EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY CHINA AB-2015-7
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 18 January 2016
Document codes: WT/DS397/AB/RW
Complainant: China
Respondent: EU
Third parties: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.S.
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. 6, 9, 5, 2, 3, 4  Anti-dumpingArt. I, X:3(a), VI:1  GATT 1994Art. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON
CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA
RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY CHINA
AB-2015-7
Report of the Appellate Body

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
Appellate Body Report Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from
China,
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
CCCME China's Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery
and Electronic Products
China's Accession Protocol Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China,
WT/L/432
CN combined nomenclature containe d in Annex 1 to Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical
nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, Official Journal of
the European Communities, L Series, No. 30 (7 September 1987),
p. 256
Commission Commission of the European Union
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DMSAL domestic sales listing
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
EU European Union
GATT 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
MET market economy treatment
NME(s) non-market economy(ies)
original panel panel in the original proceedings
original panel report Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China,

original investigation Anti-dumping investigation on imports of certain iron or steel
fasteners originating in China initiated by the European Commission
through its Notice of Initiation dated 9 November 2007
Panel Panel in these Article 21.5 compliance proceedings
Panel Report Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, WT/DS397/RW
PCN(s) product control number(s)
WA-WA weighted average-to-weighted average
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel
Exhibit
Original
Panel Exhibit
Short Title
(if any)
Description
 CHN-1

Basic AD Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December
1995 on protection against Dumped Imports from
Countries not Members of the European Community,
Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series,
No. 56 (6 March 1996), pp. 1-20
 CHN-3 Basic AD Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November
2009 on Protection against Dumped Imports from
Countries not Members of the European Community
(codified version), Official Journal of the European Union,
L Series, No. 343 (22 December 2009), pp. 51-73 and
Corrigendum
 CHN-14 Notice of Initiation European Commission Noti ce of Initiation of an
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain
iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic
of China, Official Journal of the European Union, C Series,
No. 267 (9 November 2007), pp. 31-35
 CHN-18 final disclosure General Disclosure Document, AD525: Anti-dumping
proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or steel
fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China,
Proposal to impose definitive measures, 3 November
2008
 CHN-28 Letter dated 7 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan
Chenghe and Ningbo Jinding to the European
Commission concerning the Definitive Disclosure
Document
 CHN-30 Letter dated 17 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan
Chenghe and Ningbo Jinding to the European
Commission concerning the Definitive Disclosure
Document: Request for Information II
 CHN-31 Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the European
Commission to Van Bael & Bellis in response to Kunshan
Chenghe's and Ningbo Jinding's request of 17 November
2008
 CHN-59 Letter dated 24 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan
Chenghe to the European Commission containing
comments on the Definitive Disclosure Document
CHN-1 CHN-4 Definitive
Regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No. 91/2009 of 26 January 2009
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's
Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Union,
L Series, No. 29 (31 January 2009), pp. 1-35
CHN-2 European Commission Notice regarding the anti-dumping
measures in force on imports of certain iron or steel
fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China,
following the recommendations and rulings adopted by
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization on 28 July 2011 in the EC – Fasteners
dispute (DS397), Official Journal of the European Union,
C Series, No. 66 (6 March 2012), pp. 29-31
CHN-3 Review Regulation Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 924/2012 of
4 October 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's
Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Union,
L Series, No. 275 (10 October 2012), pp. 1-22

Panel
Exhibit
Original
Panel Exhibit
Short Title
(if any)
Description
CHN-5 Letter dated 30 May 2012 from the European
Commission to interested parties including the disclosure
document concerning normal value
CHN-6 Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the
European Commission in response to the Commission's
letter of 30 May 2012
CHN-7 Letter dated 19 June 2012 on behalf of China's Chamber
of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and
Electronic Products (CCCME) to the European
Commission
CHN-8 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the
European Commission requesting further information and
clarification regarding the determination of normal value
CHN-9 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to
the European Commission requesting further information
and clarification regarding the determination of normal
value
CHN-11 E-mail dated 26 June 2012 from the European
Commission concerning CCCME, Biao Wu, and Jiashan
CHN-12 E-mail dated 21 June 2012 from the European
Commission concerning Changshu and Ningbo Jinding
CHN-15 Letter dated 5 July 2012 from the European Commission
to interested parties
CHN-17 R548: WTO Fasteners Implementation Review Note for
the File dated 11 July 2012 on the Reclassification of
Normal Value from one producer in India
CHN-20 Letter dated 17 July 2012 from the European
Commission concerning the determination of normal
value
CHN-21 Letter dated 19 July 2012 on behalf of CCCME and Biao
Wu to the European Commission concerning, inter alia,
disclosure documents
CHN-22 General Disclosure
Document
General Disclosure Document, R548: Anti-dumping
measures in force on imports of certain iron or steel
fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China:
implementation of the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Trade Organization on 28 July 2011 in the EC – Fasteners
dispute (DS397), 31 July 2012
CHN-23 Letter dated 20 August 2012 on behalf of CCCME and
Biao Wu to the European Commission containing
comments on the disclosure of 31 July 2012
CHN-24 Response to the Europe an Commission's Anti-Dumping
Questionnaire for producers in analogue countries of
certain iron or steel fasteners, submitted by Pooja Forge
in the original anti-dumping investigation
CHN-27 Letter dated 11 July 2012 on behalf of CCCME and Biao
Wu to the European Commission concerning the
disclosure of 5 July 2012
CHN-28 Comments dated 14 August 2012 on behalf of Ningbo
Jinding on the disclosure of 31 July 2012
CHN-29 Comments dated 14 August 2012 on behalf of Changshu
on the disclosure of 31 July 2012

Panel
Exhibit
Original
Panel Exhibit
Short Title
(if any)
Description
CHN-30 Hearing Officer's
Report
Report of the hearing of the European Commission held
on 11 July 2012 concerning R548 Iron or steel fasteners
originating in the People's Republic of China, 18 July
2012
CHN-33 Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to
the European Commission concerning the disclosure of
30 May 2012
CHN-34 Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the
European Commission concerning the disclosure of
30 May 2012
CHN-38 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1331/2007 of 13 November
2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports
of dicyandiamide originating in the People's Republic of
China, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series,
No. 296 (15 November 2007), pp. 1-17
CHN-39 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1659/2005 of 6 October
2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and
collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on
imports of certain magnesia bricks originating in the
People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the
European Union, L Series, No. 267 (12 October 2005)
pp. 1-14
CHN-40 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3386/93 of 6 December
1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports
of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the
People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the
European Communities, L Series, No. 306 (11 December
1993) pp. 16-21
CHN-41 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/96 of 2 July 1996
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of
unwrought pure magnesium originating in Russia and
Ukraine and collecting definitively the provisional duty
imposed, Official Journal of the European Communities,
L Series, No. 174 (12 July 1996) pp. 1-10
CHN-42 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 492/2008 of 3 June
2008 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on
imports of monosodium glutamate originating in the
People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the
European Union, L Series, No. 144 (4 June 2008)
pp. 14-30
CHN-44 Calculations for Biao Wu
CHN-45 Calculations for Ningbo Jinding
CHN-46 Calculations for Changshu
EU-2 E-mail dated 3 July 2012 from Pooja Forge to the
European Commission requesting information
EU-4 Cover letter to the General Disclosure Document dated
31 July 2012
EU-5 Letter dated 26 November 2014 from the
European Commission to the Panel concerning
Pooja Forge
EU-8 E-mail exchanges dated 2 July 2012 between the
European Commission and Pooja Forge concerning
request for information by Pooja Forge

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short title Full case title and citation
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII,
p. 3327
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
China – Autos (US) Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Automobiles from the United States, WT/DS440/R and Add.1, adopted
18 June 2014
China – GOES Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,
WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6251
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
28 October 2015
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014
EC – Bed Linen Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted
12 March 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2049
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by India, WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, DSR 2003:III,
p. 965
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Fasteners (China) Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1,
adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289
EC – Fasteners (China)
(Article 21.5 – China)
Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by China, WT/DS397/RW and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members
7 August 2015
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R,
adopted 18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable
Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R, adopted 18 August
2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R, DSR 2003:VII,
p. 2701
EC and certain member States
– Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from
Turkey, WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, DSR 2002:VII, p. 2667
EU – Footwear (China) Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear
from China, WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:IX, p. 4585

Short title Full case title and citation
Guatemala – Cement II Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000,
DSR 2000:XI, p. 5295
Korea – Certain Paper Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from
Indonesia, WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII,
p. 10637
Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted
21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6675
US – 1916 Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000,
DSR 2000:X, p. 4793
US – Carbon Steel (India) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted
19 December 2014
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January
2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 375
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, adopted 11 May
2007, DSR 2007:IX, p. 3523
US – Shrimp
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6481
US – Softwood Lumber V Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004,
DSR 2004:V, p. 1875
US – Softwood Lumber V Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, p. 1937
US – Tyres (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China,
WT/DS399/AB/R, adopted 5 October 2011, DSR 2011:IX, p. 4811
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted
20 June 2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1,
adopted 11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911
US – Zeroing (Japan) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007, DSR 2007:I,
p. 3

APPELLATE BODY

European Communities – Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or
Steel Fasteners from China

Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China

European Union
1, Appellant/Appellee
China, Other Appellant/Appellee

Japan, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

AB-2015-7

Appellate Body Division:

Ramírez-Hernández, Presiding Member
Graham, Member
Servansing, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. The European Union and China each appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations
developed in the Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China 2
(Panel Report). The Panel was established pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) to consider a complaint by China 3
regarding the consistency with the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) of measures taken by the
European Union to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) in the original proceedings in EC – Fasteners (China).
4
1.2. On 9 November 2007, the European Commission (Commission) issued a "Notice of
Initiation"5 of an anti-dumping investigation on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners from
China (original investigation). This original investigation resulted in the imposition of definitive
anti-dumping duties on fasteners from China, which was notified through the "Definitive
Regulation" of 26 January 2009.
6
1.3. On 12 October 2009, China requested the es tablishment of a panel, and the original panel
was established on 23 October 2009. 7 Before the original panel, China challenged, inter alia, the
WTO-consistency of the Definitive Regulation imposing anti-dumping duties on fasteners from
China. In its report, which was circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
3 December 2010, the original panel found that the European Union had violated certain provisions
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular: (i) Articles 6.10 and 9.2 with respect to the

1 This dispute began before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009, which, for
WTO purposes, led to the replacement of the "European Communities" with the "European Union". For this
reason, the case title in this dispute is European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, rather than European Union – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Iron or Steel Fasteners from China. As did the panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings, apart
from the case title, the Panel referred throughout its Report to the responding party in this dispute as the
European Union or the EU. We follow this practice in this Report.
2 WT/DS397/RW, 7 August 2015.
3 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS397/18.
4 The recommendations and rulings of the DSB resulted from the adoption on 28 July 2011, by the DSB,
of the Appellate Body report (WT/DS397/AB/R) and the panel report (WT/DS397/R) in EC – Fasteners (China).
In this Report, we refer to the panel that considered the original complaint brought by China as the "original
panel" and to its report as the "original panel report".
5 European Commission, Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the European
Union, C Series, No. 267 (9 November 2007), pp. 31-35 (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-14).
6 Council Regulation (EC) No. 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on
imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the
European Union, L Series, No. 29 (31 January 2009), pp. 1-35 (Panel Exhibit CHN-1).
7 WT/DS397/3; WT/DS397/4.

treatment of individual exporters and producers in the calculation of margins of dumping under
Article 9(5) of the "Basic AD Regulation" 8; (ii) Articles 3.1 and 3.2 with respect to the assessment
of the volume of dumped imports in the injury determination; (iii) Articles 3.1 and 3.5 with respect
to the causation analysis of the injury determination; (iv) Articles 6.4 and 6.2 with respect to the
failure of the Commission to disclose in a timely manner information regarding certain aspects of
the normal value determination; (v) Article 6.5.1 with respect to non-confidential summaries of
questionnaire responses; and (vi) Article 6.5 with respect to confidential treatment of certain
information.9
1.4. The European Union and China both appealed certain issues of law and legal interpretations
developed by the original panel. The Appellate Body report was circulated to WTO Members on
15 July 2011. The Appellate Body, in particular: (i) upheld, albeit for different reasons, the original
panel's finding of inconsistency of Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation with Articles 6.10 and 9.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the treatment of individual exporters and
producers in the calculation of margins of dumping; (ii) found the original panel to be in error by
not finding a violation of Article 4.1 with respect to the definition of the domestic industry;
(iii) upheld the original panel's findings of violation of Articles 6.4 and 6.2 with respect to the
failure of the Commission to disclose in a timely manner information regarding certain aspects of
the normal value determination; (iv) found that the original panel erred in respect of Article 2.4
and found instead that the Commission had failed to indicate to interested parties what
information was necessary to ensure fair comparison; and (v) reversed the original panel's finding
of violation of Article 6.5 regarding the confiden tial treatment of certain information and held
instead that China had failed to substantiate its claim.
10
1.5. On 28 July 2011, the DSB adopted the original panel and Appellate Body reports. On
19 January 2012, China and the European Union in formed the DSB that they had agreed on a
reasonable period of time for implementation of 14 months and two weeks as from 28 July 2011.11
The reasonable period of time expired on 12 October 2012.
1.6. On 11 October 2012, the European Union informed the DSB that it had adopted certain
measures necessary to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.12 As regards the
DSB's recommendations and rulings concerning the original investigation, which had resulted in
the issuance of the Definitive Regulation, the European Union had initiated a review
investigation.
13 Through the "Review Regulation" of 4 October 2012 14, the injurious dumping

8 Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 56
(6 March 1996) (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-1) as repealed and replaced by, Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 343 (22 December
2009), pp. 51-73, and Corrigendum, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 7 (12 January 2010)
pp. 23-24 (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-3).
9 Original Panel Report, para. 8.2. In addition, the original panel found that the European Union had
acted inconsistently with Articles 6.10, 9.2, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement) with respect to Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation. Further, in paragraph 8.3 of its
report, the original panel rejected certain claims, in particular, finding that China had failed to establish that
the European Union acted inconsistently with: (i) Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in
respect of the definition of the domestic industry; and (ii) Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect
of the dumping determination. In paragraph 8.4 of its report, the original panel applied judicial economy with
respect to certain other claims.
10 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 624. The Appellate Body, however, declared
moot and of no legal effect the original panel's finding that Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation was
inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.
11 WT/DS397/14.
12 WT/DS397/15/Add.3.
13 European Commission, Notice regarding the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain
iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, following the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization on 28 July 2011 in the EC - Fasteners
dispute (DS397), Official Journal of the European Union, C Series, No. 66 (6 March 2012), pp. 29-31 (Panel
Exhibit CHN-2).
14 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 924/2012 of 4 October 2012 amending Regulation (EC)
No. 91/2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in
the People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 275 (10 October 2012)
pp. 1-22 (Panel Exhibit CHN-3).

determined in the original investigation was confirmed, and revised anti-dumping duties at lower
rates were imposed.
1.7. China, however, considered that the measure taken by the European Union through the
Review Regulation to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in relation to the original
investigation was inconsistent with various provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
GATT 1994.15 Thus, on 5 December 2013, China requested the establishment of a panel. 16 The
Panel was established by the DSB on 18 December 2013.17
1.8. Before the Panel, China claimed that certain aspects of the review investigation leading to the
continued application of definitive duties on fasteners from China were inconsistent with
Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 3.1, 4.1, 6.1.2, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.
1.9. In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the WTO on 7 August 2015, the Panel made
the following findings:
a. with respect to the European Union's claims regarding the Panel's terms of reference
under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Panel, for reasons stated in the Report, found that
China's claims under: (i) Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1
18; (ii) Articles 6.4. and 6.2 19;
(iii) Article 6.1.220; (iv) Article 2.4 21; and (v) Articles 4.1 and 3.1 22 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement were within its terms of reference;
b. with respect to China's claim under Articl e 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with that provision by treating
the information on the list and characteristics of the products of the analogue country
producer
23 (i.e. Pooja Forge) as confidential since the Commission never performed an
objective assessment of whether the information at issue was confidential by nature, or
whether good cause had been shown to justify its confidential treatment
24;
c. with respect to China's conditional claim under Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement concerning the alleged failure of the Commission to ensure that Pooja Forge
submit a non-confidential summary of the information at issue, the Panel found that it
was not necessary to make a finding under that provision since it had already found a
violation of Article 6.5 regarding the confidential treatment of the information at issue
25;
d. with respect to China's claim under Articl e 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently under that provision by failing
to provide the Chinese producers with timely opportunities to see the information on the
list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, which information was not confidential
within the meaning of Article 6.5, was relevant to the presentation of the
Chinese producers' cases, and was used by the Commission
26;

15 Panel Report, para. 2.6.
16 WT/DS397/18.
17 Panel Report, para. 1.3.
18 Panel Report, para. 7.34.
19 Panel Report, paras. 7.78-7.80. Additionally, in paragraphs 7.85 and 7.86 of the Panel Report, the
Panel rejected the European Union's jurisdictional objection that a part of China's claim was not within its
terms of reference since it was not identified in China's panel request. However, this finding has not been
appealed.
20 Panel Report, paras. 7.114 and 7.115.
21 Panel Report, paras. 7.171, 7.233, and 7.239.
22 Panel Report, paras. 7.289 and 7.291.
23 We recall that, due to the fact that market economy treatment (MET) was not granted to the
Chinese producers in the original investigation, the Commission sought to determine the normal values on the
basis of prices of fasteners sold in an appropriate surrogate (analogue) country, which in this case was India.
The Commission identified two Indian companies, and one of them, Pooja Forge Ltd. (Pooja Forge), cooperated
with the investigation and was considered to be the analogue country producer. (Appellate Body Report,
EC - Fasteners (China), fn 665 to para. 470)
24 Panel Report, paras. 7.46, 7.50, and 8.1.i.
25 Panel Report, paras. 7.50 and 8.3.
26 Panel Report, paras. 7.92 and 8.1.ii.

e. with respect to China's claim under Articl e 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that the Commission, having denied the Chinese producers, access to
information relevant within the meaning of Article 6.4, acted inconsistently with
Article 6.2 since the Chinese producers did not have full opportunity to defend their
interests
27;
f. with respect to China's claim under Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that Pooja Forge was not an interested party in the review investigation, and
that China had failed to establish that the European Union acted inconsistently with the
obligations under Article 6.1.2 by failing to ensure that the information provided by
Pooja Forge concerning the list and characteristics of its products was made available
promptly to the Chinese producers
28;
g. with respect to China's claims under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that:
i. the European Union acted inconsistently with that provision by failing to provide
the Chinese producers with the information regarding the characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products that were used in the determination of the normal values
and which would have allowed the Chinese producers to request adjustments
under Article 2.4
29;
ii. China had failed to establish that "by failing to compare the prices of the
standard fasteners with the prices of standard fasteners in calculating dumping
margins for the Chinese producers", the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 2.4
30; and
iii. China had failed to establish that by fa iling to make adjustments for differences
that affected price comparability, namely, differences: (i) in taxation; (ii) in
physical characteristics; and (iii) with regards to "easier access to
raw materials", "use of self-generated electricity", and "efficiency and
productivity", the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4
31;
h. with respect to China's claim under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with that provision by not
taking into consideration, in its dumping margin determinations, models exported by the
Chinese producers that did not match any of the models sold by Pooja Forge
32; and
i. with respect to China's claim under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 in defining
the domestic industry in the review investigation on the basis of domestic producers that
came forward in response to the Notice of Initiation issued in the original investigation
since the definition suffered from a self-selection process that introduced a material risk
of distortion.
33 The Panel also found that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 3.1 since the Commission's injury de termination was based on the data obtained
from a wrongly defined domestic industry.34
1.10. On 9 September 2015, the European Union notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4
and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and
certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel and filed a Notice of Appeal and an appellant's

27 Panel Report, paras. 7.94, 7.96, and 8.1.ii.
28 Panel Report, paras. 7.119, 7.123, and 8.2.i.
29 Panel Report, paras. 7.142, 7.148, and 8.1.iii.
30 Panel Report, paras. 7.194 and 8.2.ii. This finding has not been appealed.
31 Panel Report, paras. 7.223, 7.230, 7.236, 7.250, 7.251, and 8.2.iii.
32 Panel Report, paras. 7.276 and 8.1.iv. In paragraphs 7.276 and 8.3 of its Report, the Panel refrained
from addressing China's allegation of violation of Article 2.4 owing to the exclusion of models from the dumping
determinations, since it had already found a violation of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
33 Panel Report, paras. 7.296, 7.299, and 8.1.v.
34 Panel Report, paras. 7.299 and 8.1.v.

submission.35 On 14 September 2015, China notified the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of
the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain
legal interpretations developed by the Panel and filed a Notice of Other Appeal and other
appellant's submission.
36 On 28 September 2015, the European Union and China each filed an
appellee's submission. 37 On 1 October 2015, Japan and the United States each filed a
third participant's submission.38
1.11. By letter dated 6 November 201539, the Chair of the Appellate Body notified the Chair of the
DSB that the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report in this appeal within the
60-day period pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, or within the 90-day period pursuant to the
same provision. The Chair of the Appellate Body explained that this was due to a number of
factors, including the substantial workload of the Appellate Body, scheduling difficulties arising
from overlap in the composition of the Divisions hearing appeals concurrently pending before the
Appellate Body, the length of the submissions file d in this appeal, the number and complexity of
the issues raised in this and concurrent appellate proceedings, and the shortage of staff in the
Appellate Body Secretariat. The Chair of the Appe llate Body estimated that the Report in this
appeal would be circulated to WTO Members no later than Monday, 18 January 2016.
1.12. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 10-11 November 2015. The participants and
third participants made oral statements and resp onded to questions posed by the Appellate Body
Division hearing the appeal.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the participan ts are reflected in the executive summaries of
their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.
40 The Notices of Appeal and Other
Appeal, and the executive summaries of the partic ipants' claims and arguments, are contained in
Annexes A and B of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS397/AB/RW/Add.1.
3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of the third participants ar e reflected in the executive summaries of their
written submissions provided to the Appellate Body 41, which are contained in Annex C of the
Addendum to this Report, WT/DS397/AB/RW/Add.1.
4 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
4.1. With respect to the Panel's findings under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the following issues are raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 fell
within its terms of reference (raised by the European Union);
b. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.5 because, in the review investigation, the Commission accorded confidential
treatment to the information at issue, without objectively assessing whether Pooja Forge
had shown "good cause" for such treatment (raised by the European Union); and

35 Pursuant to Rules 20 and 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010 (Working Procedures).
36 Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Working Procedures.
37 Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23(4) of the Working Procedures.
38 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
39 WT/DS397/23.
40 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).
41 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015).

c. in the event that the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that the
European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5, whether the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5.1 in the review investigation as regards the Commission's
alleged failure to ensure that Pooja Forge submit a non-confidential summary of its
information in accordance with the requirements of Article 6.5.1 (raised by China).
4.2. With respect to the Panel's findings under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the following issues are raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 fell
within its terms of reference (raised by the European Union);
b. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.4 because, in the review investigation, the Commission failed to provide "timely
opportunities" for the Chinese producers to s ee the information at issue (raised by the
European Union); and
c. whether, as a consequence of the alleged errors made by the Panel under Article 6.4,
the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.2
(raised by the European Union).
4.3. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
following issues are raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that China's claim under Article 6.1.2 fell within its
terms of reference (raised by the European Union); and
b. whether the Panel erred in finding that Pooja Forge was not an "interested party" in the
review investigation at issue within the meaning of Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and that, therefore, the obligatio n under Article 6.1.2 to make information
available promptly to interested parties did not apply to information provided by
Pooja Forge (raised by China).
4.4. With respect to the Panel's findings unde r Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
following issues are raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with the
last sentence of Article 2.4 because, in the review investigation, the Commission failed to
provide the Chinese producers with certain information regarding the characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products (raised by the European Union);
b. whether the Panel erred in finding that China's claim under Article 2.4 in respect of
adjustments relating to differences in physical characteristics not reflected in the original
PCNs fell within its terms of reference (raised by the European Union);
c. in the event that the Appellate Body reverses the Panel's finding that the
European Union acted inconsistently with the last sentence of Article 2.4, whether the
Panel erred in finding that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4
by failing to make adjustments for differences in physical characteristics (raised by
China); and
d. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union did not act inconsistently
with Article 2.4 as regards the Commission's failure to make adjustments for differences
in taxation and differences in other costs, namely, differences relating to access to
raw materials, use of self-generated electricity, efficiency in raw material consumption,
efficiency in electricity consumption, and productivity per employee (raised by China).

4.5. With respect to the Panel's findings under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
following issue is raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with this
provision by excluding, in the Commission's dumping determinations, models exported
by the Chinese producers that did not match any of the models sold by Pooja Forge
(raised by the European Union).
4.6. With respect to the Panel's findings under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the following issues are raised on appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in finding that China's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 fell
within its terms of reference (raised by the European Union);
b. whether the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 4.1 because the Commission defined the domestic industry on the basis of
domestic producers that had come forward in response to the Notice of Initiation which
stated that only those producers willing to be included in the injury sample would be
considered as cooperating (raised by the European Union); and
c. whether the Panel erred in finding that the Commission's injury determination, based on
the data obtained from a wrongly-defined domestic industry, was inconsistent with
Article 3.1 (raised by the European Union).
5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Overview of the original anti-dumping investigation
5.1. In the Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on imports of certain iron or
steel fasteners from China issued on 9 November 2007, the Commission specified that it intended
to examine, on the basis of sampling, whether the domestic industry had suffered injury and
further noted that, only those producers that had come forward within the timeline stipulated
therein and were willing to be included in the injury sample, would be considered as cooperating.
42
Out of approximately 300 domestic producers, 70 came forward in response to the Notice of
Initiation.43 The Commission excluded 25 of these 70 producers from the domestic industry
definition for various reasons, one of which was the producers' expressed unwillingness to be a
part of the injury sample.
44 Thus, 45 producers were found to constitute the domestic industry for
purposes of the investigation. The producers that supported the complaint and cooperated with the
Commission represented 27% of the total production of the like product in the European Union.45
5.2. The Commission considered that the Chinese producers under investigation did not operate
according to the principles of a market economy. Thus, the Commission resorted to the so-called
"analogue country methodology" 46 for determining the normal values for the Chinese products
under investigation. India was chosen as the analogue country. 47 The Commission, through its
anti-dumping questionnaires, requested the Ch inese producers and Pooja Forge to provide
information on the product under investigation on the basis of product control numbers (PCNs),

42 Notice of Initiation (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-14), recital 5.1(a)(iii).
43 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 428.
44 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 429.
45 Original Panel Report, para. 7.143.
46 Section 15(a) of China's Accession Protocol permits a WTO Member, in certain circumstances, to "use
either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China" in "determining price comparability under Article VI of
the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement". (Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of
China, WT/L/432) Thus, the Commission's resort to the analogue country methodology arises from this
provision. In this regard, we also recall the finding of the Appellate Body that the second Ad Note to
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, in certain circumstances, "allows investigating authorities to disregard domestic
prices and costs of … an NME in the determination of th e normal value and to resort to prices and costs in a
market economy third country". (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 285)
47 Panel Report, para. 7.9.

which were made up of six elements: (i) types of fasteners (by combined nomenclature (CN)
code); (ii) strength/hardness; (iii) coating; (iv) presence of chrome on coating; (v) diameter; and
(vi) length/thickness (the original PCNs).
48 However, Pooja Forge did not provide information
categorized on the basis of the original PCNs in its questionnaire response. Subsequently, during a
verification visit by the Commission, Pooja Forge provided a domestic sales listing (DMSAL) file
that contained prices, quantities, an internal item code for each product sold, and a product
description text string (e.g. M8X1.25X16 FLANGE SCREW) for about 80,000 transactions.
49
Pooja Forge also provided a non-confidential summary of its questionnaire response50, as well as a
company brochure, which, according to the Commission, contained information on product range,
production process, and other company-sensitive details, such as production capacity and number
of employees.
51 Additionally, Pooja Forge identified the strength class for each of the products sold
in the Indian domestic market.52
5.3. Since the normal values for the Chinese prod ucers were to be established on the basis of the
information provided by Pooja Forge, and since P ooja Forge had failed to provide information on
the basis of the original PCNs, the Commission could not make its comparison between the normal
values and the export prices on the basis of the original PCNs. Therefore, the Commission resorted
to the use of "product types" defined by two elements: (i) strength class; and (ii) the distinction
between standard and special fasteners. 53 Although the Commission indicated in the "final
disclosure"54 in the original investigation that it had based the normal value determination on
"product types", it did not specify the number or relevant characteristics of the product types or
how they were determined.
55
5.4. The Chinese producers requested information concerning the "product types", asking in
particular to "see a listing of such 'product types' and a linkage with the PCNs" that had been used
for the normal value calculation.
56 This request was subsequently reiterated, stating that "it would
still be very useful [to] have a listing simply of which type of fastener or which PCNs of
Pooja [Forge] were matched with [their] PCNs." 57 One day before the deadline for submitting
comments on the final disclosure, the Commission confirmed that "[t]he comparison was not made
on the basis of the full PCN[s], but on part of the characteristics of the product, namely the
strength class as well as the … distinction between special and standard [fasteners]" 58 – i.e. the
"product types". Referring to the Commission's belated confirmation, the Chinese producers once
again stressed the importance of obtaining information concerning these "product types" in order
to comment on the dumping determination, and reiterated that it was "moreover still unclear what
characteristics were finally included for product differentiation purposes in the calculations".
59
Thereafter, the European Union issued the Defini tive Regulation imposing anti-dumping duties
which, as described in paragraph 1.2 above, was challenged by China in the original proceedings
before the WTO as being inconsistent with the covered agreements.

48 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 470.
49 Panel Report, para. 7.9.
50 Response to the European Commission's Anti-Dumping Questionnaire for producers in analogue
countries of certain iron or steel fasteners, submitted by Pooja Forge in the original anti-dumping investigation
(Panel Exhibit CHN-24).
51 Panel Report, para. 7.9.
52 R548: WTO Fasteners Implementation Review, Note for the File dated 11 July 2012 on the
Reclassification of normal value from one producer in India (Panel Exhibit CHN-17).
53 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 471 (referring to Original Panel Report,
para. 7.293).
54 General Disclosure Document, AD525: Anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or
steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, Proposal to impose definitive measures,
3 November 2008 (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-18).
55 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 472 (referring to Original Panel Report,
para. 7.485).
56 Letter dated 7 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan Chenghe and Ningbo Jinding to the
European Commission concerning the Definitive Disclosure Document (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-28), para. 2.
57 Letter dated 17 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan Chenghe and Ningbo Jinding to the
European Commission concerning the Definitive Disclosure Document: Request for Information II (Original
Panel Exhibit CHN-30), para. 4.
58 Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the European Commission to Van Bael & Bellis in response to
Kunshan Chenghe's and Ningbo Jinding's request of 17 November 2008 (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-31),
point (4).
59 Letter dated 24 November 2008 on behalf of Kunshan Chenghe to the European Commission
containing comments on the Definitive Disclosure Document (Original Panel Exhibit CHN-59), p. 4.

5.1.2 Overview of the review investigation
5.5. On 6 March 2012, the European Union issued a notice for the purposes of: (i) initiating the
review investigation; and (ii) "inform[ing] interested parties of the manner in which the [DSB's]
findings in regard to the measures in force on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating
in the People's Republic of China [would] be taken into account".
60 It is uncontested that in the
review investigation the Commission did not issue a new notice of initiation asking domestic
producers willing to participate in the investigation to come forward. Instead, the Commission
re-defined the domestic industry on the basis of all EU producers that had come forward within the
15-day deadline prescribed in the Notice of Initiation of the original investigation, irrespective of
their willingness to be a part of the injury sample.
61 Thus, the newly defined domestic industry
represented approximately 36% of the total production of the like product in the
European Union.62
5.6. In the review investigation, the Commission disclosed more information than it had given in
the original investigation regarding "the product characteristics [that it had] found to be pertinent
in the determination of the normal value[s]".63 The record reflects that the Chinese producers then
requested more information regarding: (i) the "product types" used for the determination of the
normal values; and (ii) the characteristics of the products sold by [Pooja Forge], in particular,
information regarding "the models of products sold" and "a table matching type-by-type the
products sold by [Pooja Forge] and the products sold by [the Chinese producers]".
64 The
Commission informed the Chinese producers that the models 65 sold by Pooja Forge were provided
on a confidential basis and could not be disclosed. 66 Additionally, the Chinese producers requested
that adjustments be made for: (i) differences in ph ysical characteristics, namely, type of fastener;
coating and use of chrome; diameter and length; traceability; standards; unit of defective rate;
and hardness, bending strength, impact toughness, friction coefficient
67; as well as (ii) differences
in efficiency of consumption of the raw material; in wire rod used for production; in electricity

60 European Commission, Notice regarding the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain
iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, following the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization on 28 July 2011 in the EC - Fasteners
dispute (DS397), Official Journal of the European Union, C Series, No. 66 (6 March 2012), pp. 29-31 (Panel
Exhibit CHN-2).
61 Panel Report, para. 7.296.
62 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recitals 112 and 115.
63 Letter dated 30 May 2012 from the European Commission to interested parties including the
disclosure document concerning normal value (Panel Exhibit CHN-5).
64 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the European Commission requesting further
information and clarification regarding the determination of normal value (Panel Exhibit CHN-8), pp. 5-6.
See also Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the European Commission in response to the
Commission's letter of 30 May 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-6); Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo
Jinding to the European Commission requesting further information and clarification regarding the
determination of normal value (Panel Exhibit CHN-9).
65 We note certain discrepancies in the terminology used in this dispute, in particular, in the usage of
the term "model(s)". We note that the Commission, in Panel Exhibits CHN-11 and CHN-12, appears to have
used the term "models" to mean specific products. This understanding is further reinforced by the fact that the
Commission informed the Chinese interested parties that Pooja Forge did not want to disclose information on
"models actually manufactured and sold". (Report of the Hearing with the Commission of 11 July 2012, 18 July
2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-30), internal p. 5) We also note the usage of the term "model(s)" by the Panel. In
particular, in making its findings under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel relied on,
inter alia, the Appellate Body's ruling in US – Softwood Lumber V, where the Appellate Body indicated that the
multiple averaging technique is performed by dividing the "like product … into product types or models".
(Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 80) This would mean that the term "models" refers to
different groupings of products determined by the investigating authority for the purpose of the weighted
average-to-weighted average (WA-WA) comparison. The Panel, however, appears to have used the term
"model(s)" to refer, at times, to the groupings of products (see e.g. Panel Report, para. 7.270) and, at other
times, to specific products (see e.g. Panel Report, para. 7.144). For the purposes of this Report, unless
otherwise indicated, we use the term "model" to refer to the different product groupings that the Commission
used in the "multiple averaging" technique.
66 E-mail dated 26 June 2012 from the European Commission concerning CCCME, Biao Wu, and Jiashan
(Panel Exhibit CHN-11); E-mail dated 21 June 2012 from the European Commission concerning Changshu and
Ningbo Jinding (Panel Exhibit CHN-12).
67 Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the European Commission in response to the
Commission's letter of 30 May 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-6).

consumption; in use of self-generated electricity; in productivity per employee; and in reasonable
profit level.68
5.7. Following the comments of the Chinese pr oducers, the Commission, after analysing the
description text string of sales coding used by Pooja Forge (which was contained in the DMSAL
file), framed and disclosed the "revised PCNs" ba sed on the following elements: (i) the distinction
between standard and special fasteners; (ii) strength class; (iii) coating; (iv) diameter (ranged into
three equal bands); and (v) length (ranged into three equal bands), which it intended to use for
the purposes of the normal value and dumping margin calculations
69 instead of the "product types"
used in the original investigation. As the record further shows, the Chinese producers continued to
seek clarification from the Commission with respect to the adjustments claimed by them and the
confidential treatment of the information subm itted by Pooja Forge. The Chinese producers
requested the disclosure of "the list of normal value product types", indicating to which export PCN
they were compared; disclosure of the sales code identifying diameter and length; and information
regarding additional physical characteristics of the normal value product type, including chrome
and coating.
70 The Commission reiterated that the description text strings were confidential and
Pooja Forge did not want to disclose the "models" it had sold to its competitors.71
5.8. On 31 July 2012, as part of its final di sclosure, the Commission issued the "General
Disclosure Document" and gave the Chinese producers three weeks to submit comments. 72 Along
with the General Disclosure Document, the Commission provided company-specific disclosures,
which revealed detailed dumping margin calculations.
73 We note that, in these calculation sheets,
the transactions were organized by reference to the revised PCNs, including six letters (i.e. coating
by codes A to N; use of chrome by yes or no and codes P or Q; type of fastener by codes PCN 0
to 9; strength by codes A to Y; diameter by code s S, M, and L; and length by codes S, M, and L).
These disclosures indicated the characteristics of the products exported by the Chinese producers
and those sold domestically by Pooja Forge as per the revised PCNs. When there was a match
between export transactions and domestic transactions, the same was taken into account for the
purposes of the dumping margin calculations. Export transactions for which there was
no corresponding domestic transaction were excluded from the purview of the dumping
calculations.
5.9. In their comments on the General Disclosure Document, the Chinese producers raised several
issues regarding the obligation of the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal
values and the export prices, including, in particular: (i) the disclosure of "normal value product
types"; (ii) the need for indications on how to substantiate requests for adjustments; (iii) the need
for full disclosure on how adjustments had been made; and (iv) the obligation not to disregard any
comparable export transactions in the calculation of the dumping margins.
74 The
Chinese producers also elaborated on a number of adjustments that had been rejected by the
Commission in the General Disclosure Document, in particular, adjustments for differences relating
to: (i) access to raw materials; (ii) use of self-generated electricity; and (iii) efficiency and

68 Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the European Commission concerning the
disclosure of 30 May 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-33); Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the
European Commission concerning the disclosure of 30 May 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-34).
69 Letter dated 5 July 2012 from the European Commission to interested parties (Panel Exhibit CHN-15);
R548: WTO Fasteners Implementation Review, Note for the File dated 11 July 2012 on the Reclassification of
normal value from one producer in India (Panel Exhibit CHN-17).
70 Letter dated 11 July 2012 on behalf of CCCME and Biao Wu to the European Commission concerning
the disclosure of 5 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-27).
71 Report of the Hearing with the Commission of 11 July 2012, 18 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-30),
internal p. 5.
72 Cover letter to the General Disclosure Document dated 31 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-22); General
Disclosure Document, R548: Anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners
originating in the People's Republic of China: implementation of the recommendations and rulings adopted by
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization on 28 July 2011 in the EC – Fasteners dispute
(DS397), 31 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit EU-4).
73 Calculations for Biao Wu (Panel Exhibit CHN-44); Calculations for Ningbo Jinding (Panel Exhibit
CHN-45); Calculations for Changshu (Panel Exhibit CHN-46).
74 Letter dated 20 August 2012 on behalf of CCCME and Biao Wu to the European Commission
containing comments on the disclosure of 31 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-23).

productivity.75 Thereafter, the European Union issued th e Review Regulation, which, in China's
request for the establishment of a panel, was identified as being the measure at issue that failed
fully and correctly to implement the recommendat ions and rulings of the DSB in the original
proceedings.
76
5.2 Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.2.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.10. Before the Panel, the European Union argued that China was precluded from raising its
claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in the compliance proceedings
because it had already raised the same claims in the original proceedings and they were ultimately
rejected by the Appellate Body.
77
5.11. The Panel found that, "in terms of its object, the present claim is distinct from the original
claim."78 The Panel clarified that "[t]he present claim concerns information on the 'list and
characteristics' of the products sold by Pooja Fo rge, whereas the original claim was presented with
respect to the entirety of Pooja Forge's questio nnaire response but was pursued only with respect
to information on [Pooja Forge's] product types." 79 In support of this conclusion, the Panel noted
that the "list and characteristics" were not subm itted in Pooja Forge's questionnaire response, but
were submitted later on, in the DMSAL file and in the company brochure provided by Pooja Forge
to the Commission during a verification visit in April 2008.80
5.12. On appeal, the European Union claims that the Panel wrongly concluded that the claims
made in the original and in the compliance proceedings took issue with different types of
information.
81 The European Union argues that, in the compliance proceedings, China took issue
again with the same information, namely, Pooja Forge's "product characteristics", albeit using a
different terminology. 82 Therefore, the European Union contends that "[n]othing changed when
compared with the facts as challenged by China in the original proceedings", and that China raises
the "same claim against the same underlying facts in the context of the review investigation".83
5.13. China responds that the claim by the European Union that the Panel erred in concluding that
the objects of the claims in the original and compliance proceedings were different concerns the
Panel's assessment of the facts and we should dismiss it as the European Union did not raise a
claim under Article 11 of the DSU. 84 Moreover, China argues that, in the original proceedings, its
claim under Article 6.5 was about "product types", not about "product characteristics" or the list of
products.85 China explains that "product types" is a term "that [was] used in the original dispute
settlement proceedings to designate the 'product categories upon which the Commission based its
comparison between normal value[s] and export prices' in the original investigation". 86 With the
"list of products", China refers to the list of item codes in the DMSAL file 87, and, with the
"characteristics", China refers to information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's
products concerning at least the type of coating, chrome, diameter, length, and types of
fasteners.
88
5.14. The first question before us is whether the European Union's claim concerning the Panel's
terms of reference under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 is such that it could only have been raised on

75 Comments dated 14 August 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding on the disclosure of 31 July 2012 (Panel
Exhibit CHN-28); Comments dated 14 August 2012 on behalf of Changshu on the disclosure of 31 July 2012
(Panel Exhibit CHN-28).
76 WT/DS397/18, para. 11.
77 Panel Report, paras. 7.13 and 7.20.
78 Panel Report, para. 7.30.
80 Panel Report, paras. 7.31-7.33.
81 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 124.
82 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 132.
83 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 133.
84 China's appellee's submission, para. 41.
85 China's appellee's submission, paras. 46 and 50.
86 China's response to Panel question No. 12.a, para. 56. (emphasis omitted; fn omitted)
87 China's appellee's submission, para. 50.
88 China's appellee's submission, para. 50. See also China's response to Panel question No. 9, para. 47.

appeal under Article 11 of the DSU. We observe that whether the information whose confidential
treatment was at issue in the original proceedings is the same as the information whose
confidential treatment is at issue in these co mpliance proceedings may involve factual aspects,
which we would not be able to review on appeal in the absence of a claim under Article 11 of the
DSU. At the same time, ascertaining whether the information is the same will in this case
determine whether the Panel had jurisdiction under Article 21.5 of the DSU to address
China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the light of this, we
are of the view that the European Union's term s of reference claim should be treated as one
concerning the application of the law to the facts, rather than a purely factual issue that should
have been raised under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.15. Turning to the European Union's claim, we recall that, in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 –
India), the Appellate Body stated that a complainant should not be allowed to raise claims in
compliance proceedings that were already raised and dismissed in the original proceedings in
respect of a component of the implementation measure that is the same as in the original
measure.
89 However, in subsequent disputes, the Appellate Body clarified that the same claim with
respect to an unchanged element of the measure can be re-litigated in Article 21.5 proceedings if,
in the original proceedings, the matter was not resolved because, for instance, the Appellate Body
was not able to complete the analysis.
90
5.16. To succeed in claiming that China could no t raise its claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement before the Panel, th e European Union needed to demonstrate that
the claims are the same claims that were raised in the original proceedings, and that these claims
were resolved in the original proceedings.91 We thus begin our analysis by considering whether the
claims raised by China in these compliance pr oceedings under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 are the same
claims that China raised in the original proceedings. Only if we conclude that these are in fact the
same claims, shall we need to address the question of whether such claims were resolved in the
original proceedings.
5.17. We agree with the Panel that the question to be answered in order to determine whether
the claims raised in the original and in the comp liance proceedings are the same claims is whether
the "object" of the claims is the same. 92 We understand the object of the claim to be the
information that the Commission treated as confid ential within the meaning of Article 6.5. In
addressing this question, we briefly recall relevant findings made by the Panel.
5.18. In the original investigation, the questionnaire sent by the Commission to the
Chinese producers and Pooja Forge required that information on the products be provided based
on the original PCNs composed of six elements . However, Pooja Forge failed to provide the
information in the detailed manner as was required under the original PCNs. The
Chinese producers that had submitted the information according to the original PCNs, however,
assumed that the Commission would conduct the comparison between the normal values and the
export prices based on the original PCNs. In the final disclosure, the Commission informed the
Chinese producers that it had not conducted the comparison based on the full PCNs, but rather on
"product types", without at that stage providing any information as to those "product types" or

89 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 96 and 98. See also
Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 96. In US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 –
EC), the Appellate Body further clarified that a panel has jurisdiction under Article 21.5 in respect of new
"claims against a measure taken to comply – that is, in principle, a new and different measure" and that "[t]his
is so even where such a measure taken to comply incorporates components of the original measure that are
unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure taken to comply." (Appellate Body
Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 432)
90 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210. For the same reasons,
the Appellate Body has suggested that the same claim that was dismissed in the original proceedings due to an
exercise of judicial economy could also be raised in the compliance proceedings. (See Appellate Body Reports,
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 148; and EC – Bed Linen
91 Indeed, as the Appellate Body explained in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the exclusion of
jurisdiction for an Article 21.5 panel in respect of claims that are the same as claims raised in the original
proceedings applies when such claims have been resolved in the original proceedings. (Appellate Body Report,
US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210)
92 Panel Report, para. 7.30.

how they were determined.93 The Commission thereafter clarified that these "product types" were
made of two elements: strength class and th e distinction between special and standard
fasteners.94
5.19. Thus, in the original investigation, the Commission treated as confidential 95 and did not
disclose the "product types" it used to compare normal values and export prices for the purpose of
determining the dumping margins until late in the proceedings and after repeated requests from
the Chinese producers.
96 These "product types" were based on part of the elements of the original
PCNs. The difference between using full PCNs, on the one hand, and using the "product types"
identified by the Commission, on the other hand , was described by the Appellate Body in the
original proceedings as follows:
[T]he PCNs include six elements further divided into 38 specifications, which could
have resulted in hundreds of different comb inations. Yet, the PCN characteristics and
the product types overlap only with regard to one element, namely, the strength
class.97
5.20. In the review investigation, following th e recommendations and rulings of the DSB that the
European Union had acted inconsistently with Arti cles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
by not providing a timely opportunity to the Chinese producers to see the information regarding
the "product types", the Commission disclosed more precise information regarding the product
characteristics that had been found to be pertin ent in the determination of the normal values,
including information about Pooja Forge's "product types" and certain characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products, such as coating, le ngth, and diameter. These disclosures led the
Chinese producers to seek further information on the "product types" and the "precise and detailed
characteristics" of the products sold by Pooja Forge
98, which the Commission stated were provided
on a confidential basis and could not be disclosed.99
5.21. It follows that the Commission never fully disclosed the relevant product information
concerning the dumping calculations. The partial disclosures that were made in the original and in
the review investigation prompted the Chinese producers to request further information that they
considered relevant to their cases. The requests for further disclosure by the Chinese producers in
the review investigation were prompted by, and based, on information that the Commission had
initially treated as confidential. As such, these requests and the Commission's treatment of the
information as confidential and its non-disclosure cannot concern the same information that
the Commission treated as confidential in the original investigation.
5.22. Thus, the objects of China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in the original and in the compliance proceedings are not the same. China's claims
under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 in the original procee dings concerned the confidential treatment of all

93 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 470-472. See also Original Panel Report,
para. 7.485.
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 475.
95 In the original investigation, the Commission also treated as confidential all of the information
contained in Pooja Forge's questionnaire response. This information, however, did not include the "list and
characteristics" of Pooja Forge's products, which were submitted subsequently by Pooja Forge during the
verification visit of April 2008 by providing, inter alia, the DMSAL file and the company brochure.
96 In a letter dated 21 November 2008, the Commission replied to the request from Chinese producers
stating:
The comparison was not made on the basis of the full PCN, but on part [sic] of the characteristics
of the product, namely the strength class as well as the abovementioned distinction between
special and standard products.
(Original Panel Report, para. 7.489 (quoting Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the European Commission
to Van Bael & Bellis in response to Kunshan Chenghe's and Ningbo Jinding's requests of 17 November 2008
(Original Panel Exhibit CHN-31), p. 2 (emphasis added by the original panel))
97 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 498. We recall that the types of fasteners by
CN code included in the original PCNs were replaced by the distinction between standard and special fasteners
when the Commission decided to use the "product types" in the original investigation.
98 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the European Commission (Panel Exhibit CHN-8),
p. 5; Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the European Commission (Panel
Exhibit CHN-9), p. 5; Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the European Commission (Panel
Exhibit CHN-6), pp. 3-4.
99 Panel Report, paras. 7.70-7.74.

the information provided in Pooja Forge's questionnaire 100 and the "product types" (i.e. the
strength class and the distinction between special and standard fasteners) that the Commission
used to make the dumping calculations. China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 in the
compliance proceedings concerned the confidential treatment of the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products, which the Chinese producers asked to see after the Commission had
disclosed to them the "product types" and certain characteristics used in the price comparison in
order to bring itself into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.23. In addition to its finding that the claims at issue in the original and in the compliance
proceedings were not the same, the Panel also noted that, in the review investigation, a fair
amount of exchange of views took place betwee n the Commission and the Chinese producers with
respect to the confidentiality of the information regarding the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products. The Panel considered these communications between the Commission and
the Chinese producers to be an indication that this particular issue was closely related to the
debate regarding the consistency of the measure taken by the European Union to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original proceedings.
101 The European Union disagrees
and contends that, since there were no DSB reco mmendations or rulings on the Article 6.5 claim
with respect to information regarding Pooja Forg e, the Commission "was not required to modify
such a treatment in the context of the review investigation".102
5.24. We recall that, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body did not find a violation of
Article 6.5. However, the measure that the Appella te Body did not find to be inconsistent with
Article 6.5 is the same measure that it found to be inconsistent with Articles 6.4, 6.2, and 2.4, that
is, the confidential treatment and the non-timely disclosure of information regarding the "product
types". Therefore, the measure taken by the European Union to comply with Articles 6.4, 6.2, and
2.4 also addressed China's claims in the original proceedings under Article 6.5, in that it resulted in
the disclosure of the same information that was the object of China's claim under Article 6.5 in the
original proceedings.
103
5.25. To comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that the European Union had
acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.2 by not disclosing the information on the "product
types" on a timely basis, and with Article 2.4 by failing to indicate to the parties what information
was necessary to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission disclosed certain information
concerning the determination of normal values, including the "product types", as well as
information about certain characteristics of Pooj a Forge's products. As explained above, these
disclosures led the Chinese producers to seek furt her information concerning the "product types"
and the "precise and detailed characteristi cs" of the products sold by Pooja Forge 104, which the
Commission responded had been provided on a confidential basis and could not be disclosed.105

100 This information did not include the "list and characteristics" of Pooja Forge's products that were
provided in the DMSAL file and in the company brochure during the verification visit of April 2008.
102 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 136-139, specifically para. 139. In particular, the
European Union argues that "the fact that an issue was 'discussed' or even 'considered' in the context of a
review investigation following the DSB's recommendations and rulings does not necessarily mean that there is
a close nexus with the obligations arising for the responding Member from the original DSB's recommendations
and rulings." (Ibid., para. 138)
103 In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body reversed the original panel's finding that the
European Union had acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the
confidential information submitted by Pooja Forge. The Appellate Body considered that China had failed to
substantiate its claim that the confidential treatment of the information on product types submitted by
Pooja Forge was improper, because it had asserted this claim late in the proceedings and only in response to
questioning by the original panel. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 574-575) However,
the Appellate Body upheld the original panel's finding that the European Union had acted inconsistently with
Articles 2.4, 6.4, and 6.2 by not disclosing the information on the "product types" on a timely basis. (Ibid.,
paras. 505, 507, and 527)
104 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the European Commission (Panel Exhibit
CHN-8), p. 5; Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the European Commission
(Panel Exhibit CHN-9), p. 5; Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the European Commission
(Panel Exhibit CHN-6), pp. 3-4.
105 Panel Report, paras. 7.70-7.74.

5.26. Under these circumstances, the Commissio n's confidential treatment of the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products and their non-disclosure to the Chinese producers in the
review investigation constitute an integral part of the measure taken to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings under Articles 6.4, 6.2, and 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in the original proceedings, which comprises the disclosures made by the Commission
aimed at providing the Chinese producers with information relevant to their cases. We are thus of
the view that the claims raised in these compliance proceedings by China under Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1 concerning the Commission's confidential treatment of the information on the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products can be considered as claims against a measure taken to
comply within the meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU.
5.27. In the light of the above, and considering th at the objects of the claims are not the same, it
cannot be said that the claims raised by China under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 in the compliance
proceedings are the same claims China had raised under these provisions in the original
proceedings and that were dismissed by th e Appellate Body. Moreover, the Commission's
confidential treatment of the list and characteri stics of Pooja Forge's products constitutes an
integral part of the measure taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the
original proceedings. We thus consider that the Panel did not err in finding that China's claims in
these compliance proceedings under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were
within its terms of reference.
5.28. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.34 of its Report, that
China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were within the Panel's
terms of reference.
5.2.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding th at the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.29. We turn now to consider the European Unio n's appeal of the Panel's findings on the merits
of China's claim under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel concluded that, in
the review investigation, the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission accorded confidential treatment to information
concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products without conducting an objective
assessment of whether such information was confidential by nature, or whether Pooja Forge had
shown good cause for such treatment to be accorded to its information.
106 We begin with a brief
overview of the relevant findings of the Panel und er Article 6.5, followed by a brief review of the
relevant legal standard before turning to address each of the European Union's discrete claims on
appeal.
5.2.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.30. In support of its argument that Pooja Forge had shown good cause to justify the confidential
treatment of the information at issue, the Euro pean Union relied on Pooja Forge's request for
confidential treatment. This request is reflected in an e-mail to the Commission, dated
3 July 2012, which stated that "the list of the products sold by Pooja Forge cannot be provided
because this information if disclosed, will give advantage to our competitor."
107 The Panel noted
that the Commission had placed this e-mail on the confidential file of the investigation, to which
the Chinese producers did not have access. The Panel considered that the Chinese producers were
thus deprived of the opportunity to know of, an d respond to, the particular "good cause" alleged
by Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment of it s information. In addition, the Panel considered
that the e-mail contained "no more than a bald assertion" on the part of Pooja Forge and,
therefore, did "not seem to support the argument that Pooja Forge [had] provided good cause to
justify the confidential treatment" of the information at issue.108
5.31. The Panel further noted the European Union's statement that there was "not much" on the
record in the form of an explicit reference to the Commission's assessment of Pooja Forge's
request, because the Chinese producers "never co ntested" the confidentiality of "Pooja Forge's

106 Panel Report, paras. 7.44-7.46 and 7.50.
107 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (quoting E-mail dated 3 July 2012 from Pooja Forge to the
European Commission (Panel Exhibit EU-2)).
108 Panel Report, para. 7.44.

product range" in the original investigation. 109 The Panel characterized this statement as an
"admission", and considered that there was "no do ubt" that the Commission "never performed" an
objective assessment of whether the information at issue was confidential by nature, or whether
good cause had been shown to justify its confidential treatment.
110
5.32. Before concluding its analysis of China's claim under Article 6.5, the Panel noted that
although the European Union had argued, in connec tion with China's claim under Article 6.5, that
the information regarding the list and characterist ics of Pooja Forge's products was confidential,
the European Union had argued, in connection with China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2, that
some of this information was disclosed to the Chinese producers. For example, the European Union
argued that, through a letter dated 5 July 2012, the Commission provided the Chinese producers
with information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, in particular on coating
and diameter. In the Panel's view, this "undermine [d]" the European Union's contention that the
information at issue was confidential and that g ood cause had been shown by Pooja Forge for its
confidential treatment.
111
5.33. In the light of these considerations, the Panel found that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the review investigation.112
5.34. We recall below pertinent aspects of the legal standard under Article 6.5 that governs the
confidential treatment of information in anti-dumping investigations.
5.2.2.2 The "good cause" requirement under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.35. Article 6.5 and footnote 17 thereto of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure
would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its
disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the
information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or
which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon
good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not
be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it.*
[*original fn] Members are aware that in the terri tory of certain Members disclosure pursuant to
a narrowly-drawn protective order may be required.
5.36. Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent requires that, "upon good cause shown",
investigating authorities treat as confidential information that is "by nature confidential", or that
has been provided by parties to an investigation on a confidential basis. Article 6.5.1 requires that,
for information that has been accorded confidential treatment, a non-confidential summary of that
information be provided by parties submitting the confidential information, unless, in "exceptional
circumstances", summarization is not possible. Wh ere summarization is not possible, a statement
of reasons as to why this is the case must be provided. Hence, Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1
accommodate the concerns of confidentiality, transparency, and due process by protecting
information where good cause has been shown fo r confidential treatment, while providing an
alternative method for its communication so as to satisfy the right of other parties to the
investigation to obtain a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential
information.
113
5.37. Article 6.5 applies to both information that is confidential by nature, and information that
has been submitted to authorities on a confidential basis.114 The Appellate Body has found that the

109 Panel Report, para. 7.45 (quoting European Union's response to Panel question No. 6.b).
110 Panel Report, para. 7.46.
111 Panel Report, para. 7.48.
112 Panel Report, para. 7.50.
113 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 542.
114 In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body drew a distinction between these two categories of
information, while noting that they may, in practice, overlap. Whether information is confidential "by nature"
depends on the content of that information. By contrast, information submitted on a confidential basis is not
necessarily confidential by reason of its content. Instead, confidentiality in this context arises from the

requirement to show "good cause" applies to both categories of information. 115 The Appellate Body
has further clarified that, as used in Article 6.5, "good cause" means a reason sufficient to justify
withholding information from both the public and the other parties to the investigation, and that a
showing of "good cause" involves a demonstration of a risk of a potential consequence, the
avoidance of which is important enough to warrant the non-disclosure of the information.
116
5.38. Thus, Article 6.5 prescribes "good cause" as a condition precedent for according confidential
treatment to information submitted to an authority. In this regard, the Appellate Body considered
in the original proceedings that, if information is treated as confidential by an authority without a
showing of "good cause", the authority would be acting inconsistently with the obligations under
Article 6.5.
117
5.39. Investigating authorities and parties submitting information to them have distinct roles
under Article 6.5. The Appellate Body has stated that it is for the party requesting confidential
treatment of its information to furnish reasons ju stifying such treatment, but the authority must
assess those reasons and determine, objectively, whether the submitting party has shown "good
cause".118 The type of evidence and the extent of subs tantiation needed will depend on the nature
of the information and the particular good cause alleged. An authority, in its assessment, must
seek to balance the submitting party's interest in protecting its confidential information with the
prejudicial effect that non-disclosure may have on the transparency and due process interests of
other parties involved in the investigation. "[G]ood cause", within the meaning of Article 6.5,
"cannot be determined merely based on the subjective concerns" of the party submitting the
information at issue.
119
5.40. The Appellate Body further considered in China – HP-SSST (EU) / China – HP-SSST (Japan)
that a WTO panel, tasked with reviewing whether an authority has objectively assessed "good
cause", is to do so on the basis of the investigating authority's published report and its related
supporting documents, in the light of the nature of the information at issue, and the reasons given
by the submitting party for its request for conf idential treatment. In reviewing whether an
authority has objectively assessed "good cause", it is not for a panel to engage in a de novo review
of the record of the investigation and determine for itself whether the existence of "good cause"
has been sufficiently substantiated by the submitting party.
120
5.41. With these considerations in mind, we turn now to examine the discrete claims raised by the
European Union under Article 6.5.
5.2.2.3 Whether the Panel erred in its treatment of Pooja Forge's request for
confidential treatment of the information at issue
5.42. In support of its claim that the Panel erred in finding that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement, the European Union advances a
series of arguments that take issue with the Panel's treatment of Pooja Forge's request for
confidential treatment. As noted above, this request is reflected in an e-mail to the Commission,
dated 3 July 2012, in which Pooja Forge stated that "the list of the products sold by Pooja Forge
cannot be provided because this information if disclosed, will give advantage to our competitor."
121
The European Union asserts, first, that the Panel disregarded this e-mail on the misguided ground
that it had been placed on the confidential file of the investigation, to which the Chinese producers
did not have access. 122 The European Union contends that, by "excluding" the information in the
e-mail from its consideration, and limiting its analysis to the information "actually set forth or

circumstances in which the information has been provided to an authority. (Appellate Body Report,
EC - Fasteners (China), para. 536)
115 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537.
116 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537.
117 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 539.
118 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 539.
119 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (EU) / China – HP-SSST (Japan), para. 5.95 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537).
120 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (EU) / China – HP-SSST (Japan), para. 5.97.
121 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (quoting E-mail dated 3 July 2012 from Pooja Forge to the
European Commission (Panel Exhibit EU-2)).
122 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 224.

specifically referenced in the determination at issue and available in the public record", the Panel
acted inconsistently with Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.123
5.43. At the outset, we recall that China had requested the Panel not to take Pooja Forge's e-mail
into account in its analysis under Article 6.5 because it was not a part of the record of the
investigation.124 Subsequently, the European Union clarified that the e-mail at issue had been
placed on the confidential, rather than public, file of the record of the investigation. 125 The Panel
considered that the failure of the Commission to place the e-mail on the public file of the
investigation deprived the Chinese producers of the opportunity to know of, and respond to, the
"good cause" alleged by Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment of the information at issue. The
Panel further stated that, "[i]n any case", the e-mail, "in terms of its contents", did not seem to
support the argument that Pooja Forge had prov ided good cause to justify the confidential
treatment of its information.
126 According to the Panel, the e-mail contains "no more than a bald
assertion" on the part of Pooja Forge.127
5.44. In our view, contrary to what the European Union appears to assert, the Panel did not
"disregard" Pooja Forge's e-mail in its consideration of China's claim under Article 6.5. Instead, the
Panel clearly engaged with the content of that e-mail and found that it contained "no more than a
bald assertion", which, in the Panel's view, was insufficient to support the conclusion that
Pooja Forge had shown good cause for the confid ential treatment of the information at issue.
128
Accordingly, we do not agree with the European Union that the Panel excluded Pooja Forge's
e-mail from its consideration of China's claim under Article 6.5 and, thereby, acted inconsistently
with Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t. At this stage of our analysis, we are merely
disagreeing with the European Union's assertion that the Panel did not take Pooja Forge's e-mail
into account in its analysis of China's claim under Article 6.5. We discuss at a later stage of our
analysis the European Union's challenge to the Panel's finding that Pooja Forge's e-mail contained
only a "bald assertion".
129
5.45. The European Union further challenges the Panel's statement that, because the e-mail from
Pooja Forge had been placed on the confidential file of the investigation, the Chinese producers
were deprived of an opportunity to know of, and respond to, the particular good cause alleged by
Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment of the information at issue. The European Union
contends that the evidence on the record contradicts the Panel's statement. In particular, the
European Union relies on the "Hearing Officer's Report"
130 dated 18 July 2012, which, in the
European Union's view, demonstrates that the Chinese producers, in fact, knew of, and had ample
opportunity to respond to, the particular good ca use alleged by Pooja Forge. The European Union
contends that the Panel's finding that the Chines e producers were deprived of the opportunity to
respond to Pooja Forge's request not only amounts to an error in applying Article 6.5 to the facts,
but also falls short of the Panel's duty under Article 11 of the DSU.131
5.46. The Appellate Body has stated that, in most cases, the issue raised by a particular claim
"will either be one of application of the law to the facts or an issue of the objective assessment of

123 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 223.
124 Panel Report, para. 7.43.
125 European Union's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 46.
126 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
127 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
128 Indeed, there appears to be an inconsistency in the arguments put forward by the European Union
concerning the Panel's treatment of the e-mail from Pooja Forge. On the one hand, the European Union argues
that the Panel erred by "disregarding" the e-mail in its consideration of China's claim under Article 6.5. Yet, on
the other hand, the European Union claims that the Panel erred in finding that, in terms of its contents, the
e-mail contains no more than a bald assertion on the part of Pooja Forge, which was insufficient to support the
conclusion that good cause had been shown by Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment of the information at
issue. (European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 224 and 226) Thus, the European Union challenges the
substance of the Panel's assessment of the content of the e-mail, yet, at the same time, alleges that the Panel
disregarded the e-mail in its consideration of China's claim. We note, in addition, that these claims are not
framed as alternative claims.
129 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
130 Report of the hearing of the European Commission held on 11 July 2012 concerning R548 Iron or
steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, 18 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-30).
131 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 224-225.

facts, and not both".132 Allegations implicating a panel's appreciation of the facts and evidence fall
under Article 11 of the DSU 133, while "[t]he consistency or inconsistency of a given fact or set of
facts with the requirements of a given treaty provis ion" is a question of legal characterization and,
therefore, a legal question.134 It seems to us that, essentially, the European Union takes issue with
the Panel's appreciation of the evidence when it stated that, because Pooja Forge's e-mail to the
Commission was placed on the confidential file of the investigation, the Chinese producers were
deprived of the opportunity to know of, and re spond to, the particular good cause alleged by
Pooja Forge.
135 Thus, in our view, the European Union's claim implicates the Panel's appreciation of
the evidence before it and, accordingly, we consider this claim under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.47. The European Union relies on the Hearing Officer's Report, which, in the European Union's
view, demonstrates that the Chinese producers were aware of, and thus had an opportunity to
respond to, the particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge – i.e. that disclosure of the
information at issue would confer an advantage to Pooja Forge's competitor. The Hearing Officer's
Report reads, in relevant part, as follows:
The company considers the information as confidential and does not want to disclose
it to competitors, in particular the information on models actually manufactured and
sold as opposed to models that can potentially be manufactured. The Commission's
practice is to proceed with extreme care. If the Commission is not satisfied that it is
confidential, the information would normally be rejected and facts available would be
used. In this particular case, the company has been again asked at this late stage and
refused again to disclose. Therefore the Commission will stand by the company's
request to treat the information as confidential.
136
5.48. In examining the passage of the Hearing Officer's Report on which the European Union
relies137, we see merit in China's contention that, on its face, the Hearing Officer's Report merely
states that Pooja Forge did not wish to disclose its information to competitors without providing a
specific reason as to why it wished not to do so.138 In these circumstances, we do not consider that
the Hearing Officer's Report put the Chinese producers on notice that Pooja Forge had requested
confidential treatment for its information on the ground that disclosure of such information could
confer a competitive advantage to its competitors. Instead, the above passage of the Hearing
Officer's Report suggests that the Chinese producers may also have been under the impression
that the Commission was according confidential treatment to the information at issue simply
because Pooja Forge had "been again asked at this late stage" to disclose the information and
"refused again to disclose".
139 In this regard, we note China's contention that the
Chinese producers repeatedly complained to the Commission about the absence of a showing of
"good cause" by Pooja Forge and, in response, the Hearing Officer noted that "the Indian producer
accepted to cooperate only under the condition that all details concerning its company would
remain confidential and reiterated this position in a recent communication."
140
5.49. In the light of the above, we do not cons ider that the Panel erred in its assessment of the
facts merely because it did not refer to the Hearing Officer's Report, or attribute the same weight
that the European Union attributes to that piece of evidence. As the Appellate Body has stated in
previous disputes, "it is generally within the discretion of [a] [p]anel to decide which evidence it
chooses to utilize in making findings"
141, and the mere fact that a panel has not explicitly referred

132 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 872 (emphasis original)).
133 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US – Upland
Cotton, para. 399; US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 385; and EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1005).
134 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
para. 132).
135 In particular, the European Union cites the Hearing Officer's Report as evidence that allegedly
contradicts the Panel's finding.
136 Hearing Officer's Report (Panel Exhibit CHN-30), p. 5.
137 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 224.
138 China's appellee's submission, para. 180.
139 Hearing Officer's Report (Panel Exhibit CHN-30), p. 5.
140 China's appellee's submission, para. 181 (quoting Letter dated 17 July 2012 from the Hearing Officer
of the European Commission (Panel Exhibit CHN-20), p. 1).
141 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.78 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
EC - Hormones, para. 135).

to each and every piece of evidence in its reasoning is insufficient to establish a violation of
Article 11.142 Accordingly, we do not consider that the Panel exceeded the boundaries of its
discretion as the trier of facts in finding that the Chinese producers were not aware of the
particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment of the information at
issue. Thus, we find that the Panel did not act inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in this
regard.
5.50. We turn now to consider the European Union's further claim that the Panel erred in finding
that Pooja Forge's e-mail to the Commission reques ting confidential treatment of the information
at issue contained "no more than a bald assertion" on the part of Pooja Forge that did not seem to
support the argument that Pooja Forge had provided good cause to justify the confidential
treatment of its information.
143 The European Union contends that the Panel failed to follow the
guidance of the Appellate Body in the original proceedings that "the type of evidence and the
extent of substantiation an authority must require will depend on the nature of the information at
issue and the particular 'good cause' alleged." 144 According to the European Union, the Panel was
required to examine whether, in the light of the nature of the information at issue and the
particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge, the statement contained in the e-mail was sufficient
to establish that the Commission objectively assessed "good cause" for the purposes of Article 6.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.51. For its part, China recalls that, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body emphasized
that "good cause", within the meaning of Article 6. 5, involves a demonstration of "the risk of a
potential consequence, the avoidance of which is important enough to warrant the non-disclosure
of the information" at issue.
145 Thus, China submits that, in the absence of such a risk being
identified, there is no good cause shown by th e party submitting information for confidential
treatment. Noting the Appellate Body's finding th at "[t]he type of evidence and the extent of
substantiation an authority must require will depend on the nature of the information at issue and
the particular 'good cause' alleged" 146, China asserts that this guidance becomes relevant once
"the risk of a potential consequence" has been identified. China contends that, in the present case,
Pooja Forge merely stated that the disclosure of certain information would "provide an advantage
to a competitor", and that this does not establish a "risk of a potential consequence". 147 Thus,
contends China, the Panel correctly found that Pooja Forge's request for confidential treatment
contained "no more than a bald assertion".148
5.52. We recall that the pertinent evidence before the Panel concerning the particular good cause
alleged by Pooja Forge was contained in Pooj a Forge's e-mail to the Commission in which
Pooja Forge stated that "the list of the products sold by Pooja Forge cannot be provided because
this information if disclosed, will give advantage to our competitor."149 The European Union has not
pointed to any evidence on the record of the investigation demonstrating that Pooja Forge had
substantiated or explained why this was a potential risk or why the competitive advantage that
allegedly could materialize from disclosure would be "significant" within the meaning of Article 6.5.
Yet, as the Appellate Body found in the origin al proceedings, the requirement to show "good
cause" for the confidential treatment of information under Article 6.5 applies to both categories of
information that fall within the scope of Article 6.5, i.e. information that is confidential by nature
and information that has been submitted on a confidential basis.
150
5.53. There is also no evidence on the record of the investigation of how the Commission arrived
at the conclusion that the information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's

142 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 441-442; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 202.
143 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 226.
144 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 226 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), para. 539).
145 China's appellee's submission, para. 185 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 537).
146 China's appellee's submission, para. 186 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 539).
147 China's appellee's submission, para. 185.
149 Panel Report, para. 7.42 (quoting E-mail dated 3 July 2012 from Pooja Forge to the
European Commission (Panel Exhibit EU-2)).
150 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537.

products was confidential by nature, and that P ooja Forge had shown good cause on this basis.
However, before the Panel, the European Union sought to substantiate Pooja Forge's assertion that
the information at issue was confidential by nature because its disclosure could confer an
advantage on its competitor.
151 In this regard, the European Union argues on appeal that it
"explained repeatedly" to the Panel that there was "strong competition between Pooja Forge and
the Chinese producers in the after-sales market in India", and that a "significant" risk existed "in
view of the particularly competitive situation in the India market". 152 Such substantiation of the
particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge is, however, lacking in Pooja Forge's request for the
confidential treatment of the information at issu e. Hence, the European Union's reference to the
"strong competition between Pooja Forge and the Ch inese producers in the after-sales market in
India" constitutes ex post rationalization on the part of the European Union. In our view, it would
have been incongruous with the applicable standard of review for the Panel to have determined
whether the Commission had objectively assessed whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for
the confidential treatment of the information at issue on the basis of ex post rationales provided by
the European Union in the course of the current WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
5.54. Moreover, in the light of the particular ci rcumstances of this case as set forth above, the
European Union's contention on appeal is that it was for the Panel to examine, ab initio ,
Pooja Forge's request for confidential treatment in the light of the nature of the information at
issue and the particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge. However, it is not a proper role for a
panel to engage in such a review, as would have been required in this case. A panel does not
comply with the applicable standard of review if , in the absence of an objective assessment by the
investigating authority of the good cause alleged, it engages in a de novo review of evidence on
the record of the investigation and determines for itself, or on the basis of subjective concerns of
the submitting party, whether the request for confidential treatment is sufficiently substantiated
and that good cause for such treatment objectively exists.
153
5.55. Thus, in the particular circumstances of th is case, where substantiation of the particular
good cause alleged by Pooja Forge was lacking in Pooja Forge's request for confidential treatment
and in the Commission's published reports and rela ted supporting documents, we do not consider
that the Panel erred in finding that Pooja Forge's e-mail contained "no more than a bald assertion",
which did not seem to support the argument that Pooja Forge had shown good cause to justify the
confidential treatment of its information. Accordingly, we reject the European Union's claim in this
regard.
5.2.2.4 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that the Commission "never" conducted an
objective assessment of the good cause alleged by Pooja Forge
5.56. The European Union further claims that the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under
Article 11 of the DSU in finding that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment of
whether the information at issue was confidential by nature or whether good cause had been
shown to justify its confidential treatment as required by Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
154 At the outset, we recall that the Panel had asked the European Union to explain, on
the basis of the record of the investigation, the manner in which the Commission had assessed
Pooja Forge's request for the confidential treatment of the information at issue. In response, the
European Union stated that there was "not much explicit reference to the European Commission's
assessment of Pooja Forge's request" in the record of the investigation because "[t]he Chinese
exporting producers never contested this aspect of the investigation".
155 The Panel characterized
the European Union's response as an "admission" and stated that there was no doubt that the
Commission "never" conducted an objective assessment of whether the information at issue was
confidential by nature or whether good cause had been shown by Pooja Forge to justify its
confidential treatment.
156 Further, the Panel considered that the obligation under Article 6.5 for the
Commission to conduct an objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for

151 Panel Report, para. 7.14.
152 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 227.
153 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (EU) / China – HP-SSST (Japan), para. 5.102.
154 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 229-235.
155 Panel Report, para. 7.45 (quoting European Union's response to Panel question No. 6.b).
156 Panel Report, para. 7.46.

the confidential treatment of the information at issue was not dependent upon the
Chinese producers contesting such confidential treatment.157
5.57. The European Union claims that the evidence on the record does not support the Panel's
finding and that, in reaching this finding, the Panel failed to attribute proper weight to certain
circumstances. As regards the evidence on the record, the European Union relies on a letter dated
26 November 2014 from the case-handler who had conducted the verification visit at Pooja Forge's
premises in the course of the original investigation.
158 This letter was addressed to the compliance
Panel and was prepared specifically for the purposes of the current WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. In this letter, the case-handler avers that, at the time of the Commission's
verification visit, Pooja Forge had requested that its company details be treated confidentially, and
that Pooja Forge was "very much concerned about the treatment of its information in the
investigation" because of "tough competition" with Chinese producers in the after-sales market in
India.
159 In addition, the European Union relies on an e-mail from Pooja Forge to the Commission
dated 2 July 2012, in which Pooja Forge confirmed that it did not wish to disclose its company
details to interested parties, as "mentioned" during the verification visit that took place in 2008.160
5.58. In response, China contends that the fact that Pooja Forge expressed concerns about the
disclosure of its information is irrelevant to the question of whether the Commission conducted an
objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for the confidential treatment
of that information. According to China, there is simply no evidence on the record that
demonstrates that the Commission conducted such an assessment.
161 Thus, for China, the Panel's
finding that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had
shown good cause for the confidential treatment of its information was based on a proper analysis
of the evidence on the record, in accordance with the Panel's mandate under Article 11 of the
DSU.
162
5.59. Turning to our analysis, we note, as a preliminary matter, that the letter from the case-
handler to the compliance Panel on which the European Union relies is not a part of the record of
the investigation, but, instead, a document prepared specifically for the purposes of the current
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The Appellate Body has stated that a panel must examine
whether the conclusions reached by the investigating authority are reasoned and adequate, and
that such an examination must be critical and based on the information contained on the record
and the explanations given by the authority in its published report.
163 Thus, the letter of the case-
handler referred to above does not constitute evidence that the Panel could properly have relied on
in determining whether the Commission had objectively assessed "good cause" for the purposes of
Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Rather, the letter constitutes ex post rationalization by
the European Union. In any event, this letter merely confirms that Pooja Forge had requested
confidential treatment of its information on the basis that its disclosure could confer an advantage
on its competitor. Pooja Forge's exchange of e- mails with the Commission on 2 July 2012 merely
confirms the same. However, such evidence does not indicate whether and how the Commission
engaged with the particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge in according confidential treatment
to the information at issue. Hence, we do not consider that this evidence calls into question the
objectivity of the Panel's finding that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment of
whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for the confidential treatment of the information at
issue.
5.60. The European Union further faults the Panel for not attributing proper weight to certain
circumstances in reaching its finding that the Commission never conducted an objective
assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for the confidential treatment of the
information at issue. In this regard, the European Union argues that the Panel did not attribute

157 Panel Report, para. 7.46.
158 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 230 (referring to Letter dated 26 November 2014
from the European Commission to the Panel (Panel Exhibit EU-5)).
159 European Union's appellant's submission, fn 143 to para. 225 (quoting Letter dated 26 November
2014 from the European Commission to the Panel (Panel Exhibit EU-5)).
160 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 230 (referring to E-mail exchanges dated 2 July 2012
between the European Commission and Pooja Forge (Panel Exhibit EU-8)).
161 China's appellee's submission, para. 208.
162 China's appellee's submission, para. 217.
163 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.311 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Tyres (China), para. 123).

proper weight to the fact that there was no explicit reference to the Commission's assessment of
Pooja Forge's request in the original determinatio n because the "confidentiality of Pooja Forge's
product range was a non-issue in the original investigation". 164 Moreover, the European Union
contends that the Panel failed to attribute proper weight to the circumstance that the facts and
events to which the European Union needed to refer in this case date back to 2008, and it had
thus "understandably become rather difficult" for the European Union to locate specific documents
in the paper version of the confidential file.165
5.61. We recall that a panel's mandate under Arti cle 11 of the DSU does not require it to accord
to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties.166 Moreover, the
mere fact that a panel does not explicitly refer to each and every piece of evidence in its reasoning
is insufficient to establish a claim of violation under Article 11.
167 Instead, for a claim under
Article 11 to succeed, an appellant must explain why the evidence that it relies on is so material to
its case that the panel's failure to address explicitly and rely upon that evidence has a bearing on
the objectivity of the panel's factual assessment.
168 We do not consider that the circumstances to
which the European Union alleges the Panel failed to attribute sufficient weight call into question
the objectivity of the Panel's assessment. First, as regards the European Union's contention that
the Panel failed to attribute proper weight to "t he fact that the confidentiality of Pooja Forge's
product range was a non-issue in the original investigation" 169, we agree with China that the Panel
correctly found that "the duty to perform … an assessment [under Article 6.5] was not dependent
upon whether or not the underlying issue was contested by the Chinese producers in the
investigation."
170 With regard to the European Union's contention that the Panel failed to attribute
proper weight to the circumstance that it had become difficult for the European Union to locate
specific documents in the paper version of the confidential file because the case dates back to
2008, we also agree with China that such a circ umstance cannot excuse the fact that there was
no evidence on the record as to whether and how the Commission assessed the particular good
cause alleged by Pooja Forge in according confidential treatment to the information at issue.
171
5.62. In the light of the above, we do not consider that the Panel failed to conduct an objective
assessment of the facts, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, when it found that the Commission,
contrary to the requirement of Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, never conducted an
objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause for the confidential treatment
of the information at issue. The Panel did not exceed the boundaries of its discretion as the trier of
fact in reaching this finding. Accordingly, we see no merit in this claim of the European Union
under Article 11 of the DSU.
5.2.2.5 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that there was an inconsistency in the
arguments put forward by the European Union
5.63. We recall that after finding that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment
of "good cause" as required by Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel considered
that the European Union's contention that the information at issue was confidential, and that good
cause had been shown for its confidential treatment, was undermined by the fact that the
European Union had argued, in connection with China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, that some of this info rmation was disclosed to the Chinese producers,
for example, in the Commission's General Disclosure Document.
172 The European Union claims on
appeal that the Panel's conclusion that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 is
in error, insofar as it rests on the Panel's statement that there was an inconsistency in the
arguments presented by the European Union. The European Union argues that it is not logically
inconsistent to argue that the entirety of certain information is confidential, whereas specific parts
of that information are not equally confidential. Thus, contends the European Union, the Panel

164 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 232.
165 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 232-233.
166 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 267.
167 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 202.
168 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442.
169 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 232.
171 China's appellee's submission, para. 214.
172 Panel Report, para. 7.48 (referring to, inter alia, General Disclosure Document (Panel Exhibit
CHN-22)).

incorrectly relied on a "non-existent" contradiction in the European Union's arguments in finding
that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5.173
5.64. After making its main findings 174, and "[b]efore leaving the issue of confidentiality" 175, the
Panel underlined that the European Union's contention that the information at issue was
confidential and that good cause had been shown for its confidential treatment was undermined by
the European Union's argument, in connection with China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, that some of this info rmation was disclosed to the Chinese producers,
for example, in the Commission's General Disclosure Document.
176 In our view, the
Panel's statement that there was an inconsistency in the European Union's arguments constitutes
obiter dictum that had no material bearing on its ultimate conclusion that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-D umping Agreement. In this regard, we consider
that the Panel's finding of a violation under Article 6.5 followed from its finding that the
Commission had failed to conduct an objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown
good cause for the confidential treatment of the in formation at issue. In the circumstances, we do
not consider that the alleged error of the Panel in stating that there was an inconsistency in the
arguments put forward by the European Union prov ides a basis for reversing the Panel's ultimate
conclusion that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
5.2.2.6 Whether the Panel erred by not conduc ting its own analysis of the nature of the
information at issue
5.65. The European Union contends that the Panel erred in concluding that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Panel found,
without a proper analysis, that the information at issue was not confidential. In this regard, the
European Union asserts that the Panel failed to conduct a proper analysis of the type and nature of
the information at issue in determining whether such information was confidential for the purposes
of Article 6.5. Noting that the Panel's conclusion under Article 6.5 was based on its finding that
the Commission had failed objectively to assess whether Pooja Forge had showed "good cause" for
the confidential treatment of its information, the European Union points out that the Panel did not,
h o w e v e r , m a k e a n y f i n d i n g o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a t i s s u e . I n t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' s
view, the Panel was required to examine, separately, whether the information at issue could be
considered as confidential by nature, but, instead, the Panel simply assumed that it was not.
177
5.66. China responds that the Panel focused its analysis under Article 6.5 on whether good cause
had been shown by Pooja Forge and whether the Commission objectively assessed Pooja Forge's
request for confidential treatment of its information. In China's view, the Panel correctly found that
good cause had not been shown by Pooja Forge, and that the Commission did not conduct an
objective assessment of whether good cause had been shown.
178 China submits that, in the
absence of an objective assessment of "good cause" within the meaning of Article 6.5, information
cannot be treated as confidential under that prov ision. Thus, contends China, the Panel correctly
considered the information at issue as not requiring confidential treatment.179
5.67. At the outset, we disagree with the European Union to the extent that it suggests that the
Panel found that the information at issue was, in fact, not confidential by nature. 180 The Panel
explicitly stated that it was not making such a finding. 181 Instead, the Panel found that the

173 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 236-237 and 242-243.
174 The Panel found that the particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge for the confidential treatment
of the information at issue was "no more than a bald assertion", which did not seem to support the argument
that Pooja Forge had shown good cause to justify the confidential treatment of that information. Further, in the
absence of evidence on the record of the investigation of the Commission's assessment of Pooja Forge's
request for confidential treatment of the information at issue, the Panel found that the Commission never
conducted an objective assessment of "good cause" within the meaning of Article 6.5. (Panel Report,
paras. 7.44 and 7.46)
175 Panel Report, para. 7.48.
176 Panel Report, para. 7.48.
177 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 244-251.
178 China's appellee's submission, para. 225.
179 China's appellee's submission, para. 227.
180 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 279.
181 Panel Report, para. 7.51.

European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5, and this finding was based on the
Commission's failure to conduct an objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown good
cause for the confidential treatment of the information at issue. The European Union suggests that
this was an insufficient basis for the Panel's finding that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 6.5. As we see it, the European Union's argument, in the circumstances of this case, is
not in accordance with the Appellate Body's guid ance under Article 6.5 as regards the role of a
party requesting confidential treatment for information that it submits to an authority; the role of
that authority in examining that request; and the role of a WTO panel in the event of a claim that
the authority acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 by according confidential treatment to the
information in the absence of "good cause" being shown by the party submitting the information.
5.68. We recall that it is for the party requesting confidential treatment for information that it
considers to be confidential by nature, or that it submits on a confidential basis, to furnish reasons
justifying such treatment. The role of the auth ority is to assess such reasons and determine,
objectively, whether the submitting party has show n good cause for the confidential treatment of
its information. In the event of a claim of violatio n of Article 6.5, a panel, tasked with reviewing
whether an authority has objectively assessed the good cause alleged by the party submitting
information to that authority, must examine this issue on the basis of the investigating authority's
published report and its related supporting documents, in the light of the nature of the information
at issue, and the reasons given by the submitting party for its request for confidential
treatment.
182
5.69. The Panel, however, found that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment
of whether the information at issue was confidential by nature or whether Pooja Forge had shown
good cause on this basis for the confidential treatment of such information. 183 Having made that
finding, it was not for the Panel to conduct a de novo review of whether the information at issue
was confidential by nature or whether good caus e had been shown by Pooja Forge. Thus, we do
not agree with the European Union that the Panel erred by not conducting its own analysis of the
nature of the information at issue for the purposes of its assessment of China's claim under
Article 6.5. We therefore see no merit in the European Union's claim in this regard.
5.70. Having regard to the entirety of the Panel's analysis under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, it appears to us that the Panel's conclusion that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5 was based on two findings. First, the Panel found that the particular
good cause alleged by Pooja Forge for the confiden tial treatment of the information at issue was
no more than a bald assertion, which did not seem to support the argument that Pooja Forge had
shown good cause to justify the confidential treatment of that information.
184 Second, the Panel
found that the Commission never conducted an objective assessment of "good cause" within the
meaning of Article 6.5.185 We have reviewed these findings above and concluded that the Panel did
not err in making them. These findings establish that the Commission acted inconsistently with
Article 6.5 by according confidential treatment to the information at issue in the absence of an
objective assessment of the particular good cause alleged by Pooja Forge.
5.71. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we uphold the Panel's finding, in
paragraphs 7.50 and 8.1.i of its Report, that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the review investigation at issue.
5.72. We note that China has put forward a conditional appeal regarding the Commission's alleged
failure to ensure that Pooja Forge submit a non-confidential summary of the information at issue in
accordance with the requirements of Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This appeal is
triggered in the event that we reverse the Panel's finding of a violation under Article 6.5, and find,
instead, that the European Union acted consistently with that provision. Having upheld the Panel's
finding under Article 6.5, the condition for addressing China's appeal under Article 6.5.1 has not

182 Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SSST (EU) / China – HP-SSST (Japan), paras. 5.95 and 5.97.
183 Panel Report, para. 7.46. We have found above that the Panel did not err in making this finding.
184 Panel Report, para. 7.44.
185 Panel Report, para. 7.46.

been met. Accordingly, we make no findings on China's conditional appeal under Article 6.5.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.186
5.3 Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.3.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.73. Before the Panel, the European Union argued that China was precluded from raising its
claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the compliance proceedings
because these were claims that China could have raised but did not raise in the original
proceedings, and that pertained to an unchanged aspect of the original measure that was
separable from the measure taken to comply.
187
5.74. The Panel stated that, in deciding whethe r these claims could have been brought by China
in the original proceedings, it would have to take into account the factual circumstances in the
review investigation in which the claims were raised and examine the extent to which these
circumstances also existed in the original investigation. The Panel observed that violations of the
procedural obligations set forth in Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement could occur
multiple times during an investigation, depending on the piece of information that an interested
party requests to see or the presentation that such a party wishes to make for the defence of its
interests.
188 The Panel focused on the fact that, since the original investigation, the Commission
had in its possession certain information regarding the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's
products, parts of which it provided to the Chinese producers for the first time in the review
investigation. In the Panel's view, the disclosure of certain information in the review investigation
led the Chinese producers to make requests for further information regarding the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, the rejection of which gave rise to the present claims.
189
5.75. The Panel thus rejected the European Union' s contention that these claims could have been
but were not raised by China in the original proceedings. The Panel noted that, "[i]f an interested
party is not aware of the existence of certain information on the investigation record, it cannot
make a request to see that information or make presentations on that basis to defend its
interests."
190
5.76. On appeal, the European Union claims that the Panel erred in considering that the
information that China argues the Commission failed to disclose was "new" and hence was a
"new" aspect of the measure taken to comply. 191 The European Union contends that the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products was not a "new" aspect that was not present in the
original investigation. In support of its contention, the European Union states, first, that, in the
review investigation, the Commission based its determination on the data that Pooja Forge had
provided in the original investigation
192, and, second, that, in the review investigation,
the Commission provided more precise information, but that "the information provided by
Pooja Forge remained the same."193
5.77. China responds that, in order to analyse whether it could have brought these claims in the
original proceedings, it is not relevant whether the information relating to the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products was "new", that is to say, provided by Pooja Forge in the
review investigation, or whether it was provided by Pooja Forge in the original investigation.
Rather, China contends that what is relevant is the fact that the Chinese producers became aware

186 Before the Panel, China's claim under Article 6.5.1 was conditional upon its claim under Article 6.5 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Thus, China requested the Panel to find that the European Union had acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5.1 only if it found that the European Union had acted consistently with its
obligation under Article 6.5. The Panel found that the European Union had acted inconsistently with Article 6.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, therefore, the condition for examining China's claim under Article 6.5.1
was not met. Accordingly, the Panel made no findings under Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(Panel Report, para. 7.50)
187 Panel Report, paras. 7.57 and 7.62.
188 Panel Report, para. 7.68.
189 Panel Report, para. 7.77.
190 Panel Report, para. 7.78.
191 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 149.
192 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 144.
193 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 147.

of the existence of the information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products
for the first time in the review investigation.194
5.78. We begin our analysis by recalling that, in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil) , the
Appellate Body stated that "[a] complaining Member ordinarily would not be allowed to raise
claims in an Article 21.5 proceeding that it could have pursued in the original proceedings, but
did not."195 In US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC) , the Appellate Body found, however, that this
is not the case for "new claims against a measure taken to comply – that is, in principle, a new
and different measure" even if such measure "incorporates components of the original measure
that are unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure taken to comply". 196
In the Appellate Body's view, allowing such new claims in Article 21.5 proceedings would not
jeopardize the principles of fundamental fairness and due process or provide a second chance to
the complainant.
197
5.79. In the light of the jurisprudence, we exam ine below whether the claims raised by China in
the compliance proceedings under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 could have been but were not raised in the
original proceedings.
5.80. The Panel found, and we agree, that violations of the procedural obligations under
Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement could occur "multiple times" during an
investigation, depending on the piece of information that an interested party requests to see or the
presentation that such a party wishes to make for the defence of its interests. 198 In order to
determine whether claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 could have been raised in the original
proceedings it is not dispositive whether the underlying information that was in the possession of
the investigating authority is unchanged or is not new, but rather whether the factual
circumstances in the review investigation also existed in the original investigation.
5.81. As we have explained above, in the original investigation, the Commission did not disclose
information about the "product types" in a timely manner. In the review investigation, in order to
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings under Articles 6.4, 6.2, and 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Commission disclo sed information regarding the normal value
determinations, including the "product types" (lat er replaced by the revised PCNs), as well as
some information on certain characteristics of Pooja Forge's products. However, the Commission
declined to disclose all of the information regarding the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's
products, which the Chinese producers were asking to see.
199 In the light of these facts, even if the
underlying information is unchanged or is not new, the aspect of the measure that China
challenges in these compliance proceedings has changed from the original proceedings considering
that China is challenging a different episode of non-disclosure by the Commission, which concerns
different aspects of Pooja Forge's product information.
5.82. Thus, the key question in addressing this issue on appeal is whether the Chinese producers
were aware of the existence of this information in the original investigation and of its relevance to
that investigation. That the Chinese producers may have been generally aware of the fact that the
Commission had in its possession information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products may not be sufficient, in itself, to demonstrate that the producers could
also have requested the disclosure of such information in the original investigation. In fact, even if
the Chinese producers had been generally aware of this, they would not have requested the
disclosure of such information if, due to the particular circumstances surrounding the original
investigation, they were not aware of the relevance of this information. Thus, only if it can be
demonstrated that the Chinese producers were aware of the existence of the information regarding
the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products and of its relevance in the original
investigation, could it be concluded that China could have claimed in the original proceedings that
the non-disclosure of such information by the Commission amounted to a violation of Articles 6.4
and 6.2.

194 China's appellee's submission, para. 80.
195 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 211.
196 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 432.
197 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 427.
198 Panel Report, para. 7.68.
199 Panel Report, para. 7.74 (referring to Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 57).

5.83. As discussed above in respect of Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1, the Chinese producers' requests to
see information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products were prompted by
the Commission's disclosures of the "product types" used in the dumping margin calculations. The
Commission, however, never fully disclosed all the relevant product information, including the
product list and characteristics, and the disclosures that were made in the original and in the
review investigations prompted the Chinese producers to request further information that they
considered relevant to their cases.
200
5.84. We also recall that, in the original investigation, the Chinese producers expected the
Commission to use the original PCNs to conduct the comparisons between the normal values and
the export prices. When they were informed that the Commission would instead use "product
types", they requested the disclosure of these "p roduct types", which the Commission refused to
do until late in the investigation. In the review investigation, the Commission made disclosures
regarding the determination of normal values in the original investigation, including the "product
types" used, as part of its implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the
original proceedings. The Chinese producers consid ered these disclosures insufficient and sought
further information on the "product types" and th e "precise and detailed characteristics" of the
products sold by Pooja Forge
201, which the Commission refused to disclose on grounds of
confidentiality.202
5.85. The exchanges between the Commission and the Chinese producers in the review
investigation suggest that the Chinese producer s only became aware of the existence of the
information at issue during the review investigation following partial disclosures made by the
Commission. We, therefore, agree with the Panel th at the claims China made before the Panel are
not claims that it could have made in the original proceedings. China did raise claims under
Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent in the original proceedings, based on the
information available – i.e. that the Commission had conducted the comparison based on "product
types". The claims it raises in the compliance proceedings were prompted by the Commission's
disclosures during the review investigation, which were made in order to implement the
DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original proceedings.
5.86. Finally, the measure challenged by China in the compliance proceedings – i.e. the
Commission's non-disclosure of the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products – can be
characterized as an omission in the disclosures made by the Commission to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings under Articles 6.4, 6.2, and 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In disclosing certain information to comply with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in the original proceedings, the Commission failed to disclose other information – the list
and all of the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products. This omission is the measure challenged by
China in the compliance proceedings, and it constitutes an integral part of and is not separable
from the measure taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings.
5.87. In the light of the above, we consider that the claims that China has raised in these
compliance proceedings under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are not claims
that China could have raised in the original proceedings.
5.88. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.80 of its Report, that China's claims
under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were within the Panel's terms of
reference.
5.3.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding th at the European Union acted inconsistently
with Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.89. We turn now to consider the European Unio n's appeal of the Panel's findings on the merits
of China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We begin our

200 Panel Report, paras. 7.70-7.74.
201 Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the European Commission (Panel Exhibit
CHN-8), p. 5; Letter dated 12 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the European Commission
(Panel Exhibit CHN-9), p. 5; Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Biao Wu to the European Commission
(Panel Exhibit CHN-6), pp. 3-4.
202 Panel Report, para. 7.74.

analysis with a brief overview of the relevant findings of the Panel under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.3.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.90. Before the Panel, China claimed that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to provide timely
opportunities to the Chinese producers to see the information concerning the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products. China argued that the information at issue was used for
the determination of normal values, was relevant to the presentation of the Chinese producers'
cases, and was not confidential within the meanin g of Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Thus, by failing to provide timely opportunities for the Chinese producers to see such information,
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.4.
203 China further claimed that, as a
consequence of its violation of Article 6.4, the Commission also violated Article 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to provide th e Chinese producers with a full opportunity to
defend their interests on the basis of the information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products.204
5.91. The Panel recalled that information falling within the scope of Article 6.4 must: (i) be
"relevant" to the presentation of interested partie s' cases; (ii) not be confidential as defined in
Article 6.5; and (iii) be "used" by the authorities in the anti-dumping investigation. 205 The Panel
further recalled that it had found that there was no evidence before the Commission justifying the
confidential treatment of the information at i ssue, and that the Commission, therefore, acted
inconsistently with Article 6.5 in according confid ential treatment to that information. Hence, the
Panel considered that, for the purposes of China's claim under Article 6.4, it would treat the
information at issue as not confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5. Thus, the Panel
considered that the second condition for the application of Article 6.4 had been met.
206
5.92. Turning to the first condition – i.e. whethe r the information at issue was "relevant" to the
presentation of the Chinese producers' cases – th e Panel recalled that this question must be
assessed from the perspective of the interested parties that have requested to see the
information, rather than from the perspective of the investigating authority. 207 Noting that the
Chinese producers had requested to see the inform ation concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products, and that such requests were denied by the Commission on the basis that
such information was confidential, the Panel cons idered that these requests demonstrated that,
from the perspective of the Chinese producers, the information at issue was relevant to the
presentation of their cases. Further, the Panel co nsidered that the nature of the information at
issue underlined its relevance to the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases because it
concerned the determination of normal values, wh ich, together with export prices, determined
dumping margins. Accordingly, the Panel considered that the first condition for the application of
Article 6.4 had been met.
208
5.93. As regards the third condition, the Panel recalled that whether the Commission "used" the
information at issue, within the meaning of Article 6.4, does not depend on whether the
Commission specifically relied on that information in its determinations. Instead, the information
should be considered as having been "used" by the Commission if it pertains to "a required step"
in the anti-dumping investigation.
209 Recalling that the information at issue had to do with the
determination of normal values and dumping margins, the Panel considered that it was thus clear
that the information at issue was used by the Commission in the review investigation. Accordingly,
the Panel found that the third condition for the application of Article 6.4 had been met.
210
5.94. The Panel then turned to consider the European Union's argument that the information
concerning the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products had been disclosed to the

203 Panel Report, para. 7.55.
204 Panel Report, para. 7.56.
205 Panel Report, para. 7.88 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 142).
206 Panel Report, para. 7.88.
207 Panel Report, para. 7.89 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 145).
208 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
209 Panel Report, para. 7.90 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 147).
210 Panel Report, para. 7.90.

Chinese producers in the general and company-specific disclosures that had been made available
to the Chinese producers in accordance with the requirements of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.211 The Panel noted that Article 6.9 requires the disclosure of the essential facts under
consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Thus,
such disclosure occurs towards the end of an investigation before a final decision is made. The
Panel therefore considered that the final di sclosure occurred "too late" to afford the
Chinese producers an appropriate opportunity to us e the information in the presentation of their
cases.212 Accordingly, the Panel found that the Chinese producers were not provided timely
opportunities to see the information at issue, contrary to the requirement under Article 6.4.213
5.95. In the light of the foregoing consideratio ns, the Panel concluded that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission
failed to provide the Chinese producers with timely opportunities to see the information at issue
which was not confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5, and which was relevant to the
presentation of the Chinese producers' cases and used by the Commission.
214 Turning to
China's consequential claim under Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel
considered that accessing the information at issue would, potentially, have allowed the
Chinese producers to request adjustments to thei r normal values, determined on the basis of
Pooja Forge's prices, or to their export prices . Thus, the Panel found that, without seeing the
information at issue, the Chinese producers could not be considered as having been provided a
"full opportunity" to defend their interests within the meaning of Article 6.2.
215 Accordingly, the
Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.2 in the review
investigation.216
5.96. Having set forth the relevant findings of the Panel under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, we turn now to examine the discrete claims raised by the
European Union under these provisions.
5.3.2.2 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that the information at issue was not
confidential for the purposes of its analys is under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement
5.97. As stated by the Panel, information falling within the scope of Article 6.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement must: (i) be "relevant" to the presentation of interested parties' cases;
(ii) not be confidential as defined in Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and (iii) be "used"
by the authorities in the anti-dumping investigation. 217 When information meets these criteria,
Article 6.4 requires that investigating authorities provide "timely opportunities" for interested
parties to see it. The Panel found that the information at issue met these criteria, and that the
Commission had violated Article 6.4 by failing to provide the Chinese producers with timely
opportunities to see it.
218
5.98. On appeal, the European Union claims that the Panel erred in finding that: (i) the
information requested by the Chinese producers was "relevant" to the presentation of their cases;
(ii) such information was not "confidential" within the meaning of Article 6.5; and (iii) the
information at issue was "used" by the Commission in its calculation of dumping margins.
219 We
begin our analysis with the European Union's clai m that the Panel erred in finding that, for the
purposes of its analysis under Article 6.4, the information at issue was not "confidential" within the
meaning of Article 6.5.
5.99. The European Union argues that, in determining whether the information at issue was
confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5, for the purposes of its analysis under Article 6.4, the
Panel should not have relied on its finding that the Commission had accorded confidential

211 Panel Report, para. 7.91 (referring to European Union's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 66; and response to Panel question No. 18.a).
212 Panel Report, para. 7.91.
213 Panel Report, para. 7.91.
214 Panel Report, para. 7.92.
215 Panel Report, para. 7.94.
216 Panel Report, para. 7.96.
217 Panel Report, para. 7.88 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 142).
218 Panel Report, para. 7.92.
219 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 265.

treatment to this information in a manner that did not conform to the requirements of Article 6.5.
In the European Union's view, the Panel was requir ed to "carefully and separately" undertake an
analysis of the information at issue in order to determine whether such information was
confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5.
220 The European Union contends that, by failing to
conduct this examination and finding that the information at issue was not confidential for the
purposes of Article 6.4, the Panel "fell victim to a logical non sequitur".221
5.100. For its part, China contends that the reference in Article 6.4 to information that "is not
confidential as defined in paragraph 5" means information that cannot be treated as confidential
because the "conditions" set forth in Article 6. 5 have not been fulfilled. Under Article 6.5,
information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties
to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Thus, in
the absence of good cause shown by the submitting party, as determined pursuant to an objective
assessment by the authority, information cannot be accorded confidential treatment, and such
information would not be "confidential as defined in paragraph 5".
222 Thus, submits China, the
Panel correctly considered the information at issue as not requiring confidential treatment for the
purposes of its analysis under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.101. At issue here is the meaning of the reference in Article 6.4 to information "that is not
confidential as defined in paragraph 5". As we have explained above, Article 6.5 prescribes a
showing of "good cause" by the party requesting confidential treatment of its information as a
condition precedent for an investigating authorit y to accord such treatment. The treatment of
information as confidential is, therefore, the le gal consequence that flows from the establishment
of good cause, as determined pursuant to an objective assessment by the authority reviewing a
party's request for the confidential treatment of its information. Hence, in the absence of good
cause being shown by the party submitting information, as determined pursuant to an objective
assessment by the authority, there is no legal basis for the authority to accord confidential
treatment to that information. In the light of our in terpretation of Article 6.5, we consider that the
reference in Article 6.4 to information "that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5" is
properly to be understood as excluding from the scope of Article 6.4 information that has been
accorded confidential treatment in accordance with Article 6.5 – i.e. information for which good
cause has been shown by the submitting party for confidential treatment, as determined pursuant
to an objective assessment by the investigating authority. 223 Conversely, if information has been
accorded confidential treatment under Article 6.5 in a manner that does not conform to the
requirements of that provision, there is no legal basis for according confidential treatment and
such information would, for the purposes of Articl e 6.4, be considered as information "that is not
confidential as defined in paragraph 5".
5.102. We do not agree with the European Union that, for the purposes of conducting an analysis
under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a panel must "carefully and separately"
undertake an examination of the information at issue in order to determine whether such
information is confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5.
224 Article 6.5 requires an investigating
authority to determine, pursuant to an object ive assessment, whether the reasons furnished by
the submitting party as to why its information should be accorded confidential treatment constitute
"good cause" for the confidential treatment of that information. Thus, it is not the role of a panel
to conduct a de novo review in order to determine for itself whether there is a legal basis for
according confidential treatment to information submitted to an authority. In particular, we do not
see a basis for converting an obligation imposed on investigating authorities, under Article 6.5,
into an obligation on a panel conducting an analysis under Article 6.4. Instead, as stated above, if
information has been accorded confidential treatment under Article 6.5 in a manner that does not
comport with the requirements of that provision, there would be no legal basis for according
confidential treatment to that information, an d such information would, for the purposes of
Article 6.4, be considered as information "that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5".

220 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 278.
221 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 276.
222 China's appellee's submission, paras. 227-228.
223 We find further support for our interpretation in the equally authentic French and Spanish versions of
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the French and Spanish versions of Article 6.4, the phrase "that
224 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 278.

5.103. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we do not agree with the European Union's
contention that the Panel erred in treating the information at issue as not requiring confidential
treatment for the purposes of its analysis under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.3.2.3 Whether the Panel erred in finding th at the information at issue was "relevant"
to the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases
5.104. The European Union further claims that the Panel's finding that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is in error because the Panel
incorrectly found that the information at issue was "relevant", within the meaning of Article 6.4, to
the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases. The European Union contends that, in finding
that the information at issue was relevant to the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases, the
Panel erred by relying on the fact that the Ch inese producers had requested the information at
issue from the Commission. In the European Union's view, the fact that an interested party
requests certain information does not mean that such information is "relevant" within the meaning
of Article 6.4. The European Union cautions that, under the Panel's approach, the scope of
Article 6.4 would be determined unilaterally by any interested party, rather than by any objective
concept of what is "relevant". As a result, "irre levant requests" for information by interested
parties that are not answered by authorities would be considered as triggering a violation of
Article 6.4. The European Union submits that this does not constitute a reasonable interpretation
of Article 6.4.
225
5.105. The European Union further takes issue with the Panel's finding that the nature of the
information at issue underlines its relevance to the Chinese producers' cases because such
information concerned the determination of normal values and dumping margins. The
European Union argues that, in determining whether information is "relevant" for the purposes of
Article 6.4, an analysis of the type and nature of the requested information must be conducted
thoroughly in order to determine compliance with the obligation under Article 6.4. According to the
European Union, the Panel failed to conduct such an analysis. The European Union contends that,
contrary to the Panel's assertions, the information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products did not directly concern the calculation of dumping margins.
226
5.106. For its part, China recalls that, in the or iginal proceedings, the Appellate Body found that
"it is the interested parties, rather than the authority, who determine whether the information is in
fact 'relevant' for the purposes of Article 6.4." 227 In China's view, the repeated requests made by
the Chinese producers to have access to certain information are indeed indications that such
information was "relevant" to the presentation of their cases, within the meaning of Article 6.4.
5.107. Turning to our analysis, we consider, first, the European Union's argument that, in finding
that the information at issue was, for the purposes of Article 6.4, "relevant" to the presentation of
the Chinese producers' cases, the Panel erred by relying on the fact that the Chinese producers
had repeatedly requested the information at issue from the Commission. We recall that Article 6.4
stipulates that an authority must provide "timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all
information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases". As China correctly notes, the
Appellate Body confirmed in the original proceedings that the "possessive pronoun 'their' clearly
refers to the earlier reference in that sentence to 'interested parties'."
228 Therefore, whether an
investigating authority "regarded the information … to be relevant does not determine whether the
information would in fact have been 'rel evant' for the purposes of Article 6.4". 229 Accordingly, we
do not consider that the Panel erred in its analysis by considering whether the information
requested by the Chinese producers was, from the perspective of these producers, "relevant" to
the presentation of their cases within the meaning of Article 6.4.
5.108. We note that the European Union cautions that, under the Panel's approach, the scope of
Article 6.4 would be determined unilaterally by any interested party, rather than by an objective

225 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 267.
226 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 268.
227 China's appellee's submission, para. 259 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 479, in turn referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 146).
228 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 479 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 145).
229 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 145.

concept of what is "relevant". This would mean, ac cording to the European Union, that "irrelevant
requests" for information by interested parties that are not answered by authorities would be
considered as triggering a violation of Article 6.4. In the European Union's view, this would not be
a reasonable interpretation of Article 6.4. 230 However, the scope of Article 6.4 is not determined
solely by reference to whether information is "relevant" to the presentation of an interested party's
case. In order for information to be subject to the obligation under Article 6.4, such information
must also "not be confidential within the meaning of [Article 6.5]", and must have been "used" by
the investigating authority in the sense that it relates to "a required step in the anti-dumping
investigation".
231 Information that is "relevant" from the perspective of the interested party
requesting such information may not be subject to the obligation under Article 6.4 if such
information was not "used" by the investigating authority – i.e. the information does not relate to
a required step in the anti-dumping investigation. Similarly, although certain information may be
relevant from the perspective of the interested party requesting it, such information may not fall
within the scope of Article 6.4 if it has been accorded confidential treatment in accordance with the
requirements of Article 6.5.
5.109. Thus, we do not consider that Article 6.4 requires an investigating authority to disclose
information to an interested party merely because that party has requested such information in
the belief that it is relevant to the presentation of its case. Certainly, a request from an interested
party to see certain information should alert the authority that the party in question considers such
information to be relevant to the presentation of its case. Bearing this in mind, the authority
should then consider whether the information at issue should be disclosed to the party in the light
of whether such information has been accorded confidential treatment in accordance with the
requirements of Article 6.5, and whether such information was "used" within the meaning of
Article 6.4, in the sense that the information relates to a required step in the anti-dumping
investigation. For these reasons, we disagree with the European Union that the scope of Article 6.4
would be determined unilaterally by any interested party if the relevance of that information for
the presentation of its case is to be determined from the perspective of that interested party.
5.110. The European Union further takes issue with the Panel's finding that the nature of the
information at issue underlines its relevance to the Chinese producers' cases because such
information concerned the determination of normal values and dumping margins. The
European Union contends that, in determining whether information is "relevant" for the purposes
of Article 6.4, an analysis of the type and natu re of the requested information must be conducted
thoroughly in order to determine compliance with the obligation under Article 6.4. According to the
European Union, the information at issue did not concern the determination of normal values that
would be compared with export prices to determine the dumping margins of the
Chinese producers.
232 Hence, the European Union argues that the Panel erred in finding that the
nature of the information at issue "underlined" that it was "relevant" to the presentation of the
Chinese producers' cases, within the meaning of Article 6.4.233
5.111. In our view, the European Union's argument conflates the term "relevant" with the term
"used" under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement. Each of these terms play a role in
demarcating the information that falls within the scope of the obligation in that provision. The
Appellate Body has interpreted these terms in a manner that gives distinct meaning to each. The
"relevance" of information, for the purposes of Article 6.4, must be examined from the perspective
of the interested party that has requested that information. By contrast, whether such information
has been "used" by the authority is to be examin ed by assessing whether the information is of a
nature and type that relates to "a required step in the anti-dumping investigation".234
5.112. Nevertheless, we do not consider that the Panel erred in this case by examining the nature
of the information at issue when determining whether such information was "relevant" within the
meaning of Article 6.4. The Panel determined that information concerning the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products was relevant to the Chinese producers' cases by
examining this issue from the perspective of these producers. Having found that these producers

230 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 267.
231 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 479 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 147).
232 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 268.
233 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 266 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.89).
234 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 479 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 147).

had repeatedly requested this information, the Panel correctly concluded that, for the purposes of
Article 6.4, such information was "relevan t for the presentation of their cases". 235 That finding by
the Panel is not called into question by the fact that the Panel subsequently considered that the
nature of the information "underlines" its relevance. 236
5.113. For the reasons expressed above, we do not consider that the Panel erred in finding that
the information at issue was, for the purposes of Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
"relevant" for the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases.
5.3.2.4 Whether the Panel erred in finding th at the information at issue was "used" by
the Commission in the review investigation
5.114. The European Union further claims that the Panel's finding that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is in error because the Panel
incorrectly found that the information at issue was "used" by the Commission, within the meaning
of Article 6.4. In particular, the European Union takes issue with the Panel's statement that the
information at issue "had to do" with the determination of normal values in the calculation of
dumping margins for the Chinese producers.
237 The European Union submits that the Panel erred
by considering that the mere fact that information "relates" to a particular issue that is before the
authority establishes that such information was "used" by that authority.
238
5.115. According to the European Union, the information at issue "as a whole" –
i.e. "Pooja Forge's internal codes and product desc ription [text strings] as well as Pooja Forge's
product range sold in India" – was proprietary and sensitive information that was by nature
confidential as defined in Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
239 The European Union
asserts that this information "as a whole" – "as opposed to more specific parts of it" – was not
used by the Commission in the review investigation at issue. 240 The European Union explains that,
in the context of the review investigation, the Commission engaged in an active and constructive
dialogue with the Chinese producers. This result ed in the Commission going through, in greater
detail, the information originally provided by Pooja Forge in the DMSAL file, and extracting from
such information "as much as possible" to arrive at the revised PCNs that were ultimately used for
the Commission's dumping determinations.
241 The European Union further explains that the
information extracted by the Commission was "grouped into the product types in accordance with
the revised PCNs".
242 This information, asserts the European Union, is what the Commission
actually "used" in the dumping calculations and what was provided to the Chinese producers in the
company-specific disclosures. 243 The European Union asserts that "[a]ny other information that
was provided by the Indian producer was, thus, not 'used' by the European Commission."244
5.116. In response, China highlights that whether information was actually relied on by the
authority is irrelevant to the question of whether such information was "used" by that authority
within the meaning of Article 6.4. In this regard , China notes that, in the original proceedings, the
Appellate Body confirmed that determining whet her information was "used" by the authority
"depends on whether the information is relate d to a required step in the anti-dumping
investigation".245 China contends that the European Union has itself acknowledged that the
Commission "used" the information provided by Pooja Forge. In this regard, China points to the
European Union's explanation that the Commission extracted from the DMSAL file as much
information as possible in order to arrive at the revised PCNs, which were used in the

235 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
236 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
237 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 280 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.90).
238 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 281.
239 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 282.
240 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 282.
241 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 283.
242 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 286.
243 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 286 (referring to Calculations for Biao Wu
(Panel Exhibit CHN-44); Calculations for Ningbo Jinding (Panel Exhibit CHN-45); and Calculations for Changshu
(Panel Exhibit CHN-46)).
244 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 283.
245 China's appellee's submission, para. 287 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 479, in turn quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 147).

determination of normal values and dumping margins. 246 China emphasizes that the information
concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products thus necessarily concerns the
required step of the comparison between normal values and export prices because it was on the
basis of this information that the Commission determined the revised PCNs.
247
5.117. We recall that, in the original proceedin gs, the Appellate Body confirmed that whether
information was "used" by the authority, within the meaning of Article 6.4, does not depend on
whether the authority specifically relied on that information. Instead, "it depends on whether the
information is related to 'a required step in the anti-dumping investigation'." 248 Thus, Article 6.4
concerns information relating to "issues which the investigating authority is required to consider
under the [ Anti-Dumping Agreement ], or which it does, in fact, consider, in the exercise of its
discretion, during the course of an anti-dumping investigation".
249
5.118. We consider that the European Union puts forward a very narrow reading of the term
"used", within the meaning of Article 6.4, which does not comport with the Appellate Body's
interpretation of that term in the original proceedings. Although all of the specific data provided by
Pooja Forge concerning its products and their characteristics may not have been specifically relied
on by the Commission in its determinations, the Commission extracted as much as possible from
all of Pooja Forge's data in order to group the pr oducts at issue in accordance with the revised
PCNs, and calculated dumping margins for the Chines e producers on this basis. As such, all of the
information concerning the products sold by Pooja Forge and their characteristics was "used" by
the Commission, within the meaning of Article 6.4, because it related to a "required step" in the
investigation, i.e. the calculation of dumping margins.
5.119. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we consider that the Panel did not err in
finding that the information at issue was "used" by the Commission in the review investigation at
issue.
5.3.2.5 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the Chinese producers were not
provided with "timely opportunities" to see the information at issue
5.120. On appeal, the European Union argues that the Panel erred in finding that the provision of
information to the Chinese producers at the time when the company-specific disclosures were
issued was too late to comply with the obligation under Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In this regard, the European Union po ints out that the Chinese producers were given
three weeks to make comments on the disclosur es, including the possibility of requesting
adjustments.
250 Moreover, the European Union asserts that by contrast with the original
proceedings where the Appellate Body considered that providing one day to make comments and
request adjustments was not sufficient to comply with the obligation under Article 6.4, the Panel in
these compliance proceedings did not determine whether three weeks were sufficient for the
Chinese producers to have made requests for adjustments in the context of the review
investigation. The European Union submits that the Panel erred in this regard.
251
5.121. As the Panel found in its analysis of China's claims under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement252, and as discussed below in the context of the European Union's appeal of the Panel's
findings under that provision, the company-specific disclosures relied on by the European Union
did not disclose all of the data that the Chinese producers were requesting as regards
Pooja Forge's products. Indeed, in its analysis of China's claim under Article 6.4, the Panel noted
that "the European Union [did] not contest that the Chinese producers did request to see the
information at issue and that it was not provided to them."
253 Thus, because the Commission did

246 China's appellee's submission, para. 285 (referring to European Union's appellant's submission,
para. 283).
247 China's appellee's submission, para. 289.
248 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 479 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 147).
249 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 479 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Salmon
(Norway), para. 7.769).
250 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 287 (referring to Cover letter to the General
Disclosure Document dated 31 July 2012 (Panel Exhibit EU-4)).
251 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 287.
252 Panel Report, para. 7.144.
253 Panel Report, para. 7.89.

not provide an opportunity for the Chinese producer s to see "all" information that was "relevant to
the presentation of their cases", the question of whether "timely opportunities" were provided,
within the meaning of Article 6.4, was, in our view, a moot point that did not arise for
consideration.
5.122. We further consider that the issue of whether "timely opportunities", within the meaning
of Article 6.4, have been provided to interested parties to see information that falls within the
scope of that provision must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Article 6.4 requires
investigating authorities, "whenever practicable", to provide interested parties "timely
opportunities" to see "all information" that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not
confidential for the purposes of Article 6.5, and th at is used by the authority in the sense that it
relates to a required step in the anti-dumping investigation. Thus, the obligation in Article 6.4
applies to a broad range of information that may relate to several required steps in an
anti-dumping investigation. Hence, whether "timely opportunities" have been provided to see
information for the purposes of Article 6.4 must be considered in the light of the circumstances of
each case, taking into account the specific information at issue, the step of the investigation to
which such information relates, the practicability of disclosure at certain points of the investigation
vis-a-vis other points, and the stage of the investigation at which interested parties have made a
request to see the information at issue. Thus, we disagree with the proposition that providing
three weeks to exporters to comment on information within the scope of the obligation under
Article 6.4 is insufficient, in all cases, to sati sfy the requirement to provide "timely opportunities"
to see such information.
5.123. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we uphold the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.92 of its Report, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission fa iled to provide the Chinese producers with
information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, which was not
confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, was relevant to the
presentation of the Chinese producers' cases, and was used by the Commission.
5.124. The European Union argues that the Panel's finding that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement is in error for similar reasons
"mutatis mutandis " as those argued by the European Union in the context of its claim under
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 254 We recall that, after finding that the
European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 by failing to disclose to the Chinese producers
the information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, the Panel found,
consequentially, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.2 by not providing a
full opportunity for the Chinese producers to defend their interests on the basis of the information
at issue.
255 We have found above that the Panel did not err in finding that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 in the review investigation at issue. Accordingly, we do not
consider that the Panel erred in finding that, by failing to disclose the information at issue to the
Chinese producers in accordance with Article 6.4, the European Union denied these producers a
"full opportunity for the defence of their interests", in contravention of Article 6.2.
5.125. For the reasons expressed above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.1.ii of its
Report, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in the review investigation at issue.
5.4 Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.4.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.126. Before the Panel, the European Union argued that China was precluded from raising its
claim under Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in these compliance proceedings because
this was a claim that China could have raised but did not raise in the original proceedings, and that
pertained to an unchanged aspect of the original measure that was incorporated in, but separable
from, the measure taken to comply.
256

254 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 292.
255 Panel Report, para. 7.96.
256 Panel Report, paras. 7.101 and 7.106.

5.127. As it did in respect of Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel found
that, because the Chinese producers were not awar e of the information concerning the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, China could not have brought a claim under Article 6.1.2
in the original proceedings to challenge the Commission's failure to make available that
information promptly to the Chinese producers. The Panel also recalled that Pooja Forge provided
information on coating only during the review investigation and, therefore, China could not have
brought a claim under Article 6.1.2 in the original proceedings with respect to the disclosure of this
information.
257
5.128. On appeal, the European Union states that its claim regarding the Panel's terms of
reference in respect of Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is based on the same
arguments mutatis mutandis as the claims it makes in respect of Articles 6.4 and 6.2.
258
Article 6.1.2 and Article 6.4 require the disclosur e of information, and the information that, as
China argues, the Commission failed to disclose under these two provisions is the same. While
Article 6.4 requires the disclosure of all information that is relevant to the parties' presentation of
their cases, Article 6.1.2, for its part, requires the disclosure to interested parties of evidence
presented in writing by any other interested party.
5.129. In the light of the facts that: (i) the European Union makes the same arguments under
Article 6.1.2 that it makes under Articles 6.4 and 6.2; (ii) the underlying factual circumstances
relevant to China's claims under Articles 6.4, 6.2, and 6.1.2, are the same; and (iii) in respect of
the circumstances at issue in this dispute, Articles 6.4 and 6.1.2 impose the same disclosure
obligations; we reach the same conclusions under Article 6.1.2 that we have reached under
Articles 6.4 and 6.2. We thus consider that the claim China has raised under Article 6.1.2 in the
compliance proceedings is not a claim that China could have raised in the original proceedings.
5.130. In addition, the European Union claims on appeal that, in concluding that China's claim
under Article 6.1.2 fell within its terms of reference, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11
of the DSU. According to the European Union, cont rary to the Panel's conclusion that Pooja Forge
provided information on coating during the review investigation, what Pooja Forge actually did in
the review investigation was merely to confirm information that the Commission had already
obtained during the original investigation.
259
5.131. In the original proceedings, the Appellate Bo dy stated that "a participant claiming that a
panel ignored certain evidence, and hence acted in consistently with Article 11, must explain why
the evidence is so material to its case that the panel's failure to address such evidence has a
bearing on the objectivity of the panel's factual assessment." 260 In the present dispute, the
European Union has not demonstrated that the Panel's alleged error in concluding that Pooja Forge
provided information on coating during the review investigation, rather than simply confirming
information that it had already provided in the original investigation, is material to its case that the
Panel erred in finding that the claim under Article 6.1.2 fell within its terms of reference.
5.132. As we have explained above in respect of Articles 6.4 and 6.2, the Panel's conclusion that
China's claim under Article 6.1.2 fell within its terms of reference was not based on the fact that
the information that the Commission declined to disclose in the review investigation was "new" as
compared to the information that the Commission declined to disclose in the original investigation.
Rather, the Panel based its findings on the fact that the Chinese producers became aware of this
information only in the review investigation, so that China could not have brought the same claim
under Article 6.1.2 in the original proceedings.
5.133. Thus, even assuming that, as the European Union contends, the information on coating
had already been provided by Pooja Forge to the Commission in the original investigation, this fact
alone has no bearing on the conclusion that the European Union has not demonstrated that the
Chinese producers were aware, in the original investigation, of the existence and relevance of the
information that is at the base of China's claim under Article 6.1.2 in the compliance proceedings.

257 Panel Report, para. 7.114.
258 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 154.
259 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 156-157.
260 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 499.

5.134. In the light of the above, we see no merit in the claim by the European Union that the
Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of th e DSU in finding that Pooja Forge had provided
information on coating in the review investigation, rather than simply confirming information it had
already provided in the original investigation.
5.135. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.115 of its Report, that China's
claim under Article 6.1.2 was within the Panel's terms of reference.
5.4.2 Whether the Panel erred in rejectin g China's claim under Article 6.1.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.136. We turn now to consider China's appeal of the Panel's findings on the merits of its claim
under Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China claims that the Panel erred in rejecting
its claim that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2 in the review
investigation. China argues in this regard that the Panel erred in finding that Pooja Forge was not
an "interested party" in the review investigation and that the obligation under Article 6.1.2 did not
apply to information submitted by Pooja Forge.
261 China requests us to reverse this finding of the
Panel and to find, instead, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2 because
the Commission failed to make the information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products available to the Chinese producers.
262 We begin our analysis by
summarizing the Panel's findings under Article 6.1.2.
5.4.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.137. Before the Panel, China argued that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to make the
information concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products available promptly to
the Chinese producers. China argued that the obligation under Article 6.1.2 applied to this
information because: (i) the information at issue was not confidential within the meaning of
Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and (i i) Pooja Forge was an interested party in the
review investigation at issue.
263
5.138. The Panel recalled that it had found that the Commission acted inconsistently with
Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by acco rding confidential treatment to the information
concerning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forg e's products. In the light of this finding, the
Panel stated that it would proceed with its analysis under Article 6.1.2 on the basis that it had "not
been established that this information had to be treated as confidential". 264 Thus, the Panel
considered that the only remaining issue for its consideration was whether Pooja Forge was an
"interested party" in the review investigation.
5.139. The Panel noted that the first part of Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of entities that an authority is required to treat as "interested parties"
in an anti-dumping investigation. 265 The Panel explained that there was no dispute between the
parties that Pooja Forge, an analogue country produc er, is not one of the entities listed in the first
part of Article 6.11. Noting China's argument th at Pooja Forge was, nonetheless, an interested
party in the light of its active participation in the investigation, and the significant amount of
information that it had provided to the Commission, the Panel responded that the second part of
Article 6.11 does not state that a party that submits significant information to the authority or that
actively participates in an investigation automatically becomes an "interested party".
266 However,
the Panel considered that, because the second pa rt of Article 6.11 states that Members are not
precluded from allowing other domestic or foreign parties not mentioned in the first part of
Article 6.11 to be included as interested parties in an investigation, this implies that an authority
may allow an entity, such as an analogue country producer, to participate in an investigation as an
interested party. The Panel added that it was logical to assume that such a decision would
normally be made at the request of the party in question, and that, "[a]rguably", this party would

261 China's other appellant's submission, para. 149.
262 China's other appellant's submission, para. 183.
263 Panel Report, para. 7.116.
264 Panel Report, para. 7.116.
265 Panel Report, para. 7.117.
266 Panel Report, para. 7.118.

make such a request if it expects to be affected by the outcome of the investigation. 267 According
to the Panel, this is because gaining "interested party" status creates obligations and rights for
such parties.
268 For the Panel, this demonstrates that the decision to allow a party not specifically
listed in Article 6.11 to be included as an interested party is an important one such that it is likely
to appear on the investigation record. Noting that the record did not indicate that the Commission
decided to include Pooja Forge as an "interested party" in the review investigation, the Panel found
that Pooja Forge was, therefore, not an interested party in the investigation and, accordingly, that
the obligation under Article 6.1.2 did not apply to evidence provided by Pooja Forge.
269
5.140. Before concluding its analysis of China' s claim under Article 6.1.2, the Panel turned to
consider China's argument that, by finding, in th e original proceedings, that Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applied to Pooja Forge, the Appellate Body considered Pooja Forge
to be an "interested party" in the original investigation. Noting China's reliance on footnote 780 of
the Appellate Body report in the original proceedings 270, the Panel considered that "[a]ll that the
Appellate Body says is that the Commission had to accord the protection provided for in
Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement to the information provided by
Pooja Forge."271 For the Panel, the statement of the Appellate Body in footnote 780 of its report in
the original proceedings, alone, did not suffice to conclude that Pooja Forge was an interested
party in the original investigation, "or that the Appellate Body considered that it was".272
5.141. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Panel rejected China's claim under
Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.4.2.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that Pooja Forge was not an interested party
in the review investigation at issue
5.142. China appeals the Panel's findings under Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement on
three main grounds. First, China contends that th e Panel erred in its interpretation of the term
"interested parties" in Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement. In particular, China faults the
Panel for considering that whether an entity is an interested party depends on a decision of the
investigating authority which must appear on the record of the investigation, and for stating that
such a decision is made at the request of the part y concerned. According to China, such a decision
may "implicitly flow" from an examination of the record of the investigation, and the Panel,
therefore, erred by not examining whether the Commission, implicitly, decided to treat Pooja Forge
as an interested party.
273 China submits that the fact that the Commission selected Pooja Forge as
the analogue country producer and used its information to determine the normal values of the
Chinese producers' products demonstrates that the Commission decided to treat Pooja Forge as an
interested party.
274
5.143. Second, China contends that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
Article 6.1.2 by finding that the obligation contained therein applies only to those parties that are
"interested parties" within the meaning of Articl e 6.11. China submits that, in the light of the

267 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
268 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
269 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
270 Footnote 780 to paragraph 540 of the Appellate Body's report in the original proceedings reads as
follows:
We note, in this respect, the European Union's argument that the "good cause" requirement for
confidential treatment of information in Article 6.5 does not apply to analogue country producers
like Pooja Forge, because they do not fall within the definition of "interested parties" under
Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement … In the fasteners investigation, the Commission did
not determine normal value on the basis of the information from Chinese producers and
exporters, and decided to seek information from analogue country producers. The Indian
company Pooja Forge participated in the investigation at the request of the Commission, and
provided substantial amounts of information that was used as the basis for determining normal
value. In our view, the decision by the Commission to determine normal value based on
information from an analogue country producer, and the participation of Pooja Forge in the
investigation, require that Pooja Forge be afforded the protection of sensitive information upon
"good cause" shown and the obligations of both Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 apply. (emphasis added)
271 Panel Report, para. 7.122.
272 Panel Report, para. 7.122.
273 China's other appellant's submission, para. 162.
274 China's other appellant's submission, para. 165.

"key role" played by Pooja Forge in the review investigation 275 and the purpose of Article 6.1.2,
Pooja Forge should be assimilated to an "intereste d party" presenting evidence under Article 6.1.2
and, thus, the information provided by this company should fall within the scope of Article 6.1.2.276
Accordingly, China faults the Panel for not examining whether Pooja Forge could be assimilated to
an interested party presenting evidence for the purposes of Article 6.1.2.277
5.144. Third, China contends that the Panel erre d in its interpretation of the Appellate Body's
findings in the original proceedings. In this regard, China submits that the Panel's finding that
Pooja Forge was not an interested party for the purposes of Article 6.1.2 is not reconcilable with
the Appellate Body's finding that the obligation under Article 6.5.1 applies to Pooja Forge, despite
the fact that this provision expressly refers to confidential information provided by "interested
parties".
278 Thus, in China's view, the Appellate Body's finding that Article 6.5.1 applied to
Pooja Forge supports the conclusion that information submitted by Pooja Forge should also fall
within the scope of the obligation under Article 6.1.2.
5.145. For its part, the European Union asserts that, contrary to a textual reading of Article 6.1.2,
China is arguing that this provision does not apply only to "interested parties" within the meaning
of Article 6.11, but also to all entities that China considers can be "assimilated to 'interested
parties'".
279 Moreover, the European Union points out that Article 6.11 states that a decision by a
Member is required in order for an entity not listed in the first part of that provision to be included
as an "interested party" in an anti-dumping inve stigation. According to the European Union, China
did not point to any indications that the Commission had taken a decision to include Pooja Forge
as an "interested party" in the review investigation. Thus, submits the European Union, the Panel
correctly found that Pooja Forge was not an "interested party" for the purposes of Article 6.11 and
that, accordingly, the obligation under Article 6.1.2 did not apply to information provided by
Pooja Forge.
280
5.146. Turning to our analysis, we recall that Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
provides as follows:
Subject to the requirement to protect confid ential information, evidence presented in
writing by one interested party shall be made available promptly to other interested
parties participating in the investigation.
5.147. Article 6.1.2 makes clear that the obligation contained therein applies only to evidence
presented in writing by "interested parties" in an anti-dumping investigation. The term "interested
parties" for the purposes of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement is, in turn, defined in Article 6.11 of that
Agreement. Article 6.11 provides:
For the purposes of this Agreement, "interested parties" shall include:
(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to
investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of
which are producers, exporters or importers of such product;
(ii) the government of the exporting Member; and
(iii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business
association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the
territory of the importing Member.
This list shall not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other
than those mentioned above to be included as interested parties.

275 China's other appellant's submission, para. 172.
276 China's other appellant's submission, para. 168.
277 China's other appellant's submission, para. 168.
278 China's other appellant's submission, para. 179 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), fn 780 to para. 540).
279 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 154 (quoting China's other appellant's submission,
para. 166).
280 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 152.

5.148. Article 6.11 consists of two parts. The first part contains a non-exhaustive list of entities
that are ipso facto "interested parties" for the purposes of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In this
regard, the first part of Article 6.11 states that "interested parties" "shall include"281 the entities
listed therein, indicating that the list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive. In addition, the residual
clause of Article 6.11 states that Members shall not be precluded "from allowing … parties other
than those mentioned" in the first part of Article 6.11 to be included as "interested parties".
5.149. In examining China's claim, the Panel considered that "the decision to allow a party not
specifically listed in Article 6.11 to be included as an interested party is an important one such that
it is likely to appear on the investigation record." The Panel then stated that "[n]owhere in the
record is it indicated that the Commission decided to include Pooja Forge as an 'interested party' in
[the review] investigation."
282 The Panel therefore concluded that Pooja Forge was not an
"interested party" in the review investigation and, accordingly, that the obligation set forth under
Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "did not arise with respect to the evidence provided
by this company".283
5.150. In considering whether the Commission allowed Pooja Forge to be an "interested party" in
the investigation, we find the following factors to be pertinent. First, Pooja Forge participated in
the investigation at the request of the Commission. Second, the Commission selected Pooja Forge
as the analogue country producer for the purposes of the investigation and used its data to
determine normal values and calculate dumping margins for the Chinese producers. Third, the
Commission treated Pooja Forge like an investigating authority is required to treat an "interested
party" in an investigation by, for example, requesting Pooja Forge to provide a non-confidential
summary of information submitted in confidence , and verifying the information submitted by
Pooja Forge. Hence, in the circumstances of this case, we do not agree with the Panel's statement
that "[n]owhere in the record is it indicated that the Commission decided to include Pooja Forge as
an 'interested party' in this investigation."
284 Although there was no evidence on the record of a
formal declaration of the Commission deeming Pooja Forge to be an "interested party" within the
meaning of Article 6.11, the record of the investigation demonstrates that, by its actions in this
particular case, the Commission treated Pooja Forge as an interested party in the review
investigation at issue and, consequently, "allow[ed]" Pooja Forge "to be included as [an] interested
part[y]", within the meaning of the residual clause of Article 6.11.
5.151. Our reasoning above is consistent with the findings of the Appellate Body in the original
proceedings. In particular, the Appellate Body found that the obligations under Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applied to information submitted by Pooja Forge in the
original investigation, despite the fact that Article 6.5.1 applies explicitly to "interested parties". In
reaching this finding, the Appellate Body recalled that, in the original investigation, the
Commission did not determine normal values on the basis of the information submitted by the
Chinese producers, and decided to seek information from analogue country producers. The
Appellate Body further recalled that Pooja Forge participated in the investigation at the request of
the Commission, and provided substantial amounts of information that were used as the basis for
determining normal values. Thus, the Appellate Body considered that "the decision by the
Commission to determine normal value[s] based on information from an analogue country
producer, and the participation of Pooja Forge in the investigation, require that Pooja Forge be
afforded the protection of sensitive information upon 'good cause' shown and the obligations of
both Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 apply."
285
5.152. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we reverse the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 7.119 of its Report, that Pooja Forge was not an "interested party" in the investigation
and that, therefore, the obligation set forth in Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement did not
apply to evidence provided by Pooja Forge. Having reversed this finding of the Panel, we consider
China's request that we find that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2

281 Emphasis added.
282 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
283 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
284 Panel Report, para. 7.119.
285 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), fn 780 to para. 540.

because the Commission failed to make the information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products available to the Chinese producers.286
5.153. We recall that, subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, Article 6.1.2
requires that evidence presented in writing by one interested party be made available promptly to
other interested parties participating in an investigation. We have found above that Pooja Forge
was an interested party in the review investigation. Accordingly, evidence presented in writing by
Pooja Forge falls within the scope of the obligation under Article 6.1.2, subject to the requirement
to protect confidential information. Insofar as co nfidentiality is concerned, Article 6.1.2 must be
read in the context of Article 6.5, which governs the treatment of confidential information. Thus,
we read the term "[s]ubject to the requirement to protect confidential information" in Article 6.1.2
as excluding from the scope of that provision information that has been accorded confidential
treatment by the authority in accordance with the requirements under Article 6.5. The Panel
concluded that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 as regards the
Commission's confidential treatment of the information concerning the list and characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products. We have upheld this findin g of the Panel and further clarified that, in the
absence of "good cause" being shown, there is no legal basis under Article 6.5 for according
confidential treatment to information provided to authorities by parties to an investigation.
Accordingly, we find that the information concer ning the list and characteristics of Pooja Forge's
products is not excluded from the scope of the obligation under Article 6.1.2. Thus, by not making
this information available to the Chinese producers in the review investigation, the Commission
acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2. Therefore, we conclude that, in the review investigation at
issue, the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2.
5.154. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we reverse the Panel's finding, in
paragraph 8.2.i of its Report, that China had not established that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the review investigation at
issue, and find, instead, that the European Union acted inconsistently with that provision because
the Commission failed to make available to the Chinese producers information concerning the list
and characteristics of Pooja Forge's products.
5.5 Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.155. The European Union challenges the Pa nel's interpretation and application of the
last sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. For its part, China claims that the
Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 2.4 as regards the fair comparison
requirement under this provision.
5.5.1 The European Union's appeal under the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.156. The Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to provide the Chinese producers with
information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products that were used in determining
normal values in the review investigation at issue.
287 The European Union appeals this finding and
argues that the last sentence of Article 2.4 merely requires that interested parties be informed of
the "approach" adopted by an investigating author ity for ensuring a fair comparison and of the
characteristics of the "product groupings" used in the dumping determination.
288
5.5.1.1 The Panel's findings
5.157. Before the Panel, China claimed that the European Union acted inconsistently with the
last sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement, which requires investigating
authorities to indicate what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison, because the
Commission failed to provide the Chinese producers with information regarding the characteristics
of Pooja Forge's products that was essentia l for them to make adequate requests for
adjustments.
289 The European Union responded that the last sentence of Article 2.4 only requires

286 China's other appellant's submission, para. 183.
287 Panel Report, paras. 7.148 and 8.1.iii.
288 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 313.
289 Panel Report, paras. 7.125-7.129 and 7.134.

that interested parties be informed of the "approach" adopted by an investigating authority for
ensuring a fair comparison, but does not require the disclosure of "raw data" or confidential
information
290, or that interested parties be in a position "to satisfy themselves of the accuracy of
the information provided [to the investigating authority] by other interested parties or entities". 291
The European Union further contended that the requested information was eventually provided to
the Chinese producers through the Commission's company-specific disclosures, where detailed
dumping calculations indicated the characteristics of the products sold by Pooja Forge, as well as
the export transactions that were matched with Pooja Forge's domestic transactions.
292
5.158. The Panel began its analysis by recalling the original proceedings, where the
Appellate Body found that "Article 2.4 obliges investigating authorities … at a minimum, to inform
the parties of the products or product groups used for purposes of the price comparison."
293 The
Panel also noted the Appellate Body's conclusion that, "because the Commission did not clearly
indicate the product types used for purposes of price comparisons until very late in the
proceedings, the European Union acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2.4 by
depriving the Chinese producers of the ability to request adjustments for differences that could
have affected price comparability."
294
5.159. The Panel then turned to the review investigation at issue and stated that, "although the
Chinese producers knew the basis on which the Commission grouped the products … they did not
know the specific product types of Pooja Forge with which their own product types were being
compared."
295 Having recalled its earlier finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to provide the
Chinese producers with timely opportunities to see information concerning the list and
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, the Panel found that the Chinese producers did not know
"whether the product types were grouped consis tently with the revised PCNs" and "whether …
there were factors other than those included in the revised PCNs which could have justified further
adjustments".
296 Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the Chinese producers were deprived "of
the opportunity to make informed decisions on whether to request adjustments" under
Article 2.4.297
5.160. In addition, the Panel specifically addressed the company-specific disclosures containing
the dumping calculations relied upon by the European Union. The Panel found that these
calculations show how a particular product sold by Pooja Forge compares to each of the
PCN characteristics but do not indicate what "particular model" sold by Pooja Forge was being
compared with what "model" sold by the Chinese producers.
298 The Panel thus concluded that the
Chinese producers did not have a meaningful opportunity to request adjustments. 299 The Panel
further found that the dumping calculations did not satisfy the requirements of Article 2.4 because
they were provided as part of the final disclosure, which conveys the essential facts under
consideration with respect to the decision to impose definitive measures and is, therefore, sent to
interested parties towards the end of an investigation.
300 Finally, the Panel rejected the
European Union's argument that the relevant information was confidential, by relying on its earlier
finding that the Commission's confidential treatment of Pooja Forge's information was inconsistent
with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
301 In a footnote, the Panel added that, even if the
information were confidential, some disclosure would have been required under Article 2.4, subject
to the obligations set forth in Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding the

290 Panel Report, para. 7.130.
291 Panel Report, para. 7.131 (quoting European Union's first written submission to the Panel,
para. 110).
292 Panel Report, paras. 7.130 and 7.143 (referring to the European Union's second written submission
to the Panel, para. 65).
293 Panel Report, para. 7.138 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 512).
294 Panel Report, para. 7.138 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 513).
295 Panel Report, para. 7.139.
296 Panel Report, para. 7.141.
297 Panel Report, para. 7.142.
298 Panel Report, para. 7.144.
299 Panel Report, para. 7.144.
300 Panel Report, para. 7.144.
301 Panel Report, para. 7.145.

treatment of confidential information and the preparation of non-confidential summaries of such
information.302
5.161. Based on the foregoing, the Panel considered that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t because the Commission failed to provide the
Chinese producers with information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products that
were used in determining normal values in the review investigation at issue. 303 The Panel
underlined that this finding was made in the context of an investigation where the analogue
country methodology was used and where, consequently, the normal value was based on
information obtained from a third source, rather than from the exporter under investigation.304 The
Panel found, inter alia, that, in such an investigation, the investigating authority has "to endeavour
to put the foreign producer on an equal footing with a producer in a normal investigation in terms
of access to the information on the basis of which requests for adjustments may be formulated."305
5.5.1.2 The procedural requirement of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.162. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides, in relevant part:
A fair comparison shall be made between th e export price and the normal value. This
comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level,
and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance
shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of
trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability. … The authorities shall indicate to the
parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall
not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.
306
5.163. Article 2.4 requires investigating authorities to ensure a fair comparison between the
export price and the normal value and, to this end, to make due allowance, or adjustments, for
differences affecting price comparability. The obligation to ensure a fair comparison "lies on the
investigating authorities".
307 A s p a r t o f t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e y " a r e c h a r g e d w i t h c o m p a r i n g
normal value and export price and determining whether there is dumping of imports." 308 However,
as the Appellate Body has explained, this does not mean that interested parties do not have a role
to play in the process of ensuring a fair comparison.
309 Rather, "exporters bear the burden of
substantiating, 'as constructively as possible', th eir requests for adjustments reflecting the 'due
allowance' within the meaning of Article 2.4." 310 As such, "[i]f it is not demonstrated to the
authorities that there is a difference affecting price comparability, there is no obligation to make
an adjustment."
311 However, the authorities "must take steps to achieve clarity as to the
adjustment claimed and then determine whether and to what extent that adjustment is
merited."312
5.164. The last sentence of Article 2.4, in turn, imposes an obligation on investigating authorities
to "indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison"

303 Panel Report, para. 7.148.
304 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
305 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
306 Fn omitted.
307 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 487 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
308 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 487 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
309 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488.
310 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, para. 7.158).
311 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (referring to Panel Report, Korea – Certain
Paper, para. 7.147).
312 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).

and "not [to] impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties". This provision thus adds
a "procedural requirement" to the general obligation to ensure a fair comparison.313
5.165. As the Appellate Body explained in the original proceedings:
[W]hereas the exporters may be required to "substantiate their assertions concerning
adjustments", the last sentence of Article 2.4 requires the investigating authorities to
"indicate to the parties" what information these requests should contain, so that the
interested parties will be in a position to make a request for adjustments. This process
has been described as a "dialogue" between the authority and the interested
parties.
314
5.166. The Appellate Body further found that, "as a starting point for the dialogue between the
investigating authority and the interested parties to ensure a fair comparison, the authority must,
at a minimum, inform the parties of the product groups with regard to which it will conduct the
price comparisons."315
5.167. In addition, the Appellate Body explaine d the particular relevance of the procedural
requirement under Article 2.4 in the context of an investigation where the normal value is
established on the basis of data provided by an analogue country producer, rather than the
exporter under investigation, by stating that:
[W]here the normal value is not established on the basis of the foreign producers'
domestic sales, but is established on the basis of the domestic sales in an analogue
country, the investigating authority's obligation to inform the interested parties of the
basis of the price comparison is even more pertinent for ensuring a fair comparison.
This is because foreign producers are unlikely to have knowledge of the specific
products and pricing practices of the producer in an analogue country. Unless the
foreign producers under investigation are informed of the specific products with regard
to which the normal value is determined, they will not be in a position to request
adjustments they deem necessary.
316
5.168. With this understanding in mind, we examine below the European Union's claims of error
in respect of the Panel's interpretation and applic ation of the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.5.1.3 The European Union's claims under the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.169. On appeal, the European Union raises severa l claims under the last sentence of Article 2.4
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The European Union submits that the Panel erred in the
interpretation of the procedural obligation set out in Article 2.4 in suggesting that this obligation
differs based on the methodology used to determine normal values 317, and in finding that it

313 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 489.
314 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 489 (quoting, respectively, Panel Reports,
EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158; and Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.352). As the panel in Egypt – Steel
Rebar explained:
Finally, we note the affirmative information-gathering burden on the investigating authority in
this context, that it "shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to
ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties"
(emphasis added). In short, where it is demonstrated by one or another party in a particular
case, or by the data itself that a given difference affects price comparability, an adjustment must
be made. In identifying to the parties the data that it considers would be necessary to make such
a demonstration, the investigating authority is not to impose an unreasonable burden of proof on
the parties. Thus, the process of determining what kind or types of adjustments need to be made
to one or both sides of the dumping margin equation to ensure a fair comparison, is something of
a dialogue between interested parties and the investigating authority, and must be done on a
case-by-case basis, grounded in factual evidence.
(Panel Report, Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.352)
315 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 490.
316 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 491.
317 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 329.

requires the disclosure of "raw data". 318 In addition, the European Union claims that the Panel
erred in finding that the Commission deprived the Chinese producers of the opportunity to make
informed decisions on whether to request adjustme nts under this provision. In this context, the
European Union argues that it complied with the Appellate Body's ruling in the original proceedings
and with the procedural requirement of the last sentence of Article 2.4.
319 Finally, the
European Union claims that the Panel erred when it found that the confidential nature of the
information should not have prevented the Commission from disclosing a summary of the product
information submitted by Pooja Forge.
320 We analyse each of these claims in turn below.
5.5.1.3.1 Whether the Panel erred in suggest ing that the obligation under Article 2.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement differs based on the methodology used to determine
normal values
5.170. The European Union claims on appeal that the Panel erred in the interpretation of the
procedural obligation set out in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it allegedly
suggested that this obligation differs based on whether one or another permissible methodology is
used to determine normal value. 321 The European Union argues that there is no legal basis in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement or in China's Accession Protocol322 for a finding that Article 2.4 imposes a
"different and more far reaching disclosure obligat ion" when the analogue country methodology is
used.323 We note that this claim is raised in relation to the Panel's statements in paragraph 7.149
of its Report, where the Panel accorded particular weight to the fact that, in the investigation at
issue, the Commission relied on normal value data provided by a third party, rather than by the
exporters under investigation.
324 This paragraph of the Panel Report reads in relevant part:
In a normal investigation where the normal value is based on the foreign producer's
own prices, the latter can participate meaningfully in the dialogue envisaged under
Article 2.4 aiming to ensure a fair comparison between the normal value and the
export price. In such an investigation, the foreign producer is well positioned to make
informed decisions about the adjustments that it deems necessary for a fair
comparison. By contrast, in an investigation, such as the one before us, where the
normal value information is obtained from a third source, an issue arises as to the
foreign producer's access to that information. Fair comparison is to be carried out
between two prices, namely the normal value and the export price. Where the
[Investigating Authority] uses the analogue country methodology, the foreign exporter
will be left in the dark to the extent it does not have access to the normal value
information. The [Investigating Authority's] task in such an investigation is to find
ways to disclose as much information on normal value as the foreign producer would
need in order to meaningfully participate in the fair comparison process. In other
words, the [Investigating Authority] has to endeavour to put the foreign producer on
an equal footing with a producer in a normal investigation in terms of access to the
information on the basis of which requests for adjustments may be formulated.
325
5.171. China responds that the European Union's reading of the Panel Report is erroneous. In
China's view, the Panel found that the investigating authority needed to satisfy its obligation under
the last sentence of Article 2.4 to the same extent as would be the case in an "ordinary"
anti-dumping investigation.
326 China further explains that, irre spective of the methodology used,
"the exporters must be in a position to meaningfully request relevant adjustments in order to
ensure a fair comparison."
327 However, whereas, in an "ordinary" investigation, both the normal
value and the export price are established on the basis of the data of the exporter under

318 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 296 and 314.
319 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 317.
320 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 332.
321 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 329.
322 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432.
323 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 329.
324 Referring to the Appellate Body report in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, the
European Union requests that, should we consider this paragraph of the Panel Report to be a mere statement,
we reverse this statement. (European Union's appellant's submission, fn 234 to para. 329 (referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 936))
325 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
326 China's appellee's submission, para. 342.
327 China's appellee's submission, para. 346.

investigation and the exporter is , therefore, "well positioned" to make informed decisions about
adjustments, in an investigation involving an analogue country producer, the exporter is "left in
the dark" to the extent that it does not have access to the normal value information.
328 China
concludes that the Panel was correct when looking at the procedural obligation under Article 2.4 in
the light of the factual circumstance that the analogue country methodology was used.329
5.172. We agree that the fact that normal value is determined based on a methodology involving
data of an analogue country producer does not affect the legal obligation imposed on investigating
authorities under the last sentence of Article 2.4. In all anti-dumping investigations, "[t]he
authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair
comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties."
330 As
explained, this provision requires investigating authorities to indicate to the parties what
information requests for adjustments should contain, so that the interested parties will be in a
position to make such requests. 331 Depending on the factual circumstances at hand, this provision
may require investigating authorities to provide certain information to parties requesting
adjustments, in particular where the exporter under investigation is missing information pertaining
to the normal value determined by the investigating authority because it is based on the domestic
sales of an analogue country producer, rather than the exporter's own domestic sales. Therefore,
as we have set out above, the procedural requirement under Article 2.4 is necessarily even more
pertinent in the context of an investigation involving information from an analogue country
producer. This, however, does not mean that the legal obligation under the last sentence of
Article 2.4 is more far reaching when the analogue country methodology is used. Rather, this issue
relates to the application of this provision to a particular factual background.
5.173. The Panel correctly underlined that its findings were made "in the context of a very
particular factual situation" and it did not find that a different legal obligation applies under the
last sentence of Article 2.4 where normal value is determined based on the data of analogue
country producers
332, as the European Union suggests. 333 In addition, we agree with the Panel's
statement that, whereas in an "ordinary" investigation the exporter is well positioned to make
informed decisions about necessary adjustments, the exporter may be missing information where
the normal value is determined based on the domestic sales of an analogue country producer. As
the Panel correctly found, in this case, "the foreign exporter will be left in the dark to the extent it
does not have access to the normal value information."
334 This is because, as was set out in the
Appellate Body report in the original proceedings, the foreign producer is "unlikely to have
knowledge of the specific products and pricin g practices of the producer in an analogue
country".335 We further agree with the Panel that investigating authorities have "to endeavour to
put the foreign producer on an equal footing with a producer in a normal investigation in terms of
access to the information on the basis of which requests for adjustments may be formulated". 336 It
is indeed essential that investigating authorities provide the information that is necessary "so that
the interested parties will be in a position to make a request for adjustments". 337 As the Appellate
Body explained in the particular context of a norm al value being determined based on the data of
an analogue country producer, "[u]nless the foreign producers under investigation are informed of
the specific products with regard to which the normal value is determined, they will not be in a
position to request adjustments they deem necessary."
338
5.174. In the light of the above, we reject the European Union's claim that the Panel erred in the
interpretation of the procedural obligation set ou t in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
because it allegedly suggested that this obligation differs based on whether one or another
permissible normal value methodology is used.

329 China's appellee's submission, para. 345.
330 Article 2.4, last sentence of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
331 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 489.
332 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
333 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 329.
334 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
335 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 491.
336 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
337 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 489.
338 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 491.

5.5.1.3.2 Whether the Panel erred by turnin g the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement into a procedural ob ligation requiring the disclosure of "raw
data"
5.175. We now turn to the European Union's conten tion that the Panel erred in its interpretation
of the last sentence of Article 2.4 by turning th e "fair comparison" requirement into a procedural
provision requiring investigating authorities to disclose "raw data" and evidence to interested
parties.
339 In this context, the European Union argues that Article 2.4 does not impose specific
obligations in terms of providing information to interested parties requesting adjustments and that
Article 6 of Anti-Dumping Agreement is the relevant provision governing disclosure obligations.340
5.176. China responds that the European Unio n attempts to render the procedural obligation
imposed under the last sentence of Article 2.4 meaningless when arguing that whether specific
information should have been made available needs to be addressed exclusively under Article 6 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 341 The United States notes that, whereas the "transparency
obligation" is found in Article 6, it is "reinforced" by the last sentence of Article 2.4.342
5.177. Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains detailed rules concerning, inter alia, the
collection, confidential treatment, and disclosure of evidence in an anti-dumping investigation. It
nonetheless remains that the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement may
equally require investigating authorities to share certain information with interested parties. In this
regard, we recall that the procedural obligation under Article 2.4 is limited to ensuring that
interested parties are in a position to make requests for adjustments. By contrast, Article 6.4, for
example, relates to the parties' right to see all non-confidential information relevant to the
presentation of their cases and used by the inve stigating authority. It, therefore, applies to a
broad range of information that is used by an investigating authority for the purposes of carrying
out a required step in an anti-dumping investigation. Therefore, in the light of its limited scope, we
are of the view that the procedural obligation under Article 2.4 does not render any of the
disclosure obligations under Article 6 "redundant", as the European Union suggests.
343
5.178. Moreover, we do not agree with the European Union that the Panel erred in finding that the
last sentence of Article 2.4 requires the disclosure of "raw data".344 Whether or not a given piece of
information should be shared with interested parties under the last sentence of Article 2.4 has to
be made in the light of the specific circumstances of each investigation, not in the abstract. This is
how the Panel proceeded when finding that, in the review investigation at issue, information on the
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products needed to be shared with the Chinese producers for them
to be in a position to request adjustments.
345 We recall that, depending on the particular
circumstances of the case, the last sentence of Article 2.4 may require an investigating authority
to share certain information with interested partie s to the extent that these parties require this
information in order to make requests for adjustments.
5.179. We also note that the European Union argues that the Panel erred in the interpretation of
the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "by accepting China's approach
that a fair comparison can only be made if the producers can verify and confirm themselves if an
adjustment is required based on all of the information available to the investigating authority."
346
However, the Panel made no such finding that interested parties should be able to verify the
information provided by other parties to the investigating authority. Rather, the Panel examined
whether the Chinese producers were in a position to request adjustments based on the information
made available to them, or if the Commission should have provided them with additional
information on the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products.347

339 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 296.
340 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 305, 314, and 322-323.
341 China's appellee's submission, para. 333 (quoting European Union's appellant's submission,
para. 322).
342 United States' third participant's submission, para. 34.
343 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 322.
344 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 296.
345 Panel Report, para. 7.141.
346 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 326.
347 See e.g. Panel Report, paras. 7.142, 7.144, and 7.149.

5.180. In the light of the foregoing, we find th at the European Union has not established that the
Panel erred in the interpretation of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that the
European Union acted inconsistently with this provision because the Commission failed to provide
the Chinese producers with information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products.
5.5.1.3.3 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that the Commission deprived the Chinese
producers of the opportunity to make in formed decisions on whether to request
adjustments
5.181. The European Union claims that the Panel erred in finding that the Commission deprived
the Chinese producers of the opportunity to make informed decisions on whether to request
adjustments under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
348 According to the
European Union, the Panel should have concluded that the European Union complied with the
Appellate Body's ruling in the original proceed ings and with the procedural requirement of
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, as the Panel acknowledged, the
Chinese producers knew "the basis on which the Commission grouped the products" for the
purposes of ensuring a fair comparison.
349 The European Union explains that, in the original
proceedings, the Commission was faulted for not having informed the Chinese producers
sufficiently in advance of the two "product type s" on the basis of which it had grouped the
products, namely, the distinction between standard and special fasteners and the strength class.
350
By contrast, in the review investigation, the Commission disclosed the product groups by informing
the Chinese producers of the characteristics reflected in the revised PCNs.
351 The European Union
adds that the company-specific disclosures, which were part of the final disclosure, showed how a
particular product sold by Pooja Forge compared to each of the PCN characteristics and that this
also suffices for a finding that the European Union complied with the procedural requirement of
Article 2.4.
352
5.182. China responds that, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body referred to
information on the product groups as the "starting point" of the dialogue under Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
353 Further, China submits that the Commission should also have
provided information on the "specific products" with regard to which the normal values were
determined in the review investigation at issue 354, which the Commission failed to do. In
particular, China explains that the company-specific disclosures merely identified how the
Chinese producers' fasteners had been grouped ac cording to the revised PCNs and whether there
existed an allegedly corresponding match in Pooja Forge's products, but did not provide the
necessary information on the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products.
355
5.183. As set out above, the Appellate Body found in the original proceedings that Article 2.4
obliges investigating authorities, at a minimum, to inform the parties of the "product groups" used
for the purposes of the price comparison. 356 Furthermore, where the normal value is established
on the basis of the domestic sales in an analogue country, interested parties need to be informed
of "the specific products with regard to which the normal value is determined". 357 This will allow
them to decide whether requests for adjustments regarding any differences affecting
price comparability should be made.
5.184. The Panel noted that, in the review investigation, the Commission initially intended to base
its dumping determination on the same two "product types" used in the original investigation,
namely, the distinction between special and standard fasteners and the strength class.
358 However,
following the Chinese producers' comments and requests to see further information, the

348 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 317.
349 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 317 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.139).
350 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 319.
351 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 320.
352 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 318.
353 China's appellee's submission, para. 323 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 490).
354 China's appellee's submission, para. 325 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 491).
355 China's appellee's submission, para. 334.
356 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 490.
357 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 491.
358 Panel Report, para. 7.139.

Commission decided to use the revised PCNs, based on the following product characteristics: the
distinction between standard and special fasteners; strength class; coating; diameter; and
length.
359 The Commission disclosed the revised PCNs on the basis of which it grouped the
products to conduct the comparison between th e export prices and normal values. The Panel
further noted that "the Commission rejected the Chinese producers' repeated requests to see the
information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products."360
5.185. In addition to the revised PCNs, the Commission provided company-specific disclosures as
part of the final disclosure, consisting of individual dumping margin calculations prepared for
three Chinese producers.361 The Panel found that the company-specific disclosures provided some
but not all the information on Pooja Forge's products used to determine normal values. As the
Panel explained:
[The] disclosures indicate the PCN characteristics of the products that were matched
on the normal value and export price side but do not indicate which models were
being compared. To follow on the EU's example … the disclosure did indicate that
Pooja Forge had sold e.g. a standard hexagon socket head screw, with chrome, with a
strength class of 8.8 and small diameter and length. Contrary to what the
European Union asserts, however, this does not show the characteristics of
Pooja Forge's product with which the products of the Chinese producers were
compared. It only shows how a particular product compares to each of the
PCN characteristics taken into account in categorizing different product types. It does
not show what particular model of Pooja Forge's products was being compared with
what model sold by the Chinese producers.
362
5.186. The European Union alleges that "the Panel misunderstood what the Commission actually
disclosed."363 We recall that "[a]llegations implicating a panel's appreciation of facts and evidence
fall under Article 11 of the DSU." 364 The European Union's claim relates to the Panel's appreciation
of the evidence and, therefore, should have be en brought under Article 11 of the DSU. Yet, the
European Union has not raised a claim under Article 11 of the DSU alleging that the Panel's review
of the company-specific disclosures was inconsistent with its obligation to conduct an objective
assessment of the facts. Thus, it is not for us to second-guess the Panel's conclusion resulting
from its assessment of this evidence.
5.187. The European Union further contends that, since the Chinese producers had been informed
of the revised PCNs, they knew the product characteristics used by the Commission and could
have claimed the adjustments they deemed necessary.
365 The European Union is of the view that
the Chinese producers could have requested adjustments on the basis of other relevant
characteristics – for example, if their transactions reflected such other characteristics 366 – or if
they only sold products that had or did not have particular characteristics that were reflected in
the revised PCNs.
367
5.188. Indicating which particular method is used to categorize the products for the purposes of
price comparison is the starting point of the di alogue contemplated by the Appellate Body under
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 368 In an anti-dumping investigation involving an
analogue country producer, the exporters under investigation also need to be informed "of the
specific products with regard to which the normal value is determined", or they will "not be in a
position to request adjustments they deem necessary". 369 We recall that, in an "ordinary"

359 Panel Report, para. 7.139 (referring to Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 43). See also
Letter dated 5 July 2012 from the European Commission to interested parties (Panel Exhibit CHN-15).
360 Panel Report, para. 7.139.
361 Calculations for Biao Wu (Panel Exhibit CHN-44); Calculations for Ningbo Jinding (Panel Exhibit
CHN-45); Calculations for Changshu (Panel Exhibit CHN-46).
362 Panel Report, para. 7.144.
363 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 324.
364 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.173. (fn omitted)
365 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 320 and 324.
366 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 320 and 324. The European Union observes that the
Chinese producers were successfully able to claim adjustments regarding "quality control" without seeing the
"raw data" submitted by Pooja Forge. (Ibid., para. 319)
367 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 324.
368 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 490.
369 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 491.

anti-dumping investigation, normal value is usually determined on the basis of the particular
exporter's domestic sales. Therefore, the exporter under investigation would be expected to have
the necessary knowledge of its own products used for establishing both the export price and the
normal value. In such circumstances, once the ex porter knows on which basis the comparison will
be made (for example, once the PCNs are discl osed), that exporter can ascertain whether the
product groups used adequately capture all differences affecting price comparability or if
adjustments are necessary to account for certain differences that affect price comparability. As the
Panel correctly stated, in investigations involving an analogue country producer, the normal value
information is obtained from a third source. To the extent the exporters under investigation do not
have access to the normal value information, they are "left in the dark" as to the adjustments they
could request for differences that affect price comparability between the exported products and the
products sold domestically by the analogue country producer.
370
5.189. The factual circumstances mentioned above show that, in the investigation at issue, the
Commission indicated to the Chinese producers the "product groups" that served as the basis for
comparing the transactions by disclosing the revised PCNs. However, the Commission did not
disclose all the information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products used for the
purposes of the price comparison. In particular , the Commission did not indicate the "specific
products" of Pooja Forge that were used to de termine normal values, which would have enabled
the Chinese producers to request the adjustments they deemed necessary. The Chinese producers
might have been in a position to speculate about which adjustments were warranted by looking at
their own products – for example, if their products had characteristics not accounted for in the
revised PCNs. However, they could not know if su ch differences were relevant for a comparison
with the prices of Pooja Forge's products or if there were any other relevant characteristics that
Pooja Forge's products had which would have required an adjustment to ensure price
comparability. We, therefore, agree with the Panel's finding that, "[b]y failing to provide the
Chinese producers with the information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products
which were used in determining the normal value[s] and which were then compared with the
products of the Chinese producers, the Commission deprived these producers of the opportunity to
make informed decisions on whether to request adjustments under Article 2.4."
371
5.190. Moreover, the European Union claims that the Panel erred insofar as it considered the final
disclosure documents not to be a timely way of informing interested parties under Article 2.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 372 The European Union recalls that the dialogue between the
Commission and interested parties had started prior to the final disclosure and argues that, not
only were interested parties fully informed of the "product types" used by the Commission at the
time of the company-specific disclosures, but they were also provided with sufficient time to
comment.
373 China, on the other hand, is of the view that the dialogue contemplated under
Article 2.4 cannot appropriately take place "at the very end of the investigation", at a point in time
where the dumping calculations have been made.374
5.191. As explained above, the Panel found that the company-specific disclosures do not indicate
which "particular models" were being compared and correctly concluded that the
Chinese producers thus could not have had a meaningful opportunity to request adjustments
based on these disclosures.
375 Having found that the disclosures at issue did not contain sufficient
information to meet the requirements of the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the Panel was not required to address the question of whether such disclosures were
made in a timely manner. Nonetheless, we recall that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
provides that "[t]he authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to
apply definitive measures." This disclosure necessarily takes place towards the end of the
investigation and at a time when the investigating authority has established and compared normal
value and export price. By contrast, the dialogue under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
necessarily starts in the early stages of an investigation and thus precedes the disclosure of
essential facts under Article 6.9. An investigating authority should indeed indicate to the parties in

370 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
371 Panel Report, para. 7.142.
372 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 327.
373 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 328.
374 China's appellee's submission, para. 339.
375 Panel Report, para. 7.144.

question what information is necessary early enough in the investigation such that these parties
can make requests for adjustments ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export
price before the dumping margin is determined. Therefore, in most cases, a disclosure under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement will not fulfil the requirements of Article 2.4. However,
whether information shared at the end of an on-going dialogue under Article 2.4 is timely enough
to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and export price must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis, by assessing whether interested parties had a meaningful opportunity to
request adjustments in the light of the information shared by the investigating authority towards
the end of that dialogue. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that, in some particular instances, a
disclosure under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement could fulfil the requirements of
Article 2.4.
5.5.1.3.4 Whether the Panel erred in find ing that the confidential nature of the
information should not have prevented the Commission from disclosing a summary of
the information at issue
5.192. The European Union claims that the Panel erred in finding that the confidential nature of
the information should not have prevented the Commission from disclosing a summary of the
information at issue.
376 The European Union contends that such a non-confidential summary was in
fact provided through the "product type information" disclosed as part of the final disclosure, and
that the Commission struck a balance between prot ecting confidential information provided by
Pooja Forge and disclosing the necessary information to the Chinese interested parties.377
5.193. China responds that Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide for a
carve-out with respect to confidential information and that, consequently, the confidential
character of the information cannot be an excuse for failing to comply with the requirement of
Article 2.4.
378 China also argues that, even if the information were confidential, quod non,
the Commission could still meet its obligation under Article 2.4 through the use of non-confidential
summaries.379
5.194. We have upheld above the Panel's finding that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to conduct an
objective assessment of whether Pooja Forge had shown "good cause" for the confidential
treatment of the information at issue.
380 We therefore find that the Panel did not err in rejecting
the European Union's argument that the informat ion at issue was protected from disclosure under
Article 6.5 and, therefore, could not be disclosed under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
by relying on its earlier finding that the Commission's confidential treatment of Pooja Forge's
information was inconsistent with Article 6.5.
381
5.195. Moreover, the Panel was correct in finding that, even if the information were to be treated
as confidential under Article 6.5, the obligatio n under Article 2.4 would still have required the
Commission to make some disclosure to interested parties in order to allow them to make
informed decisions regarding possible adjustments.382 We recall that the fair comparison obligation
under Article 2.4 lies on the investigating authority. As the Panel correctly found, where the
normal value is determined on the basis of the domestic sales in an analogue country, the
investigating authority has "to find ways to disclose as much information on normal value as the
foreign producer would need in order to meaningfully participate in the fair comparison
process."
383 Therefore, even if the information had re quired confidential treatment pursuant to

376 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 332 (referring to Panel Report, fn 200 to
para. 7.145).
377 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 333-334.
378 China's appellee's submission, paras. 354-356.
379 China's appellee's submission, para. 357.
380 As we have further explained in paragraph 5.101, if information has been accorded confidential
treatment under Article 6.5 in a manner that does not conform to the requirements of that provision, there is
no legal basis for according confidential treatment to that information under another provision, such as
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
381 Panel Report, para. 7.145.
382 Panel Report, fn 200 to para. 7.145. The Panel noted that this disclosure would be subject to the
obligations set forth in Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding the treatment of
confidential information and the preparation of non-confidential summaries of such information.
383 Panel Report, para. 7.149.

Article 6.5, the Commission would, under Article 2.4, have needed to make its best effort to
disclose the information that was necessary for the Chinese producers to request adjustments.
While such information could have been disclos ed with the permission of Pooja Forge under
Article 6.5, or via a non-confidential summary prepared by Pooja Forge pursuant to Article 6.5.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement 384, it could also have been disclosed by other means for the
purposes of Article 2.4, such as via a non-conf idential summary prepared by the investigating
authority.
5.196. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the European Union has not established that the
Panel erred in its interpretation or application of the last sentence of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.197. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.148 and 8.1.iii of its Report,
that the European Union acted inconsistently wi th Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
because the Commission failed to provide the Chinese producers with information regarding the
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products that were used in determining normal values.
5.5.2 China's appeal regarding the fair comp arison requirement under Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.198. We turn now to consider China's appeal under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
China submits that the Panel erred in the interpretation and application of Article 2.4 in finding
that the European Union did not act inconsistently with the fair comparison requirement under this
provision in relation to the Commission's rejection of the Chinese producers' requests for
adjustments based on: (i) differences in taxation; (ii) differences in certain costs;
and (iii) differences in physical characteristics. In relation to its claim pertaining to differences in
costs, China also submits that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by focusing
exclusively on one of the differences put forward by the Chinese producers, and by considering the
available evidence on a piecemeal basis. We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the Panel's
findings in relation to the fair comparison re quirement under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Thereafter, we set out our understanding of certain issues relating to the
interpretation of this provision before examining, in turn, China's discrete claims on appeal with
respect to differences in taxation, other costs, and physical characteristics.
5.5.2.1 The Panel's findings
5.199. Addressing first the alleged differences in taxation, the Panel noted that Pooja Forge
imported most of its raw materials used to produce fasteners (i.e. wire rod), whereas the
Chinese producers sourced their raw materials domestically.
385 The Panel observed that "[t]he
Commission resorted to the analogue country methodology because it determined that the
Chinese producers subject to the investigation di d not operate according to the principles of a
market economy, including with respect to the price paid for domestic wire rod" and found that
adjusting for differences in taxation "would undermine the Commission's right to have recourse to
the analogue country methodology".
386 The Panel added that, "once the [investigating authority]
starts making adjustments for such cost differences, it will effectively be moving towards the costs
in the investigated country that, at the outset of the investigation, was not considered to be a
market economy."
387 Moreover, the Panel found that, even if the Commission were under an
obligation to consider making an adjustment for such differences in taxation, the
Chinese producers did not come forward with a substantiated request for an adjustment.388

384 Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-
confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a
reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In
exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that such information is not susceptible of
summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is
not possible must be provided.
385 Panel Report, para. 7.216.
386 Panel Report, para. 7.218.
387 Panel Report, para. 7.219.
388 Panel Report, paras. 7.220-7.221.

5.200. Turning to the alleged differences in physical characteristics, the Panel observed that China
referred to two groups of characteristics: (i) those that were included in the original PCNs
(i.e. coating, chrome, diameter and length, and ty pes of fasteners); and (ii) those that were not
included in the original PCNs (i.e. traceability, standards, unit of defective rate, hardness, bending
strength, impact toughness, and friction coefficient).
389 The Panel analysed China's claims with
respect to each of the characteristics included in the original PCNs separately and rejected these
claims on the basis that no showing had been made of differences affecting price comparability.
390
As regards the characteristics not included in the original PCNs, the Panel rejected the
European Union's contention that this claim did not fall within its terms of reference. 391 The Panel,
however, found that China had failed to show that the Chinese producers made substantiated
requests for adjustments.
392 The Panel further observed that China mainly took issue with the
Commission's failure to provide information on the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products. 393
According to the Panel, finding a violation of th e fair comparison requirement under Article 2.4
because the Commission failed to provide information would have been speculative since it would
have been based on the assumption that, had the Commission provided the necessary information,
the Chinese producers would have made substantiated requests for adjustments.394
5.201. Finally, the Panel analysed China's claim pertaining to differences in other costs
(i.e. differences relating to access to raw materials, use of self-generated electricity, efficiency in
raw material consumption, efficiency in electricity consumption, and productivity per employee).
After having found that this claim fell within its terms of reference
395, the Panel focused its analysis
on the alleged difference in electricity consumption, and concluded that, based on the evidence on
the record, the Chinese producers had failed to demonstrate that the claimed differences affected
price comparability.396
5.202. Turning to China's argument that the Commission had not provided sufficient information
to the Chinese producers for them to substantiate further their requests for adjustments, the Panel
noted that this issue concerned the procedural aspects of the fair comparison obligation 397, in
respect of which it had already found a violation of Article 2.4 by the European Union. Moreover,
the Panel found that, "in an investigation against an NME where the analogue country
methodology is used, claiming adjustments for al leged differences in costs would undermine the
[investigating authority]'s recourse to that methodology."398 In this context, the Panel recalled that
the Commission determined normal values based on Pooja Forge's data because "it considered
[the Chinese] producers' prices not to reflect the market dynamics." 399 The Panel further rejected
China's argument that the Commission made similar adjustments in the past on the basis that the
European Union disputed the existence of any "past practice" and that it was, in any view, not a
factor that could be taken into account under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
400 The
Panel also dismissed China's argument that because the Commission made an adjustment for
differences in quality control in the original investigation, it should have accorded the same
treatment to the cost differences at issue.
401 As the Panel found, the adjustment for quality control
was made because, unlike the Chinese producers, Pooja Forge had quality control as an additional
step in its production process. By contrast, the costs relied upon by China were incurred by both
Pooja Forge and the Chinese producers.
402

389 Panel Report, para. 7.224.
390 Panel Report, paras. 7.225-7.228 and 7.230.
391 Panel Report, para. 7.233.
392 Panel Report, para. 7.235.
393 Panel Report, para. 7.235.
394 Panel Report, para. 7.235.
395 Panel Report, para. 7.239.
396 Panel Report, paras. 7.242-7.243.
397 Panel Report, para. 7.244.
398 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
399 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
400 Panel Report, para. 7.246.
401 Panel Report, paras. 7.247-7.249.
402 Panel Report, para. 7.249.

5.203. Based on the foregoing, the Panel rejected China's claim that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement because the Commission failed to
make adjustments for differences affecting price comparability.403
5.5.2.2 The fair comparison requiremen t under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement
5.204. As we have set out above, Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires
investigating authorities to ensure a fair comparison between the export price and the normal
value and, to this end, to make due allowance, or adjustments, for differences affecting price
comparability. Whereas the obligation to ensure a fair comparison lies on the investigating
authorities, "exporters bear the burden of subs tantiating, 'as constructively as possible', their
requests for adjustments reflecting the 'due allowance' within the meaning of Article 2.4."
404
Accordingly, "[i]f it is not demonstrated to the authorities that there is a difference affecting price
comparability, there is no obligation to make an adjustment." 405 However, the authorities "must
take steps to achieve clarity as to the adjust ment claimed and then determine whether and to
what extent that adjustment is merited".406
5.205. The fair comparison requirement of Articl e 2.4 applies in all anti-dumping investigations,
irrespective of the methodology used to determine normal value. In this context, we recall that
Article 2.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement incorporates the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the
GATT 1994.407 This provision, read in conjunction with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
has been understood to allow investigating authorities to disregard domestic prices and costs of an
NME producer in the determination of normal value on the ground that a strict comparison with
such prices may not be appropriate. As the Appellate Body has explained, while the second
Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to difficulties in determining price comparability in general, "the text
of this provision clarifies that these difficulties relate exclusively to the normal value side of the
comparison."
408 As such, the second Ad Note offers flexibility only in respect of the determination
of normal value. Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol, entitled "Price Comparability in
Determining Subsidies and Dumping", contains a similar acknowledgment of the difficulties in
determining price comparability in respect of imports from China.
409 The Appellate Body has noted

403 Panel Report, para. 7.251.
404 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, para. 7.158).
405 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (referring to Panel Report, Korea – Certain
Paper, para. 7.147).
406 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).
407 The second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 reads:
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special
difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in
such cases importing Members may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a
strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.
The Appellate Body has explained that this provision "appears to describe a certain type of NME, where the
State monopolizes trade and sets all domestic prices" and that it "would thus not on its face be applicable to
lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil both conditions, that is, the complete or substantially complete
monopoly of trade and the fixing of all prices by the State". (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
fn 460 to para. 285)
408 Footnote 460 to paragraph 285 of the Appellate Body report in EC – Fasteners (China) reads, in
relevant part:
[T]he reference in the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 to a strict "comparison with domestic
prices" not always being "appropriate" provides flexibility only in respect of the determination of
normal value. The recognition of special difficulties in determining price comparability in the
second Ad Note to Article VI:1 does not mean that importing Members may depart from the
provisions regarding the determination of export prices and the calculation of dumping margins
and anti-dumping duties set forth in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and in the GATT 1994. While
the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to difficulties in determining price comparability in
general, the text of this provision clarifies that these difficulties relate exclusively to the normal
value side of the comparison. This is indicated by the operative part in the third sentence of this
provision, which only allows importing Members to depart from a "strict comparison with
domestic prices". (emphasis original)
409 Section 15(a) of China's Accession Protocol provides:
In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry

that, according to Section 15(a) of China's Accession Protocol, if Chinese producers are not able to
"clearly show" that market-economy conditions prevail in the industry at issue, "the importing
WTO Member may use an alternative methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with
domestic prices or costs in China, such as using surrogate third country or constructed normal
value."
410 As the Appellate Body has found, "while Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol
establishes special rules regarding the domestic price aspect of price comparability, it does not
contain an open-ended exception that allows WTO Members to treat China differently for other
purposes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, such as the determination of
export prices or individual versus country-wide margins and duties."
411
5.206. We understand that, in this appeal, China does not challenge the methodology used by the
Commission to determine normal values, which was based on the domestic prices of an analogue
country producer. Nor does it challenge the use of India as the analogue country or Pooja Forge as
the analogue country producer. China, however, argues that there is no legal basis in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement or in China's Accession Protocol for a finding that Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement imposes a different and less stringent fair comparison obligation in
investigations involving NME producers. 412 The European Union does not dispute that the fair
comparison requirement of Article 2.4 applies in the context of an investigation involving an
analogue country413, but argues that "the essence of the EU's analogue country methodology … is
to replace the entire data set of the exporter in the non-market economy country by the data set
of a producer in an analogue market economy country", not to replace the distorted costs by
market costs.
414 Accordingly, in such a situation, the Commission "does not adjust the prices or
costs of the analogue country producers to take into account the difference in production
methodologies, production factors or efficiencies between the analogue country producers and the
producers of the exporting country".415
5.207. As explained, the fair comparison requir ement of Article 2.4 applies in all anti-dumping
investigations, including where normal value is determined on the basis of a surrogate
third country. However, Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has to be read in the context
of the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Section 15(a) of China's Accession
Protocol. We recall that the rationale for determining normal value on the basis of the domestic
prices of Pooja Forge was that the Chinese producers had not clearly shown that market economy
conditions prevail in the fasteners industry in China.
416 Costs and prices in the Chinese fasteners
industry thus cannot, in this case, serve as reliable benchmarks to determine normal value. In our
view, the investigating authority is not required to adjust for differences in costs between the
NME producers under investigation and the analogue country producer where this would lead the
investigating authority to adjust back to the costs in the Chinese industry that were found to be
distorted. Based on the foregoing, an investigating authority can reject a request for an
adjustment if such adjustment would effectively reflect a cost or price that was found to be
distorted in the exporting country in the normal value component of the comparison that is

under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic
prices or costs in China based on the following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market economy conditions
prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to the manufacture,
production and sale of that product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices
or costs for the industry under investigation in determining price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation
cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the
like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.
410 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 286.
411 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 290. (fn omitted) The Appellate Body also
stated that, "[l]ike the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, Section 15(a) of China's Accession
Protocol permits importing Members to derogate from a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in
China, that is, in respect of the determination of the normal value." (Ibid., para. 287)
412 China's other appellant's submission, paras. 16 et seq. and 71.
413 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 22.
414 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 66.
415 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 67. However, according to the European Union,
adjustments can be made in the case of a natural comparative advantage or for an additional step in the
production process, for example, quality control, which reflects an additional cost element that results in
quality differences. (European Union's response to questioning at the oral hearing)
416 This is pursuant to China's Accession Protocol, Section 15(a)(ii).

contemplated under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Accordingly, an investigating
authority has to "take steps to achieve clarity as to the adjustment claimed" 417 and determine
whether, on its merits, the adjustment is warranted because it reflects a difference affecting price
comparability or whether it would lead to adjusting back to costs or prices that were found to be
distorted in the exporting country.
5.208. With this interpretation in mind, we turn to China's claims on appeal in relation to each of
the differences at issue, namely, differences in taxation, other costs, and physical characteristics.
5.5.2.3 Differences in taxation
5.209. We recall that Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement specifically refers to differences
in taxation as differences for which adjustments may be required.418 In addition, Article VI:4 of the
GATT 1994 provides that "[n]o product of the territo ry of any Member imported into the territory
of any other Member shall be subject to anti-dum ping or countervailing duty by reason of the
exemption of such product from duties or taxe s borne by the like product when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or
taxes."419
5.210. As the Panel observed, Pooja Forge imported most of the raw materials needed to produce
its fasteners, i.e. wire rod, whereas the Chinese producers bought their wire rod domestically. 420
The Chinese producers' requests for an adjustment were based on the fact that Pooja Forge's
domestic prices included import duties and other indirect taxes on the raw materials that were not
included in the Chinese export prices. Thes e are the differences in taxation at issue.
421 The
Chinese producers also argued that, had they imported their raw materials, they would have
benefited from a duty drawback for import duties paid on such inputs.422
5.211. The Commission rejected the Chinese producers' requests on the basis that: (i) the
Chinese producers did not show that they would benefit from a non-collection or refund of the
import duties paid on the raw materials; and (ii) the prices of the raw materials were found to be
distorted in China and therefore could not serv e as a basis for an adjustment. The Review
Regulation reads, in relevant parts:
The raw material imported by the Indian producer was subject to the basic customs
duty (5 % of assessable value) and the Customs Education Cess (3 % of the basic
customs duty value plus the CVD amount). However, according to Article 2(10)(b) of
the basic Regulation, such an adjustment for indirect taxes is claimable if the import
charges borne by the like product and by ma terial physically incorporated therein,
when intended for consumption on the domestic market would not be collected or
would be refunded when the like product is exported to the European Union. In the
absence of a claim and evidence that ex ports from the above-mentioned exporting
producers to the EU would benefit from a non-collection or refund of import charges
on imports of raw materials (wire rod), the claim must be rejected. Furthermore, such
an adjustment is not normally available when the exporting producer concerned, as is

417 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).
418 Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides, in relevant part:
Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differenc es which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade,
quantities, physical char acteristics, and any othe r differences which are also demonstrated to
affect price comparability.
419 We see no derogation from these rules in Section 15 or elsewhere in China's Accession Protocol.
420 Panel Report, para. 7.216.
421 Panel Report, para. 7.210 (referring to Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the
European Commission concerning the disclosure of 30 May 2012 (Panel Exhibit CHN-33), p. 5; Letter dated
13 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu to the European Commission concerning the disclosure of 30 May 2012
(Panel Exhibit CHN-34), p. 5; and Letter dated 19 June 2012 on behalf of China's Chamber of Commerce for
Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME) to the European Commission (Panel Exhibit
CHN-7), p. 8).
422 Panel Report, para. 7.213 (referring to Letter dated 19 July 2012 on behalf of CCCME and Biao Wu to
the European Commission (Panel Exhibit CHN-21), p. 10).

the case in this review, sources all its raw materials from domestic suppliers incurring
therefore no import charge.
…
[T]he cost of the major raw material — steel wire rod — did not substantially reflect
market values. It was found that the prices of the steel wire rods charged on the
domestic market were significantly lower than those charged on other markets.
Therefore, these distorted prices cannot be used as a basis for adjustment as
requested by the said parties. In these circumstances, the Commission fails to see
which additional information, in the view of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and
the exporting producer, could be provided to further substantiate [this request].
423
5.212. The Panel rejected China's claim on the grounds that such an adjustment would undermine
the Commission's right to have recourse to the analogue country methodology 424 and that the
Chinese producers did not substantiate their requests for an adjustment. 425 On appeal,
China claims that both of these findings by the Panel are in error. 426 We analyse each of China's
claims in turn below.
5.5.2.3.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that adjusting for differences in taxation
would undermine the Commission's right to have recourse to the analogue country
methodology
5.213. China argues that the obligation that lies on investigating authorities to make necessary
adjustments also applies in anti-dumping investigations involving NME producers. 427 Moreover,
China contends that, in the present case, making an adjustment for differences in taxation would
not undermine the Commission's ability to resort to the analogue country methodology, because
differences in taxation on raw materials are unrelated to the issue of the actual cost of such
raw materials.
428 Instead, according to China, the adjustment relates to the fact that import duties
and other indirect taxes on raw materials are included in the domestic prices of Pooja Forge while
they are not included in the Chinese export prices. 429 China further explains that making an
adjustment would only require the Commission to use Pooja Forge's data and not that of the
Chinese producers.430
5.214. The European Union responds that the differences at issue are "directly related" to the
reason for resorting to the analogue country methodology. 431 At the oral hearing, the
European Union argued that the Chinese producers would source their raw materials
internationally if the prices in China were not distorted 432, and that the market price for the raw
materials in India includes import duties. Moreover, according to the European Union, whether the
Chinese producers would have benefited from a duty drawback had they imported the
raw materials, and whose cost data are being used to calculate the adjustment, are irrelevant to
the issue of whether adjustments are warranted.
433
5.215. The Panel correctly found that "the fact that the analogue country methodology was used
does not relieve the Commission from the obligation to conduct a fair comparison as required
under Article 2.4." 434 However, we disagree with the Pane l's approach, which was to find, in
general terms and without more, that adjusting for differences in taxation "would undermine the
Commission's right to have recourse to the analogue country methodology".
435 This finding by the
Panel is not compatible with the fair comparison requirement in Article 2.4, which applies in all

423 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recitals 80 and 100.
424 Panel Report, para. 7.218.
425 Panel Report, paras. 7.220-7.221.
426 China's other appellant's submission, para. 14.
427 China's other appellant's submission, para. 22.
428 China's other appellant's submission, para. 49.
429 China's other appellant's submission, para. 49.
430 China's other appellant's submission, para. 50.
431 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 28.
432 See also European Union's appellee's submission, para. 28.
433 European Union's appellee's submission, paras. 34-35.
435 Panel Report, para. 7.218.

anti-dumping investigations and requires that "[d]ue allowance … be made in each case, on its
merits, for differences which affect price comparability". However, the investigating authority
cannot be required to adjust for differences in costs between the NME producers under
investigation and the analogue country producer where this would lead the investigating authority
to adjust back to the costs that were found to be distorted.
5.216. The Panel did not review whether the Commission had established that the differences in
taxation on raw materials were related to the issue of the price of domestic raw materials that was
found to be distorted or whether an adjustment was merited because price comparability was
affected under Article 2.4. In addition, the Panel found that, "once the [investigating authority]
starts making adjustments for such cost differences, it will effectively be moving towards the costs
in the investigated country that, at the outset of the investigation, was not considered to be a
market economy".
436 However, the Panel did not review whether the Commission's determination
reflected an examination of whether or why it would have moved towards the distorted costs of
the relevant industry in the exporting country by adjusting for these differences in taxation.
Therefore, the Panel did not properly review whether the Commission "[took] steps to achieve
clarity as to the adjustment claimed and then determine[d] whether and to what extent that
adjustment [was] merited" as required under Article 2.4.
437
5.217. The Commission found that the cost of steel wire rod did not reflect market values in China
and, therefore, could not be used as a basis for the requested adjustment. 438 The Commission's
determination, however, does not reflect that the Commission analysed the relationship between
the differences in taxation for which an adjustment was claimed by the Chinese producers and
these distorted costs. In particular, the Commission's determination does not reflect a finding that,
as the European Union suggests
439, the Chinese producers would have sourced their wire rod
internationally but for the distortion on the Chinese market, or that the price of wire rod in India
would not be a market price if the import duties were to be removed. We, therefore, consider that
the Commission's determination does not reflect that it assessed whether the requested
adjustment was warranted or whether it would have had the effect of reintroducing distorted costs
or prices in the normal value component of the comparison. The Commission, hence, failed to
"take steps to achieve clarity as to the adjust ment claimed and then determine whether and to
what extent that adjustment [was] merited" as required under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
440
5.218. Based on the foregoing, we find that the Panel erred in concluding that the Commission
w a s n o t r e q u i r e d t o " c o n s i d e r m a k i n g a n a d j u s t m e n t d u e t o [ d i f f e r e n c e s i n t a x a t i o n ] " s o l e l y
because the analogue country methodology was used in this investigation.
441 We further find that
the Commission failed to assess properly whether the requested adjustment based on differences
in taxation was warranted, or whether it would have had the effect of reintroducing distorted costs
or prices in the normal value component of the comparison.
5.5.2.3.2 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that the Chinese producers did not come
forward with a substantiated request for an adjustment
5.219. China submits that the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement
442 in finding that, "[e]ven if the Commission were under an obligation to consider
making an adjustment due to alleged differences in the taxation of wire rod in India, despite the
fact that the analogue country methodology was used in the investigation, the facts on the record
do not show that the Chinese producers showed to the Commission that this difference in taxation
affected price comparability as prescribed under Article 2.4 of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement."
443
China recalls that Pooja Forge's domestic prices included an amount for import duties and other
indirect taxes on wire rod that would not be included in its export prices, whereas Chinese export

436 Panel Report, para. 7.219.
437 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).
438 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 100.
439 See supra para. 5.214.
440 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).
441 Panel Report, paras. 7.218-7.220.
442 China's other appellant's submission, para. 52.
443 Panel Report, para. 7.220.

prices did not include any import duties and indirect taxes given that the Chinese producers
sourced their wire rod domestically. 444 China adds that, had the Chinese producers imported their
wire rod, they would have been able to obtain an import-duty drawback. 445 Accordingly, China
submits that the Chinese producers demonstrated the existence of a difference in taxation that
affects price comparability.446
5.220. The European Union argues that China should have brought a claim under Article 11 of the
DSU given that China relies on an alleged error in the factual finding of the Panel that the
Chinese producers failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate their requests for an
adjustment.447 The European Union further submits that China's claim is, in any view, without
merit because the Commission made a "reasoned and reasonable decision" when refusing to make
the requested adjustment.
448 At the oral hearing, the European Union explained that the
Chinese producers could not have provided any further information to substantiate their requests
because they were requesting an adjustment that related to a distorted market.
5.221. First, we analyse whether China should have brought its claim under Article 11 of the DSU,
as the European Union contends. We recall that, in most cases, the issue raised by a particular
claim "will either be one of application of the law to the facts or an issue of the objective
assessment of facts, and not both". 449 While allegations implicating a panel's appreciation of facts
and evidence fall under Article 11 of the DSU 450, by contrast, "'[t]he consistency or inconsistency
of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty provision is … a legal
characterization issue' and is therefore a legal question."
451 In our view, China takes issue with the
Panel's assessment of whether the Chinese producers' requests for an adjustment were sufficiently
substantiated to meet the requirements of Articl e 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In other
words, the issue is whether the differences for which an adjustment was requested affected price
comparability such that the adjustment would be warranted to ensure a fair comparison.
Therefore, this claim should be treated as a cha llenge of the Panel's application of Article 2.4 to
the facts of this case.
5.222. Turning to the issue of whether the Chin ese producers submitted a substantiated request
for an adjustment, we recall that it is the producers under investigation that bear the burden of
substantiating their requests "as constructively as possible".
452 The Commission rejected the
Chinese producers' requests on the basis that they had not shown that their exports "would benefit
from a non-collection or refund of import charges on imports of raw materials (wire rod)".
453 As
the Panel observed, the Commission "found it normal that the Chinese producers did not come
forward with such evidence because they bought their raw materials from the Chinese market and
therefore incurred no import duties." 454 In the light of the above, the Panel concluded that the
Chinese producers did not come forward with a substantiated request for an adjustment.455
5.223. At the oral hearing, the European Union argued that the Chinese producers could not have
submitted further information to substantiate their requests for an adjustment because these
requests were based on an erroneous premise that such an adjustment was permissible when the
data of an analogue country producer is used to determine normal value. 456 Indeed, in the Review
Regulation, the Commission stated that it "fail[ed] to see which additional information, in the view

444 China's other appellant's submission, para. 54.
445 China's other appellant's submission, para. 54.
446 China's other appellant's submission, para. 55.
447 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 38.
448 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 41.
449 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 872 (emphasis original)).
450 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US – Upland
Cotton, para. 399; US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 385; and EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1005).
451 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
para. 132).
452 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, para. 7.158).
453 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 80.
454 Panel Report, para. 7.220 (referring to General Disclosure Document (Panel Exhibit CHN-22),
recital 78).
455 Panel Report, para. 7.221.
456 European Union's response to questioning at the oral hearing.

of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the expo rting producer, could be provided to further
substantiate" the request for an adjustment given that "the prices of the steel wire rods charged
on the domestic market were significantly lower than those charged on other markets" and
therefore "[could] not be used as a basis for adjustment".
457 Thus, the Commission's
determination that the Chinese producers failed to substantiate their requests for an adjustment
seems to have been based on the erroneous premise that this adjustment could not be made
because certain prices were distorted in China and that, accordingly, it was not possible to
substantiate the corresponding requests any further. For these reasons, we find that the Panel
erred in the application of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when finding that the
Chinese producers did not substantiate their requests for an adjustment. Consequently, we reverse
the Panel's intermediate finding that "the Chinese producers did not come forward with a
substantiated request for an adjustment for the alleged difference in taxation".
458
5.224. In the light of the above, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.223, 7.251,
and 8.2.iii of its Report, in respect of differences in taxation, and find, instead, that, because the
Commission's determination does not reflect an adequate assessment of the Chinese producers'
requests for an adjustment for differences in ta xation, the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.5.2.3.3 New documents referred to by China on appeal
5.225. The European Union requests us not to take into account documents referred to by China
in its other appellant's submission that are not on the Panel record. 459 In our analysis, we did not
find it necessary to have recourse to the new do cuments referred to by China on appeal that did
not form part of the Panel record. Therefore, we have not found it necessary to make any finding
on the admissibility of these documents challenged by the European Union.
5.5.2.4 Other cost differences
5.226. Two of the Chinese producers requested the Commission to make adjustments for
differences relating to "efficiency of consumption of raw material", "wire rod used for production",
"consumption of electricity", "self-generated electricity", and "productivity". 460 The Commission
rejected these requests for adjustments on the ba sis that (i) no evidence had been adduced that
these differences in costs would translate into differences in prices; and (ii) where an
analogue country is used, prices and costs in the NME that are not the result of market forces are
not to be taken into account. The relevant recital of the Review Regulation, quoted by the Panel,
reads as follows:
Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation is referring to price and not cost. There was no
evidence adduced by these parties that the al leged differences in cost translated into
differences in prices. In investigations concerning economies in transition such as
China, an analogue country is used when warranted to prevent account being taken of
prices and costs in non-market economy countries which are not the normal result of
market forces. Thus, for the purpose of establishing the normal value, a surrogate of
the costs and prices of producers in functi oning market economies is used. Therefore,
these claims for adjustments taking into account the differences in cost of production
are rejected.
 461
5.227. Elsewhere in the Review Regulation, it is also explained that:
[N]one of the Chinese exporting producers received MET in the original investigation
and their cost structure cannot be considered as reflecting market values that can be
used as a basis for adjustments in particular with regard to access to raw materials. In

457 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 100.
458 Panel Report, para. 7.221.
459 European Union's appellee's submission, fn 48 to para. 51 (referring to China's other appellant's
460 Panel Report, para. 7.242 (quoting Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Ningbo Jinding to the
Commission (Panel Exhibit CHN-33), pp. 5-6 and referring to Letter dated 13 June 2012 on behalf of Changshu
to the Commission (Panel Exhibit CHN-34), pp. 5-6).
461 Panel Report, para. 7.241 (quoting Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 41).

addition, it should be noted that the production processes existing in the PRC were
found to be comparable to the Indian producer's and the alleged differences were
found to be very minor. In this case, the Indian producer was found to be competing
with many other producers on the Indian domestic market, it is considered that its
prices were fully reflecting the situation in the domestic market. As mentioned in
recital 41 above, a surrogate of the costs and prices of producers in functioning
market economies had to be used for the purpose of establishing the normal value.
462
5.228. Having reviewed the evidence on the re cord, the Panel found that the Chinese producers
failed to demonstrate that the alleged differences in costs affected price comparability 463, and that
"the [investigating authority] is not obligated to make adjustments to reflect such differences in
costs in an investigation where the analogue country methodology is used."
464 On appeal, China
submits that both findings are in error. 465 China also claims that the Panel failed to make an
objective assessment of the facts as required under Article 11 of the DSU. 466 We analyse each of
China's claims in turn below.
5.5.2.4.1 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that adjusting for differences in costs
would undermine the Commission's right to have recourse to the analogue country
methodology
5.229. In support of its claim that the Panel erred in finding that adjusting for differences in costs
would undermine the Commission's right to have re course to the analogue country methodology,
China raises similar arguments to the ones already set out above regarding differences in taxation.
In particular, China claims that the cost factors under consideration were unrelated to the alleged
non-market conditions, and that making adjustments would have required the Commission to use
data only from Pooja Forge.
467 Consequently, China submits that, "[a]bsent any link between these
differences and non-market economy conditions, it must be concluded that they relate to
undistorted factors which call for adjustments under Article 2.4." 468 To support this conclusion,
China relies on an alleged "past practice" by the Commission to accept requests for adjustments in
the context of investigations involving NMEs. 469 China also argues that the differences in costs
should be accorded the same treatment as the differences in quality control, for which the
Commission made an adjustment in the original investigation.470
5.230. The European Union responds that raw ma terial-related distortions and energy-related
distortions are among the typical features of an NME. 471 As the European Union further explains,
whether the Indian producer "did not have the same easy access to raw materials as
Chinese producers have in the distorted Chinese economy"; "was less efficient in terms of its
electricity consumption as it had to use self-gen erated electricity whereas the Chinese producers
could benefit from a distorted electricity market"; or "was more efficient and productive
per employee because it was run like a competitive enterprise" is irrelevant because these are the
reasons why Pooja Forge was used as the benchmark to determine the normal values in the
first place.
472 The European Union adds that a number of the Chinese producers relied on the
Chinese raw material consumption, the Chinese electricity consumption, and the

462 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 103. With respect to differences relating to access
to raw materials, the Review Regulation also state, at recital 100:
[T]he cost of the major raw material – steel wire rod – did not substantially reflect market
values. It was found that the prices of the steel wire rods charged on the domestic market were
significantly lower than those charged on other markets. Therefore, these distorted prices cannot
be used as a basis for adjustment as requested by the said parties. In these circumstances, the
Commission fails to see which additional information, in the view of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and the exporting producer, could be provided to further substantiate [this request]
for adjustments.
463 Panel Report, para. 7.243.
464 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
465 China's other appellant's submission, para. 68.
466 China's other appellant's submission, para. 106.
467 China's other appellant's submission, paras. 83-84.
468 China's other appellant's submission, para. 83.
469 China's other appellant's submission, para. 88.
470 China's other appellant's submission, para. 89.
471 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64.
472 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 65.

Chinese productivity when claiming adjustments, which indicates that China is attempting to undo
the analogue country methodology.473
5.231. For the same reasons set out above in re spect of China's claim regarding differences in
taxation, we disagree with the Panel's approach, which was to find, in general terms and without
more, that, "in an investigation against an NME where the analogue country methodology is used,
claiming adjustments for alleged differences in costs would undermine the [investigating
authority]'s recourse to that methodology" and that "the [investigating authority] is not obligated
to make adjustments to reflect … differences in costs in an investigation where the analogue
country methodology is used."
474 We recall that the investigating authority is required, under
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to make "[d]ue allowance … in each case, on its
merits, for differences which affect price comparability". Where the adjustment would have been
otherwise warranted, it is only where it would lead the investigating authority to adjust back to the
costs that were found to be distorted that the investigating authority cannot be required to adjust
for differences in costs between the NME producers under investigation and the analogue country
producer.
5.232. The Panel did not review whether the Commission had established that the differences in
costs were related to prices that were found to be distorted or whether adjustments were merited
because price comparability was affected under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We
note that, while the Panel stated that it was "not convinced" by China's arguments that the cost
factors at issue were unrelated to any distorted costs
475, it failed to assess whether the
Commission had analysed each of the claimed adjustments to establish if they would reflect a
distorted cost or price. Therefore, the Panel did not properly review whether the Commission
"[took] steps to achieve clarity as to the adjustment claimed and then determine[d] whether and
to what extent that adjustment [was] merited" as required under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
476
5.233. The Commission found that the "cost structure" of the Chinese producers could not "be
considered as reflecting market values that can be used as a basis for adjustments in particular
with regard to access to raw materials". 477 The Commission's determination, however, does not
reflect that it had analysed the relationship between each of the cost differences under
consideration and the costs that were found to be distorted in China, and whether adjustments
were merited on the basis that price comparability was affected under Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. In particular, the Commission's determination does not reflect an
assessment of whether energy prices were found to be distorted in China, as the European Union
suggests
478, and, for example, of whether making an adjustment on the basis that Pooja Forge
used self-generated electricity rather than electr icity from the grid would have led to adjusting
back to distorted energy prices in China. We, t hus, consider that the Commission's determination
does not reflect that the Commission assessed whether the requested adjustments were warranted
or whether they would have had the effect of reintroducing distorted costs or prices in the normal
value component of the comparison. The Commission hence failed to take "steps to achieve clarity
as to the adjustment claimed and then determine whether and to what extent that adjustment
[was] merited" as required under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
479
5.234. Moreover, we do not agree with the distinction introduced by the European Union, and
accepted by the Panel, between the cost differences at issue and the differences in quality control,

473 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 66. In relation to differences in costs, the
European Union also requests us not to take into account a document referred to by China in its other
appellant's submission that is not on the Panel record (Ibid., fn 48 to para. 51 (referring to, inter alia, China's
other appellant's submission, fn 49 to para. 80)) We have already dealt with this issue when addressing the
European Union's claim that all of the new documents referred to by China for the first time on appeal should
not be taken into account. As set out above, we have not found it necessary to make any finding on the
admissibility of these documents. (See supra, para. 5.225)
474 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
475 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
476 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).
477 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 103.
478 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 64.
479 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 488 and 519 (quoting Panel Report, EC - Tube
or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.158).

for which an adjustment was made by the Commission in the original investigation. The Review
Regulation mentions that "the Commission already made an adjustment to the normal value to
take into account quality control steps applied by the Indian producer which were not found for
Chinese sampled producers."
480 The Panel observed that "the reason why the Commission made
an adjustment for differences regarding quality control was because Pooja Forge and the
Chinese producers did not have the same step in their production processes", whereas "the cost
factors for which adjustments were requested in the review investigation did not pertain to such a
process" and "were incurred both by Pooja Forge and the Chinese producers".481 Having drawn this
distinction, the Panel reiterated that "making adjustment for differences in cost factors would have
defied logic and rendered the use of the analogue country methodology meaningless."
482 We recall
that, under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, due allowance shall be made for
differences affecting price comparability. Accordingly, adjustments are to be made for differences
affecting price comparability irrespective of whether the difference pertains to an "additional step"
in the production process or to a step found to be carried out both by the analogue country
producer and the NME producer.
5.235. Finally, we recall the Panel's findings that the alleged "past practice" of the Commission to
adjust for differences in costs in investigations involving NMEs was not established and that it is, in
any view, not a relevant factor under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
483 Irrespective of
whether there is such an established "past practice", we note that the Commission has, in the
past, made adjustments for certain differences in costs in the context of investigations involving
NMEs.
484
5.236. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the Panel erred in concluding that the
Commission was not required "to look at the cost factors" relied upon by the Chinese producers
solely because the analogue country methodology was used in this investigation.
485 We further find
that the Commission failed to assess properly whether the requested adjustments based on
differences relating to access to raw materials, use of self-generated electricity, efficiency in
raw material consumption, efficiency in electricity consumption, and productivity per employee
were warranted, or whether they would have had the effect of reintroducing distorted costs or
prices in the normal value component of the comparison.
5.5.2.4.2 Whether the Panel erred in findin g that the Chinese producers did not come
forward with substantiated requests for adjustments
5.237. China submits that the Panel erred in the application of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement when finding that the Chinese producers did not show that the cost differences at issue
affected price comparability.
486 China argues that, using all the evidence that was reasonably
available to them, the Chinese producers demonstrat ed that the differences in costs of production

480 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 50.
481 Panel Report, para. 7.249.
482 Panel Report, para. 7.249.
483 Panel Report, para. 7.246.
484 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1331/2007 of 13 November 2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping
duty on imports of dicyandiamide originating in the People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the
European Union, L Series, No. 296 (15 November 2007), pp. 1-17 (Panel Exhibit CHN-38), recitals 38 and 41;
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1659/2005 of 6 October 2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and
collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain magnesia bricks originating in the
People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Union L Series, No. 267 (12 October 2005),
pp. 1-14 (Panel Exhibit CHN-39), recital 24; Council Regulation (EC) No. 3386/1993 of 6 December 1993
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the
People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series, No. 306 (11 December
1993), pp. 16-21 (Panel Exhibit CHN-40), recital 9; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/96 of 2 July 1996
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of unwrought pure magnesium originating in Russia and
Ukraine and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, Official Journal of the European Communities,
L Series, No. 174 (12 July 1996), pp. 1-10 (Panel Exhibit CHN-41), recital 27; Commission Regulation (EC)
No 492/2008 of 3 June 2008 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of monosodium glutamate
originating in the People's Republic of China, Official Journal of the European Union, L Series, No. 144 (4 June
2008), pp. 14-30, (Panel Exhibit CHN-42), recitals 35 and 39.

485 Panel Report, para. 7.245.
486 China's other appellant's submission, para. 92.

affected price comparability by providing an overview of the cost differences and explaining that
the cost of production occupied a constant proportion of the price of Pooja Forge's products.487
5.238. The European Union agrees with the Panel' s determination. It argues that China fails to
point to any error of law under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 488, and that it should
have brought its claim under Article 11 of the DSU. 489 The European Union also argues that the
fact that the Chinese producers did not have more information to offer was immaterial to the
Panel's determination.
490 At the meeting with the parties, th e Panel had asked the European Union
what kind of evidence would have been required to show that the alleged differences in costs
affect price comparability. The European Union re sponded that differences could be demonstrated
to affect price comparability if evidence can be adduced that a natural comparative advantage
exists.
491 The European Union also explained that "in this case the requests were not substantiated
(and perhaps could not be substantiated based on any additional information) because they were
based on the wrong premise that adjustments were required to reflect distorted prices."492
5.239. First, we analyse whether China should have brought its claim under Article 11 of the DSU,
as the European Union contends. We have already explained that allegations implicating a panel's
appreciation of facts and evidence fall under Article 11 of the DSU. 493 By contrast, "'[t]he
consistency or inconsistency of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty
provision is … a legal characterization issue' and is therefore a legal question." 494 In the instant
case, China takes issue with the Panel's assessment of whether the Chinese producers' requests
for adjustments were sufficiently substantiated to meet the requirements of Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. In other words, the issue is whether the differences for which
adjustments were requested affected price comparability such that the adjustments would be
warranted to ensure a fair comparison. Therefore, this claim should be treated as a challenge of
the Panel's application of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the facts of this case.
5.240. Turning to the issue of whether the Chin ese producers submitted substantiated requests
for adjustments, we recall that they provided a comparative account of Pooja Forge's and their
own costs with respect to each of the five diffe rences upon which they relied on. They further
explained "that Pooja Forge's cost of manufacturing amounted to 80% of the price of its finished
product 'and that therefore any difference in cost s would directly translate into the difference in
price'."
495 The Commission found that "[t]here was no evidence adduced by these parties that the
alleged differences in cost translated into differences in prices" and addressed, in this context, the
fact that an analogue country methodology is us ed so as to avoid basing the determination of
normal value on distorted prices and costs. 496 The Panel in turn found that, "while highlighting the
differences between Pooja Forge and the Chinese companies in terms of the amounts incurred for
each of these cost factors", the Chinese producers did not show how such cost differences affected
price comparability.497 The Panel also found that the fact that "a company's cost of manufacturing

487 China's other appellant's submission, para. 99.
488 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 79.
489 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 75.
490 European Union's appellee's submission, para. 79.
491 European Union's response to Panel question No. 40, para. 115.
492 European Union's response to Panel question No. 40, para. 116. Recitals 100 and 103 of the Review
Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3) read, in relevant parts:
[T]hese distorted prices cannot be used as a basis for adjustment as requested by the said
parties. In these circumstances, the Commission fails to see which additional information, in the
view of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the exporting producer, could be provided to
further substantiate these two requests for adjustments.
…
[N]one of the Chinese exporting producers received MET in the original investigation and their
cost structure cannot be considered as reflecting market values that can be used as a basis for
adjustments in particular with regard to access to raw materials.
493 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US – Upland
Cotton, para. 399; US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 385; and EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1005).
494 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 183 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
para. 132).
495 Panel Report, para. 7.243 (quoting China's second written submission to the Panel, para. 253).
(fn omitted)
496 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 41.
497 Panel Report, para. 7.242.

represents a certain percentage of the price of its final product does not, in itself, show a
difference that affects price comparability." 498 Furthermore, the Panel rejected China's argument
that the Chinese producers were limited in what they could present given that they did not have
access to Pooja Forge's data on the basis that China's claim "concerns the substantive aspects of
the Commission's determination regarding fair comparison, and not whether the
Chinese producers had the information that would have allowed them to make a substantiated
request for an adjustment."
499
5.241. As set out above, under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Chinese producers
had to substantiate their requests for adjustments "as constructively as possible". 500 As we have
explained above, the Commission's determination in the Review Regulation seems to associate the
absence of evidence that the differences in costs affected price comparability with the fact that
certain costs were distorted in China.501 Stating that certain costs were distorted in China does not
address the issue of whether the requests for adjustments were sufficiently substantiated.
Moreover, the European Union acknowledged before the Panel that "the requests were not
substantiated (and perhaps could not be substa ntiated based on any additional information)
because they were based on the wrong premise that adjustments were required to reflect distorted
prices."
502 As per the European Union's own submission, the Chinese producers failed to
substantiate their requests for adjustments because such adjustments could not be made given
that certain prices were distorted in China and that, accordingly, the corresponding requests could
not be substantiated. For these reasons, we find that the Panel erred in finding that the
Chinese producers did not substantiate their requ ests for adjustments. Co nsequently, we reverse
the Panel's intermediate finding that "the Chinese producers failed to show that the alleged
differences in costs affected price comparability" and, thus, failed to come forward with
substantiated requests for adjustments.
503
5.242. In the light of the above, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.250, 7.251,
and 8.2.iii of its Report, in respect of the cost di fferences at issue, and find, instead, that, because
the Commission's determination does not reflect an adequate assessment of the Chinese
producers' requests for adjustments for differences relating to access to raw materials, use of
self-generated electricity, efficiency in raw material consumption, efficiency in electricity
consumption, and productivity per employee, th e European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.5.2.4.3 Whether the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts as
required under Article 11 of the DSU
5.243. China submits that the Panel acted inconsis tently with Article 11 of the DSU by focusing
exclusively on differences in terms of efficiency in electricity consumption when addressing China's
claim that the Commission should have made adjustments for differences relating to access to raw
materials, use of self-generated electricity, efficiency in raw material consumption, efficiency in
electricity consumption, and productivity per employee.
504 In addition, China claims that the Panel
acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by considering pieces of evidence in isolation from
each other in respect of these alleged differences. 505 Having reversed the Panel's finding on the
basis that the Panel erred in its interpretation an d application of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, we see no need to make a separate finding under Article 11 of the DSU as to whether
the Panel, as argued by China, failed to make an objective assessment of the facts in reaching its
findings.

498 Panel Report, para. 7.243.
499 Panel Report, para. 7.244.
500 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 488 (quoting Panel Report, EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, para. 7.158).
501 Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recitals 41 and 100.
502 European Union's response to Panel question No. 40, para. 116 (quoting Review Regulation
(Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recitals 100 and 103).
503 Panel Report, para. 7.243.
504 China's other appellant's submission, paras. 111-112.
505 China's other appellant's submission, para. 115.

5.5.2.5 Differences in physical characteristics
5.244. China conditionally appeals the Panel's finding that the European Union did not act
inconsistently with the fair comparison requ irement under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by rejecting the Chinese producers' requests for adjustments due to differences in
physical characteristics, both included and not included in the original PCNs. 506 China submits that
we need to consider this claim on appeal only in the event that we reverse the Panel's finding
concerning the European Union's claim under the la st sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
507 Having upheld the Panel's finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission failed to provide the
Chinese producers with information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products used in
determining normal values, the condition upon which this appeal of China rests is not met and we
need not address this claim raised by China. Ho wever, the European Union challenges the Panel's
finding that China's claims with respect to physical characteristics not included in the original PCNs
were within its terms of reference. We address th is claim raised on appeal by the European Union
below.
5.5.2.5.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.245. Before the Panel, the European Union argued that China was precluded from raising its
claim under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the compliance proceedings in respect of
adjustments relating to physical characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs because this was
a claim that China could have raised but did not raise in the original proceedings. The
European Union did not raise this as a procedural objection but pointed out that, since jurisdiction
is a matter that has to be examined on the Panel's own initiative, it would not object if the Panel
found this aspect of the claim to be outside its terms of reference.
508
5.246. The Panel found that the claim was within its terms of reference as the issue could not
have been raised in the original investigation. The Panel noted that the Chinese producers'
requests to make adjustments based on physical characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs
(such as traceability, standards, unit of defective rate, hardness, bending strength, impact
toughness, and friction coefficient) were made on response to the new information disclosed by
the Commission in the review investigation. Since nothing on the record of the original
investigation showed, nor did the European Union ar gue, that these alleged cost differences were
discussed in the original investigation, the Panel found that this aspect of China's claim was within
its terms of reference.
509
5.247. On appeal, the European Union argues that the Panel erred in finding that this claim by
China fell within its terms of reference. The European Union contends that this is a claim that
China could have raised but did not raise in the original proceedings. In the European Union's
view, the Panel wrongly focused its analysis on whether the alleged differences were "discussed" in
the original investigation. 510 The European Union argues that, considering that the
Chinese producers raised the special/standard distinction as an issue affecting price comparability
in the original investigation and that this issue was outside the original PCNs, "[t]hey could have
also raised the same requests for adjustment with respect to non-PCNs elements which affected
price comparability", but did not do so.
511
5.248. China responds that the relevant issue is whether it could have raised the same claim in
the original proceedings, rather than whether the Chinese producers could have made requests for
adjustments during the original investigation.
512 Noting that the alleged differences in physical
characteristics had not been discussed in the original investigation, and that no factual findings

506 China's other appellant's submission, para. 131 et seq.
507 China's other appellant's submission, para. 123.
508 Panel Report, paras. 7.204 and 7.231 (referring to European Union's second written submission to
the Panel, para. 156).
509 Panel Report, para. 7.233.
510 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 182.
511 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 182.
512 China's appellee's submission, para. 125.

were made in that respect, China argues that raising this claim in the original proceedings was
simply impossible.513
5.249. We observe that China raised claims concerning the special/standard distinction in the
original proceedings under Articles 2.1 and 2.6 ("likeness") and under Articles 3.1 and 3.2
("injury") of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 514 In our view, the fact that a party raised an issue in
respect of the likeness and injury determinations in the original proceedings cannot be
determinative of whether a party is entitled to raise an issue that concerns the dumping
determination in the compliance proceedings. In this respect, the fact that China had the elements
to raise claims regarding the special/standard distinction in respect of the likeness and injury
determinations does not indicate that China was also in a position to raise claims regarding other
differences in physical characteristics not included in the original PCNs in respect of the dumping
determination.
5.250. We further note that, in the review investigation, following the Commission's disclosures
that conveyed further information regarding the characteristics of Pooja Forge's products, the
Commission rejected the Chinese producers' requests to make adjustments for differences that
allegedly affected price comparability concerning certain physical characteristics not reflected in
the original PCNs, such as traceability, standards, unit of defective rate, hardness, bending
strength, impact toughness, and friction coefficient.
515 A s w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d i n r e s p e c t o f t h e
claims made under Articles 6.5, 6.5.1, 6.4, 6.2, and 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
exchanges between the Chinese producers and the Commission in the review investigation
demonstrate that the Chinese producers became aware of the information underlying the claims
made in the compliance proceedings only during the review investigation. This is so because
the Commission never fully disclosed all the information regarding the characteristics of
Pooja Forge's products that were relevant to th e dumping determination. We, thus, agree with the
Panel that the absence in the record of the original investigation of any discussion on the impact
on price comparability of physical characteristics not included in the original PCNs shows that this
issue was unique to the review investigation and, therefore, could not have been raised in the
original proceedings.
516
5.251. Moreover, we are of the view that the claim by China in these compliance proceedings
under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement not only could not have been raised in the
original proceedings, but also challenges aspects that are intrinsically connected with, and form
part of, the measure taken to comply, namely, the disclosures made by the Commission in the
review investigation to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings under Article 2.4 in
the original proceedings. Indeed, the Chinese producers requests for adjustments based on
physical characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs were made in the review investigation
and were based on the exchanges that they had with the Commission regarding Pooja Forge's
product characteristics. The Commission's refusal to make such adjustments is connected with,
and forms an integral part of, the measure taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in the original proceedings, that is, the disclosures made by the Commission in the review
investigation.
5.252. In the light of the above, we consider that the claim that China has raised in these
compliance proceedings under Article 2.4 in respect of adjustments relating to differences in
physical characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs is not a claim that China could have
raised in the original proceedings.
5.253. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.233 of its Report, that China's
claim under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect of adjustments relating to
differences in physical characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs fell within its terms of
reference.

513 China's appellee's submission, para. 126.
514 Original Panel Report, paras. 7.279 and 7.324.
515 Panel Report, paras. 7.199 and 7.233.
516 Panel Report, para. 7.233.

5.6 Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.254. In the review investigation at issue, the Commission used the weighted average-to-
weighted average (WA-WA) methodology when comp aring normal values with export prices in
calculating dumping margins for the Chinese producers. The Commission made these comparisons
in two steps. In the first step, it divided the product under investigation into product "models" and
made model-specific comparisons of normal valu e and export price. In the second step, it
aggregated such model-specific results in order to determine the margins of dumping for the
investigated product. In both the first and second steps, the Commission excluded from the scope
of its calculations those models that did not match with any of the models sold by Pooja Forge.
Thus, when the Commission aggregated the results of the model-specific calculations in the second
step, it divided the total amount of dumping by the total value of exports pertaining to the models
for which individual calculations had been made in the first step. Exports that were excluded in the
first step were also excluded in the second step from the denominator of the formula used to
calculate the overall dumping margins for the investigated product.
517 Chinese producers objected
to this calculation method, requesting that the Commission divide the total amount of dumping by
the total value of all exports in the second step of its calculations. The Commission rejected this
objection, stating that its method provided the most reliable basis on which to establish the level
of dumping.
518
5.255. Before the Panel, China claimed that the European Union acted inconsistently with
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by leaving out of the dumping margin calculations
the export transactions for which there was no match in the domestic sales of fasteners produced
by Pooja Forge. According to China, since the Commission had found that "all models of fasteners
exported from China to the European Union were 'like' the fasteners produced and sold by
Pooja Forge in India", these products must be "comparable" within the meaning of Article 2.4.2.519
5.256. The European Union disagreed, arguing that Article 2.4.2 requires that only "comparable"
export transactions be taken into consideration in calculating dumping margins. The
European Union argued that the Commission complied with Article 2.4.2 in the review investigation
because it took into consideration only those models that matched with one of the models sold by
Pooja Forge.
520
5.257. The Panel found that the Commission's approach in calculating the dumping margins was
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2. The Panel observed that dumping is defined in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement as the situation where "a product" is introduced into the commerce of another country
below normal value. 521 According to the Panel, the term "product" implies that the margin of
dumping has to be calculated for a particular product as a whole. 522 Therefore, in the Panel's view,
"a margin of dumping that excludes certain export transactions cannot be said to have been
calculated for the investigated product as a whole." 523 The Panel then stated that, since the
Commission had determined that the fasteners produced by the Chinese producers and those
produced by Pooja Forge were "like products", all transactions involving these fasteners
necessarily had to be "comparable" within the meaning of Article 2.4.2.524
5.258. On appeal, the European Union argues that the Panel erred in its interpretation of the
phrase "all comparable export transactions" contained in Article 2.4.2. 525 The European Union

517 Panel Report, para. 7.259.
518 Panel Report, para. 7.260 (referring to Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recitals 105
and 108-109).
519 Panel Report, para. 7.254 (referring to China's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 420-421).
China further argued that, by failing to take into account "all comparable export transactions" in its dumping
margin calculations, the Commission also acted inconsistently with the obligation to conduct a fair comparison
between the normal value and the export price, as required by Article 2.4. (Ibid.)
520 Panel Report, paras. 7.255-7.257. The European Union also submitted that such a methodology is
not inconsistent with the fair comparison obligation set forth in Article 2.4. (Ibid., para. 7.261)
521 Panel Report, para. 7.263 (quoting Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
522 Panel Report, para. 7.264.
523 Panel Report, para. 7.265.
524 Panel Report, paras. 7.269-7.270.
525 According to the European Union, transactions relating to a large, coated and strong screw cannot be
"comparable" to transactions relating to a small, uncoated and weak screw "just because they are 'like'
products (i.e. fasteners)", since "that cannot be the meaning of the term 'comparable' in Article 2.4.2 of the
[Anti-Dumping] Agreement." (European Union's appellant's submission, para. 355)

states that, if the drafters of the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement had wanted to provide that the
weighted average normal value should be compared with all export transactions, they could have
said so.526 The European Union submits that the "Commission excluded some export transactions
from its dumping calculation, because including them would have resulted in inaccurate findings
based on non-comparable transactions" and that "[t]his situation cannot be compared with the
zeroing situation that the Panel based its analysis on." 527 According to the European Union, in the
zeroing cases, the Appellate Body was addressing "an entirely different issue: if models are
developed that can be matched and the matching leads to a negative dumping margin, can those
models be left out of the averaging exercise or be given a zero for purposes of determining the
margin of dumping".528
5.259. China responds that the Panel correctly determined that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 2.4.2. According to China, the phrase "all comparable export
transactions" requires that "no export transaction may be left out when determining margins of
dumping"
529 and that "[a]ll types or models falling within the scope of a 'like product' must
necessarily be 'comparable'". 530 China also suggests that "the fact that all fasteners are like
products does not necessarily mean that they are all identical."531 However, according to China
"[a]ll types of fasteners falling within the scope of 'like' product are able to be compared". 532 In
China's view, while not all exported product type s may be directly comparable to product types
that are sold domestically, Article 2.4 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement requires an investigating
authority to "take non-matching models into account by making the necessary adjustments to
eliminate the effect of factors that affect price comparability".
533
5.6.1 "[A]ll comparable export transactions " under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement
5.260. Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual
export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account
appropriately by the use of a weighted av erage-to-weighted average or transaction-
to-transaction comparison.
5.261. In EC – Bed Linen , the Appellate Body stated that Article 2.4.2 explains "how domestic
investigating authorities must proceed in establishing 'the existence of margins of dumping', that
is, it explains how they must proceed in establishing that there is dumping."
534 Article 2.4.2
explicitly requires that, where the WA-WA methodology is used, the existence of margins of
dumping has to be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value
with a weighted average of prices of "all comparable export transactions ".
535 With regard to the
meaning of this phrase, the Appellate Body found that, once an investigating authority has defined
the product at issue and the "like product" on the domestic market, it cannot "at a subsequent
stage of the proceeding, take the position that some types or models of that product [have]
physical characteristics that [are] so different from each other that these types or models [are] not

526 The European Union's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
527 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 379.
528 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 358.
529 China's appellee's submission, para. 378 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan),
para. 124).
530 China's appellee's submission, para. 380 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 58).
531 China's appellee's submission, para. 395. (emphasis original)
532 China's appellee's submission, para. 395.
534 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 51. (emphasis original)
535 Emphasis added.

'comparable'."536 In that dispute, the Appellate Body considered that "[a]ll types or models falling
within the scope of a 'like' product must necess arily be 'comparable', and export transactions
involving those types or models must therefore be considered 'comparable export transactions'
within the meaning of Article 2.4.2." 537 The Anti-Dumping Agreement "concerns the dumping of a
product, and … therefore, the margins of dumping to which Article 2.4.2 refers are the margins of
dumping for a product."538
5.262. The Appellate Body further explained that, "[t]his interpretation of the word 'comparable'
in Article 2.4.2 is reinforced by the context of this provision." 539 In particular, Article 2.4 sets forth
a general obligation to make a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value and such
a general obligation "applies, in particular, to Article 2.4.2 which is specifically made 'subject to the
provisions governing fair comparison in [Article 2.4]'."
540
5.263. The Appellate Body clarified in US – Softwood Lumber V that its findings in EC – Bed Linen
should not be read to mean that an investigatin g authority may not use the practice of "multiple
averaging", where the "like product" under consider ation is divided "into product types or models
for purposes of calculating a weighted average normal value and a weighted average export price
for the transactions involving each product type or model or sub-group of 'comparable'
transactions".
541 At the same time, the Appellate Body emphasized that "the term 'all comparable
export transactions' means that a Member 'may only compare those export transactions which are
comparable, but [] it must compare all such transactions'"542, and that, where an investigating
authority has chosen to undertake multiple comparisons, the results of all of those comparisons
must be taken into account in order to establish margins of dumping for the product as a whole.
543
The reference to the "product as a whole" also reinforces the understanding that, once an
investigating authority has defined the "like product", it cannot then exclude, from the comparison
of normal value and export price, the exports of certain models or sub-groups in calculating
dumping margins for the "like product" as a whole.
5.264. While certain models or sub-groups of the exported product may not be identical to models
or sub-groups of the "like product" in the dome stic market of the exporting country or of a
third country, the investigating authority cannot exclude from the dumping margin calculations any
transactions of models that fall within the scope of the "like product" as defined by the
investigating authority. In this respect, we note that Article 2.4 provides, inter alia, that "[d]ue
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in … physical characteristics, and any other differences which
are also demonstrated to affect price comparabil ity." Therefore, Article 2.4, which informs the
interpretation of Article 2.4.2, requires that adju stments be made to provide for a fair comparison
when an investigating authority compares models that present certain differences that affect price
comparability. For example, in a case involving an analogue country, in which the analogue
country producers make only certain sub-groups or models of the "like product", an investigating
authority may have recourse to other methodologies, including using the price of the like product
when exported to an appropriate third country or the cost of production in the country of origin
plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and profits.
5.265. In any event, an investigating authority cannot first define the "like product" and then
exclude from the comparison between normal valu e and export price certain models of the like
product exported for which it determines that there are no matching models sold by the analogue
country producer. By failing to include the export transactions for which the investigating authority
could not identify matching models on the normal value side, the investigating authority is also
failing to take into account and measure the impact that the export transactions involving such
models would have on the calculation of the overall dumping margins. This is not consistent with
the requirement in Article 2.4.2 to take "all comp arable export transactions" into account when
calculating dumping margins for the like product as a whole. We also note that it is not possible to

536 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 58.
537 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 58.
538 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 51. (emphasis original)
539 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 59.
540 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 59.
541 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 80. (fns omitted)
542 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 86 (quoting Panel Report, US – Softwood
543 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 98.

reconcile such exclusion of export transactions with the notion of "fair comparison", in Article 2.4,
which provides context for Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.6.2 Whether the Commission's exclusion of non-matching models from the dumping
margin calculations is consistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.266. We next consider whether the Commission's approach in establishing dumping margins for
the Chinese producers in the review investigat ion was consistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. We begin by recalling certain factual aspects of the review investigation,
which the Panel considered to be undisputed between the parties. The Panel observed:
In the review investigation at issue, the Commission followed the WA-WA
methodology to compare the normal value with the export price in calculating
dumping margins for the Chinese producers. The Commission made these
comparisons in two steps. In the first step, it made model-specific comparisons; in the
second step, it combined such model-specific results in order to determine the margin
of dumping for the investigated product. In the first step, the Commission excluded
from the scope of its calculations exports of models which did not match with any of
the models sold by Pooja Forge. Theref ore, such exports were not taken into
consideration in the calculation of the amount of dumping. Nor were they taken into
consideration in the second step of the Commission's calculations. When the
Commission aggregated the results of model-specific calculations, it divided the total
amount of dumping by the total value of ex ports pertaining to the models for which
individual calculations were made in the first step. Exports that were excluded in the
first step were also excluded from the denominator of the formula used to calculate
the overall dumping margin for the investigated product.
544
5.267. The Commission determined that the fasteners exported by the Chinese producers and the
fasteners sold domestically by Pooja Forge (i.e. those used to determine the normal values) were
"like products". In particular, the Definitive Regulation states:
[T]he fasteners produced and sold by the Community industry in the Community,
fasteners produced and sold on the domestic market in the PRC and those produced
and sold on the domestic market in India, which served as an analogue country, and
fasteners produced in the PRC and sold to the Community are alike within the
meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.
545
5.268. The Commission's approach of first determining that all fasteners are "like products" 546,
but then proceeding to exclude certain models sold by the Chinese producers on the basis that
these models did not match with any of those sold by Pooja Forge, is not compatible with the
requirement in Article 2.4.2 to establish margins of dumping by comparing the normal value with
the price of "all comparable export transactions".
547 The European Union argues that it "did not
violate the requirement to fairly base the ma rgins of dumping … on all comparable export
transactions" because it "excluded from the dumping margin determination those export sales
transactions for which there was no comparable normal value transaction". 548 In other words, "the

544 Panel Report, para. 7.259.
545 Definitive Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-1), recital 57.
546 We note that the Commission's definition of "like products" is not in dispute between the
participants.
547 We note certain discrepancies in the terminology used in this dispute, in particular, in the usage of
the term "model(s)". In particular, as indicated above, in making its findings under Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel relied on, inter alia, the Appellate Body's finding in US – Softwood
Lumber V, where the Appellate Body indicated that the "multiple averaging" technique is performed by dividing
the "like product … into product types or models". (Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 80)
This would mean that the term "models" refers to different groupings of products determined by the
investigating authority for the purpose of the WA-WA comparison. The Panel, however, appears to have used
the term "model(s)" to refer, at times, to the groupings of products (see e.g. Panel Report, para. 7.270) and,
at other times, to specific products (see e.g. Panel Report, para. 7.144). For the purposes of this Report,
unless otherwise indicated, we use the term "model" to refer to the different product groupings that the
Commission used in the "multiple averaging" technique.

Commission excluded from the scope of its calculations exports of models which did not match
with any of the models sold by Pooja Forge."549
5.269. At the same time, the Commission selected Pooja Forge as the analogue country producer
and determined that fasteners produced by the Chinese producers and those produced by
Pooja Forge were "like products" for the purpos es of the investigation. Accordingly, when
conducting a comparison between the weighted average normal value and the weighted average
export price, Article 2.4.2 required the Commission to take into account all export transactions of
all models of fasteners sold by the Chinese prod ucers regardless of whether all exported models
matched with models sold by Pooja Forge. On ce the Commission had determined that these
products fell within the scope of the "like product", it could not exclude from the comparison,
based on alleged lack of "comparability", models for which no matching model sold by the
analogue country producer could be identified.
5.270. Compliance with the requirements of Article 2.4.2 does not mean that the Commission had
no other option than determining dumping marg ins based on comparisons of export price and
normal value of different models of fasteners without making any adjustments. As the Panel
noted, using the method of multiple averaging "minimizes, or even eliminates, the need to make
adjustments for individual differences that are shown to affect price comparability".
550
Furthermore, as we have noted above, Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a
general obligation to ensure a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value. As
indicated above, this obligation provides context for Article 2.4.2, which is explicitly made subject
to the provisions governing fair comparison in Article 2.4.
551 As also indicated above, Article 2.4
provides that due allowance shall be made, in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect
price comparability, including differences in physical characteristics.
5.271. Thus, pursuant to Article 2.4, the Commi ssion could have made adjustments in order to
account for the differences that affected price comparability, when it calculated dumping margins
based on multiple averaging, by matching models exported by the Chinese producers with models
sold by the analogue country producer. We therefore agree with the Panel that if, in an
investigation such as the one at issue, "there are certain exported models which do not match any
of the models on the normal value side of the comparison, the [investigating authority] cannot
simply exclude exports of such models from its dumping calculations."
552 In such a situation, the
investigating authority has to take non-matching models into account by making the necessary
adjustments to eliminate the effect of factors that affect price comparability.553
5.272. As noted above, the Commission could also have determined normal value based on
alternative methodologies, such as those referred to in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(that is, a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, or a
constructed value). However, given that the Commi ssion determined "fasteners" to be the "like
product", in order to respect the requirement in Article 2.4.2 to determine the dumping margins on
the basis of a comparison of "all comparable export transactions", the Commission was required to
take into account and compare normal value and export price for the like product, namely,
"fasteners" as a whole, without excluding models exported by the Chinese producers from the
calculation of the dumping margins, which could not be matched with those sold by Pooja Forge.
554
5.273. The European Union argues that there is nothing "inherently unfair" about the
Commission's approach, which "did not exclude any comparable transactions or otherwise sought
to skew the averaging that followed the model-to -model comparison as had been the issue in the
zeroing disputes".
555 The European Union contends that the excluded models were left out of the
equation entirely because "it considered this to be the most fair and reliable basis for establishing

550 Panel Report, para. 7.272.
551 In EC – Bed Linen, the Appellate Body noted that "Article 2.4 sets forth a general obligation to make
a 'fair comparison' between export price and normal value. This is a general obligation that, in our view,
informs all of Article 2, but applies, in particular, to Article 2.4.2 which is specifically made 'subject to the
provisions governing fair comparison in [Article 2.4]'." (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para. 59)
552 Panel Report, para. 7.272.
553 Panel Report, para. 7.272.
554 This conclusion is also supported by the requirement in Article 2.4 to ensure a fair comparison
between export price and normal value.
555 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 371.

the margins given the lack of complete matching." 556 China, on the other hand, argues that "the
Panel correctly found that Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement, read in the light of the 'fair
comparison' obligation of Article 2.4, requires that all transactions related to like products are to
be treated as 'comparable export transactions' and that due allowances should be made, where
necessary, for differences affecting price comparability."
557
5.274. The Commission followed the practice of "multiple averaging" by dividing the "like product"
into models, and, as a first step, calculating a weighted average normal value and weighted
average export price for each model. In this first step of its calculations, the Commission excluded
models exported by the Chinese producers that were not sold by Pooja Forge. These models
exported by the Chinese producers were also not taken into account in the second step of
the Commission's calculations, where the Commission aggregated the results of the first step of its
calculations and determined dumping margins for the "like product" as a whole. Yet, having chosen
to undertake "multiple averaging", the Commission, in our view, was required to take into account
"all comparable export transactions", and thus could not exclude export transactions of models
that fell within the scope of the "like product", as defined by the Commission. It is also not
relevant that, as the European Union contends, export transactions that were excluded in the first
step of the calculations were also excluded in the second step from the denominator of the formula
used to calculate the dumping margins for the investigated product.
558 The result is the same –
i.e. export transactions that fell within the scope of the "like product" that the Commission defined
were excluded from the calculation of the dumping margins for the "like product" as a whole.
5.275. When an investigating authority elects to calculate a margin of dumping by comparing the
weighted average normal value with the weighted av erage export price, Article 2.4.2 requires that
"all comparable export transactions" be compared. In the light of the Commission's definition of
the "like product" in the review investigation at issue, the Commission's approach does not
comport with Article 2.4.2. Regardless of the impa ct of the Commission's approach to calculating
dumping margins, excluding certain export transactions from the calculations is not consistent with
the requirement in Article 2.4.2 to compare "all comparable export transactions" to the extent that
this approach fails to ensure the comparison of models for the product as a whole. This approach
is also difficult to reconcile with the notion of "fair comparison" in Article 2.4.
5.276. We further note that, having determined dumping margins while excluding the
export transactions of non-matching models, the Commission nevertheless imposed anti-dumping
duties on the Chinese producers for the product under consideration, namely, "fasteners" as a
whole.
559 The Appellate Body has found that, in order to meet the "fair comparison" requirement of
Article 2.4, an investigating authority must treat the product under consideration as a whole for
the purposes of determining dumping margins. 560 In the anti-dumping determination at issue,
the Commission, on the one hand, failed to calcul ate dumping margins for the product as a whole,
while, on the other hand, it imposed the dumping duties commensurate with the dumping margins
on the product as a whole. In this respect, we do not consider that the Commission's approach to
calculating dumping margins, while excluding ex ports of Chinese models that did not match
models sold by Pooja Forge from the dumping margin calculations, can be reconciled with the
context of "fair comparison" under Article 2.4, which informs Article 2.4.2.
5.277. The European Union further relies on Ar ticle 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in
support of its contention that the Commission could exclude export transactions of non-matching

556 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 349.
557 China's appellee's submission, para. 393.
558 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 348.
559 For instance, the Review Regulation provides:
A comparison between export price and normal value was made on a weighted average basis
only for those types exported by the Chinese exporting producer for which a matching type was
produced and sold by the Indian producer. This was considered to be the most reliable basis for
establishing the level of dumping, if any, of this exporting producer; to attempt to match all
other exported types to closely resembling types of the Indian producer would have resulted in
inaccurate findings. On this basis, it is correct to express the amount of dumping found as a
percentage of those export transactions used in calculating the amount of dumping – this finding
is considered to be representative for all types exported. The same approach was used in
calculating the dumping margins of the other exporting producers.
(Review Regulation (Panel Exhibit CHN-3), recital 109 (emphasis added))
560 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 99.

models from the WA-WA comparison of normal value and export price. Article 6.10 stipulates the
general rule that dumping margins must be calculated for each known producer or exporter of the
product under consideration. However, where the number of exporters, producers, importers, or
types of products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the
investigating authority may limit its examination to a reasonable number of interested parties or
products by using a statistically valid sample. According to the European Union, this provision
demonstrates that the investigating authority is not obligated to include all export transactions
involving the "like product" when calculating the dumping margins, even when no matching
domestic sales exist.
561 China disagrees with the European Union and argues that Article 6.10
"allows for sampling – including of types of products – only as an exception to the obligation to
determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer".
562 China also
argues that, "contrary to the European Union's position, nothing in that provision suggests that
because of sampling certain export transactions can be excluded from the comparison under
Article 2.4.2".
563
5.278. We note that Article 6.10 deals with samp ling of exporters, producers, importers or types
of products, while Article 2.4.2 sets out the me thodologies that an investigating authority may
adopt in calculating dumping margins based on a co mparison of export price and normal value. In
this regard, the European Union has not argued that the Commission engaged in the sampling
exercise contemplated in Article 6.10. The Eu ropean Union has in fact acknowledged that
"Article 6.10 deals with an entirely different situation, as the Panel noted." 564 Instead, the
European Union relied on Article 6.10 as "evidence of the fact that it is not so that in any and all
circumstances all export transactions must be taken into consideration" when calculating margins
of dumping.565 We agree with the European Union that, if an investigating authority elects to use
sampling in accordance with Article 6.10, not all transactions will be taken into consideration when
calculating dumping margins, since it is the very essence of sampling to consider only a part of the
whole. However, we disagree with the European Union that Article 6.10 can be construed to inform
the dumping margin calculation methodology under Article 2.4.2. Articles 6.10 and 2.4.2 serve
different purposes. We see nothing in the text of Article 6.10 that would allow derogating from the
requirements of Article 2.4 to ensure a "fair co mparison" and of Article 2.4.2 to compare "all
comparable export transactions".
5.279. The European Union finally argues that the approach taken by the Commission complies
with the requirements of Article 2.4.2 because the export transactions of models for which a
matching model could be found on the normal valu e side, and that were consequently included in
the calculation of dumping margins, were both qualitatively and quantitatively representative of
the product as a whole so as to ensure a fair comparison between comparable sales.
566 The
European Union argues, for instance, that "[o]n average between 75% to 98% of all of the main
types of fasteners exported were matched with domestic sales and included in the dumping margin
calculation."567
5.280. China responds that "the percentage of the exports that are taken into consideration in
calculating dumping margins, either quantitatively or qualitatively, is not pertinent to the legal
obligation under Article 2.4.2" because "this provision requires that all comparable export
transactions be taken into account in calculating dumping margins." 568 Moreover, China points out
that the figures presented by the European Union are incorrect and that "the amount of
transactions that have been compared varies between 54.03% and 62.39% of export sales in
volume and between 52.9% and 62.59% of export sales in value."
569
5.281. We note, therefore, that it is disputed between the participants whether the transactions
that were compared remained representative of the product as a whole, in spite of the exclusions
of the non-matching models. We have observed above that the requirement of Article 2.4.2 to
compare all comparable export transactions means that the WA-WA comparison of normal value

561 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 366-369.
562 China's appellee's submission, para. 410.
563 China's appellee's submission, para. 410.
564 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 368.
565 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 367.
566 European Union's appellant's submission, paras. 377-378.
567 European Union appellant's submission, para. 373.
568 China's appellee's submission, para. 414. (emphasis original)
569 China's appellee's submission, para. 417. (fn omitted)

and export price for the purposes of calculating dumping margins should be made for the product
under consideration as a whole, which in the present case includes all exported models of
fasteners. We have indicated above that the re quirement of "fair comparison" in Article 2.4
provides contextual support for this interpretation of Article 2.4.2. It does not logically follow,
however, that the European Union can satisfactorily demonstrate that the Commission's approach
in calculating dumping margins is consistent with Article 2.4.2 by calling it a "fair comparison"
because "the matching [was] made up of a number of main product types that were sold in very
large quantities" such that "[o]n average betw een 75% to 98% of all of the main types of
fasteners exported were matched with domestic sales and included in the dumping margin
calculation."
570 While Article 2.4 provides context to Article 2.4.2, the use of the
WA-WA methodology will comply with the "fair co mparison" requirement only to the extent that
the investigating authority compares the export transactions relating to the product under
consideration as a whole. However substantial the percentage of "matching" may have been, the
Commission failed to take into consideration all export transactions involving all models exported
by the Chinese producers in the dumping margin calculations.
5.282. In the light of the above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.276 and 8.1.iv of
its Report, that the European Union acted inconsis tently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by excluding, in its dumping de terminations, the models exported by the
Chinese producers that did not match with any of the models sold by Pooja Forge.
5.7 Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.7.1 The Panel's terms of reference
5.283. Before the Panel, the European Union argued that China was precluded from raising its
claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the compliance proceedings
because these were claims that China could have raised but did not raise in the original
proceedings, and that the definition of the domestic industry was not an integral part of the
measure taken to comply because the Commission treated this issue separately in the review
investigation.
571
5.284. The Panel observed that China's claims und er Articles 4.1 and 3.1 required it to examine
"whether the Commission implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings consistently with
the findings in the Appellate Body report in the original proceedings".
572 In the Panel's view, the
statement in the original Notice of Initiation that only those producers willing to be part of the
sample for the purposes of the injury determinat ion would be considered as cooperating played a
decisive role in the Commission's definition of the domestic industry in the review investigation.
Such statement was an unchanged aspect of the original measure that became an integral part of
the measure taken to comply.
573
5.285. On appeal, the European Union contends that the Panel erred in finding that China's claims
under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 fell within its terms of reference. The European Union contends that
these claims by China concern an unchanged aspect of the measure that is separable from the
measure taken to comply and that China could have raised these claims in the original
proceedings, but it did not.
574
5.286. The European Union argues that the Pane l should have followed the guidance of the
Appellate Body to make the necessary findings on its terms of reference, without having to
examine the substance of China's claims. 575 The European Union also asserts that the Panel erred
when finding that the contested statement in the original Notice of Initiation became an
integral part of the measure taken to comply. The European Union contends that, contrary to the
Panel's assertion, the statement in the original Notice of Initiation that only those producers willing
to be part of the sample would be considered as cooperating did not play a "decisive role" in the
Commission's determination of domestic industry in the review investigation, because the

570 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 373.
571 Panel Report, paras. 7.282 and 7.287.
572 Panel Report, para. 7.289.
573 Panel Report, para. 7.290.
574 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 185.
575 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 187.

Commission employed the data already available from the original investigation and applied the
method suggested by the Appellate Body to define domestic industry.576
5.287. China responds that, since there is a fundamental disagreement between the parties on
what was required by the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original proceedings, the
Panel was correct in concluding that China's claims required it to examine whether the Commission
implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings consistently with the findings in the
Appellate Body report in the original proceedings. China agrees with the Panel that its claims under
Articles 4.1 and 3.1 go "to the very heart of a compliance panel's task … and [fell] within [its]
terms of reference".
577
5.288. We disagree with the European Union that, in order to determine whether it had
jurisdiction over China's claims under Articles 4. 1 and 3.1, the Panel examined the "substance" of
China's claims. 578 Rather, in addressing the question of whether it had jurisdiction under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Panel correctly consid ered the focus of China's claims to be whether
the European Union's measure taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings
under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 regarding the definition of the domestic industry is consistent with the
relevant covered agreement.
5.289. China's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3. 1 relate to a disagreement between the parties
over the meaning and scope of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings. The European Union considers that all it had to do to comply was to re-define the
domestic industry so as to include all the prod ucers that had come forward by the deadline set
forth in the original Notice of Initiation.
579 By contrast, China considers that, by using the
information provided by all the producers that had come forward in response to the original Notice
of Initiation to re-define the domestic industry , the Commission failed to achieve compliance. In
this respect, China observes that the Appellate Bo d y f o u n d t h e s a m e N o t i c e o f I n i t i a t i o n t o b e
flawed in the original proceedings since it made inclusion in the domestic industry conditional upon
the producers' willingness to be included in the injury sample. 580 Such a disagreement on the
scope of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original proceedings clearly could not have
been addressed in the original proceedings. We agree with the Panel that this is exactly the type of
disagreement that goes to the heart of a complia nce panel's task under Article 21.5 of the DSU,
and which it is called upon to resolve.581
5.290. In these circumstances, it was not necessary for the Panel to engage in the exercise of
determining whether China could have raised the same claims in the original proceedings and
whether the aspect of the measure that was the focus of China's claims before the Panel was
unchanged from the original proceedings and separable from the measure taken to comply. It is
uncontested that the Commission did not issue a new notice of initiation in the review investigation
and that China raised claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 in the original proceedings and obtained
findings of inconsistency with these provisions. It was sufficient for the Panel to determine that the
claims raised by China concern the consistency of the measure taken to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings and with the covered agreements. We thus see no merit in
the argument by the European Union that the Panel erred because it did not determine its
jurisdiction on these claims before examining the substance of the claims.
5.291. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.291 of its Report, that
China's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the
definition of the domestic industry fell within its terms of reference.
5.292. Finally, we observe that a claim that a panel has exceeded its terms of reference, including
under Article 21.5 of the DSU, cannot be regarded as a mere procedural objection. Indeed, a claim
of this nature impugns a panel's assessment of its jurisdiction, and "[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in

576 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 195.
578 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 187.
579 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 405.
580 China's appellee's submission, para. 462.
581 Panel Report, para. 7.289.

a panel is a fundamental prerequisite for lawful panel proceedings." 582 Any decision to raise such a
claim must be taken judiciously, in particular given the serious consequences that flow from a
finding that a matter is beyond the scope of a panel's jurisdiction under Article 21.5, namely, that
the complainant would be able to obtain a ruling on that matter only by initiating dispute
settlement proceedings afresh. In this regard, we are mindful that complainants should exercise
their judgement as to whether it is fruitful to raise such claims, as well as whether, on appeal, it is
fruitful to claim that a panel erred in finding jurisdiction in circumstances where the panel itself has
rejected the same challenge to its jurisdiction on a reasoned basis. We also recall that, even when
the parties to a dispute remain silent on issues that touch on the proper scope of the proceedings,
panels and the Appellate Body cannot ignore such issues, but must deal with such issues in order
to satisfy themselves that they have authority to proceed.
583
5.7.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding th at the European Union acted inconsistently
with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.293. The Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Commission de fined the domestic industry on the basis of
the domestic producers that had come forward in response to the Notice of Initiation which stated
that only those producers willing to be included in the injury sample would be considered as
cooperating.
584
5.294. The Panel first recalled the Appellate Body's findings in the original proceedings regarding
the definition of the domestic industry. As the Panel recalled, the Appellate Body noted that the
27% share in total production upon which the Commission relied was "'at the lower end of the
spectrum' but that such a figure could suffice to establish 'major proportion' within the meaning of
Article 4.1 provided [that this] definition '[did] not introduce material risks of distortion'". 585 The
Panel also referred to the Appellate Body's finding that "defining the domestic industry on the basis
of willingness to be included in the sample … imposed a self-selection process among the domestic
producers that introduced a material risk of distortion."586
5.295. The Panel noted that, while none of the domestic producers that had come forward in the
original investigation had been excluded from the definition of the domestic industry in the review
investigation, "[t]he fact remained … that the boundaries of the Commission's domestic industry
definition were set by the notice of initiation of the original investigation."
587 In the Panel's view,
"this show[ed] that the self-selection, or the mixing of the definition of domestic industry and the
establishment of an injury sample that the Appellate Body identified in connection with the original
investigation, continued to exist in the review investigation."588
5.296. The European Union appeals the Panel's findings that, by defining the domestic industry on
the basis of the domestic producers that had come forward in response to a notice of initiation
which stated that only those producers willing to be included in the injury sample would be
considered as cooperating, the Commission acted inconsistently with Article 4.1. According to the
European Union, the Panel misunderstood the finding by the Appellate Body in the original
proceedings that it was "the exclusion of dome stic producers on the basis of their lack of
willingness to be included in the sample [that] constituted a violation of Article 4.1".
589
The European Union argues that "the problem identified in the original dispute where the universe
of domestic producers was limited to those that could actually be examined for purposes of the
injury determination was corrected in the Implementation Review" 590, and that the Panel erred in
failing to draw the "logical conclusion that the inclusion of such previously excluded producers thus
brought the European Union into conformity with the Appellate Body's ruling".591

582 Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, para. 54. See also Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn
Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36.
583 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36.
584 Panel Report, para. 7.299.
585 Panel Report, para. 7.293 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 422).
586 Panel Report, para. 7.293 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427).
587 Panel report, para. 7.296.
588 Panel report, para. 7.296.
589 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 394.
590 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 420.
591 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 405.

5.297. China responds that an investigating auth ority has the obligation, under Article 4.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, to define the domestic in dustry on the basis of a process that "does not
give rise to a material risk of distortion". 592 According to China, "what the Appellate Body found
problematic [in the original proceedings] was not simply the actual exclusion of certain producers
but rather the link between the producer's willi ngness to be included in the sample and the
definition of the domestic industry". 593 The actual exclusion of certain domestic producers was
"only one of the consequences of the fundamentally problematic approach adopted by the
Commission in defining its domestic industry". 594 China argues that the Panel rightly determined
that because the Commission defined the domestic industry on the basis of the domestic producers
that had come forward in response to the Notice of Initiation which stated that only those
producers willing to be included in the injury sample would be considered as cooperating, the
European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
595 By relying
on the original Notice of Initiation, the Commission did not, according to China, "cure the
inconsistency caused by the link between the producer's willingness to be included in the sample
and the definition of the domestic industry" that existed in the original investigation.
596
5.7.3 The definition of domestic industry in Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.298. Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent defines the term "domestic industry" as
referring to: (i) the domestic producers as a whole of the like products; or (ii) those producers
whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic
production of those products.
597 In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body indicated:
By using the term "a major proportion", the second method focuses on the question of
how much production must be represented by those producers making up the
domestic industry when the domestic industry is defined as less than the domestic
producers as a whole … [but] Article 4.1 does not stipulate a specific proportion for
evaluating whether a certain percentage constitutes "a major proportion".
598
5.299. The Appellate Body indicated further:
The absence of a specific proportion does not mean, however, that any percentage, no
matter how low, could automatically qualify as "a major proportion". Rather, the
context in which the term "a major proportion" is situated indicates that "a major
proportion" should be properly understood as a relatively high proportion of the total
domestic production. … "A major proportion" of such total production will standardly
serve as a substantial reflection of the total domestic production. Indeed, the lower
the proportion, the more sensitive an investigating authority will have to be to ensure
that the proportion used substantially reflects the total production of the producers as
a whole.
599
5.300. In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body read the definition of domestic industry in
Article 4.1 together with the requirement in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that the
determination of injury "be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination" of,
inter alia, the impact of the dumped imports on domest ic producers. An "objective examination"
pursuant to Article 3.1 "'requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group
of interested parties' in the investigation".
600 In this respect, "to ensure the accuracy of an injury
determination, an investigating authority must not act so as to give rise to a material risk of
distortion in defining the domestic industry, for example, by excluding a whole category of

592 China's appellee's submission, para. 436 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 419).
593 China's appellee's submission, para. 443.
594 China's appellee's submission, para. 443.
595 China's appellee's submission, para. 444.
596 China's appellee's submission, para. 443.
597 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 411.
598 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 411. (emphasis original; fn omitted)
599 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 412. (emphasis original)
600 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 414 (quoting Appellate Body Report,

producers of the like product." 601 Where a domestic industry is defined as a "major proportion" of
the total domestic production, it follows that "the higher the proportion, the more producers will be
included, and the less likely the injury determination conducted on this basis would be
distorted."
602
5.301. The Appellate Body recognized the difficulty of obtaining information regarding domestic
producers, particularly in special market situations, such as fragmented industries with numerous
producers. In such special cases, the term "a major proportion" in Article 4.1 provides an
investigating authority with some flexibility to define the domestic industry. Nevertheless, while
"what constitutes 'a major proportion' may be lower in the light of the practical constraints on
obtaining information in a special market situation, an investigating authority bears the obligation
to ensure that the way in which it defines the domestic industry does not introduce a material risk
of skewing the economic data and, consequently, distorting its analysis of the state of the
industry."
603
5.302. These findings by the Appellate Body su ggest that there is an inverse relationship
between, on the one hand, the proportion of produc ers represented in the domestic industry and,
on the other hand, the absence of a risk of material distortion in the definition of the domestic
industry and in the assessment of injury. We t hus read the requirement in Article 4.1 that
domestic producers' output constitute a "major proportion" as having both quantitative and
qualitative connotations.
5.303. When the domestic industry is defined as the domestic producers whose collective output
constitutes a major proportion of total domest ic production, a very high proportion that
"substantially reflects the total domestic production" will very likely satisfy both the quantitative
and the qualitative aspect of the re quirements of Articles 4.1 and 3.1.
604 H o w e v e r , i f t h e
proportion of the domestic producers' collective output included in the domestic industry definition
is not sufficiently high that it can be considered as substantially reflecting the totality of the
domestic production, then the qualitative element becomes crucial in establishing whether the
definition of the domestic industry is consistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1. While, in the special case
of a fragmented industry with numerous producers the practical constraints on an authority's
ability to obtain information may mean that what constitutes "a major proportion" may be lower
than what is ordinarily permissible, in such cases, the investigating authority bears the same
obligation to ensure that the process of defining the domestic industry does not give rise to a
material risk of distortion. An investigating authority would need to make a greater effort to
ensure that the selected domestic producers are representative of the total domestic production by
ascertaining that the process of the domestic industry definition, and ultimately the injury
determination, does not give rise to a material risk of distortion.
5.7.4 Whether the Commission's definition of the domestic industry in the review
investigation is consistent with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.304. The Panel found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in the review investigation, the Commission defined the
domestic industry on the basis of the domestic producers that had come forward in response to
the Notice of Initiation of the original investigation, which stated that only those producers willing
to be included in the injury sample would be considered as cooperating.
605
5.305. The Panel noted that, while none of the European producers that had come forward by the
deadline set in the original Notice of Initiation were excluded from the revised definition of the
domestic industry in the review investigation, the boundaries of the Commission's domestic
industry definition were still set by the original Notice of Initiation, which stated explicitly that only
those producers that had agreed to be part of the injury sample would be considered as
cooperating. For the Panel, this showed that the Commission's domestic industry definition in the

601 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 414.
602 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 414.
603 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 416.
604 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 419.
605 Panel Report, para. 7.299.

review investigation also continued to suffer from a self-selection process that introduced a
material risk of distortion.606
5.306. On appeal, the European Union argues that the Appellate Body found in the original
proceedings that it was the "exclusion from the de finition of the domestic industry of domestic
producers that indicated that they would not be willi ng to be part of the sample and to be verified
[that] constituted a violation of the EU's obligations under Article 4.1 and 3.1". 607 According to the
European Union, when, in the review investigation, the Commission re-defined the domestic
industry to include all the domestic producers th at had come forward but had been excluded from
the definition in the original proceedings, "the problem identified in the original dispute … was
corrected."
608
5.307. China responds that the European Union' s reading of the Appellate Body report in the
original proceedings is based on an incorrect assumption that "it was only the actual exclusion of
certain domestic producers that indicated their unwillingness to be part of the sample from the
definition of the domestic industry that constituted a violation of the European Union's obligations
under Articles 4.1 and 3.1."
609 In China's view, it is the link between the producers' willingness to
be included in the injury sample and the definition of the domestic industry that was found by the
Appellate Body to give rise to a material risk of distortion. 610 The actual exclusion was only one of
the consequences of the problematic approach adopted by the Commission in defining the
domestic industry. The fact that the Commission did not issue a new notice of initiation, but
instead maintained the original Notice of Initiation providing that only those producers willing to be
included in the injury sample would be considered as cooperating, continued to give rise to a
material risk of distortion in the review investigation.
611
5.308. We recall that, in the original proceed ings, the Appellate Body determined that the
proportion, which the Commission originally relied upon to define the domestic industry,
representing 27% of total domestic production , was at the "lower end of the spectrum" and
"[could] hardly be considered a substantial reflection of the total". 612 It further found that the
Commission had failed to ensure that the domestic industry definition would not introduce a
material risk of distortion to the injury analysis by relying on a minimum benchmark irrelevant to
the issue of what constitutes "a major proportion ", and by excluding certain known producers on
the basis of a self-selection process among the producers.613
5.309. The Appellate Body specifically rejected the Commission's reliance on the threshold of 25%
in Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to meet the requirement of "major
proportion" in Article 4.1. It noted that the 25% benchmark in Article 5.4 "concerns the issue of
standing" for the initiation of an investigation and "does not address the question of what
constitutes 'a major proportion' in Article 4.1".
614
5.310. Moreover, the Appellate Body observed that the process used by the Commission to define
the domestic industry "limited the definition of th e domestic industry to those producers who 'fully
cooperated in the investigation'". 615 Thus, the Appellate Body concluded that, "by defining the
domestic industry on the basis of willingness to be included in the sample, the Commission's
approach imposed a self-selection process among the domestic producers that introduced a
material risk of distortion."
616 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body failed to see why "a
producer's willingness to be included in the sample should affect its eligibility to be included in the
domestic industry, which is a universe of producers that is by definition wider than the sample."617

606 Panel Report, para. 7.296.
607 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 398.
608 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 420.
609 China's appellee's submission, paras. 442-443.
610 China's appellee's submission, para. 443.
611 China's appellee's submission, para. 443.
612 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 422.
613 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 422.
614 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 425.
615 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 426.
616 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427 (quoting Definitive Regulation,
recital 114).
617 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427. (emphasis original)

5.311. The Appellate Body concluded that "[t]he fragmented nature of the fasteners industry,
however, might have permitted such a low proporti on [27%] due to the impracticality of obtaining
more information, provided that the process with which the Commission defined the industry did
not give rise to a material risk of distortion."
618 It noted, however, that the Commission applied a
minimum benchmark of 25% in defining what constituted "a major proportion of total domestic
production", even though this benchmark does not address the standard of "a major proportion" or
the practicality of achieving a higher proportion . Moreover, "by limiting the domestic industry
definition to those producers willing to be part of the sample, the Commission excluded producers
that provided relevant information." 619 In so doing, the Commission "reduced the data coverage
that could have served as a basis for its injury analysis and introduced a material risk of distorting
the injury determination."
620
5.312. In the review investigation, the Commissi on defined the domestic industry on the basis of
those domestic producers that had come forward in response to the Notice of Initiation in the
original investigation, which stated that only those producers willing to be included in the injury
sample would be considered as cooperating. The Commission thus included in the definition of the
domestic industry all of the producers that had come forward by the deadline, including those
producers that had originally been excluded be cause they were deemed not to cooperate. The
Commission did not issue a new notice of initiation but relied, for the purposes of the review
investigation, on the original Notice of Initiation.
621
5.313. We observe that the inclusion in the revise d definition of the domestic industry of those
producers that had come forward by the deadline but were excluded because they were not willing
to be part of the sample increased the number of included producers from 45 to 70. We also note
that the inclusion of these producers increased the proportion of total domestic production in the
European Union from 27% in the original investigation to 36% in the review investigation.
622 While
the proportion relied upon in the review investig ation is higher, a proportion of 36% of the total
domestic production remains low, even in the context of the fragmented fasteners industry.
Moreover, this low proportion could not be considered as a "major proportion" within the meaning
of Article 4.1, especially where the investigating authority relies on a process of defining the
domestic industry that introduces a material risk of distortion and fails to ensure that the
proportion of domestic producers selected is representative of the whole.
623
5.314. In re-defining the domestic industry in the review investigation, the Commission did not
issue a new notice of initiation but continued to rely on the Notice of Initiation issued in the
original investigation, which stated that only those producers that agreed to be part of the injury
sample would be considered as cooperating. As explained above, the Notice of Initiation in the
original investigation conditioned the producers' eligibility to be included in the domestic industry
on their willingness to be included in the injury sample and thus introduced a material risk of
distortion in the process of the domestic industry definition. Therefore, by including in the revised
definition of the domestic industry those produc ers that had come forward following the original
Notice of Initiation, but were unwilling to be included in the injury sample, the Commission
increased the proportion of domestic production from 27% to 36%. However, by relying on the
same Notice of Initiation, the Commission did not eliminate the materially distortive effects on the
composition of the group of domestic producer s that had come forward resulting from that
Notice which conditioned the eligibility to be included in the domestic industry on the willingness to
be included in the sample.
5.315. According to the European Union, in the original proceedings the Appellate Body
considered that it was the exclusion of the deemed non-cooperating producers that created a
material risk of distortion. The European Union finds support for its argument in a sentence in
paragraph 430 of the Appellate Body report in the original proceedings, which states:
[B]y limiting the domestic industry definition to those producers willing to be part of
the sample, the Commission excluded producers that provided relevant information.

618 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 430.
619 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 430.
620 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 430.
621 Panel Report, para. 7.296.
622 Panel Report, para. 7.283. See also European Union's appellant's submission, para. 419.
623 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 422.

In so doing, the Commission reduced the data coverage that could have served as a
basis for its injury analysis and introduced a material risk of distorting the injury
determination.
624
5.316. According to the European Union, the Appellate Body suggested that "the problematic
approach in question was the exclusion of producers that provided relevant information." 625 We
disagree with the European Union's reading of this passage in the Appellate Body report in the
original proceedings. We note that the quoted passage, on which the European Union relies, is
located in the concluding paragraph of the subs ection where the Appellate Body considered the
relevance of the material risk of distortion in the definition of the domestic industry and the
assessment of injury. First, we observe that the se ntence cited by the European Union begins with
"[m]oreover", thus suggesting that the reference to the actual exclusion of the producers is a
consideration that the Appellate Body made in addition to others. Indeed, in the preceding
sentences of paragraph 430, the Appellate Body cited the "low proportion" of 27% and the
mistaken reliance under Article 4.1 on the 25% test applicable under Article 5.4 to standing as
other elements in support of its reversal of the original panel's finding that the European Union's
definition of the domestic industry was not inconsistent with Article 4.1. Second, while in
paragraph 430 the Appellate Body summarizes certain key elements of its analysis, it developed
its reasoning on what constitutes the material risk of distortion in the preceding paragraphs. It
explained that a producer's willingness to be included in the injury sample should not affect its
eligibility to be included in the domestic industry, which is a universe of producers that is by
definition wider than the sample. By relying on this condition, the Notice of Initiation may have led
to the exclusion of certain known producers on the basis of a self-selection process among those
producers. As mentioned above, in those paragraphs, the Appellate Body explained that it was the
link between the producers' willingness to be included in the injury sample and in the definition of
the domestic industry that created the material risk of distortion, which, together with the
low proportion relied upon by the Commission, rendered the definition of the domestic industry
inconsistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1.
5.317. We, therefore, disagree with the European Union that the Appellate Body found in the
original proceedings that it was the exclusion of producers not willing to be included in the sample
that created a material risk or distortion. Rather , the Appellate Body stated that, "by defining the
domestic industry on the basis of willingness to be included in the sample, the Commission's
approach imposed a self-selection process among the domestic producers that introduced a
material risk of distortion."
626 In other words, what generates a material risk of distortion is not
the exclusion per se of the producers that had come forward and declined to be included in the
sample; rather, it is the conditioning of inclusion in the domestic industry definition on the
willingness to be included in the injury sample. Such condition set forth in the Notice of Initiation
distorted the pool of producers that had come forward, including those producers that were not
willing to be part of the sample. As the Appellate Body explained in the original proceedings, the
distortion is caused by the fact that the definition of the domestic industry and the selection of
producers for the injury sample are distinct steps that should not be confused. The domestic
industry is a universe of producers that is by definition wider than the sample, which may be
selected from the producers included in the domestic industry.
627
5.318. The Notice of Initiation stating that only those producers willing to be included in the injury
sample would be considered as cooperating did, in effect, create a distortion in the sense that
domestic producers may not have come forward unless they considered themselves to be injured
by the alleged dumping of the product under consideration. This Notice of Initiation, therefore,
provided for a self-selection process that may have skewed the composition of the domestic
industry in favour of injured producers that were m o r e l i k e l y t o c o m e f o r w a r d . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t
introduced a material risk of distorting the domestic industry definition used by the Commission for
the purposes of the review investigation.
5.319. Defining the domestic industry by relying on producers' willingness to be included in the
injury sample cannot be justified by the difficulty of obtaining information from a greater number
of producers. In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body found that, in special market

624 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 430.
625 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 410. (emphasis omitted)
626 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427.
627 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 427.

situations such as a fragmented industry with num erous producers, the practical constraints on an
investigating authority's ability to obtain information regarding domestic producers may justify
defining the domestic industry on the basis of a lower proportion than would be permissible in a
less fragmented market.
628 Nevertheless, even if it relies on a lower proportion, an investigating
authority should not seek to rely exclusively or predominantly on those domestic producers that
consider themselves to be injured and may thus be willing to be part of the injury sample. We
recall that "objective examination" under Article 3.1 requires that the domestic industry, and the
effects of dumped imports, "be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests
of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation".
629 Where an
investigating authority relies on a lower proportion of domestic producers to define the domestic
industry in the case of fragmented industries, it is particularly important that the process used to
select domestic producers does not introduce a material risk of distortion and that, therefore, the
proportion of total production included in the dome stic industry definition is representative of the
total domestic industry.
5.320. The European Union also considers as "speculative" China's assertion that the language
contained in the Notice of Initiation does not provide for sufficient incentive for producers to come
forward.
630 The European Union suggests, in this regard, that "[t]he 25 producers that came
forward within the deadline but indicated that they would not be willing to be part of the sample
clearly had a sufficient incentive to provide information … notwithstanding the question on
sampling."
631 We, however, find the European Union's argu ment in this regard to be unconvincing.
The fact that 25 producers that were not willing to be included in the sample came forward in
response to the original Notice of Initiation does not demonstrate that the language contained in
the Notice was not a disincentive for other producers.
5.321. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in the original proceedings relied repeatedly on the
concept of "material risk of distortion" 632, which suggests that a process of the domestic industry
definition may be inconsistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 not only when distortion actually occurs,
but also when the process in question risks or is susceptible to lead to distortion. In referring to a
self-selection process that introduces a material risk of distortion, the Appellate Body focused on
the distortive nature of the self-selection process rather than on its actual distortive results. In this
respect, if a low proportion of domestic producers is selected for inclusion in the domestic industry
based on a distortive self-selection process (i.e. a self-selection process that introduces a material
risk of distortion), it cannot constitute a "maj or proportion" within the meaning of Article 4.1,
regardless of whether the actual result of the process is distorted or not.
5.322. The European Union seeks to support its arguments by stating that, in defining the
domestic industry, the Commission "applied a simple registration requirement not dissimilar from
t h a t o f [ C h i n a ' s M i n i s t r y o f C o m m e r c e ] t h a t t h e p a n e l i n China – Autos (US) did not find
problematic".
633 However, we do not agree with the European Union's contention that the language
contained in the Notice of Initiation can be equated to a simple registration requirement since the
Notice does not only require domestic producers to register, but also makes their participation in
the investigation (and therefore their inclusion in the domestic industry definition) contingent upon
their willingness to be included in the sample for the purposes of assessing injury. It is this
contingency upon the willingness to be included in the injury sample, which is different from a
mere registration requirement, that introduces the risk of material distortion, and which together

628 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 415.
629 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 414 (quoting Appellate Body Report,
630 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 419.
631 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 419.
632 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 414, 419, 422, 427, and 430.
633 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 413. In China – Autos (US), anti-dumping and
countervailing duty investigations were initiated pursuant to notices of initiation, which stipulated that
interested parties should register by a certain deadline in order to participate in the investigations. (Panel
Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.185) The United States had argued that this registration requirement
distorted the domestic industry definition since it "condition[ed] the inclusion of domestic producers in the
domestic industry definition on a willingness to participate in [the Ministry of Commerce] injury investigations".
(Ibid., para. 7.191) The panel in that dispute found that the United States' contention in this regard was
"unconvincing" since a "registration process … essentiall y requires interested parties to come forward by a
deadline and make themselves known to the [investigating authority] to be considered part of the domestic
industry". (Ibid., para. 7.214)

with the low proportion relied upon by the Commission, makes the definition of the domestic
industry inconsistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1.
5.323. The European Union also seeks reliance on the Appellate Body's findings in US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment) pertaining to the interpretation of Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.634 We note, however, that Article 5.4 serves a different purpose than Articles 4.1
and 3.1, since Article 5.4 is intended at ensuri ng that the application for initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation is supported by a sufficiently large proportion of domestic producers
such that an investigation is warranted. By contrast, the definition of the domestic industry in
accordance with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 carries with it both quantitative and qualitative components,
since the proportion relied upon should be repres entative of the domestic industry as a whole and
be unbiased, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group thereof. We
therefore do not find it necessary to engage further with the European Union's arguments in this
respect.635
5.324. In sum, in order to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the
original proceedings, the Commission re-defined the domestic industry in the review investigation
on the basis of all the domestic producers that had come forward in response to the Notice of
Initiation that it had issued in the original investigation. It, therefore, included those 25 producers
that had been originally excluded from the defini tion of the domestic industry because they were
not willing to be included in the injury sample. 636 The proportion of domestic producers included in
the domestic industry definition in the review investigation increased from 27% to 36% of the total
domestic production but continues to represent a low proportion of total domestic production.
Moreover, the Commission re-defined the domestic industry in the review investigation on the
basis of the original Notice of Initiation, which indicated that only those producers that were willing
to be included in the injury sample would be considered as cooperating (and therefore eligible for
inclusion in the domestic industry definition). In so doing, the Commission continued to rely on a
process linking the definition of the domestic indu stry to the producers' willingness to be included
in the injury sample, and the original Notice of Initiation therefore continues to result in a
self-selection process among domestic producers that hence introduces a material risk of distorting
the domestic industry definition.
5.325. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.299 and 8.1.v of its
Report, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement because the Commission defined the domestic industry on the basis of the domestic
producers that had come forward in response to the original Notice of Initiation, which stated that
only those producers willing to be included in the injury sample would be considered as
cooperating; and that a domestic industry defi nition based on a self-selection process that
introduces a material risk of distortion to the investigating authority's injury analysis would
necessarily render the resulting injury determination inconsistent with the obligation to make an
objective injury analysis based on positive evidence as laid down in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. We, therefore, also conclude that the Commission's injury determination, based on the
data obtained from a wrongly defined domestic in dustry, is inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
a. with respect to Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.34 of the Panel Report, that
China's claims under Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 were within the Panel's terms of
reference;

634 European Union's appellant's submission, para. 417.
635 We also recall that, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body found that the European Union
incorrectly presumed that the 25% benchmark in Article 5.4 could be applied to the "major proportion"
requirement of Article 4.1. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 425) We believe that the
European Union should not, once again, rely on (albeit different) findings pertaining to Article 5.4 in order to
interpret the obligations contained in Articles 4.1 and 3.1.
636 Panel Report, para. 7.283. See also European Union's appellant's submission, para. 419.

ii. finds that the Panel did not disregard Pooja Forge's request for confidential treatment
in its analysis of China's claim under Article 6.5;
iii. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that Pooja Forge's request for confidential
treatment contained no more than a "bald assertion" on the part of Pooja Forge;
iv. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that the Commission did not conduct an
objective assessment of whether good caus e had been shown by Pooja Forge for the
confidential treatment of the information at issue;
v. finds that, in the circumstances of this case, the Panel did not err by not conducting
its own analysis of the nature of the information at issue for the purposes of its
assessment of China's claim under Article 6.5;
vi. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.50 and 8.1.i of the Panel Report, that
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 in the review investigation
at issue; and
vii. finds that the condition for addressing China's conditional appeal under Article 6.5.1
has not been met and, accordingly, makes no findings under that provision;
b. with respect to Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.80 of the Panel Report, that
China's claims under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 were within the Panel's terms of reference;
ii. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that, for the purposes of its analysis under
Article 6.4, the information at issue was not to be regarded as "confidential" because
the Commission accorded confidential treatment to that information without
assessing whether Pooja Forge had shown "good cause" for such treatment within
the meaning of Article 6.5;
iii. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that the information at issue was "relevant"
to the presentation of the Chinese producers' cases within the meaning of
Article 6.4;
iv. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that the information at issue was "used" by
the Commission in the review investigation within the meaning of Article 6.4;
v. finds that the Panel did not err in finding that, as a consequence of the
European Union's violation of Article 6.4, the European Union also acted
inconsistently with Article 6.2; and
vi. upholds the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.92, 7.96, and 8.1.ii of the Panel Report,
that the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.2 in the review
investigation at issue;
c. with respect to Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.115 of the Panel Report, that China's
claim under Article 6.1.2 was within the Panel's terms of reference;
ii. reverses the Panel's finding that Pooja Forge was not an "interested party" in the
review investigation within the meaning of Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and finds, instead, that, in th e circumstances of this case, Pooja Forge
was an "interested party" in the review investigation, and the obligation under
Article 6.1.2, therefore, applied to information provided by Pooja Forge; and
iii. finds that, because the Commission failed to disclose to the Chinese producers
information provided by Pooja Forge concerning the list and characteristics of its

products, the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.2 in the review
investigation;
d. with respect to Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.148 and 8.1.iii of the Panel Report, that
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 because the Commission
failed to provide the Chinese producers with certain information regarding the
characteristics of Pooja Forge's products that were used in determining normal
values;
ii. reverses the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.223, 7.251, and 8.2.iii of the Panel
Report, that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 because
the Commission failed to make adjustme nts for differences in taxation, and
finds, instead, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 with
respect to differences in taxation;
iii. reverses the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.250, 7.251, and 8.2.iii of the Panel
Report, that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 because
the Commission failed to make adjustments for differences relating to access to raw
materials, use of self-generated electricity, efficiency in raw material consumption,
efficiency in electricity consumption, and productivity per employee, and
finds, instead, that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 with
respect to these differences;
iv. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.233 of the Panel Report, that China's
claim under Article 2.4 in respect of adjustments relating to differences in physical
characteristics not reflected in the original PCNs fell within its terms of reference;
and
v. finds that the condition for addressing China's conditional appeal under Article 2.4
has not been met and, accordingly, makes no findings under that provision with
respect to physical characteristics, both reflected and not reflected in the original
PCNs;
e. with respect to Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.276 and 8.1.iv of the Panel Report, that
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 by excluding, in its
dumping determinations, models exported by the Chinese producers that did not
match any of the models sold by Pooja Forge in India; and
f. with respect to Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
i. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.291 of the Panel Report, that
China's claims under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 with respect to the definition of domestic
industry fell within its terms of reference;
ii. upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.299 and 8.1.v of the Panel Report, that
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 because the Commission
defined the domestic industry on the basis of domestic producers that came forward
in response to the original Notice of Initiation, which stated that only those producers
willing to be included in the injury sample would be considered as cooperating; and
iii. upholds the Panel's consequential findings, in paragraphs 7.299 and 8.1.v of the
Panel Report, that the Commission's injury determination, based on the data
obtained from a wrongly defined domestic industry, was inconsistent with Article 3.1.

6.2. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the European Union to bring its
measures found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement into conformity with its obligations under that
Agreement.
Signed in the original in Geneva this 11th day of December 2015 by:
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Rlcar 0 amlrez- ernan ez
Presiding Member
Shree B.C. Servansing
Member