UKRAINE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON AMMONIUM NITRATE AB-2018-5
Document: Report of the Appellate Body
Date: 12 September 2019
Document codes: WT/DS493/AB/R
Complainant: Russia
Respondent: Ukraine
Third parties: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, China, EU, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, U.S.
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 5.8, 11.2, 11.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5.1, 6.8, Annex II, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.4, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 18.1, 1, 17.4, VI  Anti-dumping

UKRAINE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON AMMONIUM NITRATE
AB-2018-5
Report of the Appellate Body

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
EuroChem JSC MCC EuroChem
GAAP generally accepted accounting principles
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Gazprom JSC Gazprom
ICIT Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade
MEDT Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine
reported gas cost price of gas that the Russian producers under investigation paid and reported
in their records
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
surrogate price of gas price of gas exported from Russia at the German border, adjusted for
transportation expenses
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review
WTO
PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel
Exhibit No.
Short title (if applicable) Description
RUS-2b 2008 original decision ICIT, Decision on the application of definitive anti-dumping
measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in
Russia No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (21 May 2008)
RUS-3b ICIT, Notice on the initiation and conduct of the interim
review of the anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
No. AD-296/2013/4423-06 (4 July 2013)
RUS-4b 2014 extension decision ICIT, Notice on the changes and extension of anti-dumping
measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in
Russia (8 July 2014)
RUS-5b Judgment of the Appellate
Court
Judgment No. 2-а-8850/08 by the Kiev Appellate
Administrative Court (26 August 2009)
RUS-6b Judgment of the District Court Judgment No. 5/411 by the District Administrative Court of
Kiev (6 February 2009)
RUS-7b Judgment of the Higher Court Judgment No. К-42562/09 by the Higher Administrative
Court of Ukraine (20 May 2010)
RUS-8b 2010 amendment ICIT, Decision implementing court orders regarding
EuroChem (25 October 2010)
RUS-10b Investigation Report MEDT, Materials on interim and expiry reviews of the
anti-dumping measures on imports of ammonium nitrate
originating in Russia (25 June 2014)
RUS-12b 2008 amended decision ICIT, Consolidated version of the Decision on the application
of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (21 May 2008, as amended on 25
October 2010)

Panel
Exhibit No.
Short title (if applicable) Description
RUS-27b ICIT, Notice on the initiation and conduct of the expiry review
of the anti-dumping measures on imports of ammonium
nitrate originating in Russia No. АD-294/2013/4423-06
(24 May 2013)
UKR-9 Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer
Against Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998)
UKR-10 Extracts from the Code of Administrative Procedure of
Ukraine
UKR-12 Resolution of the Plenum of the High Commercial Court of
Ukraine No. 15 (26 December 2011)
UKR-13 Resolution of the District Administrative Court of Kiev in case
No. 826/11526/14 (23 September 2014)
UKR-14 Ruling of Kiev Administrative Court of Appeal in case
No. 826/11526/14 (3 December 2014)
UKR-15
(BCI)
 Application of EuroChem to the Supreme Court of Ukraine in
case No. 826/11526/14 (12 February 2015)
UKR-16 Resolution of the Supreme Court of Ukraine No. 21-122a15
(21 April 2015)
UKR-42b
(BCI)
 ICIT, Decision on application of definitive anti-dumping
measures on imports into Ukraine of glass containers used
for medical purposes up to 0.15 litres originating from Russia
No. АD-293/2013/4423-06 (24 May 2013)
UKR-43 Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine, Extracts
UKR-44 Law of Ukraine "On Enforcement Proceedings", Extracts
UKR-53b
(BCI)
 Letter dated 8 October 2010 from MEDT to ICIT regarding the
agenda for the ICIT meeting on 15 October 2010
UKR-54b
(BCI)
 ICIT, Meeting agenda of 25 October 2010
UKR-55b
(BCI)
 Letter dated 21 October 2010 from MEDT to ICIT regarding
the agenda for the ICIT meeting on 25 October 2010
UKR-56b
(BCI)
 MEDT, Information on appeal of ICIT Decision on the
application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
No. АD-176/2008/143-47

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS121/AB/R, DSR 2000:II, p. 575
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Canada – Continued
Suspension
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008, DSR
2008:XIV, p. 5373
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment
of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS276/AB/R, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2817
Chile – Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October
2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October
2015, DSR 2015:IX, p. 4573
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R /
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014, DSR 2014:III, p. 805
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R,
adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
Colombia – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June
2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131
Dominican Republic – Import
and Sale of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September
1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Fasteners (China)
(Article 21.5 – China)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by China, WT/DS397/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted 12 February
2016, DSR 2016:I, p. 7
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13
February 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998,
DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Salmon (Norway) Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed
Salmon from Norway, WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1,
DSR 2008:I, p. 3

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1
June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Argentina, WT/DS473/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016, DSR
2016:VI, p. 2871
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from
Argentina, WT/DS473/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS473/AB/R, DSR 2016:VI, p. 3077
EU – Fatty Alcohols
(Indonesia)
Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports
of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia, WT/DS442/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
29 September 2017, DSR 2017:VI, p. 2613
EU – PET (Pakistan) Appellate Body Report, European Union – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, WT/DS486/AB/R and Add.1,
adopted 28 May 2018
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998,
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes
Panel Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and
Animal Products, WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22
November 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS477/AB/R,
WT/DS478/AB/R, DSR 2017:VII, p. 3131
Indonesia – Iron or Steel
Products
Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel
Products, WT/DS490/AB/R, WT/DS496/AB/R, and Add.1, adopted 27 August
2018
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 3
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR
2000:I, p. 3
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20
December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice,
Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXIII, p.
11007
Peru – Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 31 July 2015, DSR
2015:VI, p. 3403
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections
of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/R, adopted 5
April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR
2001:VII, p. 2741
Ukraine – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Ammonium
Nitrate
Panel Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate,
WT/DS493/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, circulated to WTO Members 20 July 2018
US – Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R,
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869
US – Anti-Dumping
Methodologies (China)
Panel Report, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to
Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China, WT/DS471/R and Add.1, adopted
22 May 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS471/AB/R, DSR
2017:IV, p. 1589

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX, p.
3779
US – Carbon Steel (India) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted
19 December 2014, DSR 2014:V, p. 1727
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012,
DSR 2012:XI, p. 5751
US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008,
DSR 2008:X, p. 3507
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR
2009:III, p. 1291
US – COOL Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July
2012, DSR 2012:V, p. 2449
US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures
(China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1,
adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII, p. 3027
US – Countervailing
Measures (China) (Article
21.5 – China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China,
WT/DS437/AB/RW and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 16 July 2019
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – OCTG (Korea) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Korea, WT/DS488/R and Add.1, adopted 12 January 2018
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571
US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada –
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS257/AB/RW, adopted
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11357
US – Softwood Lumber V Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, p. 1937
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20 June
2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article
21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441

APPELLATE BODY

Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Ammonium Nitrate

Ukraine, Appellant
Russian Federation, Appellee

Argentina, Third Participant
Australia, Third Participant
Brazil, Third Participant
Canada, Third Participant
China, Third Participant
Colombia, Third Participant
European Union, Third Participant
Japan, Third Participant
Mexico, Third Participant
Norway, Third Participant
United States, Third Participant

AB-2018-5

Appellate Body Division:

Zhao, Presiding Member
Bhatia, Member
Servansing, Member

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Ukraine appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report,
Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate1 (Panel Report). The Panel was established
on 22 April 20162 to consider a complaint by the Russian Federation3 (Russia) with respect to certain
measures taken by Ukraine regarding the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of
ammonium nitrate from Russia.
1.2. Duties were originally imposed on ammonium nitrate from Russia by Ukraine's
Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade (ICIT) through its decision of 21 May 2008
(2008 original decision).4 Russian producer JSC MCC EuroChem (EuroChem) successfully challenged
the 2008 original d ecision before domestic courts in Ukraine, following which ICIT issued an
amendment (2010 amendment) to the 2008 original decision ( as amended, 2008 amended
decision).5 Subsequently, following interim and expiry reviews conducted by the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade of Ukraine (MEDT), ICIT issued a decision (2014 extension decision), which
imposed anti-dumping duties at modified rates , including with respect to EuroChem .6 The factual
aspects of this dispute are set forth in greater detail in the Panel Report and in section 5 of this
Report.

1 WT/DS493/R, 20 July 2018.
2 Minutes of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Meeting held on 22 April 2016, WT/DSB/M/377,
para. 6.4.
3 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Russian Federation, WT/DS493/2 (Russia's panel
request).
4 Panel Report, para. 2.1 (referring to ICIT, Decision on the application of definitive anti-dumping
measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (21 May 2008)
(2008 original decision) (Panel Exhibit RUS-2b)). In this Report, Panel exhibit numbers that are followed by the
letter "b" refer to the English version of the relevant document.
5 Panel Report, para. 2.1 (referring to ICIT, Decision implementing court orders regarding EuroChem
(25 October 2010) (2010 amendment) (Panel Exhibit RUS-8b)); ICIT, Consolidated version of the Decision on
the application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (21 May 2008, as amended on 25 October 2010) (2008 amended decision)
(Panel Exhibit RUS-12b). See also ibid., paras. 7.18-7.19.
6 Panel Report, para. 2.2 (referring to ICIT, Notice on the changes and extension of anti-dumping
measures on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia (8 July 2014) (2014 extension decision)
(Panel Exhibit RUS-4b)).

1.3. Before the Panel, Russia challenged Ukraine's measures under various provisions of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of th e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(Anti-Dumping Agreement).7 The Panel made the following findings in its Report.
1.4. With respect to the Panel's terms of reference, the Panel found that: (i) measures consisting
of the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were within its terms of reference 8;
(ii) certain claims under Articles 5.8 and 11.1-11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement , as well as
certain claims under Article 6.8 and paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Annex II , were within its terms of
reference9; and (iii) certain claims under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
fell outside its terms of reference.10
1.5. With respect to Russia's claims concerning dumping and likelihood-of-dumping determinations
in the interim and expiry reviews, the Panel found that:
a. Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because
Ukrainian investigating authorities11 rejected the price of gas that the investigated Russian
producers paid and reported in their records (reported gas cost) without providing an
adequate basis under the second condition of Article 2.2.1.112;
b. Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because,
when constructing normal value, Ukrainian investigating authorities used a cost for gas
that did not reflect the cost of production "in the country of origin", i.e. Russia13;
c. Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because,
in conducting their ordinary-course-of-trade test, Ukrainian investigating authorities relied
on costs that were calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement14; and
d. Ukraine acted inconsistently with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
because Ukrainian investigating authorities relied on dumping margins calculated
inconsistently with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement to
make their likelihood-of-dumping determinations.15
1.6. With respect to Russia's claims concerning the non -termination of the investigation against
EuroChem, the Panel found that Ukrain e acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement because Ukrainian investigating authorities:
a. failed to exclude EuroChem from the scope of the original anti -dumping measures,
specifically the 2008 amended decision;
b. imposed a 0% anti-dumping duty on EuroChem through the 2010 amendment instead of
excluding it from the scope of the anti-dumping duty order; and

7 Panel Report, para. 3.1. Russia also raised one consequential claim under Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). (Ibid., para. 3.1.g)
8 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.
9 Panel Report, para. 8.1.b.
10 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c. The Panel also considered moot Ukraine's request for a ruling that certain
claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement fall outside its terms of reference.
(Ibid., para. 8.1.d)
11 We use the terms "Ukrainian investigating authorities" and "investigating authorities" interchangeably
to refer to both ICIT and MEDT.
12 Panel Report, para. 8.2.a.
13 Panel Report, para. 8.2.b.
14 Panel Report, para. 8.2.c.
15 Panel Report, para. 8.2.d. The Panel further found that Russia failed to establish that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and exercised judicial economy with regard to
certain additional claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.4, and 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(Ibid., para. 8.2.e-i)

c. included EuroChem within the scope of the review determinations and imposed
anti-dumping duties on it through the 2014 extension decision.16
1.7. The Panel further found that , with respect to Russia's claims challenging the investigating
authorities' conduct in the interim and expiry reviews, Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 6.9
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Ukrainian investigating authorities failed to disclose certain
essential facts and to give interested parties sufficient time to comment on MEDT's disclosure.17
1.8. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), the Panel recommended that Ukraine bring its measures into
conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.18
1.9. On 23 August 2018 , Ukraine notified the Dispute Settlement Body ( DSB), pursuant to
Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel
Report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel , and filed a Notice of Appeal 19 and
an appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 20 and Rule 21, respectively, of the Working Procedures
for Appellate Review 20 (Working Procedures). On 10 September 2018 , Russia filed an appellee's
submission.21 On 13 September 2018, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Japan, and
the United States each filed a third participant's submission .22 On the same day, Canada, China,
Colombia, Mexico, and Norway each notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third
participant.23
1.10. By letter dated 28 September 2018, the participants and third participants were informed
that, in accordance with Rule 15 of the Working Procedures, the Chair of the Appellate Body had
notified the Chair of the DSB of the Appellate Body's decision to authorize Appellate Body Member
Mr Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing to complete the disposition of this appeal, even though his
term of office was due to expire before the completion of the appellate proceedings.
1.11. By letter dated 22 October 2018, the Chair of the Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB
that the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its Report in this appeal within the 60 -day
period pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU , or within the 90 -day period pursuant to the same
provision, for the reasons mentioned therein.24 For the reasons explained in the letter, work on this
appeal could gather pace only in March 2019. By letter dated 31 July 2019 , the Chair of the
Appellate Body informed the Chair of the DSB that the Report in these proceedings would be
circulated on 12 September 2019.25

16 Panel Report, para. 8.3.a. The Panel then exercised judicial economy with regard to certain related
claims under Articles 11.1-11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerning the non-termination of the
investigation against EuroChem. (Ibid., para. 8.3.b) Moreover, the Panel found that Russia failed to establish
certain violations under Articles 11.1-11.3 in connection with the investigating authorities' alleged
determination of and reliance on injury not established in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in making their
likelihood-of-injury determination. (Ibid., para. 8.4)
17 Panel Report, para. 8.5.a-b. The Panel further found that Russia failed to establish certain violations
under Articles 6.2, 6.8, and 6.9 and paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and
exercised judicial economy with regard to additional claims under Article 6.2. (Ibid., para. 8.5.c-f) Moreover,
regarding Russia's claims of consequential violations, the Panel found that Russia failed to establish that
Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994 as a consequence of alleged violations under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, and exercised judicial economy with respect to Russia's claims under Articles 1 and
18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Ibid., para. 8.6)
18 Panel Report, para. 8.8.
19 WT/DS493/6 (contained in Annex A-1 of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS493/AB/R/Add.1).
20 WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010.
21 Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
22 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures.
23 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures. Kazakhstan and Qatar, which were third parties
before the Panel, are not third participants in these appellate proceedings as they did not file a written
submission pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Working Procedures or appear at the oral hearing.
24 The Chair of the Appellate Body referred to the size of the Panel record and the complex issues
appealed, and further noted that, in view of the backlog of appeals pending with the Appellate Body, and the
overlap in the composition of all divisions resulting in part from the reduced number of Appellate Body
Members, it would not be possible for the Division to focus on the consideration of this appeal and for it to be
fully staffed for some time. (WT/DS493/7)
25 WT/DS493/8.

1.12. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 20-21 May 2019. The participants and seven third
participants (Argen tina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Mexico, Norway, and
the United States) made oral statements. The participants and third participants also responded to
questions posed by the Members of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal.
2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
2.1. The claims and arguments of the participants are reflected in the executive summaries of their
written submissions provided to the Appellate Body.26 The Notice of Appeal and the executive
summaries of the participants' claims and argumen ts are contained in Annexes A and B of the
Addendum to this Report, WT/DS493/AB/R/Add.1.
3 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS
3.1. The arguments of those third participants that filed a written submission are reflected in the
executive summaries of their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body27, which are
contained in Annex C of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS493/AB/R/Add.1.
4 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
4.1. The following issues are raised in this appeal of the Panel Report:
a. with respect to the claims under Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU relating to the original
investigation phase:
i. whether the Panel erred in its analysis under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures
at issue in Russia's panel request;
ii. whether the Panel erred under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling on Russia's
claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as it relates to the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment; and
iii. whether the Panel erred under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to examine properly the
arguments and evidence presented by Ukraine regarding the authority of Ukrainian
courts and investigating authorities to calculate dumping margins under Ukrainian law;
and
b. with respect to the claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement relating to MEDT's determinations of dumping in the interim and expiry
reviews:
i. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the second condition in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in finding that
MEDT did not provide an adequate basis for rejecting the reported gas cost under that
condition;
ii. whether the Panel consequently erred in finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with
Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because, in conducting its
ordinary-course-of-trade test, MEDT relied on costs calculated inconsistently with
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and

26 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)
27 Pursuant to the Appellate Body's communication on "Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings" and "Guidelines in Respect of Executive Summaries of Written Submissions in
Appellate Proceedings". (WT/AB/23, 11 March 2015)

iii. whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed
to calculate the cost of production "in the country of origin".
5 RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION
5.1. We first provide an overview of relevant background information concerning Ukraine's
anti-dumping proceedings regarding imports of ammonium nitrate from Russia.
5.2. ICIT is responsible for initiating anti-dumping investigations, as well as for terminating,
extending, or changing anti-dumping measures.28 For its part, MEDT is responsible for conducting
anti-dumping investigations and reviews, as well as for preparing final reports containing its
conclusions and recommendations that serve as the basis for ICIT decisions.29
5.3. Following an anti -dumping investigation on imports of ammonium nitrate from Russia into
Ukraine, ICIT imposed anti-dumping duties on such imports through the 2008 original decision.30 In
doing so, ICIT accepted the recommendation s and dumping margins proposed by MEDT 31, which
resulted in the imposition of an anti-dumping duty of 10.78% on EuroChem.32
5.4. EuroChem successfully challenged the 2008 original decision before Ukraine's domestic
courts.33 The District Administrative Court of Kiev (District Court) held that MEDT had erroneously
applied discounts in calculating dumping margins for EuroChem where no discount had actually been
provided.34 The Panel noted that the District Court "concluded that there was 'absence of dumping'
by EuroChem in the original investigation" and that the District Court "found that the case files
reaffirmed the calculations presented by EuroChem showing that its dumping margin had a 'negative
value/rate'".35 The District Court judgment was upheld by the Kiev Appel late Administrative Court
(Appellate Court) and the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine (Higher Court).36
5.5. Following the Ukrainian courts' judgments, ICIT issued the 2010 amendment, which amended
the 2008 original decision, resulting in the 2008 amended decision.37 In the 2010 amendment, ICIT
imposed a 0% duty on EuroChem "in pursuance of" the judgments of Ukraine's domestic courts,
including the District Court.38
5.6. Subsequently, interim and expiry reviews were initiated, and M EDT issued "[m]aterials" in
connection with these reviews (Investigation Report) 39, which contained findings and
recommendations on the continued imposition of anti -dumping duties at modified rates on imports
of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia. 40 On the basis of the Investigation Report, ICIT then
issued the 2014 extension decision, thereby imposi ng anti-dumping duties at modified rates 41,

28 Panel Report, fn 11 to para. 2.1 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 1-2).
29 Panel Report, fn 11 to para. 2.1 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 3).
30 Panel Report, para. 2.1 (referring to 2008 original decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-2b)).
31 Panel Report, para. 7.136.
32 Panel Report, para. 7.136 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No.19(a), para. 75;
Russia's response to Panel question No. 19(a), para. 38).
33 Panel Report, paras. 2.1, 7.18 and fn 59 thereto, 7.134, and 7.137.
34 Panel Report, fn 238 to para. 7.136 (referring to Judgment No. 5/411 by the District Administrative
Court of Kiev (6 February 2009) (Judgment of the District Court) (Panel Exhibit RUS-6b)).
36 Panel Report, paras. 7.18 and fn 59 thereto, and 7.137 and fn 259 thereto (referring to Judgment
No. 2-а-8850/08 by the Kiev Appellate Administrative Court (26 August 2009) (Judgment of the
Appellate Court) (Panel Exhibit RUS-5b); Judgment No. К-42562/09 by the Higher Administrative Court of
Ukraine (20 May 2010) (Judgment of the Higher Court) (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b)). The Panel quoted the Higher
Court, which found that "no discounts were granted by [EuroChem] in the ordinary course of trade operations."
(Ibid., fn 239 to para. 7.137 (quoting Judgment of the Higher Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b)))
37 Panel Report, paras. 2.1 and 7.137 (referring to 2010 amendment (Panel Exhibit RUS-8b));
2008 amended decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-12b).
38 Panel Report, paras. 7.19, 7.137, and 7.147 (quoting 2010 amendment (Panel Exhibit RUS-8b)).
39 MEDT, Materials on interim and expiry reviews of the anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia (25 June 2014) (Investigation Report) (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b).
40 Panel Report, para. 2.2 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b)).
41 Panel Report, para. 2.2 (referring to 2014 extension decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-4b)).

including a duty of 36.03% on EuroChem.42 For the purpose of its dumping margin calculations in
the interim and expiry reviews, MEDT constructed the normal value of ammonium nitrate for two
investigated Russian producers on the basis of their cost of production.43 In doing so, MEDT rejected
the reported gas cost44, and replaced it with the price of gas exported from Russi a at the German
border, adjusted for transportation expenses (surrogate price of gas). 45 MEDT also used the
surrogate price of gas in its ordinary -course-of-trade test, that is, when considering that the
domestic sales of these investigated Russian producers were not in the ordinary course of trade by
reason of price and thus could be disregarded in calculating normal value. In that regard, MEDT
stated that the domestic selling prices of the investigated Russian producers were "lower than [the]
reasonable per unit costs for its production (taking into account the natural gas value adjustment)".46
5.7. In the Investigation Report, MEDT stated that it was rejecting the reported gas cost because
the records did "not completely reflect the costs associated with production and sale of the [product
under consideration], in particular, the gas expenses".47 This conclusion was based on the following
grounds: (i) the gas price in Russia was not a market price, as the State controlled th is price48;
(ii) due to the existence of State control, the price of gas for the investigated Russian producers was
much lower than the selling price of gas exported from Russia and the prices for producers in other
countries, as well as the market price in certain countries such as Canada, the European Union,
Japan, or the United States49; and (iii) calculations showed that JSC Gazprom (Gazprom), a Russian
supplier of gas, was selling below its cost of production and that its profitability was due to export
sales.50 MEDT further considered that the export price of gas from Russia at the German border was
representative and could thus be used to calculate the investigated Russian producers' cost of
production, subject to an adjustment for transportation expenses.51 In that regard, MEDT noted that
Germany was the biggest consumer of Russian natural gas and that the export price of gas from
Russia at the German border had been revised to reflect market conditions in 2012.52
6 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
6.1 Claims under Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU relating to the original investigation
phase
6.1.1 Introduction
6.1. In this section, we address Ukraine's three claims on appeal that relate to the Panel's analysis
regarding the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment, which are brought under
Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU. First, Ukraine claims that the Panel erred in its analysis under
Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were
identified as measures at issue in Russia's p anel request.53 Second, Ukraine claims that the Panel
erred under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling on Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment. 54
Ukraine argues that Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, as identified
in Russia's panel request, was not made with respect to these measures but only with respect to the
2014 extension decision.55 Third, Ukraine claims that the Panel erred under Article 11 of the DSU by
failing to examine properly the arguments and evidence presented by Ukraine regarding the
2010 amendment and the Ukrainian court judgments that ICIT implemented in concluding that

42 Panel Report, paras. 7.134 and 7.138 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b),
p. 28; 2014 extension decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-4b)).
43 Panel Report, para. 7.72.
44 Before the Panel, the parties did not dispute the fact that the reported gas cost was the price actually
paid by the investigated Russian producers. (Panel Report, para. 7.73)
45 Panel Report, para. 7.72, 7.94, and 7.99 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b),
p. 23). See also ibid., para. 7.114 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 50, paras. 17-18).
46 Panel Report, para. 7.113 (quoting Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), pp. 25-26).
(emphasis added by the Panel omitted)
47 Panel Report, para. 7.73 (quoting Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), p. 23).
48 Panel Report, para. 7.73.a (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), pp. 21-22).
49 Panel Report, para. 7.73.b (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), p. 22).
50 Panel Report, para. 7.73.c (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), pp. 22-23).
51 Panel Report, para. 7.99 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), p. 23).
52 Panel Report, para. 7.99 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), p. 23).
53 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 5-26; Notice of Appeal, para. a.
54 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 27-36; Notice of Appeal, para. b.
55 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 34.

Ukraine had acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in relation to the
2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision.56 Russia requests
that we reject these claims.57
6.2. We begin by summarizing the relevant Panel findings before addressing each of these three
claims in turn.
6.1.2 The Panel's findings
6.1.2.1 The Panel's findings under Article 6.2 of the DSU
6.3. Before the Panel, Ukraine argued that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment
fell outside the Panel's terms of reference because, in its panel request, Russia challenged only the
determinations made by Ukrainian investigating authorities in the interim and expiry reviews.58
6.4. The Panel recalled the factual background to this dispute, namely: (i) following an investigation,
Ukrainian investigating authorities imposed the original anti -dumping measures on EuroChem in
2008; (ii) EuroChem successfully challenged these measures before Ukrainian courts; (iii) Ukrainian
investigating authorities issued the 2010 amendment to implement these court judgments by
reducing the anti-dumping duty rate for EuroChem from 10.78% to 0%; (iv) Ukrainian investigating
authorities initiated interim and expiry reviews of the original anti -dumping measures; and
(v) Ukrainian investigating authorities issued the 2014 extension decision imposing anti-dumping
duties at modified rates, revising EuroChem's anti-dumping duty rate from 0% to 36.03%.59
6.5. Turning to the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Panel noted that the panel request
must identify the specific measures at issue, and t hat measures not properly identified fall outside
a panel's terms of reference and cannot be the subject of panel findings or recommendations. 60
Further, measures at issue must be "identified with sufficient precision so that what is referred to
adjudication may be discerned from the panel request".61 The Panel added that this will be the case
if a measure is identified with "sufficient particularity so as to indicate the nature of the measure
and the gist of what is at issue". 62 Accordingly, the Panel framed the issue as "whether the panel
request, read as a whole , identified the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment with
sufficient precision, in a manner consistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU".63
6.6. Subsequently, the Panel analysed the language in Russia's panel request. It noted that:
(i) footnote 2 to the opening paragraph of Russia's panel request refers to the 2008 amended
decision; (ii) item number 1 alleges violations under Articles 5.8 and 11.1-11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement because of the failure by Ukrainian investigating authorities to exclude a certain Russian
exporter from the "anti-dumping measures"; and (iii) the term "anti -dumping measures" in item
number 1 is followed by footnote 3, which refers to the 2010 amendment and notes that it amended
the 2008 original decision.64 The Panel considered that the references to the 2008 amended decision
and the 2010 amendment showed that Russia took issue in its panel request with the alleged failure
to exclude a Russian exporter from the 2008 a mended decision. Therefore, in the Panel's view,
Russia's panel request was "sufficiently precise to identify" the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment as measures at issue.65

56 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 100-152; Notice of Appeal, para. f.
57 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 56, 80, and 371-372.
58 Panel Report, para. 7.11. The Panel noted that Russia did not challenge the 2008 original decision.
(Ibid., para. 7.20)
59 Panel Report, paras. 2.1-2.2 (referring to 2008 original decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-2b);
2010 amendment (Panel Exhibit RUS-8b); 2014 extension decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-4b)), 7.18-7.19
(referring to Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-6b); Judgment of the Appellate Court
(Panel Exhibit RUS-5b); Judgment of the Higher Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b); 2010 amendment (Panel Exhibit
RUS-8b)), and 7.134 (referring to 2014 extension decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-4b)).
60 Panel Report, para. 7.21 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale
of Cigarettes, para. 120; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 790).
61 Panel Report, para. 7.21 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 168).
62 Panel Report, para. 7.21 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 169).
63 Panel Report, para. 7.21.
64 Panel Report, para. 7.24.
65 Panel Report, para. 7.24.

6.7. The Panel then addressed two arguments made by Ukraine. 66 First, the Panel disagreed with
Ukraine that the phrase "in connection with the expiry and interim reviews" in the opening paragraph
of the panel request restricted Russia's challenge to the interim and expiry reviews. 67 The Panel
reasoned that the opening paragraph of a p anel request cannot be read in isolation from the
remainder of that panel request and recalled that both footnote 2 and item number 1 covered the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment. 68 Next, the Panel rejected Ukraine's argument
that footnotes cannot determine a panel's terms of reference. It considered that nothing in Article 6.2
of the DSU prohibits identifying measures in footnotes in panel requests, and that the Appellate Body
has found that footnotes are part of the text of a panel request and therefore may be relevant to
identifying measures at issue.69
6.8. The Panel therefore concluded that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were
identified as specific measures at issue in the panel request and fell within its terms of reference.70
6.9. Subsequently, the Panel considered whether item number 1 of Russia's panel request satisfied
the second requirement of Article 6.2 to provide a brief summary of the claim sufficient to present
the problem clearly.71 The Panel articulated that this requirement is met where the panel request
explains how or why a measure at issue is considered to violate the World Trade Organization (WTO)
obligation in question, and that a panel request must plainly connect challenged measures with the
provisions of the covered agreements claimed to have been infringed.72
6.10. The Panel then analysed item number 1 of the panel request and found that Russia's use of
the word "because" twice suggested that Russia challenged two aspects of the measures at issue,
namely: (i) Ukraine fail ed to exclude a Russian exporter whose dumping margin was de minimis
from the "anti-dumping measures"; and (ii) Ukraine subject ed that exporter to interim and expiry
reviews.73 The Panel considered that footnote 3 explains "anti -dumping measures" by referring to
the 2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment, and the Ukrainian court judgments that the 2010
amendment implemented.74 The Panel also referred to the language and nature of the obligations
under Articles 5.8 and 11.1-11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.75 For the Panel, these elements
together made it sufficiently clear that Russia intended to challenge the failure by Ukrainian
investigating authorities to exclude EuroChem from the original investigation phase, and the decision
to subject EuroChem to interim and expiry reviews when it should have terminated the investigation
against it.76 On that basis, the Panel considered that Russia's panel request provided a brief summary
of the legal basis sufficient to present the problem clearly in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU.77
The Panel thus found that the claims presented in item number 1 of Russia's panel request were
within its terms of reference.78
6.1.2.2 The Panel's findings under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.11. Before the Panel, Ukraine argued that there was no determination of a de minimis dumping
margin within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
because Ukrainian courts did not have the legal competence to cal culate a dumping margin , and
Ukrainian investigating authorities never recalculated a de minimis dumping margin in the original
investigation.79 Accordingly, Ukrainian courts could not have recalculated EuroChem's dumping
margin under domestic law, and ICIT in implementing these court judgments imposed a 0% duty

66 Panel Report, paras. 7.25-7.27.
67 Panel Report, paras. 7.25.a-7.26 (referring to Ukraine's opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 12).
68 Panel Report, para. 7.26.
69 Panel Report, paras. 7.25.b (referring to Ukraine's opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 19) and 7.27 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China),
para. 4.39; referring to Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, preliminary ruling of the panel,
para. 3.15).
70 Panel Report, paras. 7.28 and 8.1.a.
71 Panel Report, paras. 7.30-7.35.
72 Panel Report, para. 7.30.
73 Panel Report, paras. 7.31-7.34.
74 Panel Report, para. 7.33.
75 Panel Report, paras. 7.33-7.34.
76 Panel Report, para. 7.34.
77 Panel Report, paras. 7.35.
78 Panel Report, paras. 7.35 and 8.1.b.i.
79 Panel Report, paras. 7.144-7.146.

without itself recalculating a dumping margin. 80 Therefore, Ukraine argued that there was no
dumping determination that could trigger the obligations under the second sentence of Article 5.8
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.81
6.12. The Panel observed that the parties did not disagree on the legal interpretation of the second
sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, which requires "immediate termination in
cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis".82 Rather, they
disagreed as to whether the obligation to terminate had been triggered in the circumstances of this
case. Specifically, the Panel understood Ukraine's argument as being that the obligations were not
triggered as there was no legally valid de minimis dumping margin determined for EuroChem in the
original investigation phase. 83 Consequently, the Panel inquired whether a de minimis dumping
margin was determined for EuroChem in the original investigation phase.84
6.13. The Panel noted the following elements: (i) the District Court had concluded that there was
an "absence of dumping" by EuroChem in the original investigation and that the case files reaffirmed
the calculations presented by EuroChem, showing that the dumping margin had a "negative
value/rate"85; (ii) the District Court's judgment had been upheld by higher courts, which found that
the District Court had correctly establis hed the circumstances of the case, and thoroughly
investigated the existing evidence 86; (iii) ICIT had itself implemented the 2010 amendment in
"pursuance" of these judgments, which made the anti -dumping duty on EuroChem 0% 87;
(iv) nothing in the 2010 amendment or other evidence on the record suggested that ICIT disputed
the Ukrainian court findings that EuroChem had a negative value/rate of dumping88; and (v) Ukraine
does not challenge the legal validity of these Ukrainian court judgments.89 On that basis, the Panel
concluded that the "combined effect" of the court judgments and their implementation by the
2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the original investigation phase
was de minimis.90
6.14. The Panel then noted Ukraine's arguments as to why no "legally valid" dumping margin had
been "calculated" for EuroChem: (i) the Ukrainian court findings were based on calculations provided
by EuroChem alone, because , according to ICIT's policy, ICIT could not provide evidence of
confidential information in public court proceedings; (ii) only ICIT and MEDT have authority under
Ukrainian law to calculate dumping margins, and Ukrainian courts do not; (iii) the 2010 amendment
enforced the Ukrainian court rulings but did not recalculate a du mping margin for EuroChem; and
(iv) ICIT could not recalculate EuroChem's dumping margin without specific instructions from
Ukrainian courts to reopen the investigation and apply a particular methodology, and thus had to
reduce the duty to 0%.91
6.15. The Panel considered that these arguments comprised matters of Ukrainian domestic law. 92
The Panel recalled that, while it is for each WTO Member to decide how to implement the decisions
of its courts, such arrangements, however, are not determinative of issues raised in WTO dispute

80 Panel Report, para. 7.145 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 253;
response to Panel question No. 21, para. 83; opening statement at the first Panel meeting, para. 138).
81 Panel Report, para. 7.145 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 256).
82 Panel Report, para. 7.146. The Panel set out its interpretation in paragraphs 7.139-7.140 of the Panel
Report. In particular, the Panel recalled that the parties agree that "immediate termination" is required where a
"zero or de minimis dumping margin" is determined in the original investigation, and that the imposition of a
0% duty does not amount to termination. Instead, relevant producers must be excluded from the scope of the
anti-dumping order. (Ibid., para. 7.140 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Rice, paras. 217, 219, and 305; Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140)).
83 Panel Report, para. 7.146.
84 Panel Report, para. 7.146.
85 Panel Report, paras. 7.136 (quoting Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-6b)) and
7.147.
86 Panel Report, para. 7.147 and fn 239 to para. 7.137 (referring to Judgment of the Appellate Court
(Panel Exhibit RUS-5b); quoting Judgment of the Higher Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b)).
87 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
88 Panel Report, para. 7.146.
89 Panel Report, para. 7.147 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 253).
90 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
91 Panel Report, para. 7.148 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 21, paras. 83-85,
and Panel question No. 22, paras. 92-93; opening statement at the first Panel meeting, paras. 138 and 142;
second written submission to the Panel, para. 97).
92 Panel Report, para. 7.149.

settlement proceedings.93 On that basis, the Panel found that Ukraine's arguments did not show that
no de minimis dumping margin had been determined for EuroChem in the original investigation
phase.94 The Panel further considered that even if ICIT had been unable to present evidence before
Ukrainian courts, the restraints on ICIT were matters of domestic law and did not affect the probative
value before the Panel of the judgments as implemented by ICIT. 95 The Panel noted that the court
judgments found that EuroChem had a negative rate of dumping, and ICIT implemented those
judgments; there was accordingly no basis for Ukraine to argue that no negative or de minimis
margin had been found in the original investigation phase.96 The Panel thus considered that Ukraine
had failed to rebut Russia's arguments that evidence on the record showed the absence of dumping
by EuroChem.97
6.16. On that basis, the Panel agreed that the obligation under the second sentence of Article 5.8
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement was triggered because EuroChem had a de minimis dumping margin
in the original investigation phase. Therefore, Ukraine had to terminate immediately the
investigation with regard to EuroChem and accordingly exclude it from the scope of the anti-dumping
measures.98 Based on the foregoing, the Panel found that Ukraine acted inconsistently with
Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to exclude EuroChem from the scope of
the original anti-dumping measures, specifically the 20 08 amended decision, and instead imposed
a 0% anti-dumping duty on EuroChem through the 2010 amendment.99
6.17. The Panel then considered Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
with respect to the interim and expiry reviews. 100 Ukraine contended that the obligation under the
second sentence of Article 5.8 had not been triggered because there was no legally valid de minimis
dumping determination, and that, in any event, a de minimis dumping determination did not require
investigating authorities to terminate a review.101 The Panel rejected Ukraine's first argument on the
basis of its prior reasoning.102 As to Ukraine's second argument, the Panel reasoned that the relevant
question did not concern whether a de minimis standard applied to interim or expiry reviews, but
instead concerned "the consequences of a finding that a producer had a de minimis dumping margin
in the original investigation phase" and the attendant obligation to terminate immediately that
investigation with respect to that producer "on the subsequent interim or expiry review". 103 The
Panel therefore considered that the question before it was "whether Article 5.8 permits investigating
authorities to include in a review a producer found to have had a de minimis dumping margin in the
original investigation and impose anti-dumping duties on it pursuant to such review".104
6.18. The Panel found that once an investigation is terminated against a producer by excluding it
from the original investigation, the producer cannot be subjected to administrat ive or changed
circumstances reviews.105 Therefore, including such a producer in interim or expiry reviews would
be inconsistent with the obligation under the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement to terminate immediately the original investigation.106 On that basis, the Panel found
that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 because Ukrainian investigating authorities

93 Panel Report, para. 7.149 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 82).
94 Panel Report, para. 7.149.
95 Panel Report, para. 7.150 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 –
Japan), fn 452 to para. 175) and fn 271 thereto.
96 Panel Report, para. 7.150.
97 Panel Report, para. 7.150. The Panel also observed that Ukraine had changed its factual arguments
during the course of the proceedings on whether, as a matter of Ukrainian law, Ukrainian investigating
authorities can recalculate dumping margins in the course of a review, or only when instructed to do so by
Ukrainian courts. (Panel Report, fn 272 to para. 7.150)
98 Panel Report, para. 7.151.
99 Panel Report, paras. 7.152 and 8.3.a.i-8.3.a.ii.
100 Panel Report, paras. 7.153-7.157.
101 Panel Report, para. 7.153.
103 Panel Report, para. 7.154 (referring to Russia's opening statement at the second Panel meeting,
para. 160).
105 Panel Report, para. 7.156. See also ibid., para. 7.140 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 217, 219, and 305; Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice, para. 7.140).
106 Panel Report, para. 7.156.

included EuroChem within the scope of the interim and expiry reviews and imposed anti -dumping
duties on it through the 2014 extension decision.107
6.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in its analysis under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that
the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures
at issue in Russia's panel request
6.19. Ukraine claims that the Panel erred in its analysis under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that
the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as measures at issue in
Russia's panel request. 108 Ukraine therefore requests that we reverse the Panel's findings under
Article 6.2 of the DSU in paragraphs 7.24, 7.26 -7.28, and 8.1.a of the Panel Report. 109 Russia
requests that we uphold the Panel's findings at issue.110
6.20. A panel request governs a panel's terms of reference and thereby "delimits the scope of [its]
jurisdiction".111 In doing so, it fulfils a due process objective by providing the respondent and third
parties with notice regarding the nature of the complainant' s case and to enable them to respond
accordingly.112 Compliance with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU must be determined on
the face of the panel request 113, in light of attendant circumstances 114, and on a case -by-case
basis.115 Panels must, on the basi s of an objective examination, "scrutinize carefully the panel
request, read as a whole, and on the basis of the language used".116 In addition, the Appellate Body
has previously recognized that "footnotes are part of the text of a panel request, and may be relevant
to the identification of the measure at issue or the presentation of the legal basis of the complaint."117
6.21. We recall that the requirement under Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the "specific measures
at issue" may be satisfied by reference to the name, number, date, and/or place of promulgation of
a particular law or regulation.118 However, the fact that a panel request does not specify the relevant
law, regulation, or other legal instrument to which a claim relates would not necessarily render a
panel request inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU, so long as the panel request contains
"sufficient information that effectively identifies the precise measures at issue".119 We further recall
that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that measures at issue be discernible from a panel request,
reading the panel request as a whole.120

107 Panel Report, paras. 7.157 and 8.3.a.iii.
108 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 5.
109 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 5; Notice of Appeal, para. a.
110 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 6.
111 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.12. See also
Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.6; US – Carbon
Steel, para. 124.
112 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.7 (referring
to Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, p. 186; US – Carbon Steel,
para. 126; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 640; Chile – Price Band System,
113 Appellate Body Reports, US – Carbon Steel, para. 127; China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST
(EU), para. 5.13. Defects in a panel request cannot be cured by the parties' subsequent submissions made
during panel proceedings, but such submissions or statements may be consulted to confirm the meaning of the
words used in the panel request. (Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 127 (referring to
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 142-143))
114 Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy, paras. 124-127; US – Carbon Steel, para. 127.
116 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562 (fn omitted)).
117 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.39.
118 See e.g. Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 8.40.
119 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 6.10 (quoting Panel Report,
Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, preliminary ruling of the panel, para. 36).
120 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 161 and 168.

6.22. At the outset, we note that the participants do not take issue with the Panel's articulation of
the legal standard under Article 6.2 of the DSU. 121 For its part, although Ukraine accep ts that the
elements of a panel request cannot be read in isolation, and that a panel request including its
footnotes must be read as a whole 122, Ukraine considers that the Panel erred by failing to demand
sufficient precision in applying that standard to Russia's panel request.123
6.23. In evaluating whether the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were within the
Panel's terms of reference, the Panel relied on language in two portions of Russia's panel request.124
First, the Panel pointed to the opening paragraph of the panel request.125 That paragraph indicates
that Russia had requested consultations regarding the interim and expiry reviews, and then notes
in footnote 2 that these "anti-dumping measures" were imposed through a number of instruments,
including the 2008 original decision, as it was amended by the 2010 amendment, resulting in the
2008 amended decision. The Panel marked in bold the language in footnote 2, which refers to the:
Decision of the Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade
No. A D-176/2008/143-47 of 21 May 2008 "On the Application of the Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Import into Ukraine of Ammonium Nitrate Originating in the
Russian Federation", as amended by the Decision No. AD -245/2010/4403-47 of
25 October 2010.126
6.24. Second, the Panel observed that item number 1 of the panel request states that Russia claims
violations under Articles 5.8 and 11.1-11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because of the alleged
failure by Ukrainian authorities to exclude a certain Russian expo rter from the "anti -dumping
measures".127 The Panel marked in bold the language in footnote 3 to that item, which refers to the:
Decision of the Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade
No. AD -245/2010/4403-47 of 25 October 2010 "On reversal of D ecision of the
Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade No. AD -176/2008/143-47 of
21 May 2008 'On the Application of the Definitive Anti -Dumping Measures on Import
into Ukraine of Ammonium Nitrate Originating in the Russian Federation' in respect of
JSC MHK EuroChem".128
6.25. According to the Panel, the reference to the "anti -dumping measures" in the text of item
number 1 is followed by footnote 3, "which refers to the 2010 amendment, and notes that it amended
the 2008 original decision".129 The Panel thus considered that the references to the 2008 amended
decision and the 2010 amendment in footnotes 2 and 3 "show that Russia took issue, in its panel
request, with the alleged failure to exclude the Russian exporter from the 2008 amended
decision".130 Accordingly, the Panel considered that Russia's panel request "was sufficiently precise
to identify the measures, i.e. [the] 2008 amended decision[] and the 2010 amendment, which were
being referred for adjudication".131
6.26. This matter relates to Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as to
whether Ukrainian investigating authorities – following successful court challenges by EuroChem –
were required to have excluded EuroChem from the anti -dumping proceedings instead of imposing
a 0% anti-dumping duty. The process by which the dumping margin assigned to EuroChem in the

121 At the oral hearing, Ukraine maintained that what is contained in a consultations request may be
relevant under Article 6.2 of the DSU and that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were not
sufficiently identified in Russia's consultations request. (Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing)
Ukraine presented no claim regarding Russia's consultations request in its Notice of Appeal and made no
reference in its appellant's submission to this argument. In its third participant's submission, the United States
submits that the Panel erred by failing to compare the terms of Russia's panel request and its consultations
request when conducting its analysis under Article 6.2 of the DSU. (United States' third participant's
submission, paras. 35-39)
122 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 15.
123 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 8 and 26.
124 Panel Report, paras. 7.22-7.24.
125 Panel Report, para. 7.22.
126 Panel Report, para. 7.22 (quoting Russia's panel request, fn 2). (emphasis omitted)
127 Panel Report, paras. 7.23-7.24.
128 Panel Report, para. 7.23 (quoting Russia's panel request, fn 3). (emphasis omitted)
129 Panel Report, para. 7.24.
130 Panel Report, para. 7.24.
131 Panel Report, para. 7.24.

2008 original decision was invalidated and a 0% duty imposed was through the 2010 amendment,
which amended the 2008 original decision, resulting in the 2008 amended decision. Accor dingly,
when the panel request refers in item number 1 to an allegation of inconsistency with Article 5.8
with respect to the "anti-dumping measures" at issue, the only proper way to understand the legal
question as to whether EuroChem should have been exc luded from the subsequent interim and
expiry reviews is to assess the basis for its non-exclusion at the time that the 2008 amended decision
and the 2010 amendment were issued. We therefore understand the Panel to have read the panel
request as having esta blished a link – by virtue of the reference to "anti -dumping measures" and
the footnote reference to the relevant decisions – between the challenged interim and expiry reviews
and the underlying instruments that related to EuroChem's status, including the 2008 amended
decision and the 2010 amendment.132
6.27. The Panel then addressed two specific contentions by Ukraine. First, the Panel responded to
Ukraine's argument that the phrase "in connection with the expiry and interim reviews" in the
opening paragraph of the panel request restricted the scope of Russia's challenge. 133 The Panel
considered that this phrase could not be read in isolation from other parts of the panel request,
including the language in item number 1 and the corresponding footnotes.134 As the Panel noted,
based on its reading of the panel request, "footnote 2 of the panel request and the reference to
'anti-dumping measures' in item number 1 of the panel request covered both the 2008 amended
decision, and the 2010 amendment."135
6.28. The Panel also rejected Ukraine's contention that footnotes cannot determine a panel's terms
of reference.136 As the Panel remarked, "nothing in Article 6.2 of the DSU specifically prohibits the
identification of the specific measures in the footnotes of a panel request."137 The Panel further found
support for its analysis in a statement by the Appellate Body in US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China) that "footnotes are part of the text of a panel request, and may be
relevant to the identification of the measur e at issue or the presentation of the legal basis of the
complaint."138
6.29. On the basis of the foregoing, we understand the Panel to have concluded that, although the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment are referenced only in footnotes of the panel
request, the question whether EuroChem should have been excluded from the interim and expiry
reviews was linked to the decision by Ukrainian courts to invalidate the basis at that point for a
dumping margin or an anti -dumping duty with respect to EuroChem, as reflected in the 2008
amended decision and the 2010 amendment. In this respect, we understand the Panel to have
concluded that the references to these two instruments, including in the footnote detailing what the
"anti-dumping measures" in item number 1 consisted of, were sufficiently precise in order to "identify
the specific measures at issue" within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
6.30. Ukraine contends that the specific measures at issue should be listed clearly in the portion of
the panel request said to identify the measures at issue. 139 Ukraine quotes the opening paragraph
of Russia's panel request and notes that only the 2014 extension decision is specifically identified.140
Ukraine then suggests that if footnotes are to be relied on, they must adopt e xplicit language that

132 See Panel Report, paras. 7.22-7.24. We note that a footnote corresponding to footnote 2 in Russia's
panel request is also contained in Russia's consultations request, and likewise refers to the 2008 original
decision and its amendment by the 2010 amendment, resulting in the 2008 amended decision. Further, we
note that item number 7 of Russia's consultations request, which corresponds to item number 1 in Russia's
panel request, alleges an inconsistency with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "because Ukraine failed
to completely exclude [EuroChem], for which a de minimis margin of dumping was determined in the course of
judicial review, from the scope of the decision establishing original anti-dumping duties, the interim and expiry
reviews and newly imposed anti-dumping duties". (Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation,
WT/DS493/1) (fn omitted) We therefore do not see that the reasoning of the Panel would have differed had it
explicitly addressed Russia's consultations request.
133 Panel Report, paras. 7.25.a and 7.26.
134 Panel Report, para. 7.26.
135 Panel Report, para. 7.26.
136 Panel Report, paras. 7.25.b and 7.27.
137 Panel Report, para. 7.27.
138 Panel Report, para. 7.27 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China), para. 4.39; referring to Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, preliminary
139 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 9-12 and 18.
140 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 11-12.

clarifies what measures and claims are being brought, and on what conditions.141 Although Ukraine
accepts that footnote 2 mentions the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment, it argues
that they are not identified as measures at issue.142
6.31. Russia responds that Ukraine's analysis relies on particular portions of the panel request and
is therefore incompatible with reading the panel request as a whole.143 For instance, Russia remarks
that Ukraine relies on specific passages as limiting th e scope of the panel request, such as "in
connection with expiry and interim reviews", and ignores the context and clarification provided by
the opening paragraph, footnote 2, item number 1, and footnote 3. 144 Russia notes that, in any
event, the 2014 extens ion decision itself refers to the 2008 amended decision. 145 Further, Russia
argues that Article 6.2 of the DSU does not require Russia to list the 2008 amended decision, the
2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision together as measures at issue or ref er to them
expressly as measures at issue.146
6.32. We recall that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that measures at issue must be identified with
sufficient precision such that they are discernible from a panel request, reading the panel request
as a whole. 147 While the location of certain information in a panel request – and, in particular,
whether such information is in the body text or in a footnote – may have some relevance for
understanding whether the measures at issue are discernible, it is unlikely to be disp ositive given
the need to read the panel request as a whole.
6.33. Ukraine relies on language in footnote s of a panel request in Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes as an example of the degree of specificity required of a footnote, which Ukraine claims is
not exhibited by footnote 2 of Russia's panel request. 148 In particular, Ukraine maintains that the
footnotes in that panel request contained "explicit language clarifying what measures and claims
were being brought and on what condition". 149 Russia responds that the footnotes in that panel
request are similar to footnotes 2 and 3 in Russia's panel request in this case.150 Given the inherent
case-by-case approach to scrutinizing panel requests, we do not consider that a textual comparison
of footnotes in different panel requests in different disputes is of much assistance in assessing
whether the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment are discernible measures at issue in
Russia's panel request. We emphasize that whether the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment are identified as specific measures at issue turns on whether these measures are
discernible in the panel request, read as a whole, and that footnotes 2 and 3 form part of the text
of Russia's panel request and may be relevant to the identification of the measures at issue. 151 We
consider that, by this standard, footnotes need not necessarily contain the type of explicit language
Ukraine points to in another dispute in order to be relevant to the identification of the specific
measures at issue.
6.34. Ukraine further argues that, although footnotes 2 and 3 of Russia's panel request – as distinct
from the opening paragraph and item number 1 – mention the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment, these references amount to background information and should not have been taken
into account by the Panel in examining whether the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment were identified as measures at issue.152 Ukraine argues that the language in footnote 2
does not indicate that Russia took issue with the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment;
rather, it provides background information and does not identify that they are specific measures at

141 Ukraine's appellant's submission, fn 5 to para. 15 (referring to Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by New Zealand, WT/DS477/9, in particular fn 5).
142 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 14.
143 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 24.
144 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 23-24.
145 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 26-27.
146 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 45.
147 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 161 and 168-169.
148 Ukraine's appellant's submission, fn 5 to para. 15 (referring to Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by New Zealand, WT/DS477/9, in particular fn 5).
149 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 15-16 and fn 5 to para. 15 (referring to Indonesia – Import
Licensing Regimes, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by New Zealand, WT/DS477/9, in particular fn 5).
150 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 34-36.
151 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 161 and 168-169; US – Countervailing
and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.39.
152 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 17 and 23.

issue.153 Russia responds that it specifically listed the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment to clarify the scope of "anti -dumping measures" in the opening paragraph and item
number 1 of the panel request, and disag rees that background information cannot be part of the
identification of measures at issue.154
6.35. The participants refer to the Appellate Body Report i n Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products in
support of their arguments regarding what information can be used from a panel request in order to
inform the scope of the measures at issue. In that dispute, the Appellate Body was asked to consider
whether the measure referred to by the language "specific dut y imposed as a safeguard measure"
was limited to the specific duty as a safeguard measure or comprised the specific duty itself, which
the complainant alleged to have been discriminatory and inconsistent with Article I:1 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).155 The Appellate Body considered that
this language explained how the measure arose (as a safeguard measure) and could not be read to
restrict the panel's understanding of the measure at issue.156 Contrary to Ukraine's submission, we
do not understand the Appellate Body to have decided in Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products that
background information is not capable of assisting with the identification of a specific measure at
issue. Rather, we understand the Appellate Body's report to illustrate that whether information is
capable of contributing to the identification of the specific measures at issue will depend on the
circumstances and facts of each case.
6.36. Finally, we note that, while the opening paragraph of the panel request refers to "Ukraine's
measures imposing anti -dumping duties … set forth in the [2014 extension decision]", the 2014
extension decision itself sets out "to amend the antidumping measures applied by [the 2008
amended decision]".157 Further, under item number 1 of Russia's panel request, Russia alleged an
inconsistency with "Artic les 5.8, 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, because
Ukraine failed to exclude a certain Russian exporter whose dumping margin was de minimis from
the anti -dumping measures and because Ukrain e subjected this exporter to expiry and interim
reviews".158 The Panel noted that the use of the word "because" twice in this sentence suggested
that Russia challenged two aspects of the measures at issue, namely , that Ukrainian investigating
authorities: (i) failed to exclude EuroChem from the "anti -dumping measures"; and (ii) subjected
EuroChem to expiry and interim reviews.159 We note that the reference to "anti-dumping measures"
is followed by footnote 3, which refers to the 2010 amendment, which amended the 2008 original
decision, and that both determina tions were made in the original investigation phase. Footnote 3
also identifies the Ukrainian court judgments, which the 2010 amendment implemented. 160 We
further recall that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that there shall be immediate
termination of an investigation in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping
is de minimis. It therefore seems reasonable for the Panel to have concluded that the first aspect of
item number 1 concerned the failure by Ukrainian investigating authorities to exclude EuroChem
from the scope of the original anti -dumping investigation, and, in particular, the 2008 amended
decision and the 2010 amendment, as is suggested in the accompanying footnote 3. In this respect,

153 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 17 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, para. 5.92).
154 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 39-44 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or
Steel Products, paras. 5.85-5.93).
155 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, paras. 5.92-5.93.
156 Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, paras. 5.92-5.93. The Appellate Body
considered that the language "specific duty imposed as a safeguard measure" was "consonant with the factual
background in the panel requests that precedes both the identification of the specific measures at issue and
the legal basis of the complaint", namely, that the "specific duty" was discriminatory and inconsistent with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Next, the Appellate Body considered the extent to which "imposed as a safeguard
measure" could be read as "going beyond providing a factual background", and concluded that such language
went to arguments about the proper legal characterization of the measure, not its identification.
(Ibid., para. 5.92)
157 2014 extension decision (Panel Exhibit RUS-4b), p. 2. We also note that the underlying notices
concerning the initiation of the interim and expiry reviews refer to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010
amendment (ICIT, Notice on the initiation and conduct of the interim review of the anti-dumping measures on
imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia No. AD-296/2013/4423-06 (4 July 2013) (Panel Exhibit
RUS-3b); ICIT, Notice on the initiation and conduct of the expiry review of the anti-dumping measures on
imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia No. АD-294/2013/4423-06 (24 May 2013) (Panel Exhibit
RUS-27b)).
158 Russia's panel request. (fn omitted)
159 Panel Report, para. 7.32.
160 Russia's panel request, fn 3.

the narrative of the panel request does not have a limiting effect, as Ukraine contends ; rather, it
highlights that the challenged interim and expiry reviews reflected in the 2014 extension decision
are necessarily linke d to the decision to impose a 0% duty on EuroChem and not to exclude
EuroChem from the anti-dumping proceeding, as reflected in the 2008 amended decision and the
2010 amendment.
6.37. We underscore that, in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU, panel requests delimit a panel's
terms of reference and play an important due process function for parties and third parties. Parties
to disputes must not leave it to panels to divine the identity of measures at issue. Nevertheless, a
panel request will satisfy the requirement in Article 6.2 of the DSU to identify the specific measures
at issue if such measures are discernible from the panel request. 161 In assessing a panel request,
panels must "scrutinize carefully the panel request, read as a whole"162, which includes footnotes.163
For the reasons outlined above, we consider that the Panel properly reasoned that the 2008 amended
decision and the 2010 amendment were discernible from the panel request. We therefore do not
consider that Ukraine has established that the Panel erre d in its analysis under Article 6.2 of the
DSU in finding that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as
measures at issue in Russia's panel request.
6.1.4 Whether the Panel erred under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling on Russia's
claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the 2008 amended
decision and the 2010 amendment
6.38. Ukraine claims that the Panel erred under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling on Russia's
claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the 2008 amended decision
and the 2010 amendment because such a claim was not made in Russia's panel request and
therefore did not form part of the Panel's terms of reference. 164 Ukraine considers that the Panel
retroactively justified including this claim by referring to information provided by Russia subsequent
to its panel request.165 Ukraine requests that we reverse the Panel's findings in paragraphs 7.147,
7.149-7.152, and 8.3.a.i-8.3.a.ii of the Panel Report.166 Russia requests that we uphold these Panel
findings.167
6.39. We recall that the measures and claims identified in a panel request in accordance with
Article 6.2 of the DSU constitute the "matter referred to the DSB", which serves as a basis for the
panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU.168 We note that we have found that Ukraine
has not established that the Panel erred under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as measures at issue in Russi a's
panel request. Ukraine has not appealed the Panel's finding that Russia had provided, in accordance
with Article 6.2 of the DSU, a brief summary of the legal basis for its claim under Article 5.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment.169
Further, Ukraine has not advanced any other grounds in support of its challenge under Articles 7.1
and 11 of the DSU170, and confirmed at the oral hearing that if we were to uphold the Panel's finding

161 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 170.
162 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.13 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 562 (fn omitted)).
163 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.39.
164 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 27-29 and 34-36.
165 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 35-36.
166 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 29; Notice of Appeal, para. b.
167 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 57 and 80.
168 Appellate Body Reports, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72-73; US – Carbon Steel, para. 125;
China – Raw Materials, para. 219.
169 In paragraph b of its Notice of Appeal, Ukraine directs its challenge to the Panel's substantive
analysis contained in section 7.5.3.1 of the Panel Report, where the Panel concluded that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because Ukrainian investigating authorities
failed to exclude EuroChem from the anti-dumping measures as reflected in the 2008 amended decision and
the 2010 amendment. Ukraine does not refer in its Notice of Appeal to paragraphs 7.30-7.35 of the Panel
Report, which contain the Panel's findings in relation to the requirement to provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint under Article 6.2 of the DSU. At the oral hearing, Ukraine confirmed that it has not
appealed this section of the Panel Report. (Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing)
170 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 27-36. While the Appellate Body has previously assessed
allegations of breach under Article 7.1 of the DSU that did not relate to the requirements under Article 6.2 of
the DSU, this is not the case in the present dispute. See Appellate Body Reports, EU – PET (Pakistan),
paras. 5.28, 5.40, and 5.51; China – Raw Materials, para. 237.

that the 2008 a mended decision and the 2010 amendment formed part of the Panel's terms of
reference, there would be no basis to entertain Ukraine's claims under Articles 7.1 and 11. 171
Accordingly, we find that Ukraine has not established that the Panel erred under Articles 7.1 and 11
of the DSU by ruling on Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it relates
to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment.
6.1.5 Whether the Panel erred under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to examine properly
the arguments and evidence presented by Ukraine regarding the authority of Ukrainian
courts and investigating authorities to calculate dumping margins under Ukrainian law
6.40. Ukraine claims that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by failing to
examine properly the arguments and evidence presented by Ukraine regarding the authority of
Ukrainian courts and investigating authorities to calculate dumping margins under Ukrainian law.172
Ukraine's claim under Article 11 of the DSU concerns the Panel's analysis regarding the second
sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires immediate termination of an
anti-dumping investigation, and therefore exclusion of a producer or exporter from the scope of that
investigation, where a de m inimis dumping margin has been determined for that producer or
exporter.173 Ukraine principally maintains that the Panel failed to consider that neither Ukrainian
investigating authorities nor Ukrainian courts recalculated – or, in these circumstances, had t he
competence to recalculate – the dumping margin for EuroChem.174 Ukraine therefore requests that
we reverse the Panel's findings in paragraphs 7.147, 7.149 -7.152, 7.154, 7.157, and 8.3.a of the
Panel Report.175 Russia requests that we uphold the Panel's findings at issue.176
6.41. Article 11 of the DSU imposes on panels a comprehensive obligation to make an "objective
assessment of the matter", which embraces "all aspects of a panel's examination of the 'matter',
both factual and legal".177 Thus, panels are required to make an "objective assessment of the facts",
of the "applicability" of the covered agreements, and of the "conformity" of the measure s at issue
with the covered agreements. 178 Moreover, the Appellate Body has stated that, in conducti ng an
objective assessment of the matter, a panel must provide reasoned and adequate explanations and
coherent reasoning.179 A claim that a panel has failed to conduct an objective assessment of the
matter before it is "a very serious allegation".180 Participants must therefore identify specific errors
regarding the objectivity of a panel's assessment181 and explain why the alleged error has a bearing
on the objectivity of a panel's assessment. 182 Not every error amounts to a failure by the panel to
comply with its duties under Article 11, only those which, taken together or singly, undermine the
objectivity of the panel's assessment of the matter before it.183
6.42. Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to consider all of the arguments and evidence presented
before it, in order to treat the parties' arguments and evidence in an even -handed manner, and to

171 Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
172 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 100-152.
173 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 217, 219, and 305. We note
that the parties did not dispute the interpretation of the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement before the Panel. (Panel Report, paras. 7.140 and 7.146)
174 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 116-152.
175 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 152; Notice of Appeal, para. f.
176 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 313 and 371.
177 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54.
178 Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 54; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products,
para. 5.31.
179 Appellate Body Reports, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.18; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1317 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), fn 618 to
para. 293); US – COOL, para. 299.
180 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, para. 5.66 (quoting Appellate Body Reports,
China – Rare Earths, para. 5.227 (fn omitted)).
181 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, para. 5.66 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442).
182 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 442.
183 Appellate Body Reports, Peru – Agricultural Products, para. 5.66; EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1318; US – COOL, paras. 300 and 321.

not disregard the arguments or evidence relevant to a party's case. 184 Within these parameters, it
is within the panel's discretion to decide which arguments or evidence it addresses or relies on in
reaching its findings.185 An allegation that the panel did not expressly refer to particular arguments
or evidence may not be sufficient to bring a successful claim under Article 11. Rather, the
Appellate Body must be satisfied that the panel exceeded its authority as the trier of facts or failed
to exercise that authority to conduct a proper analysis. 186 In addition, the Appellate Body has
cautioned participants against recasting their arguments made before the Panel "under the guise of
an Article 11 claim" on appeal.187
6.43. Moreover, in assessing the consistency of domestic measures with WTO law, a panel may be
called upon to examine a Member's domestic law, and must make an objective assessment of the
matter before it in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the covered agreements. 188 In doing
so, a panel should undertake "a holistic assessment of all relevant elements, starting with the t ext
of the law and including, but not limited to, relevant practices of administering agencies".189
6.44. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we now turn to examine the Panel's analysis. The
Panel referred to Ukraine's contention that the judgments of its co urts did not amount to a legally
valid determination of a de minimis dumping margin warranting the exclusion of EuroChem pursuant
to the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. Indeed, the Panel took note
of Ukraine's contentions that "the Ukrainian courts did not have the authority under domestic law to
recalculate EuroChem's dumping margin" and that "ICIT imposed an anti -dumping duty of 0% on
EuroChem to implement the court orders, but never recalculated its dumping margin ."190 On that
basis, the Panel inquired whether a de minimis dumping margin was determined for EuroChem in
the original investigation phase, which would have required termination of the original investigation
against EuroChem under Article 5.8.191
6.45. In its analysis, the Pa nel referenced three Ukrainian court judgments, as well as the 2010
amendment.192 Regarding the court judgments, the Panel noted that the District Court found that in
the original investigation, MEDT had erroneously considered that EuroChem had provided a discount
on the domestic sales prices that were used to calculate the normal value, and thus incorrectly
adjusted the normal value by adding the value of the discount to domestic sales prices when
calculating the dumping margin. 193 As the Panel explained, the District Court found that no such
discount had been given by EuroChem, and thus the adjustment to the normal value was not
correct.194 The Panel accordingly noted the District Court's conclusions that there was an "absence

184 See Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1317;
US – COOL, para. 299; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 185; Canada – Continued Suspension, paras. 553 and
615; US – Continued Suspension, paras. 553 and 615; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 441; US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras. 292-293 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy; para. 137, Korea –
Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164).
185 Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1317 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 511.
186 Appellate Body Reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1317 (referring to
187 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 301 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, EC – Fasteners
188 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.98.
189 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.101. In
addition, the Appellate Body has previously stated that a panel's examination of a Member's law may involve
both legal and factual characterizations, depending on the circumstances of the case. (Ibid., para. 4.101
(referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157))
190 Panel Report, para. 7.145 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, paras. 238
and 253; response to Panel question No. 21, para. 83; opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 138).
191 Panel Report, para. 7.146.
192 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
193 Panel Report, fn 238 to para. 7.136 (referring to Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit
RUS-6b)).
194 Panel Report, fn 238 to para. 7.136 (referring to Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit
RUS-6b)).

of dumping" by EuroChem and that th e case files reaffirmed that the calculations presented by
EuroChem showed that its dumping margin had a "negative value/rate".195
6.46. The Panel then referred to the fact that the judgment of the District Court was upheld twice
on appeal.196 The Panel recalled the Appellate Court's conclusion that the District Court had "correctly
established the circumstances of the case" and that Ukrainian investigating authorities "did not prove
the lawfulness of the [2008 original decision]". 197 The Panel t hen recalled the Higher Court's
conclusions that: it "follow[ed] from the case files that no discounts were granted by [EuroChem] in
the ordinary course of trade operations"; Ukrainian investigating authorities "did not have any
grounds for adjustment"; an d the District Court and the Appellate Court had correctly established
the circumstances of the case and thoroughly investigated existing evidence.198
6.47. In addition, the Panel evaluated what transpired subsequent to the Ukrainian court
judgments.199 First, the Panel noted that ICIT had itself implemented the judgments by issuing the
2010 amendment in "pursuance" of these judgments.200 Second, the Panel considered that nothing
in the 2010 amendment or other evidence on the record suggested that ICIT disputed the Ukrainian
court findings that EuroChem had a negative value/rate of dumping. 201 Third, the Panel considered
that Ukraine did not challenge the legal validity of these judgments. 202 Fourth, the Panel
acknowledged Ukraine's contention that a 0% duty does not equate to a determination of a negative
or de minimis dumping margin.203 However, the Panel did not consider that Ukraine's allegations
regarding ICIT's conduct indicated that it had not accepted the courts' findings that EuroChem had
a negative rate of dumping. Moreover, the Panel considered that Ukraine had not explained how the
exhibits it had advanced supported its position.204
6.48. On the basis of these considerations, the Panel concluded that the "combined effect" of the
Ukrainian court judgments and their implementation by the 2010 amendment was that the dumping
margin for EuroChem in the original investigation phase was de minimis.205 Consequently, the Panel
found that "the obligation under the second sentence of Article 5.8 applies in this case because
EuroChem had a de minimis dumping margin in the original investigation phase."206 The Panel further
found that, although "the Ukrainian [investigating] authorities would have been required … to
immediately terminate the investigation against EuroChem", they "failed to exclude EuroChem from
the scope of the original anti-dumping measures, specifically the 2008 amended decision", and they
"imposed a 0% anti-dumping duty on EuroChem through the 2010 amendment".207 The Panel noted
that Ukrainian investigating authorities also i ncluded EuroChem within the scope of the review
determinations and imposed anti -dumping duties on EuroChem through the 2014 extension

195 Panel Report, paras. 7.136 (quoting Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-6b)) and
7.147.
196 Panel Report, para. 7.137 and fn 239 thereto (referring to Judgment of the Appellate Court
(Panel Exhibit RUS-5b); Judgment of the Higher Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b)).
197 Panel Report, fn 239 to para. 7.137 (quoting Judgment of the Appellate Court (Panel Exhibit
RUS-5b)).
198 Panel Report, fn 239 to para. 7.137 (quoting Judgment of the Higher Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-7b)),
and para. 7.147.
199 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
200 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
201 Panel Report, para. 7.147 and fn 263 thereto.
202 Panel Report, para. 7.147 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 253).
203 Panel Report, fn 263 to para. 7.147 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 21,
para. 82).
204 Panel Report, fn 263 to para. 7.147 (referring to Letter dated 8 October 2010 from MEDT to ICIT
regarding the agenda for the ICIT meeting on 15 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-53b (BCI)); ICIT, Meeting
agenda of 25 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-54b (BCI)); Letter dated 21 October 2010 from MEDT to ICIT
regarding the agenda for the ICIT meeting on 25 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-55b (BCI)); MEDT,
Information on appeal of ICIT Decision on the application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (Panel Exhibit UKR-56b (BCI))).
205 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
206 Panel Report, para. 7.151.
207 Panel Report, para. 7.151. The Panel noted that "the only way to terminate the investigation against
a producer found to have a de minimis dumping margin in the original investigation is to exclude that producer
from the scope of the anti-dumping measures, and not to impose any anti-dumping duty on it, even at a 0%

decision.208 The Panel considered that, for all of these reasons, Ukraine acted inconsistently with
Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.209
6.49. Based on our review of the Panel's analysis, we understand the Panel to have considered that,
irrespective of whether the relevant court judgments and the 2010 amendment refer to a specific
dumping margin, the outcome of these decisions was that there was, at that point, no basis for a
dumping margin or an anti -dumping duty with respect to EuroChem, and that this therefore
amounted to a determination of a de minimis dumping margin. According to the Panel, the error
that was identified by Ukrainian courts, which resulted in the Ukrainian court orders to reverse the
2008 original decision with respect to EuroChem, related to the improper allocation of discounts by
Ukrainian investigating authorities.210 The Panel further noted that this resulted in the District Court
concluding that there was an "absence of dumping" by EuroChem and reaffirming that EuroChem's
dumping margin had a "negative value/rate".211 Thus, the Panel appears to have concluded that the
Ukrainian court judgments and the 2010 amendment invalidated the basis at that point for a
dumping margin or an anti-dumping duty with respect to EuroChem. It was on these grounds that
the Panel found that "the combined effe ct of the Ukrainian court judgments, and their
implementation by ICIT's 2010 amendment [,] was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the
original investigation phase was de minimis."212
6.50. Ukraine argues that, because Ukrainian courts are not competent to calc ulate dumping
margins, they could not have calculated a dumping margin for EuroChem. 213 In particular, Ukraine
argues that the Panel failed to consider adequately its submissions regarding Ukrainian law,
including: (i) the division of competences between Ukr ainian courts, ICIT, and MEDT; (ii) the role
ICIT and MEDT have in anti -dumping investigations and ICIT's exclusive right to decide on the
presence or absence of dumping and methods for calculating dumping margins; and (iii) that
Ukrainian courts can only review the decisions of Ukrainian investigating authorities.214
6.51. Ukraine further argues that neither Ukrainian courts nor investigating authorities calculated a
dumping margin for EuroChem. Regarding its courts, Ukraine contends that: (i) the Panel selectively
quoted the District Court's judgment, obscuring the fact that the District Court itself did not make
any calculations215; and (ii) the operative section of the District Court's judgment did not contain a
dumping margin, but rather a finding of unlawfulness and a decision to repeal partially the
2008 original decision. 216 As to its investigating authorities, Ukraine submits that they did not
recalculate a dumping margin for EuroChem in the 2010 amendment, but instead imposed a 0%
duty on EuroChem.217 In that regard, Ukraine argues that: (i) MEDT documentation underlying the
2010 amendment issued by ICIT does not indicate which dumping margin would apply to EuroChem

208 Panel Report, para. 7.157.
209 Panel Report, paras. 7.151-7.152, 7.157, and 8.3.
210 Panel Report, para. 7.136 and fn 238 thereto.
211 Panel Report, paras. 7.136 and 7.147.
212 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
213 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 130 and 137.
214 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 130-139. In support of these points, Ukraine relies on
several provisions of Ukrainian law (ibid., para. 130 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the
Panel, paras. 248-253, in turn referring to Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer Against
Dumped Imports" (22 December 1998) (Panel Exhibit UKR-9); Extracts from the Code of Administrative
Procedure of Ukraine (Panel Exhibit UKR-10))). See also Ukraine's second written submission to the Panel,
para. 97 (referring to response to Panel question No. 22, paras. 92-93, in turn referring to Law of Ukraine "On
Enforcement Proceedings" (Panel Exhibit UKR-44)). Ukraine also relies on Ukrainian court judgments (ibid.,
paras. 131-135 (referring to Resolution of the Plenum of the High Commercial Court of Ukraine No. 15
(26 December 2011) (Panel Exhibit UKR-12); Resolution of the District Administrative Court of Kiev in case
No. 826/11526/14 (23 September 2014) (Panel Exhibit UKR-13); Ruling of Kiev Administrative Court of Appeal
in case No. 826/11526/14 (3 December 2014) (Panel Exhibit UKR-14); Application of EuroChem to the
Supreme Court of Ukraine in case No. 826/11526/14 (12 February 2015) (Panel Exhibit UKR-15 (BCI));
Resolution of the Supreme Court of Ukraine No. 21-122a15 (21 April 2015) (Panel Exhibit UKR-16))). Panel
Exhibits UKR-13, UKR-14, UKR-15 (BCI), and UKR-16 relate to Ukrainian court proceedings instigated by
EuroChem to challenge the 2014 extension decision.
215 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 122-129 and 136 (referring to Judgment of the District
Court (Panel Exhibit RUS-6b)). Ukraine contends that the calculations, provided by EuroChem in its expert
report conducted by a specialist of the Kiev Forensic Examination Research Institute, were flawed as they did
not apply an ordinary-course-of-trade test to determine the normal value. (Ibid., para. 128)
216 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 129 (quoting Judgment of the District Court (Panel Exhibit
RUS-6b)).
217 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 116.

following the Ukrainian court judgments218; (ii) WTO Members are constrained only by Article 9.3 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which caps an anti-dumping duty at the margin of dumping, such that
the 0% duty imposed on EuroChem did not actually indicate what the dumping margin was in the
original investigation phase 219; and (iii) the Panel erred because it failed to recognize Ukraine's
administrative practice, reflected in Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI)220, of explicitly stating in a decision
when a dumping margin is below de minimis and to exclude the relevant producer from the scope
of the anti-dumping measure.221
6.52. Russia responds that the Panel addressed Ukraine's arguments on competence and notes that
the Panel considered that Ukraine's explanation of its domestic law provisions had varied throughout
the proceedings.222 Russia agrees with the Panel that Ukraine's arguments raise matters of Ukrainian
law, and that investigating authorities should not be able to circumvent their obligations under
Article 5.8 by not re -establishing a dumping margin based on domestic l aw justifications. 223 In
addition, Russia contends that, if Ukraine's arguments on competence circumscribe when a
de minimis dumping margin may be determined, this would amount to treating the same transaction
differently for the purpose of applying Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.224
6.53. Moreover, Russia considers that Ukraine mischaracterizes the Panel's findings in asserting
that the Panel concluded that Ukrainian courts had found that a dumping margin for EuroChem had
been incorrectly calculated.225 According to Russia, (i) EuroChem had argued before Ukrainian courts
that Ukrainian investigating authorities had erred in their calculation of the dumping margin;
(ii) Ukrainian courts found that there was an "absence of dumping"; (iii) the Panel concluded t hat
Ukrainian courts found there was an "absence of dumping"; and (iv) the Panel addressed Ukraine's
arguments about evidence before Ukrainian courts, and found that any constraint on Ukrainian
investigating authorities in providing evidence arose as a matter of Ukrainian law and did not affect
the probative value of the Ukrainian court judgments. 226 Russia further argues that Ukrainian law
constraints cannot be relied on to avoid complying with WTO obligations.227 Russia also contends
that the Panel addressed Ukraine's arguments concerning the 0% anti -dumping duty rate in the
Panel Report, and that, in relation to Ukraine's administrative practice, the Panel had discretion to
choose what evidence to rely on in making its findings, and to decide on the meaning and weight of
such evidence.228
6.54. We note that the Panel referred to Ukraine's submission that Ukrainian courts did not have
authority to, and did not, recalculate a dumping margin. We recall that the Panel considered that
Ukraine had "changed its factual argum ents" on whether, as a matter of Ukrainian law, Ukrainian
courts or investigating authorities have the competence to make dumping determinations and

218 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 117 (referring to Letter dated 8 October 2010 from MEDT to
ICIT regarding the agenda for the ICIT meeting on 15 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-53b (BCI)); ICIT,
Meeting agenda of 25 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-54b (BCI)); Letter dated 21 October 2010 from MEDT
to ICIT regarding the agenda for the ICIT meeting on 25 October 2010 (Panel Exhibit UKR-55b (BCI)); MEDT,
Information on appeal of ICIT Decision on the application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of
ammonium nitrate originating in Russia No. АD-176/2008/143-47 (Panel Exhibit 56b (BCI))).
219 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 118-119.
220 ICIT, Decision on application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports into Ukraine of glass
containers used for medical purposes up to 0.15 litres originating from Russia No. АD-293/2013/4423-06
(24 May 2013) (Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI)). Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI) is an ICIT decision concerning an
anti-dumping investigation on imports of glass containers used for medical purposes. ICIT made a "negative
determination on the existence of dumped imports" for OstrivJuice LLC and decided to "terminate an
anti-dumping investigation, to the extent related to OstrivJuice LLC … and to impose no anti-dumping
measures". (Ibid.)
221 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 120-122 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question
No. 20, para. 81; ICIT, Decision on application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports into Ukraine of
glass containers used for medical purposes up to 0.15 litres originating from Russia No. АD-293/2013/4423-06
(24 May 2013) (Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI))).
222 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 357 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.148.b; Annex E-1 to the
Panel Report (Interim Review), paras. 36-37 and fn 40 to para. 38).
223 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 344-348 and 358-359.
224 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 344-348.
225 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 336 (referring to Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 102).
226 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 336-337 and 350-352.
227 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 354-355 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing
(Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), fn 452 to para. 175).
228 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 343 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones,
para. 135; Australia – Salmon, para. 267).

concluded that these arguments did not support Ukraine's position. 229 However, we do not regard
the Panel as having sought to determine whether Ukrainian courts have the competence to, or in
fact did, calculate dumping margins, and we do not see that the Panel made any such findings.
Rather, the Panel understood that, by rejecting MEDT's application of discounts in calculating
dumping margins for EuroChem in the 2008 original decision, the Ukrainian court rulings invalidated
the basis at that point for a dumping margin or an anti-dumping duty with respect to EuroChem. We
therefore do not see that the Panel took is sue with Ukraine's submissions before it concerning the
respective competence or actions of Ukrainian investigating authorities and courts regarding the
calculation of dumping margins. Rather, the Panel concluded that, by virtue of the Ukrainian court
judgments and the 2010 amendment, there was at that point no basis under Ukrainian law for a
dumping margin or an anti -dumping duty with respect to EuroChem , and that this amounted to a
de minimis dumping determination under WTO law. Accordingly, the Panel found that this triggered
Ukraine's obligation under the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement to
exclude EuroChem from the scope of the investigation, and that such an obli gation could not be
satisfied by the imposition of a 0% duty.230
6.55. Furthermore, in relation to Ukraine's contention that the imposition of a 0% duty is not the
same as a determination of a zero dumping margin231, we do not see how the fact that ICIT does
not refer in the 2010 amendment to a specific dumping margin was relevant to, or would have
altered, the Panel's analysis. The reasoning of the Panel did not turn on whether a specific dumping
margin was set by Ukrainian courts and/or Ukrainian investigating auth orities, but rather focused
on the fact that the "combined effect" of the Ukrainian court judgments and the ensuing decision by
ICIT invalidated the basis at that point for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty on EuroChem.232
Ukraine is correct in noting that the Panel did not expressly refer to Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI)233,
which Ukraine considers is indicative of its administrative practice of explicitly stating in a decision
when a dumping margin is below de minimis and to exclude the relevant producer from the scope
of the anti-dumping measure. However, we do not see how this exhibit is relevant to this appeal,
given that, in this exhibit, ICIT is not implementing a court judgment following a successful challenge
before domestic courts to original anti -dumping measures. As a result, we do not consider that
express treatment of Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI) in the Panel Report would have had any bearing
on the Panel's analysis or its findings.
6.56. Finally, we turn to Ukraine's challenge to the Panel's reasoning that certain arguments Ukraine
raised before it are irrelevant because they would enable Ukraine to rely on features of its domestic

229 Panel Report, fn 272 to para. 7.150. The Panel referred to Ukraine's submissions: that (i) Ukrainian
investigating authorities can only recalculate dumping margins in the course of a review; (ii) Ukrainian courts
must specifically instruct ICIT to reopen an investigation and adopt a particular methodology; and
(iii) Ukrainian law requires that the District Court would have had to instruct ICIT to reopen the investigation
and adopt a particular methodology to recalculate EuroChem's dumping margin in the operative part of its
judgment. The Panel considered these to be contradictory arguments because, on one view, they suggest
Ukrainian investigating authorities can only recalculate dumping margins in a review (and therefore not
pursuant to a court judgment), whereas alternatively, they suggest that Ukrainian courts can order ICIT to
recalculate dumping margins in the absence of a review. (Ibid. (referring to Ukraine's first written submission
to the Panel, fn 85 to para. 245; response to Panel question No. 22, para. 94); second written submission to
the Panel, para. 97; response to Panel question No. 22, para. 92, in turn referring to Code of Administrative
Procedure of Ukraine, Extracts (Panel Exhibit UKR-43); Law of Ukraine "On Enforcement Proceedings", Extracts
(Panel Exhibit UKR-44))
230 As the Panel noted, "immediate termination" is required where a "zero or de minimis dumping
margin" is determined in the original investigation, and the imposition of a 0% duty does not amount to
termination. Instead, relevant producers must be excluded from the scope of the anti-dumping order.
(Panel Report, para. 7.140 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice,
paras. 217, 219, and 305; Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140)) As we noted,
the parties did not dispute the interpretation of the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement before the Panel. (Ibid., paras. 7.140 and 7.146)
231 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 116-119.
232 Panel Report, para. 7.147.
233 We note that Ukraine referred to Panel Exhibit UKR-42b (BCI) in its response to Panel question

law as a means of avoiding its WTO obligations.234 Ukraine maintains that it is not relying on domestic
law to avoid its WTO obligations, but as evidence of the "fact" that Ukrainian courts did not
recalculate a dumping margin with respect to EuroChem. 235 Russia considers that a number of
Ukraine's arguments derive from "restraints" on the competence of Ukrainian courts and
investigating authorities under Ukrainian law. 236 Russia submits that a Member's domestic law
arrangements are not determinative of issues in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, and cannot
be used to justify Ukraine's conduct in the present case with respect to Ar ticle 5.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.237
6.57. We consider that the Panel's reasoning is consistent with its understanding that the "combined
effect" of the court judgments and the 2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem
in the original investigation phase was de minimis. We recall that, as an example, the Panel stated
that the fact that, in implementing the court judgments, ICIT did not, or could not, recalculate the
dumping margin itself is a matter of domestic law, and did not, in the Panel's view, diminish the
probative value of these court judgments or ICIT's order implementing them. 238 Accordingly, we
understand that Ukraine's arguments concerning ICIT's authority to recalculate a dumping margin
for EuroChem following the court judgments were not germane to the Panel's reasoning that the
"combined effect" of the Ukrainian court judgments and the 2010 amendment was that there was
no basis at that point for a dumping margin or an anti -dumping duty with respect to EuroChem.
In light of the arguments and evidence of the parties, and the manner in which the Panel reasoned
its conclusion, we consider that the Panel was objective in rejecting Ukraine's contentions that the
obligation under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement had not been triggere d, because its
domestic law prevented the recalculation of EuroChem's dumping margin once it had been
invalidated by Ukrainian courts.
6.58. On the basis of our examination of the Panel's explanations and reasoning, we do not consider
that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. Having considered that the Ukrainian
court rulings invalidated the basis at that point for a dumping margin or an anti-dumping duty with
respect to EuroChem, the Panel provided a reasoned and coherent explanation in rea ching the
conclusion that "the combined effect of the Ukrainian court judgments, and their implementation by
ICIT's 2010 amendment[,] was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the original investigation
phase was de minimis."239 Although Ukraine cites certain arguments and evidence that it claims the
Panel overlooked, we consider that the Panel, consistent with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU,
conducted an objective assessment of the arguments and evidence necessary to resolve the claim
under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision and
the 2010 amendment. For these reasons, we also see no reason to consider that the Panel did not
conduct an objective assessment to resolve Russia's claim under Article 5.8 as it relates to the 2014
extension decision. Accordingly, we find that Ukraine has not established that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in examining the arguments and evidence presented by
Ukraine regarding the authority of Ukrainian courts and investigating authorities to calculate
dumping margins under Ukrainian law.

234 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 140-141. See also Panel Report, paras. 7.148-7.150 and
fn 265 to para. 7.147. On appeal, in response to the Panel's reasoning in footnote 265 to paragraph 7.147 of
the Panel Report, Ukraine argues that EuroChem could have petitioned Ukrainian courts for an order requiring
Ukrainian investigating authorities to recalculate its dumping margin. Ukraine considers the fact that no
de minimis dumping margin was determined was therefore a result of EuroChem's own conduct. (Ukraine's
appellant's submission, paras. 142-147 (referring to Panel Report, fn 265 to para. 7.147)) We do not consider
that the possibility of making such a petition was relevant to the Panel's reasoning or affects the Panel's
conclusion that the "combined effect" of the court judgments and the 2010 amendment was that the dumping
margin for EuroChem in the original investigation phase was de minimis. Given that there was no basis at that
point for a dumping margin or an anti-dumping duty for EuroChem, we do not see that the reason there was
no recalculation of EuroChem's dumping margin was relevant to the Panel's assessment.
235 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 141.
236 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 355.
237 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 355 and 359.
238 Panel Report, para. 7.150. As noted by the Panel, Ukraine submitted before the Panel that ICIT is
able to recalculate dumping margins only in the course of a review of anti-dumping duties, or when asked by
Ukrainian courts to reopen an investigation and apply a particular methodology to calculate a dumping margin.
(Panel Report, fn 272 to para. 7.150 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, fn 85 to
239 Panel Report, para. 7.147.

6.1.6 Conclusion
6.59. In sum, the language in Russia's panel request, including express references in footnotes,
refers to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment and sufficiently links these measures
to Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. We therefore agree with the
Panel's assessment that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were discernible and
accordingly identified as specific measures at issue in Russia's panel request.
6.60. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures at issue in
Russia's panel request. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.28 and 8.1.a
of the Panel Report, that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as
specific measures at issue in Russia's panel request, and thus fell within th e Panel's terms of
reference.
6.61. We recall that the measures and claims identified in a panel request in accordance with
Article 6.2 of the DSU constitute the "matter referred to the DSB", which serves as a basis for the
panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. We have upheld the Panel's finding that the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures at issue in
Russia's panel request, and Ukraine has not appealed the Panel's finding that Russia had provided a
brief summary of the legal basis for its claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it
relates to these measures. Moreover, Ukraine has not advanced any other grounds in support of its
challenge under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err under
Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling on Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment.
6.62. We consider that the Panel provided a reasoned and coherent explanation in reaching the
conclusion that the combined effect of the Ukrainian court judgments and the implementation by
the 2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the original investigation phase
was de minimis, triggering Ukraine's obligation under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to
exclude EuroChem from the scope of the anti -dumping investigation. We further consider that the
Panel, consistent with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU, conducted an ob jective assessment of
the arguments and evidence necessary to resolve the claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014
extension decision.
6.63. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not act in a manner inconsistent with Article 11 of the
DSU, in concluding that the combined effect of the Ukrainian court judgments and their
implementation by the 2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the original
investigation phase was de minimis.
6.64. For the reasons above, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.152, 7.157, and 8.3.a
of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement in relation to the 2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension
decision.
6.2 Claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relating
to MEDT's determinations of dumping in the interim and expiry reviews
6.2.1 Introduction
6.65. In this section, we address three closely related claims of error raised by Ukraine under
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, with respect to MEDT's
determinations of dumping in the interim and expiry reviews. First, Ukraine claims that the Pane l
erred in its interpretation and application of the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 in finding that MEDT did not provide an adequate basis for rejecting the reported gas
cost under that condition.240 Second, Ukraine claims that these same errors also led the Panel to err
in finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 because, in conducting its

240 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 37; Notice of Appeal, para. c.

ordinary-course-of-trade test, MEDT relied on costs calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1.241
Third, Ukraine claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 2.2 in finding
that, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed to calculate the cost of production "in the country
of origin".242 Russia requests that we reject these claims.243
6.66. We begin by summarizing the Panel's findings at issue. We then provide an overview of
relevant aspects of the legal standard in Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement. Next, we consider whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, namely, the condition that the records kept
by the exporter or producer under investigation "reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideration", and thus erred in finding that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 and, consequently, with Article 2.2.1. Finally, we consider whether
the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the phrase "cost of production in the country
of origin" in Article 2.2, which relates to the construction of normal value when it cannot be
determined on the basis of domestic sales.
6.2.2 The Panel's findings
6.67. Before the Panel, Russia contended that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Artic les 2.2 and
2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because, in calculating the cost of production of the
investigated Russian producers as part of its dumping determinations: (i) MEDT rejected the
reported gas cost 244; and (ii) MEDT replaced it with the surro gate price of gas. 245 Russia also
contended that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
because, in conducting its ordinary -course-of-trade test, MEDT used a cost of production that was
calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1.246
6.2.2.1 The Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.68. The Panel first addressed Russia's claim under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
pertaining to the rejection of the reported gas cost. The Panel considered whether MEDT provided
an adequate basis to reject the reported gas cost because the records of the investigated Russian
producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium
nitrate under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.247
6.69. The Panel observed that Ukraine relied heavily on the panel's observations in EU – Biodiesel
(Argentina) that, under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, investigating
authorities are free to "examine non-arms-length transactions or other practices which may affect
the reliability of the reported costs".248 Having recalled the context in which these observations were
made, the Panel considered them to reflect that panel's view that, in certain cases, the records of
an exporter or producer under investigation, while otherwise consistent with the first condition in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, may not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product u nder consideration.249 For its part, the Panel recognized that
investigating authorities are free to examine the reliability and accuracy of the costs in the records
of the investigated exporter or producer. 250 The Panel, however, did not consider that "either the
panel or the Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) 'carved out' an open-ended 'exception' for

241 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 96 and 98; Notice of Appeal, para. e.
242 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 71; Notice of Appeal, para. d.
243 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 81, 239, 305, and 312.
246 Panel Report, para. 7.104.
247 Panel Report, para. 7.81. Relying on the use of the word "normally" in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Ukraine had also asserted that MEDT was permitted to depart
from the obligation to calculate the cost of production of the product under consideration on the basis of the
exporter's or producer's records, because the gas price in the domestic Russian market was fixed by the State,
not of a commercial nature, and below the cost of production of gas. (Ibid., para. 7.78 (referring to Ukraine's
first written submission to the Panel, para. 162)) The Panel considered Ukraine's arguments in that regard to
be ex post facto rationalizations, which it could not consider. The Panel therefore limited its review to the
parties' arguments with respect to the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, which the Panel
found had been invoked by MEDT to reject the reported gas cost. (Ibid., para. 7.80 and fn 164 to para. 7.92)
248 Panel Report, para. 7.84 (quoting Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), fn 400 to para. 7.242).
249 Panel Report, para. 7.85.
250 Panel Report, para. 7.85.

'non-arm's-length transactions or other practices' as Ukraine appear[ed] to suggest ."251 The Panel
therefore did not find it necessary to assess, in the abstract, whether the conditions in the domestic
Russian market and the conditions of sale of gas met the definition of "non -arm's-length
transactions" proposed by Ukraine, or its interpretation of what Ukraine referred to as an
"other-practices" "exception".252 Instead, the Panel understood the pertinent question to be whether
the records of the exporters or producers reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production
and sale of the product under consideration. The Panel added that this question n eeded to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis, in light of the evidence before the investigating authority and its
determination.253 The Panel thus considered that it was called upon to examine "whether MEDT of
Ukraine provided an adequate basis in the Invest igation Report to find that the records of the
investigated Russian producers, insofar as the reported gas cost was concerned, did not reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium nitrate".254
6.70. The Panel recalled that MEDT had found, in its Investigation Report, that the gas price in the
domestic Russian market was not a market price as the State controlled this price, it was artificially
lower than the export price of gas from Russia as well as the price of gas in other cou ntries, and
Gazprom's gas prices were below its cost of production.255 The Panel first considered that MEDT had
examined whether, due to government regulation of gas prices in Russia, the costs incurred by these
producers were lower than prices in other countries or export prices of gas from Russia. To the Panel,
this showed that MEDT's inquiry was "focused on whether the cost of gas incurred by these producers
in the production and sale of ammonium nitrate was reasonable, or was the cost they would incur
under what it considered to be normal circumstances, i.e. in the absence of the alleged distortions
in the domestic Russian market for gas". 256 The Panel considered that this was not the purpose of
the inquiry under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.257
6.71. Turning to MEDT's view that Gazprom sells gas in the domestic Russian market below cost,
the Panel found nothing in the Investigation Report showing that this affected the reliability of the
records of the investigated Russian producers.258 In particular, the Panel noted that MEDT had not
found that Gazprom was affiliated with the investigated producers or even considered who supplied
these producers with gas.259 The Panel also noted Ukraine's acknowledgement that EuroChem had
other gas suppliers and that there was no reference to EuroChem's suppliers in the Investigation
Report.260 Moreover, there was no determination by MEDT that the records of the investigated
producers, insofar as they reflected the prices paid to these suppliers, were unreliable. In addition,
though Ukraine argued that prices of other gas suppliers were affected by Gazprom's prices, the
Panel found nothing in MEDT's determinations to support that view. 261 The Panel characterized
Ukraine's arguments in that respect as ex post facto rationalizations and concluded that there was
no correlation in MEDT's determinations between alleged below -cost sales by Gazprom and the
reliability of the records of the investigated Russian producers. 262 Moreover, considering that
Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement deals with the pricing behaviour of individual exporters and
producers, the Panel stated that the prices paid by a producer to unrelated suppliers would form
part of the costs that it incurs to produce the product under consi deration.263 The Panel did not
consider that the investigated producers' own records could be said to be "unreliable", or not to
reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
investigation, because its unrelated suppliers' prices are government regulated, lower than the prices
prevailing in other countries, or allegedly priced below their cost of production.264

251 Panel Report, fn 152 to para. 7.85 (referring to Ukraine's opening statement at the first Panel
meeting, para. 91).
252 Panel Report, para. 7.85.
253 Panel Report, para. 7.85.
254 Panel Report, para. 7.86.
255 Panel Report, paras. 7.73 and 7.88 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b),
pp. 21-23; Ukraine's second written submission to the Panel, para. 31).
256 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
258 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
259 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
260 Panel Report, fn 159 to para. 7.90 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 8, fn 10).
263 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
264 Panel Report, para. 7.90.

6.72. In these circumstances, the Panel concluded that the findings relied on by MEDT in the
Investigation Report did not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that the records of the investigated
producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium
nitrate.265 Consequently, the Panel found that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement because MEDT did not provide an adequate basis under the second
condition in the first sentence of that provision to reject the reported gas cost.266
6.2.2.2 The Panel's findings under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.73. The Panel next turned to Russia's claim under Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
pertaining to MEDT's replacement of the reported gas cost with the surrogate price of gas in
calculating the cost of production of the investigated Russian producers. The Panel considered
whether the surrogate price of gas was the cost in the "country of origin", i.e. Russia.267
6.74. The Panel observed that the panel and the Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) had
addressed a similar claim under Article 2.2.268 As the Panel recalled, in that case, having found that
the domestic price of soybeans used in the production of biodiesel was artificially lower than
international soybean prices due to distortions created by Argentina's export tax system,
the EU authorities had used the price they considered Argentinian producers would have paid in the
absence of distortions created by this tax system. 269 Specifically, the EU authorities had used the
average reference price of soybeans published by Argentina's Ministry of Agriculture for export, free
on board, minus fobbing costs.270 Given that this price had been selected to remove the perceived
distortions and precisely because it was not the price used in Argentina, the panel in that dispute
concluded that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 because the average
reference price did not constitute the cost in the "country of origin". 271 The Appellate Body in that
dispute likewise found that the EU authorities had specifically selected a surrogate price to remove
the perceived distortions in the cost of soybeans in Argentina.272
6.75. Having recalled these panel and Appellate Body findings in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), the
Panel in the present dispute observed that, in the interim and expiry reviews, MEDT had conc luded
that the export price of gas from Russia at the German border was representative and could be used
in calculating the cost of production of ammonium nitrate , because Germany was the biggest
consumer of Russian natural gas and this price had been revi sed according to market conditions in
2012.273 The Panel recognized that "investigating authorities may use out -of-country evidence to
calculate the cost of production in the country of origin provided they adapt this evidence to reflect
the cost in the country of origin." 274 However, the Panel found th at, except for an adjustment for
transportation expenses, the record did not show how MEDT adapted the export price to reflect the
prices in Russia.275 The Panel did not see "any explanations in the Investigation Report as to why
adjustments for such transportation expenses were adequate to adapt the out-of-country evidence,
i.e. export price from Russia at the German border, to reflect the cost of the investigated Russian
producers in the country of origin".276 To the contrary, the Panel considered MEDT's expl anation to
suggest that it selected the export price of gas because it was an out -of-country benchmark and
that it did not adapt this price to reflect costs in Russia.277 In these circumstances, the Panel did not

265 Panel Report, para. 7.90. The Panel considered its conclusions to be consistent with the legal findings
and interpretation developed by the panel and the Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina).
(Ibid., para. 7.91)
266 Panel Report, paras. 7.92 and 8.2.a. In light of this finding under Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to Russia's claim under Article 2.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement pertaining to MEDT's rejection of the reported gas cost. (Ibid., para. 7.92)
267 Panel Report, para. 7.95. See also ibid., paras. 7.71 and 7.93.
268 Panel Report, para. 7.95.
269 Panel Report, para. 7.96 (referring to Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.257).
270 Panel Report, para. 7.96 (referring to Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.257).
271 Panel Report, para. 7.97 (referring to Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 7.258-7.259).
272 Panel Report, para. 7.98 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.81).
273 Panel Report, para. 7.99 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), p. 23).
274 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
275 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
276 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
277 Panel Report, para. 7.99.

consider the adjustment for transportation ex penses to have been sufficient to adapt the export
price to reflect the cost of gas in Russia.278
6.76. The Panel also addressed Ukraine's argument that MEDT could not use the gas price in the
domestic market in Russia to calculate the cost of production of the investigated Russian producers
because there was no undistorted domestic market for gas in Russia.279 In this context, Ukraine had
relied on the Appellate Body's finding under Article 14(d) of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in US – Softwood Lumber IV that investigating
authorities may use out-of-country benchmarks when private prices in a country are distorted due
to the government's predominant role in the market. 280 Disagreeing with Ukraine's argument, the
Panel recalled its earlier finding that MEDT did not provide a proper basis to reject the reported gas
cost.281 The Panel also considered the Appellate Body's finding in US – Softwood Lumber IV not to
be relevant to its interpretation of Article 2.2.282 In the Panel's view, the Appellate Body in that
dispute recognized that, where the entire domestic market is distorted because of a government's
role, comparing prices at which the government provides goods with prices of private suppliers in
the domestic market could indicate an artificially low benefit, meaning that the full extent of the
subsidy would not be captured.283 The Panel took the view that the purpose of cost calculation under
Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and that of the calculation of benefit under Article 14(d)
of the SCM Agreement are different and should not be conflated.284 The Panel added that the interim
and expiry reviews concern a determination in an anti-dumping proceeding and that the question of
ascertaining the benefit granted to a producer thr ough the governmental provision of goods and
services does not arise.285
6.77. Based on the foregoing, the Panel found that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed to calculate the
cost of production "in the country of origin".286
6.2.2.3 The Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.78. With respect to Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, the Panel stated that this
provision describes a methodology for determining whether below-cost sales may be treated as not
being made in the ordinary course of trade.287 The Panel added that the first sentence of Article 2.2.1
requires investigating authorities to: (i) identify sales that are made at prices below "per unit (fixed
and variable) costs of production plus administrative, selling and general costs"; and (ii) determine
whether such below-cost sales are made within an extended period of time, in substantial quantities,
and at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time.288
6.79. The Panel noted that, in the interim and expiry reviews, MEDT had used the surrogate price
of gas, rather than the reported gas cost, to identify below-cost sales and assess whether they could
be treated as not being made in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of Article 2.2.1.289
Recalling its finding that MEDT's rejection of the reported gas cost was inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel took the view that "the use of costs that

278 Panel Report, para. 7.99. The Panel noted that the panel and the Appellate Body in
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) had reached a similar conclusion under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(Ibid., para. 7.99)
279 Panel Report, para. 7.100 (referring to Ukraine's opening statement at the first Panel meeting,
para. 105).
280 Panel Report, para. 7.100 (referring to Ukraine's first written submission to the Panel, para. 179).
281 Panel Report, para. 7.101.
282 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
283 Panel Report, para. 7.101 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 100).
284 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
285 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
286 Panel Report, paras. 7.103 and 8.2.b. In light of this finding under Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to Russia's claim under
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement pertaining to MEDT's replacement of the reported gas cost with
the surrogate price of gas.
287 Panel Report, para. 7.109 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.231).
288 Panel Report, para. 7.110 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.233).
289 Panel Report, para. 7.114. As the Panel observed, MEDT had found that the domestic selling prices of
the investigated Russian producers were "lower than [the] reasonable per unit costs for its production (taking
into account the natural gas value adjustment)". (Ibid., para. 7.113 (quoting Investigation Report
(Panel Exhibit RUS-10b), pp. 25-26) (emphasis added by the Panel))

were calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 tainted MEDT of Ukraine's ordinary -course-of-
trade test."290
6.80. Before the Panel, Ukraine contended that a finding that MEDT calculated costs inconsistently
with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement cannot lead to a violation of Article 2.2.1 of that
Agreement.291 The Panel noted that Ukraine had put forward two arguments in this respect, namely,
that: (i) cost calculations under Article 2.2.1.1 and the ordinary -course-of-trade te st under
Article 2.2.1 are separate and sequential obligations; and (ii) Russia had not made a prima facie
case that if costs had not been calculated on the basis of the methodology adopted by MEDT, the
results of the ordinary -course-of-trade test under Ar ticle 2.2.1 would have been different. 292 With
respect to Ukraine's first argument, the Panel observed that Article 2.2.1.1 applies to
"[p]aragraph 2", which covers Article 2.2.1.293 The Panel thus took the view that costs used in the
ordinary-course-of-trade test under Article 2.2.1 must be consistent with Article 2.2.1.1.294 With
respect to Ukraine's second argument, the Panel considered that it was not permitted to examine
whether the results of MEDT's ordinary -course-of-trade test would have been different ha d it
calculated the costs consistently with Article 2.2.1.1, as such an examination would have required a
de novo review of the evidence on the record.295 Furthermore, while Ukraine argued that the
outcome of the ordinary-course-of-trade test would not have changed had MEDT calculated the costs
of the investigated producers consistently with Article 2.2.1.1, the Panel did not consider "such an
argument of harmless error to be relevant to [its] analysis".296
6.81. Based on the foregoing, the Panel found that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because, in conducting its ordinary -course-of-trade test, MEDT
relied on costs that had been calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement.297
6.2.3 Overview of relevant aspects of the legal standard in Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.82. Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement form part of the disciplines
concerning the determination of dumping in Article 2 of that Agreement. Article 2.1 provides that a
product is being dumped when it is "introduced into the commerce of another country" at an export
price that is "less than its normal value". Pursuant to Article 2.1, the normal value of the product
refers to "the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined
for consumption in the exporting country". The other provisi ons of Article 2 set out the rules
regarding the determination of normal value and export price, and the comparison to be made
between the two for the purpose of determining the margin of dumping.
6.83. While normal value will typically be based on domestic sales prices pursuant to Article 2.1298,
Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement identifies circumstances in which an investigating
authority need not determine normal value on the basis of such domestic sales. 299 One such
circumstance is "[w]hen there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the
domestic market of the exporting country". The other circumstance outlined in Article 2.2 is when
domestic sales do not permit a proper comparison, either because of "the particular market situation
or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country". 300 When one of
these circumstances exists, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparing the export

290 Panel Report, para. 7.114.
291 Panel Report, para. 7.115.
292 Panel Report, para. 7.115 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 15, paras. 67-72).
293 Panel Report, para. 7.116.
294 Panel Report, para. 7.116. The Panel considered that there is nothing in the text of Article 2.2.1 or
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to support the view that an investigating authority is free to
disregard the specific rules under Article 2.2.1.1 when calculating the cost of production used for the purpose
of the ordinary-course-of-trade test under Article 2.2.1. (Ibid.)
295 Panel Report, para. 7.117.
296 Panel Report, para. 7.117 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Salmon (Norway), fn 763 to para. 7.624;
US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China), para. 7.92).
297 Panel Report, paras. 7.118 and 8.2.c.
298 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 569.
299 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.13.
300 Fn omitted. As explained in footnote 375 below, Ukraine's appeal does not require us to address
these aspects of Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, in particular, the notion of "particular market
situation" in that provision.

price with: (i) "a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country,
provided that this price is representative"; or (ii) "the cost of production in the country of origin plus
a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits". With regard to
the construction of normal value, the fact that "the cost of production " is that "in the country of
origin" defines the parameters of that inquiry. This phrase indicates that whatever information or
evidence is used to determine the "cost of production", it must be apt to yield or capable of yielding
a cost of production "in the country of origin".301 Therefore, an investigating authority must ensure
that the information it collects is used to arrive at the "cost of production in the country of origin",
and compliance with this obligation may require the investigating authority to adapt that
information.302
6.84. Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, and 2.2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement elaborate on various
aspects of Article 2.2. Article 2.2.1 sets out when sales of the like product in the domestic market
or to a third country may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade and disregarded in
determining normal value. For its part, Article 2.2.1.1 deals with "costs" while Article 2.2.2 concerns
the determination of the amounts for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.
6.85. The first sentence of Article 2.2.1 refers to "[s]ales of the like product in the domestic market
of the exporting country or sales to a third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs
of production plus administrative, selling and general costs". Such below-cost sales may be treated
as not being in the ordinary course of trade by reason of price and disregarded in determining normal
value "only if" the authorities determine that they are made: (i) within an extended period of time;
(ii) in substantial quantities; and (iii) at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs
within a reasonable period of time. The second sentence of Article 2.2.1 specifies that "[i]f prices
which are below per unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for the
period of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of costs within a
reasonable period of time."
6.86. The first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 begins with the phrase "[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2".
This indicates that, when normal value is being constructed because it cannot be determined on the
basis of domestic sales, the calculation of "the cost of production in the country of origin" is subject
to Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.303 The first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 directs the
investigating authority normally to base its calculations of costs on the records of the exporter or
producer under investigation , provided that such records are in accordance with the generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) of the exporting country, and that they "reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration". The fi rst

301 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.70.
302 The Appellate Body has stated:
In circumstances where the obligation in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 to calculate the
costs on the basis of the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation does not
apply, or where relevant information from the exporter or producer under investigation is not
available, an investigating authority may have recourse to alternative bases to calculate some or
all such costs. Yet, Article 2.2 does not specify precisely to what evidence an authority may
resort. This suggests that, in such circumstances, the authority is not prohibited from relying on
information other than that contained in the records kept by the exporter or producer, including
in-country and out-of-country evidence. This, however, does not mean that an investigating
authority may simply substitute the costs from outside the country of origin for the "cost of
production in the country of origin". Indeed, Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994 make clear that the determination is of the "cost of
production […] in the country of origin". Thus, whatever the information that it uses, an
investigating authority has to ensure that such information is used to arrive at the "cost of
production in the country of origin". Compliance with this obligation may require the investigating
authority to adapt the information that it collects.
(Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.73) (fns omitted)
303 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 6.24 and 6.44. In EU – Biodiesel
(Argentina), the Appellate Body stated that the reference to the records kept by the exporter or producer
under investigation indicates that the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 "is concerned with establishing the cost
for the specific exporter or producer under investigation". (Ibid., para. 6.17) (emphasis original) The
Appellate Body, however, also clarified that the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 does
not allow an investigating authority to evaluate the costs reported in the records kept by the exporter or
producer pursuant to a benchmark unrelated to the cost of production in the country of origin. (Ibid.,
para. 6.23) In making these statements, the Appellate Body recognized that production cost calculations
pursuant to Article 2.2.1.1 assist in determining the cost of production in the country of origin pursuant to
Article 2.2.

condition relates to whether the records of a specific exporter or producer conform to the accounting
principles, standards, and procedures that are generally accepted and apply to such records in the
relevant jurisdiction – i.e. the exporting country. This condition concerns the general accounting and
reporting practices of the exporter or producer. 304 The second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 in turn concerns whether the records reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideration in a specific anti-dumping proceeding.305 The
second and third sentences of Article 2.2.1.1 then provide rules concerning the allocation of costs.
6.87. We observe that the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 requires that costs "normally" be
calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation , provided
that the two conditions set out in that sentence are met. In other words, when these two conditions
are met, investigating authorities are "normally" to use the records of the exporter or producer under
investigation. The word "normally" may be defined as "under normal or ordinary conditions; as a
rule".306 Read in conjunction with the words "provided that", which introduce the two conditions of
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, the word "normally" indicates that when these two conditions
are met, "under normal or ordinary conditions" or "as a rule", records shall be used. The
Appellate Body has held that "the qualification of an obligation with the adverb 'normally' does not,
necessarily, alter the characterization of that obligation as constituting a 'rule' … [r]ather, … the use
of the term 'normally' … indicates that the rule … admits of derogat ion under certain
circumstances."307 Given the reference to "normally" in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, we do
not exclude that there might be circumstances other than those in the two conditions set out in that
sentence, in which the obligation to base the calculation of costs on the records kept by the exporter
or producer under investigation does not apply.308
6.88. We further observe that, under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, it
is the "records" of the individual exporter o r producer under investigation that are subject to the
condition to "reasonably reflect" the "costs associated with the production and sale of the product
under consideration". We thus consider that there is no standard of reasonableness under that
condition that governs the meaning of "costs" itself, which would allow investigating authorities to
disregard domestic input prices when such prices are lower than other prices internationally.309 The
phrase "reasonably reflect" may be understood as meaning to mir ror, reproduce, or correspond to
something suitably and sufficiently. 310 In addition, we recall that the word "costs" in the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, which can be understood as referring to the price
paid or to be paid to acquire or produce something311, is followed by the phrase "associated with the
production and sale of the produ ct under consideration". The phrase "associated with" may be
defined as "join[ed], unite[d]", "combine[d]", and "[c]onnect[ed] as an idea". 312 This definition
suggests a genuine relationship between the costs reasonably reflected in the records of the exporter
or producer under investigation and the production and sale of the specific product under
consideration. The second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 can thus be understood
to refer to whether the records kept by the exporter or producer suitably and sufficiently correspond

304 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.21.
305 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.21.
306 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007),
Vol. 2, p. 1945.
307 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 273.
308 We observe that the Panel rejected Ukraine's arguments based on the use of the word "normally" in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the Panel considered that they
constituted ex post facto rationalizations. (Panel Report, para. 7.80) Ukraine does not challenge this finding on
appeal and confirmed at the oral hearing that its claim of error on appeal is limited to the second condition in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Ukraine's response to questioning at the
oral hearing) We thus do not consider it necessary in the context of this appeal to consider further whether, in
light of the word "normally", there are other circumstances in which the obligation in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 to base the calculation of costs on the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation would not apply and what these circumstances might be in the context of the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1.
309 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 6.37 and 6.56.
310 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.20 (referring to Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edn (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 2, pp. 2481 and 2506).
311 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.18 (referring to Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edn (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 531).
312 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), fn 122 to para. 6.19 (quoting Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, 6th edn (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 137).

to or reproduce those costs incurred by the investigated exporter or producer that have a genuine
relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under consideration.313
6.89. We recognize that there may be different circumstances in which an investigating authority
will be justified, under the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, in not calculating costs on the basis of
the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation. However, we recall that t he first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 starts with the phrase "[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2". Article 2.2.1.1
thus includes rules that also pertain to the calculation of the "cost of production" for the purpose of
constructing normal value under Article 2.2. Thus, even where an investigating authority is justified
in not calculating production costs on the basis of the exporter's or producer's records under the
first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, it remains subject to the disciplines set out in Article 2.2, including
its relevant subparagraphs, regarding the construction of normal value.314
6.2.4 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the second condition
in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that MEDT
did not provide an adequate basis for rejecting the reported gas cost under that condition
6.90. Ukraine's claim on appeal under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement focuses on
the second condition in the first sentence of that provision, namely, the condition that the records
kept by the exporter or producer under investigation "reasonably reflect the costs associated with
the production and sale of the product under consideration".315 Ukraine contends that, in finding that
MEDT did not provide an adequate basis for rejecting the reported gas cost under the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, the Panel erred in its interpretation and application
of that condition. 316 Ukraine contends that these errors vitiate the Panel's finding s under
Article 2.2.1.1 as well as those under Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 317 Ukraine
therefore requests that we reverse the Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement in paragraphs 7.89 -7.92 and 8.2.a of the Panel Report, and the Panel's findings under
Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in paragraphs 7.114, 7.116 -7.118, and 8.2.c of the
Panel Report.318 Russia requests that we uphold the Panel's findings at issue.319
6.91. At the outset, we note that Ukraine challenges both the Panel's interpretation and application
of the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.320 We further note that Ukraine has
not identified separate arguments concerning the Panel's application of this condition , and we
therefore address Ukraine's interpretation and application claims together.
6.92. Ukraine contends that the relevant inquiry under the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 is one that pertains to "the reliability and accuracy of the costs recorded in the records
of the producers/exporters".321 Crucially, Ukraine understands the panel and the Appellate Body in
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) to have recognized "non-arm's length transactions" and "other practices"
"exceptions" under that second condition, as su ch transactions and practices may affect the
"reliability" of the records. 322 According to Ukraine, despite referring to the panel report in

313 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 6.26 and 6.56.
314 An investigating authority remains subject to those disciplines irrespective of the reason for which
normal value cannot be determined on the basis of domestic sales under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
315 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 37. As explained above, given the reference to "normally" in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, we do not exclude that there might be circumstances other than those in
the two conditions set out in that sentence, in which the obligation to base the calculation of costs on the
records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation does not apply. However, for the purpose of
resolving this dispute, we do not consider it necessary to consider further whether, in light of the word
"normally", there are other circumstances in which the obligation in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 to base
the calculation of costs on the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation would not apply
and what these circumstances might be in the context of the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. (See paragraph
6.87 and footnote 308 thereto above)
316 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 37.
317 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 70 and 98.
318 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 70 and 99; Notice of Appeal, paras. c and e.
319 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 81, 239, 306, and 312.
320 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 37.
321 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 49 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel
(Argentina), para. 6.41, in turn quoting Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), fn 400 to para. 7.242).
(emphasis added by Ukraine) See also ibid., para. 44.
322 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 44-45, 49, and 66.

EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), "the Panel refused to consider whether the conditions in the domestic
Russian market and the conditions of sales of gas met the definitions of 'non-arm's length' and 'other
practices'."323 Ukraine thus takes issue with the fact that "the Panel merely assessed whether the
factual basis [relied on by MEDT] was adequate to find that the records of the Russian producers did
not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production of ammonium nitrate."324
6.93. Russia acknowledges that the panel in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) referred to non-arm's-length
transactions or other practices that m ay affect the reliability of the reported costs. 325 However,
Russia considers that non -arm's-length transactions and other practices cannot be qualified as
exceptions.326 Russia also stresses that Article 2.2.1.1 does not contain the terms "non-arm's length
transactions" or "reliability".327 To Russia, the only inquiry envisaged under the second condition in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 is whether the records of the investigated exporter or producer
reasonably reflect the costs associated with the produc tion and sale of the product under
consideration.328
6.94. We begin by observing that the terms "non-arm's-length transactions" and "other practices"
are not found in Article 2.2.1.1 or elsewhere in the Anti -Dumping Agreement. The phrase
"non-arms-length transacti ons or other practices which may affect the reliability of the reported
costs", which is at the heart of Ukraine's appeal, appears in the panel report in EU – Biodiesel
(Argentina). Examining a claim under the second condition in the first sentence of Arti cle 2.2.1.1,
the panel in that dispute stated:
[W]e do not understand the phrase "reasonably reflect" to mean that whatever is
recorded in the records of the producer or exporter must be automatically accepted.
Nor does it mean, as argued by Argentina, tha t the words "reasonably reflect" are
limited only to the "allocation" of costs. The investigating authorities are certainly free
to examine the reliability and accuracy of the costs recorded in the records of the
producers/exporters, and thus, whether those records "reasonably reflect" such costs.
In particular, the investigating authorities are free to examine whether all costs incurred
are captured and none has been left out; they can examine whether the actual costs
incurred have been over or understated; and they can examine if the allocations made,
for example for depreciation or amortization, are appropriate and in accordance with
proper accounting standards. They are also free to examine non -arms-length
transactions or other practices which may affect the reliability of the reported costs .
But, in our view, the examination of the records that flows from the term "reasonably
reflect" in Article 2.2.1.1 does not involve an examination of the "reasonableness" of
the reported costs themselves, when the act ual costs recorded in the records of the
producer or exporter are otherwise found, within acceptable limits, to be accurate and
faithful.329
6.95. On appeal, the Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) reproduced these observations
in questioning the European Union's reading of that panel report.330 The Appellate Body considered
that, in light of these observations, th e panel's interpretation of Article 2.2.1.1 in that dispute
appeared to be more nuanced than the European Union's argument suggested.331

323 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 44 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.85). See also ibid.,
para. 50. At the oral hearing, Ukraine clarified that, in its view, the Panel erred by failing first to set out the
proper interpretation of these terms and then to assess whether the transactions at issue qualified as either
"non-arm's-length transactions" or as an "other practice". (Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral
hearing)
324 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 44 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.89).
325 See e.g. Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 138 and 207.
326 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 120 and fn 102 thereto.
327 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 132, 160, 180, and 206.
328 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 131. Moreover, according to Russia, in arguing that the Panel
erred by refusing to examine whether the definitions of "non-arm's-length transactions" or "other practices"
were met in this case, Ukraine essentially alleges that the Panel denied Ukraine fairness in addressing its
arguments and evidence and was not objective in its analysis of the facts. In this context, Russia submits that
Ukraine has not made a claim under Article 11 of the DSU. (Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 138-139)
329 Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), fn 400 to para. 7.242. (emphasis added)
330 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.41.
331 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.41. See also Panel Report, fn 149 to

6.96. The panel in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) also stated that "while the costs in the records might
be consistent with GAAP, they may still not accord with how they would need to be considered in
the context of an anti-dumping investigation, such as in respect of the proper allocation of costs for
depreciation or amortization or the relevant time periods." 332 As "another example" of records that
may not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration, that panel referred to an investigated exporter or producer that is "part of a
vertically-integrated group of companies in which the actual cost of production of particular inputs
is spread across different companies' records, or in which transactions between such companies are
not at arms-length or indicative of the actual costs involved in the production of the product under
consideration".333 The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that records that are GAAP -consistent
may nonetheless be found not to reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and
sale of the product under consideration.334 To the Appellate Body, "[t]his may occur, for example, if
certain costs relate to the production both of the product under consideration and of other products,
or where the exporter or producer under investigation is part of a group of companies in which the
costs of certain inputs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration
are spread across different companies' records, or where transactions involving such inputs are not
at arm's length."335
6.97. We do not subscribe to Ukraine's reading of the panel report or the Appellate Body report in
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina). In our view, it is clear from the language used in these reports that the
panel and the Appellate Body provided only examples of circumstances in which records may be
found, depending on the case at hand, not to reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of the product under consideration. We do not see that, in specifying these
examples, the panel or the Appellate Body read the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 to prescribe exceptions to , or otherwise limit in the abstract , the circumstances
allowing for the rejection of records u nder that condition. Therefore, while we note Ukraine's
understanding of arm's -length transactions336, like the Panel, we do not read the panel or
Appellate Body reports in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) as having understood the second condition in
the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 to contain open-ended "non-arm's-length transactions" or "other
practices" "exceptions". 337 Nor do we consider such exceptions to be embodied in that second
condition. As set out above, the second condition in the first sentence of A rticle 2.2.1.1 relates to
whether the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation suitably and sufficiently
correspond to or reproduce those costs incurred by the investigated exporter or producer that have
a genuine relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under consideration. 338
We thus agree with the Panel that the question under the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 is whether the records of the exporter or producer under investigation reas onably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration and that
this question is to be assessed on a case -by-case basis, in light of the evidence before the
investigating authority and its determination. 339 Consequently, we do not consider that the Panel
erred in examining "whether MEDT of Ukraine provided an adequate basis in the Investigation Report
to find that the records of the investigated Russian producers, insofar as the reported gas cost was
concerned, did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium
nitrate".340

332 Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.232.
333 Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.232.
334 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.33.
335 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.33 (referring to Panel Report,
EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.232). The Appellate Body thus referred to transactions that are not at
arm's length, but did not use the term "other practices" in the context of the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
336 Ukraine states that, for a transaction to be considered at arm's length, it needs to be between two
willing parties that are unrelated, acting independently from each other, and pursuing their own best interests.
(Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 51-52)
337 Panel Report, fn 152 to para. 7.85 (referring to Ukraine's opening statement at the first Panel
meeting, para. 91). The Panel did not find it necessary to consider, in the abstract, whether the conditions in
the domestic Russian market and the conditions of sale of gas met the definitions of "non-arm's-length
transactions" proposed by Ukraine, or its interpretation of what Ukraine referred to as an "other-practices"
"exception". (Ibid., para. 7.85)
338 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 6.26 and 6.56.
339 Panel Report, para. 7.85.
340 Panel Report, para. 7.86.

6.98. Ukraine further contends that the Panel erred because "the Panel seem[s] to suggest that the
records can only be deemed unreliable when the parties [to input transactions] are affiliated."341 In
other words, according to Ukraine, the Panel appears to have drawn a distinction between affiliated
and non-affiliated parties to input transactions for the purposes of the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. To Ukraine, however, the rationale for determining whether records are
"unreliable" under that condition is the dependent and uncommercial character of the relevant input
transactions, and any legal affiliation between transacting parties is only an "indication that these
practices may more easily occur".342 In support of its understanding of the second condition in the
first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, Ukraine refers to several WTO disputes in which a panel or the
Appellate Body allegedly assessed whether transactions were at arm's length by considering
"whether commercial principles had been respected or whether market prices were applied", instead
of focusing on whether the parties to such transactions were affiliated.343 Ukraine also refers to the
second Ad Note to Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as
relevant context, which in its view confirms that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not preclude the
possibility that certain government practices may render prices "unreliable".344
6.99. Russia disagrees with Ukraine's reading of the Panel Report. To Russia, the Panel did not
suggest that, under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, records can be
deemed "unreliable" only when parties t o relevant input transactions are affiliated, but instead
focused on addressing the facts at issue as well as Ukraine's arguments. 345 Russia also disagrees
with Ukraine's proposition that government regulation of input prices may result in a determination
that transactions between investigated producers or exporters and their suppliers of input are not
at arm's length, thereby allowing the investigating authority to reject recorded input costs under the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.346 Russia contends that this second condition
deals with the quality of the records of the exporter or producer under investigation, and, as such,
does not allow an investigating authority to reject recorded costs because it considers them to be
"unreliable" due to certain government intervention.347
6.100. The Panel addressed MEDT's reasons for rejecting the reported gas cost under the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel recalled
that MEDT had found that the gas price in the domestic Russian market was not a market price as
the State controlled this price, it was artificially lower than the export price of gas from Russia as
well as the price of gas in other countries, and Gazprom's gas prices were belo w its cost of
production.348
6.101. The Panel first examined MEDT's consideration that, due to government regulation of gas
prices in Russia, the costs incurred by the investigated Russian producers were lower than prices in
other countries or export prices of gas from Russia. To the Panel, in that respect, "MEDT of Ukraine's
enquiry was focused on whether the cost of gas incurred by these producers in the production and
sale of ammonium nitrate was reasonable, or was the cost they would incur under what it considered

341 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 45-46 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.90). Ukraine states
that "the Panel's suggestion that the fact that the gas prices were fixed by the Russian government below the
cost of production could have only made the records unreliable if MEDT of Ukraine had demonstrated that the
gas suppliers and the exporters were legally affiliated, is flawed." (Ibid., para. 59)
342 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 58.
343 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 53-56 (referring to Panel Reports, EU – Biodiesel
(Argentina), para. 7.232; US – OCTG (Korea), para. 7.197; Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
para. 141). (emphasis original)
344 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 62-65. Ukraine contends that the second Ad Note to
Article VI of the GATT 1994 suggests that "prices may be rendered unreliable as a consequence of a complete
or substantial monopoly of trade and/or state fixation of the domestic prices." (Ibid., para. 63) Turning to
Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Ukraine contends that this provision enables an investigating
authority to disregard domestic prices where such prices are affected by a particular market situation, which
Ukraine understands to be "a market structure, where the interaction of supply and demand and free price
determination, is interfered with by government intervention". (Ibid., para. 64)
345 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 151.
346 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 181-182.
347 See e.g. Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 86, 182, 199, and 236-237. Moreover, Russia
submits that Ukraine is essentially taking issue with factual findings made by the Panel in paragraph 7.90 and
footnote 159 thereto regarding MEDT's determinations in the interim and expiry reviews, which Ukraine should
have challenged under Article 11 of the DSU. (Ibid., para. 153)
348 Panel Report, paras. 7.73 and 7.88 (referring to Investigation Report (Panel Exhibit RUS-10b),
pp. 21-23; Ukraine's second written submission to the Panel, para. 31).

to be normal circumstances, i.e. in the absence of the alleged distortions in the domestic Russian
market for gas." 349 The Panel found that the examination under the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 does not concern whether the co sts contained in the records are not
reasonable because, for instance, they are lower than those in other countries, which is what MEDT
examined in the interim and expiry reviews.350
6.102. As set out above, to the extent costs are genuinely related to the production and sale of the
product under consideration, there is no additional or abstract standard of "reasonableness" that
governs the meaning of "costs" in the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.351
Like the Panel, we consider that the examination under the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 is not one that pertains to whether the costs contained in the records are not
reasonable because, for instance, they are lower than those in other countries.352 Moreover, we see
no reason to question the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 7.89 of the Panel Report, that MEDT's
examination of the gas costs incurred by the investigated Russian producers , as compared with
prices in other countries or export prices of gas from Russia, pertained to whether the cost of gas
incurred by these producers was reasonable, rather than to whether the records reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium nitrate. Ukraine has indeed not
advanced arguments that take issue with that conclusion by the Panel. Ukraine merely reiterates on
appeal that domestic gas prices were lower than the export price of the Russian gas suppliers. 353
Ukraine's arguments on appeal otherwise appear to focus on paragraph 7.90 of the Panel Report ,
which Ukraine reads as suggesting that, to the Panel, recorded costs may not be rejected under the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 when domestic input prices are fixed by the
State at a level below cost of production unless the parties to the relevant input transactions are
related.354
6.103. Addressing MEDT's consideration that Gazprom sells gas in the domestic Russian market
below cost, the Panel did not consider that this was sufficient for MEDT to conclude that the records
of the inve stigated Russian producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of ammonium nitrate. 355 The Panel made several factual findings concerning
MEDT's determinations in the Investigation Report that were key to its reasonin g and conclusion in
this respect. The Panel considered that "there is nothing in [the Investigation Report] that shows
that [Gazprom's below-cost domestic sales] affected the reliability of the records of the investigated
Russian producers, such that the r ecords did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with
production and sale of ammonium nitrate."356 The Panel noted both the absence of a determination
by MEDT that Gazprom was affiliated with the investigated Russian producers and the fact that MEDT
did not even consider who supplied these producers with gas.357 The Panel further elaborated on the
absence of a determination by MEDT that Gazprom was in fact the gas supplier of the two Russian
producers of ammonium nitrate at issue. The Panel noted that, as Ukraine acknowledged, "MEDT of
Ukraine did not ask the investigated Russian producers the names of their gas suppliers" and that
"EuroChem had … suppliers" other than Gazprom.358 Moreover, while Ukraine contended that prices
of other gas suppliers were affe cted by the prices of Gazprom, the Panel found nothing in the
Investigation Report to support this view. 359 Crucially, the Panel considered that "[t]here is no
reference to such suppliers of EuroChem in the Investigation Report ", nor is there "any finding [by
MEDT] that the records of the investigated Russian producers, insofar as they reflected the prices
paid to these suppliers, were unreliable". 360 The Panel added that "there is no correlation in MEDT
of Ukraine's findings [in the Investigation Report] between alleged below-cost sales by Gazprom and
the reliability of the records of the investigated Russian producers."361 These Panel statements show

349 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
350 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
351 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), paras. 6.37 and 6.56. See also ibid., paras. 6.30
and 6.55.
352 Panel Report, para. 7.89.
353 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 60.
354 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 42, 59, and 69.
355 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
356 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
357 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
358 Panel Report, fn 159 to para. 7.90 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 9, para. 31;
response to Panel question No. 8, fn 10).
359 Panel Report, fn 159 to para. 7.90 (referring to Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 10(a),
para. 35).

that the Panel's analysis is tailored to the specific circumstances of this case, where no determination
was made by MEDT that Gazprom was the gas supplier of the investigated Russian producers or that
Gazprom's prices affected other gas suppliers' prices.
6.104. The Panel went on to state that Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is concerned with
the pricing behaviour of individual exporters and producers.362 The Panel added that a producer may
source inputs used to produce the product under consideration from multiple unrelated suppliers
and that the prices paid by the producer to these unrelated suppliers would form part of the costs
that it incurs to produce the product under consideration. 363 The Panel did not consider that "the
investigated Russian producers' own records could be said to be unreliable, or not reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under investigation, because its
unrelated suppliers ' prices are government regulated, lower than the prices prevailing in other
countries, or allegedly priced below their cost of production."364
6.105. These references by the Panel to "unrelated suppliers", read in isolation, could arguably be
read to suggest that, in the Panel's view, records may not be disregarded under the first sentence
of Article 2.2.1.1 on the sole basis that input prices are set b y the government below cost of
production when the producers or exporters of the product under investigation and the input
suppliers are unrelated (but might be when these entities are related). To the extent the Panel
Report suggests as much, we have rese rvations regarding the relevance of drawing a distinction
between related parties to input transactions, on the one hand, and unrelated parties to such
transactions, on the other hand, for the inquiry under the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 as to
whether cost calculations should be based on records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation.365 Simply because parties to input transactions are considered to be unrelated does
not mean that cost calculations should necessarily be based on records k ept by the exporter or
producer under the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. In particular, as explained above, given the
reference to "normally" in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, we do not exclude that there might
be circumstances, other than thos e in the two conditions set out in that sentence, in which the
obligation to base the calculation of costs on the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation does not apply. However, to the extent the Panel's statements regarding unrelated
suppliers can be understood to have been made in the limited context of the second condition in the
first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, we do not take issue with the Panel's proposition that the prices
paid by the producer to unrelated suppliers would form part of the costs that it incurs to produce
the product under consideration. 366 We recall in that regard that the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 relates to whether the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation s uitably and sufficiently correspond to or reproduce those costs incurred by the
investigated exporter or producer that have a genuine relationship with the production and sale of
the specific product under consideration.
6.106. In any event, the factual findings on which the Panel relied indicate to us that the Panel's
analysis and conclusion with respect to MEDT's view that Gazprom sells gas below cost were tailored
to the specific facts and arguments before it. The Panel's statement that the records could not be
rejected under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 on the basis that unrelated
suppliers' prices are "allegedly priced below their cost of production"367 confirms our understanding.
To us, this highlights a key element of the Panel 's analysis, namely, that while MEDT determined
that Gazprom sells gas below cost, MEDT did not make such a determination with respect to the
actual gas suppliers of the two investigated Russian producers at issue, as MEDT did not inquire who
supplied thes e producers with gas. Given the Panel's case -specific approach and given that the
Panel's conclusion relies on the absence of a determination by MEDT that Gazprom was the gas
supplier of the investigated Russian producers or that Gazprom's prices affected these suppliers'
prices, we see no reason to find error with the Panel's conclusion that Gazprom's below -cost prices
did not constitute a sufficient factual basis for MEDT to conclude that the records did not reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium nitrate.

362 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
363 Panel Report, para. 7.90.
365 We note that there are various factors that may inform the degree to which parties are related.
366 Panel Report, para. 7.90.

6.107. In light of the above, we do not consider that Ukraine has established that the Panel erred
in its interpretation or application of the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that MEDT did not provide an adequate basis under that
second condition to reject the reported gas cost.368
6.108. We recall that Ukraine also challenges the Panel's finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently
with Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because, in conducting its ordinary -course-of-
trade test, MEDT relied on costs calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.369 In that regard, Ukraine argues that the Panel's finding of inconsistency with
Article 2.2.1 is vitiated by the Panel's errors of interpretation and application with respect to the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1.370 Noting that Ukraine's challenge under
Article 2.2.1 is consequential to its challenge under the seco nd condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1, Russia responds that the Panel did not err in its analysis under Article 2.2.1.1.371 As
summarized above, Article 2.2.1 sets out when sales of the like product in the domestic market or
to a third countr y may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade and disregarded in
determining normal value. In reaching its finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel relied on its earlier finding that MEDT's rejection of the reported
gas cost was inconsistent with Article 2.2.1.1 of that Agreement.372 Ukraine's arguments on appeal
are limited to alleging that the Panel's errors with respect to the interpretation and application of
the second condition in the first sen tence of Article 2.2.1.1 also vitiate the Panel's finding under
Article 2.2.1.373 At the oral hearing, Ukraine confirmed that its claim of error under Article 2.2.1 is
dependent on us reversing the Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1.1.374 Therefore, given ou r
conclusion that the Panel did not err in its interpretation or application of the second condition in the
first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, we see no reason to disturb the
Panel's finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.2.5 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed to
calculate the cost of production "in the country of origin"
6.109. We now turn to Ukraine's claim that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement in finding that MEDT failed to calculate the cost of
production "in the country of origin" when constructing normal value for two investigated Russian
producers of ammonium nitrate.375 As a result, Ukraine requests that we reverse the Panel's findings
in paragraphs 7.99, 7.101-7.103, and 8.2.b of the Panel Report.376 Russia requests that we uphold
the Panel's findings at issue.377
6.110. As set out above, in addressing Russia's claims concerning MEDT's gas cost calculations in
constructing normal value in the interim and expiry reviews, the Panel first assessed whether MEDT
provided an adequate basis to reject the reported gas cost under the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement.378 The Panel subsequently assessed
whether, having rejected the reported gas cost without providing an adequate basis to do so under

368 Panel Report, paras. 7.92 and 8.2.a.
369 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 96.
370 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 98.
371 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 310-311.
372 In addressing Russia's claim under Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel started
by observing that, in the interim and expiry reviews, MEDT had used the surrogate price of gas to identify the
below-cost sales and assess whether they could be treated as not being made in the ordinary course of trade.
The Panel then recalled its earlier finding that MEDT's rejection of the reported gas cost was inconsistent with
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. To the Panel, the use of costs that had been calculated
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 tainted MEDT's ordinary-course-of-trade test. In addition, the Panel
disagreed with Ukraine's view that a finding that MEDT calculated costs inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1
cannot lead to a violation of Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Panel Report, paras. 7.114-7.115)
373 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 96 and 98; Notice of Appeal, para. e.
374 Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing.
375 Ukraine's claim on appeal concerns the phrase "cost of production in the country of origin" in
Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This appeal does not raise the issue of the circumstances in which
an investigating authority may construct normal value. In particular, the resolution of this dispute does not
require us to address the notion of "particular market situation" in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
376 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 71 and 95; Notice of Appeal, para. d.
377 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 240 and 305.
378 Panel Report, paras. 7.81-7.92.

that condition, MEDT failed to construct normal value on the basis of the cost of production in the
country of origin within the meaning of Article 2.2 by using the surrogate price of gas.379 The Panel
considered that Article 2.2 does not preclude the possibility that an investigating authority may have
to use out-of-country evidence to construct normal value, provided that such evidence is apt to yield
or capable of yielding the cost of production in the country of origin. 380 The Panel did not see "any
explanations in the Investigation Report as to why adjustments for … transportation expenses were
adequate to adapt the … export price from Russia at the German border [] to reflect the cost of the
investigated Russian producers in the country of origin". 381 Rather, the Panel considered MEDT's
explanation in the Investigation Report to suggest that it had selected this export price because "[it]
was an out-of-country benchmark, and that it did not adapt this price to reflect costs in Russia ."382
In these circumstances, the Panel did not consider that the adjustment for transportation expenses
was sufficient to adapt the export price of gas from Russia at the German border to reflect the cost
in Russia.383 The Panel then dismissed Ukraine's argument that MEDT could n ot use domestic gas
prices in Russia because there was no undistorted domestic market for gas in Russia, relying on its
earlier finding that MEDT had not provided a proper basis to reject the reported gas cost.384
6.111. In challenging these Panel findings on appea l, Ukraine first argues that the Panel's
interpretation and application of Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement rely on the Panel's
erroneous finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1.385 Ukraine submits that, for
this reason alone, we should reverse the Panel's finding under Article 2.2.386 Ukraine makes a series
of additional arguments challenging the Panel's interpretation and application of Article 2.2 that are
premised on finding error with the Panel's interpretation or application of the second condition in the
first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. In particular, Ukraine submits that it would be circular and void of
economic logic to calculate the cost of production under Article 2.2 on the basis of costs rejected
under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 387 In that regard, Ukraine relies on the
Appellate Body reports in EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China) and US – Softwood
Lumber IV as standing for the proposition that "once a particular cost item is found to be unreliable
or distorted, an investigating authority cannot be forced to make an adjustment to re-introduce the
very same condition … that rendered the price unreliable in the first place."388 According to Ukraine,
"MEDT of Ukraine could not simply take the regulated gas price on the domestic market in Russia as
the basis for the calculation of the cost of production in the country of origin, as this price was
deemed to be unreliable."389
6.112. Russia responds that the Panel did not err in finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with
Article 2.2.1.1, and that, in any event, the Panel's findings under Article 2.2 are not dependent on
its findings under Article 2.2.1.1.390 In that regard, R ussia argues that both the factual and legal
bases for these Panel findings are different. 391 Russia also challenges Ukraine's reliance on the
Appellate Body reports in EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China) and US – Softwood

379 Panel Report, paras. 7.93-7.103.
380 Panel Report, paras. 7.71 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina),
paras. 6.70 and 6.73) and 7.99.
381 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
382 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
383 Panel Report, para. 7.99.
384 Panel Report, paras. 7.100-7.102.
385 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 75, 78, and 86.
386 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 75, 78, and 86.
388 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 87-88.
389 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 87. Ukraine argues that, having determined that the
domestic gas prices in Russia could not be used under the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1, it is unclear what adjustments MEDT should have made, other than adjusting the export price
of gas on account of transportation expenses. (Ibid., paras. 86-87)
390 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 256-257, 263, 265, and 282.
391 Russia emphasizes that the Panel's finding under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
concerns the rejection of the reported gas cost and whether there was an adequate basis for MEDT to conclude
that the reported gas cost did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of
ammonium nitrate under the second condition in the first sentence of that provision. By contrast, Russia
considers that the Panel's finding under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerns the replacement
of the reported gas cost with the surrogate price of gas and whether this is in keeping with the obligation in
Article 2.2 that the costs be those "in the country of origin". (Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 258-263)

Lumber IV, arguing that, in these reports, the Appellate Body did not address issues under
Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.392
6.113. We understand Ukraine's arguments under Article 2.2 in this regard to be dependent on its
claim that the Panel erred in its interpretation and app lication of the second condition in the first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. In particular, Ukraine's argument, relying on the Appellate Body reports
in EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China) and US – Softwood Lumber IV, that it would be
circular and void of economic logic to calculate the cost of production under Article 2.2 on the basis
of costs adequately rejected under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1,
assumes that there was an adequate basis to reject such costs under that condition. As we have
found above, Ukraine has not established that the Panel erred in its interpretation or application of
Article 2.2.1.1 in finding that MEDT did not provide an adequate basis to reject the reported gas cost
under the second conditi on in the first sentence of that provision. We therefore reject Ukraine's
arguments on appeal challenging the Panel's findings under Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement insofar as such arguments are dependent on alleged errors by the Panel in its
interpretation or application of the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.114. Having reached this conclusion, we now address Ukraine's arguments on appeal concerning
the Panel's interpretation and application of Article 2.2 that Ukraine has identified as not being
dependent on us finding error with the Panel's interpretation or application of the second condition
in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. Ukraine specified that, in its view, irrespective of whether the
Panel erred in its interpretation or application of the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1, the Panel erred in: (i) its interpretation of Article 2.2 in considering that certain
Appellate Body's findings under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in US – Softwood Lumber IV
were not relevant to that interpretation; and (ii) its application of Article 2.2 in finding that the
export price of gas was not properly adapted to reflect the cost "in the country of origin".393
6.115. Starting with Ukraine's interpretative arguments, we observe that Ukraine challenges the
Panel's interpretation of Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by relying on certain
Appellate Body findings with respect to Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in US – Softwood
Lumber IV . Specifically, Ukraine submits that the Panel erred in considering that these
Appellate Body findings are not relevant by analogy to the interpretation of the phrase "cost of
production in the country of origin" in Article 2.2 and that, consequently, recourse to an
out-of-country benchmark is not justified under that provision.394 Russia disagrees and cautions that
Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement should not be transposed into the framework of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.395 Russia highlights that the primary focus of determining the existence
of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement lies in the analysis of a government's actions, while the rules
on determination of dumping focus on the investigated producer's or exporter's pricing behaviour.396
6.116. The Panel noted that Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement is concerned with the assessment
of the benefit granted to a subsidy recipient due to the governmental provision of goods and
services.397 The Panel stressed that, unlike Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, the purpose of
Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement is not to ascertain the benefit conferred by the
governmental provision of goods and services, and the extent of that benefit. The Panel concluded
that the purpose of cost calculation under Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and that of
the calculation of benefit under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement are different and should not be
conflated.398 The Panel added that the interim and expiry reviews concern a determination in an
anti-dumping proceeding, rather than an anti -subsidy proceeding, and that the question of
ascertaining the benefit granted through the governmental provision of goods and services thus
does not arise in the present case. 399 The Panel therefore did not consider the

392 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 268 and 284-288.
393 Ukraine's response to questioning at the oral hearing. See also Ukraine's appellant's submission,
paras. 76, 79-80, and 89-94.
394 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 76-77.
395 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 268-273.
396 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 271.
397 Panel Report, para. 7.101.
398 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
399 Panel Report, para. 7.102.

Appellate Body's findings under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in US – Softwood Lumber IV to
be relevant to its interpretation of Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.400
6.117. We begin by recalling that Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement contains guidelines for the
calculation of the amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient. Article 14(d) provides,
inter alia , that the provision of goods or services by a government shall not be considered as
conferring a benefit unless such a provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, and that
adequacy of remuneration "shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the
good or service in question in the country of provision". As the Panel observed, in US – Softwood
Lumber IV, the Appellate Body stated that a government's role in providing a financial contribution,
in terms of the provision of goods, may be so predominant that it effectively determines the price
at which private suppliers sell the same or similar goods.401 In these circumstances, the comparison
of the price at which the government provides goods with the price at which private suppliers sell
these goods in the domestic market could indicate a benefit that is artificially low, or even zero, such
that the full extent of the subsidy would not be captured, thereby undermining the rights of Members
under the SCM Agreement to countervail subsidies.402
6.118. We acknowledge that Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement bear certain textual similarities. Article 2.2 refers to the cost of production "in the
country of origin" and Article 14(d) to the adequacy of remuneration to be determined in relation to
prevailing market conditions "in the country of provision". Article 14(d), however, also contains the
phrase "in relation to prevailing market conditions", which is not found in Article 2.2.403 Importantly,
these two provisions do not serve the same function. The function of Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement is to ascertain the benefit conferred on the recipient of a subsidy by, inter alia, the
governmental provision of goods and services. By contrast, Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement concerns the establishment of normal value when it cannot be determined
on the basis of domestic sa les.404 In light of these differences, the Appellate Body's findings with
respect to Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in US – Softwood Lumber IV do not speak to the
costs that may be used to construct normal value under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Therefore, in our view, the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 2.2 in considering that
these Appellate Body findings were not relevant to its interpretative exercise. 405 In light of the
foregoing, we reject Ukraine's claim challenging the Panel's interpretation of Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.119. We now turn to Ukraine's claim that the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed to cal culate
the cost of production "in the country of origin". Ukraine claims that the Panel erred in considering
that adjusting the export price of gas from Russia at the German border on account of transportation

400 Panel Report, para. 7.102.
401 Panel Report, para. 7.101 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras. 93
and 101).
402 Panel Report, para. 7.101 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 100).
In US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5 – China), the Appellate Body clarified that "[c]entral to
the inquiry under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in identifying an appropriate benefit benchmark is the
question of whether in-country prices are distorted as a result of government intervention" and that "[w]hat
would allow an investigating authority to reject in-country prices is a finding of price distortion resulting from
government intervention in the market, not the presence of government intervention in the market itself." The
Appellate Body also recognized that different types of government interventions could lead to price distortion,
such that recourse to out-of-country prices is warranted, beyond the situation in which the government's role
is so predominant that it effectively determines the price of the goods in question. (Appellate Body Report,
US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.147)
403 To the Appellate Body, the phrase "in relation to" implies a "broader sense of 'relation, connection,
reference'", suggesting that a benchmark other than private prices is not excluded under Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 89) As for the term "prevailing
market conditions", it has been found to "consist of generally accepted characteristics of an area of economic
activity in which the forces of supply and demand interact to determine market prices". (Appellate Body
Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.150) In addition, in US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body
found merit in the United States' submission that the term "guidelines" in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement,
which is equally not found in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, suggests that paragraphs (a) through
(d) should not be interpreted as rigid rules that purport to contemplate every conceivable factual circumstance.
(Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 92)
404 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.24 (referring to Panel Reports,
405 Panel Report, paras. 7.101-7.102.

expenses was not sufficient to adapt this price to reflect prices in Russia.406 In that regard, Ukraine
states that "other than apparently requesting domestic state-fixed prices to be used for the purpose
of the calculation of the cost of production, none of the interested parties in the investigation pointed
to any differences in the market conditions in Russia (other than prices being fixed by the state) and
market conditions relating to the export prices, which would necessitate further adjustments to the
export gas prices." 407 According to Ukraine, in these circumstances, "MEDT of Ukraine cannot be
faulted for limiting the adaptation to the gas export price to an adjustment on account of
transportation expenses."408
6.120. Russia responds that the Panel correctly found that the export price of gas from Russia at
the German border was not properly adapted to reflect the cost of gas in the country of origin as
required under Article 2.2.409 In that regard, Russia argues that the Panel correctly made the
following factual findings: (i) "the export price from Russia to Germany was not the cost of gas for
the investigated Russian producers in Russia"; (ii) "the record does not show how MEDT of Ukraine
adapted this export price to reflect the prices in Russia"; and (iii) MEDT "selected this price because
the export price was an out -of-country benchmark, and that it did not adapt this price to reflect
costs in Russia".410 Russia further argues that the analysis under Article 2.2 does not relate to the
market conditions for inputs in different countries, but to whether the surrogate price of gas reflects
the domestic price of gas in Russia.411 According to Russia, the Panel correctly considered that it did
not.412 Moreover, Russia argues that the obligation under Article 2.2 lies with the investigating
authority regardless of whether interested parties request adjustments to ensure that a price relied
on to construct normal value reflects the cost in the country of origin.413
6.121. As set out above, the phrase "cost of production in the country of origin" indicates that
whatever information or evidence is used to determine the "cost of production", it must be apt to
yield or capable of y ielding a cost of production "in the country of origin". 414 Therefore, an
investigating authority has to ensure that the information it collects is used to arrive at the "cost of
production in the country of origin" and compliance with this obligation may require the investigating
authority to adapt that information.415
6.122. The Panel's analysis focuses on MEDT's explanations in the Investigation Report regarding
whether the export price of gas from Russia at the German border was adapted to reflect the cost
of prod uction in the country of origin. The Panel did not see any explanation by MEDT in the
Investigation Report as to why adjustments for transportation expenses were adequate to adapt the
export price from Russia at the German border to reflect the cost of the investigated Russian
producers in the country of origin. 416 The Panel also recalled its earlier finding under the second

406 Ukraine's appellant's submission, paras. 76 and 86-87.
407 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 89. See also ibid., paras. 92-93.
408 Ukraine's appellant's submission, para. 94.
409 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 294-295.
410 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 294-295 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.99). (emphasis added
by Russia)
411 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 296.
412 Russia's appellee's submission, para. 296.
413 Russia's appellee's submission, paras. 298 and 302.
414 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.70.
415 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.73. The phrase "cost of production in the
country of origin" suggests that, in constructing normal value, an investigating authority will naturally look for
information on the cost of production "in the country of origin" from sources inside the country. The first
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 directs the investigating authority normally to base its calculations of costs on the
records of the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that the records are in accordance with the
GAAP of the exporting country and that they reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and
sale of the product under consideration. In some circumstances, however, the information in the records kept
by the exporter or producer under investigation may need to be analysed or verified using documents,
information, or evidence from other sources. This may, for example, be so where the producer under
investigation purchases inputs abroad to produce the product under consideration. Moreover, in circumstances
where the obligation in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 to calculate the costs on the basis of the records
kept by the exporter or producer under investigation does not apply, or where relevant information from the
exporter or producer under investigation is not available, an investigating authority may have recourse to
alternative bases to calculate some or all such costs. (See ibid., paras. 6.70 and 6.73, and fn 228 to
para. 6.71)
416 Panel Report, para. 7.99.

condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1417, a finding with which we agreed above. 418 Other
than pointing to the deduction of tran sportation expenses, Ukraine has not asserted, either before
the Panel or before us, that MEDT otherwise adapted the export price of gas used in its calculations
in order to ensure that it reflected the cost of production in Russia. We therefore see no bas is to
question the Panel's conclusion that the adjustment for transportation expenses made by MEDT was
not sufficient to adapt the export price from Russia to reflect the cost of production in the country
of origin, i.e. Russia . In reaching this conclusion , we are mindful of the fact that, in the particular
circumstances of this case, given that MEDT did not provide an adequate basis to reject the reported
gas cost under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, there may not have been
a basis to rely on costs other than those reflected in the records of the investigated producers.419
6.123. In light of the foregoing, we reject Ukraine's claim challenging the Panel's application of
Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement . Accordingly, we consid er that Ukraine has not
demonstrated that the Panel erred in its interpretation or application of Article 2.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in finding that, when constructing normal value, MEDT failed to
calculate the cost of production "in the country of origin".
6.2.6 Conclusion
6.124. In sum, we consider that the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to whether the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation suitably and sufficiently correspon d to or reproduce those costs that have a genuine
relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under consideration. Under the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, it is the "records" of the individual exporter
or producer under investigation that are subject to the condition to "reasonably reflect" the "costs
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration". We thus consider that
there is no standard of reasonableness under that condition that governs the meaning of "costs"
itself, which would allow investigating authorities to disregard domestic input prices when such prices
are lower than other prices internationally. Moreover, we observe that the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 directs the investigating authority normally to base its calculations of costs on the
records of the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance
with the GAAP of the exporting country and that they reasonably reflect th e costs associated with
the production and sale of the product under consideration. Given the reference to "normally", we
do not exclude that there might be circumstances other than those in the two conditions set out in
that sentence, in which the obligation to base the calculation of costs on the records does not apply.
The second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, however, does not contain open-ended
"non-arm's-length transactions" or "other practices" "exceptions", as Ukraine seems to s uggest.
Therefore, we consider that the Panel did not err in examining whether MEDT provided an adequate
basis in the Investigation Report to find that the records of the investigated Russian producers,
insofar as the reported gas cost was concerned, did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with
the production and sale of ammonium nitrate.

417 Panel Report, para. 7.101.
418 See paragraphs 6.100-6.108 above.
419 Moreover, we observe that Article 2.2 provides that when the circumstances set out in the first part
of that provision occur, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of
the like product when exported to an appropriate third country or with the cost of production in the country of
origin. In our view, although interested parties may have a role to play in that regard, it is for the investigating
authority to determine normal value consistently with Article 2.2 when domestic sales cannot be used. We are
therefore not convinced by Ukraine's argument that "MEDT of Ukraine cannot be faulted for limiting the
adaptation to the gas export price to an adjustment on account of transportation expenses" because none of
the interested parties in the interim and expiry reviews pointed to necessary adjustments to ensure that the
price of gas used reflected the cost of production in the country of origin. (Ukraine's appellant's submission,
para. 94) We are also not convinced by Ukraine's argument that any claim with respect to an adjustment on
account of a 30% export tax on gas, which Russia argued MEDT should have considered in adapting the export
price of gas to reflect the cost of production in the country of origin, should necessarily be dealt with under
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Ibid., paras. 91 and 93 (quoting Russia's second written
submission to the Panel, para. 344)) The obligation to conduct a fair comparison between the export price and
the normal value pursuant to Article 2.4 "presupposes that the component elements of the comparison –
i.e. the normal value and the export price – have already been established". (Appellate Body Report, EU –
Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), para. 5.21) In this case, the issue of the export tax arises in the context of MEDT's
replacement of the reported gas cost with the surrogate price of gas when constructing normal value, and thus
would precede any adjustments that are to be made in accordance with Article 2.4.

6.125. We also consider that the Panel did not err in its assessment of MEDT's reasons for rejecting
the reported gas cost under the second condition in the first sentenc e of Article 2.2.1.1. The Panel
noted that, in the Investigation Report, MEDT examined whether, due to government regulation, the
gas costs incurred by the investigated Russian producers were lower compared with prices in other
countries or other export prices of gas from Russia. Ukraine has not advanced any reason for us to
question the Panel's conclusion that MEDT's examination in that regard pertained to whether the
cost of gas incurred by these producers was reasonable, and that this was thus not an ade quate
basis to conclude that the producers' records did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of ammonium nitrate. The Panel also noted that, in the Investigation Report,
MEDT took the view that Gazprom sells gas in the d omestic Russian market below cost. Given the
Panel's factual finding that no determination was made by MEDT that Gazprom was the gas supplier
of the investigated Russian producers or that Gazprom's prices affected these suppliers' prices, we
see no reason to find error with the Panel's conclusion that Gazprom's below -cost prices did not
constitute a sufficient factual basis for MEDT to conclude that the records of the investigated Russian
producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium
nitrate.
6.126. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Consequently, we
uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.92 and 8.2.a of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because MEDT did not provide an
adequate basis under the second condition in the first sentence of that provision to reject the
reported gas cost.
6.127. We observe that Ukraine's claim on appeal under Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement is dependent on us reversing the Panel's finding of inconsistency with Art icle 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Given the consequential nature of Ukraine's claim on appeal, and
having upheld the Panel's finding under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we uphold
the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.118 and 8.2.c of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement because, in conducting its
ordinary-course-of-trade test, MEDT relied on costs calculated inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.128. Ukraine raises certain arguments under Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that are
dependent on us finding error with the Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1.1. Given our finding that
the Panel did not err in its interpretation or application of the second condition in the first sentence
of Article 2.2.1.1, we reject these arguments by Ukraine. In light of the differences in text and
function between Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement, we also cons ider that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 2.2 in
considering that certain Appellate Body interpretations with respect to Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement were not relevant to its interpretative exercise under Article 2.2. We also consider
that the Panel did not err in its application of Article 2.2 in finding that the export price of gas was
not properly adapted to reflect the cost "in the country of origin". An investigating authority has to
ensure that the information it collects is used to arrive at the "cost of production in the country of
origin" and compliance with this obligation may require the investigating authority to adapt that
information. The Panel did not see any explanation by MEDT in the Investigation Report as to wh y
adjustments for transportation expenses were adequate to adapt the export price from Russia at the
German border to reflect the cost of the investigated Russian producers in the country of origin. The
Panel also recalled its earlier finding under the sec ond condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1, a finding with which we agreed above. Other than pointing to the deduction of
transportation expenses, Ukraine has not asserted, either before the Panel or before us, that MEDT
otherwise adapted the export price of gas used in its calculations in order to ensure that it reflected
the cost of production in Russia. We therefore see no basis to question the Panel's conclusion that
the adjustment for transportation expenses made by MEDT was not sufficient to adapt the export
price from Russia to reflect the cost of production in the country of origin, i.e. Russia . In reaching
this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that, in the particular circumstances of this case, given
that MEDT did not provide an ad equate basis to reject the reported gas cost under the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, there may not have been a basis to rely on costs
other than those reflected in the records of the investigated producers.
6.129. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of Article 2.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.103

and 8.2.b of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted inconsistently with that provis ion because MEDT
failed to calculate the cost of production "in the country of origin".
7 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body makes the following findings and
conclusions.
7.1 Claims under Articles 6.2, 7.1, and 11 of the DSU relating to the original investigation
phase
7.2. The language in Russia's panel request, including express references in footnotes, refers to the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment and sufficiently links these measures to Russia's
claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. We t herefore agree with the Panel's
assessment that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were discernible and
accordingly identified as specific measures at issue in Russia's panel request.
a. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err under Article 6.2 of the DSU in finding that
the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures
at issue in Russia's panel request.
b. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.28 and 8.1.a of the Panel
Report, that the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as
specific measures at issue in Russia's panel request, and thus fell within the Panel's terms
of reference.
7.3. We recall that the measures and claims identified in a panel request in accordance with
Article 6.2 of the DSU constitute the "matter referred to the DSB", which serves as a basis for the
panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. We have upheld the Panel's finding that
the 2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment were identified as specific measures at issue
in Russia's panel request, and Ukraine has not appealed the Panel's finding that Russia had provided
a brief summary of the legal basis for its claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as
it relates to these measures. Moreover, Ukraine has not advanced any other grounds in support of
its challenge under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU.
a. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err under Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU by ruling
on Russia's claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement as it relates to the
2008 amended decision and the 2010 amendment.
7.4. We consider that the Panel provided a reasoned and coherent explanation in reaching the
conclusion that the combined effect of the Ukrainian court judgments and the implementation by
the 2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem in the original investigation phase
was de minimis, triggering Ukraine's obligation under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to
exclude EuroChem from the scope of the anti -dumping investigation. We further consider that the
Panel, consistent with its duty un der Article 11 of the DSU, conducted an objective assessment of
the arguments and evidence necessary to resolve the claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement as it relates to the 2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment, and
the 2014 extension decision.
a. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not act in a manner inconsistent with Article 11 of
the DSU, in concluding that the combined effect of the Ukrainian court judgments and
their implementation by the 2010 amendment was that the dumping margin for EuroChem
in the original investigation phase was de minimis.
b. For the reasons above, we uphold the Panel's findings, in paragraphs 7.152, 7.157, and
8.3.a of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in relation to the 2008 amended decision, the 2010 amendment,
and the 2014 extension decision.

7.2 Claims under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relating
to MEDT's determinations of dumping in the interim and expiry reviews
7.5. We consider that the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to whether the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation suitably and sufficiently correspond to or reproduce those costs that have a genuine
relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under consideration. Under the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, it is the "records" of the individual exporter
or producer under investigation that are subject to the condition to "reasonably reflect" the "costs
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration". We thus consider that
there is no standard of reasonableness under that condition that governs the meaning of "costs"
itself, which would allow investigating authorities to disregard domestic input prices when such prices
are lower than other prices internationally. Moreover, we observe that the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1 directs the investigating authority normally to base its calculations of costs on the
records of the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance
with the GAAP of the exporting country and that they reasonably reflect the costs associated with
the production and sale of the product under consideration. Given the reference to "normally", we
do not exclude that there might be circumstances other than those in the two conditions set out in
that sentence, in which the obligation to base the calculation of costs on the records does not apply.
The second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, however, does not contain open-ended
"non-arm's-length transactions" or "other practices" "exceptions", as Ukraine seems to suggest.
Therefore, we consider that the Panel did not err in examining whether MEDT provided an adequate
basis in the Investigation Report to find that the records of the investigated Russian producers,
insofar as the reported gas cost was concerned, did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with
the production and sale of ammonium nitrate.
7.6. We also consider that the Panel did not err in its assessment of MEDT's reasons for rejecting
the reported gas cost under the second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1. The Pan el
noted that, in the Investigation Report, MEDT examined whether, due to government regulation, the
gas costs incurred by the investigated Russian producers were lower compared with prices in other
countries or other export prices of gas from Russia. Ukraine has not advanced any reason for us to
question the Panel's conclusion that MEDT's examination in that regard pertained to whether the
cost of gas incurred by these producers was reasonable, and that this was thus not an adequate
basis to conclude that the producers' records did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the
production and sale of ammonium nitrate. The Panel also noted that, in the Investigation Report,
MEDT took the view that Gazprom sells gas in the domestic Russian market below cost. Given the
Panel's factual finding that no determination was made by MEDT that Gazprom was the gas supplier
of the investigated Russian producers or that Gazprom's prices affected these suppliers' prices, we
see no reason to find error with the Panel' s conclusion that Gazprom's below -cost prices did not
constitute a sufficient factual basis for MEDT to conclude that the records of the investigated Russian
producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of ammonium
nitrate.
a. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of the
second condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
b. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.92 and 8.2.a of the Panel
Report, that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement because MEDT did not provide an adequate basis under the second condition
in the first sentence of that provision to reject the reported gas cost.
7.7. We observe that Ukraine's claim on appeal under Article 2.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
is dependent on us reversing the Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2.1.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
a. Given the consequential nature of Ukraine's claim on appeal, and having upheld the Panel's
finding under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, we uphold the Panel's
finding, in paragraphs 7.118 and 8.2.c of the Panel Report, that Ukraine acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.1 of the Ant i-Dumping Agreement because, in conducting
its ordinary -course-of-trade test, MEDT relied on costs calculated inconsistently with
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.8. Ukraine raises certain arguments under Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement that are
dependent on us finding error with the Panel's findings under Article 2.2.1.1. Given our finding that
the Panel did not err in its interpretation or application of the second condition in the first sentence
of Article 2.2.1.1, we reject these ar guments by Ukraine. In light of the differences in text and
function between Article 2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement, we also consider that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 2.2 in
considering t hat certain Appellate Body interpretations with respect to Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement were not relevant to its interpretative exercise under Article 2.2. We also consider
that the Panel did not err in its application of Article 2.2 in finding that the export price of gas was
not properly adapted to reflect the cost "in the country of origin". An investigating authority has to
ensure that the information it collects is used to arrive at the "cost of production in the country of
origin", and compliance with this obligation may require the investigating authority to adapt that
information. The Panel did not see any explanation by MEDT in the Investigation Report as to why
adjustments for transportation expenses were adequate to adapt the export price from Russia at the
German border to reflect the cost of the investigated Russian producers in the country of origin. The
Panel also recalled its earlier finding under the second condition in the first sentence of
Article 2.2.1.1, a finding with which we agre ed above. Other than pointing to the deduction of
transportation expenses, Ukraine has not asserted, either before the Panel or before us, that MEDT
otherwise adapted the export price of gas used in its calculations in order to ensure that it reflected
the cost of production in Russia. We therefore see no basis to question the Panel's conclusion that
the adjustment for transportation expenses made by MEDT was not sufficient to adapt the export
price from Russia to reflect the cost of production in the count ry of origin, i.e. Russia . In reaching
this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that, in the particular circumstances of this case, given
that MEDT did not provide an adequate basis to reject the reported gas cost under the second
condition in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1, there may not have been a basis to rely on costs
other than those reflected in the records of the investigated producers.
a. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of
Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
b. Consequently, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.103 and 8.2.b of the Panel
Report, that Ukraine acted inconsistently with that provision because MEDT failed to
calculate the cost of production "in the country of origin".
7.3 Recommendation
7.9. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request Ukraine to bring its measures found in
this Report, and in the Panel Report as upheld by this Report, to be inconsistent with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.