SAUDI ARABIA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 16 June 2020
Document codes: WT/DS567/R
Complainant: Qatar
Respondent: Saudi Arabia
Third parties: Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, U.S., Yemen
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. VI:1, VI:2(a), VI:3  GATT 1994Art. 3.1, 4, 9, 14.3, 16.1, 41.1, 42, 61  Intellectual Property (TRIPS)Art. 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 12.2.2  Anti-dumping

SAUDI ARABIA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel 4
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Qatar 12
Annex B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 29
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia 48
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Kingdom of Bahrain 51
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil 53
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada 57
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China 60
Annex C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union 62
Annex C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan 67
Annex C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway 71
Annex C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation 74
Annex C-10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Singapore 76
Annex C-11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine 80
Annex C-12 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates 83
Annex C-13 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States 89

WTO CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Financial Services Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods
and Services, and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, DSR
2016:II, p. 431
Argentina – Financial Services Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, WT/DS453/R and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS453/AB/R, DSR 2016:II, p. 599
Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS18/RW, adopted
20 March 2000 March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, p. 2031
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p. 1649
Canada – Autos Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19 June 2000, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, DSR
2000:VII, p. 3043
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff
Program
Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted
24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R /
WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR 2013:I, p. 237
Canada – Wheat Exports and
Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat
and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted
27 September 2004, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
China – Intellectual Property
Rights
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, DSR
2009:V, p. 2097
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and
Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501
China – TRQs Panel Report, China – Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products,
WT/DS517/R and Add.1, adopted 28 May 2019
Colombia – Textiles Panel Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles,
Apparel and Footwear, WT/DS461/R and Add.1, adopted 22 June 2016, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS461/AB/R, DSR 2016:III,
p. 1227
Colombia – Textiles
(Article 21.5 – Colombia) /
Colombia – Textiles
(Article 21.5 – Panama)
Panel Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles,
Apparel and Footwear – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Colombia /
Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and
Footwear – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Panama, WT/DS461/RW
and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 5 October 2018 [appealed by
Panama 20 November 2018 – the Division suspended its work on
10 December 2019]
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted
25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Bananas III (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC)
Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by
the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB,
9 April 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 725
EC – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in
Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R, adopted 20 June 2005, DSR 2005:XV,
p. 7713

Short title Full case title and citation
EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on
Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted
19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs
Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX,
p. 3791
Guatemala – Cement II Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000,
DSR 2000:XI, p. 5295
India – Additional Import
Duties
Panel Report, India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports
from the United States, WT/DS360/R, adopted 17 November 2008, as
reversed by Appellate Body Report WT/DS360/AB/R, DSR 2008:XX,
p. 8317
India – Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of
Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS430/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2015,
DSR 2015:V, p. 2459
India – Solar Cells Appellate Body Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells
and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 14 October 2016,
DSR 2016:IV, p. 1827
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR
2002:V, p. 1827
Indonesia – Import Licensing
Regimes
Panel Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals
and Animal Products, WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, Add.1 and Corr.1,
adopted 22 November 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, DSR 2017:VII, p. 3131
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted
10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, p. 43
Russia – Pigs (EU) Panel Report, Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of Live
Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union, WT/DS475/R
and Add.1, adopted 21 March 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS475/AB/R, DSR 2017:II, p. 361
Russia – Tariff Treatment Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and
Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/R, Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted
26 September 2016, DSR 2016:IV, p. 1547
Russia – Traffic in Transit Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit,
WT/DS512/R and Add.1, adopted 26 April 2019
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on
Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011,
DSR 2011:IV, p. 2203
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from
the Philippines, WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS371/AB/R, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2299
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines) (Article 21.5 –
Philippines)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from
the Philippines – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the Philippines,
WT/DS371/RW and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 12 November 2018
[appealed by Thailand 9 January 2019]
US – 1916 Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, DSR
2000:X, p. 4793
US – 1916 Act (Japan) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by
Japan, WT/DS162/R and Add.1, adopted 26 September 2000, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, DSR 2000:X, p.
4831

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Carbon Steel (India)
(Article 21.5 – India)
Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by India, WT/DS436/RW and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members
15 November 2019 [adoption/appeal pending]
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012,
DSR 2012:XI, p. 5751
US – Coated Paper
(Indonesia)
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures
on Certain Coated Paper from Indonesia, WT/DS491/R and Add.1, adopted
22 January 2018
US – COOL (Article 21.5 –
Canada and Mexico)
Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada
and Mexico, WT/DS384/AB/RW / WT/DS386/AB/RW, adopted
29 May 2015, DSR 2015:IV, p. 1725
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R,
adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII,
p. 5475)
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 3
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd
complaint)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/R, adopted 23 March 2012, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R, DSR 2012:II, p. 649
US – Nicaraguan Trade GATT Panel Report, United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
L/6053, 13 October 1986, unadopted
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V,
p. 1909
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002,
DSR 2002:II, p. 589
US – Section 211
Appropriations Act
Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/R, adopted 1 February 2002, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS176/AB/R, DSR 2002:II, p. 683
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998,
DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 –
Malaysia)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII,
p. 6481
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 –
Malaysia)
Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, upheld by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS58/AB/RW, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6529
US – Shrimp (Ecuador) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from
Ecuador, WT/DS335/R, adopted on 20 February 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 425
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837
US – Upland Cotton Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R,
Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p. 299

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted
23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1,
adopted 11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911

EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT
Exhibit
Number
Full Title
QAT-1 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,
19 June 2017
QAT-2 Saudi Press Agency Website, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations
with Qatar", 5 June 2017
QAT-3 Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the United States website, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts
Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar", 5 June 2017
QAT-7 @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation)
QAT-8 XE Currency Converter, Saudi riyals to US dollar conversion, last accessed 8 April 2019
QAT-10 Al-Youm Al-Sabea, ''Hashtag 'Cutting Ties with Qatar' tops the world list of trend on Twitter'' (Arabic
original and English translation)
QAT-11 Saudi Al-Marsd Online Newspaper, "Legal figure: Anyone showing sympathy with Qatar on social
media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million riyals" (Arabic
original and English translation), 8 June 2017
QAT-12 Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include imprisonment for those who sympathize
with Qatar on social media", 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation)
QAT-13 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Anti-Cyber Crime Law, 26 March 2007 (English translation)
QAT-15 Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Saudi Arabia", 22 February 2018
QAT-21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of
Qatar 17-24 November 2017, Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December
2017
QAT-37 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019
QAT-38 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15 June 2017 (Arabic original and
English translation)
QAT-39 Saudi Monetary Authority, Confidential Circular, 11 July 2017 (Arabic original and English
translation)
QAT-41 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media
QAT-42 Images of beoutQ promotional material
QAT-43 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of Champions League, Video
QAT-44 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of Europa League, Video
QAT-45 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of FIFA World Cup game between Croatia and England of 2018, Video
QAT-46 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of Formula 1, Video
QAT-47 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of NBA final games between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Golden State
Warriors of 2018, Video
QAT-48 2017-2019 Sampling of Live and Replayed Content Broadcast on beoutQ
QAT-49 beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ, Video, 21 September 2018
QAT-50 SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports rights robbery", 6 March 2019
QAT-51 Tweets about the sale of beoutQ STBs, 12 August 2017
QAT-52 Public statements from world sports organizations condemning beoutQ Piracy, as collected on beIN
Media Group's Website Exposing beoutQ, 16 January 2019
QAT-53 SportsPro, "ATP and ITF pile in on BeoutQ over pirate broadcasts", 6 July 2018
QAT-54 FIFA, "Joint Public Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and
Bundesliga on beoutQ", 22 January 2019
QAT-55 UEFA, "Joint Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and Bundesliga
on beoutQ", 22 January 2019
QAT-56 Reuters, "Soccer: Leagues and governing bodies condemn beoutQ TV piracy", 22 January 2019
QAT-57 Asian Football Confederation Statement on beoutQ, 9 January 2019
QAT-58 Motion Picture Association of America, 2018 Notorious Markets Comments, 1 October 2018
QAT-59 The Guardian, "BBC and Sky call for EU crackdown on Saudi pirate TV service", 31 October 2018
QAT-60 Bloomberg, "Telemundo Says Its World Cup Broadcasts Were Illegally Distributed", 19 June 2018
QAT-62 Reuters "NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urge U.S. action on alleged Saudi TV piracy", 16 February 2019

Exhibit
Number
Full Title
QAT-63 Submission by Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 4 February 2019
QAT-64 Submission by Canal+ Group for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019
QAT-65 Submission by the International Intellectual Property Alliance for the 2019 Special 301 Review,
7 February 2019
QAT-66 Submission by the National Basketball Association and the United States Tennis Association for the
2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019
QAT-67 Submission by beIN Media Group, LLC and Miramax, LLC for the 2019 Special 301 Review,
7 February 2019
QAT-68 Submission by Sky Limited for the 2019 Special Review, 7 February 2019
QAT-69 Submission by the Sport Coalition for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019
QAT-70 Submission by U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019
QAT-71 Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to
September 2018
QAT-72 beoutQ-pirated broadcast of NFL Super Bowl LIII game between New England Patriots and
Philadelphia Eagles, Video, 4 February 2018
QAT-73 Images of beoutQ-pirated broadcast of 4 February 2018 NFL Super Bowl Half-Time Show
QAT-74 Country-by-Country Examples of beoutQ-Pirated Content (2018)
QAT-75 beoutQ advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi riyals
QAT-76 beoutQ advertisements for Saudi brands
QAT-77 Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates", 22 June 2018
QAT-78 Photographic Evidence of Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World
Cup at Cafés in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11 July 2018
QAT-79 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "IPTV Piracy on BeoutQ STBs", 25 November 2018
QAT-80 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update", 15 August 2018
QAT-81 NAGRA Kudelski Group Website, "The Group at a Glance"
QAT-83 Social Media Evidence of Saudi Municipalities Organizing Public Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate
Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup, June 2018
QAT-84 Tweet from Margherita Stancati, Wall Street Journal reporter, 22 June 2018
QAT-85 Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Announcement of 294 screens to broadcast
World Cup (Arabic original and English translation), 13 June 2018
QAT-86 Arabsat, About, last accessed 16 April 2019
QAT-87 Arabsat, "League of Arab States Secretary-General honors Arabsat CEO", 29 January 2018
QAT-89 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019
QAT-90 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018
QAT-91 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018
QAT-92 UEFA Letter to Arabsat, 12 March 2018
QAT-93 Arabsat Letter to UEFA, 14 March 2018
QAT-94 UEFA Letter to Squire Patton Boggs LLP, 17 April 2018
QAT-96 LaLiga Letter to Arabsat, 4 April 2018
QAT-97 Arabsat Letter to LaLiga, 19 April 2018
QAT-98 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to LaLiga, 13 June 2018
QAT-99 Premier League Letter to Arabsat, 11 April 2018
QAT-100 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to FIFA, 5 June 2018
QAT-101 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 29 August 2017
QAT-102 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 14 December 2017
QAT-103 Cartesian website, "Our Story"
QAT-104 Nextv News, "Selevision launches in MENA", 18 March 2014
QAT-105 Videonet, "Selevision uses Verimatrix to protect its new Seevi service, which combines IPTV and
OTT", 3 March 2016

Exhibit
Number
Full Title
QAT-106 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual
Media, 3 September 2018
QAT-107 Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller, Beluga CDN LLC, 20 June 2018
QAT-112 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003
QAT-113 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No.
(1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005
QAT-116 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15 August 2017
QAT-117 Letter from Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and English
translation), 2 September 2017
QAT-118 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017
QAT-119 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16 January 2018
QAT-120 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 6 March 2018
QAT-121 Tweets about beIN and beoutQ STBs (Arabic original and English translation), 25 and 26 May 2018
QAT-122 UEFA Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 8 June 2018
QAT-123 UEFA Letter to GCAM, 8 June 2018
QAT-124 BBC Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 26 June 2018
QAT-125 BBC Letter to GCAM, 26 June 2018
QAT-175 The New York Times, "The Brazen Bootlegging of a Multibillion-Dollar Sport Network", 9 May 2018
QAT-184 United States 2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(April 2019) (Excerpts)
QAT-187 Excerpts of United States 2018 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets, Office of the
United States Trade Representative (April 2019) (Excerpts)
QAT-188 SportsPro Media, "UK government to investigate BeoutQ Premier League IP theft", 25 April 2019
QAT-189 Broadband TV News, "MPs call for 'robust attack' on pirate beoutQ", 10 May 2019
QAT-190 Inside World Football, "AFC streaming of ACL reaches 1m in Saudi Arabia but now Saudi 24 channel
joins piracy", 13 March 2019
QAT-191 Washington Post, "FIFA wants Saudis to stop pirated Women's World Cup TV feeds", 16 June 2019
QAT-217 Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019
QAT-220 Email from GCAM to right holders, 13 July 2017
QAT-223 Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19 August 2019
QAT-224 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "Response to IGP Testing of 28 January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ
Frequency Changes", 8 February 2019
QAT-226 Synamedia Report, "'beoutQ' Service Analysis", 6 June 2019
QAT-227 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 31 July 2019
QAT-238 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019 as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration
by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019
QAT-248 Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019
QAT-257 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC Programming Director, dated 27 October 2019
SAU-1 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular
relations with Qatar, 5 June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C.,
Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State
of Qatar, 5 June 2017
SAU-2 First Riyadh Agreement
SAU-3 Implementing Mechanism
SAU-4 Supplementary Riyadh Agreement
SAU-5 Joint Statement of 5 March 2014
SAU-6 Saudi Arabia and Regional Security, Qatar's History of Funding Terrorism and Extremism,
27 June 2017
SAU-7 Qatar's Al Jazeera, Counter Extremism Project, visited 7 July 2019; Al Jazeera faces criticism in
Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood, The Washington Post, 5 January 2014

Exhibit
Number
Full Title
SAU-19 General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for Licensing Pay
TV Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters
SAU-27 "Press Release, Arabsat", dated 15 June 2019
SAU-28 S.A.R.L. beIN Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization, Summary
Proceedings Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number
352J-W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019 (English translation available at
https://www.degaullefleurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/20190613-Ordonnance-de-
r%C3%A9f%C3%A9r%C3%A9-English-version.pdf accessed 21 July 2019)
SAU-32 Copyright Law
SAU-39 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019
SAU-40 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019
SAU-41 Statement Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the "17 June 2017 Circular", 3 October 2019
SAU-42 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 536 in 2018 (19/10/1439 H)
SAU-43 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H)
SAU-44 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H)
SAU-45 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision
No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and Resolution of
the Board of Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/1440
AH
ARE-3 Letter from H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to H.E.
Dr. Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the GCC, 19 February 2017
ARE-6 United Arab Emirates' 5 June Declaration

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by Qatar
1.1. On 1 October 2018, Qatar requested consultations with Saudi Arabia pursuant to Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and
Article 64.1 of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) with respect to the measures and claims set out below.1
1.2. On 11 October 2018, Qatar received a communication from the Chairman of the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) covering a communication from Saudi Arabia, stating that
Saudi Arabia would not engage in consultations with Qatar.2
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 9 November 2018, Qatar requeste d the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 6 of
the DSU with standard terms of reference. 3 At its meeting on 18 December 2018, the DSB
established a panel pursuant to the request of Qatar in document WT/DS567/3, in accordance with
Article 6 of the DSU.4
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference, as set forth in WT/DS567/4, are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Qatar in document
WT/DS567/3 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5
1.5. On 6 February 2019, Qatar requested the Director -General to determine the composition of
the panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU. On 18 February 2019, the Director-General accordingly
composed the Panel as follows:
 Chairperson: Mr Donald McRae

 Members: Ms Annabelle Bennett
 Ms Beverley Pereira

1.6. Australia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey,
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States and Yem en notified their interest in
participating in the Panel proceeding as third parties.
1.3 Panel proceeding
1.3.1 General
1.7. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures 6 and
partial Timetable on 27 March 2019.
1.8. The Panel held a first s ubstantive meeting with the parties on 9 -10 July 2019, and a session
with the third parties took place on 10 July 2019. Following the first substantive meeting, the Panel
sent a first set of written questions to the parties and third parties on 12 July 2019. The Panel then
held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 3 October 2019, and sent a second set of
written questions to the parties on 8 October 2019. After consultation with the parties, on
15 October 2019 the Panel adopted its Timetable for the rest of the proceeding. On

1 See Request for consultations by Qatar, WT/DS567/1.
2 See Request for the establishment of a panel by Qatar, WT/DS567/3 (Qatar's panel request), para. 2.
3 See Qatar's panel request.
4 See Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 18 December 2018, WT/DSB/M/423, para. 7.10.
5 See Note by the Secretariat, Constitution of the Panel established at the request of Qatar,

6 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.

6 December 2019, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel then
issued its Interim Report to the parties on 16 March 2020, and issued its Final Report to the parties
on 27 April 2020.
1.9. The remainder of this section provides an overview of the specific procedural issues that arose
during this proceeding, which include: (a) issues arising from Saudi Arabia's refusal to interact with
Qatar; ( b) issues concerning certain English translations su bmitted by the UAE; ( c) the Panel's
request for information from the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO); (d) Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel confirm the authenticity of an exhibit submitted
by Qatar; and (e) issues arising from Qatar's submission of a witness statement.
1.3.2 Procedural issues arising from Saudi Arabia's refusal to interact with Qatar
1.10. Throughout the proceeding, Saudi Arabia took the position that, consistent with its severance
of all relations wit h Qatar (including diplomatic and consular relations), and the essential security
interests that motivated it to take that action, it would not interact, or have any direct or indirect
engagement, with Qatar in any way in this dispute. Saudi Arabia took this position in the context of
consultations7, at the DSB meeting where the request for the establishment of this Panel was first
considered8, and in its comments on the Panel's draft Working Procedures and Timetable during the
organizational phase. 9 Saudi Arabia reiterated , in all of its subsequent submissions in this
proceeding, its refusal to interact in any way, or have any direct or indirect engagement, with Qatar
in this dispute.10
1.11. Saudi Arabia's refusal to engage with Qatar in the manner described above raised the question
of how the Panel ought to conduct the proceeding. In the light of the parties' comments on the draft
Working Procedures and Timetable made at the organizational phase of the proceeding, the Panel
did not consider it necessary to devel op any special or additional working procedures in the
circumstances of this case. However, the Panel did adjust certain aspects of the normal panel
process, as well as certain aspects of the standard Working Procedures, to address this special
circumstance. The Panel has been guided at all times by the prohibition against any ex parte
communications between the Panel and either party.11
1.12. Regarding the organizational meeting, Articles 12.1 and 12.3 of the DSU provide for the
adoption of the Panel's Working Procedures and Timetable for the panel process following
consultation with the parties. While the normal practice is for a panel to hold an organizational
meeting with the disputing parties to receive their comments on the draft Working Procedures and
Timetable sent in advance, this particular means of consultation is not mandated by the text of
Article 12 of the DSU. In the special circum stances of this case, and taking into account the views
of the parties, the Panel decided to consult with the parties exclusively through a written procedure.
1.13. In addition to dispensing with an organizational meeting, the Panel also modified the standard
Working Procedures in several respects to reflect the special circumstances of this case. In particular,
the Panel:
a. modified the normal requirement of direct service of documents by the parties on one
another, so as to provide instead that "[e]ach party shall send all communications and

7 See Qatar's panel request, para. 2.
8 Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 4 December 2018, WT/DSB/M/422, para. 5.3 (stating that
"[b]ecause rejecting formal State interaction was the defining element of severed diplomatic relations, the
Saudi Government would not engage with the complaining party in connection with the referenced matter").
See also Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 18 December 2018, WT/DSB/M/423, para. 7.10.
9 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel commenting on the draft Working Procedures and
Timetable, dated 14 March 2019, p. 2 (stating that "the severance of relations means that any direct meetings
and communications with the complainant are unacceptable").
10 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 7; opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, para. 37; response to Panel question No. 28, paras. 22-23; second written submission, para. 19;
oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 4; and response to Panel question No. 37, para. 1.
11 Article 18.1 of the DSU provides that "[t]here shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or
Appellate Body concerning matters under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body." This prohibition is
reiterated in similar terms in paragraph VII:2 of the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.

documents directly to the Secretariat, which the Secretariat will then proceed
to transmit promptly to the other party"12; and
b. adjusted its Working Procedures to clarify that the purpose of the first and second
substantive meetings with the Panel was to allow each party to address the Panel
directly, and to provide that neither party was under any obligation to respond to
questions posed by the other party at or following those meetings.13
1.14. Neither party requested any separate or additional procedures to govern the conduct of the
meetings with the Panel, which otherwise proceeded in the usual manner.
1.3.3 Issues concerning certain English translations submitted by the UAE
1.15. In its third -party submission, the UAE provide d the Panel with several exhibits.
On 2 July 2019, Qatar sent a letter to the Panel raising issues with the English translations of two of
the exhibits that the UAE had provided with its third-party submission. First, Qatar maintained that
the UAE's transl ation of a letter by Qatar's Foreign Minister created the "deeply misleading
impression" that Qatar unilaterally renounced, and did not attempt to comply with, the
Riyadh Agreements, which were concluded between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in respect of regional security matters.14
Second, Qatar stated that the UAE translation of another exhibit that it had submitted contained
several paragraphs omitted in the Arabic original. 15 In its letter, Qatar indicated that it had raised
these same issues with the panel in another parallel proceeding between Qatar and the UAE, and
was forwarding its objections "for the information of this Panel".16
1.16. The Panel invited the UAE to respond to Qatar's comments by 10 July 2019. In its response,
the UAE expressed its disagreement with Qatar on some of the translation issues, but indicated that
most of the issues raised by Qatar were immaterial.17
1.17. The Panel did not consider it necessary to take any further steps in relation to these translation
issues.
1.3.4 The Panel's request for information from the International Bureau of WIPO
1.18. On 12 July 2019, the Panel sent a letter to the International Bureau of WIPO, which is
responsible for the administration of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works. In that letter, the Panel requested the assistance of the International Bureau of WIPO in the
form of any factual information available to it that would be relevant to the interpretation of the
provisions of the Paris Act of that Convention (Berne Convention (1971)) referenced by the parties.
The Panel sought, in particular, any information reflected in the materials of diplomatic conferences
and subsequent developments in the framework of the Berne Union.18
1.19. On 2 August 2019, the International Bureau of WIPO provided the requested information in a
letter to the Panel.19 In respect of the information provided, the parties were invited to provide any
comments they wished to make in the context of their second written submissions due on 30 August

12 Working Procedures, paragraph 30(e).
13 Ibid. paragraph 15.
14 For more information about the scope and content of the Riyadh Agreements, see paragraphs 2.20 to
2.26 of this Report.
15 Qatar's communication to the Panel in DS526 United Arab Emirates – Measures Relating to Trade in
Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, dated 1 July 2019, p. 3. For
more information concerning the differences in translation of the letter in question, see footnote 117 of this
Report.
16 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 2 July 2019.
17 United Arab Emirates' communication to the Panel, dated 10 July 2019, p. 1.
18 Panel's communication to the International Bureau of WIPO, dated 12 July 2019. The "Berne Union"
refers to the Union established under Article 1 of the Berne Convention by "[t]he countries to which [the
Berne] Convention applies".
19 International Bureau of WIPO's communication to the Panel, dated 2 August 2019.

2019.20 Neither party made any comments on the letter from the International Bureau of WIPO to
the Panel.
1.3.5 Saudi Arabia's request to confirm the authenticity of an exhibit submitted by Qatar
1.20. On 30 August 2019, th e same day that the parties' second written submissions were to be
filed, Saudi Arabia sent a separate letter to the Panel asking it to "certify the authenticity of the
document" presented as Exhibit QAT -1, "Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and Ge neral
Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, 19 June 2017". In its letter, Saudi Arabia recalled that
it had previously indicated, in its responses to the questions from the Panel following the first
substantive meeting, that the Ministry had conducte d a full search for an "officially issued version"
of the Circular. 21 Saudi Arabia also suggested that the Panel should be aware of the "dubious
provenance" of the Circular, and "should not attribute the alleged 'Circular' to Saudi Arabia without
authentication". While Saudi Arabia requested that the Panel "assure itself of the authenticity of the
document in order to preserve the integrity of the proceedings", it did not specify any particular
steps that the Panel should take to do so.22
1.21. Upon receipt of this letter, the Panel invited Qatar to provide its comments on this request by
13 September 2019. 23 In its comments, Qatar recalled that it had already refuted, in its second
written submission filed on 30 August 2019, Saudi Arabia's claims that the Circular was "not issued",
and that it had already demonstrated the authenticity of the Circular.24 Additionally, Qatar submitted
statements by four right holders who had attested to having received an email from the Ministry of
Culture and Information of Saudi A rabia on 13 July 2017, to which the Circular was attached. The
four right holders are Bundesliga, the International Tennis Federation, the Union of European
Football Associations and Italia Film.25
1.22. On 16 September 2019, the Panel informed the parties that insofar as either party wished to
make any further submissions on this matter, it could do so at the second substantive meeting in
the context of its oral statement, in its oral responses to any questions from the Panel pertaining to
the Circular, or on both occasions. The Panel stated its intention to reach a decision on this issue by
the end of the second substantive meeting with the parties.26
1.23. In its opening oral statement at the second substantive meeting, Saudi Arabia confirmed "that
there is no need for the Panel to certify the authenticity of the Circular".27 In doing so, Saudi Arabia
explained that "the Circular represents an accurate description of Saudi law".28
1.3.6 Procedural issues arising from Qatar's submission of a witness statement
1.24. On the afternoon of 30 August 2019, the same day that the parties' second written
submissions were due to be filed, Qatar filed an "urgent request" for additional confidentiality
procedures pursuant to paragraph 2(4) of the Working Procedures. 29 Qatar's stated purpose for
requesting these additional procedures was to ensure the safety of an individual whose testimony
would be filed as an exhibit to its second written submission later that same day.30 Qatar requested,

20 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 12 August 2019.
21 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, p. 1.
22 Ibid. p. 2.
23 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 2 September 2019.
24 See Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 13 September 2019, pp. 1-4.
25 Ibid. pp. 7, 14, 21 and 27.
26 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 16 September 2019.
27 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 16.
28 Ibid. para. 11. At the second meeting with the Panel, Saudi Arabia provided a statement indicating
that it "intends to be bound by the statements concerning its legal position as regards its domestic law" as
described in its opening statement, adding that its delegation "confirms formally and for the record that
representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have full powers to make legal representations concerning the
application of Saudi law and that they are acting within the authority bestowed on them". (Statement
Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the "17 June 2017 Circular", 3 October 2019, Exhibit SAU-41.)
29 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019.
30 Ibid. p. 1. According to Qatar, the individual previously worked for beoutQ (the entity described in
section 2.2.4 below) and provided his signed testimony "at what he believes to be great risk to his personal
safety and that of his family, on the condition that he would be provided safety under Qatar's witness
protection program"; and Qatar considered that "it would be necessary to keep the name of the Witness and all

inter alia , that the identity of the witness be designated as confidential information, that it be
redacted from the Report, and that it only be shared with a limited group of approved persons. Qatar
did not offer any views on how the information contained in the exhibit or in its second written
submission should be handled pending the resolution of this last -minute request for additional
confidentiality procedures.31
1.25. The Panel informed the parties that they should each proceed to file their second written
submissions with the Secretariat as scheduled for later tha t same day, and that the Secretariat
would transmit each party's submission and accompanying exhibits to the other party only after the
Panel had resolved Qatar's request for the adoption of additional confidentiality procedures. The
Panel invited Saudi Arabia to provide its comments on Qatar's request by 3 September 2019.32
1.26. In its comments, Saudi Arabia objected to the adoption of any additional confidentiality
procedures on the basis that the witness statement in question appeared to constitute new factua l
information that did not comply with the timing requirements of paragraph 5(1) of the
Working Procedures or the principle of due process. 33 Saudi Arabia further submitted that, in any
event, additional confidentiality procedures would be unnecessary in th e light of the existing
confidentiality requirements that apply under Article 18.2 of the DSU. Finally, Saudi Arabia
emphasized that "[t]he premise of [Qatar's request], that a person's safety would be threatened by
disclosing information of illegal activity in Saudi Arabia, is wholly unacceptable" and stated that "[n]o
WTO Member should be expected to participate in dispute settlement proceeding where evidence is
accepted based on such a false and malicious premise."34
1.27. Following the receipt of Saudi Arabia 's objection on 3 September 2019, and pending the
Panel's resolution of Qatar's request, the Panel requested Qatar to submit a version of its second
written submission the following day, on 4 September 2019, without the witness statement attached
as an exhibit, and with any references to the witness statement redacted from the body of
Qatar's second written submission. 35 Qatar did so, and the Secretariat transmitted each
party's second written submission and a ccompanying exhibits to the other party on
4 September 2019.
1.28. The Panel invited Qatar to provide its comments on Saudi Arabia's objections of
3 September 201936, and Qatar did so on 6 September 2019.37 In its comments, Qatar argued that
the new evidence in E xhibit QAT-222 was submitted as rebuttal evidence "in full accordance" with
paragraph 5(1) of the Working Procedures. 38 Qatar also contended that Saudi Arabia's arguments
failed to refute the need for, or the appropriateness of, the additional confidentiali ty requirements
requested by Qatar. Among other things, Qatar argued that the adoption of such additional
procedures requested in the present dispute "is based not on any 'premise' regarding the conduct
of the responding Member, but instead on the level of sensitivity of the information and the risks
that could arise from its public disclosure". Qatar noted that it refrained from asking for the full
protections typically extended in cases involving Highly Sensitive Business Information to ensure
that Saudi Arabia would have a full opportunity to review and engage with the evidence at issue.39
1.29. In a communication to the parties on 13 September 2019, the Panel attached a draft set of
additional procedures for the protection of strictly confidential information (SCI) for additional
comments from the parties. In this communication, the Panel observed that it is common practice
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings for additional procedures for the protection of business
confidential information (BCI) or SCI to be adopted if either of the parties so requests. The Panel
also stressed "that the decision to adopt these SCI procedures does not imply any view of the Panel
on whether certain information merits being designated as confidential information, and does not

identifying information confidential to help ensure his safety, and the safety of his family members."
(Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, p. 1.)
31 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, pp. 1-2.
32 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 30 August 2019.
33 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 3 September 2019, paras. 3-11.
34 Ibid. paras. 12-14. (emphasis original)
35 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 3 September 2019.
36 Ibid.
37 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 6 September 2019.
38 Ibid. p. 1.
39 Ibid. pp. 3-4.

imply any view on the probative value, relevance or credibility of any evidence that a party
designates as confidential".40
1.30. In the same communication, the Panel also noted that it was:
mindful of the fact that the timing of Qatar's request for additional conf identiality
procedures has resulted in an unavoidable delay in the transmission of the witness
statement to Saudi Arabia, which may in turn limit Saudi Arabia's ability to conduct, in
time for the second substantive meeting, an adequate review of the submi tted
information or its source, including but not limited to establishing the veracity of the
information, vetting the source of the information, and assessing motivation and
credibility through the application of appropriate resources.41
1.31. Accordingly, the Panel stated that:
to ensure that Saudi Arabia's due process rights are fully respected, in the event that
the Panel rules that the witness statement referenced by Qatar in the context of its
request meets the timing requirements in paragraph 5(1) of the Working Procedures,
the Panel will give sympathetic consideration to any subsequent request, from Saudi
Arabia, to file a supplementary written submission specifically addressing this evidence
if it so wishes.42
1.32. Qatar offered no further comments. However, on 16 September 2019, Saudi Arabia responded
by strongly objecting to the proposed SCI procedures. 43 Saudi Arabia indicated that it could not
accept these procedures for a number of reasons:
a. the proposal to have a list of "approved persons" was deemed unacc eptable because
the Saudi government officials, staff and contractors who may need access to
information designated as SCI include persons located in Saudi Arabia's agencies
responsible for matters such as national security and law enforcement, and the identity
of many persons in the relevant agencies cannot be disclosed without violating its
essential security interests44;
b. the premise of the SCI procedures —that a person's safety would be threatened by
disclosing information of illegal activity in Saudi Arabia —was regarded as wholly
unacceptable45;
c. the proposed definition of SCI, as information "the disclosure of which could, in the
submitting party's view, cause harm to the originators of the information" reflected that
premise, and was also incons istent with Appellate Body guidance that procedures for
granting enhanced protection for confidential or sensitive information must set out
objective criteria that panels must apply46;
d. while most requests to adopt procedures for additional protection are g ranted by
WTO panels and the Appellate Body, if a party opposes the application of
proposed BCI/SCI procedures, as in this case, a panel must exercise its control as
adjudicator and require sound justification for the procedures47;

40 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 13 September 2019.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 16 September 2019.
44 Ibid. para. 5.
45 Ibid. para. 8.
46 Ibid. para. 12. (emphasis original)
47 Ibid. para. 15.

e. any decision to open the door to sensitive witness evidence of this kind, and the
establishment of related procedures and safeguards, should be based on input from the
broader WTO Membership, at least including the third parties to the dispute48; and
f. the proposed SCI procedures would violate Saudi Arabia's due process rights, because
the complaining party's last -minute request to submit unprecedented witness
information under SCI procedures in the circumstances of this dispute would effectively
deprive Saudi Arabia of its right to present arguments at the second substantive
meeting concerning the veracity of the information and the source of the information
based on an adequate review of the submitted information.49
1.33. The Panel invited Qatar to respond to Saudi Arabia's objections to the proposed
SCI procedures by 20 September 2019, with a view to determining the next steps in the light of
Qatar's response.50 On 19 September 2019, Qatar responded that Saudi Arabia's objections went
beyond the scope of the Panel's request to comment on the specific procedures proposed by the
Panel on 13 September 2019, and that it was "inappropriate and inefficient for the parties to continue
exchanging views on matters that the Panel has already decided". As such, Qatar stated that it would
refrain from commenting further on the need for SCI procedures in this dispute, and offered no
further comments on the SCI procedures proposed by the Panel.51
1.34. Qatar enclosed with its letter a copy of the relevant exhibit (i.e. Exhibit QAT-222) with certain
confidential information blacked out and redacted, as well as Qatar's complete second written
submission, also with certain confidential i nformation blacked out and redacted. Qatar requested
that these documents be made available promptly to Saudi Arabia, noting that it trusted that
reviewing this document would convince Saudi Arabia to withdraw its objections regarding the
timeliness and relevance of the exhibit. Qatar also indicated that, upon issuance of SCI procedures,
it was prepared to submit to the Panel, for transmission to Saudi Arabia, the complete SCI versions
of these documents. These versions would include the previously blacked-out text in its entirety, in
unredacted form within square brackets.52
1.35. Following receipt of Qatar's comments, along with the redacted version of Exhibit QAT -222
and the revised version of Qatar's second written submission, the Panel informed the parties that it
had instructed the Secretariat to hold these documents, without passing them on to Saudi Arabia,
until the Panel had determined how it would proceed. The Panel indicated that it would finalize the
issue of additional confidentiality procedures which it expected to do in the course of the second
substantive meeting. The Panel also informed the parties that it had not seen any version of the
material in question, redacted or unredacted.53
1.36. At the second substantive meeting with the parties held on 3 Octob er 2019, the Panel
informed the parties that, following further deliberations on this matter, it would not adopt the
SCI procedures as requested by Qatar, and that it did not consider that there were alternative
procedures that would be effective to achiev e Qatar's stated objective. The Panel concluded,
therefore, that it would not adopt any additional SCI procedures. The Panel then informed the parties
that it had declined Saudi Arabia's request to declare the witness statement as inadmissible on the
basis that it was not submitted in a timely manner in accordance with paragraph 5(1) of the
Working Procedures. The Panel informed the parties that Qatar was free to submit the witness
statement, but that if it elected to do so, Qatar must rely on the general c onfidentiality provisions
set forth in the DSU and reflected in paragraph 2(1) of the Working Procedures. The Panel recalled
that, according to Article 18.2 of the DSU, and paragraph 2(1) of the Working Procedures, "Members
shall treat as confidential info rmation submitted to the Panel which the submitting Member has
designated as confidential".
1.37. In response, Qatar indicated that it would submit the witness statement pursuant to the
general confidentiality provisions of Article 18.2 of the DSU. Qatar further indicated that its original,
unredacted second written submission as filed on 30 August 2019, which referred to and quoted

48 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 16 September 2019, paras. 17-18.
49 Ibid. paras. 21-22.
50 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 17 September 2019.
51 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 19 September 2019, p. 1.
52 Ibid. p. 2.
53 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 23 September 2019.

from Exhibit QAT-222, should be treated as the relevant version of the submission for purposes of
the Panel record. However, upon Qa tar's indication that it planned to re -file its second written
submission and Exhibit QAT-222 in unredacted form relying on the general confidentiality provisions
of Article 18.2 of the DSU, Saudi Arabia informed the Panel that it did not wish to receive this exhibit.
1.38. The Panel informed the parties that in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU,
Qatar's designation of the name and identifying information of the witness as confidential meant
that such information would be treated as strictly confidential a s far as the Panel was concerned,
and as far as both parties were concerned. In response to Saudi Arabia's statement that it did not
wish to receive the submission or witness statement, the Panel stated that, because the documents
would be submitted to the Panel and would form part of the record, the Panel had no choice but to
send the documents to Saudi Arabia. The Panel noted subsequently that whether Saudi Arabia would
wish to consider, review, comment on, or treat the documents as not having been receiv ed was a
matter for Saudi Arabia.
1.39. In response to the Panel's statements, Saudi Arabia stated that, as a matter of sovereignty,
it had the right to accept or reject the submission of any document to it, and reiterated that it did
not wish to receive the submissions containing the information designated as confidential by Qatar.
Saudi Arabia explained that it was refusing to receive the submissions because the designation of
the witness' name as confidential information was premised on the "totally unacceptable" allegation
that Saudi Arabia potentially represented a risk to the individual or his family. Saudi Arabia stated
that it would never accept such an allegation and that it would never accept receiving such
information designated as confidential.
1.40. On 4 October 2019, the Panel informed the parties that Qatar had re -filed the unredacted
version of its second written submission and Exhibit QAT -222, including its annexes. The Panel
recalled that Saudi Arabia had stated at the second substantive meeting that it did not wish to
receive a copy of this exhibit and informed the parties, notwithstanding what it had said earlier, that
"[o]ut of respect for Saudi Arabia's position, the Panel will not forward this exhibit and its annexes
to Saudi Arabia."54
1.41. On the evening of 20 December 2019, which was the date by which the parties were to submit
their comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, Saudi Arabia sent the Panel a
communication that developed the assertion that the witness statement should not be gi ven any
weight because of the individual's employment relationship with Qatar. On 9 January 2020, the Panel
received Qatar's comments. On 14 January 2020, the Panel acknowledged receipt of the parties'
respective communications and indicated that it had no need for further submissions on the matter
which would be addressed in the Panel Report.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 Introduction
2.1. This section provides an overview of the factual background to the case, and then briefly sets
out the measures at issue. A more detaile d review of the facts, and the Panel's findings on any
disputed factual issues, will be set forth as necessary in the context of the Findings in Section 7 of
this Report.
2.2 Factual background
2.2.1 The broadcasting and copyright regime in Saudi Arabia
2.2. The Saudi Ministry of Media (formerly the Ministry of Culture and Information) and the General
Commission of Audio and Visual Media (GCAM ) are the governmental entities "in charge of any
broadcast, publication, and distribution of written, visual, or audio media content". This includes "the
granting of media licences in … Saudi Arabia and [matters relating to] broadcast, publication, and

54 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 4 October 2019.

distribution using media channels and multiplatform, which encompass broadcast signals via
satellites".55
2.3. All television and media channels that are interested in operating in Saudi Arabia "must obtain
all required licen ces from the relevant regulatory author ities which may permit operation in the
media field and more specifically in relation to publishing and distributing media content or sale and
importation of all required reception equipment for the provision thereof". 56 To be licensed as a
broadcaster, an entity must satisfy certain objective criteria specific to the broadcasting business,
and then generally applicable Saudi law must be observed, including, but not limited to, copyright
law, publications law, competition law and criminal law. 57 Broadcasting approval requirements are
set out in the regulations of GCAM.58 These provide, among other things, that a Pay TV service shall
not be operated in Saudi Arabia without a licence from GCAM. 59 A broadcasting licence may not be
renewed or can be cancelled if its holder does not comply with broadcasting laws and regulations or
with any other generally applicable Saudi law.
2.4. Saudi Arabia's domestic copyright regime is established through its Copyright Law 60 and
Implementing Regulations. 61 These instruments are also administered by the Ministry of Media.
Article 1 of the Copyright Law defines a "work" as "[a]ny literary, scientific or artistic work".
Furthermore, it defines "audio -visual work" as "[a]ny work produced for simultaneous audio and
visual use, consisting o f a series of related images, accompanied by sound and recorded on an
appropriate means and shown by suitable devices". Article 1 of the Copyright Law defines
"broadcasting" to include transmissions via satellite.62
2.5. The list of various types of protected works in Article 2 of the Copyright Law includes, inter alia,
"[w]orks which are especially prepared for broadcasting or are presented through broadcasting",
and "audiovisual works".63 Article 9 of the Copyright Law provides the author, or whoever she or he
delegates, the right to, inter alia, "[c]ommunicat[e] the work to the public via any possible means,
such as displaying, acting, broadcasting or data transmission networks".64
2.6. Both parties agreed with the premise that professional sports broadcasts constitute protected
"works" under the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement65, and are covered by the definition of "Audio -Visual Work" under Article 1 of
Saudi Arabia's Copyright Law, or otherwise protected under the Copyright Law.66
2.7. Article 13 of the Implementing Regulations provides that "[a]ny use beyond that specified by
the owner of audio, visual and broadcasting works shall be deemed an infringement of copyright",
including "communication [of] the work to the public without obtaining a prior license from the
owners of the copyright" and "[b] reaking of protective barriers for the purpose of presenting

55 See Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
Circular, Exhibit QAT-1, p. 1.
56 Ibid. para. 2.
57 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 28.
58 Ibid. (referring to General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for
Licensing Pay TV Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters, Exhibit SAU-19).
59 General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for Licensing Pay TV
Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters, Exhibit SAU-19, Article 5.1.
60 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112. See also
Qatar's first written submission, para. 113.
61 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No.
(1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113. See also Qatar's
first written submission, para. 113.
62 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112, Article 1.
See also Qatar's first written submission, para. 114.
63 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112, Article 2.
64 Ibid. Article 9.
65 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 47(a), para. 31; and Qatar's responses to Panel
question No. 6(b)(iii), para. 48, and Panel question No. 9(a), para. 69.
66 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 47(b), para. 32; and Qatar's response to Panel
question No. 47(b), paras. 122-127.

broadcasting materials through illegal means". 67 The latter is understood to cover the sale and
making available of illegal decoders, a prohibition that is reinforced by Articles 15 and 17 of the
Implementing Regulations.68 Article 11 of the Implementing Regulations on "Infringement Liability"
extends to secondary liability by providing, inter alia, that "[a]ny person who obtains an original
copy of any intellectual work and exploits it by means of renting, adaptation or permitting others to
copy or reproduce it or any other acts which affect or obstruct the author from exercising his rights
shall be deemed to have infringed the Copyright".69
2.8. With respect to broadcasting organizations, Article 18 of t he Copyright Law provides that the
scope of the Copyright Law shall cover "[w]orks of broadcasting organisations". 70 Article 7 of the
Implementing Regulations provides broadcasting organizations with "the right to prohibit any of the
following acts if under taken without their authorisation: (1) [f]ixation and reproduction of
broadcasts[;] (2) [r]etransmission by wireless means and communication of materials to the
public[;] (3) [d]etermining the means of direct broadcast and reception or through receivers or by
cable[; and] (4) [t]ransmission to the public of radio broadcast in public places or through internal
wire broadcasts of closed compounds".71
2.9. Pursuant to Saudi law, several entities are involved in the initiation, investigation and
adjudication of allegations of infringement of the above-mentioned copyrights and related rights. In
certain cases, the initiation of such procedures and investigatio ns could ultimately lead to the
application by the Saudi government of criminal penalties. Under Article 20 of the Implementing
Regulations, entitled "Detection Tasks", "officials of the General Department of Copyright in Riyadh
and its branches in the Kin gdom's provinces" are "responsible for the task of detecting violations
and securing the evidence proving the existence of an infringement of copyright, such as equipment,
works or commodities". 72 Article 21 of the Implementing Regulations then explains tha t, "upon
receiving the evidence" resulting from the "detection tasks", the "General Department of Copyright
or the competent branch shall" move forward with a number of procedures including "analyzing the
content of evidence", after which it must then prepare a report (pursuant to Article 22).73 Article 23
of the Implementing Regulations, entitled "Investigation of Violations", refers to a "competent
investigating officer", and sets out procedures for the task of investigating. 74 After the Saudi
government performs its investigation, and in accordance with Article 23(11) of the Implementing
Regulations, the "General Department of Copyright shall refer the cases and violations along with
all relevant documents to the Committee".75
2.10. The "Committee" referred to in Article 23(11) of the Implementing Regulations is established
pursuant to Article 25 thereof, entitled "Violation Review Committee". Referred to as the
"Copyright Committee" by Qatar, it is established to adjudicate any allegations of

67 Qatar's first written submission, para. 116 (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law,
Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No.
(1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113, Article 13).
68 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Articles 15 and 17).
69 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Article 11).
70 Ibid. para. 117 (referring to Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424,
30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112, Article 18).
71 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Article 7).
72 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 28 (referring to Implementing Regulations of
Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by
Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113, Article 20 (First)).
73 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Articles 21 and 22).
74 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Article 23).
75 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Article 23(11)).

copyright infringement referred to it. Once the Copyright Committee takes a decision by majority
vote with respect to any such allegations, its decision is subject to a subsequent layer of approval
before it is made final.76
2.11. The elements of the operation of the Copyright Commit tee, insofar as they have been
described generally above, do not appear to be contested by either party. Following the first
substantive meeting with the Panel, however, Saudi Arabia indicated that three resolutions by the
Council of Ministers had amended the Copyright Law or affected the manner in which the Copyright
Committee would operate. 77 More specifically, these amendments concern the question of which
governmental actor is tasked with approving the decisions taken by the Copyright Committee.
2.12. In its u namended form, Article 25(1) of the Copyright Law states that "[a] Committee to
review the violation shall be formed by the Minister [of Culture and Information]'s decision" to review
allegations of copyright infringement.78 Then, under the unamended versions of Article 25(2) of the
Copyright Law and Article 25(6) of the Implementing Regulations, the decisions taken by the
Copyright Committee as to the allegations of copyright infringement referred to it:
a. "shall be endorsed by the Minister" (Article 25(2) o f the Copyright Law) 79; and, more
specifically,
b. "shall be referred by the chairman of the committee to the Minister, and said decisions
shall not be effective unless approved by the Minister" (Article 25(6) of the Implementing
Regulations).80
Qatar thus read the unamended Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations as having required
that the Minister approve or endorse the decisions taken by the Copyright Committee before such
decisions are to have any legal effect.81
2.13. According to Saudi Arabia82, however, the Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations were
amended, such that, under Article 25(2) of the Copyright Law and Article 25(6) of the Implementing
Regulations, the Board of Directors of the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP), not the
Minister, would have the responsibility for endorsing or approving the decisions of the Copyright
Committee.83 The Board of Directors would be composed of 12 government representatives and

76 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112,
Article 25; and Copyright Law, Exhibit SAU-32, Article 25.
77 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26-28. See footnote 82 below for more
information about the amending resolutions. Saudi Arabia addressed this and other factual aspects of the
measures raised by Qatar for the purpose of demonstrating its "good faith conduct in connection with the
invocation of the security exception" in Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, and asks that this be clearly
reflected in the Report. (Saudi Arabia's comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, p. 2.)
78 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112,
Article 25(1).
79 Qatar's second written submission, para. 105 (quoting Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2
Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112, Article 25(2)). (emphasis omitted)
80 Qatar's second written submission, para. 105 (quoting Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law,
Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No.
(1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113, Article 25(6)). (emphasis omitted)
81 See, e.g. Qatar's first written submission, paras. 119, 121, 140, 152, 350, 381 and 401-402; and
Qatar's second written submission, paras. 93-94, 104-105, 109, 191, 200 and 218.
82 Saudi Arabia submitted the amended versions of its Copyright Law and its Implementing Regulations,
as well as the three resolutions that either amended the text of the Copyright Law or defined the composition
of the Board of Directors. (See Copyright Law, Exhibit SAU-32, Article 25(2); and Saudi Arabia's response to
Panel question No. 48, paras. 33-36 (referring to Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 536 in 2018
(19/10/1439 H), Exhibit SAU-42; Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H),
Exhibit SAU-43; Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H), Exhibit SAU-44; and
Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1),
29 May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and Resolution of the Board of Directors of
the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/1440 AH, Exhibit SAU-45)).
83 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26 and 27 (referring to Copyright Law,
Exhibit SAU-32, Article 25(2)); and Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and
Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and
Resolution of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated

three non-governmental stakeholders, appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers on the
proposal of the President of the Council. 84 The amendments to the Copyright Law and the
Implementing Regulations would also replace, in Articles 1 and 24 of the Copyright Law and Article
1 of the Implementing Regulations, the terms "Min istry" (referring to the Ministry of Culture and
Information) and "Minister" (referring to the Minister of Culture and Information), with the terms
"Authority" (referring to the SAIP) and "Board of Directors" (referring to the SAIP's Board of
Directors), respectively. The replacement of both sets of terms also appears to have taken place in
Articles 16(1), 16(3), 22 and 26 of the Copyright Law.85
2.14. Qatar note d that the amended versions of the Copyright Law 86 and Implementing
Regulations87 do not appear to be publicly available, and thus it questioned whether these versions
have entered into force. In particular, Qatar noted that the amended Implementing Regulations were
not issued until 9 May 2019, approximate ly six months after the establishment of the Panel. Qatar
requested the Panel to consider the Implementing Regulations at the time of the Panel's
establishment (i.e. 18 December 2018)88, but also noted that "[r]egardless of the precise identity of
the gate keeper—the Ministry or a Board of Directors consisting mostly of high-ranking government
officials … — Saudi Arabia's copyright regime requires mandatory political approval to make any
enforcement of copyright effective for both civil and criminal remedies".89
2.15. Finally, Qatar stated that it understood that the Copyright Committee "is the sole entity
responsible for copyright infringement"90 and "has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence
of criminal piracy and to determine the resulting penalties".91 However, Saudi Arabia submitted that
the SAIP also has responsibilities relating to copyright enforcement.92
2.2.2 The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it
2.16. The issues that arise in this dispute must be understood in the context of the s erious
deterioration of relations between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and certain other countries from the MENA

4/9/1440 AH, Exhibit SAU-45, Article 20). See also Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 536 in 2018
(19/10/1439 H), Exhibit SAU-42, p. 5 of PDF file.
84 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 27 (referring to Council of Ministers'
Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H), Exhibit SAU-43, p. 13 of PDF file; and Council of Ministers'
Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H), Exhibit SAU-44, p. 10 of PDF file).
85 Compare Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M-41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT-112,
Articles 1, 16(1), 16 (3) 22, 24 and 26, with Copyright Law, Exhibit SAU-32, Articles 1, 16(1), 16 (3) 22, 24
and 26; and compare Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT-113,
Article 1, with Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No.
(1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and Resolution of the Board of
Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/1440 AH, Exhibit SAU-45,
Article 1.
86 Qatar indicated that the Arabic version of the Copyright Law available on the homepage of the
website of the SAIP and the website of the Saudi Embassy to the United States reflects the Copyright Law prior
to its amendment. The link to the English version of the Copyright Law on the SAIP website directed the user
to a page from the "Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers" entitled "Page not found 404". (Qatar's
second written submission, para. 111. See also Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question
No. 49, para. 110.) Qatar also expressed concerns that the amended Copyright Law has not been notified to
the TRIPS Council pursuant to Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. (Ibid. paras. 101 and 111.)
87 Qatar noted that the publicly available version of the Implementing Regulations does not reflect the
amendment made thereto, and that, presumably, the publicly available version remains in force.
(Qatar's second written submission, paras. 106-108. See also Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to
Panel question No. 49, para. 110.) Qatar also expressed concerns that the amended Implementing Regulations
have not been notified to the TRIPS Council pursuant to Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. (Ibid. para. 111.)
88 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 49, para. 108; and Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's
response to Panel question No. 49, para. 108.
89 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 93-94. See also, ibid. paras. 104-109, 191, 200 and 218.
90 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 120, 152, 350, 381 and 401.
91 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 30. As described in paragraph 2.9 above, Qatar noted
that, in addition to the adjudicative role of the Copyright Committee, "other elements of the Saudi government
are, pursuant to Saudi law, allocated the role of initiating criminal procedures that would ultimately lead to
criminal penalties". (See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 26-31.)
92 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 34.

region.93 On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other nations severed all relations with Qatar.94
In their respective submissions to the Panel, t he disputing parties (and the UAE as a third party)
each referred to the 5 June 2017 severance and/or the events leading up to the severance and, as
noted below, the disputing parties characterized the severance of relations as constituting relevant
"background" to the measures at issue in this dispute.
2.17. Saudi Arabia characterized the events leading up to its severance of relations with Qatar as
"relevant background information".95 However, Saudi Arabia went further, submitting also that the
"severance of relations between the two countries and the publicly-stated reasons for the measures
of Saudi Arabia constitute the only relevant facts in this dispute".96
2.18. For its part, Qatar explained in its first written submission that the "rampant piracy at issue
in this dispute has occurred against the background of Saudi Arabia having imposed, since 5 June
2017, a scheme of coercive economic measures against Qatar".97 In its panel request, Qatar stated
also that:
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia imposed a scheme of diplomatic, political, and economic
measures against Qatar. Such measures impacted, inter alia , the ability of Qatari
nationals to protect intellectual property rights in Saudi Arabia. … The multiple Qatari
companies severely impacted by these measures include beIN Me dia Group LLC and
affiliates ("beIN").98
2.19. According to Saudi Arabia, especially since 2011, "the security situation in many countries in
the [MENA] region has been unstable, with wars, terrorism, and instability prevailing in many places
for many different reasons, causing a devastating effect on human life and on the stability of national
governments and multiple crises in international relations". 99 Saudi Arabia provided the following
summary of and perspective on the events leading up to the 5 June 2017 sev erance. The Panel
expresses or implies no position concerning any of these allegations . The Panel further recalls that
Qatar, while maintaining that many of Saudi Arabia's assertions about the events leading up to the
severance of relations are irrelevant to the specific measures at issue, strongly denied certain
accusations made by Saudi Arabia. Among other things, Qatar maintains that the period leading up
to that date was characterized by cordial and cooperative relations between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia.100
2.20. In the context of its discussion of the security situation, Saudi Arabia submit ted that "years
of active diplomacy at the highest national levels" took place within the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC),101 a regional council established by Saudi Arabia, Bahra in, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the

93 See Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 2 ("There is no question
that a significant dispute has arisen among the complaining Party, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates.")
94 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1-2; and United Arab Emirates' third-party
submission, para. 24 (referring to the United Arab Emirates' 5 June Declaration, Exhibit ARE-6). See also
Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46 (referring to United Arab Emirates'
5 June Declaration, Exhibit ARE-6; and Kingdom of Bahrain Ministry Foreign Affairs News Details, Statement of
the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar, 5 June 2017).
Saudi Arabia states that the Panel "may also take judicial notice of the fact that other Members of the WTO
have taken similar measures in response to the actions of the complaining Member". (Saudi Arabia's first
written submission, para. 2.)
95 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting, para. 23.
96 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 2. In keeping with its view that these are the only
relevant facts in this dispute, Saudi Arabia states that:
Saudi Arabia's only comment regarding the substance of the complaint in this dispute, and
regarding references to the relevant company of the complaining Party, is that issues with the
company began in 2016, and there never was a relationship between the company, on the one
hand, and any measures taken by Saudi Arabia in connection with the break in diplomatic and
consular relations, on the other hand. Any issue that the company may have is unrelated to the
real dispute between Saudi Arabia and the complaining Party. (Saudi Arabia's opening statement
97 Qatar's first written submission, para. 14.
98 Qatar's panel request, paras. 6-7.
99 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 24.
100 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 96-103.
101 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 17.

UAE.102 According to Saudi Arabia, it and other GCC Countries "have acted, individually where
necessary and collectively wherever possible, to uproot the sources of instability in our region". 103
Saudi Arabia stated that "[c]onsistent with this commitment", in November 2013, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar and the UAE signed the "First Riyadh Agreement", which established a collective understanding
of the causes for, and solutions to, instability and violence in the region.104
2.21. The First Riyadh Agreement included a collective commitment by signatories to refrain from
taking certain actions that were identified as the cause of instability, and which are set out in the
three paragraphs of the First Riyadh Agreement. 105 The First Riyadh Agreemen t set forth the
following obligations:
1. No interference in the internal affairs of the Council's states, whether directly or
indirectly. Not to give harbor or naturalize any citizen of the Council states that has an activity
which opposes his country's regimes, except with the approval of his country; no support to
deviant groups that oppose their states; and no support for antagonistic media.
2. No support to the Muslim Brotherhood or any of the organizations, groups or individuals
that threaten the se curity and stability of the Council States through direct security work or
through political influence.
3. Not to present any support to any faction in Yemen that could pose a threat to countries
neighboring Yemen.106
2.22. On 5 March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain issued a statement withdrawing their
ambassadors from Qatar. In the statement, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain took the position
that Qatar had not taken necessary actions to put into effect the commitments contained in the First
Riyadh Agreement of 23 and 24 November 2013.107 The statement referred, among other things, to
the principle "not to support all of the actions that threaten the security and stability of the GCC
Countries by organisations or individuals, either through direct security work or by attempting
political influence as well as not supporting hostile media".108
2.23. The Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement was signed by all GCC Countries on
17 April 2014 and set forth implementation procedures regarding the obligations contained in the
Riyadh Agreement. It identified certain agreed threats to the security and stability of GCC Countries,
reaffirmed the obligations undertaken in the First Riyadh Agreement, and established specific
procedures to ensure compliance with commitments undertaken. It also reiterated a nd expanded
upon the obligations listed in the First Agreement relating to the "Internal Security" of GCC
Countries, their "Foreign Policy" and their "Internal Affairs". The Implementing Mechanism further
clarified that "[i]f any country of the GCC Countries failed to comply with this mechanism, the other
GCC Countries shall have the right to take an[y] appropriate action to protect their security and
stability".109
2.24. On 16 November 2014, the GCC Countries found it necessary to enter into the
"Supplementary Riyadh Agreement".110 Under the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, GCC Countries
undertook, among other things, "not to give refuge, employ, or support whether directly or
indirectly, whether domestically or abroad, to any person or media apparatus that harbors
inclinations harmful to any [GCC] state".111 It further stated that all signatories were committed to
"ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms, whether

102 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5. See also Implementing
Mechanism, Exhibit SAU-3, p. 11.
103 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 25.
104 Ibid. para. 26. See First Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU-2.
105 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26. See First Riyadh
Agreement, Exhibit SAU-2.
106 First Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU-2, p. 5.
107 Joint Statement of 5 March 2014, Exhibit SAU-5, p. 2 of PDF file.
108 Ibid.
109 Implementing Mechanism, Exhibit SAU-3, p. 11.
110 Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU-4.
111 Ibid. para. 3(c).

directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on Al Jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr,
and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media".112
2.25. In connection with the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE
returned their ambassadors to Qatar in November 2014. 113 However, Saudi Arabia assert ed that,
between November 2014 and June 2017, Qatar continued to violate the explicitly agreed terms of
the Riyadh Agreements by supporting and harbouring extremist individuals and organizations, many
of whom had been designate d as terrorists by the United Nations and by individual countries 114;
supporting and allowing terrorist and extremist groups to use Qatar -based and Qatar -sponsored
media platforms to spread their messages 115; and "[e]ngaging in activities that threatened the
security and stability of GCC Countries as detailed in reports by intelligence chiefs, including as
mandated under the Riyadh Agreements, the details of which will not be presented in the context of
this WTO dispute".116
2.26. On 19 February 2017, Qatar's Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Secretary General of the
GCC calling upon the GCC Countries to "agree to terminate the Riyadh Agreement which has been
overtaken by events at the international and regional levels."117 Saudi Arabia said that it considered
this letter to amount to "a repudiation by Qatar of its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements" 118
(to which Qatar responded that the letter could not reasonably be read in that manner119).
2.27. Saudi Arabia asserted that, between 19 February 2017 and 5 June 2017, Qatar continued to
act against Saudi Arabia's essential security interests, in violation of the terms of the
Riyadh Agreements. Saudi Arabia assert ed that, in addition to continuing to harbour and support
extremists and terrorists, Qatar ha d purportedly made ransom payments to secure the release of
kidnapped members of the Qatari royal family.120 (Qatar responded that these assertions should be
rejected as having no basis in fact.121)
2.28. According to Saudi Arabia, it was in the light of the above developments, and following
Saudi Arabia's further consideration of remaining viable options to protect its essential security
interests in view of Qatar's failure to abide by its commitments under the Riyadh Agreement, tha t
Saudi Arabia determined that severing all diplomatic and consular relations would be the only way
to protect effectively its sovereign interests.122
2.29. On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia severed relations with Qatar, including diplomatic and consular
relations, t he closure of all ports , the prevention of Qatari nationals from crossing into Saudi
territory, and the expulsion within 14 days of Qatari residents and visitors in Saudi territories . On
the same day, Saudi Arabia publicly articulated the rationale behind the measures in the following
terms:

112 Ibid. para. 3(d).
113 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 32.
114 Ibid. para. 33, first bullet (referring to Saudi Arabia and Regional Security, Qatar's History of Funding
Terrorism and Extremism, 27 June 2017, Exhibit SAU-6)).
115 Ibid. para. 33, second bullet (referring to Qatar's Al Jazeera, Counter Extremism Project, visited
7 July 2019; Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood, The Washington Post,
5 January 2014, Exhibit SAU-7).
116 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 33, third bullet.
117 Letter from H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to H.E.
Dr. Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the GCC, 19 February 2017, Exhibit ARE-3. According
to the United Arab Emirates, the text should be translated as saying that "the subject of this agreement has
been exhausted", that "this agreement must be terminated since the purpose of it has been completed", and
that "the reliance on the Riyadh Agreement and the abandonment of the Charter and its other mechanisms do
not serve the interests and objectives of the GCC"; according to Qatar, it should be translated as "the subject
matter of this Agreement has been exhausted" and "this agreement should be terminated due to the
exhaustion of its purpose", and "relying on the Riyadh Agreement and abandoning the GCC Charter and its
other mechanisms do not achieve the interests or goals of the GCC". (See Qatar's communication to the Panel,
dated 2 July 2019, and the United Arab Emirates' response, dated 10 July 2019. (emphasis added))
118 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34.
119 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 301-305.
120 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 35-37.
121 Qatar's second written submission, para. 298.
122 Ibid. para. 37.

[T]he Government of … Saudi Arabia emanating from exercising its sovereign rights
guaranteed by [] international law and protecting its national security from the dangers
of terrorism and extremism has decided to sever diplomatic and consular relations with
the State of Qatar, close all land, sea and air ports, prevent crossing into Saudi
territories, airspace and territorial waters.123
2.2.3 The broadcasting operations of the Qatari-based beIN Media Group
2.30. beIN Media Group LLC (beIN) is a global sports and entertainment company headquartered
in Qatar.124
2.31. To build its business, beIN has made substantial investments in acquiring licences to
broadcast content produced by major international right holders. To this end, it has obtaine d the
exclusive rights to broadcast, and to authorize others to broadcast, prime sporting competitions in
the MENA region, including in Saudi Arabia. 125 beIN's content includes, but is not limited to,
broadcasts of: the major European football leagues, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
Association, the National Football League, the US Open Tennis Championships, the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, the Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA) Champions League and many others.126
2.32. The rights to broadcast this content have been licensed on a territorial basis, and beIN holds
exclusive rights to broadcast in the territory of Saudi Arabia. 127 As a licensor and commercial
broadcaster of sports and entertainment content, beIN's revenues are largely generated from
subscriptions to beIN's television packages. Saudi Arabia is the largest and most important market
in the MENA region, and is strategically important to beIN and its right holders.128
2.33. beIN generally owns the copyright in: ( a) any match/event commentary produced by beIN
(for example, Arabic match commentary) on particular matches/events; (b) any studio programming
produced in and around the relevant live matches/events (excluding any match/event footage
included within such studio programming but including any beIN filmed player/manager interviews,
and other beIN produced non -match footage); ( c) beIN logos (including on -screen channel bugs)
included within the relevant transmission; and ( d) any beIN commissioned/owned musical works
included within the relevant transmissions.129
2.34. In addition, beIN owns the related rights 130 conferred on broadcasting organizations 131,
including the right to prohibit u nauthorized fixations, reproductions of fixations and rebroadcasting
by wireless means of broadcasts, as well as communications to the public of television broadcasts
of the same.132

123 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular
relations with Qatar, 5 June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., Press
Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar,
5 June 2017, Exhibit SAU-1. See also Saudi Press Agency Website, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic
and consular relations with Qatar", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-2.
124 Qatar's first written submission, para. 29 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 2).
125 Ibid. paras. 29 and 30 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019,
Exhibit QAT-37, para. 6).
126 Ibid. para. 31 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 7).
127 Ibid. para. 32 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 7).
128 Ibid. para. 34 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 8).
129 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), para. 34 (quoting Supplemental Declaration by
beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, para. 7). See also Supplemental Declaration, para. 16.
130 Article 14 of the TRIPS Agreement covers three categories of "related rights", or rights related to
copyright. These are the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.
131 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), para. 34 (quoting Supplemental Declaration by beIN
Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, paras. 10 and 16).
132 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 340-352; and Qatar's response to Panel question
No. 6(b)(i), paras. 34-36. beIN provided examples from its contracts with various right holders demonstrating

2.35. In some instances, beIN had the right to take action under the Saudi Copyright Law in respect
of an infringed copyright work or related right where beIN is not the owner of that right. 133 For
example, pursuant to beIN’s media rights agreement with UEFA National Team Football, beIN may
commence legal proceedings for infringement of the underlying copyright work belonging to UEFA,
with UEFA’s prior written consent. In general, given that beIN typically owns the copyright for
multiple aspects of the works that it broadcasts, it would be expected that beIN and the relevant
sports league (e.g., UEFA) would ordinarily bring a copyright infringement action together, as co -
plaintiffs.134
2.36. Following Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017, the Saudi Ministry
of Culture and Information blocked access to beIN's website in Saudi Arabia since early June 2017.135
Since that time, customers connecting from a Saudi internet protocol address have been redirected
to a page stating that beIN websites violate Saudi law.136
2.37. On 19 June 2017, the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and GCAM issued a Circular,
which stated that beIN was not licensed to distribute media content, and did not have the right to
operate, in Saudi Arabia.137 The Circular also provided that any distribution of media content either
via satellites or through other means and platforms, and the charging and collection of related fees
in Saudi Arabia without obtaining the necessary licences from the appropriate authorities:
shall subject the distributors of such media content and content licensors, hardware
suppliers, and their owners in their individual capacity to criminal prosecution and
personal litigation and shall result in the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss
of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights.138
2.38. On 11 July 2017 , the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority issued a Decision suspending and
prohibiting "all monetary operations in all methods of payment either through credit cards, payment
cards, transfers or any other method to the said company either for new subscription s or any
renewals in its channels or services".139 The Decision referred directly to the Saudi Ministry of Culture
and Information and GCAM's Circular of 19 June 2017, which Qatar says was to prohibit beIN sports
channels in Saudi Arabia and to severely limit beIN's ability to operate in Saudi Arabia.140
2.39. The parties h eld different views as to the time periods during which beIN had a licence to
operate in Saudi Arabia. According to Saudi Arabia, beIN was not licensed and did not have the right
to operate in Saudi Arabia between December 2016 and June 2017 (or thereafter). 141 According to

that beIN retains copyright in its own works and the related rights in its broadcasts. (See Qatar's response to
Panel question No. 45, para. 105 (referring to the Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, paras. 7-16).)
133 beIN has to date not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals,
and neither has any other foreign right holder. See paragraph 7.37 of this Report.
134 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(ii), paras. 37-38, and 6(b)(iii), para. 50 (referring to the
Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, para. 14).
135 Qatar's first written submission, para. 39 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 12; and Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information,
15 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT-38).
136 Ibid. (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 12).
137 Qatar's first written submission, para. 40 (referring to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and
General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, Exhibit QAT-1). Saudi Arabia confirmed that although the
Circular was not "officially reflected" in the records of the Ministry of Media, or "officially issued" by the
Government of Saudi Arabia, the text of the Circular accurately reflects Saudi law. Saudi Arabia added, inter
alia, that the Circular was informative in nature only and did not change the status of or revoke the legal rights
of any entity. (Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 10-12 and 33.)
In response to a Panel question, Saudi Arabia stated that "[t]here is no specific 'applicable law' that penalizes
an unlicensed entity with the loss of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights." (Saudi
Arabia's response to Panel question Nos. 11(b) and 29, paras. 2 and 29.)
138 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,
Exhibit QAT-1, p. 2.
139 Qatar's first written submission, para. 42 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 15; and Saudi Monetary Authority, Confidential Circular, 11 July 2017
(Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT-39).
140 Ibid. (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 15).
141 Letter from GCAM to beIN, Exhibit SAU-29; and Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 41,
para. 26 (referring to Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 12).

Qatar, beIN understood at all times until early June 2017 that it was operating with the approval of
GCAM under a valid licence, pending the formal renewal of its pre-existing Pay TV Licence.142
2.2.4 The emergence of beoutQ
2.40. Qatar provided the following summary of and perspective on the emergence of the
broadcasting entity known as beoutQ, and the following facts do not appear to be contested. In
August 2017, beoutQ began the unauthorized d istribution and streaming of media content that is
created by or licensed to beIN, and beIN continues to broadcast in the MENA region. 143 The name
"beoutQ", i.e. "be out Qatar", is a play on the name beIN Sports. 144 beoutQ illegally streams and
broadcasts the contents of beIN's sports channels, replacing beIN's logo with that of beoutQ. 145 It
provides access to 10 beIN sports channels (both live and pre -recorded by beoutQ).146 In addition
to pirated versions of live broadcasts 147, beoutQ also creates unauthorized reproductions of those
broadcasts for later replay as reruns.148
2.41. While beoutQ initially limited its activities to streaming pirated content online, it expanded to
the retail sale of beoutQ -branded set -top boxes (STBs) throughout Sa udi Arabia and other
countries.149 These STBs receive satellite broadcasts of pirated content and, as discussed further
below, they also provide access to Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) applications offering thousands
of pirated movies, TV shows and TV channels around the globe.150 Web streaming appears to have
been terminated in favour of beoutQ's satellite-based broadcasting to STBs.151
2.42. There are reports that beoutQ STBs and subscriptions have been widely available in Saudi
retail outlets since the autumn of 2017.152 The beoutQ STBs available in the above-referenced stores
in November 2017 allegedly ranged in price from between Saudi Arabian Riyals (SAR) 360 – SAR
400 (approximately USD 95 – 110).153 In September 2018, investigators reportedly found beoutQ
STBs for sale in 16 electronics shops visited in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam.154 These beoutQ STBs
allegedly ranged in price from between SAR 330 – SAR 370 (approximately USD 89 – 99).155
2.43. In addition to generating revenue through sales of STBs and subscription s, beoutQ allegedly
sells advertising slots on its 10 pirated channels, and publishes its advertising rates in Saudi Riyals
on its website (e.g., Premier League "gold packages" for advertising priced at SAR 2,500,000 or

142 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 42, para. 43.
143 Qatar's first written submission, para. 47 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 17).
144 Ibid. para. 35.
145 Ibid. para. 48. See, e.g. beoutQ pirated broadcast of Champions League, Video, Exhibit QAT-43;
beoutQ pirated broadcast of Europa League, Video, Exhibit QAT-44; beoutQ pirated broadcast of FIFA World
Cup game between Croatia and England of 2018, Video, Exhibit QAT-45; beoutQ pirated broadcast of
Formula 1, Video, Exhibit QAT-46; and beoutQ pirated broadcast of NBA final games between the Cleveland
Cavaliers and the Golden State Warriors of 2018, Video, Exhibit QAT-47.
146 Qatar's first written submission, para. 36.
147 See, e.g. beoutQ-pirated broadcast of NFL Super Bowl LIII game between New England Patriots and
Philadelphia Eagles, Video, 4 February 2018, Exhibit QAT-72; Images of beoutQ pirated broadcast of
4 February 2018 NFL Super Bowl Half-Time Show, Exhibit QAT-73; and Country-by-Country Examples of
beoutQ Pirated Content (2018), Exhibit QAT-74.
148 Qatar's first written submission. para. 48. See, e.g. 2017-2019 Sampling of Live and Replayed
Content Broadcast on beoutQ, Exhibit QAT-48.
149 Qatar's first written submission, para. 37.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid. para. 78.
152 Ibid. para. 61 (referring to Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in
Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71).
153 Ibid. para. 62 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 39).
154 Ibid. para. 63 (referring to Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in
Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71).
155 Ibid. para. 64 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 37).

approximately USD 666,638).156 Moreover, many of the advertisements shown on beoutQ channels
are reportedly for Saudi products.157
2.44. beoutQ has promoted its pirated streams on a variety of social media platforms, including
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. 158 Additionally, beoutQ has circulated an an ti-beIN cartoon
encouraging Saudi citizens and beIN's licensors to replace beIN with beoutQ. 159 beoutQ packaging
and promotional material in Saudi retail outlets explicitly advertises the availability of sports content
exclusively licensed to beIN.160
2.45. While the focus of beoutQ's broadcasting activities was initially on sports content, it has
expanded to cover the most popular movies and television programming in the world.161 In addition
to illegally providing access to beIN channels 1 -10, the beoutQ STBs come pre-loaded with IPTV
applications and portals that lead to other pirated content. Allegedly, the beoutQ custom app store,
which comes pre -loaded on the device, contains 25 applications (apps), including 12 IPTV apps,
which are used to watch live television and video-on-demand (VOD) content over the Internet. Some
of these apps allegedly offer between 2,300 and 4,000 live or recorded television channels from all
over the world with thousands of movies available in different languages, and up to 35,000 TV show
episodes.162 The Show Box application, which has come to be known as the "Netflix of piracy",
provides free access to more than 4,700 movies, 700 TV -shows and 35,000 TV-show episodes via
streaming or direct download to the STB . The other five IPTV appli cations tested by beIN offer
thousands of live television channels in addition to VOD content and require activation codes
(subscriptions) that can be purchased online. These applications offer all major US and European
television channels, live US sports events and movies and TV shows in English and other languages.
Some of these IPTV applications also broadcast the pirate beoutQ sports channels.163
2.3 The measures at issue
2.46. According to Qatar, the measures at issue "include the following specific acts and/or
omissions:
(i) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that result in Qatari nationals being unable to protect
their intellectual property rights, including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks
and other forms of intellectual property;
(ii) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that result in failure to accord Qatari nationals
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to Saudi Arabia's own nationals or
nationals of other countries, with regard to the protection of intellectual property rights,
including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks and other forms of intellectual
property;
(iii) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that make it unduly difficult, for Qatari nationals to
access civil judicial remedies, or to seek remedies, in respect of enforcement of
intellectual property rights, including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks and
other forms of intellectual property rights; and,

156 Ibid. para. 67 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 47; beoutQ advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi Riyals, Exhibit QAT-75).
157 Ibid. para. 67 (referring to beoutQ advertisements for Saudi brands, Exhibit QAT-76).
158 Ibid. para. 49 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 21; and Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41).
159 Ibid. para. 50 (referring to beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ, Video, 21 September 2018,
Exhibit QAT-49).
160 Qatar's first written submission, para. 71 (referring to Images of beoutQ promotional material,
Exhibit QAT-42).
161 Ibid. paras. 72-77.
162 Ibid. (referring to NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "IPTV Piracy on BeoutQ STBs", 25 November 2018,
Exhibit QAT-79).
163 Ibid.

(iv) Saudi Arabia's omission to prosecute, as a criminal violation, piracy on a commercial
scale, of material in which copyright is owned by, or licensed to, Qatari nationals."164
2.47. Qatar submit ted that the above "acts and omissions" are "reflected" in the following
"evidence", which may also be analysed as specific "measures" at issue in this proceeding165:
a. the 19 June 2017 Circular allegedly issued by the Ministry of Culture and Information
and GCAM which, according to Qatar, served effectively to strip beIN of the legal right
to protect any intellectual property rights related to the beIN channels;
b. so-called "anti-sympathy measures" allegedly imposed shortly after the severance of
relations on 5 June 2017, and which allegedly subject lawyers based in Saudi Arabia to
legal jeopardy if they express support for and/or provide assistance to Qatar and Qatari
nationals, and thereby prevent beIN from securing legal representation needed to
access civil enforcement procedures against the infringement of its intellectual property
rights;
c. the travel restrictions, imposed on or shortly after 5 June 2017, to the extent that they,
in combination with the anti-sympathy measures and other measures, allegedly prevent
beIN from being able to access civil enforcement procedures against the infringement
of its intellectual property rights by initiating procedures or testifying in person;
d. the Ministerial approval requirement of Copyright Committee decisions which, as applied
to beIN, allegedly p revents beIN from being able to access civil and criminal 166
enforcement procedures against the infringement of its intellectual property rights;
e. Saudi Arabia's alleged failure to apply criminal procedures and penalties against
beoutQ167, despite the evidence that beoutQ's activities constitute copyright piracy on
a commercial scale and the evidence that it is directed and controlled by persons and
entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia; and
f. Saudi Arabia's alleged promotion of public ga therings with screenings of
beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts.
2.48. Qatar assert ed that certain of these measures "work together" 168 to prevent beIN from
accessing Saudi courts and tribunals to protect its intellectual property rights, and stresses that it
challenges their "combined operation".169
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. Qatar claims that these measures, in different combinations, violate multiple obligations in
Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement, as follows:
a. Part I of the TRIPS Agreement:

164 Qatar's panel request, para. 13; and Qatar's first written submission, para. 141.
165 Qatar's first written submission, para. 142; and Qatar's response to Panel question No. 2(a),
para. 18.
166 The Panel understands Qatar to argue that this measure prevents beIN from accessing criminal
enforcement procedures insofar as access to the Copyright Committee could result in the application of criminal
procedures and penalties. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 30.)
167 The Panel understands this measure to extend beyond the effect of the Ministerial approval
requirement of Copyright Committee decisions, as confirmed by Qatar's explanation to that effect. According to
Qatar, this measure "goes beyond the omissions (and gatekeeping function) of the Copyright Committee to
encompass omissions by all Saudi government agencies and authorities that have the authority to initiate
criminal procedures and penalties that would ensure that Saudi Arabia complies with its obligation to 'provide
for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied' against the beoutQ piracy." Thus, it is Qatar's view that
"[b]eyond the Copyright Committee, however, other elements of the Saudi government are, pursuant to Saudi
law, allocated the role of initiating criminal procedures that would ultimately lead to application of criminal
penalties." (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 28-29.)
168 Qatar's second written submission, para. 290.
169 Ibid. para. 276.

i. Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (national treatment), because they accord to
Qatari nationals treatment that is less favourable than that accorded to Saudi
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property; and
ii. Article 4 of the T RIPS Agreement (most -favoured-nation treatment), because,
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, they fail to extend
immediately and unconditionally to Qatari nationals advantages granted to
nationals of other countries.
b. Part II of the TRIPS Agreement:
i. Articles 9(1); 11; 11 bis(1)(i), (ii) and (iii); and 11 ter of the Berne Convention
(1971), as incorporated into Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail
to provide authors of works with the exclusive rights mandated therein; and
ii. Article 14(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to provide broadcasting
organizations with the requisite exclusive rights specified therein.
c. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement:
i. Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to make available to
Qatari nationals enforcement procedures, as specified in Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement;
ii. Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to make available to
Qatari nationals civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of
intellectual property rights, including inter alia the right to be represented by
independent legal counsel; and
iii. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to provide for the application
of criminal procedures and penalties to the wilful commercial scale piracy of
beIN's copyrighted material.170
3.2. Qatar request s that, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, t he Panel recommend that
Saudi Arabia bring its measures into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.171
3.3. Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel reject Qatar's claims in this dispute in their entirety, and
stated that "the Panel has multiple avenues to end its work without addressing the substantive
claims that have been raised in this case, including by:
• recognizing that Security Exceptions have been invoked;
• confirming that Saudi Arabia's actions are justified under Article 73 of the
TRIPS Agreement;
• referencing Article 3.4 of the DSU and the impossibility of issuing a recommendation or
ruling 'aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter' or Article 3.7 of the DSU
and the impossibility of securing a positive solution to the dispute; and/or
• barring t he claim because it has not been brought in good faith with the intention of
addressing substantive WTO rules."172
3.4. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia submit s that "the information that Saudi Arabia has provided to
support the Panel's 'objective assessment' of [its] good faith conduct in connection with the

170 Qatar's first written submission, para. 443; and Qatar's second written submission, para. 310.
171 Qatar's first written submission, para. 444; and Qatar's second written submission, para. 311.
172 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 70.

invocation of the Security Exception in Article 73 establishes the absence of any substantive violation
of the TRIPS Agreement".173
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel
in accordance with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1 and B-2).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan,
Norway, Russia, Singapore, Ukraine, the UAE and the United States are reflected in their executive
summaries, provided in accordance with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex
C). India, Korea, Mexico, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and Yemen did not submit written or oral arguments
to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 Introduction
6.1. On 16 March 2020, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 30 March 2020, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia each submitted written requests for the Panel to review aspects of the
Interim Report. On 14 April 2020, Qatar submitted comments on Saudi Arabia's requests for review.
Saudi Arabia did not submit any comments on Qatar's requests for review. Neither party requested
an interim review meeting.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out the
Panel's response to the parties' requests made at the interim review stage. The Panel generally
addresses the parties' requests in dividually and in sequence according to the sections and
paragraphs to which such requests pertain. To avoid repetition, the Panel addresses related requests
together where possible.
6.3. In addition to the requests for substantive modifications that are discussed below, various
corrections or improvements of a typographical or minor editorial nature were made to the Report,
including but not limited to those suggested by the parties in their interim review comments.
The discussion below refers to the paragraph numbering in the Final Report.
6.2 General issues
Saudi Arabia's non-engagement with facts or arguments presented by Qatar

6.4. Saudi Arabia suggests that the Panel seems to attribute the establishment of certain facts and
positions on arguments in both section 7.2 and section 7.3 of the Report to the lack of engagement
by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia requests that , in all instances where the Pa nel suggests that its
findings are based in part on "uncontested", "unrebutted", or "unrefuted" facts, for example, the
Panel add a sentence stating that: "The Panel recalls that Saudi Arabia did not engage with facts or
arguments presented by Qatar in the dispute settlement proceedings consistent with its position
under Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement. " Saudi Arabia specifically requests the addition of this
sentence to body text or footnotes accompanying paragraphs 7.6, 7.37, 7.40, 7.59, 7.64, 7.115,
7.154, 7.159, 7.160 and 7.174. In its comments on some of these paragraphs, Saudi Arabia also
requests that "the Panel confirm how it ensured an objective assessment of evidence given that
Saudi Arabia did not address any claims or respond to any evidence submitted by [Qatar]".
6.5. Qatar offers several reasons why the Panel should reject these requests:
a. First, paragraph 1.10 of the Report already recognizes that "[t]hroughout the
proceeding, Saudi Arabia took the position that , … it would not interact, or have any
direct or indirect engagement, with Qatar in any way in this dispute".174 Qatar considers

173 Ibid. para. 72.
174 Emphasis added by Qatar.

that paragraphs 1.10 to 1.14 of the Report accurately summarize
Saudi Arabia's position and its consequences, and that no modifications are required to
any portion of the Report to reiterate these points.
b. Second, Qatar submits that although Saudi Arabia asserted throughout the proceedings
that it was "not engaging" with Qatar, Saudi Arabia availed itself of all the available
opportunities to present its case to the Panel. Specifically, Saudi Arabia responded to
the facts and legal arguments presented by Qatar in multiple submissions and through
presenting its own factual evidence and arguments concerning each of the six measures
that Qatar challenged. Saudi Arab ia submitted 44 exhibits in these proceedings, and
participated actively in each of the two substantive meetings with the Panel. Qatar lists
multiple key factual and legal assertions that Saudi Arabia placed on the record, as often
highlighted in the Panel 's own summary of Saudi Arabia 's arguments in the Report .
Even in Saudi Arabia 's comments on the Interim Report, Saudi Arabia calls the
Panel's attention to specific arguments that it made (and evidence that it submitted) to
the Panel, and Saudi Arabia asks that the Panel reflect these arguments and evidence
in its Report.
c. Third, Qatar notes that , in paragraph 7.40 of the Report, the Panel already explained
how it ensured an objective assessment insofar as Saudi Arabia did not contest one or
more claims. The Panel recalled that, in those WTO cases where a responding party did
not contest one or more claims raised by the complainant, panels have consistently
proceeded on the basis that they were nonetheless required to satisfy themselves that
the complainant had established a prima facie case of violation in order to rule in the
complainant's favour. Accordingly, the Panel considered it important to confirm that,
before considering any exceptions or lines of defence invoked by Saudi Arabia, the Panel
must first satisfy itself that Qatar has established a prima facie case in relation to each
of the mea sures and claims at issue, including through Qatar's written and oral
submissions.
d. Finally, insofar as Saudi Arabia is challenging the merits of the Panel 's analysis and
findings, and asking the Panel to defend its analysis, Qatar contends that such a request
would fall outside of the limited scope of interim review. Qatar states that the Panel
should reject Saudi Arabia's proposed revisions to the Interim Report to the extent they
seek to challenge the merits of the Panel's analysis and findings and to reargue the facts
and law.
6.6. The Panel has revised paragraphs 7.2 and 7.40 in the light of the parties' comments.
6.7. In the context of making the above-mentioned requests, Saudi Arabia reiterates its argument
that, in paragraphs 7.40, 7.59, 7.160 and 7.174 of the Interim Report, the Panel should take special
care to ensure that it discharges its obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter, and
"to consider how the real dispute taints the arguments and evidence presented by the complaining
Party".175
6.8. Qatar responds that this is nothing but a repetition of a substantive argument which the Panel
has fully considered and rejected. In paragraph 7.15 of the Interim Report, the Panel accurately
summarized Qatar's position on Saudi Arabia's argument. In footnote 221 to the Interim Report, the
Panel recognized that the "dispute" referred to in Article 3.7 of the DSU and the "matter" referred
to in Article 11 of the DSU, like the "matter" referred to in Article 3.4 of the DSU, is the narrow one
currently before the Panel, and not what Saudi Arabia referred to as the "real dispute". Qatar recalls
that the Panel concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter referred to it by the DSB, and that
it could not refrain from exercising that jurisdiction on acc ount of what Saudi Arabia characterized
as the "real dispute". Qatar states that it fully agrees with the Panel's findings on this issue.
6.9. The Panel does not consider that there is any need to modify these paragraphs.

175 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 3.

The absence of any evidence regarding beoutQ's operations before the Saudi
authorities with exclusive jurisdiction for copyright enforcement at the time of the
establishment of the Panel

6.10. Saudi Arabia makes a series of related requests, in connection with multiple paragraphs
spanning sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 of the Report, that are aimed at having the Panel reach the
conclusion that , as of the time of the Panel's establishment, there was no evidence regarding
beoutQ's operations before the Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction f or copyright
enforcement. Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel add new text throughout its findings
to establish the propositions that:
a. the Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction for copyright enforcement are the
Copyright Committee and, as reflected in Saudi Arabia's submissions, the SAIP;
b. a complaint or information can be filed with the SAIP directly by right holders by email,
and hundreds of Saudi and foreign companies (including digital content providers) have
initiated procedures through the SAIP and to the Copyright Committee, including by
email and without legal representation;
c. at the time of the establishment of the Panel, no evidence or claim was filed with SAIP
or the Copyright Committee by any right holder regarding copyright infringement by
beoutQ to initiate civil or criminal enforcement procedures;
d. much of the "evidence" on which the Panel relied in its assessment did not exist at the
time the Panel was established; and
e. therefore, the Panel should find that, as of the date of its establishment, the Saudi
authorities that have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence of criminal piracy
and to determine the resulting penalties "never received any evidence regarding beoutQ
operations".
6.11. Saudi Arabia requests the insertion of six paragraphs of new text, in six different places in
the Report (following paragraphs 7.155, 7.175, 7.218, 7.219, 7.221 and 7.291), which would
capture all of the propositions in bullet points (a) through (e) above . In its comments on
paragraphs 7.227 and 7.293, Saudi Arabia refers back to these proposed insertions.
6.12. In addition to these insertions, Saudi Arabia proposes that additional text be added to a range
of other paragraphs to reflect or establish one or more of the propositions listed in bullet points (a)
through (e) above. Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the propositions reflected in bullet points
(a), (b) and/or (c) above be reflected through additions to paragraphs 7.37, 7.45, 7.46, 7.52,
7.86, 7.92, 7.164, 7.213 and 7.224. In connection with the proposition reflected in bullet point
(d) above, Saudi Arabia requests that, where certain evidence was not available to the Saudi officials
responsible for copyright enforcement as of the date of establishment of the Panel, the Panel add a
sentence stating that: "The Panel acknowledges that the evidence at issue here was not available to
the Saudi officials responsible for copyright enforcement as of the date of establishment of the
Panel." Saudi Arabia raises this issue primarily in connection with the evidentiary basis for the
Panel's finding that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction
of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia requests the addition of the sentence above in a number of places
in that part of the Report, including in the body text or footnotes accompanying paragraphs 7.97,
7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.123, 7.125, 7.126, 7.128, 7.129, 7.130 , 7.136 and 7.149.
However, Saudi Arabia reiterates the same point in the context of commenting on the Panels' review
of the evidence relating to the anti -sympathy measures (paragraphs 7.64, 7.65 and 7.66) and
the 19 June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement
(paragraphs 7.74 and 7.80).
6.13. Qatar responds generally that Saudi Arabia seeks to misuse this interim review process by
re-arguing significant aspects of the dispute, and by effectively asking to draft for itself new, lengthy
portions of the findings section of the Interim Report. Saudi Arabia 's approach is inconsistent with
the purpose of the interim review stage as set out in Article 15.2 of the DSU, which is for the Panel
to consider "precise aspects" of the Interim Report raised by the parties. WTO panels have often
explained that it is not appropriate to request a panel to revisit the merits of its analysis and findings

at the interim review stage. According to Qatar, t he purpose of the interim review stag e is not to
provide the parties with an opportunity to enter into a debate with the Panel.
6.14. Qatar requests that the Panel make no modifications to reflect any the propositions listed
above as (a) through (e). Qatar's comments may be summarized as follows:
a. The statement about SAIP having "responsibilities relating to copyright enforcement" is
a Saudi assertion that Qatar has explained is erroneous, and irrelevant to the current
dispute. Qatar explained at length in its submissions that SAIP was not operational and
did not "effectively launch its activities" until 2019—after the establishment of the Panel
in this proceeding on 18 December 2018. While beIN and the third -party right holders
have sent multiple letters to various Saudi government agencies informing them of the
beoutQ piracy, beIN and the third-party right holders received no indication in response
that SAIP would be the proper authority to evaluate the beoutQ piracy. Thus, the
proposed references to SAIP would conflict with the facts established by extensive
evidence on record. If the Panel were to include these additional references to
Saudi Arabia's evidence and argument on SAIP, then Qatar respectfully requests that
the Panel likewise refer to additional SAIP -related evidence and arguments that Qa tar
submitted.
b. Saudi Arabia 's request that the Panel refer to its assertion that "hundreds of other
copyright holders " have initiated procedures through SAIP and to the Copyright
Committee would not add anything of relevance to the paragraph, which is focu sed on
the beoutQ piracy. The evidence to which Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel refer is
not necessary for the Panel to resolve any particular claim in this proceeding, nor is it
relevant to the paragraphs at issue. Prior panels have rejected requests for the insertion
of lengthy recitations of arguments and evidence on the basis that panels need not refer
explicitly to every argument made, or each piece of evidence adduced, by the parties.
c. Paragraph 7.37 of the Report already states the undisputed fac t that beIN and
third-party right holders have not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ
before Saudi tribunals. It is not necessary for the Panel to repeat this fact throughout
the findings, as requested by Saudi Arabia. As the Panel found , beIN and third -party
right holders were not able to initiate civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ
because of the anti -sympathy measures and other measures taken by Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, criminal enforcement procedures are initiated by a gover nment, not by
private parties, such that a reference to beIN or other right holders not having "initiated
. . . criminal enforcement procedures" would be "nonsensical".
d. Qatar recalls that Saudi authorities were, in fact, on notice of the inability of third-party
right holders to engage Saudi counsel to represent them in proceedings against beoutQ,
as the Panel detailed earlier in the Interim Report. Saudi Arabia's suggested revisions
would contradict the factual record of this dispute. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia fails to
provide any explanation as to why the availability of the evidence to Saudi copyright
enforcement officials is legally relevant here. It appears that Saudi Arabia may be
conflating the concepts of measures within the scop e of a panel 's terms of reference,
on the one hand, with evidence that can be used to support a claim regarding specific
measures, on the other hand. Panels and the Appellate Body have endorsed the
assessment of post-establishment facts in examining whethe r the maintenance of a
measure violates a continuing obligation, including in disputes involving claims under
the TRIPS Agreement. The evidence in question helps to confirm the
right holders' claims of an ongoing problem that began well before panel establishment
and continued throughout the course of the proceedings in this dispute. In this context,
evidence available after panel establishment is particularly important for the Panel to
examine Saudi Arabia's omission to take criminal actions against beoutQ, because such
evidence demonstrates that this omission, having begun before the establishment of
the Panel, also continued throughout the course of the panel proceedings.
e. While Saudi Arabia effectively asks the Panel to reconsider its finding regarding the
attribution of certain acts and omissions to Saudi Arabia, it is not appropriate for
Saudi Arabia to reargue the facts in the interim review stage.

6.15. The Panel considers that these requests by Saudi Arabia generally amount to rearguing the
case, and the Panel does not consider it necessary to revisit the merits of its analysis and findings
at the interim review stage. The Panel notes that while certain pieces of evidence referred to in the
Panel's findings post-date the establishment of the Panel, it is clear from the Report that the Panel
based its factual findings on information that was provided to the Saudi authorities prior to the
establishment of the Panel. As already indicated in paragraph 7.155, the Panel considered that post-
establishment evidence served to "corroborate" and "supplement" the information already provided
to the Saudi authorities.
6.3 Factual aspects
The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it

6.16. Qatar states that although it understands that the Panel 's intention in section 2.2.2 is to
present a balanced account of the events leading up to Saudi Arabia 's severance of relations with
Qatar on 5 June 2017 (as reflected in the Panel 's reference to Qatar 's explanation of one point in
paragraph 2.18), Qatar observes that this section is drafted almost entirely according to the account
provided by Saudi Arabia. 176 Although Qatar notes that the Panel states in paragraph 2.19 that it
would recount Saudi Arabia 's "perspective on the events leading up to the 5 June severance ", the
Panel does not set forth Qatar's perspective, which is markedly different from that of Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, Qatar rejects a number of the factual assertions recounted by the Panel in this section.
Qatar requests that the Panel seek to introduce greater balance into its telling of the circumstances
leading up to 5 June 2017, in particular, by:
a. stating that Qatar contests many of the factual assertions that form part of the
Panel's presentation of the factual background in section 2.2.2;
b. providing a fuller account of t he positions of the parties in respect of the
19 February 2017 letter referenced in paragraph 2.26 (i.e. Qatar reiterates that
although Saudi Arabia said that it considered this letter to amount to "a repudiation by
Qatar of its obligations under the Riyad h Agreements"177, Qatar argued that the letter
could not reasonably be read in that manner178); and
c. reflecting in the Report that Qatar rejects the Saudi assertions recounted in
paragraph 2.27 as having no basis in fact.
6.17. The Panel revised paragraphs 2.19, 2.26 and 2.27 in the light of the parties' comments.
6.18. Qatar makes two requests pertaining to its submissions that Qatar and Saudi Arabia
cooperated extensively on, inter alia, counter-terrorism and related matters:
a. with reference to section 2.2.2, Qatar requests that the Panel seek to introduce greater
balance into its account of the circumstances leading up to 5 June 2017, in particular,
by referring in this section to Qatar's explanation that the period leading up to that date
was characterized by cordial and cooperative relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
with deep economic integration within the GCC and other fora and, in particular, in the
area of counter -terrorism (as highlighted by both countries ' attendance at the
Riyadh Summit of 20-21 May 2017 at which the GCC countries and the United States
established the joint Terrorist Financing Targeting Center179);
b. in paragraph 7.235, first sentence, Qatar requests that the Panel reflect Qatar's view
that no emergency prevailed when the measures at issue were taken, including because
Qatar and Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively on, inter alia, counter-terrorism and
related matters. Cooperation on such matters is detailed in paragraphs 101 -102 of
Qatar's opening oral statement at the first meeting of the Panel; and

176 Qatar refers, as examples, to the introductory clauses of paras. 2.17, 2.19, 2.20, 2.27 and 2.28.
177 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34.
178 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 301-305.
179 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 96-100.

c. in paragraph 7.235 , final sentence, Qatar requests that the words "including
cooperation on counter -terrorism and related matters " be included at the end of the
sentence. Qatar states that cooperation on such matters is det ailed in paragraph 103
of Qatar's opening oral statement at the first meeting of the Panel and paragraph 88 of
Qatar's opening oral statement at the second meeting of the Panel. In the accompanying
footnote to the final sentence of paragraph 7.235 , Qatar requests that, in addition to
citing Qatar's opening oral statement at the first meeting of the Panel, Qatar requests
that the Panel also reference paragraph 88 of Qatar 's opening oral statement at the
second meeting of the Panel , which further substantiate s the existence of ongoing
security-related cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
6.19. The Panel revised paragraph 2.19 in the light of Qatar's comments. The Panel does not
consider it necessary to revise the text of paragraph 7.235.
6.20. Qatar requests that t he Panel revise paragraph 2.24 , third sentence, by including the
remaining, underlined part of the existing quote from the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, such
that it would read as follows: "ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt
in all media platforms, whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on
Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media ."
Qatar observes that this additional language is found in Exh ibit SAU-4, paragraph 3(d), which is
currently cited in the accompanying footnote to paragraph 2.24. Qatar considers that the full quote
would provide a more accurate impression of the concerns with respect to Egyptian media, which
went beyond Al-Jazeera.
6.21. The Panel revised paragraph 2.24 in the light of Qatar's comment.
6.4 Preliminary considerations
Overview and order of analysis

6.22. Qatar notes, with reference to paragraph 7.3, that it agrees with the Panel that, in general,
panels have discretion in choosing the order of analysis to follow. Qatar also states that it agrees
with the Panel's choice of order of analysis. However, Qatar recalls the Appellate Body 's guidance
that an order of analysis contrary to "the fundamental structure and logic" of a covered agreement
would be an error of law, notwithstanding panels ' general discretion regarding the order of
analysis.180 Qatar recalls that it argued that the structure and logic of the TRIPS Agreement require
examination of the complainant's claims before a panel turns to consider whether any violations are
justified by the defen ce in Article 73(b) thereof181, and that several third parties agreed with that
view.182 Qatar requests that the Panel address the parties' and third parties' arguments on this point,
as well as the relevant Appellate Body guidance, as it sets out its approach on this issue.
6.23. The Panel does not consider it necessary to modify or expand on the discussion in paragraph
7.3.
6.5 Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia
Introduction

6.24. Each party requests additions to paragraph 7.37 to reflect what are, in their respective
views, additional "undisputed factual circumstances".
6.25. Saudi Arabia requests that the second and third sentences of this paragraph be revised so as
to add the underlined text: " First, beIN has not initiated civil or criminal enforcement procedures
against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals, and neither has any other foreign rig ht holder. Second, the

180 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 151.
181 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 1-14; and second written submission,
paras. 232-239.
182 Brazil's third-party statement, para. 5; Canada's third-party submission, paras. 8-19;
Canada's third-party statement, paras. 2-5; China's third-party statement, paras. 10-13;
European Union's third-party submission, paras. 36-39; Norway's third-party submission, paras. 4-5;
Norway's third-party statement, paras. 3-4; and Ukraine's third-party submission, para. 19.

Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement proceedings under Saudi
law have not received any claim or information from beIN or any other right holder regarding beoutQ
and have not applied criminal proce dures or penalties against what Qatar has characterized as
beoutQ's commercial-scale piracy."
6.26. Qatar responds that by requesting that the Panel insert the word "criminal" in the second
sentence of paragraph 7.37, Saudi Arabia reveals an apparent misunderstanding of the fundamental
difference between civil and criminal enforcement procedures: criminal enforcement procedures,
unlike civil procedures, are initiated by the government, not by private parties. Qatar states that the
Report already reflects the shar ed understanding that criminal procedures are to be initiated by a
government, and not by private parties; for example, in finding that Saudi Arabia violates its
obligations under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel states in paragraph 7.209 of
its Report that "[w]hile IP rights are 'private rights' that generally require right holders themselves
to assert their rights, only States are entitled to enforce criminal law procedures and penalties ".
Furthermore, pursuant to Saudi law, several elements o f the Saudi government are allocated the
role of initiating criminal procedures. For example, Articles 20 to 23 of the Saudi Copyright
Regulations make clear that the authority to initiate criminal procedures falls on Saudi government
agencies, rather than private individuals.183
6.27. Qatar adds that, contrary to what Saudi Arabia appears to suggest with its proposed changes
to the third sentence of paragraph 7.37 , Qatar has placed extensive evidence on the record
demonstrating that various Saudi authorities received ample notice of beoutQ piracy, and its
Saudi connections.184 With respect to the proposed reference to the Saudi authority with "exclusive
jurisdiction over copyright infringement proceedings under Saudi law ", Qatar states that such a
reference would be irrelevant in this context. Qatar notes that this paragraph provides a summary
of the undisputed factual circumstances underlying Qatar's claims, as stated in the first sentence of
paragraph 7.37, and Qatar submits that the Panel should reject the proposed language because
Qatar disputes its veracity.
6.28. For its part, Qatar requests that the Panel add the following sentence and accompanying
footnote at the end of the fourth sentence of paragraph 7.37: "Fourth, the pirate beoutQ has been
operated by Saudi-based persons and promoted by prominent Saudi nationals. (Qatar's first written
submission, paras. 51 and 106-111.)" According to Qatar, these facts have not b een disputed by
Saudi Arabia in this proceeding, as the Panel confirms in paragraphs 7.115 and 7.154 of its Report.
Qatar states that, with this addition, this paragraph would provide a more complete account of the
undisputed "factual circumstances underlying Qatar's claims".
6.29. The Panel does not consider it necessary or appropriate to revise paragraph 7.37 in the
manner set forth in the parties' respective requests, as that would involve presenting as "undisputed
circumstances" either contested positions or conclusions based on the review of evidence that
follows.
Anti-sympathy measures

6.30. Qatar makes two related requests in connection with the Panel's statement, in the
third sentence of paragraph 7.58 , that the anti -sympathy measures appear to be directed at
expressions of support for the State of Qatar, not necessarily to any and all Qatari nationals.
a. Qatar requests the addition of the following sentence after the third sentence in
paragraph 7.58: "Nevertheless, in practice, the anti -sympathy measures appear to
have a chilling effect that also discourages the expression of sympathy towards
Qatari nationals, generally." In Qatar's view, this suggested addition is consistent with
paragraph 7.287 of the Report , where the Panel recalls the connection b etween the
anti-sympathy measures and the refusal of Saudi law firms to represent beIN (i.e. a
Qatari national) against beoutQ piracy, and with paragraph 7.284 of the Report, where
the Panel explains that the Saudi measures at issue, which sought to end "direct or
indirect interaction between Saudi Arabia and Qatar ", "extend[] to their respective
populations and institutions", i.e. Qatari nationals.

183 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 28.
184 See Qatar's second written submission, paras. 88-91.

b. Qatar requests that the Panel add "and Qatari nationals" at the end of the first sentence
in paragraph 7.59. Qatar states that, for the reasons previously stated in its comment
on paragraph 7.58 immediately above, this addition would make the Panel 's findings
consistent with its subsequent analysis in paragraphs 7.284 through 7.288 of its Report.
Further, Qatar considers that this addition would also be supported by the evidence on
the record, including the report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights which states: "[t]he Mission was informed by all interlocutors that the
Quartet's unilateral measures have been accompanied by a widespread defamation and
hatred campaign against Qatar and Qataris in various media linked to the four countries
as well as on social media, and by the introduction of criminal sanctions in KSA, UAE
and Bahrain against people expressing sympathy for Qatar and Qataris."185
6.31. The Panel is not persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate to revise the text of paragraph
7.58. The Panel has revised paragraph 7.59 in the light of Qatar's comment.
6.32. In addition to the foregoing, Saudi Arabia requests that the second sentence of paragraph
7.59 be revised by making the following deletions and additions in that sentence: "It is uncontested
that multiple Saudi news outlets announced published reports on the existence of general anti -
sympathy measures on nearly the same three successive days." Saudi Arabia comments that, in its
objective assessment of the facts, the Panel should have considered Saudi Arabia's confirmation that
it "does not maintain any 'anti sympathy measures'" when assessing whether private news reports
can be characterized as announcements of Saudi Government measures.
6.33. Qatar responds that, despite Saudi Arabia's assertion to the contrary, the Panel 's statement
that "[i]t is uncontested tha t multiple Saudi news outlets announced the existence of general
anti-sympathy measures" is fully consistent with the evidentiary record. Qatar states that the fact
is that Saudi Arabia never contested that the three Saudi news outlet reports cited by, and exhibited
by, Qatar announced the existence of the anti -sympathy measures. 186 Qatar submits that the
unsupported general assertions to which Saudi Arabia points do not qualify as rebuttals to specific
pieces of evidence that Qatar provided. Furthermore, Qatar observes that the Interim Report already
discusses Saudi Arabia's general assertion that it did not maintain any anti -sympathy measures, in
paragraphs 7.45 and 7.58, and that there is no need for the Panel to discuss such an assertion here
again.
6.34. The Panel has revised the second sentence of paragraph 7.59 in the manner proposed by
Saudi Arabia.
6.35. Saudi Arabia notes that paragraph 7.66 states that: "Saudi Arabia stated, inter alia, that
the reason that no law firm would be able to proceed with a case aga inst beoutQ in Saudi courts
might be that the company does not have a location in Saudi Arabia. However, there has been no
evidence to support this." Saudi Arabia makes two related requests:
a. that the Panel quote the entirety of paragraph 14 of Saudi Arabia 's response to
Panel question No. 39 in the footnote accompanying the first sentence quoted above;
and
b. that the Panel clarify the evidence that it considers to be outstanding, and in particular,
whether what is lacking is evidence that lawyers do not enga ge in matters that do not
relate to their jurisdiction, or whether what is lacking is evidence that beoutQ does not
exist in the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.

185 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of
Qatar 17-24 November 2017, Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017,
186 @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), (Exhibit QAT-7);
Saudi Al-Marsd Online Newspaper, "Legal figure: Anyone showing sympathy with Qatar on social media
platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million riyals" (Arabic original and English
translation), 8 June 2017, (Exhibit QAT-11); and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include
imprisonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media", 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English
translation), (Exhibit QAT-12).

6.36. Qatar responds that when summarizing arguments put forward by Saudi Arabia,
paragraph 7.45 of the Report previously referenced the quote that Saudi Arabia requests to be
inserted, and that there is no need for the Panel to expand its reference to include the quote.
Furthermore, Qatar states that what Saudi Arabia considers to be "outstanding evidence" is, in fact,
a purely speculative assertion. The Panel has already addressed such assertions in this paragraph
and concluded that "there has been no evidence to support [these assertions] ". In Qatar's view,
interim review is not an appropriate stage to reargue the facts.
6.37. The Panel declines to make any change to paragraph 7.66 for the reasons stated by Qatar.
6.38. Saudi Arabia repeats a series of comments and requests, in connection with the
Panel's findings on the anti -sympathy measures, that are aimed at having the Panel reach the
conclusion that, as of the time of the Panel's establishment, there was no evidence that Saudi Arabia
took such measures. Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel:
(a) reflect Saudi Arabia's insistence that no measures exist in Saudi Arabia to limit the engagement
of independent counsel in any way to support the enforcement of intellectual property rights;
(b) reflect that beIN has signed Powers of Attorney for several Saudi national lawyers to represent
its interests in a wide variety of legal and administrative proceedings in Saudi Arabia; and
(c) conclude that, in light of the open, electronic line of communication for all Saudi and foreign right
holders to submit complaints to SAIP, the Panel must conclude that it would not make any sense for
Saudi Arabia to limit access to lawyers in Saudi Arabia, and that the only reason that a complaint is
not submitted to SAIP is because a company chooses not to submit a complaint. Without proposing
any specific textual changes, Sa udi Arabia reiterates the requests reflected in subparagraphs (a),
(b) and/or (c) above in relation to paragraphs 7.60, 7.64, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.95, 7.194,
7.197 and 7.199.
6.39. Qatar responds that Saudi Arabia is rearguing a factual point that the Panel has ruled on in
its Interim Report, and is effectively asking for a different result. Such a request goes beyond the
proper scope of the interim review and constitutes an attempt to re -argue the case. Further, the
Panel has already summarized elsewhere in the Interim Report most of the arguments and evidence
Saudi Arabia enumerated here, and need not reference such arguments and evidence every single
time it discusses relevant claims. The only evidence that the Panel did not address in the
Interim Report is that related to beIN's signing of powers of attorney for Saudi lawyers to represent
its interests in the competition proceedings. However, WTO panels need not refer explicitly to every
argument made, or each piece of evidence adduced, by the parties, and the evidence Saudi Arabia
submitted on the powers of attorney is not necessary for the Panel to resolve Qatar's claims because
it does not add anything of relevance about the IP -related actions and omissions underlying
Qatar's claims. Qatar recalls that i t has responded, in its previous submissions, to each of the
arguments and evidence that Saudi Arabia enumerated in its request, including the assertions
regarding the power of attorney. If the Panel opts to reference any of Saudi Arabia 's additional
arguments or evidence, Qatar respectfully requests that the Panel reference Qatar 's corresponding
rebuttals as well.
6.40. The Panel does not consider it necessary or appropriate to make any changes to these
paragraphs.
The 19 June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement

6.41. Saudi Arabia asks the Panel to explain how the Circular is relevant to Qatar's claim in light of
Saudi Arabia's "Statement Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the '17 June 2017 Circular ',
3 October 2019", submitted as Exhibit SAU-41. Saudi Arabia reiterates this comment in relation to
different paragraphs referencing the Circular, including paragraphs 7.67, 7.76 and 7.226.
6.42. Qatar responds that Exhibit SAU-41—which states that Saudi Arabia intends to be bound by
statements made by Saudi representatives concerning the application of Saudi law —is "completely
irrelevant" to the point being made in these paragraphs of the Report . Qatar contends that these
paragraphs have nothing to do with Saudi representatives ' interpretation of the text of the
19 June 2017 Circular. Qatar notes that the Panel has already summarized Exhibit SAU -41 in
footnote 28 of its Report , and understands that the Panel's silence on this exhibit reflects an
understanding, consistent with Qatar 's arguments, that this exhibit is irrelevant, and would add
nothing to the Panel's analysis.

6.43. The Panel does not consider Exhibit SAU -41 to be relevant to the discussion in the se
paragraphs, and has therefore made no revisions.
6.44. With reference to paragraph 7.89 , Qatar requests that the Panel consider referencing
paragraph 22 of the Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19 August 2019,
(Exhibit QAT-223) in this discussion, which provides further evidence that witnesses must appear in
person in judicial proceedings in Saudi Arabia.
6.45. The Panel does not consider it necessary to include a reference to or discussion of QAT -223
in the context of this paragraph.
6.46. Qatar notes that , in paragraph 7.95 , the Panel refers to Saudi Arabia having taken
"'anti-sympathy measures' that directly or indirectly have had the result of preventing beIN from
securing legal representation to enforce its IP rights ". Qatar understands that, by "anti--sympathy
measures" in this paragraph, the Panel may intend to refer to the "measures that, directly or
indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its
IP rights " referred to in paragraph 7.73. Given that Qatar understand s that the "measures"
addressed in paragraph 7.73 are not limited solely to the "anti-sympathy measures " described
elsewhere in the Panel's factual analysis, Qatar requests the Panel to clarify the relationship between
the measures covered in paragraph 7.73 and the scope of the finding in paragraph 7.95.
6.47. The Panel has revised paragraph 7.73.
Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties

6.48. Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel revise paragraph 7.149 to read as follows:
"Saudi Arabia did not itself, nor through Arabsat, provide sufficient evidence or argument to rebut
the above mentioned technical reports. " Saudi Arabia notes that the Panel has not suggested or
established that Saudi Arabia communicates "through Arabsat".
6.49. Qatar responds that Saudi Arabia 's request contradicts its own submissions in these
proceedings. In its responses to Panel questions following the second substantive meeting,
Saudi Arabia confirmed that Arabsat was sharing information with the Saudi government, and it
submitted to the Panel a letter from Arabsat to FIFA as an exhibit.187 Based on this fact alone, the
Panel's phrase should remain, as Saudi Arabia was indeed providing evidence "through Arabsat".
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has acknowledged that Arabsa t should effectively be viewed as an
instrument of the Saudi government, at least with respect to beoutQ piracy. 188 In particular,
Saudi Arabia has stated that "[m]oreover, FIFA's confirmation that it 'is in no way implying that
Arabsat is involved in, or complicit with, the illegal beoutQ operation' directly undermines claims by
the complaining Party that Saudi Arabia is involved in and complicit with beoutQ operations ".189
The only logical way to read this sentence is to understand that: if Arabsat is involved in or complicit
with beoutQ, then this necessarily implies that Saudi Arabia is involved in or complicit with beoutQ.
Qatar suggests that the Panel consider referring to this statement from Saudi Arabia in
its Final Report so as to help clarify Saudi Arabia's position on its relationship with Arabsat.
6.50. The Panel has revised paragraph 7.149 in the light of Saudi Arabia's request.
6.51. Qatar observes that , in paragraph 7.156 , the Panel states that "[i]n the light of the
conclusion stated above on the basis of the evidence canvassed above, the Panel considers it
unnecessary to review the witness statement submitted by Qatar". Qatar understands that the Panel
does not wish to express, or imply, any views on Saudi Arabia's assertions regarding the credibility
of the witness statement and its contents. In order to make that position clear, Qatar requests that
the Panel expressly clarify that its treatment of the witness statement does not reflect agreement
with Saudi Arabia's allegations about the reliability of the statement.

187 Letter from Arabsat to FIFA, dated 24 June 2019, (Exhibit SAU-39).
188 Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No.39, para. 59.
189 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para. 19.

6.52. In the light of Qatar's stated understanding that this paragraph is drafted in a manner that
avoids expressing or implying any views on Saudi Arabia's assertions, the Panel considers it
unnecessary to make the addition proposed by Qatar.
Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts

6.53. Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel reference, in both paragraphs 7.161 and 7.163, its
statement that:
Saudi Arabia maintains a vigilant watch over the enforcement of broadcast copyright
violations at public gatherings. On 14 April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and
Rural Affairs issued Circular No. 41898 which forwarded Royal Court Circular No. 40752
to the Secretariats, the Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry,
including to all Saudi municipal administrations. Circular No. 41898 emphasized that
the Royal Order must be followed and reminded all administrations "to provide the
maximum possible protection of intellectual property rights, " including copyright
protection. (Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Circular No. 41898, 9/8/1440H / 14
April 2019G. (Exhibit SAU-35)).
6.54. Qatar recalls that the Panel has previously referenced Circular No. 41898, at paragraph 7.47
of the Interim Report, which pertains to the Saudi government's prior use of "non-genuine copies of
computer software". This Circular has no relevance for paragraphs 7.161 or 7.163, which discuss
evidence of beoutQ -related tweets originating from Saudi governmental accounts, as well as
Saudi government promotions of public gatherings of beoutQ screenings. If the Panel were to opt to
reference Circular No. 41898 in this paragraph, Qatar requests that the Panel recall Qatar 's own
discussion of this Circular, namely, that it provides additional evidence of the Saudi government 's
own history of active violation of copyright law. 190 In particular, by submitting this Circular, the
Saudi government indicates that, at least through April 2019, its own government offices have been
using counterfeit or pirated computer software.
6.55. The Panel does no t consider Saudi Arabia's statement concerning Exhibit SAU -35 to be
relevant to the discussion in these paragraphs, and has therefore made no revisions.
6.6 Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement
Introduction

6.56. Qatar suggests that the second sentence in the footnote to paragraph 7.167 be deleted, as
it is unclear to what Qatar ostensibly agrees. Qatar notes that the point appears to have been added
in error.
6.57. The Panel has revised the footnote to paragraph 7.167 in the light of Qatar's request.
6.58. Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel add a longer quotation of the European Union's
submission to the text of paragraph 7.179 when summarizing the third parties' arguments on the
interpretation of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6.59. Qatar requests that if the Panel were to include the additional language from the
European Union's submissions as proposed by Saudi Arabia, the Panel also include a more complete
and balanced summary of the European Union 's position on Article 61 of the TRIPS A greement.
In particular, Qatar requests that the Panel also recall the European Union 's position that "[i]f … it
is proven that the Saudi government supported, facilitated and even participated in the alleged
piracy, it could be argued that de facto Saudi Arabia does not provide for criminal procedures and
penalties in the case of the piracy of beIN's content."191
6.60. The Panel has added a new footnote to paragraph 7.179 in the light of the parties' comments.

190 Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
191 European Union's third-party submission, para. 34.

6.7 Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement
The "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii)

6.61. Qatar notes that, in paragraph 7.273, the Panel states that "Saudi Arabia's arguments under
Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement focus on its 'comprehensive measures ', taken on
5 June 2017" and that "[t]his led Qatar to repeatedly state that these 'actions' are not the measures
that it is challenging, and to argue that Saudi Arabia has therefore not actually invoked any defence
under Article 73(b) with respect to the specific measures at issue in this dispute ". Qatar considers
that these sentences do not fully reflect either Saudi Arabia's or Qatar's arguments on the matter.
Qatar states that, for its part, Saudi Arabia expressly clarified, inclu ding at the two substantive
meetings with the Panel, that it "is not asserting that any of the [six measures described at
paragraph 2.47 of the Panel 's Interim Report] are 'action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests'". Indeed, Saudi Arabia underscored that such measures
were "unrelated" to the "real dispute".192 Faced with such a clear position by the respondent that it
was not invoking the defen ce in respect of the measures at issue challenged by Qatar,
Qatar's position was, and continues to be, that the defen ce must be invoked with respect to
measures challenged by the complainant and that Saudi Arabia conceded that at least five of the six
measures at issue did not meet one of the critical requirements for jus tification under Article 73(b)
of the TRIPS Agreement. Qatar requests the Panel to reflect this argument more accurately and fully
in its Report. Qatar also requests that the Panel reproduce or paraphrase paragraph 283 of
Qatar's second written submission for this purpose. Moreover, in footnote 374 to its second written
submission, Qatar identified several specific instances where Saudi Arabia's submissions stated that
the specific actions of which Qatar complains were unrelated to considerations of securit y.193
Qatar requests that the Panel reproduce footnote 374, along with the portions of the
Saudi submissions to which Qatar cites, in a footnote in the Report.
6.62. The Panel notes paragraph 7.273 introduces the discussion that follows and is not meant to
fully reflect either of Saudi Arabia's or Qatar's arguments on this matter. The Panel does not consider
it necessary to provide a n exhaustive recitation of either party's arguments insofar as they are
already reflected in the paragraph s that follow, but has added additional references to the parties'
submissions in footnotes, as suggested by Qatar's comment.
Saudi Arabia's articulation of its "essential security interests"

6.63. With reference to paragraph 7. 281, Qatar recalls that, at paragr aph 7.236, the Panel
recounts Qatar's argument as to why Saudi Arabia 's articulation of its essential security interests
lacks veracity, specifically because Saudi Arabia is, in fact, motivated by ulterior considerations, such
as promoting development of i ts own media industry in connection with sports broadcasting.
In paragraph 7.281, the Panel recounts Qatar 's argument that Saudi Arabia's articulation of its
security interest was vague and general; however, the Panel does not engage with Qatar's argument
that the stated security interests lacked veracity as motivations for the measures at issue in these
proceedings. Qatar requests that the Panel address this element of Qatar's argument.
6.64. The Panel does not consider it necessary to expand on its discussion o f Qatar's arguments
relating to Saudi Arabia's articulation of its essential security interests.
The connection between the measures and the essential security interests

6.65. Qatar makes two related requests in connection with paragraph 2.29 and paragraph 7.286
concerning the expulsion of Qatari nationals from Saudi territories.
6.66. First, Qatar requests that the Panel include an additional phrase (as underlined) to paragraph
2.29, first sentence, so that it would read as follows: " On 5 June 2017, Sa udi Arabia severed
relations with Qatar, including diplomatic and consular relations, the closure of all ports, the
prevention of Qatari nationals from crossing into Saudi territory, and the expulsion within 14 days
of Qatari residents and visitors in Saud i territories." Qatar states that, with this addition, the

192 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 3, 49.
193 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 3, 49; and response to

summary would better reflect the full scale of Saudi Arabia's order of 5 June 2017. Qatar notes that
the press release from the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which the Panel cites in the
accompanying footnote, reflects this additional element of the comprehensive measures.194 Second,
Qatar requests that the Panel revise paragraph 7.286, second sentence, to include the following
language as underlined:
 "Given that Saudi Arabia imposed a travel ban on all Qatari nationals from entering the
territory of Saudi Arabia and an expulsion order for all Qatari nationals in the territory
of Saudi Arabia as part of the comprehensive measures taken on 5 June 2017, it is not
implausible that Saudi Arabia might take other measures to prevent Qatari nationals
from having access to courts, tribunals and other institutions in Saudi Arabia."
6.67. The Panel has made the revisions proposed by Qatar.
6.8 Conclusions and recommendation
6.68. With respect to paragraph 8.1(b)(ii), Qatar requests that the Panel insert an additional
phrase, as underlined, so that the sentence would read as follows:
Qatar has established that Saudi Arabia has not provided for criminal procedures and
penalties to be applied to beoutQ despite the evidence establishing prima facie that
beoutQ, which has committed wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale, is operated
by individuals or entities under the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, and thus Saudi Arabia
has acted inconsistently with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6.69. In Qatar's view, this would provide a more fulsome description of Saudi Arabia 's violation of
Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, and is consistent with the Panel 's findings in paragraphs 7.214
to 7.217 and paragraph 7.221.
6.70. The Panel does not consider it necessary to revise paragraph 8.1(b)(ii) in the manner
proposed by Qatar.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Preliminary considerations
7.1.1 Overview and order of analysis
7.1. In this dispute, Qatar challenge d six different measures relating to beoutQ's piracy of
beIN's proprietary content . Qatar claims that these measures, in different combinations, violate
multiple distinct obligations of the TRIPS Agreement relating to non-discrimination, the availability
of IP rights in Saudi Arabia, and the availability of civil and criminal IP enforcement procedure s.195
Qatar structured its first written submission by first seeking to establish the main facts underlying
its claims, in relation to each of these six measures. 196 Qatar then presented each claim under the
relevant provision of the TRIPS Agreement (and the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by
reference into the TRIPS Agreement) in the sequence reflected in that agreement.197 In response to
Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement, Qatar submit ted that the
Panel should first make findings on whether the measures at issue violate the obligations of the
TRIPS Agreement, and only then consider whether the affirmative defence under Article 73(b)(iii)
applies and justifies any such violations. 198 Qatar also argued that the Panel should reject

194 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular
relations with Qatar, 5 June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., Press
Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar,
5 June 2017, Exhibit SAU-1 (emphasis added).
195 For a listing of the challenged measures and the legal claims, see Sections 2.3 and 3 above.
196 See Qatar's first written submission, part III ("Factual Background").
197 See ibid. part IV ("Saudi Arabia Violates its Obligations under the TRIPS Agreement"). Most of
Qatar's claims under the various TRIPS and Berne Convention (1971) provisions invoked by Qatar involve the
same combination of measures and factual premises, giving rise to a certain amount of repetition.
198 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 1; and second written submission, para. 234.

Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii)199 and its request that the Panel decline to make any
findings or a recommendation.200
7.2. In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia focused on its severance of all relations with Qatar
on 5 June 2017, which it refers to as its "comprehensive measures".201 Saudi Arabia submitted that
its comprehensive measures of 5 June 2017, constitute action justified by the security exception in
Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement.202 Saudi Arabia also presented the sep arate and additional
argument that the Panel should exercise its discretion to decline to make any findings or a
recommendation in this dispute. 203 In subsequent submissions, Saudi Arabia address ed the six
measures challenged by Qatar more specifically (and some of the other facts underlying Qatar's
claims), for the purposes of demonstrating its "good faith conduct in connection with the invocation"
of the exception in Article 73.204 Saudi Arabia, at the same time, stated that it would "not engage
with facts or arguments presented by Qatar".205
7.3. In considering the most appropriate order of analysis in which to address these issues, the
Panel has a wide margin of discretion to order and structure its analysis as it sees fit.206 A panel may
be guided by the man ner in which the complainant has presented its claims, and equally, by the
manner in which the respondent has presented its defences.207 Furthermore, panel findings are often
structured to avoid repetition and improves the readability of the Report.208 A panel's choice on how
to order and structure its analysis will often reflect, expressly or implicitly, one or more particular
circumstances of the case at hand.209
7.4. The Panel will first address Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel decline to make any findings
or a recommendation in this dispute. The Panel will then briefly address another set of preliminary
questions concerning the scope of the measures challenged by Qatar.
7.5. After having addressed those preliminary questions, the Panel will consider the specific
measures and legal claims raised by Qatar. The Panel structures that subsequent part of its analysis
by first examining the six measures at issue as defined by Qatar and the facts asserted to support

199 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 41-121.
200 Ibid. paras. 122-124.
201 In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that "[o]n 5 June 2017, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia … severed diplomatic and consular relations with the complaining Member, and imposed
comprehensive measures putting an end to all economic and trade relations between the two countries", and
that "from the outset, Saudi Arabia has clearly articulated its determination that the application of
comprehensive measures is necessary protect 'its national security from the dangers of terrorism and
extremism'". (Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1 and 6(c).)
202 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, part II ("Essential Security Interests").
203 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, part III ("No Satisfactory Settlement Possible at the WTO").
In its opening statement at the first meeting, Saudi Arabia reiterated these two lines of argument but presents
them in reverse order. (See Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 16-17.)
204 See Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 1; response to Panel question No. 29; and second
written submission, section 4.2.4 ("Respect for the Obligation of Good Faith").
205 See e.g. Saudi Arabia's request for review of the Interim Report.
206 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 126.
207 See Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 277; and Panel Report, US –
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), fn 1005 to para. 7.9.
208 See, e.g. Panel Reports, Guatemala – Cement II, para. 7.5; Argentina – Financial Services,
209 See, e.g. Panel Reports, Russia – Pigs (EU), para. 7.30; and Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras. 7.24-
7.26. In the context of discussing the scope of a panel's discretion to structure its analysis within the
examination of a given claim, the Appellate Body has stressed that the particular manner of sequencing the
steps of an analysis is "adaptable", and "may be tailored to the specific claims, measures, facts, and
arguments at issue in a given case". While stressing the importance of "the particular circumstances of a given
case", the Appellate Body has stated that "an appellant challenging the sequence and order of analysis adopted
by a panel in a given case must demonstrate why, by following a particular sequence, the panel committed an
error in the specific circumstances of the case at hand. It is not sufficient for an appellant merely to claim that
a panel erred by deviating from a certain sequence and order of analysis in the abstract." (Appellate Body
Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), para. 5.229. See also Appellate Body Report, India –
Agricultural Products, para. 5.26.)

Qatar's claims210, and then turning to Qatar's multiple legal claims under Parts I, II and III of the
TRIPS Agreement.211
7.6. The Panel will next examine Saudi Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article 73 of
the TRIPS Agreement. In WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it is "common practice"212 for panels
to begin with an examination of the claims of inconsistency with the relevant covered agreement, to
be followed, if any such inconsistency were found to exist, with an assessment of whether the
aspect(s) of the measure(s) at issue would be cov ered by one or more exceptions. Qatar argued
that the Panel should follow the traditional approach in this case213, and Saudi Arabia expressed no
disagreement.214 In these circumstances 215, the Panel considers it unnecessary to address the
arguments of the third parties any further, most of which take the position that a panel should follow
the traditional order of analysis in cases involving security exceptions.216
7.1.2 Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel decline to make any findings or
recommendation based on Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU
7.7. Article 3.4 of the DSU provides that "[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be
aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter". Article 3.7 of the DSU provides, in a
similar manner, that "[t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution
to a dispute." Article 11 of the DSU provides that "a panel should … make such other findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements".
7.8. Saudi Arabia requested that the Panel decline to make any findings or recommendation in the
present case.217 Saudi Arabia made that request on the basis that: (a) the current dispute is "not a
trade dispute at all" 218, but a "politi cal, geopolitical and essential security dispute" 219; (b) certain
DSU provisions —including, in particular, Article 3.4 of the DSU —raise a "legal impediment"

210 See section 7.2 of this Report ("Acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia").
211 See section 7.3 of this Report ("Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement"). The Panel
begins with the claims under Part III, for reasons that are elaborated in section 7.3.3.1 of this Report.
212 Panel Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 7.16 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Thailand –
Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 173). In the referenced passage from Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the
Appellate Body stated, in a different context, that "an analysis of whether a measure infringes an obligation
necessarily precedes, and is distinct from, the 'further and separate' assessment of whether such measure is
otherwise justified".
213 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 1-14; and second written submission,
paras. 234-239.
214 Saudi Arabia did not respond to Panel question No. 1, which invited the parties and third parties to
provide their views on the proper order of analysis in this case.
215 The different order of analysis followed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit appears to have
been influenced by circumstances that are distinguishable from the present dispute, most notably "the specific
way Russia presented its arguments with regard to the jurisdiction of the panel". (European Union's third-party
submission, para. 39.) In this case, neither Saudi Arabia nor any third party argued that its invocation of
Article 73 deprives the Panel of jurisdiction.
216 Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, Norway and Singapore urged the Panel to follow
the same order of analysis as that proposed by Qatar. (See Brazil's third-party statement, paras. 2-6;
Canada's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 1 (referring to Canada's third-party submission, paras. 8-19;
and Canada's third-party statement, paras. 2-5); European Union's third-party submission, paras. 37-39;
European Union's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 2; Japan's response to Panel question No. 1,
paras. 1-5; Norway's third-party submission, paras. 4-5; Norway's third-party statement, paras. 3-5; and
Singapore's response to Panel question No. 1.) In contrast, the United States argued that the Panel should
begin and end its analysis by taking note of a respondent's invocation of a security exception. (United States'
response to Panel question No. 1 to third parties, paras. 1 and 7.)
217 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 4, 9-13 and 15; opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, paras. 10-16; closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 3-5; response to
Panel question No. 36, paras. 77-85; second written submission, paras. 1-13 and 69-70; opening statement at
the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 2-8 and 49-50; and closing statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, paras. 2-5 and 8-10.
218 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.
219 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 1. See also opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7 and 14; closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 3; and second written submission, paras. 69-70.

precluding the Panel from ruling on the merits of the claims before it 220; and (c) any Panel findings
would be inconsequential, or a "meaningless step", in resolving this dispute because of the severance
of economic relations between the parties, as was the case in the GATT dispute US – Nicaraguan
Trade.221
7.9. While Saudi Arabia did not present the Panel with any arguments formulated in terms of the
Panel's "jurisdiction" or the "justiciability" of the dispute 222, s everal third parties, including
Australia223 and the European Union224, construed Saudi Arabia's arguments as implying that
Saudi Arabia regarded the matter as "non-justiciable". Furthermore, the United States argued that
Saudi Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement is not
reviewable, and therefore, the matter is not "justiciable". 225 There is a degree of overlap between
the third parties' arguments presented in terms of "justiciability", on the one hand, and the
arguments presented by the parties and third parties in relation to Saudi Arabia's argument that the
Panel should decline to make any findings or recommendation based on Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of
the DSU, on the other hand.
7.10. The Panel recalls that the issue of whether a panel has the discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction that has been validly established, in circumstances where the WTO dispute forms only
one element in a wider dispute between the parties, was directly addressed by the panel and
Appellate Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks . In that dispute, Mexico argued that the
United States' WTO claims were inextricably linked to a larger dispute concerning compliance with
its obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and argued that although
the WTO panel did have jurisdiction over the dispute, the panel also had the jurisdiction to decide
whether or not to exercise its substantive jurisdiction.226 Mexico argued that the panel should have
declined to exercise jurisdiction, as the dispute involved predominant elements derived from rules
of international law that were incapable of settlement at the WTO, namely, NAFTA rules.227
7.11. Examining its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the
matter, the panel in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks found that, under the DSU, it had no discretion
to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case properly before it.228 The Appellate Body
upheld the panel's finding229, stating that it saw "no reason … to disagree with the Panel's statement
that a WTO panel 'would seem … not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to exercise
its jurisdiction.'"230 Regarding the duty in Article 11 of the DSU to "make such other findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements", the Appellate Body stated that it "[i]s difficult to see how a panel would fulfil that
obligation if it declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any
finding on the matter before it".231 The Appellate Body stated that "we express no view as to whether
there may be other circumstances in which legal impediments could exist that would preclude a
panel from ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it."232

220 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(a), para. 79. See Saudi Arabia's first written
submission, paras. 4, 9-13 and 15; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7-8 and 11-15;
closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 3-4; response to Panel question No. 36(a),
paras. 78-80; and second written submission, paras. 2-3 and 70.
221 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(a) and (b), paras. 77-81.
222 The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia's integrated executive summary presented its arguments
concerning "The Matter Before the Panel", "Limited Jurisdiction to Assess Essential Security Interests", and
"Impossibility of Satisfactory Settlement" under the heading of "Jurisdictional Issues". (See Saudi Arabia's
integrated executive summary, p. 3.) According to Paragraph 22 of the Panel's Working Procedures, "executive
summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the
Panel's examination of the case".
223 Australia's third-party oral statement, para. 5.
224 European Union's third-party submission, para. 45.
225 United States' response to Panel question No. 8 to third parties, paras. 25-28.
226 Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 4.102.
227 Ibid. para. 4.104.
229 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 57.
230 Ibid. para. 53 (quoting Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 7.8).
231 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 51.
232 Ibid. paras. 44 and 54.

7.12. The panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit summarized some of the foregoing points when it
observed that:
The ICJ has rejected the "political question" argument, concluding that, as long as the
case before it or the request for an advisory opinion turns on a legal question capable
of a legal answer, it is duty-bound to take jurisdiction over it, regardless of the political
background or the other political facets of the issue. 233 … Moreover, the Panel notes
that in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body expressed the view that a
panel's decision to decline to exercise validly established juris diction would not be
consistent with its obligations under Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, or the right of a
Member to seek redress of a violation of obligations within the meaning of Article 23 of
the DSU.234
7.13. With these general considerations in mind, the Panel will now turn to the specific arguments
presented by Saudi Arabia, beginning with its argument that the current dispute is "not a trade
dispute at all"235, but a "political, geopolitical, and essential security dispute".236
7.14. Saudi Arabia stated that it had severed all diplomatic and economic ties with the complaining
Member, and emphasized that the "only relevant issue" in this dispute is that "this is not a 'trade
dispute' at all". 237Saudi Arabia contends that t he underlying dispute concerns only non -trade
interests that must be addressed following changes in behaviour, and only then in the context of
bilateral and regional political discussions. For Saudi Arabia, political and essential security disputes
of this kind cannot be resolv ed at the WTO, and should not be brought to the WTO disguised as
trade disputes. If complainants bring political and security questions to the WTO inappropriately,
panels should protect the integrity of the dispute settlement system and refuse to proceed w ith
disputes that arise from non -trade-related political and security issues that cannot be resolved at
the WTO.238 According to Saudi Arabia, in the light of the total severance of diplomatic and consular
relations between the parties, the Panel should cons ider whether any potential finding or ruling of
the DSB could in any way address the underlying causes of the comprehensive rupture in diplomatic
and consular relations between the parties.239
7.15. Qatar disagreed with Saudi Arabia's position that there is no "tr ade dispute", and that the
"real dispute" lies elsewhere.240 Qatar recalled that the Panel's terms of reference are to "examine,
in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the
matter referred to the DSB by Qatar in document WT/DS567/3 ", i.e. Qatar's panel request, which
identifies the measures at issue and Qatar's claims. 241 Qatar submit ted that Saudi Arabia ha d
violated several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, that it (Qatar) had framed its claims in its panel
request accordingly, and that such claims circumscribe the Panel's terms of reference. Qatar
contended that the matter referred to the Panel , as defined by Qatar's panel request, is, "by
definition, a 'trade dispute' over which the Panel ha d validly been conferred jurisdiction" and , in
Qatar's view, "[t]he Panel must exercise that jurisdiction".242

233 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, fn 183 to para. 7.103 (referring to International Court of
Justice, Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (United Nations) (1962) I.C.J. Reports,
p. 155; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadić (1995), Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 23-25).
234 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, fn 183 to para. 7.103 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 53).
235 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.
236 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 1. See also opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7 and 14; closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 3; and second written submission, paras. 69-70.
237 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.
238 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, paras. 69-70. See also first written submission, para. 12;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 14; and closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 3.
239 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 13.
240 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 219 (quoting Saudi Arabia's first written
submission, para. 11; and closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6).
241 Qatar's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 3-4. (emphasis omitted)
242 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 219. (emphasis omitted)

7.16. The Panel is not persuaded that it can decline to make any findings or a recommendation,
i.e. "decline to exercise its jurisdiction" on the basis of Saudi Arabia's argument that the
"real dispute"243 between the parties is not a "trade dispute".244 The Panel considers that it is evident
from its terms of reference that it has not been asked by Qatar or the DSB to make any findings or
recommendation on any wider dispute between the parties. The matter raised by Qatar in its panel
request, which now forms the Panel's terms of reference, concerns alleged violations of the
TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly, the matter before the Panel falls within the legal subject -matter
jurisdiction of a WTO dispute settlement panel.
7.17. For similar reasons, the Panel is not persuaded that it can decline to exercise jurisdiction on
the basis of Saudi Arabia's argument that it is impossible for any findings or recommendation to
secure a positive solution to "the matter" and/or achieve a satisfactory settlement of "the dispute"
under the DSU. The Panel considers that this argument, like Saudi Arabia's argument concerning
the "real dispute" not being a "trade dispute", is directed at the w ider political dispute between the
parties that is not at issue before the Panel.245 The Panel recalls that Article 3.4 of the DSU provides
that recommendations or rulings made by the DSB are to be aimed at achieving a "satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under [the DSU] and under
the covered agreements". The Panel considers that the "matter" referred to in Article 3.4 is the
"matter referred to the DSB" by a complainant in its panel request, as provided under Article 7.1 of
the DSU.246 Thus, in this dispute, the matter for which a satisfactory settlement is to be achieved is
the "matter referred to the DSB" by Qatar in its panel request, which, in turn, circumscribes the
Panel's terms of reference. The Panel is therefore not persuaded by Saudi Arabia's arguments under
Articles 3.7 and 11 of the DSU.247
7.18. In response to a question from the Panel inviting the parties and third parties to comment on
the relevance of the Appellat e Body's analysis in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks to Saudi Arabia's
request that the Panel decline to make any findings or recommendation248, Saudi Arabia argued that
"in the present dispute there exist stark legal impediments not present or considered in Mexico –
Taxes on Soft Drinks ". Specifically, Saudi Arabia stated that the implications of Article 3.4 of the
DSU (which provides that "recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving
a satisfactory settlement of the matter") were not considered in that case and that, in its vi ew, the
provisions of Article 3.4 would amount to such a "legal impediment" that would preclude a panel
from ruling on the merits of the claims before it.249 However, the Panel notes that Saudi Arabia has
identified no case in which a panel or the Appellate Body has found that the fairly general wording
of Article 3.4 of the DSU can constitute a "legal impediment" that would preclude a panel from ruling
on a particular measure or claim.
7.19. The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia further argues that, given the comprehensiveness of the
diplomatic and economic measures imposed by Saudi Arabia and other Members in the region, and
the underlying rationale for those measures, it is clear that Qatar has not exercised sound judgement

243 See paragraph 7.13 of this Report.
244 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.
245 For instance, in its first written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that "no finding of the Panel and no
ruling of the DSB will in any way address the underlying causes of the comprehensive rupture in relations
between the complaining Member and Saudi Arabia". (Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 15.)
246 Article 7.1 of the DSU establishes the following standard terms of reference: "To examine, in the
light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the
matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB
in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)." (emphasis
added)
247 The Panel considers that the "dispute" referred to in Article 3.7 and the "matter" referred to in
Article 11, like the "matter" referred to in Article 3.4, is the narrow one currently before the Panel, and not
what Saudi Arabia referred to as the "real dispute".
248 In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia referred to Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU in support
of its request that the Panel decline to make any findings or a recommendation. Saudi Arabia did not refer to
any panel or Appellate Body reports interpreting or applying those provisions. However, the issues raised by
Saudi Arabia's request, and the DSU provisions that it refers to, were addressed by the panel and the Appellate
Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks. Furthermore, without referring to any WTO cases dealing with these
provisions, Saudi Arabia apparently sought to distinguish that case by arguing that "[t]his case does not
concern whether the WTO or some other forum is more appropriate for the settlement of a trade dispute".
(Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.)
249 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(a), para. 79.

in taking action under Article 3.7 of the DSU.250 The Panel recalls the Appellate Body's statement in
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks that Article 3.3 of the DSU provides that the "prompt settlement of
situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under
the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to
the effective functioning of the WTO". 251 Thus, the Appellate Body stated that there is "little in the
DSU that explicitly limits the rights of WTO Members to bring an action".252 The Appellate Body then
added that Article 3.7 of the DSU states that "[b]efore bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful", and that Article 3.10
thereof stipulates that "if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures in good faith
in an effort to resolve the dispute ."253 Given the discretion granted to complainants in deciding
whether to bring a dispute under the DSU, the Panel does not consider that Qatar failed to exercise
its judgement within the meaning of Article 3.7 in bringing this case.
7.20. The present dispute involves claims of violation. Where a WTO panel finds a measure
inconsistent with a covered agreement, Article 19.1 of the DSU mandates the panel to recommend
that the Member concerned "bring the measure into conformity" with the covered agreement. 254
Once the DSB adopts the panel report, the panel's recommendation becomes part of the
"recommendations and rulings of the DSB" 255, with which the respondent has a legal obligation to
comply.
7.21. The Panel thus considers the present dispute distinguishable from US – Nicaraguan Trade, a
GATT dispute in which the panel declined to make findings or a recommendation in the context of
the invocation of Article XXI of the GATT 1947. 256 That panel did so in respect of a non-violation
claim, in respect of which the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES could only make a non -binding
recommendation that the United States withdraw its embargo, or authorize Nicaragua to suspend
the application of obligations toward the United States.257 Given the two -way trade embargo
between the United States and Nicaragua, the panel considered that any authorization permitting
Nicaragua to suspend obligations to the United States "could not alter the balance of advantages

250 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 9 and 13; and response to Panel question No. 36(b),
para. 82.
251 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 52. (emphasis original) The
Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III has made a similar observation with respect to Article XXIII:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 3.7 of the DSU, stating that:
a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member
under the DSU. The language of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Article 3.7 of the DSU
suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding
whether any such action would be "fruitful". (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para.
135. See Japan's response to Panel question No. 8, para. 36.)
252 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, fn 101 to para. 52 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 312).
253 Ibid. (emphasis original)
254 In contrast, Article 26.1(b) of the DSU provides that in a non-violation case, the panel or the
Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned "make a mutually satisfactory adjustment".
255 See, e.g. Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel (India) (Article 21.5 – India), para. 7.299 (stating that
"once the Appellate Body's findings are adopted by the DSB, they become the 'recommendations or rulings of
the DSB'"). (emphasis original)
256 As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia's first written submission referred to Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the
DSU in support of its request that the Panel decline to make any findings or a recommendation, and did not
refer to any panel or Appellate Body reports interpreting or applying those provisions. However, its arguments
broadly paralleled the arguments that the United States presented, and which the panel ultimately accepted, in
US – Nicaraguan Trade. In response to a question from the Panel, Saudi Arabia stated that it concurs with the
panel's approach in US – Nicaraguan Trade. (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(b).) In response
to a question from the Panel inviting the parties' and third parties' views on the relevance of the GATT panel's
findings in US – Nicaraguan Trade, the United States submitted that the panel's findings makes clear that "the
question of whether an essential security action is inconsistent with a covered agreement is not justiciable",
and that the GATT panel did not have the competence to address national security matters. (United States'
response to Panel question No. 8, paras. 17 and 31.) The UAE commented that the GATT panel's special terms
of reference could be read as implying that the parties recognized that the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES could
not play a useful role in the resolution of the dispute on matters of security between the parties. (United Arab
Emirates' response to Panel question No. 8, para. 40.)
257 GATT Panel Report, US – Nicaraguan Trade, para. 5.7. The panel was established with special terms
of reference that precluded it from examining the validity of the invocation of Article XXI of the GATT 1947.
(Ibid. paras. 1.4 and 5.3.)

accruing to the two contracting parties under the General Agreement in Nicaragua's favour" .258 In
the present dispute , Qatar and Sau di Arabia have no t imposed a two-way embargo on trade or
mutually suspended IP rights, and Qatar indicated that the DSB's authorization of a complainant to
suspend obligations would be valuable given the remedies outlined in the DSU.259
7.22. Before concluding its examination of this issue, the Panel observes that Saudi Arabia did not
argue that the TRIPS Agreement did not apply, and the Panel sees no issue regarding the
applicability of the TRIPS Agreement and the DSU to Saudi Arabia's relations with Qatar. Article 63
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[t] he severance of diplomatic or
consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established between
them by the treaty except in so far as the existence of diplomatic or consular relations is
indispensable for the application of the treaty." Likewise, Article XIII:1 of the WTO Agreement does
not recognize the severance of relations between two Members as a circumstance resulting in the
non-application of the multilateral agreements on trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, or the TRIPS Agreement.260 Saudi Arabia argued that the circumstances underlying and
evidenced by its severance of relations with Qatar should be taken i nto account for purposes of
applying the two sets of WTO provisions that it refers to, namely : (a) for purposes of establishing
that the conditions of the security exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement are satisfied,
and (b) for purposes o f establishing that the conditions for a panel making findings and
recommendations, as reflected in Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU are not satisfied.
7.23. For all of these reasons, the Panel concludes that it cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction
over the claims of WTO -inconsistency that fall within its terms of reference and that the matter is
justiciable.
7.1.3 The measures challenged by Qatar
7.24. The second set of preliminary questions concerns the scope of the matter before the Panel,
and more precisely the scope of the measures that are properly before the Panel.
7.25. The specific measures at issue identified by Qatar are the six measures reflected in
paragraph 2.47 of this Report. Qatar's submissions are directed to those measures individually and
the extent to which they "work together" 261, in various combinations, to create the results
enumerated in paragraph 2.46. These six specific measures are: (a) the 19 June 2017 Circular,
(b) the anti-sympathy measures, (c) the travel restrictions, (d) the Ministerial approval
requirement, (e) the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties, and (f) the promotion of
public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts. Qatar asserts that it is the
"combined operation"262 of the first four of these six measures that "make it unduly difficult for
Qatari nationals to access civil judicial remedies" (in the sense of the third bullet in paragraph
2.46).263 Thus, the Panel's findings are directed at the six specific measures as defined in paragraph
2.47 of this Report.
7.26. The Panel notes that Qatar's submissions referred to some of the six measures in more than
one way. In its first written submission, Qatar repeatedly refer red to the "targeted restrictions of
intellectual property protections". 264 In response to a Panel question, Qatar clarified that it was
correct to read any references to "targeted restrictions of intellectual property protections" in its

258 Ibid. para. 5.11. In this connection, the panel observed that Nicaragua accepted that it would be
"a meaningless step". (Ibid.)
259 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, paras. 213-214. Among other things, Qatar considered
that the suspension of the protections of Saudi nationals' IP rights may provide some level of redress to Qatar
for Saudi Arabia's TRIPS violations. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, paras. 211-214.)
260 Article XIII of the WTO Agreement is entitled "Non-Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements
between Particular Members", and paragraph 1 thereof states that "[t]his Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the
Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such application."
261 Qatar's second written submission, para. 290. See Qatar's responses to Panel question No. 2(a),
262 Qatar's second written submission, para. 276.
263 See paragraph 2.46, third bullet, of this Report.
264 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 156, 157 and 187, heading IV.A.2(c), paras. 205, 206, 207,
224, 225, 233, 234, 240, 326, 327, 328, 345, 352, 374 and 396.

first written submissi on to mean the 19 June 2017 Circular and not some broader category of
measures.265 As regards the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright Committee decisions
as applied to beIN, Qatar variously referred to the Ministry's "denial of access to admini strative
tribunals and courts" 266, to the Ministry's having acted to close the "gates" with respect to
adjudicating infringement of copyrights held by Qatari nationals 267, to the Ministry having barred
beIN from accessing Saudi Arabia's administrative tribunal s or courts to launch a copyright
infringement case 268, or more simply to the "gatekeeping function". 269 In response to a Panel
question, Qatar clarified that these various formulations are different ways of referring to the same
measure.270
7.27. The Panel further notes that Qatar included extremely broad language in paragraph 5 of its
panel request which may have introduced a further element of ambiguity with respect to the
measures that it is challenging. The Panel recalls that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires a complainant
to identify "the specific measures at issue" in its panel request. However, paragraph 5 of Qatar's
panel request states that "[t]he measures at issue in this request include all written and unwritten,
published and unpublished, meas ures (including omissions) that have resulted in Saudi Arabia's
failure to protect IP rights, including with respect to IP rights held (or applied for) by, inter alia,
Qatari entities and Qatari individuals". In response to a question from the Panel, Qatar clarified that
it is not challenging any measures other than those set out in paragraphs 2.46 and 2.47 above.271
7.28. Saudi Arabia observe d that, in paragraph 6 of Qatar's panel request, Qatar note d that
Saudi Arabia had "imposed a scheme of diplomatic, political, and economic measures against Qatar",
and that "[s]uch measures impacted, inter alia, the ability of Qatari nationals to protect intellectual
property rights in Saudi Arabia". 272 Saudi Arabia considered that this reference to the "scheme" of
such measures, in paragraph 6 of Qatar's panel request, "refers to the comprehensive ' measures'
as the basis for [the application of the] additional, related measures identified by the complaining
Party that allegedly impact the protection of intellectual property". 273 As a result, Saudi Arabia
emphasized that the comprehensive "measures" are "a measure affirmatively included in the
Panel's terms of reference", and that "the complaining Party cannot deny Saudi Arabia the
opportunity to raise defenses, especially based on Security Exceptions, with reference to [such a
measure]".274 According to Saudi Arabia, "the extension to and coverage of the very same
comprehensive measures within the Panel's terms of reference has been asserted by the complaining
Party since at least 19 November 2018 and cannot be disputed at this stage".275
7.29. Notwithstanding its reference to these "comprehensive measures" in its panel request,
Qatar stated on several occasions that its claims do not pertain to such measures. In its opening
statement at the first substantive meeting, Qatar stressed that it "does not challenge, in this dispute,
Saudi Arabia's decision to sever diplomatic and economic ties". 276 In its closing statement at the
same meeting, Qatar reiterated that "[t]his dispute does not include a challenge to
Saudi Arabia's decision to cut off diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar". 277 In its
second written submission, Qatar add ed that while it "recalls the scheme of coercive economic
measures imposed by Saudi Arabia on 5 June 2017 as 'background' in Section III.A of its
First Written Submission, Qatar pursue [d] no claims against that scheme" 278 and reiterated that it
"has never pursued claims agai nst Saudi Arabia's imposition of 'comprehensive measures' in this

265 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 3, para. 22.
266 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 252, 269, 322, 327, 328, 345, 352, 374 and 396.
267 Ibid. paras. 148, 350, 381 and 401.
268 Ibid. paras. 123, 350 and 381.
269 Ibid. paras. 194 and 227.
270 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 23.
271 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 2(b), para. 21.
272 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 32(a), para. 68; and second written submission,
273 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 25. (italics added, underlining original)
274 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 26; and response to Panel question No. 32(a),
paras. 65 and 69-71. (underlining original)
275 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 26; and response to Panel question No. 32(a),
paras. 65 and 69-71. (underlining original)
276 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 84. (emphasis original)
277 Qatar's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4. (emphasis original)
278 Qatar's second written submission, para. 279. (fn omitted)

dispute".279 Qatar considered that whether Saudi Arabia can justify other measures at issue—either
individually or by grouping them into a "comprehensive measure" or "overall scheme" —is entirely
irrelevant for the present dispute.280 This leaves open whether the measures which are challenged
individually and collectively fall within, or are a necessary consequence of, the comprehensive
measures.
7.30. Qatar made certain statements in its submissions th at might be construed as constituting
"as such" claims in respect of two aspects of Saudi law. The Panel recalls that in WTO law, there is
an important distinction between "as such" claims and "as applied" claims. 281 It is well established
that any "as such" claim must be clearly stated in the panel request, and that certain thresholds
must be satisfied to uphold any such claim (e.g. the law must mandate, not merely allow for,
WTO-inconsistent conduct). Regarding the need to ensure that any "as such" claim is clearly stated
in the panel request, the Appellate Body has stated that:
We would therefore urge complaining parties to be especially diligent in setting out "as
such" claims in their panel requests as clearly as possible. In particular, we would expect
that "as such" claims state unambiguously the specific measures of municipal law
challenged by the complaining party and the legal basis for the allegation that those
measures are not consistent with particular provisions of the covered agreements.
Through such straightforward presentations of "as such" claims, panel requests should
leave respondent parties in little doubt that, notwithstanding their own considered views
on the WTO-consistency of their measures, another Member intends to challenge those
measures, as such, in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.282
7.31. With the foregoing in mind, the Panel recalls that in its first written submission, Qatar
repeatedly state d that the nature of the Ministerial approval requirement in the Copyright Law
"highlights a fundamental flaw in Saudi Arabia's copyright regime"283, namely, the lack of access to
civil judicial procedures for copyright owners that the Minister disfavours, in his capacity as a political
actor working under the direction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
7.32. However, Qatar's panel request and first written submission did not present any "as such"
claim regarding the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright Committee decisions. In
response to a question from the Panel, Qatar confirmed that it is not making an "as such" claim, and
that its claim is that the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright Committee decisions "as
applied" to beIN gives rise to violations of the specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the
Berne Convention (1971).284 In the absence of an "as such" claim relating to the Ministerial approval
requirement, the relevant question before the Panel is whether that requirement has, through its
application or existence, worked alone or together with other measures to deny beIN access to civil
and criminal enforcement procedures. The burden of proof rests on Qatar to provide sufficient
evidence to substantiate its assertions to that effect.
7.33. A second aspect of Saudi law that Qatar discussed in terms that might be construe d as
constituting an "as such" claim relates to the 19 June 2017 Circular. In its first written submission,
Qatar asserted that the 19 June 2017 Circular "served to effectively strip beIN of the legal right to
protect any intellectual property rights related to the beIN channels"285, and "precluded beIN's ability
to operate in Saudi Arabia or enforce its intellectual property rights by stripping its legal right to
protect its intellectual property rights".286 Saudi Arabia countered that beIN had not lost the right to
protect any related IP rights in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the 19 June 2017 Circular because, while it

279 Ibid. para. 280.
280 Ibid. para. 281.
281 "As such" claims are directed at a provision of a law or regulation that mandates WTO-inconsistent
conduct as such, independent of any instances of its application. "As applied" claims are directed at the
application of a law, regulation or other measure in certain instances, without claiming that any provision
thereof is necessarily WTO-inconsistent in and of itself. (See generally Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act,
paras. 60-61.)
282 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 173. (emphasis
original)
283 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 140, 195, 228 and 409.
284 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 56.
285 Qatar's first written submission, para. 41.
286 Ibid. para. 144.

is true that, under Saudi law, "unlicensed distributors of illegally distribu ted content do not have a
right to protect copyright in such illegally distributed content" 287, Saudi Arabia made no
determination that beIN continued to distribute its content after 19 June 2017.288
7.34. Qatar responded that this "admission" by Saudi Arabia about its law, namely, that "beIN—or
any other entity which Saudi Arabia considers is broadcasting illegally ( i.e., without a license or for
other reasons) —could not protect copyright or related rights in its own content" 289, establishes
another "deficiency" in Saudi Arabia's domestic "copyright regime".290 In developing this argument,
Qatar referred to "the violations of the TRIPS Agreement evident from Saudi law and practice". 291
Qatar also referred to the finding of the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights that, although
international copyright rules allow WTO Members to censor content, a WTO Member is not allowed
to deny copyright protection to unlicensed content.292
7.35. The Panel recalls the findings of the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights that
Article 4(1) of China's Copyright Law—which denied copyright protection to works whose publication
and/or dissemination was prohibited by law —was inconsistent "as such" with Article 5(1) of the
Berne Convention.293 However, since Qatar's panel request did not include an "as such" claim against
this alleged deficiency in Saudi law, Qatar cannot challenge this law independently of any instances
of its application to beIN or any other entity. The Circular is mentioned by name in
Qatar's panel request, where it is characterized in terms that focus on the "distribution of beIN media
content".294 Likewise, in Qatar's first written submission, all references to the effect of the
19 June 2017 Circular focus on "Qatari nationals" or "beIN" having been stripped of t heir right to
protect their IP rights.295 This narrow focus on how the Circular affected "Qatari nationals" (i.e. beIN)
also aligns to the way in which Qatar formulated the measures, as set out in paragraph 2.46 of this
Report.
7.36. Accordingly, since Qatar's claim in relation to the Circular is an "as applied" claim, Qatar bears
the burden of substantiating its assertion that the 19 June 2017 Circular "served to effectively strip
beIN of the legal right to protect any intellectual property rights related to the beIN channels".296 To
do so, Qatar would have to adduce evidence to show that beIN had actually taken action to protect
its IP rights and that such action was barred or in some way hampered by the Saudi authorities.
7.2 Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia
7.2.1 Introduction
7.37. The following factual circumstances underlying Qatar's claims are undisputed. First, beIN has
not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals, and neither has

287 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 13.
288 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 47; and opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, para. 14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright protection to all entities even if
they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of entities found to have distributed
content illegally (i.e., without a broadcasting license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel
question No. 41, para. 24.)
289 Qatar's second written submission, para. 172 (referring to Second Supplemental Expert Report of
Professor Gervais, 19 August 2019, Exhibit QAT-223, para. 3).
290 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 41, para. 20 (referring to Qatar's second written submission,
paras. 169-173); and para. 24.
291 Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19 August 2019, Exhibit QAT-223, para. 2.
292 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 41, para. 20 (referring to Second Supplemental Expert Report
of Professor Gervais, 19 August 2019, Exhibit QAT-223, para. 4 (referring, in turn, to Panel Report, China –
Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.120-7.139)). The right to censor content is recognized in Article 17 of the
Berne Convention (1971), which, in turn, is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1.
293 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.28-7.143. That panel noted that "this
claim challenges China's Copyright Law, in particular Article 4(1), not as it has been applied in any particular
instance but 'as such'." (Ibid, para. 7.28.)
295 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 202, 230, 251, 268, 300-301, 321, 347, 379 and 399.
296 Ibid. para. 41.

any other foreign right holder.297 Second, Saudi authorities have not applied criminal procedures or
penalties against what Qatar has characterized as beoutQ's commercial -scale piracy. 298 Third,
beoutQ's illegal broadcasts of some 2018 World Cup matches were publicly screened in
Saudi Arabia.299 However, the parties disagree about the extent to which any of these circumstances
is the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia.
7.38. While Qatar as serted that Saudi Arabia ha d taken a number of measures (i.e. the 19 June
2017 Circular, anti -sympathy measures, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement)
whose "combined operation … deprive[s] Qatari nationals of access to civil judicial p rocedures and
remedies in respect of intellectual property rights" 300, Saudi Arabia submit ted that these alleged
measures either do not exist or do not have the effects alleged by Qatar. 301 Similarly, Saudi Arabia
stated that the reason for the absence of crim inal procedures and penalties being applied against
beoutQ is that beIN and other foreign right holders have not provided Saudi authorities with sufficient
supporting evidence and cooperation. 302 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia suggest ed that any public
screenings of beoutQ's illegal broadcasts were not endorsed by, and are not a measure attributable
to, the Government of Saudi Arabia.303
7.39. It is for the complainant to make a prima facie case, which involves establishing the existence
of the challenged measures and the other factual premises underlying its claims, as well as the
breach of the legal provisions invoked by the complain ant.304 While WTO-inconsistent conduct may
not be lightly p resumed, and must always be supported by sufficient evidence, the applicable
evidentiary standard of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is closer to that of the balance
of probabilities, and is not a standard of certainty or proof beyond a reasona ble doubt.305 As a
consequence of the applicable evidentiary standard being closer to that of a balance of probabilities,
panels may make findings of fact based on inferences and circumstantial evidence.306
7.40. In the light of Saudi Arabia's stated position that it would "not engage with the facts or
arguments presented by Qatar", the Panel considers it important to confirm that, before considering
any exceptions or lines of defence invoked by Saudi Arabia, it must first satisfy itself that Qatar has
established a prima facie case in relation to each of the measures and claims at issue. In those
WTO cases where a responding party did not contest one or more claims raised by the complainant,
panels have consistently proceeded on the basis that they were nonetheless required to satisfy
themselves that the complainant had established a prima facie case of violation in order to rule in
the complainant's favour.307 In this case, the Panel has sought to satisfy itself that Qatar's claims
are well-founded in fact and in law through various means, including written and oral questions and
undertaking a careful review of the evidentiary basis underlying Qatar's various factual assertions.308
The Panel has not made any material factual findings merely on the basis that some of Qata r's
assertions are uncontested by Saudi Arabia. If the Panel determines that a prima facie case has

297 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 43, paras. 47 and 60; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel
question No. 29, para. 35; Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 61; and Saudi Arabia's response to
Panel question No. 39, para. 13.
298 Qatar's first written submission, para. 131; and Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29,
para. 45.
299 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 86-94; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a),
paras. 61-62; and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 67.
301 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26-27, 35-36, and 47-50;
and second written submission, paras. 53-58.
302 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 41-46; and second written
submission, paras. 59-66.
303 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), paras. 61-62; and second written submission,
paras. 67-68.
304 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 323, at p. 335.
305 Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article 21.5 – Philippines), para. 7.777.
306 Ibid. para. 7.778.
307 See, e.g. Panel Reports, US – Shrimp (Ecuador), paras. 7.9 and 7.11; and US – Poultry (China),
paras. 7.445-7.446.
308 For example, the Panel put questions to Qatar on a series of factual and legal issues relating to its
claims, including but not limited to detailed questions to clarify the extent to which beIN holds copyright and
related rights over the alleged pirated content and broadcasts. (See, e.g. Panel question Nos. 6(b)(i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv); 6(c); 6(d); and 45 to the parties.)

been established by Qatar in relation to any of the measures, it will then turn to consider the defences
and arguments made by Saudi Arabia.
7.41. The Panel will address these disputed factual issues and consider the evidence in support
before turning to Qatar's claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel will
refer back to these factual findings later in the context of its analysis of Qatar's specific claims under
the TRIPS Agreement.
7.2.2 Arguments
7.2.2.1 Qatar
7.42. Qatar argued that beIN "has faced numerous obstacles preventing it from initiating civil action
in Saudi courts in order to enforce its IP rights". 309 First, it stated that the 19 June 2017 Circular
stripped beIN of the right to protect its IP rights before Saudi courts and tribunals.310 Qatar argued
that it does not matter whether the Circular was "officially issued".311 Second, it asserted that beIN
has been unable to obtain legal representatio n from Saudi lawyers to enforce its IP rights , partly
due to Saudi Arabia's anti-sympathy measures.312 In Qatar's view, Saudi Arabia's "raw assertion" to
the contrary "does not even attempt to refute the evidence on record". 313 Third, it submitted that
the travel ban imposed on Qatari nationals makes it impossible for Qatari right holders to initiate,
conduct or testify in proceedings for the enforcement of IP rights in Saudi Arabia.314 Qatar contended
that Saudi Arabia's "remarkable assertion" that foreign nationals may commence and participate in
proceedings by email is unsubstantiated. 315 Fourth, there is a requirement for Ministerial approval
of any decision of the Copyright Committee316 and, Qatar stated, the Minister has not approved the
initiation of proceedings before the Committee317, and would never approve any decision in favour
of beIN or its licensors (even if a case could be initiated). 318 According to Qatar, the alleged
amendment to the Copyright Law replacing the Minister with a Board of Directors changes n othing
in this regard319, and it remains "utterly implausible" that a Board of Directors comprised of Saudi
government officials and private citizens would permit a successful challenge before the
Committee.320
7.43. Regarding the "total lack of criminal enforcement" or other action by Saudi authorities, Qatar
submitted that beIN has repeatedly requested, along with other foreign right holders, that
Saudi authorities take immediate action against beoutQ. Qatar asserted that it has provided ample
evidence o f beoutQ's illegal broadcast piracy in Saudi Arabia to these authorities. 321
Nevertheless, despite the extensive evidence of beoutQ's widespread, commercial -scale copyright
piracy in Saudi Arabia, to date, Saudi authorities have taken no criminal action agai nst beoutQ,

309 Qatar's first written submission, para. 132.
310 Ibid. paras. 38-43.
311 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 23-30.
312 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 133-139.
313 Qatar's second written submission para. 78. See ibid. paras. 77-82.
314 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 15, 145 and 193.
315 Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 40, paras. 65-71.
316 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 119-121 and 140.
317 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(a), paras. 114-115.
318 Ibid. para. 116.
319 Qatar's second written submission, para. 114. See ibid. paras. 106-114.
320 Ibid. para. 114. In response to Saudi Arabia's assertion that beIN or other relevant right holders can
directly access remedies for copyright infringement in Saudi Arabia through the SAIP, Qatar maintained that
the SAIP is not the proper forum to adjudicate claims of copyright infringement, GCAM and the Ministry never
provided any indication otherwise to beIN or other foreign holders, and the SAIP was not operational at the
time of the establishment of the Panel. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 43, paras. 56-77.)
321 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 126-131 and 197-201; and second written submission,
para. 85 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, paras. 58-61;
Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15 August 2017, Exhibit QAT-116; Letter from
Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and English translation),
2 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-117; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information,
14 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-118; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information,
16 January 2018, Exhibit QAT-119; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information,
6 March 2018, Exhibit QAT-120; and Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General
Commission for Audiovisual Media, 3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106).

Arabsat, or other Saudi facilitators.322 In Qatar's view, Saudi Arabia's suggestion that the allegations
that beIN and other right holders have brought before Saudi authorities are "unfounded" and
"unsupported" is directly contradicted by the ext ensive evidence before the Panel —including
evidence that was previously shared with or otherwise made available to Saudi authorities, and it is
"hard to imagine what 'relevant and credible information' Saudi Arabia still needs".323 Qatar asserted
that "it could not be for lack of sufficient evidence" that Saudi Arabia has failed to initiate procedures
and penalties against the beoutQ piracy. 324 For Qatar, the reason that criminal procedures and
penalties have not been applied against beoutQ is that the Saudi go vernment itself has supported,
facilitated and participated in the beoutQ piracy.325
7.44. Regarding the alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings of
beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts, Qatar refer red to "government -sponsored beoutQ piracy
events"326 during the 2018 FIFA World Cup, when beoutQ broadcasts were the only way for Saudi
nationals to watch their own national team play. 327 Qatar refer red to tweets by international
journalists revealing that, on 22 June 2018, a government -sponsored event was broadc asting the
beoutQ-pirated World Cup match between Saudi Arabia and Uruguay on a large public screen in
Riyadh's main boulevard.328 Qatar also asserted that the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs of
Saudi Arabia published flyers ahead of the 2018 FIFA Wo rld Cup, advertising 294 display screens
allocated across the 13 regions of Saudi Arabia – all broadcasting beoutQ.329 Qatar provided further
evidence in the form of tweets posted by various Saudi municipal governments that promoted
various public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. 330 Qatar submitted
that Saudi Arabia does not engage with or dispute any of this evidence, and invite d the Panel to
make an objective assessment of the facts based on the ample evidence provided by Qatar.331 Qatar
added that "public statements made by government officials in their official capacity via social media
platforms can be attributed to a government, in the same way that such statements by officials to
the press can be attributed to the government for which they work".332 As regards
Saudi Arabia's reference to an April 2019 Circular that was allegedly sent to various government
offices, Qatar submitted that this Circular concerns pirated or counterfeit computer software and has
"nothing whatsoever to do with pirated sports broadcasting".333
7.2.2.2 Saudi Arabia
7.45. As regards beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures, Saudi Arabia submit ted that the
alleged measures either do not exist or do not have the legal or practical effects asserted. First, beIN
has not lost the right to protect any related IP rights in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the 19 June 2017
Circular or the rules of Saudi law that it reflects because, while it is true that "unlicensed distributors
of illegally distributed content do not have a right to protect copyright in such illegally distributed
content"334, and while it is also true that certain "entities have been distributing unlicensed media
content in Saudi Arabia after 19 June 2017", "no credible evidence exists to link such distribution to
the wilful conduct of companies of the complaining Party or related entities".335 Second, Saudi Arabia
did not maintain any "anti -sympathy measures" or any other measures that restrict ed access to

322 Qatar's first written submission, para. 131; and second written submission, para. 86.
323 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 88-92.
324 Ibid. para. 214.
325 Qatar's first written submission, para. 437; and second written submission, paras. 215-217. Qatar
also suggests that such procedures have not been applied to the beoutQ piracy "because such piracy
predominantly affects a Qatari national, beIN, and its licensors". (Qatar's first written submission, para. 200.)
326 Qatar's first written submission, section III.B.4(b).
327 Ibid. para. 86.
328 Ibid. para. 87.
329 Ibid. para. 88.
330 Ibid. paras. 89-94.
331 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 38-39.
332 Ibid. para. 39.
333 Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
334 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 13.
335 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 47; and opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, para. 14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright protection to all entities even if
they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of entities found to have distributed
content illegally (i.e., without a broadcasting license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel
question No. 41, para. 24.)

lawyers in Saudi Arabia for assistance in IP matters 336, and in any event companies may directly
provide information and evidence to the SAIP or to the Government without retaining counsel or
other local support in Saudi Arabia. 337 Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia's view, no law firm would be
able to proceed with a case against beoutQ in Saudi courts "because the company does not have a
location in Saudi Arabia, and its location outside Saudi Arabia cannot be ascertained".338 Saudi Arabia
states that "[t] his could explain why law firms in Saudi Arabia appear to be substantively and
procedurally unable to establish a case against beoutQ , rather than unwilling to work with
complainants to file cases against beoutQ." 339 Third, Saudi Arabia submitted that foreign nationals
may avail themselves of all rights in Saudi Arabia without physically travelling to or being present in
Saudi Arabia, and may commence and participate in proceedings or complaints before the Copyright
Committee or SAIP by email from outside Saudi Arabia.340 Fourth, regarding the Ministerial approval
requirement, the Copyright Law was amended to replace the Minister with a Board of Directors.341
7.46. Regarding the non -application of criminal procedures or penalties to
beoutQ's commercial-scale piracy, Saudi Arabia submit ted that "in order to take action under
Saudi criminal law and procedure, authorities require a reasonable level of evidence to facilitate
follow up and prosecution". 342 However, the various communications it has received from original
right holders outside of Saudi Arabia "follow a pattern of relaying unfounded and unsupported
allegations that beoutQ is distributing cont ent in Saudi Arabia in violation of their copyright". 343 It
submitted that "no relevant and credible information has been provided by such companies to
Saudi authorities in order to support action against alleged infringing activity and companies". 344
Saudi Arabia stated that it will "continue its efforts to identify the source and stop the copyright
piracy of beoutQ but requires cooperation from entities in the market to achieve this goal". 345 It
submitted that Arabsat ha d established that it did not distribute beoutQ content on its satellite
frequencies.346 Saudi Arabia maintain ed that Members "cannot be expected to act on criminal
allegations without evidence and without cooperation of concerned right holders"347, and submitted
that "[w]here concerned right holders c ome forward with evidence and cooperate with the
Government, Saudi Arabia effectively addresses copyright infringement issues".348
7.47. Regarding the alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings of
beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts, Saudi Arabia submitted that "[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia
does not promote or authorize screenings of beoutQ broadcasts, and has no relationship at all with
beoutQ."349 It also "note [d] that unofficial, non -government tweets are not usually recognized by
legal adjudicators or attributed to a government without explicit approval". 350 Saudi Arabia added
that it "maintains a vigilant watch over the enforcement of broadcast copyright violations at public
gatherings.351 It explained that, on 14 April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs
issued Circular No. 41898, which forwarded Royal Court Circular No. 40752 to the Secretariats, the
Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry, including to all Saudi municipal
administrations. Circular No. 41898 emphasized that the Royal Order "must be followed and
reminded all administrations 'to provide the maximum possible protection of intellectual property
rights,' including copyright protection".352

336 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 48-49.
337 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 55.
338 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para. 14.
339 Ibid.
340 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 40, paras. 20-21.
341 See paragraph 2.13 of this Report.
342 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 45.
343 Ibid. para. 41.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid. para. 42.
346 Ibid. para. 43.
347 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 59.
348 Ibid. para. 61.
349 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), para. 61.
350 Ibid. para. 62.
351 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 68.
352 Ibid.

7.2.3 Assessment by the Panel
7.2.3.1 Applicable legal standard
7.48. Article 3.3 of the DSU refers to "measures taken by another Member", without limitation as
to the government agencies involved, and "[i]n principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO
Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings".353 The
Panel is guided by the following legal considerations in its assessment of the existence of the
measures at issue, and in its assessment of the other disputed factual issues underlying all of Qatar's
various claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement.
7.49. For the purposes of the DSU, t he notion of "measures" is not restricted by requirements as
to form. Although measures challenged in the WTO are often reflected in legal instruments such as
enacted legislation, measures enacted or applied through other instruments that are legally binding
in a Member's domestic legal framework (decrees, directives, regulations, notifications, judicial
decisions354, etc.) have also been subject to challenge. A determination of whether an instrument is
a "measure" "must be based on [its] content and substance … and not merely on its form or
nomenclature."355 The legal status of an instrument within the domestic legal system of the Member
concerned is not dispositive of whether that instrument is a measure for purposes of WTO dispute
settlement.356
7.50. Only those acts or omissions attributable to a WTO Member are subject to WTO obligations.
However, under Article 4(1) of the ILC Articles on Res ponsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (2001) (ILC Articles on State Responsibility), "[t]he conduct of any State organ shall
be considered an act of that Member under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the
State." As a consequence, a Member is responsible for actions at all levels of government (local,
municipal, federal) and for all actions taken by any agency within any level of government.357 Thus,
the responsibility of Members under international law applies irrespective of the branch of
government at the origin of the action having international repercussions.358
7.51. Additionally, Article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides tha t the conduct of
a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law "if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control
of, that State in carrying out the conduct". As one panel observed, "what appear on their face to be
private actions may nonetheless be attributable to a government because of some governmental
connection to or endorsement of those actions".359 While there must be a sufficient nexus between
the action of private entities and the action of a government (or other organ of the Member) for that
government to be held responsible for that action, "it is necessary to take into account that there is
a broad variety of forms of government of action that can be effective in influencing the conduct of
private parties".360 The fact that acts or omissions of private parties "may involve some element of
private choice" does not negate the possibility of those acts or omissions being attributable to a
Member insofar as they reflect decisions that are not independent of one or more measures taken
by a government (or other organ of the Member).361

353 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81.
354 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 173 (citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Gasoline, page 28; Jennings and Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., Vol. I (Longman's
1992), p. 545; and I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 450).
355 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, fn 87 to para. 87.
356 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 187.
357 See, e.g. Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.12; Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres, para. 7.400; and Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program, fn 37 to para. 7.6.
358 Panel Report, US – 1916 Act (Japan), para. 5.10.
361 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 239 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Korea
– Various Measures on Beef, para. 146.) See also Panel Reports, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines),
paras. 7.636-7.637; Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.5 – Colombia) / Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.5 –
Panama), paras. 7.197-7.198; and Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 7.11.

7.2.3.2 beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures
7.52. Qatar assert ed that Saudi Arabia has taken a series of measures (i.e. the 19 June 2017
Circular, anti-sympathy measures, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement) whose
"combined operation … deprive[s] Qatari nationals of access to civil judicial procedures and remedies
in respect of intellectual property rights". 362 Saudi Arabia submit ted that these alleged measures
either do not exist or do not have the legal or practical effects alleged by Qatar. 363 The Panel now
turns to the question of whether sufficient evidence has been provided to establish that Qatari
nationals have been unable to initiate civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ and that this is
the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia.
7.2.3.2.1 Anti-sympathy measures
7.2.3.2.1.1 Introduction
7.53. According to Qatar, beIN's difficulty in securing legal representation in Saudi Arabia is partially
attributable to the general ''anti -sympathy measures" announced the day after the severance of
relations on 5 June 2017.364 Qatar also argued that the Government of Saudi Arabia has "instructed
lawyers in [Saudi Arabia] to refrain from representing beIN" in connection with the beoutQ matter.365
In response to a question from the Panel regarding the relationship between these ways of
characterizing the measure, Qatar explained that "[t]he instruction to lawyers in Saudi Arabia to
refrain from representing beIN is closely related to the general anti-sympathy measures, and indeed
would appear to be a natural application of that measure". 366 Qatar added that "the anti-sympathy
measures provide useful context to understand why such instructions are being provided ".367
7.54. In the light of Qatar's clarification that the "instruction" to lawyers in Saudi Arabia to refrain
from representing beIN is "a natural application of" the general anti-sympathy measures, the Panel
approaches the "general " anti -sympathy measures announced on 6 June 2017 as relevant
context.368 The Panel will begin by addressing the evidence concerning the general anti -sympathy
measures. Then, the Panel will review the evidence regarding the alleged refusal of Saudi law firms
to act in relation to the beoutQ matter and, thereafter, will review t he evidence regarding Saudi
authorities seeking to instruct or influence private entities in their arrangements with beIN. Finally,
the Panel will state its overall conclusion as derived from examining the above-mentioned evidence
in its totality.
7.2.3.2.1.2 Evidence regarding general anti-sympathy measures
7.55. Qatar assert ed that, on 6 June 2017—the day after Saudi Arabia severed relations with
Qatar—a Saudi news agency stated, via Twitter, that expressions of sympathy for Qatar could face
certain penalties. The tweet, which Qatar submitted to the Panel 369, states that "[t]he person who
sympathizes with #Doha on social networking sites after #cutting off_ relations_with_ Qatar shall
be subject to imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of up to 3 million riyals". Qatar furthe r observed
that the tweet included the hashtag "Cut_ties_with_Qatar", or "BoycottQatar", and that, at around

363 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26-27, 35-36 and 47-50; and
second written submission, paras. 53-58.
364 See, e.g. Qatar's first written submission, paras. 17-27, 143 and 188-192.
365 See, e.g. ibid. para. 136 (quoting Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information,
6 March 2018, Exhibit QAT-120; and Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 62).
366 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 98.
367 Ibid. para. 100.
368 See Qatar's first written submission, para. 17. The Panel does not consider it necessary to enter into
a discussion of all of the evidence submitted by Qatar in relation to what it terms ''a repressive climate in which
mere expressions of support for Qatar, and Qatari nationals and companies, are harshly punished".
369 Qatar's first written submission, para. 18 (referring to @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6 June 2017
(Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT-7). SAR 3 million is equivalent to approximately USD
800,000. (XE Currency Converter, Saudi riyals to US dollar conversion, last accessed 8 April 2019,
Exhibit QAT-8.)

this time, the first hashtag was the most widely retweeted hashtag on Twitter worldwide. 370 Qatar
stated that, concurrently with the issuance of the 6 June 2017 tweet, Saudi news outlets began
widely reporting that the Saudi authorities would sanction expressions of sympathy for Qatar with
five years' jail time, or a SAR 3 million fine, and has provided evidence of the same. Qatar provided
the text of these news reports as exhibits.371
7.56. Qatar explain ed that this penalty corresponds to one that exists under Saudi law.
Specifically, Qatar observed that the same penalties reported by these news outlets are provided for
in the text of Article 6(1) of the 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law. Qatar provided the Panel with the text
of this law, which refers to the "[p]roduction, preparation, transmission, or storage of material
impinging on public order, religious values, public morals and privacy, through the information
network or computers".372
7.57. In addition, Qatar provided evidence of international entities and organizations commenting
on the existence of these general anti -sympathy measures. First, Qatar provide d the Panel with a
copy of a 2017/2018 report on Saudi Arabia by Amnesty International, which found that "[f]ollowing
the announced decision to sever ties with Qatar, the Saudi authorities warned people against
expressing sympathy towards Qatar or criticizing government actions, stating that this would be
considered an offence punishable under Article 6 of the Anti -Cyber Crime [L]aw".373 Second, Qatar
provided the Panel with a copy of a report published by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), which comments on Saudi Arabia's anti-sympathy measures. According to
that report, which reflects information provided by Qatari nationals who have property in
Saudi Arabia, particularly commercial entities, "lawyers in these countries [(i.e. the UAE, Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia)] are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression
of sympathy towards Qatar".374
7.58. With respect to Saudi Arabia's assertion that it "does not maintain any
'anti-sympathy measures'"375, the Panel is aware that the evidence Qatar provided has s everal
limitations in establishing that such measures would, in and of themselves, operate to prevent Saudi
law firms from agreeing to represent beIN or other Qatari nationals. The scope of the general
anti-sympathy measures, as described above, is limited to expressions of support on "social media"
or online, as suggested by the very name of the law (i.e. the Anti-Cyber Crime Law) that, according
to Qatar, serves as the basis for the penalties. Furthermore, the anti-sympathy measures appear to
be directed at expressions of support for the State of Qatar, not necessarily to any and all Qatari
nationals. Additionally, the Panel notes that Saudi Arabia did not enact any specific law or regulation
establishing the general anti -sympathy measures, and the evident iary basis for their existence is
primarily statements by Saudi news outlets. Finally, the Panel is mindful that the OHCHR Report in
question reflects information that Qatari nationals provided to the OHCHR team.
7.59. Despite the foregoing, and having carefully reviewed and considered the evidence provided
by Qatar, the Panel concludes that the evidence establishes the existence of the general
anti-sympathy measures that directly or indirectly fostered a climate of anti-sympathy against Qatar
and Qatari nationals . It is uncontested that multiple Saudi news outlets published reports on the
existence of general anti -sympathy measures on three successive days . Specifically, each of the
three Saudi news outlets identified in the exhibits provided by Qatar reported the existence of the

370 Qatar's first written submission, para. 18 (referring to Al-Youm Al-Sabea, ''Hashtag 'Cutting Ties with
Qatar' tops the world list of trend on Twitter'' (Arabic original and English translation), 5 June 2017,
Exhibit QAT-10).
371 Ibid. para. 19 (referring to Saudi Al-Marsd Online Newspaper, "Legal figure: Anyone showing
sympathy with Qatar on social media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million
riyals" (Arabic original and English translation), 8 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-11; and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi
Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include imprisonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media",
7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT-12).
372 Ibid. para. 20 (referring to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Anti-Cyber Crime Law, 26 March 2007
(English translation), Exhibit QAT-13, p. 9).
373 Ibid. para. 21 (referring to Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Saudi
Arabia", 22 February 2018, Exhibit QAT-15, p. 3).
374 Qatar's first written submission, para. 22 (referring to Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of Qatar 17-24 November 2017, Report on the
Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017, Exhibit QAT-21).
375 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 48.

general anti-sympathy measures on 6, 7 and 8 June 2017, respectively.376 Indeed, Saudi Arabia did
not contest the authenticity of any of the evide nce referred to above or challenged
Qatar's characterization of this evidence.
7.2.3.2.1.3 Evidence regarding the refusal of Saudi law firms to act in relation to the
beoutQ matter
7.60. Qatar asserted that, following the severance of relations and the emergence of beoutQ, beIN
sought to engage legal counsel in Saudi Arabia to commence civil actions before the Saudi courts to
seek injunctions, damages, or other legal remedies against the individuals and/or entities behind
beoutQ. Qatar also asserted that, despite requests to several law firms based in Saudi Arabia, beIN
has been unable to secure legal representation. 377 Qatar provided evidence to substantiate its
account, including a Declaration provided by the CEO of the beIN Media Group LLC, dated
15 April 2019, and earlier correspondence between beIN and the Saudi authorities.
7.61. The Declaration by beIN states in relevant part:
After the piracy became evident in Saudi Arabia, we reached out to various Saudi law
firms to represent beIN in a potential copyright infringement case in Saudi Arabia. Those
law firms, including but not limited to Al Fahad & Partners, Al Tamimi, the Qasir Al
Motawee Law Firm, and TAG Legal, all declined to do so. Although the law firms did not
explicitly indicate why they refused to take on the engagement against beoutQ, my
colleagues and I understand that it was due to Saudi Arabia 's measures (both written
and unwritten) against supporting Qatari interests, as well as the statement in the
19 June 2017 Circular, which indicated that beIN would lose "the legal right to protect
any related intellectual property rights".378
7.62. In a letter to the Ministry dated 16 January 2018, beIN explained the difficulties it was
encountering in attempting to secure legal representation to initiate copyright infringement cases in
Saudi courts. beIN asked the Ministry to detail any governmental restrictions in place that may be
affecting beIN's ability to commence civil proceedings.379 More specifically, beIN stated, in relevant
part:
Over the past weeks, beIN has contacted several KSA law firms to seek representation
for such legal action before the KSA courts. None of these KSA law firms has been willing
to represent either beIN or the Rights Holders in connection with beoutQ's broadcast
piracy. Moreover, we have been advised that the KSA National Information Center has
taken the position that it will not authorize any legal action to enforce beIN's rights in
the KSA.
We therefore request that the Ministry of Culture and Information please advise:
(i) whether lawyers in the KS A are under any legal obligation or governmental
instruction preventing them from representing beIN and/or the Rights Holders in civil
legal actions before the KSA courts, including in matters relating to the piracy of
beIN's media content; and (ii) whether beIN and/or the Rights Holders are required to
seek any government authorizations or permissions in order to commence civil legal

376 See, e.g. @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation),
Exhibit QAT-7; Saudi Al-Marsd Online Newspaper, "Legal figure: Anyone showing sympathy with Qatar on
social media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million riyals" (Arabic original
and English translation), 8 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-11; and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments
include imprisonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media", 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and
English translation), Exhibit QAT-12.
377 Qatar's first written submission, para. 133.
378 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 56 (referring to Saudi
Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, dated
19 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-1, p. 2).
379 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16 January 2018, Exhibit QAT-119,
pp. 1-2.

actions before the KSA courts, including in matters relating to the piracy of beIN's media
content.380
7.63. In a 6 March 2018 letter to the Ministry, beIN set out its understanding of why it was unable
to hire counsel to bring a copyright infringement case in Saudi courts. beIN stated that "the Saudi
Government has instructed lawyers in the KSA to refrain from representing beIN … and that it is the
position of the Saudi government that beIN … cannot bring civil legal actions relating to beoutQ
broadcast piracy before the KSA courts."381 beIN's letter indicated that "we will proceed on the basis"
of this understanding "[i]n the event that the Ministry of Culture and Information fails to respond by
14 March 2018".382 In its Declaration, beIN stated that it had received no response to either of the
letters above.383
7.64. The Panel notes that, in response to Qatar's evidence about beIN's inability to secure legal
representation, Saudi Arabia state d that the Lawyers' Guide issued by the Saudi Bar Association
"gives lawyers the freedom to accept or not to accept the case of a client and the power of
attorney".384 In the Panel's view, the existence of such a freedom in the Lawyer's Guide, which was
not provided as an exhibit, is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that beIN's inability to secure
legal representation as described above is the result of a purely private choice by Saudi law firms.
Among other things, Saudi Arabia did not address whether—and, if so, how—the freedom to accept
the case of a client as expressed in the Lawyer's Guide would supersede any anti -sympathy
measures that it ha d taken. As discussed in the next subsec tion, Qatar provided evidence that a
Saudi law firm was not given this freedom in connection with its representation of beIN in the context
of a criminal matter.385
7.65. With its second written submission, Qatar provide d the Panel with a copy of a public joint
statement made on 31 July 2019 by seven major football right holders (including FIFA, UEFA, AFC,
the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie A). According to the joint statement, these
right holders have also been unable to engage Saudi counsel or access Saudi courts and
administrative tribunals in connection with the beoutQ piracy. 386 The statement reads, in relevant
part:
Over the past 15 months, we spoke to nine law firms in KSA, each of which either simply
refused to act on our behalf or initially accepted the instruction, only later to recuse
themselves.
As copyright holders we have reached the conclusion, regrettably, that it is now not
possible to retain legal counsel in KSA which is willing or able to act on our behalf in
filing a copyright complaint against beoutQ.387
7.66. In response to a Panel question asking Saudi Arabia to comment on the joint statement quoted
above, Saudi Arabia stated, inter alia, that the reason that no law firm would be able to proceed
with a case against beoutQ in Saudi cour ts might be that the company does not have a location in
Saudi Arabia.388 However, there has been no evidence to support this.
7.2.3.2.1.4 Evidence regarding other actions by Saudi authorities to direct private entities
in their arrangements with beIN
7.67. Qatar provided evidence to support its submission that Saudi authorities have actively sought
to direct private entities as to their arrangements with beIN through informal communications. As

380 Ibid. p. 2.
381 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 6 March 2018, Exhibit QAT-120, p. 1.
382 Ibid.
383 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 62.
384 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), para. 49.
385 See paragraph 7.70 of this Report.
386 Qatar's second written submission, para. 81 (referring to Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA,
the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia,
31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-227).
387 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-227.
388 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para. 14.

discussed below, this included evidence relating to the transmission of the 19 June 2017 Circular to
39 foreign right holders, and evidence that a Saudi law firm was pressured to act on behalf of beIN
in relation to a criminal law matter.
7.68. On 19 June 2017, the Ministry and GCAM issued a Circular prohibiting the distribution of beIN
media content.389 The Circular states that all television and media channels that are interested in
operating in Saudi Arabia "must obtain all required licences " and that "[a] ll be IN channels and
Al-Jazeera channels are not licensed and [do] not have the legal right to operate in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and its presence and provision of entertainment and Sports programs and television
services in the Kingdom violates the applicable laws in the Kingdom as of the date thereof." 390
This Circular further provides that:
Any distribution of media content either via satellites or through other means and
platforms and the charging and collection of related fees in the Kingdom without
obtaining the necessary licenses from the appropriate authorities, including the Ministry
of Culture and Information and the General Commission of Audio and Visual Media, shall
subject the distributors of such media content and content licensors, hardware
suppliers, and their owners in their individual capacity to criminal prosecution and
personal litigation and shall result in the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss
of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights in accordance with
the applicable laws in the Kingdom.391
7.69. By itself, the conten t of the Circular does not purport to direct any private parties in their
arrangements with beIN. However, the Panel considers that the transmission of the Circular alluding
to the potential loss of "related intellectual property rights" to these foreign r ight holders was an
action aimed at influencing these private entities in their arrangements with beIN. Qatar explain ed
that it was transmitted as an email attachment from GCAM's official account directly to 39 right
holders, including FIFA, UEFA, LaLiga, the Premier League and many others. 392 According to
Saudi Arabia, this Circular was never "officially issued".393 In the Panel's view, the "unofficial" status
of this document , sent to these 39 right holders who hold valuable IP rights related to beIN's
broadcasts, in no way diminishes its impact.
7.70. Separately from the Circular, Qatar also provided evidence, in the form of additional email
messages, in support of its assertion that a Saudi law firm was pressured to act on behalf of beIN
in relation to a criminal law matter. 394 As explained in beIN's Second Supplemental Declaration,
which was submitted together with Qatar's responses to the second set of questions in this
proceeding, Qatar provided the Panel with several email messages from a Saudi law firm to beIN
that document the following. On 1 July 2018, a Saudi law firm , representing beIN in relation to a
competition law matter that had arisen prior to the severance of relations and t he closing down of
beIN's operations in Saudi Arabia , informed beIN via email that the Saudi Council of Competition
(CCP) had called. The CCP had requested the law firm to "collect notice of a new 'criminal' case they
are launching against Bein", "probably for imposing new penalties and/or administrative
remedies".395 The law firm told beIN that, '"[b]ecause of the sensitivities of these cases, if you ask
us to decline accepting notice, we may be unable to accept representation on your behalf for the
new case and you may have to find another lawyer'".396 When beIN did not immediately instruct the
law firm to accept service of the new criminal complaint, the law firm sent another email message
to beIN two days later, on 3 July 2018. This email message, which Qata r provided as an exhibit,
states:

389 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,
Exhibit QAT-1.
390 Ibid. para. 1.
391 Ibid. para. 3.
392 Email from GCAM to right holders, 13 July 2017, Exhibit QAT-220.
393 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), fn 28 to para. 47 and fn 34 to para. 54.
394 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 38, paras. 1-15.
395 Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit QAT-248,
para. 10 (referring to Email from Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad (Al Fahad & Partners) to beIN, dated 1 July 2018,
Annex 3 to Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit QAT-248).
396 Ibid. (emphasis omitted)

We received a call from CCP that we must accept service on your behalf. We explained
we have no authority. They threatened to stop the services of our office unless we
accede to their demand. We do not believe that this co urse of action is correct but if
they do go ahead and stop our services (that would paralyze our office) we will have no
choice but to do so. Please take note.397
7.71. The Panel considers these email exchanges to be relevant to the inability of beIN and foreign
right holders to retain Saudi counsel to commence actions against beoutQ. This exchange reflects
the influence that the Government of Saudi Arabia has over the decisions of lawyers based in
Saudi Arabia to accept particular cases for particular clients. Given that the Government of
Saudi Arabia appears to have instructed a law firm in Saudi Arabia to act for beIN in respect of a
particular matter, the Panel does not consider it implausible that the Government of Saudi Arabia
would instruct, direct, or guide one or more law firms in Saudi Arabia not to act for beIN in a
particular matter.
7.2.3.2.1.5 Conclusion
7.72. The Panel considers that the e vidence before it sustains the conclusions that:
(a) Saudi Arabia imposed general anti-sympathy measures banning expressions of support toward
Qatar, at least on social media, on 6 June 2017; (b) all Saudi law firms that have been approached
by beIN, and b y seven major football right holders, have declined to act in relation to the beoutQ
matter, and it is difficult to conceive of any plausible explanation of why beIN and foreign right
holders would be unable to obtain any legal representation in Saudi Arab ia in relation to beoutQ —
an entity engaged in high-profile piracy that has been the subject of global condemnation—if not for
some form of government instruction, direction or guidance; and (c) Qatar provided two other
examples of Saudi authorities activel y seeking to influence right holders or a law firm in their
arrangements with beIN.
7.73. Examining the above-referenced evidence in its totality, and recalling the applicable standard
of proof and evidentiary principles in WTO dispute settlement398, the Panel considers that Qatar has
demonstrated that Saudi Arabia has taken "anti-sympathy measures" that, directly or indirectly,
have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights
through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals.
7.2.3.2.2 The 19 June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval
requirement
7.74. The Panel will now consider the evidence provided by Qatar to establish that the non-initiation
of civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ is the result of other acts or omissions attributable
to Saudi Arabia, including, in particular, the 19 June 2017 Circular, the travel restrictions or the
Ministerial approval requirement.
7.75. Qatar provided a copy of the 19 June C ircular to the Panel as an exhibit. 399 By its terms, it
prohibits the distribution of beIN (and Al Jazeera's) content in Saudi Arabia, and states that the
penalty for contravening this prohibition includes "the loss of the legal right to protect any related
intellectual property rights". The Panel notes that it was issued on an official Ministry letterhead, and
signed by a Saudi government official.400 Furthermore, it is undisputed that a copy of this document
was circulated broadly by the "Office of the General Direc tor of the President " of GCAM to 39
individual right holders. 401 Finally, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority Decision issued on
11 July 2017 directly referred to the 19 June 2017 Circular.402

397 Ibid. para. 11 (referring to Email from Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad (Al Fahad & Partners) to beIN, dated 3
July 2018, Annex 4 to Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit
QAT-248).
398 See paragraphs 7.39 and 7.40 of this Report.
399 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,
19 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-1.
400 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 24 and 27.
401 Ibid. (referring to Email from GCAM to right holders, 13 July 2017, Exhibit QAT-220).
402 See paragraph 2.38 of this Report.

7.76. The Panel therefore considers that the 19 June 2017 Circular exis ts, and that it is a
government measure for purposes of WTO law regardless of whether it was "officially issued". 403
Furthermore, the Panel accepts that the Circular could also potentially impact on beIN's ability to
access civil enforcement procedures.
7.77. Turning to the second of the three measures referred to above, i.e. the travel restrictions,
there is no disagreement between the parties about this measure's existence. Both parties refer to
press releases that Saudi Arabia issued on 5 June 2017, indicating that, as part of the severance of
relations, Saudi Arabia was among other things "clos[ing] all land, sea and air ports, prevent [ing]
crossing into Saudi territories, airspace and territorial waters".404 According to an official statement
by Saudi Arabia, this travel ban was intended to "prevent[] Qatari citizens' entry to or transit through
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia".405 In response to a question from the Panel, Saudi Arabia confirmed
that, as of the dat e of the establishment of the Panel, the travel restrictions on citizens of the
complaining party referred to in the 5 June 2017 announcement still existed (but noted that certain
limited exceptions apply as necessary, including for citizens of the complaining party to perform the
Hajj and Umrah).406
7.78. The Panel is therefore satisfied that the travel restrictions exist, and that these constitute a
government measure for purposes of WTO law. Furthermore, the Panel accepts that, by their nature,
the travel restrictions could also impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.
7.79. Turning to the third measure, the Ministerial approval requirement, the Panel observes that
Qatar has provided the text of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Law and Implementing
Regulations, which expressly refer to the role of the Minister in approving any Copyright Committee
decisions regarding cases of copyright infringement and state that they "shall not be effective unless
approved by the Minister".407 The Panel recalls that Saudi Arabia asserts that the Copyright Law and
Implementing Regulations were amended, such that the Board of Directors of the SAIP, not the
Minister, would have the responsibility for endorsing or approving the decisions of the Copyright
Committee.408 However, as noted by Qatar, the amended Implementing Regulations were not issued
until 9 May 2019, approximately six months after the establishment of the Panel.409 Furthermore, it
is undisputed that once the Copyright Committee takes a decision by majority vote with respect to
any such allegations, its decision is subject to a subsequent layer of approval before it is made
final.410
7.80. The Panel is therefore satisfied that the Ministerial approval requirement was provided for in
Saudi law as of the date of the Panel's establishment.411 Furthermore, the Panel accepts that, by its
nature, the Ministerial approval requirement could, in the circumstanc es prevailing in Saudi Arabia
since 5 June 2017, also impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.

403 See paragraph 1.20 and footnote 137 of this Report. In this connection, the Panel recalls that the
notion of "measures" for the purposes of the DSU is not restricted by any requirement as to form, and that the
legal status of an instrument within the domestic legal system of the Member concerned is not dispositive of
whether it is a measure for purposes of WTO dispute settlement. (See paragraph 7.49 of this Report.)
404 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 1 (referring to a report by the Saudi Press Agency).
405 Qatar's first written submission, para. 15 (referring to Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the
United States website, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of
Qatar", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-3).
406 See Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 16. The Panel notes that this is consistent with
Qatar's own responses to Panel question Nos. 15(a) and (b).
407 See paragraph 2.12 of this Report.
408 See paragraph 2.13 of this Report.
409 See paragraph 2.14 of this Report.
410 See paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11 of this Report.
411 A panel's terms of reference require it to assess the WTO-consistency of a challenged measure as it
existed on the date of the Panel's establishment. (See Appellate Body Reports, US – Clove Cigarettes,
have rejected requests from a respondent to make findings on the changed situation, on the basis that the
complainant had not requested such findings. (See, e.g. Panel Reports, Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.84;
China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.22-7.24; India – Additional Import Duties, paras. 7.58-7.60; and India –
Autos, para. 8.27.)

7.81. Thus, the Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish the existence of each of
these measures, and the Panel further accepts that each of these formal legal restrictions could
impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.
7.82. However, there is no evidence that any of these measures has yet been applied to beIN to
prevent it from accessing civil enforcement procedures and the Panel considers that
Qatar's arguments about how these measures would operate if beIN were able to retain counsel in
Saudi Arabia involves speculation about future and hypothetical events. It is well established that a
WTO dispute settlement panel should not make findings that would involve speculation either about
future or hypothetical measures 412 and panels should refrain from making speculative findings on
future measures . Panels must also refrain from making findings about existing measures in a
manner that turns on speculation about future events, or events triggering the operation of a
measure that have n ot yet arisen.413 Such speculation would be contrary to the duty of the Panel
under Article 11 of the DSU to make "an objective assessment of the facts of the case".
7.83. First, from the wording of the Circular414, it is not clear that any loss of the right to enforce IP
rights is automatic upon the conditions precedent being triggered. Those conditions precedent are
stated to be "[a]ny distribution of media content" and "the charging and collection of related fees in
the Kingdom without obtaining the necessary lice nces". Once triggered, according to the
Circular's text, these two conditions precedent "shall subject" the certain entities prescribed in the
Circular that fulfil these conditions "to criminal prosecution and personal litigation", "and shall result"
in a penalty, namely, "the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss of the legal right to protect
any related intellectual property rights in accordance with the applicable laws in the Kingdom".415
7.84. No evidence has been presented to the Panel to show that th e Circular has been applied in
the relevant circumstances. Specifically, Qatar provided no evidence to demonstrate that
any Saudi tribunal or other Saudi authority has applied the penalty provision of the Circular to deny
beIN standing to protect any IP ri ghts. Additionally, there has been no indication that the
Saudi authorities have applied any of the other penalties stated in the Circular, i.e. "criminal
prosecution", "personal litigation", or "the imposition of penalties and fines".
7.85. Furthermore, the Panel notes that Saudi Arabia maintains that beIN has not actually taken
the actions that would trigger the application of the penalty provisions in the Circular. 416 In the
Panel's view, this highlights a lack of clarity regarding whether beIN continued to "di stribute" its
media content without having obtained a license after the Circular was sent to beIN via email on
13 July 2017, and/or charge and collect fees after that time. 417 The Panel also recalls that Qatar
made no "as such" claim in connection with the aspect of Saudi law that is reflected in the Circular.418
Without evidence relating to or demonstrating the application of the Circular, the Panel is unable to
accept Qatar's assertion as to how the Circular would operate.
7.86. The Panel also notes that beIN has not yet initiated any civil enforcement proceeding with
respect to its IP rights. The Panel has found that Saudi Arabia has taken measures that, directly or
indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its
IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals. Thus, whether a
Saudi tribunal or authority would apply the terms of the Circular to prevent beIN from enforcing its

412 Panel Report, EC – Commercial Vessels, para. 7.30; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 7.158;
413 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 5.109; Appellate Body Report, US –
Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 95; Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article 21.5 –
Philippines), paras. 7.602-7.603.
414 See paragraph 7.68 of this Report.
415 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,
Exhibit QAT-1, para. 3.
416 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 11(a), para. 1, and Panel question No. 29, para. 47;
and opening statement at the second meeting, para. 14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright
protection to all entities even if they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of
entities found to have distributed content illegally (i.e., without a broadcasting license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi
Arabia's response to Panel question No. 41, para. 24.)
417 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 51, paras. 129-131.
418 See paragraphs 7.33 to 7.36 of this Report.

IP rights if beIN were able to secure legal representation to initiate civil proceedings is, for the Panel,
a matter of speculation.
7.87. Second, turning to the travel restrictions, Qatar's arguments concern the manner in which
such restrictions would operate in the hypothetical situation in which beIN was able to retain legal
counsel. For example, Qatar argued that "even if Qatari nationals were somehow able to obtain legal
representation, they would nevertheless have undue difficulties when attempting to meet with their
lawyers to discuss any proceedings". 419 The extent to which the travel restrictions would obstruct
Qatari nationals from accessing civil enforcement procedures, were they able to obtain legal
representation, has been debated by the parties and third parties.420
7.88. The Panel emphasizes that Qatar's challenge in relation to the travel restrictions is directed
at their practical consequences for beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures. Qatar
clarified that, "[t]o be clear, in these proceedings, Qatar does not challenge, per se, Saudi Arabia's
decision to close its borders, or to prevent Qatari nationals from entering its territory."421 Qatar did
not challenge the travel restrictions per se, but only the manner in which they might operate in
combination with the anti -sympathy measures and other measures to deny beIN access to civil
enforcement procedures . T he Panel cannot make a determination about the consequences of
retaining the travel restrictions while removing the anti -sympathy measures , as this would be
speculative.
7.89. In the Panel's view, w hether the travel restrictions would operate to prevent beIN from
accessing civil enforcement procedures if beIN were able to secure legal representation to initiate
civil proceedings is also a matter of speculation. The actions taken to prevent Saudi lega l counsel
from representing beIN in an action to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures
before Saudi courts and tribunals require the Panel to speculate about how the travel restrictions
would impact on beIN if it were able to secure legal representation. As Qatar put it:
Qatar has not asserted that Saudi Arabia requires Qatari nationals to initiate or conduct
proceedings in person, or to testify or otherwise participate in these proceedings in
person. Due to Saudi Arabia 's anti-sympathy measures, and the resulting restrictions
on the ability of Saudi attorneys to assist the Government of Qatar or Qatari nationals
in this WTO dispute, Qatar is unable at this time to answer the Panel's specific question
about what Saudi law requires with respect to in-person participation.422
7.90. Indeed, the Panel notes that Qatar contemplates that, if Saudi Arabia were to offer alternative
means (e.g., video testimony among other possibilities) that adequately provided for the rights of
parties to "substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence " within the meaning of
Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement, together with the right to be represented by counsel (also in line
with Article 42), then "its travel ban could potentially have little , if any, impact on the ability of
Qatari nationals to access civil judicial procedures".423
7.91. Third, with respect to the Ministerial approval requirement, Qatar assert ed that, were beIN
able to secure legal representation, it "would nevertheless be blocked" from ultimately prevailing.424

419 Qatar's first written submission, para. 226.
420 In its third-party submission, the European Union suggested, with respect to the effect of the travel
restrictions, that "Qatari nationals could be represented in legal proceedings by their representatives, provide
testimonies and discuss their cases with their lawyers via different means of communications" and thus "could
exercise the rights … remotely". (European Union's third-party submission, paras. 14 and 22).
See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 17, paras. 109-113 (alleging that the travel ban and the other
measures at issue foreclosed the ability of Qatari nationals to do so, whether in person or "remotely");
Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 40, paras. 20-22 (asserting that foreign nationals may avail
themselves of all rights in Saudi Arabia without physically travelling to or being present in Saudi Arabia,
including by email or by visiting SAIP's public webpage); and Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to
Panel question No. 40, paras. 61-71 (alleging that the travel ban, together with the other measures at issue,
make it impossible for Qatari right holders to initiate, conduct, or testify in proceedings for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights in Saudi Arabia, in violation of Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement).
421 Qatar's second written submission, para. 290.
422 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 17, para. 111. (emphasis original)
423 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 152.
424 Qatar's first written submission, para. 140.

Qatar also referred to beIN's understanding that the Ministry "will not authorise" any legal action to
enforce beIN's rights. 425 Qatar argue d that beIN "has been barred" from initiating copyright
proceedings as a consequence of th e anti-sympathy measures, and that beIN "would be barred"
from accessing the Copyright Committee by virtue of the Ministerial approval requirement.426 Thus,
by its terms, Qatar's arguments are directed at what the Minister would or would not do if beIN were
able to secure legal representation and brought a case before the Copyright Committee.
7.92. However, to date, neither beIN nor any other foreign right holder has initiated civil
enforcement procedures against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals.427 In the Panel's view, the question
of whether —and, if so, how —the Ministerial approval requirement (or replacement measures
establishing a different layer of approval428) would be applied to beIN, were beIN able to retain legal
counsel in Saudi Arabia and bring a case before the Copyright Committee, would also be an exercise
in speculation. Again, it should be noted that Qatar did not make any "as such" claim in connection
with the Ministerial approval requirement at issue .429 In the absence of evidence of how these
requirements have been applied , the Panel is unable to conclude that the Ministerial approval
requirements would operate in the manner described by Qatar.
7.93. The Panel notes that Qatar also argued that "the absence of any copyright infringement
actions being brought against beoutQ is, in and of itself, evidence that the 'gatekeeping function'
has been applied to prevent beIN and other right holders from obtaining civil remedies for copyright
infringement in Saudi Arabia".430 However, this argument assumes that, in addition to the explicit
Ministerial approval requirement regarding decisions issued by the Copyright Committee as set forth
in the text of the Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations, there is an a dditional unwritten
requirement for Ministerial approval of the initiation of proceedings before the
Copyright Committee.431 However, this additional alleged unwritten measure may simply be a
different way of characterizing another measure that the Panel has already ruled upon, namely the
measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi
legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and
tribunals. If it is a distinct measure, then Qatar has not provided sufficient evidence of the existence
of such an unwritten measure.
7.94. For these reasons, the Panel finds that Saudi Arabia has imposed certain restrictions that
could impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures. These include the 19 June 2017
Circular, the travel restrictions and the Ministerial approval req uirement. However , there is no
evidence that any of these measures has yet been applied to beIN to prevent it from accessing civil
enforcement procedures. The Panel considers that it would be an exercise in speculation to predict
how those requirements might be applied to restrict beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures.
7.95. The Panel concludes that Qatar has not discharged its burden of proving that the 19 June 2017
Circular, the travel restrictions and the Ministerial approval requirement , taken individ ually or
collectively, have prevented, or would prevent, beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures
before Saudi courts and tribunals. However, the Panel concludes that Qatar has established that
Saudi Arabia has taken "anti-sympathy measures" that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of
preventing beIN from securing legal representation to enforce its IP rights.

425 Ibid. paras. 194 and 227. See ibid. paras. 229, 350, 381 and 401.
426 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(b), paras. 117-118.
427 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 43; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29,
para. 35; Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 61; and Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question
No. 39, para. 13. Furthermore, Qatar indicated that it does not have any example of Ministerial approval
having been withheld in cases of advancing claims against copyright infringement. Qatar suggested that
Saudi Arabia "is not a country where such information is easily available". (Qatar's response to Panel question
No. 18(c), para. 121.)
428 See paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 of this Report.
429 See paragraphs 7.31 to 7.32 of this Report.
430 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 44, para. 103.
431 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(a), para. 114. See also Qatar's response to Panel question
No. 44, paras. 78-103.

7.2.3.3 Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties
7.2.3.3.1 Introduction
7.96. The Panel now turns to the question of whether sufficient eviden ce has been provided to
establish that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia. This issue is central to Qatar's claim under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, and it
is disputed between the partie s. Saudi Arabia maintained that Members cannot be expected to act
on criminal allegations without evidence and without the cooperation of concerned right holders.432
Saudi Arabia reiterate d that criminal procedures and penalties were not applied against beoutQ
because beIN and other foreign right holders have not provided sufficient supporting evidence and
cooperation.433 Qatar asserted that "it could not be for lack of sufficient evidence that Saudi Arabia
has failed to initiate procedures and penalties against the beoutQ piracy".434
7.97. The Panel will begin with an overview of the relevant correspondence between beIN and
certain third-party right holders, on the one hand, and the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information
(Ministry), GCAM and Arabsat, on the other hand. The Panel will then examine the evidence
presented by beIN and other right holders in detail, along with the additional corroborating evidence
submitted to the Panel by Qatar. After reviewing the evidence in detail, the Panel will state its overall
conclusion.
7.2.3.3.2 Overview of correspondence
7.98. The Panel begin s by summarizing the correspondence between beIN and third -party right
holders—particularly UEFA and BBC Studios —and the Ministry and GC AM. The Panel then
summarizes the correspondence between beIN and third -party right holders —particularly UEFA,
LaLiga, the Premier League and FIFA—and Arabsat.
7.99. In a letter to the Ministry dated 15 August 2017, beIN stated that it "recently learned that an
entity operating under the name 'beoutQ' is currently broadcasting beIN's proprietary media content,
without [beIN's] authorization, in … Saudi Arabia". beIN enclosed with its letter video recordings of
beoutQ's pirated broadcasts of beIN's proprietary content in Saudi Arabia435, and requested that the
Ministry and GCAM "take immediate action to investigate and prevent the unauthorized use of
beIN's media content by 'beoutQ' and/or any other unauthorized channels or means in … Saudi
Arabia".436 In a response to beIN dated 31 August 2017, GCAM stated that "it has not been proven
to us that there are any unlicensed devices at all the regular sales outlets". GCAM added that it had
not granted any licen ce for the broadcast of satel lite channels in contravention of Saudi law, and
that it would "take the appropriate measures in the event that it becomes aware of any violation of
the laws in this regard and the sanctions stipulated in the law in respect of the violators are
applied."437
7.100. Two weeks after receiving this response from GCAM, beIN submit ted a second letter to the
Ministry, dated 14 September 2017, in which it stated that it had become aware of "further evidence
indicating that persons in Saudi Arabia are actively promoting and/ or involved in these illegal and
unauthorized broadcasts". This evidence, enclosed with beIN's letter to the Ministry, consist ed of:
(a) tweets sent from the Twitter accounts of prominent Saudi persons and institutions endorsing or
advertising beoutQ's pirated broadcasts, (b) beIN's assertion that the website of the beoutQ channel
was originally geo-blocked to Saudi Arabia during the initial period of its operation, and (c) posts on
social media, including Facebook, that advertised beoutQ STBs and indicated that these STBs would
be on sale in Saudi Arabia. Considering that this evidence link ed the piracy of beIN's proprietary

432 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 59.
433 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 41-46; and second written submission,
paras. 59-66.
434 Qatar's second written submission, para. 214.
435 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15 August 2017, Exhibit QAT-116,
p. 1.
436 Ibid. p. 2.
437 Letter from Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and
English translation), 2 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-117.

content to persons subject to the Ministry's jurisdiction, beIN renew ed its request that the Ministry
and/or GCAM take action to investigate and prevent the illegal piracy by beoutQ.438
7.101. In a third letter to the Ministry, dated 16 January 2018, beIN assert ed that
beoutQ's broadcasts were available since August 2017 and had significantly expanded to include
web streaming and satellite transmission. beIN noted that, since October 2017, beoutQ offers beIN
channels, overlaid with the beoutQ logo, via satellite transmission to persons purchasin g
subscriptions and STBs from retail outlets in Saudi Arabia.439 beIN enclosed images of such STBs on
sale. beIN concluded that it "believe[s] that Saudi persons or entities own or control beoutQ, and/or
are facilitating beoutQ's unauthorized and illegal tra nsmission of beIN's proprietary media
content".440
7.102. On 8 June 2018 and 26 June 2018, respectively, UEFA and BBC Studios also each sent letters
to the Ministry and to GCAM concerning beoutQ's piracy. Both UEFA and BBC Studios stated that "a
pirate operator usi ng the name 'beoutQ' had been engaged in the unauthorised distribution of
programming and channels licensed to and/or operated by beIN and by other authorised third parties
operating in and outside of the MENA region." UEFA and BBC Studios each indicate d that beoutQ
was operating from Saudi Arabia, with UEFA further alleging that beoutQ was engaged in both illegal
web streaming and satellite broadcasting using the Badr -4/Arabsat 4-B satellite and frequencies
operated by Arabsat. UEFA and BBC Studios submit ted that beoutQ was selling STBs and
subscriptions for its satellite broadcasting in retail outlets across Saudi Arabia, that beoutQ's activity
was spreading, and that beoutQ STBs became available for sale in countries in the MENA region
other than Saudi Arabia.441
7.103. Finally, in a letter from beIN's legal representative to both the Ministry of Media (previously
known as the Ministry of Culture and Information) and GCAM, dated 3 September 2018, beIN
provided additional evidence of beoutQ's operations in Saudi Ara bia and its expansion to other
countries in the Middle East. Specifically, beIN state d that it had uncovered the sale —in other
countries in the MENA region, including Morocco, Oman and Bahrain—of beoutQ STBs imported from
Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, beIN considered that there was compelling evidence demonstrating that
beoutQ is operated from and controlled by persons in Saudi Arabia, given that: (a) beoutQ's pirate
operations are focused on the Saudi market; (b) beoutQ's pirate channels and related data are
transmitted via Arabsat satellites and have moved at different times across different Arabsat
frequencies; and (c) beoutQ is wholly, or in part, operated and/or controlled and directed by
Saudi-based persons. beIN submit ted extensive evidence, including newspaper articles describing
beoutQ's piracy, photographic evidence advertising rate cards and subscriptions priced in Saudi
Riyals, social media posts in support of beoutQ's piracy, declarations concerning the relationship
between beoutQ and a Saudi content distributor, technical reports demonstrating the transmission
of beoutQ's pirated content on Arabsat satellite frequencies and social media posts and photographic
evidence referring to public screenings of beoutQ's pirated content organized by municipalities across
Saudi Arabia.442
7.104. In addition to corresponding with the Ministry and GCAM, beIN and third-party right holders
wrote to Arabsat to convey their concerns about the transmission of beoutQ's pirated broadcasts
using Arabsat satellite frequencies . In a letter to Arabsat dated 16 August 2017, beIN request ed
Arabsat to remove or disable access to any unauthorized broadcast of beIN's proprietary content on
its satellite infrastructure. 443 In a response to beIN dated 29 August 2017, Arabsat state d that it
would "forward[] any complaint of infringement received from beIN to the channel infringing its

438 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-118,
pp. 1-2.
439 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16 January 2018, Exhibit QAT-119,
p. 2.
440 Ibid. pp. 1-2.
441 For UEFA's letters to the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and to GCAM, see UEFA Letter to
KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 8 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-122, and UEFA Letter to GCAM, 8 June 2018,
Exhibit QAT-123. For BBC Studios' letters, see BBC Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information,
26 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-124; and BBC Letter to GCAM, 26 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-125.
442 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106.
443 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91,
pp. 1-2.

rights", and would "ask[] the channel to stop such infringement immediately". Arabsat state d that
it refused to accept or bear any liability if this action does not stop the broadcast of such infringed
content.444
7.105. In a subsequent letter to beIN dated 14 December 2017445, Arabsat stated that it "ha[d] no
legal & contractual relationship with the entity of beoutQ, and ha[d] no insights [or] information on
the content broadcast[] on the said frequency since it is [an] encrypted signal". Arabsat alleged that
the signal " [was] transmitted directly from the client's premises", and that, "[r]eferring to the
mechanism agreed upon by beIN and Arab sat, and as the broadcast [] signal [was] encrypted,
Arabsat ha[d] contacted the client operating the mentioned frequency to clarify [beIN's ] claim."
According to Arabsat, the client responded that it "ha[d] no relationship or cooperation with [the]
beoutQ channel and its content" and was "fully complying with the laws relating to intellectual
property, copy rights and [its] contract with Arabsat". Accordingly, Arabsat stated, it "[was] not in
a position to deactivate the carrier as no solid evidence [was] furnished to Arabsat that
beoutQ's content is transmitted on the said frequency". Arabsat "urge [d] beIN to provide tangible
evidence proving technically that beoutQ is transmitted on the said frequency to enable Arabsat to
take the required action".446
7.106. beIN's legal representative respond ed to Arabsat's legal representative in a letter dated
26 December 2017. With respect to Arabsat's request for tangible evidence, beIN attached a report
prepared by its technical team finding that beoutQ was initially using Arabsat frequency 12207 MHz
to broadcast beIN's content through beoutQ STBs and later used Arabsat frequency 11919 MHz.447
beIN renewed its request that Arabsat, by no later than 30 December 2017: (a) identify its client(s)
using frequencies 12207 MHz and 11919 MHz to broadcast beIN's proprietary content under the
name beoutQ, (b) provide details of the uplinks used by Arabsat's client(s) using t he name beoutQ
for the transmission of signals to Arabsat's satellites, and (c) confirm that Arabsat would prevent
access to frequencies 12207 MHz, 11919 MHz and any other Arabsat frequencies used by beoutQ.448
7.107. From mid-March 2018 to early June 2018, four third-party right holders—UEFA, LaLiga, the
Premier League and FIFA—also engaged in correspondence with Arabsat concerning beoutQ's piracy.
According to the Panel record, UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League each issued letters to Arabsat,
alleging that beoutQ ha d made unauthorized transmissions of their programming via Arabsat
satellite frequencies. The Premier League identified the frequencies as 12207 MHz and 11919 MHz,
carried on the Arabsat satellite located at the orbital position 26OE. The right holders asked Arabsat
to take steps available to it to prevent beoutQ's transmissions on Arabsat satellite frequencies and
to cease any collaboration with any clients or customers broadcasting beoutQ-pirated content using
Arabsat satellites or services.449
7.108. Arabsat respond ed to the letters issued by UEFA and LaLiga, advising each to direct its
correspondence to beIN's legal representative, which had already been engaging with Arabsat, or to
Arabsat's legal representative. 450 UEFA subsequently wrote to Arabsat's legal representative to
confirm beoutQ's unauthorized transmissions via Arabsat frequencies. 451 According to the Panel
record, Arabsat's legal representative then issue d two letters , one to LaLiga and one to FIFA .
The legal representative informed LaLiga and FIFA that Arabsat was conducting an investigation
concerning the use of Arabsat's sate llite frequencies and would consider their input in the
investigation. Arabsat's legal representative added that, once it completed its investigation, Arabsat

444 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 29 August 2017, Exhibit QAT-101.
445 Arabsat states that it is responding to a letter from beIN dated 6 December 2017. While the
6 December 2017 letter has not been filed with the Panel, beIN's 26 December 2017 letter to Arabsat noted
that the 6 December 2017 letter contains a request "that Arabsat take immediate action to stop the
unauthorized and illegal transmission of beIN's proprietary media content via Arabsat's satellites by pirate
entity 'beoutQ'". (Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018,
Exhibit QAT-91, p. 3.)
446 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 14 December 2017, Exhibit QAT-102.
447 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91,
p. 3.
448 Ibid. p. 4.
449 UEFA Letter to Arabsat, 12 March 2018, Exhibit QAT-92; LaLiga Letter to Arabsat, 4 April 2018,
Exhibit QAT-96; and Premier League Letter to Arabsat, 11 April 2018, Exhibit QAT-99.
450 Arabsat Letter to UEFA, 14 March 2018, Exhibit QAT-93; and Arabsat Letter to LaLiga, 19 April 2018,
Exhibit QAT-97.
451 UEFA Letter to Squire Patton Boggs LLP, 17 April 2018, Exhibit QAT-94.

would "carefully consider the findings and then weigh what action is appropriate under the
circumstances".452 Arabsat's legal representative also emphasized to FIFA 453 that Arabsat is not
"collaborating" with any person or entity to commit IP piracy, and that Arabsat is not a Saudi entity
and is not controlled by the Saudi government or by private Saudi entities.454
7.109. In a follow-up letter dated 13 July 2018 to Arabsat's legal representative, beIN alleged that
beoutQ's commercial-scale piracy via Arabsat satellites had intensified.455 beIN submitted evidence
of a Saudi content distributor's active assistance of beoutQ's piracy and a technical report produced
by anti-piracy expert Nagra asserting that beoutQ's pirated broadcasts are transmitted on Arabsat
satellite frequencies.456 beIN then "demands[ed] as a matter of urgency" that Arabsat: (a) disable
and/or block the transmission of beoutQ's expected pirate transmission of the FIFA World Cup 2018
final game on 15 July 2018 on Arabsat satellite frequencies, including those listed in the present
letter; (b) disable and/or block any further access by beoutQ, and affiliated entities, to Arabsat
satellites and frequencies; (c) cancel any contracts that facilitate beoutQ broadcasts on Arabs at
satellite frequencies; and (d) disclose the identities of any and all persons or entities paying for,
contracting for, or using the Arabsat satellite frequencies used by beoutQ, and any other frequency
on which beoutQ transmissions are broadcast on Arab sat's satellites.457 beIN concluded that "it is
plain that Arabsat has more than enough evidence to finally take 'the problem of piracy seriously'".458
7.110. In a letter from Arabsat to FIFA, dated 24 June 2019, Arabsat stated that it was responding
to a 28 May 2019 letter from FIFA 459, as well as the "daily notices" it ha d received from FIFA .
Specifically, Arabsat contended that FIFA was ignoring two issues.460 First, FIFA neglected to discuss
the conclusion of Arabsat's prior investigations performed by six experts , reflected in
Arabsat's 15 July 2018 letter, that Arabsat frequencies are not being used by beoutQ. Arabsat also
noted that the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, France (TGI) fully vindicated Arabsat, rejected
all claims and awarded Arabsat substantia l costs. Arabsat ask ed FIFA to provide Arabsat with the
written results of the "third party on -site testing", and in the meantime, consider ed that FIFA had
provided no proof that beoutQ was using Arabsat frequencies to transmit pirate broadcasts. 461
Second, Arabsat stated that "disabling" frequencies is a permanent, radical action that it could not
undertake "absent an incontrovertible showing that a frequency has been hijacked or otherwise
misused by a third party", and that "no other means exist for preclud ing such activity".
Disabling such frequencies, in Arabsat's view, would only terminate legitimate programming and
interfere with the contractual rights of Arabsat customers, and would not affect beoutQ's broadcasts.
Moreover, satellites involve "very sensitive technology, to which no human technician has physical
access to correct malfunctions". Unlike "'flipping' a switch on land", Arabsat note d, doing so on a
satellite involves a substantial risk that the frequency might not be re-enabled. Accordingly, Arabsat
stated that it cannot "disable any frequencies used to transmit beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts".462

452 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to LaLiga, 13 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-98; and Squire Patton Boggs
LLP Letter to FIFA, 5 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-100.
453 The Panel has not been provided with a copy of FIFA's 28 May 2018 letter to Arabsat, to which
Arabsat's legal representative responds, but the key points in the letter are reproduced in the response of
Arabsat's legal representative to FIFA.
454 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to FIFA, 5 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-100. Arabsat's legal representative
submitted that Arabsat is "a quasi-governmental entity of the Arab League, established by 22 of its members".
The General Assembly is Arabsat's main organ, and its membership consists of the communication ministers in
the Arab member states or their duly authorized representatives. (Ibid.)
455 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91,
p. 5. In this letter to Arabsat, beIN referred to previous letters from 1 May 2018, 1 June 2018 and
12 July 2018, and laments that, "[d]espite numerous notices … Arabsat has failed to take any action to stop
the transmission of beoutQ's illegally pirated content, which constitutes direct infringement of beIN's copyrights
and trademarks." (Ibid.)
456 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91,
p. 6.
457 Ibid. p. 8.
458 Ibid.
459 While FIFA's 28 May 2019 letter has not been submitted to the Panel, Arabsat noted that this letter
"claims to have 'procured third party on-site testing' and to 'have received independent confirmation that
beoutQ is engage[d] in illegal satellite broadcasting' through Arabsat satellites". (Arabsat Letter to FIFA,
24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-39, p. 3.)
460 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-39, pp. 1-2.
461 Ibid. p. 2.
462 Ibid. pp. 2-3.

7.111. In its response to Arabsat, dated 26 June 2019, FIFA stated that it was simply requesting
the support of Arabsat in addressing the unauthori zed transmissions of beoutQ, and was not
"implying that Arabsat is involved in, or complicit with, the illegal beoutQ operation". In the absence
of Arabsat being in a position to disable its satellite frequencies, FIFA requested that Arabsat employ
any means necessary to investigate the use of its frequencies, notably 11270 MHz Horizontal
polarization (11270 MHz H) (on the Arabsat Badr -6 satellite) during the live transmissions of the
remaining matches of the FIFA Women's World Cup 2019. FIFA encouraged Arabsat to help identify
the source of the signals being uplinked and to provi de feedback on such investigations. FIFA
reiterated its request for a copy of the test results referred to in Arabsat's letter dated 15 July 2018,
and noted that the TGI did not find that beoutQ was not carried by Arabsat's satellite frequencies.
Rather, in FIFA's view, the TGI simply dismissed the case on the basis that beoutQ's transmissions
were not widely available in France.463
7.112. The Panel will now examine , in greater detail, the evidence presented to Saudi authorities
by beIN and other right holders, together with certain additional corroborating evidence submitted
to the Panel by Qatar.
7.2.3.3.3 Evidence regarding the promotion of beoutQ by prominent Saudi nationals
7.113. In its 14 September 2017 and 3 September 2018 letters to the Ministry and GCAM, beIN
provided evidence of tweets sent from the Twitter accounts of prominent Saudi nationals. 464 These
Twitter accounts belong to Mr Saoud Al-Qahtani, counsel for the Saudi Royal Courts465; Mr Abdulaziz
al-Mriseul, general manager of the Al Riyadh Newspaper; and the Al Riyadh newspaper itself.
beIN alleged that the tweets from these accounts "provide reason to believe that the conspiracy to
pirate beIN's proprietary media content has occurred within or has connections to t he territorial
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia".
7.114. beIN provided copies of these tweets to the Ministry466, which Qatar subsequently submitted
to the Panel.467 These tweets are reproduced below.
No. Time and
date of tweet
Author of tweet Content of tweet
1 12 June 2017 Mr Saoud Al -Qahtani,
counsel for the Saudi
Royal Courts
"The alternative solutions are coming soon and they are
going to be free or for a low price.
#Blocking_Qatari_beIN_Sport
#Oh_Dulim_Greet_them_back
It was their plan after buying the broadcas ting rights five
times the real value to insert political bulletins and
programmes to damage international stability.
There is a big hole in the law in their monopoly to
broadcast in the region. Revise the situation in Britain and
France, for example…that is enough indication."468
2 6 August 2017

Mr Abdulaziz al-Mriseul,
general manager of the
Al Riyadh Newspaper
"Saudi heroes will entirely pirate beIN sport channel [sic]
and satellite-broadcast the full content on beoutQ channel
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"469

463 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-40.
464 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-118,
pp. 1-2; and Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual
Media, 3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, p. 5. See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 22.
465 According to Qatar, as early as 12 June 2017, Saud Al-Qahtani was a consultant to the Saudi Royal
Court holding the rank of Minister, and Chairman of the Board of the Saudi Union for Cyber and Programming
Security. (Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 22.)
466 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-118,
pp. 1-2.
467 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41.
468 Ibid. pp. 15-16; and SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports rights robbery",
6 March 2019, Exhibit QAT-50. See also Qatar's first written submission, para. 46; opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, para. 26; and second written submission, para. 36.
469 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41, p. 1. See also Qatar's first written
submission, para. 51.

No. Time and
date of tweet
Author of tweet Content of tweet
3 6 August 2017 Mr Abdulaziz al-Mriseul,
general manager of the
Al Riyadh Newspaper
"This streaming will be through the channel's special
receiver and the subscription will be for a very low price
because it does not mainly aim at getting profits
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"470
4 6 August 2017 Mr Abdulaziz al-Mriseul,
general manager of the
Al Riyadh Newspaper
"After two weeks from now, beoutQ receivers will be
available in the market. It will be satellite broadcasting,
not a streaming via internet
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"471
5 6 August 2017 Mr Abdulaziz al-Mriseul,
general manager of the
Al Riyadh Newspaper
"As for me, I will strongly support beoutQ channels, and I
will never feel satisfied until the full piracy of beIN sport
channels. Let's wait and see who is the strongest.
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"472
[This tweet was accompanied by a cartoon showing beoutQ
"kicking" beIN out of the market.]473
6 N/A Al Riyadh Newspaper "Launching 10 sport channels broadcasting European
Leagues, for low prices…Soon…marking the end of 'beIN
sport' era."
[This tweet contains the logos of various sports leagues,
including Barclays Premier League, Ind Liga, Serie A, and
LFP.]474

7.115. All of the tweets above foreshadow that a substitute for beIN's operations would enter the
Saudi market, and some of the tweets support the establishment of a pirate channel, beoutQ , to
circumvent beIN's exclusive licences from third-party right holders. Saudi Arabia did not contest the
content of these tweets.
7.116. In addition to the se tweets, Qatar provided the Panel with other social media evidence,
including a cartoon commercial produced by beoutQ, show ing strong support for beoutQ and
antipathy toward beIN. Specifically, Qatar submitted tweets that were posted in August 2017 from
the Twitter account of the general manager of the Al Riyadh newspaper, the same Twitter account
that authored tweets 2 to 5 above. 475 These additional tweets further clarify the rationale of
beoutQ's piracy and the apparent origins of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia. In these t weets, the author:
(a) conducts lotteries or giveaways offering beoutQ STBs to viewers476, which, based on the text of
the tweets, appear to have drawn complaints from beIN itself 477; (b) states that beoutQ STBs will
be available in two weeks478; (c) stresses that "[t]he main purpose is to give a serious blow to the
Qatari media, invalidate their scheme, and make content available to the followers, away from their
channels … #Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"; and (d) invites readers to "spoil their scheme
and quickly subscribe in beoutQ for a very low price, and trust what the national heroes are doing".479
Qatar also submit ted an anti-beIN cartoon, circulated by beoutQ, encouraging Saudi citizens and
beIN's licensors to replace beIN with beoutQ.480

470 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41, p. 3. See also Qatar's first written
submission, para. 51.
471 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41, p. 7.
472 Ibid. p. 9. See also Qatar's first written submission, para. 51.
473 Qatar's first written submission, para. 51.
474 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41, p. 13.
475 See tweets 2 to 5 in the table following paragraph 7.114 of this Report.
476 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT-41, pp. 17-18.
477 Ibid. p. 21.
478 Ibid. p. 19.
479 Ibid. p. 11.
480 Qatar's first written submission, para. 50 (referring to beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ,
Video, 21 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-49 and SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports
rights robbery", 6 March 2019, Exhibit QAT-50). In this cartoon, Saudi citizens protest outside of what appears
to be beIN's headquarters, which is adorned by a dollar sign and has a control room in which the CEO of beIN
is surrounded by piles of US dollars. The CEO of beIN appears to become enraged at the sight of the protests,
and visits the headquarters of numerous football leagues. He leaves the headquarters of each football league,

7.117. The Panel recalls that, in the context of denying its promotion of public gatherings with
screenings of beoutQ 's unauthorized broadcasts, Saudi Arabia note d "that unofficial,
non-government tweets are not usually recognized by legal adjudicators or attributed to a
government without explicit approval". 481 The Panel discusses these tweets, not because they are
attributable to the Government of Saudi Arabia , but because they are evidence that beoutQ was
promoted by prominent individuals and newspapers within Saudi Arabia , which is relevant to the
question of whether beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction
of Saudi Arabia.
7.2.3.3.4 Evidence regarding the targeting of the Saudi market by beoutQ
7.118. Qatar indicated that beIN has provided evidence to the Saudi authorities demonstrating that
beoutQ targets the Saudi market by: (a) allowing only persons in Saudi Arabia to access its websites,
(b) making its STBs widely available for sale at retail stores in Saudi Arabia, and (c) advertising its
subscriptions and rate cards to viewers using prices in Saudi riyals.
7.119. First, beIN asserted, in a letter to the Ministry and GCAM, that only web users in Saudi Arabia
can access beoutQ's websites, or that such websites are "geo-blocked" to Saudi Arabia.482 In support
of this assertion, beIN referred to a technical report by Nagra483 indicating that, as of the date of its
report, beoutQ channels could be watched for free on two websites, http:// beoutq.se and
http://beoutq.sx, accessible only to web users in Saudi Arabia. Nagra confirm ed that it could only
access these websites with an IP address from Saudi Arabia. 484 beIN considered that this finding
"provides [a] strong reason to believe that this act of piracy was mainly targeted to the Saudi
market".485
7.120. Second, in a letter to the Ministry, beIN submitted extensive photographic evidence showing
beoutQ STBs on sale at retail stores in Saudi Arabia.486 beIN submitted this evidence to the Ministry
under the file name "Images of the beoutQ set -top boxes on sale in retail stores in the KSA". A
similarly titled exhibit, "Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi
Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018" has been submitted to the Panel.487 An examination of
the photographs in this exhibit from November 2017, for example, reveals that beoutQ STBs were
available for sale, and were ultimately purchased by investigators in Saudi Arabia, at multiple
electronics retail stores in Jeddah, Riyadh and Al Dammam. The photographic evidence shows the
store front at which each beoutQ STB was purchased; the receipt and business card from each store
detailing the cost and date of the purchase of each beoutQ STB, as well as the name and address of
each store; and, for certain STBs, the card containing an activation code and instructions for
activation. As demonstrated by beIN's photographic evidence , in November 2017, investigators
purchased beoutQ STBs from seven stores in Riyadh, nine stores in Jeddah and eight stores in Al
Dammam.488
7.121. beIN also pointed out that international journalists had reported on the wide availability of
beoutQ STBs in Saudi retail stores. On 22 June 2018, Bloomberg' s managing editor for the
MENA region reported that:

appearing to be disappointed, and walks home. At the end of the commercial, he enters the TV room of his
home with his family and sits down to a match televised by beoutQ. (Ibid.)
481 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), para. 62.
482 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106.
483 Ibid. p. 4 (referring to Appendix 9: Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview," dated 24 June 2018,
section 3.1, p. 4). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 26.
484 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", dated 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-90, section
3.1, p. 4.
485 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit QAT-118,
pp. 1-2.
486 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16 January 2018, Exhibit QAT-119.
487 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 7: Images of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in
Saudi Arabia). See Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia,
October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71.
488 Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to
September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71, pp. 51-63.

Many Saudis say it was easy to buy the devices in shops across the kingdom in the lead
up to the World Cup, generally for as much as 400 [R]iyals ($107), including a year-long
subscription. It's now common to see BeoutQ playing in homes, restaurants and cafes
that purchased receivers. The channel was playing on big screens at a
government-sponsored event in the Saudi capital on Wednesday showing the national
team's game against Uruguay. It was also playing on a large public screen on the side
of a building on Tahlia Street, the city's main commercial boulevard.489
7.122. Third, beIN also submit ted additional photographic and social media evidence, in its
3 September 2018 letter to the Ministry and GCAM, showing the extent to which beoutQ targets the
Saudi market. beIN submit ted photographic evidence in which beoutQ appears to advertise and
price, in Saudi riyals, subscriptions 490 to its pirated content, rate cards that list the prices for
advertising spots in various football matches and at various points in those matches 491, and Saudi
brands and products.492
7.123. In addition to the evidence above, submitted by beIN to the Ministry and GCAM, Qatar
provided the Panel with additional evidence supporting the conclusion that beoutQ appears to target
the Saudi market. This evidence consists of: (a) a declaration made by the CEO of beIN concerning
beoutQ's operations and the predominant use of beoutQ's websites by persons in Saudi Arab ia;
(b) photographic evidence demonstrating that beoutQ STBs were "visibly displayed, promoted, and
sold" at electronics stores in at least three major Saudi cities as recently as May 2019;
(c) photographic evidence that numerous restaurants and cafés , as well as a Saudi television
channel, openly showed beoutQ channels as recently as June 2019; and (d) statements, reports and
submissions made by governmental authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well
as third-party right holders, expressing concern about beoutQ's piracy in Saudi Arabia. The Panel
will discuss each of these categories of evidence in turn.
7.124. First, according to a 15 April 2019 Declaration made by beIN's CEO, between January 2018
and August 2018, the beoutq.sx website was a ccessed primarily and overwhelmingly by users in
Saudi Arabia (71.99%), followed by users in Egypt (5.68%), Morocco (3.68%), Algeria (3.06%),
the United States (2.04%), Tunisia (1.81%), the United Kingdom (1.19%), the UAE (1.04%) and
Germany (0.93%). 493 This information supports the finding made by Nagra above that
beoutQ's websites are geo-blocked and cannot be accessed by web users physically located outside
Saudi Arabia unless such users subscribed to a virtual private network that registers the user ’s
location as being in Saudi Arabia.494
7.125. Second, Qatar provided the Panel with additional photographic evidence demonstrating that
beoutQ STBs were "visibly displayed , promoted, and sold" at multiple Saudi electronics stores in
November 2017, September 2018, October 2018, April 2019 and May 2019. This photographic
evidence further supports the similar evidence submitted by beIN that beoutQ STBs were available
for sale in retail stores in November 2017. 495 In November 2017, investigators found that, in
Jeddah's Sahary Centre, 20 of the approximately 25 electronics stores had posted leaflets for beoutQ
or had beoutQ STBs visibly on display. Similarly, in Jeddah's Nazir Center, at least 20 of

489 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, p. 8 (referring to Appendix 15: Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim
as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates," dated 22 June 2018). See also Qatar's first written submission, para. 69
(quoting Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates", 22 June 2018,
Exhibit QAT-77).
490 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 4: Evidence of beoutQ Subscriptions Priced in Saudi Riyals).
491 Ibid. p.5 (referring to Appendix 5: Evidence of beoutQ Advertising Rate Cards Priced in Saudi Riyals).
Qatar submitted evidence to the Panel showing, for example, that beoutQ has advertised Premier League "gold
packages" for SAR 2,500,000 (or approximately USD 666,638). (See also Qatar's first written submission,
para. 67 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 47; and
beoutQ advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi Riyals, Exhibit QAT-75).)
492 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 6: Evidence of beoutQ Carrying Advertising for Saudi Brands).
493 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 27; and Qatar's first
written submission, para. 80 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37,
para. 27).
494 See paragraph 7.119 of this Report.
495 See paragraphs 7.120 to 7.122 of this Report.

40 electronics stores offered beoutQ STBs for sale. 496 The beoutQ STBs available in stores in
November 2017 ranged in price from SAR 360 to 400 (approximately USD 95-110). In September
2018, beoutQ STBs available for sale in 26 electronics stores in the above-mentioned cities ranged
in price from SAR 330 and 370 (approximately USD 89-99).497 Investigators were able to purchase
beoutQ STBs in September 2018 and October 2018 at multiple stores.498 Finally, beoutQ STBs were
also available for purchase in 15 Saudi electronics stores in late April 2019 and May 2019 at prices
ranging from SAR 600 to 720 (approximately USD 160 -192). Qatar provided a picture of the store
front and a business card for "beout Q 2", one such store in the Al Fakhriyah District of Al Dammam
that distributed beoutQ in May 2019. 499 Saudi retail stores appear to have regularly exchanged
tweets with customers regarding the sale of beoutQ STBs.500
7.126. Third, Qatar submitted evidence to the Panel showing that numerous restaurants and cafes,
as well as Saudi television channels, have broadcast beoutQ's pirated content to the public.
Photographic evidence from July 2018, April 2019, May 2019 and June 2019 reflects that restaurants
and caf es openly showed beou tQ channels on televisions on their premises. 501 This evidence
supplements and expands upon beIN's earlier evidence showing that Saudi municipalities had posted
tweets to organize public screenings of 2018 World Cup matches on beoutQ channels in many cities
in Saudi Arabia.502 The prominent Saudi -owned and Saudi -based channel Saudi 24 has also
broadcast beoutQ's pirated content on occasion, including the Al Hilal v Al Duhail AFC Champions
League match on 12 March 2019. Saudi 24 added graphics to the screen, including its own logo and
an image of Saudi Arabia's leaders apparently watching the game or other wise overseeing the
broadcast.503
7.127. Fourth, and f inally, Qatar provided the Panel with reports , statements, or submissions
produced by the United States, the United Kingdom and third-party right holders expressing concern
about beoutQ's piracy in Saudi Arabia.
7.128. For example, i n its 2019 Special 301 Report, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) placed Saudi Arabia on its Priority Watch List, citing "[r]ampant satellite and
online piracy" propagated by beoutQ. The USTR explain ed that the beou tQ STBs "continue to be

496 Qatar's second written submission, para. 49 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, paras. 34-40; Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in
Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71; Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media
Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, paras. 24-25; and Photographic Evidence of Screenings of
beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11 July 2018,
Exhibit QAT-78). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, pp. 125-188.
The beoutQ packaging and promotional material in such stores explicitly advertises the availability of sports
content exclusively licensed to beIN. (Qatar's first written submission, para. 71 (referring to Images of beoutQ
promotional material, Exhibit QAT-42).)
497 Qatar's second written submission, para. 63 (referring to Photographs of beoutQ Set-Top Boxes on
Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT-71). See also Declaration
by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, paras. 34 and 37.
498 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, paras. 36 and 38.
499 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(a), para. 134; and Qatar's opening statement at the
second meeting of the Panel, para. 45 (referring to Photographic Evidence and Documentation of beoutQ
Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Saudi Arabia, April-May 2019, attached as Annex 1 to Supplemental Declaration by
beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, pp. 22-23).
500 Qatar's first written submission, para. 52 (referring to Tweets about the sale of beoutQ STBs,
12 August 2017, Exhibit QAT-51). A New York Times article also quoted from an employee at an electronics
shop in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in May 2018. The employee stated that a one-year subscription to a beoutQ STB
costs USD 100, and that his shop had been selling beoutQ STBs since February 2018. (The New York Times,
"The Brazen Bootlegging of a Multibillion-Dollar Sport Network", 9 May 2018, Exhibit QAT-175.)
501 Qatar's second written submission, para. 49 (referring to Photographic Evidence of Screenings of
beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11 July 2018,
Exhibit QAT-78; and Photographic Evidence of Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Broadcasts at Restaurants and
Cafés in Saudi Arabia, April-June 2019, attached as Annex 2 to Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group
LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217); and Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(a), para. 134.
502 See section 7.2.3.4 ("Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts") of this Report.
503 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 20 (referring to Inside World
Football, "AFC streaming of ACL reaches 1m in Saudi Arabia but now Saudi 24 channel joins piracy",
13 March 2019, Exhibit QAT-190).

widely available and are generally unregulated in Saudi Arabia" 504 and that Saudi Arabia "has not
taken sufficient steps to address the purported role of Arabsat in facilitating [b]eoutQ's piracy
activities".505 In a series of submissions to the US Government under the 2019 Special 301 process
in February 2019, multiple right holders and coalitions from around the world detailed the harm that
the beoutQ piracy has caused to their business. 506 The USTR's 2018 Notorious Markets List, which
"highlights prominent and illustrative examples of online and physical marketplaces that reportedly
engage in and facilitate substantial piracy and counterfeiting", cite d beoutQ as "an illicit pirate
operation that has been widely available in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East region and
Europe".507
7.129. The UK Government similarly indicated that it is investigating beoutQ's IP theft of the
English Premier League's content.508 In testimony before the UK's Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Select Committee in mid-May 2019, "secretary of state [for Culture, Media and Sport] Jeremy Wright
QC, confirmed that UK Government departments are 'pursuing this matter' and 'the [UK] embassy
in Riyadh is speaking to the Saudis on this subject'". 509 Secretary Wright went on to highlight the
threat that this piracy causes to the future of sports and sports broadcasting, including in the UK.510
7.130. Qatar also provided the Panel with a copy of a public joint statement by seven major football
right holders (including FIFA, UEF A, AFC, the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie
A).511 The statement provides that:
We, the rights holders of various football competitions, collectively condemn in the
strongest possible terms the ongoing theft of our intellectual property by the pirate
broadcaster known as 'beoutQ' and call on the authorities in Saudi Arabia (KSA) to

504 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(a), para. 136 (quoting United States 2019 Special 301
Report, Office of the United States Trade Representative (April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT-184).
505 Ibid. para. 11 (quoting United States 2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade
Representative (April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT-184, p. 57); and Qatar's second written submission,
para. 59 (quoting United States 2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT-184, p. 57).
506 See, e.g. Reuters "NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urge U.S. action on alleged Saudi TV piracy",
16 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-62; Submission by Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance for the 2019 Special 301
Review, 4 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-63; Submission by Canal+ Group for the 2019 Special 301 Review,
7 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-64; Submission by the International Intellectual Property Alliance for the 2019
Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-65, p. 14; Submission by the National Basketball
Association and the United States Tennis Association for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019,
Exhibit QAT-66; Submission by beIN Media Group, LLC and Miramax, LLC for the 2019 Special 301 Review,
7 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-67; Submission by Sky Limited for the 2019 Special Review, 7 February 2019,
Exhibit QAT-68; Submission by the Sport Coalition for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019,
Exhibit QAT-69; Submission by U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019,
Exhibit QAT-70, p. 27; and Reuters "NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urge U.S. action on alleged Saudi TV piracy",
16 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-62.
507 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 11 (quoting Excerpts of
United States 2018 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT-187, pp. 2 and 15).
508 Ibid. para. 13 (referring to SportsPro Media, "UK government to investigate BeoutQ Premier League
IP theft", 25 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-188).
509 Ibid. (referring to Broadband TV News, "MPs call for 'robust attack' on pirate beoutQ", 10 May 2019,
Exhibit QAT-189).
510 Ibid.
511 Qatar's second written submission, para. 88 (referring to Public statements from world sports
organizations condemning beoutQ Piracy, as collected on beIN Media Group's Website Exposing beoutQ,
16 January 2019, Exhibit QAT-52; SportsPro, "ATP and ITF pile in on BeoutQ over pirate broadcasts",
6 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-53; FIFA, "Joint Public Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League,
LaLiga and Bundesliga on beoutQ", 22 January 2019, Exhibit QAT-54; UEFA, "Joint Statement on behalf of
FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and Bundesliga on beoutQ", 22 January 2019, Exhibit QAT-55;
Reuters, "Soccer: Leagues and governing bodies condemn beoutQ TV piracy", 22 January 2019,
Exhibit QAT-56; Asian Football Confederation Statement on beoutQ, 9 January 2019, Exhibit QAT-57;
Motion Picture Association of America, 2018 Notorious Markets Comments, 1 October 2018, Exhibit QAT-58,
p. 10; The Guardian, "BBC and Sky call for EU crackdown on Saudi pirate TV service", 31 October 2018,
Exhibit QAT-59; and Bloomberg, "Telemundo Says Its World Cup Broadcasts Were Illegally Distributed",
19 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-60).

support us in ending the widespread and flagrant breaches of our intellectual property
rights taking place in the country.512
7.2.3.3.5 Evidence regarding the transmission of beoutQ's broadcasts via Arabsat
7.131. Headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Arabsat is an intergovernmental organization and
satellite operator whose largest shareholder is the Government of Saudi Arabia (with a stake of
36.6%)513 and whose CEO is a Saudi national .514 beIN alleged that the frequencies of this satellite
operator transmit beoutQ's pirate channels and related data (firmware updates, decryption keys and
signaling data) to beoutQ STBs in Saudi Arabia, according to technical reports that it has submitted
to the Ministry, GCAM and Arabsat. Two of the four technical reports submitted to the Ministry, GCAM
and Arabsat were also submitted to the Panel515, and will be discussed below.
7.132. Cybersecurity expert Nagra516 determined that be outQ's pirate transmissions have moved
at different times across four Arabsat frequencies: 12207 MHz Vertical polarization (12207 MHz V),
11919 MHz Horizontal polarization ( 11919 MHz H ), 12380 MHz Horizontal polarization
(12380 MHz H) and 12341 MHz Horizontal polarization (12341 MHz H). These frequencies operate
on Arabsat satellites Badr-4 and Badr-6, directed at the orbital location 26 OEast, which covers the
MENA region and parts of Europe. 517 According to Nagra, beoutQ channels can be moved at will
across these frequencies without upgrades to a beoutQ STB's firmware and without interruption of
beoutQ's pirate service for end-users.518
7.133. Following initial tests conducted by Nagra leading to the findings above, Arabsat instructed
its outside experts to test "cert ain specific Arabsat frequencies at certain specific times" to detect
whether beoutQ pirate broadcasts were being transmitted on these frequencies. Arabsat's outside
experts found no such broadcasts on these Arabsat frequencies as tested at specific times.
In Nagra's view, however, the findings of Arabsat's outside experts establish only that beoutQ
repeatedly switches between the four Arabsat frequencies. Nagra note d that none of
Arabsat's outside experts was asked to conduct simultaneous or systematic testing of all four Arabsat
frequencies, and that "systematic testing would be the most obvious and straightforward way to
determine whether … beoutQ was … transmitting on any Arabsat frequenc y."519 Based on its
experience in combating piracy, Nagra considered it "no surprise whatsoever that a pirate operation
would seek to arrange its activities in such a way", and note d that Arabsat had "no legitimate
technical or practical reason to instruct i ts outside experts to engage in such selective testing".
Nagra emphasized that it is "a simple exercise to turn on a beoutQ STB and determine which
frequency is transmitting the beoutQ pirate channels", and that any satellite operator has the
technical capability to determine exactly which customers are broadcasting on its frequencies.520
7.134. Noting the regularity with which beoutQ's frequency switches occur, Nagra report ed that
beoutQ made three such switches in 10 days, between 9 June 2018 and 19 June 2018, and that all

512 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-227.
513 Arabsat, About, last accessed 16 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-86.
514 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, p. 5 (referring to Appendix 10: Nagra Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy –
Further Update," dated 15 August 2018). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019,
Exhibit QAT-37, para. 29; and Arabsat, "League of Arab States Secretary-General honors Arabsat CEO",
29 January 2018, Exhibit QAT-87.
515 See NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-90; NAGRA,
Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update", 15 August 2018, Exhibit QAT-80; and Letter from
beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 3 September 2018,
Exhibit QAT-106. The other two reports were submitted to Arabsat. (See Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat,
dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, p. 4.)
516 See NAGRA Kudelski Group Website, "The Group at a Glance", Exhibit QAT-81.
517 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, p. 5 (referring to Appendix 10: Nagra Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy –
Further Update," dated 15 August 2018); and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview",
24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-90, pp. 4 and 6-8.
518 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update", 15 August 2018,
Exhibit QAT-80, p. 6.
519 Ibid. pp. 6-9.
520 Ibid. p. 5.

such switches occurred immediately before or after Arabsat's outside experts tested a particular
Arabsat frequency . For example, on 20 June 2018, Arabsat's outside experts tested Arabsat
frequencies 11919 MHz H and 12207 MHz V. During the night of 19 June 2018 to 20 June 2018,
however, beoutQ's pirate channels had switched off of these frequencies and on to Arabsat
frequencies 12341 MHz H and 12380 MHz H. Once Arabsat's outside experts completed their tests
of frequency 11919 MHz H, beoutQ's pirate channels moved back to that frequency. Then, while
beoutQ continued to broadcast on Arabsat frequency 11919 MHz H, Arabsat mandated two other
experts to test Arabsat frequency 12341 MHz H.521 Arabsat's outside experts did not find any beoutQ
transmissions on frequency 12341 MHz H, but on 26 June 2018, Nagra found that beoutQ's pirate
channels, signaling data and STB firmware updates were all being transmitted on frequency
11919 MHz H.522 The specific frequencies used frequently changed, often before or after testing
conducted by Arabsat's outside experts , but Nagra consistently found beoutQ's pirated broadcasts
to be carried on Arabsat satellite frequencies.523
7.135. Nagra also referred to "two unusual technical features" concerning the four Arabsat satellite
frequencies that should have attracted Arabsat's attention and prompted further enquiries. 524
First, the four Arabsat frequencies contain "unusual custom obfuscated data", encoded in the Time
Offset Table (TOT), which is used by the beoutQ STB to discover where and how the beoutQ
channels, decryption keys and firmware updates are broadcast. Nagra emphasiz es that
"[n]o legitimate broadcaster would include this information in the TOT, which is intended to carry
the [Coordinated Universal Time] and local date and time information". Second, the Arabsat
frequencies carrying beoutQ audio and video signals are mi ssing the standard Digital Video
Broadcasting (DVB) / Moving Picture Experts Group tables that are commonly used in satellite
television broadcasts, such as the names of the television channels, the available audio languages,
the television operator, the s pecific satellite frequency being used to transmit the television signal
in question, the audio and video compression methods, or the electronic programme guide describing
current and future events.
7.136. In addition to the two Nagra technical reports discussed above, Qatar provided the Panel
with four other technical reports and statements noting that beoutQ's pirated content is broadcast
on Arabsat satellite frequencies. Specifically, Qatar submitted: (a) a report from anti -piracy expert
Cartesian dated 8 February 2019525, (b) an additional report from Nagra dated 8 February 2019526,
(c) a report from cybersecurity expert Synamedia dated 6 June 2019527, and (d) a report produced
by MarkMonitor dated April 2019.528 Qatar also submitted statements made by the European Union
and references to a report commissioned by third -party right holders whose content has been
affected by beoutQ's piracy.
7.137. In its 8 February 2019 technical report, anti-piracy expert Cartesian529 agreed with
Nagra's conclusion530 that Arabsat had "no legitimate technical or practical reason" to instruct its
outside experts to test specific Arabsat frequencies on specific dates, as opposed to engaging in
systematic or sequential testing of all Arabsat frequencies. The fact that beo utQ's changes in
frequencies occur immediately before and after Arabsat's outside experts' "selective testing" is, for
Cartesian, "a strong indication that Arabsat is seeking to conceal the broadcast of beoutQ's illegal
content on its satellites, if not ac tively colluding with the originator of beoutQ's illegal content". 531
Cartesian arrived at a similar conclusion when noting Arabsat's failure to take any decisive action

521 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update", 15 August 2018,
Exhibit QAT-80, p. 5. See also ibid. pp. 16-17; and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "Response to IGP Testing of 28
January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ Frequency Changes", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-224, p. 16.
522 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update", 15 August 2018,
Exhibit QAT-80, p. 5.
523 Ibid. p. 9.
524 Ibid. p. 13.
525 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89.
526 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "Response to IGP Testing of 28 January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ
Frequency Changes", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-224.
527 Synamedia Report, "'beoutQ' Service Analysis", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT-226.
528 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019 as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration
by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT-238.
529 Cartesian website, "Our Story", Exhibit QAT-103.
530 See paragraph 7.133 of this Report.
531 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89,
pp. 8-9 and 18.

concerning beoutQ's piracy. Cartesian consider ed that Arabsat is able to determine wheth er an
allegedly illegal signal is transmitted over one of its frequencies, and has the technical and
contractual means to stop any such transmission. For Cartesian, Arabsat's inaction thus "provides a
strong indication that Arabsat either is directly involved in this piracy or, at a minimum, is colluding
with beoutQ".532
7.138. According to Cartesian, changes of frequencies may happen over the lifetime of a TV channel,
but typically only once every few years, and "always for very good reasons".533 Numerous frequency
changes of the kind occurring on Arabsat satellite frequencies and the implementation of "advanced
and unusual signaling mechanisms" necessary to do so are, in Cartesian's view, "certainly … difficult,
costly and time -consuming". The on ly plausible explanation for such conduct is "an intention to
conceal the transmission of illegal content", which "should have alerted Arabsat, as the satellite
operator, to the need to carry out a full independent investigation of the suspected illegal use of its
satellites" and to take "immediate action … to stop such illegal conduct". 534 Cartesian noted that
shutting down a frequency535 is "extremely easy for a satellite operator", "is not an unusual action
for a satellite operator", is part of the "very bas ic supervision operations" that a satellite operator
can perform remotely on its satellite, is "very straightforward to do" and can be done at "virtually
no cost". Satellite operators conduct this action "on a regular basis for various reasons". 536
According to Cartesian, each frequency may be transmitting several TV channels, meaning that
shutting down a frequency will interrupt the broadcast of each TV channel carried on the frequency.
Nevertheless, if all channels on a particular frequency are part of the illegal service, the satellite
operator can shut down the frequency without impairing a legitimate service.537
7.139. The Panel considers that Cartesian 's statements in the previous paragraph address two
concerns presented by Arabsat in its 24 June 2019 letter to FIFA. Arabsat contended that disabling
one of its satellite frequencies would only terminate legitimate programming and interfere with the
contractual rights of Arabsat customers, and would not affect beoutQ's broadcasts. Arabsat also
contended that unlike "'flipping' a switch on land", doing so on a satellite involves a substantial risk
that the frequency might not be re-enabled.538 Cartesian agreed that shutting down a frequency will
have the effect of interrupting the broadcast of any legitimate TV channels on that frequency.
However, Cartesian also note d that if all channels on a particular frequency are part of the illegal
service and are not mixed with legitimate channels, the satellite operator can shut down the whole

532 Ibid. pp. 18-19.
533 Ibid. pp. 9-10. These reasons include a technical issue with a frequency, the decommissioning of a
frequency or a satellite, a migration to a newer (more cost-effective) technology, the addition of new channels,
or material changes in channels' encoding bit rates, which would cause channels to be re-distributed among
available frequencies. Furthermore, STBs do not have the capability to dynamically follow channels across
changes of frequencies, which significantly inconvenience end-users. (Ibid.)
534 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89,
pp. 10-11. See also ibid. p. 18. Cartesian also noted Nagra's findings that the Network Information Table,
Program Map Table and the Service Description Table are missing from beoutQ's signals. Broadcasting
channels without this mandatory information therefore constitutes "major non-compliance" with DVB/MPEG
regulations. Such a violation can easily be observed with any stream analyser available on the market, and a
satellite operator would immediately recognize this violation to be abnormal and extremely suspicious
behavior. (Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89,
pp. 11-12.) Cartesian considered it "very unusual—possibly unknown—in the TV satellite broadcast industry to
observe TV channels repeatedly changing from one … frequency to another on numerous occasions over a
period of only several months". (Ibid. p. 10.)
535 Cartesian used the term "transponder", rather than the term "frequency", in its technical report.
Nevertheless, based on Cartesian's discussion of these terms, these two terms appear to be nearly
synonymous. Cartesian explained that each satellite has a set of transponders, and that each transponder
corresponds to a single frequency. Thus, when Cartesian referred to a particular "transponder" in use on an
Arabsat satellite and the conclusions to be drawn from beoutQ's switches to other transponders, in line with
other technical reports, Cartesian was actually referring to the frequency carried on each transponder.
(Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89, p. 4.) For
this reason, the Panel has used the terms "frequency" or "frequencies", rather than "transponder" or
"transponders", when summarizing Cartesian's report.
536 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89,
p. 17. The two examples provided by Cartesian for switching off a customer's satellite service are: (a) when
the customer fails to pay its bills to the satellite operator, and (b) for ethical or legal reasons. (Ibid.)
537 Ibid.
538 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-39, pp. 2-3.

frequency, without any risk of impai ring a legitimate service. 539 Above all, Cartesian emphasize d
that shutting down a frequency is an easy, basic, straightforward, common action taken by satellite
operators, which appears to address Arabsat's statements about the technical difficulties that o ne
might encounter in deactivating a satellite frequency.
7.140. In its third technical report, dated 8 February 2019, Nagra documented additional suspicious
frequency changes that took place between 27 and 28 January 2019. On these dates, beoutQ
channels were broadcast: (a) first, on Arabsat frequency 12341 MHz H, accessible in Europe and
North Africa on various non-beoutQ STBs; (b) next, on Arabsat frequency 11270 MHz H; (c) then,
on Arabsat frequency 12341 MHz H once more; and (d) finally, on Arabsat frequency 11270 MHz H,
but no longer available in North Africa or in Southern Europe. 540 These switches in frequencies
occurred two days before Arabsat's outside expert tested frequency 12341 MHz H in connection with
the litigation before the TGI in France. Arabsat's outside experts did not find beoutQ channels to be
transmitted on frequency 12341 MHz H, and i n Nagra's view, the frequency switches catalogued
above explain why the outside experts arrived at such findi ngs.541 A technical report subsequently
produced by Synamedia found that, as of mid-April 2019, the 10 beoutQ channels tested by Nagra
continued to be broadcast on the Arabsat frequency 11270 MHz H via the Arabsat Badr -4/5/6/7
satellite constellation.542 For the duration of Synamedia's tests, the beoutQ content was transmitted
via one of the four Badr satellites at orbital position 26OE.543
7.141. In a video on its official Facebook page, beoutQ confirm ed that the change to
Arabsat frequency 11270 MHz H occurred due to "problems related to … the coverage area".
beoutQ stated that the new frequency could only be received from the Middle East, Egypt and
Eastern Libya and would be broadcast from "Badr26", which likely refers to the Arabsat Badr satellite
constellation at 26OEast. beoutQ also posted a message to its users in North Africa to assure them
that the loss of coverage was only temporary, and that beoutQ would either return to a previous
Arabsat frequency or use new frequencies providing coverage in North Africa. A separate posting
confirmed this plan, announcing "good surprises soon" for beoutQ customers in North Africa.
On 30 January 2019, the "BeoutQsports" Facebook page confirmed that: (a) other frequency
changes had taken place as a result of "Qatari attacks"; and (b) the frequency changes and resulting
loss of coverage in North Africa and Southern Europe were only temporary and would be reversed
after the end of the 2019 Asian Cup; and beoutQ would "return to the whole Arab world with better
quality".544 A technical report from Cartesian dated 10 September 2019 confirmed that, on
3 and 4 July 2019 in Southeast Europe, beoutQ channels returned to frequency 11270 MHz H on
Arabsat's Badr-7 satellite.545
7.142. An additional technical report that was publicly released with a Supplemental Declaration by
football right holders dated 16 September 2019, known as the MarkMonitor Report, confirms the
findings above.546 This report, which Qatar asserts only became available to it upon its public release
in mid-September 2019, is the report that Arabsat requested from FIFA in its 24 June 2019 letter.547
Since this report was published, it has not been contested by Saudi Arabia or Arabsat.

539 Cartesian Report, "Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-89,
p. 17.
540 Ibid. pp. 10-14.
541 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "Response to IGP Testing of 28 January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ
Frequency Changes", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT-224, pp. 16-17.
542 Synamedia Report, "'beoutQ' Service Analysis", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT-226, pp. 4-6. See also ibid.
pp. 9-10.
543 Ibid. p. 6.
544 Ibid. pp. 18-21.
545 Cartesian Report, "Technical Investigation of beoutQ Broadcasts", 10 September 2019,
Exhibit QAT-89, paras. 6-17, 21-26, 51-53 and 56. Using broadcast analysis tools, Cartesian also determined
that certain mandatory metadata tables were missing from the broadcast. Cartesian considered the missing
mandatory information "highly suspicious", noting that any satellite operator transmitting it can observe this
fact and suspect that it is used for unusual or illegal purposes. (Ibid. paras. 58-61. See also Qatar's opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 30.)
546 Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 55 (referring to MarkMonitor
beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, p. 3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right
Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT-238).
547 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para. 17 (referring to Arabsat Letter to FIFA,
24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-39); Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39,

7.143. According to this report, several sports leagues or federations (claimants) 548 asked the
anti-piracy and cybersecurity firm MarkMonitor to conduct an independent technical investigation
into beoutQ. MarkMonitor's investigation concluded that: (a) beoutQ re -streams the claimants'
copyrighted content without their authorization; and (b) the beoutQ "Live Sports" satellite service is
transmitted on Arabsat's Badr constellation satellites (Badr -4, 5 and 6) at 26°East over frequency
11270 MHz H (video component) and frequency 11919 MHz H (signalization for the STB to decode
the video channel); and (c) the hardware and software in the beoutQ STBs "has been designed and
operates in such a way so as to make the beoutQ channels available primarily in Saudi Arabia through
sophisticated geo -fencing and virtual private networks technology". MarkMonitor found the
beoutQ pirate service to be a highly technically sophisticated and organized operation, regionally
targeted to the Middle East, and in particular, Saudi Arabia.549
7.144. As noted above, FIFA is one of at least four entities550 that has received reports that
beoutQ's pirated content is broadcast on Arabsat satellite frequencies. Specifically, FIFA stated that
"[b]eoutQ's unauthorised transmissions of the FIFA Women's World Cup 2019 are made available
by way of Arabsat satellite frequencies". 551 The European Union also indicated that, according to
complaints received from EU right holders, "the satellite services of BeoutQ are being transmitted
by satellite (Badr-4/Arabsat-4b) of the Arab Satellite Communications Organization."552
7.145. In its 24 June 2019 letter to FIFA, Arabsat stated that the TGI fully vindicated Arabsat,
rejected all claims and awarded Arabsat substantial costs. 553 Saudi Arabia add ed that the TGI
rendered a summary judgment order in favour of Arabsat, stating that "the tests carried out at
ARABSAT's request … contradict the results of [Nagra's] tests produced by the claimants and show
that … beoutQ's programs at issue cannot be broadcast [] in France over the ARABSAT frequencies
referred to in [Nagra's] tests via the Badr -4 satellite".554 FIFA responded, and Qatar agree d, that
the TGI did not find beoutQ was not carried by Arabsat's satellite frequencies, but simply dismissed
the case on the basis that beoutQ's transmissions were not widely available in France.555
7.146. The Panel notes that the TGI explained in its decision that testing by Nagra in January 2019,
in two cities in southern France, demonstrated that beoutQ channels were available in France.
For purposes of assessing territorial jurisdiction, the TGI determined that the results of Nagra's tests

para. 55 (referring FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-40); and Qatar's opening statement at
the second meeting of the Panel, para. 55 (referring to MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, p. 3, as
attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019,
Exhibit QAT-238).
548 These sports leagues or confederations are the Asian Football Confederation (AFC); DFL Deutsche
Fußball Liga e.V. (DFL); Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA); Football Association Premier
League Limited (PL); Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (Serie A); Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional
(LaLiga); and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). (MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019,
p. 3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019,
Exhibit QAT-238.)
549 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, pp. 4-5, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental
Declaration by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT-238. See also Qatar's opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 55 (referring to MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation,
April 2019, p. 3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right Holders,
19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT-238).
550 The other three entities are UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League. (See paragraphs 7.102, 7.107 and
7.108 of this Report.)
551 Synamedia Report, "'beoutQ' Service Analysis", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT-226, para. 24 (referring to
Washington Post, "FIFA wants Saudis to stop pirated Women's World Cup TV feeds", 16 June 2019,
Exhibit QAT-191).
552 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 22 (referring to
European Union's third-party submission, para. 4).
553 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-39, p. 2.
554 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 43 and 44 (referring to S.A.R.L. beIN Media
Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization, Summary Proceedings Order, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number 352J-W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019
(English translation available at https://www.degaullefleurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/20190613-
Ordonnance-de-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9r%C3%A9-English-version.pdf accessed 21 July 2019), Exhibit SAU-28, at
p. 11); and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 63.
555 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-40; Qatar's opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, para. 28; and Qatar's second written submission, paras. 61-63 and 67.

were sufficient to establish that the TGI had jurisdiction. 556 The TGI also found that, in June 2018,
beoutQ channels were available on Arabsat frequencies 11 919 MHz H and 12207 MHz V on the
Arabsat Badr-4 satellite. Furthermore, the TGI noted that Arabsat's own website states that its
Badr-4 satellite covers the MENA region, and that this satellite's coverage also "extends to parts of
Europe, including the ext reme south of France". For the TGI, this was sufficient to establish that
Arabsat has the legal capacity to be a defendant.557
7.147. Nevertheless, the TGI also relied on tests conducted by Arabsat's outside experts, which
contradicted the results of Nagra's test, showing that: (a) the beoutQ programs at issue cannot be
broadcast in France over the Arabsat frequencies via the Badr-4 satellite; and (b) in June 2018, only
the Badr-5 and Badr -6 satellites actually covered the French territory. The Badr -4 satellite only
resulted in "theoretically slight spillovers in the extreme southern part of France", which would have
no practical impact for the public, as only a professional antenna and professional technical resources
would be able to capture beoutQ's signal.558 Accordingly, the TGI did not find that beIN demonstrated
"the existence of a 'manifestly unlawful disturbance' or evidence of imminent harm" under
French law, and it thus dismissed beIN's suit.559
7.148. The Panel thus considers the TGI to have found that beoutQ's pirated broadcasts had very
limited coverage in southern France because they were transmitted on the Arabsat Badr-4 satellite.
This meant that transmissions of beoutQ channels on Arabsat frequencies were unlikely to reach
French viewers, but that such transmissions had nevertheless occurred. Qatar contend ed that,
according to Nagra technical reports, beoutQ moved its pirated content off of the Arabsat frequencies
with wider coverage in France prior to scheduled testing conducted by Arabsat's outside experts.560
7.149. In the light of the expert technical reports prepared by Nagra, Cartesian, Synamedia and
MarkMonitor, and the complaints that Arabsat received from other entities, the Panel does not accept
Saudi Arabia's statement that, "[b]ased on information that it has collected, Arabsat has established
that it does not distribute beoutQ content on its satellite frequencies ".561 The technical reports
demonstrate that beoutQ's pirated broadcasts are transmitted via Arabsat's satellite freque ncies,
and the tests performed by Arabsat's outside experts do not throw doubt on this finding, particularly
given that they examine only certain frequencies at certain times. The selective, isolated testing of
one frequency at a pre-determined time, as conducted by Arabsat's outside experts, would not detect
the operations of a sophisticated broadcast pirate known to move across multiple satellite
frequencies without creating any interruptions in its broadcast services. The Panel also notes
Nagra's findings that beoutQ switched off of certain Arabsat frequencies shortly before or after they
were tested by Arabsat's outside experts, that Arabsat has not undertaken simultaneous or
systematic testing when this appears to have been within its capacity to do so, and that the Arabsat
frequencies carry unusual data or are missing particular information. Saudi Arabia did not, nor did
Arabsat, provide sufficient evidence or argument to rebut the above-mentioned technical reports.
7.2.3.3.6 Evidence regarding the involvement of Selevision
7.150. According to additional evidence that beIN provided in its 13 July 2018 letter to Arabsat and
in its 3 September 2018 letter to the Ministry and GCAM, beoutQ appears to be "wholly, or in part,
operated by Saudi -based persons", includin g the Saudi Selevision Company LLC (Selevision),

556 S.A.R.L. beIN Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization, Summary
Proceedings Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number 352J-W-
B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-28, p. 8.
557 Ibid. p. 9.
558 Ibid. p. 11.
559 Ibid. The TGI stated that it needed a showing of "the existence of a 'manifestly unlawful disturbance'
or evidence of imminent harm" to justify "granting its order against ARABSAT to disclose the material relating
to the broadcasting of the beoutQ programs at issue in France or the injunctions to enjoin it from broadcasting
in France the beoutQ satellite signal". (S.A.R.L. beIN Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication
Organization, Summary Proceedings Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 –
Portalis number 352J-W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-28, p. 11.)
560 See paragraphs 7.134 and 7.140 of this Report.
561 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 43 (referring to "Press Release, Arabsat",
dated 15 June 2019, Exhibit SAU-27).

a Saudi-based entity and beIN's former content distributor in Saudi Arabia. 562 beIN refer red
specifically to several pieces of evidence in support of this allegation.563
7.151. Until June 2018, beoutQ used a portion of the bandwidth of the Arabsat frequency
12380 MHz H to broadcast signaling data and software updates for beoutQ STBs. The rest of the
bandwidth on that frequency was used to broadcast 11 TV channels from the Seevii/Selevision
television service. 564 Nagra con sidered it likely that Seevii/Selevision was renting the entire
Arabsat frequency during this time. 565 Nagra also note d that the software for the beoutQ STBs
contains strings of code expressly referencing Selevision. 566 For Nagra, "[i ]t is unlikely to be a
coincidence that beoutQ and Selevision shared the use of Arabsat Badr -6 frequency 12380 MHz H
and that the beoutQ STB software contains references to Selevision".567 After these findings by Nagra
were made public, evidence of Selevisio n's link to beoutQ vanished. Selevision channels were no
longer broadcast on Arabsat frequency 12380 MHz H, and Arabsat ceased transmission on that
frequency as of 24 June 2018. The same frequency and all references to Seevii/Selevision were
removed from Arabsat's website as of 20 July 2018, and beoutQ firmware updates were encrypted
to hinder further software analysis.568
7.152. In addition, a ccording to beIN, an individual involved in the beoutQ piracy subscribed to
beIN's services using a Selevision corporate ema il address, gained access to beIN's proprietary
media content, and rebroadcast this content on beoutQ's pirate transmissions. 569 Such a practice
has been corroborated by a New York Times article describing the manner in which beoutQ pirates
beIN's signal. Ac cording to the article, a single subscriber to beIN's content is able to re -air this
content, and even though each such subscriber has a unique identification number that beIN is
normally able to trace and use to identify the subscriber, those subscribers that are rebroadcasting
beIN's proprietary content on beoutQ's channels have been able to hide their identification numbers
from detection . beIN's executive director of technology note s that he "[has] never seen this
anywhere else", referring to the level of technical sophistication of beoutQ's operation.570
7.153. Since Selevision was likely renting the entire frequency, it would follow that Selevision would
have been aware of how the bandwidth on that frequency was being used . Such an awareness by

562 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, pp. 5-6; Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, pp. 2-3; and Qatar's second written submission, para. 71. See also
Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, paras. 43-47. Selevision is a digital
entertainment services provider based in Saudi Arabia. (Nextv News, "Selevision launches in MENA",
18 March 2014, Exhibit QAT-104; and Videonet, "Selevision uses Verimatrix to protect its new Seevi service,
which combines IPTV and OTT", 3 March 2016, Exhibit QAT-105.)
563 beIN also presented evidence from US civil proceedings showing that Mr Raed Khusheim, the CEO of
the Khusheim Holdings Company, which, in turn, is the parent company of Selevision, used a credit card to pay
US company BelugaCDN LLC for the content delivery network service that would be used for the beoutQ pirate
website. (Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, pp. 5-6 (referring to Appendix 11: Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller of
BelugaCDN LLC, dated 20 June 2018).) See also Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, pp. 2-3; and Qatar's second written submission, para. 71 (referring to
Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller, Beluga CDN LLC, 20 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-107).
564 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, pp. 5-6 (referring to Appendix 9: Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy
Overview," dated 24 June 2018); Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through
13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, pp. 2-3; and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018,
Exhibit QAT-90, pp. 12-14.
565 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-90, pp. 13-14.
566 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, pp. 5-6 (referring to Appendix 9: Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy
Overview," dated 24 June 2018); and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018,
Exhibit QAT-90, p. 14. See also Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through
13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, pp. 2-3.
567 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-90, p. 14.
568 Ibid. p. 10.
569 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media,
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT-106, pp. 5-6 (referring to Appendix 12: Declaration of Walid Abdelhalim of
beIN, dated 27 June 2018).
570 The New York Times, "The Brazen Bootlegging of a Multibillion-Dollar Sport Network", 9 May 2018,
Exhibit QAT-175.

Selevision would have been required for it to ensure that all of its channels were being transmitted
successfully to viewers. If Selevision was renting the entire frequency, it is also possible that beoutQ
needed to secure Selevision's permission to broadcast its pirated content on the same frequency. In
the Panel's view, the evidence above leads to the conclusion that Selevision allowed or assisted
beoutQ to broadcast its pirated content on Arabsat frequency 12380 MHz H.
7.154. The Panel notes that the evidence regarding the involvement of Selevision has not been
disputed by Saudi Arabia.
7.2.3.3.7 Overall assessment
7.155. The Panel considers that the evidence which was provided to Saudi authorities by beIN and
other third-party right holders, and which has now been corroborated and supplemented by further
evidence submitted to the Panel, supports Qatar's assertions that: (a) beoutQ's piracy was promoted
by prominent Saudi nationals, (b) beoutQ targets the Saudi market, (c) beoutQ's pirate broadcasts
are transmitted via Arabsat satellite frequencies, and (d) beoutQ has received assistance from a
Saudi content distributor in delivering its pirated broadcasts to Saudi consumers. Taking these
conclusions together, and recalling the appl icable standard of proof and evidentiary principles in
WTO dispute settlement571, the Panel considers that Qatar has established a prima facie case that
beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.
7.156. The Panel recalls that Qatar submitted a statement from an individual alleged to have specific
knowledge of beoutQ's operations in Saudi Arabia. As discussed in section 1.3.6 above, the parties
were unable to agree on additional confidentiality procedures for handling the witness statement,
and the Panel declined to adopt any such procedures. Saudi Arabia also objected to the submission
of the evidence.572 In the light of the conclusion stated above on the basis of the evidence canvassed
above, the Panel considers it unnecessary to review the witness statement submitted by Qatar.573
7.2.3.4 Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts
7.157. The Panel now turns to Saudi Arabia's alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings
of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of some 2018 World Cup matches. The Panel will structure its
analysis by reviewing the evidence provided by Qatar, and then considering Saudi Arabia's
arguments in response to such evidence.
7.158. With its first written submission, Qatar provided the following categories of evidence as
exhibits:
a. a report published by Bloomberg, and the image of and hyperlink to a tweet by a
Wall Street Journal reporter, both dated 22 June 2018, stating that a
government-sponsored event was broadcasting beoutQ's pirated broadcas t of the
Saudi Arabia/Uruguay match on large public screens in Riyadh, including on the city's
main commercial boulevard574;
b. an image of an announcement by the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs,
dated 13 June 2018, stating "294 screens in Municip al gardens and squares to

571 See paragraphs 7.39 and 7.40 of this Report.
572 See section 1.3.6 of this Report.
573 The Panel notes a similarity with a situation that arose in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC).
In that case, the European Communities indicated that it could not accept the Business Confidential
Information (BCI) procedures adopted by the Arbitrator, and as a consequence "could not receive" the
information submitted by the other party pursuant to those procedures. The Arbitrator reasoned that the
European Communities' refusal to receive the information did not bar the complainant from submitting it, and
would not bar the Arbitrator from considering it. However, the Arbitrator ultimately assessed that it did not find
it necessary to rely on the BCI at issue to resolve the particular issue before it. (Decision by the Arbitrator,
EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), paras. 2.6-2.7.)
574 See Qatar's first written submission, para. 87 (referring to Tweet from Margherita Stancati,
Wall Street Journal reporter, 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-84; and Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as
Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates", 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-77).

broadcast World Cup Games", with a breakdown of how many screens there would be
in each of the 13 regions of Saudi Arabia575;
c. images of, and hyperlinks to, tweets by eight different Saudi municipalities promoting
public screenings of broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches, several of which included
images of beoutQ's pirated broadcasts576; and
d. photographs showing screenings of beoutQ's pirated broadcasts of the 2018 World Cup
Croatia/England match on 11 July 2018 on large public screens at seven different cafes
in Riyadh.577
7.159. The Panel considers that, in the absence of effective refutation, the above evidence would
suffice to substantiate Qatar's assertion that Saudi Arabia promoted public gatherings with
screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of certain 2018 World Cup matches.
7.160. The Panel regards Saudi Arabia's assertion that "[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia does not
promote or authorize screenings of beoutQ broadcasts"578 as insufficient to rebut the evidence
provided by Qatar. Saudi Arabia has not contested the authenticity of this evidence or challenged
any aspect of Qatar's characterization of it. Insofar as Saudi Arabia's assertion is meant to
distinguish the central "Government of Saudi Arabia" from the municipalities, it suffices to refer to
the applicable principles of state responsibility that apply in WTO dispute settlement.579
7.161. The Panel considers that Saudi Arabia's statement that "unofficial, non-government tweets
are not usually recognized by legal adjudicators or attributed to a government without explicit
approval"580 is beside the point, because most of the tweets in question are in fact governmental
tweets. Article 11 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, entitled "Conduct acknowledged and
adopted by a State as its own", provides that "[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State … shall
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the
State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own." By its terms, the principle only
applies to conduct that is not otherwise attributable to a state. However, as already noted above ,
under general international law principles of state responsibility, actions at all levels of government
(local, municipal, federal), or by any agency within any level of government, are attributable to the
State.581
7.162. The Panel recalls Saudi Arabia's assurance that it maintains a "vigilant watch" over the
enforcement of broadcast copyright violations at public gatherings 582, and its explanation that on
14 April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs forwarded Royal Court Circular
No. 40752 to the Secretariats, the Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry, including
to all Saudi municipal administrations. 583 The Panel notes, however, that Qatar's assertion and
supporting evidence is directed at the promotion of public screenings of 2018 World Cup matches
and not at ongoing conduct.
7.163. Based on the foregoing, the Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia promoted public gatherings
with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.

575 See ibid. para. 88 (referring to Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Announcement of
294 screens to broadcast World Cup (Arabic original and English translation), 13 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-85).
576 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 89-94 (referring to Social Media Evidence of Saudi
Municipalities Organizing Public Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup,
June 2018, Exhibit QAT-83).
577 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 70 and 86 (referring to Photographic Evidence of
Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafés in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
11 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-78).
578 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), para. 61.
579 See paragraph 7.50 of this Report.
580 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), para. 62.
581 See paragraph 7.50 of this Report.
582 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 68.
583 Ibid.

7.2.4 Conclusion
7.164. The Panel concludes that although Qatar did not demonstrate the existence of formal legal
restrictions being applied to prevent beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures, Qatar
otherwise established that the non-initiation of civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ before
Saudi tribunals by beIN, the non -application of criminal procedures or penalties against beoutQ by
the Government of Saudi Arabia and the public screening of beoutQ's illegal broadcasts of 2018
World Cup matches in Saudi Arabia a re all the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi
Arabia.
7.3 Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement
7.3.1 Introduction
7.165. Having addressed the existence of the challenged measures and made findings on the
disputed factual questions in th is dispute, the Panel now proceeds to address the applicable
provisions in Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement in connection with the following measures:
(a) the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obta ining
Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts
and tribunals (anti-sympathy measures); (b) the non -application of criminal procedures and
penalties to beoutQ; and (c) the promotion of public gath erings with screenings of beoutQ's
unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.
7.166. Qatar raises multiple legal claims in relation to these three measures. First, Qatar claim s
that the anti -sympathy measures are inconsistent with: (a) the non -discrimination obligations in
Article 3.1584 and Article 4585 of the TRIPS Agreement, contained in Part I thereof; (b) the obligations
to provide authors of works with the exclusive rights mandated in Articles 9 586, 11587, 11bis588 and
11ter589 of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by reference in Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement590, as well as the obligation to provide broadcasting organi zations with the
exclusive rights provided for in Article 14.3591 of the TRIPS Agreement, also contained in Part II
thereof; and (c) the obligations in Article 41.1592 and Article 42593 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
relate to civil enforcement procedures and are included in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement. Second,
Qatar claim s that the non -application of crimina l procedures and penalties to beoutQ is also
inconsistent with most of the above -referenced obligations in Parts I and II of the
TRIPS Agreement594, but its claim under Part III concerns Article 61595, as opposed to Articles 41.1
and 42, of the TRIPS Agreement. Third, Qatar claims that the promotion of public gatherings with

584 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 156-157, 187-192 and 205; and second written submission,
paras. 141, 143 and 148.
585 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 206-207, 225-226 and 233; and second written submission,
paras. 151, 153 and 158.
586 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 249 and 252; and second written submission, paras. 164 and
168.
587 Qatar's first written submission, para. 269; and second written submission, para. 165 and 168.
588 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 302-305; and second written submission, paras. 166 and
168. In response to a question from the Panel, Qatar clarifies that its claims regarding the anti-sympathy
measures extend to subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of Article 11bis(1). (See Qatar's response to Panel question
No. 9(b).)
589 Qatar's first written submission, para. 322; and second written submission, paras. 167-168.
590 Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement is entitled "Relation to the Berne Convention", and paragraph 1
thereof states: "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the
Appendix thereto."
591 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 341 and 346; and second written submission, paras. 179 and
184.
592 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 375-376 and 382-383; and second written submission,
paras. 189-190 and 194.
593 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 396-397; and second written submission, paras. 198-199 and
202.
594 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 197-201 and 229 (Articles 3.1 and 4 of the
TRIPS Agreement), and paras. 251-252, 269, 302-303 and 322 (Articles 9(1), 11, 11bis(1)(ii) and 11ter of the
Berne Convention (1971)); and second written submission, paras. 141, 148, 151, 153 and 158 (Articles 3.1
and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement), and paras. 164-168 (Articles 9(1), 11, 11bis and 11ter of the
Berne Convention (1971)).
595 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 411-442; and second written submission, paras. 205-219.

screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches is also a measure that
is itself inconsistent with Articles 11 and 11bis596 of the Berne Convention (1971), and also a rgued
that it serves as evidence of the violation of Article 61.597
7.167. Saudi Arabia state d that, consistent with its previous position before the Panel, it is not
engaging with the substance of any claims raised by the complaining party. 598
Saudi Arabia's submissions did not reference any of the above -cited provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement or Berne Convention (1971). However, Saudi Arabia did make arguments, and
quoted from third -party arguments, relating to the obligation under Article 61 of the
TRIPS Agreement.599
7.168. In this dispute, the third parties focus ed their submissions and oral statements almost
exclusively on systemic issues pertaining to the interpretation and application of the security
exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement. The European Union is the only third party
that, in its written submission, addressed the interpretation and application of the TRIPS obligations
invoked by Qatar.600 However, in response to questions from the Panel, several third parties provided
their views on issues concerning the relationship between the obligations in Parts I, II and III of the
TRIPS Agreement and the scope of the obligations in Articles 41.1, 42 and 61.
7.169. The next subsection provides an overview of Qatar's main arguments on the interpretation
of the obligations that it invokes, and on how the ob ligations in Parts I, II and III relate to one
another. The next two subsections reflect Saudi Arabia's arguments concerning Article 61 of the
TRIPS Agreement, as well as the views expressed by the third parties.
7.3.2 Arguments
7.3.2.1 Qatar
7.170. With respect to its claim s under Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, Qatar note d the
Appellate Body's statements that the most -favoured-nation treatment and national treatment
provisions are "fundamental" and "cornerstone" provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.601 Qatar
explained that while its claims under Articles 3.1 and 4 focus on the discriminatory treatment with
respect to civil and criminal enforcement, "because the restrictions on the ability of Qatari nationals
to enforce intellectual property rights are so extreme, they also implicate the substantive protections
that must be accorded pursuant to Part II of the TRIPS Agreement" and, therefore, Qatar's claims
of discrimination also extend to matters covered by Part II of the TRIPS Agreement. Qatar argued
that findings of violation unde r Part III of the TRIPS Agreement would not render any additional
findings in respect of the claims under Part I duplicative602, and stated that "it is important that the
Panel consider not only the claims under Parts II and III of the TRIPS Agreement, but a lso the
distinct claims under Part I of the TRIPS Agreement".603 Qatar noted that this view has largely been
shared by third parties, including Canada, the European Union and Japan.604
7.171. Regarding the obligations in Articles 9, 11, 11bis and 11ter of the Berne Convention (1971)
and Article 14.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, Qatar argue d that a WTO Member must do more than
merely provide such rights in name or on paper only, and that for such rights to be meaningful, they
must be "enjoyed".605 Qatar's claims under Part II of the TRIPS Agreement rest on the premise that

596 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 271 and 304; response to Panel question No. 9(a); and
second written submission, paras. 165 and 168.
597 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 431 and 437-438; and response to Panel question No. 9(a).
598 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para. 9; and second written submission,
para. 59.
599 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 46.
600 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 6-35.
601 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 160 and 209 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Section 211 Appropriations Act, paras. 241 and 297, respectively).
602 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(b), paras. 143-151.
603 Ibid. para. 151.
604 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 131-133.
605 Ibid. para. 161. Qatar also quotes the European Union's response to Panel question No. 5, which
stated that "criminal procedures and penalties should not be provided only on paper, but should be effective in

although Saudi Arabia "provides certain rights on paper (i.e. in the text of their copyright law and
regulations), those rights effectively have been stripped" 606 from beIN through the measures at
issue. Qatar argued that "[w]here the loss of enforcement is so drastic, the entirety of the rights is
eliminated"607, in the sense that Saudi Arabia's violations of the obligations of Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement "are so extreme that they render effectively worthless the substantive rights under
Part II of the TRIPS Agreement".608 Qatar submitted that its interpretation of the obligations in
Part II does not render the enforcement obligations in Part III redundant, because "there are many
situations where a measure would violate Part III, but not violate any obligations under Part II". 609
Qatar stated that "it is only in the extreme (and, frankly, unusual) situation where right holders are
effectively completely blocked from accessing civil judicial procedures ( and where criminal
procedures are not applied) that an inability to enforce IP r ights would also violate the core
substantive obligations under Part II".610
7.172. Turning to the relationship among the obligations in Part III that it invokes, Qatar submitted
that Article 42 and Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement are two distinct provisions covering different
aspects of the IP enforcement (i.e. civil/administrative enforcement vs. criminal enforcement) that
Members are required to provide.611 Qatar noted that it has challenged a different group of measures
under Article 42 and under Article 61, and different compliance obligations may result from this
dispute.612 In Qatar's view, Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is also distinct from both Article 42
and Article 61. While Article 42 sets out specific requirements for "fair and equitable procedures"
that must be available in a Member —e.g. requiring that parties be allowed "independent legal
counsel" and be "duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence" —
Article 41.1 is more focused on the potential results of these p rocedures (i.e. permitting "effective
action" and "expeditious remedies" including those that "constitute a deterrent to further
infringements").613 Similarly, while Article 41.1 focuses on the nature and content of the procedures
that must be made "available", Article 61 requires that criminal procedures are "to be applied", at
least in situations of egregious commercial -scale piracy such as that occurring with the beoutQ
piracy.614 Given the significant differences between the standards under each of the three provisions,
a finding of violation under one would not be duplicative of a finding under either of the other two ,
Qatar argues.615
7.173. With respect to the obligation under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, Qatar submit ted
that it follows from the phrase "to be applied" that Members "must do more than simply write down
criminal procedures and penalties in their criminal laws".616 In its view, Members "have an obligation
to actually apply those procedures and penalties, particularly in egregious cases of conduct that
qualifies as a crime".617 As contextual support for its position, Qatar refer red to the requirement in
the second sentence of Article 61 that "[r]emedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent …", and argues that "[t]o provide such [a] deterrent
to wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale, those acts must be
actively prosecuted and punished".618 It further submitted that the objective of Article 61 would be
frustrated without a WTO Member actually applying those criminal procedures and penalties in

practice, otherwise the obligation would be deprived of its meaning". (Ibid. paras. 209-210 (quoting European
Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 25).)
606 Qatar's second written submission, para. 161.
607 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 24(b), para. 161.
608 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para. 64; and response to Panel question No. 24(a),
para. 159. See also Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para. 66.
609 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 24(c), para. 166.
610 Ibid. para. 164. (emphasis original)
611 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 25, para. 168.
612 Ibid. paras. 169-172.
613 Ibid. para. 174.
615 Ibid. para. 177.
616 See Qatar's first written submission, para. 419. See generally ibid. paras. 413-430; response to
Panel question Nos. 26(a) and (b); and second written submission, paras. 205-211.
617 Qatar's first written submission, para. 419. (emphasis original) In Qatar's view, the phrase "to be
applied" in Article 61 can be contrasted with the use of the phrases, e.g., "are available" (in Article 41.1),
"shall make available" (in Article 42), and "shall have the authority" (in Articles 44, 45 and 46) in other
enforcement-related provisions in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement, in a manner that clarifies the special nature
of the obligation under Article 61. (Qatar's second written submission, para. 207.)
618 Qatar's first written submission, para. 421. (emphasis original)

practice—particularly in situations of egregious, open, widespread piracy —by actively prosecuting
and punishing (at least) the two types of infringements identified in Article 61.619 Qatar added that
"such an interpretation of Article 61 does not imply that Members are under an obligation to actively
prosecute all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale".620
Rather, in Qatar's view, "Article 61 mandates that Members prosecute such counterfeiting or piracy
at least in some situations, particularly in egregious cases of conduct that qualifies as a crime." 621
In response to Saudi Arabia's indication that it "does not consider that the TRIPS Agreement obliges
Members to prosecute every alleged criminal activity" and that a Member may enforce "intellectual
property law when justified by the available evidence and circumstances", Qatar state d that "[i]n
principle, Qatar agrees."622
7.3.2.2 Saudi Arabia
7.174. In the light of its invocation of Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, Saudi Arabia did not
address the claims made by Qatar under Parts I, II and III, with the exception of Qatar's claim under
Article 61.
7.175. Saudi Arabia submitted that it "does not consider that the TRIPS Agreement obliges Members
to prosecute every alleged criminal activity". 623 Rather, Saudi Arabia state d that it "enforces
intellectual property law when justified by the available evidence and circumstances."624 In its second
written submission, Saudi Arabia state d that "even in cases where the TRIPS Agreement provides
for criminal procedures and penalties, Members are not required to apply these remedies in all
cases." Rather, in Saudi Arabia's view, "Members should provide legal fora and procedures to apply
such remedies where warranted and where supported by evidence", and "[i]n particular, Members
cannot be expected to act on criminal allegations without evidence and without cooperation of
concerned rights holders." 625 Saudi Arabia add ed that it is prepared to investigate and prosecute
violations of IP laws, consistent with the TRIPS Agreement and under Saudi law. However, to take
action under Saudi criminal law and procedure, authorities require a reasonable level of evidence to
facilitate follow up and prosecution.626
7.3.2.3 Third parties
7.176. With respect to the obligations in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, Canada, the
European Union and Japan argued that a finding of violation under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement
would not render a finding of violation under Part I duplicative, as the obligations in Parts I and III
are distinct. Among other things, Canada observe d that "a panel's finding that a Respondent does
not permit parties to a domestic civil judicial IP enforcement procedure to be represented by
independent legal counsel, as required by TRIPS Article 42 (under Part III), does not also mean that
the Respondent has failed to do so on a non-discriminatory basis, as required under TRIPS Article 3.1
(under Part I)". The European Union noted that different measures "can infringe different provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement and the same measure can simultaneously violate provisions in Part I and
III". Japan suggest ed that because "Articles 3 and 4 are not subsumed in Parts II or III", in "a
situation of discriminatory denial of criminal procedures and penalties, the Panel must therefore also
rule concerning the application of Articles 3 and 4 [in addition to ruling under Article 61]".627 The
UAE disagreed with Qatar and these third parties, and submit ted that, given the overlap in Qatar's
claims under Parts I and III, the UAE d id not see how additional findings under Part I would be
necessary to resolve the dispute. The UAE maintain ed that were the Panel to find that Qatari
nationals do not have access to civil and criminal remedies and that this constitutes a violation of

619 Ibid. paras. 422-424.
620 Qatar's second written submission, para. 206 (referring to Qatar's response to Panel question
No. 26(b), para. 181).
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid. para. 211. (emphasis original)
623 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 46.
624 Ibid.
625 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 59 (referring to the European Union's integrated
626 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 45.
627 Canada's response to Panel question No. 2(b) to third parties, para. 5; European Union's response to
Panel question No. 2 to third parties, para. 5; and Japan's response to Panel question No. 2 to third parties,
para. 15.

Part III, the rectification of this violation would necessarily rectify any potential discrimination under
Articles 3 and 4.628
7.177. Regarding the scope of the obligations in Part II, Canada, the European Union and Japan
also suggested that the same aspects of the same measures violate copyright obligations in Part II
of the TRIPS Agreement and the enforcement obligation s in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.629
Canada stated that, "without prejudice to our position as to whether Articles 9, 11, 11bis and 11ter
of the Berne Convention include a requirement that the rights contemplated are able to be 'enjoyed'",
a claim regarding the rights under those provisions is different from a claim under Articles 41.1, 42
and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.630 The European Union submitted that the 19 June 2017 Circular
seems to pertain to the obligations in Parts II and III equally, as it contains some elements that
appear to pre-empt the enjoyment of the exclusive right of the right holders, while others appear to
make enforcement against infringements practically impossible (and some elements may violate
both Parts II and III). The European Union nevertheless consider ed that the other measures,
including the alleged significant difficulties in securing legal representation, may violate the relevant
obligations included in Part III rather than Part II, as these measures appear to concern the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 631 The European Union added that accepting
Qatar's claims under the Berne Conv ention" would by no means render the claims related to the
enforcement obligations in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement redundant".632 Japan agree d that
"Qatar's interpretation of the Berne Convention would not render Part III of the TRIPS Agreement
redundant".633 In contrast, the UAE submit ted that the very fact that the drafters placed the
obligations in different Parts with different titles makes clear that the obligations within each Part
seek to regulate distinct matters, and thus the very structu re of the TRIPS Agreement undermines
Qatar's argument that the same aspects of the same measure can violate both sets of obligations
simultaneously for the same reasons. 634 For the UAE, Qatar's argument pertains more to the
availability of rights as opposed to the enforcement of such rights, as it is submitting that the
substantive right is, in fact, not available.635
7.178. Regarding the relationship among the obligations in Part III that Qatar invokes, Canada, the
European Union, Japan and Ukraine all consider ed that Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 contain sets of
distinct obligations, and therefore, a finding under one of these provisions would not render a finding
under another duplicative.636 The European Union, Japan and Ukraine, in particular, all consider ed
that Article 41.1 sets out general principles or general obligations that are further elaborated in more
detail in Articles 42 and 61, and that Article 41.1 is distinct from Articles 42 and 61.637 Japan noted
Articles 42 and 61 develop the general principles in Article 41.1, but do not entirely duplicate them,
and as such, the Panel can exercise judicial economy with respect to a finding under Article 41.1
only if there would be no impact on the manner of compliance in the case at issue, in the light of
the factual circumstances and claims in that case.638 The UAE maintained that, as Article 41.1 refers
to "enforcement procedures as specified in this Part", there appears to be overlap between
Article 41.1 and the other provisions in Part III. To the extent that the Panel co nsiders that its
findings under various provisions would be duplicative, and therefore unnecessary, the UAE
suggested that the Panel consider exercising judicial economy.639
7.179. With respect to the interpretation of Article 61, the third parties present ed diverse views.
Several third parties, including Brazil, Canada and Ukraine, ma de arguments consistent with

628 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 2(b) to third parties, para. 16.
629 Canada's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, para. 7; European Union's response to
Panel question No. 3 to third parties, paras. 6-14; and Japan's response to Panel question No. 3(a) to
third parties, paras. 16-18.
630 Canada's response to Panel question No. 3(c) to third parties, para. 8.
631 European Union's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, paras. 9-10.
632 Ibid. para. 13.
633 Japan's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, para. 20.
634 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 3(a) to third parties, para. 18.
635 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 3(b) to third parties, para. 19.
636 Canada's response to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras. 9-10; European Union's response
to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras. 15-19; Japan's response to Panel question No. 4 to
third parties, paras. 24-25; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras. 10-15.
637 European Union's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 15-19; Japan's response to Panel
question No. 4, paras. 24-25; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 10-15.
638 Japan's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 24-25.
639 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 4, para. 21.

Qatar's interpretation of this provision and submitted that this obligation requires more than merely
"writing down" certain criminal procedures and penalties in a Member 's domestic law. 640
Several other third parties, including China, Singapore and the UAE , advanced a more restrictive
interpretation, arguing that the obligation under Article 61 is fully discharged by the "writing down"
of criminal procedures and penalties in a Member's domestic law.641 The European Union considered
that Article 61 merely requires that Members provide for criminal procedures and penalties, and, in
principle, the absence of initiation of investigations and the punishment of the alleged perpetrators
alone cannot show a violation of Article 61.642 However, the European Union contemplated that "a
constant non-enforcement may amount to facilitating IP rights infringement, against the spirit of
Article 61". The European Union added that "[i]ndeed, criminal procedures and penalties should not
be provided only on paper, but should be effective in practice, otherwise the obligation under
Article 61 would be deprived of its meaning."643 Japan similarly submitted that the first sentence of
Article 61 requires Members to have relevant criminal procedures available for application but does
not provide an obligation to prosecute all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright
piracy on a commercial scale; but similarly add ed that if a Member "systematically suspends the
application" of criminal procedures and penalties, it is reasonable to conclude that it does not provide
for such criminal procedures and penalties "to be applied".644
7.3.3 Assessment by the Panel
7.3.3.1 Order of analysis
7.180. The parties do not dispute that the text of the Saudi Copyright Law and Implementing
Regulations provide for all of the exclusive rights set forth in Part II of the TRIPS Agreement that
are relevant to the dispute.645 The Panel therefore considers Qatar's claims fall more squarely under
the enforcement obligations in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement rather than the obligations in

640 See Brazil's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties; Canada's response to Panel
question No. 5 to third parties, paras. 11-12; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties,
paras. 16-19. Brazil understood Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement to require not only the "writing down" of the
criminal procedures and penalties, but also their "application", and states that this threshold would be met by a
Member "criminalizing these conducts and prosecuting instances of these conducts" according to its legal
system. (Brazil's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties.) Canada considered that Article 61
"should be interpreted as requiring Members not only to have criminal procedures and penalties in place, but to
apply them in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale".
(Canada's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 11.) Ukraine stated that it will not comment
specifically on the interpretation of Article 61 or the views of Qatar or the European Union, but submits that
"the nature of a legal norm that stipulates, in particular, criminal procedures and penalties, entails a possibility
of this norm to be applied and/or enforced" and that, "[o]therwise, non-applicability of such norm undermines
the relevance of its existence overall." (Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 19.)
641 See China's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties, paras. 3-4; Singapore's response to
Panel question No. 5 to third parties; and United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 5(a) to
third parties, para. 22. According to China, Article 61 "has not imposed any direct obligation for Members to
initiate the investigation and eventually, impose penalties against the specific criminal activities. The phrase 'to
be applied' in the first sentence of Article 61 "merely sets the scope of those criminal actions, and should not,
under any circumstance, be interpreted as to impose [an] additional obligation [on] Members."
(China's response to Panel question No. 5(a), para. 3.) Singapore argued that the text of Article 61 "does not
support that argument" of Qatar, and observes that in China – Intellectual Property Rights, "the panel did not
find a duty to prosecute". (Singapore's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties (quoting Panel Report,
China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.596-7.597).) According to the United Arab Emirates, "[c]reating a
legal pathway for prosecution is not an obligation to actually prosecute" and "[i]n other words … the text of
Article 61 imposes an obligation of procedure, and not an obligation of result." (United Arab Emirates' response
to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties, para. 22.)
642 The European Union also stated that "[t]he wording 'to be applied' does not add an obligation to
investigate and punish all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
There are certain objective criteria which can justify if a WTO member does not investigate or prosecute in a
given case (i.e. lack of evidence). In principle, the absence of initiation of investigations and the punishment of
the alleged perpetrators alone cannot show a violation of Article 61." (European Union's response to Panel
question No. 5 to third parties, paras. 20-21.)
643 European Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 25. (emphasis omitted)
See also ibid. paras. 20-24; and third-party submission, paras. 31-35.
644 Japan's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, paras. 26-28.
645 Qatar's first written submission, section III.C and paras. 238, 253, 272, 305, 324 and 326.

Part II.646 In response to a Panel question, Qatar indicate d that, while the "fundamental structure
and logic" of certain provisions of the covered agreements would require a panel to follow a particular
order of analysis, Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement do not constitute such provisions. 647
The Panel considers it appropriate to begin with the claims under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement,
and then address the claims under Parts I and II in the light of its findings under Part III.
7.181. Regarding the order of analysis of the three distinct claims that Qatar brings under Part III,
the Panel proceeds as follows. While the Panel does not question that Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 of the
TRIPS Agreement set forth distinct obligations, the Panel addresses the claims under Articles 41.1
and 42 together because both are directed at the same measures said to prevent beIN from
accessing civil enforcement procedures. Next, the Panel will then address the claim under Article 61
relating to the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties for wilful copyright piracy on a
commercial scale. The Panel notes that, in principle, the general obligation under Article 41.1 applies
equally to civil and criminal enforcement procedures provided for in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.
The reason that the Panel does not also rule on the obligation under Article 41.1 in relation to the
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties is that the scope of Qatar's claim under
Article 41.1 is expressly limited to restrictions imposed on IP right holders from pursuing civil actions
before Saudi courts.648
7.3.3.2 Claims under Article 42 of the TRI PS Agreement regarding civil and
administrative procedures and remedies, and Article 41.1 on general obligations
7.3.3.2.1 Applicable legal standard
7.182. Article 41 constitutes Section 1, entitled "General Obligations", of Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement. Article 41.1 reads as follows:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including e xpeditious remedies
to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
7.183. As the Appellate Body has noted, "[t]hese enforcement procedures … provide for an
internationally-agreed minimum standard which Members are bound to implement in their domestic
legislation".649
7.184. Article 42, entitled "Fair and Equitable Procedu res", is part of Section 2, entitled "Civil and
Administrative Procedures and Remedies", of Part III of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 42 reads as
follows:
Members shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the
enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by this Agreement. Defendants
shall have the right to written notice which is timely and contains sufficient detail,
including the basis of the claims. Parties shall be allowed to be represented by
independent legal counsel, and procedures shall not impose overly burdensome
requirements concerning mandatory personal appearances. All parties to such

646 When panels are confronted with claims under multiple WTO provisions that apply cumulatively to
the same measure, they often select the order of analysis on the basis of which provision "deals specifically,
and in detail" with the types of measures at issue. (See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III,
paras. 155 and 204.)
647 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), paras. 139-142. In response to the same question,
Saudi Arabia stated that, consistent with its previous conduct before the Panel, it is not engaging with the
substance of any claims raised by the complaining party and has no comment on the Panel's proposed analysis
of these claims. (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para. 9.)
648 Qatar's panel request stated that Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article 41.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement "… by restricting intellectual property right holders (including Qatari rights holders) from
pursuing civil actions before Saudi courts (or otherwise frustrating their ability to do so) …". (Qatar's panel
request, paragraph 15(f). (emphasis added))
649 Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 206.

procedures shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant
evidence. The procedure shall provide a means to identify and protect confidential
information, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.
7.185. Article 42 is part of Section 2, which deals with civil and administrative procedures and
remedies. Article 42 details specific requirements in respect of "civil judicial procedures" concerning
the enforcement of any IP rights to ensure that such procedures are "fair and equitable".
The Appellate Body has noted that, "[l]ike Section 1 of Part III, Section 2 introduces an international
minimum standard which Members are bound to implement in their domestic legislation".650
7.186. Footnote 11 to Article 42 clarifies that, for the purpose of Part III, the term "right holder"
includes federations and associations having legal standing to assert such rights. The Appellate Body
has noted that the term "right holders" within the meaning of Article 42 "includes persons who claim
to have legal standing to assert rights".651
7.187. The basic obligation in the first sentence of Article 42 is that Members shall "make available"
to "right holders" "civil judicial procedures" concerning the enforcement of any IP right covered by
the TRIPS Agreement. The Appellate Body has elaborated that "[m]aking something available means
making it 'obtainable', putting it 'within one's reach' and 'at one's disposal' in a way that has sufficient
force or efficacy" 652; therefore, "the ordinary meaning of the term 'make available' suggests that
'right holders' are entitled under Article 42 to have access to civil judicial procedures that are
effective in bringing about the enforcement of their rights covered by the Agreement".653
7.188. The Appellate Body has further noted that:
Article 42, first sentence, does not define what the term 'civil judicial procedures' in that
sentence encompasses. The TRIPS Agreement thus reserves, subject to the procedural
minimum standards set out in that Agreement, a degree of discretion to Members on
this, taking into account 'differences in national legal systems'.654 Indeed, no Member's
national system of civil judicial procedures will be identical to that of another Member.655
7.189. Section 2 of Part III of the TRIPS Agreement also contains Article 49, entitled "Administrative
Procedures". Article 49 provides that, to the extent that any civil remedy can be ordered as a result
of "administrative procedures" on the merits of a case, such procedures shall conform to the
principles equivalent in substance to those set forth in Section 2.
7.3.3.2.2 Application to the facts
7.190. The Panel considers that beIN is undoubtedly a "r ight holder" for purposes of Articles 41.1
and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement. As elaborated in section 2.2.3 of this Report, beIN has made
substantial investments in acquiring licences to broadcast content produced by major international
right holders, and has obtained the exclusive rights to broadcast, and to authorize others to
broadcast, prime sporting competitions in the MENA region, including in Saudi Arabia. The rights to
broadcast this content have been licensed on a territorial basis, and beIN holds exc lusive rights to
broadcast in the territory of Saudi Arabia.656
7.191. The Panel considers that it is also clear that sports broadcasts of the type that beIN has been
licensed to distribute constitute protected "works" under the provisions of the Berne Convention

650 Ibid. para. 207.
651 Ibid. para. 217.
652 Ibid. para. 215 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, L. Brown (ed.), (Clarendon
Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 154).
653 Ibid. para. 215 (referring to Panel Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 8.95).
(emphasis added)
654 (footnote original) Recital 2(c) of the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement.
655 Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 216.
656 Qatar's first written submission, para. 32 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC,
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT-37, para. 7). See also Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT-91, p. 5 (stating that beIN "holds exclusive rights to broadcast the 2018
FIFA World Cup in the MENA region, including the World Cup Final game … as well as any rebroadcasts and
recaps of that game" and owns "copyrights, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property").

(1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, and are covered by the definition of "Audio-Visual
Work" under Article 1 of Saudi Arabia's Copyright Law, or otherwise protected under the
Copyright Law. The Panel notes that there is no disagreement between the parties on this issue.657
7.192. In addition, beIN generally owns the copyright in any match/event commentary produced
by beIN, as well as studio programming such as interviews, beIN logos and musical works. beIN also
owns the related rights conferred on broadcasting organizations, including the right to prohibit
unauthorized fixations, reproductions of fixations and rebroadcasting by wireless means of
broadcasts, as well as communications to the public of television broadcasts of the same.658 In some
instances, beIN had the right to take action under the Saudi Copyright Law in respect of an infringed
copyright work or related right where beIN is not the owner of that right.659
7.193. The Panel notes Saudi Arabia's observation, made in the context of commenting on
paragraph 2.31 of the draft descriptive part of the Report, that "mere assertions" by Qatar that it
has broadcast rights for certain content cannot "establish the fact of such rights".660 The Panel recalls
that it put several questions to Qatar aimed at further clarifying and confirming, on the basis of
evidence, the nature and extent of beIN's copyright and related rights in connection with beoutQ's
broadcasts. The relevant evidence that accompanied Qatar's first written submission has been
supplemented with additional evidence, including, among other things : (a) examples of protected
works or subject matter of related rights of which beIN is the right owner661; (b) examples of licence
agreements that enable beIN to take action under the Saudi Copyright Law in respect of the allegedly
infringed work or related right s licensed to it662; (c) an explanation of the categories of protected
works or subject matter of related rights that were infringed in relation to specific broadcasts, such
as the beoutQ's screenings of the 2018 World Cup matches663; and (d) side-by-side screen captures
of a small sampling of sports events or episodes of television shows that were initially broadcast by
beIN and then immediately pirated and rebroadcast by beoutQ within a time delay of mere
seconds.664
7.194. The Panel has found that Saudi Arabia has taken measures that, directly or indirectly, have
had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through
civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals.665 Given that beIN is a right holder
for purposes of Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement, it follows that Saudi Arabia has acted
inconsistently with the specific requirement, in the third sentence of Article 42, that parties "shall be
allowed to be represented by independent legal counsel".
7.195. The Panel notes that Qatar has also argued that, because of the travel restrictions at issue,
Qatari nationals are generally not permitted to enter the territory of Saudi Arabia, including to
initiate, conduct, or testify in proceedings for the enforcement of IP rights. According to Qata r, the
inability to personally attend legal proceedings in Saudi Arabia, particularly when considered
together with the inability to hire legal counsel, "precludes Qatari nationals from presenting evidence
in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enfor cement of intellectual property rights". 666
According to Qatar, this violates the specific requirement, in the fourth sentence of Article 42, that
litigants "shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence". 667
As elaborated earlier, the Panel considers that whether or not the travel restrictions would operate
to prevent beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures, if beIN were able to secure legal
representation to initiate civil proceedings, is a matter of specula tion.668 In the Panel's view, it is

657 See paragraph 2.6 of this Report.
658 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), paras. 34-35 (referring to Supplemental Declaration
by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT-217, paras. 7, 10 and 16).
659 Ibid. para. 37 (referring to Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019,
Exhibit QAT-217, para. 14).
660 Saudi Arabia's comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, p. 3.
661 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i).
662 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(ii).
663 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(d).
664 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 45, para. 113 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group
LLC Programming Director, dated 27 October 2019, Exhibit QAT-257).
665 See section 7.2.3.2.1 ("Anti-sympathy measures") of this Report.
666 Qatar's first written submission, para. 398.
667 Ibid.
668 See paragraphs 7.87 to 7.89 of this Report.

unnecessary to rule on Qatar's argument concerning the fourth sentence of Article 42 in the light of
its earlier finding regarding the travel restrictions.
7.196. The Panel has also considered Qatar's argument, made in the contex t of challenging the
Ministerial approval requirement as applied to beIN, that the effect of such a "political" element is
that Copyright Committee proceedings are not "civil judicial procedures" within the meaning of
Article 42, first sentence, of the TRIPS Agreement.669 The Panel considers it unnecessary to express
any view on the interpretation of the term "civil judicial procedures" in the context of the
first sentence of Article 42, in the light of its earlier finding regarding the Ministerial approval
requirement. As elaborated earlier, Qatar did not make any "as such" claim in respect of this aspect
of Saudi law, and the Panel has concluded that the question of whether —and, if so, how —the
Ministerial approval requirement (or replacement measures establi shing a different layer of
approval670) would be applied to beIN, if beIN was able to retain legal counsel in Saudi Arabia and
bring a case before the Copyright Committee, would be an exercise in speculation.
7.197. For these reasons, the Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted in a manner inconsistent
with Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement by taking measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the
result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals.
7.198. The Panel recalls that Q atar has made an additional claim under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement. The Panel considers that the violation of the obligation under Article 42 of the
TRIPS Agreement to allow parties to be " represented by independent legal counsel" gives rise to a
consequential violation of the obligation under Article 41.1 to "ensure that enforcement procedures
as specified in this Part are available under their law". As the Panel has found that enforcement
procedures as specified in Part III are to that extent not "available", the question of whether they
permit "effective action against any act of infringement" of IP rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement
within the meaning of Article 41.1 does not arise.
7.3.3.2.3 Conclusion
7.199. The Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted i n a manner inconsistent with Article 42
and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement by taking measures that, directly or indirectly, have had
the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals.
7.3.3.3 Claim under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement regarding criminal procedures
7.3.3.3.1 Applicable legal standard
7.200. Article 61, which constitutes Section 5, entitled "Criminal Procedures", of Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement, reads as follows:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in
cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/o r monetary fines sufficient to
provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a
corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringin g goods and of any materials and
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence.
Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases
of infringement of intellectual property rights, in p articular where they are committed
wilfully and on a commercial scale.
7.201. Qatar's claim is directed at the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 that Members
"shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilf ul …
copyright piracy on a commercial scale." This obligation was invoked as the basis for a claim in one

669 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 391-395 and 401-409.
670 See paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 of this Report.

prior case, China – Intellectual Property Rights, and that panel's findings provide guidance on the
interpretation and application of this provision.671
7.202. The scope of the obligation to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied"
is limited by the phrase "at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a
commercial scale".672 As the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights noted:
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement distinguishes between the treatment of wilful
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale, on the one hand,
and all other infringements of intellectual property rights, on the ot her hand, in that
only the former are subject to an obligation regarding criminal procedures and penalties.
This indicates the shared view of the negotiators that the former are the most blatant
and egregious acts of infringement. This view must inform the interpretation of
Article 61.673
7.203. As regards the term "wilful", the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights explained that
it "functions as a qualifier indicating that trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy is not subject
to the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 unless it is 'wilful'." This word, in the panel's view,
"[which] focus[es] on the infringer's intent, reflects the criminal nature of the enforcement
procedures at issue."674
7.204. As regards the terms "trademark counterfeiting" and " copyright piracy", the panel in
China – Intellectual Property Rights considered that the definitions of the similar terms "counterfeit
trademark goods" and "pirated copyright goods" provided in footnote 14 to Article 51 of the
TRIPS Agreement are relevant to understanding the meaning of these terms in the context of
Article 61.675 Footnote 14(b) provides that, for purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, the term "pirated
copyright goods" shall mean:
[A]ny goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or person
duly authorized by the right holder in the country of production and which are made
directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the country
of importation.
7.205. The panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights, furthermore, clarified the meaning of the
term "on a commercial scale" as follows:
[A] "commercial scale" is th e magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial
activity. Therefore, counterfeiting or piracy "on a commercial scale" refers to
counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual
commercial activity with respect to a gi ven product in a given market. The magnitude
or extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a given product in a
given market forms a benchmark by which to assess the obligation in the first sentence
of Article 61. It follows that what c onstitutes a commercial scale for counterfeiting or
piracy of a particular product in a particular market will depend on the magnitude or
extent that is typical or usual with respect to such a product in such a market, which
may be small or large. The magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity
relates, in the longer term, to profitability.676

671 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.494-7.669. That panel was also
confronted with a related claim under the second sentence of Article 61, which turned on the outcome of the
claim made under the first sentence. This panel report was not appealed.
672 Article 61 sets out a minimum standard. The last sentence of Article 61 provides that Members may
provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of IP rights, in
particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.
673 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.514 and 7.528.
674 Ibid. paras. 7.518-7.524.
675 Ibid. paras. 7.520-7.521 and 7.572.
676 (footnote original) This finding is without prejudice to the qualitative aspect of "commercial scale"
considered with respect to the second limb of this claim.

The Panel observes that what is typical or usual in commerce is a flexible concept. The
immediate context in the second sentence of Article 61, which is closely related to the
first, refers to the similarly flexible concepts of "deterrent" and "corresponding gravity".
Neither these terms nor "commercial scale" are precise but all depend on circumstances,
which vary according to the differing forms of commerce and of counterfeiting and piracy
to which these obligations apply.677
7.206. The first sentence of Article 61 states that Members "shall provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied". The meaning of the phrase "to be applied" in this provision has arisen
as a general interpretative issue in this case, one not addressed in prior WTO jurisprudence.
7.207. In the Panel's view, the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement
is not automatically discharged through the creation of a formal written law that provides for the
criminalization of wilful commercial-scale piracy without regard to whether and, if so, how the written
law is applied in practice. In cases where a Member has not taken actions that could lead to the
application of criminal procedures and penalties against wilful commercial -scale piracy, an
assessment of compliance with Article 61 must consider the evidence available to the authorities
and other relevant circumstances. Naturally, the onus would rest on the compl aining Member to
establish that, notwithstanding that another Member's written law provides for criminal penalties
and procedures to be applied to cases of wilful copyright piracy, that Member has acted inconsistently
with Article 61 in relation to the manner in which its authorities have applied the law.
7.208. The Panel considers this interpretation to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the
relevant terms of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the verb to "apply" is defined as
"[t]o bring (a rule, a test, a principle, etc.) into contact with facts; to bring to bear practically; to
put into practical operation".678 This would suggest that Members have an obligation to put criminal
procedures and penalties into practical operation.
7.209. It is important to consider Article 61 in the context of the whole of the TRIPS Agreement and
the distinctions that it draws. The Panel agrees with Qatar that the phrase "to be applied" in
Article 61 can be contrasted with the use of the phrase "shall make avail able" in Article 42.679 The
phrase can also be contrasted with the phrase "shall have the authority" in Articles 44, 45 and 46 of
the TRIPS Agreement, and with the more general phrase, in Article 41.1, that requires Members to
ensure that enforcement procedu res as specified in Part III "are available". This difference in
terminology, including in particular the difference in terminology between Article 61 ("shall provide
for … to be applied") and Article 42 ("shall make available") reflects and is explained by an important
structural difference between civil and criminal procedures. While IP rights are "private rights" 680
that generally require right holders themselves to assert their rights, only States are entitled to
enforce criminal law procedures and penalties.681
7.210. Certain other elements of the context of Article 61 are difficult to reconc ile with the view
that the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 requires nothing more of Members than that
they formally "write down criminal procedures and penalties in their criminal laws" without regard
to whether and, if so, how they are applied. Article 1.1, first sentence, speaks in broader and more
general terms of each Member being required to "give effect" to TRIPS provisions ; and, in its third
sentence, refers more widely to the implementation of obligations in a Member's "legal system and
practice". Likewise, the general obligation under Article 41.1 is that Members shall ensure that

677 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.577-7.578. The Panel emphasized that
its findings regarding the first sentence of Article 61 were confined to the issue of what acts of infringement
must be criminalized and not those which must be prosecuted. (See ibid. para. 7.596.)
678 Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of "apply", available at:
< https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9724?rskey=pQF380&result=2#eid>, accessed 21 January 2020.
679 Furthermore, in the context of discussing Article 42, the Appellate Body has explained that "the
ordinary meaning of the term 'make available' suggests that 'right holders' are entitled under Article 42 to have
access to civil judicial procedures that are effective in bringing about the enforcement of their rights covered by
the Agreement". (Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 215 (referring to
Panel Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 8.95). (emphasis added))
680 See Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, fourth recital.
681 European Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 25.

enforcement procedures as specified in Part III are available under their law "so as to permit effective
action" against any act of infringement of IP rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement.
7.211. The Panel considers that a restrictive interpretation of the terms "shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied" would also be at odds with the object and purpose of
Article 61. The object and purpose of Article 61 includes singling out what negotiators of the TRIPS
Agreement understood to be the two "most blatant and egregious acts of infringement" and "[t]his
view must inform the interpretation of Article 61."682 A restrictive interpretation of the obligation in
the first sentence of Article 61 would also be difficult to reconcile with the TRIPS Agreement's overall
object and purpose of "provid[ing] effective and appropriate means for the enforcement" of trade -
related IP rights, as reflected in subparagraph (c) of the second recital of the preamble.
7.212. The parties and a number of third parties provided views on the scope of the obligation in
Article 61 to provide for criminal procedures and penalties "to be applied". 683 The Panel notes that
both parties, and third parties that expressed a view, agree with the view that Article 61 does not
contain an obligation on Members to investigate and prosecute all suspected cases of wilful
"trademark counterfeiting" and "copyright piracy" on a commercial scale . The Panel accepts that
view. However, the parties and third parties held diverging views about the implications of accepting
that premise. Some third parties reasoned that, if there is no obligation to investigate and prosecute
all suspected cases of "trademark counterfeiting" and "copyright piracy" on a commercial scale, then
it follows that the absence of any express guidance or criteria in the text of Article 61 as to which
kinds of circumstances would compel a Member's authorities to investigate and prosecute a
particular set of allegations is an indication that no such obligation exists. 684 Certain other third
parties present ed arguments that eschew an all -or-nothing appro ach, referring for instance to
situations of "constant" or "systematic" non-enforcement potentially giving rise to a violation of the
obligation in the first sentence of Article 61.685
7.213. The Panel does not consider it necessary to determine further, in the abstract, the scope of
the obligation to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied". Having found that
Qatar has established a prima facie case that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject
to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia 686, the Panel turns to the textual elements of Article 61
of the TRIPS Agreement to assess whether: (a) the conduct identified of beoutQ amounts to "wilful
… copyright piracy on a commercial scale" , and (b) Saudi Arabia has implemented its obligation to
"provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied" in the circumstances of this case.
7.3.3.3.2 Application to the facts
7.214. In the Panel's view, the conduct of beoutQ amounts to "wilful … copyright piracy on a
commercial scale".
7.215. As elaborated in Section 2.2.4 of this Report, beoutQ has engaged in "copyright piracy on a
commercial scale". It initially streamed pirated content online, and then expanded to the retail sale
of beoutQ-branded STBs throughout Saudi Arabia and other countries. These STBs receive satellite
broadcasts of pirated content and, as discussed further below, they also provide access to
IPTV applications offering thousands of pirated movies, TV shows and TV channels around the globe.
There are reports th at beoutQ STBs and subscriptions have been widely available in Saudi retail
outlets since the autumn of 2017. In addition to generating revenue through sales of STBs and
subscriptions, beoutQ allegedly sells advertising slots on its 10 pirated channels, and publishes its
advertising rates in Saudi riyals on its website (e.g., Premier League "gold packages" for advertising
priced at SAR 2,500,000 or approximately USD 666,638). beoutQ has promoted its pirated streams

682 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, para. 7.528.
683 See paragraphs 7.173, 7.175 and 7.179 of this Report.
684 The UAE observed that:
Members use different factors in determining priorities, such as the extent of prosecutorial
resources, the availability of evidence, cooperation of witnesses and the accused, the impact of
prosecution on other ongoing cases or matters, and the presence or absence of remedial efforts.
It would be just as impractical to expect all Members to uniformly apply such factors to their
decision-making processes. (United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 5(b),
para. 23.)
685 See paragraph 7.179 of this Report.
686 See section 7.2.3.3 ("Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties") of this Report.

on a variety of social media platforms, in cluding Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. While the focus
of beoutQ's broadcasting activities was initially on sports content, it has expanded to cover the most
popular movies and television programming in the world.
7.216. A figure reflecting the commercial scale of this piracy was provided in a Declaration produced
by beIN and submitted by Qatar to the Panel. This Declaration states that, since 12 March 2018,
beoutQ has pirated and rebroadcast 33,488 sporting events and 3,447 episodes of television shows
that were initially broadcast by beIN.687 The Declaration also provides side-by-side screen captures
of 15 sporting events or episodes of television shows that were initially broadcast by beIN and then
immediately pirated and rebroadcast by beoutQ within a time delay of mere seconds. In each of the
15 examples, the screen capture on the left-hand side shows the beoutQ-pirated broadcast, and the
screen capture on the right-hand side shows the feed from beIN prior to its broadcast. The screen
captures and video clips of beoutQ's pirated content feature a beoutQ logo that is superimposed
over the beIN logo. The beIN watermark remains in the background in some of the video clips.688
7.217. The Panel considers that beoutQ's conduct is properly characterized as "wilful", taking into
account "the infringer's intent". 689 An entity such as beoutQ, whose sole operation consists of
providing illegally pirated content and does so on a commercial scale, is not infringing on third-party
copyright in a manner that could be characterized as unintentional, accidental, or inadvertent.
7.218. Turning next to the question of whether Saudi Arabia has "provide[d] for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied" to beoutQ's commercial-scale piracy, Saudi Arabia has not identified
any such action. Rather, Saudi Arabia argued that its authorities have taken no such action because
they have received "no credible evidence".
7.219. The Panel has found that Qatar has established a prima facie case that beoutQ is operated
by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia. 690 The Panel has also
found that beIN and other foreign right holders repeatedly sent detailed information to the Saudi
authorities to inform them of beoutQ's alleged piracy, and the exte nsive evidentiary basis for
concluding that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia.691 Additionally, the Panel has found that, while taking no action to apply criminal
procedures and penalties to beoutQ, Saudi authorities engaged in the promotion of public gatherings
with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.
7.220. The Panel notes Saudi Arabia's assertions, as reflected in certain media reports, that its
authorities have taken actions to seize beoutQ's STBs, thus acknowledging that beoutQ is engaging
in illegal activities.692 Leaving aside Qatar's submissions about the lack of any evidence to sustain
Saudi Arabia's assertions in this regard693, Saudi Arabia did not suggest that any such seizures are
"criminal procedures and penalties" in the sense of Article 61, or that they relate to beoutQ's
copyright piracy. Rather, Saudi Arabia stated that the basis for its authorities' seizures of beoutQ's
STBs is the same basis upon which its authorities have seized beIN's STBs – namely, that they are

687 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 45, paras. 110, 111 and 113 (referring to Declaration by beIN
Media Group LLC Programming Director, dated 27 October 2019, Exhibit QAT-257).
688 Ibid.
689 Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras. 7.518-7.524.
690 See section 7.2.3.3 ("Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties") of this Report.
691 Ibid.
692 The media report submitted as Exhibit QAT-77 states:
Saudi Arabia has strongly denied accusations it was behind a television service pirating multi-
billion-dollar content, with a senior official saying that authorities have confiscated thousands of
pieces of equipment being used to illegally watch premium soccer events like the World Cup …
Al-Qahtani, in rare public remarks to international news organizations, said Saudi authorities
have confiscated 12,000 devices used for illegal streaming. 'I believe that the actual number of
confiscated devices will prove much higher,' he said. Authorities will continue 'to conduct
inspection campaigns in coordination with all relevant bodies to prevent any attempt to
broadcast any illegal content,' he said. (Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer
Rights' Spat Escalates", 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT-77.)
693 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(b), para. 138; and second written submission,
para. 52-56. Video footage posted on Twitter suggests that, in late May 2018, the Government of Saudi Arabia
has seized beIN STBs from coffee shops and stores, and based on an eyewitness account, at least one coffee
shop subsequently purchased a beoutQ STB to replace the beIN STB. (Tweets about beIN and beoutQ STBs
(Arabic original and English translation), 25 and 26 May 2018, Exhibit QAT-121.)

not licensed.694 Accordingly, such seizures could not, in the Panel's view, have discharged Saudi
Arabia's obligation under Article 61 to provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied
against beoutQ for its copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
7.3.3.3.3 Conclusion
7.221. Having considered all of the evidence before it, the Panel concl udes that Qatar has
discharged its burden of establishing that, notwithstanding that Saudi Arabia's written law may
provide for criminal penalties and procedures to be applied to cases of wilful copyright piracy on a
commercial scale, its authorities have acted inconsistently with the obligation in the first sentence
of Article 61 to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied" to the operations of
beoutQ. The Panel therefore concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article 61 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
7.3.3.4 Claims under Part I and Part II of the TRIPS Agreement
7.222. In its first written submission, Qatar set forth its interpretation of the language "treatment
no less favourable" 695, "nationals of other Members" 696, and "with regard to the p rotection of
intellectual property"697 in the context of Article 3.1, as well as the corresponding textual elements
of the legal standard in Article 4.698 Qatar also presented a detailed discussion and analysis of each
of the obligations in Articles 9, 11, 11bis and 11ter of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 14.3
of the TRIPS Agreement.699
7.223. However, t he Panel recalls that the WTO dispute settlement system is not meant "to
encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the
WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute", and that a panel "need only
address those claims which must be addressed to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute".700 For
the reasons that follow, the Panel considers it appropriate to exercise judicial economy in respect of
Qatar's remaining claims concerning the anti -sympathy measures, the non -application of
criminal procedures and penalties and the promotion of public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's
unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.
7.224. In the light of its finding that the anti-sympathy measures (in particular the measures that,
directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Sa udi legal counsel to
enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals) violate
Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement and its finding that the non -application of criminal
procedures or penalties to beoutQ vi olates Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel considers
it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims that these same measures violate
Articles 3.1 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. In the Panel's view, these additional claims under Part I
are premised on the alleged inability of Qatari nationals to access civil and criminal remedies to
enforce their IP rights. Specifically, Qatar argued that the treatment/advantages allegedly accorded
to Saudi nationals (or non-Qatari foreign nationals) is the treatment reflected in the provisions of
Chapter Six of the Saudi Copyright Law.701 These provisions provide for civil and criminal remedies

694 In response to Panel question No. 49, Saudi Arabia stated that it "would like to confirm that it seizes
STBs of the relevant company of the Complaining Party and beoutQ on the basis that they are not licensed to
distribute content by the appropriate Saudi authorities". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 49,
para. 37.)
695 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 164-169.
696 See ibid. paras. 170-173.
697 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 174-183.
698 Ibid. paras. 212-218.
699 Ibid. paras. 242-247 (Article 9), 255-264 (Article 11), 274-293 (Article 11bis(1)(i), (ii) and (iii)),
308-317 (Article 11ter), and 329-340 (Article 14.3).
700 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 18-19, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 339-340.
701 Having said this, Qatar also submitted that third-country nationals have also been frustrated in their
attempts to initiate civil proceedings in relation to the beoutQ matter, and that it has no knowledge of any such
proceedings being initiated by third-country nationals. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 20(a), (b) and
(c), paras. 128-131.) The Panel recalls that with its second written submission, Qatar provides the Panel with a
copy of a public joint statement made on 31 July 2019 by seven major football right holders (including FIFA,
UEFA, AFC, the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie A). According to the joint statement, these
right holders have also been unable to engage Saudi counsel or access Saudi courts and administrative
tribunals in connection with the beoutQ piracy. (See paragraph 7.65 of this Report.)

against the infringement of copyrights that seem to correspond to those required by Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement.702 While the Panel agrees with Qatar, Canada, the European Union and Japan
that the obligations in Articles 3.1 and 4 are distinct from the obligations contained in Part III703,
Qatar and these third parties did not explain how, in the facts of this case, any potential
discrimination under Articles 3 and 4 would persist if Saudi Arabia brought its anti -sympathy
measures and non -application of criminal procedures and penalties into conformity with its
obligations under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.
7.225. In the light of its findings under Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel
also considers it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims relating to the
anti-sympathy measures and non-application of criminal procedures and pena lties under Part II of
the TRIPS Agreement. In the Panel's view, these additional claims under Part II are also premised,
insofar as the anti-sympathy measures and the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties
are concerned, on the alleged inability of beIN to access civil and criminal remedies to enforce their
rights. Qatar made this clear when it characterized Saudi Arabia's violations of the obligations in
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement as being "so extreme that they render effectively worthless the
substantive rights under Part II of the TRIPS Agreement".704 Thus, if Qatar is correct in arguing that
Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11 ter of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 14.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement require that WTO Members d o more than merely provide such rights in name or
on paper only, and that for such rights to be meaningful they must be "enjoyed" 705, in this case,
beIN's inability to "enjoy" those rights stems from the submission that its IP rights cannot be
"enforced" under Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Even if it were correct that the
same aspects of the same measures may violate copyright obligations in Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement and the enforcement obligation s in Part III thereof706, no explanation has been
given as to how , on the facts of this case, any violations of Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11ter of the
Berne Convention (1971) and Article 14.3 of the TRIPS Agreement would persist if Saudi Arabia
were to bring its anti -sympathy measures and the non -application of criminal procedures and
penalties into conformity with its obligations under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.
7.226. The Panel notes that certain aspects of Saudi law would persist despite the withdrawal of
the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi
legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcemen t procedures before Saudi courts and
tribunals, and despite the application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ. Specifically,
based on Saudi Arabia's description of its legal regime, it would still be the case that, as reflected in
the 19 June 2017 Circular, "unlicensed distributors of illegally distributed content do not have a right
to protect copyright in such illegally distributed content". 707 Thus, any violations of Articles 9, 11,
11bis and 11ter of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article 14.3 of the TRIPS Agreement arising
from this measure would persist regardless of the Panel's findings on the anti -sympathy measures
and the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties. However, the Panel is not declining to
rule on these alleged violations of Part II because it involves speculation. As already explained708, it
is the limited scope of the claims Qatar raised, including its refraining from making any "as such"
claim in relation to this measure, that prevents the Panel from ruling on it.
7.227. In the light of its findings under Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement regarding the
anti-sympathy measures and the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties, the Panel
also considers it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additiona l claims that t he promotion of
public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches
is itself inconsistent with Articles 11 and 11bis709 of the Berne Convention (1971). First, the Panel

702 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 184-187 and 219. While Qatar stated that its claims under
Article 3.1 and 4 also extend to discrimination in respect of matters covered by Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement, Qatar at the same time clarified that its claims under Part II are also premised on the same
aspects of the same measures that give rise to the violations of Articles 41.1, 42 and 61. (Qatar's response to
Panel question No. 8, paras. 57-59; and second written submission, para. 136.)
703 See paragraphs 7.170 and 7.176 of this Report.
704 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), paras. 64 and 66; and response to Panel question
No. 24(a), para. 159.
705 Qatar's first written submission, para. 238. (emphasis omitted)
706 See paragraphs 7.171 and 7.177 of this Report.
707 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 13.
708 See paragraphs 7.33 to 7.36 of this Report.
709 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 271 and 304; response to Panel question No. 9(a),
paras. 69-72; and second written submission, paras. 165 and 168.

has already fully taken this measure into account as a relevant factual circumstance in the course
of finding that Saudi Arabia does not "provide for" criminal procedures and penalties to "be applied"
in the sense of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the promotion of public gatherings with
screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches occurred nearly
two years ago in the context of the World Cup, and in the absence of any claim or evidence of a
continuing act by Saudi Arabia, it is not clear how an additional ruling under Articles 11 and 11bis
of the Berne Convention (1971) would have any implications for implementation.
7.228. The Panel concludes that, in the light of these findings upholding Qatar's claims under Part III
of the TRIPS Agreement, it is unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims under Parts I
and II of the TRIPS Agreement.
7.4 Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement
7.4.1 Introduction
7.229. Saudi Arabia has invoked the security exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement.
In the light of its findings in sections 7.2 and 7.3 above, the Panel will determine whether the
measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi
legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and
tribunals (i.e. the anti-sympathy measures), and/or Saudi Arabia's refusal to provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied to beoutQ , constitute "action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations".
7.230. Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, which is identical to Article 73(b)(iii) of the
TRIPS Agreement, was recently addressed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit.710 It held that
a panel must determine for itself whether the invoking Member's actions were "taken in time of war
or other emergency in international relations" in subparagraph (iii) of Article XXI(b) of the GATT
1994. It further found that a panel's review of whether the invoking Member's actions are ones
"which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under the chapeau
of Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 requires an assessment of whether the invoking Member has
articulated the "essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issue are necessary to
protect, along with a further assessment of whether the measures are so remote from, or unrelated
to, the "emergency in international relations" as to make it i mplausible that the invoking Member
implemented the measures for the protection of its "essential security interests" arising out of the
emergency. According to the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit , the obligation of a Member to
interpret and apply Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 in "good faith" requires "that the measures
at issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security
interests, i.e. that they are not implausible as measures protective of these interests".711
7.231. In this dispute, both parties interpret ed Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement by
reference to , and consistently with , the interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994
developed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit .712 However, the parties' arguments reveal
divergent views on three fundamental issues pertaining to the applicability of the security exception
in Article 73(b)(iii) to the facts and measures at issue: (a) whether there is an "emergency in
international relations" in the sense of subparagraph (iii) of Article 73(b); (b) whether Saudi Arabia
has articulated its "essential security interests" with sufficient clarity and precision; and
(c) whether—and, if so, how—the measures that Saudi Arabia characterizes as the "action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under the chapeau of
Article 73(b) relate to any of the specific measures challenged by Qatar in this dispute.

710 See generally Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras. 7.27-7.149.
711 Ibid. para. 7.138.
712 See section 7.4.3.1 ("Applicable legal standard") of this Report.

7.4.2 Arguments
7.4.2.1 Saudi Arabia
7.232. Saudi Arabia submit ted that the Panel should find that an "emergency in international
relations" exists in the sense of Article 73(b)(iii) on the basis that it has "severed all diplomatic and
economic ties with the complaining Member, which is the ultimate State expression of the existence
of an emergency in international relations".713 Saudi Arabia also submitted that "[t]he existence of
an emergency in international relations has been recognized by other countries which have applied
similar measures against the complaining Party".714 It referenced Qatar's alleged repudiation of the
Riyadh Agreements concluded between the GCC members 715 and alleged interference in other
countries in the region.716 Saudi Arabia asserted that its action was taken "in time of" the emergency
because it severed all diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017, following
Qatar's repudiation of the Riyadh Agreements and Qatar's continued actions that those agreements
identified as threats to the security and stability of GCC members.717 According to Saudi Arabia, the
emergency in international relations "has persisted since June 2017".718
7.233. In its submissions, Saudi Arabia articulated its "essential security interests" generally in
terms of protecting itself "from the dangers of terrorism and extremism".719 Thus, it stated that "one
of its principal essential security interests" is "the elimina tion of the extremism and terrorism that
have led to instability and conflict in [their] region" 720 and that the "essential security interest" in
question is "the protection of Saudi citizens, territory, and government from terrorism and
extremism".721 In summarizing its earlier submissions, Saudi Arabia reiterate d that it "has always
defined its 'essential security interest' as carrying out its central sovereign duty of protecting
Saudi citizens and population, government institutions, and territory from the t hreats of terrorism
and extremism, which have led to war, instability, and general unrest in our region".722
7.234. In the context of its invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) Saudi Arabia focused on its
"comprehensive measures" taken on 5 June 2017, and on its consequent refusal to engage directly
or indirectly with Qatar in this dispute.723
7.4.2.2 Qatar
7.235. Qatar disagreed with the arguments raised by Saudi Arabia concerning the existence of an
"emergency in international relations" in this case, submitting that: Saudi Arabia's al legations
regarding the events leading up to the severance of relations in June 2017 are unsupported, and
also point ed to a "mere political or economic" dispute, which is not sufficient to constitute an
emergency724; to the extent that Saudi Arabia argue d that the severance of all diplomatic and
economic ties in June 2017 itself precipitated an "emergency" that justifies the same severance of
all diplomatic and economic ties, the argument is illogical and would render the condition set forth

713 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(a).
714 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46. (fn omitted)
715 Ibid. paras. 21-22 and 44-45; Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
paras. 18-20; and second written submission, paras. 14-18 and 41.
716 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 47.
717 Ibid. para. 48 (referring to Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU-4).
718 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 41; opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 21.
719 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1, 6(c) and 14.
720 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 21.
721 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(b), para. 63.
722 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 42. (fn omitted)
723 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 7; opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, paras. 6 and 43; closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 5, 8 and 10; response to
Panel question No. 28, para. 23; second written submission, paras. 6, 10, 11, 19 and 43-45; opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 2 and 4; and closing statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, paras. 3-8.
724 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 65-66 and 96; and second written
submission, paras. 271, 294-295 and 299-300.

in Article 73(b)(iii) redundant.725 In Qatar's view no "emergency" in international relations prevails
today, and the two countries cooperate in various fora.726
7.236. Qatar submitted that Saudi Arabia has not identified its "essential security interests" with
sufficient clar ity or precision, and that its articulation of its essential security interests
"lacks veracity".727 In its view, Saudi Arabia 's apparent interests "are communicated in the most
abstract of terms".728 That is problematic, Qatar asserts, because the present dispute is distant from
the "hard core" of war, and therefore the Member invoking Article 73(b) "must articulate its interest
with an appropriate degree of clarity and precision to demonstrate their veracity, so as to
demonstrate that they are true and not a disguise for pursuit of other objectives".729 Qatar doubted
the veracity of any security interests in connection with the measures at issue, because in its view
those measures bear no relation to such interests.730 Qatar asserted that Saudi Arabia's actions are
in fact motivated by the objective of promoting the growth of its own media industry, and submitted
that a Member is not permitted to invoke the security defen ce merely by labelling commercial
interests as security interests.731
7.237. Qatar further submitted that the measures at issue are not plausibly connected to
Saudi Arabia's essential security interests.732 In response to Saudi Arabia's submissions about what
constitutes the "action" that it considers "necessary to protect its essential security interests" in the
sense of the chapeau of Article 73(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Qatar set out its understanding that
Saudi Arabia has not actually invoked Article 73(b) with respect to the measures at issue.733 In the
light of Saudi Arabia's statements that it is not invoking Article 73 in respect of any of the six
measures challenged by Qatar other than the travel restrictions, Qatar submit ted that the Panel
"cannot uphold the defense in respect of the measures that the respondent affirmativ ely asserts
were not considered necessary for protecting its essential security interests" and that "[d]oing so
would amount to impermissibly making the case for the respondent and legal error." 734 Qatar
submitted that the argument presented by the UAE (and adopted by Saudi Arabia) about the
impermissibility of "parsing out individual measures" taken as part of an "overall action" is irrelevant
to the present dispute, because it is irrelevant "whether or not Saudi Arabia can justify measures
other than the me asures at issue —either individually or by grouping them into a 'comprehensive
measure' or 'overall scheme'".735
7.4.2.3 Third parties
7.238. Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Japan and Russia agree d with the panel's finding in
Russia – Traffic in Transit that the existence of an "emergency in international relations" is a factual
circumstance subject to an objective determination by a panel. 736 The UAE also agree d with the
panel's finding in this respect, noting that an "emergency in international relations" refers to a
serious, unexpected and possibly dangerous situation involving the interactions of two or more

725 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 95; and second written
submission, para. 265.
726 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 101-103; and opening statement
at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 88.
727 Ibid. paras. 107-115.
728 Ibid. para. 108.
729 Ibid.
730 Ibid. para. 110.
732 Ibid. paras. 116-121; and Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
paras. 81-83.
733 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 81-85; and second written
submission, paras. 272-281.
734 Qatar's second written submission, para. 259. (emphasis original)
735 Ibid. para. 281. (emphasis original)
736 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 12-13; Canada's third-party submission, paras. 21-22;
Canada's third-party statement, paras. 6-7; European Union's third-party submission, paras. 81 and 86-87;
Japan's third-party statement, paras. 13 and 19; and Russia's third-party statement, paras. 18-19.
Both Canada and the European Union considered that, under Article 73(b)(iii), a panel must determine whether
there is a "sufficient nexus" between the respondent's measure and the circumstances set out in
subparagraph (iii). (Canada's third-party submission, para. 23; Canada's third-party statement, paras. 8-9;
and European Union's third-party submission, para. 90.)

countries or in how they regard each other, which is related to essential security interests .737
By contrast, both Bahrain and the United States considered that Article 73(b) is a self -judging
provision, in part, because the words "which it considers necessary" in the chapeau apply to
subparagraphs (i) to (iii).738 As regards whether an "emergency in international relations" exists in
this dispute, Japan submitted that the assertion that the severance of economic and diplomatic ties
constitutes in itself such an emergency under Article 73(b)(iii) is "circular reasoning" and should be
rejected.739 The European Union and Singapore consider ed that the severance of d iplomatic and
consular relations is not necessarily dispositive of the existence of such an emergency, but facts
underlying or leading to such a severance could qualify as an "emergency in international
relations".740 The UAE concluded that its and other countries' termination of relations with Qatar "in
and of itself" reflects the existence of an "emergency in international relations", and agree d with
Saudi Arabia that the severance of diplomatic and economic ties is the "ultimate State expression"
of the existence of an emergency in international relations.741
7.239. Most of the third parties refrain ed from commenting on the manner in which Saudi Arabia
has identified its "essential security interests". The European Union stated that, without taking a
position on the facts of this case, Saudi Arabia should have better explained several elements of its
defence, including the "essential security interests" that it claims to be at issue.742 However, several
third parties commented on the issue of whether—and, if so , how—the measures at issue are
plausibly connected to Saudi Arabia's essential security interests. Brazil "fail[ed] to see how the
respondent's proffered essential security interests, or any country's essential security interests for
that matter, could be protected by allowing the operation of a copyright pirate whose broadcasts
have spread beyond the respondent's borders and encompass not only the copyrights held by the
claimant's nationals but by other countries' nationals as well, including Brazil's". 743
The European Union stated that, without taking a position on the fact s of this case, it would
"welcome a detailed explanation clarifying why, in order to protect its essential security interests,
Saudi Arabia considers necessary to breach the rights of third party right-holders".744
7.240. The UAE submitted that a panel "cannot parse out the individual measures taken as part of
the overall action of severing diplomatic and economic relations, and seek to apply the plausibility
test to each element separately and out of context".745 The UAE added that, if the Panel applies the
test to individual "measures" (e.g. limiting access to a port), as opposed to the overall "action"
(e.g. termination of relations), this can only be to consider a plausible connection between the overall
"action" and "measures"—i.e. if limiting access to a port is plausibly connected to the termination of
relations (which itself must be plausibly connected to the emergency). 746 Brazil responded that the
text of Article 73(b) of the TRIPS Agreement refers to "action", not "overall action", and "[n]othing
in the text of Article 73(b) limits the scope of this provision to only one action." 747 Canada stated
that if "individual measures are included as part of an 'overall action' or comprehensive response to
a security threat, the relationship between the comprehensive response and the security interest is
relevant to determining whether the individual measures are sufficiently linked to the circumstances
set out in subparagraph", but added that a panel should still consider whether each of the individual
measures has a sufficient nexus to the circumstances set out in subparagraph (iii). 748
The European Union submitted that it "does not see any basis for the proposition that the required

737 United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, para. 9. For this reason, the UAE considered that a
panel should not apply a rigid, unbending standard in examining whether an "emergency in international
relations" exists. Rather, a panel must take into account the perspective and position of one Member in light of
its relationship with another, and must conduct its examination from the vantage point of the Member claiming
the existence of an emergency and the essential security interests. (Ibid.)
738 Bahrain's third-party submission, paras. 5-6; Bahrain's third-party statement, paras. 7-13;
United States' third-party submission, para. 5; and United States' third-party statement, paras. 5 and 7.
739 Japan's third-party submission, para. 12; and third-party statement, para. 16.
740 European Union's third-party statement, para. 3; and Singapore's third-party statement, para. 6.
741 United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, para. 25.
742 European Union's third-party submission, para. 67.
743 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 37. The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia, when invited to address
this point, stated that it "has not taken copyright works of any right-holders in connection with the protection
of Saudi Arabia's essential security interests". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 76.)
744 European Union's third-party submission, para. 67.
745 United Arab Emirates' oral statement, para. 23.
746 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, paras. 36-37.
747 Brazil's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties.
748 Canada's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, paras. 17-18.

connection should be linked to a nebulous overall 'action', while the concrete measures would escape
scrutiny".749 According to Japan, if an "overall action consisting of individua l measures has its own
unique effect through synergy between its component measures, the connection with these
emergency and security interests should be examined in relation to the overall action, rather than
each component measure".750 Singapore did not agree that the "overall action" to be assessed is the
action of "severing diplomatic and economic relations", and stated that what is required in the
present case "is an articulation of how the various measures alleged to be substantive violations of
the TRI PS Agreement, seen in totality, bear a connection with the 'emergency in international
relations'".751
7.4.3 Assessment by the Panel
7.4.3.1 Applicable legal standard
7.241. As previously stated, the wording of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement is identical to
that of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, which was first interpreted by the panel in Russia –
Traffic in Transit .752 The panel's interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) in that dispute gave rise to an
analytical framework that can guide the assessment of whether a respondent has properly invoked
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, or, for the purposes of this dispute, Article 73(b)(iii) of the
TRIPS Agreement.
7.242. Specifically, a panel may proceed by assessing:
a. whether the existence of a "war or other emergency in international relations" has been
established in the sense of subparagraph (iii) to Article 73(b);
b. whether the relevant actions were "taken in time of" th at war or other emergency in
international relations;
c. whether the invoking Member has articulated its relevant "essential security interests"
sufficiently to enable an assessment of whether there is any link between those actions
and the protection of its essential security interests; and
d. whether the relevant actions are so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in
international relations" as to make it implausible that the invoking Member considers
those actions to be necessary for the protection of its essential security interests arising
out of the emergency.
7.243. The parties in this dispute and multiple third parties each express agreement with the
general interpretation and analytical framework enunciated by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit.
These parties and third parties therefore considered that both can be transposed to Article 73(b)(iii)
of the TRIPS Agreement.753

749 European Union's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, para. 29.
750 Japan's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, para. 34. On the other hand, Japan
considered that "to the extent the relevant individual measures are independent and distinct, each of these
measures may need to be justified by finding a connection with the emergency and security interests at issue".
(Ibid. para. 33.)
751 Singapore's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties.
752 Where two sets of exceptions from obligations use similar language and requirements and set out
their provisions in the same manner, the Appellate Body has considered prior panel and Appellate Body reports
concerning the first set of exceptions to be relevant for its analysis under a second set of exceptions.
(See Appellate Body Reports, US – Gambling, para. 291 (finding previous decisions under Article XX of the
GATT 1994 relevant for its analysis under Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS));
and Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.202 (referring to the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1994 in Korea – Various Measures on Beef to set out its analytical framework for Article XIV(c) of
the GATS).)
753 See Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 72-73; Qatar's opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 43-49 and 65-67; Qatar's second written submission,
paras. 265-271; Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 43-49;
Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33; Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting

7.244. The first step in the analytical framework outlined above requires a panel to assess whether
the existence of a "war or other emergency in international relations" has been establishe d in the
sense of subparagraph (iii) of Article 73(b). The panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit concluded that
the circumstance in subparagraph (iii) is "an objective fact" that is "amenable to objective
determination".754 In other words, the panel concluded that the adjectival clause "which it considers"
in the chapeau of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 "does not qualify the determination of the
circumstance[]" in subparagraph (iii).755 In th at panel's view, the evaluation of whether the
respondent has satisfied the circumstance in subparagraph (iii) must "be made objectively rather
than by the invoking Member itself".756
7.245. The panel also concluded that the term "emergency in international relations" refers
generally "to a situation of armed c onflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened tension or
crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state". Such situations, in the panel's view,
"give rise to particular types of interests for the Member in question, i.e. defence or military interests,
or maintenance of law and public order interests". For the panel, while "political" and "economic"
conflicts could sometimes be considered "urgent" and "serious" in a political sense, such conflicts
will not be "emergenc[ies] in international relations" within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) "unless
they give rise to defence and military interests, or maintenance of law and public order interests".757
7.246. Saudi Arabia and Qatar each appeared to generally agree with the interpretation of
subparagraph (iii) provided above , as both refer red to the interpretations of the panel in Russia –
Traffic in Transit. Neither party stated any disagreement with any aspect of that panel's reasoning.758
Notably, Saudi Arabia agree d that the phrase "emergen cy in international relations" should be
understood to mean "a situation of armed conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened
tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state." 759 The Panel notes that
the opinion of the majority of the third parties that expressed a view on this issue is consistent with
that panel's interpretation.760
7.247. Turning to the second step of the analytical framework, the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit
examined the introductory phrase "taken in time of" in subparagraph (iii). This phrase connects the
"action" referred to in the chapeau of paragraph (b) to the phrase "emergency in international
relations" in subparagraph (iii). In the panel's view, this i ntroductory phrase "require[s] that the
action be taken during the war or other emergency in international relations". The connection

of the Panel, paras. 19-48; Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7;
Australia's third-party statement, paras. 10-14; Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 11-17;
Canada's third-party submission, paras. 21-22; Canada's third-party statement, paras. 6-7;
European Union's third-party submission, paras. 81-97; Japan's third-party submission, para. 9;
Japan's third-party statement, paras. 13 and 19; Russia's third-party statement, paras. 17-21;
Singapore's third-party statement, paras. 3-5; Ukraine's third-party submission, paras. 25-26; and
Ukraine's third-party statement, paras. 9-13.
754 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.71. See also ibid. paras. 7.66, 7.72-7.74, 7.77, 7.79
and 7.82. In its interpretation of this phrase in Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, the panel in Russia – Traffic
in Transit took into account several elements, including: (a) the operation of subparagraphs (i) to (iii) as
clauses that "qualify and limit the exercise of the discretion accorded to Members under the chapeau"
(Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.65); (b) the "substantially different" nature of the subject
matter in subparagraphs (i) to (iii), each of which establishes an "alternative" requirement
(ibid. paras. 7.67-7.68); (c) the ordinary meaning of the term "war" and the use of the term "or" to indicate
that war is but one example of a larger category of "emergency in international relations" (ibid. para. 7.72
(emphasis omitted)); and (d) the negotiating history of Article XXI of the GATT 1947, which revealed, inter
alia, that the potential abuse of the exceptions would be curtailed by limiting the circumstances in which the
exceptions could be invoked to those circumstances specified in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) (ibid. para. 7.98(b)).
755 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.82. See also ibid. para. 7.101.
756 Ibid. para. 7.100.
757 Ibid. paras. 7.75-7.76. (fn omitted)
758 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33 (quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit,
paras. 7.76 and 7.111); and Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 61-62, 65-67
and 74-75 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.65, 7.75, 7.76, 7.82, 7.100).
759 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33 (quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit,
paras. 7.76 and 7.111).
760 See paragraph 7.238 of this Report.

between these two elements constitutes a "chronological concurrence [that] is also an objective fact,
amenable to objective determination".761
7.248. Saudi Arabia and Qatar both appeared to generally agree, implicitly or expressly, with the
panel's interpretation of the phrase "taken in time of".762 Notably, Saudi Arabia also referred to the
"temporal relation" that should exist between qualifying emergencies and related "actions". 763
None of the third parties expressed any disagreement with this aspect of the panel's
interpretation.764
7.249. Proceeding to the third step in the analytical framework, the panel in Russia – Traffic in
Transit concluded that a panel would be required to assess whether a respondent has sufficiently
articulated its "essential security interests" in the sense of the chapeau of paragraph (b). The panel
noted that "essential security interests" is evidently a narrower concept than "security interests",
with the former generally concerning "those interests relating to the quintessential functions of the
state, namely, the protection of its territory and its populati on from external threats, and the
maintenance of law and public order internally". 765 For the panel, "[t]he specific interests that are
considered directly relevant to the protection of a state from such external or internal threats will
depend on the particular situation and perceptions of the state in question, and can be expected to
vary with changing circumstances". For these reasons, the panel considered that "it is left, in general,
to every Member to define what it considers to be its essential security interests".766
7.250. The panel noted, however, that a Member is not "free to elevate any concern to that of an
'essential security interest'"; rather, "the discretion of a Member to designate particular concerns as
'essential security interests' is limited by its obligation to interpret and apply Article XXI(b)(iii) of the
GATT 1994 in good faith".767 For the panel, this "obligation of good faith" requires that Members not
use the security exception as a means to circumvent their WTO obligations.768 The panel concluded
that "[i]t is therefore incumbent on the invoking Member to articulate the essential security interests

761 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.70. (emphasis original) See also ibid. para. 7.77.
762 Saudi Arabia argued that the "measures at issue were 'taken in time of' an emergency in
international relations in June 2017 … and continued to be applied within the meaning of
TRIPS Article 73(b)(iii)". Saudi Arabia also referred to the "temporal relation" that should exist between
qualifying emergencies and related "actions". (Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(b); and
second written submission, para. 33.) For its part, Qatar noted that this phrase connects the defended action
to the emergency and requires that the action "be adopted during the existence of an emergency, which came
into being before their adoption and continues to exist thereafter". (Qatar's opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 64 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.70). (emphasis
original) See also Qatar's second written submission, para. 269 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
Transit, para. 7.70).)
763 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33.
764 Canada and the European Union submitted that subparagraph (iii) requires at least that the action be
taken during a period of time in which the "war" or "other emergency" exists. (Canada's third-party
submission, paras. 23-24; and European Union's third-party submission, paras. 90-92.) Both Canada and the
European Union considered that, under Article 73(b)(iii), a panel must also determine whether there is a
"sufficient nexus" between the respondent's measure and one of the circumstances set out in
subparagraph (iii). (Canada's third-party submission, para. 23; Canada's third-party statement, paras. 8-9;
and European Union's third-party submission, para. 90.) Russia and the UAE agreed that the terms "taken in
time of" require that the action be taken during the war or other emergency in international relations.
Russia referred to the connection between these two elements as "a chronological concurrence that is also an
objective fact, amenable to objective determination". (Russia's third-party statement, para. 19 (quoting
Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.70.)) In the UAE's view, this temporal requirement "must be
distinguished from the narrower 'relationship of ends and means' required by the terms 'relating to' used in
subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of Article 73(b)". (United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, para. 10.)
765 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.130.
766 Ibid. para. 7.131.
767 Ibid. para. 7.132.
768 In what it deemed a "glaring example" of a respondent's circumvention of its WTO obligations, the
panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit stated that a respondent could seek, hypothetically, to release itself from
the structure of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements" that constitutes the multilateral trading
system. The respondent would do so "simply by re-labelling trade interests that it had agreed to protect and
promote within the system, as 'essential security interests', falling outside the reach of that system". (Ibid.
para. 7.133.)

said to arise from the emergency in international relations sufficiently enough to demonstrate their
veracity."769
7.251. Qatar and Saudi Arabia each advanced arguments consistent with the Russia – Traffic in
Transit panel's interpretation of the phrase "essential security interests". 770 Notably, Saudi Arabia
maintained that it "has clearly articulated its determination that the application of comprehensive
measures is necessary [to] protect 'its national security from the dangers of terrorism and
extremism', and … are [not] applied to circumvent its WTO obligations".771 Most if not all of the third
parties that addressed this element of the security exception expressed their agreement with one or
more elements of the panel's interpretation reviewed above.772
7.252. Moving to the fourth and final step of the analytical framework set out above, the panel in
Russia – Traffic in Transit considered the "obligation of good faith " to apply not only to the
respondent's articulation of "its essential security interests", but also to the connection between the
measures at issue and those interests. This obligation, for the panel, is "crystallized in demanding
that the measures at issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered
essential security interests".773 Specifically, a panel must determine "whether the measures are so
remote from, or unrelated to, the … emergency that it is implausible t hat [the respondent]
implemented the measures for the protection of its essential security interests arising out of the
emergency".774
7.253. Saudi Arabia and Qatar each express ed basic agreement with the interpretation of the
chapeau of paragraph (b) as expressed above. Saudi Arabia stated that a panel could examine the
relationship between the measures for which the security exception was invoked, and the essential
security interests, where such an examination would support the panel's assessment of the bona fide
invocation of the security exception.775 Saudi Arabia also sought to demonstrate its "respect for the
obligation of good faith" with reference to "the relationship between the measures and the essential
security interests at issue".776
7.254. Qatar agreed that the phrase "which it considers" in the chapeau of Article 73(b) "confer[s]
… discretion on the Member taking the actions at issue"; in addition, such discretion is not
unfettered.777 For Qatar, this is because a panel must ensure that the invoking Member acts in good
faith and does not exercise its discretion "in pursuit of different or ulterior objectives". 778
Qatar submitted that the word "necessary" "denotes an action that contributes to the attainment of
the relevant objective"; however, should a measure, in the light of the facts, be "manifestly incapable
of making a contribution to the stated security interests, or actually undermine[] those interests",
Qatar assert ed that the invo king Member could not, in good faith, "consider[]" the measure
"necessary for the protection of its essential security interests".779
7.255. Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Russia and Ukraine consider ed that the language
"which it considers" in the chapeau of Article 73(b) confers discretion on an invoking Member to

769 Ibid. para. 7.134.
770 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 6(c) and 14; opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, paras. 18-22; second written submission, para. 34 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
Transit, para. 7.130); Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 74-75, second
written submission, paras. 257-258 and 262-264; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
para. 69 (quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras. 7.71 and 7.133-7.135).
771 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(c). See also ibid. para. 14; and opening statement at
the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 18-22.
772 See Australia's third-party statement, para. 10 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit,
paras. 7.130-7.131); European Union's third-party submission, paras. 62, 94 and 96 (referring to
Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras. 7.130, 7.132-7.133 and 7.138); Singapore's third-party
statement, para. 5; Ukraine's third-party submission, paras. 20-24; and United Arab Emirates' third-party
submission, para. 6 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.131).
773 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138.
775 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 37 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
Transit, para. 7.133).
776 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 46.
777 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 70. (emphasis omitted)
778 Ibid. para. 71 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.132).
779 Ibid. para. 78. (emphasis omitted)

determine the necessity of the measure, but that this discretion is not unfettered. Though these
third parties expressed slightly different formulations of the "minimum requirement of plausibilit y",
they all agree with this requirement and the role of the obligation of good faith in the application of
Article 73(b)(iii).780 For example, the European Union considered that if a threshold analysis of the
"design" of the measure reveals that it is "inca pable" of addressing the purported objective of
protecting essential security interests, (e.g. because it is designed to circumvent WTO obligations or
compliance obligations or promote protectionist interests), then the measure cannot be justified
under th is exception. 781 Nevertheless, t he UAE consider ed that, to give the clause "which it
considers" legal effect in the chapeau of Article 73(b), a panel must leave it to the implementing
Member to determine whether the action was "necessary". 782 The UAE also cons idered that the
"minimum requirement of plausibility"783 enunciated by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit might
have been appropriate in that dispute, but should not be applied "too mechanically" and that this
Panel should proceed with "caution" in adopting a test that is not grounded in the text of the security
exception.784 Regardless, in its view, the "plausibility formulation" sets "a very low bar".785
7.4.3.2 "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations"
7.256. The Panel will no w proceed with the first prong of the test under Article 73(b)(iii) of the
TRIPS Agreement, which entails consideration of two issues: (a) whether an "emergency in
international relations"786 exists between the disputing parties; and (b) whether the anti -sympathy
measures and non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ were "taken in time
of" this emergency. The Panel will address these two elements of Article 73(b)(iii) in turn.
7.257. For the reasons that follow, the Panel considers that "a situation … of heightened tension or
crisis"787 exists in the circumstances in this dispute, and is related to Saudi Arabia's "defence or
military interests, or maintenance of law and public order interests" (i.e. essential security interests),
sufficient to establish the existence of an "emergency in international relations" that has persisted
since at least 5 June 2017. The Panel notes at the outset that it is the combination of the
considerations that follow which sustains this conclusion, rather than any one of them being
necessarily decisive in its own right.
7.258. First, the Panel recalls that, on 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia "severed diplomatic and consular
relations with [Qatar], and imposed comprehensive measures putting an end to all economic and
trade relations between [itself and Qatar]". 788 On the same day, the Saudi Press Agency reported
the actions and their underlying rationale as follows:
An official source stated that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emanating
from exercising its sovereign rights guaranteed by the international law and protecting
its national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism has decided to sever

780 Australia's third-party statement, para. 10 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit,
paras. 7.146-7.147), paras. 11-12 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138) and
paras. 15-16; Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 18 and 27-29; European Union's third-party submission,
paras. 44, 96-97, 100 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138) and para. 101;
Russia's third-party statement, para. 21; Ukraine's third-party submission, paras. 20-26 and 28 (referring to
Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras. 7.132, 7.135 and 7.138); and Ukraine's third-party statement,
paras. 11-13.
781 European Union's third-party submission, para. 100 (referring to Appellate Body Report, India –
Solar Cells, para. 5.58).
782 United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, para. 5 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
783 United Arab Emirates' third-party statement, para. 19 (quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
Transit, para. 7.138).
784 Ibid. para. 20.
785 Ibid. para. 21.
786 The Panel notes that neither party has claimed that there was, at any point, a state of "war" in the
sense of paragraph 73(b)(iii).
787 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.76. (fn omitted)
788 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 1.

diplomatic and consular relations with the State of Qatar, close all land, sea and air
ports, prevent crossing into Saudi territories, airspace and territorial waters.789
7.259. The Panel agrees with Saudi Arabia that one Member's severance of "all diplomatic and
economic ties" with another Member could be regarded as " the ultimate State expression of the
existence of an emergency in international relations". 790 The UAE observed that
Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Qatar, "in and of itself, indicates the gravity of the
situation"791, and "there are few circumstances in international relations short of war that constitute
a more serious state of affairs".792
7.260. The Panel notes that the severance of diplomatic or consular relations has been characterized
as "a unilateral and discretionary act usually decided upon only as a last resort when a severe crisis
occurs in the relations between" a sending state and a receiving state. 793 The severance of such
relations typically brings about "the termination of all direct official communication between" the two
states.794 The severance of diplomatic relations is an "exceptional" act795, and it has been observed
that "[b]reaking off diplomatic relations has become rarer and they are nowadays sometimes even
maintained in times o f armed conflict. … The temporary or permanent recall of a mission is used
more frequently and is resorted to in case of security issues or serious crises in diplomatic
relations."796 It has also been observed that the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations
"was usually accompanied by rising tension in public opinion and by hostility".797
7.261. In this connection, the Panel further notes that Article 41 of the UN Charter —located in
Chapter VII thereof, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression"—provides that the UN Security Council may decide what measures, short of
the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Article 41 states that these
measures "may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations".798
7.262. Saudi Arabia's severance of all diplomatic, consular and economic ties with Qatar, viewed in
the context of similar actions taken by several other nations and the relevant history recounted in
this Report, falls into the category of cases in which such action can be characterized in terms of an
exceptional and serious crisis in the relations between two or more States.
7.263. Second, the Panel recalls the context in which Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with
Qatar occurred. Saudi Arabia repeatedly allege d799 that Qatar had, inter alia , repudiated the
Riyadh Agreements designed to address regional concerns of security and stability 800, supported
terrorism and extremism 801, and interfered in the internal affairs of o ther countries.802 The Panel
expresses or implies no position concerning any of these allegations, and recalls that Qatar strongly

789 Ibid. (quoting "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar",
Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637298).
790 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(a).
791 United Arab Emirates' third-party statement, para. 16.
792 Ibid.
793 Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 63: Severance of
diplomatic or consular relations, (Brill, Nijhoff 2009), pp. 786-787, paras. 4-5.
794 Ibid.
795 John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, Parry & Grant, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 3rd
Edition (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 554.
796 Holger P Hestermeyer, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), Max Planck Encyclopedia
of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, para. 40.
797 Working paper prepared by Mr. Abdullah El-Erian, Special Rapporteur, Volume II(2), UN Document
A/CN.4/L.166 (July 1971) p. 103, para. 12.
798 Charter of the United Nations, done at San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1 UN Treaty Series XVI,
Article 41, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/Part/un_charter.pdf.
799 See paragraphs 2.22 to 2.28 of this Report.
800 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 21-22 and 44-45; closing
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 18-20; and second written submission, paras. 14-18 and
41.
801 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 26-37; closing statement
at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 17-20; and second written submission, paras. 14-15.
802 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 47.

denied the various accusations made by Saudi Arabia. It suffices to observe that the nature of the
allegations constitutes furt her evidence of the grave and serious nature of the deterioration and
rupture in relations between these Members, and is also explicitly related to Saudi Arabia's security
interests. In the Panel's view, when a group of States repeatedly accuses another of supporting
terrorism and extremism, as described in greater detail earlier 803, that in and of itself reflects and
contributes to a "situation … of heightened tension or crisis" 804 between them that relates to their
security interests.805 Thus, in the light of the reasons advanced by Saudi Arabia for its actions, the
Panel does not accept Qatar's view that the events culminating in the severance of relations can be
characterized as a "mere political or economic" dispute.806
7.264. Third, the Panel notes the argument of Qatar and Japan that it might involve circular
reasoning, and/or render one of the two main elements of Article 73(b)(iii) redundant, if
Saudi Arabia's severance of all diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017 were
deemed to constitute both the "emergency in international relations" under subparagraph (iii), and
also the "action which [Saudi Arabia] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests" under the chapeau of Article 73(b). It is not necessary for the Panel to determine whether,
and if so, to what extent one and the same action or factual circumstance may constitute both an
"emergency in international relations" and the "action" the Member concerned considers "necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests" and "taken in time of" that emergency . In this
case the "action" that the Panel must examine under the chapeau of Article 73(b) is not the
severance of diplomatic and economic relations that took place on 5 June 2017.
7.265. The Panel recalls that the "action[s]" that it must examine under the chapeau are the specific
acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia that it has found to be inconsistent with the
TRIPS Agreement. In this case, these are: (a) the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the
result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals; and (b) Saudi Arabia's non -application
of criminal procedures and penalties to be applied to beoutQ. Qatar itself stressed that the severance
of relations is distinct from the measures it is challenging.807
7.266. Finally, the Panel does not consider that various forms of cooperation between the disputing
parties in the fora highlighted by Qatar 808 call into question that the "emergency in international
relations" between Saudi Arabia and Qatar persists. It is not in dispute that the complete severance
of diplomatic, consular and economic relations has remained essentially unchanged between June
2017 and the present.
7.267. Both parties, and most third parties in their submissions, agreed that the determination of
whether there exists "a war or other emergency in international relations" is to be made "objectively"
by a panel.809 The parties and several third parties advanced divergent views as to whether a panel
must grant any margin of "deference" to a respondent's characterization of a situation as an
emergency.810

803 See section 2.2.2 ("The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it") of this Report.
804 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.76. (fn omitted)
805 The Panel elaborates further on the nature of these interests in the context of its examination of the
measures under the chapeau of Article 73, which entails consideration of the "essential security interests"
articulated by Saudi Arabia. (See section 7.4.3.3.3 ("Saudi Arabia's articulation of its 'essential security
interests'") of this Report.)
806 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 65-66 and 96; and second written
submission, paras. 294-295 and 299-300.
807 See paragraph 7.29 of this Report.
808 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 101-103.
809 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in
Transit, paras. 7.76 and 7.111); and Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 73
(referring to Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 65-67; and Qatar's second
written submission, paras. 265-271). Bahrain and the United States considered that Article 73(b) is entirely
"self-judging" and that the words "which it considers necessary" in the chapeau apply to subparagraphs (i) to
(iii). (Bahrain's third-party submission, paras. 5-6; Bahrain's third-party statement, paras. 7-13; United States'
third-party submission, para. 5; and United States' third-party statement, paras. 5 and 7.)
810 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33; Qatar's opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, paras. 72 and 75; European Union's third-party submission, para. 89;
European Union's third-party statement, para. 3; and United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, para. 9.

7.268. The Panel recalls that the WTO dispute settlement system is not meant "to encourage either
panels or the Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement
outside the context of resolving a particular dispute".811 In the light of its findings above, the Panel
does not consider it necessary to rule on certain issues discussed by the parties or third parties
about how a panel should proceed in a case where it is not persuaded that an "emergency in
international relations" exist s, or is presented with an insufficient basis upon which to make any
determination of that issue. The Panel has found, on the basis of the facts in this dispute, that an
"emergency in international relations" exists in this case.
7.269. As to the second element of subparagraph (iii) of Article 73(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, it
follows from the foregoing assessment, and in particular the Panel's conclusion that an "emergency
in international relations" has persisted since at least 5 June 2017, that the two actions that the
Panel must examine under the chapeau of Article 73(b) were "taken in time of" the "emergency in
international relations". The measures at issue are of a continuing nature, as opposed to acts or
omissions that occurred or were completed on a partic ular date, and neither party has suggested
that the Panel must assign any dates to them for the purposes of examining the claims and defences
before the Panel. In the Panel's view, it suffices to note that beoutQ did not commence operations
until August 2017, and hence the actions to be examined under the chapeau were "taken in time of"
the "emergency in international relations" that has persisted since at least 5 June 2017.
7.270. The Panel thus concludes that the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result
of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals (i.e. anti -sympathy measures), and
Saudi Arabia's non-application of criminal procedures and pe nalties to be applied to beoutQ, were
"taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations".
7.4.3.3 "action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests"
7.4.3.3.1 Introduction
7.271. The Panel will now proceed with the second prong of the test under Article 73(b)(iii) of the
TRIPS Agreement, which entails the consideration of two further issues: (a) whether Saudi Arabia
has sufficiently articulated the "essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issu e
are necessary to protect; and (b) whether the anti -sympathy measures and/or the non-application
of criminal procedures or penalties are so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in
international relations" as to make it implausible that the invokin g Member implemented the
measures for the protection of its "essential security interests" arising out of the emergency.
7.272. Before turning to those issues, the Panel will first address a fundamental issue regarding the
scope of Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii).
7.4.3.3.2 The "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii)
7.273. As explained earlier, Saudi Arabia's arguments under Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS
Agreement focus on its "comprehensive measures" taken on 5 June 2017. This led Qatar to
repeatedly state that these "actions" are not the measures that it is challenging, and to argue that
Saudi Arabia has therefore not actually invoked any defence under Article 73(b) with respect to the
specific measures at issue in this dispute.812
7.274. In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that it has "properly invoked the Security
Exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement"813 and the consequence of that, according to
Saudi Arabia, is that the Panel "should decline to proceed further in this dispute because a
WTO dispute settlement panel is not capable of resolving the national security matter at issue ".814
In its second written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that it "has established that its invocation of

811 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 18-19, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 339-340.
812 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 81-85; second written
submission, paras. 272-281.
813 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 3.
814 Ibid. para. 4.

the Security Exceptions under Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement is justified and that no additional
findings be made in this dispute".815 In short, according to Saudi Arabia, the effect of its invocation
of Article 73 was that no further findings can be made in this dispu te and thus Article 73 operated
to end the case. On that basis, the invocation of Article 73 was an invocation of the security exception
in respect of, and which applied to, the entire matter before the Panel.
7.275. To clarify the relationship of the "measures a t issue " identified by Qatar and the
"comprehensive measures" taken by Saudi Arabia on 5 June 2017, the Panel asked Saudi Arabia
"whether Saudi Arabia is asserting that any of the acts or omissions raised by Qatar as the measures
at issue are 'action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests'
for purposes of Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement". Saudi Arabia responded that, with the potential
exception of the travel restrictions, it was not asserting that any of the alleged acts or omissions is
an "action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests " for
purposes of Article 73 of the TRI PS Agreement.816 This statement was relied upon by Qatar as a
concession by Saudi Arabia that Article 73 was not being invoked in respect of the measures at issue
in this case.817 Thus, Qatar contended, the invocation of Article 73 must fail.
7.276. However, a closer analysis of Saudi Arabia's position shows that Saudi Arabia was not resiling
from what it had set forth in its written pleadings. Rather, Saudi Arabia invoked Article 73 in respect
of, and as applied to, the entire matter before the Panel, and was not directing its invocation at the
specific measures identified by Qatar. The Panel notes that, given that Saudi Arabia denied that
some of the measures identified by Qatar existed in fact, it would have been contradictory for Saudi
Arabia to say that it had in voked Article 73 specifically in respect of measures whose existence it
denied.
7.277. Saudi Arabia affirmed that its invocation of Article 73 covered the measures at issue
identified by Qatar. Saudi Arabia argued that Qatar's panel request asserts the existence of a "direct
relationship" between the comprehensive measures and the related measures referenced by
Qatar.818 Saudi Arabia also adopted the view that "a panel cannot parse out the individual measures
taken as part of the overall action of severing diplomatic and economic relations, and seek to apply
the plausibility test to each element separately and out of context".819 In response to a question by
the Panel, Saudi Arabia stated that it considers that the "comprehensive measures … extend to and
encompass the measures referenced by the complaining party in this dispute". 820
Saudi Arabia's position was that the comprehensive measures were taken precisely for the purpose
of protecting the essential security interests for which it invokes the security exception in Article 73.
7.278. For these reasons, the Panel concludes that the "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia 's
invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement include the anti-sympathy measures and the
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ.
7.4.3.3.3 Saudi Arabia's articulation of its "essential security interests"
7.279. Having addressed the scope of the "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia 's invocation of
Article 73(b)(iii), the Panel will next examine whether Saudi Arabia has sufficiently articulated the
"essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issue are necessary to protect.
7.280. First, Saudi Arabia has expressly articulated its "essential security interests", in terms of
protecting itself "from the dangers of terrorism and extremism" .821 Thus, the situation in this case
contrasts to the situation that arose in Russia – Traffic in Transit, in which the respondent appeared
not to expressly articulate its essential security interests at all.822 Second, the interests identified by
Saudi Arabia are ones that clearly "relat[e] to the quintessential functions of the state, namely, the

815 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 73.
816 Saudi Arabia's responses to Panel question Nos. 30 and 31.
817 See, e.g. Qatar's second written submission, para. 283.
818 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 32(a), para. 68; second written submission, para. 24.
819 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 33(a), para. 74.
820 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 32(a), para. 65 (emphasis omitted); response to Panel
question No. 33(a), para. 74.
821 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1, 6(c) and 14. See paragraph 7.233 of this Report.
822 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.136.

protection of its territory and its population from external threats, and the maintenance of law and
public order internally".823
7.281. Although Qatar argued that Saudi Arabia's formulations of its essential security interests are
"vague" or "imprecise"824, the Panel sees no basis in the text of Article 73(b)(iii), or otherwise, for
demanding greater precision than that which has been presented by Saudi Arabia. The Panel recalls
that, in Russia – Traffic in Transit , the standard applied to the invoking Member was whether its
articulation of its essential security interests was "minimally satisfactory" in the circumstances. 825
The requirement that an invoking Member articulate its "essential security interests" sufficiently to
enable an assessment of whether the challenged measures are related to those intere sts is not a
particularly onerous one, and is appropriately subject to limited review by a panel.826 The reason is
that this analytical step serv es primarily to provide a benchmark against which to examine the
"action" under the chapeau of Article 73(b). That is, this analytical step enables an assessment by
the Panel of whether either of the challenged measures found to be inconsistent with the TRIPS
Agreement is plausibly connected to the protection of those essential security interests.
7.282. Based on the foregoing, the Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia's articulation of its relevant
"essential security interests" is sufficient to enable an assessment of whether there is any link
between the relevant actions and the protection of its essential security interests.
7.4.3.3.4 The connection between the measures and the essential security interests
7.283. The Panel notes that both parties have suggested that the Panel may and should assess the
relationship (if any) between the relevant measures and the "emergency in international relations".
Saudi Arabia stated that it has "no problem with the good faith test" in respect of the invocation of
Article 73(b)(iii)827, and that "the Panel may assess compliance with Saudi Arabia 's obligation of
good faith".828 Saudi Arabia stated more generally that "consistent with Saudi Arabia's approach to
this dispute, [it] will not address the facts presented by the complaining Party, and leave the
assessment of the evidence to the Panel". 829 For its part, Qatar stressed that
Saudi Arabia's purported non -engagement with parts of the matter before the Panel does not
prevent the Panel from fulfilling its function under the DSU and its terms of reference, and that there
is "no reason whatsoever for Saudi Arabia's purported 'refusal to engage' with Qatar to frustrate the
ability of the Panel to make findings and recommendations based on its terms of reference and the
material on the record".830
7.284. The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia's position in this dispute is that it seeks to protect Saudi
citizens and the Saudi population, Saudi government institutions, and the territory of Saudi Arabia
from the threats of terrorism and extremism . One of the means through which Saudi Arabia seeks
to protect these essential security interests is by ending any direct or indirect interaction between
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, extending to their respective populations and institutions. An action that
Saudi Arabia has taken for this purpose is to ref use to interact with Qatar in the context of WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. Another is to end or prevent any direct or indirect interaction or
contact between Saudi Arabian and Qatari nationals.
7.285. The Panel turns to the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing
beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures
before Saudi courts and tribunals (anti-sympathy measures). The relevant question is whether the
anti-sympathy measures "meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered
essential security interests, i.e. that they are not implausible as measures protective of these

823 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 74-75 (quoting Panel Report,
Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.71); Qatar's second written submission, paras. 262-264 (quoting
Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.71); and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 34
(quoting Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.130).
824 See paragraph 7.236 of this Report.
825 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.137.
826 Among other things, it may be noted that an assessment of whether or not certain security interests
are "essential" or not is not one that a WTO dispute settlement panel is well positioned to make.
827 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 28, paras. 20-23.
828 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 46.
829 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 20 December 2019, para. 7.
830 Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 37, para. 19.

interests".831 The panel must therefore review whether the anti-sympathy measures "are so remote
from, or unrelated to, the ["emergency in international relations" ] as to make it implausible that
[Saudi Arabia] implemented the measures for the protection of its essential security interests arising
out of the emergency".832
7.286. The measures aimed at denying Qatari nationals access to civil remedies through
Saudi courts may be viewed as an aspect of Saudi Arabia's umbrella policy of ending or preventing
any form of interaction with Qatari nat ionals. Given that Saudi Arabia imposed a travel ban on all
Qatari nationals from entering the territory of Saudi Arabia and an expulsion order for all Qatari
nationals in the territory of Saudi Arabia as part of the comprehensive measures taken on
5 June 2017, it is not implausible that Saudi Arabia might take other measures to prevent Qatari
nationals from having access to courts, tribunals and other institutions in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is
not implausible that, as part of its umbrella policy of ending or preventing any form of interaction
with Qatari nationals , a s reflected through , inter alia , its 5 June 2017 travel ban intended to
"prevent[] Qatari citizens' entry to or transit through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"833, which forms
part of Saudi Arabia's "comprehensive measures" , Saudi Arabia might take various formal and
informal measures to deny Saudi law firms from representing or interacting with Qatari nationals for
almost any purpose.
7.287. As an ancillary consideration, the Panel also notes the direct link made by Qatar itself
between the anti-sympathy measures preventing law firms from representing beIN, on the one hand,
and the "comprehensive measures" taken on 5 June 2017, on the other hand . Saudi Arabia
maintained that the "comprehensive measures" are an "action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests" , a point that Qatar does not dispute . Specifically, as
elaborated earlier834, Qatar explained that "[t]he instruction to law yers in Saudi Arabia to refrain
from representing beIN is closely related to the general anti-sympathy measures, and indeed, would
appear to be a natural application of that measure". 835 The Panel recalls that the general
anti-sympathy measures were announced by Saudi news outlets on 6 June 2017, i.e. the day after
Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Qatar. The Panel also finds it significant that
Qatar's argument has focused on the manner in which the anti-sympathy measures "work together"
with the travel restrictions that were announced on 5 June 2017, and which undoubtedly constitute
an integral part of the "comprehensive measures" taken by Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, Qatar's submissions consistently refer to these two measures in tandem, using the
formulation "anti-sympathy and related measures (e.g. travel restrictions)".836
7.288. For these reasons, the Panel considers that the anti-sympathy measures "meet a minimum
requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are
not implausible as measures protective of these interests".837
7.289. In the Panel's view, however, the same conclusion cannot be reached regarding the
connection between Saudi Arabia's stated essential security interests and its authorities'
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ. In contrast to the anti -sympathy
measures, which might be viewed as an aspect of Saudi Arabia's umbrella policy of ending or
preventing any form of interaction with Qatari nationals, the Panel is unable to discern any basis for
concluding that the application of criminal procedures or penalties to beoutQ would require any entity
in Saudi Arabia to engage in any form of interaction with beIN or any other Qatari national.

831 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138.
832 Ibid. para. 7.139.
833 Qatar's first written submission, para. 15 (referring to Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the
United States website, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of
Qatar", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT-3).
834 See paragraph 7.53 of this Report.
835 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 98. See the Panel's findings at section 7.2.3.2.1
("Anti-sympathy measures") of this Report.
836 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 8. 156, 157, 187, 205, 206, 207, 225, 233, 269, 322, 327,
328, 345, 346, 352, 374 and 396; and Qatar's responses to Panel question No. 4, para. 24, Panel question
No. 8, paras. 58, 61, and 65, and Panel question No. 17, para. 112.
837 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138.

7.290. Multiple third-party right hol ders submitted evidence directly to the Saudi authorities and
have made such evidence available to these authorities in the course of this dispute. This third-party
corroborating evidence includes, for example:
a. letters issued by UEFA and BBC Studios to the Ministry and GCAM containing evidence
concerning beoutQ's operations and efforts to target the Saudi market , its use of
Arabsat satellites and its sale of STBs and subscriptions in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere
in the MENA region838;
b. letters from UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League to Arabsat reporting beoutQ's use of
particular Arabsat satellite frequencies to transmit its pirated content 839, which
Arabsat's legal representative stated in letters to third-party right holders that Arabsat
would take into account in its ongoing investigation840;
c. FIFA's letter to Arabsat concerning the scope of its satellite coverage and its
transmission of beoutQ's pirated content841;
d. submissions made to the USTR concerning beoutQ's piracy, which were summarized in
the USTR's 2019 Special 301 Report and have been submitted to the Panel and
Saudi Arabia in this dispute842;
e. a public joint statement made by seven major football right holders condemning beoutQ
and requesting enforcement action by Saudi Arabia against beoutQ843; and
f. a technical report produced by the anti -piracy and cybersecurity firm MarkMonitor, at
the request of the seven football right holders, making specific findings concerning
beoutQ's unauthorized re -streaming of copyrighted content, the transmission of
beoutQ's pirated content on specific Arabsat satellites and frequencies, the design and
operation of the hardware and software of beoutQ STBs to target Saudi Arabia, and the
technically sophisticated and organized nature of beoutQ's operation.844
7.291. The Panel recalls that the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ, a
commercial-scale broadcast pirate , affects not only Qatar or Qatari nationals , but also a range of
third-party right holders. The Panel recalls that several third parties commented on the question of
whether—and, if so, how—the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ could
plausibly be connected to Saudi Arabia's essential security interests. Brazil stated that it "fails to see
how the respondent's pr offered essential security interests, or any country's essential security
interests for that matter, could be protected by allowing the operation of a copyright pirate whose
broadcasts have spread beyond the respondent's borders and encompass not only the copyrights
held by the claimant's nationals but by other countries' nationals as well, including Brazil's". 845
Similarly, the European Union stated that, without taking a position on the facts of this case, it would
"welcome a detailed explanation clarifying why, in order to protect its essential security interests,
Saudi Arabia considers it necessary to breach the rights of third party right-holders".846 In its third-
party oral statement, the European Union reiterated that it "would appreciate it if Saudi Arabia could
provide a plausible explanation of the reasons why 'it considers necessary' to allow the systematic
infringement of the intellectual property rights of EU right holders in order to protect its essential
security interests".847
7.292. The Panel observes tha t, in further contrast to the anti -sympathy measures, neither party
has suggested that there is any direct link between the non -application of criminal procedures and
penalties, on the one hand, and any action taken on , or consequential to , the 5 June 2017

838 See paragraph 7.102 of this Report.
839 See paragraph 7.107 of this Report.
840 See paragraph 7.108 of this Report.
841 See paragraphs 7.110 to 7.111 of this Report.
842 See paragraph 7.128 of this Report.
843 See paragraph 7.130 of this Report.
844 See paragraph 7.142 of this Report.
845 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 37.
846 European Union's third-party submission, para. 67.
847 European Union's third-party oral statement, para. 7. (emphasis omitted)

"comprehensive measures" severing relations with Qatar, on the other hand . Whereas the
anti-sympathy measures were announced on 6 June 2017, there is no such temporal connection
between the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties and the 5 June 2017
"comprehensive measures". For the reasons given above, there is also no rational or logical
connection between the comprehensive measures aimed at ending interaction with Qatar and
Qatari nationals, and the non-application of Saudi criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ.
7.293. The Panel concludes that the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ
does not have any relationship to Saudi Arabia's policy of ending or preventing any form of
interaction with Qatari nationals. Therefore, the Saudi authorities' non-application of criminal
procedures and penalties to beoutQ is so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in
international relations" as to make it implausible that Saudi Arabia implemented these measures for
the protection of its "essential security interests".848 As a consequence, the Panel concludes that the
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ does not "meet a minimum
requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are
not implausible as measures protective of these interests".849
7.4.4 Conclusion
7.294. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the requirements for invoking Article 73(b)(iii) are
met in relation to the inconsistency with Article 42 and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement850 arising
from the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining
Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts
and tribunals. The Panel also finds that the requirements for invoking Article 73(b)(iii) are not met
in relation to the inconsistency with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement arising from
Saudi Arabia's non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:
a. The Panel has no discretion to decline to make any findings or recommendation in the
case that has been brought before it;
b. With respect to Qatar's claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement:
i. Qatar has established that Saudi Arabia has taken measures that, directly or
indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal
counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi
courts and tribunals, and thus Saudi Arabia has acted in a manner inconsistent
with Article 42 and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement;
ii. Qatar has established that Saudi Arabia has not provided for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied to beoutQ despite the evidence establishing prima
facie that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities under the jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia, and thus Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article 61 of
the TRIPS Agreement;
iii. in the light of these findings, it is unnecessary to make findings on
Qatar's additional claims under Parts I and II of the TRIPS Agreement.
c. With respect to Saudi Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article 73(b)(iii)
of the TRIPS Agreement:
i. the requirements for invoking Article 73(b)(iii) are met in relation to the
inconsistency with Article 42 and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement arising

848 See paragraph 7.285 of this Report.
849 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para. 7.138.
850 The Panel notes that its analysis under Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement would apply equally
to any violations of Parts I and II of the TRIPS Agreement arising from the anti-sympathy measures, and
therefore sees no reason to disturb its decision to exercise judicial economy over those claims.

from the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing
beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals; and
ii. the requirements for invoking Article 73(b)(iii) are not met in relation to the
inconsistency with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement arising from Saudi Arabia's
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ.
8.2. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. The Panel concludes that, to the extent that the measures at issue are
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Qatar
under that Agreement.
8.3. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommends tha t Saudi Arabia bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.