COLOMBIA – MEASURES RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF TEXTILES, APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR AB-2016-1
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 7 June 2016
Document codes: WT/DS461/AB/R
Complainant: Panama
Respondent: Colombia
Third parties: Ecuador, El Salvador, EU, China, Guatemala, Honduras, U.S., Philippines
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. II:1(b), II:1(a), VIII:1, X:3(a)  GATT 1994

COLOMBIA – MEASURES RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF
TEXTILES, APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR
AB-2016-1
Report of the Appellate Body

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implem entation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Colombia's Customs Tariff Adopted pursuant to Decree No. 4927 of 26 December 2011, and
subsequently amended by, for purposes of this dispute, Decrees
No. 074 of 23 January 2013 and No. 456 of 28 February 2014
Customs Valuation
Agreement
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Decree No. 074 Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 074 of
23 January 2013, partially amending the Customs Tariff (Panel
Exhibits PAN-2 and COL-16)
Decree No. 456 Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 456 of
28 February 2014, partially amending the Customs Tariff (Panel
Exhibits PAN-3 and COL-17)
Decree No. 4927 Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 4927 of
26 December 2011, adopting the Customs Tariff and other
provisions (Panel Exhibit PAN-1, containing extracts of Chapters 61
through 64)
DIAN Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales
(National Customs and Excise Directorate)
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes
FATF Financial Action Task Force
f.o.b. free on board
FTA free trade agreement
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Panel Report Panel Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, , 27 November 2015
Plan Vallejo Special Import-Export Systems for Capital Goods and Spare Parts
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
UIAF Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero
(Information and Financial Analysis Unit)
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August
2010
WTO World Trade Organization

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel
Exhibit(s)
Description
COL-6 Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia, "Política Nacional Contra las Drogas"
(Ministry of the Interior and Justice, National Anti-Drug Policy)
COL-8 World Customs Organization, Illicit Trade Report 2012
COL-10 Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas
Nacionales, Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero de Colombia, "Tipologías
de Lavado de Activos Relacionadas con Contrabando", enero de 2006
(Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, National Customs and Excise Directorate,
and Information and Financial Analysis Unit, Money Laundering Typologies Related
to Smuggling, January 2006)
COL-11 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Trade-Based Money Laundering, 23 June 2006
COL-12 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade
Zones, March 2010
COL-19 Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, "Política Nacional Anti-Lavado de
(National Council for Economic and Social Policy, National Policy against Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 18 January 2013)
COL-27 Ministro de Justicia y del Derecho, Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia,
(Ministry of Justice and Law, Drugs Observatory, The Drug Problem in Colombia,
Actions and Results 2011-2013)
COL-30 Charts containing import data submitted by Colombia with its opening statement at
the first Panel meeting
COL-33 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, "Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010-2014"
(extractos)
(National Planning Department, National Development Plan 2010-2014 (extracts))
(extractos de los Capítulos 61-64)
(Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 4927 of 26 December
2011, adopting the Customs Tariff and other provisions) (extracts of Chapters 61
through 64))
PAN-2 /
COL-16
(Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 074 of 23 January 2013,
partially amending the Customs Tariff)
PAN-3 /
COL-17
(Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 456 of 28 February 2014,
partially amending the Customs Tariff)

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Financial Services Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, WT/DS453/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016
Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22
April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Canada – Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW,
adopted 4 August 2000, DSR 2000:IX, p. 4299
Canada – Periodicals Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449
Canada – Renewable Energy
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR
2013:I, p. 7
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004,
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001,
DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by India, WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, DSR 2003:III,
p. 965
EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005,
DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR
1998:I, p. 135
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July
1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3359
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R,
adopted 18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1
June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Japan – Agricultural
Products II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4391
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 3
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR
2000:I, p. 3
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January
2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV,
p. 2203
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R,
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,
p. 3779
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR
2009:III, p. 1291
US – COOL Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July
2012, DSR 2012:V, p. 2449
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX,
p. 4051
US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR
2012:I, p. 7
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, p. 589
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR
1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13
June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20 June
2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 9 May
2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417

APPELLATE BODY

Colombia – Measures Relating to the
Importation of Textiles, Apparel and
Footwear

Colombia, Appellant
Panama, Appellee

China, Third Participant
Ecuador, Third Participant
El Salvador, Third Participant
European Union, Third Participant
Guatemala, Third Participant
Honduras, Third Participant
Philippines, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

AB-2016-1

Appellate Body Division:

Zhang, Presiding Member
Servansing, Member
Van den Bossche, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Colombia appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the
Panel Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear
1
(Panel Report). The Panel was established on 25 September 2013 to consider a complaint by
Panama
2 with respect to a measure taken by Colombia affecting imports of textiles, apparel, and
footwear.
1.2. This dispute concerns the imposition by Co lombia of a "compound tariff" on the importation
of certain textiles, apparel, and footwear classified under Chapters 61 through 64 of Colombia's
Customs Tariff.
3 The compound tariff was introduced by Decr ee of the President of the Republic of
Colombia No. 074 of 23 January 20134 (Decree No. 074), which was subsequently "replace[d] and
repeal[ed]"5 by Decree of the President of the Republ ic of Colombia No. 456 of 28 February 2014 6
(Decree No. 456). Decree No. 456 entered into force on 30 March 2014 for a period of two years 7,
and was recently extended until 30 July 2016.8
1.3. The compound tariff is composed of an ad valorem levy, expressed as a percentage of the
customs value of goods, and a specific levy, expressed in units of currency per unit of
measurement.9 While the ad valorem component of the compound tariff is 10% for all products
regardless of their value, the specific component varies depending on the product and the declared
free on board (f.o.b.) price in respect of two thresholds: (i) for products classified in

1 WT/DS461/R, 27 November 2015.
2 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Panama, WT/DS461/3, 20 August 2013.
3 Panel Report, para. 2.1. The relevant chapters of Colombia's Customs Tariff are: (i) Chapter 61 –
"Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted"; (ii) Chapter 62 – "Articles of apparel and
clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted"; (iii) Chapter 63 – "Other made up textile articles; sets; worn
clothing and worn textile articles; rags"; and (iv) Chapter 64 – "Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such
4 Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 074 of 23 January 2013, partially amending
Colombia's Customs Tariff (Panel Exhibits PAN-2 and COL-16). Decree No. 074 came into effect on
1 March 2013 and remained in force for one year. (Panel Report, para. 7.31)
5 Panel Report, para. 7.37.
6 Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 456 of 28 February 2014, partially amending
Colombia's Customs Tariff (Panel Exhibits PAN-3 and COL-17).
7 Panel Report, paras. 2.7 and 7.31. For the products concerned, Decree No. 456 modifies Colombia's
Customs Tariff adopted pursuant to Decree No. 4927 of 26 December 2011 (Decree No. 4927), which
establishes ordinary customs duties in Colombia. (Decree of the President of the Republic of Colombia No. 4927
of 26 December 2011, adopting the Customs Tariff and other provisions. (See Panel Exhibit PAN-1, containing
extracts of Chapters 61 through 64) See also Panel Report, para. 7.141)
8 Colombia's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
9 Panel Report, para. 2.4.

Chapters 61, 62, and 63 (textiles and articles of apparel), and under tariff line 6406.10.00.00 of
Chapter 64 of the Customs Tariff (uppers of footwear and parts thereof, other than stiffeners), the
specific levy is US$5/kg when the declared f.o.b. price is US$10/kg or less, and US$3/kg when the
declared f.o.b. price is greater than US$10/kg; and (ii) for products classified in Chapter 64
(footwear), with the exception of those under heading 64.06 (parts of footwear), the specific levy
is US$5/pair when the declared f.o.b. price is US$7/pair or less, and US$1.75/pair when the
declared f.o.b. price is greater than US$7/pair.
10 When, in a single transaction, some goods under
the same subheading are imported at prices at or below and others at prices above the respective
threshold, the compound tariff payable is 10% ad valorem plus the highest specific levy applicable,
i.e. US$5/kg or US$5/pair, depending on the classification of the goods. 11 Finally, with respect to
certain imports of goods, the compound tariff does not apply.12
1.4. Panama claimed before the Panel that the compound tariff imposed by Colombia is
inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994) and Colombia's Schedule of Concessions.
13 Furthermore, in response to the defences
invoked by Colombia, Panama requested the Panel to reject the argument that the compound tariff
is justified under the general exceptions set out in Article XX(a) and Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994.
14 Finally, Panama requested the Panel to suggest, in accordance with Article 19.1 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), that
Colombia introduce a cap mechanism that would guarantee compliance with the relevant bound
tariffs, or, alternatively, that it revert to an ad valorem tariff system, without exceeding the bound
levels of 35% and 40% ad valorem depending on the product.
15
1.5. Colombia requested that the Panel reject Panama's claims in their entirety. 16 Colombia
contended that the compound tariff is a measure designed to combat illegal trade operations that
are not covered by Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 and that Panama had not presented any evidence
to support a prima facie case that the compound tariff results in a breach of the levels bound in
Colombia's Schedule of Concessions.
17 In the event that the Panel were to find that the measure at
issue is inconsistent with any of the obligations under Article II:1 cited by Panama, Colombia
maintained that the measure is justified under the general exceptions set out in Article XX(a) and
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. 18 Finally, Colombia requested the Panel to refrain from making
suggestions as to the manner in which Colombia could comply with a recommendation of the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to bring the measure at issue into conformity with its World Trade
Organization (WTO) obligations.
19
1.6. In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the WTO on 27 November 2015, the Panel
found that the measure at issue is structured and designed to be applied to all imports of the
products concerned, without distinguishing between "licit" and "illicit" trade, and that no provision
in Colombia's legal system bans the importation of goods whose declared prices are below the
thresholds established in the measure.
20 In the light of these findings, the Panel did not consider it
necessary to rule on Colombia's claim that the obligations contained in Article II:1(a) and (b) of
the GATT 1994 are not applicable to illicit trade.21
1.7. The Panel found that the compound tariff co nstitutes an ordinary customs duty that exceeds
the levels bound in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions, and is therefore inconsistent with the first
sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, an d accords treatment less favourable than that

10 Panel Report, para. 7.25.
11 Panel Report, para. 7.26.
12 The compound tariff does not apply to: (i) imports of goods from countries with which Colombia has
signed free trade agreements, in which subheadings subject to Decree No. 456 have been negotiated;
(ii) imports of goods entering certain regions of Colombia designated as Special Customs Regime Zones; and
(iii) imports of goods under the Special Import-Export Systems for Capital Goods and Spare Parts, also known
as the "Plan Vallejo" (i.e. production inputs, which are subsequently processed or used to manufacture goods
for export). (Panel Report, paras. 7.27-7.30)
13 Panel Report, para. 3.1.
14 Panel Report, para. 3.2.
15 Panel Report, para. 3.3.
16 Panel Report, para. 3.4.
17 Panel Report, para. 3.4.
18 Panel Report, para. 3.4.
19 Panel Report, para. 3.5.
20 Panel Report, para. 8.1.
21 Panel Report, para. 8.1.

envisaged in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions, in a manner inconsistent with Article II:1(a) of
the GATT 1994, in the following instances22:
a. for imports of products classified in Chapters 61, 62, and 63, and under tariff
line 6406.10.00.00 of Chapter 64 of Colombia's Customs Tariff:
i. the tariff consisting of an ad valorem component of 10% plus a specific component of
US$5/kg, when the f.o.b. import price is US$10/kg or less;
ii. the tariff consisting of an ad valorem component of 10% plus a specific component of
US$5/kg, when, in a single transaction, some products under the same subheading
are imported at f.o.b. prices above and othe rs at f.o.b. prices below the threshold of
US$10/kg; and
iii. with regard to subheading 6305.32, the tariff consisting of an ad valorem component
of 10% plus a specific component of US$3/kg, when the f.o.b. import price is greater
than US$10/kg but lower than US$12/kg; and
b. for imports of products classified under various tariff headings of Chapter 64 of
Colombia's Customs Tariff subject to the measure at issue:
i. the tariff consisting of an ad valorem component of 10% plus a specific component of
US$5/pair, when the f.o.b. import price is US$7/pair or less; and
ii. the tariff consisting of an ad valorem component of 10% plus a specific component of
US$5/pair, when, in a single transaction, some products under the same subheading
are imported at f.o.b. prices above and othe rs at f.o.b. prices below the threshold of
US$7/pair.
1.8. Thus, according to the Panel, the ad valorem equivalent of the compound tariff necessarily
exceeds the levels bound in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions in the following circumstances:
Products covered Declared f.o.b. price Formula for calculating the
compound tariff
Chapters 61, 62, and 63, and
Chapter 64, tariff line
6406.10.00.00
Prices of US$10/kg or less 10% ad valorem plus US$5/kg
Chapter 63, subheading
6305.32
Prices above US$10 and below
US$12/kg
10% ad valorem plus US$3/kg
Chapters 61, 62, and 63, and
Chapter 64, tariff line
6406.10.00.00
Some prices above and others
below US$10/kg when
imported under the same
subheading
10% ad valorem plus US$5/kg
Chapter 64, except for
heading 64.06
Prices of US$7/pair or less 10% ad valorem plus
US$5/pair
Chapter 64, except for
heading 64.06
Some prices above and others
below US$7/pair when
imported under the same
subheading
10% ad valorem plus
US$5/pair
Source: Panel Report, para. 7.187.
1.9. With respect to Colombia's recourse to cert ain of the general exceptions under Article XX of
the GATT 1994, the Panel found that Colombia had fa iled to demonstrate that the compound tariff
is a measure necessary to protect public morals within the meaning of Article XX(a), or necessary
to secure compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code within the meaning of
Article XX(d).
23 The Panel further found that, even assuming that Colombia had succeeded in

22 Panel Report, paras. 8.2-8.4.
23 Panel Report, paras. 8.5-8.6.

demonstrating that its measure is provisionally justified under Article XX(a) or Article XX(d), the
compound tariff is not applied in a manner th at meets the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XX.24
1.10. In accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommended that Colombia bring the
measure at issue into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994, but refrained from
making a suggestion as to the manner in which Colombia could do so.25
1.11. On 22 January 2016, Colombia notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the
DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal
interpretations developed by the Panel, and filed a Notice of Appeal and an appellant's submission
pursuant to Rule 20 and Rule 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review 26
(Working Procedures). On 9 February 2016, Panama filed an appellee's submission. 27
On 12 February 2016, the European Union filed a third participant's submission. 28 On the same
day, China, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ho nduras, the Philippines, and the United States
each notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.29
1.12. By letter of 22 March 2016, the Chair of th e Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB
that the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report in this appeal within the 60-day
period pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, or within the 90-day period pursuant to the same
provision.
30 The Chair of the Appellate Body explained that this was due to a number of factors,
including the overlap in the composition of the Divisions in appeals concurrently pending before
the Appellate Body, constraints resulting from the need for Spanish-speaking staff of which the
Appellate Body Secretariat has only a limited num ber, and the need to translate documents from
Spanish into English for non-Spanish-speaking Appellate Body Members and staff. On
11 April 2016, the Chair of the Appellate Body informed the Chair of the DSB that the Report in
these proceedings would be circulated no later than 7 June 2016.
31
1.13. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 4-5 April 2016. The participants and
five third participants (China, the European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States)
made opening and/or closing statements. The part icipants and third participants responded to
questions posed by the Members of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal.
1.14. By letter of 1 June 2016, the participants and third participants were informed that, in
accordance with Rule 15 of the Working Procedures , the Appellate Body had notified the Chairman
of the DSB of its decision to authorize Mrs Yuej iao Zhang, the Presiding Member of the Division
hearing this appeal, to complete the disposition of this appeal even though her second term as
Appellate Body Member was due to expire before the completion of the appellate proceedings.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the participan ts are reflected in the executive summaries of
their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.
32 The Notice of Appeal and the executive
summaries of the participants' written submissions are contained, respectively, in Annexes A and B
of the Addendum to this Report.33

24 Panel Report, para. 8.7.
25 Panel Report, paras. 8.9-8.10.
26 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
27 Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
28 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
29 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.
30 WT/DS461/7.
31 WT/DS461/8.
32 Pursuant to the Appellate Body Communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in Appellate
Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)
33 WT/DS461/AB/R/Add.1.

3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of the European Union, as third participant, are reflected in the executive
summary of its written submission provided to the Appellate Body 34, contained in Annex C of the
Addendum to this Report.35
4 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
4.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal:
a. with respect to Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty to make an objective
assessment of the matter pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, including an objective
assessment of the applicability of the relevant covered agreements, in concluding
that it was not necessary to issue a finding as to whether or not the obligations of
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 apply to what Colombia considers to be
illicit trade; and
ii. whether Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 applies to what Colombia
considers to be illicit trade; and whether the Panel erred in the application of
Article II:1(b) in finding that the measure did not incorporate a legislative ceiling;
b. with respect to Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel erred in the interpretation and application of Article XX(a) in
finding that Colombia failed to demonstrate that the measure is "necessary to
protect public morals", and, in particular:
 whether the Panel erred by imposing an incorrect legal standard in its
analysis of whether the measure at issue is "designed" to protect public
morals; and
 whether the Panel erred in its analysis of whether the measure is "necessary"
to protect public morals by imposing an incorrect legal standard in assessing
the contribution of the measure towards its objective, and by failing to
undertake a proper weighing and balancing of the relevant factors; and
ii. whether the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty to make an objective
assessment of the matter pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in its assessment of
certain evidence provided by Colombia;
c. with respect to Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel erred in the interpretation and application of Article XX(d), for
the same reasons it erred in the interpretation and application of Article XX(a), in
finding that Colombia failed to demonstrate that the measure is "designed" and
"necessary" to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent
with the GATT 1994; and
d. with respect to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994:
i. whether the Panel erred in the interpreta tion and application of the chapeau of
Article XX, and acted inconsistently with its duty to make an objective assessment
of the matter pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, in finding that the measure is not
applied in a manner that meets the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.

34 Pursuant to the Appellate Body Communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in Appellate
Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)
35 WT/DS461/AB/R/Add.1.

5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994
5.1. Colombia appeals the Panel's finding that it was "not necessary for the Panel to issue a
finding on whether or not the obligations of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 can be extended to 'illicit
trade'".
36 Colombia argues that, in reaching this finding, the Panel failed to make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, as required un der Article 11 of the DSU. In the event that we
reverse this finding of the Panel, Colombia requests us to complete the legal analysis and find
that: (i) Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 does not apply to illicit trade; and (ii) because
imports priced below the thresholds set out in the measure at issue are imported at artificially low
prices that do not reflect market conditions, the compound tariff does not violate Article II:1(a)
and (b) of the GATT 1994.
37
5.2. We begin by recalling the Panel's findings concerning Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994
before turning to address Colombia's claim under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.1.1 The Panel's findings
5.3. The Panel first addressed Colombia's argument that "Article II of the GATT 1994 only 'covers
licit trade and cannot cover operations where ther e are indications that they are being conducted
at artificially low prices in order to launder money'." 38 In this connection, Colombia asserted that
the terms "commerce" and "importation" in Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, respectively,
refer only to licit trade and cannot be extended to trade operations conducted for the purpose of
laundering money or for other illicit purposes.
5.4. The Panel began its analysis by noting that Colombia's argument would be pertinent only if
the Panel were to make two determinations: (i) that the trade affected by the measure at issue is
illicit trade; and (ii) that the obligations contained in Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 do
not apply to illicit trade.
39
5.5. Turning to the issue of whether the trade affe cted by the measure is illicit, the Panel pointed
out that the covered agreements contain no definition of "illicit trade". 40 Thereafter, the Panel
reviewed the definitions of the concept of illicit trade in various international instruments furnished
by Colombia.41 The Panel observed that the factor common to the various definitions of illicit trade
cited by Colombia is that they all refer to "illegal" activities, i.e. "activities that have been
prohibited by law".
42 However, the Panel added that the compound tariff applies to all imports of
products classified in Chapters 61, 62, 63, and 64 of Colombia's Customs Tariff (except for those
classified under some tariff lines of heading 64.06). The Panel pointed out that the "[i]mposition of
the compound tariff on imports is not preceded by any declaration on the part of the judicial or
administrative authorities that the operation constitutes an unlawful act, nor is it even associated
with the commission of any unlawful act."
43 Moreover, the Panel noted that Colombia had not
identified any legal rule prohibiting the importation of goods at prices lower than the thresholds
determined in the measure at issue. Therefore, in the Panel's view, "the compound tariff is applied
to all imports of the products in question, without distinguishing as to whether the operations are
lawful or unlawful" and "is not structured or desi gned to apply solely to operations which have
been classified as 'illicit trade'".
44
5.6. The Panel also noted that the compound tariff does not apply to: (i) imports from countries
with which Colombia has signed trade agreements in which Colombia's Customs Tariff subheadings
subject to the measure at issue have been negotiated; (ii) goods entering Special Customs Regime

37 Colombia's Notice of Appeal, para. 7.
38 Panel Report, para. 7.59 (quoting Colombia's first written submission to the Panel, para. 67; and
39 Panel Report, paras. 7.91 and 7.104.
40 Panel Report, para. 7.93.
41 Panel Report, paras. 7.94-7.97.
42 Panel Report, para. 7.105.
43 Panel Report, para. 7.105.
44 Panel Report, para. 7.106.

Zones; and (iii) goods entering Colombian territory under the Special Import-Export Systems for
Capital Goods and Spare Parts (Plan Vallejo). In the Panel's opinion, this supports the conclusion
that "in Colombia's legal system there is no rule prohibiting or restricting what Colombia considers
'illicit trade', that is, the import of goods whose declared prices are below the thresholds provided
for in Decree No. 456".
45
5.7. For these reasons, the Panel concluded that "a finding as to whether or not the obligations in
Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 are applicable to 'illicit trade' would be merely
theoretical and would be neither necessary nor of practical use in achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter placed before [the] Panel." 46 As a result, the Panel considered it
unnecessary to issue a finding on whether or not the obligations of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994
extend to illicit trade.
5.8. The Panel then examined whether the compound tariff exceeds the bound rates in Colombia's
Schedule of Concessions. The Panel noted that the "complex feature"
47 of the present dispute is
that the bound tariff rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions are expressed in ad valorem
terms, whereas the compound tariff contains both an ad valorem and a specific component. In
order to compare the tariff treatment accorded under the compound tariff with the bound rates
established in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions, the Panel relied on a "break-even price" for
each tariff subheading. 48 Having reviewed the arithmetical calculations furnished by Panama in
respect of each scenario of the application of the compound tariff, the Panel concluded that
Panama's calculations were correct and that, in the instances identified in the Panel Report, the
compound tariff " necessarily exceeds the levels bound in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions of
35% and 40% ad valorem (depending on the subheading)".
49
5.9. The Panel also examined whether, as argued by Colombia, the measure at issue incorporates
a legislative ceiling that prevents the bound tariff rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions
from being exceeded.50 Referring to the Appellate Body report in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel,
the Panel noted that it is possible for a Member to establish a legislative ceiling or cap that would
ensure that, even if the type of duty applied diffe rs from the type provided for in that Member's
Schedule of Concessions, its ad valorem equivalent would not exceed the bound rates provided for
in that Schedule.51
5.10. However, in the Panel's view, the legislative ceiling referred to by Colombia applies only to
imports at prices above the prescribed thresholds. Therefore, it would not apply to other imports,
in particular, to imports priced below the thresh olds or to imports under the same subheading,
when, in a single transaction, some imports are priced above and others are priced below the
relevant threshold.
52 Moreover, the Panel recalled that, even with respect to imports entering at
prices above the thresholds, it had found that, at least in the case of imports classified under
heading 6305.32, at prices higher than US$10/kg but lower than US$12/kg, the compound tariff
exceeds the bound tariff rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions. As a result, the Panel was
not convinced by Colombia's argument that the measure incorporates a legislative ceiling that
would prevent the compound tariff from resulting in duties that exceed Colombia's bound rates.
53
5.11. The Panel consequently concluded that, in the instances identified in the Panel Report, the
compound tariff necessarily exceeds the bound tari ff rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions
and is therefore inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994.54

45 Panel Report, para. 7.107.
46 Panel Report, para. 7.108.
47 Panel Report, para. 7.145.
48 Panel Report, paras. 7.146-7.148.
50 Panel Report, para. 7.182 (referring to Colombia's first written submission to the Panel,
paras. 63-64).
51 Panel Report, para. 7.184 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel,
para. 54).
52 Panel Report, para. 7.185.
53 Panel Report, para. 7.186.
54 Panel Report, paras. 7.189 and 7.193-7.194.

5.1.2 Whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU
5.12. Colombia contends that, in stating that it was not necessary for the Panel to make a finding
on whether or not the obligations of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 extend to illicit trade, the Panel
failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required under Article 11 of the
DSU, including an objective assessment of the app licability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements. 55 We note that, in response to questioning at the oral hearing, Colombia
explained that, when it uses the term "illicit trade", it is referring to transactions at prices at or
below the thresholds incorporated in the measure at issue for which there is a very high chance
that such transactions are being used for money laundering purposes.56
5.13. For Colombia, "[t]he only conceivabl e way the Panel could have … escape[d] the
interpretative question was if it had found … that none of the imports subject to [the measure]
involved illicit trade." 57 However, Colombia points out that the Panel never made such a finding.
Instead, in Colombia's view, in some of its statements, "the Panel acknowledged that imports
subject to Decree 456 could involve illicit trade"
58, and therefore had to examine whether or not
Article II:1(a) and (b) applies to illicit trade. Colombia further submits that "no prior panel has
decided that it would only proceed with the interpretation [of a particular provision] after having
affirmatively determined that the challenged measure only covered the type of conduct that was
allegedly excluded from that provision"
59, and that the Panel "improperly dodged its interpretative
function by first concluding that the challenged measure did not cover solely illicit trade". 60 In
Colombia's view, the Panel's decision not to address the interpretative issue before it constitutes
false judicial economy and a violation of Colombia's due process rights.
61
5.14. Colombia further points out that the Panel failed to examine the relevance of the thresholds
incorporated into the measure at issue, which, as Colombia had argued before the Panel, "reflected
a distinction between licit imports, on the one hand, and imports that Colombia had determined
were imported at artificially low prices to launder money, on the other hand". 62 Moreover,
Colombia contends that, in concluding that there is no rule under Colombian law prohibiting the
importation of goods at prices lower than the thresholds determined in the measure, the Panel
failed to take into account Colombia's argument that Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code
prohibits a broad array of conduct, including money laundering.
63 Finally, Colombia takes issue
with the Panel's statement that the fact that imports from free trade agreement (FTA) partners or
under the Plan Vallejo may be subject to lower tariffs upon entering Colombia "supports the
conclusion that in Colombia's legal system there is no rule prohibiting or restricting what Colombia
considers 'illicit trade'."
64
5.15. In response, Panama argues that no provision in the covered agreements precluded the
Panel from proceeding in the manner it did. 65 Moreover, Panama asserts that the obligation of a
panel to clarify the scope of existing provisions arises to the extent that such clarification may be

55 Colombia's Notice of Appeal, para. 5; appellant's submission, paras. 49-50.
56 The Panel noted that, in some parts of its statements before the Panel, Colombia referred to illicit
trade as "imports effected at artificially low prices which are used for money laundering", whereas, in other
parts of its statements, Colombia referred to "the 'high risk' of imports at below-threshold prices being used for
money laundering". (Panel Report, para. 7.352 (quoting Colombia's responses to Panel questions No. 1,
para. 4, and No. 6, para. 14; and referring to Colombia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 35, 60,
66, 73, and 93, respectively))
57 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 41.
58 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 41 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.359, 7.366, 7.375,
and 7.434).
59 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 44. (emphasis original)
60 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 47. Colombia also refers to Articles 3.2 and 12.7 of the DSU
in support of its claim under Article 11 of the DSU. (Ibid., para. 38)
61 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 52-61.
62 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 65 (referring to Colombia's first written submission to the
Panel, paras. 30-35 and 66-67; and second written submission to the Panel, paras. 30-37).
63 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 72 (referring to Colombia's second written submission to the
Panel, paras. 41-42).
65 Panama points out that nothing in Articles 3.2, 11, and 12.7 of the DSU requires a panel to resolve
each issue raised by a party without being able to assess whether or not the resolution of that issue will assist
in securing a positive solution to a dispute. (Panama's appellee's submission, paras. 3.15-3.16)

pertinent in the light of the specific facts of the dispute. 66 In Panama's view, having found that the
measure at issue is neutral in terms of the lawf ulness or unlawfulness of the trade affected, the
Panel correctly concluded that it was unnecessary for it to address the interpretative issue.67
5.16. We note that Article 11 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
Article 11
Function of Panels
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
5.17. The Appellate Body remarked in US – Hot-Rolled Steel that Article 11 of the DSU imposes
upon panels a comprehensive obligation to make an "objective assessment of the matter", which
embraces "all aspects of a panel's examination of the 'matter', both factual and legal".
68 Thus,
panels are required to make an "objective assessment of the facts", of the "applicability" of the
covered agreements, and of the "conformity" of the measure at issue with the covered
agreements.
69 With respect to "the applicability of … the relevant covered agreements", a panel is
required to conduct an objective assessment of whether the obligations in the covered
agreements, with which an inconsistency is claimed, are relevant and applicable to the case at
hand. The touchstone of this obligation is that a panel's assessment must be "objective".
5.18. With regard to a panel's assessment of the facts of the case, Article 11 requires a panel to
"consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure
that its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence".
70 In addressing a panel's
assessment of the facts, the Appellate Body has stated that a panel is "expected to provide
reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent reasoning". 71 We would also expect a panel to
provide reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent reasoning when assessing the
applicability of the covered agreements.
5.19. As noted, Colombia's claim under Article 11 of the DSU is that the Panel failed to make an
objective assessment of the applicability of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 to what Colombia
considers to be illicit trade. We note that, ordinarily, in structuring its analysis, a panel would first
identify which provisions of the covered agreements are applicable in the light of its terms of
reference, and would then interpret those provisions as appropriate. In this dispute, the Panel
stated that Colombia's argument that the obligations under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994 do not extend to illicit trade "would on ly be pertinent if the Panel determine[d] as a
factual issue that, as asserted by Colombia, the trade affected by the measure at issue is 'illicit
trade'".
72 Thus, the Panel appears to have considered that it would be required to address the
interpretative issue under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 only if it were to find that the
trade affected by the measure was illicit trade.

66 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.16.
67 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.17; response to questioning at the oral hearing.
68 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54.
69 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54.
70 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.178 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 185, in turn referring to Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones,
paras. 132-133; Australia – Salmon, para. 266; EC – Asbestos, para. 161; EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 –
India), paras. 170, 177, and 181; EC – Sardines, para. 299; EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 125;
Japan – Apples, para. 221; Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 141-142; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages,
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 313; and EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 258).
71 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), fn 618 to para. 293. At the same
time, we note that a panel is not obligated to consider each and every argument put forward by the parties in
support of their respective claims, as long as it completes an objective assessment of the matter before it, in
accordance with Article 11 of the DSU. (See Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large
Civil Aircraft, para. 894; Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 125; and EC – Poultry,
para. 135)
72 Panel Report, para. 7.104.

5.20. As a general principle, panels have a degr ee of discretion to structure the order of their
analysis as they see fit, while ensuring "that th ey proceed on the basis of a properly structured
analysis to interpret the substantive provisions at issue". 73 The fact that a panel first seeks to
determine the coverage of the measure at issue in order to assess whether it is necessary to
engage with an interpretative question is not, in itself, incorrect. Indeed, a panel may refrain from
ruling on the scope of a particular provision in circumstances where it establishes that the measure
does not even address the conduct that a particular party alleges is outside the scope of that
provision. In doing so, however, a panel must not structure its analysis in a manner that prevents
it from acting in accordance with its duty to conduct an objective assessment of the matter, as
required under Article 11 of the DSU, including, where implicated, an objective assessment of the
applicability of the relevant covered agreements.
5.21. Colombia also argues that the Panel's obligation to make an objective assessment of the
applicability of Article II:1(a) and (b) in this disp ute derives from Articles 3.2, 11, and 12.7 of the
DSU, and that, by failing to resolve the interpretative issue before it, the Panel failed to fulfil its
obligations under these provisions.
74 We note that, although in its appellant's submission Colombia
refers to Articles 3.2 and 12.7 of the DSU in support of its claim under Article 11 of the DSU, it has
not referred to these provisions in its Notice of Appeal. We therefore do not understand Colombia
to have raised separate claims of error under these provisions and do not address them as such.
5.22. We recall that, at the outset of its analysis, the Panel explained that it was going to
determine whether or not "the trade affected by the measure at issue is 'illicit trade'".
75 In doing
so, the Panel stated the following:
The factor common to the various definitions of "illicit trade" cited by Colombia is that
they all refer to "illegal" activities, that is, activities that have been prohibited by law.
In the light of the actual terms of the meas ure that is the subject of this dispute,
however, the compound tariff applies to all imports of products classified in
Chapters 61, 62, 63 and 64 of Colombia's Customs Tariff (except for some tariff lines
of heading 64.06). For each category of product, the compound tariff has two different
levels, one that is lower (10% ad valorem and US$3/kg or 10% ad valorem and
US$1.75/pair, depending on the products concerned) and one that is higher (10%
ad valorem and US$5/kg or 10% ad valorem and US$5/pair, depending on the
products concerned). In the specific case of the highest levels of the compound tariff,
which correspond to some of the instances identified by Panama as inconsistent with
Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the compound tariff applies to all
imports of the products concerned when they are effected at prices below the
thresholds provided for in Decree No. 456. Imposition of the compound tariff on
imports is not preceded by any declaration on the part of the judicial or administrative
authorities that the operation constitutes an unlawful act, nor is it even associated
with the commission of any unlawful act. Moreover, Colombia has not identified any
legal rule prohibiting the import of goods at prices lower than the thresholds
determined in Decree No. 456.
76
5.23. On this basis, the Panel concluded that the compound tariff applies to all imports without
distinguishing whether or not they are lawful, and that the measure at issue "is not structured or
designed to apply solely to operations which have been classified as 'illicit trade'".77
5.24. Colombia argues that the Panel failed to e n g a g e w i t h C o l o m b i a ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t " t h e
thresholds incorporated into Decree 456 reflected a distinction between licit imports, on the one
hand, and imports that Colombia had determined were imported at artificially low prices to launder
money, on the other hand."
78 Colombia further points out that, in reaching its conclusion that "in
Colombia's legal system there is no rule prohibiting or restricting what Colombia considers 'illicit

73 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 127. See also para. 126.
74 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 38.
75 Panel Report, para. 7.104.
76 Panel Report, para. 7.105.
77 Panel Report, para. 7.106.
78 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 65 (referring to Colombia's first written submission to the
Panel, paras. 30-35 and 66-67; and second written submission to the Panel, paras. 30-37).

trade'"79, the Panel failed to consider the relevance of Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code. 80
That provision, as Colombia noted, criminalizes money laundering activities.81
5.25. Although the Panel did not expressly analyse the implications of the above arguments for its
understanding of the measure at issue, we note that the Panel did subsequently address similar
arguments in analysing Colombia's defences under Article XX of the GATT 1994. As we discuss
further below, the Panel was of the view that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that import
transactions priced at or below the thresholds set out in the measure were necessarily at artificially
low prices and were being undervalued for money laundering purposes.
82 This conclusion is in
keeping with the Panel's finding, in the context of its analysis under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994,
that the compound tariff "applie[s] to all imports of the products in question, without
distinguishing as to whether the operations are lawful or unlawful".
83 Moreover, although the Panel
did not refer to Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code in this section of its Report, it subsequently
remarked that "there is no indication that the importation of products at prices below the
thresholds established in Decree No. 456 automatically results in the imposition of some other
type of measure (distinct from the compound tariff ) or any particular follow-up of the products or
importers involved."
84 This observation supports the Panel's understanding that, while Article 323
of Colombia's Criminal Code prohibits money laundering, there is no rule in Colombia's legal
system prohibiting or restricting what Colombia considers illicit trade. In addition, this observation
supports the Panel's conclusion that no finding of illegality is required in respect of an import
transaction priced at or below the relevant thre shold before applying the compound tariff. Thus,
we do not consider that the Panel would have reached a different conclusion had it expressly
referred to Colombia's assertions regarding the thresholds set out in the measure at issue, or to
any consequence that the importation of goods priced at or below such thresholds would have
under Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code.
5.26. However, we disagree with the Panel's conclusion that it was not necessary for it to
interpret Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 because the compound tariff is not structured or
designed to apply "solely to operations which have been classified as 'illicit trade'".
85 The Panel's
statement that the measure does not apply "solely" to illicit trade operations implies that the
measure applies, or could apply, to some transactions classified by Colombia as illicit trade. 86 The
fact that there is no legal rule establishing that every transaction priced at or below the thresholds
is deemed an illegal or illicit transaction does not preclude the possibility that some such
transactions nevertheless involve what Colombia considers to be illicit trade. In our view, the
Panel's finding that the compound tariff does not distinguish between licit and illicit trade further
indicates that the measure does or could cover what Colombia considers to be illicit trade.
5.27. In these circumstances, we do not consider that the Panel could have refrained from ruling
on the interpretative issue before it simply because the challenged measure did not "solely" cover
the type of transactions that Colombia maintained was outside the scope of the applicable
provision. Rather, given that this statement of the Panel implies that the measure at issue applies,
or could apply, to some transactions considered by Colombia to be illicit trade, the Panel was, in
our view, required to address the interpretative issue before it pertaining to the scope of

79 Panel Report, para. 7.107.
80 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 72. Colombia notes that "[t]he fact that the Criminal Code
does not specifically define imports below the thresholds as a criminal act is immaterial. The fact remains that
use of imports at artificially low prices to launder money falls within the offense of 'money laundering' and may
be subject to criminal prosecution." (Ibid., para. 73)
81 Panel Report, para. 7.335 (referring to Colombia's second written submission to the Panel, para. 41;
and joint study prepared by Colombia's Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, National Customs and Excise
Directorate, and Information and Financial Analysis Unit, Money Laundering Typologies Related to Smuggling,
January 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-10), p. 8). See also Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 72.
82 See infra, paras. 5.53-5.55.
83 Panel Report, para. 7.106.
84 Panel Report, para. 7.390.
85 Panel Report, para. 7.106.
86 We further note that, as discussed in section 5.2.2 of this Report, the Panel subsequently made
findings in its Report that indicated that the measure at issue could apply to some products that are imported
at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes. (See infra, paras. 5.85-5.89)

Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. 87 The Panel's conclusion that it was not necessary for it
to interpret Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 does not follow logically from its previous finding
indicating that the measure applies, or could appl y, to some illicit trade. We therefore consider
that the Panel did not provide coherent reasoning, and that the basis upon which it refrained from
interpreting Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 was flawed.
5.28. We therefore find that the Panel acted inco nsistently with its duty under Article 11 of the
DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter, including an objective assessment of the
applicability of the relevant covered agreements, in finding that it was unnecessary for the Panel to
interpret the scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. Consequently, we reverse the
Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.108 and 8.1 of it s Report, that it was unnecessary for the Panel to
issue a finding as to whether or not Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 applies to illicit trade.
5.1.3 Completion of the legal analysis
5.29. Having reversed the Panel's finding that it was unnecessary for the Panel to interpret the
scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, we turn to Colombia's request that we complete
the legal analysis and find that Article II:1(a) and (b) does not apply to illicit trade and that,
because imports priced at or below the thresholds are imported at artificially low prices that do not
reflect market conditions, the compound tariff does not violate Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994.
88
5.30. At the outset, we note that, on a number of occasions, the Appellate Body has completed
the legal analysis with a view to facilitating the prompt settlement and effective resolution of the
dispute.
89 The Appellate Body has completed the legal analysis when sufficient factual findings by
the panel and undisputed facts on the panel record allowed it to do so. 90 In addition to the lack of
factual findings by the panel and undisputed facts on the panel record, the reasons that have
prevented the Appellate Body from completing the analysis include "the complexity of the issues,
the absence of full exploration of the issues before the panel, and, consequently, considerations for
parties' due process rights".
91
5.31. For Colombia, the term "commerce" in Article II:1(a) and the term "importation" in
Article II:1(b) do not cover what Colombia considers to be illicit trade. 92 Colombia argues that
other provisions of the covered agreements, in particular, Article VII:2(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994 and Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Cus toms Valuation Agreement), provide contextual
support for its interpretation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994.
93 Colombia also contends that its
interpretation of the terms in Article II:1 is consistent with the object and purpose of the
GATT 1994, as reflected in the preamble.
94 In support of its interpretation, Colombia refers to the

87 At the same time, we do not agree with Colombia that the Panel's decision not to address the
interpretative issue before it constitutes judicial economy. The Panel did not refrain from interpreting
Article II:1(a) and (b) due to its disposition of another legal claim. Rather, having found that the compound
tariff is not designed or structured to apply solely to illicit trade, the Panel considered that it was not necessary
for it to proceed to interpret Article II:1(a) and (b). (Panel Report, para. 7.108)
88 Colombia's Notice of Appeal, para. 7.
89 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon, paras. 117-136; US – Wheat Gluten,
paras. 80-92; and Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras. 43-52.
90 See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Gasoline, p. 19, DSR 1996:I, p. 18; Canada – Periodicals,
p. 24, DSR 1997:I, p. 469; Australia – Salmon, paras. 117-118; US – Lamb, paras. 150 and 172;
US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 352; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft,
paras. 1174-1178; and US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), paras. 1272-1274. The Appellate Body did not
complete the legal analysis in situations where the factual findings by the panel and undisputed facts on the
panel record were insufficient for the Appellate Body to conduct its own analysis. (See e.g. Appellate Body
Reports, EC – Hormones, para. 251; US – Upland Cotton, para. 693; US – Zeroing (EC), paras. 228 and 243;
EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 286; US – Continued Zeroing, para. 194; US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), para. 537; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 736,
91 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy/Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, para. 5.224
(referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, fn 537 to para. 339).
92 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 100 and 102. We recall that, for Colombia, transactions at
artificially low prices used for money laundering purposes constitute illicit trade.
93 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 103-106.
94 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 107.

doctrine of abus de droit and to several decisions of investment tribunals, which have refused to
extend the protection of bilateral and regional investment treaties to illegal investments.95
5.32. Panama responds that the terms "comme rce" and "importation" are not subject to any
qualification and that there is therefore no basis in the text of Article II:1(a) and (b) for excluding
from its coverage any particular type of import transaction. 96 Moreover, for Panama, Article VII:2
of the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation Agreement do not provide context for the
interpretation proposed by Colombia since imports with different declared values do not cease to
be subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994.
97 Panama points out that Colombia's interpretation
of Article II:1 seeks to curtail the disciplines of the covered agreements with respect to what a
Member unilaterally considers to be illicit trade, and that such an interpretation would be contrary
to the purpose of the GATT 1994 of reducing ba rriers to international trade and eliminating
discrimination. Finally, in Panama's view, Colombia's concern that certain imports could be used to
commit unlawful acts could be addressed under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
98
5.33. We note that Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 provides, in relevant part:
Article II
Schedules of Concessions
1. (a) Each Member shall accord to the commerce of the other Members treatment
no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.
 (b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any Member,
which are the products of territories of other Members, shall, on their
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the
terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from
ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those
imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily
required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing
territory on that date.
5.34. Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 serves the im portant function of preventing Members from
applying duties that exceed the bound rates agreed to in tariff negotiations and incorporated into
their Schedules of Concessions.
99 Article II:1(a) provides that a Member shall accord to the
"commerce" of other Members treatment no less favourable than that provided for in its Schedule.
The term "commerce" is defined as referring broadly to the exchange of goods such that, in this
provision, the "commerce" of a Member should be understood to refer to all such exchanges of
that Member.
100 W e d o n o t s e e t h a t t h e s c o p e o f t h i s t e r m , a s i t a p p e a r s i n A r t i c l e I I : 1 ( a ) , i s
qualified in respect of the nature or type of "commerce", or the reason or function of the
transaction, in a manner that excludes what Colombia considers to be illicit trade.
5.35. The first sentence of Article II:1(b) provides that products described in a Member's
Schedule shall, on their importation into that Member's territory, be exempt from ordinary

95 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 109-110. With regard to the doctrine of abus de droit,
Colombia explains that the behaviour of "[e]xporters that demand that tariffs not exceed the bindings, while
colluding in illicit trade by providing a false invoice with an artificially low price, results in the abusive exercise
of rights." (Ibid., para. 109)
96 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.47.
97 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.48.
98 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.47.
99 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47.
100 The term "commerce" is defined as "buying and selling; the exchange of merchandise or services,
especially on a large scale". (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University
Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 462)

customs duties in excess of those set out in the Schedule. 101 Article II:1(b) thus provides that the
products described in a Member's Schedule may not, "on their importation", be subject to ordinary
customs duties, or other duties or charges, that exceed that Member's bound tariff rates. The term
"importation" refers generally to the action of bringing in goods from another country.
102 Thus, as
with the term "commerce", we do not see that the scope of the term "importation" is qualified in
respect of the nature or type of imports, or the reason or function of the transaction, in a manner
that excludes what Colombia considers to be illicit trade.
5.36. Moreover, we note that Article II:2 of the GATT 1994 provides immediate context for the
obligations contained in Article II:1 by setting out instances in which the obligations of Article II:1
do not apply. Article II:2 provides that nothing in Article II, including Article II:1(b), shall prevent
a Member from imposing on the importation of a product: (i) a charge equivalent to an internal tax
imposed consistently with Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 in respect of a like domestic product;
(ii) an anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994;
or (iii) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered. The three instances
identified in Article II:2, in which the obligations set out in Article II:1 do not apply, constitute a
closed list. In our view, the fact that Article II:2 sets out a closed list of instances in which bound
tariff rates may be exceeded provides further support for a reading of Article II:1 that does not
exclude what Colombia considers to be illicit trade.
5.37. Colombia further asserts that Article VII:2(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 and the Customs
Valuation Agreement provide contextual support for its interpretation of Article II:1 of the
GATT 1994. Specifically, for Colombia, goods imported at artificially low prices with the purpose of
laundering money cannot be considered to reflect "actual value" under Article VII:2 of the
GATT 1994, or "transaction value" under Article 1.1 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.
103 In
response, Panama points out that Article V II:2 of the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation
Agreement do not provide context for the interpretation proposed by Colombia since imports with
different declared values do not cease to be subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994.104
5.38. Article VII:2(a) of the GATT 1994 provides that the value of an imported product for
customs purposes should be based on the "actual value" of the imported merchandise, and should
not be based on "arbitrary or fictitious values". The "actual value" is further defined in
Article VII:2(b) as "the price at which, at a ti me and place determined by the legislation of the
country of importation, such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of
trade under fully competitive conditions."
105 The general valuation principles set out in Article VII
of the GATT 1994 are further elaborated in the Cu stoms Valuation Agreement. Article 1.1 of the
Customs Valuation Agreement stipulates that "[t]he customs value of imported goods shall be the
transaction value, that is the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to
the country of importation adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Article 8" of the Customs
Valuation Agreement. 106 Where it is not possible to determine the customs value of imported

101 In Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, the Appellate Body stated in respect of the relationship between
Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b) that "[p]aragraph (b) prohibits a specific kind of practice that will always be
inconsistent with paragraph (a): that is, the application of ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided
for in the Schedule." (Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45) We note that the
term "importation" also appears in Article II:1(b), second sentence, and Article II:1(c) of the GATT 1994.
102 The term "importation" is defined as "the action of importing or bringing in something, specifically
goods from another country". (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford
University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 1339)
103 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 105-106.
104 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 3.48.
105 We further note that the Ad Note to paragraph 2 of Article VII provides that the "actual value" may
be represented by the invoice price, plus any non-included charges for legitimate costs that are proper
elements of actual value, and any abnormal discount or other reduction from the ordinary competitive price.
106 Article 1.1(a)-(d) of the Customs Valuation Agreement further specifies circumstances in which
customs value need not be based on transaction value. In particular, the transaction value may not be
acceptable when there are certain restrictions on the disposition or use of the goods by the buyer; the sale or
price is subject to some condition or consideration for which a value cannot be determined with respect to the
goods being valued; some part of the proceeds accrue to the seller; or where, under certain circumstances, the
buyer and seller are related.

goods based on the transaction value, the Customs Valuation Agreement provides for
five alternative valuation methods.107
5.39. While Article VII:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that the value of a product for customs
purposes should be based on "actual value" and not on "arbitrary or fictitious values" or sales on
other than "fully competitive conditions" 108, these provisions do not support a reading of
Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 that excludes from its disciplines transactions that are at "artificially
low prices", "do not result from market operations", or are otherwise classified as illicit trade. 109
Rather, Article VII:2 of the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation Agreement have a different
focus than Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 in that they set out conditions in which customs
authorities may adjust or reject the declared value of goods and instead rely upon alternative
methods for determining the value of those goods for customs purposes. Thus, where a declared
value of a transaction is rejected because it is unduly low, the result under the Customs Valuation
Agreement would be that the value for customs purp oses would be adjusted or determined in an
alternative manner. This value would subsequently serve as the basis for any imposition of a tariff
in accordance with Article II:1 of the GATT 1994. The existence of such alternative methods for
determining the customs value under these provisions confirms that the underlying transaction
remains subject to the bound tariff rates pursua nt to Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 and the
relevant part of a Member's Schedule. This further supports our understanding that the scope of
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 does not exclude what Colombia considers to be illicit
trade.
5.40. Colombia further contends that the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, as reflected in the
preamble, supports its interpretation of Article II:1(a) and (b).
110 Specifically, Colombia points out
that the criminal activities associated with illicit trade reduce standards of living, generate
economic distortions that hurt employment, and reduce real income.
111 We recall that the
Appellate Body has previously stated that the GATT 1994 strikes a balance between Members'
obligations, on the one hand, and their rights to adopt measures seeking to achieve legitimate
policy objectives, on the other hand.
112 To effectuate such a balance, Article XX of the GATT 1994
contains a number of exceptions that reflect important societal objectives other than trade
liberalization, which may be relied upon in seeking to justify an otherwise GATT-inconsistent
measure. The GATT 1994 thus preserves the right of Members to pursue legitimate policy
objectives, including addressing concerns relating to, in casu , money laundering, through the
general exceptions set out in Article XX.
5.41. Moreover, we note that Colombia's interpretation would allow a Member to exclude from the
scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 trade activities that it has unilaterally determined
to be illicit under its domestic law. Such an interpretation would mean that, in respect of
concessions inscribed in a Member's Schedule, the scope of a Member's obligation could vary
depending on what is defined as illicit or asserted to be illicit under that Member's domestic law.
As we see it, such an approach to the interpretation of Article II:1(a) and (b) would create
uncertainty as to the scope of coverage of tariff concessions undertaken by Members.
5.42. Finally, we note that Colombia also takes issue with the Panel's finding that the measure at
issue does not incorporate a legislative ceiling that prevents the compound tariff from resulting in
duties that exceed the bound rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions.
113 In particular, for
Colombia, Article II:1(a) and (b) does not impose an obligation on Members to ensure that their

107 These methods are: (i) transaction value of identical goods (Article 2); (ii) transaction value of
similar goods (Article 3); (iii) deductive value (Article 5); (iv) computed value (Article 6); and (v) residual or
fall-back method (Article 7).
108 The Ad Note to paragraph 2 of Article VII defines "actual value" and refers to "any abnormal discount
or other reduction from the ordinary competitive price". It also describes the term "in the ordinary course of
trade … under fully competitive conditions" as "excluding any transaction wherein the buyer and seller are not
independent of each other and price is not the sole consideration."
109 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 105.
110 The preamble of the GATT 1994 provides that the relations of Members "in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods".
111 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 107.
112 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 156.
113 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 83-84; response to questioning at the oral hearing.

bound rates are not exceeded when goods are imported at artificially low prices. Therefore, for
Colombia, the legislative ceiling need not apply to imports priced at or below the thresholds that
are not covered by Article II:1 of the GATT 1994. Moreover, in Colombia's view, the Panel's finding
that the legislative ceiling does not apply to imports classified under heading 6305.32 of
Colombia's Customs Tariff, entering at prices above US$10/kg but below US$12/kg, may indicate
that the legislative ceiling does not apply in that particular scenario, but cannot serve as a basis
for an overall conclusion that the legislative ceilin g does not ensure conformity with Article II:1 of
the GATT 1994.
114
5.43. On the basis of our interpretation of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 developed
above, we do not find support for Colombia's argument that a legislative ceiling need not apply to
imports priced at or below the thresholds incorporated in the measure at issue. We do not see that
Article II:1(a) and (b) excludes from its scope transactions that Colombia considers to be illicit
because they are at artificially low or below market prices for money laundering purposes. We
therefore do not consider that a measure that fails to ensure that such transactions do not exceed
Colombia's bound tariff rates can operate as a legislative ceiling. Moreover, Colombia does not
contest the Panel's finding that imports classified under heading 6305.32 of the Customs Tariff,
entering at prices above US$10/kg but below US$12/kg, exceed the rate bound in Colombia's
Schedule of Concessions.
115 We recall that the Appellate Body, in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel,
explained that "it is possible, under certain circ umstances, for a Member to design a legislative
'ceiling' or 'cap' on the level of duty applied wh ich would ensure that, even if the type of duty
applied differs from the type provided for in that Member's Schedule, the ad valorem equivalents
of the duties actually applied would not exceed the ad valorem duties provided for in the Member's
Schedule."116 For the foregoing reasons, contrary to the notion of a legislative ceiling articulated by
the Appellate Body, the price thresholds set out in Colombia's measure do not ensure that duties
imposed on certain imports do not exceed Colombia's bound tariff rates.
5.44. As we have noted, apart from the grounds of appeal identified and addressed above,
Colombia has not challenged the Panel's findings regarding the instances in which the application
of the compound tariff results in a duty that exceeds the bound tariff rates in Colombia's Schedule
of Concessions. We therefore see no grounds to disturb the Panel's findings that the compound
tariff necessarily exceeds Colombia's bound tariff rates in the instances set out in
paragraphs 7.164 and 7.180 of its Report.
5.45. In sum, we do not see that the text of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 excludes
what Colombia classifies as illicit trade. Moreover, the context provided in Articles II:2 and VII:2 of
the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation Agreemen t supports our view that the scope of
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 is not limited in the manner suggested by Colombia. We
also consider that our interpretation regarding the scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994 is in keeping with the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, and that a Member
seeking to address concerns regarding money laundering may do so through the general
exceptions contained in Article XX of the GATT 1994. We recall that we have reversed the Panel's
finding, in paragraphs 7.108 and 8.1 of the Pane l Report, that it was unnecessary for the Panel to
issue a finding as to whether or not Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 applies to illicit trade.
However, in the light of our interpretation of Arti cle II:1(a) and (b), we see no grounds to disturb
the Panel's findings that the compound tariff necessarily exceeds Colombia's bound tariff rates in
the instances set out in paragraphs 7.164 and 7.180 of its Report.
5.46. We therefore find, for imports of products classified in Chapters 61, 62, 63, and 64 (except
for heading 64.06 but including tariff line 6406.10.00.00) of Colombia's Customs Tariff, that, in the
instances identified in the Panel Report, the compound tariff exceeds the bound tariff rates in
Colombia's Schedule of Concessions, and is therefore inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of
the GATT 1994. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.189, 7.192-7.194,
and 8.2-8.4 of its Report.
5.47. Before turning to our analysis of Colombia 's defences under Article XX(a) and Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1994, we wish to remark that our anal ysis set out above should not be understood to
suggest that Members cannot adopt measures seeking to combat money laundering. This aim,

114 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 88.
115 Colombia's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
116 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 54.

however, cannot be achieved through interpreting Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 in a manner that
excludes from the scope of that provision what a Member considers to be illicit trade. A Member's
right to adopt and pursue measures seeking to address concerns relating to money laundering can
be appropriately preserved when justified, for example, in accordance with the general exceptions
contained in Article XX of the GATT 1994.
5.2 Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994
5.48. We now address Colombia's appeal of the Panel's finding that Colombia had failed to
demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure necessary to protect public morals within the
meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. We begin by summarizing relevant aspects of the
Panel's findings before turning to examine Colombia's claims on appeal.
5.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.49. The Panel structured its analysis of whethe r the compound tariff is a measure necessary to
protect public morals within the meaning of Arti cle XX(a) of the GATT 1994 by assessing, first,
whether Colombia had shown that the compound tariff has been adopted or enforced, or is
designed, to protect public morals; and, second, whether the compound tariff is necessary to
protect public morals.
117
5.50. The Panel began by considering whether Colombia had shown that the declared policy
objective of combating money laundering is one of the policies designed to protect public morals in
Colombia. The Panel noted that money laundering is criminal conduct in Colombia under
Article 323 of its Criminal Code, and that Colombia had submitted documents showing that
combating money laundering is an important policy objective for Colombia.
118 In the Panel's view,
Colombia presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a real and present concern
in Colombia with regard to money laundering, as well as with regard to the way in which money
laundering is linked with drug trafficking and other criminal activities and with Colombia's internal
armed conflict. Consequently, the Panel concluded that combating money laundering is one of the
policies designed to protect public morals in Colombia.
119
5.51. The Panel then turned to examine whether the compound tariff is itself designed to combat
money laundering. The Panel examined the text of Decree No. 456 and observed that it does not
contain "any statement of reasons or recitals indicating that the objective of the compound tariff is
to combat money laundering".120
5.52. Turning to the design, architecture, an d structure of the compound tariff, the Panel
considered that Colombia made a series of interconnected assumptions that required verification,
namely: (i) that the thresholds established in the measure reflect "market conditions" so that any
price below them is "artificially low"; (ii) that products imported at prices below the thresholds
established in the measure are being undervalued; and (iii) that imports of goods subject to the
compound tariff at prices below the thresholds established in the measure are being used for
money laundering purposes.
121
5.53. As to whether the thresholds established in the measure reflect "market conditions" so that
any price below them is "artificially low", the Panel highlighted Colombia's statement that the
studies and calculations used as a basis for determining the price thresholds are confidential, but
that Colombia had offered a general explanation of the methodology used for determining the
price thresholds.
122 In the light of these considerations, the Panel considered it "impossible" to
verify, on the basis of the information availabl e, whether the thresholds established in the

117 Panel Report, para. 7.330.
118 Panel Report, para. 7.335. The Panel referred to several documents submitted by Colombia, including
National Planning Department, National Development Plan 2010-2014 (extracts) (Panel Exhibit COL-33);
Ministry of the Interior and Justice, National Anti-Drug Policy (Panel Exhibit COL-6); and National Council for
Economic and Social Policy, National Policy against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism,
18 January 2013 (Panel Exhibit COL-19).
119 Panel Report, paras. 7.338-7.339.
120 Panel Report, para. 7.347.
121 Panel Report, para. 7.353.
122 Panel Report, para. 7.354. The Panel noted that Colombia had indicated that the price thresholds are
based on domestic and international market prices.

measure reflect the prices of transactions under normal market conditions for the products in
question.123 In particular, the Panel pointed out that Colombia had not explained how the
calculation of single price thresholds establis hed on a fixed basis for each of the two broad
categories of products covered by this dispute can be useful for determining market prices and the
levels below which import prices must be considered "artificially low", without an examination of
the specific characteristics of the particular transaction concerned. 124 The Panel added that it was
not clear how the methodology used by Colombia takes into account the possible differences that
could exist between the import prices of the different products, within each of the broad categories
covered by these thresholds, in terms of factors such as: production costs; component materials;
quality levels; trademarks; seasonality, consumer tastes, and preferences; and the actual nature
of the products in question.
125 The Panel concluded that, while it could not be ruled out that the
importation of goods at prices below the thresholds established in the measure could reflect
"artificially low" prices, Colombia had not shown that the thresholds "could be decisive in
establishing that the importation of goods at prices below those thresholds is necessarily taking
place at 'artificially low' prices that do not reflect real prices or market conditions".
126
5.54. In assessing whether there was any evidence that the products imported at prices below the
thresholds established in the measure are being undervalued, the Panel noted that "[t]he notion of
underinvoicing or undervaluation pertains to a situation in which the price declared on the invoice
for a particular transaction is lower than the price actually paid or payable." 127 Then, the Panel
observed that "[t]he studies contributed by the parties are not conclusive with respect to whether
the undervaluation occurs exclusively or even preponderantly in connection with imports of
products with 'low' prices."
128 As a result, the Panel stated that, "insofar as the thresholds
established in Decree No. 456 were determined on a fixed basis for broad categories of products
and without examining the specific characteristi cs of the transaction concerned, there is no
indication that products imported at prices below the thresholds established in Decree No. 456 are
necessarily being undervalued."
129
5.55. The Panel then turned to examine whet her there was any evidence that the products
subject to the compound tariff upon importation into Colombia are being undervalued for money
laundering purposes. In this regard, the Panel stated that the information available suggests that
the undervaluation of imports is one of the methods used for money laundering detected by
Colombian authorities.
130 The Panel, however, highlighted that not every undervaluation operation
in an international trade transaction is for money laundering purposes. The Panel added that the
undervaluation of imports is just one of the many methods used for money laundering, and that
smuggling involving imports as a modus operandi for money laundering does not constitute one of
the most commonly used methods.
131 On this basis, the Panel concluded that, "even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that products imported at prices below the thresholds established in
Decree No. 456 are being undervalued, there is no ev idence that this necessarily means that the
undervaluation in question is for money laundering purposes."
132

123 Panel Report, para. 7.355.
124 Panel Report, para. 7.355.
125 Panel Report, para. 7.357.
127 Panel Report, para. 7.363.
128 Panel Report, para. 7.364.
129 Panel Report, para. 7.365.
130 Panel Report, para. 7.366. In support of this proposition, the Panel referred to a joint study
conducted by Colombia's Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales
(DIAN) (National Customs and Excise Directorate) and Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (UIAF)
(Information and Financial Analysis Unit), which identifies some of the most common methods (known as
"typologies") used for laundering money and financing terrorism by means of smuggling operations. The Panel
indicated that the typologies include the "payment in kind for illicit activities with goods smuggled into the
national territory" and the "transport of money of illicit origin to another country to purchase goods which are
introduced into the local country by means of technical smuggling based on underinvoicing". Colombia stated
before the Panel that both typologies correspond to the sort of practices that the compound tariff seeks to
combat. (Ibid., paras. 7.369-7.370 (referring to Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, National Customs and
Excise Directorate, and Information and Financial Analysis Unit, Money Laundering Typologies Related to
Smuggling, January 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-10); and quoting Colombia's response to Panel question No. 44,
para. 101))
131 Panel Report, paras. 7.374-7.375.
132 Panel Report, para. 7.376.

5.56. Next, the Panel examined certain exemptions from the compound tariff. The Panel noted,
first, that imports into Special Customs Regime Zones could be used for money laundering, and
that Colombia had not indicated what measures it is taking to deal with the risk of money
laundering in connection with these imports. Second , in respect of goods entering Colombia under
the Plan Vallejo, the Panel did not rule out the possibility that companies participating in the
Plan Vallejo might use imports for money laundering. Third, in respect of the exemption from the
compound tariff for imports from countries with which Colombia has trade agreements in force, the
Panel stated that this exemption is related to the negotiation of the relevant tariff subheadings in
the respective agreement, rather than to the existence of customs cooperation and information
exchange mechanisms, as Colombia had allege d. Therefore, the Panel concluded that the
exemptions from the compound tariff are unrelated to, and inconsistent with, the measure's
alleged objective of combating money laundering.
133
5.57. The Panel then stated that the fact that the measure would remain in force for a period of
two years is not in keeping with the measure's alleged objective of combating money
laundering.134 Moreover, for the Panel, the fact that imports of products at prices below the
thresholds established in the measure are not prohibited under Colombian legislation and are not
automatically subject to some type of measure ot her than the compound tariff would appear to be
inconsistent with the compound tariff's objective.
135
5.58. For the foregoing reasons, the Panel consid ered that the design, architecture, and revealing
structure of the compound tariff did not make it possible to conclude that there is a relationship
between the compound tariff and the declared objective of combating money laundering. Thus, the
Panel found that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is designed to
combat money laundering.
136 Consequently, the Panel concluded that, although Colombia had
demonstrated that combating money laundering is one of the policies designed to protect public
morals in Colombia, it had not shown that the compound tariff is a measure designed to protect
public morals.137
5.59. Having made this finding, the Panel stated that, since it had concluded that Colombia had
failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is designed to combat money laundering, there
should be no need to examine whether the compound tariff is necessary to protect public morals.
However, the Panel indicated that, "in order to be exhaustive in its analysis", it would continue
with its evaluation by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the compound tariff is designed to
combat money laundering.
138
5.60. In the context of its analysis of "necessity", the Panel concluded that, even though Colombia
had demonstrated that the objective of combating money laundering in Colombia serves societal
interests that could be described as vital and important in the highest degree, Colombia had not
demonstrated the contribution of the compound tariff to the alleged objective of combating money
laundering. For this reason, and taking into account the restriction on international trade caused
by the compound tariff, the Panel found that Colombia had failed to show that the compound tariff
is a measure necessary to combat money laundering.
139 Consequently, the Panel concluded that
Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure necessary to protect
public morals within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
140
5.2.2 Whether the Panel erred under Article XX(a) in finding that Colombia had failed to
demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to protect public morals"
5.61. Colombia appeals the Panel's findings that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the
compound tariff is a measure "designed" to protect public morals, and that it is "necessary" to

133 Panel Report, para. 7.388.
134 Panel Report, para. 7.389.
135 Panel Report, paras. 7.390-7.391. In addition, the Panel observed that Panama submitted evidence
of statements made by high-ranking Colombian officials suggesting that the compound tariff was imposed to
protect the textiles sector from unfair competition, revitalize industry, and protect domestic production. (Ibid.,
para. 7.392)
136 Panel Report, para. 7.400.
137 Panel Report, para. 7.401.
138 Panel Report, para. 7.402.
140 Panel Report, paras. 7.471 and 8.5.

protect public morals, within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. We begin by
assessing Colombia's claim concerning the Panel's finding regarding the "design" of the measure.
5.62. Colombia argues that the Panel erred under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 by requiring
Colombia to demonstrate the "effectiveness" of the challenged measure as part of establishing that
the measure is "designed" to protect public morals. 141 According to Colombia, the "effectiveness"
of the challenged measure goes to the contribution of the measure to the objective pursued,
which, under Appellate Body jurisprudence, is a matter that is relevant to the "necessity" analysis,
rather than to the consideration of whether the measure is "designed" to protect public morals.
Colombia considers that the Panel required it to demonstrate that imported products covered by
the measure are necessarily being undervalued and used for money laundering purposes, which
focuses on the degree to which the measure is co ntributing to its objective. Therefore, in
Colombia's view, the Panel erred by conflating the analysis of the "design" of the measure with the
subsequent and more exhaustive analysis of the "necessity" of the measure under Article XX(a).
142
5.63. Colombia submits that, even if it was appropriate for the Panel to examine the contribution
of the measure in the context of assessing its "design", the Panel erred by imposing an "overly
demanding" standard of the term "to protect" public morals that is inconsistent with
Article XX(a).
143 In particular, Colombia considers that the Panel, in essence, required that the
measure satisfy a "100% effectiveness standard" 144, which is neither required, nor possible to
meet, under Article XX(a). According to Colombia, the Panel imposed a standard that required
Colombia to demonstrate that each and every transaction priced below the thresholds established
in the measure involved money laundering. This is because the Panel required evidence "that
demonstrated that products at prices below the threshold established in Decree 456 were
necessarily imported at artificially low prices that did not reflect market conditions, that the
thresholds themselves necessarily reflected artificially low prices, and that imports at prices below
the thresholds necessarily were being used to launder money".
145
5.64. In response, Panama argues that, given that the parties disagreed about the objective of
the measure, the Panel was required to examine the design, structure, and architecture of the
measure.146 In particular, Panama considers that the Panel was required to examine the
relationship amongst low-priced imports, the alleged undervaluation, and the alleged money
laundering.
147 Given that the price thresholds established in the compound tariff are established on
a fixed basis for a wide range of diverse products, Panama considers that the Panel rightly found
that it is not possible to conclude that all products imported at prices below the thresholds are
necessarily undervalued. Moreover, the Panel found that it was not possible to conclude that every
instance of undervaluation is necessarily used for money laundering purposes. This is because the
undervaluation activity can be used to evade taxes or capital controls. Panama contends that, in
both instances, the Panel could have omitted using the word "necessarily" without affecting the
validity of its conclusions. Panama does not consider that the Panel was assessing the "necessity"
of the compound tariff in its examination of the "design" of the measure at issue.
148
5.65. Panama also contends that, contrary to Colombia's assertion, the Panel did not seek to
determine whether the compound tariff achieves "100% effectiveness" in eradicating the
undervaluation of imports for money laundering purposes.
149 Rather, the Panel focused on whether
the measure had been conceived to address problems relating to undervaluation and money
laundering.150 Panama points out that, at this point of its analysis, the Panel did not make a ruling
about the measure's concrete results in eradicating or mitigating undervaluation or money
laundering. Rather, the Panel's findings challenged by Colombia are part of a broader set of

141 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 120.
142 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 120-123. Colombia adds that the Panel's assessment of
the term "to protect" goes beyond what has been required in the past by panels and the Appellate Body. (Ibid.,
para. 124)
143 Colombia's appellant's submission, heading section V.B.
144 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 127.
145 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 130. (emphasis original)
146 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.4. Panama recalls its contention before the Panel that the
real objective of the measure is the protection of Colombia's textile and footwear industry.
147 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.5.
148 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.6.
149 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.7.
150 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.7.

findings seeking to determine whether the measure's real objective is to address undervaluation as
a means of money laundering.151
5.66. In order to analyse Colombia's claim on appeal, we first set out key aspects of the legal
standard under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. Article XX(a), together with the introductory
clause of Article XX, reads as follows:
Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
5.67. We recall that the analysis of a measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994 is two-tiered,
such that a panel must first examine whether the measure falls under one of the exceptions listed
in the paragraphs of Article XX, before considering the question of whether the measure satisfies
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
152 Moreover, the Appellate Body has explained that
provisional justification under one of the paragraphs of Article XX requires that a challenged
measure "address the particular interest specified in that paragraph", and that "there be a
sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected".
153 "The required nexus – or
'degree of connection' – between the measure and th e interest is specified in the language of the
paragraphs themselves, through the use of terms such as 'relating to' and 'necessary to'" in
Article XX.154 In order to establish whether a measure is justified under Article XX(a), the analysis
proceeds in two steps. First, the measure must be "designed" to protect public morals. 155 Second,
the measure must be "necessary" to protect such public morals.
5.68. With respect to the analysis of the "design" of the measure, the phrase "to protect public
morals" calls for an initial, threshold examination in order to determine whether there is a
relationship between an otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure and the protection of public
morals.
156 If this initial, threshold examination reveals that the measure is incapable of protecting
public morals, there is not a relationship between the measure and the protection of public morals
that meets the requirements of the "design" step . In this situation, further examination with
regard to whether this measure is "necessary" to protect such public morals would not be
required. This is because there can be no justification under Article XX(a) for a measure that is not
"designed" to protect public morals.
157 However, if the measure is not incapable of protecting

151 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 4.7. Panama recalls that the Panel also examined the text of
the measure, the exemptions from the compound tariff, the period of validity of the measure, and the legal
consequences of importing goods below the thresholds established by the measure. (Ibid., para. 4.8)
152 See Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996:I, p. 20. See also Appellate Body
Reports, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 64; US – Shrimp, paras. 118-120; and
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 139.
153 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
US – Gambling, para. 292).
154 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 292.
155 In this dispute, the Panel noted that the term "public morals" denotes standards of right and wrong
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation. (Panel Report, para. 7.299 (quoting Panel
156 Recently, the Appellate Body examined in Argentina – Financial Services a defence under
Article XIV(c) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in which it made similar observations
regarding the phrase "to secure compliance". (Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services,
para. 6.203) We recall that Article XIV of the GATS sets out the general exceptions from obligations under that
Agreement in a manner similar to Article XX of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has indicated that, where
similar language is used in both provisions, previous decisions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 are relevant
for the analysis under Article XIV of the GATS. (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 291) We consider
that the reverse is also true.
157 See Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203; and Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks, para. 72.

public morals, this indicates the existence of a relationship between the measure and the
protection of public morals. In this situation, further examination of whether the measure is
"necessary" is required under Article XX(a).
5.69. In order to determine whether such a rela tionship exists, a panel must examine evidence
regarding the design of the measure at issue, including its content, structure, and expected
operation.
158 We note that a measure may expressly mention an objective falling within the scope
of "public morals" in that society. 159 However, an express reference to such objective may not, in
and of itself, be sufficient to establish that the measure is "designed" to protect public morals for
purposes of substantiating the availability of the defence under Article XX(a). Conversely, a
measure that does not expressly refer to a "public moral" may nevertheless be found to have such
a relationship with public morals following an a ssessment of the design of the measure at issue,
including its content, structure, and expected operation.
5.70. We do not see the examination of the "design" of the measure as a particularly demanding
step of the Article XX(a) analysis. By contrast, the assessment of the "necessity" of a measure
entails a more in-depth, holistic analysis of the relationship between the measure and the
protection of public morals. The Appellate Body has explained that a necessity analysis involves a
process of "weighing and balancing" a series of fa ctors, including the importance of the societal
interest or value at stake, the contribution of the measure to the objective it pursues, and the
trade-restrictiveness of the measure.
160 In most cases, a comparison between the challenged
measure and possible alternatives should subsequently be undertaken.161
5.71. Regarding the specific factors of the "necessity" analysis, we first note that it entails "an
assessment of the 'relative importance' of the in terests or values furthered by the challenged
measure".162 The more vital or important the interests or values that are reflected in the objective
of the measure, the easier it would be to accept a measure as "necessary".163
5.72. A panel must also examine the contribution of the measure to the objectives pursued by it.
In assessing this factor, "a panel's duty is to assess, in a qualitative or quantitative manner, the
extent of the measure's contribution to the end pu rsued, rather than merely ascertaining whether
or not the measure makes any contribution."
164 This is because "[t]he greater the contribution, the
more easily a measure might be considered to be 'necessary'."165 The Appellate Body has indicated
that there is no "generally applicable standard requiring the use of a pre-determined threshold of
contribution in analysing the necessity of a measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994".
166 Since
a measure's contribution is only one component of the necessity calculus under Article XX, the
assessment of whether a measure is "necessary" cannot be determined by the degree of
contribution alone, but will depend on the manner in which the other factors of the "necessity"
standard inform the analysis.
167
5.73. Another relevant factor in conducting a "necessity" analysis is the restrictiveness of the
measure in respect of international commerce. In assessing this factor, "a panel must seek to
assess the degree of a measure's trade-restrictiveness, rather than merely ascertaining whether or
not the measure involves some restriction on trade." 168 As with the assessment of a measure's
contribution to its objective, the examination of a measure's trade-restrictiveness may be done in
a qualitative or quantitative manner. The Appella te Body has stated that "[a] measure with a

158 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, paras. 135-142; and EC – Seal Products, para. 5.144.
159 In discerning the objective of a measure, a panel is not limited to the text or preamble of a measure,
or to a respondent's characterization of the objective in WTO dispute settlement proceedings; it may also look
at other evidentiary elements such as the design, structure, and operation of the measure in making its own
determination of a measure's objective. (Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.144)
160 See Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; US – Gambling,
161 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
162 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 306 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
163 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162.
164 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.234.
165 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
166 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.213.
167 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.215.
168 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.234.

relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as 'necessary'
than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects."169
5.74. As we have noted, in most cases, a pa nel must then compare the challenged measure and
possible alternative measures that achieve the same level of protection while being less trade
restrictive.170 The Appellate Body has explained that an alternative measure may be found not to
be "reasonably available" where "it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the
responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on
that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties".
171
5.75. The Appellate Body has noted that "the very utility of examining the interaction between the
various factors of the necessity analysis, and conducting a comparison with potential alternative
measures, is that it provides a means of testing these factors as part of a holistic weighing and
balancing exercise".
172 In this respect, the weighing and balancing exercise can be understood as
"a holistic operation that involves putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating
them in relation to each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an
overall judgement."
173
5.76. Finally, we observe that the "design" and "necessity" steps of the analysis under
Article XX(a) are conceptually distinct, yet related, aspects of the overall inquiry to be undertaken
into whether a respondent has established that the measure at issue is "necessary to protect
public morals".174 As the assessment of these two steps is not entirely disconnected, there may, in
fact, be some overlap in the sense that certain evidence and considerations may be relevant to
both aspects of the defence under Article XX(a). We note, in particular, that, in the context of the
"design" step of the analysis, a panel is not precluded from taking into account evidence and
considerations that may also be relevant to the examination of the contribution of the measure in
the context of the "necessity" analysis.
5.77. We observe that, once an analysis of the "design" of a measure reveals that the measure is
not incapable of protecting public morals, such that there is a relationship between the measure
and the protection of public morals, a panel may not refrain from conducting the "necessity" step
of the analysis. The Appellate Body has emphasized that "[a] panel must not … structure its
analysis of the ["design" step] in such a way as to lead it to truncate its analysis prematurely and
thereby foreclose consideration of crucial aspects of the respondent's defence relating to the
'necessity' analysis."
175 As we have noted, the "necessity" analysis involves weighing and
balancing the relative importance of the societal interest or value at stake, the degree of
contribution, and the degree of trade-restrictiveness so as to determine whether the measure is
"necessary" to protect public morals.
176 Whether a particular degree of contribution is sufficient for
a measure to be considered "necessary" cannot be answered in isolation from an assessment of
the degree of the measure's trade-restrictiveness and of the relative importance of the interest or
value at stake. For example, a measure making a lim ited contribution to protecting public morals
may be justified under Article XX(a) in circumstances where the measure has only a very low
trade-restrictive impact, taking into account the importance of the specific interest or value at
stake; similarly, it may be that a measure making a significant contribution is not justified under
Article XX(a) if that measure is highly trade rest rictive. Thus, if a panel finds some degree of
contribution, but ceases to analyse the other factors (the degree of trade-restrictiveness and the
relative importance of the interest or value at stake), a weighing and balancing exercise cannot be

169 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
170 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169. In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body
recalled that, in US – Tuna II (Mexico), it had identified in the context of Article 2.2 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) circumstances in which a comparison with possible alternative
measures may not be required, for instance, when the challenged measure is not trade restrictive, or when it
makes no contribution to the objective. (Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, fn 1181 to para. 5.169
(referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), fn 647 to para. 322))
171 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 308.
172 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.215. (fn omitted)
173 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 182.
174 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.205.
175 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203.
176 As we have also noted, in most cases, a panel must then compare the challenged measure and
possible alternative measures that achieve the same level of protection while being less trade restrictive.
(Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169)

conducted, and thus a proper consideration of a respondent's defence that the measure is
necessary is foreclosed.
5.78. With these considerations in mind, we now turn to assess Colombia's challenge to the
Panel's finding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the measure is "designed" to protect
public morals.
5.79. Colombia alleges that the Panel applied an "overly demanding" 177 legal standard in
assessing whether the compound tariff is a meas ure "designed" to protect public morals, by
erroneously importing aspects of the "necessity" analysis. Colombia considers that the standard
applied by the Panel in the context of its analysis of the "design" of the measure focused on the
degree to which the measure is contributing to its objective. According to Colombia, the
assessment of the contribution of the measure is an aspect that may be examined under the
"necessity" analysis, but not during the consideration of whether the measure is "designed" to
protect public morals. Therefore, in Colombia's view, the Panel conflated the analysis of whether
the measure is one "to protect public morals" with the subsequent and more exhaustive analysis of
"necessity".
5.80. As highlighted above, in the context of an assessment of the "design" of a measure, the
examination of the relationship between the meas ure and the protection of public morals under
Article XX(a) does not, a priori , exclude from its scope an assessment of evidence and
considerations that may also be relevant in the context of the "necessity" step of the analysis.
Indeed, the examination of whether a measure is "designed" to protect public morals may involve
scrutinizing a range of evidence and considerations related to the measure at issue, including the
texts of statutes and/or regulations, the measure's legislative history, the measure's objective, and
other evidence regarding its content, structure, and expected operation. Thus, an assessment of
aspects that are related to a measure's contribution to its objective may also be of relevance for
determining whether a measure is "designed" to protect public morals under Article XX(a).
Consequently, to the extent that Colombia argues that the Panel erred in its analysis of the
"design" of the measure for the mere reason that it examined evidence and considerations related
to an analysis of the contribution of the measure, we disagree.
5.81. However, the thrust of Colombia's claim of error is that the Panel applied an "overly
demanding" legal standard in assessing whether the compound tariff is a measure "designed" to
protect public morals.
178 We therefore review the relevant findings by the Panel to determine
whether Colombia is correct in asserting that the Panel improperly applied the legal standard in
assessing the "design" of the measure under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
5.82. The Panel began by finding that "combating money laundering is one of the policies
designed to protect public morals in Colombia." 179 Having made this finding, the Panel turned to
assess whether the compound tariff is itself "des igned" to combat money laundering. Since the
parties disagreed with regard to the nature of the objective of the measure, the Panel indicated
that it would "make an objective assessment as to whether the compound tariff is, in fact,
designed to combat money laundering" by assessing the design, architecture, and revealing
structure of the compound tariff, as well as all of the available evidence.
180
5.83. The Panel examined the text of the meas ure and noted that neither Decree No. 456 nor the
previous Decree No. 074 contains any statement of reasons indicating that the objective of the
compound tariff is to combat money laundering.181 Then, the Panel turned to analyse other aspects
relating to the design, architecture, and structure of the compound tariff. In this context, the Panel
decided to verify the "series of interconnected assumptions" that, in the Panel's view, were the
basis of Colombia's argument. 182 The Panel therefore examined: (i) whether the thresholds
established in the measure reflect "market conditions" so that any price below them is "artificially
low"; (ii) whether products imported at prices below the thresholds established in the measure are

177 Colombia's appellant's submission, heading section V.B.
178 Colombia also contends that the Panel "required an erroneous 100% effectiveness standard".
(Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 129)
179 Panel Report, para. 7.339.
180 Panel Report, para. 7.343.
181 Panel Report, para. 7.347.
182 Panel Report, para. 7.353.

being undervalued; and (iii) whether imports of goods subject to the compound tariff at prices
below the thresholds established in the measure are being used for money laundering purposes.
5.84. The Panel's conclusions regarding these "assumptions" were that: (i) Colombia had not
shown that the thresholds "could be decisive in establishing that the importation of goods at prices
below those thresholds is necessarily taking place at 'artificially low' prices that do not reflect real
prices or market conditions"183; (ii) there was "no indication that products imported at prices below
the thresholds established in Decree No. 456 are necessarily being undervalued"184; and (iii) even
assuming that products imported at prices below the thresholds established in the measure are
being undervalued, there was "no evidence that this necessarily means that the undervaluation in
question is for money laundering purposes". 185 On the basis of these conclusions and certain
additional considerations, the Panel concluded that "a connection between the compound tariff and
the alleged objective of combating money laundering ha[d] not been demonstrated", and that it
was not "possible to conclude that there is a relationship between the compound tariff and the
declared objective of combating money laundering".
186 Accordingly, the Panel concluded that
Colombia had "failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is designed to combat money
laundering".187
5.85. Having set out the main aspects of the Panel's analysis, we note that there is a tension
between some of the Panel's intermediate findings and the conclusions it reached concerning the
"design" of the measure. In particular, we note that, although the Panel concluded that Colombia
had failed to establish a relationship between the compound tariff and the objective of combating
money laundering, this conclusion is belied by findings indicating that the compound tariff is not
incapable of combating money laundering, such that there is a relationship between that measure
and the protection of public morals.
5.86. In respect of the question of whether prices below the thresholds set out in the measure are
"artificially low", we note the Panel's finding that "it cannot be ruled out that the importation of
goods at prices below the thresholds established in Decree No. 456 could, in practice, reflect
'artificially low' prices that do not reflect market conditions."
188 We consider that, by stating that
"it cannot be ruled out" that goods imported at prices below the thresholds reflect "artificially low"
prices, the Panel acknowledged that at least some transactions at or below the thresholds could
reflect such prices.
189 In other words, this finding by the Panel shows that at least some goods
imported at prices at or below the thresholds set out in the measure could reflect "artificially low"
prices and thus would not reflect market conditions.190
5.87. We also observe the Panel's finding that "the information available suggests that the
undervaluation of imports is, in fact, one of the methods used for money laundering detected by
the Colombian authorities." 191 In this regard, the Panel examined a joint study prepared by
Colombia's Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales
(DIAN) (National Customs and Excise Directorate) and Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero
(UIAF) (Information and Financial Analysis Unit) 192, which identifies methods used in Colombia for
laundering money. On the basis of this joint study, the Panel explained that one of the methods for
laundering money that the compound tariff seeks to combat is the "transport of money of illicit
origin to another country to purchase goods which are introduced into the local country by means

186 Panel Report, para. 7.399.
187 Panel Report, para. 7.400.
188 Panel Report, para. 7.359.
189 We note that, before the Panel, Colombia stated that "it use[d] the term 'underinvoicing' to refer in
shorthand form to imports at artificially low prices that do not correspond to real or market prices." (Panel
Report, para. 7.362 (quoting Colombia's response to Panel question No. 41, para. 98))
190 We note that the Panel made some additional findings in assessing the contribution of the measure
under the "necessity" analysis that further demonstrate the Panel's understanding that at least some of the
products at issue priced at or below the thresholds could be imported into Colombia at artificially low prices and
thus could be undervalued. For instance, the Panel held that "it cannot be ruled out that the existence of lower
prices for some of the imports considered by Colombia indicates the existence of undervaluation practices."
(Panel Report, para. 7.421)
191 Panel Report, para. 7.366.
192 Money Laundering Typologies Related to Smuggling, January 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-10).

of technical smuggling based on underinvoicing". 193 These findings indicate recognition by the
Panel that, in Colombia, one of the methods used to launder money is the undervaluation of
imports. This is further supported by additional observations by the Panel about the phenomenon
of trade-based money laundering as recognized by international bodies. As the Panel observed, the
World Customs Organization refers to trade-based money laundering as "the process of
legitimizing the proceeds of crime by disguising them in the form of a payment for an international
trade transaction".
194 The Panel also noted that a study by an intergovernmental body, the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), similarly refers to trade-based money laundering as "the
process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade
transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origin".
195 Furthermore, we note that the Panel
stated that "the information available suggests that not every … undervaluation operation in an
international trade transaction is for money laundering purposes." 196 In our view, the Panel's
finding that "not every" undervaluation operation is for money laundering purposes amounts to an
acceptance that at least some of the undervaluation operations can be carried out in order to
launder money.
5.88. We also note that, in assessing the co ntribution of the measure under the "necessity"
analysis
197, the Panel addressed Colombia's contention that the compound tariff reduces the
incentives for using textile, apparel, and footwear imports to launder money. According to
Colombia, the compound tariff leads to an increase in the unit price of apparel and footwear
imports, thereby reducing the artificially high profit margin, which is the incentive for using these
imports to launder money.
198 While the Panel did not make a definitive finding that the compound
tariff has discouraged undervaluation practices carried out for money laundering purposes 199, the
Panel did make several findings that support Colo mbia's position that the compound tariff could
reduce the incentive of using undervalued imports to launder money. In addition to finding that
"since the compound tariff entered into force, Colombian imports of the products in question have
declined and average import prices have increased" 200, the Panel also accepted that "the
compound tariff could reduce the incentives for importing textile products, apparel and footwear at
prices below the thresholds laid down in Decree No. 456."201 Similarly, in stating that "the effect of
the compound tariff would be limited to reducing th e profit margin of the persons intending to use
imports for money laundering purposes"202, the Panel recognized, in our view, that goods imported
at prices at or below the thresholds for money laundering purposes would be subject to the
disincentive created by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
5.89. Taking the above Panel findings together, we consider that the Panel itself recognized that
the compound tariff is not incapable of combating money laundering, such that there is a
relationship between that measure and the protecti on of public morals. We recall that the Panel
concluded that Colombia had failed to establish a relationship between the compound tariff and the

193 Panel Report, para. 7.370 (quoting Colombia's response to Panel question No. 44, para. 101).
194 Panel Report, para. 7.367 (referring to World Customs Organization, Illicit Trade Report 2012 (Panel
Exhibit COL-8), p. 34).
195 Panel Report, para. 7.367 (referring to Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Trade-Based Money
Laundering, 23 June 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-11), p. 3).
196 Panel Report, para. 7.374.
197 We recall that the Panel stated that, since it had concluded that Colombia had failed to demonstrate
that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering, there should be no need to examine
whether the compound tariff is "necessary" to protect public morals. However, the Panel indicated that, "in
order to be exhaustive in its analysis", it would continue with its evaluation by assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering. (Panel Report, para. 7.402)
198 Panel Report, para. 7.410 (referring to Colombia's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 37,
87, and 99; and opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 31 and 33). Colombia also argued before
the Panel that the compound tariff has resulted in a change in the composition of imports of the products in
question, which would indicate that the measure has discouraged the undervaluation of such imports. (Ibid.
(referring to Colombia's opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 30 and 32; response to Panel
question No. 57; and charts containing import data submitted by Colombia with its opening statement at the
first Panel meeting (Panel Exhibit COL-30))
199 We are cognizant that the Panel ultimately found that "the fact that the compound tariff has had a
greater effect on lower-priced, as compared with higher-priced, products does not in itself prove that the
compound tariff has helped to discourage the use of 'artificially low' prices or undervaluation for money
laundering purposes." (Panel Report, para. 7.430 (emphasis added))
200 Panel Report, para. 7.428.
201 Panel Report, para. 7.435.
202 Panel Report, para. 7.436.

objective of combating money laundering. 203 We further recall that a panel may cease its analysis
of a defence under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 at the stage of assessing the "design" of the
measure only where the measure at issue is incapabl e of protecting public morals, such that there
is no relationship between the measure and the pr otection of public morals. In the light of the
cited passages from the Panel Report, we consider that the Panel was not in a situation in which
the measure at issue is incapable of protecting public morals. Although the Panel concluded that
Colombia had failed to establish a relationship between the compound tariff and the objective of
combating money laundering, we consider that this conclusion is belied by the Panel findings we
have examined above. Indeed, we understand the Panel to have recognized that at least some
goods priced at or below the thresholds could be imported into Colombia at artificially low prices
for money laundering purposes, and would thus be subject to the disincentive created by the
higher specific duties that apply to these goods. Thus, the Panel's analysis indicates that the
compound tariff is not incapable of combating money laundering, such that there is a relationship
between that measure and the protection of public morals.
5.90. Consequently, the Panel should not have ceased its analysis at this stage of its review of
Colombia's defence under Article XX(a). Rather, it was incumbent on the Panel to turn to the
analysis of the "necessity" of the measure to expl ore further the extent of that relationship in
assessing the measure's contribution to the objective, and to evaluate any such contribution
together with the other factors of the "necessity" analysis.
204 As noted, a panel errs under
Article XX(a) if, in assessing the "design" of the measure, it does not proceed to an analysis of
"necessity" once it has determined that the measure is not incapable of protecting public morals,
such that there is a relationship between the measure and the protection of public morals.
Otherwise, a panel would foreclose an assessment of whether the degree of contribution, when
weighed and balanced against the degree of trade-restrictiveness and the importance of the
interests and values at stake, is sufficient to justify the measure under Article XX(a).
5.91. We recall that, having found that Colomb ia had not shown that the compound tariff is a
measure "designed" to protect public morals, the Panel stated there was no need to examine
whether the compound tariff is "necessary" to prot ect public morals. Nevertheless, "in order to be
exhaustive in its analysis", the Panel evaluated whether the measure is "necessary" by assuming,
for the sake of argument, that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering.
205
We note, in any event, that the Panel's ultimate conclusion as to the availability of the
Article XX(a) defence to Colombia was founded solely on its conclusion that Colombia had not
demonstrated that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering.
5.92. In sum, the Panel erred in concluding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the
measure is "designed" to combat money laundering given its recognition that the compound tariff
is not incapable of combating money laundering, such that there is a relationship between that
measure and the protection of public morals. Thus, the Panel failed to assess the "necessity" of the
measure on the basis of a weighing and balancing exercise. Contrary to the legal standard under
Article XX(a), the Panel prematurely ceased its analysis under this provision without proceeding to
assess the degree of contribution of the measur e to its objective, together with the other
"necessity" factors in a weighing and balancing exercise.
5.93. We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.400 of its Report, that Colombia
has failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering, and
the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.401 of its Report, that Colombia has not shown that the
compound tariff is a measure "designed" to protect public morals. Since the Panel's ultimate
findings in respect of Article XX(a) were based exclusively on these erroneous findings, we also
reverse the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.471 and 8.5 of its Report, that Colombia has failed to
demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to protect public morals" within the
meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.

203 Panel Report, paras. 7.399-7.400.
204 While we agree with Colombia that the Panel imposed an "overly demanding" legal standard in
assessing whether the measure at issue is "designed" to protect public morals, we do not see that the Panel
required that the measure at issue satisfy a "100% effectiveness" standard, as also contended by Colombia.
205 Panel Report, para. 7.402.

5.94. We note that Colombia also presented ad ditional challenges to the Panel's assessment of
whether the measure is "designed" to protect public morals 206 and raised certain claims of error
concerning the Panel's findings in respect of the "necessity" analysis 207, as well as claims under
Article 11 of the DSU.208 Given that we have reversed the Panel's finding that Colombia has failed
to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to protect public morals, we do not consider
it necessary to examine Colombia's additional claims of error, including that the Panel erred in its
"necessity" analysis under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, and that the Panel acted inconsistently
with its duty to conduct an objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.2.3 Completion of the legal analysis
5.95. Having reversed the Panel's finding that Colombia has failed to demonstrate that the
compound tariff is a measure "designed" to protect public morals, we now turn to consider
Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the measure at issue is
necessary to protect public morals and is thus justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
209
5.96. Colombia maintains that we may be able to find that the compound tariff is a measure
"designed" to protect public morals under Article XX(a) on the basis of the following:
a. the Panel accepted that the importation of products at prices below the thresholds
established in the measure could reflect "artificially low" prices that do not reflect market
conditions210;
b. the Panel found that the evidence demonstrates that Colombian authorities had
identified the use of undervaluation as one of the mechanisms used to launder
money
211;
c. the Panel found that the use of undervaluation of imports to launder money had been
confirmed by international organizations involved in the fight against money laundering
and illicit trade
212; and
d. the Panel found that the information available suggests that the undervaluation of
imports is, in fact, one of the methods used for money laundering detected by the
Colombian authorities.
213
5.97. We begin by noting that the Panel found th at Colombia had presented sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the existence of a real and present concern in Colombia with regard to money
laundering, as well as with regard to the way in which money laundering is linked with drug
trafficking and other criminal activities and with Colombia's internal armed conflict. On this basis,
in a finding that is not contested on appeal, the Panel concluded that combating money laundering
is one of the policies designed to protect public morals in Colombia.
214
5.98. Since the Panel found that combating money laundering is one of the policies designed to
protect public morals in Colombia, we now proceed to examine whether the findings by the Panel
are sufficient to establish that the compound ta riff is a measure "desig ned" to combat money
laundering and thus "to protect public morals" under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.

206 See executive summary of Colombia's appellant's submission in Annex B-1 to this Report, paras. 25
and 27.
207 See executive summary of Colombia's appellant's submission in Annex B-1 to this Report,
paras. 29-30.
208 See executive summary of Colombia's appellant's submission in Annex B-1 to this Report, paras. 26
and 31.
209 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 201 and 243.
210 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 202 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.359).
211 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 203 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.366). Colombia also
indicates that the Panel reiterated subsequently in its Report that "it has been shown that the undervaluation …
of imports … can be used for money laundering purposes". (Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 204
(quoting Panel Report, para. 7.434))
212 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 205 (referring to Financial Action Task Force (FATF),
Trade-Based Money Laundering, 23 June 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-11), p. 25).
214 Panel Report, para. 7.339.

5.99. Our prior examination of Colombia's claim of error revealed that, when several findings by
the Panel are read together, it is clear from its analysis that the compound tariff is not incapable of
combating money laundering, such that there is a relationship between that measure and the
protection of public morals. Indeed, we understand the Panel to have recognized that at least
some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be imported into Colombia at artificially low
prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be subject to the disincentive created by
the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
5.100. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that the measure at issue is
"designed" to protect public morals in Colombia within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the
GATT 1994.
5.101. We now proceed to examine whether the compound tariff is a measure "necessary" to
protect public morals under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
5.102. We recall that a necessity analysis involves a process of "weighing and balancing" a series
of factors, including the importance of the societal interest or value at stake, the contribution of
the measure to the objective it pursues, and the trade-restrictiveness of the measure. 215 We
consider that each of these factors must be demonstrated with sufficient clarity in order to conduct
a proper weighing and balancing exercise that may yield a conclusion that the measure is
"necessary". In most cases, a comparison between the challenged measure and possible
alternatives should subsequently be undertaken.
216
5.103. The weighing and balancing process begins "with an assessment of the 'relative
importance' of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure". 217 The more vital or
important the interests or values that are reflected in the objective of the measure, the easier it
would be to accept a measure as "necessary". 218 Turning to the contribution of the measure to the
objectives pursued by it, we recall that "[t]he greater the contribution, the more easily a measure
might be considered to be 'necessary'."219 For this reason, the Appellate Body has emphasized that
"in an analysis of 'necessity', a panel's duty is to assess, in a qualitative or quantitative manner,
the extent of the measure's contribution to the end pursued, rather than merely ascertaining
whether or not the measure makes any contribution."
220 The nature of the analysis for ascertaining
a measure's contribution to the objective pursued by it can be contrasted with the type of analysis
that a panel must undertake in the context of assessing the "design" of the measure under
Article XX(a). Indeed, whereas an assessment of whether the measure is "designed" to protect
public morals focuses on determining whether the measure is or is not incapable of protecting
public morals, an examination of the measure's co ntribution to the protection of public morals
focuses on determining the degree of such contribution, in a qualitative or quantitative manner.
5.104. Turning to an assessment of the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce, the Appellate Body has stated that "[a] measure with a relatively slight impact upon
imported products might more easily be considered as 'necessary' than a measure with intense or
broader restrictive effects."
221 Consequently, in assessing a measure's trade-restrictiveness
"a panel must seek to assess the degree of a measure's trade-restrictiveness, rather than merely
ascertaining whether or not the measure involves some restriction on trade."
222
5.105. With these considerations in mind, we begin with the Panel's findings regarding the relative
importance of the interests or values pursued by the challenged measure. We recall that the Panel
noted that money laundering is criminal conduct in Colombia under Article 323 of its
Criminal Code, and that Colombia had submi tted documents showing that combating money

215 See Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; US – Gambling,
216 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
217 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 306 (referring to Appellate Body Reports,
218 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162.
219 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
220 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.234.
221 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.
222 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.234.

laundering is an important policy objective for Colombia. 223 In the Panel's view, Colombia
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a real and present concern in
Colombia with regard to money laundering, as well as with regard to the way in which money
laundering is linked with drug trafficking and other criminal activities and with Colombia's internal
armed conflict.
224 For these reasons, in a finding that is not contested on appeal, the Panel held
that, in Colombia, the objective of combating money laundering reflects societal interests that can
be described as vital and important in the highest degree.
225 We also observe that, before the
Panel and on appeal, Panama has not denied that, for Colombia, the fight against money
laundering is a societal interest that could be described as vital and important in the highest
degree.
226
5.106. We now turn to examine the contribution of the measure to combating money laundering.
Above, we have identified a number of findings concerning the Panel's understanding regarding the
relationship between the measure at issue and the objective of combating money laundering. We
consider that the same findings of the Panel that led us to conclude that the compound tariff is not
incapable of combating money laundering, such that there is a relationship between that measure
and the protection of public morals, also indicate that there may be at least some contribution by
the compound tariff to the objective of combating money laundering. We recall the Panel's finding
that "it cannot be ruled out that the importation of goods at prices below the thresholds
established in Decree No. 456 could, in practice, reflect 'artificially low' prices that do not reflect
market conditions."
227 We further recall that the Panel found that "the information available
suggests that the undervaluation of imports is, in fact, one of the methods used for money
laundering detected by the Colombian authorities." 228 Moreover, we noted the Panel's findings
that, "since the compound tariff entered into forc e, Colombian imports of the products in question
have declined and average import prices have increased" 229, and that "the compound tariff could
reduce the incentives for importing textile products, apparel and footwear at prices below the
thresholds laid down in Decree No. 456". 230 As stated above, these findings demonstrate the
Panel's understanding that at least some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be
imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be
subject to the disincentive created by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
Therefore, we consider that these findings estab lish the Panel's recognition that there may be at
least some contribution by the measure to the objective of combating money laundering.
5.107. However, while the Panel's findings discussed above indicate that there may be at least
some contribution, they are also indeterminate as to the degree of such contribution. For instance,
the Panel's finding that "it cannot be ruled out that the importation of goods at prices below the
thresholds established in Decree No. 456 could, in practice, reflect 'artificially low' prices that do
not reflect market conditions" 231 does not indicate whether the amount or proportion of goods
imported at prices at or below the thresholds is low or high, or anywhere in between. A similar
observation can be made in respect of the Panel's finding that "the undervaluation of imports is, in
fact, one of the methods used for money laundering detected by the Colombian authorities." 232
Indeed, this finding does not indicate the freq uency or scope of this method as a means for
laundering money. In this regard, we also obse rve the Panel's statement that the undervaluation
of imports "is just one of the many methods used for money laundering". 233 The Panel also
referred to a document of the Colombian Ministry of Justice and Law indicating that, "according to

223 The Panel referred to several documents submitted by Colombia, including National Planning
Department, National Development Plan 2010-2014 (extracts) (Panel Exhibit COL-33); Ministry of the Interior
and Justice, National Anti-Drug Policy (Panel Exhibit COL-6); and National Council for Economic and Social
Policy, National Policy against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 18 January 2013 (Panel
224 Panel Report, para. 7.338. See also paras. 7.406-7.407.
225 Panel Report, para. 7.408.
226 Panel Report, para. 7.405.
227 Panel Report, para. 7.359.
228 Panel Report, para. 7.366.
229 Panel Report, para. 7.428.
230 Panel Report, para. 7.435.
231 Panel Report, para. 7.359.
232 Panel Report, para. 7.366.
233 Panel Report, para. 7.375.

the Office of the Attorney-General of the Nation , this modus operandi does not constitute one of
those most commonly employed for money laundering purposes."234
5.108. Other findings by the Panel highlight the lack of sufficient clarity surrounding the amount
or proportion of import transactions involving the products at issue that are actually used for
money laundering purposes. In this regard, the Pane l observed that "the compound tariff does not
directly target undervalued imports, still less imports used for money laundering, but all imports
declared at below-threshold prices, regardless of whether or not there is undervaluation and
whatever the purpose of the transaction."
235 As a consequence, the Panel concluded, "the
compound tariff affects imports which enter at pric es below the thresholds even if there is no
undervaluation."236 While the Panel considered that it "has been shown that the undervaluation …
of imports … can be used for money laundering purposes", it also noted that "money laundering
can be based on other practices or methodologies, including non-undervalued imports and overt
smuggling."237 Moreover, according to the Panel, "the practice of undervaluation may have
purposes other than money laundering, including tax evasion in particular." 238 In this regard, the
Panel concluded that, "even assuming, for the sake of argument, that products imported at prices
below the thresholds established in Decree No. 456 are being undervalued, there is no evidence
that this necessarily means that the undervaluation in question is for money laundering
purposes."
239 In making these findings, we read the Panel as emphasizing that Colombia had not
established with sufficient clarity the amount or proportion of import transactions involving the
relevant products that are, in fact, undervalued for money laundering purposes.
5.109. Moreover, the Panel did not have much clarity as to how effective the disincentive of the
compound tariff is as a means of combating money laundering. The Panel acknowledged that
imports of the products in question have declined and average import prices have increased since
the compound tariff entered into force, and that the compound tariff has affected imports of
lower-priced products to a greater extent than imports of higher-priced products.
240 Ultimately,
however, the Panel found that "the fact that the compound tariff has had a greater effect on
lower-priced, as compared with higher-priced, products does not in itself prove that the compound
tariff has helped to discourage the use of 'artificially low' prices or undervaluation for money
laundering purposes." 241 Other findings by the Panel also highlight the lack of sufficient clarity
surrounding the effectiveness of the compound tariff as a means of combating money laundering.
For instance, in assessing the existence of undervaluation of imports of textiles, apparel, and
footwear, the Panel stated that, "[a]lthough it cannot be ruled out that some imports with low
declared prices are being undervalued, on the basis of the information available and in view of the
great diversity of the products considered, it is no t possible to arrive at a general conclusion as to
the degree of undervaluation of the imports prior to the entry into force of the compound tariff."
242
Similarly, the Panel indicated that "the available information does not make it possible to arrive at
a general conclusion concerning the degree to which, as Colombia asserts, the entry into force of
the compound tariff has resulted in a decrease in the undervaluation index of imports of the
relevant products."
243
5.110. The above considerations regarding the unc ertainty surrounding the amount or proportion
of imported goods below the thresholds that are actually used for money laundering purposes, as
well as the extent to which the compound tariff acts as a disincentive to money laundering,
indicate the Panel's view that Colombia had not demonstrated with sufficient clarity the degree of
contribution made by the compound tariff to the objective of combating money laundering. 244 The
Panel's uncertainty is also evident in its overall conclusion that, "[t]aking into account the relevant
facts and the relevant circumstances of the case, including the design, architecture and revealing

234 Panel Report, para. 7.375 (referring to Ministry of Justice and Law, Drugs Observatory, The Drug
Problem in Colombia, Actions and Results 2011-2013 (Panel Exhibit COL-27), p. 145).
235 Panel Report, para. 7.432.
236 Panel Report, para. 7.432.
237 Panel Report, para. 7.434.
239 Panel Report, para. 7.376.
240 Panel Report, paras. 7.428-7.429.
242 Panel Report, para. 7.415.
243 Panel Report, para. 7.423.
244 We note that, in assessing the "necessity" of a measure, the degree of a measure's contribution to
its objective may be expressed in a qualitative or quantitative manner.

structure of the compound tariff, … Colombia ha[d] failed to demonstrate the contribution of the
compound tariff to the objective of combating money laundering".245
5.111. Turning to the trade-restrictiveness of the measure at issue, we note that the Panel found
that "the compound tariff is less restrictive on international trade than an import ban or a measure
having the effects of a ban." 246 This finding by the Panel reflects uncertainty as to the degree of
trade-restrictiveness of the measure at issue because it does not indicate how much less trade
restrictive the measure is in comparison to an import ban. In this regard, we also observe that
Colombia asserts that the trade-restrictive effect of the measure is "modest" since it is less
restrictive on international trade than an import ban.
247 Our examination of the Panel Report
shows that, contrary to Colombia's assertion, the Panel did not find that the trade-restrictive effect
of the measure is "modest". Rather, the Panel indicated that "[t]he compound tariff has definite
effects on international trade, by reducing the ca pacity of the products concerned to compete on
the Colombian market, particularly when the imports are subject to the highest levels of the
tariff."
248 The Panel added that "[t]his is confirmed by the figures submitted by the parties, which
indicate increases in import prices, as well as reductions in imports, mainly in terms of volume, but
also in terms of value." 249 On this basis, the Panel concluded that "the trade-restrictiveness of the
compound tariff is undeniable and is recognized by both parties." 250 Thus, while Colombia is not
correct in asserting that the trade-restrictiveness of the measure is "modest", the Panel's findings
that the measure is less restrictive than an import ban and that the trade-restrictiveness is
"undeniable" do not sufficiently elucidate the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the compound
tariff.
5.112. We also note that, despite acknowledging that the measure is less restrictive than an
import ban, the Panel also raised the possibility that the compound tariff can be highly trade
restrictive, and in some circumstances as restrictive as a ban. Indeed, the Panel stated that, "[b]y
its very nature, a tariff can reduce the capacity of imports to compete in the domestic market of
the country of importation, by increasing the price of the products. If the tariffs are too high, they
can have a very restrictive, even prohibitive effect."
251 The fact that the Panel did not or could not
determine whether the higher specific duty had su ch a prohibitive effect further supports our view
that the Panel was unable to determine the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the measure.
5.113. The above findings by the Panel indicate the uncertainty as to the degree to which the
compound tariff can be considered to be less trade restrictive than an import ban, and thus
support the view that Colombia had not established with sufficient clarity the degree of
trade-restrictiveness of the measure.252
5.114. We note that our understanding of the Panel's findings examined above is in line with the
Panel's preliminary conclusion with respect to the assessment of the "necessity" factors. We recall
that the Panel found that, "even though Colombia ha[d] demonstrated that the objective of
combating money laundering in Colombia serves social interests that could be described as vital
and important at the highest degree, Colombia ha [d] not demonstrated the contribution of the
compound tariff to the alleged objective of combating money laundering."
253 The Panel also held
that, "[f]or this reason, and taking into account the restriction on international trade caused by the
compound tariff, Colombia ha[d] failed to show that the compound tariff is a measure necessary to
combat money laundering."
254 Given our above examination of the relevant Panel findings, we
understand that the Panel's weighing and balancing of the "necessity" factors revealed that
Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the measure is "necessary" to protect public morals.
255

245 Panel Report, para. 7.437.
246 Panel Report, para. 7.444.
247 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 243.
248 Panel Report, para. 7.442.
250 Panel Report, para. 7.444.
252 We note that the degree of a measure's trade-restrictiveness may be expressed in a qualitative or
quantitative manner.
253 Panel Report, para. 7.445.
254 Panel Report, para. 7.445.
255 Panel Report, para. 7.445.

5.115. Finally, we note that, before the Panel, the parties also advanced arguments as to whether
there are any less trade-restrictive alternatives that are reasonably available. Before the Panel,
Panama presented three possible alternative measures to the compound tariff: (i) the disciplines of
the Customs Valuation Agreement; (ii) customs cooperation and information exchange
mechanisms; and (iii) the disciplines of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection.
256 We recall
that, "in order to qualify as an alternative, a measure proposed by the complaining Member must
be not only less trade restrictive than the measure at issue, but should also 'preserve for the
responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective
pursued'."
257 Given the lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution of the
measure to the objective of combating money laundering, and the degree of trade-restrictiveness
of the measure, we see no basis to proceed with a comparison of the measure at issue with any
possible alternative measures.
5.116. In sum, our assessment of the Panel's findings reveals the Panel's consideration that there
was a lack of sufficient clarity with respect to several key aspects of the "necessity" analysis
concerning the defence that Colombia presented to the Panel under Article XX(a). In particular,
there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution of the measure at issue to
the objective of combating money laundering and the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the
measure. Without sufficient clarity in respect of these factors, a proper weighing and balancing
that could yield a conclusion that the measure is "necessary" could not be conducted. In the light
of these considerations, the Panel's findings support the conclusion that Colombia has not
demonstrated that the conclusion resulting from a weighing and balancing exercise is that the
measure at issue is "necessary" to protect public morals.
5.117. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that Colombia has not
demonstrated that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to protect public morals" within
the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
5.3 Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
5.3.1 Whether the Panel erred under Article XX(d) in finding that Colombia had failed to
demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent" with the GATT 1994
5.118. Colombia further appeals the Panel's finding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that
the compound tariff is a measure "designed" to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the GATT 1994, within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
258
According to Colombia, the Panel's conclusions regarding whether the measure is "designed" to
secure compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, and whether the measure is
"necessary" to secure such compliance, are based entirely on its previous analysis under
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. In Colombia's view, since the Panel's analysis under Article XX(a)
is "fundamentally flawed", the Panel's analysis und er Article XX(d) "necessarily suffers from the
same flaws".
259 Colombia requests, if we reverse the Panel's findings under Article XX(a), that we
also reverse the Panel's findings under Article XX(d), and that we complete the legal analysis and
find that the measure at issue meets the requirements of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
260
5.119. Panama maintains that Colombia's claim of error regarding the Panel's analysis under
Article XX(d) relies entirely on the same arguments it presented in challenging the Panel's analysis
under Article XX(a), and that Colombia has not de veloped any arguments on appeal specific to
Article XX(d). Characterizing Colombia's claim of error as imprecise and vague, Panama considers
that it should be rejected. 261 In addition, Panama maintains that , since the Panel did not err in its
analysis under Article XX(a), the Panel also did not err in its analysis under Article XX(d).

256 Panel Report, para. 7.448.
257 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 156 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
US – Gambling, para. 308).
258 Colombia's Notice of Appeal, para. 8.
259 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 249.
260 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 249-254.
261 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 6.6 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines), para. 179).

Consequently, Panama asks that we reject Colombia's request to reverse the Panel's findings and
complete the legal analysis under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.262
5.120. Before the Panel, Colombia asserted a defence under Article XX(d) by maintaining that the
compound tariff is "designed" to secure comp liance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994. The Panel first found that "Colombia ha[d]
identified Article 323 of its Criminal Code, whic h creates the crime of money laundering, as the
anti-money laundering legislation with which it seeks to secure compliance by means of the
compound tariff."263 The Panel then turned to assess whether Colombia had demonstrated that its
anti-money laundering legislation is not inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994. In this
regard, the Panel held that "there [wa]s no reason to consider that Article 323 of the
Colombian Criminal Code is itself inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994."
264 These
findings by the Panel are not appealed.
5.121. Next, the Panel examined whether Colombia had demonstrated that the compound tariff is
itself "designed" to secure compliance with Colombia's anti-money laundering legislation. The
Panel observed that "Colombia ha[d] used the same arguments to try to show that its compound
tariff seeks to combat money laundering as to try to show that its compound tariff seeks to secure
compliance with Article 323 of the Colombian Criminal Code". 265 The Panel recalled its main
findings in the context of Article XX(a), highlighting that it had found that "Colombia had not
demonstrated a connection between the compound tariff and the alleged objective of combating
money laundering."
266 In the Panel's view, the "same considerations" led it to a similar conclusion
under Article XX(d), since the "same elements" that led the Panel to conclude that Colombia had
failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat money laundering also led
it to conclude that Colombia had also failed to demonstrate that the measure is "designed" to
secure compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code.
267 The Panel therefore concluded
that, "[i]n fact, on the basis of the totality of the evidence, including the text of Decree No. 456,
and the other evidence submitted by the partie s, no connection ha[d] been shown to exist
between the compound tariff and the alleged object ive of securing compliance with the Colombian
anti-money laundering provisions, and more specifically Article 323 of the Criminal Code."268
5.122. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the Panel's examination of the first step of the
legal standard under Article XX(d) – i.e. whether the measure is "designed" to secure compliance
with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code – relied mainly on reasoning and findings it had
developed in the context of its analysis under Article XX(a). We therefore focus on the relevant
elements of the legal standard under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, and point to certain
similarities with a panel's analysis of a defence under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, before
turning to a more detailed assessment of the Panel's findings.
5.123. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the Appellate Body explained that, for a respondent
to justify provisionally a measure under Arti cle XX(d) of the GATT 1994, the following two
elements must be shown: (i) the measure must be one "designed" to secure compliance with laws
or regulations that are not themselves inconsis tent with some provision of the GATT 1994; and
(ii) the measure must be "necessary" to secure such compliance.
269
5.124. Recently, in Argentina – Financial Services , the Appellate Body addressed aspects of the
two elements of the legal standard as it pertains to a similar exception set out in Article XIV(c) of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS):
With respect to the first element, the phrase "to secure compliance" circumscribes the
scope of Article XIV(c) of the GATS, as it sp eaks to the function of the measures that
a Member can seek to justify under this provision. This phrase calls for an initial
examination of the relationship between the inconsistent measure and the relevant

262 Panama's appellee's submission, para. 6.8.
263 Panel Report, para. 7.508.
264 Panel Report, para. 7.512.
265 Panel Report, para. 7.515.
266 Panel Report, para. 7.516.
267 Panel Report, para. 7.517.
268 Panel Report, para. 7.518.
269 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 157.

laws or regulations and, for this purpose, directs panels assessing whether a measure
secures compliance with laws or regulations to scrutinize the design of the measures
sought to be justified. A measure can be said "to secure compliance" with laws or
regulations when its design reveals that it secures compliance with specific rules,
obligations, or requirements under such laws or regulations, even if the measure
cannot be guaranteed to achieve such result with absolute certainty. The more
precisely a respondent is able to identify specific rules, obligations, or requirements
contained in the GATS-consistent laws or regulations, the more likely it will be able to
elucidate how and why the inconsistent measure secures compliance with such laws or
regulations. Yet, where the assessment of the design of the measure, including its
content and expected operation, reveals that the measure is incapable of securing
compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under the relevant law or
regulation, as identified by a respondent, further analysis with regard to whether this
measure is "necessary" to secure such compliance may not be required. This is
because there is no justification under Article XIV(c) for a measure that is not
designed to "secure compliance" with a Member's laws or regulations. A panel must
not, however, structure its analysis of the first element in such a way as to lead it to
truncate its analysis prematurely and thereby foreclose consideration of crucial
aspects of the respondent's defence relating to the "necessity" analysis.
The second element entails a more in-depth, holistic analysis of the relationship
between the inconsistent measure and the relevant laws or regulations. In particular,
this element entails an assessment of whether, in the light of all relevant factors in
the "necessity" analysis, this relationship is sufficiently proximate, such that the
measure can be deemed to be "necessary" to secure compliance with such laws or
regulations.
270
5.125. In addressing above the legal standard under Article XX(a), we have noted similar
considerations pertaining to the "design" and "necessity" steps of that standard. In that context,
we have observed that these two steps of the analysis are conceptually distinct, yet related,
aspects of the overall inquiry to be undertaken into whether a respondent has established that the
measure at issue is "necessary to protect public morals", and that such an assessment is not
entirely disconnected in the sense that certain evidence and considerations may be relevant to
both aspects of the defence. This applies equally in the context of Article XX(d) when examining
whether the measure at issue is "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent" with the GATT 1994.
5.126. We further recognize that, while the content of the legal standards under Article XX(a) and
Article XX(d) differ, there are also certain similarities that are relevant for our consideration of
Colombia's appeal. Under both paragraphs (a) and (d) of Article XX, justification is sought for an
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure. Under Article XX(a), the societal interest or value at stake
must fall within the scope of "public morals", whereas the interests and values reflected in the
"laws or regulations" under Article XX(d) are not limited in a similar way. Also, recourse to
Article XX(d) requires identification of specific rules, obligations, or requirements of laws or
regulations that are not themselves GATT-inconsis tent, while such a requirement is absent in
Article XX(a).
271 The examination of a defence under both Article XX(a) and Article XX(d) requires
an initial, threshold examination of the design of the measure at issue, including its content,
structure, and expected operation. In the ca se of Article XX(a), a panel must examine the
relationship between the measure and the protection of public morals; in the case of Article XX(d),
a panel must examine the relationship between the measure and securing compliance with
relevant provisions of laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent.
272 Thus, while the terms

270 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, paras. 6.203-6.204. (fns omitted) As we have
noted supra at footnote 156, Article XIV sets out the general exceptions from obligations under the GATS in a
similar manner to Article XX of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has indicated that, since similar language is
used in both provisions, previous decisions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 are relevant for the analysis
under Article XIV of the GATS. (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 291) We consider that the
reverse is also true.
271 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203.
272 The Appellate Body has remarked that the objectives of, or the common interests or values protected
by, the relevant law or regulation may assist in elucidating the content of specific rules, obligations, or
requirements in such law or regulation. (Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, fn 495 to
para. 6.203)

"to protect" and "to secure compliance" may differ, we consider that both terms involve
establishing the existence of such a relationship. If the assessment of the design of the measure,
including its content, structure, and expected oper ation, reveals that the measure is incapable of,
in the case of Article XX(a), protecting public morals, or, in the case of Article XX(d), securing
compliance with relevant provisions of laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent, there is
not a relationship that meets the requirements of the "design" step. In either situation, further
analysis with regard to whether the measure is "necessary" would not be required. This is because
there can be no justification under Article XX(a) for a measure that is not "designed" to protect
public morals, just as there can be no justification under Article XX(d) for a measure that is not
"designed" to secure compliance with relevant provisions of laws or regulations that are not
GATT-inconsistent.
273 However, as indicated by the Appellate Body, in both cases, "[a] panel must
not … structure its analysis of the ["design" step] in such a way as to lead it to truncate its
analysis prematurely and thereby foreclose consideration of crucial aspects of the respondent's
defence relating to the 'necessity' analysis."
274
5.127. In the circumstances of this case, the analys is of the "design" of the measure as it relates
to Colombia's defences under Article XX(a) and Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 examines what
amounts to a similar relationship. In the case of Article XX(a), as we have explained, the question
before the Panel was whether its examination of the "design" of the measure revealed that there is
a relationship between the measure and protecting public morals by combating money laundering.
In the context of Article XX(d), the question befo re the Panel was whether its examination of the
"design" of the measure revealed that there is a relationship between the measure and securing
compliance with a specific rule, obligation, or requirement of Colombian legislation, namely,
Article 323 of its Criminal Code, which combats money laundering by criminalizing such conduct.
Thus, provided that the Panel's reasoning accounts for the differences in the legal standards under
paragraph (a) and paragraph (d) of Article XX, we do not see that the Panel acted improperly
simply because it relied, in the context of its application of the legal standard under Article XX(d),
on reasoning it had developed in assessing Colombia's defence under Article XX(a). As the Panel
observed, Colombia itself had presented the same arguments and evidence in respect of both
paragraph (a) and paragraph (d) of Article XX. In deed, in both instances, Colombia maintained
that the compound tariff seeks to combat money laundering so as to secure compliance with
Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code because, "by its design, [it] reduces the incentives for
criminal groups to use imports of apparel and footwear for money laundering purposes, by means
of artificially low prices."
275 In the context of this dispute, the objective of combating money
laundering is also reflected in a provision of a Colombian law that combats money laundering by
criminalizing such conduct. In these circumstances, the Panel did not act improperly by examining
similar aspects of the manner in which the measure did or did not demonstrate a relationship to
combating money laundering activities, or by relying on similar considerations and reasoning in
reaching its conclusions under Article XX(a) and Article XX(d).
276
5.128. At the same time, however, we consider that the concerns we have raised in the context of
the Panel's assessment of whether the compound tariff is "designed" to protect public morals
under Article XX(a) are also relevant in the context of the assessment under Article XX(d). We
recall that, in our examination of Colombia's claim on appeal under Article XX(a), we have
reviewed a number of findings made by the Panel in its assessment of the relationship between
the measure and combating money laundering.
5.129. In that prior analysis, we have noted that, with regard to whether the price thresholds set
out in the measure are such that any price below them is "artificially low", the Panel stated that "it
cannot be ruled out that the importation of goods at prices below the thresholds established in
Decree No. 456 could, in practice, reflect 'artificially low' prices that do not reflect market
conditions."
277 By stating that "it cannot be ruled out" that goods priced below the thresholds

273 See Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203; and Mexico – Taxes on Soft
Drinks, para. 72.
274 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203.
275 Panel Report, para. 7.515.
276 We recall that neither party contests the Panel's conclusions that combating money laundering is a
Colombian policy "designed" to protect public morals (Panel Report, para. 7.339), or that Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code forms part of legislation that criminalizes money laundering activities (para. 7.508).
Moreover, neither party appeals the Panel's finding that there is "no reason to consider that Article 323 of the
Colombian Criminal Code is itself inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994." (Ibid., para. 7.512)
277 Panel Report, para. 7.359.

reflect "artificially low" prices, the Panel acknowledged that at least some transactions at or below
the thresholds could reflect such prices. Second, the Panel found that "the information available
suggests that the undervaluation of imports is, in fact, one of the methods used for money
laundering detected by the Colombian authorities."
278 By making this statement, the Panel
acknowledged that, in Colombia, one of the methods used to launder money is the undervaluation
of imports.279
5.130. Moreover, we have considered that additi onal findings by the Panel show a relationship
between the compound tariff and the money laundering activities that Colombia seeks to
discourage through the application of the challeng ed measure. For instance, we have noted the
Panel's findings that the compound tariff leads to an increase in the unit price of apparel and
footwear imports, thereby reducing the artificially high profit margin that is the incentive for using
these imports to launder money. The Panel found, for example, that, "since the compound tariff
entered into force, Colombian imports of the products in question have declined and average
import prices have increased."
280 In addition, the Panel also accepted that "the compound tariff
could reduce the incentives for importing textile products, apparel and footwear at prices below
the thresholds laid down in Decree No. 456" 281, and that "the effect of the compound tariff would
be limited to reducing the profit margin of the persons intending to use imports for money
laundering purposes".282
5.131. In our view, these findings demonstrate the Panel's recognition, in respect of its analysis
under both Article XX(a) and Article XX(d), that at least some goods priced at or below the
thresholds could be imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering
purposes, and would thus be subject to the disincen tive created by the higher specific duties that
apply to these goods. Taking these findings together, we consider that the Panel itself recognized
that the compound tariff is not incapable of securing compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a relationship between that measure and securing
such compliance.
5.132. We recall that the Panel concluded that Colombia had failed to establish a relationship
between the compound tariff and securing compliance with provisions of Colombian anti-money
laundering legislation.
283 In this regard, we further recall that a panel may cease its analysis of a
defence under Article XX(d) at the stage of assessi ng the "design" of the measure only where the
measure at issue is incapable of securing compliance with relevant provisions of laws or
regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent, such that there is no relationship between the measure
and securing such compliance. In the light of the cited passages from the Panel Report, we
consider that the Panel was not in a situation in which the measure at issue is incapable of
securing such compliance. Although the Panel concluded that Colombia had failed to establish a
relationship between the compound tariff and Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, we consider
that this conclusion is belied by the Panel findings we examined above. Indeed, we understand the
Panel to have recognized that at least some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be
imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be
subject to the disincentive create d by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods. Thus,
the Panel's analysis indicates that the compound tariff is not incapable of securing compliance with
Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a relationship between that measure
and securing such compliance.
5.133. Consequently, the Panel should not have ceased its analysis at this stage of its review of
Colombia's defence under Article XX(d). As we have noted, a panel errs under Article XX(d) if, in
assessing the "design" of the measure, it does not proceed to an analysis of "necessity" once it has
determined that the measure is not incapable of securing compliance with relevant provisions of

278 Panel Report, para. 7.366.
279 The Panel made additional findings that further demonstrate the Panel's understanding regarding the
existence of trade-based money laundering through the importation of undervalued goods. For instance, the
Panel explained that one of the methods for laundering money that the compound tariff seeks to combat is the
"transport of money of illicit origin to another country to purchase goods which are introduced into the local
country by means of technical smuggling based on underinvoicing". (Panel Report, para. 7.370 (quoting
Colombia's response to Panel question No. 44, para. 101))
280 Panel Report, para. 7.428.
281 Panel Report, para. 7.435.
282 Panel Report, para. 7.436.
283 Panel Report, para. 7.518.

laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent, such that there is a relationship between the
measure and securing such compliance. Otherwise, a panel would foreclose an assessment of
whether the degree of contribution, when we ighed and balanced against the degree of
trade-restrictiveness and the importance of the interests and values at stake, is sufficient to justify
the measure under Article XX(d).
5.134. We recall that, having found that Colombia had not shown that the compound tariff is a
measure "designed" to secure compliance with Article 323 of the Criminal Code, the Panel
concluded that there was no need to examine whether the compound tariff is "necessary" to
secure compliance with Colombian anti-money laundering legislation. Nevertheless, "in order to be
exhaustive in its analysis", the Panel evaluated whether the measure is "necessary" by assuming,
for the sake of argument, that the compound tariff is "designed" to secure such compliance.
284 We
note, in any event, that the Panel's ultimate conclusion as to the availability of the Article XX(d)
defence to Colombia was founded solely on its conclusion that Colombia had not demonstrated
that the compound tariff is "designed" to secure compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code.
5.135. In sum, the Panel erred in concluding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the
measure is "designed" to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
GATT-inconsistent given its recognition that the compound tariff is not incapable of securing
compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a relationship between
that measure and securing such compliance. Thus, the Panel failed to assess the "necessity" of the
measure on the basis of a weighing and balancing exercise. Contrary to the legal standard under
Article XX(d), the Panel prematurely ceased its analysis under this provision without proceeding to
assess the degree of contribution of the measur e to its objective, together with the other
"necessity" factors in a weighing and balancing exercise.
5.136. We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.519 of its Report, that Colombia
has failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to secure compliance with
Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code. Since the Panel's ultimate findings in respect of
Article XX(d) were based exclusively on this erroneous finding, we also reverse the Panel's
findings, in paragraphs 7.537 and 8.6 of its Report, that Colombia has failed to demonstrate that
the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent" with the GATT 1994, namely, Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, within
the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
5.3.2 Completion of the legal analysis
5.137. This brings us to Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the
measure at issue meets the requirements set ou t in Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Colombia
contends that it had demonstrated before the Panel that the measure is aimed at securing
compliance with Colombian laws and regulations against money laundering and the financing of
other criminal activities. Colombia points out that money laundering is a criminal offense in
Colombia under Article 323 of its Criminal Code, and that the Panel found that Article 323 is
consistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994.
285 Colombia adds that the use of imports of
apparel and footwear at artificially low prices to launder money is well established by competent
Colombian authorities 286 and international bodies 287, and that the Panel acknowledged that
criminal groups use imports of apparel and footwear at artificially low prices to launder illicit
money.
288 Therefore, Colombia asserts, the measure is "designed" to secure compliance with its
anti-money laundering legislation, as it discourages criminal groups from using imports of apparel
and footwear at artificially low prices to launder money.289

284 Panel Report, para. 7.520.
285 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 250 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.512).
286 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 251 (referring to Ministry of Finance and Public Credit,
National Customs and Excise Directorate, and Information and Financial Analysis Unit, Money Laundering
Typologies Related to Smuggling, January 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-10)).
287 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 251 (referring to Financial Action Task Force (FATF),
Trade-Based Money Laundering, 23 June 2006 (Panel Exhibit COL-11); and Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of
Free Trade Zones, March 2010 (Panel Exhibit COL-12)).
288 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 251.
289 Colombia's appellant's submission, para. 252.

5.138. We begin by recalling the Panel's finding that "Article 323 of [Colombia's] Criminal Code,
which creates the crime of money laundering, [i]s the anti-money laundering legislation with which
[Colombia] seeks to secure compliance by means of the compound tariff."
290 This finding is not
challenged on appeal. We therefore consider that, in the circumstances of this dispute, the specific
provision of the legislation with which Colombia seeks to secure compliance within the meaning of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 is the prohibition of money laundering set out in Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code.
5.139. Article XX(d) also indicates that the laws or regulations with which the measure at issue
secures compliance must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994. In this regard,
the Panel found that "there is no reason to consider that Article 323 of the
Colombian Criminal Code is itself inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994."
291 This
finding is also not challenged on appeal. We therefore see no basis to consider that Article 323 is
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994.
5.140. Our prior examination of Colombia's clai m revealed that, when several findings by the
Panel are read together, it is clear from its analysis that the compound tariff is not incapable of
securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a relationship
between that measure and securing such compliance. Indeed, we understand the Panel to have
recognized that at least some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be imported into
Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be subject to the
disincentive created by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
5.141. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that the measure at issue is
"designed" to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
GATT 1994, namely, Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, within the meaning of Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1994.
5.142. We now proceed to examine whether the compound tariff is a measure "necessary" to
secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent, within the meaning of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. We recall that a "necessity" analysis involves a process of
"weighing and balancing" a series of factors, incl uding the importance of the societal interest or
value at stake, the contribution of the measure to the objective it pursues, and the
trade-restrictiveness of the measure.
292 We further recall that each of these factors must be
demonstrated with sufficient clarity in order to conduct a proper weighing and balancing exercise
that may yield a conclusion that the measure is "necessary".
5.143. Turning to Colombia's request for completion of the legal analysis, we note that Colombia
considers that it has provided sufficient argument s and evidence to demonstrate, and that certain
conclusions by the Panel provide a sufficient basis to find, that the measure at issue is "necessary"
to secure compliance with Article 323 of the Criminal Code as regards money laundering
operations that use undervalued imports of apparel and footwear.
293
5.144. With respect to the importance of the interests or values at stake, the Panel noted
Colombia's position that such interests or values in this dispute are vital and important in the
highest degree, and that Panama does not question that the fight against money laundering is a
societal interest that could be characterized as vital and important in the highest degree.
294 The
Panel therefore considered that, for reasons similar to those mentioned in its analysis under
Article XX(a), securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code reflects societal

290 Panel Report, para. 7.508.
291 Panel Report, para. 7.512.
292 See Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; US – Gambling,
a comparison between the challenged measure and possible alternatives should subsequently be undertaken.
(Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling,
para. 307))
293 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 253-254 (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.408, 7.436,
7.444, and 7.448-7.469).
294 Panel Report, para. 7.522.

interests that can be characterized as vital and important in the highest degree. 295 We note that
this finding is not challenged on appeal.
5.145. We now turn to examine the contribution of the measure to the objective it pursues.
Above, we have identified a number of findings concerning the Panel's understanding regarding the
relationship between the measure and the obje ctive of securing compliance with Colombian
anti-money laundering legislation, namely, Articl e 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code. We consider
that the same findings of the Panel that led us to conclude that the compound tariff is not
incapable of securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a
relationship between that measure and securing such compliance, also indicate that there may be
at least some contribution by the compound tariff to securing such compliance. As we have noted,
various findings of the Panel demonstrate its understanding that at least some goods priced at or
below the thresholds could be imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money
laundering purposes, and would thus be subject to the disincentive created by the higher specific
duties that apply to these goods. We therefore consider that these findings establish the Panel's
recognition that there may be at least some contribution by the measure to securing compliance
with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code.
5.146. However, while the Panel's findings that we have discussed indicate that there may be at
least some contribution, they are also indeterminate as to the degree of such contribution. As we
have noted, various findings by the Panel highlight the lack of sufficient clarity surrounding the
amount or proportion of import transactions involving the products at issue that are actually used
for money laundering purposes. Moreover, we have noted findings by the Panel that indicate that
the Panel did not have much clarity as to how effective the disincentive of the compound tariff is
as a means of combating money laundering. These considerations regarding the uncertainty
surrounding the amount or proportion of imported goods below the thresholds that are actually
used for money laundering purposes, as well as the extent to which the compound tariff acts as a
disincentive to money laundering, indicate the Panel's view that Colombia had not demonstrated
with sufficient clarity the degree of contribution made by the compound tariff to the objective of
combating money laundering.
296 The Panel's uncertainty is also evident in its overall conclusion
that, "[t]aking into account the relevant facts and relevant circumstances of the case, including the
design, architecture and revealing structure of the compound tariff", Colombia had "failed to
demonstrate the contribution of the compound tariff to the objective of securing compliance with
the Colombian anti-money laundering legislation".
297
5.147. Turning to the trade-restrictiveness of the measure at issue, we note that the Panel found
that "the compound tariff is less trade-restrictive than a ban on imports". 298 This finding by the
Panel reflects uncertainty as to the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the measure at issue because
it does not indicate how much less trade restrictive the measure is in comparison to an import ban.
We also note that, despite acknowledging that the measure at issue is less restrictive than an
import ban, the Panel had previously raised the possibility that the compound tariff can be highly
trade restrictive, and in some circumstances as re strictive as a ban. Indeed, the Panel stated that,
"[b]y its very nature, a tariff can reduce the capacity of imports to compete in the domestic
market of the country of importation, by increasing the price of the products. If the tariffs are too
high, they can have a very restrictive, even prohibitive effect."
299 The fact that the Panel did not or
could not determine whether the higher specific duty had such a prohibitive effect further supports
our view that the Panel was unable to determine the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the
measure. In our view, the above findings by the Panel indicate the uncertainty as to the degree to
which the compound tariff can be considered to be less trade restrictive than an import ban, and
thus support the view that Colombia had not established with sufficient clarity the degree of
trade-restrictiveness of the measure.
300

295 Panel Report, paras. 7.523-7.524.
296 We note that, in assessing the "necessity" of a measure, the degree of a measure's contribution to
its objective may be expressed in a qualitative or quantitative manner.
297 Panel Report, para. 7.528.
298 Panel Report, para. 7.530.
300 In addition, as we have noted in the context of our analysis under Article XX(a), given the lack of
sufficient clarity regarding the degrees of contribution and trade-restrictiveness of the measure, there is no
basis to proceed in comparing the measure at issue with any possible alternative measures regarding their
contribution and trade-restrictiveness.

5.148. We note that our understanding of the Panel's findings examined above is in line with the
Panel's preliminary conclusion with respect to the assessment of the "necessity" factors. We recall
that the Panel found that, "even though the objective of securing compliance with the Colombian
anti-money laundering legislation reflects social interests that could be characterized as vital and
important in the highest degree, Colombia ha[d] failed to demonstrate the contribution of the
compound tariff to the alleged objective of securing compliance with the Colombian anti-money
laundering legislation."
301 The Panel also held that, "[f]or this reason, and taking into account the
restriction on international trade caused by the compound tariff, Colombia ha[d] failed to
demonstrate that the compound tariff is a measure necessary to secure compliance with the
Colombian anti-money laundering legislation and, more specifically, Article 323 of the
Criminal Code."
302 Given our above examination of the relevant Panel findings, we understand that
the Panel's weighing and balancing of the "necessity" factors revealed that Colombia had failed to
demonstrate that the measure is "necessary" to secure compliance with laws or regulations that
are not GATT-inconsistent.
303
5.149. In sum, our assessment of the Panel's findings reveals the Panel's consideration that there
was a lack of sufficient clarity with respect to several key aspects of the "necessity" analysis
concerning the defence that Colombia presented to the Panel under Article XX(d). In particular,
there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution of the measure at issue to
securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, and the degree of
trade-restrictiveness of the measure. Without sufficient clarity in respect of these factors, a proper
weighing and balancing that could yield a conclusion that the measure is "necessary" could not be
conducted. In the light of these considerations, the Panel's findings support the conclusion that
Colombia has not demonstrated that the conclusion resulting from a weighing and balancing
exercise is that the measure at issue is "necessary" to secure compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code.
5.150. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that Colombia has not
demonstrated that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent" with the GATT 1994, within the meaning of Article XX(d) of
the GATT 1994.
5.4 Chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
5.151. Finally, we take note of Colombia's appeal of the Panel's findings pertaining to the chapeau
of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Colombia clai ms that the Panel erred under Article XX and
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, and under Article 11 of the DSU, in rejecting Colombia's contention
that an FTA-based exemption from the compound tariff is consistent with Article XXIV, and
therefore does not contravene the requir ements of the chapeau of Article XX.
304 In addition,
Colombia claims that the Panel erred under Article XX by failing to establish that any treatment
arising from certain exemptions reflects discrimination "between countries where the same
conditions prevail", and that the Panel also erred under Article 11 of the DSU by making the case
for Panama, and by ignoring Colombia's arguments as to why the exemptions are justified.
305
5.152. We recall the Panel's finding that, becaus e Colombia had failed to demonstrate that its
compound tariff is justified under Article XX(a) or Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, it was not
necessary for the Panel to analyse whether the compound tariff meets the requirements of the
chapeau.306 Nevertheless, "in order to be exhaustive in its analysis", the Panel conducted its
assessment of the chapeau by assuming, for the sake of argument, that Colombia had succeeded
in showing that its measure is provisionally justified under Article XX(a) or Article XX(d) of the

301 Panel Report, para. 7.532.
302 Panel Report, para. 7.532.
303 Panel Report, para. 7.532.
304 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 256-280. Colombia also claims that the Panel erred under
Article 6.2 of the DSU by allegedly finding that Colombia's arguments concerning Article XXIV of the
GATT 1994 were not within its terms of reference. (See ibid., para. 271; and Colombia's Notice of Appeal,
para. 8)
305 Colombia's appellant's submission, paras. 281-300. The relevant exemptions are those for imports
into Colombia's Special Customs Regime Zones, and under the Plan Vallejo.
306 Panel Report, para. 7.550.

GATT 1994.307 We further recall our findings above that Colombia has not demonstrated that the
compound tariff is provisionally justified under Article XX(a) or Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
5.153. Given these findings, we do not consider it necessary to examine Colombia's claims on
appeal pertaining to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. We express no view on the
Panel's reasoning in that regard, or the Panel's findings in paragraphs 7.591 and 8.7 of its Report.
6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, th e Appellate Body makes the following findings and
conclusions.
6.1 Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994
6.2. With respect to the Panel's finding that it was unnecessary to interpret the scope of
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, we consider that this finding does not follow logically
from its previous finding indicating that the measure applies, or could apply, to some illicit trade.
We therefore consider that the Panel did not prov ide coherent reasoning, and that the basis upon
which it refrained from interpreting Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 was flawed.
a. We therefore find that the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 of the
DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter, including an objective assessment
of the applicability of the relevant covered agreements, in finding that it was
unnecessary for the Panel to interpret the scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994.
b. Consequently, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.108 and 8.1 of the Panel
Report, that it was unnecessary for the Panel to issue a finding as to whether or not
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 applies to illicit trade.
6.3. With respect to Colombia's request for completion of the legal analysis, we do not see that
the text of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 excludes what Colombia classifies as illicit
trade. Moreover, the context provided in Ar ticles II:2 and VII:2 of the GATT 1994 and the
Customs Valuation Agreement supports our view that the scope of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994 is not limited in the manner suggested by Colombia. We also consider that our
interpretation regarding the scope of Article II:1( a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 is in keeping with
the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, and that a Member seeking to address concerns
regarding money laundering may do so through the general exceptions contained in Article XX of
the GATT 1994. In the light of this interpretation of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, we
see no grounds to disturb the Panel's findings that the compound tariff necessarily exceeds
Colombia's bound tariff rates in the instances set out in paragraphs 7.164 and 7.180 of its Report.
a. We therefore find, for imports of products classified in Chapters 61, 62, 63, and 64
(except for heading 64.06 but including tariff line 6406.10.00.00) of Colombia's Customs
Tariff, that, in the instances identified in the Panel Report, the compound tariff exceeds
the bound tariff rates in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions, and is therefore
inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994.
b. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.189, 7.192-7.194,
and 8.2-8.4 of the Panel Report.
6.2 Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994
6.4. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, the Panel erred in
concluding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the measure is "designed" to combat
money laundering given its recognition that the compound tariff is not incapable of combating
money laundering, such that there is a relationship between that measure and the protection of
public morals. Thus, the Panel failed to assess th e "necessity" of the measure on the basis of a
weighing and balancing exercise. Contrary to the legal standard under Article XX(a), the Panel

307 Panel Report, para. 7.551.

prematurely ceased its analysis under this prov ision without proceeding to assess the degree of
contribution of the measure to its objective, together with the other "necessity" factors in a
weighing and balancing exercise.
a. We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.400 of the Panel Report, that
Colombia has failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to combat
money laundering, and the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.401 of the Panel Report, that
Colombia has not shown that the compound tariff is a measure "designed" to protect
public morals.
b. Since the Panel's ultimate findings in respect of Article XX(a) were based exclusively on
these erroneous findings, we also reverse the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.471
and 8.5 of the Panel Report, that Colombia has failed to demonstrate that the compound
tariff is a measure "necessary to protect public morals" within the meaning of
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
6.5. Given that we have reversed the Panel's finding that Colombia has failed to demonstrate that
the compound tariff is "designed" to protect public morals, we do not consider it necessary to
examine Colombia's additional claims of error, including that the Panel erred in its "necessity"
analysis under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, and that the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty
to conduct an objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.
6.6. With respect to Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the
measure at issue is "designed" to protect public morals, our prior examination of Colombia's claim
of error revealed that, when several findings by the Panel are read together, it is clear from its
analysis that the compound tariff is not incapable of combating money laundering, such that there
is a relationship between that measure and the protection of public morals. Indeed, we understand
the Panel to have recognized that at least some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be
imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be
subject to the disincentive created by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
a. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findin gs, we find that the measure at issue is
"designed" to protect public morals in Colombia within the meaning of Article XX(a) of
the GATT 1994.
6.7. With respect to Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the
measure at issue is "necessary" to protect public morals, our assessment of the Panel's findings
reveals the Panel's consideration that there was a lack of sufficient clarity with respect to several
key aspects of the "necessity" analysis concerning the defence that Colombia presented to the
Panel under Article XX(a). In particular, there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree
of contribution of the measure at issue to the objective of combating money laundering, and the
degree of trade-restrictiveness of the measure. Without sufficient clarity in respect of these
factors, a proper weighing and balancing that could yield a conclusion that the measure is
"necessary" could not be conducted. In the light of these considerations, the Panel's findings
support the conclusion that Colombia has not demonstrated that the conclusion resulting from a
weighing and balancing exercise is that the measure at issue is "necessary" to protect public
morals.
a. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that Colombia has not
demonstrated that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to protect public morals"
within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
6.3 Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
6.8. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, the Panel erred in
concluding that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the measure is "designed" to secure
compliance with laws or regulations that are not GATT-inconsistent given its recognition that the
compound tariff is not incapable of securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal
Code, such that there is a relationship between that measure and securing such compliance. Thus,
the Panel failed to assess the "necessity" of the me asure on the basis of a weighing and balancing
exercise. Contrary to the legal standard under Article XX(d), the Panel prematurely ceased its

analysis under this provision without proceedin g to assess the degree of contribution of the
measure to its objective, together with the other "necessity" factors in a weighing and balancing
exercise.
a. We therefore reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.519 of the Panel Report, that
Colombia has failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is "designed" to secure
compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code.
b. Since the Panel's ultimate findings in respect of Article XX(d) were based exclusively on
this erroneous finding, we also reverse the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.537 and 8.6
of the Panel Report, that Colombia has failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff is
a measure "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent" with the GATT 1994, namely, Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code,
within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
6.9. With respect to Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the
measure at issue is "designed" to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
GATT-inconsistent, our prior examination of Colombia's claim revealed that, when several findings
by the Panel are read together, it is clear that the Panel recognized that the compound tariff is not
incapable of securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, such that there is a
relationship between that measure and securing such compliance. Indeed, we understand the
Panel to have recognized that at least some goods priced at or below the thresholds could be
imported into Colombia at artificially low prices for money laundering purposes, and would thus be
subject to the disincentive created by the higher specific duties that apply to these goods.
a. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findin gs, we find that the measure at issue is
"designed" to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the GATT 1994, namely, Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, within the meaning of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
6.10. With respect to Colombia's request that we complete the legal analysis and find that the
measure at issue is "necessary" to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
GATT-inconsistent, our assessment of the Panel's findings reveals the Panel's consideration that
there was a lack of sufficient clarity with respect to several key aspects of the "necessity" analysis
concerning the defence that Colombia presented to the Panel under Article XX(d). In particular,
there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution of the measure at issue to
securing compliance with Article 323 of Colombia's Criminal Code, and the degree of
trade-restrictiveness of the measure. Without sufficient clarity in respect of these factors, a proper
weighing and balancing that could yield a conclusion that the measure is "necessary" could not be
conducted. In the light of these considerations, the Panel's findings support the conclusion that
Colombia has not demonstrated that the conclusion resulting from a weighing and balancing
exercise is that the measure at issue is "necessary" to secure compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia's Criminal Code.
a. Therefore, on the basis of the Panel's findings, we find that Colombia has not
demonstrated that the compound tariff is a measure "necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent" with the GATT 1994, within the
meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
6.4 Chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
6.11. With respect to the Panel's findings under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, given
our findings that Colombia has not demonstrated that the compound tariff is provisionally justified
under Article XX(a) or Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, we do not consider it necessary to examine
Colombia's claims on appeal pertaining to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. We express
no view on the Panel's reasoning in that regard, or the Panel's findings in paragraphs 7.591
and 8.7 of the Panel Report.