UKRAINE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON AMMONIUM NITRATE ARB-2019-1
Document: Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Award of the Arbitrator Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández
Date: 8 April 2020
Document codes: WT/DS493/RPT
Complainant: Russia
Respondent: Ukraine
Third parties: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, China, EU, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 5.8, 11.2, 11.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5.1, 6.8, Annex II, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.4, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 18.1, 1, 17.4, VI  Anti-dumping

UKRAINE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON AMMONIUM NITRATE
ARB-2019-1
Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes

Award of the Arbitrator
Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández

* NOTE CONCERNING DOCUMENT SYMBOL: As of 13 April 2017, for ease of reference, awards of
arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU bear the symbol WT/DS[number]/RPT.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS AWARD
Abbreviation Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
Appellate Body Report Appellate Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium
Nitrate, and Add.1
Draft Law against Dumped
Imports
Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports" to replace
the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against
Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998)
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
EuroChem JSC MCC EuroChem
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Gazprom JSC Gazprom
ICIT Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade
Law against Dumped Imports Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped
Imports" (22 December 1998)
Ministry Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine
(formerly the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine)
Panel Report Panel Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate,
, Add.1 and Corr.1
UN United Nations
Ukrainian Safeguard Law Law of Ukraine on the application of safeguard measures on imports to
Ukraine
VRU Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
WTO

EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS AWARD
Exhibit No. Short title Long title
Exhibit RUS-1b Law against Dumped
Imports
Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against
Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998)
Exhibit RUS-2b 2010 amendment ICIT, Decision implementing court orders regarding EuroChem
(25 October 2010)
Exhibit RUS-6 ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on import of
passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and
export (10 September 2015)
Exhibit RUS-8 Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law
against Dumped Imports
Exhibit RUS-10 WTO Statistics on Initiation of Dumping, Countervailing and
Safeguard Investigations
Exhibit RUS-12b ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti-dumping measures on
imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia
(18 February 2017)
Exhibit RUS-13b ICIT, Notice on the resumption of anti-dumping measures on
imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in
Russia (20 May 2017)
Exhibit RUS-14b Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in Case
No. 826/7760/17 (18 December 2019)
Exhibit RUS-20b Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus SARS-CoV-2
(17 March 2020)
Exhibit RUS-21b Ministry, Notice regarding submission of information
(27 March 2020)
Exhibit RUS-22b Ministry, Press release, "The Ministry for Development of
Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine informs about the
specifics of conducting trade investigations during the period of
quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev"
(17 March 2020)
Exhibit UKR-2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on the
measures that may be taken by the Community following a
report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters
Exhibit UKR-5 Statistics on duration of reviews of anti-dumping measures
Exhibit UKR-6 United Nations News, "Human cost of Ukraine conflict is
growing, Security Council told" (16 July 2019)
Exhibit UKR-7 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine,
16 August to 15 November 2019
Exhibit UKR-8 United Nations General Assembly resolution 74/17, Problem of
the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black
Sea and the Sea of Azov (9 December 2019)
Exhibit UKR-10 Draft Law against
Dumped Imports
Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports"
to replace the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National
Producer against Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998)
Exhibit UKR-13 Laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of
IX convocation concerning the emergency situation in Ukraine,
until 14 February 2020

CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD
Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Hides and Leather
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of
Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS155/10, 31 August 2001, DSR 2001:XII,
p. 6013
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS332/16,
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581
Canada – Pharmaceutical
Patents (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS114/13,
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p. 3
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties
on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS414/12, 3 May 2013,
DSR 2013:IV, p. 1495
Colombia – Ports of Entry
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on
Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS366/13, 2 October 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3819
Colombia – Textiles
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation
of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, WT/DS461/13, 15 November 2016
EC – Chicken Cuts
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15, 20 February 2006
EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Export Subsidies on
Sugar – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS265/33,
WT/DS266/33, WT/DS283/14, 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11581
EC – Hormones
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833
EC – Tariff Preferences
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS246/14, 20 September 2004, DSR
2004:IX, p. 4313
Indonesia – Autos
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12,
7 December 1998, DSR 1998:IX, p. 4029
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic
Random Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, WT/DS336/16, 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8553
Peru – Agricultural Products
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS457/15, 16 December 2015, DSR 2015:XI, p. 5845
Russia – Traffic in Transit Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit,
WT/DS512/R and Add.1, adopted 26 April 2019
Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate Appellate Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium
Nitrate, WT/DS493/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 30 September 2019
Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate Panel Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate,
WT/DS493/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 30 September 2019, as upheld
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS493/AB/R
Ukraine – Passenger Cars Panel Report, Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain
Passenger Cars, WT/DS468/R and Add.1, adopted 20 July 2015,
DSR 2015:VI, p. 3117
US – 1916 Act
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 –
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14,
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Anti-Dumping
Methodologies (China)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their
Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China – Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS471/RPT, 19 January 2018
US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, 4 December 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173
US – Countervailing Measures
(China) (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS437/16, 9 October 2015, DSR 2015:XI, p. 5775
US – Gambling
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS285/13, 19 August 2005,
DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11639
US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1163
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS268/12, 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11619
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, WT/DS429/12, 15 December 2015, DSR 2015:XI, p. 5811
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS344/15, 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619
US – Washing Machines
(Article 21.3(c))
Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea – Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS464/RPT, 13 April 2017, DSR 2017:VIII,
p. 4309

AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR

Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Ammonium Nitrate

Parties:

Russian Federation
Ukraine

ARB-2019-1

Arbitrator:

Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández

INTRODUCTION
1.1. On 30 September 2019, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body
Report1 and the Panel Report2 in Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate . This
dispute concerns certain anti -dumping measures imposed by Ukraine on imports of ammonium
nitrate from the Russian Federation (Russia).3 The Panel and the Appellate Body found the measures
at issue to be inconsistent with various provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).
1.2. At the meeting of the DSB held on 28 October 2019, Ukraine indicated its intention to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute and stated that it would need
a reasonable period of time in which to do so.4 By letter dated 21 November 2019, Russia informed
the DSB that Russia and Ukraine had entered into consultations regarding the reasonable period of
time for implementation pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), but that these consultations had not resulted in an
agreement. Russia therefore requested that the reasonable period of time be determined through
binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.5
1.3. By letter dated 2 December 2019, Russia informed the Director -General of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) that consultations with Ukraine had not led to mutual agreement on an
arbitrator. Russia therefore requested the Director -General to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to
footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.6
1.4. After consulting with the parties, the Director -General appointed me as the Arbitrator on
11 December 2019. 7 On 12 December 2019, I informed the parties of my acceptance of the
appointment as Arbitrator and transmitted to them a Working Schedule identifying the dates for the
filing of the parties' written submissions and the date of the hearing.8
1.5. On 13 December 2019, Ukraine sent a letter requesting that the due date for its written
submission be extended and that the hearing be postponed. Ukraine identified several reasons for
its request. Ukraine pointed to official holidays in Ukraine in late December 2019 and early
January 2020 as well as to preparation work for the 50th annual meeting of the World Economic
Forum to be held in Davos, Switzerland, on 21-24 January 2020.

1 WT/DS493/AB/R and Add.1.
2 WT/DS493/R, Add.1 and Corr.1.
3 WT/DS493/10.
4 WT/DSB/M/436, para. 2.3.
5 WT/DS493/11.
6 WT/DS493/12.
7 WT/DS493/12.
8 Considering the end of the year period, the Working Schedule of 12 December 2019 indicated that the
written submission of Ukraine should be filed on 9 January 2020, the written submission of Russia should be
filed on 23 January 2020, and the hearing would be held on 6 February 2020.

1.6. On 16 December 2019, I invited Russia to comment on Ukraine's letter. On 17 December 2019,
Russia sent a letter stating that the reasons given by Ukraine did not justify the requested extension.
Nevertheless, given the winter holidays and for the purposes of constructive engagement in this
arbitration, Russia indicated that it would agre e that the date for Ukraine's written submission be
moved to 23 January 2020, the date for Russia's written submission be moved to 6 February 2020,
and the date of the hearing be moved to 27 or 28 February 2020.
1.7. Having taken account of Ukraine's request a nd Russia's comments, on 18 December 2019,
I sent a revised Working Schedule to the parties. In accordance with this revised Working Schedule,
Ukraine filed its written submission on 23 January 2020, Russia filed its written submission on
6 February 20209, and the hearing was held on 20 February 2020.
1.8. By letter dated 25 March 2020, I informed the parties that the award would be circulated no
later than 31 March 2020. I also informed the parties that, given access restrictions to the
WTO premises in light of developments related to the COVID-19 virus, circulation would be made by
electronic means only . The parties did not object to circulation by electronic means. On
26 March 2020, Ukraine sent a letter requesting me to take into account, in my determination of the
reasonable period of time, Ukraine's recent measures in response to the COVID-19 virus, as they
may significantly affect implementation in this dispute. The next day, I invited Russia to comment
on Ukraine's request. By letter dated 30 March 2020, Russia expressed its solidarity with the
countries affected by the COVID-19 virus. Russia, however, stated that it was unclear that Ukraine's
recent measures would affect implementation. On 31 March 2020, I informed the parties that the
circulation of the award would be delayed in order to allow me to consider properly Ukraine's request
as well as Russia's comments. By letter dated 7 April 2020, I informed the parties that the award
would be circulated by electronic means no later than 8 April 2020.10
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
2.1. Annexes A and B to this Award contain the executive summaries of the parties' submissions.
Certain details of the parties' arguments are further described below, insofar as they are relevant to
the analysis.
REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME
3.1 Introduction
3.1. I have been appointed by the Director -General, at the request of Russia, to determine the
reasonable period of time for Ukraine to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate.
3.2. In this section, I begin by setting out the mandate of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU. I then identify the specific measures that Ukraine is required to bring into conformity with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Finally, I examine the factors affecting the determination
of the reasonable period of time in this dispute, including the means of implementation, the relevant
steps in the implementation process, as well as the particular circumstance that Ukraine has asked
me to take into account in reaching my determination.
3.2 Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU
3.3. Article 21.3 of the DSU provides that "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which

9 On 7 February 2020, Russia filed a revised written submission to correct the paragraph numbering and
to include page numbering. By letter of 11 February 2020, given that certain footnotes had been inadvertently
omitted in Russia's submission, I invited Russia to refile its written submission with these footnotes included,
subject to Ukraine's comments. Accordingly, on 12 February 2020, Russia filed a revised written submission to
include the missing footnotes. By letter of 14 February 2020, Ukraine confirmed that it had no objection.
10 Ukraine and Russia agreed by email of 16 December 2019 and at the hearing, respectively, that an
award not made within 90 days after the adoption of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB would be
deemed to be an award of the arbitrator for the purposes of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.

to do so." Where the reasonable period of time is determined through binding arbitration pursuant
to Article 21.3(c), that provision stipulates that:
[A] guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable p eriod of time to
implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months
from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may
be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances.11
3.4. Pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, my mandate in this arbitration is therefore to determine
the "reasonable period of time" within which Ukraine must comply with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
3.5. Article 21.3(c) establishes as a g uideline that such period should not exceed 15 months and
recognizes that, "depending upon the particular circumstances", the period "may be shorter or
longer". Other provisions of the DSU further shed light on the mandate of an arbitrator. Article 21.1
of the DSU states the general principle that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings
of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
Members." The second sentence of Article 21.3 of the DSU provides that a reasonable period of time
for implementation shall be available only if it is "impracticable to comply immediately" with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The reasonable period of time for implementation should
therefore, in principle, be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing
Member12 that will enable it to achieve effective implementation of the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB .13 Moreover, as previous arbitrators have highlighted, the implementin g Member is to
utilize all of the flexibilities available within its legal system in implementing the relevant
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.14
3.6. In determining the reasonable period of time, the means of imple mentation available to the
Member concerned is a relevant factor. Previous awards under Article 21.3(c) have indicated that
the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation
that it deems most appropriate.15 The implementing Member's discretion, however, does not amount
to "an unfettered right" to choose any means of implementation. 16 Rather, the proposed
implementing action must "fall[] within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in order
to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings".17 In particular, the means of implementation
chosen must be apt in form, nature, and content to bring the Member into compliance with its
WTO obligations.18 Thus, the chosen method of implementation must be capable of bringing the
Member into compliance with its WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time, in accordance

11 Fn omitted.
12 Awards of the Arbitrators, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26; Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 25; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; US – Countervailing Measures (China)
13 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 53.
14 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 3.51-3.53; US – Shrimp II
(Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42;
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 25;
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 64 and 74; Peru – Agricultural Products
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4. An implementing Member is not, however, expected to utilize "extraordinary
procedures" to bring its measure into compliance, and implementation must be effected in a transparent and
efﬁcient manner that affords due process to all interested parties. (Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.46; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51;
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.36;
US – Washing Machines (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.9)
15 Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27; EC – Export Subsidies
on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 48.
16 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69.
17 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42;
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.
18 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.4; US – Countervailing
Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.2; Colombia – Ports of

with the guideline contained in Article 21.3(c).19 Previous awards have indicated that, inasmuch as
they elaborate on those aspects of the measure at issue that were found to breach WTO obligations,
the findings by the Panel in the underlying dispute offer guidance for determining whether the
proposed implementing measures are apt to achieve compliance, as well as how long is reasonably
needed to do so. 20 Previous awards have also indicated that, if the action that the implementing
Member proposes to take seeks to achieve objectives unrelated to the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB, or forms part of a wider reform of that Member's municipal law, then these considerations
cannot justify a longer implementation period.21
3.7. At the same time, the mandate of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) is limited to determining
the period of time within which it would be reasonable to expect implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB to occur. Determining when the implementing Member
must comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB may require some consideration of
how the Member proposes to do so. 22 The mandate of an arbitrator, however, does not involve a
determination of the consistency with the covered agreements of the measure that the Member
envisages to adopt in order to comply.23
3.8. Finally, with regard to the burden of proof, it is well established that the implementing Member
bears the overall burden to prove that the time period requested for implementation constitutes a
"reasonable period of time". 24 The longer the propose d period of implementation, the greater this
burden will be.25 However, this does not "absolve" the complaining Member of its duty to provide
evidence supporting why it disagrees with the period of time proposed by the implementing Member,
and to substantiate its view that a shorter period of time for implementation is reasonable.26
3.3 Measures to be brought into conformity
3.9. The dispute underlying this arbitration concerns certain anti -dumping measures imposed by
Ukraine on ammonium nitra te from Russia. Following an anti-dumping investigation conducted by
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, now the Ministry for Development of
Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine (Ministry), duties were originally imposed by Ukra ine's
Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade (ICIT) through its decision of 21 May 2008
(2008 original decision). Russian producer JSC MCC EuroChem (EuroChem) successfully challenged
the 2008 original decision before domestic courts in Ukraine , following which ICIT issued an
amendment (2010 amendment) to the 2008 original decision (as amended, 2008 amended
decision). Subsequently, following interim and expiry reviews, ICIT issued a decision
(2014 extension decision) imposing anti-dumping duties at modified rates, including with respect to
EuroChem.27
3.10. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the scope of Ukraine's implementation obligations in
this dispute relates to the findings made by the Panel and the Appellate Body that are set forth in

19 Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 69; Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)
20 Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 3.5 and 3.39-3.40.
21 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 3.36 and 3.41;
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 64 and 85; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)),
22 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)), para. 68; Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
23 Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27; US – Countervailing
US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.8.
24 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.6;
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)), para. 47;
US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 33; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26; US – Washing
Machines (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.10; US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.11.
25 Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical
26 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 67; US – Washing
Machines (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.10; US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.11.
27 Panel Report, paras. 2.1-2.2; Appellate Body Report, para. 1.2.

paragraphs 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5 of the Panel Report and paragraphs 7.1 through 7.8 of the
Appellate Body Report.28
3.11. In ruling on the claims raised by Russia against the measures at issue, the Panel found that
Ukraine acted inconsistently with:
a. Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by: (i) failing to exclude EuroChem from the
scope of the original anti -dumping measures, specifically the 2008 amended decision;
(ii) imposing a 0% anti -dumping duty on EuroChem through the 2010 amendment,
instead of excluding it from the scope of the anti -dumping duty order; and (iii) including
EuroChem within the scope of the interim and expiry review determinations, and imposing
anti-dumping duties on it through the 2014 extension decision29;
b. Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by rejecting the gas cost that the
investigated Russian producers reported in their records when constructing normal value
in the interim and expiry reviews without providing an adequate basis under the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.130;
c. Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by using a cost for gas that did not reflect the
cost of the product under consideration "in the country of origin" when constructing normal
value in the interim and expiry reviews31;
d. Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by relying on costs that were calculated
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement when conducting its
ordinary-course-of-trade test in the interim and expiry reviews32;
e. Articles 11.2-11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by relying on dumping margins
calculated inconsistently with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement to make its likelihood -of-dumping determinations in the interim and expiry
reviews33; and
f. Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by failing to: (i) disclose the essential facts
underlying its price effects analysis and dumping determinations; and (ii) give interested
parties sufficient time to comment on its disclosure in the interim and expiry reviews.34
3.12. The Panel's findings under Article 5.8 as well as those under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1
were upheld by the Appellate Body35, and Ukraine did not appeal the Panel's findings under
Articles 6.9 and 11.2-11.3. Accordingly, Ukraine's implementation obligations in this dispute pertain
to: (i) the non-termination of the investigation against EuroChem, as reflected in the 2008 amended
decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision; (ii) dumping and
likelihood-of-dumping de terminations in the interim and expiry reviews, as reflected in the
2014 extension decision; and (iii) the disclosure of essential facts in these interim and expiry
reviews.36

28 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing; Russia's submission, paras. 39-42;
Ukraine's submission, paras. 15 and 17.
29 Panel Report, para. 8.3.a. The Panel stated that the obligation under the second sentence of
Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to immediately terminate the investigation applies because
EuroChem had a de minimis dumping margin. (Ibid., para. 7.151)
30 Panel Report, para. 8.2.a.
31 Panel Report, para. 8.2.b.
32 Panel Report, para. 8.2.c.
33 Panel Report, para. 8.2.d.
35 Appellate Body Report, paras. 7.4 and 7.6-7.8.
36 At the hearing, the parties agreed with this description of the scope of Ukraine's implementation
obligations.

3.4 Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time
3.13. Ukraine considers that I should determine that 27 months is a reasonable period of time for
Ukraine to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.37 Ukraine argues
that this period is necessary given that implementation requires Ukraine to: (i) adopt first a "general
legislative framework" to allow Ukrainian investigating authorities38 to initiate and conduct review
investigations for the purpose of complying with recommendations and rulings of the DSB ; and
(ii) subsequently conduct an administrative review to amend the anti-dumping measures at issue.39
Ukraine also argues that it is currently facing a situation of "emergency in international relations"
and that this is a relevant particular circumstance "affect[ing] daily life, disturb[ing] the economy
and [leading] to extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward
actions".40
3.14. Russia objects to Ukraine's proposal for a reasonable period of time of 27 months, stating
that it "exceeds the standard of 'promp t compliance'" embodied in Article 21.1 of the DSU .41
Specifically, Russia questions the need to make legislative changes or conduct an administrative
review to address the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.42 Russia contends
that no reasonable period of time should be granted to implement the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB pertaining to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that Ukraine should have
been reasonably able to implement the remaining recommendations and rulings of the DSB through
a decision by ICIT within two months.43 Even if legislative changes and/or an administrative review
were necessary to implement the recom mendations and rulings of the DSB (quod non ), Russia
maintains that Ukraine has failed to meet its burden of proof in requesting a reasonable period of
time of 27 months.44
3.15. At the outset , I observe that Russia distinguishes between: (i) the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB pertaining to Article 5.8; and (ii) the remaining recommendations and rulings of
the DSB.45 With respect to Ukraine's implementation obligations under Article 5.8, Russia stated at
the hearing that immediate compliance is not "impracticable" within the meaning of Article 21.3 of
the DSU, and Ukraine should therefore not be granted a reasonable period of time for this aspect of
its implementation obligations. Russia also emphasized that the second sentence of Article 5.8
requires the immediate termination of an investigation.46
3.16. As indicated above, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, my mandate in this arbitration is
to determine the reasonable period of time within which Ukraine must comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.47 In my view, my mandate does not extend
to determining whether "it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and
rulings" under the second sentence of Article 21.3 of the DSU. Moreover, in singling out the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB pertaining to Article 5.8, Russia is essentially requesting
me to consider separately what might be the reasonable period of time for Ukraine's remaining
implementation obligations. In US – Gambling, the arbitrator suggested that he might not be limited,
under Article 21.3(c) to determining one reasonable period of time, but had difficulty accepting that
it may be possible to determine two separate reasonable periods of time with respect to the same
measure.48 In the current dispute, all of Ukraine's implementation obligations pertain to a single set
of measures forming part of the same anti -dumping proceeding, namely, the 2008 amended
decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision. In particular, the 2014 extension
decision is at the heart of all the recommendations and rulings of the DSB .49 I have difficulty
accepting that I should distinguish between the various recommendations and rulings of the

37 Ukraine's submission, paras. 3 and 177.
38 In this Award, I use the term "Ukrainian investigating authorities" to refer to ICIT and/or the Ministry.
39 Ukraine's submission, paras. 2 and 28-31.
40 Ukraine's submission, para. 127.
41 Russia's submission, para. 7.
42 Russia's submission, paras. 7, 53, and 58.
43 Russia's submission, paras. 7-8, 119, and 164.
44 Russia's submission, paras. 153 and 160.
45 Russia's submission, paras. 29-30, 115, 119, and 164.
46 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing. See also Russia's submission, paras. 30, 119,
and 164.
47 See para. 3.4. above.
48 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), para. 41.
49 See paras. 3.11. 3.12. above.

DSB pertaining to the same measure for the purpose of my determination . In light of the
circumstances of this dispute, I consider it appropriate to determine one reasonable period of time
with respect to all of Ukraine's implementation obligations.
3.17. With this consideration in mind, I turn to my analysis of the reasonable period of time for
Ukraine to implement all the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. Below, I first
address the means of implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB at issue, before
considering the relevant steps in the implementation process. Finally, I examine the particular
circumstance alleged by Ukraine to be relevant to my determination.
3.4.1 Means of implementation
3.18. The parties disagree on whether legislative changes and an administrative review are
necessary to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, and whether
any additional time that such changes and review may entail should be taken into account in
determining the reasonable period of time . Ukraine takes the view that implementation should be
undertaken through legislative changes, followed by an administrative review of the anti -dumping
measures at issue.50 Russia in turn contends that ICIT can amend or term inate the anti-dumping
measures at issue under the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped
Imports" (22 December 1998) (Law against Dumped Imports ), without legislative changes or an
administrative review.51

3.19. As indicated abov e, Ukraine has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of
implementation that it deems most appropriate. However, that discretion is not unfettered, and the
chosen method of implementation must be capable of bringing Ukraine into compliance with its
WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time.52 A key determinant of the reasonable period of
time for implementation is the nature of the implementing action that is to be taken.53 A combination
of legislative and administrative actions, like the ones proposed by Ukraine, will inevitably require
more time than implementation that can be achieved by administrative means. Below, I consider
available administrative means for implementation under the Law against Dumped Imports as well
as Ukraine's proposed legislative changes.
3.4.1.1 Administrative means under the Law against Dumped Imports
3.20. I begin my analysis with Russia's argument that Article 5.6 of the Law against Dumped
Imports allows ICIT to take a summary decision, inter alia , on the application of anti -dumping
measures, and that neither an administrative review nor legislative changes are thus required for
the purpose of implementation in this dispute.54 In that regard, Russia relies on prior decisions made
by ICIT that did not require an administrative review.55
3.21. Article 5.6 of the Law against Dumped Imports lists, in general terms, the decisions that ICIT
may take.56 This provision does not specify the steps that need to be completed before ICIT can

50 Ukraine's submission, para. 31.
51 Russia's submission, para. 52. Russia argues that where the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
can be implemented in a more expedited manner through specific administrative means, the reasonable period
of time should be set by reference to these administrative means. (Ibid., paras. 26-27)
52 See paras. 3.5. 3.6. above. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures
(China) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 69; Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3.
53 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), para. 35.
54 Russia's submission, paras. 58 and 115.
55 Russia's submission, paras. 49-52 (referring to ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on
import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10 September 2015)
(Exhibit RUS-6)), paras. 54-55 (referring to ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti-dumping measures on imports
of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS-12b); ICIT, Notice on the
resumption of anti-dumping measures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in
Russia (20 May 2017) (Exhibit RUS-13b)), para. 115 and fn 110 thereto (referring to ICIT, Decision
implementing court orders regarding EuroChem (25 October 2010) (2010 amendment) (Exhibit RUS-2b)). In
this Award, exhibit numbers that are followed by the letter "b" refer to the English version of the relevant
document.
56 Article 5.6 of the Law against Dumped Imports reads:

make such decisions; such steps and other requirements are set out in various other provisions of
the Law against Dumped Imports. I therefore consider Article 5.6 of the Law against Dumped
Imports, on its own, to be of limited guidance in determining whether the anti-dumping measures
at issue could be amended simply through a decision by ICIT or whether an administrative review
is warranted for the purpose of implementation in this dispute.
3.22. Moreover, the ICIT decisions on which Russia relies do not appear to be relevant to this
dispute. First, Russia refers to a decision of 2015 made by ICIT under the La w of Ukraine on the
application of safeguard measures on imports to Ukraine (Ukrainian Safeguard Law) to implement
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in Ukraine – Passenger Cars.57 As Ukraine explained,
that decision was based on a specific provision of Ukraine's Safeguard Law, which empowers ICIT to
repeal or review safeguard measures if certain circumstances are met. 58 While Russia states that
the Ukrainian Safeguard Law and the Law against Dumped Imports bear certain similarities59, Russia
has not pointed to a corresponding provision in the Law against Dumped Imports that would allow
ICIT to amend the anti -dumping measures at issue in this dispute without conducting an
administrative review. In this respect, I am mindful of the fact that, as acknowledged by the parties
at the hearing, implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB will require excluding
EuroChem from the scope of the anti -dumping measures, calculating dumping margins, and
complying with certain disclosure obligations. 60 Second, Russia refers to two decisions of 2017,
whereby ICIT suspended and subsequently resumed anti-dumping measures.61 Those decisions were
based on Article 28.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports 62, which deals with the collection of
anti-dumping duties and sets out the circumstances in which anti -dumping measures may be
suspended and resumed by a decision of ICIT. 63 There is nothing in the language of this provision
to suggest that it could form the basis for ICIT to exclude EuroChem, calculate dumping margins, or
comply with disclosure obligations. Finally, Russia refers to the 2010 amendment, whereby
ICIT imposed a 0% duty on EuroChem. 64 I understand that this decision was made following
domestic court decisions concluding that there was an absence of dumping by EuroChem in the
original investigation.65 Ukraine explained that, pursuant to Article 129 of its constitution, such court
decisions are legally binding and are to be enforced by the State, which is why setting the

At meetings of the Commission the following decisions shall be taken:
1) the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation;
2) the positive or negative conclusions regarding the existence of dumping and the methods they
give the ability to determine the dumping margin;
3) positive or negative conclusions about the damage and its size;
4) to determine the causal link between dumped imports and injury;
5) the application of anti-dumping measures;
6) on other issues within the powers provided by this Law.
(Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998) (Law
against Dumped Imports) (Exhibit RUS-1b), Article 5.6)
57 Russia's submission, paras. 49-52 (referring to ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on
import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10 September 2015)
(Exhibit RUS-6)).
58 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing; ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures
on import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10 September 2015)
(Exhibit RUS-6); Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law against Dumped Imports
(Exhibit RUS-8), Article 19 of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law.
59 Russia's submission, para. 51 (referring to Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law
against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-8)).
60 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing.
61 Russia's submission, paras. 54-55 (referring to ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti-dumping measures
on imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS-12b); ICIT,
Notice on the resumption of anti-dumping measures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers
originating in Russia (20 May 2017) (Exhibit RUS-13b)). Russia highlights that the Supreme Court of Ukraine
upheld the decision of ICIT of 20 May 2017, noting, by reference to Article 5.6 of the Law against Dumped
Imports, that ICIT "has the authority to amend the adopted decisions". (Russia's submission, para. 57 (quoting
Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in Case No. 826/7760/17 (18 December 2019) (Exhibit RUS-14b))
62 ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti-dumping measures on imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers
originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS-12b); ICIT, Notice on the resumption of anti-dumping
measures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia (20 May 2017)
(Exhibit RUS-13b).
63 Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-1b), Article 28.3.
64 Russia's submission, para. 115 and fn 110 thereto (referring to 2010 amendment (Exhibit RUS-2b)).
65 Panel Report, para. 7.147.

anti-dumping duty to 0% for EuroChem could be achieved through an ICIT decision. 66 Russia did
not offer a response or point to a similar provision concerning the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB. For all these reasons, I am not convinced by Russia's argument that implementation in this
dispute can be achieved through a decision by ICIT, without Ukrainian investigating authorities
conducting an interim review.
3.23. Now, I turn to Ukraine's allegation that there is no legal basis for Ukrainian investigating
authorities to review the anti -dumping measures at issue for the purpose of implementing the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB under the Law against Dumped Imports. According to
Ukraine, under the Law against Dumped Imports, an interim review cannot: (i) be initiated ex officio
by the Ministry; (ii) be initiated on the basis that anti -dumping measures were found to be
WTO-inconsistent; and (iii) focus on examining compliance with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB.67 In light of the parties' submission and responses to questioning at the hearing, Ukraine
has not shown that its investigating authorities could not reasonably review the anti -dumping
measures at issue to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB under its current Law
against Dumped Imports.
3.24. In that regard, I observe that, pursuant to Article 20.1 of the Law against Dumped Imports,
an administrative review can be initiated at the request of "an executive authority in the country of
import".68 Ukraine has not put forward a definition of the term "executive authority" under its
domestic legislation. Ukraine asserts only that the Ministry is not an executive authority of Ukraine
for the purposes of that provision and that an interim review cannot be initiated at the request of
the Ministry. Yet Ukraine has not advanced any reasons for or evidence in support of this assertion.
At the hearing, Ukraine merely stated, without providing any supporting evidence, that the past
practice of Ukrainian investigating authorit ies has been to consider that the Ministry is not an
executive authority for the purposes of Article 20.1 of the Law against Dumped Imports .69 Ukraine
has not explained why any such past practice, if established, would necessarily prevent the same
entity that conducts anti-dumping investigations and reviews from requesting the initiation of the
administrative review necessary for implementation or, for that matter, prevent another executive
authority of Ukraine from making such a request.
3.25. Moreover, pursuant to Article 20.2 of the Law against Dumped Imports, an interim review is
initiated provided there is sufficient evidence that the continued imposition of the anti -dumping
duties is no longer necessary to offset dumping .70 Pursuant to Article 20.3 of th at Law, once an
interim review is initiated , the Ministry shall "in particular" examine "whether the circumstances
relating to dumping and injury have changed significantly". 71 Ukraine argued that, at this stage, it
is unclear whether the continued imposition of the anti -dumping duties is no longer necessary to
offset dumping within the meaning of Article 20.2 and whether the circumstances relating to
dumping changed significantly within the meanin g of Article 20.3. This is because, according to
Ukraine, until dumping margins are recalculated, Ukrainian investigating authorities cannot know
whether and the extent to which there is a change in dumping margins .72 I observe that some of
Ukraine's implementation obligations directly concern its dumping calculations in the 2014 extension
decision and necessarily require Ukraine to recalculate dumping margins.73 Ukraine's implementation
obligations also involve excluding EuroChem from the scope of the anti-dumping measures at issue

66 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
67 Ukraine's submission, para. 37. I understand that Ukraine has taken steps to amend the Law against
Dumped Imports. The Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports" to replace the Law of
Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998) (Draft Law
against Dumped Imports) contains a new Article 122 addressing specifically compliance with recommendations
and rulings of the DSB. (Draft Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit UKR-10), Article 122)) At the time of the
hearing in this arbitration, the Draft Law against Dumped Imports had gone through the first stages of
Ukraine's legislative process. (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing; submission, paras. 106, 157,
and 161) I also understand that a previous version of the Draft Law against Dumped Imports was submitted to
Ukraine's Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), in 2018, but that, following parliamentary
elections in July 2019 and the dissolution of the VRU, it was removed from consideration by the VRU.
(Ukraine's submission, paras. 154-155)
68 Ukraine's submission, para. 33. See also Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-1b), Article 20.1.
69 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
70 Ukraine's submission, para. 34. See also Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-1b), Article 20.2.
71 Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-1b), Article 20.3. See also Ukraine's submission, para. 36.
72 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
73 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing. See also paras. 3.11. 3.12. above.

because EuroChem, one of the two main investigated Russian producers involved in the interim and
expiry reviews, was found to have a de minimis dumping margin 74, something that is already
established at this stage. The continuation of anti-dumping measures is thus at the heart of Ukraine's
implementation obligations. In light of these considerations and without any further explanation by
Ukraine, I am not convinced that the circumstances of this dispute would not justify the initiation of
an interim review under Article 20.2 of the Law against Dumped Imports. I am also not convinced
that, once initiated, the Ministry could not focus this interim review on implementing the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB under Article 20.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports .
Ukraine has not explained why new d umping margin calculations and the exclusion of EuroChem
would not qualify as a significant change in circumstances relating to dumping under that provision.
I am not convinced by the general proposition that findings of inconsistency with Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement could not qualify as a "circumstance[] relating to dumpin g" that merits
review. In any event, Article 20.3 directs the Ministry to examine "in particular" significant changes
in circumstances relating to dumping. This suggests to me that the Ministry is free to examine other
relevant aspects as part of an interim review.75
3.26. In light of the foregoing, Ukraine has not shown that, i n the circumstances of this dispute,
Ukraine could not reasonably initiate and conduct an administrative review of the anti -dumping
measures at issue for the purposes of implementation under the Law against Dumped Imports.

3.4.1.2 Legislative changes
3.27. Given the considerations above , the issue of the time needed for Ukraine's proposed
legislative changes is moot. Ukraine enjoys a certain discretion in choosing the means and method
of implementation. However, that discretion is not unfettered, and the chosen method of
implementation must be capable of bringing Ukraine into compliance with its WTO obligations within
a reasonable period of time.76 In that regard, I recall that the reasonable period of time should be
the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing Member, and the
implementing Member should utilize all flexibilities available within its legal system in implementing
the relevant recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.77 While
I recognize that the legislative and administrative means of implementation proposed by Ukraine
fall within the range of permissible means that are capable of achievin g the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB , I consider that legislative action is not indispensably
required to achieve compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
This is because Ukraine has not shown that it could not review the anti-dumping measures at issue
under its current Law against Dumped Imports. It is not my task as Arbitrator acting pursuant to
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU to decide which method or type of measure should be chosen by an
implementing Member for the purpose of implementation. However, it does fall within my mandate
to assess what would be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing
Member for effective implementation of the recommendations and r ulings of the DSB. In the
particular circumstances of this case, given that Ukraine has not shown that implementation cannot
be reasonably achieved through administrative means under the Law against Dumped Imports, I do
not believe that my determination of the reasonable period of time needs to account for additional
legislative actions, as Ukraine proposes.78
3.28. I note Ukraine's argument that its situation is akin to that of the European Union in EC – Bed
Linen. Ukraine states that the reasonable period of time in that case allowed the European Union to
modify its legal framework to include specifically the possibility to review anti-dumping measures to

74 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing. See also paras. 3.11. 3.12. above.
75 Ukraine has not offered another reading of Article 20.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports.
(Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)
76 See para. 3.6. above. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 69; Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3.
77 See para. 3.5. above.
78 In US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), the arbitrator acknowledged the generally accepted principle that
administrative means are faster than legislative means, and decided that the reasonable period of time would
be determined based exclusively on available administrative means, in accordance with the principle that the
reasonable period of time should be the shortest possible time period within the legal system of the
implementing Member. (Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 53)

implement recommendations and rulings of the DSB, before reviewing the anti-dumping measures
at issue.79 Since Ukrainian legislation does not set out a procedure aimed specifically at bringing
anti-dumping measures into conformity with recommendations and rulings of the DSB, drawing on
the processes for implementation in EC – Bed Linen, Ukraine contends that its general legislative
framework has to be amended before it can initiate an administrative review .80 Ukraine stresses
that, like the European Union in EC – Bed Linen, this is the first time its anti -dumping measures
have been found to be inconsistent with the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 81 I observe that t he
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in that dispute did not apply to Ukraine. Rather, they
concerned a measure taken by another WTO Member, and implementation was undertaken in a
different legal system. Crucially, the reasonable period of time in that dispute was agreed upon by
the parties and the means for implementation and the associated timeframes for implementation
were not considered by an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. Therefore, I am of the view
that the means for implementation adopted by the European Union in that dispute are of limited
relevance to my determination in this arbitration.
3.29. For these reasons, I consider that my determination of the reasonable period of time should
not account for the legislative changes that Ukraine proposes to undertake. In these circumstances,
I turn to the period of time within which Ukraine's administrative process for implementation must
be completed.
3.4.2 Steps of the implementation process
3.30. Turning to the steps of the implementation process relevant to this arbitration, Ukraine
contends that it will need approximately 12 months to complete the administrative review of the
anti-dumping measure s at issue. 82 According to Ukraine, this time is to be allocated as
follows: 15 days for the Ministry to prepare a proposal; 10 days for ICIT to consider this proposal
and initiate the review; 30 days for interested parties to be notified and submit comments; 100 days
to prepare and issue questionnaires, allow time for interested parties to respond, and for the Ministry
to analyse the responses; 20 or 40 days to conduct verification visits, depending on whether they
involve a domestic or a foreign company; 30 days to hold a hearing with interested parties and allow
for written submissions; 90 days to draft the main facts and findings; and 35 days for the disclosure
and final decision by ICIT.83 At the hearing, Ukraine agreed that the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB pertaining to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require Ukrainian investigating
authorities to exclude EuroChem immediately from the scope of the anti -dumping measures. 84
Ukraine thus referred to a "pointed partial interim review" focusing on dumping determinations and
due process rights.85
3.31. Russia contests the amount of time that Ukraine claims is required to review the anti-dumping
measures at issue. Russia argues that the scope of the administrative review that Ukraine proposes
to conduct will necessarily be limited and that a full-fledged review is not necessary for the purpose
of implementation in this dispute .86 In that regard, Russia states that the figures necessary fo r
calculating dumping margins are already on the investigation record, and that Ukraine therefore
does not need to collect any additional data. 87 Russia adds that Ukraine's proposed timeframes do
not reflect mandatory time periods under its domestic law . I nstead, they reflect "general time

79 Ukraine's submission, para. 49 (referring to Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on
the measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters (Exhibit UKR-2)).
80 Ukraine's submission, paras. 51-52.
81 Ukraine's submission, paras. 48 and 52.
82 Ukraine's submission, para. 174.
83 Ukraine's submission, para. 174. Ukraine stated that these are the usual steps of an administrative
review under the Law against Dumped Imports. (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)
84 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
85 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
86 Russia's submission, paras. 160-161.
87 Russia's submission, paras. 161 and 163-164.

periods that are relevant for original investigations ".88 In Russia's view, Ukraine should have
reasonably been able to complete its administrative review within two months.89
3.32. I begin by observing that 12 months is the maximum amount of time foreseen under Ukraine's
domestic legislation for an interim review. 90 It is also the time the interim and expiry reviews, in
which WTO-inconsistent determinations were made, took to complete. 91 In setting out the various
steps of its administrative review and corresponding timeframes , Ukraine refers to durations that
are needed "in general", "normally", or "on average".92 At the hearing, however, Ukraine stated that
its proposed timeframes do not reflect average durations, but are based on the fastest full
administrative review Ukrain ian investigating authorities ever conducted under the Law against
Dumped Imports, which took 11.5 months to complete .93 Although Ukraine acknowledged that
certain steps could arguably be completed in somewha t shorter timeframes tha n the ones it
proposed, Ukraine did not know whether an administrative review could, overall, be conducted in a
more expeditious manner.94
3.33. I cannot accept that the time period in which Ukrainian investigating authorities have been
able to conduct previous full-fleshed reviews is an appropriate measure of the time within which
they should conduct an administrative review in this case. The 11.5-month review to which Ukraine
refers was, by nature, distinct from a redetermination for the purpose of implementing
recommendations and rulings of the DSB . I also do not agree that the administrative review
necessary for implementation would require the same amount of time than the interim and expiry
reviews in which WTO-inconsistent determinations were made. In my view, the administrative review
to be conducted will necessarily be much more limited in scope. In that regard, I note that Ukraine's
implementation obligations pertain only to the non -termination of the investigation against
EuroChem, dumping and likelihood -of-dumping determinations , and the disclosure of essential
facts.95 Crucially, it became clear at the hearing that: (i) EuroChem, one of the two main investigated
Russian producers involved in the interim and expiry reviews, will be excluded from the scope of the
anti-dumping measures at issue , such that no new determination will need to be made for
EuroChem; (ii) new analysis will be limited to recalculating normal value for the remaining
investigated Russian producers, without considering afresh the export price or the injury analysis ;
and (iii) some data relevant to these normal value calculations are already on the record.96 Ukraine
specifically recognized that Ukrainian investigating authorities will not need to make a new injury
determination, recalculate the export price, or deal with public interest concerns. Ukraine also
acknowledged that some data are already on the investigation record to calculate normal value.97
3.34. In considering the time that is reasonably necessary to conduct the requisite administrative
review in this dispute, I note that Ukraine has not argued or provided evidence that, under Ukrainian
law, all the steps and timeframes it has put forward are mandatory. In this regard, I understand
that the Ministry is not necessarily required to issue new questionnaires, conduct verification visits,
or hold a hearing in the context of administrative reviews.98

88 Russia's submission, para. 162. Russia refers to the Award of the Arbitrator in Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
as having clarified that "reliance on time periods used in original investigations seems inappropriate, because
the implementing Member 'is only required to conduct a re-determination to implement a limited number of
DSB rulings of inconsistency'." (Ibid., para. 160 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 48))
89 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing.
90 Pursuant to Article 18.4 of the Law against Dumped Imports, "[t]he review of the anti-dumping
measures shall take place as soon as possible and shall end asas [sic] a rule, not later than 12 months after
the date of such review." (Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS-1b)) Ukraine acknowledged as much.
(Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)
91 Statistics on duration of reviews of anti-dumping measures (Exhibit UKR-5).
92 Ukraine's submission, paras. 79, 82, 85, 89, 92, 94, 96, and 103.
93 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing. Statistics provided by Ukraine show that the time
needed to complete an interim review ranged from 11.5 months to 2 years. (Statistics on duration of reviews
of anti-dumping measures (Exhibit UKR-5))
94 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
95 See paras. 3.11. 3.12. above.
96 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing.
97 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
98 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing.

3.35. Yet, I am not convinced by Russia's argument that Ukraine simply needs to reconsider existing
evidence on the investigation record for the purpose of recalculating normal value, and thus does
not need to complete all of the usual steps of an administrative review.99 According to Russia, to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, Ukraine is, inter alia, required to construct
normal value using the production costs of the investigated Russian producers as reported in their
records, instead of using a surrogate cost for gas. Russia emphasized that these reported costs are
already on the investigation record.100 Ukraine in turn pointed to paragraph 7.90 of the Panel Report
and footnote 159 thereto, as providing room for Ukraine to consider additional information and
evidence, instead of engaging in a mathematical exercise of constructing normal value using
production costs as reported in the records of the investigated Russian producers.101
3.36. As the Appellate Body observed, in paragraph 7.90 of the Panel Report and footnote 159
thereto, the Panel made several important factual findings underpinning its analysis under Article 2
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. While Ukrainian investigating authorities had found that
JSC Gazprom (Gazprom), a Russian supplier of gas, sells gas in the domestic Russian market below
cost, the Panel found that no determination was made that Gazprom was the gas supplier of the
investigated Russian producers or that Gazprom's prices affected o ther gas suppliers' prices. 102 In
light of these findings, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Gazprom's below-cost prices
did not constitute a sufficient factual basis for the Ukrainian investigating authorities to conclude
that the records of the investigated Russian producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated
with the production and sale of ammonium nitrate under the second condition of the first sentence
of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body ultimately upheld the Panel's
finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 because Ukrainian investigating
authorities did not provide an adequate basis under the second condition in the first sentence of that
provision to reject the gas cost that the investigated Russian producers reported in their records
when constructing normal value.103
3.37. Given the Panel and Appellate Body findings at issue, I do not exclude that the Ministry could
collect additional information and data concerning relevant gas suppliers to construct normal value.
Implementation in this dispute might therefore not be as straightforward as Russia suggests , and
I consider that my determination should account some time for the Ministry to issue questionnaires
and to collect and consider additional information and data. Moreover, bearing in mind the nature of
the implementation that Ukraine proposes to undertake, and mindful that investigated exporters
and producers benefit from the opportunity to defend their interests in hearings and through the
process of verification, I would be reluctant to determine any period of time for implementation that
would foreclose the possibility t hat such procedural steps could be taken if and when warranted.
That being said, given the limited scope of Ukraine's administrative review discussed above, the
time allocated for these steps should be reasonably reduced as compared to Ukraine's proposed
timeframes.
3.38. Ukraine argues that some of the time periods that will apply to the specific steps that it
considers necessary for implementation are based on important due process and transparency
obligations arising under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, including, for example: giving "all interested
parties … a full opportunity for the defence of their interests"; providing " opportunities for all
interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be
presented and rebuttal a rguments offered"; providing "timely opportunities" for interested parties
to see information relevant to their cases and to prepare presentations based on that information;

99 Russia's submission, paras. 87-89, 161, and 164; responses to questioning at the hearing.
100 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing.
101 Ukraine also emphasized that the production costs at issue concern gas prices, which it sees as a
complex and key aspect of this anti-dumping proceeding, potentially involving related parties. (Ukraine's
responses to questioning at the hearing)
102 Appellate Body Report, para. 6.103 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.90 and fn 159 thereto). The
Appellate Body highlighted "a key element of the Panel's analysis, namely, that while [Ukrainian investigating
authorities] determined that Gazprom sells gas below cost, [they] did not make such a determination with
respect to the actual gas suppliers of the two investigated Russian producers at issue, as [Ukrainian
investigating authorities] did not inquire who supplied these producers with gas". (Ibid., para. 6.106)
103 Appellate Body Report, para. 7.6. The Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, as upheld by the Appellate Body, in turn, was key to the findings of inconsistency
with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 11.2-11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Panel Report, paras. 7.101, 7.114,
and 7.131; Appellate Body Report, paras. 7.7-7.8)

and giving public notices of final determinations detailing the "findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law considered material".104 I see some merit in these arguments advanced by
Ukraine. Indeed, even if some steps and time periods are not required by law, they may nonetheless
be useful in ensuring that implementation is effected in a transparent and efficient manner, fully
respecting due process for all parties involved. 105 At the same time, I consider that due process
concerns must be balanced with the principle of prompt compliance reflected in Article 21.1 of the
DSU.106 To that end, all flexibilities within the legal system of an implementing Member must be
employed in the implementation process. 107 In this case, while it has referred to due process
obligations, Ukraine has not explained how the timeframes associated with the various steps of its
proposed administrative review reflect the use of flexibilities within its legal system. It seems to me
that, given the limited scope of the administrative review at issue, Ukraine has available to it a
considerable degree of flexibility to conduct that administrative review in a shorter period of time
than it proposes, as evidenced by the absence of mandatory timeframes in relation to the majority
of the component steps of Ukraine's proposed review.
3.39. In light of all of the considerations above, Ukraine has not satisfied its burden of proving that
12 months is the shortest period of time possible within its legal system to complete the
administrative review at issue. I am of the view that Ukraine could complete this administrati ve
review in reasonably less time. Relevant considerations include the required immediate exclusion of
EuroChem and the fact that this administrative review will essentially focus on calculating normal
value for the remaining investigated Russian producers and ensuring that certain disclosure
obligations are met. 108 Given the limited scope of the administrative review at issue, I am not
convinced that conducting it in a shorter period of time than Ukraine proposes would, in the
circumstances of this dispute, infringe upon due process rights. At the same time, I believe that the
review to be undertaken in this dispute will require more than the two months proposed by Russia.
I indeed find it highly doubtful that a period of two months would allow Ukrainian inve stigating
authorities to complete all the necessary steps for an administrative review. In that regard, I note
that the component steps of Ukraine's proposed administrative review would seem to be sequential
steps that cannot be conducted in parallel.109
3.40. A few days before the circulation of this Award , by letter dated 26 March 2020, Ukraine
requested me to take into account Ukraine's recent measures in response to the COVID-19 virus, as
they may significantly affect implementation in this dispute . Ukraine re ferred to the 30 -day
emergency situation regime introduced across Ukraine on 2 5 March 2020, specifically pointing to
quarantine measures, the suspension of all commercial international passenger services to and from
Ukraine, the closing of all non -essential services, and t he ban on gatherings of more than
10 individuals. Ukraine indicated that , depending on how the situation evolves , these measures
might be prolonged beyond 30 days .110 By letter dated 30 March 2020, Russia expressed its
solidarity with the countries affected by the COVID -19 virus. Russia stated, however, that it was
unclear how Ukraine's recent measures would affect the Ministry's ability to conduct administrative
reviews in short timeframes. Russia emphasized that, as per the Ministry itself, investigations would
not be terminated or suspended. Russia also emphasized that, while the Ministry introduced certain
mitigating measures dealing with on-site verifications and interactions with interested parties in

104 Ukraine's submission, para. 168 (quoting Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
105 In that regard, I observe that Ukraine was found to have acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in the interim and expiry reviews leading up to the 2014 extension decision because
Ukrainian investigating authorities had failed to give interested parties sufficient time to comment on its
disclosure.
106 In determining that balance, the arbitrator in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) noted that considerable
opportunity had already been afforded to interested parties to participate in the original investigation. The
arbitrator thus considered it appropriate to provide a shorter time to such interested parties in the context of
an investigation that was far more limited in scope and had been initiated to implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB. (Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51)
107 See para. 3.5. above.
108 I also recall that, pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
"[t]here shall be immediate termination [of an investigation] in cases where the authorities determine that the
margin of dumping is de minimis". The language "immediate termination", which applies to EuroChem in this
dispute, is not without relevance to my determination of the reasonable period of time. (emphasis added)
109 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
110 Letter from Ukraine dated 26 March 2020.

response to the recent developments in Ukraine pertaining to the COVID -19 virus, investigations
were otherwise to be conducted "as usual".111
3.41. Ukraine has not explained in detail the extent to which its recent measures to address the
COVID-19 virus affect its investigating authorities' ability to review the anti -dumping measures at
issue in this dispute. At the same time, I am aware of the seriousness of Ukraine's recent measures,
which were put in place as part of an emergency situation regime in response to a pandemic. The
types of measures described by Ukraine may affect many aspects of a country's operation. Although
investigations are not suspended, the documents put on the record by Russia confirm that Ukraine's
recent measures affect the conduct of trade -defence investigations and that certain necessary
adjustments are being made by the Ministry. For example, I understand that Ukraine's measures to
prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus affect the ability of interested parties to access materials
of investigations, and that the Ministry has thus introduced remote access to certain information.
The Ministry is also organi zing hearings remotely , instead of holding face -to-face meetings .
Moreover, as a result of the COVID -19 virus, on-site verifications are cancelled, which may lead to
extending the deadlines for interested parties to provide answers to questionnaires .112 While I see
merit in Russia's argument that the COVID-19 pandemic is not "an overwhelming excuse for failures
to comply with the WTO obligations" 113, I cannot, in my determination of the reasonable period of
time in this dispute, turn a blind eye to the recent developments in Ukraine and the rest of the world
relating to the COVID-19 pandemic that affect the work of Ukrainian investigating authorities.114 My
determination also needs to take into account the recent developments in Ukraine relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
3.4.3 Particular circumstances
3.42. Ukraine submits that, as recognized by the Panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit, it is currently
in a situation of "emergency in international relations", which constitutes a particular circumstance
that I should take into account in determining the reasonable period of time.115 According to Ukraine,
this situation has existed since 2014.116 Since then, Ukraine has been prioritizing urgent legislative
and regulatory actions to protect its territory and population, and maintain its law and public order
internally, resulting in other initiatives experiencing significant delays.117 Ukraine emphasizes that
this particular circumstance "affects daily life, disturbs the economy and continues to lead to
extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward actions" .118
Consequently, Ukraine requests me to determine that a period of six months be added to the
reasonable period of time that I would otherwise determine.119 This additional time is to be allocated

111 Letter from Russia dated 30 March 2020 (referring to Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus
SARS-CoV-2 (17 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-20b); Ministry, Notice regarding submission of information
(27 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-21b); Ministry, Press release, "The Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade
and Agriculture of Ukraine informs about the specifics of conducting trade investigations during the period of
quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev" (17 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-22b)). These exhibits were
attached to Russia's letter of 30 March 2020, and Ukraine did not object to these new exhibits.
112 Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (17 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-20b); Ministry,
Notice regarding submission of information (27 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-21b); Ministry, Press release, "The
Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine informs about the specifics of
conducting trade investigations during the period of quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev"
(17 March 2020) (Exhibit RUS-22b).
113 Letter from Russia dated 30 March 2020.
114 In its letter dated 30 March 2020, Russia also stated that it was unclear how Ukraine's recent
measures would affect Ukraine's legislative process. Above, I considered that my determination of the
reasonable period of time should not account for the legislative changes that Ukraine proposes to undertake.
I therefore do not consider it necessary to address further Russia's arguments pertaining to Ukraine's
COVID-19 measures as they relate to Ukraine's legislative process.
115 Ukraine's submission, para. 121 (quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.123).
Ukraine also identifies the need to amend the Law against Dumped Imports and review the anti-dumping
measures at issue as a particular circumstance. (Ibid., para. 120) I have addressed this circumstance above.
116 Ukraine's submission, para. 121.
117 Ukraine's submission, paras. 134-135 and 137.
118 Ukraine's submission, para. 127.
119 Ukraine's submission, para. 137. In support of its request, Ukraine refers to previous awards under
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU as having recognized "other, considerably less disruptive 'particular circumstances'
…, such as natural disasters or severe economic and financial problems". (Ukraine's submission, para. 128.
See also paras. 129-133 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrators, Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)),

as follows: three months to complete its legislative process and three months to review the
anti-dumping measures at issue.120
3.43. Russia responds that Ukraine attempts to "impermissibly expand[] the scope of [the
particular] circumstances" under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.121 Russia argues in this respect that the
particular circumstances are those "within the legal system of the implementing Member" that "make
it 'impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB '".122
To Russia, factors such as the state of international relations, the political situation between
Members, or priorities and workload of implementing authorities are irrelevant in this context.123 At
the hearing, Russia nevertheless acknowledged that a situation of "emergency in international
relations" may qualify as a particular circumstance within the meaning of Article 21.3(c).124 In any
event, Russia contends that "the allegations made by U kraine have no impact whatsoever on the
capacity of Ukraine to adopt laws and conduct investigations."125 Specifically, Russia points out that,
although the situation identified by Ukraine allegedly materialised in 2014 , Ukrainian investigating
authorities initiated more anti -dumping investigations in 2015-2019 than in 2010 -2014.126 Russia
also observes that, in 2015, ICIT implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
Ukraine – Passenger Cars within two months.127
3.44. I do not, in principle, rule out th e possibility that a situation of "emergency in international
relations" may qualify as a particular circumstance and may thus be relevant to my determination
of the reasonable period of time.128 I recognize that such a situation may affect a Member's capacity
to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. I recall, however, that Ukraine bears
the overall burden of proving that the period of time requested for implementation constitutes a
reasonable period of time.129 In my view, Ukraine has not sufficiently substantiated that there is a
situation of "emergency in internation al relations" that affects the reasonable period of time for
implementation in this dispute.130
3.45. Ukraine has not clarified, in its written submission or during the course of the hearing, how
or to what extent the period of time needed for implementation woul d be affected by the alleged
situation of " emergency in international relations ". Nor has Ukraine explained how it devises
six months as the additional period of time needed in response to the impact entailed by the alleged
situation, or how it devises the three additional months specifically requested to review the
anti-dumping measures at issue .131 Ukraine has not submitted any evidence in support of its
allegation that the situation of "emergency in international relations " would result in delays in the

para. 3.45; Indonesia – Autos (Article 21.3(c)), para. 24; Argentina – Hides and Leather (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 51)
120 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
121 Russia's submission, para. 32.
122 Russia's submission, para. 34 (quoting Article 21.3 of the DSU).
123 Russia's submission, para. 36.
124 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing.
125 Russia's submission, para. 131.
126 Russia's submission, para. 141 (referring to WTO Statistics on Initiation of Dumping, Countervailing
and Safeguard Investigations (Exhibit RUS-10)).
127 Russia's submission, para. 132 (referring to Communication from Ukraine, Ukraine – Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars, WT/DS468/10 of 8 October 2015).
128 Both parties agreed that a situation of "emergency in international relations" may qualify as a
particular circumstance within the meaning of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. (Parties' responses to questioning at
the hearing)
129 See para. 3.8. above.
130 In Peru – Agricultural Products, the arbitrator did not exclude that a natural disaster may constitute a
particular circumstance under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The relevant issue in that arbitration was how and to
what extent Peru's activities to address and mitigate the effects of an anticipated natural disaster affected the
period of time for implementation. (Award of the Arbitrator, Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c))
para. 3.45)
131 Ukraine referred to the additional period of time of six months granted by the arbitrator in
Indonesia – Autos as a benchmark. (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing) In that case, the
arbitrator considered that Indonesia is a developing country in a dire economic and financial situation.
(Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Autos (Article 21.3(c)), para. 24)) The additional period of time awarded
in that case is of limited relevance to my determination. That dispute did not concern Ukraine, but another
WTO Member. Moreover, the arbitrator was guided by Article 21.2 of the DSU, which provides that "[p]articular
attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members". (Ibid. (quoting
Article 21.2 of the DSU))

conduct of anti-dumping investigations. At the hearing, Ukr aine merely asserted, without more, that
the Ministry ha s to devote manpower to urgent border issues, and therefore cannot focus on
anti-dumping proceedings .132 The exhibits reli ed on by Ukraine in the context of its "particular
circumstances" arguments comprise: (i) a 2019 news item by the United Nations (UN) ; (ii) a 2019
report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ; (iii) UN General Assembly
Resolution 74/17 of 9 December 2019; and (iv) a table listing 16 laws adopted in 2019 by Ukraine's
Parliament.133 None of these exhibits speak s to the alleged delays in anti-dumping investigations. 134
3.46. For these reasons , I do not consider that there is a particular circumstance relevant to my
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementati on in this dispute.
3.4.4 Conclusion
3.47. In sum, Ukraine has not satisfied its burden of showing that 12 months is the shortest period
of time possible within its legal syste m to complete the administrative review of the anti -dumping
measures at issue or that there is a particular circumstance relevant to my determination of the
reasonable period of time in this dispute. Given the limited scope of the contemplated administrative
review, which will focus on calculating normal value and complying with certain disclosu re
requirements , 12 months is more than is reasonably needed for implementation in this dispute . In
reaching this conclusion, I am also mindful of the recent developments in Ukraine relating to the
COVID -19 pandemic.
4 AWARD
4.1. In light of the foregoing consid erations, the "reasonable period of time" for Ukraine to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 11 months and 15 days ,
from 30 September 2019, that is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports in this dispute. The reasonable period of time for implementation will expire
on 15 September 2020.
Signed in the original this 7th day of April 2020 by:

Ricardo Ramírez -Hernández
Arbitrator

132 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.
133 United Nations News, "Human cost of Ukraine conflict is growing, Security Council told"
(16 July 2019) (Exhibit UKR-6); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on
the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2019 (Exhibit UKR-7); United Nations
General Assembly resolution 74/17, Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (9 December 2019)
(Exhibit UKR-8); Laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of IX convocation concerning the emergency
situation in Ukraine, until 14 February 2020 (Exhibit UKR-13). Exhibit UKR-13 was distributed by Ukraine at the
hearing, and Russia did not object to this new exhibit.
134 Moreover, as Ukraine acknowledged, any delays resulting from the situation of "emergency in
international relations" it claims to have existed since 2014 are, at least to a certain extent, already accounted
for in its statistics on the duration of administrative reviews completed since 2014, which formed the basis for
the requested 12 months for reviewing the anti-dumping measures at issue. (Ukraine's responses to
questioning at the hearing. See also Statistics on duration of reviews of anti-dumping measures (Exhibit
UKR-5))

ANNEX A
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF UKRAINE'S SUBMISSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') adopted the recommendations and rulings of the Panel
and the Appellate Body in Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate (DS 493) at its
meeting of 30 September 2019. Immediately thereafter, a t the DSB meeting of 28 October 2019,
Ukraine informed the DSB that it intended to implement the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings,
but that it would need a reasonable period of time to do so.
2. This is the first time Ukrainian anti -dumping measures have been found to be inconsistent
with law of the World Trade Organization ('WTO') by the DSB. Consequently, Ukrainian leg islation
does not currently set out a procedure aimed specifically at bringing anti -dumping measures into
conformity with DSB's recommendations and rulings. Therefore, the implementation process in this
case will require two phases. First, Ukraine will have to adopt the required legislative framework to
initiate and conduct a review of anti-dumping measures. More specifically, Ukraine will have to revise
the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" of
22 December 1998 N o. 330-XIV and adopt an updated version of it ( Draft Law of Ukraine "On
Protection against Dumped Imports" as further referred 'Draft Law against Dumped Imports'). In a
second phase, Ukraine will conduct a review of the anti-dumping measures at issue. Ukraine will not
be able to start this second phase until its legislation has been amended.
3. Ukraine intends to completely implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings as promptly
as it can but anticipates that this will require no less than 27 months in total.
2. FIRST STEP: ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT LAW AGAINST DUMPED IMPORTS
4. In order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this case, as a first step,
Ukraine will have to adopt the Draft Law against Dumped Imports, as currently the Law of Ukraine
"On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" of 22 December 1998 No. 330-XIV
does not foresee the possibility for a review proceeding of anti-dumping measures to be initiated as
a way of complying with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.
5. Indeed, under the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped
Imports" of 22 December 1998 No. 330-XIV:
• There is no possibility for the Ministry to initiate a review proceeding of anti -dumping
measures ex officio on the basis of the DSB's recommendations and rulings or without a
preliminary request in this regard;
• There is no possibility to initiate such a review based specifically on the fact that certain
anti-dumping measures have been found to be inconsistent with Uk raine's obligations
under WTO law; and
• Once a review has been initiated, there is no possibility for the Ministry to focus its
examination on compliance of the anti -dumping measures concerned with the
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in a specific case, as it is
mandated by law to examine (i) whether the circumstances relating to dumping and injury
have substantially changed and (ii) whether the anti -dumping measures have had the
desired effect, namely, the prevention of injury.
6. In the Draft Law against Dumped Imports, provisions were therefore added in order to allow
an interim review procedure: (i) to be initiated ex officio by the Ministry; (ii) specifically as way of
complying with DSB 's recommendations and rulings; and (iii) to allow the Ministry to focus on
bringing the anti -dumping measures concerned into compliance with such recommendations and
rulings.
7. In early 2018, the Draft Law against Dumped Imports was submitted for review to t he
Parliament of Ukraine. However, because of parliamentary elections in July 2019, the Parliament

was dissolved before the end of its 5 -year term and before the Draft Law against Dumped Imports
could be adopted. According to Ukraine's domestic legislation , all draft laws that were not adopted
in the first reading by a previous convocation of the Parliament must be removed from consideration
of the newly elected Parliament. Therefore, in order to be officially adopted, the Draft Law against
Dumped Imports must go through the approval procedure again.
8. As can be seen from the table below, in order for all the mandatory procedural steps for the
adoption of the Draft Law against Dumped Imports to be completed, Ukraine will need a period of
9 months in total.
Procedural step Time needed
Legislative initiative Completed
Drafting by the Ministry Will be completed by the end of January 2020
Approval by other relevant Ministries and interested
government services 1 month Public consultations and submission to relevant
associations for comments
Legal expertise by the Ministry of Justice 10 days
Review and approval by the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine 1 month
Review and adoption by the Parliament of Ukraine 5 months (Exhibit 4)
Signature by President and official publication 15 days
Entry into force 30 days
3. SECOND STEP: REVIEW OF THE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES AT ISSUE
9. Once Ukraine's legislative framework has been amended in order to allow an interim review
proceeding of anti -dumping measures to be initiated with the specific aim of complying with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings, the anti-dumping measures at issue will have to be reviewed
in order to bring them into conformity with WTO law.
10. Such a review is a very thorough procedure and, in accordance with national legislation, it
requires several mandatory procedural steps to be followed. As can be seen from the t able below,
in order for all these procedural steps required for the review of anti -dumping measures to be
completed, Ukraine will need 12 months in total.
Procedural step Time needed
Preparation of proposals by the Ministry 15 days
Consideration of the Ministry's proposals and decision to
initiate by the ICIT 10 days
Interested parties are notified and may submit comments 30 days
Questionnaire replies are sent out and answers are
provided and analysed by the Ministry 100 days
Verification visits 20 days for a domestic company and 40 days
for a foreign company
Hearing and written submissions 30 days
Drafting main facts and findings 90 days
Disclosure and final decision 35 days
4. PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE: EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
11. A particular circumstance that should be taken into account by the Arbitrator in this specific
case, is the fact that Ukraine is currently in a situation qualified by the Panel in Russia – Traffic in
Transit as an "emergency in international relations " within the meaning of Article XXI (b) of

the GATT.1 According to the Panel in that case, such a situation allows WTO Members to " depart
from their GATT and WTO obligations".2
12. This particular circumstance affects daily life, disturbs the economy and continues to lead to
extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward actions. Concretely,
the above-specified actions and time frames are those that operate as a rule in a 'normal' situation,
i.e. under ordinary conditions. Because, however, life is no longer normal since the uninvited
disruptions started, this continuing emergency should be taken into account when determining a
realistic time frame under surreal circumstances.
13. More specifically, since Ukraine needs to focus on issuing emergency laws and regulations to
respond to the situation of "emergency in international relations" that currently exists in its territory,
other regulatory or legislative initiatives will experience significant delays. Consequently, a specific
flexibility of at least six additional months should be added over and above the reasonable period of
time that would otherwise be determined, absent these crippling and highly particular circumstances
from which Ukraine has been severely suffering during the last years.
5. CONCLUSION
14. In summary, in order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, the two following
steps will have to be completed:
• First, the Draft Law against Dumped Imports will need to be adopted in order to enable a
review of anti -dumping measures to be initiated on the basis of the
DSB's recommendations and rulings; and
• Secondly, a review of the anti -dumping duties will have to be conducted in accordance
with domestic mandatory procedure and taking into account the ruling of the Panel and
the Appellate Body in this case.
15. Ukraine's reasonable and realistic estimate is that it will take no less than 9 months to adopt
the Draft Law against Dumped Imports and that it will take an additional 12 months to conduct a
review of the anti-dumping duties at issue.
16. Therefore, Ukraine respectfully requests that the Arbitrator determine that 21 (= 9 + 12)
months is a reasonable period of time in which to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, had there been no particular circumstances present, as explained
above. Because of the current armed conflict in Ukraine, recognized by WTO as situation of
"emergency in international relations" that currently still exists in its territory, an additional 6 months
should be added to this period of time. In sum, the total reasonable period of time in this case should
therefore be determined at 27 months (= 21 + 6).

1 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit (DS 512), para. 7.123.
2 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit (DS 512), para. 7.79.

ANNEX B
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RUSSIA'S SUBMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 30 September 2019, the DSB adopted its recommendations and rulings to bring
Ukraine's anti-dumping measures on Russian ammonium nitrate in conformity with the ADA.1 While
Ukraine announced its intention to comply with these recommendations and rulings, the
Russian Federation considers that the timetable it proposed to do so cannot be considered as
representative of a RPT within the meaning of Article 21.3 of the DSU.
2. In particular, the Russian Federation considers that (i) Ukraine unduly seeks to limit the role
of the arbitrator, (ii) no RPT should be afforded to implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings relating to Article 5.8 of the ADA, (iii) the DSB's recom mendations and rulings can be
implemented in a shorter period of time, without legislative changes or review and (iv) no particular
circumstance justifies the extension of the RPT.
II. UKRAINE UNDULY SEEKS TO LIMIT THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
3. The Russian Federation considers that the role of the arbitrator is not limited to validating the
timetable proposed by the implementing Member.
4. Where necessary, in order to ensure "prompt compliance" within the meaning of Article 21.1
of the DSU, the Arbitrator must establish the RPT as the shortest period of time possible within the
legal system of the implementing Member, using all flexibility and discretion available within its
system and taking into account the particular circumstances of the case.2
5. An implementing Member does not have an unfettered discretion when determining their
means of implementation. 3 Arbitrators can consider such means of implementation as a relevant
factor.4 In particular, Arbitrators can review whether the implementing action falls within the range
of permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB recommendations and
rulings.5 Similarly, Arbitrators can set the RPT by reference to available administrative means, if
such way of implementation should be favore d in order to comply promptly with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in accordance with Article 21 of the DSU.6
6. In any case, the implementing Member bears the burden of proving that the period it requests
is the shortest possible within its legal system7 and that the steps it proposes are required under its
domestic laws to implement the recommendations and rulings.8
7. The Russian Federation therefore requests the Arbitrator to consider that a RPT should only
be granted if permitted, without taking account of unnecessary legislative changes or reviews, based
on the shortest period possible within Ukraine's legal system.
III. NO RPT SHOULD BE AFFORDED FOR ARTICLE 5.8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS
8. The Panel and Appellate Body Reports make clear that the only way to comply with Article 5.8
of the ADA is to immediately exclude EuroChem from the scope of the anti-dumping measures and

1 Dispute Settlement Body, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, Appellate Body
Report and Panel Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, 3 October 2019, WT/DS493/10.
2 See inter alia Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 61.
3 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 56.
4 See inter alia Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26.
5 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.3. See also Awards of the
Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)), para. 69 and EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)),
para. 55.
6 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 53. See also Award of
the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 48 and 52.
7 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 44.
8 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)), para. 56.

from the scope of any subsequent review. It is established in the WTO jurisprudence and undisputed
by Ukraine that there is no oth er way to comply with Article 5.8 of the ADA. There is no other
permissible range of actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB recommendations and
rulings and immediate compliance is practicable.
9. The exclusion of EuroChem from the scope of the anti-dumping measures and from the scope
of any subsequent review only requires a decision by ICIT, pursuant to Article 5(6) of the Ukrainian
Dumping Law. Ukraine should therefore immediately comply with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings relating to Article 5.8 of the ADA.
10. If necessary, the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings could be done in
two steps, with the immediate exclusion of EuroChem, as a first step, and the implementation within
a RPT of the remaining DSB's recommendations and rulings, as a second step.9
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SHORTEST
 PERIOD OF TIME, WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
11. First, the Russian Federation considers it is unnecessary to amend the Ukrainian Dumping
Law to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Implementation can already be done,
without a review, under the existing provisions of the Ukrainian Dumping Law. Moreover, the
Ukrainian Dumping Law includes provisions similar to those relied on in the Ukrainian Safeguard Law
to implement within two months – without any legislative change or review – the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in dispute Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain
Passenger Cars (DS468).
12. Thus, the RPT should not include the time needed to implement any legislative change or
conduct reviews and the RPT should have been two months from the adoption of the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports, similar to what was done in DS468.
13. Second, assuming legislative changes would be needed (quod non), the timetable submitted
by Ukraine for any legislative change is excessive. Ukraine nowhere explains how the "general"
delays to which it refers would be mandatory, nor why such delays could not be shortened using all
flexibility available within its legal system. In any event, the Russian Federation notes that average
delays cannot be used as a benchmark when setting the RPT. 10 To the contrary, the
Russian Federation considers that, insofar as only a single Article would be added to the Ukrainian
Dumping Law, any delay relating to the adoption of such amendment should be minimal.
14. Third, Russia considers that the DSB's recommendations and rulings can be implemented in
full without necessarily conducting a review, as illustrated by the past practice of the Ukrainian
authorities confirmed by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.
15. However, even if a review was to be conducted (quod non), the Russian Federation disagrees
that Ukraine should conduct a comprehensive 12 -months review to implement the
DSB's recommendations and rulings. Past arbitrators have emphasized that any review to implement
the DSB's recommendations and rulings should not amount to a de novo review and that, using all
flexibility available within their legal system, implementing Members can be expected to conduct
these reviews in a shorter period of time as compared to time periods used in original
investigations.11 This position is not affected by t he alleged need to respect due process rights in
the context of the review implementing the DSB's recommendations and rulings.12
16. In light of the limited DSB's recommendations and rulings that must be complied with and the
fact that Ukraine already has in it s possession all the information it needs, and to the extent none
of the delays raised by Ukraine are mandatory, the proposed 12 -month period cannot be accepted
for the conduct of the review.

9 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), para. 41. See also Award of the Arbitrator,
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 108.
10 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 71.
11 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 38, 47 and 48.
12 Award or the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 49-51.

V. NO PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFIES THE EXTENSION OF THE RPT
17. Ukraine wrongfully attempts to refer to the "emergency in international relations" identified in
the Panel Report in Russia – Traffic in Transit (DS 512). In referring to this dispute, Ukraine errs
legally and factually. Any considerations relating to th is dispute are irrelevant to the resolution of
the present arbitration proceedings. In addition, an analysis of available facts shows that Ukraine
has not incurred any delay when discussing and adopting laws or conducting trade defense
investigations.
VI. CONCLUSION
18. The Russian Federation considers that no RPT can be granted to implement the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in relation to Article 5.8 of the ADA. Ukraine should therefore
take an immediate decision to exclude EuroChem from the scope of its anti-dumping measure and
any subsequent review thereof.
19. With respect to obligations under Articles 2.2.1.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 6.9 of the ADA,
Ukraine should implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations in a RPT, corresponding to the
shortest period possible, using all flexibilities available. However, this requires neither legislative
change, nor reviews and particularly nor full-fledged reviews. The Russian Federation considers that
a decision to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings could have been adopted within
two months.