CHINA – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON GRAIN ORIENTED FLAT-ROLLED ELECTRICAL STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES ARB-2013-1/27
Document: Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Award of the Arbitrator Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
Date: 3 May 2013
Document codes: WT/DS414/12
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: China
Third parties: Argentina, EU, Honduras, India, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Russia
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. VI  GATT 1994Art. 1  Anti-dumpingArt. 10, 11.2, 11.3, 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, 12.7, 12.8, 22.3, 22.5, 15.1, 15.2  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 6.9, 12.2.2, 6.8, Annex II, 6.4, 6.5.1, 3.1, 3.2  Anti-dumping

CHINA – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON GRAIN
ORIENTED FLAT-ROLLED ELECTRICAL STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES
ARB-2013-1/27
Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Award of the Arbitrator
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann

CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Hides and
Leather (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of
Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, , 31 August 2001,
DSR 2001:XII, 6013
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
, 29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, 8581
Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
, 18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, 3
Chile – Alcoholic
Beverages
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, ,
, 23 May 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2583
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, , 17 March 2003,
DSR 2003:III, 1237
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts, / /
, adopted 12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – Auto Parts Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile
Parts, / / / and Add.1 and
Add.2, adopted 12 January 2009, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as
modified (WT/DS340/R / WT/DS342/R) by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R,
DSR 2009:I, 119-DSR 2009:II, p. 625
China – GOES Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Duties on Grain Oriented Flat–Rolled Electrical Steel from the
United States, WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012
China – GOES Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat–Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,
WT/DS414/R, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS414/AB/R
China – Intellectual
Property Rights
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20
March 2009, DSR 2009:V, 2097
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010,
DSR 2010:I, 3
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January
2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R,
DSR 2010:II, 261
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various
Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R / WT/DS395/R / WT/DS398/R / and
Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body
Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R
Colombia – Ports of Entry
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions
on Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS366/13, 2 October 2009, DSR 2009:IX, 3819
EC – Chicken Cuts
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Customs
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15, 20 February
2006
EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Export Subsidies on
Sugar – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS265/33,
WT/DS266/33, WT/DS283/14, 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11581
EC – Hormones
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833
EC – Tariff Preferences
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries – Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS246/14, 20 September 2004,
DSR 2004:IX, p. 4313
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic
Random Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS336/16, 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX,
8553
Korea – Alcoholic
Beverages
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS75/16,
WT/DS84/14, 4 June 1999, DSR 1999:II, 937
US – 1916 Act
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS136/11,
WT/DS162/14, 28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017
US – COOL
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin
Labelling (COOL) Requirements – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, 4 December 2012
US – Gambling
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS285/13, 19 August 2005,
DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11639
US – Hot–Rolled Steel
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot–Rolled Steel Products from Japan – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS184/13, 19 February 2002,
DSR 2002:IV, 1389
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R,
adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Section 110(5)
Copyright Act
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS160/12, 15 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 657
US – Stainless Steel
(Mexico)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures
on Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, WT/DS344/15, 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, 8619

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III,
1163
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS268/12, 7 June
2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 11619

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS AWARD
Abbreviation Description
Administrative
Reconsideration Law
Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative
Reconsideration, adopted at the 9th Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the 9th National People's Congress on 29 April 1999
and promulgated by Order No. 16 of the President of the People's
Republic of China on 29 April 1999 (English translation provided in
Exhibit USA-6 and available at: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Law/2007-12/11/content_1383562.htm>)
AD Regulations Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Anti-Dumping,
promulgated by Decree No. 328 of the State Council on 26 November
2001, and revised in accordance with the Decision of the State
Council on Amending the Regulations on Anti-Dumping promulgated
on 31 March 2004 (see WTO document G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.3
(Exhibit USA-8))
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Appellate Body Report Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the
United States, WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012
BOFT MOFCOM's Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports
CVD Regulations Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countervailing
Measures, promulgated by Decree No. 329 of the State Council on
26 November 2001, and revised in accordance with the Decision of
the State Council on Amending the Regulations on Countervailing
Measures promulgated on 31 March 2004 (see WTO document
G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/Suppl.3 (Exhibit USA-3))
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
DTL MOFCOM's Department of Treaty and Law
IBII MOFCOM's Investigation Bureau for Industry Injury
Foreign Trade Law Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted as
amended at the 8th Session of the Standing Committee of the 10th
National People's Congress on 6 April 2004 (see WTO document
G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.4)
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
GOES grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
Panel Report Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,
WT/DS414/R, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS414/AB/R
Regulations on Rules Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Procedures for the
Formulation of Rules, promulgated by Decree No. 322 of the State
Council on 16 November 2001, and effective as of 1 January 2002
(English translation provided in Exhibit CHN-4)

Abbreviation Description
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Tariff Commission Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China
WTO World Trade Organization
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR

China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled
Electrical Steel from the United States

Parties:

China
United States

ARB-2013-1/27

Arbitrator:

Claus-Dieter Ehlermann

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. On 16 November 2012, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the
Appellate Body Report
1 and the Panel Report 2, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, in
China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from
the United States . This dispute concerns the United States' challenge of China's measures
imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel
(GOES) from the United States, as set forth in the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic
of China (MOFCOM) Announcement No. 21 of 10 April 2010 and its annexes. The Panel and the
Appellate Body found the measure at issue to be inconsistent with various provisions of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement).
3 At the DSB meeting of 30 November 2012, China indicated its intention to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DS B in this dispute, and stated that it would
require a reasonable period of time in which to do so.4
1.2. On 8 February 2013, the United States informed the DSB that consultations with China had
not resulted in an agreement on the reasonab le period of time for implementation. The
United States therefore requested that such period be determined through arbitration pursuant to
Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU).5
1.3. The United States and China were unable to agree on an arbitrator within 10 days of the
referral of the matter to arbitration. Consequently, by letter dated 22 February 2013, the
United States requested that the Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) appoint
an arbitrator pursuant to footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The Director-General appointed
me as Arbitrator on 28 February 2013, after consulting with the parties. I informed the parties of
my acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 4 March 2013
6 and undertook to issue the
award no later than 3 May 2013.
1.4. China filed a written submission on 11 March 2013, and the United States filed a written
submission on 18 March 2013. An oral hearing was held on 4 April 2013. The parties have agreed
that this Award will be deemed to be an arbi tration award under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
notwithstanding the expiry of the 90-day period stipulated in Article 21.3(c).7

1 WT/DS414/AB/R.
2 WT/DS414/R.
3 See infra, section 3.1.3 of this Award.
5 WT/DS414/10.
6 See WT/DS414/11.
7 See WT/DS414/9. The 90-day period following the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports
expired on 14 February 2013.

2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
2.1 China
2.1. China requests that I determine that the reas onable period of time for implementation in this
dispute is 19 months from the date of adoption by the DSB of the Panel and Appellate Body
Reports.
8
2.2. China elaborates on the various administrative stages required to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. According to China, these stages include:
(i) internal and inter-agency deliberations, as well as consultations with external legal experts and
China's Legal Office of the State Council to cl arify and consider the need for, and scope of,
amendments to existing regulations to accommodate the implementation of DSB rulings in the
trade remedy context; (ii) the adoption of new, specific rules to accommodate the implementation
of DSB rulings and recommendations in disputes concerning trade remedies; and (iii) specific
administrative action with respect to the underlying anti-dumping and countervailing duties at
issue in this dispute.
9
2.3. China submits that the technical complexi ty that confronted MOFCOM in addressing the
question of whether legal authority for implemen tation existed under domestic law represents a
"particular circumstance" that is relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. China adds th at an inquiry into whether and how China may
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings within the context of its legal system is not
unlike the type of "pre-legislative" consideration that previous arbitrators have found to be
relevant as a "particular circumstance of implementation".
10 According to China, another
"particular circumstance" relevant to this dispute is the outcome of the internal and inter-agency
deliberations that were conducted, namely, "the need for new rules".11
2.1.1 Administrative rulemaking
2.4. With regard to the need to provide legal authority and a mechanism for specific
implementation action in this dispute, China acknowledges that China's Foreign Trade Law 12
provides the "overarching legal basis" for trade remedy measures and that China's Regulations on
Anti-Dumping13 (AD Regulations) and the Regulations on Countervailing Measures 14
(CVD Regulations) provide "the more detailed framework" for anti-dumping and countervailing
measures.15 China emphasizes, however, that these laws do not provide a basis for the
implementation of WTO dispute settlement decisions.16

8 China's submission, paras. 5, 8, 9, and 90.
9 China's submission, para. 4.
10 China's submission, para. 48 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrator, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 43; and US – Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3(c)), para. 38).
11 China's submission, para. 49.
12 Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted as amended at the 8th Session of the
Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress on 6 April 2004 (see WTO document
G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.4).
13 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Anti-Dumping, promulgated by Decree No. 328 of the
State Council on 26 November 2001, and revised in accordance with the Decision of the State Council on
Amending the Regulations on Anti-Dumping promulgated on 31 March 2004 (see WTO document
G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.3 (Exhibit USA-8)).
14 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countervailing Measures, promulgated by Decree
No. 329 of the State Council on 26 November 2001, and revised in accordance with the Decision of the State
Council on Amending the Regulations on Countervailing Measures promulgated on 31 March 2004 (see WTO
document G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/Suppl.3 (Exhibit USA-3)).
15 China's submission, paras. 17 and 18.
16 China's submission, para. 19.

2.5. China further explains that Article 47 of the AD Regulations authorizes MOFCOM to adjust
existing anti-dumping measures to account for "new exporters" that had not exported previously
to China, and that Article 48 of the AD Regulations and Article 47 of the CVD Regulations authorize
MOFCOM to conduct "sunset reviews".
17 These provisions do not, however, provide broader
authority to make changes to trade remedies for "other reasons". 18 China adds that Article 49 of
the AD Regulations and Article 48 of the CVD Regulations authorize MOFCOM to decide, "on
justifiable grounds", to review the need for the continued imposition of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. 19 While these provisions address the issue of interim reviews under
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Ar ticle 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, they do "not
provide broader authority to make changes to trade remedies for other reasons". 20 The same is
true with respect to Article 50 of the AD Regula tions and Article 49 of the CVD Regulations, which
provide China's Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council 21 (Tariff Commission) with
"specific legal authority" to adopt any changes triggered by "new shipper" reviews, sunset reviews,
or interim reviews, "but go no further". 22 China notes that Article 57 of the AD Regulations and
Article 56 of the CVD Regulations also provide MOFCOM with the responsibility for managing
China's participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings concerning trade remedies, but
asserts that these provisions do not "directly and unambiguously" address the implementation of
WTO dispute settlement decisions in this area.
23
2.6. China further explains that Article 58 of the AD Regulations and Article 57 of the CVD
Regulations provide MOFCOM with discretion to formulate "implementing measures", but only if "in
accordance with these Regulations".
24 Hence, although general authorization to implement could
arguably be found within the AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations, such authority does not
extend to modification or withdrawal of specific anti-dumping or countervailing measures.
Moreover, the AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations lack any provisions dealing with the
consequences of modification or withdrawal of anti-dumping or countervailing measures, such as
whether these actions have retroactive or prospective effect.
25
2.7. China submits that the new rules to be adopted by MOFCOM will serve two important
purposes. First, they will specifically state that MOFCOM can maintain, amend, or withdraw
anti-dumping or countervailing measures through administrative actions such as reinvestigation,
and will clarify the status of any anti-dumping and countervailing duties already collected. Second,
they will establish the specific procedures to be followed when MOFCOM implements WTO dispute
settlement decisions concerning trade remedies imposed by China.
26
2.8. China highlights that MOFCOM and related agencies began implementation efforts
immediately after the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute on
16 November 2012.27 China expounds on its implementation efforts thus far, and details the
implementation work that has been completed, as well as the implementation work that remains
to be done.
2.9. According to China, 4 months have already been spent on internal and inter-agency
deliberations, as well as consultations with external legal experts and the Legal Office of the State
Council. These deliberations and consultations entailed: (i) discussing what, if any, authority exists
for MOFCOM to engage in implementation under the current AD Regulations and CVD Regulations;
(ii) reaching an understanding that the current regulations provide MOFCOM with only general
authority to implement, without any specific auth ority regarding particular actions that might be
taken; and (iii) determining what other steps and specific actions might be necessary to implement

17 China's submission, paras. 20 and 21.
18 China's submission, paras. 20 and 21.
19 China's submission, para. 22.
20 China's submission, para. 22.
21 The Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council of the People's Republic of China is an
inter-agency coordination body composed by the vice-ministers of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), and the General Administration on Customs.
22 China's submission, para. 24.
23 China's submission, para. 26.
24 China's submission, paras. 26-28.
25 China's submission, para. 46.
26 China's submission, para. 34.
27 China's submission, para. 37.

the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. These discussions were held from late
November 2012 to early March 2013.28
2.10. China notes that work has commenced on the drafting and examination of the new
implementation rules. This process will take a total of 5.5 months. Work commenced in
January 2013 with MOFCOM's Department of Treaty and Law (DTL) formulating the first draft of
the proposed new rules, which was circulated for comment to other MOFCOM departments,
experts, and lawyers. Comments were received by DTL in February 2013. Based on these
comments, DTL revised the first draft and prepared a second draft. 29 China explains that DTL will
circulate the second draft of the new rules, an d seek additional comments from other MOFCOM
departments and legal experts. Subsequently, anothe r revised draft will be prepared. According to
China, this process will take an additional 15 days 30, and is required by Article 14 of the
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules31 (Regulations on Rules).
2.11. After revising the draft text, DTL will, as required by Article 16 of the Regulations on Rules,
seek comment from government agencies with an interest in the matter. In particular, China notes
that MOFCOM will need to consult with the Tariff Commission and with the General Administration
on Customs, and make any necessary revisions to the draft. China anticipates that this stage of
the process will take 1 month.
32
2.12. Upon completion of the internal govern ment review, the draft rules will, pursuant to
Article 14 of the Regulations on Rules, be made available for public comment. China highlights that
the minimum time period necessary for public comment is 30 days. After receiving any public
comments, DTL will produce a revised draft, in a process that will take an additional 15 days to
complete. The new revised draft will then be circ ulated by DTL among the other relevant MOFCOM
departments, including the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports (BOFT) and the
Investigation Bureau for Industry Injury (IBII), so that they may review and co-sign the draft. This
process will take 15 days.
33
2.13. The co-signed draft is then presented at the MOFCOM executive meeting for deliberation, as
required by Chapter V of the Regulations on Rules. China highlights that MOFCOM executive
meetings are held no more than once a month, and, because there are no intervening executive
meetings, the time necessary for this action is expected to take 1 month. Next, DTL revises the
draft and prepares the final draft for approval, in accordance with Article 29 of the Regulations on
Rules. According to China, this step takes at le ast 7 days. DTL then submits the final draft to the
MOFCOM minister to sign the decree to promulgate the new rules. This step also takes at

28 In late November and December 2012, MOFCOM's Department of Treaty and Law (DTL), conducted
an internal analysis of the AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations, focusing on the question of MOFCOM's
legal authority to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the area of trade remedies. The result
of this analysis was unclear as to whether MOFCOM in fact had legal authority to implement, and how any such
implementation could be conducted. Therefore, DTL began discussions with two other departments within
MOFCOM with immediate jurisdiction over trade remedy matters, namely, the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports
and Exports (BOFT) and the Investigation Bureau for Industry Injury (IBII). These discussions confirmed the
legal ambiguity in relation to the existence of a proper and sufficient legal basis for implementation. Under
these circumstances, DTL determined that the process would benefit from consultation with external legal
experts and academic experts. A similar conclusion was reached by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council. A "study meeting" with external law firms and academics was held in early February 2013. This
meeting was followed by one attended by all government agencies involved in consideration of the issue.
(China's submission, paras. 38-45)
29 China's submission, para. 52.
30 China's submission, para. 53.
31 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, promulgated
by Decree No. 322 of the State Council on 16 November 2001, and effective as of 1 January 2002 (English
translation provided in Exhibit CHN-4).
32 According to China, the Tariff Commission's review is particularly important as it is responsible for the
final determination to apply anti-dumping and countervailing measures. Moreover, the review of the General
Administration on Customs is also important, as it is responsible for the implementation and collection of any
anti-dumping and countervailing duties. (China's submission, para. 54)
33 China's submission, paras. 55 and 56.

least 7 days. Finally, in accordance with Article 32 of the Regulations on Rules, the rules become
effective 30 days after the date of promulgation.34
2.14. In sum, China submits that it requires a minimum of 8 months to draft and promulgate new
rules to address the specific procedures for implementation. This time period reflects: 2 months for
"initial drafting", which has already been completed 35; 3.5 months to conduct the "final drafting
and examination" stage 36; and 2.5 months to conduct the "decision and promulgation" stage. 37
This time period could begin only after the initial 1.5 months 38 during which the issues to be
addressed in the new rules were studied.
2.15. China emphasizes that the timeframes for the "drafting" and "examination" of the
implementation rules have been accelerated by having DTL conduct the examination process in
parallel with the drafting process.
39 According to China, concluding the "decision and
promulgation" stage within 2.5 months represents "extreme acceleration" of the process within
China's legal system. 40 China adds that any shortening of the 5-month "drafting" period would
"begin to call into question" the ability of MOFCOM to conclude the "decision and promulgation"
stage within the 2.5-month period described above.41
2.16. China also points out that the 8-month period that it requires for rulemaking in this case is
"relatively short, compared with similar implementation exercises" conducted by China in previous
instances in which China was required to modify laws, regulations, or rules in order to implement
WTO dispute settlement decisions. 42 The average period of time in such cases was "closer to a
year", with the reasonable period of time for implementation ranging from 7.7 months (in a
dispute involving the termination of relevant ru les, rather than the enactment of new rules)
43
to 14 months.44
2.1.2 Administrative redetermination
2.17. China states that, once MOFCOM has clear legal authority to implement, and specific steps
to follow, only then can it begin the administrative work to implement the DSB's recommendations
and rulings in this dispute. China highlights, ho wever, that MOFCOM has already commenced work
on the specific actions necessary to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this
dispute. Immediately after adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, MOFCOM began
preparations for the translation of the Reports in to Chinese, which took 15 days, and then spent
30 days reading and understanding the reasoning of the Reports, and engaging in internal
discussions on the work and information that would be necessary to implement each of the
individual recommendations and rulings.
45
2.18. China asserts that the administrative wo rk to implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in this dispute will involve several steps. First, upon the effective date of the new rules,
MOFCOM will draft and obtain the necessary approval of the initiation notice, which will be

34 China's submission, paras. 59 and 60.
35 1 January–28 February 2013. See China's submission, para. 64.
36 1 March–15 June 2013. See China's submission, para. 64.
37 16 June–30 August 2013. See China's submission, para. 64.
38 16 November–30 December 2013. See China's submission, para. 64.
39 China's submission, para. 58.
40 China's submission, para. 61.
41 China's submission, para. 61.
42 China's submission, para. 63 and fn 22 thereto. China refers to the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in China – Auto Parts, China – Intellectual Property Rights, and
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products. China further notes that, in China – Raw Materials,
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings involved administrative, rather than legislative,
action.
43 China's submission, para. 63 (referring to the dispute in China – Auto Parts).
44 China's submission, para. 63 (referring to the dispute in China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products).
45 China's submission, para. 66.

published to provide public notice of the reinvestigation and redetermination processes that will
take place. This will take 20 days.46
2.19. Second, MOFCOM must consider the comments of interested parties on all procedural and
substantive issues related to the initiation notice, as well as the injury, subsidy, and dumping
issues raised by the DSB's recommendations and rulings. This step will require 30 days.47
2.20. China asserts that, "[i]nitially", MOFCOM mu st reconsider a new version of the petition in
relation to the underlying anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations at issue in this
dispute.48 China considers that this "preliminary work" will address the DSB rulings concerning:
(i) the initiation of countervailing duty investigations in respect of certain alleged government
subsidy programmes; and (ii) the sufficiency of non-confidential summaries of information
submitted by the petitioners in confidence. Acco rding to China, MOFCOM considers that "it is
appropriate" for this work to take place in parallel with the 30-day period for comment mentioned
above to ensure that the addressing of the other issues in this dispute is not delayed.
49
2.21. China considers that 30 days is the minimum time necessary to allow interested parties to
present their views because of the range of substa ntive and procedural issues raised by the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. With regard to the Panel's finding that China acted
inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreem ent, China points out that, although the Panel
disagreed with the choice of "facts available" made by MOFCOM to calculate the subsidy margin for
one of the respondents, the Panel did not provid e any guidance as to which alternatives are
possible, or which alternatives would be WTO-consistent. Next, with regard to the Panel's findings
concerning MOFCOM's determination of the "all others rate" in respect of unknown companies,
China highlights that, although the Panel found that China acted inconsistently with its WTO
obligations, the Panel provided no guidance as to how an investigating authority may determine
anti-dumping and countervailing duty margins that are WTO-consistent, and that create an
incentive for unknown companies to cooperate with investigations. Finally, with regard to the Panel
and Appellate Body findings relating to MOFCOM's injury determination, China asserts that,
although the Panel and the Appellate Body found fault with certain aspects of MOFCOM's price
effects analysis, neither provided a particularly clear or explicit set of directions in respect of what
must be done.
50
2.22. China adds that, since this case will be the "first instance" of China implementing DSB
recommendations and rulings on trade remedy me asures, every issue will be "an issue of first
impression".51 China argues, therefore, that it is necessary to grant the interested parties at least
30 days to prepare and submit their comments.52
2.23. Third, after considering the initial comments, MOFCOM must also allow the submission of
rebuttal comments from interested parties in response to affirmative comments filed on procedural
and substantive issues. According to China, 30 days is the minimum time necessary for this step
because parties will be reacting to new arguments and possibly new information.
53
2.24. Fourth, China argues that an additional 37 days must be allotted to accommodate the
possibility of a request for a hearing being made by interested parties. At this hearing, parties with
"adverse interests" can present information and arguments. Although it is not certain that a
hearing would be requested or held in the event that there is no adverse party to meet, the time
necessary for this stage must be accounted for in determining the reasonable period of time for
implementation, in order to safeguard the procedur al rights of the parties involved. China asserts

46 China's submission, para. 67.
47 China's submission, para. 68.
48 China's submission, para. 70.
49 China's submission, para. 70.
50 China's submission, paras. 73-75.
51 China's submission, para. 76.
52 China's submission, paras. 76 and 77.
53 China's submission, paras. 78 and 79.

that 37 days is the "normal time taken according to MOFCOM's rules", and that any shorter period
would require taking "extraordinary measures" for implementation.54
2.25. Fifth, MOFCOM must draft the documents describing any new determinations after receiving
initial comments, rebuttal comments, and any information or argument presented at the hearing,
should one be held. Under "standard procedures", 30 days is the normal period needed for drafting
such documents. In the light of the Panel and Appellate Body findings on price effects and
causation, MOFCOM will be required to undertake a substantial reconsideration of its prior injury
determination, as well as drafting work on a scale comparable to its original investigation.
55
2.26. Sixth, MOFCOM must circulate its drafts of the relevant documents for internal comment.
Under MOFCOM's "normal working procedures and practice", officials in charge of the investigation
are allowed 30 days to circulate the draft documents among other divisions also responsible for
anti-dumping and countervailing investigations, with time then allowed for any revisions in
reaction to any comments from these divisions. China anticipates that at least 30 days is required
for this step. The revised disclosures are then approved by BOFT and IBII.
56
2.27. Seventh, the approved documents must be submitted to DTL to examine whether they are
consistent with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and China's WTO obligations. This review
process will take 10 days.
57
2.28. Eighth, interested parties will be allowed to make comments on the documents during a
period of normally 20 days. This time period takes into account the language needs of the
interested parties in the United States, since they may need to first have the lengthy disclosure
documents translated into English in order to start preparing their comments.
58
2.29. Ninth, the investigating authority will then draft the final determination, which will take into
consideration any comments received from the interested parties on the disclosure documents.
DTL will then be provided 10 days to examine and determine whether the final determination is
consistent with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and China's WTO obligations.
Subsequently, the final determination will be presented to the ministers for approval. In a normal
investigation without DTL involvement, this stage would take 30 days. China submits that, given
the need to add some time for the DTL exam ination – for which a minimum of 10 days is
necessary – it is appropriate to allocate 40 days for this stage of the implementation procedure.
59
2.30. Tenth, 30 days will be provided for the Tariff Commission to approve the final
determination. During this approval process, the Tariff Commission seeks comments from relevant
ministries that are members of the Tariff Commission, such as the National Development and
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Finance,
and the Ministry of Agriculture. After receiving comments from all the relevant ministries, the Tariff
Commission will present a report to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission for approval, and issue
its decision on the final determination to MOFCOM and the General Administration on Customs.
60
2.31. Finally, 10 days will be provided for MOFC OM, after receiving the approval from the Tariff
Commission, to publish the announcement and notice to implement the decision. With this final
step, China will bring the revised measure, "if there is any", into legal effect.61
2.32. China underscores that many of the time periods that will apply to the specific steps that
MOFCOM considers necessary for implementation are based on important procedural obligations
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Ag reement, including, for example: giving "all

54 China's submission, para. 80.
55 China's submission, para. 81.
56 China's submission, para. 82.
57 China's submission, para. 83.
58 China's submission, para. 84.
59 China's submission, para. 86.
60 China's submission, para. 87.
61 China's submission, para. 88.

interested parties … a full opportunity for the defense of their interests" 62; providing "timely
opportunities" for interested parties to see information relevant to their cases and to prepare
presentations based on that information
63; and giving public notice and explanation of preliminary
and final determinations. 64 China submits that these obligations constitute a "particular
circumstance", and will help minimize the risk of any possible violation of procedural obligations
during the course of the implementation process.65
2.33. In sum, China requires approximately 11 months to conduct the administrative work to
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. China notes that this time
period consists of 45 days of preparatory work, which was completed in late 2012, and an
additional 287 days that will begin on 1 Septem ber 2013 after new rules authorizing MOFCOM to
conduct such proceedings have been adopted. China clarifies that this 287-day (9.5-month) period
of actually conducting the administrative proc eedings can begin only once the new rules have
taken effect.
66
2.2 United States
2.34. The United States requests that I determine the reasonable period of time for
implementation to be either: (i) 1 month, if China revokes the relevant anti-dumping and
countervailing duties in the absence of clear legal authority to revise these duties; or (ii) 4 months
and 1 week, if China concedes that an existing administrative reconsideration procedure can be
used to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
67
2.35. The United States notes that the role of an arbitrator is to determine the shortest period of
time for implementation within a Member's domestic legal system. The United States asserts that,
if an administrative reconsideration procedure is not currently available within China's domestic
legal system, then the reasonable period of time for implementation should be based on the time
necessary for China to conduct a procedure that is currently available, namely, the immediate
revocation of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of grain oriented flat-rolled
electrical steel (GOES) from the United States.68
2.36. The United States highlights that this is the first time that the reasonable period of time for
China's implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings is being determined through
arbitration. According to the United States, the time periods for China's implementation of the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in the prior disputes referred to by China 69 were reached by
agreement among the parties to those disput es, and are therefore not relevant to the
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute.
2.2.1 Administrative rulemaking
2.37. The United States asserts that there is no basis for the reasonable period of time for
implementation to be lengthened for the purpose of enabling China to adopt rules for
implementing DSB recommendations and rulings concerning trade remedies.
70 The United States
notes that the DSB did not make findings with respect to China's legislative regime for imposing
anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Rather, the DSB's recommendations and rulings are
limited to China's measures imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on GOES from the

62 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 25 thereto (referring to Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
63 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 27 thereto (referring to Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
64 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 28 thereto (referring to Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
65 China's submission, para. 85.
66 China's submission, para. 89.
67 United States' submission, paras. 5, 7, 12, and 62.
68 United States' submission, para. 4.
69 See supra, para. 2.16 and fn 42 thereto of this Award. China refers to the following previous disputes:
China – Auto Parts; China – Intellectual Property Rights; China – Publications and Audiovisual Products; and
China – Raw Materials.
70 United States' submission, para. 13.

United States. Thus, at issue in this arbitration is the time necessary for China to bring those
measures into conformity with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.71
2.38. The United States contends that, on several occasions, arbitrators have declined to lengthen
the period of time for implementation in order to accommodate a proposed method of
implementation that was not necessary to effect changes to the measure found to be in breach of
a Member's WTO obligations. The United States notes, for example, that, in Argentina – Hides and
Leather (Article 21.3(c)) , the arbitrator was unconvinced by Argentina's argument that
implementation would require the adoption of new legislation in addition to a regulatory
amendment.72 Drawing an analogy with that dispute, the United States submits that, in this case,
nothing prevents China from undertaking a more ambitious legislative endeavour with respect to
its trade remedy laws, either in parallel with, or separately from, its efforts to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. Chin a cannot, however, request that the reasonable
period of time for implementation take into account the time necessary to undertake this
endeavour.
73
2.39. The United States finds "surprising" China's apparent position that administrative authority
was delegated to MOFCOM to apply anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports, but not the
authority to revise those duties when they are found to be inconsistent with China's WTO
obligations.
74 The United States adds that, to the extent that China seeks clear legal authority for
MOFCOM to revise measures in response to DS B recommendations and rulings, China does not
offer any explanation as to why the purported gap in China's domestic administrative regime was
not addressed when China acceded to the WTO or at any point during the intervening 12 years.
The United States points, in particular, to the fact that China's trade remedy measures were first
challenged by a WTO Member two and a half years ago; to March 2012, when the Panel issued its
interim report in this dispute; and to July 2012, when China opted not to appeal many of the
Panel's findings of inconsistency, and therefor e knew that these findings would need to be
addressed.
75
2.40. The United States submits that China has the ability in its domestic system to revoke the
anti-dumping and countervailing duties at issue in this dispute. Moreover, revocation would be
consistent with the principle of "prompt" compliance under Article 3.3 of the DSU, and, under
Article 3.7, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measure.
76 The United States further notes that, under Article XVI:4 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), China made a
commitment to "ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements".
77
2.41. The United States contests China's assertion that it needs to develop new rules to
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. The United States asserts that,
according to China's own legal analysis, "at worst", MOFCOM's legal authority to conduct an
administrative redetermination for the purpose of implementation is not "perfectly clear".
78
According to the United States, the evidence sugge sts that MOFCOM does in fact have the ability
to re-examine duties, including in response to DSB recommendations and rulings. The
United States notes that China outlines a number of provisions in its AD Regulations and
CVD Regulations, which do not appear to preclude a redetermination in response to DSB
recommendations and rulings.
79

71 United States' submission, para. 16.
72 United States' submission, para. 17 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Hides and
Leather (Article 21.3(c))).
73 United States' submission, para. 18.
74 United States' submission, para. 24.
75 United States' submission, para. 23.
76 United States' submission, para. 21 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 57).
77 United States' submission, para. 22.
78 United States' submission, para. 27.
79 United States' submission, para. 26.

2.42. First, the United States notes that Article 49 of the AD Regulations and Article 48 of the
CVD Regulations authorize MOFCOM to decide, "on ju stifiable grounds", to review the need for the
continued imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The United States argues that
China has not persuasively explained why this language cannot be read to include the
implementation of China's WTO commitments.
80 Second, the United States argues that it would
seem "appropriate" for MOFCOM to take action under Article 57 of the AD Regulations and
Article 56 of the CVD Regulations to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this
dispute considering that China accepts that these provisions provide MOFCOM with the authority to
manage WTO dispute settlement with respect to trade remedies.
81
2.43. Third, the United States notes that, although China points to Article 58 of the
AD Regulations and Article 57 of the CVD Regu lations as authorizing MOFCOM to formulate
implementing measures, China expresses doubt as to whether these provisions permit specific
administrative actions.82 In the United States' view, China's interpretation seems contrary to these
provisions, which state that "[MOFCOM] may, in accordance with these Regulations, formulate
specific implementing measures".83
2.44. The United States further notes that China does not refer, in its submission, to the Law of
the People's Republic of China on Administrative Reconsideration84 (Administrative Reconsideration
Law). According to the United States, the Administrative Reconsideration Law, together with
provisions under the AD Regulations, has been us ed in the past by MOFCOM to conduct at least
three administrative reviews: (i) Kraft Linerboard Administrative Reconsideration85; (ii) Cold Rolled
Steel Administrative Review 86; and (iii) Electrolytic Capacitor Paper (ECP) Administrative
Reconsideration.87 The United States notes that these proceedings were completed in less than
5 weeks, 4 months, and 2 months, respectively. 88 In the United States' view, based on these past
cases, MOFCOM could indefinitely suspend or revoke the anti-dumping and countervailing duties at
issue in this dispute, using its existing authority.
2.2.2 Administrative redetermination
2.45. The United States submits that, under China's existing laws, the reconsideration of an
anti-dumping and countervailing duty determination involves five steps: (i) preparatory phase
89;
(ii) initiation of notification; (iii) collection of new evidence; (iv) disclosure of necessary facts; and
(v) consultation with relevant agencies and promulgation of the tariff. The United States associates
the following timeframes with each step.

80 United States' submission, para. 28 and fn 27 thereto (referring to China's submission, para. 22).
81 United States' submission, para. 29.
83 United States' submission, para. 30 (quoting Article 58 of the AD Regulations and Article 57 of the
CVD Regulations). (emphasis added by the United States)
84 Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Reconsideration, adopted at the 9th Meeting
of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress on 29 April 1999 and promulgated by Order
No. 16 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 29 April 1999 (English translation provided in
Exhibit USA-6 and available at: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_
1383562.htm>).
85 United States' submission, para. 33 (referring to Kraft Linerboard Administrative Reconsideration
(2005) (Exhibit USA-10)).
86 United States' submission, para. 34 (referring to Cold Rolled Steel Administrative Review (2004)
(Exhibit USA-5)).
87 United States' submission, para. 35 (referring to Electrolytic Capacitor Paper (ECP) Administrative
Reconsideration (2007) (Exhibit USA-2)).
88 United States' submission, paras. 33-35.
89 United States' submission, para. 37 and fn 40 thereto (referring to Awards of the Arbitrator,
US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)); US – Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3(c)); and Chile – Alcoholic Beverages
(Article 21.3(c))). The United States notes that this step is not a legal obligation under China's domestic
system. The United States, however, includes this step in the light of the fact that previous arbitrators have
recognized the need for preparatory work.

2.46. First, the United States considers that the preparatory phase should take no more
than 1 month.90 Second, the initiation of the notification can take place before the preparatory
phase is completed, and should take no more than 2 weeks.91 Third, the collection of new evidence
should take no more than 2 months, taking into account the nature of the issues that would be
under consideration. 92 Fourth, the disclosure of necessary facts should take 1 week, consistent
with MOFCOM's past practice. 93 Finally, the United States considers that consultations with
relevant agencies and the subsequent promulgation of the tariff should take approximately
1 month, consistent with MOFCOM's past practice.94
2.47. The United States highlights that there are no mandatory timeframes identified in the
AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations with re spect to any of these steps. Therefore, the
United States considers the length of time that was necessary for previous reconsiderations to be
"persuasive".95 According to the United States, Members with systems that do not prescribe
minimum mandatory timeframes have been characterized by previous arbitrators as having "a
considerable degree of flexibility".
96 Moreover, these arbitrators have insisted that Members "make
use of such flexibility in order to ensure prom pt compliance with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB".97 In the light of these considerations, the United States submits that the time period
for reconsideration of the single anti-dumping and countervailing duty determination at issue in
this dispute should be no more than 4 months and 1 week.
2.48. The United States considers that the component steps of the proposed procedure for
implementation outlined by China are "grossly overstated". 98 There are significantly more steps in
China's proposed procedure than those required under the current procedures of the
AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations. Similarl y, the United States considers the timeframes
proposed by China for the various steps to be "overinflated". 99 The United States submits that
China offers no evidence to support these proposed timeframes, and no specific references to
domestic regulations. Instead, according to the United States, China is now proposing a process
that takes twice as long to complete as the longest administrative reconsideration to date, and
four times as long as the average.
2.49. The United States adds that the original investigation and imposition of the anti-dumping
and countervailing duties in this dispute took 10 months. Thus, China has proposed a review
procedure that will take the same amount of time, notwithstanding the fact that most
administrative reconsiderations are completed in less time than an original investigation.
Moreover, although China states that it is "making a good faith effort to proceed along parallel
tracks", China outlines an almost entirely sequential process, instead of "collapsing" steps where

90 United States' submission, para. 37. The preparatory phase entails the internal review of the
measures, consultations, and preparation for administrative action.
91 United States' submission, para. 37 and fn 41 thereto (referring to Articles 19 and 22 of the
AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations). At this stage of the reconsideration process, MOFCOM is required to
publish its decision to initiate a reconsideration and notify the interested parties and their government(s). This
stage also includes the preparation of non-confidential summaries by the complainant and possible
re-submission of comments on non-confidential summaries.
92 United States' submission, para. 37 and fn 42 thereto (referring to Article 20 of the AD Regulations
and Articles 20 and 26 of the CVD Regulations).
93 United States' submission, para. 37 and fn 43 thereto (referring to Article 25 of the AD Regulations
and Articles 25 and 26 of the CVD Regulations). At this stage of the redetermination, MOFCOM will, prior to
making a final determination, inform all interested parties and their government(s) of the essential facts on
which the final determination is based.
94 United States' submission, para. 37 and fn 44 thereto (referring to Article 25 of the AD Regulations
and Articles 26 and 27 of the CVD Regulations). At this final stage of the reconsideration, MOFCOM will need to
solicit comments from the Tariff Commission concerning the final determinations before promulgating the
relevant tariff.
95 United States' submission, para. 38.
96 United States' submission, para. 38 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 39; and Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 83).
97 United States' submission, para. 38 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 39; and Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 83).
98 United States' submission, para. 39.
99 United States' submission, para. 39.

appropriate.100 The United States submits that several of the steps proposed by China are
"unnecessary"101, and that several should be collapsed.102
2.50. The United States questions the need fo r 45 days for the translation and reading of the
Panel and Appellate Body Reports. The majority of the findings in this dispute are contained in the
Panel Report, which was circulated on 15 June 2012. The United States presumes that China would
have needed to translate and read the Panel Repo rt in order to prepare its appeal. Further, the
Appellate Body Report was circulated on 18 Octobe r 2012, nearly a month prior to its adoption at
the DSB meeting of 16 November 2012. China had more than 45 days to translate and review the
majority of the findings prior to November 2012.103
2.51. The United States contends that the "parti cular circumstances" of implementation in this
dispute do not support a time period of 19 months for implementation. According to the
United States, China has not established that "par ticular circumstances" require the adoption of
new rules for implementation. Although the "particular circumstances" of implementation include
consideration of the particular circumstances of the implementing Member's legal system, China's
request for a reasonable period of time for implementation of 19 months is not based on its
current legal system, but on the requirements of a hypothetical future legal system that it hopes
to develop as part of the implementation process. In the United States' view, the "circularity" of
China's argument highlights the difficulty of determining a reasonable period of time for
implementation based on legal requirements that do not presently exist in an implementing
Member's legal system. Moreover, in the United States' view, China's argument "invites Members
to devise new procedures" that would result in a protracted timeframe for implementation.
104
2.52. The United States argues that China's ex planation of the particular circumstances that
warrant a time period of 19 months for implementation is also contradicted by the facts. The
United States points out that China has not referred to any time periods set out in its domestic
law, or to any previous examples of cases in which it has required the proposed amount of time to
complete analogous steps.
105
2.53. The United States disagrees with China that the technical complexity of determining
whether legal authority for implementation existed under China's laws constitutes a "particular
circumstance" to be taken into account in determining the reasonable period of time for
implementation. The United States highlights that the DSB's recommendations and rulings concern
the anti-dumping and countervailing measures at issue, and do not concern China's broader
legislative or regulatory system.
106 Therefore, according to the United States, China does not need
to engage in a lengthy legal analysis to address the DSB's recommendations and rulings.107

101 With respect to China's proposed step of a "hearing", the United States asserts that, in the three
previous administrative reconsiderations conducted by MOFCOM, a hearing was not held. Moreover, the
United States notes that China proposes a timeframe of 20 days for "comments by the parties" prior to the
"drafting/review of the final determination". The United States asserts, however, that, under China's current
system, MOFCOM has an obligation to inform interested parties and their government(s) of the essential facts
on which the final determination is based, and that there is no additional opportunity for comment by parties.
(United States' submission, para. 46)
102 For example, China proposes the following as separate steps, together with timeframes for each:
"comments by parties"; "rebuttal comments by parties"; "hearing"; "initial draft determination"; "internal
review"; and "review by DTL". According to the United States, these steps appear to be a single stage under
China's current procedures for administrative reconsideration, namely, "the collection of evidence". In the
United States' view, this stage can be completed within 2 months, as opposed to China's proposed 167 days.
Moreover, China's proposed steps of "drafting and approval of the public notice" and "comments by the
parties" can be conducted in parallel. Finally, the United States notes that China proposes separate steps of
"drafting/reviewing the final determination"; "Tariff Commission review"; and "publication". According to the
United States, these steps can, under China's current system, be completed in a single "final drafting and
internal consultation step". No more than 1 month should be necessary for this step. (United States'
submission, para. 45)
103 United States' submission, para. 44.
104 United States' submission, para. 48.
105 United States' submission, para. 49.
106 United States' submission, paras. 16 and 48.
107 United States' submission, para. 51.

2.54. The United States further contends that, contrary to China's assertions, the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute do not present "exceptional challenges" in relation to
their implementation.
108 First, with regard to the Panel's finding that China acted inconsistently
with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, the United States recalls China's argument that, although
the Panel disagreed with the choice of "facts avai lable" made by MOFCOM to calculate the subsidy
margin for one of the respondents, the Panel did not provide any guidance as to possible
alternatives, or as to which alternatives would be WTO-consistent. According to the United States,
the Panel examined record evidence that provides credible alternatives for China. 109 Second, with
regard to the Panel's findings concerning MOFCOM 's determination of the "all others rate" in
respect of unknown companies, the United States contends that China does not explain why
implementing this aspect of the DSB's recomme ndations and rulings would present challenges.
110
Third, with regard to China's assertion that the DSB's rulings do not provide guidance on what
must be done to correct defects in MOFCOM's injury analysis, the United States explains that the
Appellate Body provided an exhaustive analysis of the obligations contained in Article 3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15 of the SCM Agreement. For the United States, the
Appellate Body's analysis provides concrete guidelines for China in respect of implementation in
this dispute.
111
2.55. According to the United States, China has made no serious effort to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings since the DSB's adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports on
16 November 2012. Moreover, as the Panel issued its Report on 15 June 2012, China has had
more than 9 months to address the unappealed sect ions of that Report – containing the largest
share of the findings to be implemented in this dispute – and the question of whether MOFCOM
has legal authority to implement these findings. The United States further recalls that previous
arbitrators have taken account of implementation efforts made following the adoption of relevant
reports.
112
2.56. For these reasons, the United States considers that the "reasonable period of time" for
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB should be either: (i) 1 month, if
China revokes the relevant anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the absence of clear legal
authority to revise these duties; or (ii) 4 months and 1 week, if China concedes that an existing
administrative reconsideration procedure can be used to implement the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
3 REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME
3.1 Preliminary matters
3.1.1 Introduction
3.1. The Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute were adopted by the DSB on
16 November 2012. On 30 November 2012, China informed the DSB of its intention to comply with
the DSB's recommendations and rulings, but stated th at it would need a reasonable period of time
in which to do so.
113 As the parties failed to agree on a reasonable period of time for
implementation, the United States requested that such period be determined through binding
arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. 114 The Director-General, after consulting with
the parties, appointed me as Arbitrator on 28 February 2013.

108 United States' submission, para. 52.
109 The United States notes, in particular, the Panel's statement that "MOFCOM's application of this rate
was actually at odds with information on the record suggesting a lesser rate of utilization should be applied".
Further, the Panel then examined record evidence that could have formed the basis of MOFCOM's rate of
utilization finding, based on "facts available". (United States' submission, para. 52 (referring to Panel Report,
paras. 7.303 and 7.305-7.309))
111 United States' submission, para. 53 (referring to Appellate Body Report, paras. 125-221).
112 See United States' submission, para. 54 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrator, US – Section 110(5)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 46; Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)), para. 43; and Colombia – Ports of
Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 79).
114 WT/DS414/10.

3.1.2 Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU
3.2. It is well established that my mandate as Arbitrator in these proceedings is to determine the
time by when the implementing Member must achieve compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in the underlying dispute. In making this determination, the means of
implementation available to the Member concerned is a relevant consideration.
115 In particular, an
implementing Member's chosen method of implem entation must be capable of placing it into
compliance with its WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time in accordance with the
guidelines contained in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. 116 In other words, "the means of
implementation chosen must be apt in form, nature, and content to effect compliance, and should
otherwise be consistent with the covered agreements".
117 It is beyond my mandate to determine,
in this case, the consistency with WTO law of implementing measures that are eventually chosen
by China to achieve compliance with the recommendat ions and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
This can only be determined in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
3.3. Certain provisions of the DSU guide me in executing my mandate. I note that Article 21.1
provides that "prompt compliance" is essential for the effective resolution of WTO disputes.
Furthermore, the introductory paragraph of Arti cle 21.3 indicates that a "reasonable period of
time" for implementation shall be available only if "it is impracticable to comply immediately" with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. I note further that, according to the last sentence of
Article 21.3(c), the "particular circumstances" of a dispute may affect the calculation of the
reasonable period of time for implementation, making it "shorter or longer".
118 I therefore agree
with previous arbitrators that the context of Article 21.3(c) makes clear that the reasonable period
of time for implementation "should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the
[implementing] Member".119
3.4. I also note that the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means
of implementation that it deems most appropriate, "as long as the means chosen are consistent
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and with the covered agreements". 120 In
addition, I agree with previous arbitrators that, wh ile the implementing Member is not required to
utilize "extraordinary procedures" to bring its measures into compliance 121, it must, nevertheless,
utilize all the "flexibilities" available within its legal system in order to implement the relevant
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.122 The use of such
flexibilities is necessitated by the importance of fulfilling the obligation to comply immediately with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB that cert ain measures of the implementing Member are
inconsistent with its WTO obligations.123

115 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26.
116 See Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27 (referring to Award of
the Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69).
117 Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 64.
118 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25 (referring to Award of the
Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 49).
119 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26.
120 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48 (quoting Award of the
Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 38). See also Awards of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs
(Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25; EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 49; Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 41-43; Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)), para. 32; EC – Tariff
Preferences (Article 21.3(c)), para. 30; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 26; US – Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), para. 33; and EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 69.
121 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42 (referring to
Awards of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 25; EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 49; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 42; Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51; and US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 74).
122 See Awards of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42;
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; and Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25
(referring to Awards of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 49; Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 39; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)), para. 36; and US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 64).
123 Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 70.

3.5. Finally, with regard to the burden of proof applicable in these proceedings, I agree with the
principle that the implementing Member bears the burden of proving that the period it seeks for
implementation constitutes a "reasonable period of time". 124 The longer the proposed period of
implementation, the greater this burden will be. Ultimately, however, it is for the arbitrator to
determine the "shortest period possible" for im plementation within the legal system of the
implementing Member, on the basis of the evidence presented by all parties.125
3.6. At the oral hearing in this arbitration, China and the United States agreed that these
principles set out in previous arbitration awards are relevant for the determination of the
reasonable period of time for implementation.
3.1.3 Measures to be brought into conformity
3.7. The underlying dispute concerns the United States' challenge of China's measures imposing
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on GOES from the United States, as set forth in MOFCOM's
Announcement No. 21 of 10 April 2010 and its annexes. Before the Panel, the United States
challenged several aspects of the investigations leading to the imposition of these duties, claiming
that China acted inconsistently with provisions of the SCM Agreement, the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).
3.8. The Panel concluded that China acted inconsistently with:
(a) Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, on the basis that MOFCOM
initiated countervailing duty investigations into each of the
11 programmes challenged before the Panel by the United States,
without sufficient evidence to justify this;
(b) Articles 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, on the basis that MOFC OM did not require the applicants
to furnish non-confidential summaries in sufficient detail to permit a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the information
submitted in confidence;
(c) Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in connection with MOFCOM's use
of a 100% utilization rate in calculating the subsidy rates for the two
known respondents under certain procurement programmes;
(d) Articles 6.8, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, in connection with the resort to facts
available to calculate the "all others" dumping margin for unknown
exporters and due to deficiencies in the related essential facts
disclosure and public notice and explanation;
(e) Articles 12.7, 12.8, 22.3 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement, in
connection with the resort to facts available to calculate the "all
others" subsidy rate for unknown exporters and due to deficiencies in
the related essential facts disclosure and public notice and
explanation;
(f) Articles 15.1, 15.2, 12.8 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement and 3.1,
3.2, 6.9 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in connection
with MOFCOM's findings regarding the price effects of subject imports
and due to deficiencies in the related essential facts disclosure and
public notice and explanation;

124 Awards of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)), para. 47; US – 1916 Act
125 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51 (referring to Award of
the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 44).

(g) Articles 15.1, 15.5, 12.8 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement and 3.1,
3.5, 6.9 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in connection
with MOFCOM's finding that subject imports caused material injury to
the domestic industry and due to deficiencies in the related essential
facts disclosure and public notice and explanation; and
(h) Article 10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, as a consequence of the foregoing violations of these
Agreements.
126
3.9. Although the United States made multiple claims before the Panel, many of which were
upheld, the scope of China's appeal focused solely on the Panel's findings in respect of MOFCOM's
price effects analysis and related disclosures. More specifically, China claimed on appeal that the
Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement in finding that MOFCOM's price effects analysis was inconsistent
with these provisions.
127 China also claimed on appeal that the Panel erred in finding that China
acted inconsistently with Articles 6.9 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 12.8
and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement, because MOFCOM's final injury disclosure document and public
notice of the final determination contained insufficient information regarding MOFCOM's price
effects analysis.
128
3.10. The Appellate Body upheld, albeit for different reasons, the Panel's findings on appeal.
3.2 Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time
3.11. China argues that implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this
dispute will require a reasonable period of time of 19 months.
129 This time period encompasses
9.5 months to complete the process of adopting rules that would serve as the legal basis for
MOFCOM's implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings concerning trade remedies, plus
another 9.5 months to conduct an administrati ve redetermination of the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties at issue.
130
3.12. In response, the United States contends that China should be granted a reasonable period
of time of 1 month to revoke the anti-dumping and countervailing duties at issue, if, as China
argues, there is no clear legal basis for MOFCOM to revise such duties on the basis of an
administrative redetermination. Alternatively, if China concedes that an existing administrative
procedure can be used to implement the recommendat ions and rulings of the DSB in this dispute,
then China should be granted a reasonable period of time of 4 months and 1 week to conduct such
a procedure.
131
3.13. The United States submits that, if China maintains that there is no clear legal basis pursuant
to which MOFCOM can modify the relevant duties through administrative means, the reasonable
period of time for implementation should be based on the time necessary to withdraw the duties at
issue. In support of its argument, the United States explains that revocation is consistent with the
principle of "prompt" compliance under Article 3.3 of the DSU, and that, under Article 3.7, the first
objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measure
at issue.
132 The United States further refers to China's obligations under Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement "as evidence of China's ability to withdraw" the measures at issue.133

126 Panel Report, para. 8.1.
127 China's Notice of Appeal (WT/DS414/5), paras. 5 and 6.
128 China's Notice of Appeal (WT/DS414/5), para. 9.
129 China's submission, paras. 5, 8, 9, and 90.
130 China's submission, para. 90.
131 United States' submission, paras. 5, 7, 12, and 62.
132 United States' submission, paras. 21 and 22.
133 United States' opening statement at the oral hearing. Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement provides:
Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

3.14. The United States seems to suggest that the absence of a legal basis to modify a measure
means, without more, that the implementing Member is necessarily required to revoke, or repeal,
the relevant measure. I note, however, that an implementing Member retains the discretion to
choose its preferred means of implementation, provid ed that this method of implementation falls
within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
134 Moreover, although "withdrawal of an inconsistent
measure is the preferred means of complying with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
a violation case, it is not necessarily the only means of implementation consistent with the covered
agreements."135 In this respect, I recall that the arbitrator in Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c)) found that "a Member whose measure has been found to be inconsistent with the
covered agreements may generally choose between two courses of action: withdrawal of the
measure; or modification of the measure by remedial action".136 Thus, "[w]hile withdrawal may be
the preferred option to secure 'prompt complianc e', a Member may, where withdrawal is deemed
impracticable, choose to modify the measure, prov ided that this is done in the shortest time
possible, and that such modification is permissible under the DSB's recommendations and
rulings."137
3.15. Thus, even assuming that withdrawal were possible under China's existing legal system 138,
it does not follow that the reasonable period of time for implementation must be based on that
method of implementation, as opposed to modification of the measure through remedial action. I
therefore disagree with the United States to the ex tent that it suggests that the absence of a legal
basis to modify a measure means, without more, that the reasonable period of time for
implementation must necessarily be based on the time required to revoke, or repeal, the relevant
measure.
3.16. I now proceed to consider China's request for a reasonable period of time on the basis of
the two stages of implementation that China en visages: (i) the adoption of rules for making
changes to trade remedy measures for the purpose of implementing recommendations and rulings
of the DSB; and (ii) an administrative redete rmination of the anti-dumping and countervailing
duties at issue in this dispute.
139 I will address the parties' arguments regarding each stage in turn
below.
3.2.1 Administrative rulemaking
3.17. China and the United States disagree as to whether the reasonable period of time for
implementation should include time for the adoption of legal authority and a mechanism allowing
China to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.
140 The United States
asserts that "MOFCOM does in fact have the ability to re-examine duties, including in response to
[DSB] recommendations and rulings". 141 China counters that MOFCOM can begin formal
administrative proceedings to implement the DS B's recommendations and rulings only after the
adoption of "specific legal authority and a mechanism" clarifying the procedures for

134 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48 (quoting Award of the
Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27).
135 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 38. (original emphasis; fn omitted)
136 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 37. Similarly, the arbitrator
in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)) was of the view that "the United States may choose
either to withdraw or modify the CDSOA so as to bring it into conformity with its obligations under the covered
agreements." (Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 50 (original
emphasis))
137 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 37. The arbitrator in
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) was also of the view that "modification … is within the 'range of
permissible actions' available for Colombia to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB". (Award
of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 77)
138 I note that China contested this proposition at the oral hearing.
139 China's submission, para. 9.
140 At para. 34 of China's submission, China states that the purpose of the new rules that it intends to
adopt is two-fold. First, they will specifically state that MOFCOM can maintain, amend, or withdraw
anti-dumping or countervailing measures through administrative actions such as re-investigation, and will
clarify the status of any anti-dumping and countervailing duties already collected. Second, they will establish
the specific procedures to be followed when MOFCOM implements WTO dispute settlement decisions concerning
trade remedies imposed by China.
141 United States' submission, para. 25.

doing so.142 According to China, no such mechanism currently exists.143 In response to questioning
at the oral hearing, China explained that, becaus e the AD Regulations and the CVD Regulations do
not "clearly authorize" the implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, MOFCOM cannot
take such action while complying with the requirement to act "in accordance with" those
regulations.
144
3.18. As I see it, the question of whether MOFCOM can conduct an administrative redetermination
of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties at issue only after adopting specific rules authorizing
such action hinges on the scope and meaning of China's laws. China characterizes this question as
being "technically complex" and highlights that, after the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body
Reports, internal, inter-agency, and external cons ultations were held to determine what, if any,
authority exists for MOFCOM to engage in implementation under China's current AD Regulations
and CVD Regulations.145
3.19. I recall that, in arbitrations under Article 21.3(c), the implementing Member bears the
burden of establishing that the period it seeks for implementation constitutes a reasonable period
of time, and the longer the proposed period of implementation, the greater this burden will be. 146
Thus, I cannot simply defer to China's assertion that the first stage of implementation in this case
is required under Chinese law. Instead, I must examine whether China has established what it
asserts.
3.20. In explaining why its existing laws and regulations do not provide a basis for an
administrative redetermination to implement DSB recommendations and rulings, China explains
that Article 47 of the AD Regulations authoriz es MOFCOM to adjust existing anti-dumping
measures to account for "new exporters" that ha d not exported previously to China; and that
Article 48 of the AD Regulations and Article 47 of the CVD Regulations authorize MOFCOM to
conduct "sunset reviews". According to China, thes e provisions do not, however, provide broader
authority to make changes to trade remedies for "other reasons".
147 China adds that Article 49 of
the AD Regulations and Article 48 of the CVD Regulations authorize MOFCOM to decide, "on
justifiable grounds", to review the need for the continued imposition of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. China asserts that, while these provisions address the issue of interim
reviews under Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the
SCM Agreement, they do "not provide broader au thority to make changes to trade remedies for
other reasons". 148 The same is true, according to China, with respect to Article 50 of the
AD Regulations and Article 49 of the CVD Regula tions, which provide China's Tariff Commission
with "specific legal authority" to adopt "any chan ges triggered" by "new shipper" reviews, sunset
reviews, or interim reviews, "but go no further". 149 China also emphasizes that Article 57 of the
AD Regulations and Article 56 of the CVD Regula tions provide MOFCOM with the authority to
manage WTO dispute settlement with respect to trade remedies, but asserts that these provisions
do not "directly and unambiguously" address the implementation of WTO dispute settlement
decisions in this area.
150
3.21. China further explains that Article 58 of the AD Regulations and Article 57 of the
CVD Regulations provide MOFCOM with discretion to formulate "implementing measures", but only
if "in accordance with these Regulations".
151 Hence, China considers that, although general
authorization to implement could arguably be found within the AD Regulations and the

142 China's opening statement at the oral hearing.
143 China's submission, para. 10.
144 In response to questioning at the oral hearing, China further explained that the "ambiguity" of the
provisions of its relevant laws creates the "gap" that exists within its legal system.
145 See supra, fn 28 of this Award.
146 Awards of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)), para. 47; US – 1916 Act
147 China's submission, paras. 20 and 21.
148 China's submission, para. 22.
149 China's submission, para. 24.
150 China's submission, para. 26.
151 China's submission, paras. 26-28.

CVD Regulations, this authority "refers to MOFCOM's ability to draft specific rules of general
application, and does not refer to specific administrative actions".152
3.22. The United States counters that the provisio ns outlined by China do not appear to preclude
a redetermination to implement DSB recommendations and rulings. 153 For example, Article 49 of
the AD Regulations and Article 48 of the CVD Regulations authorize MOFCOM to decide, "on
justifiable grounds", to review the need for the continued imposition of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. Moreover, according to the United States, it would seem "appropriate" for
MOFCOM to take action under Article 57 of the AD Regulations and Article 56 of the
CVD Regulations, because, as China accepts, these provisions provide MOFCOM with the authority
to take responsibility for managing WTO dispute settlement with respect to trade remedies.
154 The
United States further asserts that the Administrative Reconsideration Law, together with provisions
under the AD Regulations, has been used in the past by MOFCOM to conduct at least three
"administrative reconsiderations". In the United States' view, based on these past cases, MOFCOM
could, using its existing authority, indefinitely suspend or revoke the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties at issue in this dispute.
3.23. At the oral hearing, China explained that the Administrative Reconsideration Law does not
provide authority to implement DSB recommendations and rulings. First, China explained that only
parties aggrieved by the action of an agency can initiate procedures under the Administrative
Reconsideration Law. Second, China explained that the procedures under the Administrative
Reconsideration Law are of a fundamentally different nature than an administrative
redetermination to implement DSB recommendations and rulings. According to China, a procedure
under the Administrative Reconsideration Law involves a narrow process of "correcting a mistake",
and not the broader process of a redetermination. Moreover, a procedure under the Administrative
Reconsideration Law "generally takes the form of written examination", and requires neither a
hearing nor inter-agency consultations.
155
3.24. China explains that consultations among ex perts led it to conclude that Article 57 of the
AD Regulations and Article 56 of the CVD Regulations provide " general authorization for MOFCOM
to implement" recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 156 China adds, however, that there
remained "significant legal uncertainty about what such general authorization actually meant" in
the absence of any guidance in the AD Regulati ons and the CVD Regulations, together with the
"legal requirement" that any changes to trade remedies take place in accordance with these
regulations.
157
3.25. As I see it, a general authorization to act would usually encompass the authority to take
specific measures on the basis of such authorization. At the oral hearing, I asked China to clarify
why MOFCOM's general authorization to implement was not sufficient to implement the specific
DSB recommendations and rulings in this disp ute. China explained that MOFCOM's general
authorization to implement "makes clear th at MOFCOM is the responsible agency" for
implementation, but that this does not empower MOFCOM to take specific implementing measures
until its authority to implement has been "actualised" through the adoption of specific rules.158
3.26. Having considered the arguments and eviden ce submitted by both parties, I accept China's
assertion that, under China's existing laws, there is no legal authority and mechanism allowing
China to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. 159 In the light of this
conclusion, the question becomes whether the reasonable period of time for implementation
should take into account the time required by China to adopt rules authorizing MOFCOM to take

152 China's submission, para. 28.
153 United States' submission, para. 26.
155 China's opening statement at the oral hearing.
156 China's submission, para. 45. (original emphasis)
157 China's submission, para. 45.
158 China's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
159 The underlying facts and circumstances of the present dispute differ from those at issue in
Argentina – Hides and Leather (Article 21.3(c)). In that dispute, Argentina had itself acknowledged that the
legislative enactment that it proposed was not, "as a matter of public or administrative law", necessary to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. (Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Hides and
Leather (Article 21.3(c)), para. 43) This is not the case here.

specific implementation action in respect of DSB recommendations and rulings concerning trade
remedies.
3.27. The United States points out that the DSB's recommendations and rulings are limited to
China's measures imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of GOES from the
United States160, and that the DSB did not adopt any findings with respect to China's "broader
legislative or regulatory system".161 Thus, while "nothing prevents China from undertaking a more
ambitious legislative endeavour", the time necessary to undertake such an endeavour is, according
to the United States, not relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time for
implementation in this dispute. 162 China responds that the fact that its proposed new rules on
implementation will apply to future cases does not mean that these rules are unnecessary for
implementation in this dispute. According to China, its new rules are "indispensable to
implementation in either context".163
3.28. I do not exclude that there may be circumstances in which bringing a measure into
conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB may require, as a first step,
legislative action or administrative rulemaking by the implementing Member. The amended laws or
regulations would then be applied in a manner that remedies the inconsistency found in the
original measure. Contrary to what the United St ates seems to suggest, the time required for an
implementing Member to adopt or amend laws or re gulations as a first step of its implementation
process is not, necessarily, irrelevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time for
implementation under Article 21.3(c) when such la ws or regulations have not been the subject of
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
3.29. I recall that I have accepted China's assertion that, under its existing laws, there is no legal
authority and mechanism allowing China to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in
this dispute. I find it relevant nonetheless that China seeks now to fill a gap, the existence of
which long pre-dates the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. At the oral hearing,
China stated that it would be unreasonable to expect China, "as a developing country", to have
addressed the issue in advance.
164 The United States responds that China has not persuasively
explained why the purported gap in its domestic administrative regime was not addressed when
China acceded to the WTO more th an 10 years ago. The United States adds that China has also
not explained why the issue was not addressed when China's trade remedy measures were first
challenged two and a half years ago by a WTO Me mber. The United States further contends that
China has not explained why the purported gap was not addressed in March 2012, when the Panel
issued its interim report in this dispute, or in July 2012, when China appealed only some of the
Panel's findings of inconsistency, and could ther efore have been expected to have known that
recommendations and rulings of the DSB mi ght eventually have to be implemented.
165 At the oral
hearing, China questioned "what, if any obligation" these events would have created for China.166
3.30. It is well established that the duty to implement recommendations and rulings of the DSB
begins when the relevant panel and/or Appellate Body reports are adopted. Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU makes clear that the "reasonable period of time" for implementation is measured from the
"date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report" by the DSB. However, at issue here is not
the question of when the formal legal obligation to implement begins. Rather, the question is
whether circumstances pre-dating the adoption of the relevant panel or Appellate Body reports
may inform what is reasonable in a given case. In my view, such circumstances may indeed be
relevant to the determination of the reasonable pe riod of time for implementation. In this vein, I
note that the arbitrator in US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) took into account the United States'
"awareness of the need to modify the COOL meas ure even before the DSB adoption of the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports".
167

160 United States' submission, para. 3.
161 United States' submission, para. 16.
162 United States' submission, para. 18.
163 China's opening statement at the oral hearing.
164 China's opening statement at the oral hearing.
165 United States' submission, para. 23.
166 China's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
167 Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 84.

3.31. I note that the United States filed a request for the establishment of a panel on 11 February
2011.168 As of that time, China was apprised that the measure at issue in this dispute would be
subject to scrutiny by a WTO panel and that the range of possible outcomes of the panel
proceedings included that the challenged measure might be found to be inconsistent with its WTO
obligations. These circumstances served notice to China that its trade remedy system might have
to accommodate adverse recommendations and ruli ngs by the DSB. Had China been attentive to
this prospect at the time of the panel request, it would have had well in excess of the 9.5 months
that it now requests for the purpose of adopting legal authority and a mechanism for the
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings concerning trade remedies.
3.32. The circulation of the Panel Report on 15 J une 2012 should also have alerted China to the
possible need eventually to bring its measures into compliance with recommendations and rulings
of the DSB. This is not, in my view, altered by the fact that China appealed certain aspects of the
adverse findings contained in the Panel Report on 20 July 2012.
3.33. In the light of these facts, I cannot now a ccept China's argument that the need to evaluate
whether its legal system can accommodate the implementation of DSB recommendations and
rulings concerning trade remedies, and, if not, to take steps to enable such implementation to
occur, constitute "particular circumstances" releva nt to my determination of the reasonable period
of time for implementation in this dispute. China should, in the circumstances of this case, have
taken steps to ensure, in a timely manner, that it had a legal basis, if necessary, to implement
DSB recommendations and rulings concerning trade remedies well before the adoption of the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute. I do no t consider it reasonable to award China time for
this purpose at this stage.
3.34. In the light of the above, I decline to awar d China time for the purpose of adopting rules to
authorize MOFCOM to implement DSB recommendations and rulings concerning China's anti-
dumping and countervailing duty measures.
3.2.2 Administrative action
3.35. I turn now to what China envisages as a second step of implementation, namely, conducting
a redetermination of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed on imports of GOES from
the United States. China estimates that it will require a period of approximately 9.5 months for
this purpose. In addition, China requests 45 days for "preparatory work", consisting of the
translation and study of the Panel and Appellate Bo dy Reports in this dispute. China's proposed
11-month period of implementation amounts to a total of 332 days.
169 I note that the original
anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigatio n was conducted over a period of approximately
10 months.170
3.36. I will first address China's contention that 45 days for preparatory work should be factored
into my determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation. China explains that,
immediately after adoption of the Panel and Appe llate Body Reports, MOFCOM began preparations
for the translation of the Reports into Chinese, which took 15 days, and then spent 30 days
reading and understanding the reasoning of the Repo rts, and engaging in internal discussions on
the work and information that would be nece ssary to implement each of the individual
recommendations and rulings.
171
3.37. Like previous arbitrators, I consider that, in determining the reasonable period of time for
implementation, time may be allocated for preparatory work. 172 Further, I consider that an
implementing Member's translation of panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as its study of
these reports to assess how implementation might be achieved, can qualify as preparatory work

168 WT/DS414/2.
169 China's submission, para. 89.
170 Panel Report, paras. 2.2 and 2.5. MOFCOM initiated the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
investigation on 1 June 2009, and issued its final determination imposing anti-dumping and countervailing
duties on imports of GOES from the United States on 10 April 2010.
171 China's submission, para. 66.
172 See e.g. Awards of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 83; US – Hot-Rolled Steel

that may be relevant in determining the reasonable period of time for implementation. 173 I am
concerned, however, that China did not commence this preparatory work earlier. According to
China, the preparatory phase commenced on 16 November 2012, that is, on the day when the
DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute.
174 I note, however, that the
Panel and Appellate Body Reports were circulated on 15 June 2012 and 18 October 2012,
respectively. While Article 21.3(c) of the DSU makes clear that the "reasonable period of time" for
implementation is measured from the "date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report" by the
DSB, I consider that China could have commenced translation and study of the relevant Reports
immediately after their circulation, rather than waiting for them to be adopted by the DSB. Indeed,
in response to questioning at the oral hearing, China accepted that an implementing Member can
reasonably be expected to begin translation and study of panel and Appellate Body reports after
their circulation.
3.38. I turn now to address China's request for 9.5 months to conduct an administrative
redetermination in respect of the anti-dumping an d countervailing duties at issue. China requests
time to conduct a redetermination procedure consisting of the following steps and associated
timeframes: drafting and approval of the publ ic notice of the redetermination (20 days);
consideration of comments of interested parties (30 days); submission of rebuttal comments from
interested parties (30 days); the holding of a hearing (37 days); drafting of the initial
determination (30 days); internal review of the re levant documents and approval of the disclosure
documents by BOFT and IBII (30 days); review of the approved documents by DTL (10 days);
consideration of comments from interested parties on the documents (20 days); drafting and
review of the final determinatio n (40 days); approval of the final determination by the Tariff
Commission (30 days); and publication of the announcement and notice (10 days).
175
3.39. The United States counters that there are significantly more steps in China's proposed
procedure for redeterminations than there are for administrative reconsiderations 176 under the
existing AD Regulations and CVD Regulations. Moreover, the United States argues that the
timeframes envisaged by China for the various steps are "overinflated" 177, and would result in a
redetermination process that takes four times longer to complete than the average time in which
MOFCOM completed three reviews under the AD Regulations and the Administrative
Reconsideration Law thus far.
3.40. I do not agree with the United States to the extent that it suggests that I should determine
the time within which MOFCOM should conduct a redetermination in this case on the basis of the
average time in which MOFCOM has completed three previous reviews under the AD Regulations
and the Administrative Reconsideration Law. The re views to which the United States refers were
conducted pursuant to procedures that are, by nature, distinct from a redetermination for the
purpose of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings.
178 I note further that the component
steps of China's proposed redetermination procedure would seem, for the most part, to be
sequential steps that cannot be conducted in parallel. 179 I am therefore hesitant to simply accept
that the average time period in which MOFCOM conducted these previous reviews is an appropriate
measure of the time within which MOFCOM should conduct a redetermination in this case.
3.41. Turning to the component steps of China's proposed redetermination procedure, I note that,
in response to questioning at the oral hearing, China clarified that only two steps of its proposed

173 See also Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)), para. 53.
175 China's submission, para. 89.
176 At the oral hearing, the United States clarified that the United States' submission uses the term
"administrative reconsideration" to refer to any administrative procedures conducted by a Chinese
administrative body to modify or repeal existing administrative decisions. Such procedures would include, but
would not be limited to, "administrative reconsiderations" conducted pursuant to China's Administrative
Reconsideration Law.
177 United States' submission, para. 39.
178 The United States refers to: (i) Cold Rolled Steel Administrative Review (2004) (Exhibit USA-5);
(ii) Kraft Linerboard Administrative Reconsideration (2005) (Exhibit USA-10); and (iii) Electrolytic Capacitor
Paper (ECP) Reconsideration (2007) (Exhibit USA-2).
179 For example, drafting and approval of the public notice of the redetermination (20 days);
consideration of comments of interested parties (30 days); submission of rebuttal comments from interested
parties (30 days). (See China's submission, para. 89)

procedure have specific timeframes prescribed by law. First, a period of 37 days is required to
conduct a hearing, and, second, a period of "at least" 10 days must be allowed for interested
parties to comment on any disclosure documents. Thus, as China has explained, the vast majority
of the timeframes that China has associated with the component steps of its proposed
redetermination procedure are inspired by MOFCOM's "practice and experience" with original
investigations.
3.42. China also argues that "many of the time pe riods" that will apply to the specific steps that
MOFCOM considers necessary for implementation are based on important procedural obligations
arising under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, including, for example:
giving "all interested parties … a full opportunity for the defense of their interests"
180; providing
"timely opportunities" for interested parties to see information relevant to their cases and to
prepare presentations based on that information 181; and giving public notice and explanation of
preliminary and final determinations. 182 China submits that these obligations constitute a
"particular circumstance", and will help minimize the risk of any possible violation of procedural
obligations during the course of the implementation process.183
3.43. China adds that, given the Panel and Appellate Body findings on issues such as the choice of
adverse "facts available", the determination of th e "all others rates" for unknown companies, and
the findings related to MOFCOM's injury determination, interested parties will certainly have views
that MOFCOM will need to consider and address.184
3.44. I see some merit in these arguments advanc ed by China. Indeed, even if some steps and
time periods are not required by law, they may nonetheless be useful in ensuring that
implementation is effected in a transparent and efficient manner, fully respecting due process for
all parties involved.185
3.45. In response to questioning at the oral hear ing, the United States explained that it does not
dispute the need to afford due process to interested parties. 186 The United States further accepts
that some of the steps of China's proposed re determination procedure stem from a "legitimate
source", namely, the covered agreements.187 The United States argues, however, that due process
concerns must be balanced with the principle of prompt compliance under the DSU.188
3.46. I consider that a determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation involves
balancing various considerations. I agree with the arbitrator in US – Hot-Rolled Steel
(Article 21.3(c)), who found that the term "reasonable" should be interpreted as including "the
notions of flexibility and balance", in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular
circumstances of each case. 189 Article 21.1 of the DSU indicates that implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB must be pr ompt. To that end, all flexibilities within the
legal system of an implementing Member must be employed in the implementation process. 190 At
the same time, implementation must be effected in a transparent and efficient manner that affords
due process to all interested parties.
191 I do not consider that the imperatives of prompt
compliance, on the one hand, and of ensuring the du e process rights of interested parties, on the
other hand, are mutually exclusive objectives. A re asonable period of time for the implementation

180 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 25 thereto (referring to Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
181 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 27 thereto (referring to Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
182 China's submission, para. 85 and fn 28 thereto (referring to Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
183 China's submission, para. 85.
184 China's submission, paras. 73-75.
185 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 51.
186 United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
187 United States' submission, para. 43.
188 United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
189 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25 (quoting with approval
Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 85).
190 See supra, para. 3.4 of this Award.
191 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 51.

of DSB recommendations and rulings is capable of accommodating both. This, however, requires
striking "a balance between respecting due process rights of interested parties and the promptness
required in implementation."192
3.47. In sum, I consider that, while China has explained the extent to which its proposed
redetermination procedure will be designed to respect the due process rights of interested parties,
China has not persuasively explained how the various steps of its proposed redetermination
procedure, and their associated timeframes, reflect the use of flexibility within its legal system. It
seems to me that China has available to it a considerable degree of flexibility to conduct a
redetermination in a shorter period of time than it proposes, as evidenced by inter alia the absence
of mandatory timeframes in relation to the majority of the component steps of China's proposed
redetermination procedure. I am not convinced th at conducting a redetermination in a shorter
period of time than China proposes would, in the circumstances of this dispute, infringe upon the
due process rights of interested parties.
4 AWARD
4.1. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I determine that the "reasonable period of time"
for China to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 8 months
and 15 days from 16 November 2012, that is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute. Thus , the reasonable period of time will expire on
31 July 2013.
Signed in the original at Geneva this 19th day of April 2013 by:

192 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51.