UNITED STATES — TARIFF MEASURES ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 15 September 2020
Document codes: WT/DS543/R
Complainant: China
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. I:1, II:1(a), II:1(b)  GATT 1994Art. 23.1, 23.2  Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

UNITED STATES — TARIFF MEASURES ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA

REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 12
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 20
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 42
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 44
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 46
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 49
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand 51
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Singapore 52
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Chinese Taipei 57

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Financial
Services
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, DSR 2016:II,
p. 431
Argentina – Financial
Services
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
 and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, as modified by Appellate Body
Report , DSR 2016:II, p. 599
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by Appellate Body Report
, DSR 2000:II, p. 575
Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, and Corr.1, adopted
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Brazil – Taxation Panel Reports, Brazil – Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges,
WT/DS472/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS497/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted
11 January 2019, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS472/AB/R /

Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443
Canada – Wheat Exports
and Grain Imports
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment
of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS276/AB/R, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2817
Chile – Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted
23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p. 261
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various
Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted
22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 /
WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by
Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R,
DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805
China – Rare Earths Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R and Add.1
/ WT/DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body
Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV,
p. 1127
Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535
Colombia – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
22 June 2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131
Colombia – Textiles Panel Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles,
Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June 2016, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS461/AB/R, DSR 2016:III, p. 1227

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Dominican Republic –
Import and Sale of
Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted
19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR
2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Asbestos Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997,
DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) /
EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Ecuador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, adopted 11 December 2008, and Corr.1 /
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and Corr.1, adopted 22 December 2008, DSR
2008:XVIII, p. 7165
EC – Bananas III
(Guatemala and Honduras)
Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras,
WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 695
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador)
(Article 22.6 – EC)
Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,
24 March 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2237
EC – Bananas III (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC)
Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB,
9 April 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 725
EC – Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted
27 September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9157
EC – Chicken Cuts Panel Reports, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/R (Brazil) / WT/DS286/R (Thailand),
adopted 27 September 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9295 / DSR 2005:XX,
p. 9721
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted
13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Hormones (Canada)
(Article 22.6 – EC)
Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by Canada – Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1135
EC – IT Products Panel Reports, European Communities and its member States – Tariff
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, WT/DS375/R /
WT/DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010, DSR 2010:III,
p. 933
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p. 7
EC – Seal Products Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R and Add.1 / WT/DS401/R and
Add.1, adopted 18 June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, DSR 2014:II, p. 365
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Panel Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/R, adopted 11 December 2006, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS315/AB/R, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3915
EU – Energy Package Panel Report, European Union and its member States – Certain Measures
Relating to the Energy Sector, WT/DS476/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO
Members 10 August 2018
EU – PET (Pakistan) Appellate Body Report, European Union – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, WT/DS486/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
28 May 2018

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
India – Additional Import
Duties
Panel Report, India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from
the United States, WT/DS360/R, adopted 17 November 2008, as reversed by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS360/AB/R, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8317
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R,
WT/DS175/R, and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, p. 1827
India – Quantitative
Restrictions
Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted
22 September 1999, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1763
India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR
1998:I, p. 9
India – Solar Cells Appellate Body Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 14 October 2016, DSR
2016:IV, p. 1827
India – Solar Cells Panel Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules, WT/DS456/R and Add.1, adopted 14 October 2016, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS456/AB/R, DSR 2016:IV, p. 1941
Indonesia – Import
Licensing Regimes
Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products,
Animals and Animal Products, WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, and Add.1,
adopted 22 November 2017, DSR 2017:VII, p. 3037
Indonesia – Import
Licensing Regimes
Panel Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and
Animal Products, WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted
22 November 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS477/AB/R,
WT/DS478/AB/R, DSR 2017:VII, p. 3131
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4391
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I,
p. 3
Korea – Various Measures
on Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001,
DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3
Peru – Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 31 July 2015, DSR
2015:VI, p. 3403
Russia – Pigs (EU) Panel Report, Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs,
Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union, WT/DS475/R and Add.1,
adopted 21 March 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS475/AB/R, DSR 2017:II, p. 361
Russia – Tariff Treatment Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and
Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/R, Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted
26 September 2016, DSR 2016:IV, p. 1547
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV,
p. 2203
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines) (Article 21.5 –
Philippines II)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the
Philippines – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the Philippines,
WT/DS371/RW2 and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 12 July 2019
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R,
adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
US – 1916 Act (EC)
(Article 22.6 – US)
Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Original
Complaint by the European Communities – Recourse to Arbitration by the
United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB,
24 February 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4269
US – FSC (Article 21.5 –
EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR
2002:I, p. 55
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted
20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Brazil)
(Article 22.6 – US)
Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Brazil – Recourse to Arbitration by the
United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA,
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4341
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry
from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 1909
US – Renewable Energy Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable
Energy Sector, WT/DS510/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members
27 June 2019
US – Section 337 Tariff Act GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439,
adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345
US – Shrimp (Ecuador) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador,
WT/DS335/R, adopted on 20 February 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 425
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR
1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and
Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted
9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)

Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews
– Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan, WT/DS322/RW, adopted
31 August 2009, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS322/AB/RW, DSR
2009:VIII, p. 3553
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441
US – Zeroing (Korea) Panel Report, United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures
Involving Products from Korea, WT/DS402/R, adopted 24 February 2011, DSR
2011:X, p. 5239

EXHIBITS REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT
Exhibit Short title
(if applicable) Title
CHN-1 United States Schedule of Concessions and Commitments
CHN-2 Notice of
20 June 2018
Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning
Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's
Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83,
No. 119 (20 June 2018), p. 28710
CHN-3 Notice of
21 September 2018
Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,
and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 184
(21 September 2018), p. 47974
CHN-4 Notice of
9 May 2019
Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,
and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 90 (9 May 2019),
p. 20459
CHN-10 Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning
Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's
Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, vol. 83,
No. 67 (6 April 2018), p. 14906
CHN-13 Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,
and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 243
(19 December 2018), p. 65198
CHN-14 Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,
and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 43 (5 March 2019),
p. 7966
CHN-15 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
CHN-17 Current US Section 301 Tariff Lists
CHN-20 Procedures for
Exclusion
Procedures To Consider Requests for Exclusion of Particular Products
From the Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's
Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, vol. 83,
No. 133 (11 July 2018), p. 32181
CHN-21 Procedures for
exclusion for List 2
products
Procedures for Requests to Exclude Particular Products From the
September 2018 Action Pursuant to Section 301, Federal Register,
Vol. 84, No. 121 (24 June 2019), p. 29576
US-1 Section 301 Report Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 22 March 2018
US-2 Update to Section
301 Report
Update Concerning China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 20 November 20
US-12 California Code, Penal Code § 484 (General Theft Statute)
US-13 Texas Penal Code, Title 7, Chapter 31 (Offenses against Property –
Theft)
US-14 18 U.S.C. Chapter 31 (Embezzlement and Theft)
US-16 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030)
US-17 Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832)
US-18 Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985)
US-20 Federal Trade Commission Act 5 U.S.C § 45
US-21 35 U.S.C. §200 (Patents Policy and objective)
US-22 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205
US-30 18 U.S.C. Chapter 41
US-31 Federal Trade Commission Act 5 U.S.C § 45 (Exhibit US–20) and
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
US-32 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)
US-33 Phase One
Agreement
Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China
US-34 USTR, Letters RE: Product Exclusion Requests
US-35 Notice of the Office of the People's Government of Guangdong
Province on the Issuance of Certain Recommendations of Guangdong
Province on Accelerating the Development of the Semiconductor and
Integrated Circuit Industries, 3 February 2020

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
USTR United States Trade Representative
WTO World Trade Organization
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. This dispute concerns China's challenge to United States' measures , imposing additional
ad valorem duties on certain products imported from China, pursuant to the findings of an
investigation the United States Trade Representative (USTR) carried out into China's acts, policies,
and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301 Report) 1, and the arguments raised by the United States in
defence to China's claims.
1.1 Complaint by China
1.2. On 4 April 2018, China requested consultations with the United States pursuant to Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and
Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) with respect to the
measures and claims set out below.2
1.3. On 6 July 20183, 16 July 20184, and 18 September 20185, in addenda to its initial request for
consultations, China requested further consultations with the United States on subsequent related
legal instruments.
1.4. Consultations were held on 28 August 2018 and 22 October 2018 but failed to resolve the
dispute.
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.5. On 6 December 2018, China requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Articles 4.7
and 6 of the DSU and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 with standard terms of reference. 6 At its
meeting on 28 January 2019, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to
the request of China in document WT/DS543/7, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.7
1.6. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by China in document
WT/DS543/7 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.8
1.7. On 24 May 2019, China requested the Director -General to determine the composition of the
panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU .9 On 3 June 2019, the Director -General accordingly
composed the Panel as follows10:

1 Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 22 March 2018,
(Exhibit US-1) (Section 301 Report).
2 WT/DS543/1-G/L/1219 (China's consultations request).
3 Addendum to China's consultations request, WT/DS543/1/Add.1-G/L/1219/Add.1. China specifies that
"[t]his addendum supplements and does not replace China's request for consultations with the United States
dated 4 April 2018." (Ibid. p. 1)
4 Second addendum to China's consultations request, WT/DS543/1/Add.2 – G/L/1219/Add.2. China
specifies that "[t]his addendum supplements and does not replace China's request for consultations dated
4 April 2018 and the supplemental request for consultations dated 6 July 2018." (Ibid. p. 1)
5 Third addendum to China's consultations request, WT/DS543/1/Add.3 – G/L/1219/Add.3. China
specifies that "[t]his addendum supplements and does not replace China's request for consultations dated
4 April 2018, the supplemental request for consultations dated 6 July 2018 and the supplemental request for
consultations dated 16 July 2018." (Ibid. p. 1)
6 Request for the establishment of a panel by China, WT/DS543/7 (China's panel request).
7 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 28 January 2019, WT/DSB/M/425, para. 5.5.
8 Constitution Note of the Panel, WT/DS543/8, para. 2.
9 Constitution Note of the Panel, WT/DS543/8, para. 3.
10 Constitution Note of the Panel, WT/DS543/8, para. 4.

Chairperson: Mr Alberto Juan Dumont

Members: Mr Álvaro Espinoza
 Ms Claudia Uribe

1.8. Following the resignation of Ms Claudia Uribe on 25 September 2019, China requested the
Director-General to appoint a replacement. The United States agreed to accept as a replacement
panelist a person named by the Director-General "in the limited circumstances of this dispute".11 On
17 October 2019, the Director-General appointed Ms Athaliah Lesiba Molokomme as a member of
the Panel. Accordingly, the composition of the Panel is as follows12:
Chairperson: Mr Alberto Juan Dumont

Members: Mr Álvaro Espinoza
 Ms Athaliah Lesiba Molokomme

1.9. Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, t he
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey,
and Ukraine notified their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.10. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures13 and timetable
on 21 June 2019. On 18 October 2019, the day after the Director -General appointed Ms Athaliah
Lesiba Molokomme to replace Ms Claudia Uribe as a member of the Panel, the United States
suggested a delay in the date for the first substantive meeting in order to allow Ms Molokomme to
become acquainted with the matters at issue in advance of the first substantive meeting and to allow
her to meaningfully participate in the preparation for t he first substantive meeting. The Panel
modified the timetable so as not to issue advance questions to the Parties on 17 October 2019, but
decided to maintain the scheduled date of the first substantive meeting. Following a request from
the United States, and in light of China's comments thereon, the Panel revised its timetable on
12 December 2019, to provide both parties with additional time to submit their second written
submissions. The Panel further revised its timetable on 2 March 2020, following consultations with
the parties, in order to specify the dates for the final stages of the proceedings.
1.11. China and the United States submitted their first written submissions on 23 July 2019 and
27 August 2019, respectively. On 10 September 2019, the Panel receiv ed third-party submissions
from Brazil and the European Union.
1.12. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties from 29-31 October 2019. A
session with the third parties took place on 30 October 2019, during which Australia, the
European Union, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Chinese Taipei made oral statements. Prior to
this meeting, on 28 October 2019, the Panel sent the parties a list of questions for preliminary oral
responses at the meeting. After the first day of the meeting, on 30 October 2019, the Panel sent the
parties a list of additional questions for preliminary oral responses on the second day of the meeting.
Following the meeting, on 1 November 2019, the Panel sent a revised and combined list of written
questions to the parties. On the same date, the Panel also sent written questions to the third parties.
The Panel received responses to these questions on 20 November 2019. The third parties submitted
their integrated executive summaries on the same day.14
1.13. On 8 January 2020, the parties filed their second written submissions to the Panel.
1.14. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 25 and 26 February 2020.
Prior to this meeting, on 12 February 2020, the Panel sent the parties a list of questions for
preliminary oral responses at the meeting. After the first day of the meeting, on 25 February 2020,

11 United States' comments on the draft descriptive part of the Panel Report, para. 3.
12 Addendum to the Constitution Note of the Panel, WT/DS543/8/Add.1.
13 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.
14 Specifically, the Panel received integrated executive summaries from Australia, Brazil, the
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore. Chinese Taipei informed the Panel that its third-party
oral statement should serve as its executive summary.

the Panel sent the parties an additional question for preliminary oral response on the second day of
the meeting. Following the meeting, on 28 February 2020, the Panel sent a revised and combined
list of written questions to the parties. The Panel received responses to these questions on 17 March
2020. The Panel received parties' comments on each other's responses on 31 March 2020. The
parties submitted their integrated executive summaries on 7 April 2020. On the same day, China
requested the Panel to reject , as untimely filed, Exhibit US-35, which the United States submitted
with its comments on China's responses to the Panel's questions after the second subst antive
meeting. The Panel invited the United States to comment on China's request. The Panel received
the United States' comments on China's request on 9 April 2020.
1.15. On 15 April 2020, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. On
29 April 2020, the Panel received the parties' comments on the descriptive part of its Report. The
Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 19 May 2020. The parties submitted written
requests for the Panel to review precise aspects of the Interim Report on 2 June 2020. Neither party
requested that an interim review meeting be held. The Panel provided the parties with an opportunity
to comment on each other's requests for review. The parties submitted their comments on
9 June 2020. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 19 June 2020.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS AND MEASURES AT ISSUE
2.1. This section of the Report provides a descriptive overview of the factual aspects of the
measures at issue in this dispute. The precise scope of the second measu re at issue in this dispute
is subject to disagreement between the parties in the context of a discussion of the Panel's terms of
reference. The Panel will, therefore, address the scope of the second measure in more detail as part
of its findings in Section 7 of this Report.
2.2. China challenges the following measures adopted by the United States15:
• Additional ad valorem duties of 25%, imposed on 20 June 2018 on a list of 818 tariff
subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of USD 34 billion of product s imported
from China, as of 6 July 2018 (List 1).16
• Additional ad valorem duties, imposed on 21 September 2018 on a list of 5,745 tariff
subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of USD 200 billion of products imported
from China, as of 24 September 2018 (List 2). 17 The Notice of 21 September 2018 set the
rate of additional ad valorem duties at 10% until the end of the year, and announced that the
rate of additional duties would increase to 25% on 1 January 2019.18 The increase in the rate

15 China's panel request reads as follows:
The measures at issue in this request include the actions taken by the United States, based on
the USTR's investigation into China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer,
intellectual property, and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and pursuant to
sections 301(b), 301(c), and 304(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 and the direction made in the
President's statement to impose an additional ad valorem duty upon certain imported products of
Chinese origin. The above-mentioned actions include:
1. An additional 25% duty ad valorem on approximately $34 billion worth of imports from
China announced by the USTR on 15 June 2018 and implemented by the Federal Register notice
of 20 June 2018 (Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed
Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, (83 Fed. Reg. 28,710)); and
2. An additional 10% duty ad valorem on approximately $200 billion worth of imports
from China implemented on 24 September 2018, and the rate of additional duty will increase to
25% ad valorem on 1 January 2019, according to the announcement by the USTR on
21 September 2018 (Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation,
(83 Fed. Reg. 47,974)). (WT/DS543/7, p. 2).
16 Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action
Pursuant to Section 301: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 119 (20 June 2018), p. 28710 (Notice of
20 June 2018) (Exhibit CHN-2).
17 Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 184
(21 September 2018), p. 47974, (Notice of 21 September 2018) (Exhibit CHN-3).
18 Notice of 21 September 2018, (Exhibit CHN-3), p. 47975.

of additional duties was postponed twice.19 On 9 May 2019, the United States increased the
rate of additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25%, as of 10 May 2019.20
2.3. In its panel request, China lists 16 legal instruments t hrough which, inter alia, the measures
at issue were adopted.21
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. China requests that:
• The Panel find that the United States has violated Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 through its
application of additional tariffs that apply only to products originating from China; and
• The Panel find that the United States has violated Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994
through its application of additional tariffs in excess of those contained in its Schedule.22
3.2. China further requests that the Panel recommend that the United States bring its measures
into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.23
3.3. The United States requests that:
• The Panel reject China's request for findings under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994 with
respect to the allegedly WTO-inconsistent tariff measures, and, instead, issue a report with a
"brief description" of the pertinent facts of the dispute and "reporting that a solution has been
reached" by the parties, as prescribed by Article 12.7 of the DSU. 24
• If the Panel examines China's contentions:
• The Panel find that the measures at issue are justified under Article XX(a) of the
GATT 1994; and
• The Panel find that the increase of the additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to
25% falls outside the Panel's terms of reference.25
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel
in accordance with paragraph 22 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1
and B-2).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and
Chinese T aipei are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with
paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C-1, C-2, C-3,
C-4, C-5, C-6, and C-7).

19 Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 243
(19 December 2018), p. 65198 (Exhibit CHN-13); and Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's
Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal
Register, Vol. 84, No. 43 (5 March 2019), p. 7966 (Exhibit CHN-14).
20 Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 90 (9 May 2019),
p. 20459 (Notice of 9 May 2019) (Exhibit CHN-4).
21 China's panel request, pp. 2-4.
22 China's first written submission, para. 79.
23 China's first written submission, para. 6.
24 United States' first written submission, para. 113.
25 United States' first written submission, para. 114.

5.2. Canada, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation,
Turkey, and Ukraine did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1. On 19 May 2020, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 2 June 2020, the parties
submitted written requests for the Panel to review precise aspects of the Interim Report. On
9 June 2020, the parties submitted comments on each other's requests for review. Neither party
requested an interim review meeting.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Panel Report describes the
parties' requests for review at the interim review stage and the Panel's response to them. The
numbering of some paragraphs and footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the numbering
in the Interim Report. Unless otherwise specifically indicated, the references to paragraph numbers
in this section refer to the paragraph and footnote numbers in this Final Report, and not the
numbering in the Interim Report. This section of the Panel's Report constitutes an integral part of
the Panel's findings.
6.3. The Panel corrected typographical, stylistic and other non -substantive aspects of the Report,
including those identified by the parties.
6.4. Both parties request ed that the Panel revise its depiction of the parties' and third parties'
arguments in a number of paragraphs. In response to these requests, and on its own review of the
Report, the Panel adjusted the following paragraphs: 7.4, 7.113, 7.130, 7.138, 7.148, 7.149, 7.164;
and footnotes: 33, 71, 72, 73, 75, 204, 219, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 269, 272, 278, 279, 315,
363, and 379. The Panel inserted footnotes 34, 246, 270, 271, and 296.
6.5. The United States requested the Panel to amend the wording of paragraph 7.156 to reflect
more accurately the Panel's functions with respect to t reaty interpretation. China encouraged the
Panel to reject the proposed addition. The Panel has made textual modifications to this paragraph.
6.6. With respect to paragraphs 7.177, 7.178, 7.179, 7.180, and 7.185 of the Interim Report, the
United States requested that the Panel further consider its conclusion s and further explain the
underlying logic of its reasoning, in light of the United States' argument that "a measure does not
have to only apply to products that are inherently morally offensive to b e justified under
Article XX(a)".26 The United States argues that the Panel "determined, contrary to the U.S. position,
that a connection between the public morals objective and the products specifically affected by a
measure is the only means of proving necessity under Article XX(a) in this dispute".27 China opposed
the United States' request.
6.7. The Panel considers that the United States' request, as referred to in the preceding paragraph,
mischaracterizes the Panel's approach in this area. The aim of the Panel's enquiry was to locate an
appropriate nexus between the measures the United States adopted and the invoked public morals
concerns in order to inform the examination of the question of whether and how the measures could
be shown or demonstrated to be "necessary" to protect public morals. The Panel, for its part, did
not find it necessary to make any finding on the abstract issue of the extent to which Article XX(a)
may allow for the application of measures on prod ucts that did not embody morally offensive
conduct.
6.8. The Panel observes that even assuming, arguendo, that a measure does not have to only apply
to products that are considered to be inherently morally offensive to be justified under Article XX(a),
it remained for the United States to explain how its chosen measures were apt to contribute to its
public morals objectives, and how it ensured that any WTO-inconsistent duties did not apply beyond
what was necessary within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. While the United States
asserted that any measures it adopted were necessary, the Panel considers that the United States
did not offer the requisite explanation that Article XX envisages to substantiate and justify this
assertion. The Panel has, however, in response to the United States' request in this area, introduced
some modifications and inconsequential changes to further clarify its reasoning in paragraphs 7.178,

26 United States' request for review of precise aspects of the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 13.
27 United States' request for review of precise aspects of the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 13.

7.179, 7.180, 7.185, 7.191, 7.193, 7.206, 7.222, and 7.236 and in the heading of the first subsection
of the section "Contribution of the imposition of additional duties on List 1 products to the pursued
public morals objective as invoked by the United States" in Section 7.3.2.4.2.3. The Panel also added
paragraph 7.214 and footnote 365.
6.9. With respect to paragraphs 7.231, 7.232 , 7.233, and 7.234 of the Interim Report , the
United States requested that the Panel "explain what other alternatives are available to t he
United States to protect its public morals, and what effect China's failure to identify any other
reasonably available alternative has on the Panel's necessity analysis". 28 China opposed the
United States' request.
6.10. The Panel notes that it had reached the preliminary conclusion that the United States had not
met its burden of demonstrating that its measures were provisionally justified under Article XX(a).
In particular, the United States had not met its burden of demonstrating how its restrictions
contributed to protecting its public morals and did not extend beyond what was necessary .
Consequently, the Panel was not required to reach any conclusion on the consequence s of China's
refusal to suggest less trade restrictive or WTO-consistent reasonably available alternative measure.
The Panel has introduced some modifications to clarify its reasoning in paragraphs 7.232 and 7.235.
The Panel also added footnotes 461 and 462.
7 FINDINGS
7.1. In this dispute, China claims that the United States has violated Articles I:1, II:1(a) and II:1(b)
of the GATT 1994. In response to China's challenge, the United States raises three sets of
arguments: (i) that the parties have reached a solution within the meaning of the last sentence of
Article 12.7 of the DSU and the Panel should confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and
a notation that a settlement has been reached; (ii) that the increase of the rate of additional duties
on List 2 products from 10% to 25% falls outside the Panel's terms of reference; and (iii) that in
any case, the measures at issue are justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.2. Accordingly, the Panel will begin by addressing the preliminary issues raised by the
United States' first two series of arguments (i.e. whether the parties have reached a solution within
the meaning of Article 12.7 of the DSU and whether the increase of th e additional duties on List 2
products from 10% to 25% falls within the Panel's terms of reference), as well as China's request
that the Panel reject an exhibit submitted by the United States. The Panel will then proceed to
examine whether the measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994, and then, following this, will examine whether any inconsistency of the challenged
measures with these provisions is justified as necessary to protect the US public morals, pursuant
to Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.1 Preliminary issues
7.1.1 Whether the parties have reached a solution within the meaning of Article 12.7 of
the DSU
7.1.1.1 Parties' arguments
7.3. The first set of arguments the United States raised relates to the legal implications of the
ongoing bilateral negotiations between China and the United States to address several trade
concerns – including some matters covered by the current WTO dispute.
7.4. According to the United States, "there is no legal basis for the Panel to issue the findings or
recommendations requested by China because the Parties have reached a 'settlement of the matter'
within the meaning of Article 12.7 of the DSU". 29 Accordingly, the United States argues that,
consistent with the requirements of Article 12.7 of the DSU, the Panel should reject China's request
for legal findings on the measures at issue and confine its report to a brief statement of the facts
and a notation that a settlement has been reached.30 The United States recalls that "[w]here a

28 United States' request for review of precise aspects of the Interim Report of the Panel, para. 16.
29 United States' second written submission, para. 1.
30 United States' second written submission, para. 5.

settlement of the matter among the parties to the dispute has been found", Article 12.7 of the DSU
requires that "the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief description of the case and to
reporting that a solution has been reached".31 The United States asserts that the parties have agreed
to "settle this matter outside the WTO system"32, noting that China has already "imposed retaliatory
tariffs" "without first obtaining the authorization from the DSB pursuant to the DSU".33 However, the
Panel observes that the Government of the United States has not, up to the present time, initiated
action under the DSU with respect to these tariffs. Instead, the United States claims that the parties
have undertaken a bilateral negotiation process that amounts t o a solution within the meaning of
Article 12.7 of the DSU.34
7.5. In support of its argument, during the Panel's second substantive meeting with the parties, the
United States pointed to the Economic and Trade Agreement between the two countries (Phase One
Agreement)35 as evidence that a bilateral negotiation process is ongoing and has been fruitful.
According to the United States, Article 12.7 of the DSU simply refers to circumstances where a
"settlement of the matter among the parties to the dispute has been found" and does not specify or
delimit the evidence that a panel may consult to discern the existence of a "settlement". The
United States asserts that Article 12.7 of the DSU covers the present situation. For these reasons,
the United States considers that the Panel should not issue any of the findings or recommendations
China requested but should instead issue a brief report stating that the parties have reached their
own solution, in accordance with the third sentence of Article 12.7 of the DSU.
7.6. China raises a series of arguments on the scope of any mutually agreed solution and on the
need to notify such a MAS to the DSB pursuant to Article 3.6 of the DSU. China insists that the
parties have not developed a mutually satisfactory solution and that "the matter set forth in China's
Panel Request remains unresolved and subject to adjudication by the Panel." 36 China expressly
states that the Phase One Agreement is not legally relevant in the current dispute, because (i) it
does not address the measures at issue, and (ii) the additional duties subject to this dispute remain
in effect.37 Accordingly, China asserts that it has never agreed to any process or other solution that
would constrain the Panel from issuing the findings and recommendations it has requested. China
argues that the parties have not settled the matter within the meaning of Article 12.7 (last sentence)
of the DSU, because the parties have not found a "mutually agreed solution" within the meaning of
Article 3.6 of the DSU, or notified such a solution to the DSB.38
7.1.1.2 Panel's findings
7.7. Under the DSU, a WTO Member has the right to initiate a WTO dispute whenever it considers
that any benefits accruing to it are being impaired by measures taken by another Member (Article 3.3
of the DSU). In EC – Bananas III, the United States argued successfully that WTO Members do not
have to demonstrate their legal inte rest to initiate a WTO dispute, and have a broad discretion to

31 Article 12.7 of the DSU reads as follows:
Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the
panel shall submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the
report of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the
basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of
the matter among the parties to the dispute has been found, the report of the panel shall be
confined to a brief description of the case and to reporting that a solution has been reached.
(emphasis added)
32 United States' second written submission, para. 6.
33 United States' first written submission, para. 25; and second written submission, paras. 7-10.
34 To the Panel, it appears that the United States considers that an agreed bilateral negotiation process
outside the WTO constitutes a "solution" within the meaning of Article 12.7 of the DSU, even if the bilateral
negotiations do not yield any results, and even if the issues remain unresolved.
35 Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China, signed on 15 January 2020, entered into force on
14 February 2020 (Exhibit US-33).
36 China's response to Panel question No. 9(a), para. 11. See also China's response to Panel question
No. 18, para. 2.
37 China's response to Panel question No. 18, paras. 1 and 3. China explains that since the Phase One
Agreement "does not address the duties which are the basis for this dispute before the Panel", and "says
nothing about resolving this pending dispute before the Panel", the Phase One Agreement "does not support
the United States' argument that it constitutes a 'mutually satisfactory solution' under Article 12.7 of the DSU".
(China's response to Panel question No. 18, para. 4)
38 See China's response to Panel question No. 9(c), para. 14; and China's second written submission,
para. 11. (emphasis added)

decide whether to bring a case whenever they consider that such proceedings would be "fruitful" in
terms of "securing a positive solution" to the dispute (Article 3.7 of the DSU).39 In addition, the WTO
dispute settlement process is compulsory and automatic, so WTO Members are "entitled to a ruling
by a WTO panel".40
7.8. Therefore, the initiation of the WTO dispute settlement process should, in principle, result in a
decision by an adjud icating body 41, with findings on the claims raised, unless the complaining
Member withdraws its complaint or requests a suspension of the proceedings that allows for the
Panel's jurisdiction to lapse, or unless the parties reach a mutually agreed solution. A panel is thus
required to discharge its adjudicative responsibilities under the DSU, unless the parties relinquish
their rights under DSU.
7.9. Previous panels and the Appellate Body have traditionally adopted a high threshold when
analysing whether WTO Memb ers have relinquished their rights under the DSU, including through
mutually agreed solutions. 42 The Appellate Body has cautioned against assuming "lightly" any
relinquishment of the rights granted by the DSU: "in order to ascertain whether a Member has
relinquished, by virtue of a mutually agreed solution in a particular dispute, its right to have recourse
to WTO dispute settlement in respect of that dispute, greater scrutiny by a panel or the
Appellate Body may be necessary."43
7.10. The United States argues that the parties have reached "their own solution"44 consisting of
an agreement to resolve their dispute outside of the WTO system. In its response to a Panel question,
the United States clarified its argument by specifying that a solution within the meaning of
Article 12.7 of the DSU could include a process of bilateral negotiations.45
7.11. The United States' argument raises the question whether an engagement to pursue a bilateral
negotiations process aimed at resolving a disagreement between the parties can be c haracterized
as a mutually satisfactory solution within the meaning of Article 12.7 of the DSU.
7.12. Following the United States' logic, a solution within the meaning of Article 12.7 of the DSU
could exist even if the bilateral negotiations in which the parties have engaged do not yield any
results, and the issue remains unresolved. Yet, this situation would, to quote the opening words of
Article 12.7 of the DSU, appear to be one in which the parties have "failed to develop a mutually
satisfactory solution" and as a result "the panel shall submit its findings in the form of a written
report to the DSB". The Panel also notes that the United States' arguments appear to place stronger
emphasis on the more general reference to "solution" in the last sentence of Article 12.7 of the DSU,
rather than the more specific term "mutually satisfactory solution" in the first sentence of Article 12.7
of the DSU. That said, read in the context of the paragraph as a whole, it seems that the "solution"
referred to in the final sentence is intended to reflect the same concept as the term "mutually
satisfactory solution" referred to in the first sentence. This reinforces the conclusion that for any
"solution" to exist in terms of Article 12.7 of the DSU, it has to be a "mutually s atisfactory" one,
rather than one based on one party's unilateral assertion that may be satisfactory to it, but not to
the other party. We also note that the term "solution" refers to "the act of solving a problem". 46
Logically, when a solution is found, the problem is solved and does not exist anymore. As the panel

39 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 132 and 135.
40 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 52. (emphasis original)
41 A panel report, an Appellate Body report (if the Appellate Body is able to adjudicate the matter), or an
arbitration award.
42 Since "the relinquishment of rights granted by the DSU cannot be lightly assumed", the
Appellate Body insists that "any such relinquishment must be made clearly." (Appellate Body Reports,
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II / Article 21.5 – US), para. 217; and Peru – Agricultural Products,
para. 5.25)
43 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, para. 5.19.
44 United States' first written submission, para. 38. (emphasis added)
45 United States' response to Panel question No. 8, para. 37.
46 See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 212 and footnote 272 (quoting Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn,
W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 2917).

in India – Autos noted, "agreed solutions are intended to reflect a settlement of the dispute in
question, which both parties expect will bring a final conclusion to the relevant proceedings".47
7.13. More importantly, and setting aside whether a mutually agreed solution could include a
"process", panels have systematically put an emphasis on the parties' shared assessment that they
have reached a solution. In that respect, panels have traditionally fo und relevant the parties'
characterization of their shared views on the substantive matter before the panel as a "mutually
agreed solution".48
7.14. China insists that it has never agreed to terminate the dispute, and that it has never agreed
with the United States that the matter has been, or should be, resolved outside the WTO. China also
insists that " [t]he matter set forth in China's Panel Request remains unresolved and subject to
adjudication by the Panel".49 In sum, one of the parties to this dispute (China) clearly disagrees that
the parties have reached a mutually satisfactory solution.
7.15. While the Panel recognizes that an ongoing process of bilateral negotiations is currently taking
place, such bilateral negotiations seem to be parallel to the ongoing pane l proceedings and not
intended, by China at least, to replace them. 50 They cannot be understood to deprive China of its
right to claim that the measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles I and II of the GATT 1994,
nor of its entitlement to a ruling by a WTO panel.
7.16. The Panel also notes that WTO Members often pursue bilateral negotiations – with or without
informing the panel – in parallel with an ongoing panel proceeding. In such circumstances, if a
complainant considers that ongoing negotiations with the respondent should lead to a suspension of
the work of the panel, the complainant could also avail itself of its right to request the suspension
of the proceedings under Article 12.12 of the DSU. China has not requested such a suspension, nor
has it withdrawn its complaint.
7.17. We also note that the pursuit of negotiations between the parties in parallel to an initiated,
or an ongoing dispute, is usually not an alternative to the dispute process, but rather an additional
path towards solving the parties' disagreement, encouraged by the DSU. Accordingly, it is important
that this situation is not interpreted in a manner that results in denying the complainant's entitlement
to findings by the panel.
7.18. That negotiations aimed at settlement can be pursued in parall el with panel proceedings is
further underlined by Article 11 of the DSU which requires the Panel to "consult regularly with the
parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution". Moreover, Article 5 of the DSU on "good offices, conciliation and mediation" refers
specifically to a series of "soft" dispute settlement procedures that "may continue while the panel
process proceeds" (Article 5.5 of the DSU).
7.19. In the Panel's view, China's responses to the United States' arguments confirm that China has
not relinquished any of its rights under the DSU to pursue proceedings against the United States in
the current dispute. China 's strong opposition to the existence of a mutually satisfactory solution
within the meaning of Article 12.7 serves to further underline that there is no mutually agreed
resolution of the matter before the Panel.

47 Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.113. (emphasis added) This point is confirmed by the
Appellate Body's observation, albeit in a different context, that "consultations are by definition a process, the
results of which are uncertain." (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 317)
48 Panel Reports, US – Shrimp (Ecuador), para. 7.1; and US – Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.14.
49 China's response to Panel question No. 9(a), para. 11. Moreover, the Panel notes that the initial
negotiations between the parties, materialized in the Phase One Agreement, do not appear to have brought a
resolution to the issues that are before the Panel (see United States' opening statement at the second
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, para. 6: "[…] what does the Phase One Agreement say about
this dispute, or the U.S. additional duties that China challenges in this dispute? Nothing.").
50 The Panel also notes that at the initial stage of the ongoing bilateral negotiations, materialized in the
Phase One Agreement, the parties made no specific reference to the current dispute. Moreover, the Phase One
Agreement includes provisions that specifically provide for WTO rights and obligations to be preserved
(Article 7.6, para. 1 of the Phase One Agreement: "The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with
respect to each other under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which the Parties are party.").

7.20. Additionally, there is no written document that might otherwise serve as evidence of the
existence of a mutually agreed solution to the matters raised in this dispute, merely an assertion by
the United States that the conduct of the parties in pursuing various bilateral discussions or dialogues
on trade issues should be sufficient in this regard.
7.21. Without ruling on the i mplications of the absence of notifying the DSB of any such mutually
agreed solution or settlement, we also note that no mutually agreed solution has been notified to
the DSB under Article 3.6 of the DSU.
7.22. Against this background, the Panel concludes that t he parties have not reached a mutually
agreed solution that would deprive China of its right to adjudication and entitlement to
recommendations and rulings by the Panel.
7.1.2 The measures covered by the Panel's terms of reference in this dispute
7.1.2.1 Introduction
7.23. China's challenge concerns the United States' imposition of additional ad valorem duties
(additional duties) on two sets of products:
• List 1 products, on which the United States imposed additional duties of 25% on
20 June 201851; and
• List 2 products, on which the United States initially imposed additional duties of 10% on
21 September 2018, announcing that the rate of additional duties would increase to 25% on
1 January 2019. 52 After two postponements 53, the United States increased the rate o f
additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% on 9 May 2019.54
7.24. China requested the establishment of this Panel on 6 December 201855 and the Panel was
established on 28 January 2019.56 The Panel was thus established after the imposition of additional
duties of 25% on List 1 products (20 June 2018) and the imposition of additional duties of 10% on
List 2 products (21 September 2018), but before the increase of the rate of additional duties on
List 2 products from 10% to 25% (9 May 2019).
7.25. The parties disagree on the scope of the Panel's terms of reference, specifically whether the
Panel is entitled to and should make findings on the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2
products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019.
7.26. The United States asserts that the Panel's terms of reference are limited to two measures:
the additional duties on List 1 products imposed on 20 June 2018; and the additional duties of 10%
imposed on List 2 on 21 September 2018. For the United States, the increase of the rate of additional
duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 is a third and separate measure57, which
is outside the Panel's terms of reference.58 The United States asserts that "there is no legal basis for
the Panel to issue findings or reco mmendations" with respect to the Notice of 9 May 2019.59 The
United States points to the fact that the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2 products
from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 "did not exist when the Panel was established" 60 and was not

51 Notice of 20 June 2018, (Exhibit CHN-2).
52 Notice of 21 September 2018, (Exhibit CHN-3).
53 Notice of 19 December 2018, (Exhibit CHN-13); and Notice of 5 March 2019, (Exhibit CHN-14).
54 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4).
55 China's panel request, WT/DS543/7.
56 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 28 January 2019, WT/DSB/M/425, para. 5.5.
57 United States' first written submission, para. 33. See also United States' response to Panel question
No. 1, para. 4.
58 United States' first written submission, paras. 93-112.
59 United States' first written submission, para. 98. See also United States' first written submission,
paras. 14 and 94.
60 United States' first written submission, paras. 97-98. See also United States' response to Panel
question No. 1, para. 4.

among the "specific measures" identified in China's panel request.61 For the United States "measures
enacted after the date of establishment […] are not within a panel's terms of reference". 62 The
United States argues that the DSU does not allow panels to assert jurisdiction over a measure that
otherwise falls outside of their terms of reference.63
7.27. China asserts that the Panel's terms of reference cover two measures: the additional duties
of 25% imposed on List 1 products on 20 June 2018; and the additional duties on List 2 products,
imposed initially at a rate of 10% on 21 September 2018, which was increa sed to 25% on
9 May 2019, as envisaged by the Notice of 21 September 2018.64 China argues that the increase of
the additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 is "clearly a modification"65
of the second measure and is covered by the Panel's terms of reference. In support of its argument,
China notes that (i) the Notice of 21 September anticipated a planned increase of the rate of
additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25%; (ii) the United States "labelled the increase
in additional import duties as a modification"66; (iii) China's panel request expressly referred to the
anticipated modification of the second measure and specifically identified the planned increase of
the rate of additional duties on List 2 products 67; and (iv ) China's panel request referred to "any
modification, replacement or amendment to the measures identified above".68
7.28. China also argues that if the Panel were to find the additional duties of 25% to be outside of
its terms of reference, China would be denie d due process because it would be required to "adjust
its pleadings throughout dispute settlement proceedings in order to deal with a disputed measure
as a 'moving target'".69 Conversely, China considers that the United States' due process rights would
not be denied if the Panel were to find the additional duties of 25% to be within its terms of reference,
because China's panel request "provided the United States with precisely the information it needed
to respond to China's case".70
7.29. Several third parties also express views on this point. Australia recalls that "measures must
be listed in the panel request" 71, but warns against an "overly formalistic approach" 72, reminding
that "[l]itigation is lengthy and resource -intensive" and "[d]uring the litig ation process, laws and
regulations may expire, or be renewed, or enacted in a different form".73 The European Union relies
on the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Selected Customs Matters that "a panel has the authority to
examine a legal instrument enact ed after the establishment of the panel that amends a measure
identified in the panel request, provided that the amendment does not change the essence of the
identified measure"74, to invite the Panel to ascertain "whether [the increase of the duty] 'chang es
the essence' of Measure 2".75

61 United States' first written submission, paras. 95 and 98. The United States points out that in
EC – Chicken Cuts the Appellate Body held that the measures at issue in a dispute "'must be measures that are
in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel'". (United States' first written submission, para. 97
(quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156))
62 United States' first written submission, para. 106.
63 United States' first written submission, paras. 101 and 110.
64 China argues that "the imposition of 25 percent additional ad valorem duties on an approximate $200
billion of imports from China – despite the fact that the additional duties in place on this $200 billion of imports
at the time of China's panel request was only 10 percent additional ad valorem duties – is included in the terms
of reference." (China's first written submission, para. 26. See also China's second written submission, para. 15)
65 China's first written submission, para. 26.
66 China's second written submission, para. 21.
67 China's second written submission, para. 15. See also China's response to Panel question No. 2,
para. 2.
68 China's first written submission, para. 26. China also argues that a failure to reach a decision by the
Panel on the additional duties that are currently in effect, at a rate of 25%, would preclude a "positive solution"
to this dispute (China's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 6).
69 China's second written submission, para. 17 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band
System, para. 144).
70 China's second written submission, para. 16.
71 Australia's third-party statement, para. 18 and integrated executive summary, para. 15.
72 Australia's third-party statement, para. 18 and integrated executive summary, para. 15.
73 Australia's third-party statement, para. 18 and integrated executive summary, para. 15.
74 European Unions' third-party submission, para. 58 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected
Customs Matters, para. 184).
75 European Union's third-party submission, para. 61. See also European Union's integrated executive
summary, para. 15.

7.1.2.2 Overview of applicable principles
7.30. The Panel recalls that Article 6.2 of the DSU reads, in relevant part:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly. […]
7.31. In accordance with Article 7.1 of the DSU, the Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by China in document
WT/DS543/7 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.76
7.32. While the parties agree that the imposition of additional duties of 25% on List 1 products (first
measure) and the imposition of additional duties of 10% on List 2 products (second measure) are
within the Panel's terms of reference, they disagree whether the increase in the additional duty on
List 2 products from 10% to 25% is also within the Panel's terms of reference.
7.33. At this stage, the issue before the Panel is whether the increase of the rate of additional duties
on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 is covered by the Panel's terms of reference.
7.34. It is well established by WTO adjudicators that a panel's mandate or terms of reference is to
examine the measures and related claims the complainant has raised in its panel request.77 This is
in conformity with the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system, which, inter alia, is to achieve a
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the parties ' rights and obligations
(Article 3.4 of the DSU) and to secure a positive solution to a dispute (Article 3.7 of the DSU).78
7.35. Prior panels and the Appellate Body have observed that, as a general rule, "the measures
included in a panel's terms of reference must be measures that are in existence at the time of the
establishment of the panel".79 However, Article 6.2 of the DSU does not set out an express temporal
condition or limitation on the measures that can be identified in a panel request.80 Measures enacted
subsequent to the establishment of the panel "may, in certain limited circumstances, fall within a
panel's terms of reference".81 More specifically,
[A] panel may examine a legal instrument enacted after the date of the panel's
establishment, which amends one of the challen ged measures at issue, provided that

76 Constitution Note of the Panel, WT/DS543/8, para. 2.
77 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 131 ("the panel request
identifies the measures and the claims that a panel will have the authority to examine and on which it will have
the authority to make findings"); and Australia – Salmon, para. 223. See also Panel Report, EC – Selected
Customs Matters, para. 7.43.
78 As prior WTO adjudicators have consistently held, a panel's terms of reference are important because
they "fulfil an important due process objective" – they give the parties and third parties sufficient information
concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the
complainant's case (Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186. See also
Appellate Body Reports, EU – PET (Pakistan), para. 5.39; EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 143; and
Thailand – H-Beams, para. 85; and Panel Reports US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 7.104;
and EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 7.49). Moreover, the terms of reference establish the jurisdiction of
the panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the dispute. Clearly, "due process and adequate notice
would not be served if a complaining party were free to add new measures or new claims to its original
complaint as reflected in its panel request at a later stage of a panel proceeding (Panel Report, Argentina –
Footwear (EC), para. 8.45. See also Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, fn 14).
79 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156. See also Panel Reports, US – Renewable
80 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 121 and Panel Report,
US – Renewable Energy, para. 7.8 (currently under appeal).
81 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing
(Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 121; and Panel Report, US – Renewable Energy, para. 7.8 (currently
under appeal).

the panel request is broad enough to encompass such an amendment and the
amendment does not change the "essence" of the measure.82
7.36. In other words, where a measure identified in the panel request has merely been amended
by a subsequent measure and the amendment did not, in any way, change the "essence" of the
original measure, prior WTO adjudicators have deemed it appropriate to consider the measure as
amended in coming to a decision in a dispute.83
7.1.2.3 The measures covered by China's panel request
7.37. China's panel request reads, in relevant parts:
The measures at issue in this request include the actions taken by the United States,
based on the USTR's investigation into China's acts, policies, and practices related to
technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 and pursuant to sections 301(b), 301(c), and 304(a) of the Trade Act
of 1974 and the direction made in the President's statement to impose an additional ad
valorem duty upon certain imported products of Chinese origin. The above mentioned
actions include:
1. An additional 25% duty ad valorem on approximately $34 billion worth of
imports from China announced by the USTR on 15 June 2018 and implemented by the
Federal R egister notice of 20 June 2018 ( Notice of Action and Request for Public
Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301:
China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property
and Innovation, (83 Fed. Reg. 28,710)); and
2. An additional 10% duty ad valorem on approximately $200 billion worth of
imports from China implemented on 24 September 2018, and the rate of additional duty
will increase to 25% ad valorem on 1 January 2019,[13] according to the announcement
by the USTR on 21 September 2018 ( Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action:
China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property
and Innovation, (83 Fed. Reg. 47,974)).84
13 The application of this additional 25% tariff for $200 billion imported products of Chinese origin
may be postponed as per the statement by the United States after the bilateral meeting between
China and the United States on 1 December 2018 in Argentina. […]
7.38. This statement is followed by a list of legal instruments through which, among others,
"[t]he measures at issue are adopted and implemented".85
7.39. China's panel request also states that it "also concerns any modification, replacement or
amendment to the measures identified above, and any closely connected, subsequent measures."86
Importantly, attached to this clause is the following footnote 29:
Especially according to Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China 's Acts,
Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, 83 FR 47,974 (Sept. 21, 2018), the present 10% additional tariffs imposed
upon $200 billion worth of imports of Chinese origin shall be increased to 25% starting
from 1 January 2019. China notes that the implementing date of 1 January 2019 may

82 Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article 21.5 – Philippines), para. 7.808 (currently
under appeal). See also Appellate Body Reports, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 136-144; and
EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 184; and Panel Reports, Russia – Pigs, para. 7.130; Colombia – Textiles,
para. 7.10 (currently under appeal).
83 See Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 144. See also Appellate Body Report,
EC – Chicken Cuts, paras. 156-157.
84 China's panel request, p. 2. (emphasis original)
85 China's panel request, p. 2.
86 China's panel request, p. 4.

be postponed as per the statement by the United States after the bilateral meeting
between China and the United States on 1 December 2018 in Argentina.
7.40. China argues that its panel request "stated clearly and explicitly"87 that it also concerns any
modification, replacement or amendment to the measures identified therein. 88 Moreover, China
explains that it specifically referenced the planned increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2
products from 10% to 25% in its panel request and indicated that this increase might be
postponed.89
7.41. The United States insists that the Notice of 9 May 2019, which increased the rate of additional
duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25%, was a third, separate measure90. In support of this
contention, the United States notes that the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2
products from 10% to 25% was implemented through a different legal instrument and that it "had
its own, particular rationale".91 The United States explains that (i) the 10% additional duty on List 2
products was imposed "after China 'made clear – both in public statements and in government -to-
government communications – that it [would] not change its policies' and instead 'responded … by
increasing duties on U.S. exports to China'" 92; while (ii) developments in the bilateral negotiations
in May 2019, in particular China's retreat from specific commitments agreed to in earlier rounds,
resulted in the United States adopting a new measure, which definitively set a duty level of 25% on
List 2 products.93
7.42. China considers the United States' argument that the increase of the rate of additional duties
on List 2 products from 10% to 25% had its own, particular rationale to be "irrelevant to th e issue
of whether the List 2 tariffs raised from 10 percent to 25 percent are within the Panel's 'terms of
reference'".94 For China, the essence of the measure remained the same and "the United States'
'particular rationale' does not inform the Panel's analysis and should be disregarded".95
7.43. The Panel notes that China's panel request anticipates, on three occasions, the incre ase of
the rate of additional duties on List 2 products:
• The description of the second measure refers to an announcement that "the rate of additional
duty will increase to 25% ad valorem on 1 January 2019"96;
• Footnote 13 refers to a statement by the United States after the bilateral meeting between
China and the United States on 1 December 2018 in Argentina, according to which "[t]he
application of this additional 25% tariff for $200 billion imported products of Chinese origin
may be postponed"97; and
• Footnote 29 repeats that the additional duty of 10% on List 2 products "shall be increased to
25% starting from 1 January 2019" and notes that "the implementing date of 1 January 2019
may be postponed as per the statement by the United States after the bilatera l meeting
between China and the United States on 1 December 2018 in Argentina".98
7.44. Further, the legal instrument implementing the initial additional duty on List 2 products
anticipated the increase of the rate of additional duty from 10% to 25%. The Notice of

87 China's first written submission, para. 26.
88 China's panel request, p. 4.
89 China's second written submission, para. 15 (referring to China's panel request).
90 United States' first written submission, para. 33. See also United States' response to Panel question
No. 1, para. 4.
91 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 30-31.
92 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 27 (quoting the Notice of 21 September 2018
(Exhibit CHN-3)).
93 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 30.
94 China's response to Panel question No. 19, para. 6.
95 China's response to Panel question No. 19, para. 7.
96 China's panel request, p. 2 (referring to the Notice of 21 September 2018, (Exhibit CHN-3)).
97 China's panel request, p. 2, fn 13.
98 China's panel request, p. 4, fn 29.

21 September 2018 stated that "the rate of additional duty will increase to 25 percent ad valorem
on January 1, 2019".99
7.45. Moreover, the legal instrument implementing the increase of the rate of additional duties on
List 2 products from 10% to 25% (Notice of 9 May 2019) explicitly refers to the legal instrument
through which the initial additional duties of 10% were imposed on List 2 products (Notice of
21 September 2018) on multiple occasions. Moreover, on at least three occasions, the Notice of
9 May 2019 specifically states that it is adopted pursuant to a decision to modify the Notice of
21 September 2018:
• The Notice of 9 May 2019 recalls that, according to the Notice of 21 September 2018, "the
rate of additional duty was set to increase to 25 percent on January 1, 2019"100, and refers to
the two occasions on which this increase was postponed101;
• The Notice of 9 May 2019 explains that USTR "has determined to modify the action being
taken in this Section 301 investigation by increasing the rate of additional duty from 10
percent to 25 percent".102
• The Notice of 9 May also refers to USTR's "decision to modify the September 2018 action" and
reads further that USTR "has determined that it is appropriate for the rate of additional duty
under the September 2018 action to increase to 25%". 103 These references appear to
corroborate the proposition that the increase of the duty r ate from 10% to 25% is a
modification, an amendment of the original measure rather than a different measure.
7.46. These cross -references between the legal instruments implementing the initial additional
duties on List 2 products of 21 September 2018 and the increase of these additional duties on List 2
products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 point towards the existence of only one (albeit composite)
action.
7.47. The parties disagree on the meaning and implications of the Appellate Body's finding in
Chile – Price Band System that an amendment of a measure identified in a panel request may be
considered within the panel's terms of reference, even if this amendment was enacted after the
panel establishment, as long as it does not change the essence of the measure. 104 The
Appellate Body concluded in this case that in these circumstances, "it is appropriate to consider the
measure as amended".105
7.48. In the Panel's view, the examination whether an amendment changes the essence of a
measure identified in a panel request must remain circumscribed by the specific circumstances of
the case at hand and cannot rely on pre-established factors. Prior WTO adjudicators have considered
various factors, including the type of trade -restrictive effect sought (ban/additional duties) 106; the
range of products subject to duties 107; the operation of the measure and the amendment 108; their
legal implications109; the identity of their regulatory purpose 110; the proximity of design, structure
and impact111; the existence of an explicit reference in the amendment to the original measure112;
the title of the amendment113; the authority that issued the measure and the amendment114 and the

99 Notice of 21 September 2018, (Exhibit CHN-3), p. 47975.
100 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20459.
101 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20459.
102 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20459.
103 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20460.
104 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 136.
105 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 144. (emphasis original)
106 See e.g. Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37.
107 See e.g. Panel Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37; and India – Additional Import Duties,
para. 7.63; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 158. See also Panel Report,
Argentina – Financial Services, para. 7.32.
108 See e.g. Panel Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37; and EC – IT Products, para. 7.186.
109 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 158; and Panel Reports, EC – IT Products,
110 See e.g. Panel Report, Russia – Pigs, para. 7.156.
111 See e.g. Panel Report, Russia – Pigs, para. 7.156.
112 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 158.
113 See e.g. Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37.
114 See e.g. Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37.

legal basis cited 115, as well as whether the original measure remained in force "in substance". 116
Prior WTO adjudicators have also put emphasis on the question whether the complaining party has
requested findings on the measure as amended.117 In contrast, they have considered that facts such
as the "apparent" consistency or inconsistency of a measure 118, have limited bearing in this
examination.
7.49. In this case, the increase of the rate of additional duties covers the same products (List 2
products) as the second measure identified in China's panel request. The Annex of the Notice of
9 May 2019 amends the Harmonized Tariff Sched ule of the United States "to provide that the rate
of additional duties for the September 2018 action will increase to 25 percent on May 10, 2019"119,
and envisages the establishment of a process "by which interested persons may request that
particular products classified within an HTSUS subheading covered by the September 2018 action
be excluded from the additional duties".120
7.50. Further, the increase of the additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of
9 May 2019 has the same alleged legal implications as the second measure identified in China's
panel request, namely an increase of the additional duties allegedly above bindings that, according
to China, has nullified or impaired China's benefits arising from Articles I:1 and II:1 of the
GATT 1994.121 The only element that changed was the rate of the additional duty. On this point, the
Panel recalls the Appellate Body's observation in China – Raw Materials that "the fact that one
measure imposes a lesser export duty rate than another measure mi ght mean that the former is
consistent while the latter is inconsistent with a WTO Member's obligations under Article II of the
GATT 1994", but that "[i]t is not clear, however, why this fact, taken alone, would necessarily mean
that the two measures are not of the '"same essence'".122
7.51. The increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of
9 May 2019 was implemented through the same type of legal instrument (Notice published in the
Federal Register), issued by the same authority (USTR) on the same legal basis in US domestic
legislation (Section 307(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974) as the imposition of the initial additional
duties of 10% on List 2 products. The Panel also recalls its earlier observation that the two Notices
appear to be two subsequent parts of one composite action.123
7.52. In that context, the Panel notes the United States' argument that the increase of the rate of
additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% had its "own, particular rationale"124, different
from t he rationale behind the adoption of the additional duties of 10% on List 2 products. The
United States insists that "the 'fundamental or underlying' reason ( i.e. the 'rationale') behind a
Member's decision to adopt a measure"125 cannot be disentangled from the measure's "essence".
7.53. The Panel is of the view that the rationale (or the policy justification) behind the increase of
the rate of additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to 25% does not alter the nature or the
essence of the measure. The new poli cy explanation invoked by the United States – that China
retreated from specific commitments agreed to in earlier rounds of negotiation – would, to the
contrary, seem to confirm that the increase of the additional duties is intrinsically linked to the
original measure imposing additional duties of 10% on List 2 products.126

115 See e.g. Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.37.
116 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 8.45.
117 See e.g. Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.84.
118 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, fn 524.
119 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20460. (emphasis added)
120 Notice of 9 May 2019, (Exhibit CHN-4), p. 20460. (emphasis added)
121 On this point, the Panel recalls the Appellate Body's observation in US – Gambling that "[t]he DSU
provides for the 'prompt settlement' of situations where Members consider that their benefits under the
covered agreements 'are being impaired by measures taken by another Member'" and "the 'measure' must be
the source of the alleged impairment, which is in turn the effect resulting from the existence or operation of
the 'measure'." (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 121 (emphasis original))
122 Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, fn 524.
123 See para. 7.46 above.
124 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 31.
125 United States comment on China's response to Panel question No. 22, para. 18.
126 However, it is hard to see how a difference in rationale, even if proven, would change the essence of
the second measure, which still remains an imposition of additional duties above bindings.

7.54. Finally, the Panel recalls that China's panel request explicitly refers to "any modification,
replacement or amendment" of the listed measures. In other words, China's panel request
anticipates the possibility that the measures listed would be amended, and pre -emptively refers to
any such modification.
7.55. The parties disagree on the implication of the inclusion of this clause included in China's panel
request. The United States insists that the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2 products
from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 took effect after the Panel was established and ca n therefore not
be part of the Panel's terms of reference. For the United States, the phrase "any modification,
replacement or amendment to the measures identified [in the Panel request] and any closely
connected, subsequent measures" 127, does not and canno t "serve as a net for capturing future
measures of possible interest to China".128 According to the United States, the utility of this phrase
is to capture measures that came into existence before the date of panel establishment but were
perhaps unknown to China.129 The United States argues that even in the presence of such clauses,
a panel's terms of reference cannot cover any post-panel establishment changes.130
7.56. China asserts that the clause in its panel request referring to "any modification, replacement
or amendment" covers the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2 products from 10% to
25% of 9 May 2019 precisely because this increase was "clearly a modification of a measure that
China identified in both its request for consultations and panel request".131
7.57. The Panel agrees with the consistent practice of prior WTO adjudicators in considering that
broad references in panel requests – such as the phrase "any modification, replacement or
amendment" in China's panel request – authorize panels to consider within their terms of reference
legal instruments enacted after the panels' establishment.132 This is so because, otherwise, as noted
by prior WTO adjudicators, respondents could easily shield measures from scrutiny by a panel by
amending minor aspects during dispute settlement proceedings.133
7.58. In the panel's view, the increase of the rate of additional duties on List 2 products from 10%
to 25% of 9 May 2019 is an amendment that did not change the essence of the second measure
identified in China's panel request.
7.59. Therefore, the Panel considers that the increase of the rate of additional duties on Lis t 2
products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 is covered by the Panel's terms of reference, especially
since China's panel request included (i) an express reference to the anticipated increase of the rate
of additional duties on List 2 products; and (ii) a re ference to "any modification, replacement or
amendment to the measures identified above".
7.1.2.4 Conclusion on the measures covered by the Panel's terms of reference
7.60. In the Panel's view, it is appropriate to consider the increase of the rate of additional duties
on List 2 products from 10% to 25% of 9 May 2019 as an amendment of the additional duties of
10% imposed on List 2 products on 21 September 2018.
7.61. For these reasons, the Panel considers that the measures covered by its terms of reference
are:

127 China's panel request, p. 4.
128 United States' response to Panel question No. 2, para. 8.
129 United States' response to Panel question No. 2, para. 8.
130 United States' response to Panel question No. 2, para. 9. For the United States, the Appellate Body's
finding in Chile – Price Band System "at most, suggests that a measure enacted after the date of panel
establishment can serve as interpretive guidance for measures identified in a panel request, not that a panel is
authorized to render findings on such a measure". (United States' first written submission, para. 107)
131 China's first written submission, para. 26.
132 See e.g. Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.12; and EC – IT Products, para. 7.140. See
also Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 135.
133 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 144. See also Panel Reports, China – Raw
Materials, para. 7.13; and Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.83. As the Appellate Body observed in
Chile – Price Band System, "a complaining party should not have to adjust its pleadings throughout dispute
settlement proceedings in order to deal with a disputed measure as a 'moving target'." (Appellate Body Report,

a. The additional duties of 25% imposed on List 1 products on 20 June 2018; and
b. The additional duties imposed on List 2 products, at the initial rate of 10%, as imposed by
the Notice of 21 September 2018, and at the rate of 25%, as imposed by the amendment
of this measure in the Notice of 9 May 2019.
7.62. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it is appropriate for it to make findings and
recommendations with respect to the above-mentioned measures, i.e. the first measure as identified
in China's panel request (additional duties of 25% on List 1 products), and the second measure as
amended on 9 May 2019 (additional duties of 25% on List 2 products).
7.1.3 China's request that the Panel reject Exhibit US-35
7.63. On 31 March 2020, along with its comments on China's responses to the Panel questions
following the second substantive meeting, the United States filed Exhibit US-35 – a Notice issued by
the Guangdong Provincial Government on 3 February 2020, containing recommendations on
accelerating the development of the semiconductor and integrated circuit industries. 134 The
United States referred to Exhibit US-35 in support of its argument that "China continues to engage
in the unfair and immoral practices documented in the Section 301 Report".135
7.64. In a letter of 7 April 2020, China requested the Panel to reject, as untimely filed,
Exhibit US-35, submitted by the United States with its comments on China's responses to the Panel's
questions after the second substantive meeting. China argues that the submission of new evidence
or new factual assertions with a party's last submission raises due process concerns that the Panel
needs to address. China considers that the United States could have provided Exhibit US-35 earlier
in the proceedings, providing an opportunity for China to comment on it. In its letter of 7 April 2020,
China also comments that Exhibit US-35 has no legal relevance for the dispute and does not support
the United States' argument because it "fails to demonstrate the existence of any public morals
concern, let alone establish any relationship between the products targeted and public morals".136
7.65. The United States provided comments on China's request in a letter of 9 April 2020. The
United States argues that the submission of Exhibit US -35 falls within the terms of the Panel's
Working Procedures. Specifically, the United States explains that Exhibit US-35 is an element of the
United States' comments on China's response to Panel question No 23, and of the United States'
rebuttal of the specific argument presented by China in this response. The United States points out
that China has not made any assertion that the measure reflected in Exhibit US -35 does not exist,
or that the United States has mis-described the content of the measure.
7.66. The Panel recalls that, in principle, panel proceedings should progress in two stages. During
the first stage, the complaining party "should set out its case in chief, including a full presentation
of the facts on the b asis of submission of supporting evidence". 137 The second stage is "generally
designed to permit 'rebuttals' by each party of the arguments and evidence submitted by the other
parties"138. Whereas parties should, in principle, submit evidence before the first meeting, prior WTO
adjudicators have observed, however, that the submission of evidence may not always fall neatly
into one or the other of these categories.139 There is no absolute bar against the submission of new
evidence after the first substantive meeting.140
7.67. Indeed, pursuant to paragraph 5(1) of the Panel's Working Procedures,
Each party shall submit all evidence to the Panel no later than during the first
substantive meeting, except evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, or evidence

134 Exhibit US-35, p. 1.
135 United States' comments on China's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 23 and fn 40.
136 China's letter of 7 April 2020. (emphasis original)
137 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 79.
138 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 79. See also Appellate Body Reports,
139 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 149.
140 See Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.17; and Canada – Aircraft, para. 9.73.

necessary for answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other
party. Additional exceptions may be granted upon a showing of good cause.
7.68. The United States submitted Exhibit US -35 at a late stage of the proceedings on
31 March 2020 (with its comments on China's responses to the Panel's questions after the second
substantive meet ing). Given the date of adoption of the measure reflected in Exhibit US -35
(3 February 2020), the Panel notes that the United States could have submitted Exhibit US-35 at an
earlier stage of the proceedings.
7.69. The Panel's Working Procedures allow , however, for submission of "evidence necessary for
purposes of rebuttal". The United States asserts that it submitted Exhibit US -35 in support of its
rebuttal of China's views of the facts of the dispute . The United States explains that Exhibit US-35
"is particularly helpful in supporting that the measures at issue are 'necessary' within the meaning
of Article XX(a)", because it "demonstrates that China continues to adopt new measures in order to
unfairly acquire the technology of other WTO Members".141
7.70. The Panel's Working Procedures do not bar the submission of evidence such as Exhibit US-35
"for purposes of rebuttal". Moreover, the Panel is of the view that Exhibit US-35 could potentially be
relevant for its analysis of the United States' defence under Art icle XX(a) of the GATT 1994. The
Panel also notes that China has not expressed concerns with respect to the existence of the measure
reflected in Exhibit US -35, or with the accuracy of the United States' comments describing this
measure. China has rather e xpressed its concerns with the moment at which the United States
submitted Exhibit US-35. China has also explained why it considers that Exhibit US -35 does not
support the United States' arguments under Article XX(a).
7.71. The Panel agrees with the observation of the panel in China – Rare Earths that "with respect
to questions regarding the admission of evidence challenged by one party for lateness, due process
is the vitally important general principle by which panels must be guided". 142 The Panel considers
that the due process rights of both parties have been respected. China provided its comment on the
relevance of Exhibit US-35 in its letter of 7 April 2020, where China not only expressed its concerns
with the procedural aspects of the timing of the United States' submission of Exhibit US-35, but also
commented on the substance of Exhibit US-35. The United States provided its comments on China's
request in its letter of 9 April 2020.
7.72. In sum, the Panel notes that Exhibit US-35 was submitted at a late stage in the proceedings
and could have been submitted earlier. However, the Panel considers that (i) its Working Procedures
do not prohibit the submission of evidence necessary for the pur poses of rebuttal after the first
meeting; (ii) Exhibit US-35 could potentially be relevant for the Panel's analysis; and (iii ) the due
process rights of both parties have been respected. For these reasons, the Panel will consider Exhibit
US-35, to the ext ent that it finds it relevant for its analysis of the United States' defence under
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.2 Whether the measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and II:1(a) and (b)
of the GATT 1994
7.2.1 Introduction
7.73. China argues that the meas ures are inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 because they fail to accord immediately and unconditionally to certain
products originating in China and imported into the United States the advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by the United States "[w]ith respect to customs duties and charges of any kind
imposed on or in connection with" the importation of like products originating in the territories of
other WTO Members. 143 China further argues that th e measures are inconsistent with the
United States' obligation s under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 because they impose
additional duties on certain imported products originating in China in excess of the United States'
bound rates set forth in its Schedule.144

141 United States' letter of 9 April 2020.
142 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.19.
143 China's first written submission, para. 25.
144 China's first written submission, para. 25.

7.74. The United States asserts that the measures at issue are " legally justified because they are
measures 'necessary to protect public morals' within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ('GATT 1994')".145
7.75. The Panel notes that the United States has not raised arguments directly pertaining to the
alleged inconsistency of the measures with Articles I:1 and II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. The
United States' arguments pertaining to the consistency of the measures with the United States'
obligations under the GATT 1994 are focused on the justification of the measures under Article XX(a)
of the GATT 1994.
7.76. As prior WTO adjudicators have consistently observed, the initial burden in a dispute lies on
the complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of the covered
agreements on the part of the defending party. 146 A prima facie case must be based on evidence
and legal argument put forward by the complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the
claim.147 The evidence and legal argument must be "sufficient to identify the challenged measure
and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and
explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that pro vision".148 When that
prima facie case is made, "the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn
counter or refute the claimed inconsistency".149 A prima facie case is "one which, in the absence of
effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of
the complaining party presenting the prima facie case".150
7.77. The United States has not presented to the Panel any refutation of China's assertion that the
measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1 and II:1 (a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. Thus, if the Panel
finds that China has established a prima facie case of inconsistency of the measures with Articles
I:1 and II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel will be required, as a matter of law, to find that
the measures are inconsistent with these provisions.
7.78. Therefore, the Panel will assess whether China has established a prima facie case of
inconsistency of the measures with Articles I:1 and II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994.
7.2.2 Whether the measures at issue are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
7.79. China argues that the measures are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, because
the United States "fails to extend an advantage to China that it has granted to all other Members
and thereby denies China the same competitive opportunities it extends to all other Members". 151
According to China, the measures "are facially discriminatory and deny China equal competit ive
conditions with respect to the like products of other Members, and thus, are in violation of
Article I:1".152
7.80. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 reads, in relevant part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded

145 United States' first written submission, para. 13.
146 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones, para. 98; Japan – Apples, para. 157;
147 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 140 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Wool
Shirts and Blouses, DSR 1997:I, p. 323, p. 16).
148 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 141.
149 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 98.
150 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 104 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Wool
Shirts and Blouses, DSR 1997:I, p. 323, p. 14).
151 China's first written submission, para. 60.
152 China's first written submission, para. 78.

immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
7.81. Prior WTO adjudicators have traditionally required that the complainant demonstrate four
elements to establish an inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.153
7.82. First, it must be demonstrated that the measures at issue fall within the scope of application
of Article I:1. China asserts that this is the case, because the measures are "without dispute customs
duties".154 In the cont ext of China's claim under Article II:1(b), presented before its claim under
Article I:1, China argues that the additional duties are "ordinary customs duties"155, because (i) they
are "'additional ad valorem customs duties' that are calculated based on the value of the good" 156;
(ii) they are incorporated157 and form part of the HTSUS "which identifies all OCDs [ordinary customs
duties] that importers have to pay upon importation of goods into the United States"158; and
(iii) they are collected by Customs and Border Protection "in the same manner as it collects other
customs duties identified in Column 1 of the HTSUS" .159 The Panel observes that the measures
consist of additional duties imposed on products from China classified under specific subheadings of
the HTSUS. 160 Moreover, the measures modify Subchapter III of Chapter 99 of the HTSUS by
inserting new headings and new notes. 161 The Panel is of the view that the additional duties are
customs duties within the meaning of Article I:1.
7.83. Second, it must be demonstrated that the imported products at issue are "like" products
within the meaning of Article I:1. China explains that " [e]ach Chinese product subject to the
Section 301 tariffs is a 'like' product from other Members not subject to the additional duties within
the meaning of Article I:1"162, because the measures "discriminate against Chinese products based
solely on the fact that the products originate from China" .163 The Panel notes that prior WTO
adjudicators have consistently held that where a measure provides for a distinction based exclusively
on origin, there will or can be products that are the same in all respects except for origin and,
accordingly, "likeness" can be presumed. 164 The additional duties at issue apply only to products
"from China"165 and, therefore, provide for a distinction based exclusively on origin. For that reason,
any product from China subject to additional duties can be presumed to be "like" any product from
other WTO Members that is not subject to additional duties.
7.84. Third, it must be demonstrated that the measures confer an "advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity" on a product originating in the territory of any country. China argues that applying
additional duties only to China and not to other WTO Members confers an "ad vantage" on the
products originating in all other WTO Members except China, because the measures "deny China the
advantage of equal treatment in conformity with the US bound tariffs". 166 The Panel observes that
"advantages" in the sense of Article I:1 are t hose that create "more favourable competitive
opportunities" or affect the commercial relationship between products of different origins. 167 The
United States imposes additional duties on products from China, whereas identical products from
other WTO Members are not subject to additional duties. In other words, while products from other
WTO Members are subject to general rates of duty, identical products from China are subject to

153 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.86.
154 China's first written submission, para. 62.
155 China's first written submission, para. 41.
156 China's first written submission, para. 37.
157 China's first written submission, para. 38.
158 China's first written submission, para. 41.
159 China's first written submission, para. 41.
160 Notice of 20 June 2018, (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28710; and Notice of 21 September 2018,
(Exhibit CHN-3), p.47974.
161 Notice of 20 June 2018, (Exhibit CHN-2), Annex A; and Notice of 21 September 2018,
(Exhibit CHN-3), Annex A.
162 China's first written submission, para. 66.
163 China's first written submission, para. 66.
164 See e.g. Panel Reports, Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7.355-7.356; and US – Poultry (China),
paras. 7.424–7.432. For an application of this "presumption of likeness" in the field of trade in services, see
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.38
165 Notice of 20 June 2018, (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28710; and Notice of 21 September 2018, (Exhibit
CHN-3), p.47974.
166 China's first written submission, para. 73.
167 Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.341, quoting Panel Report, EC – Bananas III,

additional duties and to the general duty rates. 168 The Panel is of the view tha t the United States
confers an "advantage" on products originating in all other WTO Members except China.
7.85. Fourth, it must be demonstrated that the advantage accorded is not extended "immediately"
and "unconditionally" to "like" products originating in the territory of all WTO Members. China argues
that "the United States has failed to confer immediately and unconditionally the advantage of MFN
status on products originating in China that it confers to like products originating in all other Members
after the additional duties on the products identified in List 1 and List 2 went into effect on
6 July 2018 and 24 September 2018, respectively".169 The Panel observes that the United States
imposes additional duties on products from China, while products from other WTO Members are not
subject to additional duties. Thus, the Panel is of the view that the United States does not extend to
China "immediately" or "unconditionally" the identified "advantage" accorded to other
WTO Members.
7.86. The Panel concludes that China has established a prima facie case that the measures are
inconsistent with Article I:1, because China has demonstrated that the additional duties apply only
to products from China and thus fail to accord to products originating in China an advantage granted
to the like product originating in all other WTO Members. The United States has not presented to
the Panel any refutation of China's assertion that the measures are inconsistent with Article I:1.
7.87. For the above reasons, the Panel finds tha t the measures are inconsistent with Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994.
7.2.3 Whether the measures at issue are inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994
7.88. China argues that the measures impose additional duties on certain products from China that
are in excess of the rates to which the United States bound itself in its Schedule, and thus, "are in
flagrant violation of Article II:1(a) and (b)".170
7.89. Article II:1 reads, in relevant parts:
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party,
which are the p roducts of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms,
conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs
duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those
directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the
importing territory on that date.
7.90. The Panel agrees with prior WTO adjudicators that Article II:1(b) prohibits a specific kind of
practice "that will always be inconsistent with pa ragraph (a)".171 For that reason, the Panel begins
by assessing whether the measures are inconsistent with Article II:1(b). If the Panel finds that the
United States has applied customs duties in excess of those provided for in its Schedule, inconsistent
with the requirements of Article II:1(b), this would also constitute "less favourable" treatment
inconsistent with the requirements of Article II:1(a).

168 Notice of 20 June 2018, (Exhibit CHN-2), Annex A, note 20; and Notice of 21 September 2018,
(Exhibit CHN-3), Annex A, note 20(e).
169 China's first written submission, para. 77.
170 China's first written submission, para. 33.
171 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45. See also Panel Reports,

7.91. First, China argues that the additional duties are "ordinary customs duties" .172 China further
asserts that, even if the Panel were to conclude that the additional duties are not "ordinary customs
duties", the measures would constitute "other duties or charges" imposed inconsistently with
Article II:1(b), "because no such 'other duty or charge' was recorded in the US Schedule consistently
with the Understanding on Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994".173
7.92. The Panel recalls its assessment that the additional duties are customs duties within the
meaning of Article I:1. The Panel is also of the view that the additional duties are "ordinary customs
duties" within the meaning of Article II:1(b).
7.93. Second, China argues that the measures are "in excess" of the duties to which the
United States bound itself in its Schedule of Concessions and Commitments (Schedule)174, because
the duties are imposed "in addition to any other duties, fees or charges that may also be due". 175
China asserts that the United States' bound rates in its Schedule are "virtually the same" as the MFN
rates identified in Column 1 of the HSUS 176, and for that reason "any additional duties imposed in
addition to the duties identified in Column 1 of the HTSUS will result in applied duties above the rate
notified in its Schedule".177
7.94. The Panel notes that the tariff binding in the United States' Schedule provides an upper limit
on the amount of duty that may be imposed.178 China has provided evidence that "duties assessed
on every Chinese product identified in Lists [ sic] 1 and List 2 as a result of the imposition of the
Section 301 tariffs are, with regard to every product, in excess of the rates provided for in the US
Schedule".179 The United States has not provided any evidence or argument to rebut China's prima
facie case on that point. The Panel, therefore, is of the view that the additional duties composing
the measures at issue are in excess of the duties to which the United States bound itself in its
Schedule, inconsistent with Article II:1(b).
7.95. China further argues that, because the measures accord imports from China "less favourable"
treatment than that provided for in the United States' Schedule, they are also incons istent with
Article II:1(a).180 The Panel recalls its observation that a practice prohibited under Article II:1(b) will
always be inconsistent with Article II:1(a).181 The application by the United States of customs duties
in excess of those provided for in the United States' Schedule, inconsistent with Article II:1(b),
constitutes "less favourable" treatment in the sense of Article II:1(a). Therefore, the Panel is of the
view that the additional duties accord imports from China "less favourable treatment" th an that
provided in the United States' Schedule, inconsistent with Article II.
7.96. In sum, China has established a prima facie case that the measures are inconsistent with
Article II:1(b), because China has demonstrated that the additional duties are ordinary customs
duties applied in excess of the rates to which the United States bound itself in its Schedule. China
has also established a prima facie case that the measures are inconsistent with Article II:1(a),
because China has demonstrated that the additional duties accord imports from China "less
favourable treatment" than that provided in the United States' Schedule. The United States has not
refuted China's assertion that the measures are inconsistent with Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b).
7.97. For the above reasons , the Panel finds that the measures are prima facie inconsistent with
Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994.
7.2.4 Conclusion
7.98. In sum, the Panel concludes that the measures at issue are prima facie inconsistent with
Article I:1, because the additional duties apply only to products from China and thus fail to accord

173 China's first written submission, para. 45.
174 China's first written submission, paras. 48-50, referring to United States Schedule of Concessions
and Commitments (Exhibit CHN-1).
175 China's first written submission, para. 50.
176 China's first written submission, para. 51.
177 China's first written submission, para. 52, referring to Exhibits CHN-15 and CHN-17.
178 See Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 46.
179 China's first written submission, para. 53, referring to Exhibit CHN-17.
180 China's first written submission, para. 56.
181 See para. 7.90 above.

to products originating in China an advantage granted to the like product originating in all other
WTO Members. The measures at issue are also prima facie inconsistent with Articles II:1(a) and (b),
because the additional duties are ordinary customs duties applied in excess of the rates to which the
United States bound itself in its Schedule and accord imports from China "less favourable treatment"
than that provided in the United States' Schedule.
7.99. The Panel will now assess the United States' argument that any inconsistency of the measures
with provisions of the GATT 1994 is justified as necessary to protect US public morals pursuant to
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.3 The United States' defence under Article XX of the GATT 1994
7.3.1 Introduction – the nature and purpose of Article XX of the GATT 1994
7.100. The United States asserts that any inconsistency of the measures at issue with provisions of
the GATT 1994 is justified as necessary to protect US public morals pursuant to Article XX(a) of the
GATT 1994. This is because, according to the United States, China's acts, policies, and practices
addressed in the relevant Section 301 Report amount to "state -sanctioned theft and
misappropriation of U.S. technology, intellectual property, and commercial secrets"182 which violates
the public morals prevailing in the United States.183
7.101. China considers that the United States has failed to establish the existence of a public morals
objective184, as the measures at issue "have nothing to do with protecting alleged 'public morals' in
the United States".185 According to China, the United States "seeks to stretch the narrow parameters
of Article XX(a) to encompass blatantly coercive economic objectives".186
7.102. Article XX(a), together with the introductory clause (chapeau) of Article XX, reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals; …
7.103. WTO Members can resort to Article XX as an exception to justify measures that would
otherwise be inconsistent with their GATT 1994 obligations. Specifically, the subparagraphs of
Article XX list various categories of policies that WTO Members may invoke to justify the potential
inconsistency of their (challenged) measures with the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994.187
7.104. As prior WTO adjudicators have consistently noted, the exceptions of Article XX may be
invoked "as a matter of legal right".188 In other words, WTO Members have the legal right to invoke
the policies listed in the subparagraphs of Article XX to justify inconsistencies with their obligations
under the GATT 1994, precisely because these policies have been recognized as important and
legitimate in character. 189 Thus, Article XX allows WTO Members to adopt measures , which are a
priori WTO-inconsistent if they do so in order to protect certain values or provide for certain policies.
This legal right is subject to the challenged WTO -inconsistent measures complying with the
requirements of the relevant provisions of Article XX. Because of the importance that WTO Members

182 United States' second written submission, para. 22.
183 United States' second written submission, para. 22. See also United States' first written submission,
para. 74.
184 China's second written submission, para. 25.
185 China's opening statement at the first meeting, para. 6.
186 China's second written submission, para. 77.
187 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Gasoline, p. 17 (DSR 1996:I, 3); and Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes, para. 5.94.
188 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22 (DSR 1996:I, 3). See also Appellate Body
Report, US – Shrimp, para. 156.
189 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 121.

accord to this protection, the Panel recalls that the right to invoke the exceptions of Article XX is
"not to be rendered illusory".190
7.105. At the same time, the exercise by a WTO Member of its right to invoke the exceptions of
Article XX, if abused or misused, will erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights of other
WTO Members. For that reason, each of the subparagraphs of Article XX should be seen as a limited
and conditional exception from the substantive obligations contained in the other provisions of the
GATT 1994.191 Thus, the burden lies on the respondent invoking the defence of Article XX to prove
that its challenged measure falls within the scope of the invoked subparagraph(s), and meets the
requirements of the chapeau.192
7.106. It is generally accepted that the interpretation and application of Article XX should be
informed by the need to mai ntain a balance between the right of a WTO Member to invoke an
exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the
other WTO Members. 193 In other words, while the respondent may invoke the exceptions of
Article XX as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied so as to frustrate or defeat the legal
obligations of the holder of the right under the GATT's substantive rules.194 The balance between the
right of a WTO Member to invoke the Article XX exceptions and its obligation to respect the rights of
other WTO Members under the substantive provisions of the GATT 1994 is not fixed and unchanging
but moves depending on the type and shape of the challenged measures and the facts in each
case.195
7.107. Traditionally, panels have analysed claims of justification under Article XX using a two-tiered
analysis: panels have first examined whether the measure at issue provisionally falls under one of
the exceptions listed in the subparagraphs of Article XX, before considering whether the application
of the challenged measure satisfies the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.196
7.108. The Panel will therefore first assess if the United States' measures, found to be inconsistent
with the GATT 1994, are provisionally justified under subparagraph (a). If it finds that this is the
case, the Panel will consider whether the United States has applied the measures consistently with
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
7.3.2 Whether the measures are provisionally justifie d under Article XX(a) of the
GATT 1994
7.3.2.1 Introduction
7.109. To provisionally justify a challenged measure under one of the Article XX subparagraphs, a
responding Member must establish that the challenged measure addresses the interest specified in
that paragraph, and that there is "a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest
protected".197
7.110. Prior WTO adjudicators have considered that the first step under Article XX(a) is to determine
whether the claimed policy is a "public morals" objective within the meaning of Article XX(a). They
have then assessed whether the measure is "designed" to protect that public morals objective. 198
Finally, the text of Article XX(a) refers to measures "necessary" to protect public morals, which

190 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 156.
191 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 157.
192 See, e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14 (DSR 1997:I, 323); and
US – Gasoline, p. 22 (DSR 1996:I, 3); and Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.177-8.178.
193 See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 156; and Panel Report, US – Gambling, paras. 6.452
and 6.575.
194 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22 (DSR 1996:I, 3).
195 See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 159; and Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles,
para. 7.286.
196 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Gasoline, p. 22 (DSR 1996:I, p. 3); Dominican Republic –
Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 64; US – Shrimp, paras. 118-120; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 139;
and Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.67; and Panel Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.288; Brazil – Taxation,
197 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Gambling, para. 292).

envisages a process of "weighing and balancing" of a series of factors and, in most cases, a
comparison between the challenged measure and reasonably available WTO -consistent alternative
measures.199
7.111. The Panel considers that its analysis under subparagraph (a) of Article XX is a holistic
exercise, which involves an overall assessment of whether the United States has demonstrated that
the challenged measures are necessary to protect its invoked public morals, although this overall
assessment will be based on the Panel 's interpretation of each element of Article XX(a) and on its
application to the specific facts of this dispute. Using this holistic approach, the Panel will analyse
the elements and requirements of subparagraph (a) together, before reaching its ultimate conclusion
on whether the United States has demonstrated that the WTO-inconsistent measures are necessary
to protect its invoked public morals. The Panel will refrain from reaching any intermediate conclusion
before completing the entire analysis. 200 Only such a holistic approach guarantees that the nature
and purpose of Article XX(a) are not frustrated.
7.112. In the following sections, we will therefore assess (i) whether the United States has raised
a public morals objective within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994; (ii) whether the
measures are designed to protect the public morals objective as invoked by the United States; and
(iii) whether the measures are necessary to protect this objective. Each step of this analysis will
allow us to continue our assessment towards an overall conclusion whether the challenged measures
are "necessary to protect public morals" within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.3.2.2 Whether the measures concern a public morals objective within the meaning of
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994
7.3.2.2.1 The concept of "public morals" under Article XX(a)
7.113. The United States asserts that the measures at issue protect public morals within the
meaning of Article XX(a) because they have been adopted to "'obtain the elimination' of conduct
that violates U.S. standards of rights and wrong, namely China 's unfair trade acts, policie s, and
practices".201 In support of its argument, the United States has submitted evidence of several
domestic instruments that reflect prevailing US "standards of right and wrong" and outlaw some
(although not all) of the Chinese practices documented in th e Section 301 Report. 202 The
United States contends that acts, policies, and practices of China referred to in the Section 301
Report violate US "standards of right and wrong", in particular the prohibition of theft, extortion,
cyber-enabled theft and cyber -hacking, economic espionage and the misappropriation of trade
secrets, anti-competitive behaviour, as well as the regulation of governmental takings of property
(hereafter referred to as "the public morals as invoked by the United States").
7.114. China rejects the characterization of the United States' concerns as "public morals" within
the meaning of Article XX(a) and argues that the United States has failed to establish the existence
of a valid "public morals" objective. 203 According to China, the Unite d States' reference to public
morals is "nothing but a post hoc attempt to justify a purely economic objective" 204 and that the

199 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, paras. 5.71-5.73 and 5.77; India – Solar Cells,
para. 5.59; and Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 162-164.
200 The Panel does not consider itself obliged, in every instance, to make an explicit intermediate finding
that a party has met its burden to establish a prima facie case in respect of each element of a particular claim
or defence (see e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 134; Korea – Dairy, para. 145;
Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 135; and China – Rare Earths, para. 5.141).
201 United States' first written submission, para. 69 (fn omitted). See also United States' second written
submission, para. 20.
202 United States' first written submission, paras. 74 and 75; United States' second written submission,
paras. 22-31; and United States' response to Panel question No. 16(a) and (b), paras. 71-72.
203 China's second written submission, Section V(A)(2)(a) and para. 33.
204 China's second written submission, para. 28. With respect to China's argument that the justification
raised by the United States is post hoc, the United States argues that the reasoning behind these measures
was not adopted only at the time of these proceedings. Instead, the United States submits that the
Section 301 investigation – including public notice of the issues under investigation, a full notice and comment
period, and public hearings – the Section 301 Report itself, as well as the notices imposing the measures, state
that "the tariff measures were adopted to obtain the elimination of the unfair policies identified in the report."
(United States' comments on China's response to Panel question No. 18, para. 12) The United States also
argues that there is no rule or concept that the factual and legal argumentation provided by a party asserting
an Article XX justification during a dispute is post hoc and inadmissible. According to the United States, "(i)f

objective of the measures at issue is not to protect public morals, but to reduce China's exports to
the United States and address the US trade deficit.205
7.115. The Panel begins by noting that the text of Article XX(a) does not provide a definition for the
term "public morals". Dictionary definitions refer to the word "public" as "of or pertaining to the
people as a whole; belonging to, a ffecting, or concerning the community or nation" 206 and to the
word "morals" as "habits of life with regard to right and wrong conduct". 207 Therefore, the ordinary
meaning of the term "public morals" refers to a set of habits of life relating to right and wr ong
conduct (i.e. societal values) that belong to, affect or concern a community or a nation. This
understanding accords with prior panels which have considered that the term "public morals"
denotes "standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or
nation".208
7.116. To the extent that the concept of public morals pertains to a group of individuals (a
community or nation), the content and scope of this concept may vary from one WTO Member to
another, influenced by each Member's syst ems and scales of values. Prior WTO adjudicators have
similarly observed that the content of the concept of public morals for WTO Members can vary in
time and space, depending on a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and
religious values.209
7.117. Although the Panel must take into account how the responding Member articulat es the
measure's objective, the Panel is not bound by that characterization but must make an objective
and independent assessment of the measure's objective, taking into account all the evidence
available to it. 210 The panel in EC – Seal Products explained its task of determining whether the
challenged measures addressed a public morals concern in the following manner:
[T]he question of whether a meas ure aims to address public morals relating to a
particular concern in the society of a regulating Member requires, in our view, an
assessment of two issues: first, whether the concern in question indeed exists in that
society; and, second, whether such concern falls within the scope of "public morals" as
"defined and applied" by a regulating Member "in its territory, according to its own
systems and scales of values".211
7.118. Prior WTO adjudicators have found the following policies as pertaining to public morals :
prevention of underage gambling and the protection of pathological gamblers 212; restricting
prohibited content in cultural goods, such as violence or pornographic content, as well as protection
of Chinese culture and traditional values 213; protecting animal welfare 214; combatting money
laundering215; or bridging the digital divide within society and promoting social inclusion.216

this were the case, no Member could meet a burden of establishing a justification under any Article XX
exception." (United States' comments on China's response to Panel question No. 18, para. 13)
205 China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 23-27; China's second written
submission, para. 28; and China's comment on the United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 2.
In support of this contention, China refers to a series of statements by United States' officials "regarding the
economic objectives of the measures at issue". (China's second written submission, para. 28, referring to
China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 23-31)
206 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 2393.
207 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 1829.
208 Panel Reports, US – Gambling, paras. 6.465; China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,
para. 7.520.
209 Panel Reports, US – Gambling, para. 6.461; China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,
para. 7.520.
210 See in this respect Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.480.
211 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.383.
213 Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.763.
214 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.410.
215 Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, paras. 7.338-7.339.
216 Panel Report, Brazil – Taxation, paras. 7.521 and 7.568.

7.119. It is against this background that the Panel will analyse the extent to which the United States
has raised a public morals objective within the meaning of Article XX(a).
7.3.2.2.2 Whether an explicit reference to public morals in the legal instruments
implementing the measures is required
7.120. At the outset, the Panel notes that China argues that the absence of a reference to public
morals in the measures at issue is relevant evidence proving that the measures at issue do not have
a public morals objective.217
7.121. The United States considers that a measure need not include an explicit reference to public
morals to be justifiable under Article XX(a), but that in any event the measures at issue "expressly
mention an objective falling within the scope of 'public morals' in the United States – namely, the
elimination of the unfair trade acts, policies, and practices documented in the Section 301 Report".218
7.122. Several third parties have also expressed views on this issue. Brazil considers that "while
express mention of public morals objectives may be significant", the Panel should engage in an
"assessment of the content, structure and expected opera tion of the measure itself" to determine
whether it is designed to protect public morals. 219 The European Union also notes that "whether or
not the text of the statute that provides for the measure, or its legislative history, mention[s] the
invoked public moral, while not dispositive, is directly relevant in order to identify the genuine
objective of the measure".220
7.123. The Panel acknowledges that the measures do not contain specific references to the societal
concerns underlying the United States' decision to impose additional ad valorem duties (additional
duties) on imports from China. The measures refer, however, t o the United States Trade
Representative's determination in the Section 301 Report that certain Chinese acts, policies and
practices are "unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce". 221 The
United States' submissions also refer to C hina's "conduct" documented in the Section 301 Report
and the determinations of the Section 301 Report indicating US concern with China's documented
conduct.222
7.124. The Panel observes that the Section 301 investigation, and the resulting Section 301 Report,
are said to relate to "longstanding" 223 concerns in the United States about "a wide range of unfair
practices of the Chinese government […] related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and
innovation".224
7.125. The Panel does not consider that for a measure to fall within the scope of the public morals
exception of Article XX(a), the legal instruments implementing the measure must expressly mention
a public morals objective. The Panel agrees with prior WTO adjudicators that measures that do not
expressly refer to "public morals" may nevertheless be found to have a relationship with public

217 China's response to Panel question No. 13(a), para. 27.
218 United States response to Panel question No. 13(a), para. 55.
219 Brazil's response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, para. 3. See also Brazil's integrated
executive summary, para. 8.
220 European Union's response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, para. 3.
221 See Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711; and Notice of 21 September 2018 (Exhibit
CHN-3), p. 49794.
222 United States' first written submission, paras. 70-77 and United States' second written submission,
paras. 20-31. The Section 301 Report is the result of a US domestic investigation that preceded the adoption of
the measures. The Panel observes that the Section 301 Report does not specifically refer to an objective
related to "public morals". The Section 301 Report also addresses issues not related to the United States'
invoked public morals objective. In particular, the Section 301 Report covers aspects of China's industrial policy
that do not seem to be directly related to the norms of "right and wrong" invoked by the United States. These
include China's outbound investment (Part IV of the Section 301 Report), China's alleged talent acquisition
efforts (part VI.5 of the Section 301 Report), or China's Anti-Monopoly Law (part VI.5.3 of the Section 301
Report, in which part the United States appears to take issue with provisions on intellectual property rights that
are not specific to China – see USTR, Special 301 Report (April 2019)). In addition, the Section 301 Report
mentions practices by China that concern countries other than the United States, such as "acquisition of
mineral deposits and other natural resource assets [in] Africa and Latin America" and "technology-focused
investments [in] the United States and Europe". (Section 301 Report, p. 62)
223 Section 301 Report (Exhibit US-1), p. 4.
224 Section 301 Report (Exhibit US-1), p. 4.

morals following an assessment of their design, their content, structure and expected operation. 225
For that reason, the Panel does not consider the absence of a reference to public morals in the US
measures at issue to be determinative to the outcome of the United States' defence.
7.126. The Panel will therefore assess the United States' invocation of a public morals objective.
7.3.2.2.3 The public morals objective invoked by the United States
7.127. The United States asserts that China's actions documented in the Section 301 Report violate
prevailing US "standards of right and wrong" as reflected in US domestic legislation. 226 The
United States has submitted as evidence several domestic instruments that reflect prevail ing US
"standards of right and wrong" and that outlaw some (although not all) of the Chinese practices
documented in the Section 301 Report.227 Specifically, the United States refers to:
• state and federal laws, under which the act of "theft" is universally deemed a criminal
offence228;
• US laws that generally prohibit extortion229;
• US laws that criminalize cyber-enabled theft and cyber-hacking230;
• US laws that criminalize economic espionage and the misappropriation of trade secrets
(including though acts of "bribery" or "extortion")231;
• US laws against anti -competitive behaviour (in particular the prohibition and
criminalization of monopolization) 232, which reflect "fundamental concepts of fair
competition and fair play"233, and the breach of which the United States views as "a threat
to the 'preservation of our democratic political and social institutions'"234;
• US laws on contracts and torts235;
• US laws on patents236; and
• civil and criminal laws on, and governmental takings, of property.237
7.128. The United States explains that the economic concerns underlying some of these legal
instruments are related to notions of fair competition and fair play 238, and that the United States
does not view unfair competitive practices merely as a detriment to business and innovation, but
also as a threat to the preservation of its democratic political and social institutions. 239 The

225 See Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.69; and EC – Seal Products, para. 5.144.
226 United States' first written submission, para. 74; and United States' second written submission,
para. 22.
227 United States' first written submission, para. 74; United States' second written submission,
paras. 22-31; and United States' to Panel's question No. 16(a) and (b), paras. 71-72.
228 California Code, Penal Code § 484 (General Theft Statute) (Exhibit US–12); Texas Penal Code,
Title 7, Chapter 31 (Offenses against Property – Theft) (Exhibit US–13); 18 U.S.C. Chapter 31 (Embezzlement
and Theft) (Exhibit US–14).
229 18 U.S.C Chapter 41 (Extortion and threats) (Exhibit US-30).
230 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) (Exhibit US–16), in particular 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(a)(4).
231 Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832) (Exhibit US–17), Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (1985) (Exhibit US–18).
232 Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5 U.S.C § 45 (Exhibit US–20); and Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Exhibit US-31).
233 United States' second written submission, para. 31.
234 United States' second written submission, para. 25 (quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (Justice Hugo Black) (Exhibit US-32)).
235 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205 (Exhibit US–22); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A.
236 35 U.S.C. §200 (Patents Policy and objective) (Exhibit US–21).
237 United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
238 United States' second written submission, para. 31.
239 United States' second written submission, para. 25.

United States also explains that it "imposes constraints on behavior based on national concepts of
right and wrong to ensure market -oriented outcomes".240 According to the United States, China
"uses coercion and subterfuge to steal or otherwise improperly acquire intellectual property, trade
secrets, technology, and confide ntial business information from U.S companies with the aim of
advantaging Chinese companies and achieving China's industrial policy goals."241 The United States,
considers that these acts, policies, and practices relating to intellectual property and techno logy
transfer violate these US standards of right and wrong and thus implicate US public morals within
the meaning of Article XX(a).242
7.129. China dismisses the United States' reference to its domestic legal instruments stating that
"the fact that a Member has c riminalized certain conduct does not, by itself, provide sufficient
evidence of a public morals objective". 243 China also considers that the United States has not
demonstrated that each of the referenced domestic laws embody alleged public morals that are
implicated by China's practices at issue.244
7.130. Several third parties have expressed views on what can constitute a public morals policy for
WTO Members. Australia underline s that the discretion accorded to WTO Members in determining
what constitutes public morals "is not without some limitations".245 Singapore states that "Members
must be afforded a certain degree of domestic policy space to define their own public morals
objectives, having regard to their specific cultural, religious and other social contexts"246, a discretion
that is limited by the requirements set out in the design and the necessity tests. 247 The
European Union does not take a position on whether the standards of conduct invoked by the
United States may, in the abstract, qualify as "public morals" within the meaning of Article XX(a)248,
but recalls "the broad deference accorded to each Member in view of defining its own public moral
standards".249 Japan asserts that each WTO Member may have its own concepts of public morals
and Members must be afforded a degree of policy space to define their own public moral
objectives.250 Japan also confirms that "a Member's domestic criminal law provides relevant evidence
for evaluating what might constitute a 'public moral' in that Member". 251 Chinese Taipei warns the
Panel against using "an overly restrictive interpretive approach when reviewing a Member's
invocation of Article XX(a)".252
7.131. The Panel agrees with prior WTO adjudicators that "ascertaining the precise content and
scope of morality in a given society may not be an easy task". 253 WTO Members should have some
scope to define and apply for themselves the concept of public morals in their respective territories,
according to their own systems and scales of values, and the right to determine the level of
protection that they consider appropriate. 254 WTO Members are thus afforded a certain degree of
deference in defining the scope of public morals with respect to the values prevailing in their societies
at a given time.255 Nevertheless, it remains for each WTO Member invoking an Article XX(a) defence

240 United States' second written submission, para. 26.
241 United States' first written submission, para. 74. (emphasis original)
242 United States' first written submission, para. 77. The United States asserts that, even after the
adoption of the measures, China continues to engage in the practices documented in the Section 301 Report.
(United States' comments on China's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 23; and Exhibit US-35).
243 China's second written submission, para. 32. See also China's response to Panel question No. 11,
para. 22.
244 China's second written submission, para. 27.
245 Australia's third-party statement, para. 15; and integrated executive summary, para. 12.
246 Singapore's third-party statement, para. 7; and integrated executive summary, para. 7.
247 Singapore's third-party statement, para. 8; and integrated executive summary, para. 8.
248 European Union's third-party statement, para. 12; and integrated executive summary, para. 10.
249 European Union's integrated executive summary, para. 13
250 Japan's third-party response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, para. 8. See also Japan's
integrated executive summary, para. 3.
251 Japan's third-party statement, para. 10 and integrated executive summary, para. 4.
252 Chinese Taipei's third-party statement and integrated executive summary, para. 2.
253 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.409.
254 See Panel Reports, US – Gambling, para. 6.461; China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,
para. 7.520.
255 Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.380; Colombia – Textiles, paras. 7.301 and 7.338; and
Brazil – Taxation, para. 7.520. See also Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.199.

to establish that the invoked policy objective at issue is a public morals objecti ve according to its
value system.256
7.132. The Panel notes that the parties have engaged in discussions on whether the Article XX
exceptions, and specifically the concept of public morals in Article XX(a), could encompass economic
concerns.
7.133. China argues that the public morals objectives asserted by the United States, "as a matter
of law, do not fall within the scope of Article XX(a)"257. This is because, according to China, the scope
of Article XX(a) is limited to non -economic concerns.258 Generally, China consi ders that "interests
within the realm of trade liberalization are not covered by Article XX".259 Specifically, China argues
that the term "public morals" in Article XX(a) does not encompass economic policy concerns. 260
According to China, "a concern for so -called 'unfair conduct', including a lack of respect for fair
competition and innovation" does not constitute a matter of public morals261 and Article XX(a) does
not allow WTO Members to "circumvent their WTO obligations by interpreting Article XX(a) to
encompass so -called 'unfair' trade, a topic which is addressed by several of the covered
agreements".262
7.134. The United States considers that the concept of public morals in Article XX(a) could relate to
issues of economic concern 263, and the phrase "public morals" cannot be read to exclude any
concerns that are economic in nature. 264 According to the United States, a measure can have both
moral and economic features 265 and "some types of conduct or behaviour would appear to be
immoral precisely because of the economic harms that result from such conduct".266
7.135. The Panel understands the parties' disagreement in this respect to be twofold: first, the
parties disagree whether the exceptions set out in Article XX can pertain to economic interests and
concerns; second, the parties disagree whether the term "public morals" can encompass economic
concerns, and in particular concerns pertaining to unfair competition.
7.136. On the first point, the Panel observes that several of the subparagraphs in Article XX refer
to the protection of interests that involve, directly or indirectly, a clear economic dimension, including
the importation or exportation of gold or silver (Article XX(c)), the protection of intellectual property
rights (Article XX(d))267, price stabilization efforts (Article XX(i)) and products in short supply
(Article XX(j)).
7.137. On the second point, public morals objectives may frequently have inseparable economic
aspects. For example, prior panels have recognized that measures targeting money laundering,
bridging the digital divide or promoting social inclusion and fraud prevention were measures related
to public morals. In the Panel's view, a measure may be found to pursue a public morals objective
even if it has economic aspects.268 Moreover, often the pursuit of non-economic concerns might lead
to the adoption of measures that have economic effects – for instance, a restriction of imports so as
to protect against, for example, risks to health has a clear economic effect and directly affects trade.

256 See Panel Reports, Brazil – Taxation, para. 7.558.
257 China's second written submission, para. 29.
258 China's second written submission, para. 31.
259 China's second written submission, para. 30.
260 China's second written submission, paras. 30-31.
261 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 21. See also China's second written submission,
para. 27.
262 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 21.
263 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
264 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 29.
265 United States' response to Panel question No. 13(a), para. 56.
266 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 31.
267 See also GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff Act, paras. 5.22-5.35, which considered the
relevance of United States' laws protecting intellectual property rights in relation to the exception in
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1947.
268 The Panel recalls, on that point, the example the United States presented at the second meeting of
the act of stealing money from a bank which brings about economic harm and can, at the same time, be
considered immoral, because it is contrary to standards of wrong (see United States' opening statement at the
second meeting of the Panel, para. 31).

7.138. The United States has pointed to several domestic legal instruments that reflect pr evailing
US "standards of right and wrong" and outlaw some (although not all) of the Chinese practices
documented in the Section 301 Report. In this connection, the Panel also recalls that prior WTO
adjudicators have highlighted that WTO Members must be afforded a certain degree of deference in
defining the scope of public morals with respect to various values prevailing in their societies at a
given time. Further, the Panel notes that most third parties confirm that broad deference should be
accorded to WTO Members in defining their own public moral standards.269 In addition, certain third
parties express views on the specific kinds of acts, policies, and practices at issue in this dispute.
According to Japan, " no country should require or pressure technology transfer from foreign
companies to domestic companies ".270 Chinese Taipei "share[s] the same concerns as the
United States, and believe[s] it is important for these issues to be taken into account by the
Panel".271
7.139. The Panel takes note of the conc erns expressed by certain third parties and by China that
the discretion accorded to WTO Members to define the scope of "public morals" with respect to
various values in their societies should not be "without its limits"272 and that Article XX(a) "does not
allow [WTO Members] to circumvent their WTO obligations by interpreting Article XX(a) to
encompass so-called 'unfair' trade".273 The Panel reaffirms its view that, in the present dispute, only
a holistic approach to the various elements of Article XX(a) would allow it to strike the necessary
balance between the right to invoke the Article XX(a) exception and the rights of other WTO Members
under the substantive rules of the GATT.
7.140. The Panel also emphasizes that at this stage of its analysis it is considering the issue of the
public morals objectives invoked by the United States, and not the further questions that need to be
answered under Article XX of the relationship of such public morals to the measures challenged in
this dispute. Against this background, the Panel concludes that the "standards of right and wrong"
invoked by the United States (including norms against theft, misappropriation and unfair
competition) could, at least at a conceptual level, be covered by the term "public morals" within the
meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.141. Accordingly, in continuing its analysis, the Panel will now consider whether the challenged
measures are designed to protect the public morals objective as invoked by the United States.
7.3.2.3 Whether the measures are designed to protect the public morals objective as
invoked by the United States
7.142. The United States considers that Article XX(a) does not contain any textual requirement to
show that a measure is "designed to" protect public morals.274 The United States asserts, however,
that, in any event, "there is a clear relationship between the U.S. measures at issue and the objective
of protecting public morals"275, and that the measures at issue satisfy the "design" requirement of
Article XX(a).
7.143. China considers that the measures are not designed to protect public morals, mainly because
they are not designed to apply to "goods that embody content or conduct offensive to public morals
in the United States".276 According to China, the measures at issue are "underpinned by economic
concerns and are not desig ned to shield U.S. public morals from imported goods that contain
offensive content or embody offensive conduct".277

269 See Australia's third-party statement, para. 15; Australia's integrated executive summary, para. 12;
European Union's integrated executive summary, para. 13; Japan's third-party response to Panel question
and Singapore's integrated executive summary, para. 7.
270 Japan's third-party statement, para. 4. See also Japan's integrated executive summary, para. 1.
271 Chinese Taipei's third-party statement and integrated executive summary, para. 4.
272 Singapore's third-party statement, para. 8 and integrated executive summary, para.8. See also
Australia's third-party statement, para. 15; and integrated executive summary, para. 12.
273 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 21.
274 United States' second written submission, para. 43.
275 United States' second written submission, para. 50.
276 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 21.
277 China's second written submission, para. 46.

7.144. Several third parties also express views on the Panel's approach to the "design" requirement
of Article XX(a). Brazil, Japan and Singapore i nvite the Panel to follow the approach prior WTO
adjudicators have used in determining the existence of a relationship between the measures and the
protection of public morals through an investigation of the measures' design, including their content,
structure, and expected operation.278 The European Union – similarly to China – considers that the
measures do not appear to be designed to protect public morals279, because they "seem not to seek
to restrict specifically imports into the US territory of Chinese goods that offend the US public
morals".280 According to the European Union, Article XX(a) requires that the risk to public morals,
against which the measures are meant to protect, manifests itself either in the content of the goods
or the methods in which they were obtained or produced.281
7.145. In past cases, the Appellate Body considered the phrase "to protect public morals" requires
the adjudicator to examine "the design of the challenged measure, including its content, structure
and expected operation"282, with a view to ensuring that the measure is "not incapable of" protecting
public morals.283 Following this approach, if a panel finds that a measure is incapable of protecting
the values considered by the responding Member as public morals, there is no relationship between
the measure and the protection of public morals that would meet the requi rements of the "design"
step. If, on the other hand, a panel finds the measure to be "not incapable of protecting public
morals, this indicates the existence of a relationship between the measure and the protection of
public morals"284 that would meet the requirement of the design test.285
7.146. Against this background, the Panel will seek to assess whether the measures are designed
to protect the "standards of right or wrong" invoked by the United States (the public morals objective
as invoked by the United States).
7.147. The United States argues that the measures are not "incapable" of addressing the acts,
policies, and practices documented in the Section 301 Report, because (i) the United States adopted
the measures at issue "with the explicit goal of eliminating the unfair trade acts, policies, and
practices documented in the Section 301 Report"286; (ii) the measures are "structured so as to target
particular types of goods that benefit from the unfair and immoral Chinese technology transfer
policies"287; (iii) the measures "alert U.S. consumers and purchasers to the unfair and immoral
practices that underlie many traded Chinese products and signal to U.S. consumers and purchasers
that such practices are not acceptable" 288; and (iv) the same measures "raise the economic cost
that China will incur so long as it maintains the unfair trade acts, policies, and practices document
in the Section 301 Report". 289 The United States concludes that its measures create a disincentive
for China to continue its conduct found to be morally objectionable, and thus meet the minimal
threshold of being "designed to" protect public morals for the purposes of Article XX(a).290

278 Brazil's integrated executive summary, para. 8; Japan's third-party statement, para. 12; Japan's
integrated executive summary, para. 6; Singapore's third-party statement, para. 9; and Singapore's integrated
executive summary, para. 16.
279 European Union's third-party submission, para. 41; and integrated executive summary, para. 10.
280 European Union's third-party submission, para. 46.
281 European Union's third-party submission, para. 43. On that point, the Panel recalls that prior WTO
adjudicators have rejected arguments that Article XX(a) requires the identification of a risk to the public moral
concerns identified. (See Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.198; and Panel Report,
Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.302)
282 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.69.
283 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.68.
284 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.68.
285 In fact, the use of a double negative in the articulation of the standard ("not incapable") suggests
that, in practice, it would be rather the complainant's task to demonstrate that the measures at issue would be
incapable of protecting the values considered by the responding Member as public morals. See also
Panel Reports, Brazil – Taxation, para. 7.522; and Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 7.680.
286 United States' second written submission, para. 47.
287 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 11, para. 46. See also United States' second
written submission, para. 48.
288 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 11, para. 46. See also United States' second
written submission, para. 48.
289 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 11, para. 46. See also United States' second
written submission, para. 49.
290 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 11, para. 47.

7.148. As noted earlier, China questions, however, "whether the standard 'not incapable of
protecting' is properly based on the text of Article XX(a)".291 Moreover, China asserts that for a
measure to have a sufficient nexus to the public morals objective and so to be provisionally justified
under Article XX(a), it must be designed to apply to products that embody the morally offensive
conduct or content.292 China concludes that the measures are incapable of protecting public morals
because "there is no evidence that the additional import duties imposed by the United States are
designed to apply to goods that embody content or conduct offensive to public mora ls in the
United States".293
7.149. While the United States asserts that there is no textual requirement in Article XX(a) to show
that a measure is "designed to" protect public morals 294, China appears to consider that there is
such a requirement, but questions whether the legal standard suggested by the Appellate Body (i.e.
"not incapable") is "properly based" on the text of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.295 China also
indicates that "even if the phrase 'to protect public morals' requires the measure at issue to be 'not
incapable of' protecting public morals, the U.S. measures are incapable of protecting public
morals".296
7.150. The Panel considers that every case must be assessed on its own merits. The Panel observes
that the design test is a preliminary step aimed at as sisting and informing the further analysis of
whether a measure is provisionally justified under sub paragraph (a) of Article XX. That said, it will
sometimes be the case that the application of this test at a general level will not necessarily provide
useful information that informs this further analysis.
7.151. In the present case, the Panel does not consider that the "design test", if there is one, is an
undemanding task to perform.297 Having said this, the Panel is not convinced that, in the absolute ,
the imposition of additional duties would always be incapable of protecting public morals or would
never be incapable of protecting public morals. In the circumstances of this case, the Panel finds it
difficult to assess at any general level whether the measures at issue are "designed" to protect public
morals and is therefore not convinced that the intermediate step of such a design test is helpful for
its analysis. The more detailed design aspects and consequential understanding of measures may
only become apparent once an analysis of the necessity of the measures is advanced further. In this
regard the Panel agrees with the Appellate Body that it must not structure its analysis of the "design"
step in such a way as to lead it to truncate its investigati on prematurely and thereby foreclose
consideration of crucial aspects of the "necessity" analysis.298
7.152. The Panel recalls its preference for a holistic approach to determining whether the measures
at issue are "necessary to protect public morals" within the m eaning of Article XX(a).299 In the
process of this holistic analysis, t he Panel considers that whether an appropriate nexus exist s
between the products subject to the additional duties and the public morals objective as invoked by
the United States pertains rather to the assessment of the line or balance between the trade -
restrictive measures that are acceptable as necessary to protect public morals, and those that are
not. For this reason, the Panel will address the parties' (and third parties') arguments related to the
nexus between the products subject to additional duties and the public morals objective as invoked
by the United States, in the context of the necessity analysis.
7.153. The Panel will therefore continue its holistic examination of the challenged me asures to
determine whether they are necessary to protect the invoked public morals objective, consistent
with Article XX(a).

291 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 19.
292 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 19.
293 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 21.
294 United States' second written submission, para. 43.
295 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 19.
296 China's response to Panel question No. 11, para. 20.
297 The Appellate Body in Colombia – Textiles observed that the "design step" of an analysis under
Article XX(a) is not "particularly demanding". (Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.70)
298 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203. See also Appellate Body Report,
Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.77.

7.3.2.4 Whether the measures are necessary to protect the public morals objective as
invoked by the United States
7.154. After having analysed the public morals objective raised by the United States and whether
the measures at issue are designed to protect this public morals objective, the Panel now turns to
assess whether the measures are necessary to protect the invoked public morals objective.
7.3.2.4.1 Introduction – the nature and purpose of the necessity requirement
7.155. The Panel recalls that its interpretation of each element of the subparagraphs of Article XX
is informed by the overall need to maintain a balance between the right of the United States to
invoke the exception of Article XX(a) and the duty of the United States to respect the market access
rights of China under the GATT 1994.300 It is clear from the text of Article XX(a) that the mere
invocation of a public morals objective under Article XX(a) does not automatically render any WTO-
inconsistent action acceptable.
7.156. Pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, one of a panel 's functions is to "make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of th e case and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements ". When carrying out this
function, a panel will clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, as set out in Article 3.2 of the DSU.301
The Panel's duty as treaty interpreter is thus to examine the words of the covered agreements to
determine the parties' intentions.302 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Tre aties
directs the Panel to interpret the GATT 1994 in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and
purpose.303 One of the corollaries of this general r ule of treaty interpretation is the principle of
effective treaty interpretation, according to which an interpretation must give meaning and effect to
all the terms of a treaty. In effect, an interpreter is "not free to adopt a reading that would result in
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility".304
7.157. With these considerations in mind, the Panel begins by focusing on the ordinary meaning of
the terms of Article XX(a). The word "necessary" in Articles XX(a), XX(b) and XX(d) of the GATT 1994
regulates and defines the circumstances in which these provisions can be invoked. This is reflected
in the requirement that there be a nexus between the challenged measures and the values protected,
in order for the measures to be shown as necessary.305 The intensity of this nexus can vary, as the
Appellate Body explained in Korea – Various Measures on Beef (in the context of Article XX(d)):
Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure
compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of Article XX(d). But other measures, too,
may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d), the term

300 See para. 7.106 above. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 156; and Panel Report,
US – Gambling, paras. 6.452 and 6.575.
301 The text of Article 3.2 of the DSU reads as follows:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
302 See Appellate Body Reports, India – Patents (US), paras. 45-46; and India – Quantitative
Restrictions, footnote 23 to para. 94.
303 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reads, in relevant parts:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. […]
304 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Gasoline, p. 23 (DSR 1996:I, 3); and Korea – Dairy, para. 80.
305 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Gasoline, p. 16; US – Gambling, para. 292; EC – Seal Products,

"necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this
continuum lie s "necessary" understood as "indispensable"; at the other end, is
"necessary" taken to mean as "making a contribution to". We consider that a
"necessary" measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of
"indispensable" than to the opposite pole of simply "making a contribution to".306
7.158. Prior WTO adjudicators have kept this general function of the necessity requirement in mind
when "weighing and balancing" factors to assess whether WTO -inconsistent measures are justified
under Articles XX(a), (b) or (d).307
7.159. This weighing and balancing approach requires an assessment of a series of factors, including
(i) the relative importance of the pursued policy objective 308; (ii) the restrictive impact of the
challenged measures on trade309; and (iii) the contribution of these measures to the realization of
the objective pursued310 (manifested in the existence of a "genuine relationship of ends and means
between the objective pursued and the measure at issue"311), followed by an assessment of whether
potential WTO-consistent or less trade -restrictive alternatives, suggested by the complainant, are
reasonably available to the responding Member. 312 Prior WTO adjudicators have traditionally seen
this analysis as a holistic one "that involves putting al l the variables of the equation together and
evaluating them in relation to each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach
an overall judgement".313
7.160. The Panel also notes that the context of Article XX(a) includes the third recital of the
Preamble of the WTO Agreement, which refers to the desire of WTO Members to contribute to
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations".314 Further, the object and purpose of the covered agreements are focused on the principle
of liberalization of trade flows between WTO Members. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article XX(a)
allowing any type or range of restrictive trade measures that may otherwise breach a complainant's
WTO rights, simply on the basis of an assertion that they were necessary, rather than a
demonstration by a respondent of the necessity of the measures, would be contrary both to the text
of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement, and to the spirit of the WTO covered agreements. Such an
interpretation would reduce the word "necessary" used in Article XX(a) to redundancy and inutility,
running counter to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation.
7.161. Against this background, the Panel will examine each of these factors to assess whether the
measures at issue are necessary to protect the "standards of right or wrong" invoked by the
United States (the public morals objective as invoked by the United States).

306 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161. See also Appellate Body
307 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; US – Gambling,
308 The more important the societal value pursued by the measure at issue, the more easily the measure
may be considered to be "necessary". (See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; and
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162; and Panel Reports, Brazil – Taxation, para. 7.525)
309 The less restrictive the effects of the measure, the more likely it is to be characterized as
"necessary". (See Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 310)
310 The greater the contribution, the more easily a measure might be considered to be "necessary". (See
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163)
311 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145. See also e.g. Panel Reports,
Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.315; and India – Solar Cells, para. 7.361; and Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal
Products, para. 5.210.
312 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.215; China – Publications and Audiovisual
313 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 182.
314 Emphasis added. The Panel agrees with prior WTO adjudicators that the text of the preamble is
useful for providing interpretative context for the operative provisions being interpreted. (See e.g.
Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article 21.5 – Philippines), para. 7.749 (currently under
appeal))

7.162. The Panel notes that the disputing parties and the third parties agree with the legal test
consistently applied in previous disputes, as described above.315 For this reason, in the next section,
the Panel will proceed directly to assess the application of this legal test to the present dispute after
briefly noting parties' and third parties' main arguments.
7.3.2.4.2 The Panel's assessment on whether the United States has demonstrated the
necessity of the measures at issue
7.163. The United States argues that the additional duties at issue are "necessary" to protect public
morals because they "play a necessary role toward the goal of eliminating China's unfair trade acts,
policies, and practices by raising the cost of such practices and reducing China's incentive to continue
engaging in such conduct going forward ".316 According to the United States, "it is reasonable to
conclude that China will continue to pursue its unfair trade acts, policies, and practices while it is
advantageous to China to do so, for example, until the economic costs of doing so begin to approach
or outweigh the economic benefits"317, and for that reason, "to protect U.S. interests in moral (right
or wrong) economic behaviour, it is necessary for the United States to adopt measures tha t are
capable of changing China's economic cost-benefit analysis".318 The United States also asserts that
the measures are necessary to achieve the public morals objective as invoked by the United States
because it was only after their adoption that China a greed to enter into negotiations with the
United States to address the concerns documented in the Section 301 Report. 319 Finally, the
United States asserts that so long as a WTO Member can establish that a measure that aims to
influence the policies or prac tices of another Member is necessary to protect public morals, that
measure can be justified under Article XX(a).320
7.164. According to China, the United States' arguments asserting that the measures are necessary
are unrelated to the necessity analysis usually c onducted under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.321
China considers that the interpretation of the term "necessary", as suggested by the United States,
would render the necessity analysis meaningless in practice, because it would allow WTO Members
to "ratchet up duties on any product to any level for any length of time that the Member deems
appropriate, regardless of whether the products contain or embody morally offensive content or
conduct".322 China further considers that the measures at issue are not "necessary to protect public
morals" within the meaning of Article XX(a) because "the importance of any interest in combatting
particular criminal conduct that the United States may theoretically possess is significantly
outweighed by the lack of contribution of the U.S. measures to the achievement of that objective
and their severe trade restrictiveness". 323 In China's view, the measures do not contribute to any
"public morals" objective within the meaning of Article XX(a) because they are applied to products
on the basis of economic objectives and not on the basis of the morally offensive content of the
products themselves.324 China asserts that, even if the Panel were to find that certain products
covered by the measures embody morally offensive conduct, which is a position China does not

315 See United States' second written submission, paras. 51-56; China's second written submission,
paras. 53-61; Australia's third-party statement, paras. 14-15; Australia's integrated executive summary,
paras. 11-12; Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 11-12; Brazil's integrated executive summary, para. 11;
European Union's third-party submission, paras. 49-55; Singapore's third-party statement, paras. 11-12; and
Singapore's integrated executive summary, paras. 11-12.
316 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
317 United States' first written submission, para. 78. See also United States' second written submission,
paras. 38 and 60; United States' response to Panel question No. 12, para. 49; United States' response to Panel
question No. 15, para. 65; and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 2.
318 United States second written submission, paras. 38 and 60. See also United States' response to
Panel question No. 12, para. 49; and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 2.
319 United States second written submission, para. 40. The United States contends that it has made
significant efforts to change China's conduct, among others through "dialogue, admonishment, multilateral
forums, bilateral mechanisms, and the pursuit of criminal charges against individuals and entities affiliated with
the Chinese government". According to the United States, because none of these efforts "have proven to be
durably effective", imposition of the tariffs was necessary. (United States' first written submission, para. 80.
(footnotes omitted)) However, the United States also notes that even after the adoption of the measures,
"China continues to engage in the unfair and immoral practices documented in the Section 301 Report."
(United States' comment on China's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 23; and Exhibit US-35)
320 United States' second written submission, para. 64.
321 China's second written submission, para. 53.
322 China's second written submission, para. 54.
323 China's second written submission, para. 55.
324 China's second written submission, para. 56.

concede, a "genuine ends-means relationship would still not exist".325 Finally, China asserts that "the
United States believes that a measure can be 'necessary' within the meaning of Article XX(a)
whenever it is designed to coerce another Member into adopting a particular policy" 326; China
continues that coercing another Member to change policies cannot be a matter of necessity under
Article XX(a).
7.165. Several third parties have also discussed the necessity analysis under Artic le XX(a).
Australia, Brazil and Singapore emphasize that under the "necessity test", as developed by prior
WTO adjudicators, only measures that are necessary are permitted under Article XX(a).The
European Union agrees that the necessity test involves an as sessment of the contribution of the
challenged measure to the policy goal pursued. According to the European Union, in the present
case, the contribution of the measures at issue to the objective invoked by the United States is "too
indirect"327 and their t rade restrictiveness exceeds that of measures found provisionally justified
under Article XX(a) in previous cases, because in the present case the measures "apply
indiscriminately to all imports of a very large category of products, regardless of whether they have
been identified as morally tainted".328
7.166. The Panel now examines the factors traditionally assessed in the consideration whether the
challenged measures (the additional duties) are necessary.
7.3.2.4.2.1 Importance of the pursued policy objective
7.167. The United States asserts that the measures pursue the vitally important objective of
upholding US norms against theft and coercion, and that such values are "of tremendous importance
to U.S. society and the functioning of the U.S. economy".329 China accepts that "addressing problems
relating to crime could, in theory, be characterized as serving a societal interest" 330, but considers
that "the importance of any interest in combatting particular criminal conduct that the United States
may theoretically possess is significantly outweighed by the lack of contribution of the U.S. measures
to the achievement of that objective and their severe trade restrictiveness".331
7.168. The Panel recalls the deference accorded to WTO Members to define the scope of the public
morals they want to protect in their societies, corresponding to their own system and scales of
values. The analysis of the necessity of a challenged measure includes an assessment of the
importance of the pursued public policy objective not in general, but for the responding WTO
Member, in light of the relevant public morals it has invoked as applicable in its territory. During this
assessment, prior WTO adjudicators have focused on examining the protected societal interest,
"rather than assuming that by virtue of its status as a 'public moral' objective the interest is per se
vital or important to the highest degree".332 For instance, in US – Gambling, the panel examined the
interests and values protected by the challenged measure and concluded that these interests and
values "serve very important societal interests that can be characterized as 'vital and important in
the highest degree'".333 Similarly, in EC – Seal Products, the panel noted the European Union's claim
that the specific moral concern with regard to the protection of animals was regarded as a value of
high importance in the European Union, and found that "the protection of such public moral concerns
is indeed an important value or interest".334
7.169. In the circumstances of the present case, the Panel notes that the public morals objective
as invoked by the United States reflects societal interests that the United States describes as highly
important to it.

325 China's second written submission, para. 57.
326 China's second written submission, para. 54.
327 European Union's third-party submission, para. 54.
328 European Union's third-party submission, para. 55.
329 United States' second written submission, para. 52.
330 China's second written submission, para. 55.
331 China's second written submission, para. 55.
333 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.492. The Appellate Body upheld this finding.
334 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.632. The Appellate Body upheld this finding.

7.3.2.4.2.2 Restrictive impact of the challenged measures on trade
7.170. The United States asserts that the measures at issue are not overly trade restrictive, because
they "do not impose a ban on the import of any Chinese products, [but] tariffs at moderate levels,
and […] calibrated to obtain the elimination of the conduct documented in the Section 301 Report".335
China argues that measures at issue are severely trade -restrictive, because they "extend to
essentially all imports from China and have resulted in increases of 25 perc ent above the bound
tariff rates"336, which "have reduced the ability of Chinese imports to compete in the U.S. market by
increasing their price relative to domestically -produced products and imports from third countries
not subject to the additional import duties".337
7.171. The Panel observes that the measures at issue are not an import ban, but rather additional
tariff duties on a wide range of products imported from China. As the panel in Colombia – Textiles
observed, a "tariff is less restrictive on international trade than an import ban or measure having
the effects of a ban"338, but still has "definite effects on international trade, by reducing the capacity
of the products concerned to compete on [the] market". 339 However, particularly given the wide
range of products imported from China subject to the additional duties, the Panel notes that the
measures have significant effects on international trade.
7.3.2.4.2.3 Contribution of the measures to the pursued public morals objective as
invoked by the United States
7.172. The United States contends that the measures at issue make a substantial contribution to
the objective of protecting US public morals, because (i) they raise the cost of China's practices and
reduce China's incentive to continue engaging in such conduct340; (ii) they signal to US citizens that
China's trading conduct is unacceptable and will not be rewarded in the marketplace, "and thereby
reduce the incentive for U.S. actors to adopt behavior similar to China's"341; (iii) China entered into
negotiations with the United States to address the concerns documented in the Section 301 Report
after the adoption of the measures at issue. 342 The United States asserts that it "has made out a
prime facie case that the measures at issue contribute to the protection of public morals and China
has presented no arguments that would rebut this conclusion".343
7.173. China asserts that the measures do not contribute to any public morals objective within the
meaning of Article XX(a) because they are applied to products on the basis of t he United States'
economic objectives and not on the basis of the morally offensive content of the products
themselves.344 In China's view, even if the United States "may also have imposed tariffs on certain
products that could theoretically embody alleged morally offensive conduct "345, this "is simply a
function of the overbreadth of the U.S. measures, not evidence of a genuine ends -means
relationship".346
7.174. The Panel recalls that the extent to which the challenged measures contribute to the
realization of the objective pursued is one of the aspects to be considered in evaluating whether
they are "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(a).347 There is no generally applicable standard
requiring the use of a pre-determined threshold of contribution.348 For instance, in EC – Seal Products

335 United States' second written submission, para. 55.
336 China's second written submission, para. 59.
337 China's second written submission, para. 59.
340 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
341 United States' second written submission, para. 54.
342 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
343 United States' comment on China's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 21.
344 China's second written submission, para. 56.
345 China's second written submission, para. 57.
346 China's second written submission, para. 57.
347 See e.g. Appellate Body Report Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163. The Panel observes
that in this case, the Appellate Body considered the choice of the measure and its level of trade restrictiveness
to be indicative of the level of protection sought by the adopting Member: "[w]e think it unlikely that Korea
intended to establish a level of protection that totally eliminates fraud with respect to the origin of beef
(domestic or foreign) sold by retailers. The total elimination of fraud would probably require a total ban of
imports." (Ibid. para. 178)
348 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.213.

the Appellate Body disagreed with the European Union's argument that a contribution ought to be
"material" and specifically cautioned against the use of a standard of "materiality" as a generally
applicable pre-determined threshold in its contribution analysis.349
7.175. Prior WTO adjudicators have consistently held that contribution exists "when there is a
genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue".350
They have thus determined the level of contribution to be made by the challenged measures by
assessing the extent to which these measures were "apt to" contribute to the objectives pursued.351
This assessment can be either in quantitative or in qualitative terms352 and panels generally enjoy a
certain latitude in designing the appropriate methodology to use and deciding how to structure or
organize their analysis.353 Therefore, as previous WTO adjudicators have done, the Panel will focus
on determining the existence of a genuine relationship of ends and means between the public morals
objective as invoked by the United States and the measures at issue.354
7.176. The Panel begins by noting the United States' as sertion that the measures "make a
substantial contribution"355 to the objective of protecting US public morals, because they raise the
cost of China's practices and reduce China's incentive to continue engaging in them, and they reduce
the incentive for US actors to engage in similar practices . The United States also notes that China
entered into negotiations with the United States to address the concerns documented in the Section
301 Report after the adoption of the measures at issue. 356 The Panel recalls, however, that the
contribution of a measure cannot be resolved on the basis of assertion alone, but must be supported
by evidence and explanation demonstrating the contribution of the measure to the objective
pursued, that would assist the Panel in arriving at its overall conclusion on whether the necessity
test is me t. Accordingly, the Panel will therefore consider the further arguments that the parties
make in this area.
7.177. In this connection, the Panel notes that both the United States and China appear to accept
the need for there to be a sufficient nexus between the p ublic morals objective and the chosen
measures. They diverge, however in their views on how this relationship can be demonstrated and
reflected in the choice of the measures and their contribution to the invoked policy goal. Responding
to China, the United States asserts that the text of Article XX(a) does not require a direct correlation
or "embodiment" between the products subject to the measure at issue and the "public morals"
objective invoked by the defending WTO Member 357, because "Article XX(a) refers to measures
'necessary to protect public morals' – full stop – not measures necessary to protect public morals
from morally offensive products".358 According to the United States, "[a] measure may be necessary
to protect public morals without being limited to a product that itself offends public morals".359 China,
although in the context of its arguments on the design test rather than the necessity test under
Article XX(a), argues that Article XX(a) cannot be interpreted as permitting measures that tar get
non-morally offensive products. 360 According to China, such an interpretation "is incorrect as a
matter of treaty interpretation, unsupported by the relevant jurisprudence, and would set a
dangerous precedent".361 In China's view, "a measure that targets products on grounds other than
their embodiment of morally offensive content or conduct is not genuinely related to enforcing

349 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.216.
350 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145. See also e.g. Panel Reports,
Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.315; and India – Solar Cells, para. 7.361; and Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal
Products, para. 5.210.
351 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.213.
352 See Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 146; and Argentina – Financial Services,
para. 6.234.
353 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 145. See also Appellate Body Reports,
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.210.
354 See e.g. Panel Reports, Brazil – Taxation, para. 7.526; EU – Energy Package, para. 7.1360 (currently
under appeal); Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.315; and India – Solar Cells, para. 7.361; and Appellate Body
355 United States' second written submission, para. 53.
356 See para. 7.172 above.
357 United States' second written submission, para. 59.
358 United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 1.
359 United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 11, para. 41.
360 China's second written submission, paras. 37-38.
361 China's second written submission, para. 43.

policies for the protection of public morals".362 The European Union appears to agree with China and
asserts that a "tariff increa se on a very large category or products, regardless, apparently, of
whether the imports of the products concerned pose, by themselves, any threat to the public
morals"363 makes the relationship between the measures at issue and the public policy objective
pursued by the United States "too indirect".364
7.178. For the purpose of this dispute the Panel does not consider it necessary to resolve at an
abstract level the debate between the parties on th e above issue. Rather , the Panel seeks to
understand the United States' explanation of how the specific measures that it chose to impose, i.e.
additional duties on specifically selected products from China, contribute to the public morals
objective invoked. The Panel considers that to demonstrate the existence of such a contribution, and
in particular of a genuine relationship of ends and means between the public morals objective and
the measures at issue, the United States must demonstrate how the additional duties are apt to
contribute to the public morals objective as invoked by the United States. The Panel recalls that the
measures in this case are additional duties applying to a very wide range of products.365 The Panel
considers that a genuine relationship of ends and means between the measures the United States
has chosen and the public morals objective could be discerned through demonstrating the existence
of a nexus between these chosen measures and the public morals objective as invoked by the
United States. In this way , the United States would be able to point to or prove a genuine
relationship of ends and means between the measures at issue and the invoked public morals
objective that would highlight the contribution the measures make to the stated objective and assist
the Panel in reaching its conclusions on the necessity test as a whole. Therefore, the Panel will direct
its enquiry towards seeking to identify the nexus between the measures the United States has
chosen (i.e. additional duties on a wide range of product s) and the US public morals concerns, in
order to inform the examination of the question of whether and how the measures contribute, and
could be shown or demonstrated to be "nece ssary", to protect public morals within the meaning of
Article XX(a).
7.179. The Panel understands the United States to argue that a WTO Member that invokes an
Article XX(a) defence is not required to limit the products subject to the WTO-inconsistent measures
that it wishes to justify only to products which offend public morals. The United States asserts that
"nothing in the text of Article XX(a) supports the view that Article XX(a) excludes measures aimed
at inducing policy changes in other WTO Members".366 In the Panel's view, the scope of Article XX(a)
is intrinsically limited and is circumscribed, first, by the determination of the specific content of the
public morals that the responding Member wishes to protect, and, second, by the requirement that
the measure a Member has chosen can be demonstrated to be necessary to the achievement of this
public morals objective. In other words, even assuming, arguendo, that a measure does not have
to only apply to products that are considered to embody morally offensive conduct to be justified
under Article XX(a), the respondent still has to demonstrate that the measure it chose (in this case,
additional duties on a wide range of products from China) is apt to contribute to protecting public
morals concerns, by establishing the relevant nexus, and also that such measures do not go beyond
what is necessary within the meaning of Article XX(a).
7.180. For these reasons, the Panel considers that, in its examination of the contribution of the
measures to the pursued public morals objective as invoked by the United States, it must assess
the explanation and evidence submitted by the United States that bears on the relationship of ends
and means between the products subject to additional duties and the US public morals concerns.
7.181. Accordingly, the Panel will now analyse the contribution of each of the two challenged
measures to the pursued public morals objective as invoked by the United States.

362 China's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 17.
363 European Union's third-party submission, para. 44 and integrated executive summary, para. 11. The
European Union also raises this issue with regard to the design of the measures.
364 European Union's third-party submission, para. 44.
365 This contrasts with previous cases where Article XX(a) has been invoked, in which the measures at
issue were more narrowly targeted or focused on specific goods or services sectors (Panel Reports and
Appellate Body Reports, US – Gambling, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products; EC – Seal Products;
Colombia – Textiles; and Brazil – Taxation).
366 United States' second written submission, para. 64.

Contribution of the imposition of additional duties on List 1 products to the pursued
public morals objective as invoked by the United States
Products covered by List 1
7.182. The United States asserts that its argument that the measures at issue are necessary "is not
contingent on the application of those measures to any particular class of morally offensive
products"367, but that – in any event – List 1 covers products that embody morally offen sive
conduct.368 The United States affirms that the products subject to additional tariffs under List 1 "were
found to benefit from the trade policies documented in the Section 301 Report, including 'Made in
China 2025'".369 According to the United States, there is a "clear and direct relationship between the
'List 1 Products' and the unfair technology transfer policies, and practices described in the
Section 301 Report".370 This is demonstrated by the significant emphasis put in the legal instruments
through which the United States adopted and implemented the measures at issue on "Made in China
2025 and the Chinese industries that benefit from that initiative" 371. The United States also notes
that since "the benefits and advantages that China derives from its u nfair trade acts, policy, and
practices are designed to serve China's 'industrial policy goals' and 'economic objectives' writ large
and in a comprehensive sense, […] a corresponding response to China's unfair trade acts, policies,
and practices could also be expected to be broad -based and designed to apply economic pressure
to China in a comprehensive sense, not just with respect to a narrow range of morally offensive
products".372
7.183. China asserts that there is no "genuine relationship of ends and means" betw een the
measures at issue and the public morals objective as invoked by the United States, because the
measures at issue "are not applied based on the morally offensive content of the products
themselves".373 According to China, the measures at issue do not target products "on the grounds
that they contain content or embody conduct offensive to such concerns".374 China notes that (i) the
United States determined the value of the products that would be covered by the measures based
on the "estimated harm to the U.S. economy" and selected products based on their "likely impact
on U.S. consumers"375; (ii) the United States "apparently weighed whether the same products could
be sourced from alternative countries" 376; and (iii) the United States' approach to evaluating
exclusions from the application of the additional duties reveals the economic objectives pursued by
the United States.377 According to China, al l these elements establish that the measures at issue
"are designed to punish China for alleged harm to the U.S. economy while avoiding causing economic
harm to U.S. consumers".378
7.184. In its third -party submission, the European Union also asserts that the measures at issue
provide for tariff increases on a "very large category of products, regardless, apparently, of whether
the imports of the products concerned pose, by themselves, any threat to the public morals invoked
by the United States".379 The European Union notes that this makes the measures at issue "far more
trade restrictive than the measures found provisionally justified under Article XX(a) of the
GATT 1994 in previous cases, because they apply indiscriminately to all imports of a very large
category of products, regardless of whether they have been identified as morally tainted".380

367 United States' second written submission, para. 60.
368 United States' second written submission, para. 62.
369 United States' second written submission, para. 34. See also United States' opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, para. 48; United States' response to Panel question No. 12, para. 51; United States'
second written submission, para. 62; and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 4.
370 United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 4.
371 United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 8.
372 United States' second written submission, para. 61; and United States' response to Panel question
No. 21, para. 3.
373 China's second written submission, para. 56.
374 China's second written submission, para. 44.
375 China's second written submission, para. 46. (emphasis omitted)
376 China's second written submission, para. 46. According to China, this demonstrates that "[e]vidently,
the covered products are not in and of themselves offensive to the public morals of the United States,
otherwise the same products from alternative countries would pose the same risk of offence." (Ibid. para. 46)
377 China's second written submission, para. 48.
378 China's second written submission, para. 48.
379 European Union's third-party submission, para. 44 and integrated executive summary, para. 11.
380 European Union's third-party submission, para. 55.

7.185. As noted previously, the Panel does not consider it necessary to resolve the debate between
the parties and third parties on this issue in the abstract. Cases and disputes in which Article XX(a)
is invoked will concern different public morals, measures and factual circumstances that will need to
be considered by each adjudicator to determine whether the requisite nexus between the invoked
public morals and the measures is demonstrated. Accordingly, the panel will focus on the choice of
specific measures that a respondent has selected to determine whether such a nexus exists.
Considering the evidence before it, the Panel understands that the selection process of products to
be covered by List 1 began with the publication of a Notice in the Federal Register on 6 April 2018.381
The Notice of 6 April 2018 summarized the findings of the Section 301 Report and proposed that
"appropriate action" with regard to some of the US concerns related to Chinese acts, policies , and
practices documented in the Section 301 Report, would include the imposition of additional duties
on products from China. The Notice of 6 April 2018 proposed a list of products (proposed List 1) that
would be subject to the additional duties.
7.186. The Notice of 6 April 2018 explained the process of selection of the products covered by this
proposed List 1 as follows:
The list of products covered by the proposed action was developed using the following
methodology:
Trade analysts from several U.S. Government agencies identified products that benefit
from Chinese industrial policies, including Made in China 2025. The list was refined by
removing specific products identified by analysts as likely to cause disruptions to the
U.S. economy, and tariff lines that are subject t o legal or administrative constraints.
The remaining products were ranked according to the likely impact on U.S. consumers,
based on available trade data involving alternative country sources for each product.
The proposed list was then compiled by selecti ng products from the ranked list with
lowest consumer impact.
The value of the list is approximately $50 billion in terms of estimated annual trade
value for calendar year 2018. This level is appropriate both in light of the estimated
harm to the U.S. economy, and to obtain elimination of China 's harmful acts, policies,
and practices.382
7.187. Although the Notice of 6 April 2018 indicates that the imported products subject to additional
duties " benefit[ted] from Chinese industrial policies, including Made in China 2025", the
United States did not provide an explanation or evidence to further substantiate this assertion.383
The Panel observes that the Notice of 6 April 2018 assessed the estimated annual trade value to be
covered by the proposed additional duties, with the conclusion that this level was appropriate in light
of the estimated harm to US economy and to obtain elimination of China's practices documented in
the Section 301 Report.
7.188. Following a comment period, on 20 June 2018 the United States published a second Notice
in the Federal Register. 384 The Notice of 20 June 2018 contained the final list of 818 tariff

381 Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of
Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, vol. 83, No. 67 (6 April 2018), p. 14906 (Exhibit
CHN-10) (Notice of 6 April 2018).
382 Notice of 6 April 2018 (Exhibit CHN-10), p. 14907. (emphasis added)
383 In its response to Panel question No 16(c) ("Could you please indicate which industries are
concerned by China's alleged acts, policies and practices relating to technology transfer, protection of
intellectual property and innovation, explaining whether and how products made or services provided by these
industries were considered in the process of the adoption of the additional import duties on List 1 and on List 2
products?"), the United States limited its response to reiterating its statement that List 1 products "were found
to benefit from the Chinese policies detailed in the Section 301 Report, including Made in China 2025" without
providing any further explanation or evidence. (United States' response to Panel Question 16(c), para. 73) The
United States referred to a broad list of industrial sectors "that contribute to or benefit from the 'Made in China
2025' industrial policy" and asserted that "[a]ll U.S. industries are ultimately concerned and affected by China's
forced technology transfer policies and practices." (United States' response to Panel Question 16(c), para. 73)
384 Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action
Pursuant to Section 301: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 119 (20 June 2018), p. 28710 (Notice of
20 June 2018) (Exhibit CHN-2).

subheadings of Chinese imports, that were subject to an additional duty of 25% (List 1).385 With
respect to the selection of the products to be covered by the additional duties, the Notice of 20 June
reads as follows:
USTR and the Section 301 Committee have carefully reviewed the public comments and
the testimony from the three -day public hearing. In addition, and consistent with the
Presidential directive, USTR and the interagency Section 301 Committee have carefully
reviewed the extent to which the tariff subhead ings in the April 6, 2018 notice include
products containing industrially significant technology, including technologies and
products related to the "Made in China 2025 '" program. Based on this review process,
the Trade Representative has determined to nar row the proposed list in the April 6,
2018 notice to 818 tariff subheadings, with an approximate annual trade value of
$34 billion.386
7.189. The Notice of 20 June also refers to a statement by the United States President of
29 May 2018, according to which
Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States will impose a 25 percent
tariff on $50 billion of goods imported from China containing industrially significant
technology, including those related to the 'Made in China 2025' program.387
7.190. The Panel notes the United States' assertions that it has imposed the additional duties on
products that benefitted from China's "immoral" practices documented in the Section 301 Report.
The United States further reiterated that the measures at issue are "structured so as to target
particular types of goods that benefit from the conduct detailed in the Section 301 Report" and, in
this regard, they "alert U.S. consumers and purchasers to the unfair and immoral practices that
underlie many traded Chinese products and s ignal to U.S. consumers and purchasers that such
practices are not acceptable". 388 However, the United States has not explained how the legal
instruments through which the United States adopted and im plemented the measures at issue
support this assertion. T he most elaborate explanation of the selection process is provided in the
Notice of 6 April 2018 which reads: "[t]rade analysts from several US Governmental agencies
identified products that benefit from Chinese industrial policies".389 Moreover, the legal instruments
through which the United States adopted and implemented the measures at issue (the Notice of
20 June 2018, and by reference – the president's statement of 29 May 2018) indicate that the
covered products "contain[] industrially significant technology, including those related to the 'Made
in China 2025' programme".390 The legal instruments through which the United States adopted and
implemented the measures do not provide any further explanation.
7.191. In the Panel's view, the legal instruments through which the United States adopted and
implemented the measures at issue do not explain the relationship between the chosen measures –
additional duties applied to a range of specified products – and the public morals objective pursued
by the United States. The United States has also not provided any other evidence in support of its
assertion that the products on which it imposed additional duties benefitted from practices of China
that the United States considered to be contrary to its public morals, nor evidence that would more
generally demonstrate how the products it selected for additional duties treatment contributed to its
public morals objective.
7.192. Moreover, the Panel observes that the Section 301 Report focuses on a certain number of
Chinese industrial policies, including the "Made in China 2025" industrial policy 391, and finds that
China adopted the documented practices and poli cies "to advance China's industrial policy

385 The Panel examines the process of the initial narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1 in
paras. 7.196-7.201 below.
386 Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711.
387 Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711, quoting Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic
Technology and Intellectual Property from China's Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices.
388 United States' second written submission, para. 48.
389 Notice of 6 April 2018 (Exhibit CHN-10), p. 14907.
390 Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711 (emphasis added).
391 The Section 301 Report refers to "the National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan Outline (2006-2020) (MLP), the State Council Decision on Accelerating and Cultivating the
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI Decision), and, more recently, the Notice on Issuing 'Made
in China 2025'" (Made in China 2025 Notice)". (Section 301 Report (Exhibit US-1), p. 10, footnotes omitted)

objectives, in particular the goals and objectives reflected in Made in China 2025, 'China's ten-year
plan for targeting ten strategic advanced technology manufacturing industries for promotion and
development'"392. The Section 301 Report does not seem to contain a comprehensive list of
industries affected by the alleged Chinese acts, practices, or policies, that engage the public morals
invoked by the United States in this dispute. Instead, the document appears to mention sectors that
have allegedly been the focus of these practices, or that are illustrative of China's actions. These
sectors include agriculture, automotive (including new energy vehicles), aviation and aerospace,
financial services, biotec hnology, chemicals, educational services, electrical generation and
transmission equipment, energy (including new energies and nuclear power), environmental
technology, exploration and development of oil and natural gas, information technology, integrated
circuits advanced manufacturing, marine technology, medical devices, mining, pharmaceuticals, real
estate and housing, robotics and automated machine tools, steel, telecommunications,
transportation, water and mineral resources. 393 An Update to the Section 301 Report394 specifies
that "[i]ndustrial sectors that contribute to or benefit from the 'Made in China 2025' industrial policy
include aerospace, information and communications technology, robotics, industrial machinery, new
materials, and automobiles".395 The United States asserts that "[a]ll U.S. industries are ultimately
concerned and affected by China's forced technology transfer policies and practices".396
7.193. That said, the additional duties on List 1 products do not apply to all Chinese imports, but
as noted above, only to a selection of products that the United States asserts clearly benefit from
the specific policies that are the subject of the US public morals concerns. 397 In asserting the
contribution that the additional duties on these products have to the stated US public morals
objectives, the United States points to a relationship between the specific products in List 1 to this
stated contribution.398 Accordingly, the Panel will investigate this relationship further.
7.194. Following a preliminary review of the tariff lines subject to the additional duties, the Panel
notes that certain product categories do not appear closely related to the list of affected industrial
policies discussed in the Section 301 Report. List 1 products include fishery products, cosm etics (if
not considered part of the chemical industry), textiles, wood, wooden products and paper, and
possibly certain construction material. From the evidence presented to it, the Panel finds it unclear
how the United States associated China's sectoral industrial policies with specific products within
certain economic sectors that benefit from China's policies and practices considered to violate the
public morals invoked by the United States.399
7.195. The Panel continues its examination of the additional duties actually imposed on List 1
products to determine the extent to which the imposition of these additional duties on List 1 products
contributes to the pursued public morals objective as invoked by the United States.
The initial narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1
7.196. The Panel recalls that, as described before, the selection process of products to be covered
by List 1 began with the publication of a Notice in the Federal Register on 6 April 2018. The Notice
of 6 April 2018 proposed a list of products with an approximate value of USD 50 billion (proposed
List 1) and invited comments from interested persons on any aspect of the proposed action, including
(i) the specific products to be subject to increased duties; (ii) the level of the increase, if any, in the

392 United States response to Panel question No. 21, para. 7; referring to Section 301 Report (Exhibit
US-1), pp. 17, 20, 27, 29, 36, 63, 149, 150, and 153; and quoting Section 301 Report (Exhibit US–1), p. 14.
393 See Section 301 Report, (Exhibit US-1), pp. 11, 13, 14, 23, 26, 65, 100, 156, and Appendix D.
394 Update Concerning China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (November 20, 2018) (Exhibit US-2)
(Update to Section 301 Report).
395 Update to Section 301 Report (Exhibit US-2), p. 7.
396 United States' response to Panel question No. 16(c), para. 73.
397 United States' second written submission, paras. 34 and 62.
398 See United States' second written submission, para. 54: "[t]he measures at issue further contribute
to the objective of protecting public morals by signaling to U.S. citizens that China's trading conduct is so
unacceptable and contrary to basic norms of fairness that the United States government was compelled to take
action by lowering trade in the Chinese products that may benefit from China's unfair trade policies."
399 On that point, China asserts that "[m]erely listing a series of economic sectors that supposedly
'benefit from' various policies does not prove that USTR determined that specific products within those sectors
embody the allegedly 'unfair' trade acts, policies, and practices." (China's second written submission, para. 50
(emphasis original))

rate of duty; and (iii) the appropriate aggregate level of trade to be covered by additional duties.400
Following the comment period, the United States published the Notice of 20 June 2018 which
contained the final list of products with a n approximate value of USD 34 billion (final List 1).
Compared with the proposed List 1 in the Notice of 6 April 2018, the final List 1 was narrowed down:
USTR and the Section 301 Committee have carefully reviewed the public comments and
the testimony from the three-day public hearing. In addition, and consistent with the
Presidential directive, USTR and the interagency Section 301 Committee have carefully
reviewed the extent to which the tariff subheadings in the April 6, 2018 notice include
products conta ining industrially significant technology, including technologies and
products related to the "Made in China 2025" program. Based on this review process,
the Trade Representative has determined to narrow the proposed list in the April 6,
2018 notice to 818 tariff subheadings, with an approximate annual trade value of
$34 billion.401
7.197. China has challenged the consistency of the additional duties on the final List 1 and not on
the proposed List 1 with the GATT 1994. However, the Panel considers that the process of initial
narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1 is an aspect of the measure at issue that may
help understand the existence of a genuine relationship of ends and means between the measure at
issue and the public morals objective as invoked by the United States.
7.198. The final List 1 cover s some, but not all, of the products included in the proposed List 1.
Following a comparative examination of the two Notices, the Panel observes that products covered
by the proposed List 1 that were later exclu ded from the final List 1 include certain inorganic
chemicals402, all organic chemicals included in the proposed List 1 403, all pharmaceutical products
included in the proposed List 1 404, certain rubber articles 405, all iron and steel included in the
proposed List 1406, all articles of iron or steel included in the proposed List 1 407, all aluminium and
aluminium articles included in the proposed List 1408, all miscellaneous articles of base metal included
in the proposed List 1409, certain nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances and
parts thereof410, certain electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof, sound recorders and
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of
such artic les411, certain vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and
accessories thereof412, certain aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 413, certain ships, boats and
floating structures 414, certain optical, photographic, cinematographic, mea suring, checking,
precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus and parts and accessories thereof 415, all
clocks and watches and parts thereof included in the proposed List 1 416, all arms and ammunition
and parts and accessories thereof included i n the proposed List 1417, and all furniture, bedding,
mattresses and other related products included in the proposed List 1.418

400 Notice of 6 April 2018 (Exhibit CHN-10), p. 14908.
401 Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711. (emphasis added)
402 Subheadings 28443010, 28443020, and 28443050 from the United States' Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTSUS).
403 All subheadings from Chapter 29 (Organic chemicals) of the HTSUS.
404 All subheadings from Chapter 30 (Pharmaceutical products) of the HTSUS.
405 Subheadings 40610000, 40091200, 40094200, 40101100, 40121980, and 40169915 of the HTSUS.
406 All subheadings from Chapter 72 (Iron and steel) of the HTSUS.
407 All subheadings from Chapter 73 (Articles of iron and steel) of the HTSUS.
408 All subheadings from Chapter 76 (Aluminum and articles thereof) of the HTSUS.
409 All subheadings from Chapter 83 (Miscellaneous articles of base metal) of the HTSUS.
410 For instance, subheadings 84159040, 84159080, and others of the HTSUS.
411 For instance, subheadings 85073080, 85079040, 85192000, and others of the HTSUS.
412 Subheading 87141000 of the HTSUS.
413 Subheading 88010000 of the HTSUS.
414 Subheading 89079000 of the HTSUS.
415 For instance, subheadings 90079140, 90079180, 90191060, and others of the HTSUS.
416 All subheadings from Chapter 91 (Clocks and watches and parts thereof) of the HTSUS.
417 All subheadings from Chapter 93 (Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof) of the
HTSUS.
418 All subheadings from Chapter 94 (Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and
similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated sign
illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings) of the HTSUS.

7.199. This narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1, in itself, does not support a specific
conclusion with respect to the r elationship between the challenged measure and the public morals
objective as invoked by the United States. In addition, the legal instruments through which the
United States implemented this narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1 do not indicate
any particular relationship between the narrowing process of List 1 and the public morals objective
as invoked by the United States.
7.200. Rather, the documents the parties submitted suggest that the narrowing of the range of
products covered by List 1 was based on considerations related to the likely risks of disruptions to
the US economy and to the value of imports covered by the additional duties on the "estimated harm
to the U.S. economy".419 The elimination of certain imported products from List 1 does n ot appear
to have considered the potential harm to the invoked public morals objective, nor the coherence of
the policy goal pursued, in the process of narrowing the range of products covered by List 1.420
7.201. Therefore, the narrowing of the range of products covered by List 1 does not indicate how
the United States sought to ensure, or how it would enable the United States to demonstrate, a
genuine relationship of ends and means between the invoked objective of public morals and the
additional duties imposed on List 1 products.
The exclusion of particular products from the scope of the additional duties
7.202. The Notice of 20 June 2018 envisages the exclusion of some products from the scope of the
additional duties. The Notice of 20 June 2018 refers to the following considerations that warrant the
establishment of a process allowing stakeholders to request the exclusion of particular products from
the additional duties: (i) specific products that were only available from China; (ii) the imposition of
additional duties on the specific products would cause severe economic harm to a US interest, and
(iii) the specific products were not strategically important or related to the "Made in China 2025"
programme.421
7.203. On the basis of these considerations, on 11 July 2018 the United States published
Procedures for requests for exclusion of particular products from the additional duties imposed on
List 1 products (Procedures for exclusion). 422 According to these Pr ocedures for exclusion, any
request for exclusion from the additional duties of a particular product covered by List 1 must provide
the rationale for the requested exclusion, addressing the following factors: (i) whether the particular
product is available only from China and whether the particular product and/or a comparable product
is available from sources in the United States and/or in third countries; (ii) whether the imposition
of additional duties on the particular product would cause severe economic harm to the requestor
or other US interests; and (iii) whether the particular product is strategically important or related to
"Made in China 2025" or other Chinese industrial programmes.423
7.204. The United States explained the process for granting product exclusions in the course of the
proceedings.424 This process appears to involve two stages. First, in the course of a "public
submission process", USTR publicly posts all received requests for product exclusions. Interested
parties may support or oppose any exclusion request. If a request is opposed, the requestor is given
an opportunity to respond. All these additional submissions are made publicly available.425 Second,
in the course of a "review process", each request undergoes a "multistep review by trade and tariff
experts"426. This review involves an examination of all the factors set out in the Procedures for
exclusion on a case-by-case basis. At the end of this process, USTR issues a decision letter to the

419 Notice of 6 April 2018 (Exhibit CHN-10), p. 14907.
420 It is unclear to the Panel how this conforms with the United States' description of the contribution of
the measures to the pursued public morals objective (see para. 7.172 above) or with the United States'
assertion that these measures were structured so as to target particular types of goods that benefit from these
practices (see para. 7.147 above).
421 Notice of 20 June 2018 (Exhibit CHN-2), p. 28711.
422 Procedures To Consider Requests for Exclusion of Particular Products From the Determination of
Action Pursuant to Section 301: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Federal Register, vol. 83, No. 133 (11 July 2018), p. 32181 (Exhibit
CHN-20) (Procedures for Exclusion).
423 Procedures for exclusion (Exhibit CHN-20), pp. 32182-32183.
424 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, paras. 21-25.
425 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 23.
426 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 24.

initial requestor, also publicly posted. 427 The decision letter states whether the request has been
granted or denied.428 If the request has been denied, the decision letter identifies which of the factors
resulted in the denial.429
7.205. These explanations are helpful for the Panel's understanding of the procedure USTR followed
to grant products exclusions. However, they provide little clarity on USTR's substantive assessment
of the relevant factors for granting product exclusions in each case, and specifically on whether
excluded products could have benefitted from China's practices and policies that the United States
considers inconsistent with its public morals.
7.206. The Panel notes the United States' argument that the Procedures for exclusion are not a
measure challenged by China in this dispute. 430 Although China has explicitly challenged only the
adoption of additional duties on List 1 and List 2 products, the Panel notes that China's panel request
expressly mentions the Procedures for exclusion in the list of legal instruments through which the
measures at issue are adopted and implemented.431 Moreover, the Panel understands the references
in China's submissions to the Procedures for exclusion to focus on the argument that the process for
evaluating exclusions is "revealing of the economic objectives of the U.S. measures"432, rather than
a challenge of the WTO -consistency of the Procedures for exclusion themselves. In any event, the
Panel examines the Procedures for exclusion only in an attempt to better understand the rationale
behind the selection by the United States of the specific measures at issue.
7.207. China argues that "the exclusion process is an integral part of the tariff measures at issue
and further confirms the economic objective of the measures themselves". 433 According to China,
the United States has failed to explain "how the criteria for granting exclusions are rationally related
to the protection of public morals".434 In China's view, the United States has failed to explain "how
public moral concerns were taken into account in granting or denying particular ex clusion
request".435 China asserts that the United States grants exclusions to certain products "on the basis
of economic considerations that have nothing to do with 'public morals'".436
7.208. According to the United States, the factors used in the Procedures for exclusion "confirm
that the U.S. tariff measures address the moral harm caused by China's unfair technology transfer
policies".437 The United States asserts that nothing in Article XX(a) requires WTO Members to ignore
economic impacts in designing a measure necessary to protect public morals.438 The United States
also asserts that it "did not intend to exclude products that benefit from China's unfair and harmful
industrial policies".439 The Panel considers it pertinent, nevertheless, to enquire further whether the
exclusion processes could potentially lead to outcomes that would undermine or run counter to the
stated US public morals objective.
7.209. The Panel observes that first two of the factors listed in the Procedures for exclusion clearly
pertain to economic considerations. This fact does not necessarily point towards the lack of a genuine
ends and means relationship between the measures at issue and the public morals objective as
invoked by the United States. However, the United States has not explained whether the excluded
products benefitted (or not) from China's policies and practices considered by the United States to
be inconsistent with its public morals.
7.210. It is unclear from the formulation of the third factor whether particular products could be
excluded from the additional duties because they do not benefit from practices and policies that

427 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 24.
428 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 25.
429 United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 25.
430 United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 12.
431 WT/DS543/7, p. 3.
432 China's second written submission, para. 48.
433 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 8. See also China's
second written submission, para. 48.
434 China's second written submission, para. 70. See also China's comments on the United States'
response to Panel question No. 23, para. 12.
435 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 23, para. 12.
436 China's second written submission, para. 70.
437 United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 13.
438 United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 15.
439 United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 15.

violate the United States' invoked public morals objective, or because they are not strategically
important enough to China's industrial programmes.
7.211. The United States explained in its response to a Panel question that a number of exclusions
have been explicitly denied on the basis of this third factor, "because the product subject to the
request was covered by China's Made in China 2025 program or other industrial programs"440, and
provided a sample of three such denial letters. 441 The denial letters provided as evidence by the
United States do not contain explanations why exclusion for these particular products was denied on
the basis of the third factor. Rather, t hese letters contain an identical statement that reads as
follows: "Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your request was denied because
the request concerns a product strategically important or related to 'Made in China 2025' or other
Chinese industrial programs and the request failed to show that this particular product is available
only from China." 442
7.212. The Panel is of the view that the United States has not sufficiently explained why products
that were initially considered to benefit from China's practices and policies (which the United States
claims harm its public morals) are excluded from the additional duties and how such exclusions do
not undermine the achievement of the public morals objective as invoked by the United States. In
other words, the United States has not explained how the Procedures for exclusion are coherent with
the policy objective invoked by the United States and do not undermine the achievement of this
policy objective.
7.213. Absent sufficient explanation by the United States, the Panel thus finds it difficult to see how
the factors considered by the United States in the Procedures for exclusions, as well as the resulting
exclusions of particular products from List 1, are coherent with the public morals objective as invoked
by the United States. The Procedures for exclusion could lead to situations where two products
produced in China, using similar practices and policies that the United States considers contrary to
US public morals, are treated differently (one product is subject to additional punitive duties, and
the other is not). This potential difference in treatment requires the United States to explain how it
reconciles its public morals objective with these exclusions. It is unclear to the Panel how this
conforms with the United States' description of the contribution of the measures to the pursued
public morals objective443 and with the United States' assertion that these measures were structured
so as to target particular types of goods that benefit from these practices.444
7.214. While, as earlier explained, a key focus of the United States' arguments throughout these
proceedings has been that the List 1 products subject to additional duties benefit from China's
policies and practices that involve "public morals" concern s, the Panel also notes that the
United States additionally argues that regardless of whether such products so benefit, all such
additional duties are apt to contribute to, and are in fact necessary to protect, the invoked US public
morals concerns. The Panel considers, however, that the United States has not substantiated its
assertions about the nature of this contribution and how such measures can be justified as necessary
through a demonstration of the requisite "ends and means" nexus or relatio nship envisaged by
Article XX(a).
7.215. In conclusion, the Panel considers that the United States has not provided an explanation
that demonstrates a genuine relationship of ends and means between the imposition of duties on
List 1 products and the public morals objective as invoked by the United States.

440 United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 18.
441 USTR, Letters RE: Product Exclusion Requests (Exhibit US-34). China asserts that these are "simply
[…] form letter[s]" confirming "that the tariff measures are irrelevant to the public morals protection". (China's
comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 11)
442 USTR, Letters RE: Product Exclusion Requests (Exhibit US-34), pp. 1, 2 and 3.
443 See para. 7.172 above.
444 See para. 7.147 above.

Contribution of the imposition of additional duties on List 2 products to the pursued
public morals objective as invoked by the United States
7.216. The United States adopted and implemented the additional duties on List 2 products through
the Notice of 21 September 2018. This Notice explains the rationale of the imposition of additional
duties on List 2 products as follows:
China's unfair acts, policies, and practices include not just its specific technology
transfer and IP polices referenced in the notice of initiation in the investigation, but also
China's subsequent defensive actions taken to maintain those policies. China has
decided to impose approximately $50 billion in tariffs on U.S. goods, with the go al of
encouraging the United States to drop its efforts to obtain the elimination of China 's
unfair policies. Thus, instead of addressing the underlying problems, China has
increased tariffs to further protect the unreasonable acts, policies, and practices
identified in the investigation, resulting in increased harm to the U.S. economy.
[…]
The judgment during the period of investigation, based on then -available information,
was that a $50 billion action would be effective in obtaining the elimination of Ch ina's
policies.
China's response, however, has shown that the current action no longer is appropriate.
China has made clear – both in public statements and in government -to-government
communications - that it will not change its policies in response to the current Section
301 action. Indeed, China denies that it has any problems with respect to its policies
involving technology transfer and intellectual property.445
7.217. Thus, the additional duties imposed by the Notice of 21 September 2018 do not seem to
concern products that have allegedly benefit ted from China's practices and policies documented in
the Section 301 Report.
7.218. The United States explains that "List 2 measures apply to a broader class of products than
those found to directly benefit from the unfair trade acts, policies, and practices documented in the
Section 301 Report".446 The United States asserts that it imposed additional duties on List 2 products
"after China 'made clear – both in public statements and in government -to-government
communications – that it [would] not change its policies' and instead 'responded … by increasing
duties on U.S. exports to China'". 447 According to the United States, the imposition of additional
duties on List 2 products is "derivative" of the imposition of additional duti es on List 1 products.448
For that reason, the United States argues that the imposition of additional duties on List 2 products
is "also necessary to protect public morals in part because to fail to respond to China's economic
retaliation would demonstrate that the United States Government is willing to acquiesce in theft and
forced transfer of U.S. technology by one of its largest trading partners".449
7.219. China emphasizes that the United States does not assert that List 2 products benefit from
China's practices and policies documented in the Section 301 Report. China considers the approach
the United States chose in determining the range of List 2 products to be " overtly punitive"450, and
asserts that the additional duties on List 2 products "were not intended to target specific products
that embody so-called 'unfair' industrial policies, let alone embody any morally offensive conduct".451
According to China, "[t]here is nothing 'derivative' about the manner in which the United States
selected the approximately $200 billion worth of products. There is no reference to USTR having

445 Notice of 21 September 2018 (Exhibit CHN-3), pp. 47974-47975.
446 United States' response to question No. 21, para. 11.
447 United States' second written submission, para. 35, quoting Notice of Modification of Section 301
Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 184 (21 September 2018), p. 47974 (Notice of 21 September 2018)
(Exhibit CHN-3).
448 United States' second written submission, para. 35. See also United States' response to Panel
question No. 12, para. 52; and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 11.
449 United States' response to Panel question No. 14, para. 61.
450 China's second written submission, para. 51.
451 China's comment on the United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 6.

selected those products based on their connection to the initial $50 billion worth of products allegedly
found to have 'benefit[ted] from Chinese industrial policies'".452
7.220. The Panel notes that the Notice of 21 September 2018 does not provide any explanation on
the approach followed in selecting the range of List 2 products. 453 In the course of the Panel's
substantive meeting with the parties, the United States further stated that it adopted the additional
duties on List 2 products because China had "made clear" that it would not change its policies. 454
The United States also explained during the Panel's substantive meetings with the parties, that List 2
products are not necessarily products that have been found to benefit from China's practices and
policies considered by the United States as contrary to its public morals.
7.221. The Panel understands the United States to argue that the imposition of additional duties on
List 2 products contributes to the achievement of the public morals objective pursued by the
United States, because it "re -enforces" the imposition of additional duties on List 1 products, and
applies stronger economic pressure on China "in a comprehensive sense".455
7.222. In the Panel's view, a genuine relationship of ends and means between the challenged
measure and the public morals objective pursued could not be derived from the potential existence
of such a relationship with respect to a different measure. The Panel notes that the range of List 2
products is not related to China's practices and policies allege dly harming US public morals . The
Panel observes that the United States also asserts, as a general matter, that, irrespective of whether
products on which additional duties are imposed benefit from China's practices and policies that
involve public morals concerns, all such additional duties contributed to, and were in fact necessary
to, protect the invoked US public morals concerns . In this context , the United States has not
adequately explained how there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between the imposition
of additional duties on List 2 products and the public morals objective as invoked by the
United States.
7.223. The Panel further recalls that Article XX(a) allows WTO Members to adopt measures which
would be otherwise WTO-inconsistent to protect their public morals. As mentioned above, the scope
of Article XX(a) is limited by the specific public morals objective identified by the respondent, and
by the requirement that the measures be necessary to achieve this public mo rals objective. While
there are provisions in the WTO agreements that specifically provide for the imposition of additional
tariffs above bound rates in certain defined circumstances, without any need to demonstrate any
"necessity" for the measures to achieve a particular purpose, those provisions are not applicable to
the current dispute.456

452 China's second written submission, para. 51.
453 The Panel notes that the range of List 2 products appears to also have been narrowed from an initial
proposed list. However, the Notice of 21 September 2018 does not provide any explanation as to the factors
considered in this narrowing process: "USTR and the Section 301 Committee have carefully reviewed the public
comments and the testimony from the six-day public hearing. Based on this review process, the Trade
Representative, at the direction of the President, has determined not to include certain tariff subheadings listed
in the Annex to the July 17 notice, resulting in 5,745 full and partial tariff subheadings with an approximate
annual trade value of $200 billion." (Notice of 21 September 2018 (Exhibit CHN-3), p. 47975)
454 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 27, United States' response to Panel question
No. 14, para. 61 and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 11.
455 United States' second written submission, para. 61. The United States also provided evidence in
support of its argument that China continues to engage in the practices documented in the Section 301 Report.
(Exhibit US-35).
456 Specifically, in the context of retaliation pursuant to Article 22 of the DSU, WTO Members are allowed
to suspend obligations and concessions on a wide range of products that they have unilaterally selected,
initially from the same sectors (and, ultimately, from other sectors, under certain conditions), so long as the
value of the effects of such suspension is equivalent to the value of the level of nullification of benefits. This is,
however, only possible following a multilateral determination of inconsistency of the measures challenged with
the covered agreements; and with authorization from the DSB. This is a situation distinct from the facts of the
present dispute. In the present dispute, the United States argues that any inconsistency of the challenged
additional duties with the GATT 1994 is justified because these additional duties are "necessary to protect
public morals". Accordingly, in the context of Article XX(a) the adopting Member must demonstrate that there
exists a genuine relationship of ends and means between the public morals objective and the measures at
issue that would meet the necessity requirement.

7.224. The Panel notes that the United States has also adopted Procedures for exclusion for
particular products from the additional duties on List 2 products. 457 According to these Procedures
for exclusion for List 2 products, any request for exclusion from the additional duties of a particular
product covered by List 2 must provide the rationale for the requested exclusion, addressing the
following factors: (i) whether the particular product is available only from China and whether the
particular product and/or a comparable product is available from sources in the United States and/or
in third countries; (ii) whether the requester has attempted to source the produ ct from the
United States or third countries; (iii) whether the imposition of additional duties on the particular
product would cause severe economic harm to the requester or other US interests; and (iv) whether
the particular product is strategically important or related to "Made in China 2025" or other Chinese
industrial programmes.458
7.225. The factors used in these Procedures for exclusion for List 2 products are similar to the
factors used in the Procedures for exclusion for List 1 products. The first three factors clearly pertain
to economic considerations, while the meaning of the fourth factor is unclear as to whether particular
products could be excluded from the additional duties because they do not benefit from practices
and policies that violate the Uni ted States' invoked public morals, or because they are not
strategically important enough to China's industrial programs.
7.226. For the same reasons stated above with respect to the Procedures for exclusion for List 1
products, the Panel finds it difficult to se e how the factors considered by the United States in the
Procedures for exclusions for List 2 products do not undermine the achievement of the public morals
objective as invoked by the United States.
7.227. In conclusion, the Panel considers that the United States has not provided an explanation
that would allow the Panel to understand the relationship between the additional duties imposed on
List 2 products and the public morals objective invoked by the United States.
7.3.2.4.2.4 Preliminary conclusion on necessity after the initial "weighing and balancing"
of three factors
7.228. The Panel concludes that the public morals objective as invoked by the United States reflects
societal interests and values that appear to be highly important in the United States, and that the
measures at issue have significant effects on international trade.
7.229. Having assessed the measures adopted by the United States on a holistic basis, the Panel
considers, however, that the United States has not provided an explanation that demonstrates how
the measures contribute to the public morals objective as invoked by the United States. More
specifically, the United States has not demonstrated that there is a genuine relationship of ends and
means between the measures at issue and the public morals objective pursued by the United States.
7.230. With respect to the imposition of additional duties on List 1 products, the United States has
not sufficiently explained how a genuine relationship of ends and means exists between the products
subject to additional duties and the public morals objective as invoked by the United States. This is
also the case with respect to the initial narrowing of the range of List 1 products, or the adoption of
Procedures for exclusion of particular products from the additional duties on List 1 products.
7.231. With respect to the imposition of additional duties on List 2 products, the United States has
clearly stated that it imposed these additional duties because China had "made clear" that it would
not change its polic ies459 and as a response to measures China had imposed on the United States
following the imposition by the United States of additional duties on List 1 products. The Panel does
not consider that the contribution of the imposition of additional duties on Li st 2 products to the
achievement of the public morals objective as invoked by the United States can be "derived" from
the (potential) contribution of the imposition of additional duties on List 1 products. Moreover, the
United States has not provided any other evidence or explanation that would demonstrate a genuine

457 Procedures for Requests to Exclude Particular Products From the September 2018 Action Pursuant to
Section 301, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 121 (24 June 2019), p. 29576 (Exhibit CHN-21) (Procedures for
exclusion for List 2 products).
458 Procedures for exclusion for List 2 products (Exhibit CHN-21), p. 29577.
459 United States' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 27, United States' response to Panel question
No. 14, para. 61; and United States' response to Panel question No. 21, para. 11.

relationship of ends and means between the measures comprising the additional duties on List 2
products and the public morals objective invoked by the United States.
7.3.2.4.2.5 Comparison with reasonably available alternative measures
7.232. In assessing whether a challenged measure is "necessary" within the meaning of
Articles XX(a), XX(b) or XX(d), prior WTO adjudicators have traditionally considered the existence
of reasonably available alternatives.460 In particular, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, it was decided that
"[i]n order to determine whether a measure is 'necessary' within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994, a panel must assess all the relevant factors, particularly the extent of the contribution
to the achievement of a measu re's objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the light of the
importance of the interests or values at stake "461, and that " [i]f this analysis yields a preliminary
conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure
with its possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued".462
7.233. China does not suggest any alternative measure. In China's view, the challenged measures
are not about public morals, are not designed to deal with public morals and are certainly not
necessary. Therefore, China considers that "there is no need for the Panel to analyse WTO-consistent
alternative measures in order to confirm whether the U.S. me asures are 'necessary' for the
protection of public morals".463 China asserts that "due to the unique facts of this dispute, there is
no requirement for China to present or the Panel to examine alternative measures".464
7.234. The United States, in support of its assertion that the measures are necessary within the
meaning of Article XX(a), points to its prior efforts to address its concerns with China's policies and
practices "through dialogue, admonishment, engagement in multilateral forums, [and] bilateral
mechanisms".465 According to the United States, "[t]hat none of these prior efforts have proven
durably effective further demonstrates the necessity of the measures at issue".466
7.235. The Panel recalls China's refusal to put forward reasonably available alternativ e measures.
The Panel's preliminary conclusion, based on a weighing and balancing of the relevant factors , is
that the United States has not explained how the chosen measures are apt to contribute to the
public morals objective , as invoked by the United States, and how they could therefore be
"necessary". For all those reasons, the Panel is not required to proceed to a comparison with
reasonably available alternative measures.
7.3.2.5 Conclusion on whether the measures are provisionally justified under
subparagraph (a) of Article XX of the GATT 1994
7.236. As the Panel observed above, the nature and purpose of Article XX – to allow WTO Members
to adopt measures that would be otherwise WTO-inconsistent to protect their public morals – cannot
be reconciled with a situation where WTO Members would be allowed to restrict any trade from any
WTO Member with the mere invocation of what might, in an abstract sense, be considered a valid
policy objective within the meaning of Article XX of the GATT 1994. The scope of the restrictive
measures justifiable under Article XX(a) is determined by the public morals objective invoked and
by the requirement that the measures be necessary to achieve this objective. In other words, there
is a requirement that there be a nexus between the challenged measure and the interest protected
by the policy objective at issue. In the case of Article XX(a), this requirement is specified by the
term "necessary to protect public morals". This is especially important in the context of Article XX(a),

460 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.215; China – Publications and Audiovisual
Panel Reports, Brazil – Taxation, paras. 7.531-7.533.
461 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 156.
462 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 156 (emphasis added). See also
Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 242 and 249; and Panel Report,
463 China's second written submission, para. 60.
464 China's response to Panel question No. 20, para. 9. China relies on a series of observations by the
Appellate Body that "there may be cases in which it is not necessary for a Member to propose alternative
measures." (Ibid. para. 8)
465 United States' second written submission, para. 56.
466 United States' second written submission, para. 56.

because the concept of "public morals" is a broad one, that may be based on considerations specific
to individual WTO Members.
7.237. As the Panel has earlier emphasized, the invocation of each Article XX defence needs to be
considered carefully based on the facts relating to the particular sub paragraph of Article XX relied
on and the challenged measures. The Panel notes that the text of Article XX(a) itself limits the range
of measures that WTO Members are allowed to rely on. To fall within the limited scope of
Article XX(a), the measures have to concern public morals. Moreover, the measures have to be
"necessary" for the achievement of the public morals objective invoked. In other words, if the
adopting WTO Member does not explain how the challenged measures contribute to the achievement
of the public morals objective pursued, by showing that there is a genuine relationship of "ends and
means" between these measures and the public morals objective, this is a strong indication that the
challenged measures have exceeded the limits acceptable under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
7.238. As elaborated in the Panel's earlier analysis, having assessed the evidence on a holistic basis
in the present dispute, the Panel concludes that the United States has not provided an explanation
that demonstrates how the imposition of additional duties on the selected imported products
contributes to the achievement of the public morals objective as invoked by the United States. It
follows that the United States has not adequately explained how the measures the United States
has chosen are necessary to protect such public morals.
7.3.3 Whether the United States has demonstrated that the measures satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
7.239. The United States argues that it has not applied the measures in a manner that constitutes
"a disguised restriction on international trade "because it has taken "no steps to conceal the reasons
for adopting the measures at issue" .467 The United States asserts that it has not applied the
measures in a manner that constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" because of the
"deliberate nature" in which it proceeded before adopting the measures 468 and because it "has
explained the rationale and j ustification for adopting the measures at issue". 469 The United States
also argues that it has not applied the measures in a manner inconsistent with the chapeau of
Article XX because "no other government is engaging in forced technology transfer policies a nd
practices of the type or to the extent that China is".470
7.240. China argues that the measures are not provisionally justified under Article XX(a) and that
"there is no need to proceed to evaluate whether the measures are consistent with the conditions
set forth in the chapeau of that provision".471 On an arguendo basis, China asserts that the measures
fail to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau. 472 China argues that the "lack of a rational connection
between the U.S. measures and the covered products reflec ts the true, coercive intent of the U.S.
measures"473, and "a prohibition on unduly coercive action is tied directly to the limiting function of
the chapeau".474 China further argues that the measures "restrict international trade under the guise
of a public morals measure" 475 and "are nothing more than barely disguised restrictions on
international trade".476
7.241. The Panel recalls its conclusion that the United States has not provided sufficient evidence
or explanation to substantiate its assertion that the measures are necessary to protect the
"standards of right or wrong" invoked by the United States and which are considered as public morals
in the United States. Prior WTO adjudicators have traditionally refrained from assessing the

467 United States' first written submission, para. 88.
468 United States' first written submission, para. 84.
469 United States' first written submission, para. 86.
470 United States' first written submission, para. 83.
471 China's second written submission, para. 62.
472 China's second written submission, para. 63.
473 China's second written submission, para. 67.
474 China's second written submission, para. 68.
475 China's second written submission, para. 74.
476 China's second written submission, para. 75.

conformity with the chapeau of measures that they have found not to be provisionally justified under
various subparagraphs of Article XX.477
7.242. In light of its conclusion that the Unite d States has not adequately explained how the
measures chosen by it are necessary to protect public morals, the United States has not met its
burden of demonstrating that the measures are provisionally justified under Article XX(a). The Panel,
therefore, does not consider it necessary to make findings on whether the United States has
demonstrated that its measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION(S)
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes that:
a. the parties have not reached a mutually satisfactory solution within the meaning of
Article 12.7 of the DSU , or otherwise relinquished their rights to pursue WTO dispute
settlement action on the measures at issue in this dispute;
b. all measures challenged by China fall within the Panel 's terms of reference, and it is
appropriate for the Panel to make findings and recommendations with respect to the first
measure as identified in China's panel request (additional duties of 25% on List 1
products), and the second measure as amended on 9 May 2019 (additional duties of 25%
on List 2 products);
c. the challenged measures are prima facie inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1(a) and II:1(b)
of the GATT 1994; and
d. the United States has not met its burden of demonstrating that the measures are
provisionally justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
8.2. As a consequence, the Panel concludes that the measures at issue are inconsistent with
Articles I:1, II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
8.3. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. The Panel concludes that, to the e xtent that the measures at issue are
inconsistent with certain provisions of the GATT 1994, they have nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to China under that agreement within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994.
8.4. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommends that the United States bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
9 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
9.1. In conclusion, the Panel wishes to make some additional observations:
9.2. The Panel is very much aware of the wider context in which the WTO system currently operates,
which is one reflecting a range of unprecedented global trade tensions.
9.3. At the same time, it is not the role of this Panel to draw any legal conclusions or make
recommendations on any matters o ther than those it has been specifically tasked to deal with
through these dispute settlement proceedings. In this connection, the Panel recalls that the
Government of the United States has not, up to the present time, initiated action under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding with respect to any measures China has imposed in response to
the United States' measures at issue in this dispute.478

477 See e.g. Panel Reports, India – Solar Cells, paras. 7.389-7.390; China – Audiovisual Products,
para. 7.912; and Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.620. See also Appellate Body Reports, India – Solar Cells,
para. 5.155; and China – Audiovisual Products, fn 614.
478 Para. 7.4 of the Panel Report refers.

9.4. The Panel emphasizes that pursuant to the requirements of Article 11 of the DSU, it has sought
to perform dilig ently its adjudicatory role in relation to the matters that fall within the terms of
reference of these dispute settlement proceedings. Additionally, the Panel notes that the panel
process is structured in such a way that time is available for the parties to take stock as proceedings
evolve and further consider opportunities for mutually agreed and satisfactory solutions.479
9.5. Accordingly, recalling Article 3.7 of the DSU that highlights that the aim of the dispute
settlement system is to achieve a positive solution to a dispute, the Panel express es its ongoing
encouragement to the parties to pursue further efforts to achieve a mutually satisfactory solution to
the matters that have been raised before it in this dispute.