UNITED STATES – FINAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON STAINLESS STEEL FROM MEXICO
Document: ARB-2008-3/24 Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Date: 31 October 2008
Document codes: WT/DS344/15
Complainant: Mexico
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Brazil, Chile, China, EU, Japan, South Korea, Thailand
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9, 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1, VI:2  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

UNITED STATES – FINAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
ON STAINLESS STEEL FROM MEXICO

ARB-2008-3/24

Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes

Award of the Arbitrator
Florentino P. Feliciano

AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR

Parties:

Mexico
United States

 ARB-2008-3/24

 Arbitrator:

 Florentino P. Feliciano

I. Introduction
1. On 20 May 2008, the Dispute Settlement Body (t he "DSB") adopted the Appellate Body
Report1 and the Panel Report 2, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in .3 At the DSB meeting held on 2 June 2008,
the United States indicated its intention to implem ent the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in
this dispute, and stated that it would require a reasonable period of time in which to do so.4
2. On 11 August 2008, Mexico informed the DSB th at consultations with the United States had
not resulted in an agreement on the "reasonable period of time" for implementation. Mexico therefore
requested that such period be determined through bi nding arbitration, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU").5
3. Mexico and the United States were unable to agr ee on an arbitrator within 10 days of the
matter being referred to arbitration. Therefore, by letter dated 22 August 2008, Mexico requested the
Director-General to appoint an arb itrator pursuant to footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The
Director-General appointed me as Arbitrator on 29 August 2008, after consulting the parties. 6
I informed the parties of my acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 1 September 2008.

1Appellate Body Report, WT/DS344/AB/R.
2Panel Report, WT/DS344/R.
3WT/DS344/10.
4WT/DSB/M/251, para. 9.
5WT/DS344/13.
6WT/DS344/14.

4. Mexico and the United States have agreed that th is Award will be deemed to be an arbitration
award under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, notwithstandi ng the expiry of the 90-day period stipulated in
Article 21.3(c).
7
5. The United States filed its written submission on 10 September 2008. Mexico filed its written
submission on 19 September 2008. An oral hearing was held on 6 October 2008.
II. Arguments of the Parties
A. United States
6. The United States submits that the "reasonable pe riod of time" necessary to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the present case is 15 months, ending on 20 August 2009.
The United States highlights the complex and le ngthy legislative process, the administrative
modifications necessary for compliance, the future changes in the United States Administration and
Congress, the text of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, and previous arbitration awards under this provision.
7. The United States points out that the task of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU is
to determine the "reasonable period of time" for a Member to bring itself into compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The United States notes that it is not for the arbitrator to
prescribe any particular method of implementation. Instead, it is the prerogative of the implementing
Member to determine, by itself, the most appropr iate means of implementation, including the timing
and sequence of necessary steps.
8. The United States considers that Article 21.3(c) prescribes a "guideline" for the arbitrator to
determine the reasonable period of time in that it "should not exceed 15 months". This guideline
however, is not an "outer limit" or "a floor or inner limit"
8, but may vary depending upon the specific
circumstances of a particular case. Thus, accordi ng to the United States, Article 21.3(c) provides for
flexibility that should be defined on a case-by-case basis.

7The 90-day period following the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports expired on
18 August 2008. On 8 July 2008, the United States and Mexico mutually agreed that any awards of the
arbitrator (including awards not made within 90 days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and
rulings) should be deemed to be awards of the arbitrator for the purposes of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.
(See WT/DS344/13)
8United States' submission, para. 7 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, US – Hot-Rolled Steel ,
para. 25).

9. The United States also notes that the specific circumstances, releva nt to the determination of
the reasonable period of time under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, are the legal form of implementation;
the technical complexity of the measures necessary for implementation; and the period of time
required for implementation of such measures. Th e United States points to, as specific circumstances
in the present case, the complexity of addressing zer oing in the context of administrative reviews,
especially in the allocation of anti-dumping duti es among the importers for assessment purposes.
Moreover, the United States submits that it would re quire a pre-legislative phase for consultations and
technical assessments and "building of support for th e measure to occur", which is an important phase
for the success of the proposed implementation action. 9 The United States underlines that the pre-
legislative phase has been considered relevant by previous Article 21.3(c) arbitrators in
Canada – Autos and Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents.10
10. Further, the United States points out that, in January 2009, a new Administration and a new
Congress will take office, resulting in additional time required to put in place relevant staff and senior
policymakers for the implementation of measures th at would bring the United States into compliance
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The United States highlights that previous
arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU have he ld that an implementing Member is not expected
to utilize extraordinary legislative procedures and th at the normal legislative process is, generally, to
be used.11
11. The United States indicates that its Administrati on is in the process of "consulting internally"
on compliance and that two approaches are under consideration: legislative action, and administrative
action.12
1. Legislative Action
12. With respect to legislative action, the United St ates stresses the particular difficulties that it
faces under the current legislative calendar. Acco rding to the United States Constitution, Congress
meets "at least once in every year", generally convening on 3 January. 13 Currently, the United States
is nearing the end of the second session of the 110th Congress, and the expected adjournment date for

9United States' submission, para. 10.
10Ibid. (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Autos, paras. 18, 49, and 56; and Award of the
Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, paras. 1, 14, and 62).
11Ibid., para. 12 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, para. 45; and
Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 42).
12Ibid., para. 14.
13Ibid., para. 15 (referring to The Constitution of the United States (Exhibit US-2 submitted by the
United States to the Arbitrator), Article I, Section 4).

the House of Representatives is 26 September 2008.
14 The United States indicates that a legislation
on simple zeroing introduced before Congress, if it is not acted upon before adjournment, will "die" at
the end of the Congress, as "the 110th Congress does not have the ability to 'save' the work that it does
during its second session in 2008 and complete it in 2009".15
13. The United States contends that, as any modification to the current anti-dumping system is
complex, and as a period of time for public hearings and legislative consider ation should be allowed,
it would not be possible to complete the legislative work before the adjournment date, and the relevant
proposed legislation would need to be addressed by the new Congress in 2009. The United States
further points out that members of the new Congres s will not begin to conduct official business and
acts of legislation until late January or early Fe bruary 2009. The United States adds that a new
President will be sworn in on 20 January 2009, and th erefore it will be some time after that date that
new officials will be appointed who will have to vet and approve the new legislation. In these
circumstances, the United States believes that a compliance legislation could not be introduced before
April or May 2009, and at the very least four months would then be required to pass that legislation in
the multi-stage, bicameral United States legislative system.
14. Turning to the legislative pro cess, the United States notes that, as the power to legislate rests
upon Congress (which consists of two chambers, the House of Repr esentatives and the Senate), the
Executive branch has no control over the timetable a nd procedures of Congress. In its description of
the United States legislative process, the United States points out that a bill, after its introduction in
the House or the Senate by a member of Congress, is usually referred to a standing committee or
committees having jurisdiction over the subject matter of that bill. There is no specified timeframe
for committee consideration. The United States adds that most bills are referred to by the committee
with jurisdiction to a subcommittee for considera tion. In the House of Representatives, the
subcommittee normally schedules public hearings to obtain the views of stakeholders. When the
hearings are completed, the subcommittee usually meets to "mark-up" the bill, that is, to make
changes and amendments prior to deciding whethe r to recommend or report the bill to the full
committee. The subcommittee may also suggest that a bill be "tabled", that is, postponed indefinitely.
The United States points out that, after receiving the subcommittee's report, the full committee may
conduct a further study and hearings, and may al so make changes or amendments. The full
committee then votes on whether to "report back" the bill to the plenary of the House.

14United States' submission, para. 16 (referring to United States House and Senate Tentative
Schedules (2008) (Exhibit US-3 submitted by the United States to the Arbitrator)).
15Ibid., para. 16.

15. The United States explains that the scheduling for consideration of legislation on the House
floor is determined, as a general rule, by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority
political party leader, who may place the bill on th e calendar for House debate. The House Rules
Committee generally recommends the amount of time that will be allocated for debate and whether
amendments may be offered. During the debate process, the bill is read in detail and members of
Congress may offer further amendments. After vo ting on amendments, the House immediately votes
on the bill itself with any adopted amendments. The bill can also be returned to the committee that
reported it. If passed, the bill must be referred to the Senate.
16. The Senate, in turn, has the power to approve, reject, or ignore the bill referred to by the
House. While the Senate has si milar procedures for considerati on of legislation by relevant
committees, there are significant di fferences in the way the Senate considers proposed legislation.
The United States explains that the Senate functions in a less rules-driven manner than the House, and
that scheduling and floor consideration are generally decided by consensus. The United States further
observes that, unlike the House where debate is strictly controlled, debate is rarely restricted in the
Senate. Individual Senators may "filibuster" a b ill by taking the floor and speaking for extended
periods of time. Filibustering could only be ended by a " cloture" procedure, requiring a vote
by 60 Senators which is very difficult to achieve.16
17. The United States adds that differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill will
be discussed for reconciliation in a conference committee. The members of this committee are
appointed by each chamber and given specific instruct ions that may be revised every 21 days. If the
conference committee cannot reach agreement, the b ill expires. If the conference committee reaches
agreement on a single bill, a report is prepared and must be approved by both chambers, in identical
form, otherwise the revised legislation expires.
18. Finally, the United States indicates that, after the approval by both chambers of Congress, the
bill is sent to the President for approval. Only after Presidential approval does a proposed piece of
legislation become law.
2. Administrative Action taken pursuant to Section 123 of the URAA
19. The United States stresses, with respect to ad ministrative action, that Section 123 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the "URAA") sets forth the requirements for implementation of
DSB recommendations and rulings regarding regulati ons or practice of the United States Department
of Commerce (the "USDOC"). The United States observes that the administrative process

16United States' submission, para. 29.

contemplated in this provision comprises six steps. First, the United States Trade Representative
(the "USTR") is required to consult with comm ittees of Congress with jurisdiction over relevant
matters. The United States points out that, in respec t of the measure at issue in this dispute, such
consultations have already taken place. Secondly, the USTR is required to seek advice from private
sector advisory committees. Thirdly, the USDOC must publish in the Federal Register the proposed
modification and the explanation thereto, in orde r to provide for an opportunity to receive public
comments. Fourthly, the USTR is required to report to relevant Congressional committees the
proposed modification, the reasons for the modifica tion, and a summary of the advice received from
the private sector advisory committees. Fifthly, both the USTR and the USDOC must consult with
relevant Congressional committees on the proposed conten t of the final rule. Finally, the USDOC is
required to publish the final rule in the Federal Register. The United States indicates that a rule may
not enter into force before the end of a 60-day pe riod from the date on which consultations between
the USTR, the USDOC, and committees in the Congress take place.
20. The United States underlines the unique difficulties posed by the impending elections as well
as a new Administration and new Congress taking office, and notes that some of the steps required by
Section 123 call for interaction between the Admini stration and Congress. The United States submits
that key Administration officials will not be in pl ace to make policy decisions regarding compliance
until "some time after 20 January 2009".
17 The United States points out that, under normal
conditions, the USDOC would require about three months to conduct consultations and to publish the
proposed rule or practice, with an explanation, in the Federal Register. The United States adds that
one additional month would be appropriate to allow for new officials to be appointed, to study the
relevant matters, and to make changes and reco mmendations. For the United States, the earliest an
administrative proposal could be circulated in this case is early May 2009. The United States
considers that the USDOC would also need an additional three months to make possible modifications
to address the public comments and to hold final c onsultations. According to the United States, under
the best possible scenario, this administrative process would be completed in August 2009.
21. In the light of these considerations, the Unite d States requests a reasonable period of time
of 15 months, ending on 20 August 2009.

17United States' submission, para. 37.

B. Mexico
22. Mexico requests that I determine the "reasonabl e period of time" for the implementation of
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute to be seven months from the date of the
adoption of the Appellate Body and Panel reports, that is, until 20 December 2008.
23. First, Mexico highlights that the mandate for the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU is
to determine the reasonable period of time and not to analyze the consistency of the proposed
implementation measure with World Trade Organiza tion ("WTO") law. Mexico notes that, according
to Articles 21.1 and 21.3 of the DSU, prompt compliance is essential for the resolution of disputes and
that immediate compliance is the preferred option. Mexico explains that previous arbitration awards
have identified guidelines regarding the determination of the reasonable period of time. First, the
reasonable period of time should be the "shortest pe riod of time possible within the legal system" of
the implementing Member.18 Secondly, Mexico states that, a lthough an implementing Member is not
required to use extraordinary procedures, it must utilize all the flexibility and discretion available
within its legal system. Thirdly, Mexico points ou t that the particular circumstances of the dispute
must be taken into consideration in calculating the r easonable period of time. In this respect, Mexico
observes that the implementing Member bears the bu rden to demonstrate that its proposed schedule
constitutes a reasonable period of time under the specific circumstances of the dispute. 19 In Mexico's
view, the United States has not met its burden to show that it cannot implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB in less than 15 months.
24. As to the particular circumstances of this case, Mexico emphasizes that model zeroing in
original investigations and simple zeroing in pe riodic reviews have been challenged on a number of
occasions over the last seven years, and that bot h practices have repeatedly been found to be
inconsistent with Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"),
as well as with the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping Agreement"). Mexico further observes that the United States has
been under an obligation to eliminate simple ze roing since at least 9 May 2006, when the DSB
adopted its recommendations and rulings in US – Zeroing (EC).20 Mexico adds that the United States
has also been under an obligation to eliminate si mple zeroing "as such", when the DSB adopted its

18Mexico's submission., para. 10 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 51;
and referring to Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para. 44; and Award of the
Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 61).
20Ibid., para. 12, where Mexico indicates that the reas onable period of time for the United States to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in US – Zeroing (EC) expired on 9 April 2007.

recommendations and rulings in US – Zeroing (Japan) on 24 January 2007.
21 For Mexico, these
disputes provide an important context for the determination of the reasonable period of time.
25. Mexico underlines that the United States has fo cused its arguments entirely on the reasonable
period of time necessary to comply with its oblig ations in respect of simple zeroing "as such".
Mexico notes that, as to its "as applied" obligations, the United States has not requested any additional
time beyond what is requested for complying with its "as such" obligations.
26. Mexico notes that the United States has iden tified two possible paths of compliance:
(i) administrative implementation under Section 123 of the URAA; and (ii) legislative action by
which statutory provisions concerning calculation of dumping margins in administrative reviews
would be amended. According to Mexico, the Unite d States has failed to show that legislative action
would lead to the shortest period of time for impl ementation. Rather, Mexico is of the view that
administrative implementation may proceed with more efficiency and speed, and is thus the fastest
path that should be the basis for the Award in this arbitration.
1. Legislative Action

27. Mexico submits that previous Article 21.3(c) arbitrations have recognized that legislative
action is generally more time-consuming than admini strative changes, and that the description of the
domestic legislative process provided by the United St ates confirms that. Mexico underscores that, in
its description of the legislative process, the Unite d States concedes that the Executive branch has no
control over Congress and that the voting process with in Congress is complex and time-consuming.
Mexico therefore considers that the description o ffered by the United States shows that legislative
action is "inherently slower and less reliable than administrative action".22
28. Mexico considers that, in order to implemen t the recommendations and rulings of the DSB,
legislative action is not required. Mexico points to United States domestic courts that have held that
no change to the anti-dumping statutes is necessary in order to eliminate simple zeroing. 23 Mexico
also refers to a USDOC statement acknowledging that zer oing is "not required by statute, but rather is

21Mexico's submission, para. 12, where Mexico notes that the reasonable period of time for the United
States to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in US – Zeroing (Japan) expired on
24 December 2007.
22Ibid., para. 21.
23Ibid., para. 23 (referring to United States Cour t of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in SKF, Inc. v.
United States , Ct. No. 2007-1502 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 2008) (Exhibit MX-8 submitted by Mexico to the
Arbitrator); also in NSK v. United States, 510 F. 3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Exhibit MX-9 submitted by Mexico
to the Arbitrator); and in Timken Co. v. United States , 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Exhibit MX-10
submitted by Mexico to the Arbitrator)).

the result of an interpretation of the statute", thus showing, in Mexico's view, that the elimination of
zeroing does not require legislative action.24
29. As for the allocation of anti-dumping duties among importers for assessment purposes,
Mexico submits that the USDOC has the legal author ity under United States Statutes to address this
issue. A United States court has recognized that statutory language does not dictate how the USDOC
must calculate the importer's specific assessment rates on the "basis of" the margin of dumping
calculated in the review.
25 Therefore, Mexico argues, no enactment of legislation is required in order
to deal with the allocation issue in a WTO-consistent manner.
30. In sum, Mexico submits that the USDOC h as the necessary discretion to determine the
method of calculation of anti-dumping duties. While the United States may opt for legislative action,
this form of implementation is generally a slower option than administrative action. For Mexico, the
legislative path would be inconsistent with th e United States' obligation to choose the shortest
possible means of implementation.
2. Administrative Action taken pursuant to Section 123 of the URAA
31. Mexico recalls the United States' position that administrative action must follow the
procedure set forth in Section 123 of the URAA, an d that this process would require a similar period
of time as that associated to legislative change . According to Mexico, the United States has not
substantiated this assertion and has not demonstrated the need for the period of time it requests.
32. Mexico contends that the United States coul d utilize a shorter and simpler administrative
means of implementation than Section 123 of the URAA. According to Mexico, the Statement of
Administrative Action accompanying the URAA sets out that Section 123 applies only to changes or
modifications of administrative practice "cons isting of written policy guidance of general
application".
26 In Mexico's view, the United States is not required under its legal system to utilize the
procedure under Section 123 of the URAA. Instead , Mexico opines that the United States could use
the procedure set out in the Administrative Procedure Act governing administrative actions, which

24Mexico's submission, para. 24 (referring to USDOC, Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the
Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation ; Final Modification, United States
Federal Register, Vol. 71, No. 248 (27 December 2006) 77722 (Exhibit MX-11 submitted by Mexico to the
Arbitrator)).
25Ibid., para. 42 (Exhibit MX-14 submitted by Mexico to the Arbitrator).
26Ibid., para. 29 (referring to Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, reprinted in 1994 USCCAN 4040 (Exhibit MX-17 submitted by Mexico to the
Arbitrator)).

provides that formal rulemaking is not necessary for "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice".
27
33. Mexico maintains that, in using this alterna tive administrative procedure, the United States
could change its administrative practice of simple zeroing in a less formal and less time-consuming
manner. Mexico observes that unwritten interpreta tive rules and policies have been amended in the
past by the USDOC without any formal public noti ce, whereas, in other cases relating to practices
with wider applicability, policy changes have been instituted through publication in Import
Administration "Policy Bulletins".
28 Mexico recognizes that the US DOC has the option of soliciting
public comment in the course of instituting an inform al policy change. However, Mexico argues that,
even with a public comment peri od, the process of implementation under these procedures could be
accomplished within a period of 60-90 days.
34. Mexico notes that the Section 123 implementation process involves two main stages:
(i) internal deliberations, approval, and consultations with Congress and the private sector leading to
the publication of a proposed rule in the Federal Register; and (ii) modifications to the rule as a result
of public comments, final consultations with Congress, and publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register. Mexico is of the view that the process of implementation under Section 123 could be
completed in seven months from the date of a doption of the DSB's recommendations and rulings on
20 May 2008. Mexico also rejects the United St ates' contention that the first stage of the
implementation process cannot begin until 20 January 2009, when the new President takes office.
Mexico notes that the United States has already ha d four months to conduct consultations with
Congress and the private sector, and that this peri od exceeds the 90 days the United States asserts is
required for the first stage of the Section 123 procedure.
35. Mexico also contests the United States' request of 120 days to complete the second stage of
the implementation process under Section 123 of the URAA. Mexico notes that, in previous disputes,
the United States completed the second stage (from the publication of the proposed rule to the
adoption of the final rule) in less than 120 days. Me xico also points out that implementation in this
case concerns an issue that was already the subject of a prior WTO dispute settlement proceeding and
implementation obligations, and that it has been the subject of notice and comment procedures.

27Mexico's submission, para. 30 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, United States Code , Title 5,
Section 553(b)(3)(A) (Exhibit MX-18 submitted by Mexico to the Arbitrator)).
28Mexico mentions automatic initiation of "Sales Below Cost Investigations" in new administrative
reviews and certain interest provisions for new shipper reviews (Exhibits MX-20 and MX-21 submitted by
Mexico to the Arbitrator).

Therefore, Mexico considers that 60 days would be a reasonable period of time for the United States
to complete the second stage of the implementation process under Section 123 of the URAA. In sum,
Mexico is of the view that a period of seven m onths constitutes a reasonable period of time within
which administrative implementation under Section 123 could be accomplished. Mexico considers
that such a period of time would allow for complian ce to be completed before the new Administration
takes office.
36. Regarding the United States' contention that a preparatory process is needed, Mexico recalls
its position that the United States has been under an obligation to eliminate simple zeroing "as such"
since 24 December 2007 when the reasonable period of time in US – Zeroing (Japan) expired, long
before the DSB adopted its recommendations and rulings in this case. For Mexico, the need to engage
in a preparatory process is not a factor that should carry any weight in the determination of the
reasonable period of time in this case. Mexico emphasizes that the discretion of Members to
determine their means of implementation is not without bounds.29
37. Finally, Mexico rejects the United States' position that the alleged complexity of the
implementation process is a factor warranting an ex tended period for compliance. For Mexico, the
complexity of the implementation process alleged by the United States is limited to one issue: how to
allocate anti-dumping duties among individual impor ters in a periodic review proceeding for
assessment purposes. Mexico s ubmits that the normal Section 123 procedures and timeframe are
already designed to accommodate su ch decision-making and that, in at least one previous case, a
conceptually more complex issue has been addr essed within a Section 123 implementation process
that was completed within six months. 30 Furthermore, although Mexico appreciates that the question
of zeroing is a contentious one, it considers that domestic contentiousness of implementation action
must not be factored into the determination of the reasonable period of time.
38. In the light of these considerations, Mexico re quests the reasonable period of time should be
no longer than seven months as from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports,
ending on 20 December 2008.

29Mexico's submission, para. 39 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 56).
30Ibid., para. 53 (referring to USDOC, Antidumping Proceedings: Affiliated Party Sales in the Ordinary
Course of Trade, United States Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 221 (15 November 2002) 69186) (Exhibit MX-24
submitted by Mexico to the Arbitrator)).

III. Reasonable Period of Time
A. Mandate of the Arbitrator
39. This dispute is concerned with model zeroi ng in original anti-dumping investigations
31, as
well as simple zeroing in periodic reviews. 32 The Appellate Body and Pa nel Reports in this dispute
were adopted by the DSB on 20 May 2008. On 2 Ju ne 2008, the United States informed the DSB of
its intention to comply with the recommendations a nd rulings of the DSB. Article 21.3 of the DSU
stipulates that, when it is "impracticable" fo r a Member to comply "immediately" with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, that Me mber "shall have a reasonable period of time in
which to do so". As the parties failed to agr ee on the length of the reasonable period of time for
compliance, the Director-General appointed me as arbitrator on 29 August 2008, and I accepted the
appointment on 1 September 2008.
40. In keeping with my mandate, I must take due account of the relevant provisions of the DSU.
Article 21.1 of the DSU sets out that "prompt co mpliance" is essential for the resolution of WTO
disputes. More specifically, Article 21.3(c) reads:
[A] guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period
of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations
should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report. However, th at time may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the particular circumstances. (footnote omitted)
41. My mandate relates to the time by which the implementing Member must have achieved
compliance, not to the manner in which that Member achieves compliance. I am mindful that it is
beyond my mandate to determine the consistency with WTO law of the measure eventually taken to
comply; this can only be assessed in Article 21.5 proceedings. Yet, I consider that when a Member
must comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot be determined in isolation
from the chosen means of implementation. In order "to determine when a Member must comply, it

31"Model zeroing in investigations" refers to the "method under which the USDOC, in original
investigations, makes a weighted average-to-weighted av erage comparison ... of expo rt price and normal value
for each 'model' of the product under investigation, and disregards the amount by which the weighted average
export price exceeds the weighted averag e normal value for any model, when aggregating the results of model-
specific comparisons to calculate a weighted average marg in of dumping for the exporter or foreign producer
32"Simple zeroing in periodic reviews" refers to "the method under which the USDOC, in periodic
reviews for assessment of final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, compares the prices of individual
export transactions against monthly weighted average normal values, and disregards the amount by which the
export price exceeds the monthly weighted average normal value for each model, when aggregating the results
of the comparisons to calculate the margin of dumping for the exporter and the duty assessment rate for the
importer concerned." (Appellate Body Report, para. 67)

may be necessary to consider how a Member proposes to do so." 33 In making my determination
pursuant to Article 21.3(c), the means of implem entation chosen by the Member concerned is,
therefore, a relevant consideration.34 As noted by previous arbitrators, the implementing Member has
"a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation, as long as the means chosen are
consistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and with the covered agreements." 35 In
exercising its discretion, the implementing Member will be expected to act in good faith in developing
a measure capable of producing the desired result, that is, the implementation of the adopted
Appellate Body and panel reports. However, this pr inciple of good faith is not to be used by the
implementing Member to delay implementation.
42. While the implementing Member enjoys a cer tain discretion in choosing the means and
method of implementation, this discretion is not wit hout bounds. As stated by previous arbitrators,
"the implementing Member does not have an unfettered right to choose any method of
implementation."36 I must consider, in particular, "whether the implementing action falls within the
range of permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings."37 Put a little differently, the chosen method mu st be capable of placing the implementing
Member in compliance within a reasonable period of time in accordance with the guidelines contained
in Article 21.3(c).38 According to the last sentence of Artic le 21.3(c), the "particular circumstances"
of a dispute may affect the calculation of the reasonable period of time, making it "shorter or
longer".39 Therefore, as other arbitrators in the past, I also consider that the implementing Member is
expected to use all the flexibility available with in its domestic legal system to implement the

33Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para. 26. (original emphasis)
34Ibid., para. 27.
35Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 48 (original emphasis) (quoting Award of
the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones, para. 38). See also Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para. 25
(referring to Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 49, in turn referring to Award of the Arbitrator,
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, paras. 41-43; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System, para. 32;
Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 30; Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 26; Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling, para. 33; Award of the Arbitrator,
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 69).
36Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 48 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator,
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 69).
38Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) , para. 27 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator,
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 69).
39Ibid., para. 25 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 49).

recommendations and rulings of the DSB
40; however, this does not necessarily mean that the
implementing Member is expected to utilize "extraordinary" means of compliance.41
43. Finally, it is incumbent upon the implementing Member seeking a reasonable period of time
to establish that the proposed period is the "shortest period possible" within its domestic legal system
to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Failing that, it is ultimately for the
arbitrator to determine the "shortest period possible" for implementation, on the basis of the evidence
presented by all parties."
42
B. Measures to be brought into Conformity
44. The relevant findings and conclu sions of both the Panel and the Appellate Body that have
been adopted by the DSB in this dispute are summed up below. The Appellate Body found that:
(a) simple zeroing in periodic reviews is, as such , inconsistent with Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement43; and
(b) the United States acted inconsistently with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by applying simple zeroing in five
specific periodic reviews.44
45. The Panel made the following findings (that were not appealed):
(a) model zeroing in investigations is, as such , inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement45; and

40See Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , para. 48; Award of the Arbitrator,
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) , para. 25 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts , para. 49, in turn
referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System, para. 39; Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff
Preferences, para. 36; and Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 64).
41Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 48 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator,
Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para. 25; and Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 49, in turn referring
to Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 42; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band
System, para. 51; and Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 74).
42Ibid., para. 51 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 44).
43Appellate Body Report, para. 165(a). In this dispute, Mexico appealed the Panel's findings that
determined that simple zeroing, both "as such" and "as app lied", in periodic reviews is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as claimed by Mexico.
44Ibid., para. 165(b).
45Panel Report, para. 8.1(a).

(b) the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in
the investigation on Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico by using
model zeroing.46
46. In sum, the Panel and the Appellate Body findi ngs in this dispute included four findings of
WTO-inconsistency: (i) the use of model zer oing in original investigations "as such" 47; (ii) the
application of model zeroing in the original in vestigation at issue before the Panel and the
Appellate Body48; (iii) the use of simple zeroing in periodic reviews "as such" 49; and (iv) the use of
simple zeroing in specific periodic reviews at issue before the Panel and the Appellate Body.50
47. The United States emphasizes that it has discontinued the methodology of model zeroing in
original investigations51 and, thus, it does not request any specific period of time for implementing the
Panel's findings in this dispute regarding model zeroing "as such" and "as applied" in original
investigations. In other words, th e elimination of model zeroing in original investigations is not at
issue in this arbitration. Thus, my task is lim ited to the determination of a reasonable period of time
for the United States to comply w ith the recommendations and rulings of the DSB relating to simple
zeroing "as such" and "as applied" in periodic reviews.
48. Mexico observes that the United States has not requested a period of time for compliance with
the DSB recommendations and rulings as to simple zeroing "as applied" "beyond what would be
reasonable for complying with its WTO obligations concerning the 'as such' findings with respect to
periodic reviews."
52 In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the United States confirmed that
compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings relating to simple zeroing "as applied" would
not require a longer period of time than comp liance with the DSB recommendations and rulings
regarding simple zeroing "as such". Accordingly, my analysis will focus on the reasonable period of
time needed by the United States to implemen t the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
regarding simple zeroing "as such" in periodic reviews.

46Panel Report, para. 8.1(b).
47Ibid., para. 8.1(a); USDOC, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Stainless Steel Sheet and St rip in Coils from Mexico, United States Federal Register , Vol. 64, No. 109
(8 June 1999) 30790, subsequently amended as Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From Mexico, United States
Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 143 (27 July 1999) 40560.
48Panel Report, para. 8.1(b).
49Appellate Body Report, para. 165(a).
50Ibid., para. 165(b); the five periodic reviews challenged by Mexico before the Panel are listed in
Panel Report, para. 2.2.
51Panel Report, paras. 7.45 and 7.50; Appellate Body Report, footnote 158 to para. 68.
52Mexico's submission, para. 15.

C. Legislative Action versus Administrative Action
49. The United States requests a period of time of 15 months to bring itself into compliance with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The United States points out that two means of
implementation are under consideration—(i) legislative action; or (ii) administrative action—and that
whichever measure is chosen, the reasonable peri od of time would end on 20 August 2009. The
United States indicates that internal consultations are currently taking place in order to decide how
best to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
53 Should implementation by
administrative means be chosen, the United States not es that the procedure set out in Section 123 of
the URAA must be followed.
50. Mexico submits that the reasonable period of time for the United States to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB should no t exceed seven months from the adoption of the
DSB recommendations and rulings in this dispute, ending on 20 December 2008. 54 According to
Mexico, the United States has recognized that compliance can be achieved either through
administrative or legislative action, and that administrative action is the shorter path for
implementation.55 At the oral hearing, Mexico argued that legislative action is not necessary to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 56 Regarding administrative
implementation, Mexico contends that the United States might resort to administrative action under
the Administrative Procedure Act, and that such an action would allow implementation within a
shorter period of time than action under Section 123 of the URAA.
51. From responses to questioning at the oral hearing, I understand that the United States does not
dispute that the elimination of simple zeroing in pe riodic reviews, in and of itself, does not require a
legislative action. However, the United States empha sizes that it has not as yet decided how it would
change the periodic review methodology and, more specifically, how it would change its importer-
specific system of assessment of final anti-dumping duties so as to ensure that all anti-dumping duties
assessed on all importers that imported from the same exporter do not exceed that exporter's margin of
dumping. The United States considers that, at this stage, it cannot be excluded that, in order to change
the periodic review methodology, or to address what it calls the issue of the "allocation of

53United States' submission, para. 4.
54Mexico's submission, para. 56.
55Mexico's statement at the oral hearing.
56Ibid.

antidumping duties among the importers for assessment purposes" 57, legislative action could be more
appropriate than an administrative action, depending on the nature of the policy choices that are made
in this respect.
52. As noted earlier, the implementing Member enjo ys a certain discretion in choosing the means
and method of implementation, but it does "not ha ve an unfettered right to choose any method of
implementation".58 I recognize that both the legislative and administrative means of implementation
proposed by the United States fall within this ra nge of permissible means that are capable of
achieving the elimination of simple zeroing "as such " in periodic reviews. The United States itself
recognizes that administrative means are available a nd that legislative action is not indispensably
required to achieve compliance with the DSB recomme ndations and rulings. At the oral hearing, the
United States did not put forward any argument that would suggest that a statutory provision needs to
be amended or repealed to terminate simple zeroing in periodic reviews. Furthermore, I observe that
the USDOC has discontinued model zeroing in original investigations through administrative action.59
53. It is not my task as Arbitrator acting pursuant to Article 21.3(c) to decide which method or
type of measure should be chosen by an implemen ting Member to bring it into compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. However, it does fall within my mandate to assess what
would be "the shortest period possible within the legal system of the [implementing] Member" 60 for
effective implementation of the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB. It is widely accepted that
implementation through administrative action usually takes a shorter period of time than
implementation through legislative action.61 In the light of the parties' responses to questioning at the
oral hearing, I am not persuaded that the United States is not in a position to eliminate the simple
zeroing methodology in periodic reviews by administrative action, or that legislative implementation
would necessarily be more effective than administ rative implementation. In these circumstances,
I turn to the period of time within which administ rative action eliminating the methodology of simple
zeroing in periodic reviews could be completed.

57United States' submission, para. 9.
58Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 48 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator,
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 69).
59Panel Report, paras. 7.43-7.45; Exhibit MX-10 submitted by Mexico to the Arbitrator. Mexico
acknowledged before the Panel that, since 22 February 2007, the United States had changed its methodology
regarding model zeroing in investigations and that it applied the new methodology in at least one investigation
initiated subsequent to this date. Mexico contended, however, that "this change in policy only affect[ed]
investigations ongoing as of, or initiated after, 22 February 2007." (Panel Report, para. 7.43)
60Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones, para. 26.
61Award of the Arbitrator, Australia – Salmon, para. 38; Award of the Arbitrator, US – Section 110(5)
Copyright Act, para. 34; Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , para. 49; Award of the
Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term , para. 41; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System , para. 38;
Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para. 57; Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 26.

D. The Administrative Procedure Act and Section 123 of the URAA
54. Mexico has argued that the recommendations a nd rulings adopted by the DSB in this case
could be implemented through administrative acti on under the Administrative Procedure Act faster
than through administrative action under Section 123 of the URAA. Mexico recognizes, however,
that the methodology of simple zeroing in peri odic reviews may be terminated also by the
administrative process set out in Section 123 of the URAA.
55. It may be observed that the Administrative Proce dure Act is a statute that generally applies to
the adoption and modification of administrative regulation. By contrast, Section 123 of the URAA is
the lex specialis of implementation of recommendations and ru lings of the DSB. It may be recalled
that the implementing Member enjoys a certain degree of discretion in determining "the most
appropriate, and probably effectiv e, method of implementing the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB".
62 Because Section 123 of the URAA addresse s specifically the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, it appears to me that the United States would not exceed
the bounds of its discretion by having recourse to the procedures under Section 123 of the URAA
instead of the procedures under the Administrative Pr ocedure Act. Moreover, as previous arbitrators
have stated, an implementing Member may use its "normal" internal procedures.
63 Therefore, I
consider the timing and sequence of procedural steps provided for in Section 123 of the URAA as
particularly relevant in the determination of the reasonable period for implementation in this case.
E. Administrative Action and the Reasonable Period of Time
56. The parties do not fully agree on the elements and structure of the implementation process
under Section 123 of the URAA and the period of time needed for completing specific steps
thereunder. For the United States, the pr ocess under Section 123 of the URAA comprises three
distinct steps: (i) the initial preparatory process; (ii) the drafting and the publication of the proposed
modification; and (iii) a further stage of consulta tions that may result in a revision of the proposed
modification, and the issuance of the final rule.
64 According to the United States, the completion of
this process requires approximately nine months.65 I note, however, that, in its written submission, the
United States argues that "under normal circumstances" (for example, in a year without elections)
seven months would be sufficient to complete the process under Section 123 of the URAA.
66

62Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 42.
63Supra, footnote 41.
64United States' statement at the oral hearing.
65At the oral hearing, the United States indicated that each of the three stages would require
approximately three months.
66United States' submission, para. 36.

57. For its part, Mexico considers that the im plementation process under Section 123 of the
URAA consists of two key stages: (i) a period of "internal consultations and approval and
consultations with Congress and the private sector l eading to publication of a proposed rule in the
Federal Register"; and (ii) a second phase involving "modifications of the rule as a result of public
comments, final consultations with ... Congress, and publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register."67 Mexico submits that the process under Section 123 of the URAA would not require more
than seven months in the circumstances of this dispute.68
F. Particular Circumstances of This Case
58. I turn to "particular circumstances" that the parties have asked me to take into account in
determining the reasonable period of time, in accordan ce with the last sentence of Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, and which may make the reasonable period of time "shorter or longer".69
59. In this dispute, the parties advanced the follo wing "particular circumstances" as pertinent for
the determination of the reasonable period of time: (i) the technical complexity of eliminating the
simple zeroing methodology in periodic reviews due to the import-specific assessment of final
anti-dumping liability under the United States' retr ospective system; (ii) the election of a new
Congress and a new President in the United States a nd consequential changes in the Administration
and the composition of Congressional committees; and (iii) the existence of similar DSB
recommendations and rulings in previous disputes involving zeroing methodologies.
60. The United States contends that, in determini ng the reasonable period of time, I should take
into account the technical complexity of the term ination of the methodology of simple zeroing in
periodic reviews. For the United States, complia nce in this case is complex, mainly because
terminating simple zeroing in periodic review s would imply changes in its duty assessment
methodology.
70 The United States recalls that, under its retrospective system, anti-dumping liability is
assessed on an importer-specific basis. It notes that , when there are several importers importing from
the same exporter or foreign producer subject to an anti-dumping order, the importer-specific
assessment of final anti-dumping liability without si mple zeroing may result in a scenario where, for
some of those importers, the aggregation of the results of multiple comparisons of monthly weighted-
average normal value and individual export prices may yield a negative value. The United States

67Mexico's submission, para. 34.
68Ibid., paras. 42 and 43.
69Supra, footnote 39.
70United States' submission, para. 9.

refers to the Appellate Body's findings that the total amount of the anti-dumping duties levied from all
importers purchasing from an exporter or foreign producer must not exceed that exporter's or foreign
producer's margin of dumping. The United States also notes the Appellate Body's statements that the
importing Member is under no obligation to compen sate importers for the negative value (that is,
when export prices exceed normal value).
71 Accordingly, the termination of simple zeroing "as such"
in periodic reviews implies, the United States argues, that it will need to address the complex issue of
how anti-dumping duties are allocated among importers for assessment purposes when some of them
have "negative" amounts of anti-dumping duties. 72 According to the United States, this will require
the involvement of senior policy-make rs at a time when a major reshu ffle is likely to occur at this
level as a result of the election of a new Administration and a new Congress.
61. In principle, the elimination of simple zeroing in periodic reviews is distinct from the issue of
the "allocation of antidumping duties among the importers for assessment purposes". 73 The former
can clearly be carried out by ad ministrative means. In the real world, because it involves imposition
of differing levels of financia l liability among the importers, depe nding on the circumstances, the
latter may be easier to bring about on a durable basis by a legislative enactment. In the real world too,
however, the elimination of simple zeroing in periodic reviews is closely related to the issue of the
allocation of final anti-dumping duties among importers ; implementation of the former might well be
tied to reaching satisfactory resolution of the complexities of allocation of anti-dumping duties among
the importers. Accordingly, the technical complexities of allocation of duties among importers cannot
casually be disregarded but, to the contrary, may le gitimately be considered a particular circumstance
affecting the determination of a reasonable time fo r abolition of the methodology of simple zeroing in
periodic reviews. At the same time, however, this particular circumstance cannot justify a long delay
in the implementation of elimination of simp le zeroing in periodic reviews. Provisional
administrative allocation rules might, perhaps, be devised and put into effect while the long-term
administrative or legislative allocation standards are in process of establishment.

71In its Report in this dispute, the Appellate Body no ted that it "has consistently held that 'margin of
dumping' is an exporter-specific concept, and that, whatever methodology is followed for assessment and
collection of anti-dumping duties, the total amount of anti-dumping duties assessed and collected from all
importers must not exceed the total amount of dumping found in all the sales made by the exporter concerned,
calculated according to the margin of dumping established for that exporte r without zeroing." (Appellate Body
Report, para. 112) According to the Appellate Body , this interpretation "does not preclude a WTO Member
applying a retrospective system from assessing an impor ter's final anti-dumping duty liability on the basis of its
own transactions, subject, however, to the legal requirem ent that the prescribed overall margin of dumping for
the exporter is respected." ( Ibid., para. 113) Moreover, "if aggregation of the results of multiple comparisons
yields a negative value for a particular importer, 'this would not mean that the authorities would be required ... to
compensate an importer for the amount of that negative value (that is, when export prices exceed normal
value)'." ( Ibid., footnote 237 to para. 113 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) ,
footnote 363 to para. 155; and Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), footnote 234 to para. 131)).
72United States' submission, para. 9.
73Ibid.

62. In addition, the United States submits that the impending Presidential and Congressional
elections would lengthen the period for reaching im plementation of the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB, as a new Congress will be convened and a new President will take office in
January 2009.74 According to the United States, irrespec tive of the means of implementation chosen,
the process would require the participation of the new Congress and the new Administration, so that
the process could not begin before late January 2009. The elections may, of course, lead to changes in
staff and senior policy-makers in the Administratio n and in Congress. However, I do not see why,
because some policy decisions might be required as a result of compliance with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB, the implementation process (including the preparatory process, consultations
with stakeholders, and work on possible solutions to technical complexities) could not be initiated and
moved forward under the current Administration a nd then completed after January 2009. Issues
relating to Presidential and Congressional elections and the transition to a new President, a new
Administration, and a new Congress, or the controversial character of required changes in the
domestic legal system, have arisen in previous arbitrations.
75 Like those arbitrators, I believe that the
implementation process—particularly an admini strative one—should begin forthwith upon adoption
of the DSB recommendations and rulings and be completed after the new Administration and
Congress take office.
63. Finally, Mexico points out that several WTO disputes resemble the present dispute in that
they also concern the simple zeroing methodologies employed by the United States, and have led to
DSB recommendations and rulings on this issue. 76 Specifically, Mexico notes that the reasonable
period of time for the United States to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings in
US – Zeroing (EC) with respect to simple zeroing as applied in certain periodic reviews expired on
9 April 2007, and in US – Zeroing (Japan) with respect to simple ze roing in periodic reviews "as
such", on 24 December 2007.77 At the oral hearing, the United States argued that the measures in the
disputes referred to by Mexico and the measures at issue in the present dispute are different, and that
the DSB recommendations and rulings in the prev ious disputes cannot be considered in this
arbitration.78

74United States' submission, para. 11.
75Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act , para. 40; Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term ,
paras. 59-60.
76Mexico's submission, para. 12; Mexico's statement at the oral hearing.
77See WT/DS294/19 in US – Zeroing (EC); and WT/DS322/20 in US – Zeroing (Japan).
78United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

64. The disputes to which Mexico refers are indeed distinct from the present one. Those disputes
involved different complainants and were at diffe rent procedural stages of WTO dispute settlement,
including proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
79 Given this context, I consider that the
particular circumstances of those disputes should be attributed limited releva nce to my determination
of the reasonable period of time in this arbitration.
IV. Award
65. In the light of the above considerations, I dete rmine that the reasonable period of time for the
United States to implement the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB in this dispute is 11 months
plus 10 days from the date of adoption of the Pa nel and Appellate Body Re ports. The reasonable
period of time will thus end on 30 April 2009.

Signed in the original at Manila this 20th day of October 2008 by:

Florentino P. Feliciano
Arbitrator

79Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 42.