INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL, TEXTILE AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS AB-1999-3
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 23 August 1999
Document codes: WT/DS90/AB/R
Complainant: U.S.
Respondent: India
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. XIII  GATT 1994Art. 4.2  AgricultureArt. 3  Import LicensingArt. XI:1, XVIII:11  GATT 1994

INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF
AGRICULTURAL, TEXTILE AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
AB-1999-3
Report of the Appellate Body

WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
APPELLATE BODY
India – Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products
India, Appellant
United States, Appellee
AB-1999-3
Present:
Ehlermann, Presiding Member
El-Naggar, Member
Matsushita, Member
I. Introduction
1. India appeals from certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel
Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products
(the "Panel Report").1 The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the United States relating
to quantitative restrictions imposed by India on imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products.
2. India maintains quantitative restrictions on the importation of agricultural, textile and
industrial products falling in 2,714 tariff lines. India invoked balance-of-payments justification in
accordance with Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994, and notified these quantitative restrictions to the
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions (the "BOP Committee"). On 30 June 1997,
following consultations in the BOP Committee, India proposed eliminating its quantitative restrictions
over a seven-year period. Some of the Members of the BOP Committee, including the United States,
were of the view that India's balance-of-payments restrictions could be phased out over a shorter
period than that proposed by India. As a result, consensus on India's proposal could not be reached.
The relevant factual aspects of this dispute are set out in greater detail in paragraphs 2.1-2.28 as well
as in paragraphs 3.345-3.417 of the Panel Report.

1, 6 April 1999.

3. On 15 July 1997, the United States requested consultations with India under the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Go verning the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") on the
consistency of the latter's quantitative restrictions with its WTO obligations. 2 Japan participated as a
third party in these consultations. Subsequently, Australia, Canada, the European Communities,
New Zealand and Switzerland also requested consultations on claims similar to those of the
United States.
3 India reached mutually agreed solutions with all concerned parties except the
United States.4
4. The United States requested the establishment of a panel to examine the consistency of India's
balance-of-payments restrictions with its obligat ions under Article XI and Article XVIII:11 of the
GATT 1994, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures.5
5. In its Report, circulated on 6 April 1999, the Panel concluded that:
(i) the measures at issue applied by India violate
Articles XI:1 and XVIII :11 of GATT 1994 and are
not justified by Article XVIII:B;
(ii) the measures at issue, to the extent they apply to
products subject to the Agreement on Agriculture,
violate Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture;
and
(iii) the measures at issue nullify or impair the benefits of
the United States under GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Agriculture.
6
The Panel recommended that the DSB request India to bring the measures at issue into conformity
with its obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the
"WTO Agreement").7

2WT/DS90/1, 22 July 1997.
3WT/DS91/1, WT/DS92/1, WT/DS93/1, WT/DS94/1 and WT/DS96/1, respectively.
4In accordance with these mutually agreed solutions, India will phase out its quantitative restrictions
over a six-year period.
5WT/DS90/8, 6 October 1997.
6Panel Report, para. 6.1.
7Panel Report, para. 6.2.

6. On 25 May 1999, India notified the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") of its decision to
appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal interpretations developed by
the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Appellate Body pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the "Working
Procedures").8 On 4 June 1999, India filed an appellant's submission. 9 The United States filed an
appellee's submission on 21 June 1999.10
7. The oral hearing in the appeal was held on 19 July 1999. 11 The participants presented oral
arguments and responded to questions put to them by Members of the Appellate Body Division
hearing the appeal.
II. Arguments of the Participants
A. Claims of Error by India - Appellant
1. Competence of the Panel
8. In what it describes as its principal claim of legal error, India argues that the Panel erred in
law by failing to take into account that each organ of the WTO must exercise its power with due
regard to the powers attributed to the other organs of the WTO. India thus appeals from the issues of
law and legal interpretations on the basis of which the Panel, according to India, concludes that the
authority of panels to determine the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions is "unlimited",
notwithstanding the fact that jurisdiction over this matter has been explicitly assigned to the BOP
Committee and the General Council.
9. In support of its position, India notes that the constitutions of modern democracies provide for
a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers and establish systems of checks and balances
designed to avoid a concentration of governmental power. In addition, a doctrine of institutional
balance has been developed by the Court of Justi ce of the European Communities in cases involving
the question whether organs of the Communities have exceeded their powers or have infringed upon
the powers of the other organs. While the United Nations Charter does not effect a complete
separation of powers between the organs of the United Nations, individual judges of the International
Court of Justice and scholars have pointed to the need for the maintenance of an institutional

8WT/DS90/5, 25 May 1999.
9Pursuant to Rule 21(1) of the Working Procedures.
10Pursuant to Rule 22(1) of the Working Procedures.
11Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Working Procedures.

equilibrium within the United Nations, which can only be maintained if each organ of the United
Nations respects the functions and powers of the other.
10. India submits that, while the institutional structure of the WTO is not comparable to that
created by constitutions of modern democracies or by the European Union, and while many of the
checks and balances that have been created in modern democracies are missing in the WTO, the
principle of institutional balance has an important role to play in the WTO context as well.
11. India argues that the Panel's view about the distribution of powers between the judicial and the
political organs of the WTO is inconsistent with the practice under the GATT 1947. India draws an
analogy between the balance-of-payments provisions of the GATT 1994 and the provisions relating to
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. Throughout the history of the GATT 1947, not a single panel
decided to determine the balance-of-payments justification of measures notified under Article XII or
Article XVIII:B, or the compatability of regional trade agreements with Article XXIV. The practice
under the GATT 1947 was to assign these matters to bodies composed of representatives of the
Contracting Parties.
12. With respect to regional trade agreements, India asserts that the question whether one organ
created by the CONTRACTING PARTIES could encr oach upon the jurisdiction of another arose in
the context of Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 in European Community – Tariff Treatment on
Imports of Citrus Fruit from Certain Countries of the Mediterranean Region ("EC – Citrus")
12, and
in EEC – Member States Import Regimes for Bananas ("EC – Bananas I ")13. The question of
institutional balance between panels and the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements is not
necessarily whether or not panels may review agreements notified under Article XXIV:7, but the
extent to which they should review them.
13. India submits that the principle of institutional balance was implicitly recognised recently
by a WTO panel. The panel in Turkey – Restrictions on Textile and Clothing Products
("Turkey – Textiles ") considered that a panel can assess the WTO compatibility of any specific
measure adopted on the occasion of the formation of a customs union, but not the WTO compatibility
of a customs union as such.
14 The panel said that the latter is generally a matter for the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements since it involves a broad multilateral assessment of matters which
concern the WTO Membership as a whole.

12L/5776, 7 February 1985, unadopted.
13DS32/R, 3 June 1993, unadopted.
14WT/DS/34/R, circulated 31 May 1999.

14. Turning specifically to Article XVIII:B, India submits that the panel in Republic of Korea –
Restrictions on Imports of Beef (" Korea- Beef "), found that the BOP Committee had already
determined the legal status of the restrictions imposed by Korea, and it could, therefore, base its
decision on this determination. 15 This case provides legal authority for the conclusion that the
principle of institutional balance was already recognized under the GATT 1947. It does not, however,
justify the conclusion that panels can exercise their authority without any regard for the powers
assigned to the BOP Committee, the General Council and the IMF.
15. India submits that the United States attempted to amend the balance-of-payments provisions
of the GATT in 1954 as well as during the Uruguay Round, and that these efforts were resisted by
developing countries.
16. According to India, the ordinary meaning of footnote 1 to the Understanding on the Balance-
of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994 (the " BOP Understanding ") is that the DSU may be
invoked in respect of matters that relate to the specific use or purpose of a balance-of-payments
measure or to the manner in which a balance-of-payments measure is applied in a particular case.
The footnote may not be invoked with respect to the question of balance-of-payments justification of
these measures, which remains within the competence of the BOP Committee.
17. India asserts that the reference to the DSU in footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding has the
dual function of confirming the right to resort to the DSU and defining matters in respect of which
this right may be exercised. The phrase in footnote 1 which reads "with respect to any matters arising
from the application" refers only to the application of balance-of-payments restrictions and not to
their justification.
18. India submits that the Panel's interpretation of "any matters arising from the application of" as
referring to both the application of balance-of-payments restrictions and their justification is
contrary to the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties adopted by the Appellate
Body, according to which an interpreter is not fr ee to adopt an interpretation that would result in
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.
16 In disregard of this
principle, the Panel interprets the clause "any matters arising from the application of" out of existence,
so that the words could be struck from the text of the footnote without any legal consequence.

15Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef , complaint by Australia, adopted
7 November 1989, BISD 36S/202-234, Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef , complaint by New
Zealand, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/234-268 and Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of
Beef, complaint by the United States, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/268-306.
16Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (" Japan – Alcoholic Beverages "),
WT/DS8/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996.

19. India argues that the BOP Committee and the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements deal
with trade policy matters that concern the WTO Membership in general. It would, therefore, be
inappropriate to determine the overall consistency of a general import policy in a dispute settlement
proceeding limited normally to two WTO Members. If a measure notified under Article XVIII:B is
designed to protect individual sectors or to discriminate against other Members, it will have an impact
on individual Members. The footnote to the BOP Understanding makes it clear that in the latter
case, those Members have a right to invoke the DSU.
20. India notes that the drafters of the WTO Agreement created a complex institutional structure
under which numerous bodies are empowered to take binding decisions on matters within their
competence that confirm or define the rights and obligations of Members. These bodies must
cooperate to achieve the objectives of the WTO. They can achieve that end only if each of them
exercises its competence with due regard to the competence of all other bodies. Each of the organs of
the WTO charged with making legal determinations operates within a different legal framework.
Moving an issue from one organ to another, th erefore, changes the legal framework in which
decisions are taken, which can profoundly impinge on the procedural and substantive rights of the
Members concerned.
21. It is India's conviction that each shift in the institutional balance between the organs
administering the law of the WTO inevitably entails a shift in the balance of rights and obligations
between Members. If Members adversely affected by balance-of-payments restrictions had the
possibility to obtain a determination on the balance-of-payments justification under the DSU
procedures, they would no longer have any inte rest in joining a consensus for the removal of
restrictions in a time schedule that is longer than the implementation period provided for in
Article 21.3 of the DSU. The rules specifically designed to permit a gradual phasing out of balance-
of-payments restrictions maintained legally for long periods of time would be rendered useless in
practice, and the negotiated balance of rights and obligations under Article XVIII:B and the BOP
Understanding would be upset.
22. India contends that when an organ of the WTO determines its own jurisdiction, it interprets
the provisions of the WTO Agreement conferring jurisdiction upon it. It follows from Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention")
17 that, when an organ of the
WTO determines its jurisdiction, it must also take into account not only the terms of the provision
attributing powers to it, but the context in which this provision appears. This implies that an organ of
the WTO cannot determine its jurisdiction in a manne r that entails a change in the procedural or
substantive rights and obligations of Members. Each organ of the WTO must, in determining the

17Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.

scope of its own powers, proceed with due regard to the powers of the other organs of the WTO, and
with due regard for the rights and obligations of Members.
23. India disagrees with the view of the Panel that assigning legal functions to other WTO bodies
is only relevant if there is an express provision that limits the panel's competence. Domestic courts
and the European Court of Justice have developed doctrines providing for deference by courts to
political institutions without there being an e xplicit limitation on their competence. There is,
therefore, no reason why panels and the Appellate Body could not do the same.
24. India asserts that the Panel's recognition of a "dual track system" under which both panels and
the BOP Committee are equally competent to examine the balance-of-payments justification of
measures notified under Article XVIII:B is, in effect, a propagation of the principle of institutional
duplication. Under this principle, the judicial and political organs of the WTO can simultaneously or
successively address the same legal issue. The Panel is not correct when it claims that its "dual track
approach" does not affect either the institutional balance between panels and the BOP Committee or
India's exercise of its procedural rights under the balance-of-payments provisions and the BOP
Understanding.
25. According to India, it is incompatible wi th Article 3.2 of the DSU to permit Members to
invoke the DSU in a way that diminishes the righ ts of the defendant under the WTO Agreements.
India does not agree with the Panel that its rights under the BOP Committee process have not been
diminished because there is nothing that prevents India from invoking these rights. Article 3.2 of the
DSU does not merely prohibit the formal elimination of the rights of the defendant; the defendant
must be left with the possibility to effectively exercise them.
26. India argues that the Panel fails to take supplementary means of interpretation into account.
The Panel should have thus been guided by discussions in the GATT Council of Representatives on
the role of panels, the GATT panel reports on the issue, as well as the rejection of the United States'
dual track proposal, all of which point in one direction: that in examining balance-of-payments
restrictions and regional trade agreements, there should be a division of tasks between the judicial and
political organs of the WTO.
27. India submits that the principle of institutional balance would imply that a panel, in examining
whether the complainant's rights under Article XVIII:B and the BOP Understanding have been
violated, would have to take into account the competence conferred upon the BOP Committee, the
General Council and the IMF. A panel would be free to examine, for instance, whether the measures
at issue are applied in a manner that is consistent with the WTO Agreements, and whether they are

capable of being approved under Article XVIII:B procedures, taking into account the range of
discretion available to the BOP Committee, the General Council and the IMF.
28. According to India, on the basis of the principle of institutional balance, the Appellate Body
could develop a jurisprudence which ensures that each organ of the WTO determines its jurisdiction
with due regard for the powers conferred on other organs, and that the rights and obligations of
Members are not modified through changes in the agreed institutional balance.
2. The Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
29. In its first subsidiary claim of legal error, India argues that the Panel erred in law by
interpreting the word "thereupon" in the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 to mean
"immediately" with the consequence that the Ad Note would apply only in situations in which a
removal of the restrictions would produce "immediately" the conditions of Article XVIII:9.
30. India submits that definition of the word "thereupon" is crucial because it determines the
scope of policy options available to a developing country. The Note Ad Article XVIII:11 is a
provision meant to benefit developing countries, which may need, over a period of time, to control the
general level of their imports in order to prevent that level from rising beyond the means available to
pay for them.
31. India submits that the Panel acknowledged that the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 applies in
situations where balance-of-payments difficulties have ceased to exist, but there is a threat that they
might return. The Panel still concluded that India is not entitled to phase out its balance-of-payments
restrictions because the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 applied only in situations in which the removal
would "immediately" give rise to balance-of-payments difficulties. This interpretation of the word
"thereupon" eviscerates the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of its practical applicability and is inconsistent
with accepted principles of interpretation.
32. In India's view, the Panel should have interp reted the word "thereupon" to mean that the
recurrence of balance-of-payments difficulties must be a direct consequence of the removal of India's
balance-of-payments restrictions. In practice, this would imply that the removal of balance-of-
payments restrictions would have to entail a direct and foreseeable rise in foreign exchange
expenditure of such magnitude that the foreign reserves would no longer be adequate. This
interpretation would serve to qualify the nature of the causality between the removal of restrictions
and the reserve level, by requiring that there be a direct link between the two.
33. India submits that it is reasonable to require a direct and, therefore, clear and foreseeable
causal link between the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the recurrence of

balance-of-payments difficulties because the indirect consequences of a removal of restrictions on the
external financial position are difficult to trace and quantify. The purpose of Article XVIII:11 and the
Ad Note can only be achieved if developing country Members are permitted to remove their
restrictions gradually in all cases in which the clear and foreseeable consequence of an immediate
removal would be renewed balance-of-payments difficulties.
3. The Proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
34. In its second subsidiary claim of legal error, India argues that the panel erred in law by
requiring India to use macroeconomic and other development policy instruments to meet balance-of-
payments problems caused by the immediate removal of its balance-of-payments restrictions.
35. According to India, the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 and the corresponding
provision in Article XII:3(d) make it clear that the balance-of-payments provisions permit the
imposition of restrictions, even if the Member has policy instruments at its disposal that could render
the restrictions unnecessary. It is up to each Member to choose among those policy instruments,
taking into account, not only the economic efficiency considerations on which the IMF bases its
policy advice, but also its structural, institutional and political constraints.
36. India submits that it demonstrated before the Panel, that the immediate removal of all its
balance-of-payments restrictions, covering one-fourth of all tariff lines, would require substantial
changes in its development policy. In particular, India showed that an immediate removal of all
restrictions, by itself, was bound to reduce India's reserves below levels considered adequate by the
IMF. The United States did not submit any specific evidence on this issue.
37. According to India, the IMF confirmed that the removal of the restrictions had to be coupled
with changes in India's macroeconomic and structur al adjustment policies. While the IMF said that
India could achieve balance-of-payments equi librium by replacing import controls with
macroeconomic policy instruments complemented by structural adjustment policies, it never stated
that India could remove all restrictions at once, maintain its existing policies, and face no balance-of-
payments difficulties.
38. India notes that the Panel dismissed as irrelevant the references of the IMF to the need for
structural adjustments in the context of Article XVIII:B because the Agreement on Safeguards has
established rules for dealing with such problems. This is, however, completely beside the point.
Structural adjustments are needed to cause an incr ease in foreign exchange receipts from export and
foreign investment so as to offset the rise in foreign exchange expenditure on imports.

39. India objects to the finding implied in the Panel's reasoning that the adverse balance-of-
payments impact of an immediate removal of Indi a's restrictions could be expected to be offset
immediately by the positive effects following the removal. The Panel essentially argues that
expecting a surge in imports is not sufficient to establish that the conditions of Article XVIII:9 will
immediately occur because of the potentially favourable effects on India's balance-of-payments
following the removal of India's restrictions, such as the attraction of foreign capital into the
distribution of consumer goods and other service industries. The Panel incorrectly assumes that these
potentially favourable effects could and would occur, within the framework of India's current
macroeconomic and structural policies, "immediately upon lifting the restrictions".
4. Burden of Proof
40. In its third subsidiary claim of legal error, India argues that the Panel failed to properly assess
and apply the burden of proof in respect of the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 and the
Note Ad Article XVIII:11. While the Panel correctly identified the main claims of the United States
in this dispute, it did not exactly specify, in the context of its finding on the burden of proof, the
assertions or defences that India must support.
41. India submits that the text of Article XVIII:12 (c) and (d) expressly allocates the burden of
proof on the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions maintained under Article XVIII:B to the
United States. Under Article XVIII:12, the United States would have had to establish a prima facie
case of inconsistency of India's balance-of-payments restrictions with Article XVIII:11 as well as the
trade damage caused thereby. The burden of proof, therefore, must remain with the complaining
party in a dispute settlement proceeding as well.
42. India notes that the Appellate Body has stated that the burden of proof is on the party making
a claim or assertion.
18 However, the Appellate Body did not intend to rule that the burden of proof
must be carried by the party making a claim or asse rtion, even where the text of a provision expressly
clarifies which party must carry the burden of proo f. India requests the Appellate Body to find that
the United States, as the complaining party, bore the burden of proving the lack of justification of
India's restrictions under Article XVIII:11 even though India invoked that provision in its defence.
43. Turning firstly to the proviso to Article XVIII:11, India argues that the Panel incorrectly
concluded that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 is an affirmative defence, and, therefore, incorrectly
placed the burden of proof on India. The proviso is limited in scope. Read in the context of

18Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India ("United States – Shirts and Blouses "), WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, Appellate
Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (" European Communities –
Hormones"), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998.

Article XVIII:11, the proviso imposes an obligation on the complaining party to provide evidence that
is unqualified by any statements that what is required of India to attain external balance does not
involve a change in its development policy.
44. With regard to the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, India submits that the Panel did not expressly
render a finding on whether the burden of making a prima facie case in respect of the Ad Note lay on
India or on the United States. If India's assump tion is correct that the Panel placed the burden of
proof on India to establish that it met the conditions in the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, the Panel
clearly erred in the allocation of the burden of proof. If, on the other hand, the Panel in fact placed the
burden of proof on the United States, the Panel erred in its application of the burden of proof in terms
of the principles laid down in United States – Shirts and Blouses
19 and European Communities –
Hormones.20
45. As to the manner in which the Panel applied the burden of proof with respect to the Ad Note,
India notes that the Panel recounted the evidence adduced by the United States prior to the Panel's
consultations with the IMF. The Panel, however, failed to analyze whether this evidence could, in the
absence of refutation by India, require the Panel, to hold in favour of the United States.
21
46. India submits that none of this evidence addressed the issue of the impact on India's reserves
of the removal of its balance-of-payments restrictions. Therefore, the Panel failed to carry out its
obligation to ensure that the United States had established a prima facie case prior to shifting the
burden to India. These errors of the Panel cannot be dismissed merely as an issue of the weight to be
ascribed to the evidence adduced by the United States, because they constitute fundamental legal
errors in the assessment and application of the burden of proof in this case.
47. India submits, therefore, that the evidence introduced by the United States did not meet the
requirements of a prima facie case with respect to the requirements of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11.
5. Objective Assessment of the Matter
48. In its final subsidiary claim of legal error, India requests the Appellate Body to reverse the
Panel's finding that India's balance-of-payments restrictions are not justified under the Ad Note
because this finding was not based on an objective assessment of the matter in accordance with
Article 11 of the DSU. According to the Appellate Body's interpre tation, the assessment of the facts

19United States – Shirts and Blouses, supra, footnote 18.
20European Communities – Hormones, supra, footnote 18.
21United States – Shirts and Blouses, supra, footnote 18.

is a duty that a panel must carry out itself; it cannot be delegated to another body, unless there is a
special dispute settlement procedure that specifically permits it to do so. 22
49. It is India's contention that while Article 13 of the DSU permits the Panel to consult the IMF
as an expert to obtain its opinion, the Panel could not permit the opinion of the expert to substitute for
its own. It follows from the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel
Case that an expert appointed by a judicial tribunal can perform only the functions of gathering facts
and rendering expert opinions.
23 It is vital that the tribunal places itself in a position to examine and
weigh the relevance of the facts on its own.
50. India argues that the Panel nowhere attempts an independent analysis to determine whether
the IMF views and judgement could be inferred from the evidence. The Panel was to seek facts and
an expert opinion from the IMF, but instead obtained unverifiable views, and then decided to base its
own findings on those views. The Panel's treatm ent of the information and opinions obtained from
the IMF with respect to the Ad Note and the proviso demonstrates an abdication of its judicial
responsibilities to the IMF. The Panel impermissibly delegated its judicial responsibilities to the IMF
and, therefore, acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
B. Arguments of the United States - Appellee
1. Competence of the Panel
51. In response to India's principal claim of legal error, the United States contends that the Panel
correctly ruled that the DSU mandated it to review the status of balance-of-payments restrictions and
the justification of those measures to the extent necessary to address the claims of the United States.
India states that it is appealing the Panel’s conclu sion that the authority of panels to determine the
balance-of-payments justification of balance-of-payments restrictions is unlimited. The Panel, in fact,
nowhere reaches this conclusion.
52. According to the United States, the principle of institutional balance invoked by India cannot
be found in the DSU or anywhere else in the WTO Agreement. India does not base its contention on
an analysis of the text in accordance with the principles of the Vienna Convention, but asks the
Appellate Body to adopt that concept through judicial legislation. India’s argument requires the
Appellate Body to ignore the provisions of the WTO Agreement that establish the scope of the
dispute settlement system and the function of dispute settlement panels.

22European Communities – Hormones, supra, footnote 18.
23Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports, (1949), 4, 18-22.

53. According to the United States, the Appellate B ody should, like the Panel, conclude that the
reports cited by India, namely, EC – Citrus
24 and EC – Bananas I
25, do not seem to support India's
contention that past practice under the GATT 1947 did not permit the application of dispute
settlement procedures when a specific review procedure, such as that in Article XXIV, exists. These
reports are unadopted and, in addition, they are of limited relevance as they relate to the relationship
between Article XXIII and Article XXIV of the GATT 1947.
54. The United States notes that the panel in Korea – Beef considered subsequent information
about Korea's balance-of-payments situation and conducted its own examination of the matter.
26 This
panel report, therefore, supports the conclusion reached by the Panel in the present case concerning its
competence to examine the justification of India's balance-of-payments restrictions.
55. The United States notes that India proposes to read footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding as
having the dual function of confirming the right to resort to the DSU, and limiting the matters with
respect to which this right may be exercised. Such a reading is hardly in keeping with the ordinary
meaning of that provision as the language is affirmative: the DSU may be invoked. Moreover, the
language is comprehensive: the DSU may be invoked with respect to "any matters arising from the
application" of the covered measures.
56. The United States rejects India’s argument that the Panel, in effect, read the words "any
matters arising from the application of" out of the footnote. India makes too much out of the principle
of effectiveness. The Appellate Body stated that an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragr aphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.
27
However, as the reference to "clauses and paragraphs" makes clear, the Vienna Convention does not
require that words should be looked at in isolation. Moreover, the word "application" reflects the fact
that, under consistent GATT practice, dispute settlement panels review the application of measures.
With the exception of mandatory legislation where a measure is certain to be applied, measures can be
reviewed only if they are applied.
57. The United States submits that, as India has admitted, there is no relevant record of the
negotiating history for the BOP Understanding . Contrary to India’s assertion, the fact that a
United States–Canadian proposal on balance-of-payments restrictions was not adopted does not mean

24EC – Citrus, supra, footnote 12.
25EC – Bananas I, supra, footnote 13.
26Korea – Beef, supra, footnote 15.
27Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
("United States – Gasoline"), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996.

that the applicability of dispute settlement provisions to balance-of-payments restrictions was not
eventually accepted.
58. In response to India's objection that the Panel propagates what one might call the principle of
institutional duplication, the United States argues that the Panel undertook a thorough consideration of
the potential conflicts and redundancies between its work and that of the BOP Committee. The
existence of two tracks to consider balance-of-payments matters is not exceptional within the WTO
system. Article 3.9 of the DSU recognizes that the provisions of the DSU are without prejudice to the
right to seek authoritative interpretations of provisions of a covered agreement, including the
GATT 1994, through decision-making under the WTO Agreement . Article IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement gives the Ministerial Conference and the General Council the authority to adopt
interpretations of that Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
59. According to the United States, panels should take all relevant matters into account and, in
particular, should respect the conclusions of the BOP Committee where applicable. Indeed, to the
extent that India requires panels to respect the roles of other WTO bodies, the Panel in this case did
so.
2. The Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
60. In response to India's first subsidiary claim of legal error, the United States argues that the
Panel's construction of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 is required by the interpretive principles of the
Vienna Convention. The word "thereupon" means "immediately" wherever it appears in the GATT
and that reading is compelled by the French and Spanish texts of the Agreement. The interpretation
of "thereupon" to mean "immediately" gives proper effect to the object and purpose of the Agreement.
61. The United States notes that, while India concedes that "thereupon" cannot be interpreted as
simply expressing a causal link, India considers that the word expresses direct causality. It is not
clear that India is proposing an interpretation that is very different from that of the Panel. The Panel
correctly made it clear that the function of the word "thereupon" is to ensure that remote possibilities
are not held up as the basis for retaining balance-of-payments restrictions at a time when balance-of-
payments difficulties have ended.
62. The United States submits that the unstated assumption in India’s argument, namely, that the
removal of balance-of-payments restrictions will necessarily lead to new balance-of-payments
difficulties, is not tenable in the face of the fact that many developing countries have been able to
disinvoke Article XVIII:B.

63. The United States argues that India is wrong to imply that the Panel's interpretation would
require a developing country Member to remove its restrictions when the Member can actually
foresee serious balance-of-payments difficulties, as opposed to India’s "balance-of-payments impact".
The Ad Note does not require a developing country Member to remove its restrictions, if doing so
would thereupon produce the conditions specified in Article XVIII:9. One of those conditions is the
threat of serious decline in monetary reserves.
64. The United States submits that India fails to take into account the text of the WTO Agreement.
India’s argument that the word "thereupon" should be read to imply "directly" ignores the fact that the
GATT 1994 routinely uses the word "directly", e.g., in Articles II:1(b), III:2, III:5, and XI:2(c)(i). By
contrast, the word "thereupon" appears in the GATT in only two other places: Articles XV:6 and
XVIII:18. In each of these provisions, the word clearly has a temporal meaning which is confirmed
by the French and Spanish texts of these provisions.
65. The United States argues that even if India’s proposed reading of the Ad Note were adopted,
the outcome in this case would not change. After weighing the evidence, the Panel found that, as a
matter of fact, the removal of India's measures would not immediately produce conditions justifying
the re-imposition of balance-of-payments restrictions. Even if India’s proposed legal test of direct
causality were applied to the Panel’s factual findings, the same result would be reached.
3. The Proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
66. According to the United States, India's assertion that the Panel erred by "requiring India to use
macroeconomic policy instruments to meet any balance-of-payments problems caused by the
immediate removal of its import restrictions" is a misconstruction of the proviso to Article XVIII:11
and of the Panel’s analysis.
67. The United States argues that, while the proviso to Article XVIII:11 merely proscribes a
particular argument applicable to Members whose reserves still meet the requirements of
Article XVIII:9, the Ad Note sets out the limited parameters under which a Member may maintain its
balance-of-payments restrictions, even though its reserves no longer meet the requirements of
Article XVIII:9. The Ad Note clearly requires an examination of the impact on its reserves.
68. The United States notes India's contention that the IMF comment according to which the
external financial situation can be managed using macroeconomic policy instruments alone, is
inconsistent with the proviso to Article XVIII:B. India's position is mistaken for several reasons. The
IMF statement is not an argument of the type that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 proscribes. The
IMF was explicit about the basis of its findings on India's reserve situation. The IMF view was based
on the size of India's existing and potential claims on reserves, examined in the context of its

economic circumstances. Moreover, this statement is not a statement about change in India's
development policy. India already manages its external financial situation through macroeconomic
policy instruments, such as exchange rate m echanisms, current account convertibility, and the
reduction of the level of its short-term debt. Furthermore, macroeconomic policy instruments with
respect to a Member’s external financial situation, like its commercial trade policy, are not
instruments of "development policy" within the meaning of the proviso to Article XVIII:11. Finally,
the IMF did not say that the external financial situation would, or should, be managed by
"macroeconomic adjustment complemented by structural adjustment measures". The IMF stated that
the external financial situation can be managed using macroeconomic policy alone. The reference to
the "need" for structural policy reforms is clearly an additional comment on India's balance-of-
payments situation, as it applies only to reform in consumer goods. Since macroeconomic policy
instruments that are already in use can alone manage the external financial situation, the structural
measures mentioned by the IMF are not required for that purpose.
69. In the view of the United States, India's argument that its development policy is based on the
principle of gradual liberalization of imports is completely circular because it amounts to a contention
that India's development policy is a policy that requires its balance-of-payments restrictions to be
removed gradually, which would make Article XVIII:11 entirely meaningless.
4. Burden of Proof
70. The United States argues that the text of Article XVIII:B and the BOP Understanding imply
that India has the burden of proof on issues relating to the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 and the proviso
to Article XVIII:11. If the Appellate Body disagrees, the United States submits that the evidence it
submitted to the Panel prior to the latter's consultations with the IMF met the United States' obligation
to make a prima facie case.
71. The United States notes India's argument that under Article XVIII:12, the United States had
the burden of proof with respect to all aspects of Article XVIII:B. The United States argues that India
misreads that provision. Article XVIII:12(d) provides for additional consultations, outside of the
ordinary biannual cycle, if a Member requesting such additional consultations can establish a prima
facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with Article XVIII:B, and that its trade is adversely
affected thereby.
72. The United States asserts that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 does nothing more than prevent
a Member from being required to eliminate its balance-of-payments restrictions on the ground that a
change in its development policy would render those measures unnecessary. Therefore, there is

effectively no burden of proof allocation to be made as the proviso merely proscribes a particular type
of argument.
73. In the alternative, if its position in the preceding paragraph is not accepted, the United States
agrees with the Panel that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 is an affirmative defence, in respect of
which India should bear the burden of proof. Moreover, even if the United States had the burden of
presenting a prima facie case with respect to the proviso, the United States asserts that it met that
burden. In particular, the United States provided evidence that India’s monetary reserves, considered
by themselves and without reference to India’s development policy, were not declining at all, nor
inadequate, nor threatened with serious decline.
74. With respect to the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, the United States considers that India should
bear the burden of proof in respect of it, as the Ad Note is an affirmative defense to the claim under
Article XVIII:11. India is in the best position to demonstrate that the removal of its balance-of-
payments restrictions would thereupon produce any of the conditions specified in Article XVIII:9.
75. In the event that the Appellate Body disagrees, the United States considers that it met the
burden of establishing a prima facie case on all of these matters. In light of India's allegation that the
United States improperly relied on the material presented by the IMF in response to the Panel's
questions, the United States emphasizes that all the evidence and arguments discussed in this section
were offered before the Panel decided to consult the IMF. After the United States had presented this
material, the burden shifted to India to rebut the evidence adduced by the United States. However,
India did not do so.
5. Objective Assessment of the Matter
76. The United States considers that the Panel did not abdicate its responsibilities to the IMF.
While India contends that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, India does not
attempt to meet the standard set by the Appellate Body that the Panel deliberately disregarded, refused
to consider, wilfully distorted, or misrepresented the evidence in this case, or committed an error that
calls into question the good faith of the Panel.
28
77. In the view of the United States, India’s contention that a violation of Article 11 of the DSU
arises "because the Panel delegated its duty" does not have merit. India’s analysis takes practically no
account of the provisions of Article XV of the GATT 1994. Article XV:2 requires panels, and not
just the BOP Committee and the General Council, to accept the findings and determinations of the
IMF on the subjects specified in that provision. Further, India mis-characterizes the Panel’s

28Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products , WT/DS76/AB/R,
adopted 19 March 1999; European Communities – Hormones, supra, footnote 18.

assessment of the IMF contribution to its work. It is clear that the Panel did not abdicate its
responsibilities.
78. The United States submits that, in addition to the IMF replies, the Panel took into account the
evidence that the United States furnished before the Panel consulted the IMF, India’s submissions on
increased imports following removal of restrictions, the stock of India’s reserves, and other factors
cited by India, such as the Asian currency crisis and the evolution of India’s reserve situation from
November 1997 through June 1998.
III. Issues Raised in this Appeal
79. This appeal raises the following issues:
(a) whether the Panel erred in law in finding that it was competent to review the
justification of India's balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B of the
GATT 1994;
(b) whether the Panel correctly interpreted the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT
1994 and, in particular, the word "thereupon";
(c) whether the Panel's finding that India is not entitled to maintain its balance-of-
payments restrictions under the terms of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 is consistent
with the proviso to Article XVIII:11;
(d) whether the Panel correctly allocated and applied the burden of proof in respect of the
proviso to Article XVIII:11 and the Note Ad Article XVIII:11; and
(e) whether the Panel delegated to the IMF its duty to make an objective assessment of
the matter and, therefore, acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
IV. Competence of the Panel
80. India appeals the Panel's conclusion on its competence to review the justification of India's
balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVII I:B of the GATT 1994. According to India, the
Panel erred in law by failing to take into account that each organ of the WTO must exercise its power
with due regard to the powers attributed to the other organs of the WTO. India argues that the Panel
thus failed to respect the institutional balance reflected in the provisions of the WTO Agreement. In
view of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council with respect to balance-of-
payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the BOP Understanding, the

Panel erred, according to India, in finding that the co mpetence of panels to review the justification of
balance-of-payments restrictions is "unlimited".29
81. In paragraph 5.114 of its Report, the Panel concluded with regard to its competence to review
the justification of India's balance-of-payments restrictions:
We are thus competent to review the legal status of balance-of-
payments measures and the justification of these measures to the
extent necessary to address the claims submitted to us, within the
scope of our mandate under the DSU. We are aware of the fact that
the BOP Committee and panels have different functions and our
finding is without prejudice to the role of the Committee and the
General Council in reviewing balance-of-payments measures in the
context of consultations under the balance-of-payments provisions of
GATT 1994. By finding that panels can review the justification of
balance-of-payments measures, we do not conclude that panels can
substitute themselves for the BOP Committee. … It is also clear that
panels could not ignore determinations by the BOP Committee and the
General Council.
82. In light of this conclusion and the detailed reasoning which precedes it, we note that, contrary
to what India argues, the Panel did not conclude that the competence of panels to review the
justification of balance-of-payments restrictions is "unlimited". We also note that the Panel, when
determining the scope of its competence, carefully considered the powers of the BOP Committee and
the General Council. The Panel came to the conclusion that it was, nevertheless, competent to review
the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions. India's appeal raises the issue whether the Panel
erred in law in coming to this conclusion.
83. We are of the opinion that the competence of the Panel to review all aspects of balance-of-
payments restrictions should be determined in light of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated
and applied by the DSU, and of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding.
84. This dispute was brought pursuant to, inter alia , Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.
30
According to Article XXIII, any Member which considers that a benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under the GATT 1994 is being nullified or impaired as a result of the failure of another
Member to carry out its obligations, may resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII.
The United States considers that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT 1994 was nullified or
impaired as a result of India's alleged failure to carry out its obligations regarding balance-of-
payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B of th e GATT 1994. Therefore, the United States was

29India's appellant's submission, paras. 2 and 109.
30This dispute was also brought pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 6
of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, both of which refer to Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.

entitled to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII with regard to this
dispute.
85. Article XXIII is elaborated and applied by the DSU. The first sentence of Article 1.1 of the
DSU provides:
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes
brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions
of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred
to in this Understanding as the "covered agreements").
We note that Appendix 1 to the DSU lists "Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods", to which the
GATT 1994 belongs, among the agreements covered by the DSU. A dispute concerning
Article XVIII:B is, therefore, covered by the DSU.
86. Article 1.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part:
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to
such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement
contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to
this Understanding.
Appendix 2 does not identify any special or additional dispute settlement rules or procedures relating
to balance-of-payments restrictions. It does not mention Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994, or any
of its paragraphs. The DSU is, therefore, fully applicable to the current dispute.
87. Any doubts that may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures
under Article XXIII were available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been
removed by the second sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, which reads:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may
be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of
restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes.
(emphasis added)

88. In our opinion, this provision makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures under
Article XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, are available for disputes relating to any
matters concerning balance-of-payments restrictions.
89. We note that India is of the view that the words "matters arising from the application of"
imply a limitation on the scope of application of the dispute settlement provisions. According to
India, these words define and limit what aspects of balance-of-payments restrictions can be examined
by panels. Panels can examine whether specific balance-of-payments restrictions are applied in a
manner that is consistent with the WTO agreements. In India's view, however, panels are not allowed
to examine the overall justification under Article XVIII:B. We are unable to accept this
interpretation of the footnote.
90. First, the footnote provides that the dispute settlement provisions may be invoked with respect
to " any matters" arising from the application of balance-of-payments restrictions. The dispute
settlement provisions can, therefore, be resorted to with respect to any claims of inconsistency with
WTO obligations arising from the application of balance-of-payments restrictions.
91. Second, according to the footnote, the dispute settlement provisions may be invoked with
respect to any matters " arising from" the application of balance-of-payments restrictions. According
to the relevant dictionary meaning of the word "arise", the dispute settlement provisions can,
therefore, be resorted to with respect to any ma tter which "presents itself" or "occurs" as a result of
the application of balance-of-payments restrictions.
31
92. Third, the footnote provides that the dispute settlement provisions can be invoked with respect
to any matters arising from the "application " of balance-of-payments restrictions. The relevant
dictionary meaning of the word "application" is "use, employment; a specific use or purpose to which
something is put".
32 The dispute settlement provisions can, therefore, be resorted to in respect of any
matters arising from the "use" or "employment" of balance-of-payments restrictions. In addition, we
note that the words "application" and "applied" are frequently used in other provisions of the
WTO Agreement and, in particular, in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the BOP Understanding and
Articles III:2, III:4, XIII, XVIII:12 and XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994. In these provisions, the words
"application" and "applied" clearly refer to the practice of "using", "employing" or "imposing"
measures.

31The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 113.
32Ibid., p. 100.

93. We do not agree with India that, under the Panel's interpretation, the words "matters arising
from the application of" would have no meaning at all and would be read out of existence. These
words reflect the traditional GATT doctrine that, with the exception of mandatory rules, only
measures that are effectively applied can be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings. We,
therefore, do not share India's view that the Panel disregarded the principle "that interpretation must
give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty" and that "[a]n interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clau ses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility".
33
94. We note India's arguments relating to the negotiating history of the BOP Understanding.34
However, in the absence of a record of the negotiations on footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, we
find it difficult to give weight to these arguments. 35 We do not exclude that footnote 1 to the
BOP Understanding was "heavily negotiated", and that it tries to accommodate opposing views held
by different parties to the negotiations on the BOP Understanding.36 We are convinced, however,
that the second sentence of footnote 1 does not accord with the position held by India. To interpret
the sentence as proposed by India would require us to read into the text words which are simply not
there. Neither a panel nor the Appellate Body is allowed to do so.
37
95. Therefore, in light of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding , a dispute relating to the
justification of balance-of-payments restrictions is clearly within the scope of matters to which the
dispute settlement provisions of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the
DSU, are applicable.

33United States – Gasoline , supra , footnote 27, p. 23. See also Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, supra,
footnote 16, p. 12.
34India's appellant's submission, paras. 17 and 83.
35In its appellant's submission, India states that "there is no formal record of the discussions leading to
the adoption of this clause". See India's appellant's su bmission, para. 11. The United States agrees with India
that "there is no relevant negotiating history for the [ BOP Understanding ]". See United States' appellee's
submission, para. 84. The only document referred to by India is the United States–Canadian Proposal for a
"Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes", discussed by the Panel in paras.
5.106-5.109 of its Report.
36India refers to the "heavily negotiated text of the footnote in the [ BOP Understanding]". See India's
appellant's submission, para. 17.

96. Our view that panels are competent to review any matters that arise from the application of
balance-of-payments restrictions is also confirmed by past GATT practice. The panel in Korea –
Beef found:
… the wording of Article XXIII was all-embracing; it provided for
dispute settlement procedures applicable to all relevant articles of the
General Agreement, including Article XVIII:B in this case. Recourse to
Article XXIII procedures could be had by all contracting parties.
However, the Panel noted that in GATT practice there were differences
with respect to the procedures of Article XXIII and Article XVIII:B.
The former provided for the detailed examination of individual
measures by a panel of independent experts whereas the latter provided
for a general review of the country’s balance-of-payments situation by a
committee of government representatives.
It was the view of the Panel that excluding the possibility of bringing
a complaint under Article XXIII against measures for which there was
claimed balance-of-payments cover would unnecessarily restrict the
application of the General Agreement. This did not preclude,
however, resort to special review procedures under Article XVIII:B.
Indeed, either procedure, that of Article XVIII:12(d) or Article XXIII,
could have been pursued by the parties in this dispute. But as far as
this Panel was concerned, the parties had chosen to proceed under
Article XXIII.
38
97. Thus, the panel in Korea – Beef was clear in its conclusion that the dispute settlement
procedures under Article XXIII, as well as the procedures under Article XVIII:12, are both available
for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions. We believe that the Panel in the present case
was correct in interpreting GATT practice as pe rmitting the Member concerned to choose either
course of action. Should a Member decide to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures under
Article XXIII, such action would in no way prejudice the competence of the BOP Committee and the
General Council to consider the same matter in accordance with Article XVIII:12.
98. In support of its claim of legal error, India argues that there is a principle of institutional
balance which requires panels, in determining the sc ope of their competence, to take into account the
competence conferred upon other organs of the WTO. According to India, the drafters of the
WTO Agreement created a complex institutional structure under which various bodies are empowered
to take binding decisions on related matters. These bodies must cooperate to achieve the objectives of
the WTO, and can only do so if each exercises its competence with due regard to the competence of
all other bodies.
39 In order to preserve a proper institutional balance between the judicial and the
political organs of the WTO with regard to matters relating to balance-of-payments restrictions,

38Korea – Beef , complaint by the United States, supra, footnote 15, paras. 117-118.

review of the justification of such measures must be left to the relevant political organs, i.e., the BOP
Committee and the General Council.40 In light of the powers attributed to these organs under Article
XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the BOP Understanding, panels should, according to India, refrain
from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments measures under Article XVIII:B.
99. During the oral hearing, India conceded that the principle of institutional balance, as defined
by it, does not flow from a general principle of in ternational law. India argues, however, that, while
there is no explicit textual basis for this principle in the WTO Agreement, it is nevertheless a principle
of WTO law.
100. In support of this proposition, India refers to the GATT 1947 panel reports in EC – Citrus,41
EC – Bananas I 42 and Korea – Beef .43 The panel reports in EC – Citrus and EC – Bananas I are
both unadopted. Moreover, these two reports concern the relationship between Article XXIII and
Article XXIV on regional trade arrangements, not that between Article XXIII and Article XVIII on
balance-of-payments restrictions, which is the relationship at issue in this case. The panel in Korea –
Beef, far from supporting the interpretation suggested by India, was explicit in adopting the "dual
track" approach. Moreover, the panel in that case did not limit itself to merely espousing the
conclusions of the BOP Committee. In addition to taking into account the deliberations and
conclusions of the BOP Committee, that panel looked to other sources of information, including data
originating from Korea and the IMF, evaluated the evidence before it, and concluded that Korea's
balance-of-payments restrictions were no longer justified. We, therefore, conclude that the three
reports cited by India do not support its contention that there is a principle of institutional balance, as
defined by India, in WTO law.
101. In support of its argument on the principle of institutional balance, India also contends that the
review by panels of the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions would be inconsistent with
Article 3.2 of the DSU and the first sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding. Article 3.2 of
the DSU reads in relevant part:
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.

41EC – Citrus, supra, footnote 12.
42EC – Bananas I, supra, footnote 13.
43Korea – Beef, complaint by the United States, supra, footnote 15.

The first sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding states:
Nothing in this Understanding is intended to modify the rights and
obligations of Members under Articles XII or XVIII:B of GATT
1994.
India argues that the review by panels of the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions would
diminish the procedural rights of developing country Members under Article XVIII:12 and the
BOP Understanding.
102. We do not agree with India. Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into
question either the availability or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP
Understanding. On the contrary, if panels refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-
payments restrictions, they would diminish the explicit procedural rights of Members under
Article XXIII and footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their substantive rights under
Article XVIII:11.
103. We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council with
respect to balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the
BOP Understanding. However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of
panels. Moreover, we are convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments
restrictions, panels should take into account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP Committee,
as did the panel in Korea – Beef.
104. We agree with the Panel that the review by panels of the justification of balance-of-payments
restrictions would not render redundant the competence of the BOP Committee and the General
Council.
44 The Panel correctly pointed out that the BOP Committee and panels have different
functions, and that the BOP Committee procedures and the dispute settlement procedures differ in
nature, scope, timing and type of outcome.
45
105. We, therefore, consider that India failed to advance any convincing arguments in support of
the existence of a principle of institutional balance that requires panels to refrain from reviewing the
justification of balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B. We note, in addition, that
such a requirement would be inconsistent with Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated and
applied by the DSU, and footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding which, as discussed above, clearly
provides for the availability of the WTO dispute settlement procedures with respect to any matters
relating to balance-of-payments restrictions.

44Panel Report, para. 5.91.
45Ibid., paras. 5.90 and 5.114.

106. During the oral hearing, India clarified its claim of legal error by stating that although panels,
in principle, have competence to review any matters relating to balance-of-payments restrictions, they
should exercise judicial restraint with respect to these matters. With regard to this argument, we
make the following observations.
107. First, we note that this argument is incompatible with India's view that, under footnote 1 to the
BOP Understanding, panels have no competence in matters relating to the justification of balance-of-
payments restrictions. Evidently, judicial restraint implies that panels do have competence in these
matters.
108. Second, we note that, if the exercise of judicial restraint were to lead in practice, as India
seems to suggest, to panels refraining from considering disputes regarding the justification of balance-
of-payments restrictions, such exercise of judicial restraint would, as discussed above, be inconsistent
with Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, and footnote 1 to the
BOP Understanding.
109. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that panels have the competence to review the
justification of balance-of-payments restrictions. More generally, we conclude that the dispute
settlement provisions of the GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, can be invoked with
respect to any matters relating to balance-of-payments restrictions. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's
finding in paragraph 5.114 of its Report that it was competent to review the justification of India's
balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994.
V. The Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
110. India appeals the Panel's interpretation of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
and, in particular, the word "thereupon". India claims that the Panel erred in law in interpreting the
word "thereupon" to mean "immediately". According to India, "thereupon":
… indicates that there must be a direct causal link between the
removal of measures imposed [for] balance-of-payments reasons and
the recurrence of the conditions defined in Article XVIII:9.
46
(emphasis added)

111. The Note Ad Article XVIII:11 provides:
The second sentence in paragraph 11 shall not be interpreted to mean
that a contracting party is required to relax or remove restrictions if
such relaxation or removal would thereupon produce conditions
justifying the intensification or institution, respectively, of restrictions
under paragraph 9 of Article XVIII. (emphasis added)
112. The conditions which justify the intensification or institution of balance-of-payments
restrictions under Article XVIII:9 (a) and (b) are a threat of a serious decline in monetary reserves, a
serious decline in monetary reserves, or inadequate monetary reserves.
113. The Panel found that to maintain balance-of-payments restrictions under the Ad Note:
… it must be determined that one of the conditions contemplated in
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVIII:9 would appear
immediately after the removal of the measures, and a causal link
 must
be established between the anticipated reoccurrence of the conditions
of Article XVIII:9 and the removal. It should be noted that the text
requires more than a mere possibility of reoccurrence of the
conditions ("would produce"). The Ad Note therefore allows for the
maintenance of measures on the basis only of clearly identified
circumstances, and not on the basis of a general possibility of
worsening of balance-of-payments conditions after the measures have
been removed. (underlining added)
47
114. We agree with the Panel that the Ad Note, and, in particular, the words "would thereupon
produce", require a causal link of a certain directness between the removal of the balance-of-
payments restrictions and the recurrence of one of the three conditions referred to in Article XVIII:9.
As pointed out by the Panel, the Ad Note demands more than a mere possibility of recurrence of one
of these three conditions and allows for the maintenance of balance-of-payments restrictions on the
basis only of clearly identified circumstances.
48 In order to meet the requirements of the Ad Note, the
probability of occurrence of one of the conditions would have to be clear.49
115. We also agree with the Panel that the Ad Note and, in particular, the word "thereupon",
expresses a notion of temporal sequence between the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions
and the recurrence of one of the conditions of Article XVIII:9. We share the Panel's view that the
purpose of the word "thereupon" is to ensure that measures are not maintained because of some
distant possibility that a balance-of-payments difficulty may occur.50

47Panel Report, para. 5.199.
48Ibid.
49Ibid., para 5.213.
50Ibid., para. 5.198.

116. The Panel considered the various dictionary definitions of the word "thereupon" and came to
the conclusion that "the most appropriate meaning should be 'immediately'." 51 The Panel found
support for this interpretation in the context in which the word "thereupon" is used 52, the objective of
paragraphs 4 and 9 of Article XVIII and the Ad Note 53, and the object and purpose of the
WTO Agreement.54
117. We recall that balance-of-payments restrictions may be maintained under the Ad Note if their
removal or relaxation would thereupon produce: (i) a threat of a serious decline in monetary reserves;
(ii) a serious decline in monetary reserves; or (iii) inadequate monetary reserves.
55 With regard to the
first of these conditions, we agree with the Panel that the word "thereupon" means "immediately".
118. As to the two other conditions, i.e., a serious decline in monetary reserves or inadequate
monetary reserves, we note that the Panel, in paragraph 5.198 of its Report, qualified its
understanding of the word "thereupon" as follows:
We do not mean that the term "thereupon" should necessarily mean
within the days or weeks following the relaxation or removal of the
measures; this would be unrealistic even though instances of very
rapid deterioration of balance-of-payments conditions could occur. 56
119. We agree with the Panel that it would be unrealistic to require that a serious decline or
inadequacy in monetary reserves should actually oc cur within days or weeks following the relaxation
or removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions. The Panel was, therefore, correct to qualify its
understanding of the word "thereupon" with regard to these two conditions. While not explicitly
stating so, the Panel in fact interpreted the word "thereupon" for these two conditions as meaning
"soon after". This is also one of the possible dictionary meanings of the word "thereupon".
57 We are
of the view that instead of using the word "immediately", the Panel should have used the words "soon
after" to express the temporal sequence required by the word "thereupon". However, in view of the
Panel's own qualification of the word "thereupon", the use of "immediately" with respect to these two
conditions does not amount to a legal error.

51Panel Report, para. 5.196.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., para. 5.198.
54Ibid.
55See, supra, paras. 111-112.
56Panel Report, para. 5.198.
57See e.g: The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1447.

120. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's interpretation of the Ad Note and, in particular, the word
"thereupon".
VI. The Proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
121. India claims that the Panel erred in law:
… by requiring India to use macro-economic and other development
policy instruments to meet balance-of-payments problems caused by
the immediate removal of its import restrictions.58
India argues that such a requirement amounts to a change in its development policy, and is, therefore,
inconsistent with the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994.
122. The second sentence of Article XVIII:11 provides that Members:
…shall progressively relax any restrictions applied under this Section
as conditions improve, maintaining them only to the extent necessary
under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article and shall eliminate them
when conditions no longer justify such maintenance;
and adds the following proviso:
Provided that no contracting party shall be required to withdraw or
modify restrictions on the ground that a change in its development
policy would render unnecessary the restrictions which it is applying
under this Section.
123. In reply to a question by the Panel59, the IMF stated:
The Fund's view remains ... that the external situation can be managed
using macro-economic policy instruments alone. Quantitative
restrictions (QRs) are not needed for balance-of-payments
adjustments and should be removed over a relatively short period of
time. …
60
124. In reaching its conclusion that the removal of India's balance-of-payments restrictions will not
"immediately" produce the recurrence of any of the conditions of Article XVIII:9 and that the

59The Panel asked:
"Noting that these restrictions relate mainly to consumption goods, would
relaxation or removal of the restrictions, as of 18 November 1997, have been
likely to produce thereupon 'conditions justifying the intensification or
institution, respectively, of restrictions under paragraph 9 of Article XVIII'
(Ad Note to Article XVIII:11) ?" (Question 3)
60Panel Report, para. 3.367.

maintenance of these measures is, therefore, not justified under the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, the
Panel took this statement of the IMF into account.61
125. India argues that the Panel required India to change its development policy in order that the
removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions would not produce a recurrence of any of the
conditions of Article XVIII:9. We disagree. Nothing in the Panel Report suggests that the Panel
imposed this requirement. On the contrary, in paragraph 5.220 of its Report, the Panel stated:
India had in the past used macroeconomic policy instruments to
defend the rupee, suggesting that the use of macroeconomic policy
instruments as mentioned by the IMF would not necessarily constitute
a change in India's development policy.
126. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not
related to any particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Members regardless of the type
of development policy they pursue. The IMF statement that India can manage its balance-of-
payments situation using macroeconomic policy instruments alone does not, therefore, imply a change
in India's development policy.
127. In paragraph 5.209 of the Panel Report, the Panel referred to the following IMF statement:
The macroeconomic policy instruments would need to be
complemented by structural measures such as scaling back
reservations on certain products for small-scale units and pushing
ahead with agricultural reforms.
62
128. We believe structural measures are different from macroeconomic instruments with respect to
their relationship to development policy. If India were asked to implement agricultural reform or to
scale back reservations on certain products for small-scale units as indispensable policy changes in
order to overcome its balance-of-payments difficulties, such a requirement would probably have
involved a change in India's development policy.

61Panel Report, paras. 5.202, 5.213 and 5.214.
62The IMF made this statement as part of its response to Question 3 from the Panel (see, supra,
footnote 59)

129. We note that the Panel did not take a position on the question whether the adoption of the
structural measures of the type mentioned by the IMF would entail a change in India's development
policy. The Panel concluded in paragraph 5.211 of its Report as follows:
The IMF's suggestions on "structural measures" should not be taken in
isolation from the context in which they are made. We recall that the
IMF began its reply to Question 3 by stating that India's "external
situation can be managed by using macroeconomic policy instruments
alone". Its comments on structural measures appear only at the end of
its answer after it has suggested other liberalization measures, such as
tariff reductions. The adoption by India of "structural measures" is
not suggested as a condition for preserving India's reserve position.
Thus, we cannot conclude that the removal of India's balance-of-
payment measures would thereupon lead to conditions justifying their
reinstitution that could be avoided only by a change in India's
development policy.
Clearly, the Panel interpreted the IMF statement to the effect that the implementation of structural
measures is not a condition for the preservation of India's external financial position. We consider
this interpretation to be reasonable.
130. We conclude that the Panel did not require India to change its development policy and,
therefore, did not err in law with regard to the proviso to Article XVIII:11.
VII. Burden of Proof
131. India claims that the Panel erred in law in allocating and applying the burden of proof in
respect of the proviso to Article XVIII:11 and the Note Ad Article XVIII:11.
132. With regard to the proviso to Article XVIII:11, India argues that the Panel erred in finding that
the proviso to Article XVIII:11 is an affirmative defence and that India should, therefore, bear the
burden of proof in respect of it.
63
133. We recall that the second sentence of Article XVIII:11 provides that Members:
… shall progressively relax any restrictions applied under this Section
as conditions improve, maintaining them only to the extent necessary
under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article and shall eliminate them
when conditions no longer justify such maintenance; Provided that no
contracting party shall be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on
the ground that a change in its development policy would render
unnecessary the restrictions which it is applying under this Section.

63Panel Report, paras. 5.210 and 5.219.

134. The proviso precludes a Member, which is challenging the consistency of balance-of-
payments restrictions, from arguing that such restrictions would be unnecessary if the developing
country Member maintaining them were to change its development policy. In effect, the proviso
places an obligation on Members not to require a developing country Member imposing balance-of-
payments restrictions to change its development policy.
135. In United States - Shirts and Blouses the Appellate Body stated:
… the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence.
64
136. We consider that the invocation of the proviso to Article XVIII:11 does not give rise to a
burden of proof issue insofar as it relates to the interpretation of what policies may constitute a
"development policy" within the meaning of the proviso. However, we do not exclude the possibility
that a situation might arise in which an assertion regarding development policy does involve a burden
of proof issue. Assuming that the complaining party has successfully established a prima facie case
of inconsistency with Article XVIII:11 and the Ad Note, the responding party may, in its defence,
either rebut the evidence adduced in support of the inconsistency or invoke the proviso. In the latter
case, it would have to demonstrate that the complaining party violated its obligation not to require the
responding party to change its development policy. This is an assertion with respect to which the
responding party must bear the burden of proof. We, therefore, agree with the Panel that the burden
of proof with respect to the proviso is on India.
137. As to the burden of proof in respect of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, India claims that the
Panel never rendered a finding on whether the burden of proof was on India or the United States. We
note, however, that the Panel stated in the context of its examination of the evidence relating to the Ad
Note:
In analyzing whether the United States has provided sufficient
evidence to establish that the conditions foreseen in the Ad Note are
not met in this case, we consider the US position in light of the
responses thereto by India.
65
The Panel thus appears to have considered that the burden of proof in respect of the Ad Note was on
the United States. This is confirmed by the structure of the Panel's analysis in paragraphs 5.202
to 5.215 of its Report, in which the Panel begins its reasoning by considering the arguments advanced

64United States – Shirts and Blouses, supra, footnote 18, p. 14.
65Panel Report, para. 5.205.

by the United States. Furthermore, we do not consider that a panel is required to state expressly
which party bears the burden of proof in respect of every claim made.
138. We share the Panel's view that the burden of proof in respect of the Ad Note rests on the
complainant, i.e., the United States.
139. India also argues that, assuming the Panel allocated the burden of proof with respect to the
Ad Note to the United States, the Panel did not apply the rules on burden of proof correctly.
According to India, the Panel made two mistakes. First, the Panel failed to analyze whether the
United States made a prima facie case prior to considering the answers of the IMF to the Panel's
questions, and prior to shifting the burden of proof to India. The Panel thus failed to conclude, after
recounting the evidence adduced by the United States, that the United States had successfully made a
 prima facie case with respect to the Ad Note. Second, India argues that the evidence introduced by
the United States could not, as a matter of law, have constituted a prima facie case that India's
balance-of-payments restrictions were not justified under the Ad Note.
140. With respect to the first alleged mistake, we note that, indeed, the Panel did not explicitly find
that the United States had made a prima facie case before it considered the answers of the IMF and
the responses of India to the arguments of the United States. As mentioned above, the Panel stated
that it would consider the position of the United States in light of the responses of India.
66
141. In support of its argument, India refers to the Appellate Body Report in European
Communities – Hormones, where the Appellate Body stated:
In accordance with our ruling in United States – Shirts and Blouses ,
the Panel should have begun the analysis of each legal provision by
examining whether the United States and Canada had presented
evidence and legal instruments sufficient to demonstrate that the EC
measures were inconsistent with the obligations assumed by the
European Communities under each article of the SPS Agreement
addressed by the Panel. … Only after such a prima facie
determination had been made by the Panel may the onus be shifted to
the European Communities to bring forward evidence and arguments
to disprove the complaining party's claim.
67
142. We do not interpret the above statement as requiring a panel to conclude that a prima facie
case is made before it considers the views of the IMF or any other experts that it consults. Such
consideration may be useful in order to determine whether a prima facie case has been made.
Moreover, we do not find it objectionable that the Panel took into account, in assessing whether the

66Panel Report, para. 5.205.

United States had made a prima facie case, the responses of India to the arguments of the
United States. This way of proceeding does not imply, in our view, that the Panel shifted the burden
of proof to India. We, therefore, are not of the opinion that the Panel erred in law in proceeding as it
did.
143. As to the second alleged mistake, namely, that the evidence introduced by the United States
could not, as a matter of law, have constituted a prima facie case that India's balance-of-payments
restrictions were not justified under the Ad Note, we recall that in European Communities –
Hormones, the Appellate Body stated:
… Determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed
to (that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and
parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the
discretion of a panel as the trier of facts …
68
Similarly, in Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body stated:
The Panel's examination and weighing of the evidence submitted fall,
in principle, within the scope of the Panel's discretion as the trier of
facts and, accordingly, outside the scope of appellate review. … 69
144. We believe that this second mistake alleged by India relates to the weighing and assessing of
the evidence adduced by the United States, and is, therefore, outside the scope of appellate review.
145. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the Panel did not err in law in its allocation
and application of the burden of proof in respect of the proviso to Article XVIII:11 and the Note Ad
Article XVIII:11.

69Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/AB/R, adopted
A panel's discretion as trier of facts is not, of course, unlimited. That discretion is
always subject to, and is circumscribed by, among other things, the panel's duty to
render an objective assessment of the matter before it.
India's claim that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter as required by Article 11 of the
DSU is dealt with below.

VIII. Objective Assessment of the Matter
146. India claims that the Panel delegated to the IMF its duty to make an objective assessment of
the matter and, therefore, acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
147. Article 13 of the DSU provides in relevant part:
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems
appropriate …
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the
matter …
148. Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 provides:
In all cases in which the C ONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves,
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall
consult fully with the Intern ational Monetary Fund. In such
consultations, the C
ONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of
statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign
exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall
accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a
contracting party in exchange ma tters is in accordance with the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with the
terms of a special exchange agreement between that contracting party
and the C
ONTRACTING PARTIES. The C ONTRACTING PARTIES in
reaching their final decision in cases involving the criteria set forth in
paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or in paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall
accept the determination of the Fund as to what constitutes a serious
decline in the contracting party's monetary reserves, a very low level
of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its
monetary reserves, and as to the financial aspects of other matters
covered in consultation in such cases.
149. On the basis of these provisions, the Panel submitted to the IMF a number of questions
regarding India's balance-of-payments situation. 70 The Panel gave considerable weight to the views
expressed by the IMF in its reply to these questions. However, nothing in the Panel Report supports
India's argument that the Panel delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective
assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the Panel Report makes clear that the Panel did not
simply accept the views of the IMF. The Panel critically assessed these views and also considered
other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions.

70Panel Report, para. 5.12.

150. In that respect, we note that, on the issue of whether India's balance-of-payments restrictions
were justified under Article XVIII:9, we note that in paragraphs 5.170 to 5.184 of its Report, the Panel
took into account evidence adduced by both the United States and India, including information from
the report of the Reserve Bank of India. As to whether India's balance-of-payments restrictions were
justified under Article XVIII:11 and the Note Ad Article XVIII:11, the Panel reached its conclusion
after weighing all the evidence and considering the arguments of the parties. 71 With respect to the
proviso to Article XVIII:11, the Panel based its conclusion primarily on the fact that India failed to
supply convincing evidence that the removal of it s balance-of-payments restrictions would entail a
change in its development policy.
72 Moreover, it is clear from the Panel's analysis in paragraphs
5.211 and 5.220 of its Report that it critically assessed the views of the IMF on this issue.
151. We conclude that the Panel made an objective assessment of the matter before it. Therefore,
we do not agree with India that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.
152. The question whether Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 requires panels to consult with the IMF
and to consider as dispositive specific determinations of the IMF was debated at length by the parties
before the Panel. However, the Panel did not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this dispute, to
decide this issue.
 73 As this finding of the Panel is not appealed, we abstain from taking any position
on it.
IX. Findings and Conclusions
153. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) upholds the Panel's finding that it was comp etent to review the justification of India's
balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994;
(b) upholds the Panel's interpretation of the Note Ad Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994
and, in particular, the word "thereupon";
(c) concludes that the Panel did not require India to change its development policy and,
therefore, did not err in law with regard to the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the
GATT 1994;

71Panel Report, paras. 5.201-5.215.
72Ibid., para. 5.219.
73Ibid., para. 5.13.

(d) concludes that the Panel did not err in law in its allocation and application of the
burden of proof in respect of the proviso to Article XVIII:11 and the Note Ad
Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994; and
(e) concludes that the Panel made an objective assessment of the matter before it as
required by Article 11 of the DSU.
154. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request that India bring its balance-of-
payments restrictions, which the Panel found to be inconsistent with Articles XI:1 and XVIII:11 of the
GATT 1994, and with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , into conformity with its
obligations under these agreements.
Signed in the original at Geneva this 6th day of August 1999 by:
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
Presiding Member
_________________________ _________________________
Member Member