UNITED STATES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM CHINA
Document: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China
Date: 12 December 2008
Document codes: WT/DS379/2
Complainant: China
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, EU, India, Japan, Kuwait, the State of, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Turkey
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. I, VI  GATT 1994Art. 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 32  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 1, 2, 6, 9, 18, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. 15  Protocol of Accession

UNITED STATES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM CHINA

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China

 The following communication, dated 9 December 2008, from the delegation of China to the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

On 19 September 2008, the People's Republic of China requested consultations with the
United States of America pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM Agreement"), and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( "AD Agreement"). This request for consultations
concerned the anti-dumping and countervailing duti es imposed by the United States pursuant to
certain final anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations and orders issued by the US
Department of Commerce, as described below.
 Consultations were held on 14 November 2008 with a view to reaching a mutually
satisfactory solution. These consultations clarified ce rtain issues pertaining to this matter, but failed
to resolve the dispute.
 Therefore, China respectfully requests, pur suant to Articles 4.7 and 6 of the DSU,
Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994, Article 30 of the SCM Agreement, and Article 17 of the AD
Agreement, that the Dispute Settle ment Body ("DSB") establish a Panel to examine this matter.
China asks that this request be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting to be held on
22 December 2008. China further requests that the Pa nel have the standard term s of reference, as set
forth in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
A. S
PECIFIC MEASURES AT ISSUE
 This request for establishment of a Panel con cerns the following measures, which include the
definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed pursuant to their authority, the conduct of
the underlying anti-dumping and countervailing duty inv estigations, and the combined effect of the
anti-dumping and countervailing du ty determinations and duties in each of the specified
investigations:
Investigations A-570-910 and C-570-911 ("CWP")
• Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative
Final Determination of Critical Circumstances: Circular Welded Carbon Quality

Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China , 73 Federal Register 31970
(5 June 2008).
• Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe
from the People's Republic of China, 73 Federal Register 42547 (22 July 2008).
• Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Federal Register 31966
(5 June 2008).
• Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China :
Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Notice of Countervailing Duty Order, 73 Federal Register 42545 (22 July 2008).
Investigations A-570-912 and C-570-913 ("OTR")
• Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Partial
Affirmative Determination of Critical Ci rcumstances, 73 Federal Register 40485
(15 July 2008).
• Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value and Antidumping Duty Order, 73 Federal Register 51624 (4 Sept. 2008).
• Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Federal Register 40480
(15 July 2008).
• Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Countervailing Duty Order, 73 Federal Register 51627 (4 Sept. 2008).
Investigations A-570-914 and C-570-915 ("LWRP")
• Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part: Light–Walled Rectangular
Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of China, 73 Federal Register 35652
(24 June 2008).
• Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from Mexico, the People's Republic of
China, and the Republic of Korea: Antidumping Duty Orders, 73 Federal
Register 45403 (5 Aug. 2008).
• Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From People's Republic of China :
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty I nvestigation Determination, 73 Federal
Register 35642 (24 June 2008).
• Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of China :
Notice of Countervailing Duty Order, 73 Federal Register 45405 (5 Aug. 2008).

Investigations A-570-916 and C-570-917 ("LWS")
• Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China : Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Federal Register 35646
(24 June 2008).
• Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Laminated Woven Sacks From the People's
Republic of China, 73 Federal Register 45941 (7 Aug. 2008)
• Laminated Woven Sacks from th e People's Republic of China : Final Affirmative
Countervailing Determination and Final Affirmative Dete rmination, in Part, of
Critical Circumstances, 73 Federal Register 35639 (24 June 2008).
• Laminated Woven Sacks From the People's Republic of China : Countervailing
Duty Order, 73 Federal Register 45955 (7 Aug. 2008).
 In certain of the investigations specified a bove, the US Department of Commerce stated that
US law provides no basis to make any adjustment to either the anti-dumping or countervailing duty
calculations to avoid the imposition of a double remedy for the same unfair trade practice, where such
a double remedy arises from the use of the US non-market economy (NME) methodology to impose
anti-dumping duties simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product.
The measures therefore include, as an omission, th e failure of the United States to provide legal
authority for the US Department of Commerce to avoid the imposition of a double remedy when it
imposes anti-dumping duties determined pursuant to the US NME methodology simultaneously with
the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product.
B. L
EGAL BASIS OF THE COMPLAINT
 China considers that the measure s specified above are inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States under, inter alia, Articles I and VI of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19,
and 32 of the SCM Agreement, Articles 1, 2, 6, 9, 18, and Annex II(1) of the AD Agreement, and
Article 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (the Protocol of
Accession).
1. As Applied Claims
 China considers that the CWP, OTR, LWRP , and LWS anti-dumping and countervailing duty
investigations, determinations and orders, th e definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties
imposed pursuant thereto, as well as the combined effect of the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
determinations, orders, and duties in each such investigation, are inconsistent, at a minimum, with the
following obligations of the United States under the covered agreements:1

1 Unless otherwise noted, all inconsistencies relating to the GATT 1994, the SCM Agreement, and the
Protocol of Accession arise in connection with each of the CVD measures in the four identified investigations,
while all inconsistencies relating to the AD Agreem ent arise in connection with each of the anti-dumping
measures in the four identified investigations.

(a) in connection with the alleged provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration
–
(i) the US authorities' determination that certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
are "public bodies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM
Agreement;
(ii) in the absence of a valid determinati on that certain SOEs are public bodies,
the US authorities' failure to make a determination that China "entrusts or
directs" SOEs to provide goods to producers of subject merchandise, within
the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) even assuming a valid determination that certain SOEs are public bodies, the
US authorities' failure to make a determ ination that SOEs "entrust or direct"
trading companies to provide goods to producers of subject merchandise,
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement;
2
(iv) the US authorities' determination that the sale of goods by trading companies
to producers of subject merchandise confers a countervailable subsidy within
the meaning of Article 1 of the SC M Agreement and a benefit under the
guidelines set forth in Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement;
(v) the US authorities' failure to determin e whether the alleged benefit received
by trading companies was passed through to producers of subject
merchandise, in violation of Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 10,
14, 19.1, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(vi) the US authorities' inclusion in subsidy benefit calculations of only those
transactions that produced a positive be nefit, while excluding transactions
that yielded no benefit, in violation of Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and
Articles 10, 14, 19.1, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(b) in connection with the alleged provision of land and land use rights for less than
adequate remuneration –
(i) the failure of the US authorities to de monstrate specificity under Articles 2.1
and 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, and to clearly substantiate these
determinations of specificity on the basis of positive evidence, as required by
Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement;
3
(c) in connection with the alleged provision of loans on preferential terms –
(i) the US authorities' determination that certain state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs) are "public bodies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the
SCM Agreement;4
(ii) in the absence of a valid determinati on that certain SOCBs are public bodies,
the US authorities' failure to make a determination that China "entrusts or

2 The inconsistencies set forth in paras. a(iii) – a(v) do not arise in c onnection with the LWS CVD
measures.
3 The inconsistency set forth in para. b(i) does not arise in connection with the CWP CVD measures.
4 The inconsistencies set forth in paras. c(i) – c( iii) do not arise in connection with the LWRP CVD
measures.

directs" SOCBs to provide loans to producers of subject merchandise, within
the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) the failure of the US authorities to de monstrate specificity under Articles 2.1
and 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, and to clearly substantiate these
determinations of specificity on the basis of positive evidence, as required by
Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement;
(d) in connection with each instance in which th e US authorities resorted to a benchmark
outside of China for the purpose of dete rmining the existence and amount of any
alleged subsidy benefit –
(i) the US authorities' rejection of preva iling terms and conditions in China as
the basis for determining whether, and to what extent, subject producers
received a subsidy benefit under the methodologies set forth in Article 14 of
the SCM Agreement;
(ii) the US authorities' rejection of preva iling terms and conditions in China as
the basis for determining whether, and to what extent, producers of subject
merchandise received a subsidy benefit, without making a finding of "special
difficulties" as required under Article 15 of the Protocol of Accession;
(iii) the US authorities' use of benefit methodologies that the United States did not
notify to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as
required by Article 15(c) of the Protocol of Accession;
(e) in connection with all countervailing duty i nvestigations, determin ations and orders
specified above –
(i) the failure of the US authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that the
imposition of countervailing duties was in accordance with Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement, as re quired by Article 10 of the SCM
Agreement;
(ii) the use of a specific action against alle ged subsidies other than in accordance
with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the SCM
Agreement, in violation of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) the imposition of countervailing duties in a manner inconsistent with the
requirements of Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994;
(f) in connection with the US authorities' use of its NME methodology for the purpose of
a determination of dumping and the impos ition of anti-dumping duties under Article
VI of the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement, simultaneously with a determination
of subsidization and imposition of countervailing duties on the same product –
(i) the US authorities' levying of countervailing duties in excess of the amount of
the subsidy found to exist, in violation of Article 19.4 of the SCM
Agreement;
5

5 The inconsistencies set forth in paras. f(i) – f(vii) relate to each of the CVD and AD measures in the
four identified investigations, as well as to the combined effect of the CVD and AD measures in each of the
identified investigations.

(ii) the use by the US authorities of a specifi c action against subsidization that is
not in accordance with the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the SCM
Agreement, in violation of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) the US authorities' failure to take al l necessary steps to ensure that the
imposition of countervailing duties was in accordance with Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement, as re quired by Article 10 of the SCM
Agreement;
(iv) the US authorities' levying of anti -dumping and countervailing duties in
excess of the "appropriate amounts," in vi olation of Article 9.2 of the AD
Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, respectively;
(v) the US authorities' failure to make a fair comparison between the export price
and normal value, in violation of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement;
(vi) the US authorities' imposition of anti-dumping duties in excess of the amount
of dumping found to exist, in violation of Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement;
(vii) in violation of Article I of the GATT 1994, the failure of the United States to
accord to imports from China, immedi ately and unconditionally, the same
unconditional entitlement to the avoidan ce of a double remedy for the same
unfair trade practice that it accords to imports of like products from the
territories of other WTO Members. This benefit is evidenced, inter alia, by
the presumption that the US Department of Commerce has consistently
applied concerning the effects of domest ic subsidies on export prices, and by
the consistent position of the US Departme nt of Commerce that it will adjust
neither the costs of production nor the export prices in an anti-dumping duty
investigation in a manner that would produce a double remedy for the same
unfair trade practice.
(g) in connection with the conduct of the underlying anti-dumping and countervailing
duty investigations –
(i) the US authorities' failure to invite China for consultations regarding new
subsidy allegations, as required by Article 13.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(ii) the US authorities' failure to allow 30 days for responses to questionnaires
issued in connection with subsidy allega tions made after the initiation of the
investigation, as required by Article 12.1.1 of the SCM Agreement;
(iii) the US authorities' failure to take due account of any difficulties experienced
by interested parties in supplying info rmation requested in questionnaires, as
required by Article 12.11 of the SCM Agreement;
(iv) the US authorities' failure to provide notice to interested parties of the
information which the US authorities re quired to make a determination with
respect to whether certain entities are "public bodies" within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, as required by Article 12.1 of the
SCM Agreement;
(v) the US authorities' failure to inform in terested parties of the essential facts
under consideration with respect to whether certain entities are "public

bodies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, as
required by Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement;
(vi) the US authorities' failure to provide notice to interested parties of the
information which the US authorities required to determine whether the
simultaneous application of anti-dumpi ng and countervailing duties results in
a double remedy for the same unfai r trade practice, as required by
Article 12.1 of the SCM Agreement a nd Articles 2.4 and 6.1 of the AD
Agreement, as well as Annex II(1) of the AD Agreement;
(vii) the US authorities' failure to inform in terested parties of the essential facts
under consideration with respect to wh ether the simultaneous application of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties results in a double remedy for the
same unfair trade practice, as required by Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement
and Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement; and
(viii) the US authorities' use of adverse infe rences and facts available in a manner
inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, including, in
particular, those instances in which the US authorities drew "adverse
inferences" or relied upon "neutral" or "adverse" facts available, having failed
to request information from interested parties concerning the factual issue in
question.
2. As Such Claims
 Pursuant to Section 773(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c), the US Department
of Commerce determines normal value in anti-dum ping investigations involving products from
countries it has designated as non-market economies us ing the values of factors of production in
countries it has designated as market economies (so-called "surrogate values").
 In those circumstances in which the US Depa rtment of Commerce uses surrogate values for a
producer's costs of production in an anti-dumping investigation conducted in accordance with its
NME methodology, the resulting price comparison under Article 2 of the AD Agreement will
necessarily offset any subsidy received by the produ cer, at a minimum in those circumstances where
the surrogate values are higher than a respondent produ cer's putatively subsidized costs of production.
The United States has not provided the Department of Commerce with any legal authority to adjust
either the anti-dumping or countervailing duty cal culations to avoid the imposition of a double
remedy when it imposes anti-dumping duties de termined pursuant to its NME methodology
simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product. The Department of
Commerce has acknowledged the absence of any such legal authority.
 China considers that the absence of any legal authority for the Department of Commerce to
avoid the imposition of a double remedy is an omi ssion that, as such, is inconsistent with the
following obligations under the covered agreements:
• Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement, inso far as the absence of legal authority to
avoid a double remedy necessarily will lead the US authorities to levy
countervailing duties in excess of the amount of subsidy found to exist;
• Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, inso far as the absence of legal authority to
avoid a double remedy necessarily will lead the US authorities to make use of a
specific action against subsidization that is not in accordance with the GATT
1994, as interpreted by the SCM Agreement;

• Article 10 of the SCM Agreement, insofar as the absence of legal authority to
avoid a double remedy necessarily will lead the US authorities to fail to take all
necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of countervailing duties is in
accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement;
• Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement,
respectively, insofar as the absence of le gal authority to avoid a double remedy
necessarily will lead the US authorities to levy anti-dumping and countervailing
duties in excess of the "appropriate amounts";
• Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, insofa r as the absence of legal authority to
avoid a double remedy necessarily will lead the US authorities not to make a fair
comparison between the export price and normal value; and
• Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement, insofa r as the absence of legal authority to
avoid a double remedy necessarily will lead the US authorities to impose anti-
dumping duties in excess of the amount of dumping found to exist.
 In addition, the United States, in all cases, ensures that it avoids the imposition of a double
remedy for the same unfair trade practice in para llel trade remedy investigations involving imports
from WTO Members that the United Stat es has designated as market economies.
6 The United States
extends this benefit automatica lly and unconditionally to imports from WTO Members that it has
designated as market economies. To the extent th at US law does not permit the Department of
Commerce to avoid the imposition of a double remedy for the same unfair trade practice in parallel
anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations involving imports from WTO Members that the
United States has designated as non-market economi es, China considers that US law is, as such,
inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994. This is because the United States fails to accord to
imports from China, immediately and unconditionally, an advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
with respect to the method of levying import duti es or charges, and with respect to rules and
formalities in connection with importation, that it acco rds to like products originating in the territories
of other WTO Members.
 For these reasons, China considers that the measures specified above nullify and impair
benefits accruing to China under the GATT 1994, the SCM Agreement, the Protocol of Accession,
and the AD Agreement.
Anti-dumping Duty , 51 Fed. Reg. 10071 (24 March 1986); Notice of Final Results of Antidumping
Administrative Review: Low En riched Uranium from France , 69 Fed. Reg. 46501 (3 August 2004); Certain
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Germany: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
62 Fed. Reg. 18390 (15 April 1997); U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 15 F.Supp. 2d 892 (Ct. Int' l Trade
1998); Stainless Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 19153 (12 April 2004); Wheatland Tube Co v.United States, 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2007).