Document: WT/DS331/R Page B-1 ANNEX B EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE THIRD PARTIES Contents Page Annex B-1 Executive Summary of the Thir d Party Submission of the European Communities – 4 September 2006
Date: 4 September 2006
Document codes: WT/DS331/R
Complainant: Guatemala
Respondent: Mexico
Third parties: China, EU, Honduras, Japan, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.1, 5.4, 6.4, 6.9, 9.1, 9.3, 18.1, 6.6, 6.8, 6.13, 6.7, 6.7, 2.2, 6.2, 12.2, 6.5  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994Art. 1, 18.1  Anti-dumping

ANNEX B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE
THIRD PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex B-1 Executive Summary of the Thir d Party Submission of the European
Communities – 4 September 2006
B-2
Annex B-2 Executive Summary of the Third Party Submission of the
United States – 4 September 2006
B-5
Annex B-3 Executive Summary of the Third Party Submission of Japan –

B-10
Annex B-4 Third Party Oral Statement of the European Communities B-13
Annex B-5 Third Party Oral Statement of the United States B-17
Annex B-6 Third Party Oral Statement of Japan B-19

ANNEX B-1

THIRD PARTY STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(4 September 2006)

1. The European Communities, as a third party, is making this submission owing to its general
interest in the correct interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (AD Agreement). In doing so, it
will focus its remarks on certain issues, reserving the right to address others in its oral submission.
2. Regarding the initiation of the investigation , the parties do not appear to disagree on the
interpretation of Article 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement, but rather, on the application of those
provisions in the specific case at issue. Guatemal a claims that the application for initiation of the
investigation lacked, in four r espects, sufficient evidence of dump ing; that it lacked sufficient
evidence of injury in relation to the volume of impo rts; and that the Ministry of the Economy (SE)
failed to properly examine the accuracy and adequa cy of the evidence of dumping and injury in the
application.
3. To resolve these issues, the Eu ropean Communities considers the use of Articles 2 and 3 of
the AD Agreement to interpret Article 5.2 and 5.3 (and the use of the former to interpret the latter), as
was done in Guatemala – Cement II , to be correct, and suggests that the Panel should do likewise in
this case.
4. If the Panel were to reach the conclusion that the application for initiation lacked sufficient
evidence of dumping and injury, the European Commun ities considers that there would be no need to
assess whether the SE properly examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence of dumping and
injury in the application.
5. Regarding the definition of the allegedly dumped product , ("product under consideration"),
the parties agree on the fact that the definition in both the application and the Initiating Resolution
(pipes and tubes for conduction of a diameter of one half to four inches, produced under a certain
technical standard from hot-rolled sheet) was expanded on two occasions: first, in the Preliminary
Resolution, to include pipes and tubes of more than four and up to six inches in diameter, and second,
in the Final Resolution, to include structural pipes and tubes of one half to four inches in diameter.
6. The discrepancies essentially lie in the appreciation of these changes from the standpoint of
various provisions of the AD Agreement. It should be noted in this connection that Article 5.2(ii) of
the AD Agreement stipulates that the application must contain "a complete description of the
allegedly dumped product", although it is true that Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement provides that the
application shall contain "such info rmation as is reasonably available to the applicant", and that in
US – Softwood Lumber , the Panel pointed out that the AD Agreement contained no instructions for
determining the "product under consideration".
7. Nevertheless, the European Communities agre es with Guatemala on the importance of a
proper definition of the product u nder consideration from the outset of the procedure, although, as
Guatemala states, this does not preclude such minor clarifications to the definition as may be
necessary. Guatemala includes in its submission a list, which the European Communities considers
accurate, of the various implications of the defin ition of the product with respect to the different
components and phases of an anti-dumping investigation: definition of the like product, definition of
the domestic industry and its level of support for the initiation of the investigation, and determination
of dumping, injury, and causal link.

8. These implications have an impact on essentia l aspects of the investigation, on the
identification by the interested parties (exporters, im porters and industry) of the information that they
must or can supply, and on the investigating authority's examination. The importance of these
implications increases as the procedure advances. Thus, a change in the definition of the product in
the Preliminary Resolution, as occurred in this cas e, means that the information provided by the
exporters or the foreign producers in their reply to the questionnaires will be incomplete.
9. The problem is more serious if, as also occu rred in the case at issue, the change in the
description of the product under consideration is made in the Final Resolution, since we are now faced
with a new problem: the data on which the Final R esolution is based have not been discussed in the
course of the procedure, and will not be discussed, be cause the procedure has been finalized. In other
words, the authorities will have failed to comply with their obligation to inform the interested parties,
prior to the adoption of the Final Determination, of the essential facts, as we shall see later on, and
this, in its turn, results in the violation of the right s of the parties to defend their interests (Article 6.2
of the AD Agreement).
10. The parties differ on the consistency of the investigation period
, which ran from 1 July to
31 December 2000, while the Initiating Resolution w as issued on 14 August 2001, i.e. seven and a
half months later.
11. The European Communities shares Guatemala's interpretation of the application of the
teachings from Mexico – Rice to the case at issue. Although in this case, the time elapsed was not
fifteen months, but seven and a half months, a diffe rence of more than six months is too much to
consider the investigation period as being representativ e, and is inconsistent with the obligation under
Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement to carry out an objective examination based on objective evidence.
We recall the statement of the Appellate Body that more recent data are likely to provide better
indications about current injury.
12. At the same time, in this case we have all of the other factors to which the Panel in Mexico –
Rice attributed importance in its evaluation of the facts and that the Appellate Body listed in its report.
Contrary to what Mexico has stated in this case, in Mexico – Rice , the suggestion that the
investigation period proposed by the applicant was accepted "knowing that that period had been
proposed because it allegedly reflected the maximu m penetration of exports " was not taken into
account.
13. Moreover, the European Communities considers th e fact that in this case a full examination
was conducted of the information provided in the application for initiation, and that a request for
additional information was made, to be irrelevant to the issue before us unless Mexico can
demonstrate that from that examination it deduced that the information relating to the period of
investigation conveyed indications as to current injury and constituted an appropriate basis for
determining whether there was current injury, as stated by the Appellate Body in Mexico – Rice.
14. The European Communities also agrees with Guatemala's analysis that in the present case, the
use of information from the second half only of the three years from 1998 to 2000 for the injury
analysis was not objective and representative, and was therefore inconsistent with the AD Agreement.
15. The European Communities notes that there is no data whatsoever in the record to suggest
that the selective use of the second half of each of three years rather than the complete years is
justified by seasonal considerations or factors.
16. As with respect to the previous issue, the teachings of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Rice
are fully applicable to this case.

17. The European Communities also agrees with Guatemala's analysis that in the present case, the
use of information relating to the factor s based on different sets of information
 from different
companies within the domestic industry, as summari zed by Guatemala in the table appearing in its
written submission, was not coherent, and conseque ntly, it was not objective and it was inconsistent
with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
18. In its written submission, Mexico does not respond to Guatemala's claims in this respect, but
merely states that under Article 4.1 of the AD Agre ement, there are two ways of complying with the
obligation to examine the domestic industry: by examining the producers in their totality, or by
examining a significant portion of the producers. Ho wever, this is not what Guatemala claims: it
does not refer to the representativeness of the data, but rather, to their incoherent and arbitrary use.
19. Guatemala points out that in violation of Artic le 6.9 of the AD Agreement, the SE failed to
inform the interested parties of two essential facts : the rejection, based on the verification visit, of the
information on prices provided by the exporter and th e inclusion of structural pipes and tubes in the
definition of the product under investigation.
20. Although Mexico rejected the first claim, it did so through a generic reference to the
Preliminary Resolution and the records of the hear ing, so that the European Communities was unable
to conduct the necessary verification.
21. At the same time, as already mentioned, the in clusion of structural pipes and tubes in the
definition of the product under inv estigation took place in the Final Resolution, hence violating the
Article 6.9 requirement that the authorities inform all interested parties of the essential facts under
consideration "before a final determination is made".
22. Although not very clearly, Guatemala states that contrary to the requirements of Article 6.5 of
the AD Agreement, the SE failed to ass ess whether the confidential treatment requested by the
applicant of the invoice and price quotation attached to the application was justified, and failed to ask
the applicant for a non-confidential summary.
23. Since it is unable to verify the content of the confidential information, the European
Communities will refrain from examining this element, concerning which Mexico merely pointed out
that information expressed in numbers could not be summarized.
24. Mexico further responds that "the justification for designating a piece of information as
confidential is sufficient provided the investigati ng authority considers this to be the case". The
explanation is somewhat tautological, and fails to clarify where in the corresponding decision there is
any explanation of the motives that would help to understand, and control, the reasons that led the
investigating authority to the conclusion that the information was confidential.
25. Finally, it is unacceptable that a WTO Member sh ould consider, as Mexico suggests, that its
domestic legislation on access to confidential inform ation in the hands of the administration can
replace the obligations set forth in Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement. That Article requires the
authorities to clarify whether a request for confidentiality is warranted, and if it is not, and the supplier
insists that it should not be disclosed, the author ities may disregard such information unless it can be
demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct. This
procedure cannot simply be replaced by another pro cedure such as the one set forth in Article 80 of
Mexico's Foreign Trade Act, supplemented by Article 147 of the Regulations thereto.

ANNEX B-2

THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES

(4 September 2006)

INTRODUCTION

 The United States makes this third party submissi on to provide the Panel with its view of the
proper legal interpretation of certain provisions of the Agreement on Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "AD Agreement") and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") that are relevant to this dispute.
The United States addresses in this submission the proper interpretation of: (1) Article 5.2 of
the AD Agreement; (2) Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement; and (3) Article 19.1 of
the DSU. The United States also comments on several aspects of the factual record in this dispute.

 Guatemala claims that Mexico breached Artic le 5.2 of the AD Agreement because it initiated
an investigation based on an application that l acked sufficient evidence of dumping and injury.
Specifically, regarding dumping, Guatemala argues that the evidence contained in the application
concerning normal value – one sales invoice and on e price quote – was insufficient for purposes of
initiation because: (1) the invoice and price quote are not related to the exporter named in the
application; (2) the price quote is not an "actual" sales price; (3) the single sale represented by the
invoice was compared to a multiple-month average expor t price; and (4) evidence of prices for two
models is not representative of the "fu ll range of products under investigation."
1 Regarding injury, it
argues that the evidence in the application was insufficient because it included volume and price
information for "all imports" entering the country unde r two tariff classifications, despite the fact that
other imported pipes and tubes that also entered th e country under these tariff classifications had been
"explicitly excluded from the investigation."2

 Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement does not dictate that an application must contain a particular
form or quantum of evidence regarding dumping or injury. Rather, it requires that an application
contain such information as is "reasonably available to the applicant." What is "reasonably available"
necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case.3

 Thus, depending on the circumstances, an inv estigating authority may decide to initiate an
investigation based on an application that contai ns home-market pricing information solely from a
producer not identified in the application. Article 5.2(iii) requires only that an application contain
home-market price inform ation specific to "the product in question" ( i.e., the "allegedly dumped
product" referred to in subparagraph (ii)).

1 See First Written Submission of Guatemala, paras. 69-80.

2 First Written Submission of Guatemala, para. 81.

3 See United States – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB) , para. 84 ("The word 'reasonable' implies a degree of
flexibility that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case. What is 'reasonable' in one
set of circumstances may prove to be less than 'reasonable' in different circumstances.").

 Similarly, an investigating authority is not re quired to summarily reject an application based
partially or solely on a price quote, as opposed to an "actual" price. Article 5.2(iii) refers to
"information on" prices, and a price quote provides "information on" prices. If the drafters had
intended to require nothing short of "actual" pri ces – regardless of the circumstances – they would
have done so.
4 Nor is an investigating authority required to summarily reject an application (1) that
only provides home-market pricing information with r espect to some, but not all, models or types of
the product in question 5 or (2) that provides information on the volume of the allegedly dumped
imports using import data from tariff classifications that are broader than the product in question.
Again, the relevant question is whether more sp ecific or accurate information was "reasonably
available" to the applicant.6

 Guatemala claims that, "based on the specific circumstances of the investigation in question,"
Mexico breached Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because it selected a period of
investigation that was too remote to allow for th e gathering of positive evidence to be used as the
basis for an objective examination of injury – in much the same way as occurred in Mexico – Rice .
Mexico, on the other hand, attempts to distinguish this case from Mexico – Rice.

 It is worth recalling that the Panel in Mexico – Rice did not base its findings solely on the
"temporal gap" between the period of investigation and the initiation of the investigation. As the
Appellate Body recognized:

The Panel, as trier of the facts, gave weight to other factors: (i) the period of
investigation chosen by [Mexico's authorit y] was that proposed by the petitioner;
(ii) Mexico did not establish that practical problems necessitated this particular period
of investigation; (iii) it was not established that updating the information was not
possible; (iv) no attempt was made to upda te the information; and (v) Mexico did
not provide any reason – apart from the allega tion that it is Mexico's general practice
to accept the period of investigation submitted by the petition – why more recent
information was not sought. Thus, it is not only the remoteness of the period of
investigation, but also these other circumstances that formed the basis for the Panel to
conclude that a prima facie case was established.
7
 Based on the submissions the United States has recei ved in this dispute, many of these "other
circumstances" appear to be present in this case in much the same way as they were in Mexico – Rice.
Mexico acknowledges that, as in Mexico – Rice , the period of investigation chosen by its authority
was that proposed by the petitioner 8, and Mexico did not assert during th e investigation or in its First
Written Submission that it was not possible to updat e the information. Moreover, Mexico has not

4 See, e.g., AD Agreement, Article 2.2.2 (requiring that, when constructing normal value for purposes
of determining dumping, the amounts for administrative, selling, and general costs and for profits shall be based
on "actual data").

5 See United States – Softwood Lumber AD Final (Panel), paras. 7.121-7.123.

6 See also United States – Softwood Lumber AD Final (Panel) , para. 7.54 ("It seems to us that the
'reasonably available' language was intended to avoi d putting an undue burden on the applicant to submit
information which is not reasonably available to it. It is not, in our view, intended to require an applicant to
submit all information that is reasonably available to it. ... This is particularly true where such information might
be redundant or less reliable than information contained in the application.").

7 Mexico – Rice (AB), para. 167.

8 First Written Submission of Mexico, para. 164.

asserted that it attempted to update this information during the investigation. It also has not provided
any reason why more recent information was not sought.
 Mexico makes three points in attemp ting to distinguish this case from Mexico – Rice: (1) the
gap between the end of the period of investigation and the initiation of the investigation was "only"
eight months in this case, whereas it was 15 months in Mexico – Rice ; (2) its authority performed a
more thorough examination of the petition here, and that examination caused delay in the initiation of
the investigation; and (3) in Mexico – Rice , Mexico's authority accepted the period of investigation
proposed by the petitioner knowing that that period reflected the maximum penetration of imports.9

 With respect to Mexico's first point, the Unite d States appreciates that there is a difference
between a 15-month gap between the period of invest igation and the initiation of an investigation and
an eight-month gap. The United States, recalls, however, that the Panel in Mexico – Rice considered
not only this gap, but also the gap between the period of investigation and the imposition of final
anti-dumping duties. In Mexico – Rice, this gap was two years and nine months. In this case, the gap
is two years and thirteen days.

 With regard to Mexico's second point, Mexi co has failed to explain why a more thorough
review of a petition would justify lengthening th e gap between the period of investigation and
initiation in this case. Even if Mexico's author ity performed a more thorough examination of the
petition
10, and that examination caused a delay in initia ting the investigation, Mexico could have
established a more recent period of investigation to re flect the delay: the period of investigation was
not set in stone when it was proposed by the petitioner. Moreover, notwithstanding Mexico's
explanation that initiation in this dispute was delayed because its authority undertook a more thorough
investigation than was undertaken in Mexico – Rice, in the Rice dispute there was a much longer delay
between the filing of the petition (on 2 June 2000) and the initiation of the investigation
(11 December 2000) than in this dispute (petition filed on 22 May 2001; in vestigation initiated on
24 August 2001).

 With regard to Mexico's third point ( i.e., unlike in this dispute, the period proposed by the
petitioner in Mexico – Rice was the period of maximum import pene tration), nothing in the Panel or
Appellate Body reports suggests this was a factor in th e analysis of the "stale" period of investigation.
The issue of seasonal differences in imports arose in Mexico – Rice not in the context of a "stale"
period of investigation but in the context of an incomplete period of investigation ( i.e., the six-month
period of each year when imports of rice were at their peak).

 As explained by the Appe llate Body, the Panel in Mexico – Rice found that Mexico's injury
analysis, which was based on data covering only six months of each of the three years examined, did
not allow for an "objective examination," as requi red by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement, for
two reasons:

[F]irst, whereas the injury analysis was selective and provided only a part of the
picture, no proper justification was provided by Mexico in support of this approach;
and secondly, [Mexico's investigating authorit y] accepted the 'period of investigation
proposed by the applicants because it a llegedly represented th e period of highest

9 First Written Submission of Mexico, para. 161. Wh ile Mexico lays out four separate subparagraphs
in paragraph 161, the points in the second and third subparagraphs appear to be the same.

10 Mexico does not appear to argue that its authority examined the period of investigation proposed in
this petition more closely than in the petition in Mexico – Rice. Instead, it appears the authority's examination of
the petition related to issues not relevant to that period. See First Written Submission of Mexico, para. 164.

import penetration and would thus show the most negative side of the state of the
domestic industry.'
11
 In this case, while Mexico's authority accepted the six-month period proposed by the
petitioner, there does not appear to be any evidence that this period represented the period of highest
import penetration. Guatemala appears to acknowle dge this in paragraph 259 of its First Written
Submission.

 Thus, the Panel in this case must determine, in essence, whether an injury analysis that is
based on data covering only six months of each of th e three years examined allows for an "objective
examination" where the investigating authority chose the period proposed by the petitioner and
provided no justification in support of examining onl y parts of years, but where there is no evidence
that imports were higher during the six-month periods selected.

 In the view of the United States, examining data relating to the whole year normally "would
result in a more accurate picture of the 'state of the domestic industry' than an examination limited to a
six-month period."
12 While there may be circumstances in which there could be "convincing and
valid reasons for examining only parts of years" 13, an investigating authority cannot simply assume
that the six-month periods proposed by a petitioner will provide an accurate picture of the state of the
domestic industry.

 Indeed, in most circumstances it would be di fficult to "demonstrate [ ] that the dumped
imports are, through the effects of dumping, . . . causing injury"
14 by looking at six-month snapshots
over a three-year period. For example, while dumped imports may increase and the domestic
industry's condition may have deteriorated from the first half of the first year to the first half of the
third, the condition of the industry may be due to a natural disaster that destroyed most of the
industry's production capacity in the second half of the first year. But six-month snapshots would
mistakenly suggest that the industry was injured by dumped imports, not by the natural disaster.

 The burden should not fall on exporters and foreign producers to investigate what happened
to the domestic industry during those months that ar e disregarded by the authority, in the hope of
persuading the authority to investigate a continuous period. While the petitioners admitted in their
petition in Mexico – Rice that the six-month period reflected the period of highest import
penetration,
15 it will not always be so easy for exporter s and foreign producers to discover the biases
that may result from a discontinuous period of investigation.

 As the Panel found in Mexico – Rice , Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement "impose[s] certain
obligations on the . . . investigating authorities with regard to the comple teness of the data used as the
basis for its determination."
16 The United States agrees with Guatemala that an objective

11 Mexico – Rice (AB), para. 176.

12 Mexico – Rice (AB), para. 183.

13 Mexico – Rice (Panel), para. 7.82.

14 AD Agreement, Article 3.5.

15 Mexico – Rice (Panel), para. 7.83.

16 Mexico – Rice (Panel), para. 7.77.

determination cannot be based on an incomplete series of data unless the investigating authority
provides a justified explanation for doing so.17

 Guatemala requests that, if the Panel were to find in Guatemala's favor, the Panel should
suggest that Mexico "immediately end the measure" at issue in this dispute. The Panel should decline
Guatemala's request and provide the recommendation set forth in DSU Article 19.1 that Mexico bring
its measure into conformity with its obligations under the relevant agreements.

 In general, panels have declined requests to make suggestions under Article 19.1 of the DSU,
and for good reason. A Member generally has many options available to it to bring a measure into
conformity with its WTO obligations. As the Panel noted in US – Softwood Lumber ITC
Investigation, Article 21.3 of the DSU makes clear that "the choice of means of implementation is
decided, in the first instance, by the Member concerned."
18

 Guatemala asserts that the situation in th is dispute is analogous to the situation in Argentina –
Poultry, where the Panel suggested repeal of the anti-dumping measures in question because the Panel
could not "perceive how Argentina could proper ly implement our recommendation without revoking
the anti-dumping measure at issue in this dispute."
19 However, it is counterintuitive that a panel
should provide guidance where guidance is needed least ( i.e., where there is only one "way" 20 to
implement the recommendations, and that way is clear).21

 Moreover, in this particular case, it would be difficult to square a suggestion that Mexico
"immediately" end the measure with Article 21.3 of the DSU. That provision recognizes that it may
be impracticable to comply "immediately" and cr eates a process to determine a reasonable period of
time to comply – after the report has been adopted, and after the Member concerned informs the DSB
of its intentions in respect of implementation. Article 21.3 also expresses a clear preference (a) for a
reasonable period proposed by the Member concerned and approved by the DSB, (b) for a period of
time "mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute" and (c) as a last resort, a period of time
determined through binding arbitra tion. The Panel plays no role in that process. As a result, a
suggestion from the Panel to "immediately" end the measure would insert the Panel inappropriately in
the process to determine the time in which to comply.

17 First Written Submission of Guatemala, para. 257.

18 US – Softwood Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel), para. 8.8.

19 Argentina – Poultry (Panel), para. 8.7.

20 Article 19.1 of the DSU refers to "ways" to implement the Panel's recommendations, not to a single
"way."

21 Guatemala also notes Mexico's announced intentions regarding the implementation of the rulings
and recommendations in Mexico – Rice in support of its request. In the view of the United States, however, a
dispute involving a different measure and a different complaining party does not support a request for a
suggestion under DSU Article 19.1, even though some of the claims in the two disputes are similar to one
another.

ANNEX B-3

THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION OF JAPAN

(1 September 2006)

I. CHANGES IN THE DEFINITION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION
AND THEIR CONSISTENCY WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3

1. Mexico appears not to disagree that its i nvestigating authority changed the definition of
the PUC, but it argues that the changes were not s ubstantial and were justified by the process of
investigation.

2. Under the AD Agreement, the authorities might be able to change the definition of the PUC
during the course of the investigation. However, this does not relieve Mexico of its obligation to
make dumping and injury determinations pursuant to the relevant provisions, in particular, Articles 2
and 3 of the AD Agreement . In this respect, Japan agrees with Guatemala that the definition of
the PUC has broad implication for the investiga tion, and changes to the PUC could affect the
Panel's determination of whether the investigation and resulting measure at issue is consistent with the
relevant provisions of the AD Agreement. Japan finds support for this position in the Panel's analysis
in Guatemala - Cement II with respect to the claims raised by Mexico involving anti-dumping
measures imposed by Guatemala on imports of cement from Mexico.

3. As the Appellate Body observed, "[h]aving defined the product as it did, [investigating
authority] was bound to treat that product consistently thereafter in accord ance with that definition."
Thus Japan considers that, if and when investiga ting authorities change the definition of the products,
they must conduct their examination concerning dumping and injury based on such changed definition
of the product (including the definition of the "like product"), in accordance with "the need for
consistent treatment of a product in an anti-dumping investiga tion" as defined or redefined by the
authorities.

4. Given that Guatemala and Mexico do not disagree that the definition of the PUC was
changed, the Panel should make the necessary f actual findings as to precisely what these changes
were, when and how they were made, and the conse quences of such changes in terms of the scopes of
investigation for dumping and injury determinations at issue. Since chan ges in the definition of
the PUC could have impact on the legitimacy (or WTO consistency) of inv estigations under review,
the Panel should make these factual findings and car efully examine the consistency of any such
changes with the AD Agreement, in particular Articles 2 and 3, based on such findings.

II. SELECTION OF THE PERIOD FOR INJURY ANALYSIS AND ITS CONSISTENCY
WITH ARTICLE 3

A. R
EMOTE PERIOD FROM THE INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION FOR THE INJURY ANALYSIS

5. Japan believes that the Appellate Body in Mexico - Rice has already shown useful guidelines
in evaluating the consistency of a selection of a remote period of data collection, or a remote period of
investigation, for injury analysis. In that case, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel below that
"evidence that is not relevant or pertinent to the issue … is not 'positive evidence' " and that "relevance
or pertinence must be assessed with respect to the existence of injury by dumping at the time the

investigation takes place ." The Appellate Body further explained that "[b]ecause the conditions to
impose an anti-dumping duty are to be assessed with respect to the current situation , the
determination of whether injury exists should be based on data that provide indications of the
situation prevailing when the investigation takes place . [...] [M]ore recent data is likely to provide
better indications about current injury ." Thus, more recent data is more relevant and pertinent as to
assessing "current injury," as observed by the Appellate Body.

6. In addition, the Appellate Body in Mexico - Rice considered other factors to be relevant as
follows "these temporal gaps were not the only ci rcumstances that the Panel took into account. The
Panel, as trier of the facts, gave weight to other factors: (i) the period of investigation chosen by
Economía was that proposed by the petitioner; (ii) Mexico did not establish that practical problems
necessitated this particular period of investigati on; (iii) it was not established that updating the
information was not possible; (iv) no attempt was made to update the information; and (v) Mexico
did not provide any reason - apart from the allegation that it is Mexico's general practice to accept the
period of investigation submitted by the petitioner - why more recent information was not sought."
While the Panel's assessment of these other factors in Mexico - Rice relates to the specific
circumstances of that case, Japan c onsiders that these other factors are highly relevant for the Panel's
disposition of this issue in light of the similarity between that case and the case at hand. To begin
with, it is apparent from Economía's the Notice of the Initiation on 13 March 2002 that, at least,
factors (i) and (iii) thereof are also present in this case.

7. As to other factors, Mexico raised four factors, in paragraph 161 of its First Written
Submission, intending to distinguish this investig ation from the investigation that was reviewed in
Mexico - Rice case. Japan considers that as regards poi nt (a) thereof, an 8-month period from the
initiation of the investigation, thus more than 24-month period from the completion of the
investigation, may still raise doubts whether the pe riod reflects "the situation prevailing when the
investigation takes place." As regards point (c) ther eof, the scrutiny before in itiating an investigation
that is required under Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement does not justify the authority's use of
outdated information. As regards point (d) thereo f, we question its relevance, because the Appellate
Body in Mexico - Rice took this factor into consideration in examining the WTO consistency of the
injury analysis limited to data relating to six-m onth period each year within a period of investigation
for injury analysis, not in the context of the Mexico's selection of a remote period of investigation. As
regards point (b) thereof, we do not take a specific position with regard to factual aspects.

8. While Mexico stresses the pertinence of the information in selecting the period for injury
analysis rather than the contemporaneity, or up- to-dateness of the inform ation, the question still
remains as to which period is more pertinent. It is not clear why the remote period would be more
pertinent than the recent period. Mexico's only proffe red justification is that information of the more
recent period would be affected by the dumped imports. In light of the Appellate Body's finding in
Mexico - Rice that Guatemala refers to, Japan request s the Panel to examine whether Mexico
demonstrates that "the information relating to th e period of investigation convey indications as to
current injury and constitute an appropriate basis fo r determining whether there was current injury, in
spite of its remoteness."

B. A
VAILABILITY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLES 9 AND 11

9. Furthermore, Japan has doubts about the ar gument advanced by Mexico concerning the
availability of subsequent reviews of the dumpi ng and injury determination after the imposition of
anti-dumping measures. Mexico contends that cha nges in the circumstances which may occur at a
later stage of the period of investigation or even thereafter should be considered in subsequent reviews
under Articles 9 or 11 of the AD Agreement, relying on the following statement of the Appellate Body
in EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings "[i]n our view, the Anti-Dumping Agreement takes into account the
possibility of such major changes occurring at a late stage of the POI, or even after the POI, not by

allowing investigating authorities to pick and choo se a subset of data or sub-periods of a POI
according to their subjective considerations, but by review mechanisms."

10. Mexico's reliance on this statemen t is misplaced. First, unlike in EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings ,
the issue before the Panel in this case is not wh ether "major changes occurring at a late stage of
the POI" justifies the use of remote period of inves tigation. Second, the mere availability of a review
to re-examine injury cannot substitute for compliance with the obligations governing the initiation and
conduct of an investigation, in pa rticular, the obligation to base injury determination "on data that
provide indications of the situation prevailing when th e investigation takes place" or "current injury."
Japan notes that in some cases, co mpliance with these obligations could lead to a decision not to
impose anti-dumping duties, in which case there would be no review under Article 11 in the
first place.

C. L
IMITED EXAMINATION OF INJURY TO SIX-MONTH PERIODS OF EACH YEAR

11. The Appellate Body in Mexico - Rice found that "the focus of an injury determination is the
state of the 'domestic industry,'" and that "in our view, examining data relating to the whole year
would result in a more accurate picture of the 'state of the domestic industry' than an examination
limited to a six-month period." The Appellate Body clarified that this does not mean that there is
"a presumption that an injury analysis based on data relating to only parts of years is not objective."

12. On this issue, Japan also does not have a sp ecific position with regard to the factual aspects.
However, given the Appellate Body's finding in Mexico - Rice, Japan considers that it would not be an
objective examination required under Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement if the authorities consider only
limited information out of a limited period of each year without "proper justification."

13. In this regard, th e Appellate Body in Mexico - Rice affirmed the Panel's finding that the
combination of selective use of data in the injury analysis with "the acceptance of a period of
investigation proposed by the appli cants because it allegedly represented the period of highest import
penetration and would thus show the most negative si de of the state of the domestic industry"
established "a prima facie violation of Article 3.1." On this issue, too, Japan does not take a specific
position as to the factual aspects and recognizes that th e Panel's assessment of the relevant factors in
Mexico - Rice relates to the specific circumstances of that case. However, in light of the similarity
between the Rice case and this case, Japan considers it appropriate for the Panel to inquire as to
whether the Mexican authorities accepted the peri od proposed by petitioner, knowing that the period
chosen was allegedly a period of higher import penetration.

ANNEX B-4

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(12 September 2006)

Table of Cases Cited in this Oral Statement

Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Poultry Argentina – Definitive An ti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil,
WT/DS241/R, Report of the Panel, adopted by the DSB on
19 May 2003
US – Softwood Lumber
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW, Report of the Appellate Body,
adopted by the DSB on 1 September 2006
US – Zeroing

United States – Laws, regulations and methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, Report of the
Appellate Body, adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2006
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland
cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, Report of the Panel, adopted by
the DSB on 17 November 2000
Mexico – Rice Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice ,
WT/DS295/AB/R, Report of the Appe llate Body, adopted by the DSB
on 20 December 2005
Mexico – Rice

Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice,
WT/DS295/R, Report of the Panel, adopted by the DSB on
20 December 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body,

1. INTRODUCTION
 Mr Chairman, distinguished members of the Panel,

1. The European Communities would like to thank the Panel for this opportunity to make its
third party oral submission, which is justified by th e EC's general interest in the correct interpretation
of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).
2. In deference to the Panel and the parties, this submission will be in Spanish which, it should
be stressed, is a first for the European Communities at the World Trade Organization.
3. To avoid wasting the Panel's time or trying its patience, we would like to begin by referring to
our written submission, whose arguments we shall not repeat. Our oral statement will be confined to
commenting on two issues raised in the written submissions of the other third parties: the initiation of
the original investigation, and the request for suggestions from the Panel.
2. INITIATION OF THE ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION
4. Regarding the written submission of the United States, the European Communities agrees that
the use of the term "reasonably" in Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement implies a degree of
flexibility.
1 However, this does not mean that the investigating authorities' discretion in that respect is
"boundless".2 The Appellate Body has stated in this connection that there is a correspondence
between the concepts of "dumping" and "margin of dumping" 3, and that "it is a unitary concept"
which has the same meaning throughout Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.4 Moreover, both the panels and the Appellate Body have repeatedly pointed out that the
concept of dumping refers to the margins of dumping for specific exporters or foreign producers.5
5. Accordingly, the European Communities would expect the information in an application
submitted under Article 5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relating to normal value, on the one
hand, and export prices on the other, normally to refer to products from the same enterprise.
Otherwise, given that circumstances can vary signi ficantly from one producer or exporter to another,
it is questionable that an application could be sai d to contain any evidence of dumping. In such
circumstances, the application could at least be exp ected to include some explanation or indication of
why the normal value demonstrated for producer or exporter X should be considered representative of
the normal value for producer or exporter Y in respect of which export price evidence has been
submitted, or vice versa. In th e absence of such evidence or explanation, it is doubtful that the
application would comply with the Article 5.2 require ment that it include evidence, with respect to a
specific exporter or producer, of dumping.
6. The above remarks are made without prejudice to the possibility – provided the
"reasonableness" criterion is respected – that a complaint could be based on data relating to a different
country or pertaining to a different producer or exporter.

1 US written submission, paragraphs 3 and 4.

2 Report of the Panel, Mexico – Rice, paragraph 7.57, as upheld by the Report of the Appellate Body,
Mexico – Rice, paragraphs 158 to 172.

3 Report of the Appellate Body, US – Zeroing, paragraph 125.

4 Report of the Appellate Body, US – Softwood Lumber (Article 21.5 – Canada), paragraph 89.

5 Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , paragraphs 215-221;
Report of the Appellate Body, US – Zeroing, paragraph 129.

3. REQUEST FOR THE PANEL TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS
7. Guatemala requests that in view of the magn itude and number of errors committed by the
Ministry in conducting its investigation, the Panel suggest to Mexico that it apply the rulings and
recommendations in this case not by re-conducting the investigation, but by terminating the measure
at issue.6
8. Mexico makes no arguments in this respect, but the United States proposes that the Panel
decline Guatemala's request.
9. The European Communities considers that this calls for a few comments.
10. To begin with, we note that certain panels ha ve already issued recommendations that the anti-
dumping measure at issue in a dispute be terminated, for instance in Argentina – Anti-Dumping Duties
on Poultry7 and Guatemala – Cement II. 8 The second of these two cases was an anti-dumping case
between the same parties as in this dispute, alth ough in different procedural positions. However,
these panels provided concise justifications for the suggestions they made.
11. For example, in paragraphs 8.6 a nd 8.7 of its report, the Panel in Argentina – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Poultry stated the following:
We have determined that Argentina has ac ted inconsistently with its obligations
under the AD Agreement in its imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of
eviscerated poultry from Brazil. We have found these violations to be of a
fundamental nature and pervasive.
In light of the nature and extent of the violations in this case, we do not perceive how
Argentina could properly implement ou r recommendation without revoking the anti-
dumping measure at issue in this dispute. Accordingly, we suggest that Argentina
repeal Resolution No. 574/2000 imposi ng definitive anti-dumping measures on
eviscerated poultry from Brazil.
12. Similar wording was used in Guatemala – Cement II.
13. The European Communities does not believe that th e "pervasive" nature of certain violations
is sufficient to justify a suggestion that an anti-dumpi ng measure be revoked. In principle, there is no
reason why a general violation, or even a major vi olation, cannot be remedied by means other than
revoking the measure.
14. On the other hand, it is possible that in the cas e of fundamental violations, i.e. those that
affect the very essence of the measure, there may be no other remedy than to revoke the measure.
This is the European Communities' understanding of what the Panel ultimately wished to say in
Argentina – Poultry when it added that "we do not perceive how Argentina could possibly implement
our recommendation without revoking the anti-dumping measure".
15. However, the European Commun ities believes that it is up to each panel to explain exactly
why it considers a violation to be "fundamental" in the sense that the only way of complying is to
revoke the measure. Since suggestions are not bind ing, they can only contribute to the rapid and

6 Written submission of Guatemala, paragraph 353 et seq.

7 Report of the Panel Argentina – Poultry, paragraphs 8.3 to 8.7.

8 Report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II, paragraph 9.6

effective solution of disputes in accordance with th e objectives set forth in Article 3 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding if they are substantiated.
16. In the European Communities' view, an example of a violation of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement that can only be remedied by revoking the measure is when the proceedings are initiated in
violation of the Agreement, for in stance, because the Article 5.2 conditio ns are not respected. In that
case, there are no errors in the investigation, or even in the measure, that can be resolved. The error
that needs to be rectified is the initiation itsel f. Accepting a new complaint would lead to the
institution of new anti-dumping proceedings without rectifying the error committed when the original
investigation was initiated.
17. In any case, the European Communities does not agree with the position of the United States
that a panel suggestion would be contrary to a prin ciple that the United States considers to be implicit
in Article 21.3 of the Dispute Settlement Unde rstanding. That principle, according to the
United States, is that it would be up to the affected Member, in the first instance, to choose the means
of implementation. This is incorrect, since Article 19.1 of the DSU expressly permits panels to make
suggestions.
18. However, the European Communities agrees with the United States that a suggestion should
not specify that the measure must be ended "immediately". The period of time needed to revoke is
not a form or means of implementation, but is regulated by Article 21.3 of the DSU.
 Mr Chairman, distinguished Members of the Pane l, this completes the oral submission of the
European Communities. We remain at your disposal for any questions you may wish to raise.

 Thank you for your attention.

ANNEX B-5

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATMENT
BY THE UNITED STATES

(13 September 2006)

Introduction

1. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Pa nel. It is a pleasure to appear before you
today to present the views of the United States in this proceeding. The purpose of this oral statement
is to highlight certain aspects of the US third-party submission and to comment on points raised by
other third parties in their submissions.

Information in application

2. Guatemala questions the sufficiency of th e application and the Mexican Investigating
Authority's decision to initiate based upon the inform ation in the application. Article 5.2 of the
Antidumping Agreement sets forth the evidence an application "shall include," which includes
"information on prices."

3. Guatemala maintains that an application suppor ted by one invoice for galvanized tubing and a
quotation for light-walled tubing is insufficient. Wh ether this information was sufficient to establish
the home-market price component of evidence of dumping for purposes of initiation is a case- and
fact-specific inquiry. We note, however, that Artic le 5.2 provides that an application contain such
information "as is reasonably available" to the a pplicant. The phrase "reasonably available" is not
defined in the Agreement. More over, pricing, cost of producti on, and profitability information
pertaining to foreign producers or domestic competitor s is likely difficult to obtain and, thus, may not
normally be "reasonably available" to an applicant.

4. Article 5.2(iii) also does not prescribe the pr ecise form of the information or evidence that
must be submitted. Nor does Article 5.2 specify the quantum of evidence that must be submitted.
1
Rather, the plain language of Article 5.2(iii) simply requires the application to contain "information
on prices" at which the product in question is sold when destined for consumption in the domestic
market of the country of origin or export. We th erefore disagree with Guatemala's argument that one
invoice and quotation are necessarily insufficient to initiate an inves tigation, or that an application
must contain pricing information for a particular exporter.

Product under consideration

5. In addition to questioning the sufficiency of the application and the decision to initiate an
investigation, Guatemala contests the various changes to the definition of the "product under
consideration." Mexico does not dispute that the definition was changed, but maintains that, as a
factual matter, the changes were insignificant.

1 United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada , Panel Report,
WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 Aug. 2004, para. 7.101 (applicant need not submit “all” information reasonably
available).

6. The United States generally agrees with Japan's observation in its third-party submission that
the Antidumping Agreement permits changes to the de finition of the product under consideration, but
the investigating authority must be cognizant of the broad implications of such changes.
2 F o r
instance, the definition of the product under consid eration implicates the requisite threshold for
industry support set forth in Article 5.4. This th reshold could be rendered meaningless if an applicant
could unilaterally and significantly alter the definition of the product. That is, one could imagine an
applicant first narrowly defining the product under c onsideration so that, at initiation, the applicant
would account for a sufficiently large percentage of the domestic industry to justify initiation.
Subsequently, the applicant could alter that product definition such that, if industry support were re-
examined subsequent to initiation, the applicant would no longer account for a significant percentage
of the domestic industry.

7. The European Communities also recognizes that under certain situations, the definition of the
product under consideration may change in minor and necessary ways.
3 A change to the definition of
the product under consideration anno unced in a final determination is not necessarily inconsistent
with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be
informed of the essential facts under consideration and not necessarily the conclusion an authority
may ultimately draw from those facts. That said, in order to provide parties a full opportunity "for the
defence of their interests" under Article 6.2, they must be made aware of proposals for changes to the
product under consideration and be afforded an opportunity to advocate their position on such
proposals.

8. As noted in Japan's third-party submission, Gu atemala and Mexico agree that the definition of
the product under consideration changed, but disagree as to the signi ficance of the changes. 4 In the
view of the United States, the appropriate time for definitively identifying the product under
consideration will depend upon the circumstances of the case. The parties should, however, be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to address proposed significant changes.5

Conclusion

9. This concludes our presentation to the Panel. Thank you for your attention.

2 Third Party Submission of Japan at para. 5.

3 Third Party Submission of the European Community at para. 10.

4 Third Party Submission of Japan at para. 7.

5 See, e.g., Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.4.

ANNEX B-6

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT
OF JAPAN

(12 September 2006)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Mr Chairman and distinguished Members of th e Panel, Japan appreciates this opportunity to
present its view as a third party. Today, Japan will not repeat its arguments set forth in its written
submission. Instead, it would like to focus on certain additional issues relating to (1) Guatemala's
claim on Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement with re gard to the disclosure of the definition of the
product under consideration (PUC) (paragraph 166 of the Guatemala's First Written Submission), and
(2) the Guatemala's request for specific suggestions under Article 19.1 of the DSU (paragraph 353 of
the Guatemala's First Written Submission).

II. ARGUMENTS

1. The changes in the definition of the PUC in the final product and their consistency with
Article 6.9 of the Agreement

2. The first issue relates to the lack of "disclosure" of "essential facts" under Article 6.9, as
raised in the EC's written submission.

3. Let me read out the text of Article 6.9 one more time:

 The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the
decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in
sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests. (Emphasis added.)

4. As Japan explained in its th ird party submission (at paragra phs 5 and 7), the definition of
the PUC could have a substantial impact on th e scope and legitimacy of the anti-dumping
investigation and resulting measures. Accordingly, in Japan's view, facts that form the basis for
determining the definition of the PUC would constitute "essential facts [] which form the basis for the
[final] decision." In the present case, however, Mexican authorities do not seem to have identified or
specified to all interested parties what essential facts are with regard to the final definition of the PUC,
as the EC pointed out in paragraph 24 of its written submission.

5. Article 6.9 does not prescribe, in every detail, the specific manner in which the authorities are
to comply with its requirement of disclosing "the essential facts". However, for the purpose of
Article 6.9, the authorities cannot inform or disclose "essential facts" "in sufficient time" without
explicitly notifying what cons ists of such "essential facts" so as to let the interested parties be aware
of such facts out of a massive amounts of "all inform ation" (Article 6.4) and enable them to "defend
their interests." In this case, the interested parties cannot have opportun ities to adequately defend
their interests concerning such facts, if the aut horities merely imply the "essential facts" through
simply asking interested parties comments on the de finitional factors of the product during the course
of the investigation, without informing them of th e facts that form the basis for the change of the
definition of the PUC, that is, the inclusion of structural pipes.

6. Thus, Japan asks the Panel to decide on the Gu atemala's claims that Mexico failed to comply
with the obligation under the Article 6.9 by not disclosing the essential facts concerning the definition
of the PUC until the issuance of the final determination.

2. Guatemalan request to the Panel for sugg esting a revocation of a measure to implement
recommendations

7. In its third party submission, the United Stat es argues that the Panel should reject Guatemala's
request to suggest the way to implement the recomme ndations pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.
Japan disagrees. The panel has the authority to make suggestions under Artic le 19.1 where it deems
appropriate, and in this case the Pa nel may well consider it appropriate to suggest a revocation of the
measure as a way to implement the recommendations.

8. First, the second sentence of Article 19.1 serves important objectives of the dispute settlement
mechanism, i.e., to secure prompt and positive settlement of disputes. These objectives are articulated
in the various provisions of the DSU; for example, Article 21.1 says "[p]rompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes
to the benefits of all Members." Articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7 also set forth these objectives in a slightly
different manner. To facilitate these objectives, pa nels are authorized under Article 19.1 to decide
whether it is appropriate to suggest ways to implemen t and, if so, the specific ways to be suggested to
the Member concerned.

9. In Japan's view, this provision contemplates th at, as a trier of facts and issues of law raised
before them, panels are well positioned and equipped to suggest specific ways to implement their
recommendations and rulings. Moreover, nothing in the text of the DSU precludes panels from
exercising its discretion under Article 19.1 in cases where there are only one way to implement the
recommendations. Nor must panels restrain themselves from so doing simply because of the fact that
the previous panels in other cases didn't make suggestions under Article 19.1. Japan does not disagree
with the United States' observation that "[a] Member generally has many options available to it to
bring a measure into conformity with its WTO obligations." However, Japan would also point out
that the choice made by the Member concerned does not necessarily lead to the prompt and positive
solution to the dispute.

10. Secondly, nothing in the DSU prevents the panel from suggesting a revocation of the measure
as a way to implement under Article 19.1, while Japan also recognizes that the Member concerned
will have a "reasonable period of time" "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations" (Article 21.3 of the DSU, emphasis added).

11. The findings of the panels in the si milar cases are instructive. The panel in Guatemala –
Cement I found inconsistency with Artic le 5.3 of the AD Agreement and suggested the responding
Member to revoke the measure on the ground that " the entire investigation rested on an insufficient
basis, and therefore should never have been conducted " and that such violation cannot be cured
afterward (WT/DS60/R, paragraph 8.6, emphasis added). The panel in Guatemala – Cement II also
suggested a revocation "in the light of the nature an d extent of the violations in this case," including
the violation of the initiation requirements (WT/DS156/ R, paragraph 9.6). Thus, it is Japan's view
that a revocation of the measure in dispute can be at least one of positive and effective ways to
implement the recommendations and rulings depending, of course, on the nature and extent of the
violations and the specific circumstances of this case.

12. In the present case, Guatemala asks the Panel to suggest that Mexico revoke the measure at
issue. The alleged violations relate to the initiati on requirements of investigations and the nature and
extent of such violations can be such that " the entire investigation … should never have been
conducted" in the first place.

13. For all these reasons, Japan respectfully requ ests the Panel to consider, in exercising its
discretion under Article 19.1, to suggest a revo cation of measures in question as a way in which
Mexico implement the recommendations in order to secure prompt and positive settlement of this
dispute.

III. CONCLUSION

14. To conclude, Japan would like the Panel to car efully examine these issues mentioned in this
statement, in addition to the arguments advanced in its written submission. Thank you, again, for
your attention.