Document: Appellate Body United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline AB-1996-1 Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 29 April 1996
Document codes: WT/DS2/AB/R
Complainant: Venezuela
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Australia, Canada, EU, Norway
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. I, III  GATT 1994Art. 2  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

ORGANIZATION Appellate Body
United States - Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline
AB-1996-1
Report of the Appellate Body

APPELLATE BODY
United States - Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline
United States, Appellant
Brazil
Venezuela, Appellees
European Communities
Norway, Third Participants
AB-1996-1
Present:
Feliciano, Presiding Member
Beeby, Member
Matsushita, Member
I. Introductory
The United States appeals from certain conclusions on issues of law and certain legal
interpretations contained in the Panel Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, , 29 January 1996 (the "Panel Report"). That Panel had been
established to consider a dispute between the United States, on the one hand, and Venezuela, later
joined by Brazil, on the other. The dispute related to the implementation by the United States of its
domestic legislation known as the Clean Air Act of 1990 (the "CAA") and, more specifically, to the
regulation enacted by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") pursuant to
that Act, to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in
or imported into the United States. This regulation is formally entitled "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline", Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code
of Federal Regulations,1 and is commonly referred to as the Gasoline Rule.
140 CFR 80, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (16 February 1994).

A. Procedural Matters
On 21 February 1996, the United States notified the Dispute Settlement Body of its decision
to appeal certain conclusions on issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report pursuant
to Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the
"DSU")2 and simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Body, pursuant to Rule 20
of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review ( the "Working Procedures").3 Thereafter, on 4 March
1996, the United States filed its Submission as Appellant.4 Venezuela in turn filed, on 18 March 1996,
its Appellee's Submission; Brazil filed on the same day its Appellee's Submission.5 The third
participantsfollowed, the EuropeanCommunities and Norwayfiling Submissions,on 18 March 1996.6
The complete record of the Panel proceedings was duly transmitted to the Appellate Body.7
The oral hearing contemplated by Rule 27 of the Working Procedures was held on 27 and
28 March 1996.8 At the hearing, oral arguments were made respectively by the participants and the
third participants. Questions were put to them by the Members of the Appellate Body hearing the
appeal. Most of these questions were answered orally, and some were responded to in writing with
the responses being furnished both to the Appellate Body and the other participants and third participants.9
In addition,the participants and thirdparticipantswere invitedtoprovide,and didprovide,the Appellate
Body and each other with final written statements of their respective positions.10 All the participants
and third participants responded positively and punctually, which was a source of satisfaction for the
Appellate Body.
2WT/DS2/6.
3WT/AB/WP/1, 15 February 1996.
4Pursuant to Rule 21(1) of the Working Procedures.
5Pursuant to Rule 22(1) of the Working Procedures.
6Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Working Procedures.
7Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Working Procedures.
8The oral hearing was originally scheduled for 25 March 1996 but had, for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, to be
deferred to 27 and 28 March 1996.
9Rule 28 of the Working Procedures.
10Rule 28(1) of the Working Procedures.

B. The Clean Air Act and its Implementation
The CAA and its implementation by the Gasoline Rule, are described fully at paragraphs 2.1-
2.13 of the Panel Report. However, it may be convenient to recall a number of the Panel's factual
findings at this stage.
The CAA establishedtwogasolineprograms11 toensurethatpollutionfrom gasolinecombustion
does not exceed 1990 levels and that pollutants in major population centres are reduced. The first
program concerns ozone "nonattainment areas", consisting of (i) nine large metropolitan areas that
have experienced the worst summertime ozone pollution and (ii) various additional areas included at
the request of the state governors concerned. All gasoline sold to consumers in these nonattainment
areas must be "reformulated." The sale of conventional gasoline in nonattainment areas is prohibited.
The second program concerns "conventional" gasoline, which may be sold to consumers in the rest
of the United States. The implementation of both programs, which apply to gasoline sold by domestic
refiners, blenders and importers, was entrusted to the EPA. As a result, the EPA adopted the Gasoline
Rule, which relies heavily on the use of 1990 baselines as a means of determining compliance with
the CAA requirements.
1. The Reformulated Gasoline Program
The CAA established certain compositional and performance specifications for reformulated
gasoline.12 Thus, the oxygen content must not be less than 2.0 per cent by weight, the benzene content
must not exceed 1.0 per cent by volume and the gasoline must be free of heavy metals, including lead
or manganese. The performance specifications of the CAA require a 15 per cent reduction in the
emissions of both volatile organic compounds ("VOCs") and toxic air pollutants ("toxics"), and no
increase in emissions of nitrogen oxides ("NOx"). Section 80.41 of the Gasoline Rule sets out two
methods by which entities can certify their gasoline as meeting these requirements. From 1 January
1995 to 1 January 1998, domestic refiners, blenders and importers may use an interim method of
certificationcalledthe "SimpleModel", whichrequirescompliancewithfixedspecifications concerning
Reid Vapour Pressure, oxygen, benzene and toxics performance. In addition, compliance is required
with certain "non-degradation requirements" by maintaining sulphur, olefins and T-90 qualities at or
below 1990 baseline levels, on an average annual basis. As of 1 January 1998, these entities must
11Section 211(k).
12Section 211(k)(2)-(3).

comply with the "Complex Model", which more accurately predicts emissions performance. The
Complex Model is not in issue in the present dispute.
2. The Conventional Gasoline Program
In order to prevent the "dumping" of pollutants extracted from reformulated gasoline into
conventional gasoline, the CAA requires that conventional gasoline sold by domestic refiners, blenders
and importers in the United States remains as clean as 1990 baseline levels.13 Unlike the Simple Model
for reformulated gasoline, the "non-degradation" from 1990 baseline requirements for conventional
gasoline applies in respect of all conventional gasoline qualities, and not only sulphur, olefins and T-90.
Compliance is measured by comparing emissions from the conventional gasoline sold by domestic
refiners, blenders and importers against emissions from a 1990 baseline and is assessed on an annual
average basis.14
3. Baseline Establishment Rules
In respect of both reformulated gasoline (for sulphur, olefins and T-90 requirements under
the Simple Model) and conventional gasoline (for all requirements), 1990 baselines are an integral
element of the Gasoline Rule enforcement process. Accordingly, the Gasoline Rule contains detailed
baseline establishment rules.15 Baselines can be either individual (established by the entity itself) or
statutory (established by the EPA and intended to reflect average 1990 United States gasoline quality),
depending on the nature of the entity concerned.
(i) domestic refiners
Any domestic refiner which was in operation for at least six months in 1990 must establish
an individual baseline representing the quality of gasoline produced by that refiner in 1990. The Gasoline
Rule providesthree methods of establishment tobe used for thispurpose. UnderMethod 1, the domestic
refiner must use the quality data and volume records of its 1990 gasoline. If Method 1 data is not
available, the domestic refiner must use its 1990 gasoline blendstock quality data and 1990 blendstock
production records (Method 2). In the event that Method 2 data is not available, the domestic refiner
must establish an individual 1990 baseline on the basis of its post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or
13Section 211(k)(8) of the CAA.
14Section 80.90 of the Gasoline Rule.
15Section 80.91.

gasoline quality data modeled in the light of refinery changes to show 1990 gasoline composition
(Method 3).
Domestic refiners that were in operation for at least six months in 1990 are not permitted to
forego their individual baseline and use the statutory baseline established by the EPA. However,
domestic refiners that commenced operations after 1990, or operated for less than six months during
1990, are required to use the statutory baseline established by the EPA.
(ii) blenders
Blenders are required to establish an individual baseline representing the quality of their 1990
gasoline using Method 1 above. Failing this, they must use the statutory baseline established by the
EPA. Blenders may not apply an individual baseline using Methods 2 or 3.
(iii) importers
Importers of foreign gasoline are required to establish an individual baseline in respect of gasoline
imported by them during 1990, using Method 1. Like blenders, importers become subject to the statutory
baseline if, as anticipated by the EPA, the data necessary for Method 1 is unavailable.
The Gasoline Rule does not provide for foreign refiner individual baselines, although the possible
use of individual baselines for foreign refiners was examined by the EPA while drafting the Gasoline
Rule. Indeed, the EPA continued to examine the possible use of individual baselines for foreign refineries
after the adoption of the Gasoline Rule, and prepared its May 1994 proposal16 as a result. The May
1994 proposal provided for limited use by importers of individual baselines established for foreign
refineries in order to demonstrate that gasoline produced at that foreign refinery complied with the
reformulated (but not conventional) gasoline standards. The individual baselines would be determined
using Methods 1, 2 or 3, as for domestic refineries under the Gasoline Rule. However, the use of
individual baselines in such cases would be conditioned and limited in a number of ways. The EPA's
May 1994 proposal never entered into force, as the United States Congress enacted legislation in
September 1994 denying the funding necessary for its implementation.
1640 CFR 80, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22 800 (3 May 1994).

C. The Panel Report: Its Findings and Conclusions
The Panel's overall conclusions and its recommendation are set out in the following terms:
8.1 In the light of the findings above, the Panel concluded that the baseline
establishment methods contained in Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations are not consistent with Article III:4 of the General Agreement,
and cannot be justified under paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of Article XX of the
General Agreement.
8.2 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the
United States to bring this part of the Gasoline Rule into conformity with its
obligations under the General Agreement.17
On route to its overall conclusions, the Panel made the following principal findings:
(i) that the Panel's terms of reference were established after the 75 per cent rule had ceased
to have any effect, and the rule had not been mentioned in the terms of reference, and
that, in any case, it was unnecessary, in view of findings (ii), (iv), (v) and (vii) below,
to determine whether the measure at issue was inconsistent with Article I:1 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "General Agreement");18
(ii) that imported and domestic gasoline were "like products" and that since, under the
baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule, imported gasoline was effectively
prevented from benefitting from as favourable sales conditions as were afforded domestic
gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported gasoline
was treated "less favourably" than domestic gasoline. The baseline establishment rules
of the Gasoline Rule were accordingly inconsistent with Article III:4 of the General
Agreement;19
(iii) that, in view of finding (ii), it was not necessary to examine the consistency of the
Gasoline Rule with Article III:1;20
17Panel Report at p. 47.
18Panel Report, para. 6.19.
19Panel Report, para. 6.16.
20Panel Report, para. 6.17.

(iv) that the "aspect of the baseline establishment methods" found inconsistent with
Article III:4 was not justified under Article XX(b) of the General Agreement as
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health";21
(v) that the "maintenance of discrimination between imported and domestic gasoline"
contrary to Article III:4 was not justified under Article XX(d) as "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of [the General] Agreement";22
(vi) that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g)
of the General Agreement;23
(vii) that the baseline establishment rules found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 could
not be justified under Article XX(g) as a measure "relating to" the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources;24
(viii) that it was unnecessary, in the light of finding (vii), to determine whether the measure
at issue was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption";25
(ix) that it was unnecessary, in the light of finding (vii), to determine whether the measure
at issue met the conditions in the introductory clause of Article XX (sometimes referred
to as the chapeau of Article XX);
(x) that it was unnecessary, in view of findings (ii), (iv), (v) and (vii), to determine whether
the measure at issue was inconsistent with Article XXIII:1(b) as having nullified and
impaired benefits accruing under the General Agreement;26 and
21Panel Report, para. 6.29.
22Panel Report, para. 6.33.
23Panel Report, para. 6.37.
24Panel Report, para. 6.40.
25Panel Report, para. 6.41.
26Panel Report, para. 6.42.

(xi) that it was unnecessary, in the light of findings (ii), (iv), (v) and (vii), to determine
whether the measure at issue was inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (the "TBT Agreement").27
II. Issues Raised In This Appeal
A. The Claims of Error by the United States
It is important to focus upon the subject matter of this appeal. We seek to do this first by
identifying the issues which have been raised by the Appellant, the United States. In what follows
we highlight those same issues by listing certain other issues dealt with in the Panel proceedings but
whichhave notbeen broughtbefore the AppellateBodyinthisappeal, and whichwe accordinglyexclude
from consideration in this Appellate Report.
In itsNotice of Appeal, dated 21 February 1996, and its Appellant'sSubmission, dated 4 March
1996, the United States claims that the Panel erred in law, firstly, in holding that the baseline
establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule are not justified under Article XX(g) of the General Agreement
and, secondly, in its interpretation of Article XX as a whole.
More specifically, the United States assigns as error the ruling of the Panel that the baseline
establishment rules do not constitute a "measure" "relating to" the conservation of clean air within
the meaning of Article XX(g) of the General Agreement. Consequently, it is also the view of the United
States that the Panel erred in failing to proceed further in its interpretation and application of
Article XX(g), and in not finding that the baseline establishment rules satisfy the other requirements
of Article XX(g) and the introductory provisions of Article XX.
The sharply limited scope of this appeal is underscored by noting the number of findings which
the Panel had made but which have not been appealed from by the United States. Very briefly, the
United States does not appeal from the findings or rulings made by the Panel on, or in respect of, the
consistency of the baseline establishment rules with Article I:1, Article III:1, Article III:4, and
Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement and the applicability of Article XX(b) and Article XX(d)
of the General Agreement and of the TBT Agreement. Understandably, the United States has also not
27Panel Report, para. 6.43.

appealed from the Panel's ruling that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning
of Article XX(g) of the General Agreement.
B. The Claims of the Appellees and the Arguments of the Third Participants
The Appellees, Venezuela and Brazil, submit that the Appellate Body should dismiss the United
States' appeal and uphold the Panel's findings and conclusions concerning Article XX(g). In particular,
Venezuela and Brazil support the Panel's finding that the measure at issue before the Panel was not
one "relating to" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Venezuela also states that a measure
can only be "relating to" or "primarily aimed at" conservation if the measure was both: (i) primarily
intended to achieve a conservation goal; and (ii) had a positive conservation effect.
Venezuela argues that, as the United States has not met its burden with respect to the "relating
to" requirement of Article XX(g) in this appeal, the Appellate Body may uphold the Panel Report on
this issue alone, and it is not necessary to address the additional requirements of Article XX(g), nor
the requirements in the Article XX chapeau.
If the Appellate Body overturns the Panel's findings on the "relating to" component of
Article XX(g) and does proceed to examine the other requirements of Article XX(g), Venezuela and
Brazil submit that the United States has also failed to demonstrate that those requirements have been
satisfied. They argue that the measure in issue is not "made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption" as the restrictions are not imposed as direct limits on the
production or consumption of clean air, but rather upon the consumption of certain kinds of gasoline.
They further submit that clean air does not qualify as an "exhaustible natural resource" within the
meaning of Article XX(g).
With regard to the requirements in the chapeau to Article XX, Venezuela and Brazil submit
that the measure is applied in a manner which constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail." Venezuela argues that the measure constitutes
a "disguised restriction on international trade" as well.
The Appellees also raise the conditional argument that, if the Appellate Body were to overturn
the Panel's findings on Article XX(g), and not find in favour of Venezuela and Brazil as to the other
requirements of Article XX, it would then need to examine their claims under the TBT Agreement.

The third participants, the European Communities and Norway, endorse the Panel's interpretation
of "relating to" and the Panel's findings under Article XX(g). They find it difficult to accept the United
States' arguments that the measure at issue was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption," as the measure in issue did not impose restrictions on clean
air. With regard to the Article XX chapeau criteria, the European Communities and Norway both
submit that the measure is applied in a manner constituting "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail" and a "disguised restriction on international trade."
C. The Preliminary Question
A preliminary questionwas raised by the United States at the oral hearingconcerning arguments
made by Venezuela and Brazil in their respective Appellees' Submissions on the issues of whether
clean air isan exhaustible naturalresource withinthe meaning of Article XX(g) and whether the baseline
establishment rules are consistent with the TBT Agreement. The gist of the preliminary question is
that the above issues and the related arguments made by Venezuela and Brazil were not properly brought
before the Appellate Bodyin thisappeal in accordance with the WorkingProcedures. It was underscored
by the United States that Venezuela and Brazil had not appealed from the ruling of the Panel on the
clean air issue or from the non-ruling of the Panel on the applicability of the TBT Agreement. Venezuela
and Brazil had not filed Appellants' Submissions under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures. Neither
had Venezuela nor Brazil filed separate appeals under Rule 23(4) of the Working Procedures. Their
arguments on these two matters had been made in their Appellees' Submissions pursuant to Rule 22
and, as Appellees, Venezuela and Brazil could not challenge the Panel's finding on the clean air issue
and its non-finding on the TBT Agreement's applicability.
At the oral hearing, in response to questions posed by the Appellate Body, Venezuela and Brazil
confirmed that they, indeed, were not appealing the mentioned two matters. They went on, however,
to state that they believed it would be within the scope of authority of the Appellate Body, if it found
it necessary to do so, to address the results of the Panel's examination of those two issues.
In its Post-Hearing Memorandum, the United States asserted, among other things, that were
the Appellate Bodyto take up the above two matters in the present appeal, unfairnesswould be generated
vis-à-vis the United States and it would encourage a disregard of the Working Procedures. Such disregard
by the Appellate Body would, it was further stated, create difficulties for third parties who would have
to make up their minds to become third participants or not on the basis of the issues raised on appeal
as set out in the Notice of Appeal and the Appellant's Submission. The United States itself had not

raised the clean air issue and the applicability of the TBT Agreement in its appeal, and the United States
was the only Appellant in AB-1996-1.
We find the UnitedStates' submissionson thispreliminary question persuasive. The arguments
raised by Venezuela and Brazil on the clean air and TBT issues may be seen to be, in effect, conditional
appeals, that is, conditional on the Appellate Body's overturning the Panel's overall findings on
Article XX(g) and not finding in favour of Venezuela and Brazil as to the other requirements of
Article XX. This condition is not fulfilled. Even if this condition had been fulfilled, the Appellate
Body would have been most reluctant to pass upon these two issues. We observe, in the first place,
that the issues in fact raised by the Appellant, the United States, are not of the kind which cannot be
decided without at the same time necessarily resolving the clean air issue or the applicability of the
TBT Agreement. In the second place, to deal with those two issues, under the circumstances of this
appeal, would have required the Appellate Body casually to disregard its own Working Procedures
and to do so in the absence of a compelling reason grounded on, for instance, fundamental fairness
or force majeure. Venezuela and Brazil could have appealed the Panel's finding and non-finding on
the two matters by taking advantage of Rules 23(1) or 23(4) of the Working Procedures and thereby
placing the Appellate Body in a position to dispose of those issues directly in one and the same appellate
proceeding.
The acceptance by Venezuela and Brazil of the Working Procedures, and their commitment
to them, is not in question. We have no option, however, but to find that the route they chose for
addressing the two issues in question is not contemplated by the Working Procedures, and therefore,
these issues are not properly the subject of this appeal.

III. The Issue of Justification Under Article XX(g) of the General Agreement
Article XX(g) needs to be set out in full:
Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures:

(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption;

A. "Measures"
The initial issue we are asked to look at relates to the proper meaning of the term "measures"
as used both in the chapeau of Article XX and in Article XX(g). The question is whether "measures"
refers to the entire Gasoline Rule or, alternatively, only to the particular provisions of the Gasoline
Rule which deal with the establishment of baselines for domestic refiners, blenders and importers.
Cast in the foregoing terms, the issue does not appear to be a live one. True enough the Panel
Report used differing terms, or terms of shifting reference, in designating the "measures" in different
parts of the Report. The Panel Report, however, held only the baseline establishment rules of the
GasolineRule to be inconsistentwithArticle III:4, tothe extentthatsuch rulesprovided"lessfavourable
treatment" for imported than for domestic gasoline. These are the same provisions which the Panel
evaluated, and found wanting, under the justifying provisions of Article XX(g). The Panel Report
did not purport to find the Gasoline Rule itself as a whole, or any part thereof other than the baseline
establishment rules, to be inconsistent with Article III:4; accordingly, there was no need at all to examine
whether the whole of the GasolineRule or any of its other rules, was saved or justified byArticle XX(g).
The Panel here was following the practice of earlier panels in applying Article XX to provisions found
to be inconsistent with Article III:4: the "measures" to be analyzed under Article XX are the same

provisions infringing Article III:4.28 These earlier panels had not interpreted "measures" more broadly
under Article XX to include provisions not themselves found inconsistent with Article III:4. In the
present appeal, no one has suggested in their final submissions that the Appellate Body should examine
under Article XX any portion of the Gasoline Rule other than the baseline establishment rules held
to be in conflict with Article III:4. No one has urged an interpretation of "measures" which would
encompass the Gasoline Rule in its totality.29
At the oral hearing and in its Post-Hearing Memorandum, the United States complained about
the designation of the baseline establishment rules in the Panel Report and by the Appellees Venezuela
and Brazil, in such terms as "the difference in treatment", "the less favourable treatment" or "the
discrimination." It is, of course, true that the baseline establishment rules had been found by the Panel
to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the General Agreement. The frequent designation of those
provisions by the Panel in terms of its legal conclusion in respect of Article III:4, in the Appellate
Body's view, did not serve the cause of clarity in analysis when it came to evaluating the same baseline
establishment rules under Article XX(g).
B. "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources"
The Panel Report took the view that clean air was a "natural resource" that could be "depleted."
Accordingly, as already noted earlier, the Panel concluded that a policy to reduce the depletion of clean
air was a policy to conserve an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).
Shortly thereafter, however, the Panel Report also concluded that "the less favourable baseline
establishments methods" were not primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
and thus fell outside the justifying scope of Article XX(g).
28Canada- Administration oftheForeign Investment Review Act, BISD 30S/140, adopted 7 February 1984; UnitedStates -
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345, adopted 7 November 1989; United States - Taxes on Automobiles,
DS31/R (1994), unadopted.
29Although, in earlier submissions to the Appellate Body, the United States suggested that "the Gasoline Rule" should
be examined in the context of Article XX(g), in its Post-Hearing Memorandum, dated 1 April 1996, the United States confirmed
its understanding that the "measures" in issue are the baseline establishment rules contained in the Gasoline Rule.
Brazil stated, in its final submission to the Appellate Body, dated 1 April 1996, that "the ‘ measure’ with which this appeal
is concerned is the baseline methodology of the Gasoline Rule, not the entire rule itself." This would suggest a position
similar to that adopted by the United States. Thereafter, Brazil continued to state that "Brazil and Venezuela did not challenge
all portions of the Rule; they challenged only the discriminatory methods of establishing baselines."
Venezuela stated, in its summary statement, dated 29 March 1996, that "the measure to be examined is the discriminatory
measure, that is, the aspect of the Gasoline Rule that denies imported gasoline the right to use the same regulatory system
of baselines applicable to U.S. gasoline, namely, the system of individual baselines."

The Panel, addressing the task of interpreting the words "relating to", quoted with approval
the following passage from the panel report in the 1987 Herring and Salmon case:30
as the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX:(g) in
the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy
purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement
do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural
resources. The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not
have to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource,
it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to
be considered as "relating to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX:(g).
(emphasis added by the Panel)
The Panel Report then went on to apply the 1987 Herring and Salmon reasoning and conclusion
to the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule in the following manner:31
The Panel then considered whether the precise aspects of the Gasoline Rule that it had
found to violate Article III -- the less favourable baseline establishments methods that
adversely affected the conditionsof competitionfor importedgasoline-- were primarily
aimed at the conservation of natural resources. The Panel saw no direct connection
between less favourable treatment of imported gasoline that was chemically identical
to domestic gasoline, and the US objective of improving air quality in the UnitedStates.
Indeed, in the view of the Panel, being consistent with the obligation to provide no
less favourable treatment would not prevent the attainment of the desired level of
conservation of natural resources under the Gasoline Rule. Accordingly, it could not
be said that the baseline establishment methods that afforded less favourable treatment
to imported gasoline were primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources.
In the Panel's view, the above-noted lack of connection was underscored by the fact
thataffordingtreatment ofimportedgasolineconsistentwithitsArticle III:4obligations
would not in any way hinder the United States in its pursuit of its conservation policies
under the Gasoline Rule. Indeed, the United States remained free to regulate in order
to obtain whatever air quality it wished. The Panel therefore concluded that the less
favourable baseline establishments methods at issue in this case were not primarily
aimed at the conservation of natural resources.
It is not easy to follow the reasoning in the above paragraph of the Panel Report. In our view,
there is a certain amount of opaqueness in that reasoning. The Panel starts with positing that there
was "no direct connection" between the baseline establishment rules which it characterized as "less
favourable treatment" of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to the domestic gasoline and
"the US objective of improving air quality in the United States." Shortly thereafter, the Panel went
on to conclude that "accordingly, it could not be said that the baseline establishment rules that afforded
30Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD 35S/98, para. 4.6; adopted on 22 March
31Panel Report, para. 6.40.

less favourable treatment to imported gasoline were primarily aimed at the conservation of natural
resources" (emphasis added). The Panel did not try to clarify whether the phrase "direct connection"
was being used as a synonym for "primarily aimed at" or whether a new and additional element (on
top of "primarily aimed at") was being demanded.
One problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the
"less favourable treatment" of imported gasoline was "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural
resources, rather than whether the "measure", i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were "primarily
aimed at" conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal
conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn
Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided "less favourable
treatment" under Article III:4 before the Panel examined the "General Exceptions" contained in
Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that
it is the "measures" which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of "less
favourable treatment."
Furthermore, the Panel Report appears to have utilized a conclusion it had reached earlier in
holding that the baseline establishment rules did not fall within the justifying terms of Articles XX(b);
i.e. that the baseline establishment rules were not "necessary" for the protection of human, animal
or plant life. The Panel Report, it will be recalled, found that the baseline establishment rules had
not been shown by the United States to be "necessary" under Article XX(b) since alternative measures
eitherconsistentorless inconsistentwiththe GeneralAgreement were reasonablyavailable to the United
States for achieving its aim of protecting human, animal or plant life.32 In other words, the Panel Report
appears to have applied the "necessary" test not only in examining the baseline establishment rules
under Article XX(b), but also in the course of applying Article XX(g).
A principal difficulty, in the view of the Appellate Body, with the Panel Report's application
of Article XX(g) to the baseline establishment rules is that the Panel there overlooked a fundamental
rule of treaty interpretation. This rule has received its most authoritative and succinct expression in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention")33 which provides in relevant
part:
32Panel Report, paras. 6.25-6.28.
33(1969), 8 International Legal Materials 679.

ARTICLE 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
The "general rule of interpretation" set out above has been relied upon by all of the participants
and third participants, although not always in relation to the same issue. That general rule of
interpretation has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law.34 As such,
it forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" which the Appellate
Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of
the General Agreement and the other "covered agreements" of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization35 (the "WTO Agreement"). That direction reflects a measure of recognition
that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.
Applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty, like the General
Agreement, are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty's object
and purpose, the Appellate Body observes that the Panel Report failed to take adequate account of the
words actually used by Article XX in its several paragraphs. In enumerating the various categories
of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit
of differing legitimate state policies or interests outside the realm of trade liberalization, Article XX
uses different terms in respect of different categories:
"necessary" - in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "essential" - in paragraph (j);
"relating to" - in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "for the protection of" - in paragraph (f);
"in pursuance of" - in paragraph (h); and "involving" - in paragraph (i).
34See, e.g., Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), (1994), I.C.J. Reports p. 6 (International Court
of Justice); Golder v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Series A, (1995) no. 18 (European Court of Human Rights); Restrictions
to the Death Penalty Cases, (1986) 70 International Law Reports 449 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights); Jiménez
de Aréchaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century" (1978-I) 159 Recueil des Cours 1, p. 42; D. Carreau,
Droit International (3è ed., 1991) p. 140; Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed., Jennings and Watts, eds. 1992) Vol. 1,
pp. 1271-1275.
35Done at Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994.

It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to require, in respect
of each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or relationship between the measure
under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.
At the same time, Article XX(g) and its phrase, "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources," need to be read in context and in such a manner as to give effect to the purposes
and objects of the General Agreement. The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the
rest of the General Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III and XI; conversely, the context
of Articles I and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the phrase "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources" may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose
and object of Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 be given so broad a reach as effectively to emasculate
Article XX(g) and the policies and interests it embodies. The relationship between the affirmative
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests embodied in the
"General Exceptions" listed in Article XX, can be given meaning within the framework of the General
Agreement and its object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by careful
scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually
used by the WTO Members themselves to express their intent and purpose.
The 1987 Herring and Salmon report, and the Panel Report itself, gave some recognition to
the foregoing considerations of principle. As earlier noted, the Panel Report quoted the following
excerpt from the Herring and Salmon report:
as the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX(g) in
the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy
purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do
not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.36 (emphasis added)
All the participants and the third participants in thisappeal accept the propriety and applicability
of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a measure must be "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the scope of
Article XX(g).37 Accordingly, we see no need to examine this point further, save, perhaps, to note
36Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD 35S/98, para. 4.6; adopted 22 March
37We note that the same interpretation has been applied in two recent unadopted panel reports: United States - Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (1994); United States - Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R (1994).

that the phrase "primarily aimed at" is not itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus
test for inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g).
Against this background, we turn to the specific question of whether the baseline establishment
rules are appropriately regarded as "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources for the
purposes of Article XX(g). We consider that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
The baseline establishment rules, taken as a whole (that is, the provisions relating to establishment
of baselines for domestic refiners, along with the provisions relating to baselines for blenders and
importers of gasoline), need to be related to the "non-degradation" requirements set out elsewhere in
the Gasoline Rule. Those provisions can scarcely be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves,
totally divorced from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which certainly constitute part of the context
of these provisions. The baseline establishment rules whether individual or statutory, were designed
to permit scrutiny and monitoring of the level of compliance of refiners, importers and blenders with
the "non-degradation" requirements. Without baselines of some kind, such scrutiny would not be possible
and the Gasoline Rule's objective of stabilizing and preventing further deterioration of the level of
air pollutionprevailingin1990,wouldbe substantiallyfrustrated. The relationshipbetween the baseline
establishment rules and the "non-degradation" requirements of the Gasoline Rule is not negated by
the inconsistency, found by the Panel, of the baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4.
We consider that,given thatsubstantial relationship,the baseline establishmentrules cannot be regarded
as merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States for
the purposes of Article XX(g).
C. "if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption"
The Panel did not find it necessary to deal with the issue of whether the baseline establishment
rules "are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption",
since it had earlier concluded that those rules had not even satisfied the preceding requirement of
"relating to" in the sense of being "primarily aimed at" the conservation of clean air. Having been
unable to concur with that earlier conclusion of the Panel, we must now address this second requirement
of Article XX(g), the United States having, in effect, appealed from the failure of the Panel to proceed
further with its inquiry into the availability of Article XX(g) as a justification for the baseline
establishment rules.

The claim of the United States is that the second clause of Article XX(g) requires that the burdens
entailed by regulating the level of pollutants in the air emitted in the course of combustion of gasoline,
must not be imposed solely on, or in respect of, imported gasoline.
On the other hand, Venezuela and Brazil refer to prior panel reports which include statements
to the effect that tobe deemed as "made effective inconjunction with restrictionson domestic production
or consumption", a measure must be "primarily aimed at" making effective certain restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.38 Venezuela and Brazil also argue that the United States has
failed to show the existence of restrictions on domestic production or consumption of a natural resource
under the Gasoline Rule since clean air was not an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning
of Article XX(g). Venezuela contends, finally, that the United States has not discharged its burden
of showing that the baseline establishment rules make the United States' regulatory scheme "effective."
The claim of Venezuela is, in effect, that to be properly regarded as "primarily aimed at" the conservation
of natural resources, the baseline establishment rules must not only "reflect a conservation purpose"
but also be shown to have had "some positive conservation effect."39
The Appellate Body considers that the basic international law rule of treaty interpretation,
discussed earlier, that the terms of a treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning, in context, so as
to effectuate its object and purpose, is applicable here, too. Viewed in this light, the ordinary or natural
meaning of "made effective" when used inconnectionwitha measure - a governmental act orregulation-
may be seen to refer to such measure being "operative", as "in force", or as having "come into effect."40
Similarly, the phrase "in conjunction with" may be read quite plainly as "together with" or "jointly
with."41 Taken together, the second clause of Article XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental
measures like the baseline establishment rules being promulgated or brought into effect together with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption of natural resources. Put in a slightly different
manner, we believe that the clause "if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
ondomestic productorconsumption"isappropriatelyread as a requirement that the measures concerned
impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline.
38Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD 35S/98, paras. 4.6-4.7; adopted
22 March 1988. Also, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (1994), unadopted; and United States -
Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R (1994), unadopted.
39Venezuela's Appellee's Submission, dated 18 March 1996; Venezuela's Statement at the Oral Hearing, dated
27 March 1996.
40The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (L. Brown, ed., 1993), Vol. I, p. 786.
41Id., p. 481.

The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of
conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.
There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported
products. Indeed, where there is identity of treatment - constituting real, not merely formal, equality
of treatment - it is difficult to see how inconsistency with Article III:4 would have arisen in the first
place. On the other hand, if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at
all, and all limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted as
primarily or even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals.42 The measure would
simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods.
In the present appeal, the baseline establishment rules affect both domestic gasoline and imported
gasoline, providing for - generally speaking - individual baselines for domestic refiners and blenders
and statutory baselines for importers. Thus, restrictions on the consumption or depletion of clean air
by regulating the domestic production of "dirty" gasoline are established jointly with corresponding
restrictions with respect to imported gasoline. That imported gasoline has been determined to have
been accorded "less favourable treatment" than the domestic gasoline in terms of Article III:4, is not
material for purposes of analysis under Article XX(g). It might also be noted that the second clause
of Article XX(g) speaks disjunctively of "domestic production or consumption."
We do not believe, finally, that the clause "if made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption" was intended to establish an empirical "effects test" for the
availability of the Article XX(g) exception. In the first place, the problem of determining causation,
well-known in both domestic and international law, is always a difficult one. In the second place,
in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years,
may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be
observable. The legal characterization of such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon
occurrence of subsequent events. We are not, however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable
effects of a measure is never relevant. In a particular case, should it become clear that realistically,
42Some illustration is offered in the Herring and Salmon case which involved, inter alia, a Canadian prohibition of exports
of unprocessed herring and salmon. This prohibition effectively constituted a ban on purchase of certain unprocessed fish
by foreign processors and consumers while imposing no corresponding ban on purchase of unprocessed fish by domestic
processors and consumers. The prohibitions appeared to be designed to protect domestic processors by giving them exclusive
access to fresh fish and at the same time denying such raw material to foreign processors. The Panel concluded that these
export prohibitions were not justified by Article XX(g). BISD 35S/98, para. 5.1, adopted 22 March 1988. See also the
Panel Report in the United States - Prohibition ofImports of Tuna and TunaProducts from Canada, BISD 29S/91, paras. 4.10-
4.12; adopted on 22 February 1982.

a specific measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, it
would very probably be because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation to begin
with. In other words, it would not have been "primarily aimed at" conservation of natural resources
at all.
IV. The Introductory Provisions of Article XX of the General Agreement: Applying the
Chapeau of the General Exceptions
Havingconcluded, inthe preceding section, thatthe baselineestablishmentrules of the Gasoline
Rule fall within the terms of Article XX(g), we come to the question of whether those rules also meet
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. In order that the justifying protection of Article XX
may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular
exceptions - paragraphs (a) to (j) - listedunder Article XX; itmust also satisfythe requirements imposed
by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional
justification by reason of characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of
the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.
The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific
contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied.43 It is, accordingly, important
to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the
prevention of "abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX]."44 This insight
drawn from the drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is animated by the
principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should
not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the
substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in
other words, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with
due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other
parties concerned.
The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within one of the
exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute
43This was noted in the Panel Report on United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD 30S/107,
para. 56; adopted on 26 May 1983.
44EPCT/C.11/50, p. 7; quoted in Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Volume I, p. 564 (1995).

abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of
necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g),
encompasses the measure at issue.
The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofitable one if it involved no
more than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline establishment rules were inconsistent
with Article III:4. That would also be true if the finding were one of inconsistency with some other
substantive rule of the General Agreement. The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to
the same standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred.
To proceed down that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the
exceptions inparagraphs (a) to(j) of meaning. Such recourse wouldalso confuse the questionof whether
inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate question arising under the
chapeau of Article XX as towhether that inconsistencywas neverthelessjustified. One of the corollaries
of the "general rule of interpretation" in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning
and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result
in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.45
The chapeau, it will be seen, prohibits such application of a measure at issue (otherwise falling
within the scope of Article XX(g)) as would constitute
(a) "arbitrary discrimination" (between countries where the same conditions prevail);
(b) "unjustifiable discrimination" (with the same qualifier); or
(c) "disguised restriction" on international trade.
The textof the chapeau isnot withoutambiguity,includingone relatingtothe fieldof application
of the standards its contains: the arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination standards and the disguised
restriction oninternational trade standard. It may be asked whether these standards do nothave different
fields of application. Such a question was put to the United States in the course of the oral hearing.
It was asked whether the words incorporated into the first two standards "between countries where
the same conditions prevail" refer to conditions in importing and exporting countries, or only to
conditions in exporting countries. The reply of the United States was to the effect that it interpreted
45E.g., Corfu Channel Case (1949) I.C.J. Reports, p.24 (International Court of Justice); Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad) (1994) I.C.J. Reports, p. 23 (International Court of Justice); 1966 Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, Vol. II at 219; Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed., Jennings and Watts eds., 1992), Volume 1,
1280-1281; P. Dallier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public, 5è ed. (1994) para. 17.2); D. Carreau, Droit International,
(1994) para. 369.

thatphrase as referring toboth the exporting countriesand importingcountriesand as between exporting
countries. It also said that the language spoke for itself, but there was no reference to third parties;
while some thought that this was only between exporting countries inter se, there is no support in the
text for that view. No such question was put to the United States concerning the field of application
of the third standard - disguised restriction on international trade. But the United States put forward
arguments designed to show that in the case under appeal, it had met all the standards set forth in the
chapeau. In doing so, it clearly proceeded on the assumption that, whatever else they might relate
to in another case, they were relevant to a case of national treatment where the Panel had found a
violation of Article III:4. At no point in the appeal was that assumption challenged by Venezuela or
Brazil. Venezuela argued that the United States had failed to meet all the standards contained in the
chapeau. So did Norway and the European Communities as third participants. In short, the field of
application of these standards was not at issue.
The assumption on which all the participants proceeded is buttressed by the fact that the chapeau
says that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contractingpartyof measures ..." The exceptionslisted inArticle XX thus relate to allof the obligations
under the General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the most-favoured-nation obligation,
of course, but others as well. Effect is more easily given to the words "nothing in this Agreement",
and Article XX as a whole including its chapeau more easily integrated into the remainder of the General
Agreement, if the chapeau is taken to mean that the standards it sets forth are applicable to all of the
situations in which an allegation of a violation of a substantive obligation has been made and one of
the exceptions contained in Article XX has in turn been claimed.
Against this background, we see no need to decide the matter of the field of application of
the standards set forth in the chapeau nor to make a ruling at variance with the common understanding
of the participants.46
46We note in this connection that two previous panels had occasion to apply the chapeau. In United States - Imports
of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD 30S/107; adopted on 26 May 1983, the panel had before it a ban on imports,
and an exclusion order of the United States' International Trade Commission, of certain automotive spring assemblies which
the Commission had found, under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to have infringed valid United States patents. The
panel there held that the exclusion order had not been applied in a manner which would constitute a means of "arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination against countries where the same conditions prevail," because that order was directed against
imports of infringing assemblies "from all foreign sources, and not just from Canada." At the same time, the same order
was also examined and found not to be "a disguised restriction on international trade." Id., paras. 54-56. See also United
States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products, BISD 29S/91, para. 4.8; adopted 22 February 1982.
It may be observed that the term "countries" in the chapeau is textually unqualified; it does not say "foreign
countries", as did Article 4 of the 1927 League of Nations International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export
Prohibitions and Restrictions, 97 L.N.T.S. 393. Neither does the chapeau say "third countries" as did, e.g., bilateral trade
(continued...)

"Arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction" on
international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It
is clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It
is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does
not exhaust the meaning of "disguised restriction." We consider that "disguised restriction", whatever
else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of
an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations
pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination", may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a "disguised restriction"
on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding
abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.
There was more than one alternative course of action available to the United States in
promulgating regulations implementing the CAA. These included the imposition of statutory baselines
without differentiation as between domestic and imported gasoline. This approach, if properly
implemented, could have avoided any discrimination at all. Among the other options open to the United
States was to make available individual baselines to foreign refiners as well as domestic refiners. The
United States has put forward a series of reasons why either of these courses was not, in its view,
realistically open to it and why, instead, it had to devise and apply the baseline establishment rules
contained in the Gasoline Rule.
In explaining why individual baselines for foreign refiners had not been put in place, the United
States laid heavy stress upon the difficulties which the EPA would have had to face. These difficulties
related to anticipated administrative problems that individual baselines for foreign refiners would have
generated. This argument was made succinctly by the United States in the following terms:
Verification on foreign soil of foreign baselines, and subsequent enforcement actions,
presentsubstantialdifficultiesrelatingtoproblemsarisingwheneveracountryexercises
enforcement jurisdiction over foreign persons. In addition, even if individual baselines
were established for several foreign refiners, the importer would be tempted to claim
the refinery of origin that presented the most benefits in terms of baseline restrictions,
46(...continued)
agreements negotiated by the United States under the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act; e.g. the Trade Agreement
between the United States of America and Canada, 15 November 1935, 168 L.N.T.S. 356 (1936). These earlier treaties
are here noted, not as pertaining to the travaux preparatoires of the General Agreement, but simply to show how in comparable
treaties, a particular intent was expressed with words not found in printer's ink in the General Agreement.

and tracking the refinery or origin would be very difficult because gasoline is a fungible
commodity. The United States should not have to prove that it cannot verify information
and enforce its regulations in every instance in order to show that the same enforcement
conditionsdonotprevailintheUnitedStatesand othercountries... Theimpracticability
of verification and enforcement of foreign refiner baselines in this instance shows that
the "discrimination" is based on serious, not arbitrary or unjustifiable, concerns
stemming from differentconditionsbetween enforcement ofitslawsinthe UnitedStates
and abroad.47
Thus, according to the United States, imported gasoline was relegated to the more exacting
statutory baseline requirement because of these difficulties of verification and enforcement. The United
States statedthatverificationand enforcement of the GasolineRule's requirementsfor importedgasoline
are "much easier when the statutory baseline is used" and that there would be a "dramatic difference"
inthe burdenofadministeringrequirements forimportedgasolineif individualbaselineswere allowed.48
While the anticipated difficulties concerning verification and subsequent enforcement are doubtless
real to some degree, the Panel viewed them as insufficient to justify the denial to foreign refiners of
individual baselines permitted to domestic refiners. The Panel said:
While the Panel agreed that it would be necessary under such a system to ascertain
the origin of gasoline, the Panel could not conclude that the United States had shown
that this could not be achieved by other measures reasonably available to it and
consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement. Indeed, the Panel noted
that a determination of origin would often be feasible. The Panel examined, for
instance, the case of a direct shipment to the United States. It considered that there
was no reason to believe that, given the usual measures available in international trade
for determination of origin and tracking of goods (including documentary evidence
and third party verification) there was any particular difficulty sufficient to warrant
the demands of the baseline establishment methods applied by the United States.49

In the view of the Panel, the United States had reasonably available to it data for, and
measures of, verification and assessment which were consistent or less inconsistent
with Article III:4. For instance, although foreign data may be formally less subject
to complete control by US authorities, this did not amount to establishing that foreign
data could not in any circumstances be sufficiently reliable to serve U.S. purposes.
This, however, was the practical effect of the application of the Gasoline Rule. In
the Panel's view, the United States had not demonstrated that data available from foreign
refiners was inherently less susceptible to established techniques of checking,
verification, assessment and enforcement than data for other trade in goods subject
47Para. 55 of the Appellant's Submission, dated 4 March 1996. The United States was in effect making the same point
when, at pages 11 and 12 of its Post-Hearing Memorandum, it argued that the conditions were not the same as between the
United States, on the one hand, and Venezuela and Brazil on the other.
48Supplementary responses by the United States to certain questions of the Appellate Body, dated 1 April 1996.
49Panel Report, para. 6.26.

to US regulation. The nature of the data in this case was similar to data relied upon
by the United States in other contexts, including, for example, under the application
of antidumping laws. In an antidumping case, only when the information was not
supplied or deemed unverifiable did the United States turn to other information. If
a similar practice were to be applied in the case of the Gasoline Rule, then importers
could, for instance, be permitted to use the individual baselines of foreign refiners for
imported gasoline from those refiners, with the statutory baseline being applied only
when the source of imported gasoline could not be determined or a baseline could not
be established because of an absence of data.50
We agree with the finding above made in the Panel Report. There are, as the Panel Report
found, established techniques for checking, verification, assessment and enforcement of data relating
to imported goods, techniques which in many contexts are accepted as adequate to permit international
trade - trade between territorial sovereigns - to go on and grow. The United States must have been
aware that for these established techniques and procedures to work, cooperative arrangements with
both foreign refiners and the foreign governments concerned would have been necessary and appropriate.
At the oral hearing, in the course of responding to an enquiry as to whether the EPA could have adapted,
forpurposesof establishingindividualrefinery baselinesfor foreignrefiners, procedures for verification
of information found in U.S. antidumping laws, the United States said that "in the absence of refinery
cooperation and the possible absence of foreign government cooperation as well", it was unlikely that
the EPA auditors would be able to conduct the on-site audit reviews necessary to establish even the
overall quality of refineries' 1990 gasoline.51 From this statement, there arises a strong implication,
it appears to the Appellate Body, that the United States had not pursued the possibility of entering into
cooperative arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had, not to the point
where it encountered governments that were unwilling to cooperate. The record of this case sets out
the detailed justifications put forward by the United States. But it does not reveal what, if any, efforts
had been taken by the United States to enter into appropriate procedures in cooperation with the
governmentsof Venezuela and Brazilsoastomitigatethe administrativeproblemspleaded bythe United
States.52 The fact that the United States Congress might have intervened, as it did later intervene, in
50Panel Report, para. 6.28.
51Supplementary responses to the United States to certain questions of the Appellate Body, dated 1 April 1996.
52While it is not for the Appellate Body to speculate where the limits of effective international cooperation are to be found,
reference may be made to a number of precedents that the United States (and other countries) have considered it prudent
to use to help overcome problems confronting enforcement agencies by virtue of the fact that the relevant law and the authority
of the enforcement of the agency does not hold sway beyond national borders. During the course of the oral hearing, attention
was drawn to the fact that in addition to the antidumping law referred to by the Panel in the passage cited above, there were
other US regulatory laws of this kind, e.g., in the field of anti-trust law, securities exchange law and tax law. There are
cooperative agreements entered into by the US and other governments to help enforce regulatory laws of the kind mentioned
and to obtain data from abroad. There are such agreements, inter alia, in the anti-trust and tax areas. There are also, within
the framework of the WTO, the Agreement on theImplementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, (the "Antidumping Agreement"),
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM Agreement") and the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection,
all of which constitute recognition of the frequency and significance of international cooperation of this sort.

the process by denying funding, is beside the point: the United States, of course, carries responsibility
for actions of both the executive and legislative departments of government.
In its submissions, the United States also explained why the statutory baseline requirement
was not imposed on domestic refiners as well. Here, the United States stressed the problems that
domestic refineries would have faced had they been required to comply with the statutory baseline.
The Panel Report summarized the United States' argument in the following terms:
The United States concluded that, contrary to Venezuela's and Brazil's claim, Article XX
did not require adoption of the statutory baseline as a national standard even if the
difficulties associated with the establishment of individual baselines for importers were
insurmountable. Application of the statutory baseline to domestic producers of
reformulated and conventional gasoline in 1995 would have been physically and
financially impossible because of the magnitude of the changes required in almost all
US refineries; it thus would have caused a substantial delay in the programme.
Weighing the feasibility of policy options in economic or technical terms in order to
meet an environmental objective was a legitimate consideration, and did not, in itself,
constitute protectionism, as alleged by Venezuela and Brazil. Article XX did not require
a government to choose the most expensive possible way to regulate its environment.53
(emphasis added)
Clearly, the United States did not feel it feasible to require its domestic refiners to incur the
physical and financial costs and burdens entailed by immediate compliance with a statutory baseline.
The United States wished to give domestic refiners time to restructure their operations and adjust to
the requirements in the Gasoline Rule. This may very well have constituted sound domestic policy
from the viewpoint of the EPA and U.S. refiners. At the same time we are bound to note that, while
the United States counted the costs for its domestic refiners of statutory baselines, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that it did other than disregard that kind of consideration when it came to foreign
refiners.
We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States: to explore adequately
means, including in particular cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating
the administrative problems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting individual baselines
for foreign refiners; and to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition
of statutory baselines. In our view, these two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for the
Panel to determine that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in the first place. The resulting
discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable. In the light
53Panel Report, para. 3.52.

of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their
application,constitute"unjustifiablediscrimination"anda "disguisedrestrictiononinternationaltrade."
We hold, in sum, that the baseline establishment rules, although within the terms of Article XX(g),
are not entitled to the justifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole.
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons set out in the preceding sections of this report, the Appellate Body has reached
the following conclusions:
(a) the Panel erred in law in its conclusion that the baseline establishment rules contained
in Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations did not fall within the terms
of Article XX(g) of the General Agreement;
(b) the Panel accordingly also erred in law in failing to decide whether the baseline
establishment rules contained in Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations
fell within the ambit of the chapeau of Article XX of the General Agreement;
(c) the baseline establishment rules contained in Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations fail to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the General
Agreement, and accordingly are not justified under Article XX of the General
Agreement.
The foregoing legal conclusions modify the conclusions of the Panel as set out in paragraph 8.1
of its Report. The Appellate Body's conclusions leave intact the conclusions of the Panel that were
not the subject of appeal.
The Appellate Body recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States
to bring the baseline establishment rules contained in Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement.
It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this does not mean. It does
not mean, or imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution
or, more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the fact that

Article XX of the General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state interests -
including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources -
to find expression. The provisions of Article XX were not changed as a result of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision
on Trade and Environment,54 there is specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of
coordinating policies on trade and the environment. WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy
to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their
environmentalobjectivesand theenvironmentallegislationtheyenactand implement. Sofar asconcerns
the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General
Agreement and the other covered agreements.
Signed in the original at Geneva this 22nd day of April 1996 by:
Florentino P. Feliciano
Presiding Member
___________________________ _______________________________
Christopher Beeby Mitsuo Matsushita
Member Member
54Adopted by Ministers at the Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994.