Document: WT/DS405/R Page C-1 ANNEX C ORAL STATEMENTS, OR EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF, OF THE PARTIES AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH THE PANEL Contents Page
Document codes: WT/DS405/R
Complainant: China
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Japan, Turkey, U.S., Vietnam
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 9  Anti-dumping  Protocol of AccessionArt. 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4  Anti-dumpingArt. I, XVI:4, X:3(a)  GATT 1994Art. 2.1, 2.4  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1  GATT 1994Art. 3.1, 17.6, 3.4, 3.5, 6.1.2, 6.5, 6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.8, 11.3, 12.2.2, 1, 18.1, 2.2.2, 2.6, 9.1, 3.3, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.1.1, 6.9, 6.10.2  Anti-dumping

ANNEX C

ORAL STATEMENTS, OR EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF,
OF THE PARTIES AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE
MEETING WITH THE PANEL

Contents Page
Annex C-1 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of China C-2
Annex C-2 Opening Statement of the European Union C-11
Annex C-3 Closing Statement of China C-16
Annex C-4 Closing Statement of the European Union C-18

ANNEX C-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE OPENING
STATEMENT OF CHINA

I. THE REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RU LING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. With respect to Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ("ADA") as it relates to
investigating authorities, China would first like to stress that the issue presents two completely
separate questions. One is whether or not the la nguage of the Article, introducing to the ADA the
concepts of "bias" and "proper establishment of f acts," contains any substance beyond that already
contained in, for example, the "positive evidence" and "objective examination" language contained in
Article 3.1. The other concerns the relationship between the broad standards
1 set by Article 17.6(i)
and those parts of an investigation not arising under a provision with some sort of fairness or due
process language already built into it. Notably th e resolution of the second question will ultimately
determine, among others, the question of whether or not an authority's conduct throughout certain key
parts of an anti-dumping investigation is completely unreviewable.

2. With respect to the first question, China notes that the broad standards set by Article 17.6(i),
namely those referring to a proper establishment a nd unbiased and objective evaluation of the facts,
quite clearly apply to the entire matter before the Panel, not only certa in stages of the investigation
under review. This is made clear by the chapeau of Article 17.6, referring to the matter before the
DSB.

3. Next, China notes, with clear support from the Appellate Body ("AB") in US - Hot Rolled
Steel, that even though the language of the provision only explicitly defines the Panel's discretion to
overturn the decisions made by authorities w ith respect to issues of fact, the Article impliedly and
necessarily defines the limits of the discretion of authorities, as triers of fact. Namely, that authorities'
conclusions cannot be overturned if they comply with the broad standards set by the Article, but in the
event that they do not, then those conclusions must be overturned.
2

4. It is not entirely clear wh ether the EU denies that the limits of the Panel's discretion are
inextricably linked to that of the authorities in spite of the AB's clear pronouncement to that effect, or
whether the EU considers that even with such link, without an explicit obligation on authorities to act
in conformity with the standards set by Article 17.6(i), there can be no basis on which to claim a
violation for the failure to conduct an investigat ion in conformity therewith. Either position is
untenable and renders the broad standards set by the Article a nullity with respect to everything except
the aspects of an investigation the related provisions of which already have some built-in due process
or fairness language, such as those relating to the determination of injury in Article 3.1.

5. China considers that when the AB in US - Hot Rolled Steel said that the provision relates to
the authorities' "establishment and evaluation of the facts under other provisions of the [ADA],"
3 it
was clearly referring to the "other provisions" pur suant to which facts could be established and
evaluated. The EU's argument, on the other hand, seems to depend on the premise that the "other
provisions" referred to are those which - before the Uruguay Round-addition of Article 17.6(i) -
already contained some fairness or due-process re lated language, of wh ich the language in

1 Note that "broad standards" is the language of the AB. See AB Report in US - Hot Rolled Steel, para. 56.
2 Id.
3 Id. Emphasis added.

Article 17.6(i) is meant to serve as a mere "reminder". 4 In China's view, however, the chapeau of the
Article, along with common sense, supports the conclu sion that the standards set by the Article were
meant to set limits on both the authorities' conduct and the Panel's review thereof with respect to the
entire dispute.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL AND REVIEW REGULATIONS

II.1 CLAIMS CONCERNING DUMPING

6. China first wishes to correct the EU's unf ounded assertion that since paragraph 151 of the
Working Party Report was not included in the Accession Protocol, the WTO members were indicating
that they did not regard the statement as represen ting an existing legal obligation. Such an assertion
reduces to nullity the conclusions summarized in th e Working Party Report concerning the terms of
China's accession negotiated in the 21 meetings between 1996 and 2001. The express acceptance of
the WTO Members in Paragraph 151 of the Working Pa rty Report to comply with the provisions of
that paragraph in implementing su bparagraph (a)(ii) of section 15 of the Accession Protocol, is an
integral part of Paragraph 15(a)(ii) of the Accessi on Protocol and China's agreement to the temporary
derogation therein.

7. With respect to the analogue country selection, the substance of China' s claim is that when
WTO Members resort to the temporary derogation provided for in the second supplementary
provision of Article VI:1 GATT 1994, it should not resu lt in a breach of Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 17.6(i)
of the ADA and Article VI:1 GATT 1994.

8. The factors described by China in its FWS of necessity resulted in Brazilian prices not being
'comparable prices' to the Chinese export prices fo r the purpose of Articles 2.1 of the ADA and VI:1
GATT 1994. Therefore, the inherently incomp arable Brazilian normal value precluded a fair
comparison within the meaning of Article 2.4 of th e ADA. The EU's view that it is enough for an
investigating authority to just take a random anal ogue country and claim that it provides 'comparable'
prices/costs for the purpose of the normal value estab lishment, is unacceptable. This is because if the
analogue country selection leads to the establishment of a normal value which is not comparable to
the export price to begin with, Article 2.4, first sente nce, is automatically violated as there can be no
fair comparison and the concept of 'price comparability' is overturned at its root.

9. Article 2 of the ADA aims to achieve price comparability based on a fair comparison. The
very reason for different methodologies in Artic le 2.2 and the special rule in the second
supplementary provision of Article VI:1 GATT 1994 was to establish a comparable normal value
appropriate for price comparability and thus suitab le for achieving fair comparison. The fair
comparison obligation would serve no purpose if, to begin with, a normal value based on analogue
country data is not appropriate and is unsuitable for the purpose of fair comparison.

10. Having explained the basis of its claim, China further submits that the issue of the degree of
appropriateness of Brazil as the analogue country ( i.e. most appropriate or best) is not the subject of
the claim and the EU's arguments in this regard are irrelevant to the dispute.

11. China considers that investigating authoriti es are obliged to follow certain criteria in the
analogue country selection. Based on the word s and the negotiating history of the second
supplementary provision of Article VI:1 GATT 1994, the existence of fair and adequate competition
in the analogue country is essential in determ ining whether the analogue country prices are
appropriate for price comparability. Moreover, th e WTO members in paragraph 151 of the Working
Party Report accepted that an analogue country selected should have "significant producers of
comparable merchandise" and be either "at a level of economic development comparable to that of

4 Para. 13, EU's FWS.

China" or otherwise be "an appropriate source for the prices or costs". This acceptance reiterates in
more explicit terms the need to establish a comparab le normal value. Theref ore, the comparability of
the socio-economic standards, production structures a nd costs are important criteria for ensuring that
the analogue country selected leads to the establis hment of comparable prices. Additionally, the
absence of domestic sales by cooperating producer s of an important product type (e.g. children's
footwear as found in the present case) demonstr ates the clear absence of comparable prices.
Therefore, China has rightly argued that Brazil wa s not an appropriate analogue country. The EU's
claim that it considered competitiven ess in the Brazilian market and 'var iety of footwear types' traded
besides the 'volume of representative sales' is de feated by facts on record. The facts show
respectively that the EU had no data available for the period prior to the 35 per cent import duty rate
increment, to make a comparative evaluation of the effect on domestic sales and competition
afterwards. Furthermore, children's footwear whic h was a significant part of the exports from China
was not produced by any cooperating Brazilian pr oducer implying therefore that the claim of
considering the variety of footwear traded was indeed a farce.

12. Furthermore, compared to the Review Regulation
5, in its FWS, the EU has changed its
reasoning for the disparity in sending the analogue country questionnaires to Indian and Indonesian
producers, and even this ex-post rationalization is not supported by facts. The EU's unsubstantiated
statement that "in practice, Indian and Indonesian companies had more time to respond than those in
Brazil"
6 is also contradicted by the factual in formation in the Note for the File dated
6 February 2009.7 Finally, the collusion between the It alian and Brazilian footwear associations
which the EU failed to investigate is not remedi ed by the assertion that the data of the Brazilian
producers was not distorted. The reason being that it cannot be excluded that the two footwear
associations colluded to encourage carefully select ed Brazilian producers to cooperate, with the aim
of ensuring the finding of high dumping margins.

13. Similarly, in the context of the original inv estigation claims, in trying to justify what the EU
recognizes in its FWS is a "considerable emphasis" on the criterion of the representativity of domestic
sales, the EU confuses the very distinct steps of (1) selecting an appropriate analogue country and (2)
selecting the data to be used (prices or cost) fo r calculating normal value on the basis of the data
collected in the previously selected analogue country.

14. China has also provided evidence indicating that the procedure for the analogue country
selection in the original investigation was biased. Regr ettably, the EU attempts to distract the Panel's
attention from the substance of China's claims, e. g., by claiming that China presented no evidence to
indicate that any party to the investigation made a ny complaint regarding the EU's efforts to gather
information from exporters in the analogue country. However, Chinese exporting producers did in
fact request the EU to undertake more extensive and diligent efforts to secure producer cooperation
and better assess the appropriateness of India and Indonesia as analogue countries.
8 In response to
China's claims, the EU makes a number of asser tions, but does not adduce any evidence to support
them, despite the clear endorsement by the AB of th e rule that the party which asserts a fact, whether
the complainant or respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. 9 Thus, the burden of
proving that there were fewer (known) producers in Indonesia lies with the EU, not China. Similarly,
China is being accused of having provided evidence which is "sketchy in the extreme", but at the time
of its FWS, the EU itself was unable to confirm the date of submission of the confidential version of
the questionnaire of a Brazilian e xporter. Furthermore, the record shows that the question - which
deadline was granted to the Brazilian exporters to respond to the questionnaire - was just one out of
the many questions and arguments raised by interested parties to which the EU has failed to answer or

5 Recital 52, Review Regulation.
6 Para. 188, EU's FWS.
7 Exhibit CHN-8.
8 Exhibit CHN-91, page 20.
9 AB Report, US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.

which it has failed to consider, and therefore shows that the EU's establishment of the facts was not
proper.

II.2 CLAIMS CONCERNING INJURY AND CAUSATION

15. In the context of the injury claims, the EU's assertion that China's claims II.2-II.5 suffer from
a legal error is incorrect. In US - OCTG Sunset Reviews , the Panel based on the reasoning applied by
the AB in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel (with regard to the determination of 'dumping' in expiry
reviews), held that to the extent that an inves tigating authority relies on a determination of injury
when conducting a sunset review, the obligations of Article 3 would apply to that determination.
10

16. China has submitted arguments in its FW S accompanied by excerpts from the Review
Regulation which will be elaborated in the Second Written Submission, that the EU made a detailed
injury determination.11 For instance, the EU an alyzed whether there was a significant increase in the
allegedly dumped imports per Article 3.2 of the ADA. It further evaluated the price effect of the
allegedly dumped imports by making a new unde rcutting calculation based on a sample of the
Chinese exporters and EU producers selected in the re view investigation. The EU also conducted a
cumulative injury assessment pursuant to Article 3. 3, evaluated the injury indicators pursuant to
Article 3.4 and made a causal link analysis per Ar ticle 3.5. Finally, the EU relied upon that injury
determination entirely to the exclusion of any ad ditional analysis for concluding the likelihood of
continuation of injury which was contained in a mere five recitals of the Review Regulation.
Consequently, the violations of the Article 3 prov isions are claimed in the context of the injury
determination and not the likelihood analysis under Article 11.3. China is not "forcing the Panel to
disregard Article 11.3 of the ADA in the considerati on of all the injury-related determinations in the
Regulation"12, as claimed by the EU, but is just following the approach suggested by the Panel in US -
OCTG Sunset Reviews.

17. Having clarified the legal basis of its injury-re lated claims, China wishes to reiterate that there
was a lack of fundamental fairness and objectivity in the procedure for the injury determination of
which the sampling of the domestic industry was the first step, because the complainant producers
were not required to complete sampling forms which resulted in the fact that the relevant 'positive
evidence' for sampling was not available at the time of sample selection. The EU has deviated from
China's fundamental argument that the production and sales data of the individual complainant
producers for the Review Investigation Period which was claimed to be the key basis of the sample
selection in the Notes for the File13 and the Review Regulation14 was not available in the complaint, in
the standing forms or pre-10 October 2008 CEC submissions. The EU's post-sample selection
justification regarding the representativeness of the sa mple cannot rectify the failure to comply with
Articles 3.1 and 17.6(i) at the time of sample selection.15

18. China notes that the EU has not provided any evidence to support its assertion that the
relevant sampling information was available to it a nd that there was no need or practical purpose for
sending sampling forms to the complainants. The EU 's contention that the information that would
have been sought through the samp ling forms was already available,
16 is simply factually incorrect.

10 Panel Report, US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, paras. 7.273-7.275.
11 See also recital 219, Review Regulation; para. 254 of EU's FWS. In both these contexts the EU
notes made an injury analysis and that it investigated the existence of injury.
12 Para. 244, EU's FWS.
13 See Note for the Files dated 29 October 2008, 9 December 2008, and 9 March 2009.
14 Recital 21, Review Regulation.
15 Para. 279, EU's FWS.
16 Para. 263, EU's FWS.

As done on previous occasions for instance in EC - Salmon, China requests the Panel to ask the EU to
demonstrate what information in the file of this investigation supports its arguments.
17

19. Concerning the representativity of the sample , China notes that it posits the application of
Article 6.10 of the ADA with regard to the sample of the dom estic industry on two grounds. First,
China's arguments are based on the ruling of the Panel in EC - Salmon that a determination of injury
is a collective assessment for the entire domestic industry as a whole and "a sample that is not
sufficiently representative of the domestic industry as a whole is not likely to allow for such an
unbiased investigation, and therefore may well result in a determination on the question of injury that
is not consistent with the requirements of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement" .18 Second, China relies on
that Panel's reasoning that whether any other fact or besides the production volume would be equally
or more relevant to ensure that the sample ade quately represents the domestic industry has to be
assessed on a case-specific basis. Thus, the EC - Salmon Panel's finding that it saw "no basis to
impose the criteria of Article 6.10 on sampling in the context of injury" cannot be read as a prohibition
on the use of these criteria in the injury context. Hence, China considers that if the volume of
production or sales is the key factor taken into account by the investigating authority as done by the
EU, then it must comply with the sampling criteria in Article 6.10 which would ensure that the sample
is representative of the entire domestic industr y as a whole and satisfies the requirements of
Article 3.1. The EU however failed to select a sa mple accounting for the 'largest percentage of
volume' of production, sales and included in the sa mple one or more companies that had small
production volumes. China reiterates its request to the Panel to use its investigatory powers under
Article 13.1 of the DSU to request the EU to disclose the number of employees per sampled company.
China believes that such data is likely to further evidence that the EU in fact included some very small
companies in the sample, contrary to its stated position in the Note for the File.

20. China reiterates that in the original investigation the EU by its own admission selected the
domestic industry sample based on the production vol ume of the complainants. Likewise, in the
review investigation, through the various No tes for the File, the EU made clear that "the baseline for
the [sample] selection was founded on a ranking of the producers with the highest production volume
in the IP."
19 Therefore, the sample of the EU producers selected should have accounted for the largest
percentage of volume of production which was not the case as it included even small producers in that
sample and producers that outsourced production to non-EU countries.

21. With regard to the definition of the domestic industry in the review investigation, China
submits that it is only in the FWS that the EU has explicitly mentioned, albeit in direct contradiction
to the Note for the File 20 issued during the investigation and on the basis of reference to one recital of
the Review Regulation (which is certainly not sel f-explanatory), that the domestic industry consisted
of complainants and non-complainants. China requ ests the Panel not to accept the post-investigation
definition of the domestic industry as claimed by th e EU. The contrary would permit investigating
authorities to maintain a safety valve by leaving th e text of the determination vague and switching the
definition of the domestic industry depending on the s ituation to ensure that they are protected against
any allegation of a breach of the ADA even though they expressly violated the provisions of that

17 In EC - Salmon, the Panel noted that: "[w]e consider it imperative that there be some indication in
the published determination, or at least some information on the matter in the files of the investigating authority
which can be identified for a reviewing panel, on the basis of which that panel can determine how the facts were
established, beyond the undisputed good faith and hard work of the staff of the investigating authority ."
para. 7.667.
18 Ibid., at paras. 7.128 and 7.130.
19 Note for the file dated 9 March 2009. Exhibit CHN-27. Also Note for the File dated
29 October 2008 mentions that 'eight large producers' were sent the anti-dumping questionnaire. Exhibit CHN-
25.
20 Note for the File dated 9 March 2009.

agreement in the course of the injury determina tion. This would make the Article 3.1 and 3.4
provisions practically ineffective.

22. China also notes that such a radical change in the definition of the domestic industry in the
review investigation as compared to the origin al investigation would have required a detailed
explanation in the Review Regulation. This is because Article 11(9) of the EU's Basic AD Regulation
requires that " [i]n all review…investigations…the Commission shall, provided that circumstances have
not changed, apply the same methodology as in the investigation which led to the duty."

23. However, in case the Panel were to accept the EU's new definition of the domestic industry,
China submits that a sample representing 3.1 per cent of the total domestic industry production and
consisting only of the complainants cannot possi bly be considered representative of the entire
domestic industry which then included the non-comp lainant producers accounting for around 65 per
cent of the EU production. By selecting a sample of the domestic industry from the complainant
producers' pool only, the EU violates Articles 3.1 and 17.6(i) of the ADA.

24. Irrespective of the different domestic indus try definition now claimed by the EU, China
emphasizes the breach of Article 3.4 in the EU's evaluation of the macro-economic indicators. The
EU has asserted that producers who imported over 25 per cent of their output from the countries
concerned and had delocalized production were not part of the EU production.
21 However, in
contradiction to this assertion, the EU evalua ted the injury indicator 'production' based on the
Prodcom data, and the remaining indicators on the b asis of national associations' data which included
the data of even those producers that are relate d to Chinese/Vietnamese producers and/or are major
importers of Chinese or third country outsourced fo otwear. Thus Prodcom and national associations'
data did include the data of producers not part of the EU production and therefore the domestic
industry.

25. The EU's whole evaluation of 'production' based on Prodcom data for EU-27 as being equal to
the domestic industry production is based on the e rroneous assumption that out of 18,000 producers,
only two non-complainant producers needed to be excluded from the definition of the Union
production and industry on account of their relation to Chinese exporters and significant imports.
This assumption is refuted by facts and the Review Re gulation. The latter states that the EU made the
evaluation only for the complainant producers, as to whether or not they were related to exporting
producers in the countries concerned, had delocaliz ed production, or were major importers of the
product concerned from the countries concerned/third countries.22

26. Considering the EU's definition of the domestic industry in its FWS, the breach of Article 3.4
and lack of objective evaluation is in fact more pronounced. This is because 'production' was
evaluated based on 100 per cent production in the EU as reported in Prodcom, whereas the indicators
production capacity, sales, employment, growth were evaluated based on the data of eight national
associations accounting for 80 per cent of the EU production.
23

27. Additionally, the lack of positive evidence for the injury evaluation is not remedied by the
fact that the eight Member States' associations were verified, when the data reported by them
24 was
clearly stated as being based on 'estimates ' for the lack of official statistics 25 and was not specific to
the like product. Moreover, concerning production, the Prodcom data clearly includes estimates and
reports production on an yearly basis at the 8-digi t CN code level which includes the data for the

21 Recital 339 Review Regulation.
22 Recital 195 Review Regulation.
23 Para. 303, EU's FWS.
24 For injury indicators such as production, sales volume, production capacity.
25 Responses of ANCI, Polish Chamber of Shoe and Leather Industry.

products not under investigation as well. Therefore, one is left to guess how the EU evaluated the
Review Investigation Period production figures for the like product.

28. Finally, with respect to the causation analysis in the original inves tigation, China has argued
that the EU's interpretation of the non-attribution la nguage effectively renders that provision null. In
spite of the EU's boilerplate proclamation that it " carefully analysed" other known factors, and they
"in isolation or seen together would [not] be su ch as to break the causal link between the dumped
imports and the injury suffered by Union produ cers," China considers that the Regulations
demonstrate that for the "other known factors" that did have some acknowledged injurious effect, the
EU declined to consider those factors for non-attribution which did "not on its own appear to be a
factor that would break the causal link." This causal link standard with respect to individual factors is
unacceptable. It would mean that even if, for exam ple, two variables each accounted for half of the
injury caused to the domestic industry, in terms of the depressive effects on prices, neither of those
two variables would by themselves sever the causal link, as a result of which there would still be
causation. Under such interpretation, the non-attribution requirement would have no value.

29. Furthermore, with respect to certain other f actors, such as the steep appreciation throughout
the Investigation Period of the EURO generally and vis-à-vis the currency in which most competing
imports are priced in particular, the EU pos its that such a factor would not even be eligible for
consideration or analysis because China cannot "shift res ponsibility for the injury suffered by the EU
producers away from the exporters and onto an extraneous event
26". China considers that the very
purpose of the non-attribution analysis is to identify the extraneous events causing injury for which the
exporters are not actually responsible. The EU justifies its stance on these issues through its wide
discretion on the methodology according to which othe r factors are analyzed, but China submits that
the EU is confusing the selection of an analytical methodology with the legal standard to which the
results of that analysis are held in order to be given actual effect.

II.3 CLAIMS CONCERNING PROCEDURAL ISSUES

30. While there are numerous procedural and transp arency issues shrouding the EU's original and
review determinations, at this stage China wishes to highlight a few key issues. With reference to the
review investigation, the EU blatan tly disregards the Panel's ruling in Guatemala - Cement II in the
context of Article 6.1.2 by asserting that "when a company supplies information, described as non-
confidential, which is of a type that would normally be accorded confidenti ality, the European Union
authorities will check that company's intentions on the point before making it available to other
interested parties", thereby justifying a one month delay in placing the information in the non-
confidential file. 27 China submits that, first, it is not for the investigating authorities to judge
confidentiality of information in the specific cont ext of a non-confidential document submitted by a
party. Second, in the absence of a duly substa ntiated request for confidentiality by the party
submitting the information, 'the requirement to protect confidential information' in Article 6.1.2
cannot be invoked to justify the failure to promptly make available that information to other interested
parties.28 The latter point also underlines the fallacy of the EU's interpretation that the period for
assessing the prompt availability of information ru ns from the moment the non-confidentiality status
of the document/information is ascertained to the satisfaction of the investigating authority.

31. With respect to the express conditions for according confidentiality under Article 6.5, the EU
erroneously claims in the context of the review inv estigation that for information that is 'by nature'
confidential, good cause is shown by "simply placing data of this kind in the appropriate part of the
submission."
29 Such an interpretation makes Article 6. 5 totally unnecessary and if accepted, would

26 Para. 476, EU's FWS.
27 Paras. 358, 359, EU's FWS.
28 Panel Report, Guatemala - Cement II, paras. 8.142-8.143.
29 Para. 447, EU's FWS.

permit parties to submit blank non-confidential questionnaire responses. Moreover, the EU's
contention that confidentiality requested in the expiry review request for the names of the
complainants is enough to cover all other submissions of the complainants and supporters and for all
other sets of information for which neither c onfidentiality was requested nor good cause was
demonstrated, completely belittles the provisions of Article 6.5. It also discredits the Guatemala -
Cement II Panel's ruling that authorities may not grant confidential treatment to information on their
own initiative in the absence of a good cause demonstration by the party concerned.30

32. Besides having failed to require the con cerned sampled EU producers in the review
investigation to state reasons why non-confid ential summaries could not be provided for the
information in the injury questionnaire r esponses submitted in confidence, based on a
misunderstanding of Article 6.5.1, the EU explai ns in its FWS why non-confidential summarization
was not possible, when it was actually incumbent on the parties concerned to do so.

33. In the original investigation, by the EU 's own admission, certain information was never
supplied to interested parties. 31 In this respect, the EU stated that "(i)n addition to the protection
normally provided to confiden tial business information the Eur opean Union was in this case
motivated to extend confidential treatment in ord er to protect the identities of the Complainants …".
China submits that such a "motivated extension" of confidential treatment, is contrary to Article 6.5.

34. As was already submitted duri ng the administrative procedure
32, the EU is not able to confirm
why certain documents pertaining to the origin al investigation were not included in the non-
confidential file. Interested parties were not gr anted access to the questi onnaire response of the EU
producer "n.10" and the more than 500 missing declarations of support. The EU seems to hold the
peculiar view that it may select a "sample" of information submitted by interested parties for inclusion
in the file and that it may unilaterally decide to withhold information duly submitted by interested
parties on the ground that the interests of other in terested parties would not have been served by its
disclosure.
33

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING ARTICLE 9(5) OF THE EU BASIC AD REGULATION

35. China considers that the EU has violated the basic MFN principle, which requires WTO
Members to treat like products equally, irrespective of their origin. China begins from the premise
that Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation co nstitutes a rule or formality in connection with
importation since it effectively determines whethe r or not individual anti-dumping duties will be
imposed upon the product concerned upon importation to the EU. Furthermore, individual duties
clearly constitute an "advantage" within the meani ng of the Article because receipt of an individual
duty ensures that an exporter is not subjected to a duty higher than its own dumping margin.

36. The EU has not provided any legal basis fo r the proposition that the status of the Chinese
economy may have an effect on the nature of the imports originating in China such that they could not
be considered like products, as compared to impor ts from other countries, and therefore the EU's
argument with respect to the GATT I.1 claim fails.

37. Nor has the EU provided any legal basis fo r the proposition that the status of China's
economy could affect whether an exporter is eligib le for the calculation of an individual dumping
margin and/or subsequent imposition of an indivi dual duty. This is nevertheless a fundamental
premise on which the EU's defenses relating to China's Article 6.10 and 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 claims rest.

30 Panel Report, Guatemala - Cement II, paras. 8.220-8.221.
31 Para. 762, EU's FWS.
32 CHN-87, p. 8.
33 Para. 781, EU's FWS.

38. With respect to the Article 6.10 claim, China c onsiders that Article 9(5) is inconsistent with
the ADA because it provides that specific conditions must be met before exporting producers from
"non-market economy" countries can receive an individual dumping margin. This is impermissible
because the face of the text, as well the context of other provisions of the ADA, clearly indicate that
sampling is the only exception to the rule that i ndividual exporters are to be granted individual
dumping margins. The EU argues, contrary to cons istent case law, that a departure from the rule
contained in Article 6.10 is in theory permissible in other situations as well. In support of this view,
the EU relies principally on the identification of what it considers to be other "exceptions" to the rule.
China considers these to not actually be exceptions at all, but rather circumstances otherwise provided
for in the ADA, and China will fully address them point by point in its Second Written Submission.

39. In any case China notes that even in the event that the Panel were actually willing to create a
judicially-made exception to what the EU has con ceded is, at a minimum, a "clear preference"
34 for
individual margins, the EU has not even begun to adduce evidence demonstrating a need, compelling
or otherwise, for what would be a unique derogation from the norm.

40. Next, China will address the EU's alternative argument to the "exceptions" issue, that the
reasoning of the Panel report in Korea - Paper justifies the "IT regime" instituted by Article 9(5).
China considers that any analogy between the two does not obtain for a multitude of reasons, a few of
which China will identify here. First, the EU wrongly presumes that the aim of the Korea - Paper test
was to identify the "actual source of price discrimination," and justifies the IT regime on the basis that
it shares that aim. The EU uses the phrase "actual source of price discrimination" 18 times throughout
its FWS, but the Panel report did not frame it this way even once because the relevant portion of the
report is meant to address the risk of the circumvention of duties, and that only.

41. Even if the IT criteria were limited to those relating directly to a high risk of circumvention of
duties by WTO Members, the Panel in Korea - Paper was clear that the burden of proving this risk, as
a factual matter, was on the authorities. The authorities were explicitly not given the discretion to
operate under a legal presumption th at exporters were related, whic h is precisely what the EU has
done here.35

42. China will now address the Article 9.2 claim. With respect to the parties' disagreement over
the definition of the word "impracticable" within the text of the Article, China considers that the word
clearly refers to situations in which there is a hi gh number of exporters. This should be clear from the
face of the Article itself, and even more so when read in light of the similar structure of Article 6.10,
which provides an exception to the principle that exporters should receive an individual dumping
margin, only in the case of sampling.

43. With respect to the EU's alternative argumen t that it may consider the State to be a single
supplier within the meaning of Article 9.2, China c onsiders that Article 9(5) is inconsistent with
Article 9.2 for many of the same reasons th at it cannot be considered analogous with the Korea -
Paper test. Namely, the factual inquiry impermissibl y shifts the burden of proof as to relation with
the State and most of the IT criteria go far beyond what would be necessary to identify whether the
State were indeed the true single "supplier" of a good.

44. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Panel, the De legation of China thanks you very much for your
attention and will be at your disposal for answering any questions you may have.

34 Id. at 82.
35 Panel Report in Korea - Paper, para. 7.161.

ANNEX C-2

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Panel, we w ould like to thank you for agreeing to serve on
this Panel and thank the Secretariat for all the wo rk they have done and will do in facilitating your
task.

2. In this dispute China has launched a great numb er of claims in respect of a provision of the
European Union's Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation a nd of two measures taken in respect of certain
footwear originating in China. We have responde d to these claims in our First Written Submission in
great detail. We do not intend to repeat today a ll the points we have made in that Submission,
although we of course remain ready to explain a nd elaborate upon any of them should the Panel so
require. Rather, we will focus only on certain speci fic points and also on some general remarks about
China's claims, and the way they are presented in its Submission. We will also address some of the
matters raised in the submissions of the Third Parties.

II. CHINA'S "AS SUCH" CLAIM AGAINST ARTICLE 9(5) OF THE BASIC AD
REGULATION

3. Regarding China's "as such" claims against Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation, China
blatantly ignores the actual scope of the measure at issue and follows incorrect interpretations of the
relevant provisions of the covered agreements.

4. In view of Articles 6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU, the European Union considers that the Panel's
mandate with respect to China's "as such" claim is to examine the conformity of the concrete aspects
of the specific measure described by China in its Panel Request with the relevant provisions of the
covered agreements invoked by China.

5. The specific measure in this case, as defined by China's Panel Request, is a very concrete
legislative provision, i.e., Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation. The concrete aspects provided for
by Article 9(5) and that China described in its Panel Request are that, in case of imports from non-
market economy countries: (i) an individual anti-dumping duty shall be specified for suppliers that
can demonstrate, on the basis of properly substantiated claims, that they fulfil the five criteria listed in
that provision; and, otherwise, (ii) the anti-dumpi ng duty shall be specified for the supplying country
concerned and not for each supplier. The Panel is thus not called upon to examine matters merely
because they may be somehow "connected" to the Artic le 9(5) determination as to who the relevant
supplier is. Thus, it is not called upon to examine matters pertaining to the calculation or individual
determination of dumping margins, or to the wa y in which the level of anti-dumping duties is
established. It is limited to the matters specifically identified by China in its Panel Request.

6. Moreover, the European Union has already la id out the reasons why the Panel should reject
most of China's claims. Firstly, contrary to the requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU, China's
Panel Request failed to present the problem clearly. Secondly, on the substance, the specific measure
described by China in its Panel Request does not fall within the scope of the obligations contained in

Articles 9.2
1, 6.10, 9.3 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and in Article X:3(a) of the GATT
1994.

7. In any event, like the vast majority of third parties expressing a view on this issue
2, the
European Union considers that China's claims against Article 9(5) are based on an erroneous
understanding of the relevant provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994 and China's
Protocol of Accession.

8. Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement allows for a single dumping margin to be
determined for the actual producer and the source of th e price discrimination, even if there are several
exporters involved. This is in essence the situa tion that prevails in non-market economy countries,
and particularly in China
3, where State control over the means of production and State intervention in
the economy including international trade and export activities imply that exports are best regarded as
emanating from a single producer. It follows that the imposition of anti-dumping duties on a single
supplier, i.e., China, despite th e existence of several exporters which do not act independently from
the State, in other words non-IT suppliers , is also permitted by Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In this respect, the calculation of dumping margins and the imposition of anti-dumping
duties on a country-wide basis in cases of impor ts from non-market economy countries do not differ
significantly from the situation where the investigati ng authority is confronted with several exporters
who are all dependent on a single producer, that producer being the actual source of the price
discrimination.

9. Even assuming that Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement can be read as containing the
principle to impose individual anti-dumping duties for each known exporter or producer, the
imposition of country-wide anti-dumping duties is nevertheless permitted in cases where such
imposition on an individual basis w ould result in the measure being ineffective. This is precisely the
situation that arises because of China's non-market economy status. Indeed, the objective of offsetting
or preventing dumping (stated in Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 ) would be undermined if individual
duties were to be imposed on suppliers whose expor t activities were not sufficiently independent of
the State (i.e., the actual producer of the product concerned).

10. Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation mirrors the language of Article 9.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement as far as possible, and establishes a mechanism for imposing anti-dumping
duties in situations where market-economy c onditions are absent which accurately addresses the
actual source of dumping in each case (i.e., either the independent MET/IT supplier, or the State and
its export branches as one supplier).

11. Thus, Article 9(5) is fully in conf ormity with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. The European Union observes that China's cl aims under Articles 9.3, 9.4 and 18.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles I:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement are entirely dependent on a finding that Article 9(5) "as such" infringes Article 9.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and, to some extent Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Since
this is not the case, the Panel does not need to examine those claims.

III. ARTICLE 17.6(I) ADA

12. We now turn our attention – very briefly – to China's claims based on Article 17.6(i) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement . As the European Unio n has already explained, China's claims based on

1 EU First Written Submission, footnote 123.
2 U.S. Third Party Written Submission, paras. 3–17; Japan's Third Party Written Submission,
paras. 12–13; Brazil's Third Party Written Submi ssion paras. 12–26; Colombia's Third Party Written
Submission, paras. 7–12; Turkey's Third Party Written Submission, paras. 5–15.
3 EU First Written Submission, paras. 71–73.

this provision are not suitable to be pursued in dispute settlement proceeding. But rather than
repeating our reasons for adopting this position, at this juncture we would like to focus on the
significance of China's claims for the present proceeding and the European Union's rights of defence.

13. In this respect, we also refer to the Third Party Written Submission of Brazil, specifically to
Brazil's view that "Article 17.6(i) is a procedural rule, relating to the WTO dispute settlement process,
that does not impose self-standing obligations" upon investigating authorities.
4 While this statement
supports the position that the European Union takes be fore the Panel, that is not why we mention it
here. Our present concern is that, should the Panel in deed consider that Article 17.6(i) imposes direct
obligations on WTO Members, the European Un ion would consider it necessary to enter into a
discussion before the Panel about the extent and scope of such obligations. Should Article 17.6(i) be
interpreted as entailing such direct obligations, thei r extent would have to be determined, taking due
account of other relevant provisions 5 establishing, to use Brazil's la nguage, other related "procedural
rules" provided in the Anti-Dumping Agreement , including the second sentence of Article 17.6(i).
China has never taken a stance on this issue. And yet this was one of the reasons why the European
Union raised this issue as a preliminary matter – namely to understand what case we have to answer
on this issue.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS

14. Our next remarks are of a more general natu re. The fact that China is challenging three
distinct legal instruments, and that with regard to each of the two operative measures it is making a
lengthy list of challenges, is a reason for paying special attention to the issue of whether those
challenges are expressed clearly. Unfortunately, a reading of China's Submission shows it to be
characterised by confusion rather than clarity of expression.

15. A minor but quite avoidable source of confusion becomes apparent right at the outset. The
two operative measures, the Definitive Regulation a nd the Review Regulation were adopted in 2006
and 2009 respectively. Put at its simplest, the first 'sets the scene' for the second. Certain aspects of
the second, such as the choice of PCNs or the denial of market-economy treatment, do not make sense
unless one knows the details of the first. Neverthele ss, for no apparent reason China has chosen to set
out its case against the two measures in the opposite order, that of 2009 before that of 2006.

16. More seriously, China creates confusion by making little distinction between the bases of its
challenge on the two measures. Instead of recogni sing the distinct legal context of the Review
Regulation, specifically the fact that, as an expiry review, it is governed by Article 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement ,
6 China approaches both measures as though they were initial investigations.
Yet, as we explained at length in our Submission, it is Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
which governs the reviews and not, for instance, Ar ticle 3. China's reliance on the latter provision
constitutes a legal error which, on its own, invalidates China's claims.

17. The imprecise nature of many of China's clai ms creates additional confusion. Thus, in many
cases the European Union is accused of misbehaviour without any re ference to particular rules of the
GATT 1994 or the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Again, in claims regardi ng supposed procedural errors,
for example regarding allegations of improper dela ys on the part of the investigating authorities,
China repeatedly confuses the applicable provisions of Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

18. Also in the context of its procedural claims , China treats the criteria for according confidential
treatment as though they were self-standing rules ra ther than ones that only had meaning within the

4 Brazil's Third Party Submission, para. 9. To the same effect, see also Japan's Third Party Submission,
para. 22.
5 See EU Request for a Preliminary Ruling, para. 80, third sentence, in particular.
6 To the same effect, see also U.S. Third Party Written Submission, paras. 21-25.

particular obligations of transp arency that are created by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Here again it
includes lists of items that it finds unsatisfactory w ithout indicating in which particular respects they
are alleged to infringe WTO rules. As the res pondent Member the European Union will defend itself
against properly formulated claims. It is the r esponsibility of China, as the complainant Member, to
identify with precision the specific obligations that it alleges the European Union to have infringed.

19. Finally, China adds to the confusion created by its Submission through arguments that are at
times opportunistic and inconsiste nt. For example, the meaning that it proposes for the term
'information' in Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement fluctuates throughout the Submission,
according to what best suits China's current purpose.

20. The task of the Panel in adjudicating on this dispute, and that of the European Union in
upholding the legality and correctness of its acti ons, have been unnecessarily complicated by these
aspects of China's submission. We will nevert heless seek to set out our arguments in as
straightforward a way as possible.

21. There will, no doubt, be opportunities to ra ise these issues in the course of the panel
proceedings. For the remainder of this short stat ement we intend to discuss matters for which such
opportunities are more limited.

V. LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS ADVANCED BY THIRD PARTIES

22. To be specific, at this point we would like to consider the submissions made by the Third
Parties.

23. We are, of course, heartened to see that, for the most part, the comments and arguments
presented in these submissions support or agree with the positions taken by the European Union.

24. At this moment, we will therefore concentrate on a few points in the submissions where we
take a somewhat different view to that presented by Third Parties, as we consider it useful to highlight
this before the Panel.

25. First, we would comment upon the Submission of the United States, and in particular on its
observation (at paragraph 30) that:

Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement requires that the domestic industry account for at
least a "major proportion" of the producti on of the like product and does not permit
an investigating authority to exclude a por tion of the domestic industry that is an
"important, serious, or significant" proportion of domestic production.
26. Since the matter is not, as far as we can see, crucial to the present dispute, we will not devote
much time to it. Suffice it to say that the aut horitative source relied upon by the United States to
uphold its observation (paragraph 7.341 of the Panel Report Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping
Duties) in fact supports the opposite contention, as it sp ecifically envisages that there may be more
than one 'major proportion' of an industry.

27. The second point that we want to bring to the Panel's attention is more closely connected with
the matters at issue in this dispute. It concerns the interpretation that Japan maintains (at paragraph 50
of its Submission) should be given to Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . The Panel will
recall that this provision states that:

The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all
interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their
cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the

authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis
of this information.
28. At this point in its Subm ission Japan addresses the scope of this obligation and concludes
that:

information, on which an authority did not base its decision and thus was not required
to disclose under Article 6.9, still falls within Article 6.4's disclosure requirement.'
29. The justification for this conc lusion is that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which
also contains a disclosure obligation, refers to fact s 'which form the basis for the decision whether to
apply definitive measures'. The implicit assumption is that if the Agreement intended the obligation
in Article 6.4 to cover information that 'formed th e basis' for the authorities' decision, it would have
employed that term and it would not have spoken of information that was 'used' by them. However, in
adopting this argument Japan effectively interprets the latter term to mean information that was
'available' or 'known' to the authorities. Applying the same logic that Japan adopts one could say that
if that had been its intention the Agreement could have used either of those terms. However, it did not
do so.

30. Japan quotes the Panel Report EC – Salmon (Norway) in support of its interpretation, but the
quotation that it gives does not explain how a matter that the authorities should use in an investigation
becomes one that they do use, which is what Article 6.4 addresses.

VI. CONCLUSION

31. Mr. Chairman, members of the Panel, that concludes the opening remarks of the European
Union. While it is of course the responsibility of China, as the complainant, to establish a case against
us, and not for us to disprove one , we will nevertheless actively engage in demonstrating to the Panel
the lawfulness of the European Union's anti-dumping legislation, and of the anti-dumping action it has
taken in respect of certain footwear from China. In this regard, we look forward to the opportunities
that will be presented by the further stages of thes e proceedings, and in particular to responding to
your questions. Thank you for your attention.

ANNEX C-3

CLOSING STATEMENT OF CHINA

1. China wishes to extend its sincere gratitude to the panel and the secretariat for its attention
during the past days. In its opening statement y esterday, China addressed several aspects pertaining
to this dispute. Notably pertaining to Article 17. 6(i), certain claims raised in the context of the
original and review investigations and the 'as such' claims. In this closing statement China will not
repeat its arguments and will remain brief. Chin a will highlight certain key points which have been
the subject of some debate in the last two days.

2. First, with respect to the 17.6(i) claims, Ch ina will not reiterate its arguments as to why it
considers that the Article can form the basis of a claim, but would like to stress again the specific
legal question presented in this case is one of absolu te first impression before the Panel. In neither
Thailand - H-Beams, which at least appears to support the EU's view, nor US - Hot Rolled Steel,
which China considers to support its view , nor any of the other cases presented by the parties in
support of their arguments on this point was an actua l violation of Article 17.6(i) alleged in a Panel
request. It is significant that the cases dealt with Article 17.6(i) in relation to Articles already
containing embedded due process language, such as Article 3.1. None of the pertinent dicta contained
therein control or relate directly to the issue before the panel.

3. Ultimately it appears as though both China and the EU agree that if the authorities are not
bound to evaluate facts throughout the entire investigation in an objective and unbiased manner, then
the efficacy of the system is at risk. China sees Article 17.6(i) as providing an overarching due-
process requirement with respect to factual determ inations made pursuant to the ADA, whereas the
EU has stated it that considers that each individual provision has such a requirement "embedded"
within, though without explaining how such a requi rement would be given practical effect. China
considers it clear which of these two is the lesser administrative evil and looks forward to clarifying
its position on the issue.

4. In the course of the discussion concerning China' s claims with regard to Article 9(5) of the
Basic AD Regulation, the EU has argued that the "i ndividual treatment" regime is somehow justified
by Paragraph 15 of China's Protocol of Accession. When questioned, the EU was, however, unable to
point to any specific wording in the Paragraph wh ich would confirm that a Member may treat China
differently with respect to the imposition of individual dumping duties, the calculation of individual
dumping margins, or even the factual determination of whether state is effectively the parent company
of two or more exporters. Para graph 15 of the Protocol only deals with one very limited issue,
namely the possibility, for a limited time, for WT O Members to determine normal value on the basis
of data other than the domestic prices and costs in China. Nothing more, nothing less.

5. The EU raised a very specific issue dur ing the debate concerning the scope of the
applicability of Paragraph 151 of the Working Part y Report on China's accession to the WTO. The
EU considers that Paragraph 151(a) expressed the acceptance of only certain WTO Members, notably
those that had not established and published criteria at the time of China's ac cession to the WTO, for
determining whether market economy conditions prev ailed in the industry or with respect to a
company producing the like product, and the methodology that they used in determining price
comparability. The words of Paragraph 151(a) ho wever make it very clear that the acceptance
contained therein was with respect to all WTO Members. It explicitly requires all Members to apply a

methodology that includes inter ali a, " guidelines that the investigating authorities should normally
utilize" the prices or costs in one or more market economy countries that are significant producers of
comparable merchandise and that either are at a le vel of economic development comparable to that of
China or are otherwise an appropriate source for the pr ices or costs to be utilized in light of the nature
of the industry under investigation.

6. Moving to the injury related issues, China woul d like to recall that in the review investigation
the EU made an injury determination and entirel y relied upon that determin ation to conclude the
likelihood of continuation of injury. In particul ar, 153 recitals of the Re view Regulation covering
almost 21 pages exclusively discuss the injury determ ination of the EU and the likelihood analysis is
contained in a mere five recitals of that Regul ation that follow the 153 recitals discussing the EU's
injury determination. Based on the facts contained in the Review Regulation and in light of the panel
ruling in US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, China has claimed a breach of Article 3 provisions of the ADA
and in consequence thereof a breach of Article 11.3 of the ADA.

7. The EU noted again yesterday that the domestic industry comprised of complainants and non-
complainants. China does not agree with this new ex post definition of the domestic industry. In the
event the Panel were to accept the definition of th e domestic industry now claimed by the EU, China
considers that a sample of the domestic industry selected only from th e pool of complainants and thus
comprising only of the complainants cannot possi bly be considered representative of the entire
domestic industry as a whole and is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 17.6(i) of the ADA.

8. In the specific context of the procedural cl aims concerning the review investigation, China
notes that the EU has mentioned for the first time during the course of the first substantive meeting
with this Panel that five of the eight producers sa mpled in the review investigation did not provide
non-confidential versions of the Community interest questionnaire responses. While clearly this fact
was not made known during the investigation, it was not even noted by the EU in its FWS. This
shows yet again the lack of transparency of the EU's anti-dumping practice.

9. Moreover, China wishes to note that contra ry to the arguments of the EU, it has been
established by the panels in Guatemala - Cement II and Korea - Paper , that 'good cause' must be
'shown' by the interested party submitting the confid ential information. This requirement extends to
both information that is confidential by nature and that which is submitted on a confidential basis.

10. China once again thanks the Panel and the S ecretariat for their attention and the pertinent
questions asked during this first meeting. China remains at your disposal to provide any further
information and evidence that may be required.

ANNEX C-4

CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

 The EU would like to thank again for agreeing to serve on this Panel and also thanks the
WTO Secretariat for their efforts and assistance in this case.

 We have three brief points we want to raise in our closing statement. First, as you have
correctly identified in the course of this first h earing, China seems to try to expand the obligations
contained in the ADA or create obligations where ther e are none. In this respect, we could refer to
our discussion on Article 17(6)(i), Article 2.4 (fair comparison and its application to the analogue
country selection), the requirements under Article 3. 1 and its "automatic" inclusion in the cumulative
examination in Article 3.3 ADA, or China's recogn ition yesterday that there are no obligations in
para. 151 of China's Working Party Report. We are sure that you will identify these instances in your
examination of the case.

 Second, we also want to bring yo ur attention to the issue of burden of proof. It is for China to
make a prima facie case of what its claims. Also in accordance with the Pa nel's working procedures,
today was the last time for China to bring all th e evidence to support its claims. We respectfully
request the Panel to take its mandate very seriously and while making an objective assessment of this
case, refrain from entering into issues that China simply has decided not to address by this stage of the
procedure. This is in particular the case of like lihood of injury analysis in the Review Regulation.
Even if Article 3 ADA were applicable to expiry reviews and were the Panel to find that China has
established a violation of it, China never explained how or on the basis of which evidence that alleged
violation amounted to a violation of Article 11. 3. This is both a legal ground and a factual
misunderstanding of the Review Regulation.

 Finally, in its closing statement we just h eard China referring to para. 15 of its Protocol,
saying that we have been unable to point to any specific wording which could confirm our approach
under Article 9(5). This is also wrong and ignores pa ra. 128 of our FWS which, of course, we invite
China to read and comment on.

 Once more thanks again for your attention a nd we look forward to continue assisting you in
this dispute.