Document: WT/DS295/R Page A-1 ANNEX A Responses of the United States to Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling Content Page Annex A-1 Responses of the United States A-2
Document codes: WT/DS295/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: Mexico
Third parties: China, EU, Turkey
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 12.5, 12.7, 19.3, 11.9, 21.1, 21.2, 32.1, 12.1.1  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 5.8, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 11.9, 18.1, 19.3, 21.1, 21.2, 32.1  Anti-dumping

ANNEX A

Responses of the United States to Mexico's request for a preliminary ruling

Content Page
Annex A-1 Responses of the United States A-2

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Mexico offers no legitimate basis for its request for a preliminary ruling (“Mexico’s
Request”) that the US panel request in this dispute fails to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of the
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”). To the
contrary, as required by Article 6.2, the US panel request properly “identif[ies] the specific measures
at issue and provide[s] a brief summary of the lega l basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly”.

2. Mexico is seeking to have this Panel read in to Article 6.2 a requirement that is not there and
that the Appellate Body has specifically reject ed: namely, that the United States summarize the
specific legal arguments to be presented in the first US submission. The Appellate Body in
EC Bananas
1 has already rejected the suggestion that a complaining party must summarize its legal
arguments in the panel request, and this Panel should do so as well.

3. Mexico is also seeking to have this Panel fi nd that the US panel request does not “identify the
specific measure” with respect to one of the measures at issue in this dispute, Article 366 of Mexico’s
Federal Code of Civil Procedure (“FCCP”). Inasmuch as Article 366 is specifically identified in the
panel request, there is no basis for such a finding.

4. Mexico has also failed to provide any legiti mate basis for its argument that the US panel
request is inconsistent with Articles 4.5 and 4. 7 of the DSU, or Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(“AD Agreement”). The gist of Mexico’s argument is that the US panel request contains legal claims
that were not the subject of consultations. Mexico fails to recognize that it is the panel request, and
not the consultation request, that establishes the scope for this Panel’s work.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. The United States requested formal dispute settlement consultations with Mexico on the
definitive anti-dumping measures on beef and rice, and on various provisions of Mexico’s Foreign
Trade Act and Article 366 of the FCCP, on 16 June 2003.
2 The United States and Mexico held two
days of consultations with respect to the measur es in Mexico City, on 31 July and 1 August 2003, but
failed to resolve the dispute.

6. Consequently, on 19 September 2003, the Un ited States requested the establishment of a
panel, specifically identifying the definitive anti- dumping measure on rice, Articles 53, 64, 68, 89D,
93V, and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act, and Article 366 of the FCCP as the specific measures at issue,
and providing a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint. 3 The Panel was established on
7 November 2003.4

1 Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, para. 141 (“EC Bananas AB”).
2 Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Me asures on Beef and Rice, Reque st for Consultations by the
United States , WT/DS295/1, G/L/631, G/ADP/D50/1, G/SCM/D54/1, circulated 23 June 2003 (“US
Consultation Request”).
3 Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Meas ures on Beef and Rice, Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by the United States, WT/DS295/2, circulated 22 September 2003 (“US Panel Request”).
4 Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Constitu tion of the Panel Established
at the Request of the United States, Note by the Secretariat, WT/DS295/3 (19 February 2004).

III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DSU ARTICLE 6.2
7. Article 6.2 of the DSU requires, in relevant part, that a request for the establishment of a
panel “identify the specific measures at issue and pr ovide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly”.

8. Mexico’s Request contains a number of quotations from Appellate Body reports that explain
this provision and emphasize its role and importan ce in dispute settlement. It has entirely missed,
however, one aspect of these reports that is critical to the issue now before this Panel: the key
distinction between claims – which must be included in the panel request – and the arguments in
support of those claims – which need not be in cluded. As the Appellate Body explained in
EC Bananas:

In our view, there is a significant difference between the claims identified in the
request for the establishment of a panel, which establish the panel’s terms of
reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments supporting those
claims, which are set out and progressively clarified in the first written
submissions, the rebuttal submissions and the first and second panel meetings
with the parties.
5
9. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in EC Bananas made clear that a panel request may in some
cases adequately state a claim if the request si mply cites the pertinent provision of the WTO
agreement:

We accept the Panel’s view that it was suffi cient for the Complaining Parties to list
the provisions of the specific agreements alleged to have been violated without
setting out detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the measures at issue
relate to which specific provisions of those agreements.6
10. Mexico also fails to note that – according to the Appellate Body – even in cases where simply
citing the pertinent provisions would not satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2, the Panel is not
automatically deprived of jurisdiction over the ma tter. Rather, the Appellate Body has found that a
panel must examine, based on the “particular ci rcumstances of the case”, whether the defect has
prejudiced the ability of the responding party to defend itself given the actual course of the panel
proceedings. As the Appellate Body explained in Korea Dairy:

In assessing whether the European Commun ities’ request met the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU, we consider that, in view of the particular circumstances of
this case and in line with the lette r and spirit of Article 6.2, the
European Communities’ request should have been more detailed. However, Korea
failed to demonstrate to us that the mere listing of the articles asserted to have been
violated has prejudiced its ability to defend itself in the course of the Panel
proceedings. Korea did assert that it had sustained prejudice, but offered no
supporting particulars in its appellant’s submission nor at the oral hearing . We,
therefore, deny Korea’s appeal relating to the consistency of the
European Communities’ request for the estab lishment of a panel with Article 6.2 of
the DSU.
7

5 EC Bananas AB, para. 141.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R,
adopted 12 January 2000, para 131 (“ Korea Dairy ”) (emphasis added). The Appellate Body concluded in

11. Therefore, in evaluating claims that a panel request fails to provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present th e problem clearly, as required by DSU Article 6.2,
the Panel may consider the particular circumstanc es of the dispute, including whether the responding
party has been prejudiced.

12. Mexico asserts that the US panel request (1 ) does not provide a brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly; and (2) does not identify the “specific
measure at issue” with respect to Article 366 of the FCCP, and that Mexico has thereby been
prejudiced. As detailed in the sections that follow, Mexico’s objections are wrong on both counts.

IV. CONTRARY TO MEXICO’S ALLEGATIONS, THE US PANEL REQUEST
PROVIDES A BRIEF SUMMARY OF TH E LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMPLAINT
SUFFICIENT TO PRESENT THE PROBLEM CLEARLY
13. The first of Mexico’s complaints about the US panel request is that the request is too vague,
and that it allegedly does not provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly, as Article 6.2 requires. Mexico’s complaint is groundless.

14. It is important to note at the outset that Mexico only challenges the sufficiency of the US
panel request with respect to a few of the US claims.
8 Accordingly, the United States is proceeding
under the assumption that Mexico considers the ot her claims that it did not challenge in its
preliminary ruling request as being sufficient for purposes of Article 6.2.9

15. With respect to the claims that Mexico do es challenge, the US panel request does provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly, as required
by Article 6.2. It both lists the specif ic provisions of the AD Agreement and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) alleged to be violated, and provides, in addition, a brief
textual explanation of the basis of the complaint.

16. Turning first to subsections 1(f) and (g) of the US panel request, the United States lists 15
specific provisions of the AD Agreement (including five specific paragraphs of Annex II of the
AD Agreement). Mexico has failed to provide an y reason as to why citing these specific provisions
was insufficient under DSU Article 6.2. For exampl e, Mexico has made no effort to explain why it
was unclear from the US citation of Article 6.8 a nd Annex II (the “facts available” provisions) of the
AD Agreement that the United States was challenging Mexico’s use of the facts available in assigning
anti-dumping margins to Producers Rice (in subsection 1(f)) and all of the rest of the exporters and
producers in the United States that Mexico did not individually examine (in subsection 1(g)).

17. On the contrary, Mexico concedes that the US request in fact asserts that Mexico’s
application of the facts available to those entities br eached the listed provisions. What it objects to is
that it believes the United States has not adequately explained how
 Mexico’s application of the facts
available breached each of the provisions (in othe r words, the United States did not in its panel
request provide arguments to support its claims).10 As noted above, previous panels and the Appellate
Body have been very careful to distinguish between the claims that must be made in a panel request
under Article 6.2 – i.e., the brief summary of the legal basis for the complaint sufficient to present the

Korea Dairy that simply listing the articles of the agreement involved may not be sufficient if, for example, the
articles listed established multiple obligations. Id., para. 124.
8 Specifically, Mexico questions the listing of Ar ticle VI of GATT 1994 and Article 4.1 of the
AD Agreement in subsection 1(a) of the panel request, a nd it questions the articles listed in subsections 1(f) and
(g) of the panel request. See Mexico’s Request, paras. 14-19.
9 Specifically, Mexico does not question five of the seven articles listed in subsection 1(a), any of the
articles listed in subsections 1(b)-(e), (h), or (i), or any portion of subsections 2 or 3.
10 Id., paras. 17-18.

problem clearly – and the arguments supporting those claims. The clai ms must be set forth in the
panel request. The arguments need not be.
11

18. Mexico’s challenge to the US claim th at the injury and causation analyses breached
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement suffers from a similar flaw.
12 Mexico does not argue that the claim
should have been more specific; the request cites clearly to the first paragraph of Article 4. Mexico
even concedes that the United States included a narrative description that provided further information
with respect to the claim. It objects, however, th at it is unable to understand which of the statements
in the narrative description results in a breach of Article 4.1. Thus, its concern is with the US
arguments, and not with the specificity of the claim itself.

19. Turning next to Mexico’s objection to the US claim under Article VI of GATT 1994, it is true
that Article VI has several paragraphs. 13 However, Mexico cannot argue that it was unable to
understand which paragraphs were relevant to the matters in dis pute. In the US panel request, the
Article VI claim is accompanied by a lengthy narra tive description that provid es more than sufficient
detail about the nature of the US claims and demonstrat es that the majority of Article VI is simply not
relevant. The plain facts underlie this conclusi on. For example, the narrative description does not
address the imposition of countervailing duties (which is the topic of paragraphs 3 and 5 of
Article VI), because there is no Mexican countervailing duty measure on US rice. Similarly, the
description does not mention either of the scenarios that are the subject of paragraphs 4 or 7 of
Article VI, because the anti-dumping measure does not involve either issue. Rather, the narrative
focuses on issues that are addressed by the only paragra phs of Article VI that are relevant to this
dispute: paragraphs 2 and 6(a). As such, through the narrative description in the US panel request, the
United States provided Mexico a brief summary of th e legal basis of the complaint with respect to
Article VI that is sufficient to present the problem clearly.

20. Furthermore, it is worth noting th at in Mexico’s panel request in United States –
Anti-Dumping Measures On Oil Coun try Tubular Goods From Mexico , Mexico includes a claim
under Article VI of GATT 1994, but fails to specify which paragraphs of Article VI are relevant.
14
Thus, it is apparent that Mexico itself believes a c itation to Article VI as a whole is not inconsistent
with Article 6.2 of the DSU.

21. In sum, Mexico has not presented any reasons why subsections 1(a), (f), and (g) of the US
panel request should be found inconsistent with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.

V. THE US PANEL REQUEST DOES NOT PR EJUDICE THE ABILITY OF MEXICO
TO DEFEND ITSELF
22. Even if Mexico had succeeded in demonstra ting that the US panel request does not meet the
requirements of DSU Article 6.2, which it has not, Mexico has offered nothing to suggest that it has
been prejudiced.
23. In Korea Dairy, the Appellate Body denied Korea’s claim that the panel request had failed to
provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the co mplaint sufficient to present the problem clearly,

11 See, e.g., EC Bananas AB, para. 141; Appellate Body Report on Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland , WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted
5 April 2001, at para. 88, n.36 (noting that there is a “significant difference between the claims identified in the
request for the establishment of a panel, which esta blish the panel’s terms of reference . . . and the arguments
supporting those claims,” and that the arguments are clar ified in the first written submission and in subsequent
documents.) While Mexico cited paragraph 88 of the Thai Steel AB report, it omitted reference to footnote 36,
which is appended to that paragraph. See Mexico’s Request, para. 11.
12 Id., paras. 15-16.
13 Mexico’s Request, para. 14.
14 See United States – Anti-Dumping Measures On Oil Country Tubular Goods From Mexico, Request
for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico, WT/DS282/2, circulated 29 July 2003.

for the following reason: although Korea had asser ted prejudice, it offered no supporting particulars
and failed to demonstrate that the panel request had prejudiced its ability to defend itself during the
panel proceedings.15 Mexico categorically asserts that it is prejudiced by the US panel request, but
only in the vaguest and most conclusory manner.

24. Mexico’s only explanation of how it has been prejudiced is its assertion that the alleged
deficiencies in the panel request are im peding its ability to prepare a defence.
16 It has failed
completely, however, to provide any supporting par ticulars as to why this is so. Moreover, its
assertion is contradicted by the facts, since Mexico’s first written submission contains a lengthy
response to each of the challenged US claims.
17

25. In light of the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Korea Dairy , Mexico’s mere assertion of
prejudice is plainly insufficient to establish prejudi ce. As was the case for Korea in that dispute,
Mexico has “offered no supporting particulars” and h as “failed to demonstrat e” that its ability to
defend itself in the panel proceedings has been prejudiced.

VI. MEXICO’S ASSERTION THAT THE US PANEL REQUEST DOES NOT IDENTIFY
ARTICLE 366 OF THE FEDERAL CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS A “SPECIFIC
MEASURE AT ISSUE” IS INCORRECT
26. Mexico’s second objection to the US panel re quest under Article 6.2 of the DSU is that the
request allegedly failed to identify Article 366 of th e FCCP as a “specific measu re at issue”. Mexico
first made this assertion at the DSB meeting where the United States first requested the formation of a
panel in this dispute. As the United States explai ned at that time, and as it further explained at the
DSB meeting that established the panel, Mexico’s assertion is groundless.

27. Section 3 of the US panel request states the following:

Mexican officials have asserted that Article 366 of Mexico’s Federal Code of Civil
Procedure and Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act prevent Mexico from
conducting reviews of anti-dumping or count ervailing duty orders while a judicial
review of the order is ongoing, including a “binational panel” review pursuant to
Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement . These provisions
appear to be inconsistent with Articles 9. 3, 9.5, and 11.2 of the AD Agreement, and
Articles 19.3 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
18

15 Korea – Dairy, para 131.
16 Mexico’s Request, para. 38. Mexico’s only other assertion of prejudice relates to the date on which
it received an English-language translatio n of the US first written submission. Mexico’s Request, para. 5. It is
not clear to the United States how the date that Mexi co received the first written submission is relevant to
determining whether Mexico was prejudiced by the panel request. The United States notes, however, that
Mexico received five weeks to prepare its first writte n submission – which is two weeks longer than the
maximum period proposed in Appendix 3 of the DSU. In addition, if any Party has been prejudiced by the
"translation" issue, it is the United States, which has had to prepare and file this response to Mexico's Request
before receiving the English-language translation. Althou gh we have done our best to respond to Mexico's
complaints in a comprehensive manner, we may need to supplement our response after we receive the English
translation.
17 In United States – Lamb Meat , the Panel found that the United States had not provided adequate
“supporting particulars” in support of its claim of prejudice. It based its finding in part on the fact that the US
first written submission contained a detailed rebuttal to the challenged claims. See Panel Report on
United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and
Australia, WT/DS177/R, WT/DS178/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para. 5.51.
18 US Panel Request, Section (3).

28. Mexico focuses solely on the first sentence, which refers to the assertions made by the
Mexican officials. It ignores completely, however, th e second sentence, which pl ainly states that it is
the “provisions” themselves – including Article 366 of the FCCP – that the United States is
challenging, and not the assertions of the Mexican offi cials. While it is barely credible that Mexico
would take from the first sentence the understanding that the United States was challenging assertions
rather than the provision, when the paragraph is viewed in its entirety, it is plain that Mexico’s claims
are groundless.
19

29. Furthermore, the US representative specifically addressed this issue at the DSB meeting that
established this Panel, after Mexico claimed not to understand which measure the United States was
challenging:

The United States wished to address briefly two erroneous statements that Mexico
had made during [the first DSB meeting that considered the US panel request]. First,
Mexico had mistakenly asserted that the United States had abandoned its claim
addressing Article 366 of Mexico’s Federal C ode of Civil Procedure. In actuality,
this claim appeared in section 3 of the panel request. Second, Mexico had asserted
that the United States was claiming that certa in statements of Mexican officials were
“measures”. As the request itself made clear, the United States was making no such
claim. Rather, it had cited statements of Mexican officials with respect to certain
provisions that are measures – namely, Article 366 of the Federal Code of Civil
Procedure, and Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act.
20
30. Accordingly, there is no doubt that Article 366 is a “specific measure at issue”. Moreover,
there is no need for the Panel to address Mexico’s arguments that statements of Mexican officials
cannot be considered “measures”.21 The United States has made no ar guments to the contrary. It is
Article 366 – and not statements about Article 366 – that is the measure at issue.

31. For the foregoing reasons, there are no grounds for Mexico’s assertion that the United States
failed to identify Article 366 of the FCCP as a “sp ecific measure at issue” in this dispute, and
therefore no grounds to conclude that the US pa nel request does not meet the requirements of DSU
Article 6.2 with respect to this measure.

VII. MEXICO’S CHALLENGES TO THE ADEQUACY OF CONSULTATIONS LACK
MERIT
32. Mexico’s final challenge to the US panel request pertains to the adequacy of the consultations
with respect to the claims at i ssue. Mexico argues that a Member cannot include a legal claim in a
panel request unless that claim was discussed during consultations.
22 It also complains about the

19 The notion that the United States would be challengi ng the statements of the Mexican officials about
Article 366, rather than Article 366 itself, is even more difficult to credit given discussions on this topic at
consultations. The United States provided Mexico with a list of questions during consultations that specifically
addressed Article 366. As an introduction to the questions, the United States noted, as it did in the US panel
request, that Mexican officials had claimed in meetings with US officials that Article 366 of the FCCP
precluded Mexico from conducting reviews while judicial review proceedings were ongoing. The seven
questions that followed, however, were addressed to Artic le 366 itself, and not to the assertions of the Mexican
officials. Thus, it was abundantly clear to Mexico that the measure in question was Article 366, and not the
statements by the Mexican officials about Article 366.
20 Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 2 October 2003 , WT/DSB/M/156,
10 November 2003, para. 45.
21 Mexico’s Request, paras. 22-26.
22 Mexico’s Request, paras. 33-34.

adequacy of the consultations with respect to Mexi co’s evaluation of the injury factors in the rice
investigation.23 Neither objection has merit.

33. First
, there is no basis for Mexico’s contention th at a Member cannot include a claim in its
panel request unless the claim was discussed duri ng consultations. A consultation request must
provide an “identification of the measures at is sue and an indication of the legal basis for the
complaint”.24 However, nothing in the DSU requires that a Member must have ascertained all of the
possible legal claims and relevant pr ovisions of the WTO agreements before the Member can even
request consultations. One of the purposes of consu ltations is to foster a better understanding of the
relevant measures and concerns of the various Memb ers in order to promote a satisfactory adjustment
of the matter. Consultations are often the firs t time that the Member maintaining the measure
provides a detailed description of the measure and re levant facts and legal documents. Consultations
are not a “dress rehearsal” or “moot court” for the panel process requiring Members to have worked
out all of their claims and positions in advance a nd presenting them in the consultations for the other
side to practice its prepared responses.

34. The DSU reflects the difference between request s for panels and requests for consultations by
using different terms for each. With respect to panels, the DSU requires that a request for the
establishment of a panel provide a “brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly”.
25 However, with respect to consu ltations, the DSU merely requires that
requests for consultations give “an indicati on” of the legal basis for the complaint. 26 Moreover,
previous panels have rejected the approach that Me xico is urging here – for example, the panel in
Japan – Agricultural Products rejected Japan’s argument that the US panel request could not include
a claim under Article 7 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
if the claim was not included in the consultation request and no consultations were held on it.27

35. Second , Mexico’s complaint about the alleged inadequacy of the consultations with respect to
Mexico’s evaluation of the injury factors is equally without merit. Contrary to Mexico’s assertion, the
consultations did address Mexico’s evaluation of the in jury factors in the rice investigation. More
fundamentally, precisely to avoid litigation over what the parties did or did not say during
consultations, the DSU only requires that the consu ltation request identify the measure that is the
subject of the consultations; there is no requir ement as to the adequacy of the consultations
themselves. As the panel noted in Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages:

The only requirement under the DSU is that c onsultations were in fact held, or were
at least requested, and that a period of sixty days has elapsed from the time
consultations were requested to the time a request for a panel was made. What takes
place in those consultations is not the concern of a panel.
28
36. In addition, the panel in Bananas III specifically rejected the contention that consultations
must lead to an adequate explanation of the complainants’ case:

23 Id., para. 35.
24 DSU Art. 4.4.
25 Id., Art. 6.2.
26 Id., Art. 4.4.
27 Panel Report on Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products , WT/DS76/R, adopted
19 March 1999, para. 8.4(i).
28 Panel Report on Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R, adopted
17 February 1999, para. 10.19 ( citing Panel Report on European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States , WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted
25 September 1997, para. 7.19 (“Bananas III”)).

As to the EC argument that consultations must lead to an adequate explanation of the
Complainants’ case, we cannot agree. Consu ltations are the first step in the dispute
settlement process. While one function of th e consultations may be to clarify what
the case is about, there is nothing in the DS U that provides that a complainant cannot
request a panel unless its case is adequately explained in the consultations. The
fulfilment of such a requirement would be difficult, if not impossible, for a
complainant to demonstrate if a respondent chose to claim a lack of understanding of
the case, a result which would undermine the automatic nature of panel establishment
under the DSU. The only prerequisite for re questing a panel is that the consultations
have “fail[ed] to settle a dispute within 60 days of receipt of the request for
consultations ...”. Ultimately , the function of providing notice to a respondent of a
complainant's claims and arguments is ser ved by the request for establishment of a
panel and by the complainant’s submissions to that panel.
29
37. In the present case, the United States and Mexico spent two full days in Mexico City
consulting at length on each of the specific measures at issue in this dispute. In addition, more than
sixty days elapsed from the time the United States re quested consultations to the time the request for
the panel was made. 30 Therefore, there is no basis for Mexico’s assertion that the United States has
acted inconsistently with Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU with respect to consultations over the
disputed measures.

38. Finally, Mexico also claims that the US pa nel request is inconsiste nt with Articles 17.4 and
17.5 of the AD Agreement. Neither claim has merit. First
, to the extent that Article 17.4 creates any
obligation with respect to consultations, it is that the requesting Member “consider” that the
consultations have failed to achieve a mutually agr eed solution. The United States so considered in
this dispute. In the view of the United States, th e consultations in this case have, in fact, failed to
achieve a mutually satisfactory solution. Therefore, Mexico’s Article 17.4 claim is groundless.

39. Second , Mexico’s claim under Article 17.5 of the AD Agreement must fail because
Article 17.5 imposes no obligation on the complaining party; rather, it establishes that the DSB shall,
upon the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter based on the panel
request and the facts made availa ble in conformity with appropria te domestic procedures to the
authorities of the importing Member.

VIII. CONCLUSION
40. For the reasons stated above, Mexico’s argum ents in support of its request for a preliminary
ruling that the US panel request does not meet the requirements of Articles 4.5, 4.7, and 6.2 of the
DSU or Articles 17.4 or 17.5 of the AD Agreement ar e without merit. Accordingly, the Panel should
reject that request.