself, and would thus exist even if measures are taken in order to avoid the
taking and killing of dolphins in the nets, as is the case under the AIDCP.
 706
7.505 In light of the above, it appears that, to the extent that the US dolphin-safe provisions deny
access to the label to products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins, they enable the
US consumer to avoid buying tuna caught in a manner involving the types of observed and
unobserved adverse impact on dolphins associated with this method, as described above.
7.506 We also note, however, that, to the extent that the measures make no distinction between
setting on dolphins in general and setting on dolphins under the controlled conditions developed in the
context of the AIDCP, they would not allow the US consumer to be informed of any of the measures
that have been taken in the context of this Progra mme. We note in this respect that the United States
itself acknowledges that the implementation of the AIDCP has made an important contribution to the

This corroborates the findings of the IATTC (1986) and Pryor and Kang-Shallenberger (1991)
that indicate that the dolphins have learned behaviors that reduce the risk of entanglement and
allow them to anticipate events in the fishing operations.
Heat stress studies – One of the [SWFSC Chase Encirclement Stress Studies] studies (Pabst et
al. 2002) examined th e thermal stress by measuring deep-core temperatures and surface
temperatures and heat flux from the dorsal fins of the dolphins (the dorsal fin functions as a
radiator to release excess heat). None of th ese measurements showed any indications that
adverse impacts due to heat stress were occurring. The data for one dolphin were puzzling
because it displayed the highest deep-body temper ature after being involved in the shortest
chase (12 min.) of the study. It is most likely that the temperature reading was confounded by
the long process (17 min.) required to capture this particular dolphin just prior to sampling".
Lymphoid study – A study of the lymphoid organs conducted as part of the SWFSC Necropsy
Program (Romano et al. 2002) showed no signs of stress or of a compromised immune
system-10).
Blood analysis study – Analyses of the blood collected from dolphins captured during the CHESS
studies were largely equivocal, being hampered by small sample sizes and few recaptures of tagged and sampled
dolphins (St. Aubin 2002). In general, "certain changes were noted signaling a stress response, but none that
suggested distress at the time of se cond capture." The SWFSC report sugge sts that capture myopathy may be a
cause of delayed mortality (p. 68), but the blood analyses during the CHESS cruise reported by Forney et al.
(2002) indicated that recapt ured dolphins had lower values of the mu scle-specific enzyme CK, rather than the
higher IATTC Report – Oct 2002 10 values that would be encountered if capture myopathy were occurring"
(Exhibit MEX-67, pp. 9-10).
704 Mexico's responses to the Panel's questions from the Second Substantive Meeting, paras. 55-56.
705 It has been recognized that the "difficult logistics of studying pelagic dolphins have precluded
detailed observations of [dolphin behaviour] during and after tuna purse-seine sets", Exhibit US-4, p. 20.
706 One study indicates for instance that "a 2- to 3-h purse-seine set on dolphins to catch yellowfin tuna,
including chase, net deployment, and closed net confinement, generates stressful stimuli", Exhibit US-11,
p. 191.

reduction in numbers of observed dolphin killings in the ETP. 707 Moreover, the Panel recalls that the
United States has acknowledged that "[s]ince the AI DCP's conclusion in 1998 and entry into force in
1999, all parties including Mexico have generally been abiding by their obligations under the
AIDCP".708
Conditions of access to the label for tuna caught by other methods
7.507 As described above, the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions contain further distinctions, for
the granting or denial of the dolphin-safe label. We must also consider, therefore, the extent to which
the requirements contained in the US dolphin-safe pr ovisions and applied by the United States to tuna
caught by methods other than setting on dolphins (a nd high seas driftnet fishing) allow consumers to
accurately distinguish between tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins and
other tuna, by ensuring that the label is available exclusively to products containing tuna that was not
caught "in a manner that adversely affects dolphins".
7.508 As explained in paragraph 7.488 above, access to the label is available for tuna caught by
methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP without certifying that no dolphins were killed
or seriously injured, while tuna caught inside the ETP by the same methods requires a certificate that
no dolphin was killed or seriously injured in the set s. Mexico observes in this respect that the
US Form 370 (Fisheries Certificate of Origin) does not require any certification at all with respect to
harm to dolphins in the capture of tuna outside the ETP
709, and that even if it did, there is no system to
verify certifications.710
7.509 Mexico claims that there are substantial dolph in mortality rates associated with fishing
techniques other than setting on dolphins 711, and that it is well establishe d that dolphins are regularly
killed in gillnets, both in US waters and elsewhere. 712 Mexico also argues that scientific research
indicates that there are associations of tuna w ith dolphins outside the ETP and that a number of
cetaceans species are affected in different fisheries and by different methods.713
7.510 According to Mexico, notwithstanding the evid ence that dolphins and other marine mammals
are being killed in significant numbers in ocean regions other than the ETP, no measures have been
taken in those other regions compar able to those taken for the ETP 714, and the United States tolerates
such harm, even when the absolu te numbers of marine mammals be ing killed are comparable to the
ETP and when the ratios of marine mammals being ha rmed are higher in relation to their populations
than in the ETP. 715 Thus, according to Mexico, the United Stat es applies a standard for sustainability
of marine mammal stocks to its own fisheries that to lerates level of mortalities, as a percentage of the
potential biological removal (PBR), equivalent to or greater than those of dolphins in the ETP. 716The

707 The United States has accepted that the AIDCP "h as made an important contribution to dolphin
conservation in the ETP, including that it has fostered the continued reduction in observed dolphin mortalities in
the fishery" (emphasis in the original), United States ' first written submission, para. 9; United States' second
written submission, para. 141.
708 United States' second written submission, fn 187.
709 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 103, paras. 47-48.
710 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 54.
711 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 50.
712 Mexico's first oral statement, para. 52.
713 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 11-18; Mexico's second written submission, paras. 98-110;
Mexico's second oral statement, paras. 99-103.
714 Mexico's first written submission, para. 19.
715 Mexico's second oral statement, para. 105.
716 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 15, para. 31. Mexico has clarified that the PBR "is
intended to be an estimate of the maximum level of taki ngs that may be removed from a stock without affecting

United States considers, however, that Mexico's assertions are both factually incorrect and legally
irrelevant, inter alia because the MMPA and the DPCIA are different measures with different
objectives and, in the US view, comparisons betwee n the tuna purse seine fisheries in the ETP and
other fisheries that are not tuna fisheries are inappropriate.
717
7.511 The United States argues that the hypothetical situation of a tuna caught in a set where
dolphins have been killed entering the US market with a dolphin-safe label might exist only in the
limited scenario where three factors coincide, namely: (1) the tuna are caught in a fishery where there
is no regular or significant association between tuna and dolphins and no regular or significant
dolphin mortality; (2) a dolphin is accidentally kille d when a purse seine net is accidentally set on a
dolphin; and (3) the official dolphin-safe label is us ed. The United States claims that "the likelihood
of any such products being on the US market is lo w" and that Mexico has presented no evidence that
such hypothetical actually exists.718
7.512 The United States also argues that dolphin mort alities in the ETP are fundamentally different
from dolphin mortalities that may occasionally occur in other fisheries because, in the ETP, dolphins
are intentionally exploited commercially and on a wide scale to catch tuna, and this results not only in
observed mortalities but also in other unobserved effects, as described above. 719 In the US view,
outside the ETP there is no tuna-dolphin association similar to that in the ETP, and absent repeated
intentional chase and encirclement of dolphins to cat ch tuna, there is no basis to infer that there are
significant unobserved dolphin mortalities outside the ETP, much less so that such mortality would be
anywhere close to the level of unobserved mortality in the ETP.
720 The United States considers that
observer programs exist in other fisheries, that are capable of detecting whether there is any indication
of regular or significant mortality or regular and significant tuna- dolphin association, and that these
programs have not reported any such indications. 721 In the US view, the sources cited by Mexico rely
on anecdotal information, from earlier reports not subsequently substantiated, are based on reporting
of non-tuna fisheries, or are otherwise misrepresented.722
7.513 Mexico refers to information from the websites of the other major tuna fisheries to show that
they do not have observer progra mmes comparable to the ETP. It observes that the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC) has no meaningful data on bycatch and no observer program. It also refers
to the International Commission for the Conservati on of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which indicated it
has a goal of achieving five percentage observer c overage on large longline vessels fishing for bigeye
tuna and to establish observer coverage for large ve ssels fishing for bigeye in one small subregion.
Mexico states that ICCAT reports include 26 sp ecies of dolphins and whales captured by fishing
vessels in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, of whic h 15 were caught in purse seine nets. Mexico also
noted that the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) has limited observer
coverage and has not made data publicly available – even projections – on the overall interaction of

the ability of the stock to reach or maintain its optimum sustainable population". Mexico added that PBRs are
developed for individual fisheries and stocks, Mexico's first written submission, fn 64.
717 See United States' second written submission, para. 53-58.
718 United States' second written submission, paras. 14 3-146; United States' second oral statement,
para. 56.
719 See United States' second written submission, pa ras. 48-52; United States' response to Panel
question No. 15, paras. 43-50; United States' second oral statement, paras. 14-18; United States comments on
Mexico's response to Panel question Nos. 86 and 100, pa ras. 9 and 25; United States response to Panel question
No. 37, para. 92.
720 United States' comments on Mexico's response to Panel question No. 86, para. 3.
721 United States' comments on Mexico's response to Panel question No. 86, para. 9.
722 United States' second written submission, paras. 50- 51; 56-57; United States second oral statement,
paras. 15-16, United States' response to Panel question No. 108, para. 31, United States' comments on Mexico's
response to Panel question No. 136, para. 57 and fn 83.

this fishery with marine mammals, or attempted to estimate the size of dolphin stocks but that
nonetheless, observers witnessed intentional setting of nets on dolphin and whales, indicating that
there is an association between tuna and marine mammals in at least some parts of the Western and
Central Pacific.
7.514 Thus, according to Mexico, these other regional fi sheries management organizations are still
in the early stages of beginning to monitor the impact of fishing operations on marine mammals and
evidence of dolphin mortalities in these other fisher ies already presented by Mexico cannot be refuted
by citing to inaction by those fisheries management organizations.
723 Mexico adds that the
United States does not make the same projections of multiplier effects on populations that it applies to
the ETP when evaluating observed marine mammal mortalities in other fisheries, even though
dolphins killed in those fisheri es are separated from their calves, and escaping dolphins are likely
injured by destructive fishing techniques such as FAD and longline fishing. 724 For Mexico, there is no
reason to believe that the indirect ("unobserved" ) effects on dolphins outside the ETP are less than
those within the ETP because the evidence indicates that dolphin mortalities – both "observed" and
"unobserved" – in these other ocean regions are lik ely higher than in the ETP, as in those other
regions there is no regulation of fishing designed to protect dolphins and other marine mammals, and
no one is even monitoring the impact of fishing on marine mammals.725
7.515 In light of these arguments, we now consider the manner in which the requirements of the
US dolphin-safe provisions operate in respect of tuna caught by methods other than setting on
dolphins, and the extent to which they allow the consumer to accurately distinguish, based on the
label, between tuna caught in a manner harmful to dolphins and other tuna. This question, in our
view, turns in the first instance on the conditions of eligibility for the label, rather than on the
"likelihood" of the situation arising on the market.
7.516 As we understand it, there are two related aspects to Mexico' argument: first, if access to the
label is available to tuna caught in conditions where dolphins may in fact have been harmed, this
would be misleading to the consumer, in that it would lead it to believe incorrectly that such tuna was
caught in conditions that are not harmful to dolphins; secondly, to the extent that some tuna caught in
conditions that are equally harmful to dolphins are denied access to the label, this is also misleading in
that the consumer would not be in a position to accurately identify these products as equally harmful
or not harmful to dolphins.
Whether fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins may adversely
affect them
7.517 In order to address this argument, we must firs t consider whether, as Mexico argues, fishing
for tuna by methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP may adversely affect dolphins,
such that access to the US label is available to tuna that has in fact been caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins.
7.518 We note at the outset that, as several of th e studies submitted by the parties observed,
information is lacking to evaluate the existence and extent of the threats faced by different species of
dolphins in different areas around the globe, especially outside the ETP.726 A report commissioned by

723 Mexico's second written submission, paras. 86–110.
724 See Mexico's responses to the panel's questions from the first substantive meeting, para. 26;
Mexico's second written submission, para. 69.
725 See Mexico's second written submission, para. 104.
726 E.g. Exhibit MEX-2 (suggesting more research "on behaviour of tuna and dolphins" in the ETP);
Exhibit MEX-5, p. vii (recommending research globally); Exhibit US-10, p. 38 (stating that "data collection by

the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra tion (NOAA) Fisheries cautions in this respect
that the lack of evidence that dolphins are being affected by fishery-related activities in certain
fisheries should not be wrongfully taken as evidence of the absence of a problem:
"There are large areas of the world where it seems likely there may well be
interactions between cetaceans and fisheries, but for which there are, as yet, no data,
and no idea of any impact that such fisheri es may cause. This lack of information on
the impacts of a fishery does not imply, however, that there is no problem, especially
since reporting of just a few individuals in a specific fishery may be indicative of a
larger interaction. Only when scienti sts can accomplish a detailed study of the
cetacean stock abundance, the fishing effort , and the bycatch rate in each fishery can
a thorough and accurate assessment be made".
727
7.519 In contrast, due in particular to the AIDC P On-Board Observers Program and the AIDCP
System for Tracking and Verifying Tuna, detailed information is ava ilable about dolphin mortalities
resulting from tuna fishing activities in the ETP. Hence, the Panel's analysis of the existence of
dolphin bycatch during tuna fishing operations outside the ETP is based on the evidence contained in
a limited amount of ad hoc studies. In this regard, we find the following observation of the Appellate
Body in the context of an analysis under Article XIV of the GATS pertinent for the purposes of our
own assessment of the evidence in this case:
"The selection of a methodology to assess a measure's contribution is a function of
the nature of the risk, the objective pursued, and the level of protection sought. It
ultimately also depends on the nature, quantity, and quality of evidence existing at the
time the analysis is made".728
7.520 The evidence submitted to the Panel suggests th at the association between schools of tunas
and dolphins does not occur outside the ETP as frequently as it does within the ETP.729 This evidence
further suggests that although there are indications that intentional setting on dolphins occurs outside

objective scientific agencies may be the only route to a truly unbiased pictur e of dolphin mortality incidental to
purse-seine operations" in the western Pacific Ocean).
727 Exhibit MEX-5, p. vii. The Panel notes that, as indicated above, Exhibit MEX-5 is a report
commissioned by the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries. We
also recall that the United States has submitted that NO AA neither edited nor endorsed this report. Moreover,
the United States highlights that the "views or opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors" and not
necessarily those of NOAA, United States' second written submission, fn 75. Despite these observations, the
Panel considers that the fact that this study was commi ssioned to outside contractors and that it reflects their
views and not those of the US agency does not diminish its probative value. The fact that NOAA commissioned
this study to these contractors in particular suggests that they deserved a certain level of credibility in the eyes of
agency itself. Moreover, the Panel no tes that the authors of this report base their conclusions on previous
studies, estimates and field-research. Thus, the Panel sees no reason to disregard this evidence as untrustworthy.
See also Exhibit MEX-99, p. Ev 26, which states that:

"During the 1990s, observer studies of By-Catch in pelagic trawl fisheries recorded dolphin
catches in four fisheries targeting sea bass, ha ke, tuna and horse mackerel. The report notes
that, given the size of the Europe an fleet and the amount of fish ing effort, the total number of
animals caught may be significant. It also observes that the By-Catch estimate must be treated
as a minimum because, for instance, some fishing fleets refused to take observers on board".

728 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145.
729 United States' first written submission, para. 58. See e.g. Exhibits MEX-2, p. 45 and US-61
(describing the type of tuna-dolphin association that ta kes place in the ETP); Exhibits MEX-4, p. 16-17 and
Exhibit US-10, p. 38 (stating that such association occurs rarely outside the ETP).

the ETP 730, there are "no records of consistent or widespread fishing effort on tuna-dolphin
associations anywhere other than in the ETP". 731 However, there are clear indications that the use of
certain tuna fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins may also cause harm to dolphins. 732
7.521 For instance, the use of unassoci ated purse-seine sets or FADs to catch tuna may result, in
certain cases, in substantial dolphin bycatch. 733 Trawl fishing is another method that may be
employed to harvest tuna, and that may also produce dolphin bycatch. 734 Similarly, the use of
driftnets to catch tuna in coastal areas within Exclusive Economic Zones is considered "a highly
destructive practice" and one of "the greatest thr eats to populations of sma ll cetaceans" in certain
areas of the world. 735 A report prepared by the Committee on Porpoise Mortality from Tuna Fishing
established under auspices of the National Resear ch Council thus observes that "[a]lthough purse
seining for yellowfin tuna associated with dolphins in the ETP is the primary focus of this report,
other methods, including additional purse-seining m odes, are used for catching yellowfin. Some of
these methods are known to kill dolphins, as are othe r techniques of fishing for other fish species
(Northridge, 1984, 1991)." The report identifies longline, log and school fishing as the most important
of the other fishing methods known to kill dolphins.736
7.522 There are reports on dolphin bycatch resulting from tuna fishing operations in European
fisheries.737 There are also reports on dolphin mortalities arising from tuna fishing activities in

730 See e.g. Exhibit MEX-98, page. 59; Exhibit MEX-105. See also United States' response to Panel
question No. 108, para. 30, where it acknowledges that, in oceans other than the ET P, it may be possible to
intentionally set a purse seine net on dolphins but if this occurs, it does not involve the intentional chase and
encirclement of dolphins as a means to catch tuna.
731 See e.g. Exhibit US-10, p. 38.
732 Exhibit MEX-2, pages 37, 98.
733 Exhibit MEX-5, pages 26, 112, 131 (reporting on an estimate annual bycatch of 2000 dolphins as a
result of tuna fishing operations by a fleet of five purse seiners using fish-aggregating devices or FADs).
734 According to the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs a study of a pair-trawl
for tuna, conducted by the Republic of Ireland in 1998 and 1999, recorded a total bycatch of 180 cetaceans,
including the Atlantic white-sided dolphin and the striped dolphin, Exhibit MEX-99, pages 13, Ev 27. See also
the information on European fisheries using pelagic trawl Exhibit MEX-99, p. Ev 26.
735 See e.g. "[t]he By-Catch of cet aceans in fisheries is recognised to be one of the greatest threats to
populations of small cetaceans and has been highlighted by various international fora including the Agreement
on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS). Several fisheries and sea
areas have already been identified wh ere By-Catch presents a serious and unsustainable problem. The case of
pelagic driftnets used in tuna and swordfish fisheries is an example of a highly destructive practice that has now
been addressed by the EU in the form of the driftnet ba n that came into effect in Ja nuary 2002. However, there
is ample evidence of problems in other fisheries that have yet to be addressed. Moreover, many fisheries in the
EU that present a threat to cetaceans are not yet being monitored for their By-Catch. Therefore, the data that are
available represent only a minimum estimate of the scale of the problem". Exhibit MEX-99, p. Ev 26.
See also Exhibit MEX-5, p. 100, stating:
"In the Northeast Atlantic, within the framework for cooperation and research of the [Agreement on the
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and Nort h Seas, ASCOBANS], does not provide authority for
actual regulation of fishing operations, even though it has documented how those operations affect cetacean
bycatch. Action is up to individual parties of ASCOBANS for measures within the EEZs".
In relation to driftnets to catch tuna, the Panel observes that the US dolphin-safe provisions prohibit the
use of the dolphin-safe label for tuna caught "on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing" (emphasis
added), but they do not impose the same restriction in re lation to driftnet fishing for tuna within EEZs. This
implies that tuna caught by applying this method within te rritorial waters is eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe,
see US dolphin-safe provisions subsection 1835(d)(1)(A), Exhibit US-05.
736 Exhibit MEX-2, p. 37.
737 "There is some evidence that other pelagic fisheries may also be responsible for some by-catch of
common dolphins, although few observer studies of by-catch in these fisheries appear to have been carried out.
The Whale and Dolphin Conservation So ciety (WDCS) and Nick Tregenza bo th note that, during the 1990s,

fisheries in Asia
738 and Africa. 739 For instance, a study commissioned by the NOAA of the
US Department of Commerce refers to the case of 1,700 bottlenose dolphi ns and 1,000 spinner

observer studies of by-catch in pelagic trawl fisheries recorded dolphin catches in three other fisheries, those for
mackerel, horse mackerel, hake and tuna" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-99, p. 31.
"The [Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society] also pointed out that a number of other pelagic
fisheries share common characteristics w ith the pelagic sea bass fishery: other fisheries also use trawling and
pair trawling gear and oper ate in the Celtic Sea/Bay of Biscay area during the winter months, when dolphin
strandings occur on the south-west coast. In addition to the fisheries named above, they also cited the herring,
blue whiting, pilchard, sardine and anchovy fisheries, and the albacore tuna fishery, which operates during the
summer months but uses pair traw ling gear. The WDCS considers that , until these fisheries are properly
monitored, it is reasonable to assu me that some, if not all, may be responsible for some cetacean by-catch"
(emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-99, p. 32.
"Goujon estimates that th e French driftnet fishery for tuna caught 1,722 (1365-2079) common, striped
and bottlenose dolphins, and long-finned pilot whales in 1992; and 1,654 (1115-2393) common, striped and
bottlenose dolphins, and long-finned pilot whales in 1993" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. XX-16, fn 89.
"In 1995, the UK driftnet fishery for albacore caught 104 striped dolphins (38 – 169)" (emphasis
added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. AA-16.
"In 1996 and 1998 respectively, the Irish driftnet fishery for albacore caught 136 and 964 striped
dolphins" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. AA-16.
738 "Roughly 1,700 bottlenose dolphins and 1,000 spinner dolphins are incidentally caught in gillnet,
driftnet, and purse-seine fisheries in the western central Pacific. Also at risk are Irrawaddy dolphins. This
region's fisheries are diverse and poorly documented. Nevertheless, coastal gillnets, especially driftnets for tunas
and mackerels, are widely used. After a closure in Aust ralian waters, the Taiwanese driftnet fishery relocated
and continued fishing in In donesian waters in the Arafura Sea. With no reduction in effort, high cetacean
bycatch rates are probable" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. 26.
"Spinner and Fraser's dolphins experience substantial bycatch in Philippine fisheries. In the Philippines,
scientists estimated that about 2,000 dolphins—primarily spinner, pan-tropical spotted, and Fraser's—were
being killed each year by a fleet of five tuna purse seiners using fish-a ggregating devices" (emphasis added),
Exhibit MEX-5, pages 26, 112, 131.
"Few recent studies appear to have been made in th is area. The recent revelation that a driftnet fishery
has been operating off Tristan da Cunha for tuna, with concomitant incidental mortality of small whales and
dolphins, suggests that there may also be considerable mortality to some as yet unidentified species. Incidental
mortality to Heaviside's dolphin, which is restricted to the coastal zone of South Africa and Namibia, may also
be an important interaction, but recent data on bycatch and population size are lacking" (emphasis added),
Exhibit MEX-5, p. 18.
"A now-terminated Taiwanese shark and tuna gilln et fishery operated off Northern Australia and
caught bottlenose dolphins, spinner dolphins, spotted dolphins, humpback dolphins and false killer whales, a
proportion of which are in this area . The fishery was mainly located in Area 71 and is discussed under that
section. Given the amount of gillnetting likely to occur in this region, accidental cat ches may adversely affect
small coastal species such as the finless porpoise and Ir rawaddy dolphin to some extent. The driftnet fisheries
operating farther offshore—in the Bay of Bengal, for example—might be expected to catch spinner and spotted
dolphins, at least, and perhaps other species. Driftnet fisheries in the southern Indian Ocean may catch a variety
of species such as the spectacled porpoise, the southern right whale dolphin, and common dolphin. All of these
fisheries require more detailed information on non-target catches" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. 23.
"Catches in India are reported quite frequently, and formed 33% of the total catch of cetaceans
recorded in the gillnet fishery at Calicut. Bottlenose dolphins are one of the commonly caught dolphins in
seerfish and tuna driftnet fisheries on the west coast of India, and in coastal gillnet fisheries for pomfrets and
other species too. In Sri Lanka, th is species was found to consist of between 5 and 25% of the total cetacean
catch in four different surveys amounting to 1,250 to 10,000 animals" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5,
p. AA-40.
"Spinner dolphins are caught in Sri Lankan coastal gillnet and driftnet fisheries. This species is caught
in Pakistani offshore deepwater gillnet fisheries and is commonly entangled in coastal driftnet fisheries for
seerfish and tunas on the west coast of India, and is al so entangled in other gillnet fisheries for sharks, pomfrets
and other species" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. AA-41.

dolphins being caught in one year in the western cen tral Pacific by gillnet, driftnets and purse-seine
fisheries, including coastal gillnets fishing for tuna. The study also states that "[i]n the Philippines,
scientists estimated that about 2000 dolphins –prima rily spinner, pan-tropical spotted, and Fraser's-
were being killed each year by a fleet of five tuna purse seiners using fish aggregating devices". 740
Moreover, the study also stresses the "need to conti nue efforts to assess incidental catch in the tuna
purse seine and drift gillnet fisheries" in the western central Pacific.741
7.523 The Panel also notes that, based on the number of documented incidental bycatch of dolphins
and other small cetaceans in the western central Pacifi c, the same study identifi ed the need to address
the western central Pacific tuna-dolphin interac tions as a second tier priority for agency action. 742
This study refers to examples of observed dolphin mortalities in the western central Pacific 743, which
equate or exceed the number of dolphin observe d mortalities in the ETP in recent years (which
amount to approximately 1000 to 1200 deaths per year).744
7.524 We note that the United States has submitted th at observer programmes outside the ETP exist
and that they have not reported significant mortalities. 745 Mexico observes however that there is
limited observer coverage outside of the ETP 746 and argues that the United States greatly overstated

"Spinner dolphins are the most frequ ently caught species in the Sri Lankan fishery, where they formed
between 33 and 47% of the total cetacean catch in for different surveys, or roughly 7,050-11,750 dolphins per
year" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. AA-41.
"Finless porpoise are entangled in Sri Lankan coastal gillnet and driftnet fisheries, shark nets in
Australian, and Indian ocean coastal g illnets. This species is commonly ca ught in seerfish and tuna driftnet
fisheries throughout the west coast of India. Finless porpoises have been caught in a shrimp trawl in Pakistan in
1989, entangled in beach seines and stake nets for shrimp, and entangled in small and medium mesh finfish
gillnets in shallow inshore waters of Pakistan" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. AA-43.
"The annual bycatch of small cetaceans in a single tuna driftnet fishery in Negros Oriental was
estimated at about 400" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, pages 26, 27, 131.
739 "In the Eastern Central Atlantic, the clymene dolphin (Ghanaians call it the "common dolphin"),
bottlenose, pantropical spotted, Risso's, long-beaked common, and rough-toothed dolphins; short-finned pilot
whale, melon-headed whale, dwarf sp erm, and Cuvier's beaked whale may all be caught in large-meshed drift
gillnets targeting tuna, sharks, billfish, manta rays, and dolphins", (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. 102.
"In 1997, the IWC Scientific Committee concluded that information on small cetaceans in Africa
(outside southern Africa) is very sparse and that issues of cetacean fi shery bycatch must be addressed. Projects
that have sampled landing sites of small scale coasta l fisheries in Ghana since 1998 show that bycatch and
directed harvests of small cetaceans are commonplace and possibly increasing. The largest catches, by far, are
the result of deployment of large meshed drift gillnets ta rgeting tuna, sharks billfish, manta rays, and dolphins.
The species most frequently caught are clymene (Ghanaians call it the "common dolphin"), bottlenose, pan-
tropical spotted, Risso's, long-beaked common, and rough-toothed dolphins, together with short-finned pilot and
melon-headed whales" (emphasis added), Exhibit MEX-5, p. 9.
740 Exhibit MEX-5, pages 26-27, AA-60-63. The Unite d States criticises this information by pointing
out that it "was based on data from a report from 1994" and that "there has been no substantiation of these
claims in the 16 plus years since they were made". In addition the United St ates claims that these estimates "do
not appear to be supported by robust scientific method", United States' second written submission, para. 50. The
Panel considers that while the information seems to be based on a study prepared in 1994, the United States did
not submit any previous or more recent piece of ev idence showing that these estimates were wrongfully
calculated. Furthermore, the United States did not elaborate on why, in its opinion, the scientific basis of this
study was not "robust".
741 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 27.
742 Exhibit MEX-5, pp. xxi-xxii.
743 Exhibit MEX-5, pp. 26-29, AA-60-63.
744 The United States claims that dolphin observed mortalities in the ETP has been reduced to
approximately 1200 dolphins per year, United States' second written submission, para. 2.
745 See para. 7.512 above.
746 Mexico's second written submission, para. 99.

the monitoring activities of the non-ETP regional fisheries management organizations.
747 Mexico also
argues that it has produced evidence that no regiona l fisheries management organization other than
the IATTC has had a comprehensive program for many years to monitor bycatch of marine
mammals.
748 We note in this respect that the United St ates has not challenged Mexico's assertion that
observer coverage outside of the ETP is not as comprehensive as it is in the ETP. 749 Instead, the
United States has argued that Mexico's conclusion th at the lack of 100 per cent observer coverage in
fisheries outside of the ETP means that the risk of dolphin mortality or serious injury is unknown
should be rejected.750 The United States suggests that if there we re reasons to believe that there was a
regular and significant association between tuna and dol phins in purse seine tuna fisheries outside the
ETP or regular and significant dolphin mortality or serious injury in other fisheries outside of the
ETP, the relevant regional fisheries management or ganizations would be aware of the issue and it
would be their responsibility to address such issue. 751 However, as described above, some studies
warn that absence of information should not be a basis for assuming that no problem exists and
suggested rather that the level of information should be increased.752
7.525 The United States also argues that there are very few interactions between US vessels fishing
for tuna and dolphins in the WCPO and that reports on that fishery reveal that marine mammal take is
"relatively small". In support of this assertion, the United States states that "based on reporting from
independent observers on US vessels fishing for tuna in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO),
the United States noted that of the 1500 sets observed in 2008, there were 5 in teractions with false
killer whales and one interaction with a short-fi nned pilot whale observed; there were no observed
interactions with other marine mammals".
753 The United States cites as source for this assertion a
communication of a NOAA official, without however providing such communication or any
supporting evidence. As observed by Mexico, this leaves unexplained the basis for this assertion,
including whether the observers were specifically tr ained to watch for dolphin interactions, where the
observed vessels were fishing, or how the vessels were fishing. 754 We also note Mexico’s observation
that the observation of 1500 sets represents a sample of 1.5% of the total number of sets in the
WCPO, making it meaningless. We further note that this information relates only to US vessels.

747 Mexico's second written submission, para. 89.
748 Mexico noted that the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is still in the initial stages
establishing programs to monitor bycatch quoting a report that stated that the IOTC had resolved to implement a
regional observer scheme (ROS) beginning in July 2010 that would target a coverage of 5% of fishing
operations for vessels larger than 24m from 1 July 2010 which would gradually increase towards a 5% coverage
for vessels smaller than 24m fishing outside their EEZ and develop sampling programs to monitor artisanal
fisheries at landings. The report quoted by Mexico noted that although the ROS started on 1 July 2010, to date,
no observer trip reports had been sent to the Secretaria t. Mexico also showed that the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) also has very limited information on bycatch by referring to its
latest biennial report published in 2010, includes the following, which with respect to observer coverage noted
that "In order to obtain data on the composition of the catches, particularly those of spawners, relative to the
fishing areas and seasons, there shall be observers on board at least 5% of longline vessels over 24 meters
fishing for bigeye." Mexico also explained that the ICCAT Regional Observer Program shall be established to
ensure observer coverage of 100% of all fishing vessels over 20 m fishing for bigeye tuna in a specific area is
nonetheless limited to large vessels fishing for bigeye t una in a specific region and the specific tasks of the
observers do not appear to include recording data on bycatch. S ee Mexico's second written submission,
paras. 90-96.
749 United States' second written submission, para. 47.
750 United States' second written submission, para. 47.
751 United States' comments on Mexico's answers to Panel question No. 101, para. 29.
752 See paragraph 7.518 above , fn 725 referring to MEX-5.
753 United States' response to the Panel question No. 15, para. 49.
754 Mexico's second written submission, para. 98.

7.526 The United States further refers to a report of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in the
framework of the Oceanic Fisheries Program, assessing the status of stocks in the western and central
pacific tuna fishery, which was provided as evidence by Mexico. 755 The United States notes that this
report shows that over an eleven year period, 33, 319 tuna purse seine sets were observed and bycatch
of 1315 marine mammals was reported, 46 of which were reported killed.756
7.527 We note that the figures at issue relate specifica lly to the equatorial purse-seine fishery in the
WCPO. The report takes note of a "relatively high le vel of observer coverage", with one-third of sets
observed over the period, and observes that marine mammals were caught in a very small proportion
of these observed sets, mainly from sets targeting t una schools associated with either whales or
dolphins. We also note that the full data set reflec ts, in addition to the 46 marine mammals identified
as killed referred to above, 36 alive and 1233 whose fate remained “unknown”.
7.528 We also note that the authors of the report themselves do not consider these figures to be a
sufficient basis for overall estimates for the fishery. Rather, the authors suggest that a more detailed
analysis would be required for this purpose:
"For the WCP–CA, incidences of capture of marine mammals in the equatorial purse-
seine and area-specific longline fisheries were summarised from observer data to
identify (where possible) the main species caught and provide an indication of the
level of fishery interaction. However, it is important to note that no attempt has been
made to apply these data to provide overall estimates for the fishery. This work would
require a more detailed analysis of observe r coverage rates of individual fleets and
consideration of appropriate spatial and te mporal stratification. It is intended to
undertake such an analysis during the next year."
7.529 We are therefore not persuaded that these figures demonstrate, as the United States suggests,
that there is no or only insignificant risk of dolphin mortality or injury arising from tuna fishing
operations outside the ETP or call into question th e other evidence referred to by Mexico and cited
above. Rather, the observations reflected in this report confirm the existence of interaction outside the
ETP between purse seine (and longline) tuna fisher ies and marine mammals, including dolphins, and
the existence of some bycatch and mortality in this context in the WCPO.
7.530 Furthermore, the authors' conclusion that furt her study would be required in order to draw
overall conclusions for the fishery confirms that the information available in this respect is incomplete
and that this issue warrants further analysis. Th is observation is consistent with other evidence

755 See Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "'The Western And Central Pacific Tuna Fishery: 2006
Overview And Status Of Stocks,"' 2008, ps. 59-60. E xhibit MEX-98. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC) is an international organisation that provides technical and policy advice an d assistance, training and
research services to its Pacific Island members. The Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems Division
assists members to sustainably develop and manage their coastal, aquaculture and oceanic (tuna) fisheries by
providing technical advice, assistance and training; conducting research and monitoring; and disseminating
information through two programs ma inly, the Oceanic Fisher ies Program and the Coas tal Fisheries Program.
The Oceanic Fisheries Program provides data products, such as stock assessment and evaluation of species. It is
in this context that the 2006 report on stock assessment was issued, with a view primarily to assessing tuna
stocks. The SPC is not responsible for international management of tuna fisheries throughout the region; this is
the responsibility of the Western and Central Paci fic Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) whose membership
includes all 26 SPC members, as well as Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, the European Union, Japan, Korea and
Philippines. The OFP provides data management and stock assessment services and advice to WCPFC under an
annual service agreement.
756 See Exhibit MEX-98, p. 59-60.

presented by Mexico and discussed above.
757 We also recall in this respect the observations of the
report commissioned by NOAA and referred to above, that the absence of information should not be
assumed to reflect an absence of problem.758
7.531 Therefore, based on the evidence provided to us, we conclude that Mexico has demonstrated
that certain tuna fishing methods other than setting on dolphins have the potential of adversely
affecting dolphins, and that the use of these other techniques outs ide the ETP may produce and has
produced significant levels of dolphin bycatch, during the period over which the US dolphin-safe
provisions have been in force.
Whether access to the US dolphin-safe l abel is available to tuna caught in
conditions that may adversely affect dolphins
7.532 We note that where such tuna is caught ou tside the ETP, it would be eligible for the
US official label, even if dolphins have in fact been caught or seriously injured during the trip, since
there is, under the US measures as currently applied, no requirement for a certificate to the effect that
no dolphins have been killed or seriously injured outside the ETP.
759
7.533 The Panel further observes that some of th e examples referred to above involve dolphin
mortalities occurring as a result of tuna fishing op erations in the western central Pacific Ocean
(WCPO)760 where, according to the United States, "a lmost all U.S. purse seine vessels fish for
tuna".761 The United States has further clarified that the US tuna canning industry uses tuna caught by
both, domestic and foreign vessels. 762 According to the information provided by the United States,
during 2009, 99 per cent of the tuna used by US canners was caught in the western Pacific by
US vessels. Similarly, 80 per cent of the tuna US canners sourced from foreign vessels was also
caught in the western Pacific.
763 Thus, according to these figures, approximately 86% of the tuna
packed by US canners in 2009 was fi shed in the western Pacific Ocean. 764 The Panel also notes that

757 See also Exhibit MEX-5, p.27.
758 See para. 7.518 above and fn 725 referring to MEX-5.
759 We recall in this respect that, as described in para. 2.25 above, such a requirement would exist in the
event of a determination by the Secretary of Commerce that there is regular and significant dolphin mortality or
serious injury of dolphins, but that no such determination has in fact been made.
760 Exhibit MEX-5, pages 18, 23, 26, 27, 112, 131, AA-40, AA-41, AA-43.
761 United States' response to Panel question No. 15(b), para. 49.
762 United States' second written submission, para. 22; see also Exhibit US-61, p. 151.
763 Exhibit US-55, p. 2.
764 Moreover, there are indications that the three major tuna canners have processing facilities in
locations situated near the western Pacific Ocean. Indeed, the study conducted by the Committee on Reducing
Porpoise Mortality from Tuna Fishing established by the National Research Council, and funded by the
US Department of Commerce narrates that:
"During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. tuna companies relocated most of the canning operations from the
U.S. west coast to offshore U.S. sites in American Sa moa and Puerto Rico to take advantage of favorable
economic conditions includin g relatively inexpensive labor and tax advantages offered by commonwealth and
territorial governments. During the 1980s, these companies began shifting from these offshore U.S. territories to
Asian sites to take advantage of even cheaper labor and less costly worker benefits and environmental
restrictions" (emphasis added).
The same study reports that, at the moment it was concluded, Starkist was the only US company still
operating in American Samoa or Puerto Rico, while the companies that owned the brands Chicken of the Sea
and Bumble Bee had been sold to Indonesian and Thai companies, respectively. Exhibit MEX-5, p. 31. This
suggests the possibility that all three major tuna canners participating in the US market, including those that
have been sold to foreign companies, could source the tuna contained in their products from fleets operating in
near-by waters, including the western Pacific Ocean.

Thailand's tuna canners, which dominate the US market of imported tuna products765, also obtain most
of their tuna supply from companies operating in the WCPO.766
7.534 In addition, the United States has explained th at the techniques currently used by US and
foreign vessels to catch tuna for products sold on the US market include "purse seine sets on dolphins,
unassociated purse seine sets (sets on floating objects such as FADs and free swimming schools),
longline, troll, pole and line, gillnet, harpoon and handline" (emphasis added).
767 The United States
has also stated that "most tuna products sold in the United States are eligible to be labelled
dolphin-safe", and that for instance, "98.5% of tota l US imports (by volume) of canned tuna products
were eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe in 2009". 768 This means the vast majority of tuna products
containing tuna caught in the western Pacific Ocean by using, for instance, FADs, trolls or gillnets,
sold in the US market are elig ible to be labelled dolphin-safe. 769Based on this information, the Panel
considers that Mexico has sufficiently demonstrat ed that tuna caught during a trip where dolphins
were killed or seriously injured using a method of fishing other than setting on dolphins outside the
ETP may be contained in the tuna products sold in the US market under the dolphin-safe label. This
is particularly true considering that no determination of existen ce of regular and significant tuna-
dolphin association770 or regular and significant mortality771 has been made for any fishery outside the
ETP, which means that under the DPCIA pr ovisions that are currently applicable all tuna products
containing tuna caught in a non-ETP fishery using a method other than setting on dolphins are eligible
to be labelled dolphin-safe without certifying that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured in the set.
7.535 We also note that the United States has explained that Subsection 1385(d)(3)(C)(i) of the
US dolphin-safe provisions establishes conditions that must be met in addition to those contained in
Subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2), to label tuna products dolphin-safe with an alternative mark (rather than
the official DOC mark). 772 Namely, if an alternative label rather than the official DOC label is used,
no dolphin may have been killed or seriously in jured in the sets in which the tuna was caught
regardless of the type of fishery. Thus, accordi ng to the United States, tuna products using an
alternative dolphin-safe mark may not contain tuna caught in a trip where dolphins were killed or
seriously injured even if there is no determinati on that there is regular and significant tuna-dolphin
association or dolphin mortality in the fishery wher e that tuna was caught. The United States further

765 Mexico's first written submission, para. 37.
766 These companies are FCF, Tri Marine and Itochu , which specialize in the procurement of canning-
grade tuna, Exhibit MEX-111.
767 United States' response to Panel question 90, para. 10. The Panel also recalls that the United States
has clarified that techniques used to catch tuna used in tuna products exported to the United States by vessels
flagged to Thailand, the Philippines, Ecuador, Vietnam and China since 2000, include gillnet, longline, pole and
line, purse seine, troll, etc. The Thai fleet for instance uses, inter alia , gillnets and trolls to fish for tuna,
United States' response to Panel question No. 98, para. 22.
768 United States' response to Panel question No. 95, para. 18.
769 This is particularly true if we consider that approximately 1% of the imports of tuna products in the
United States come from Mexico, and that most of these imports do not qualify to be labelled as dolphin-safe.
See Exhibits MEX-86(A), MEX-86(B), MEX-86(C) and ME X-66. The United States has stated that "of the
$1.2 billion of U.S. imports of tuna and tuna products, the vast majority contained tuna that was caught by
methods other than setting on dolphins and are eligible to be labelled dolphin-safe" (emphasis added). The
United States added that "[f]or example, of the over 10,000 entries of canned tuna products in 2009, all but 137
entries were dolphin-safe", United States' response to Panel question No. 95, para. 18.
770 United States' response to Panel question No. 12(a), para. 29.
771 United States' response to Panel question No. 85(a), para. 1.
772 See paragraph 7.489 above.

argues that none of the US canners uses the of ficial dolphin-safe label mark, since they have
developed their own dolphin-safe logos.
773
7.536 The Panel recognizes that Subsection 1385(d)(3 )(C)(i) suggests that tuna products using
alternative labels must not contain tuna caught in a set where dolphins were killed or seriously injured
even if no determination of regular and significan t tuna-dolphin association or dolphin mortality has
been made in relation to the fishery in question. 774 Although the Panel fails to understand the reasons
behind the US regulator's decision to establish a diff erence in this regard between the official and
alternative dolphin-safe labels, it defers to the Unite d States' interpretation of its own regulations and
accepts its explanation that these requirements apply in addition to the general requirements of
Subsections (d)1 and (d)2.775
7.537 At the same time, we also note that accordi ng to NOAA Form 370, which is the instrument
that "reflects the documentation requirements nece ssary to support dolphin-safe claims for tuna
products as set forth in the [US dolphin-safe provisions]" 776, tuna products imported to United States
containing tuna caught in a non-ETP fishery where th ere is no regular and significant tuna-dolphin
association or dolphin mortality, using a method other than setting on dolphins, do not need to
demonstrate (or even declare) that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in order to use the
official DOC mark. NOAA Form 370 also does not a ppear to provide any particular space in which
such declaration might be made.
7.538 Therefore, although the text of the US dolphin -safe provisions seems to require that tuna
products using an alternative label must not contain tuna caught in a set where dolphins were killed or
seriously injured, regardless of whether there is a determination of regular and significant tuna-
dolphin association or dolphin mortality, it is not clea r that the application of these provisions through
the use of the NOAA Form 370, as described by the United States itself, involves any enforcement of
such requirement. This seems to considerably increase the chances of tuna caught during trips
involving dolphin killings or serious injuries, being sold as dolphin-safe in the US market.
7.539 In addition, we note that to the extent that th e use of an "alternative" label is subjected to
different – and more stringent – requirements than th e official label, the official label and alternative
labels would have different mean ings, leading, as Mexico points out, to further confusion for
consumers.777 Furthermore, that the requirements applicable to the use of an alternative label may be
more stringent than those for access to the official label does not modify the fact that access to the
official label is available to tuna products ca ught outside the ETP by methods other than setting on
dolphins, regardless of whether dolphins have been killed or seriously injured in the sets.
7.540 Finally, we note that the United States also argues that in adopting measures to fulfil
legitimate objectives, it is appropriate for Members to consider the costs of such measures in light of
their benefits and that, where the risk of a product containing tuna caught in a set in which a dolphin
was killed or seriously injured is low, the dolphin-safe provisions do not condition dolphin-safe
claims on the provision of an observer's statement that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured.
778
The United States argues that the cost of requiring a certification for tuna caught in the ETP using
purse seine nets that no dolphins were killed or ser iously injured in the set in which the tuna was

773 United States' response to Panel question No. 11, para. 28.
774 Exhibit US-05.
775 United States' response to Panel question No. 8; United States' second written submission, paras. 40-
41. See also Section II.F above.
776 United States' response to Panel question No. 7, para. 16.
777 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 86, para. 3.
778 United States' second oral statement, para. 56.

caught is relatively low as compar ed to the cost of imposing the same requirement for tuna caught
outside the ETP, because if it required certification th at no dolphins were kille d or seriously injured
for tuna caught outside the ETP, this would impose the additional cost of maintaining 100 per cent
observer coverage on vessels in that fishery, for which there is no intergovernmental agreement that
such observer coverage would be warranted.779
7.541 We note that this explanation is not consistent with the United States' own explanation that
Subsection 1385(d)(3)(C)(i) imposes a requirement that no dolphin be killed or seriously injured if an
alternative label is used, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. We understand the United States to
suggest that the requirement that no dolphin has been killed or seriously injured is in fact not enforced
through a certification requirement with respect to the alternative label, while a statement by an
observer is required with respect to the same substa ntive requirement, for the use of the official label
in the ETP. We fail to see, however, how the co st of demonstrating compliance with the same
requirement (i.e. that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured) would justify that no such
requirement be imposed with respect to the use of an official label, while it would be imposed for the
same tuna caught in the same cond itions in the same fisheries, in the case of use of an alternative
label. It is also not clear to us what the impositi on of this additional requirement means in practice in
respect of the alternative label, if it is assumed that it cannot be verified and that this is a reason not to
impose it for the use of the official label.
7.542 In light of the above, we find that, to the extent that the US dolphin-safe measures grant
access to the label to certain tuna products that may have been caught in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins (i.e. tuna produc ts containing tuna caught outside the ETP by methods other than
setting on dolphins, regardless of whether dolphins ma y have been killed on the trip), they do not
allow the consumer to accurately distinguish between tuna caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins and other tuna. In addition, to the extent that, depending on whether such tuna is caught in
the ETP or outside the ETP, the measures require or do not require a certification that no dolphin has
been killed or seriously injured, we find that th is also does not allow the consumer to accurately
identify tuna caught in conditions that are similarly harmful to dolphins.
7.543 We also note that the provisions of the DP CIA themselves envisage the possibility that a
fishery outside the ETP would be identified as one "having a regular and significant mortality, or
serious injury of dolphins", which would then lead to the application in such fishery of requirements
comparable to those applied in the ETP, including a requirement to certify that no dolphin has been
killed or seriously injured on the trip. However, in the absence of such determination – despite strong
evidence that regular and significant mortality and seri ous injury of dolphins also exists outside of the
ETP, as described in paragraph 2.25 and explained in paragraph 7.532 above – no such requirement
currently applies outside the ETP. We note in this respect that we are not aware of any process or
procedure having been established or initiated, under the US dolphin-safe measures, in order to trigger
such determination.
7.544 To summarize, therefore, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, as currently applied,
address observed and unobserved mortality resulting fr om setting on dolphins, in any fishery, as well
as observed mortality from other fishing methods with in the ETP. However, they do not address
mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins
outside the ETP. In addition, the measures also do not allow the consumer to be informed in any
manner with respect to measures taken in the context of the AIDCP, to minimize the incidental taking
and killing of dolphins when setting on them in the ETP.

779 United States' second written submission, paras. 46, 149.

7.545 Consequently, when consumers buy a tuna product labelled dolphin-safe under the
US measures, they may be completely assured that no dolphin was adversely affected during the
catching of that tuna in the ETP. However, consum ers would not have equal certainty that no dolphin
was killed or injured or that dolphins were not othe rwise adversely affected in respect of tuna caught
outside the ETP.
Adverse effects of fishing activities on dolphins in and outside of the ETP
7.546 The Panel would like now to address the United States' suggestion that granting access to the
dolphin-safe label to tuna caught outside the ETP us ing a method other than setting on dolphins does
not represent a considerable risk of confusion for the consumers, because the probability that dolphins
were hurt during the fishing of that tuna is very low. The United States has explained that the
difference in certification requirements between t una coming from the ETP and tuna harvested in
other areas reflects a calibration of the likelihood that any given dolphin would interact with fishing
gear and be accidentally killed or seriously injured as a result.
780
7.547 The United States has suggested that the rati onale behind these differences in requirements
for tuna harvested in the ETP is the existence of sp ecial conditions of this area of the Pacific Ocean.
First, according to the United States, in the ETP "there is regular and significant tuna-dolphin
association that is commercially exploited on a wi de scale commercial basis to catch tuna" and for
which dolphin mortality and serious injury are "a regular, foreseeable and expected consequence of
exploiting that association".781 Second, in the United States' view, "dolphin populations in the ETP are
depleted with abundance levels at less than 30 per cent of the levels they were at before the practice of
setting on dolphins to catch tuna began".782
7.548 The United States submits that these differences mean that outside the ETP there is much
lower likelihood that dolphins will be killed or seriously injured as a result of tuna fishing activities.783
However, the United States adds that "to the extent that unintentional deaths of dolphins in purse
seine fishery other than the ETP or in non-purse seine fishery does indicate a systemic issue", the
US measures contemplate "that dolphin-safe claims on tuna products that contain tuna caught in such
fisheries be supported by an observer's statement th at no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in
the set".
784
7.549 We understand the United States' explanation to suggest that the US dolphin-safe provisions
aim at establishing different requirements based on the likelihood that dolp hins will be killed or
seriously injured. Thus, the greater the risk, the stricter the certification requirements are for tuna
products to be labelled dolphin-safe. We acknowledge that it may be legitimate to provide for a
different degree of stringency or of tolerance to adverse impacts, depending on the extent of the
threat. This is consistent, in our view, with th e requirement to take into account the risks that non-
fulfilment of the objective would create, as foreseen in Article 2.2. However, we are not persuaded
that this is what the US dolphin-safe measures achieve, in respect of the different treatment of tuna
caught within and outside of the ETP.
7.550 We first observe that, as described by the Unite d States itself, its measures seek to address a
range of adverse effects of fishing techniques on dolphins. As established in paragraphs 7.483 to
7.486 above, this includes situations in which dolphins are killed or seriously injured. It is also clear,

780 United States' second written submission, paras. 39-47.
781 United States' second written submission, para. 42; United States' second oral statement, para. 14
782 United States' second written submission, para. 43.
783 United States' second written submission, para. 44.
784 United States' second written submission, para. 44.

from the United States' own description of its objectiv es, that its intention to address adverse effects
of fishing techniques on dolphins in the form of observed or unobserved mortality is not subordinated
to considerations relating to the conservation of de pleted dolphin stocks. This is made clear by its
clarification, in response to a question by the Panel, that addressing such impacts " might also be
considered to seek to conserve dolphin populations". 785 In these conditions, we are not persuaded
that differences with respect to the depletion status of the stocks at issue would be sufficient to justify
the absence of any requirement to certify that no dolphin has been killed or seriously injured, in
situations where dolphins may in fact have been be killed or seriously injured.
7.551 Notwithstanding this conclusion, we also note that, although the United States did not identify
the conservation of dolphin stocks or populations as a direct objective of its measures, the recovery of
dolphin populations, as well as the likelihood of mortality or serious injury in a particular fishery, are
among the considerations reflected in the desi gn and structure of the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions. 786 We therefore consider further the extent to which such considerations could explain
the absence of a requirement to certify that no dolphin was killed for tuna caught outside the ETP.
7.552 We first note that, even assuming that the United States' contention that certain environmental
conditions in the ETP (such as the intensity of tuna-dolphin association) are unique, 787 the evidence
submitted to the Panel suggests that the risks faced by dolphin populations in the ETP are not. As
discussed above, a study commissioned by NOAA entitled " An evaluation of the most significant
threats to cetaceans, the affected species and the geographic areas of high risk, and the recommended
actions from various independent institutions ", contains multiple examples of numerous dolphins
being killed annually in other fisheries as a result of tuna fishing activities and recommends further
action being taken in this respect.788
7.553 In some cases, cetacean bycatch in other fish eries targeting different species including tuna,
has been considered "a seri ous and unsustainable problem". 789 For instance, the above-mentioned
study recommends that the United States collaborates w ith international organizations to "investigate
the interaction between tuna purse seine vessels fish ing for tuna off the coast of West Africa and
whales and dolphins". According to this study, "allegations and sparse documentation of these
interactions have existed for more than twenty year s". Thus the study identif ies the need to "plac[e]
observers on tuna vessels fishing in these areas [to] help document the occurrence of association of

785 See paragraphs 7.485-7.486.
786 As noted in footnote 162 above, the change in the US dolphin-safe standard from a standard of
absence of setting on dolphins to a standard of absence of killing or seriously injury dolphins was made
contingent upon secretarial findings regarding whether the intentional deployment on or encirclement of
dolphins with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The ty pe of scientific research mandated to substantiate the secretarial finding
also evidenced the preoccupation for conservation matters insofar as it required, inter alia , population
abundance surveys of depleted stocks and research into whether the physiological stress effects of using purse
seine nets to chase and encircle dolphins is adversely affecting depleted dolphin populations prior to
implementing any change in the dolphin-safe label. However, the court rulings overruled the findings,
emphasizing among other things the recovery issue and stating that all of the best available evidence pointed
towards the fishery as the cause of the dolphin's failure to recover (See for instance Earth Island Institute v
Evans). No. 03-0007, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15729, 2004 WL 1774221, at *30-31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2004). In
addition, the DPCIP foresees the possibility of requiring a certification that no dolphins are killed or seriously
injured, if a determination is made that serious mortality or tuna-dolphin association exists in the fishing. In
addition, as described in Section III above, the US do lphin-safe provisions foresee the possibility of more
onerous certification requirements outside the ETP in the event of a determination of regular mortality, or of
association between tuna and dolphins, in a fishery.
787 United States' second oral statement, paras. 14-18
788 E.g. Exhibit MEX-5, pp. 26, 27, 112, 131AA-16, fn 89, AA-40, AA-41.
789 Exhibit MEX-99, p. Ev 26.

tuna schools with whales and dolphins and the fre quency of encirclement and magnitude of any
bycatch.
790 At the same time, the study reports that th e bycatch in this area "threatens the continued
existence of Atlantic humpback dolphins" and reports that populations of this species of dolphin near
the coast of Ghana and Togo are "severely depleted".791
7.554 The Panel also observes that in the western Paci fic Ocean, where most of the tuna sold in the
US market is sourced from, there are also exampl es of incidental dolphin mortalities which affect a
percentage of the dolphin populations in that area that is higher than the percentage of dolphins
observed to be affected in the ETP (which is less than 0.1 per cent) under the controlled conditions of
the AIDCP. 792 The Panel notes in particular, that the sa me study indicates that in the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere in the western central Pacific, relatively little is known about
abundance, distribution, and bycatch levels of cetaceans such as the Irrawa ddy dolphin, Indo-Pacific
humpback dolphin, Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphin, finless porpoise, and spinner dolphin (and its
dwarf form) and that "comprehensive cetacean abu ndance and bycatch surveys are needed to develop
effective mitigation strategies", 793 including assessments on "incidental catch in the tuna purse seine
and drift gillnet fisheries". 794 The Panel also notes that the study reports that Irrawaddy dolphin
populations are seriously depleted in parts of Thailand and the Philippines.795
7.555 Thus, based on the evidence, we are not persuaded that the US statement that "in the course of
using other fishing methods for tuna outside the ETP, a dolphin may be killed or seriously injured"796,
accurately represents the magnitude of the threat posed by tuna fishing to dolphins outside of the ETP.
7.556 Again, the Panel recognizes that the evidence concerning dolphin bycatch outside the ETP is
not as detailed and as abundant as the information in relation to the ETP. As mentioned above, it has
been observed in this respect that the absence of in formation is not indicative of absence of a problem
and that the scarce information available should be considered as an underestimation of the bycatch.797
It is also known that some fishing fleets refuse to take observers on board. 798 Therefore, we disagree
with the United States that "[i]f anything can be inferred from the absence of a 100 per cent observer
requirement to monitor marine mammal interactions in other fisheries is that in those fisheries there is
no problem such as the one in the ETP".799
7.557 We also note that the evidence suggests that observed dolphin mortality in the ETP, by
contrast, is low relative to population size. 800 Indeed, the United States acknowledges that the
observed annual dolphin mortality in the ETP "is not believed to be significant from a population
recovery perspective".801 In addition, most of the studies submitted by the parties also suggest that the

790 Exhibit MEX-5, p. xxi.
791 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 12.
792 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 30 (reporting that the percentage of the population of dolphins observed killed is
less than 0.1 per cent), p. 96 (indicating for instance that the estimate bycatch mortality for spinner dolphins in
this area is 1,500-3,000 dolphins which represents between 5 and 10 per cent of the population of this type of
dolphins in this area); see also, e.g., United States' firs t written submission, paras. 62-64 (noting that bycatch of
dolphins in the ETP stands apart from other fisheries in that three to six million dolphins are chased and
encircled each year when purse seine nets are intentionally set on them to catch tuna).
793 Exhibit MEX-5, pp. 29 and 114.
794 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 27.
795 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 28-29, 113.
796 United States' second written submission, para. 44 (emphasis added).
797 Exhibit MEX-5, p. vii.
798 Exhibit MEX-99, p. Ev 26.
799 United States' second oral statement para. 18.
800 Exhibit US-20, p. 12; Exhibit US-21, p. 10.
801 United States' response to Panel question No. 36, para. 89.

dolphin populations identified by the United States as depleted are recovering, 802 although they
disagree as to whether they are growing at suffici ently high rates. Nevertheless, the most recent
estimates show that "[o]ver the 8-year period from 1998-2006 all 3 of the officially depleted dolphin
stocks (coastal and northeastern offshore spo tted dolphins and eastern spinner dolphins) were
estimated to be growing at rates considered to be near the 4-8 per cent maximum possible for
dolphins".
803 The United States, while suggesting the possibility that uncertainty in abundance
estimates may mean that dolphin stocks are actually declining, notes that the most recent assessment
model estimates median annual population growth ra tes of northeastern offshore spotted dolphins and
eastern spinner dolphins of 1.7 per cent and 1.4 per cent per year, respectively. The United States also
notes, however, that this estimate is 2.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent below the expected annual
population growth rate, i.e. 4 per cent.
804
7.558 We also note that it has been suggested that factors other than purse-seine fishery-related
effects are hindering the growth rate of dolphin s stocks in the ETP. Evidence submitted by the
United States indicates that "it is unknown whether such low intrinsic growth rates are natural to these
species or whether the low rates are due to other factors impeding the recovery of these stocks".805

802 Exhibit US-4, p. 1; Exhibit US-19, p. 32.
803 Exhibit US-20, p. 12. The Panel notes that the United States has questioned Mexico's assertion that
this report stands for the proposition that the relevant dolphin populations are growing at rates near 4-8 per cent
and pointed out that the report gave several caveats that precluded dr awing that conclusion. First, the
United States submits that statistical and methodological constraints preclude a definitive conclusion as to
whether the higher estimates mean the populations have actually increased. Given the 95% confidence intervals
on the estimates of growth rate, it is possible that these stocks are declining, United States' first written
submission, para. 48, United States' second oral statement, para. 12, Exhibit US-20, p. 12-13. Second, the
United States also points out that this study indicat es that the apparent decrease in abundance of the
western/southern stock of offshore spotted dolphin is coincident with the apparent increase abundance of
northeastern offshore spotted dolphins, suggesting that dolphins could be moving across the geographic
boundaries, United States' first written submission, fn 49, United States' second oral statement, para. 12, Exhibit
US-20, p. 13. Finally, the United States submits that this report contains an abundance estimate and is not an
assessment model, United States' second oral statement, para. 11. The United States explains that because of
variability in and uncertainty surrounding point estimates of abundance, it is not possible to infer population
growth rates by looking at perceived trends in these point estimates over time. The United States further
explains that the rate at which dolphin populations are growing should be estimated using assessment models,
which can condition based on realistic population dynami cs, United States' response to Panel question No. 37,
para. 92, United States second oral statement, paras. 11-12, Exhibit US-20, p. 13. In this regard the Panel
observes that, because of the very nature of the issues this type of studies deal with, it appears to be extremely
difficult to arrive to an optimum level of absolute certainty. We are aware that the conclusions contained in
most of the studies submitted by the parties imply a certain margin of error. For instance, the study used by the
United States to support its argument that dolphin stoc ks in the ETP are not recovering, also includes certain
caveats and tempers its conclusions by "admitting that there is small probability that, relative to their respective
estimates … neither [the northeastern offshore spotted stock nor eastern spinner dolphins] stock was depleted in
2002", Exhibit US-21, p. 9. The Panel also observes that besides pointing out that this study is not an
assessment model, the United States did not submit any other reason indicating that the results provided in this
study were not reliable. Nor did the United States provide any evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
increase in the numbers of northeastern offshore spotted dolphins is due to a relocation of the western/southern
stock. Finally, the Panel notes the United States itself has also relied on it to support its own arguments, see e.g.
United States' first written submission, para. 47.
804 United States' response to Panel question No. 37, paras. 90-92. According to the United States
northeastern offshore spotted dolphins are growing at rates of 1.7% while eastern spinner dolphins growth rate is
1.4 per cent.
805 Exhibit US-21, page 10. One hypothesis is that northeastern offshore spotted and eastern spinner
dolphin populations are already at, or near, their ca rrying capacities (Exhibit US-19, page 32). Another
hypothesis is that after by catch due to the purse-seine fishery has b een reduced or eliminated, there is a lag

7.559 As described above, the United States has ar gued that any differences in documentation to
substantiate dolphin-safe claims are calibrated to th e risk that dolphins will be killed or seriously
injured when tuna is caught. In this context, the United States has emphasized the uniqueness of the
ETP in terms of the phenomenon of tuna-dolphin associati on, which is such that it is used widely on a
commercial basis and causes observed and unobserve d mortalities, which the United States argues are
fundamentally different from dolphin mortalities occu rring in other oceans. We are not persuaded,
however, that the United States has demonstrated that the requirements of the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are "calibrated" to the likelihood of injury, as it suggests.
7.560 We recall that under the US measures, inten tionally setting on dolphins disqualifies tuna
products from access to a dolphin-safe label, both in and outside the ETP. In these circumstances, it is
unclear to us why the requirement that no dolphin be killed or seriously injured in the sets in which
the tuna was caught would apply in respect of tuna caught by methods other than setting on dolphins
in the ETP but not outside the ETP, for access to the official label. Even assuming that, as we have
accepted earlier, setting on dolphins may result in observed and unobserved harmful effects on
dolphins, these are not the effects targeted by the additional requirement imposed, in respect of tuna
caught in the ETP, that no dolphin have been killed or seriously injured during the set (since, by
hypothesis, no setting on dolphins must have take n place, in order to qualify for the label).
Accordingly, the only types of adverse effects on dolphins that can be targeted by the additional
requirement applied in the ETP that no dolphin have been killed or seriously injured (applied in
addition to the requirement of not setting on dolphins) are those arising from incidental bycatch as a
result of fishing methods other than setting on dolphins. The United States does not explain,
however, why such incidental bycatch would be more likely to take place in the ETP than outside the
ETP, and justify a requirement that no dolphin be kille d or seriously injured with respect only to the
ETP.
7.561 Conversely, assuming for the sake of argument that the United States is correct in its assertion
that tuna and dolphins do not associate in other oceans as they do in the ETP, the need for maintaining
the requirement of absence of setting on dolphins woul d not be justified for fisheries other than the
ETP on the basis of the risks for dolphins, since there would be no possibility of exploiting such
interaction outside of the ETP on a commercial basis. To the extent that an incidental risk of death or
injury remains, due to other fishing methods, su ch risk could only be monitored by imposing a
different substantive requirement, i.e. that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets in
which the tuna was caught. Yet, the measures impose, for fisheries other than the ETP, a requirement
not to set on dolphins but no requirement that no dolphin have been killed or seriously injured, at least
for access to the official label. In light of the above, we are not persuaded that the requirements
applicable in different fisheries under the US dolphin safe measures are "calibrated", as the
United States suggests, to the likelihood of dolphins being killed or seriously injured.
7.562 Therefore, in light of the evidence presented in these proceedings, the Panel is not persuaded
that the threats arising from the use of fishing methods other than setting on dolphins to catch tuna
outside the ETP are insignificant, as the United States suggests, be it in terms of observed mortality or
serious injury, or even, in at least some cases, in terms of sustaina bility of the populations. Nor are
we persuaded that they are demonstrated to be lowe r than the similar threats faced by dolphins in the
ETP. As a result, granting access to dolphin-safe label to tuna products containing tuna caught in this
manner creates a genuine risk that consumers may be misled about whether that tuna was caught by
using a technique that does not adversely affect dolphins.

period before recovery begins (Exhibit US-19). One study has thus predicted that "a long-term, declining trend
in the biomass of large phytoplankton (e.g. diatoms) in the ETP will cause the biomass of dolphins to decline
regardless of potential fishery effects" (Exhibit US-21, page 11).

7.563 From these elements, we conclude that in relation to the first objective pursued by the
US dolphin-safe provisions, the US measures can only partially ensure that consumers are informed
about whether tuna was caught by using a method that adversely affects dolphins.806
7.564 This is in part because they could be misled in to thinking that a tuna product did not involve
injury or killing of a dolphin when this may in fact have been the case (if caught outside the ETP), and
also because, to the extent that the measures w ould guarantee an absence of killing with respect to
some tuna (caught in the ETP) but not others (caught outside the ETP), this creates ambiguity as to the
meaning of the guarantee provided by the label. Fu rthermore, although the United States submits that
the requirements for the alternative label differ from t hose of the official label, this difference would
also not allow the consumer to accurately distinguish between tuna that has and has not been caught in
a manner that adversely affects dolphins and create further confusion as to the meaning of the label
and thus create the potential to mislead the consumer.
Whether the alternative measure proposed by Mexico provides a reasonably available less-
trade restrictive means of achieving the same level of protection
7.565 The parties agree, and we concur, that the bur den of establishing prima facie the existence of
an alternative measure that would similarly fulfil the objectives of the United States rests on Mexico
as the complainant.807
7.566 Mexico has suggested that "a 'reasonably availa ble alternative measure' for the United States
would be to permit the use in the US market of the AIDCP 'dolphin-safe label'". 808 According to
Mexico, the objective of informing the consumer s can be accomplished by the AIDCP, since the
monitoring, tracking, verification and certification system under the AIDCP would allow the
consumers to have the assurances that no dolphin s were injured or killed during the capturing of
tuna.809
7.567 In the United States' view, neither the AIDCP (or measures implemented pursuant to it) nor
the AIDCP label constitutes a "reasonably availabl e alternative" that could fulfil the legitimate
objectives of the DPCIA provisions. 810 According to the United States, eliminating the DPCIA
provisions in lieu of the AIDCP would not fulfil the objective of contributing to the protection of
dolphins or ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether or not tuna products
contain tuna caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins. 811 The United States explains that
while the AIDCP has made an important contribution to dolphin protection, the US provisions further
contribute to protecting dolphins by ensuring the U.S. market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to
set on dolphins to catch tuna, which is a fishing t echnique that, in the United States' view, adversely
affects dolphins.

806 According to the evidence provided by Mexico , at least around 12% of the public in the
United States believes that dolphin-safe means that setting on dolphins were encircled and then released in the
capture of the tuna, Exhibit MEX-64.
807 United States' first written submission, para. 169; Mexico's response to Panel question No. 67,
808 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 134, para. 52.
809 Mexico's response to question 67 from the Panel, para. 238.
810 United States' first written submission, para. 170; United States' first oral statement, para. 48;
United States' response to question 37 from the Panel, paras. 91-2; United States' second written submission,
paras. 140 and 155.
811 United States' first written submission, paras. 170-1 72; United States' first oral statement, para. 48.
United States' second written submission, paras. 160-162.

7.568 We first note that the US dolphin-safe provisions do not formally restrict the importation or
sale of tuna or tuna products that are not labelle d dolphin-safe. However, as noted above, the parties
agree that the US public has a preference for tuna products that are dolphin-safe, and access to the
label is therefore a valuable advantage on the US ma rket. To the extent that the proposed alternative
would provide access to the label, and thus to this advantage, to a greate r range of tuna products,
including imported tuna products, it would be less-tr ade restrictive than the existing US measures, in
that it would allow greater competitive opportunities on the US market to those products.
7.569 We now consider whether this proposed a lternative is reasonably available to the
United States, to achieve the same level of pr otection as it currently achieves with the existing
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
7.570 In the Panel's view, Mexico has not suggested, as described by the United States, "eliminating
the DPCIA provisions in lieu of the AIDCP".
812 As we understand it, what Mexico suggests is that
the US dolphin-safe label and the AIDCP label shoul d be allowed to coexist on the US market in
order to provide fuller information to US consumers. In practical terms, this would entail that tuna
caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins coul d be labelled as complying with the AIDCP
requirements for dolphin-safe labelling, and sold in the US market, as long as it was harvested in
accordance with the AIDCP.
7.571 The AIDCP requirements for dolphin-safe la belling are based on compliance with the
Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certifi cation, which includes submitting an independent
observer's statement that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna
were caught.
813 Therefore, if tuna products labelled dolphin-safe according to the AIDCP were
allowed in the US market, US consumers buying these products would have the assurance that no
observed dolphin deaths or serious injuries occurred during the sets in which that tuna was caught.
They would also been assured that certain specific measures have been taken, in the process of setting
on dolphins to catch the tuna, in order to minimi ze incidental catches of dolphins. However,
consumers would not be assured that tuna products using this label do not contain tuna caught by
setting on dolphins, or that no unobserved negative effects on dolphins arose in this context.
7.572 As observed in the preceding section, insofar as the US dolphin-safe provisions do not require
a certification that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured in respect of tuna caught outside the
ETP, consumers can only be assured that such tuna , when labelled dolphin-safe, did not result in
unobserved adverse effects on dolphins. However, as discussed above, they would remain unsure
whether no dolphins were observed being killed or ser iously injured, insofar as the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions fail to impose the obligation to show that tuna caught outside of the ETP without
setting on dolphins involved no dolphin mortality or serious injury.
7.573 Thus, under both, the US measures and the AIDCP regime, consumers of tuna products would
bear a certain level of uncertainty whether dolphins were adversely affected during the catching of the
tuna contained in those products. Considering th at under the US measures, as we concluded above, it
is possible that tuna caught during a trip where dolphi ns were in fact killed or injured may be labelled
dolphin-safe; while under the AIDCP, a label woul d only be granted where no dolphins was killed,
but where certain unobserved adverse effects coul d nonetheless have been caused to dolphins, we
consider that the extent to which consumers would be misled as to the implications of the manner in
which the tuna was caught would not be greater if th e AIDCP label were allowed to co-exist with the
US dolphin-safe provisions, than it currently is under the existing measures.

812 United States' first written submission, para. 172.
813 Exhibit MEX-56.

7.574 In this respect, and bearing in mind the Unite d States' submission that its measures calibrate
the applicable requirements for the use of the dolphi n-safe label in accordance with the level of risk
faced by dolphins, we are not persuaded that a llowing consumers to be fully informed about the
efforts made in the context of the AIDCP for the protection of dolphins in fishing for tuna and the
monitoring of dolphin stocks in the ETP would be more misleading than allowing a dolphin-safe label
to be applied to tuna caught outside the ETP in the absence of any monitoring of observed or
unobserved killing or of dolphin populations.
7.575 Moreover, the Panel notes that Mexico goes be yond simply suggesting that the use of the
AIDCP dolphin-safe logo be allowed in the US market . Mexico submits that the coexistence of the
US and the AIDCP dolphin-safe labels, would perm it US consumers to be "fully informed of all
aspects of dolphin-safe fishing methods" (emphasis added) so that "they [could] choose accordingly
when purchasing tuna products from US retailers". 814 The Panel understands Mexico's suggestion as
advocating the inclusion of more information on th e dolphin-safe labels allowed in the US market on
the actual and potential fishery-re lated adverse effects on dolphins. 815 The Panel considers that such
addition would contribute to informing consumers about the precise dolphin-safe characteristics of the
various techniques used to harvest tuna. In our view, this would enhance the ability of the
dolphin-safe labels to remedy market failures aris ing from asymmetries of information between tuna
producers, retailers and final consumers in the US market. Well-informed consumers would be in a
better position to use their purchasing power to influence the way tuna fisheries and canners operate.
7.576 In such conditions, accepting the use of the AI DCP dolphin-safe label as a tool to provide
more precise information to US consumers would not imply that the United States should forego its
own dolphin-safe label. To the extent that the alternative suggested by Mexico implies conveying
more complete information to consumers, such alternative may have the potential to reduce the
possibilities of consumer deception more than the current US dolphin-safe label.
7.577 Therefore, the Panel concludes that allowing compliance with the dolphin-safe requirements
of the AIDCP dolphin-safe label in conjunction with the existing standard embodied in the
US dolphin-safe provisions would be at least as ap t to contribute to the objective of ensuring that
consumers are not misled about whether tuna has been caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins. Both the existing US measures and the alternative suggested by Mexico may reduce to
some extent, but do not eliminate, the possibilities of the US consumers being misled. Taking into
account the risks of non-fulfilment of the United States' objective if the AIDCP label was allowed, the
Panel concludes, accordingly, that the alternativ e measure suggested by Mexico does not entail a
greater risk of consumers being deceived than the US dolphin-safe provisions, as currently applied.
7.578 In light of all the above, we find that, in rela tion to the objective of consumer information,
Mexico has identified a less trade-restrictive alte rnative that would achieve a level of protection
equivalent to that achieved by the US measures, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would
create. Thus, the Panel concludes that Mexico h as demonstrated that the US dolphin-safe provisions
are more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil their objective of ensuring that consumers are not
misled about whether tuna products contain tuna th at was caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins, and the United States has not successfully re butted this claim. In reaching this conclusion,
the Panel has considered the available scientific and technical information, related processing
technology and the intended end-uses of tuna products.

814 Mexico's second written statement, para. 210; Mexico's second oral statement, para. 115.
815 The Panel recognizes that without additional in formation in the labels, the US and the AIDCP
dolphin-safe logos may be confused with one another.

(iii) Whether the US dolphin-safe provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to
contribute to the protection of dolphins by en suring that the US market is not used to
encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins
Arguments by the parties
7.579 Mexico claims that the US measures have no effect on encouraging foreign fishing fleets not
to set upon dolphins. Mexico argues that the US measures will not influence or modify the conduct of
the ETP tuna fishery so as to further preserve dolphi n stocks. According to Mexico, the US measures
do not add to that protection, particularly in respect of the actions of fishing fleets from countries that
are signatories to the AIDCP and that are already fishing in what Mexico considers as the most
environmentally responsible manner.
816
7.580 According to Mexico, all the US measures accomp lish is to block impor ts of tuna products
and tuna from those countries and, thereby, protect the US tuna industry. In Mexico's view, by
withdrawing the economic incentive for countries and fishing fleets to comply with the AIDCP, the
US measures undermine the viability of the AIDCP. Thus, Mexico concludes that undermining the
AIDCP does not fulfil the objective of preserving dolphin stocks in the ETP.
817
7.581 Mexico also submits that the key underlying factual premise of the Hogarth ruling is the
belief that dolphin stocks in the ETP were not re covering. According to Mexico, a recent study
commissioned by the US Department of Commerc e shows that dolphin populations in the ETP are
recovering.818 Moreover, Mexico submits that no scientific evidence supports the view that setting on
dolphins in a manner consistent with the AIDCP adversely affects dolphins from a stock sustainability
perspective.819 Therefore, Mexico concludes the c ourt ruling does not fulfil the objective of
preserving dolphin stocks in the ETP.820
7.582 Thus, Mexico argues that the US measures are based on conditions that existed in the late
1980s but which ceased to exist many years ago and that they provide no mechanism for the
United States to re-evaluate the status of mari ne mammal protection in the ETP based on the best
available evidence.821
7.583 Mexico also rejects the US argument that besides the observed dolphin injuries and
mortalities in the ETP, there are unobserved mortaliti es of dolphins due to the fishing practice of
setting on them. According to Mexico, the United States does not make projections about unobserved
mortalities for any fishery other than the ETP, even when other fisheries have been identified by the
United States as having high levels of mortality.822
7.584 Mexico claims that the United States does not apply the same multipliers to account for
alleged unseen mortalities in its own fisheries as it does for the ETP. According to Mexico, the
US analytical approach to evaluating dolphin populations incorporates a considerable amount of
speculation and unreliable assumptions. Mexico subm its that following the United States approach
would mean that unobserved mortalities are over 28 times greater than the observed mortalities of
about 1,200. Nonetheless, in Mexico's view, even if the US approach is a pplied, the best available

816 Mexico's first written submission, para. 211; Mexico's second written statement, para. 206.
817 Mexico's first written submission, para. 211; Mexico's second written statement, para. 206.
818 Mexico's first written submission, para. 211.
819 Mexico's second written submission, para. 204.
820 Mexico's first written submission, para. 211.
821 Mexico's second oral statement, para. 111; Mexico's response to question 86, para. 4.
822 Mexico's response to question 100 from the Panel, para. 43.

evidence is that dolphin mortalities in the ETP are ne gligible and do not affect populations of any of
the dolphin stocks.823
7.585 According to the United States, the US dolphin-safe provisions help protect dolphin
populations, by ensuring that the "dolphin-safe" label is not used on tuna products that contain tuna
caught by setting on dolphins. According to the Unite d States, to the extent customers choose not to
purchase tuna products without the dolphin-safe label, the US dolphin-safe provisions help ensure that
the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to set on dolphins. In the United States' view, as
the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna in the ETP decreases in frequency, the associated
adverse effects on dolphin populations decrease as well.
824
7.586 The United States argues that the most probable reason dolphin populations remain depleted
and show no clear signs of recovery is the practic e of setting dolphins to catch tuna and the many
adverse effects beyond immediate mortality or serious injury in the nets.825
7.587 The United States submits that setting on dolphins has significant adverse effects on
individual dolphins. 826 First, the United States argues that dolphin deaths are a foreseeable and
expected consequence of setting on dolphins to cat ch tuna, and this is why under the AIDCP each
vessel that wishes to fish for tuna in this way is assigned a set number of dolphins that it may be
observed killing each year. 827 Therefore, the United States claims that "it cannot be disputed that not
setting on dolphins to catch tuna affords greater protection to dolphins than setting on them".828
7.588 Second, the United States submits that the ob served dolphin mortalities and serious injuries
are only one of the many adverse effects of setting on dolphins to catch tuna. In the United States'
view, as long as dolphins are set upon to catch tuna, they will suffer the a dverse effects of that
practice.829 The United States accepts that the magnitude of observed dolphin mortality due to setting
on dolphins with purse seine nets has decreased significantly. 830 However, according to the
United States, the AIDCP does not address the many other adverse effects of setting on dolphins to
catch tuna, such as separation of dependent calv es from their mothers, reduced reproductive success
due to stress induced foetal mortality, acute car diac and muscle damage, cumulative organ damage,
compromised immune function and increased predation. 831 The United States points out that
speedboats and helicopters are used to encircle dolphins during setting on dolphins operations. 832
Thus, the US dolphin-safe provisions further contribute to protecting dolphins by ensuring that the
US market is not an incentive for fishing fleets to use fishing techniques that adversely affect
dolphins.
833

823 Mexico's second oral statement, paras. 105-107.
824 United States' first written submission, para. 158.
825 United States' response to question 66 from the Panel, para. 154.
826 United States' first written submission, paras. 49 -59; United States' second oral statement,
paras. 7-9.
827 United States' second written submission, para. 139.
828 United States' second written submission, para. 157.
829 United States' second written submission, para. 157.
830 United States' first written submission, para. 54.
831 United States' first written submission, para. 56; United States' second written submission,
paras. 139-40.
832 United States' second oral statement, para. 7; Mexico's response to question 99 from the Panel,
para. 40.
833 United States' first written submission, para. 170; United States' first oral statement, para. 48

Analysis by the Panel
7.589 For the purposes of determining whether the US dolphin-safe provisions are more
trade-restrictive than necessary to contribute to prot ecting dolphins by ensuring that the US market is
not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins", we
need first to ascertain the manner and extent to which these measures contribute to this objective, and
then consider whether the same level of protec tion could be achieved by the alternative measure
proposed by Mexico.
The contribution of the US dolphin-safe provisions to protecting dolphins, by ensuring that
the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins
7.590 In considering the contribution of the US dolphin-safe provisions to protecting dolphins by
ensuring that the US market is not used to encour age fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins, we first note that, as descr ibed earlier, the achievement of this objective is
in large part dependent on the successful achieveme nt of the first objective relating to consumer
information. Only if consumers are correctly guide d by the dolphin-safe label towards products that
contain tuna not caught using a fishing method that adversely affects dolphins, can the US measures
successfully avoid encouraging those fishing techniques.
7.591 We also note in this respect that this US objective goes beyond mere information, as it seeks
to provide a disincentive for certain behaviour, b ased on consumer choice. As described by the
United States itself, it is only "to the extent that consumers choose" to buy dolphin-safe products that
the measures will be able to ensure that the US market is not used to encourage the use of fishing
techniques harmful to dolphins.834
7.592 At the outset, we recall that we have alread y determined above that the US dolphin-safe
provisions can only partially achieve the objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled about
whether tuna was harvested by a method that adve rsely affects dolphins. It follows that the second
objective can only be partially fulfilled, at best: to the extent that the measures fail to allow the
consumer to accurately distinguish between tuna ca ught in conditions harmfu l to dolphins and other
tuna, the related fishing techniques cannot be discour aged or encouraged in a manner that accurately
reflects this distinction. With this in mind, we consider further the extent to which the US dolphin-
safe provisions contribute to protecting dolphins.
7.593 The Panel observes that the United States has ar ticulated its objective in general terms,
without making any distinctions among fisheries, su ggesting its intention to discourage the use of
harmful techniques in all tuna fisheries regardless of their location.
7.594 We recall that under the US measures, t una caught in the ETP may only be labelled
dolphin-safe if a certification is provided that no dolphins were set upon and, in addition , that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured. We also recall that the US measures allow virtually all tuna
harvested outside the ETP by using a method other than setting on dolphins to be labelled
dolphin-safe, without requiring a statement that no dol phins were killed or seriously injured, despite
indications that dolphins may be adversely affected by those fisheries.
7.595 We further recall that, as described above, the United States has also explained that in relation
to tuna that is intended to be labelled with an alternative label, it is n ecessary to certify that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured, wherever it was caught. However, as discussed earlier, it is

834 United States first written submission, paras. 146, 158.

not clear that this requirement is in fact enforced through the NOAA Form 370. In addition, as also
previously observed, if such a requirement is enfor ced, it would not modify the fact that access to the
official label is available without such certification.
7.596 As described above, Mexico c onsiders that the US measures effectively discourage rather
than encourage the efforts undertaken by signatories of the AIDCP to prevent the harmful effects of
setting in dolphins in the ETP. Mexico argues in pa rticular that the US m easures mistakenly assume
that dolphin populations in the ETP are depl eted. As discussed previously, however, the
US objectives in relation to dolphin protection are not limited to the conservation of dolphin
populations or to the avoidance of direct morta lity. They also encompass additional unobserved
incidental impacts of setting on dolphins. To the ex tent that denying a dolphin-safe label to any tuna
caught by setting on dolphins ensures that these unobserved impacts of setting on dolphins are not
encouraged, the US dolphin-safe provisions thus contribute to the United States' objective of not
encouraging fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
7.597 However, to the extent that the US measures allow the use of a dolphin-safe label for tuna
caught by any method other than setting on dol phins outside the ETP, without requiring any
certification in relation to whether a dolphin may have been killed or seriously injured, the
US dolphin-safe provisions do not ensure that the US market is not used to encourage fishing
techniques that adversely affect dolphins. As dete rmined above, the potential for dolphin mortality or
serious injury outside the ETP, in the course of fi shing operations using techniques other than setting
on dolphins, is not insignificant.
7.598 Moreover, the Panel notes that by granting acces s to the dolphin-safe label to tuna caught by
using fishing techniques that adversely affect dolphins outside the ETP, while at the same time
denying it to tuna caught in the controlled conditions of the AIDCP in the ETP, the US dolphin-safe
provisions may not only fail to discourage such harm ful fishing techniques, but may actually have the
opposite effect. Indeed, it seems that under the curren t implementation of the US measures, virtually
all tuna caught outside the ETP by using a method other than setting on dolphins may be labelled
dolphin-safe. Fisheries using these other techniques, knowing that their tuna is granted virtually
unrestricted access to the dolphin-safe label, have no incentive to adapt their fishing gear and
practices to address dolphin protection concerns. As we established earlier, the application of some of
these other techniques may result in the death of a co nsiderable number of dolphins and other marine
mammals around the world.
835 This means that, in practice, fleets wishing to have access to the
US market could be discouraged from setting on do lphins in the ETP under the regulated conditions
of the AIDCP and encouraged to relocate instead to other fisheries in which dolphins populations are
less closely monitored and where the incidental killing of dolphins is not monitored. We note in this
respect the following observations made in the report commissioned by NOAA, referred to
previously:
Cetaceans are "migratory." They spend sev eral months each year traveling from one
area to another, often covering vast distances in search of food, a particular climate,
or a safe breeding ground. From a c onservation and management perspective
migratory species are exposed to an arra y of threats because they do not confine
themselves to one location. Moreover, because they periodically cross through a
number of jurisdictions, the level of protection afforded to cetaceans fluctuates
according to their geographical location. Inevitably, migrating animals will pass

835 See paragraphs 7.520 to 7.531 above.

through jurisdictions where cetacean conserva tion is less of a priority than in other
areas.
836
7.599 For these reasons, the Panel concludes that th e US dolphin-safe provisions are capable of
protecting dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing practices that may
kill or seriously injure dolphins, only within the ETP. In other fisheries, the US measures are capable
of achieving their objective only in relation to the practices of setting on dolphins and using high seas
driftnets. However, in relation to all other fish ing techniques used outside the ETP, the US measures
are not able to contribute to the protection of dolphins. Therefore, the Panel concludes that
US measures may, at best, only partially fulfil their stated objective of protecting dolphins by ensuring
that the US market is not used to encourage fish ing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins.
7.600 As in relation to the first objective, we note that the United States has explained that the
difference in certification requirements between tuna caught in the ETP and tuna harvested in other
areas reflects a calibration of the likelihood that any given dolphin would interact with fishing gear
and accidentally be killed or seriously injured 837 and that the rationale behind these differences is the
existence of special conditions, such as regular a nd significant tuna-dolphin association and the fact
that dolphin populations in the ETP do not show clear signs of recovery in the ETP. 838 However, as
discussed in relation to the first objective, in light of the evidence presented in these proceedings, the
Panel is not persuaded the threats from tuna fish ing for dolphins outside the ETP are insignificant,
either in terms of observed mortality or serious in jury, or even, for at least some of populations, in
terms of sustainability of the popul ations or that the US measures calibrate the requirements to the
likelihood of interaction and harmful effects to dolphins.
Whether the alternative suggested by Mexico provides a reasonably available less trade
restrictive means of achieving the same level of protection
7.601 Having clarified the extent to which the US dolphin-safe provisions are able to contribute to
the protection of dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to
catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphi ns, we must now consider whether the alternative
measure proposed by Mexico would provide a less trade-restrictive means of achieving the same level
of protection.
7.602 Mexico submits that the objective of discouraging fishing techniques that affect dolphins can
also be accomplished by the AIDCP. According to Mexico, the dolphin set method administered by
the AIDCP provides the most comprehensive and ti ghtly regulated protection for dolphins and other
bycatch of any fleet in the world, including the US fleet. In addition, Mexico claims that the objective
of protecting dolphins has long been accomplished in the ETP through the AIDCP, which Mexico
considers to be the most successful multilateral agreement regarding effective dolphin protection.
839
7.603 In the United States' view, neither the AIDCP itself nor measures implemented pursuant to it
constitute a "reasonably available alternative" that could fulfil the legitimate objectives of the DPCIA
provisions. While the United States agrees that th e AIDCP has made an important contribution to

836 Exhibit MEX-5, p. v.
837 United States' second written submission, paras. 39-4 7. See the discussion of the adverse effects of
setting on dolphins in paragraphs 7.485-7.486, 7.587-7.588 above.
838 United States' second written submission, para. 42-43; United States' second oral statement,
para. 14
839 Mexico's response to question 67 from the Panel, paras. 239-40; Mexico's first oral statement,
para. 56.

dolphin protection in the ETP, in its view, despite the conservation measures called for under the
AIDCP, dolphin populations remain depleted and have not recovered.840
7.604 The United States accepts that the magnitude of observed dolphin mortality due to setting on
dolphins with purse seine nets has decreased significantly. 841 However, according to the
United States, the AIDCP does not address the many other adverse effects of setting on dolphins to
catch tuna, such as separation of dependent calv es from their mothers, reduced reproductive success
due to stress induced foetal mortality, acute car diac and muscle damage, cumulative organ damage,
compromised immune function and increased predation. 842 The United States points out that
speedboats and helicopters are used to encircle dolphins during setting on dolphins operations. 843 As
discussed earlier, the United States submits that setti ng on dolphins has significant adverse effects on
individual dolphins. 844 The United States claims that "it cannot be disputed that not setting on
dolphins to catch tuna affords greater protection to dolphins than setting on them". 845 I n t h e
United States' view, as long as dolphins are set upon to catch tuna, they will su ffer the adverse effects
of that practice.846
7.605 The United States observes that the AIDCP does not contain provisions aimed at discouraging
the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna. Thus, in the United States' view, the AIDCP is not a
substitute for provisions that seek to protect dolphi ns by discouraging the practice of setting on them
to catch tuna.847
7.606 The United States claims that the DPCIA provisions together with the measures called for
under the AIDCP and other provisions of US law form part of a comprehensive US strategy to protect
dolphins. Thus, the United States claims that substituting the DPCIA provisions for measures called
for under the AIDCP would reduce the overall ability of the United States to protect dolphins.848
7.607 The Panel first recalls that the alternative measure suggested by Mexico would allow the
coexistence of the US and the AIDCP dolphin-safe labe ls in the US market, with the aim of providing
the US consumers with more detailed information a bout the dolphin-safe implications of the fishing
methods employed to catch the tuna contained in those products. As noted above, Mexico does not
suggest replacing the US dolphin-safe provisions in their entirety with the AIDCP regime. Nor could
the provisions of the AIDCP be applicable in other fisheries to countries that are not parties to this
treaty.
7.608 We have already concluded that the US dolphin- safe provisions are capable of contributing to
the protection of dolphins in the ETP by discourag ing the practice of setting on dolphins and other

840 United States' first written submission, para. 170; United States' first oral statement, para. 48;
United States' response to question 37 from the Panel, paras. 91-2; United States' second written submission,
paras. 140 and 155.
841 United States' first written submission, para. 54.
842 United States' first written submission, para. 56; United States' second written submission,
paras. 139-40.
843 United States' second oral statement, para. 7; Mexico's response to question 99 from the Panel,
para. 40.
844 United States' first written submission, paras. 49 -59; United States' second oral statement,
paras. 7-9. See the discussion of the adverse effects of setting on dolphins in paras. 7.485-7.486 and 7.587-
7.588.
845 United States' second written submission, para. 157.
846 United States' second written submission, para. 157.
847 United States' second written submission, para. 157.
848 United States' first written submission, para. 171; United States' second written submission,
para. 157.

fishing methods that may cause dolphin deaths or injuries. On the other hand, since tuna caught by
setting on dolphins may be labelled dolphin-safe un der the AIDCP, Mexico's alternative would not
discourage the use of this practice in the ETP. To that extent, any adverse effects on dolphins of
setting on them that are not addressed by the AIDCP regime would not be discouraged.
7.609 It is undisputed that the application of the AI DCP controls has played a decisive role in the
considerable reduction of dolphin mortalities in the ETP in the last decades.
849 Annual estimate of
dolphin mortality in the ETP in 1986 was 132,169 ma rine mammals, whereas the estimate in 2008
was 1,169 individuals. 850 As noted above, the United Stat es recognizes that the observed dolphin
mortalities as a result of setting on dolphins in th e ETP are approximately 1,200 dolphins per year. 851
Furthermore, the Panel observes that the majority of sets on dolphins in the ETP these days produce
zero observed dolphin mortalities. In 2008, for instance, in 92 per cent of the sets on dolphins in the
ETP no incidental mortalities of dolphins were observed to have occurred.852
7.610 Improvements in the fishing gear and methods may considerably reduce the risks arising from
setting on dolphins. 853 Mexico has explained that some of these adaptations have already been
adopted in the ETP under the AIDCP. 854 According to the Committee on Reducing Porpoise
Mortality from Tuna Fishing established by the US National Academy of Science, small and major
modifications to the gear and techniques may be adopted to further reduce dolphin mortality. 855
Moreover, the same Committee has indicated that "i mprovement in captain performance is the single
most important step that can be taken to reduce dolphin mortality in the ETP purse-seine fishery".856
7.611 Moreover, the AIDCP establishes overall dolphi n mortality limits (DMLs) for the fleets
fishing for tuna in the ETP (5,000 individuals). In recent years, these limits have not been met. 857
The Panel also notes that the AIDCP has establishe d certain mechanisms to enforce these limits.
Under the AIDCP observer program 100 per cent of the trips are monitored by an independent
observer.
858 The AIDCP has also established an Interna tional Review Panel (IRP) that monitors the
compliance by the vessels operating in the ETP with requirements and controls established by the
AIDCP.859 Finally, under the System for Tracking and Verifying Tuna of the AIDCP, each party
establishes its own tracking and verification progra mme, implemented and operated by a designated
national authority, which includes periodic audits and spot checks for caught, landed, and processed

849 Exhibit MEX-5, p. 31, Exhibit US-24, pp. 22-23.
850 Exhibit US-24, p. 52.
851 United States' second written submission, para. 2.
852 Exhibit US-24, page 23. Already in 1992, only 0.5% of dolphins encircled in the purse-seine net
sets monitored by the NMFS were injured or killed, Exhibit MEX-2, page 19.
853 Exhibit MEX-2, page 110.
854 This methods include: (i) backing down the edges of the nets to create a channel through which the
dolphins may escape, (ii) using divers and personnel in sm all boats to assist the dolphins, (iii) covering the top
portion of the purse seine with a skirt of mesh that pr events dolphins from catching their beaks or heads in the
net in the event of a net "canopy", and (iv) prohibiting fi shing after sundown to ensure that dolphins within the
net can be seen, Mexico's first written submission para. 29.
855 Exhibit MEX-2, pages 72-90.
856 Exhibit Mex-02, page 10.
857 Exhibit US-24, page 26.
858 The IATTC's international observer program and the national observer programs of Colombia,
Ecuador, the European Union, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pa nama and Venezuela constitute the AIDCP On-Board
Observer Program, Exhibit US-24, P. 23.
859 During 2008, the IRP consisted of 20 members: the 14 participating governments that have accepted
the Agreement, and 6 representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 3 from environmental
organizations and 3 from the tuna industry, Exhibit US-24, p. 26.

tuna products.860 Should the mortalities of the fleet of an y party to the AIDCP meet or exceed the
total amount of DML distributed, fishing for tuna in association with dolphins must cease for all
vessels operating under the jurisdiction of that party.
861
7.612 On the basis of the above, we conclude that, when conducted under "controlled"
circumstances, e.g. in accordance with the require ments of the AIDCP, the adverse effects of setting
on dolphins in the form of observed dolphin mortality or serious injury may be considerably reduced.
In addition, compliance with the AIDCP dolphin- safe labelling requirements includes a requirement
that no dolphin has been killed or seriously injured in sets in which the tuna was caught. Therefore,
allowing compliance with the AIDCP labelling requirements to be advertised on the US market would
discourage observed dolphin mortality resulting fro m setting on dolphins to the same extent as the
existing US dolphin-safe provisions do and would invol ve no reduction in the level of protection in
this respect.
7.613 However, as described earlier, the US objec tives also include an intention to minimize
unobserved consequences of setting on dolphins. Su ch adverse effects would not be discouraged
through the AIDCP labelling requirements, which allows setting on dolphins. We also note that,
according to the United States, these unobserved effect s are responsible for the fact that the dolphin
populations in the ETP remain depleted. Therefore, to the extent that it would not discourage these
unobserved effects of setting on dolphins and their potential consequences on dolphin populations
within the ETP, the use of the AIDCP labelling re quirements as the exclusive basis for a dolphin-safe
label could potentially provide a lesser degree of protection than the existing US dolphin-safe
provisions, which disqualify setting on dolphins entirely for access to the dolphin-safe label.

However, we note that, as observed above, othe r fishing techniques may also have adverse
consequences on dolphins. As discussed above, the evidence before the Panel suggests that significant
dolphin mortality also arises outside the ETP from the use of other techniques than setting on
dolphins, and that some of the affected dolphin populations may be at risk as a result. The Panel notes
in this respect the example of a Japanese driftnet fishery for albacore that was observed to have a
dolphin mortality rate of three animals per net.
862 In contrast, as previously mentioned, the vast
majority of the dolphin sets in the ETP are zero-kills.863
7.614 As also discussed above, the US dolphin-safe measures do not address such adverse impacts,
and thus do not discourage the use of such fishing techniques, in respect of tuna caught outside the
ETP. To the extent that they may encourage relocation from the ETP to other areas where such
adverse effects arise but where access to the label is not subjected to certification that no dolphin was
killed or seriously injured in the course of the trip , the US measures as currently applied (i.e. in the
absence of any determination of regular and signifi cant mortality outside the ETP pursuant to Section
1385(d)(1)(D) of the DPCIA) may even have the e ffect of encouraging the development of such
fishing techniques without seeking to monitor and re duce the level of incidental killings and other
harmful effects on dolphins.
7.615 In these conditions, we are not persuaded that allowing compliance with the AIDCP
requirements to be advertised in addition to the ex isting US standard would lead to a lower level of
protection than is currently provided under the US dolphin-safe provisions. As established above, in
some cases, the risks arising from setting on dol phins under controlled circumstances may be lower

860 This system also includes mechanisms for communication and cooperation between and among
national authorities, Exhibit US-24, p. 26.
861 See Mexico's second written submission, para.67 and MEX-110
862 See Exhibit MEX-2, p. 101.

than the risks arising from other fishing techniqu es applied without controlling for dolphin mortality
or other adverse impacts.
7.616 This conclusion is not modified by the fact that access to alternative labels under the
US measures are subjected to the additional require ment that no dolphin was killed even for tuna
caught outside the ETP, since this would not modify the fact that access to the US official label,
which provides the same advantage on the US market as an alternative label, is available without a
requirement that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured.
7.617 We are mindful of the United States' submissi on that its measures calibrate the applicable
requirements for the use of the dolphin-safe label in accordance with the level of risk faced by
dolphins. However, as discussed in the context of our earlier consideration of this issue in relation to
the first US objective, we are not persuaded, based on the evidence presented to us, that at least some
of the dolphin populations affected by fishing t echniques other than setting on dolphins are not facing
risks at least equivalent to those currently faced by dolphin populations in the ETP under AIDCP
monitoring.
7.618 In light of all the above, the alternative s uggested by Mexico does not seem to create greater
risks to dolphins in the ETP than those accepted by the United States under the challenged measures
in relation to other fishing techniques used outsi de the ETP. Thus, we consider that Mexico's
alternative would achieve a level of protecti on equal to that achieved by the US dolphin-safe
provisions outside the ETP, as currently applied. As mentioned above in relation to the objective of
consumer information, we note that this does not im ply, in our view, that the different conditions for
compliance with the US and the AIDCP label could not be made clear, to allow the consumer the
benefit of full information in this respect.
7.619 Recalling our conclusion that the alternative submitted by Mexico is less trade-restrictive than
the US dolphin-safe provisions, we therefore conclude that Mexico has identified a reasonably
available less-trade restrictive alternative that w ould meet the level of protection achieved by the
US measures in relation to the objective of contributing to the protection of dolphins by ensuring that
the US market is not used to encourage fishing to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins. In reaching this conclusion, we have taken into account the available scientific and
technical information, related processing technology and the end-uses of tuna products.
(iv) Conclusion
7.620 In light of our determinations above in relation to both objectives of the US dolphin-safe
provisions, we find that these measures are more tr ade-restrictive than n ecessary to fulfil their
legitimate objectives, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Consequently, the
Panel finds that the US dolphin-safe provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.621 As described above, we make this determina tion taking into account our finding that the
US dolphin-safe measures, as applied, only partly address the adverse effects on dolphins of tuna
fishing that the United States has identified as relevant it the context of its objectives of informing
consumers and contributing to the protection of dolphi ns in relation to the impact of such fishing
techniques. Specifically, the US dolphin-safe pr ovisions do not address observed mortality, and any
resulting adverse effects on dolphin populations, for t una not caught by setting on dolphins or high
seas driftnet fishing outside the ETP. Similarly, the proposed AIDCP dolphin-safe standard which
Mexico identified as part of its proposed alternative measure would also not address the entirety of the
adverse effects identified by the United States, insofar as it would not address unobserved mortalities
from setting on dolphins, and any resulting adverse effects on dolphin populations.

7.622 We also recall, in this context, our determina tion that the choice of the level of protection to
be achieved in pursuance of the legitimate object ives identified is the prerogative of the Member
taking the measures, and we therefore make no determination as to what might be an appropriate level
of protection to achieve in relation to the objectives identified by the United States for the information
of consumers and the protection of dolphins in relation to the manner in which tuna is caught.
7.623 Finally, we note that, as reflected in our anal ysis above, our findings take into account the
information, including scientific information concerni ng the effects of tuna fishing on dolphins that is
available to us for the purposes of these proceedi ngs. From these elements, it appears that a number
of aspects of this issue are not fully documented and that further research may be necessary in order to
ascertain the exact situation in various areas.
4. Whether the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement
7.624 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that:
"Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them,
as a basis for their technical regulations ex cept when such international standards or
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems."
7.625 Mexico argues the US dolphin-safe labelling meas ures are not based on an existing relevant
international standard for the following reasons: (i ) a relevant international standard exists (the
"AIDCP standard"); (ii) the United States has failed to base its regulation on that international
standard; and (iii) the relevant international standard is not an ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued. 864 The United States has failed to base its measures
on the international standard, Mexico argues, becau se, it contemplated the application of the AIDCP
Standard but rejected its application in favour of a unilateral standard, a " setting of nets on dolphins"
standard.865
7.626 The United States first considers that the AIDCP resolutions cited by Mexico do not set out a
relevant international standard. Secondly, it argues that the use of the definition of dolphin-safe in the
AIDCP resolution would neither be effective nor appropriate to fulfil the objectives of the
US labelling provisions, clarifying that it is for Me xico to show that the relevant international
standard it identifies would be effective and appr opriate in meeting the objective pursued by the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.866
(a) Overall approach
7.627 The elements of a violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement were addressed by the
Appellate Body in EC – Sardines. In that case, although the pane l and the Appellate Body followed
the same approach in their assess ment of Peru's claim under Article 2.4. They first considered
whether the alleged international st andard was indeed a "relevant in ternational standard" within the
meaning of Article 2.4, then they analysed whether the relevant inte rnational standard had been used
"as a basis for" the EC regulation challenged by Pe ru; finally the third element considered was the

864 Mexico's first written submission, para. 228.
865 Mexico's first written submission, para. 245.
866 United States' first written submission para. 178.

"ineffectiveness or inappropriateness" of the relevant international standard for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued.
867 We find this approach to be c onsistent with the terms and structure
of Article 2.4. Accordingly, we find it appropriate to examine Mexico's claim under Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement on the basis of the following three elements:
 – the existence or imminent completion of a relevant international standard;

 – whether the international standard h as been used as a basis for the technical
regulation; and

 – whether the international standard is an ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, taking into account fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.

7.628 We also note that, in addressing the allocation of burden of proof under this provision, the
Appellate Body held that the complaining party had to prove that the alleged international standard
had not been used as a basis for the challenged regula tion and that it also had to show that the alleged
international standard was effec tive and appropriate to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the
regulation.
868
7.629 We therefore now consider the three elements identified above in orde r to determine whether
Mexico has demonstrated that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not based on a relevant
international standard in violation of Article 2.4. Specifically, we will consider:
 – whether the "AIDCP standard" constitu tes a relevant international standard;

 – whether the United States has used it as a basis for its dolphin-safe labelling
provisions; and

 – whether it is an effective and appropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate
objectives pursued by the United States.

(b) Whether the "dolphin-safe" definition cont ained in the AIDCP Tuna Tracking System
Resolution is a relevant international standard
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.630 In its first written submission, Mexico explaine d that the parties to the AIDCP adopted in
2001 the "Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna" which
contains the following definitions:

867 See Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.61-7.139 and Appellate Body Report, paras. 217-291.
868 "Similarly, the circumstances envisaged in the second part of Article 2.4 are excluded from the
scope of application of the first part of Article 2.4. Accordingly, as with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement, there is no 'general rule-exception' relationship between the first and the second parts of
Article 2.4. Hence, in this case, it is for Peru – as the complaining Member seeking a ruling on the
inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement of the measure applied by the European Communities – to
bear the burden of proving its claim. This burden includes establishing that Codex Stan 94 has not been used 'as
a basis for' the EC Regulation, as well as establishing that Codex Stan 94 is effective and appropriate to fulfil
the 'legitimate objectives' pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation." Appellate Body
Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 274-275.

 – Dolphin-safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which there is no mortality or serious
injury of dolphins;

 – Non-dolphin-safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which mortality or serious injury of
dolphins occurs.
869

7.631 Further, Mexico explains that the parties to the AIDCP also adopted the "Resolution To
Establish Procedures For AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification" and that that document states the
"[t]he terms used in this document are as define d in the AIDCP System for Tracking and Verification
of Tuna"; therefore Mexico notes that the AIDCP's definitions of "dolphin-safe" and "non-
dolphin-safe" apply with respect to the AIDCP's rules on dolphin-safe certification.870
7.632 Following the Panel's reasoning in EC – Sardines, Mexico observes that before addressing the
question of whether an international standard is relevant, it must first be determined that an
international standard exists.871 Mexico referred to the definition of "standard" provided in Annex 1.2
of the TBT Agreement:
"Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristi cs for products or related processes and
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method."
7.633 According to Mexico the definition of "dolphin -safe" contained in the AIDCP Resolution to
Adopt the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna
872 is an international standard
within the meaning of Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agre ement for of the following reasons: (i) the AIDCP
provides for common and repeated use, rules, gui delines or characteristics for products or related
processes and production methods because it provides rules expressly dealing with the
characterization of tuna as dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe 873, (ii) compliance with the AIDCP
dolphin-safe certification is not mandatory and Secti on 2.1 of the Resolution To Establish Procedures
For the AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification wh ich provides that "Application of the procedures
for the use of the AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate shall be voluntary for each Party, especially
in the event that they may be inconsis tent with the national laws of a Party" 874 and (iii) the AIDCP
Standard was prepared and approved by the AIDCP member governments, which constitute a
recognized body according to the sixth edition of th e ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 which defines the terms
used in the TBT Agreement according to Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement.875 Mexico notes that:
"[T]he 1991 Guide states in Article 4.1 that a 'body' is defined as a '[l]egal or
administrative entity that has specific task s and composition.' The AIDCP fits this
definition. Article 4.2 states that an 'organi zation' is defined as a '[b]ody that is based

869 Mexico's first written submission, para. 229.
870 Mexico's first written submission, para. 230.
871 ( footnote original ) Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines ,
WT/DS231/R and Corr.1, adopted. (Mexico's first written submission, fn 151).
23 October 2002, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 7.63.
872 Mexico refers to the definition as the "AIDCP Standard". See Mexico's first written submission,
fn 149.
873 Mexico's first written submission, para. 234.
874 Mexico's first written submission, para. 235.
875 Mexico notes that the TBT Agreement does not defined "recognized body" but that Annex I of the
TBT Agreement establishes that the terms of the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991when used in the
TBT Agreement shall be given the same meaning.

on the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an established constitution
and its own administration.' The AIDCP also fits this definition, as it is composed of
governments and is administered by the secretariat of the IATTC."
876
7.634 Mexico notes that a "standardizing body" under Article 4.3, is a "[b]ody that has recognized
activities in standardization" and that under Article 1.1, "standardization" is "[a]ctivity of establishing,
with regard to actual or potential problems, provi sions for common and repeated use, aimed at the
achievement of an optimum degree of order in a given context." 877 Mexico also recalls the definition
of a "provision" of Article 7.1 of the ISO/IEC Gu ide which is an "[e]xpression in the content of a
normative document, that takes the form of a statement , an instruction, a recommendation, or a
requirement."878
7.635 Taking all these elements into account, Mexico conc ludes that "the characterization of tuna as
dolphin-safe is an activity that falls within the defi nition of a 'provision' suitable for 'standardization',
and the AIDCP organization is a 'recognized body' for purposes of the definition of a 'standard' in
Annex I.2 of the TBT Agreement. For these reasons, the AIDCP Standard falls within the definition
of "standard" contained in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement."879
7.636 The United States in turn argues that "the de finition of 'dolphin-safe' in the AIDCP tuna
tracking resolution Mexico cites does not constitute a relevant international standard within the
meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement as it is not (1) a standard; (2) international; or (3)
relevant."880
7.637 The United States observes that as the "relevant international standard" for the purpose of its
claims under Article 2.4, Mexico cites the definiti on of "dolphin-safe" in an AIDCP resolution:
Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna which states that "the
terms used in this document are defined as follows" and includes in the list of those terms a definition
for "dolphin-safe". The United States also observ es that Mexico cites a second AIDCP resolution:
"Resolution to Establish Procedures for AIDCP Do lphin Safe Tuna Certification" and that it
characterizes this resolution as setting out the "A IDCP's rules on dolphin-safe certification". The
United States specifies that this resolution defines the term "AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate"
for the purposes of the resolution as a "[d]ocumen t issued by the competent national authority,
evidence of the dolphin-safe status of tuna and t una products, in accordance with the AIDCP System
for Tracking and Verification of Tuna."881
7.638 The United States first notes that the definiti on in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolution does
not meet the definition of a "standard" in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement because it does not set out
"rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods"; it sets
out a definition for purposes of an intergovernmental agreement. The United States contends that the
definition does not itself establish any rules, guidelin es or characteristics for products or their related
processes and production methods, or aspects covered under the second sentence of the definition of a

876 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 233-237.
877 Mexico's first written submission, para. 238.
878 (footnote original) Pursuant to Article 3.1, a "normative document" is a "Document that provides
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results." Article 7.2 provides that a "statement" is a
"Provision" that conveys information, while Article 7.3 provides that an "instruction" is a "Provision that
conveys an action to be performed." Pursuant to Article 7.4, a "recommendation" is a "Provision that conveys
advice or guidance," while Article 7.5 pr ovides that a "requirement" is a "Pro vision that conveys criteria to be
fulfiled." (Mexico's first written submission, fn 153).
879 Mexico's first written submission, paras. 238-239.
880 United States' first written submission, para. 182.
881 United States' first written submission, para. 181.

technical regulation, such as labelling requirements. 882 The United States argues that the definition in
the AIDCP resolution, simply defines a term and while the tuna tracking resolution more broadly
seeks to establish procedures to track tuna, Mexico does not appear to be arguing that the resolution
constitutes the "rules" at issue but that the definition itself sets out such "rules".883
7.639 Secondly, the United States argues that the "dolphin-safe" definition in the tuna tracking
resolution is not "for common and repeated use". 884 The United States further argued that to construe
the definition of "dolphin safe" in the AIDCP resolution as a standard for "common and repeated use"
would expand the scope of the definition of a "standa rd" and have serious implications with respect to
Members' rights and obligations under any intergovernmental agreement.885
7.640 The third reason the United States invokes in support of its argument is that the
"dolphin-safe" definition in the tuna tracking resolution is not contained in a "document approved by a
... body". It holds that the AIDCP tuna tracking resolution (as well the AIDCP dolphin-safe
certification resolution) is a document approved by the parties to the AIDCP, and neither the AIDCP
nor the parties to it constitute a "body" (i.e. a "legal or administrative entity that has specific tasks and
composition").
886 The United States points out that the AI DCP is an inter-governmental agreement
and that countries are parties to, not members of , the AIDCP. The United States asserts that, even
assuming arguendo that the AIDCP was a "body", it does not have recognized activities in
standardization and therefore would not constitute a "recognized" body.887
7.641 Finally, the United States argues that the de finition in the AIDCP tuna tracking resolution
does not qualify as "international" insofar as the r esolution has only been adopted by the 14 countries
parties to the AIDCP. It notes that despite the AIDCP being open to ratification by other countries, its
accession is still limited to countries meeting certain criteria. 888 Recalling that the term "international
standard" is defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 as "[s]tandard that is adopted by an international
standardizing/standards organization and made availa ble to the public," and that the TBT Agreement
defines "international body" as a "body ... whose member ship is open to the relevant bodies of at least
all Members", the United States holds that read together, an international standard is adopted by a
body whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members, and yet the AIDCP is
not open for any Member to join. 889 Assuming arguendo that the AIDCP were a "body", neither the

882 United States' second written submission, para. 170.
883 United States' first written submission, para. 183.
884 The United States explains that the word "common" in the definition of a standard refers to a rule,
guideline or characteristic of general application and a rule, guideline, or characteristic that is for common and
repeated use would not be one that was drafted for the specific purpose of defining a term in an international
agreement, and that the AIDCP does not purport to establish a definition of "dolphin safe" for application
outside the context of the AIDCP resolutions. Unite d States' second written submission, paras. 171-172;
United States' answers to Panel question No. 33, paras. 74-76
885 For example, the United States argues, it woul d mean that any time a Member agreed to the
definition of a term for purposes of an intergovernmental agreement, it would have an obligation to use that
definition as the basis for its technical regulations, ev en for example, where the intergovernmental agreement
expressly states that no party has an obligation to implement that definition for purposes of domestic law.
United States' second written submission, para. 172; United States' answers to Panel question No. 33, para. 77
886 United States' first written submission, fn 197.)
887 It stresses that the objectives of the AIDCP and the activities parties take pursuant to it are
fundamentally different from those of bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) or ASTM
International that have as their core function the development of standards. United States' first written
submission, para. 185.
888 (i) with a coastline bordering the ETP; (ii) that are a member of the IATTC; or (iii) whose vessels
fished for tuna in the ETP between 21 May 1998 and 14 May 1999.
889 United States' first written submission, paras. 186-187.

AIDCP nor resolutions adopted by its parties qualify as international within the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
7.642 In the absence of a definition of the term "i nternational standard" in the TBT Agreement , the
Panel invited the parties to clarify this term for the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
The United States explained that, by virtue of th e chapeau of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement the
terms of the TBT Agreement had the same meani ng as given in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC
Guide 2: 1991. It also noted th at the ISO/IEC Guide in turn defi nes an "international standardizing
organization" as a standardizing organization "whose membership is open to the relevant national
body from every country"
890 and "organization" as a "body" and that Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement
provides in paragraph 4 that an "international body" is a "body ... whose membership is open to the
relevant bodies of at least all Members". The Un ited States also observed that in paragraph 2
(explanatory note) that "[s]tandards prepared by the international standardization community are
based on consensus". In light of these definitions the United States concluded that "an international
standard is a standard that is (i) adopted by a body whose membership is ope n to the relevant bodies
of at least all Members, (ii) based on con sensus and (iii) made available to the public". 891 It further
noted that this interpretation of the term "interna tional standard" was consistent with the work of
Members since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and particularly with the 2000 Decision of the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on Prin ciples for the Development of International
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relati on to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the [TBT]
Agreement
892 that sets out principles and procedures th at standardizing bodies should observe when
developing international standards, guides and recommendations.
7.643 Mexico agrees that the ISO/IEC Guide definiti on of "international standard" is applicable by
virtue of Annex I of the TBT Agreement.893 It further notes that the 1991 Guide defines "international
standardizing organization" as a "Standardizing organization whose membership is open to the
relevant national body from every country" and th at a standardizing body is a "Body that has
recognized activities in standardization". 894 However, Mexico submits that the concept of
"international standard" should be applied flexibly to suit the circumstances of a particular situation. It
illustrates that statement with the example of the Institute of Electronics Engineers and SAE
International, Mexico asserts that these organizatio ns are engaged in setting international standards
despite the fact that they have as members individuals and not governments. Mexico adds that it is not
clear that the TBT Agreement was intended to ex clude the standards of those organizations from
being treated as "international standards" even though those entities are not open to WTO members as
such.895 Finally Mexico points out to that the use of national standards by developed countries to
create non-tariff barriers to import from developing countries is a growing source of concern for the
WTO system and that Article 2.4 is an important tool in ensuring that standards are adopted and
applied in a trade-neutral manner.
896
7.644 With regard to the United States' contention th at the AIDCP should not be considered as a
"recognized body" insofar as it does not have recognized activities in standardization, Mexico replied
that the United States had not explained what it considered to be "recognized activities" in
standardization and that the AIDCP is not only a recognized body but the recognized body for the

890 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, para. 4.3.2.
891 United States' response to Panel question No. 59, para. 135.
892 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the D evelopment of Internati onal Standards, Guides
and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, G/TBT/1/Rev.9, pp. 37-39.
893 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 59, paras. 184-185.
894 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 59, para. 186.
895 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 59, para. 187.
896 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 59, para. 188.

setting of standards relating to the protection of dol phins in the ETP insofar as its main role is to
establish rules and procedures – i.e., standards – governing the interaction between fishing and
dolphins. It notes that the members of the AIDCP have issued the Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin
Safe Tuna Certification which are directly applicable to the subject of this dispute. It also holds that
the AIDCP has issued a number of other standard s, including Procedures for Maintaining the AIDCP
List of Qualified Captains, Technical Guidelin es to Prevent High Mortality During Sets on Large
Dolphin Herds, and Guidelines for Required Raft for the Observation and Rescue of Dolphins and
that the core function of the AIDCP is to establish procedures to be followed by the commercial fleets
of the individual nations that are members of the AIDCP.897
7.645 As for the characteristics that a body must me et to produce "international standards" within
the meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agre ement Mexico, recalling that Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement defines an "international body or system" to be a "[b]ody or system whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members", notes that Annex 1 also defines
"regional body", "central government body", "l ocal government body" and "non-governmental body"
and that, accordingly, participation in the "body or system" by central government – as is the case for
the AIDCP - is sufficient to meet the qualification test for "relevant bodies". 898 Noting that "body" is
not defined in the TBT Agreement, Mexico recalls th at the 1991 Guide states in Article 4.1 that a
"body" is defined as a "[l]egal or administrative entity that has specific tasks and composition." It
argues that Article 4.2 states that an "organizatio n" is defined as a "[b]ody that is based on the
membership of other bodies or individuals an d has an established constitution and its own
administration." According to Mexico national governments of course are "bodies", and the AIDCP is
based on government's membership. It explains th e AIDCP has its own administration, which is
implemented by the Secretariat of the IATTC and that AIDCP system operates in conformity with the
2000 TBT Committee decision.
899 Mexico concludes that the AIDCP has the characteristics
appropriate for a body to produce international standards.900
7.646 In light of the definition of international standa rd, the United States contends that in order for
a standard developed by a body to be international that body must (i) permit at least all Members to be
members of that body, (ii) have developed the standard based on consensus, and (iii) made the
standard publicly available. Therefore, determining whether a particular standard is "international"
involves determining, in its view, not only whet her the body that developed the standard is
"international" but also whether the standard was adopted by consensus and made publicly
available.901
7.647 In response to a question by the Panel, Mexico observed that if negotiators of the
TBT Agreement had intended that "recognized body" have the exact same meaning as "standardizing
body" as defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, they would have used the same term. 902 It also
asserted that the core purpose of the AIDCP organiza tion – which is composed of the member central
governments acting collectively, and is administered by the secretariat of the IATTC – is to establish
standards for tuna fishing to protect marine mamm als and that there is no support for the US claim
that the AIDCP organization is not a "recognized" or "standardizing" body for establishing when tuna
caught in the ETP is dolphin-safe. 903 In contrast, the United States is of the view that a reasonable

897 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 60, paras. 190-191.
898 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 61, paras. 192-193.
899 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 61 , paras. 195-196 and Mexico's second written
submission, para. 212.
900 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 61, para. 197.
901 United States' response to Panel question No. 61, para. 137.
902 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 62, para. 199.
903 Mexico's second written submission, para. 213.

interpretation of "recognized" in the context of a standard would be that the body has recognized
activities in standardization insofar as neither the TBT Agreement nor the ISO Guide contain a
definition of "recognized body" but the ISO Guide does include a definition of the term "standardizing
body".
904 Mexico however contends that the United St ates' proposed interpretation would conflict
with the wording of Annex 1.2.
7.648 The United States also commented on Canada's argument in its third party submission that the
question of whether a body is "recognized" within the meaning of Annex 1 should be determined
based on whether the body applies the six princi ples set out in the TBT Committee Decision on
Principles for the Development of International St andards, Guides and Recommendations stating that
given that the Committee Decision sets out principles and procedures that standardizing bodies should
observe when developing international standard s it would seem to support the position that a
"recognized" body means a body that has recognized ac tivities in standards development. However,
the United States acknowledged Cana da's suggestion that a body may be "recognized" not simply
because it develops standards or has recognized activ ities in standardization, but because it develops
standards or engages in standardization activities in accordance with certain recognized principles, for
example, those in the Committee Decision. 905 Finally the United States concludes that under either
interpretation, however, the AIDCP resolutions we re not adopted by a "recognized body" because
neither the AIDCP nor the parties to it constitute a "body" within the meaning of Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement and neither the AIDCP or the parties to it have recognized activities in
standardization, or under Canada's interpretation, develop standa rds in accordance with the TBT
Committee Decision principles, since only parties to the AIDCP participate in activities related to the
AIDCP and only certain Members may be parties to the AIDCP.
906
7.649 Concerning the meaning of the term "interna tional body" contained in Annex 1.4 of the
TBT Agreement, Mexico is of the view that the definition should be interpreted to mean that
membership is open to those WTO Members who have an interest in the subject matter of the
regulation.907 In that regard it notes that first the AIDCP is not closed to additional members and that
it remains open to accession by any State or regional economic integration organization that meets the
requirements set out in the agreement, or is otherw ise invited to accede to the Agreement on the basis
of a decision by the Parties. It explains that no additional countries or regi onal economic integration
organizations have expressed interest in joining th e AIDCP and that further it is common that during
the AIDCP meetings, Parties invite observer countri es that regularly attend such meetings with the
intention in the future to become Parties. In addition it stresses that unlike the SPS Agreement which
specifically identifies three specific sources of inte rnational standards, the TBT Agreement does not
and therefore retains flexibility for determining what are the relevant and applicable international
standards on a case-by-case basis. Mexico also notes that in this case, the United States – a founding
member of the AIDCP – has asserted that it can ignore an international standard that it created, to the
disadvantage of Mexico, a developing country that expressly agreed to the international standard.
Finally it observes that the US measure at issue is a standard specially designed to have an impact
only on the ETP, where Mexico fishes and that this is reflected in the fact that the United States
applies a different, less restrictiv e standard to other fisheries. Mexi co finally contends that it cannot
reasonably be expected that countries that are unaffected would be interested in participating.908
7.650 On the contrary the United States notes that Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement states that an
"international body or system" is a "body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies

904 United States' response to Panel question No. 62, para. 138.
905 United States' response to Panel question No. 62, paras. 138-139.
906 United States' response to Panel question No. 62, paras. 140.
907 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 63, para. 200.
908 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 63, paras. 201-206.

of at least all Members" and that nothing in this text supports reading the reference to "at least all
Members" as meaning a subset of Members, for example, those that have interest in some or all of the
work of that body or system. In fact, the contex t in which the definition of "international body or
system" appears supports the opposite conclusion. In particular, the definition of a "regional body or
system" is "body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of only some of the
Members". Thus, a body whose membership is ope n to only some Members, for example those that
have an interest in the work of the body, would be a regional body; it would not be an international
body.909
7.651 In the United States' view, if an internati onal body included bodies whose membership was
only open to a subset of Members, it would mean that bodies that are not open to all Members may
develop "international standards". This would have two important implications: (i) pursuant to
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, Members would have an obligation to use such "international
standards" as the basis for their technical regulati ons (unless ineffective or inappropriate to meet a
legitimate objective); (ii) it would also, pursuant to Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, give any
Member that based a technical regulation on such an "international standard" a presumption that the
technical regulation was not an unnecessary obstacl e to trade. In other words, defining an
international body to include bodies whose membership is open to only a subset of Members, would
result in that subset of Members determining for other Members the "international standards" that
must be the basis of their technical regulations.910
7.652 Conversely, the United States contends th at defining an international body whose
membership is open to all Members ensures that a ll Members have the opportunity to participate in
the development of any "international standard" that by virtue of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
they are obliged to use as the b asis for their technical regulations (unless ineffective or inappropriate
to fulfil the legitimate objective pursued). It al so ensures that Members do not benefit from a
presumption that their technical regulations are no more trade restrictive th an necessary when based
on standards developed by bodies that permitted only a subset of Members to participate.911
7.653 The United States also contends that when sta ndards are developed by bodies not open to at
least all Members, the likelihood that they will de velop standards that are relevant, effective and
appropriate in fulfilling the objectives pursued by Me mbers that were not permitted to participate in
their development is greatly reduced along with the likelihood that those standards will be used as the
basis for the Member's technical regulations.
7.654 The Panel asked the United States whether it agreed that the concept of "international
standard" in Article 2.4 "should be applied flexibly ". The United States responded that if this meant
the term should be interpreted in a manner that depa rts from the text of the TBT Agreement, it did not
agree with Mexico's assertion. It reiterated, for the reasons set in paragraph 7.646 above, the
meaning of the term "international standard" is a standard that is (i) adopted by a body whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at l east all Members; (ii) based on consensus and (iii)
made available to the public. 912 The United States said it based this interpretation on the text of the
TBT Agreement, in particular the definition of the term "international body" together with the
ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 definition of an "internationa l standard" and the language in paragraph 2 of

909 United States' response to Panel question No. 63, para. 141.
910 United States' response to Panel question No. 63, para. 142.
911 United States' response to Panel question No. 63, para. 143.
912 United States' response to Panel question 59, paras. 134-135 and United States' second written
submission, paras. 176-177.

Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement: "Standard prepared by the international standardization community
are based on consensus".
913
7.655 As for Mexico's comment that certain organiza tions despite being composed of individuals
and not governments as members are noneth eless engaged in standard setting activities 914 the
United States agrees that bodies such as IEEE and SAE may develop international standards based on
the meaning of the term "international standards" derived from the text of the TBT Agreement. This is
because TBT Agreement defines an international b ody as a body whose membership is open to the
relevant bodies of at least all Members, and the IS O/IEC Guide 2 defines "international standardizing
organization" as a "standardizing organization whose membership is open to the relevant national
body from every country". The United States specifies that nothing in these definitions indicate that
membership is limited to governments. A body su ch as SAE that allows individuals as well as
bodies915 of at least all WTO Members to be members would fall within the definition of a body
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members, the United States
says.916
7.656 The United States also noted that there is an im portant policy reason to not interpret the term
"international standard" "flexibly" as Mexico suggest s or in a way that departs from the text of the
TBT Agreement: under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreem ent, Members have an obligation to base their
technical regulations on relevant international standards, unless ineff ective or inappropriate to fulfil a
legitimate objective. Accordingly, it is impor tant for Members to know which standards are
"international" and therefore standards on which they have an obligation to base their technical
regulations. If the term "internati onal standard" is given a "flexibl e" meaning that departs from the
text of the TBT Agreement, it is not clear how Me mbers could be expected to know which standards
are international and in turn how to comply with their obligation under Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement it argues.917
7.657 The Panel asked whether it should take into acco unt the fact that the United States is a
member of the IATTC and a signatory party to the AIDCP, Mexico argued that the AIDCP's role is to
establish standards governing the interaction between fishing and dolphins, which then must be
implemented and enforced by its member nations. It further noted that the AIDCP has promulgated
the Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Ce rtification which incorporates a definition of
"dolphin-safe" which is the multilateral standard for dolphin-safe for tuna harvested in the ETP.
According to Mexico, this meant that the United States, as a founding and fully participating member
of the AIDCP, has "recognized" the AIDCP's standardizing activities.918
7.658 The United States considers that the AIDCP is an intergovernmental agreement, not a body.
It further says that the AIDCP re solutions were adopted by the parties to the AIDCP and not by a
"body" as that term is defined for the purposes of the TBT Agreement. While the IATTC is a body,
neither the AIDCP nor the AIDCP resolutions were adopted by the IATTC. Finally it holds that the
fact that the United States is a signatory to the AIDCP and a member of IATTC does not change these
facts.
919 It also emphasizes that decisions regardin g implementation of the international dolphin
conservation program established under the AIDCP ar e taken by the parties to the AIDCP, not the

913 United States' response to Panel's question No. 139, para. 66.
914 See paragraph 7.643.
915 ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 defines a "body" as a "legal or administrative entity that has specific tasks
and composition", for example a company, organization or authority. ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991, para. 4.1; see also
ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991, para. 4.5 (defining "authority" as "body that has legal powers and rights").
916 United States' response to Panel question No. 139, para. 67.
917 United States' response to Panel question No. 139, para. 68.
918 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 141, paras. 114-115.
919 United States' response to Panel question No. 141, para. 70.

IATTC and that while meetings of the parties to the AIDCP typically take place in conjunction with
IATTC meetings and the IATTC is to provide Secr etariat support for the AIDCP, decisions regarding
implementation of the international dolphin co nservation program including any resolutions
thereunder remain decisions of the parties to the AIDCP. It further specifies that the IATTC has no
legal authority to undertake activities or make decisions regarding the international dolphin
conservation program established by the AIDCP and that in addition the 1949 IATTC Convention and
its successor agreement the Antigua Convention, which establish the IATTC, and the AIDCP are
distinct legal instruments, each with their own objectives and obligations.920
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.659 We must determine, in this part of our anal ysis, whether the "dolphin-safe" definitions and
labelling provisions contained in the AIDCP resolu tions identified by Mexico constitute a "relevant
international standard" in relation to the US dolphi n-safe labelling provisions within the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
7.660 For that purpose, we must first clarify the no tion of "international standard" for the purposes
of this provision, and then determine whether the AIDCP resolution falls within the scope of this
notion, and whether it is "relevant" in this dispute.
The notion of "international standard" in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
7.661 Article 1.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that "[g]eneral terms for standardization and
procedures for assessment of conformity shall no rmally have the meaning given to them by
definitions adopted within the United Nations system and by international standardizing bodies taking
into account their context and in the light of the obj ect and purpose of this Agreement. In addition,
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, entitled "Terms and their definitions for the purpose of this
Agreement", provides that:
"The terms presented in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, General
Terms and Their Definitions Concerning St andardization and Related Activities,
shall, when used in this Agreement, have the same meaning as given in the
definitions in the said Guide taking into account that services are excluded from the
coverage of this Agreement."
7.662 Annex 1 also provides specific definitions for the terms: "technical regulation", "standard",
"conformity assessment procedures", "international body or system", "regional body or system",
"central government body", "local government body" and "non-governmental body". As expressed by
the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines: "[A]ccording to the Chapeau [of Annex 1], the terms defined in
Annex 1 apply for the purposes of the TBT Agreemen t only if their definitions depart from those in
the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 (the 'ISO/IEC Guide'). This is underscored by the word 'however'".921
7.663 The term "international standard" is not define d in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, but is
defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2. In accordance wi th the terms of Annex 1, in the absence of a
specific definition of this term in Annex 1, the te rm "international standard" should be understood to
have the same meaning in the TBT Agreement as in the ISO/IEC Guide 2, which defines it as a
"standard that is adopted by an international sta ndardizing/standards organization and made available
to the public".

920 United States' response to Panel question No. 141, para. 71.
921 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 224.

7.664 An "international standard” is thus composed of three elements: (i) a standard; (ii) adopted by
an international standardizing/standards organization; and (iii) made available to the public. We must
therefore consider whether the provisions of th e AIDCP tuna tracking and verification resolution
(which contain a definition of dolphin-safe) and of the AIDCP dolphin-safe certification resolution
(which provides for the AIDCP dolphin-safe label) meet each of these components and thus constitute
an "international standard".
7.665 Finally, we note that both parties ha ve referred to the TBT Committee Decision on Principles
for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations that sets out principles
and procedures that standardizing bodies should observe when developing international standards. We
consider it appropriate to take into account the pr inciples contained in this decision where they may
inform our understanding of certain aspects of th e ISO/IEC Guide definitions such as the terms
"international standardizing/standards organizati on" and "made available to the public" in the
definition of "international standard". However we note that the Panel in EC – Sardines, in a
statement not addressed by the Appellate Body, observed that the TBT decision "is a policy statement
of preference and not the controlling provision in interpreting the expression 'relevant international
standard' as set out in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement".
922
Whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe definition and certification constitutes a "standard" for the
purposes of Article 2.4
7.666 The term "standard" is defined both in th e ISO/IEC Guide 2 and in Annex 1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.667 The ISO/IEC Guide 2 defines a "standard" as a:
"[D]ocument, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that
provides, for common and repeated use, ru les, guidelines or characteristics for
activities or their results, aimed at the achiev ement of the optimum degree of order in
a given context".
7.668 Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement defines a "standard" as a:
"Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristi cs for products or related processes and
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
7.669 We note that the existence of differences between the ISO/IEC definition and the definition of
a "standard" in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement is acknowledged in the Explanatory Note, which
distinguishes between standards "prepared by the international standardizing community" and
standards covered by the TBT Agreement, i.e. those standards the preparation, adoption of application
of which is regulated in the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement. The Explanatory Note
suggests that standards prepared by the international standardizing community are based on consensus
while the TBT Agreement also covers “documents that are not based on consensus”, and that
standards as defined in the ISO/IEC Guide may be voluntary or mandatory, whereas those covered by
the TBT Agreement are defined as voluntary.
923

923 The Explanatory Note to Annex 1.2 provides as follows:

7.670 We see a difference between the notion of "s tandard", as defined in Annex 1.2 of the
TBT Agreement for the purposes of defining the sc ope of application of the provisions of the
TBT Agreement on standards (such as Articles 4), and the use of the term "standard" in the definition
of the composite term "international standard" in the ISO/IEC Guide 2.
7.671 We acknowledge that, as noted by the Appellate Body, the terms defined in Annex 1 apply
for the purposes of the TBT Agreement if these definitions depart from those in the ISO/IEC Guide.924
Nonetheless, in our view, the term "standard" as used in the definition of an "international standard"
in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 must be read in its proper context, i.e. as it is defined in the ISO/IEC Guide
itself, in order to assign it the meaning intended in that definition. This is consistent with the terms of
Article 1.1 and with Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, which, as described above, provides that "[t]he
terms presented in the sixth edition of the ISO/IE C Guide 2: 1991 (…) shall, when used in this
Agreement, have the same meaning as given in the definitions in the said Guide".
7.672 Accordingly, pursuant to the definition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2, we must consider whether
the AIDCP "dolphin-safe" provisions of the AIDCP constitute a "document, established by consensus
and approved by a recognized body, that provides, fo r common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order
in a given context".
7.673 We first note that the AIDCP tuna tracking and verification resolution containing the
dolphin-safe definition is a document that describes a system for tracking tuna caught in the
Agreement Area by vessels fishing under the AIDCP. The purpose of this system is to enable
dolphin-safe tuna to be distinguished from non-dolphin -safe tuna, from the time of capture to the time
it is ready for retail sale, on the basis of tuna tr acking forms and additional verification procedures
described in this document. Therefore, insofar as it contains provisions that relate to the capture,
unloading, storage, transfer and processing of tuna, the AIDCP tuna tracking and verification
resolution is a document that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for tuna fishing and tuna.
7.674 The United States asserted that "one element nec essary for a measure to constitute a standard
is that it provide rules, guidelines etc. for 'co mmon and repeated' use" and while noting that the
ordinary meaning of "common" is "shared ... of general application" and of "repeated" is "frequent",
the United States deduces that "'common' addresses the shared or general nature of the measure, while
'repeated' addresses the frequency of the measure is to be used".
925 In its view, a rule, guideline etc.
that is for common and repeated use would not be one that was drafted for the specific purpose of
defining a term in an international agreement. We agree with the United States that one component of

"The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services. This
Agreement deals only with technical regula tions, standards and conformity assessment
procedures related to products or processes and production methods. Standards as defined by
ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this Agreement
standards are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents.
Standards prepared by the international standa rdization community are based on consensus.
This Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus."
These language differences were emphasized by the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines: "[t]he definition
of a 'standard' in the ISO/IEC Guide expressly includes a consensus requirement" (Appellate Body Report, EC –
Sardines, para. 225). According to the Appellate Body, the omission of a consensus requirement in Annex 1.2
was a deliberate choice on the part of the drafters of the TBT Agreement and the last two sentences of the
Explanatory note give effect to this choice. The Appellate Body considered had the negotiators considered
consensus to be necessary to satisfy the definition of "s tandard", they would have said so explicitly in the
definition as is the case in the ISO/IEC Guide (ibid).
924 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 224.
925 United States' response to Panel question No. 33, para. 75.

the content of an international standard concerns the general applicability of the rules, guidelines or
characteristics therein provided. This in turn has a bearing on the frequency of the use of such rules,
guidelines or characteristics. We observe that to the extent that the rules and guidelines of the tracking
system need to be observed and the tuna tracki ng forms completed for each fishing, unloading,
storage, processing and marketing operation, the AIDCP tuna tracking and verification resolution
provides rules "for common and repeated use".
7.675 In addition, the AIDCP dolphin-safe certification resolution is a document that establishes
procedures to obtain the dolphin-safe certificate, provides what constitutes an invalid dolphin-safe
certificate and it regulates the content of such certif icate. This resolution defines the AIDCP Dolphin
Safe Certificate as a "[d]ocument issued by th e competent national authority, evidence of the
dolphin-safe status of tuna and t una products, in accordance with the definition of the AIDCP System
for Tracking and Verification of Tuna". It also provides a definition of AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna
Label as: "[g]raphic representation which distinguishes dolphin-safe tuna and tuna products, as
defined in the System for Tracking and Verifying T una, which can be used on the packaging of tuna
certified under this resolution". We infer from this description that the AIDCP dolphin-safe
certification resolution is a document which includes symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to tuna and tuna products.
7.676 We acknowledge the Appellate B ody's statement that consensus is not an element of the
definition of an international standard.
926 Nonetheless, we observe that the two AIDCP resolutions
cited by Mexico are documents that, as the United States pointed out, are approved by the Parties of
the AIDCP. AIDCP resolutions are adopted in or dinary or extraordinary meetings of the AIDCP
where quorum is reached when a majority of part ies are present and are a dopted by consensus.
Specifically, the parties to the AIDCP agreed, at the 5th Meeting of the Parties, held on 15 June 2001
in San Salvador (El Salvador), to "adopt the following Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin-Safe Tuna
Certification" and the "modified System for Track ing and Verification of Tuna developed by the
Permanent Working Group on Tuna Tracking and r ecommended by the International Review Panel".
The Parties to the AIDCP that were present at th e meeting and approved these resolutions are States
which have ratified or acceded to the Agreement (C olombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the
European Union, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the United States, Vanuatu and Venezuela). Both
resolutions took effect thirty days after their adop tion date. We believe that these documents therefore
meet the ISO/IEC Guide 2 definition of "consensus", which is described as a "[g]eneral agreement,
characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the
concerned interests and by a process that involves seekin g to take into account the views of all parties
concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments".
7.677 In conclusion, from and analysis of the content of the AIDCP resolutions we conclude that the
dolphin-safe definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking a nd verification resolution cross-referenced in the
AIDCP dolphin-safe certification resolution provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines
or characteristics for tuna fishing and tuna produc ts, and thus constitutes a "standard" for the purposes
of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. With this preliminary determination in mind, we now consider
whether it constitutes an "international standard" within the meaning of that provision.

926 See para. 7.669 above.

Whether the dolphin-safe definition in the AIDC P tuna tracking and verification resolution
has been approved by an international standa rdizing or standards organization and made
available to the public
7.678 As described above, the ISO/IEC Guide defines an "international standard" as a "[s]tandard
that is adopted by an international standardizi ng/standards organization and made available to the
public". Further, a standard is defined, inter alia, as a document approved by a "recognized body".
7.679 We must therefore now consider whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe definition has been
approved by an "international standardizing/sta ndards organization". We note that the ISO/IEC
Guide 2 defines an "international standardizing or ganization" as a "standard izing organization whose
membership is open to the relevant national body from every country". A "standardizing body", in
turn, is defined as a "body that has recognized activiti es in standardization". The term "organization"
is defined as a "body that is based on the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an
established constitution and its own administration". ( emphasis added ) The Guide also defines the
term "body" as a "legal or administrative entit y that has specific tasks and composition". The
TBT Agreement does not define these various terms, but does contain definitions of "international
body or system", "regional body or system" and "central government body".927
7.680 In light of these definitions, we must therefore determine whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe
definition and labelling provisions were adopted by a legal or administrative entity based on the
membership of other bodies or individuals th at has an established constitution and its own
administration, has recognized activities in standard ization, and whose membership is open to the
relevant national body of every country.
7.681 We first note that the two relevant AIDCP resolu tions cited by Mexico are documents that are
approved by the Parties of the AIDCP. AIDCP resolu tions are adopted in ordinary or extraordinary
meetings of the AIDCP where quorum is reached when a majority of parties are present and are
adopted by consensus.
928 The parties to the AIDCP adopted the Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin-Safe
Tuna Certification and the modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna on 15 June 2001.
The Parties to the AIDCP that were present at th e meeting and approved these resolutions are States
which have ratified or acceded to the Agreement (C olombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the
European Union, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Pe ru, the United States, Vanuatu and Venezuela 929).
Both resolutions took effect thirty days after their adoption date.
7.682 The AIDCP is an international agreement c oncluded among States, and it does not as such
have an established constitution or its own admini stration as such. However, the Parties to the
convention acting jointly accomplish specific tasks in fulfilment of its objectives, as illustrated by the
two resolutions at issue. Article II of the AIDCP thus provides that:
"The objectives of this Agreement are:

927 Annex 1.4 of the TBT Agreement defines an "international body or system" as a "[b]ody or system
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members". "Regional body or system" is defined
in Annex 1.5 as a:"[b]ody or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of only some of the
Members". Finally "central government body" is, according to Annex 1.6, a "[c]entral government, its ministries
and departments or any body subject to the control of the central government in respect of the activity in
question".
928 Article VIII and Article IX of the AIDCP.
929 Guatemala and Honduras did not attend the AIDCP meeting.

1. To progressively reduce incidental dol phin mortalities in the tuna purse-seine
fishery in the Agreement Area to levels approaching zero , through the setting of
annual limits;
2. With the goal of eliminating dolphi n mortality in this fishery, to seek
ecologically sound means of capturing large yellowfin tunas not in association with
dolphins; and
3. To ensure the long-term sustainabilit y of the tuna stocks in the Agreement
Area, as well as that of the marine resour ces related to this fishery, taking into
consideration the interrelationship among species in the ecosystem, with special
emphasis on, inter alia, avoiding, reducing and minimizing bycatch and discards of
juvenile tunas and non-target species."
7.683 In addition, the implementation of the IDCP (the programme undertaken under the AIDCP),
is supported by the IATTC, which has significant responsibilities in this respect and provides the
Secretariat for the programme. The IATTC has an institutional structure composed of a principal
body (the Commission), advisory committees, perm anent working groups and two other types of
committees (the committee for the review of implementation of measures adopted by the Commission
and the scientific advisory committee. It al so has a constitution, the Antigua Convention
930 as well as
its own administration, insofar as it is governed by its own rules of procedures and financial
regulations and has a Secretariat.
7.684 The institutional link between the AIDCP and the organization is strengthened by the fact that
all the States that are parties to the AIDCP are members of the IATTC (with the exception of
Honduras). The AIDCP is open for signature, inter alia by States or regional economic integration
organizations that are members of the IATTC. As for the ordinary annual meeting of the Parties of the
AIDCP where decisions related the implementation of the agreement are taken, the AIDCP provides
that it should take place preferably in conjunction with the IATTC meeting.931 In light of these facts,
we conclude that the parties of the AIDCP acti ng within the institutional framework of the IATTC
constitute an "organization" for the purposes of the application of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
7.685 We now consider whether the parties of the AIDCP collectively act as a "standardizing body",
that is, a "[b]ody that has recognized activities in standardization"(emphasis added) as defined by the
ISO/IEC Guide 2. "Standardization" is defined as th e "[a]ctivity of establishing, with regard to actual
or potential problems, provisions for common and re peated use, aimed at the achievement of the
optimum degree of order in a given context". 932 As concluded above, the AIDCP resolutions contain
provisions, for common and repeated use, that concern tuna and tuna products and their related
processes and production methods and that also d eal with marking and labelling requirements. We
therefore conclude that the parties of the AIDCP, within the institutional framework of the IATTC,
develop and establish, with regard to dolphin mo rtality and tuna-stock sustainability problems,
provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of dolphin

930 Which was negotiated to strengthen and replace the 1949 Convention establishing the IATTC, and
entered into force on 27 August 2010.
931 Article VIII.2 of the AIDCP.
932 1.1 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2. We note in this respect that it is not necessary for the standardizing
activity to be the single or even a "principal function" of the organization, in order for it to be a "standardizing
body". This contrasts with the definitions of a "standards body", which is defined by the ISO/IEC Guide 2 as a
"standardizing body" "that has as a principal function, the preparation, approval or adoption of standards".

protection and rational use of tuna resources in the context of the ETP tuna purse-seine fishery. 933
The AIDCP has activities in standardization.
7.686 Mexico has also stressed that "[t]here can be no doubt that the United States, as a founding
and fully participating member of the AIDCP, has 'recognized' the AIDCP's standardizing
activities".934 We agree that the term "recognized" refe rs to the body's activities in standards
development, and that the participation in these activities of the countries that are parties to the
Agreement is evidence of their recognition. In our view, such recognition may also be inferred from
the recognition of the resulting standard, i.e. when its existence, legality and validity has been
acknowledged.935 In this respect, it appears that the AIDCP dolphin-safe definition and certification
have been recognized by the parties to the Agreemen t, including the United States. This is reflected
in one of the court rulings that led to the final Hogarth ruling that Mexico has challenged. The District
Court for the Northern District of California in Earth Island Institute v. Evans, ruled that:
"Accordingly, Congress rejected the Panama Declaration on this point and instead
adopted a compromise which provided that any change from the existing standard to
the less protective standard called for by the Panama Declaration would turn on the
scientific question of 'whether the inten tional deployment on or encirclement of
dolphins with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted
dolphin stock in the [ETP].'"
936 (emphasis added).
7.687 In light of the above, we conclude th at the AIDCP has "recognized activities in
standardization" and thus constitutes a "standard izing body". We must now consider whether
membership in the AIDCP is open to the relevant national body of every country, such that it may be
considered to be an "international standardization organization" as defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2.
7.688 Article XXVI of the AIDCP provides that:
"This Agreement shall remain open to accession by any State or regional economic
integration organization that meets the requi rements in Article XXIV, or is otherwise
invited to accede to the Agreement on the basis of a decision by the Parties."
7.689 The requirements of Article XXIV are temporal rather than geographical. The Article reads as
follows:
"This Agreement is open for signature at Washington from May 21, 1998, until
May 14, 1999 by States with a coastline borde ring the Agreement Area and by States
or regional economic integration organizati ons which are members of the IATTC or
whose vessels fish for tuna in the Agreement Area while the Agreement is open for
signature."
7.690 In addition, given that the AIDCP was open fo r signature by Members of the IATTC it may
be useful to note that IATTC membership is open to the following: (a) the Parties to the
1949 Convention (i.e. the United States and Costa Rica); (b) States not Party to the 1949 Convention
with a coastline bordering the Convention Area; (c) States whose vessels fish for fish stocks covered

933 See AIDCP Preamble.
934 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 141, para. 115.
935 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press), Volume II, p. 2490.
936 Exhibit MEX-29.

by the Convention, following consultation with the Par ties; or (d) States that are otherwise invited to
join on the basis of a decision by the Parties.
937
7.691 Furthermore, we consider that the principle of openness embodied in Section C of the TBT
decision on Principles and Procedures for the Developm ent of International Standards, Guides and
Recommendations which establishes that membership should be open on a non-discriminatory basis to
relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members may assist us in interpreting the term "international
standardizing/standards organization". The AIDCP membership was open for signature from 21 May,
1998 until 14May, 1999 to States whose vessels fished for tuna in the Agreement Area. Given that
there were no limitations to or prohibitions of fish ing in the agreement area, provided that the vessels
did not operate in the EEZ of one of the coastline countries of the agreement area, any country whose
fishing fleet was operating in the ETP could have signed the AIDCP. Thus the AIDCP was indeed
open to signature on a non-discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members in
accordance with the principle of openness as describe d in the TBT decision. In addition, the AIDCP
remains open to accession to any States or regional ec onomic integration organization that is invited
to accede to the Agreement on the b asis of the parties' decision. To this day, the AIDCP membership
is therefore open on a non-discriminatory basis to th e relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members in
accordance with the principle of openness as described in the TBT Committee Decision.
7.692 We find that the AIDCP is therefore an inte rnational standardizing organization for the
purpose of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
7.693 In light of the above, we conclude that the AIDCP is open to the relevant body of every
country and is therefore an international standard izing organization for the purposes of Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement.
7.694 The final point to be addressed is whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe definitions and
certification were made available to the public. We note that the dolphin-safe certification resolution,
entitled "Public education", provides for transparency procedures. It establishes that:
"a. Each Party, as appropriate, and the Secretariat shall give due publicity to the
new AIDCP Dolphin Safe Certificate and AIDCP Dolphin Safe Label through
relevant communications to interested governmental and non-governmental entities.
b. The Parties agree to dissemi nate objective information to, inter alia,
importers, fishermen's organizations, and non-governmental organizations, using their
own capabilities within their national and in ternational markets, to support an
accurate public perception of the AIDCP, in order to increase the broad understanding
of the AIDCP and its objectives.
c. The Parties, through the Secretariat, may support the design and
implementation of an international pub lic education campaign to accomplish the
objectives set forth within this section."
7.695 These transparency procedures aim at informi ng market operators about the AIDCP and its
objective and the procedures for the dolphin-safe certif icate and the dolphin-safe label which, by the
same token, makes it possible to obtain the certifi cate and the label. Thus, these procedures are "made
available to the public". We are therefore sat isfied that the IADCP dolphin-safe definition and
certification are made available to the public.

937 See Article XXVII of the Antigua Convention.

7.696 In addition, we consider that the principle of transparency contained in Section B of the
TBT Committee Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and
Recommendations and which informs the reading of the terms "made available to the public" supports
this finding. We agree with Mexico that the AIDCP system operates in conformity with the principle
of transparency as described in the TBT decision. As Mexico noted AIDCP Article XVII provides:
"1. The Parties shall promote transpar ency in the implementation of this
Agreement, including through public participation, as appropriate.
2. Representatives from intergovernmental organizations and representatives
from non-governmental organizations con cerned with matters relevant to the
implementation of this Agreement shall be afforded the opportunity to take part in
meetings of the Parties convened pursuant to Article VIII as observers or otherwise,
as appropriate, in accordance with the guidelines and criteria set forth in Annex X.
Such intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations shall have
timely access to relevant information, subject to procedural rules on access to such
information that the Parties may adopt."
938
7.697 This provision ensures that information on th e procedures for the dolphin-safe certificate and
the dolphin-safe label is effectively disseminated to all interested parties in the territories of the parties
of the AIDCP, in accordance with Section B of the TBT decision on Principles for the Development
of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations which defines transparency in terms of
accessibility of standards to at least all interested parties in the territories of at least all WTO Members
and effective dissemination of information concerni ng transparency procedures which should include
inter alia, at a minimum, the prompt publication of a standard upon adoption.
Whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe definition and certification are "relevant"
7.698 Mexico considers that the AIDCP standard is relevant "because it serves the exact same
purpose as the United States dolphin-safe labelling provisi ons" insofar as it is used to determine when
tuna and tuna product can be certified as dolphin-safe and bear a dolphin-safe label.939
7.699 On the contrary, in the United States' view, th e definition Mexico cites "does not bear upon,
relate to or pertain to the U.S. dolphin-safe labeling provisions". 940 The United States reiterates that
the definition is just that – a definition and that it does not set out any rules, guidelines or
characteristics for the labelling of tuna products and therefore, concludes that the definition does not
bear upon, relate to or pertain to the US dol phin-safe labelling provisions. In addition, the
United States argues, it is also clear from the text of the tuna tracking resolutio n that the relevance of
its definition of dolphin-safe is limited to de fining that term for purposes of the resolution. 941 Finally,
the United States contends that the definition of do lphin-safe in the tuna tracking resolution does not
relate or pertain to the objective of the United St ates dolphin-safe labelling provisions because, whilst
it defines dolphin-safe as tuna caught in a set in wh ich no dolphins were observed killed or seriously
injured, the United States dolphin-safe labelling prov isions, however, seek to ensure that consumers
are not misled or deceived about whether tuna produ cts contain tuna that was caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins, which includes not only whether the tuna was caught in a set in which

938 See Mexico's response to Panel question No. 61 , para. 196.
939 Mexico's first written submission, para. 241.
940 United States' first written submission, para. 189.
941 United States' first written submission, para. 189.

dolphins were observed killed or seriously injure d but whether dolphins we re otherwise adversely
affected.
942
7.700 As noted by both parties, in EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body agreed with the panel's
statement that the ordinary meaning of the term "relevant" is "bearing upon or relating to the matter in
hand; pertinent".943 According to the panel's reasoning, to be a "relevant international standard", the
standard at issue in the dispute – Codex Stan 94 – would have to "bear upon, relate to, or be pertinent
to the EC Regulation".944
7.701 In the present case, we need therefore to determine whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe
definition and certification bear upon, relate to, or are pertinent to the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions. As noted by Mexico "the measures apply to the same product, i.e. tuna, which are caught
in the same area, and are then processed into canned tuna and bear a dolphin-safe label".945 Indeed, the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions and the AIDCP resolutions both deal with the same products:
tuna and tuna products. In add ition, the AIDCP dolphin-safe certifi cation resolution establishes the
"AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate" and the "AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Label", respectively
defined as "Document issued by the competent nati onal authority, evidence of the dolphin-safe status
of tuna and tuna produc ts, in accordance with the definition of the AIDCP System for Tracking and
Verification of Tuna" and "Graphic representation which distinguishes dolphin-safe tuna and tuna
products, as defined in the System for Tracking and Verifying Tuna, which can be used on the
packaging of tuna certified under this resolution" . The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions and the
later AIDCP resolution therefore regulate the same su bject matter, insofar as they both deal with the
definition of criteria for identifying tuna as " dolphin-safe" and means for identifying dolphin-safe
tuna, in the form of labelling requirements.
7.702 In our view, the dolphin-safe definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking and verification
resolution cross-referenced in the AIDCP dolphin-saf e certification resolution is relevant for the
purposes of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, for the reasons explained below.
7.703 The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions est ablish regulatory categories based on a dual
criterion: the area where the tuna fishery ta kes place and the fishing method used. The AIDCP
regulates the ETP, which is an area regulated also by the US dolphin-safe provisions. In addition, the
AIDCP is also pertinent to the extent that it addr esses the fishing method to which the United States'
measures foreclose access to the US dolphin- safe label: setting on dolphins. Because of the
combination of these two elements, the AIDCP dolphin-safe standard bears upon the matter that is
regulated by the US dolphin-safe label, insofar as both instruments address the consequences of the

942 United States' first written submission, para. 190.
943 Panel report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.68, quoting Webster's New World Dictionary (William Collins
& World Publishing Co., Inc. 1976), p. 1199; Appellate Body Report on EC – Sardines, para. 230.
944 In examining this issue, the panel noted: "The title of Codex Stan 94 is 'Codex Standard for Canned
Sardines and Sardine-type Products' and the EC Regulation lays down common marketing standards for
preserved sardines. The European Communities indicated in its response that the term 'canned sardines' and
'preserved sardines' are essentially identical. Therefore, it is apparent that both the EC Regulation and Codex
Stan 94 deal with the same product, namely preserved sardines. The scope of Codex Stan 94 covers various
species of fish, including Sardina pilchardus which the EC Regulation covers, and includes, inter alia,
provisions on presentation (Article 2. 3), packing medium (Article 3.2), labelling, including a requirement that
the packing medium is to form part of the name of the food (Article 6), determination of net weight
(Article 7.3), foreign matter (Article 8.1) and odour and flavour (Article 8.2). The EC Regulation contains these
corresponding provisions set out in Codex Stan 94, including the section on labelling requirement." Panel report,
EC – Sardines, para. 7.69.
945 Mexico's first written submission, para. 241.

tuna-dolphin association in the ETP tuna purse-seine fishery and define "dolphin-safe" tuna with a
view to promoting fishing methods that minimize harm to dolphins.
7.704 The AIDCP also has a bearing on the docum entary evidence required to obtain the
dolphin-safe label under the US measures, insofa r as Annex II establishes an on-board observer
program aimed at certifying the manner in which t una was harvested; the US dolphin-safe label is
then, by virtue of the US dolphin-safe labelling prov isions, contingent upon this type of certification.
For instance, for tuna caught in the ETP to be labelled dolphin-safe, the DPCIA provides that it must
be accompanied, inter alia, by a written statement executed by:
"(I) the Secretary or the Secretary's designee;
(II) a representative of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; or
(III) an authorized representative of a par ticipating nation whose national program
meets the requirements of the Internati onal Dolphin Conservation Program, which
states that there was an observer approved by the International Dolphin Conservation
Program on board the vessel during the entire trip and that such observer provided the
certification required under subsection (h); and"
7.705 This provision confirms, in our view, the relevance of the AIDCP and the IATTC as
competent authorities that regulate the ETP tuna purse seine fishery.
7.706 In addition, for fisheries located outside of the ETP where regular and significant tuna-
dolphin association has been determined, the US do lphins safe labelling provision also require a
written statement of "an observer participating in a national or international program acceptable to the
Secretary"; this evidences, in our view, the per tinence of this mechanism put in place by the AIDCP
that serves as a reference for other fisheries. The US dolphin-safe labelling provisions build on the
institutional framework established by the AIDCP which signals, not only the matters regulated by the
two types of provisions are closely connected, but that in addition the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions heavily rely on the AIDCP system. In light of the above, we find that the dolphin-safe
definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking and verifica tion resolution cross-referenced in the AIDCP
dolphin-safe certification resolution is relevant for the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions within the
meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
7.707 In light of the above, we find that the AIDCP dolphin-safe definition and certification
constitute a "relevant international standard" within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement,
for the purpose of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
(c) Whether the United States used the AIDCP st andard as a basis for its dolphin-safe labelling
provisions
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.708 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that, where international standards exist or their
completion is imminent Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their
technical regulations.
7.709 We have already determined that the dolphin-safe definition in the AIDCP tuna tracking and
verification resolution cross-referenced in the AIDCP dolphin-safe certification resolution is the
relevant international standard for the purposes of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions. The next
step in the enquiry is to determine whether it wa s used as a basis for th e US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions.

7.710 Mexico contends that the United States has not based the US labelling provisions on the
AIDCP standard, but on the contrary it "contemplated the application of the AIDCP Standard – which
is incorporated into the U.S. national statute – but rejected its application in favour of a unilateral
standard, a setting of nets on dolphins standard".
946 Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the
current US standard is not based on the AIDCP Standard, Mexico states.947
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.711 In EC — Sardines , the Appellate Body agreed with the pa nel that an international standard is
used "as a basis for" a technical regulation "when it is used as the principal constituent or fundamental
principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation". 948 As Mexico noted the Appellate
Body cited certain definitions of the term "basis", and concluded that:
"From these various definiti ons, we would highlight the similar terms 'principal
constituent', 'fundamental principle', 'main constituent', and 'determining principle' —
all of which lend credence to the conclusion th at there must be a very strong and very
close relationship between two things in order to be able to say that one is 'the basis
for' the other".949
7.712 As noted above, we consider that there the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions and the
AIDCP resolutions are closely connected. In our view, the US legislator has constructed the
US dolphin-safe labelling scheme building on the AIDCP foundations. However, the strong
relationship between the two bodies of rules appear s to be insufficient to infer that the AIDCP
standard was used as a basis for the technical regulation.
7.713 In EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body rejected the Eu ropean Communities' assertion that a
"rational relationship" between an international standard and a techni cal regulation was sufficient to
find that the former is used "as a basis for" the latter:
"[W]e see nothing in the text of Article 2.4 to support the European Communities'
view, nor has the European Communities point ed to any such support. Moreover, the
European Communities does not offer any arguments relating to the context or the
object and purpose of that provision that would support its argument that the
existence of a 'rational relationship' is the appropriate criterion for determining
whether something has been used 'as a basis for' something else.
We see no need here to define in general th e nature of the relationship that must exist
for an international standard to serve 'as a basis for' a technical regulation. Here we
need only examine this measure to determine if it fulfils this obligation."950
7.714 Finally, as Mexico points out, the Appellate Body also stated that:
"In our view, it can certainly be said – at a minimum – that something cannot be
considered a 'basis' for something else if the two are contradictory. Therefore, under
Article 2.4, if the technical regula tion and the international standard contradict each

946 Mexico's first written submission, para. 245.
947 Mexico's first written submission, para. 245.
948 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 240–245.
949 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, para. 245. (Mexico's first written submission, fn 157).
950 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 247–248.

other, it cannot properly be concluded that the international standard has been used 'as
a basis for' the technical regulation."951
7.715 In the case at hand, the departure from the AIDCP standard was formally stated by the Court
rulings, and in particular the Hogarth ruling which describes it as an explicit refusal to adopt the
standard:
"The program was formalized into a lega lly-binding agreement known as the Panama
Declaration, pursuant to which the Unite d States' delegation agreed to seek a
weakening of the dolphin-safe labeling standard and allow such a label to be affixed
to tuna caught with purseseine nets as l ong as no dolphins were observed to be killed
or seriously injured during the set. ...
When the delegation asked Congress to ch ange the standard, however, Congress
refused to relax its strict requirements without affirmative evidence that the tuna
fishery was not significantly contributing to the slowness of the recovery rate of
already depleted dolphin stocks."
952
7.716 In light of this evidence, we conclude that the United States failed to base the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions on the relevant international standard of the AIDCP.
(d) Whether the AIDCP dolphin-safe standard would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfilment of the legitimate objective(s) pursued by the United States
(i) Arguments of the parties
7.717 Mexico considers the AIDCP standard to be an effective means for achieving the pursued
objective of protecting dolphins give n that dolphin mortality in the ETP has decreased by 99 per cent.
In addition, Mexico infers from the fact that the United States agreed to the standard itself in the
context of the AIDCP that the United States consid ered it as "an effective means for accomplishing
the objective of informing consumers that tuna was fished in a manner safe for dolphins."953
7.718 The United States argues that the use of th e definition of dolphin-safe in the AIDCP
resolution would neither be effective nor appropr iate to fulfil the objectives of the US labelling
provisions, in particular, the definition would not en sure that consumers are not misled or deceived
about whether the tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins.954 It adds that that the use of the definition would not be effective at protecting dolphins at
the level the United States considers appropriate. Although the United States agrees with Mexico that
the AIDCP has made an important contribution to protecting dolphins in the ETP, it considers
however that it has only addressed part of the pr oblem aiming at reducing observed dolphin mortality
and serious injury caused by setting on dolphins to harvest tuna but not addressing other adverse
effects of setting on dolphins. 955 Furthermore, it argues that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
have addressed both observed dolphin mortality and ser ious injury but also other adverse effects by
encouraging fishing fleet to use other fishing techniques. It concludes that the US provisions have the
objective to protect dolphins in ways that go beyond the protection provided under the AIDCP.
956 In

951 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 248.
952 Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, Exhibit MEX-30.
953 Mexico's first written submission, para. 251.
954 United States' first written submission, paras. 191-192.
955 United States' first written submission, para. 193.
956 United States' first written submission, para. 194.

that sense, the United States considers that the AIDCP only addresses partially the first objective
targeted by the US labelling provisions, that is, the pr otection of dolphin populations. In its first oral
statement the US asserted that allowing tuna products to be labelled dolphin-safe based on the AIDCP
resolution definitions would defeat the objective of ensuring consumers are not misled or deceived
about whether tuna products contai n tuna that was caught in a manne r that adversely affects dolphins
and also defeat the objective of ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage the technique of
setting on dolphins to catch tuna.
7.719 The Parties were asked whether the United States, acting as member of the IATTC and within
the context of this organization had ever objected the appropriateness or effectiveness of the AIDCP
regime to protect the dolphin populations in the ETP and whether it had, within the same context, has
the United States ever expressed concerns about the consumer-deceiving potential of the AIDCP
"dolphin-safe" designation. The United States confirmed it had been and continues to be a strong
supporter of the AIDCP, whether at meetings of the parties to the AIDCP, IATTC meetings or in
other contexts because it recognizes that setting on dolphins to catch tuna occurs and that the
conservation measures called for under the AIDCP ar e an effective means to reduce observed dolphin
mortalities when dolphins are set upon to catch tuna. In the context of the AIDCP, the United States
said it had periodically proposed or supported effort s to strengthen implementation of the AIDCP.
However it also observed that its strong support for th e AIDCP should not be understood to mean that
the United States supports the practice of setting on dolphins to catch tuna or that the United States
believes the measures called for under the AIDCP ar e sufficient to protect dolphins from the harms
associated with setting on dolphins to catch tuna. Re garding its concerns about other countries' use of
the AIDCP dolphin-safe designation for their markets in the IATTC or AIDCP party meetings, the
United States responded it never expressed any.
957
7.720 Mexico also confirmed the United States ha d never expressed objections to the AIDCP
regime to protect dolphins and that it was also not aware that the United States has expressed concern
over the AIDCP designation being deceptive. It noted that if the United States had concerns about the
AIDCP, it should have raised those concerns in th e IATTC rather than imposing a unilateral measure
and emphasized that a key point is that the decisi ons, resolutions and regulations of the AIDCP are
adopted by consensus which means that the United St ates has specifically agreed to all aspects of the
AIDCP regime, including the AIDCP dolphin-safe certification program.958
(ii) Analysis by the Panel
7.721 We first recall the Appellate Body's clarification in EC – Sardines that the burden of proving
that the international standard is effective and appropriate to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued
by the challenged measures rests on the complaining party:
"There are strong conceptual similarities be tween, on the one hand, Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement and, on the other hand, Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement,
and our reasoning in EC — Hormones is equally apposite for this case. ...
Accordingly, as Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, there is no 'general rule-
exception' relationship between the first and the second parts of Article 2.4. Hence, in
this case, it is for Peru — as the complaining Member seeking a ruling on the
inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement of the measure applied by the
European Communities — to bear the burden of proving its claim. This burden
includes establishing that Codex Stan 94 has not been used 'as a basis for' the EC
Regulation, as well as establishing that Code x Stan 94 is effective and appropriate to

957 United States' response to Panel question No. 142.
958 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 142, paras. 117-118.

fulfil the 'legitimate objectives' pursued by the European Communities through the
EC Regulation."959
7.722 Accordingly, in the present case, it is for Mexi co to demonstrate that the AIDCP dolphin-safe
standard is effective and appropriate to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the United States
through its dolphin-safe labelling provisions.
7.723 With respect to the meaning of the term "ineffe ctive or inappropriate means", we note that
the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines agreed with the Panel's view that the term "ineffective or
inappropriate means" refers to two questions, the question of the effectiveness of the measure and the
question of the appropriateness of the measure and that these two questions, although closely related,
are different in nature. 960 The Panel had interpreted the term "i neffective" as referring to something
which is not "having the function of accomplishing", "having as a result", or "brought to bear", whilst
it had interpreted the term "inappropriate" as referring to something which is not "specially suitable",
"proper" or "fitting". 961 In sum, the Panel had noted that: "... in the context of Article 2.4, an
ineffective means is a means which does not ha ve the function of accomplishing the legitimate
objective pursued, whereas an inappropriate means is a means which is not specially suitable for the
fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued. … The question of effectiveness bears upon de results
of the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates more to the nature of the
means employed. (original emphasis)."962
7.724 In light of these determinations, we now cons ider whether Mexico has discharged its burden
of showing that the AIDCP standard is appropriate and effective to fulfil the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions' objectives. We note that this enquiry di ffers from that conducted earlier under Article 2.2.
In that context, as discussed earlier, Mexico had suggested that a label complying with the AIDCP
standard could be allowed to coex ist with the existing US standard. 963 Under Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement, the Panel's point of enquiry is whether this international standard in itself would
fulfil the legitimate objectives of the United States.
7.725 In accordance with the clarifications provided by the Appellate Body as described above, we
consider that the AIDCP standard would be eff ective if it had the capacity to accomplish the two
legitimate objectives defined by the United States, a nd it would be appropriate if it were suitable for
the fulfilment of both of these objectives. 964 In addition, as noted by the Panel and the Appellate
Body, insofar as the terms "ineffective" and "inapp ropriate" have different meaning and that it is
conceptually possible that a measure could be eff ective but inappropriate, Mexico bears the burden of
showing that the AIDCP standard is both effective and appropriate. 965 Mexico therefore has the duty
to adduce sufficient evidence that the AIDCP standa rd meets the legal requirements of effectiveness
and appropriateness set out in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.966
7.726 As described in Section (i) above, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions have two stated
objectives: (1) ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products

959 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 274–275
960 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 285 citing the Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 261.
961 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 285 citing the Panel Report, EC – Sardines
para. 7.116.
962 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 285 citing the Panel Report, EC – Sardines
para. 7.116.
963 Mexico's second written submission, para. 210.
964 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 288.
965 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 289 citing the Panel Report, EC – Sardines ,
para. 7.116.
966 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 290.

contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins; and (2) contributing to the
protection of dolphins by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch
tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
967 We recall that, as discussed in
Section 3(b)(ii)above (in particular in paragraphs 7.484 to 7.486), the scope of these objectives is not
limited to the ETP, and encompasses a considerati on of direct consequences of fishing techniques
such as killing or serious injuries, and of unobserve d consequences of setting on dolphins. We also
recall the United States' observation that reducing such adverse effects "might also be considered to
contribute to the protection of dolphin populations".968
7.727 We first note that, to the extent that the US objectives are not limited to the ETP, and that the
AIDCP standard addresses fishing conditions in the ETP and not in any other fishery, the AIDCP
standard alone would not have the capacity to address US concerns in relation to the manner in which
tuna is caught beyond the ETP. Although, as observed above, the types of mechanisms developed and
implemented under the AIDCP may provide guidance in addressing the dolphin-safe issue beyond the
ETP, we cannot assume that this would necessarily l ead to the achievement of US objectives in these
fisheries. Nonetheless, we consider further whet her the requirements of the AIDCP for dolphin-safe
labelling would be appropriate or effective to fulfil the US objectives with respect to the area that it
addresses, i.e. the ETP.
7.728 With respect to the objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about
whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins, the
United States holds that the AIDCP standard w ould not be effective because tuna caught in
accordance with the AIDCP may be caught by setti ng on dolphins and nonetheless is certified as
dolphin-safe under the AIDCP and the AIDCP label w ould not ensure that consumer have accurate
information about whether tuna products contain t una that was caught in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins and are not misled or deceived.969
7.729 As described earlier, compliance with the AI DCP standard allows the use of setting on
dolphins as a fishing technique, but subjects it to a number of conditions and a monitoring
programme, to reduce the number of incidental bycatches of dolphins. In addition, the AIDCP
dolphin-safe standard is only accorded to tuna th at was caught on a trip in which no dolphin was
killed or seriously injured. Therefore, with the AIDCP label alone, consumers will not be misled or
deceived about whether dolphins we re killed during the sets in which the tuna is caught. However, to
the extent that there might be other adverse effects deriving from that fishing method, the AIDCP
standard alone would not address them. It would no t also, in itself, convey any information in this
respect. The AIDCP dolphin-safe label itself does not convey any information on the fishing method
that has been used for harvesting tuna contained in the product that bears the AIDCP logo, or on the
impact that such method may have on dolphins. Even assuming that the parties to the AIDCP comply
strictly with their transparency obligations, this would only inform the interested actors that the
meaning of the term "dolphin-safe" in the context of the AIDCP framework refers to tuna captured in
association with dolphins, in sets in which mortality or serious injury of dolphins does not occur.
7.730 Therefore, to the extent that it would not allo w consumers to be informed of the fact that
dolphins were chased in the context of catching the tuna at issue, and of the existence of potential
unobserved consequences from such setting, the AIDC P label would not address some of the adverse
effects on dolphins that the United States has identified as part of its objectives.

967 See e.g. United States' first written submission, para. 146; United States' first oral statement,
para. 47.
968 See para. 7.484 and fn 617.
969 United States' first written submission, paras. 195-196.

7.731 We therefore conclude that the AIDCP standard , applied alone, would not be an effective or
appropriate means of fulfilling the US objective of ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived
about whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
7.732 We now turn to the objective of contributing to protecting dolphins by ensuring that the
US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins. In the United States' view, while the AIDCP has made an important contribution to
protecting dolphins in the ETP, it only addresses part of the problem – that is how to reduce dolphin
mortality when setting on dolphins to catch tuna . However, because it does not prohibit setting on
dolphins to catch tuna, it does not ensure that no dol phins are in fact killed or seriously injured when
dolphins are used to catch tuna and it does not a ddress other adverse effects of setting on dolphins to
catch tuna, the United States says. It emphasizes that the AIDCP contemplates that up to 5000
dolphins may be killed using this technique per year. 970 And yet, the United States explains that its
measures seek not only to reduce observed dolphin mo rtality and serious injury, but also to address
other adverse effects of setting on dolphins to catch tuna by encouraging fishing fleets to transition to
techniques to catch tuna that do not involve setting on dolphins by prohibiting use of the dolphin-safe
label for tuna products that contai n tuna that was caught during a trip in which purse seine nets were
deployed or used to encircle dolphins.971
7.733 The United States therefore concludes that th e US dolphin-safe labelling provisions have as
their objective to protect dolphins in ways that go beyond the protections provided for under the
AIDCP and that relying solely on the AIDCP or its resolutions would not be an effective means of
fulfilling the objective of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions "to protect dolphins above and
beyond minimizing observed mortalities and serious injuries as a consequence of setting on dolphins
to catch tuna".972
7.734 Mexico's main argument in support of its asser tion that the AIDCP standard is an effective
means for achieving the objective of protecting dol phins is that the objective of the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions relate solely to adverse eff ect on dolphins that occur when nets are set upon
dolphins, but that the measures have no objectives concerning adverse effects on dolphins resulting
from other fishing methods or occurring in ocean regions other than the ETP. 973 Mexico also argues
that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions are b ased on the underlying assumption that the fishing
method used by the Mexican fleet and regulated by the AIDCP adversely affects dolphins, which it
deems is unsupported by reliable evidence. Mexico focuses on the dolphin stocks recovery and
affirms that the best available scientific evid ence shows that dolphin mortalities in the ETP are
negligible and are not affecting populations of any of the dolphin stocks. Mexico underlines the fact
that the IATTC has also questioned whether the overall United States' analytical approach to
evaluating dolphin populations is sound.
974 To summarize, Mexico argues that there is "no scientific
evidence that setting upon dolphins in a manner consis tent with the AIDCP adversely affects dolphins
from a stock sustainability perspective." 975 It holds that the most recent study, a 2008 US DOC study,
indicated that dolphin stocks are recovering, indicating that the fishing methods are not having
adverse effect on dolphins.976

970 United States' first written submission, para. 193.
971 United States' first written submission, para. 194.
972 United States' first written submission, para. 194.
973 Mexico's oral statement of the second substantive meeting, para. 88.
974 Mexico's oral statement of the second substantive meeting, para. 106.
975 Mexico's second written submission, para. 204.
976 Mexico's second written submission, para. 204.

7.735 Mexico argues that the US dolphin-safe labelli ng provisions are based on the assumption that
one of the fishing method used by the ETP fishing fleets adversely affects dolphins which is, in turn,
based on the assumption that dolphin stocks are not recovering.
977 As explained in paragraph 7.550
above, however, we are not persuaded that th e objective of protecting dolphins through the
US dolphin-safe provisions is to be understood exclus ively, or even primarily, in terms of dolphin
population recovery. Rather, both US objectives are de fined in terms of "adver se effects" of fishing
practices on dolphins. As described above, this includes observed mortality from tuna fishing as well
as unobserved consequences of setting on dolphins. As also described above, the United States has
indicated that this "may also be considered as seeking to conserve dolphin populations". This
suggests to us that the US objective of seeking to minimize observed and unobserved mortality and
injury to dolphins is not conditioned upon or dependent on dolphin populations being depleted.
7.736 As we understand it therefore, the United States' assumption that setting on dolphins is
harmful to dolphins is not premised only on the l ack of dolphin stocks recovery. As mentioned above,
the United States has referred to a diversity of adverse effects of setting on dolphins, emphasizing
both the individual dolphin mortality (observed or de layed) as well as the issue of the recovery of
dolphin stocks. As a study presented as evidence by Mexico itself states describes, there are
ecological but also other concerns for dolphins and various target levels of either dolphin population
size or mortality. We note that this study also suggests that the difficulty presented by the tuna-
dolphin issue as an international problem is due to differing conservation ethics, and suggests that the
United States' laws and policies have the goal of pr eventing all dolphin mortality from tuna fishing,
while the laws and policies of other nations and more often directed toward conserving dolphin
populations but not necessarily preventing all mortality.
978
7.737 As explained earlier in the context of our dete rminations under Article 2.2 in relation to the
legitimate objectives pursued by the United States, th e Panel has considered that despite the existence
of a degree of uncertainty in relation to the ex tent to which setting on dol phins may have adverse
impact on dolphins beyond observed mortality, sufficient evidence has been put forward by the
United States to raise a presumption that genuine concerns exist in this respect and that the method of
setting on dolphins "has the capacity" of resulting in observed and unobserved adverse effects on
dolphins .
7.738 We acknowledge that the AIDCP standard cont ributes importantly, as the United States itself
observes, to the reduction of dolphin mortality from setting on dolphins within the ETP. 979 It may
even contribute to the protection of dolphin stocks and progressive recovery of depleted populations.
However, taken alone, it fails to address unobserved adverse effects derived from repeated chasing,
encircling and deploying purse seine nets on dolphins, such as separation of mothers and their
dependent calves, killing of lactating females resulting in higher indirect mortality of dependent
calves and reduced reproductive success due to acute stress caused by the use of helicopters and
speedboats during the chase.
980
7.739 We also note that, to the extent that the AIDCP standard addresses setting on dolphins and not
other fishing techniques that may also result in adverse effects on dolphins, it would also not provide
an effective or appropriate means of fulfilling the US objectives in this respect.

977 See Mexico's oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para.104.
978 Dolphins and the Tuna Industry , a study by the Committee on Reducing Porpoise Mortality from
Tuna Fishing, the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, The Commission on Life Sciences and the
National Research Council mandated by the MMPA, (1992) p. 3, 5 and 21 . MEX-2
979 United States' first written submission, para. 170.
980 Exhibits US-4 and US-11.

7.740 For all these reasons, we find that Mexico has failed to demonstrate that the AIDCP dolphin-
safe standard is an effective and appropriate mean s to fulfil the US objectives at the United States'
chosen level of protection.
C. MEXICO'S CLAIMS UNDER THE GATT 1994
7.741 In addition to its claims under the TBT Agreem ent, Mexico has also raised claims under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Given the strong commonalities between these claims and
some of Mexico's claim under the TBT Agreement, we must consider whether it is necessary, for the
full resolution of the dispute, to consider also these claims under GATT 1994.
7.742 We note that, in response to a question by the Panel 981, Mexico has argued that it was
necessary and essential to the effective resolution of this dispute that the Panel rule on all of the
claims raised by Mexico under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4
of the TBT Agreement because of: "(i) the nature of th e measures at issue; (ii) the fact that this is the
first time that such measures have been subject to dispute settlement under the DSU; (iii) the
differences in the wording and potential applica tion of the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the
TBT Agreement to the measures; and (iv) the importa nce of the effective discipline of such non-tariff
measures to developing country Members such as Mexico. This final reason – the importance of
these disciplines to developing country Members – is particularly important because developing
country Members may be most likely to be exposed to the adverse effects of non-tariff measures such
as those at issue in this dispute."982
7.743 We agree with Mexico that, should the Panel fail to make findings that are necessary to
resolve the dispute this would constitute a false judicial economy and an error of law. 983 However, we
also note that if the panel finds that the matter in di spute is sufficiently resolved by the findings on the
first claims examined, there is no need to examin e additional claims. As explicitly stated by the
Appellate Body, "[n]othing in [Article 11 of the DSU] or in previous GATT practice requires a panel
to examine all legal claims made by the complaining party.984
7.744 In this respect, we note that three of the reasons invoked by Mexico in support of its view that
the Panel should not exercise judicial economy with resp ect to any of its claims (reasons (i), (ii) and
(iv)) do not appear to directly relate to the questi on of whether the dispute would be fully resolved.
These considerations therefore have little, if any, b earing on the question of whether we may exercise
judicial economy.
7.745 The third reason invoked by Mexico, i.e. "differences in the wording and potential application
of the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agre ement to the measures", does, however, have a
bearing on the question at hand. To the extent that the legal and factual bases of different claims are
distinct, this may affect the question of whether all the issues before the Panel have been properly
addressed through an examination of some of these claims only.
7.746 We note that Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994 are non-discrimination claims under
Articles I:1 and III:4. We also note that in the context of considering Mexico's claims under the
TBT Agreement, we have considered among ot hers, Mexico's non-discr imination claims under
Article 2.1 of that Agreement.

981 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 1 paras. 3-4.
982 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114 para. 67.
983 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133.
984 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, para. 339.

7.747 We further recall that, in the presentation of its arguments to the Panel under the
TBT Agreement, Mexico consistently referred the Panel to its arguments under Articles I.1 and III:4
of the GATT 1994 (and the United States sim ilarly referred to its own responses under the
GATT 1994). In that context, Mexico argued that Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement contains two
non-discrimination obligations applicable to technica l regulations, one that is similar to the national
treatment obligation in Article III:4 and the othe r that is similar to the most-favoured-nation
obligation in Article I:1, and that although language u sed in Article 2.1 is different from that used in
Articles III:4 and I:1, both of these GATT 1994 pr ovisions offer guidance on how to interpret
Article 2.1.
985 Mexico has not provided any explanation fo r its contrary view expressed in the context
of its request that the Panel refrain from exercising judicial economy, that it was necessary to rule on
these claims under both agreements and under both contexts (national treatment and MFN) because
the nature, scope and application of the claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, and
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, are different, and address different rights and obligations which, in
turn, will have different implications during the implementation phase of this dispute.986
7.748 In light of the fact that we have addressed, in the context of our examination of Mexico's
claims under the TBT Agreement, all aspects of Mexico's claims, including non-discrimination
aspects under Article 2.1, and other aspects under Artic le 2.2 and 2.4, and in light of our findings
under these provisions, we are not persuaded that it is necessary for us to consider separately and
additionally Mexico's claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, we
exercise judicial economy in respect of these claims and decline to rule on them.987
VIII. RULINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 In light of the above findings, the Panel finds that the US dolphin-safe provisions:
(a) are not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement;
(b) are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement because they are more trade-
restrictive than necessary to achieve a le gitimate objective, taking into account the
risks that non-fulfilment would create;
(c) are not inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.

985 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 58 para. 172.
986 Mexico's response to Panel question No. 114 para. 69.
987 We note in this respect the following determinations of the Appellate Body in relation to the
completion of the analysis in the context of Peru's claims under Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
and Article III:4 of GATT 1994 in EC – Sardines:
"Peru submits that, if we conclude that the EC Regul ation is consistent with Article 2.4, it would be
appropriate for us to complete the Panel's analysis and resolve the dispute by making findings on those
provisions of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement on which the Panel did not make any findings, namely Articles 2.2
and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Although Peru made a claim before the Panel under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, Peru does not ask us to complete the an alysis by addressing that provision. The European
Communities objects to the completion of the analysis, expressing the view that there are not sufficient
undisputed facts in the record to do so.
Because we have found that the EC Regulation is not consistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement,
the conditions to Peru's request have not been met, and, therefore, we do not think it is necessary for us to make
a finding under Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in order to resolve this dispute. Equally, we do not
think it is necessary to make a finding under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 in order to resolve this dispute.
Therefore, we decline to make findings on Articles 2.2 and 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, or on Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994." (Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 312-313).

8.2 For the reasons explained in Section VII of th is Report, the Panel exercises judicial economy
with respect to Mexico's claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
8.3 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment of benefits under that ag reement. Accordingly, we conclude that, to the
extent that the United States has acted inconsistently with the provisions of the TBT Agreement, it has
nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Mexico under that Agreement. We therefore recommend
that the DSB request the United States to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under
the TBT Agreement.