Document: WT/DS322/RW Page A-1 ANNEX A EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Contents Page
Document codes: WT/DS322/RW
Complainant: Japan
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Argentina, China, EU, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 5.8, 3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 1  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994Art. 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

ANNEX A

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex A-1 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of Japan A-2
Annex A-2 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of
the United States
A-10

ANNEX A-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN
SUBMISSION OF JAPAN

(7 July 2008)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the original proceedings in this disput e, the United States was found to have violated
various of its obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994")
and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement").
The measures at issue found to be WTO-inconsiste nt in the original proceedings were: the
United States' zeroing procedures; 11 periodic reviews; and two sunset reviews. Japan has brought
these proceedings because the United States has failed to implement the recommendations and rulings
of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") regarding these measures.

II. COMPLIANCE AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS FORM PART OF A
CONTINUUM OF EVENTS

2. Compliance panels and the Appellate Body ha ve recognized that "Article 21.5 proceedings do
not occur in isolation from the original proceedings, but that both proceedings form part of a
continuum of events."
1 In US – Softwood Lumber VI (21.5), the Appellate Body observed that "doubts
could arise about the objective nature of an Article 21 .5 panel's assessment if, on a specific issue, that
panel were to deviate from the reasoning in the origin al panel report in the absence of any change in
the underlying evidence."2

III. FACTUAL ASPECTS

A. THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS

3. On 23 January 2007, the DSB adopted the A ppellate Body Report a nd the original panel
report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
3 In doing so, the DSB requested that the
United States bring certain measures found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
the GATT 1994 into conformity with the United States' obligations under those agreements.4

4. On 4 May 2007, Japan and the United States ag reed, pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU,
that the reasonable period of time ("RPT") from the date of adoption for the United States to
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings would expire on 24 December 2007.
5

1 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System (21.5) , para. 136, citing Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Corn Syrup (21.5), para. 121 (emphasis added).
2 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (21.5), para. 103 (emphasis added).
3 WT/DSB/M/225, para. 96.
4 See Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 191.
5 WT/DS322/20.

B. THE UNITED STATES' DECLARED IMPLEMENTATION ACTION AND INACTION

1. Zeroing Procedures

5. On 23 January 2007, as noted, the DSB ruled that the zeroing procedures are WTO-
inconsistent in the following situ ations: (i) in W-to-W and T-to-T comparisons in original
investigations; (ii) under any comparison methodol ogy in periodic reviews; and (iii) under any
comparison methodology in new shipper reviews.

6. On 6 March 2006, two days before the orig inal panel circulated its interim report, the
United States Department of Commerce ("USDOC") published a notice of its intention to abandon the
use of the zeroing procedures in W-to-W comparisons in original investigations "in light of the panel's
report in US – Zeroing [(EC)]".
6

7. On 27 December 2006, almost one month before the DSB's adoption of the original panel and
Appellate Body reports in this dispute, the USDOC published a final notice announcing that it would
no longer apply the zeroing procedures in W-to-W comparisons in original investigations.
7 T h e
USDOC expressly declined to modify any aspect of its comparison methodologies for calculating
dumping, other than the abandonment of zeroing in W-to-W comparisons in original investigations.

2. Periodic Reviews

8. Japan recalls that the DSB's recommendations and rulings require the United States to bring
11 periodic reviews into conformity with WTO law. However, the United States has taken no action
to revise the WTO-inconsistent aspects of these meas ures. Instead, it asserts that no such action is
required because it has taken action to adopt subsequent periodic reviews that it contends "supersede"
the WTO-inconsistent periodic reviews. In th ese proceedings, Japan challenges five of the
11 periodic reviews that were at issue in the orig inal proceedings and that the United States asserts
were superseded, as well as three of the subsequent periodic reviews that it says superseded the
original reviews.
8

3. Sunset Reviews

9. The DSB's recommendations and rulings requi re the United States to bring two sunset
reviews into conformity with its WTO obligations . Japan is unaware of any action taken by the
United States to comply with these obligations. In these proceedings, Japan challenges one of the two
sunset reviews found to be WTO-inconsistent, i.e., the sunset review, of 4 November 1999, in relation
to Anti-Friction Bearings. The anti-dumping order relating to the second sunset review has since been
revoked, and Japan does not challenge the sunset review relating to that order in these proceedings.

C. MEASURES AT ISSUE AND CLAIMS MADE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS

1. Zeroing Procedures

10. Japan challenges the United States' omissi on to take action to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings that the zeroing proc edures are WTO-inconsistent in the following

6 Antidumping Proceedings: Calcul ation of the Weighted Average Dumping Margin During an
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 11189 (Dep't of Comm., 6 March 2006) (emphasis added)
(Exhibit JPN-24).
7 Antidumping Proceedings: Calcul ation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an
Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification, 71 Fed. Reg. 77722, 77723 (Dep't of Comm.,
27 December 2006) (emphasis added) (Exhibit JPN-25).
8 Japan reserves the rights to address any other subsequent closely connected measures.

situations: (i) in T-to-T comparisons in orig inal investigations; (ii) under any comparison
methodology in periodic reviews; and (iii) unde r any comparison methodology in new shipper
reviews.
9

2. Periodic Reviews

11. Japan challenges the United States' omissi on to take action to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings with respect to fi ve of the 11 periodic reviews found to be WTO
inconsistent in the original proceedings (reviews numb ered (1), (2), (3), (7) and (8), in paragraph 13
below).

12. Japan also challenges three subsequent peri odic reviews, numbered (4), (5), and (6) in
paragraph 13 below, as "measu res taken to comply" under Article 21.5 of the DSU. The
United States reported to the DSB that it had comp lied with the DSB's recommendations and rulings
regarding the original periodic reviews because thos e reviews have been "superseded" by subsequent
reviews, including the three subsequent review s challenged by Japan in these proceedings.
10 T h e
subsequent reviews are, ther efore, replacement measures that undermine the United States'
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding the original periodic reviews.11

13. The periodic reviews at issue in these proceedings are:

 (1) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 1999 through 30 April 2000)
(JTEKT and NTN);

 (2) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 2000 through 30 April 2001)
(NTN);

 (3) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 2002 through 30 April 2003)
(JTEKT, NSK, and NTN);

 (4) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 2003 through 30 April 2004)
(JTEKT, NSK, NPB, and NTN);

 (5) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 2004 through 30 April 2005)
(JTEKT, NSK, NPB, and NTN);

 (6) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 2005 through 30 April 2006)
(Asahi Seiko, JTEKT, NSK, NPB, and NTN);

 (7) Cylindrical Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan (1 May 1999 through
31 December 1999) (JTEKT and NTN); and,

 (8) Spherical Plain Bearings and Part s Thereof From Japan (1 May 1999 through
31 December 1999) (NTN).

14. With respect to each of these eight periodic reviews, the United States had not, by the end of
the RPT, liquidated certain entries covered by the review and imported from the named exporters.

9 Japan's Panel Request, paras. 10-12.
10 WT/DS322/22/Add.2.
11 Japan's Panel Request, paras. 13-15 and Annex 1.

3. Sunset Reviews

15. Japan challenges the United States' omissi on to take action to implement the DSB's
recommendations and rulings with respect to the sun set review determination of 4 November 1999 in
relation to Anti-Friction Bearings that was found to be WTO in consistent in the original
proceedings.12

IV. THIS PANEL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE MEASURES AT ISSUE IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS

A. THE PANEL HAS JURISDICTION OVER AN IMPLEMENTING MEMBER'S ACTIONS
AND OMISSIONS

16. The measures at issue identified in Japan's panel request include both actions and omissions
by the United States. It is well-established that , like other WTO dispute settlement proceedings,
Article 21.5 proceedings cover measures in both these forms – i.e., omissions as well as positive
actions taken to comply.

B. THE THREE SUBSEQUENT PERIODIC REVIEWS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU

1. Review of the case-law on the interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU

17. Certain of the measures that Japan challenges were neither part of the original proceedings
nor declared by the United States to be measures taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations
and rulings regarding those original measures. Th ese measures are, in particular, the periodic reviews
numbered (4), (5), and (6) in paragraph 13.

18. The fact that the United States may not rec ognize measures challenged by Japan as "taken to
comply" does not preclude them from so being. An implementing Member cannot decide for itself
whether or not a measure is "taken to comply"; instead, a compliance panel must objectively assess
whether a challenged measure meets the requirements of Article 21.5.
13 Further, as noted by the panel
in US – Gambling (21.5) , measures cannot be excluded from the scope of compliance proceedings
"due to the purpose for which they have been taken".14

19. Also, the fact that measures challenged under Ar ticle 21.5 were not challenged in the original
proceedings does not preclude them from being "m easures taken to comply". The Appellate Body
recognized in one of its first Article 21.5 rulings th at "Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in principle,
not the original measure, but rather a new and different measure which was not before the original
panel."
15

20. In subsequent disputes, new measures – not recognized by the respondent as "taken to
comply" – have been found to be covered by Article 21.5 because of a close relationship to the DSB's
recommendations and rulings regarding the orig inal measures and because the new measures
undermine compliance with those recommendations and rulings.

12 Japan's Panel Request, para. 16 and Annex 2.
13 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 73, note 111. See also Panel Report,
Australia – Salmon (21.5) , para. 7.10, sub-para. 22, quoted with approval by the Panel in US – Softwood
Lumber IV (21.5) , para. 4.38; Panel Report, Australia – Leather (21.5) , para. 6.4, quoted with approval by the
Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 73, note 111.
14 Panel Report, US – Gambling (21.5), para. 6.24 (emphasis in original).
15 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5), para. 41 (emphasis added).

21. In US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) , the United States asserted that a periodic review
imposing countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber was not within the scope of Article 21.5
proceedings that stemmed from original pro ceedings regarding the USDOC's calculation of
countervailing duties in an original investigation.

22. The Appellate Body disagreed, emphasizing that Article 21.5 establishes an "express link"
between the measures covered by Article 21. 5 and the DSB's recommendations and rulings.
16 After
reviewing the approach taken by the panels in Australia – Salmon (21.5) 17 and Australia –
Leather (21.5)18,19 the Appellate Body concluded that where new measures have "a particularly close
relationship to the declared ‘measures taken to comply ', and to the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB", or where there are "sufficiently close links", those new measures are subject to review by an
Article 21.5 panel.20 In conducting that analysis, the Appellate Body held that a panel must employ a
"nexus-based test"21 to "scrutinize these relationships, which ma y, depending on the particular facts,
call for an examination of the timing, nature, and effects of the various measures."22

23. In commenting on its findings in US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) , the Appellate Body in US
– Upland Cotton (21.5) 23 noted that the First Assessment Review was a "measure taken to comply"
because of its particularly close relationship to the Section 129 determination. 24 It also emphasized
that new measures are regarded as "taken to comply" when they have "the effect of undermining
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings" or where justified "to avoid circumvention"
of those recommendations and rulings.25

24. The Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton (21.5) added that Article 21.5 must be interpreted
to prevent the implementing Member from undermin ing the substantive disci plines in the covered
agreements and also the dispute settlement mechanism in the DSU. 26 The Appellate Body noted that,
if new subsidy payments identical to those at is sue in the original proceedings had been excluded
from the scope of Article 21.5, this would make the DSB's recommendations and rulings "essentially
declaratory in nature", and create an endless cycl e of never-ending litigation, with no implementation
of the outcome forthcoming.27

25. Finally, the Appellate Body has explained that its approach to Article 21.5 strikes a balance
between competing considerations, taking into account, among others, that the provision "seeks to
promote the prompt resolution of disputes, to avoid a complaining Member having to initiate dispute
settlement proceedings afresh when an original measure found to be inconsistent has not been brought
into conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and to make efficient use of the
original panel and its relevant experience."
28

26. In the sections to follow, Japan explains that the three subsequent periodic reviews are
"measures taken to comply" under Article 21.5 because they undermine compliance with the

16 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 68.
18 Panel Report, Australia – Leather (21.5), paras. 6.1 and 6.5.
19 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), paras. 73-76.
20 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 77 (emphasis added).
21 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 79.
22 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 77.
23 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), paras. 213 and 249.
24 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), para. 205.
25 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), para. 205.
26 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), paras. 245-246.
27 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), paras. 245-246.
28 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 72. See also Appellate Body Report,

recommendations and rulings of the DSB as result of the close relationship between them and the
original measures.

2. The Three Subsequent Periodic Reviews Are "Measures Taken To Comply"

27. In the present proceedings, the three subsequent periodic reviews (numbered (4), (5), and (6)
in paragraph 13 above) involve acti on by the United States to replace the original WTO-inconsistent
periodic reviews concerning ball bear ings (numbered (1), (2), and (3 ) in paragraph 13 above). As
discussed below, these measures have a very close substantive relationship, with the subsequent
reviews replacing the original measures, and they all involve the WTO-inconsistent application of the
zeroing procedures. Given the relationship between the measures, the three subsequent reviews
undermine the United States' compliance with the DS B's recommendations and rulings regarding the
original measures. As a result, the subsequent periodic reviews constitute "measures taken to
comply" for purposes of Article 21.5 of the DSU.

28. In the next sub-section, Japan outlines the cl ose substantive relationship between the original
and subsequent reviews. It is the very closeness of this relationship that, as explained in the sub-
section thereafter, means that the subsequent reviews have the potential to – and, in Japan's view, do –
undermine compliance with, and circumvention of, the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding
the original periodic reviews.

(a) The Original and Subsequent Reviews Are Substantively Related

29. With respect to the nature of the measures, the original and subsequent periodic reviews have
essentially the same connections that led the Appellate Body to conclude in US – Softwood Lumber IV
(21.5) that a "particularly close relationship" existe d between the three measures at issue in those
proceedings:

• the original and subsequent measures all resulted from anti-dumping proceedings conducted
by the USDOC and, in particular, the same type of proceeding, namely periodic reviews;

• the three subsequent reviews were all conduc ted pursuant to the same anti-dumping order,
namely "Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan " and they all, therefore, concern the
same subject product as the sev en "ball bearing" reviews challenged in the original
proceedings;
29 and,

• the original and subsequent "ball bearing" reviews concern dumping determinations made
with respect to exports from the same companies.

30. Moreover, like the measures at issue in US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) , a substantive
relationship exists because the original and sub sequent "ball bearing" reviews provide succeeding
bases for the continued imposition of anti-dumping du ties on ball bearings, with each new review (i)
establishing a cash deposit rate that replaced the cash deposit rate from the prev ious review, and (ii)
determining the definitive duty ( i.e., importer-specific assessment) rate for entries initially subjected
to the cash deposit rate from a prior review. In other words, in substantive terms, the various
measures form an unbroken chain of measures flowing from a single anti-dumping order.

31. Again like the measures at issue in US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) , with respect to each of
the periodic reviews, Japan contests "a specific component" of the review, namely, the zeroing

29 Five of these seven measures are subject to these proceedings. The remaining two reviews – the
reviews for 1998-1999 and 2001-2002 – are not because all of the entries covered by these reviews had been
liquidated prior to the end of the RPT.

methodology used to make the dumping determinations.
30 This specific component of the three
subsequent reviews – and not other aspects of those measures – is within the scope of these
proceedings.

32. An important temporal relationship also exis ts between the three subsequent periodic reviews
and the DSB's recommendations and rulings. In the case of each of the three reviews, the
United States had not collected definitive anti- dumping duties on certain entries covered by these
reviews at the end of the RPT. As a result, the United States will apply the WTO-inconsistent
importer-specific assessment rate determined in these reviews after the end of the RPT.

(b) The Three Subsequent Reviews Undermine and Circumvent Compliance with the DSB's
Recommendations and Rulings As a Result of the Close Relationship Between the Measures

33. To borrow from the words of the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton (21.5) , the three
subsequent reviews have "the effect of undermin ing compliance", and "circumvent[ing]" the DSB's
recommendations and rulings.
31 Instead of revising the cash deposit and importer-specific assessment
rates established in the original reviews, the United States simply replaced those rates, as explained in
paragraph 27, with new rates determined in the subsequent revi ews using the same WTO-inconsistent
zeroing methodology. Thus, the measures found to be WTO-inconsistent have been withdrawn and
replaced by new measures that simply perpetuate the WTO-inconsistency that the United States was
obliged to eliminate.

34. The United States itself has recognized that the subsequent reviews replace the original
reviews. The United States informed the DSB of its vi ew that it is not obliged to revise the results of
the original WTO-inconsistent periodic reviews because "in each case the results were superseded by
subsequent reviews". 32 It added that, "[b]ecause of this, no further action is necessary for the
United States to bring these challenged measur es into compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB." 33 Thus, the United States considers that the adoption of the subsequent periodic
reviews – which it says "superseded" the WTO-in consistent reviews – involved implementation
"action", and "no further" such "action" is needed to comply.

35. If the subsequent reviews are excluded from the scope of Article 21.5 of the DSU, the
United States could disregard the DSB's recommendations and rulings with impunity. The DSB's
recommendations and rulings would be "essentially declaratory in nature".
34 One set of WTO-
inconsistent measures could simply be replaced by another set of substantively related measures that
include the same WTO-inconsistency, and an endless cycle of never-ending litigation would ensue.

V. THE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED TO BRING ITS WTO-INCONSISTENT
MEASURES INTO CONFORMITY WITH ITS WTO OBLIGATIONS

36. These Article 21.5 proceedings concern the Unite d States' failure to comply fully with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Specifi cally, Japan challenges bo th the existence and
consistency of US measures taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings on: (i) the
maintenance of zeroing procedures; (ii) eight periodic reviews; and (iii) two sunset reviews.

37. With respect to the zeroing procedures, th e USDOC expressly stated that it was abandoning
the zeroing procedures solely in W-to-W comparisons employed in original investigations. Under this
limited rule change, the USDOC said that it was not making "any … modifications" to its calculation

30 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 83.
31 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), para. 205.
32 WT/DS322/22/Add.2 (emphasis added).
33 WT/DS322/22/Add.2 (emphasis added).
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (21.5), para. 246.

methodologies in other situations, including T-to-T co mparisons in original investigations, or in any
comparison methodology in periodic and new shipper re views. Since that ti me, the United States has
taken no further action to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

38. With respect to the five original periodic reviews that Japan challe nges in these proceedings,
the United States admits that has taken no actio n to implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings. Japan's challenge focuses on these five pe riodic reviews because th ey continue to produce
legal effects after the end of the RPT. In particul ar, the United States will take action, after the end of
the RPT, to collect definitive anti-dumping duties at importer-specific assessment rates determined
with zeroing in these reviews. As regards the th ree subsequent reviews, these "measures taken to
comply" are inconsistent with the Anti-Du mping Agreement and the GATT 1994 because the
United States determined the cash deposit rate and importer-specific assessment rate using zeroing.

39. Finally, the sunset review at issue resulted in the maintenance by the United States of its anti-
dumping order on ball bearings from Japan as from 4 N ovember 1999. In the absence of that review,
the order should have been revoked at that time. However, because the sunset review is WTO-
inconsistent, it could not, and cannot today, provide a va lid legal basis under Article 11.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement for the continued maintenance of the anti-dumping order in question. Following
the adoption of the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs, the United States was given an opportunity
to bring the sunset review into conformity w ith its obligations during the RPT but, to Japan's
knowledge, elected not to take any action regarding the review.

ANNEX A-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION
OF THE UNITED STATES

(4 August 2008)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Japan erroneously claims that the Unite d States has failed to implement the Dispute
Settlement Body's ("DSB") recommendations and rulings in US – Zeroing (Japan) . Japan also
attempts to expand the proper scope of this Article 21.5 proceeding by challenging the WTO-
consistency of three administrative reviews that are not measures taken to comply.

2. The United States has fully implemente d the DSB's recommenda tions and rulings.
Subsequent administrative reviews have supersed ed the administrative reviews found to be WTO-
inconsistent, thereby eliminating the WTO inconsistencies found in the original proceeding. As to the
challenged sunset review, the majority of the dumpi ng margins relied on in that determination are not
WTO-inconsistent and inde pendently demonstrate that dumping at above the de minimis level
continued after the imposition of the order. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to change the challenged
sunset review determination. And lastly, the United States has eliminated the single measure known
as the "zeroing procedures" that was found to be WTO-inconsistent "as such."

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. In the underlying dispute, the DSB adopted th e Appellate Body report and panel report, as
modified by the Appellate Body report, on 23 Janua ry 2007. The reasonable period of time ("RPT")
for this dispute expired on 24 December 2007. The United States implemented all of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings by that date. On 7 April 2008, Japan requested the establishment of this
panel under Article 21.5 of the of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU").

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF

4. Under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel must "make an objective assessment of the matter
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements." In anticipation of US arguments on zeroing, Japan
cites dicta from the recent Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico ) indicating that
panels are allegedly bound to follow adopted Appe llate Body reports on the same legal issues. To the
extent that the reasoning in prior dispute settlement reports is persuasive, t hose reports may be taken
into account, but they have no stare decisis effect. In addition, the burden in this dispute is on Japan
to prove that the United States failed to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

IV. PRELIMINARY RULING REQUESTS

A. THE THREE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS ON BALL BEARINGS ARE NOT
MEASURES "TAKEN TO COMPLY"

5. An Article 21.5 compliance panel may only exam ine a claim that a measure taken to comply
does not exist, or that a measure taken to comply is inconsistent with a covered agreement. As the
Appellate Body noted in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5) : "[p]roceedings under Article 21.5 do not
concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to
those 'measures taken to comply with the recommenda tions and rulings' of the DSB. In our view, the
phrase 'measures taken to comply' refers to measures which have been, or which should be, adopted
by a Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB ."
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, in assessing whethe r a challenged measure is a "measure taken to
comply," the Panel must first look to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

6. Two of the administrative review determinati ons identified by Japan in its Article 21.5 panel
request – Review Nos. 4 and 5 – cannot be consid ered measures taken to comply because they pre-
date the adoption of the DSB's recommendations and rulings on 23 January 2007. The Appellate
Body has found that "[a]s a whol e, Article 21 deals with events subsequent to the DSB's adoption of
recommendations and rulings in a particular dispute."

7. In its Article 21.5 panel request, Japan identifies the US Department of Commerce's
("Commerce") determinations in the 2003- 04 and 2004-05 administrative reviews of Ball Bearings
(Review Nos. 4 and 5). These two determinations we re not identified by Japan in its original panel
request. The DSB adopted the Appellate Body report in this dispute on 23 January 2007. Commerce,
however, made and published the final results of the 2003-04 administrative review in 2005, well
before the adoption of the Appellate Body report. Likewise, Commerce made and published the final
results of the 2004-05 administrative review in 2006, m onths before the adoption of the report. These
measures have no connection with the DSB's recomm endations and rulings, and cannot be considered
measures taken to comply. Accordingly, these meas ures are outside the terms of reference of this
Panel.

8. Relying on prior panel and Appellate Body re ports, Japan asserts that the three subsequent
administrative reviews are within the scope of the Article 21.5 proceeding. First, Japan asserts that
the original administrative reviews and the thr ee subsequent reviews have "essentially the same
connections that led the Appellate Body to conclude in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5) that a
'particularly close relationship' existed between th e three measures at issue in those proceedings."
Japan misunderstands the Appellate Body's findings in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5) . As
the Appellate Body stated in that dispute, "not . . . every assessment review will necessarily fall within
the jurisdiction of an Article 21.5 panel." Accordi ng to the Appellate Body, "such an approach would
be too sweeping." This Panel should reject Japan 's attempt to include subsequent reviews of Ball
Bearings just because they are administrative reviews involving the same product exported from
Japan by the same companies. If the overlap between product, exporting country, and exporting
company were sufficient to establish the type of "particularly close relationship" found in US –
Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5), then every administrative review would fall within the jurisdiction
of an Article 21.5 panel.

9. Japan, in relying on US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 ), ignores the differences between
the two disputes. In making its finding in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5) , the Appellate
Body considered the timing between the two dete rminations at issue. The timing of these two
determinations provided Commerce with the abilit y to take account of the DSB's recommendations
and rulings, and as the Appellate Body emphasized , the United States expressly acknowledged that
Commerce used the same pass-through analysis in the first administrative review (i.e., the alleged
measure taken to comply) as in the Section 129 de termination (i.e., the declared measure taken to

comply) "in view of" the DSB's recommendations and rulings. The situation in this dispute does not
resemble the situation in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5). As the United States has
demonstrated above, two of the three subsequent de terminations were made well before the adoption
of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. These sub sequent determinations thus could not logically
have taken into consideration the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original dispute. As
to the administrative review of Ball Bearings for 2005-06, Commerce issued its final results after the
adoption of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. However, this determination did not occur
around the same time as US withdrawal of th e administrative reviews subject to the DSB's
recommendations and rulings, and did not closely co rrespond to the expiration of the RPT. Most
importantly, unlike the first assessment review in US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5), the 2005-
06 administrative review did not incorporate elemen ts from a Section 129 determination "in view of"
the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

10. Japan, seeking to draw support from prior disput e settlement reports, claims that because the
three subsequent Ball Bearings reviews "undermine" and "circumvent" the US compliance with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings, they should be subj ect to Article 21.5. However, this dispute is
distinguishable from disputes in which panels and the Appellate Body found subsequent measures to
undermine the declared measure taken to comply. For example, in Australia – Leather (Article 21.5) ,
the DSB found that a grant contract by Australia to a particular company was inconsistent with
Australia's obligations pursuant to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM
Agreement"). Australia notified the DSB that the su bsidy that had been found to be inconsistent had
been withdrawn and, the next day, announced a new grant contract, made to the company's parent. In
concluding that the new grant contract was within the compliance proceeding's terms of reference, the
compliance panel noted that the contract was "inext ricably linked to the steps taken by Australia in
response to the DSB's ruling in this dispute, in view of both its timing and its nature." Australia thus
chose to undertake action coincident with its implementation of the DSB's recommendations and
rulings. Grant contracts are not required by the SCM Agreement. But assessment reviews are
required under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement ("AD Agreement"), when requested. In Australia
– Leather (Article 21.5) , Australia chose to provide a grant the day after it withdrew the WTO-
inconsistent measure, thus affecting the existence of the withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy.

11. The facts are similar in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5), another dispute relied on by Japan.
There, Australia claimed compliance with the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB in July 1999,
but in October 1999 Tasmania chose to impose a ne w import ban on salmonids. The panel noted its
concern about a situation in which "an implemen ting Member could simply avoid any scrutiny of
certain measures by a compliance panel" by claiming one measure was a measure taken to comply
and that another was not, even though the latter, voluntary action had the effect of undoing the
compliance. That is not the situation generally presented with administrative reviews, which occur
upon request of interested parties on a schedule that is established without regard to dispute settlement
proceedings and pursuant to rights and obligations established in the AD Agreement. The three
subsequent reviews of Ball Bearings therefore had a timetable independent of the present dispute. In
fact, the final results of two of the three reviews, as noted above, were issued well before the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in the original dispute. None of these administrative reviews was a
voluntary action taken by the United States around the time of implementation to circumvent or
undermine declared compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

12. Japan believes that because the United States announced that the results of the original
administrative reviews were "superseded" by subsequent reviews, those subsequent reviews should be
treated as measures taken to comply. The original reviews were superseded by subsequent reviews
because the cash deposit rate from one review was replaced by the cash deposit rate from the next
review. This is not the same thing as saying that th e subsequent review is a measure taken to comply.
The United States was merely noting that the me asures subject to the DSB's recommendations and
rulings were eliminated as an incidental conse quence of a subsequent administrative review – an

entirely different proposition from the (incorrect) suggestion that the subsequent administrative
review was a measure taken to comply.

13. Japan also mistakenly relies on the Appellate Body report in US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5). In that dispute, the Appellate Body cons idered whether actionable subsidies claims
against US support payments made after the end of the RPT were properly within the scope of the
Article 21.5 proceeding, even th ough the DSB's recommendations and rulings were limited to
payments made in prior years. The Appellate Body considered that the later payments, to the extent
they were made under the same conditions and criteri a as the original payments, were subject to the
obligation under Article 7.8 of th e SCM Agreement to withdraw the subsidy or remove its adverse
effects and that they therefore were properly w ithin the scope of the Article 21.5 proceeding.
Contrary to Japan's assertion, the Appellate Body did not consider the sub sequent payments to be
"measures taken to comply" in the context of Article 21.5.

14. The Appellate Body did not adopt a broad test in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5) as to
what should be considered a "measure taken to comply" in any and all proceedings under Article 21.5.
Rather, it was interpreting compliance obligations in a specific dispute in light of Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement, for which there is no analogous provision in the AD Agreement. Moreover, the
Appellate Body's dicta in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5) were limited to concerns over the
availability of relief against the adverse effects of actionable subsidies. In US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5), the Appellate Body also made clear that there is no general rule that any measure that
has a "particularly close relationship" to the declared measure to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings would be within th e scope of a compliance proceeding. This
clarification counsels against the unwarranted e xpansion of Article 21.5 proceedings to cover
subsequent administrative reviews simply because of the similarities between such reviews and those
subject to the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

15. Japan also worries that if the Panel excludes subsequent reviews, th en Members could never
obtain relief against administrative reviews. The DSU and the other covered agreements cannot be re-
written to apply to additional measu res just because that is what Japan believes would be a better
approach. In any event, the United States has co mplied with the DSB's recommendations and rulings
here, and so there is no issue about obtaining relief against non-compliance.

16. Lastly, Japan argues that it is, in fact, challenging the " omission" by the United States to take
the necessary action to implement the DSB's recomme ndations and rulings with respect to the three
administrative reviews of Ball Bearings (Review Nos. 1, 2, and 3). Japan is taking mutually exclusive
positions. If Japan is making a claim under Article 21.5 that measures taken to comply do not exist,
then it cannot also assert that such measures exist, and that they are inconsistent with the covered
agreements.

B. JAPAN CANNOT INCLUDE MEASURES NOT YET IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF
ITS REQUEST FOR ESTABLISHMENT

17. Under Article 6.2, a panel request must identify the " specific measures at issue" in the
dispute, and a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 are limit ed to those sp ecific measures.
Japan in its Article 21.5 panel request identified as measures "any amendments to the eight periodic
reviews and the closely connected instructions and notices, as well as any subsequent closely
connected measures." Japan also states in its first written submission that in addition to the claims it
is making against the three subsequent administrati ve reviews, "Japan reserves the right to address
any other subsequent closely connected measure s." Japan nowhere has identified these alleged
subsequent measures. The United States objects to Japan's failure to specifically identify the
"subsequent closely connected measures" as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. In particular, the
United States is concerned that Japan is trying to in clude in the Panel's terms of reference any future

administrative reviews related to the eight identified in its panel request; this would, of course, be
improper.

V. ARGUMENT

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS COMPLIED WITH THE DSB'S RECOMMENDATIONS
AND RULINGS CONCERNING THE "AS APPLIED" FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS

18. Before this Panel, Japan argues that the Unite d States has failed to eliminate zeroing in five
administrative reviews. Japan's argument is premised on the incorrect and entirely unsupported
assumption that this Panel should consider assessment (or "liquidation") of duties years after Japanese
bearings entered the United States when determini ng whether the United States has complied with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.

19. Japan misapprehends the nature and scope of WTO disputes challenging anti-dumping and
countervailing duty measures. Implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommendations in these
disputes applies prospectively. When – as is the case with the admi nistrative reviews at issue in this
proceeding – the United States has eliminated the cash deposit rates established by the administrative
reviews that were found to be WTO-inconsistent in the original proceeding, nothing remains to be
done to come into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

20. Other Members have acknowledged that, fo r purposes of assessing compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB relating to duties, one examines the treatment accorded to
goods entered after the expiration of the reasonable pe riod of time. As the EC explained to the panel
that considered the Section 129 dispute: "[t]he EC is concerned that Canada's claim implies a legal
obligation of WTO Members not to act inconsiste ntly with the DSB ruling with respect to all
decisions taken after the expiry of the reasonable period of time even if these concern goods that
entered before the expiry of the reasonable period of time or even before the adoption of the DSB
ruling. Yet . . . the EC considers that no such obligation has been incurred by WTO Members under
the DSU."

21. Likewise, the preamble to an EC regulation on measures that may be taken to comply in anti-
dumping and countervailing duty disputes states: "T he recommendations in the reports adopted by
the DSB only have prospective effect. Consequently , it is appropriate to specify that any measures
taken under this Regulation will take effect from the date of their entry into force, unless otherwise
specified, and, therefore, do not provide any basis for the reimbursement of the duties collected prior
to that date . . . ." The EC took a similar view when it implemented the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB in the dispute EC – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts.

22. In this dispute, implementa tion should be assessed by looki ng at the treatment accorded to
goods entered after the expiration of the RPT. The cash deposit rates arising from the five
administrative reviews challenged in the original proceeding no longer applied at the time of the
expiration of the RPT, and goods entered on or af ter that date were not subject to those five
administrative reviews. The United States therefore had withdrawn the WTO-inconsistent measure.

23. The text of GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement also demonstrate that it is the legal regime in
existence at the time that an import enters the Member's territory that determines whether anti-
dumping duties apply to the import. The text ther efore confirms that the focus for implementation
purposes should be on the time of entry of merchandi se. Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 provides: "[i]n
order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an
anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product."
24. Article VI:6(a) of GATT 1994 reflects the fact th at the levying of a duty generally takes place
in connection with "the importation of any pr oduct." Nonetheless, the interpretive note to

paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article VI states: "[a]s in many other cases in customs administration, a
contracting party may require reasonable security (bond or cash deposit) for the payment of
anti-dumping or countervailing duty pending final dete rmination of the facts in any case of suspected
dumping or subsidization." The interpretive note clarifies that, notwithstanding that duties are
generally levied at the time of importation, Me mbers may instead require cash deposits or other
security, in lieu of the duty, pendi ng final determination of the releva nt information. Thus, the cash
deposits serve as a place-holder for the liability which is incurred at the time of entry.

25. Several provisions of the AD Agreement furthe r demonstrate that determining whether relief
is "prospective" or "retroactive" can only be determin ed by reference to date of entry. For example,
Article 10.1 of the AD Agreement states that pr ovisional measures and anti-dumping duties shall only
be applied to "products which enter for consumption after the time" when the provisional or final
determination enters into force, subject to certa in exceptions. Similarly, Article 8.6 of the AD
Agreement states that if an exporter violates an undertaking, duties may be assessed on products
"entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the app lication of . . . provisional measures,
except that any such retroactive ass essment shall not apply to imports entered before the violation of
the undertaking." In addition, Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement states that wh en certain criteria are
met, "[a] definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied on products which were entered for consumption
not more than 90 days prior to the date of applica tion of provisional measures . . . ." However, under
Article 10.8, "[n]o duties shall be levied re troactively pursuant to paragraph 6 on products entered for
consumption prior to the date of initiation of the investig ation." As these articles demonstrate, the
critical factor for determining whether particular entries are liable for the assessment of anti-dumping
or countervailing duties is the legal regime in existence on the date of entry.

26. Contrary to Japan's claim, the United States is not attempting to transform "prompt
compliance" under the DSU into "an endless peri od of non-compliance." Rather, in the five
challenged administrative reviews, the United Stat es has withdrawn the cash deposit rate resulting
from the challenged review and calculated new cash deposit rates pursuant to separate and distinct
administrative reviews.

27. With regard to the 1999 administrative reviews of Cylindrical Roller Bearings and Spherical
Plain Bearings (i.e., Reviews Nos. 7 and 8), the United States revoked these anti-dumping duty orders
effective 1 January 2000. As such, these Japanese bearings are entering the United States without
regard to anti-dumping duties, and the United St ates is not collecting cash deposits pursuant to
Reviews Nos. 7 and 8.

28. Turning to the remaining three administrativ e reviews (Reviews Nos. 1, 2, and 3), the
United States is no longer collecting cash deposits pursuant to these administrative reviews, nor do
these administrative reviews provide authority to assess anti-dumping duties on these products that
enter the United States after 24 December 2007 (i.e ., the end of the RPT). Commerce has completed
subsequent administrative reviews of Ball Bearings. It has thus calculated new margins of dumping,
and put in place new cash deposits for the companies examined . As a result, the cash deposit rates
that had been established in the administrative revi ews that Japan originally challenged are no longer
applied at the border.

29. A proper interpretation of a Member's implem entation obligations requires that retrospective
duty assessment systems and prospective anti-dumping systems be placed on a "level playing field,"
unless a provision of the WTO Agreement provides otherwise. Under prospective anti-dumping
systems, the Member collects the amount of anti-du mping duties at the time of importation. If an
anti-dumping measure in a prospective system is found to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement, the
Member's obligation is merely to modify the measure as it applies to imports occurring on or after the
date of importation. That is, the Member changes the amount of anti-dumping duties to be collected
on importations occurring after the end of the RPT. The Member need not remedy the effects of the
measure on imports that occurred prior to the date of implementation. Neither the AD Agreement,

nor the DSU authorizes different implementation obligations in respect of the types of systems. Yet if
the issuance of assessment or liquidation instructions after the RPT forms the basis for
implementation obligations, as Japan wants, then retrospective systems will be subject to very
different and more extensive implementation obligations than prospective anti-dumping systems.

30. Japan argues that the alleged US failure to bring the five challenged administrative reviews
into conformity with its WTO obligations is a c ontinuing violation of Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the AD
Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Because the United States has complied with the
DSB's "as applied" findings, Japan has no basis upo n which to assert that the United States continues
to be in violation of Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of th e AD Agreement and Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 with
respect to the challenged administrative reviews. Japa n also claims that as to these five reviews, the
United States has acted inconsistently with Article 17.14 of the DSU. Japan has not identified –
whether in its Article 21.5 panel request or in its submission – a measure that would show conditional
acceptance by the United States. Moreover, the United States has complied with the Appellate Body's
findings in the original dispute, and therefor e, Japan has no basis on which to assert that the
United States conditionally accepted those findings. Japan also claims that as to the five reviews, the
United States has acted inconsistently with Article s 21.1 and 21.3 of the DSU. These provisions do
not impose substantive obligations. In any event, even if Articles 21.1 and 21.3 impose relevant
obligations, the United States has not acted inconsis tently with them because, as explained above, it
has implemented the DSB's recommendations a nd rulings with respect to the challenged
administrative reviews.

B. THE UNITED STATES HAS COMPLIED WITH THE DSB'S RECOMMENDATIONS
AND RULINGS CONCERNING THE "AS APPLIED" FINDINGS FOR SUNSET
REVIEWS

31. The Appellate Body found that with r espect to the 4 November 1999 sunset review
determination in Antifriction Bearings from Japan, the United States acted inconsistently with the AD
Agreement "when it relied on margins of dumping calculated in previous proceedings through the use
of zeroing. " (Emphasis added.) The original likeli hood of dumping determination did not rest
exclusively upon margins that the Appellate Body found inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD
Agreement. The majority of those margins cannot be charact erized as inconsistent with the AD
Agreement because they either predate the AD Agreement or did not involve the use of a zeroing
methodology. Each of these two categories of margins independently support Commerce's
determination that there was a likelihood of conti nuation of dumping. Accordingly, the margins that
the Appellate Body found inconsistent with the AD Agreement are unnecessary to the overall validity
of Commerce's finding in the challenged sunset review.

32. In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the panel observed that Article 11.3 does
not provide for a particular methodology that applies to the substantive determin ations to be made in
sunset reviews. Similarly, th e Appellate Body in that dispute endorsed the interpretation that
"Article 11.3 does not expressly prescribe any speci fic methodology for investigating authorities to
use in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review." The Appellate Body further explained,
"[n]or does Article 11.3 identify any particular factors that authorities must take into account in
making such a determination. Thus, Article 11.3 neither explicitly requires authorities in a sunset
review to calculate fresh dumping margins, nor prohibits them from relying on dumping margins
calculated in the past." Accordingly, the United States is not required to calculate "fresh dumping
margins" as a substitute for margin s invalidated by the Appellate Body in this dispute, particularly
where at least some (and in this case the majority of) margins calculated in the past are not WTO-
inconsistent and independently dem onstrate that dumping at above the de minimis level continued
after the imposition of the order. Therefore, it was unnecessary to change the challenged sunset
determination.

C. THE UNITED STATES HAS COMPLIED WITH THE DSB'S RECOMMENDATIONS
AND RULINGS CONCERNING THE "AS SU CH" INCONSISTENCY OF THE ZEROING
PROCEDURES

33. The DSB in US – Zeroing (Japan) ruled that the US zeroing procedures were "as such"
inconsistent with various provisions of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994. In the original
proceeding, Japan challenged, inter alia, the US "zeroing procedures" as being "as such" inconsistent
with various provisions of the AD Agreement a nd the GATT 1994. Japan considered the zeroing
procedures to be "a single measure that applies to [weighted aver age-to-weighted average ("W-to-
W")] comparisons, [transaction-to-transaction ("T- to-T")] comparisons and [weighted average-to-
transaction ("W-to-T")] comparisons, used in any type of anti-dumping proceeding." The original
panel and the Appellate Body agreed that the zero ing procedures are a single measure. According to
the original panel, "we consider that what Japan terms 'zeroing procedures' is a measure which can be
challenged as such." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, the Appellate Body concluded that "the Panel had
sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the 'zeroing procedures' under different comparison
methodologies, and in different stages of anti- dumping proceedings, do not correspond to separate
rules or norms, but simply reflect different manifestations of a single rule or norm ." (Emphasis
added.) Accordingly, the DSB's recommendations and rulings applied to this single measure.

34. Commerce announced on December 27, 2006 that it would no longer apply the zeroing
procedures in W-to-W comparisons in original inves tigations effective as of 22 February 2007. The
United States thus eliminated the single measure th at Japan had challenged and that was found to be
"as such" inconsistent, well before the expiration of the RPT on 24 December 2007.

35. Japan tries to argue that the United States "h as omitted to take any action to implement the
DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding the zeroing procedures in original investigations under
a T-to-T comparison , or under any comparison methodology in periodic and new shipper reviews "
and has therefore failed to comply fully with th e DSB's recommendations and rulings. Japan cannot
have it both ways – it took the position in the origin al proceeding that the zeroing procedures were "a
single measure, that applies to W-to-W comparisons, T- to-T comparisons and W-to-T comparisons,
used in any type of anti-dumping proceeding." Japan would now like this Panel to ignore its own
argument – and the findings of both the original pa nel and the Appellate Body – and treat the DSB's
recommendations and rulings as though they applied to more than one measure. However, the
recommendations and rulings applied to the "zeroi ng procedures," a single measure comprised of
zeroing in W-to-W comparisons, T-to-T comparisons , and W-to-T comparisons, in any anti-dumping
proceeding. Now that zeroing is no longer used in W-to-W comparisons in anti-dumping
investigations, the single measure that was subj ect to the DSB's recommendations and rulings has
been withdrawn.

VI. CONCLUSION

36. For the foregoing reasons, the United States resp ectfully requests this Panel to find that the
United States has complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and to reject Japan's
claims to the contrary.