KOREA – IMPORT BANS, AND TESTING AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIONUCLIDES REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY JAPAN
Document: REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL
Date: 21 August 2015
Document codes: WT/DS495/3
Complainant: Japan
Respondent: South Korea
Third parties: U.S., EU, Norway, New Zealand, India, Russia, Taiwan, China, Guatemala, Canada, Brazil
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 7, Annex B, 5.8, 2.3, 5.5, 5.6, 8, Annex C  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)Art. XXIII:1  GATT 1994

KOREA – IMPORT BANS, AND TESTING AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 FOR RADIONUCLIDES
REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY JAPAN
The following communication, dated 20 August 201 5, from the delegation of Japan to the
Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

Article XXIII:2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), and
Article 11.1 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement "), and
asks that the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") esta blish a panel with standard terms of reference
as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
2. On 21 May 2015, pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Ar ticle XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), and Article 11.1 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement"), Japan requested consultations regarding the Korean import bans
and additional testing and additional certification requirements. That request, dated 21 May 2015,
was circulated on 1 June 2015 as document
3. Japan and Korea held consultations on 24 and 25 June 2015, with a view towards settling the
dispute. Unfortunately, the consultations failed to reach a mutually agreed solution.
I. Background
4. Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that occurred subsequent
to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011, Japan understands that Korea adopted a
series of measures that (i) ban the import of certain food products from some 13 Japanese
prefectures, and (ii) in the event radionuclides, including cesium 134 or 137 (collectively "cesium")
or iodine 131, are detected in certain food products from Japan, impose additional testing and
additional certification requirements regarding the presence of other radionuclides.
1 Further,
Japan understands that, in September 2013, Korea (i) extended the scope of its import bans to all
fishery products caught or landed in 8 Japanese prefectures, and (ii) extended the additional
testing and additional certification requirements regarding the presence of radionuclides other than
cesium and iodine 131 to all food products from Japan that are not subject to import bans, where
cesium or iodine 131 are detected. To date, Korea has failed to publish these measures, such that
the evidence and information at Japan's disposal is, to a significant extent, limited to that which
can be gleaned from press releases issued by the relevant Korean agencies and ministries.

1 Based on a response from Korea's SPS Enquiry Point, dated 26 August 2014, Japan understands that
the additional radionuclides are: plutonium 238, plutonium 239, plutonium 240, americium 241, strontium 90,
ruthenium 106, iodine 129, uranium 235, sulfur 35, cobalt 60, strontium 89, ruthenium 103, cerium 144,
iridium 192, hydrogen 3, carbon 14 and technetium 99.

5. For many months, Japan has engaged in intense efforts to identify and understand Korea's
measures, and to satisfy Korea's concerns. Japan has participated in numerous bilateral meetings
with Korea to discuss the matter,
2 consistent with the spirit of the SPS Agreement. In this spirit,
Japan has repeatedly provided volumes of detailed information to Korea (i) as a part of information
regularly provided to foreign missions in Japan, and (ii) in response to specific requests received
from Korea.3 Japan has also repeatedly offered to hold additional meetings between our respective
technical experts, to further understand and address Korea's concerns.
6. Moreover, to enable Japan to demonstrate to Korea the equivalence of Japan's own SPS
measures to Korea's SPS measures, and because Japan has reason to believe that Korea's SPS
measures have the potential to and do constrain export from Japan, and are not based on relevant
international standards, guidelines or reco mmendations, on 18 March 2014, Japan requested
Korea, under Articles 4 and 5.8 of the SPS Agreement , to provide: an explanation of the
objectives and reasons for Korea's SPS measures; an identification of the risks that its measures
are intended to address; an indication of the leve l of protection its SPS measures are designed to
achieve; and, a copy of any risk assessments Korea has undertaken. On 9 June 2014 and
12 August 2014, Japan sent further letters reiterating its request. Although Korea is obliged by
Articles 4 and 5.8 of the SPS Agreement to have provided all of the requested information, it has
failed to provide meaningful responses to Japan's request.
4
7. In light of Korea's failure to publish its measures, and its failure meaningfully to respond to
Japan's request under Articles 4 and 5.8 of the SPS Agreement, Japan is deeply concerned about a
fundamental lack of transparency concerning the Ko rean SPS measures at issue. Accordingly, on
24 June 2014, Japan requested Korea's SPS enquiry point to provide copies of its measures, and
to respond to basic questions regarding the scope and meaning of those measures. Pursuant to
Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement , Korea is obliged to provide responses to the
substantive questions and requests. A response from Korea's SPS enquiry point, dated
26 August 2014, failed however to provide meanin gful substantive responses to many of Japan's
questions, and failed altogether to answer other of those questions.
8. As a result of these failures, on 13 November 2014, Japan sent a further communication to
Korea's SPS enquiry point, reiterating those questions from its 24 June 2014 request that
remained unanswered, and posing follow-up questions and requests to clarify matters left
ambiguous by the Korean enquiry point's 26 Augu st 2014 response. To date, Japan has not even
received an acknowledgement of receipt, let alone a response, to its enquiry of
13 November 2014.
9. Although, for many months, Korea did not respon d to Japan's repeated offers to hold meetings
at the level of each side's technical experts, Korea finally agreed to send a group of technical
experts and representatives of consumer's association ("the group") to Japan, purportedly as part
of an effort to review the Korean measures. Throughout its visits to Japan, which took place in
December 2014 and January 2015, Japan provided the group with further information and
opportunities to visit various sites so as to allow them to develop a first-hand understanding of the
current situation. Moreover, during and following the visits, upon request by Korea, Japan and
Korea conducted joint sampling of fishery products and ocean water for comparison of testing
results. Results of these joint inspections show that the levels of radionuclides in fishery products
are significantly below applicable Japanese and Korean thresholds, and that there are no more

2 Japan engaged in bilateral meetings with Korea to discuss this matter on 16 September 2013;
15 January 2014; 30 April 2014 and 18 September 2014, as well as in bilateral meetings in the margin of SPS
Committee meetings (15 October 2013; 24 March 2014; 8 July 2014; 15 October 2014 and 25 March 2015).
See further, paragraph 9, below.
3 For example, in response to questionnaires received from Korea, Japan provided large amounts of
information to Korea on 28 August 2013; 5 September 2013; 12 September, 2013; 29 January 2014,
9 June 2014, 12 December 2014; 7 January 2015; 8 January 2015; 9 January 2015; 14 January 2015;
29 January 2015; 5 February 2015; 10 February 2015. In addition, Japan responded to numerous additional
requests for information.
4 In particular, Korea's letters of 4 July 2014 and 15 September 2014 fail to provide: (i) “an explanation
of the reasons” for the Korean SPS measures, under Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement; and (ii) an explanation
of the objectives and rationale of the SPS measures, a clear identification of the risks that its measures are
intended to address, and a copy of any risk assessments Korea has undertaken and on which these SPS
measures are based, or a technical justification based on a relevant international standard, guideline or
recommendation, under Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and the SPS Committee's Decision on the
Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement (G/SPS/19/Rev.2).

than trace amounts of radionuclides in ocean water. Additionally, at Korea's request, Japanese
technical experts visited Korea on 2 April 2015, to address questions raised by Korean technical
experts in relation to the testing results.
10. Despite these developments, Korea has not offered any indication of appreciable progress
toward review and lifting of its measures. Moreover, Korea continues its failure to provide
meaningful information to Japan that would allow Japan to understand the operation of and
concerns behind Korea's measures, and to address and resolve these concerns.
II. Measures at issue
11. This request for the establishment of a panel concerns two groups of Korean measures. First,
the Korean measures covered by this request include the following omissions relating to Korea's
transparency obligations under the SPS Agreement:
a. Korea's failure to publish promptly, upon their adoption, the SPS measures listed in
paragraphs 13 and 14, below, in such a manner as to enable Japan to become
acquainted with them;
b. Korea's failure, following Japan's requests of 18 March 2014, 9 June 2014 and
12 August 2014 under Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement , to provide Japan with "an
explanation of the reasons for" the SPS measures listed in paragraphs 13 and 14, below;
c. Korea's failure, following Japan's requests of 18 March 2014, 9 June 2014 and
12 August 2014 under Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and the SPS Committee's Decision
on the Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement ,5 to provide Japan with, in
particular, an explanation of the objectives and rationale of the SPS measures referred
to in paragraphs 13 and 14, below; a clear identification of the risks that these same
SPS measures are intended to address; and, a copy of the risk assessment on which
these same SPS measures are based, or a technical justification based on a relevant
international standard, guideline or recommendation, so as to enable Japan to
demonstrate to Korea the equivalence of Japan's own SPS measures; and,
d. Korea's failure, in particular the failure of its SPS enquiry point, to respond to certain of
Japan's 24 June 2014 questions and requests for documents related to the measures
listed in paragraphs 13 and 14, below, and its failure to respond to any of Japan's
13 November 2014 reiterations of unanswered questions and follow-up questions and
requests related to the measures referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14, below.
12. Second, the Korean measures covered by this request also include SPS measures in the form
of (i) import bans, and (ii) additional testing an d additional certification requirements adopted by
Korea. As noted above, these measures suffer a fundamental lack of transparency. And Korea has
failed to engage meaningfully in bilateral discussions held in the spirit encouraged by the SPS
Agreement, and has failed to meet its express obligations under the SPS Agreement to provide
information and documents requested by Japan, including copies of the Korean measures at issue.
Accordingly, and taking account of the limited extent to which Korea has made available relevant
information regarding its measures, Japan refers, in paragraphs 13 and 14, below, to Korean
measures, as evidenced by and/or reflected in press releases issued by the relevant Korean
ministries and agencies.
13. As noted in point (i) of paragraph 12, the Korean SPS measures covered by this request
include import bans on certain food from particular regions in Japan, imposed in or after March
2011, following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Japan understands
that the import bans are evidenced by, and/or are reflected in, inter alia, the following publicly
available documents:
a. Press release by the Prime Minister's Secretariat, dated 23 March 2011, "Prime Minister
Hwang-Shik Kim demands stringent inspection of imported food products";

5 G/SPS/19/Rev.2.

b. Press release by the Korea Food and Drug Administration ("KFDA"), dated 23 March
2011, "Status of KFDA's response and management measures regarding Japanese
nuclear crisis (1)";
c. Press release by KFDA, dated 24 March 2011, "Status of KFDA's response and
management measures regarding Japanese nuclear crisis (2)";
d. Press release by the Prime Minister's Secretariat, dated 25 March 2011, "Temporary
import suspension of foods from regions in Japan contaminated with radioactivity";
e. Press release by Ministry of Food, Agricultur e, Forestry and Fisheries ("MIFAFF"), dated
21 April 2011, "Temporary ban on import of sand lances from Fukushima";
f. Press release by KFDA, dated 5 October 2011, "Status of KFDA's response and
management measures regarding Japan nuclear crisis";
g. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 16 April 2012, "T emporary ban on import of char from
Fukushima";
h. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 20 April 2012, "Temporary ban on import of sea-bass,
blue drum, flat fish, channel catfish and crucian carp from Ibaraki-ken";
i. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 23 April 2012, "Temporary ban on import of white mullet
and masou salmon from Miyagi-ken";
j. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 30 April 2012, "Temporary ban on import of common
carp and crucian carp from Fukushima-ken";
k. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 3 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of cod from
Miyagi-ken and Iwate-ken";
l. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 8 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of Japanese eel
from Ibaraki-ken, etc.";
m. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 9 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of panther puffer
from Miyagi-ken";
n. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 15 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of white mullet
from Iwate-ken";
o. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 16 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of char from
Miyagi-ken";
p. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 31 May 2012, "Temporary ban on import of flat fish from
Miyagi-ken";
q. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 4 June 2012, "Temporary ban on import of thornback
rays from Ibaraki-ken";
r. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 21 June 2012, "Temporary ban on import of char from
Tochigi-ken";
s. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 26 June 2012, "Temporary ban on import of 35 fishery
products including yellowfish from Fukushima-
ken";
t. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 29 June 2012, "Temporary ban on import of black sea
bream from Miyagi-ken";
u. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 9 July 2012, "Temporary ban on import of stone flounder
from Ibaraki-ken";

v. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 17 July 2012, "Temporary ban on import of barfin
flounder, etc. from Fukushima-ken";
w. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 24 July 2012, "Temporary ban on import of crucian carp
from Chiba-ken";
x. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 27 July 2012, "Temporary ban on import of starspotted
dogfish from Fukushima-ken";
y. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 6 August 2012, "Temporary ban on import of Japanese
eel from Fukushima-ken";
z. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 13 August 2012, "Temporary ban on import of masou
salmon from Tochigi-ken";
aa. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 28 August 2012, "Temporary ban on import of purple
puffer from Fukushima-ken";
bb. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 29 August 2012, "Temporary ban on import of cod from
Aomori-ken";
cc. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 26 October 2012, "Temporary ban on import of sea bass
from Iwate-ken";
dd. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 7 November 2012, "Temporary ban on import of black
sea bream from Iwate-ken";
ee. Press release by MIFAFF, dated 13 November 2012, "Temporary ban on import of cod
from Ibaraki-ken";
ff. Press release by the Prime Minister's Office, dated 6 September 2013, "Government
bans import of all fishery products from 8 ken near Fukushima";
gg. Press release by the Ministry of Food an d Drug Safety of Korea ("MFDS"), dated
27 September 2013, "Results of radiation inspection of imports from Japan (Sept. 13 –
26, 2013)"; and,
hh. MFDS Notice of Temporary Special Measure fo r Safety for Food Imported from Japan,
dated 6 September 2013, referred to by Korea in its notification of emergency measures
to the SPS Committee of 28 October 2013 that has been circulated as WTO document
G/SPS/N/KOR/454/Add.1 ("G/SPS/N/KOR/454/Add.1").
Japan further understands that the import bans that are the subject of this request for the
establishment of a panel implement, and/or were adopted on the basis of, inter alia, the following:
ii. Korea's Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides,
including Articles 4, 7, 7-2, 14, 15, 15-2, 17, 21, 22, 57 and 58;
jj. Korea's Standards and Specifications for Foods (Food Code) as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 1.1 (paragraphs 33 and 34), 2 and
5;
kk. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 4, 5, 7 and 11;
ll.
 Korea's Enforcement Regulation of the Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 10 and 12, and Annex 4 thereto;

mm. Korea's Livestock Products Sanitation Control Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 4, 15, 15-2, 26.3, 26-4, 33 and
33-2;
nn. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Livestock Products Sanitary Control Act as it relates
to potential contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 18-5, 26-3 and 26-4;
oo. Korea's Enforcement Regulation of Livestock Products Sanitation Control Act as it relates
to potential contamination with radionuclides, including Article 21;
pp. Korea's Processing Standards and Composition Specifications regarding Livestock
Products as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides;
qq. Korea's Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Control Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides;
rr. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Control Act
as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides; and,
ss. Korea's Enforcement Regulation of the Agricu ltural and Fishery Product Quality Control
Act as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides.
14. In addition, as noted in point (ii) of paragraph 12, the Korean SPS measures covered by this
request include additional testing requirements an d additional certification requirements regarding
the presence of other radionuclides in food from Japan, in the event that radionuclides, including
cesium or iodine 131, are detected in the food. These measures were imposed in or after
March 2011, following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Japan
understands that these measures are evidenced by, and/or are reflected in, inter alia , the
following publicly available documents:
a. Press release by KFDA, dated 14 April 2011, "Status of KFDA's response and
management measures regarding Japanese nuclear crisis (5)";
b. Press release by the Prime Minister's Office, dated 6 September 2013, "Government
bans import of all fishery products from 8 ken near Fukushima";
c. Press release by MFDS, dated 27 September 2013, "Results of radiation inspection of
imports from Japan (Sept. 13 – 26, 2013)";
d. Press release by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of Korea, dated 21 August 2014,
"As regards media reports ‘Fish, untrustworthy' (explanation material)";
e. MFDS Notice of Temporary Special Measure fo r Safety for Food Imported from Japan,
dated 6 September 2013, referred to by Korea in G/SPS/N/KOR/454/Add.1;
f. Press releases by Korea's MFDS since 14 April 2011,
6 publishing the results of testing for
cesium and iodine 131 in food from Japan and other exporting countries, and indicating
that additional testing and additional certification is required for food from Japan in
which cesium or iodine 131 are found; and,
g. Notices issued by Korea since 14 April 2011 to individual importers into Korea or
exporters from Japan into Korea of food from Japan, requiring additional testing and
additional certification for radionuclides, in the event that cesium or iodine 131 were
detected in such food.
Japan further understands that the additional te sting requirements and additional certification
requirements that are the subject of this requ est for the establishment of a panel implement,
and/or were adopted on the basis of, inter alia, the following:

6 Korea's MFDS publishes these press releases at: http://www.mfds.go.kr/index.do?mid=979 (last
visited 17 August 2015); and http://www.mfds.go.kr/index.do?mid=977 (last visited 17 August 2015).

h. Korea's Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides,
including Articles 4, 7, 7-2, 14, 15, 15-2, 17, 19, 19-4, 21, 22, 24, 57 and 58;
i. Food Code as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides, including
Articles 1.1 (paragraphs 33 and 34), 2 and 5;
j. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 4, 5, 7 and 11;
k. Korea's Enforcement Regulation of the Food Sanitation Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 10 and 12, and Annex 4 thereto;
l. Korea's Livestock Products Sanitation Control Act as it relates to potential contamination
with radionuclides, including Articles 4, 15, 15-2, 33 and 33-2;
m. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Livestock Products Sanitary Control Act as it relates
to potential contamination with radionuclides, including Articles 18-5, 26-3, 26-4 and 65;
n. Korea's Enforcement Regulation of Livestock Products Sanitation Control Act as it relates
to potential contamination with radionuclides, including Article 21;
o. Korea's Processing Standards and Composition Specifications regarding Livestock
Products as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides;
p. Korea's Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Control Act as it relates to potential
contamination with radionuclides;
q. Korea's Enforcement Decree of the Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Control Act
as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides; and,
r. Korea's Enforcement Regulation of the Agricu ltural and Fishery Product Quality Control
Act as it relates to potential contamination with radionuclides.
15. Where press releases are cited above as a re flection and/or evidence of the measures at
issue, it is due to the fundamental lack of tran sparency concerning the Korean SPS measures at
issue and Korea's failure to observe the tran sparency and publication obligations of the SPS
Agreement, as explained in, e.g., section I, above. Thus, where press releases are cited, this
request for the establishment of a panel also covers: Korean legal instruments or any other form
of a measure giving rise to and/or described in the press releases, whether of, inter alia , a
legislative, regulatory, administrative, executive or judicial nature; and, notices or guidance issued
to Korean agencies, Korean importers, or foreign exporters to assist with implementation and/or
application of all Korean legal instruments or any other form of measure giving rise to and/or
described in the press releases.
16. In addition, this request also covers in whatever form: any amendments, supplements, or
extensions to or of the measures referred to in paragraphs 11-14, above; any measures replacing,
renewing or implementing the measures referred to in paragraphs 11-14, above; and, any
measures related to the measures referred to in paragraphs 11-14, above.
III. Legal basis for the complaint
17. Japan considers that the Korean measures identified in section II, above, are inconsistent with
the SPS Agreement. In particular, Japan considers that:
a. Korea's failure, identified in paragraph 11.a, above, to publish promptly, upon their
a d o p t i o n , t h e S P S m e a s u r e s r e f e r r e d t o i n p a r a g r a p h s 1 3 a n d 1 4 , a b o v e , i n s u c h a
manner as to enable Japan to become acquainted with them, is inconsistent with
Article 7 and paragraph 1 Annex B to the SPS Agreement;
b. Korea's failure, identified in paragraph 11.b, above, following Japan's requests of
18 March 2014, 9 June 2014 and 12 August 2014 under Article 5.8 of the SPS

Agreement, to provide Japan with "an explanation of the reasons for" the SPS measures
referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, is inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the SPS
Agreement;
c. Korea's failure, identified in paragraph 11.c, above, following Japan's requests of
18 March 2014, 9 June 2014 and 12 August 2014 under Article 4 of the SPS Agreement
and the SPS Committee's Decision on th e Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS
Agreement,7 to provide Japan with, in particular: an explanation of the objectives and
rationale of the SPS measures referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14; a clear identification
of the risks that these same SPS measures are intended to address; and, a copy of the
risk assessment on which these same SPS measures are based, or a technical
justification based on a relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation, so
as to enable Japan to demonstrate to Korea the equivalence of Japan's own SPS
measures, is inconsistent with Article 4 of the SPS Agreement; and,
d. Korea's failure, identified in paragraph 11.d, above, to respond fully to Japan's
24 June 2014 and 13 November 2014 questions and requests for documents related to
the measures referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, is inconsistent with Article 7
and paragraph 3 of Annex B to the SPS Agreement.
18. Moreover, Japan believes that the measures referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, are
inconsistent with relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. Specifically, Japan considers that:
a. The measures in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement, because they arbitrarily or unjusti fiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail, or because they are applied in a manner
which constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade;
b. The measures in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, are inconsistent with Article 5.5 of the
SPS Agreement, because they entail arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of
protection in different situations that result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
the importation of food products from Japan;
c. The measures in paragraphs 13 and 14, above, are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement , because they are more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
Korea's appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical and economic
feasibility;
d. The measures in paragraph 14, above, to the extent they constitute control, inspection
or approval procedures, are inconsistent with Article 8 and paragraphs 1(a), 1(c), 1(e)
and 1(g) of Annex C to the SPS Agreement, because: the relevant procedures are not
undertaken and completed in no less favorable manner for imported products than for
like domestic products; because the information requirements for control, inspection and
approval procedures are not limited to what is necessary; because the requirements for
control, inspection and approval of indivi dual specimens are not limited to what is
reasonable and necessary; and, because the criteria used in the siting of facilities are not
the same and do not minimize the inconvenience to applicants, importers, exporters or
their agents.
19. Japan considers that the measures in question also nullify or impair, within the meaning of
Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994, benefits accruing to Japan directly or indirectly under the SPS
Agreement.
20. Japan asks that this request for the establishment of a panel be placed on the agenda for the
next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, which is scheduled for 31 August 2015, and that the
Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel with standard terms of reference as set out in
Article 7.1 of the DSU.