UNITED STATES – TAX TREATMENT FOR "FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS"
Document: Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR The decision of the Arbitrator on United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"  is being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU.  The report is being circulated as an unrestricted document from 30 August 2002 pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/452).
Date: 30 August 2002
Document codes: WT/DS108/ARB
Complainant: EU
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Jamaica, Japan
Dispute stage: Retaliation & Arbitration
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 3, 8  AgricultureArt. 3.1(a), 3.1(b)  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 9, 10  Agriculture

UNITED STATES – TAX TREATMENT FOR "FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATIONS"
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
under Article 22.6 of the DSU
and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement
DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR
The decision of the Arbitrator on is
being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated as an
unrestricted document from 30 August 2002 pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/452).

I. INTRODUCTION
A. INITIAL PROCEEDINGS
1.1 On 20 March 2000, the Dispute Settlement B ody (DSB) adopted the Panel and Appellate
Body reports in this dispute. The DSB recommended, in particular, that the United States bring into
conformity the measures found to be inconsistent with its obligations under the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the Agreement on Agriculture and that
the United States withdraw the FSC subsidies "at the latest with effect from 1 October 2000". 1 On
12 October 2000, the DSB agreed 2 to accede to a request by the United States that the DSB modify
the time-period in this dispute so as to expire on 1 November 2000. 3 On 15 November 2000, the
President of the United States signed into law an Act of the United States Congress entitled the " FSC
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 "4 (the "ETI Act"). With the enactment of
this legislation, the United States considered that it had implemented the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in the dispute and that the legislation was consistent with the United States' WTO obligations.
5
1.2 On 17 November 2000 the European Communities had recourse to Article 21.5 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Go verning the Settlement of Disputes (the " DSU"),
considering that the United States had failed to withdraw the subsidies as required by Article 4.7 of
the SCM Agreement and had thus failed to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The
Panel established under Article 21.5 of the DSU (the "Compliance Panel") found the ETI Act to be in
violation of United States obligations under the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture and
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body upheld these conclusions. The reports of the
Compliance Panel and the Appellate Body were adopted by the DSB on 29 January 2002.
B. REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION AND SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATOR
1.3 On 2 October 2000, the parties informed the DSB of their Understanding on "Agreed
Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ( DSU) and Article 4 of
the SCM Agreement applicable in the follow-up to the United States – Tax Treatment for 'Foreign
Sales Corporations' dispute", concluded between the parties on 29 September 2000. 6 The agreed
procedures in this Understanding foresaw that, if the European Communities considered that the
situation described in Article 21.5 of the DSU existed and initiated consultations under that provision,
it could request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of
the DSU and to adopt countermeasures pursuant to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
7 It was also
agreed that, "[u]nder Article 22.6 of the DSU including Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement [(sic)]",
the United States would object to the appropriateness of the countermeasures and/or the level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations and/or make an Article 22.3 claim, before the date of
the DSB meeting considering the European Communities request, and that the matter would be
referred to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU.
8 It was also agreed that where the
European Communities requested the establishment of a compliance panel, both parties would request

1 Panel Report, ("US – FSC" )
WT/DS108/R, adopted 20 March 2000 as modified by original Appellate Body Report, WT/DS108/AB/R,
DSR 2000:IV, 1677, para. 8.8
2 See Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 12 October 2000, WT/DSB/M/90, paras. 6-7.
3 WT/DS108/11, 2 October 2000.
4 United States Public Law 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000), submitted as Exhibit EC-5; Exhibit US-1.
in the Article 21.5 Compliance Panel proceedings.
5 Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 17 November 2000, WT/DSB/M/92, para. 143.
6 Circulated as document WT/DS108/12, 5 October 2000.
7 Ibid, para. 8.
8 Ibid, para. 10.

the arbitrator to suspend his work until either: (a) adoption of the Article 21.5 compliance panel
report or, (b) if there was an appeal, adoption of the Appellate Body report.9
1.4 On 17 November 2000, the European Communities requested authorization from the DSB to
take appropriate countermeasures and to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU in the amount of US$4,043 million per year. On
27 November 2000, the United States objected to the appropriateness of the countermeasures
proposed by the European Communities and the level of suspension of concessions proposed by the
European Communities and requested that, "as required by Article 22.6 of the DSU (and consequently
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement), 'the matter be referred to arbitration'".10
1.5 At the meeting of the DSB on 28 November 2000, it was agreed that the matter raised by the
United States in document WT/DS108/15 be referred to arbitration as required by Article 22.6 of the
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement.11 In the light of the establishment of a compliance
panel under Article 21.5 and in accordance with the Procedures agreed between the European
Communities and the United States, the European Communities and the United States requested the
Arbitrator to suspend the arbitration proceeding unt il adoption of the Panel Report or, if there was an
appeal, adoption of the Appellate Body Report.12
1.6 The panel and Appellate Body reports under Article 21.5 of the DSU were adopted by the
DSB on 29 January 2002 and, in accordance with the parties' understanding referred to in
paragraph 1.3 above, the Arbitrator then resumed its work.
1.7 The Arbitration was carried out by the original panel, namely:
Chairman: Mr. Crawford Falconer
Members: Mr. Didier Chambovey
Prof. Seung Wha Chang.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A. MANDATE OF THE ARBITRATOR
2.1 The United States has initiated these proceedings pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. Article 22.6 of the DSU provides in relevant part:
"When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall
grant authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the
expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject
the request. However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension
proposed, (…) the matter shall be referred to arbitration. (…)"
2.2 With regard to countermeasures taken in response to violations of Article 3.1 of the
SCM Agreement on prohibited subsidies, however, Article 4.11 of that Agreement provides the
following mandate for arbitrators:

9 WT/DS108/12, para. 11.
10 See WT/DS108/15.
11 See WT/DS108/17.
12 See WT/DS108/18.

"In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (' DSU'), the arbitrator shall
determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate."10
(original footnote ) 10 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that would be
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited.
2.3 With regard to any amount of suspension of concessions that would be requested in relation to
a violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 or of the Agreement on Agriculture , our mandate is
defined by Article 22.7 of the DSU, which provides in relevant part that:
"The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the
level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment …"
2.4 The United States argues both that the amount of suspension of concessions requested by the
European Communities is inconsistent with Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement in that the
countermeasures proposed are not "appropriate" within the meaning of that provision, and that the
level of suspension of concessions requested by the European Communities is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article 22.4 in that it is not "equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment"
suffered by the European Communities.
2.5 The European Communities clarified, in the course of the proceedings, that it based its
request for authorization for countermeasures in the amount of US$4,043 million on both the
SCM Agreement and DSU provisions. If we should decide that the appropriate amount of
compensation under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement is less than the requested amount, then the
European Communities is of the view that it will be necessary for us to consider whether an additional
amount of suspension of concessions needs to be awarded under Article 22.7 of the DSU, in particular
with regard to the violation of Article III:4 of GATT 1994.13 Therefore, we decide to first examine
whether the European Communities's proposed countermeasures are appropriate within the meaning
of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. Then, if necessary, we shall proceed to examine whether the
level of the European Communities requested suspension of concessions is inconsistent with
Article 22.4 of the DSU.
2.6 We also recall the terms of Article 30 of the SCM Agreement , which clarifies that the
provisions of the DSU are applicable to proceedings concerning measures covered by the
SCM Agreement. Article 22.6 of the DSU therefore remains relevant to arbitral proceedings under
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, as illustrated by the textual reference made to Article 22.6 of the
DSU in that provision. However, the special or additional rules and procedures of the
SCM Agreement, including Articles 4.10 and 4.11, would prevail to the extent of any difference
between them.14
2.7 Finally, we note that there is no dispute on the type of measure proposed in this case. Our
mandate under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement in relation to the violation of Article 3 of that
Agreement is therefore only to determine whether the level of countermeasures proposed is
appropriate.

13 EC response to question 2 of the Arbitrator.
14 On the notion of "difference", see Report of the Appellate Body on Guatemala – Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico ("Guatemala – Cement I"), WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted
25 November 1998, DSR 1998:IX, paras. 65 and 66.

B. BURDEN OF PROOF
2.8 Both parties agree that the United States, as the applicant in this case, bears the burden of
proving its assertions that the requested level of suspension of concessions is not an appropriate
countermeasure within the meaning of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement and is not equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment to the European Communities within the meaning of Article 22.4
of the DSU.
15
2.9 The United States, however, disputes the European Communities' description of the duties of
the United States in these proceedings, to the extent that it suggests that the United States bears the
burden of disproving every factual assertion made by the European Communities.16
2.10 We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof, as stated by the Appellate
Body, require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another
Member must assert and prove its claim. 17 We find these principles to be also of relevance to
arbitration proceedings under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.18 In
this procedure, we thus agree that it is for the Un ited States, which has challenged the consistency of
the European Communities proposed amount of suspension of concessions under Articles 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement and 22.4 of the DSU, to bear the burden of proving that the proposed amount is not
consistent with these provisions.
2.11 We also note, however, that it is generally for each party asserting a fact, whether
complainant or respondent, to provide proof thereof. 19 In this respect, therefore, it is also for the
European Communities to provide evidence for the facts which it asserts. In addition, we consider
that both parties generally have a duty to cooperate in the proceedings in order to assist us in fulfilling
our mandate, through the provision of relevant information.20
C. RELEVANT MEASURE AND DATE FOR CALCULATIONS
2.12 We note that the time-period within which the United States was to have withdrawn the
prohibited FSC subsidy in this dispute originally terminated on 1 October 2000. 21 We also recall that
the DSB acceded to the United States request that the DSB modify the time-period in this dispute so
as to expire on 1 November 2000. 22 We further note that the United States enacted the ETI Act on
15 November 2000. It was the ETI Act which was reviewed by the Compliance Panel and, on appeal,
by the Appellate Body, under Article 21.5 of the DSU.

16 US first submission, para. 27.
17 Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India (" US – Wool Shirts and Blouses") , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
DSR 1997:I, 323, at 337.
18 For previous application of these rules in ar bitration proceedings under Article 22.6 of the DSU, see
Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) – Original Complaint by Canada – Recou rse to Arbitration by the European Communities under
Article 22.6 of the DSU ("EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC) , WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1998 DSR
1999:III, 1135, paras. 8 ff. For an application in the context of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, see Decision
by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, (Brazil – Aircraft , ( Article 22.6 –Brazil)")
WT/46/ARB, 28 August 2000, paras. 2.8 ff.
19 Report of the Appellate Body, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
20 Report of the Appellate Body , Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
("Canada – Aircraft"), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1377, para. 190.
21 WT/DS108/11.
22 Ibid.

2.13 The parties to this dispute agree that the ETI Act, as the implementing measure found to be
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the WTO Agreement, is the relevant measure to
consider. We agree that this should be the relevant measure to take into account for the purposes of
our examination.23
2.14 However, in using the ETI Act as the relevant measure, we have to address two main
questions:
(a) The first one is the date on which we should assess the appropriateness of the
countermeasures proposed by the European Communities. We note that the
United States was required to withdraw the subsidy by 1 November 2000, and that the
ETI was enacted on 15 November 2000. We also recall: (i) that the European
Communities had recourse to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of
the DSU on 17 November 2000 24; (ii) that the DSB agreed that the matter was
referred to arbitration on the basis of the United States" request pursuant to
Article 22.6 of the DSU and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement on 28 November 2000; and
(iii) that this arbitration was suspended on 21 December 2000, pending the conclusion
of the proceedings initiated under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
We recall that in past arbitrations, arbitrators have referred to the date on which the
implementation period expired, as the date on which to assess whether the proposed
suspensions of concessions or other obligations were equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment or constituted appropriate countermeasures. 25 Since this
arbitration was suspended pending the completion of the Article 21.5 DSU
proceedings, we should give the term "suspension" its full legal meaning and
consider that the European Communities proposed countermeasures should be
assessed as of the date of expiry of the implementation period.
26
(b) Secondly, we must take into account certain considerations in our assessment of the
data before us, in particular, the extent to which we may rely on estimates of
economic figures based on the pre-ETI FSC scheme. We considered whether we
needed to adjust such figures to account for the entry into force and application of the
ETI Act.
27 We took into account the following factors:
(i) First, we note that the actual application of the ETI Act to date has been
limited. It was enacted in November 2000 and, pursuant to its own terms, in
the case of FSCs already in existence on 30 September 2000, the ETI Act did

23 We recall that, in EC – Bananas III , the arbitrators considered that the level of proposed suspension
of concessions had to be assessed in relation to the m easure taken in order to comply with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB, rather than the original measure. See WT/DS27/ARB, para. 4.3: "In the original
Bananas III dispute, the findings of nullification and impairment were based on the conclusion that several parts
of the EC measures at issue were inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Therefore, any assessment of the level
of nullification or impairment presupposes an evaluation of consistency or inconsistency with WTO rules of the
implementation measures taken by the European Communities, i.e. the revised banana regime, in relation to the
panel and Appellate Body findings concerning the previous regime."
24 WT/DS108/13.
25 Decision by the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones , WT/DS48/ARB, paras. 38 to 42 and Decision of the
Arbitrator, Brazil – Aircraft, WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.66.
26 We note that the arbitrator in Brazil – Aircraft based its calculations on the number of deliveries and
sales that took place between the end of the period of implementation and the latest period for which figures
were available (18 November 1999-30 June 2000). However, this solution was based on the particular
circumstances of the case, where the amount of subsidy granted was specifically related to the delivery of
aircraft after the end of the reasonable period of time.
27 See Annex 1, "shift to the ETI Act".

not apply to transactions occurring before 1 January 2002. Furthermore, for
FSCs already in existence on 30 September 2000, the FSC subsidies
continued in operation for one year and, with respect to FSCs that entered
into long-term binding contracts with unrelated parties before
30 September 2000, the ETI Act did not alter the tax treatment of those
contracts for an indefinite period of time. Some aspects of the FSC regime
are actually "grandfathered", in some cases indefinitely.
28
(ii) Second, we noted that the United States suggested that the transitional
provisions of the ETI Act mentioned above could be ignored for purposes of
estimating the amount of the subsidy and the trade effect or trade impact.
Both parties agreed that the amount of benefit to the taxpayer was the same
under both the ETI and the FSC regimes.29.
(iii) The United States agreed with the European Communities that an upward
adjustment should be made to the amount of the subsidy to account for the
additional product coverage in the ETI Act, as compared to the initial FSC
scheme.30
2.15 We therefore decided to assess the proposed suspension of concessions at the time the United
States should have withdrawn the prohibited subsid y at issue, in 2000. We consider it relevant, in
light of the nature of the countermeasures proposed by the European Communities, to calculate the
appropriate countermeasures on a yearly basis. We thus decided to include the whole of the year
2000 in our assessment, taking into account an adjustment for the shift to the ETI Act.
III. SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENTS
3.1 The United States has argued that the amount of countermeasures proposed by the European
Communities is not appropriate because it is disproportionate to the trade impact of the inconsistent
measure on the European Communities. 31 It interprets Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement as
requiring countermeasures not to be disproportionate to the trade impact of the violating measure on
the complaining Member.32 It also considers that, in this instance, the amount of the subsidy can and
should be used as a "proxy" for the trade impact of the measure. 33 The United States estimated the
total value of the subsidy at US$4,125 milion for the year 200034, and suggested that, allocating to the
European Communities its share of that amount, countermeasures in a maximum amount of
US$1,110 million would be appropriate. 35 It further encouraged the arbitrators to refrain from using
economic modelling in the circumstances of this case, because of the range of uncertainties of the
measurements and the range of possible "reasonable" outcomes under economic modelling. However,
in response to questioning, the United States has also indicated that, were we to pursue economic
modelling, certain considerations would have to be taken into account.

28 We recall, in particular, that the ETI act's provis ions "grandfathering" the FSC subsidies were part of
the subject of examination in the compliance proceedings.
29 EC answers to additional questions from the arbitrator, para. 4 and US answers to additional
questions, para. 2.
30 US second submission.
31 US first submission, para. 15.
32 US first submission, paras. 16 to 57.
33 US first submission, para. 62.
34 US Exhibit 17.
35 US second submission, para. 4. In its first submission, the United States had initially estimated the
actual value of the subsidy at a lower figure. However, it subsequently re-evaluated that amount to take account
of certain EC arguments concerning the relevant elements for the calculation. The amount cited here is the US
figure for the amount of the subsidy as adjusted to take account of the coverage of the subsidy and the shift to
the ETI Act. A more detailed analysis of the relevant factors and figures can be found in Annex 1.

3.2 The European Communities has argued that the amount of countermeasures it has proposed
corresponds to the value of the subsidy, and that this amount is "appropriate" within the meaning of
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement . In the European Communities view, Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement sets out a unique benchmark for countermeasures in response to violations of a
particular provision of the SCM Agreement – namely Article 3.36 In the European Communities view,
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement allows for countermeasures which will induce compliance, and in
this instance, countermeasures in the amount of the value of the subsidy to be withdrawn are
appropriate, although they reflect a conservative approach.
IV. APPROACH OF THE ARBITRATOR
4.1 We recall that Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement provides as follows:
"In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period
specified by the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's
report or the Appellate Body's report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the
complaining Member to take appropriate
9 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides
by consensus to reject the request."
(footnote original ) 9 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited.
4.2 In addition, Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement defines our mandate as follows:
"In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (" DSU"), the arbitrator shall
determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate.10"
(footnote original ) 10 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited.
4.3 These two provisions complement each other: the arbitrator's mandate in relation to
countermeasures concerning prohibited subsidies under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement is defined,
quite logically, with reference to the notion embodied in the underlying provision in Article 4.10. The
expression "appropriate countermeasures" defines what measures can be authorized in case of non-
compliance, and our mandate requires us to review whether, in proposing certain measures to take in
application of that provision, the prevailing Member has respected the parameters of what is
permissible under that provision.
4.4 In doing this, we must aim at determining whether, in this particular case, the
countermeasures proposed by the European Communities are "appropriate".
4.5 We recall, in this regard, that the European Communities has proposed a certain amount of
countermeasures and explained the rationale for that proposal. The United States, as noted above, is
challenging that amount as being disproportionate to the trade impact of the violating measure on the
European Communities. We understand the United States argument to be essentially two-fold. The
United States seems to argue to the effect that the fundamental test for assessing whether
countermeasures are appropriate or not is an "adverse effects" test and that, moreover, this is to be
assessed in a manner broadly comparable to that which would occur pursuant to a case of nullification
or impairment under Article 22.4 of the DSU. This is tantamount to a two-pronged argument: (a) that
the European Communities entitlement to respond to the illegal subsidy is limited to the trade effect

36 EC second submission para 22.

on it; and (b) that the mode of calculation is comparable, although not identical in its precision, to an
assessment under Article 22.4 of the DSU.
4.6 In order to examine the United States challenge, we therefore need to consider first whether
indeed, as argued by the United States, countermeasures under Article 4.10 are required to be
proportionate, or at least not disproportionate, to the trade impact of the violating measure on the
complaining Member. We will then be in a position to assess, in light of our conclusion on that point,
whether in the circumstances of this case, the proposed countermeasures are "appropriate" or not.
4.7 We will consider first the expression "appropriate countermeasures" contained in
Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. In this regard, we note that the scope of application of
Article 3.2 of the DSU is not limited to panel and Appell ate Body proceedings. Accordingly, in
assessing the matter before us, we must clarify the relevant provisions, to the extent necessary, in
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. These rules are
reflected in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
Convention"). We recall in particular that Article 31.1 requires a treaty to be
"interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
37
4.8 We will therefore consider the terms of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement in accordance
with these rules.
V. THE NOTION OF "APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES" UNDER ARTICLE
4.10 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT
5.1 In assessing the validity of the US proposition that countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement should not be disproportionate to the trade impact of the measure on the complaining
Member, in this instance the European Communities, we find it useful to consider first the terms of

37 The full text of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context, for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion
of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted
by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 4.10 in themselves. 38 This initial textual analysis will inform the rest of our analysis, where
we will address the detail of the US interpretation and, more generally, our understanding of the
expression "appropriate countermeasures" in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, taken in its context
and in light of its object and purpose.
A. TEXT OF THE PROVISION
5.2 We recall again that Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement provides as follows:
"In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period
specified by the Panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's
report or the Appellate Body's report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the
complaining Member to take appropriate 9 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides
by consensus to reject the request".
(Original footnote) 9 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited.
5.3 This provision thus foresees the authorization of "appropriate countermeasures". We shall
consider these terms in turn.
1. "Countermeasures"
5.4 Dictionary definitions of "countermeasure" suggest that a countermeasure is essentially
defined by reference to the wrongful action to which it is intended to respond. The New Oxford
Dictionary defines "countermeasure" as "an acti on taken to counteract a danger, threat, etc". 39 The
meaning of "counteract" is to "hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of"40.
Likewise, the term "counter" used as a prefix is defined inter alia as: "opposing, retaliatory"41. The
ordinary meaning of the term thus suggests that a countermeasure bears a relationship with the action
to be counteracted, or with its effects (cf. "hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or
effect of"42).
5.5 In the context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement , the term "countermeasures" is used to
define temporary measures which a prevailing Member may be authorized to take in response to a
persisting violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement , pending full compliance with the DSB's
recommendations. This use of the term is in line wi th its ordinary dictionary meaning as described
above: these measures are authorized to counteract, in this context, a wrongful action in the form of
an export subsidy that is prohibited per se, or the effects thereof.
5.6 It would be consistent with a reading of the plain meaning of the concept of countermeasure
to say that it can be directed either at countering the measure at issue (in this case, at effectively
neutralizing the export subsidy) or at counteracting its effects on the affected party, or both.
5.7 We need, however, to broaden our textual analysis in order to see whether we can find more
precision in how countermeasures are to be construed in this context. We thus turn to an examination

38 Our analysis, in this section, of the terms "appropriate countermeasures" as contained in Article 4.10
of the SCM Agreement (as informed by footnote 9), should be understood to apply also the same terms as they
are contained in Article 4.11 (as informed by footnote 10).
39 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).
40 Ibid.
41 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).
42 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).

of the expression " appropriate" countermeasures with a view to clarifying what level of
countermeasures may be legitimately authorized.
2. "Appropriate countermeasures"
5.8 The term "appropriate" countermeasures in Article 4.10 is informed by footnote 9, which
provides guidance as to what the expression "appropriate" should be understood to mean. For the
sake of clarity, we will first consider the term "appropriate", and then the terms of the footnote.
However, this is with the understanding that these two elements are part of a single assessment and
that the meaning of the expression "appropriate countermeasures" should result from a combined
examination of these terms of the text in light of its footnote.
5.9 The ordinary dictionary meaning of the term "appropriate" refers to something which is
"especially suitable or fitting".
43 "Suitable", in turn, can be defined as "fitted for or appropriate to a
purpose, occasion …" 44 or "adapted to a use or purpose". 45 "Fitting" can be defined as "of a kind
appropriate to the situation".46
5.10 As far as the amount or level of countermeasures is concerned, the expression "appropriate"
does not in and of itself predefine, much less does it do so in some mathematically exact manner, the
precise and exhaustive conditions for the application of countermeasures. That is, in itself, surely
significant. There would have been no a priori reason why some defined and/or formulaic approach
could not have been set down in advance for the application of countermeasures. The terms of the
SCM Agreement on this point manifestly eschew any such approach. But the provisions actually used
do not become any the less meaningful or of lower legal status by reason of that fact. Much less can
there be some kind of inherent presumption that they must be contorted to fit some kind of
procrustean bed in the proportions of a formula when it is manifestly not present in the text itself.
5.11 It is, after all, scarcely a matter for debate that not all situations can be imagined in advance.
But even if one takes the view that, as a consequence, there can be no manual which offers a precise
course of action for a given situation, that does not mean that one is completely bereft of guidance or,
as the case may be, that there are no bounds set to permissible action. This is clearly enough the
situation we are dealing with here, where a Member might find itself resorting to countermeasures.
The relevant provisions are not designed to lay down a precise formula or otherwise quantified
benchmark or amount of countermeasures which might be legitimately authorized in each and every
instance. Rather, the notion of "appropriateness" is used.
5.12 Based on the plain meaning of the word, this means that countermeasures should be adapted
to the particular case at hand. The term is consistent with an intent not to prejudge what the
circumstances might be in the specific context of dispute settlement in a given case. To that extent,
there is an element of flexibility, in the sense that there is thereby an eschewal of any rigid a priori
quantitative formula. But it is also clear that there is, nevertheless, an objective relationship which
must be absolutely respected: the countermeasures must be suitable or fitting by way of response to
the case at hand.
5.13 We would underline that the adjective "appropriate" does not, in and of itself, make it clear
whether the "countermeasures" at issue become so by reason of whether they are aimed at neutralizing
the original wrongful action, its effects, or both. To that extent, we only say, at this point, that the test
is in principle permissive of a range of possibilities.

43 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).
44 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).
45 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).
46 Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1994).

5.14 We must turn, therefore, to footnote 9 of the SCM Agreement to see whether this is capable of
shedding any further light on this matter.
3. Footnote 9 to the SCM Agreement
5.15 Footnote 9 of the SCM Agreement, which provides the only express indication of what the
expression "appropriate countermeasures" encompasses, reads as follows:
"This expression [appropriate] is not meant to allow countermeasures that are
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these
provisions are prohibited."
5.16 This footnote effectively clarifies further how the term "appropriate" is to be interpreted. We
understand it to mean that countermeasures that would be "disproportionate in light of the fact that the
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited" could not be considered "appropriate"
within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. We turn to a further examination of these
terms.
5.17 The term "disproportionate" can be defined as "lacking proportion, poorly proportioned, out
of proportion".47 The term "proportion" refers, inter alia, to a "comparative relation or ratio between
things in size, quantity, numbers" or a "relation between things in nature. etc". 48 T h e t e r m
"disproportionate" thus suggests a lack of proper or due relationship between two elements.
5.18 Based on the ordinary meaning of the terms, the concept involved is understood well enough
in everyday experience. It is a manner of describing relationships adapted to the circumstances,
where the instrument of measurement is perception by the naked eye rather than scrutiny under the
microscope. It is not meant to entail a mathematically exact equation but soundly enough to respect
the relative proportions at issue so that there is no manifest imbalance or incongruity.49 In short, there
is a requirement to avoid a response that is dispr oportionate to the initial offence - to maintain a
congruent relationship in countering the measure at issue so that the reaction is not excessive in light
of the situation to which there is to be a response. But this does not require exact equivalence – the
relationship to be respected is precisely that of "proportion" rather than "equivalence".
5.19 We consider therefore that footnote 9 further confirms that, while the notion of "appropriate
countermeasures" is intended to ensure sufficient flexibility of response to a particular case, it is a
flexibility that is distinctly bounded. Those bounds are set by the relationship of appropriateness.
That appropriateness, in turn, entails an avoidance of disproportion between the proposed
countermeasures and, as our analysis to this point has brought us, either the actual violating measure
itself, the effects thereof on the affected Member, or both.
5.20 We receive, however, rather more specific guidance on these elements in the final part of the
footnote, which reads:
" … disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these
provisions are prohibited." (emphasis added)
5.21 The use of the terms "in light of" directs that the final part of the footnote is a matter that must
enter into consideration at all times. It seems reason able also to conclude that it is not seen to be a

47 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993). Vol. I, p. 700.
48 Ibid.
49 See, on that issue, the Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States
of America v. France) (1978) International Law Reports, Vol. 54 (1979), p. 304 (hereafter " Air Services
arbitration"): "It has been observed, generally, that judging the proportionality of countermeasures is not an
easy task and can at best be accomplished by approximation" (at para. 83, p- 338).

minor or insignificant consideration. On the contrary, it is rather to be an element that is to pervade or
colour the whole assessment. That, at least, is the only reasonable way to construe viewing something
"in light of" something else.
5.22 As we read it, the text refers us unambiguously to the provisions of Part II of the SCM
Agreement and requires us to ensure that our perspective on countermeasures is invested with and
coloured by consideration of the nature and legal status of the particular underlying measure in respect
of which the countermeasures are applied. In short, this provides that, when assessing
countermeasures under Article 4.10, account must be taken of the fact that the export subsidy at issue
is prohibited and has to be withdrawn.
5.23 This emphasis on the unlawful character of e xport subsidies invites, in our view, a
consideration of the impact which this unlawful character may have, in itself. We note in this respect
that the maintenance of the unlawful measure by the Member concerned – in violation of its
obligations – has, in itself, the effect of upsetting the balance of rights and obligations between the
parties, irrespective of what might be, as a matter of fact, the actual trade effects on the complainant.
We recall, in this regard, that the prohibition on export subsidies is a per se obligation, not itself
conditioned on a trade effects test. Members are entitled to trade without other Members resorting to
export subsidies. In our view, the second part of the footnote directs that this is in itself a required
consideration when it comes to assessing whether countermeasures are not disproportionate within the
meaning of Article 4.10. Such consideration can only be reasonably construed to be aggravating
rather than a mitigating factor, to be duly reflected in our assessment of whether countermeasures are
appropriate.
50 Indeed, it directs us to consider the "appropriateness" of countermeasures under Article
4.10 from this perspective of countering a wrongful act and taking into account its essential nature as
an upsetting of the rights and obligations as between Members. This, we conclude, is the manner in
which we are directed to assess the matter. We are not, by comparison, actually directed to, e.g.,
consider demonstrated trade effects of the measure on the complaining Member.
5.24 On the latter point, we would simply note that there has been – and remains – nothing in the
text which precludes a Member from applying countermeasures in the sense of measures that are
aimed at countering the injury, more narrowly conceived, that it has suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act.
51 However, what this footnote makes clear is that the text cannot be construed to
confine the appropriateness test to the element of countering the injurious effects on a party, but also,
and more importantly, that the entitlement to countermeasures is to be assessed taking into account
the legal status of the wrongful act and the manner in which the breach of that obligation has upset the
balance of rights and obligations as between Members. It is from that perspective that the judgement
as to whether countermeasures are disproportionate is to be made.
5.25 Having considered the express terms of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement , we therefore
note, at this stage of our analysis, that they do not suggest a specific quantum to be respected in each
and every case in the determination of an amount of countermeasures which can be authorized under
this provision. On the contrary, they direct us to consider whether the countermeasure proposed are in
an adequate relation to the situation to be countere d, instructing us specifically to consider that the
subsidies under Part II of the SCM Agreement are prohibited in assessing whether the
countermeasures proposed are disproportionate.

50 On this point, see WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.51.
51 We would only add on this point that, as regards countering any demonstrated effects, the standard of
judgement is still that of appropriateness, in the sense of being not disproportionate, by which we take it to mean
a judgement that does not require mathematical exactness of equivalence but that of proportionality in the sense
of not being manifestly excessive. We see this as consistent with the view of the arbitrator in Brazil – Aircraft
(footnote 55) to the effect that " 'appropriate' should not be given the same meaning as 'equivalent', but should
be understood as giving more discretion in the appraisal of the level of countermeasures against prohibited
subsidies".

5.26 It should also be noted that the negative formulation of the requirement under footnote 9 is
consistent with a greater degree of latitude than a positive requirement may have entailed: footnote 9
clarifies that Article 4.10 is not intended to allow countermeasures that would be "disproportionate".
It does not require strict proportionality.52
5.27 With these observations in mind, we will consider further whether, when reading these terms
in their context and in light of their object and purpose, this interpretative approach is confirmed and
whether further clarification can be ascertained as to how the "appropriateness" of countermeasures
under Article 4.10 should be assessed.
B. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 4.10
5.28 We thus turn to an examination of the terms of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement taken in
their context, in order to ascertain further how the notion of "appropriate countermeasures" should be
understood. In that regard, we will address the US arguments relating to the role of the trade impact
of the measure in assessing whether countermeas ures are appropriate under Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement.
5.29 In the view of the United States, "appropriate" countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement must not be disproportionate to the "trade impact" of the measure on the complaining
Member. The United States acknowledges that the standard under Article 4.10 – "not …
disproportionate" – is not identical to the standard under Article 22.4 of the DSU – equivalence – .
However, in its view, the standard under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement cannot be applied as if it
existed in clinical isolation from the DSU, and in a manner which is inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the DSU. The United States argues in particular that in light of Article 22.4 of the DSU
and Articles 7.9 and 9.4 of the SCM Agreement, it would be untenable to interpret Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement as permitting countermeasures that are disproportionate to the trade impact on the

52 We note in this regard the view of the commentator, Sir James Crawford, on the relevant Article of
the ILC text on State Responsibility, reflected in a resolution adopted on 12 December 2001 by the UN General
Assembly (A/RES/56/83), which expresses – but only in positive terms – a requirement of proportionality for
countermeasures:
"the positive formulation of the proportionality requirement is adopted in Article 51. A
negative formulation might allow too much latitude."
 (J. Crawford, The ILC's Articles on
State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries 2002, CUP, para. 5 on Article 51).
Article 51 of the ILC Articles on State responsibility (entitled "Proportionality") reads as follows:
"countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question". (emphasis added)
We also note in this respect that, while that provision expressly refers - contrary to footnote 9 of the SCM
Agreement - to the injury suffered, it also requires the gravity of the wrongful act and the right in question to be
taken into account. This has been understood to entail a qualitative element to the assessment, even where
commensurateness with the injury suffered is at stake. We note the view of Sir James Crawford on this point in
his Commentaries to the ILC Articles :
"Considering the need to ensure that the adoption of countermeasures does not lead to
inequitable results, proportionality must be a ssessed taking into account not only the purely
"quantitative" element of the injury suffered, but also "qualitative" factors such as the
importance of the interest protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness of the breach.
Article 51 relates proportionality primarily to the injury suffered but "taking into account" two
further criteria: the gravity of the internationally wrongful act, and the rights in question. The
reference to "the rights in question" has a broad meaning, and includes not only the effect of a
wrongful act on the injured State but also on the rights of the responsible State. Furthermore,
the position of other States which may be affected may also be taken into consideration." ( op.
cit., para. 6 of the commentaries on Article 51).

complaining Member.53 In the US view, the term "countermeasures" as used in the SCM Agreement
does not have a special meaning and these countermeasures do not have a unique objective in
inducing compliance. Rather, Article 4 of the SCM Agreement should be interpreted in light of the
objectives of the WTO dispute settlement, including the objective of maintaining a proper balance
between the rights of obligations of Members, as foreseen in Article 3.3 of the DSU. An assessment
of the appropriateness of countermeasures under Article 4.10 by reference to the trade impact of the
violating measure on the complaining Member is, in the US view, the only approach that is consistent
with the object and purpose of Article 4.10.54
5.30 To begin with, we recall that first, we have found not only that, via footnote 9, there is an
entitlement to take account of the unlawful natu re of the initial act which gives rise to the
countermeasures, but also that this is the perspective for assessment specifically required for under the
SCM Agreement. While we do not see the plain language of Article 4.10 as in any way precluding the
application of countermeasures aimed at countering the effects of the wrongful act on a Member
provided they otherwise satisfy the terms of the SCM Agreement , we do not find this to be the
necessary standard of assessment laid down in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. We saw nothing
in the plain language of this text which, on its face, dictates that the term "appropriate
countermeasures" must be limited in its meaning to "equivalence" or correspondence (or some
synonym) with the "trade impact" on the complaining Member.55
5.31 We therefore must address the question of whether there is otherwise, in reading the provision
in context, some overriding requirement to assess the appropriateness of countermeasures under
Article 4.10 from the perspective of demonstrated trade effects on the complaining Member.
1. Article 4.10 in the context of the SCM Agreement
5.32 Recourse to countermeasures is foreseen in three provisions of the SCM Agreement: Article
4.10, which we are concerned with here, Article 7.9 and Article 9. 56 As regards actionable subsidies,
Article 7.9 provides for authorization of countermeasures "commensurate with the degree and nature
of the adverse effects determined to exist…". In a similar vein, Article 9.4 provides, in relation to
non-actionable subsidies, for the authorization of countermeasures "commensurate with the nature and
degree of the effects determined to exist". The explicit precision of these indications clearly
highlights the lack of any analogous explicit textual indication in Article 4.10 and contrasts with the
broader and more general test of "appropriateness" found in Articles 4.10 and 4.11.
5.33 In short, as far as prohibited subsidies are concerned, there is no reference whatsoever in
remedies foreseen under Article 4 to such concepts as "trade effects", "adverse effects" or "trade
impact". Yet, by contrast, such a concept is to be found very clearly in the context of remedies under
Article 7, through the notion of "adverse effects".
5.34 We believe that this difference must be given a meaning and that we should give due
consideration to the fact that the drafters – who obviously could have used other terms in order to
quantify precisely the permissible amount of countermeasures in the context of Article 4.10 – chose

53 See US first submission, paras. 32 ff.
55 The United States acknowledges that Article 4.10 does not require the strict equivalence imposed
under Article 22.4 of the DSU. Nonetheless, it construes the "appropriateness" of countermeasures under
Article 4.10 fundamentally as a "trade effects" test of a nature comparable to that foreseen under Article 22.4.
See US answers to questions by the Arbitrator, paras. 4 and 5.
56 We are aware of the provisions of Article 31 of the SCM Agreement and that Members took no
action to extend the application of the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of the Agreement concerning non-
actionable subsidies beyond the period of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
However, these provisions can nevertheless be helpful, in our view, in understanding the overall architecture of
the Agreement with respect to the different types of subsidies it sought and seeks to address.

not to do so. It is not our task to read into the treaty text words that are not there. 57 We are also
cognizant that the terms that do appear in the text of the treaty must be presumed to have meaning and
must be read effectively. 58 The implications of the use of the term "appropriate" must therefore be
acknowledged and we must give this expression in Article 4.10 its full meaning.59
5.35 This cannot be viewed as a matter of simple difference in terminology in abstraction from any
other consideration. Export subsidies do, after all, have "adverse effects" on third parties.
Systemically speaking they are, as a category of subsidy, more inherently prone to do so than any
other. Thus, there would have been no inherent reason why the drafters could not have, in relation to
export subsidies, provided for disciplines of the type foreseen in Articles 5 and 7 in terms of "adverse
effects" and made provision for countermeasures based on the same concept as is applied, e.g., in
Article 7. On the contrary, there would have been every reason to treat this category of subsidies in
the same way if the guiding intent had been to apply an "adverse effects" test. Yet it was decided not
to do so. This, in our view, underlines all the more that this is meaningful and reflective of a rationale.
In other words, the distinction cannot be presumed to be arbitrary or casual, much less effectively read
out of the text in its entirety.
5.36 We consider that the rationale is not difficult to discern. These different wordings reflect, in
our view, the distinct legal nature and treatment under the SCM Agreement of various types of
subsidies. The fundamental distinction between actionable and prohibited subsidies which underlies
the whole structure and logic of the SCM Agreement finds expression generally in the differences in
the elements defining the applicable obligations and the differences of treatment given to these
measures with regard to the remedies available to challenge them.
60
5.37 The distinction in the terminol ogy relating to countermeasures is, in turn, a corresponding
reflection of the distinction when it comes to substa ntive disciplines for export subsidies: i.e. a clear
and unambiguous intent to apply different and more exacting disciplines when it comes to export
subsidies viz. a prohibition.
5.38 The underlying rationale for the distinction made is clear enough. The provisions regarding
remedies pursuant to Articles 5 and 7 relate to subsidies that are accepted, in themselves, not to be
illegal. But, while they are acceptable in themselves, other Members are, nevertheless, entitled to
protection from their possible adverse effects. So the basis for actionability of such measures is their

57 See for example the reports of the Appellate Body in India – Quantitative Restrictions ,
WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, 1763, para 94; EC – Hormones , WT/DS26/AB/R, and WT/DS48/AB/R,
DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 181; India – Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, DSR, 1998:I, 9, para. 45.
58 See for example the reports of the Appellate Body on US – Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R,
DSR 1996:I, 3, at 21 and Korea – Dairy, WT/DS98/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, 3, para. 81.
59 See paras. 4.24-4.26 above.
60 With respect to the differences in the elements defining the applicable obligations, we recall that
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement – containing the defining elements of prohibited export subsidies --
provides:
"3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture , the following subsidies, within
the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact 4, whether solely or as one of several other
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5;"
(original footnote) 4This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a
subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied
to actual or anticipated exportation or export earning s. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted
to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export
subsidy within the meaning of this provision.

adverse effect on other Members. 61 In the case of a nullification or impairment claim, this adverse
effect is defined as that which is "caused to the interests of the Member requesting consultations".62
5.39 This is, of course, quite different from the situation with export subsidies. We see in Article 4
of the SCM Agreement that the prohibited nature of export-contingent subsidies has justified more
stringent (faster) dispute settlement procedures 63 and a clear requirement to withdraw them without
delay.64 More importantly, they are prohibited per se. Other Members are not obliged to make a case
regarding any adverse effects to successfully challe nge such measures. They are required simply to
establish the existence of a measure that is, as a matter of principle, expressly prohibited. As an
empirical matter they undoubtedly do have adverse effects. But that is not the legal basis upon which
action may be taken to challenge them under the SCM Agreement.
5.40 This is, in turn, reflected consistently in the provisions addressing remedies. Pursuant to the
relevant provisions in Articles 5 and 7, a Member found to be in breach - having granted a subsidy
which was not prohibited but has produced demonstrated adverse effects on another Member - has the
alternative of withdrawing the measure or removing these adverse effects.
65 What is important for
present purposes is that, by contrast, there is, under Article 4 relating to prohibited export subsidies,
no option for an infringing party to simply remove the adverse effects and retain the measure. A
Member found to be in breach must withdraw the measure without delay. This contrasts with the
remedies in Article 7 of the same Agreement that are available in relation to actionable subsidies. In
all provisions relating to prohibited subsidies in Part II of the SCM Agreement, the remedies available
are stronger and more rapid than those available in Part III of the SCM Agreement for actionable
subsidies. This is clearly not just a random distinction. It reflects the legal status of a prohibition: if
the measure is per se prohibited, irrespective of its effects, the only consistent remedy is to withdraw
it.
66
5.41 This reading of the text in its context confirms us in our view that, rather than there being any
requirement to confine "appropriate countermeasures " to offsetting the effects of the measure on the
relevant Member, there is a clear rationale exhibited that reinforces our textual interpretation that the
Member concerned is entitled to take countermeasures that are tailored to neutralizing the offending
measure qua measure as a wrongful act. The expression "appropriate countermeasures", in our view,
would entitle the complaining Member to countermeasures which would at least counter the injurious

61 Thus, the concept of "adverse eff ect" is indeed to be found in the SCM Agreement , but only in
relation to provisions that contrast with the prohibition on export subsidies in Article 4. Article 7 makes it clear
that when a member considers that the granting or maintaining of a subsidy results in, inter alia, nullification or
impairment, the provisions on remedies pursuant to that Article will apply. It should be emphasized that a
positive finding of nullification and impairment is, by definition, also a finding of "adverse effects" (this
ultimately deriving from the use of i.e. in Article 5 which makes it plain that nullification and impairment is one
category of the overarching concept of "adverse effects" under the SCM Agreement.). It is also to be noted that
where a positive finding is made, the party concerned may either "remove the adverse effects of the subsidy"
(Article 7.9) or "withdraw the subsidy" ( ibid.). In a situation where there is non-compliance by the party
against whom a finding has been made, the complaining Member is entitled "to take countermeasures,
commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist".
62 SCM Agreement, Article 7.2.
63 SCM Agreement, Article 4, including Article 4.12.
64 SCM Agreement, Article 4.7.
65 One might note, in passing, that there is no provision for compensation in a nullification and
impairment case under these provisions of the SCM agreement as there is provided for under Article XXIII
GATT 1994 and the Article 22 of the DSU, although that is not important for present purposes.
66 Of course, as a logical matter, removal of the measure would certainly encompass a suppression of
effects. One might underline here that is a matter of removal of all effects: the practical effect of the remedy
provided for under Article 4 is clearly to eliminate a meas ure in its entirety-including its effects. That is clearly
distinct from the practical effect of the Article 5 and 7 disciplines under which it is envisaged that a remedy can
be applied which would ensure elimination of the effect on a complaining party but where the possibility of
effects on other parties remains.

effect of the persisting illegal measure on it. However, it does not require trade effects to be the
effective standard by which the appropriateness of countermeasures should be ascertained. Nor can
the relevant provisions be interpreted to limit the assessment to this standard. Members may take
countermeasures that are not disproportionate in light of the gravity of the initial wrongful act and the
objective of securing the withdrawal of a prohibited export subsidy, so as to restore the balance of
rights and obligations upset by that wrongful act.
5.42 To conclude otherwise would effectively erode the fundamental distinction in the SCM
Agreement between those provisions regarding purely "effects-oriented" remedies and those distinctly
provided for pursuant to Article 4. Under the former provisions, it is clear that the premise is that the
Member is to retain the entitlement to persist with certain subsidies, as they are not prohibited per se.
The obligation of such a Member goes to attenuating their demonstrated trade effect. Accordingly, the
remedy to which an affected Member is entitled goes only as far as countering those effects. In such a
situation, there is an effective "rebalancing", but only a rebalancing on the level of reciprocal actual
trade effects. In such a case, the legal status of the original measure is not itself affected.
5.43 This contrasts with the situation vis-à-vis a prohibited export subsidy. To insist on a remedy
limited to such effects would be precisely to entertain "rebalancing" at that level, which would neither
specifically take into account the obligation to wit hdraw the original measure nor aim to restore the
balance of rights and obligations that has been upset by the original wrongful action. It would be
effectively to read away the fundamental distincti on between the relevant provisions as well as to
undermine the essential rationale of that distinction. In our view, footnotes 9 and 10, in their final
part, require us specifically to account for, and give due force to, that distinction in our determination
of whether countermeasures are "appropriate".
2. Article 4.10 and Article 22.4 of the DSU
5.44 While the aforementioned provisions appear to us to be the most direct and relevant context,
we examine also whether there is anything which, taking Article 22.4 of the DSU into account, would
in any way lead us to modify our interpretation. We do so in particular bearing in mind the fact that
the United States considers that the DSU is relevant on the matter of the role of trade effects pursuant
to Article 4.10.
5.45 We recall that Article 22.4 of the DSU provides as follows:
"The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the
DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment."
5.46 The drafters have explicitly set a quantitative benchmark to the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations that might be authorized. This is similarly reflected in Article 22.7,
which defines the arbitrators' mandate in such proceedings as follows:
"The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 … shall determine whether the level of
such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment…."
(footnote omitted)
5.47 As we have already noted in our analysis of the text of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
above, there is, by contrast, no such indication of an explicit quantitative benchmark in that provision.
It should be recalled here that Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement are "special or additional
rules" under Appendix 2 of the DSU, and that in accordance with Article 1.2 of the DSU, it is possible
for such rules or procedures to prevail over those of the DSU. There can be no presumption,
therefore, that the drafters intended the standard under Article 4.10 to be necessarily coextensive with
that under Article 22.4 so that the notion of "appr opriate countermeasures" under Article 4.10 would
limit such countermeasures to an amount "equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment"

suffered by the complaining Member. Rather, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement use
distinct language and that difference must be given meaning.
5.48 Indeed, reading the text of Article 4.10 in its context, one might reasonably observe that if the
drafters had intended the provision to be construed in this way, they could certainly have made it
clear. Indeed, relevant provisions both elsewhere in the SCM Agreement and in the DSU use distinct
terms to convey precisely such a standard as described by the United States, in so many words. Yet
the drafters chose terms for this provision in the SCM Agreement different from those found in Article
22.4 of the DSU. It would not be consistent with effective treaty interpretation to simply read away
such differences in terminology.
5.49 We therefore find no basis in the language itself or in the context of Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement to conclude that it can or should be read as amounting to a "trade effect-oriented"
provision where explicitly alternative language is to be read away in order to conform it to a different
wording to be found in Article 22.4 of the DSU.
5.50 We would simply add that, while we consider that the precise difference in language must be
given proper meaning, this goes no further than that. Our interpretation of Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement as embodying a different rule from Article 22.4 of the DSU does not make the DSU
otherwise inapplicable or redundant.
C. O
BJECT AND PURPOSE
5.51 Our understanding of the terms of Article 4.10, including footnote 9, based on an analysis of
the relevant terms taken in their context is, in our view, also consistent with the object and purpose of
the SCM Agreement in relation to Article 4.10, and of the WTO Agreement, as they relate to the
dispute settlement remedies.
5.52 In our view, the object and purpose of the DSB’s mandate to authorize countermeasures under
Article 4.10 can first be drawn from the very language of Article 4.10. Article 4.10 requires that the
DSB authorize the complaining Member to take appropriate countermeasures in case of non-
compliance with the recommendation of the DSB. In other words, countermeasures are taken against
non-compliance, and thus its authorization by the DSB is aimed at inducing or securing compliance
with the DSB’s recommendation. In this context, pursuant to Article 4.7, the DSB may only
recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. We therefore consider
that the objective of the SCM Agreement in relation to Article 4.10 in particular is to secure
compliance with the DSB’s recommendation to withdraw the subsidy without delay.
5.53 Article 4.10, by allowing for the imposition of countermeasures in case of non-compliance,
provides a specific temporary instrument to WTO Members, in the context of disputes concerning
prohibited subsidies. This instrument contributes to the ultimate achievement of the objectives of
dispute settlement.
5.54 We note in this respect that Article 3.7 of the DSU also provides that "[i]n the absence of a
mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure
the withdrawal of the measures" found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations.
5.55 We also note that the DSU Article 3.2 provides that the WTO dispute settlement system (of
which this type of arbitration is an integral part) is "a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system", and "[t]he Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements."
5.56 In the case of prohibited subsidies, we are of the view that the fact that a panel determining
that a subsidy found to be prohibited can only recommend its withdrawal without delay is significant

and must be given some meaning when determining the appropriateness of proposed
countermeasures. Furthermore, in our view, the legal means prescribed to ultimately restore the
"balance of rights and obligations" of Members in relation to prohibited subsidies are specifically
provided for under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. In a situation where the balance of rights and
obligations has been upset through the granting of a prohibited subsidy, panels may only recommend
that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy "without delay" in order to restore such balance.
5.57 In light of the above, we believe that countermeasures authorized under Article 4.10
contribute to the purpose of inducing compliance with the DSB’s recommendations, consistently with
restoring the balance of rights and obligations between the Members. In our view, the terms of
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, including footnote 9, confirm that, when assessing the scope of
what may be deemed "appropriate" countermeasures, we should keep in mind the fact that the subsidy
at issue has to be withdrawn and that a countermeasure should contribute to the ultimate objective of
withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy without delay.
5.58 Finally, we note that the term "countermeasures" has acquired a meaning in general
international law
67, which is reflected in the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on
State Responsibility. While the term "countermeasures" has a specific meaning in the SCM Agreement
as regards their nature and application, we find that our interpretation of the relevant texts appear to
be consistent with the object and purpose of countermeasures as reflected in the work of the ILC.
5.59 Article 49 of the text resulting from the ILC's work on State Responsibility (of which the
General Assembly of the UN has taken note in a recent resolution) provides, in respect of the object
and limits of countermeasures in international law, inter alia, that:
"An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible
for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its
obligations in Part Two."
68
5.60 We note that Article 49.1 of the ILC text does not, per se , determine the amount of
countermeasures that can be authorized. Rather, it defines the only object and purpose for which
countermeasures can legitimately be imposed: i.e., to induce the State which has committed an
internationally wrongful act to comply with its obligations.
69 That is not incompatible, in our view,
with the notion of countermeasures within the WTO dispute settlement system, where such measures
are imposed as a temporary response to an absence of compliance. We note in this respect the
observation by the arbitrator in the EC - Bananas case, in the context of Article 22.4 of the DSU, that
"this temporary nature [of suspension of concessions or other obligations] indicates that it is the
purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance".70
5.61 Thus, as we interpret Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, a Member is entitled to act with
countermeasures that properly take into account the gravity of the breach and the nature of the upset
in the balance of rights and obligations in question. This cannot be reduced to a requirement that
constrains countermeasures to trade effects, for the reasons we have set out above.

67 See, e.g., the Naulilaa arbitral award (1928), UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, p.
1028 and the Air Services arbitration, op. cit.
68 Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN, A/RES/56/83, Responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful Acts, adopted on 12 December 2001. We note that the ILC's work is based on relevant
State practice as well as on judicial decisions and doctr inal writings, which constitute recognized sources of
international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
69 See J. Crawford, op. cit., p. 286. This author notes in particular that "countermeasures are taken as a
form of inducement, not punishment" (para. 7 of the Commentaries on Article 49).
70 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU
("EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC)
 "), WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999, DSR 1999:II, 725, para. 6.3.

5.62 At the same time, Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement does not amount to a blank cheque.
There is nothing in the text or in its context which suggests an entitlement to manifestly punitive
measures. On the contrary, footnote 9 specifically guards us against such an unbounded interpretation
by clarifying that the expression "appropriate" cannot be understood to allow "disproportionate"
countermeasures. However, to read this indication as effectively reintroducing into that provision a
quantitative limit equivalent to that found in other provisions of the SCM Agreement or Article 22.4 of
the DSU would effectively read the specific language of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement out of the
text. Countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement are not even, strictly speaking,
obliged to be "proportionate" but not to be " dispro portionate". Not only is a Member entitled to take
countermeasures that are tailored to offset the original wrongful act and the upset of the balancing of
rights and obligations which that wrongful act entail s, but in assessing the "appropriateness" of such
countermeasures – in light of the gravity of the breach – , a margin of appreciation is to be granted,
due to the severity of that breach.
VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE COUNTERMEASURES PROPOSED BY THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
6.1 As noted above, the parties agree that, in qualitative terms, the type of measure envisaged by
the European Communities in this case is appropriate. Their disagreement is over whether the
quantitative amount of the countermeasure is appropriate.
6.2 The European Communities has requested an authorization to suspend concessions in an
amount of US$4,043 million. It has argued, as a general matter, that Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement would allow for an amount of countermeasures such as to effectively induce compliance,
and that it could have, on that basis, requested a higher amount of countermeasures. However, it has
explained that the amount which it has actually requested in this instance is based on the amount
expended by the United States in granting the subsidy.
6.3 We will therefore consider whether countermeasures in this amount can be considered
"appropriate" within the meaning of Article 4.10, bearing in mind our analysis in the previous section.
6.4 We recall that we are required, in our analysis, to apply the terms of footnote 9 and, in that
regard, need to take into account its second part. We therefore need to consider whether the European
Communities proposed countermeasures are not disproportionate "in light of the fact that the
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited".
6.5 In approaching this, we first wish to underline exactly what our responsibility is in making
this determination. We are required, under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, to ascertain whether
the countermeasures proposed by the European Communities are "appropriate". In this assessment,
we are guided in particular by the terms of footnote 10, which directs us to consider whether we are
persuaded that the EC countermeasures are "disproportionate" in light of the fact that the subsidies at
issue are prohibited. As we noted above, this is not exactly the same as being persuaded that they are
"proportionate". In the absence of being effectively persuaded that they are disproportionate, we
would conclude that the European Communities' proposed countermeasures are within the bounds of
what they are entitled to apply pursuant to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
6.6 As noted above, in assessing whether the proposed countermeasures are "disproportionate" in
light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with in this provision are prohibited, "our perspective on
countermeasures is invested with and coloured by consideration of the nature and legal status of the
particular underlying measure in respect of which the countermeasures are applied".
71 As we have
outlined in paragraph 5.61 above, we consider that the European Communities is entitled to act with

71 Supra, para. 5.22.

countermeasures that properly take into account the gravity of the breach and the nature of the upset
in the balance of rights and obligations in question. In the case at hand, we consider what this entails.
6.7 As regards the matter of the balance of rights and obligations between Members that is being
upset through the granting of the subsidy, the European Communities has had the "right" to expect
that there will be no export subsidies applied to those goods covered by the SCM Agreement. The
United States, for its part, has had a corresponding obligation to refrain from applying such export
subsidies. The persistence by the United States with this breach of its obligations upsets the "balance
of rights and obligations" that we have referred to in the previous section of this report.
6.8 As far as a trading partner is concerned, the matter does not become problematic, as a legal
matter, contingent on any other factor such as, e.g. the actual effects of the measure itself. It is
problematic in the form of an upset in the reciprocal balance of rights and obligations in and through
the measure itself and, in this case, it is intrinsic to that measure as a wrongful act that the United
States is incurring costs in granting and maintaining the export subsidy. Once such a measure is in
operation, its real world effects cannot be separated from the inherent uncertainty that is created by
the very existence of such an export subsidy. The measure is, by its very nature, inherently
destabilizing. This is its essential character and it is reflected in the fact that the measure is per se
prohibited. In this particular case, moreover, the subsidy at issue, the FSC/ETI scheme, is a measure
which is extensive in its application and, indeed, is potentially available to a very wide range of goods
for export. It is not at all like a product- or even a sector-specific measure with, e.g., a set rate or
quantum of funds. It is a highly complex and comprehensive export subsidy being applied to a
multiplicity of firms.
6.9 The FSC/ETI scheme is available systemically and very widely. If anything, this can only
intensify the degree to which, in this case, the measure concerned creates systematic uncertainty and
instability of expectations as to trading conditions, as opposed to security and stability of such
conditions based on the understanding – grounded in an express obligation – that export subsidies are
prohibited. We consider that this is a matter that is relevant to the issue of the "gravity" of the initial
wrongful act. The European Communities cannot, of course, itself counter the export subsidy at its
source, i.e. effect its cessation. But, as regards the balance of rights and obligations between
Members, it is entitled to "redress" the upsetting of that balance via countermeasures.
72
6.10 The quantitative element of the breach in this case is, in fact, that the United States has spent
approximately US$4,000 million yearly in breach of its obligations. 73 To our mind, each dollar is, as
it were, as much a breach of the obligations of the United States as any other. Certain dollars do not
become any less so – or effectively "quarantined" from their legal status of breach of an obligation –
by virtue of some other criteria (such as trade effects). To put it another way, the United States'
breach of obligation is not objectively dismissed because some of the products benefiting from the
subsidy are, e.g., exported to another trading partner. It is an erga omnes obligation owed in is
entirety to each and every Member. It cannot be considered to be "allocatable" across the
Membership. Otherwise, the Member concerned would be only partially obliged in respect of each
and every Member, which is manifestly inconsistent with an erga omnes per se obligation. Thus, the
United States has breached its obligation to the European Communities in respect of all the money

72 Of course, the balance of rights and obligations between Members will only ultimately be properly
redressed through full compliance with the DSB's recommendations, i.e., in this case, withdrawal of the
unlawful subsidy. Countermeasures merely offer a temporary and imperfect redress to the persisting violation,
which in no way reduces the need to comply or substitutes for such compliance.
73 For a detailed analysis of the value of the subsidy, see Annex A below.

that it has expended, because such expenditure in breach – the expense incurred – is the very essence
of the wrongful act.74
6.11 Thus, legally speaking, in terms of redressing the balance of rights and obligations, this is a
significant consideration in our assessment of the European Communities' proposed countermeasures.
In this respect, we recall our earlier conclusion that countermeasures under Article 4.10 may be
tailored to the initial wrongful act they are to counter. In this instance, the European Communities has
proposed to take countermeasures which would precisely tailor the response to the amount of this
initial wrongful act. In light of our interpretation, in the previous section, of the terms of Article 4.10
of the SCM Agreement, we find such an approach, which aims to challenge the wrongful act itself –
the breach of the obligation – to be permissible in principle. Indeed, it is in our view entirely
compatible with the essence of the notion of countermeasures, in that it seeks to respond exactly to the
violation, the persistence of which generates the entitlement to countermeasures.
6.12 We thus turn to a consideration of the proposed countermeasures in relation to the initial
wrongful act which they are to counter, the prohibited subsidy.
A. T
HE PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES IN RELATION TO THE PROHIBITED SUBSIDY
6.13 In order to proceed with an analysis of the proposed countermeasures in relation to the
wrongful act they are to counter, we must first define the elements of that wrongful act. It seems to us
that the relevant factors that can be used when it comes to defining the prohibited subsidy itself cannot
be artificially constructed. They should be discerned from and grounded in the SCM Agreement itself.
We recall in this respect the guidance provided in particular by footnote 9, which directs us to take
into consideration that the underlying subsidy is prohibited under Part II of the SCM Agreement.
6.14 We turn first to what we consider to be fundamental when it comes to characterizing the
measure qua measure, namely the "financial contribution", given that it is a core element of the
definition of a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
6.15 In this regard, we first note that the amount of the countermeasures proposed certainly
exhibits a manifest relationship of proportionality, as we understand the term
75, in regard to the
amount of the export subsidy granted. In this instance, the parties effectively do not fundamentally
disagree on the actual value of the export subsidy in respect of which the United States has been
found to be in persistent violation.
76 Their disagreement rests only on the issue of whether that
amount of countermeasures is "appropriate" within the meaning of Article 4.10.
6.16 As noted above, the quantitative element of the breach in this case is, in fact, that the United
States has spent approximately US$4,000 million in breach of its obligations. 77 The European
Communities, for its part, is requesting an author ization to take countermeasures in an amount of
US$4,043 million.
6.17 The values concerned are not disproportionate. In purely numerical terms, they are in fact in
virtual correspondence.78
6.18 But this is not just a matter of merely arithmetic proportionality in the abstract. There is an
underlying more "structural" element of proportionality that is exhibited in the countermeasures

74 One of the arbitrators wishes to stress that this and the following paragraph should not be read to
mean that, without regard to the particular circumstances of individual cases, the total amount of the subsidy
would be a universally and generally applicable standard at all times.
75 See supra para. 5.18.
76 For a detailed analysis of calculations of the amount of the subsidy, see Annex A below.
77 For a detailed analysis of the value of the subsidy, see Annex A below.
78 See WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.60.

proposed which provides a legally relevant relationship between measure and countermeasure.
Firstly, the granting of a subsidy involves a financial contribution, thus an expense incurred by the
government. That is, stricto sensu, the "measure" at issue as the wrongful act of the responsible State
party. In this instance, an amount of approximately US$4,000 million has been granted in the year
2000, in a manner found to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, by the US government to its
exporters. That is the expense incurred by the United States Government in granting that measure,
through the FSC/ETI scheme. As a wrongful act – as breach of an obligation owed to the European
Communities in this case – this is the essential act of the government itself.
6.19 Thus, following our reasoning above, this is a central perspective from which to view the
"appropriateness" of the countermeasures at issue. The United States has effectively incurred an
expense which can be valued at around US$4,000 million for the year 2000, as an act of Government
in breach of its obligations under the SCM Agreement. In the instant case the European Communities
cannot, of course, directly thwart that expenditure at source. As we see it, the European Communities
is proposing to respond by suspending a numerically equivalent obligation which it owes to the
United States. Absent those countermeasures, the United States would enjoy those rights, just as,
absent the expenditure by the United States, the European Communities would enjoy its rights. It
appears to us that this is a proper manner from which to judge the congruence of the countermeasure
to the measure at issue, i.e. to view it under its legal category: on the one hand an expense to
government of a certain value constituting an upsetting of the balance of rights and obligations; and
therefore, on the other hand, a congruent duty imposed by a responding government as a mirror
withdrawal of an obligation.
6.20 We have evidently assigned fundamental importance to the role of the financial contribution
as the act in respect of which countermeasures should be evaluated. That reflects the fact that it is the
element reflecting most accurately the act of the Member itself, over which it exerts direct control.
79
6.21 Of course, the second element that is central to the subsidy as defined by Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement itself is the benefit to the recipient. In this case, there is manifestly a benefit conveyed
through the FSC/ETI scheme. It is conveyed to US firms. At the broadest level, the EC
countermeasures would be viewed as aiming to deprive such firms of an advantage they would
otherwise receive in relation to access to the EC market. There is no doubt that the character of the
EC response, in addition to being an act of response to a quantifiable breach of an obligation with a
congruent response, also has the consequence of effecting that via US firms. Yet it is also a fact that
US firms are benefiting from the prohibited subsidy. To that extent, a certain basic proportionality is
respected. In this case, the European Communities' powers are limited to its own jurisdiction. One
way of countering an absolute benefit to firms is to impose an equivalent absolute expense. Certainly,
the overall effects will vary as will the impact on firms. There will not be pure equivalence in terms
of economic impact. But within the realistic constraints that states operate in, and in dealing with an
all-pervasive regime such as the FSC/ETI scheme, the principle being effectively followed here is the
imposition on firms of the Member concerned of expenses at least equivalent to those initially
incurred by the treasury of the Member concerned in granting benefits to its firms. In that sense, there
is a certain correlation between the benefits initially conferred to US firms and the European
Communities' proposed response.
6.22 It is certainly true that the European Communities' proposed countermeasures would not in a
literal sense amount to (nor are they claimed to be) an exact counter to the benefits to recipients of the
FSC/ETI subsidy. This does not, in our view, represent a fundamental problem in this case. It is
almost inevitable that it will, in many situations, be impracticable to devise a countermeasure that
would exactly counter the benefits conferred, nor is there, in our view, a requirement to do so,
precisely because the terms justifying countermeasures are, for the reasons we have given, entitled to

79 This is not necessarily the case, e.g., for the effects of the measure, it being understood, of course,
that as regards responsibility, this extends also to the consequences as well as the act.

be viewed essentially from the perspective of countering the legal breach as a wrongful act. Be that as
it may, in the case of a programme such as this, which applies to firms across a considerable range of
industries and products, it is clearly impossible for a foreign government to counter precisely the
specific benefits to specific firms. The task of calculation alone would be near impossible, let alone
tailoring responses to particular firms.
6.23 In this instance, the European Communities has based its proposed amount of
countermeasures on the face value of the subsidy, rather than directly on the benefits conferred by it.80
The United States has not sought to object to the level of countermeasures on these grounds. Taking
all of this into account, we, for our part, have certainly found no reason to consider that, to the extent
that this aspect is relevant in the first place, it provides any reason to depart from our judgement that
the entitlement to the level of countermeasures stemming from the wrongful act as measured by the
expense to government is not disproportionate.
6.24 Thus, it is our view, in light of these considerations, that the countermeasures proposed are
not disproportionate to the initial wrongful act to which they are intended to respond.
6.25 Our analysis above and the fact that we have concluded that the countermeasures proposed in
this case are not disproportionate to the initial wrongful act – the maintenance by the United States of
an unlawful export subsidy in violation of its obligations under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement – ,
would in themselves, in our view, be sufficient to allow us to consider that, in the circumstances of
this case, the proposed amount of countermeasures would be "appropriate" within the meaning of
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. We recall in this respect our conclusion in Section V above
regarding the entitlement to take countermeasures tailored to restore the balance of rights and
obligations upset by the original wrongful act, and taking into account its gravity. In this instance,
this is the approach followed by the European Comm unities, and we find it to be consistent with the
terms of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
 81
6.26 This is an appropriate point at which to underline that there is one matter that is particular to
the circumstances of this case and is material to this conclusion, yet has not – up to this point – been
expressly dealt with.
6.27 In the circumstances of this case, the Europ ean Communities is the sole complainant seeking
to take countermeasures in relation to this particular violating measure. That is also, in our view, a
relevant consideration in our analysis. Had there been multiple complainants each seeking to take
countermeasures in an amount equal to the value of the subsidy, this would certainly have been a
consideration to take into account in evaluating whether such countermeasures might be considered to
be not "appropriate" in the circumstances. That is not, however, the situation before us.

80 The European Communities has referred, in the course of the proceedings, to the notion of benefits
to the United States of the scheme in the context of proposing alternative methodological approaches to
calculate an amount of "appropriate countermeasures" and suggests that "since the benefits the US derives from
the FSC/ETI scheme are higher than the value of the subsidy, the imposition of countermeasures equivalent to
the value of the subsidy can be seen to be a modest and conservative estimate of what is required to induce
compliance" (First submission, para. 69). It has also argued that it had proposed "countermeasures based on the
- and proportionate to – the benefit provided by the FSC-ETI scheme to United States exporters" (Second
submission para. 55). However, the European Communities has not sought to directly quantify these benefits to
demonstrate an exact correspondence between these benefits and the amount it is suggesting in this instance.
Rather, it argues that these benefits would be higher than the amount of the subsidy.
81 We would only observe that our judgement is, in any case, simply that the countermeasures sought
by the European Communities are not disproportionate, based on our reasoning and the facts of this case. In
determining that, we have not necessarily defined this quantum of countermeasures as being the definitive limit.
We have not made – and do not make – any judgement on that matter. The only question before us is whether
the amount sought by the European Communities is not disproportionate.

6.28 The reasoning we have followed above could be construed – in a purely abstract manner – to
be as inherently applicable to any other Member as to the complainant in this case viz. the European
Communities.82 We would simply underline, in this regard, that in this case, we were not presented
with a multiple complaint but a complaint by one Member. Thus we have not been obliged to
consider whether or how the entitlement to countermeasures based on our reasoning above should be
allocated across more than one complainant. Thus to the extent that there would be an issue of
allocation, as it were, it need not – and did not – enter into consideration as an element to otherwise
"discount" the European Communities' entitlement to countermeasures in this particular case.
6.29 Understandably, it would be our expectation that this determination will have the practical
effect of facilitating prompt compliance by the Un ited States. On any hypothesis that there would be
a future complainant, we can only observe that this would give rise inevitably to a different situation
for assessment. To the extent that the basis sought for countermeasures was purely and simply that of
countering the initial measure (as opposed to, e.g., the trade effects on the Member concerned) it is
conceivable that the allocation issue would arise (although due regard should be given to the point
made in footnote 84 above). We take note, on this point, of the statement by the European
Communities:
"…it may well be that the European Communities would be happy to share the task
of applying countermeasures against the United States with another member and
voluntarily agree to remove some of its countermeasures so as to provide more scope
for another WTO Member to be authorized to do the same. This will be another fact
that future arbitrators could take into consideration.".
83
6.30 It must be stressed, however, that there is no mechanical automaticity to this. The essence of
such assessments is that it is a matter of judging what is appropriate in the case at hand. There could
well be other factors to take into account in their own right, e.g., if for instance the matter of bilateral
trade effects were essentially at issue.
6.31 At this point of our analysis, we therefore have, in our view, elements sufficient to allow us to
find that the countermeasures proposed could be considered "appropriate" within the meaning of
Article 4.10, on the basis of their relation to the initial violating measure.
6.32 In doing so, we are conscious that we have not precisely considered the contention that the
matter should be determined by means of reference to the adverse trade effects of the subsidy on the
European Communities. We recall, moreover, that the United States has argued that the basis for
assessing the "appropriateness" of countermeasures should precisely be these adverse trade effects (or
"trade impact"). We address this issue further below.
B. T
HE TRADE EFFECTS OF THE SUBSIDY ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
6.33 As discussed in the previous section, we have not interpreted Article 4.10 to preclude a
Member from taking countermeasures that are tailored to counter the adverse effects it has suffered as
a result of the illegal measure. We therefore do not rule out a priori that trade effects of the measure
on the affected Member can enter into consideration in a particular case, as a relevant factor, in
determining the "appropriate" amount of countermeasures within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement. Indeed, as we have previously noted, the expression "appropriate countermeasures",

82 One of the arbitrators wishes to stress that under different circumstances in a particular case, this
consideration alone may not automatically lead to the conclusion that the countermeasures are "appropriate"
within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
83 EC response to question 42 from the Arbitrator, para. 116.

in our view, would entitle the complaining Member to countermeasures which would at least counter
the injurious effect of the persisting illegal measure on it.84
6.34 However, we have also determined that Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement does not require
trade effects to be the effective standard by which the appropriateness of countermeasures should be
ascertained. Nor can the relevant provisions be interpreted to limit the assessment to this standard.
6.35 Bearing in mind, however, our view that trade effects are not a priori to be ruled out as
relevant in a particular case, we see merit in examining whether, even if one addressed the matter of
trade effects in this case, there would be any reason to reach a different conclusion. In this case, in
fact, we find no reason to reach a different conclusion after examining the arguments presented by the
United States in respect of the trade effects of the FSC/ETI scheme on the European Communities.
6.36 We recall in that regard that the United States presented essentially two lines of argument in
relation to the assessment of the trade effects of the FSC/ETI scheme on the European Communities.
Firstly, the United States principally suggested that in this case, the face value of the subsidy should
be taken as a "proxy" for the trade impact of the measure and that this sum then should be apportioned
on a percentage basis to the EC share of world trade as a proxy for the trade effect of the subsidy on
the European Communities. Secondly, in the event that we would nonetheless decide to examine the
economic data pertaining to the trade effects of the measure, the United States has presented a range
of possible estimates of the trade impact of this measure using methodologies other than the "proxy"
approach. The United States nonetheless argued in the first instance that these should not be used to
estimate the trade effects of the measure in this case, by reason of their unreliability and the
excessively broad range of the results of calculations. We will consider these two arguments in turn.
6.37 Turning first to the proposed "proxy" approach, under that approach, if the US$4,125
million
85 figure suggested by the United States is used as the starting-point, representing the value of
the subsidy, and retaining 26.8 per cent of that figure as the European Communities' share of the
global trade effects of the subsidy, as suggested by the United States 86, the appropriate amount of
countermeasures would be in a range of approximately US$1,110 million.87
6.38 We have stated that we see nothing in the text that directs a trade effects test and that it cannot
be construed to be limited to this. There is furthermore nothing in the text which would expressly
direct how trade effects are to be estimated in a case relating to countermeasures in response to export
subsidies. The "proxy" approach proposed by the United States, however, does not appear to have
any sound support in the provisions at issue or in the facts of the case.
6.39 To begin with, the proxy approach proposed by the United States is based on no particular
economic rationale. It simply presumes a one to one correspondence of dollar of subsidy to dollar of
trade impact. This is manifestly arbitrary. Indeed one could even argue that it is a fundamentally
self-contradictory concept: if a dollar of subsidy can always and everywhere only lead to a dollar of

84 See para. 5.41 above. For instance, it is conceivable that some adverse effects on a Member could be
manifestly greater than the amount of the subsidy that is expended. In such cases, the Agreement can hardly be
construed to preclude a Member from taking countermeasures to deal with that situation precisely on the basis
of adverse trade effects or that Member – especially when that would otherwise mean that they had recourse
thereby only to countermeasures that would be less effective than those available to a Member under Article 5
of the SCM Agreement (or for that matter under the countervailing provisions of the Agreement, where the other
conditions for application would also be present). That is not, of course, the situation we are dealing with here.
The European Communities is not seeking entitlement to countermeasures greater than the face value of the
subsidy.
85 Amount of the subsidy for the year 2000 as calculated by the United States, including relevant
adjustments.

trade effect, this is manifestly to determine in advance what the trade effect is. Yet the very concept
of trade effect is precisely to assess what has occurred in the real world as the distinct effect of that
dollar expended. One is, it seems to us, actually precluded from determining such effect if it is
already determined that it is the actual expenditure. This renders the whole concept of "effect"
redundant or meaningless. Under this approach, no such assessment would ever be required: the
conclusion is predetermined once the amount of government expenditure is known.
6.40 Indeed, the approach suggested by the United States is hardly reconcilable with a coherent
reading of the Agreement. Where trade effects are specifically dealt with under the SCM Agreement,
in provisions other than Article 4, the criteria for assessment are not at all arbitrary or artificial in this
way. This is evident in those provisions of the SCM Agreement where a demonstration of trade
effects is relevant, and the provisions relating to su ch assessments (e.g. in re lation to injury to the
domestic industry or serious prejudice – Article 6 on actionable subsidies – and application of
countervailing duties – Part V –). In such cases, the relevant concepts (such as price undercutting,
price depression and suppression, etc) are manifestly aimed at objectively determining certain effects.
There is not the slightest suggestion in these provis ions that this can be ascertained by means of an
arbitrary "proxy" such as that proposed by the United States in this case.
6.41 Indeed, were it a matter of merely determining the expenditure, this would completely obviate
the need for any such precise concepts to be applie d when ascertaining the effects. Bearing that in
mind, it would scarcely be coherent to consider that, when it comes to the manifestly more stringent
requirements relating to export subsidies, there should be any presumption of an implicit methodology
which is less likely to bear an objective relationship to the facts of the case.
6.42 Nor has the United States convinced us of why this particular predetermination would be any
more inherently plausible than any other. The arbitrator in the Brazil – Aircraft case suggests in fact
that, if anything, a more likely presumption would be that the relationship of expenditure to effect is
to be multiplied rather than static.
88 We take no position on that point in this case. We note, however,
that the United States approach in fact amounts to assigning implicit values to the economic variables
which the United States otherwise argues are too uncertain to devise, in the context of economic
modelling.
 89 It is not at all clear to us why these implicit values would be inherently more plausible
than any of those that can be assigned in the cont ext of economic modelling, which at least represents
analytical estimates rather than an unreasoned assumption. This underlines, in our view, the
inherently arbitrary nature of the US proposed approach.
6.43 We turn now to the alternative methodologies presented by the parties for estimating the trade
effects of the measure on the European Communities. These methodologies are similar in nature.
Nevertheless, different estimations were obtained, both below and above the amount of
countermeasures proposed by the European Communities, due to differing assumptions about the
values to be assigned to the relevant parameters in the calculations.
90

88 See the Decision of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) WT/DS46/ARB, para.
3.54 ("given that export subsidies usually operate with a multiplying effect (a given amount allows a company
to make a number of sales, thus gaining a foothold in a given market with the possibility to expand and gain
market shares), we are of the view that a calculation based on the level of nullification or impairment would, as
suggested by the calculation of Canada based on the harm caused to its industry, produce higher figures than one
based exclusively on the amount of the subsidy").
89 Assuming full pass through of the subsidy, a value of –1.65 for the price elasticity of the aggregate
US export demand curve will result in the value of the trade effect equalling the value of the subsidy (see exhibit
US-17).
90 The quantitative estimate of the impact of an export subsidy on trade depends upon the relationship
between the mode of delivery of the subsidy and various economic parameters. In this case the subsidy is
allocated on the basis of export income. Eligible export income is used to reduce the overall tax burden of a
firm. The overall impact depends upon four factors: the value of the subsidy; the reduction in the price of the

6.44 The European Communities suggested that the Arbitrators should consider the methodology
used by the US Treasury Department in 1997 in its report to the United States Congress on the trade
impact of the FSC Scheme. 91 The United States objected to this methodology on the following
grounds: (1) the price elasticity of export demand is estimated to be too high; (2) the price elasticities
of export supply are also estimated to be too high and (3) the pass through of the subsidy to prices is
overstated.
6.45 The methodology of the US Treasury is more sophisticated than the proposal by the United
States to simply use the value of the subsidy as a proxy. In recognition of this fact, the United States
made two further proposals for our consideration. The first was an alternative methodology that the
United States claimed was more suitable for an estimation of trade effects on the European
Communities.
92 The second was to resort to a different set of parameters for the US Treasury
model.93
6.46 The United States itself subsequently questioned its own alternative proposed methodology
due to the fact that it contained incomplete data. 94 Hence, the options before us for evaluating the
trade effects would be limited to the US Treasury model, as proposed by the European Communities,
and amendments to this model as suggested by the United States.
6.47 To the extent that we might consider it approp riate in this case to assess the trade effects of
the measure on the European Communities, our task w ould not be to judge, with absolute precision,

good benefiting from the subsidy; the export response of producers benefiting from the subsidy; and the price
elasticity of demand for US exports.
91 EC First Submission, paragraph 62. For example, using the US Treasury model as proposed by the
European Communities and the estimated subsidy values of both the European Communities and the United
States for industrial products as set out in Annex A, the range of the estimated trade effects can be estimated
between $3,253 million and $4,294 million.
92 The United States proposed the Armington model, which assigns elasticities to products based on
their country of origin. Therefore, the model, according to the United States, has the advantage of isolating the
EC specific trade impact of the subsidy (US Second submission, para 122).
93 The United States took the position that "imputed" elasticity estimates from estimated substitution
elasticities are more robust than the estimates prov ided by the European Communities. The calculations
provided by the United States were justified on the grounds that they were more recent and could be calculated
at a disaggregate level.
94 While we acknowledge the general contribution that the Armington approach to modelling
differentiated products models of trade can make, the United States did not, in the case before us, satisfactorily
explain why we would be obliged to find the particular a pproach suggested by it to be more reasonable than that
generated by the proposed EC approach. On the contrary, the United States' approach had demonstrable flaws
as it sought to apply it in this case. We note that, in this case, the estimation of the trade impact of the subsidy
generated by the United States using the Armington model does not in fact employ EC-specific cross price
elasticities nor does it use specific elasticities of US export demand (US Second submission, footnote 97).
Furthermore, in response to a question from the Arbitrator relating to the use of the alternative methodology, the
United States underlined the lack of reliable basis to us e this approach. Its response was that "Although the
United States could not find the information necessary to distinguish between the EC and the rest of the world,
the Armington model runs, nevertheless, at least furnish the Arbitrator with an independent assessment of the
trade impact of the US subsidy on the EC based on a different set of parameter estimates" (emphasis added)
(Para. 30, US Response to Additional Questions by the Arbitrator). The United States also stated that it lacks
information, which if available would have allowed them to calculate the trade effects with more precision.
"With this additional information, the Armington model may have possibly provided better guidance than the
Treasury model, because it would have incorporated more information (i.e. the degree of substitutability
between US exports and EC goods) and would have avoided the need to determine how to calculate the EC
share" (US Answers to Additional Questions from the Arbitrator, paragraph 30) (emphasis added). Thus, at
most, the United States hypothesizes that there could be a more reliable and robust approach. It however has
been itself unable to give us a reliable alternative basis to make a judgement that would definitively prevail over
any based on the Treasury model.

which is the single correct model or which are the correct parameters, but to examine the results of
these models to see if they provide an insight into the range of trade effects caused by the FSC/ETI
scheme carrying sufficient weight to materially affect our judgement on whether the countermeasures
proposed are disproportionate.
6.48 In this regard, the very fact that the US Treasury report was submitted to Congress is, in our
view, of considerable weight. That report did suggest that it may have somewhat overstated the
results. Indeed, it may not be absolutely exact. Nonetheless, the US Treasury obviously made the
judgement that, in the context of presenting the effects of the FSC scheme to US Congress (the
authors, we note, of the legislation concerned), this report, including the modelling assumptions on
which it is based, had sufficient credibility to represent a reliable reflection of the impact of the
scheme when it came to the matter of informing the US Congress on its operation and effects. That
was presumably not undertaken lightly and, at the very least, it was presumably considered to be not
manifestly misleading. That perspective, it seems to us, is akin to the kind of judgement that is to be
properly applied when an assessment is to be made of whether something is disproportionate. One is
not expecting, or looking for, mathematical exactitude, but whether or not (to a reasonable eye)
something is out of proportion. In these circumstances, it is not a matter of whether or not the US
Treasury study might not be certain as to its conclusions. It is a matter of whether there is, available
to us, a more fundamental reason to reliably reject the Treasury study. In this sense, we see that there
is, in practical terms, a burden on the United States in this case, in our view, to successfully challenge
the model that its own Treasury Department had developed to evaluate the scheme before the US
Congress.
6.49 Of course, we have to take due note of the reservations now expressed by the United States
about its own study. One can always debate all estimates, but the real issue is not whether some
alternatives are possible, but whether there is something reliable that would oblige us to see the broad
parameters of that study’s outcome as being unreasonable. In that context, we are mindful that the
task of evaluating the trade effects of the scheme cannot be accomplished with mathematical
precision. Nevertheless, economic science does allow us to consider a range of possible trade effects
with a certain degree of confidence.
6.50 In our view, however, the United States has, in any event, failed to demonstrate that
alternative assumptions leading to lower estimates would be more plausible than those used in the US
Treasury study and relied on by the European Communities in this case. First, the United States has
argued that different elasticities of export demand should be used
95 and that the pass through rates
should be lower. The basis upon which these should be preferred to those which their own
Administration actually applied in the study were not, however, persuasively explained. The United
States submitted re-estimated parameters for the Treasury model using more recent data, but these
were imputed from estimates of US imports, instead of US exports, which are our concern in this
case.96

95 The United States submitted that the range of estimates of the point price elasticity of the aggregate
US export demand is between –1.13 and –2.53, whereas the simple average of the estimates of the price
elasticities used in the US Treasury study is –3.0. The difference between these estimates, the United states
argues, is one reason why the US Treasury model would l ead to overestimates of the actual trade impact. The
United States, however, did not submit evidence to support the use of these alternative aggregate estimates.
More to the point, it did not deal with the fact that four sectors alone in the US Treasury study account for 66
per cent of the total FSC exempt income and pursuant to the US Treasury study, these have estimates at the
sectoral level of –1.7, -3.8, -4.1, -3.8 respectively. Given the weight of these sectors in the overall trade effect of
the subsidy, the value of the price elasticity of these sectors should be the focus of analysis. This is consistent
with the view that simple aggregate elasticities would be more inherently likely to underestimate elasticities for
the purposes of an analysis of the FSC/ETI scheme.
96 The United States took the position that 'imputed' elasticity estimates from estimated substitution
elasticities are more robust than the estimates prov ided by the European Communities. The calculations

6.51 Secondly, with respect to the issue of pass th rough, the economic reasoning provided by the
United States for adjusting the rate to a lower fi gure was no more inherently compelling than that
which was used for its own study (US Treasury). The EC estimate of the trade impact assumes a full
pass through effect of the subsidy onto the price of US products.97 The United States argues that such
an assumption is not necessarily supported by the empirical facts and hence would bias the results
upward.
98 It argues that two factors could act in concert to result in a less than 100 per cent pass
through of the subsidy onto the price of world products.99 First, if firms are operating on the positively
sloped segment of their average cost curve, an increase in production could result in an increase in
costs that may not be compensated by the subsidy. 100 Second, if firms in an industry have market
power, they would not necessarily have an incentive to lower prices.101
6.52 However, empirical evidence shows that the pass through effect of a similar programme was
75 per cent in the 1970s.102 Today, more than 25 years later it is not unreasonable to suggest that the

provided by the United States were justified on the grounds that they were more recent and could be calculated
at a disaggregate level. The process by which the elasticities are imputed, however, was never clearly specified
by the United States. The original estimates from which the imputed estimates are done were sourced from two
academic studies (Gallaway et al. (2001); Shiells and Reiner t (1993)). Both studies relate to the United States.
We note that these estimates are derived from demand functions for US consumers. Therefore, these estimates
relate to the degree of substitution between imported products into the United States and domestically produced
products for US consumers. The United States did not establish why measures of elasticities of imports into the
United States could be used as estimates of elasticitie s of exports. In our view, the United States failed to
effectively respond to three reasons identified by the EC as a cause for concern about the procedure used by the
United States:
"The Armington elasticity estimates used by the United States are for substitution between
imports into the United States and domestically produced US products. These are not the
same as substitution elasticities between US exports and domestically produced products in
foreign countries. First, the foreign countr ies will have different policies towards imports.
Second, foreign consumers will have tastes and preferences that are different from US
consumers. Third, it is likely that the set of trade goods in an industry is not the same as the
set of domestically produced goods offered for local sale. Therefore, the set of US exported
goods is not the same as the set of domestically produced goods offered for sale in the United
States, and the set of goods imported into the United states is not the same as the set of foreign
produced goods offered for sale in foreign countries." ( EC comments on US Responses to
Additional Questions from the Arbitrator, para 5).
97 The issue of pass through relates to the degree to which a company uses a subsidy it receives to
lower the price of the product that it exports. At one extreme the company may choose to apply the full amount
of the subsidy to the price of its products, thereby lowering its price. At the other, it may choose not to lower the
price of the product. The concept of pass through is further explained in paragraph 89 of US Answers to
Questions from the Arbitrator:
"An exporter presented with the FSC/ETI tax savings can do one of two things. One the one
hand, it can lower the price of its exports by the amount of the tax savings. If it does this, its
net profit per transaction will remain the same, although its overall profits may increase
because – other factors being held constant – the volume of its exports will increase. This is
the "full pass through" scenario.
Alternatively, the exporter can leave the price of its exports unchanged. If it does this, the
volume of its exports will remain unchanged – other factors being held constant – but its net
profit per transaction will increase by the amount of the tax savings. This is the "no pass-
through scenario".
98 The United States asserts that "pass-through is so critical that if it were determined that firms
completely absorbed the tax subsidy rather than reflecti ng it in export prices, the subsidy would have no effect
on US exports and the quantification of the trade impact would be zero." (US Oral Statement, para. 56).
99 US Answers to Questions from the Arbitrator, para 94.
100 US Answers to Questions from the Arbitrator, paras 95-97.
101 US Answers to Questions from the Arbitrator, para 98-99.
102 EC Answers to Questions from the Arbitrator, para 134.

world market is now more competitive, thereby increasing the pass through effect. 103 We certainly
found no plausible reason to give credence to a view that it was reasonable to assume that pass
through was in the lower rather than the higher end. Again, we cannot say with mathematical
precision the exact figure for the pass through, but we can put a lower and upper limit to the range of
possible effects.104
6.53 We recognise the existence of a genuine debate on the values of parameters in economic
models. Furthermore, we recognise that the parameters employed in the US Treasury model are in the
upper range of estimates. Nonetheless, they fall within an acceptable range, underlined in particular
by the fact that the US Treasury itself used them to report to Congress. The United States has
suggested various possibilities based on different assumptions and variables, which could yield an
estimate of the trade effects of the FSC/ETI sche me on the European Communities that is lower than
the amount of countermeasures the European Communities proposes to take. On balance, however,
we would consider them not to be persuasive, and certainly not inherently more persuasive than the
figures proposed by the European Communities.
6.54 Even if one were to assume equal plausibility of the various variables and outcomes, an
examination of them would at most lead to the conclusion that the trade effects of the measure on the
European Communities were not proven to be either higher or lower than the proposed amount of
countermeasures. That would evidently not be sufficient to lead us to conclude that the
countermeasures proposed are disproportionate. Absence of proof on a point that is objected is not
enough to undermine a judgement that is otherwise substantiated. In these circumstances, one would
certainly not be entitled to conclude that the benefit of the doubt in the face of competing figures must
always go to the Member challenging the proposed amount of countermeasures, in this instance the
United States. Such an assessment – based on the trade effects of the measure on the European
Communities as suggested by the United States – would actually lead, in this instance, to the
conclusion that the proposed countermeasures could not be considered to be "disproportionate" to
these effects.
6.55 Not that, in this case, it is the situation we would in fact find ourselves in. It appears to us
that, on balance, the European Communities figures are at least as plausible as the low estimates put
forward by the United States. The wording of footnote 9 makes it clear that we must make our
assessment in light of the fact that the subsidy co ncerned is prohibited. Here we recall that the last
part of footnote 9 suggests that this is an aggravating rather than mitigating consideration, and that in
assessing the "appropriateness" of such countermeasures – in light of the gravity of the breach – a
margin of appreciation is to be granted.
105 That can only reasonably be construed to entail that, in a
situation where there is no more inherently plausible reason to opt for a lower rather than higher
number, it would be inconsistent with the direction of the footnote to automatically default to the
lower option. That would be effectively to go in the opposite direction from that laid down in
footnote 9.
6.56 Moreover, to the extent that there is an even chance of error, any presumption for a lower
number would systematically bias the risk in favour of creating a disincentive to conforming with

103 The market access landscape for industrial products as a result of the Uruguay Round was a
reduction in average tariffs of 40 per cent from 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion of
products entering duty-free in the developed country markets would increase from 20 to 44 per cent, while the
proportion of products facing tariffs above 15 per cent declined from 7 to 5 per cent (GATT Secretariat (1994),
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations , Geneva, GATT). In addition, the United
States did not successfully rebut arguments presented by the European Communities as to the increasing global
competition in markets for industrial goods. In partic ular, the European Communities cited relevant economic
literature suggesting rising global competition to US firms (see EC Answer to Question 47 by the Arbitrator).
104 An upper limit would be 100 per cent, whereas a lower limit could be the estimate for the similar
programme in the 1970s of 75 per cent (see EC Answers to Questions from the Arbitrator, para. 134).
105 See paragraph 5.62 above.

withdrawal of the subsidy. That w ould be entirely contrary to the direction of footnote 9. Thus, the
objective of the requirement must be to ensure that the incentive is more likely to ensure respect for
the objective of withdrawal of a prohibited export subsidy as the sole way to restore the preexisting
balance of rights and obligations.106 For these additional reasons, we are all the more comfortable in
our judgement in this case.
6.57 Consequently, even if consideration is given to the adverse trade effects of the measure on the
European Communities in this case, we would not have any reliable basis to conclude that, based on
the trade effects of the measure on the European Communities (and taking account of the manner in
which these are to be judged), the amount of countermeasures proposed by the European
Communities would be out of proportion with these effects.107
6.58 Moreover, we recall that beyond the reasonable margin of appreciation that might exist in
assessing the actual trade effects of the measure on the European Communities, Article 4.10 would in
any event not only allow for, but indeed directs that, in our assessment, we provide for a consideration
of the prohibited nature of the subsidy. As we have noted above, this entails, in our view, a
consideration of the gravity of the initial breach, and of the fact that, in itself, the maintenance of the
measure in violation of the United States' obligations under the SCM Agreement upsets the balance of
rights and obligations between Members, and more specifically, between the United States and the
European Communities. As we have seen, in this case, the prohibited measure is a scheme that is
available systemically and on a very wide scale. It thus has the potential of creating instability in the
trading conditions across a broad range of sectors. This is in itself an appropriate consideration in an
assessment of whether the proposed countermeasures are relevant, even if an assessment were to be
made on the basis of actual trade effects of the measure on the complaining Member.
6.59 Such an element can only be conceived, in quanti tative terms, as ensuring an entitlement to a
Member taking countermeasures that it is at a level somewhat higher than what a very precisely
constructed estimate of trade effects (should such a calculation be feasible) would lead to. For the
reasons outlined elsewhere above, to conclude otherwise would effectively reduce the terms of
Article 4.10 and footnote 9 thereto to a pure "trade effects" standard, thereby undermining the whole
object and purpose of ensuring that such a distinction be made, respected and enforced effectively in
the SCM Agreement.
6.60 We therefore do not find any reason to reach a different conclusion from that already reached
on the basis of the European Communities proposed approach, having now also examined the
proposed level of countermeasures from the perspective of the measure's trade effects on the
European Communities.
C. C
ONCLUDING REMARKS
6.61 Finally, although we are satisfied that the countermeasures are not disproportionate, we wish
to address any possible residual concern that the European Communities cannot be entitled to de facto
act erga omnes on behalf of the WTO membership, as it were.

106 As a practical application, one could relate this to pass through. Even if one took the view that there
was no decisive evidence for 100 per cent pass through, in a situation where plausibility was at stake, say, as
between 75, 90 or 100 per cent, it would need to be borne in mind that the prohibition of export subsidies is not
inherently conditioned on whether or not the export subsidy is entirely passed through into prices. A dollar of
export subsidy is a dollar of export subsidy. That being so, in circumstances where there is no decisive element
to opt for one particular alternative, the direction in f ootnote 9 comes into play, to the effect that there is no
presumption that a lower option should prevail.
107 We recall that the United States itself considered that they did not provide a reliable tool, in this
case, to estimate these effects, in light of the number of uncertain variables that would need to be accounted for.

6.62 That is not how we see the matter before us. First, to the extent that there was any suggestion
that entitlement to countermeasures to the level we have determined was reflecting "trade effects" on
parties other than the European Communities, this would have no foundation. To repeat, we consider
that our finding is warranted, based on the equivalence in the breach of the original rights and
obligations taking into account the gravity of the breach. Where we addressed the issue of trade
effects, we have in any case done so only in respect of those relating to the European Communities.
6.63 Second, the conclusion we have reached is not in any sense, a matter of "entitling" the
European Communities to act "on behalf" of Members other than itself. As we have underlined in our
reasoning above, it is proposing countermeasures relating to the redress of rights and obligations as
between those two Members. In the facts of this case, we are dealing with the precise situation at
hand. That precise situation at hand is that it is the European Communities that has sought the
entitlement to take countermeasures. In doing so, the fact that this is a matter between two Members
is a relevant factor which we have taken into account. Should the matter ever arise, our finding does
not affect the ability of other complainants to subsequently request, and, if warranted, obtain an
authorization to take appropriate countermeasures in accordance with Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement. By definition, in the event that any such case could arise hypothetically, it need only be
stated that there is, in our view, no reason to pr esume that an arbitrator who might be required to
address such a complaint in future would not take in to account all the relevant factors in determining
what might, at the time it is ruling, constitute "appropriate countermeasures" in such future case.
108
6.64 In light of the above, we find that the amount of countermeasures proposed by the European
Communities in this case is "appropriate" within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
VII. EC REQUEST IN RESPECT OF THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III:4 OF THE
GATT 1994
7.1 We note that the European Communities has requested a specific amount of countermeasures,
and has clearly limited its request to this amount. The European Communities made clear its view
that it would be necessary for us to consider whether an additional amount of suspension of
concessions needs to be awarded under Article 22.7 of the DSU, in particular with regard to the
violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994109 in the event that we were to decide that the appropriate
amount of countermeasures under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement is less than the requested
amount. We have concluded that countermeasures in the amount of $4,043 million, as proposed by
the European Communities, would constitute "appropriate countermeasures" in the circumstances of
this case. We therefore do not need to address the issue of suspension of concessions or other
obligations in relation to the violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
VIII. AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR
8.1 For the reasons set out above, the Arbitrator determines that, in the matter , the suspension by the European Communities of
concessions under the GATT 1994 in the form of the imposition of a 100 per cent ad valorem charge
on imports of certain goods from the United States in a maximum amount of $4,043 million per year,
as described in the European Communities' request for authorization to take countermeasures and
suspend concessions, would constitute appropriate countermeasures within the meaning of
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.

108 We refer to paragraph 6.29 above and the European Communities' statement in this respect.
109 EC response to Question 2 of the Arbitrator.

ANNEX A - CALCULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE SUBSIDY
A.1 The purpose of this annex is to present the arguments and methodologies for the estimation of
the value of the subsidy for the year 2000.
A.2 There is no actual data available for the year 2000. 110 The starting-point for the analysis is,
therefore, the revenue cost of the FSC scheme for 1996, the latest year for which data is available. 111
The parties differ in their views about the methodol ogy to be used to project the 1996 figure forward
to the year 2000.112
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
1. Calculation of the unadjusted value
A.3 The first submission of the European Communities states that the actual revenue cost of the
programme (subsidy) is known only for 1996. In this year the cost of the programme was $2,972
million.113 They propose two alternative methodologies in order to estimate the value for later years.
First, one based on a US Treasury approach that assumes a growth rate of 8 per cent. In this scenario
the value of the subsidy is $4,043 million in the year 2000. Second, actual exempt income under the
FSC programme grew at an average annual rate of 16.7 per cent from 1987 to 1996. 114 If this growth
rate were applied the value of the subsidy in 2000 would be $5,512 million.115
A.4 In its comments on the European Communities Methodology, the United States proposed the
use of the US Dept. of Treasury published tax expenditure estimate of the subsidy for that year. 116
This figure is stated in the United States first submission as the figure used in the Budget of the
United States government as $3,890 million for 2000.
117 Since the programme is applied across the
board an adjustment is required to take services trade into account. The United States argues that this
adjustment should be 8.3 per cent to deduct agricultural, computer, motion picture, engineering and
architectural services.
118 The value of the subsidy in 2000 according to the United States is, therefore,
$3,567 million.119
A.5 Section V of the United States second submission addresses the methodology issue directly
and makes some amendments to the above figure. It argues that there are two elements to be
considered in the growth of the subsidy. The first is the revenue cost per dollar of FSC exports, or the
value of the subsidy divided by FSC exports. The se cond is the ratio of FSC exports to total exports.
By separating the value of the subsidy from total expo rts, actual data on United States exports can be

110 We note in this respect that the European Commu nities argued in the course of the proceedings that
more recent actual data should be available through a report to be presented to Congress for the period 1997-
2000. In response to a question by the Arbitrator, the United States indicated that the US Department of the
Treasury has been collecting and processing data on the operation of the FSC programme every four years since
1992, and that the most recent year for which data have been collected and analyzed in 1996. While data has
been collected for the year 2000, the "finished data" for tax year 2000 should be available by the end of 2002.
Publication of the analyzed data is not expected before 2004. The United states also indicates that the
production of tax returns would not be permissible under US law, and that the use of selected data would
produce an unreliable and potentially very misleading picture of the programme's operation in the year 2000
(see US answers to Questions, paras. 75 to 83).
111 Exhibits EC 11 and US 15.
112 These are summarized in exhibits EC 11 and US 15.
113 Para. 34.
114 EC first submission para 41.
115 EC-3.
116 Para. 7.
117 Page 28.
118 Page 29.
119 US first submission para 74 .

used for estimation purposes. As a result, the only component of the subsidy that needs to be
estimated is the revenue cost per dollar. The United States estimate of the growth rate of this
component is 1 percent based on economic data for the period from 1997 to 2000.120
A.6 In order to better understand how this estimate is calculated, the United States breaks down
the overall revenue cost of the FSC/ETI programme into its three determinants: the revenue cost per
dollar of eligible exports, the ratio of FSC exports to total United States exports, and total
United States exports.
121
A.7 The relevant information on these components is:
• In 1987 the revenue cost per dollar of FSC exports was 0.092 per cent, 0.091 per cent
in 1992 and 1.04 per cent in 1996. The average rate of growth from 1992 to 1996
was 3.3 per cent;
• The share of total United States exports was 33.7 per cent in 1987, 34.6 per cent in
1992 and then 46.7 per cent in 1996. The average rate of growth of this component
was 7.5 per cent from 1992 to 1996. The United States argues that the growth rate
forecast of these two components (combined) to be 1 per cent122; and
• The usage of FSC (the ratio of exempted revenues to the value of total exports) was
1.36 per cent in 1996. At a one per cent annual average growth rate, this figure
would reach 1.414 per cent in 2000 and 1.429 in 2001.
A.8 The total global unadjusted subsidy, according to the United States would be $3,869 million
in 2000, which differs from its original estimate .123
A.9 The European Communities agreed to the revised United States methodology which takes
into account actual data , subject to two provisions.
124 The first was the year to be calculated. The
second is that the growth rate of the usage of the FSC provision should be the 1992 to 1996 growth
rate. The European Communities does not consider that the utilisation of the scheme between 1987
and 1996 is appropriate since the United States corporate income tax rate declined from fiscal year
1987 to fiscal year 1992.125 It argues that the decrease in the corporate tax rate would have a negative
impact on the usage of the FSC scheme. Accordingly, it argues, the growth rate should be 1992 to
1996 during which tax variables were constant.
126
A.10 The United States has identified three factors, which it considers to underpin the US Treasury
estimate for the period 1996 to 1999. These are: the ratio of taxable profits to sales of manufacturing
corporations with positive tax liabilities, the ratio of FSC exports to total exports, and the overall
United States tax rates.
127 The United States goes onto say that the key aspect of these three points is
that they rely on data from the actual period to be estimated, as opposed to extrapolating forward from

120 US Second submission para. 84.
121 US Second Submission paragraphs 77-78.
122 US Second Submission para. 84.
123 US Second Submission para. 86.
124 EC Oral Statement para. 47.
125 EC Oral Statement, para. 50.
126 EC Oral Statement, para. 50.
127 US Answers to questions from the Arbitrator, para. 122.

past rates.128 The United States further amplified on these points in a response to a specific question
on this issue from the Arbitrator.129
A.11 The European Communities has maintained its position that they view the approach of the
Treasury as arbitrary and that the US Treasury has consistently underestimated the value.
130 It argues
that, based on the new methodology proposed by the United States, the growth rate from 1996 to 2000
should be based on the 1992 to 1996 growth rate
131, since the United States approach "lacks any solid
basis".132
A.12 The European Communities also criticises the use of unreferenced data by the United States.
They cite tabulations 1 and 2 from the United States Answers to additional questions from the
Arbitrator that are "done by the Office of Tax analysis, US Department of Treasury".
133 They also
specifically address the determinants proposed by the United States. For example, they argue that
there is a difference between the profitability of the overall manufacturing industry and the
profitability that can be attributed to export sales.
134 With respect to the figures on profits, the
European Communities produced data from the Economic Report of the President that challenge the
United States data on profitability, and cited a study that showed that the major FSC beneficiaries has
increased their FSC benefits in absolute amounts during the period 1996-2000.135
A.13 Taken together, if the 1992-1996 usage rate is applied, the European Communities estimate of
the unadjusted subsidy for 2000 is $5,577 million (table A.1). 136 In contrast, the estimate of the
unadjusted subsidy using the United States methodology is $3,869 million.
2. Adjustments to the estimated total
A.14 We note that the parties differed slightly in their approaches to this aspect of the calculation.
While the European Communities contended that "if it were appropriate to reduce [its] estimates of
revenue foregone by an amount corresponding to sales of services, the reduction would be very small
and well within the overall margin of undere stimation built into the European Communities'
conservative request"
137, the United States initially proposed a one per cent downward adjustment to
the total subsidy amount 138, and subsequently endorsed a methodology involving a 0.57 per cent
reduction of the amount calculated for the subsidy. 139 The European Communities accepted that any
possible reduction for services could only be 0.57 per cent. However, it also contested that any
deduction was necessary because, in its view, the obligation of the United States is to withdraw the
FSC/ETI scheme, and there is no indication that the United States would have introduced this scheme
for engineering and architectural services only or that it would remove it for all exports except for
engineering and architectural services. 140 In the view of the European Communities, to reduce the
countermeasures in respect of these services would reduce the amount of the appropriate
countermeasures to less than the benefit and therefore to below the level needed to induce
compliance.

128 US Answers to questions from the Arbitrator, para. 122.
129 Question 10 of Additional Questions from the Arbitrator and the response of the United States to
that question.
130 EC Second submission paras 40-45.
131 EC Oral Statement, para 52 and Exhibit EC-11.
132 EC Comments on US Responses to Additional Questions from the Arbitrator, para 16.
133 EC Comments on US Answers to Additional Questions from the Arbitrator, para 17.
134 EC Comments on US responses to Additional Questions from the Arbitrator, para 19.
135 The data is produced in exhibit EC 17 and the study was submitted as Exhibit EC 15.
136 EC Response to questions from Arbitrator, para. 52.
137 EC first submission, para. 93.
138 US Second Submission, para. 23.
139 This amount was based on 2000 SOI data: i.e. the proportion.
140 EC second submission, para. 86.

B. ASSESSMENT BY THE ARBITRATORS
1. Projection of the value of the subsidy
A.15 Like previous arbitrators, we consider th at we are not bound by the amounts and calculations
presented by the parties. If necessary, i.e. if we consider that the amount or calculations of the parties
are not appropriate, we may perform our own calculations.141
A.16 We have addressed supra the issue of the relevant year to be taken into account, hence we
shall proceed with our calculation of the subsidy value for the year 2000.142
A.17 Both parties agree that the ratio of net exempt income to United States exports was 0.91 per
cent in 1992 and 1.36 per cent in 1996.
143 Using the standard formula to calculate the average annual
growth rate with a period of compounding assumed to be four periods gives the result of 10.69 per
cent for the year 2000.144 The United States has estimated the growth rate to be 1 per cent.145
A.18 When the 2000 ratio of net exempt income, calculated using the 10.69 per cent per annum, is
applied to total United States exports of $781,918 million, the amount of total exempt income for that
year is $15,940 million. The corresponding amount of the unadjusted subsidy is $5,577 million for
that year. In contrast, using the United States figure of 1 per cent growth rate results in an unadjusted
subsidy value of $3,869 million.
2. Adjustments to the subsidy
A.19 Some adjustments to the total amount of the s ubsidy should be considered in order to reach a
figure representing the total value of the subsidy whic h the United States is required to withdraw as a
result of the DSB's rulings and recommendations.
Accounting for services
A.20 The United States initially considered that the amount of the subsidy should be adjusted by
deducting amounts which, in its view, were attributable to exports concerning four categories of
services. The European Communities objected that of these four categories, only one, architectural
and engineering services, did not involve the export of goods. The United States, upon further
review, agreed that this was the only statistical cat egory in respect of which an adjustment should be
made.146
A.21 Under the ETI Act, the only way to earn qualif ying foreign trade income that does not involve
qualifying foreign trade property is through certain engineering or architectural services. 147 W e

141 See Hormones and Aircraft arbitrations, op. cit.
142 See above paras. 2.14 and 2.15.
143 Exhibit EC 11 and paragaph 73 of US Second submission.
144 The formula is V=A(1 + g) t. Where V is the final value, A is the initial value, t is the number of
time periods, and g is the annual average growth rate.
145 US Answers to Additional questions, response to question 10.
146 US Second Submission para 23.
147 We recall that under the ETI Act, certain income of a United States taxpayer may be excluded from
taxation. Such income - "extraterritorial income" that is "qualifying foreign trade income" - may be earned with
respect to goods only in transactions involving qualifying foreign trade property. Outside the goods area, such
income may be earned in relation to services which are: related and subsidiary to (i) any sale, exchange, or other
disposition of qualifying foreign trade property, or (ii) any lease or rental of certain qualifying foreign trade
property; for engineering or architectural services for construction projects located (or proposed for location)
outside the United States; or for the performance of managerial services for a person other than a related person
in furtherance of the production of certain foreign trad ing gross receipts. ETI Act, section 3; section 942 IRC,
as described in Compliance Panel Report, para. 2.3 and note 23.

therefore agree that, for the purposes of fulfilling our mandate concerning the level of
countermeasures in relation to the violation of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, the adjustment to
the subsidy amount for exports of services should account for this category of engineering and
architectural services.148
A.22 Since there are differences of view between the parties regarding the growth of the FSC usage
rate and adjustments to the gross estimate of the subsidy, there are necessarily differences in the
estimates. Nevertheless, if the subsidy is adjusted downwards by 0.57 per cent and upwards by 7.2
per cent, the overall adjustment would be upwards by 6.63 per cent, which is the difference between
the two adjustment values. In this case, the estim ate of the adjusted subsidy provided by the United
States is $4,125 million, while that of the European Communities is $5,988 million.
3. Allocating agriculture
(a) Introduction
A.23 The United States initially considered that the amount of subsidies attributable to exports of
agricultural products should be deducted for the purposes of determining the amount of "appropriate
countermeasures" under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. Upon further reflection, it considered
that such adjustment was not necessary, because the same proxy approach is necessary. The
European Communities argues that the obligation of the United States is to withdraw the whole
subsidy, and that the amount of exports of agricultural products under the FSC/ETI scheme is in any
case very small.
149 The European Communities has also argued that the existence of a separate
violation under the Agriculture Agreement cannot lead to a reduction of the amount of
countermeasures below the amount of the subsidy.
A.24 We turn to an examination of the amount of the subsidy for the purposes of the SCM
Agreement. 150 In order to identify the agricultural component of the FSC subsidy, we will refer to the
product coverage of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The principal technical challenge involved
is that the WTO definition is commodity-based, whereas the industry definitions are a mix of
manufacturing and services industries. For example, in the USSIC fishing is included in 090, but so is
the operation of fish hatcheries and preserves (table A.2).
(b) Coverage of the Agreement on Agriculture
A.25 The Agreement on Agriculture covers HS Chapters 1-24, less fish and fish products, plus a
number of headings in chapters, 33, 35, 38, 41, 43, and 51-53.151 Fish and fish products are defined as
chapter 03, 0509, 1504, 1603-05, 2301.152
(c) US Standard Industrial Categories
A.26 The 13 sectors that are used in the European Communities study are aggregated using
United States SIC classification. Since these are industry categories they are a mix of both service and

149 First Submission para. 88.
150 We recall that the 21.5 panel in this case made a separate ruling that the FSC/ETI scheme was in
violation of the Agreement on Agriculture, in addition to the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body upheld this
finding (Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, para. 256(d)). We also note, in respect of the deduction for
agricultural products discussed here, that if a separate assessment were made to evaluate the level of
nullification or impairment resulting from the violation of the Agreement on Agriculture , this could provide a
separate basis for suspension of concessions which would in any event not lower the entitlement to
countermeasures under the SCM Agreement.
151 See Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1.
152 From WTO, Unfinished Business.

manufacturing industries. The sectors where agriculture products are included are: agriculture, other
non-manufactured, food and tobacco.
A.27 The non-manufactured industry in the United States SIC classification includes mining,
forestry and fishing, none of which are part of the WTO definition of agriculture. Fish, and fish
products are included in the United States SIC other food products (209), Therefore, the exempt
income related to that category must be deducted in order to calculate the overall subsidy.
A.28 Isolating exempt income for United States SIC category 209 is problematic, since the only
degree of disaggregation of exempt income available to the Arbitrator is the 13 sector level used in the
European Communities model. In our view there are only two options to estimate the WTO
agriculture consistent definition of agriculture. Either, deduct food from the overall calculation so
that the estimate is an underestimate of the true value. Or, include food so that the overall calculation
would be an overestimate.
A.29 The second approach has been chosen for the calculation, since fish and fish products are
classified in the other food sectors. This classification would imply that such products are, by
definition, not core products in the classification. The assumption is that had it been of sufficient
importance in terms of production in that category a specific classification number would have been
allocated. We recognise that this approach is not perfect, especially since these categories were not
structured with respect to key sectors that use FSC programme. It is entirely possible for a significant
amount of the exempt income in the food category to be concentrated in the fish and fish product
category, but it is impossible to quantify that figure without the relevant data.
(d) Conclusion
A.30 In the absence of any information that would allow fish and fish products to be separated
from the food category, the non-agricultural component of the subsidy can be calculated by
subtracting exempt income from agriculture, food and tobacco industries.
4. Recalculating the value of the subsidy
A.31 Following from the previous section, the sectoral distribution of the exempt income is given
in table A.3. Subtracting the exempt income from agriculture, food and tobacco gives a total value of
$5,843.2 million. This amount can now be used to calculate the estimated value of the subsidy in
2000 using the methodologies proposed by the European Communities and the United States, which is
obtained by multiplying the amount of exempt income by 0.65.
A.32 The estimated subsidy using the United St ates methodology is, therefore, $3,798 million
(table A.1). Using the same procedure for the European Communities yields $7,860 million for
exempt income and a corresponding estimate for the overall subsidy using their methodology of
$5,332 million.
C. C
ONCLUSION
A.33 Having regard to the figures reached on the basis of the calculation, we note that the final
amount of subsidy following the United States approach is $3,739 million, whereas the final amount
following the European Communities approach is $5,332 million.
A.34 We see merits and shortcomings in both calculations. We also recall that we are not expected
to calculate an exact amount but to determine whether the amount of countermeasures proposed by
the European Communities, in the amount of $4,043 million, is appropriate. In these circumstances,
we find that the amount of $4,043 million, which falls within the range of reasonable values

calculated on the basis of the parties' respective methodologies, can be considered to be a reasonable
approximation of the actual value of the subsidy for the year 2000.

Table A.1 - Calculating the value of the subsidy for the year 2000
United States European Communities
FSC Usage growth rate .01 per annum .106886 per annum
FSC Exempt Income in 2000
Total US Exports* $781,918 million $781,918 million
Unadjusted subsidy value in
2000
$3,869 million $5,577 million
Adjustment
Services (-0.57 %) $22 million
ETI Adjustment (+7.2%) $278 million $401 million
Estimated value with
agriculture $4,125 million $5, 988 million
Estimated value without
agriculture $3,739 million $ 5,332million
* Source: WTO (2002), www.wto.org
Table A.2 – United States Standard Industrial Classification
Agriculture
010 Agricultural production – crops
020 Agricultural production – livestock and animal specialties
070 Agricultural services
Forestry, and Fishing
080 Forestry
090 Fishing, hunting and trapping
Food and Kindred Products
201 Meat products
202 Dairy products
203 Preserved fruit and vegetables
204 Grain mill products
205 Bakery products
208 Beverages
209 Other food and kindred products
210 Tobacco

Table A.3 - Pre-tax exempt income (millions of dollars)
1996 US 2000 EC 2000
Agriculture 118.7 165.3 222.9
Other non-manufactured 435.6 644.8 818.3
Food 153.3 214.2 287.9
Tobacco 153.6 214.2 288.5
Lumber 30.3 42.1 56.9
Paper 74.5 103.7 139.9
Chemical 729.8 1018.2 1370.9
Rubber 24.4 33.8 45.8
Primary metal 44.2 61.6 83.0
Fabricated metal 59.9 83.4 112.5
Non-electrical machinery 742.5 1036.3 1394.8
Electrical machinery 911.7 1272.2 1712.6
Transport equipment 644.3 898.8 1210.3
Scientific instruments 254.4 355.4 478.0
Other manufactured 137.0 202.1 257.3
TOTAL 4513.9 6346.1 8479.5
Total non –agriculture 4088.4 5752.4 7680.2
 Source: WTO, based on submissions by the parties.