UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN SHRIMP FROM VIET NAM
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 17 November 2014
Document codes: WT/DS429/R
Complainant: Vietnam
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: China, Ecuador, EU, Japan, Norway, Thailand
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 2, 9, 1  Anti-dumpingArt. VI:1, VI:2  GATT 1994Art. 11  Anti-dumpingPart I, para. 1.2  Protocol of AccessionArt. 18  Anti-dumpingArt. XVI:4  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON
CERTAIN SHRIMP FROM VIET NAM

REPORT OF THE PANEL

LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures for the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on BCI A-7
Annex A-3 Preliminary Ruling A-9
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF VIET NAM
Contents Page
Annex B-1 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of Viet Nam B-2
Annex B-2 Executive Summary of the Oral Statements of Viet Nam at the First Panel
Meeting
B-9
Annex B-3 Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of Viet Nam B-14
Annex B-4 Executive Summary of the Oral Statements of Viet Nam at the Second Panel
Meeting
B-24
Annex B-5 Viet Nam's Response to the United States' Request for Preliminary Rulings B-29
Annex B-6 Viet Nam's Response to the United States' Reply for the Request for
Preliminary Rulings
B-32
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States C-2
Annex C-2 Executive Summary of the Oral Statements of the United States at the First
Panel Meeting
C-10
Annex C-3 Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States C-13
Annex C-4 Executive Summary of the Oral Statements of the United States at the Second
Panel Meeting
C-21
Annex C-5 United States' Request for Preliminary Rulings C-26
Annex C-6 United States' Reply to Viet Nam's Response to the United States' Request for
Preliminary Rulings
C-31
ANNEX D
ARGUMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Executive Summary of the Third Party Arguments of China D-2
Annex D-2 Executive Summary of the Third Party Arguments of the European Union D-7
Annex D-3 Executive Summary of the Third Party Arguments of Japan D-12
Annex D-4 Executive Summary of the Third Party Arguments of Norway D-17
Annex D-5 Thailand's Third Party Responses to Questions from the Panel D-20
Annex D-6 China's Submission on the United States' Request for Preliminary Rulings D-23
Annex D-7 European Union Comments on the US Request for a Preliminary Ruling D-26

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Ceramic Tiles Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of
Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy, WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November 2001,
DSR 2001:XII, p. 6241
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1161
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable
Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R, adopted
18 August 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R,
DSR 2003:VII, p. 2701
Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from
Turkey, WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, DSR 2002:VII, p. 2667
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998,
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
Korea – Certain Paper Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from
Indonesia, WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII,
p. 10637
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US)
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted
21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6675
US – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Oil Country Tubular Goods
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R, adopted
28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XX, p. 10127
US – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Oil Country Tubular Goods
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular
Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/R, adopted 28 November 2005, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS282/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXI,
p. 10225
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application
of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009,
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
US – Continued Zeroing Panel Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, WT/DS350/R, adopted 19 February 2009, as modified as
Appellate Body Report WT/DS350/AB/R, DSR 2009:III, p. 1481
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Countervailing Duty
Investigation on DRAMS
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea,
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131
US – DRAMS Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from
Korea, WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 521
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted
23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews
Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/R and Corr.1, adopted
17 December 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS268/AB/R,
DSR 2004:VIII, p. 3421
US – Orange Juice (Brazil) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and
Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil,
WT/DS382/R, adopted 17 June 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3753
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry
from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 1909
US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA Panel Report, United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, adopted 30 August 2002, DSR 2002:VII,
p. 2581
US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) Panel Report, , WT/DS404/R, adopted 2 September 2011, DSR 2011:X, p. 5301
US – Softwood Lumber V Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004,
DSR 2004:V, p. 1875
US – Softwood Lumber V
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, DSR 2006:XII,
p. 5087
US – Softwood Lumber V
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada,
WT/DS264/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, as reversed by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS264/AB/RW, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5147
US – Softwood Lumber VI
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006,
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4865
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008,
DSR 2008:II, p. 513
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/R, adopted 20 May 2008, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS344/AB/R, DSR 2008:II, p. 599
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted
9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417
US – Zeroing (EC) Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/R, adopted
9 May 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/R,
DSR 2006:II, p. 521
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1,
adopted 11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/RW, adopted 11 June 2009,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VII,
p. 3117

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Zeroing (Japan) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007, DSR 2007:I,
p. 3
US – Zeroing (Japan) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset
Reviews, WT/DS322/R, adopted 23 January 2007, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS322/AB/R, DSR 2007:I, p. 97
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan,
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 August 2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3441
US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan)
Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset
Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan, WT/DS322/RW,
adopted 31 August 2009, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS322/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3553

EXHIBITS REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT
Panel Exhibit Title
VN-04 USDOC Final Determination and accompanying Issues and Decision
Memorandum for Original Investigation (8 December 2004) ("final
determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in the original
investigation")
VN-06 USDOC Initiation Notice for Fourth Administrative Review (26 March 2009)
("notice of initiation for the fourth administrative review")
VN-07 USDOC Respondent Selection for Fourth Administrative Review (11 June 2009)
("Respondent Selection Memorandum in the fourth administrative review")
VN-08 USDOC Initiation of Five-Year Sunset Review (4 January 2010) ("notice of
initiation for the sunset review")
VN-09 USDOC Preliminary Results for Fourth Administrative Review (15 March 2010)
("preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review")
VN-10 USDOC Initiation Notice of Fifth Administrative Review (9 April 2010) ("notice of
initiation for the fifth administrative review")
VN-11 USDOC Respondent Selection for Fifth Administrative Review (30 July 2010)
("Respondent Selection Memorandum in the fifth administrative review")
VN-12 USDOC Preliminary Determination of Five-Year Sunset Review (6 August 2010)
("preliminary likelihood-of-dumping determination in the sunset review")
VN-13 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
Fourth Administrative Review (9 August 2010) ("final determination and Issues
and Decision Memorandum in the fourth administrative review")
VN-14 USDOC Final Results of Five-Year Sunset Review (7 December 2010) ("final
likelihood-of-dumping determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in
the sunset review")
VN-15 USDOC Preliminary Results for Fifth Administrative Review (4 March 2011)
("preliminary determination in the fifth administrative review")
VN-16 USDOC Initiation Notice for Sixth Administrative Review (31 March 2011)
("notice of initiation for the sixth administrative review")
VN-17 USDOC Respondent Selection for Sixth Administrative Review (17 June 2011)
("Respondent Selection Memorandum in the sixth administrative review")
VN-18 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
Fifth Administrative Review (15 September 2009) ("final determination and
Issues and Decision Memorandum in the fifth administrative review")
VN-19 USDOC Preliminary Results for Sixth Administrative Review (7 March 2012)
("preliminary determination in the sixth administrative review")
VN-20 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
Sixth Administrative Review (11 September 2012) ("final determination and
Issues and Decision Memorandum in the sixth administrative review")
VN-22 USDOC Amended Final Results for Sixth Administrative Review
(18 October 2012) ("amended final determination in the sixth administrative
review")
VN-24 Chapter 10, Non-Market Economies (NME), Department of Commerce 2009
Antidumping Manual ("USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10")
VN-25 Affidavit of Anya Naschak and suppo rting documentation ("Naschak affidavit")
VN-31 Section 129, 19 U.S.C. §3538
VN-32 "Approval and entry into force of Uruguay Round Agreements", 19 U.S.C. §3511
("Section 101(a)(2) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a)(2)")
VN-33 "Relationship of agreements to United States law and State law", 19 U.S.C.
§3512 ("Section 102(d) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d)")
VN-34 Relevant Section 129 Excerpts of Uruguay Round Agreements, Statement of
Administrative Action, H.Doc 103-316(I), 103d Cong, 2d Sess.
(27 September 1994) ("Statement of Administrative Action")
VN-36 Corus Staal BV v. United States, Court No. 07-00270, Slip Op. 07-140 (Ct. Int'l
Trade) (19 September 2007)
VN-37 Tembec v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 2006)
VN-42 USDOC Section 129 Compilation
VN-47 "Administrative review of determinations", 19 U.S.C. §1675 ("Section 751 of the
Tariff Act of 1930")
VN-55 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin
and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final
Modification, 77 Fed. Reg. 8101 (14 February 2012)
VN-58 "Revocation of orders; termination of suspended investigations", 19 C.F.R.
§351.222 ("19 C.F.R. 351.222(b)")

Panel Exhibit Title
VN-59 Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. 29875 (21 May 2012)
VN-61 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Results, Partial Rescission, and Request for Revocation, In Part, of
the Third Administrative Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 10009 (9 March 2009)
VN-62 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
First Administrative Review (12 September 2007) ("final determination and
Issues and Decision Memorandum in the first administrative review")
VN-63 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
Second Administrative Review (9 September 2008) ("final determination and
Issues and Decision Memorandum in the second administrative review")
VN-64 USDOC Final Results and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for
Third Administrative Review (15 September 2009) ("final determination and
Issues and Decision Memorandum in the third administrative review")
VN-66 Import Administration Policy Bulletin Number 05.1 (5 April 2005) ("Policy
Bulletin 05.1")
VN-72 Federal Register Notices and Decision Memoranda of the Original Investigation
and First, Second, and Third Administrative Reviews ("final determinations and
Issues and Decision Memoranda in the original investigation and the first,
second and third administrative reviews")
VN-79 Documentation on Individual Revocati on Procedures of Australia, Brazil, and
India
VN-81 Requests for Administrative Reviews Submitted by Domestic Interested
Parties – Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Administrative Reviews
VN-82 Request for Revocation in the Third Ad ministrative Review ("Fish One's request
for revocation in the third administrative review")
VN-83 Requests for Revocation in the Fourth Administrative Review ("requests for
revocation submitted in the fourth administrative review")
VN-84 Requests for Revocation in the Fift h Administrative Review ("requests for
revocation submitted in the fifth administrative review")
US-04 Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1675)
("Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930")
US-08 Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
75 Fed. Reg. 61,122 (4 October 2010) ("amended final determination in the
fourth administrative review")
US-09 Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Amended Final Results and Final Partial Rescission of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,307 (18 October 2011) ("amended
final determination in the fifth administrative review")
US-10 Section 123 of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3533
US-11 Order, Grobest & I Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., v. United States, Consol.
Court No. 10-00238 (13 September 2012)
US-12 Grobest & I Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., v. United States, 853 F.Supp.2d
1352 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 2012)
US-13 Successor to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., Withdrawal of
Request for Voluntary Respondent Review and Revocation of Antidumping Duty
Order in Part (12 December 2012)
US-14 Response to 15 January 2013 Supplemen tal Questionnaire in Reexamination of
Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. Voluntary Responses
(29 January 2013)
US-15 Response by Successor to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., to
Department's Supplemental Questionnaire and Petitioners' Objection to
Rescission (13 February 2013)
US-16 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Results of Reconducted of Administrative Review of Grobest & I-Mei
Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. and Intent Not to Revoke; 2008-2009, 78 Fed.
Reg. 57,352 (18 September 2013)
US-18 Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from the Netherlands: Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Preliminary Intent to Rescind,
77 Fed. Reg. 46,024 (2 August 2012)
US-19 Certain Pasta from Italy: Notice of Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, Preliminary No Shipment Determination and Preliminary
Intent to Revoke Order, in Part, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,377 (3 August 2012),
unchanged in 78 Fed. Reg. 9,364 (8 February 2013)
US-20 Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from Finland; Notice of Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,036 (7 August 2012)
US-26 19 C.F.R. § 351.401

Panel Exhibit Title
US-27 Antidumping Manual, Chapter 1, Department of Commerce, p. 1
("USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 1")
US-29 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2011-2012,
78 Fed. Reg. 15,699 (12 March 2013) ("preliminary determination in the
seventh administrative review)
US-30 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2011-2012, 78 Fed.
Reg. 56,211 (12 September 2013) ("final determination in the seventh
administrative review")
US-38 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin
During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722
(27 December 2006)
US-39 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin
and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final
Modification, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,101 (14 February 2012) ("Final Modification")
US-40 Stainless Steel Bar From India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,337 (7 June 2013)
US-41 Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, and Italy: Final Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews; 2010-2011, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,415
(10 December 2012)
US-42 Low Enriched Uranium From France: Final Results of the Expedited Second
Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,100
(9 April 2013)
US-43 Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products From India, Indonesia, the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine; Final Results of the
Expedited Second Sunset Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders, 78 Fed.
Reg. 15,703 (12 March 2013)
US-44 Lemon Juice From Argentina: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review
of the Suspended Antidumping Duty Investigation, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,021
(7 December 2012)
US-45 Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Belarus, Indonesia, Latvia, Moldova,
Poland, People's Republic of China and Ukraine: Final Results of the Expedited
Second Sunset Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,140
(23 November 2012)
US-46 Honey From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Expedited Sunset
Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 59,896 (1 October 2012)
US-47 Certain Activated Carbon From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of
Expedited Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,420
(6 June 2012)
US-64 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People's Republic of China: Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,587
(14 August 2008)
US-65 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People's Republic of China: Amended
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 53,188
(15 September 2008)
US-66 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Carbon and
Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Ukraine, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,785
(30 August 2002)
US-67 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Urea Ammonium
Nitrate Solutions from Belarus, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,055 (27 February 2003)
US-68 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Structural Steel
Beams from the Russian Federation, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,490 (20 May 2002)
US-69 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Small
Diameter Carbon and Alloy Seamless Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe from
Romania, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,125 (23 June 2000)
US-73 Separate Rate Certification for Firms Previously Awarded Separate Rate Status
US-81 Vietnam Constitution, Chapt. II, Art. 15 (partial document)
US-84 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics (South-Western Centage
Learning 2012) (partial document)
US-85 Paul R. Gregory & Robert C. Stuart, Comparing Economic Systems in the
Twenty-First Century (Houghton Mifflin Company 2004) (partial document)
US-90 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Final
Results of Re-Conducted Administrative Review of Grobest & I-Mei Industrial
(Vietnam) Co., Ltd and Intent Not To Revoke; 2008-2009, 79 Fed. Reg. 15309
(19 March 2014)
US-91 19 C.F.R. § 351.216
US-95 19 U.S.C. § 1677m

Panel Exhibit Title
US-96 Letter from Counsel for Seaprodex Minh Hai to Secretary of Commerce
(31 July 1999)
US-97 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Notice of Reopening of the First Five-Year "Sunset" Review of the Antidumping
Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 15310 (19 March 2014)

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Impl ementation of Article VI of GATT 1994
BCI Business Confidential Information
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
NME Non-Market Economy
POI Period of investigation
POR Period of review
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subs idies and Countervailing Measures
SPB Sunset Policy Bulletin
URAA Uruguay Round Agreements Act
United States United States of America
USCBP United States Custom s and Border Protection
USDOC United States Department of Commerce
USITC United States International Trade Commission
USTR United States Trade Representative
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969,
1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679
Viet Nam Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
Viet Nam's Protocol of
Accession
Protocol on the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, WT/L/662
(15 November 2006)
Viet Nam's Working Party
Report
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48
(27 October 2006)
WTO World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by Viet Nam
1.1. On 22 February 2012, Viet Nam requested consultations with the United States pursuant to
Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994"), and Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the Ag reement on Implementation of Article VI of
GATT 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") with respect to certain anti-dumping measures imposed
by the United States in the context of the US anti-dumping proceedings on Certain Frozen
Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam (hereinafter "Shrimp") as well as with respect to certain US laws
and US Department of Commerce ("USDOC") methodologies and practices.
1
1.2. Consultations were held on 28 March 2012 but failed to resolve the dispute.
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 20 December 2012, Viet Nam requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to
Article 6 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference. 2 At its meeting on 27 February 2013, the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") established a panel pursuant to the request of Viet Nam in
document WT/DS429/2/Rev.1 and Corrigenda 1 & 2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.3
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant pr ovisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter refe rred to the DSB by Viet Nam in document
WT/DS429/2/Rev.1 and Corrigenda 14 and 25 and to make such findings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those
agreements.
1.5. On 12 July 2013, the parties agreed that the panel would be composed as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Simon Farbenbloom

Members: Mr Adrian Makuc

1.6. China, Ecuador, the European Union, Japan, Norway and Thailand notified their interest in
participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
6
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.3.1 General
1.7. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures 7 on
5 August 2013 and its timetable on 6 August 2013. On 9 August 2013, the Panel revised its
Working Procedures and adopted Additional Workin g Procedures Concerning Business Confidential
Information ("BCI"). 8 The Panel revised its timetable on 16 December 2013 and on
31 March 2014.
1.8. The Panel held a first substantive meetin g with the parties on 10 and 11 December 2013. A
session with the third parties took place on 11 December 2013. The Panel held a second

1 WT/DS429/1 (hereafter "Viet Nam's consultations request").
2 WT/DS429/2, revised on 17 January 2014 in WT/DS429/2/Rev.1 and Corr. 1 & 2 (hereafter
"Viet Nam's panel request").
3 See WT/DSB/M/329.
4 In French only.
5 In English and Spanish only.
6 WT/DS429/3.
7 See Annex A-1.
8 See Annex A-2.

substantive meeting with the parties on 25-26 March 2014. On 6 May 2014, the Panel issued the
descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on
16 July 2014. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 4 September 2014.
1.3.2 Preliminary ruling
1.9. On 31 July 2013, the United States submitted to the Panel a request for preliminary rulings in
which it asked that the Panel find that certain me asures and claims referenced in Viet Nam's panel
request were not properly within the Panel's terms of reference.
9 Viet Nam responded to the
United States' request on 5 August 2013. 10 The United States replied to Viet Nam's response on
13 August 2013, and two third parties, the European Union and China, filed observations regarding
the United States' request on 14 August 2013.11 On 16 August 2013, Viet Nam provided comments
on the United States' reply.12
1.10. On 26 September 2013, the Panel issued a Preliminary Ruling addressing the United States'
request, and indicated that the Ruling would become an integral part of its Final Report, subject to
any changes that may be necessary in light of co mments received from the parties at the interim
review stage. The Preliminary Ruling was circulated to the parties and to the third parties to the
dispute and is included as Annex A-3 of this Report.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1. This dispute concerns certain US laws, methodologies and practices with respect to the
imposition of anti-dumping duties as well as certain USDOC actions and determinations in the
Shrimp proceedings.
2.2. The United States operates a "retrospec tive" duty assessment system. Under this system,
the USDOC determines whether the imposition of anti-dumping measures is justified by conducting
an original investigation. In the investigation, the USDOC determines whether dumping exists
during the period of investigation. The United States International Trade Commission ("USITC")
concurrently determines whether the relevant US industry is injured by reason of the dumped
imports. When the USDOC finds dumping and the USITC finds that dumped imports caused injury
to the domestic industry, the USDOC issues an anti-dumping "order" imposing final measures. The
anti-dumping order provides the United States Government with the authority to require cash
d e p o s i t s a t a r a t e e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e m a r g i n o f d u m p i n g c a l c u l a t e d f o r e a c h k n o w n
producer/exporter at the time of importation and, as described below, to subsequently assess anti-
dumping duties on imports of the subject merchandise and eventually collect such duties
("liquidation").
13
2.3. The definitive amount of anti-dumping duty liability is determined subsequently, after the
importation of the merchandise, as a result of an annual "administrative review" which the USDOC
initiates upon request from interested parties. In the administrative review, the USDOC calculates
assessment rates with respect to the "entries" (imports) under review, and determines the cash
deposit that will be required as a security on future entries, until subsequent administrative
reviews are conducted with respect to those entries. At the conclusion of the administrative review
process, the USDOC instructs US Customs and Border Protection ("USCBP") to liquidate the entries
consistent with its determination; if the definitive duties owed are less than the level of the cash
deposits, USCBP returns the excess with interest to the importer. If the definitive duty liability is
greater than the cash deposits, the importer must pay the additional amount. In the event that no
administrative review is requested, entries are liqui dated at the cash deposit rate applicable at the
time of importation. Moreover, final assessment or collection ("liquidation") may be delayed by

9 United States' request for preliminary rulings (Annex C-5).
10 Viet Nam's response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings (Annex B-5).
11 United States' reply to Viet Nam's response to the US request for preliminary rulings (Annex C-6);
China's submission on the United States' request for preliminary rulings (Annex D-6); European Union's
comments on the US request for a preliminary ruling (Annex D-7).
12 Viet Nam's response to the United States' reply for the request for preliminary rulings (Annex B-6).
13 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 30-33 and 215-216 (quoting from, and referring to,
Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 2.5-2.8 and footnotes 10 and 11); United States'
first written submission, paras. 8-10. The US duty assessment system is also described in detail in Panel
Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), paras. 7.12-7.13.

challenges before US courts given that in such proceedings, parties may obtain an injunction
against liquidation for the duration of the court proceeding.14
2.4. The USDOC initiated its Shrimp investigation in January 2004 and issued an anti-dumping
order in February 2005. At the time of these Panel proceedings, it had completed seven
administrative reviews and conducted a first sunset review15 in which it determined that revocation
of the anti-dumping duty order would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of
dumping.
16
2.5. In the Shrimp proceedings, because Viet Nam has been designated by the USDOC as a non-
market economy ("NME"), the USDOC applied a rebu ttable presumption that all companies within
Viet Nam are essentially operating units of a single government-wide entity and, thus, should
receive a single anti-dumping duty rate (the "Viet Nam-wide entity rate"). Vietnamese
producers/exporters had to pass a "separate rate test" to receive a rate that was separate from
the Viet Nam-wide entity rate. Those producers/ex porters that did not establish that they were
separate from the Viet Nam-wide entity received the Viet Nam-wide entity rate.
2.6. In addition, in the original investigation and in each of the administrative reviews, in light of
the large number of Vietnamese respondents involved, the USDOC limited its examination and
determined individual dumping margins for a limited number of companies. The USDOC assigned
the companies who were not selected for individual examination and who demonstrated sufficient
independence from government control a "separate rate". In the original investigation, it assigned
a single "Viet Nam-wide entity" rate to the Vietnamese respondents who did not demonstrate
independence from government control. The Viet Nam-wide entity rate was determined on the
basis of information contained in the petition. The USDOC continued to apply the same Viet Nam-
wide entity rate in each of the administrative reviews.
2.7. Without prejudice to which segments of the Shrimp proceedings fall within the Panel's terms
of reference, the following table summarizes the rates that were assigned by the USDOC to the
Vietnamese producers/exporters involved:
Proceeding, date of final
determination, period of
investigation or review
Dumping margins17
Mandatory and
voluntary
respondents
Separate-rate respondents Viet Nam-wide
entity
Original investigation

8 December 2004 (amended
1 February 2005)
POI: 1 April 2003 to
30 September 2003
4 mandatory
respondents,
3 cooperated:
 CAMIMEX: 5.24%
 Minh Phu: 4.38%
 Seaprodex Minh
 Hai: 4.30%
4.57%

(weighted-average of margins for mandatory
respondents)
25.76%

(calculated on the
basis of facts
available)
First administrative review
and first new shipper
review

12 September 2007
POR:
16 July 2004 to
31 January 2006
3 mandatory
respondents, only
one cooperated:
Fish One: 0%
4.57%
(the separate rate was based on the
separate rate in the original investigation)
Except:
 Grobest: 0.00% (new shipper review rate)
25.76%

14 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 30-33 and 215-216 (quoting from, and referring to, Panel
Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 2.5-2.8 and footnotes 10 and 11; United States' written
submission, paras. 8-10; response to Panel question No. 68.
15 The United States refers to these as "segments" of the Shrimp proceeding.
16 Final likelihood-of-dumping determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in the sunset
review, Exhibit VN-14. Viet Nam's claims only pertain to the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination.
Although Viet Nam asserts that the order was continued, it only submits to the Panel the USDOC's likelihood-
of-dumping determination, and does not provide references to either the USITC's likelihood-of-injury
determination or the continuation of the order by the USDOC as a result of the USDOC and USITC
determinations.
17 The margins are those in the final determination or, where applicable, the amended final
determination.

Second administrative
review

9 September 2008
POR:

1 February 2006 to
31 January 2007
2 mandatory
respondents:
 Minh Phu: 0.01%
 CAMIMEX: 0.00%
4.57%
Except:
 Grobest: 0.00%
 Fish One: 0.00%
 Seaprodex Min Hai: 4.30%
(USDOC applied the same separate rate as
in the investigation, except for separate rate
respondents which had previously received
an individual margin)
25.76%
Third administrative
review

15 September 2009
POR: 1 February 2007 to
31 January 2008
3 mandatory
respondents:
 Minh Phu: 0.43%
 CAMIMEX: 0.08%
 Phuong Nam:
 0.21%
4.57%
Except:
 Fish One: 0.00%
 Grobest: 0.00%
 Seaprodex Min Hai: 4.30%
(USDOC applied the same separate rate as
in the investigation, except for separate rate
respondents which had previously received
an individual margin).
25.76%
Fourth administrative
review

9 August 2010
(amended
29 September 2010)

POR:
1 February 2008 to
31 January 2009
2 mandatory
respondents:
 Minh Phu: 2.95%
 Nha Trang: 4.89%
3.92%

(simple average of margin for mandatory
respondents)
25.76%
Fifth administrative review

12 September 2011
(amended 18 October 2011)
POR:
1 February 2009 to
31 January 2010
3 mandatory
respondents:
 CAMIMEX: 0.80%
 Minh Phu: 1.15%
 Nha Trang: de
minimis
1.03%
(weighted-average of margins for mandatory
respondents, excluding de minimis margin)
25.76%
Sixth administrative
review

11 September 2012
(amended 18 October 2012)
POR:
1 February 2010 to
31 January 2011
2 mandatory
respondents:
 Minh Phu: 0.53%
 Nha Trang: 1.23%
0.88%

(simple average of margins for mandatory
respondents)
25.76%
Seventh administrative
review

12 September 2013
POR:
1 February 2011 to
31 January 2012
2 mandatory
respondents and one
voluntary
respondent:
 Minh Phu: 0.00%
 Nha Trang: 0.00%
 Quoc Viet
(voluntary
respondent): 0.00%
0.00%

(weighted-average of margins for mandatory
respondents)
25.76%

2.8. The relevant facts are described in more detail in our findings.
2.9. Viet Nam makes claims with respect to the USDOC's final determinations in the fourth,
fifth and sixth administra tive reviews. Viet Nam's claims regarding these three administrative
reviews concern: (i) the use of zeroing in the calculation of dumping margins; (ii) the rate that
was assigned to certain Vietnamese producers who did not demonstrate sufficient independence
from government control and thus were deemed by the USDOC to be part of the so-called
"Viet Nam-wide entity"; and (iii) the USDOC's failure to revoke the anti-dumping order with
respect to certain respondent Vietnamese producers/exporters.
18 Moreover, Viet Nam also makes
claims with respect to the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination in the context of the
sunset review.
2.10. In addition, Viet Nam also makes "as such" claims with respect to the following measures:

18 With respect to the latter, Viet Nam also challenges the USDOC's treatment of a request for
revocation in the context of the third administrative review. (Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 49).
The United States argues that the third administrative review is not a measure at issue in this dispute
(United States' second written submission, para. 34 and footnote 32.) The Panel addresses the United States'
objection below, in paras. 7.356. -7.361.

a. The USDOC's "simple zeroing methodology"19 as applied in administrative reviews;
b. The USDOC's practice with respect to the rate that is assigned to certain
producers/exporters who do not demonstrate sufficient independence from government
control (the "NME-wide entity rate") in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports from
NMEs;
c. Section 129(c)(1) of the US Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA").
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. Viet Nam requests that the Panel find as follows:
20
a. The USDOC's simple zeroing methodology, as it applies in administrative reviews is, as
such, inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994;
b. The USDOC's application of the simple zeroing methodology in the calculation of
dumping margins in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994;
c. The USDOC's practice, in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports from NMEs, with
respect to the rate assigned to the "NME-w ide entity" comprised of producers/exporters
who do not demonstrate sufficient independence from government control is, as such,
inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4 and 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
d. The rate assigned by the USDOC in the fourth , fifth and sixth admini strative reviews to
the "Viet Nam-wide entity" comprised of Vietnamese producers/exporters who did not
demonstrate sufficient independence from government control is inconsistent with
Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4 and 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
e. Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA is inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1
and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
f. The USDOC's reliance on margins of dumping calculated with zeroing and failure to
properly establish the facts and conduct an objective evaluation in the first sunset review
is inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
g. The USDOC's failure to revoke the anti-dumping duty order with respect to companies
that have demonstrated the absence of dumping is inconsistent with Articles 11.1
and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
21
3.2. Viet Nam requests that the Panel exercise its discretion under Article 19.1 of the DSU to
suggest that the United States revoke the anti-dumping duty order: (i) in its totality, to comply
with all the Panel's findings, and (ii) with respect to Minh Phu and Camimex, should the Panel find

19 Viet Nam describes the "simple zeroing methodology" as the methodology by which the USDOC, when
calculating dumping margins on the basis of a comparison of a weighted-average normal value to individual
export transactions, disregards negative comparison results. (Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 54.)
21 In addition, Viet Nam included a number of other claims in its request for the establishment of a panel
which it did not pursue in its submissions to the Panel. In particular, Viet Nam's panel request included claims
with respect to the USDOC's limitation of the number of Vietnamese respondents selected for individual
examination in the proceedings at issue (see Viet Nam's panel request, pp. 5-7), which Viet Nam did not
pursue before the Panel. Moreover, while with respect to certain claims Viet Nam's panel request referred both
to the USDOC's use of practices in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews and to "the continued
application" or the application on a "continued and ongoing basis" of these practices "throughout the full course
of the shrimp anti-dumping proceeding", Viet Nam did not pursue any claims with respect to the latter in its
submissions. See also the Panel's Preliminary Ruling, in which the Panel notes Viet Nam's indication that it
would not pursue certain other claims set forth in its panel request.

that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Articles 11.1 and 11.2 in its treatment of these
companies' requests for revocation.22
3.3. The United States requests that the Panel reject Viet Nam's claims that the United States has
acted inconsistently with the covered agreements.23
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflecte d in their executive summaries, provided to the
Panel in accordance with paragraph 18 of th e Working Procedures adopted by the Panel
(see Annexes B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 and C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of China, the Euro pean Union, Japan, Norway and Thailand
24 are reflected in
their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of the Working Procedures
adopted by the Panel (see Annexes D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D-5). Ecuador did not submit written
or oral arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1. On 16 July 2014, the Panel submitted its In terim Report to the parties. On 28 July, the
United States submitted a written request for the review of precise aspects of the Interim Report.
Viet Nam did not submit any request for review and did not submit comments on the
United States' request for review. No meeting with the Panel was requested.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out the Panel's
response to the United States' request made at the interim review stage. The Panel modified
aspects of its Report in the light of the United States' comments where it considered it appropriate,
as explained below. As a result of the changes that we have made, the numbering of footnotes in
the Final Report has changed from the Interim Report. References to footnotes in this section
relate to this Report, except as otherwise noted.
6.3. The United States requested that the Panel revise the last sentence of paragraph 7.249 and
the first sentence of footnote 399, and add language to paragraph 7.344 to more accurately reflect
arguments it made before the Panel. The Panel amended the relevant paragraphs and footnote to
more completely reflect the arguments made by the United States.
6.4. The United States noted that in footnote 334, the Panel briefly discusses the decision of the
US Court of International Trade in Tembec v. United States . In light of the fact that the Panel
addresses Viet Nam's arguments concerning this decision in more detail in two other footnotes and
to avoid confusion, the United States requested that the Panel delete footnote 334 and rely on its
more complete discussion of the case in these ot her footnotes. In light of the United States'
comments, the Panel has moved footnote 334 and has reworded it to shorten it and to refer to the
more complete discussion of the same issue in footnotes 373 and 398.
6.5. The United States requested that the Pa nel delete footnote 391 of the Interim Report
because, it submits, this footnote appears to be based on an inaccurate characterization of its
argument and, moreover, is superfluous to the Panel's reasoning and to the resolution of the
dispute. Given that footnote 391 of the Interim Re port was not necessary to the Panel's resolution
of Viet Nam's claim, the Panel has deleted it as requested by the United States.

22 We note that Viet Nam included both requests under Article 19.1 of the DSU in its first written
submission (Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 356). In its second written submission, Viet Nam only
included the request that the Panel suggest the revocation of the order in its totality (Viet Nam's second
written submission, para. 139), but did not indicate that it was abandoning its request with respect to Minh Phu
and Camimex. Moreover, Viet Nam initially made the second request with respect to Minh Phu, Camimex and
Nha Trang Seafood. However, Viet Nam subsequently indicated that the inclusion of Nha Trang Seafood in the
request was an error. (See Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 73(e), para. 51.)
24 Thailand did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel but submitted responses to questions
from the Panel.

6.6. Finally, the Panel has made a number of change s of an editorial nature to improve the clarity
and accuracy of the Report or to correct typographical errors, certain of which were suggested by
the United States.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 General principles of treaty interpreta tion, the applicable standard of review and
burden of proof
7.1.1.1 Standard of review
7.1. Pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, a panel has to "make an objective assessment of the
matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements". As to the establishment of the facts in a case, this "objective assessment" has been
understood as mandating neither a de novo review (i.e. the complete repetition of the fact-finding
conducted by national authorities) nor "total deference" to domestic authorities (i.e. the simple
acceptance of their determination).
25
7.2. Although Article 11 of the DSU sets forth a general standard of review for all covered
agreements, Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent sets forth a specific standard of review
applicable to anti-dumping disputes, namely:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities' establishment of the facts wa s proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel
finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
7.3. Taken together, Article 11 of the DSU an d Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
establish the standard of review this Panel must apply with respect to both the factual and the
legal aspects of the present dispute.
7.4. Several panels and the Appellate Body have addressed the use of this standard of review in
cases where a panel is assessing whether competent authorities have complied with obligations in
agreements that require governments to set forth their reasoning and determinations in written
reports.
7.5. In US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada) , the Appellate Body stressed that
Article 11 requires panels to engage in a critical and searching analysis and that a panel must not
limit itself to assessing whether the investigating authority's findings are not unreasonable.
26 In
this regard the Appellate Body mentioned:
The panel's scrutiny should test whether the reasoning of the authority is coherent
and internally consistent. The panel must undertake an in-depth examination of
whether the explanations given disclose how the investigating authority treated the
facts and evidence in the record and whether there was positive evidence before it to
support the inferences made and conclusion s reached by it. The panel must examine
whether the explanations provided demonstrate that the investigating authority took

25 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 117.
26 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 113-140.

proper account of the complexities of the da ta before it, and that it explained why it
rejected or discounted alternative explanations and interpretations of the record
evidence. A panel must be open to the possibility that the explanations given by the
authority are not reasoned or adequate in the light of other plausible alternative
explanations, and must take care not to assume itself the role of initial trier of facts,
nor to be passive by "simply accept[ing] the conclusions of the competent
authorities".
27
7.6. The Appellate Body also recalled its indication in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on
DRAMS that a panel must "consider, in the context of the totality of the evidence, how the
interaction of certain pieces of evidence may justify certain inferences that could not have been
justified by a review of the individual pieces of evidence in isolation".28
7.7. Moreover, Article 17.5(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes clear that a panel is to
examine the matter referred to it by the DSB "based upon … the facts made available in
conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member".
Thus, the Panel must only consider evidence that was before the investigating authorities in
reviewing the authorities' analysis and conclusions. The Appellate Body has explained that in doing
such an analysis a panel should:
bear in mind its role as a reviewer of agency action, rather than as initial trier of fact.
Thus, a panel, examining the evidentiary basis for a subsidy determination should, on
the basis of the record evidence before th e panel, inquire whether the evidence and
explanation relied on by the investigating authority reasonably supports its
conclusions.29
7.8. In sum, a panel reviewing the determination of the investigating authority must evaluate the
determination being reviewed on the basis of what the investigating authorities knew at the time,
and determine whether the investigating authority has provided a reasoned and adequate
explanation of its conclusions, without conducting a de novo review or giving complete deference
to the investigating authority.
7.1.1.2 Treaty interpretation
7.9. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the dispute settlement system serves to clarify the
provisions of the covered agreements "in accordan ce with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law". It is generally accepted that the principles codified in Articles 31 and 32
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"), in particular, are such
customary rules.
7.10. As mentioned above, Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also provides that if a
panel finds that a provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, it shall uphold a measure that rest s upon one of those interpretations. According to
the Appellate Body, Article 17.6(ii) contemplates a sequential analysis whereby the panel applies
the customary rules of interpretation to the treaty and only after engaging in this exercise will a
panel determine whether the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) applies. 30 The Appellate Body
recognised that:

27 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93.
(emphasis original)
28 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 157.
(emphasis original)
29 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 188. (italics original;
underline added; footnotes omitted)
30 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 271.

the application of the rules of the Vienna Convention may give rise to an interpretative
range and, if it does, an interpretation falling within that range is permissible and
must be given effect by holding the measur e to be in conformity with the covered
agreement. The function of the second sentence is thus to give effect to the
interpretative range rather than to require the interpreter to pursue further the
interpretative exercise to the point where only one interpretation within that range
may prevail.
31
7.11. However, the Appellate Body has considered that the permissible range of interpretations
cannot include mutually contradictory results. In the Appellate Body's view "[i]t would be a
subversion of the interpretative disciplines of the Vienna Convention if application of those
disciplines yielded contradiction instead of coherence and harmony among, and effect to, all
relevant treaty provisions".
32
7.1.1.3 Burden of proof
7.12. The general principles applicable to the a llocation of the burden of proof in WTO dispute
settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO Agreement must assert
and prove its claim.
33 Therefore, as the complaining party, Viet Nam bears the burden of
demonstrating that the measures at issue taken by the United States are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of the GATT 1994 invoked by Viet Nam. The
Appellate Body has stated that a complaining party will satisfy its burden when it establishes a
prima facie case, namely a case which, in the absenc e of effective refutation by the defending
party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party.
34 Finally, it
is generally for the party asserting a fact to provide proof for its assertions.35
7.2 Preliminary ruling
7.13. On 31 July 2013, the United States submitted to the Panel a request for preliminary rulings
objecting to the inclusion of certain claims and measures in Viet Nam's panel request. Specifically,
the United States requested that the Panel find that the following measures and claims were not
within the Panel's terms of reference: (i) the sixth administrative review, as it was not listed as a
measure at issue in Viet Nam's request for consultations;
36 (ii) the "use of zeroing in original
investigations, new shipper reviews and changed circumstances reviews"37, as they were not listed
in Viet Nam's request for consultations; (iii) the claim set forth in Viet Nam's panel request under
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as the Vi enna Convention is not a covered agreement;
38 and
(iv) the claim set forth in Viet Nam's panel request relating to the US Statement of Administrative
Action ("SAA") accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, because the SAA does not have
any legal effect independent of an applicable US statute or regulation and is thus not a measure
susceptible to dispute resolution.
39 The United States requested that the Panel issue preliminary
rulings before the filing of the first written submissions of the parties.40

31 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 272.
32 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 273.
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
34 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 104.
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
36 United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 6.
37 United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 7.
38 United States' request for preliminary rulings, paras. 9-10.
39 United States' request for preliminary rulings, paras. 11-16.
40 United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 21.

7.14. Viet Nam responded to the United States' request for preliminary rulings on 5 August 2013,
and each party submitted further written comments to respond to each other's comments on the
US request.
41 The Panel also invited the third parties to submit any written comments they might
have in response to the views expressed by the parties.42
7.15. In its response to the United States' request and in its comments, Viet Nam asked the Panel
to find that the sixth administrative review was within its terms of reference. 43 With respect to the
other objections raised by the United States, Viet Nam indicated that it was not pursuing the
remaining claims cited in the US request for preliminary rulings, namely those with respect to the
USDOC's use of zeroing in original investigations, new shipper reviews and changed circumstances
reviews;
44 the claim under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention; 45 and the claim relating to
the SAA.46
7.16. The Panel issued its Preliminary Ruling to the parties and third parties on
26 September 2013 and indicated that, subject to comments that parties may submit at the
interim review stage, the ruling would form an integral part of its Final Report. In its Preliminary
Ruling, the Panel dismissed the US request that it find that the sixth administrative review is
outside its terms of reference.47 The Panel declined to make any findings with respect to the three
remaining objections raised by the United States, in light of Viet Nam's indication that it was not
pursuing the corresponding claims. 48 While the Panel reserved its right to revisit the decisions
contained in the preliminary ruling during the course of proceedings, the parties have not asked it
to do so. Accordingly, the Panel maintains its resolution of the United States' objections as
contained in the preliminary ruling, which is attached as Annex C of this Report.
7.3 Viet Nam's claims with respect to zeroing
7.3.1 Introduction
7.17. Viet Nam's claims with respect to zeroing pertain to the "simple zeroing" methodology used
by the USDOC in the context of administrative reviews. Viet Nam alleges that the USDOC, when
calculating dumping margins on the basis of a comparison of a weighted-average normal value to
individual export transactions, disregards negative comparison results (those for which the
individual export transaction price exceeds the weighted-average normal value).
49
7.18. Viet Nam requests the Panel to find that:50
a. The USDOC's "simple zeroing" methodology in administrative reviews is "as such"
inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994; and
b. The application by the USDOC of the "simple zeroing" methodology in the fourth, fifth
and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.51

41 United States' reply to Viet Nam's response to the US request for preliminary rulings
(13 August 2013); Viet Nam's response to the United States' reply for the request for preliminary rulings
(16 August 2013). The Preliminary Ruling, at para. 1.2, incorrectly states that Viet Nam submitted its response
to the United States' reply on 19 August 2013.
42 China and the European Union submitted comments on the United States' preliminary rulings request
on 14 August 2013.
43 Viet Nam's response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings, paras. 9-10; response to
the United States' reply for the request for preliminary rulings, paras. 4-7.
44 Viet Nam's response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 3.
45 Viet Nam's response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 4.
46 Viet Nam's response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings, para. 5.
49 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 54.
50 Viet Nam's panel request included a challenge against the zeroing methodology "as such and as
applied in a continued and ongoing basis" (Viet Nam's panel request, p. 3). However, Viet Nam has not
developed or pursued a claim against the application of the zeroing methodology on a "continued and ongoing
basis" in its submissions to the Panel. We therefore limit our analysis to the "as such" and "as applied" claims
developed by Viet Nam.

7.19. We examine each claim in turn, starting with Viet Nam's "as such" claim.
7.3.2 Zeroing "as such"
7.3.2.1 Introduction
7.20. We start with Viet Nam's claim that the zeroing methodology used by the USDOC in
administrative reviews is, "as such", inconsistent with 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
52
7.21. In examining Viet Nam's claim, we shall first examine whether Viet Nam has established the
existence of the zeroing methodology as a measure that may be challenged "as such". If we are
satisfied that Viet Nam has properly established the existence of such a measure, we shall then
evaluate the parties' arguments regarding the WTO-consistency of that measure.
7.3.2.2 Whether Viet Nam has established th e existence of the zeroing methodology as
a measure which may be challenged as such
7.3.2.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.3.2.2.1.1 Viet Nam
7.22. Viet Nam submits that various panel and Appellate Body reports have found that the zeroing
methodology is an established norm which may be the subject of an "as such" claim and that the
Appellate Body has concluded at least twice that the use of zeroing in administrative reviews is "as
such" inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
53 Viet Nam further argues that a measure
found by the Appellate Body to be "as such" incons istent with a covered agreement is not specific
to the facts of any particular dispute; by their nature, "as such" claims are of general and
prospective application and an Appellate Body finding of violation in respect of such a claim
concerns the authority's on-going failure to bring the practice into conformity with clearly
established obligations.
54
7.23. According to Viet Nam, the zeroing methodology still exists as a measure which may be
challenged "as such" despite the fact that the USDOC modified its calculation methodology.
Viet Nam contends that panels do make rulings on measures that have been modified or repealed
and refers to the panel in US – Poultry (China) as an example of a panel making such a ruling.
Viet Nam also argues that the USDOC could easily re-start applying the zeroing methodology in
administrative reviews because it has the authority to do so under US law. Finally, Viet Nam
contends that the United States continued to use the zeroing methodology after Viet Nam
requested consultations with the United States in this dispute, in the final results of the
sixth administrative review, published on 11 September 2012.
55
7.3.2.2.1.2 United States
7.24. The United States replies that Viet Nam has failed to demonstrate as a matter of fact that
the United States maintains a measure of general and prospective application that requires the use
of zeroing. According to the United States, Appellate Body and panel findings in prior disputes
regarding the existence, "as such", and precise content of the zeroing measure cannot constitute
conclusive evidence for the purpose of this dispute. Moreover, the facts underlying this dispute are
different from the facts in prior disputes because the USDOC has changed its calculation
methodology for determining dumping margins and now grants offsets for non-dumped
comparisons.
56 The United States submits that, by the time Viet Nam requested the establishment

51 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 356; second written submission, para. 139.
52 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 91; second written submission, para. 4.
53 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 67-68 (referring to Panel Reports, US – Continued Zeroing,
Reports, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 88, 166, and 169; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 133-136).
54 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 69.
55 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 10-15; opening statement at the second meeting
of the Panel, para. 19.
56 United States' first written submission, paras. 205-209.

of this Panel, there was no "zeroing" measure as found in previous WTO reports and nothing that
required the use of that methodology. According to the United States, the USDOC has, since
April 2012, issued numerous determinations in which it has granted offsets equal to the amount by
which normal value is less than export price on non-dumped sales, including in the most recent
administrative review under the Shrimp order.
57
7.25. The United States also contests Viet Nam's argument that the USDOC could easily re-
impose the zeroing methodology. It notes that the USDOC's changes in methodology were made
after extensive consultations with appropriate congressional committees, private sector advisory
committees, and public comment regarding the proposed modifications. The United States adds
that Viet Nam has not provided a single example of a USDOC practice that was found to be WTO-
inconsistent and changed pursuant to section 123(g) being subsequently "easily re-imposed". The
United States also submits that the situation before this Panel is different from the situation in
US – Poultry (China) where the panel decided to rule on the repealed measure because it
recognized that that measure could allow the repetition of potentially WTO-inconsistent conduct.
58
7.3.2.2.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.26. The European Union submits that its experience indicates that the United States no longer
systematically resorts to zeroing in all cases since April 2012, but considers that the Panel's
resolution of this question will ultimately depend on a close analysis of all the evidence before the
Panel.59
7.27. Japan submits that the Panel should examine whether the modified calculation
methodology also applies to remaining unliquidated entries. Japan also notes that in the Federal
Register notice announcing the modification of its calculation methodology, the USDOC indicated
that it "retains the discretion on a case-by-case basis, to apply an alternative methodology, as
appropriate".
60
7.28. Thailand submits that even if the zeroing methodology used prior to 2012 has changed and
thus can no longer be challenged "as such" in dispute settlement proceedings, it is possible that
the old methodology has now been replaced by a new zeroing methodology that could, in itself, be
challenged "as such" in dispute settlement proceedings. The Panel may also wish to consider
whether, if it finds that the old practice or methodology no longer exists, there is a new practice or
methodology that would separately meet the test for being susceptible to challenge on an "as
such" basis.
61
7.3.2.2.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.29. Viet Nam's claim raises the issue of when, and under what conditions, an unwritten rule or
norm may be challenged "as such". Neither the DSU nor the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes
criteria for determining when measures can be challenged "as such". However, we can find
relevant guidance in previous WTO dispute settlement decisions where claims of this nature have
been considered. Thus, we believe it is useful, before analysing whether the zeroing methodology
can be challenged "as such" in the present dispute, to recall how "as such" challenges have been
examined in previous WTO dispute settlement case s. The following summary will also be relevant
for our subsequent consideration of Viet Nam's "as such" claims concerning the NME-wide entity
rate practice and concerning Section 129(c)(1).
7.30. In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body concluded that, in
principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for
purposes of dispute settlement, and noted that, in WTO dispute settlement, panels have examined
not only particular acts applied in specific situations, but also "acts setting forth rules or norms

57 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 39-41.
58 United States' second written submission, paras. 102-104.
59 European Union's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 12.
60 Japan's response to Panel question No. 2, paras. 2-3. Japan refers to requests for the establishment
of a panel submitted by Korea in WT/DS464/4, dated 6 December 2013; and by China in WT/DS471/5, dated
16 December 2013.
61 Thailand's response to Panel question Nos. 1 and 2, p. 1.

that are intended to have general and prospective application". 62 The Appellate Body explained
that, allowing claims against measures "as such" pr otects "the security and predictability needed
to conduct future trade" and also "serves the purpose of preventing future disputes by allowing the
root of WTO-inconsistent behaviour to be eliminated".
63 In the same dispute, the Appellate Body
also considered whether there are any limitations as to the types of measures that may be the
subject of an "as such" challenge under the DSU or the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Recalling its
reasoning in US – 1916 Act that panels have jurisdiction to consider legislation "as such" under
both agreements, the Appellate Body found that, although most of the measures subject "as such"
to dispute settlement were legislation, a broad range of measures could be submitted "as such" to
dispute settlement.
64 The Appellate Body considered that the language in Article 17.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement contains "no threshold requirement … that the measure in question be of a
certain type" and that the phrase "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" in Article 18.4
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement encompasses "the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms
and standards adopted by Members in connec tion with the conduct of anti-dumping
proceedings".
65 Following this analysis, the Appellate Body concluded that there is "no reason for
concluding that, in principle, non-mandatory measures cannot be challenged 'as such'".66
7.31. Subsequently, in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , the Appellate Body
further clarified that the relevant issue is not whether the measure subject to an "as such"
challenge is a binding legal instrument within the domestic legal system of a Member, but, rather,
whether it is "a measure that may be challenged within the WTO system".
67 In that dispute, the
Appellate Body considered that the USDOC's Sunset Policy Bulletin (SPB) was a measure which
could be challenged "as such" in spite of its non-binding character:
In our view, the SPB has normative value, as it provides administrative guidance and
creates expectations among the public and among private actors. It is intended to
have general application, as it is to apply to all sunset reviews conducted in the
United States. It is also intended to have prospective application, as it is intended to
apply to sunset reviews taking place after its issuance. Thus, we confirm – once
again – that the SPB, as such, is subject to dispute settlement.
68
7.32. The Appellate Body further observed that:
By definition, an "as such" claim challenges laws, regulations, or other instruments of
a Member that have general and prospective application, asserting that a Member's
conduct – not only in a particular instance that has occurred, but in future situations
as well – will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member's WTO obligations. In
essence, complaining parties bringing "as such" challenges seek to prevent Members
ex ante from engaging in certain conduct. The implications of such challenges are
obviously more far-reaching than "as applied" claims.
69
7.33. In US – Zeroing (EC) , the Appellate Body considered whether unwritten rules or norms
could be challenged "as such". Recalling its findings in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews regarding the types of measures that
could be challenged "as such", the Appellate Body found that there is no basis to conclude that
rules or norms can be challenged "as such" only if they are expressed in the form of a written
instrument.
70 The Appellate Body cautioned, however, that "a panel must not lightly assume the
existence of a "rule or norm" constituting a measure of general and prospective application,

62 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 81-82.
63 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 82.
64 The Appellate Body recalled, in this respect, its statement in Guatemala – Cement I that, in the
practice established under the GATT 1947, a "measure" may be "any act of a Member, whether or not legally
binding, and it can include even non-binding administrative guidance by a government". (Appellate Body
Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 85, referring to Appellate Body Report,
Guatemala – Cement I, footnote 47 to para. 69.)
65 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 86-87.
66 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 88.
67 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 187.
68 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 187. (footnotes
omitted)
69 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 172.
70 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 193.

especially when it is not expressed in the form of a written document". 71 The Appellate Body
explained that, when a challenge is brought agains t a rule or norm that is not expressed in the
form of a written document, "the very existence of the challenged 'rule or norm' may be
uncertain".
72 The Appellate Body indicated that the complainant must establish the following to
meet the particularly high burden of establishing the existence of a rule or norm of general and
prospective application that is not expressed in a written document:
In our view, when bringing a challenge against such a "rule or norm" that constitutes
a measure of general and prospective application, a complaining party must clearly
establish, through arguments and supporting evidence, at least that the alleged "rule
or norm" is attributable to the responding Member; its precise content; and indeed,
that it does have general and prospective application. It is only if the complaining
party meets this high threshold, and puts fo rward sufficient evidence with respect to
each of these elements, that a panel would be in a position to find that the "rule or
norm" may be challenged, as such. This evidence may include proof of the systematic
application of the challenged "rule or norm". Particular rigour is required on the part of
a panel to support a conclusion as to the existence of a "rule or norm" that is not
expressed in the form of a written document. A panel must carefully examine the
concrete instrumentalities that evidence the existence of the purported "rule or norm"
in order to conclude that such "rule or norm" can be challenged, as such.
73
7.34. This reasoning has been subsequently applied by panels considering "as such" challenges in
US – Zeroing (Japan) , US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) and US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) .74 Those panels
further observed that a measure may be found to have general and prospective application if it
reflects a deliberate policy, going beyond the mere repetition of the application of that measure in
specific instances.
75
7.35. In this dispute, following the guidance of those prior decisions, we shall consider whether
Viet Nam has met its burden of proof with respect to the existence of the unwritten zeroing
methodology as a rule or norm which can be challe nged "as such". In particular, we shall consider
whether Viet Nam has established: (i) that th e zeroing methodology is "attributable" to the
United States, (ii) the "precise content" of th e zeroing methodology, and (iii) that the zeroing
methodology does have "general and prospective application".
7.36. With respect to the precise content of the alleged norm or rule, and attribution to the
United States, we recall that Viet Nam refers to the calculation of dumping margins in
administrative reviews, whereby the USDOC, in aggregating intermediate comparison results to
determine the numerator, "zeroes" or disregards a ll negative results where export price is higher
than normal value.
76 Viet Nam also posits that the zeroing methodology is applied by the USDOC,
which forms part of the United States Government. The United States does not contest that
Viet Nam has established the content of the zero ing methodology, and that that methodology is
attributable to the United States.
7.37. Turning to the issue of whether Viet Nam has demonstrated that the zeroing methodology
has "general and prospective application", we note that Viet Nam refers to previous disputes in
which panels or the Appellate Body found that the zeroing methodology in administrative reviews
was a norm or practice that could be subject to an "as such" claim.
77 Viet Nam argues that "[a]n
inconsistency found by the Appellate Body to be an as such violation relates to the authority's use
of the practice itself and is not specific to the facts of any particular dispute".
78 Viet Nam also
submits that the United States bears the burden of demonstrating that the panel's factual findings

71 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 196.
72 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 197.
73 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198. (emphasis original)
74 Panel Reports, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 7.47-7.59; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 7.28-
7.42 and 7.84-7.97; and US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), paras. 7.110-7.111.
75 Panel Reports, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 7.52; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 7.40
and 7.95; US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), para. 7.112.
76 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 54.
77 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 67-68 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US – Zeroing
(Japan), paras. 88, 166 and 169; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 133-136; and Panel Reports, US –
78 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 69.

and conclusions in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) with respect to the WTO-inconsistency of this
methodology, which the United States did not appeal, are in error.79
7.38. As an initial matter, Viet Nam appears to be claiming that findings of panels and the
Appellate Body in previous disputes are sufficient to establish, in the present dispute, the existence
of the zeroing methodology as applied in administrative reviews as a norm of general and
prospective application, and that the burden has now shifted to the United States, which should
demonstrate that these previous factual findings are not applicable in the present dispute.
7.39. We are not persuaded by this argument. We recall that it is a well-established rule in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings that "the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof".
80 Hence, in our view, the factual findings in
previous decisions do not relieve a complainant of the burden of establishing the facts in a
subsequent dispute it initiated. We note that the Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion in a
prior zeroing dispute, when it found that a complaining party may not discharge its burden of proof
with respect to the establishment of the facts simply by referring to past decisions. The
Appellate Body observed:
As an initial matter, we note the European Communities' reference to adopted panel
and Appellate Body reports in which the existence of the United States' zeroing
methodology, as an unwritten norm of general and prospective application, was found
to exist in the context of both original investigations and periodic reviews. Factual
findings made in prior disputes do not determine facts in another dispute. Evidence
adduced in one proceeding, and admissions made in respect of the same factual
question about the operation of an aspect of municipal law, may be submitted as
evidence in another proceeding. The finders of fact are of course obliged to make their
own determination afresh and on the basis of all the evidence before them. But if the
critical evidence is the same and the factua l question about the operation of domestic
law is the same, it is likely that the finder of facts would reach similar findings in the
two proceedings. Nonetheless, the factual fi ndings adopted by the DSB in prior cases
regarding the existence of the zeroing methodology, as a rule or norm, are not
binding in another dispute.81
7.40. We further note that the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) similarly considered that the
factual findings of prior panels and the Appellate Body did not "alleviate Viet Nam's burden of
establishing, before us, that the U.S. zeroing methodology is a norm of general and prospective
application".82
7.41. Viet Nam further argues that "the extent of [the burden of proof] and the party bearing this
burden will vary based on the particular circum stances of a proceeding" and that it does not
"bear[] the burden of establishing for a second time the facts on which the findings and
conclusions of the panel in [ US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) ] were based". According to Viet Nam, it is
now up to the United States, which did not appeal the findings and conclusions of the panel in
US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) , to demonstrate that those findings and conclusions "are not correct or
are not applicable in the instant proceeding".
83
7.42. We disagree with Viet Nam. In our view, the fact that the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam)
found that Viet Nam had established the existence of the zeroing methodology as a measure of
general and prospective application under the sa me anti-dumping order does not affect the
fundamental rule regarding allocation of the burden of proof in the present dispute. Viet Nam is
therefore bound to provide relevant evidence prov ing the facts it asserts in the present dispute
and cannot rely on previous panel and Appellate Body decisions to establish, as a matter of fact,
the existence of the zeroing methodology as a norm or rule of general and prospective application.

79 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 2.
80 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14. See also above, Section 7.1.3, "Burden
of Proof".
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 190. (emphasis added, footnote omitted)
82 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), footnote 163.
83 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 2-3.

7.43. In addition to relying on findings in previous disputes, Viet Nam also submits factual
evidence in support of its allegation that the zeroing methodology applied by the USDOC in
administrative reviews is a rule or norm of general and prospective application. First, Viet Nam
provides the Panel with evidence that the zeroin g methodology was used in administrative reviews
one to six of the Shrimp order.
84 The United States does not contest that zeroing was used in the
three administrative reviews at issue in the present dispute, reviews four to six. 85 Moreover, in
response to a question by the Panel, the United States indicates that it "does not dispute that a
number of the dumping margins derived in the original investigation and in the first
three administrative reviews were calculated using the so-called 'zeroing' methodology".86
7.44. Second, Viet Nam provides the Panel with evidence indicating that the USDOC applies
zeroing in anti-dumping proceedings more generally. Some of the Issues and Decision Memoranda
submitted by Viet Nam contain statements pointing to the general and prospective nature of the
zeroing methodology. 87 In addition, Viet Nam submits an affidavit from Ms Anya Naschak
discussing the USDOC's use of zeroing in the three administrative reviews at issue. The affidavit
also includes a general overview of the standard computer programme used by the USDOC in anti-
dumping cases, indicating that the structure and language of this computer programme implement
zeroing in original investigations and administrative reviews.88 The United States has not contested
the description provided in the Naschak affidavit.

84 Viet Nam submits the final determinations and Issues and Decision Memoranda in the original
investigation and the first, second and third administrative reviews (Exhibit VN-72). The Issues and Decision
Memoranda accompanying the final determinations in these three reviews indicate that the USDOC used
zeroing to calculate margins of dumping (see first administrative review, Comment 3, pp. 14-15; second
administrative review, Comment 5, pp. 12-13; and third administrative review, Comment 3, pp. 10-13).
Finally, Viet Nam has put on the record the USDOC's final determinations in administrative reviews four to six,
at issue in the present dispute, which confirm that the USDOC did not allow non-dumped sales to offset the
amount of dumping found with respect to other sales (see Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying
the final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13, Comment 10, p. 33; Issues and
Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18,
Comment 3, p. 29; and Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the
sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-20, Comment 3, p. 26). Viet Nam also submits evidence demonstrating
that the USDOC used model zeroing in the original investigation (Issues and Decision Memorandum
accompanying the final determination in the original investigation, Exhibit VN-04, p. 12).
85 United States' first written submission, paras. 210-211, and opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, paras. 42-44. As discussed below, the United States submits, however, that zeroing was not used in
the seventh administrative review under the Shrimp order.
86 United States' response to Panel question No. 37, para. 123.
87 For instance, in the Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the
fourth administrative review, the USDOC observed that "consistent with the Department's interpretation of the
Act described above, in the event that any of the export transactions examined in this review are found to
exceed normal value, the amount by which the price exceeds normal value will not offset the dumping found in
respect of other transactions", Exhibit VN-13, p. 35. In the Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying
the final determination in the fifth administrative review, the USDOC states that "[b]ecause no dumping
margins exist with respect to sales where NV is equal to or less than EP or CEP, the Department will not permit
these non-dumped sales to offset the amount of dumping found with respect to other sales. The CAFC has held
that this is a reasonable interpretation of Section 771(35) of the Act" (Exhibit VN-18, p. 29). In the Issues and
Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the sixth administrative review, the USDOC
states, inter alia, that "the CIT recently sustained the Department's explanation for using zeroing in
administrative reviews while not using zeroing in certain types of investigations" (Exhibit VN-20, p. 26).
88 Naschak affidavit, Exhibit VN-25, paras. 5-6. In her affidavit, Ms Naschak introduces herself as an
International Trade Analyst employed at the law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt, and Mosle LLP, and who
was previously employed as an analyst in the USDOC. Under the heading "Overview of the Standard Computer
Programming for Antidumping Cases", Ms Naschak notes:
The USDOC requires foreign respondents to provide extensive sales and factors of production
information for the specific period under examination. Data must be provided for both the U.S.
and the factors of production. The USDOC has in place standard computer programs that
manipulate these databases to execute every aspect of the USDOC's margin calculation. The
USDOC's computer programs are divided into specific 'sections' of programming code, each of
which executes a specific aspect of the USDOC's dumping margin calculations.
The USDOC computer programs are all written and executed using SAS, which is both a software
application and a computer programming language. The SAS programming language works only
in the SAS software application, and it is the tool by which the programmer communicates the
calculations and procedures that he or she wants the SAS application to execute. The structure
and language of the computer programming the USDOC uses to derive the overall weighted-
average dumping margin are basically the sale in an original investigation and administrative

7.45. The United States submits, however, that the facts in this dispute are different from the
facts in the US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) dispute because, effective April 2012, the USDOC changed its
practice for calculating dumping margins in administrative reviews in response to Appellate Body
findings, and now "grants offsets for non-dumped comparisons (i.e., does calculations without the
'zeroing' methodology) in various types of proceedings", including administrative reviews.
89 As
evidence in support of this assertion, the United States submits a Notice of Final Modification in
which the USDOC announces that it is modifying its calculation methodology, which "was
challenged as being inconsistent with the WTO … GATT 1994 and the … Anti-Dumping Agreement
in several disputes".
90 The United States further submits that, consistent with the Final
Modification, the USDOC granted offsets for non-dumped transactions in the
seventh administrative review of the Shrimp order 91 and that, since April 2012, it has issued
"numerous determinations" under other anti-dumping orders in which it has granted such offsets
in various contexts, including original investigations, administrative reviews, and sunset reviews.92
7.46. Viet Nam does not dispute that the USDOC modified its calculation methodology in
administrative reviews. Nor does Viet Nam contest that the USDOC did not apply the zeroing
methodology when calculating dumping margins in the seventh administrative review under the
Shrimp order or in other administrative reviews under other orders.
93

reviews, although minor differences in language occur. These differences do not, however, affect
the language and procedures used to implement what is commonly referred to as "zeroing".
89 United States' first written submission, paras. 203, 206 and 208; opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, paras. 39-41; second written submission, para. 99.
90 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and
Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final Modification (hereafter "Final Modification"),
Exhibit US-39, p. 8101.
91 United States' first written submission, para. 208; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 41. In its preliminary and final determinations in the seventh administrative review, the USDOC
indicated that it "applied the assessment rate calculation method adopted in Final Modification for Reviews, i.e.,
on the basis of monthly average-to-average comparisons using only the transactions associated with that
importer with offsets begin provided for non-dumped comparisons". (Preliminary determination in the seventh
administrative review, Exhibit US-29, p. 15703; final determination in the seventh administrative review,
Exhibit US-30, p. 56216.)
92 United States' first written submission, para. 208; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 40; response to Panel question No. 54, para. 4. The United States refers to a number of USDOC
determinations in administrative reviews and sunset reviews which, it argues show that the USDOC acted
consistently with the Final Modification by not zeroing in administrative reviews and by not relying on margins
of dumping calculated with zeroing in likelihood-of-dumping determinations in the context of sunset reviews
(United States' first written submission, footnote 274, referring to Stainless Steel Bar From India: Final Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,337 (7 June 2013), Exhibit US-40,
p. 34337; Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, and Italy: Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews; 2010-2011, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,415 (10 Dec. 2012); Exhibit US-41; and United States'
first written submission, footnote 275, referring to Low Enriched Uranium From France: Final Results of the
Expedited Second Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,100 (9 April 2013),
Exhibit US-42; Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products From India, Indonesia, the People's Republic of
China, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine; Final Results of the Expedited Second Sunset Reviews of the
Antidumping Duty Orders, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,703 (12 March 2013), Exhibit US-43; Lemon Juice From Argentina:
Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Suspended Antidumping Duty Investigation, 77 Fed.
Reg. 73,021 (7 Dec. 2012), Exhibit US-44; Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Belarus, Indonesia, Latvia,
Moldova, Poland, People's Republic of China and Ukraine: Final Results of the Expedited Second Sunset
Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,140 (23 Nov. 2012), Exhibit US-45; Honey From the
People's Republic of China: Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed.
Reg. 59,896 (1 Oct. 2012), Exhibit US-46; and Certain Activated Carbon From the People's Republic of China:
Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,420 (6 June 2012),
Exhibit US-47.
93 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 1-2. In its response, Viet Nam submits,
however, that, in the preliminary determination in the eighth administrative review, the USDOC resorted to the
alternative average-to-transaction methodology provided for in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and used zeroing, and notes that the Appellate Body has not ruled specifically on the application of zeroing in
such a context. We note, however, that Viet Nam's claims are limited to the simple zeroing methodology and
that Viet Nam does not challenge the use of zeroing in the context of the third methodology provided for under
Article 2.4.2. Hence, we do not address the question of the consistency of zeroing in this context, and consider
that even if Viet Nam demonstrated that the USDOC did use zeroing in applying the third methodology in the
eight administrative review, this would be irrelevant to our consideration of whether the simple zeroing
methodology as used in administrative reviews is a measure of general and prospective application.

7.47. Viet Nam contends, however, that, despite the Final Modification and the fact that zeroing
was not used in the seventh administrative review of the Shrimp order, "the USDOC's zeroing
methodology still exists as a measure that can be challenged 'as such'". 94 Viet Nam also argues
that panels routinely make rulings on measures that have been modified or repealed and submits
that this dispute is similar to the US – Poultry (China) case where the panel decided to rule on a
measure which expired two days before the complainant's first written submission, because it
considered that the respondent Member had not conceded the WTO-inconsistency of the measure
and the repealed measure could be easily re-imposed.
95 Viet Nam finally submits that the USDOC
continued to use the zeroing methodology after the implementation of the Final Modification, since
the final results of the sixth administrative revi ew, published on 11 September 2012, utilized the
zeroing methodology.
96
7.48. In our view, Viet Nam's arguments are somewhat self-contradictory. On the one hand,
Viet Nam argues that the measure "still exists as a measure that can be challenged 'as such'",
thereby conveying that, in Viet Nam's view, zeroin g in administrative reviews still exists as a
measure of general and prospective application. On the other hand, Viet Nam contends that
"[p]anels routinely make rulings on measures that have been modified or repealed", thus
suggesting that the measure does not exist any longer, having been modified or repealed.
7.49. We note that in the Final Modification submitted as evidence by the United States, the
USDOC indicates, inter alia, that:
In reviews, except where the Department de termines that application of a different
comparison method is more appropriate, the Department will compare monthly
weighted-average export prices with monthly weighted-average normal values, and
will grant an offset for all such comparisons that show export price exceeds normal
value in the calculation of the weighted-average margin of dumping and antidumping
duty assessment rate.
97
7.50. In the Final Modification, the USDOC also observes that the methodology which it modifies
was found inconsistent, both "as such" and "as applied", with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement by the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) , US –
Zeroing (Japan), US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) and US – Continued Zeroing (EC). It indicates that,
following these adverse rulings, the USTR info rmed the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that the
United States intended to comply with its WTO obligations in these disputes. The USDOC also
explains that "[i]n adopting this Final Modification for Reviews , the Department's intention is to
apply a comparison methodology in reviews that parallels the WTO-consistent methodology the
Department currently applies in original investigations".
98
7.51. In our view, Viet Nam's arguments fail to appreciate the significance of the Final
Modification for its assertion that the zeroing methodology is a measure of general and prospective
application. To us, the fact that the USDOC has modified its calculation methodology and ceased to
apply the zeroing methodology in administrative reviews is a significant element to take into
consideration because it speaks directly to the question of the very existence of this methodology
as a measure of general and prospective application. The Final Modification indicates that the

94 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 10.
95 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 11-14. Viet Nam refers to the Panel Report in
US – Poultry (China), para. 7.55. Viet Nam also recalls that, while the US – Poultry (China) panel made
findings concerning the WTO-inconsistency of the measure, it considered that it would not be appropriate to
make recommendations.
96 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 15. In response to a question by the Panel,
Viet Nam also indicates that the 2012 Final Modification did not apply to entries which remained unliquidated
as of the date of its entry into force (i.e. 16 April 2012), as illustrated by the fact that it did not apply to entries
subject to the sixth administrative review. (Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 53, para. 3; comments
on the United States' response to Panel question No. 53, para. 1.)
97 Final Modification, Exhibit US-39, p. 8102. The Final Modification also announces a modification of the
USDOC practice in sunset reviews, indicating that in sunset review determinations, the USDOC will no longer
rely on dumping margins that were calculated using zeroing.
98 Final Modification, Exhibit US-39, p. 8102. The USDOC modified its calculation methodology in original
investigations, to eliminate zeroing under the weighted-average to weighted-average methodology, in 2006;
see Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping
Investigation; Final Modification, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (27 December 2006), Exhibit US-38, referred to in
United States' first written submission, footnote 273).

USDOC decided to apply a modified methodology, ex cept where it determines that application of a
different comparison method is more appropriate. 99 This decision took effect with respect to all
reviews for which the preliminary determination is issued after 16 April 2012. 100 Viet Nam
requested the establishment of a panel on 20 December 2012 and the Panel was established on
27 February 2013.101 Hence, in our view, as of the date of Viet Nam's panel request and as of now,
the USDOC's simple zeroing methodology, as used by the USDOC in administrative reviews, does
not exist as a measure of general and prospective application.
7.52. The United States does not contest that, as argued by Viet Nam, dumping margins in the
sixth administrative review were calculated using the zeroing methodology. However, the fact that
the USDOC used zeroing in the final results of the sixth administrative revi ew, i.e. after the Final
Modification, does not in our view establish that the measure continues to exist as a measure of
general and prospective application. We observe that, pursuant to the Final Modification, the
modifications to USDOC practice took effect with respect to administrative reviews in which the
preliminary determinations were issued after 16 April 2012.
102 Since the preliminary determination
in the sixth administrative review was issued on 7 March 2012, the USDOC was still acting
pursuant to its previous practice, consistent with the effective date established for its modified
practice. We therefore remain of the view that, as of 16 April 2012, and, in any event, as of the
present date, the USDOC's simple zeroing methodol ogy, as used by the USDOC in administrative
reviews, does not exist as a measure of general and prospective application.
103
7.53. Concerning Viet Nam's reference to US – Poultry (China), we note that the question at issue
in that dispute was whether the panel should rule on the consistency with the covered agreements
of the repealed measure. However, in that dispute, there was no controversy between the parties
regarding the existence of the measure itself before it was repealed. 104 In the present dispute, the
parties disagree as to whether the measure claimed by Viet Nam to be WTO-inconsistent is a rule
or norm of general and prospective application which can be challenged "as such". This Panel is
not, therefore, in the same situation as the panel in US – Poultry (China) : we are not trying to
determine whether it would be appropriate for us to rule on the WTO-consistency of an expired
measure, but rather, whether Viet Nam has established that this measure can be challenged "as
such".

99 See Final Modification, Exhibit US-39, pp. 8101-8102:
Prior to this Final Rule and Final Modification for Reviews, the Department typically has compared
normal value and export price using the average-to-transaction ("A–T") method, which involved
a comparison of the weighted-average normal value to the export price of individual transactions
for comparable merchandise. When aggregating the results of these comparisons to determine
the weighted average margin of dumping in a review, the Department did not offset the results
of the comparisons for which export price was less than normal value by the results of
comparisons for which export price exceeded normal value. When determining importer-specific
assessment rates in a review, the Department similarly aggregated the results of importer-
specific comparison results and did not offset the comparison results for which export price was
less than normal value by the comparison results for which export price exceeded normal value.
…
After considering all of the comments submitted, the Department is adopting the proposed
changes to its methodology for calculating weighted average margins of dumping and
antidumping duty assessment rates to provide offsets for non-dumped comparisons when using
monthly A–A comparisons in reviews, in a manner that parallels the WTO-consistent
methodology the Department currently applies in original antidumping duty investigations. In
reviews, except where the Department determines that application of a different comparison
method is more appropriate, the Department will compare monthly weighted-average export
prices with monthly weighted-average normal values, and will grant an offset for all such
comparisons that show export price exceeds normal value in the calculation of the weighted-
average margin of dumping and antidumping duty assessment rate.
(footnotes omitted)
100 Final Modification, Exhibit US-39, pp. 8101 and 8113.
101 See above, para. 1.3.
102 Final Modification, Exhibit US-39, p. 8101.
103 Moreover, we refer to our finding below that the USDOC's use of zeroing in the three administrative
reviews at issue is inconsistent "as applied" with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of
the GATT 1994. In our view, our findings of inconsistency with respect to the application of simple zeroing in
the three administrative reviews at issue adequately address Viet Nam's concerns regarding the final results of
the sixth administrative review.
104 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.54-7.57.

7.54. In any event, we are not convinced that the zeroing methodology "can be easily re-
imposed" by the USDOC. Viet Nam provides no evidence indicating that the USDOC intends to
revert to this methodology. Moreover, the Final Modification shows that, as argued by the
United States, the USDOC's changes in methodology were made after extensive consultations with
different stakeholders, and in order to implement prior DSB rulings and recommendations.
105 This
indicates to us that, contrary to what is argued by Viet Nam, such modifications are not easily
made under the US system. In the absence of ev idence to the contrary, we cannot assume that
the United States will "easily re-impose" the use of simple zeroing in administrative reviews.
Moreover, having modified its practice to comply with its WTO obligations, we must assume that
the United States will continue to comply with its WTO obligations in good faith.
7.55. We conclude, therefore, that Viet Nam ha s failed to establish the existence of the alleged
measure (simple zeroing methodology used by the USDOC in administrative reviews) as a rule or
norm of general and prospective application. Consequently, we do not consider the parties'
arguments concerning the consistency of the alleged measure with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.56. Therefore, we find that Viet Nam did not establish that the USDOC's simple zeroing
methodology in administrative reviews is inconsistent "as such" with Article 9.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.3.3 Zeroing "as applied" in the administrative reviews at issue
7.3.3.1 Introduction
7.57. Viet Nam requests the Panel to find that the application of the zeroing methodology to
calculate dumping margins for the individually-examined respondents in the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
106
7.58. We shall first consider whether Viet Nam has demonstrated that the USDOC applied zeroing
in the three administrative reviews at issue. If we find that Viet Nam has met its burden of proof in
this respect, we shall then consider whether the application of the zeroing methodology in the
fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with the United States' obligations
under Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.3.3.2 Whether Viet Nam has established th at the zeroing methodology was applied in
the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews
7.3.3.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.3.3.2.1.1 Viet Nam
7.59. Viet Nam submits that the USDOC applied the zeroing methodology when calculating the
dumping margins of the mandator y respondents in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative
reviews of the Shrimp order. Viet Nam indicates that the USDOC's final determinations in those
reviews confirm that the zeroing methodology wa s applied. Viet Nam further argues that the
affidavit prepared by Ms Naschak, provided by Viet Nam to the Panel, confirms the application of
the zeroing methodology in those administrative reviews.
107 Viet Nam notes that the United States
does not appear to dispute that the USDOC used the zeroing methodology in the administrative
reviews at issue.
108

105 United States' second written submission, para. 102. See also Final Modification, Exhibit US-39,
pp. 8103-8113.
106 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 356; second written submission, para. 139.
107 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 59-60.
108 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 3.

7.3.3.2.1.2 United States
7.60. The United States does not contest Viet Nam's allegation that the USDOC applied the
zeroing methodology when calculating dumping margins at issue. The United States contends,
however, that the application of zeroing is not inconsistent with the covered agreements.
109
7.3.3.2.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.61. We proceed to examine the evidence submitted by Viet Nam in support of its allegation that
the USDOC applied the zeroing methodology in the calculation of dumping margins for mandatory
respondents in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews.
7.62. As noted in the preceding section of this Report, the Naschak affidavit submitted by
Viet Nam discusses the USDOC's use of zeroing in the three administrative reviews at issue, when
calculating the margins of dumping for the mandatory respondents in those reviews – Minh Phu,
Nha Trang and Camimex.
110 The affidavit attaches relevant excerpts of the USDOC's computer
"logs" (printouts of the computer programming instructions) and "outputs" (printouts of the
dumping calculations and of the databases that were run through the programme) for two of these
respondents, Nha Trang and Minh Phu in the fourth , fifth and sixth admini strative reviews. The
affidavit explains, inter alia, that the programming language used in calculating the margins for
both Minh Phu and Nha Trang shows that only positive comparison results were used to calculate
the overall margins and directs the Panel's attention to certain lines of computer code in the "logs"
that implement the instruction to disregard NV (normal value) – EP (export price) comparisons
where the EP exceeds the NV, in the calculation of Nha Trang and Minh Phu's margins of dumping.
The affidavit also directs the Panel to the relevant parts of the "logs" confirming that the negative
comparison results were excluded in calculating the dumping margins, concluding in this respect
that "no U.S. sales where the export price exceeded normal value were included in the calculation
of the overall margin [of dumping]".
111
7.63. Viet Nam has also provided the Panel with the Issues and Decision Memoranda that
accompany each of the USDOC's final determinations in the three administrative reviews at issue.
This evidence confirms that the UDSOC applied the zeroing methodology in these reviews. In the
Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the
fourth administrative review, the USDOC states that "consistent with the Department's
interpretation of the Act … in the event that any of the export transactions examined in this review
are found to exceed normal value, the amount by which the price exceeds normal value will not
offset the dumping found in respect of other transactions".
112 Likewise, in the Issues and Decision
Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fifth administrative review, the USDOC
observes that "[b]ecause no dumping margins exist with respect to sales where NV is equal to or
less than EP or CEP, the Department will not permit these non-dumped sales to offset the amount
of dumping found with respect to other sales".
113 Finally, in the Issues and Decision Memorandum
accompanying the final determination in the sixth administrative review, the USDOC refers to its
"interpretations of section 771(35) of the Act to permit zeroing in average-to-transaction
comparisons, as in the underlying administrative review", and indicated that "in the event that any
of the U.S. sales transactions examined in this review are found to exceed NV, the amount by
which the price exceeds NV will not offset the dumping found in respect of other transactions".114
7.64. The United States does not challenge the evidence submitted by Viet Nam. We recall that,
when a party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the
burden then shifts to the other party who must adduce sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption.
115 In the present dispute, Viet Nam has submitted sufficient evidence indicating that

109 United States' first written submission, paras. 210-211; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 42-44.
110 Naschak affidavit, Exhibit VN-25, p. 1.
111 Naschak affidavit, Exhibit VN-25, paras. 22, 34, and 46.
112 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fourth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-13, p. 35.
113 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fifth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-18, p. 29.
114 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the sixth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-20, pp. 26-27.
115 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.

the USDOC applied the zeroing methodology in the calculation of dumping margins of individually-
examined respondents in the administrative reviews at issue. As the United States did not provide
arguments or evidence to rebut the presumption raised by Viet Nam, we conclude that Viet Nam
has demonstrated that the USDOC applied simple zeroing in the calculation of margins of dumping
of individually-investigated respondents in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews.
7.3.3.3 Whether the applicatio n of zeroing in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative
reviews is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2
of the GATT 1994
7.3.3.3.1 Introduction
7.65. We now examine whether the application by the USDOC of the zeroing methodology to
calculate margins of dumping of individually-e xamined respondents in the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative review is inconsistent the United States' obligations under Article 9.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.3.3.3.2 Main arguments of the parties
7.3.3.3.2.1 Viet Nam
7.66. Viet Nam submits that the Appellate Body has consistently found that the USDOC's use of
zeroing in administrative reviews is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
116 Viet Nam observes that the Appellate Body repeatedly
rejected the same arguments that are again being made by the United States in this dispute and
urges this Panel to follow the clear and consistent decisions by the Appellate Body.
117 Viet Nam
argues that the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement both define the concepts of
"dumping" and "margin of dumping" with regard to the product under investigation as a whole and
do not allow for differentiation among sub-groups or categories. According to Viet Nam,
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which defines du mping as when "products of one country are
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products",
refers to the product as a whole. Furthermore, Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which
applies to the entire Agreement, defines dumping with clear reference to the "product" that is
subject to the proceeding. Viet Nam recalls that , based on these provisions, the Appellate Body
has repeatedly found that the concepts of "dumping" and "margin of dumping" are defined in
relation to the product under investigation as a whole, and cannot be found to exist only for a
type, model, or category of that product.
118
7.67. Viet Nam submits that Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 explicitly provide that margins of dumping may not be greater than the margin of
dumping for the product as a whole. This, according to Viet Nam, means that when the
administering authority makes use of multiple comparisons at an intermediate stage, it must
aggregate the results of all intermediate comparisons, including negative comparison results, for
purposes of calculating the final dumping margin. Viet Nam argues that, by systematically
disregarding negative comparison results, the US DOC's simple zeroing practice necessarily results
in dumping margins that are greater than the margins for the product as a whole.
119

116 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 79-91 and 93 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US –
Zeroing (EC), para. 133; US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 175-176; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 103,
109, and 139; US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 312 and 316; US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
paras. 195 and 197); second written submission, paras. 12-17. We note that, in its first written submission,
Viet Nam discusses the consistency of the zeroing methodology with the covered agreements in the context of
its argumentation with respect to its "as such" claim and refers to that discussion in its "as applied" claim (see
Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 93). In its second written submission, Viet Nam jointly discusses the
legal consistency "as such" and "as applied" of the zeroing methodology (see Viet Nam's second written
submission, paras. 12-17).
117 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
118 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 71-78. Viet Nam refers in particular to the Appellate Body
Reports in US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 115 and US – Softwood Lumber V, paras. 93 and 96.
119 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 79-84; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 24-27; second written submission, paras. 12-17.

7.3.3.3.2.2 United States
7.68. The United States argues that the text an d context of the relevant provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, interpreted in accordance with customary rules of interpretation, support its
interpretation that the concepts of dumping and margins of dumping have meaning in relation to
individual transactions and, therefore, there is no obligation to aggregate multiple comparison
results in assessment proceedings to arrive at an aggregated margin of dumping for the product as
a whole.
120 The United States contends that it is permissible to interpret the terms of "dumping"
and "margin of dumping" as referring to specific export transactions, and not only to the "product
as a whole". 121 The United States submits that Members' rights and obligations stem from the
texts of the covered agreements, and not from panel or Appellate Body reports and urges the
Panel to remain faithful to the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and to find that the
US interpretation rests on a permissible interpretation of that Agreement.122
7.69. The United States argues that Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of
the GATT 1994 do not require the provision of offsets in assessment proceedings and do not
provide textual support for the concepts of "product as a whole" and "negative dumping". 123 The
United States submits that the terms upon which Viet Nam's interpretation rests are absent from
the text of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The
United States is of the view that, as recognized by several panels, averaging of export prices is not
required to calculate a margin of dumping under Ar ticle 9.3 and, therefore, an interpretation that
permits the existence of transaction-specific margins of dumping is supported by the text of that
provision. The United States is of the view that, as long as the margin of dumping is properly
understood as applying at the level of individual transactions, there is no tension between the
exporter-specific concept of dumping as a pricin g behaviour and the importer-specific remedy of
payment of dumping duties.
124
7.3.3.3.3 Main arguments of the third parties
7.70. China submits that, in light of the consistent and well-founded decisions by the
Appellate Body, to the extent that Viet Nam has established the use of the zeroing methodology in
the three administrative reviews, the application of zeroing in those reviews is also inconsistent
with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.125
7.71. The European Union submits that the issue of zeroing has been extensively litigated in the
WTO and does not warrant repeated scrutiny. The Panel should therefore deal with it in a summary
manner and uphold Viet Nam's "as applied" claims.126
7.72. Recalling previous Appellate Body jurisprudence with respect to zeroing in administrative
reviews, Japan submits that the Panel should find that the zeroing methodology, as it relates to
the use of simple zeroing in administrative reviews, is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.127
7.73. While not taking a position on the facts of this case, Norway agrees with Appellate Body
rulings in previous cases that the use of all forms of zeroing in all forms of proceedings is
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.128

120 United States' first written submission, para. 210.
121 United States' opening statement to the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 42-44. The United States
refers in particular to Panel Reports, US – Zeroing (EC), US – Zeroing (Japan), US – Softwood Lumber V
(Article 21.5), and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico). See United States' first written submission, paras. 210-241,
notably at footnote 285.
122 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 44.
123 United States' first written submission, paras. 219-232.
124 United States' first written submission, paras. 234-240. The United States refers to Panel Reports,
US – Zeroing (EC), paras. 7.201, 7.204-7.207, and 7.220-7.223; US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 7.196, 7.198-
7.199; and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 7.124.
125 China's third-party submission, para. 5.
126 European Union's third-party submission, para. 6.
127 Japan's third-party submission, paras. 3-12.
128 Norway's third-party submission, paras. 13-32.

7.3.3.3.4 Evaluation by the Panel
7.74. Our analysis begins with the text of the relevant provisions relied upon by Viet Nam in its
claims. Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads, in relevant parts:
The amount of the anti-dumping duty shal l not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.
7.75. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides as follows:
In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped
product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in
respect of such product. For the purposes of this Article, the margin of dumping is the
price difference determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.
7.76. Although formulated differently, Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2
of the GATT 1994 impose similar obligations, as they both provide that the amount of the anti-
dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dump ing. The main question that the Panel needs to
address is whether the term "margin of dumping" referred to in both provisions must be calculated
for the "product as a whole", as argued by Viet N a m , o r w h e t h e r i t m a y b e c a l c u l a t e d o n a
transaction-specific basis, as submitted by the United States. As observed by parties and
third parties, this controversy is not novel.
7.77. In prior disputes, the Appellate Body has cons istently held that the text of Article 2.1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as the text of Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, indicate clearly that
the term "dumping" is used in relation to the product as a whole, and not in relation to individual
export transactions. The Appellate Body has also found that the "margin of dumping" is used in
relation to the dumped "product as a whole" and must be determined on the basis of all export
transactions of a given exporter or foreign producer. The Appellate Body also stressed on various
occasions that the terms "dumping" and "margin of dumping" are exporter-specific concepts.
129
The Appellate Body has clarified that, while an investigating authority may choose to undertake
multiple comparisons or multiple averaging at an intermediate stage to establish margins of
dumping, it is only on the basis of aggregating all these intermediate values that the investigating
authority can establish margins of dumping for the product as a whole.
130
7.78. We further note that, according to the Appellate Body, these definitions of "dumping" and of
the "margin of dumping" apply throughout the Ag reement, including under Article 9.3, and under
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. It therefore follo ws that the amount of anti-dumping duties
assessed pursuant to those provisions cannot exceed the margin of dumping as established for the
"product as a whole". In other words, the margin of dumping established for an exporter or foreign
producer operates as a ceiling on the total amount of anti-dumping duties that can be levied on
the entries of the product from that exporter or producer.
131 Accordingly, the Appellate Body found
that the zeroing methodology applied by the USDOC in administrative reviews is inconsistent with
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because it
results in the levy of an amount of anti-dumping duty that exceeds an exporter's margin of
dumping. The Appellate Body observed that:
when applying "simple zeroing" in periodic reviews, the USDOC compares the prices of
individual export transactions against monthly weighted average normal values, and
disregards the amounts by which the expo rt prices exceed the monthly weighted
average normal values, when aggregating the results of the comparisons to calculate
the going-forward cash deposit rate for the exporter and the duty assessment rate for
the importer concerned. Simple zeroing thus results in the levy of an amount of anti-
dumping duty that exceeds an exporter's margin of dumping, which, as we have

129 Appellate Body Reports, US – Zeroing (EC), paras. 127-129; US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 111-112
and 150; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 83-95; and US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 282-283.
130 Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber V, paras. 92-100; US – Zeroing (EC), para. 126;
US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 122; US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 108-110, 115,
and 151; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 97-99; and US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 276-287.
131 Appellate Body Reports, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 130; US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 155-156; US –
Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 96 and 102; and US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 286-287 and 314.

explained above, operates as the ceiling for the amount of anti-dumping duty that can
be levied in respect of the sales made by an exporter.132
7.79. The Appellate Body has also held that Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, when interpreted in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law, as required by Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, do not admit of another interpretation as far as the issue of zeroing is concerned and
therefore that zeroing does not rest upon a "permissible interpretation" of the text of the relevant
provisions.
133
7.80. We have carefully considered and assessed the arguments made by the parties in the
present dispute. We note that the very same arguments that the United States makes before us
were rejected by the Appellate Body in prior disputes, in which it concluded that the very same
measure which is now before us, namely the zeroing methodology as applied by the USDOC in
administrative reviews, is inconsistent with Articles 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
134 We are also mindful of the Appellate Body's admonition that
"following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but it is what
would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same". 135 In US – Stainless
Steel (Mexico), the Appellate Body explained:
Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach significance to
reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in
dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body
in subsequent disputes. In addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national
regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account
the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute
settlement system. Ensuring "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement
system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent
reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in
a subsequent case.
136
Following an objective assessment of the matter, and after a careful review of the findings
discussed above, we see no reason not to rely on the interpretation of the relevant provisions and
on the reasoning developed by the Appellate Body in relation to the issue of zeroing in these prior
disputes.

7.81. We find, therefore, that the application by the USDOC of the simple zeroing methodology to
calculate the dumping margins of mandatory respondents in the fourth, fifth and sixth
administrative reviews of the Shrimp order is inconsistent with United States' obligations under
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
7.4 Viet Nam's claims regarding the "NME-wide entity" rate practice
7.4.1 Introduction
7.82. Viet Nam makes claims with respect to what it terms the USDOC's "NME-wide entity rate
practice". Viet Nam includes within this practice: (i) the USDOC's presumption, in anti-dumping
proceedings – including original investigations and administrative reviews – involving imports from
NMEs, that all companies within the designated NME country are essentially operating units of a

132 Appellate Body Report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 133. See also Appellate Body Reports,
US – Zeroing (EC), paras. 132-133; and US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 315-316.
133 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 189.
134 Appellate Body Reports, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 133; US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 176; US –
Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 139. Moreover, in two of those disputes, the Appellate Body also ruled that the
zeroing methodology applied by the USDOC in administrative reviews was "as such" inconsistent with
Articles 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. See Appellate Body Reports,
US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 166 and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 133-134.
135 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188.
136 Appellate Body Report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160.

single, government-wide entity and the assignment of a single anti-dumping duty rate to that
entity; and (ii) the manner in which this anti-dumping rate is determined, distinct from the
separate rate, on the basis of facts available. Viet Nam also challenges the application of this NME-
wide entity rate practice in the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews. Specifically,
Viet Nam claims that:
a. the USDOC's "NME-wide entity rate practice" is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 6.10,
9.2, 9.4, 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and
b. the application by the USDOC of the "NME-wide entity rate practice" in the fourth, fifth
and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4, 6.8 and
Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.83. In its request for the establishment of a panel, Viet Nam also included a challenge to "the
treatment of the Vietnam-wide entity in the original investigation and the first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews, … to the extent that these determinations
demonstrate the USDOC's continued and ongoing use of this practice throughout the full course of
the shrimp anti-dumping proceeding".
137 In its first written submission, Viet Nam claimed that "the
United States' application of the Vietnam-wide entity practice on a continued and ongoing basis
through the course of the shrimp anti-dumping pr oceedings is inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement".
138 As Viet Nam has not further developed the claim regarding "continued and ongoing
use" of the practice in question in its arguments to the Panel, we shall not consider it in this Report
and make no findings in this respect.
7.84. The United States asks the Panel to reject all of Viet Nam's claims of inconsistency.
139
7.85. We shall start our analysis with Viet Nam's claims that the NME-wide entity rate practice is
inconsistent "as such" with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4, 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. We shall then turn to Viet Nam's clai ms that the application of the NME-wide entity
rate practice in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with those same
provisions.
7.4.2 Claims with respect to the NME-wide entity rate practice "as such"
7.4.2.1 Introduction
7.86. Viet Nam claims that the "NME-wide entity rate practice" is a measure which may be
challenged "as such" and which is inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4, 6.8 and Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
140 The United States submits that Viet Nam has failed to establish the
existence of the NME-wide entity rate practice as a measure of general and prospective application
that may be challenged "as such" under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 141 The United States also
asks the Panel to reject Viet Nam's claims of inconsistency.142
7.87. In view of the parties' disagreement on this issue, we need to first determine whether
Viet Nam has established that the "NME-wide entity rate practice" it has defined is a measure of
general and prospective application which is susceptible to an "as such" challenge. If we are
satisfied that Viet Nam has done so, we shall then turn to Viet Nam's claims that this rule or norm
is, as such, inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4, 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

137 Viet Nam's panel request, p. 5.
138 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 42.
140 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 94 and 356; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 8-9; second written submission, para. 19.
141 United States' first written submission, para. 145; opening statement at the first meeting of the

7.4.2.2 Whether Viet Nam has established th e existence of the NME-wide entity rate
practice as a measure which may be challenged "as such"
7.4.2.2.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.4.2.2.1.1 Viet Nam
7.88. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's standa rd practice is articulated in its Antidumping
Manual, which demonstrates that, in anti-dumping proceedings involving NME countries, the
USDOC starts with the rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country are
essentially operating units of a single, government-wide entity and, thus, should receive a single
anti-dumping duty rate, the NME-wide rate. A ccording to Viet Nam, the USDOC retains broad
discretion on the method for calculating the NME-wide entity rate, but in most investigations and
administrative reviews, the USDOC finds that the NME-wide entity did not cooperate, thus
justifying the use of adverse facts available. Fi rms seeking a "separate" (or "all others") rate,
based on the weighted-average of the rates for the individually-investigated respondents, must
pass a "separate rate test" whereby they must establish an absence of government control, both in
law and in fact, with respect to exports. Hence, unlike cases involving market economy countries
where all non-investigated firms receive the "all others" rate, non-investigated firms in NME may
receive the "all others" rate only if they satisf y established criteria. According to Viet Nam, the
Antidumping Manual makes it clear that the USDOC's NME-wide practice is applied on a
generalized and prospective basis.
143
7.89. Viet Nam further submits that Policy Bulletin 05.1, on Separate-Rates Practices and
Application of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations involving Non-Market Economy
Countries, articulates the same presumption for NME countries as the Antidumping Manual and
also sets forth a requirement that exporters affirmatively demonstrate independence from
government control in order to be eligible for a rate that is separate from the NME-wide entity.
Viet Nam submits that Policy Bulletin 05.1, which sets forth the USDOC's policy, is of general and
prospective effect, as its purpose is to provide ce rtainty and predictability to NME exporters on the
requirements for a separate rate.
144 Viet Nam further argues that the determinations relevant to
the Shrimp order, from the original investigation to the sixth review, also constitute relevant
evidence because they describe the "long-standing policy" of presuming government ownership of
all firms in NME investigations. 145 In Viet Nam's view, the evidence regarding the NME-wide entity
policy is more compelling than in the zeroing disputes, because the Panel has before it multiple
written documents explaining the exact nature of the policy, as well as its general and prospective
effect.146 Viet Nam clarifies that it is not challenging the Antidumping Manual and Policy
Bulletin 05.1 as measures themselves, but consider s that both documents serve as evidence that
the practice or policy in question amounts to a measure of general and prospective application.147
7.4.2.2.1.2 United States
7.90. The United States replies that Viet Nam has not established that the alleged NME-wide
entity rate practice exists as a measure which can be challenged "as such". Viet Nam does not
explain how a "practice" can set out a rule or norm of general and prospective application, and has
not demonstrated that the USDOC invariably applies the alleged practice. According to the
United States, the Antidumping Manual stipulates, inter alia, that it is "for the internal training and
guidance of Import Administration (IA) personnel only" and that it "cannot be cited to establish
DOC practice", which means that it cannot serve as a basis to argue that the USDOC has adopted
an approach that must be followed for any partic ular future proceeding. The United States argues
that the use of the Manual is not required under domestic law or under the WTO Agreements and,
thus, Viet Nam is attacking a non-required step undertaken by the United States to promote
transparency. The United States contends that Viet Nam has not pointed to a principle of US law

143 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 95-106; opening statement at the first meeting of the
144 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 10; response to Panel
question No. 7(b), para. 23.
145 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 11; response to Panel
question No. 7(b), para. 24.
146 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 19; response to Panel question No. 7(b), paras. 20-24.
147 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 7(b), para. 19; opening statement at the second meeting
of the Panel, para. 6.

that supports the conclusion that the Antidumping Manual requires the USDOC to do something; in
fact, Viet Nam itself acknowledges that the USDOC retains broad discretion on the method for
calculating the NME-wide entity rate. According to the United States, the Antidumping Manual does
not require calculating that rate on the basis of facts available. The United States concludes that
Viet Nam has failed to make a prima facie case that the so-called NME-wide entity rate is a
measure that can be challenged "as such".
148
7.91. The United States further argues that, since Viet Nam has made clear that it is not alleging
that either the Antidumping Manual or Policy Bulletin 05.1 are themselves measures that Viet Nam
challenges "as such", the issue is solely whether Viet Nam has shown the existence of an unwritten
measure that may be challenged "as such", based on an alleged practice adopted by the
United States. According to the United States, Viet Nam has failed to establish the existence of
such an unwritten norm.
149 The United States also notes that Policy Bulletin 05.1 applies only to
original investigations initiated on or after the date of publication of the notice announcing this
policy (5 April 2005). As a consequence, the Bulletin did not require the USDOC to follow the
approaches set forth therein during the covered reviews or generally during administrative reviews
of products from NME countries.
150
7.4.2.2.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.92. China submits that the form of the measure is not decisive when considering whether a
measure may be subject to an "as such" challenge. In this dispute, the NME-wide entity rate
practice is expressed in written documents, in particular in Policy Bulletin 05.1, which leaves no
uncertainty as to the content of the NME-wide entity rate practice. Moreover, this document is
identical in its material effects to the Sunset Policy Bulletin that the Appellate Body found to be a
norm of general and prospective application in prior disputes.
151
7.93. The European Union submits that, in the light of the Appellate Body report in EC –
Fasteners (China) , the Panel will have to consider, in particular, whether Viet Nam has
demonstrated the existence and precise content of the "as such" measure at issue, as well as the
existence of a presumption.
152
7.4.2.2.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.94. Neither party contests, and it is well-established in WTO dispute settlement practice, that it
is possible to challenge certain measures "as such", i.e. independently of their application in
specific instances. The United States argues, however, that Viet Nam has not established that the
alleged NME-wide entity rate practice exists as a measure of general and prospective application.
7.95. In the present dispute, Viet Nam challenges a "practice" or "policy" of the USDOC, an
agency of the United States Government. According to the United States, an administrative
practice standing alone is not itself a measure for the purpose of the DSU, but it may be relevant
evidence in a dispute settlement proceeding. The United States also submits that the Appellate
Body has not, to date, pronounced upon the issue of whether a "practice" may be challenged, as
such, as a measure in WTO dispute settlement.
153
7.96. We note that the USDOC itself uses alternatively the words "practice" and "policy" when
referring to the existence of an NME-wide entity and to the single rate assigned to that entity.154 In
our view, however, the particular terms used to describe the alleged measure are not
determinative155 and it does not matter whether the alleged measure is a "practice" or a "policy".

148 United States' first written submission, paras. 140-145; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 24-27; second written submission, paras. 66 and 68.
149 United States' second written submission, paras. 64-66.
150 United States' second written submission, para. 67.
151 China's third-party statement, paras. 3-7.
152 European Union's third-party written submission, para. 22.
153 United States' response to Panel question No. 3, paras. 1 and 3.
154 See, for instance, Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the
original investigation, Exhibit VN-04, pp. 29-30. The USDOC also refers to the NME-wide entity rate as a
"methodology" (see also USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24).
155 The Appellate Body has observed that the scope of "laws, regulations and administrative procedures"
challenged in WTO dispute settlement "must be determined for purposes of WTO law and not simply by

Rather, what we need to assess is whether Viet Nam has demonstrated, in casu, that the alleged
measure is a norm or rule of general and prospective application that can be challenged "as such"
in the WTO dispute settlement system.
7.97. As we observed above
156, neither the DSU nor the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes
criteria for determining when measures can be challenged "as such". However, this issue was
considered in previous WTO dispute settlement cases, which have outlined criteria to assess
whether a rule or norm amounts to a rule or norm of general and prospective application which
can be challenged "as such". Thus, we recall that , while there is no threshold requirement that the
measure challenged "as such" be of a certain type
157, the burden of establishing the existence of a
rule or norm of general application – which rests on the party alleging that such a measure exists
– may be different depending on the type of measur e at issue. This burden will be more easily
discharged when the measure at issue is set forth in a legislative act than in situations where the
existence of the alleged measure is not expressed in a written document. The Appellate Body has
explained that this burden is particularly high in the latter case.
158
7.98. Viet Nam challenges the NME-wide entity rate "practice" or "policy" as an unwritten rule or
norm, rather than challenging a particular legislative or administrative act setting forth that
practice or policy.
159 Written documents referred to by Viet Nam as describing the NME-wide entity
rate practice – the Antidumping Manual and Policy Bulletin 05.1 – are to be used as relevant
evidence in assessing the existence of the al leged measure, but are not themselves being
challenged as measures. This being the case, consistent with the standard set out above 160, we
shall consider whether Viet Nam has established that: (i) this practice or policy is "attributable" to
the United States, (ii) the "precise content" of this practice or policy, and (iii) that this practice or
policy does have "general and prospective application".
7.99. With respect to the first criterion, i.e. attribution to the United States, we have already
remarked above that the NME-wide entity rate is a practice or policy used by the USDOC, which is
an agency of the United States Government. Th ere appears to be no controversy between the
parties that the practice or policy is "attributable" to the United States.
7.100. Viet Nam's arguments regarding the precise content of the NME-wide entity rate practice
or policy pertain to two elements. The first element concerns the application by the USDOC in anti-
dumping proceedings (e.g. original investigations and administrative reviews) involving NME
countries of a rebuttable presumption that, in such countries, all companies belong to a single,
NME-wide entity, and the assignment of a single rate to that entity. The second element concerns
the manner in which the rate assigned to the NME-wide entity is determined, in particular the use
of facts available. We note that, in its arguments to the Panel, Viet Nam has put more emphasis on
the former than on the latter. We shall examine these two elements separately.
7.101. With respect to the first element, turning to the evidence submitted by Viet Nam, we first
consider Chapter 10 of the Antidumping Manual, entitled "Non-Market Economies".
161 In
Section III ("Separate Rates"), it provides that:

reference to the label given to various instruments under the domestic laws of each WTO Member. This
determination must be based on the content and substance of the instrument, and not merely on its form or
nomenclature". Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, footnote 87.
156 See paras. 7.29. -7.34. of this Report.
157 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 88. Moreover, the
Appellate Body found, at para. 81 that, in principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be
a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement.
158 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198.
159 We recall that Viet Nam clarified that it is not advancing claims against the Antidumping Manual or
Policy Bulletin 05.1 per se. Viet Nam also suggests that the Panel should apply the legal standard used by the
Appellate Body for determining when an unwritten rule or norm can be challenged "as such". (See Viet Nam's
response to Panel question No. 7(a)-(b), para. 19; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 8; and second written submission, para. 19.) We further note that the United States refers to the same
standard in arguing that Viet Nam has failed to demonstrate the existence of a measure of general and
prospective application. (United States' first written submission, paras. 141-145; opening statement at the
160 See paras. 7.29. -7.34. of this Report.
161 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24.

Individual dumping margins are automatically assigned to exporters in market-
economy country cases. In NME cases, however, exporters must pass a separate rate
test to receive a rate that is separate from the NME-wide rate. Those exporters that
do not or cannot demonstrate that they are separate from the government-wide entity
receive the NME-wide rate.
162
7.102. The Antidumping Manual further explains that "[i]n proceedings involving NME countries,
the Department begins with a rebuttable presumpt ion that all companies within the country are
essentially operating units of a single, government-wide entity and, thus, should receive a single
antidumping duty rate (i.e., an NME-wide rate)". 163 Pursuant to the "separate rate test", exporters
in NMEs are accorded separate, company-specific margins "if they can provide sufficient proof of
an absence of government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to export activities".
164 In
Section IV ("The NME-Wide Rate"), the Antidumping Manual states again that:
The Department begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the
NME country are essentially operating units of a single, government-wide entity and
should receive a single anti-dumping rate.165
7.103. The description of the NME-wide entity rate and separate rates in Chapter 10 of the
Antidumping Manual concerns anti-dumping "proceedings" or "cases". This suggests to us that this
practice or policy applies to any of the various segments leading to an anti-dumping measure and
subsequent implementation. Section IV describes the application of the rate in original
investigations and administrative reviews.
166 Hence, pursuant to the Antidumping Manual, the
NME-wide entity rate practice or policy applies throughout an anti-dumping proceeding.
7.104. In our view, Chapter 10 of the Antidumping Manual is evidence of the first element of the
alleged NME-wide entity rate practice or policy, i.e. that in anti-dumping proceedings involving
NMEs, the USDOC applies a rebuttable presumption that all exporters in the NME country are part
of a single NME-wide entity and assigns a single anti-dumping duty rate to all exporters who do
not rebut this presumption by establishing that they operate, de jure and de facto, independently
from the government with respect to their export activities.
7.105. Turning to the question whether this el ement of the alleged measure has "general and
prospective application", we first note that Chapter 10 of the Antidumping Manual uses the terms
"practice" or "methodology" when referring to the treatment of NMEs in anti-dumping proceedings.
Moreover, on its face, the Antidumping Manual appears to describe a generally applicable practice.
Nothing in Chapter 10 suggests that there may be circumstances or situations in which the USDOC
would not "start with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within a NME country" belong to
a single, NME-wide entity and would not assign a single rate to that entity. The United States does
not contest that the "practice" described in Chapter 10 of the Antidumping Manual is applied in all
proceedings involving NME countries. Nor has the United States provided the Panel with a single
example of an anti-dumping proceeding involvin g an NME where the USDOC did not start with the
rebuttable presumption regarding the existence of an NME-wide entity and go on to assign to that
entity a single anti-dumping duty rate. Chapte r 10 of the Antidumping Manual suggests, in our
view, that this "practice" or "methodology" has general and prospective application because it
applies in all anti-dumping proceedings involving NMEs and makes it possible to anticipate the
future conduct of the USDOC in such anti-dumping proceedings.

162 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 3. (footnote omitted)
163 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 3.
164 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 4. In Section III, the Manual stipulates
that evidence supporting, though not requiring, a finding of de jure absence of government control over export
activities includes: (i) an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter's business
and export licenses; (ii) any legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; and (iii) any other
formal measures by the central and/or local government decentralizing control of companies. Furthermore,
four factors are considered when evaluating whether a respondent is subject to de facto government control
over its export activities: (i) whether the export prices are set by, or subject to the approval of, a
governmental authority; (ii) whether the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other
agreements; (iii) whether the respondent has autonomy from the government in making decisions regarding
the selection of management; and (iv) whether the respondent retains the proceeds of its export sales and
makes independent decisions regard disposition of profits or financing of losses.
165 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 3.
166 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 8.

7.106. Referring to Chapter I of the Antidumping Manual, the United States submits, however,
that the Manual clearly states that it is "subject to change without notice" and "cannot be cited to
establish DOC practice".
167 According to the United States, the USDOC has explicitly alerted
petitioners and respondents that the Antidumping Manual cannot serve as a basis to argue that the
USDOC has adopted an approach that must be followed for any particular, future proceeding. The
United States also submits that neither domestic law nor the WTO Agreement require that the
Antidumping Manual be used. The United States concludes on the basis of these considerations
that the Antidumping Manual cannot therefore, be considered as having general and prospective
application, adding that allowing an "as such" finding against the Manual would discourage the
promotion of transparency.
168
7.107. We understand that, according to the United States, the Antidumping Manual is a non-
mandatory instrument and, for this reason, cannot be challenged "as such". However, the status of
the Antidumping Manual under domestic law is not determinative. Even assuming that the
Antidumping Manual is not a mandatory instrument under US domestic law, this fact would not be
dispositive of the issue of whether certain practices it describes, including the rebuttable
presumption and assignment of a single rate, can be challenged "as such" in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings.
7.108. We recall that, in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review and US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, the Appellate Body rejected the US argument that a measure of a
non-mandatory character, the Sunset Policy Bulletin (SPB), was not susceptible to "as such"
challenge. In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body indicated that
there was "no reason for concluding that, in principle, non-mandatory measures cannot be
challenged 'as such'".
169 In US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , the Appellate Body
observed that the relevant issue is not whether th e measure subject to an "as such" challenge is a
binding legal instrument within the domestic legal system of a Member, but, rather, whether it is a
measure that may be challenged in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, i.e. whether is an "act[]
setting forth rules or norms that are intended to have general and prospective application". The
Appellate Body answered this question in the affirmative in that dispute, on the basis that the SPB:
(i) had "normative value", as it provided admini strative guidance and created expectations among
the public and among private actors; (ii) was intended to have general application, as it was to
apply to all the sunset reviews conducted in the United States; and (iii) was intended to have
prospective application, as it was intended to apply to sunset reviews taking place after its
issuance.
170
7.109. In the present dispute, Viet Nam refers to the Antidumping Manual as evidence that the
unwritten practice or policy in question amo unts to a measure of general and prospective
application that can be challenged "as such". 171 Hence, the issue facing us is not whether the
Antidumping Manual itself can be challenged "as such" as a rule or norm of general and
prospective application, but whether it constitutes relevant evidence to establish the existence of a
rule of norm of general and prospective application. In our view, the reasoning of the
Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review and in US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews is relevant in this regard. We believe that if a non-mandatory instrument
can be found to be a measure of general and prospective application it can a fortiori constitute
probative evidence of the existence of an unwritten measure of general and prospective
application. Hence, we consider that the Antidumping Manual constitutes relevant and probative
evidence of the existence of a norm of general and prospective application.
7.110. We turn now to the second piece of evidence submitted by Viet Nam, namely Policy
Bulletin 05.1.
172 We observe that, in the "Statement of Issue", the Policy Bulletin explains that it
"describes the Department's application process for separate rates status in non-market economy

167 United States' first written submission, para. 143, citing USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 1,
Exhibit US-27, p. 1. We note in this respect that the relevant paragraph reads as follows: "This manual is for
the internal training and guidance of Import Administration (IA) personnel only, and the practise set out
therein are subject to change without notice. This manual cannot be cited to establish DOC practice".
168 United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 24-25.
169 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 88.
170 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 187.
171 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 7(b), para. 19.
172 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66.

("NME") investigations". 173 It further states that "[i]n an NME antidumping investigation, the
Department presumes that all companies within the NME country are subject to government
control and should be assigned a single antidump ing duty rate unless an exporter demonstrates
the absence of both de jure and de facto governmental control over its export activities". 174
According to Policy Bulletin 05.1, the USDOC "assigns separate rate status in NME cases only if an
exporter can demonstrate the absence of both de jure and de facto government control over its
export activities". 175 In our view, Policy Bulletin 05.1 is further evidence confirming the first
element of the alleged measure. It clearly indicates that, in investigations involving NME countries,
the USDOC will presume that all companies within the NME country are subject to government
control and will receive a single anti-dumping duty rate and that exporters wishing to receive a
separate rate must demonstrate the absence of de jure and de facto government control over their
export activities.
7.111. Moreover, in the "Statement of Policy", Po licy Bulletin 05.1 "clarifies" the Department's
practice with respect to the application for separate rates and indicates, inter alia , that "the
separate rate application does not change the long-established standard for eligibility for receiving
a separate rate … which remains whether a firm can demonstrate an absence of both de jure and
de facto governmental control over its export activities".
176 The "Statement of Policy" section
concludes by stating that "[the separate rate] practice will be effective for all NME antidumping
investigations initiated on or after the date of publication in the Federal Register of the notice
announcing this policy".
177
7.112. The language used in Policy Bulletin 05. 1 conveys that the "practice" or "policy" (both
terms are used) whereby the USDOC presumes that all NME exporters belong to a single, NME-
wide entity and apply a single rate to that entity is applied in all anti-dumping investigations
involving NMEs. There is no mention of instances in which the USDOC would not use that
presumption and would not apply the single rate. Policy Bulletin 05.1 plainly states that it will
apply to "all" NME anti-dumping investigations initiated "on or after the date of publication" in the
Federal Register, thus evidencing that it has "gen eral" and "prospective" application. With respect
to the nature of the instrument, we also note that this Policy Bulletin is similar to the SPB which
was at issue in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review and in US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews. In those two disputes, the Appellate Body concluded that the SPB could be
challenged "as such" in WTO dispute settlement.
178 In the present dispute, Viet Nam does not
challenge Policy Bulletin 05.1 itself "as such", but rather relies on it as evidence that the NME-wide
entity rate practice amounts to a measure of general and prospective application that can be
challenged "as such". Again, we consider that if the SPB could be found to constitute a measure of
general and prospective application, Policy Bulletin 05.1 can a fortiori be considered to provide
relevant and probative evidence of the existe nce of an unwritten measure of general and
prospective application.
7.113. The United States submits that Policy Bulletin 05.1 applies only to original investigations,
and moreover, only applies to investigations initiated after 5 April 2005. Consequently, the
United States argues, the USDOC was not required to follow the approaches set forth in the Policy
Bulletin in the covered reviews or generally during administrative reviews of products from NME
countries.
179
7.114. The notice of initiation of the anti-dumping investigation for the Shrimp order is dated
27 January 2004, i.e. before the entry into force of Policy Bulletin 05.1, and thus we agree with
the United States that the Policy Bulletin did not apply to the original investigation underlying the
Shrimp order. However, this does not undermine the relevance and probative value of Policy
Bulletin 05.1 with respect to the general and prospective nature of the first element, i.e. the
application by the USDOC in anti-dumping proceedings involving NME countries of a rebuttable
presumption that, in such countries, all companies belong to a single, NME-wide, entity, and the

173 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66, p. 1.
174 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66, p. 1.
175 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66, p. 2. Policy Bulletin 05.1 also describes the test used to
determine de facto and de jure absence of government control over export activities.
176 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66, pp. 3-4.
177 Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66, p. 6.
178 See above, para. 7.108.
179 United States' second written submission, para. 67 (referring to Policy Bulletin 05.1, Exhibit VN-66,
pp. 6-7).

assignment of a single rate to that entity. Moreov er, when it states that it "does not change the
long-established standard for eligibility for receiving a separate rate", Policy Bulletin 05.1 supports
the conclusion that essentially the same practice existed before its entry into force.
180
7.115. In our view, therefore, both the Anti dumping Manual and Policy Bulletin 05.1 provide
relevant and probative evidence of the content of the first element of the alleged unwritten
measure, i.e. that, in anti-dumping proceedings involving NME countries, the USDOC begins with a
rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country belong to a single, NME-wide entity
and assigns a single rate to that entity. Furtherm ore, these two instruments also provide relevant
and probative evidence of the general and pr ospective character of the alleged measure.
Notwithstanding their non-binding nature, these two instruments create expectations among the
public and among private actors that the USDOC will follow this practice and/or apply this policy.
7.116. In addition, evidence of the general and pr ospective nature of this element of the alleged
unwritten measure can be found in a number of statements made by the USDOC in the Notices
issued under the Shrimp order. For example, in the Issues and Decision Memorandum
accompanying the final determination in the original investigation, the USDOC explains that:
The Department has a long-standing policy in antidumping proceedings of presuming
that all firms within an NME country are subject to government control and thus
should all be assigned a single, country-wide rate unless a Respondent can
demonstrate an absence of both de jure and de facto control over its export activities.
… In accordance with the separate-rates criteria, the Department assigns separate
rates in NME cases only if respondents can demonstrate the absence of both de jure
and de facto government control over export activities.
181
In the same Issues and Decision Memorandum, th e USDOC explains that the US Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit had "agreed that it was within Commerce's authority to employ a
presumption of state control for exporters in a nonmarket economy, and to place the burden on
the exporters to demonstrate an absence of government control". 182 The USDOC further observes
that "[t]he Department's longstanding practice of assigning a country-wide rate to NME companies
that do not qualify for a separate rate is reasonable and has been repeatedly affirmed by the
courts".183

7.117. In the final determination in the fourth administrative review, the USDOC explains:
Because we begin with the presumption that all companies within a NME country are
subject to government control, and because only the companies listed under the "Final
Results of Review" section below have overcome that presumption, we are applying a
single antidumping rate, i.e., the Vietnam-wide entity rate, to all other exporters of
subject merchandise.
184
7.118. In the notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review, the USDOC explains:
In proceedings involving non-market economy ("NME") countries, the Department
begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country are
subject to government control and thus, should be assigned a single antidumping duty
deposit rate. It is the Department's policy to assign all exporters of merchandise

180 We also recall that Viet Nam's claim pertains to a practice or policy applicable in both original
investigations and administrative reviews. Moreover, there appears to be no material difference in the content
of the norm as it is applied in either type of proceeding.
181 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the original investigation,
Exhibit VN-04, p. 30.
182 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the original investigation,
Exhibit VN-04, pp. 30-31.
183 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the original investigation,
Exhibit VN-04, p. 31.
184 Final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13, p. 47773. We further note
that, in the preliminary determination in the same review, the USDOC stated that: "[i]t is the Department's
standard policy to assign all exporters … in NME countr ies a single rate unless an exporter can affirmatively
demonstrate an absence of government control". (Preliminary determination in the fourth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12210.)

subject to an administrative review in an NME country this single rate unless an
exporter can demonstrate that it is sufficien tly independent so as to be entitled to a
separate rate.185
7.119. In the preliminary determination in the sixth administrative review, the USDOC explains
again:
In NME countries, the Department begins with a rebuttable presumption that all
companies within the country are subject to government control and thus should be
assessed a single antidumping duty rate. However, a company in the NME applying for
separate rate status may rebut that presumption by demonstrating an absence of
both de jure and de facto government control over its export activities.
186, 187
7.120. Viet Nam also contends that similar language can be found in every anti-dumping
determination involving an NME country 188, but does not provide any evidence in other
proceedings. We recall, however, that no example has been brought to our attention of an anti-
dumping proceeding involving an NME in which the USDOC did not start with a rebuttable
presumption that all companies belong to a single, government-wide entity.189
7.121. In our view, the significance of the ab ove statements by the USDOC goes beyond the
proceedings under the Shrimp order. These statements provide further confirmation that the
application by the USDOC in anti-dumping proceedings on imports from NMEs of a rebuttable
presumption that all companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity, and the assignment of a
single rate to that entity amounts to a rule or norm of general and prospective application.
7.122. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Viet Nam has established that, in anti-dumping
proceedings involving NME countries, the USDOC starts with a rebuttable presumption that all
companies within that NME country belong to a single, NME-wide entity and that a single rate is
assigned to that entity, and, thus, to companies deemed to belong to that entity.
7.123. The second element of Viet Nam's challenge to the NME-wide entity rate practice relates to
the determination of the rate assigned to the NM E-wide entity. Viet Nam submits that the USDOC
applies a punitive rate based on adverse facts available to the producers/exporters deemed to be
part of the NME-wide entity.
190
7.124. The United States replies that the only evidence cited by Viet Nam to support its allegation
that the USDOC has a practice of determining th e NME-wide rate based on facts available is
two sentences from the Antidumping Manual, neither of which requires the USDOC to base the
NME-wide rate on facts available. The United Stat es observes that Viet Nam itself concedes that
the USDOC "retains broad discretion on the method for calculating the NME-wide entity rate".
Thus, according to the United States, even Viet Nam does not argue that this alleged practice
exists and is invariably applied by the USDOC.
191

185 Notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-10, p. 18154.
186 Preliminary determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-19, pp. 13550-13551.
(footnotes omitted)
187 Viet Nam has also provided relevant evidence for the first administrative review (final determination
and Issues and Decision Memorandum in the first administrative review, Exhibit VN-62), second administrative
review (final determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in the second administrative review,
Exhibit VN-63) and third administrative review (final determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in
the third administrative review, Exhibit VN-64). Evidence submitted by the United States shows that the NME-
wide rate was also applied in the seventh administrative review (final determination in the seventh
administrative review, Exhibit US-30).
188 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 7(b), para. 24 (emphasis original). Nevertheless, we can
glean from various documents related to the Shrimp order that exporters from China are subject to the same
practice. For example, the notice of initiation in the fifth administrative review requires that all firms from
China and Viet Nam – the two NMEs subject to the Shrimp order – demonstrate the absence of both de jure
and de facto government control. (Notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-10,
pp. 18155-18156).
190 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 104 (referring to USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10,
Exhibit VN-24, pp. 7-8.

7.125. Viet Nam presents only limited evidence as to how the NME-wide entity rate is calculated,
and the evidence that it relies upon is inconclusive. In particular, Chapter 10 of the Antidumping
Manual, referred to by Viet Nam, explains that the NME-wide rate:
may be based on adverse facts available if, fo r example, some exporters that are part
of the NME-wide entity do not respond to the anti-dumping questionnaire. In many
cases the Department concludes that some part of the NME-wide entity has not
cooperated in the proceedings because those that have responded do not account for
all imports of subject merchandise.
192
7.126. In addition, Viet Nam does not refer to other NME investigations where NME-wide rates
were determined using facts available, which could serve to establish the existence of a policy or
practice in this respect. Moreover, as noted by the United States, Viet Nam itself casts some doubt
on the consistency of USDOC's practice in determining a rate for an NME-wide entity when it
asserts that "[t]he USDOC retains broad discretion on the method for calculating the NME-wide
entity rate, but in most investigations and administrative reviews makes a finding that the
generalized 'NME-wide entity' did not cooperate wi th the proceeding, justifying the use of facts
available".
193
7.127. In response to a question from the Panel, the United States refers to cases where the
NME-wide entity rate was based on the weighted-average margin calculated for the mandatory
respondents and, thus, the NME-wide rate was not based on facts available. 194 Viet Nam argues
that, in those examples, the individually investig ated exporters represented the entire universe of
imports of subject merchandise into the United St ates and, thus, the rate assigned to the NME-
wide entity was irrelevant because it had no practical use.195
7.128. In the first example cited by the United States, the USDOC applied a NME-wide rate
corresponding to the "simple average" of (i) the weighted-average of the calculated rates for
mandatory respondents, and (ii) "a simple aver age of petition rates based on US prices and
normal values within the range of the U.S. pr ices and normal values calculated for [the
two mandatory respondents]". It would thus appear that, contrary to the United States'
representations, the NME-wide applied in that proceeding was largely based on facts available. 196
As noted by Viet Nam, in the other proceedings cited by the United States, there were no other
exporters of the subject merchandise than the ma ndatory respondent(s), and in each of these
proceedings, the USDOC applied a NME-wide rate based on the mandatory respondents' rate,
apparently on the basis that the mandatory respondents accounted for the totality of exports of
subject merchandise to the United States. Moreover, in three cases, the USDOC specified that the
NME-wide rate "applies to all entries of the subject merchandise" except for entries from the
mandatory respondents.
197 While it may have been that the NME-wide rate was actually not

192 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added). We note that
Policy Bulletin 05.1 is silent as to the manner in which the USDOC determines the NME-wide entity rate in
original investigations.
193 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 104.
194 United States' response to Panel question No. 15(a), para. 47 (referring to Steel Wire Garment
Hangers from the People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed.
Reg. 47,587 (14 Aug. 2008), Exhibit US-64; Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People's Republic of China:
Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 53,188 (15 Sept. 2008),
Exhibit US-65; Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel
Wire Rod from Ukraine, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,785 (30 Aug. 2002), Exhibit US-66; Notice of Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solutions from Belarus, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,055
(27 Feb. 2003), Exhibit US-67; Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Structural Steel
Beams from the Russian Federation, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,490 (20 May 2002), Exhibit US-68, p. 35490; and Notice
of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Small Diameter Carbon and Alloy Seamless
Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe from Romania, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,125 (23 June 2000), Exhibit US-69).
195 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 26.
196 Information contained in the petition by definition constitutes facts available; moreover, the
mandatory respondents' rates were partly based on facts available. (Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the
People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,587
(14 Aug. 2008), Exhibit US-64; Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People's Republic of China: Amended
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 53,188 (15 Sept. 2008), Exhibit US-65).
197 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solutions
from Belarus, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,055 (27 Feb. 2003), Exhibit US-67; Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value: Structural Steel Beams from the Russian Federation, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,490 (20 May 2002),
Exhibit US-68; Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Small Diameter Carbon

applied with respect to any producer/exporter in these proceedings, we are not convinced that, for
this reason, the NME-wide entity rate applied in these proceedings had "no practical use". In any
event, the very nature of a rule or norm of general and prospective application is that it applies
independently of the specific factual circumstances of a particular case. Hence, the fact that the
USDOC may use a different method for determining a rate for the NME-wide entity depending on
the circumstances suggests to us that the USDOC does not have a consistent practice of
determining NME-wide rates using facts available.
7.129. We recall that a panel "must not lightly assume the existence of a rule or norm
constituting a measure of general and prospective application, especially when it is not expressed
in a written document".
198 The Appellate Body also indicated that the party bringing a challenge
against a rule or norm that allegedly constitutes a measure of general and prospective application
must meet a "high threshold".199
7.130. Overall, taking into account the evidence cited by the United States, and Viet Nam's
admission that the USDOC retains broad discretion concerning the method used to determine the
NME-wide rate, we conclude that, while the eviden ce on the record does suggest that the USDOC
often determines the rate for the NME-wide entity based on facts available, it does not establish
that the USDOC consistently uses a certain defined methodology to determine the NME-wide entity
rate or systematically bases that rate on facts available. We therefore conclude that, in relation to
the second element of the alleged measure, Viet Nam has failed to establish the existence of any
practice amounting to a rule or norm of general and prospective application.
7.131. In sum, we conclude that Viet Nam has established that the USDOC's policy or practice
whereby, in anti-dumping proceedings involving NMEs, it presumes that all companies belong to a
single, NME-wide entity, and assigns a single rate to that entity amounts to a measure of general
and prospective application which can be challenged "as such". However, we find that Viet Nam did
not establish the existence of a USDOC practice with respect to the manner in which it determines
the NME-wide entity rate, in particular concerning the use of facts available, amounting to a
measure of general and prospective application, and which can therefore be challenged "as such".
7.4.2.3 Whether the NME-wide entity rate pr actice is inconsistent with Articles 6.10
and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.4.2.3.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.4.2.3.1.1 Viet Nam
7.132. Viet Nam argues that the plain language of Articles 6.10 and 9.2, read in context,
precludes application of a single anti-dumping margin to multiple entities where those companies
have not been found by the authority to constitute a single entity. Viet Nam argues that the first
sentence of Article 6.10 requires the authority to determine an individual dumping margin for each
known exporter or producer. According to Viet Na m, the use of "sampling", provided for in the
second sentence of Article 6.10, is the only exception to the rule contained in the first sentence.
Viet Nam further argues that the requirement contained in the first sentence of Article 6.10 is
further reinforced by Article 9.2, the first senten ce of which requires that the anti-dumping duty
"shall be collected in the appropriate amounts". Viet Nam asks that the Panel take special note of
the Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Fasteners (China) because it addressed a nearly identical legal
and factual scenario to the measure at issue in the present dispute. Viet Nam argues that, in that
dispute, the Appellate Body found that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigating
authority is not permitted to presume that in NME countries the state and exporters constitute a
single entity, but is required to make an affirmative determination to that effect.
200
7.133. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's presum ption of the existence of an NME-wide entity
and application of an NME-wide entity rate does not comply with the requirement in Articles 6.10

and Alloy Seamless Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe from Romania, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,125 (23 June 2000),
Exhibit US-69.
198 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 196.
199 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 198.
200 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 121-142 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
Fasteners (China)); second written submission, paras. 29-31.

and 9.2 that authorities determine individual dump ing margins and duties. According to Viet Nam,
the NME-wide entity is not an individual exporter or producer, but a collection of exporters that the
USDOC collapses into a single entity, without perf orming the required analysis to that effect.
Instead, the USDOC presumes that all entities within the NME country are, in fact, a single entity
under the control of the government, but does not establish, as a matter of fact, the existence of
the single entity. Viet Nam is also of the view that the USDOC's practice does not fit within the
single, limited exception provided for in Articles 6.10 and 9.2. Viet Nam requests, therefore, that
the Panel find that the USDOC's practice is inco nsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
201
7.134. Viet Nam submits that the United States' reliance on Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession to
the WTO and Working Party Report as a legal justification is unavailing. Viet Nam's Accession
Protocol contains a single exception to the app lication of the disciplines of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, namely the use of an alternative me thodology for the calculation of normal value.
According to Viet Nam, the Working Party Report describes the prevailing economic conditions in
Viet Nam at the time of the Report, but nowhere in the Report or the Accession Protocol does
Viet Nam agree to generalised concessions based on those economic conditions. Thus, except for
the determination of normal value, there is no language in Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession to the
WTO which provides an investigating authority with the legal basis to treat Viet Nam, as an NME,
differently from a market economy country. Viet Nam contends that the Appellate Body's
reasoning in EC – Fasteners (China) with respect to China's Accession Protocol applies to the
present dispute.
202
7.135. According to Viet Nam, the United States attempts to turn the question of the legal
justification for the USDOC's presumption into a question of facts; however, as observed by the
Appellate Body, an authority cannot use a presumption to apply a single rate to multiple entities,
regardless of the "evidence" cited by that authority. In Viet Nam's view, there is a significant
difference between, on the one hand, an investigating authority making a determination on a case-
by-case basis that several exporters belong to a single entity (as discussed in the panel report
Korea – Certain Paper ) and, on the other hand, the investigating authority beginning with the
presumption that all exporters in the NME country are under the control of the government and
should be assigned a single rate. In the latter case, the presumption is not based on any analysis
of the exporters actually under investigation, but on general information about the economy as a
whole, and is, therefore, inconsistent with Arti cles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Viet Nam submits that the Panel does not need to discuss the criteria used by the USDOC to
determine whether entities are sufficiently independent from the government because the starting
point of the test, i.e. the presumption that all companies belong to a single NME-wide entity, is
wrong.
203
7.4.2.3.1.2 United States
7.136. The United States204 submits that Viet Nam has no basis for asserting that related entities,
simply because they may be organized as a formal matter as separate companies, must be treated
as individual exporters for the purpose of Arti cle 6.10. To the contrary, context in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, in particular footnote 11 to Article 4.1(i) and Article 9.5, indicates that
whether producers are related to each other affects the investigating authority's analysis of those
firms. According to the United States, Article 6.10 uses similar language and, where exporters or
producers are sufficiently related, they are not economically independent and would not have
individual margins. For the United States, depending on the facts of a given situation, an
investigating authority may determine that legally distinct companies should be treated as a single
"exporter" or "producer" based on their activities and relationships. The United States concludes

201 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 143-147.
202 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 35-37 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
Fasteners (China), para. 290).
203 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 38-41; opening statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, paras. 7-11.
204 The United States made arguments regarding the consistency of the measure at issue with
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement primarily in respect of Viet Nam's "as applied" claims
(United States' first written submission, paras. 146-155; second written submission, paras. 85-88). Because
we understand the United States to have made the arguments with respect to both Viet Nam's "as applied" and
"as such" claims, we nevertheless refer as appropriate to those arguments in assessing Viet Nam's claims that
the measure at issue is inconsistent "as such" with the provisions cited by Viet Nam.

on this basis that Article 6.10 does not preclude the USDOC from treating multiple companies as a
single entity, including, where approp riate, a Viet Nam-government entity. 205 The United States
also argues that nothing in Article 9.2 prevents an authority from concluding that the relationship
between multiple companies is sufficiently close to support treating them as a single entity and
subject them to a single duty rate. According to the United States, an investigating authority must
determine whether a group of companies are in a close enough relationship to support their
treatment as a single entity before it can know how to calculate and apply duties to those
companies' exports and Article 9.2 does not set out criteria for an investigating authority to
examine before making that determination. The United States concludes that Article 9.2 does not
preclude the USDOC from treating multiple companies as a single entity, including, where
appropriate, a Viet Nam-government entity.
206 According to the United States, the question raised
by Viet Nam's claim does not involve a pure question of legal interpretation, but is a mixed
question of fact and law, and Viet Nam cannot point to any provision of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement that specifies exactly how an authority is to decide whether different sets of exports
are considered to be from one exporter or multiple exporters.
207
7.137. According to the United States, Viet Nam's Working Party Report and Accession Protocol
indicate that all Members were not convinced that market-economy conditions might prevail in
Viet Nam. Viet Nam's Accession Protocol does not impose on Members any non-market economy
characterization of Viet Nam, but allows Members to decide unilaterally on their understanding of
Viet Nam's economy and the appropriate treatment for Vietnamese respondents on a case-by-case
basis. The United States is of the view that the Accession Protocol provides important context in
terms of deciding which entities in Viet Nam should be considered as a single entity for purposes of
Article 6.10. The United States notes that paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report
expressly provides importing Members the discretion to use an NME methodology when it is not
clearly shown that market economy conditions prevail in Viet Nam. According to the United States,
the understanding in Viet Nam's Accession Protocol that Viet Nam is not yet a market economy is
in effect an understanding that prices for inputs and outputs are affected by the government
which, in turn, is in effect an understanding that there remains government control over all firms.
On the basis of this understanding, a single "gov ernment-controlled" rate is warranted, unless and
until it is clearly demonstrated that market economy conditions prevail for the purpose of
calculating dumping margins and assigning anti-d umping duty rates. For the United States,
the 2002 USDOC determination that the Government of Viet Nam is legally or operationally in a
position to control or materially influence the behaviour of firms is not in dispute; it is then logical
for the USDOC to consider that the Government of Viet Nam simultaneously exerts control or
material influence over these entities with respect to the pricing and output of identical or similar
products destined for export. The United States submits that the presumption underlying the
Working Party Report, as incorporated in the Accession Protocol, that NME conditions prevail in
Viet Nam is an integral part of the WTO agreemen ts and justifies placing the burden of proof on
Vietnamese respondents to demonstrate the appropriateness of a separate rate. For the
United States, by not challenging the use by the USDOC of an NME methodology to calculate
normal value, Viet Nam does not challenge the underlying presumption in paragraph 255 of its
Accession Protocol that market economy conditions do not clearly prevail, which, in turn, has
implications extending beyond the calculation of normal value.
208
7.138. According to the United States, Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must
be read in a manner consistent with paragraph 255 of the Working Party Report. The United States
argues that the Appellate Body's conclusions in EC – Fasteners (China) that, underlying
Article 6.10 is a presumption that every entity must first be recognized as an individual exporter or
producer, lacks any support in the text of the An ti-Dumping Agreement and does not result in a
reading of that provision that is consistent with paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party
Report, especially where NME conditions preva il. According to the United States, where NME
conditions do prevail, it is far more reasonable, as a starting point for an anti-dumping analysis, to

205 United States' first written submission, paras. 147-151.
206 United States' first written submission, paras. 152-155.
207 United States' second written submission, para. 69.
208 United States' first written submission, paras. 156-169; second written submission, paras. 71-84;
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 14-30.

think of entities as operating subject to governme nt control until otherwise demonstrated, than to
think of them as operating independently from government control.209
7.139. The United States further argues that, even if this Panel were to follow the
Appellate Body's reasoning in EC – Fasteners (China) , the USDOC's determination regarding the
Viet Nam-wide entity is consistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2. First, an important difference with
EC – Fasteners (China) is that neither Viet Nam nor any Vietnamese exporter requested, at any
time during the proceedings, that the USDOC reconsider Viet Nam's non-market economy status.
Hence, unlike in EC – Fasteners (China) , there is no question for the Panel to resolve as to
whether Viet Nam is a non-market economy. The United States further argues that the USDOC's
determination that a Viet Nam-government entity existed and that certain exporters, while legally
separate, were in fact part of that entity, rested on adequate factual findings in the course of the
relevant reviews. In EC – Fasteners (China) , the Appellate Body did not preclude an investigating
authority from collecting and offering evidence to justify a presumption that a single government
entity exists. The United States submits that, in the challenged proceedings, the USDOC afforded
companies the opportunity to submit information about their relationship with the Viet Nam-
government entity to demonstrate independence from the Government and the evidence sought
by the USDOC is fully consistent with those factors that the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners
suggested should be probed to determine whether two or more exporters should be treated as a
single entity. Finally, the United States argues that the USDOC's conclusion that multiple
companies in Viet Nam are part of the Viet Nam-government entity is based on a permissible
interpretation of Articles 6.10 and 9.2.
210
7.4.2.3.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.140. China submits that the USDOC's separate rate test is materially identical to the
European Union individual treatment test at issue in EC – Fasteners (China), and requests that the
Panel interpret Articles 6.10 and 9.2 in light of the Appellate Body's findings in that dispute. China
observes that the question at stake is not whether authorities are allowed to treat two or more
sufficiently related exporters as a single entity in certain situations, but whether authorities are
allowed to presume that all the exporters in an NME country constitute a single entity.
211
7.141. The European Union anticipates that the Panel will be guided by the clarifications
provided by the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China) . In particular, the Panel will have to
consider whether or not the test applied by the United States is capable of establishing whether
the exporting State and one or more exporters shou ld be deemed to be a single entity. In this
respect, the European Union agrees with the United States that Members are entitled to make
single entity determinations based on the type of criteria referred to by the United States.
212
7.142. Thailand agrees with the Appellate Body's ruling that Articles 6.10 and 9.2 do not
preclude treating several companies as a single entity provided that it is not presumed, but based
on available evidence.
213
7.4.2.3.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.143. We recall our finding above that Viet Nam has successfully established that the USDOC's
policy or practice whereby, in anti-dumping proceedings involving NMEs, it presumes that all
companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity, and assigns a single rate to that entity is a
measure of general and prospective application wh ich may be challenged "as such". We will now
examine whether, as alleged by Viet Nam, this measure is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 6.10
and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.144. We turn first to the text of the relevant legal provisions at issue. Article 6.10 provides that:

209 United States' first written submission, paras. 172-175; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 33-37; second written submission, paras. 86-87.
210 United States' first written submission, paras. 176-183;
211 China's third-party submission, paras. 13-20; third-party statement, paras. 12-16.
212 European Union's third-party submission, para. 22.
213 Thailand's response to Panel question No. 7.

The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each
known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases
where the number of exporters, producers, im porters or types of products involved is
so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their
examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using
samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the
authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of
the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.
7.145. In EC – Fasteners (China), the Appellate Body found that the use of the term "shall" in the
first sentence of Article 6.10 indicates that this provision contains a mandatory rule to determine
individual dumping margins for each known export er or producer. In the Appellate Body's view,
the term "as a rule" indicates that the obligation to determine individual dumping margins may be
subject to derogations, such as the sampling except ion in the second sentence of Article 6.10. The
Appellate Body did not consider, however, that the "flexibility provided by the term 'as a rule' goes
as far as providing Members with an open-ended possibility to create exceptions, which would
erode the obligatory character of Article 6.10".
214 The Appellate Body concluded that:
The general rule, that is, the obligation to determine individual margins of dumping
for each known exporter or producer, applies, unless derogation from it is provided for
in the covered agreements.215
7.146. The Appellate Body "[did] not find any provision in the covered agreements that would
allow importing Members to depart from the obligation to determine individual dumping margins
only in respect of NMEs". 216 The Appellate Body concluded that Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement must be interpreted:
as expressing an obligation, rather than a preference, for authorities to determine
individual margins of dumping. This obligation is qualified and is subject not only to
the exception specified for sampling in the second sentence of Article 6.10, but also to
other exceptions to the rule to determine individual dumping margins that are
provided for in the covered agreements.
217
7.147. Turning to Article 9.2, we note that it provides as follows:
When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping
duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a
non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be
dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which price
undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted. The authorities
shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. If, however, several
suppliers from the same country are involved, and it is impracticable to name all these
suppliers, the authorities may name the supplying country concerned. If several
suppliers from more than one country are involved, the authorities may name either
all the suppliers involved, or, if this is impracticable, all the supplying countries
involved.
7.148. In EC – Fasteners (China) , the Appellate Body observed that the first two sentences of
Article 9.2 are of a mandatory nature.
218 It also considered that the term "sources", which appears
twice in the first sentence of Article 9.2, "has the same meaning and refers to the individual
exporters or producers and not to the country as a whole". 219 The Appellate Body noted the
complementarity between Articles 6.10 and 9.2 and recalled that Article 6.10 contains an
obligation to determine individual dumping margin s for each exporter or producer, except when
sampling is used or if a derogation is otherwise provided for in the covered agreements. Hence:

214 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 320.
215 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 320.
216 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 328.
217 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 329.
218 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 336.
219 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 338.

where an individual margin of dumping ha s been determined [in accordance with
Article 6.10], it flows from the obligation contained in the first sentence of Article 9.2
that the appropriate amount of anti-dumping duty that can be imposed also has to be
an individual one. We do not see how an importing Member could comply with the
obligation in the first sentence of Article 9.2 to collect duties in the appropriate
amounts in each case if, having determined individual dumping margins, it lists
suppliers by name, but imposes country-wide duties. In other words, unless sampling
is used, the appropriate amount of an anti-dumping duty in each case is one that is
specified by supplier, as further clarified and confirmed by the obligation to name
suppliers in the second sentence of Article 9.2.
220
The Appellate Body considered that the obligat ion to "name" the supplier(s) of the product
concerned, in the second sentence, when read in the light of the first sentence and in the overall
context of Article 9 as a whole, "is closely relate d to the imposition of individual anti-dumping
duties" and, thus, "should be interpreted as a re quirement to specify duties for each supplier". 221
The Appellate Body concluded that Article 9. 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "requires
investigating authorities to specify an individual duty for each supplier, except where this is
impracticable, when several suppliers are involved".
222 The Appellate Body also observed that the
third sentence of Article 9.2 provides for an exception to the obligations contained in the first and
second sentences, which allows Members "to specify duties for the supplying country concerned,
where specification of individual duties is 'impracticable'".
223

7.149. In our view, the reasoning of the Appellate Body highlighted above is highly persuasive as
to the correct interpretation of these provisions and thus provides a proper legal standard for our
examination of Viet Nam's claims of inconsistency under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. We therefore adopt it as the basis for our analysis in this dispute.
7.150. The issue we need to resolve is whether, under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the United States is entitled to presume that all exporters within an NME belong to a
single, NME-wide entity under the control of the government, and assign a single rate to that
entity.
7.151. We recall that, pursuant to Article 6.10, investigating authorities have an obligation to
determine individual margins of dumping for each known exporter or producer. This obligation
flows from the first sentence of Article 6.10 whic h provides that the authorities "shall" determine
an individual dumping margin for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under
investigation. The term "as a rule" in this same sentence indicates that this obligation may be
subject to certain exceptions. It is subject, in particular, to the exception contained in the second
sentence of Article 6.10 which applies in situations where the investigating authority decides to
limit its examination to a reasonable number of interested parties or products (so-called
"sampling"). Moreover, as stated by the Appellate Body, the obligation contained in the
first sentence of Article 6.10 may be subject to other exceptions, as long as these exceptions are
provided for in the covered agreements.
224
7.152. We have found above that in proceedings involving NME-countries, the USDOC starts "with
a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the NME country are essentially operating units
of a single, government-wide entity and should receive a single anti-dumping rate". 225 Exporters
must pass a "separate rate test" in order to receive a rate that is "separate from the NME-wide
rate", which can be either an individual rate (for exporters who were individually examined) or, in
cases in which the USDOC resorted to "sampling", th e separate rate (for exporters not individually
examined). Only exporters that have passed the separate rate test by demonstrating the absence
of government control, both de facto and de jure , over their export activities will receive an
individual rate or a rate that is generally based on the weighted-average of the rates individually
calculated for the mandatory respondents, excluding zero and de minimis rates, as well as rates

220 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 339. (emphasis original)
221 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 340-341.
222 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 354.
223 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 342.
224 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 329.
225 USDOC, Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 7.

based on facts available (i.e. a separate rate). 226 The USDOC calculates a single NME-wide anti-
dumping margin and imposes a single NME-wide duty rate for all those exporters which are
deemed to belong to the NME-wide entity because they failed – or did not attempt – to pass the
separate rate test. In other words, the USDOC's practice at issue establishes a presumption that
individual exporters in NME countries are not entitled to an individual rate, unless they successfully
demonstrate independence from the government with respect to their export activities. Such a
practice runs directly counter to the obligation contained in Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement whereby an investigating authority "shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of
dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned".
7.153. The United States argues that, depending on the facts of a given situation, an investigating
authority may determine that legally distinct companies should be treated as a single exporter or
producer based on their activities and relationships. 227 We agree that, under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, an investigating authority may treat separate entities as a single exporter or producer
for the purpose of calculating dumping margins. We recall that the panel in Korea – Certain Paper
found that, pursuant to Article 6.10, separate legal entities that were in a sufficiently close
structural and commercial relationship could justifiably be treated as a single exporter or
producer.
228 That panel considered, however, that an investigating authority could not treat
distinct legal entities as a single exporter or producer without justification, but had to "determine",
on the basis of the record of the particular investigation, that entities are in such a close
relationship.
229
7.154. In the EC – Fasteners (China) dispute, the Appellate Body also accepted that "in principle
there may be situations where nominally distinct exporters may be considered as a single entity
for the purpose of determining individual du mping margins and anti-dumping duties under
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , due to [the] State's control or material
influence in and coordination of these exporters' pricing and output". 230 The Appellate Body
explained that:
In our view, Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do not preclude an
investigating authority from determining a single dumping margin and a single anti-
dumping duty for a number of exporters if it establishes that they constitute a single
exporter for purposes of Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
Whether determining a single dumping margin and a single anti-dumping duty for a
number of exporters is inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 will depend on the
existence of a number of situations, which wo uld signal that, albeit legally distinct,
two or more exporters are in such a relationship that they should be treated as a
single entity. These situations may incl ude: (i) the existence of corporate and
structural links between the exporters, such as common control, shareholding and
management; (ii) the existence of corporate and structural links between the State
and the exporters, such as common control, shareholding and management; and (iii)
control or material influence by the State in respect of pricing and output.
231

226 The Antidumping Manual contrasts the situation of, respectively, market and non-market economy
countries as follows: "Individual dumping margins are automatically assigned to exporters in market-economy
country cases. In NME cases, exporters must pass a separate rate test to receive a rate that is separate from
the NME-wide rate". (USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 3).
227 United States' first written submission, para. 150.
228 In Korea – Certain Paper, the panel found that Article 6.10 could be interpreted as allowing the
treatment of separate legal entities as a single supplier "in circumstances where the structural and commercial
relationship between the companies in question is sufficiently close to be considered as a single exporter or
producer". (Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper, paras. 7.162 and 168).
229 Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper, para. 7.161:
While Article 6.10 does not by its terms require that each separate legal entity be treated as a
single "exporter" or "producer", neither does it allow a Member to treat distinct legal entities as a
single exporter or producer without justification. Whether or not the circumstances of a given
investigation justify such treatment must be determined on the basis of the record of that
investigation. In our view, in order to properly treat multiple companies as a single exporter or
producer in the context of its dumping determinations in an investigation, the IA has to
determine that these companies are in a relationship close enough to support that treatment.
230 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 382. The Appellate Body also described
three different situations in which such a single entity might be found to exist (ibid., para. 376).
231 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 376.

7.155. The Appellate Body stressed however that, under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement:
it is the investigating authority that is called upon to make an objective affirmative
determination, on the basis of the evidence that has been submitted or that it has
gathered in the investigation, as to who is the known exporter or producer of the
product concerned. It is, therefore, the investigating authority that will determine
whether one or more exporters have a relationship with the State such that they can
be considered a single entity and receive a single dumping margin and a single anti-
dumping duty.
232
7.156. The separate rate test used by the USDOC in anti-dumping proceedings involving NME
countries operates differently, however. The USDOC presumes that all exporters and producers are
not independent from the State and, therefore, be long to the NME-wide entity. Each exporter or
producer must then rebut the presumption of affiliation with the State in order to be eligible for an
individual dumping margin and an individual anti -dumping duty. In other words, in proceedings
involving NME countries, the USDOC does not make an "objective affirmative determination" as to
who is the known exporter or producer, but presumes from the start the existence of this exporter
or producer in the form of a NME-wide entity. Thus, pursuant to the separate rate test, not only
does the USDOC place the burden on exporters to rebut the presumption that they are not
independent from the State, but it then does not make a factual determination in that regard.
7.157. We also note that the USDOC makes "single entity determinations" (pursuant to a "single
entity test") to determine whether legally distinct companies constitute a single entity for purposes
of calculating a dumping margin in both market economy and NME investigations. 233 Pursuant to
the Antidumping Manual, a single entity determination "is specific to the facts presented in each
review and is based on several considerations, incl uding the structure of the affiliated entities, the
level of control between/among affiliates, and the level of participation by each affiliates in the
proceeding"; moreover, the single entity wi ll obtain a single anti-dumping duty rate.
234 The single
entity determination is distinct from the separate rate test and in fact, both may be applied in the
same anti-dumping proceeding. 235 In our view, the existence of the single entity test, as distinct
from the separate rate test, shows that the USDOC's treatment of the NME-wide entity is a matter
entirely separate from the question of determining whether different exporters are so closely
related that they constitute a single entity. The fundamental difference between the two tests is
that, under the single entity test, the USDOC pr esumes that all exporters are entitled to an
individual rate and makes an affirmative finding, based on the facts of the case, that two or more
legally distinct companies constitute a single entity, while under the separate rate test, the USDOC
begins with the presumption that legally distinct companies (i.e. NME exporters) are part of a
NME-wide entity, and, thus, should not be assigned an individual dumping margin and an
individual anti-dumping rate.
7.158. We find, therefore, that the USDOC's policy or practice whereby it presumes, in anti-
dumping investigations involving NMEs, that all companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity,
and assigns a single rate to that entity is inconsistent with the obligations contained in
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

232 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 363.
233 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f), Exhibit US-26, and USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Section V,
Exhibit VN-24, p. 8.
234 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Section V, Exhibit VN-24, p. 10.
235 For instance, the USDOC made single entity determinations in the fifth and sixth administrative
reviews. In the fifth review, the USDOC determined that Nha Trang and certain affiliates should be treated as a
single entity. Similarly, in the sixth review, the USDOC treated Minh Phu and Hau Giang as a single entity. See
United States' response to Panel question No. 10(b), paras. 20-22. The United States also argues that the
two tests differ in focus, in the sense that the single entity determination examines possible relationships
among private persons or enterprises, while the separate rate test examines possible relationships between
private persons or enterprises and the State. (United States' response to Panel question No. 10(a), para. 17.)
We are of the view that, as a matter of principle, nothing would prevent the United States from establishing
different tests for determining relationships among private persons or enterprises vs. private
persons/enterprises and the State. However, any such test must be consistent with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

7.159. Our finding in this respect is consistent with the report of the Appellate Body in EC –
Fasteners (China), where it concluded that:
placing the burden on NME exporters to rebu t a presumption that they are related to
the State and to demonstrate that they ar e entitled to individual treatment runs
counter to Article 6.10, which "as a rule" re quires that individual dumping margins be
determined for each known exporter or producer , and is inconsistent with Article 9.2
that requires that individual duties be specified by supplier. Even accepting in principle
that there may be circumstances where exporters and producers from NMEs may be
considered as a single entity for purposes of Articles 6.10 and 9.2, such singularity
cannot be presumed; it has to be determined by the investigating authorities on the
basis of facts and evidence submitted or gathered in the investigation.236
7.160. The United States contends that the Appellate Body's reasoning in EC – Fasteners (China)
is flawed. According to the United States, "[t]he presumption in EC – Fasteners that Articles 6.10
and 9.2 require Members to first recognize each entity as an individual exporter or producer … was
based on an improper interpretation because the Appellate Body created obligations that are not
grounded in the text of these articles". 237 The United States argues, inter alia, that context in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular footnote 11 to Article 4.1(i) and Article 9.5, indicates that
whether producers are related to each other affects the investigating authority's analysis of those
firms.238
7.161. Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to determine
individual dumping margins for exporters who have not exported the product during the period of
investigation; those new exporters will receive an individual margin only if they can show that they
are not related to any of the exporters that are su bject to the anti-dumping duties. We noted, in
paragraph 7.146. above that the obligation to determine individual dumping margins may be
subject to certain exceptions, as long as these exceptions are provided for in the covered
agreements. In our view, Article 9.5 sets out an exception to the general rule in Article 6.10 that
individual dumping margins be specified for each known producer/exporter, and is, therefore, one
of the possible departures from the general rule contained in Article 6.10.
239 Hence, Article 9.5
does not undermine our understanding of Article 6.10. Second, Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement contains a definition of the term "dom estic industry" and footnote 11, referred by the
United States, describes the circumstances when "producers shall be deemed to be related to
exporters or importers". We note that this prov ision does not deal with the determination of
dumping margins for producers/exporters, but with the definition of the domestic industry; the
"producers" referred to are domestic producers. In any event, we agree with the United States
that whether producers are related to each other may justify treating them as a single
producer/exporter under Articles 6.10 and 9.2; the tenor of our findings, and of the Appellate
Body's findings in EC – Fasteners (China) is that such a "singularity" must be determined on the
basis of positive evidence in the particular case, and cannot be presumed.
7.162. The United States also argues that this case is different from EC – Fasteners (China)
because, according to the United States, the criteria underlying the "separate rate test" are
different from those underlying the EU IT test at issue in that case. The United States submits that
the USDOC's separate rate test "differs significantly from Article 9(5) of the EU's Basic

236 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 364 (italics original; underlining added). The
Basic AD Regulation at issue in EC – Fasteners (China) provided that, where the normal value for NME
suppliers was determined on the basis of market economy third-country prices (or another method set forth in
the Regulation), a single duty rate was specified for the supplying country concerned – the so-called "country-
wide" duty – which applied to all suppliers and imports from that country. NME suppliers could, however, avoid
the country-wide rate and be granted an individual rate if they satisfied the criteria of the so-called "IT test". In
such case, the NME supplier would receive an individual rate which was determined by comparing the normal
value from the market economy third country with the exporter's actual export prices. (See Appellate Body
Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 275-277).
237 United States' first written submission, para. 175.
238 United States' first written submission, paras. 147-151.
239 We note that, in EC – Fasteners (China), the Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion. See
Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 319 ("an exception permitting derogation from the rule
requiring the determination of individual margins for new exporters is … expressly provided for in Article 9.5")
and 326.

AD Regulation", with respect to both the context in which the test is used as well as the criteria
considered. In the view of the United States:
unlike the criteria that compose Article 9(5) … the criteria that compose the "separate
rate test" are effectively waived (and a separate rate assigned) when the exporter
under investigation or review is owned wholly by entities located in market-economy
countries or has been previously assigned a separate rate. And when they do apply,
they focus, unlike the criteria of Article 9(5), strictly on exporter-specific activities.
240
7.163. In the view of the United States, the evidence sought under the US test is consistent with
the factors that, according to the Appellate Body, could signal that legally distinct entities are in
such a relationship that they should be treated as a single entity.
241
7.164. According to Viet Nam, a discussion of the criteria used for the separate rate test is
irrelevant for the Panel's analysis. Viet Nam submits that a practice whereby the USDOC would
begin with the presumption that all exporters are assigned an individual rate and would apply the
separate rate test to determine whether a single entity exists may be consistent with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. However, the fact that the NM E-wide entity policy is based on a reversal of
that presumption makes it inconsistent with the Agreement.242
7.165. We recall that, in order to be accorded a separate rate, exporters from NMEs must
demonstrate absence of government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to export
activities. Pursuant to Chapter 10 of the Anti dumping Manual, the USDOC considers three factors
in evaluating whether there de jure is absence of government control over export activities. 243 The
USDOC considers four factors in evaluating whether a respondent is subject to de facto
governmental control over its export functions.244
7.166. We have carefully considered the criteria constituting the separate rate test, as well as the
arguments of the United States. However, we are not persuaded that the alleged differences
between the IT test at stake in EC – Fasteners (China) and the separate rate test at issue in the
present dispute are sufficient in themselves to make the US practice consistent with Articles 6.10
and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.167. We observe, first, that exporters owned wholly by entities located in market economy
countries are also required to fill out the separate rate application; although the certification
process may be arguably "lighter", it still requires that the firm in question establish, although in a
different way (i.e. through affiliation with a fo reign-owned company), independence from the NME
government in order to receive an individual rate. The second category referred to by the
United States, exporters located in the NME count ry and which have been previously assigned a
separate rate, refers to those exporters that ha ve successfully rebutted the presumption (at least
in the original investigation) that they are part of the NME-wide entity in order to be eligible for a

240 United States' response to Panel question No. 11, paras. 23-38 (the quoted extract is from para. 28).
See also United States' first written submission, para. 181.
241 United States' first written submission, para. 181 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners
(China), para. 376). The criteria referred to by the United States are quoted above, in para. 7.154. See also
United States' response to Panel question No. 11, paras. 28 and 32.
242 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 41. See also Viet Nam's response to Panel question
No. 11, paras. 34-36.
243 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 4. See also Policy Bulletin 05.1,
Exhibit VN-66, p. 2. These three factors are: (i) an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an
individual exporter's business and export licences; (ii) any legislative enactments decentralizing control of
companies; and (iii) any other formal measures by the central and/or local government decentralizing control
of companies.
244 USDOC Antidumping Manual, Chapter 10, Exhibit VN-24, p. 4. See also Policy Bulletin 05.1,
Exhibit VN-66, p. 2. The four factors are: (i) whether the export prices are set by, or subject to the approval
of, a governmental authority; (ii) whether the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and
other agreements; (iii) whether the respondent has autonomy from the government in making decisions
regarding the selection of management; and (iv) whether the respondent retains the proceeds of its export
sales and makes independent decisions regarding the disposition of profits or financing of losses. We note that,
in the latter document, the third factor is worded slightly differently ("whether the respondent has autonomy
from the central, provincial and local governments in making decisions regarding the selection of its
management").

separate rate. 245 Hence, in our view, the two examples provided by the United States do not
support its argument that certain categories of exporters are not subject to the presumption.
7.168. Second, we do not believe that we need to pronounce on the relevance and/or consistency
with the covered agreements of the criteria used by the USDOC, in the context of the separate
rate test, in evaluating de jure and de facto absence of government control. Nor do we need to
pronounce on whether these criteria are consistent with the factors identified by the Appellate
Body in EC – Fasteners (China) and referred to by the United States. First, we recall that Viet Nam
does not challenge the criteria composing the separate rate test. More importantly, these criteria
are not used to establish whether several exporters are sufficiently integrated with each other or
with the State so as to justify being treated as a single NME-wide entity. The purpose of this test is
to determine whether exporters are sufficiently distinct from the State so as to overcome the
presumption that they are part of the NME-wide entity. Thus, even if we were to find, arguendo,
that some or all of the criteria used by the USDOC in its separate test are relevant or appropriate
to effectively determine that the State controls or materially influences exporters such that they
can be found to constitute a single entity, the ve ry starting point of the separate rate test, the
rebuttable presumption that a NME-wide entity exists, and the evidentiary burden placed on
exporters to overcome that presumption, gives rise to an inconsistency with Articles 6.10 and 9.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
246 Therefore, the criteria used under the separate rate test
cannot save the measure from being found inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2, even if, per se,
they might be relevant or appropriate for determining that two or more exporters are sufficiently
related among themselves or with the government so that they constitute a single entity.
247
7.169. In light of the above, we maintain our conclusion that the policy or practice whereby in
anti-dumping proceedings involving NME countries, the USDOC applies a rebuttable presumption
that, in such countries, all companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity and assigns a single rate
to that entity is inconsistent with the obligatio ns contained in Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
7.170. However, before concluding our analysis of the consistency of the measure at issue with
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t, we turn to the question whether Viet Nam's
Accession Protocol provides a legal basis for the rebuttable presumption that, in Viet Nam, all
companies are part of a single, Viet Nam-wide entity and should be assigned a single rate. We
discuss the role of Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession here for the sake of a complete discussion of
Viet Nam's arguments in support of its "as such" claim. We note, however, that the role of
Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession is equally, if not more, relevant in the context of Viet Nam's "as
applied" claim. Therefore, any conclusions we reach with respect to Viet Nam's Protocol of
Accession in this context will be applicable mutatis mutandis t o o u r a n a l y s i s o f V i e t N a m ' s " a s
applied" claims below.
7.171. The United States argues that Viet Nam's Working Party Report provides "legal (as well as
factual) support" for treating multiple companies in Viet Nam as part of a Viet Nam-wide entity for
the purpose of determining a margin of dumping.
248 Viet Nam submits that its Accession Protocol
and Working Party Report provide that the prov isions of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement "shall apply" in anti-dumping proceedi ngs involving exports from Viet Nam, subject to

245 Separate Rate Certification for Firms Previously Awarded Separate Rate Status, Exhibit US-73. We
also observe that the Separate Rate Certification indicates, inter alia, that "completion of this Certification does
not guarantee separate rate status for this POR" and "companies who had changes to corporate structure,
ownership, or to the official company name may not file a Separate Rate Certification but must instead file a
Separate Rate Application" (Exhibit US-73, p. 2). We also note that, under the Separate Rate Certification,
firms must also certify absence of de jure or de facto government control. While wholly foreign-owned entities
are not requested to respond to most questions related to de jure control, they are required to respond to
certain questions related to de facto government control. See Exhibit US-73, pp. 8-9.
246 Viet Nam does not contest the criteria relied upon by the USDOC. Viet Nam even concedes that "if …
the USDOC began with the presumption that all exporters are assigned individual rates and then applied the
'separate rate test', to exporters to determine if they are part of a single entity, the practice may be consistent
with Articles 6.10 and 9.2". (Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 41.)
247 We observe that, in EC – Fasteners (China), the Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion with
respect to the IT test under consideration in that dispute. See Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 377.
248 United States' second written submission, para. 70. The United States' arguments with respect to
this issue are summarized above, paragraphs 7.137. - 7.138.

one special rule, namely the right for an investigating authority to use an alternate methodology
when calculating normal value.249
7.172. China, as a third party, submits that pa ragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report is
similar in substance to Article 15 of China's Protocol of Accession. In China's view, the sole issue
addressed by subparagraph (a) of each provision is the issue of whether to use domestic prices or
costs in China/Viet Nam when determining price comparability in anti-dumping proceedings.
According to China, it is clear that the Anti-Dum ping Agreement, including Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4
and 6.8, applies in anti-dumping proceedings agai nst imports from China/Viet Nam with the only
exceptions explicitly stated in the subparagraph (a) of each provision. Hence, other WTO Members
are not allowed to discriminate against imports from China/Viet Nam in anti-dumping proceedings,
for purposes other than the determination of normal value. China is of the view that this
understanding has been confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China).
250
7.173. Turning first to the relevant provisions of Viet Nam's Working Party Report, we observe
that the Report indicates that, during Viet Nam's accession negotiations to the WTO, certain
Members considered that the fact that Viet Nam ha d not yet transitioned to a full market economy
might cause certain difficulties in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports from Viet Nam. This
concern is reflected in paragraph 254 of the Working Party Report, which states that:
Several Members noted that Viet Nam was continuing the process of transition
towards a full market economy. Those Members noted that under those
circumstances, in the case of imports of Vietnamese origin into a WTO Member,
special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price comparability in the
context of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty investigations. Those
Members stated that in such cases, the importing WTO Member might find it
necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic
costs and prices in Viet Nam might not always be appropriate.
251
7.174. In light of such difficulties, paragraph 255 of the Working Party Report provides in relevant
part:
The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that, upon accession, the following would
apply − Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trad e 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and
the SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving exports from Viet Nam into a
WTO Member consistent with the following:
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO
Member shall use either Vietnamese prices or costs for the industry under
investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison
with domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam based on the following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the
like product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of
that product, the importing WTO Member shall use Vietnamese
prices or costs for the industry under investigation in determining
price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is
not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in
Viet Nam if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show
that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing

249 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 36-37. Viet Nam's arguments with respect to this issue
are summarized above, at paragraph 7.134.
250 China's third-party written submission, paras. 36-36 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC –
Fasteners (China), para. 290).
251 Viet Nam's Working Party Report, para. 254.

the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of
that product.
…
(d) Once Viet Nam has established, under the national law of the
importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of
subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing
Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of
accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall
expire on 31 December 2018. In addition, should Viet Nam establish,
pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market
economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-
market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to
that industry or sector.
7.175. Provisions contained in Accession Protocols are binding upon the parties and are therefore
treaty text to be interpreted pursuant to customary rules of interpretation, in particular Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention. By virtue of paragraph 2 of Viet Nam's Accession Protocol, the
commitment contained in paragraph 255 of its Working Party Report is incorporated by reference
into the Accession Protocol and is therefore treaty language. In contrast, paragraph 254 is not
referred to in Viet Nam's Accession Protocol and, therefore, is not treaty text.
252
7.176. The introductory clause of paragraph 255 states, in relevant parts, that "Article VI of the
GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Ar ticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") … shall apply … consistent with the following". This
introductory clause is then followed by four sub-paragraphs, two of which – paragraphs (a) and (d)
– deal with the treatment of imports from Viet Nam in anti-dumping proceedings. 253 Hence, we
understand that paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report confirms that Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement apply in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports
from Viet Nam, subject to the provisions contained in sub-paragraphs (a) and (d).
7.177. Pursuant to paragraph 255(a), other WTO Members may, if the producers under
investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the relevant industry,
determine the normal value on a basis other than domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam.
254 Thus,
the derogation provided for under paragraph 255(a) is a limited one, which only concerns the
determination of normal value, and does not extend to the determination of export price.
7.178. We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 contains a similar
recognition of the difficulties which may exist in determining price comparability in the case of
imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly over its trade
and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State. 255 Like paragraph 255(a) of Viet Nam's

252 Paragraph 2 of Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession states, in relevant parts, that "[t]his Protocol, which
shall include the commitments referred to in paragraph 527 of the Working Party Report, shall be an integral
part of the WTO Agreement". Paragraph 255 of the Working Party Report is listed in paragraph 527, unlike
paragraph 254. See Viet Nam's Accession Protocol, para. 2 and Viet Nam's Working Party Report, para. 527.
253 Subparagraph (b) deals with proceedings under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures and subparagraph (c) concerns notifications to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and to the
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. These two provisions are not at stake in this dispute and
we shall not address them further.
254 Paragraph 255(a) provides that, in determining price comparability, the importing WTO Member may
use either of two methods to establish normal value, i.e. "Vietnamese prices or costs for the industry under
investigation" or "a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in
Viet Nam". Paragraph 255(d) sets forth different instances in which the special rule for the determination of
price comparability in paragraph (a) will cease to apply: paragraph (a) shall terminate with respect to Viet Nam
or particular sectors or industries in Viet Nam, once Viet Nam has established, under the national law of the
importing country, that, respectively, "it is a market economy" or that "market economy conditions prevail in a
particular industry or sector". Paragraph 255(d) indicates, moreover, that "the provisions of
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire on 31 December 2018".
255 The second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 states:
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special
difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in

Working Party Report, the Ad Note allows investigating authorities to depart from a "strict
comparison with domestic prices", thus suggesting that this provision provides flexibility with
respect to the determination of normal value.
256 In EC – Fasteners (China) , the Appellate Body
remarked that:
The recognition of special difficulties in determining price comparability in the second
Ad Note to Article VI:1 does not mean that importing Members may depart from the
provisions regarding the determination of export prices and the calculation of dumping
margins and anti-dumping duties set forth in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and in the
GATT 1994. While the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to difficulties in
determining price comparability in general, the text of this provision clarifies that
these difficulties relate exclusively to the no rmal value side of the comparison. This is
indicated by the operative part in the third sentence of this provision, which only
allows importing Members to depart from a "strict comparison with domestic
prices".257
7.179. In our view, neither the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 nor
paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report can be read as allowing WTO Members to treat
Viet Nam differently for purposes other than the determination of normal value.
7.180. We further observe that, pursuant to subparagraph 255(a)(i), the importing WTO Member
"shall use Vietnamese prices or costs" if the producers under investigation "clearly show" that
market economy conditions prevail. If Vietname se producers succeed in showing that market
economy conditions prevail, the importing Member shall then use Vietnamese prices or costs when
determining price comparability, i.e. in the determination of normal value. Conversely, when
Vietnamese producers do not succeed in showing that market economy conditions prevail, the
importing Member "may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic
prices and costs in Viet Nam", pursuant to paragraph 255(a)(ii). In our view, a failure by
Vietnamese producers to show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing
the product under investigation only allows the importing Member to treat those producers
differently with respect to the determination of normal value because the scope of the derogation
conceded by Viet Nam in its Protocol of Accession concerns exclusively the determination of normal
value. Hence, paragraph 255(a) of Viet Nam's Working Party Report does not authorize importing
Members to treat Viet Nam differently for purposes other than the determination of normal value.
7.181. We find therefore that, in anti-dumping proceedings involving imports from Viet Nam,
paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report, as incorporated in Viet Nam's Accession
Protocol, authorizes WTO Members to treat Viet Nam differently from other Members with respect
to the determination of price comparability in respect of domestic prices and costs in Viet Nam,
that is, the determination of normal value. However, this provision does not provide for a general
exception permitting different treatment of Vietnamese exporters for other purposes, such as the
application of a presumption that, in Viet Nam, all companies belong to a single, Viet Nam-wide
entity, and should receive a single rate.
7.182. Our reading of paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report comports with the
Appellate Body's reading of virtually identical provisions contained in Section 15 of China's Protocol
of Accession.
258 In EC – Fasteners (China), in assessing the European Union's arguments on appeal
under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body examined the
extent to which China's Protocol of Accession allowed the European Union to apply different rules
to China than to other Members in anti-dumping proceedings. The Appellate Body concluded:
In our view, therefore, Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol does not authorize
WTO Members to treat China differently from other Members except for the

such cases importing Members may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a
strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.
256 Article 2.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that Article 2 "is without prejudice to the second
Supplementary Provision in paragraph 1 to Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994".
257 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), footnote 460 to para. 285. (italics original,
underlining added)
258 The language of Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol is materially identical to that of
paragraph 255.

determination of price comparability in respect of domestic prices and costs in China,
which relates to the determination of normal value. We consider that, while
Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol establishes special rules regarding the
domestic price aspect of price comparability, it does not contain an open-ended
exception that allows WTO Members to treat China differently for other purposes
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, such as the determination of
export prices or individual versus country-wide margins and duties.
259
7.183. The United States discusses in detail various provisions and Annexes of Viet Nam's
Working Party Report, which, in its view, provide evidence that Viet Nam is an NME and, thus,
justify USDOC's treatment of Vietnamese producers and exporters.
260 The United States describes
the specificities of market vs. non-market economy conditions, and submits that, in the latter, the
role of the government in controlling resource allocation justifies the concerns expressed in
Viet Nam's Working Party Report and, in turn, the application of a single government-entity rate or
of a presumption that all companies in Viet Na m are controlled by the Government. According to
the United States, the issue presented in the disp ute is a "mixed question of fact and law" and
"there is no clear dividing line between what amounts to 'factual' versus 'legal' support".
261 The
United States also points to Viet Nam's Constitution262 and to "many other examples [in Viet Nam's
Working Party Report] confirming that Vietnam had not yet shifted completely away from a
centrally planned economy to a market-based economy". 263 The United States concludes that,
given the presumption that, in NME countries, the government effectively controls resource
allocations, "it would make no sense to automatically assign individual dumping margins to
different sets of exports that are all associated with Vietnamese companies under the
government's control".
264
7.184. Viet Nam submits that, while the Working Party Report describes the prevailing economic
conditions present in Viet Nam at the time of the Report, nowhere in the Report or the Accession
Protocol does Viet Nam make generalized concessions based on those economic conditions.
Viet Nam argues that there is no textual basis in the Protocol which would allow Members to
presume the existence of an NME-wide entity and that no legal basis can be assumed; hence, the
Panel should conclude, like the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China), that Viet Nam's Protocol
does not contain an open-ended exception that al lows WTO Members to treat Viet Nam differently
from a market economy country. Viet Nam also submits that the United States' attempt to turn the
issue into a question of facts is a distraction from the fundamental issue which is, as in EC –
Fasteners (China), that an authority cannot use a presumption to apply a single rate to multiple
entities because the covered agreements do not allow for the use of such a presumption.
265
7.185. We have examined the factual evidence submitted by the United States regarding the
characteristics of NMEs' economic systems in general and Viet Nam's economy in particular, and
the concerns that these characteristics may raise in the WTO system. We believe, however, that
the factual evidence presented by the United States with the aim of showing that Viet Nam is an
NME is not relevant to the resolution of the legal question we need to address, namely whether the

259 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 290.
260 United States' second written submission, paras. 71-74 (referring to Viet Nam's Working Party
Report, paras. 52, 56, 57, 60, and 253-255; Annex 2, Table 4, para. 83; Annex 2, Tables 1 and 2).
261 United States' second written submission, para. 70.
262 Viet Nam Constitution, Chapt. II, Art. 15 (partial document), Exhibit US-81, Article 15.
263 United States' second written submission, paras. 71-72. The United States refers in particular to
certain paragraphs contained in the section of the Working Party Report discussing state-owned enterprises
("SOEs") and which show, according to the United States, that "the open-ended list of such enterprises … is
extensive and encompasses industries and sectors far beyond those normally considered national security-
related or natural monopolies". See United States' second written submission, para. 72 (referring to Viet Nam's
Working Party Report, paras. 52, 56, 57 and 60, and Annex 2, Table 4). The United States also points to "a
long list of industries in which investment was prohibited, conditional or restricted" in Viet Nam. See
United States' second written submission, para. 72, referring to Viet Nam's Working Party Report, Tables 1
and 2 in Annex 2. These tables contain a list of goods and services sectors where business is prohibited or
subject to conditions. Viet Nam's Working Party Report, Annex 2, Tables 1 and 2.
264 United States' second written submission, paras. 75-76 (referring to N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of
Microeconomics (South-Western Centage Learning 2012) (partial document), Exhibit US-84, pp. 10-11 and 84;
and Paul R. Gregory & Robert C. Stuart, Comparing Economic Systems in the Twenty-First Century (Houghton
Mifflin Company 2004) (partial document), Exhibit US-85, pp. 25-31).
265 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 36-38.

United States is entitled to presume that, in Viet Nam, all companies belong to a single, Viet Nam-
wide entity, and should be assigned a single rate.
7.186. We recall that our task is to assess the legal question of whether the treatment of NMEs by
the USDOC in anti-dumping investigations under the challenged measure is consistent with the
requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The factual information provided by the
United States concerning the economic specificities of NME countries in general and of Viet Nam in
particular must be distinguished from the legal question as to how, under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, an investigating authority may use that information in an anti-dumping proceeding.
Whether an investigating authority is allowed, in an anti-dumping proceeding involving an NME, to
presume that all exporters belong to a single, government-wide entity is a legal question. In our
view, the factual evidence tabled by the United States, cannot, in and of itself, justify a WTO
Member treating Vietnamese exporters differently from any other Member's exporters in the
absence of a clear textual basis in Viet Nam's Accession Protocol. Hence, we also disagree with the
United States' proposition that Viet Nam's Working Party Report contains an "underlying"
presumption that NME conditions prevail in Viet Nam, which, in turn, would, according to the
United States, justify the application of a single "government-entity" rate.
266
7.187. We observe that, in EC – Fasteners (China) , the Appellate Body drew a similar distinction,
finding that:
the economic structure of a WTO Member may be used as evidence before an
investigating authority to determine whethe r the State and a number of exporters or
producers subject to an investigation are sufficiently related to constitute a single
entity such that a single margin should be calculated and a single duty be imposed on
them. It cannot, however, be used to imply a legal presumption that has not been
written into the covered agreements.
… the evidence submitted by the European Union concerning NMEs in general and
China in particular is not relevant to the legal question of whether the European Union
is permitted to presume under Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation that the State
and the exporters are a single exporter for purposes of Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. The review of this evidence reveals that it is possible that in
specific circumstances an investigating authority may reach the conclusion that the
State and certain exporters are so closely related that they constitute a single entity.
However, the evidence submitted by the European Union cannot establish that the
economic structure in China justifies a general presumption that the State and all the
exporters in all industries that might be subject to an anti-dumping investigation
constitute a single legal entity, where no legal basis for such a presumption is
provided for in the covered agreements.267
7.188. We find that the evidence submitted by the United States regarding the economic
characteristics of NMEs in general and Viet Nam in particular cannot justify a general presumption
that, in NME countries (including in Viet Nam), all exporters belong to a single, government-wide
entity, where no legal basis for such a presumptio n is provided for in the covered agreements. We
conclude therefore, that the evidence submitted to the Panel regarding the operation of NMEs in
general and Viet Nam in particular is not relevant to the legal question of whether the
United States is entitled to presume the existence of an NME-wide entity and assign a single rate
to that entity.
268
7.189. The United States also argues that "price comparability", referred to in paragraph 255, is a
central tenet of a dumping analysis. 269 The United States appears to derive two main inferences
from the reference to "price comparability": (i) th e term "price comparability" must be understood
as making reference to both normal value and export price because both are necessary to ensure

266 United States' second written submission, paras. 74-76. See also United States' first written
submission, para. 166.
267 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 367 and 369. (italics original, underline
added)
268 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 370.
269 United States' second written submission, para. 80; opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 25.

appropriate price comparability; and (ii) the ne ed to ensure appropriate comparability between
normal value and export price, in turn, provides a reasonable basis for the USDOC to presume that
Vietnamese companies belong to the Viet Nam-wide entity. 270 The United States also argues that
the presumption in paragraph 255 of the Working Pa rty Report makes it "legally permissible" for
the USDOC to presume government influence, which, in turn, also makes it legally permissible and
in fact "the most logical step for purposes of price comparability", to presume that all companies
belong to the Viet Nam-wide entity for purposes of the calculation of export price.
271
7.190. Leaving aside the seemingly circular arguments and inferences made by the United States,
our reading of the term "price comparability" in paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report
is narrower than the reading proposed by the Unit ed States. We agree that "price comparability"
for the purpose of a dumping analysis involves a comparison between normal value and export
price. However, while paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report acknowledges that there
may be certain difficulties in determining price comparability in respect of imports from Viet Nam,
we have already found that the text of paragraph 255 clarifies that these difficulties can relate only
to "Vietnamese prices or costs" (sub-paragraph 255(a)(i)) / "domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam"
(sub-paragraph 255(a)(ii)). Hence, as we stated ab ove, these difficulties can relate only to the
determination of normal value. Therefore, the reference to "price comparability" in paragraph 255
cannot be interpreted to also include the right to resort to a different methodology with respect to
the determination of export price.
7.191. The United States also submits that Viet Nam could have challenged, in the present
dispute, the USDOC's decision to treat Viet Nam as an NME and/or the NME methodology used by
the USDOC for calculating normal value, and the fa ct that it did not "supports the presumption"
that each exporter is controlled by the government.
272 In our view, the fact that Viet Nam did not
challenge before the Panel the 2002 USDOC decision to treat it as an NME for the purpose of anti-
dumping proceedings cannot imply any kind of acknowledgement, on the part of Viet Nam,
regarding the existence of a "Viet Nam-wide entity" or regarding any right for the United States to
presume the existence of such an entity under the covered agreements. Viet Nam had no reason
to challenge before the Panel USDOC's decision to treat it as an NME and to use a different
methodology to calculate normal value since this possibility is specifically provided for in
paragraph 255(a) of its Working Party Report.
7.192. Therefore, we also disagree with the United States that paragraph 255 "modifies" the
obligations contained in Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
273 A s w e s t a t e d
above, paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working Party Report only allows importing Members to
derogate from the disciplines of the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement with respect to the methodology
used to calculate normal value. However, nothing in paragraph 255 indicates that this provision
provides for a derogation from the obligations to assign an individual dumping margin pursuant to
Article 6.10 and an individual anti-dumping duty ra te pursuant to Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
7.193. We conclude, therefore, that the USDOC's policy or practice whereby, in anti-dumping
proceedings involving NMEs, it presumes that all companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity,
and assigns a single rate to that entity is incons istent "as such" with Article 6.10 and Article 9.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.4.2.4 Whether the NME-wide entity rate prac tice is inconsistent with Articles 9.4, 6.8
and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.194. We recall our finding above that, while the evidence on the record indicates that the
USDOC often calculates the rate for the NME-wide entity based on facts available, it does not
establish that the USDOC consistently uses a defined methodology to calculate the NME-wide
entity rate or systematically bases that rate on facts available. Therefore, we concluded that
Viet Nam had failed to establish that the USDOC's methodology used to calculate the NME-wide
entity rate, in particular as it refers to the use of facts available, is a rule or norm that constitutes
a measure of general and prospective application which can be challenged as such. This being the

270 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
271 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 28.
272 United States' first written submission, para. 162; response to Panel question No. 14(a), para. 41.
273 United States' second written submission, para. 86.

case, we find that Viet Nam did not establish that the alleged measure is "as such" inconsistent
with Articles 6.8 and 9.4, and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.4.3 Claims with respect to the application of the NME-wide entity rate practice in the
administrative reviews at issue
7.4.3.1 Introduction
7.195. Viet Nam claims that the Viet Nam-wide rate applied in the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp order is inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.4, 6.8
and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The United States requests that we reject
Viet Nam's claims of inconsistency.
7.196. Before addressing Viet Nam's claims of inconsistency, we set out the relevant facts
concerning the three administrative reviews at issue. We will then examine whether Viet Nam has
demonstrated that one or more of the measures at issue is inconsistent with the provisions it cites.
7.4.3.2 Factual background
7.197. In the fourth administrative review, th e USDOC started with the rebuttable presumption
that "all companies within the country are subject to government control and, thus, should be
assigned a single antidumping duty deposit rate".
274 It selected two separate rate companies –
Minh Phu and Nha Trang – for individual examination on the ground that they were "the largest
exporters, by volume, of subject merchandise during the POR". 275 The rate assigned to the
separate rate companies was based on the simple average of the individual margins calculated for
the two mandatory respondents and amounted to 3.92%.
276 The USDOC further stated "we are
applying a single antidumping rate, i.e . the Vietnam-wide entity rate, to all other exporters of
subject merchandise from Vietnam" and set that rate at 25.76%. The USDOC did not explain how
this rate was determined, other than to say that the rate assigned to the Viet Nam-wide entity is
"the entity's current rate and only rate ever determined for the entity in this proceeding".
277
7.198. In the fifth administrative review, the USDOC recalled that "[i]n proceedings involving non-
market economy ("NME") countries, the Department begins with a rebuttable presumption that all
companies within the country are subject to government control and thus, should be assigned a
single antidumping duty deposit rate".
278 It selected the three largest exporters as mandatory
respondents, namely Camimex, Minh Phu and Nha Trang. 279 Twenty-seven companies successfully
met the criteria for separate rate status and received a separate rate of 1.03%, calculated on the
basis of the weighted-average margins determined for Camimex and Minh Phu.
280 With respect to
non-separate rate companies, the USDOC observed that "no party has submitted evidence of the
proceeding to demonstrate that … government influence is no longer present or that our treatment
of the NME entity is otherwise incorrect. Therefor e, we are assigning the entity's current rate of
25.76%, the only rate ever determined for the Vietnam-wide entity in this proceeding".
281
7.199. In the sixth administrative review, the USDOC again recalled that "[i]n NME countries, the
Department begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country are

274 Notice of initiation for the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-06, p. 13178.
275 Preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12207. Minh Phu and
Nha Trang received a final rate of, respectively, 2.95% and 4.89%. See amended final determination in the
fourth administrative review, Exhibit US-08, p. 61123.
276 Amended final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit US-08, p. 61123.
277 Final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13, pp. 47773 and 47776;
preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12211.
278 Notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-10, p. 18154.
279 Preliminary determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-15; final determination in the
fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18.
280 Amended final determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit US-09, p. 64309. In the final
determination, the USDOC explains that "[t]he separate rate is determined based on the estimated weighted-
average anti-dumping margins established for exporters and producers individually investigated, excluding
zeroing and de minimis margins or margins based entirely on facts available". (Final determination in the
fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18, p. 56160.)
281 Preliminary determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-15, p. 12059. See also final
determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18.

subject to government control and thus should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate". 282 It
selected the two largest exporters – Minh Phu and Nha Trang – as mandatory respondents. 283 The
USDOC calculated a separate rate of 0.88%, corresponding to the simple average of the margins
for the two mandatory respondents.
284 With respect to some 30 companies that did not
demonstrate eligibility for a separate rate, the USDOC noted that "no party has submitted
evidence of the proceeding to demonstrate that su ch government influence is no longer present or
that our treatment of the NME entity is otherwise incorrect. Therefore, we are assigning the entity
rate of 25.76%, the only rate ever determined for the Vietnam-wide entity in this proceeding". 285
The Viet Nam-wide entity rate of 25.76% was confirmed in the final determination.286
7.200. To sum up, in each of the reviews at issue, the USDOC began with a rebuttable
presumption that all shrimp exporters and producers in Viet Nam are operating units of a single,
Viet Nam-wide entity. Exporters and producers that established sufficient independence from
government control with respect to their export ac tivities qualified for "separate rate status". In
each review, the USDOC decided to limit the number of respondents for individual examination and
selected the largest producers/exporters as mandatory respondents on the basis of USCPB data.
Mandatory respondents were assigned an individual dumping margin calculated on the basis of a
surrogate normal value that the USDOC determined for Viet Nam and each exporter's own export
prices. Exporters with separate rate status wh ich were not selected as mandatory respondents
received the "separate rate", a rate based on the simple or weighted-average of the rate of the
mandatory respondents in each review. Vietnamese companies which did not successfully establish
independence from the Vietnamese Government, or which did not apply for separate rate status,
were assigned the Viet Nam-wide rate of 25.76% in each review.
7.4.3.3 Whether the Viet Nam- wide entity rate applied in the administrative reviews at
issue is inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.4.3.3.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.4.3.3.1.1 Viet Nam
7.201. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's presumption of the existence of a Viet Nam-wide entity
in the proceedings at issue does not comply with the plain language of Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Viet Nam argues that, in the three administrative reviews at issue, the
USDOC did not establish, as a factual matter, the ex istence of a single entity but, instead, relied
on a presumption that all entities within Viet Nam belong to a single entity under the control of the
government. Viet Nam refers to its arguments made in connection with its claim that the USDOC's
practice of presuming that all exporters belong to a single, government-wide entity is, as such,
inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According to Viet Nam, the
USDOC's practice of presuming a Viet Nam-wide enti ty and assigning a single rate to that entity,
as applied in the proceedings at issue, resulted in violation of the obligation, contained in
Articles 6.10 and 9.2, that investigating authorities determine individual dumping margins and
anti-dumping duties for exporters and producers.
287
7.4.3.3.1.2 United States
7.202. The United States argues that treating related companies in the covered reviews as a
single exporter or producer for the purpose of determining a dumping margin is consistent with
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According to the United States, the
USDOC's conclusion that multiple companies in Viet Nam are part of a Viet Nam-government entity
is based on a permissible interpretation of Arti cles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

282 Preliminary determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-19, p. 13550.
283 Amended final determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-22, p. 64102.
284 Amended final determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-22, pp. 64102-64103.
285 Preliminary determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-19, p. 13552.
286 Final determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-20.
287 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 148-153. Viet Nam's arguments with respect to the WTO-
consistency of the NME-wide entity rate with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are set out
in more details in Section 7.4.2.3.1 above.

The United States requests, therefore, that the Panel find that the USDOC's conclusions in the
three administrative reviews at issue are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.288
7.4.3.3.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.203. The present claims raise the issue of whether, in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative
reviews, the application by the USDOC of a rebuttable presumption that all shrimp
producers/exporters in Viet Nam are operating units of a single, Viet Nam-wide entity, and the
determination of a single dumping margin for, and application of, a single anti-dumping rate to
that entity, is inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.204. We recall our finding above that, pursuant to Article 6.10, investigating authorities have an
obligation to determine individual margins of du mping for each known producer/exporter. This
obligation is subject to the exception contained in the second sentence of Article 6.10 and may be
subject to other exceptions as well, as long as these exceptions are provided for in the covered
agreements. We also found that, pursuant to Articl e 9.2, individual anti-dumping duties must be
specified for each supplier, except where this is impracticable.
289
7.205. We further recall our factual finding that, in each administrative review at issue in the
present dispute, the USDOC began with a rebuttable presumption that all shrimp exporters and
producers in Viet Nam are part of a single, Viet Nam-wide entity, and determined a single dumping
margin for and applied a single anti-dumping rate to that entity. We also found that, in order to be
eligible for an individual rate, Vietnamese exporters and producers were required to pass the
"separate rate test" by demonstrating independence from the Government of Viet Nam.
7.206. Having concluded that the USDOC's policy or practice whereby, in anti-dumping
proceedings involving NMEs, it presumes that all companies belong to a single, NME-wide entity,
and assigns a single rate to that entity is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 6.10 and 9.2
290, we
do not see how the application of that practice in the three administrative reviews at issue could
be found consistent with those same two provisions.
7.207. We also recall our finding above that nothing in paragraph 255 of Viet Nam's Working
Party Report, as incorporated into Viet Nam's Protocol of Accession, indicates that this provision
provides for a derogation from the obligations to assign an individual dumping margin pursuant to
Article 6.10 and an individual anti-dumping duty ra te pursuant to Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.291 These conclusions are applicable mutatis mutandis to our consideration of
Viet Nam's "as applied" claims.
7.208. Therefore, we conclude that the application by the USDOC, in the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative reviews, of a presumption of the existence of a Viet Nam-wide entity and
application of a single rate to that entity is in consistent Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
7.4.3.4 Whether the Viet Nam- wide entity rate applied in the administrative reviews at
issue is inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.4.3.4.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.4.3.4.1.1 Viet Nam
7.209. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's failure to assign the Viet Nam-entity a rate calculated
pursuant to the methodology provided for in Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement amounts

288 United States' first written submission, paras. 146 and 183. The United States' arguments with
respect to the WTO-consistency of the NME-wide entity rate are set out in more details above in
Section 7.4.2.3.1 . As noted above in footnote 204 of this Report, the United States argued more extensively
with respect to the consistency with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 in its response to Viet Nam's "as applied" claims;
however, because we first consider Viet Nam's "as such" claims, we considered it appropriate to provide a
more complete summary of the United States' arguments in the section of the Report addressing those claims.
289 See above paras. 7.148. -7.149.
290 See above para. 7.193.
291 See above paras. 7.170. -7.192.

to a violation of that provision. According to Viet Nam, in each of the three administrative reviews
at issue, the USDOC limited the number of investigated companies, and then assigned
two different rates to the companies not selected for individual examination, i.e. one rate to the
so-called Viet Nam-wide entity, and a different rate to companies that qualified for a separate rate.
Viet Nam submits that the difference between the two rates is substantial since the separate rate
is based on a simple (in the fourth and sixth administrative reviews) or weighted (in the
fifth administrative review) average of the rates the USDOC calculated for the mandatory
respondents, whereas the Viet Nam-wide entity ra te is based on facts available. According to
Viet Nam, the text of Article 9.4 requires that, where an investigating authority has limited its
examination, it must calculate an anti-dumping duty for all companies not individually investigated
that is no greater than the weighted average margin of dumping of the selected companies,
excluding rates that are zero, de minimis or based on facts available. Viet Nam agrees with the
conclusions of the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) which found that "there is nothing in
Article 9.4 suggesting that authorities are entitled to render application of an 'all others' rate
conditional on the fulfilment of some additional requirement". Viet Nam submits that the Viet Nam-
wide entity should have received a rate calculated pursuant to Article 9.4.
292
7.210. According to Viet Nam, the record before the Panel clearly shows that, in each
administrative review at issue, the USDOC conducted a limited examination within the meaning of
Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that the Viet Nam-wide entity was never selected
for individual examination. Viet Nam contends that, since it was not individually examined, the
V i e t N a m - w i d e e n t i t y s h o u l d h a v e r e c e i v e d a n a n t i - d u m p i n g d u t y r a t e c a l c u l a t e d i n a m a n n e r
consistent with Article 9.4. Viet Nam also submits that, contrary to what is asserted by the
United States, requests for reviews were made in the three administrative reviews at issue for
companies presumed to be part of the Viet Nam-wide entity. According to Viet Nam, by arguing
that Article 9.4 does not apply to the Viet Nam-wide entity because the entity was assigned a rate
in previous segments of the proceedings, the United States attempts to read into Article 9.4
exceptions that do not exist. Viet Nam initially argued that a Member may not apply more than
one rate to producers/exporters which were not individually examined. Viet Nam later
acknowledged that it may be possible for an authority to assign multiple different rates to
companies not individually examined, but mainta ined that all such rates must comply with
Article 9.4.
293 Viet Nam concludes that the USDOC's failure to assign to the Viet Nam-wide entity a
margin consistent with Article 9.4 constitutes a violation of Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.294
7.4.3.4.1.2 United States
7.211. The United States submits that the rate assi gned to the Viet Nam-wide entity is not an "all
others" rate subject to the limit provided for in Article 9.4. In the United States' view, the
Viet Nam-wide entity was not assigned a country-wide rate, but was individually examined and
received its own rate, i.e. a rate based on facts available, after being included in the examination
in the anti-dumping duty proceeding and failing to cooperate. This rate was assigned to the
companies that had not claimed or established that they were free from government control and
were thus properly considered to be parts of the single government entity that the UDSOC
identified as an "exporter" or "producer" consistent with Article 6.10 of the Agreement. According
to the United States, Article 9.4 does not obligate Members to replace an existing WTO-consistent
rate that was individually determined for an entity that had failed to cooperate in the proceeding,
with a different rate that is based on an average rate of producers/exporters that fully cooperated.
The United States further submits that Article 9. 4 does not impose an obligation to calculate a
"single" anti-dumping duty for producers/exporters not individually examined, but, as explained by
the Appellate Body in US – Hot Rolled Steel , this provision simply identifies a maximum limit, or
ceiling, which authorities shall not exceed in establishing an "all others" rate. According to the
United States, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require that a particular label be assigned to
the rate in effect for the Viet Nam-wide entity. The rate applied to the Viet Nam-government entity
is not inconsistent with the obligations in the Agreement because it was the rate in effect, and
neither the Viet Nam-government entity nor any Vietnamese companies that were part of the

292 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 158-174 (referring to Panel Report, US – Shrimp
(Viet Nam), para. 7.245).
293 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 159; second written submission, para. 51.
294 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 19-20; second written
submission, paras. 51-53; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 15-17.

entity requested that the rate be changed. Because neither the Viet Nam-wide entity nor any
constituent parts of the entity requested a change to the existing rate of the Viet Nam-wide entity,
the USDOC's decision to apply that rate in the three administrative reviews at issue was not
inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
295
7.4.3.4.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.212. China concurs with the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) that nothing in Article 9.4 entitles
authorities to render application of an "all others" rate conditional upon the fulfilment of some
additional requirements, such as a separate rate test. 296 China opines that the Panel is not
necessarily required to decide whether Article 9.4 requires a single "all others" rate, but will have
to first determine whether the Viet Nam-wide entity was individually investigated. Should the
answer be negative, the Panel could reach th e conclusion that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 9.4 by assigning a rate based on facts available to the Viet Nam-wide
entity.
7.213. The European Union is of the view that Article 9.4 does not require that there be a single
"all others" rate. According to the European Union, Article 9.4 contains a ceiling on the amount of
any rate applied, not on the number of different rates applied.
297
7.214. Thailand submits that Article 9.4 does not require that there be a single "all others" rate
provided that those rates are based on the differe nt levels of cooperation established throughout
the proceedings.298
7.4.3.4.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.215. Article 9.4 provides, in relevant part:
When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second
sentence of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any anti-dumping duty applied to imports from
exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:
(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the
selected exporters or producers …
provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any
zero and de minimis margins and margins established under the circumstances
referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.
7.216. We note the link between Articles 6.10 and 9.4. Under the general rule set forth in
Article 6.10, the investigating authorities must normally calculate an individual margin for "each
known exporter or producer" (hereafter "producer/exporter") of the product at issue pursuant to
Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
299 If the number of producers/exporters is too large for
individual examination of each producer/exporte r to be practicable, Article 6.10 allows the
investigating authorities to "limit their examination" to a group of producers/exporters selected in
accordance with the methods set out in Article 6.10 itself. In cases where the authority limits its
examination under Article 6.10, an anti-dumpi ng duty may nonetheless be applied to the
producers/exporters not individually examined. Articl e 9.4 specifies that the rate of any such duty
(commonly referred to as an "all others" duty rate) may not exceed a ceiling calculated pursuant
to Article 9.4, i.e. the weighted average margin of dumping established for the selected,
individually-examined producers/exporters, excluding zero, de minimis and facts available
margins. It is noteworthy that, as the Appellate Body concluded in US – Hot Rolled Steel ,

295 United States' first written submission, paras. 189-200; second written submission, paras. 97-98;
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 34.
296 China's third-party submission, paras. 21-24.
297 European Union's response to Panel question No. 3, paras. 15-18.
298 Thailand's response to Panel question No. 3, p. 1.
299 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 329.

Article 9.4 does not provide for a method to calculate an "all others rate", but establishes a
"ceiling" for any such rate that may be applied to unexamined producers/exporters.300
7.217. The text of Article 9.4 provides that, when an investigating authority conducts a "limited
examination" pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.10, "any" rate assigned to non-
investigated producers/exporters "shall not exceed" the ceiling calculated pursuant to Article 9.4.
While we need not decide the issue, we observe that the word "any" may be understood to mean
that there can be more than one rate assigned to non-investigated producers/exporters, and the
parties do not disagree.
301 In addition, the use of the word "any" indicates that this limitation
applies to all rates assigned to unexamined prod ucers/exporters. Thus, in our view, Article 9.4
requires that the duty rate applied to all prod ucers/exporters for which a dumping margin is not
individually determined shall, without exception, not exceed the ceiling calculated pursuant to
Article 9.4.
7.218. The main question we must address in order to resolve Viet Nam's claims under Article 9.4
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is whether, in the three administrative reviews at issue, the
United States was required by Article 9.4 to ensu re that the duty rate applied to the Viet Nam-
wide entity, and to any individual companies deemed to be part of that entity, did not exceed the
ceiling calculated pursuant to that provision.
7.219. In each of the requests underlying the administrative reviews at issue, domestic producers
listed companies which had been found to be part of the Viet Nam-wide entity in the previous
administrative review.302 This shows, in our view, that, in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative
reviews, US domestic producers requested a review of the rates applied to producers/exporters
under the Shrimp order, including those applied to companies deemed to be part of the Viet Nam-
wide entity. In addition, the notices of initiations for the three administrative reviews at issue
indicate that each review was initiated with respect to most, if not all, Vietnamese
producers/exporters, including those deemed to be part of the Viet Nam-wide entity.
303 The
preliminary and final determinations show that each review was conducted with respect to the
companies for which the review had been initiated, i.e. including companies deemed to be part of

300 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para. 116.
301 We note that Viet Nam's argumentation has evolved with respect to the number of rates that can
potentially be assigned pursuant to Article 9.4. In its first written submission, Viet Nam argued that Article 9.4
"envisions the calculation of only a single anti-dumping duty for all producers/exporters not individually
examined" (Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 159, emphasis original). The United States replied that
Article 9.4 does not impose an obligation to calculate a "single" rate and that Viet Nam's interpretation would
create a new obligation which is not present in that provision (United States' first written submission,
para. 195). In its second written submission, Viet Nam concedes that "[i]t is possible for an authority to assign
multiple duty rates to companies not individually investigated, but all rates must comply with the ceiling
requirement of Article 9.4" (Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 51). We consider, therefore, that we
do not need to rule on this issue.
302 Requests for Administrative Reviews Submitted by Domestic Interested Parties – Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Administrative Reviews, Exhibit VN-81. Each request attaches an annex listing the Vietnamese
producers/exporters for which the domestic producers request a review. A number of companies listed in these
annexes are identified as belonging to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the final determination of the respective
previous administrative review. Compare the requests for administrative review submitted by domestic
interested parties in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews (Exhibit VN-81) with, respectively, the
final determination in the third, fourth and fifth administrative reviews (Exhibits VN-72, footnote 19, p. 47197;
VN-13, Appendix II, p. 47777; and VN-18, Issues and Decision Memorandum, Appendix II).
303 See notice of initiation for the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-06, footnote 6 ("[i]f one of
the below named companies does not qualify for a separate rate, all other exporters of shrimp from Vietnam
who have not qualified for a separate rate are deemed to be covered by this review as part of the single
Vietnam-wide entity of which the named exporters are a part"). A similar footnote is contained in the notice of
initiation for the fifth administrative review (see Exhibit VN-10, footnote 4) and in the notice of initiation for the
sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-16, footnote 11. Note that there seems to be an error in this latter
footnote which refers to the "PRC" while it is attached to "Socialist Republic of Vietnam …" (p. 17831).
Compare also the lists of Vietnamese companies contained in, respectively, (i) final determination in
third administrative review (Exhibit VN-72, p. 47197, footnote 19) with notice of initiation for the
fourth administrative review (Exhibit VN-06, pp. 13179-13182); (ii) final determination in the fourth
administrative review (Exhibit VN-13, Appendix II) with notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review
(Exhibit VN-10, pp. 18155-18158); and (iii) final determination in fifth administrative review (Exhibit VN-18,
Issues and Decision Memorandum, Appendix II) with notice of initiation in the sixth administrative review
(Exhibit VN-16, pp. 17381-17385).

the Viet Nam-wide entity. 304 We note that, in the preliminary determination in the
fourth administrative review, the USDOC explicitly stated that "the Viet Nam-wide entity is now
under review".
305 Finally, in each review, the USDOC assigned a cash deposit rate to the Viet Nam-
wide entity and to the companies deemed to be part of that entity, i.e. the Viet Nam-wide entity
rate of 25.76%.306 Hence, it is clear to us that the three administrative reviews at issue covered
the Viet Nam-wide entity and the companies deemed to be part of that entity.307
7.220. The evidence before the Panel further sh ows that in each review, the USDOC limited the
number of producers/exporters for which it determin ed an individual margin, and that neither the
Viet Nam-wide entity nor the companies deemed to be part of that entity were selected as
mandatory respondents or otherwise individually examined under Article 6.10. In particular, the
USDOC did not request information from the Viet Nam-wide entity or any of the companies
deemed to be part of that entity in any of the reviews at issue.
308 Hence, the facts before us show
that, in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews, the Viet Nam-wide entity and the
companies deemed to constitute it were not individually examined and individual margins were not
determined for them.
7.221. In light of the above, pursuant to Articl e 9.4, the Viet Nam-wide entity and the companies
deemed to constitute that entity should have been assigned a rate not exceeding the ceiling
calculated pursuant to this provision, namely a rate not exceeding the weighted-average margin of
dumping established for the selected, individually-examined, exporters, excluding zero, de minimis
and facts available margins.
7.222. We recall that, in each of the three administrative reviews at issue,
unexamined Vietnamese exporters fell into two different categories. The first category, the
"separate rate" companies, received a rate based on the simple or weighted average of the
margins calculated for the mandatory respondents, excluding zero, de minimis or margins
calculated using facts available. The separate rate was 3.92% in the fourth review, 1.03% in the
fifth review and 0.88% in the sixth review. The separate rate applied in the fifth administrative
review was equivalent to the ceiling calculated following the methodology set forth in Article 9.4,

304 The USDOC explains, in particular, that all companies for which the review was initiated were
provided the opportunity to complete either the separate rate application or certification. See Preliminary
determinations in fourth administrative review (Exhibit VN-09, p. 12209), fifth administrative review
(Exhibit VN-15, p. 12059) and sixth administrative review (Exhibit VN-19, p. 13552).
305 Preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12209.
306 In each review, the final determination reports this rate as the "Vietnam-wide Entity Rate". The final
determination in the fourth administrative review indicates that "for all Vietnamese exporters of subject
merchandise which have not been found to be entitled to a separate rate, the cash deposit rate will be the
Vietnam-wide entity rate of 25.76 per cent" (Exhibit VN-13, p. 47777). A similar statement is found in the final
determinations in the fifth and sixth administrative reviews (Exhibits VN-18, p. 56164 and VN-20, p. 55805,
respectively). The final determinations in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews list the companies that
constitute the Viet Nam-wide entity (Exhibits VN-13, Appendix II and VN-18, Issues and Decision
Memorandum, Appendix II, respectively). The final determination in the sixth administrative review does not
list the companies constituting the Viet Nam-wide entity, but indicates that 30 companies failed to demonstrate
their eligibility for a separate rate and, therefore, were assigned the Viet Nam-wide entity rate of 25.76%
(Exhibit VN-20, p. 55802).
307 The United States seeks to draw a distinction between the Viet Nam-wide entity and its constituent
parts. The United States suggests that for the rate applicable to the entity to be under review, a request for
review must refer to both the constituent parts and the entity itself. (United States' comments on Viet Nam's
response to Panel Question No. 62, para. 4: "Vietnam's response to Question 62 fails to demonstrate that the
domestic interested party requested that Commerce change the amount of duty applicable to the Vietnam-
government entity.") We note that the United States' own arguments indicate that the Viet Nam-wide entity is
under review when a constituent part of that entity is under review, thus suggesting that no distinction is to be
drawn between the entity and its constituent parts. See e.g. United States' response to Panel question
No. 17(a) ("[b]ecause a part [i.e. Kim Anh Company Ltd] of the NME-government entity was selected for
individual examination, the NME-government entity as a whole was under individual examination");
United States' response to Panel question No. 17(d)(i) ("[a] mandatory respondent … may be either the
Vietnam-government entity (if, for example, a company that is part of the Vietnam-government entity was
selected for individual examination) or a company that is separate from that entity"); and United States'
response to Panel question No. 19(a), para. 69) ("[t]he Vietnam-government entity was not selected as a
mandatory respondent during any of the covered reviews. Notably, neither the Vietnam-government entity nor
any of its constituent parts requested a review of the rate applicable to the Vietnam-government entity during
the fourth, fifth or sixth administrative reviews"). The United States cannot have it both ways.
308 Respondent selection memoranda in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews, Exhibits VN-
07, VN-11, and VN-17.

given that it was calculated as the weighted average of the margins calculated for the mandatory
respondents, excluding zero, de minimis or margins calculated using facts available. 309 The
separate rates applied in the fourth and sixth administrative reviews were calculated as the simple,
and not weighted, average of the margin calculated for the mandatory respondents in each
case.310 However, given that in each case the Viet Nam-wide entity rate exceeds by far the highest
of the individual margins determined for mandatory respondents, it follows that it necessarily
exceeds a weighted average of those rates, and thus the ceiling calculated pursuant to Article 9.4.
In each of the three administrative reviews at is sue, the Viet Nam-wide entity (and all of the
companies deemed to be part of that entity in each review) was assigned a rate of 25.76%. Thus,
in our view it is undisputable that, in the three reviews at issue, the rate applied to the Viet Nam-
wide entity and its constituent companies exceeds the ceiling applicable under Article 9.4.
7.223. We find, therefore, that the duty rate applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity and the
companies deemed to be part of that entity in th e fourth, fifth and sixth ad ministrative reviews is
inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.4.3.5 Whether the Viet Nam- wide entity rate applied in the administrative reviews at
issue is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.4.3.5.1 Main arguments of the parties
7.4.3.5.1.1 Viet Nam
7.224. Viet Nam argues that, pursuant to Ar ticle 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an
investigating authority may make a determination on the basis of facts available only with respect
to those interested parties from which necessa ry information was required. Viet Nam refers inter
alia to the Appellate Body's statement that non-investigated exporters cannot, by definition, be
"interested parties" pursuant to Article 6.8.
311 Viet Nam further submits that the necessary or
essential information referred to in Article 6.8 is the information necessary to calculate an anti-
dumping margin pursuant to Article 2 and can only be requested from parties individually
investigated or reviewed by the investigating authority. 312 A c c o r d i n g t o V i e t N a m , i n t h e
three administrative reviews at issue, the USDOC applied a rate based on facts available with an
adverse inference to companies which were not individually investigated and from which no
necessary information was requested, thus acting inconsistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
313
7.225. Viet Nam notes that the United States does not appear to dispute Viet Nam's legal
interpretation of the obligations contained in Article 6.8, but reiterates the formalistic argument,
rejected by the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), that the rate applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity
in subsequent reviews was not determined on the basis of facts available. Viet Nam asks the Panel
to draw the same conclusion as the US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) panel and reject this argument
because the USDOC had no factual basis to conclude that the Viet Nam-wide entity did not
cooperate, since, as acknowledged by the United States, no information was requested from that
entity. Second, the rate applied in each administ rative review was the rate determined in the
original investigation with adverse inference. Viet Nam also notes that the United States, while
arguing that the Viet Nam-wide rate is not a facts available rate pursuant to Article 6.8, does not
indicate pursuant to which provision that rate was calculated.
314

309 Final determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18, p. 56160.
310 Preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12211; preliminary
determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-19, p. 13552.
311 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 175-178 (citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Zeroing (EC), para. 459).
312 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 178-182 (referring to Panel Reports, Argentina – Ceramic
Tiles, footnote 96 and Egypt – Steel Rebar, paras. 7.146 and 7.151).
313 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 192-196.
314 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 189; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
paras. 21-23; second written submission, paras. 58-61; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
paras. 12-13.

7.4.3.5.1.2 United States
7.226. The United States submits that Viet Nam's analysis is based on faulty facts because in the
fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews the Viet Nam-wide entity was assigned the only rate
it has ever received under this order. In the original investigation, the USDOC determined a
Viet Nam-wide entity rate of 25.76% based on ad verse facts available and continued to apply that
rate to the entity in subsequent reviews. The United States argues that, as no party requested a
review of the margin of dumping assigned to th e Viet Nam-wide entity, the exporters subject to
the Viet Nam-wide entity rate in effect expre ssed the view that the duties were appropriate.
Hence, according to the United States, the USDOC's final duty assessment rate for exports by
companies that are part of the Viet Nam-wide entity cannot be a facts available rate because it is
not based on the interested party's refusal to give access to, or otherwise provide, necessary
information during the covered reviews. It was based, instead, on the fact that the Viet Nam-wide
entity and those companies that would be subject to the Viet Nam-wide entity rate did not seek a
different rate, but accepted the existing rate of the Viet Nam-wide entity. Accordingly, the USDOC
applied the existing rate of the Viet Nam-wide en tity during the administrative reviews at issue,
and was under no obligation to change the existing rate for final assessment purposes. The
United States further submits that the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) misinterpreted Article 6.8
because this Article cannot apply when the USDOC did not make a finding based on facts available.
According to the United States, the panel should have found that there was, in fact, no application
of facts available. In the three reviews at issue in the present dispute, as in the
third administrative review at issue in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) , the USDOC made no findings on
the basis of facts available, but it only applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity the only rate the entity
had ever received. The United States submits that, when examination has been properly limited to
fewer than all exporters, it is not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement to apply a rate to
unexamined exporters that is the only rate ever determined for those exporters.
315
7.227. The United States also argues that Article 6.8 refers to "any interested party" and
Article 6.11 defines "interested parties" as including, inter alia, "the government of exporting the
exporting Member". Articles 6.8 and 6.11 thus expressly contemplate that an anti-dumping
determination may be based on facts available wh enever the government of an exporting Member
does not cooperate during an investigation. The United States further submits that information
held by the Government of Viet Nam was necessary for the proceedings at issue and that nothing
in the Anti-Dumping Agreement prevents a Me mber from sending questionnaires to the
government of an exporting Member. It is ther efore fully consistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement to use facts available if an NME government does not cooperate.
316
7.4.3.5.2 Main arguments of the third parties
7.228. China argues that, as in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) , this Panel should reject the formalistic
argument made by the United States that the Viet Nam-wide rate in the reviews at issue is not
based on facts available, but is just the continuation of the rate assigned to the Viet Nam-wide
entity in the original investigation.317
7.229. Referring to the Appellate Body report in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , the
European Union argues that the Appellate Body did not find that facts available could never be
used in the calculation of an "all others" rate. According to the European Union, this remains
possible, provided that the investigating authorit y makes some additional effort to notify the
producers/exporters to whom it applies this rate of the information required and the consequences
of not providing it.318
7.4.3.5.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.230. The parties disagree as to whether, in th e fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews,
the USDOC made a determination on the basis of facts available within the meaning of Article 6.8
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We therefore address this question of fact first.

315 United States' first written submission, paras. 184-188; second written submission, paras. 95-96;
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 33.
316 United States' second written submission, paras. 91-94.
317 China's third-party submission, paras. 25-33.
318 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 22-24.

7.231. We note, as recognized by both parties, that the Viet Nam-wide rate calculated during the
original investigation was determined on the basis of facts available. 319 In the original
investigation, the USDOC indicated that "the use of adverse facts available for the Vietnam-wide
rate is appropriate" and that "as adverse facts available, we have applied a rate of 25.76%, a rate
calculated in the initiation stage of the investigation from information provided in the
petition …".
320 Moreover, the rate calculated for the Viet Nam-wide entity during the
second administrative review also appears to have been determined based on facts available.321 In
contrast, the record from the subsequent reviews contains no indication that the USDOC
considered whether to use facts available or made a finding to the effect that it would use facts
available to determine the rate for the Viet Nam-wide entity. In the third administrative review,
the USDOC did not find that it was appropriate to apply facts available, but decided that it would
"continue to assign the entity's current rate of 25.76%, the only rate ever determined for the
Vietnam-wide entity in this proceeding".
322
7.232. Similarly, the records of the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews contain no
reference to the USDOC having made a finding that the Viet Nam-wide entity or any of its
constituent parts failed to provide information or to USDOC determining a rate based on facts
available. In the fourth and fifth reviews, the final determinations indicate in essence that, since
"no additional information" was placed on the record with respect to certain entities which "did not
demonstrate that they operate free of government control", the USDOC is "applying a single
antidumping rate, i.e., the Vietnam-wide entity rate to all … exporters of subject merchandise from
Vietnam".
323 In the final determination in the sixth administrative review, the USDOC also notes,
with respect to the Viet Nam-wide entity, that 30 companies "failed to demonstrate their eligibility
for a separate rate" and explains:
In NME proceedings, "'rates' may consist of a single dumping margin applicable to all
exporters and producers". Therefore, we a ssigned the entity a rate of 25.76%, the
only rate ever determined for the Vietnam-wide entity in this proceeding. We have not
received any information since issuance of the Preliminary Results that provides a
basis for reconsidering this determination, and will therefore continue to apply the
entity rate of 25.76% to these 30 companies.
324
7.233. Turning to the provision at issue in this claim, we note that Article 6.8 provides:
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be
made on the basis of the facts available. Th e provisions of Annex II shall be observed
in the application of this paragraph.
It follows from the language of Article 6.8 that it imposes disciplines with respect to when, and
under what conditions, "preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative may be made
on the basis of facts available". The evidence on the record shows that, in the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative reviews, the USDOC did not resort to facts available, i.e. it did not make any

319 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 109 and United States' first written submission, para. 185.
320 Final determination and Issues and Decision Memorandum in the original investigation, Exhibit VN-
04, p. 71008.
321 In the notice from the second administrative review, the USDOC indicates that the Viet Nam-wide
entity "did not cooperate to the best of its ability", and, therefore, the USDOC "continue[d] to find that it is
appropriate to apply facts available with an adverse inference with respect to the Vietnam-Wide entity". (Final
determination in the second administrative review, Exhibit VN-72, p. 52275.) In response to a question by the
Panel, the United States clarifies that the rate in effect during the administrative reviews at issue "was based
on the rate applied by Commerce to the Vietnam-government entity in the second review", i.e. the last review
in which the USDOC made a finding of non-cooperation. (See United States' response to Panel question
No. 56(a), para. 10.) The evidence on the record for the first administrative review does not allow us to
determine whether the rate was calculated on the basis of facts available during that review. We make no
judgment as to whether the rate assigned to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the original investigation and second
administrative review was calculated in a manner consistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
322 Final determination in the third administrative review, Exhibit VN-72, p. 47195.
323 Final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13, p. 47773; final determination
in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18, p. 56160.
324 Final determination in the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-20, p. 55802. (footnote omitted)

"determination[], affirmative or negative … on the basis of the facts available". While the USDOC
continued to apply to the Viet Nam-wide entity "the entity's current rate and only rate ever
determined for the entity in this proceeding"
325, which rate was initially determined on the basis of
facts available, we cannot conclude that the USDOC's actions in the three administrative reviews
at issue constitute "preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative … made on the
basis of facts available" within the meaning of Ar ticle 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In our
view, continuing to apply a rate determined in an earlier proceeding is not the same as making a
determination in the later proceeding, and, therefor e, does not give rise to a possible violation of
Article 6.8.

7.234. We note that the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) was faced with a similar issue and
reached a different conclusion. In that dispute, the panel acknowledged that, in the
third administrative review under the Shrimp order, the USDOC "did not explicitly apply a facts
available rate".
326 Observing that the rate ultimately assigned to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the
third review was exactly the same as the rates that had previously been assigned in the original
investigations and preceding administrative review, the panel considered, however, that "to fail to
treat this rate as a facts available rate would elevate form over substance, and ignore the true
factual circumstances surrounding the assignment of the rate".
327
7.235. We respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) . As
explained above, in our view, the application of Article 6.8 is triggered by an investigating
authority resorting to "facts available" in the making of a determination. Given our view that, in
the administrative reviews at issue, the USDOC did not make a determination within the meaning
of Article 6.8, we are unable to find that the USDOC made a determination on the basis of facts
available in the three administrative reviews at issue.
7.236. For the reasons set out above, we find that Viet Nam has failed to establish that the rate
applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative review is
inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.5 Claims regarding Section 129(c)(1) of the US Uruguay Round Agreements Act
7.5.1 Introduction
7.237. Viet Nam claims that Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA is "as such" inconsistent with
Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
328 Viet Nam argues that, by
limiting the application of new, WTO-consistent, determinations made to implement adverse DSB
recommendations and rulings to "entries" (imports ) of subject merchandise made on or after the
"implementation date" of the ne w determination, Section 129 precludes US authorities from
implementing DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to any entries made prior to that
date and that remain "unliquidated", which Viet Nam refers to as "prior unliquidated entries". 329
Specifically, Viet Nam argues that Section 129(c)(1) is inconsistent with:
a. Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that Section 129(c)(1) results in
the application of an anti-dumping measur e despite the duty having been imposed
pursuant to an investigation conducted in violation of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

325 See, for instance, preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09,
p. 12211. Similar language is found in the determinations for the fifth and sixth reviews.
326 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), para. 7.277.
327 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), para. 7.279.
328 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 15, 42, 211-266, and 356. Although Viet Nam cites the
GATT 1994 in respect of this claim in paras. 42 and 212 of its first written submission, Viet Nam has presented
no arguments with respect to any claim of violation, on an independent basis, under the GATT 1994. Moreover,
although Section 129 applies to the United States' implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings under
the Anti-Dumping, SCM and Safeguard Agreements, Viet Nam only makes claims under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
329 Viet Nam defines "prior unliquidated entries" as imports made prior to the date on which the
Section 129 determination takes effect (date of implementation) and for which there is no definitive
assessment of anti-dumping duty liability (the final duty rate and duty have not yet been established) as of
that date.

b. Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that Section 129(c)(1) results
in the continued collection of anti-dumping duties at a level in excess of the "appropriate
amount" (i.e., an amount determined consistently with the terms of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement) on prior unliquidated entries;
330
c. Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that Section 129(c)(1) results
in the continued collection of anti-dumping duties at a level exceeding the margin of
dumping established consistently with Articl e 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement on prior
unliquidated entries;
331
d. Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that Section 129(c)(1) results
in the continued collection of anti-dumping duties with respect to prior unliquidated
entries pursuant to anti-dumping duty orders that were revoked;
332
e. Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that Section 129(c)(1) results
in the continued collection of duties amounts pursuant to an action that is performed
without the authority provided in the GATT 1994.
333
7.5.2 Factual background
7.238. Section 129 of the URAA (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3538) sets forth a mechanism with
respect to the implementation of DSB recommendat ions and rulings concerning anti-dumping and
countervailing duty actions. Section 129(c)(1), the specific sub-paragraph challenged by Viet Nam,
addresses the question of when revised determ inations made pursuant to that mechanism
("Section 129 determinations") take effect. It provides that Section 129 determinations apply to
entries made on or after the date on which the USTR directs the USDOC to revoke the order in
totality or in part (in the case of a USITC Section 129 determination) or the date on which the
USTR directs the USDOC to implement a USDOC Section 129 determination.
334 For ease of
reference, we hereafter refer to these dates as the "implementation date".
7.239. Section 129 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3538) provides, in relevant part:
§ 3538 Administrative action following WTO panel reports
(a) Action by the United States International Trade Commission
(1) Advisory report
If a dispute settlement panel finds in an interim report under Article 15 of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or the Appellate Body finds in a
report under Article 17 of that Understanding, that an action by the
International Trade Commission in connection with a particular
proceeding is not in conformity with the obligations of the United States
under the Antidumping Agreement, the Safeguards Agreement, or the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Trade
Representative may request the Commission to issue an advisory report
on whether title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 or title II of the Trade Act of
1974, as the case may be, permits the Commission to take steps in
connection with the particular proceeding that would render its action not
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body

330 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 236-238.
331 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 239-240.
332 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 241.
333 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 212, 242-243; second written submission para. 85;
response to Panel question No. 70.
334 The USTR has authority to order implementation of all USDOC Section 129 determinations and to
direct the USDOC to implement a revised USITC Section 129 determination by revoking the order in whole or
in part. However, the USTR does not have authority to order implementation of a USITC Section 129
determination that does not result in at least partial revocation of the order. On the latter, see the discussion
of the decision of the US Court of International Trade in Tembec v. United States, below in footnotes 373
and 398.

concerning those obligations. The Trade Representative shall notify the
congressional committees of such request.
…
(3) Consultations on request for Commission determination
If a majority of the Commissioners issues an affirmative report under
paragraph (1), the Trade Representative shall consult with the
congressional committees concerning the matter.
(4) Commission determination
Notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930 … or title II of the
Trade Act of 1974… if a majority of the Commissioners issues an
affirmative report under paragraph (1), the Commission, upon the written
request of the Trade Representative, shall issue a determination in
connection with the particular proceeding that would render the
Commission's action described in paragraph (1) not inconsistent with the
findings of the panel or Appellate Body. The Commission shall issue its
determination not later than 120 days after the request from the Trade
Representative is made.
(5) Consultations on implementation of Commission
determination
The Trade Representative shall consult with the congressional committees
before the Commission's determination under paragraph (4) is
implemented.
(6) Revocation of order
If, by virtue of the Commission's determination under paragraph (4), an
antidumping or countervailing duty order with respect to some or all of
the imports that are subject to the action of the Commission described in
paragraph (1) is no longer supported by an affirmative Commission
determination under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 … or this
subsection, the Trade Representative may, after consulting with the
congressional committees under paragraph (5), direct the administering
authority to revoke the antidumping or countervailing duty order in whole
or in part.
(b) Action by administering authority
335
(1) Consultations with administering authority and
congressional committees
Promptly after a report by a dispute settlement panel or the
Appellate Body is issued that contains findings that an action by the
administering authority in a proceeding under title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930 ... is not in conformity with the obligations of the United States
under the Antidumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, the Trade Representative shall consult with the
administering authority and the congressional committees on the matter.
(2) Determination by administering authority
Notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930 … the
administering authority shall, within 180 days after receipt of a written

335 The USDOC is the "administering authority".

request from the Trade Representative, issue a determination in
connection with the particular proceeding that would render the
administering authority's action described in paragraph (1) not
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body.
(3) Consultations before implementation
Before the administering authority implements any determination under
paragraph (2), the Trade Representative shall consult with the
administering authority and the congressional committees with respect to
such determination.
(4) Implementation of determination
The Trade Representative may, after consulting with the administering
authority and the congressional committees under paragraph (3), direct
the administering authority to implement, in whole or in part, the
determination made under paragraph (2).
(c) Effects of determinations; notice of implementation
(1) Effects of determinations
Determinations concerning title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C.
1671 et seq.]… that are implemented under this section shall apply with
respect to unliquidated entries of the subject merchandise (as defined in
section 771 of that Act [19 U.S.C. 1677]) that are entered, or withdrawn
from warehouse, for consumption on or after—
(A) in the case of a determination by the Commission under
subsection (a)(4), the date on which the Trade Representative
directs the administering authority under subsection (a)(6) to
revoke an order pursuant to that determination, and
(B) in the case of a determination by the administering authority
under subsection (b)(2), the date on which the Trade
Representative directs the administering authority under subsection
(b)(4) to implement that determination.
 (2) Notice of Implementation
(A) The administering authority shall publish in the Federal Register
notice of the implementation of any determination made under this
section with respect to title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930….
(B) The Trade Representative shall publish in the Federal Register notice
of the implementation of any determination made under this section with
respect to title II of the Trade Act of 1974….
(d) Opportunity for comment by interested parties
Prior to issuing a determination under this section, the administering
authority or the Commission, as the case may be, shall provide interested
parties with an opportunity to submit written comments and, in
appropriate cases, may hold a hearing, with respect to the
determination.
336
7.240. In practice, the "implementation" of a Section 129 determination may result in: (i) the
revocation of the order; or (ii) a change in the dumping calculation resulting in the USDOC

336 Section 129 of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3538, Exhibit VN-31.

modifying the cash deposit rates that apply to en tries of the subject product from the date of
implementation going forward. Viet Nam refers to the cases in the first situation as "revocation"
cases and to cases in the second as "modification" cases.
7.241. Although not challenged by Viet Nam, Section 123 of the URAA is also relevant to our
consideration of Viet Nam's claims.
337 Section 123(g)(1) establishes a mechanism for
US authorities to make changes in USDOC (or other agency) regulations or practice to render them
consistent with DSB recommendations and rulings. 338 Under that provision, the regulation or
practice at issue may be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified upon the fulfilment of a series
of procedural steps, including consultations between the relevant agency, USTR, and the
appropriate congressional committees. The changes go into effect no less than 60 days after the
date on which the agency and USTR consult with the relevant congressional committees, unless
the US President determines that an earlier date is in the national interest.
7.242. Also of relevance to Viet Nam's claims are the findings of the panel in an earlier dispute,
US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA .
339 In that dispute, the panel considered and rejected claims by
Canada that are similar to the claims of Viet Na m in the present dispute. Canada had claimed that
Section 129(c)(1) was "as such" inconsistent with: (i) Articles VI:2, VI:3, and VI:6(a) of the
GATT 1994; (ii) Articles 1, 9.3, 11.1, and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; (iii) Articles 10,
19.4, 21.1 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement; and (iv) as a consequence of these violations,
Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement, and Article XVI:4
of the WTO Agreement.
340 In its analysis, the panel considered the text of Section 129(c)(1), the
Statement of Administrative Action that accompanied the URAA ("SAA"), as well as the application
of Section 129(c)(1) by the United States Government as of that date. The panel found that
Section 129(c)(1), on its face, does not address prior unliquidated entries, and only speaks to
entries that take place on or after the implementation date. On this basis, it was clear to the panel
that Section 129(c)(1) does not, by its express terms, require or preclude any particular action
with respect to "prior unliquidated entries".
341 The panel further rejected Canada's arguments that
Section 129(c)(1) had the effect of requiring and/or precluding certain actions with respect to prior
unliquidated entries. The panel considered, inter alia, that it could not be inferred from the mere
fact that a Section 129 determination establishing a new dumping margin or a new countervailable
subsidy rate was not applicable to prior unliquidated entries that the USDOC would be required to
retain excessive cash deposits collected on such entries, would be precluded from refunding such
cash deposits, would be required to make administrative review determinations and assess
definitive duties with respect to prior unliquidated entries on the basis of the previous, WTO
inconsistent methodology, or would be prec luded from making administrative review
determinations and assessing definitive duties with respect to "prior unliquidated entries" on the
basis of the new, WTO-consistent methodology.
342 The panel also reasoned that it could not be
inferred from the mere fact that a revocation is not applicable to prior unliquidated entries that the

337 Section 123 of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3533, Exhibit US-10.
338 The USITC is an independent agency of the United States Government; Section 123(g)(4) provides
that Section 123(g) does not apply to any regulation or practice of the USITC.
339 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA.
340 Canada alleged that Section 129(c)(1) "required", or had the effect of "requiring", the USDOC to:
(a) conduct administrative reviews with respect to "prior unliquidated entries" after the implementation
date pursuant to an anti-dumping or countervailing duty order found by the DSB to be WTO-inconsistent;
(b) make administrative review determinations regarding dumping or subsidization, with respect to
"prior unliquidated entries" after the implementation date pursuant to an anti-dumping or countervailing duty
order found by the DSB to be WTO-inconsistent;
(c) assess definitive duties with respect to "prior unliquidated entries" after the implementation date
pursuant to an antidumping or countervailing duty order found by the DSB to be WTO-inconsistent; and
(d) retain cash deposits in respect of "prior unliquidated entries" after the implementation date at a
level found by the DSB to be WTO-inconsistent.
Canada also alleged that section 129(c)(1) "precluded", or had the effect of "precluding", the USDOC from:
(a) making administrative review determinations regarding dumping or subsidization with respect to
"prior unliquidated entries" after the implementation date in a manner that was consistent with an adverse
DSB ruling;
(b) assessing definitive antidumping or countervailing duties with respect to "prior unliquidated entries"
after the implementation date in a manner that was consistent with an adverse DSB ruling; and
(c) refunding, after the implementation date, cash deposits collected on "prior unliquidated entries"
pursuant to an antidumping or countervailing duty order found by the DSB to be WTO inconsistent.
(Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.31-6.32).
341 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.54-6.55 and footnote 101.
342 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.68-6.69.

USDOC would be required to retain cash deposits collected on such entries on the basis of the
WTO-inconsistent order, would be precluded from refunding such cash deposits, would be required
to conduct administrative reviews for such entries, would be required to make determinations with
respect to such entries on the basis of the WTO- inconsistent order, or would be precluded from
making such determinations and assessing definitive duties with respect to such entries in a
manner consistent with WTO requirements. On this basis, the panel concluded that Canada had
failed to establish that Section 129(c)(1) "mandated", as a matter of WTO law, the United States
to take any of those actions or mandated it not to take any of those actions.
343 In light of these
findings, the panel did not did not reach the issue of whether the actions alleged by Canada were
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the covered agreements.
344
7.5.3 Main arguments of the parties
7.5.3.1 Viet Nam
7.243. Viet Nam argues that Section 129 is the exclusive authority 345, or the first point of
inquiry346, under US law, for implementation of adverse DSB recommendations and rulings where
implementation can be achieved by a new admi nistrative determination without the need for
statutory or regulatory amendment. Viet Nam notes that the Appellate Body has found that the
date of liquidation, and not the date of entry, is the relevant parameter for assessing
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings.
347 Viet Nam argues that by providing that
the determination takes effect only with respect to unliquidated entries made on or after the
implementation date, Section 129(c)(1) prohibits the refund of duties on prior unliquidated entries
and thus prevents the United States from implementing DSB recommendations and rulings with
respect to those prior unliquidated entries.
348
7.244. Viet Nam finds support for its interpretation of Section 129(c) as precluding
implementation with respect to prior unliquidated entries in the SAA that accompanied the URAA349
and in decisions of US courts – in particular the decision of the US Court of International Trade in
Corus Staal BV v. United States.350
7.245. Viet Nam argues that the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel erred in its interpretation of
Section 129 and that this Panel has the benefit of several years of application of Section 129 which
the previous panel did not have. 351 Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's application of Section 129
over these years shows a systematic and constant refusal by the USDOC to issue liquidation
instructions that would extend the result of Section 129 determinations to prior unliquidated
entries every time that the opportunity to do so arose, for both "modification" and "revocation"
cases.
352
7.246. Viet Nam submits that Sections 123 and 129 are distinct, and that Section 123 does not
address and is not a remedy to the narrow legal effect of Section 129 determinations. Viet Nam
argues that while it is possible for Section 123 and Section 129 to operate in sequence where a
regulation or practice is first amended under Section 123 before it is applied to correct a specific
action under Section 129, that is a "fact specific scenario that is neither automatic nor in any way

343 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.124-6.126.
344 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.127-6.128.
345 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 211, 224-225; opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, para. 28.
346 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 26.
347 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 232 (citing to Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 261.
348 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 211-252. In para. 213 of its first written submission,
Viet Nam argues that Section 129(c)(1) "serves as an absolute legal bar to any refund of duties as prior
unliquidated entries". In para. 223 of its first written submission, Viet Nam characterizes Section 129(c)(1) as
an "express prohibition against duty refunds for prior unliquidated entries" and a "rule with no discretion at all"
established by Congress.
349 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 221-222 and 231 (referring to SAA, Exhibit VN-34).
350 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 223-245; second written submission, paras. 62-67
(referring to Corus Staal BV v. United States, Court No. 07-00270, Slip Op. 07-140 (Ct. Int'l Trade,
19 Sept. 2007), Exhibit VN-36).
351 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 244.
352 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 264-266; response to Panel question No. 50;
second written submission, paras. 68-69.

diminishes Viet Nam's claim regarding the legal effect given Section 129 determinations". In
addition, Viet Nam takes issue with the fact that, even in cases where Section 123 may bring
implementation with respect to prior unliquidated entries, the USDOC retains excessive cash
deposits well after the expiration of the "reaso nable period of time" to comply with the DSB
recommendations and rulings.
353 Likewise, Viet Nam considers that the fact that the United States
might implement adverse DSB rulings and recommendations through future administrative reviews
does not render Section 129 WTO-consistent.
354
7.5.3.2 United States
7.247. The United States submits that Viet Nam's claims are without merit. The United States
argues that Viet Nam fails to establish that Section 129(c)(1) mandates actions that are
inconsistent with WTO obligations.
355
7.248. Moreover, the United States contends that Viet Nam improperly assumes that
implementation would necessarily be effectuated through Section 129, to the exclusion of other
means of implementation, i.e. Section 123 or the ad option by Congress of a law having an impact
on prior unliquidated entries. The United States ar gues that the US authorities have in the past
assessed and liquidated prior unliquidated entries in a manner that is consistent with DSB
recommendations and rulings by using these other mechanisms.
356 In addition, the United States
argues that implementation could be effectuated through determinations in subsequent segments
of the proceeding.357 The United States explains that, for instance, the USDOC could change – and
has in past instances changed – the methodology it applies in an administrative review conducted
after the Section 129 implementation date (whether following action pursuant to Section 123 or
not).
358 The United States argues that applying the mandatory/discretionary analytical approach to
the facts at issue in this dispute, it is clear that nothing in Section 129(c)(1) mandates a breach of
the US obligations under the covered agreements.
359 The United States contends that the same
arguments that Viet Nam makes in this proceeding – that Section 129 is the exclusive authority
under US law for the United States to comply with adverse DSB rulings, and that Section 129 is a
legal bar against refunds for any WTO-inconsistent duties applicable to entries made before the
implementation date – were rejected by the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel.
360
7.249. Finally, the United States submits that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement cited
by Viet Nam do not impose any obligations with respect to the implementation of
DSB recommendations and rulings. The United States considers that, in the anti-dumping context,
the DSU is the only WTO agreement that addresses the obligation to implement
DSB recommendations and rulings.
361
7.5.4 Main arguments of the third parties
7.250. China agrees with Viet Nam that Section 129 is the only vehicle by which the
United States implements adverse DSB recommendations and rulings regarding individual
administrative reviews and that Section 129 is WTO-inconsistent for the reasons advanced by
Viet Nam. China submits that the possibility that the US Congress may adopt new legislation
cannot preclude other Members from establishing the WTO-inconsistency of existing US laws,
practices, or particular measures. China further argues that, while the USDOC may change its
regulations or practices pursuant to Section 123, this provision does not apply with respect to
particular anti-dumping measures, and the United States cannot rely on broad policy changes

353 Viet Nam's response to Panel question Nos. 26, 27, and 67.
354 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 26 (referring, inter alia, to Appellate Body Report, US –
1916 Act, paras. 91 and 155).
355 United States' first written submission, para. 104.
356 United States' first written submission, paras. 96-97 and 109-112.
357 United States' first written submission, para. 106.
359 United States' response to Panel question No. 30; second written submission, paras 47-52.
360 United States' first written submission, paras. 94-95; second written submission, paras. 35-36.
361 United States' first written submission, paras. 98-103; closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 3; second written submission, paras. 41-44.

under Section 123 as a means of avoiding its obligation to comply with DSB rulings in individual
reviews under Section 129.362
7.251. Concerning the provisions cited by Viet Nam, China argues that a Member simultaneously
bears obligations: (i) to conform with the covered agreements; and (ii) under Articles 19.4
and 21.1 and 21.3 of the DSU, when the DSB adopts a finding of inconsistency, to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. China ar gues that by failing to comply with the DSB
rulings and recommendations, a Member not only violates the obligation under the provisions
of DSU, but also remains in continued violation of the obligations under the relevant covered
agreement.363
7.252. The European Union argues that the possibility of a municipal authority (e.g. the
US Congress) revoking, modifying or countermanding the measure identified by the complaining
Member exists in every case, and has no relevance to the WTO-consistency of the measure. The
European Union considers that the possibility of US municipal authorities using another measure
(Section 123) in order to ensure WTO-consistenc y may have some relevance to what the measure
is. However, in the present dispute, the European Union is of the view that a consideration of
Section 123 does not have any impact on the question of whether Section 129(c)(1) ensures
compliance and is WTO-consistent.
364 The European Union also submits that "as such" claims
require a higher threshold of evidence than "as applied" claims and recalls the Appellate Body's
indication that the "mandatory/discretionary" distinction is not to be mechanistically applied. 365
The European Union argues that the more mandatory (or less discretionary) something is, the
more likely it is that it will lead to the WTO-inconsistent behaviour complained of, and the more
likely it is that the measure itself is WTO-inconsistent. Conversely, the less mandatory something
is, the less likely it is that it will lead to the WTO inconsistent behaviour complained of, and the
less likely it is that the measure itself is WTO-inconsistent.
366
7.253. Regarding the legal bases cited by Viet Nam for its claims, the European Union notes that
the essence of Viet Nam's complaint is that Se ction 129(c)(1) does not ensure conformity with
DSB recommendations and rulings. While Viet Nam might have been expected to make claims
under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, or
under Articles 3.7, 17.4, 21.1 or 21.3 of the DSU, the European Union considers that the type of
claims made by Viet Nam can be framed differently, and the Panel has to consider whether or not
the provisions cited by Viet Nam are adequate.
367
7.254. Japan submits that Section 129 appears to be inconsistent "as such" with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Japan argues that the text of Section 129 as a whole suggests that a
Section 129 proceeding is meant to be the exclusive avenue pursuant to which the USDOC and
USITC may bring anti-dumping measures into compliance with adopted recommendations and
rulings. Japan adds that this interpretation is supported by the SAA and by US Court of
International Trade findings that Section 129 precludes any relief with respect to prior unliquidated
entries, even in revocation cases.
368 Japan argues that the United States' arguments regarding
Section 123 and the possibility of Congressional action are unpersuasive. Japan argues that
Section 123, by its terms, appears to apply only with respect to recommendations and rulings
concerning a US regulation or practice and would not apply with respect to determinations in
specific cases. Regarding the possibility that the US Congress could pass a new law that might
have an impact on prior unliquidated entries, Japan submits that WTO Members always retain the
ability to modify or abandon particular measures in the future. Japan contends, however, that that
theoretical possibility does not preclude other Members from establishing that an existing law or
practice is inconsistent with the covered agreements.
7.255. Japan argues that if, in certain specific circumstances, the statute pursuant to which a
Member implements the recommendations and ruling s of the DSB necessarily leads to a failure to
comply after the expiration of the reasonable period of time, that statute would itself be

362 China's third-party submission, paras. 39-46; response to Panel question No. 10.
363 China's response to Panel question No. 12.
364 European Union's response to Panel question No. 10.
365 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 25-36.
366 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 25-36; response to Panel question No. 11.
367 European Union's response to Panel question No. 12.
368 Japan's third-party submission, paras. 13-19 (referring to, inter alia, Corus Staal BV v. United States,
Court No. 07-00270, Slip Op. 07-140 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 19 Sept. 2007), Exhibit VN-36).

inconsistent with the covered agreements. For this reason, Japan does not believe that Viet Nam
must establish that Section 129(c)(1) necessarily leads to WTO-inconsistent action in all instances
to succeed in its claim. Japan adds that the mandatory/discretionary distinction, which the
Appellate Body cautioned should not be applied in a mechanistic fashion, does not come into play
in the current dispute given that the United States only refers to the possibility that other,
separate, measures (i.e. Section 123) may address prior unliquidated entries, rather than relying
on the USDOC's possible discretion under Section 129 with respect to liquidation of prior
unliquidated entries. Even if the Panel were to consider the "mandatory/discretionary" distinction
relevant to Viet Nam's claim in this case, Japan believes that it would be sufficient for Viet Nam to
demonstrate that the provision subject to challenge mandates, or leads to, WTO-inconsistent
liquidation in certain specific circumstances.
369
7.256. Norway recalls that the Appellate Body clarified in US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 –
Japan) that Members must comply with DSB rulings and recommendations no later than by the
end of the reasonable period of time. Thus, fo r Norway, WTO-inconsistent measures affecting
imports that entered an implementing Member's terri tory prior to the expiration of the reasonable
period of time must be rectified by the end of that reasonable period of time.370
7.5.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.257. We consider it appropriate to first examine whether Viet Nam has established, as a factual
matter, that Section 129(c)(1) acts as a legal bar – or precludes – implementation of DSB
recommendations and rulings with respect to prior unliquidated entries. If we find that Viet Nam
has done so, we will consider whether this results in an inconsistency with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3,
11.1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. With respect to the latter, we note that Viet Nam
relies on the finding of the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan) that the
relevant date to assess implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings is the date on which
the duty is assessed or collected, and that any action for the assessment or collection of duties
after the expiry of the reasonable period of time must conform to the DSB's recommendations and
rulings, irrespective of the date of importation.
371 Viet Nam relies on this finding to argue that
when a US anti-dumping determination is found to be WTO-inconsistent, the United States must
implement the DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to any entries that remain
unliquidated as of the expiration of the reasonable period of time.
7.258. Before we turn to our consideration of Viet Nam's factual allegations concerning the
operation of Section 129, it is important to highlight the fact that Viet Nam's challenge is limited to
Section 129(c)(1). Viet Nam does not challenge any other provision of US law. As a result, we are
not asked to consider whether other provisions of US law, by themselves or in combination with
Section 129(c)(1), preclude US authorities from taking actions to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings with respect to prior unliquidated entries; we are only tasked with
considering Viet Nam's contention that Section 129(c)(1) itself precludes such actions.
7.259. We begin our analysis of Viet Nam's claim with the text of Section 129(c)(1).
Section 129(c)(1) sets out when revised determ inations made pursuant to the Section 129
mechanism take effect. It defines the application of those determinations in terms of which entries
are affected, providing that a Section 129 determination "shall apply with respect to unliquidated
entries of the subject merchandise … that are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption on or after" the implementation date. As a result, Section 129 does not, on its face,
have any effect with respect to prior unliquidated entries. Thus, it is clear to us, as it was to the
US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel, that prior unliquidated entries are unaffected by a
Section 129 determination. We agree with the conclusion reached by the US – Section 129(c)(1)
URAA panel that Section 129(c)(1) "does not, by its express terms, require or preclude any
particular action with respect to prior unliquidated entries".
372 It necessarily follows that

369 Japan's third-party submission, paras. 13-19; third-party statement, paras. 3-8; response to Panel
question Nos. 10-13.
370 Norway's third-party statement, paras. 11-13 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan)
(Article 21.5 – Japan), paras. 160-161).
371 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), paras. 153-197. See also
Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), paras. 286-355; and Panel Reports, US –
Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), paras. 8.164-8.218; and US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
paras. 7.139-7.155.
372 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, para. 6.55.

Section 129(c)(1) cannot be found to preclude implementation of DSB recommendations and
rulings with respect to such prior unliquidated en t r i e s . T h e f a c t t h a t , a s a l l e g e d b y V i e t N a m ,
Section 129 may be the only explicit statutory provision governing the effective date of US
Government determinations to implement DSB recommendations and rulings in our view cannot
justify an interpretation of the statute that is unsupported by its terms.
373
7.260. We note the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel's view that it may well be the case that
because Section 129(c)(1) limits the application of Section 129 determinations to entries that take
place on or after the implementation date, prior unliquidated entries would remain subject to other
provisions of US anti-dumping or countervailing duty laws which might, for instance, require the
USDOC to assess definitive duties with respect to these prior unliquidated entries on the basis of
an old, WTO-inconsistent methodology, or might preclude the USDOC from assessing duties with
respect to such entries on the basis of the new, WTO-consistent methodology, but that, in such
instances, it would not be because of Section 129(c)(1) that the USDOC would be required to take,
or be precluded from taking, such actions, bu t because of those other provisions of US law. 374 We
agree with this view, and recall once again that our mandate in this dispute is limited to examining
the WTO-consistency of Section 129(c)(1).
7.261. Viet Nam also relies, in support of its interpretation of Section 129(c)(1), on the SAA,
noting in particular the statement that "[u]nder 129(c)(1), if implementation of a WTO report
should result in the revocation of an antidumpin g or countervailing duty order, entries made prior
to the date of the USTR's direction would remain subject to potential duty liability". 375 The SAA is
an authoritative statement on the interpretation of the URAA, adopted by the US Congress at the
time of the adoption of the latter.376 It indicates, in respect of Section 129(c)(1), inter alia, that:
Consistent with the principle that GATT panel recommendations apply only
prospectively, subsection 129(c)(1) provides that where determinations by the ITC or
Commerce are implemented under subsections (a) or (b), such determinations have
prospective effect only. That is, they apply to unliquidated entries of merchandise
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which
the Trade Representative directs implementation. Thus, relief available under
subsection 129(c)(1) is distinguishable from relief available in an action brought
before a court or a NAFTA binational panel, where, depending on the circumstances of
the case, retroactive relief may be availabl e. Under 129(c)(1), if implementation of a
WTO report should result in the revocation of an antidumping or countervailing duty

373 Viet Nam further argues that the US Congress' failure to provide the USTR with authority to
implement modified USITC affirmative injury determinations would be odd if Congress, in enacting
Section 129, was truly leaving open the possibility under US law to extend the relief provided by adverse DSB
recommendations and rulings. (Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 252-254.) Viet Nam argues in this
respect that where an affirmative USITC determination is modified from a finding of present material injury to
a finding of threat of material injury, it creates a situation where unliquidated provisional measure deposits
should be refunded pursuant to US law and to Article 10.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Viet Nam submits
that in the absence of any legal authority to implement the modified USITC determination, there is no basis
under US law for the USDOC to instruct USCBP to make such refunds. Viet Nam argues that if Congress' intent
was simply not to ensure compliance with respect to prior unliquidated entries, as opposed to precluding
compliance, it would not have completely denied any authority to implement modified USITC injury
determinations as it would otherwise be nonsensical to assume that Congress only created this limitation for
USITC determinations and not USDOC determinations. (Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 253-254).
In making this argument, Viet Nam relies on a finding of the Court in Tembec v. United States that
"section 129 cannot be read to imply authority for the USTR to order the implementation of a section 129(a)
determination that does not result in at least partial revocation of a related AD, CVD, or safeguards order".
However, as we discuss below in footnote 398, Viet Nam misreads this holding as implying that the USTR has
no authority to order the refund of duties where a WTO-inconsistent finding of present injury is replaced, in a
Section 129 determination, by a finding of threat of injury; the Court explicitly refrains from deciding this
question. Even if Viet Nam's interpretation of Section 129 is correct, there is nothing in this argument by
Viet Nam that addresses the basic shortcoming in its position identified above, namely that Section 129 has no
effect with respect to prior unliquidated entries. While it may be that the United States fails to implement
adverse DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to prior unliquidated entries, such an outcome would
presumably result from the operation of other provisions of US law; it does not result from the operation of
Section 129(c).
374 Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, footnotes 112, 123, and 126.
375 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 66 (referring to SAA, Exhibit VN-34).
376 Section 101(a)(2) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a)(2), Exhibit VN-32; Section 102(d) of the URAA,
19 U.S.C. § 3512(d), Exhibit VN-33.

order, entries made prior to the date of Trade Representative's direction would remain
subject to potential duty liability.377
7.262. The SAA does not contradict our reading of Section 129(c)(1). Rather, it merely confirms
that which is readily apparent from the text of Section 129(c)(1), i.e. that implementation through
Section 129 determinations only has effects with respect to entries that are made after the
implementation date. Nothing in the SAA suggests that Section 129(c)(1) concerns itself with in
any way, or itself has any effect on, prior unliquidated entries.
378
7.263. Viet Nam also finds support for its interpretation of Section 129(c)(1) in USDOC practice
since Section 129(c)(1) came into effect. 379 Viet Nam argues that this USDOC practice
demonstrates that the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel's interpretation of the provision was in
error, as the US authorities' application of Section 129 to date "reveals a systematic and consistent
refusal by the USDOC to issue liquidation instructions that would extend the results of its
Section 129 determinations to prior unliquidated entries". 380 Viet Nam adds that in every single
instance, whether in revocation or modification cases, where an opportunity (according to the
United States' interpretation) presents itself for the USDOC to extend the benefit of a DSB ruling
to prior unliquidated entries, the United States Government foregoes that opportunity. 381
Specifically, Viet Nam argues that in every case in which a Section 129 determination resulted in a
revocation, the USDOC continued to retain anti-dumping deposits after the implementation date
and then conducted a subsequent administrative review covering prior unliquidated entries that
resulted in the assessment of final duties on thos e entries, notwithstanding the revocation of the
order as a result of the Section 129 determination.
382 Likewise, Viet Nam submits that, although in
some instances one must "disentangle the normal operation of US trade remedy laws from the
restrictions imposed by Section 129", in every modifi cation case it is possible to identify a course
of conduct that is consistent with an interpretation that Section 129(c)(1) prohibits extending the
benefits of DSB rulings to prior unliquidated entries. Viet Nam adds that this is most often seen in
the refusal to refund excessive deposits on en tries prior to the implementation date, and in
automatic liquidation instructions that call for assessments at the pre-Section 129 rate.383
7.264. The application of Section 129(c)(1) to date does suggests that the United States
Government, following a Section 129 proceeding resulting in a determination to revoke or modify
an anti-dumping order, typically has not extended th e effect of that decision to prior unliquidated
entries. That said, we fail to see how the "pattern" alleged by Viet Nam would, in and of itself,
demonstrate that the USDOC legally cannot "extend the benefits of implementation" (to use
Viet Nam's formulation) to prior unliquidated entries. More importantly, it does not establish that
the United States Government is precluded from doing so by Section 129(c)(1), which is the only
provision of US law challenged by Viet Nam.
384 Hence, we cannot agree with Viet Nam's assertion
that the "consistent pattern" of the US Government not extending the effect of Section 129

377 SAA, Exhibit VN-34.
378 Like the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel, we note that the SAA affirmatively states that "prior
unliquidated entries" would remain subject to potential duty liability and that it is conceivable that
administrative reviews would be conducted with respect to "prior unliquidated entries" and that administrative
review determinations would be made with respect to such entries on the basis of a WTO-inconsistent
determination. Also like that panel, we consider that such actions, if taken, would not be taken because they
were required by section 129(c)(1), but because they were required or allowed under other provisions of
US law. (Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, para. 6.110.)
379 Viet Nam alleges that the USDOC alone has issued 21 Section 129 determinations affecting more
than 40 distinct anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders. For the sake of clarity, we recall that Viet Nam
challenges Section 129(c)(1) "as such", i.e. independently of any application of that provision in any particular
case. Viet Nam relies on the USDOC practice as evidence supporting its interpretation of Section 129(c)(1),
and that is how we consider this evidence.
380 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 257.
381 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 264; second written submission, para. 68.
382 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 265; second written submission, para. 68.
383 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 266. Viet Nam adds that "even in cases where the
Section 129 margin is higher, the USDOC never issues instructions that change the deposits or assessments for
prior unliquidated entries". In Exhibit VN-42, Viet Nam provides the Panel with extensive examples of how the
United State has applied Section 129 since 2001.
384 In fact, it would appear that the treatment of prior unliquidated entries is merely a result of other
provisions of US law and of the prior determinations continuing to produce effects with respect to those entries.

determinations to prior unliquidated entries suggests "more than just a practice, but a recognition
that Section 129 demands such treatment as a matter of U.S. law".385
7.265. Moreover, we note that the United States asserts that the USDOC can "implement" DSB
recommendations and rulings with respect to prior unliquidated entries. According the
United States:
a. The US Congress may adopt new legislation or amend existing legislation in a manner
that will mean that prior unliquidated entries are liquidated pursuant to a WTO-
consistent methodology;
b. The US Administration can use Section 123 to amend a WTO-inconsistent USDOC
practice, and, in setting the effective date of the modification, can effectively implement
with respect to prior unliquidated entries.
c. The USDOC could adopt a WTO-consistent methodology in a subsequent administrative
review, i.e. another segment of the proceeding, thus effectively "implementing" with
respect to prior unliquidated entries.
386
7.266. In this regard, we note that the United States has identified instances in which the
United States Government has used certain of these approaches.387 The evidence submitted by the
United States satisfies us that the United States Government is not precluded from implementing
DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to prior unliquidated entries. In particular, the
United States effectively demonstrated that in a situation in which a Section 129 determination is
implemented with respect to entries made after that determination, and an administrative review
is conducted with respect to prior unliquidated en tries, the relevant authority (USDOC or USITC)
may, in that subsequent administrative revi ew, act in accordance with the relevant DSB
recommendations and rulings. This would be possible whenever a WTO-consistent approach
suggested by the relevant DSB recommendations and rulings is permitted by the relevant
applicable law or regulation, or where the United States Government modifies the regulation or
practice pursuant to Section 123.
388 The United States identifies instances in which a modification
to USDOC practice (with respect to the USDOC's use of the zeroing methodology) was effected
through a Section 129 determination as well as a Section 123 rule modification, which itself was
applied in subsequent administrative reviews with respect to some prior unliquidated entries. 389

385 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 264; Viet Nam uses similar language in its opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34.
386 United States' response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 100-106.
387 United States' first written submission, para. 120.
388 Again, we agree with the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel when it stated that:
we find convincing the argument of the United States that a distinction is to be drawn between
the section 129 determination, which, e.g., establishes a particular dumping margin or
countervailable subsidy rate, and the methodologies developed and applied in a section 129
determination. As we understand the terms of section 129(c)(1), they limit the application of
section 129 determinations to entries that take place on or after the implementation date. We
see nothing in section 129(c)(1) which would similarly limit the use of methodologies developed
and applied in a section 129 determination to such entries. Thus, section 129(c)(1) does not
have the effect of precluding the application of methodologies developed in a section 129
determination in administrative reviews of "prior unliquidated entries".
(Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, para. 6.72).
389 United States' first written submission, para. 120 (referring to USDOC Section 129 Compilation,
Exhibit VN-42, Determination 19-1 (Notice of Implementation of Determination Under Section 129 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils From Belgium, Steel Concrete Reinforcing
Bars From Latvia, Purified Carboxymethylcellulose From Finland, Certain Pasta From Italy, Purified
Carboxymethylcellulose From the Netherlands, Stainless Steel Wire Rod From Spain, Granular
Polytetrafluoroethylene Resin From Italy, Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From Japan, 77 Fed.
Reg. 36,257 (18 June 2012)), p. 36260; Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average
Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final Modification,
77 Fed. Reg. 8101 (14 February 2012), Exhibit VN-55; Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from the Netherlands:
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Preliminary Intent to Rescind, 77
Fed. Reg. 46,024 (2 Aug. 2012) (Exhibit US-18); Certain Pasta from Italy: Notice of Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Preliminary No Shipment Determination and Preliminary Intent to
Revoke Order, in Part, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,377 (3 Aug. 2012), unchanged in 78 Fed. Reg. 9,364 (8 Feb. 2013),
Exhibit US-19; and Purified Carboxymethylcellulose from Finland; Notice of Preliminary Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,036 (7 Aug. 2012), Exhibit US-20).

Viet Nam does not dispute the accuracy of the ex amples cited by the United States, but merely
contests their relevance.390 That the United States authorities proceeded in this fashion in our view
d i s p r o v e s V i e t N a m ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t i s i n s o m e g e n e r a l w a y
precluded from "implementing" DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to prior
unliquidated entries. Moreover, it further confirms our view that Section 129 does not itself
preclude the United States from implementing adverse DSB recommendations and rulings with
respect to prior unliquidated entries.
7.267. Viet Nam also argues that decisions of US courts support its argument that Section 129
precludes implementation with respect to prior unliquidated entries. Although it suggests that
there are a number of relevant US court decisions, Viet Nam only refers to the decisions of the
US Court of International Trade in Corus Staal BV v. United States and – but only in passing – in
Tembec v. United States . Viet Nam argues that the ruling of the Court in Corus Staal BV v.
United States stands for the proposition that "the statutory language of Section 129 'explicitly'
prevents any duty refunds prior to the USTR impl ementation date, and thus an importer who has
any entries prior to the effective date 'cannot obtain relief under the current statutory scheme'".
391
Viet Nam also asserts that:
appeals before U.S. courts seeking to give legal effect to revocations issued as a result
of Section 129 determinations to address prior unliquidated entries have been
consistently swept aside. U.S. courts have repeatedly explained that, given the limited
effective date of Section 129 determinations, there is no basis under U.S. law for
finding an order invalid with respect to prior unliquidated entries . The order remains
valid as a matter of U.S. law and such entries are subject to potential liability
regardless of the adverse DSB rulings and recommendations. This is true even
though, as a matter of U.S. law, under normal circumstances where an order is found
invalid all deposits would be refunded.
392
7.268. We find it noteworthy that in this description of the US court rulings it purports to rely on,
Viet Nam does not actually assert that Section 129 precludes refunds of duties with respect to
prior unliquidated entries. Rather, the description of the rulings by Viet Nam suggests that they
are consistent with our reading of Section 129(c) as having no effect on prior unliquidated entries.
And indeed, in our view, they ar e. The gist of the US Court of International Trade's ruling in Corus
Staal393 is that Section 129(c) does not mandate the refund of duties on prior unliquidated entries.
In other words, the Court affirms that the e ffect of a revocation effectuated through the
Section 129 mechanism is limited to entries made after the date of implementation. However
nowhere does the Court suggest that Section 129 itself precludes the refund of prior unliquidated
duties. In its opening statement at our first meet ing, Viet Nam argued that the holding of the
Court in Corus Staal is that "[b]ut for the explicit effective date under Section 129, one might find
relief for prior unliquidated entries under the normal operation of U.S. trade law".394 The statement
of the Court of International Trade cited by Vi et Nam does recognize a difference between the
general operation of US law, where revocation of an order by a domestic court provides a legal
basis to seek a refund with respect to prior unliq uidated entries, and the operation of Section 129,
which provides no legal basis for such action. 395 However, it does not follow from the fact that it

390 Viet Nam submits that the examples cited by the United States were "WTO-consistent action by
coincidence" and only were a consequence of the normal operation of US law in that the rule had been changed
through Section 123 action, and the USDOC only followed the modified rule in administrative reviews
subsequent to the date of implementation of the Section 129 determination, thereby affecting prior
unliquidated entries. Viet Nam argues that all that the examples cited by the United States show is that in
some instances where a new regulation or practice is brought about by Section 123, that modification can be
applied in some subsequent administrative review determination that may affect certain prior unliquidated
entries. Viet Nam also argues that the United States' claims of WTO-consistent action in subsequent
administrative reviews do not address the fact that the United States continues to hold on to excessive
deposits between the period of the Section 129 determination and completion of the review. (Viet Nam's
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 38-44; opening statement at the second meeting,
para. 27.)
391 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 250.
392 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 232. (emphasis added)
393 Corus Staal BV v. United States, Court No. 07-00270, Slip Op. 07-140 (Ct. Int'l Trade,
19 Sept. 2007), Exhibit VN-36.
394 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting, para. 35.
395 In its findings, the Court indicates that:

does not provide for such refunds that Section 129(c)(1) precludes them, as Viet Nam alleges. In
the absence of Section 129(c)(1), Section 129 would simply be without any definition of the
temporal scope of application of Section 129 determinations.
396 This would not, in our view,
demonstrate that Section 129(c)(1) prohibits the refund of cash deposits on prior unliquidated
entries.
7.269. The decision of the US Court of International Trade in Tembec v United States , which
Viet Nam also refers to in passing 397, also merely confirms that Section 129 has limited effects. It
does not suggest that Section 129(c)(1) precludes the US authorities from "implementing" with
respect to prior unliquidated entries. 398 Hence in our view, this decision does not support
Viet Nam's position.

As a general rule, [the USDOC] cannot impose antidumping duties without a valid determination
of dumping. See §§ 1673 & 1673d(c); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.212. However, the statute that
governs implementation of a WTO panel report explicitly states that revocation of an
antidumping order applies prospectively on a date specified by the USTR. See § 3538(c);
Section 129 Determination, 72 Fed.Reg. at 25,261.
(Corus Staal BV v. United States, Court No. 07-00270, Slip Op. 07-140 (Ct. Int'l Trade 19 Sept. 2007),
Exhibit VN-36, p. 5).
396 The US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel rejected a similar argument by Canada as follows:
if there were no section 129(c)(1), there would be no effective date for the application of
section 129 determinations which the USTR directs to implement. … Even disregarding the issue
of the effective date and accepting that, in the absence of section 129(c)(1), a revocation would
apply to "prior unliquidated entries" as well, we fail to see how this would demonstrate that
section 129(c)(1) has the effect of precluding the Department of Commerce from returning cash
deposits on "prior unliquidated entries", declining to hold administrative reviews for such entries
and declining to assess duties with respect to such entries.
(Panel Report, US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA, paras. 6.86-6.87).
397 Tembec v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 2006), Exhibit VN-37. As we note
above, footnote 373, in Viet Nam's view, Tembec illustrates that:
In situations where the USITC modified its affirmative injury determination, such as altering its
theory from one of present material injury to threat of material injury, USTR has no authority to
direct any action under Section 129.
Congress' failure to provide authority to USTR to direct implementation of modified USITC
affirmative injury determinations would be odd if Congress, in enacting Section 129, was truly
leaving open the possibility under U.S. law to extend the relief provided by adverse DSB rulings
to prior unliquidated entries. Rather, this failure confirms the language "shall … on or after"
means what it says.
(Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 252-253; see also Viet Nam's second written submission,
para. 67).
398 In its decision in Tembec v. United States, the Court of International Trade held that Section 129
does not grant the USTR the authority to order the USDOC to "implement" revised affirmative USITC injury
determinations made pursuant to Section 129(a) unless it results in the revocation of the order, in whole or in
part. In that case, the USTR had ordered the implementation of a Section 129 affirmative threat of injury
determination to replace a prior threat of injury determination that had been found WTO-inconsistent. The
Court found that the USTR's order to the USDOC to implement the Section 129 determination was ultra vires
and void. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court distinguished between the narrower authority granted to the
USTR under Section 129(a) with respect to USITC Section 129 determinations, pursuant to which the USTR can
only order the USDOC to "revoke" the underlying order in whole or in part, and the broader authority granted
to the USTR under Section 129(b), under which the USTR may order the USDOC to "implement" a revised
determination. The Court considered that the United States Congress had used narrower "revocation" language
in Section 129(a) to reflect the "yes-or-no" nature of USITC determinations, given that implementation of WTO
recommendations and rulings with respect to a USITC determination would necessarily result in revoking all or
part of an existing order, if implementation were necessary at all. Adoption of WTO recommendations with
respect to an affirmative USDOC determination, in contrast, might lead to changes in the applicable anti-
dumping or countervailing duty margins, thereby necessitating the broader "implementation" language
contained in Section 129(b). The Court expressly avoided deciding the issue of whether relief in the form of
refunds of cash deposits would be available following issuance of a Section 129 determination containing a
finding of threat of material injury replacing a prior, WTO-inconsistent, finding of present injury. The reasoning
of the Court however indicates that, assuming arguendo that such a relief would be permissible under US law
(the Court posits that it might be construed as a form of retrospective relief unavailable under Section 129),
the USTR's power to direct the USDOC to revoke an order "in part" could allow it to order such refunds: the
Court reasons that the USDOC "could implement the determination by revoking the portion of the outstanding
order requiring retention of cash deposits collected during the investigation period". Hence, the Court's decision
does not support – and could even be read as contradicting – Viet Nam's argument that in situations where the
USITC modified an affirmative injury determination, such as altering its theory from one of present material
injury to threat of material injury, the USTR has no authority to direct any action under Section 129.

7.270. In light of the foregoing, having taken into consideration the text of Section 129(c)(1),
the SAA, the United States Government's application of Section 129(c)(1) in the years since it was
adopted, and the US Court of International Trade decisions cited by Viet Nam, we conclude that
Viet Nam has failed to establish that Section 129(c)(1) precludes, or acts as a legal bar to,
"extending the benefits of implementation" to pr ior unliquidated entries. We note that we have
undertaken an independent examination of Viet Nam's claims and of Section 129(c)(1), but we
have arrived at conclusions similar to those of the US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA panel.
7.271. Having concluded that Viet Nam has failed to establish its factual allegation that
Section 129(c)(1) precludes implementation with respect to prior unliquidated entries, we need
not, and do not, consider Viet Nam's arguments regarding the consistency of Section 129(c)(1)
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement cited by Viet Nam.
399
7.272. In light of the foregoing, we find that Viet Nam has not established that Section 129(c)(1)
of the URAA is "as such" inconsistent with Articl es 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
7.6 Claims with respect to the sunset review
7.6.1 Introduction
7.273. Viet Nam claims that the USDOC's affirmative likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
first sunset review is inconsistent with Articl es 11.3 and 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Viet Nam's challenges:
a. the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping, which Viet Nam argues
was inconsistent with Article 11.3 and constituted an improper establishment of facts
and prevented an unbiased and objective evaluati on of the facts, inconsistent with that
provision and Article 17.6; and
b. the USDOC's reliance on a presumption with respect to the decline in import volumes, as
opposed to other factors, in reaching its likelihood-of-dumping determination, which
Viet Nam argues was not supported by the facts and is an improper evaluation of
changes in volumes based on the facts of th e review, inconsistent with Articles 11.3
and 17.6.
7.274. The United States asks the Panel to reject Viet Nam's claims.
7.6.2 Factual background
7.275. Before addressing Viet Nam's claims, we start by setting out the relevant facts pertaining
to the first sunset review under the Shrimp order.
7.276. Under US law, five years after the publication of an anti-dumping duty order, the USDOC
and the USITC conduct a "sunset review" to determ ine, respectively, whether revocation of the
order would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping ("likelihood-of-dumping"
determination) and the continuation or recurrence of material injury ("likelihood-of-injury"
determination). The order is revoked unless both the USDOC and the USITC make affirmative
"likelihood" determinations.
400
7.277. Viet Nam's claims concern the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
first sunset review under the Shrimp order.

399 Because we do not examine Viet Nam's arguments on the WTO-consistency of Section 129(c)(1), we
do not consider it necessary to address the United States' argument that Viet Nam's claims are outside the
Panel's terms of reference, because Viet Nam complains of the United States' failure to implement DSB
recommendations and rulings, but fails to make claims under the DSU, where obligations with respect to the
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings in the anti-dumping context are found. Moreover, we
note that the parties have debated the issue of the continued relevance of the mandatory/discretionary
distinction, but we do not find it necessary to pronounce ourselves on the continued relevance of this
distinction or on its application to the facts before us.
400 Sections 751 and 752 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. §1675, Exhibit US-04.

7.278. On 4 January 2010, the USDOC initiated a sunset review of the Shrimp order. 401 On
6 August 2010, the USDOC preliminarily determined that revocation of the Shrimp order was
"likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping". 402 In the Issues and Decision
Memorandum accompanying the preliminary determination, the USDOC indicated that, when
making a likelihood-of-dumping determination, it considers "the margins established in the
investigations and/or reviews conducted during the sunset review period, as well as the volume of
imports for the periods before and after the issuance of the order". It further stated that the
USDOC "normally will determine" that revocation of the order is likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping if one of three scenarios occurs: (i) dumping continued at any level above
de minimis after the issuance of the order; (ii) impo rts of the subject merchandise ceased after
issuance of the order; or (iii) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import
volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly.403 The USDOC then noted, with respect
to the extent of dumping during the period foll owing the issuance of the order (2005-2009) (the
sunset review period), that it had "assigned positive rates for many Respondents during the four
completed administrative reviews", adding that "[t]herefore, the Department has found dumping
of the subject merchandise to exist after the issuan ce of the order, and that the revocation of the
antidumping order is likely to lead to a continuation of dumping".404
7.279. With respect to import volumes, the USDOC reviewed public US import data for 2003-2009
and found that imports of subject merchandise from Viet Nam during the relevant period, 2005
through 2009, were 42.1, 35.9, 37.9, 46.7, 40.1 million kilograms, respectively, while they
totalled 56.3 million kilograms in 2003, the year preceding the year in which the original anti-
dumping investigation was initiated. While acknowledging certain recoveries in import volumes
following the issuance of the order, the USDOC co ncluded nevertheless that "with the discipline of
the order, imports fell after the initiation of the original investigation, and did not return to pre-
initiation levels in any of the individual years or as a whole (an average of 40.5 million kilograms
during the sunset review period)".
405
7.280. The final determination, issued on 7 December 2010, confirmed the conclusions reached
by the USDOC in its preliminary determination. In the final determination, after recalling its
approach to determining likelihood-of-dumping, the USDOC found that:
both the positive dumping margins found for numerous companies reviewed, and the
decline in import volume during the sunset review period following the initiation of the
original investigation, consistent with the language of the statute and reflective of our
practice as discussed in the statute and the Statement of Administrative Action
("SAA"), are highly probative that dumping is likely to continue or recur".
406
7.281. The USDOC then addressed, and rejected, a number of arguments raised by Vietnamese
interested parties concerning its assessment of dumping margins during the sunset review period.
First, the USDOC indicated that contrary to th e assertion of Vietnamese respondents, it had
considered the zero and de minimis margins calculated for some of the mandatory respondents
during the first three administrative reviews, adding however that because it determines
likelihood-of-dumping on an order-wide basis, the existence of zero or de minimis margins does
not by itself require it to reach a negative likelihood determination. The USDOC further noted that
while Vietnamese respondents repeatedly claimed that dumping did not continue following the
issuance of the order, they also "carefully qual if[ied] that claim by stating that only the 'vast
majority' of the imports were not dumped". Therefore, in the USDOC's view, "by their own
admission, Vietnamese Respondents [did] not dispute there was some dumping that occurred".
The USDOC also faulted the Vietnamese interested parties for failing to address the fact that the
two mandatory respondents in the first administrative review chose not to participate in that

401 Notice of initiation for the sunset review, Exhibit VN-08.
402 Preliminary likelihood-of-dumping determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-12.
403 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 4.
404 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the preliminary likelihood-of-dumping
determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-12, p. 5; Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the
final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 4.
405 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the preliminary likelihood-of-dumping
determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-12, p. 6.
406 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 4.

review and received an adverse facts available margin of 25.76%, as part of the Viet Nam-wide
entity, as a result. The USDOC added that it had also found positive dumping margins for the
mandatory respondents in the fourth administ rative review, and that while Vietnamese
respondents argued that the only reason these ma rgins were positive was the application of the
zeroing methodology, they had failed to provide any evidentiary support for this claim. The USDOC
concluded by stating that zeroing is not contrary to US law and by rejecting arguments by the
Vietnamese interested parties concerning the separate rates in the four administrative reviews, on
the basis that these rates "are presumed to be correct".
407
7.282. The USDOC also reaffirmed its findings wi th respect to the evolution of import volumes
during the 2003-2009 period. In its consideration of comments by interested parties, the USDOC
first stated that the Vietnamese respondents had failed to articulate any rationale that would
compel it to depart from its established practice to look at the full year prior to initiation of the
investigation as the base year for comparison. It continued that while it acknowledged that there
were certain recoveries in import volume foll owing the issuance of the order, the record
demonstrated, and it continued to find, that imports had fallen after the initiation of the original
investigation, and "did not return to pre-investigation levels in any of the individual years, or as a
whole".
408
7.283. With respect to arguments made by Vietnamese respondents concerning "other factors",
the USDOC recalled that under its Regulations, the burden is on an interested party to provide
information or evidence that would warrant consideration of the other factors in question. In the
instant proceeding, the USDOC did not consider such other factors on the ground that Vietnamese
respondents did not demonstrate their relevance. The USDOC indicated that the Vietnamese
Respondents "did not make a timely good caus e argument for other factors" and provided
incomplete market share information as they failed to submit data for the last year of the sunset
review period (2009). The USDOC stated that "[w]hile the Vietnamese Respondents speculate that
import volume could have been higher, if not for the margins assigned to the separate rate
companies or supply and demand issues, they have not demonstrated how these factors could
have affected import volumes". Hence, it concluded, the "other factor arguments do not outweigh
the likelihood analysis based on the existence of margins and decline of imports".
409
7.284. In light of its consideration of both dumping and import volumes, the USDOC:
continue[d] to find that the evidence on the record indicates that dumping of shrimp
from Vietnam is likely to continue, or recur, absent the discipline of the antidumping
order because dumping occurred after the issu ance of the order, and import volumes
fell and have not recovered to the levels prior to the initiation of the investigation.
Moreover, we find that the other factors alleged by the Vietnamese Respondents do
not affect this finding.410
As in the preliminary determination, the USDOC concluded that, in the event the order were to be
revoked, dumping was likely to continue or recur at the margins calculated during the original
investigation.411

407 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, pp. 4-5.
408 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 5.
409 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, pp. 4-5.
410 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 6.
411 The USDOC reports the margins likely to prevail to the USITC. The rates calculated during the
original investigation were as follows: mandatory respondents: CAMIMEX (5.24%), Seaprodex Min Hai
(4.30%), and Min Phu (4.38%); separate rate respondents not individually examined: 4.57%; and Viet Nam-
wide rate: 25.76%. (Final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-14.)

7.6.3 Main arguments of the parties
7.6.3.1 Viet Nam
7.285. With respect to the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping, Viet Nam
refers to prior decisions in which the Appellate Body found that reliance in an Article 11.3 sunset
review on margins of dumping determined using a methodology inconsistent with Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement results in the like lihood-of-dumping determination also being
inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
412 V i e t N a m a d d s t h a t t h e
United States misrepresents the findings of the Appellate Body when it claims that only exclusive
reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins renders the results of a sunset review inconsistent with
Article 11.3. In Viet Nam's view, the mere fact that the USDOC relied on WTO-inconsistent
margins is sufficient to find that the sunset review determination is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
413
7.286. Viet Nam argues that, in the sunset review determination at issue, the USDOC relied on
margins of dumping which are inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular:
(i) individual margins calculated with zeroing throughout the course of the Shrimp proceeding, as
found by the US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) p a n e l a n d a s a r g u e d b y V i e t N a m i n t h i s d i s p u t e ; ( i i ) a
separate rate that was not supported by any facts relevant to the period of the review, was found
contrary to US law by the US Court of International Trade in Amanda Foods, and is inconsistent
with Article 9.4 for the reasons discussed by the US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) panel; and (iii) a
Viet Nam-wide entity rate based on adverse facts available and applied to unknown and
unidentified companies, and which was also found to be WTO-inconsistent in US – Shrimp
(Viet Nam).
414
7.287. Viet Nam admits that the USDOC relied on two properly calculated facts available rates in
the first administrative review, but considers that these two rates must be evaluated in light of the
particular circumstances of the first administrative review. Viet Nam explains in this regard that
virtually all of the potential respondents for wh ich petitioners had requested a review reached
agreement with the petitioners for the petitioners to withdraw the request for a review in exchange
for cash payments by each of the respondent s. As a result, the USDOC was left to choose
mandatory respondents from among marginal exporters which led to the selection of the
two mandatory respondents which, because of their relative lack of interest in the proceeding or
the US market, did not cooperate in the review.
415 Viet Nam contends that it demonstrated to the
Panel that, except for these two respondents' positive margins, dumping ceased completely after
the first review when dumping margins are calc ulated in a manner consistent with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.416
7.288. In addition, Viet Nam argues that the United States misrepresents Viet Nam's position
when it claims that the statement by Vietnamese respondents before the USDOC that the vast
majority of sales were not dumped was an admission that some dumping continued to occur; one
of the reasons Vietnamese respondents were not in a position to definitely claim that there were
no dumped sales was that the USDOC limited the number of individually-examined respondents.
417
7.289. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC assumed that declining import volumes are an indication
of the likelihood of continued dumping, and that this assumption is unsound for several reasons,
related in particular to the inherent uncertainty affecting retrospective duty assessment systems,
an uncertainty which is further compounded for NMEs. 418 Viet Nam acknowledges that the volume
of dumped imports is, together with dumping margins, an important factor for determining the
likelihood of dumping continuing or recurring. However, import levels must be given context and a

412 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 295-298 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 128) and 303-307.
413 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 90 and 99-113; opening statement at the
second meeting of the Panel, paras. 37-38.
414 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 269-280; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 46, 48-49.
415 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 276; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
416 Viet Nam's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 39.
417 Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 58-60.
418 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 281-289; second written submission, para. 93.

simple assumption that a decline in imports of virtually any magnitude can alone support a
likelihood determination is neither objective nor unbiased; as stated by the Appellate Body, an
authority cannot mechanically apply such an assumption, but must assess the role of other factors
on a case-by-case basis.
419
7.290. Viet Nam submits that, in the Shrimp sunset review, the decline in volumes before and
after the imposition of anti-dumping duties becomes less relevant, and possibly irrelevant, when
one considers that all of the cooperating individu ally-examined producers/exporter had substantial
negative, or "safety" margins when their dumping margins are calculated in a WTO-consistent
manner, a fact which supports a conclusion that the decline in overall volume was due to factors
other than dumping duties.
420 According to Viet Nam, the USDOC would have reached the
conclusion that dumping had ceased and that there had been a moderate decline in import levels if
it had used WTO-consistent margins. In addition, reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins prevented
Vietnamese exporters from making a critical argument, namely that throughout the sunset review
period, the margin of sales above normal value was substantial for all individually-examined
respondents. In Viet Nam's view, the real reason for any decline in exports is the chilling effect
that the US retroactive duty assessment system has on imports subject to anti-dumping duties.
421
7.6.3.2 United States
7.291. The United States argues that Article 11.3 does not prescribe the exact methodologies that
authorities must follow for purposes of the likelihood determination and that attempts to read into
Article 11.3 substantive obligations contained in other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
have been rejected in prior decisions.
422
7.292. The United States submits that Viet Nam contradicts itself when it claims that the USDOC
relied "exclusively" on WTO-inconsistent margins, while claiming elsewhere that "almost all" of the
margins were WTO-inconsistent. In addition, the United States argues that the USDOC noted in its
determination that Vietnamese respondents themselves did not dispute that some dumping
occurred.
423 In any event, the United States does not agree that the dumping margins the USDOC
relied on in the sunset review are WTO-inconsistent. It submits that, in its determination, the
USDOC relied on positive anti-dumping duty rate s applied to numerous exporters during the four
completed reviews, including two companies list ed as among the largest exporters during the
first administrative review who received facts av ailable rates because they failed to cooperate,
which, in the United States' view, alone provides sufficient support for the USDOC's conclusion that
dumping continued during the sunset review period. 424 According to the United States, Viet Nam
acknowledges that the margin applied to those two companies was calculated in a WTO-consistent
manner and has provided no evidence supporting its assertions that these two companies were
"small".
425 Moreover, the United States submits that other margins also were not calculated with
zeroing, in particular the rate assigned to an uncooperative company during the original
investigation, the separate rate calculated in the second and third review, and the Viet Nam-wide
entity rate in the second, third and fourth reviews.
426 The United States also argues that so-called
"safety margins" are not relevant under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.293. The United States notes that the USDOC found that import volumes fell in the year
preceding the final determination and did not return to pre-initiation levels, which suggests that
the exporters were unable to sustain pre-investigation import levels without dumping. Moreover,
contrary to what Viet Nam asserts, the change in import volumes was significant as it represented

419 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 299-301 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US –
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 177-178 and 208-209); opening statement at the
420 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 111. By "safety margins", Viet Nam means the amount
by which the export price exceeded the normal value, expressed in percentage terms.
421 Viet Nam's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 40-43.
422 United States' first written submission, paras. 244-246; second written submission, para. 106.
423 United States' first written submission, paras. 248-250; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 46-47; second written submission, paras. 107-109.
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 49.
425 United States' second written submission, paras. 108-109 (referring to Viet Nam's response to Panel
question No. 32, paras. 98 and 101, and No. 35, para. 114).
426 United States' opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 47-50.

a decline of about 28% compared to the year preceding the investigation. In addition, the
United States submits, declining import volumes were a part of the evidence relied upon by the
USDOC, but not the exclusive basis for finding likelihood.
427 The United States submits that the
arguments that Viet Nam presents to the Panel wi th a view to explaining the decline in import
volume are speculative and post hoc and in any case do not undermine the evidence relied on by
the USDOC. Thus, in the United States' view, Viet Nam has failed to demonstrate that the decline
in import volumes is due to factors other than the discipline of the anti-dumping duty order.
428
7.294. The United States finally contends that the Appellate Body report in US – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods confirms that Article 11.3 allows for alternative ways of
determining likelihood-of-dumping even where a WTO-inconsistent methodology has been used at
some point in the calculation of a dumping margin. According to the United States, where an
investigating authority has relied not only on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping, but also on
other, sufficient evidentiary bases, such that the likelihood determination can stand on its own
after any factors based on a WTO-inconsistent methodology have been removed, the likelihood
finding should be considered consistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
429
7.6.4 Main arguments of the third parties
7.295. China refers to previous Appellate Body reports which have held that when investigating
authorities choose to rely on dumping margins in making their sunset review determinations, the
calculation of these margins must be consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China notes
that the United States itself admits that the USDOC "relied on" margins of dumping which were
calculated in a WTO-inconsistent manner. In China's view, this fact necessarily invalidates the
sunset determination.
430
7.296. The European Union argues that, consistent with the findings in prior disputes, a sunset
review determination that relies on dumping margins that are WTO-inconsistent, notably because
of the use of zeroing, is itself WTO-inconsistent. The European Union submits that the question of
what the sunset determination would be absent reliance on such margins is not a matter for an
original panel. Hence, the appropriate way forward is for the panel to make a finding of
inconsistency, and for the defending Member to consider how it wishes to implement the rulings
and recommendations in a WTO-consistent manner.
431
7.297. Japan recalls that the Appellate Body has determined that if an investigating authority
relies on margins calculated with zeroing in its likelihood determination, that determination is
inconsistent with Article 11.3. Regarding Viet Nam's claim that the USDOC's reliance on the decline
in import volume was not unbiased and objective, Japan submits that the Panel should examine
whether the USDOC engaged in a "case-specific analysis of the factors behind [the] decline in
import volumes".
432 According to Japan, it would be inappropriate for the Panel to try to
determine, based on a counterfactual analysis, whether the USDOC would have reached the same
conclusion had it relied only on WTO-consistent factors; such an exercise would amount to an
impermissible de novo review of the evidence before the investigating authority.
433
7.298. Norway argues that a margin calculated with zeroing can never be the foundation for an
investigating authority's likelihood-of-dumping determination. Norway further submits that a
panel's role is not to redo the investigation and make its own determination, but to assess whether
the investigating authority relied upon WTO-inconsistent margins and not whether other factors
may justify the determination.
434

427 United States' first written submission, paras. 262-263; second written submission, paras. 113-114;
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 51.
428 United States' first written submission, paras. 264-268; second written submission, paras. 115-118.
429 United States' first written submission, paras. 269-270; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 50; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 52.
430 China's third-party submission, paras. 49-51; response to Panel question No. 14, paras. 27-28.
431 European Union's third-party submission, para. 39.
432 Japan's third-party submission, paras. 22-26 (quoting from Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion
433 Japan's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 12.
434 Norway's response to Panel question No. 14, paras. 3-6.

7.299. Thailand submits that a likelihood-of-dumping determination can be found to be WTO-
consistent when the investigating authority's consideration of relevant factors identified to support
the determination is WTO-consistent.
435
7.6.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.300. In its requests for findings, Viet Nam claims that the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping
determination in the sunset review at issue is inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 17.6 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, suggesting that it is making an independent claim of violation under each
provision.
436 Yet, at times, Viet Nam appears to only allege a violation of Article 11.3.437
7.301. Article 17.6 provides that:
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was
unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;
7.302. Article 17.6 sets forth the relevant standard of review applicable to a panel's examination
of the consistency with the Agreement of a Member 's anti-dumping measures. While it may inform
the obligations set forth under other provisions of the Agreement, it does not, in itself, impose
obligations upon investigating authorities. For this reason, insofar as Viet Nam may be making an
independent claim of violation under that provision, we reject this claim.
7.303. Turning to Article 11.3, we note that this provision reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti-dumping
duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or
from the date of the most recent review und er paragraph 2 if that review has covered
both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine,
in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly
substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a
reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely
to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
22 The duty may remain
in force pending the outcome of such a review.
Article 11.3 lays down a mandatory rule with an exception:
Members are required to terminate an anti - d u m p i n g d u t y w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s o f i t s
imposition " unless" the following conditions are satisfied: first, that a review be

435 Thailand's response to Panel question No. 14.
436 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 356; second written submission, para. 139.
437 For instance, Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 113:
Based on the above, Viet Nam believes that the panel must find that the Sunset Review
conducted by the USDOC of the antidumping duty order on Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp
from Viet Nam was inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement in that; (1) it relied on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping which constituted an
improper establishment of the facts and prevented an unbiased and objective evaluation of the
proper facts; and (2) it relied on a volume presumption which itself is not supported by the facts
and its improper evaluation of changes in volume based on the facts of the review.

initiated before the expiry of five years fr om the date of the imposition of the duty;
second, that in the review the authorities determine that the expiry of the duty would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping; and third, that in the
review the authorities determine that the expi ry of the duty would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of injury. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the
duty must be terminated.
438
7.305. In the same dispute, the Appellate Body noted that Article 11.3 does not prescribe any
specific methodology to be applied in making a "likelihood" determination, and that this provision
does not identify any particular factors that authorities must take into account in making such a
determination.
439 However, the Appellate Body did provide some guidance to authorities. In
particular, it indicated that when making a determination pursuant to Article 11.3, investigating
authorities "must undertake a forward-looking analysis and seek to resolve the issue of what
would be likely to occur if the duty were terminated". 440 In addition, Article 11.3 assigns an active
rather than a passive decision-making role to the authorities; according to the Appellate Body, the
words "review" and "determine" in Article 11.3 suggest that authorities conducting a sunset review
must act with an "appropriate degree of diligence" and arrive at a "reasoned conclusion on the
basis of information gathered as part of a process of reconsideration and examination". Moreover,
in view of the use of the word "likely" in Articl e 11.3, an affirmative likelihood determination may
be made only if the evidence demonstrates that dumping would be probable if the duty were
terminated — and not simply if the evidence suggests that such a result might be possible or
plausible.
441 Finally, a firm evidentiary foundation is required in each case for a proper likelihood
determination, and such a determination "cannot be based solely on the mechanistic application of
presumptions".442
7.306. Of direct relevance to Viet Nam's claims in the present dispute is the conclusion of panels
and the Appellate Body in prior disputes that, wh ile there is no obligation under Article 11.3 for
investigating authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in considering likelihood-of-
dumping, should an investigating authority choose to rely upon dumping margins in making a
likelihood-of-dumping determination, the calculation of those margins must conform to the
disciplines of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements. Reliance on margins calculated in
a manner inconsistent with relevant provisions of the covered agreements results in a violation not
only of those provisions, but also of Article 11.3.
443 We agree with this interpretation of
Article 11.3.
7.307. It is undisputed in this case that the USDOC relied, in its likelihood-of-dumping
determination, on certain margins that had been calculated with zeroing. 444 In particular, it is not
disputed between the parties that the USDOC relied on the margins of dumping calculated for the
mandatory respondents in the fourth administrative review. We have found above that the USDOC
used zeroing in calculating these dumping margins and that for this reason, these margins are
inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-D umping Agreement and VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
Moreover, we note that the final determinations in the second and third administrative reviews
indicate that the USDOC used zeroing in calculating the margins of dumping for mandatory
respondents in these reviews.
445 However, the USDOC does not seem to have relied on these

438 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 104. (emphasis original)
439 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 123.
440 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 105.
441 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 111.
442 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 178
443 Appellate Body Reports, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 127, and US –
Zeroing (Japan), para. 185; Panel Report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 7.195–7.196 (upheld in
Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 394 and 395(v)).
444 The preliminary and final determinations do not list each of the margins of dumping which the
USDOC relied upon, but we read the USDOC's reference to the "positive rates for many respondents during the
four completed administrative reviews" (Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the preliminary
likelihood-of-dumping determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-12, p. 5) as indicating that the USDOC
relied on all the non-zero and/or non-de minimis rates assigned in the first four administrative reviews. See
also the USDOC's reference in its final determination to the "positive dumping margins found for many
companies reviewed". (Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping
determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 5.)
445 See above, footnote 84, and final determinations in the second and third administrative reviews,
Exhibit VN-72; final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13). The US – Shrimp
(Viet Nam) panel reached a similar conclusion and found that the margins were inconsistent with Article 2.4 of

margins or on the margin calculated for Fish One in the first administrative review, as each of
these margins was either zero or de minimis.446
7.308. The USDOC also relied on the separate rate applied by the USDOC in the various
proceedings. Viet Nam asserts that the separate rate applied in each of the proceedings is
inconsistent with the United States' obligations. Viet Nam relies, in particular on the findings of the
United States Court of International Trade in Amanda Foods and on the findings of the US –
Shrimp (Viet Nam) panel, which found that the separate rates applied in the second and third
administrative reviews were inconsistent with, respectively, US law and Article 9.4. 447 However, a
ruling by a domestic court of a Member, applying the domestic law of that Member, cannot
establish an inconsistency with WTO obligations. Moreover, for reasons set out above
448, we are
reluctant to incorporate, without more scrutiny of the facts and parties' arguments, the factual
findings reached by a panel in a prior dispute.
7.309. Viet Nam does also attempt to establish the WTO-inconsistency of the separate rate
applied in the first three administrative reviews independently. We note that the separate rate
of 4.57% applied in the original investigation corresponded to the weighted average of the
margins of dumping for the three mandatory respondents in the investigation, which themselves
had been calculated with zeroing.
449 The same rate was then applied in the first, second and
third administrative reviews. 450 The separate rate of 3.92% applied in the fourth administrative
review corresponded to the simple average of the margins for mandatory respondents, which were
calculated with zeroing. We have sympathy for Viet Nam's argument that a separate rate
calculated on the basis of margins calculated with zeroing would be WTO-inconsistent.
451 We note
however that all margins for mandatory respondents in the first, second and third administrative
reviews were either zero, de minimis, or based on facts available. In such a situation, Article 9.4
does not indicate how to calculate the relevant ceiling; the lacuna in Article 9.4 identified in prior
panels and the Appellate Body reports arises.452 In the absence of a more developed discussion by
the parties as to the relevant disciplines applicable under Article 9.4 in such circumstances and as
to whether the use of margins calculated with zeroing to derive a rate which is subject to the
Article 9.4 ceiling results in an inconsistency with that provision, and because it is ultimately not
necessary for us to determine the WTO-consistency of all the rates relied upon by the USDOC, we
do not reach a final conclusion as to whether the separate rates applied in the four first
administrative reviews were determined consistently with the provisions of the Agreement.
453

the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), paras. 7.80, 7.97). The United States
does not contest that the USDOC used zeroing in calculating the dumping margins for mandatory respondents
in the original investigation and the first three administrative reviews (United States' response to Panel
question No. 37, para. 123). Viet Nam admits that the margins of dumping for the two mandatory respondents
in the first administrative review were established consistently with the disciplines of the Agreement.
446 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination in the
sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 4.
447 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 272 (referring to Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v.
United States, Slip Op. 09-106 (Ct. In'tl Trade, 17 June 2010) and Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v.
United States, Slip Op. 10-69 (Ct. In'tl Trade, 29 September 2009); Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd., et. al v.
United States, Court No. 08-00301 Slip Op. 10-69 (Ct. In'tl Trade, 17 June 2010): Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand; Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. et. al v. United States, Consol.
Court No. 09-00431, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Ct. In'tl Trade, 2011) Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Court Remand, Exhibits VN-52-54); Viet Nam' second written submission, para 106 (referring to Panel Report,
US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), paras. 7.218-7.227).
448 See above, para. 7.39.
449 Final determination in the original investigation, Exhibit VN-04, p. 71009.
450 Final determination in the first administrative review, p. 52054, Exhibit VN-72; final determination in
the second administrative review, p. 52275 and Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final
determination in the second administrative review, Comment 6, Exhibit VN-72; and final determination in the
third administrative review, p. 47195, Exhibit VN-72.
451 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 106.
452 Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para. 126; US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC),
para. 452. The margins calculated by the USDOC with zeroing in the first, second and third administrative
review were all zero, de minimis, or based on facts available.
453 The panel in US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) found that the separate rates applied in the second and
third administrative reviews were inconsistent with Article 9.4 because in these reviews, the USDOC
determined the maximum allowable "all others" rate, which it applied as "all others rate" (i.e. separate rate),
on the basis of margins of dumping that themselves had been calculated with zeroing in the original
investigation. (Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), paras. 7.217 and 7.227.)

7.310. Finally the USDOC relied on the rate of 25.76% assigned to the Viet Nam-wide entity in
the first four administrative reviews. We have found that the Viet Nam-wide rate of 25.76%
applied in the fourth administrative review was inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2, and 9.4.
However, the parties have not engaged with the facts in the first, second and third administrative
reviews and we are reluctant to conclude, without more, that the application of the same rate in
those segments of the Shrimp proceedings was WTO-inconsistent.
7.311. In sum, in its likelihood-of-dumping determination, the USDOC relied on certain WTO-
inconsistent margins of dumping or rates, in particular: (i) the margins of dumping for the
mandatory respondents in the fourth administrative review which were calculated with zeroing and
therefore inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the An ti-Dumping Agreement and VI:2 of the GATT; and
(ii) the Viet Nam-wide entity rate applied in the fourth administrative review, which is inconsistent
with Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 9.4.
7.312. In light of our understanding of the oblig ations under Article 11.3 as described above, the
USDOC's reliance on these WTO-inconsistent margins renders its likelihood-of-dumping
determination inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.313. In addition to arguing that the margins calculated with zeroing and the NME-wide entity
rate are WTO-consistent, arguments which we have rejected above
454, the United States' response
to Viet Nam's arguments focuses on the fact that the USDOC relied on certain margins – those for
the two mandatory respondents in the first admini strative review – the WTO-consistency of which
is not contested. Moreover, the United States relies on the alleged admission by Vietnamese
producers/exporters before the USDOC that some dumping existed after the issuance of the
order.
455
7.314. In making this argument, the United Stat es relies on the statement of the Appellate Body
in US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods that its finding in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review:
does not stand for the proposition that a WTO-inconsistent methodology used for the
calculation of a dumping margin will, in and of itself, taint a sunset review
determination under Article 11.3. The only way the use of such a methodology would
render a sunset review determination inconsistent with Article 11.3 is if the
investigating authority relied upon that margin of dumping to support its likelihood-of-
dumping or likelihood-of injury determination.
456
7.315. On its face, this statement merely confir ms that it is the fact of relying on a WTO-
inconsistent margin in the sunset review, rather than the mere calculation of a WTO-inconsistent
margin in one of the underlying administrative reviews, that gives rise to a violation of
Article 11.3.
457 We agree with this view.
7.316. We understand the United States to be arguing that the USDOC's reliance on certain WTO-
inconsistent margins of dumping does not necessarily render its likelihood determination
inconsistent with Article 11.3, and that we should uphold the determination if WTO-consistent
factors relied upon by the USDOC in arriving at its determination "form an independent basis to
demonstrate the continuing need for the discipline of the order".
458 The United States considers
that irrespective of the USDOC's reliance on dumping margins that Viet Nam alleges are WTO-
inconsistent, the determination stands on the basis of: (i) the alleged admission before the USDOC
that some dumping continued after the imposition of the order; (ii) the presumably WTO-

454 See above paras. 7.81. and 7.208.
455 United States' first written submission, paras. 247-248; response to Panel question No. 35,
para. 119.
456 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 181
(quoted in United States' first written submission, para. 270). (emphasis original)
457 In US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, the panel found that, although the
USDOC reported to the USITC the dumping margins at issue as "margins likely to prevail" in the event that the
order were revoked, it did not rely on those margins in its likelihood determination, but rather relied on import
volumes. The panel's findings are described in Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods, paras. 174-175.
458 United States' first written submission, footnote 355; response to Panel question No. 34(a),
para. 116.

consistent margins for the two mandatory respon dents in the first administrative review; and
(iii) the USDOC's finding that import volumes fell after the initiation of the original investigation
and did not return to pre-investigation levels.
7.317. We agree with the United States that an investigating authority's reliance on WTO-
inconsistent factors may not always be fatal to the consistency of a likelihood-of-dumping
determination with Article 11.3. This may be the case, for instance, if there are separate
independent bases for a determination, at least one of which is not inconsistent with WTO
obligations, and a reviewing panel can conclude that the challenged determination rested on each
of those multiple independent bases. Here, however, the determination contains no indication that
the USDOC considered that the rate applied to two uncooperative companies and the declining
import volumes constituted an independent basis or bases for the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping
determination or that the determination rested on such basis or bases. To be sure, there is
language (albeit qualified) in the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination suggesting that, in
general, the USDOC would reach an affirmative likelihood-of-dumping determination where any
dumping continues after the imposition of the order, which suggests that the first two factors
referred to by the United States in this regard could form the basis for an affirmative
determination.
459 It is, however, clear from the determination itself that the USDOC's consideration
of the existence of dumping in this instance rests upon all the different margins of dumping –
margins for mandatory respondents, separate rate and Viet Nam-wide entity rate that – it had
calculated in each of the reviews. The USDOC discusses these various dumping margins together,
and does not consider the two margins for the uncooperative respondents separately, other than
w h e n r e b u t t i n g a n a r g u m e n t o f V i e t n a m e s e i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s .460 Hence, we are unable to
conclude in the present instance that the USDOC's determination rested upon WTO-consistent
bases that were separate and independent from the WTO-inconsistent margins and rates upon
which it relied.
461
7.318. We arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to the United States' argument concerning
the USDOC's evaluation of import volumes. The preliminary and final determinations indicate that
the USDOC considered evolutions in import volumes together with dumping margins in an
integrated manner.462 There is no indication that the USDOC examined whether the changes in

459 The preliminary and final likelihood-of-dumping determinations indicate that:
The Department normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping duty order is likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above
de minimis after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after
the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and
import volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly. However the SAA at 889-90,
the House Report at 63, and the Senate Report at 52 state that, "declining (or no) dumping
margins, accompanied by steady or increasing imports may indicate that foreign companies do
not have to dump to maintain market share in the United States and that dumping is less likely
to continue or recur if the order were revoked".
(Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the preliminary likelihood-of-dumping determination
in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-12, p. 5; Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-
of-dumping determination in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 2.) (italics added)
460 We note that Viet Nam submits a lengthy argumentation regarding, inter alia, the reasons why the
two mandatory respondents did not cooperate in the first administrative review and the existence of "safety"
margins for mandatory respondents showing, according to Viet Nam, that dumping was unlikely to recur.
(Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 276-277, and opening statement at first substantive meeting,
paras. 54-55.) In light of our findings, we do not consider it necessary to consider these arguments.
461 We recall that our task is to determine whether the challenged likelihood-of-dumping determination
is consistent with the Agreement; we are not to engage in speculation as to whether the USDOC could, or
would, have reached the same result for different reasons.
462 See Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final likelihood-of-dumping determination
in the sunset review, Exhibit VN-14, p. 4:
The Department determines that both the positive dumping margins found for numerous
companies reviewed, and the decline in import volume during the sunset review period following
the initiation of the original investigation, consistent with the language of the statute and
reflective of our practice as discussed in the statute and the Statement of Administrative Action
("SAA"), are highly probative that dumping is likely to continue or recur.
See also p. 6 of Exhibit VN-14:
For these reasons, the Department continues to find that the evidence on the record indicates
that dumping of shrimp from Vietnam is likely to continue, or recur, absent the discipline of the
antidumping duty order because dumping occurred after the issuance of the order, and import
volumes fell and have not recovered to the levels prior to the initiation of the investigation.

import volumes alone justified a determination of likelihood-of-dumping. For the same reasons as
set out above, we cannot conclude that the USDOC' s determination rested on its analysis of the
evolution of import volumes independent of its consideration of dumping.
7.319. Given this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to address Viet Nam's
argument that the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination is inconsistent with Article 11.3
due to the USDOC's failure to carry out an unbiased and objective evaluation of the facts
pertaining to the volume of imports, and for disregarding other factors in its analysis.
463
7.320. In light of the foregoing, we find that the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determination in
the first sunset review is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article 11.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.7 Claims with respect to company-specific revocations
7.7.1 Introduction
7.321. Viet Nam's claims concerns the denial, in the third, fourth, and fifth administrative reviews
under the Shrimp order, of requests for company-specific revocations submitted by Vietnamese
respondents.
464 Viet Nam claims that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 11.1
and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement due to the USDOC's refusal to revoke the Shrimp anti-
dumping order with respect to the Vietnamese producers/exporters that submitted these
requests.465
7.7.2 Factual background
7.322. Section 751(d) of the US Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (codified at 19 U.S.C. §1675 (d)),
provides that the USDOC (which the statute refers to as the "administering authority") may
"revoke, in whole or in part, a countervailing duty order or an antidumping duty order or finding,
or terminate a suspended investigation, after review under subsection (a) or (b) of this section".
19 U.S.C. §1675 subsection (a) governs the conduct of administrative reviews, whereas
subsection (b) provides authority for the USDOC to conduct changed circumstances reviews.
466

Moreover, we find that the other factors alleged by the Vietnamese Respondents do not affect
this finding.
463 We note that the United States asserted in a comment on Viet Nam's closing statement at the
second panel meeting made in the context of its comments on Viet Nam's responses to Panel questions after
the second meeting of the Panel, that the USDOC has reopened the record of the sunset review based on new
information of fraud that was not available at the time of the sunset review. (United States' comments on
Viet Nam's responses to Panel questions after the second meeting, paras. 91-96 (referring to Certain Frozen
Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Notice of Reopening of the First Five-Year "Sunset"
Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 15310 (19 March 2014), Exhibit US-97). The
United States asserted that it was introducing this new factual information before the Panel "[g]iven that
Viet Nam has chosen to make an issue of the conduct of Vietnamese shrimp exporters" (Viet Nam had asserted
in the context of its closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel that Vietnamese shrimp exporters
had "played by the rules"). Because we do not consider that they are relevant to our examination of the
consistency with Article 11.3 of the USDOC's first sunset review determination, we do not consider it necessary
to decide whether the United States properly introduced these new facts before the Panel, but nevertheless
note that para. 8 of the Panel's Working Procedures provides that, with certain exceptions – e.g. for purposes
of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments the other party's answers – the parties were to submit all
factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting.
464 Below, in paras. 7.356. -7.361. , we examine an objection raised by the United States to Viet Nam's
claims with respect to the USDOC's actions in the third administrative review.
465 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 356. In its first written submission, Viet Nam asserted that
absent revocation, individually-examined producers/exporters "are being denied their rights under Articles 2.1,
2.4.2, 9.3". However Viet Nam clarified that it is only pursuing claims of violation under Articles 11.1 and 11.2
(Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 49, para. 168).
466 Section 751 of the Act; 19 U.S.C. § 1675, Exhibit VN-47. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) provides, inter alia,
that:
(b) Reviews based on changed circumstances
(1) In general
Whenever the administering authority [i.e. the USDOC] or the Commission [i.e. the USITC]
receives information concerning, or a request from an interested party for a review of—

7.323. 19 C.F.R. §351.222 of the USDOC Regulations sets forth rules and procedures for the
revocation of anti-dumping duty orders by the USDOC. At the time of the administrative reviews at
issue467, an exporter or producer could request revocation of an order with regard to itself under
Section 751(a) of the Act and Section 351.222(b) of the USDOC Regulations. 468 Section 351.222,
"Revocation of orders; termination of suspended investigations", at the time provided as follows:
(a) Introduction. ''Revocation'' is a term of art that refers to the end of an
antidumping or countervailing proceeding in which an order has been issued.
''Termination'' is the companion term for the end of a proceeding in which the
investigation was suspended due to the a cceptance of a suspension agreement.
Generally, a revocation or termination may occur only after the Department or the
Commission have conducted one or more reviews under section 751 of the Act. This
section contains rules regarding requirements for a revocation or termination; and
procedures that the Department will follow in determining whether to revoke an order
or terminate a suspended investigation.
(b) Revocation or termination based on absence of dumping.
(1)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order or terminate a
suspended antidumping investigation, the Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether all exporters and producers cove red at the time of revocation by the
order or the suspension agreement have sold the subject merchandise at not less than
normal value for a period of at least three consecutive years; and
(B) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise
necessary to offset dumping.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A) and
(B) of this section, that the antidumping du ty order or suspension of the antidumping
duty investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or
terminate the investigation.
(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order in part, the
Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order have sold the
merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at least three consecutive
years;

(A) a final affirmative determination that resulted in an antidumping duty order under this
subtitle or a finding under the Antidumping Act, 1921, or in a countervailing duty order under
this subtitle or section 1303 of this title,
(B) a suspension agreement accepted under section 1671c or 1673c of this title, or
(C) a final affirmative determination resulting from an investigation continued pursuant to
section 1671c(g) or 1673c(g) of this title,
which shows changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review of such determination or
agreement, the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may be) shall conduct
a review of the determination or agreement after publishing notice of the review in the Federal
Register.
…
(4) Limitation on period for review
In the absence of good cause shown—
…
(B) the administering authority may not review a determination made under section 1671d(a) or
1673d(a) of this title, or an investigation suspended under section 1671c or 1673c of this title,
less than 24 months after the date of publication of notice of that determination or suspension.
467 As noted below, the USDOC subsequently amended its regulations. However, Viet Nam's claim
pertains to the USDOC's application and interpretation of Section 351.222(b) as it existed prior to these
modifications and we therefore consider the statutory and regulatory scheme as it existed at the time of the
USDOC actions at issue.
468 Section 751(a) of the Act; 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) and (d), Exhibit VN-47, 19 C.F.R. 351.222(b),
Exhibit VN-58.

(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary previously has
determined to have sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value, the
exporter or producer agrees in writing to its immediate reinstatement in the order, as
long as any exporter or producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes
that the exporter or producer, subseque nt to the revocation, sold the subject
merchandise at less than normal value; and
(C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise
necessary to offset dumping.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A)
through (C) of this section, that the antidu mping duty order as to those producers or
exporters is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those
producers or exporters.
(3) Revocation of nonproducing exporter.
I n t h e c a s e o f a n e x p o r t e r t h a t i s n o t the producer of subject merchandise, the
Secretary normally will revoke an order in part under paragraph (b)(2) of this section
only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those companies
that supplied the exporter during the time-period that formed the basis for the
revocation.
…
(d) Treatment of unreviewed intervening years
(1) In general. The Secretary will not revoke an order or terminate a suspended
investigation under paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section unless the Secretary has
conducted a review under this subpart of th e first and third (or fifth) years of the
three-and five-year consecutive time periods referred to in those paragraphs.
The Secretary need not have conducted a review of an intervening year ( see
paragraph (d)(2) of this section). However, except in the case of a revocation or
termination under paragraph (c)(1) of this section (government abolition of
countervailable subsidy programs), before revoking an order or terminating a
suspended investigation, the Secretary must be satisfied that, during each of the
three (or five) years, there were exports to the United States in commercial quantities
of the subject merchandise to which a revocation or termination will apply.
(2) Intervening year. ''Intervening year'' means any year between the first and final
year of the consecutive period on which revocation or termination is conditioned.
(e) Request for revocation or termination
(1) Antidumping proceeding.
During the third and subsequent annual anniversary months of the publication of an
antidumping order or suspension of an an tidumping investigation, an exporter or
producer may request in writing that the Secretary revoke an order or terminate a
suspended investigation under paragraph (b) of this section with regard to that person
if the person submits with the request:
(i) The person's certification that the person sold the subject merchandise at not less
than normal value during the period of review described in § 351.213(e)(1), and that
in the future the person will not sell the merchandise at less than normal value;
(ii) The person's certification that, during each of the consecutive years referred to in
paragraph (b) of this section, the person sold the subject merchandise to the
United States in commercial quantities; and

(iii) If applicable, the agreement regardin g reinstatement in the order or suspended
investigation described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section.
…
(f) Procedures. (1) Upon receipt of a timely request for revocation or termination
under paragraph (e) of this section, the Secretary will consider the request as
including a request for an administrative review and will initiate and conduct a review
under § 351.213.
(2) In addition to the requirements of § 351.221 regarding the conduct of an
administrative review, the Secretary will:
(i) Publish with the notice of initiation under § 351.221(b)(1), notice of ''Request for
Revocation of Order (in part)'' or ''Request for Termination of Suspended
Investigation'' (whichever is applicable);
(ii) Conduct a verification under § 351.307;
(iii) Include in the preliminary results of review under § 351.221(b)(4) the Secretary's
decision whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the requirements for
revocation or termination are met;
(iv) If the Secretary decides that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the
requirements for revocation or termination are met, publish with the notice of
preliminary results of review under § 351.221(b)(4) notice of ''Intent to Revoke Order
(in Part)'' or ''Intent to Terminate Suspended Investigation'' (whichever is applicable);
(v) Include in the final results of review under §351.221(b)(5) the Secretary's final
decision whether the requirements for revocation or termination are met; and
(vi) If the Secretary determines that the requirements for revocation or termination
are met, publish with the notice of final results of review under § 351.221(b)(5) notice
of ''Revocation of Order (in Part)'' or ''Termination of Suspended Investigation''
(whichever is applicable).

(3) If the Secretary revokes an order in whole or in part, the Secretary will order the
suspension of liquidation terminated for the merchandise covered by the revocation on
the first day after he period under review, and will instruct the Customs Service to
release any cash deposit or bond.
7.324. In 2012, the USDOC amended its regulations to eliminate 351.222(b)(2).
469
7.325. Sections 351.216 and 351.222(g) of the USDOC Regulations, which were not affected by
the 2012 modification, govern the conduct of changed circumstances reviews. 470
Section 351.222(g) provides as follows:
(g) Revocation or termination based on changed circumstances.
(1) The Secretary may revoke an order, in whole or in part, or terminate a suspended
investigation if the Secretary concludes that:
(i) Producers accounting for substantially all of the production of the domestic like
product to which the order (or the part of the order to be revoked) or suspended
investigation pertains have expressed a lack of interest in the order, in whole or in
part, or suspended investigation (see section 782(h) of the Act); or

469 Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. 29875 (21 May 2012), Exhibit VN-59. The amendment took effect on 20 June 2012.
470 19 C.F.R. 351.216, Exhibit US-91; 19 C.F.R. 351.222(g), Exhibit VN-58.

(ii) Other changed circumstances sufficient to warrant revocation or termination exist.
(2) If at any time the Secretary concludes from the available information that changed
circumstances sufficient to warrant revocation or termination may exist, the Secretary
will conduct a changed circumstances review under § 351.216. …
7.326. Section 351.216 sets forth the procedures applicable in changed circumstances reviews.
471
7.327. For ease of reference, in our discussion below, we refer to revocation of the "duty" in its
entirety (with respect to all foreign producers/exporters, including under Section 351.222(b)(1))
as an "order-wide" revocation and to revocation of a "duty" for an individual producer/exporter
(including pursuant to Section 351.222(b)(2)) as a "company-specific" revocation.
7.328. In the third, fourth and fifth administrative reviews under the Shrimp order, a number of
Vietnamese producers/exporters requested company-specific revocations pursuant to
Section 751(a) of the Act and Section 351.222(b) of the USDOC Regulations. No requests for
revocation under these provisions were made in the sixth administrative review.472
7.329. Fish One requested revocation of the order, as it concerned that company, in the context
of the third administrative review 473, based on its "likely" three consecutive years of sales "at not
less than normal value". Fish One had received an individual margin of zero in the
first administrative review, and was not selected as mandatory respondent but received a rate of
zero as separate rate in the second administrative review.
474 Fish One's request stated that it was
the USDOC's practice to treat companies that were not mandatory respondent in the interim
period (here, the second review) the same as if th ey had obtained a zero margin for the period of
review, and stated that it believed that it would again qualify for a zero margin in the
third review.
475
7.330. In its preliminary determination in the third administrative review, the USDOC determined
not to revoke the order in respect of Fish One because Fish One had not been selected for
individual examination.476 The final determination confirmed the preliminary determination. In the
Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying its final determination, the USDOC stated that:

471 Order-wide revocation is also authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(h)(2) if producers accounting for
substantially all of the production of the domestic like product express a lack of interest in the order
(Exhibit US-95). Such revocation requests are examined in changed circumstances reviews.
472 Notice of initiation for the sixth administrative review, Exhibit VN-16.
473 Fish One's request for revocation in the third administrative review, Exhibit VN-82.
474 This is because in the first, second and third administrative reviews, all mandatory respondents
received a margin of zero, de minimis, or based on facts available. Since US law provided that the USDOC
could not base the separate rate on these types of margins, but provided that the USDOC could resort to an
alternative methodology, the USDOC decided to assign the most recent margin calculated as separate rate. For
most separate rate respondents, this was the separate rate of 4.57% calculated in the original investigation.
For Fish One, in the third administrative review, this was a rate of zero that had been calculated for that
company in the first administrative review.
475 Fish One's request for revocation in the third administrative review, Exhibit VN-82. Fish One's
request, as well as each of the other requests submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters, included a
request to be included in the administrative review, and stated that they attached the certifications required by
Section 351.222(e)(1) and, where relevant, the certifications required under the Certain Fresh Cut Flowers
from Colombia procedure discussed below. Viet Nam provided the Panel with the text of the requests but only
included in the documents submitted to the Panel the certifications provided by Camimex, Phuong Nam and
Grobest/I-Mei in support of their requests for revocation in the fifth administrative review (requests for
revocation submitted in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-84).
476 Preliminary determination in the third administrative review, Exhibit VN-61, p. 10011. The USDOC
reasoned that: (i) the Act affords it broad discretion to limit the number of respondents selected for individual
review when individual examination of all companies under review is impracticable, and (ii) although the
Regulations setting out rules and requirements for revocation of an order were silent on their applicability in
situations in which the USDOC limited its examination, the USDOC did not interpret them as requiring it to
conduct an individual examination of Fish One given that it had limited its examination and Fish One was not
one of the companies selected for individual examination. The USDOC added that to interpret the Regulations
as Fish One proposed would undermine its authority under the Act to limit its examination in cases involving a
large number of producers/exporters, and would require it to conduct individual reviews for any company
requesting revocation.

For the final results of the instant review, we continue to find that our preliminary
determination with respect to Fish One's revocation request is not contrary to the
statute or Department policy. Because Fish One was not selected for individual review
pursuant to 777A(c)(2)(B) of the Act, it was treated as a cooperative separate-rate
respondent, and has received a separate rate pursuant to the statute and the
Department's policy. The statute does not require the Department to select exporters
for revocation purposes within the context of section 777A(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Rather,
pursuant to that statutory provision, because of the large number of companies with
review requests, the Department selected respondents for individual examination that
could reasonably be examined. That Fish One requested revocation pursuant to the
Department's regulations does not require the Department to individually review Fish
One for revocation purposes, when the Department, as it did here, limits the
individually reviewed companies under the statute.
477
7.331. Seventeen Vietnamese respondents requested company-specific revocations in the context
of the fourth administrative review:
a. Fish One again requested a company-specific revocation of the order, based on its "likely
four consecutive years of sales at not less than normal value". Fish One recalled that it
had been selected for individual examination and had received a zero margin in the
first administrative review, had not been selected for individual examination in the
second and third administrative reviews, although it had received a margin of zero (as
separate rate) in the second administrative review. In its request, Fish One stated that it
was the USDOC's practice to treat companies that were not mandatory respondents in
the interim period the same as if they had obtained a zero margin for the period of
review, and indicated that it expected to receive again a zero margin in the
third administrative review if selected for individual examination, and believed it would
again qualify for a zero rate in the fourth administrative review.
478
b. Camimex and Minh Phu requested that the USDOC revoke the order with respect to
them based on their likely three consecutive years of sales at not less than normal
value. Their joint request stated that they both had been selected as mandatory
respondents in the second and third administrative reviews, had received zero or de
minimis margins in the second administrative review, and stated that they believed that
they would again qualify to receive a zero or de minimis margin in the
third administrative review, and if selected for individual examination in the
fourth review, could demonstrate that they did not engage in dumping for
three consecutive years.
479
c. In the same submission to the USDOC, 13 co mpanies that had never been selected as
mandatory respondents but received the separate rate in both the second and
third administrative reviews also requested revocation from the order. In their request,
these companies referred to a procedure for addressing requests for revocation by
companies not selected as mandatory resp ondents developed by the USDOC in its

477 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the third administrative
review, Exhibit VN-72, p. 62.
478 Requests for revocation submitted in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-83 (Fish One's
request for revocation). Fish One's request stated that it attached certifications to the effect that it: (i) sold the
subject merchandise in the United States at not less than normal value during the fourth review period;
(ii) sold the subject merchandise in the United States in commercial quantities; and (iii) agreed to its
immediate reinstatement in the anti-dumping order, should the USDOC conclude that it sold the subject
merchandise at less than normal value subsequent to revocation.
479 Requests for revocation submitted in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-83 (request for
revocation submitted by 15 respondents, including Minh Phu and Camimex). The request stated that it included
certifications stating that Minh Phu and Camimex: (i) sold the subject merchandise in the United States at not
less than normal value during the fourth review period; (ii) sold the subject merchandise in the United States
in commercial quantities during the second, third and fourth review periods; and (iii) agreed to their immediate
reinstatement in the anti-dumping order, should the USDOC conclude that they sold the subject merchandise
at less than normal value subsequent to revocation.

proceeding on Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia . The request asserted that
these 13 companies met the criteria set forth by the USDOC in that proceeding.480
d. Grobest also requested revocation from the order, stating that it had requested to be
reviewed but was not selected as a mandatory respondent in the second and third
administrative reviews. Grobest also referred to the approach proposed by the USDOC in
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia for considering revocation of companies not
selected for individual examination and stated that it met each criterion set forth by the
USDOC in that proceeding.481

480 The request cited the following language from the USDOC's final determination in Certain Fresh Cut
Flowers from Colombia:
we have decided to adopt the following procedure for addressing requests for revocation by small
companies in this proceeding. We believe this procedure addresses many of the concerns raised
by the parties and, at the same time, meets the resource constraints faced by the Department.

Under this procedure, companies that were not selected for examination in prior reviews
(because of the large number of companies for which a review was requested) will have a
mechanism for obtaining revocation on the basis of three consecutive years of sales at not less
than normal value. The first opportunity for such a procedure will occur in the review of the
period March 1, 1997 to February 28, 1998 (the eleventh review period). Companies that request
a review for that period may also request revocation if they meet the following criteria: (1) a
review was requested for the company in each of the two years immediately preceeding the
period of review in which revocation is requested, but the company was not selected for
examination in either of those two preceding reviews; and 2) with the request for revocation the
company (a) certifies that it sold subject merchandise at not less than normal value during the
period described in 19 C.F.R. 351.213(e)(1) and for two consecutive years immediately
preceeding that period; (b) provides the certifications required under 19 C.F.R. 351.222(e)(ii)
and (iii); and (c) submits a statement acknowledging that its entries are subject to assessment
of AD duties at the non-selected respondent rate in one or both of the two preceding review
periods. If a company meets these criteria, Commerce will examine the company's sales during
the current period of review for purposes of determining a dumping margin in accordance with
section 751(a) of the Act. In accordance with section 751(a)(2) of the Act, the results of that
analysis will form the basis for any assessment of antidumping duties on entries during that
period and for cash deposits. In addition, for the purposes of revocation only, Commerce will
examine data for the two prior years to determine whether the company sold subject
merchandise at not less than normal value. If Commerce determines that the company sold
subject merchandise at not less than normal value in each of the three years examined and the
other conditions of 19 CFR 351.222 are met, it will revoke the order with respect to that
company.
The request states that the 13 companies requested reviews in each of the two years immediately preceding
the period of review in which the revocation was requested (i.e. in the periods covered by the second and third
administrative reviews). It attaches certifications for all 13 companies stating that they: (i) sold the subject
merchandise in the United States at not less than normal value during the second, third and fourth review
periods; (ii) sold the subject merchandise in the United States in commercial quantities during the second,
third and fourth review periods; (iii) agreed to their immediate reinstatement in the anti-dumping order, should
the USDOC conclude that they sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value subsequent to
revocation; and (iv) acknowledged that their entries were subject to assessment of anti-dumping duties at the
non-selected respondent rate set in the second and third administrative reviews. The request invited the
USDOC to examine the companies' data for the two prior years to determine whether they companies sold
subject merchandise at not less than the normal value. (Requests for revocation submitted in the
fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-83 (request for revocation submitted by 15 companies, including Minh
Phu and Camimex)).
481 Requests for revocation submitted in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-83 (Grobest's
request for revocation). The request stated that Grobest met each of the criteria set forth by the USDOC in
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia, that it attached the certification required under that procedure, and
invited the USDOC to examine its data for the two prior years to determine whether it sold subject
merchandise at not less than the normal value. Following litigation, Grobest obtained a court ruling that the
USDOC individually examine it as voluntary respondent in the fourth administrative review. During the court-
ordered individual examination, Grobest's successor in interest, I-Mei Frozen Foods, withdrew its request for
individual review, including its request for revocation of the order. (Order, Grobest & I Mei Industrial (Vietnam)
Co., Ltd., v. United States, Consol. Court No. 10-00238 (13 Sept. 2012), Exhibit US-11; Grobest & I Mei
Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., v. United States, 853 F.Supp.2d 1352 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 2012), Exhibit US-12;
Successor to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., Withdrawal of Request for Voluntary Respondent
Review and Revocation of Antidumping Duty Order in Part (12 Dec. 2012), Exhibit US-13; Response to
15 January 2013 Supplemental Questionnaire in Reexamination of Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co.,
Ltd. Voluntary Responses (29 Jan. 2013), Exhibit US-14; Response by Successor to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial

7.332. The preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review indicated that of the
Vietnamese respondents who initially requested revocation of the order, 13 subsequently withdrew
their requests. The USDOC noted that of the companies that maintained their requests
482, only
Minh Phu was selected for individual examination. The USDOC preliminarily determined not to
revoke the order with respect to Minh Phu as it had calculated a non- de minimis positive margin
for the company in the review. 483 The remaining three companies received the separate rate. The
USDOC preliminarily determined not to revoke the order with respect to them, for the reason that
they had not been selected for individual examination.484 The final determination maintained these
decisions.485 The Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination further
discussed the USDOC's determination not to revoke the order with respect to these respondents
who were not selected for individual examination.
486 The USDOC explained that the procedure
devised in Certain Cut Flowers from Colombia , through which non-individually-examined
producers/exporters could obtain revocation, was actually never implemented in practice and was
limited to that one proceeding and therefore was not applicable in the administrative review at
issue. The USDOC also reiterated its interpretation of the Statute that its discretion to limit its
examination was not limited by virtue of the prov isions of the Regulations addressing revocations
in the context of administrative reviews, adding:
That the non-selected revocation companies requested revocation pursuant to the
Department's regulations does not require the Department to individually review these
companies for revocation purposes, when th e Department, as it did here, limits the
individually reviewed companies under the statute.
487
7.333. In the fifth administrative review, three companies requested company-specific
revocations:

(Vietnam) Co., Ltd., to Department's Supplemental Questionnaire and Petitioners' Objection to Rescission
(13 Feb. 2013), Exhibit US-15). In its preliminary and final determinations in the re-conducted fourth
administrative review, the USDOC rejected I-Mei's request for rescission of the individual examination,
assigned a margin of 25.76% to I-Mei, found that the company did not meet the requirements of
Section 351.222(b) and therefore determined not to revoke the order with respect to I-Mei. (Certain Frozen
Warmwater Shrimp From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Results of Reconducted of
Administrative Review of Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. and Intent Not to Revoke; 2008-2009,
78 Fed. Reg. 57,352 (19 Sept. 2013) (Exhibit US-16); Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam; Final Results of Re-Conducted Administrative Review of Grobest & I-Mei
Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd and Intent Not To Revoke; 2008-2009, 79 Fed. Reg. 15309 (19 March 2014),
Exhibit US-90). The United States, citing I-Mei's request for rescission of the administrative review and
withdrawal of the request for revocation, argues that Grobest withdrew its request. However, we note that
Viet Nam's challenge concerns the USDOC's initial rejection of Grobest's request for revocation; as discussed
below, the USDOC determined not to revoke the order with respect to Grobest on the basis that it was not
individually examining Grobest. Moreover, the USDOC's determination in the court-ordered individual
examination proceeding – which is not challenged by Viet Nam and therefore does not fall within our terms of
reference – shows that the USDOC did not accept I-Mei's withdrawal of the request for revocation. Instead, as
indicated above, the USDOC preliminarily rejected the request on the basis that it calculated a positive, non de
minimis, margin of dumping for the company. This is also Viet Nam's reading of the evidence on record.
(Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 75.)
482 In its determination, the USDOC indicated that five companies maintained their requests. However,
only four companies actually maintained their request: Minh Phu Group, Camimex, Grobest, and Fish One.
Seaprodex Minh Hai was listed as having maintained its revocation request in the preliminary and final
determinations, but the Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination (which
preceded the final determination), footnote 86, indicates that Seaprodex Minh Hai should not have been listed.
The United States clarified, in response to a question from the Panel, that Seaprodex Minh Hai had withdrawn
its request for revocation (United States' response to Panel question No. 74, referring to Letter from Counsel
for Seaprodex Minh Hai to Secretary of Commerce (31 July 1999), Exhibit US-96).
483 Preliminary determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12209.
484 The USDOC's reasoning was essentially the same as in its decision rejecting Fish One's request in the
third administrative review, namely that the USDOC is under no obligation to conduct individual examination of
non-selected companies, or verify non-selected companies' data. (Preliminary determination in the
fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-09, p. 12209.)
485 Final determination in the fourth administrative review, Exhibit VN-13, p. 47774.
486 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fourth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-13, pp. 15-17.
487 Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the final determination in the fourth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-13, pp. 16-17.

a. In its request, Camimex stated that it had received a de minimis margin in the
third administrative review but was not selected for individual examination in the
fourth review. It referred to the USDOC's "policy and regulations" under 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.222(d) to treat companies that are not mandatory respondents in the interim
period (in this case, the period of the fourth review) the same as if they had obtained a
zero margin, and asserted its belief that it would obtain a zero or de minimis margin in
the fifth review, in which case it would have demonstrated that it had sold the subject
merchandise without dumping for at least three consecutive years.
488
b. In its request, Phuong Nam stated that it had been individually examined and received a
de minimis margin in the third administrative review but was not selected for individual
examination in the fourth review. Phuong Nam stated that it was the USDOC's policy to
treat companies not selected for individual examination in the interim period (here, the
fourth administrative review) the same as if they had obtained a zero margin, and that
Phuong Nam believed that it would again qualif y for a zero margin in the fifth review, in
which case it would have demonstrated that it had sold the subject merchandise without
dumping for at least three consecutive years.
489
c. In its request, Grobest noted that it had requested to be reviewed and cooperated in the
third and fourth administrative reviews, but was not selected for individual examination;
it also recalled its request for revocation in the fourth review, which remained
unanswered. Grobest again referred to the procedure proposed by the USDOC in Certain
Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia, and asserted that it met the condition set forth by the
USDOC in that proceeding.
490
7.334. In its preliminary determination in the fifth administrative review, the USDOC noted that of
the three companies requesting revocation, only Camimex was a mandatory respondent. The
USDOC preliminarily determined not to revoke th e order with respect to that company on the
ground that it had calculated a positive, non- de minimis , dumping margin for Camimex in the
review.491 As in the third and fourth administrative reviews, the USDOC preliminarily determined
not to revoke the order with respect to companies that it had not selected as mandatory
respondents.492 The final determination maintains these decisions.493
7.335. On the basis of the record before us, we understand that the USDOC determined not to
revoke the order with respect to:
a. Minh Phu (fourth administrative review) and Camimex (fifth administrative review), on
the basis that it calculated a positive, non de minimis margin for these companies in the
corresponding administrative review; and

488 Requests for revocation submitted in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-84 (Camimex's
request for revocation). Camimex's request included a certification stating that it: (i) sold the subject
merchandise in the United States at not less than normal value during the fifth review period; (ii) sold the
subject merchandise in the United States in commercial quantities during the third, fourth and fifth review
periods; and (iii) agreed to its immediate reinstatement in the anti-dumping order, should the USDOC conclude
that it sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value subsequent to revocation.
489 Requests for revocation submitted in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-84 (Phuong Nam's
request for revocation). Phuong Nam's request attached certifications stating that it: (i) sold the subject
merchandise in the United States at not less than normal value during the fifth review period; (ii) sold the
subject merchandise in the United States in commercial quantities during the third, fourth and fifth review
periods; and (iii) agreed to its immediate reinstatement in the anti-dumping order, should the USDOC conclude
that it sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value subsequent to revocation.
490 Requests for revocation submitted in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-84 (Grobest's
request for revocation). Grobest's request invited the USDOC to examine its data for the two prior years to
determine whether it sold subject merchandise at not less than the normal value, consistent with the
procedure developed by the USDOC in Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia. The request stated that
Grobest met each criterion set forth by the USDOC in Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia and attached a
certification pursuant to that procedure, which certification is included in the documentation provided by
Viet Nam.
491 Notice of initiation for the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-10; preliminary determination in the
fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-15, pp. 12057-12058; final determination in the fifth administrative
review, Exhibit VN-18.
492 Preliminary determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-15, p. 12057.
493 Final determination in the fifth administrative review, Exhibit VN-18, pp. 56160-56161.

b. Fish One (third administrative review); Camimex, Grobest, and Fish One
(fourth administrative review); and Grobes t and Phuong Nam (fifth administrative
review) on the basis that the requesting producer/exporter was not a mandatory
respondent in the corresponding administrative review.
494
7.7.3 Main arguments of the parties
7.7.3.1 Viet Nam
7.336. Viet Nam is challenging the USDOC's rejection of requests for company-specific
revocations submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters in the administrative reviews at issue.
Specifically, with respect to some of these company-specific requests, Viet Nam challenges the use
of WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping in determining whether the producer/exporter at issue
had ceased dumping for at least three consecutive years. With respect to others, Viet Nam
challenges the USDOC's refusal to revoke the order in respect producers/exporters which it was
not individually examining in the review at issue.
495
7.337. Viet Nam indicates that with respect to Minh Phu and Camimex, which were individually
examined in at least three consecutive reviews and had their requests rejected on the basis of the
margins calculated for them, its claims pertain to the USDOC's reliance on dumping margins
calculated with zeroing in rejecting the requests for revocation. Viet Nam invites the Panel to adopt
the reasoning of the Appellate Body in disputes involving sunset review determinations, and to find
that the USDOC's reliance on margins of dumping calculated with zeroing as a basis for rejecting
requests for revocation was inconsistent with Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
496
7.338. Viet Nam's argumentation as it relates to the Vietnamese producers/exporters who were
never individually examined or who were individu ally examined in fewer than three consecutive
administrative reviews focuses on the fact that the USDOC refused to revoke the order in respect
of these companies on the basis that they had not been selected for individual examination. 497
Viet Nam argues that the USDOC's failure to revoke the anti-dumping order with respect to
companies that were denied the opportunity to demonstrate the absence of dumping because they
were not individually examined violates Articles 11.1 and 11.2. Viet Nam further argues that the
USDOC imposed a requirement that respondents be individually examined in three consecutive
reviews to qualify for consideration for revocation, notwithstanding its determination that each
such respondent was subject to a zero or de minimis s e p a r a t e r a t e i n e a c h o f t h e r e v i e w s . I n
addition, Viet Nam argues that these companies would have been able to demonstrate the absence
of dumping in three consecutive years if: (i) ze roing had not been used when calculating their
individual margins (if and when they were indivi dually examined), and (ii) the USDOC had applied
a WTO-consistent separate rate in the administrative reviews at issue, i.e. a separate rate of zero
or de minimis.
498

494 Viet Nam confirms this understanding in its response to Panel question No. 73(c).
495 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 347; response to Panel question No. 50, para. 169;
second written submission, para. 125.
496 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 348-349; response to Panel question No. 43;
second written submission, paras. 114, 116. Viet Nam states that it assumes, for the purpose of its claim, that
the standard applied by the USDOC for company-specific revocations (i.e. absence of dumping for
three consecutive years) is the appropriate standard under Article 11.2 (Viet Nam's first written submission,
para. 347).
497 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 117. Viet Nam initially presented a distinct
argumentation for three categories of exporters which requested revocation, namely: (i) exporters that were
individually examined in three or more reviews, who would not have been found to have dumped in the
reviews but for zeroing; (ii) exporters that were individually examined in less than three reviews and which
believed they could demonstrate the absence of dumping for a period of three consecutive years; and
(iii) exporters which were never individually examined but which believed they could demonstrate the absence
of dumping for a period of at least three years. (Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 325-327.) In its
second submission, Viet Nam abandoned this categorization and as indicated above instead distinguished
between Vietnamese producers/exporters whose requests were rejected on the basis that the USDOC
calculated WTO-inconsistent positive margins for them and Vietnamese producers/exporters whose requests
were rejected because they had not been individually examined.
498 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 43.

7.339. In support of its claim, Viet Nam asserts that Article 11.2 imposes an obligation to revoke
anti-dumping duties as to individual producers/ exporters once the criteria set forth in that
provision are met by those individual producers/ex porters. Viet Nam argues in this respect that
Article 11.1 seeks to limit the imposition of dumping duties both in terms of "time" ("only so long
as") and scope ("to the extent necessary"), and notes that both Articles 11.2 and 11.3 address the
time period during which anti-dumping duties may remain in effect. Viet Nam notes that
Article 11.3, however, only addresses the issue of the "expiry" of duties and not "the extent" to
which duties are continued. Viet Nam submits that "the extent" limitation not being addressed in
Article 11.3, it must necessarily be addressed under Article 11.2. Viet Nam notes that this is
contemplated by Article 11.2 in that it envisa ges duties not only being "removed" but also
"varied". Viet Nam argues that, if they are to ha ve meaning, both the terms "extent" and "varied"
must be read as permitting changes in both the exporters and products subject to anti-dumping
duties.
499 Viet Nam also argues that the reference to "any interested parties" in Article 11.2
supports its contention that Article 11.2 applies to individual producers/exporters. 500 In Viet Nam's
view, the terms "any" and "varied" must both in form Article 11.2, so that the removal of the
application of the duty with respect to any indi vidual importers, exporters or foreign producers
qualifies as "the duty" being varied.501
7.340. Viet Nam believes that footnote 21 further confirms its interpretation of Article 11.2.
Viet Nam submits that the difference in the la nguage of footnotes 21 and 22 recognizes the
authority to terminate duties in part under Article 11.2 in contrast to the requirement of
termination of the anti-dumping duties as a whole under Article 11.3.
502
7.341. Viet Nam further argues that its interpretation of Article 11.2 is consistent with other
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that address individual producers/exporters, in
particular Article 5.8, which requires the immediate termination of the investigation in respect of
exporters for which an individual margin of dumping of zero or de minimis is determined. Viet Nam
argues that it would be nonsensical if a similar mechanism to avoid the application of anti-dumping
duties did not exist for individual companies through revocation once the order is in place if they
demonstrate that they are no longer dumping and that dumping is unlikely to recur.
503
7.342. Viet Nam submits that its interpretation of Article 11.2 is confirmed by the "subsequent
practice" of certain Members, including the United States, in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention.
504
7.343. Viet Nam argues that the "limited examination" exception under Articles 6.10 and 9.4
applies only in the context of original investigations, and through Article 9.4, in administrative
reviews, and consequently does not apply in the context of Article 11.2 reviews.
505 Alternatively,
Viet Nam argues, Members must interpret and apply the provisions of the covered agreements in a
manner which gives meaning to all provisions. Accordingly, even if the exception were applicable,
it would have to be applied in a manner that reconciles the investigating authority's resource
limitations with individual producers/exporters' right to obtain company-specific revocations.
506

499 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 132-133.
500 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 41; opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, paras. 48-51. (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
paras. 149-150, 152); response to Panel question No. 79, para. 59; comment on the United States' response
501 Viet Nam's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 52.
502 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 40.
503 Viet Nam's second written submission, paras. 134-135; opening statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, para. 54.
504 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 38 (referring to Documentation on Individual Revocation
Procedures of Australia, Brazil, and India, Exhibit VN-79).
505 Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 122. In its response to Panel question No. 44,
para. 160, however, Viet Nam states that its "position is not that the USDOC cannot use sampling. Rather, if it
does use sampling, it must do so in a manner which also allows it to take actions consistent with its obligations
under Article 11".
506 Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 340, 350-355; second written submission, paras. 120-
125. Viet Nam argues that the USDOC has turned the "limited examination" exception under the
second sentence of Article 6.10 into a rule, uses the exception to undermine Article 11.2 and that the
application of the "limited examination" exception in cases where there is a large number of respondents would
render Article 11.2 a nullity. Viet Nam suggests, inter alia, that the United States could rely on the separate

Hence, Viet Nam submits, the determination of the existence of the conditions for the application
of the Articles 6.10/9.4 exception would have to be determined separately for each type of
review.
507
7.7.3.2 United States
7.344. The United States argues that Article 11.2 imposes no obligation on investigating
authorities to consider or to provide company-specific revocations. The United States notes in
particular that the Appellate Body has interpreted the term "duty" as it is used in Article 11.3 as
referring to duties imposed on a product from a country, and not to the specific anti-dumping
duties imposed or collected with respect to imports from an individual company. The United States
argues that the term is most logically interpreted as having the same meaning in both provisions
since they both set forth mechanisms to ensure that, as per Article 11.1, the duty remains in place
only as long as necessary to counteract injurious dumping.
508 The United States further notes that
Article 11.3 contains a cross-reference to Article 11.2, as it provides that an Article 11.2 review
restarts the "five-year clock" for conducting a five-year sunset review, which strongly suggests
that both types of review contemplate examination of the "duty" on a product (i.e. order-wide)
basis. According to the United States, when viewed in light of this language, Viet Nam’s
interpretation of Article 11.2 yields an absurd result. The United States submits that if an
investigating authority considers a request for company-specific revocation covering both dumping
and injury in the fourth year after the imposition of the duty, it would automatically extend the
duration of the duty (as it applies to all producer s/exporters) by an additional five years without
any obligation to conduct a sunset review under Article 11.3. If such company-specific reviews are
requested by interested parties and conducted at least once every five years, "the duty" would
continue indefinitely. In addition, the United States argues that the title of Article 11 and
Article 11.5 confirm that Article 11 also applies to price undertakings under Article 8, mutatis
mutandis. The United States submits that when the raising of export prices under a price
undertaking eliminates dumping, pursuant to Viet Nam's interpretation of Article 11.2, this would
lead to automatic termination of the duty. Thus, there would be no basis for review under
Article 11.3 (after five years), which again is an ab surd result. The United States also relies on the
fact that the text of Article 11.2 makes no distinction between the likelihood-of-dumping
determination and the likelihood-of-injury determination, both of which can provide the basis for
termination of "the duty", and that the likelihood-of-injury determination inherently relates to all of
the imports subject to "the duty". For the United States, it therefore follows that the likelihood-of-
dumping determination under Article 11.2 is also product-wide.
509
7.345. The United States argues that footnote 21 further demonstrates that the reviews provided
for in Article 11.2 are with respect to the "duty" imposed on an order-wide basis. The
United States notes that the footnote clarifies that Article 9.3 assessment reviews, do not, on their
own, constitute Article 11.2-type of reviews, and in so doing contrasts the two types of reviews.
The United States admits that the "by itself" language in footnote 21 implies that company-specific
assessment reviews may play a role in product-wide reviews under Article 11.2, but argues that
this role is as limited as in Article 11.3 sunset reviews: Members may take into account company-
specific dumping margins from assessment revi ews when conducting product-wide Article 11.3
sunset reviews.
510
7.346. The United States takes issue with Viet Nam's argument concerning the "removed or
varied" language in Article 11.2. The United States argues that this language pertains to injury,
but not to dumping, and that in addition, the duty could be "varied" by decreasing the scope of
products covered by an antidumping duty order, which would be product (not company)

rate in considering revocation for non-examined producers/exporters (Viet Nam's second written submission,
para. 137).
507 Viet Nam's first written submission, para. 352.
508 United States' second written submission, paras. 12-13; opening statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, paras. 54-56 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 150).
509 United States' first written submission, para. 77 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 140, 149, 150 and 154-155); opening statement at the first substantive
meeting, paras. 53-55; response to Panel question 38; second written submission, paras. 8-11; comments on
Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 79.
510 United States' response to Panel question No. 40.

specific.511 Further, in the United States' view, the reference to "interested parties" in Article 11.2
represents a procedural distinction from Article 11.3 that does not, contrary to Viet Nam assertion,
inform the interpretation of "the duty"; rather, the term "interested parties" merely defines who
can seek a review. The United States adds, in this regard, that neither Articles 11.2 nor 11.3
contain the term "margins" which, for the United States, might implicitly refer to individual
exporters or producers.
512 The United States argues that had Members agreed to an obligation to
examine company-specific revocation requests in Article 11.2, they would have included explicit
language to that effect as they did in Articles 5. 8 and 6.10. The United States also argues that to
read "the duty" in the context of Article 11 as a company-specific reference would disregard the
distinction between this term as used in Article 11 and the terms "individual duties" in Article 9.4
and "individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer" in Article 6.10.
513
7.347. The United States further submits that its interpretation of Article 11.2 is confirmed by the
preparatory work of Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement. The United States explains that
during the negotiations, the Nordic countries proposed adding a company-specific reference to
"dumping margins" in Article 11.2, but this proposed amendment was rejected.514
7.348. The United States also argues that even accepting, arguendo, that Article 11.2 imposes an
obligation to consider company-specific revocations, Article 11.2 does not require Members to
adopt tests based on the absence of dumping for th ree years. Hence, the United States submits,
the provisions of US law and regulations providing for company-specific revocations on the basis
of, inter alia, an absence of dumping for three consecutive years go beyond the requirements of
Articles 11.1 and 11.2 by establishing a presumption that operates in favour of foreign
producers/exporters. For this reason, even if the USDOC had found that some of the Vietnamese
producers/exporters had zero margins for three years, it would not have been required under
Articles 11.1 and 11.2 to revoke the order with respect to these companies.
515
7.349. Moreover, the United States argues that, by virtue of Article 11.4, the limited examination
exception under the second sentence of Article 6.10 would apply in the Article 11.2 context. The
United States considers that the question of the individual examination of companies is governed
by Article 6.10. It follows, argues the United States, that limiting the number of
producers/exporters individually-examined consistently with Article 6.10 cannot provide a basis for
a breach of Article 11.2 in the event that no n-selected producers/exporters seek a company-
specific revocation.516 The United States notes that Viet Nam has not alleged that the USDOC's
limitation of its examination in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews was inconsistent with
Article 6.10.517 In addition, the United States rejects as without basis in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement Viet Nam's suggestion that investigating authorities must apply different standards, or
must seek to balance individual producers/expo rters' rights and the investigating authority's
resource constraints if and when they limit their examination in a combined administrative review
and Article 11.2 review proceeding.
518
7.7.4 Main arguments of the third parties
7.350. China considers that Article 11.2 provides indi vidual producers/exporters the right to
request reviews for the purpose of obtaining company-specific revocations and leaves the
authorities no discretion to refuse to initiate an Article 11.2 review when an interested party has

511 United States' second written submission, paras. 14-16.
512 United States' response to Panel question No. 79, paras. 81-84 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 149-150).
513 United States' opening statement at the first meeting, para. 56; second written submission,
para. 18.
514 United States' response to Panel question 38, paras. 127-132 (quoting from Drafting Proposals of the
Nordic Countries Regarding Amendments of the Anti-Dumping Code, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/76, p. 5).
515 United States' second written submission, para. 23; and response to Panel question No. 45,
para. 147 (all referring to Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods,
paras. 7.153, 7.159, 7.165-7.166, 7.174).
516 United States' first written submission, paras. 86-89; second written submission, para. 7;
response to Panel question No. 44, paras. 142-145 (quoting from Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Viet Nam),
paras. 7.151-7.168).
517 United States' first written submission, para. 87.
518 United States' first written submission, para. 90.

met the conditions set out under that provision. 519 China argues that the term "duty" has a
broader meaning under Article 11.2 than under Arti cle 11.3 and refers to either the duty on a
product-specific basis, or the duties on a company-specific basis, depending on the particular
circumstances. China notes that the Appellate Body has concluded that Article 11.3 does not oblige
investigating authorities to make company-specific likelihood determinations in a sunset review,
partly on the basis that, in contrast to Article 11.2, Article 11.3 contains no express reference to
"interested parties".
520 China also notes that unlike Article 11.3, which requires the authorities to
review the likelihood of continuation or recu rrence of both dumping and injury, Article 11.2
provides that interested parties may request authorities to review either dumping or injury, or
both. Thus, it envisages that a duty may be te rminated after a review only with respect to
dumping, which is an exporter-specific concept.
521 Further, China submits that whereas
Article 11.3 obliges the authorities to review only the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping, Article 11.2 requires authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty
is necessary to offset dumping, which requires determining individual dumping margins.
522 China
argues that the distinction between "duty" and "dutie s" is not absolute and that there is no "fixed
collocation" between the terms concerned. In this sense, while China agrees with the United States
that the term "duty" in Article 11.2 is different from the term "individual duties" in Article 9.4,
China argues that this does not preclude that the former could refer to duties on exports by
individual companies, depending on the particular circumstances.
523 China submits that even if the
"limited examination" exception under Article 6.10 a pplies to Article 11.2 reviews, it should not be
applied in a manner that deprives interested parties of the right to request a review and to
demonstrate the absence of dumping, rendering Article 11.2 a nullity.524
7.351. The European Union argues that a request under Article 11.2 may relate only to
dumping, only to injury, or to both, and the review must consider whether the need for the
continued imposition of the duty at the various duty rates is necessary to offset dumping at these
rates. The review may or not be conducted on a company-specific basis, but if it is, it may also
take into account factors that relate to the industry as a whole in the exporting Member. The
European Union adds that the fact that a firm has not been dumping for a particular period of time
does not in itself require the termination of the duty with respect to that firm.
525 In addition, the
European Union considers that the second senten ce of Article 6.10 applies in the context of
Article 11.2 reviews and therefore that limite d examination may be used in such reviews. 526 The
European Union considers that reliance on dumping margins calculated with zeroing in an
Article 11.2 review violates Articles 11.1 and 11.2, and that the Panel could limit itself to finding
that the determinations at issue are inconsistent with Articles 11.1 and 11.2 on that basis.527
7.352. Japan argues that Article 11.2 affords a company-specific right to request a review, and
eventually obtain revocation, of the order. Japan notes that the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion
Resistant Steel Sunset Review gave interpretive significance to the presence of the terms "any
interested party" in Article 11.2, which it contrasted with the absence of any reference to
individual exporters, producers or interested parties in Article 11.3. Japan argues that the
reference to interested parties in Article 11.2 suggests that the drafters intended to impose
obligations regarding individual producers/exporters under Article 11.2. Consequently, Japan
argues, the term "duty" should be given a broader meaning under Article 11.2 than under
Article 11.3 and also encompasses duties imposed on a company-specific basis.
528 Japan also

519 China's third-party submission, para. 60 (quoting from Appellate Body Reports, US –
Zeroing (Japan), paras. 108–112, 114; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 87 and 94; and Mexico –
Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 308-316).
520 China's response to Panel question No. 15, paras. 31-32 (quoting from Appellate Body Report, US –
Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 149).
521 China's response to Panel question No. 15, paras. 33-34.
522 China adds that the US – DRAMs panel found that Article 11.2 does not require immediate and
automatic revocation as soon as an exporter is found to have ceased dumping, which China reads as implying
that exporters are entitled to company-specific revocations under that provision. (China's response to Panel
question No. 15, para. 34, referring to Panel Report, US – DRAMS, paras. 6.32-6.34.)
523 China's response to Panel question No. 15, para. 36.
524 China's third-party-submission, paras. 54-69; response to Panel question No. 15.
525 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 43-47; response to Panel questions No. 15 and 17.
526 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 46; European Union's response to Panel question
No. 18, para. 56.
527 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 43-47.
528 Japan's response to Panel question Nos. 15 and 16, paras. 14-15 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 149, 152).

attaches significance to the fact that, unlike Arti cle 11.3, Article 11.2 envisions that a duty may be
terminated after a review of only the need for the duty to offset dumping. 529 Japan adds that it is
relevant that Article 11 applies mutatis mutandis to price undertakings, which are necessarily
company-specific, and that it would be anomalous if individual exporters could seek the removal of
a price undertaking, but not of a duty. 530 Moreover, Japan argues that the term "varied" in
Article 11.2 presupposes that the investigating authority can recalculate individual dumping
margins and impose "the duty" at a different rate, which assumes that the term "the duty" is used
in a company-specific sense. 531 Finally, Japan considers that, by virtue of Article 11.4, to the
extent that it may be relevant in such a context, the limited examination exception in Article 6.10
applies in Article 11.2 reviews.
532
7.353. Norway considers that Article 11.2 gives any interested party a right to a review where
the conditions set forth under that provision are met. Norway relies in part of the Appellate Body's
statement in US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review that when the drafters of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement intended to impose obligations regarding individual producers/exporters, they
did so explicitly. 533 With respect to the application of the limited examination exception in the
context of an Article 11.2 review, Norway considers that there can be no automatic rejection of a
request for review, even if the Article 6.10 except ion has been applied at a previous stage of the
anti-dumping proceeding.
534
7.354. Thailand argues that Article 11.2 refers to a specific interested party as it addresses the
issue of "partial reviews" whereas Article 11. 3 governs the review of an overall proceeding
covering both dumping and injuries involving all interested parties concerned.535
7.7.5 Evaluation by the Panel
7.7.5.1 Introduction
7.355. Viet Nam's claims are two-fold: First, Viet Nam challenges the USDOC's refusal to grant
company-specific revocation to Vietnamese producers/exporters who were not individually
examined. Second, Viet Nam challenges the USDOC's reliance on dumping margins that were
calculated inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its consideration and eventual
rejection of the requests for revocation of certain Vietnamese producers/exporters. We examine
each in turn. But before we turn to the substance of Viet Nam's claims, we consider the
jurisdictional question of whether the USDOC's treatment of Fish One's request for revocation in
the third administrative review falls within the Panel's terms of reference.
7.7.5.2 Whether the USDOC's treatment of Fish One's request for revocation in the
third administrative review falls within the Panel's terms of reference
7.356. In its first written submission, Viet Nam discussed the USDOC's treatment of requests for
revocations in the third, fourth, and fifth admini strative reviews (no requests were made in the
sixth review administrative review)
536, and requested findings of inconsistency with respect to the
USDOC's actions in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews. 537 Subsequently, however, in
response to a question from the Panel, Viet Nam indicated that it is was making claims in respect
of the USDOC's rejection of requests for revocation in the context of the fourth and fifth reviews as
well as with respect to "the claim made in the third review".
538 Hence we understand Viet Nam to
include in its claims the USDOC's treatment of Fish One's request for revocation in the
third administrative review. The United States takes issue with Viet Nam's formulation of a claim in

529 Japan's response to Panel question Nos. 15 and 16, para. 16 (referring to Appellate Body Report,
US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 111).
530 Japan's response to Panel question Nos. 15 and 16, para. 18.
531 Japan's response to Panel question Nos. 15 and 16, para. 19.
532 Japan's response to Panel question No. 18.
533 Norway's response to Panel question Nos. 14 and 17, paras. 8-12 (quoting from Appellate Body
Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 152).
534 Norway's opening statement at the first meeting, paras. 8-10; response to Panel question Nos. 14
and 17.
535 Thailand's response to Panel question No. 17.
536 See Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 325 and 326.
537 See, inter alia, Viet Nam's first written submission, paras. 13 and 42.
538 Viet Nam's response to Panel question No. 48, para. 167.

this respect, as it considers that the third administrative review was not included in either
Viet Nam's request for consultations or its panel request.539 In light of the United States' objection,
we examine whether the USDOC's actions taken in the context of the third administrative review
constitute a "measure at issue" in the present di spute, such that it falls within our terms of
reference.540
7.357. Viet Nam's panel request defines the outer limit of our terms of reference – our terms of
reference require us to examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements,
the matter referred to the DSB by Viet Nam in its panel request. Viet Nam's panel request
indicates that it is made "in particular but not exclusively" with respect to: "the imposition of anti-
dumping duties and cash deposit requirements pursuant to the final results" of the fourth, fifth and
sixth administrative reviews; the fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews themselves insofar
as they did not revoke the anti-dumping duty order with respect to certain respondents requesting
or eligible for such revocation; the "continued application of the practices and conduct" described
in the panel request in any other on-going or future administrative reviews and preliminary and
final results thereof as well as any assessment instructions, cash deposits requirements, and
revocation determinations issued pursuant to such reviews; the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping
determination in the sunset review; and, finally, Section 129 of the URAA.
541 This language
suggests that only the USDOC's treatment of requests for company-specific revocations in the
fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews fall within the Panel's terms of reference.542
7.358. Moreover, as we discuss below, we are of the view that Viet Nam could in any event not
have raised a claim with respect to the USDOC's treatment of requests for revocation in the
third administrative review in its panel request.
7.359. As we noted in our 25 September 2013 preliminary ruling 543, pursuant to the terms of
Article 4544 and of Article 6.2 of the DSU545, the request for consultations constitutes a prerequisite
for the panel request and as a result circum scribes the scope of the panel request and,
consequently, the panel's terms of reference.546 As we also noted in our preliminary ruling:
The Appellate Body has indicated that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU "set forth a process
by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be

539 United States' second written submission, para. 34 and footnote 32.
540 The Panel asked Viet Nam to react to the United States' objection, but in its response, Viet Nam did
not address the question of the USDOC's treatment of Fish One's request in that determination. (Viet Nam's
response to Panel question No. 81.)
541 Viet Nam's panel request, WT/DS429/2/Rev.1, 18 January 2013, p. 2, point 2 ("Summary of facts
and legal basis of complaint").
542 The panel request further develops the factual and legal bases of Viet Nam's various claims.
Two sections of the panel request are of relevance to Viet Nam's "revocation" claims, neither of which appear
to place the USDOC's treatment of Fish One's request for revocation in the third administrative review within
our terms of reference. Section (e) of the panel request, "Revocation in the absence of any evidence of
dumping", states that "the anti-dumping duty order should be revoked in part with respect to individually
investigated respondents having zero or de minimis margins of dumping in reviews two through five and
two through six, when the sixth review is completed". (emphasis added) Section (c) of the panel request
concerns the USDOC's limitation of the number of respondents selected for individual examination. Although
Viet Nam has not pursued any claim in this respect, this section is of some relevance to Viet Nam's claims with
respect to company-specific revocations. It states, in relevant part, that:
Viet Nam challenges the use of limited respondent selection in the original investigation and the
first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth administrative reviews, (1) to the extent that this
practice impacted the USDOC’s revocation and five-year "sunset" review determinations in the
measures at issue and (2) to the extent that these determinations demonstrate the USDOC’s
continued and ongoing use of this practice throughout the full course of the shrimp anti-dumping
proceeding. (emphasis added)
543 Preliminary Ruling, Annex A-3, paras. 2.11-2.13.
544 Article 4.4 provides, in particular, that:
Any request for consultations shall be submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the
request, including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for
the complaint.
545 Article 6.2 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:
The request for establishment of the panel ... shall indicate whether consultations were held,
identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.
546 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 58.

held, before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel" 547,
and that "consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the
scope of the dispute between them".
548 The Appellate Body has also held that
Articles 4 and 6 do not "require a precise and exact identity between the specific
measures that were the subject of consulta tions and the specific measures identified
in the request for the establishment of a panel". 549 Thus, the Appellate Body has
indicated that:
As long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the
dispute, we hesitate to impose too rigid a standard for the "precise and
exact identity" between the scope of consultations and the request for the
establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request for
consultations for the panel request.
550, 551
7.360. Hence, with respect to the correspondence between the measures included in the panel
request and those included in the request for consultations, the relevant question is whether the
" s c o p e o f t h e d i s p u t e " i s e x p a n d e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n c l u s i o n o f a n a d d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e i n t h e
panel request. 552 In relevant part, Viet Nam's consultations request sought consultations with
respect to essentially the same measures as it subsequently listed in its panel request, with the
exception that the consultations request does not expressly refer to the sixth administrative
review, instead referring to "[a]ny other ongoing or future anti-dumping administrative reviews,
and the preliminary and final results thereof, … as well as any assessment instructions, cash
deposit requirements, and revocation determinations issued pursuant to such reviews".
553 This
language makes it clear that only the USDOC's treatment of requests for company-specific
revocations in the context of the fourth, fifth, and ongoing future administrative reviews were
included in the request for consultations.
554 More importantly, the consultations request concludes:

547 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 131.
548 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 54.
549 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para. 132. (original emphasis)
550 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293 (citing Appellate Body Report, Brazil –
Aircraft, para. 132). (footnote omitted)
552 Preliminary Ruling, Annex A-3, para. 2.13 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Continued
Zeroing, para. 224, referring in turn to Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 293; and to Panel
Report, US — Orange Juice (Brazil) , para. 7.18).
553 Viet Nam's consultations request, p. 1.
554 Moreover, nothing in the remainder of the consultations request directly pertains to the USDOC's
treatment of Fish One's request for revocation in the third administrative review. See, in particular, the
following paragraphs of Viet Nam's consultations request, which are relevant to its claims with respect to
company-specific revocations, and in which it indicates its intention to request consultations with respect to:
(3) in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews, the limited selection of respondents individually
investigated, such that non-investigated companies are denied the opportunity to demonstrate
the absence of dumping necessary to qualify for revocation of the anti-dumping duty order;
…
(6) in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews, the USDOC's determination to not revoke the
anti-dumping duty order with respect to three respondents: Minh Phu Group, CAMIMEX, and
Grobest, despite evidence demonstrating the absence of dumping in the fourth administrative
review and the absence of any evidence of dumping by these respondents in any of the prior
reviews conducted by the USDOC;
(7) the use of zeroing to calculate dumping margins and determine duty assessment in the final
results of the original investigation and first, second, third, fourth, and fifth administrative
reviews, to the extent that the USDOC's use of the zeroing methodology in those determinations
impermissibly inflated assessed anti-dumping duties and consequentially impacted the USDOC's
revocation and five-year "sunset" review determinations in the measures at issue;
…
(9) the use of limited respondent selection in the original investigation and first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth administrative reviews, to the extent that this practice denied respondents not
selected for individual review the opportunity to obtain revocation of the anti-dumping duty order
in the measures at issue and impacted the USDOC's five-year "sunset" review determination;
…
(13) in all of the anti-dumping proceedings of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the absence of any mechanism to provide individually investigated
or non-individually investigated respondents the opportunity to establish the absence of dumping
that is required for revocation of the antidumping duty order;

To avoid the apparent confusion that our inclusion of the original investigation caused
the US in Vietnam's previous request for consultations and a panel involving Certain
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, we would like to
clarify that while practices and determinations in the original investigation and the
first, second, and third administrative reviews are referenced because they have had
an effect on the fourth administrative review, the fifth administrative review, the
five year "sunset review", an d ongoing or future reviews, the practices and
determinations are included in this request for consultations only to the extent that
they have had or will have an effect on the fourth administrative review, the fifth
administrative review, the five year sunset review, and subsequent reviews . The
underlying determinations, decision memoranda, and other memoranda and record
evidence in the original investigation an d the three reviews are thus necessary and
relevant to the proceeding for which these consultations are requested.
555
7.361. This last paragraph excludes, in our view, the possibility for Viet Nam to include within the
panel request, and hence within our terms of reference, any claims regarding the USDOC's actions
in the third administrative review. In light of this explicit exclusion, and notwithstanding the fact
that the claims that Viet Nam seeks to make with respect to the USDOC's actions in the
third administrative review pertain to USDOC actions that took place under the same overall anti-
dumping proceeding and are of the same nature as actions challenged in the fourth and
fifth administrative reviews, and that Viet Nam makes similar claims with respect to the USDOC's
treatment of requests for revocation in each of these reviews, we conclude that a claim in its panel
request in respect of such actions would have impermissibly expanded the scope of the dispute.
This being the case, the USDOC's determination not to revoke the Shrimp order with respect to
Fish One in the third administrative review does not fall within our terms of reference.
7.7.5.3 General considerations with respect to the interpretation of Articles 11.1
and 11.2
7.362. Article 11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerns the "Duration and Review of Anti-
Dumping Duties and Price Undertakings". Articles 11.1 to 11.5, which are directly relevant to
Viet Nam's claims, provide as follows:
11.1 An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent
necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury.
11.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty,
where warranted, on their own initiative or, pr ovided that a reasonable period of time
has elapsed since the imposition of the defi nitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by
any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a
review.
21 Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine
whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether
the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or
both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that
the anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive
anti-dumping duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its
imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that
review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the
authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or
upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry
within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
22 The duty may
remain in force pending the outcome of such a review.
11.4 The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any
review carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out

(Viet Nam's consultations request, pp. 3-4, emphasis added)
555 Viet Nam's consultations request, p. 5. (emphasis added)

expeditiously and shall normally be conc luded within 12 months of the date of
initiation of the review.
11.5 The provisions of th is Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to price undertakings
accepted under Article 8.
Articles 11.2 and 11.3.556 In the present dispute, Viet Nam itself argues that Article 11.1 sets forth
an obligation which is operationalized in Articles 11.2 and 11.3 557, and we do not understand
Viet Nam to be arguing that the challenged USDOC actions violate Article 11.1 independently of
Article 11.2. This being the case, our evaluation of Viet Nam's claims focuses on the language of
Article 11.2, drawing on the context provided by, inter alia, Article 11.1, where relevant.
7.364. As just noted, Articles 11.2 and 11.3 operationalize the general principle in Article 11.1
that the duty only remain in force for as long as and to the extent necessary in order to counteract
dumping which is causing injury. Article 11.2 and Article 11.3 provide for related, yet distinct,
mechanisms to operationalize this general principle. Article 11.3 conditions the continuation of
anti-dumping measures beyond a five year period on a review of the continuing need for "the
duty", based on a determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and of
injury. Article 11.2 imposes upon an investigating authority the obligation to conduct a review of
the continuing need for "the duty" in the interv al between the imposition of the measure and the
five-year, "sunset", review.
558 Thus, each paragraph provides for a review of the continuing need
for the duty, one at a specified point in time, on the investigating authority's own initiative or on
the basis of a substantiated request by the domestic industry, in order to justify continuing the
duty at all; the other available at any time, on the investigating authority's own initiative or on the
basis of a substantiated request by an interested party (provided in the latter case that a
reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive duty) to examine the
continued need for the duty.
7.365. In Mexico – Anti Dumping Measures on Rice , the Appellate Body concluded that
Article 11.2 requires investigating authorities to conduct a review under that provision where the
conditions set forth therein are met and that the authorities may not impose additional conditions
in this respect.
559 The Appellate Body explained that:
Article 11.2 requires an agency to conduct a review, inter alia, at the request of an
interested party, and to terminate th e anti-dumping duty where the agency
determines that the duty "is no longer warranted". The interested party has the right
to request the authority to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is

556 Panel Reports, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.113; and US – DRAMS, para. 6.41.
557 For instance, in its first written submission, para. 329, Viet Nam writes that:
The relevant provisions related to the revocation of anti-dumping duties are provided in
Article 11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. ... Article 11 does not only provide for revocation of
anti-dumping duties as a result of required five year reviews under Article 11.3, it also provides
for reviews under Article 11.2 in order to give effect to the general principle articulated in
Article 11.1.
558 As provided in Article 11.3, where the most recent Article 11.2 review covered both dumping and
injury, the five year period runs from the date of that review.
559 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 314-315. At issue in that
dispute was a provision of Mexican law providing that interested parties, e.g. an exporter, seeking a changed
circumstances review had to satisfy the authorities that the volume of their exports to Mexico during the
review period were representative.

necessary to offset dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if
the duty were removed or varied, or both. Article 11.2 conditions this obligation on
(i) the passage of a reasonable period of ti me since imposition of the definitive duty;
and (ii) the submission by the interested party of "positive information" substantiating
the need for a review. ... Where the conditions in Article 11.2 have been met, the
plain words of the provision make it clear that the agency has no discretion to refuse
to complete a review, including consideration of whether the duty should be
terminated in the light of the results of the review.
560
7.366. With respect to the corresponding provision of the SCM Agreement (Article 21.2), in US –
Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body noted that:
Article 21.2 differs from Article 21.3 in that the former identifies certain circumstances
in which the authorities are under an obligation to review ("shall review") whether the
continued imposition of the countervailing duty is necessary. In contrast, the principal
obligation in Article 21.3 is not, per se, to conduct a review, but rather to terminate a
countervailing duty unless a specific determination is made in a review. We note that
Article 21.2 sets down an explicit evidentiary standard for requests by interested
parties for a review under that provision. In order to trigger the authorities' obligation
to conduct a review, such requests must, inter alia , include "positive information
substantiating the need for review.
561
7.367. Also of relevance, because Article 11.2 uses the same terms, in U S – Corrosion Resistant
Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body interpreted the terms "review" and "determine" in
Article 11.3 as follows:
This language in Article 11.3 makes clear that it envisages a process combining both
investigatory and adjudicatory aspects. In other words, Article 11.3 assigns an active
rather than a passive decision-making role to the authorities. The words "review" and
"determine" in Article 11.3 suggest that authorities conducting a sunset review must
act with an appropriate degree of diligence and arrive at a reasoned conclusion on the
basis of information gathered as part of a process of reconsideration and examination.
In view of the use of the word "likely" in Article 11.3, an affirmative likelihood
determination may be made only if the evidence demonstrates that dumping would be
probable if the duty were terminated—and not simply if the evidence suggests that
such a result might be possible or plausible.
562
7.368. Having reviewed relevant findings by prior panels and the Appellate Body, we now
examine the constitutive elements of Article 11.2 in relation to requests made by an interested
party.563 In broad terms, Article 11.2 provides that if an investigating authority: (i) receives a
request from an interested party; (ii) after a reasonable period of time has elapsed; (iii) requesting
it to examine one of the three matters specified in the second sentence of Article 11.2 (need for
the continued imposition of the duty on th e basis of dumping, injury, or both); and
(iv) accompanied by positive information substantiating the need for a review, then the authority
must undertake a review of the need for the continued imposition of the duty. While the
authorities must undertake the review where these conditions are met, Article 11.2 does not
specify whether the review must be of the duty as a whole (i.e. on an order-wide basis) or of the
duty as it applies to an individual producer/exporter (i.e. on a company-specific basis).
7.369. In our view the term "duty" as it is used in Article 11.2 can be interpreted to mean either a
company-specific duty or an order-wide duty. Wh ile the Appellate Body has interpreted the term
"duty", as it is used in Article 11.3, to refer to the duty as a whole, on an order-wide basis 564, the
term "duty" in Article 11.2 need not, in our view, be understood identically as it is in Article 11.3.

560 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 314. (emphasis original,
footnote omitted)
561 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 108. (emphasis original)
562 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 111. (emphasis original)
See also above, para. 7.305.
563 Given the circumstances of this dispute, we do not need to consider the elements of Article 11.2 in
relation to reviews undertaken by authorities on their own initiative.
564 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 149-150.

T h e r ea s o n s fo r t h is a r e , a s d is c u s s ed in m o r e d e ta i l b e lo w, f ir s t , t h e d iffe r e n t p u rp o s e s o f the
provisions; second, the reference to "interested part ies" in Article 11.2, the fact that Article 11.2
refers to the term "dumping" on its own (independently of the concept of injury) and the
three different kinds of examinations that may be requested by an interested party under the
second sentence of Article 11.2; and third, the reference to price undertakings in Article 11.5 and
in the title of Article 11.
7.370. With respect to the first point, we note that although Articles 11.2 and 11.3 both
implement the general "necessity" requirement cont ained in Article 11.1, the two provisions serve
different purposes, and establish different mechanisms to implement that requirement. Thus,
Article 11.1 refers not only to the duty's duration in time, but also to its "extent", providing that
the duty "shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping
which is causing injury". To us, this implies that Article 11.1 is concerned not only with the fact
that an anti-dumping duty is in place with respect to imports from another Member generally, but
also with the fact that duties are imposed on in dividual producers/exporters. Article 11.3 on the
other hand, is concerned with the imposition of the measure with respect to imports from another
Member as a whole and its duration in time. It makes no mention of the "extent" to which the
measure is necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury, as provided for in
Article 11.1, suggesting that this aspect of Article 11.1 is operationalized in Article 11.2. This, in
our view, finds confirmation in the term "or varied" in Article 11.2, which indicates that the
outcome of an Article 11.2 review may be a modifi cation of the individual duty rates imposed on
individual producers/exporters.
565
7.371. The reference to "interested parties" – which Article 6.11 makes clear includes foreign
producers and exporters – and to "dumping" in Article 11.2 also in our view suggests that the
drafters intended to impose obligations on the authorities with respect to individual
producers/exporters. We note in this regard that in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
the Appellate Body contrasted the texts of Articles 11.2 and 11.3, specifically with respect to the
fact that the former referred to "interested parties", and the latter did not. This was one of the
considerations that led the Appellate Body to conclude that the term "duty" in Article 11.3 refers to
the duty as a whole, i.e. on an order-wide basis.
566 By the same reasoning, this difference
suggests to us that the term "duty" in Article 11.2 can refer to the duty as applied to an individual
producer/exporter.
7.372. With respect to the term "dumping", Article 11.2 gives an interested party the right to a
review to examine "whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping,
whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or

565 It could also refer, for instance, to modifications in the scope of the duty, in terms of products
covered, because some product types are no longer produced in the importing country or in the exporting
country, meaning that the duty is no longer necessary to prevent injury to the domestic industry with respect
to these product types, or other partial modification of the duty.
566 See Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 149 and 152:
Article 11.3 does not expressly state that investigating authorities must determine that the
expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to dumping by each known exporter or producer
concerned. In fact, Article 11.3 contains no express reference to individual exporters, producers,
or interested parties. This contrasts with Article 11.2, which does refer to "any interested party"
and "[i]nterested parties". We also note that Article 11.3 does not contain the word "margins",
which might implicitly refer to individual exporters or producers. On its face, Article 11.3
therefore does not oblige investigating authorities in a sunset review to make "company-specific"
likelihood determinations in the manner suggested by Japan.
…
In contrast to Article 11.3, several provisions of Article 6 refer expressly or by implication to
individual exporters or producers. Article 6 requires all interested parties to have a full
opportunity to defend their interests. In particular, Article 6.1 requires authorities to give all
interested parties notice of the information required and ample opportunity to present in writing
evidence that those parties consider relevant. Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.9 provide other examples
of the kind of opportunities that investigating authorities must give each interested party. These
references suggest that, when the drafters of the Anti-Dumping Agreement intended to impose
obligations on authorities regarding individual exporters or producers, they did so explicitly.
These provisions of Article 6 apply to Article 11.3 by virtue of Article 11.4. They therefore
confirm that investigating authorities have certain specific obligations towards each exporter or
producer in a sunset review. However, these provisions of Article 6 are silent on whether the
authorities must make a separate likelihood determination for each exporter or producer.
(emphasis original)

both". Hence Article 11.2 allows an interested party to request an examination limited to the
question whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping. Since
dumping results from the pricing behaviour of private entities
567 and is determined with respect to
individual producers/exporters, it seems logi cal to understand Article 11.2 as providing for
termination of the duty with respect to an individu al producer/exporter if that duty is no longer
necessary to offset dumping by that producer/expor ter. This is in contrast to the situation under
Article 11.3, which envisions a review of the need for the duty on the basis of both dumping and
injury, and provides for termination unless both would continue or recur if the duty were removed.
These considerations support the view that the term "duty" in Article 11.2 can be interpreted to
refer either to the "duty" on an order-wide basis, or "the duty" on a company-specific basis. The
fact that the term "duty" is used, rather than th e more explicitly producer/exporter-specific term
"dumping margins" used elsewhere in the Agreement is in our view not determinative; in
numerous places – e.g. Articles 7.4, 9.1, 9.4, and 10.3 – the Agreement uses the term "duty" in
the singular when referring to the duty in a company-specific sense.

7.373. Finally, we note that the title of Article 11 refers not only to anti-dumping duties, but also
to price undertakings and that Article 11.5 states that Article 11.2 and the other paragraphs of
Article 11 "shall apply mutatis mutandis to price undertakings accepted under Article 8". Because
price undertakings are necessarily company-specific, this reference to price undertakings in
Article 11.5 further supports our view that the term "duty" in Article 11.2 can be understood in
either of the two senses.
568
7.374. Our conclusion that the term "duty" in Article 11.2 can be read in either a company-
specific or an order-wide sense is based on the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 11.2, read
in their context. We note the United States' argument relying on the negotiating history of
Article 11.2. We do not consider it either necessary or appropriate to resort to supplementary
means of interpretation, as in our view there is no lack of clarity as to the meaning of the terms of
Article 11.2. In any event, the information submitted by the United States concerning the
negotiating history of Article 11.2 does not in our view conclusively establish an intention on the
part of the drafters that the term "duty" under Article 11.2 can only be understood as a reference
to the anti-dumping measures on an order-wide basis.
7.375. Turning to the nature and character of the obligation imposed on the investigating
authority, we note that like Article 11.3
569, Article 11.2 does not prescribe any specific
methodology for or criteria to be considered by the authority in determining whether there is a
need for the "continued imposition of the duty". However, as noted above, the Appellate Body did
indicate that Article 11.3 envisages a process combining both investigatory and adjudicatory
aspects and assigns an active rather than a passive decision-making role to the authorities. 570 The
same considerations apply, in our view, to the re view provided for in Article 11.2, and when the
conditions set therein are met, Article 11.2 imposes an obligation on the authority to undertake a
review of the need for the continued imposition of the duty and to make a determination in that
respect.
7.376. In light of our understanding of the term "duty" in Article 11.2, we consider that an
authority has some – but not unlimited – discretion in deciding whether to undertake a review on
an order-wide or on a company-specific basis. This discretion is fettered by the right of an

567 See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 111.
568 As Japan notes (Japan's response to Panel question Nos. 15 and 16, para. 19), the effect of
Article 11.5 is to give the right to a producer/exporter party to a price undertaking to "request the authorities
to examine whether the continued imposition of the [price undertaking] is necessary to offset dumping,
whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the [price undertaking] were removed or varied, or
both". We share Japan's view that it would be anomalous if individual exporters could seek the removal of a
price undertaking, but not of a company-specific duty.
569 In US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Reviews, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that:
Article 11.3 does not expressly prescribe any specific methodology for investigating authorities to
use in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review. Nor does Article 11.3 identify any
particular factors that authorities must take into account in making such a determination. Thus,
Article 11.3 neither explicitly requires authorities in a sunset review to calculate fresh dumping
margins, nor explicitly prohibits them from relying on dumping margins calculated in the past.
This silence in the text of Article 11.3 suggests that no obligation is imposed on investigating
authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in a sunset review.
(Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 123, footnotes omitted).
570 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 111.

interested party to request an examination of certain matters pursuant to the second sentence of
Article 11.2. The situation will be different in ea ch case and will depend on both the specific
request made by the interested party and the evid ence submitted by that party substantiating the
need for a review. For example, an investigating au thority may decide, in response to a request to
examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, that it only
needs to undertake a review on a company-specific basis. Equally, the authority may decide to
undertake a review of the duty on an order-wide basis. By contrast, if the request made by the
interested party is for the examination of the need for the continued imposition of the duty with
respect to both dumping and injury, then the authority in our view is required to undertake a
review of the order as a whole, as the consider ation of all dumped imports would be a necessary
element of determining whether injury is likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or
varied. In any event, while Article 11.2 does not specify in what circumstances an authority should
undertake a review on a company-specific basis and in what circumstances it should undertake a
review on an order-wide basis, it does impose an obligation on the authority to undertake a review
of the need for the continued imposition of th e duty and to make a determination when an
interested party submits a request meeting the requirements set therein.
7.377. With these general considerations in mind, we examine the claims made by Viet Nam with
respect to the revocation requests presented by Vietnamese producers/exporters in the fourth and
fifth administrative reviews. We will first examine whether the requests satisfy the requirements of
Article 11.2 before examining the USDOC's treatment of those requests.
7.7.5.4 Whether the revocation requests submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters
in the administrative reviews at issue satisfied the requirements of Articles 11.2
7.378. As noted above, Article 11.2 imposes an obligation on an authority to conduct a review of
the need for the continued imposition of the duty where the following conditions are met:
571
a. a request is submitted by an interested party;
b. after a reasonable period of time has elapsed;
c. requesting that the investigating authority examine one of the three matters specified in
the second sentence of Article 11.2; and
d. the request is accompanied by positive information substantiating the need for a review.
7.379. As set out above in our description of the factual background to this claim, a number of
Vietnamese producers/exporters submitted re quests for revocation in the fourth and
fifth administrative reviews. Each Vietnamese producer/exporter that requested revocation of the
Shrimp order with respect to itself was, by virtue of the definition of that term in Article 6.11, an
"interested party", satisfying the first element.
7.380. The requests were submitted with respect to the fourth and fifth review periods. Given that
this means the requests were submitted after the anti-dumping measure had been in place for
several years, in our view, they satisfy the second element, that is, a reasonable period of time
had elapsed before they were submitted.
7.381. Moreover, each of these requests was submitted under Section 351.222(e) of the USDOC's
Regulations and was a request for the revocation of the order with respect to the individual
Vietnamese exporter that submitted the reques t, pursuant to Section 751(a) of the Act and
Section 351.222(b) of the Regulations, which at the time of the proceedings at issue, established
procedures for the "[r]evocation or termination based on absence of dumping". Each request
argued that the exporter qualified for revocation under these provisions, and requested that the
USDOC terminate, pursuant to these provisions, th e order with respect to the requesting company
on the ground that it had ceased dumping for the required number of years. Finally, we recall that,
pursuant to Section 351.222(b)(2), in addition to considering whether the exporter requesting

571 Article 11.2 also requires an authority to review the need for the continued imposition of the duty,
where warranted, on their own initiative. As noted above at footnote 563, given the circumstances of this
dispute, we do not need to consider the elements of Article 11.2 in relation to reviews undertaken by
authorities on their own initiative.

revocation had ceased dumping for a period of three consecutive years and had made sales in
commercial quantities, the USDOC was required to undertake a broader consideration of "whether
the continued application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise necessary to offset dumping".
This satisfies us that the requests that were submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters in the
fourth and fifth administrative reviews qualify as requests that the US authorities "examine
whether the continued imposition of the duty is nece ssary to offset dumping" i.e., the first type of
examination which may be requested by an interested party under Article 11.2.
7.382. Finally, as required under Section 351.222 of the USDOC Regulations, each request
asserted, and attached certifications to the e ffect that, the company no longer engaged in
dumping. This is in our view suffices to meet the requirement that the request be accompanied by
positive information substantiating the need for a review.
7.383. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that each of the requests submitted by Vietnamese
producers/exporters in the context of the fourth and fifth administrative reviews constituted a
request to the USDOC for it to examine "whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary
to offset dumping" within the meaning of Article 11.2.
7.7.5.5 Whether the USDOC's treatment of requests for revocation by Vietnamese
producers/exporters not individually examin ed is inconsistent with Articles 11.1
and 11.2
7.384. We now consider the USDOC's treatment, in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews, of
the requests for company-specific revocation submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters who
were not being individually examined in the review at issue.
572
7.385. We recall that in the two proceedings at issue, with respect to each of the
producers/exporters that requested revocation, the USDOC made a determination not to revoke
the order. In each case, the reason for the USDOC's decision was that the producer/exporter was
not a mandatory respondent in the administrative review at issue, and was therefore not
individually examined. It is clear from the preliminary and final determinations, as well as the
Issues and Decision Memoranda accompanying the final determinations, that the USDOC did not
undertake any consideration of the need for the continued imposition of the duty to offset dumping
by any of the requesting companies. The evidence before us clearly indicates that the USDOC's
decisions not to revoke the order with respect to any of the requesting companies was based
solely on the fact that the producers/exporters at issue were not being individually examined.
7.386. The United States argues that the Articl e 6.10 "limited examination" exception applies in
the context of Article 11.2 reviews, such that the USDOC was not obligated to conduct a review
where it was requested to do so by a producer/exporter that was not being individually examined.
7.387. We recall that the first sentence of Articl e 6.10 sets forth the principle that the authorities
shall, "as a rule", determine an individual margin of dumping for each known producer/exporter.
The second sentence of Article 6.10 provides th at "[i]n cases where the number of exporters,
producers, importers or types of products involved is so large" as to make such a determination of
an individual margin of dumping for each known producer/exporter impracticable, the authorities
may limit their examination pursuant to one of two methods. Hence, the "limited examination"
exception in Article 6.10 concerns the possibility for a Member to limit the number of
producers/exporters for which it calculates an individual margin.
7.388. Article 11.4 provides that the provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure
apply to reviews conducted under Article 11.2. However, the Appellate Body has indicated (in the
context of interpreting Article 11.3) that Arti cle 11.4 does not import the requirements under

572 In its submissions, Viet Nam has made reference to a number of Vietnamese producers/exporters
that did not submit a request for company-specific revocation, or that submitted such a request and
subsequently withdrew their request. However, we do not understand Viet Nam to be pursuing any claim with
respect to Vietnamese producers/exporters who did not submit and maintain a request for revocation. In any
event, in the absence of a request for review, or in case such a request is withdrawn, there can in our view be
no factual basis for a finding of inconsistency under Article 11.2, unless it is argued that the authority should
have self-initiated a review. Viet Nam does not make the latter argument.

Article 6 into Article 11 wholesale.573 As noted above, Article 11.2 provides little or no guidance for
the authorities as to the methodology or criteria for the conduct of a review under that provision.
We consider that, for the same reasons as led the Appellate Body to its conclusion regarding the
interpretation of Article 11.3 in light of Article 11.4, nothing requires the authorities to calculate
individual margins of dumping in the context of an Article 11.2 review. Moreover, in our view the
reference in Article 11.4 to the "limited examination" exception in Article 6.10 does not allow an
authority to refuse to conduct a review under Article 11.2 when the conditions set forth in that
provision are otherwise fulfilled, on the basis that the producer/exporter requesting revocation is
not being individually examined or was not individually examined in prior reviews or proceedings.
7.389. Even assuming that Article 6.10 applies in Article 11.2 reviews in the same way as it does
in original investigations, the USDOC's decision not to undertake the requested reviews in the
proceedings at issue cannot be justified on the basis of that Article. There is no indication that the
USDOC considered whether – or determined that – initiating the reviews sought by Vietnamese
producers/exporters was impracticable; rather, it preconditioned the review on the requesting
producer/exporter having been selected for individual examination in the corresponding
administrative review. Moreover, by requiring that only companies selected for individual
examination were eligible to obtain a company-specific revocation, the USDOC imposed an
additional condition, not foreseen under Article 11.2, on the initiation of reviews under that
provision.
7.390. We note the United States' argument that Viet Nam's claims pertain to the USDOC's
treatment of requests made under one of two alternative mechanisms available under US law to
seek the revocation (in both cases, on a company-specific and/or order-wide basis) of anti-
dumping duty orders. As described above, at the time of the determinations at issue, US law and
regulations provided for two distinct mechanisms through which the USDOC could consider
revoking the order with respect to an individual producer, i.e. the changed circumstances review
mechanism provided for under Section 751(b) of the Act and Section 351.222(g) of the
Regulations, and the mechanism for revocation in the context of administrative reviews, set forth
under Sections 751(a) of the Act and Section 351.222(b) of the Regulations. However, in our view,
this argument of the United States is inapposite : the existence, under the Member's legal system,
of an alternative mechanism is not determinative of the consistency with the WTO Agreement of
the Member's treatment of requests for review under the first mechanism.
574 It is irrelevant that
the domestic law of the importing Member provides for more than one provision or mechanism
which could have been used by the interested party to submit its request; an authority cannot
decline to conduct a review under one mechanism, and justify that refusal on the basis that the
interested party requesting it could have used another mechanism but did not. What matters is
whether the interested party made a request that satisfies the requirements of Article 11.2, and
the actions taken by an authority in response to that request.

7.391. On the basis of the above, we find that in its treatment of the requests for revocation
submitted by Vietnamese producers/exporters th at were not being individually examined, the
USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
575 This being the case, and in the light of Viet Nam's argument that

573 In US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body considered that Article 11.4
does not import into Article 11.3 an obligation for investigating authorities to calculate dumping margins (on a
company-specific basis or otherwise) in a sunset review. As a consequence, the Appellate Body agreed with the
Panel's view that "[t]he provisions of Article 6.10 concerning the calculation of individual margins of dumping in
investigations do not require that the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
under Article 11.3 be made on a company-specific basis". (Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant
Steel Sunset Review, paras. 154-155, emphasis original.)
574 We note that our approach in this respect differs from that of two prior panels. The US – DRAMS and
US – Anti Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods panels both considered, and rejected, claims under
Article 11.2 challenging requirements under Section 351.222 of the USDOC Regulations and its predecessor.
Both panels considered it relevant that US law provided a more general opportunity to request revocation
through the changed circumstances review, which was not alleged to be inconsistent with Article 11.2 (Panel
Reports, US – Anti Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, paras. 7.162-7.169; and US – DRAMS,
para. 6.53).
575 We note that Viet Nam also argues that the Vietnamese producers/exporters had demonstrated in
repeated reviews that they were no longer dumping while maintaining a substantial level of exports, and thus
had actually established that the continued imposition of the duty was no longer necessary to offset dumping
by that producer/exporter (presumably independently of the requirement to demonstrate three years of no
dumping under Section 351.222). (See, for instance, Viet Nam's opening statement at the first meeting of the

Article 11.2 operationalizes the general principle set forth under Article 11.1, we do not consider it
necessary to make separate findings under Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.7.5.6 Whether the USDOC's determination not to revoke the order for certain
Vietnamese producers/exporters on the basis that it had calculated a positive margin of
dumping for these producers/exporters is inconsistent with Articles 11.1 and 11.2
7.392. We now address Viet Nam's claims with respect to the Vietnamese producers/exporters –
Minh Phu in the fourth administrative review and Camimex in the fifth administrative review – for
which the USDOC determined not to revoke the order in part on the ground that they had positive
dumping margins.576 With respect to these producers/exporters, the basis for Viet Nam's claim is
that the USDOC's determination not to revoke the order was based on its reliance on WTO-
inconsistent margins of dumping.
7.393. As discussed in more detail in the section of our findings addressing Viet Nam's claims
concerning the sunset review
577, we share the view of other panels and the Appellate Body that if
an authority decides to rely on margins of dumping in conducting its analysis in an Article 11.3
sunset review, those margins of dumping must have been established consistently with the
provisions of the Agreement. We see no reason to adopt a different approach with respect to a
review conducted pursuant to Article 11.2. As we have noted above, Article 11.2 does not
necessarily require an investigating authority to determine the continued need for the imposition
of the duty on the basis of dumping margins calculated for respondents. However, if the
investigating authority elects to rely on the existence of dumping margins in the determination
foreseen under Article 11.2, then, the margins it relies upon must be margins determined
consistently with the disciplines of the Agreement and with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. As a
consequence, to the extent that the USDOC relied on margins of dumping calculated inconsistently
with the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its consideration of requests for revocation of certain
companies, the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11.2.
7.394. The evidence before us establishes that, in the fourth administrative review, the USDOC
determined not to revoke the Shrimp order with respect to Minh Phu on the basis that it had
calculated a dumping margin for that producer/exp orter. We have already determined that this
dumping margin was calculated with simple zeroing, and for this reason, is inconsistent with
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
Consequently, the USDOC's determination not to revoke the order with respect to Minh Phu on the
basis of the dumping margin in the fourth administrative review is inconsistent with Article 11.2.
7.395. The evidence before us also establishes that, in the fifth administrative review, the USDOC
determined not to revoke the Shrimp order with respect to Camimex on the basis that it had
calculated a dumping margin for that producer/exporter. As was the situation regarding Minh Phu,
this dumping margin was calculated with simple zeroing, and for this reason, contrary to
Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
Consequently, the USDOC's determination not to re voke the order with respect to Camimex in the
fifth administrative review is inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.396. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the United States acted inconsistently with
Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-
inconsistent margins of dumping in its determination, in the fourth administrative review, not to
revoke the Shrimp anti-dumping order with respect to Minh Phu, and in its determination, in the

Panel, para. 64.) Viet Nam's argument invites us to engage in a de novo review of the evidence before the
USDOC, to determine whether the evidence justified the revocation of the order. We recall that we are not to
engage in any such de novo review of the evidence before the USDOC, and that our consideration of the WTO-
consistency of the USDOC's determinations must proceed on the basis of the requests that were actually
submitted to it, and of the reasons that it provided in its determinations. We also note that Viet Nam does not
argue that the USDOC should have self-initiated a review (or reviews) under Article 11.2.
576 Viet Nam argues that the issue of whether or not a WTO-inconsistent margin of dumping can be
relied upon in the context of an Article 11.2 review is also an issue with respect to other respondents, i.e.
presumably those discussed in the preceding section. (See Viet Nam's second written submission, para. 117.)
However, the record before us shows that the only two producers for which the USDOC determined not to
revoke the order because it calculated positive dumping margins for them were Minh Phu in the fourth
administrative review and Camimex in the fifth administrative review.
577 See above, para. 7.306.

fifth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp anti-dumping order with respect to Camimex.
In light of these findings, and in the light of Viet Nam's argument that Article 11.2 operationalizes
the general principle set forth under Article 11.1, we do not consider it necessary to make findings
under Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:
a. Viet Nam has failed to establish that the simple zeroing methodology as used by the
USDOC in administrative reviews is a measure of general and prospective application
which can be challenged "as such". Therefore, we find that Viet Nam has not established
that the USDOC's simple zeroing methodology in administrative reviews is inconsistent
"as such" with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994;
b. The United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as a result of the USDOC's application of the simple
zeroing methodology to calculate the dumping margins of mandatory respondents in the
fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order;
c. The practice or policy whereby, in NME proceedings, the USDOC presumes that all
producers/exporters in the NME country belong to a single, NME-wide, entity and assigns
a single rate to these producers/exporters, is "as such" inconsistent with the
United States' obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
d. The United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a result of th e application by the USDOC, in the fourth,
fifth and sixth administrative reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order, of a
rebuttable presumption that all companies in Viet Nam belong to a single, Viet Nam-
wide, entity and assignment of a single rate to that entity;
e. Viet Nam has failed to establish the existence of a measure with respect to the manner
in which the USDOC determines the NME-wide entity rate, in particular concerning the
use of facts available. Therefore, we find that Viet Nam has not established that the
alleged measure is "as such" inconsistent with Articles 6.8 and 9.4, and Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement;
f. The United States acted inconsistently with Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the application to the Viet Na m-wide entity of a duty rate exceeding the
ceiling applicable under that provision in the fourth, fifth and sixth administrative
reviews under the Shrimp anti-dumping order;
g. Viet Nam has failed to establish that the rate applied to the Viet Nam-wide entity in the
fourth, fifth and sixth administrative reviews is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
h. Viet Nam has failed to establish that Section 129(c)(1) precludes implementation, with
respect to prior unliquidated entries, of DSB recommendations and rulings. Therefore,
we find that Viet Nam has not established that Section 129(c)(1) is "as such"
inconsistent with Articles 1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
i. The United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping or rates in
its likelihood-of-dumping determination in the first sunset review;
j. The United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
in the fourth and fifth administrative reviews as a result of its treatment of requests for
revocation made by certain Vietnamese producers/exporters that were not being
individually examined. We do not make any findings with respect to Viet Nam's
corresponding claim under Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

k. The United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as a result of the USDOC's reliance on WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping in its
determination, in the fourth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp anti-
dumping order with respect to Minh Phu, and with respect to its determination, in the
fifth administrative review, not to revoke the Shrimp anti-dumping order with respect to
Camimex. We do not make any findings with respect to Viet Nam's corresponding claim
under Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
8.2. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases wh ere there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue are
inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, they have nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to Viet Nam under those Agreements.
8.3. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, we re commend that the United States bring the relevant
measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994 and the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
8.4. Viet Nam requests that we exercise the discretion granted to WTO dispute settlement panels
under Article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest that th e United States implement this recommendation
by revoking the anti-dumping duty order in its totality, and with respect to Minh Phu and
Camimex, the latter as a consequence of eventual findings concerning the USDOC's treatment of
these Vietnamese producers/exporters' requests for revocation.
578
8.5. Article 19.1 of the DSU provides as follows:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the
panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations. (footnotes omitted)
8.6. Thus, while a panel must ("shall") re commend that a Member found to have acted
inconsistently with a provision of a covered agreement bring the relevant measure into conformity,
it has discretion to ("may") suggest ways in which the responding Member could implement that
recommendation. Previous panels have emphasized that Article 21.3 of the DSU gives the
authority to decide the means of implementation, in the first instance, to the Member found to be
in violation.
579 Although we have found that certain of the measures challenged by Viet Nam are
inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-D umping Agreement, and recommend that the
United States bring the relevant measures into conformity with its obligations under these
Agreements, we decline to exercise our discretion under the second sentence of Article 19.1 in the
manner requested by Viet Nam.