Document: WT/DS350/R Page A-1 ANNEX A FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES Contents Page Annex A-1 First Written Submission of the European Communities A-2 Annex A-2 First Written Submission of the United States A-70
Document codes: WT/DS350/R
Complainant: EU
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 11, 1, 11.1, 11.3, 11.2, 2  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1, VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX A

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY
THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex A-1 First Written Submission of the European Communities A-2
Annex A-2 First Written Submission of the United States A-70
Annex A-3 Response to the United States' Request for Preliminary Rulings by
the European Communities A-116

TABLE OF CASES

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Bed Linen
Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India , ,
adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

EC – Bed Linen
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India ,
, adopted 12 March 2001, DSR 2001:V, 2291
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description
of Sardines, , adopted 23 October 2002
EC – Tube and Pipe Fittings
European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast
Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil , , adopted
18 August 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report,
, DSR 2003:VII, 2701
Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ,
, , and
(4 October 1996), adopted 1 November 1996
US – OCTG Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina ,
 (29 November 2004), adopted

US – 1916 Act (EC)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 –
Complaint by the European Communities, and Corr.1,
adopted 26 September 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body
Report, , , DSR 2000:X, 4593
US – 1916 Act (Japan)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 –
Complaint by Japan , and Add.1, adopted
26 September 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, DSR 2000:X, 4831
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Japan , WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted on
9 January 2004
US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment)
Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted
27 January 2003
US – Hot-Rolled Steel
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled St eel Products from Japan , WT/DS184/AB/R,
adopted 23 August 2001
US – Section 301 Trade Act Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, WT/DS152/R (22 December 1999), adopted 27 January 2000

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 –
Malaysia)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia , WT/DS58/AB/RW, (22 October 2001)
adopted 21 November 2001
US – Softwood Lumber V
United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified
by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, 1937
US – Softwood Lumber V
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada ,
WT/DS264/AB/R, 11 August 200 4 adopted 31 August 2004,
DSR 2004:V, 1875
US – Lumber V (Article 21.5
– Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumb er from Canada – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS264/AB/RW, adopted
1 September 2006
US – Shrimp (Ecuador)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp
from Ecuador , WT/DS335/R, circulated to WTO Members
30 January 2007, adopted on 20 February 2007
US – Zeroing (EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") ,
WT/DS294/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 9 May 2006
US – Zeroing (EC)
Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/R,
adopted 9 May 2006, modified by Appellate Body Report,

US – Zeroing (Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to
Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, circulated to WTO
Members 9 January 2007, adopted 23 January 2007
US – Zeroing (Japan)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/R, circulated to WTO Members
20 September 2006, adopted 23 January 2007, as modified by
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS322/AB/R

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The European Communities requests this Pane l to rule on an issue which has been found
repeatedly inconsistent with WTO rules in previous cases and, in respect of which, the United States
has failed to comply with its obligations. Indeed, in recent years, the United States has been subject to
intense WTO dispute settlement proceedings cont esting the use of zeroing when calculating the
margin of dumping for products in anti-dumping pr oceedings. In all cases, the Appellate Body has
clearly interpreted the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreements finding that zeroing as such and as
applied by the United States was inconsistent with WTO rules, in particular with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement).

2. In view of this consistent interpretation of the relevant pr ovisions of the WTO Agreements,
the European Communities has decide d not to ask this Panel to rule again on the WTO inconsistency
of the United States' zeroing methodology in original investigations and in re view investigations "as
such". The "as such" WTO inconsistency of the methodology has already been successfully
established in US – Zeroing (EC) and in US – Zeroing (Japan) . Pursuant to Article 17.14 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the United Stat es must be considered to have unconditionally
accepted the Appellate Body's findings on "as such" zer oing. Since the "as such" practice applies to
imports from all sources, the European Communities considers that its illegality vis-à-vis the
European Communities (and all other WTO Memb ers) is established. Consequently, the
European Communities sees no purpose in having the same legal discussion a bout the same facts,
given that the Dispute Settlement Body has already settled this matter.

3. The United States' violation of its obligations under the mentioned agreements has resulted in
an excessive imposition and collection of anti-du mping duties as well as their unduly extension
pursuant to sunset reviews in the 18 measures mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request.
1

4. The European Communities regrets to have b een compelled to bring this dispute settlement
proceeding before the WTO. In light of the multip le panel and Appellate Body decisions that have
already considered this issue and the numerous ne w dispute settlement proceedings that are still
pending on the same issue, the European Comm unities would have expected compliance from the
United States, i.e., by eliminating the use of zeroing in all types of anti-dumping proceedings. Since
this is not the case, the Europ ean Communities will outline in its First Written Submission the claims
against the continued application of zeroing in the cases at issue. As the European Communities will
explain below, the United States maintains anti-dum ping duties at specific levels on the basis of a
number of different criteria. First, pursuant to an original investigation, the United States establishes
that dumping has occurred and that, therefore, anti-dumping duties can be imposed in the form of cash
deposits required at the time of importation of the products. Second, pursuant to administrative
review investigations, the United States adjusts the deposit rate and determines the amount of duties
to be paid for any individual period. Third, pursuant to sunset review investigations, the United States
looks into the likelihood of continuation or recurren ce of dumping and injury in order to determine
whether the duties should be revoked. The Europ ean Communities, thus, challenges the measure in
the form of the continued imposition of anti-dumping duties.

5. Additionally, the European Communities cont ests the individual results of the different
investigations carried out by the United States w ith respect to the 18 measures mentioned in the
Annex to the Panel request, namely in 4 original proceedings, 37 administrative review proceedings
and 11 sunset review proceedings.

1 Exhibit EC-1 (Request for the Establishment of the Panel, WT/DS350/6).

II. FACTS
A. O
RIGINAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. Imposition of anti-dumping duties
6. The imposition of anti-dumping duties in the Un ited States in original investigations can be
broadly described as follows. In order to determ ine whether the imposition of anti-dumping measures
on known exporters of a product under investigation ma y be justified, the United States examines the
existence and degree of dumping during a given inves tigation period. This de termination is made by
the United States Department of Commerce (US DOC) and is published in a Notice of Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value. The Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value sets out USDOC's assessment of the existence and degree of dumping. Following a
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, USDOC generally orders the deposit of
estimated anti-dumping duties. 2 The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) then
determines whether the relevant United States industry was injured by reason of the dumped imports.

7. When USDOC finds dumping and USITC finds that such dumping caused injury to the
domestic industry, USDOC issues a Notice of Antidumping Duty Order imposing anti-dumping
duties.
3 That order directs customs to assess an anti-dumping duty equal to the amount by which the
normal value of the merchandise exceeds the export price, once the administering authority receives
satisfactory information upon which the assessment may be based. 4 The order also requires the
deposit of estimated anti-dumping duties pending liquidation of future entries. 5 Entries of
merchandise, the liquidation of which has been su spended, are subject to the imposition of anti-
dumping duties under Section 731 of the Tariff Act.6

8. Thus, following the publication of an Anti- Dumping Order, duties are imposed and the
amount of estimated anti-dumping duties must be depos ited at the time of importation of the products
covered by the order. However, the final assessment ( i.e., the final collection of the duties) does not
take place immediately.

2. Method of comparing normal value and export price
9. In an original investigation, when comp aring normal value and export price, USDOC in
general uses a weighted-average to weighted-ave rage or a transaction-to-transaction comparison
method
7; in most cases, USDOC has app lied the average-to-average method. 8 The transaction-to-
transaction method is only used in unusual situati ons, such as when there are very few sales and the
merchandise sold in each market is identi cal or very similar or is custom-made. 9 Exceptionally, the
investigating authority may compare a weighted -average normal value with individual export
transactions, if there is a pattern of export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions or
periods of time, and the administering authority ex plains why such differences cannot be taken into

2 As last amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the "URAA") (the "Tariff Act"),
Section 735(c), Exhibit EC-2 (Tariff Act – Title VII, particularly Sections 731 to 783).
3 Tariff Act, Section 735(c)(2).
4 Tariff Act, Section 736(a)(1).
5 Tariff Act, Section 736(a)(3).
6 Tariff Act, Section 736(b)(1).
7 Tariff Act, Section 777A(d)(1)( A); see also Regulations on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty
Proceedings adopted by USDOC (the "Regulations"), Sections 351.414 (b)(1) and (2), Exhibit EC-3
(Regulations).
8 Regulations, Section 351.414(c).
9 Regulations, Section 351.414(c).

account using a symmetrical method (a situation referred to in the Regulations as "targeted
dumping").10

3. Model Zeroing
10. When calculating the magnitude of any margin of dumping in order to determine whether the
imposition of anti-dumping duties in respect of imports from known expor ters of a product under
consideration may be justified, and if so wh at the appropriate amount of duty should be, the
United States used a method commonly referred to as "model zeroing". The investigating authority,
as well as determining the overall product scope of the proceeding 11, identifies those sales of sub-
products or models in the United States consider ed comparable and incl udes such sales in an
averaging group.12 An averaging group consists of merchandi se that is identical or virtually identical
in all physical characteristics. 13 Each category of model or sub-product within the subject
merchandise is assigned a control number (CONNUM). 14 A weighted-average-to-weighted-average
comparison between normal value and export pr ice is made within each averaging group. 15 T h e
amount by which normal value exceeds export price is considered by the United States to be a
"dumping margin"16 or dumped amount (referred to by the United States as the Potential Uncollectible
Dumping Duties, "PUDD"). 17 If export price exceeds normal value (the margin is negative), the
"dumping margin" or PUDD for that averaging group is considered to be zero.

11. The overall margin of dumping for the product is obtained by aggregating the multiple model-
based comparisons and expressing the result as a percentage. USDOC calculates both the numerator
and denominator for the fraction from which the overall percentage is derived. The numerator is the
total amount of dumping by model and the denominator is the total value of all "comparable" export
transactions. In adding up the comparison results by model to calculate the numerator under the
model zeroing procedures, USDOC included solely th e results for models with positive differences.
All comparisons with negative differences are disregar ded in the calculation of the numerator. Thus,
for models with negative results , USDOC ignores the results of th e comparison of normal value and
export price. As a result, the total amount of dumping in the numerator is inflated by an amount equal
to the excluded negative results.

12. The Standard Anti-Dumping Margin Program used by USDOC when carrying out the
comparison between normal value and export price per model in original investigations contains the
following lines of computer code, or code of substantially the same structure or effect:

PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
VAR EMARGIN & MUSQTY USVALUE;
OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUDD (DROP=_FREQ_ _TYPE_)
SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL;

13. A detailed explanation of each element of th ese standard procedures is set out in Exhibit EC-
5. In a nutshell, the Standard Zeroing Proce dures separate those sales with positive margins (GT 0)

10 Tariff Act, Section 777A(d)(1)(B) ; Regulations Section 351.414(f). See generally the 1997 edition
of the Import Administration Anti-dumping Manual (the "Manual"), Exhibits EC-4.intro; EC-4.contents; and
EC-4.1 to EC-4.20, in particular, Chapter 6, p. 7, second paragraph; Chapter 7, pp. 28 and 29.
11 Tariff Act, Section 771(25).
12 Regulations, Section 351.414(d)(1).
13 Regulations, Section 351.414(d)(2).
14 Manual, Chapter 4, pp. 8 and 9; Chapter 5, p. 9, second paragraph; Chapter 9, pp. 23 and 27.
15 Regulations, Section 351.414(d)(1); Manual, Chapter 7, pp. 27 and 28; Chapter 9, pp. 23 and 27.
16 The European Communities considers that this concept does not correspond to the term "margin of
dumping" as used in, for example, Articles 2.4.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
17 Manual, Chapter 6, p. 9.

from sales with negative margins and subtotal the dumping amount ("TOTPUDD") for sales with
positive margins only. The sum is kept in the dat aset called "ALLPUDD", which is used to calculate
the final margin of dumping.

14. The European Communities notes that, on 26 December 2006, the United States announced
that it had partly implemented the DSB rulings and recommendations in US – Zeroing (EC) by
changing the above described methodology, so as to abandon the use of zeroing.
18 The measures at
issue in this dispute, however, have not been corrected, and remain tainted by the use of zeroing.

B. A
DMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS
15. The United States has a retrospective assessme nt system under which final liability for anti-
dumping duties is determined after merchandise is imported. 19 Under this system, an anti-dumping
duty liability arises at the time of entry, but duti es are not actually finally assessed at that time.
Rather, the United States collects se curity in the form of a cash deposit at the time of entry, and
determines the final amount of duties due on the entry at a later date, based on dumping margins
during the period of time contemporaneous with the imports, as opposed to the original investigation
period.

16. Specifically, each year during the anniversary month of the publication of an Anti-dumping
Duty Order, a domestic interested party, a foreign government of the exporting/manufacturing
country, an exporter or producer covered by an orde r, or an importer of the subject merchandise may
request an "administrative review"
20 of the amount of duty. 21 Each month USDOC publishes in the
Federal Register a "Notice of Opportunity to Requ est Administrative Review", informing interested
parties that they may request an "administrativ e review" of the amount of duty, and listing those
orders with an anniversary month corresponding to the month of publication of the "Opportunity
Notice".22 Following a request, USDOC promptly publis hes in the Federal Register a notice of
initiation, and sends to appropriate interested parties or other persons questionnaires requesting factual
information, normally no later than 30 days after th e date of publication of the notice of initiation.
USDOC then conducts an investigation. Questionna ires request information on export sales, domestic
sales and costs of production during the period of review. 23 USDOC determines the normal value and
export price of the subject merchandise. 24 USDOC conducts, if appropria te, verifications; issues and
publishes preliminary and final results in the Federa l Register; and promptly instructs customs to
assess anti-dumping duties. In general, preliminary results must be issued within 245 days after the
last day of the anniversary month in which the re quest was made, and final results within a further
120 days, unless these periods are extended. 25 In case of judicial review, an injunction against

18 US Notice on Zeroing in Original Investigations (Exhibit EC-6).
19 Regulations, Sections 351.212 and 351.213.
20 A "periodic review" is often refe rred to, by reference to the more general title of Section 751 of the
Tariff Act, as an administrative review under Section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff Act, which reference is sometimes
shortened to simply "administrative review", in accordance with the defi nition in Section 351.102(b) of the
Regulations. Under the Tariff Act, however, the term "administrative review" encompasses all the types of
reviews under Section 751 of the Tariff Act (including, for example, so-called new shipper reviews, changed
circumstances reviews and five year reviews). In th is submission, the European Communities will refer to
"administrative review".
21 Regulations, Section 351.213(b); Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: "(…) a request for
a final assessment of the amount of the anti-dumping duty has been made (…)".
22 Manual, Chapter 18, p. 3.
23 Manual, Chapter 18, p. 4. Chapter 4.
24 Tariff Act, Section 751(a)(2)(A)(i).
25 Regulations, Section 351.213( h); Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement : "(…) the
determination (…) shall take place (…) no rmally within 12 months, and in no case more than 18 months, after
the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of the anti-dumping duty has been made".

liquidation may be requested, in which case suspension of liquidation is continued.26 Within USDOC
the same team follows the same case from the orig inal investigation through the "administrative
review" process, in order to ensure consistency in the handling of the same case.27

17. The period of "review" will normally be 12 m onths. The first "administrative review" period
will generally be longer, also extending back to the date on which provisional measures were first
applied or liquidation was first suspended (that is, the withholding of appraisement within the
meaning of Article 7 of the Anti- Dumping Agreement ). The results of the first "administrative
review" are, thus, the collection of the actual am ount of duties and the establishment of a new deposit
rate.
28

18. Thus, if there is a "administrative review " pursuant to Section 751(a) of the Tariff Act,
USDOC establishes final liability for the paymen t of anti-dumping duties in relation to the
investigated period, which entails determining the ex tent to which there have been sales at less than
fair value (that is, a margin of dumping) during the period of review by the investigated firm. By
comparison, in particular, with the original investig ation, the period of time from which the data used
to calculate the (up-dated) margin of dumping ar e taken, and the period of time during which export
transactions to be subject to the duty take place, w ill generally coincide. This temporal retrospective
match for the purposes of final liability is the esse ntial point and "basic purpose" of United States
"administrative reviews".29

19. While, generally, the amount of duties to be asses sed is determined in a "review" of the order
covering a discrete period of time, if such a review is not requested, duties are assessed at the rate
established in the completed "review" covering the mo st recent prior period, or, if no "review" has
been completed, the deposit rate applicable at the time merchandise was entered.
30 Thus, if there is no
"administrative review" for a particular firm, entries from that firm are assessed at the rate applicable
to the time of entry.31

1. Calculation of Exporter-Specific Dumpin g Margins and Importer-Specific Assessment
Rates
20. In administrative review investigations, th e United States always calculates two types of
margin: an overall "weighted average dumping margin" for each exporter and importer-specific
assessment rates.

21. The overall weighted average dumping margin which is calculated using zeroing becomes the
duty deposit rate that the United States applies to future entries of the product for the purpose of
collecting estimated duties, until completion of the next review.

22. The importer-specific assessment rates are used by the United States to collect definitive anti-
dumping duties for the review period. The amount of anti-dumping duties owed by each individual
importer is calculated on the basis of comparisons between monthly exporter-specific "normal values"
established on a weighted average basis and prices of individual export transactions. The total
amount of dumping associated with each importer is then aggregated and expressed as a percentage of

26 Manual, Chapter 18, pp. 6 and 7; Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, footnote 20: "It is
understood that the observance of the time-limits mentioned in this subparagraph and in subparagraph 3.2 may
not be possible where the product in question is subject to judicial proceedings".
27 Manual, Introduction, p. 9.
28 Regulations, Section 351.213(e).
29 Manual, Chapter 18, p. 3.
30 Regulations, Sections 351.212 and 351.213; Manual, Introduction, p. 7.
31 Regulations, Section 351.212(a).

that importer's United States imports (the assessment ra te). This assessment rate is then applied to
imports during the period reviewed.
32

23. The final anti-dumping duty liability for past en tries and the new cash-deposit rate for future
entries is calculated by USDOC and published in a Notice of Final Results of Anti-dumping Duty
Administrative Reviews.

2. Method of comparing normal value and export price
24. In administrative review investigations, when comparing normal value and export price, the
investigating authority normally uses the average-to-transaction method.
33 When normal value is
based on the weighted average of sales of the foreign like product, the averaging of such prices will be
limited to sales incurred during the contemporaneous month.34

3. Simple zeroing
25. In administrative review investigations, wh en calculating the magnitude of any margin of
dumping, the United States uses a method commonly known as "simple zeroing". When comparing a
weighted-average normal value with an individua l export transaction, the amount by which normal
value exceeds export price is considered to be the "dumping margin" 35 or amount for that export
transaction.36 If export price exceeds normal value ( i.e., when the margin is negative), the "dumping
margin" or amount for that export transaction is considered to be zero.

26. The overall margin of dumping is calculated by combining the results of each comparison.
The total dumping amount (excluding the negative amount s or treating them as zero) is expressed as a
percentage of the total export price (including all export transactions). USDOC sums the price
differences exclusively for those comparisons fo r which there was a positive dumping margin. All
comparisons with negative differences are disregar ded from the calculation of the numerator of the
overall margin fraction. Thus, where there is a ne gative difference, USDOC ignores the results of the
comparisons of export transactions and normal value. As a result, the sum total of dumping is inflated
by an amount equal to the excluded negative differences.

27. The Standard Anti-Dumping Margin Program employed by USDOC in administrative
reviews contains the following lines of computer code, or code of substantially the same structure or
effect:

PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
BY & USCLASS;
WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
VAR WTDMRG WTDQTY WTDVAL;
OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUD (DROP = _FREQ_ _TYPE_)
SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL

28. A detailed explanation of each element of these standard procedures is provided in
Exhibit EC-5. In short, the Standard Zeroing Procedures separate those transactions with positive
margins (GT 0) from transactions with negativ e margins and subtotal the dumping amounts

32 Regulations, Sections 351.212 and 351.213; Manual, Introduction, p. 7.
33 Regulations, Section 351.414 (c)(2); Manual, Chapter 6, p. 7.
34 Tariff Act, Section 777A(d)(2); Regulations, Section 351.414(e); Manual, Chapter 6, p. 7.
35 The European Communities considers that this concept does not correspond to the term "margin of
dumping" as used in, for example, Articles 2.4.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
36 Tariff Act, Section 751(a)(2)(A); Section 777A(d)(2).

("TOTPUDD") for transactions with positive margins only. The sum is kept in the dataset called
"ALLPUDD", which is used to calculate the final dumping margin.

29. The importer is liable to pay the final anti- dumping duty, as it results from the administrative
review proceeding. USDOC sends appraisement inst ructions to customs, determining an "assessment
rate" and thus the final anti-dumping duty to be paid.
37

C. S
UNSET REVIEWS
30. In sunset review investigations, five year s after publication of an anti-dumping duty order,
USDOC and USITC, respectively, review whether revocation of the order " would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dump ing (…) and of material injury ". USDOC may determine that
dumping is likely to continue or recur if th e anti-dumping order were revoked, notably because
dumping has continued at levels above de minimis after the issuance of the order. To find that
dumping has continued after the issuance of the order, USDOC relies on dumping margins calculated
in the original investigation and/or in administ rative review proceedings using zeroing. Although
sunset reviews do not change the deposit rate for the amount of anti-dumping duty (this continues to
be determined by the original order or most rece nt administrative review), USDOC is required to
determine a duty rate that is "likely to prevail" in the event of revocation of the order and also to
report this rate to the ITC.38

31. In most cases, USDOC considers that the dumpi ng margin found in the original investigation
should be considered as the rate likely to prevail in the event of revocation of the order, since this is
the only margin that reflects the behaviour of an exporter or producer without the discipline of an
order in place. USDOC may also consider that th e dumping margin found in previous administrative
reviews is the one which should be chosen for th e purpose of the sunset review. In both cases, i.e.,
original investigations or administrative reviews, dumping margins were calculated by using model or
simple zeroing.

D. M
EASURES AT ISSUE
32. Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Unders tanding requires that the Panel request identify
the specific measures at issue and provide a brie f summary of the legal basis of the complaint
sufficient to present the problem clearly. In th e Panel request, the European Communities identified
the specific measures at issue in the present dispute as follows:

"The measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint include, but are not
limited to, the following:

The continued application of, or the application of the specific anti-dumping duties
resulting from the anti-dumping orders enumer ated from I to XVIII in the Annex to
the present request as calculated or maintain ed in place pursuant to the most recent
administrative review or, as the case may be, original proceeding or changed
circumstances or sunset review proceedi ng at a level in excess of the anti-dumping
margin which would result from the corr ect application of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement (whether duties or cash deposit rates or other form of measure).

In addition to these measures, the admini strative reviews, or, as the case may be,
original proceedings or changed circumst ances or sunset review proceedings listed

37 Regulations, Section 351.212(b)(1).
38 Section 752(c)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930; Section 315.218(e)(2)(i) of USDOC's implementing
regulation; and Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders, Exhibit EC-7, Sunset Policy Bulletin, at para. II.B.

in the Annex (numbered 1 to 52) with th e specific anti-dumping orders and are also
considered by the EC to be measures subj ect to the current request for establishment
of the panel in addition to the anti-dumping orders.

This includes the determinations in re lation to all companies and includes any
assessment instructions, whether automatic or otherwise, issued at any time pursuant
to any of the measures listed in the Annex. The anti-dumping duties maintained (in
whatever form) pursuant to these orders, a nd the administrative reviews, or, as the
case may be, original proceedings and changed circumstances or sunset review
proceedings listed in the Annex are inconsistent with the following provisions […]."

33. There are, thus, two sets of measures whic h the European Commun ities challenges in the
present dispute.

34. First, the European Communities challenges the application or continued application of
specific anti-dumping duties resulting from the 18 anti-dumping orders in the Annex to the Panel
request as calculated or maintained in place pursuan t to the most recent administrative review or, as
the case may be, original proceeding or changed circumstances or sunset review proceeding, since
these anti-dumping duties are calculated and are ma intained in place at a level in excess of the
dumping margin which would result from the correct application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

35. Second, the European Communities ch allenges the application of zeroing ( i.e., either using
the model or simple zeroing technique) as applied in 52 anti-dumping proceedings, including original
proceedings, administrative review proceedings and s unset review proceedings listed in the Annex to
the Panel request.

1. Continued application of anti-dumping dut ies which exceed the dumping margin which
would result from the correct application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
36. The European Communities challenges in 18 specific anti-dumping measures
39 the
application or continued application of anti-dumping duties which were calculated and are maintained
in place pursuant to the most recent investigati on at a level which exceeds the anti-dumping margin
which would result from the correct application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, i.e., without zeroing.

37. In these 18 anti-dumping measures, USDOC has firstly determined in the original
investigation proceedings the level of anti-dumping duties by applying model zeroing. In some of
these cases, applying simple zeroing, USDOC has reviewed the anti-dumping duties pursuant to
administrative reviews and/or maintained them in place pursuant to sunset reviews. In the latter,
USDOC determined that dumping was likely to con tinue or recur if the anti-dumping order were
revoked, notably because dumping has continued at levels above de minimis after the issuance of the
order. To find that dumping has continued afte r the issuance of the order, USDOC relied on dumping

39 The 18 anti-dumping measures are the following: Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia (US
DOC No A-449-804); Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy (US DOC No A-475-801); Ball Bearings and
Parts Thereof from Germany (US DOC No-A-428-801); Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (US
DOC No A-427-801); Stainless Steel Bar from France (US DOC No A-4 27-820); Stainless Steel Sheet and
Strip in Coils from Germany (US DOC No A-428-825); Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium (US DOC
No A-423-808); Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from UK (US DOC No A-412-801); Stainless Steel Bar from
Germany (US DOC No A-428-830); Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands
(US DOC No A-421-807); Stainless Steel Bar from Italy (US DOC No A-475-829); Stainless Steel Sheet &
Strip in Coils from Italy (US DOC No A-475-824); Ce rtain Pasta from Italy (US DOC No A-475-818); Brass
Sheet & Strip from Germany (US DOC No A-428-602); Purified Carbonxymethylcellulose from Sweden
(US DOC No A-401-808); Purified Carbonxymethylcellulose from the Netherlands (US DOC No A-421-811);
Purified Carbonxymethylcellulose from Finland (US DOC No A-405-803); Chlorinated Isocyanurates – Spain
(US DOC No A-469-814).

margins calculated in the original investigation and in administrative review proceedings using
zeroing. Regardless of whether duty rates were es tablished pursuant to an original, administrative
review or sunset review investigation, the anti- dumping duties were calculated and are maintained in
place at a level exceeding a dumping margin which is consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
since they have been determined using zeroing.

38. In short, in this case the European Commun ities is challenging the duty rates currently applied
in the 18 anti-dumping measures concerned since the dumping margins were established in the
original investigations and in their subsequent review proceedings by applying a comparison
methodology which has already been found "as su ch" –and "as applied" by the United States in
particular– inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 by the Appellate
Body.

39. In terms of instruments in which they are embodied, the challenged measures refer for each of
the 18 anti-dumping measures concerned to the Anti- Dumping Duty Orders as continued or modified
pursuant to the any administrative review proceedi ng or, as the case may be, original proceeding or
changed circumstances or sunset review proceedings ( i.e., any measure adopted by the United States
affecting the duty levels with respect to the 18 measures at issue).

2. The zeroing methodology as applied in 52 anti-dumping proceedings, including original
investigations, administrative review and sunset review proceedings
40. The European Communities al so challenges the use of zeroing (either model or simple
zeroing technique) as applied in 4 original invest igations, 37 administrative review proceedings
and 11 sunset review proceedings. The measures at issue cover:

- With respect to original investigations
, the Final Determination and any amendments to
the Final Determination. The Final Determin ation refers to the Issues and Decision
Memorandum, which in turn refers to the "Mar gin Calculations", that is, the Calculation
Memoranda and the Final Margin Program Log and Outputs for all the firms investigated.
The measures at issue also include the An ti-dumping Duty Order and any amendments
including the assessment instructions to wh ich it likewise refers; and the ITC injury
determination (on which the Anti-dumping Duty Order is in any event based).

- With respect to administrative review proceedings , the Notices of Final Results of Anti-
dumping Duty Administrative Reviews, includi ng any amendments, and including all the
Issues and Decision Memoranda to which they refer, and all the Final Margin Program
Logs and Outputs to which they in turn refer, for all the firms investigated and each of the
assessment instructions issued pursuant to any of the Notices of Final Results.

- With respect to sunset review proceedings , the Continuation of Anti-dumping Duty
Orders and any amendments including an y assessment instructions; the Final
Determination and any amendments to the Fi nal Determination; the Issues and Decision
Memorandum, which in turn refers to the "Mar gin Calculations", that is the Calculation
Memoranda and the Final Margin Program Log and Outputs for all the firms investigated.

III. CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS
41. The European Communities considers that the Un ited States' repeated failure to comply with
its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 is particularly flagrant, given
that the Appellate Body has expressly condemned zeroing several times.

42. The European Communities will address first in its submission the main findings of the
panels and, mainly, the Appellate Body in this re gard. It will then examine the precedential value of

these reports in the WTO system and, in particular, the weight that the Panel should grant them when
ruling in this dispute. Third, the European Communities will show that the continued imposition of
duties in the 18 anti-dumping measures concerned by the United States is contrary to Articles 2.4,
2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as
well as Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establ ishing the WTO (WTO Agreement), since the
United States used zeroing when calculating the dump ing margins in the original proceedings and in
their subsequent review proceedings. Finally , the European Communities will show that the
4 original investigations, 37 administrative review proceedings and 11 sunset review proceedings
covering the 18 anti-dumping measures concerned, are inc onsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3,
11.1, 11.2 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994,
since the United States used model or simple zeroing when calculating the dumping margins.

A. Z
EROING: A METHODOLOGY "AS SUCH" AND "AS APPLIED" PROHIBITED BY WTO RULES
43. Zeroing has been contested several times in WTO dispute settlement proceedings in recent
years. In all cases, the DSB has adopted the panel or Appellate Body Report finding this
methodology inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. In particular, the
interpretation of the Appellate Body as to the use of zeroing when carrying out a weighted average-to-
weighted average (W-W) comparison in original investigations as well as in cases on weighted
average-to-transaction (W-T) comparisons in administ rative review proceedings and in sunset review
proceedings has remained constant, finding that they are inconsistent with the United States'
international obligations pursuant to those Agreements.

44. In the following Sections, the European Co mmunities will examine th e main arguments and
conclusions of the Appellate Body as regards the use of zeroing in the comparison methodologies
applied in the original investigations and review investigations involved in this case.

1. Model Zeroing in Original Investigations
45. The use of zeroing by the United States in orig inal investigations as described above has been
found "as such" inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by the Appellate
Body. In US – Zeroing (EC) , the Appellate Body concluded th at "the zeroing methodology, as it
relates to original investigations in which th e weighted-average-to-weighted average comparison
method is used to calculate margins of dumping, is inconsistent, as such, with Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement".
40 In doing so, the Appellate Body upheld the findings of the panel, which
also relied on the consistent inte rpretation of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by the
Appellate Body in previous cases.41

46. Indeed, the Appellate Body has also found the same methodology "as applied" by the
United States inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement on multiple occasions.
In particular, in US – Lumber V , Canada challenged an anti-dumping duty order issued by the
United States in respect of Canadian softwood lumber , relating to an original investigation in which
the weighted-average-to-weighted average compar ison method was used to calculate margins of
dumping. The panel had concluded that, by not taking into account all comparable export
transactions in its zeroing practice in the orig inal anti-dumping investigation at issue, the
United States violated Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
42 On appeal, the Appellate Body
addressed the question of "margins of dumping" in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
The Appellate Body referred to the text of Articles VI:1 and VI:2, second sentence, of the
GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 9.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to confirm its view that
that dumping can be found to exist only "for the product under investigation as a whole, and cannot be

40 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 222.
41 Panel Report, US – Zeroing (EC), paras 7.27 – 7.28.
42 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, paras 67-74.

found to exist only for a type, model, or category of that product". 43 In this regard, it said that the
results of multiple comparisons at the sub-group le vel through "multiple averaging" are not "margins
of dumping" within the meaning of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Rather, those
results reflect only intermediate calculations made by an investigating authority in the context of
establishing margins of dumping for the product unde r investigation. Thus, the Appellate Body
concluded that it is only on the basis of aggregating all these intermediate values that an investigating
authority can establish margins of dumping for the product under investigation as a whole.44

47. The Appellate Body considered some additiona l arguments made by the United States in this
respect, but rejected them all. On the one hand, as regard the US argument based on the historical
background of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , the Appellate Body stated that "[t]he
material to which the United States refers does not, in our view, resolve the issue of whether the
negotiators of the Anti-Dumping Agreement intended to prohibit zeroing", noting that the
United States acknowledged that the materials do not constitute "travaux préparatoire". In any event,
the Appellate Body stressed that it had concluded, based on the ordinary meaning of Article 2.4.2 read
in its context, that zeroing is prohibited when est ablishing the existence of margins of dumping under
the weighted-average-to-we ighted-average methodology.
45 On the other hand, the Appellate Body
rejected the United States' argument that, in finding that "zeroing" is prohibited under Article 2.4.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement , the panel failed to apply the standard of review set out in
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.46

48. On the basis of the above reasoning, the Appe llate Body upheld the panel's finding that the
United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in determining
the existence of margins of dumping on the basi s of a weighted average-to-weighted average
comparison methodology incorporating the practice of "zeroing".47

49. Finally, it should be noted that both panels and the Appellate Body have always found the use
of "zeroing" when a weighted average-to-weighted average comparison is used to calculate dumping
margins inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.48

50. In light of the above, it can be concluded that the use of "zeroing" when applying a weighted
average-to-weighted average comparison methodology to calculate the dumping margin in original
investigations is, as such, contrary to Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In this respect, as
mentioned before, the European Communities notes that, on 26 December 2006, the United States
acknowledged the inconsistency of the above described methodology with WTO rules.
49

2. Simple Zeroing in Administrative Reviews
51. As described above, in administrative review proceedings, when calculating the magnitude of
any margin of dumping for the purpose of assessi ng an importer's final liability for paying anti-
dumping duties and any future exporter-specific cash deposit rate, the United States normally uses the
weighted average-to-transaction method50 and applies the so-called "simple zeroing" method.

43 Id., paras 92-94.
44 Id., paras 95-98.
45 Id., paras 107-108.
46 Id., paras 113-116.
47 Id., para.117.
48 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 66; Panel Report, EC – Pipe Fittings , para. 7.216;
and Panel Report, US – Shrimp from Ecuador (not appealed), paras 7.40 – 7.43.
49 US Notice on Zeroing in Original Investigations (Exhibit EC-6).
50 Regulations, Section 351.414 (c)(2); Manual, Chapter 6, p. 7.

52. The use of zeroing by the United States in administrative review proceedings as described
above has been found "as such" inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 by the Appellate Body. In US – Zeroing (Japan)
51, the Appellate
Body first turned to Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
and disagreed with the panel's view, affirming ag ain that "dumping" and "margins of dumping" can
exist only at the level of a product. 52 In addition, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's
consideration of Article 9, recalling its previous holding in US – Zeroing (EC) 53, i.e., that the margin
of dumping acts as a ceiling for the total amount of anti-dumping duties.54

53. The Appellate Body then considered issues re lated to the operation of "prospective" normal
value systems, finding that "[u]nder any system of duty collection, the margin of dumping established
in accordance with Article 2 operates as a ceiling for the amount of anti-dumping duties that could be
collected in respect of the sales made by an exporte r". Thus, as with the United States' retrospective
system, "[t]o the extent that duties are paid by an importer, it is open to that importer to claim a refund
if such a ceiling is exceeded".

54. On this basis, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the United States does not
act inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 by maintaining zeroing procedures in administrative reviews.
55

55. The Appellate Body then examined the issue of zeroing in administrative reviews under the
"fair comparison" requirement of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . In this regard, the
Appellate Body stated that the use of zeroing me ans that anti-dumping duti es are collected in excess
of the margin of dumping, a methodology which does not involve a "fair comparison".
56 As a result,
the Appellate Body reversed the panel's findings that zeroing is not, as such, inconsistent with
Articles 2.1, 9.1, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.57

56. The Appellate Body also found that the use of zeroing "as applied" in administrative reviews,
where the United States follows a weighted aver age-to-transaction comparison methodology, is
inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4, 9.1, and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles VI:1 and
VI:2 of the GATT.58

3. Zeroing in Sunset Reviews
57. The Appellate Body has had the occasion to rule on the inconsistency of the use of zeroing in
sunset review proceedings in measu res adopted by the United States in US – Zeroing (Japan) . With
regard to the specific sunset review determinations at issue, the Appellate Body recalled its previous
reports according to which the terms "deter mine" and "review" in Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement require a reasoned conclusion "based on" positive evidence and a "sufficient factual basis".
It noted in particular that it has previously deci ded that, when investigating authorities rely on past
dumping margins in making their likelihood determina tion in a sunset review, these margins must be
consistent with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
59 The Appellate Body also noted that
USDOC relied on past margins that were calcula ted during administrative reviews on the basis of

51 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan).
52 Id., paras. 149-151.
53 Appellate Body Report, United States – Zeroing (EC), para. 130.
54 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 152-156.
55 Id., para. 166.
56 Id., paras 167-169.
57 Id., paras 170-171.
58 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) , paras 174 – 176; Appellate Body Report, US –
Zeroing (EC), para. 135.
59 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 127; and Appellate
Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 180.

"simple zeroing". Having previously concluded that zeroing in administrative reviews is inconsistent
with Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , the Appellate Body found that the
determinations in the sunset reviews at issu e are inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

58. On this basis, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the United States acted
consistently with Articles 2 and 11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when, in the sunset reviews at
issue in that case, it relied on margins of dumpi ng calculated in previous administrative review
proceedings. The Appellate Body found instead th at the United States acted inconsistently with
Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

59. Consequently, the Appellate Body has ruled that the use of zeroing in sunset reviews as
applied by the United States is inconsistent with Articles 2.4, 9.3 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

4. Conclusions
60. From the interpretation of the relevant WTO provisions made by the Appellate Body in recent
years, it is clear that the use of zeroing ( i.e., failure to offset the results of comparisons of normal
value and export price to determine any margin of dumping), in the case of original investigations
when using a weighted average-to-weighted average comparison method, in the case of administrative
review proceedings when using a weighted averag e-to-transaction comparison method or in sunset
review proceedings, has been found contrary to WT O rules several times in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings.

61. This consistent interpretation of the rules clearly states that "dumping" and "margins of
dumping" can be found to exist only in relation to that product as a whole as defined by that authority.
They cannot be found to exist for only a type, mode l, or category of that product. Nor, under any
comparison methodology, can "dumping" and "margins of dumping" be found to exist at the level of
an individual transaction. Thus, it is clear that, wh en an investigating authority calculates a margin of
dumping on the basis of multiple comparisons of norma l value and export price, the results of such
intermediate comparisons are not, in themselves, "m argins of dumping". Rather, they are merely
"inputs" that are to be aggregated in order to est ablish the margin of dumping for the product under
investigation with respect to each exporter or producer.

B. R
OLE OF THE PRECEDENT: VALUE OF THE APPELLATE BODY REPORTS
62. To the extent that panels and the Appellate Body have already analysed model and simple
zeroing in several disputes and to the extent th at, as explained above, the Appellate Body has found
the zeroing methodology in weighted average-to -weighted average comparisons in original
investigations, in weighted average-to-transacti on comparisons in administrative reviews and in
sunset reviews as being inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, it is
essential to examine, for the purpose of the present di spute –which actually covers the same issues–
the role of precedents, i.e., what is the value of previous panels and Appellate Body reports, in
particular of previous Appellate Body reports.

63. In this respect, the European Communities submits that the Panel in this case should not
deviate from the findings of previo us Appellate Body reports clearly addressing the same matter and
carrying out a consistent interpretation of the vari ous provisions involved. Should the Panel wish to
depart from previous rulings, this should be carefully considered and based on cogent reasons.

1. Introduction
64. In the WTO dispute settlement system, there is no doctrine of stare decisis, or binding judicial
precedent, by which courts are bound by their previous decisions. The stare decisis doctrine which is
traditionally recognised in common law jurisdictions is, therefore, not applied in the WTO dispute
settlement system, and this is also generally so in all fields of public international law.
60

65. This can be illustrated by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the highest
judicial body of the United Nations, competent to deal with international law disputes between
sovereign States that have accepted its jurisdiction. Article 38(1) of the ICJ's Statute sets out the law
that this Court must apply. Although these provisions are expressed in terms of the function of
the ICJ, they reflect the previous practice of arbitr al tribunals and are generally regarded as the most
complete statement of the sources of international law. 61 According to Article 38(1)(d), judicial
decisions are (only) "subsidiary means for the de termination of [internati onal] law". Further,
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that "the decision of the Court has no binding force except as
between the parties and in respect of that particular case".
62 These provisions indicate that there is not
stare decisis in the ICJ.

66. Insofar as they reject the doctrine of binding judicial precedents, international courts and
tribunals are said to closely resemble civil law juri sdictions. In a civil law tradition, lawmaking is
considered as being a function of the legislature; contrary to common law judges, civil law judges'
task is considered to be passive: they must impl ement legal rules contained mainly in various codes,
laws and statutes.
63

67. However, even if interna tional law has no doctrine of stare decisis in the sense that judgments
only bind the parties and onl y with respect to the case in which they are delivered, the absence of
stare decisis has not prevented the development of case-law and reliance on such case-law in
subsequent disputes. With respect to the ICJ, the Appellate Body noted that " Article 59 [of the ICJ
Statute] has not inhibited the development by the ICJ (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in
which considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible".
64

68. Reliance on previous case-law actually flows fro m the necessity to ensure in any legal system
security, consistency and predictability. Thus, even where previous decisions are not binding per se,
reliance on previous case-law is necessary to ensure consistency of such case-law, in particular where
case-law comes from higher courts or tribunals.

69. The European Communities submits that these principles of security, consistency and
predictability –which apply in civil law systems and in other international c ourts and tribunals– also
apply in the framework of the WTO dispute settleme nt system. These same principles imply that
panels should rely on previous case-law, and primarily, when such case-law comes from the Appellate
Body which is hierarchically superior to panels. The European Communities will explain below these
principles as contained in national and internationa l legal systems and their application to the WTO
system.

60 Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute Settlement (Cameron
May, 2002) p. 510 (Exhibit EC – 8).
61 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (5th ed. 1988), p. 3 (Exhibit EC-9).
62 ICJ Statute (Exhibit EC-10).
63 Arnull, the European Union and its Court of Justice (2006), p. 623 (Exhibit EC-11).
64 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, footnote 30, p. 14.

2. Reliance on Previous Case-Law in Na tional and International Legal Systems
(a) Principle of Consistency and Predictability of Jurisprudence
70. In all legal systems, there is a need for cons istency and predictability in the case-law. This is
probably the most important reason underpinning the stare decisis doctrine in common law systems.
It is, however, generally admitted that there are limi ts to this doctrine. In common law systems, the
highest courts treat previous decisions as "normally bi nding", but they reserve the right to depart from
them in certain, narrowly defined, exceptional circumstances.

71. In civil law jurisdictions which do not recognise the principle of stare decisis , the highest
courts will, however, as a matter of judicial policy an d practice, follow their previous decisions. This
is illustrated by the French
65 and Italian66 legal systems.

72. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) which is a hybrid court –part constitutional court, part
general national court of last instance– also pays specific attention to its earlier case-law.
67 T h e
general position is that the ECJ is not bound by its prev ious decisions, but that it, in practice, does not
often depart from them.68

73. As outlined above, the ICJ Statute makes cl ear that decisions rendered by the ICJ in a
particular case between states cannot be binding on other states in dispute before the Court. However,
even if, strictly speaking, the ICJ does not obser ve the doctrine of precedent (except however, in
matters of procedure), there is no doubt that it stri ves to maintain consistency in its jurisprudence.
69
As Judge Shahabuddeen observed:

"The desiderata of consistency, stability and predictability , which underlie a
responsible legal system , suggest that the Court would not exercise its power to
depart from a previous decision except with circumspection… The Court
accordingly pursues a judicial policy of not unnecessarily impairing the
authority of its decisions".70 (emphasis added)

74. In the Peace Treaties case, Judge Zoricic adequately explained the value which the ICJ may
attach to decisions of other international tribunals, including of the ICJ itself:

" (…) it is quite true that no international court is bound by precedents. But there is
something, which this Court is bound to take into account, namely the principles of
international law. If a precedent is firm ly based on such a principle, the Court
cannot decide an analogous case in a contrary sense, so long, as the principle retains
its value".
71

65 David and De Vries, The French Legal System (1985), p. 113 et seq. discussed by Zweigert and
Kötz, op.cit., pp. 262-3 (Exhibit EC-12).
66 Cappelletti et al., The Italian Legal System: An Introduction (1967), at p. 271 discussed by Zweigert
and Kötz, op. cit., p. 263 (Exhibit EC-12).
67 The EU judicial system is of a sui generis character. It consists of se veral instances, beginning with
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), established in 1952. The ECJ was supplemented in 1988 with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) which has jurisdiction over cases brought by private parties against decisions of EU
institutions as well as over cases brought by member st ates against decisions of the European Commission:
Rosas, "The European Court of Justice: sources of law and methods of interpretation" in The WTO at Ten
(2006), p. 482 (Exhibit EC-13).
68 Id.
69 Brownlie, op. cit., pp. 21 -22.
70 Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), p. 239 (Exhibit EC-14).
71 Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania , Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1950, p. 65 at p. 104, Judge Zoricic, Dissenting Opinion, quoted in Shahabuddeen, op.cit., p. 237.

75. Seen in this light it is not surprising to note that the ICJ, like other (international) tribunals,
frequently invokes previous decisions in order to su pport a decision in a particular case. This is not
because previous decisions are regarded as preced ents that would bind the Court as a matter of stare
decisis. Previous decisions are invoked because they ar e a statement of what the Court regarded as
"the correct legal position".
72

76. The importance of previous decisions can also be found in other inte rnational tribunals or
courts, including the International Tribunal for th e Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and in International Criminal Tribunals.73

77. Formal rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis should not be confused with the interest that
all legal systems have in maintain ing continuity in jurisprudence. Whether as a matter of doctrine or
practice, all legal systems place a high value on c onsistency, certainty and predictability of the
jurisprudence, particularly as regards decisions rendered by the highest courts. Departures from
previous decisions are carefully consid ered and require the identification of cogent reasons for doing
so.

78. In cases where courts, in particular those d ealing with international law, are not formally
bound by their previous decisions, they will nevertheless consider themselves bound by the
(international) law as authoritatively expressed in a decision.

79. A rule such as that expressed by Article 59 of the ICJ's Statute, quoted above, is concerned
only with the notion that the decision, qua decision, binds only the parties to a particular case.
However, it does not prevent the decision from bei ng treated in a later case by the same court or
tribunal as the correct legal position.

(b) Are decisions of higher courts binding on lower courts?
80. In common law systems, decisions of a higher court are binding on lower courts.
74 While,
there is no doctrine of binding precedent in civil law jurisdictions, as a matter of practice, lower courts
tend to follow the decisions of higher courts, even if there is rarely an explicit legal rule compelling a
judge to follow the decisions of a higher court.

81. In the EU judicial system, the Court of First Instance (CFI) will normally uphold ECJ case-
law. The CFI will follow the precedents set by the ECJ for two reasons. Firstly, as in the court
systems of the EC Member States, the lower courts in the hierarchy accepts, as a general rule, the
authority of precedents; secondly, the decision est ablishing the CFI was accompanied by a provision
allowing appeal of CFI judgements to the ECJ on the grounds of "infringement of Community law".
75
The precedents set by the Court, of course, are part of Community law, so that where these are clear

72 Shabuddeen, op.cit., p. 236.
73 Treves, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea", in The WTO at 10 (1996), p. 490 at 493
(Exhibit EC-15); Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed. 2004),
p. 51 (Exhibit EC-16); and Article 21(2) ICC Statut e, which states as follows: "[T]he Court may apply
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions": Text of the Rome Statute circulated as
document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998,
12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into
force on 1 July 2002 (Exhibit EC-17).
74 Kmiec, "The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism"", Comment, California Law
Review, October 2004, 1466-1467 (Exhibit EC-18).
75 ECJ Statute, Article 58: "An appeal to the Court of Justice shall be limited to points of law. It shall
lie on the grounds of lack of compet ence of the Court of First Instance, a breach of procedure before it which
adversely affects the interests of the appellant as well as the infringement of Community law by the Court of
First instance" (Exhibit EC-19).

and consistent the lower court would regard itself as bound to follow them at risk of its decision being
set aside on appeal.76

82. Similarly, in international legal systems where there are two or more hierarchical tribunals or
courts, the general rule appears to be that decisions of the hierarchical higher body are followed by the
hierarchical lower body, at least insofar as the ratio decidendi, legal principles or points of law are
concerned. This is the case, inter alia, of the ECHR
77, the ICTY/ICTR78, and the ICSID.79

83. The above survey of national and internationa l legal systems shows that even if there is no
doctrine of stare decisis , as a matter of judicial practice, all legal systems place a high value on
consistency, certainty and predictability of jurisp rudence which lead such courts and tribunals to
follow previous decisions. Departures from previous decisions are carefully considered and require
the identification of important reasons for doing so.

84. The above survey also demonstrates that even in legal systems where there is no doctrine of
binding judicial precedents, lower courts follow, as a matter of practice, decisions of higher courts.
This has probably to do with the fact that higher bodies generally have more limited functions centred
around settling issues of law while lower bodies' t asks are usually centred around fact-finding and
dealing with the merits of the cases. Further, a st atement that a decision of a hierarchically higher
body is binding on a lower body, w ill normally be confined to the legal principles involved, the ratio
decidendi. Still, the ratio decidendi cannot be distinguished merely because the facts to which it is
applied are different.

85. This does not imply that, in dealing with the me rits of a particular dispute or case, there would
be no scope whatsoever for lower bodies to develo p the jurisprudence. However, departures from
decisions taken by higher courts on issues of law must be carefully considered. There must be cogent
reasons for a lower court or tribunal to depart from the legal positions taken by hierarchically superior
courts. If the lower court or tribunal deviates from what the higher court has considered as the correct
legal position its decision runs the risk of being st ruck down. This will be especially the case when
the higher court has, through a series of decisi ons, endeavoured to create a consistent body of
jurisprudence on a particular issue. A lowe r body may express a reasoned disagreement on legal
principles with the higher body, but this will ultimately be for the consideration of the higher body.

86. The European Communities recognises that re ferences to doctrines and practices followed in
other legal systems, national or international, ar e not determinative of the authority of previous
decisions –of the Appellate Body– in the WTO dis pute settlement system. However, the European
Communities believes that the same principles and concerns which constitute the basis of a practice in
other legal systems to follow previous decisions, esp ecially of higher courts, are present in the WTO
dispute settlement system, taking into account in pa rticular the characteristics of the WTO dispute
settlement system and the place and functions of the Appellate Body in such a system.

76 Neville and Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (2000), pp. 370-377
(Exhibit EC-20).
77 Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (1 st ed. 1998), p. 43
(Exhibit EC-21).
78 ICTY, Aleksovski Appeal Judgement , Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 24 March 2000, para. 113, pp. 47-48
(Exhibit EC-22).
79 ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID
Arbitration, October 22, 2004; part VI and Annex, Possible Features of an ICSID Appeals Facility ,
paras. 5, 7, 9 (Exhibit EC-23); and Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID
Rules and Regulations, 12 May 2005, para. 4 (Exhibit EC-24).

3. The WTO dispute settlement system
(a) Purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system: security and predictability
87. As set out in Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the main purpose of the
dispute settlement system is to "provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system".
This is to be achieved by preserving the right s and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements and by clarifying the existing provi sions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of international law. This has to be done without adding or diminishing the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.

88. It follows, according to the European Commun ities, that the most important function of the
dispute settlement system is to provide security and predictability to Members and the system as a
whole by detailing and interpreting the rules and outlin ing the rights and obligations of Members, so
that they may act accordingly.

89. The importance of security and predictabilit y as an object and purpose of the WTO dispute
settlement system has been recognised in many panel and Appellate Body reports.
80

(b) The Appellate Body in the WTO dispute settlement system
90. The task of the Appellate Body is to "hear appeals from panel cases".
81 To that extent, it
occupies a superior position in the WTO dispute settlement system's hierarchy.

91. The Appellate Body's function is limited to hear appeals with respect to issues of law or legal
interpretations developed by a panel in its report. 82 The Appellate Body cannot review issues of fact
or factual findings. In that respect, the Appe llate Body is somewhat similar to the French Cour de
Cassation, the highest Supreme Court in France which can only deal with legal issues. The purpose is
to ensure that the legal interpretation is consistent with the Agreements concerned.

92. The fact that the Appellate Body, unlike pa nels, is a permanent body composed of seven
permanent members further supports the importance of the Appellate Body in ensuring the security
and predictability of the multilateral trading system.

93. In light of the foregoing, it appears that the main function of the Appellate Body is, by its
characteristics (i.e., the fact that it is a permanent body, that it is superior in the hierarchy and that it
can only deal with legal issues), to ensure consis tency and coherence in the interpretation of the
Agreements which can be examined under the disput e settlement system. In this sense, the Appellate
Body provides for the correct interpretation of the relevant rules.

4. Precedential value of case law of the Appellate Body
94. As explained above, there is no stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement system. Panels
are therefore not, strictly speaking, bound by prev ious findings of the Appellate Body. However,
predictability and stability require a consistent in terpretation of the rules that carefully builds on
previous decisions and avoids unconsidered departures from previous interpretations.

95. As a preliminary observation, it should be not ed that the Appellate Body as well as panels
regularly invoke previous decisions –in particular, decisions of the Appellate Body– in their reports
even if not addressing the issue of the value of such reports.

80 See e.g., Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.75.
81 Article 17.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
82 Article 17.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

96. The issue of the value of adopted reports was first addressed by the Appellate Body in
Japan – Alcoholic Taxes on Beverages, stating that:83

"Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute . However, they are not binding, except with respect to the
resolving the particular dispute between the pa rties to that dispute. In short, their
character and their legal status have not been changed by the coming into force of
the WTO Agreement". (emphasis added)

97. In US – Shrimp Article(Article 21.5 – Malaysia) , the Appellate Body confirmed that its
finding in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages also applied to Appellate Body reports and explained that:84

"The reasoning in our Report in United States – Shrimp on which the Panel relied
was not dicta; it was essential to our ruling. The Panel was right to use it, and right
to rely on it. Nor are we surprised that the Panel made frequent references to our
Report in United States – Shrimp . Indeed, we would have expected the Panel to do
so. The Panel had, necessarily, to consider our views on this subject, as we had
overruled certain aspects of the findings of th e original panel on this issue and, more
important, had provided interpretative guidan ce for future panels, such as the Panel
in this case."

98. The foregoing supports the view that pa nels should follow previous case law from the
Appellate Body. This is even more important wh ere the issues raised are the same, as underlined by
the Appellate Body in US – OCTG Sunset Reviews. In US – OCTG Sunset Reviews, the United States
had appealed the panel's finding that considered the Sunset policy Bulleting to be a measure. On
appeal, the United States challenged this finding, argu ing that the panel erred in concluding that the
SPB is a measure because such a conclusion does not result from "an objective assessment" consistent
with Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understandi ng, in that the panel "did not explain why the
findings of the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , as to whether the
SPB is a measure, 'would be persuasive given the fact ual record in this dispute'". The Appellate Body
found that:
85

"Regarding the arguments presented by the United States relating to Article 11 of
the DSU, we disagree with the United States that the Panel did not assess objectively
whether the SPB is a measure. […] The Panel had before it exactly the same
instrument that had been examined by the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review; thus, it was appropriate for the Panel, in determining
whether the SPB is a measure, to rely on the Appellate Body's conclusion in that
case. Indeed, following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier disputes is
not only appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially
where the issues are the same . Although the Panel may have expressed itself in a
concise manner, we find no fault in its analysis that could justify ruling that the
Panel failed to observe its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU". (emphasis
added)

99. In that case, the Appellate Body has thus cl early stated that panels are bound by the legal
analysis of the Appellate Body. This is consiste nt with the purpose of the dispute settlement system
which is to ensure the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and the specific

83 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Taxes on Beverages II, p. 14.
84 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 107.
85 Appellate Body Report, United States – OCTG Sunset Reviews, para. 188.

task of the Appellate Body, as a hierarchically superior body, which decides only on issues of law and
legal interpretations.

100. In this respect, the European Communities su bmits that, as a result, panels should follow the
findings of the Appellate Body to the extent that they relate to the same legal issues and legal
interpretations. Panels should only depart from th em should there be serious reasons and arguments
to do so.

5. Precedential value of Appellate Body reports on zeroing
101. As mentioned in Section III.A, the issue of zeroing has been discussed and examined several
times within the WTO dispute settle ment system. Panels and the Appellate Body already examined
several aspects of zeroing in previous disputes. In the context of these disputes, reference has often
been made to previous findings of the Appellate Body.

102. For instance, in US – Zeroing (Japan) , the Appellate Body expressly referred to its reports in
US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5) to justify its conclusion that the use of zeroing in transaction-
to-transaction methodology in the framework of or iginal investigations was inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
86

"We see no reason to depart from the appellate Body's reasoning in US – Softwood
Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada) , which is which is in consonance with the
Appellate Body's approach in the earlier case of US – Softwood Lumber V and is
consistent with the fundamental disciplines that apply under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, as highlighted above".

103. Likewise, in US – Zeroing (EC), the panel noted that the calculation was identical in relevant
respects to the zeroing methodology considered by the panels and Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen
and US – Softwood Lumber V. The panel said that it had carefully considered the arguments raised by
the United States. However, it noted that these i ssues had already been examined by the Appellate
Body in US – Softwood Lumber V . Noting that although previous Appellate Body decisions are not
strictly speaking binding on panels, there is clearly an expectation that panels will follow such
decision in subsequent cases raising issues that the Appellate Body has expressly addressed and
concluded that it did not believe "it would be appropriate […] to depart from the Appellate Body's
conclusion that when a margin of dumping is calcu lated on the basis of multiple averaging by model
type, the margin of dumping for the product in qu estion must reflect the results of all such
comparisons, including weighted average export pri ces that are above the normal value for individual
models".
87

104. As regards the use of model zeroing in weight ed average-to-weighted average comparisons in
original investigations, the Appellate Body has found such practice to be inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: first of all, in EC – Bed Linen, then in US – Lumber V
and finally, in US – Zeroing (EC). As noted by the panel in US – Shrimp from Ecuador:88

"We further note that the Appellate Body Re port in US – Zeroing (EC) also referred
to its reasoning and finding in US – Softwood Lumber V. Thus, in our view, there is
now a consistent line of Appellate Body reports, from EC – Bed Linen to US –
Zeroing (EC) that holds that "zeroing" in the context of the weighted average -
to- weighted average methodology in origin al investigations is inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2". (emphasis added)

86 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para 121.
87 Panel Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 7.31.
88 Panel Report, US – Shrimp from Ecuador, para. 7.40.

105. As far as the use of simple zeroing in admi nistrative reviews is c oncerned, the Appellate
Body also found in two cases ( US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) that such practice is
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the second of these two cases, the Appellate Body
referred to its previous findings in US – Zeroing (EC).89

106. Therefore, the European Communiti es submits that, even if there is no stare decisis principle
applicable in the WTO dispute settlement system a nd that the Panel is therefore entitled to depart
from previous rulings made on the substantive issues raised in this proceeding, the Panel should not
depart from previous rulings, in particular, given that:

- these are findings of the Appellate Body which is hierarchically superior and only dealing
with issues of law;
- these findings have been repeated in several cas es so that there is now a consistent line of
interpretation; and
- especially, to the extent that the Appellate Bo dy has already examined the arguments which
could be raised by the defendant in this case.

6. Conclusions
107. The Appellate Body's rulings must, in the view of the European Communities, be regarded as
commanding particular authority for panels. This is despite the fact that that there is no formal
doctrine of stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement system, and notwithstanding the fact that,
according to the Article 17.14 of the Dispute Settle ment Understanding, Appellate Body reports only
bind parties to the dispute at issue.

108. Firstly, Appellate Body decisions should co mmand appropriate respect with panels and
parties to the proceedings as authoritative pronouncements on the law. Secondly, the system of
"negative consensus" for adopti ng reports necessarily puts a high premium on the Appellate Body
decision's correctness in the first place, since the error-correcting mechanisms cannot easily be
invoked. Thirdly, because the Appellate Body is the hierarchically superior body, tasked with
deciding on issues of law and legal interpretations , panels should follow Appellate Body decisions
which constitute an authoritative interpretation of the law to be applied by the panel.

109. It is for those reasons that the European Communities submits that the Appellate Body has
stated that, panel reports –and equally adopted Appellate Body reports– "create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute".
90

110. In light of the above, the European Communiti es submits that the Panel in this case should not
deviate from the findings of previous Appellate Body reports clearly addressing the same matter ( i.e.,
the use of zeroing in original, administrative and sunset proceedings), carrying out a consistent
interpretation of the various provisions involved, and concluding that the zeroing methodology, when
aggregating the results of the comparison between norm al value and export price, is inconsistent with
WTO rules.

89 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), at para. 155.
90 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14.

C. C
ONTINUED APPLICATION IN 18 ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES AT A
LEVEL IN EXCESS OF THE DUMPI NG MARGIN WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THE CORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT
1. The Measures at Issue
111. The European Communities challenges in th e 18 specific anti-dumping cases mentioned in
the Annex to the Panel request the application or continued application of anti-dumping duties which
were calculated and are maintained in place pursuant to the most recent administrative review, or as
the case may be, original proceeding or changed circ umstances or sunset review proceeding at a level
which exceeds the anti-dumping margin which woul d result from the correct application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, i.e., without zeroing.

112. The application or continued application of anti-dumping duties as described above is a
measure which can be subject to assessment of conformity by the Panel. The Appellate Body
affirmed in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review that, in principle, any act or omission
attributable to a WTO Member can be a "measure" of that Member for purposes of WTO dispute
settlement proceedings, and that the concept of a measure within the meaning of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding encompasses certain acts or instruments irrespective of their application in
specific instances. The Appellate Body characteris ed such acts or instruments as "acts setting forth
rules or norms that are intended to have general a nd prospective application" and "instruments of a
Member containing rules or norms". Not allowing claims against instruments setting out rules or
norms inconsistent with a Member's obligations would frustrate the objective of protecting the
security and predictability to conduct future trade and lead to a multiplicity of litigation.91

113. The Appellate Body also pointed out that Article 17.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
contains no threshold requirement that a measure submitted to dispute settlement be of a certain type
92
and that the phrase "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" in Article 18.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement implies that "the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards
adopted by Members in connection with the conduc t of anti-dumping proceedings" can be challenged
within the dispute settlement system.93

114. A measure can exist where there is evidence of a generally applicable rule or norm of
prospective application, such as when there is a c onsistent practice that can only be explained by the
existence of a general rule that is being applied. In US – Zeroing (Japan) , the Appellate Body
confirmed that the US "zeroing procedures" unde r different comparison methodologies, and in
different stages of anti-dumping proceedings, do not correspond to separate rules or norms, but simply
reflect different manifestations of a single rule or norm.
94

115. The European Communities is thus not ch allenging the zeroing methodology "as such" since
the WTO inconsistency of such a practice has alr eady been established in previous disputes, in
particular in US – Zeroing (EC) and in US – Zeroing (Japan) . Instead, the European Communities
challenges the use of the zeroing methodology in 18 specific anti-dumping measures, in other words,
with respect to 18 specific products originating in sp ecific Member States of the EC. In this respect,
the European Communities submits that , in addition to the violations of the relevant provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 resulting from the use of zeroing in the specific
administrative or sunset review proceedings, the application (since the original Anti-Dumping Order)
and continued application by the United States of anti-dumping duties in the cases contained in the
Annex to the Panel request at a level which excee ds a WTO consistent dumping margin is also a

91 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 82.
92 Id., para. 86.
93 Id., para. 87.
94 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), at para 88.

measure adopted by the United States which is equally inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and the GATT 1994.

116. The following diagrams will serve to illustrat e the position of the European Communities in
this respect. In Case 1 contained in the Annex to the Panel request, it can be observed that the
United States first established a dumping margin in the original investigation (17.21 per cent) in a
manner inconsistent with WTO rules, i.e., by applying model zeroing. Imports of the product
concerned were subject to securities ( e.g., cash deposits) as of the date of publication of the Anti-
Dumping Order. Then, in subsequent administra tive review proceedings, one company requested the
review of its duties. In all of them, the United States calculated the margin of dumping by applying
another methodology found inconsistent with WTO rules, i.e., simple zeroing. This means that the
United States retrospectively collected an incorr ect amount of duties and established a new exporter-
specific margin, subject to securities at the time of importation, with respect to that company for the
following year. Once five years had passed, pursuant to a sunset review, the United States considered
that dumping would likely recur in the future and established the new dumping margin level at the
rate imposed in the original investigation. Once again, the United States imposed duties in a manner
and levels contrary to WTO rules.
Continued Application of Duties (Case 1)
Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars – Latvia
17.21% 17.21%
3.01%
5.24%
5.94%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Original Inves tigation Adminis trative Review
(2002/2003)
Adm inistrative Review
(2003/2004)
Administative Review
(2004/2005)
 Sunset Review
(Feb 2007)
LM All Others

117. The same effect can be observed in all the cas es mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request.
For the sake of simplicity, the Eu ropean Communities will refer to Cases 2 and 6 to show the same
effect.

Continued Application of Duties (Case 2)
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof – Italy
2.52%
68.29%
5.88%4.79%
2.87%
68.29% 69.99%
7.65%
2.59%1.38%
69.99%
5.08%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Origi nal
Investigation
Administrative
Review
(2001/2002)
Administrative
Review
(2002/2003)
Administrative
Review
(2003/2004)
Administrative
Review
(2004/2005)
Sunset Review
(Sept 2006)
All Others Rate = 155.27%FAG IT SKF

Continued Application of Duties (Case 6)
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strips in Coils – Germany
13.48%
2.45%
9.50%
7.03%
3.72%
13.48%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Original Investigation Administrative Review
(2001/2002)
Administrative Review
(2002/2003)
Administrative Review
(2003/2004)
Administrative Review
(2004/2005)
 Sunset Review
(Aug. 2005)
TK N All Others

118. As can be seen, the European Communiti es is challenging the adoption of anti-dumping
duties with respect to the 18 measures mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request insofar as the
original duty levels and subsequent review levels are inconsistent with WTO rules, as a result of the
use of zeroing by the United States.

119. Consequently, the European Communities su bmits that the 18 measures brought before the
Panel are the duty rates applied in the 18 anti-dum ping proceedings concerned. Since the dumping

margins where established in the or iginal proceedings and in their subsequent reviews by applying a
comparison methodology which has already been found "as such" and "as applied" inconsistent with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 by the Appellate Body, the European Communities
submits that the United States has infringed several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
the GATT 1994.

2. Violation of Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994
120. The European Communities submits that the continued application of anti-dumping measures
in the 18 measures mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request, insofar as such duties have been
calculated by using zeroing, are inconsistent with Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994.

121. For the sake of brevity, the European Comm unities will not here re-sate the arguments which
respect to these violations, since these are id entical to the arguments submitted by the
European Communities in Section III.D below. Th erefore, the European Communities refers the
Panel to that Section in support of this claim, the arguments therein equally applying with respect to
the present measures and claims.

3. Violation of Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
122. In addition to the violation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
GATT 1994, the European Communities also submits that the United States, by continuing the
application anti-dumping duties with zeroing in the 18 measures contained in the Annex to the Panel
request, has violated Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement).

123. The European Communities notes that, norma lly, the determination of a breach of any
provision of any WTO covered agreement gives automa tically rise to a violation of Article XVI:4 of
the WTO Agreement. This provision reads as follows:

"Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements."

124. As stated by the panel in US – 1916 Act (Japan):

"[I]f a provision of an 'annexed Agreement' is breached, a violation of Article XVI:4
immediately occurs. GATT 1994 is one of the 'annexed Agreements' within the
meaning of Article XVI:4. Since we found that provisions of Article VI of the
GATT 1994 has been breached, we conclude that, by violating this provision, the
United States violates Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement."
95

125. Similarly, the panel in US – 1916 Act (EC) found that:

"If Article XVI:4 has any meaning, it is that when a law, regulation or
administrative procedure of a Member has been found incompatible with the WTO
obligations of that Member under any ag reement annexed to the WTO Agreement,
that Member is also in breach of its obligations under Article XVI:4."96

95 Panel Report, US – 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.287.
96 Panel Report, US – 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.223.

126. Since the use of model and simple zeroing in or iginal investigation, administrative and sunset
review proceedings violates Articles 2. 4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11. 1, 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, it follows that the United States has not ensured the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administra tive procedures with the obligations established in
those WTO agreements. In this respect, the Eu ropean Communities submits that the United States
violated Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.

127. In addition, the European Communities claims that the United States violated Article XVI:4
of the WTO Agreement insofar as this provision also establishes a clear obligation for all WTO
Members to ensure the conformity of their existi ng laws, regulations, and administrative procedures
with the obligations in the covered agreements.
97 This obligation becomes more evident in cases
where an adopted DSB report has concluded that a specific law, regulation or administrative practice,
as such and as applied in numerous cases, is contrary to several provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and the GATT of 1994.

128. In this respect, the European Communities subm its that the findings of the Appellate Body as
adopted by the DSB in specific disputes create an independent international obligation for the losing
party in that dispute to comply. As noted by Jo hn H. Jackson, "an adopted dispute settlement report
establishes an international law ob ligation upon the Member its ques tion to change its practice to
make it consistent with the rules of the WTO Ag reement and its annexes". According to Jackson,
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement "can serve as an important basis for the notion that the result of
the DS procedure is to establish an internationa l law obligation to comply with the results and
applications made in the DS process".
98

129. The objective of protecting security and predictability needed to conduct future trade would
be frustrated if instruments setting out rules or norms inconsistent with a Member's obligations would
remain in place despite the findings of an adopted DSB report declaring their inconsistency with
WTO rules. It would also lead to a multiplicity of endless litigation. Thus, allowing claims against
measures which are the result of the application of instruments or norms which have been found as
such inconsistent with WTO rules serves the purpo se of preventing future disputes by allowing the
root of WTO-inconsistent behaviour to be eliminated.

130. Moreover, in case Members ignore a clear ruling and refuse to change their laws or practices,
it can be argued that a violation of the duty of good faith would arise. The principle of good faith
requires a party to a treaty to refrain from acti ng in a manner which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole or the treaty provision in question.
99

131. The zeroing procedures invariably employed by USDOC in original investigation,
administrative and sunset review proceedings menti oned in the Annex to the Panel request violate the
obligations set forth in various provisions of WTO agreements. This has been the conclusion of the
reports adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2006, with respect to US – Zeroing (EC) and on
23 January 2007, concerning US – Zeroing (Japan) . The European Communities considers that, at
least as of the date of adoption of the first Appe llate Body report declaring the zeroing procedures
inconsistent with WTO rules, it became clear that the United States was obliged to comply with the
recommendation to "bring the measure into conformity" with its obligations in the future. Most of the

97 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, at para. 213. A similar obligation is contained in Article 18.4
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement : "Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular
character, to ensure, not later than th e date of entry into for ce of the WTO Agreement fo r it, the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with th e provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for
the Member in question".
98 John H. Jackson, "International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Comply or Option to "Buy Out", 98 American Journal of International Law 109 (2004), Exhibit EC-25.
99 Panel Report, US – Byrd Amendment, at para 7.64.

cases mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request, as far as the latest dumping margin determination
leading to the current anti-dumping duties is concerne d, were issued after that date, thereby ignoring
the obligation established in the adopted DSB reports.

132. Consequently, by maintaining and applying the model and simple zeroing procedures, which
are administrative procedures not in conformity with various provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and the GATT 1994, the European Communities submits that the United States failed to
take all necessary steps to ensure it complies with its WTO obligations. Accordingly, the
United States also violated its obligation under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.

4. Conclusions
133. In light of the above, the European Communitie s submits that the United States has failed to
comply with its obligations pursuant to Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as well as Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement, by using zeroing when calculating dumpi ng margins in the original proceedings and in
their subsequent review proceedings mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request.

D. T
HE ZEROING METHODOLOGY AS APPLIED IN 52 ANTI -DUMPING PROCEEDINGS , INCLUDING
ORIGINAL INVESTIGATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND SUNSET REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
134. The European Communities also submits that th e 4 original investigations, 37 administrative
review proceedings and 11 sun set review proceedings covering the 18 anti-dumping measures
concerned are inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3., 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Indeed, as the European Communities will
show below, the United States used model or si mple zeroing when calculating the dumping margins
in those cases. The Euro pean Communities will address first the cl aims with respect to the original
investigations concerned, to then continue with the arguments concerning administrative and sunset
review proceedings.

1. Original Investigations
135. The European Communities considers that th e United States has failed to comply with its
obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 with respect to the
determinations carried out in the original investig ations contained in the Annex to the request for
establishment of the Panel (Cases XV to XVIII). The European Communities will describe below the
main facts and findings made by the US in Case XVI, Purified Carboxymethylcellulose – Netherlands
(A-421-811), No. 50 (Exhibit EC-26), and the violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
GATT resulting thereof. For the sake of simplicity , the European Communities will not repeat the
same arguments with respect to the other three orig inal investigations. The relevant sections of
USDOC determination showing the use of model zeroing in the other cases will be mentioned instead.

1.1 Purified Carboxymethylcellulose – Netherlands (A-421-811)
(a) The Measure at issue
136. In the "Notice of Antidumping Duty Orders" published in the Federal Register 100, margins of
dumping of 14.88 per cent (Noviant B.V.), 13.39 per cent (Akzo Nobel) and 14.57 per cent (all
others) were calculated with respect to the period of investigation from 1 April 2003 to
31 March 2004 and the product concerned.

100 Exhibit EC-26, Appendix I, pp. 28277 and 39735.

137. The application of the standard program and, thus zeroing, to Noviant BV is reflected in the
program code as follows:
101

PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
 WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
 VAR EMARGIN QTYU VALUE;
 OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUDD (DROP = _FREQ_ _TYPE_)
 SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL;
RUN;

138. The application of zeroing is also reflected in the program log as follows:
102

6934
6935 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
6936 WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
6937 VAR EMARGIN QTYU VALUE;
6938 OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUDD (DROP = _FREQ_ _TYPE_)
6939 SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL;
6940 RUN;

NOTE: There were 243 observations read from the data set WORK.MARGIN.
 WHERE EMARGIN>0;
NOTE: The data set WORK.ALLPUDD has 1 observations and 3 variables.
NOTE: PROCEDURE MEANS used (Total process time):
 real time 0.01 seconds
 cpu time 0.02 seconds

139. The relevant tables containing the calculations with respect to Noviant BV show that zeroing
was used in this case.
103 Indeed, on Page 22 the percentage of value with AD margins (63.3199) and
the percentage of quantity with AD margins ( 69.1105) can be found. Thus, for the remaining
transactions, no dumping was found and no offsets we re provided. The final anti-dumping duty rate
using zeroing was 14.8815.

140. The tables containing the calculations with respect to Noviant BV without zeroing show that,
with the same data, the final anti-dum ping margin would have been 12.1508 ( i.e., by taking 100 per
cent of the transactions and offsetting positive and negative dumping margins found).104

141. Consequently, in this case, to determine th e anti-dumping duties to be imposed as a result of
the original investigation proceeding, USDOC calculated margins of dumping using a W-to-W
comparison that included the standard model zeroing procedures. In aggregating the results of the
multiple comparisons to obtain the overall weighted average dumping margin, only those comparisons
for which there were positive results were taken into account. In this respect, USDOC disregarded
any comparisons with a negative value. As a result, the sum total amount of dumping was inflated by
an amount equal to the excluded negative values. Without zeroing, the results of those calculations
would have been lower.

101 Exhibit EC-26, Appendix III, p. 31 of the Program Code, Calculate overall margin.
102 Exhibit EC-26, Appendix IV, p. 56 of the Program Log, Calculate overall margin.
103 Exhibit EC-26, Appendix V.
104 Exhibit EC-26, Appendix V, p. 23.

(b) Violation of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
142. The European Communities submits that the "model zeroing" method used by the
United States in this case is not in conformity with its obligations contained in Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.

143. As mentioned in Section III.A, several panels and the Appellate Body have repeatedly found
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 105 the use of "model zeroing" in
original investigations. In particular, in a recent case, i.e., US – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp
from Ecuador , the panel, after explaining the Appella te Body's reasoning on this issue in US –
Softwood Lumber V, affirmed that:

We further note that the Appellate Body report in US – Zeroing (EC) also referred to
its reasoning and findings in US – Softwood Lumber V. In our view, there is now a
consistent line of Appellate Body reports , from EC – Bed Linen to US – Zeroing
(EC) that holds that "zeroing" in the context of the weighted average-to-
weighted average methodology in original investigations (first methodology in
the first sentence of Article 2.4.2) is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 .
106 (emphasis
added)

144. The European Communities submits that, followi ng the findings of the Appellate Body in the
above-mentioned disputes, the Panel in the presen t case should conclude on the same basis that
zeroing in the context of the weighted average-to-weighted average methodology in original
investigations is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

145. The European Communities also notes that the United States fa iled to contest the claim of
inconsistency with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement before the Appellate Body in US –
Zeroing (EC)
 as well as before the panels in US –Zeroing (Japan) , and US – Zeroing (Ecuador) . In
fact, USDOC has published a Notice indicating its inten tion to eliminate the use of zeroing in original
investigations when comparisons are made on an average-to-average basis.107

146. Regardless of this, for the sake of complete ness, the arguments supporting the claim that the
United States failed to complied with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when using
"model zeroing" in original investigations are explained and detailed below.

(i) "Dumping" and "margins of dumping" are de termined with respect to a product as a whole
147. Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:

Subject to the provisions governing fair co mparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established

105 See Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 6.119; Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 66;
Panel Report, US – Lumber V , para. 7.224; Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber V , para. 117; Panel Report,
US – Zeroing (EC), para. 7.32; Panel Report, US – Shrimp from Ecuador, para. 7.43.
106 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Ecuador), para. 7.40.
107 See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an
Antidumping Investigation, 71 FR 77722 (USDOC) (27 December 2006) (final modification), stating that it is
"modifying its methodology in antidumping investigations" to "no longer make average-to-average comparisons
in investigations without providing offsets for non-dumped comparisons". See also Antidumping Proceedings:
Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margins in Antidumping Investigations , 72 FR 3783 (USDOC)
(26 January 2007), stating that the effective date for implementation of this modification was 22 February 2007.
In addition, on 9 April 2007 the United States publicly announced that it is implementing the WTO panel
decision in US – Zeroing (EC) with respect to twelve original determinations disputed in that case (Exhibit EC-
27).

on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of
normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal
value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of
individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which
differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-
to-transaction comparison. (emphasis added)

148. Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:

For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped,
i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country. (emphasis added)

149. This definition reiterates the definition of "dumping" in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.
108
Thus, it is clear from Article 2.1 that "dumping" is determined in relation to a specific product as
defined by the investigating authority. As not ed by the Appellate Body, Article 2.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement makes "clear (…) that dumping is defined in relation to a product as a whole",
and not in relation to a "type, m odel or category" of a product". 109 Given that Article 2.1 applies to
the entire Anti-Dumping Agreement (since Article 2.1 clearly indicates that the definition included
therein is laid down "for the purpose of this Agre ement"), it also applies to Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and, thus, "margins of dumping" under Artic le 2.4.2 must also be established for
the product as a whole.110

150. Consequently, it flows from Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement that "dumping" and "margin of dumping" can only exist with respect to the
product as a whole and not with respect to a category, type or model of that product.

151. Other provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement also provide contextual support to this
conclusion. First, Article VI:2 of the GATT 199 4 provides that "in order to offset or prevent
dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumpe d product an anti-dumping duty not greater in
amount that the margin of dumping in respect of that product". Second, Article 9.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement also refers to the imposition of an anti-dumping duty with respect to a product.
Third, Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also states that "the authorities shall, as a rule,
determine an individual margin of dumping fo r each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation". Thus, in light of these provisions, it clear that "dumping" and "margins
of dumping" can only be defined with respect to a product and not with respect to a category, model
or type of that product.

152. The necessity to determine margins of dumpi ng for the product as a whole does not prevent,
however, investigating authorities from calculating in termediate results with respect to various
averaging groups. In other words, investigating au thorities are entitled to calculate a dumping margin
on the basis of multiple comparisons for sub-divisions of the product.
111 However, the results of these
multiple comparisons at the sub-group level do not constitute "margins of dumping" within the

108 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 92.
109 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V , para. 93, Appellate Body Report, US –
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 126.
110 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 93 and 96.
111 Id., para. 97.

meaning of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement but only intermediate calculations. 112 It is
only on the basis of aggregating all these intermed iate values that an investigating authority can
establish a margin of dumping for the product under investigation as a whole.113

153. As the Appellate Body pointed out in US – Softwood Lumber V , this analysis is not affected
by the use of the plural "margins of dumping" in article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
Indeed, pursuant to Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which provides that authorities shall,
as a rule, determine an individual margin of dum ping for each known exporter or producer concerned
of the product under investigation, as soon as there are more than one producer or exporter in an
investigation, there should be several dumping marg ins. Similarly, nothing precludes investigating
authorities to investigate more than one country in a single proceeding.
114 For these reasons, a single
proceeding may result in more than one margin of dumping. Therefore, the plural used in
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to margins of dumping has logic to it,
independently from the fact that investigating au thorities choose to calculate dumping on the basis of
averaging groups.

154. This analysis is similarly unaffected by the us e of the word "comparable" in Article 2.4.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement . From the moment the investigating authorities define the product
under investigation and consider that it was suffici ently comparable to justify the calculation of a
single dumping margin and the imposition of a singe dut y, the investigating authority is not entitled to
decide that certain models, namely those where th e "export price" exceeded the "normal value", have
ceased to become comparable.

155. Accordingly, in determining the existence of dumping, and in calculating the margin of
dumping for the product as a whole, Articles 2.1 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, together
with Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, pr ohibit a Member from disregarding the results of
any multiple comparisons undertaken by the authoriti es. As explained below, in the case at hand, the
United States failed to comply with these requirements.

(ii) The United States failed to establish the ma rgin of dumping with respect to the product
concerned as a whole
156. In this case, the United States defined the product as follows: "all purified
carboxymethylcellulose (CMC), sometimes also refe rred to as purified sodium CMC, polyanionic
cellulose, or cellulose gum, which is a white to off–white, non–toxic, odorless, biodegradable powder,
comprising sodium CMC that has been refined a nd purified to a minimum assay of 90 per cent.
Purified CMC does not include unpurified or crude CMC, CMC Fluidized Polymer Suspensions, and
CMC that is cross–linked through heat treatment. Purified CMC is CMC that has undergone one or
more purification operations which, at a minimu m, reduce the remaining salt and other by–product
portion of the product to less than ten percent. Th e merchandise subject to this investigation is
classified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) at subheading
3912.31.00". The United States then decided to make "averaging groups" for the purpose of
determining dumping and calculating the dumping margins for each exporter. The
European Communities submits that while the Unite d States was entitled to calculate dumping on the
basis of multiple comparisons at sub-group leve ls, this could not be done in breach of the
requirements of Article 2.4.2, namely to determine dumping margins for the product as a whole.

157. When combining the intermediate results cal culated for each averaging group, in order to
calculate the margin of dumping of the product under investigation, the United States disregarded

112 Id.
113 Id., paras 93 and 99: "We see no basis, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for treating the very
same sub-group transactions as "non-dumped" for one purpose and "dumped" for other purposes".
114 Articles 3.3(a) and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

those averaging groups for which the export price exceeded the normal value, thereby inflating the
overall margin of dumping for the product concerned.
115

158. For these reasons, the European Communities c onsiders that the United States, once having
defined the product subject to the anti-dumping pro ceeding, could not zero the negative intermediate
results calculated for certain averaging groups. This is inconsistent with the obligation arising under
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(c) Violation of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
159. The European Communities also submits that the United States failed to comply with the
basic principle of fair comparison enshrined in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when
applying model zeroing in the case at hand.

(i) "Fair comparison": an inde pendent and overarching obligation
160. Pursuant to Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , in order to determine whether
dumping has occurred with respect to a given product, a comparison must be made between the
normal value and export price of that product. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies
how this comparison must be made. It provides that:

A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect
price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation,
levels of trade, quantities, physical char acteristics, and any other differences which
are also demonstrated to affect price comparability. In the cases referred to in
paragraph 3, allowances for costs, in cluding duties and taxes, incurred between
importation and resale, and for profits accrui ng, should also be made. If in these
cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall establish the normal
value at a level of trade equivalent to th e level of trade of the constructed export
price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The
authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to
ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on
those parties.

161. Thus, the first sentence of Article 2.4 requir es that a fair comparison be made between the
export price and normal value. This requirement under Article 2.4 to make a fair comparison between
the export price and the normal value constitutes an independent and overarching obligation. In other
words, the scope of the "fair comparison" requirement in Article 2.4 is not exhaustively determined by
the remainder of the paragraph regarding the step s to be taken to carry out price comparability.
116 It
means that the legal obligation created by the firs t sentence of Article 2.4 is independent from the
other obligations created in the second an d third sentences of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

162. This interpretation is confirmed by the modi fication brought to that provision in the Uruguay
Round Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, the text of the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement
contains an important and significant innovation by co mparison with the text of the previous Tokyo

115 See Exhibit EC-26, Appendix IV (Program Log used in this case containing the zeroing line –
WHERE EMARGIN GT 0).
116 Panel Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 7.2; and Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) ,
para. 146.

Round Anti-Dumping Code, in which the equivalent or similar provisions to the first and second
sentences of Article 2.4 of the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement were contained in the same
sentence.117 In the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement, however, the words "fair comparison
(…) between the export price and the normal value" were lifted up and placed on their own in a new
first sentence of Article 2.4. This change conf irms that Article 2.4 contains and overarching and
independent obligation to make a fair comparison.

(ii) "Fair comparison": a general obligation
163. The requirement pursuant to Article 2.4 to ma ke a fair comparison between the export price
and the normal value is not limited to the price comp arability under paragraph 4 of Article 2. In other
words, the "fair comparison" obligation constitutes a general obligation which applies not to only to
price comparability under Article 2.4 but also to sub-paragraphs 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.

164. This is supported by the fact that Article 2.4.2 expressly indicates that the rule included
therein is "subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4".

165. The general character of the "fair compar ison" obligation has been underlined by the
Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen:

"Article 2.4 sets forth a general obligation to make a "fair comparison" between
export price and normal value. This is a general obligation, that, in out view,
informs all of Article 2 but applies, in particular, to Article 2.4.2 which is
specifically made 'subject to the provisions governing fair comparisons in
[Article 2.4]."
118 (emphasis added)

(iii) Unfairness of the model zeroing comparison method used by the United States
166. The European Communities submits that th e obligation imposed by Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement to conduct a fair comparison preclude d the model zeroing comparison method
used by the United States in this case.

167. The term "fair" is generally understood to connote impartiality, even-handedness or lack of
bias.
119 However, the use of model zeroing unde r the weighted averag e-to-weighted average
comparison methodology when aggregating the resu lts of the "averaging groups" comparisons for
purposes of calculating the "margins of dumping" is inherently biased.

168. The model zeroing comparison method involves an unfair comparison. By excluding the
negative results of any comparisons from the aggr egation of total dumping, the zeroing procedures
overstate the total amount of dumping by an amount equal to the excluded negative values. As a
result, the dumping margin is inflated. Moreover, in situations where the aggregate value of excluded
negative results exceeds the aggregate value of th e included positive results , the zeroing procedures
produce a dumping determination where the product as a whole is not dumped. In consequence,

117 Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, Article 2.6, first sentence: "In order to effect a fair comparison
between the export price and the domest ic price in the exporting country (or the country of origin) or, if
applicable, the price established pursuant to the provisions of Article VI:1 (b) of the General Agreement, the two
prices shall be compared at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made
at as nearly as possible the same time".
118 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 59; see also Panel and Appellate Body Reports,
US – Zeroing (EC), paras 7.254- 7.255 and 146 respectively.
119 According to the dictionary, fair means "just, unbiased, equitable, impartial, legitimate, in
accordance with the rules of standards" and "offering an equal chance of success" (Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary; 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol.1, p.915), quoted
by the Appellate Body in US – Lumber V (Article 21.5), para. 138.

USDOC conducts its investigation "in such a way that it becomes more likely that [it] will determine
that" there is dumping.
120 By rendering a dumping determination more likely, and by systematically
inflating the dumping margin, the zeroing procedur es deprive the comparison of normal value and
export price of even-handedness. Instead, the pro cedures systematically favour the interests of
petitioners, and systematically prejudice the interests of exporters.

169. The use of model zeroing could even lead to a situation where dumping is found while there
is in fact no dumping. In the case at hand, the dramatic effect which the inherently biased zeroing
method used by the United States had on the outcome of the calculation for Noviant B.V. was an
automatic increased in the duties by 2.73 per cent. The other exporting companies were also subject
to the same calculation, leading to the same inflationary effect on the margins of dumping calculated.

170. Therefore, the method of zeroing which the United States employs is biased because when an
exporter makes some sales above normal value and some sales below normal value, the use of zeroing
will inevitably result in a margin higher than would otherwise be calculated. A methodological
choice that systematically and inevitably results in a higher margin when there has been no change in
pricing behaviour is inherently biased and unfair and is thus inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

(iv) Existing case-law confirms United States model zeroing unfair
171. The above-mentioned conclusions are confirmed by the findings of the Appellate Body in the
EC – Bed Linen case:

"Article 2.4 sets forth a general obligati on to make a "fair comparison" between
export price and normal value.
121

Furthermore, we are also of the view that a comparison between export price and
normal value that does not fully take into account the prices of all comparable
export transactions – such as the practice of "zeroing" at issue in this dispute – is not
a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value, as required by
Article 2.4 and by Article 2.4.2".
122

172. They are further confirmed by the findings of the Appellate Body in US-Carbon Steel from
Japan:

"However, should investigating authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in
making their likelihood determination, the calculation of these margins must
conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4. We see no other provision in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement according to which Members may calculate dumping margins.
In the CRS sunset review, USDOC cho se to base its affirmative likelihood
determination on positive dumping margins that had been previously calculated in
two particular administrative reviews. If these margins were legally flawed because
they were calculated in a manner inconsistent with Article 2.4, this could give rise to
an inconsistency not only with Article 2. 4, but also with Article 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
123

It follows that we disagree with the Panel's view that the disciplines in Article 2
regarding the calculation of dumping ma rgins do not apply to the likelihood

120 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 196.
121 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 59.
122 Id. para. 55.
123 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 127.

determination to be made in a sunset re view under Article 11.3. Accordingly, we
reverse the Panel's consequential finding, in paragraph 8(1)(d)(ii) of the Panel
Report, that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in the CRS sunset review by relying on dumping margins
alleged by Japan to have been calcu lated in a manner inconsistent with
Article 2.4.124

As explained above, if a likelihood dete rmination is based on a dumping margin
calculated using a methodology inconsistent w ith Article 2.4, then this defect taints
the likelihood determination too. Thus, the consistency with Article 2.4 of the
methodology that USDOC used to calculate the dumping margins in the
administrative reviews bears on the cons istency with Article 11.3 of USDOC's
likelihood determination in the CRS sunset review. In the CRS sunset review,
USDOC based its determination that "dumpi ng is likely to continue if the [CRS]
order were revoked" on the "existence of dumping margins" calculated in the
administrative reviews. If these marg ins were indeed calculated using a
methodology that is inconsistent with Article 2.4 – an issue that we examine below –
then USDOC's likelihood determination c ould not constitute a proper foundation for
the continuation of anti-dumping duties under Article 11.3".125

173. The Appellate Body went on to recall its findings in the EC – Bed Linen case, and stated that:

"When investigating authorities use a zeroing methodology such as that
examined in EC-Bed Linen to calculate a dumping margin , whether in an
original investigation or otherwise, that methodology will tend to inflate the
margins calculated. Apart from inflating the margins, such a methodology could,
in some instances, turn a negative marg in of dumping into a positive margin of
dumping. As the Panel itself recognized in the present dispute, "zeroing … may
lead to an affirmative determination th at dumping exists where no dumping would
have been established in the absence of zeroing". Thus, the inherent bias in a
zeroing methodology of this kind may di stort not only the magnitude of a
dumping margin, but also a finding of the very existence of dumping ."
126
(emphasis added)

174. These conclusions were agai n confirmed by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V , the issue
before the panel being whether United States mode l zeroing was "consistent with the obligations
imposed by Article 2.4.2 and the "fair comp arison" requirement in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement".
127 The Appellate Body in that case again found that:

"[z]eroing means, in effect, that at least in the case of some export transactions, the
export prices are treated as if they were l ess than what they actually are. Zeroing,
therefore, does not take into account the entirety of the prices of some export
transactions, namely, the prices of export tr ansactions in those sub-groups in which
the weighted average normal value is less th an the weighted average export price.
Zeroing thus inflates the margin of dumping for the product as whole."

124 Id., para. 128.
125 Id., para. 130.
126 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 135.
127 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, paras 7.196.

175. Finally, the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (Japan) , again, confirmed that the use of model
zeroing in original investigations was, as such, inconsistent, inter alia , with the fair comparison
principle enshrined in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
128

(v) The United States failed to carry out a fair comparison
176. The European Communities submits that, in the present case, the model zeroing methodology
used by the United States involved an inherent bias that had the effect of inflating the margin of
dumping. The determination in this case was ther efore inconsistent with the obligation imposed on
the United States by Article 2.4 of the Anti- Dumping Agreement to make a fair comparison between
normal value and export price. The model zeroing method used by the United States was not fair
within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It failed to duly reflect the actual
prices of the export transactions that took place during the period of investigation, as it should have
done once the United States had fixed the parameters of its investigation in terms of subject product.

(d) Conclusions
177. In light of the foregoing, the European Co mmunities submits that the United States violated
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 when using model zeroing in the original investigation proceedings mentioned in the
Annex to the Panel request as Case XVI.

1.2 Other Measures at Issue
178. The European Communities submits that the othe r three original investigations contained in
the Annex to the request for establishment of the Pane l are inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement on the basis of the same argument s mentioned above. For the sake of
simplicity, the European Communities will not repeat the arguments mentioned before. Instead, in
Exhibits EC-28 to 30, the relevant sections of th e United States' determination showing the use of
model zeroing are mentioned.

1.3 Conclusions
179. From the foregoing, the European Communiti es concludes that the United States violated
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 when applying model zeroing in the 4 orig inal investigation proceedings mentioned in
the Annex to the Panel request.

2. Administrative Reviews
180. The European Communities considers that th e United States has failed to comply with its
obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 with respect to the
determinations carried out in the administrative revi ew investigations contai ned in the Annex to the
request for establishment of the Panel.

181. The European Communities will describe belo w the main facts and findings made by the
United States in Case II, Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof – Italy (A-475-801), No. 5 (Exhibit EC-31),
and the violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT resulting thereof. For the sake of
simplicity, the European Communities will not repeat the same arguments with respect to the other
administrative review proceedings. The relevant sections of USDOC determination showing the use
of simple zeroing will be mentioned instead.

128 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras 146 and 147.

2.1 Ball Bearings from Italy (A-475-801)
(a) The measure at issue
182. In the "Final Results of Anti-Dumping Du ty Administrative Reviews", Notice published in
the Federal Register 129, margins of dumping of 7.65 per cent and of 2.52 per cent were calculated
respectively for SKF Italy and for FAG Italy.

183. At point 1 of the Issues and Decisi on Memorandum, entitled "Offsetting of Negative
Margins", USDOC states its position with regard to the respondent's arguments concerning zeroing.
USDOC refers to its established practice. It explai ns that it considers itself directed by United States
Statute to use the zeroing methodology. In partic ular, USDOC insists on the definition of "dumping
margin" in Section 771(35)(A) of the Act whic h is the "amount by which the normal value exceeds
the export price and constructed export price of th e subject merchandise". According to USDOC, this
means that a dumping margin exists only when norma l value is greater than the export price or the
Constructed Export Price (CEP). As no dumping margins exist with respect to sales where normal
value is equal to or less than export or CEP, USDOC did not permit these non-dumped sales to offset
the amount of dumping found with respect to other sales. USDOC also considered that it had no
obligation to act on the basis of Appellate Body reports in US – Softwood Lumber and US –
Zeroing (EC).
130

184. The application of the standard program and, thus simple zeroing, to FAG Italy was reflected
in the Final Margin Program Log as follows:131

MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGCALC;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): VAR EMARGIN QTYU USVALUE;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): WEIGHT WTFACT
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUDD (DROP=_FREQ_ _TYPE_)
SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): RUN;
NOTE: There were [155] observations read from the data set WORK.MARGCALC.
WHERE EMARGIN>0;
NOTE: The data set WORK.ALLPUDD has [1] observations and [3] variables.
NOTE: PROCEDURE MEANS used (Total process time):
real time 0.01 seconds
cpu time 0.02 seconds

185. In the Final Margin Program Log with respect to SKF Italy, the application of the standard
program and, thus simple zeroing, was reflected as follows:
132

MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGCALC;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): VAR EMARGIN QTYU USVALUE;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): WEIGHT WTFACT
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): OUTPUT OUT = ALLPUDD (DROP=_FREQ_ _TYPE_)
SUM = TOTPUDD MARGQTY MARGVAL;
MPRINT(US14_MARGINS): RUN;
NOTE: There were [ ] observations read from the data set WORK.MARGCALC.

129 Exhibit EC-31, Appendix I.
130 Exhibit EC-31, Appendix II, p. 11.
131 Exhibit EC-31, Appendix III, p. 41.
132 Exhibit EC-31, Appendix IV, pp. 43-44.

WHERE EMARGIN>0;
NOTE: The data set WORK.ALLPUDD has [ ] observations and [3] variables.
NOTE: PROCEDURE MEANS used (Total process time):
real time 0.00 seconds
cpu time 0.01 seconds

186. In both cases, when zeroing is not applied, the dumping calculations with respect to FAG Italy
and SKF Italy show no dumping. In fact, the dumping marg in would have been negative. The tables
containing the calculations with respect to FAG It aly without zeroing show that, with the same data,
the final anti-dumping margin would have been negative, -30.27 ( i.e., by taking 100 per cent of the
transactions and taking account of all positive a nd negative instances of dumping found, no dumping
took place).
133 By contrast, the use of zeroing in this case resulted in duties being imposed at 2.52 per
cent.

187. Likewise, the tables containing the calculations with respect to SKF Italy without zeroing
show that, with the same data, the final anti- dumping margin would have been negative, -4.00.
134 By
contrast, the use of zeroing in this case resulted in duties being imposed at 7.65 per cent.

188. Consequently, in this case, to determine th e anti-dumping duties to be collected for entries
made during the period of review ( i.e., the assessment rate), and to determine the deposit rate for
future entries, USDOC calculated margins of dump ing using a W-to-T comparison that included the
standard simple zeroing procedures. USDOC, th erefore, made multiple comparisons between a
weighted normal value and export price for a series of comparable individual export transactions. In
terms of USDOC's standard simple zeroing proce dures, in aggregating the results of the multiple
transaction-based comparisons to obtain the overa ll weighted average dumping margin, only those
comparisons for which there were positive results were taken into account. In other words, USDOC
disregarded any comparisons with a negative value. As a result, the sum total amount of dumping
was inflated by an amount equal to the excluded negative values. Without zeroing, the results of
those calculations would have been negative for e ach of these two respondents, and no anti-dumping
duties would have been assessed or collected.

(b) Violation of Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
189. The European Communities considers that, by using the simple zeroing methodology in the
administrative review at issue, the United States acted in a manner inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4,
2.4.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . This is so because USDOC determination did not
reflect the margin of dumping for the product as a wh ole. Rather, USDOC used, without justification,
an asymmetrical method of comparison between norma l value and export price. USDOC, therefore,
did not comply with its obligation to ensure that the amount of the anti-dumping duty collected does
not exceed the margin of dumping in accordance with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

190. The administrative review concerned includes final retrospective assessments as provided for
in Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is therefore not disputed that such administrative
review must be consistent with, inter alia, the relevant obligations set out in Article 9.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which provides that:

"The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2."

133 Exhibit EC-31, Appendices V and VII.
134 Exhibit EC-31, Appendices VI and VIII.

191. Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a specific methodology
according to which the duties should be assessed . As noted by the Appellate Body in US –
Zeroing (EC):

"In particular, a reading of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 does not suggest that final anti-dumping duty
liability cannot be assessed on a transaction- or importer-specific basis, or that the
investigating authorities may not use specifi c methodologies that reflect the distinct
nature and purpose of proceedings govern ed by these provisions, for purposes of
assessing final anti-dumping duty liability, provided that the total amount of anti-
dumping duties that are levied does not exceed the exporters' or foreign producers'
margins of dumping."135

192. However, although Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a specific
methodology according to which the duties should be assessed, it sets out a requirement regarding the
amount of the anti-dumping duties to be assessed. As noted by the Appellate Body:

"[I]nvestigating authorities are required to ensure that the total amount of anti-
dumping duties collected on the entries of a product from a given exporter shall not
exceed the margin of dumping as established fo r that exporter. In other words, the
margin of dumping established for an expor ter or foreign producer operates as a
ceiling for the total amount of anti-dumping duties that can be levied on the entries
of the subject product (from that exporter) covered by the duty assessment
proceeding".
136 (emphasis added)

193. Given that Article 9.3 explic itly refers to Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it must be
ensured that the margins of dumping which operate as a ceiling for the amount of assessed anti-
dumping duties are established in accordance with Article 2.
137

(i) The duty must not exceed the margin of dumping as determined with respect to the product as
a whole
194. As discussed above in Section III.D.1.1(b)(i ), "dumping" and "margins of dumping" as
defined in Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
are concepts that are strictly defined in relation to the "product" under investigation. 138 T h e t e r m s
"dumping" and "dumping margins" in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, therefore, apply to the product
under investigation as a whole and do not apply to sub-group levels. 139 These definitions apply
throughout the Agreement in each of the five type s of anti-dumping proceeding (including original
investigations and administrative reviews) and with respect to all comparison methodologies ( i.e.,
comparisons made on an average-to-average, transa ction-to-transaction, and average-to-transaction
basis).140

135 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 131.
136 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 130.
137 This is, in addition, consistent with the Appellate Body's finding in US – Corrosion Steel Sunset
Review according to which "should investigating authoritie s choose to rely upon dumping margins in making
their likelihood determination, the calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4.
We see no other provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement according to which Members may calculate
dumping margins" (para. 127).
138 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 110.
139 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 102.

195. Investigating authorities may undertake mu ltiple intermediate comparisons between a
weighted average "normal value" and individual ex port transactions. However, the results of such
multiple comparisons are not "margins of dumping" within the meaning of Article 9.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement . It is only on the basis of aggregating all these "intermediate values" that an
investigating authority can establish margins of dumping for the product under investigation as a
whole.
141

196. The European Communities argues that th e simple zeroing used by USDOC in the
administrative review at issue did not allow for the calculation of the margin of dumping for the
product as a whole. As explained before, USDOC disregarded the results of the intermediate
comparisons when the export price exceeded th e contemporaneous average normal value when
calculating the overall margin of dumping for dete rmining the new exporter-specific cash deposit and
importer-specific assessment rates. By systematically disregarding intermediate price comparison
results where the export price exceeds the normal va lue, the margin of dumping determined by
USDOC only partially reflects the transactions under considerati on and, therefore, fails to reflect the
product as a whole.

197. Accordingly, in the administrative review at issue, the amount of duties assessed by USDOC
exceeded the foreign producer's or exporter's marg in of dumping for the pr oduct under consideration
under Article 2. The European Communities submits that this directly violates the obligation to
calculate the margin of dumping for the product as a whole and results in collections above the ceiling
established pursuant to Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and inflated cash deposit rates, and
are, therefore, inconsistent with Articles 2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
142

(ii) The duty must not exceed the dumping margin established in accordance with the fair
comparison requirement under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
198. As a preliminary observation, it should be underlined, as noted by the Appellate Body, that
one implication of the fact that the fair comparison is expressed in terms of a general and abstract
standard is that this requirement is also appli cable to proceedings governed by Article 9.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
143

199. The European Communities submits that the si mple zeroing method used by the United States
in the relevant measures at issue results in the calculation of a margin of dumping, whether expressed
as an amount or a percentage rate, that is unbala nced and inherently biased and, therefore, is
inconsistent with the fair comparison requirement under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

200. As mentioned before, the term "fair" is generally understood to connote impartiality, even-
handedness or lack of bias.
144 Rather than being "fair", the use of simple zeroing in administrative
reviews is inherently biased because when an exporter makes some sales above normal value and
some sales below normal value, the use of zeroing will inevitably result in a margin higher than would
otherwise be calculated. This increase in the margin is not attributable to an y change in the pricing
behaviour of the exporter. Rather, this increase is th e direct result of the United States' decision to
limit the numerator of its dumping calculation to those transactions with positive intermediate
comparison results. A methodological choice that systematically and inevitably results in a higher

141 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), paras 126 and 132.
143 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 146.
144 According to the dictionary, fair means "just, unbiased, equitable, impartial, legitimate, in
accordance with the rules of standards" and "offering an equal chance of success" (Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary; 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol.1, p. 915), quoted
by the Appellate Body in US – Lumber V (Article 21.5), at para. 138.

margin where there has been no change in pricing be haviour is inherently biased and unfair and, thus,
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

201. These conclusions are confirmed if one consid ers the situation from the exporter's point of
view. Having been made subject to an anti-dumpi ng duty following the original investigation, an
exporter will most likely wish to remedy this situat ion by increasing its prices so as to eliminate the
margin of dumping as established during the original investigation. However, the removal of the
original margin of dumping will not prevent the ex porter from being subject to the further imposition
of a duty following a United States "administrativ e review" of the amount of duty, unless the exporter
actually increases its prices by more than the margin of dumping. This cannot be consistent with the
general overarching principle that comparisons between normal value and export price be fair.

202. As mentioned in Section III.A.2 above, prev ious panels and Appella te Body reports have
confirmed this interpretation of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In EC – Bed Linen , the
Appellate Body noted that:

"Furthermore, we are also of the view that a comparison between export price and
normal value that does not fully take into account the prices of all comparable
export transactions – such as the practice of "zeroing" at issue in this dispute – is not
a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value, as required by
Article 2.4 and by Article 2.4.2".
145

203. In US – Carbon Steel from Japan, the Appellate Body went on to recall its findings in the
EC – Bed Linen case, and stated that:

"When investigating authorities use a zeroing methodology such as that examined in
EC – Bed Linen to calculate a dumping margin, whether in an original investigation
or otherwise, that methodology will tend to inflate the margins calculated. Apart
from inflating the margins, such a methodol ogy could, in some instances, turn a
negative margin of dumping into a positive margin of dumping. As the Panel itself
recognized in the present dispute, 'zeroing … may lead to an affirmative
determination that dumping exists wher e no dumping would have been established
in the absence of zeroing'. Thus, the inhe rent bias in a zeroing methodology of this
kind may distort not only the magnitude of a dumping margin, but also a finding of
the very existence of dumping".
146 (emphasis added)

204. These conclusions were again essentially confirmed by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V,
the issue before the panel being whether Unite d States model zeroing was "consistent with the
obligations imposed by Article 2.4.2 and the "fai r comparison" requirement in Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement"
147. The Appellate Body in that case again found that:

"[z]eroing means, in effect, that at least in the case of some export transactions, the
export prices are treated as if they were less than what they actually are. Zeroing,
therefore, does not take into account the entirety of the prices of some export
transactions, namely, the prices of export tr ansactions in those sub-groups in which
the weighted average normal value is less th an the weighted average export price.
Zeroing thus inflates the margin of dumping for the product as whole".148

145 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para 55.
146 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 135.
147 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, paras 7.196.
148 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para 101.

205. Similarly, in US – Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada) , the Appellate Body concluded that the
use of zeroing in the Section 129 Determination is inconsistent with Article 2.4:

"The term "fair" is generally understo od to connote impartiality, even handedness,
or lack of bias. For the reasons stated be low, we consider that the use of zeroing
under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology is difficult to reconcile
with the notions of impartiality, evenhande dness, and lack of bias reflected in the
"fair comparison" requirement in Article 2.4.

First, the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison
methodology when aggregating the transaction-specific comparisons for purposes of
calculating the "margins of dumping", distorts the prices of certain export
transactions because export transactions ma de at prices above normal value are not
considered at their real value. The prices of these export transactions are artificially
reduced when zeroing is applied under th e transaction-to-transaction comparison
methodology. As the Appellate Body explaine d in the original dispute, "[z]eroing
means, in effect , that at least in the case of some export transactions, the export
prices are treated as if they were less than what they actually are".

Secondly, the use of zeroing in the transaction-to-transaction comparison
methodology, as in the weighted average- to-weighted average methodology, tends
to result in higher margins of dumping. As the Appellate Body underscored in US –
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the use of zeroing:

... will tend to inflate the margins calculated. Apart from inflating the margins, such
a methodology could, in some instances, turn a negative margin of dumping into a
positive margin of dumping. ... Thus, the i nherent bias in a zeroing methodology of
this kind may distort not only the magnitude of a dumping margin, but also a finding
of the very existence of dumping.

In sum, the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison
methodology artificially inflates the magnitude of dumping, resulting in higher
margins of dumping and making a positive de termination of dumping more likely.
This way of calculating cannot be described as impartial, even-handed, or unbiased.
For this reason, we do not consider that the calculation of "margins of dumping", on
the basis of a transaction-to-transaction co mparison that uses zeroing, satisfies the
"fair comparison" requirement within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement".
149

206. Finally, in US – Zeroing (Japan) , the Appellate Body stated with respect to zeroing in
administrative reviews that:

"If anti-dumping duties are assessed on the basis of a methodology involving
comparisons between the export price and the normal value in a manner which
results in anti-dumping duties being collected from importers in excess of the
amount of the margin of dumping of the exporter or foreign producer, then this
methodology cannot be viewed as involving a "fair comparison" within the meaning
of the first sentence of Article 2.4. Th is is so because such an assessment would
result in duty collection from importers in excess of the margin of dumping
established in accordance with Article 2, as we have explained previously.
Therefore, Panels and the Appellate Body have clarified that the use of model

149 Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 139 to 142.

zeroing in administrative reviews runs against the fair comparison obligation
contained in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement".150

207. The European Communities submits that, in the present case, the zeroing methodology used
by the United States involved an inherent bias that had the effect of inflating (or super-inflating) the
margin of dumping, and even of turni ng a negative margin into a positive one.
151 Indeed, the
calculations with respect to FAG Italy with and without zeroing show that, with the same data, the
final anti-dumping margin ranges from -30.27 to 2.52 per cent. A range from -4.00 to 7.65 per cent
can be seen with respect to SKF Italy. The determination in this case was, therefore, inconsistent with
the obligation imposed on the United States by Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to make a
fair comparison between normal value and export price.

208. Consequently, the simple zeroing method used by the United States in this case was not fair
within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(iii) Violation of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
209. The European Communities submits that by using the asymmetrical method of comparison of
the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 and by using simple zeroing in the measure at issue, the
United States breached Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

210. Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:

"Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investiga tion phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of
normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal
value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of
individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which
differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-
to-transaction comparison."

211. Article 2.4.2 thus sets out three comparison methodologies that investigating authorities may
use to calculate dumping margins. The first sente nce of Article 2.4.2 provides for two comparison
methodologies involving symmetrical comparisons of normal value and export price (weighted
average-to-weighted average and transaction-to-transaction comparisons). Article 2.4.2 stipulates that
these two methodologies "shall normally" be used by i nvestigating authorities to establish margins of
dumping. As an exception to the two normal methodologies, the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 sets
out a third comparison methodology which involves an asymmetrical comparison between weighted
average normal value and prices of individual export transactions. This methodology may only be
used if the circumstances defined in th e second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement are met.

212. The European Communities will a ddress below the issue of the application of Article 2.4.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement to all types of investigations undertaken pursuant to Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement in which margins of dumping are calculated or relied
upon. In this respect, the European Comm unities submits that Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping

150 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), at para. 168.
151 Exhibit EC-31, Appendices V to VIII.

Agreement applies not only in the context of original inv estigation proceedings but also in the context
of review proceedings, including "administrative reviews".

(1) Interpretation of the term "the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation
phase"
213. Article 2.4.2 refers to the determination of the "existence of margins of dumping during the
investigation phase" (emphasis added). The ordinary mean ing of the word "investigation" indicates a
systematic examination or inquiry or a careful st udy of or research into a particular subject. 152
According to the European Communities, what that pa rticular subject is may be limited by the terms
of a particular provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

214. For instance, Article 5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers to an investigation "to
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping" such as is conducted in an original
investigation (emphasis added) . The words in inverted commas would be redundant if the
United States' previous assertions about the "limited" or special meaning of the word investigation
would be correct. Similarly, Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement calls for an investigation into
the existence and degree of dumping by a new shipper; Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
calls for an investigation into whether or not the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to
offset dumping or whether injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or
varied; Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement calls for an investigation into whether or not the
expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury; and
Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement calls for an investigation into the amount of anti-
dumping duty that should be retrospectively assessed.

215. It is apparent that in all the above cases, and particularly when assessing the amount of duty
to be paid under its system of retrospective asse ssment, an investigating authority is required to
engage in a "systematic examination" or a "careful study". Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement contains no limiting language in that regard . To read any other limiting language –such as
that found in Article 5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement – into Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, when there is simply no such language there, would thus be legally incorrect.

216. This good faith interpretation is confirmed by the ordinary meaning of all the terms in the
phrase, considered in isolation and together, includi ng the grammatical structure of the phrase, in its
context and having regard to its object and purpose. It is also unequivocally confirmed by the
preparatory work.

(2) Context of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

217. The application of Article 2.4.2 to all types of investigations in which margins of dumping are
calculated or relied upon is supported by the context of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
in particular Article VI of the GATT 1994 as well as Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

218. Article 2.4.2 contains one direct link to other treaty terms: the term "margins of dumping" in
Article 2.4.2 has a special defined meaning as pr ovided for in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 defines the word "dumping" whilst Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
defines the term "margin of dumping". Thus, whenever, the Anti-Dumping Agreement uses the word
"dumping", that word has the special meaning given to the defined term "dumping" and whenever the
Anti-Dumping Agreement uses the term "margin of dumping", that phrase has the special meaning
given to the defined term "margin of dumping". Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

152 Investigation: "The action or process of investig ating; systematic examin ation; careful research
(…). An instance of this; a systematic inquiry; a careful study of a particular subject" (The New Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary) (Exhibit EC-32).

implements the definition of "dumping". Similarly, Articles 2.1 to 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement implement the definition of "margins of dumpi ng". There are not other provisions in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement which concern themselves with how to calculate a margin of dumping.

219. Given that Article 2.4 implements the provisions of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
concerning "margins of dumping", it must neces sarily apply across the Agreement. The term
"margins of dumping" which has a precise defin ition in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 cannot have
different meanings in the context of various investigations.

220. As noted by the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel , in the framework of
sunset reviews under Article 11.3 –but this is equally applicable to administrative reviews– "should
investigating authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in making their likelihood
determination, the calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4. We see
no other provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement according to which Me mbers may calculate
dumping margins".
153

221. This is logical. If both Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were limited to
"original investigations", that would open up in the Anti-Dumping Agreement a vast loophole on the
fundamental issue of how to calculate a margin of du mping. In addition, it would make the results of
an original investigation effectively worthless. It would void entirely of content the overarching and
independent obligation contained in Article 2.4. This would lead to absurd results, in particular in the
context of the US anti-dumping system in which the results of retrospective assessments eclipse
entirely the results of the original investigation. Indeed, suppose that as a result of an original
investigation proceeding without zeroing, duties ar e imposed at 5 per cent. Assuming that the
exporter made the same number of transactions at equal prices during the following year, the use of
zeroing in the first administrative review proceedi ng would automatically inflate the dumping margin
and the amount to be collected. In other words, this would thus allow the United States to re-
introduce unlawful zeroing methodology by the "back door", in an administrative review conducted as
soon as possible following the imposition of duties, the results of which would annul entirely the
results of the original investigation proceeding.

222. Also, according to Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , "the amount of the anti-
dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumpi ng as established under Article 2". The reference
to Article 2 must be taken to be a reference to the whole of Article 2. There is no exclusion of parts of
Article 2 in that cross-reference. The cross-references in the Anti-Dumping Agreement clarify when
they refer only to certain paragraphs or sub-paragraphs of an article or when they are restricted some
way. This is not the case of the cross-reference in Ar ticle 9.3 to Article 2. This confirms that, in the
context of Article 9.3, a "margin of dumping" is to be established by reference to the whole of
Article 2, consistent with the use of the defined term "margins of dumping" in Article 2.4.2.

(3) Administrative reviews must comply with th e requirements of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement
223. In light of the above, the European Commun ities submits that the phrase "the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase" in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
is not limited to original investigations but also to other investigation proceedings, e.g., reviews.
Indeed, there are five different types of anti-dumpi ng proceedings expressly referred to in the text of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement : original proceedings (see, for example, Article 5.9); changed
circumstances proceedings (see, for example, Article 9.5 "normal (…) review proceedings"); sunset
proceedings (see, for example, Article 9.5 "normal (…) review proceedings"); and assessment or
refund proceedings (see, for example, Article 9.5 "normal (…) review proceedings"). Assessment
proceedings under Article 9.3.1 or refund proceed ings under Article 9.3.2 are therefore to be

153 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 127.

distinguished from original proceedings under Article 5. These different types of proceedings have
different purposes and are not all subject to all the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

224. However, all of these proceedi ngs generally involve an investig ation into something. In the
case of Article 5, an investigation into the existen ce, degree an effect of any alleged dumping; in the
case of Article 9.5 an investigation into the ne w comer's margin of dumping; in the case of
Article 11.2, an investigation into whether or not changed circumstances warrant a variation of the
duty; in the case of Article 11.3, an investigation into whether or not expi ry of the duty would be
likely to lead to continua tion or recurrence of dumping and injury; and in the case of Article 9.3, an
investigation into the actual (contemporaneous) marg in of dumping and final liability for payment of
duties. Consistent with the definition of the te rm "margin of dumping" in Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994, as implemented in all of Article 2, and the cross-reference in Article 9.3 to all of
Article 2, whenever an authority investigates or relies on a "margin of dumping" in any of these anti-
dumping proceedings, that margin of dumping must be calculated in a manner consistent with
Article 2, that is, for the product as a whole.

225. Consequently, as explained in Section III.D.1.1(b), since Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement prohibits the zeroing of negative intermediate results calculated for certain transactions,
the United States also violated this provision in the administrative review proceeding at issue pursuant
to Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(iv) Conclusions
226. In light of the foregoing, the European Co mmunities considers that, by using the simple
zeroing methodology in the administrative review at issue, the United States violated Articles 2.1, 2.4,
2.4.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , since USDOC's determination did not reflect the
margin of dumping for the product as a whole.

(c) Violation of Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
227. As mentioned in Section II.B.1, as a result of administrative reviews carried out by the
United States, duties are collected with respect to a previous period of review (POR) and a revised
estimated anti-dumping duty deposit rate is imposed with respect to future imports.

228. The European Communities argu es that the United States re-inves tigation of the cash deposit
rate, which is carried out in conjunction with the retrospective assessment proceeding, must also be
consistent with the obligations set out in Article 11. 2. That provision refers to the re-investigation of
the margin of dumping calculated during the orig inal proceeding. The European Communities
considers that, if an investigating authority ma kes or relies on a dumping determination for the
purposes of Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it is bound to establish any such dumping
margin in conformity with the provisions of Article 2.4, including Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In this respect, Article 11.2 must be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement , including, necessarily, those that cont ain relevant definitions, such as
Article 2, which defines dumping.

229. Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states that:

"The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty,
where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided th at a reasonable period of
time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon
request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the
need for a review.
21 Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities
to examine whether the continued impositio n of the duty is necessary to offset
dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were

removed or varied, or both. If, as a resu lt of the review under this paragraph, the
authorities determine that the anti-dumping du ty is no longer warranted, it shall be
terminated immediately.
Article".

230. The focus of Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is on reviewing the need to
continue with the anti-dumping duty. The principl e remains that insofar as the importing Member
needs to consider margins of dumping in the cour se of an Article 11.2 review, or varies the anti-
dumping duty as a result of an Article 11.2 review, the margin of dumping shall be established in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, and the amount of anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the
margin of dumping so established.

231. The European Communities submits that the rea ssessment of a cash-deposit rate to be applied
to future entries also constitutes a "review" of whether the continued imposition of the anti-dumping
duty is necessary to counteract dumping that is causing injury.

232. The European Communities is of the view that "administrative reviews" carried out by the
United States comprise two steps: first, the determ ination of the definitive amount of duties; and,
second, the establishment of new exporter-specific deposit rates for future entries. In this respect, the
first part would be covered by the provisions in Article 9.3 whereas the second part would fall under
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

233. Footnote 21 to the Anti-Dumping Agreement , in the context of Article 9.3.1, does not
contradict this conclusion. This Footnote states that:

"A determination of final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, as provided
for in paragraph 3 of Article 9, does not by itself constitute a review within the
meaning of this Article [Article 11.2 Anti-Dumping Agreement]."

234. The European Communities would like to draw th e Panel's attention to the words "by itself".
Indeed, the collection of final duties pursuant to an administrative review falls under Article 9.3.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which calls for an investigation into the amount of anti-dumping duty
that should be retrospectively assessed. This, by itself , does not constitute a "review" pursuant to
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . By contrast, the imposition of new deposit rates for
future entries after a reassessment of the dumpi ng margin, something which is different from the
collection of definitive duties, also amounts to a "review" of whether the continued imposition of the
anti-dumping duty is necessary to counteract dumping that is causing injury.

235. In this respect, the European Communities wish es to add that the effects of reviews pursuant
to Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the reassessment of deposit rates for future entries
in administrative reviews are the same. Indeed, in administrative reviews
154, the United States fixes
an up-dated period of review, gathers all necessary data about normal value and export price during
that new period, re-calculate normal values and ex port prices, make a comparison and re-calculate a
margin of dumping. In this sense, the Unites States reviews the current duty levels in light of the most
recent data, assesses final liability for anti-dumping duties and imposes new deposit rates for future
entries.

236. In this specific measure at i ssue, as mentioned in Section III.D.2.1, as a result of the unlawful
zeroing method described in this submission, the marg in of dumping determined by the United States

154 See Section II.B above.

was not calculated in conformity with Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , and particularly
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

237. The United States also acted in this case in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It failed to consider whether or not the imposition of
the duty was necessary to offset "dumping" as defined in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Rather, the United States sought to justify the con tinued imposition of the duty as necessary to offset
something that did not constitute dumping w ithin the meaning of Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Indeed, in the measure at issue, the ca lculation of the dumping margin without using
zeroing would have resulted in a negative result (i.e., no dumping).

(d) Conclusions
238. Therefore, the European Communities consider s that United States has violated Articles 2.1,
2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3 and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by using the simple zeroing methodology in
the administrative review proceeding examined herein.

2.2 Other Measures at Issue
239. Exhibits EC-33 to EC-68 c ontain documents for the other cases, including generally, the Final
Results, Issues and Decision Memorandum, Final Margin Program Log and Output, and margin
calculation without zeroing. These documents generally demonstrate: that simple zeroing was used,
that there were some negative intermediate margins –set to zero by USDOC; and the super-
inflationary effect of simple zeroing.

240. The same unlawful zeroing method was used by th e United States, to similar effect, in each of
these cases. Accordingly, for the same reasons, in each of these cases, the United States acted
inconsistently with the obligations imposed on it by Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3 and 11.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

2.3 Conclusions
241. In light of the foregoing, the European Co mmunities submits that the United States violated
Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3 and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of
the GATT when using model zeroing in the administrative reviews included in the Annex to the Panel
request.

3. Sunset Reviews
242. As mentioned in Section II.C, in sunset re views, five years after publication of an anti-
dumping duty order, USDOC and USITC review whethe r revocation of the order "would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping (…) and of material injury".
155 In doing so, USDOC
relies on dumping margins calculated in a prior origin al investigation or an administrative review as
the basis for the review determination. Accord ingly, USDOC necessarily relies on margins that are
calculated using either the model or simple zeroing procedures, one of which is always a feature of
USDOC's margin calculations.

243. The European Communities submits that, with r espect to the sunset reviews contained in the
Annex to the request for establishment of the Pane l, the United States failed to comply with its
obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 by relying on dumping margins
calculated in prior investigation proceedings using zeroing.

155 Tariff Act, Section 751(c)(1).

244. The European Communities will describe belo w the main facts and findings made by the
United States in Case XII , Stainless Steel Sheet & Strip in Coils – Italy (A-475-824), No. 42
(Exhibit EC-69), and the violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT resulting thereof.
For the sake of simplicity, the European Communities will not repeat again the same arguments with
respect to the other 10 cases. The European Co mmunities submits evidence of the reliance upon
margins that were calculated using standard zeroing procedures in Exhibits EC-70 to EC-79.

3.1 Stainless Steel Sheet & Strip in Coils – Italy (A-475-824)
(a) The Measure at issue
245. In the Notice titled "Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders on Stainless Steel Sheet and
Strip in Coils from Germany, Italy, Japan, th e Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, and
Countervailing Duty Orders on Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy and the Republic of
Korea" published in the Federal Register 156, the United States decided in the course of the expedited
sunset review that revocation of the anti-dumping duty order on stainless steel sheet and strip in coils
from Italy would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the following
percentage weighted average percentage ma rgins: 11.23 per cent, with respect to ThyssenKrupp
Acciai Speciali Terni, S.A. (TKAST), and 11.23 per cent for all others.

246. The Decision Memorandum of the Inte rnational Trade Administration dated
22 November 2004 (69 FR 67894) states in its Page 4 that: "After considering the dumping margins
determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, the Department determines that it is
appropriate to report to the USITC for TKAST and "all others" the rates from the amended final
determination because they are the only calculate d rates that reflect the behaviour of companies
without the discipline of the order. Therefore, we will report to the USITC the rates as published in
the amended final determination, as listed in the next section".
157

247. It can be observed that the duties imposed as a result of the sunset revi ew investigation were
identical to the duty levels as calculated in the original investigation, i.e., 11.23 per cent (see Notice of
Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order;
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From Italy , 64 FR 40567, of 27 July 1999). 158 It should
therefore not be disputed that the United States, in accordance with its regulations, manual of
proceedings, standard programs, etc, used model ze roing in original investigations, including this
one.159

248. In the case at hand, the result of the program log in the original investigation proceeding
shows that zeroing was used:
160

156 Exhibit EC-69, Appendices I and II.
157 Exhibit EC-69, Appendix III.
158 Exhibit EC-69, Appendix IV.
159 Indeed, the European Communities wi ll like to recall several statements made by the United States
where it acknowledges the use of model zeroing in original investigations in the past (Exhibit EC-80).
160 Exhibit EC-69, Appendix V.

3813
3814
3815 ***************************************
3816 *** CALCULATE OVERALL MARGIN. ***
3817 ***************************************
3818
3819 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
3820 VAR VALUE QTY;
3821 OUTPUT OUT = ALLVAL (DROP = _FREQ_ _TYPE_)
3822 SUM = TOTVAL TOTQTY;
3823 RUN;

NOTE: The data set WORK.ALLVAL has 1 observations and 2 variables.
NOTE: The PROCEDURE MEANS used 0.08 seconds.

3824
3825 PROC PRINT DATA = ALLVAL (
SYMBOLGEN: Macro variable PRINTOBS resolves to 10
3825 OBS = &PRINTOBS);
3826 TITLE3 "TOTAL VALUE AND QUANTITY OF U.S. SALES";
3827 RUN;

NOTE: The procedure PRINT used 0.02 seconds.

3828
3829 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA = MARGIN;
3830 WHERE EMARGIN GT 0;
3831 VAR PCTEMARG;
3832 OUTPUT OUT = MINMAX (DROP = _FREQ_ _TYPE_)
3833 MIN = MINMARG MAX = MAXMARG;
3834 RUN;

249. The tables containing the results of the preliminary calculations show that, with zeroing, the
dumping margin found for TKAST was 3.52461 whereas, with the same data but without zeroing, no
dumping would have been found (-12.94723). The fi nal determination with out zeroing would have
resulted in a negative dumping margin (-0.41), rather than 11.23 per cent.
161

(b) Violation of Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(i) Dumping margins used in sun set reviews must be determined with respect to a product as a
whole
250. In sunset reviews, pursuant to Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , investigating
authorities must determine whether the expiry of th e duty that was imposed at the conclusion of an
original investigation would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.

251. Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not define the word "dumping". However,
the definition of dumping which is laid down in Ar ticle VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and in Article 2.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies to sunset reviews. Indeed , the words "for the purposes of this

161 Exhibit EC-69, Appendices VI and VII.

Agreement" in Article 2.1 clearly indicate that the definition of dumping contained in that provision
applies to the entire Agreement, including its Article 11.3. This interpretation is supported by the fact
that Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not indicate, expressly or implicitly, that
"dumping" has a different meaning in the context of sunset reviews than in the rest of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. As a result, in sunset reviews, the question for the investigation authorities is
whether the expiry of the duty would be likely to l ead to continuation or recurrence of dumping of the
product subject to the duty (that is, to the introdu ction of that product into the commerce of the
importing country at less than its normal value).162

252. As indicated above, Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes clear that dumping is
defined in relation to a product as a whole and not in relation to a type, model or category of a
product. Thus, if dumping margins are used in the likelihood-of-dumping determination in sunset
reviews, they must be determined for the product as a whole.

(ii) Dumping margins used in s unset reviews must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
253. In a sunset review, investigating authoriti es are not entitled to rely on dumping margins which
are inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular with Article 2. In US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel, the Appellate Body clarified that:

"Article 2 sets out the agreed disciplines in the Anti-Dumping Agreement for
calculating dumping margins. As observed earlier, we see no obligation under
Article 11.3 for investigating authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in
determining the likelihood of continuati on or recurrence of dumping. However,
should investigating authorities ch oose to rely upon dumping margins in
making their likelihood determination, the calculation of these margins must
conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4 . We see no other provisions in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement according to which Members may calculate dumping margins.
In the CRS sunset review, USDOC cho se to base its affirmative likelihood
determination on positive dumping margins that had been previously calculated in
two particular administrative reviews. If these margins were legally flawed because
they were calculated in a manner inconsistent with Article 2.4, this could give rise to
an inconsistency not only with Article 2. 4, but also with Article 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement".
163 (emphasis added)
254. Thus, if investigating authorities decide to rely on dumping margins calculated in original
investigations or subsequent administrative review investigations, those margins must be calculated in
a manner consistent with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

255. The European Communities submits that to the extent that the dumping margins on which
USDOC relied in this sunset review have been determined on the basis of zeroing, they are
inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, as mentioned
before, the USDOC relied on the dumping margins pub lished in the amended fi nal determination as
the only ones reflecting the behaviour of companies without the discipline of the order. 164 These had
been calculated by using model zeroing.165

(c) Violation of Articles 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
256. Articles 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provide that:

162 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 109.
163 Id., para. 127.
164 Exhibit EC-69, Appendix III, p. 4.
165 Exhibit EC-69, Appendices V to VII.

"11.1 An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent
necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury."

"11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of pa ragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti-
dumping duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its
imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that
review has covered both dumping and injury , or under this paragraph), unless the
authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or
upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry
within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The
duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review."
257. As highlighted by the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel , if a likelihood
determination under Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is based on a dumping margin
calculated using a methodology inconsistent with Artic le 2.4, then this defect taints the likelihood
determination too and, thus, USDOC's likeliho od determination could not constitute a proper
foundation for the continuation of anti- dumping duties under Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

258. Even if an investigating authority does not rely on margins of dumping calculated since the
original proceeding, it must still necessarily rely on the margin of dumping calculated in the original
proceeding itself. That is because the terms "recu r" and "continue" necessarily relate to something
that not only is going to occur in the future, but which also occurred in the past. If there is nothing in
the past, there is nothing that can recur or continue . Consequently, at least in the case where the use
of zeroing in the original proceeding had the effect of creating a more than de minimis dumping
margin, when in fact there was no dumping or only a de minimis amount of dumping, then the sunset
measure will by definition be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

259. On the basis of the foregoing, the European Communities submits that by relying in this
sunset review on margins calculated in prior proceedings using model zeroing, USDOC did not
comply with its obligations pursuant to Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.4.2 because these margins were not
based on a fair comparison and not calculated for the product as a whole.
166 As a result, USDOC
acted in breach of Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Also, because USDOC reviews
conducted pursuant to these provisions are flawed , the United States failed to comply with the
obligation in Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

260. These conclusions were also reached by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (Japan). In that
case, the Appellate Body noted that since USDOC re lied on margins of dumping established in prior
proceedings in its likelihood-of-dumping determin ation which were calculated during administrative
reviews on the basis of simple zeroing and since such zeroing is inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 9.3,
the likelihood-of-dumping determinations in sunset reviews on the basis of those previous dumping
margins are inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
167

(d) Conclusions
261. Therefore, the European Communities submits that the United States violated Articles 2.1,
2.4, 2.4.2, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the sunset review mentioned in the Annex
to the Panel request as Case XII , No. 42 when relying on margins of dumping calculated in prior
investigations using the zeroing methodology.

166 Id.
167 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 184 – 187.

3.2 Other Measures at Issue
262. The European Communities submits that the othe r 10 sunset review proceedings contained in
the Annex to the request for establishment of the Pane l are inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2,
11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement on the basis of the same arguments mentioned above.
For the sake of simplicity, the Eu ropean Communities will not repeat these arguments. Instead, in
Exhibits EC-70 to EC-79, the relevant sections of USDOC's determinations showing the use of
zeroing are mentioned.

3.3 Conclusions
263. In light of the foregoing, the European Communities submits that the United States has
violated Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the sunset reviews
mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request when relying on margins of dumping calculated in
previous proceedings using the zeroing methodology.

IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REQUESTED
264. For the reasons stated above, the European Communities respectfully requests this Panel to
make the following findings:

• The United States failed to comply with Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement , Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement since it continues applying duties which were calculated by using zeroing in
the 18 anti-dumping measures mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request.

• The United States violated Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as
Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 when applying model zeroing in the 4 original
investigation proceedings mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request.

• The United States violated Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3 and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as
well as Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT when using model zeroing in
the 37 administrative review proceedings included in the Annex to the Panel request.
• The United States violated Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in the sunset review proceedings men tioned in the Annex to the Panel request
when relying on margins of dumping calculated in prior investigations using the zeroing
methodology.

265. The European Communities notes that, contrary to Article 4.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, the United States has so far failed to give duly consideration to the European
Communities' representations on this matter. In view of the obligations contained in Article 3 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, in particular the obligation for WTO Members to engage in
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve di spute, the European Communities once again invites
the United States to comply with its obligations under the WTO Agreements.

266. In order to make effective these obligations, the European Communities requests this Panel to
recommend, pursuant to Article 19 of the Dispute Se ttlement Understanding, that the United States
takes the steps necessary to bring its measures into conformity with the cited WTO provisions. In
particular, in the view of the European Communitie s, the Panel should suggest that the United States
cease using zeroing when calculating dumping margin s in any anti-dumping proceeding with respect
to the 18 measures mentioned in the Annex to the Panel request or any other. This recommendation
will be appropriate to help promote the resolution of the dispute.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

EC-1 Request for Establishment of the Panel (DS350)

EC-2 Tariff Act 1930 (extract)

EC-3 Regulations (in three parts)

EC-4 Manual (by Chapter)

EC-5 Detailed Explanation of Computer Language

EC-6 US Notice on Zeroing in Original Investigations

EC-7 Sunset Policy Bulletin

EC-8 Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute
Settlement (Cameron May, 2002), p.510

EC-9 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed. 1988) pp. 3-5,
pp. 20-21

EC-10 ICJ Statute

EC-11 Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (2006) pp. 622-638

EC-12 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introductio n to Comparative Law (3rd ed. 1988),
pp. 256-265

EC-13 Rosas, "The European Court of Justice: sources of law and methods of
interpretation", in The WTO at Ten (2006), pp. 482-489

EC-14 Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), pp. 234-241

EC-15 Treves, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea", in The WTO
at 10, (1996), pp. 490-500

EC-16 Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to th e European Convention on Human Rights
(2nd ed. 2004), p. 51

EC-17 ICC Statute

EC-18 Kmiec, The Origin and Current M eanings of "Judicial Activism", Comment,
California Law Review, October 2004, 1422-1477

EC-19 ECJ Statute

EC-20 Neville and Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities
(2000), pp. 370-377

EC-21 Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to th e European Convention on Human Rights
(1st ed. 1998), p. 43

EC-22 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor
v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement 24 March 2000,
pp. 41-48 and Declaration of Judge David Hunt

EC-23 ICSID Secretariat Discussion Pa per, "Possible Improvements of the
Framework for ICSID Arbitration", 22 October 2004

EC-24 ICSID Secretariat Working Paper, "Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules
and Regulations", 12 May 2005

EC-25 Jackson, "International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:
Obligation to Comply or Option to "Buy Out", 98 American Journal of
International Law 109 (2004)

EC-26 [A-421-811] Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from the Netherlands (No. 50)
Appendix I: Final USDOC Determinat ion (70 FR 28275) and Final Order
(70 FR 39734)
Appendix II: USITC Determ ination (70 FR 39334)
Appendix III: Program Code of Noviant BV
Appendix IV: Program Log of Noviant BV
Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for Noviant BV
Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for
Noviant BV

EC-27 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the Section 129
Determinations (9 April 2007)

EC-28 [A–401-808] Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from Sweden (No. 49)
 Appendix I: USDOC Determination (70 FR 28278)
 Appendix II: USITC De termination (70 FR 39334)
 Appendix III: Final Order (70 FR 39734)

EC-29 [A–405-803] Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from Finland (No. 51)
 Appendix I: USDOC Determination (70 FR 39734)
 Appendix II: USITC Dete rmination (70 FR 39334)
 Appendix III: Final Order (70 FR 28279)

EC-30 [A–469-814] Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from Spain (No. 52)
 Appendix I: USDOC Determination (70 FR 24506)
 Appendix II: USITC Determ inations (70 FR 36205)
 Appendix III: Final Order (70 FR 36562)
 Appendix IV: Program Log of Aragonesas Delsa S.A.

EC-31 [A-475-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy (No. 5)
 Appendix I: USDOC Determination (71 FR 400064)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Logs of FAG
 Appendix IV: Program Logs of SKF
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for FAG
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for FAG
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF

EC-32 Investigation, New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary

EC-33 [A-449-804] Steel Concrete Re inforcing Bars from Latvia (No. 1)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 74900)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program used with respect to LM
 Appendix IV: Program Log of LM
 Appendix V: Tables containing LM's calculations with zeroing
 Appendix VI: Tables containing LM's calculations without zeroing

EC-34 [A-449-804] Steel Concrete Re inforcing Bars from Latvia (No. 2)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 7016)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program used with respect to LM
 Appendix IV: Program Log of LM
 Appendix V: Tables containing LM's calculations with zeroing
 Appendix VI: Tables containing LM's calculations without zeroing

EC-35 [A-449-804] Steel Concrete Re inforcing Bars from Latvia (No. 3)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 74498)
 Appendix II: Program used with respect to LM
 Appendix III: Program Log of LM
 Appendix IV: Tables containing LM's calculations with zeroing
 Appendix V: Tables containing LM's calculations without zeroing

EC-36 [A-475-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy (No. 6)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 54711)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of FAG Italy
 Appendix IV: Program Log of SKF Italy
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VI: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SKF Italy
 Appendix VII: Table containing calculations without zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF Italy

EC-37 [A-475-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy (No. 7)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 55574) + amendment (69 FR
62023)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF Italy
 Appendix IV: Program Log of FAG Italy
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF Italy
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF Italy

EC-38 [A-475-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy (No. 8)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (68 FR 35623)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log for SKF Italy
 Appendix IV: Program Log for FAG Italy
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VI: Table containing calculations without zeroing for FAG Italy
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF Italy
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF Italy

EC-39 [A-428-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany (No. 10)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 40064)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF Germany
 Appendix IV: Program Logs of FAG Germany
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for FAG
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for FAG
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF

EC-40 [A-428-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany (No. 11)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 54711)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of FAG Germany
 Appendix IV: Program Log of SKF Germany
 Appendix V: Table containing cal culations with zeroing for FAG
Germany
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF
Germany
 Appendix VII: Table containing cal culations without zeroing for FAG
Germany
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF
Germany

EC-41 [A-428-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany (No. 12)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 55574) + amendment (69 FR
63507)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF Germany
 Appendix IV: Program Log of FAG Germany
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SKF Germany
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF
Germany
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for FAG
Germany
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for FAG
Germany

EC-42 [A-428-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany (No. 13)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (68 FR 35623)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF Germany
 Appendix IV: Program Log of FAG Germany
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SKF Germany
 Appendix VI: Table containing cal culations without zeroing for SKF
Germany
 Appendix VII: Table containing calcu lations with and without zeroing for
FAG Germany

EC-43 [A-427-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (No. 15)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 40064)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Logs of SKF France
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SKF France

 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF
France

EC-44 [A-427-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (No. 16)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 54711)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF France
 Appendix IV: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SKF France
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF
France

EC-45 [A-427-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (No. 17)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 55574) + amendment (69 FR
62023)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of SKF France
 Appendix IV: Program Log of SNR
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SKF France
 Appendix VI: Table containing cal culations without zeroing for SKF
France
 Appendix VII: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for SNR
 Appendix VIII: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SNR

EC-46 [A-427-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (No. 18)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (68 FR 35623) + amendment (68 FR
43712)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of SKF France
 Appendix IV: Program Log of SKF France
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for SFK France
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for SKF
France

EC-47 [A-427-820] Stainless Steel Bar from France (No. 20)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 30873)

EC-48 [A-427-820] Stainless Steel Bar from France (No. 21)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 46482)

EC-49 [A-428-825] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany (No. 22)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 74897)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of TKN
 Appendix IV: Program Log of TKN
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKN
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for TKN

EC-50 [A-428-825] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany (No. 23)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 73729)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of TKN
 Appendix IV: Program Log of TKN
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKN
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for TKN

EC-51 [A-428-825] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany (No. 24)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 75930)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of TKN
 Appendix IV: Program Log of TKN
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKN
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for TKN

EC-52 [A-428-825] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany (No. 25)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 6262)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of TKN
 Appendix IV: Program Log of TKN
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKN
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for TKN

EC-53 [A-423-808] Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium (No. 27)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 72789)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum

EC-54 [A-423-808] Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium (No. 28)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 74495)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of U&A Belgium
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for U&A
Belgium
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for U&A
Belgium

EC-55 [A-412-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from the United Kingdom
(No.30)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 54711)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of Barden/FAG
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calcu lations with and without zeroing for
Barden/FAG

EC-56 [A-412-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from the United Kingdom
(No. 31)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 55574)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of Barden/FAG
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for Barden/FAG
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for
Barden/FAG

EC-57 [A-428-830] Stainless Steel Bar from Germany (No. 33)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 42802) + amendment (71 FR
52063)
 Appendix II: Program Code of BGH
 Appendix III: Tables containing calculations with and without zeroing for
BGH

EC-58 [A-428-830] Stainless Steel Bar from Germany (No. 34)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 32982)
 Appendix II: Program Code of BGH
 Appendix III: Tables containing cal culations with zeroing for BGH
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for BGH

EC-59 [A-421-807] Certain Hot–Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the
Netherlands (No. 35)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (72 FR 28676) + amendment (72 FR
34441)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of Corus Staal
 Appendix IV: Program Log of Corus Staal
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for Corus Staal
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for Corus
Staal

EC-60 [A-421-807] Certain Hot–Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the
Netherlands (No. 36)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 18366)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of Corus Staal
 Appendix IV: Program Log of Corus Staal
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for Corus Staal
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for Corus
Staal

EC-61 [A-421-807] Certain Hot–Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the
Netherlands (No. 37)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Resu lts (69 FR 33630) + amended Final
Results (69 FR 43801)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of Corus Staal
 Appendix IV: Program Log of Corus Staal and Program Log of the
amended Final Results
 Appendix V: Table containing calculations with zeroing for Corus Staal
amended Final Results
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for Corus
Staal

EC-62 [A-475-829] Stainless Steel Bar from Italy (No. 39)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 32984)
 Appendix II: Program Log of Forini
 Appendix III: Calculations with zeroing for Forini

EC-63 [A-475-824] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy (No. 40)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Resu lts (70 FR 7472) + Amended Final
Results (70 FR 13009)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Code of TKAST
 Appendix IV: Program Log of TKAST
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKAST
 Appendix VI: Tables containing calcu lations without zeroing for TKAST

EC-64 [A-475-824] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy (No. 41)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final (68 FR 69382)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Program Log of TKAST
 Appendix IV: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for TKAST
 Appendix V: Tables containing calculations without zeroing for TKAST

EC-65 [A-475-818] Certain Pasta from Italy (No. 43)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (72 FR 7011)
 Appendix II: Program Log of Atar
 Appendix III: Tables containing calculations with zeroing for Atar

EC-66 [A-475-818] Certain Pasta from Italy (No. 44)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 71464)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Table containing calculations without zeroing

EC-67 [A-475-818] Certain Pasta from Italy (No. 45)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 6832)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Table containing calculations without zeroing

EC-68 [A-475-818] Certain Pasta from Italy (No. 46)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 6255) + amendment
(69 FR 22761)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum

EC-69 [A-475-824] Stainless Steel Sheet & Strip in Coils from Italy (No. 42)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 67894)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Notice of Amended Fi nal Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order (64 FR 40567)
 Appendix V: Program Log of TKAST (Original investigation proceeding)
 Appendix VI: Calculations with zeroing for TKAST (Preliminary
Determination of Investigation)
 Appendix VII: Calculations without zeroing for TKAST (Preliminary and
Final)

EC-70 [A-449-804] Steel Concrete Re inforcing Bars from Latvia (No. 4)
 Appendix I Notice of Final Results (72 FR 16767)
 Appendix II Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III Antidumping Duty Order (66 FR46777)
 Appendix IV Program Log of LM (O riginal Investigation Proceeding)

EC-71 [A–475–801] Ball Bearings And Parts Thereof from Italy (No. 9)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Resu lt (70 FR 58183) + Continuation Order
(71 FR 54469)
 Appendix II: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix III: Original Order (54 FR 20903)

EC-72 [A-428-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany (No. 14)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 58183)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (71 FR 54469)

 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Order (54 FR No. 92, 15 May 1989)

EC-73 [A-427-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France (No. 19)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 58183)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (71 FR 54469)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Order (54 FR No. 92, 15 May 1989)

EC-74 [A–428–825] Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany (No. 26)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 67896)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (70 FR 44886)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Order (64 FR 40557)

EC-75 [A–423–808] Certain Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium (No. 29)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (69 FR 61798)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (70 FR 41202)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Order (64 FR 27756)

EC-76 [A-412-801] Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from the United Kingdom
(No. 32)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (70 FR 58183)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (71 FR 54469)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Orders (54 FR No. 92, 15 May 1989)

EC-77 [A-421-807] Certain Hot–Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the
Netherlands (No. 38)
 Appendix I: Notice of Preliminary Results (72 FR 7604)
 Appendix II: Final Results and Revocation Order (72 FR 35220)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum, Section 129
Determinations
 Appendix IV: Issues and Decision Memorandums
 Appendix V: Original Order (66 FR 50408) + amendment (66 FR 55637)

EC-78 [A-475-818] Certain Pasta from Italy (No. 47)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (72 FR 5266)
 Appendix II: Notice of Antidumpi ng Duty Order and Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value (61 FR 38547)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memo for the Expedited Sunset Reviews
of the Antidumping Duty Orders on Certain Pasta from Italy and Turkey;
Final Results (66 FR 51015)
 Appendix IV: Continuation of Countervailing and Anti-dumping Duty
Orders: Pasta from Italy and Turkey, and Clad Steel Plate From Japan (66 FR
57703)

EC-79 [A- 428-602] Brass Sheet and Strips from Germany (No. 48)
 Appendix I: Notice of Final Results (71 FR 4348)
 Appendix II: Continuation Order (71 FR 16552)
 Appendix III: Issues and Decision Memorandum
 Appendix IV: Original Order (52 FR 35750)

EC-80 Statements made by the Unite d States acknowledging the use of model
zeroing in original investigations in the past

TABLE OF REPORTS

Short Form Full Citation
Argentina – Poultry Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry
from Brazil, WT/DS241/R, adopted 19 May 2003
Brazil – Aircraft (AB) Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997
EC – Audiocassettes
GATT Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties
on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan , ADP/136,
circulated 28 April 1995 (unadopted)
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5) (Panel)
Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Line n from India – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by India , WT/DS141/RW, adopted
24 April 2003, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton - Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted
24 April 2003
EC – Cotton Yarn
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Panel Report, EC –
Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from
Brazil, ADP/137, adopted 30 October 1995
Egypt – Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel
Rebar from Turkey, WT/DS211/R, adopted October 1, 2002
Guatemala – Cement I (AB)
Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted
25 November 1998
India – Patents (AB)
Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted
16 January 1998
Indonesia – Autos
Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R,
adopted 23 July 1998
Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB)
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R adopted
1 November 1996
Mexico – HFCS
(Article 21.5) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of
High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States: Recourse
to Article 21.5 by the United States , WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted
21 November 2001
US – 1916 Act (EC) (Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 ,
WT/DS136/R, adopted 26 September 2000, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R

Short Form Full Citation
US – 1916 Act (Japan)
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 ,
WT/DS162/R, adopted 26 September 2000, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R
US – 1916 Act (AB) Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 ,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000
US – Certain EC Products
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain
Products from the European Communities, WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted
10 January 2001
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel CVD (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2002
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review (Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion - Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan ,
WT/DS244/R, adopted 9 January 2004, as modified by the Appellate
Body Report, WTDS244/AB/R
US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Corrosion - Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004
US – Cotton Subsidies
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton ,
WT/DS267/R, adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by the Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS267/AB/R
US – DRAMS AD
Panel Report, United States – Anti-dumping Duty on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit
or Above From Korea, WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999
US – Gambling (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/R,
adopted 20 April 2005
US – Gasoline (AB) Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996.
US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan , WT/DS184/AB/R,
adopted 23 August 2001
US – OCTG from Argentina
(AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tu bular Goods from Argentina ,
WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004
US – OCTG from Mexico
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country
Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico , WT/DS282/R, adopted
28 November 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment ) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 , WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R,
adopted 27 January 2003
US – Section 211 (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted
1 February 2002
US – Shrimp AD Measure
(Ecuador)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from
Ecuador, WT/DS335/R, adopted 20 February 2007

Short Form Full Citation
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5)
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia ,
WT/DS58/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/RW
US – Softwood Lumber CVD
Final (Article 21.5) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada ,
WT/DS257/AB/RW, adopted 20 December 2005
US – Softwood Lumber
Dumping (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted
31 August 2004
US – Softwood Lumber
Dumping (Article 21.5)
(Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Rec ourse to 21.5 of the DSU by
Canada, WT/DS264/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, as modified by
the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS264/AB/RW
US – Softwood Lumber
Dumping (Article 21.5) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada – R ecourse to 21.5 of the DSU by
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW, adopted 1 September 2006
US – Underwear (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear , WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted
25 February 1997
US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins , WT/DS294/R, adopted 9 May 2006,
as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS294/AB/R
US – Zeroing (EC) (AB)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins , WT/DS294/AB/R,
adopted 9 May 2006
US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/R, adopted 23 January 2007, as modified
by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS322/AB/R
US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing
and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007

I. INTRODUCTION
1. It is a fundamental principle of customary ru les of interpretation of public international law
that any interpretation must address the text of th e agreement and may not impute into the agreement
words and obligations that are not there. 1 Further, in settling disputes among Members, WTO dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements".2

2. The European Communities ("EC"), in asserting its claims for relief, relies heavily on prior
Appellate Body reports, asserting that "the Pane l should not depart from" prior Appellate Body
reports. Although the EC acknowledges that there is no obligation for a panel to follow the reasoning
of prior reports, the EC attempts to establish some legal threshold for departure from those prior
reports. However, the rights and obligations of th e Members flow, not from panels or the Appellate
Body, but from the text of the covered agreements. Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") plainly requires each panel to make its
own objective assessment of the matter before it, in cluding an objective assessment of the facts and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.

3. The EC's challenges, in this dispute, necessarily require that this Panel read an obligation into
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("AD Agreement") and Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994"), notwithstanding the fact that there is no textual basis for the obligations that the EC
proposes. Namely, the EC seeks to read into the agreements an obligation to reduce antidumping
duties on dumped imports by the amounts by which any other imports covered by the same
assessment proceedings exceed normal value. The positi on of the United States is that such an offset
or credit need not be granted in the assessment phase of an antidumping proceeding.

4. And the actual situation is far different from th e EC's claim that there is a "consistent" line of
reasoning in past WTO panel and A ppellate Body reports on the issue of offsets. Three WTO panels
consisting of trade remedies experts have examined whether there is an obligation to provide offsets
beyond the context of average-to-average comparisons in an investigation. In every case, the panel of
experts determined that the customary rules of interpretation of public international law do not
support a reading of the AD Agreement or the GATT 1994 that extends a zeroing prohibition beyond
the use of average-to-average comparisons in an investigation.
3

5. Nevertheless, the A ppellate Body has adopted an interp retation of the AD Agreement that
includes a general prohibition of zeroing. Using reasoning that has shifted from dispute to dispute,
these Appellate Body reports have found, despite th e contrary interpretation offered by the panels,
that a general prohibition of zeroing reflects the only permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement.
The EC's claims in this dispute rely entirely on that conclusion. The United States respectfully
disagrees with the reasoning in these Appellate Body reports that the only permissible interpretation
of the AD Agreement includes a general prohibition of zeroing. Accordingly the United States
requests that this Panel refrain from adopting the Appellate Body's interpretation. Instead, the
United States requests that this Panel remain faithful to the text of the AD Agreement and find that the
United States' interpretation outside the context of average-to-average comparisons in investigations
is permissible.

1 India – Patents (AB), para. 45.
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article 19.2;
see id., Article 3.2.
3 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) , paras. 7.216, 7.219, 7.222, 7.259; US – Softwood Lumber Dumping
(Article 21.5) (Panel), paras. 5.65, 5.66, 5.77; US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), paras. 7.223, 7.284.

6. As the United States will demonstrate, in order to accept the EC's arguments, one must
suspend disbelief and pretend that assessment proceed ings are investigations and that the alternative
assessment methods contemplated by Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement do not exist.

7. As the United States will explain below, the provisions of the WTO agreements invoked by
the EC do not require that an offset or credit be granted for "negative dumping" in assessment
proceedings and do not require the use of the average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction method
in assessment proceedings.

8. The EC's claims as to WTO inconsistency of the challenged sunset reviews should be
rejected, as the EC has not demonstrated that a cal culation done in accordance with the EC's approach
would result in zero or de minimis dumping margins in the cited cases.

9. The EC's claim with resp ect to Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("WTO Agreement") depends on a finding of inconsistency with provisions of the
AD Agreement and GATT 1994, which the EC has not demonstrated. Consequently, there is no
breach of Article XVI:4. The EC has further attemp ted to interpret Article XVI:4 in a novel manner
that would significantly alter the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system and directly contradict
the WTO Agreement. The EC's attempt should be rejected.

10. In addition, as set out below, the United Stat es requests a preliminary ruling that the measures
that were not subject of consultations but instead ap peared for the first time in the EC's panel request
fall outside of the scope of the Pane l's terms of reference. Contrary to Articles 4.4., 4.7 and 6.2 of the
DSU and Articles 17.3, 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agr eement, the EC seeks to expand the matter in this
dispute beyond the measures upon which consultations were requested. Moreover, insofar as the EC
has added indeterminate measures, th e Panel should find that they are outside of the Panel's terms of
reference because they do not comply with the specificity requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
11. The US antidumping duty law is designed to provide domestic producers with a remedy
against injurious dumping. The US statute govern ing antidumping proceedings is the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended ("the Tariff Act"). The Tariff Act, consistent with the AD Agreement, provides for
two distinct phases in antidumping proceedings. The first stage of the antidumping proceeding is the
investigation phase. The US Department of Commerce ("Commerce") will determine whether
dumping existed during the period of investigati on by calculating an overall weighted average
dumping margin for each foreign producer/exporter inv estigated. Separately, the US International
Trade Commission ("ITC") determines whether an indus try in the United States is materially injured
by reason of the dumped imports.

12. If Commerce finds that dumping existed during the period of investigation, and if the ITC
determines that a US industry was injured by r eason of dumped imports, the investigation phase ends
and the second phase of the antidumping proceedi ng – the assessment phase – begins. In the
assessment phase, the focus is on the calculati on and assessment of antidumping duties on specific
entries by individual importers.

A. T
HE ARTICLE 5 INVESTIGATION PHASE
13. With respect to the investigation phase, US law provides that Commerce will normally use
the average-to-average method for comparable transactions during the period of investigation. 4
US law also provides for the use of transaction-to-transaction comparisons5 and, provided that there is

4 19 C.F.R. 351.414(c)(1) (Exhibit EC-3).
5 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(d)(1)(A) (Exhibit EC-2).

a pattern of prices that differs significantly by region or time period, among other things 6, for use of
the average-to-transaction method.7

14. In the investigation phase, Commerce must resolve the threshold question of whether
dumping "exists" such that the imposition of an antidumping measure is warranted.
Section 771(35)(A) of the Tariff Act defines "dumping margin", for the purposes of US law, as "the
amount by which the normal value exceeds the export pr ice or constructed export price of the subject
merchandise".
8 Thus, for purposes of US law, the "dumping margin" is the result of a specific
comparison between an export price (or constr ucted export price) and the normal value for
comparable transactions. When average-to-average comparisons are used, similar export transactions9
are grouped together and an average export price is calculated for the comparison group which is
compared to a comparable normal value. Some of these comparisons could result in dumping
margins while other comparisons might result in no dumping margin.

15. Section 771(35)(B) of the Tariff Act defi nes "weighted average dumping margin" as the
"percentage determined by dividing the aggregate dumping margins determined for a specific exporter
or producer by the aggregate export prices and constructed export prices of such exporter or
producer".
10 Thus, to calculate a single weighted average dumping margin for each foreign
exporter/producer individually examined in an investigation, Commerce has summed the total amount
of dumping found for each comparison group for that exporter/producer in the United States during
the period of investigation. After 22 February 2 007, in making average-to-average comparisons in
investigations, Commerce intends to provide offsets for non-dumped comparisons that reduce the total
amount of dumping found by the amount by which an y comparison reflected an average export price
in excess of normal value. 11 For example, Commerce did provide su ch offsets in the investigation of
certain activated carbon from the People's Republic of China.12

16. Commerce then divides the aggregate amount from the sum of the comparison groups by the
aggregate export prices of all US sales by the exporter/producer during the period of investigation to
arrive at the "weighted average dumping margin".13

17. If the overall weighted average dumping ma rgin for a particular exporter/producer is de
minimis, the exporter/producer is excl uded from any antidumping measure.
14 If the overall weighted
average dumping margin for each exporter/producer is de minimis , the antidumping proceeding is
terminated.15 If Commerce and the ITC make final affirm ative determinations of dumping and injury,
respectively, then Commerce orders the impos ition of antidumping duties (an "antidumping duty
order" or, simply "order" in US parlance).16 The issuance of an antidumping duty order completes the
investigation phase.

6 This pattern commonly is referred to as "targeted dumping".
7 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) (Exhibit EC-2).
8 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A) (Exhibit EC-2).
9 Similarity of export transactions is generally de termined on the basis of product characteristics.
Therefore, comparison groups are common ly referred to as "models". However, other factors affecting price
comparability are taken into account, e.g., level of trade.
10 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(B) (Exhibit EC-2).
11 See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an
Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification , 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (27 December 2006); Antidumping
Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margins in Antidumping Investigations; Change
in Effective Date of Final Modification, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,783 (26 January 2007) (Exhibit EC-6).
12 See Final Determination of Sales for Less Than Fa ir Value: Certain Activated Carbon from the
People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 9,508 (2 March 2007) (Exhibit US-1).
13 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(B) (Exhibit EC-2).
14 19 C.F.R. 351.204(e)(1) (Exhibit EC-3).
15 19 U.S.C. 1673d(c)(2) (Exhibit EC-2).
16 19 U.S.C. 1673e(a) (Exhibit EC-2).

B. T
HE ASSESSMENT PHASE
18. Unlike investigations, which are subject to a single set of rules, the AD Agreement provides
Members with the flexibility to adopt a variety of systems to deal with the assessment phase. There
are two basic types of assessment systems – prospec tive and retrospective. In a prospective system,
normal values or an ad valorem duty rate are established and applied to the merchandise subject to the
antidumping measure upon importation on an entry-by-entry basis. While ad valorem systems apply
duties to all subject imports, in prospective normal value systems, those imports for which the export
price is greater than or equal to the normal value do not result in duty liability. However, no offset is
provided on other transactions where the export price is below normal value.

19. The United States has a retrospective assess ment system. Under the US system, an
antidumping duty liability attaches at the time of en try, but duties are not actually assessed at that
time. Rather, the United States collects security in th e form of a cash deposit at the time of entry, and
determines the amount of duties due on the entry at a later date. Specifically, once a year (during the
anniversary month of the orders) interested parti es may request a review to determine the amount of
duties owed on each entry made during the previous year.
17 Antidumping duties are calculated on a
transaction-specific basis and are paid by the im porter of the transaction, as in prospective duty
systems. If the final antidumping duty liability ends up being less than the cash deposit, the difference
is refunded. If no review is requested, the cash de posits made on entries during the previous year are
automatically assessed as the final duties. To simplify the collection of duties calculated on a
transaction-specific basis, the absolute amount of duties calculated for the transactions of each
importer are summed up and divided by the total entered value of that importer's transactions,
including those for which no duties were calculated. US customs authorities then apply that rate to
the entered value of the imports to collect the correct total amount of duties owed.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
20. This dispute began when the EC re quested consultations on 2 October 2006.
18 O n
9 October 2006, the EC filed a second request fo r consultations that included two additional
administrative reviews.19 The United States and the EC held consultations on 14 November 2006, and
28 February 2007.

21. On 10 May 2007, the EC requested the establishment of a panel.
20 On 4 June 2007, the
Dispute Settlement Body established a panel pursuant to the EC's revised request.

IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. BURDEN OF PROOF
22. The AD Agreement imposes obligations on the authorities that they must satisfy, but the
burden of proving that those obligations have not been satisfied is on the complaining party. In US –
Corrosion-Resistant Steel CVD , the Appellate Body explained that the complaining party bears the
burden of proof:

17 The period of time covered by US assessment proceedings is normally twelve months. However, in
the case of the first assessment proceeding following the investigation, the period of time may extend to a period
of up to 18 months in order to cover all entries that may have been subject to provisional measures.
18 WT/DS350/1 (3 October 2006). The EC had originally filed a request for consultations on
22 September 2006, but discovered that it had omitted a measure. The EC withdrew that request on October 2
in favour of its 2 October 2006 request.
19 WT/DS350/1 Add. 1 (11 October 2006).
20 WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007). As detailed below, the EC added additional measures that were not
contained in its consultation request.

[t]he complaining Member bears the burden of proving its claim. In this regard, we
recall our observation in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses that:

… it is a generally-accepted canon of eviden ce in civil law, common law and, in
fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether
complaining or defending, who asserts th e affirmative of a particular claim or
defence. (emphasis added).21

23. Accordingly, the burden is on the EC to prove that US measures exist that are inconsistent
with US obligations under the rele vant covered agreement. The bur den is not on the United States to
prove that it acted in a WTO-consistent manner.

B. S
TANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The Applicable Standard of Review is Whether the Authority's Measure Rests on a
Permissible Interpretation of the AD Agreement
24. Article 11 of the DSU defines generally a pane l's mandate in reviewing the consistency with
the covered agreements of measures taken by a Me mber. In a dispute involving the AD Agreement, a
panel must also take into account the standard of revi ew set forth in Article 17.6(ii) with respect to an
investigating authority's interpretation of provisions of the AD Agreement.22 Article 17.6(ii) states:

the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the author ities' measure to be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.

25. The question under Article 17.6(ii) is whether an investigating authority's interpretation of the
AD Agreement is a permissible interpretation. Arti cle 17.6(ii) confirms that there are provisions of
the Agreement that "admit[] of more than one permi ssible interpretation". Where that is the case, and
where the investigating authority has relied upon one such interpretation, a panel is to find that
interpretation to be in conformity with the Agreement.
23

26. The explicit confirmation that there are provi sions of the AD Agreement that are susceptible
to more than one permissible reading provides cont ext for the interpretation of the AD Agreement.
This provision reflects the negotiators' recognition th at they had left a number of issues unresolved
and that customary rules of interpretation would no t always yield only one permissible reading of a
given provision.

27. One panel recalled that "in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement, if an
interpretation is 'permissible', then we are compelled to accept it".
24 Similarly in this case, it is useful
to bear in mind that Article 17.6(ii) applies and th ere may be multiple permissible interpretations of
particular provisions in the AD Agreement.

21 US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel CVD (AB), paras. 156-157 (footnote omitted).
22 See EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5) (AB), paras. 108, 114, and 118.
23 See Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.341 and n. 223.
24 Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.45 (stating that under Article 17.6(i), panels "may not engage in de novo
review").

2. The Panel Should Make an Objective Asses sment of the Matter Before It and Not Add
to or Diminish the Rights and Obligations Provided in the Covered Agreements
28. Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to ma ke an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements. Th e Appellate Body has explained that the matter includes both the
facts of the case (and the specific measures at issu e in particular) and the legal claims raised.
25
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU contain the fundamental principle that the findings and
recommendations of a panel or the Appellate Body, and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB,
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.

29. The EC engages in a long discourse on the EC's particular view of muni cipal law, other legal
systems and fora, and urges that the Panel should not "deviate" from prior Appellate Body reports
addressing the issue of zeroing.
26 In essence, the EC is urging the Panel to rubber-stamp those prior
reports that are favorable to the EC's position, to disregard those panel reports that demonstrate that
the EC's position is contrary to the agreed text of the WTO agreements, and to ignore the Panel's
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU to conduct an objective assessment of the matter before it.
The EC, in relying so extensively on examples from outside the WTO dispute settlement context,
highlights the fact that there is no support for its approach in the DSU, which governs the Panel's
review of the consistency of the measures with the WTO Agreement. A panel is bound to make an
objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU, and must not make findings and recommendations
that add to or diminish the rights and obligations in the covered agreements.

30. The EC erroneously argues that the "WTO inc onsistency of . . . [zeroing] has already been
established in previous disputes".
27 EC citations to evidence before separate panels and the Appellate
Body do not permit the Panel to simply adopt tho se findings here without an objective assessment of
the facts at issue. The panel in US – Subsidies on Upland Cotton rejected Brazil's request that the
panel simply accept and apply the reasoning of a prior panel, as modified by the Appellate Body. In
declining to do so, the panel stated that there was "no basis in the text of the DSU . . . for such
incorporation by reference of claims and argumen ts made in a previous dispute nor for a quasi-
automatic application of findings, recommendations and rulings from a previous dispute".28

31. Ironically, while arguing that a panel should follow the reasoning of prior panel and Appellate
Body reports, the EC appears to have a starkly di vergent view of the WTO dispute settlement system
than prior panel and Appellate Body reports. The EC begins from a rather startling premise - it claims
that the "main purpose" of the dispute settlement syst em is to "provide security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system."
29 Users of the dispute settlement system could be forgiven for
thinking that the main purpose of the dispute settlement system was to resolve disputes.

32. Furthermore, while prior adopted panel a nd Appellate Body reports create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members30, this Panel is not bound to follow the reasoning set forth in any
Appellate Body report. In this instance, the EC urges the Panel to follow prior Appellate Body

26 See EC First Written Submission, paras. 63, 110. The EC appears to advocate that the Panel
disregard its duty under Article 11 of the DSU when it asserts that the Panel should not depart from previous
Appellate Body findings on zeroing "to the extent that the Appellate Body has alread y examined the arguments
which could be raised by the defendant in this case". EC First Written Submission, para. 106. The Panel is
required to make an "objective assessment" of this case, and cannot simply refuse to examine the arguments of
the United States because the EC alleges that they are similar to those made in another dispute that was the
subject of an adopted Appellate Body report.
27 See EC First Written Submission, paras. 115.
28 US – Cotton Subsidies (Panel), paras. 735 - 739.
29 EC First Submission, para. 87.

findings in order to ensure the "security and pred ictability" referred to in Article 3.2 of the DSU. 31
However, read in its context in Article 3.2, the re ference to security and pred ictability in Article 3.2
supports the opposite conclusion. The rights and oblig ations of the Members flow, not from panel or
Appellate Body reports, but from the text of the cove red agreements. In this regard, the "security and
predictability" referred to in the first sentence of Ar ticle 3.2 results from the application of the correct
interpretive approach set forth in the second sente nce of Article 3.2 - the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law - to the provisions of the WTO Agreement. A result which
adds to or diminishes the rights or obligations of Members provided in the covered agreements is
prohibited by the third sentence of Article 3.2 an d is therefore the antithesis of the "security and
predictability" referred to in the first sentence of Article 3.2. This conclusion does not change
because the result in question had previously been reached by the Appellate Body.

33. Appellate Body reports should be taken into account only to the extent that the reasoning is
persuasive. The Appellate Body itself has stated that its reports are not binding on panels.
32 While
the reasoning in such reports may be taken in to account, Members are free to explain why any
reasoning or findings should not be taken into account. 33 Therefore, although the dispute settlement
system serves to resolve a particular dispute, and to clarify agreement provisions in the context of
doing so, neither panels nor the Appellate Body can issue authoritative interpretations that are binding
with respect to another dispute.

34. The EC argues that the Appellate Body in US – OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) "clearly stated
that panels are bound by the legal analysis of the Appellate Body".
34 The Appellate Body in that case,
however, merely said that it would expect panels to follow earlier conclusions where issues are the
same, not that panels are legally bound by prior Appellate Body reports. The Appellate Body's
statement does not represent the incorporation of the doctrine of stare decisis into the WTO dispute
settlement system, nor could it.

35. The EC further asserts that "the Panel shoul d not depart" from prior Appellate Body reports
on zeroing because the Appellate Body occupies a "s uperior position" in the WTO hierarchy, is a
"permanent body", and "provides for the corr ect interpretation of the relevant rules".35 None of this is
provided for in the DSU. Although the Appellate Body undeniably has an important role in the WTO
dispute settlement system, panels also possess fundamental responsibilities under Articles 3.2, 11, and
19.2 of the DSU, and are not free to ignore them be cause one party refers to Appellate Body findings
on a similar issue in another dispute. Panels must make an objective assessment of the matter, and
must correctly apply the customary rules of interpre tation of public international law, even when this
requires a conclusion different from that reached in an earlier report.

36. In connection with reports dea ling with "zeroing", the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan)
appreciated that panels are not bound to apply r easoning and findings of the Appellate Body on the
subject.
36 The panel, explaining why it departed from the Appellate Body reasoning on certain
aspects of the zeroing claim, recognized that alt hough Appellate Body reports should be taken into
account when they are relevant to a dispute, "a panel is under an obligation under Article 11 of the

31 See EC First Written Submission, paras. 94, 99.
32 See US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), para. 111 (citing Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB) and US –
Shrimp (Article 21.5) (AB) ). As the Appellate Body noted in US – Softwood Lumber , adopted reports "are not
binding, except with respect to resolving the partic ular dispute between the parties to that dispute". US –
 Softwood Lumber (AB), para. 111 (quoting Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB)). Panels also have recognized that they
are not bound by previous WTO panel reports. See Argentina – Poultry , para. 7.41 ("We note that we are not
bound to follow rulings contained in adopted WTO panel reports.").
33 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), n. 175.
35 EC First Written Submission, paras. 90, 93, 106.
36 The United States provides below specific analysis as to why previous Appellate Body reports are
inapposite to this case.

DSU to 'make an objective assessment of the matte r before it, including an objective assessment of
the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements...'".
37 Further, as the panel noted, "Article 3.2 of the DSU requires a panel 'to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law' and provides that '[r]ecommenda tions and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in covered agreements.'"38

37. Likewise, recently in US- Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador) , the panel correctly stated that in
accordance with its obligations under Article 11 of th e DSU, it had to satisfy itself that Ecuador had
established a prima facie case by presenting evidence and arguments to identify the measure being
challenged and explaining the basis for the claime d inconsistency of zeroing with a WTO provision,
despite the fact that the responding party di d not contest the claims made by Ecuador.
39 The panel
stated that:

[T]he fact that the United States does not c ontest Ecuador's claims is not sufficient
basis for us to summarily conclude that Ecuador's claims are well-founded. Rather,
we can only rule in favour of Ecuador if we are satisfied that Ecuador has made a
prima facie case.
40

38. Lastly, the United States notes that the EC's claim that prior Appellate Body reports
"constitute an authoritative interpretation of the law"
41 cannot be reconciled with Article IX:2 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which confers the "exclusive
authority to adopt interpretations" of the covered agreements upon the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council. 42 Therefore, while the dispute settlement system serves to resolve a particular
dispute, and to clarify Agreement provisions in the context of doing so, neither panels nor the
Appellate Body have the "authority" to adopt inte rpretations that would be binding with respect to
another dispute. The same flaw applies to the EC's novel argument concerning Article XVI:4 of the
Marrakesh Agreement as well, as discussed further below.

V. ARGUMENT
39. The US argument is structured in the following manner. First, in Section A, the United States
requests that the Panel make preliminary rulings regard ing the scope of its terms of reference. As we
demonstrate, the Panel should limit its terms of reference to those final measures that were first
identified in the consultation request, and subseque ntly in the panel request. Moreover, the EC's
additional measures, to the extent that they are deem ed indeterminate, also are outside of the panel's
terms of reference because they do not comply with the specificity requirement of Article 6.2 of the
DSU.

40. In Section B, the United States responds to the EC's claims concerning assessment
proceedings. The United States will demonstrate th at for purposes of an assessment proceeding, there
is no WTO requirement to offset "negative dumpi ng" or use the average-to-average method or

37 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.99 and n. 733.
38 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.99 and n. 733.
39 US – Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador), paras. 7.10-7.11 (quoting US – Gambling (AB), para. 141).
40 US – Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador), para. 7.9.
42 The Appellate Body recognized this point in one of its earliest reports, when it noted that
"Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides: "The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall
have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretatio ns of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements". Article IX:2 provides further that such decisions "shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the
Members". The fact that such an 'exclusive author ity' in interpreting the treaty has been established so
specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by
implication or by inadvertence elsewhere". Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB), p. 13.

transaction-to-transaction method. 43 Therefore, the Panel should reject the EC's claims as to
assessment proceedings.

41. In Section C, the United States refutes the EC 's argument that Commerce's determinations in
the challenged sunset reviews are inconsistent w ith AD Agreement Articles 11.1, 11.3, 2.1, 2.4 and
2.4.2. In Section D, the United States addresses th e EC's "as applied" claim with respect to four
original investigations. Finally, in Section E, the United States responds to the EC's claim with
respect to Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. Because the EC has not demonstrated inconsistency
with provisions of the AD Agreement and GATT 1994, there can be no breach of Article XVI:4. The
United States also will demonstrate that the EC's broad interpretation of Article XVI:4 would lead to a
distortion of the WTO dispute settlement system, and should be rejected.

A. R
EQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS
42. The United States requests a preliminary ruling that the measures appearing for the first time
in the EC's panel request are not within the Panel's te rms of reference. Contrary to Articles 4.4, 4.7,
6.2 and 7.1 of the DSU, and Articles 17.3, 17.4 and 17.5 of the AD Agreement, the EC seeks to
expand the matter in this dispute beyond the measures upon which consultations were requested.44

43. First, among the 52 alleged measures (called "proceedings" by the EC) the EC specifically
identifies in the Annex to its panel request, 14 are not within the Panel's terms of reference. These
14 specific alleged measures were not identified in the EC's consultation request and were not the
subject of consultations; they therefore fall outside of the Panel's terms of reference.

44. Second, the EC adds in its panel request a clai m against "[t]he continued application of, or the
application of the specific anti-dumping duties resulting from the anti-dumping orders ... calculated or
maintained in place pursuant to the most recent admi nistrative review, or, as the case may be, original
proceeding or changed circumstances or sunset review proceeding" in 18 enumerated cases.
45 The
United States assumes that this request refers to the most recent measure included for each of the
18 cases listed in the Annex. To the extent that th e EC's request does not refer to the most recent
identified measure, but to any most recent measure, it refers to an indeterminate number of alleged
measures. Indeterminate measures that are no wher e specifically identified would not fall within the
Panel's terms of reference. Like the 14 alleged measures mentioned above, the EC did not identify the
continued application of, or the application of the anti-dumping duties resulting from the 18 listed
cases – either specifically or generally – in its consultation request.

45. Insofar as the EC's added measure concerning the application and continued application of
antidumping duties is deemed indeterminate, the Pa nel should find that it is outside of the Panel's
terms of reference because it does not comply with the specificity requirement of Article 6.2 of the
DSU.

46. Finally, four of the ne wly alleged measures were preliminary results from on-going
proceedings in which no final determination had been made at the time of the panel request. For this
additional reason, the Panel should rule that these four on-going proceedings are not within its terms
of reference.

43 Or, put differently, that it is permissible under the WTO agreements to use the average-to-transaction
method in assessment proceedings with respect to situations other than those involving "targeted dumping".
44 US – Shrimp (Article 21.5) (Panel) , para. 5.6 ("We note that, as confirmed by the Appellate Body, a
panel has the responsibility to determine its jurisdiction and that assessing the scope of its terms of reference is
an essential part of this determination" (Citing US – 1916 Act (AB), para. 54)).
45 See WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007) at para. 2; see also EC's First Submission, para. 111.

1. The EC Requested Establishment of the Panel on Measures Not Included in its Request
for Consultations
(a) The Measures Contained in the EC's Original Consultation Request
47. The EC's consultation request of 2 Octobe r 2006, was explicitly limited to 38 specific
measures.
46 Paragraph 2(b) of the cons ultation request refers to " [t]he specific antidumping
administrative reviews listed in Annex I to the present request, and any assessment instructions issued
pursuant to them..." (emphasis added). Annex I lists 33 specific administrative reviews, one of which
was an on-going proceeding at the time of the consultation request. 47 Similarly, paragraph 2(c) of the
consultation request describes the investigations covered by the consultation request as "[t] he specific
dumping determination in the original investigations listed in Annex III to the present request, and any
automatic assessment instructions issued pursuant to them..." (emphasis added). Annex III lists four
specific final determinations of antidumping original investigations. Finally , paragraph 2(d) of the
consultation request describes the single sunset review covered by the consultation request as " [t]he
specific Sunset review determination in the case listed in Annex II to the present request" (emphasis
added). Annex II lists one specific sunset review determination.

48. The EC's additional consultation request of 9 October 2006, to its initial consultation request
added two administrative reviews to the annex of the original cons ultation request, one of which was
an ongoing proceeding at the time of the addendum. 48 Accordingly, the EC identified a total of 38
specific measures and 2 on-going proceedings in its consultation request.

(b) The EC's Panel Request Explicitly Identifi es Additional Alleged Measures that were not
Identified in its Request for Consultations
49. In contrast to the consultation request, the EC 's panel request identified 52 specific measures:
the original 38 measures plus 14 additional allege d measures, including 7 final and 3 on-going
additional sunset reviews 49, and 3 final and 1 on-going a dditional administrative reviews. 50 None of

46 See WT/DS350/1 (3 October 2006). Paragraph 2(a) of the consultation request of 2 October 2006
specifies as the subject of consulta tions: "The United States regulations, zeroing methodology, practice,
administrative procedures and measures for determining the dumping margin in reviews mentioned under
point 1(a) above and which the EC considers are inconsistent with several provisions of the AD Agreement ,
GATT 1994 and the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization". Paragraph 2 of the
EC's panel request does not identify these same alleged measures.
47 See WT/DS350/1 (3 October 2006) (identifying Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia ,
71 Fed. Reg. 45,031 (Aug. 8, 2006) (preliminary results)).
48 WT/DS350/1/Add. 1 (11 October 2006) (identifying Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from
Germany, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,024 (Aug. 8, 2004) (preliminary results)) (Exhibit EC-49).
49 Compare WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007), Annex, with WT/DS350/1 (3 October 2006), Annex;
WT/DS350/1/Add.1 (11 October 2006), Annex. The additional sunset reviews include the final sunset review
determinations: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Italy, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,469 (Sept. 15, 2006) (Exhibit EC-
71); Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Germany , 71 Fed. Reg. 54,469 (Sept. 15, 2006) (Exhibit EC-72);
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France , 71 Fed. Reg. 54,469 (Sept. 2006) (Exhibit EC-73); Stainless
Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany , 70 Fed. Reg. 44,886 (Aug. 4, 2005) (Exhibit EC-74); Stainless
Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium , 70 Fed. Reg. 41,202 (July 18, 2005) (Exhibit EC-75); Ball Bearings and
Parts Thereof from the United Kingdom , 71 Fed. Reg. 54,469 (Sept. 15, 2006) (Exhibit EC-76); Stainless Steel
Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,886 (Aug. 4, 2005) (Exhibit EC-69). The panel request also
includes on-going sunset review determinations Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia , 72 Fed.
Reg. 16,767 (April 5, 2007) (USITC had not yet determined injury at time of panel request) (Exhibit EC-70);
Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands , 72 Fed. Reg. 7604 (16 Feb. 2007)
(preliminary results) (Exhibit EC-77); and Certain Pasta from Italy , 72 Fed. Reg. 5266 (5 Feb. 2007) (USITC
had not yet determined injury at time of panel request) (Exhibit EC-78).
50 Compare WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007), Annex, with WT/DS350/1 (3 October 2006), Annex;
WT/DS350/1/Add.1 (11 October 2006), Annex. The additional final administrative review results are: Steel

these 14 alleged measures were referenced in th e consultation request, and none were formally
included in consultations.

50. The EC's panel request also added a new request that the panel review:

The continued application of, or the application of the specific anti-dumping duties
resulting from the anti-dumping orders enumer ated from I to XVIII in the Annex to
the present request as calculated or maintain ed in place pursuant to the most recent
administrative review or, as the case may be, original proceeding or changed
circumstances or sunset review proceeding at a level in excess of the anti-dumping
margin which would result from the correct application of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement (whether duties or cash deposit rates or other form of measure).
51

51. The United States assumes that this additional request refers to the continued application of,
or the application of, the specific anti-dumping duti es for the most recent of the measures specifically
listed for each of the 18 cases in the Annex. To the extent that the EC's request does not refer to the
most recent identified measure, it refers to an indeterminate number of alleged measures in connection
with the 18 cases. In this event, the EC would be challenging zeroing "as applied" in the calculation
of antidumping duties under original investigati ons, and an indeterminate number of past
administrative reviews, past changed circumstances re views, and past sunset reviews. The new claim
also would challenge the calculation of antidumping duties in an indeterminate number of current
and/or future reviews that Commerce allegedly is concluding or will conclude at some point in the
future.

52. With this additional request, the EC would be suggesting that there is some measure or are
some measures, with respect to the orders, separ ate and apart from the particular determinations
identified in its Annexes, that contain calcula tions of antidumping duties. The EC does not
specifically identify any of these alleged measures. These alleged past and future measures to which
the EC appears to allude were not formally a part of its consultation request, and were not included in
request for consultations.

2. The EC May Not Expand the Panel's Terms of Reference by Including in its Request for
Establishment of a Panel Specific Measures Not Included in its Request for
Consultations
(a) Consultations Must be held Regarding a Specific Measure Before a Member may Refer that
Measure to the DSB
53. A panel's terms of referen ce are determined by the complaining party's request for the
establishment of a panel, which pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, must "identify the specific
measures at issue " (emphasis added). However, a Member may not request the establishment of a
panel with regard to any measure; rather, it may only file a panel request with respect to a measure
upon which the consultations process has run its course. Specifically, Article 4.7 of the DSU provides
that a complaining party may request establishment of a panel only if "the consultations fail to settle a
dispute".

Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,031 (Aug. 8, 2006) (identified as preliminary results in
consultation request) (Exhibit EC-65); Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany , 71 Fed. Reg.
45,024 (Aug. 8, 2006) (identified as preliminary re sults in consultation request) (Exhibit EC-49); and Certain
Pasta from Italy , 72 Fed. Reg. 7011 (14 Feb. 2007) (Exhibit EC-65). The additional on-going administrative
review result is Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands , 70 Fed. Reg. 71,523
(11 December 2006) (preliminary results) (Exhibit EC-59).
51 WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007).

54. In turn, Article 4.4 of the DSU provides that a request for consultations must state the reasons
for the request "including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis
for the complaint" (emphasis added).

55. Thus, there is a clear progression between th e measures discussed in consultations conducted
pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU and the measures id entified in the request to establish a panel which
in turn, form the basis of the panel's terms of reference. Indeed, the Appellate Body in Brazil –
Aircraft stated that:

Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU . . . set forth a process by which a complaining party
must request consultations, and consultations must be held, before a matter may be
referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel.
52

 Moreover, the Appellate Body has found that "as a general matter, consultations are a
prerequisite to panel proceedings".
53

56. These rules apply with equal force to di sputes brought under the AD Agreement, and the
AD Agreement itself clarifies further the relati onship between consultati ons and panel requests. 54
Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement states that a Member may only refer "the matter" to the DSB
following a failure of consultations to achieve a mu tually agreeable solution, and final action by the
administering authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive antidumping duties or to accept
price undertakings. In Guatemala - Cement (AB), the Appellate Body explained that what constitutes
the "matter" is the "key concept in defining the sco pe of a dispute that may be referred to the DSB
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, therefore, in identifying the parameters of a panel's terms of
reference in an anti-dumping dispute".
55 The Appellate Body analyzed the "matter" referenced in
Articles 17.3 through 17.6 of the AD Agreemen t and found that the specific requirements in
Article 6.2 of the DSU – identification of the speci fic measure at issue and the legal basis for the
claim – define the "matter" and, accord ingly, the panel's terms of reference. 56 The Appellate Body
also found that the term "matter", has this same me aning in Article 17.3, relating to the request for
consultations, and Articles 17.4 and 17.5, relating to the referral of a matter to the DSB and the
request for the formation of a panel to examine the matter.57

57. Article 17.3 states that the consultations are to be held with the view of "reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter ". Moreover, Article 17.4 provides that when "consultations
pursuant to [Article17.3 of the AD Agreement] have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution" and
"final action has been taken", by the admi nistering authorities, a Member "may refer the matter to the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")". And, under Artic le 17.5, the DSB "shall, at the request of the
complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter" (emphasis added). In all cases, the matter
encompasses the specific measure or measures identified by the complaining party, and the legal basis
for the complaint.

58. Articles 17.3, 17.4, and 17.5, along with Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, therefore set forth a
process by which a complaining party must request consultations on a specific matter before that

52 Brazil – Aircraft (AB), para. 131.
54 Pursuant to DSU Article 1.2 and Appendix 2, in disputes arising under the AD Agreement, the
provisions of the DSU "apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement
contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2", that is, Articles 17.4 through 17.7 of the
AD Agreement. To the extent of any differences, which do not exist here, between the rules of the DSU and the
AD Agreement, the special rules and procedures in Articles 17.4 to 17.7 would apply. See DSU, Article 1.2.
56 Guatemala – Cement I (AB), paras. 71-73.

matter may be referred to the DSB for the establis hment of a panel. Moreover, pursuant to these
provisions, a panel's terms of reference cannot include measures which were outside of the request for
consultations.

59. Similar issues have arisen in a previous dispute. In US – Import Measures on Certain EC
Products, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that a par ticular action taken by the
United States was not part of the panel's terms of reference, because the EC , while referring to that
action in its panel request, had faile d to request consultations upon it. In particular, the EC's request
for consultations made reference to the increased bonding requirements levied by the United States as
of 3 March 1999, on EC listed products in connection with the EC Bananas dispute, but not to US
action taken on 19 April 1999, to impose 100 perc ent duties on certain designated EC products.
58
When the EC sought findings with respect to both the March 3rd measure and the April 19th action, the
panel found that the March 3 rd measure and April 19 th action were legally distinct, and that the
April 19th action did not fall within the panel's terms of reference.59

60. The Appellate Body upheld th e Panel's finding. The Appellate Body found that because the
consultation request did not refer to the April 19 th action, and as the EC admitted at the oral hearing
that the April 19 th action "was not formally the subject of the consultations", it was not a measure in
that dispute and fell outside the panel's terms of reference.60

(b) Because the EC's Panel Request Contained Measu res That were not the Subject of Its Request
for Consultations, these Additional Measures do not fall within the Panel's Terms of
Reference
61. The EC's panel request explicitly introduced to the dispute 14 new administrative review and
sunset review determinations. None of these alleged measures were a subject of the EC's consultation
request.

62. The EC also requested establishment of a pane l as to "the continued application of, or the
application of the specific antidumping duties resu lting" from the determinations in the 18 cases
identified in the Annex to its panel request. The EC's request for consultations did not contain either a
specific or general reference to these alleged measures.

63. The situation in this dispute resembles that in US Import Measures . As in that or any other
dispute, the scope of the measures subject to refe rral to the DSB is delineated by the consultation
request and, absent a request for consultations, a meas ure may not be placed before a panel. The EC's
consultation request made no mention of any of the additional measures, and accordingly, these
"measures" do "not fall within the Panel's terms of reference".
61

64. Permitting the EC to request a panel with resp ect to measures on which consultations have not
been held would also have dangerous systemic c onsequences for the WTO dispute settlement system.
The very purpose of consultations and any practical utility that they provide would be completely
undermined if a complainant could add complete ly new measures upon which no consultations had
been held, to a request for the establishment of a panel. To allow a complaining party to have
recourse to panel proceedings without having cons ulted on a measure would deny both parties the
opportunity to attempt to settle their differences and resolve the dispute, contradicting the role stated
in Article 3.3 of the DSU of the dispute settlement system in providing the "prompt settlement" of
situations where one Member considers that its benefits under the covere d agreements are being
nullified or impaired by measures taken by another Member. It is also unclear how such an outcome

58 US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 70.
59 US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 82.
60 US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 70.
61 US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 70.

would advance the purpose of consultations; we note in this connection that Article 4.1 of the DSU
calls on Members "to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures
employed by Members".

65. For these reasons, the United States respectfu lly requests the Panel to find that the 14 new
alleged measures specifically identified in the EC 's panel request, along with the "application and
continued application of duties" relating to the 18 cases referenced in the EC's panel request, are not
within this Panel's terms of reference.

(c) The EC's Reference to "18 Cases" Do Not Comport with the Specificity Requirements of
Article 6.2
66. The EC in its panel request identified as additional "measures" "the continued application of,
or the application of the specific anti-dumpi ng duties resulting from the anti-dumping orders
enumerated from I to XVIII in the Annex to the pr esent request as calculated or maintained in place
pursuant to the most recent administrative revi ew or, as the case may be, original proceeding or
changed circumstances or sunset review proceeding".
62 The United States assumes that this request
refers to the most recent of the measures specifica lly listed for each of the proceedings for each of 18
cases in the Annex. However, to the extent that the EC's request does not refer to the most recent
identified measure, it refers to an indeterminate number of alleged measures.

67. A general reference to an indeterminate num ber of measures does not satisfy the requirement
of Article 6.2 of the DSU that a panel request "identify the specific measures at issue" (emphasis
added). Each measure that calculates and sets marg ins of dumping is a legally distinct measure. To
challenge legally distinct measures, a Member must identify specifically each measure in its
consultation and panel requests.
63 The EC did not comply with this requirement. Accordingly,
neither these 18 cases nor any additional proceed ings that flow from these 18 cases, beyond the
measures specifically identified in both the consu ltation and panel requests, can be included within
this Panel's terms of reference.64

68. Permitting the EC to expand th e terms of reference to include the indeterminate measures not
specifically identified would cause severe prejudice to the United States. Individual assessment
proceedings relate only to certain named compani es covered by the review proceeding. The EC,
inasmuch as its challenge relate s to certain enumerated proceedings, limits the application of its
challenge to certain companies named in the Annex of its panel request. It is, however, conceivable
that (1) companies other than those named in the EC's Panel Request, might have been reviewed in
one or more of the particular segments being chal lenged, and (2) that the orders the EC identifies
cover companies in addition to those the EC has iden tified. Thus, this raises the question of not only
which proceedings the EC is challenging, but also wh ether the EC is limiting its challenge to only the
companies named in the Annex of its panel request.

69. Because the United States has had no opportunity to consult with the EC with respect to these
indeterminate number of alleged measures, it was una ble to seek further clarity regarding the scope
and effect of the measures the EC is challenging. Without prior consultations on specific measures, a
Member cannot adequately respond to allegations brought by another Member. This inability causes
prejudice to the United States when making its argumen ts before the Panel, and deprives the Panel of
a full argument on the matter.

70. Moreover, in addition to l acking in clarity, any attempt by the EC to assert a broad, all
encompassing challenge to "18 cases", and suggest that its claim covers any and all individual

62 See WT/DS350/6 (11 May 2007).
63 See US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 76.
64 See US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 70.

proceedings which flow from these cases is untenab le. By failing to identify specific measures at
issue, the EC has failed to establish a prima facie case as to the orders in general, or to any proceeding
that it has not specifically named. Original i nvestigations and assessment reviews, even when
pertaining to the same subject merchandise, are di fferent processes which serve distinct purposes.
The purpose of an investigation is to determine th e existence, degree, and effect of any alleged
dumping, while the purpose of an assessment review is to determine the amount of the duty to be
assessed on previous imports of subject merchandise and the estimated dumping duty to be applied to
future imports. A challenge and finding by a panel with respect to one administrative proceeding does
not necessitate the same type of finding as to a ll proceedings that encompass the same subject
merchandise.

71. The Appellate Body recognized in US – Softwood Lumber CVD (21.5)(AB) separate
proceedings to be independent of each other and that they operate under their own timelines and
procedures.65 In that instance, the Appellate Body fou nd the Section 129 determination and the first
assessment review decision with respect to pass through to be linked because the administrative
review referenced the WTO proceedings and findings. 66 However, by tailoring its finding to the
narrow facts of that case, and by indicating that it did not intend its finding to be broadly applicable,
the Appellate Body effectively conveyed that un less the particular facts dictate otherwise, each
proceeding should be treated as its own measure.67

3. The EC Requested Establishment of the Panel on Measures That Were Not Final at the
Time of its Panel Request
72. As mentioned above, four of the alleged me asures identified in the panel request were
preliminary results of assessment reviews. 68 They do not constitute "final action" within the meaning
of Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement, and thus ca nnot serve as the basis for requesting establishment
of a panel.

73. A matter may only be referred to a panel if "f inal action has been taken by the administering
authority".69 The EC, however, alerts the Panel that some of the matters it ha s referred to the DSB
relate to proceedings that are not final by prominen tly disclosing in its panel request that the measures
it challenges are "Final Results ( unless otherwise specified )", and by identifying the one on-going
administrative review and one of the on-goi ng sunset reviews as "Preliminary results". 70 The EC also

65 US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (21.5) (AB), para. 88.
66 See US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5) (AB), paras. 90-92.
67 US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 93.
68 See WT/DS350/6, Annex: List of Cases ( identifying Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products
from the Netherlands , 70 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (December 11, 2006) (preliminary results) ( see Exhibit EC-59);
Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands , 72 Fed. Reg. 7604 (16 Feb. 2007)
(preliminary results) ( see Exhibit EC-77); Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia , 72 Fed. Reg. 16,767
(April 5, 2007) (USITC has not yet determined injury) (Exhibit EC-70); Certain Pasta from Italy , 72 Fed.
Reg. 5266 (5 Feb. 2007) (USITC has not yet determined injury) (Exhibit EC-78). See WT/DS350/1
(3 October 2006) (identifying Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia , 71 Fed. Reg. 45,031 (8 Aug. 2006)
(preliminary results) (Exhibit EC-33). See WT/DS350/1/Add. 1 (11 October 2006) ( identifying Stainless Steel
Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany , 71 Fed. Reg. 45,024 (8 Aug. 2006) (preliminary results) (Exhibit EC-
49).
69 AD Agreement, Art. 17.4. A provisional measure ma y only be challenged when it " has a significant
impact and the Member that requested consultations co nsiders that the measure was taken contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7". The EC has neither alleged nor demonstrated that these criteria have
been met with respect to the preliminary results identified.
70 WT/DS350/6, Annex: List of Cases (p.11) (emphasis added); Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat
Products from the Netherlands , 72 Fed. Reg. 7604 (16 Feb. 2007) (preliminary results) ( see Exhibit EC-77);
Certain Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands , 70 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (11 Dec. 2006)
(preliminary results) (see Exhibit EC-59).

omits from its panel request reference to the final IT C decisions and final orders in two of the sunset
reviews because these proceedings also were on-going at the time the EC submitted its panel request.
These four on-going proceedings challenged by the EC are not "final action[s] . . . taken by the
administering authority of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties".
71 To the
contrary, at the time of the panel request, no d ecision had been made to levy definitive duties. 72
Indeed, it was entirely possible that no definitive anti-dumping duty would be levied, or would
continue to be levied at all.

74. Submitting a request for establishment of a panel to review proceedings that are not final is
not permitted by Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. Nor are measures that are not yet in existence at
the time of panel establishment within a panel's terms of reference under the DSU.
73 We respectfully
request that the Panel find that the four on-going proceedings are not within its terms of reference.

B. T
HE UNITED STATES METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IN THE AD AGREEMENT
75. To the extent the EC challenges the WTO-consistency of the zeroing methodology as applied
in assessment proceedings, as we demonstrate below, th e EC's claims directly contradict the text of
the AD Agreement. The methodology used by the United States to calculating antidumping duties in
the assessment proceedings in question is WTO-consistent.

76. The AD Agreement provides no general obliga tion to consider transactions for which the
export price exceeds normal value as an offset to the amount of dumping found in relation to other
transactions at less than normal value. The excl usive textual basis for an obligation to account for
such non-dumping in calculating margins of dumping appears in connection with the obligation found
in Article 2.4.2 that "the existence of marg ins of dumping during the investigation phase shall
normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions . . . ".
74 This particular text of
Article 2.4.2 applies only within the limited contex t of determining whether dumping exists in the
investigation phase when using the average-to-ave rage comparison methodology in Article 2.4.2. 75
There is no textual basis for the additional obligations that the EC would have this Panel impose.

77. In US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), the Appellate Body specifically recognized that the
issue before it was whether zeroing was prohib ited under the average-to-average comparison
methodology found in Article 2.4.2.
76 Thus, the report found only that "zeroing is prohibited when
establishing the existence of margins of dumping u nder the weighted-average-to-weighted-average
methodology".77 The Appellate Body reached this conclu sion by interpreting the terms "margins of
dumping" and "all comparable export transactions" as th ey are used in Article 2.4.2 in an "integrated
manner".78 In other words, the term "all comparab le export transactions" was integral to the
interpretation that the multiple comparisons of average normal value and average export price for

71 AD Agreement, Art. 17.4.
72 Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,767 (5 April 2007) (USITC has not yet
determined injury) (Exhibit EC-70); Certain Pasta from Italy, 72 Fed. Reg. 5266 (5 Feb. 2007) (USITC has not
yet determined injury) (Exhibit EC-78).
73 See, e.g, US – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Panel) , para. 7.158 (finding that a measure that had not
yet been adopted could not form a part of the Panel's terms of reference); Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Panel) , para. 14.3 (agreeing with the responding party that a
measure adopted after the establishment of the panel was not within the panels terms of reference).
74 Emphasis added. See US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), paras. 82, 86, and 98.
75 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.213; US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.197; US – Softwood
Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.65-5.66 and 5.77.
76 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), paras. 104, 105, and 108.
77 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), para. 108.
78 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), paras. 86 - 103.

averaging groups did not constitute an average-to -average comparison of all comparable export
transactions unless the results of all such comparis ons were aggregated. Th e obligation to provide
offsets, therefore, was tied to the text of the provision addressing the use of the average-to-average
comparison methodology in an investigation, and did not arise out of any independent obligation to
offset prices.

78. The EC's argument that there is either a ge neral prohibition of "zeroing", or one specifically
applicable to the more particular context of assessment proceedings, cannot be reconciled with the
interpretation articulated in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) , wherein the phrase "all
comparable export transactions" in Article 2.4.2 m eant that zeroing was prohibited in the context of
average-to-average comparisons in investigations. If, as the EC seems to argue, there is a general
prohibition of zeroing that applies in all proceedings and under all comparison methodologies, the
meaning ascribed to "all comparable export transacti ons" by the Appellate Body in that dispute would
be redundant of the general prohibition of zeroing and therefore "inutile".

79. The need to avoid such redundancy was recognized in US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) when the
Appellate Body changed its interp retation of this phrase. In US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) ,
"margins of dumping" and "all comparable export tr ansactions" were interpreted in an integrated
manner. The Appellate Body found that in aggreg ating the results of the model-specific comparisons,
"all" comparable export transactions must be account ed for. Thus, the phrase necessarily referred to
all transactions across all models of the product under investigation, i.e., the product "as a whole".
The textual reference "all comparable export tran sactions" was the basis for the Appellate Body to
conclude that "product" must mean "product as whol e" and margins of dumping may not be based on
individual averaging group comparisons. The Appella te Body subsequently relied on this "product as
a whole" concept, although in a manner detached fro m its underlying textual basis, in concluding that
margins of dumping cannot be calculated for individual transactions.
79

80. However, in US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) , the Appellate Body reinterpreted "all comparable
export transactions" to relate solely to all transac tions within a model, and not across models of the
product under investigation. 80 In doing so, the Appellate Body abandoned the only textual basis for
its reasoning in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB).81

81. In making its own "objective assessment", however, this Panel must give particular
consideration to the special standard of review for matters arising under the AD Agreement – that a
Member's measure may not be found inconsistent w ith the obligations set fo rth in the AD Agreement
if the measure is based on a permissible interpreta tion of the AD Agreement. Accordingly, for the
reasons set forth below, the Panel should not a dopt reasoning and conclusi ons from Appellate Body
reports that reject a permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement.

79 US – Zeroing (EC) (AB), paras. 126, 127; US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (21.5) (AB),
paras. 89, 114; US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB), paras. 121, 122, 151.
80 US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) , para. 124 ("[T]he phrase 'all comp arable export transactions' requires
that each group include only transactions that are comparable and that no other transaction may be left out when
determining margins of dumping under [the average-to-average comparison] methodology").
81 The United States raised these points in its DSB statement and communication of 20 February 2007
(Exhibit US-2). See also, Communication from the United States, WT/DS294/16, and Communication from the
United States, WT/DS294/18.

1. Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994
82
82. As an initial matter, Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 are
definitional provisions that, "read in isola tion, do not impose independent obligations". 83
Nevertheless, these definitions are important to the interpretation of other provisions of the
AD Agreement at issue in this dispute. In partic ular, it is most significant that Article 2.1 of the
AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 do not define "dumping" and "margins of dumping"
so as to require that export transactions be exam ined at an aggregate level. The definition of
"dumping" in these provisions references "product . . . introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than its normal value". This definition describes the real-world commercial conduct by
which a product is imported into a country, i.e., transaction by transaction. 84 Thus, dumping is
defined as occurring in the course of a commercial transaction in which the product, which is the
object of the transaction, is "introduced into th e commerce" of the importing country at an export
price that is "less than normal value".

83. In addition, the term "less than normal va lue" is defined as when the "price of the product
exported . . . is less than the comparable price . . . ".
85 Again, this definition describes the real-world
commercial conduct of pricing such that one price is less than another price. The ordinary meaning of
"price" as used in the definition of dumping is the "payment in purchase of something". 86 T h i s
definition "can easily be applied to individual tr ansactions and does not require an examination of
export transactions at an aggregate level".87

84. The "dumping" definition's description of the conduct that antidumping duties are intended to
remedy provides strong contextual support for the interpretation of these provisions that permits an
authority to examine dumping in relation to the particular conduct described, i.e., individual import
transactions. Thus, in the US – Zeroing (Japan) dispute, the panel correctly concluded that the
definition of dumping itself "undermines the argument that it is not permissible to interpret the
concept of dumping as being applicable to individual sales transactions".88

85. In other words, dumping – as defined under these provisions – may occur in a single
transaction. There is nothing in the GATT 1994 or the AD Agreement that suggests that injurious
dumping that occurs with respect to one transact ion is mitigated by the occurrence of another
transaction made at a non-dumped price. Indeed, th e commercial reality is that the foreign producer
or exporter itself exclusively enjoys the benefit of the extent to which the price of a non-dumped
export transaction exceeds normal value.

86. In US – Zeroing (Japan) , the panel noted that "the record of past discussions in the
framework of GATT shows that historically the concept of dumping has been understood to be
applicable at the level of individual export transactions".
89 Well before the recent debate about
"zeroing" or "offsets", a Group of Experts convened to consider numerous issues with respect to the

82 Because Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreemen t do not impose independent obligations, to the
extent the EC is claiming that the challenged measures ar e inconsistent with "obligations" found in either 2.1
or 2.4, the EC fails to establish the existence of any obligations pursuant to these definitional provisions, and
therefore, the EC's claims mu st necessarily depend on Article 2.4.2. If, however, the Panel elects not to follow
the reasoning employed in prior Appellate Body findings ( see e.g., US – Zeroing (Japan) (AB) , para. 140), and
finds the application of zeroing in reviews inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.4, then the Panel may exercise
judicial economy and need not reach the EC's argument as to Article 2.4.2.
84 See US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.285.
85 Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement.
86 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), p. 2349.
89 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.107 and n.743.

application of Article VI of the GATT 1947. In th is report, the Group of Experts considered that the
"ideal method" for applying antidumping duties "was to make a determination of both dumping and
material injury in respect of each single importation of the product concerned".
90

87. Taking the same view, the panel in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) reasoned:

In referring to a "determination . . . of . . . dumping . . . in respect of each single
importation of the product concerned", the Group of Experts clearly envisaged the
calculation of transaction-specific margins of dumping. This would suggest that the
Group of Experts did not consider that there was anything in the definition of
dumping set forth in Article VI of the GATT that would preclude the calculation of
such transaction-specific margins.
91

88. Thus, as the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) found, "historically the concept of dumping has
been understood to be applicable at the level of individual export transactions".
92

89. It bears recalling that the AD Agreement was negotiated against the background of the
Antidumping Code and the antidumping investig ation methodologies of individual Contracting
Parties under the Code. The methodology of not offsetting dumping based on comparisons where the
export price was greater than normal value was ex amined by two GATT panels and was found to be
consistent with the Antidumping Code. 93 In view of these findings, the Uruguay Round negotiators
actively discussed whether the use of "zeroing" should be restricted. 94 The text of Article VI of the
GATT 1947, however, did not change as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. 95 The normal
inference one draws from the absence of a change in language is that the drafters intended no change
in meaning.96

90. The EC's claims in this dispute depend on a contrary interpretation of these provisions
holding that "dumping" and "margins of dumping" apply to the product under investigation "as a
whole" and do not apply to sub-group levels. 97 The EC claim depends on the reasoning set forth in
the Appellate Body reports in US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) 98, which rejected the
notion that dumping may occur with respect to an individual transac tion in the absence of the textual
basis that was present in EC – Bed Linen (AB) and US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) . This
interpretation relies on the term "product" as being solely and exclusively synonymous with the

90 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties , Second Report of the Group of Experts, L/1141, adopted
on 27 May 1960, BISD 9S/194, para. 7.
91 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.64.
94 See, e.g., Communication from Japan , MTN.GNG/NG8/W/30 (20 June 1988), item I.4(3), in which
Japan expressed concern about a methodology wherein "negative dumping margins, i.e., the amount be which
export price exceeds normal value, are ignored"; Proposed Elements for a Framework for Negotiations:
Principles and Objectives for Anti-dumping Rules, Communication from the Delegation of Singapore ,
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/55 (Oct. 13, 1989), at item II.E.(d) (proposing that in calculating dumping margins
"'negative' dumping should be taken into account, i.e. if certain transactions are sold for more than the normal
value in the foreign market, that excess should be balanc ed off against sales of merchandise at less than normal
value"); Communication from the Delegation of Hong Kong, MTN.GNG/NG8/W46 (July 3, 1989), at 7.
95 Similarly, the text of Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement mirrors the text of the Tokyo Round
Antidumping Code.
96 Instructive in this regard is US – Underwear (AB), p. 17, in which the Appellate Body found that the
disappearance in the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing of the earlier Multi-Fibre Agreement provision for
backdating the operative effect of a restraint measure, "strongly reinforced the presumption that such retroactive
application is no longer permissible". The corollary, however, is that when a provision is not changed, there is a
presumption that behaviour that previously was permissible remains permissible.

concept of "product as a whole". In particular, it denies that the ordinary meaning of the word
"product" or "products" used in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994
admits of a meaning that is transaction-sp ecific. However, as the panel report in US – Zeroing
(Japan) explained, "[T]here is nothing inhe rent in the word 'product[]' (as used in Article VI:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of AD Agreement) to suggest that this word should preclude the
possibility of establishing margins of dumping on a transaction-specific basis . . . ".
99

91. In US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) , the Appellate Body reasoned that zeroing was not
permitted in the context of "multiple averaging" , on the basis of the phrase "all comparable export
transactions", but did not explain how zeroing coul d be prohibited in the context of "multiple
comparisons" generally. In contrast to US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB) , in US – Zeroing (EC)
(AB) a new interpretation was embraced, such that the "product as a whole" concept led to the
conclusion that zeroing is prohibited whenever "multiple comparisons" are made. The phrases
"product as a whole" and "multiple comparisons" do not appear in the AD Agreement, but were
derived from interpretations based on the phrase "all comparable export transactions", which appears
only in connection with average-to-average comparis ons in investigations. In considering this, the
Panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) found:

no explanation of this shift from the use of the "product as a whole" concept as
context to interpret the term "margins of dumping" in the first sentence of
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in connection with multiple averaging, on the
one hand, to the use of this concept as an autonomous legal basis for a general
prohibition of zeroing, on the other. In this regard, we note, in particular, that the
Appellate Body does not discuss why the f act that in the context of multiple
averaging the terms "dumping" and "margins of dumping" cannot apply to a sub-
group of a product logically leads to the broader conclusion that Members may not
distinguish between transactions in which export prices are less than normal value
and transactions in which export prices exceed normal value.
100

Thus, the "product as a whole" concept as adopted does not support a claim that the challenged
measures are inconsistent because of some general prohibition of zeroing present in all proceedings
and under all comparison methods.

92. Examination of the term "product" as used throughout the AD Agreement and the
GATT 1994 demonstrates that the term "product" in these provisions does not exclusively refer to
"product as a whole". Instead, "product" can have either a collective meaning or an individual
meaning. For example, Article 2.6 of the AD Agre ement – which defines the term "like product" in
relation to "the product under consid eration" – plainly uses the term "product" in the collective sense.
By contrast, Article VII:3 of the GATT 1994 – which refers to "[t]he value for customs purposes of
any imported product" – plainly uses the term "product" in the individual sense of the object of a
particular transaction (i.e., a sale involving a specific quantity of merchandise that matches the criteria
for the "product" at a particular price). Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the same term has such
an exclusive meaning when used in Article 2. 1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the
GATT 1994.

93. As the panel in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) explained, "an analysis of the
use of the words product and products throughout the GATT 1994, indicates that there is no basis to
equate product with "product as a whole". . . T hus, for example, when Article VII:3 of the GATT
refers to "the value for customs purposes of any im ported product", this can only be interpreted to

99 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) , para. 7.105 ( quoting US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5)
(Panel), n.32).

refer to the value of a product in a particular import transaction." 101 The panel detailed numerous
additional instances where the term "product", as used in the AD Agreement and GATT 1994 do not
support a meaning that is solely, and exclusively, synonymous with "product as a whole":

To extend the Appellate Body's reference to the concept of "product as a whole" in
the sense that Canada proposes to the T- T methodology would entail accepting that
it applies throughout Article VI of GA TT 1994, and the AD Agreement, wherever
the term "product" or "products" appears. A review of the use of these terms does
not support the proposition that "product" must always mean the entire universe of
exported product subject to an anti-dumping investigation. For instance,
Article VI:2 states that a contracting party "may levy on any dumped product" an
anti-dumping duty. Article VI:3 provides that "no countervailing duty shall be
levied on any product". Article VI:6(a) provides that no contracting party shall levy
any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product...".
Similarly, Article VI:6(b) provides that a contracting party may be authorized "to
levy an anti-dumping or countervailing dut y on the importation of any product".
Taken together, these provisions suggest that "to levy a duty on a product" has the
same meaning as "to levy a duty on the impor tation of that product". Canada's
position, if applied to these provisions, would mean that the phrase "importation of a
product" cannot refer to a single import transaction. In many places where the
words product and products are used in Article VI of the GATT 1994, an
interpretation of these words as necessarily referring to the entire universe of
investigated export transactions is not compelling.
102

Indeed, in a prospective normal value system, a duty is necessarily levied on an import basis, and not
on a product as a whole basis.

94. In sum, the terms "product" and "products" ca nnot be interpreted in such an exclusive manner
so as to deprive them of one of their ordinary mean ings, in particular the "product" or "products" that
are the subject of individual transactions. Theref ore, the words "product" and "products" as they
appear in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 cannot be understood to
provide a textual basis for an interpretation that requires margins of dumping established in relation to
the "product" must necessarily be established on an aggregate basis for the "product as a whole".

95. Likewise, examination of the term "margi ns of dumping" itself provides no support for the
EC's interpretation of the term as solely, and ex clusively, relating to the "product as a whole".
103 As
the panel in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) observed:

Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that, for the purposes of Article VI, "the
margin of dumping is the price differen ce determined in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1" of Article VI. Paragraph 1 of Article VI defines dumping
as a practice "by which products of one count ry are introduced into the commerce of
another country at less
 than the normal value of the products" (emphasis supplied).
... Article VI:1 provides that "a product is to be considered as being introduced into
the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of
the product exported from one count ry to another (a) is less than the comparable
price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product in the exporting country"
(emphasis supplied). In other words, ther e is dumping when the export "price" is
less
 than the normal value. Given this definition of dumping, and the express
linkage between this definition and th e phrase "price difference", it would be

101 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.23, n. 36.
102 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.23.
103 See EC First Submission, paras. 196.

permissible for a Member to interpret the "price difference" referred to in
Article VI:2 as the amount by which the e xport price is less than normal value, and
to refer to that "price difference" as the "margin of dumping".
104

Thus, the panel saw "no reason why a Member may not . . . establish the "margin of dumping" on the
basis of the total amount by which transaction-spec ific export prices are less than the transaction-
specific normal values".
105 Although the panel was examining margins of dumping in the context of
the transaction-to-transaction comparison method in investigations under Article 2.4.2, its reasoning is
equally applicable to margins of dumping establishe d on a transaction-specific basis in an assessment
proceeding under Article 9.3.

96. Additionally, the term "margin of dumpi ng", as used elsewhere in the GATT 1994 and the
AD Agreement, does not refer exclusively to the aggregated results of comparisons for the "product as
a whole." As used in the Note Ad Article VI:1, which provides for importer-specific price
comparison, the term "margin of dumping" cannot rela te to aggregated results of all comparisons for
the "product as a whole" because an exporter or fo reign producer may make export transactions using
multiple importers.

97. Similarly, the term "margin of dumping" as us ed in Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement would
require the use of constructed value for the "produ ct as a whole", even if the condition precedent for
using constructed value under Article 2.2 relates onl y to a portion of the comparisons. The panel in
US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (21.5) observed that this "would run counter to the principle that
constructed normal value is an alternative to be u sed only in the limited circumstances provided for in
Article 2.2. . . . We are not convinced that the Appellate Body could have intended its US – Softwood
Lumber Dumping findings to be applied in this manner.
106

98. Nevertheless, the EC asserts that it is "only on the basis of aggregating . . . "intermediate
values" . . . that an investigating authority can establish margins of dumping for the product under
investigation as a whole".
107 In this regard, the reasoning of the Appellate Body reports relied upon
by the EC is unpersuasive because it is contrary to the great weight of evidence indicating that the
concepts of dumping and margin of dumping have long been understood as relating to individual
transactions, as evidenced by the report of the Group of Experts, the reports of the GATT panels, the
well-established practice of Members utilizing antid umping regimes, the negotiating history of the
AD Agreement, as well as the ordinary meaning of the text the relevant provisions of the
AD Agreement, the Antidumping Code, the GATT 1947 and the GATT 1994. Accordingly,
Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 do not define the terms
"dumping" and "margin of dumping" such that export transactions must necessarily be examined at an
aggregate level.

2. Article 2.4.2
99. The text and context of the relevant pr ovisions of the AD Agreement, interpreted in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law, do not support a general
prohibition against zeroing that would apply in th e context of assessment proceedings. The express
terms of Article 2.4.2 limit its application to the "i nvestigation phase" of a proceeding. To require the
application of Article 2.4.2 to Article 9 assessment proceedings would read out of the AD Agreement

104 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.27.
105 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.28.
106 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), para. 5.62.
107 EC First Submission, para. 195.

Article 2.4.2's express limitation to investigations. Such a result w ould be inconsistent with the
principle of effectiveness, under which all the terms of an agreement should be given meaning.108

100. Article 2.4.2 provides as follows:

Subject to the provisions governing fair comp arison in paragraph 4 of this Article,
the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase
 shall normally
be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with
a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a
comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction to transaction basis.
(Emphasis added)

101. Other provisions of the AD Agreement al so expressly limit their application to the
investigation phase of an antidumping proceeding, and do not apply elsewhere. For instance,
Article 5.1 refers to "an investig ation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged
dumping shall be initiated by or on behalf of a domestic industry". Similarly, Article 5.7 provides that
evidence of dumping and injury must be considered simultaneously "in the decision whether or not to
initiate an investigation" and "during the course of th e investigation". Panels have consistently found
that the references to "investigation" in Article 5 only refer to the original investigation and not to
subsequent phases of an antidumping proceeding.
109 As the panel found in US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel AD Sunset Review:

[T]he text of paragraph 8 of Article 5 re fers expressly to the termination of an
investigation in the event of de minimis dumping margins. There is, therefore, no
textual indication in Article 5.8 that would suggest or require that the obligation in
Article 5.8 also applies to sunset reviews.110

102. The limited applicability of Article 2.4.2 could not be plainer. Article 2.4.2, by its very terms,
is limited to the "investigation phase". Thus, the text leaves no doubt that the Members did not intend
to extend these obligations to any phase beyond the investigation phase. Accordingly, a panel has
already recognized that the application of Article 2. 4.2 is expressly limited to the investigation phase
of an antidumping proceeding. As the panel in Argentina – Poultry found:

Article 2.4.2, uniquely among the provisions of Article 2, relates to the
establishment of the margin of dumping "during the investigation phase".
111

Thus, the ordinary meaning of the term "investiga tion phase," as it is used in the AD Agreement, does
not include subsequent phases, such as assessment reviews.

103. Similarly, the panel in US – Zeroing (EC) conducted a thorough analysis of the text of the
AD Agreement, finding that ""during the investig ation phase" constitutes a unique limitation of scope
of Article 2.4.2", which serves to contradict ar guments that "during the investigation phase" has
general meaning applicable to other parts of the AD Agreement.
112 In summation, the panel found:

108 See, e.g., Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB) , sections G & H (discussing fundamental principle of
effectiveness in treaty interpretation); see also US – 1916 Act (AB), para. 123.
109 US – DRAMS AD, para. 521, at footnote 519 ("investigation" means the investigation phase leading
up to the final determination of the investigating authority); EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5) (Panel) , para. 6.114
(Article 5.7 applies to investigations).
110 US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel), para. 7.70.
111 Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.357.
112 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.188; see also id., paras. 7.146-7.188.

First, the phrase "the existence of marg ins of dumping during the investigation
phase" in Article 2.4.2 read in its ordinary meaning in the context of the
AD Agreement as a whole means that Article 2.4.2 applies to the phase of the
"original investigation" i.e. the investiga tion within the meaning of Article 5 of the
AD Agreement as opposed to subsequent phases of duty assessment and review.
Second, our interpretation of the meaning of this phrase as limiting the applicability
of Article 2.4.2 to investigations within th e meaning of Article 5 is also consistent
with the distinction made between inves tigations and subsequent proceedings in
various Appellate Body decisions. Third, alternative meanings suggested by the
European Communities are implausible at best and deny this phrase any real
function, in contradiction with princi ples of interpretation. Fourth, this
interpretation is entirely consistent with different functions played by "original
investigations" and duty assessment proceedings. . . .
113

The panel in US – Zeroing (EC) , when making is own objective assessment of the facts before it, in
accordance with the customary prin ciples of international law, provided a thorough and solid review
of the text and context of Article 2.4.2.
114 In this regard, we request that this Panel find persuasive the
reasoning put forth by the panel in US – Zeroing (EC).

104. The EC further argues that the phrase "the existence of margins of dumping during the
investigation phase" in Article 2.4.2 is not limited to original investigations because all of the
antidumping proceedings employed by Commerce "generally involve an investigation into
something".
115 The text of the AD Agreement and prior panel and Appellate Bo dy reports, however,
do not support this argument.

105. Article 18.3 of the AD Agreement explicitly r ecognizes the difference between investigations,
which may lead to the imposition of a measure , and "reviews" of existing measures. In Brazil –
 Desiccated Coconut (AB) , the Appellate Body, analyzing an iden tical distinction in Article 32.3 of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), noted that the
imposition of "definitive" duties (an "order" in US parlance) ends the investigative phase.
116 T h i s
distinction is also present in the substantive provisions of the AD Agreement.

106. The Appellate Body and prior panels have also consistently found that the provisions in the
AD Agreement with express limitations to investigati ons are, in fact, limited to the investigation
phase of a proceeding. In evaluating whether restrictions on cumulation in investigations were
equally applicable to sunset reviews, the Appellate Body noted that Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement
– like Article 2.4.2 – "plainly speaks to anti-dumping investigations . . . . It makes no mention of
injury analyses undertaken in any proceeding other than original investigations . . . . [T]he text of
Article 3.3 plainly limits its applicability to original investigations".
117 The Appellate Body's finding
confirms the approach taken by prior panels. For example, the panel in US – DRAMS AD found that
the term "investigation" means "the investigative phase leading up to the final determination of the
investigating authority".118

107. The EC, citing the dictionary definition of "investigation", argues that Article 2.4.2 is
applicable in all phases of antidumping proceedi ngs because all proceedings necessarily involve a

114 See US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), paras. 7.220 and 7.6-7.7.
115 EC First Submission, paras. 223-224.
116 Brazil – Desiccated Coconut (AB) , p. 9. See, also, US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB) , paras. 53, 61
(distinguishing between Article 21.2 reviews and the original determination in an investigation).
117 US – OCTG from Argentina (AB), paras. 294, 301.
118 US – DRAMS AD, para. 6.87, footnote 519, discussing Article 5 of the AD Agreement.

"systemic examination or inquiry or a careful study of or research into a particular subject. 119 T h e
panel in US – Zeroing (EC) , however, squarely rejected "that the decisive element regarding the
interpretation of the scope of Article 2.4.2 is the word 'investigation' which has not been defined in the
AD Agreement and which must therefore be interp reted strictly by reference to a dictionary
definition".120

108. The consistency with which th e Appellate Body and panels ha ve recognized the distinctions
between investigations and other segments of an antidumping proceeding is consistent with the
distinct purpose of the investigation phase, which is to establish as a threshold matter whether the
imposition of an antidumping measure is warranted . Other phases (such as Article 9 assessment
proceedings or Article 11 sunset reviews) have different purposes. Whereas the purpose of an
investigation is to determine whether a remedy against dumping should be provided, the purpose of an
assessment proceeding is to determine the precise amount of that remedy.

109. It is further not accurate, as the EC infers in its submission, that a margin is "established"
when Commerce performs a periodic review.
121 It would be more accurate to describe the three
principal calculations performed in a periodic review as: (1) the calculation of margins of dumping
for each export transaction; (2) the calculation of an assessment rate for each importer on the basis of
the margins of dumping of the importer's transactions from each exporter/producer during the period
examined; and (3) the calculation of a cash deposit ra te for future entries of each exporter/producer
on the basis of the margins of dumping of the expor ter/producer's transactions during the period
examined. In this regard, the provisions of US law relating to each calculation are: 19 U.S.C.
1675(a)(2)(A) (providing that Commerce shall determine the margin of dumping for each entry of the
subject merchandise), and 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(C) (pr oviding that the determination of the margin of
dumping for each entry shall be the basis for the asse ssment of antidumping duties and for deposits of
estimated duties (i.e., the cash deposit)).

110. Finally, the limited applicati on of Article 2.4.2 to the investigation phase is consistent with
the divergent functions of investigations and other proceedings under the AD Agreement. The
Appellate Body has already recognized that in vestigations and other proceedings under the
AD Agreement serve different purposes and have diffe rent functions, and therefore are subject to
different obligations under the Agreement.
122 Thus, contrary to the EC's apparent contention, the
AD Agreement does not require Members to examin e whether margins of dumping exist in the
assessment phase.123 Article 9 assessment proceedings are not concerned with the existential question
of whether injurious dumping exists above a de minimis level such that the imposition of antidumping
measures is warranted. That inquiry would have al ready been resolved in the affirmative in the
investigation phase. Instead, Article 9, by its te rms, focuses on the amount of duty to be assessed on
particular entries, an exercise that is separate and apart from the calculation of an overall dumping
margin during the threshold investigation phase of an antidumping proceeding.

111. The express limitation in Article 2.4.2 to the i nvestigation phase is also consistent with the
fact that the antidumping systems of Members are different for purposes of the assessment phase. The
different methods used by Members include the use of prospective normal values, retrospective
normal values, and prospective ad valorem assessment. If the requirements of Article 2.4.2 regarding
comparison methods applied to the assessment of antidumping duties, this divergence of assessment
systems would not be possible. For example, it is not possible to reconcile the prospective normal
value system used by some Members with a require ment to use either the average-to-average or

119 EC First Submission, para. 213.
121 EC First Submission, para. 222.
122 See, e.g., US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (AB), para. 87.
123 See EC First Submission, para. 222. ("This confirms that, in the context of Article 9.3, a 'margin of
dumping' is to be established by reference to the whole of Article 2 . . .").

transaction-to-transaction method, because such systems compare we ighted average normal values to
individual export prices to assess dumping duties on in dividual transactions. Thus, to retain the
flexibility in assessment systems reflected in Article 9, it is not only appropriate, but necessary, to
limit the requirements of Article 2.4.2 to the investigation phase.

3. Article 2.4.2, Second Sentence
112. In addition, such a general prohibition of zer oing that applies beyond the context of average-
to-average comparisons in inves tigations, would be inconsistent with the remaining text of
Article 2.4.2, which provides for an alternative "targeted dumping" methodology that may be utilized
in certain circumstances. The "targeted dumpi ng" methodology was drafted as an exception to the
obligation to engage in symmetrical comparisons in an investigation. By the terms of Article 2.4.2, it
may be used "if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among
different purchasers, regions or time periods . . . ". When the investigating authority provides an
explanation as to why these "differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a
weighted average-to-weighted average or transacti on-to-transaction comparison", it may then use the
asymmetrical average-to-transaction comparison to establish the existence of margins of dumping
during the investigation phase.

113. The mathematical implication of a general prohibition of zeroing, however, is that the
targeted dumping clause would be reduced to inu tility. That is because the targeted dumping
methodology, provided for in Article 2.4.2, mathema tically must yield the same result as an average-
to-average comparison if, in both cases, non-dumpe d comparisons are required to offset dumped
comparisons.
124 In this respect, a general zeroing prohibition would render the targeted dumping
exception in Article 2.4.2 a complete nullity. Su ch an interpretation would be disfavoured under a
key tenet of customary rules of treaty interpretation, namely that an "interpretation must give meaning
and effect to all the terms of a treaty".125

114. In US – Zeroing (EC) , US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) and US – Zeroing
(Japan), each of the panels recognized that the cu stomary rules of interpretation of public
international law precluded an interpretation th at rendered the targeted dumping provision of
Article 2.4.2 redundant. 126 The panel in US – Zeroing (EC) found that a general prohibition of
zeroing that applied to the targeted dumping methodology "would deny the second sentence [of
Article 2.4.2] the very function for which it was created". 127 The fact that, under a general zeroing
prohibition, the average-to-average comparison me thod and the average-to-transaction comparison
method would yield identical results was recognized by each of the panels.128

124 The reason for this is that, if offsetting is required, then all non-dumped sales ( i.e., negative values)
will offset the margins on all of the dumped sales ( i.e., positive values). It makes no difference mathematically
whether the calculation of the final overall dumping margin is based on comparing weighted-average export
prices to weighted-average normal values or on comp aring transaction-specific e xport prices to weighted-
average normal values. In both cases, the sum total of the positive values will be offset by the sum total of the
negative values, and the results will be the same.
125 US – Gasoline (AB), p. 23.
126 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.266, US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel),
127 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.266, see also US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5)
(Panel), para. 5.52 ("[A] general prohibition of zeroing . . . would deprive the second sentence of Article 2.4.2
of effect"); US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.127 ("If zeroing is prohib ited in the case of the average-to-
transaction comparison, the use of this method will nece ssarily always yield a result identical to that of an
average-to-average comparison").
128 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.266 ("In fact, under such an interpretation the alternative
asymmetrical comparison methodology would as a matter of mathematics pro duce a result that was identical to
that of the first average-to-average methodology"); US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel) ,
para. 5.76 ("[A] prohibition of zeroing under the targeted dumping comparison methodology . . . would result in

115. Despite the findings of fact of the panels that the results of the targeted dumping methodology
"will necessarily always yield a result identical to that of an average-to-average comparison",129 under
a general prohibition of zeroing, the Appellate Body has found this concern to be "overstated".130 The
Appellate Body has asserted that mathematical equi valence will occur only in "certain situations" 131
and represents "a non-tested hypothesis" 132 because "[the United States] has never applied the
[targeted dumping] methodology, nor provided exam ples of how other WTO Members have applied
this methodology". 133 These objections, however, are not pers uasive. First, the panels have
specifically addressed all of the situations under which it was argued that mathematical equivalence
would not obtain and found these situations did not represent methodologies consistent with the
AD Agreement.134 The targeted dumping provision is re ndered inutile if the only alternative
methodologies that do not result in mathematical equi valence are, themselves, not consistent with the
AD Agreement. Second, mathematical equivalence is not a "non-tested hypothesis" because the EC, a
Member that actively utilizes this methodology is actually faced with this problem in administering its
antidumping duty regime, as described in detail below.

116. In its most recent report to address this i ssue, the Appellate Body dismissed the redundancy
caused by mathematical equivalence by concluding th at it may be permissible to apply the targeted
dumping methodology to a subset of export transactions.
135 The United States is unaware of any
Member ever having done this, nor has any Member ever suggested it would administer its
antidumping regime in this manner. The language of the AD Agreement says nothing about selecting
a subset of transactions when conducting a target ed dumping analysis. The Appellate Body has
drawn its conclusions about "zeroing" from its inte rpretation of "dumping" as relating to a "product",
i.e., a "product as a whole". The targeted dumping provision provides that when certain conditions
are met, Members are permitted to compare aver age normal values to transaction-specific export
prices. If the Appellate Body is correct that dumping may only be determined for the product as a
whole (which the United States does not concede), there is no textual basis for inferring that the
targeted dumping comparison methodology is an exception to that provision (which, as Article 2.1
provides, applies throughout the AD Agreement). The targeted dumping provision simply provides
an exception to the average-to-average or transac tion-to-transaction comparison requirement of the
first sentence of Article 2.4.2. Consequently, the use of a subset of export transactions as a means of
avoiding mathematical equivalency would also appear to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement.

117. This mathematical equivalenc y problem with the Appellate Bo dy's recent interpretation of
Article 2.4.2 cannot be ignored, particularly when Members such as the EC, are actively involved in
administering antidumping duty regimes that apply the targeted dumping provision. Indeed, the
redundancy that results from this mathematical e quivalence appears to have already led the EC,
attempting to reconcile the issue before its munici pal tribunals, to advance an interpretation of the
AD Agreement that is contrary to the interpretatio n the EC necessarily relies on in this dispute.
Specifically, the Council of the European Union argued before the Court of First Instance that:

the asymmetrical method, as compared with the first symmetrical method, makes
sense only if the zeroing technique is applied. Without that mechanism, that method

a margin of dumping mathematically equivalent to that established under W-W comparison methodology");
US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.127 n. 763 ("Mathematically, if zeroing is prohibited under the average-
to-transaction method, the sum total of amount by which export prices are above normal value will offset the
sum total of the amounts by which export prices are less than normal value").
130 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 100.
132 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 97.
133 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 97.
134 See, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) , paras. 7.127-7.137; US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel) , para. 7.266;
US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), paras. 5.33-5.52.

would mathematically lead to the same r esult as the first symmetrical method and it
would be impossible to prevent the non-dumped exports from disguising the
dumping of the dumped exports.
136

 The Court agreed, finding that:

as the Council pointed out in its written proceedings, the zeroing technique has
proved to be mathematically necessary in orde r to distinguish, in terms of its results,
the asymmetrical method from the first symmetr ical method. In the absence of that
reduction, the asymmetrical method will always yield the same result as the first
symmetrical method . . . .
137

Thus, in effect, the EC itself, a Member that has used the average-to-transaction comparison in
investigations, when addressing this issue before domestic tribunals, agrees with the United States and
the panel reports cited above, that a general pr ohibition of zeroing applied equally to both assessment
proceedings and original investigations, would render the average-to-transaction comparison inutile.

118. The redundancy of the targeted dumping provisi on of Article 2.4.2 occurs as a consequence
of any interpretation that results in a general prohibition of zeroing, whether derived from the
definitional language of Article 2.1 of the AD Ag reement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 or from
the "fair comparison" requirement of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, or otherwise. Accordingly,
the Panel should summarily reject any contention th at zeroing is necessarily prohibited in all contexts
under all comparison methodologies, including with respect to assessment proceedings. "An
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a
treaty to redundancy or inutility."
138

4. Article 9
119. For the reasons discussed above, an analysis of the text of Article 2.4.2 demonstrates that
Article 2.4.2 does not apply to assessment proceedings. The EC, however, argues that Article 2.4.2 is
nonetheless applicable to assessment proceedings by virtue of the cross reference in Article 9.3 to
Article 2 of the AD Agreement.
139 Article 9.3 provides:

The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.

120. However, the general reference to Article 2 in Article 9.3 necessarily includes any limitations
found in the text of Article 2. As discussed above, Article 2.4.2 by its own te rms is explicitly limited
to the investigation phase. The text of Article 9. 3, therefore, does not support the EC's argument that
the requirements of Article 2.4.2 apply in assessment proceedings.

121. The reference in Article 9.3 to Article 2 means that the amount of antidumping duty assessed
may not exceed the amount of antidumping duty calculated in accordance with the general
requirements of Article 2, such as making the various adjustments set forth in Article 2.4 necessary to
provide a fair comparison. As the panel found in Argentina – Poultry:

136 Case T-274/02, Ritek Corp. v. Council of the European Union, 24 October 2006, para. 94 (Exhibit
US-3). Notwithstanding making this argument before its municipal tribunals, the EC has taken a contrary
position in WTO dispute proceedings. See, e.g. Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (AB) , para. 49 ("The
European Communities rejects the 'mathematical equivalence' argument. . .").
138 US – Gasoline (AB), p. 23.
139 EC First Submission, para. 224.

Article 9.3 does not refer to the margin of dumping established "under
Article 2.4.2," but to the margin of dumping established "under Article 2". In our
view, this means simply that, when ensu ring that the amount of the duty does not
exceed the margin of dumping, a Member should have reference to the methodology
set out in Article 2. This is entirely consistent with the introductory clause of
Article 2, which sets forth a definition of dumping "for the purpose of this
Agreement . . . ". In fact, it would not be possible to establish a margin of dumping
without reference to the various elements of Article 2. For example, it would not be
possible to establish a margin of dumping without determining normal value, as
provided in Article 2.2, or without making relevant adjustments to ensure a fair
comparison, as provided in Article 2.4.
140

122. The context of Article 9 also demonstrates that there is no basis in Article 9 to overcome the
explicit language in Article 2.4.2, limiting its re ach to investigations. As the panel found in
Argentina – Poultry:

[N]othing in the AD Agreement explicitly identifies the form that anti-dumping
duties must take . . . . As the title of Article 9 of the AD Agreement suggests,
Article 9.3 is a provision concerning the imposition and collection of anti-dumping
duties. Article 9.3 provides that a duty ma y not be collected in excess of the margin
of dumping as established under Article 2. The modalities for ensuring compliance
with this obligation are set forth in sub-para graphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 9.3, each of
which addresses duty assessment and the reimbursement of excess duties. The
primary focus of Article 9.3, read together w ith sub-paragraphs 1-3, is to ensure that
final anti-dumping duties shall not be assessed in excess of the relevant margin of
dumping, and to provide for duty refund in cases where excessive anti-dumping
duties would otherwise be collected.
141

123. In other words, Article 9 contains certain procedural obligations applicable in assessment
reviews. However, Article 9 does not prescribe methodologies for assessment proceedings such as
those established in Article 2.4.2 for the investigati on phase. Instead, Article 9 establishes time limits
for conducting assessment proceedings, ensuring that respondent companies may obtain timely refund
of any excess antidumping duties collected by a Member.
142

124. Relying on its extension of Article 2.4.2 to assessment proceed ings, the EC seems to suggest
that the United States may only make "asymmetrical" comparisons in such proceedings when it finds
that the prerequisites of Article 2.4.2 for "targeted dumping" have been met ( i.e., "a pattern of export
prices which differ significantly among different purchases, regions, or time periods").
143 The EC's
argument is without merit. Not only are the Artic le 2.4.2 restrictions on the investigation phase
irrelevant in assessment proceedings, but Article 9 expressly provides for comparisons between
weighted average normal values and individual export transactions in assessment proceedings,
notwithstanding the EC's description of such comparisons as "asymmetrical". The EC is thus arguing
that the Panel ignore the text of not just one, but two provisions of the AD Agreement.

125. Article 9.4(ii) explicitly provides for the cal culation of antidumping duties, in the assessment
phase, on the basis of a comparison of weighted av erage normal values and individual export prices,
stating that the amount of duty shall not exceed:

140 Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.357.
141 Argentina – Poultry, para. 7.355.
142 Article 9.3.1 and Article 9.3.2, respectively, es tablish for retrospective and prospective assessment
systems timetables with respect to the amount of time within which final liability for payment of antidumping
duties is to be determined or refunds of any duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping are to made.
143 EC First Submission, para. 211.

where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the basis of a
prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted average normal value
of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices of exporters or producers
and the export prices of exporters or producers not individually examined.

This provision plainly indicates that there is nothing exceptional about assessing antidumping duties
on the basis of comparisons of weighted average normal values with individual export prices.

126. In fact, the calculation of transaction-speci fic antidumping duties in assessment reviews has
been found to be entirely consistent with the AD Agreement. In Argentina – Poultry, the panel found
the Argentine prospective normal value assessment system to be fully consistent with the
AD Agreement.
144 Under that assessment system, the authorities imposed duties on a transaction-by-
transaction basis when particular export prices were below the weighted average normal value. The
United States agrees with the EC's position in that case that:

Article 9.3.1 envisages the possibility to co llect duties on a retrospective basis,
which, by definition, presupposes the possibility to calculate the dumping margins
on the basis of data for individual ship ments or for time-periods outside the
investigation period.
145

As the EC acknowledged in Argentina – Poultry, the AD Agreement does not specify the form which
duties must take in assessment reviews. Moreover, the reference in Article 9.3 to Article 2 does not
overcome the limiting language in Article 2.4.2 which, by its own terms, limits its obligations to "the
investigation phase".

127. There is simply no textual basis in the AD Agreement for the EC's assertion that Article 9.3
requires the application of Article 2.4.2 in assessment proceedings. Article 9 of the AD Agreement
relates, as its title indicates, to the imposition a nd collection of antidumping duties. In particular,
Article 9.3 states that the "amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping
as established under Article 2". For the reasons set forth in detail above, the term "margin of
dumping", as defined in Article 2.1 of the AD Agre ement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, may be
applied to individual transactions. This understanding of the term "margin of dumping" is particularly
appropriate in the context of antidumping duty assessment. In the real world of administering
antidumping regimes, the individual transactions are both the means by which less than fair value
prices are established and the mechanism by which the object of the transaction ( i.e., the "product") is
"introduced into the commerce of the importing c ountry". Likewise, antidumping duties are assessed
on individual entries resulting from those individual transactions. Therefore, the obligation set forth
in Article 9.3 to assess no more in antidumping duties than the margin of dumping, is similarly
applicable at the level of individual transactions.

128. The EC's apparent claim under Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement is that the amount of the
antidumping duty has exceeded the margin of dumping established under Article 2.
146 This claim
however necessarily depends upon whether the EC's preferred interpretation of the "margin of
dumping", which precludes any possibility of transaction-specific margins of dumping, is the only
permissible interpretation of this term as used in Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement. Under such a
view, a Member breaches Article 9.3 by failing to provide offsets, because Members are required to
calculate margins of dumping on an exporter-specific basis for the product " as a whole " and,
consequently, a Member is required to aggregate the results of " all" "intermediate comparisons ",
including those for which the export price exceeds the normal value. The United States notes that the
terms upon which such an interpretation rests ar e conspicuously absent from the text of both

144 Argentina – Poultry, paras. 7.345-7.367.
146 EC First Submission, para. 224.

Articles 2.1 and 9.3, and thus such an interpretation is not mandated by the definition of dumping
contained in Article 2.1, as described in detail above.

129. As the panel in US – Zeroing(EC) correctly concluded, there is "no textual support in
Article 9.3 for the view that the AD Agreem ent requires an exporter-oriented assessment of
antidumping duties, whereby, if an average normal value is calculated for a particular review period,
the amount of anti-dumping duty payable on a particul ar transaction is determined by whether the
overall average of the export prices of all sales made by an exporter during that period is below the
average normal value".
147 The Panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) similarly rejected the conclusion that
the "margin of dumping under Article 9.3 must be determined on the basis of an aggregate
examination of export prices during a review peri od in which export prices above the normal value
carry the same weight as export prices below the normal value ...".148

130. In US – Zeroing (Japan) , the panel found that "there are im portant considerations specific to
Article 9 of the AD Agreement that lend further support to the view that it is permissible . . . to
interpret Article VI of the GATT 1994 and relevant provisions of the AD Agreement to mean that
there is no general requirement to determine dum ping and margins of dumping for the product as a
whole, which, by itself or in conjunction with a requirement to establish margins of dumping for
exporters or foreign producers, enta ils a general prohibition of zeroing".
149 In particular, the panel
explained that such a requirement is inconsistent with the importer-and import-specific obligation to
pay an antidumping duty:

In the context of Article 9.3, a margin of dumping is calculated for the purpose of
determining the final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3.1
or for the purpose of determining the amount of anti-dumping duty that must be
refunded under Article 9.3.2. An anti-dumping duty is paid by an importer in
respect of a particular import of the product on which an anti-dumping duty has been
imposed. An importer does not incur liability for payment of an anti-dumping duty
in respect of the totality of sales of a product made by an exporter to the country in
question but only in respect of sales made by that exporter to that particular
importer. Thus, the obligation to pay an anti-dumping duty is incurred on an
importer-and import-specific basis. Since the calculation of a margin of dumping in
the context of Article 9.3 is part of a process of assessing the amount of duty that
must be paid or that must be refunded, this importer- and import-specific character
of the payment of anti-dumping duties must be taken into account in interpreting the
meaning of "margin of dumping."
150

131. Similarly, the panel in US – Zeroing (EC) explained:

In our view, the fact that in an assessment proceeding in Article 9.3 the margin of
dumping must be related to the liability incurred in respect of particular import
transactions is an important element that distinguishes Article 9.3 proceedings from
investigations within the meaning of Article 5. ... [I]n an Article 9.3 context the
extent of dumping found with respect to a par ticular exporter must be translated into

147 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel) , para. 7.204 ("In our view, if the drafters of the AD Agreement had
wanted to impose a uniform requirement to adopt an exporter oriented-method of duty assessment, which would
have entailed a significant change to the practice and legi slation of some participants in the negotiations, they
might have been expected to have indicated this more clearly.").
148 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) , para. 7.199. The panel in US – Zeroing (EC) expressed essentially
the same view. US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), paras. 7.204 - 7.207 and 7.220-7.223.
150 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.198 - 7199 (emphasis in the original).

an amount of liability for payment of antidumping duties by importers in respect of
specific import transactions.
151

132. The panel's understanding of Article 9.3 is, at a minimum, a permissible interpretation of the
provision. Indeed, the EC's interpretation of "margi n of dumping" as used in Article 9.3, if applied,
would fundamentally alter the antidumping practices of numerous Members using this remedy and
render many of these systems difficult, if not impossibl e, to administer. In particular, under the EC's
interpretation of Article 9.3, antidumping duties would be prevented from fulfilling their intended
purpose under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, because im porters that contribute the most to injurious
dumping would be favoured over other importers (a nd domestic competitors) that price fairly, and
prospective normal value systems would be rendered retrospective, as described further below.

133. Although, as stated by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (Japan), dumping involves
differential pricing behaviour of exporters or producers between its export market and its normal
value
152, dumping nevertheless occurs at the level of i ndividual transactions. Moreover, the remedy
for dumping provided for in Article VI:2 of GATT 1994, i.e., antidumping duties, are applied at the
level of individual entries for which importers incur the liability. In this way, the importer may be
induced to raise resale prices to cover the amount of the antidumping duty, thereby preventing the
dumping from having further injurious effect. If instead, the amount of the antidumping duty must be
reduced to account for the amount by which some ot her transaction was sold at above normal value,
possibly involving an entirely different importer, then the antidumping duty will be insufficient to
have the intended effect. The importer of th e dumped product would remain in a position to
profitably resell the product at a price that continues to be injuriously dumped. For this reason, if the
EC's interpretation of the margin of dumping is adopted as the sole permissible interpretation of
Article 9.3, the remedy provided under the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 will be prevented
from addressing injurious dumping.

134. These concerns led the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) to reject the same interpretation that the
EC offers in this dispute. The panel observed th at the implication of this interpretation was that
Members with retrospective assessment systems "may be precluded from collecting anti-dumping
duties in respect of particular export transactions at prices less than normal value to a particular
importer at a particular point of time because of pr ices of export transactions to other importers at a
different point in time that exceed normal value".
153 The panel found that this result was not
supported by the text of Article 9.3, which "c ontains no language requiring such an aggregate
examination of export transactions in determin ing final liability for payments of antidumping
duties . . . ".

135. It also follows that if a Member is una ble to calculate and assess the duties on a transaction-
specific basis, importers of the merchandise for which the amount of dumping is greatest will actually
have an advantage over their competitors who impor t at fair value prices because they will enjoy the
benefit of offsets that result from their competitors' fairly priced imports. Indeed, even if one were
not to impose duties on importers whose entries were not responsible for the finding of dumping, the
importers buying at non-dumped prices would sti ll be significantly disadvantaged because the
importers buying at the dumped prices would still have a cost advantage, since the duties they pay on
the dumped merchandise would be reduced by the amount by which the non-dumped merchandise
exceeded normal value.

136. As the panel in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) observed, the perverse
incentives created by providing offsets also arise in the context of prospective assessment systems:

[An] obligation to take all (including non-dumped) comparisons into account in
determining the margin of dumping for the product as a whole ... is illogical, as it
would provide importers clearing dumped transactions with a double competitive
advantage vis-à-vis other importers: first, they would benefit from the lower price
inherent in a dumped transaction; second, they would benefit from offsets, or
credits, "financed" by the higher prices paid by other importers clearing non-
dumped, or even less-dumped, transactions.

Again, this makes no sense in the cont ext of a prospective normal value duty
assessment system, becau se (as even Canada acknowledges) the "margin of
dumping" at issue is a transaction-specific price difference calculated for a specific
import transaction. And if other comparisons for the product as a whole were
somehow relevant, offsets would have to be provided for non-dumped transactions,
with the result that one importer could request a refund on the basis of a margin of
dumping calculated by reference to non-dumped transactions made by other
importers. We are unable to accept that the Appellate Body could have intended
such absurd results to follow from its interpretation of the phrase "margins of
dumping" in US - Softwood Lumber V.
154

137. Further, the EC's interpretation of Article 9.3, requiring that antidumping duty liability be
determined for the product "as a whole", is inconsis tent with the specific provision in Article 9 that
recognizes the existence of prospective normal value systems of assessment.
155 Article 9.4(ii) of the
AD Agreement "expressly refers to the calculation of the liability for payment of antidumping duties
on the basis of a prospective normal value system". 156 Under such a system, the amount of liability
for payment of antidumping duties is determined at the time of importation on the basis of a
comparison between the price of the individual export transaction and the prospective normal value.
157
For example, an importer who imports a product the e xport price of which is equal to or higher than
the prospective normal value cannot incur liability fo r payments of antidumping duties. The converse
is also true. A liability for a dumped sale would be determined by comparing the price of individual
export transaction with prospective normal value and the prices of other transactions have no
relevance to this determination. 158 As the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) found, "there is no textual
support in Article 9 for the proposition that export prices in other transactions are of any relevance".159

138. Because in a prospective normal value syst em, liability for antidumping duties is incurred
only to the extent that prices of individual export transaction are below the normal value, the panel in
US – Zeroing (Japan) concluded, "the fact that express provision is made in the AD Agreement for
this sort of system confirms that the concept of dumping can apply on a transaction-specific basis to
prices of individual export transaction below the normal value and that the AD Agreement does not
require that in calculating margins of dumping the same significance be accorded to export prices
above the normal value as to export prices below the normal value".
160

154 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel), paras. 5.54-5.57.
157 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.201; See also US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5)
(Panel), para. 5.53.
158 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (Article 21.5) (Panel) , para. 5.53 ("Under a prospective normal
value duty assessment system, anti-dumping duties are assessed as individual import transactions occur, by
comparing a transaction-specific export price against a prospective normal valu e . . . . In the context of such
transaction-specific duty assessment, it makes no sense to talk of a margin of dumping being established for the
product as whole, by aggregating the results of all comparisons, since there is only one comparison at issue.").
160 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.205; see also US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.206.

139. If in a prospective normal value system indi vidual export transactions at prices less than
normal value can attract liability for payment of anti dumping duties, without regard to whether or not
prices of other export transactions exceed normal va lue, there is no reason why liability for payment
of antidumping duties may not be similarly assessed on the basis of export prices less than normal
value in the retrospective systems applied by the United States.
161

140. Further, accepting the EC's interpretation th at a Member must aggregate the results of "all"
comparisons on an exporter-specific basis would re quire that retrospective reviews be conducted,
even in a prospective normal value syst ems, in order to take into account " all" of the exporters'
transactions. The results of the retrospective revi ew would be to determine antidumping duty liability
on a retrospective basis. This result, however, is contrary to the very concept of the prospective
normal value system. As the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) explained, the "liability for payment of
anti-dumping duties is final in prospective normal value system at the time of importation of a
product".
162 In effect, prospective normal value systems will become retrospective, a conclusion also
reached in a Canadian parliamentary report on potential changes to its prospective normal value
system.163 In that report and at its trade policy review, Canada expressed its view that in a prospective
normal value system, each entry provides a margin of dumping. 164 If, in fact, Members had intended
prospective normal value systems to have such re views, one would have expected Members to have
provided for this in explicit agreement language.

5. Article 2.4
141. The text of Article 2.4 requires that a "fair comparison shall be made between the export price
and the normal value". The text of Article 2.4, however, does not resolve whether any particular
assessment of antidumping duties exceeds the margin of dumping because the text of Article 2.4 does
not resolve whether "dumping" and "margins of dum ping" are concepts that apply to individual
transactions. Nor does the text resolve whether, for purposes of assessing antidumping duty liability,
a margin of dumping may be specific to each importe r that is liable for payment of the antidumping
duties. Indeed, the text of Article 2.4 does not resolve the question of whether zeroing is "fair" or
"unfair". As the panel in US – Zeroing (Japan) noted, the "precise meaning of" the "fair comparison"
requirement "must be understood in light of the nature of the activity at issue".
165 The panel

161 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) , para. 7.208 ("We see no textual basis in Articles 9.3 and 9.4 for the
view that if an authority assesses the amount of the anti-dumping duty on a retrospective basis by examining
export transaction that have occurred du ring a certain period, it is obligated to take into account export prices
above the normal value that it would not have been required to take into account if it had applied a prospective
normal value system.").
163 Report on the Special Import Measures Act, House of Commons Canada, December 1996,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/sima/reports/01_1996-12/chap4e.html (Exhibit US-4)
(hereinafter "SIMA Report"). See also Special Import Measures Act Self-Assessment Guide ("Normal Value -
Export Price = Antidumping Duty (or Margin of Dumping"), http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/self-e.html#12
(Exhibit US-5).
164 Id.
165 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.155; see also US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel) , para. 7.260
("[C]aution ... is especially warranted where as in the case of the first sent ence of Article 2.4, a legal rule is
expressed in terms of a standard that by its very nature is more abstract and less determinate than most other
rules in the AD Agreement. The meaning of 'fair' in a legal rule must necessarily be determined having regard
to the particular context within which the rule operates."); see also US – Softwood Lumber Dumping
(Article 21.5) (Panel), para.5.74 ("[W]e believe that a claim based on a highly general and subjective test such
as "fair comparison" should be approa ched with caution by treaty interpreters. For this reason, any concept of
"fairness" should be solidly rooted in the context provided by the AD Agreement, and perhaps the
WTO Agreement more generally. As such there must be a discernible standard within the AD Agreement, and
perhaps the WTO Agreement, by which to assess whether or not a comparison has been "fair" or "unfair". Thus,
the fact that comparison methodology A produces a higher margin of dumping than comparison methodology B
would only make comparison methodology A unfair if comparison methodology B were the applicable standard.

concluded that "the "fair comparison" requirement cannot have been intended to allow a panel to
review a measure in light of a necessarily somewh at subjective judgment of what fairness means in
the abstract and in complete isolation from the substantive context".166

142. Assessment of antidumping duties in the amount by which the normal value exceeded the
export price on a transaction-specific basis, without providing an offset for non-dumped transactions
does reflect a "fair comparison" made for each ex port transaction. The EC's assertion that the
United States has assessed antidumping duties "in excess of the actual margin of dumping for the
product" is predicated on the assumption that zeroi ng is prohibited – otherwise, the challenged
assessments would reflect the correct magnitude of the margins of dumping.

143. The EC's claim of inconsistency with Ar ticle 2.4 adopts the reasoning set forth in the
Appellate Body report in US – Zeroing (Japan) , finding that a methodology cannot be viewed as
involving a "fair comparison" under Article 2.4 if the resulting assessments exceed the "margin of
dumping established in accordance with Article 2".
167 The reasoning upon which the EC relies,
however, is entirely consequential of the Appellate Body report's previous analysis of the term
"margin of dumping". Indeed, the passage quoted by the EC makes plain that the rationale followed
in the Appellate Body report was based on the results of the comparison methodology in relation to
the previously interpreted "margin of dumping", rath er than on any inherently unfair aspect of the
comparison methodology itself. Therefore, this claim of "unfairness" depends not on the text of
Article 2.4, but on whether it is permissible to in terpret the term "margin of dumping" as used in
Article 9.3 as applying to transactions.

144. As the panels in US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) have concluded, it is
permissible to interpret "margin of dumping" as us ed in Article 9.3 as applying to an individual
transaction.
168 As a consequence, there is no obligati on to aggregate transactions in calculating
margins of dumping in an assessment proceeding, and there can be no obligation to offset the
antidumping duty liability for a transaction to reflect the extent to which other transactions were not
dumped. Therefore, if the Panel finds, as the pr ior panels have found, that it is permissible to
understand the term "margi n of dumping" as used in Article 9.3 as applying to an individual
transaction, then the challenged assessment will not exceed the margin of dumping and there will be
no basis, according to the rationale adopted by the EC, for a finding of inconsistency with Article 2.4.

145. In addition, as mentioned above, an interpreta tion of Article 2.4 that gives rise to a general
prohibition of zeroing also renders the second sente nce of Article 2.4.2, the "targeted dumping
provision", inutile.169 The targeted dumping provision is an exception to the symmetrical comparison
methodologies generally required by Article 2.4.2. It is not an exception to the fair comparison
requirement of Article 2.4. Thus, an interpretation of Article 2.4 that generally prohibits zeroing in all
contexts would render the distinctions between the average-to-average and the average-to-transaction
methodologies in Article 2.4.2 without meaning. 170 A panel should not interpret provisions of the
AD Agreement in such a way that its express pr ovisions are rendered meaningless or superfluous. 171
As the Appellate Body has consistently found, "inter pretation must give meaning and effect to all the
terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole

If however, the AD Agreement were to permit either comparison methodology A or B, this would not be the
case.").
166 US – Zeroing (Japan) (Panel), para. 7.158 (quoting US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 7.261).
170 Id.
171 See US – Gasoline (AB), p. 23; Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB), p. 12; Egypt – Rebar, para. 7.277.

clauses or paragraphs of a treat y to redundancy or inutility".
172 An interpretation of Article 2.4 of the
AD Agreement to require that dumping margins be offset by non-dumped transactions is therefore
impermissible and must be rejected.

146. The EC also argues that the US assessment me thodology is inconsistent with US obligations
under Article 2.4 because it is "inherently biased" as opposed to the EC's preferred methodology.
173
But the EC can point to nothing in the text of the Agreement to support its contention that a
methodology can be designated as "fair" or "unfair" within the meaning of Article 2.4 solely on the
basis of whether it makes dumping margins go up or down.

147. Moreover, the EC's claim that the US a ssessment methodology necessarily results in higher
antidumping duties than would a so-called "symmetrical" comparison is incorrect. A simple example
illustrates this point. Assume that the export price fo r a particular transaction is 9, and that there are
two corresponding home market transactions, one at 8 and one at 10. Assume also that both home
market transactions are comparable to the export tr ansaction, but that the transaction at 10 is the most
comparable. Under a transaction-to-transaction me thod, the transaction at 10 would be used for
normal value, resulting in a dumping amount of 1 (10-9 = 1). However, under the so-called
"asymmetrical" average-to-transaction method, the two home market transactions would be averaged,
resulting in a normal value of 9 and, in turn, a dumping amount of zero (9-9 = 0).

148. Under the average-to-transaction comparis on method used by the United States, no
antidumping duties would be assessed in this situati on, because the export price – 9 – is not less than
the weighted average normal value – 9. Howeve r, under a transaction-to-transaction comparison
method – a "symmetrical" comparison method explic itly permitted in investigations pursuant to
Article 2.4.2 – the United States would be perm itted to assess $1 in antidumping duties for this
transaction. Consequently, there is no inherent bias associated with the US assessment method.

149. Moreover, the EC has not offered any argument as to how an offset to antidumping duties
assessable on one entry as a result of a distinct entry having been sold at above normal value would be
considered an adjustment or other comparison criteri on that falls under the rubric of Article 2.4. The
focus of Article 2.4 is on the selection of compar able transactions and the making of appropriate
adjustments to those transactions so as to render th em comparable. Even as described by the EC, an
offset requirement would be applied to the results of comparisons, and would not pertain to the
comparisons themselves.
174 Consequently, it falls clearly outside the scope of Article 2.4.

150. Finally, the EC's attempt to use the "fair co mparison" reference in Article 2.4 to nullify the
express limitation in Article 2.4.2 is inconsistent w ith principles of treaty interpretation and, for that
reason, should be rejected by the Panel.

6. Article 11.2 Is Not Applicable to Article 9.3 Assessment Proceedings
151. The determination of such a rate in an assessment proceeding conducted pursuant to
Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement does not constitute a review of the continued necessity of the
antidumping duty and, thus, is not subject to the oblig ations of Article 11.2. The EC's argument that
reviews pursuant to Article 11.2 of the AD Agreemen t and the reassessment of deposit rates for future
entries in future reviews are "the same"
175 is not supported by the plain language of Article 11.2 of the
AD Agreement.

172 US – Gasoline (AB), p. 23; see also Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB). p. 12; US – Underwear (AB) ,
p. 16.
173 EC First Submission, para. 200.
174 EC First Submission, para. 207.
175 EC First Submission, para. 235.

152. Article 11.2 allows interested parties to requ est a review to determine "whether the injury
would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied". Therefore, an Article 11.2
review is focused on the continuation or recurrence of injury if the duty were varied, rather than on a
determination of a varying duty rate. The EC c ites footnote 21 in support of its position; however,
footnote 21 simply states that a determination of liability for payment of antidumping duties made
pursuant to Article 9.3 does not, by itself, constitu te a review under Article 11.2. This statement
supports the position that assessment proceedings c onducted under Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement
are not subject to the obligations of Article 11.2. Furthermore, footnote 22 to the AD Agreement,
provides that in a retrospective system, a finding in a proceeding conducted pursuant to Article 9.3
that no duty is to be levied does not by itself re quire termination of the duty. Neither of these
provisions supports the EC's view that a determ ination of the amount of antidumping duty to be
assessed on specific import transactions determined in assessment proceedings relates to the inquiry
called for by Article 11.2 as to whether injury would likely continue or recur if the duty were removed
or varied.

C. T
HE EC'S CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO SUNSET REVIEWS
153. The EC argues that the United States' determ inations in the challenged sunset reviews are
inconsistent with Articles 11.1 and 11.3 of the AD Agreement because when making its
determinations that removal of the antidumping duty would likely lead to a continuation or recurrence
of dumping, the United States relied on margins that were calculated in "proceedings using model
zeroing", and therefore "did not comply with its obligations pursuant to Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.4.2
because these margins were not b ased on a fair comparison and not calculated for the product as a
whole".
176

154. The EC's argument, however, should be rej ected. The EC has not demonstrated that a
calculation done in accordance with the EC's approach would result in zero or de minimis dumping
margins in the cited cases, leading to a revocation of the order.

D. T
HE EC'S CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTIGATIONS
155. With respect to the four investigations pr operly before the Panel, upon which the EC did
request consultations, and continues to challenge 177, the United States acknowledges that Commerce
did not provide offsets for non-dumped transactions when calculating the margins of dumping using
the average-to-average comparison methodology duri ng the investigation phase. The United States
recognizes that in US – Softwood Lumber Dumping the Appellate Body found that the use of
"zeroing" with respect to the average-to-avera ge comparison methodology in investigations was
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, by interpreting the terms "margins of dumping" and "all comparable
export transactions" as used in Article 2.4.2 in an integrated manner. ( See US – Softwood Lumber
Dumping (AB) , paras. 62-117). The United States ac knowledges that this reasoning is equally
applicable with respect to the claims for these four investigations.

156. The United States, however, continues to c ontest the EC's challenges that extend beyond
Article 2.4.2 with respect to these four investig ations. Specifically, the United States contests any
claims of WTO inconsistency as to Articles 2. 1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement, and hereby
incorporates arguments contained in Section B.
178 Because Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement
do not impose independent obligations, to the ex tent the EC is claiming that the challenged
investigations are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 or 2.4, the EC has failed to establish the existence of

176 EC First Submission, para. 259.
177 Cases XV, XVI, XVII and XVIII of the EC's Panel Request.
178 Paragraph 177 of the EC's First Submission allege that the four, named investigations in its Annex
only violate Articles 2.4 and Articles 2.4.2, however, the EC also cites Article 2.1 in support of its argument.
See EC First Submission, paras 149, 155, 160.

any obligations pursuant to these definitional provis ions, and thus, the EC's challenge must depend on
Article 2.4.2. Therefore, a finding by the Panel on the narrow issue of Article 2.4.2 is sufficient to
resolve this matter.

E. WTO
 AGREEMENT ARTICLE XVI:4
157. The EC's first claim with respect to Ar ticle XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement depends on a
finding of inconsistency with provisi ons of the AD Agreement and GATT 1994. 179 As one panel
recognized, there is no "independent" basis for a claim under Article XVI:4. 180 For the reasons set out
above demonstrating that the United States has not ac ted inconsistently with the provisions of either
the AD Agreement or the GATT 1994, the EC's clai m with respect to Article XVI:4 should be
rejected.

158. The EC also attempts to demonstrate a br each of Article XVI:4 by relying on a novel,
expansive and erroneous interp retation of that provision.
181 It argues that "the findings of the
Appellate Body as adopted by the DSB in specifi c disputes create an independent international
obligation for the losing party in that dispute to comply". 182 Because the DSB has adopted Appellate
Body reports holding zeroing incons istent with provisions of the c overed agreements, the EC asserts
that the United States is under a continuing obligation to comply, and has not done so for certain
determinations that were issued after the adoption of at least the first report finding zeroing to be
inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement .
183 In fact, the EC overlooks the fact that the
determinations listed in the Annex to its panel request were issued before the expiration of the
"reasonable period of time to comply" in both US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) . It is
unanswered why the EC would like the Panel to im pose a greater obligation on the United States than
the DSU itself imposed.

159. The EC's expansive interpretation of Artic le XVI:4 should be rejected. The idea of a
continuing "independent internati onal obligation" arising from adopt ed reports cannot be reconciled
with the long-standing rule that Appellate Body and panel reports "are not binding, except with
respect to resolving the particular disput e between the parties to that dispute". 184 (Again, there is a
certain irony in the EC's position – asserting that find ings in prior disputes are binding on this Panel
while at the same time ignoring findings from prio r disputes when they conflict with the EC's position
in this dispute.) The EC's interpretation finds no support in the text of the covered agreements. For
each individual dispute, the DSU provides the m echanism to determine compliance by the Member
concerned with the DSB's adopted recommendations and rulings, and, in cases of non-compliance, to
authorize the suspension of concessions in the absence of an agreement on compensation.185

179 As the EC acknowledges, the determination of a breach of a provision of any covered agreement
gives rise to a breach of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. See EC First Written Submission, paras. 123-25
(citing US – 1916 Act (Japan) (Panel) and US – 1916 Act (EC) (Panel)).
180 See US – OCTG from Mexico (Panel) , para. 7.189. The panel in that dispute also found that there
can be no independent breach of Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement, which requires that "[e]ach Member shall
take all necessary steps, of a general or particular charact er, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force
of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its la ws, regulations and administrative procedures with the
provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for the Member in question".
181 See EC First Written Submission, para. 128.
182 EC First Written Submission, para. 128. The EC references an international law journal article in
support of its interpretation of Article XVI:4. See EC First Written Submission, paras. 128. The rights and
obligations of Members, however, are found in the text of the covered agreements, and not in articles written by
a private individual.
183 See EC First Written Submission, paras. 131-132. It is ambiguous which report the EC considers
first in time, but it cites just US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan) in paragraph 131, making US –
Zeroing (EC) the first report to be adopted of the two.
184 US – Softwood Lumber Dumping (AB), para. 111 (quoting Japan – Alcohol Taxes (AB)).
185 See DSU, Arts. 21, 22.

160. The EC is advocating that the Panel adopt an approach which would distort the WTO's
dispute settlement system to the detriment of th e "security and predictability" of the multilateral
trading system referred to in Article 3.2. 186 Under the EC's reading of Article XVI:4, a complaining
party could identify a Member's measures that are a llegedly similar to those that already have been
found inconsistent in adopted A ppellate Body reports, and claim non- compliance with the findings in
the adopted reports. Allowing such a claim w ould completely flout the DSU's provisions on
compliance and on not adding to or diminishing righ ts of Members, and would make adopted reports
binding on all Members, despite their non-binding status outside of the original dispute.

161. The rationales offered by the EC do not justif y its reading of Article XVI:4. The EC asserts
that allowing claims based on the enforcement of adopted panel reports woul d serve to eliminate a
"multiplicity of endless litigation".
187 Policy arguments based on speculative concerns about the
number of future cases, however, cannot trump the language of the DSU, which establishes the rules
for adjudicating individual disputes and dealing with issues of non-compliance in each separate
dispute. The EC is free to raise its arguments in the context of the ongoing efforts of Members to
amend the DSU, but this Panel must apply the DSU as it currently is written.

162. Furthermore, the EC's argument would tran sform panel and Appellate Body findings into
authoritative interpretations of the covered agreements with effect beyond the particular parties to a
particular dispute. But Article IX of the Marrak esh Agreement is explicit - neither a panel nor the
Appellate Body has the authority to render interp retations of the covere d agreements. Members
conferred that authority exclusively upon the Mi nisterial Conference and the General Council.
Accordingly, the EC's proposed interpretation of Article XVI:4 fails on this basis alone.

163. The EC also appears to argue for an expansive reading of Article XVI:4 as a means to deter or
sanction breaches of "the duty of good faith".
188 However, panels are not tasked with determining,
nor are they authorized to determine, whether Members have complied with a public international law
principle of "good faith"; rather they must determ ine whether a Member's meas ure is consistent with
the covered agreements. The cove red agreements do not provide for an obligation of "good faith" to
be considered in connection with the substantive obligations set forth therein, nor would it be
constructive for panels to engage in examining whether a Member's breach resulted from a good faith
reading or otherwise. 189 Indeed, the Appellate Body has noted that "[n]othing . . . in the covered
agreements supports the conclusion that simply b ecause a WTO Member is found to have violated a
substantive treaty provision, it therefore has not acted in good faith". 190 It is worth noting that the
Appellate Body made this statement in the context of reversing the panel finding cited by the EC for
the proposition that panels may in fact find that a Member has acted in bad faith.

164. Panels are subject to clear and unequivocal limits on their mandate: they may clarify
"existing provisions" of covered WTO agreements and may examine the measures at issue in light of

186 "Security and predictability" resu lts from the application of the correct interpretive approach set
forth in the second sentence of Article 3.2 of the DSU – the "customary rules of interpretation of public
international law" – to the provisions of the WTO Ag reement. The proper interpretation ensures that the
findings and recommendations of a panel or the Appellate Body, and the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB, do not "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements". The EC's
reading of Article XVI:4 would be antithetical to the "secu rity and predictability" that a proper interpretation of
the covered agreements brings to the world trading system.
189 The EC later in its submission asserts that Artic le 3 of the DSU contains an "obligation for WTO
Members to engage in procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve dispute [sic]." EC First Written
Submission, para. 265. However, the EC is not alleging a breach of this provision of the DSU, nor would there
be any basis for it to do so.
190 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (AB), para. 298.

the relevant provisions of the covered WTO agreements.
191 The Appellate Body is confined to review
"issues of law covered in the panel report and le gal interpretations developed by the panel". 192
Nowhere in Appendix 1 to the DSU, which defines the covered agreements for purposes of the DSU,
is there listed an international law principle of good faith. Nor does the WTO Agreement distinguish
between a breach of an agreement in good faith and a breach in bad faith – in either case it would be a
breach of the Agreement and would have the cons equences provided in the Agreement. The EC's
invocation of the "duty of good faith" cannot justify its expansive reading of Article XVI:4.

VI. CONCLUSION
165. As set forth above, the United States respec tfully requests that the Panel grant the US
preliminary objections and reject the EC's "as applied" claims regarding assessment proceedings,
sunset reviews, and investigations.

191 See DSU, Arts. 3.2, 7.1.
192 DSU, Art. 17.6.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

US-1 Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Activated Carbon
from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 9508 (2 March 2007).

US-2 Communication by the United States of 20 February 2007 (WT/DS322/16).

US-3 Case T-274/02, Ritek Corp. v. Council of the European Union, 24 October 2006.

US-4 Report on the Special Import Meas ures Act, House of Commons Canada,
December 1996,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/sima/reports/01_1996-12/chap4e.h
tml.

US-5 Special Import Measures Act Se lf-Assessment Guide ("Normal Value -
Export Price = Antidumping Duty (or Margin of Dumping"),
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/self-e.html#12.

TABLE OF CASES

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Footwear
Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear, WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by
the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS121/AB/R
Brazil – Aircraft
Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft ,
WT/DS46/R, adopted 20 August 1999, as modified by the Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS46/AB/R
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997
Canada - Aircraft
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 Augu st 1999, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS70/AB/R
Canada – Wheat
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276/R, adopted
27 September 2004, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

Chile – Agricultural Products
(Price Band)
Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R, adopted
23 October 2002, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

EC – Bananas III
Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/R, adopted
25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,

EC – Bananas III
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R,
adopted 25 September 1997
EC – Computer Equipment
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs
Classification Of Certain Computer Equipment ,
WT/DS62,67,68/AB/R/, adopted 22 June 1998
Korea – Vessels Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial
Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecti ng Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998
Mexico – Definitive Anti-
Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures
on Beef and Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 December 2005
Measures – HFCS
Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R,
adopted 24 February 2000
US – Zeroing (Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to
Zeroing and Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted
23 January 2007

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Following your fax dated 17 September 2007, the European Communities provides below its
reply to the request for preliminary rulings made by the United States. As will be explained below,
the European Communities considers that (1) it does not seek to expand the matter in this dispute
beyond the measures upon which consulta tions were held; (2) the matter subject to review by this
Panel has been determined precisely in the requ est for establishment of the Panel; and (3) all
measures contained in the Panel request fall within the Panel's terms of reference.

2. In particular, the European Communities subm its that the consultations and the request for
establishment of the Panel gave the United States ad equate notice of the scope of the matters and
claims asserted by the European Co mmunities in conformity with Articles 4.4, 4.7, 6.2 and 7.1 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding and Articles 17.3, 17.4 and 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Moreover, the measures subject to this dispute we re precisely identified in the Panel request in
accordance with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Finally, all
the challenged measures fall within the Panel' s terms of reference. Therefore, the
European Communities requests the Panel to reject the United States' request for preliminary ruling
entirely.

II. ALL MEASURES DESCRIBED IN THE PANEL REQUEST WERE ALREADY
IDENTIFIED IN THE CONSULTATION REQUEST
3. The United States argues that the measures cont ained in the request for consultations relate
to 38 specific measures and 2 on-going original proceedings, whereas the Panel request refers
to 52 specific measures, i.e., the original 38 measures plus 14 additional allegedl y new measures,
including 7 final and 3 on-going additional sun set review proceedings, and 3 final and 1 on-going
additional administrative review proceedings.
1 The United States reached this conclusion by referring
to the anti-dumping proceedings mentioned in the An nexes of the request for consultations and Panel
request respectively. In light of this, the United St ates considers that, since consultations did not take
place on these additional 14 specific measures, they should be excluded from the terms of reference of
this Panel.

4. As explained below, the European Communiti es considers that all measures described in the
Panel request were already identified in the request for consultations.

A. C
ONTINUED EXISTENCE AND APPLICATION OF ZEROING AS THE MATTER CONCERNED
5. The European Communities submits that the matte r subject to this dispute was clearly stated
since the very beginning in the request for consultati ons. Indeed, the title of this case showed to the
United States that the European Co mmunities wanted to consult on the " continued existence and
application of the zeroing methodology" as the matter concerned.

6. Moreover, the first paragraph of the request for consultations also clearly refers to the
application of zeroing as the matter concerned, a nd then identifies specific anti-dumping proceedings
where the United States used this methodolog y when calculating dumping margins on products
imported from the European Communities. In particular, the request for consultations states that:

"The European Communities request consu ltations with the United States (…) with
regard to the practice and methodologies for calculating dumping margins involving
the use of zeroing, and the application of zeroing in certain specified anti-dumping
measures."

1 First Written Submission by the United States, para. 49.

7. Then, the request for consultations describes how the United States applies zeroing in original
investigation, administrative review and sunset re view proceedings and includes references to anti-
dumping proceedings where this methodology was used, resulting in higher duties being in place.

8. Following this logic, section 2 of the request for consultations refers to several matters as
subject to discussion:

"(a) The United States regulations, zeroing methodology, practice, administrative
procedures and measures for determining the dumping margin (…)"; (b) The
specific anti-dumping administrative reviews listed in Annex I to the present
request, and any assessment instructions i ssued pursuant to them in which the
United States applied the regulations, zeroi ng methodology, practice, administrative
procedures and measures described under point 1(a) above (…); (c) The specific
dumping determination in the original i nvestigations listed in Annex III to the
present request, and any automatic assessment instructions issued pursuant to them,
in which the United States applied the zeroing methodology described under
point 1(b) above (…); (d) The specific Sunset review determination in the case
listed in Annex II to the present request. The United States relied in its
determination on dumping margins that were calculated in the original investigation
and in administrative reviews using the methodology described under point 1(a)
above."

9. The Annexes to the request for consulta tions identify precisely the measures where the
United States applied the contested methodology by providing information on the specific anti-
dumping proceedings concerned. In particular, the Annexes mention, inter alia , the product and
country subject to anti-dumping duties in the United States.

10. The request for establishment of the Panel fo llows a similar structur e as the one described
above and, thus, does not expand the scope of the matter subject to c onsultations. The title still refers
to the "continued existence and application of zeroing methodology". Likewise, the scope of the
Panel request states that:

"The European Communities hereby requ ests that a panel be established by
DSB (…) with regard to an "as such" measu re or measures providing for the practice
or methodologies for calculating dumping margins involving the use of zeroing, and
the application of zeroing in certain spec ified anti-dumping measures maintained by
the United States."

11. Since the WTO inconsistency of the zeroing methodology had already been established in
previous cases, the Panel request notes that "the European Communities does not ask the Panel to rule
on the WTO inconsistency of this practice ". However, the European Communities described the
matter as follows:

"The United States uses this practice or methodology in calculating dumping
amounts or dumping margins, and in setti ng and collecting anti-dumping duties.
The level of such anti-dumping duties is set in original proceedings, revised in
administrative review proceedings or changed circumstances proceedings, and the
need for the continued application of anti-dumping duties is decided in sunset
review proceedings. In the latter DOC may determine that dumping is likely to
continue or recur if the anti-dumping order were revoked, notably because dumping
has continued at levels above de minimis after the issuance of the order. To find that
dumping has continued after the issuance of the order, DOC relies on dumping
margins calculated in the original pr oceeding and in administrative review
proceedings using zeroing. The EC has id entified in the annex to this request a

number of anti-dumping orders where duties are set and/or maintained on the basis
of the above-mentioned zeroing practice or methodology with the result that duties
are paid by importers either in excess of the dumping margin which would have
been calculated using a WTO consistent methodology or are paid when no such duty
would have resulted from the use of a WTO-consistent methodology."

12. In other words, as it was the case in the re quest for consultations, the European Communities
still refers to the use of zeroing by the Unite d States in several anti-dumping proceedings as the
subject matter of this dispute. Then, when describ ing the measures at issue, the Panel request refers
to:

"The continued application of, or the a pplication of the specific anti-dumping duties
resulting from the anti-dumping orders enumer ated from I to XVIII in the Annex to
the present request as calculated or maintain ed in place pursuant to the most recent
administrative review or, as the case may be, original proceeding or changed
circumstances or sunset review proceedi ng at a level in excess of the anti-dumping
margin which would result from the corr ect application of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement (whether duties or cash deposit rates or other form of measure).

In addition to these measures, the admini strative reviews, or, as the case may be,
original proceedings or changed circumst ances or sunset review proceedings listed
in the Annex (numbered 1 to 52) with th e specific anti-dumping orders and are also
considered by the EC to be measures subj ect to the current request for establishment
of the panel in addition to the anti-dumping orders.

This includes the determinations in re lation to all companies and includes any
assessment instructions, whether automatic or otherwise, issued at any time pursuant
to any of the measures listed in the Annex."

13. Again, the Panel request mentions the conti nued application of anti-dumping duties at a level
in excess of the anti-dumping margin which woul d result from the correct application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement , i.e., without zeroing. Then, the Panel request includes in its Annex
18 measures, derived from 18 original anti-dumpi ng orders, including 52 anti-dumping proceedings,
i.e., 4 original proceedings, 37 administrative review proceedings and 11 sunset review proceedings.
As was the case in the request for consultations, those 18 measures are described by reference to the
product concerned originating from a particular country.

14. As can be seen, both the request for consu ltations and the Panel request describe the matter
concerned in a similar manner. Therefore, due process has been respected since the United States
obtained adequate notice of the scope of the matter and claims asserted by the
European Communities.
2

B. S
PECIFIC MEASURES NOT INCLUDED IN THE REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS ARE ALSO
COVERED
15. The United States points out in its First Writte n Submission that the Panel request contains
14 additional measures which were not raised during consultations, including 10 sunset review
proceedings and 4 administrative review proceedings.3
16. Even if some of the specific anti-dumping pro ceedings which were listed in the request for the
establishment of a Panel were not included expressly in the Annexes to the request for consultations,

2 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft , (WT/DS70/R), paras 9.12-9.31; Panel Report, Korea – Vessels
(WT/DS273/R), at para. 9; and Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/R), paras 89-95.
3 First Written Submission by the United States, para. 61.

the European Communities submits th at those measures were also covered and that the United States
had enough notice of the matter subject to dispute.

17. The European Communities argues that, acco rding to the relevant case-law on Articles 4
and 6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, there is no need that the specific measures that are
the subject of the request for consultations and th ose which are the subject of the Panel request be
identical, as long as they invol ve essentially the same matter, i.e., the application of zeroing
methodologies when calculating the dumping margin s in the specific anti-dumping proceedings with
respect to a particular product originating from one specific country.

18. In Brazil – Aircraft , on appeal, Brazil argued that the Panel erred in finding that certain
regulatory instruments relating to PROEX referred to in the Panel request were properly before the
Panel. Specifically, Brazil claimed that because thos e instruments came into effect in 1997 and 1998,
after consultations were held between Canada and Brazil, they had not been the subject of
consultations and, therefore, coul d not properly be before the Panel. The Panel had ruled as follows
on this issue:
4

"(…) [W]e recall that Brazil and Cana da consulted 'regarding certain export
subsidies granted under the Brazilian Programa de Financiamento ás Exportações
(PROEX) to foreign purchasers of Brazil's EMBRAER aircraft', and that the request
for establishment of a Panel relates to 'export subsidies under PROEX'. We consider
that the consultations and request for establishment relate to what is
fundamentally the same 'dispute', beca use they involve essentially the same
practice, i.e., the payment of export subsidies under PROEX. Under these
circumstances, and notwithstanding the fact that both the authorizing legal
instrument and certain other legal instrume nts relating to the administration of the
PROEX interest equalization regime changed or were only introduced subsequent to
the last consultations, we cannot say that Canada has failed to comply with the
requirements of Article 4.7 of the DSU" (emphasis added).

19. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding . In doing so, the Appellate Body said that:
5

"We note that Brazil and Canada consulted about 'certain export subsidies granted
under the Brazilian Programa de Financiamento às Exportações (PROEX) to
foreign purchasers of Brazil's Embraer aircraft', and that the request for the
establishment of a Panel also relates to 'the payment of export subsidies through
interest rate equalization and export financing programmes under PROEX'. We
have been advised by Brazil that the regulat ory instruments that came into effect in
1997 and 1998, after the consultations ha d taken place, and that relate to the
administration of PROEX, did not change the essence of that regime.

In our view, Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, as well as paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of
the SCM Agreement, set forth a process by which a complaining party must request
consultations, and consultations must be held, before a matter may be referred to the
DSB for the establishment of a Panel. Under Article 4.3 of the SCM Agreement ,
moreover, the purpose of consultations is 'to clarify the facts of the situation and to
arrive at a mutually agreed solution'.

We do not believe, however, that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, requ ire a precise and exact identity between
the specific measures that were the subj ect of consultations and the specific

4 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (WT/DS46/R), para. 7.11.
5 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (WT/DS46/AB/R), paras 130-132.

measures identified in the request for the establishment of a Panel . As stated by
the Panel, '[o]ne purpose of consultations , as set forth in Article 4.3 of the SCM
Agreement, is to 'clarify the facts of th e situation', and it can be expected that
information obtained during the course of consultations may enable the complainant
to focus the scope of the matter with r espect to which it seeks establishment of a
Panel'. We are confident that the speci fic measures at issue in this case are the
Brazilian export subsidies for regional airc raft under PROEX. Consultations were
held by the parties on these subsidies, and it is these same subsidies that were
referred to the DSB for the establishmen t of a Panel. We emphasize that the
regulatory instruments that came into effect in 1997 and 1998 did not change the
essence of the export subsidies for regional aircraft under PROEX" ( emphasis
added).

20. Similarly, in Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dump ing Measures on Beef and Rice , the Appellate
Body emphasised the purpose of consultations in find ing that, with respect to the measures at issue,
Articles 4 and 6 of the Dispute Settlement Understandi ng do not "require a precise and exact identity"
between the request for consultations and the Pa nel request, provided that the "essence" of the
challenged measures has not changed.
6 Previously, the Panel in the same case had confirmed that:7

"In our view, [Articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement] do not in any way req uire a complete identity between the
scope of the request for consultations an d the request for establishment, nor do
they, in our view, limit the scope of the request for establishment to the exact scope
of the request for consultations . While we read these provisions to require that
Members should attempt to find a mutually agreed solution on the 'matter' in dispute
through consultations, this, in our view, onl y requires that request for consultations
relate to the same subject matter as the request for establishment of a panel. In sum,
and provided the request for establishment concerns a dispute on which
consultations have been requested, there is no need for the matter ( i.e. the specific
measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint) as identified in the request for
establishment to be identical to the matter on which consultations were requested."

21. Therefore, in light of the above case-law, it can be concluded that there is no need for identity
between the specific measures that were the subject of the request for consu ltations and those subject
of the Panel request provided that they involve essentially the same matter.

22. In the present case, the 14 allegedly new measur es included in the Panel request refer to the
same matter raised during consultations, i.e., the use of zeroing when calculating the dumping
margins in the specific anti-dumping proceedings with respect to the same products originating from
the specific countries listed therein. Consequently, the specific measures not mentioned by the
United States would also fall within the matter of this dispute.

23. In any event, it should be added that the inclusion of new measures which amount to an
extension or a modification of measures previously mentioned in the request for consultations do not
affect the consistency of the panel request with the consultations carried out between the parties. In
Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measu res Relating to Certain Agricultural Products
(DS 207), in the context of the extension of a safegua rd measure not foreseen in the request for
consultations, the Panel dealt with this issue as follows:
8

6 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice
(WT/DS295/AB/R), para. 138; and Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (WT/DS70/R), para 9.12.
7 Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumpi ng Measures on Beef and Rice (WT/DS295/AB/R),
para. 7.41.
8 Panel Report, Chile – Agricultural Products (Price Band) (WT/DS207/R), para. 7.119.

"[T]he 'extensions' are not distinct measures, but merely continuations in time of the
definitive safeguard measures. As a result, we consider that the definitive safeguard
measures were not terminated before the re quest for establishment, but, rather, that
their duration was simply extended at that time. Thus, we need not further consider
Chile's argument that we lack the author ity to make findings in respect of the
definitive measures on the grounds that they have expired. For the same reason, we
also consider the fact that the extensio n was not mentioned in the request for
consultations irrelevant for the determina tion of our jurisdiction: pursuant to
Article 4.4 of the DSU, Argentina had to, and did, identify the definitive safeguard
measures in its request for consultations . The fact that the duration of the
identified measures was extended by Chile af ter the request for consultations cannot
affect Argentina's compliance with Article 4.4 of the DSU."

24. In line with this case-la w, the European Communities argues that the requirement of
consistency between the request for consultations and the Panel request, as established by Articles 4.4
and 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, is still met in case where there is no identity
between the specific measures that were the subject of the request for consultations and those which
are the subject of the Panel request as long as they involve essentially the same matter. In this sense,
the extension or modification of the measures menti oned in the Panel request are also covered by the
request for consultations.

25. The 14 additional measures mentioned by the Un ited States have a direct relationship with the
measures listed in the request for consultations. As mentioned before, the Annexes to the request for
consultations identified the measures, inter alia , by reference to the product and exporting country
subject to anti-dumping duties as a result of the most recent proceeding ( i.e., original proceeding,
administrative or sunset reviews). The additional measures contained in the Panel request refer to
modifications or implemen tations of the original anti-dumping orders with respect to the same
products and countries already discussed in the context of consultations.

26. The request for establishment of the Panel c ontains some measures which were adopted or
initiated after consulta tions were requested
9, but they refer to the identical products and countries
already mentioned in the Annex to the request for consultations.

27. The request for establishment of the Panel also refers to sunset review measures not included
in the request for consultation
10 which were very close to the date of request for consultations (they
are dated 15 September 2006, where the request was filed on 2 October 2006), or relate to the
continuation of measures which were covered by an administrative review mentioned in the request
for consultations.

28. Finally, two proceedings
11 listed in the Annex to the request for the establishment of a panel
which the United States pretend to be new measures we re in fact already listed in the Annex to the
request for consultations even if the request for co nsultations only referred to the preliminary results
of these proceedings.

29. Therefore, in light of the above, the Europ ean Communities submits that the 14 allegedly new
measures mentioned by the United States were covere d by the request for consultations since they
relate to the same matter, i.e., the use of zeroing when calculating the dumping margins in the specific
anti-dumping proceedings with respect to a partic ular product from a specific country, and have a

9 Three sunset review proceedings (proceedings No 4, 38 and 47) and four administrative review
proceedings (proceedings No 1, 22, 35 and 43).
10 Proceedings No 9, 14, 19, 26, 29, 32 and 42.
11 Proceedings No 1 and 22.

direct relationship with the measures mentioned in the Annexes to the request for consultations, since
they imply extensions (in the case of sunset revi ews), modifications (in administrative reviews) or
implementations (i.e., definitive collection in the case of ad ministrative reviews) of the anti-dumping
duties consulted upon.

C. C
ONCLUSIONS
30. From the foregoing, the European Comm unities submits that both the request for
consultations and the Panel request describe the matter concerned in a similar manner. To the extent
that the measures covered in the Panel request we re based on the same zeroing methodology already
targeted in the consultations request and the sa me anti-dumping proceedings (described by reference
to products and countries concerned), this is suffici ent to comply with the requirements of Articles 4
and 6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and their mirroring provision in Article 17 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Moreover, since the 14 allegedly new measures had a direct relationship with
the measures identified in the Annexes to the requ est for consultations (by reference to the same
products and countries subject to anti-dumping duties) , the European Communities consider that all
the measures fall within the matter of this dispute.

III. THE PANEL REQUEST IDENTIFIES A CONCRETE NUMBER OF MEASURES
31. The United States argues that the Panel request refers to an indeterminate number of measures
that were not specifically identified and, thus, wo uld not fall within the Panel's terms of reference
pursuant to Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

32. In particular, the United States points out that the Panel request identified as "measures" the
following:

"[T]he continued application of, or the application of the specific anti-dumping
duties resulting from the anti-dumping orders enumerated from I to XVIII in the
Annex to the present request as calculated or maintained in place pursuant to the
most recent administrative review or, as the case may be, original proceeding or
changed circumstances or sunset review proceeding."

33. The United States then assumes that this requ est refers to the most recent of the measures
specifically listed for each of the 18 anti-dumping cases in the Annex. However, to the extent that the
request does not refer to the most recent identifie d measure, but to any most recent measure, the
United States argues that it refers to an indeterminate number of alleged measures.

34. Finally, the United States notes that, because it did not have opportunity to consult with the
European Communities with respect to this indete rminate number of alleged measures, it was unable
to seek further clarity regarding the scope and effect of the challenged measures.

35. The European Communities submits that th is claim is unfounded. As stated in Canada –
Aircraft
12, the consistency of a party's request for th e establishment of a panel in accordance with
Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settle ment Understanding should be judge d exclusively in light of the
specificity of the request for establishment, and not in light of the specificity of the party's earlier
request for consultations. The European Commu nities submits that the Panel request precisely
identifies the measures subject to this dispute.

12 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, (WT/DS70/R), para. 9.32.

A. T HE PANEL REQUEST IDENTIFIES 18 ANTI-DUMPING PROCEEDINGS AS MEASURES
36. The European Communities considers that th e Panel request contains a clear list of the
measures which fall within the Panel's terms of refe rence. In particular, its Annex identifies 18 anti-
dumping proceedings, by product and country concerned, mentioning the relevant places where the
measures were published in the United States, and th e duty rates imposed. The identification of the
original anti-dumping order imposing duties on the product from the country concerned is thus
followed by all instances wh ere the measures at hand , i.e., the duties imposed on the basis of zeroing
methodologies, have been modified. In this respect, when the Panel request refers to the continued
application of duties determined using zeroing methodologies as a result of the original anti-dumping
orders in the 18 cases contained in the Annex, the m easures subject to the Panel's terms of reference
are properly defined.

37. The fact that the Panel request does not enum erate the last modification of the duties with
respect to the 18 anti-dumping proceedings as publis hed in the United States is irrelevant insofar as
the measures have been determined by reference to the products, countries concerned, and duty levels.
In this sense, the Panel in Argentina – Footwear found that it is the identification of the measures
(rather than merely the numbers of the resolutions and the places of their promulgation in the Official
Journal) which is primarily relevant for the pu rposes of Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding:
13

"[W]e consider that the EC's request primarily and unambiguously identifies the
provisional and definitive measures (rathe r than only the cited resolutions and
promulgations as such). In our view, it is the identification of these measures (rather
than merely the numbers of the resolutions and the places of their promulgation in
the Official Journal) which is primarily relevant for purposes of Article 6.2 of the
DSU. Therefore, we consider that it is the provisional and definitive measures in
their substance rather than the legal acts in their original or modified legal forms
that are most relevant fo r our terms of reference . In our view, this is consistent
with the Appellate Body's findings in the Guatemala - Cement case" ( emphasis
added).

38. Likewise, in Canada – Wheat
14 the Panel noted that, by its terms, Article 6.2 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding does not require that pane l requests explicitly specify measures of general
application (i.e., laws and regulations) by name, date of a doption, etc. The Panel found that the fact
that the United States had not specified the relevant laws or regulations by name, date of adoption,
etc, did not necessarily render the panel request inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.

39. Thus, the European Communities submits that the measures falling within the Panel's terms of
reference were sufficiently identified in the Annex to the Panel request.

B. T
HE PANEL REQUEST ADEQUATELY INFORMS THE UNITED STATES OF THE CHALLENGED
MEASURES
40. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the word ing used in the Panel request leaves the
United States unaware of the measures which are subject to this dispute. Indeed, the purpose of the
specificity requirement in Article 6.2 of the Di spute Settlement Understanding is to guarantee the

13 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear, (WT/DS121/R), para. 8.40.
14 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat, (WT/DS276/R), para. 19.

rights of the parties to a due process. In this sense, the Appellate Body in EC – Computer
Equipment
15 noted that:

"We do not see how the alleged lack of precision of the terms, LAN equipment
and PCs with multimedia capability, in the request for the establishment of a panel
affected the rights of defence of the Eu ropean Communities in the course of the
panel proceedings. As the ability of the European Communities to defend itself
was not prejudiced by a lack of knowing the measures at issue, we do not believe
that the fundamental rule of due process was violated by the Panel " ( emphasis
added).

41. Similarly, the Panel in Canada – Wheat
16 found that:

"whether sufficient information is provided on the face of the panel request will
depend, as noted above, on whether the information provided serves the purposes of
Article 6.2, and in particular its due process objective, as well as the specific
circumstances of each case, including the type of measure that is at issue."

42. In this respect, the European Communities ar gues that the United States has failed to show
that the Panel request is so flawed that the de fending party's rights of defence are prejudiced, and
maintains that the United States cannot demonstrate th at any imperfections in the Panel's request for
establishment rise to this level.

C.
 S UBSEQUENT MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE
18 MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE PANEL REQUEST ALSO FALL WITHIN THE PANEL'S TERMS OF
REFERENCE
43. Finally, the European Communities notes that subsequent measures, subsidiary or closely
related to the specified measures, have been acc epted as proper identification of the measures falling
within the Panel's terms of reference in accord ance with Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.

44. The Panel in EC – Bananas III found that the object and purpose of the specificity
requirement of Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is to ensure the clarity of panels'
terms of reference, which pursuant to Article 7 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding are typically
determined by the panel request, and to inform th e respondent and potential third parties of the scope
of the complaining party's claims (i.e., the "measures" challenged and the WTO provisions invoked by
the complaining party).
17 As long as Article 6.2 is interpreted to require any measure challenged to be
specified in the panel request or to be subsidiary or closely related to the specified measures, the
object and purpose of Article 6.2 are satisfied.18

45. In EC – Bananas III , the "basic EC regulation at issue" was identified in the request for
establishment of the Panel. In addition, the re quest referred in general terms to "subsequent
EC legislation, regulations and administrative measures (...) which implement, supplement and amend
[the EC banana] regime". The Panel found that for purposes of Article 6.2 this reference was
sufficient to cover all European Communities legi slation dealing with the importation, sale and

15 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment (WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R,
WT/DS68/AB/R), para. 70.
16 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat, (WT/DS276/R), para. 20.
17 Panel Report, EC –Bananas III , (WT/DS27/R), para. 7.35; Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas
III, (WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 142; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut (WT/DS22/AB/R),
para. 22.
18 Panel Report, Japan – Film (WT/DS44/R), para. 10.9.

distribution of bananas because the measures that th e complainants were cont esting were "adequately
identified", even though they were not explicitly listed. 19 The Appellate Body agreed that the panel
request contained sufficient identification of the measures at issue to fulfil the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.20

46. Implementing measures which are not expressl y mentioned in the Panel request also fall
within the Panel's terms of reference. In Argentina – Footwear, the Panel noted that:21

"We further recall that the Japan – Film Panel considered certain measures which
had not been listed in the Panel request to be within its terms of reference because
they were 'implementing measures' based on a basic framework law, specifically
identified in the Panel request, which specified the form and circumscribed the
possible content and scope of such implementing measures. From this we infer that
a legal act not explicitly listed in a Panel request but which has a direct
relationship to a measure that is specifica lly described therein, can be said to be
sufficiently identified to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 . In this respect, we
agree with the Japan – Film Panel's statement that the requirements of Article 6.2
could be met in the case of a legal act that is subsidiary to or so closely related to a
measure specifically identified, that the responding party can reasonably be found to
have received adequate notice of the scope of the claims asserted by the complaining
party" (emphasis added).

47. Therefore, any subsequent measure, in othe r words, any anti-dumping proceeding, modifying
the duty levels established in the Panel request w ith respect to the original anti-dumping orders
mentioned in the Annex would be closely related to the measures id entified therein and, thus, would
fall under the Panel's terms of reference in accord ance with Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. In this respect, the European Comm unities considers that the Panel request identifies
precisely the measures which are covered in this dispute.

D. C
ONCLUSIONS
48. From the foregoing, the European Communiti es submits that the United States' claim is
unfounded since the Panel request identifies the specif ic measures subject to this dispute, including
any subsequent modification of the measures ( i.e., the duty levels) described therein with respect to
the products and countries concerned.

IV. THE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS INCLUDED IN THE PANEL REQUEST
FALL WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE
49. The United States argues that four of the 14 allegedly new measures were preliminary results
from on-going proceedings in which no final determin ation had been made at the time of the Panel
request. For this additional reason, the United St ates considers that these four on-going proceedings
are not within the Panel's terms of reference, since Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does
not permit for the establishment of a Panel to review proceedings that are not final.
22

19 Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, (WT/DS27/R), para. 7.27.
20 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 140.
22 First Written Submission by the United States, para. 72.

A. P
RELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS ARE SUBSE QUENT MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE PANEL
REQUEST
50. The European Communities submits that this argument should be rejected. As explained
before, the Panel request describes as the matter con cerned the continued application of specific anti-
dumping duties resulting from the anti-dumping orders enumerated from I to XVIII in its Annex "as
calculated or maintained in place pursuant to the most recent [anti-dumping proceedings]". In other
words, it comprises any subsequent measure adopte d by the United States, including preliminary
determinations setting out the dut y levels (wrongly calculated by applying zeroing) and insofar as
those duties are still in place.

51. As mentioned before, subsequent measures a dopted by the United States with respect to the
anti-dumping proceedings contained in the Annex to th e Panel request fall within the Panel's terms of
reference. In order to avoid re petition, the European Communities re fer this Panel to the arguments
mentioned in Section II.C above.

52. Therefore, the European Communities consid ers that any act or decision taken by the
United States with respect to the du ties in place, even if it is not final, is covered by the Panel's terms
of reference.

B. T
HE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS ARE RELATED TO THE ANTI -DUMPING PROCEEDINGS
FALLING WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE
53. In addition, the European Communities note th at challenges to administrative decisions in
anti-dumping proceedings (even if they are not final in the sense that duties ha ve not been imposed),
which are related to the imposition of duties have b een admitted in previous cases. For instance, in
Mexico – HCFS,23 the Panel noted the following:

"A claim regarding the period for which a provisional measure was applied does not,
at first glance, constitute a challenge to the definitive anti-dumping duty in this
dispute. However, we consider that th e United States' claim under Article 7.4 of
the AD Agreement is nevertheless related to Mexico's definitive anti-dumping duty.
In this regard, we recall that, under Artic le 10 of the AD Agreement, a provisional
measure represents a basis under which a Member may, if the requisite conditions
are met, levy anti-dumping duties retroactively. At the same time, a Member may
not, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement,
retroactively levy a definitive anti-dumping duty for a period during which
provisional measures were not applied. Consequently, because the period of time
for which a provisional measure is applied is generally determinative of the period
for which a definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied retroactively, we consider
that a claim regarding the duration of a provisional measure relates to the definitive
anti-dumping duty.

(…) In our view, it would be incorrect to interpret Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement
in a manner which would leave Members without any possibility to pursue dispute
settlement in respect of a claim alleging a violation of a requirement of the
AD Agreement" (emphasis added).

54. The four on-going proceedings contained in the Panel request refer to one administrative
review
24 and three sunset reviews. 25 In all cases, as shown in the European Communities' First

23 Panel Report, Mexico – HCFS, (WT/DS132/R), paras 7.53-7.54.
24 Proceeding No. 35.
25 Proceedings No. 4, 38 and 47.

Written Submission, a final determination by the USDOC has been issued where dumping margins
have been calculated by applying zeroing. In th is respect, the European Communities is challenging
the duties already in place with respect to three cases 26 and any administrative step leading to the
modification or collection of the duty level with respect to the measures identified in the Panel
request. The preliminary determinations carried out by the USDOC have an impact in the final duty
level which may result from the latest proceeding and, thus, fall within the Panel's terms of reference.

C. C
ONCLUSIONS
55. From the foregoing, the European Communiti es submits that the United States' claim is
unfounded since the preliminary determinations identif ied in the Panel request are related to the anti-
dumping proceedings enumerated in its Annex and, therefore, fa ll within the Panel's terms of
reference.

V. FINAL REMARKS
56. In light of the above, the European Communiti es submits that the United States' request for a
preliminary ruling should be rejected entirely.

57. Firstly, the European Communities considers that the request for consultations and the request
for establishment of the Panel gave the United Stat es adequate notice of the scope of the matters
asserted by the European Communities in conformity with Articles 4.4, 4.7, 6.2 and 7.1 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding and Articl es 17.3, 17.4 and 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In any
event, the United States has not proven how the d escription of the measures contained therein has
affected its rights to a due process.

58. Secondly, the measures subject to this dispute were precisely identified in the Panel request in
accordance with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Contrary to
what the United States argues, th e Panel request clearly identifies 18 anti-dumping proceedings, by
reference to products and countries concerned, wher e duties are in place at a level higher than it
should be, since the United States applied zeroing when calculating the dumping margins.

59. Finally, all the challenged measures, includi ng the preliminary determinations by the USDOC
fall within the Panel's terms of reference.