GUATEMALA – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON GREY PORTLAND CEMENT FROM MEXICO
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 24 October 2000
Document codes: WT/DS156/R
Complainant: Mexico
Respondent: Guatemala
Third parties: EU, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 5, 12, 1, 6, 7, 18, 2, 3, 9  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

GUATEMALA – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
ON GREY PORTLAND CEMENT FROM MEXICO
Report of the Panel
The report of the Panel on is being circulated to all Members, pursuant to the DSU. The report is being circulated
as an unrestricted document from 24 October 2000 pursuant to the Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents (WT/L/160/Rev.1). Members are reminded that in accordance with
the DSU only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report. An appeal shall be limited to issues of
law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. There shall be no
ex parte communications with the Panel or Appellate Body concerning matters under consideration by
the Panel or Appellate Body.
Note by the Secretariat: This Panel Report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within 30 days after the
date of its circulation unless a party to the dispute decides to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report .
If the Panel Report is appealed to the Appellate Body, it sha ll not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after the
completion of the appeal. Information on the current status of the Panel Report is available from the WTO Secretariat.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
1.1 On 5 January 1999, Mexico requested consultations with Guatemala under Article 4 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and
Article 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("AD Agreement") regarding the definitive anti-dumping measure imposed by
Guatemala on imports of Portland cement from Cooperativa Manufacturera de Cemento Portland la
Cruz Azul, SCL, of Mexico ("Cruz Azul"), as well as the actions that preceded it (WT/DS156/1).
1.2 Mexico and Guatemala held one-day consultations on 23 February 1999, but failed to reach a
mutually satisfactory solution.
B. ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL
1.3 On 26 July 1999, pursuant to Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement and Article 6.2 of the DSU,
Mexico requested the establishment of a panel to examine the consistency of Guatemala's definitive
anti-dumping measure on imports of Portland cement from Mexico, as well as the actions that
preceded it, with Guatemala's obligations under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("WTO Agreement"), in particular those contained in the AD Agreement (WT/DS156/2
and WT/DS156/2/Corr.1).
1.4 At the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") on 26 July 1999, Guatemala stated
that it could not join the consensus to establish a panel until certain domestic procedures concerning
the investigation had been completed. The DSB agreed to revert to this matter at a later date.
1.5 At its meeting on 22 September 1999, the DSB established a panel in accordance with
Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference. The terms of reference were:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
Mexico in documents WT/DS/156/2 and WT/DS/156/2/Corr.1, the matter referred to
the DSB by Mexico in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB
in making the recommendations or in givi ng the rulings provided for in those
agreements".
1.6 Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Communities, Honduras and the United States reserved
their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.7 On 12 October 1999, Mexico requested the Director-General to determine the composition of
the Panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU. The Director-General composed the following Panel:
Chairman: Mr. Johan Human
Members: Mr. Antonio Buencamino
Mr. Oscar Hernández
C. P
ANEL PROCEEDINGS
1.8 The Panel met with the parties on 15-16 February 2000 and 12-13 April 2000.

II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 This dispute concerns the definitive anti-dumping measure imposed by Guatemala's Ministry
of Economy ("Ministry"), as well as the actions that preceded it, in particular the anti-dumping
investigation against imports of grey Portland cement from Cruz Azul, a Mexican producer.
Cementos Progreso SA ("Cement os Progreso"), the only cement producer in Guatemala, filed a
request for an anti-dumping investigation on 21 September 1995 and a supplementary request on 9
October 1995. On 11 January 1996, based on these requests, the Ministry published a notice of
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation regarding allegedly dumped imports of grey Portland
cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico. The Ministry notified the Government of Mexico of the initiation
of the investigation on 22 January 1996. The Ministry requested certain import data from
Guatemala's Directorate-General of Customs by letter dated 23 January 1996. On 26 January 1996,
the Ministry transmitted questionnaires to interested parties, including Cruz Azul and Cementos
Progreso, with a response originally due on 11 March 1996. In answer to Cruz Azul's request, the
Ministry extended the deadline for submission of the questionnaire responses until 17 May 1996.
Cruz Azul filed a response on 13 May 1996. On 16 August 1996, and with effect from 28 August
1996, Guatemala imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty of 38.72% on imports of type I (PM) grey
Portland cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico. The provisional duty was imposed on the basis of a
preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and consequent threat of injury. That provisional
duty expired on 28 December 1996.
2.2 The original investigation period set forth in the published notice of initiation ran from
1 June 1995 to 30 November 1995. On 4 October 1996, the Ministry extended the investigation
period to include the period 1 December 1995 to 31 May 1996. On 14 October 1996, the Ministry
issued supplemental questionnaires to Cruz Azul and Cementos Progreso, requesting that Cruz Azul
provide cost data and other information for the extended investigation period.
2.3 A verification visit was scheduled to take place from 3 - 6 December 1996. This verification
visit was cancelled by the Ministry shortly after it commenced on 3 December 1996, in the face of
Cruz Azul's refusal to accept named non-governmental experts.
2.4 On 17 January 1997, Guatemala imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 89.54% on
imports of grey Portland cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico. The definitive measure was imposed on
the basis of a determination of dumping and consequent injury.
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES
A. M
EXICO
3.1 Mexico has requested the Panel to find and recommend that:
(a) the initiation of the investigation by the Ministry of the Economy of Guatemala is
inconsistent with Articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 12 of the AD Agreement;
(b) Guatemala violated Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement by failing to provide Cruz
Azul and the Government of Mexico with the full text of the application as soon as it
initiated the investigation;
(c) the provisional anti-dumping measure was imposed in violation of Articles 1, 7, 12
and 18 of the AD Agreement;
(d) Guatemala committed the following procedural violations:

1. Guatemala did not set a specific period for the gathering, submission and
consideration of evidence and did not determine a time limit for the
admission and receipt of evidence, in violation of Article 6.1 and 6.2 of the
AD Agreement.
2. Guatemala did not give Cruz Azul the opportunity to examine the evidence
used by the Ministry of the Economy in the course of the investigation, thus
violating Article 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement.
3. Guatemala did not satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information
provided by Cementos Progreso that formed the basis for its conclusions
throughout the various stages of the inve stigation, failing to comply with its
obligations under Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement.
4. Guatemala extended the investigation period in the ninth month after
initiation of the investigation without giving the grounds for the extension,
thus violating Article 6.1 and 6.2 and paragraph 1 of Annex II to the AD
Agreement.
5. Guatemala improperly asked Cruz Azul to provide information on production
costs corresponding to both investigation periods – the original period and the
extended period – in violation of Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD Agreement.
6. Guatemala sought to conduct an on-the-spot investigation without having
obtained the express consent of the firm, in violation of several obligations
and requirements in Article 6.7, and paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I to
the AD Agreement.
7. Guatemala rejected the technical accounting evidence furnished by Cruz Azul
on the normal value and the export price during the original investigation
period, in violation of Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 and paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Annex II to the AD Agreement.
8. Guatemala admitted confidential information from Cementos Progreso
without a public version thereof, did not give the reasons for which it deemed
the information confidential and did not promptly give Cruz Azul the
documentation provided by Cementos Progreso, in violation of Article 6.1,
6.2, 6.3 and 6.5 of the AD Agreement.
9. Guatemala did not promptly inform Cruz Azul of the essential facts taken
into account for the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping measure, thus
violating its right of defence provided under Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the
AD Agreement.
10. during the final stage of the investigation, Guatemala changed the
determination of threat of material injury made at the initiation of the
investigation and when imposing the provisional measure into a
determination of material injury. This was done without giving Cruz Azul
any opportunity to defend itself or present relevant evidence, in violation of
Article 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
(e) the definitive anti-dumping measure was imposed in violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 9,
12 and 18 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994;

(f) the Guatemalan authority did not adequately establish the elements of fact and law
put forward in the investigation and did not make an unbiased and objective
evaluation of them;
(g) where applicable, Guatemala made impermissible interpretations of the AD
Agreement and imposed the definitive anti-dumping measure, as well as the action
that preceded it, including the provisional measure, on the basis of these
impermissible interpretations.
Consequently, on the basis of Article 19.1 of the AD Agreement, Mexico respectfully requests that
the Panel:
(a) recommend that Guatemala bring its measure into conformity with the GATT 1994
and the AD Agreement;
(b) suggest that Guatemala revoke the anti-dumping measure adopted against imports of
Mexican cement and refund the anti-dumping duties collected.
B. G
UATEMALA
3.2 Guatemala has requested the Panel to make the following rulings:
1. As a preliminary matter the panel is without jurisdiction to consider this dispute
3.3 Guatemala respectfully requests the Panel to find that:
• the Panel is not properly composed, because it includes one of the members of the
previous panel which examined the case Guatemala - Cement I , a fact which
compromises the impartiality of the Panel established to examine this dispute, and
rule that this Panel has no jurisdiction to consider the present case;
• the Panel lacks jurisdiction to consider Mexico's complaints concerning the
provisional measure, because Mexico did not request consultations in respect of that
measure and because in its first submission, Mexico does not prove, as required by
Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, that the said measure has had an
enduring significant impact;
• in the alternate, the Panel lacks the jurisdiction to consider Mexico's complaints
concerning the provisional measure because the said provisional measure never had a
significant impact on Mexico's overall trade interests;
• in view of the findings of the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I, the report of
the Panel in that case has no value as a precedent and lacks legal value to be invoked
by Mexico as a basis for its allegations, and that the Panel should therefore reject
those of Mexico's arguments that are based on the said report. Similarly, the Panel
should refrain from using the report in the Guatemala - Cement I case to substantiate
such conclusions and recommendations as it reaches after analysing the present case.
3.4 Guatemala requests the Panel to rule on the preliminary objections separately and before
examining the substantive arguments of the parties.
2. The substantive claims of Mexico should be rejected
3.5 If, notwithstanding the solid factual foundations and legal underpinning of Guatemala's
preliminary objections, the Panel should decide to proceed to consider the merits of the case,
Guatemala requests that the Panel reject Mexico's arguments and petitions and find that:

• Guatemala's definitive anti-dumping measure and the actions that preceded it are fully
consistent with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
• all other aspects of Guatemala's anti-dumping investigation are fully consistent with
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, specifically that:
• Guatemala initiated its investigation in conformity with Article 5 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;
• all aspects of the notification of initiation were in compliance with Articles 5,
6 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
• Guatemala imposed the provisional measure in conformity with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement;
• Guatemala formulated the final affirmative determination in conformity with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
3.6 If, notwithstanding the solid factual foundations and legal underpinnings of Guatemala's
position, the Panel were to decide that in conducting its investigation Guatemala committed
procedural or technical errors, Guatemala requests the Panel to find:
• any procedural or technical error that Guatemala may have committed is harmless or
was acquiesced in by Mexico;
• Guatemala has rebutted the presumption of nullification or impairment referred to in
Article 3.8 of the DSU.
3.7 In the alternative Guatemala requests the Panel to find that any technical error that it may
have committed is insufficient to justify the formulation of a recommendation by the Panel under
Article 19.1 of the DSU.
3.8 In the further alternative, Guatemala requests that, regardless of what is decided in the present
case, the Panel rejects Mexico's request that the Panel should suggest that Guatemala revoke the
definitive anti-dumping measure or refund the anti-dumping duties collected.
IV. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
4.1 Guatemala raises a number of preliminary objections in support of its argument that the
Panel was without jurisdiction to consider the present dispute. The submissions of Guatemala and
Mexico on these preliminary objections, presented verbatim, are as follows:
A. T
HE PANEL WAS IMPROPERLY COMPOSED AND IS NOT COMPETENT TO EXAMINE THE MATTER
BEFORE IT
1. Submissions of Guatemala
4.2 Guatemala's first preliminary objection is that the Panel was improperly composed, and
hence was not competent to examine the matter referred by Mexico to the DSB. Guatemala's
arguments in this regard were are as follows:
4.3 Guatemala objected to the appointment of any members who had served on the panel in the
previous dispute, because having examined Mexico's first complaint, without the competence to do
so, they would have preconceived positions. Specifically, it must be borne in mind that the first

dispute involved the examination of claims relating to the violation of Article 5.3 and 5.5 which will
be examined once again in this case. Guatemala would like to state clearly for the record that it does
not question or dispute the integrity or qualifications of the panellist appointed in the first dispute and
reappointed to serve on the Panel in this dispute. However, it would be virtually impossible for him
or any other person not to take account of the op inions of those who served with him and of the
discussions held and the decisions taken in the previous dispute in which he participated, above all if
we bear in mind that panel decisions are collegiate and do not reflect the position of any individual
member in particular. Thus, the inclusion of a member who served on the previous Panel would seem
to deprive this Panel of its independence and to render it unsuitable.
4.4 This is considered to be the first time under the DSU that a panel report has been reversed
because the panel did not have the mandate to ex amine the complaints, that a complaining Member
has brought a second dispute settlement case involving some of the complaints submitted in the first
case, and that the Director-General has been asked to appoint a new panel under Article 8.7.
Guatemala considers that in such situations, the DSU does not permit the Director-General to
reappoint the members of the previous panel.
4.5 First, the DSU does not empower the Appellate Body to refer the dispute back to the panel
whose conclusion was reversed. As recognized by the Appellate Body in paragraph 89 of its report,
Mexico's only option in the face of the reversal of conclusions in Guatemala - Cement I was to pursue
"another dispute settlement complaint" under the provisions of Article 17 of the AD Agreement and
of the DSU.
4.6 Second, neither Article 17 nor the DSU provides for the reappointment of members that
served in a previous dispute concerning the same anti-dumping investigation. This is particularly
important when one of the parties (in this case Guatemala) objects to such a course.
4.7 Third, Article 8.2 of the DSU stipulates that "Panel members should be selected with a view
to ensuring the independence of the members … ." 1 Although the DSU does not define the word
"independence", Article 3.2 stipulates that panels must interpret the DSU and the "covered
agreements" in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. In the
case United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (hereinafter
Reformulated Gasoline), the Appellate Body concluded that the fundamental rule of treaty
interpretation contained in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna
Convention) "has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law".
2
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states that the words of a treaty constitute a point of departure
in the process of interpretation. Thus, the words of a treaty must be interpreted in their "ordinary
meaning", taking account of "their context" (i.e. other provisions of the same treaty) and the "object
and purpose" of the treaty.3 The ordinary meaning of the term "independence" is "quality or condition
of being independent", and the ordinary meaning of the term "independent" is "said of a person who
upholds his rights or opinions without accepting external intervention." 4 It is obvious that a member

1 DSU, Article 8.2 (emphasis added).
2 Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, page 17.
3 See, for example, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations (second case) [1950] ICJ Report, *8 ("The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to
them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur.").
4 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Twenty-First Edition, page 817 (Real Academia Española,
1992). See also The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1413 (Oxford University Press 1971).
Oxford defines "independence" as "the fact of not depending on another; exemption from external control or
support", idem, 199. See also Webster's Encyclopedic Unab ridged Dictionary of the English Language
(Gramercy Books, 1994).

of the Panel in Guatemala - Cement I will have been influenced by the other members of the Panel in
respect of the claims that were already examined during that first dispute and are now to be examined
again.
4.8 Fourth, according to Article 11 of the DSU, the panel should "make an objective assessment
of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case, and the applicability
of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements …". 5 An objective assessment would appear
to be impossible when the panel includes someone who has already formed opinions with respect to
the identical complaints made in a previous case between the same parties.
4.9 Fifth, under Article 9 of the DSU, a single panel may be established to examine the
complaints in cases involving more than one complain ant, or if more than one panel is established to
examine complaints related to the same matter, the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of
the separate panels. In the case at issue, Mexico is the only complainant. Thus, Article 9, is not
applicable.
4.10 Sixth, the fact that the drafters considered it necessary to include Article 9 in the DSU in
order to enable the same persons to serve on di fferent panels established to examine complaints
relating to the same matter proves that this is an exception to the rule. Where there is not more than
one complainant, the DSU does not authorize the same persons to serve on the different panels
examining different disputes relating to the same matter.
4.11 Moreover, a fundamental principle of public international law stipulates that the decision of
an international tribunal must be impartial and objective.6 The concept of impartiality not only covers
the question of whether the person taking the decision has a personal interest in the result of the
dispute, but also requires that that person should come to the case "with an open mind, ready to be
convinced by the arguments of the parties, and should not already have formed and expressed a view
on the questions arising in the case". 7 Indeed, it is essential to the proper operation of any
international dispute settlement procedure that "the parties to proceedings are satisfied that they will
receive procedural justice, in the sense that their arguments will be fairly heard and impartially
examined, on the basis of complete equality with each other …". 8 "If the parties are concerned about
the perceived bias of the mediator/arbitrator, then the use of different persons as the mediator and the
arbitrator is appropriate."9
4.12 Recognizing these principles, the preamble to the Rules of Conduct for the DSU states that
the operation of the DSU "would be strengthened by rules of conduct designed to maintain the
integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the DSU …". 10 According
to the principles contained in the Rules of Conduct, the impartiality of the members of the panel
requires those members to approach the dispute without any preconceived positions. All of the
members of the panel "shall be independent and impartial, shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of
interest …". Moreover, "such persons shall consider only issues raised in, and necessary to fulfil their
responsibilities within the dispute settlement proceeding …". 11 The principles contained in the Rules

5 DSU, Article 11 (emphasis added).
6 See V.S. Mani, International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects, page 20 (M. Nijhoff 1980).
7 See N. Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice , page 190 (Kluwer 1989) (in
English).
8 Idem, page 189.
9 J. Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 2.47 (1997).
10 WT/DSB/RC/1, 11 December 1996. The Working Procedures stipulate that "The deliberations of
the Panel … shall be kept confidential." (DSU, Appendix 3, paragraph 3.) The appointment of a person who
served on a previous panel as member of a second panel to examine identical complaints would give the
impression that the confidential deliberations of the previous panel were being shared with the second panel.
11 Idem, II and III.2 (emphasis added).

of Conduct for the DSU would be undermined if an y member of the previous panel were allowed to
participate in the present panel.12
4.13 Consequently, with due respect, Guatemala requests that a preliminary resolution be issued to
the effect that the Panel was improperly composed and does not therefore have the competence to
examine the matter referred by Mexico to the DSB.
2. Rebuttal of Mexico
4.14 Mexico set out its position regarding Guatemala's preliminary objection regarding the
competence of the Panel as follows:
4.15 In its written submission, Guatemala "requests that a preliminary resolution be issued to the
effect that the Panel was improperly composed and does not therefore have the competence to
examine the matter referred by Mexico to the DSB".
4.16 Mexico contends that the Panel was properly composed and had the competence to examine
the matter referred by Mexico to the DSB.
4.17 In general Mexico states that Panel was established in conformity with the DSU. The
Director-General, following the procedures set forth in Article 8.7 and in consultation with the
Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, appointed the
members which he considered suitable after having consulted Guatemala and Mexico.
4.18 Guatemala's preliminary objection is not clear. At certain points Guatemala asserts that it
"would seem" or "would appear" that the composition of the Panel was not suitable or lacked
independence (see paragraph 21 and 26 for example), while at other points (paragraph 31) it
categorically asserts that the Panel was not properly composed. If Guatemala considers that the Panel
or one of its members lacks independence or objectivity, it not only has to say so clearly, but it also
has to provide specific facts to show that this is the case. This is too delicate a matter to rely on
simple appearances or on the suppositions or suspicions of one of the parties (in this case the
defendant) without supporting evidence. What is at stake is the credibility of the panels, the prestige
of the members of those panels and the power of the Director-General of the WTO to appoint the
members of a panel when there is no agreement between the parties.
4.19 Even supposing Guatemala were to present evidence to support its preliminary objection, the
Panel is not the suitable body to examine the substance of that objection or to rule on the subject.
Under Articles VIII.1 and VIII.5 of the Rules of Conduct for the DSU (hereinafter the "Rules of
Conduct") Guatemala should submit the evidence in its possession as soon as possible to the
Chairman of the DSB so that he can initiate the procedure aimed at determining whether a material
violation of those Rules has occurred. Guatemal a should withdraw its preliminary objection before
the Panel, failing which the Panel should determine that Guatemala's objection comes under the scope
of the Rules of Conduct.
4.20 The reasoning behind Guatemala's preliminary objection does not make sense. To accept it
would be to imply, inter alia , that this dispute could not be the subject of an appeal, since the
Appellate Body already conducted an examination and issued a ruling beforehand in respect of the
previous dispute. In other words, Mexico would have the right not to accept an appeal because the
Appellate Body might lack independence and objectivity, having already ruled on the matter at issue

12 Similarly, Article 17(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that "no member
may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate
for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court or of a commission of enquiry or in any
other capacity." See in general S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, page 196 (1985).

in this dispute. The fact that the members of the Appellate Body involved could be wholly or partly
different from the original members is irrelevant since as we know, all of the members of the
Appellate Body are involved in all disputes under the principle of collegiality.
4.21 Sticking to the order of Guatemala's arguments, Mexico makes the following remarks:
4.22 Regarding Guatemala's first arguments, its references to the Appellate Body have nothing to
do with its preliminary objection. Nobody, let alone Mexico, has argued that the composition of the
Panel which is currently examining the present dispute derives from some statement by the Appellate
Body in the previous case. The Appellate Body simply did not make any statement concerning the
composition of the Panel in this case.
4.23 In its second argument Guatemala states that "neither Article 17 nor the DSU provides for the
reappointment of members that served in a previous dispute concerning the same anti-dumping
investigation". In this connection, Mexico would like to stress that Article 17 (of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement) does not regulate the requirements for membership of a panel, so that it is not applicable.
4.24 As regards the DSU, the requirements for membership of a panel are contained in Article 8, in
particular in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 thereof. Thus, the persons who comply with these requirements
are eligible to compose a panel. Article 8.1 of the DSU expressly stipulates that panels shall be
composed, inter alia, of "persons who have served on … a panel". In other words, not only is the fact
of having served on a panel not an obstacle, it is an advantage.
4.25 Furthermore, it is a well-established practice in the WTO to rely on members of a panel in a
previous or similar dispute. This is what has be en done, for example, in the case of disputes brought
under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
4.26 During the process of appointment of the members of the Panel, Mexico cited at least three
cases in which the Director-General had appointed the same members who had served on a previous
panel, unless they were unavailable (Mexico's communications to the Director-General and his reply
to the parties are annexed hereto).
13 This same reasoning has been applied to disputes on the subject
of anti-dumping measures, for example the two disputes on United States - Anti-Dumping Act of
1916.14
4.27 Guatemala's third argument in this objection focuses on the term "independence" referred to
in Article 8.2 of the DSU. According to Guatemala, the DSU does not define this word, and
ultimately it is necessary to resort to the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention.
4.28 While it is true that the DSU does not contain any definition of the word "independence", it is
also true that through this reasoning, Guatemala is seeking to ignore the existence of clearly
established procedures for cases in which one of the parties considers that one or several members of
a panel do not comply with that requirement. As stated above, these procedures are contained in the
Rules of Conduct.
4.29 Consequently, if Guatemala has any problem in this respect, it should follow the procedures
set forth in the Rules of Conduct. In any case, the Panel does not have the authority to determine

13 See India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (WT/DS50
and WT/DS79). See also Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (WT/DS18) in conjunction with
Australia - Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids (WT/DS21), and Argentina - Measures Affecting
Imports of Footwear, Textile s, Apparel and Other Items (WT/DS56) in conjunction with Argentina - Measures
Affecting Textiles, Clothing and Footwear (WT/DS77).
14 WT/DS136 and WT/DS162. Both cases are being examined by Johan Human, Dimitrij Grcar and
Eugeniusz Piontek.

whether or not one or several of its members are independent, since this would be contrary to the
principle that one cannot be a judge and a party at the same time.
4.30 Nor is Guatemala's interpretation of the term "independent" correct. According to the Vienna
Convention, a treaty must be interpreted in accordan ce with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Guatemala only referred partially to
the ordinary meaning of the word "independent", ignoring the context in which it appears and the
object and purpose of the DSU.
4.31 According to Guatemala, the ordinary meaning of the term independent is "said of a person
who upholds his rights or opinions without accepting external intervention". However, the context
and the object and purpose of the DSU clearly show that:
(a) The term "independence" in Article 8.2 refers to the independence of the members of
a panel with respect to the governments and parties of the other Members of the WTO
(see Article 8.9 of the DSU) and not with respect to the other members of the panel.
To consider that independence refers to the other members of the panel is to imply
that panel reports can contain differing views among the panel members, which has in
fact never happened. As we know, panel reports are the result of the collective work
of the different members and not of the work of each one of those members taken
independently.
(b) The DSU does not contain any provision to the effect that the participation of a panel
member in two panels would be contrary to the independence, objectivity and
impartiality of that member in either of the two panels in question. On the contrary,
the DSU recognizes, in Article 8.1, that the participation of a person in a panel must
be seen as an advantage in terms of experience for other panels, and in the case of
Article 21.5 it expressly states that a disagreement concerning implementation must
be resolved "wherever possible through re sort to the original panel". If the
independence requirement in Article 8.2 were interpreted as Guatemala argues,
Article 21.5 could not be applied, since by definition all of the members of the second
panel could not be considered independent.
(c) The Members of the Appellate Body will never be independent, since they are
governed by the principle of collegiality.
4.32 In view of the above considerations, under the Vienna Convention, the word "independence"
cannot be given the meaning that Guatemala gives it, since this is not the ordinary meaning of the
word in its context, nor does it take account of the treaty's objective and purpose.
4.33 Concerning Guatemala's fourth argument, after referring to Article 11 of the DSU, Guatemala
indicates that "An objective assessment would a ppear to be impossible when the panel includes
someone who has already formed opinions with respect to the identical complaints made in a previous
case between the same parties."
4.34 Guatemala's reference to Article 11 of the DSU is inappropriate. This Article refers to the
function of panels as a whole and not to the independence or lack of independence of one of their
members. Assuming that one of the members holds a preconceived opinion because he had
participated in a previous panel, this does not necessarily imply that the panel as a whole is no longer
objective. Moreover, Guatemala is not even sure of what it affirms. It does not argue that the Panel
cannot make an objective assessment, what it states is that an objective assessment "would appear to
be impossible".
4.35 If Guatemala's purely speculative argument is accepted, this would imply:

(a) That opinions of the Panel member whose participation is contested by Guatemala
were not objective in the previous Panel either. Conversely, if these opinions were
objective in the first Panel, then they would be objective in the second Panel. As will
be recalled, in paragraph 21 of its written submission, Guatemala acknowledges that
it does not "question or dispute the integrity or qualifications of the panellist
appointed in the first dispute", so its objection contradicts its initial statement;
(b) that not only were the opinions of the member contested by Guatemala not objective
but they also prevailed over the opinions of the other members of the first Panel
(including its Chairman) and, what is even more unlikely, these non-objective
opinions prevailed over those of the other members of the second Panel, including its
Chairman;
(c) that no person who has read the report of the Panel in the Guatemala I case may
participate in the current proceedings because they would hold opinions regarding
these complaints;
(d) that no person who has examined any matter relating to the Anti-Dumping
Agreement would be objective, for the same reasons;
(e) that the complaints made under Article 21.5 do not require members of panels to be
objective;
(f) that in the cases cited by Mexico when the Panel was appointed
15, the principle of
objectivity was disregarded; and
(g) that this matter may not be the subject of an appeal because the Appellate Body
would not be objective.
4.36 Regarding Guatemala's fifth argument, Guatemal a states that Article 9 of the DSU does not
apply because it refers to cases involving several complainants. Mexico agrees that there is only one
complainant in this case, but this does not detract from Article 9 of the DSU as a clear example that
the same persons may consider different cases without forfeiting their objectiveness or independence.
4.37 In paragraph 28 of its written submission, Guatem ala states that the inclusion of Article 9 in
the DSU "proves that this is an exception to the rule", without explaining why, but above all how, it is
possible that such a sensitive matter as the independence of one or more members of a panel or the
objectivity of the panel as a whole could be the subject of an exception to the rule. Both
independence and objectivity are absolute concepts that are either applied or not applied. If Article 9
was an exception to the rule, in other words to independence and objectivity, all panels set up under
this Article would also be an exception to the rule, in other words dependent and not objective.
4.38 In addition, a statement that "where there is not more than one complainant, the DSU does not
authorize the same persons to serve on the different panels examining different disputes relating to the
same matter" does not imply, as Guatemala suggests, that the DSU does not allow such a possibility.
On the contrary, as already indicated, not only are there a number of precedents in which such action
has been taken, but no provision of the DSU establishes a presumption against this and there are even
provisions which specifically provide for recourse to the original panel, for example, Article 21.5.

15 See India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (WT/DS50
and WT/DS79). See also Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (WT/DS18), in conjunction
with Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids (WT/DS21), and Argentina – Measures
Affecting Imports of Footwear, T extiles, Apparel and Other Items (WT/DS56), in conjunction with Argentina –
Measures Affecting Textiles, Clothing and Footwear (WT/DS/77).

4.39 Guatemala further states that "if the parties are concerned about the perceived bias of the
mediator/arbitrator, then the use of different persons as the mediator/arbitrator is appropriate". This
statement does not apply to disputes brought under the DSU. As will be recalled, Article 8.6 of the
DSU provides that "the parties to this dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling
reasons". In other words, it is not enough for there to be a perceived bias. There must be compelling
reasons not to accept a candidate proposed.
4.40 In addition, according to Rule VIII.1 of the Rules of Conduct, a party must present evidence
of material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality or confidentiality or the
obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. In other words, perception or semblance is not enough.
4.41 Lastly, nothing prevents members of the Panel from considering "only issues raised in, and
necessary to fulfil their responsibilities within the dispute settlement proceeding", because this is their
mandate. That mandate governs all their action, irrespective of any past experience they might have.
4.42 In view of the foregoing, Mexico requests the Panel:
(a) To find that the Panel does not have the mandate or competence to take any decision
on the substance of the preliminary objection by Guatemala and should therefore
continue to consider the matter raised by Mexico;
(b) to determine that, because of its nature and content, the preliminary objection by
Guatemala should be rejected in accordance with the procedures laid down in the
Rules of Conduct; and
(c) to ask whether Guatemala intends to apply immediately the procedures laid down in
the Rules of Conduct and, if not, to enquire as to its reasons for not doing so.
B. C
ONSIDERATION BY THIS PANEL OF PREVIOUS PANEL REPORT
1. Submissions of Guatemala
4.43 Guatemala raises the further preliminary objection that because the previous panel dealing
with this dispute did not have a mandate to examine the complaints brought by Mexico in these
proceedings, its report is without value as a precedent to this case and should not be taken into
consideration by this panel. Its arguments in this regard are as follows:
4.44 In it's first submission, Mexico speaks extensively of the Report of the Panel in Guatemala –
Cement I. In fact, Mexico quotes that report at least 85 times. Essentially, Mexico would like this
Panel to forego its obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter before it in this dispute
settlement procedure as stipulated in Article 11 of the DSU, and rely on the examination conducted by
the previous Panel in respect of complaints that are identical. This has clearly been Mexico's objective
from the outset, when it improperly insisted that the Director-General reappoint the members of the
first Panel to consider this second complaint.
4.45 However, the members of this Panel must reject Mexico's request to take up the assessment of
the matter made by the first Panel. This Panel must fulfil its obligation to carry out its own objective
assessment of the matter, and to that end it must completely disregard the report issued by the
previous panel.
4.46 In international law it is accepted that any decision by an international body, including panels
in a dispute settlement procedure, representing an excess of jurisdiction, must be considered void and

without legal effect.16 If a municipal tribunal lacks jurisdiction, its decisions are void and without any
effect.17 In fact, a decision which has been reversed has no value as a precedent.18
4.47 In Guatemala – Cement I , the Appellate Body ruled that the Panel which examined the
dispute should never have examined the complaints submitted because the matter was not properly
before it. The Appellate Body reversed the report of the Panel on the grounds that it lacked
jurisdiction. As a result, the report produced in Guatemala – Cement I has no value as a precedent, as
evidence, or as guidance. Moreover, it would be extremely injurious to Guatemala, a Member which
has the right to an objective examination by this Panel, if the Panel were to be guided by the reasoning
of the report released in Guatemala – Cement I.
4.48 In the report issued in the case Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (hereinafter Japan -
Taxes) the Appellate Body confirmed that "unadopted panel reports 'have no legal status in the GATT
or WTO …'". 19 In Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other
Items (hereinafter Argentina - Footwear, Textiles and Apparel ) the Appellate Body considered that
the Panel had committed an error by relying on an unadopted report.20
4.49 Under the GATT dispute settlement system, the legal status of unadopted panel reports was
not recognized because the losing party had prevented adoption for political reasons. In the case at
issue, the Report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I has no legal status and cannot constitute a
valid precedent not because Guatemala prevented its adoption, but because the Appellate Body
concluded that the Panel did not have the mandate to examine the complaints before it. Thus,
recourse to the report issued in Guatemala – Cement I as useful guidance in respect of any matter
being examined in the present dispute would be a violation of the decision of the Appellate Body.
4.50 Consequently, Guatemala requests that a preliminary decision be issued stating that the Panel
shall not take account of the report issued in Guatemala - Cement I.
2. Rebuttal of Mexico
4.51 Mexico's rebuttal of Guatemala's preliminary objection against Panel consideration of the
panel report issued in Guatemala – Cement I is as follows:
4.52 Guatemala's request was based on two premises in particular:
(a) The Panel must meet its obligation to carry out an objective assessment of the
matter21; and
(b) the report of the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I was issued outside its jurisdiction, was
not adopted and therefore has no effect as a precedent, a means of conviction or as
guidance.
22

16 See H. Lauterpacht, The Legal Remedy in Case of Excess of Jurisdiction , 9 Brit Y. B. Int'l L.
page 117 (1928), and E. Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of the Illegal Acts of International Organizations in
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, page 88 (1965).
17 See, for example, Rex V. Judge Pugh [1951], page 2, K.B. 623.
18 See, for example, League of Latin American Citizens v. Wilson , 131 F. 3d 1297, 1305 n. 5 (9 th Cir.
1997); see also Durning v. Citibank, 950 F 2d 1419, 1424 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991) (decisions that have been reversed
have no value as a precedent).
19 Report of the Appellate Body, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted on 1 November 1996, page 15 (hereinafter Japan - Taxes).
20 Report of the Appellate Body , Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R, adopted on 22 April 1998, paragraph 43.
21 Ibid., paragraphs 32 and 33.
22 Ibid., paragraphs 34-37.

4.53 In its oral submission at the first substantive meeting with the parties, Mexico rejected
Guatemala's arguments for the following reasons:
(a) The arguments put forward are those of Mexico irrespective of whether or not they
were issued by a Panel.23
(b) The report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I was adopted.24

23 Oral submission by Mexico's, 15 February 2000, paragraphs 18 and 19, which state the following:
"18. In fact, the findings of the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I were favourable to Mexico.
This means that both Mexico and the Panel agree that the facts presented (i.e. Guatemala's acts
and omissions during the investigation) violated the AD Agreement. It is therefore necessary
to make clear that the legal reasoning explained here constitutes Mexico's position and should
be taken as such.
19. Consequently, irrespective of the validity which the current Panel attributes to the previous
Report, it should always be borne in mind that what is being examined here is Mexico's
arguments before this Panel".
24 Ibid., paragraphs 20-25, which state the following:
"20. According to Articles 16.4 and 17.14, the DSB is the body empowered to adopt reports
of panels and of the Appellate Body respectively. The fact that the Appellate Body reversed
three of the Panel's findings does not mean that the latter's report was not adopted.
21. Guatemala holds a contradictory position rega rding unadopted reports. On the one hand,
it cites them when it believes this is useful and, on the other, it mentions several sources to
show why this Panel should not consider the direct precedents in Guatemala – Cement I . The
sources cited by Guatemala are not applicable to this case and are completely irrelevant and
without any legal merit. Moreover, Guatemala does not take account of the rules on the
adoption of reports in the DSU, which will be seen below, and gives a biased interpretation of
the findings of the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. It also places on
a same level the Report of a Panel ( Bananas II) which unlike the Report in the Guatemala –
Cement I case, was simply not adopted.
22. In order to apprehend the validity of this Report which was adopted 'as rejected by the
Appellate Body', it is important to determine how the rejection affected the Report. To do so,
it is necessary to turn to Article 17.6 of the DSU, which states the following: 'An appeal shall
be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by
the panel.'
23. The foregoing shows that the Appellate Body's terms of reference were limited to 'issues
of law' and to 'legal interpretations' developed by the Panel. The factual elements which the
parties submitted to the Panel, mainly in their written submissions and in positions stated
orally, could not therefore be rejected because they do not fall within the Panel's authority.
Consequently, the Panel Report is an adopted report and the adoption of the Appellate Body's
Report does not in any way affect the part concerning the facts.
24. As we all know, the Panel Report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages contains
useful guidance when determining the merits of panel reports because it recognizes that
'Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered
by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and,
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.'
25. Following this logic, Mexico has legitimate expectations that the Panel responsible for
considering the present case will take into account the facts submitted to the previous Panel
and base its reasoning on these. Moreover, the Guatemala – Cement I Report is undoubtedly
relevant to the dispute before you. Guatemala' s exigency that the previous report should not
be taken into account is not only groundless but is also contrary to the reasoning developed by
the Appellate Body."

(c) The Report of the Panel (WT/DS60/R) is an integral part of the request for the
establishment of this Panel, so it forms part of the latter's terms of reference.25
(d) Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the Panel's report in Guatemala – Cement I
was not adopted, it nevertheless contains useful indications that are relevant to the
matter before this Panel.26
4.54 In order to supplement its subsidiary claims, Mexico provides some details and makes some
remarks.
4.55 Firstly, it must be emphasized that the legal interpretations in the Panel's report in
Guatemala-Cement I constitute part of Mexico's pleadings, so there can be no doubt that the Panel has
to consider them. It should be recalled that, in the Shrimps–Turtle case, the Appellate Body
determined that it was legitimate for a party to a dispute to attach the briefs by non-governmental
organizations, or any portion thereof, to its own submissions. 27 If it is permitted to include the
arguments of a body outside the WTO, it is equally possible for Mexico to cite the Panel's reasoning
in Guatemala – Cement I in its submission, particularly since this is a direct precedent to the present
case and was identified as such in the request for the establishment of a Panel.
4.56 Secondly, it is interesting to see the way in which Guatemala has constructed the logic of its
objection. In its first written submission, Guatemala intimates that Mexico wished to "incite" the
Panel to act improperly using expressions such as "Mexico would like this Panel to forego its
obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter" 28 or "the members of this Panel must reject
Mexico's request to take up the assessment of the matter made by the first Panel".29

25 Ibid., paragraphs 26 and 27, which state the following:
"26. This is a very simple claim: as shown below, the Report of the previous Panel was duly
identified as a precedent in this case and, as Guatemala specifically recognizes, forms part of
this Panel's terms of reference (footnote omitted).
27. In outlining the problem, Mexico specifically identified the report of the previous Panel
and requested that this Panel: 'Examine, in the light of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the matter referred to the DSB by Mexico on the basis of this
request and of the direct precedents to this WTO dispute as set forth in the Report of the Panel
(WT/DS60/R) and of the Appellate Body (WT/DS60/AB/R);'."
26 Ibid., paragraphs 28-31, which state the following:
"28. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that Guatemala was right in saying that the Panel's
report in Guatemala – Cement I was not adopted, it is nevertheless useful for this Panel to
consider the reasoning followed by the previous Panel.
29. As we all know, according to the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 'a
panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report
that it considered to be relevant'.
30. This reasoning was reaffirmed by the Appellate Body itself, for example, in Argentina –
Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items.
31. Given the similarity between Guatemala - Cement I and the present case, it is obvious that the
reasoning of the previous Panel is especially useful. It is also undeniable that, legal status
notwithstanding, this Panel is empowered to consider the reasoning set out in this Report."
(footnotes omitted).
27 Report of the Appellate Body in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (WT/DS58/AB/R), adopted on 6 November 1998, paragraph 110. The Appellate Body recognized that
"the Panel acted within the scope of its authority under Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU in allowing any party to
the dispute to attach the briefs by non-governmental organizations, or any portion thereof, to its own
submissions."
28 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 32.
29 Ibid., paragraph 33.

4.57 The way in which Guatemala puts forward its arguments is very simple. According to
Guatemala, as Mexico cites the Panel report in Guatemala – Cement I "at least 85 times"30 this means
that Mexico would like the Panel to forego its obligation to make an objective assessment.
4.58 Guatemala's approach is unrealistic. If panels lose their objectivity when evaluating previous
reports, then no panel which has taken action under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (or,
where applicable, under the GATT) would have made an objective assessment of the matter because
they referred to reports by other panels. When considering the Japan – Taxes case, the Appellate
Body made very clear the pertinence of panels examining reports of other panels, whether or not
adopted.
31 In fact, following Guatemala's argument, it is possible to reach the conclusion that
Guatemala would also like the Panel to forego an objective assessment because in its first submission
it mentions the Appellate Body at least 36 times.
4.59 Suffice it to say that Mexico would like the Panel to "make an objective assessment of the
facts, the applicability of the relevant covered agreements and conformity with these" and it has
furnished all the elements of fact and of law ava ilable to it for this purpose, whether or not the
previous Report was adopted. To follow Guatemala's logic would be tantamount to limiting Mexico's
right of defence.
4.60 Thirdly, Guatemala cannot prohibit the Panel from taking into account the Report of the
previous Panel.
32 In the Shrimp–Turtle case33 the Appellate Body determined that "It is particularly
within the province and the authority of a panel … to ascertain the acceptability and relevancy of
information or advice received, and to decide what weight to ascribe to that information or advice."34
4.61 Consequently, Mexico submits that it is not necessary to determine the status of the Report in
the previous case because, irrespective of its status, the Panel is entitled to examine it and, in this
particular case, it is especially relevant as a direct precedent to the case.
4.62 Mexico therefore reiterates what it stated in its request for the establishment of the Panel,
namely, that the Panel should examine the matter submitted to the DSB by Mexico in the light of
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement, on the basis of its request, (which specifically
includes the document WT/DS60/R), as well as the direct precedents to this WTO dispute as set forth
in the Report of the Panel (WT(DS60/R) and of the Appellate Body (WT/DS60/AB/R).

30 Ibid., paragraph 32.
31Report of the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
(WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R), adopted on 1 November 1996, pages 14-15. Referring
to reports adopted by panels, the Appellate Body consid ered that adopted panel reports were an important part
of the GATT acquis and recognized that "They are often considered by subsequent panels" and "should be taken
into account where they are relevant to any dispute" . Regarding unadopted panel reports, the Appellate Body
indicated that "a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report
that it considered to be relevant."
32 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 33, 35, 37 and 38.
33 Report of the Appellate Body in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (WT/DS58/AB/R), adopted on 6 November 1998.
34 Ibid., paragraph 104. See also the Report of the Panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of
High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (WT/DS132/R and WT/DS132/R/Corr.1) ( Mexico –
Corn Syrup ), adopted on 24 February 2000, paragraph 7.34; see also United States – Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Produc ts Originating in the
United Kingdom (WT/DS138/R) (under appeal), paragraph 6.3 and 6.6. It should be noted that these legal
interpretations were not the subject of the appeal.

3. Guatemala's response to rebuttal arguments of Mexico
4.63 Guatemala responds to Mexico's rebuttal by asserting that since the previous panel did not
have a mandate to examine the complaints brought by Mexico, its report is without value as a
precedent to this case and should not be taken into consideration by this panel. The following are the
arguments Guatemala advanced on this point in its second written submission:
4.64 Guatemala objects to Mexico's considering the report of the previous panel (hereinafter
Guatemala - Cement I) as the "law" applicable to this dispute. Throughout its first written submission
and during the first meeting on this case, Mexico repeatedly cited the report of the previous case as if
it governed this dispute. In citing the report in the previous case, Mexico is trying the convince the
Panel that it does not have to address certain questions because they have already been resolved.
4.65 Guatemala respectfully submits that no one, still less the Panel, should look to the Guatemala
- Cement I report for useful guidance in settling the present dispute. Firstly, that Panel exceeded its
jurisdiction. The Appellate Body considered that the Panel in the previous dispute should not have
examined the complaints brought before it because it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case. 35
If a subsequent panel were to ignore the findings and use the Report of the Panel in Guatemala -
Cement I for guidance, it would be violating the ruling of the Appellate Body.
4.66 During the first meeting of the present procedure, Mexico not only insisted that the Panel use
the report in Guatemala - Cement I as "useful guidance", but it also argued that the "legal
interpretations made" in that report were "as valid and permissible as those of any other adopted panel
report".36 Mexico bases this astonishing conclusion on tw o premises: 1. that the Appellate Body did
not reverse the conclusions of the panel report on the merits of the case; 2. that the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the panel report.37
4.67 Guatemala submits that it is contrary to the law to equate the report in Guatemala - Cement I
with the adopted report of a panel which was issued in accordance with the terms and stipulations of
the WTO dispute settlement system. The latter reflects a ruling under the auspices of a multilateral
institution, adopted by the corresponding body of that institution, while the former reflects a statement
that does not come under the auspices of any multilateral institution. This distinction is at the heart of
the Appellate Body's ruling: the Panel in Guatemala - Cement I exceeded its jurisdiction. The Panel
did not have the mandate to do what it did. Thus, from the legal point of view, the report in
Guatemala - Cement I does not have any more relevance than, say, an interesting book or some
Article that was published on legal matters.38
4.68 In the recent ruling in the case Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (hereinafter Corn Syrup), the Panel found that the Guatemala -
Cement I report "has no legal status".39 Unfortunately, the Panel added that it could refer to the report
"to the extent we consider it persuasive". The text suggests that the Panel treated the report in
Guatemala - Cement I in the same way as an unadopted report. We consider this to be an error and
respectfully request the Panel not to make this same error.

35 Report of the Appellate Body, Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement
from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted on 25 November 1998, paragraph 90.
36 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 22.
37 Idem.
38 At one point during the first hearing with the Panel, Mexico accused Guatemala of hypocrisy. The
representative of Mexico said that Guatemala frequently invoked unadopted reports in support of its arguments.
Idem.
39 WT/DS132/R, circulated on 28 January 2000, paragraph 7.63, footnote 556.

4.69 Equally spurious is Mexico's claim that the Guatemala - Cement I report comes under the
Panel's terms of reference since it was mentioned in the request for the establishment of a panel. If
this were the case, the result of every dispute could effectively be decided by the claimant if it were
sufficiently prepared to cite favourable reports in their request for the establishment of a panel and to
ignore the panel reports that were contrary to their position. Obviously, this interpretation of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is ri diculous and unworthy of further attention by
Guatemala or the Panel.
4.70 Finally, Guatemala respectfully submits that the rejection of this preliminary objection would
set a bad precedent. It would motivate panels to ignore their terms of reference and settle questions
that could appear important or new because even if their conclusions were reversed at the appellate
stage, the ability to make their reasoning prevail would survive and be cited by future panels.
4.71 At the second substantive meeting, in its final oral submission, Mexico emphasized that
Guatemala's attempts to undermine the legal reasoning in the Report of the Panel which examined the
Guatemala - Cement I case are nothing new. What is new is that Guatemala finally recognizes that
Mexico can turn to the arguments in this report
40 because this is precisely Mexico's argument. It
recalled that on many occasions Mexico had indicated that the Panel's arguments were those of
Mexico and consequently, the validity and relevance of the previous report are irrelevant. Everything
else is superfluous.
C. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO PANEL CONSIDERATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MEASURE AND
THE COMPLAINTS RELATING THERETO
1. Submissions of Guatemala
4.72 Guatemala makes the following arguments in support of its preliminary objection that the
Panel does not have the mandate to examine the provisional measure and the complaints relating
thereto:
(a) Mexico did not request consultations in respect of the provisional measure
4.73 Under Article 4.4 of the DSU, all requests for consultations shall identify "the measures at
issue". The request for consultations submitted by Mexico identifies the definitive anti-dumping
measure, but not the provisional anti-dumping measure. Consequently, this Panel does not have the
mandate to examine the provisional measure or Mexico's complaints challenging that measure.
Specifically, the Panel does not have the mandate to examine the complaints contained in Mexico's
first submission in Part V.B, "Imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure violated Articles 2
and 7 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994", pages 40-54.
4.74 In Guatemala - Cement I , the Appellate Body considered that "the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of a covered Agreement are not meant to replace, as a coherent system of
dispute settlement for that Agreement, the rules and procedures of the DSU."
41 Thus, the provisions
of Article 17 of the AD Agreement and Article 4 of the DSU must be understood as having to be
applied jointly. It is only in the specific circumstance where a provision of the DSU and a special or
additional provision of paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 17 are mutually inconsistent that the provisions of
Article 17 may be read to preva il over the provision of the DSU.
42 The Appellate Body therefore
rejected Mexico's argument that Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement replaced Article 6.2 of the DSU
and submitted that the request for the establishment of a panel must identify the anti-dumping
measure at issue, as required under Article 6.2 of the DSU.

40 Oral statement of Guatemala, paragraph 14.
41 WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted on 25 November 1998, paragraph 67.
42 Idem, paragraph 66.

4.75 Similarly, Article 17.3 of the AD Agreement does not replace Article 4.4. of the DSU in
respect of the applicable procedure for requesting consultations. In fact, Article 17.3 is not even
mentioned in Annex 2 of the DSU as a special or additional provision. Thus, the request for
consultations "shall be submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including
identification of the measure at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint".43
4.76 In Guatemala - Cement I , the Appellate Body also ruled that the "matter" consisted of two
elements: the specific "measure" and the "claims" relating to it. 44 Moreover, it concluded that the
word "matter" had the same meaning in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 17 of the AD Agreement
(Consultation and Dispute Settlement) as it had in Article 7 of the DSU (Terms of Reference of
Panels). Thus, by limiting the scope of its request for consultations to include only the definitive anti-
dumping measure and the complaints relating thereto, Mexico clearly excluded from this dispute
settlement procedure the provisional measure and the complaints relating to it.
4.77 Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel of 15 July 1999 recognizes that the request
for consultations only identified the definitive anti-dumping measure "as well as the actions that
preceded it".
45 In the request for the establishment of a panel, Mexico challenges the definitive anti-
dumping measure and "the actions that preceded it, including the provisional anti-dumping measure
and various matters relating to the initiation of the investigation and the anti-dumping proceeding". 46
Thus, Mexico does not challenge the provisional measure per se. Mexico challenges the provisional
measure only as one of the actions preceding the challenge of the final measure. In other words, if we
read Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel together with its request for consultations, we
find that Mexico did not identify the provisional measure as a specific measure at issue, but only as
one of its complaints against the final measure.
4.78 However, to the extent that it can be said that Mexico's request for the establishment of a
panel did identify the provisional measure as the subject of its complaint, that request violates
Article 4 of the DSU. Under Article 6 of the DSU, a Member may not request the establishment of a
panel to challenge a measure in respect of which it has not requested prior consultations under
Article 4 of the DSU. Article 4.3 stipulates that a Member may proceed directly to request the
establishment of a panel if the other Member does not respond to the request or enter into
consultations within specified periods of time. Article 4.7, for its part, stipulates that "If the
consultations fail to settle a dispute" within the time-period specified therein, "the complaining party
may request the establishment of a panel." Similarly, Article 6.2 requires that in its request for the
establishment of a panel, the Member "indicate whether consultations were held" and "identify the
specific measures at issue". Since the request for consultations submitted by Mexico did not identify
the provisional measure as the specific measure at issue, that measure cannot be the subject of the
dispute. Allowing Mexico to extend the scope of the litis to include the provisional measure would
undermine the provisions of Article 4 of the DSU, which stipulates, as already mentioned, that
consultations must be requested in respect of a specific measure before the request for the
establishment of a panel to examine that measure can be submitted.
4.79 To permit Mexico to include the provisional measur e in its complaint, as it tries to do in its
first submission, would be to ignore an important stage in the dispute settlement process, in violation
of Article 3.7 of the DSU which states that:
"Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under
these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure

43 DSU, Article 4.4.
44 WT/DS60/AB/R, paragraph 76.
45 WT/DS156/2, page 2.
46 Idem.

a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and
consistent with the covered Agreements is clearly to be preferred."
Under this Article, the parties must do their utmost to find a mutually acceptable solution. If a
Member chooses not to request consultations in respect of a measure which it challenges in its first
submission, as in the case at issue, a fundam ental objective of the DSU is thereby completely
undermined.
4.80 In United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway (hereinafter United States - Salmon from Norway), the Panel found that
under Article 15 of the special dispute settlement provisions contained in the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (Tokyo Round
Anti-Dumping Code), "before a party to a dispute could request a Panel concerning a matter, the
parties to the dispute had to have been given an opportunity to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution
of the matter. This condition would not be meaningful unless the matter had been raised in
consultations and conciliation."
47
4.81 Guatemala recognizes that Article 7.1 of the DSU defines the terms of reference of a panel,
which are normally established on the basis of the request for the establishment of a panel presented
by the complainant. 48 Moreover, it recognizes that the terms of reference of a panel establish its
jurisdiction.49 However, they would not determine its jurisdiction if it were found that the request for
the establishment of a panel submitted by the complainant covered a dispute that had not been the
subject of a request for consultations.50 As clearly explained in Canada - Civilian Aircraft, Article 4.4
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) read together with
Article 4.7 of the DSU, "prevent a Member from requesting the establishment of a panel with regard
to a 'dispute' on which no consultations were requested". 51 Similarly, read together, the provisions of
Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement and those of Articl e 4.7 of the DSU prevent Mexico, in this case,
from requesting the establishment of a panel on a dispute concerning Guatemala's provisional
measure in respect of which it did not request consultations.
52
4.82 Mexico's failure to identify the provisional measure (and to present the complete category of
complaints regarding the provisional measure) in its request for consultations prevented the special
dispute settlement rules for anti-dumping cases from providing the parties an opportunity to reach a
"mutually satisfactory resolution" of the dispute under Article 17.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
4.83 Thus, Guatemala requests the Panel to issue a preliminary decision to the effect that the Panel
does not have a mandate to examine the provisional measure and all of the complaints referring
thereto, since Mexico did not request consultations in respect of that measure.

47 ADP/87, adopted on 27 April 1994, paragraph 333.
48 Report of the Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting th e Export of Civilian Aircraft (hereinafter
Canada - Civilian Aircraft), WT/DS70/R, adopted on 20 August 1999, paragraph 9.11.
49 Idem.
50 Idem, paragraph 9.12.
51 Idem.
52 Unlike in the case Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, this case does not involve a
situation in which the measure identified in the request for consultations (a resolution for the payment of export
subsidies under PROEX) and the measure identified in the request for the establishment of a panel (regulations
issued subsequently for the payment of export subsidie s under PROEX) essentially involved the same practice
or dispute (WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, paragraph 132). A provisional anti-dumping measure is
clearly different and separate from a definitive anti-dumping measure, and the challenge of one of the measures
may be accepted while the other may be rejected. Consequently, they constitute different "disputes".

(b) In the alternative the provisional measure does not have a "Significant Impact" in
conformity with Article 17.4
(i) The requirement to prove "Significant Impact"
4.84 Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers mainly to the definitive anti-dumping
measures. The provisional measures may only be challenged in certain limited situations.
Specifically, a complainant may challenge a provisional measure only: (a) "when a provisional
measure has a significant impact", and (b) "the Member that requested consultations considers that the
measure was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7" of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
53
4.85 These requirements were also contained in Article 15.3 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping
Code, which is the legal precedent for Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.54
4.86 The simple wording of Article 17.4 indicates that the complainant must prove that there was a
significant impact. In contrast, the complainant only needs to consider that the measure was taken
contrary to the provisions of Article 7.1. Moreover, the use of the present tense ("has a significant
impact") indicates that the provisional measure must have a current and enduring impact, and not a
historical impact.
4.87 Finally, the intention of the drafters of Article 17.4 must have been that the significant impact
must be proven in relation to the trade interests of the complaining party and not in relation to the
exporting industry under investigation. This is due to the fact that the complainant in a dispute
settlement procedure is a WTO Member and not the exporter or exporters under investigation. Since
the WTO dispute settlement procedures refer to the rights and the obligations of the Member
countries, the question of whether or not there is a significant impact must be assessed in relation to
the overall trade interest of the complaining Member. No other interpretation of Article 17.4 would
be logical given the object and purpose of the AD Agreement and the DSU. Mexico agrees with this
interpretation. In the case United States – Anti-Dumping Duties on Grey Portland Cement and
Cement Clinker from Mexico, Mexico stressed that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
(GATT 1947) was designed to regulate conduct between signatory countries and that the dispute
settlement process was a government-to-government process.
55 Mexico contended that the
predecessor to Article 17.4 "expressly allowed signatories to challenge…preliminary determinations
where these had a significant impact on their trading interests."56
4.88 These strict requirements, which must be met by complainants in order to challenge a
provisional measure, establish an important balance between the rights of a complainant to make such

53 Article 7.1 reads as follows:
Provisional measures may be applied only if:
(i) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a public notice
has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to
submit information and make comments;
(ii) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a
domestic industry; and
(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the
investigation.
54 The Appellate Body recognized that the context of a provision includes previous agreements on the
same matter (report of the Appellate Body in United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made
Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, AB-1996-3, adopted on 25 February 1997, page 17 ("the disappearance in
the ATC of the earlier MFA express provision for backdating the operative effect of a restraint measure,
strongly reinforces the presumption that such retroactive application is no longer permissible.")
55 ADP/82, Report of the Panel (unadopted), 7 July 1992, paragraph 3.1.11.
56 Idem, (emphasis added).

challenges and the burden on the defending party in defending itself against them. In almost all cases,
the underlying anti-dumping investigation is close to completion, and in no more than a few months
the provisional measure will be replaced by the definitive measure.57 In fact, the AD Agreement does
not even require members to impose provisional measures as a prerequisite to the imposition of
definitive measures. For example, in situations where the definitive anti-dumping measure has
already been imposed, if for any reason the complainant decides to challenge the provisional measure,
it is difficult to imagine how it would be possible for the complainant to show that the provisional
measure has had an enduring significant impact.
(ii) Mexico does not claim that the provisional measure has had an enduring significant impact
4.89 In its request for the establishment of the panel of 15 July 1999, Mexico claims that the
imposition of a provisional measure was an "action" contrary to Guatemala's obligations under the
AD Agreement.
58 Although Mexico claims in its request for the establishment of a panel that the
provisional measure "had a significant impact", it does not claim that the provisional measure "has a
significant impact" as required by Article 17.4. Similarly, in its first written submission to this Panel,
it does not argue that the provisional measure "has a significant impact". In fact, it is inconceivable
that the provisional measure should have an enduring impact. That measure expired on
28 December 1996, more than three years ago.
(iii) In the alternative, the provisional measure never had a significant impact
4.90 Mexico could claim – although Article 17.4 uses the present tense ("has a significant impact")
– that proof of prior significant impact suffices. Guatemala would disagree with this idea, because it
is contrary to the simple wording of Article 17.4. However, even if we were to assume, for the sake
of argument, that it were enough under Article 17.4 to prove prior significant impact, Mexico does not
even do that. In its first submission, Mexico neither claims not tries to prove that the provisional
measure had a significant impact.
4.91 Mexico cannot prove that the provisional measure in question has a "significant impact" on its
trading interests as a whole. In fact, the provisional measure was only in force for four months, and
only affected an insignificant portion of Mexico's exports during those four months. According to
official information on exports from Bancomex, during 1996, exports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico to Guatemala represented only 0.016 per cent of Mexican exports of all products to all
countries (US$15.6 million in cement exports to Guatemala/US$96 billion in total exports to all
countries). Moreover, the provisional measure only affected a small fraction of Mexico's exports to
Guatemala. Mexico's cement exports to Guatemala in 1996 represented only 4.3 per cent of its total
exports to Guatemala (US$15.6 million in cement exports/US$360 million in overall exports).
4.92 Nor can Mexico prove that the provisional measure had a significant impact on the Mexican
cement industry, even if we assume for the sake of argument that such an analysis specific to the
cement sector had any relevance under Article 17.4. Guatemala is not one of Mexico's traditional
cement export markets. In fact, Mexico had no interest in exporting cement to Guatemala until it
suffered a severe recession resulting in an enormous excess cement production capacity in 1995.
Moreover, the provisional measure applied only to Cruz Azul, one of the five producers of grey
Portland cement in Mexico. The provisional measure did not apply to the leading producers and
exporters in Mexico – CEMEX, S.A. de C.V., Apsaco S.A. de C.V., and Cementos de Chihuahua,

57 Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement stipulates that "the application of provisional measures shall be
limited to as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months or, on decision of the authorities concerned,
upon request by exporters representing a significant per centage of trade involved to a period not exceeding six
months."
58 As stated above, Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel does not challenge the provisional
measure per se, which is only mentioned as an action preceding the imposition of the definitive measure.

S.A. de C.V.. And indeed, the provisional measure only required Guatemalan importers to provide a
guarantee or a cash deposit to cover the estimated margin of dumping. If Cruz Azul or a Guatemalan
importer had asked for an examination under Article 9 of the AD Agreement and had shown that there
was no dumping, the guarantee provided by the importers would have been restituted and the cash
deposits reimbursed. Neither Cruz Azul nor its importers requested such an examination.
4.93 Given the proliferation of disputes brought before the WTO, the competence restrictions
contained in Article 17.4 should be respected in order to prevent certain Members from having
recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system every time a provisional measure is imposed, when
the impact of the measure is insignificant or temporary and can only affect an individual company in
the territory of the Member. Article 17.4 is designed in part to preserve the WTO's resources for
disputes relating to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures or to price commitments,
unless it is proved that the imposition of a provisional measure has had an enduring "significant
impact" on the trade interests of a Member.
4.94 Since Guatemala's provisional measure does not have a significant impact on Mexico's overall
trading interests, Guatemala requests the Panel to i ssue a preliminary resolution to the effect that the
Panel does not have the mandate to examine the provisional measure and all of the complaints
referring to that measure.
2. Rebuttal of Mexico
4.95 Mexico makes the following rebuttal arguments to Guatemala's preliminary objection
regarding the Panel's examination of the provisional measure:
4.96 Guatemala asserts that the Panel does not have the mandate to examine the provisional
measure and the complaints referring thereto. To substantiate its assertion, Guatemala puts forward
the following alternative arguments:
(a) Mexico did not identify the provisional measure as "the specific measure at issue".
(b) Nevertheless, if it is interpreted that Mexico did identify the provisional measure as
"the specific measure at issue", Mexico failed to meet its obligation to request the
holding of consultations on the provisional measure.
(c) The provisional measure does not or did not have a "significant impact", as required
by Article 17.4.
4.97 Mexico responded to these assertions in its oral submission at the first substantive meeting
with the parties by indicating the following:
(a) The obligations in the second sentence of Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement do not
apply to cases in which the definitive anti-dumping measure is contested.
(b) The concept of "significant impact" does not refer to the "overall trading interests" of
a Member.
(c) In any event, Mexico shows that it did comply with the formal and material
requirements in the DSU for contesting a provisional measure.
4.98 In addition to the arguments it has already put forward, Mexico wishes to underline certain
aspects that are important for its pleadings.

(a) Mexico was not obliged to hold consultations with Guatemala, nor to prove that the
provisional measure imposed by Guatemala had or has a "significant impact"
(i) Holding of consultations
4.99 Mexico understands Guatemala's objection to be formulated as follows:
(a) Firstly, it sets out arguments to assert that Mexico does not contest the provisional
measure as such but only as one of the actions which preceded the objection to the
final measure, consequently the Panel has no mandate to examine this.59
(b) Subsequently, it argues that, if it is understood that Mexico did identify the
provisional measure as the subject of its complaint, such a request violates Article 4
of the DSU because no opportunity was given for consultations with a view to
reaching a mutually satisfactory solution of the matter.
60
4.100 According to Mexico's understanding, Guatemal a's reasoning provides alternatives: (i) if
Mexico did not identify the provisional measure as "the specific measure at issue", then the
provisional measure was outside the Panel's mandate; however, (ii) if Mexico did identify the
provisional measure as "the specific measure at issue", then it failed to meet the requirement to hold
consultations.
4.101 The following at least can be deduced from Guatemala's assertions:
(a) Guatemala acknowledges that Mexico did identify the provisional anti-dumping
measure, at least as an action that preceded the definitive anti-dumping measure.
61
(b) Guatemala also acknowledges that the actions do not have to be included in the
request for consultations.62
4.102 As Mexico has already indicated, the fact of whether or not the provisional anti-dumping
measure was identified as the "specific measure at issue" is irrelevant.63
4.103 In this rebuttal, it will be shown why, irrespective of whether or not the provisional anti-
dumping measure was identified as the ("specific measure at issue"), the result is exactly the same:
that is to say that the Panel is entitled to examine it.
4.104 Mexico did identify the provisional measure as an action that preceded the definitive anti-
dumping measure ("specific measure at issue") and this was specifically accepted by Guatemala.
64
4.105 In its oral submission at the first substantive meeting with the parties, Mexico showed that,
when a definitive anti-dumping measure is contested as the "specific measure at issue", the
complainant is at liberty to make any type of complaint regarding the provisional anti-dumping

59 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 39-43.
60 Ibid., paragraphs 44-49.
61 Ibid., paragraph 43.
62 Ibid., paragraph 44. Guatemala claims a violation of Article 4 of the DSU "to the extent that
Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel did identify the provisional measure as the subject of its
complaint".
63 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting.
64 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 43.

measure as the action that preceded the definitive anti-dumping measure. 65 As the Appellate Body
pointed out in Guatemala-Cement I:
"This requirement to identify a specific anti-dumping measure at issue in a panel
request in no way limits the nature of the claims that may be brought concerning
alleged nullification or impairment of benefits or the impeding of the achievement of
any objective in a dispute under the Anti-Dumping Agreement."
66
4.106 There is nothing in Article 17.4 or in any other part of the AD Agreement to prevent claims
being made against any action taken during an anti-dumping investigation (even the imposition of a
provisional measure), provided that the requirement to identify the definitive measure as the "specific
measure at issue" is met. Article 1 of the AD Agreement itself obliges the authorities to impose anti-
dumping measures only "pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement". This means that the imposition of the definitive measure must be the
result of an investigation conducted in accordance with the AD Agreement. In other words, all the
steps taken in the investigation preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure affect the imposition of
that measure. In the present case, the provisional anti-dumping measure is a step taken in the
investigation (or action preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure), and therefore, Mexico can
unquestionably make several claims in this regard.
4.107 Furthermore, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 17.4 prevents the provisional
measure from being contested as an action, it should be noted that the second sentence of the
Article only refers to paragraph 1 of Article 7 and not to other obligations related to the provisional
measures.
67 Following Guatemala's logic, therefore, even if the Panel did not have the mandate to
examine claims relating to violations of Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement, the same Panel could
examine Mexico's claims regarding violations of Articles 2.2, 2.4.3 and 12.2.1. If this were the case,
the absence of a mandate would be offset by the Panel's authority to examine the provisional measure
under Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
4.108 Lastly, it should be noted that it is common practice for Members of this Organization to
conduct dispute settlement proceedings that cover both a provisional and a definitive measure.
68
4.109 Assuming that Mexico did identify the provisional anti-dumping measure as the "specific
measure at issue", even though it is not necessary to repeat everything said in the oral submission at
the first substantive meeting, it should be recalled that Mexico did request consultations on the
provisional measure and that Guatemala acknowledged that it had consulted with Mexico. 69 All the
background to these proceedings constitutes reliable proof that there were more than enough
opportunities to try to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of this issue. Two particularly relevant
aspects should be highlighted in relation to this dispute: (i) Mexico's request for consultations refers
specifically to Article 7 of the DSU
70; and (ii) Mexico and Guatemala did consult about the

65 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting, paragraphs 34-37.
66 Report of the Appellate Body in Guatemala-Cement I, paragraph 79.
67 See the Report of the Panel in Mexico-Corn Syrup, paragraph 7.54.
68 See inter alia, the request for the establishment of a Panel in European Communities - Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (WT/DS141/3) and United States - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (WT/DS179/2). See
also the Report of the Panel in Brazil - Milk Powder , in particular, paragraph 368. This is proof that a Panel
may note non-compliance of provisional and definitive measures in the context of the same dispute settlement
proceedings.
69 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting with the parties.
70 See Mexico's request for consultations WT/DS156/1, G/L/289, G/ADP/D/14/1, of 8 January 1999.

provisional anti-dumping measure in the context of this dispute. See the indicative list of questions at
the hearing, particularly questions 27-38.71
4.110 Consequently, to the extent that the provisional measure is interpreted as a "specific measure
at issue", Mexico consulted with Guatemala and thus fully complied with Article 4 of the DSU.
Moreover, the request for the establishment of a panel indicated that two series of consultations had
been held: one in the context of the previous proceedings and the other relating to the present
proceedings, therefore, although Guatemala does not make any claim in this regard, it is clear that
Mexico complied with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
(ii) Significant impact
4.111 After reading this claim, the first remark that sp rings to mind is that it is an alternative. In
other words, the Panel can examine the claim relating to consultations or the claim relating to
significant impact, but it is not necessary to examine both claims. In any event, if the Panel decides to
examine Guatemala's claim, it is important to emphasize the following:
4.112 Guatemala's reasoning has a very strange basis: according to Guatemala, Article 17.4 of the
AD Agreement mainly refers to definitive anti-dumping measures because it is very difficult to
contest a provisional measure (at no time does it mention price undertakings).
72 This logic seems to
be an attempt to make the second sentence of Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement inoperative or, in
other words, it seeks to make any objection to provisional measures inoperative.
4.113 According to Guatemala:
(a) Article 17.4 indicates that the complainant "must prove that there was a significant
impact"73;
(b) " … the intention of the drafters of Article 17.4 must have been that the significant
impact must be proven in relation to the trade interests of the complaining party and
not in relation to the exporting industry under investigation."74
4.114 Using this interpretation, Guatemala claims that Mexico does not complain that the
provisional measure has an enduring significant impact 75 or, alternatively, that the provisional
measure did not have any significant impact.76
4.115 With regard to these claims, at the first subs tantive meeting with the parties Mexico asserted
that.77
(a) There is no obligation to prove a significant impact.

71 In order to understand the significance of footnote 45 to Guatemala's first submission, see the Panel
Report in Canada - Measures Affecting th e Export of Civilian Aircraft (WT/DS70/R), adopted on 20 August
1999, paragraph 9.12, where the Panel adopts an approach that "seeks to preserve due process while also
recognising that the 'matter' on which consultations are requested will not necessarily be identical to the 'matter'
identified in the request for establishment of a panel" Put another way, this approach supports the concept that it
was not necessary for Mexico to identify the provis ional anti-dumping measure as the "specific measure at
issue" (concept of "matter") in its request for consultations and it was sufficient for the consultations to have
covered this matter.
72 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 50.
73 Ibid., paragraph 51.
74 Ibid., paragraph 52.
75 Ibid., paragraph 54.
76 Ibid., paragraphs 55-59.
77 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting with the parties.

(b) The concept of "significant impact" does not refer to the overall trading interests of a
Member because such an interpretation would give countries which impose
provisional anti-dumping measures in br each of the AD Agreement almost total
immunity.
4.116 Regarding this matter, Mexico wishes to pu t forward the following arguments in order to
facilitate the Panel's work:
4.117 The logic of "significant impact" is similar to that in the case of consultations. In other
words, the second sentence of Article 17.4 does not apply if the definitive measure is identified as the
"specific measure at issue".
4.118 Having said this, Mexico recalls that it has already shown that, unlike Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement, Article 17.4 does not contain the word "demonstrated". It is nevertheless important to
examine the wording of Article 17.4 in order to understand the obligation contained therein.
According to this Article "When a provisional measure has a significant impact …that Member may
also refer such matter to the DSB". Does th is mean that the significant impact must be
"demonstrated" in the request for the establishment of a panel? It would appear that this is
Guatemala's position, because if it is not it would not have used the word "challenged" and would not
have claimed that the Panel did not have a mandate.
78
4.119 Mexico submits that Guatemala is wrong. Guatemala's reasoning means that the second
sentence of Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement makes it necessary to "demonstrate" a significant
impact. If this same logic is applied to the first sentence of this Article, however, a Member
requesting the establishment of a panel would have to "demonstrate" that the competent authority of
the importing Member had adopted definitive anti-dumping duties or had accepted price undertakings.
As can be seen, this is an illogical interpretation of the dispute settlement provisions. No Member of
the WTO has had to provide such a demonstration before a panel could be established.
4.120 Neither Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement nor any other provision in the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism contains an obligation to provide any demonstration in order to be able to
request the establishment of a panel. Furthermore, the need to demonstrate any particular point in the
request for the establishment of a panel would conflict with the virtually automatic principle in
Article 6.2 of the DSU whereby panels are established automatically unless there is a consensus to the
contrary. Consequently, it would be illogical to assume that a complainant Member is not obliged to
provide any evidence for the establishment of a panel because when establishing a panel there is no
difference according to whether or not an alleged requirement has been proved.
79 In any event,
assuming for the sake of argument that there is an obligation to demonstrate a significant impact, this
should be done after the establishment of a panel.
4.121 In order to clarify the different levels of demonstration when requesting the establishment of a
panel and when presenting the parties' submissions to a panel, the Panel in EC – Bananas pointed out
that:

78 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 50 and 59.
79 The Panel which considered the complaint of the United States in the European Communities –
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27/R/USA ), in paragraph 7.26, recognized
that it is not necessary to examine the formal requirements for the establishment of a panel prior to its actual
establishment. It therefore stated the following: "Becau se of the application of 'reverse' consensus decision-
making applicable in the case of panel establishment in the DSB, the DSB is not likely to be an effective body
for resolving disputes over whether a request for the establishment of a panel meets the requirements of
Article 6.2 of the DSU. Therefore, as a practical matter only the panel established on the basis of the request
(and thereafter the Appellate Body) can perform that function."

"… there is a significant difference between the claims identified in the request for the
establishment of a panel, which establish the panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the
DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims, which are set out and progressively
clarified in the first written submissions, the rebuttal submissions and the first and second
panel meetings with the parties".80
4.122 Furthermore, it would be illogical for a Member to have to demonstrate a signficant impact in
order to object to a provisional anti-dumping measure, particularly if this concept is understood
according to Guatemala's unacceptable interpretation. Bearing in mind that the duration of
provisional measures is four months (or, in any event, six months), by the time a Member had
collected all the relevant statistics, held consultations and established a panel, the measure would
already have expired or be on the point of expiring. It would not therefore make any sense to
challenge this type of measure and the second sentence of Article 17.4 would be inoperative, as
Guatemala would like.
4.123 Consequently, Mexico asserts that the demonstration of a current or past "significant impact"
is not a requirement to be met before a Panel can examine a provisional anti-dumping measure.
3. Guatemala's response to rebuttal arguments
4.124 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's rebuttal of its preliminary objection
regarding Panel examination of the provisional measures:
4.125 The third preliminary objection raised by Guatemala concerns Mexico's claims directed
exclusively against the provisional measure. Guatemala respectfully submits that the Panel lacks the
mandate to examine the provisional measure and the complaints referring to that measure.
4.126 In Guatemala - Cement I , the Appellate Body considered that Article 17.4 of the AD
Agreement merely specified the three types of measure which could make up the dispute referred to
the DSB: definitive (i.e. final) anti-dumping duties, price undertakings and provisional measures. 81
In the case Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (hereinafter Canada –
Civilian Aircraft ), the Panel considered that Article 4.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement") and Article 4.7 of the DSU read together "prevent a
Member from requesting the establishment of a panel with regard to a ´dispute` on which no
consultations were requested". 82 In the present case, Mexico's request for consultations does not
identify the provisional measure as being the subject of this dispute – it identifies only the definitive
antidumping measure.83 Thus, Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement and Article 4.7 of the DSU, read
together, prevent Mexico from requesting the establishment of a panel with respect to Guatemala's
provisional measure, on which consultations were not requested. The provisional measure is clearly
different and separate from the definitive anti-dumping measure and the challenge of one of those
measures can prevail while the challenge of the other measure fails. In other words, they are separate
"disputes".

80 Report of the Appellate Body in European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS/27/ABR), adopted on 25 September 1997, paragraph 141.
81 WT/DS60/AB/R, paragraph 79.
82 WT/DS70/R, adopted on 20 August 1999, paragraph 9.12.
83 Nor has it been shown that Mexico and Guatemala held consultations in respect of the provisional
measure. Contrary to what Mexico suggests in its oral submission. The fact that the two Members may have
held consultations in respect of the provisional measure prior to the establishment of the Panel in Guatemala I
does not show that in the present dispute, similar consultations were held.

4.127 At the first meeting with the Panel, Mexico recognized that it was not challenging the
provisional measure; but it argued that it was challenging the provisional measure "as an action
preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure".84
"Since Mexico had clearly challenged the definitive anti-dumping measure in its request for
the establishment of a panel, it was free to assert any number of complaints regarding any
aspect of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which might arise during the dispute, including the
provisional measure, without having to identify them as "specific measures at issue".
85
4.128 According to Mexico, this also means that it was under no obligation to demonstrate that the
provisional measure had a "significant impact".
"Since Mexico has the freedom to raise various complaints concerning the provisional
measure as an action preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure (sic), there is no need to
comply with the requirements mentioned by Guatemala".86
These statements at best reflect a deep misunderstanding of the report of the Appellate Body
and the relevant DSU provisions.
4.129 First, the operative question is whether Mexico is seeking to obtain a recommendation by the
Panel under Article 19.1 of the DSU to the effect that Guatemala's provisional measure is inconsistent
with the AD Agreement. In order to obtain th is recommendation, Mexico should have requested
consultations on the provisional measure and should have requested the establishment of a panel in
respect of the provisional measure. Mexico did neither of these two things. By identifying the final
determination as the only measure at issue, Mexico prevented the Panel from issuing a
recommendation in respect of the provisional measure.87
4.130 Secondly, as discussed at great length by the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I ,
provisional anti-dumping measures are completely different from definitive anti-dumping measures.
In fact, the investigating authorities could issue a definitive anti-dumping measure without having
issued a provisional anti-dumping measure. Thus, even if the Panel were to rule on Mexico's
complaints in respect of the provisional measure, this ruling would not include the definitive
measure.
88
4.131 Finally, the provisional measure has not had an enduring "significant impact" under
Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement. Indeed, it is in conceivable that the provisional measure should
have had any enduring impact since it expired on 28 December 1996, more than three years ago.
Moreover, the provisional measure was only in force for four months, and affected an insignificant
share of Mexico's exports during those months (i.e. only 0.016 per cent).89

84 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 34.
85 Idem, paragraph 35.
86 Idem, paragraph 39.
87 This explains why at the first meeting Guatemala asked Mexico whether it sought to obtain a
recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU in respect of the provisional measure.
88 In other words, Members may attack various elements of an investigation, including the initiation, as
part of their challenge of the provisional or definitive anti-dumping measures. However, they cannot challenge
a provisional measure as part of their challenge of the definitive measure. As stated by the Appellate Body in
Guatemala I, these measures are distinct from each other.
89 Mexico's attempt to interpret Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement as not requiring "significant impact"
must also be rejected. Although this provision does not use the term "prove", according to International Law
and WTO practice "the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence". Report of the Panel United States – Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted on 23 May 1997, page 14.

4.132 For the above reasons, which are developed more extensively in our first written submission,
Guatemala respectfully submits that the Panel lacks the authority to examine the provisional measure
and all of the complaints referring thereto.
V. THIRD PARTY ARGUMENTS
A. ECUADOR
5.1 Ecuador made the following arguments to the Panel:
5.2 In conformity with Article 10.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes and paragraph 17.1 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement, Ecuador would like to
make the following observations:
1. Concerning the background
5.3 Following consultations and a dispute settlement procedure between the Governments of
Mexico and Guatemala, on 19 June 1998 the Panel in the case Guatemala – Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico issued its report (WT/DS60/R) which was
appealed by Guatemala. The ruling of the Appellate Body (WT/DS60/AB/R), adopted by the Dispute
Settlement Body at its meeting of 25 November 1998, concluded in paragraph 88 that: " … the Panel
erred in concluding that it could examine Mexico's claims concerning the initiation of the anti-
dumping investigation." It added in paragraph 89 that: "Having found that this dispute was not
properly before the Panel, we consider that the merits of Mexico's claims in this case are not properly
before it. Therefore we cannot consider any of the substantive issues raised in the alternative by
Guatemala in this appeal."
5.4 The Appellate Body also stated, at the end of paragraph 89, that its findings in no way
precluded Mexico from seeking consultations with Guatemala regarding the latter's imposition of
definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of portland cement from Mexico, or from pursuing " …
another dispute settlement complaint under the provisions of Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and of the DSU." In accordance with the above, Mexico held consultations with
Guatemala on 23 February 1999 concerning the defi nitive anti-dumping measure imposed on imports
of grey portland cement from the Mexican firm Coope rativa La Cruz Azul (Cruz Azul) as well as the
actions that preceded it. Guatemala argues in its first submission of 10 January 2000 that Mexico did
not hold consultations concerning the provisional measure which forms part of its complaint, as
required under Article 6.2 of the DSU if it is to be included in the Panel's analysis.
5.5 These consultations were unable to resolve the dispute, and Mexico requested the
establishment of a panel in accordance with document WT/DS156/2 of 20 July 1999, which states that
the complaint covers the definitive anti-dumping measure imposed by Guatemala and the actions that
preceded it, including the provisional anti-dumping measure and various matters relating to the
initiation of the investigation and the anti-dumping proceeding. Among the matters to be examined
are certain aspects raised during the initial dispute, such as the violation of Articles 5.3 and 5.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement on which the Appellate Body did not rule for the substantive reasons set
forth in its conclusions.
2. Concerning the composition of the Panel
5.6 Guatemala formally objected to the appointment of the members who served on the Panel in
the previous dispute ( Guatemala I ) in the conviction that the participation of one or more of the
previous panelists in the new Panel would deprive the new Panel of the independence and the
objectivity it required to fulfill its purpose. Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU, one of
the previous panelists was appointed to the present Panel. Guatemala maintains that the present Panel

was improperly composed, since one of its members had already issued opinions (reflected in the
report of the Panel in Guatemala I ) on matters identical to those which are now to be examined.
According to the said report of the Appellate Body , that Panel did not have the jurisdiction to carry
out its first examination. To this, Guatemala adds that there is a possibility that in the framework of
the discussions of the new Panel, that member could refer to and/or reveal opinions or elements
relating to the deliberations of the Panel in Guatemala I , thereby compromising the principle of
confidentiality enshrined in Article 14 of the DSU and in paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 of the DSU.
Given the peculiarities of this case, Ecuador considers that it is essential to ensure that the
composition of the Panel is devoid of flaws from its inception and free of any objective risk of
elements or circumstances which could undermine the basic principles of public international law,
such as the principles of impartiality and objectivity as well as others contained in the Rules of
Conduct for the DSU. From the systemic point of view , it must be recognized that Article 8.7 of the
DSU grants the Director-General the authority to appoint the panelists in case of disagreement
between the parties, specifying that this should be done "… after consulting with the parties to the
dispute" and considering the written objections concerning the participation of the panel members. At
the same time, Ecuador stresses that this authority should be applied in accordance with Article 8.2,
which states that "Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the
members …". Otherwise, the final decisions of the Panel would be compromised. Consequently,
Article 8.7 of the DSU should be implemented with due attention to the particular circumstances of
each case in order to avoid problems which could lead to serious consequences if objections such as
those of Guatemala reached the Appellate stage and were sustained by the competent body. At the
same time, the Panel does not have the jurisdiction to rule on whether or not it has, itself, been
properly composed.
3. Concerning whether the report in Guatemala I constitutes a precedent
5.7 In view of the ruling of the Appellate Body in WT/DS60/AB/R, and taking account of the fact
that the present dispute was brought by Mexico essentially to resolve the "substance of the case" that
was not resolved by the Panel in Guatemala I , Ecuador considers that the conclusions,
recommendations and suggestion of the Panel in the dispute Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (WT/DS60/R) do not constitute a legal precedent under
GATT/WTO practice, and should not be taken into consideration as such. In international law, it is
acceptable for decisions of international bodies adopted in excess of their jurisdiction to be considered
void and without legal effect. This is what happened in the case Guatemala I , and Ecuador is
therefore of the opinion that Mexico's suggestion, contained in paragraph 8 of its submission
OF/OMC/742/99 of 13 December 1999, that the Panel rely on various precedents of fact and law from
the previous procedure is inadmissible and should not be accepted. Hence, Guatemala's request that
the Panel issue a preliminary decision declaring that it will not take account of the report in
Guatemala I is relevant.
4. Concerning the provisional measure and the consultations
5.8 The request for the establishment of a panel by Mexico (WT/DS156/2) states that Mexico "
… challenges the definitive anti-dumping measure imposed by Guatemala on imports of grey portland
cement from Cruz Azul through the final resolution, 'Resolution 000113', published in the Diario de
Centroamérica on 30 January 1997, as well as the actions that preceded it, including the provisional
anti-dumping measure and various matters relating to the initiation of the investigation and of the anti-
dumping proceeding, as being contrary to Guatemala's obligations under Article VI of the GATT
1994 and Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as
Annexes I and II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement." In accordance with the legal reasoning and the
ruling of the Appellate Body (WT/DS60/AB/R) in the case Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, this implies that if Mexico had the intention of challenging
the provisional measure, it should have identified that measure expressly and individually as a specific

measure at issue pursuant to Articles 6.2 of the DSU and 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as it
did for the definitive anti-dumping measure. Ecuador submits that the identification of the measure
was at best ambiguous, casting doubt as to whether that part of the complaint was properly brought
before the Panel. In any case, even supposing the Panel were to consider that Mexico had, in fact,
identified the provisional measure as a specific m easure at issue in its complaint, it would seem,
unless it can be clearly proven otherwise, that Mexico's application does not meet the requirements of
Article 4 of the DSU since Mexico has failed, in this process, to hold consultations with Guatemala
concerning the provisional measure per se as required for the Panel to be able to examine it. Mexico's
request reveals that consultations were held only in respect of the definitive measure and the "actions
that preceded it" (WT/DS156/2), a generalization which does not palliate the lack of specificity
concerning consultations on the provisional measure and makes it impossible to comply, pursuant to
paragraph 3.7 of the DSU, with the requirements in paragraph 5 of the mentioned Article 4 of the
DSU that in the course of the consultations " … before resorting to further action under this
Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter." At the same
time, the failure to hold such consultations has made it impossible for third parties to exercise their
rights under Article 4.11 of the DSU, which permits them to safeguard their interests by joining in
such consultations. In addition, Article 6.2 of the DSU emphasises the substantive nature of the
consultation procedure as a prelude to examination by the Panel of the complainant's claims; in other
words, it leads to the examination by the Panel itself of the specific measures at issue on which
consultations have been requested. Finally, with reference to Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Mexico should have proved – and in Ecuador's view it did not do so convincingly – that
the provisional measure "has a significant impact". In short, Ecuador submits that Mexico's complaint
concerning the provisional measure was not properly brought; that the consultations concerning that
measure did not take place; and that Mexico did not provide full proof of the "significant impact" of
the measure.
5. Concerning the complaints and the violations alleged by Mexico: sufficiency of the
examination of the evidence
5.9 In Parts III and V of its submission OF/O MC/742/99 of 13 December 1999, Mexico set out
its complaints concerning the inititaion of the invest igation, referring to alleged inconsistencies in the
application for initiation by Cementos Progreso, as well as shortcomings in the examination of the
evidence and in the initiation itself. It also refers to Guatemala's alleged failure to comply with the
obligations on notification and publication of the public notice of initiation, and points out what it
considers to be general violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In Ecuador's view, Article 5 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement clearly indicates the type of information that an application for
initiation of an investigation in this area must contain. Article 5.2 stipulates that the application must
include "evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of the GATT 1994 as
interpreted by this Agreement and (c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged
injury." It stresses that simple assertion without evidence cannot be considered sufficient to meet
these requirements, and that the application "shall contain such information as is reasonably available
to the applicant" on subparagraphs 5.2(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Mexico claims that the evidence
submitted by the applicant was insufficient to initiate the investigation and that it was not properly
examined by the investigating authority. In fact, Ecuador would like to observe that the investigating
authority decided to gather further information during an assessment period of "three or four months"
(paragraph 69 of Guatemala's submission), followin g which it decided that there was "sufficient
evidence". In this context, the various interpreta tions of the sufficiency of "such information as is
reasonably available to the applicant" clearly complicate the examination of the matter. In Ecuador's
view and as demonstrated in paragraphs 67 a nd 72 to 77 of Guatemala's submission of 10 January
2000, the applicant firm – representing 100 per cent of the domestic injury – supplied such
information and evidence as was reasonably available to it under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) in support
of its request for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, in conformity with Article 5.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, Mexico would seem to be right that in its initial application,

Cementos Progreso did not properly substantiate its evidence under subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) of
Article 5.2 regarding price and volume, which are significant factors in helping the applicant to
support its threat of injury claim. In any case, this does not mean that the applicant did not
substantiate threat of injury, but that it would have been appropriate and desirable that the information
and evidence in Cementos Progreso's possession should have been more extensive. Concerning
Mexico's contention that the examination of the evidence by the investigating authority was deficient
in that the decision to initiate the investigation reflected shortcomings in terms of the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence, Ecuador submits that the investigating authority does in fact have a right to
substantiate its findings when it considers that there is sufficient evidence. This does not indicate bias
or lack of objectivity, particularly when the investigating authority is presumed to have acted in good
faith. Without wishing to play down the effects of the procedural violations alleged by Mexico, it
should be borne in mind that most procedural errors committed during anti-dumping investigations
are generally attributable to the complexity of the actual procedure and the fact that Members who
only make sporadic use of it are not familiar with it. Certain violations, for example not providing
timely notification before initiating the investigation, could have been corrected long ago – perhaps
through the initiation of a new investigation – if Mexico had stated its procedural objection at the
time, and not several months after the initiation of the investigation. Thus, in any case, the main point
to be elucidated, supposing that they turn out to be true, would be whether the possible procedural
violations alleged by Mexico, many of them fact ual, effectively restricted Cruz Azul's right of
defence, and nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Mexico under the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the DSU and the covered Agreements. Ecuador does not think so.
6. Concerning the definitive measure
5.10 Ecuador considers that the investigating authority exercised its right, under the regulations in
force, in particular Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to impose the definitive measure.
The extension of the period of investigation by the investigating authority was right, considering that
in view of the nature and purpose of the anti-dumping investigation the authority required updated
information, for example concerning Cruz Azul's sales during the extended period or its production
costs, data which was requested by the Ministry but never provided by the firm. It should be added
that this authority to extend the investigation is also provided for under the Mexican legal system.
The same applies to the investigating authority's righ t to gather further evidence, since this does not
conflict either with the spirit or the letter of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Guatemalan
investigating authority provided Cruz Azul and Mexi co with an opportunity to defend their interests
as required under Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, even granting an extension – as
stipulated in the said Agreement – for Cruz Azul to submit the relevant questionnaire. Against this
background, the investigating authority made its interpretation of the facts and conducted its
examination and evaluation of the evidence in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and found that there was dumping, injury and a causal relationship which led,
legitimately, to the introduction of the provisional, and subsequently, the definitive measure. The fact
that the investigating authority did not use the technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul
in connection with the determination of the definitive measure – in Guatemala's words a "self-
verification of its own information" - is not a violation because, in Ecuador's understanding, it was the
Authority's exclusive right under Article 6.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to establish whether the
evidence was adequate or not in deciding whether to accept or reject it. Here, the objection raised by
Mexico (which belatedly supplied unsubstantiated data resulting from an audit carried out by a
company hired by the Mexican firm itself) is therefore unfounded, since requiring the acceptance of
such information could amount to substituting for the Ministry as investigating authority.
7. Requests by Mexico to the Panel
5.11 Concerning Mexico's requests in Part F, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) of document
WT/DS156/2 of 20 July 1999, it has been the general practice of the GATT and the WTO in this area

for panels and the Appellate Body to issue - in accordance with their findings and conclusions - a
general recommendation along the lines of the first sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU, which
stipulates that: "Where a panel or the Appellate B ody concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity
with that agreement." The implementation of the second sentence of Article 19.1 is appropriate in
certain cases where there is a clear and duly substantiated need which must be evaluated by the panel
– for example, to ensure the prompt and effective resolution of a dispute in circumstances in which it
has been demonstrated that there have been repeated breaches on the part of the Member concerned –
and as a result of which the objective of Article 21.1 of the DSU cannot be achieved. In such cases it
would indeed be appropriate for a panel to suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations of the DSB. Howeve r, this dispute does not seem to warrant any
suggestion by the panel as to how the Member concerned could implement the relevant
recommendations, since as a rule, it is always preferable for the parties to a dispute to be able to reach
a mutually agreed solution following the adoption of a report. This leads us to the conclusion that
Mexico's requests to the Panel, in particular the request contained in subparagraph (d), are excessive.
B. E
L SALVADOR
5.12 El Salvador made the following arguments to the Panel:
5.13 The Government of El Salvador would like to state clearly its interest in the dispute
Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.
5.14 El Salvador and Guatemala are both members of the Treaty on Central American Economic
Integration, and ever since the beginning of our history as countries, we have been linked by strong
cultural and commercial ties as well as ties of friendship.
5.15 El Salvador and Guatemala are committed to building a customs union in their territories.
5.16 El Salvador is aware that dumping is an unfair trade practice which should not be tolerated
because of the damage it does to the domestic industry of any country, particularly the developing
countries which, as such, have more vulnerable economies.
5.17 El Salvador is an active Member of the World Trade Organization, and as such it has an
interest in any case of this kind which affects any developing country, the more so when the country
in question is a neighbouring country with which we are bound by strong ties.
5.18 El Salvador and Guatemala, like the other Central American countries, share the same
procedural legislation in this field, and El Salvador's interest in cases of this sort is therefore to ensure
strict compliance with WTO rules and regulations and to confirm the efficiency of the procedures
applicable under the Central American regulations.
5.19 Through its participation, El Salvador is interested above all in ensuring the proper and
correct application of the principles contained in the agreements administered by the World Trade
Organization, in particular those which guarantee special and differential treatment for the developing
countries.
5.20 In the light of the above considerations, we would like to submit: (i) that the mechanisms
provided for in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as a means of discouraging an injurious practice
are valuable and legitimate as a means of defence against this reprehensible trade conduct, and in
implementing them, Members should guarantee their observance, taking account of the problems
facing the developing countries in applying and implementing the provisions of the WTO as well as
their urgent need to defend themselves against distorting practices which have an enormous impact on
their economies; and (ii) that the dispute settlement system serves to preserve the rights and

obligations of the Members under the covered agr eements and to ensure that the recommendations
and rulings of the dispute settlement system cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in those agreements, all of this in conformity with the principle which guarantees economies
such as ours special and differential treatment.
C. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.21 The European Communities made the following arguments to the Panel:
1. Introduction
5.22 The European Communities (hereafter "the EC") makes this third party submission because of
its systemic interest in the correct interpretation of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“ADP Agreement”).
5.23 Many of the issues in dispute involve questions of fact on which the EC is not in a position to
comment. Accordingly, this submission will address only a number of issues of legal interpretation
which are of particular interest to the EC.
5.24 Section II discusses the preliminary objections advanced by Guatemala. Section III addresses
some of the claims submitted by Mexico.
2. Preliminary objections raised by Guatemala
(a) Is the Panel validly constituted?
5.25 Guatemala claims that the Panel was not validly constituted because one of its members
served as a panelist in Guatemala – Antidumping Investigation on Imports of Portland Cement from
Mexico (“ Portland Cement I”). On that ground, Guatemala has requested the Panel to issue a
preliminary ruling declaring that it is not “competent” to examine the matter in dispute.
5.26 The EC considers that this is not the proper venue to address Guatemala’s request. It is
clearly beyond a Panel’s authority to decide that it has not been validly composed. The EC would
suggest that if Guatemala considers that one of the members of this Panel lacks the requisite
“independence”, it should raise the matter with the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body in
accordance with the procedure specifically prov ided for in the Rules of Conduct for the Dispute
Settlement Understanding90 (the “DSU”).
(b) Is the provisional anti-dumping measure properly before the Panel?
5.27 Guatemala argues that the provisional anti -dumping measure was not mentioned in the
request for consultations and, therefore, is not properly before the Panel.91
5.28 The EC recalls that, by now, it is well established that a measure which has not been the
subject of consultations cannot be examined by a Panel.92 The fact that a measure is not mentioned in

90 Cf. paragraphs 5 to 10.
91 Guatemala’s First submission, paras. 39-49.
92 See e.g. the Panel reports in European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (Bananas III ), 7.18- 7.19; Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/R,
WT/DS84/R, paras. 10.17-10.20; and Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , WT/DS46/R,
paras. 7.4-7.11.
 In Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, at paras. 127-133), the
Appellate Body clarified that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU do not require “a precise and exact identity between

the request for consultations creates a presumption that no consultations were held with respect to
such measure. Yet, a complaining party should be permitted to prove by other means that a measure
not mentioned expressly in the request for consultations was, nevertheless, the subject of
consultations.93
5.29 Mexico’s request for consultations is ambiguous as to whether it extends to the provisional
measure, as it refers to the definitive measure “and the actions that preceded it”. The EC would note,
however, that the request mentions Article 7 of the ADP Agreement, a provision which deals
exclusively with the imposition of provisional measures. Moreover, significantly Guatemala does not
seem to allege that the provisional measure was not discussed in the course of the consultations.
5.30 In the alternative, Guatemala argues that Mexico failed to show that the provisional measures
had a “significant impact” within the meaning of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement94.
5.31 The EC concurs with Guatemala’s view that Mexico must demonstrate through positive
evidence that the provisional measures have a “significant impact” and cannot satisfy itself simply
with invoking such impact.95
5.32 On the other hand, the EC takes issue with Guatemala’s position that the impact of the
measures must be assessed with respect to Mexico’s “overall trade interest”.96 The EC considers that
the impact should be examined with respect to the imports covered by the measure. Indeed,
Guatemala’s interpretation would have the absurd consequence that Members with large economies,
such as the EC, could never be in a position to challenge a provisional measure. In the absence of any
indication that Article 17.4 has the purpose of affording special and differential treatment to
developing countries, an interpretation which l eads to such a discriminatory outcome should be
rejected.
3. Claims submitted by Mexico
(a) Initiation of the investigation
5.33 The EC notes that, unlike in Portland Cement I , there appears to be no substantial
disagreement between the parties with respect to the interpretation of the provisions of the ADP
Agreement concerning the initiation of investigations. Indeed, both Mexico and Guatemala seem to be
in accord with the interpretation of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 made in Portland Cement I (even if,
understandably, Guatemala avoids any express reference to that report). The disputes arise only at the
stage of applying that interpretation to the facts of the case.
5.34 The EC considers that the interpretation of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 made in Portland Cement I
was generally correct, irrespective of whether the particular application of such interpretation to the
facts of the case was also correct, an issue on which the EC is not in a position to comment.
Therefore, the EC would encourage this Panel to follow the same interpretation.

the specific measures that were the subject of consultations and the specific measures identified in the request
for the establishment of the panel”. That case, however, concerned a measure which had been replaced by a new
measure having essentially the same content (Report of the Appellate Body in.
93 In Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R
(at para. 131), the Appellate Body suggested that a defective panel request does not prevent the panel from
considering a claim unless it prejudices the defendant’s ab ility to defend itself in the course of the proceeding.
By the same token, a defective request for consultations should not prevent the establishment of a panel, if it can
be shown that it did not cause prejudice to the defendant.
94 Guatemala’s First submission, paras. 50-59.
95 Ibid., paras. 50-51.
96 Ibid., para. 52.

5.35 In particular, the EC agrees with the panel’s conclusions with respect to the relationship
between Articles 5.2 and 5.3, namely that
the question whether there is ‘sufficient evidence’ to justify initiation is not answered
by a determination that the application contains all the information ‘reasonably
available’ to the applicant on the factors specified in Article 5.2 (i)-(iv) … the
‘reasonable available’ language in Article 5.2 does not permit the initiation of an
investigation based on evidence and information which, while all that is reasonably
available to the applicant is not, objectively judged, sufficient to justify initiation.
97
5.36 The EC is also in accord with the standard of interpretation of “sufficient evidence”
developed by the panel98 on the basis of the Softwood Lumber report.99
5.37 Finally, the EC agrees with the panel’s view that Articles 2 and 3 of the ADP Agreement are
relevant in assessing whether there is “sufficient evidence” for purposes of Article 5.3. As noted by
the panel, the subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that
needed to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping and injury, although the quality and
quantity is less. 100 At the same time, however, it is obvious that, contrary to Mexico’s claims, this
does not mean that, by initiating an investigation on the basis of insufficient evidence of dumping and
injury, a Member is in breach not only of Article 5.3, but also of Articles 2 and 3.
(b) Notification of the initiation
5.38 In the EC’s view, it is beyond question that the investigation was “initiated” by Guatemala
pursuant to the Notice published on 11 January 1996. Accordingly, by not notifying the initiation of
the investigation to the Mexican Government until 22 January 1996, Guatemala acted inconsistently
with Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement.
5.39 Guatemala’s contention that the investigation was not initiated “effectively” until
23 January 1996101, even if true, would be devoid of relevance, as Footnote 1 to the ADP Agreement
specifies that the term “initiated”, as used in the ADP Agreement, means “the procedural action by
which a Member formally commences an investigation...” [emphasis added].
5.40 Guatemala’s argument to the effect that its Constitution requires to notify the interested
parties before initiating an investigation is also irrelevant.102 If anything, this argument would suggest
that, by failing to notify the Mexican Government be fore initiating the investigation, the investigative
authorities infringed not only the ADP Agreement but also Guatemala’s Constitution.
5.41 As a subsidiary defence, Guatemala invokes that in any event the late notification would have
to be exonerated because it is a “harmless error” ( error inocuo ).103 The evidence adduced by
Guatemala is not sufficient to show that what it calls the “harmless error” principle is in fact a general
principle of international law. In any event, the examples cited by Guatemala are concerned with the
consequences of the violation of a procedural rule, and not with the existence of the violation of a
procedural rule. They stand for the proposition that, in certain cases, the violation of procedural rule
does not entail the lack of validity of the act adopted pursuant to that procedure. At issue here,

97 Portland Cement I, para. 7.53.
98 Portland Cement I, paras. 7.54-7.57.
99 United States – Measures affecting Softwood Lumber from Canada , SCM/162, adopted
27 October 1993, BISD 40S/358.
100 Portland Cement I, paras. 7.64, 7.67.
102 Ibid., paras. 203-204.
103 Ibid., paras. 206-216.

however, is not the question of whether the an ti-dumping measures imposed by Guatemala are
“valid”, notwithstanding the violation of Article 5.5, but rather the previous question of whether
Guatemala has violated Article 5.5.
5.42 As an additional subsidiary defence, Guatemala contends that Mexico is “estopped” from
raising this claim, because it did not complain about the late notification until six months after the
initiation of the investigation.
104 In the EC’s view, Guatemala has not shown that the strict
requirements for the operation of the principle of estoppel are met in the present case. In particular, it
cannot be considered that Mexico’s failure to complain immediately about the late notification
amounts to a “clear and unequivocal representation” 105 that it acquiesced to the violation by
Guatemala of Article 5.5.
5.43 Contrary to Guatemala’s assertions 106, previous panel reports do not support its claim of
estoppel. In Canada/European Communities Article XXVIII rights, the Arbitrator did not rely on the
principle of estoppel, but instead on the rather vague notion that it was necessary to preserve the
“stability and predictability of the GATT system”.107 More relevant is the report in EC - Bananas I108,
where a claim of estoppel was dismissed on the following grounds:
“361… the Panel considered that such a modification or estoppel could only result from the
express, or in exceptional cases implied, consent of [the complaining parties] or of the
CONTACTRING PARTIES.
362. The Panel considered that the decision of a contracting party not to invoke a
right under the General Agreement at a particular point in time could due to
circumstances that change over time. The decision of a contracting party not to
invoke a right vis-à-vis another contracting party at a particular point in time can
therefore, by itself, not reasonably be assumed to be a decision to release that other
contracting party from its obligations under the General Agreement. The Panel noted
in this context that previous panels had based their findings on measures which had
remained unchallenged for long periods of time. The Panel therefore found that the
mere fact that the complaining parties had not invoked their rights under the General
Agreement in the past had not modified these rights and did not prevent them from
invoking these rights now”. [footnotes omitted]
5.44 As yet another subsidiary defence, Guatemala contends that the late notification did not
nullify or impair any benefits.
109 For the reasons aptly explained by the panel in Portland Cement I110,
the EC considers that Guatemala has failed to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment
laid down in Article 3.8 of the DSU.

104 Ibid., paras. 217-219.
105 See e.g. Temple of Preah Vihear Case, where the International Court of Justice enounced the
conditions for the application of the principle of estoppel as follows:
“The principle operates to prevent a State contes ting before the Court a situation contrary to a
clear and unequivocal representation made by it to an other State, expressly or impliedly, on which
representation the other state was, in the circumstances, entitled to rely, and as a result that other State
has been prejudiced or the State making it has secured some benefit or advantage for itself” (ICJ
reports 91962) pp. 143-144).
106 Ibid., para. 218.
107 DS12/R, BISD 37/80, at p. 86.
108 Panel report in EEC – Member States’ Import regimes for Bananas, DS32/R (unadopted).
109 Guatemala’s First submission, paras. 220-221.
110Portland Cement I, para. 7.42.

(c) Disclosure of essential facts
5.45 In response to Mexico’s claim that Guatemal a violated Article 6.9 of the ADP Agreement,
Guatemala appears to be arguing that its investig ating authorities complied with that provision by
granting access to the public file.111
5.46 Guatemala’s defence reflects a serious misunderstanding of the disclosure requirements
imposed by Article 6.9. That Article imposes upon the investigating authorities a positive duty “to
inform” the interested parties which goes beyond simply granting access to the file. The public file of
an investigation consists essentially of questionnaire responses and allegations submitted by the
different interested parties, which are often contradictory. Thus, the mere examination of the file may
not allow the interested parties to identify the “essential facts” on the basis of which the authorities
intend to impose definitive measures. For that reason, Article 6.9 requires that the investigating
authorities indicate to the interested parties which, of all the facts contained in the file, are the
“essential facts” that will form the basis for their decision, so that the interested parties can defend
their interests adequately.
5.47 Moreover, if the obligation imposed by Article 6.9 could be fulfilled simply by granting
access to the file, Article 6.9 would become totally redundant, since the obligation to provide access
to the file is already prescribed by Article 6.4 of the ADP Agreement.
(d) Extension of the investigation period
5.48 Mexico claims that by extending the period of investigation Guatemala violated paragraph 1
of Annex II to the ADP Agreement, as well as Articles 6.1 and 6.2.
112.
5.49 In the EC’s view, paragraph 1 of Annex II does not prevent the investigating authorities from
requesting additional information in the course of the investigation, including information pertaining
to a period different from that initially defined as the investigation period. The investigating
authorities may not become aware that certain information is “required” for the purposes of the
investigation until they have already received some information from the interested parties. In those
cases, it is not “possible” for the investigating auth orities to request such information at an earlier
stage and, therefore, it cannot be claimed that there is a violation of paragraph 1 of Annex II.
5.50 Nevertheless, the extension of the investigation period should be justified and not impose an
unreasonable extra burden on the interested parties. In addition, the investigating authorities should
observe the same procedural requirements as when they made the original request for information,
including in particular those contained in Articles 6.1 and 6.2. Whether or not Guatemala complied
with those requirements when it extended the investigation period is a question of fact on which the
EC is not in a position to comment.
(e) Information on costs of production
5.51 Mexico claims that Guatemala has breached Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the ADP Agreement
because the investigating authorities requested information on costs of production from the exporter,
even though the complaint did not allege that domestic sales were made below cost.
113.
5.52 This claim is clearly unfounded. The investigating authorities are entitled to request any
information which is pertinent for a determination of dumping. There is nothing in the wording of
Articles 2.1 and 2.2, or in any other provision of the ADP Agreement, which may be interpreted as

112 Mexico’s First submission, paras. 355-372.
113Ibid., paras. 373-379.

restricting the possibility for the investigating author ities to request cost of production data to those
cases where the complaining industry has alleged the existence of sales below cost.
(f) Revocation of the measures
5.53 Guatemala has submitted that, even if the Panel were to found that the definitive anti-
dumping measures are inconsistent with the ADP Agreement, it should reject Mexico’s request that
the Panel “suggest” the revocation of those measures.
114.
5.54 It is true that, as argued by Guatemala, under the GATT 1947, panels recommended specific
remedies in very few occasions. Yet, Guatemala’s position that panels should never suggest
“specific” remedies, including the revocation of a measure, is clearly untenable, as it would reduce to
inutility the last sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU, which provides expressly that “in addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations”.
5.55 The EC would agree, nonetheless, that panels should be careful not to make suggestions
which limit the choices available to the offending Member. Accordingly, they should not suggest the
revocation of a measure, unless it can be established that there is no other possible way to “bring the
measure into conformity”. The panel report in DRAMS
115, which has been cited with approval by
Guatemala, supports that view. Indeed, in DRAMS the panel did not rule that Panels can never
suggest the revocation of a measure, but rather that
in light of the range of possible ways in which … the United States could
appropriately implement our recommendation, we decline to make any suggestion in
the present case.116
5.56 The report in Portland Cement I reflects the same principle. The Panel suggested the
revocation of the definitive anti-dumping measure only after having determined that, in view of the
nature of the violations of the ADP Agreement incurred by Guatemala, there was no other possible
way to bring that measure into conformity:
We have determined that an unbiased and objective investigation authority could not
properly have determined, based on the evidence and information available at the
time of initiation, that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of the anti-
dumping investigation Thus, the entire investigation rested on an insufficient basis,
and therefore should have never been conducted. This is, in our view, a violation
which cannot be corrected effectively by any actions during the course of the ensuing
investigation. Therefore, we suggest that Guatemala revoke the existing anti-
dumping measure on imports of Mexican cement, because, in our view, this is the
only appropriate means of implementing the recommendation.
117
5.57 The EC agrees with the report in Cement Portland I that, where an investigation has been
initiated on the basis of insufficient evidence, the only possible means of implementation is the
revocation of the anti-dumping measure imposed pursuant to that investigation. Therefore, in those
circumstances, it would be appropriate for a panel to suggest the revocation of the measure.

114 Guatemala’s First submission, paras. 399-404.
115 Panel report in United States – Anti-dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit Or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R.
116 Ibid., para. 7.4.
117Cement Portland I, para. 8.6.

D. HONDURAS
5.58 Honduras submitted the following arguments to the Panel:
1. Interest of Honduras as a third party to the dispute
5.59 The Government of Honduras welcomes the opportunity to make this written submission as a
third party to the dispute brought by Mexico challenging the definitive anti-dumping measure
imposed by the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy (the Ministry) on imports of grey portland
cement (cement) produced by one of its exporters, Cooperativa la Cruz Azul, S.C.L. (Cruz Azul), as
well as the action that preceded it, including the provisional anti-dumping measure.
5.60 Honduras' economy is closely linked to that of Guatemala. Central America has a broad and
varied programme with Mexico, and consequently we are interested in strengthening our trade links
and ensuring that trade between Mexico and our countries is not affected by unfair trade practices.
5.61 Our cement industry is also highly vulnerable to the dumping practices reported to the
Guatemalan investigating authority. The anti-dumping measure taken satisfactorily protects Central
America's interests and, to some extent, represents an effective deterrent to dumping of other products
by Mexico.
5.62 The Government of Honduras took part in the first dispute between Mexico and Guatemala in
order to protect the right of any WTO Member to conduct an anti-dumping investigation and not to be
cited before a panel whose terms of reference do not allow it to hear the case. Honduras is now
participating in this second dispute because it considers that Guatemala correctly applied the
regulations contained in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
2. Preliminary objections
5.63 This dispute raises considerations of competence and admissibility which affect fundamental
principles and, in order to maintain the purity and integrity of the dispute settlement system, the Panel
should take a preliminary decision on these.
(a) The Panel was improperly composed
5.64 Firstly, Guatemala has made an appropriate and duly reasoned complaint that the
Director-General appointed to the present Panel persons who had heard the previous dispute.
Honduras shares Guatemala's concern regarding the lack of independence and objectiveness of
persons who had already taken positions when considering Mexico's first complaint, without having
the competence to do so, in connection with claims relating to the violation of Article 5.3 and 5.5,
which are again the subject of this case.
5.65 Clearly, no one is questioning the integrity or qualifications of the panellist in the first dispute
who has been re-appointed to consider the present dispute, but he will undoubtedly take into account
the views held by those who served with him on the first Panel and will be unable to disregard the
discussions held and decisions taken during the previous dispute in which he participated.
5.66 The issue is of systemic interest and, as far as we know, this is the first time that a panel
report has been rejected and the complaining Member has initiated a second dispute concerning the
same complaints. The DSU and Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do not empower the
Appellate Body to refer the dispute back to the panel whose conclusions were rejected and likewise
the Director-General should not act in such a way.

5.67 Article 8.2 of the DSU states that "Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring
the independence of the Members …", and according to Article 11 a panel "should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of … the relevant covered agreements …" (emphasis added).
5.68 In order to ensure that full effect is given to the principle of public international law whereby
decisions by international tribunals must be impartial and objective, the Director-General should take
into account Guatemala's objections regarding a particular individual. The Preamble to the Rules of
Conduct for the DSU states that the operation of the DSU "would be strengthened by rules of conduct
designed to maintain the integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the
DSU".118 The confidentiality requirement is also to be found in paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 on
Working Procedures.
5.69 According to Sections II and III of the aforementioned Rules of Conduct, all members of
panels "shall be independent and impartial, shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest …" and
shall also "consider only issues raised in, and nece ssary to fulfil their responsibilities within, the
dispute settlement proceeding …" (emphasis added). If any member of the previous Panel were
allowed to participate in the present Panel, these principles would be undermined.
5.70 Consequently, with due respect, Honduras supports Guatemala's request that a preliminary
resolution be issued to the effect that the Panel was improperly composed and does not therefore have
the competence to examine the matter referred by Mexico to the DSB.
(b) The report of the previous panel is without value
5.71 Mexico wishes this Panel to endorse the work and the conclusions of the Panel in the first
dispute (hereinafter Guatemala I) and therefore repeatedly quotes the latter's report. According to
Article 11 of the DSU, however, this Panel must respect its obligation to make an objective
assessment of the matter and conduct its own review, completely disregarding the report published by
the previous Panel.
5.72 In Guatemala I, the Appellate Body ruled that the Panel which examined the dispute should
never have considered the claims submitted to it and rejected its report. As a result, this report has no
value as a precedent, as evidence or as guidance. Honduras considers that, if this Panel is guided by
the reasoning in the report in the Guatemala I case, this would constitute a precedent that would have
a negative impact on every WTO Member.
5.73 The report published in the Guatemala I case cannot even be used simply for guidance, as has
sometimes occurred for reports that were not adopted. There is a substantive difference between a
report that was not adopted by the DSB – whose legal findings have not been rejected – and a report
expressly rejected by the Appellate Body; it is clear that a report that has been rejected has no legal
existence.
5.74 Honduras therefore supports Guatemala's reques t that a preliminary decision be taken
declaring that the Panel should not take into account the report on the Guatemala I case.
(c) The Panel does not have the mandate to examine the provisional measure and the claims
referring thereto
5.75 In anti-dumping disputes, the specificity requirement is of particular relevance. Articles 4
and 6 of the DSU and Article 17 of the Anti-D umping Agreement define when an anti-dumping
dispute can be submitted to a panel. Paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

118 WT/DSB/RC/1, 11 December 1996.

should be interpreted in parallel with paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the DSU, which requires that the
parties submit to the DSB matters regarding which consultations have been held and identify the
specific measures at issue.
5.76 In the present case, Mexico's request for consultations identifies the definitive anti-dumping
measure but not the provisional measure. This Panel does not therefore have any mandate to consider
the provisional measure or Mexico's claims contesting it.
5.77 Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel shows that the request for consultations only
identified the definitive anti-dumping measure "as well as the actions that preceded it"
119, but Mexico
also challenges "the actions preceding that measure", including the provisional anti-dumping
measure.120 Mexico does not contest the provisional measure per se , but as one of the actions
preceding the challenge of the final measure.
5.78 In any event, if it is considered that Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel did
identify the provisional measure as a subject of complaint, the request violates Article 4 of the DSU.
According to Article 6 of the DSU, a Member may not request the establishment of a panel to contest
a measure regarding which it has not requested the consultations specified in Article 4 of the DSU.
Similarly, Article 6.2 requires, that in its request for the establishment of a panel, a Member must
indicate "whether consultations were held, and identify the specific measures at issue …". As
Mexico's request for consultations did not identify the provisional measure as the specific measure at
issue, this measure cannot be the subject of the dispute.
5.79 The United States – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, cited by Guatemala, is indicative in this respect.
5.80 Mexico's failure to identify the provisional measure (and to present the full series of
complaints relating to the provisional measure) in its request for consultations prevented the special
dispute settlement rules applicable to anti-dumping cases from giving the parties an opportunity to
reach a "mutually satisfactory resolution" of the dispute in accordance with Article 17.3 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
5.81 Consequently, Honduras considers that, as request ed by Guatemala, the Panel should take a
preliminary decision to the effect that it has no mandate to consider the provisional measure and all
the complaints referring thereto because Mexico did not request consultations on this measure.
5.82 In the alternate, Honduras also considers that all the WTO's Members, but especially those
countries which are particularly vulnerable to dumping, have an interest in ensuring full respect for
Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which restricts complaints in the WTO to disputes
concerning the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures or price undertakings, unless it can be
proved that the imposition of a provisional measure has an enduring "significant impact" on the trade
interests of a Member.
5.83 The clear wording of Article 17.4 indicates that the complainant must prove a significant
impact. The intention of those who drafted Article 17.4 was that the significant impact must relate to
the trade interests of the complainant and not to the exporting industry under investigation because, in
a dispute settlement procedure, the complainant is the WTO Member and not the exporter or exporters
being investigated.
5.84 In the present case, Mexico does not claim that the provisional measure has had an enduring
significant impact. In its first submission to this Panel, Mexico does not argue that the provisional

119 WT/DS156/2, page 2.
120 Idem

measure had a significant impact at any time. It is in fact inconceivable that the provisional measure
has had an enduring impact because it expired over three years ago.
5.85 In the alternate, Honduras endorses Guatemala's position that the provisional measure did not
have any significant impact. In its first submission, Mexico neither claimed nor tried to prove that the
provisional measure had had a significant impact in the past.
5.86 Consequently, Honduras requests the Panel to is sue a preliminary resolution to the effect that
the Panel does not have a mandate to consider the provisional measure and all the claims referring
thereto.
3. Arguments
(a) Standard of review
5.87 Another aspect of particular importance is the scope of the examination to be conducted by
panels in anti-dumping cases. Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement prescribes that panels
may not overturn the establishment of the facts by an investigating authority, even if they do not agree
with its evaluation. In other words, panels may not undertake a new examination of the facts.
5.88 Regarding legal questions, according to Article 17.6(ii) a national authority's determination
should rest upon a "permissible interpretation" of the Agreement's provisions. Clearly, several
interpretations may exist, but the Anti-Dumping Agreement only requires that the investigating
authority use one that is permissible.
5.89 In the present case, as the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy's determination is based on a
permissible interpretation of the regulations applicable – in particular, the meaning of words that are
not defined in the Agreement but are central to the action of an investigating authority, for example,
"sufficient" in Article 5.3, "As soon as" in Article 6.1.3, "adequate" in Article 12.1.1, and "sufficient
detail" in Article 12.1.1
* – the Panel should respect its determination.
(b) It is up to Mexico to prove that there has been a violation
5.90 Honduras wishes to draw the Panel's attention to the fact that Mexico does not deny that Cruz
Azul dumped cement in Guatemala nor does it deny material injury.
5.91 Moreover, Mexico has not assumed the burden of proving that there has been a violation of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The WTO is no different from other legal systems which make the
complainant responsible for providing prima facie proof of non-compliance and it is only when this
has been done that the burden of rebutting the claim would be shifted to Guatemala.121
(c) Guatemala properly initiated the anti-dumping investigation
5.92 Honduras considers that, during the investigation that gave rise to the definitive anti-dumping
measure challenged by Mexico, Guatemala complied with the applicable provisions in Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and Articles 1-3, 5-7, 9, 12, 18, and
Annexes I and II, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

* Translator's note: These words do not appear in Article 12.1.1, but in 12.2.
121See, for example, the Report of the Appellate Body United States – Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted on 23 May 1997, page 14. See also the
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Measures C oncerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS/26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted on 13 February 1998, paragraph 98.

5.93 Honduras does not share Mexico's opinion that any WTO Member requested to initiate an
investigation is obliged to conduct a prior investigation. Contrary to what is claimed by Mexico,
under Article 5.3 the investigating authority did not have to have evidence of injurious dumping based
on a "fair comparison" of Cruz Azul's prices in Mexico and Guatemala. 122 Claiming that there must
be sufficient information to establish these facts prima facie amounts to a claim that the investigating
authority should conduct a prior investigation.
5.94 Mexico's claim that the Ministry did not "examine" the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in Cementos Progreso's application123 is not acceptable either. A correct reading of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 1 of Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement shows that:
According to Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an applicant must substantiate its
claims with relevant evidence - described in subparagraphs (i)–(iv) of Article 5.2 -, but this is
limited to the information "reasonably available to the applicant".124
Article 5.3 lays down the obligation to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
provided which "justify the initiation of an investigation".125
According to Article 5.1, it is during the course of the investigation and not at the time of its
initiation that the authority must determine "the existence, degree and effect of any alleged
dumping …".
5.95 It is also a matter of concern that Mexico considers that the Ministry should have
"ascertained" the "legitimacy or veracity" of th e documentary evidence attached to Cementos
Progreso's application
126, and should have proved the normal value and export price before initiating
the investigation.127 Honduras does not consider that it is the investigating authority's responsibility to
sift the complaints before initiating an investigation.
5.96 An investigating authority cannot "prove" the normal value or the export prices and cannot
"verify" the legitimacy and veracity before conducting an investigation in any country in the world,
especially in Central America. This is why Article 6.7 and Annex I of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
provide for the verification of information during the course of an investigation.
5.97 Even though Honduras considers that Guatemala met the provisions of Article 5.2 and 5.3 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, others – Mexico for example – might consider that in a perfect world it
would have been better if Guatemala had had more information before deciding whether an
investigation was justified. But the situation in countries such as Guatemala, which is familiar to
Honduras because the circumstances are the same, is that further information is not easy to obtain nor
reasonably available.
5.98 The scope of the examination prior to initiating an investigation and the fact that the level of
"sufficient" evidence to justify initiation is lower than the level of evidence required for a preliminary

122Idem, paragraphs 98, 103, 107 and 126.
123 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 75, 89-90 and 111.
124 Article 5.2 does not stipulate that the complainant must attach documentary evidence. Article 5.2
and 5.3 use the words "evidence" and "information" without distinction. It is therefore clear that the "evidence"
mentioned in the first sentence of Article 5.2 consists of the types of information defined in subparagraphs (i) –
(iv) of the same Article.
125 Article 5.3 (emphasis added).
126 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 75, 89-90 and 111.
127 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 98, 103, 107 and 126.

or final affirmative determination were dealt with at length in Softwood Lumber II, which Guatemala
cites in its first written submission to the Panel.128
5.99 Furthermore, even though Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contain useful
definitions of the words "dumping", "injury" and "causal relationship", there is no legal reason for
claiming that these Articles apply to the initiation phase.
5.100 As already stated, Article 5 governs the initiation of an investigation, and does not mention
Article 2. The sole reference to Article 3 is in s ubparagraph 5.2(iv), but only in relation to the factors
used to demonstrate injury and as guidance for the submission of information in an application, which
suggests that those drafting the text did not intend any other provision of Articles 2 or 3 to apply at the
time of initiating the investigation.
5.101 To summarize, Honduras considers that th e investigating authority undertook a full
examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in Cementos Progreso's
application. On the basis of this examination and of all the information before it, the Ministry
reasonably determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation.
5.102 If the standard of review referred to in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is
applied correctly, the Panel is not empowered to assess once again the evidence used when taking the
decision to initiate the investigation.
(d) Guatemala correctly notified the initiation of the investigation
5.103 It is contrary to the interests of WTO's Members which could potentially conduct their own
anti-dumping investigations for panels hearing complaints to impose the regulations applicable with
excessive severity. On the contrary, panels should bear in mind the object and purpose of the
provisions applicable.
5.104 Honduras considers that the provisions in Articles 5.5, 12.1-12.1.1 and 6.1.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement were not established with the object and purpose of imposing formal
obstacles on investigating authorities. The goal of these provisions is to ensure that exporting
Members and their exporters have the opportunity to defend their interests in a timely and appropriate
manner.
5.105 As far as Article 5.5 is concerned, Honduras does not consider that the interests of Mexico
and its exporters were infringed because the investigation was not actually initiated until Mexico had
been notified. As Guatemala points out, in our countries the rights of the defendant have to be
infringed before failure to give a proper hearing can be claimed.
5.106 In Honduras' view, Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement was not violated either
because this provision does not lay down any time-limit for making a notification; it only requires
that a notification and a public notice must be issued when the authorities are satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence.
5.107 Regarding the information to be provided in th e public notice, according to Article 12.1.1 the
necessary details may be contained in the notice or in a separate report such as that to be found in the
administrative file.
129

128 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 134.
129First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 227 and 228.

5.108 Lastly, in compliance with Article 6.1.3, Guatemala gave the Government of Mexico and
Cruz Azul the full text of the anti-dumping application "as soon as" the investigation was initiated.
5.109 In conclusion, Honduras considers that the Panel should take into account the fact that, if
Guatemala had complied with these Articles in another way, this would not have affected the course
of the investigation. For example, Article 5.5 does not provide that the Member to be investigated
may undertake action or submit any evidence, or in other words, prevent the initiation of the
investigation; likewise, nothing would have change d if further information had been included in the
public notice or if the full text of the application had been submitted beforehand.
(e) The provisional measure was imposed in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement
5.110 Although the preliminary determination of injurious dumping made by the Ministry is not the
subject of this complaint and, in any event, its imposition is not subject to further requirements, in the
alternative Honduras considers that it was made on the basis of duly established and reasonably
assessed facts and that Guatemala respected the provisions contained in Articles 7, 2 and 3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Moreover, the public not ice of the preliminary determination and the
separate report dated 26 July 1996 comply with Article 12.2.1.
5.111 The preliminary margin of dumping (38.72 per cent) was fixed on the basis of information
submitted by Cruz Azul in response to the Ministry's questionnaire. The subsequent preliminary
determination of threat of injury was based on the rapid increase in dumped imports (from
June 1995 – November 1995, Cruz Azul captured 25 per cent of the market) and the resulting
reduction in Cementos Progreso's sales, market share, production and prices.
5.112 As pointed out with regard to the decision to initiate the investigation, as far as the
preliminary determination is concerned, the Panel is not empowered to replace its own examination
by the examination of the investigating authority.
(f) Conduct of the investigation
5.113 Mexico drew attention to a series of alleged violations in the course of the investigation.
Although a detailed analysis of these goes beyond the purpose of this submission, after considering
them Honduras is of the view that none of these al leged violations impaired the rights of Mexico or
Cruz Azul.
5.114 Nevertheless, Honduras believes it necessary to emphasize that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
also imposes certain obligations on the firms investigated in a Member country, and a complaint can
only lawfully be made when there has been such cooperation. For example, a firm is obliged to
provide the information requested in the questionnaires and must refrain from impeding the
verification of information required by Article 6.7 and Annex I of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.115 Unlike complaints relating to the violation of other covered agreements, the basis of an anti-
dumping dispute is a complaint of an unfair trade practice by one or more exporting firms of the
complaining Member. Honduras, therefore, consid ers that the Panel's examination should not be
limited to compliance with the investigation procedures which the regulations prescribe for the
respondent Member, but should also consider the attitude of the firm or firms of the complaining
Member and the additional burden imposed on the inve stigating authority as a result of their lack of
cooperation.
(g) The final affirmative determination by Guatemala
5.116 In its first submission to the Panel, Mexico did not try to prove that its firm had not been
involved in dumping or had not caused injury to Cementos Progreso. Both the firm investigated and

the Government confined themselves to contesting alleged procedural violations during the initiation
and conduct of the investigation.
5.117 Guatemala considers that the final determination, published in the Diario de Centro América
of 30 January 1997, contains the required information in sufficient detail relating to the conclusion
reached by the Ministry that Cruz Azul had been involved in dumping, that the dumping margin was
89.54 per cent, and that the dumped imports had caused material injury to Cementos Progreso.
5.118 Mexico claims, but does not demonstrate, that Guatemala violated Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Regarding the normal valu e and the adjustments in order to make a fair
comparison, the Panel should note that the lack of collaboration obliged Guatemala to base its
determination on the best information available. The Panel should also take into account the fact that
Mexico did not contest the export price.
5.119 Guatemala considers that, after having properly established the facts, the Ministry carried out
an unbiased and objective evaluation thereof and, faced with Cruz Azul's refusal to cooperate in the
investigation, the Ministry was obliged to use the facts available in order to calculate the final margin
of dumping. The same applies to its subsequent conclusion that there was dumping, based on the
statistical information in the file which showed a rapid increase in imports and the devastating effect
on Cementos Progreso's sales, production, market share, prices and profits. The dumping margin was
enormous, the increase in imports dramatic and the injury immediate and severe.
5.120 Guatemala made its analysis in a way that meets the requirements of the anti-dumping
regulations and it is compelling. In this connection, reference should be made to the "supplemented
report on the determination of injury caused by dumped imports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico", of 15 January 1997, by the Ministry's Di rectorate of Economic Integration, and its final
determination. Guatemala considers that it met the provisions of Article 3 because it based its
determination of injury on positive evidence and an objective examination of the following:
The volume of the dumped imports and their effect on the price of like products in the
domestic market (according to Article 3.2).
The resulting impact of the dumped imports on domestic producers (taking into account the
factors in Article 3.4).
5.121 In conclusion, Honduras affirms that, taking into account the purpose and object sought by
the drafters when laying down the formalities for an anti-dumping investigation, the point at stake is
whether Guatemala gave Mexico and Cruz Azul an opportunity to defend their interests properly.
There can be no question that the formalities for an anti-dumping investigation pursue this purpose,
otherwise it would mean that they only existed fo r the purpose of hindering the investigation. An
examination that takes into account this aspect would be a real contribution to anti-dumping
disciplines.
E. U
NITED STATES
5.122 The United States made the following arguments to the Panel:
1. Introduction
5.123 The A-D Agreement recognizes a Member’s right to impose anti-dumping measures, but
specifies procedures that investigating authorities must follow in imposing them. Many of these
procedural requirements are technical in nature, but they are not mere “technicalities”. As elaborated
below, the United States is of the view that Guatemala violated certain requirements codified in the
A-D Agreement. For example, Article 5.5 of the A-D Agreement requires investigating authorities to

notify the government of the exporting country prior to the initiation of an investigation, which
Guatemala did not do.
5.124 At the same time, the Panel should be wary of certain arguments presented by Mexico that
attempt to expand the obligations of investigating authorities under the A-D Agreement. Article 19.2
of the DSU could not be more clear that panels “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements”. For example, the A-D Agreement does not require
investigating authorities to fix a rigid schedule for the acceptance of relevant evidence. So long as the
investigating authority provides adequate time for exporters to respond to information requests, the
A-D Agreement establishes no limit on the number of requests that may be made, or when they may
be made.
5.125 Finally, the United States is concerned that, while Mexico has asked this Panel to issue a
general recommendation that Guatemala bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under
the A-D Agreement, Mexico has also asked the Panel to suggest two specific ways in which this
should be accomplished – revocation of the anti-dumping duty order and refund of duties. If the
Panel does determine that Guatemala has violated its obligations under the A-D Agreement, the
United States urges the Panel to refrain from suggesting revocation of the measure and refund of
duties. The latter, especially, is a specific, retroactive remedy of the sort panels reviewing anti-
dumping and countervailing duty measures have avoide d. Panels are not experts in national law, and
should refrain from attempting to identify ways in which Members can best bring offending measures
into conformity with their obligations.
5.126 In submitting these views, the United States notes that it has not yet received the WTO
Secretariat’s English translation of Guatemala’s fi rst submission and has received the translation of
Mexico’s first submission in draft. The United States therefore reserves the right to supplement or
amend the views presented in this submission once these translations are made available.
2. US views regarding the parties' claims and arguments
(a) Guatemala's conduct of the anti-dumping investigation
(i) Investigating authorities are entitled to initiate anti-dumping investigations only where an
applicanbt has submitted information reasonably available regarding dumping, injury and
causation, and where the evidence regarding each element is sufficient
5.127 The threshold question before this Panel – at least as far as the procedural requirements of the
A.D Agreement are concerned – is whether Guatemala was authorized to accept, and subsequently act
upon, the anti-dumping application filed by Cementos Progreso.
5.128 Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Article 5.2 of the A-D Agreement by initiating the
investigation based upon an application that did not contain required information “reasonably
available” to the applicant. According to Mexico, the application’s deficiencies relate to all three
fundamental elements of a dumping allegation – dumping, injury, and causation. Mexico also argues
that Guatemala violated Article 5.3 of the A-D Agreement when it failed to ascertain whether there
was “sufficient evidence” to justify initiation of the investigation. Mexico contends that both the
“reasonably available” and “sufficient evidence” standards cannot be interpreted without reference to
Articles 2 and 3 of the A-D Agreement, which set forth the basic elements of dumping and injury,
respectively.
5.129 Guatemala contends that Cementos Progreso did include all pertinent information reasonably
available to it in its application, and that the Guatemalan authorities properly concluded that the
evidence was sufficient to warrant initiation of the investigation. Guatemala further argues that
Mexico is mistaken in its position regarding the relationship between Article 5, on the one hand, and

Articles 2 and 3, on the other. According to Guatemala, both the Uruguay Round negotiating history
as well as panel practice confirm that the level of evidence sufficient for initiation is less than the
level of evidence required for preliminary or final dumping analyses.
5.130 In the view of the United States, Article 5.2 is precise with respect to the information that
must be included in an anti-dumping application. Specifically, an applicant must submit “reasonably
available” information regarding each of the information categories enumerated at subarticles (i)
through (iv). Article 5.2(i) dictates, among other things, that applicants shall describe “the volume
and value of the domestic production of the like product by the applicant.” Article 5.2(ii) requires “a
complete description of the allegedly dumped product.” Article 5.2(iii) sets forth requirements
regarding domestic market and export prices. Finally, Article 5.2(iv) specifies that an application
must contain information regarding the extent and effects of the alleged dumping.
5.131 Article 5.2 thus is intended to prevent the imposition of unreasonable information
requirements that go beyond not only the normal capacity of a private entity to develop, but also
beyond those of a particular applicant in a given case. Thus, for example, confidential pricing, cost of
production, and profitability information pertaining to foreign producers or domestic competitors is
not normally obtainable by legal means and would not normally be considered to be “reasonably
available” to an applicant so as to require such information for initiation. Similarly, there may be
aggregate information regarding the volume and value of imports or industry production and capacity
that is available in some countries, but which may be legally or simply practically unavailable in
others or to other applicants. In circumstances where a practical or legal bar exists to the acquisition
of information otherwise required by the Agreement, such information in that instance also should not
be considered to be “reasonably available” to an applicant.
5.132 However, Article 5.2 also specifies that “[s]imple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant
evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph.” Because the
“reasonably available” language in Article 5.2 was not intended to excuse any inadequacy in an
application that could have been avoided or cured by reasonable efforts on the part of the domestic
industry, where an applicant asserts the unavailability of critical data as a reason for not fulfilling
information requirements imposed by the Agreem ent, some explanation of the basis for the
unavailability may be required. Such explanation appears particularly appropriate when missing
information pertains to the domestic entities making the application and which normally would be
expected to be within their possession. Again, “simple assertions” do not suffice.
5.133 Article 5.3 sets forth the separate requirement that, once an application has been submitted,
the authorities shall examine its “accuracy and adequacy” and ascertain whether “there is sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.” In the view of the United States, Articles 5.2
and 5.3 of the A-D Agreement set forth distinct obligations. First, under Article 5.2, investigating
authorities must determine that an application contains such information of dumping, injury, and
causation as was “reasonably available” to the applicant. If, and only if, this condition is satisfied,
may authorities proceed to the second inquiry under Article 5.3 – whether the evidence presented is
sufficient to warrant the initiation of an investigation.
130 Article 5 thus appears to contemplate
scenarios in which an applicant provides all “rea sonably available” information, but this information
proves insufficient to justify initiation of an investigation.

130 As stated by the Guatemala I panel, “Article 5 establishes an obligation that extends beyond a
determination that the requirements of Article 5.2 are satisfied.” Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/R, circulated 19 June 1998, at para. 7.49 (“ Guatemala I”).
We do not agree with Guatemala that the findings of the Guatemala I panel should be rejected outright by this
Panel. To the extent that they are relevant in light of the way the issues have been framed in this proceeding, we
see no legal obstacle to this Panel’s consideration of those findings.

5.134 Turning to the facts before this Panel, the Unit ed States submits that the evidentiary basis for
Guatemala’s initiation of the investigation appears to have been especially thin with respect to the
requirements of Article 5.2(iii). Paragraph 5.2(iii) requires that applicants provide information
supporting allegations of dumping. It appears that the application did not identify the type of grey
portland cement upon which the Guatemalan industry based its evidence of normal value. The normal
value price information consisted of two invoices reflecting two separate sales of Mexican cement in
Tapachula, Mexico in August 1995. Both the invo ices and the application merely identified the
cement sold in Mexico as grey cement. There is no indication that either Cementos Progreso in its
application, or the Guatemalan authorities in their initiation analysis, recognized the possibility that
the initial product comparison may have been based on sales of different types of cement. Also, it
appears that Cementos Progreso relied upon Mexican retail prices in alleging normal value, while
relying upon wholesale prices in alleging export price. This component of the allegation, too, appears
to have been accepted at face value.
5.135 The obvious questions for this Panel, thus, are whether this information was all that was
reasonably available to Cementos Progreso, and whether the investigating authorities should have
further probed its accuracy and adequacy. There is no indication in either the notice of initiation of
the investigation or the memorandum recommending initiation from the Ministry of Economy that the
Guatemalan authorities subjected these factual assertions to further scrutiny.
131
5.136 With respect to information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports
required by Article 5.2(iv), the investigating authority relied on two shipments of cement from
Mexico which occurred on consecutive days and statements that other imports were being made
during a three-month period. These import volumes were described as massive, but were not
quantified. The applicant had explained that the dearth of import volume data was due to its lack of
access to official import data, and had requested the investigating authority to develop this
information. However, while Guatemala provides some explanation as to why this information was
not reasonably available to the applicant, Guatemala does not explain why its investigating authority
did not obtain this information on it own. Although Guatemala attempts to excuse its apparent lack of
diligence by claiming that it is a small country relative to Mexico, nothing in the A-D Agreement
permits such a “small country” exception. The Panel should not excuse Guatemala’s actions for a
reason that has no foundation in the Agreement.
132
5.137 The views of the parties differ dramatically ab out the relationship between Articles 5.2 and
5.3, on the one hand, and Articles 2 and 3, on the other. Mexico argues that Guatemala’s violations of
Articles 5.2 and 5.3 comprised violations of Articles 2 and 3, because the evidence before the
Guatemalan investigating authorities did not “establish” and “prove” the existence of dumping, injury
and causal link. Guatemala argues that Articles 2 and 3 inform an authority’s determination to
initiate, but cannot be violated as such, because the evidence that is sufficient to justify initiation need
not prove or establish dumping, injury and causal link. The United States agrees that there is a
difference between allegation and proof, and that violations of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 do not comprise
violations of Articles 2 and 3. Articles 2 and 3 are of course relevant in determining whether the
information presented in an application justifies initiation of an investigation
133, and may reasonably

131 The Guatemala I panel concluded that “based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the
information before it, the Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of
dumping to justify the initiation of the investigation.” Id. at para. 7.63.
132 The Guatemala I panel stated that “based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the evidence
and information before it in this case, the Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient
evidence of injury, that is threat of injury, to justify the initiation of the investigation.” Id. at para. 7.77.
133 The Guatemala I panel held that investigating authorities “may not ignore” the provisions of
Article 2 of the A-D Agreement because that Article defines dumping. See id. at para. 7.64.

be viewed as providing “context” for Articles 5.2 and 5.3 in that they set forth, respectively, detailed
definitions of dumping and injury.134
5.138 In any event, the Panel need not define the precise relationship between Articles 5.2 and 5.3
and Articles 2 and 3. The Guatemala I panel did not. It simply rejected Guatemala’s assertion that its
authorities could compare sales of two sacks of cement at the retail level with sales of several
thousand sacks of cement at the wholesale level without appearing to accord any consideration to
these differences.
135 The United States respectfully submits that such an approach – that is,
concluding only that the Guatemalan authorities exercised inadequate scrutiny of the applicant’s
pricing information – would be appropriate in this proceeding as well.
5.139 Along this same line, the United States disagrees with Mexico’s characterization of the
detailed price-adjustment requirements in Article 2.4 and their application in the initiation context. 136
Investigating authorities cannot be expected to analyze and ensure, for example, that all price
comparisons at the initiation phase are at the same level of trade. Level-of-trade adjustments (not to
mention other types of complex adjustments mandated by Article 2) must by their very nature be
based on detailed (and usually confidential) information supplied by the exporting firm, and thus
cannot be made until the investigating authority has developed an evidentiary record based on
complete questionnaire responses.
137 The United States urges the Panel to exercise particular caution
in this area, and not to suggest or find that investigating authorities must make level-of-trade
adjustments at initiation per the requirements of Article 2.4.
5.140 Finally, the United States also urges the Panel to avoid implying in any context (initiation,
preliminary or final phases) that the reference to “fair comparison” in Article 2.4 requires something
more than compliance with the more specific langua ge embodied in that Article. In the view of the
United States, a price has been “fairly” adjusted where an investigating authority has complied with
the detailed adjustment provisions enumerated in Article 2.4. At any rate, as explained, the legal
sufficiency of Guatemala’s decision to initiate the anti-dumping investigation can be assessed by the
Panel without a finding regarding the extent to which Articles 2 and 3 inform Articles 5.2 and 5.3.
(ii) Investigating authorities must notify exporting members prior to initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation
5.141 Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Article 5.5 of the A-D Agreement by failing to notify
the Government of Mexico before formally initiating the investigation. Guatemala’s position that its
“actual investigation” did not commence until after its 11 January 1996 publication of the notice of
initiation in the official government journal, the Diario Oficial de Centro América . Guatemala also
argues in the alternative that: (1) the delay was harmless under generally accepted principles of
international law; (2) the Government of Mexico acquiesced to the delay; and (3) the delay did not

134 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at Article 31.1, provides that “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary m eaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
135 Guatemala I, at para. 7.62.
136 Mexico’s first submission, while first recognizing that the “quantum and quality” of evidence
supporting an initiation decision will by its very nature be less than the amount supporting subsequent
determinations, then appears to assume that Article 2 is directly applicable to a sufficiency determination under
Article 5.3. For example, para. 100 states the initial price-comparison analysis “must take due account of the
differences affecting the comparability of the prices . . . and to do otherwise would be a serious violation of
Article 2 of the ADP Agreement.”
137 This conclusion is compelled not just by logic, but also by the structure of the AD Agreement.
Articles 2 and 3 are styled, respectively, Determination of Dumping and Determination of Injury. An
investigating authority cannot determine the existence of dumping or injury until it has gathered evidence.
Nothing in the AD Agreement suggests that a decision to initiate an anti-dumping investigation also constitutes
a “determination of dumping” or “of injury.” In fact, Article 5.2 itself does not specifically refer to Article 2.

bring about nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Mexico under the A-D Agreement.
The United States submits that Guatemala did, for purposes of the A-D Agreement, initiate its
investigation when it published notice in the Diario Oficial de Centro América, and that its arguments
in the alternative are unpersuasive.138
5.142 Article 5.5 states that “after receipt of a properly documented application and before
proceeding to initiate an investigation, the author ities shall notify the government of the exporting
Member concerned.” Footnote 1 to the A-D Agreement clarifies that “initiate” refers to “the
procedural action by which a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 5.”
Read together, these provisions allow little latitude for Guatemala to argue that the procedural action
through which it formally launched its investigation was any action other than its 11 January 1996
publication of the initiation notice.
5.143 The documents before the Panel also suggest that the Guatemalan authorities themselves
believed that the 11 January 1996 publication constituted the formal act of initiation. For one, the
15 December 1995 memorandum from the Director for Economic Integration to the Ministry of the
Economy states, in paragraph 5, that “[t]he date of the initiation of the investigation shall be
considered to be the date on which such notice is published in the Official Journal.” Also, the actual
published notice makes no mention of the fact that the investigation would not commence until some
later date, but instead, for example, notifies interested parties that they will have thirty days from the
date of publication of the notice to submit any supplementary arguments and evidence that they may
consider relevant. These documents thus show that the Guatemalan authorities deemed the
investigation to have commenced with the publication of notice of initiation on 11 January 1996.
5.144 Guatemala contends, citing other sources of public international law, that this Panel should
apply a theory of harmless error which holds that procedural errors should not be viewed as
invalidating an official determination. The Panel n eed not turn to other sources of law, however, as
the DSU squarely resolves the issue presented. Article 3.8 of the DSU provides as follows:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on other Member parties to that covered agreement, and
in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been
brought to rebut that charge.
Thus, if a Member has violated a WTO obligation which is phrased as a categorical rule, an assertion
that the violation was merely a harmless error is irrelevant. Guatemala notes that panels have not
ruled out application of the harmless error doctrine in construing GATT/WTO obligations and
rights.
139 However, to date, no panel has ever invoked this doctrine, and the facts of this case do not
warrant its application here.
5.145 The procedural requirement in Article 5.5 of the A-D Agreement is not a mere technicality. It
is obvious from Article 5.5 that Members, in negotiating the A-D Agreement, wished to safeguard the
right of governments to take whatever steps they deemed necessary and appropriate in reacting to
other governments’ impending anti-dumping investigations. In this case, Guatemala effectively

138 The Guatemala I panel thoroughly rejected Guatemala’s arguments that its notification was legally
adequate or, if inadequate, excusable. See id. at paras. 7.30-7.43.
139 The panel in Brazil - Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on Milk
Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community , SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994,
at para. 271, stated: “Without wishing to exclude that the concept of ‘harmless error’ could be applicable in
dispute settlement proceedings under the Agreement, the Panel considered that this concept was inapplicable
under the circumstances of the case before it.”

deprived Mexico of that protected right. It is impossible to show, as Guatemala would have this Panel
believe, that the course of the investigation would not have been altered had Mexico received timely
notification ( e.g., prior to publication of the initiation notice) of the decision to initiate the
investigation. It is simply impossible to know what steps the Government of Mexico might have
taken had it been notified pursuant to the terms of Article 5.5.140
5.146 Guatemala’s assertion that Mexico acquiesced in the violation of its rights is without
foundation. It was well-established under the GATT 1947 that the fact that a violation has taken place
with the knowledge of the complaining party changes neither the violator’s obligations nor the right to
redress of the complaining party. In 1983, a GATT panel examined French quantitative restrictions
on watches and other products from Hong Kong.141 The EEC argued to that panel that the restrictions
were of long standing and that the widespread existence of quantitative restrictions meant that
“contracting parties had adopted a tolerant attitude that was tantamount to acceptance of the
situation.”142 In response,
The Panel . . . recognized that restrictio ns had been in existence for a long time
without Article XXIII ever having been in voked by Hong Kong with respect to the
products concerned, but concluded that this did not alter the obligations which
contracting parties had accepted under GATT provisions . Furthermore the Panel
considered it would be erroneous to interpret the fact that a measure had not been
subject to Article XXIII over a number of years, as tantamount to its tacit acceptance
by contracting parties. . . .”143
5.147 The 1993 Bananas I panel report [DS32/R] also rejected an EC argument that subsequent
practice with respect to the banana import regimes at issue had modified GATT rights and obligations
or resulted in the complaining parties being estopped from raising such rights.
144 The EC cited in
particular “(a) the notoriety of the facts involved; (b) the general tolerance of these measures by the
GATT contracting parties, especially by those most interested in the matter; (c) the period of time the
parties tolerated restrictions associated with th e EEC banana import régimes; (d) the area of law
concerned; and (e) the basic aims and mechanisms of the General Agreement.” 145 In examining and
rejecting this argument, the Panel found that “such modification or estoppel could only result from the
express, or in exceptional cases implied, consent of such parties or of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES”146 and that “[t]he decision of a contracting party not to invoke a right vis-à-vis another
contracting party at a particular point in time can . . . by itself, not reasonably be assumed to be a
decision to release that other contracting party from its obligations under the General Agreement.”147
5.148 Whether Mexico was aware of and complained about the violation of its rights in the course
of Guatemala’s investigation or not, Guatemala remained obligated to carry out Article 5.5 of the A-D
Agreement, and Mexico retained the right to invoke its rights under the DSU and the WTO

140 The United States notes a recent recommendation adopted by the Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices relating to Article 5.5 which states, “. . . the Committee recommends that the notification required by
the second sentence of Article 5.5 should be made as soon as possible after the receipt by the investigating
authorities of a properly documented application, and as early as possible before the decision is taken regarding
initiation of an investigation on the basis of that properly documented application.” G/ADP/5
(3 November 1998).
141 EEC - Quantitative Restrictions Against Im ports of Certain Products from Hong Kong , L/5511,
adopted on 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129.
142 Id., 30S/135, para. 17.
143 Id., 30S/138, para. 28; emphasis added.
144 Report of the Panel in EEC - Members States' Import Regimes for Bananas , DS32/R, 3 June 1993
paras. 124-146 (unadopted).
145 Id., para. 127.
146 Id., para. 361.
147 Id., para. 362.

Agreement. Guatemala could not unilaterally alter Mexico’s rights to a timely notification. In the
1992 dispute concerning United States anti-dumping duties on Atlantic salmon from Norway, the
panel rejected an argument that the failure of Norway or private Norwegian respondents to raise
certain issues before the investigating authoritie s precluded Norway from raising them before the
panel. That panel considered that no such limitation existed in the Tokyo Round A-D Code, nor could
it be implied.
148 In short, the consistent interpretative approach under the GATT and WTO has been
to resist reliance on “subsequent practice,” supposed acquiescence, or other such conduct as a source
for altering the rights and obligations conferred by the positive treaty law agreed between
governments.
(iii) Where separate reports replace public notices for purposes of Article 12, those reports must
be adequate and accessible
5.149 Mexico argues that Guatemala’s public notice of initiation in the Diario Oficial de Centro
América does not comply with Article 12.1.1 of the A-D Agreement because the notice does not
contain adequate information regarding the allegations of dumping and injury. In response,
Guatemala contends that its public notice of initiation should be assessed in conjunction with the
17 November 1995 Report of the Office of Economic Integration, which does summarize the
information presented by the applicant, Cementos Progreso.
149
5.150 Article 12.1.1 of the A-D Agreement provides that a public notice of initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation must contain “adequate information” regarding, inter alia, “the basis on which
dumping is alleged in the application” and “a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury
is based.” Importantly, the information may be made available “through a separate report,” so long as
that report “is readily available to the public.” While Mexico entirely overlooks this alternative to
publication, which is clearly spelled out in Article 12.1.1 and the accompanying footnote 23,
Guatemala appears to suggest – erroneously – that the “separate report” can be any document,
anywhere on the record of the investigation.
5.151 The United States is of the view that the purpose of Article 12.1.1 is to ensure transparency of
decision-making. Accordingly, where an investigating authority relies upon a “separate report” to
disclose information of the type outlined in subarticles (i) through (vi), that separate document should
be referenced in or clear from the public initiation notice and be “available” publicly pursuant to the
plain meaning of that term. Where the separate report does not clearly substitute for the public notice,
or is not readily “available,” the separate report should be seen as failing to satisfy the requirements of
Article 12.
150
5.152 The arguments on this point thus present the Panel with two factual questions – whether the
17 November 1995 Report of Guatemala’s Department of Economic Integration was indeed “readily
available to the public,” and, if so, whether the information contained therein was “adequate.” In this
respect, the United States suggests that, in weighing the arguments of Mexico and Guatemala, the
Panel be mindful of the purpose of Article 12.1, which, as mentioned, is to ensure that investigating
authorities reveal the evidentiary basis for proceeding with initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.
Where exporters are in no position to assess either the quality or the source of the information relied
upon by the investigating authority, the purpose of Article 12.1 has presumably been subverted.

148 United States - Imposition of Anti-dumping Dutie s on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon
from Norway , ADP/87, 30 November 1992 , paras. 347-351 (adopted); accord, United States - Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway , SCM/153,
4 December 1992, paras. 216-220 (adopted).
149 Guatemala makes similar arguments regarding the memoranda supporting its preliminary and final
determinations of dumping. See Guatemala first submission, paras. 286 and 386.
150 The same rationale applies to the use of separate reports to explain the bases for the imposition of
subsequent measures.

(iv) Investigating authorities enjoy considerable latitude under Article 6 of the A-D Agreement in
developing the evidentiary record
5.153 Mexico contends that Guatemala violated Article 6 of the AD Agreement, as well as Annexes
I and II thereto, in developing the evidentiary record of the investigation. Specifically, Mexico
attempts to persuade this Panel, inter alia, that the Guatemalan authorities violated their obligations
by: (1) failing to fix a precise time-frame for th e submission of evidence; (2) attempting to gather
additional evidence during an on-the-spot verification of the exporting firm; and (3) rejecting certain
“technical accounting evidence” submitted late in the proceeding. The Panel should reject Mexico’s
arguments and refrain from supplementing the already-detailed provisions regarding the development
of evidentiary records with the additional requirements proposed by Mexico.
5.154 Article 6.1 provides that “[a]ll interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be
given notice of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.”
Articles 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.1.3 further require, respectively, that exporters or foreign producers be
accorded at least 30 days in which to reply to a questionnaire, that evidence submitted by one party be
made available promptly to other parties, and that authorities provide the full text of an application to
the known exporters and authorities of the exporting Member. Article 6.2 adds, in pertinent part, that
interested parties to an investigation “shall have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests.”
5.155 While Article 6 sets forth a host of procedural requirements that an investigating authority
must follow in requesting informat ion, nowhere does it specify, as Mexico appears to believe, that
investigating authorities must fix a particular time-frame for the collection of evidence during an
investigation. So long as the investigating authority has provided a reasonable opportunity for
respondent exporters or producers to answer information requests, the A-D Agreement does not limit
the timing of such requests. Indeed, depending on the complexities of a case, an investigating
authority may need to solicit extensive informa tion during the final phase of an investigation.
Likewise, nothing in the A-D Agreement precludes the extension of the period of investigation, and
Article 6 should not be read as prohibiting per se the collection of information related to this extended
period.
5.156 Also contrary to Mexico’s arguments, investigating authorities are free under the terms of the
A-D Agreement to seek additional information – within reason – while conducting on-the-spot
verification visits. According to Mexico, Guatemala was not entitled under Article 6.7 to seek new
information from Cruz Azul during its planned verification. Mexico appears again to be asking this
Panel to restrict the latitude investigating authorities possess under the A-D Agreement in developing
evidentiary records.
5.157 Article 6.7 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In order to verify information provided or to obtain further details , the authorities
may carry out investigations in the territory of other Members as required, provided
they obtain the agreement of the firms concerned and notify the representatives of the
government of the Member in question, and unless that Member objects to the
investigation. The procedures described in Annex I shall apply to investigations
carried out in the territory of other Members.
5.158 Paragraph 7 of Annex I elaborates on the scope of investigating authorities in conducting on-
the-spot verifications:
5.159 As the main purpose of the on-the-spot invest igation is to verify information provided or to
obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received
unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by the

investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard
practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be
verified and of any further information which needs to be provided , though this should not preclude
requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained.
5.160 Article 6.7 and Annex I thus expressly recognize that the examination of information already
on the record at an on-the-spot verification in no way precludes the solicitation of additional
information. While Mexico argues that the “further details” an investigating authority may attempt to
acquire are necessarily limited to details corresponding with information already on the record, such
an interpretation is neither required nor envisaged by the Agreement’s text. Paragraph 7 of Annex I,
after all, clearly provides that investigating authorities should, before commencing verification,
inform exporting firms of “any further information which needs to be provided.”
5.161 At any rate, Mexico’s narrow textual argument appears to mask the real issue – Cruz Azul’s
unwillingness to provide information crucial to the calculation of an accurate margin of dumping.
Mexico does not deny that Cruz Azul refused to provide either sales information related to the
extended period of investigation, or information regarding its costs of production. The United States
submits that, given the firm’s intransigence in providing requested information, Guatemala acted
reasonably in attempting to obtain this information while verifying the accuracy of other evidence of
record. Indeed, Guatemala appears to have done more than required under the A-D Agreement by
providing Cruz Azul with yet another opportunity to provide the withheld information.
5.162 Mexico makes much of the “technical accounting evidence” presented by Cruz Azul after the
aborted verification, and objects strenuously to Guatemala’s rejection of this evidence. Yet nothing in
Article 6 requires investigating authorities, in developing an evidentiary record, to rely upon
information that does not comply with the inve stigating authority’s pre-verification information
requests and is presented after verification. While Mexico contends that the Guatemalan authorities
should have accepted and relied upon the “technical accounting evidence” after the failed verification
attempt, nothing in the A-D Agreement required the Guatemalan authorities to base their final
determination of dumping on this information.
5.163 Annex II to the A-D Agreement elaborates upon the procedures that administering authorities
must follow in developing an evidentiary record. Paragraph 3, for example, states in relevant part,
that:
All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be
used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely
fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium, or computer language
requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are
made.
In light of the fact that Cruz Azul submitted this technical accounting information after the scheduled
verification, it is simply not tenable for Mexico to argue, as it does now, that Guatemala was required
to rely upon this information in its final analysis.
5.164 Paragraph 5 of Annex II instructs that “[e] ven though the information provided may not be
ideal in all respects, this should not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested
party has acted to the best of its ability.” Paragraph 6 further states:
If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed
forthwith of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further
explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of
the investigation. If the explanations ar e considered by authorities as not being

satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be
given in any published determinations.
5.165 The Guatemalan authorities acted consistently wi th these provisions as well in rejecting the
“technical accounting evidence.” For one, this information was not just less than “ideal in all
respects;” it was not even remotely compliant with Guatemala’s information requests. Also, by
waiting until after the scheduled verification to submit the information, Cruz Azul effectively ensured
that the Guatemalan authorities would not be in a position to verify it at all.
5.166 Under these circumstances, the United States cannot concur with the Government of
Mexico’s argument that Guatemala was required to base its final determination, in whole or in part,
upon the unverified “technical accounting evidence.” Mexico’s claims incorrectly ignore Cruz Azul’s
failure to provide the investigating authority with timely and complete information regarding, for
example, its production costs.
(v) Investigating authorities have discretion to consider all relevant circumstances when making
preliminary and final injury or threat of injury determinations and are not limited to the
factors enumerated in the A-D Agreement
5.167 Mexico incorrectly argues that Guatemala erred when it relied on data on domestic
inventories of clinker rather than on inventories of grey portland cement in its final injury
determination. The A-D Agreement gives an investigating authority the discretion to consider all
relevant circumstances when determining whether a domestic industry is injured or threatened with
injury from subject imports. It does not limit an in vestigating authority to considering only specific
factors or product comparisons. For instance, Articles 3.4 and 3.7 of the A-D Agreement specifically
permit an investigating authority to consider factors which are not enumerated as injury or threat of
injury factors.
151
5.168 Therefore, Mexico is incorrect when it claims that an investigating authority may not find
inventories of a dedicated input relevant when determining whether a domestic industry is injured or
threatened with injury. Dete rmining the relevance of such factors based upon the particular
circumstances affecting imports and the domestic industry is central to a proper injury or threat
analysis under the A-D Agreement. Considering inventories of a dedicated input can be especially
relevant in cases involving a product under investigation that has a short or unstable shelf life, making
it impractical for producers to maintain large inventories of the finished product. Thus, manufacturers
of these types of products may find it more efficient and economical to maintain their inventories, not
in the finished product, but in a semifinished, shelf stable product that can be quickly and cheaply
transformed into the finished product. The Panel should not restrict the ability of investigating
authorities to accord relevance to information regarding the inventories of upstream products.
5.169 The United States also disagrees with Mexico’s claim that an investigating authority may not,
after initiating an investigation based on allegations of threat of material injury, make a final
determination of present injury without specific justification for the change. Without reaching the
procedural issues that Mexico raises under Article 6, the United States submits that the AD
Agreement does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to examine all relevant evidence
gathered during the course of an investigation, ir respective of its determination in the preliminary
phase of the investigation. At the initiation phase, Article 5.3 dictates that an authority should
ascertain whether the application contains “sufficient information to justify the initiation of an

151 The last sentence of Article 3.4 states: “This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these
factors necessarily give decisive guidance.” The last sent ence of the first paragraph of Article 3.7 states in part:
“[i]n making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the authorities should
consider, inter alia, such factors as . . .”

investigation.” Nothing in that Article suggests that the scope of an investigation is limited to the
issues on which the applicant could present evidence prior to investigation. A preliminary
determination serves the function of, inter alia , assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify proceeding with a full investigation, incl uding with respect to injury. Consequently, it is
reasonably likely that a preliminary determination will not include all of the information a full
investigation could obtain. Thus, a decision at the preliminary phase based on either of the two bases
set out in footnote 9 of the A-D Agreement is without prejudice to a finding on full investigation that
the other ground is met.
5.170 In the course of an antidumping investigation, the bulk of the evidence which forms the basis
of the final determination is generally gathered after the preliminary determination. The Agreement,
including Article 6, envisions that evidence at the point of a final determination may be much more
expansive than the more limited evidence available at the initiation or preliminary stages. Thus,
preliminary evidence may indicate that a domestic industry is threatened with material injury by
reason of subject imports, but as more evidence is gathered and upon closer inspection, a final
determination of present material injury may be justified.
(b) Requirements of DSU Article 19
5.171 In its first submission, Mexico argues that this Panel should (a) “recommend” that Guatemala
bring the offending measures into conformity with Guatemala’s obligations under the GATT 1994
and A-D Agreement, and (b) “suggest” that Guatemala revoke its anti-dumping measure concerning
imports of Mexican cement and refund improperly collected duties. The United States respectfully
submits that the Panel should refrain from exercising its discretion to suggest specific ways in which
Guatemala might bring any offending measures into conformity with its obligations under the A-D
Agreement. The Panel should particularly avoid suggesting specific remedies with a retroactive
component, such as the refund of duties.
5.172 Article 19 of the DSU defines the remedial authority of panels:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with the agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or
Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement
the recommendations.
Article 19 thus clearly distinguishes “recommendations” from “suggestions.” Where a panel finds a
violation of an obligation, it must recommend that the offending measure be brought into conformity
with the obligation at issue; however, a panel need not suggest specific ways in which this may be
accomplished.
5.173 In addition to the express language of the DSU regarding the nature of panel and Appellate
Body recommendations, it is the general practice of reviewing bodies to refrain from issuing specific
recommendations. The United States urges this Panel to adhere to this practice. The requirement
that panels issue general recommendations reflects the purpose and role of dispute settlement in the
WTO and, before it, the GATT 1947. Article 3.4 of the DSU provides that “[r]ecommendations and
rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter,” and
Article 3.7 provides that “[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute . . . is clearly to
be preferred.” To this end, Article 11 of the DSU directs panels to “consult regularly with the parties
to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
Ideally, a mutually agreed solution will be achieved before a panel issues its report. However, if this
does not occur, a general panel recommendation that directs a party to bring an offending measure
into conformity with its obligations still leaves parties with the necessary room to cooperate in

arriving at a mutually agreed solution. A panel’s suggestion of specific procedures for the correction
of an offending measure could impede such cooperation because the suggested solution is likely to be
perceived by the complaining Member as the panel’s preferred solution to the dispute.
5.174 Retroactive remedies, such as the refund of anti-dumping duties sought by Mexico, suffer
from the same defects as specific remedies. In addition, however, retroactive remedies are
inconsistent with the established practice of panels of refraining from recommending – or suggesting
– remedies that attempt somehow to restore the status quo ante or otherwise compensate the
prevailing party for WTO-inconsistent actions taken by the defending party. As explained by the
panel in the Norway - Toll Collection Equipment case, involving procurement by a Norwegian city of
electronic toll collection equipment, there was no basis under GATT law for annulling the contract
and recommencing procurement.
152 The panel stated that it was not appropriate to issue a
recommendation that would operate retroactively because “[r]ecommendations of this nature had not
been within customary practice in dispute settlement under the GATT system and the drafters of the
Agreement on Government Procurement had not made specific provision that such recommendations
be within the task assigned to panels under standard terms of reference.”153
5.175 The conclusions of the Norway - Toll Collection Equipment panel – even though they related
to government procurement rather than trade flows – are fully consistent with the general principle
that GATT rules are generally considered as protecting “expectations on the competitive relationship
between imported and domestic products,” rather than “expectations on export volumes”.154 Thus, no
GATT 1947 or WTO panel ever has awarded monetary compensation to an exporting country for lost
trade. Moreover, even if GATT 1994/WTO rules were intended to restore lost trade volumes, the
retroactive remedy of a duty refund requested by Mexico would not accomplish this objective,
because the repayment of duties to individual importers would not reestablish the competitive
conditions that a prevailing country could have expected in the absence of a WTO-inconsistent action
by a party.
5.176 As Guatemala correctly notes, panels in anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases have
been careful to avoid specific and retroactive remedies – even in suggesting ways in which offending
measures could be brought into conformity with GATT/WTO obligations. Thus, in United States -
DRAMs, the panel rejected Korea’s request that it suggest revocation of the anti-dumping duty order
at issue and amendment of a pertinent regulatory provision.
155 Instead, the panel concluded that,
given “the range of possible ways in which we believe the United States could appropriately
implement our recommendation, we decline to make any suggestion in the present case”.156 Similarly,
the Guatemala I panel, citing Article 21.3 of the DSU, emphasized that “the modalities of
implementation of a panel, or Appellate Body, recommendation are for the Member concerned to
determine”.157

152 Norway - Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim , GPR/DS2/R,
adopted 13 May 1992 (“Norway - Toll Collection Equipment”).
153 Id., para. 4.17.
154 See, e.g., United States - US Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , L/6175, adopted
17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136, 158, at para. 5.1.9.
155 United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs)
of One Megabit or Above from Korea , WT/DS99/R, circulated 29 January 1999, Report of the panel
(“United States - DRAMs”).
156 Id., para. 7.4.
157 Guatemala I, at para. 8.3. The Guatemala I panel declined to issue a suggestion on implementation
with respect to its finding that Guatemala had violated Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement. Id. at para. 8.4. With
respect to its finding that Guatemala had violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, it suggested “that
Guatemala revoke the existing anti-dumping measure on imports of Mexican cement, because, in our view, this
is the only appropriate means of implementing our recommendation.” Id. at para. 8.6. However, the panel did
not suggest that Guatemala should also refund improperly collected duties.

5.177 Even where panels have offered suggestions in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
context, these suggestions have been general and prospective in nature. In the recent United States -
Lead and Bismuth Steel Products decision, the panel refused to suggest, as advocated by the European
Communities, that the United States amend its law to bring the offending measure into conformity
with US obligations under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. Rather, the panel
suggested “that the United States take[] all appropriate steps, including a revision of it administrative
practices, to prevent the aforementioned violation of Article 10 of the SCM Agreement from arising
in the future”.
158
5.178 This appropriate reluctance even to suggest specific actions a Member might take is grounded
in the likelihood that a country might have at its disposal a variety of administrative or regulatory
mechanisms with which to bring offending measures into conformity with its obligations. Further,
panels generally lack expertise in the domestic law of a defending Member. Indeed, the DSU
provides, at Article 8.3, that citizens of Members whose governments are parties to a dispute normally
shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, absent agreement by the parties.
5.179 For these reasons, the United States submits that, while Article 19.1 of the DSU expressly
permits suggestions as to the ways in which offending measures might be brought into conformity
with the obligations of a covered agreement, GATT/WTO practice reveals that – at least with respect
to obligations regarding the conduct of anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations – even
the suggestion of specific and retroactive remedies is in most instances inappropriate.
VI. MAIN ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING ISSUES ARISING UNDER
THE AD AGREEMENT AND GATT 1994
159
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF
1. Submissions of Guatemala
6.1 Guatemala makes the following submissions regarding the standard of review and the burden
of proof in these proceedings:
(a) Standard of review
6.2 Mexico is seeking a re-examination of the hundreds of factual matters considered by the
Ministry in connection with the underlying administrative proceedings. In order to do so, the Panel
would have to substitute itself for the Ministry. The Panel should not allow Mexico to interpret the
standard of review unilaterally for its own purposes.
6.3 The Panel review is not a substitute for the proceedings conducted by the national
investigating authorities.160 Various panels have recognized that the role of panels is not to carry out a
de novo review of factual matters. 161 Describing the role of panels in reviewing factual matters, the
Panel in the Korea – Resins case considered that:

158 United States - Imposition of Countervailing Du ties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R, circulated 23 December 1999, Report
of the panel, para. 8.2 (“United States - Lead and Bismuth Steel Products”).
159 The arguments of the parties are set out verbatim, as submitted to the Panel.
160 Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre
Underwear, WT/DS24/R, as modified by the Appellate Body, adopted on 25 February 1997, paragraph 7.12.
161 See, for example, idem, citing the report of the Panel in Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Polyacetal Resins from the United States , ADP/92, adopted on 27 April 1993, paragraph 227 (hereinafter
"Korea – Resins"); report of the Panel in United States – Initiation of a Countervailing Duty Investigation into

"the Panel should [not] substitute its own judgement for that of the KTC as to the relative
weight to be accorded to the facts before the KTC. To do so would ignore that the task of the
Panel was not to make its own independent evaluation of the facts before the KTC to
determine whether there was material injury to the industry in Korea but to review the
determination as made by the KTC for consiste ncy with the Agreement, bearing in mind that
in a given case reasonable minds could differ as to the significance to be attached to certain
facts."162
6.4 The standard of review to be applied by this Panel is contained in Article 17.6 of the AD
Agreement. In fact, the AD Agreement is unique in that it is the only covered Agreement containing
its own special standard of review.163
6.5 Subparagraph (i) instructs panels not to substitute their own judgement for that of the national
investigating authorities:
"In its assessment of the facts of the matter, the Panel shall determine whether the authorities'
establishment of the fact was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased
and objective, even though the Panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned.164
Moreover, by applying this standard, Article 17.6(ii) instructs the Panel to limit its review to the facts
that were known to the Ministry when it reached its determination (e.g. the evidence contained in the
administrative file).165
6.6 A panel may, "in its assessment of the facts of the matter", draw conclusions on the basis of
the facts contained in the file. 166 In Canada – Civilian Aircraft , the Appellate Body recently found
that "The drawing of inferences is … an inherent and unavoidable aspect of the panel's basic task of
finding and characterizing the facts making up a dispute."167
6.7 In examining the legal matters surrounding the true meaning of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Article 17.6(ii) stipulates that:
"the panel shall interpret the relevant prov isions of the Agreement in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the

Softwood Lumber Products from Canada , BISD 34S/194, adopted 3 June 1987 (hereinafter " Softwood
Lumber I").
162 Korea – Resins, ADP/92, paragraph 227 (Emphasis added).
163 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, paragraph 118, WT/DS121/AB/R,
circulated on 14 December 1999.
164 Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement (emphasis added). In its first submission, Mexico does not
recognize that the more lax standard of review set forth in Article 17.6(i) replaces the less lax standard of review
established by certain panels under the GATT (see, for example, first submission by Mexico, paragraphs 74-76).
165 In the case United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India (hereinafter United States – Wool Shirts ), the Panel refused to reinvestigate the market situation in
question. Rather, it maintained that the purpose of the panel review was limited to analysing "the evidence used
by the importing Member in making its determination to impose the measure" in question (Report of the Panel,
WT/DS33/R, as modified by the Appellate Body, a dopted on 23 May 1997, paragraph 7.21). The covered
Agreement in question in United States – Wool Shirts, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, does not contain
a special standard of review like the AD Agreement.
166 Report of the Appellate Body in Canada – Measures Affecting th e Export of Civilian Aircraft
(hereinafter Canada – Civilian Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted on 20 August 1999, paragraph 198.
167 Idem.

panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests
upon one of those permissible interpretations".168
This wording is designed to provide the authorities with a certain amount of flexibility.
Article 17.6(ii) stipulates that the authorities shall establish (or maintain) their own interpretations and
compliance procedures, particularly where the AD Agreement is obscure or ambiguous. The perfect
example of such a situation can be found in this dispute, where the failure to define certain key terms,
such as "sufficient" in Article 5.3, "as soon as" in Article 6.1.3, "adequate" in Article 12.1.1 and
"sufficient detail" in Article 12.2 has led to a certain amount of obscurity.
6.8 In other words, what is important in each case is not whether the challenged determination
rests on the best or "correct" interpretation of the AD Agreement, but whether it rests on a
"permissible interpretation" (of which there can be ma ny). If this is the case, then the Panel should
respect the determination of the Ministry of the Economy.
(b) Burden of proof
6.9 It is a known fact that Mexico, as complainant in this dispute, bears the burden of proving that
a WTO Agreement has been violated. This is explained extensively in the case United States – Wool
Shirts, where the Appellate Body found:
"In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial
settlement could work if it incorporated the position that the mere assertion of a claim might
amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including
the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the
rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible
for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law,
common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party,
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed
is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption."
169
6.10 In assuming the burden of proof, Mexico must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency
with a provision of the AD Agreement or the GATT 1994 which falls within the terms of reference of
the Panel, and it must do so before passing on to Guatemala the burden of proving compliance with
the provision in question. In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body found that:
"The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of
inconsistency with a particular provision of the Agreement on the part of the defending party,
or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When the prima facie
case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or
refute the claimed inconsistency."
170
"In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the evidence and arguments remain in equipoise", the
Panel must give Guatemala, as the respondent, "the benefit of the doubt".171

168 AD Agreement, Article 17.6 (ii).
169WT/DS33/AB/R, page 14 (footnote omitted).
170Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS/26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted on 13 February 1998, paragraph 98 (hereinafter "EC-Hormones").
171Report of the Panel in United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , WT/DS/152/R,
circulated on 22 December 1999, paragraph 7.14.

6.11 For example, in the case United States – Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (hereinafter United States –
DRAM), Korea challenged the rejection of an economic study in an anti-dumping investigation by the
United States Department of Commerce. In rejectin g the complaint, the Panel stated that Korea had
erred "in failing to advance anything beyond conclusive arguments in support of its claim that the
DOC should not have rejected the Flamm Study".
172
6.12 Consequently, the Panel considered that Korea had not established prima facie that the
United States had violated any provision of the AD Agreement.173
6.13 Similarly, it has been established that a panel cannot relieve the complainant of the burden of
establishing a violation. 174 In addressing this issue in the case Japan - Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products (hereinafter Japan-Agricultural Products) , the Appellate Body made the
following finding:
"… we consider that it was for the United States to establish a prima facie case that there is an
alternative measure that meets all three elements under Article 5.6 in order to establish a
prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 5.6. Since the United States did not even claim
before the Panel that the 'determination of sorption levels' is an alternative measure which
meets the three elements under Article 5.6, we are of the opinion that the United States did
not establish a prima facie case that the 'determination of sorption levels' is an alternative
measure within the meaning of Article 5.6".
175
6.14 The report continues with the following finding:
"Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement suggest that panels have a
significant investigative authority. However, this authority cannot be used by a Panel to rule
in favour of a complaining party which has not established a prima facie case of inconsistency
based on specific legal claims asserted by it. A panel is entitled to seek information and
advice from experts and from any other relevant source it chooses, pursuant to Article 13 of
the DSU and, in an SPS case, Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, to help it to understand and
evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to make the
case for a complaining party."176
6.15 In the present case, Mexico did not assume the burden of the proof, and the Panel should
therefore find that the final determination (and, in the alternate, the provisional determination) is
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
2. Rebuttal of Mexico
6.16 Mexico makes the following rebuttal arguments to Guatemala's submissions regarding the
standard of review and burden of proof in these proceedings:

172Report of the Panel in United States – DRAM , WT/DS/99/R, adopted on 19 March 1999,
paragraph 6.69.
173 Idem, paragraph 6.69. See also Idem, paragraph 6.80.
174 See, e.g. Report of the Panel in EEC-Quantitative Restrictions Agai nst Imports of Certain Products
from Hong Kong, BISD 30, page 129 (1983) (France argued that the terms of reference of the Panel stipulated
that the Panel must consider all of the justifications. The Panel did not agree).
175 Report of the Appellate Body, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products , WT/DS76/AB/R,
adopted 19 March 1999, paragraph 126.
176 Idem, paragraph 129 (emphasis added). See also the Report of the Appellate Body in the case
Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R, circulated on
14 December 1999, paragraph 147 (citing Japan - Agricultural Products).

(a) Standard of review
6.17 According to Guatemala, "Mexico is seeking a re-examination of the hundreds of factual
matters considered by the Ministry in connection with the underlying administrative proceedings" and
"In order to do so, the Panel would have to substitute itself for the Ministry." 177 It does not, however,
provide one single item of evidence of this. 178 Because this is a general statement without any
evidence, Mexico will not dwell on the matter. Nevertheless, the following comments are relevant:
(a) Any arguments concerning the standard of review in Article 17.6 are in vain because
Mexico based its request for the establishment of a Panel on Article 17 of the AD
Agreement. Furthermore, in its oral submission at the first substantive meeting,
Mexico reiterated its request that the Panel reach its determinations on the basis of the
standard of review in the AD Agreement.
179
(b) The Panel which examined Guatemala – Cement I took its decisions on the basis of
the standard of review in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, and, on that basis,
determined that Guatemala had committed a number of violations of the Agreement,
adding that the investigation should never have been initiated. 180 As is known,
Mexico had included this Report in this Panel's terms of reference and so it is obvious
that it is confident of a favorable outcome based on the rule in Article 17.6.
6.18 Irrespective of the foregoing, some aspects of Guatemala's arguments need to be highlighted:
(a) Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement has nothing to do with the facts known to the
Ministry, but refers to the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement. 181
Moreover, the consideration relating to the Canada – Civilian Aircraft case is
unrelated to Article 17.6(ii).182
(b) Article 17.6(ii) does not empower the authorities to establish "their own
interpretations and compliance procedures, particularly where the AD Agreement is
obscure or ambiguous". 183 This Article is aimed at the Panel, not at a Member's
authorities.
(c) Article 17.6(ii) is not, as Guatemala appears to suggest, a blank cheque for erroneous
interpretations of the AD Agreement on the pretext that its provisions are obscure. 184
What this Article does is to instruct this Panel to apply the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law and not to grant a waiver to interpret the AD
Agreement as wished. In other words, if the Panel accepts the Guatemalan authority's
interpretations, it must first interpret th e terms of the Agreement according to the
rules of interpretation of public international law and determine whether Guatemala's
interpretations correspond to this interpretation. It is only if it is found that a
provision has several acceptable interpretations that it should be determined whether
the Guatemalan authority's interpretations are based on any of these acceptable

177 Ibid., paragraph 116. See also paragraphs 196-198.
178 See, in particular, footnote 131 to Guatemala's first submission. Guatemala omits to mention that
paragraph 75 of Mexico's first submission deals precisely with the review criterion in Article 17.6 of the AD
Agreement.
179 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting with the parties, 15 February 2000.
180 See the Report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I, in particular, paragraphs 7.79 and 8.6.
181 See first submission by Guatemala, paragraph 119.
182 Ibid., paragraph 120.
183 Ibid., paragraph 121.
184 Idem.

interpretations. If this is not the case, the Panel cannot endorse the action by the
Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy.
(b) Burden of proof
6.19 The way in which Guatemala deals with the concept of burden of proof is particularly strange.
First of all, it states that Mexico must prove that a violation has occurred and concludes that "Mexico
did not assume the burden of the proof" without furnishing any grounds for this statement other than
the reports by other panels in completely unrelated cases.
185 Furthermore, Guatemala considers that it
has reversed the prima facie presumption of nullification or impairment by asserting that Mexico's
rights under Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement were not affected. 186 It would seem that Guatemala
expects the Panel to apply different criteria to it when determining compliance with the obligation to
substantiate its statements.
6.20 Mexico recognizes the procedural principle that "the burden of the proof lies with the party
making the assertion". This principle has been duly incorporated in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.187 What Mexico categorically rejects is Guatemala's attempt to take advantage of a
legitimate principle in order to cover up a ridiculous assertion which it cannot substantiate with
evidence, such as "Mexico did not assume the burden of proof". In order to be able to make such a
strong accusation, Guatemala should have identified the assertions in Mexico's first submission that
were not substantiated by relevant evidence. In addition, Guatemala cannot reverse the prima facie
presumption simply by asserting that Mexico was not affected by its violation of Article 5.5,
inasmuch as it confines itself to speculating on what would have occurred if Guatemala had not
violated the Article.
B.
INITIATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
1. Claims under Article 5 and Articles 2 and 3 – requirements for the initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.21 Mexico makes the following claims under Articles 5, 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement with
respect to the requirements for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.
6.22 The application made to the Ministry of the Economy by Cementos Progreso for initiation of
an anti-dumping investigation into grey Portland cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico (hereinafter the
"application for initiation") did not include relevant evidence of dumping, threat of material injury or
a causal relationship between the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged threat of material injury,
as required by Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. Moreover, the application for initiation did not
contain the information reasonably available to the applicant on the points specified in subparagraphs
(i) to (iv) of this Article.
6.23 The Ministry did not examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application by Cementos Progreso and initiated the investigation without sufficient evidence of
dumping, threat of material injury or a causal link between them to justify the initiation of an
investigation, as required by Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.

185 Ibid., paragraphs 125-128.
186 Ibid., in particular paragraphs 220 and 221.
187 See inter alia the reports of the Appellate Body in United States - Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India (WT/DS33/AB/R), adopted on 23 May 1997, pages 12 and 13. See
also EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R)
adopted on 13 February 1998, paragraph 98.

6.24 The Ministry also violated Article 5.7 and 5.8, as Article 5.7 requires that the evidence of
dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously when deciding whether or not to initiate an
investigation. If the Ministry had conducted this examination when deciding upon initiation, as
required by the AD Agreement, it would have been convinced that there was not sufficient evidence
of dumping and injury and would have rejected the application by Cementos Progreso, as required by
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
6.25 An application must also contain evidence and information on the essential elements of
dumping, injury and a causal link. The substantive provisions of Articles 2.1 and 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4,
3.5 and 3.7 inter alia on determining the existence of dumping and injury
188 respectively must be
taken into account by the investigating authorit y in order to assess whether the evidence in an
application is relevant and whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation according to Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
6.26 Article 5.2 states that an application for initiation must include evidence of dumping
according to the definition given in Article 2 of the AD Agreement. Moreover, when assessing
whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation, an
investigating authority must take into account the provisions of Article 2 regarding the methodology
and technical elements for calculating the dumping margin, determining the normal value and the
export price, and making the necessary adjustments to ensure a fair comparison.
189
6.27 In order to determine the sufficiency of eviden ce on the existence of material injury for the
purposes of initiation, it is also necessary to take into account the technical and economic factors
mentioned in the various provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement, including those referred to in
Article 3.2, 3.4 and 3.7. Article 5.2 in fact specifically refers to Article 3.2 and 3.4 and, even though
it does not expressly mention Article 3.5 and 3.7, it is obvious that they also apply to the decision to
initiate an investigation in cases of threat of material injury.
6.28 It cannot be argued that these substantive provisions do not apply to the decision to initiate an
investigation but only to the preliminary or final dete rmination of dumping, injury or threat of injury,
because information such as that mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 must be contained in the application
and must be taken into account when assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
initiation.
6.29 Nevertheless, when initiating the investigation, the Ministry totally disregarded the
substantive provisions on the determinations of dumping and injury laid down in Articles 2 and 3
respectively of the AD Agreement, which must be duly taken into account by the investigating
authority in order to comply with the requirement s on initiation specified in Article 5 of the AD
Agreement.
6.30 To summarize, and as can be seen throughout this section, the initiation of the anti-dumping
investigation by the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy did not comply with Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.7
and 5.8, nor the various provisions in Articles 2 and 3, of the AD Agreement.

188 Injury is understood as defined in footnote 9 to the AD Agreement, which defines injury, unless
otherwise specified, as material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or
material retardation of the establishment of such an industry.
189 Even when the criteria used to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping justifying
the initiation of an investigation are different to those used for a preliminary or final determination of dumping,
this does not mean that Article 2 should not be taken into account when determining whether an investigation
should be initiated. See section 1.A "Dumping" in Mexico’s first written submission.

(b) Response of Guatemala
6.31 The following are Guatemala's arguments in response to Mexico's claims under Articles 5, 2
and 3 of the AD Agreement:
6.32 Mexico complains that the Ministry did not "examine" the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence submitted with Cementos Progreso's application. 190 According to Mexico, the Ministry
should not have initiated the investigation until it had "evidence" 191 of injurious dumping based on a
"fair comparison" of Cruz Azul's prices in Mexico and Guatemala. 192 Mexico asserts that the
initiation of the investigation did not comply with "Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8, nor … various
provisions in Articles 2 and 3, of the AD Agreement." 193 Guatemala respectfully submits that these
arguments are based on a fundamentally erroneous notion of the initiation and conduct of
anti-dumping investigations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. If the Panel were to accept such
arguments, it would be undermining the spirit of the Agreement and requiring the authorities to
conduct investigations before initiating the inve stigation. For the following reasons, Mexico's
arguments must be rejected.
6.33 First, Article 5 of the AD Agreement establishes the requirements for initiating an anti-
dumping investigation. Under Article 5.2, it is not enough for the complainant to assert that there is
dumping and consequent injury. The complainant mu st support its claims with relevant evidence -
that is, the information described in sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of Article 5.2. While the application
must contain some evidence of dumping, injury and causal link, the evidence submitted must be
limited to such information as is "reasonably available to the applicant".194
6.34 Article 5.3, for its part, stipulates that "the authorities shall examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of an investigation". 195 If the authority determines that there is sufficient
evidence, Article 5.1 authorizes the initiation of an investigation "to determine the existence, degree
and effect of any alleged dumping …".
196
6.35 The AD Agreement does not define the term "investigation", but in its ordinary meaning, to
investigate signifies to search or to enquire. 197 If we apply this definition in the context of the AD
Agreement it follows that the "examination" that the authorities must conduct prior to initiation is
less than the examination, search or enquiry which takes place during the investigation. Mexico
repeatedly forgets this fact. It insists, for exampl e, that it is up to the Ministry to "ascertain" the
"legitimacy or veracity" of the documentary evidence submitted with Cementos Progreso's
application198 and to prove the normal value and export price before initiating the investigation. 199
This is absurd. No authority, however sophisticated and experienced, can "prove" the normal value or
the export prices before conducting an investigation. In a way, the real purpose of an anti-dumping
investigation is to "prove" the normal value and the export prices. The same applies to "verification".
Verification of the information (including invoices and import certificates) is something that the

190 First submission of Mexico, paragraphs 75, 89-90 and 111.
191 Idem, paragraphs 91, 92, 107-109.
192 Idem, paragraphs 98, 103, 107 and 126.
193 Idem, paragraph 64.
194 Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement.
195 Idem, Article 5.3 (emphasis added).
196 Idem, Article 5.1 (emphasis added).
197 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 1971);
see also Webster's Encyclopaedia Unabr idged Dictionary of the English Language, 749 (Gramercy Books
1994) ("1. The act or process of investigating or the condition of being investigated. 2. A searching enquiry for
ascertaining facts; a detailed or careful examination").
198 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 75, 89-90 and 111.
199 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 98, 103, 107 and 126.

authority does during the investigation, not before . Thus, Article 6.7 and Annex I of the AD
Agreement provide for the verification of information during the course of the investigation.
6.36 A look at the history of the negotiation of the AD Agreement confirms Mexico's error. 200
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Hong Kong and the Nordic countries
insisted that any application must include "information sufficient to permit the authorities concerned
to establish a prima facie case of dumping, of injury and of causality".
201 According to Hong Kong,
the intention of the proposed text was to clarify the circumstances under which an anti-dumping
investigation shall be initiated and to introduce a more definitive requirement of "evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie case". That the investigating authorities had a particular responsibility in the
vetting of complaints was emphasized.
202 This "more definitive requirement" was rejected during the
negotiations, and the standard of the Tokyo Round was maintained basically intact.
6.37 The report of the Panel in United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber
from Canada (hereinafter Softwood Lumber II ) serves as an illustration of the review which the
authorities must conduct before initiating the investigation.203
The Panel made the following observations:
"In analysing further what was meant by the term "sufficient evidence", the Panel
noted that the quantum and quality of evidence to be required of an investigating
authority prior to initiation of an investigation would necessarily have to be less than
that required of that authority at the time of making a final determination. At the
same time, it appeared to the Panel that "sufficient evidence" clearly had to mean
more than mere allegation or conjecture, and could not be taken to mean just "any
evidence". In particular, there had to be a factual basis to the decision of the national
investigative authorities and this factual basis had to be susceptible to review under
the Agreement".
204
This level of "sufficient" evidence to justify initiation is lower than the level of evidence
required for an affirmative preliminary or final determination, as confirmed by the Chairman of the
Panel in Softwood Lumber II:
"The Panel feels that a number of substantive concerns have been raised by the
parties in this case. The Panel saw considerable merit in many of Canada's criticisms
with respect to the United States' initiation of a countervailing duty investigation on
imports of softwood lumber from Canada. In particular, the Panel recognized that the
data and methodologies used by the United States contained shortcomings, in some
cases of a serious nature. A number of questions arose regarding particular aspects of

200 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention states that recourse may be had to preparatory work to verify
(or confirm) a meaning that emerges as a result of the textual approach. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, page 630 (Fourth Edition, 1990) (hereinafter "Brownlie").
201 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.5 (23 July 1990). Sufficien t evidence to establish "a prima facie case"
is essentially the amount of evidence that would support a finding if proof to the contrary is not considered. The
standard of "sufficient evidence" in Article 5.3 establishes a lower threshold.
202 Document MTN.GNG/NG8/W/51, page 4 (12 September 1989) (emphasis added).
203 Report of the Panel in United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from
Canada, BISD-40S/358, adopted 27 October 1993. Although the Softwood Lumber II report analysed the
sufficiency of evidence for the initiation of an investigation on countervailing measures, the aspects of the report
which referred to the amount of evidence required to justify initiation are equally applicable to anti-dumping
investigations. However, we must note that the standard of review set forth in Article 17.6 (i) governing this
dispute settlement procedure is more lax in respect of the findings of the investigating authorities than the
standard of review contained in Softwood Lumber II.
204 Idem, paragraph 332 (emphasis added).

the evidence addressed by the US Department of Commerce. Moreover, certain facts
available to the United States, for example on the impact of the recession, were, but
arguably should not have been, ignored. Such information might have had an
important bearing on this case, even at the initiation stage. However, the Panel had to
take into account that it was not reviewing a determination of the existence of
subsidy, injury and causality, but a finding that sufficient evidence of these elements
existed to warrant an investigation … The Panel was also aware, despite its rigorous
application of the criteria established in paragraphs 331, 332, 333 and 335 of its
report, of concerns that the threshold for initiation as applied in customary practice in
several countries was relatively low. Nonetheless, the Panel was of the view that the
threshold required by Article 2.1 of the Agreement for initiation of a countervailing
duty investigation was such that the Panel could not properly find that the United
States initiation in this case was inconsistent with that Article, having regard to the
standard of review".205
6.38 Second, contrary to what Mexico argues, an investigating authority cannot make a "fair
comparison" under Article 2.4 before concluding its investigation. 206 In general, the information
required to make a fair comparison is not available to the authority until it has concluded its
investigation and is ready to determine whether the imports at issue are being dumped in the meaning
of the AD Agreement. It is absurd to suggest, fo r example, that before initiating the investigation
Guatemala should have adjusted the level of trade in conformity with Article 2.4. As we shall argue
further on in greater detail, the adjustment of the level of trade is one of the most difficult anti-
dumping adjustments for the authorities to calculate and among those that require the most data.
6.39 To summarize, Mexico is mistaken in assertin g that in initiating its investigation on cement
from Mexico, the Ministry "violated" Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The
obligation to make a "fair comparison" under Article 2 and to "prove" injury under Article 3 only
applies to the final determination (and to a lesser extent, to the preliminary determinations).207 We are
not suggesting that Articles 2 and 3 are totally irrelevant during the initiation phase. Articles 2 and 3
contain definitions which give meaning to the expressions "dumping", "injury" and "causal link" used
in Article 5.2. When the authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted in
the application, those definitions help to establish whether there is "sufficient evidence" in the
meaning of Article 5.3 to justify the initiation of the investigation.
208 However, Mexico goes too far
when it states that:
"An investigating authority must take into account the provisions of Article 2
regarding the methodology and technical elements for calculating the dumping

205 Letter from Michael Cartland, Chairman of the Panel in Softwood Lumber II , to G. Salembier,
Chairman of the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (7 December 1992) (emphasis
appears in original). (This letter transmits the observations of the Panel and the Softwood II report) (hereinafter
the "Cartland Letter").
206 First submission by Mexico, paragraphs 98-103, 126.
207 Article 5.2(iv) establishes that the factors which serve to demonstrate injury listed in paragraphs 2
and 4 of Article 3 may be used as a guide for presenting information in an application. However, neither
Article 5.2 nor Article 5.3 make any other reference to Articles 2 and 3. This suggests, the very least, that it was
not the intention of the drafters that any other provision of Articles 2 or 3 should be applicable upon initiating
the investigation.
208 For example, if the applicant were to claim that imports were being dumped on the basis of the fact
that the exporter's prices were higher in the importing country than in the exporting country, causing injury to
the applicant's industry consuming that imported product, this allegation, however correct or well documented,
would not provide sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.

margin, determining the normal value and the export price, and making the necessary
adjustments to ensure a fair comparison."209
6.40 The Ministry carried out a full examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
supplied in the application submitted by Cementos Progreso. On the basis of this examination and of
all of the information before it, the Ministry reas onably determined that there was sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.41 The following is Mexico's rebuttal of Guatemala's response to its claims under Articles 5 and
Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement:
6.42 First of all, Mexico wishes to reaffirm its position that Guatemala violated Article 5.2, 5.3. 5.7
and 5.8, inter alia, of the AD Agreement by initiating the in vestigation without having examined the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence and without having sufficient evidence to allow it to evaluate
and establish properly the facts that have to be established in order to justify a determination to initiate
an investigation, i.e. the existence of dumping, a threat of injury and a causal relationship.
6.43 The main arguments and evidence substantiating Mexico's position have been put before the
Panel in Mexico's first written submission and in the evidence contained in the annexes attached
thereto, which allow the Panel to examine and note that, on the basis of the evidence available to the
Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy at the time of initiation, a reasonable and unbiased authority
could not have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, threat of material injury and
a causal relationship to justify its decision to initiate an investigation against imports of grey Portland
cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico. In this part of our rebuttal, therefore, we shall mainly focus on
responding to and rejecting several of the assertions made by Guatemala in its first submission and at
the first substantive meeting of the parties.
6.44 Mexico also reaffirms its rejection of Guatemala's distortion and manipulation in its first
submission
210 in an attempt misrepresent Mexico's arguments concerning various violations
committed in the course of initiation. This is why throughout this submission we shall clarify various
specific aspects in this regard, but first we shall inform the Panel that in general Mexico's position in
no way has the nuances or the "temporal" sense which Guatemala has tried to attribute to it on several
occasions by imputing to Mexico incorrect and absurd assertions.211
6.45 Mexico in no way suggested that it was a question of the Ministry "taking its time" or
"examining the evidence more carefully" because in certain respects the evidence was simply non-
existent. Suffice it simply to read the corresponding section in Mexico's first written submission,
including the paragraph to which Guatemala itself refers,
212 to see that at no time did Mexico claim
what Guatemala is presenting in a distorted and tendentious way in an attempt to substantiate an
initiation that is flagrantly inconsistent with the AD Agreement. What Mexico did assert is that the

209 First submission by Mexico, paragraph 60 (emphasis added).
210 See inter alia paragraphs 129, 171 and 174.
211 Guatemala continues to distort Mexico's arguments in its oral submission at the first substantive
meeting (14 and 15 February 2000), in paragraphs 26 and 29.
"26. In its first submission, Mexico tries in vain to chip away at this mountain of evidence. For
example, it claims Guatemala violated Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the AD Agreement because the Ministry's
evidence of normal value was somehow deficient and because it did not wait
 for precise figures on the
volume of Cruz Azul's imports …" (emphasis added).
29. Second, Mexico errs when it asserts that Guatemala did not 'verify' the accuracy and adequacy
of the information presented by Cementos Progreso, and that Guatemala should not have initiated its
investigation until it had 'proof' of injurious dumping by Cruz Azul …" (Emphasis added).
212 Guatemala's first written submission, footnotes 145, 146, 205-208.

facts which must be established in every case in order to justify the initiation of an investigation
pursuant to the AD Agreement (i.e. the existence of the alleged dumping, injury and a causal
relationship) were not duly established in this case because of the insufficient evidence before the
Ministry of the Economy and therefore its initiation determination cannot be substantiated by any
admissible interpretation of the various provisions in Article 5, which were violated by Guatemala.
6.46 Guatemala also misrepresents Mexico's arguments and is mistaken in indicating in
paragraph 171 of its first submission that "Mexico never objected directly to any of the evidence
mentioned". It is more than obvious in these pr oceedings that Mexico's complaints regarding the
initiation are basically related to the lacunae in the application and, above all, to the evidence put
forward by Cementos Progreso in order to comply w ith Article 5.2. Mexico has also objected to the
lack of accuracy and adequacy of the evidence on the alleged dumping and the total absence of
evidence on threat of injury and the causal relationship, all facts which prevented the Ministry of the
Economy from determining the objective sufficiency of the evidence in order to justify the initiation
of the investigation, as required by Article 5.3.
6.47 An examination of these matters by the Panel therefore necessitates in the first place a
determination of whether the facts which lead to the acceptance of a request and, where applicable the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation (i.e. the existence of sufficient evidence of dumping, injury
and the causal relationship of the evidence pursuant to Article 5.2, 5.3. 5.7 and 5.8) were duly
established by the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy; and whether the Ministry conducted an
unbiased and objective assessment of these facts. It is also necessary to decide whether the various
omissions and actions of the Ministry in connection with its initiation determination can be
substantiated according to a permissible interpretation of the relevant provisions of the AD Agreement
which lay down the conditions for the initiation of an investigation.
6.48 As we have already stated, Mexico for its part furnished the arguments and evidence of the
violations committed in respect of initiation in its first written submission. The main aspects on
which Mexico's claims regarding initiation of the investigation are based are the following:
6.49 FIRST: Cementos Progreso's application
213 was clearly insufficient to meet the requirements
of Article 5.2. Firstly, it did not include relevant evidence of the alleged dumping. Secondly, it did
not contain evidence, not to mention relevant evidence, of any sort concerning the alleged threat of
material injury and the corresponding causal relationship, which is not the subject of the slightest
claim in the application. Thirdly, contrary to what is argued by Guatemala 214, the information in
Cementos Progreso's application cannot be considered as constituting all the information reasonably
available to the complainant on the data required in accordance with subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of
Article 5.2.
6.50 SECOND: The investigation was initiated by the Ministry in clear violation of Article 5.3
because the Guatemalan authority failed to examine, or in the best of cases undertook an insufficient
examination of, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application, and initiated the
investigation without sufficient proof to justify its initiation. If the Ministry had conducted an
examination of the accuracy and adequacy as required by Article 5.3, it would have seen that not only
did the evidence in the application in no way constitute accurate and adequate proof to substantiate
the alleged dumping but also that evidence on the alleged threat of injury was simply non-existent in
Cementos Progreso's application, which only provided a series of assertions and suspicions without
attaching any evidence to substantiate them. The same may be said of the causal relationship, which,
as we have already pointed out, was not even claimed in the application. The foregoing, together with

213 Both the original application of 21 September 1995, and the supplemented application of
9 October 1995.
214 See Guatemala's first written submission, paragraphs 138-151 and Guatemala's oral submission at
the first substantive meeting, paragraph 25.

the fact that the investigating authority did not make any effort to obtain more evidence other than that
in the application and confined itself to plainly and simply accepting the limited evidence and mere
declarations furnished by Cementos Progreso, will necessarily lead the Panel to find that the
investigation was initiated without sufficient evidence to justify initiation.
6.51 THIRD: It is also clear that the Ministry failed to comply with Article 5.7, which requires
that the evidence of dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously when deciding whether or
not to initiate an investigation. If the authority had fully met this obligation, it would have perceived
the lack of sufficient evidence of dumping and injury, in accordance with Articles 2 and 3, to underpin
its determination on initiation.
6.52 FOUR: The Ministry violated Article 5.8 because it should have rejected the application and
refrained from initiating the investigation due to insufficient evidence.
6.53 Having summarized the central elements of Mexico's position on the violations committed in
respect of initiation, some important aspects substantiating Mexico's position are set out below, taking
into account the relationship existing among the provisions relevant to the present case and
responding to some of the arguments put forward by Guatemala in its first written submission and its
oral submission at the first substantive meeting.
6.54 As regards the applicability of Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Mexico states as follows:
6.55 Guatemala contends that Article 5, and not Article 3 (or Article 2), establishes the
requirements for initiation of an investig ation under the AD Agreement (paragraph 180 of
Guatemala's first written submission). Indeed, it is Article 5 that establishes the requirements for
initiation, but this does not mean that Articles 2 and 3 are not to be taken into account in initiating an
investigation. If by reading Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8 together we are to understand that an
investigation can only be initiated if there is sufficient evidence of dumping and injury (including
evidence of a causal link), then Articles 2 and 3 indisputably apply to the initiation determination if
that determination is to be consistent with the various requirements established under Article 5.
6.56 Article 5.2 and 5.7 expressly refer to evidence of dumping and injury, and the scope of these
provisions extends to the obligations contained in Article 5.3 and 5.8 which refer to this same
evidence. Meanwhile, Articles 2 and 3, which are expressly entitled "Determination of dumping" and
"Determination of injury", in fact establish the substantive provisions applicable to such
determinations without distinction as to the different moments at which these determinations must be
made during an investigation.
6.57 Consequently, it cannot be argued that the provisions contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the
Agreement do not apply to the decision to initiate an investigation, and that they apply only to the
preliminary or final determination of dumping and injury or threat of injury. On the contrary, it has
been recognized that in an anti-dumping investigation, dumping and injury must be established, albeit
with different levels of evidence, at three different moments, i.e. in the initiation determination, in the
preliminary determination and in the final determination. In this connection, the Panels in USA –
Softwood Lumber 215 and Guatemala – Cement I 216 established that the subject-matter or type of
evidence needed to justify initiation is the same su bject-matter or type of evidence as that needed to
make a preliminary or a final determination, although the quality and quantity of the evidence needed
for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation is less than for a preliminary or final determination
of dumping and injury.

215 United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, SCM/162 , report
adopted on 27 October 1993, BISD 40S/426, paragraph 332.
216 Report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I, paragraphs 7.67 and 7.77.

6.58 Seen from this angle, we submit that for an initiation determination to be consistent with
Article 5, it is necessary for an investigating authority to take account of the various provisions of
Articles 2 and 3 in order to ensure that the evidence of dumping and injury on which the initiation
determination is based contains the same subject-matter or is of the same type as the evidence
required for a preliminary or final determination of dumping and injury, even if the level of evidence
is clearly different. Only then can the investigating authority:
(i) Evaluate and establish in the first instance whether the application for initiation meets
the requirements of Article 5.2, in particular whether it includes evidence of the
existence of dumping, injury and causal link;
(ii) evaluate and establish whether the evidence of the alleged dumping and the alleged
injury or threat of injury meet the standard of sufficiency contained in Article 5.3 for
justifying the initiation of the investigation, or whether, on the contrary, the
application should be rejected pursuant to Article 5.8. In this connection, both the
examination required under Article 5.3 and that required under Article 5.7 must be
conducted in the light of the substantive provisions of Articles 2 and 3, since the
accuracy, adequacy and, where applicable, sufficiency of evidence to justify initiation
must in fact be established in direct relation to the (determination of) dumping and
injury, including as an integral part of this concept, the causal link pursuant to
Article 3.5.
6.59 Moreover, we can also assert that for the purposes of an initiation determination, the
investigating authority must take account of the various provisions of Articles 2 and 3, to ensure
consideration of all areas which the provisions of Article 5 expressly or implicitly require to be
considered. For example, Article 5.2 (iv) expressly refers to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3; so that
to evaluate the evidence of dumping implicit reference is made to the relevant provisions of Article 2
concerning the normal value and the export price, and to Article 3.5 for the establishment of a causal
link between dumped imports and the alleged injury. Here, Mexico's position is perfectly consistent
with the findings of the Panels in United States – Softwood Lumber and Guatemala – Cement I.
6.60 In view of the above, Mexico cannot agree wi th Guatemala's argument that for the purposes
of an initiation determination Articles 2 and 3 are not applicable or are only applicable in a limited
way with respect to the definitions of dumping and injury. If this were the case, Article 5 would refer
expressly and exclusively to the definitions of dumping and injury contained in Article 2.1 and
footnote 9 of the Agreement respectively.
6.61 It is up to the Panel to evaluate the need to decide whether or not there is any inconsistency
per se with Articles 2 and 3. Mexico's position has focused more on the argument that for the
initiation of an investigation to be consistent with the provisions of Article 5, the determination of
dumping and injury must be consistent with the provisions of Articles 2 and 3, and not run counter to
their meaning. The fact is that an initiation dete rmination such as the one at issue, in which it is
evident that the investigating authority did not take account of the nature of the evidence of dumping
and injury, clearly violating a number of the relevant provisions of Articles 2 and 3, including aspects
expressly provided for in Article 5, is obviously inconsistent with Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(d) Guatemala's response to rebuttal of Mexico
6.62 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's rebuttal:
6.63 The factual record shows clearly that Cruz Azul began to export relatively large quantities of
grey Portland cement to the Guatemalan market at dumped prices in the middle of 1995 in an effort to

avoid the devastating effects of a severe recession in Mexico caused by the devaluation of the peso in
December 1994. The record also shows that Cruz Azul's export prices were significantly lower than
its prices in Mexico and the prevailing prices on the Guatemalan market. In fact, these prices were
even lower than Cementos Progreso's production costs. Although Cementos Progreso responded by
lowering its prices, even then it lost customers and market share to Cruz Azul. Indeed, in the six
months immediately prior to the initiation of the investigation, Cruz Azul's share in the Guatemalan
market went from 0 to 25 per cent.
6.64 Threatened by a flood of dumped imports in its only market, Cementos Progreso had no
choice but to file an anti-dumping application with the Guatemalan investigating authority. In its
application, dated 21 September 1995, and the supplementary application of 9 October 1995,
Cementos Progreso provided the Ministry with all of the information reasonably available to it on
dumping, injury and causal link in conformity with Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. With respect to
dumping, the company provided the Ministry with invoices, bills of lading and import certificates
showing that Cruz Azul was selling grey Portland cement in Mexico at Q 27.62 per sack, while at the
same time, just the other side of the border, it was selling grey Portland cement in Guatemala at only
Q 14.77 per sack. This difference reflected a margin of dumping of 87 per cent.
217 With respect to
injury, Cementos Progreso provided information concerning loss of sales, loss of customers and a
trend towards penetration of imports which, in the space of one single day, basically went from 0 to
480 tons (representing a loss of sales of approxima tely US$60,000). Finally, with respect to causal
link, the company provided the Ministry with evidence of price undercutting by Cruz Azul, an
increase in Cruz Azul imports and the effect of Cruz Azul imports on Cementos Progreso's profits,
sales and investment plans.
6.65 During the first meeting, Mexico tried desperately to cast doubt on this evidence. Firstly, it
scolded Guatemala for not gathering more evidence of injurious dumping before initiating the
investigation. According to Mexico, it is "incomprehensible" that Cementos Progreso should not have
provided (and the Ministry collected) more ev idence during the period of time between the
submission of the supplementary application on 9 October 1995 and the initiation of the investigation
a few months later.218
6.66 Furthermore, Mexico repeatedly argues that Guatemala simply "did not conduct the
examination required" under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. 219 According to Mexico, Guatemala
did not conduct the "examination required" with respect to the type of cement 220, the size of the
sacks221, "representivity" of the sales222, level of trade223 and exchange rates.224
6.67 Mexico maintains that the result of this examination is not important. It does not seem to care
who ended up being the "beneficiary" of any particular adjustment.225 What is important, according to
Mexico, is that Guatemala allegedly failed to carry out the examination required under Article 5.3 of
the AD Agreement.226

217 See, for example, first submission by Guatemala, paragraph 154.
218 Oral submission of Mexico, paragraphs 62 and 82. Curiously, in other parts of its oral submission
(paragraphs 107-109), Mexico accuses Guatemala of "manipulating" similar language contained in Mexico's
first written submission. See, for example, first written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 128 and 134-136.
219 See, for example, oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 88.
220 Idem, paragraphs 86-89.
221 Idem, paragraphs 92-94.
222 Idem, paragraphs 96-98.
223 Idem, paragraphs 99-100.
224 Idem, paragraphs 101-103.
225 Idem, paragraph 90.
226 Idem.

6.68 Finally, Mexico continues to insist that Guatemala violated Articles 2 and 3 of the AD
Agreement by initiating the challenged investigation. 227 For example, according to Mexico the
investigation was initiated in spite of a "total absence of evidence of an alleged threat of injury".228
6.69 As we shall demonstrate below, some of these arguments make no sense and none of them
have any merit.
6.70 Firstly, like the Panel, Guatemala does not really understand what Mexico means when it uses
the term "representivity". 229 Mexico never explained where this "representivity" requirement comes
from, nor has it explained the basis for its assertion that the alleged "lack of representivity … without
any doubt affected the comparison made between the normal value and the export price". 230 I f
Mexico uses this term to mean "sufficient quantity" as indicated in footnote 2 to Article 2.2 of the AD
Agreement
231, then Guatemala fully respected its WTO obligations as discussed in detail in the reply
to question 17 of the Panel to Mexico.232
6.71 Secondly, Mexico paints a false picture when it adduces that Guatemala did not conduct the
"examination required" under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.233 In any anti-dumping investigation,
there are thousands of potential adjustments. Adjustments can be made with respect to like products,
support to industry, transactions between related parties; or there could be price or cost adjustments
associated with the costs of maintaining an inventory, credit expenditures, interest payments to banks,
bonds, advertising costs, transport costs (pre-sale and post-sale), reimbursement of tariffs in tolling
operations, tax rebates and sales commissions. The list is practically infinite. However, at the time of
initiation, the factual record before the authorities is incomplete by definition. Thus, the authorities
can only address the matters which appear in an affirmative form. All other adjustments, real or
imaginary, must be addressed, where appropriate, during the course of the investigation.
6.72 In this dispute, for example, the Ministry had no reason whatsoever to believe at the time of
initiation that the cement sold in Mexico was di fferent from the cement that Cruz Azul sold in
Guatemala. As explained in greater detail in our first written submission, the invoices for the sales in
Mexico identified the cement as "grey cement" and "Cruz Azul" cement.
234 The evidence of the
export price - which was supported by import certificates, invoices and bills of lading - identifies the
product as "grey cement", "grey Portland cement" and "type II Portland cement with pozzolana".
Since the price of cement in Guatemala had been regulated for more than 50 years, this evidence
indicated to the Ministry that the sales that were being compared concerned "grey cement".
6.73 It is also wrong for Mexico to state that it is not important whether a particular adjustment at
the moment of initiation could have benefited Cruz Azul. This Panel was established to resolve a
dispute, not to issue a consultative opinion. Mexico maintains that Guatemala initiated an anti-
dumping investigation in violation of Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In particular,
Mexico maintains that the evidence which the investigating authority of Guatemala had before it at
the time of initiation was not "sufficient" to justify an investigation. Guatemala disagrees.

227 See, for example, Idem, paragraphs 121-122.
228 See, for example, paragraph 111. See, also, Idem, paragraph 63. ("Cementos Progreso did not
provide any information in support of its assertions concerning the alleged threat of material injury.")
229 See questions of the Panel to Mexico, 18 February 2000, Geneva, 17-18 (hereinafter Appendix I).
230 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 98. See, also, first submission of Mexico, paragraphs 122-
123 and 234-236.
231 As Mexico suggests in paragraph 168 of its oral submission.
232 Appendix I, question 17 to Mexico.
233 See, for example, oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 88.
234 Mexico recognizes, in paragraph 113 of its first written submission, that the invoices documenting
the sales in Mexico did not identify the product as a particular or special type of grey cement. If this had been
the case, the invoices would probably have reflected the fact.

6.74 In its defence, Guatemala showed, inter alia, that the Ministry did have "sufficient evidence"
in the meaning of Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to justify the initiation of an
investigation. As part of this demonstration, it was shown that even if Mexico had been right in
certain of its claims, Guatemala still had sufficient evidence to justify the initiation. For example, in
its first written submission, Guatemala stated that an adjustment for the size of the sacks would have
left a margin of 59 per cent 235 and any adjustment for the type of cement would probably have
increased the margin.236 This demonstration is entirely relevant.
6.75 Mexico is the complainant in this dispute, and as such bears the burden of proving that a
WTO Agreement was violated.237 It is therefore up to Mexico to establish prima facie that there is an
inconsistency with a provision of the AD Agreement or the GATT 1994 included in the Panel's terms
of reference before the burden of proving the consistency of the provision in question is shifted to
Guatemala. As found by the Appellate Body in the case European Communities - Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones):
"The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of
inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending
party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima
facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn
counter or refute the claimed inconsistency."
238
"In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the evidence and arguments remain in equipoise", the Panel
must give Guatemala, as defending party, "the benefit of the doubt".239
6.76 Mexico did not fulfil the requirements of presenting a prima facie case of inconsistency. At
least, Guatemala refuted the claimed inconsistency.240
6.77 Third, Mexico is mistaken in asserting that the initiation of the investigation was
"inconsistent" with Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement. 241 As we discussed in detail in our first
written submission, this argument is not support ed by a permissible interpretation of the AD
Agreement242 and was not supported by the United States243 or the European Union.244 Mexico is also
mistaken in adducing that the investigation was initiated in spite of a "total absence of evidence of
injury".245 As we explained in detail in our first written submission, the Ministry had plenty of
evidence of injury at the time of initiation.246
6.78 Finally, Mexico is right about one thing. Guatemala could have collected more evidence of
dumping, injury and causal link before deciding whether the evidence it had before it was "sufficient"

235 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 160, footnote 191.
236 Idem, paragraph 159.
237 Idem, paragraphs 123-128 (regarding the burden of proof).
238 WT/DS/26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R adopted on 13 February 1998, paragraph 98.
239 Report of the Panel in United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , WT/DS/152/R,
circulated on 22 December 1999, paragraph 7.14.
240 This explains why Guatemala asked Mexico during the first meeting with the Panel whether the
87 per cent ad valorem margin of dumping would have disappeared if all of the adjustments sought by Mexico
had been made.
241 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 121-122.
242 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 135-136.
243 Submission by the United States as third party, 27 January 2000, paragraph 15.
244 Submission by the European Union as third party, 27 January 2000, paragraph 16.
245 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 111. See also Idem, paragraph 63 ("Cementos Progreso did
not provide any information in support of its assertions concerning the alleged threat of material injury.")
246 See first written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 166-181.

to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. 247 The Ministry could have wasted many
years and millions of quetzals gathering further information; in fact, the Ministry could still be
gathering evidence. But this is not the point. The point is, that in January 1996 Guatemala had
"sufficient evidence" to launch an anti-dumping investigation. In our first written submission and
during the first meeting we demonstrated that the only correct reply to this question would be "yes".
6.79 As we indicated during the first meeting with th e Panel, it is possible that others, including
the Panel, would have done things differently.
248 Looking back upon decisions that were taken more
than four years ago, it is easy enough to identify things that might have been done differently -
additional information that might have been gathered or a particular enquiry which might have been
pursued before deciding on the initiation. For example, in the case Measures Affecting Imports of
Softwood Lumber from Canada (hereinafter Softwood Lumber II ) the Panel considered that the data
and methodologies used by the United States contained "shortcomings". 249 The Panel even
considered that the United States had "ignored" certain facts that were important and that "might have
had an important bearing on this case, even at the initiation stage". 250 But the Panel did not reverse
the decision to initiate. The Panel recognized that it was only reviewing a decision justifying the
investigation and not a final determination based on a complete file.
251
6.80 The Panel in Softwood Lumber II also stated that the term "sufficient evidence" clearly had to
mean "more than mere allegation or conjecture". 252 According to the Panel "there had to be a factual
basis to the decision of the national investigative authorities". 253 In the present case, Guatemala had
a factual basis for initiating the investigation. Cementos Progreso's application and the supplementary
application contained more than mere "allegation or conjecture". These documents contained, among
other import figures and trends, information on prices backed by invoices, bills of lading and other
elements, market prices in Guatemala, and evidence of price undercutting. In fact, it was shown that
the prices of the dumped imports averaged only Q 13.96 per sack, almost 15 per cent less than the
average price of Q 26 charged by Cementos Progreso in Guatemala. Once again, if Mexico or the
Panel had been the investigating authority, they might have done certain things differently or they
might have arrived at a different conclusion. However this is not the point. It is not the Panel's job to
take over from the investigating authority of Guatemala. The Panel's mandate consists in determining
whether, according to Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agr eement, Guatemala's decision to initiate rested on
facts which were properly established and evaluated in an unbiased and objective manner. In
fulfilling this task, the Panel should bear in mind that the evidence of injurious dumping available to
the authority at the time of initiation will be incomplete and imperfect by definition. This is what
investigations are for - to gather more complete information.

247 See first oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 62 and 82 (arguing that it is "incomprehensible"
that neither Cementos Progreso nor Guatemala collected further evidence before deciding to initiate").
248 Oral submission by Guatemala, 14 February 2000, Geneva, paragraphs 31-38 (hereinafter oral
submission by Guatemala).
249 Letter by Michael Cartland, Chairman of the Panel on Softwood Lumber II , to G. Salembier,
Chairman of the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (7 December 1992) (letter
transmitting the observations of the Panel and the report in Softwood Lumber II).
250 Idem.
251 Report of the Panel in Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada , BISD 40S,
adopted 27 October 1993, paragraph 359. While the report in Softwood Lumber II analysed the sufficiency of
evidence to initiate an investigation on countervailing measures, the elements of the report relating to the
quantity of evidence needed to justify the initiation are also applicable to anti-dumping investigations.
However, the standard of review contained in Article 17.6(i) governing this dispute settlement procedure is
more deferential to the findings of the investigating authorities than the standard of review in Softwood
Lumber II. See oral submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 28-29 (where a distinction is made between the
standard of review in Softwood Lumber II and the standard of review in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
252 Idem, paragraph 332.
253 Idem.

2. Claims under Articles 5.2 and 5.3 – "sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of and
investigation"
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.81 Mexico further makes the following claims under Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement:
(i) Evidence to be Included in an Application
6.82 Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement states the following:
"An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury
within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and
(c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple
assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to
meet the requirements of this paragraph." (Emphasis added.)
6.83 As the Panel may note, the application for initiation by the firm Cementos Progreso, in
violation of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, did not include relevant evidence of dumping, threat of
injury and a causal link between them, as required by Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement. The
investigation was in fact initiated on the basis of two delivery notes for cement and two import
certificates, without even knowing the total amount of imports from Mexico, in the complete absence
of evidence regarding the alleged threat of injury to the Guatemalan industry and the equally complete
absence of evidence or even arguments regarding a causal link or relationship between the alleged
dumping and the alleged threat of injury.
6.84 Article 5.2 also states that the application mu st contain "such information as is reasonably
available to the applicant" on:
"(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the
domestic production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application
is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry
on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers
of the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to
the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of
the like product accounted for by such producers;
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the
country or countries of origin or export in question, the identify of each known
exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in
question;
(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined
for consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or
export (or, where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold
from the country or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on
the constructed value of the product) and information on export prices or, where
appropriate, on the prices at which the product is first resold to an independent buyer
in the territory of the importing Member;
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports,
the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and
the consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by

relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry,
such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3."
6.85 A mere glance at the application for initiation in this particular case shows clearly that the
applicant, like the Ministry, failed to observe these requirements. It is not only highly doubtful
whether the requirements laid down in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) were respected, for example, a
description of the volume and value of the domestic production of the like product and a complete
description of the product by the applicant, which in this case were obviously inadequate or
incomplete, but, what is more serious, the appl icant failed to provide the information required by
subparagraphs (iii) and (iv), which in general was certainly reasonably available to it.
6.86 The information contained in Cementos Progreso’s application (essentially two delivery notes
and two import certificates, together with a number of unsubstantiated allegations) could not therefore
be considered as all the information reasonably available to the applicant, nor as relevant evidence of
dumping, still less a threat of material injury and a causal link between the imports allegedly dumped
and the alleged threat of material injury to the domestic industry. The sections below will provide
further details regarding the lack of evidence on each of these elements.
6.87 For the moment, it must be stated that, even though in principle Article 5.2 undoubtedly lays
an obligation on the applicant to provide evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link between the
two in its application, together with the informati on reasonably available to it on the points indicated
in subparagraphs (i) to (iv), it is also true that, under the AD Agreement, this requirement is also
incumbent upon the investigating authority because, according to Article 5.8, an investigating
authority must accept an application if these requirements are met or reject it if such evidence and/or
information as is reasonably available to the applicant is not provided. This should have been done by
the Ministry of the Economy, as will also be explained in a subsequent section of this submission.
6.88 Mexico also argues that the Guatemalan authorities violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement
by not examining the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence contained in Cementos Progreso’s
application and by initiating the investigation without sufficient evidence to justify this. Article 5.3
provides the following:
"The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in
the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation."
6.89 As can be seen from the text of the Agreement itself, Article 5.3 lays an obligation on the
investigating authority that results from Article 5.2. In other words, once the authority has accepted
an application after having determined that it cont ains evidence of the existence of the three elements
required, namely, dumping, injury and a causal relationship, as well as the information reasonably
available to the applicant on the points specified in Article 5.2, it must then examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application, but in this instance to "determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation".
6.90 This means that Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement imposes on the investigating authority an
obligation that goes beyond determining whether or not an application meets the terms of Article 5.2.
This provision requires that, once it has been determined that the requirements of Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement have been met, the authority must also examine whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify the initiation of an investigation. If it de termines that the evidence and information contained
in the application are not accurate nor adequate to support the conclusion that there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiating an investigation, the authority must refrain from initiating the
investigation or it may ex officio try to obtain evidence and information that will allow it to meet the
sufficiency standard laid down in the AD Agreement in order to initiate an investigation. The Panel
that considered this matter previously concluded that:

"7.53 … In particular, there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent an investigating
authority from seeking evidence and information on its own, that would allow any
gaps in the evidence set forth in the application to be filled. We do not suggest that
such action by the investigating authority is in any case required by the AD
Agreement."
6.91 The Panel that heard the case United States –Softwood Lumber, when referring specifically to
a panel’s role of examining the consistency of a decision to initiate an investigation with the
provisions of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, stated:
"The Panel considered that in reviewing the action of the United States authorities in
respect of determining the existence of suff icient evidence to initiate, the Panel was
not to conduct a de novo review of the evidence relied upon by the United States
authorities or otherwise to substitute its judgment as to the sufficiency of the
particular evidence considered by the United States authorities. Rather, in the view of
the Panel, the review to be applied in the present case required consideration of
whether a reasonable, unprejudiced person could have found, based upon the
evidence relied upon by the United States at the time of initiation, that sufficient
evidence existed of subsidy, injury and causal link to justify initiation of the
investigation."254 (Emphasis added.)
6.92 In the present case as well, therefore, the Panel had to examine whether, on the basis of the
evidence available to the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy at the time of initiation, a reasonable,
unprejudiced authority could have found sufficient evidence of dumping, threat of material injury and
a causal link to justify its decision to initiate the investigation into imports of grey Portland cement
from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul.
6.93 Although neither Article 5 nor any other prov ision of the AD Agreement defines what is
meant by "sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation", certain Panel decisions are
indicative in this regard. The report of the Panel in the United States – Softwood Lumber case is also
important in this respect when it states the following:
"In analysing further what was meant by the term ‘sufficient evidence’, the Panel
noted that the quantum and quality of evidence to be required of an investigating
authority prior to initiation of an investigation would necessarily have to be less than
that required of that authority at the time of making a final determination. At the
same time, it appeared to the Panel that ‘sufficient evidence’ clearly had to mean
more than mere allegation or conjecture, and could not be taken to mean just ‘any
evidence’. In particular, there had to be a factual basis to the decision of the national
investigative authorities and this factual basis had to be susceptible to review under
the Agreement. Whereas the quantum and quality of evidence required at the time of
initiation was less than that required to establish, pursuant to investigation, the
required Agreement elements of subsidy, subsidized imports, injury and causal
linkage between subsidized imports and injury, the Panel was of the view that the
evidence required at the time of initiation nonetheless had to be relevant to
establishing these same Agreement elements."
255(Emphasis added.)

254 United States – Measures affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada , SCM/162, report
adopted on 27 October 1993, BISD 40S, paragraph 335.
255 Idem, paragraph 332. Although in the United States – Softwood Lumber case ex officio initiation of
an investigation into countervailing duties was contested, inter alia because it was claimed that the evidence was
insufficient to justify initiation, these aspects of the report are equally applicable to the initiation of anti-
dumping investigations.

6.94 However, in the special circumstances of this investigation, it is particularly important to take
into account the relationship between Article 5.2 (whi ch lays down the requirements to be met in an
application) and Article 5.3 (which establishes the requirement of sufficiency of evidence to justify
the initiation of an investigation).
6.95 As we have already stated, it is obvious that the two delivery notes and the two import
certificates submitted to the Ministry together with the application cannot, according to the minimum
acceptable standard, be considered all the information reasonably available to the applicant because
Cementos Progreso even went so far as to fail to submit information that was certainly reasonably
available to it, for example, information on several of the factors mentioned in subparagraphs (iii) and
(iv).
6.96 Nevertheless, even supposing - although Mexico does not accept this - that the evidence
submitted with the application had been all the information reasonably available to the applicant, this
does not imply that, in the circumstances of this particular case, the evidence was accurate or relevant
to be able to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of the investigation within
the meaning of Article 5.3.
6.97 Even if the information provided by Cementos Progreso in its application was deemed to be
all the information reasonably available to it, which Mexico rejects, these two provisions (Article 5.2
and 5.3) cannot acceptably be interpreted to mean that Article 5.3 authorizes an investigating
authority to initiate an anti-dumping investig ation solely because an application meets the
requirements of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement (which were not even met in this case).256
6.98 In other words, even supposing - without agreeing - that the information needed to be able to
determine that there was sufficient evidence was no t reasonably available to the applicant, this does
not mean that the lack of information in Cementos Progreso’s application became the criterion for
considering that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation in accordance with Article 5.3 of the
AD Agreement.
6.99 Moreover, as happened in this case, if an authority, prior to initiation, does not make any
effort to obtain evidence other than the mere al legations and clearly insufficient evidence in the
application (two delivery notes and two import certificates), it is obvious that the AD Agreement
cannot authorize the initiation of an investigation on such bases. Even if it was all the information
reasonably available to the applicant, an objective and unbiased examination would not allow it to be
deemed sufficient to justify initiation. In fact, in its own application for initiation, Cementos Progreso
requested the Ministry to collect certain information on the volume of imports that it was not in a
position to obtain. The Ministry, however, only sought this information after the investigation had
been initiated.
6.100 Taking into account the limited documentation submitted by Cementos Progreso in its
application for initiation, as well as the fact that at no time prior to initiation did the Guatemalan
authority request fuller information from Cementos Progreso or even try to obtain additional
information or evidence by any other means in order to make good the deficiencies in the application,
the Panel can see that the Ministry of the Economy did not conduct the examination of the accuracy
and adequacy of the evidence required by Article 5.3 and therefore could not have satisfactorily
established the objective sufficiency of the evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
6.101 Even though the recommendation of 17 November 1995 (which served as the basis for
resolution 2-95 of 15 December 1995 by the Ministry’s Director of Economic Integration) refers to an

256 Compliance with the requirements of Article 5.2 does not ipso facto mean that there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiating an investiga tion in accordance with Article 5.3. See Guatemala – Cement ,
paragraph 7.51.

alleged analysis of the information submitted and appears to reach the conclusion that there was
sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation, it is
clear that neither in the determination on initiation of 9 January nor in the public notice of
11 January 1996 is there any indication whatsoever to show that the investigating authority did in fact
examine the accuracy, adequacy, and above all sufficiency, of the evidence submitted by Cementos
Progreso, as required by Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
6.102 In Mexico’s opinion, the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso in its application was far
from being accurate or adequate. However, even if it were considered accurate or adequate, that
would not mean that it was sufficient, and the decision to initiate an investigation must be taken in the
light of the objective sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence cannot be accurate, adequate and,
certainly not sufficient, simply because the inves tigating authority considers it to be so, as the
Ministry did without any grounds.
6.103 An examination of the documentation prior to initiation to be found in the administrative file
necessarily leads to the conclusion that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not
rightly have made the determination made by the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy. Given the
circumstances of this case, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not rightly have
determined that there was sufficient evidence of the three elements required by the AD Agreement to
justify the initiation of an investigation.
6.104 Lastly, Mexico shares the view of the Panel in the case United States – Softwood Lumber to
the effect that the quantum and quality of the evidence to be required at the time of initiation are less
than the quantum and quality of the evidence required for a preliminary or final determination of
dumping, injury or a causal link
257 requiring evidence of the same nature. In the present case it is
obvious beyond any doubt that the information before the investigating authority was not in any way
the type of evidence, nor of the quantum and quality required when initiating an investigation in order
to determine the existence of dumping, threat of injury or a causal link, in accordance with the
substantive provisions of the AD Agreement (i.e. Articles 2 and 3).258
6.105 To illustrate this, suffice it to take as an example in this particular case the two delivery notes
used as the basis for calculating the alleged normal value and consequently to determine the existence
of dumping. These delivery notes only mention the product as "grey cement" or "Cruz Azul cement",
without specifying the type of cement, so they do not show whether this is a like product potentially
the subject of the investigation (Type I PM grey Portland cement). This description only indicates
that it is not white cement, but it does not specify whether it is grey Portland cement or whether or not
it is pozzolanic cement.
6.106 Likewise, the Guatemalan authorities never ascertained the legitimacy or veracity of these
documents which, as can be seen, are not proper invoices according to Mexican legislation but merely
delivery notes issued by independent distributors that do not deal solely with Cruz Azul and may
simply have falsified the entry "Cruz Azul cement" or have entered "grey cement" without it
necessarily being from the firm Cruz Azul.
6.107 The fact that the Ministry did not satisfy itself as to the veracity or legitimacy of these
documents nor ask Cementos Progreso for more evidence (other than the two delivery notes) nor
obtain it on its own initiative shows that the Guatemalan authority did not examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the necessarily limited evidence before it and on which it based its initiation decision. In

257 United States – Softwood Lumber, paragraph 332.
258 "… The subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to
make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the quality and quantity is less." Guatemala –
Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala – Cement) , WT/DS60/R,
Report of the Panel, adopted on 25 November 1998, inter alia, paragraph 7.67.

the light of the foregoing, it is also obvious that the two delivery notes do not constitute accurate and
adequate information either and are certainly not sufficient, neither in nature, quantum nor quality.
6.108 To summarize, Mexico contends that:
(i) The application by Cementos Progreso was accepted by the Ministry of the Economy
in flagrant violation of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement because the information it
contained cannot be considered as the type of adequate evidence needed to prove
dumping, the threat of injury and the causal link, neither can the two import
certificates be considered all the information reasonably available to the applicant;
(ii) in open violation of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, the Ministry based its initiation
decision on insufficient evidence. An unbiased and objective investigating authority
examining such evidence could not have properly determined that there was sufficient
evidence of dumping, still less the existence of a threat of material injury, and a
causal link between the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged threat of material
injury to the Guatemalan domestic industry.
(ii) Evidence of Dumping
6.109 The Ministry of the Economy initiated the investigation in question only taking as adequate
evidence of dumping copies of the two delivery notes to show the normal value, dated 25 and
26 August 1995, corresponding to the sale in Mexico of one load of cement each; and import
certificates corresponding to two transactions for 7,035 and 4,221 sacks of cement dated 14 and
15 August 1995 as proof of the export price.
259
6.110 These documents were submitted by Cementos Progreso in its application for the initiation of
an investigation and in fact neither in the extension of the application nor in the file on the case is
there any indication that the Ministry had any other information. Even the Panel which examined the
case stated "There is no indication that any other information on dumping was available to or
considered by the Ministry."260
6.111 Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, however, provides that, for the purposes of complying with
the requirements on initiation, simple assertion is not sufficient unless it is substantiated by relevant
evidence. An application must therefore contain the information reasonably available to the applicant
in relation to subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of this Article.
6.112 Although it is true that there is no minimum or maximum amount of documentation that must
be submitted in order to prove dumping, this does not mean that any documentation suffices to justify
the initiation of an investigation in a particular case. Article 5.2 prescribes that an application must
include relevant evidence of dumping and Article 5.3 makes it necessary to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
6.113 As we have already stated, when considering whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping
to justify the initiation of an investigation, an investigating authority cannot disregard the provisions
of Article 2 of the AD Agreement because this is th e provision that expressly refers to dumping and
applies both to the initiation of an investigation and to the determination of a provisional or definitive
measure. The nature or type of evidence required to justify initiation are the same as the nature or
type of evidence required to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the
quality and quantity may be less for initiation.

259 Import certificates together with their corresponding invoices and bills of lading.
260 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.61.

6.114 As we have also mentioned, Article 2 establishes the technical elements for calculating the
dumping margin, determining the normal value and the export price, as well as the adjustments
required for a fair comparison. In this particular case, Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement is especially
relevant:
"A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due
allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels
of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability." (The footnote has been omitted.)
6.115 In this particular case, it can be clearly seen that the Ministry failed to make a fair comparison
between the normal value and the export price for the following reasons:
(a) The transactions that were the subject of comparison were at different volumes and
levels of trade, so it is obvious that the prices used to establish the normal value were
retail prices to the public, whereas the export prices were the manufacturer’s prices to
the distributor;
(b) the conditions of sale for these transactions were under different circumstances
because the information contained in the delivery notes used to prove the normal
value referred to the price of 50 kg. bags of cement, whereas the import certificates
used to prove the export price showed the price of 42.5 kg. bags of cement;
(c) the dollar-peso exchange rate claimed by Cementos Progreso was not documented
and was solely based on an affirmation by the applicant without any substantiation
whatsoever, i.e. there was no proof.
6.116 Regarding the above, the Panel which previously examined the Guatemala – Cement case,261
when considering the differences noted in the documentation submitted to prove the normal value and
the export price, particularly the volumes of the product investigated and the levels of trade,
concluded:
"7.62. The two invoices reflect two separate sales at the retail level of one sack of
cement of unspecified weight each. The import documents reflect two separate
import transactions at the distributor (or wholesale) level of several thousand sacks of
cement, each sack weighing 94 pounds (42.6 kilograms). The alleged margin of
dumping is calculated in the application by comparing the average retail price for the
cement bought in Mexico (converted into Guatemalan Quetzales at then current rates)
with the average c.i.f. value of the cement imported into Guatemala (converted into
Guatemalan Quetzales at then current rates). The Ministry recommended initiation
based on this information. In our view, this comparison ignores obvious problems
with the data: (1) the transactions involv e significantly different volumes; and (2)
the transactions occurred at different levels of trade." (Emphasis added.)
6.117 Thus, the prices shown on the delivery notes used to prove the normal value and those in the
documentation used to show the export price, are not comparable according to Article 2.1 and 2.4.
The analysis must take due account of the differences affecting the comparability of the prices shown
on each and to do otherwise would be a serious violation of Article 2 of the AD Agreement.

261 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.62.

6.118 In its letter of 26 July 1996, the Ministry acknowledged that it had not made adjustments to
the prices shown on the alleged invoices nor on the import certificates in order to place them on a
comparable level, stating that it was the responsibility of the exporting firm to prove that there was no
dumping:
"With respect to the points on which you sought clarification as to the criteria used by
the investigating authority to determine the existence of dumping and the threat of
injury to the domestic industry, please be informed that the Department of Economic
Integration of the Ministry of the Economy of Guatemala considered the evidence
submitted showing differences between the prices of cement being sold on Mexican
territory and that being sold in our country to be sufficient. It was not possible to
make any adjustments at the date when the initial resolution was published, as these
are made on the basis of information supplied by the exporting company, which is
concerned to demonstrate that the alleged dumping does not exist." 262 (Emphasis
added.)
6.119 It is important to point out that this shows a total lack of understanding of and compliance
with the AD Agreement as the latter does not provide that exporters are responsible for proving that
there is no dumping. They obviously have the right to defend their interests in this regard. The
Agreement does, however, make the applicant responsible for providing adequate evidence of
dumping and the investigating authority responsible for not accepting an application when this
evidence is lacking and not initiating an investigation when there is not sufficient evidence.
6.120 At the least, the Ministry should have recognized that such adjustments were needed in order
to make a fair comparison. Concerning the failure to make the necessary adjustment to allow a fair
comparison according to Article 2.4, the Panel which previously considered this matter stated:
"…In our view, this provision" (Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement) "establishes an
obligation for investigating authorities to make a fair comparison. Investigating
authorities can certainly expect that exporters will provide the information necessary
to make adjustments and demonstrate that particular differences for which
adjustments are sought affect price comparability. However, the authorities cannot,
in our view, ignore the question of a fair comparison in determining whether there is
sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, particularly when the need for
adjustments is apparent on the face of the application …". 263 (Emphasis added.)
6.121 The above shows that the evidence submitted together with the application was not sufficient
to justify initiation of the investigation. It was initiated on the basis of two delivery notes/invoices for
one load of cement each (to determine the normal value) and import certificates for two transactions
(to determine the export price) without any relevant evidence as to the total volume of imports and the
trend in imports allegedly dumped or other factors relevant to initiation.
6.122 The Ministry thus determined the normal value of the product investigated using solely the
average of the retail selling price shown on the alleged invoices attached to the application, without

262 Letter of 26 July 1996 from Ms. Edith Flores de Molina, Ministry of the Economy of Guatemala,
sent to Mr. Eduardo Solis, Secretary for Trade and Industrial Development of Mexico.
263 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.65.

making a fair comparison with the export price and duly taking account of the different levels of
trade, quantities and exchange rate, thereby violating Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement.264
6.123 Likewise, information on the evolution of the total volume of imports allegedly dumped was
not supplied in the application, in violation of Article 5.2(iv) of the AD Agreement, and it cannot
simply be claimed that this information was not reasonably available to the applicant for the purposes
of initiating the investigation because, based on an unbiased and objective assessment of the
information in its possession, the Ministry could not rightly have determined that there was sufficient
evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation. This was acknowledged by the
Ministry when, after initiating the investigation, it requested the Directorate General of Customs to
supply information on the volume of imports, which could have been done by the applicant or the
Ministry during the months prior to initiation of the investigation (11 January 1996) or after receiving
the application for initiation (21 September 1995).
6.124 In addition, the fact that the authority simply assumed that the application contained all the
information reasonably available to the applicant is not sufficient to obviate the fact that the applicant
did not submit relevant evidence regarding the normal value, the export price nor the evolution in
imports, thus violating Article 5.2, and that the Ministry, disregarding Article 2 of the AD Agreement,
did not take into account the necessary adjustments in order to make a fair comparison between the
normal value and the export price. In other words, lack of information in an application cannot
become the standard for compliance with sufficiency of evidence on the premise of "information
reasonably available to the applicant".
6.125 The Panel which considered the Guatemala – Cement case 265 concluded that the Ministry
committed a number of violations of the AD Agreement in the following terms:
"7.66. In this case it is apparent on the face of the application that the alleged normal
value and the alleged export price are not comparable for purposes of considering
whether dumping exists without adjustment. The recommendation to the Director of
the Department of Economic Integration reflects this lack of comparability when it
states that the normal value is the average price ‘to the final consumer’ and the export
price is the average of ‘the c.i.f. values’. However, there is no recognition of the need
for any adjustments in either the recommendation or the notice of initiation. While
we would not expect the authorities to have, at the initiation stage, precise
information on the adjustments to be made, we find it particularly troubling that there
is not even any recognition that the normal value and export price alleged in the
application are not comparable, nor any indication that more information on this issue
was requested from the applicant or otherwise sought by the Ministry. When, as in
this case, it is evident from the informatio n before the investigating authority that
some form of adjustment will be required to make a fair comparison and establish a
dumping margin, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not, in our
view, properly determine that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify
initiation in the absence of such adjustment, or at least without acknowledging the
need for such adjustment." (The footnote has been omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
6.126 In addition, under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, the documents submitted by the applicant
cannot be considered as accurate and adequate evidence to prove the normal value nor the export
price.

264 All these differences necessarily increase the dumping margin artificially: indeed different volumes
are compared since the normal value concerns 50 kg. of cement and the export price transactions for 4,000 to
7,000 sacks.
265 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.66.

6.127 Firstly, with regard to the alleged invoices showing the normal value:
6.128 Neither of the two alleged invoices mentions the type of cement so the Ministry could not be
sure whether it was a like product to that being investigated, according to the terms of Article 2.1 and
2.6 of the AD Agreement, or the content of the loads of cement (a fact that is particularly relevant in
this case as 50 kg. bags are sold in Mexico and 42.5 kg. bags in Guatemala, and was curiously omitted
by the applicant).
6.129 Consequently, the Ministry could not be certain that the product covered by the two alleged
invoices was in fact the product investigated and not another more expensive product. It is not
sufficient for the purposes of accuracy and adequacy to argue that all types of grey Portland cement,
with or without pozzolana or modified pozzolana, come under tariff heading 2523.29.00 of the
Central American Tariff System when, on the one hand, the product investigated is identified on the
basis of declarations by the applicant and the examination of the likeness of products to be undertaken
by the investigating authority according to Article 2.1 and 2.6 of the AD Agreement and, on the other,
where applicable, physical and chemical differences among products result in different prices
irrespective of the tariff classification.
6.130 Regarding price differences for the products, it is not enough to argue that this information
was not reasonably available to the applicant because the various types of cement are not mentioned
in the delivery notes for the cement sold in Mexico.
6.131 In fact, the Ministry did not in fact ask Cementos Progreso for, or collect or try in any way to
obtain, further information on the type of product sold, whether it was a like product, the prices of the
product sold in Mexico or the export price. This shows that the Guatemalan investigating authority
did not undertake the examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence required by
Article 5.3 and incorrectly determined that there was sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation,
thereby violating Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.132 In the application for initiation of an investigation submitted on 21 September 1995, the
following is indicated under point X entitled "Charact eristics of the product subject to unfair trade
practices":
"Cement is a product which uses clinker as a raw material (mixture of natural
minerals with hydraulic properties). Five per cent gypsum (hydrated calcium
sulphate, burned, milled and mixed with water) is added to the clinker, together with
10 to 15 per cent of pozzolanic material (volcanic rock). It is then pulverized and
thoroughly mixed in special mills. The result is a powder called PORTLAND
CEMENT". (Emphasis added.)
6.133 The documents submitted to prove the export price are two import certificates (with the
corresponding invoices and two bills of lading). One of the certificates identifies the product as "grey
Portland cement, tariff heading 2523.29.00". The other mentions "Type II grey Portland cement with
pozzolana, tariff heading 2523.29.00". The two invoices from Cruz Azul define the product as
"Type II grey Portland cement with pozzolana". The two bills of lading identify the product as "grey
Portland cement".
6.134 In Section II entitled "GENERAL INFORMATION" of the extension of the application for
initiation of an investigation of 9 October 1995, the following appears:
"Detailed description of the domestic product
The domestic product is grey Portland cement, which is packaged in 42.5-
kilogramme sacks, the equivalent of 94 pounds. The commercial name is grey

Portland cement, Cementos Progreso brand, and it is intended for use in the
construction industry.
Detailed description of the imported item
The imported item is grey Portland or pozzolanic cement, in 94-pound bags, under
the brand name La Cruz Azul, and is intended for use in construction".
6.135 In Section IV of the extension application entitled "FEATURES OF THE DOMESTIC
INDUSTRY", the following appears:
"… to produce clinker – a raw material used in the production of Portland cement – a
mixture of natural ores is processed to yield an intimate mixture of artificial ores with
hydraulic properties … Once the new material is obtained, i.e. the raw material
clinker, it is combined with 5 per cent gypsum (hydrated calcium sulphate, burned,
milled and mixed with water) and 10 to 15 per cent pozzolanic material (volcanic
rock) and the mixture is pulverized and mixed thoroughly in special mills. The
mixture of clinker, gypsum and pozzolana produces a powder called Portland
cement." (Emphasis added.)
6.136 The above clearly highlights differences in identifying the product investigated and, for the
reasons already explained, shows the failure to examine both whether they were like products, 266 and
the price difference, which must be taken into account where applicable, as well as the failure to
examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence prescribed by Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
6.137 Furthermore, on the basis of the type of evidence submitted by the applicant, it was not
possible for the Ministry to satisfy itself as to the amount of the product sold because 50 kg. sacks are
sold in Mexico and 42.5 kg. sacks in Guatemala, a circumstance that was curiously omitted by
Cementos Progreso yet is of vital importance for a fair comparison between the normal value and the
export price, thus showing once again the failure to undertake the examination of the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence required by Article 5.3.
6.138 As mentioned above, the Ministry did not seek from the applicant, nor collect nor in any way
try to obtain more information on the volume of the product sold in Mexico for the purposes of
comparison with that sold in Guatemala.
6.139 Moreover, concerning the representative nature of the transactions, the following should be
noted:
(a) The operations shown on each of the alleged invoices could not be considered as
representative because they only cover one load of cement each and both occurred on
two days (25 and 26) of one of the months (August) of the investigation period 1 June
to 30 November 1995;
(b) comparing one tenth of a tonne with the total sales of the domestic producer in the
Mexican market during the period investigated (six months) cannot be considered a
fair, unbiased, objective and reasonable comparison;

266 The failure to examine whether they were like products before initiating the investigation results in
equivocal and contradictory determinations. Firstly, with respect to the initiation of the investigation, where the
product being investigated is not clearly identified. Secondly, the provisional measure imposing provisional
anti-dumping duties on imports of Type I (PM) grey Portland cement. Thirdly, the definitive measure imposing
definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of grey Portland cement without any distinction.

(c) the price shown on the alleged invoices for sales of cement in Mexico cannot be
considered as representative for the purposes of determining the normal value
because, even if they refer to commercial transactions that supposedly took place, the
sales only reflect an insignificant share of Cruz Azul’s operations on the Mexican
market.
6.140 Secondly, as far as determination of the export price is concerned, the documentation
submitted by Cementos Progreso cannot be considered accurate and adequate evidence either
because:
(a) It cannot be assumed that two transactions for 299 and 179 tonnes each (7,035 and
4,221 bags weighing 42.5 kg.) respectively are representative of a market which, at
the beginning of the investigation period, was estimated to be around 95,000 tonnes
per month; and
(b) both transactions occurred over only two days (14 and 15) of one of the six months of
the investigation period (August).
6.141 In addition, the documentation submitted by the applicant does not adequately identify the
product concerned, particularly since it is variously described as grey cement, grey Portland cement or
Type II grey Portland cement with pozzolana. As we have already mentioned, this information is
particularly important in order to allow the Ministry to analyse properly whether they are like
products.
6.142 From the foregoing, it can be seen that the Ministry of the Economy did not meet the standard
laid down in Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by examining the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application and making an unbiased and objective evaluation of whether
there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation according to Article 5.2 of the
AD Agreement.
6.143 To summarize, the Ministry of the Economy violated Articles 2.1, 2.4, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8 of the
AD Agreement by initiating an investigation after accepting as accurate and adequate evidence of
dumping the two delivery notes and the import certificates relating to two transactions, failing to
make a proper analysis and a fair comparison and determining that the documentation submitted was
sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
6.144 Lastly, the Panel which previously examined this matter, when referring to the Ministry’s
action with regard to the information in its possession and the determination of the alleged dumping,
concluded the following:
6.145 "7.67 … while there is clearly a different standard applicable to making a preliminary or final
determination of dumping, than to determining whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to
justify initiation of an investigation, we cannot agree with Guatemala’s position that Article 2 is
irrelevant to the initiation determination. The subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify
initiation is the same as that needed to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping,
although the quality and quantity is less. Thus, in our view, based on an unbiased and objective
evaluation of the evidence and information before it in this case, the Ministry could not properly have
determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the
investigation."267 (Emphasis added.)
(iii) Evidence of Threat of Injury

267 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.67.

6.146 The Ministry of the Economy initiated the anti-dumping investigation apparently taking as
evidence of the threat of material injury two import certificates, although under no permissible
interpretation of the AD Agreement can these be co nsidered adequate evidence to prove a threat of
material injury and still less sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
6.147 In Cementos Progreso’s application, the only information transmitted to the Ministry was the
documentation concerning two transactions (certificates) for the import of grey Portland cement into
Guatemala through the customs post at Tecún Umán, Department of San Marcos, both on
15 August 1995, through which it is apparently sought to show the volume of imports allegedly
dumped.268
6.148 As already mentioned, on 9 October 1995, the applicant presented a new submission
extending its original application ("extended application"). Despite the submission of a new
application, it did not include in this extended application any more evidence to substantiate the
alleged threat of injury. In fact, the extended application merely claimed that:
- Cementos Progreso was being threatened by "massive" imports of cement from
Mexico and sought to substantiate the word "massive" with two photocopies of the
same import certificates attached to the original application
269 and a declaration on its
suspicions "that similar imports are also taking place through the customs posts of
El Carmen, Department of San Marc os, and La Mesilla, Department of
Huehuetenango".270 (Emphasis added.)
- cement was entering Guatemala by land allegedly at prices lower than normal value
and directly affecting investment by Cementos Progreso.
6.149 Consequently, the only additional information in the extended application regarding the threat
of material injury consisted of the following claim:
"Cementos Progreso, S.A. is being threatened by massive imports of cement from
Mexico. By way of evidence, the initial complaint contained two photocopies of
import certificates showing imports at prices below the normal retail price in Mexico,
and which therefore threatened the company with imminent material injury, as set out
below:
- Cement entering Guatemala by land at prices lower than normal value is
directly affecting investment planning by the company, specifically for plant
improvements and expansion, which would entail:
- Expanding raw material milling facilities at the plant itself;
- maximizing the efficiency of the plant;
- building a third kiln at the San Miguel Sanarate plant;
- restructuring the existing electricity system by converting the plant that
presently runs on bunker;

268 The import certificates covered total sales of 480 metric tonnes of cement.
269 Covering the import of 7,035 and 4,221 sacks of cement respectively.
270 See Cemento Progreso's extended application, section entitled Customs posts or posts via which the
goods are imported into Guatemala.

- the foregoing expansions would call for at least an additional 400 workers, who
would no longer be needed if the projects were stopped;
- rather than invest in cement at below-cost prices, the company would prefer to
cease production and become an importer;
- loss of market shares;
- were the company to become an importer, it would be compelled to dismiss
1,052 workers, with all the attendant social problems;
- the plant would lose its expertise or what is referred to as technology transfer."
6.150 The foregoing claims are not substantiated by any relevant evidence, as found by the Panel
which previously considered this matter:
"7.71 … ‘Sufficient evidence to justify init iation’ must, in our view, mean something
whose ‘accuracy and adequacy’ can be objectively evaluated as required by
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Mere statements do not fall into this category of
information. Moreover, there is no indication as to what evaluation was made of the
‘accuracy and adequacy’ of these statements."271 (Emphasis added.)
6.151 As may be noted, like the original, the extended application failed to provide information on
the factors referred to in Article 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement, which are specifically mentioned
in Article 5.2(iv). We shall refer to this omission below. Taken together with the fact that, as we
have already stated, none of these claims was substantiated by relevant information or evidence in the
application, there is a more serious issue, namely, in order to initiate the investigation, the Guatemalan
investigating authority did not have more evidence or information than that simply to be found in the
application.
6.152 Neither in the documentation prior to initiation to be found in the administrative file (the
recommendation of 17 November, resolution 2-95 of 15 December and the initiation decision of
9 January) nor in the public notice of initiation is there evidence to indicate that, in deciding or
initiating the investigation, the Ministry of the Economy had sought to obtain more information or
evidence to substantiate the claims made in the original and extended applications from Cementos
Progreso.
6.153 Below we explain to the Panel some of the reasons why the Guatemalan authorities failed to
comply with the AD Agreement when it initiated the investigation.
6.154 Firstly, regarding the allegedly "massive" nature of the imports, the following remarks must
be made:
(a) As we have already mentioned, the only information both in the application and the
investigating authority’s administrative file regarding the volume of imports was the
two import certificates and the claims concerning the "suspicion" of possible imports
through other customs posts;
(b) in this regard, it must be pointed out that, in its extended application of 9 October,
Cementos Progreso stated that it denounced a "threat of injury, as thus far, it has not
been able to prove the huge volume of the product entering the country daily"; 272 it

271 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.71.
272 Paragraph 3 in the Legal framework section of Cementos Progreso's extended application.

asked the Ministry of the Economy inter alia to request "from the customs authorities
the import certificates for the last year, so as to ascertain the quantities of grey cement
imports", which it claimed had caused "material injury to the domestic industry and to
the national economy".273
(c) despite Cementos Progreso’s request in its extended application of 9 October, the
Ministry only sought information on imports from the Directorate General of
Customs after having initiated the investigation, which highlights facts that constitute
very serious violations of the AD Agreement:
- firstly: neither when accepting the application, when deciding to initiate an
investigation, nor when publishing the notice of initiation, did the
investigating authority possess information on the level of imports for any
date other than 15 August 1995 (date of the two import transactions); nor did
it have information on possible imports of grey Portland cement that might
have come from other origins or sources than the firm Cruz Azul;
- secondly: neither in the Ministry’s administrative file, nor in the public
notice of initiation is there any indication either that, when deciding to initiate
an investigation, the investigating authority knew or even tried to calculate or
compare the volume of imports (represented by the two import certificates)
with consumption in Guatemala, nor that it attempted, according to any
criterion (e.g. production), to determine the allegedly "massive" nature of the
imports. On the contrary, everything seems to indicate that the Guatemalan
authorities simply accepted the claim made in the application in this respect.
6.155 This shows that the Ministry of the Economy did not have, nor obtain nor seek information
that was essential to justify initiation according to Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
(d) Without the minimum relevant information on any increase in the volume of imports
of grey Portland cement, in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in
Guatemala274, it might be asked how the applicant could affirm that these were
massive or had caused "material injury" or "threat of injury"? But above all, how
could the investigating authority justify initiation on the basis of sufficient evidence
regarding the threat of injury if, at the time of initiation, it only had the two import
certificates and the mere suspicions or allegations on the part of Cementos Progreso
referred to in the application, which do not constitute any valid grounds for qualifying
the volume of imports as "massive"?
(e) moreover, there is no evidence to show that, when taking the decision to initiate an
investigation, the Ministry had conducted an analysis of the level and trend in imports
for the period investigated (June-November 1995) relative to the level and trend in
imports for a previous comparable period (June-November 1994). Indeed, there is no
indication that the authority considered or even possessed information on the volume
of imports prior to June 1995. Without such a comparative analysis, the authority
could not simply assume that any increase in imports was massive.
6.156 To summarize, neither in the application nor in the investigating authority’s administrative
file is there any other evidence or even informa tion to allow a determination that imports of grey
Portland cement from Cruz Azul were "massive". It is obvious that the two import certificates on

273 Subparagraph (e) in the In regard to substance part of the I REQUEST section of Cementos
Progreso's extended application.
274 As required by Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement.

which the Ministry of the Economy based its decision to initiate an investigation cannot, from any
standpoint, constitute "sufficient evidence" within the meaning of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement in
order to prove the allegedly "massive" nature of the imports, still less to initiate an investigation on
the basis that the imports ipso facto threatened to cause material injury to the Guatemalan domestic
industry.
6.157 Another essential factor which the Guatemalan authority failed to analyse when taking the
initiation decision concerns the effect of the imports on prices. As we have already stated, Article 3.2
of the AD Agreement refers to Article 5.2(iv) and stipulates that the application for initiation shall
include information on whether there has been significant price undercutting by the dumped imports
or whether the effect of such imports has been otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or
prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred.
6.158 The information contained in Cementos Progreso’s application on the price of Mexican
cement in Guatemala (c.i.f. price of Q14.77 accordi ng to the two import certificates provided) and on
the price of Guatemalan cement (average retail price of Q24 in the capital and Q32 in the Department
of El Petén), does not in any way make it possible to determine the effect of the dumped imports on
prices because it is obvious that these prices are not comparable. The prices in the import certificates
were c.i.f. prices applicable to independent distributors and consequently they cannot be properly
compared with the retail price of Guatemalan cement because the difference in the level of trade has a
significant effect on prices and their comparison.
6.159 Furthermore, an analysis of the share of imports in the Guatemalan market and their impact
on prices was essential in this case, particularly in view of Cementos Progreso’s monopolistic position
on the Guatemalan market.
6.160 In addition, as we have stated, the claim that there was a threat of material injury was not
substantiated either by relevant evidence regarding the economic factors and indices having a bearing
on the state of the industry listed in Article 3.4 (and mentioned in Article 5.2(iv) of the AD
Agreement): for example, actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investment.
6.161 Although it could be argued that the application for initiation contained allegations regarding
some of these factors
275 (for example, where it is claimed that the expansion plans would require the
recruitment of 400 new workers and that, if production stopped completely, 1,052 workers would be
dismissed), it is more than obvious that, contrary to the terms of the AD Agreement, the (original and
extended) application submitted to the Ministry of the Economy did not contain relevant evidence on
these factors, which involve specific and quantifiable information that is generally reasonably
available to the applicant.
276
6.162 Moreover, in the case of an industry such as cement and taking particular account of
Cementos Progreso’s monopoly in the Guatemalan market, it was quite reasonable for the firm to
have available specific and quantifiable data and information on levels of sales, profits and
employment inter alia , as well as on its ability to finance investment or expansion plans, and to
include these in its application to the Ministry.

275 See above where the declarations in the application are cited.
276 Even where such business information is of a confidential nature, this does not justify the fact that
Cementos Progreso’s application did not contain the speci fic information that was relevant to prove its claims
regarding the threat of material injury, as not only the AD Agreement but also Central American legislation
applicable in Guatemala establishes mechanisms to guarantee the confidential nature of information where this
is justified.

6.163 Likewise, Cementos Progreso’s statements to the effect that, if the imported product allegedly
dumped continued to be sold on the Guatemalan market, this would directly affect its investment
plans (expansion and modernization of the production infrastructure) were not accompanied by any
information regarding its ability to raise capital or finance its investment in some other way,
information which should quite logically be reasonably available to the applicant.
6.164 To summarize, the statements contained in Cementos Progreso’s application regarding the
existence of a threat of material injury were not substantiated either by evidence on the relevant
economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry listed in Article 3.4 and still
less by the accurate and adequate evidence required by the AD Agreement. Moreover, no permissible
interpretation of the AD Agreement allows these simple declarations, unaccompanied by relevant
evidence to substantiate them and without the authority examining or seeking to ensure their accuracy
or adequacy, to be enough to meet the standard of "sufficient evidence" of threat of material injury for
the purposes of initiation. We shall go into greater detail concerning this standard below.
6.165 Before continuing, however, it is also necessa ry to explain that, in obvious violation of
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, Cementos Progreso’s initiation application failed to provide
information and evidence on the factors listed in Article 3.7, which is particularly serious when a
threat of material injury is alleged in a case.
6.166 In Mexico’s opinion, no permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement can allow the
argument that the factors listed in Article 3.7 do not have to be considered when deciding to initiate an
investigation, for the following reasons.
6.167 Firstly, the provisions of the AD Agreement itself must be taken into account, and Article 5.2
states the following:
An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of […] (b) injury within the
meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement […]."
(Emphasis added.)
6.168 The concept of "injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994" as interpreted by the
AD Agreement is in turn defined in footnote 9 to Article 3 of the AD Agreement as follows:
"Under this Agreement the term ‘injury’ shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic
industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article." (Emphasis added.)
6.169 Thus, this footnote makes it clear that the provis ions of Article 5.2 referring to the concept of
"injury" should be interpreted as meaning a "threat of material injury" when it is a case of threat of
injury. Article 5.2(iv) of the AD Agreement specifies that the application to initiate an investigation
must also contain information on the four factors listed in Article 3.7 when a threat of material injury
is claimed.
6.170 Secondly, in this regard the Panel which previously examined this matter concluded the
following:
"7.75 … We recognize that there is no specific reference in Article 5.2 to the factors
enumerated in Article 3.7 regarding threat of injury, such as there is to the factors set
forth in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 regarding injury. However, we do not accept the view
that the lack of a specific reference to Article 3.7 means that an applicant is not
required to submit ‘such information as is reasonably available to the applicant’ on
the question of threat of material injury, if threat of material injury is alleged in the

application. Such an interpretation of the Agreement would, in our view, be entirely
impermissible, as it would be inconsistent with the text, as well as the object and
purpose of Article 5.2 as a whole."
6.171 The Panel confirmed the conclusion of the Panel in the United States – Softwood Lumber case
to the effect that "the subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as
that needed to make a preliminary or final determination of threat of injury, although the quality and
quantity is less."277
6.172 Consequently, in the light of the decisions by various Panels in this regard, the applicability of
Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement to a decision to initiate an investigation when threat of material
injury is alleged is indisputable.
6.173 In this case, therefore, when Cementos Progreso claimed threat of injury, its application for
initiation should obviously have contained evidence of a threat of material injury according to the
factors set out in Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement. In other words, for the Ministry to accept an
application for initiation alleging threat of injury, Cementos Progreso should also have furnished
evidence to demonstrate the significant rate of in crease in imports, the exporter’s freely disposable
capacity or its imminent and substantial increase, the effect of the exports on domestic prices on the
Guatemalan market and inventories of the product investigated.
6.174 The Panel in this case, however, can see that the evidence submitted in no way shows a
significant rate of increase of imports, the freely disposable capacity of the exporter, an imminent,
substantial increase in capacity, or the effect of Mexican imports on prices, inter alia. Indeed, there is
no reference to surplus capacity in Mexico nor to the likelihood of increased imports in the
application for initiation, nor in the recommendation by the two advisers from the Department of
Economic Integration, nor in the decision to initiate an investigation.
6.175 It is therefore clear that Cementos Progreso failed to provide relevant evidence and that the
investigating authority in turn did not have suffic ient evidence to allow it to establish the threat of
material injury alleged by the applicant. It is also obvious that, with the limited and insufficient
information contained in the only two items of evidence submitted by the applicant (the two import
certificates), it was impossible for the Ministry of the Economy to conduct a proper analysis of the
adequacy of the evidence in accordance with Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement in relation to any of the
factors enumerated in Article 3.7 in order to decide whether to initiate an investigation. Without
information on these factors, an unbiased and objective investigating authority simply cannot properly
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of thr eat of material injury to justify initiation of an
investigation if a threat of material injury is alleged.
278
6.176 The foregoing clearly leads to the conclusion that:
(a) The only information before the Ministry of the Economy when the investigation was
initiated to prove the alleged threat of injury claimed by Cementos Progreso was two
import certificates and a number of suspicions and allegations not substantiated by
adequate evidence; these could not be considered the accurate and adequate evidence
required by Article 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement in order to prove threat of injury
according to Article 3. Moreover, no permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement

277 Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala –
Cement), WT/DS60/R, Report of the Panel, adopted on 25 November 1998, inter alia paragraph 7.77 in
connection with United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada (United States –
Softwood Lumber), Report adopted on 27 October 1993, paragraph 332.
278 This was indeed the conclusion of the Panel which previously considered the matter. See
Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.77.

could allow these to be considered as meeting the standard of sufficiency required by
Article 5.3 in order to justify initiation.
(b) the applicant – and the investigating authority which accepted an application that was
obviously not consistent with the AD Agreement – failed to respect the concepts of
injury and threat of injury defined in Article 3, and the provisions of Article 5, whose
purpose is "to ensure that certain conditions be met before the initiation was decided
upon"
279, for example: (i) the application to initiate an investigation must contain
evidence of the injury or threat of injury, as well as the information reasonably
available to the applicant on a number of factors, in this case those enumerated in
subparagraph (iv) of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement; and (ii) a decision to initiate
an investigation into threat of material injury must be based on facts and not on
simple allegations, conjectures or remote possibilities, and these must be established
on the basis of the objective sufficiency of the evidence in accordance with
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
6.177 On the basis of an unbiased and objective evaluation, the Guatemalan investigating authority
could not properly have determined that the alleged evidence and allegations of threat of injury
submitted to the Ministry by Cementos Progreso were sufficient to justify the initiation of an
investigation within the meaning of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. This was indeed the conclusion
of the Panel which previously examined this matter.280
6.178 Lastly, it is also necessary to mention another matter of particular importance which shows
that, at the time of initiating the investigation, the Guatemalan investigating authority did not have
sufficient evidence of a threat of material injury. On 22 January 1996 (11 days after publication of the
notice of initiation), the Ministry of the Economy itself ordered that Cementos Progreso be sent the
"Form for producers applying for the initiation of an investigation into discriminatory pricing
practices", through which it requested information on the production process and technical standards,
production, sales, customers, profits, cost structure, plant capacity, labour force, domestic price
trends, imports, accounting statements, and matters relating to threat of injury and a causal link. This
information was submitted by Cementos Progreso on 17 May 1996, in other words, eight months after
the submission of its original application and four months after the initiation of the investigation.
6.179 The above must certainly lead the Panel to the conclusion that the Guatemalan Ministry of the
Economy failed to act in compliance with the AD Agreement, in particular Article 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and
5.8 (as will be seen below), or the substantive provisions in Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7.
(a) By accepting an application based on simple allegations which blatantly lacked or
omitted relevant evidence to substantiate the allegations, instead of rejecting it;
(b) by failing to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the information and allegations
by Cementos Progreso;
(c) by initiating an investigation, basing its decision on two import certificates and
simple allegations, conjectures and remote possibilities of the alleged threat of injury,
which do not constitute adequate and sufficient evidence thereof.

279 This was the conclusion of the Panel which considered the case of United States – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico (United States – Gray Portland Cement and
Clinker), ADP/82, Report of the Panel, published on 7 September 1992, not adopted, paragraph 5.37.
280 See Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.70.

6.180 No permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement can in this case lead to the conclusion that
the Ministry of the Economy acted properly in determining that there was sufficient evidence of threat
of material injury to justify the initiation of the investigation.
(iv) Evidence of causal link
6.181 The relevant section of Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement states the following:
"An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury
within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and
(c) a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged injury."
(Emphasis added.)
6.182 In this context, it is also important to cite once again Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement:
"The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in
the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation." (Emphasis added.)
6.183 Reading these Articles shows that any application for initiation must contain, and any
investigation must be initiated on the basis of, evidence not only of dumping and injury but also of a
third element required by the AD Agreement, namely, a causal link between the dumped imports and
the injury, within the meaning of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
6.184 In the present case, the Ministry initiated the anti-dumping investigation without sufficient
evidence regarding the causal link between the allegedly dumped imports and the alleged threat of
injury to the domestic industry. The argument in this respect is quite straightforward.
6.185 In its application for initiation and in the extended application submitted by Cementos
Progreso on 21 September and 9 October 1995 respectively, there was not the slightest relevant
evidence of a causal relationship between the allegedly dumped imports and the alleged threat of
injury to the Guatemalan domestic industry, as required by Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. There
was not even any mention of or reference to such a causal link. Likewise, in the initiation decision of
9 January 1996 and the public notice of initiation of 11 January 1996, the Ministry of the Economy
did not mention any evidence or conduct any ev aluation that would allow it to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence of a causal relationship between the alleged dumping and the alleged
threat of injury.
281
6.186 Nevertheless, these omissions in Cementos Progreso’s application and in the Ministry of the
Economy’s decision and notice of initiation are the result of a quite obvious and even logical
situation.
6.187 As has been shown throughout this written submission, the Panel may see that (i) Cementos
Progreso’s application did not contain relevant evidence of dumping nor of threat of material injury to
the domestic industry; (ii) the Guatemalan authority did not obtain or seek in any way additional
evidence of these elements before deciding on initiation; and (iii) the Ministry initiated the
investigation without sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury to justify initiation.

281 The delivery notes and the import certificates submitted by Cementos Progreso as sole evidence in
its application for the initiation of an investigation cannot be considered relevant evidence to substantiate a
causal relationship. Still less can they be considered adequate evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation in accordance with Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.

6.188 Consequently, it is both logical and obvious that owing to the lack of sufficient evidence of
dumping and threat of material injury to justify initiation, the Ministry did not have sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship. 282 The Panel which previously
considered this matter indeed concluded the following:
"Finally, we conclude that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not
properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of causal relationship to
justify initiation if there was not sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury.
In this case, having concluded that the evidence of dumping and threat of material
injury were insufficient to justify initiation, we also conclude that the evidence of
causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged injury was, perforce,
not sufficient to justify initiation. The AD Agreement clearly requires sufficient
evidence of all three elements before an investigation may be initiated."
283
6.189 To summarize, in initiating the investigation without sufficient evidence of this third element,
the Ministry of the Economy acted in a manner inconsistent with the AD Agreement, which clearly
requires the investigating authority to possess sufficient evidence of three elements in order to initiate
an investigation: dumping, injury and a causal relationship.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.190 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to Mexico's claims regarding the
evidence required to justify the initiation of an investigation:
(i) Evidence to be included in application
6.191 The first sentence of Article 5.2 stipulates that the application shall include evidence of
dumping and of injury within the meaning of Article VI of the GATT 1994 as interpreted by the AD
Agreement, and a causal link. The second sentence stipulates that assertions of dumping, injury and
causal link must be substantiated by "relevant evidence" that is "sufficient" to meet the requirements
set forth in Article 5.2. The concept of "relevant" evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of
Article 5.2 is defined in the third sentence as "such information as is reasonably available to the
applicant" concerning the factors listed in sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv).
6.192 Contrary to what Mexico argues, Article 5.2 does not stipulate that the evidence required to
substantiate an assertion must be documentary evidence.
284 The expression "evidence" and the
expression " information" are used without distinction in Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement
and in the corresponding Articles (11.2 and 11.3) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement). Article 11.2 (iv) of the SCM Agreement states that " … this evidence
includes information." Thus, the "evidence" referred to in the first sentence of Article 5.2 consists of
the categories of "information" described in subparagraphs (i)-(iv) of the third sentence of that same
article.
285

282 From a technical standpoint, it can be assumed that dumping or injury may exist without there
necessarily being a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to domestic industry because the
state of the industry could be the result of other distinct factors. Under no circumstances, however, is it possible
simply to assume the existence of a causal link if there is not even sufficient evidence to show the existence of
dumping or injury to a domestic industry, as is the case in this instance.
283 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.78.
284 Idem, paragraphs 83, 90, 93-96, 128, 136-162, 167-171.
285 A similar position was adopted by the Panel in the case United States – Salmon from Norway with
respect to Article 5.1 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code which is the predecessor to Articles 5.2 and 5.3
of the AD Agreement (ADP/87, 27 April 1994, para. 362). In that case, the panel concluded that the statements
in an application constituted sufficient evidence of the applicant's standing to submit an application.

6.193 As we shall show in greater detail further on, Cementos Progreso's application contained
statements of dumping, threat of material injury and causal link. All of the information and evidence
contained in the application and its annexes (and in the supplementary application) concerning the
categories of information described in subparagraphs (i) and (iv) of the third sentence of Article 5.2
constitute the evidence or information in support of those statements.
6.194 Article 5.2 (i) states that the application shall contain such information as is reasonably
available to the applicant on the following: (1) the identity of the applicant; (2) domestic production
of the like product; (3) the industry on behalf of which the application is made. The application of
21 September 1995 identified Cementos Progreso as the applicant. The supplementary application of
9 October 1995 indicated that Cementos Progreso's production represented 100 per cent of cement
production in Guatemala, that its production capacity was 1.6 million tons and that it used 100 per
cent of its installed capacity.
6.195 Article 5.2(ii) states that the application shall contain such information as is reasonably
available to the applicant on the following: (1) a complete description of the allegedly dumped
product; (2) the names of the country or countries of origin or export in question; (3) the identity of
each known exporter or foreign producer; (4) a list of known persons importing the product in
question. In its application of 21 September 1995, Cementos Progreso identified the dumped product
as grey Portland cement; explained how grey Portland cement was manufactured; identified Mexico
as the country of export; identified Cruz Azul as the producer and exporter of the allegedly dumped
product; and also identified Distribuidora De León and Distirbuidora Comercial Molina as the known
importers of the product in question.
6.196 According to Article 5.2(iii) the application sh all contain such information as is reasonably
available to the applicant on the following: (1) the prices at which the product in question is sold
when destined for consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or
export; (2) export prices. Cementos Progreso's application of 21 September 1995 supplied
information and evidence concerning the prices at which Cruz Azul sold cement in Mexico and the
prices at which it exported cement to Guatemala. In the supplementary application of
9 October 1995, Cementos Progreso stated that during the month of August 1995, the price in Mexico
was Q 27.62 per sack and the export price to Guatemala was Q 14.77 per sack. Consequently, the
margin of dumping was Q 12.85 per sack. In its application of 21 September 1995, Cementos
Progreso furnished documentary evidence of these prices.
6.197 The price in Mexico was certified by two invoices showing the price of two different sales
which took place in Tapachula, Mexico, in August 1995. One invoice was from Cruz Azul, while the
other identified the brand name of the cement as "Cruz Azul". The sales price in one case was
Mex$27, while in the other it was Mex$28. Consequently, the sales price information for both
transactions was consistent. The Cruz Azul invoice identified the product as "grey cement", while the
other invoice identified it as "Cruz Azul" cement.
6.198 The export price was certified by two sales carried out by Cruz Azul to two different
importers in Tecún Umán, Guatemala, on 15 August 1995. The applicant provided an import
certificate, invoices and bills of lading for both sales. The product was shipped as "grey cement",
"grey Portland cement" and "Type II grey Portland cement with pozzolana" without distinction. This
evidence was relevant because it showed the price of Cruz Azul cement in Mexico and its export price
to Guatemala in the same month and in the same locations – Tapachula, Mexico and Tecún Umán,
Guatemala – which are not very far from each other (45 kilometres).
6.199 Under Article 5.2(iv), the application shall contain such information as is reasonably available
to the applicant on the following: (1) the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports;
(2) the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market; (3) the consequent

impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by the relevant factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article 3.
6.200 The application contained information and evidence of massive Cruz Azul imports which
began in the middle of 1995. This information and evidence showed that imports increased rapidly
from a zero base, and referred to the evolution of the volume of dumped imports.
6.201 The application also contained information and evidence of "a significant price undercutting".
This information and evidence was relevant to the effect of dumped imports on the prices of the like
product in the domestic market as required by Article 3.2.
6.202 Moreover, the application contained information and evidence concerning the expected
adverse effects of the dumped imports. This information and evidence were relevant to the
consequent impact of the imports because Cementos Progresos claimed threat of injury and not actual
material injury. For the Ministry, the evidence of the risk that the dumped imports would threaten the
jobs of 1,052 employees was significant. At the time, unemployment in Guatemala was
approximately 42 per cent.
286
6.203 According to Article 5.3, the investigating au thorities shall "examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of an investigation." As Guatemala will explain in the next section of this
submission, the Ministry reasonably determined that the application contained "adequate" evidence
because it contained such information and evidence as was reasonably available to the applicant on
the categories of evidence described in subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of Article 5.2. The Ministry also
determined that the application contained "accurate" evidence because it contained information and
evidence that was reasonable, consistent, and plausible, and did not contain any statement contrary to
the facts which were known to the Ministry at that time.
6.204 In its first submission, Mexico did not try to show that any of the information and evidence
described above and contained in the application and supplementary application were false. Nor did
Cruz Azul try to prove this during the course of the investigation.
(ii) Evidence of dumping
6.205 Mexico claims that Guatemala violated Articles 2.1, 2.4, 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement by
initiating the investigation without sufficient evidence of dumping. In particular, Mexico argues that
the evidence of normal value used by the Ministry in initiating the investigation was flawed because
(i) it only covered two sacks of cement, an insignificant portion of Cruz Azul's sales on the Mexican
market
287; (ii) it only covered two days of the month of August 1995 288; (iii) it did not identify the
type of cement289; (iv) the invoices were not proper invoices under Mexican law. 290 In attacking the
evidence that the Ministry had before it in establishing the export price and comparing it with the
normal value at the time of initiation, Mexico states that: (i) Cruz Azul's sales to Guatemala were at
a different level of trade than the sales in Mexico 291; (ii) the sales to Guatemala involved smaller

286 The subsequent investigation confirmed Cemetos Progreso's fears. In the space of only six months,
the rapidly increasing imports at unfair prices captured 25 per cent of the market, causing Cementos Progreso to
suffer a corresponding loss in market share, a fall in sale s, loss of customers, a slump in production, an increase
in the fixed costs per unit produced, a decrease in prices, a fall in profits and a negative cash flow.
287 First submission by Mexico, paragraph 122.
288 Idem, paragraphs 92, 122.
289 Idem, paragraphs 88, 111-19 and 124.
290 Idem, paragraph 89.
291 Idem, paragraph 98.

sacks than the sales in Mexico 292; (iii) the Dollar-Peso exchange rate claimed by Cementos Progreso
and used by the Ministry was not "documented" 293; (iv) the sales to Guatemala represented only a
small percentage of Cruz Azul's total sales to Guatemala and only covered a period of two days in
August 1995.294 Each one of these arguments is without foundation and should be rejected by the
Panel.
6.206 First, as mentioned above, Article 5 establishes the requirements for the initiation of an
investigation under the AD Agreement. An authority cannot "violate" Articles 2 and 3 simply by
initiating an investigation into a complaint of injurious dumping.
6.207 Second, as explained above, the level of dumping documented in the application was quite
substantial. In the supplementary application of 9 October 1995, Cementos Progreso submitted
evidence showing that in Mexico, Cruz Azul was selling grey Portland cement at Q 27.62 per sack
and that it was selling the same cement in Guatemala for only Q 14.77 per sack Thus, the Ministry
had evidence of a margin of dumping of 87 per cent – (27.62 – 14.77)/14.77 = .87. The Ministry also
had documentary evidence to support the alleged margin of dumping.
6.208 The evidence of the price in Mexico was certified by two invoices showing the prices for two
separate sales in Tapachula, Mexico, during August 1995. As stated above, one invoice was from
Cruz Azul and identified the product as "grey cement". The other invoice identified the brand name
of the cement as "Cruz Azul". The price of one of the sales was Mex$27 (i.e. the equivalent of
Q 25.65). The price of the other sales was Mex$28 (i.e. the equivalent of Q 27.62). The fact that, as
Mexico states, the two sales took place at a similar price and during the same period of time does not
deprive them of their probative value; rather, it would tend to show that the sales were legitimate and
the documentary evidence authentic. Moreover, contrary to what Mexico states, nothing in the AD
Agreement required the Ministry to base its calculations of normal value (for the purposes of
initiation) on a higher number of sales in Mexico. In fact, it is common at the time of initiation for the
authorities of other countries, including Mexico, not to base their determinations of normal value on
any sale at all (to base it, for example, on price lists).
295
6.209 Third, at the time of initiation of the investigation, the Ministry did not have any reason to
believe that there was any difference between the cement sold in Mexico and the cement that
Cruz Azul sold in Guatemala. In fact, in its first submission to this Panel, Mexico did not ever claim,
much less defend the position that the cement sold in Mexico was of better quality or value than the
cement sold in Guatemala.

292 Idem.
293 Idem.
294 Idem, paragraph 123.
295 See for example Pencils from the People's Republic of China , 9 August 1993 (Mexico) (List of
prices for normal value); Additives for Gasoline from the United States , 8 November 1993 (Mexico) (List of
prices for normal value); Bags and Vanity Cases from the People's Republic of China , 29 November 1993
(Mexico) (List of prices for normal value). Additives for Gasoline from the United States , 25 April 1996
(Mexico) (List of prices for normal value) See also Initiation of Anti-Dumping Duty Investigations: Certain
Pasta from Italy and Turkey , Federal Register Vol. 60, 30268, 30269 (1995) (United States) (Normal value
based on price lists) Moreover, it is not rare for the anti-dumping authority of Mexico, SECOFI, to initiate an
anti-dumping investigation in which the evidence of normal value is limited to one or two sales in the domestic
market of the exporter. See, for example , Rubber Belts for Use in the Automotive Industry from the Republic of
Korea, (15 May 1992) (one invoice for the calculation of normal value); Sodium Tripolyphosphate from Spain ,
11 February 1992 (one invoice for the calculation of normal value).

6.210 As explained above, the invoices for the sales in Mexico identified the cement as "grey
cement" and "Cruz Azul" cement. 296 The evidence of the export price – import certificates, invoices
and bills of lading – identified the product as "grey cement", "grey Portland cement" and "Type II
grey Portland cement with pozzolana". In a country where the price of cement had been regulated by
the Government for over 50 years, this evidence in dicated to the Ministry that the sales that were
being compared were of "grey cement".
6.211 Even if the Panel were to assume, at this stage, that the evidence of normal value and the
export price available at the time of initiation referred to two different types of cement, the Ministry
would nevertheless have been justified in initiating the investigation. It must not be forgotten that the
application documented a margin of dumping of 87 per cent. There is nothing in the file of the
proceedings, nor indeed is there any evidence anywhere else, to suggest that differences in types of
grey Portland cement could excuse such a level of price discrimination. Cement is, after all, a
fungible consumer product. In most countries, espe cially in developing countries, consumers are not
prepared to pay a significant price difference for cement with higher industrial standards.
6.212 Moreover, if the Ministry had made an adjustment for the alleged difference in types of
cement, the chances are it would have benefited Cementos Progreso rather than Cruz Azul. Some of
the documents referring to exports sales suggest that the product imported into Guatemala was
"Type II grey Portland cement with pozzolana", while the product sold in Mexico was simply
identified as "grey cement" (i.e. standard Type I cement). Type II cement has higher industrial
standards than Type I.
297 Thus, if any adjustment had been made, the margin of dumping would have
increased, and not decreased as Mexico suggests.
6.213 Fourth, something similar might be said for Mexico's argument that the size of the sacks
under comparison at the beginning of the investigation was different. Firstly, neither the application
nor any evidence in the possession of the Ministry at the time of initiation provided any indication that
the size of the sacks was in fact different. This came to light some time after the initiation of the
investigation.298 In fact, it would have been very reasonable for the Ministry, at the time of initiation,
to assume that Cruz Azul would not incur additional costs by using sacks of a different size in
Guatemala and Mexico. This is especially true in that the evidence of normal value and export price
is based on sales transactions in two cities (Tapachula, Mexico and Tecún Umán, Guatemala) that are
only 45 kilometres apart. In any case, given the substantial dumping margin shown by the invoices
and other evidence in the Ministry's possession at the time of initiation, the fact is that there would
still have been a significant margin of dumping even if the slight difference in the weight of the sacks
had been taken into account.
299
6.214 Fifth, it is absurd to suggest, as Mexico has done, that Guatemala ignored its WTO
obligations when it initiated the investigation in que stion without adjusting for the level of trade. To
begin with, the application and the evidence before the Ministry at the time of initiation provided no
indication that any adjustment for level of trade would be appropriate. Even if the Panel were to
assume, for the purposes of this dispute, that sales in Mexico were taking place at retail level and sales
in Guatemala were taking place at another level (i.e. wholesale or distributor), this would not be

296Mexico recognizes, in paragraph 113 of its submission, that the invoices backing the sales in Mexico
did not identify the product as a rare or special type of grey cement. If this had been the case, we must assume
that the invoices would have reflected this fact.
297 In its communication to the Ministry of 9 May 1996 (Annex GUA-22), Cruz Azul stated that none
of the invoices certifying the sales in Mexico identified the type of cement as anything other than grey cement.
298 It eventually came to light that the two invoices certifying the sales in Tapachula, Mexico, referred
to 50 kg. sacks, while the exports entering via Tecún Umán, Guatemala, concerned 42.5 kg. sacks.
299 Allowing for the difference, the Ministry still had evidence that Cruz Azul was selling cement in
Mexico at an adjusted price of Q 23.48 per sack of 42.5 kg. as compared to Q 14.77 per sack of the same weight
in Guatemala, resulting in a margin of dumping of 59 per cent.

sufficient to justify an adjustment in the level of trade. Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement requires an
adjustment to the same level of trade only in cases where sales at a different level of trade "affect
price comparability". In this case, there was no such indication, especially at the initiation stage. In
fact, Cruz Azul never provided the Ministry with any evidence that sales in its domestic market were
at a different level of trade than its exports sales, and that those different levels affected price
comparability.
6.215 Throughout the world many authorities, including SECOFI in Mexico, rely on the same
methodology, which is basically the one used by the Ministry in this case. Indeed, in a final
determination SECOFI compares levels of trade that are nominally different (i.e. retail against
wholesale) unless the foreign exporter provides evidence that its sales at those different levels affect
price comparability. In its main written submission to the dispute settlement panel established under
Article 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement to examine a challenge by the company
Archer Daniels Midland Corp. (the claimant) against the definitive determination of dumping with
respect to imports of high fructose corn syrup from the United States, SECOFI stated that:
"This means that the claimant must have proven that it was involved in
different sales activities in the two markets; that these activities involved differences
in the costs incurred and that there is in fact a price differentiation pattern which
depends on the type of customer to which the investigated products are sold."
6.216 Sixth, the Ministry had no reason to consider that the export price evidence was not
"representative" of Cruz Azul's export activities. As Mexico was obliged to recognize in its first
submission, the AD Agreement does not contai n any minimum requirement with respect to
documentation. Moreover, there was no reason whatsoever for the Ministry to conclude that the two
export sales were not representative merely because they were registered on two consecutive days in
the same month. The fact that the prices were basically the same on those two consecutive days
would tend to confirm their probative value. The invoices, as well, were recent - from the month
preceding the submission of the application. Furthermore, the dates of these export sales were
contemporaneous with the dates of the sales in the exporter's domestic market.300
6.217 Seventh, Mexico argues, without evidence or confirmation of any kind, that the documents in
the hands of the Ministry providing evidence of no rmal value were not "proper invoices according to
Mexican legislation". As argued in connection with the burden of proof in this dispute, Mexico is the
complainant in these proceedings, and as such, carries the burden of the proof in this case. In the case
United States - DRAM, which we also discussed above, the Panel rejected outright certain complaints
by Korea which were not substantiated by facts or arguments. 301 The same should apply to the
present dispute. Moreover, it is not particularly odd (and it is certainly not inconsistent with the AD
Agreement) that the authorities should base the evidence of normal value at the time of initiation on
documents other than invoices. Mexico does so all the time.
6.218 Finally, Mexico claims without any grounds that the exchange rate used by Cementos
Progreso in its application "was not documented and was solely based on an affirmation". The fact is
that the exchange rate used by Cementos Progreso was anything but a mere affirmation. Comparing
the exchange rate by Cementos Progreso with the official IMF exchange rate for December 1995, they
turn out to be practically identical.302

300 Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates that the authorities must make the
comparison "as at nearly as possible the same time".
301 United States - DRAM, WT/DS99/R, adopted on 19 March 1999, paragraphs 6.67-6.69.
302 In its application of 9 September 1995, Cementos Progreso indicated the exchange rate for the new
Mexican peso against the Guatemalan quetzal, relating both currencies to the US dollar (US$1 = 6 new pesos or

(iii) Evidence of threat of injury
6.219 Article 5.2(iv) of the AD Agreement provides that the application should contain such
information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly
dumped imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and
the consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry. As shown in detail below, the
application submitted by Cementos Progreso clearly met the requirements of Article 5.2(iv).
6.220 Firstly, concerning the evolution of imports, Cementos Progreso stated that for more than
three months at least, a company in Mexico, Cruz Azul, had been selling cement in Guatemala.
Cementos Progreso relied on the above-mentioned import documents to support its claim of massive
imports. The documentary evidence showed that in one day Guatemala received substantial imports
of Mexican cement from Cruz Azul through the Tecún Umán customs post. 7,035 sacks of cement
were registered for one of the import transactions, while the other involved 4,221 sacks of cement.
These imports were in fact fairly considerable in relation to the size of the Guatemalan market.
Cementos Progreso mentioned that it suspected that other imports had entered through the customs
6.221 Cementos Progreso stated that it was claiming threat of injury, and not actual injury, because
it had been impossible for it to obtain information to show the significant volume of the dumped
product that was entering the country. It asked the Ministry to obtain documentation concerning the
previous year to determine the volume of cement imports from Mexico that had caused injury to the
Guatemalan cement industry.
6.222 Secondly, concerning the effect of imports on the prices of the like domestic product,
Cementos Progreso based its assertions on a list of prices for cement in Guatemala and on the import
documents identified above to show that the dumped imports were being sold at a price significantly
lower than the prices of Cementos Progreso in Guatemala. It was shown that the prices of the dumped
imports averaged no more than Q 13.96 per sack, which was almost 50 per cent less than the average
price of Q 26 being charged by Cementos Progreso in Guatemala. Thus, the application contained
compelling evidence of "significant price undercutting" in accordance with Article 3.2 of the AD
Agreement.
6.223 Thirdly, concerning the consequent impact of imports on the domestic industry, Cementos
Progreso supplied evidence that the dumped imports were threatening its investment programme for
the modernization and expansion of its production capacity. In particular, the firm stated that its
ongoing investment programme included the expansi on of its capacity to grind clinker and produce
cement, the modernization of its production equipment, the construction of a third kiln to produce
clinker at its San Miguel plant, and the conversion of its kilns to coal instead of bunker. The firm
mentioned that 400 employees would be dismissed if this major investment project were cancelled.
Moreover, it mentioned that if it had to compete with dumped cement at prices below production
costs, it would have to become a cement importer, in which case it would have to dismiss
1,052 production workers and the national economy w ould lose their know-how and expertise in
cement production.
303

5.70 quetzals). From then on, all prices contained in the application, both in new pesos and in quetzals, are
converted into US dollars.
The official IMF exchange rate for the new Mexican peso and the Guatemalan quetzal against the US
dollar for September 1995 was US$1 = 6.3025 new pesos (or 5.8882 quetzals). Thus, the IMF exchange rate is
very close to the exchange rate used by Cementos Progreso in its application.
303 Article 3.4 lists the actual and potential negative effects on employment, growth, ability to raise
capital and investments as the factors relevant to the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.

6.224 Mexico never objected directly to any of the evidence mentioned. In fact, Mexico never
denied that Cruz Azul was shipping cement to Guatemala at significant margins of dumping. Rather,
it has argued that the Ministry was under obligation to examine more evidence of injury before
initiating the investigation. 304 Mexico never denied that Cruz Azul flooded the Guatemalan market
with cement or that in less than one year, Cruz Azul's share of the Guatemalan cement market
increased from zero to 25 per cent approximately. Rather, it insisted that Guatemala should have
analysed at greater length the evidence before it and should have taken more time to issue its decision
to initiate the investigation.
305 For example, Mexico cites the decision of the Ministry to initiate its
investigation without waiting for fuller information on the actual level of Cruz Azul's imports. 306
Mexico asserts that if the Ministry had taken its time and studied the evidence more carefully, it
would have realized that there was no justification for an investigation. Guatemala contends, with due
respect for its larger neighbour in the north, that these arguments are nothing short of ridiculous.
6.225 Firstly, Guatemala is a small country in comparison to Mexico. Its total cement consumption
in 1994 (the year preceding the submission of the application for the anti-dumping investigation at
issue) amounted to only 1,180,000 tons. 307 Mexico's total cement consumption for 1994 was
approximately 29 million tons, for an installed production capacity of about 43 million tons.308
6.226 Moreover, when Cruz Azul suddenly began to ship great quantities of cement to Guatemala in
the summer of 1995, it was not threatening an unimportant industry. Cement is not a luxury good. In
Guatemala, cement is a strategically important consumer good, essential for dam and road
construction and other infrastructure projects.
6.227 Mexico's suggestion that the Ministry should have delayed initiation in order to gather more
information conjures up Nero playing his violin while Rome was in flames. In this submission, we
have proved beyond any doubt that the Ministry had more than sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation under Article 5 of the AD Agreement. The Ministry knew
the size of the domestic market. Cementos Progreso exported practically no cement up to 1995, and
no one was interested in exporting cement to the Guatemalan market.
309 Consequently, Cementos
Progreso's production reflected national consumption. The Ministry did not need complete
information to know that imports were rapidly increasing. As explained above, within a period of a
few months in 1995, imports increased from basically zero to 25 per cent of consumption in
Guatemala. The Ministry also knew that Mexico was going through a terrible recession and that
consumption and production had decreased dramatically, resulting in thousands of tons of idle
capacity. Finally, the Ministry knew that Cruz Azul's prices were well below those of Cementos
Progreso, because the Government regulated cement prices and because the Government itself was
one of the main purchasers of cement, and becaus e Cementos Progreso had supplied information on
domestic prices.
6.228 In these circumstances, the Ministry could not wait around while its only producer of a
strategic consumer good drowned in a tidal wave of imports. This might be an option for a large and
developed country like the United States, where according to the latest data there are 42 different
cement companies operating 105 different plants, but for Guatemala, as a small developing country
with only one producer operating two plants, the collapse of Cementos Progreso would mean the
collapse of the entire industry.

304 See, for example, first submission by Mexico, paragraphs 128, 134-136.
305 First submission by Mexico, 136(c) and 139.
306 Idem, paragraph 136 (b) and (c).
307 The Global Cement Report.
308 Idem, pages 176-178.
309 Idem, page 123.

6.229 It is also unfair for Mexico to seek to impose on a developing country, like Guatemala, a level
of evidence and documentation which many other small countries are not always able to achieve.
Mexico appears to take it for granted that all the Ministry had to do to gather more complete
information on imports of the product under investigation was to press a button and wait for it to
shoot out of some computer. This may be the case in Mexico and in many developed countries, but it
is definitely not the case in Guatemala.
6.230 Indeed, full information on imports of the product under investigation was not available to
Cementos Progreso, and it took the Ministry approximately two months to obtain it. 310 As is the case
in many developing countries, information on imports is not always kept in a specific register for each
product corresponding to the scope of an anti-dumping claim, and even if the data were entered in a
specific register for each product, the information would have to be tabulated by hand.
6.231 In short, just as Article 5.2 takes account of what is reasonably available to the applicant in
judging the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence, Article 5.3 should take account of what is
reasonably available to the investigating authority. The drafters of Article 5.2 were seeking to allow
for the fact that access to information (such as consumption and import figures) is not universal. In
other words, what is easily available in the United States may not be easily available in Guatemala or
another developing country. Thus, part of the purpose of Article 5.2 would be compromised if the
Panel were to ignore this reality in applying Article 5.3.
311
6.232 In conclusion, the Ministry acted reasonably and in keeping with its WTO obligations under
Article 5 of the AD Agreement. In a perfect world it would perhaps have been better for the Ministry
to have had complete information on imports before deciding whether an investigation was justified,
but the Panel should take account of the fact that this information was not easily and reasonably
available to the Ministry. Cementos Progreso was faced with a growing flood of imports in its only
market. In its application of 21 September and the supplementary application of 9 October 1995, the
company supplied evidence concerning the injurious effects of Cruz Azul's dumping in Guatemala.
In particular, Cementos Progreso furnished information relating to loss of sales, loss of customers and
a trend towards the penetration of imports, which in a single day increased from basically zero to 480
tons (representing a loss of sales of approximately $60,000).
312 While this sum may seem small to
Mexico, projected over one year it would represent a substantial proportion of Cementos Progreso's
cement sales in 1995.
6.233 Mexico also asserts that the initiation by Guatemala violated Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7
of the AD Agreement. 313 However, as we have explained in detail on several occasions throughout
this submission, Article 5, and not Article 3 (or Article 2), establishes the requirements for initiation
of an investigation under the AD Agreement. Thus, an authority cannot "violate" any of the
requirements contained in Article 3 by simply initia ting an investigation into allegations of injurious
dumping.

310 It is not possible for a private company in Gu atemala to obtain information from Government or
other sources containing figures on imports of a particular product into Guatemala. If such information is
required, a private company may request that it be collected as part of an official Government investigation, and
this can take some time.
311 In the case United States – Reformulated Gasoline , the Appellate Body considered that the
interpretation of a treaty must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty: "An interpreter is not free
to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility." Report of the Appellate Body in United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, page 23.
312 The customs value of the imports was approximately US$30,000 and the file indicates that the
export prices were at least 50 per cent lower than Cementos Progreso's prices in Guatemala.
313 First submission by Mexico, paragraph 161.

6.234 Finally, Mexico claims that the fact that the Ministry sent Cementos Progreso a questionnaire
after initiation shows that the application did not contain adequate evidence of threat of injury. 314 In
fact, questionnaires are routinely sent to domestic producers in the vast majority of anti-dumping
investigations, including those conducted by Mexico.
(iv) Evidence of Causal Link
6.235 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 5.2 and 5.3 by accepting an application that
did not contain any evidence of a causal link between the alleged dumping and the alleged threat of
injury.315 Once again, Mexico's claim is without merit.
6.236 Article 5.2 provides that the application should contain evidence of a causal link between the
dumped imports and the alleged injury. It does not, however, specify any particular factor that should
prove the causal link, other than those contained in Article 5.2(iii) and 5.2(iv). Article 5.2 does not
refer to Article 3.7, which concerns the demonstration of a causal link required in making a
preliminary or final determination of threat of material injury. The clear meaning of Article 5.2 is that
there is sufficient evidence of a causal link if the application provides evidence of dumping in
conformity with Article 5.2(iii) and proof of cons equent injury in conformity with Article 5.2(iv).
Cementos Progreso met those requirements.
6.237 As shown above, the application contained accurate and adequate evidence with respect to the
criteria contained in Article 5.2(iii) and 5.2(iv). Contrary to what Mexico states in its first
submission, the application also referred explicitly to the causal link.
316 The application dated
21 September states that the dumped cement was entering in quantities that were causing injury to
Cementos Progreso. The supplementary applica tion states that Cementos Progreso was being
threatened by massive imports of cement from Mexico. The supplementary application also describes
how the dumped imports were directly affecting the firm's investments.
(v) Guatemala examined the accuracy and adequacy of the application
6.238 Mexico insists that the Ministry "totally disregarded" the requirements of the AD Agreement
when initiating the investigation. 317 According to Mexico, the file put together during the underlying
administrative process lacks any evidence that the Ministry actually examined the accuracy or
adequacy of the information contained in Cementos Progreso's application. 318 Mexico insists that no
"unbiased and objective" investigating authority examining the information that the Ministry had
before it in this case could have concluded that it constituted sufficient evidence of dumping, threat of
material injury or causal link.319 As in the case of Mexico's other arguments, this argument is flawed
and must be rejected by the Panel.
6.239 It is clear from our earlier discussion of the matter that the Ministry examined the accuracy
and adequacy of the evidence accompanying the application in determining whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation. As mentioned earlier on in the
"Chronology of the Investigation", the initial application was submitted on 21 September 1995. The
Ministry then held a number of meetings with officials from Cementos Progreso to determine whether
the evidence in the application was accurate and adequate. During these meetings, the Ministry asked
the Cementos Progreso officials many questions concerning the evidence and information provided in
the application. The Ministry informed Cementos Progreso that the original application did not

314 Idem, paragraph 160.
315 Idem, paragraphs 163-171.
316 Idem, paragraph 167.
317 See, for example, first submission by Mexico paragraphs 63 and 102.
318 See, for example, first submission by Mexico paragraphs 63 and 102.
319 Idem, paragraph 91.

contain sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation because it did not provide
sufficient information to substantiate the assertio n that there was a consequent threat of material
injury. In the supplementary application of 9 October 1995, Cementos Progreso furnished additional
information which, read together with the application, provided evidence of dumping, injury and
causal link in conformity with Article 5.2. On 6 November 1995, the Directorate of Economic
Integration passed the application and the supplementary application on to the legal department for
examination. In accordance with the mandate received, on 17 November 1995 two legal advisers
submitted an opinion to the Directorate of Economic Integration containing their detailed analysis of
the application (and the supplementary application) and accompanying evidence, and expressing their
view that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. On
15 December 1995, the Directorate of Economic Integration adopted the opinion of 17 November
1995 and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. The
Ministry approved this finding on 9 January 1996 and issued a public notice of its determination on
11 January 1996.
6.240 To summarize, Guatemala did not act hastily. It did not initiate its investigation until it had
examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence and determined that there was "sufficient
evidence" under Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement of dumping, injury and causal link.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.241 The following are Mexico's arguments in rebuttal to Guatemala's response its claims under
Articles 5.2 and 5.3:
6.242 Mexico has submitted that the evidence contained in Cementos Progreso's application cannot
be considered as accurate and adequate evidence, let alone sufficient to meet the standards set forth in
Article 5.2 and 5.3. For its part, Guatemala has tried to defend itself by arguing that the application
contained all of the information reasonably available to the applicant, and that this information was
also considered by the Ministry to be sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.
6.243 However, Guatemala failed to provide an acceptable explanation of why it should have
considered that the applicant, upon submitting its application for initiation, had no more information
"reasonably available" to it than two notes and two import certificates. In Mexico's view, the limited
information that these items provided cannot be co nsidered as constituting all of the information
reasonably available to the applicant. Similarly, Guatemala failed to demonstrate the insufficiency of
the evidence, resorting to a series of post hoc arguments and getting involved in a series of
contradictions that provide no excuse for failin g to comply with its obligations under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
6.244 As Guatemala itself recognizes in paragraph 69 of its first submission, several months elapsed
between the time when it was first approached by Cementos Progreso, or between the submission of
Cementos Progreso's original application, and the initiation determination and corresponding public
notice. Between these two events, Cementos Progreso also had the opportunity to submit a
supplement to its application. However, all that this supplementary application added to the original
application was a series of simple assertions and mere suspicions concerning the alleged threat of
injury and the alleged "massive" nature of the imports, unsubstantiated by any relevant evidence. It is
therefore difficult to understand why, in spite of the geographical proximity
320 of Mexico and
Guatemala, of the fact that several months had elapsed, and that Cementos Progreso even had the
opportunity to supplement its application, it was not possible for the applicant to obtain anything more
than two delivery notes and two import certificates , established on two consecutive days, as evidence
of the normal value and the export price as well as the allegedly "massive" nature of the imports.

320 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 145 and 160, recognizing that Tapachula,
Mexico and Tecún Umán, Guatemala, are separated by only 45 kilometres.

6.245 More serious and more obvious still is the fact that the application did not include the
information required in Article 5.2(iv), information which to a large extent clearly had to be
reasonably available to the applicant, since Cementos Progreso stated in its application that it
represented 100 per cent of domestic cement production in Guatemala. In other words, the
information concerning the relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic
industry, the probable impact of the imports on the domestic industry and the relevant economic
factors must have been, to a great extent, exclusively in the hands of the applicant. And yet Cementos
Progreso did not supply any information in support of its assertions concerning the alleged threat of
injury, information which it clearly controlled, considering in particular that this information was in
fact submitted by Cementos Progreso itself during later stages of the investigation.
6.246 For example, the failure by Cementos Progreso to provide information on Cruz Azul's costs
might be understandable, probably because the information in question was confidential and under the
control of the exporting firm. This, then, might validly be considered as information that was not
"reasonably available to the applicant", since there were factual and legal impediments barring access
to the information. But since it was argued in the supplementary application that, inter alia, export
prices "were in fact lower than Cementos Progreso's production costs "
321, what justification can
there be for not substantiating this assertion with data in the application on Cementos Progreso's
production costs, information which was in fact under the applicant's control.
6.247 Even if we accept, for the sake of argument only, that the information on the evolution of the
volume of the imports was difficult for Cementos Progreso to obtain, how is it possible to justify the
failure to submit any information or evidence to back its assertions on the alleged effect of the imports
on prices and hence their consequent impact on the domestic industry relating to the economic factors
set forth in Articles 3.2 and 3.4, such as sales, production volume, market share, profits, productivity,
investment projects, inventories, employment, salaries, etc., which were also under the control of the
applicant.
6.248 Thus, even though Guatemala has tried to reject Mexico's arguments concerning the
insufficiency of information in the application on the grounds that Cementos Progreso's application
contained such information as was reasonably available to the firm, it is an indisputable fact that there
was no information or evidence at all concerning the relevant factors having a bearing on the state of
the domestic industry, such as those listed in Article 3.2 and 3.4, or concerning the factors listed in
Article 3.7, since the application claimed threat of material injury, as expressly and implicitly required
by subparagraph (iv) of Article 5.2.
6.249 As we said earlier on, Mexico also submits that the Ministry did not comply with its
obligation under Article 5.3 to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application, and that there is no way that the investigating authority could have validly determined
that there was sufficient evidence to justify the in itiation of the investigation. I shall therefore now
turn to the lack of accuracy and adequacy of the evidence contained in Cementos Progreso's
application, both in terms of the failure to comply with the Article 5.2 requirement that the application
contain relevant evidence of dumping, injury and causal link, and in terms of the failure to comply
with Article 5.3, which requires the authority to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
provided in the application.
6.250 The relevance or adequacy of the evidence within the meaning of Articles 5.2 and 5.3
basically depends on the relationship and relevance of the information or data concerned to the facts
that it is necessary to establish in order to initiate the investigation, i.e. the alleged dumping, the
alleged injury, and the causal link between the two. Similarly, the qualification of a piece of evidence
as accurate within the meaning of Article 5.3 basically depends on the quality, precision and
reliability of the data and information concerned, as well as its sources.

321 Ibid., paragraph 66.

6.251 As can be seen in paragraph 129 of its first written submission, Guatemala distorts and
manipulates Mexico's position with respect to the insufficiency of evidence of dumping to justify the
initiation of an investigation when it states that:
" … According to Mexico, the Ministry should not have initiated the investigation
until it had 'evidence' of injurious dumping based on a 'fair comparison' of Cruz
Azul's prices in Mexico and Guatemala." (Emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
6.252 Mexico never brought this time factor into its ar guments. Mexico's position in this respect is
very clear: in the investigation at issue, the evidence of dumping contained both in Cementos
Progreso's original application (of 21 September 1995) and in its supplementary application (of
9 October 1995) cannot in any way be qualified as accurate and adequate, let alone sufficient to
justify initiation within the meaning of Article 5.2 and 5.3, for the following reasons:
6.253 Firstly, because the evidence of normal value and export price differs in the identification of
the product concerned by the transaction, so that it is not precise or accurate to say that it is product
investigated, in this case Type I PM grey Portland cement with pozzolana; there may even have been,
as a result, price comparisons involving different types of cement.
6.254 Secondly, the delivery notes that were used as evidence of normal value only referred to the
sale of one load or sack of cement each; in other words they concern transactions involving
insignificant volumes which cannot be considered as "representative" (in the sense of sufficient
quantity) in demonstrating the normal value of the like product to that being investigated. In fact, if
the Ministry had access post hoc to information on the size of the Mexican cement market 322, then it
could have obtained that information before initiating the investigation and it would have realized that
the volumes covered by the delivery notes used to document the normal value were not
"representative" of the Mexican domestic market. The same is true for the two invoices and import
certificates used to calculate the export price. This evidence, covering transactions involving 299 and
179 tons respectively, certainly could not be considered as representative of the volume which
Cruz Azul exported to Guatemala during the period of investigation.
6.255 Thirdly, the transactions used as proof of the normal value and the export price took place at
distinctly different levels of trade: retail level in the case of the normal value, and distributor level in
the case of the export price. These differences preclude a proper comparison between the two prices,
and thus cannot be considered as accurate and adequate as evidence of a margin of dumping.
6.256 Bearing in mind that the Ministry initiated the investigation on the basis of the same evidence
that is contained in the application, some of the above considerations also apply to the insufficiency of
evidence of dumping required for the initiation of the investigation. There is clear evidence that the
Ministry did not examine the accuracy and adequacy of the two delivery notes which it used as
evidence of normal value, or the two import certificates and their corresponding invoices which it
used as evidence of the export price. If it had done so, it would certainly have noticed that there were
differences between them with respect to the identification of the product involved, and in fact they do
not refer to the investigated product. Moreover, they are not representative of the prices in the
domestic market and the export market, they concern distinctly different volumes and the transactions
took place at different levels of trade. In these circumstances, no unbiased and objective authority
could possibly have determined that the evidence contained in Cementos Progreso's application
warranted the conclusion that there was sufficient ev idence of dumping to justify the initiation of the
investigation.

322 The Global Cement Report (2 nd Ed. 1996), No. 123, cited in paragraph 62 of Guatemala's first
written submission.

6.257 At the same time it is difficult, in fact impossible to say anything about the accuracy,
adequacy or insufficiency of the evidence of thr eat of injury required for the purposes of the
Ministry's initiation determination, since such evidence was simply non-existent. In its application,
Cementos Progreso merely attempts to prove the alleged massive nature of the imports with the two
much-cited import certificates and the firm's "suspicions" that other imports were entering through
other customs posts.
323
6.258 We have already referred to the differences between these two certificates which preclude
their being considered as accurate and adequate evidence. Apart from these suspicions, the
supplementary application merely contained a series of assertions or statements by Cementos
Progreso, unsubstantiated by information or evidence of any kind, which we included in our first
submission to the effect that the imports of grey Portland cement from Cruz Azul were threatening to
cause material injury to Guatemala's domestic industry.
6.259 Thus, it seems to us cynical and downright ridiculous for Guatemala to dare to include these
suspicions and simple assertions by Cementos Progreso, on which it based its initiation determination,
among its arguments before this Panel to justify an initiation which was incompatible with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in every respect.
6.260 The Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes very clearly that simple assertion, unsubstantiated
by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 5.2.
Similarly, Article 3.7 could hardly be clearer when it stipulates that "a determination of a threat of
material injury shall be based on fact and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility".
This applies to initiation determinations as well, particularly in view of the fact that Article 5.3 and
5.8 require sufficient evidence of injury, or as in this case, of threat of injury, to initiate an
investigation, failing which the investigating auth ority must reject the application and refrain from
initiating the investigation.
6.261 Thus, it cannot be concluded that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could
properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the
investigation on the basis of mere allegations or statements made by Cementos Progreso to the
Ministry in its application or in the alleged meetings with officials to which Guatemala refers, and
without the slightest information or evidence of the alleged threat of injury to the Guatemalan
industry.
6.262 Moreover, with respect to the insufficiency of evidence, it is worth citing Guatemala's
comments in paragraph 68 of its first written submission and 28 of its oral submission:
"68. The case before it was so convincing that the Ministry was fully justified in
pursuing the investigation. Firstly, the product in question was not a luxury item – it
was a strategically important consumer good which was crucial to the development of
the infrastructure (e.g. roads and dams) of a small country. Secondly, the industry in
question was not large and diversified – Cementos Progreso is the only producer of
cement in Guatemala. If Cementos Progreso collapsed, the entire industry collapsed
…" (Emphasis added).
"28. Given this disparity, it is perhaps understandable that Mexico would scoff at
the idea that several hundred or several thousand tons of cement could threaten
material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the AD Agreement. But in a small,
developing country like Guatemala, this kind of threat is very real. Particularly
where, as here, the product under investigation is not a luxury item, but a strategically

323 Concerning the explicit recognition that the Ministry took account of mere suspicions of other
possible imports, see Guatemala's first written submission, paragraphs 75 and 167.

important commodity, and the domestic industry is not large and diverse , but
confined to only one company that depends on its domestic market for all of its
revenues. As we noted in Guatemala's first submission, had Cementos Progreso
failed, the entire cement industry in Guatemala would have failed. Would Mexico be
making the same arguments it is today if the "shoe had been on the other foot"? I
think not". (Emphasis added).
6.263 In the paragraphs cited above, Guatemala argues that the Ministry had such a convincing case
before it that it was fully justified in pursuing the investigation. But far from seeking to substantiate
its argument by trying to demonstrate the sufficiency of the evidence, Guatemala resorts to a series of
considerations that are absurd and out of context, and which have nothing to do with the standard of
sufficiency of evidence imposed by Article 5.3 to justify the initiation of an investigation. In this
context, it is thoroughly inappropriate and devoid of legal value for Guatemala to try to justify the
initiation of the investigation by resorting to considerations such as the fact that the product in
question is a consumer good and not a luxury item, or that the industry in question is not large and
diversified but consists of a single domestic producer, which merely reflects the monopolistic position
enjoyed by Cementos Progreso. Guatemala also suggests that it deserves special treatment or some
kind of exemption on the grounds that it is a small and developing country. However, there are no
provisions or exceptions under the WTO whereby small and developing countries like Guatemala are
given special treatment in the form of a lower leve l of evidence and standard of sufficiency than the
other Members, relieving them of their obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular
under Article 5 thereof.
324
6.264 The fact that Guatemala should resort to such considerations simply confirms the bias and
lack of objectivity with which the Guatemalan authority evaluated and improperly established the
facts required for the initiation of the investigation, i.e. the sufficiency of the evidence justifying such
initiation. Moreover, there is no permissible interpretation of Article 5.3 under which the
"forcefulness of a case" justifying the pursuit of an investigation can be determined on the basis of
considerations or criteria such as those put forward by Guatemala. On the contrary, such arguments
or considerations clearly have nothing to do with the letter, the context, the object and the purpose of
Article 5.3 which consists in establishing the objective sufficiency of the evidence as a requirement
for an authority to be able to proceed with the in itiation of an investigation. Thus, under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, the sufficiency of evidence is in any case the only standard which can serve as a
measure of the "forcefulness" of a case justifying the initiation of an investigation.
6.265 Still on the subject of the insufficiency of evidence, we cite below paragraph 69 of
Guatemala's first written submission:
"Notwithstanding, the Ministry did not act hastily. In fact, as we mentioned initially,
it began by rejecting Cementos Progreso's application because it needed further

324 We cite below paragraph 27 of Guatemala's oral submission at the first substantive meeting as
another example of its post hoc arguments based on information which was reflected neither in the
determination nor in the public notice of initiation, where Guatemala seeks to hide behind its status as a
developing country in order to relieve itself of its obligations under Article 5:
"First, Mexico trivializes the size and impact of Cruz Azul's imports on Guatemala.
Guatemala is a small, developing country. In 1994 (the year before the challenged anti-
dumping investigation was initiated), Guatemala consumed only 1.18 million metric tonnes
("tons") of cement. By comparison, Mexico consumed 28.7 million tons of cement in 1994.
Guatemala also has only two cement plants (both operated by Cementos Progreso) with a total
productive capacity of less than 1.4 million tons in 1994. Mexico, by comparison, had well
over 25 cement plants in 1994 with a productive capacity of approximately 43 million tons.
Indeed, in 1995, Mexico's excess capacity (18.8 million tons) was 15 times greater than
Guatemala's total consumption of cement (1.2 million tons)."
See also, in this connection, Guatemala's first written submission, paragraph 176.

information and documentation concerning certain complaints. In the course of the
three or four months that followed, the Ministry obtained additional information from
Cementos Progreso and interviewed officials from that firm. It was only after that
extended period of evaluation that the Ministry decided that there was "sufficient
evidence" under Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to initiate an anti-
dumping investigation." (Emphasis added).
6.266 On the one hand, this argument by Guatemala is an express recognition of the absence of
information and the insufficiency of evidence, and on the other hand, it is no more than a post hoc
argument without foundation, since although Guatem ala argues that the Ministry rejected the
application at first because it needed further information, there is nothing in the administrative file to
prove these facts. Nor is there anything to show or to clearly explain what the information originally
submitted by Cementos Progreso consisted in, not to mention the alleged "additional" information
which, according to Guatemala, the Ministry obtained from Cementos Progreso during the course of
the following three or four months. In other words, Mexico wonders why Guatemala does not explain
what information Cementos Progreso had initially, when its application was rejected, and what other
information and evidence was subsequently gathered for its application to be accepted by the Ministry
later on.
6.267 At the same time, how can there possibly be any validity or credibility in the simple allegation
by Guatemala that the Ministry conducted alleged interviews with officials from Cementos Progreso
when the file did not contain the slightest record of them, let alone of such alleged additional
information as the Ministry might have obtained through the alleged interviews. Without any record
in the file, such data or information that the Ministry may have obtained through these interviews,
assuming that they took place, amounts to no more than simple assertion, unsubstantiated by
evidence, in violation of Article 5.2 which states that the requirements contained therein cannot be
met through simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.
6.268 Similarly, it is unacceptable and inexplicable that if several months separated this alleged
rejection from the submission of the original application, and allegedly there were efforts by the
authority and Cementos Progreso to obtain additional information, the evidence that was finally
submitted and considered by the Ministry as "sufficient" to initiate the investigation should have been
limited to two delivery notes and two
 import certificates, since there is no way that a series of
unsubstantiated allegations concerning the alleged threat of injury can be considered as constituting
evidence, as Guatemala seems to suggest.
6.269 In the circumstances which Guatemala has itself evoked, it is also difficult to understand why
it was not possible for the investigating authority to ask its customs authorities for the information on
imports of the investigated product as soon as it was first approached by Cementos Progreso or as
soon as the original application was filed, but that it should have done so only after initiating the
investigation. If, as Guatemala asserts, "the Ministry did not act hastily" and three or four months
elapsed, providing it with an "extended period of evaluation", there was ample time for the Ministry
to request and obtain the relevant information on imports of the investigated product, particularly if
we consider that the information requested from the customs authorities following the initiation of the
investigation took about two months for the Ministry to obtain.
6.270 Given the lack of accurate and adequate evidence of dumping, the simple acceptance of the
allegations and suspicions of the applicant concerning the alleged threat of injury, and the complete
absence of evidence concerning these allegations, it is clear that none of the facts could be properly
established by the Guatemalan authority. Clearly, the authority did not carry out an evaluation of the
alleged facts in an unbiased and objective manner, but decided to accept outright the simple
allegations and suspicions of the applicant.

6.271 Similarly, there is no permissible interpretation of Article 5.3 that would warrant considering
that two delivery notes, two import certificates and a series of allegations and suspicions concerning
the imports and their alleged effects would permit a reasonable and unbiased investigating authority to
establish that such evidence in the application comp lied in the least with the objective sufficiency
standard of evidence applicable to an initiation determination.
6.272 Thus, the only possible conclusion is that the investigation was initiated in a manner contrary
to Article 5.3, since although no permissible interpretation of that provision could possibly justify the
insufficiency of evidence of dumping, not to mention the total absence of evidence of the alleged
threat of injury, and hence the causal link, the investigation was nevertheless initiated.
6.273 This enables us to conclude that under Article 5.3, the Ministry of the Economy simply
should not have initiated this investigation and that the anti-dumping measures imposed by Guatemala
and challenged by Mexico in this dispute rested on an investigation initiated by the Ministry on the
basis of clearly insufficient evidence of the alleged dumping, the alleged threat of injury and the
corresponding causal link.
6.274 However, before continuing, we must refute a number of assertions made by Guatemala in an
attempt to distort and manipulate Mexico's arguments, and respond to some of its post hoc arguments
which not only fail to demonstrate the alleged consistency of the initiation with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, but ironically and fortunately have served to strengthen Mexico's position in this WTO
proceeding.
(i) Replies to Guatemala's arguments concerning the alleged sufficiency of the evidence of
dumping to justify initiation
6.275 Regarding the likeness of the investigated product, Guatemala argues that it had no reason to
believe that there was any difference between the cement sold in Mexico and the cement that
Cruz Azul sold in Guatemala. 325 This makes it clear that the Ministry, in making its initiation
determination, did not take account of the differences that can be seen in the identification of the
product both in the application for an investigation 326 filed by Cementos Progreso and in the
accompanying evidence of the normal value and the export price. Similarly, the Ministry clearly did
not conduct the examination stipulated in Article 5.3, in this case in particular, in checking the
likeness of the product under Article 2.6.
6.276 Guatemala clearly reveals a flaw in its argument when it recognizes, in paragraph 157 of its
first submission, the differences in the identification of the investigated product contained in the
evidence referred to above, and reproduces the refe rences contained in the evidence of normal value
and export price, such as "grey cement" and "C ruz Azul cement" for the normal value, and "grey
cement", "grey Portland cement" and "Type II grey Portland cement with Pozzolana" for the export
price.
6.277 Furthermore, in the same paragraph of its first submission, Guatemala tries, through the
assertion below, to maintain that in fact the pr ice comparison carried out on the basis of the evidence
provided by Cementos Progreso both for the normal value and for the export price concerned "grey
cement":
"In a country where the price of cement had been regulated by the Government for
over 50 years (footnote omitted), this evidence indicated to the Ministry that the sales
that were being compared were of 'grey cement'."

325 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 156.
326 In the sections "Detailed description of the domestic product" and "Detailed description of the
imported item", Cementos Progreso mentions the differences in types of cement.

6.278 While this deduction by Guatemala may be valid for identifying the product exported by
Cruz Azul to the Guatemalan market, it is not valid for determining the like product destined for
consumption in the domestic market of Mexico, particularly when one of the delivery notes used for
the calculation of normal value merely indicated "Cruz Azul cement". This description merely
indicates that the product in question was cement, and no more - not that it was "grey cement" as
Guatemala contends. In fact, the Ministry asserted post hoc that: "… Mexico, which has a common
border with Guatemala 963 kilometres long and whose capital (Mexico city) is the second largest city
in the world, consumed 28,700,000 tons of cement in 1994".
327
6.279 Since Guatemala recognizes that the Mexican cement market is large in comparison to its
own market, even highlighting the fact that Mexico City is the second largest city in the world, and
clearly has many different types of consumers with different needs, it should have been obvious that
"grey" cement was not the only type of cement consumed domestically.
6.280 Further evidence that Guatemala did not conduct the examination required under Article 5.3
can be found in the fact that Cementos Progreso's application contains allegations that the investigated
product was "grey Portland or pozzolanic cement in 94-pound bags" (sic) and that the evidence
submitted with the application for an investigation referred to above did not clearly identify the type
of cement used to prove the normal value (see MEXICO-3). Furthermore, neither Cementos
Progreso's application nor the alleged analysis carried out by Guatemala recognizes the possibility
that the product comparison might have been made in respect of different types of cement. Guatemala
simply did not conduct the required examination.
6.281 In fact, there is no evidence that Guatemala conducted an examination of product likeness,
still less that it did so in conformity with Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement, and apparently in making
its determination of likeness, if indeed it made such a determination, the Ministry accepted the
validity of Cementos Progreso's allegation withou t carrying out any check or examination under
Article 5.3.
6.282 Finally, Guatemala adds that an adjustment for the alleged difference in types of cement
would probably have benefited Cementos Progreso and not Cruz Azul. In Mexico's view, what
counts is not who might have benefited from the adjustment, but that Guatemala violated Articles 2.6
and 5.3 by not carrying out the required examination and not making an initiation determination
based, inter alia, on an analysis and determination of product likeness.
6.283 As regards the differences in volume in the evidence submitted in support of the alleged
dumping, there is a discrepancy between the applicant's allegation that the product investigated was
sold in bags, and the evidence supplied in support of the normal value which indicates that the cement
was sold in loads or sacks, and not bags. Sales in sacks or loads reflect a quantity of 50 kg., while the
sale in bags referred to by the applicant concerns a quantity of 42.5 kg.
6.284 Guatemala submits that neither the application, nor any evidence in the possession of the
Ministry at the time of initiation, provided any indication that the size of the sacks was in fact
different.
328 Here we repeat that the evidence in support of the normal value expressly states that the
two transactions concerned one sack of cement and one load of cement respectively. Hence the need
to examine whether the sacks or loads of cement had the same volume as the bags. Guatemala's
assertion shows once again that the Ministry did not conduct the examination required under
Article 5.3.
6.285 Guatemala ignored the possible differences which could result from the sale of cement in
loads and sacks instead of the bags referred to by the applicant. In fact, Guatemala did not even

327 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 62.
328 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 160.

decide on the matter, and consequently, has no evidence to show that it carried out the examination.
Lacking the evidence, Guatemala circumvents the violation it committed in respect of Article 5.3, and
in paragraph 160 of its first written submission states that:
"In any case, given the substantial dumping margin shown by the invoices and other
evidence in the Ministry's possession at the time of initiation, the fact is that there
would still have been a significant margin of dumping even if the slight difference in
the weight of the sacks had been taken into account." (Emphasis added).
6.286 On the subject of the levels of trade of the reported transactions, Mexico submits that in
comparing the normal value and the export price, Guatemala failed to take account of the fact that
these levels were different. Guatemala has asserted in this connection that the application and the
evidence before the Ministry at the time of initiation provided no indication that any adjustment for
level of trade would be appropriate.
329 By making this assertion, Guatemala shows once again that it
did not examine the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso.
6.287 As we have said, Guatemala simply did not conduct the examination required under
Article 5.3. The evidence submitted by the applicant with respect to normal value referred to
transactions which took place at retail price to the public, while the evidence of the export price
referred to transactions at prices between the manufacturer and the distributor. In establishing price
comparability, Guatemala should have recognized and evaluated the fact that the prices for normal
value and the export prices were obtained on the basis of transactions which took place at different
levels of trade, and in its initiation determination, in the section entitled "Estimation of the Margin of
Dumping", it should have acknowledged this fact.
6.288 Another element which confirms Guatemala's violation of Article 5.2 and 5.3 is the fact that
the dollar/peso exchange rate put forward by the applicant is not documented in the file. Cementos
Progreso did not provide any evidence to substantiate the claimed exchange rate. Once again,
Guatemala accepted the applicant's claim as valid without conducting the examination required under
Article 5.3.
6.289 Now, as part of this procedure, Guatemala cites the official exchange rate of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for September 1995, the month and year in which the application for an
investigation was submitted, adding that the IMF ex change rate was very close to the exchange rate
used by Cementos Progreso in its application.
330
6.290 Thus, using post hoc arguments Guatemala is now seeking to show that the exchange rate
used for the initiation determination was close to the official exchange rate. In doing so, however,
Guatemala is disregarding two important elements . Firstly, under Article 5.2, Cementos Progreso
should have provided evidence in support of its assertion concerning the exchange rate, failing which
the Ministry should have requested the information from the applicant; and secondly, under
Article 5.3 the examination and verification of the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso should
have been conducted and documented before the initiation determination was issued; in other words,
what Guatemala is now seeking to demonstrate is, inter alia, what it should have demonstrated before
issuing the determination of initiation of the anti-dumping investigation.
6.291 Regarding the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso in support of the normal value,
Mexico submits that the so-called invoices are in fact delivery notes. In this connection, Guatemala
attempts
331 to shift the burden of the proof to Mexico, although as argued in the general remarks
section of this second submission, this is totall y unacceptable. If, instead, Guatemala had conducted

329 Ibid., paragraph 161.
330 Ibid., paragraph 165 and footnote 199.
331 Ibid., paragraph 164.

the examination required under Article 5.3, it would have discovered that the evidence submitted by
the applicant in support of the export price included invoices that were sent by Cruz Azul on the
grounds that they complied with the relevant requirements under Mexican law in that, inter alia, they
were identified as numbered invoices and contained a photocopy of the tax certification showing that
they were registered with the corresponding Mexican tax authority (in this case, it appears at the top
of the documents).
6.292 The delivery notes provided as evidence of the normal value, on the other hand, contain no
clear indication that they are in fact invoices, nor do they contain the tax certification; in fact one of
them refers to an order rather than a sale, suggesting there might not actually have been a sale of a
sack of cement, but only an offer.
6.293 In any case, it seems fairly clear that Guatemala did not conduct the examination required
under Article 5.3; inter alia, it did not review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted to
prove the normal value and the export price. In fact, Guatemala did not recognize the differences in
the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso and in a general and arbitrary manner, the Ministry
pointed out that the evidence of normal value consisted of invoices.
6.294 With respect to the alleged dumping in support of the initiation determination, it is clear to
Mexico that any authority that had made an unbiased and objective evaluation of the facts in
conducting the examination stipulated in Article 5.3 would have realized that in making a comparison
between the normal value and the export price it could not disregard the significant and obvious
differences reflected in the evidence submitted in respect of the alleged dumping, inter alia ,
differences in the products, the volumes, the levels of trade and the "representivity" of the sales, and
the lack of evidence concerning the exchange rate.
6.295 It is equally serious in the light of the above considerations that Guatemala, in its initiation
determination, should not have shown the slightest recognition of the fact that the normal value and
export price cited by Cementos Progreso in its application for initiation were not comparable and that
there was no indication that the Ministry asked the applicant for more information or tried to obtain
the information by some other means.
6.296 While Mexico understands that the information contained in the application for initiation of
an investigation is limited to the information reasonably available to the applicant on the factors listed
in subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of Article 5.2, and that the level of evidence needed to justify the initiation
of an investigation is lower than the level of evidence required for a preliminary or definitive
determination, the evidence required to initiate an investigation cannot be just "any evidence".
332
How could Guatemala possibly think that two delivery notes which failed to identify the type of
cement that was supposed to be a like product to that exported by Mexico to Guatemala, that failed to
indicate the terms and conditions of sale applicable to the prices reported in the alleged invoices for
sales in the Mexican market and corresponding to two sales transactions expressed in the lowest
possible unit of sale for the marketing of the investigated product, and two import certificates which
showed export volumes at wholesale or distributor level, could be considered as accurate and
adequate evidence, and hence, as sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation?

332 Although neither Article 5 nor any other provision of the AD Agreement defines the term "sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation", certain panel decisions shed light in this respect, as for
example the report adopted on 27 October 1993, SCM/162, BISD/426, United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, paragraph 332. Although United States - Softwood Lumber involved
the challenge of an ex officio initiation of a countervailing duty investigation, inter alia because it was argued
that the evidence was insufficient to justify initiation, these elements apply by analogy to the initiation of anti-
dumping investigations as well.

6.297 In short, for the purposes of its initiation determination the Ministry failed to take account of
the differences between the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso of normal value and the
evidence of the export price, thereby violating Article 5.2 and 5.3, not to mention Article 2; and since
it did not have accurate and adequate evidence, nor sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the
investigation, Guatemala should have promptly rejected the application for initiation of the anti-
dumping investigation. By not doing so, it also violated Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Reply to Guatemala's arguments concerning the alleged sufficiency of evidence of threat of
injury to justify the initiation
6.298 Guatemala's arguments concerning the alleged sufficiency of evidence of threat of injury to
initiate the investigation must also be rejected.
6.299 We must begin by refuting certain arguments set forth in paragraph 67 of Guatemala's first
written submission:
"Seeing itself threatened by this flood of imports on its only market, Cementos Progreso had
no choice but to file an application for an anti-dumping investigation with the Ministry of the
Economy. In its application dated 21 September 1995, and the supplementary application of
9 October 1995, Cementos Progreso presented evidence of the injurious effects of dumping
by Cruz Azul in Guatemala. In particular, Cementos Progreso supplied information relating
to loss of sales, loss of customers and a trend towards penetration of imports which in the
space of a single day increased from basically 0 to 480 tons (representing approximately
US$60,000 in loss of sales). While this amount may seem small to Mexico, projected over
one year it would represent a substantial portion of the total production and income of
Cementos Progreso in 1995." (Footnote omitted)
6.300 Firstly, Cementos Progreso never supplied inform ation to show that it was threatened by a
"flood" of imports; indeed, its application was supported only by the documentation concerning two
import certificates and simple assertions, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, as prohibited by
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.301 Secondly, Cementos Progreso never presented "evidence of the injurious effects of dumping
by Cruz Azul", since the only documents that could have been considered as evidence in the
application were, as we said, two delivery notes, two import certificates and a "flood" of simple
assertions. Similarly, Guatemala is lying when it claims that Cementos Progreso supplied information
relating to loss of sales, loss of customers and a "trend" towards penetration of imports. Simple
assertion in respect of these factors is not enough to substantiate the argument that the application
contained the information required under subparagraph (iv) of Article 5.2.
6.302 Thirdly, Guatemala cannot contend that it had information concerning an "increase" in the
"trend towards penetration of imports" when the analysis of an import penetration "trend" would in
any case require a study of many more indicators than the two import certificates showing an
incremental difference for only one day while the original investigation period was six months; it
cannot now argue, in this proceeding, that the mentioned figure (0 to 480 tons) "projected over
one year … would represent a substantial portion of the total production and income of Cementos
Progreso in 1995". It should be noted that at no time prior to initiation did the applicant or the
Ministry make this projection or any other projection, nor did they examine the volume of imports
against production or consumption in Guatemala as the Ministry now asserts.
333 So that Guatemala
cannot substantiate its allegation that the imports were massive merely by arguing that Cementos
Progreso was threatened by a "flood" of imports, nor can it assert, as it did in paragraph 32 of its oral

333 First written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 136 and 137.

submission at the first substantive meeting, that Cementos Progreso's application contained import
figures and trends.
6.303 At the same time, in its first written submission (Part III B, Section 2(b)), Guatemala
maintains that the Ministry had sufficient evidence of threat of injury to initiate the investigation, and
in an effort to develop its position, it also makes an unfortunate attempt to counter Mexico's
arguments concerning the insufficiency of evidence of threat of injury to initiate the investigation.
6.304 In paragraph 174 of its first submission, in very eloquent, almost literary terms, Guatemala
displays evident confusion concerning Mexico's arguments relating to the insufficiency of evidence of
threat of injury:
"174. Mexico's suggestion that the Ministry should have delayed initiation in order to gather
more information conjures up Nero playing his violin while Rome was in flames. […]."
(Emphasis added)
6.305 Similarly, in paragraph 171 of its first submission, Guatemala tries to manipulate Mexico's
position by stating that Mexico "has argued that the Ministry was under obligation to examine more
evidence of injury before initiating the investigation". According to Guatemala, Mexico "insisted that
Guatemala should have analysed at greater length the evidence before it and should have taken more
time to issue its decision to initiate the investigation", adding that "Mexico cites the decision of the
Ministry to initiate its investigation without waiting for fuller information on the actual level of Cruz
Azul's imports." In a further attempt to counter Mexico's arguments, Guatemala states that "if the
Ministry had taken its time and studied the evidence more carefully , it would have realized that there
was no justification for an investigation" and conten ds that "with due respect for its larger neighbour
in the north, […] these arguments are nothing short of ridiculous".
6.306 It is true that Mexico's arguments, as dist orted and manipulated by Guatemala, would seem
ridiculous to anyone. Nowhere has Mexico suggested that Guatemala's violations in this context have
anything to do with the fact that the Ministry should have "taken more time to issue its decision" or
should have "delayed initiation in order to gather more information" as Guatemala absurdly suggests.
Nor was it a matter of "waiting for fuller information on the actual level of Cruz Azul's imports", but
rather, of the Ministry's complying with its oblig ation to have sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation. For example, regarding the alleged "massive" nature of Cruz Azul's imports, the Ministry
had ample time to obtain information on imports before initiation, but preferred to base its decision on
the insufficient information contained in two import certificates, and request information on imports
from the customs authorities only after the investigation had been initiated.
6.307 Still less did Mexico argue that the point at issue was that the Ministry should examine "at
greater length the evidence before it
" or that it was "under obligation to examine more evidence of
injury" as Guatemala absurdly tries to suggest. We might respond to these absurd suggestions by
asking what evidence the Ministry had before it of threat of injury? When does Guatemala think that
Mexico ever stated that the Ministry had any evidence before it of the alleged threat of injury when
deciding to initiate? How many times do we have to repeat that the initiation was based on nothing
more than simple assertions, and that the evidence in support of those assertions was non-existent?
6.308 What evidence could the Ministry have examined at "greater" length, when in fact Mexico
has insisted any number of times that neither Cementos Progreso's application, nor the administrative
file on initiation, contained any evidence at all, let alone relevant, accurate, or sufficient to initiate the
alleged threat of injury and the corresponding causal link, and that the Ministry merely accepted and
adopted outright the simple assertions and even the suspicions of the applicant with respect to the
alleged massive volume of imports and this alleged effect on the Guatemalan domestic industry, in
open violation of Articles 5.2 and 5.3?

6.309 But suffice it to read the relevant part of Mexico's first written submission, including the
paragraphs to which Guatemala itself refers 334, to realize that Mexico never argued what Guatemala
has presented in a manipulated and tendentious way in an absurd attempt to defend an initiation which
was blatantly inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Ag reement owing to the indisputable fact that it
took place without the slightest evidence in support of the alleged threat of injury. This complete lack
of evidence of injury cannot, under any permissible interpretation of the Agreement, be considered
consistent with the standard of sufficiency stipulated in Article 5.3 for the initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation.
6.310 In an equally absurd attempt to support the fallacy that the Ministry had "more than
sufficient" evidence of the alleged threat of inju ry to justify the initiation of the investigation,
Guatemala states, in paragraph 174 of its first submission 335, that the Ministry knew of certain
information with respect to Cementos Progreso and on aspects such as the cement market in
Guatemala, prices, the increase in imports, and the fact that Mexico was going through a deep
recession, from which is simply inferred that Mexico had an excess capacity.
6.311 To assert that the Ministry knew of this information is not the same as proving that these
alleged facts were duly established by the Guatemalan authority for the purposes of initiating the
investigation. Even assuming, for the sake of ar gument, that the Ministry knew of the information,
there is no such indication in Cementos Progreso's application, or in the recommendation prepared by
the two advisors, or in the initiation determination, still less in the public notice of initiation. In fact,
Guatemala expressly acknowledges in the cited paragraph that the Ministry "did not need complete
information to know that imports were rapidly incr easing" and that the Ministry merely inferred that
there was excess capacity from its "knowledge" that Mexico was going through a "terrible recession",
without any element of the administrative file on the initiation or the public notice of initiation
making the slightest reference to any information or evidence in support of the likelihood of an
increase in imports or excess capacity in Mexico. Consequently, these simple assertions cannot be
taken into consideration in evaluating whether the Ministry correctly reached the conclusion that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation.
(iii) Reply to Guatemala's arguments concerning the alleged sufficiency of evidence of a causal
link to justify initiation.
6.312 Guatemala argues that the Ministry had sufficient evidence concerning the causal link
between the alleged dumping and the alleged threat of injury, and that Mexico's claim concerning the

334 First written submission by Guatemala, footnotes 205 to 208.
335 Ibid., paragraph 174, which reads:
"Mexico's suggestion that the Ministry should have delayed initiation in order to gather more
information conjures up Nero playing his violin while Rome was in flames. In this submission, we have proved
beyond any doubt that the Ministry had more than sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation under Article 5 of the AD Agreement. The Ministry knew the size of the domestic market.
Cementos Progreso exported practically no cement up to 1995, and no-one was interested in exporting cement to
the Guatemalan market. Consequently, Cementos Progreso's production reflected national consumption. The
Ministry did not need complete information to know that imports were rapidly increasing. As explained above,
within a period of a few months in 1995, imports increased from basically zero to 25 per cent of consumption in
Guatemala. The Ministry also knew that Mexico was going through a terrible recession and that consumption
and production had decreased dramatically, resulting in thou sands of tons of idle capacity. Finally, the Ministry
knew that Cruz Azul's prices were well below those of Cementos Progreso, because the Government regulated
cement prices and because the Government itself was one of the main purchasers of cement, and because
Cementos Progreso had supplied information on domestic prices." (Emphasis added by Mexico)

violation of Article 5.2 and 5.3 based on lack of evidence of a causal link 336 is without merit.
Guatemala's defence is based simply on the argument that:
" … The clear meaning of Article 5.2 is that there is sufficient evidence of a causal link if the
application provides evidence of dumping in conformity with Article 5.2(iii) and proof of
consequent injury in conformity with Article 5.2(iv). Cementos Progreso met those
requirements".
337
6.313 Guatemala's argument is erroneous from various points of view:
6.314 Firstly, the interpretation of Article 5.2 adduced by Guatemala is simply impermissible, since
even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there was evidence of dumping and threat of injury
in the application, this does not necessarily and automatically imply, let alone prove, that there was a
causal link, since the state of the domestic industry could be the result of factors other than dumping.
From a strictly technical point of view it is possible to imagine that there is dumping and injury
without there necessarily being a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to a domestic
industry, since the effects on the domestic industry could be the result of other factors. But when
there is insufficient evidence of the existence of dumping or threat of injury to a domestic industry, as
in this case, it cannot under any circumstances simply be assumed that there is evidence of a causal
link.
6.315 Nor is it enough, secondly, to say in refutation of the argument that Article 5.2 and 5.3 were
violated:
"… the application also referred explicitly to the causal link. The application dated
21 September states that the dumped cement was entering in quantities that were causing
injury to Cementos Progreso. The supplementary application states that Cementos Progreso
was being threatened by massive imports of cement from Mexico. The supplementary
application also describes how the dumped imports were directly affecting the firm's
investments."338 (Emphasis added by Mexico) (footnotes omitted)
6.316 A plain reading of this quotation clearly reveals that the application did not contain any
evidence of the causal link between the dumping a nd the alleged threat of injury, but only simple
assertions or statements. To "refer to", "to state" or "to describe" something cannot, under any
permissible interpretation of Article 5.2, be considered as consistent with the requirement stipulated
therein to include "evidence" of a causal link. In fact, Article 5.2 expressly prohibits what Guatemala
has adduced in its defence by firmly stating that:
"[…] Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient
to meet the requirements of this paragraph. […]" 339
6.317 Thirdly, Guatemala's defence is not only based on an impermissible interpretation of
Article 5.2, but it also fails to answer Mexico's claim concerning the violation of Article 5.3. Simply
to argue that "the application contained accurate and adequate evidence with respect to the criteria

336 From its first submission onwards, Mexico has maintained that the application did not contain, nor
did the Ministry have before it, any evidence of the causal link for the purposes of its initiation determination,
and that this constituted a violation of Article 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement. See paragraphs 165 to 171 of
Mexico's first written submission.
337 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 183.
338 Ibid., paragraph 184.
339 Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement.

contained in Article 5.2 (iii) and 5.2 (iv) "does not answer the question of whether there was sufficient
evidence of a causal link to justify the initiation by the Ministry of the Economy of an investigation.340
6.318 Mexico has being demonstrating throughout this proceeding that the application did not
contain relevant evidence of dumping or of threat of injury, nor did the Ministry obtain ex-officio any
evidence thereof, initiating the investigation without sufficient evidence of dumping and of threat of
injury. Thus, the only possible conclusion is that the Ministry of the Economy could not, under any
circumstances, simply assume that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal link either.
6.319 In short, when there is insufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury to justify
initiation as in this case, it cannot simply be argued, as Guatemala has done, that "the Ministry had
sufficient evidence of a causal link", as this merely reflects a poor attempt to demonstrate what cannot
be demonstrated.
3. Claims Under Articles 5.7 and 5.8 – Simultaneous Consideration of Evidence of Both
Dumping and Injury
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.320 Mexico advances the following arguments under Articles 5.7 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement:
6.321 Despite the obvious lack of sufficient evidence of the alleged dumping and the alleged threat
of injury, the Ministry of the Economy did not reject Cementos Progreso’s application for initiation
but, on the contrary, initiated the investigation im properly basing itself on the submission of two
delivery notes and two import certificates and on mere allegations and conjectures unsubstantiated by
evidence.
6.322 It is thus obvious that the Guatemalan authority violated Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement by
failing to examine the evidence of dumping and th reat of injury simultaneously, in accordance with
Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement, when deciding whether or not to initiate the investigation.
6.323 Moreover, the relevant section of Article 5.8 makes a specific reference to rejection of
applications submitted in accordance with Article 5.1 as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied
that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case:
"5.8. An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or injury to justify proceeding with the case
[…]."
6.324 This provision is clearly related to Article 5.2 and 5.3 and can only be interpreted to mean that
an investigation cannot be initiated unless there is sufficient evidence of dumping and injury. Where
this is not the case, the application must be rejected by the investigating authority and an investigation
may not be initiated.
6.325 As has been established in previous decisions by panels, failure to comply with the provisions
on initiation laid down in the AD Agreement cannot be remedied or replaced by measures subsequent

340 In this connection, the Panel in the case "Guatemala – Cement I" found:
"7.53 We have concluded that the question whether there is 'sufficient evidence' to justify initiation is
not answered by a determination that the applicatio n contains all the information 'reasonably available'
to the applicant on the factors specified in Article 5.2 (i) to (iv). […] "See also paragraphs 7.49 and
7.50 of the same document.

to initiation of the investigation 341 as the very purpose of Article 5 is to ensure compliance with
specific minimum criteria before deciding to initiate an investigation. 342 Not only should Cementos
Progreso’s application have been rejected, but the investigation should never have been initiated.
6.326 The Ministry of the Economy therefore violated Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement by not
rejecting the application made by Cementos Progreso and by not refraining from initiating the
investigation due to the lack of sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury to justify initiation
in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement respectively.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.327 The following are Guatemala's arguments in response to Mexico's claims under Articles 5.7
and 5.8:
6.328 Mexico asserts that Guatemala initiated the inve stigation at issue without sufficient evidence
of dumping and injury.
343 Mexico argues that as a result, Guatemala violated Article 5.7 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.344
6.329 Article 5.7 stipulates that "the evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered
simultaneously" when an authority makes its determination with respect to initiation. 345 Mexico's
claim that Guatemala violated Article 5.7 is no more than a claim, because it is not substantiated by
facts or arguments. In addressing the burden of proof above, we showed that when a complainant
fails to substantiate a claim, that claim must be rejected. Mexico's claim concerning Article 5.7 must
be rejected.
6.330 Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Panel were to allow Mexico to maintain its
claim with respect to Article 5.7, that claim should not be allowed to prevail because it is without
merit. Our earlier discussion of the subject (which we incorporate here by reference) shows
sufficiently clearly that Guatemala fully examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence before
it with respect to dumping and injury. There is no evidence, and Mexico certainly does not cite any,
that could lead this Panel to conclude that the Mi nistry examined one category and not the other prior
to the initiation of the investigation at issue.
(i) There was sufficient evidence of dumping and injury
6.331 According to Mexico, "the Ministry of the Economy … violated Article 5.8 of the AD
Agreement by not rejecting the application made by Cementos Progreso and by not refraining from
initiating the investigation due to the lack of su fficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury
…". 346 This last minute argument must be rejected for the following reasons:

341 Some GATT Panels considered this issue in the context of the Tokyo Round Agreement on
application of Article VI of the GATT. See, for example, United States – Gray Portland Cement and Clinker,
above footnote 26, paragraph 5.37, where it is concluded that "a failure to observe the requirements in Article 5
could not be remedied by action subsequent to the initiation of the investigation …"; and United States –
Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden ,
ADP/47, Report of the Panel published on 29 August 1990 (not adopted), paragraph 5.20, which states that
"there was no basis to consider that an infringement of this provision could be cured retroactively". See also
Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 8.6.
342 United States – Gray Portland Cement and Clinker, paragraph 5.37.
343 First submission of Mexico, paragraph 172.
344 Idem, paragraph 173.
345 AD Agreement, Article 5.7.
346 First submission by Mexico, paragraph 177.

6.332 Like Mexico's claim with respect to Article 5.7, this claim with respect to Article 5.8 is no
more than just that: a claim unsubstantiated by any facts or arguments. Thus, Mexico has failed to
assume the burden of the proof as required of it, and its claims should be rejected. If, nevertheless,
the Panel were to allow Mexico to maintain this claim, like all other such claims, it should not be
allowed to prevail because it is without merit.
6.333 Firstly, the first sentence of Article 5.8 states that "an application under paragraph 1 shall be
rejected and an investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are
satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or injury to justify proceeding with the
case."
347 The next sentence identifies certain situations requiring "immediate termination" of an
investigation.348 The wording of Article 5.8 makes it clear that it is only applicable after the initiation
of the investigation.
6.334 This interpretation of Article 5.8 is confirmed by negotiating history. The origins of this
provision can be found in Article 5(c) of the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, the title of which
was the same as that of the current Article 5: "Initiation and Subsequent Investigation". However
during the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, this text was included in Article 7 of the
Draft Anti-Dumping Code under the title "Subsequent Consideration".
349 This suggests exactly what
the ordinary meaning of the current text is, i.e. that Article 5.8 is applicable to the consideration and
conduct of anti-dumping investigations after they have been initiated.
6.335 Secondly, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that this approach to Article 5.8 were
rejected, Guatemala respectfully submits that if this Panel applied the appropriate standard of review,
it could not conclude, as Mexico claims, that the investigation at issue was initiated without sufficient
evidence of dumping and threat of injury. In earlier sections of this submission we presented our
arguments and opinions on the matter, and we shall simply incorporate them here by reference.
(ii) The determination of initiation by the ministry is not subject to examination by the panel as a
de novo review
6.336 Throughout its first submission, Mexico argues for a standard of review which would require
this Panel, illegally, to substitute its judgement for that of the investigating authority in Guatemala.
Mexico repeatedly urged the Panel to examine the evidence which the Ministry had before it and to
find that the said evidence was not sufficient to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation.
350 Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement prescribes a standard of review.
Article 17.6(i) stipulates that panels should respect the factual decisions of an investigating authority
when "the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion … ". If these conditions are satisfied, the
evaluation of the national investigating authority will not be overturned, even if the panel has reached
a different conclusion.
351

347 AD Agreement, Article 5.8 (emphasis added).
348 For example, when the margin of dumping is de minimis. See United States – DRAM, WT/DS99/R,
adopted on 19 March 1999, paragraph 6.90.
349 See TN.64/NTB/W/16,6 (3 March 1967); TN.64/NTB/W14,6 (9 December 1966).
350 See, for example, first submission of Mexico, paragraphs 91, 126, 138, 159, 161-62, 170-71.
351 As mentioned when we discussed the standard of review above, the Panel in the case Korea –
Resins arrived at this same conclusion:
"The Panel considered that a review of whether the KTC's determination was based on
positive evidence did not mean that he Panel should substitute its own judgement for that of
the KTC as to the relative weight to be accorded to the facts before the KTC. To do so would
ignore that the task of the Panel was not to make its own independent evaluation of the facts
before the KTC to determine whether there was material injury to the industry in Korea but to
review the determination as made by the KTC for consistency with the Agreement, bearing in

6.337 Thus, the limited scope of the Article 17.6(i) review means that: (a) panels should not
reassess the evidence; and (b) panels cannot carry out a de novo review.352 As long as the decision of
the Ministry to initiate the investigation at issue rests on facts that were adequately established and
assessed on an unbiased and objective basis, the panel should respect that decision.
6.338 Mexico asserts that the determination made by the Ministry concerning the initiation reflected
a complete omission in assessing the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence and a partial analysis of
the evidence. An impartial reading of the Ministry 's determination and of the facts in this dispute
shows that the Ministry examined the facts that it had before it completely and fairly, and made a
determination that was reasonably supported by those facts. Mexico or this Panel may carry out a
de novo review and arrive at a different conclusion, but that is not the Panel's function
6.339 In conclusion, Mexico did not meet the requirement to demonstrate, under the applicable
standard of review, that Guatemala's factual findings were made in an inadequate and partial manner.
Although Mexico argues that the factual determinations at issue were biased and partial, it has not
provided any evidence in support of its arguments. Similarly, there is no indication of partiality in the
way in which the evidence was interpreted by the Guatemalan authorities. 353 At best, all Mexico has
done is to offer an alternative reading of the evidence, or in some cases, it has merely suggested that
an alternative reading might be possible, and not that the factual record required an alternative
finding. In view of this situation, there is simply no reason whatsoever why the Panel should
substitute its interpretation of the facts for that of the Guatemalan authorities, and to do so would
simply infringe the clear standard of review applicable to anti-dumping disputes under Article 17.6(i)
of the AD Agreement.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.340 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's response to its claims under Articles 5.7 and 5.8 as follows:
6.341 As Mexico has argued before, it is clear from the proven circumstances in which the
investigation at issue was initiated that Guatemala also violated Article 5.7 and 5.8 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. That is, it can also be seen from the evidence that Mexico supplied to the Panel
on the basis of the administrative file of Guatemala's investigation that in deciding whether or not to
initiate the investigation, the Ministry failed to consider simultaneously the evidence of both dumping
and injury in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 3.
6.342 In Mexico's view, this is not a simple requirement under the Agreement, but a provision
which in all cases reinforces the examination required under Article 5.3 and its standard of objective
sufficiency of the evidence. If it had conducted this examination simultaneously as required by the
Agreement, the authority would not have been able to consider two delivery notes and two import

mind that in a given case reasonable minds could differ as to the significance to be attached to
certain facts. The Panel considered that a pr oper review of the KTC's determination against
the requirement of positive evidence under Article 3.1 meant that it should examine whether
the factual basis of the findings articulated in the determination was discernible from the text
of the determination and reasonably supported those findings."
ADP/92, 2 April 1993, paragraph 227.
352 See the Cartland Letter, footnote 159 above.
353 In the Panel Report EC - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil ,
ADP/137, adopted on 30 October 1995, paragraphs 512-513, the Panel determined that when an investigating
authority had before it two sets of inconsistent data neither of which was necessarily more precise than the other,
the decision of the investigating authority to base its determination on one of those sets of data and not the other
did not show any bias or lack of objectivity. In Guatemala's opinion, when one of the parties tries to prove that
the determination of the investigating authority is not "unbiased" in the meaning of Article 17.6(i), it must
provide positive evidence that the decision was influenced by a bias or prejudgement. Mere allegation or
conjecture cannot in any way discharge the burden that rests with the challenging party in this respect.

certificates as sufficient evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2, let alone as sufficient
evidence of injury within the meaning of Article 3.
6.343 Moreover, faced with the conclusion that would inevitably have resulted from such an
examination, if the authority had conduced that the evidence was insufficient, the Ministry should
have rejected the application submitted by Cementos Progreso and refrained from initiating the
investigation in accordance with Article 5.8. But Guatemala seems to have disregarded both the letter
and the object and purpose of this provision.
6.344 Indeed, Mexico considers the interpretation of Article 5.8 proposed by Guatemala to be
totally impermissible.
354 According to Guatemala, Article 5.8 is only applicable to the rejection of an
application after the initiation, to terminate an investigation. Under this interpretation, an
investigation could be initiated without sufficient evidence of dumping and injury, which would
totally contradict the text of this provision which refers to the rejection of an application as soon as
the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of
injury to justify proceeding with the case.
355 Likewise, Guatemala's interpretation goes against the
logic of the standard of objective sufficiency established in Article 5.3. What point would there be in
Article 5.3 requiring sufficient evidence to justify initiation of an investigation if Article 5.8,
according to Guatemala's interpretation, permitted the initiation of the investigation in spite of
insufficient evidence?
6.345 Finally, in this connection, paragraph 39 of Guatemala's oral submission at the first
substantive meeting with the parties states:
"[…] [ As we explain in our writ ten submission, this provision does not apply to the
initiation of anti-dumping investigations. As the Panel in Corn Syrup from the United States
recently found (paragraph 7.99), Article 5.8 only applies after the initiation of an
investigation. … Besides being a correct interpretation of Article 5.8, this interpretation also
underscores the low evidentiary threshold for initiation under Article 5.3. In other words, if
the allegations that warrant initiation are later proven not to "justify proceeding with the
case", importers are protected by Article 5.8 which requires "prompt " termination of the
proceeding".
6.346 We cite below paragraph 7.99 of the report of the Panel which recently examined the case
Mexico – Corn Syrup
356 in order to refute Guatemala's erroneous reading of this conclusion:
[…] In our view, Article 5.8 does not impose additional substantive obligation beyond those
in Article 5.3 on the authority in connection with the initiation of an investigation. That is, if
there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation under Article 5.3, there is no violation of
Article 5.8 in not rejecting the application. […] (Emphasis added)
6.347 As can be seen, the Panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup certainly did not establish that Article 5.8
applied only after the initiation of an investigation as Guatemala mistakenly tries to suggest. What the
Panel established is that Article 5.8 does not impose any additional substantive obligations beyond
those in Article 5.3 as long as there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.

354 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 193.
355 This was the view taken by the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I, which added:
"Merely that Article 5.8 continues to outline circumstances in which an investigation must be
terminated, which presumes that it has been in itiated, does not support the conclusion that the
Article does not refer to rejection of an application prior to initiation if the authorities conclude that
there is not sufficient evidence of dumping and injury". See the report of the Panel in Guatemala –
Cement I, paragraph 7.59.
356 Report of the Panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup.

In fact, this conclusion reaffirms Mexico's position that Article 5.8 applies before the initiation and
not after, since it is a supplementary provision to Article 5.3 in that it requires the authority to reject
the application and to refrain from initiating an inve stigation when there is not sufficient evidence to
justify such initiation.
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.348 Guatemala responds by claiming that it did not violate Articles 5.7 and 5.8 when it notified
the initiation of the investigation. The following are its arguments in this regard:
6.349 Mexico also errs in asserting that Guatemala violated Article 5.7 and 5.8 of the AD
Agreement when it initiated the investigation. Firstly, as we explained in our first submission,
Article 5.8 does not apply to the initiation of anti-dumping investigations. As recently found by the
Panel in Corn Syrup , Article 5.8 only applies after the initiation of an investigation.
357 Thus, for
example, had the Ministry received import data from its customs authorities after the initiation of the
investigation indicating that the imports were negligible, Guatemala would have been required under
Article 5.8 to terminate the investigation. Besides being a correct interpretation of Article 5.8, this
interpretation also underscores the low evidentiary threshold for initiation under Article 5.3. In other
words, if the allegations that warrant initiation are later proven not to justify "the initiation of an
investigation", importers are protected by Article 5.8, which requires "prompt" termination of the
proceeding.
6.350 Secondly, even if Article 5.8 were applicable to initiations, the challenged investigation was
initiated on the basis of "sufficient evidence" within the meaning of Article 5.3. As we discussed in
greater detail in our first submission, the Ministry examined the "accuracy and adequacy" of the
evidence accompanying the original application and the supplementary application with respect to
dumping, injury and causal link.
358 Thus, Guatemala complied with Article 5.7 and 5.8 of the AD
Agreement (to the extent that the latter was applicable to the initiation of the investigation).
C. GUATEMALA'S NOTIFICATION OF THE INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION
1. Claims Under Article 5.5 – Notification On Receipt of Properly Documented
Application for Investigation
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.351 Mexico claims that Guatemala was in violation of its obligations under Article 5.5 of the AD
Agreement. Its arguments in this regard are as follows:
6.352 Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement states the following:
"5.5. The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an
investigation, any publicizing of the applica tion for the initiation of an investigation.
However, after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to
initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting
Member concerned."
6.353 Moreover, footnote 1 to the AD Agreement defines the concept of "initiated" relating to an
investigation as follows:

357 WT/DS/132/R, paragraph 7.99.
358 See first submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 138-87.

"The term ‘initiated’ as used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which
a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 5."
6.354 In the light of the foregoing, one of Guatemala’s obligations was to notify the exporting
Member’s Government after receiving a properly documented application and before proceeding to
the "procedural action" by which an investigation formally commences.
6.355 Guatemala, however, only notified the Government of Mexico of initiation of the
investigation on 22 January 1996. This delay constitutes a violation of Article 5.5 of the AD
Agreement. In order to show this, the following arguments have to be taken into account.
(i) Guatemala - Cement Initiated the investigation on the same date on which it published the
"Public Notice of the Initiation of the Investigation Pursuant to a Complaint of Dumping"
6.356 The initiation of an investigation is one of the structural elements of dumping disciplines.
The fact that initiation is a formal act corresponds to a logical structure: an anti-dumping
investigation involves several actors in addition to the authority itself and implies compliance with a
timetable. The information provided by interested parties is extremely important in allowing the
authorities to make their determinations. This is why it would be illogical to assume that an
investigation could be initiated on just any date or as a result of an internal act by the investigating
authority.
6.357 In the present case, Guatemala decided formally to initiate the investigation upon publication
of the "Public notice of the initiation of the investigation pursuant to a complaint of dumping" in the
Diario Oficial de Centro América on 11 January 1996. This has been the interpretation given by the
Guatemalan authorities throughout the investigation. Several documents attest to this.
6.358 Firstly, resolution 2-95 of the Directorate of Economic Integration of the Guatemalan
Ministry of the Economy, dated 15 December 1995, expressly stated that the date of initiation of the
investigation was deemed to be the date of publication in the Diario Oficial de Centro América and
ordered that the corresponding notifications be made.
6.359 Secondly, resolution 000042 of 9 January 1996, issued by the Ministry of the Economy,
announcing the decision to give public notice of initiation that would take effect "on the day of
publication of the notice in the Diario Oficial".
6.360 Furthermore, in its letter to the Government of Mexico dated 26 July 1996, Guatemala
indicates the following:
"We sincerely regret that your country was not notified before the publication of the
resolution for the initiation of the investigation, and we offer our sincere apologies in
that regard. This was due to a slip on the part of the persons responsible for effecting
the notifications, as they were not familiar with the provisions applicable to anti-
dumping investigation procedures. Once again, please accept our apologies."
6.361 It should be noted that Guatemala refers to "the publication of the resolution for the initiation
of the investigation". In other words, Guatemala specifically states that the "resolution for the
initiation of the investigation" was a publication. On 26 July 1996, the only publication concerning
the investigation was the public notice of initiation of 11 January 1996.
6.362 Moreover, in Guatemala’s preliminary determination it was decided "to pursue the
investigation initiated on 11 January this year".

6.363 When referring to the initiation stage of the investigation, Guatemala’s final determination
referred solely to "Notice of the initiation of the investigation".
6.364 Thus, it is indisputable that Guatemala initiated the anti-dumping investigation on
11 January 1996, the date of publication of the "Public notice of the initiation of the investigation
pursuant to a complaint of dumping". Moreover, Guatemala’s interpretation that the public notice of
initiation itself constituted the initiation of the investigation was consistent throughout the
investigation.
(ii) The Guatemalan authorities did not notify th e Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate the investigation.
6.365 As proof of this argument, we refer to the letter sent by the Guatemalan authority to the
Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City. This notification was received by the Mexican Embassy on 22
January 1996. Having noted that Guatemala initiated the investigation on 11 January 1996, it is
obvious that the Guatemalan authority did not notif y the Government of Mexico before initiating the
investigation.
6.366 As mentioned above, Guatemala’s letter of 26 July 1996 expressly recognizes that Mexico
was not notified "before the publication of the resolution for the initiation of the investigation".
6.367 The AD Agreement obliges the investigating authority to notify the exporting Member in two
instances:
(a) Initiation of an investigation (Articles 5.5 and 12.1.1);
(b) on-the-spot investigations (Article 6.7 and paragraph 6 of Annex I).
6.368 As the letter refers to publication of the resolution to open the investigation, Guatemala was
certainly referring to the notification mentioned in Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement.
(iii) By not notifying the Government of Mexico before proceeding to initiate the investigation,
Guatemala violated Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement
6.369 Having established the preceding facts, we shall now refer to the usual meaning of the terms
in Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement, including the following: "after receipt of a properly documented
application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the
government of the exporting Member concerned". As already indicated, the facts set out in this
section clearly show that Guatemala did not comply with the obligation in Article 5.5 to notify
Mexico "after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to initiate an
investigation".
6.370 It is interesting to note that the Guatemalan authorities were aware of their obligation to
notify. In resolution 2-95 of 15 December 1995, the Ministry of the Economy decided to notify the
interested parties (including the Government of the exporting Member). Likewise, resolution 000042
of 9 January 1996 indicates that the interested parties (including the Government of the exporting
Member) should be notified.
6.371 In addition, in its letter of 26 July 1996, the Government of Guatemala apologized to the
Government of Mexico for not having notified Mexico prior to publication of the resolution to open
the investigation and attributes this to "a slip on the part of the persons responsible for effecting the
notifications, as they were not familiar with the provisions applicable to anti-dumping investigation

procedures".359 This letter clearly shows that the Guatemalan authorities interpreted the AD
Agreement in such a way that the notification referred to in Article 5.5 was made after initiation itself
and that this violated the Article.
6.372 It impossible to know the reasons which incited Guatemala to notify after having initiated the
investigation. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, by failing to notify the Government of Mexico before
proceeding to initiate the investigation, Guatemala violated Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.373 The following are Guatemala's responses to Mexico's claims relating to notifications:
6.374 Guatemala argues, in response to Mexico's cl aims under Article 5.5, that its notification to
Mexico did not impair the right of Mexico and Cruz Azul to mount a timely defence. Its response is
as follows:
6.375 According to Article 5.5, "before proceeding to in itiate an investigation, the authorities shall
notify the Government of the exporting Member concerned." Article 6.1.3 stipulates that "as soon as
an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full text of the written application
received… to the known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member", while according
to Article 12.1 "when the authorities are satisfied th at there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the [exporting Member and other
interested parties] shall be notified and a public notice shall be given."
6.376 The object and purpose of these provisions is to ensure that when an investigation is opened
the exporting Member and its exporters can defend their interests in an appropriate and timely
manner. Clearly, the object and purpose of these provisions is not to give an "advantage" to the
exporting Member or its exporters before the investigation begins. The only Article that requires
notification "before proceeding to initiate an investigation" is Article 5.5, but this Article does not
specify any minimum interval between the act of not ification and the act of investigation. Thus, for
the purpose of complying with Article 5.5 the inve stigating authority could notify at 8 a.m. and
initiate the investigation at 8.01 a.m.. Moreover, as distinct from Article 13.1 of the SCM Agreement,
Article 5.5 does not require Members to hold consultations between the time of notification and the
initiation of the investigation.
6.377 As shown below, Guatemala complied with each and all of the above-mentioned articles and
did nothing to impair the right of Mexico or Cruz Azul to mount a timely and appropriate defence.
(i) Under Guatemalan legislation, the investigation was not and could not have been initiated
until Mexico and Cruz Azul had received timely notice of the investigation
6.378 Guatemala complied with Article 5.5 because it did not effectively initiate the investigation
until Mexico had received the official notification made on 22 January 1996. In refraining from
beginning the actual investigation until Mexico had been notified, Guatemala complied with its own
notification legislation. In particular, Article 12 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which takes
precedence over all provisions relating to due process and the right to a hearing, establishes that
notification is a sine qua non for the initiation of any legal proceeding.
360 The constitutional

359 It should be noted that there is a specific reference to the (i) personnel responsible for notification,
and (ii) ignorance of the provisions applicable to anti-dumping investigation procedures.
360 See, for example, case 40-93 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Guatemala,
3 August 1993, Gaceta Jurisprudencial No. 29 (Article 12 of the Constitution stipulates that the defence of the
person and his rights are inviolable; the guarantee of audiator inter partes is ensured by the notification

guarantee concerning the obligation to give notification is developed in Article 66 of the Code of
Civil and Commercial Procedure361 and in Article 45(e) of the Law on the Organization of Justice. In
accordance with Article 26 of the Law on Administrative Appeals, these provisions are applicable to
administrative acts. In strict compliance with the above-mentioned legislation, although the
resolution would establish a specific date for the initiation of the investigation, the Ministry was
obliged to postpone it until the working day following the day on which the Government of Mexico
was notified of the decision to initiate an investigation
362 and this is what the Ministry did. If
Guatemala had proceeded with the investigation without having previously notified Mexico and Cruz
Azul, either of them could have brought an amparo action to annul the investigation, but neither
Mexico nor Cruz Azul made use of that remedy.363
6.379 It should be noted that in its own anti-dumping investigations Mexico does not comply with
the provisions of Article 5.5 as strictly as it would have Guatemala do in this proceeding. On
4 September 1997, the United States requested Mexico to hold consultations with respect to an
anti-dumping investigation on corn syrup imports. These consultations were requested, inter alia ,
because Mexico had not notified the United States "before proceeding to initiate an investigation"
which, in the opinion of the United States, was an infringement of Article 5.5. The file on this
investigation shows that the Mexican investigating authority issued the initiation decision on
17 February 1997 and published it at 6.00 a.m. on 27 February, but the Government of Mexico did not
notify the United States until 9.48 p.m. on 27 February. Mexico did not notify the Government of the
United States either before issuing the initiation decision on 17 February or before publishing the
notice of initiation on 27 February.
(ii) In its reply to the questionnaire Cruz Azul acknowledges that the investigation was not
"initiated" until 22 January 1996
6.380 As already pointed out, Guatemalan legislation requires that notification be given before any
investigation is carried out. Mexico acknowledges that Cruz Azul was notified on 20 January 1996
before any step had been taken to conduct an investigation.
364 C l e a r l y , h a v i n g r e c e i v e d t h e
notification on 20 January 1996, a Saturday, Cruz Azul considered that the effective initiation date
was 22 January 1996, the first working day following the date of notification. In fact, Cruz Azul
expressly records in its reply to the Ministry's questionnaire that the investigation was initiated on
22 January 1996 and not 11 January 1996 as the Government of Mexico now claims.
(iii) Notifying Mexico on 11 January 1996 or before that date would not have affected the course
of the investigation
6.381 The alleged delay in giving notification under Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(which Guatemala does not accept) did not impair Mexico's rights in the proceeding and in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law was merely a harmless error.
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates that "the panel shall interpret the relevant

communicating the judicial or administrative decision to the subjects of the proceedings; depriving a person of
a reasonable opportunity to be heard is an infringement of the constitutional protection of due process).
361 See, for example, case 80-88 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Guatemala,
7 November 1988, Gaceta Jurisprudence No. 10 (notifi cation under Article 66 in the form laid down in
Article 71 gives effect to the guarantee of a hearing and preserves the right of defence; failure to notify would
violate the fundamental rights fully guaranteed by the Constitution, would introduce uncertainty into the judicial
system and would render the other party defenceless).
362 Article 45(e) of the Law on the Organization of Justice ("e" any time-limit must be calculated from
the day following the date of the last notification).
363 The fact that neither Mexico nor Cruz Azul brought an amparo action shows that both considered
that their right to a timely and appropriate defence wa s intact. Moreover, the object and purpose of the WTO
provisions concerning notifications were duly respected.
364 Mexico's first written submission, para. 206.

provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law". WTO panels have recognized that "the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law" are those incorporated in th e Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the
Vienna Convention).365 Thus, the expression "customary rules of interpretation of public international
law" in Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also refers to the rules laid down in the
Vienna Convention.
6.382 Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention establishes that, in addition to the text, consideration
must be given to "any relevant rules of internat ional law applicable in the relations between the
parties". Accordingly, in arriving at a decision, a WTO panel should apply the relevant rules of
international law.
6.383 In accordance with Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
sources of international law include, inter alia, the "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations".
366 The principle of harmless error, which states that a party must show injury before
obtaining the right to be compensated for a procedural error, is a general principle of law recognized
by civilized nations. The response to the violation of a substantive rule is very direct; the national
measure is condemned and its withdrawal is requested. Violations of procedural rules may also be
condemned. However, the question is whether it can be said that a decision involving such a violation
is flawed. The retrospective rejection of administrative decisions can give rise to immense confusion
and to avoid this most national legal systems are prepared to accept that a minor procedural error does
not invalidate the decision.
6.384 The Members of the WTO make extensive use of the doctrine of harmless error in connection
with infringements of procedural rules in civil and criminal proceedings. In Australia, for example,
the courts agreed that a delay in lodging an application, for the purpose of examining a report and
preliminary finding of the Australia Customs Service, was a harmless error since the delay was
unlikely to have prejudiced the respondent.
367 Similar decisions have been taken in the United States.
For example, in Intercargo Insurance company v. United States, the court applied the principle to
defective notices for extension of liquidation period sent by the customs service to an importer. 368 In
fact, the United States federal rules of civil procedure stipulate that "the court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties".369
6.385 Expressions of this principle or its equivalent are also to be found in the criminal proceedings
of many WTO Members. In Namibia, for example, it has been held that when a verdict has not been
tainted by an irregularity committed during the trial, the verdict should stand.
370 A similar approach
has been adopted by the courts of Guatemala and other Member countries of the WTO such as Spain,
Canada, Australia and the United States.371

365 See, for example, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. WT/DS8/R, paragraph 6.7 (11 July 1996).
366 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 ICJ, Article 381.
367See, for example, C.A. Ford v. Comptroller General of Customs, Fed. 854 (D.N.S.W.
24 November 1993) (Australia) (the two-week delay was judged harmless because it was unlikely to prejudice
the respondents, the Australian industry or the importers).
368 83 F. 3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (United States).
369 Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
370See, for example, S.V. Shikunga, 1997 (9) B.C.L.R. 1321 (NmS).
371See, for example, Constitutional Court of Guatem ala, Gaceta Jurisprudencial, No. 12, Case 37-89,
Cons. II (the applicant drew attention to alleged irregularities, but these did not prevent him from learning of the
existence of an administrative proceeding that affected his interests and taking the necessary corrective action),
9 May 1989; Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, Hastings Int'l. and Comp. L. Rev., 241.349 No. 478
(Winter 1998) (referring to the application of the harmle ss error principle in Spanish criminal proceedings);
R.v. Bevan [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 (application of the harmless error principle by the Canadian Supreme Court);

6.386 Harmless error is also accepted by international courts. For example, the International Court
of Justice recognizes the concept. 372 It is also recognized and applied by the European Court of
Justice where "an error of law made by the [court of first instance] will not suffice to quash its
decision if it was harmless and the same outcome could have been properly reached in the absence of
error."373 Moreover, when a WTO Member requests the Appellate Body to "reverse a panel's ruling
on matters of procedure it must demonstrate the prejudice generated by the legal ruling."374
6.387 For its part, Mexico incorporated the harmless error concept in articles 237-238 of its Federal
Tax Code according to which an administrative deci sion by SECOFI in unfair trading cases will only
be illegal if the procedural error harms the individual.
6.388 Within the context of the present dispute, th e application of the harmless error principle
means that the Panel should examine Guatemala's acts and decide whether the non-fulfilment of a
procedural obligation should be overlooked on the grounds that the omission did not prejudice the
rights of Mexico or Cruz Azul. A panel es tablished under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code
recognized the principle of harmless error but considered that it was inapplicable under the
circumstances of the case before it. 375 The case of Brazil – Milk Powder was certainly decided by the
panel in this way since the investigating authority had notified importers of the initiation of the
investigation 22 days after the public notice of initiation and 1 day before imposing a provisional
measure.376 Meanwhile, the exporting government was notified more than two months after
publication and one month after the provisional measure was imposed. 377 Accordingly, the panel did
not accept the argument that these delays constituted "harmless error" because it considered that they
had clearly prejudiced the defence of the interests of the interested parties.378
6.389 As distinct from the circumstances of Brazil – Milk Powder , in Guatemala's case the alleged
delay in giving notification was only 11 days; between initiation and notification the investigating
authority did not engage in any investigation-related activity and all the interested parties had
sufficient time and opportunity to participate in the proceedings; the provisional measure was not
imposed until several months after receipt of the notification. Thus, the alleged delay in notifying
Mexico of the initiation of the investigation was a "harmless error", since it did not prejudice Mexico's
rights under the AD Agreement.
6.390 In fact, the alleged procedural error in not having given Mexico timely notice in accordance
with Article 5.5 had no effect on the development of the anti-dumping investigation. If Mexico had

Wilde v. The Queen (1988) 164 CLR.365, Slip op. (FC) (application of the principle in Australia); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(a) (United States) ("no error, defect, irregul arity or variation that does not affect substantial rights
should be taken into account").
372See, for example, Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the ICOA Council (India v. Pakistan), 1972
I.C.J. 46 (18 August) (Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard) ("it would appear that even if there were error, it was
harmless error").
373See Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Proced ure or Only a Two-Stage Process? A comparative
view of the Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 30 Law and Pol'y. Int'l. Bus.
193, 206 (1999).
374 See Report of the Appellate Body in EC - Hormones , WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted on
16 January 1998, paragraph 152; see also Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need
for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System , 14 Am. U. Int'l. Rev. 1173, 1219 (1999) (" it is evident
that the commission of what is known in the United States as harmless error will be insufficient to warrant the
reversal of a panel decision).
375See Brazil - Imposition of Provisional and Definiti ve Countervailing Duties on Milk Powder and
Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community (Brazil – Milk Powder ) SCM/179, para. 271
(adopted 28 April 1994).
376Idem, para. 240.
377Idem, para. 228.
378Idem, para 271.

been notified of the initiation of the investigation on 11 January, nothing would have happened
differently from then onwards, except that the init ial stages of the investigation might possibly have
been speeded up. Clearly, the AD Agreement does not give Mexico any right to delay or impede the
initiation of an investigation or allow Mexico to make any kind of submission before the investigation
is initiated. Notification given on 11 January would not have given Mexico or Cruz Azul additional
time to defend their interests since under Guatemalan law grace periods are calculated from the date
of notification. Similarly, under Guatemalan legislation the period allowed for replying to a
questionnaire is also calculated from the date of receipt of that questionnaire. Furthermore, Cruz Azul
was granted 30 additional working days to reply to the questionnaire, which is not required by the AD
Agreement. The Ministry also extended to 17 May the period granted to Cruz Azul for replying to the
questionnaire. Finally, instead of imposing the provisional measure within 60 days of the date of
initiation, Guatemala waited until 28 August before acting, that is, until eight months after initiation.
In view of all this, it is inconceivable that having notified Mexico on 11 January could have had any
effect on the course of the investigation.
6.391 Consequently, in accordance with the general principles of international law recognized by
civilized nations, the Panel should apply the principle of "harmless error" to Guatemala's alleged
procedural delay under Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement and reject the Mexican argument.
6.392 In the alternate, Guatemala maintains that the Mexican Government gave rise to estoppel by
not objecting to any putative delay in notification under Article 5.5. Mexico made no mention of the
alleged violation of Article 5.5 until 6 June 1996, that is, almost six months after the date of
publication of notice of initiation. Even then, Mexico did not send the Ministry a formal note
expressly objecting to the alleged violation 379, merely mentioning the alleged violation in the month
of June within the context of informal consultations with Guatemala. By 6 June 1996, Guatemala and
the interested parties had invested substantial resources in the investigation.
6.393 Acquiescence is an accepted principle of international law. It has been recognized and
applied on numerous occasions by the International Court of Justice. 380 The principle has also been
applied by GATT 1947 and WTO dispute settlement panels. For example, in the case Canada – EEC
Arbitration on the Ordinary Wheat Agreement , the Arbitrator, Mr. Patterson, used the acquiescence
principle for interpreting the GATT and the Ordinary Wheat Agreement. In the award it is expressly
stated that "a properly functioning multilateral international trading system does require that after a
certain period silence must be considered acceptance of a state of affairs or abandonment of a claim.
The predictability and stability that are central features of the GATT system require that".381
6.394 If Mexico had promptly entered an objection in the administrative file with respect to the
alleged violation of Article 5.5, Guatemala would have reinitiated the investigation after making the
notification which, according to Mexico, was necessary under Article 5.5. Instead, Mexico waited
until Guatemala had investigated for six months. By that time it was very late and from every point of
view unnecessary for Guatemala to do anything abou t the alleged delay. Consequently, on the basis
of the principle of estoppel, the Panel should reject the Mexican argument.
6.395 In the alternate, Guatemala maintains that the alleged delay did not nullify or impair benefits
accruing to Mexico under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As noted above, Guatemala did not take
any step to begin the investigation until Mexico had been notified. Moreover, Guatemala granted

379In a communication dated 30 October 1996, Cruz Azul objected for the first time to the delay in
notification under Article 5.5. In a communication dated 7 February 1996, Cruz Azul objected to the decision to
initiate an investigation, but did not object to the delay in notification under Article 5.5 or under any other
provision of the AD Agreement.
380See, for example, the case relating to the Temple of Preah Vihear, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 32-33.
381Award of the arbitrator in Canada – European Communities Article XXVIII Rights ,
BISD 37S/80 (1990).

Cruz Azul a two-month extension to reply to the questionnaire. Thus, any putative delay in
notification under Article 5.5 did not prejudice Mexico's ability to defend its interests nor affect in any
other way Mexico's benefits under the Agreement.
6.396 According to Article 3.8 of the DSU "There is normally a presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it
shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge". In the
present instance, Guatemala has amply rebutted any presumption of nullification or impairment of
Mexico's rights under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It should be stressed that the obligation alleged
to have been infringed in this case is a procedural and not a substantive obligation. Given that
Article 3.8 of the DSU clearly states that the presumption of nullification or impairment is rebuttable
and taking into account the fact that the alleged violation is procedural, Guatemala maintains that it
has in fact rebutted the presumption. The Panel should therefore reject this argument.382
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.397 In its rebuttal, Mexico makes the following observations concerning the concepts of 'harmless
error and nullification or impairment' in the 'General Comments' section, noting that Guatemala had
referred to these concepts in relation to various violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
6.398 Section IV.B.3 of Guatemala's first written submission focuses on the assertion that, if
Guatemala had met its obligation, this would not have affected the course of the investigation. First,
it states that this was a "harmless error"
383, then it mentions that Mexico acquiesced 384 and, lastly,
Guatemala asserts that it has demonstrated that there was no nullification or impairment. 385 T h e s e
arguments can be found in other parts of Guatemala's submission. 386 Nevertheless, as will be shown
below, in this dispute the principles of "harmless error" and "acquiescence" are not only inapplicable
but are mutually exclusive and as far as nullification or impairment is concerned, Guatemala did not
prove anything.
6.399 Guatemala puts forward the concepts of harmless error, acquiescence and nullification or
impairment in the context of its claim relating to Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement and repeats them
in other parts of its first written submission. Consequently, the arguments set out below should be
seen as supplementing those in the section concerning Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement, but also
apply when rejecting Guatemala's claims of "har mless error", "acquiescence" and "nullification or
impairment" in each context where these appear.
(i) Applicability of the concept of "harmless error"
6.400 Regarding the concept of "harmless error", Guatemala asserts that its delay in notifying did
not prejudice Mexico's rights and that, according to the rules governing interpretation of public
international law, it is the responsibility of the Panel to "examine Guatemala's acts and decide whether

382 Guatemala points out that the notification under Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is
unique within the context of the WTO. This notification does not relate to the notification of laws under
covered agreements, the subject of most WTO notification rules. The notification in question applies only to an
isolated stage in an anti-dumping proceeding. Unlike Article 13.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (1994), the notification does not impose any obligation to hold post-notification
consultations. Finally, in accordance with the Agreement, it is the only notification rule that could result in a
prior notice of no consequence. For example, the invest igating authority could give notice to the representative
of the government of the exporting country under Article 5.5 and then, immediately afterwards, proceed to give
that representative notice of initiation.
383 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 206-216.
384 Ibid., paragraphs 217-219.
385 Ibid., paragraphs 220 and 221.
386 See, for example, Ibid., paragraph 226.

the non-fulfilment of a procedural obligation shoul d be overlooked on the grounds that the omission
did not prejudice the rights of Mexico or Cruz Azul".387
6.401 According to Guatemala, if it had notified Mexico of the initiation of the investigation on
11 January, nothing would have changed, because the ADP Agreement does not give Mexico the right
to delay or prevent the initiation of an investigation or to put forward claims.
6.402 In its oral submission to the Panel, Mexico (i) recalled that, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the
DSU, failure to comply with obligations leads to a presumption of nullification or impairment so
whether or not there was a harmless error has no meaning; (ii) added that it was Mexico's right to be
notified before the initiation of the investigation (in this case, publication of the relevant public
notice), irrespective of the action taken; (iii) emphasized that Guatemala was obliged to comply with
the provisions of the ADP Agreement and non-compliance cannot be excused as a "harmless error";
and (iv) the Panel which examined Guatemala – Cement I found that harmless error did not apply in
this case.
388
6.403 In addition to the arguments set out above, Mexico wishes to indicate the following:
6.404 Guatemala states that harmless error does apply to this dispute because the concept can be
found in a number of domestic laws and has been recognized by the International Court of Justice. 389
Subsequently, it indicates that the Panel which heard the Brazil – Milk Powder case did not accept this
because "it considered that [these delays] had clearly prejudiced the defence of the interests of the
interested parties".390
6.405 Mexico totally rejects the arguments outlined by Guatemala. Firstly, as the Panels have
clearly indicated, Guatemala did not even prove that its theory of "harmless error" constitutes a
principle of international law and, even if that were the case, the examples it mentions do not apply to
the present dispute. 391 Secondly, Guatemala's interpretations are unacceptable because they are
contrary to the provisions of Article 3.8 of the DSU. Thirdly, no panel has accepted such a theory. 392
In the Brazil – Milk Powder case, the Panel rejected Brazil's argument, not because a long time had
elapsed after initiation of the investigation but, as will be seen below, because Brazil, like Guatemala,
tried to reverse the burden of proof in a manner contrary to Article 3.8 of the DSU:
"It was not incumbent upon a signatory whose procedural rights under Article 2 had
been infringed by another signatory to demonstrate the harm caused by such an
infringement. The Panel therefore rejected the position of Brazil that it was for the
EEC to demonstrate that the results of this investigation would have been different
had Brazil not committed its procedural errors."393
6.406 Furthermore, in another case in which the principle of harmless error was claimed, namely,
Guatemala – Cement I, the Panel, after having considered exactly the same facts as those now being
presented, rejected Guatemala's argument regarding "harmless error" stating the following:
"7.40 Guatemala argues that, even assuming there was a violation of Article 5.5,
the Panel should conclude that any delay in notification under Article 5.5 was without

387 Ibid., paragraph 213.
388 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 136-141.
389 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 208-212.
390 Ibid., paragraph 213.
391 See the first submission by the European Communities, 27 January 2000, paragraph 20.
392 See the first submission by the United States, 27 January 2000, paragraph 22.
393 Report of the Panel in Brazil – Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on
Milk Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community (SCM/179), paragraph 271.

adverse effects on Mexico's rights and thus constitutes harmless error under
customary rules of public international law. Guatemala further argues that the alleged
delay did not nullify or impair Mexico's rights under the ADP Agreement.
7.41 We have concluded, as discussed above, that Guatemala failed to carry out its
obligation under Article 5.5 to notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate this investigation. Article 3.8 of the DSU provides that there is a presumption
that benefits are nullified or impaired when a Member fails to carry out an obligation
under a WTO Agreement:
'In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption
that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Member parties to
that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member
against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge'.
In other words, there is a presumption that a violation will entitle a Member to relief,
because that violation nullified or impaired a benefit accruing to the complaining
Member, that is, 'harmed' the complaining Member. Article 17 of the
ADP Agreement entitles a Member to relief when benefits accruing to that Member
under the ADP Agreement are nullified or impaired. Moreover, while Article 3.8 of
the DSU indicates that the presumption of nullification or impairment may be
rebutted, GATT panels have consistently found that the presumption is not rebutted
simply because the particular violation in question had no or insignificant adverse
effects on trade.
394 This approach is supported by the Appellate Body's decision in
Japan Alcohol, in which it upheld the Panel's decision not to introduce a trade effects
test into the first sentence of Article III:2 of GATT 1994.395
7.42 In our view, having found that Guatemala failed to notify the Government of
Mexico in a timely fashion, we need not determine that the failure to carry out an
obligation had particular or demonstrable adverse trade effects in order to find that
the benefits accruing to Mexico under the ADP Agreement were nullified or
impaired. Rather, to the extent that the presumption of nullification or impairment

394 In United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , L/6175 (Adopted
17 June 1987), BISD 34S 136, 157-58, the Panel reviewed previous disputes in which parties had claimed that a
measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore did not nullify or impair
benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party that had brought the complaint. The
Panel concluded from its review that,
"while the CONTRACTING PARTIES had not explicitly decided whether the presumption that illegal
measures cause nullification or impairment could be rebutted, the presumption had in practice operated
as an irrefutable presumption".
Idem at paragraph 5.1.7
395 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8, DS10, DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1997. We note
also the decision of the Panel in Brazil - Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on Milk
Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community , SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994
at paragraph 271:
"It was not incumbent upon a signatory whose procedural rights under Article 2 had been infringed by
another signatory to demonstrate the harm caused by such an infringement. The Panel therefore rejected the
position of Brazil that it was for the EEC to demonstrate that the results of this investigation would have been
different had Brazil not committed its procedural errors. Without wishing to exclude that the concept of
'harmless error' could be applicable in dispute se ttlement proceedings under the Agreement, the Panel
considered that this concept was inapplicable under the circumstances of the case before it".

may be rebutted in the case of the breach of a procedural obligation, it would be
incumbent on the Member that has breached the obligation to demonstrate that its
failure to respect the obligation could not have had any effect on the course of the
investigation in question. In this case, the procedural obligation breached was the
requirement to notify the exporting Member prior to proceeding to initiate an anti-
dumping investigation. A key function of the notification requirements of the ADP
Agreement is to ensure that interested pa rties, including Members, are able to take
whatever steps they deem appropriate to defend their interests. Where a required
notification is not made in a timely fashion, the ability of the interested party to take
such steps is vitiated. We cannot now speculate on what steps Mexico might have
taken had it been timely notified, and how Guatemala might have responded to those
steps.
396 Thus, while it is possible that the investigation would have proceeded in the
same manner had Guatemala timely notified Mexico before proceeding to initiate the
investigation, we cannot say with certainty that the course of the investigation would
not have been different. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Guatemala has rebutted the presumption that its failure to carry out its obligation
under Article 5.5 consistent with the ADP Agreement nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to Mexico under that Agreement.
7.43 With respect to Guatemala's arguments regarding harmless error, the
precedents cited - assuming arguendo that they reflect customary rules of public
international law - relate to the consequences of a violation of a procedural rule,
rather than to the existence of a cause of action. Thus, we do not consider that the
assertion that an error is 'harmless' should prevent us from reaching the issue whether
a violation of a provision of the ADP Agr eement nullifies or impairs benefits under
that Agreement. However, we do not preclude that the notion of 'harmless error'
could be relevant to the question of what steps a Member should take in order to
implement the recommendation of a panel in a particular dispute. Since we do not
view the principle of harmless error as one which would prevent us from determining
that there was a violation of the ADP Agreement which nullified or impaired benefits
under that Agreement, we believe it would be improper for us to fail to make a
recommendation under Article 19.1. However, the effects of a particular error may,
we believe, be relevant in determining what remedial actions might be appropriate -
that is, what if any suggestions a panel might make as to how its recommendation
may be implemented."
6.407 Lastly, Mexico simply wishes to recall that the nullification or impairment caused by non-
compliance with Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement does not vanish because Mexico could have held
consultations or not. Guatemala violated one of Mexico's rights, irrespective of the action which
Mexico might have decided to take.
397

396 We note Guatemala's argument that, unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the ADP Agreement does not require Members to afford an opportunity for consultations before
initiating an investigation, and that therefore there is no action which would take place after notification but
before initiation. Merely that the ADP Agreement does not require some action following notification of the
exporting Member and before initiation does not mean that nothing useful can take place following a timely
notification, or that the exporting Member therefore has no interest in timely notification.
397 See Brazil – Milk Powder , paragraph 232, which states: "The requirement to notify other
signatories and interested parties served the essential pur pose of enabling these signatories and interested parties
to effectively defend their interests by participating in the investigation." See also, Ibid., paragraph 264, which
states that the "offer of consultations made to the EEC on 27 February 1992, i.e., prior to the initiation of the
investigation, was immaterial to the issue of Brazil's compliance with its obligations under Article 2:5 of the
Agreement" (notification). See also the first submission by the United States, paragraph 26.

(ii) Nullification or impairment
6.408 Guatemala asserts that as it "did not take any step to begin the investigation until Mexico had
been notified … [it] did not prejudice Mexico's ability to defend its interests." 398 In Guatemala's
opinion, therefore, according to Article 3.8 of the DSU, the presumption of nullification or
impairment has been amply rebutted so the Panel should reject this argument. 399 Mexico wishes to
indicate the following in this regard:
(a) The only "evidence" put forward by Guatemala to rebut the presumption of
nullification or impairment is two assertions: (i) that Guatemala did not take any step
to begin the investigation until Mexico had been notified; and (ii) Guatemala granted
Cruz Azul a two-month extension to reply to the questionnaire.400
(b) Nevertheless, as pointed out in this rebuttal, the investigation began on 11 January,
while Mexico was notified after and not before the initiation so by then the violation
had been committed.
(c) Guatemala did not respect Mexico's right to be notified by Guatemala before the
investigation began and, therefore, Mexico's benefits were nullified or impaired.
(d) Guatemala cannot prove that, if there had been compliance with Article 5.5 "nothing
would have happened differently" 401, particularly since in another part of its
submission Guatemala itself indicates that "If Mexico had promptly entered an
objection in the administrative file with respect to the alleged violation of Article 5.5,
Guatemala would have reinitiated the investigation …". 402
(e) In fact, contrary to what Guatemala indicates 403, the Panel which examined the case
of Brazil – Milk Powder considered that the obligation to notify the initiation of an
investigation was independent of the right to hold consultations.404 Consequently, the
fact that the ADP Agreement does not provide for the holding of consultations before
initiating an investigation does not constitute grounds for excusing Guatemala's non-
compliance.
(f) The extension granted to Cruz Azul has nothing to do with the violation of
Article 5.5. Moreover, Guatemala was obliged to grant this extension, according to
Article 6.1.1 of the ADP Agreement.
(g) In the GATT, there are no precedents for the successful rejection of the presumption
of nullification or impairment and, in the present case, Guatemala's assertions are
certainly not sufficient to rebut this presumption.405
6.409 In its first written submission, Guatemala mentions that Mexico gave rise to estoppel by not
objecting to any putative delay in notification under Article 5.5. 406 Subsequently, it indicates that "If

398 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 220.
399 Ibid., paragraph 221.
400 Ibid., paragraph 220.
401 Ibid., paragraph 215.
402 Ibid., paragraph 219.
403 See Guatemala's first submission, footnote 267, which asserts that Article 5.5 of the ADP
Agreement is of no importance and, unlike Article 13.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, it does not require the holding of consultations.
404 See report of the Panel in "Brazil – Milk Powder", paragraph 264.
405 See first submission by the EC, paragraph 23.
406 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 217.

Mexico had promptly entered an objection in the administrative file with respect to the alleged
violation of Article 5.5, Guatemala would have reinitiated the investigation."407
6.410 Mexico asks itself: if Guatemala did not prejudice Mexico's rights by delaying notification 408
yet, on the other hand, asserts that, if Mexico had objected to the late notification, Guatemala would
have reinitiated the investigation409, does this not imply that Mexico would at least have had the right
to lodge an objection in the administrative file and that the matter is sufficiently serious for Guatemala
itself to recognize that its authorities would have had to reinitiate the investigation?
6.411 In addition, the Appellate Body in Guatemala – Cement I determined that, pursuant to the
ADP Agreement, only the definitive anti-dumping measure, the provisional anti-dumping measure
and price undertakings may be contested.410 If a Member has to wait until one of these three measures
is applied, what can it do to see that the principle of estoppel is not applied?
6.412 The above examples show the absurdity of Guatemala's reasoning regarding this concept.
According to its logic, Members will lose rights as time goes by and they do not object to violations
committed by other Members.
6.413 As Mexico has already indicated, unlike other provisions, neither the ADP Agreement nor the
DSU prescribe time-limits within which to contest a measure.411 Moreover, as will be seen below, the
legal practice in the GATT has shown the inapplicability of the concept put forward by Guatemala.
6.414 The Panel which heard the case Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong412 found the following:
"28. … The Panel … recognized that restrictions had been in existence for a long time
without Article XXIII ever having been invoked by Hong Kong in regard to the products
concerned, but concluded that this did not alter the obligations which contracting parties had
accepted under GATT provisions. Furthermore, the Panel considered it would be erroneous
to interpret the fact that a measure had not been subject to Article XXIII over a number of
years, as tantamount to its tacit acceptance by contracting parties."
6.415 In addition to the foregoing, in the case United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway
413, the Panel rejected an argument along
the same lines as that put forward by Guatemala. In that dispute, it was argued that "… the failure of
Norway or private Norwegian respondents to raise these issues before the investigating authorities
precluded Norway from raising them before the Panel". Later on in the same report, the Panel states
the following:
"349. … The Panel did not find in this provision any basis for it to refuse to consider a claim
by a Party in dispute settlement under the Agreement merely because the subject matter of the
claim had not been raised before the investigating authorities under domestic law."

407 Ibid., paragraph 219.
408 Ibid., paragraph 214.
409 Ibid., paragraph 219.
410 Report of the Appellate Body in Guatemala – Cement I, paragraph 79.
411 Oral submission at the first substantive meeting with the parties, paragraph 132.
412 See the Report of the Panel on EEC - Quantitative Restrictions A gainst Imports of Certain Products
from Hong Kong (L/5511 - 30S/129-140), adopted on 12 July 1998, paragraph 28.
413 See the Report of the Panel in United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (ADP/87), adopted on 30 November 1992, paragraphs 347-
351. See also the Report of the Panel in United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (SCM/153), adopted on 4 December 1992, paragraphs 216-
220.

6.416 Furthermore, in EEC - Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas 414 an attempt was made
to apply the principle of acquiescence, but the Panel decided that it was inoperative as follows:
"362. The Panel considered that the decision of a contracting party not to invoke a right
under the General Agreement at a particular point in time could be due to circumstances that
change over time. For instance, a contracting party may not wish to invoke a right under the
General Agreement pending the outcome of a multilateral trade negotiation, such as the
Uruguay Round, or pending an assessment of the trade effects of a measure. The decision of
a contracting party not to invoke a right vis-à-vis another contracting party at a particular
point in time can therefore, by itself, not reasonably be assumed to be a decision to release
that other contracting party from its obligations under the General Agreement. The Panel
noted in this context that previous panels had based their findings on measures which had
remained unchallenged for long periods of time. The Panel therefore found that the mere fact
that the complaining parties had not invoked their rights under the General Agreement in the
past had not modified these rights and did not prevent them from invoking these rights now."
(Footnote omitted).
6.417 In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that Mexico could have waited until Guatemala had
imposed a definitive anti-dumping measure and then objected to the violations of Article 5.5 of the
ADP Agreement, without this being construed as Mexico acquiescing in the errors made by the
investigating authority. As seen above, since it is only possible to object to three measures in anti-
dumping disputes
415, it is even more obvious that the concept of estoppel does not apply in these
cases. Mexico could not have acquiesced in the violation of Article 5.5, as claimed by Guatemala.
6.418 In addition, in relation to Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement, Mexico's objection was such that
the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I decided against Guatemala. Paragraph 8.4 of the Panel's report
states the following:
"8.4 We have concluded in this case that Guatemala violated the provisions of the
ADP Agreement by failing to notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate, as required by Article 5.5. We therefore recommend that the Dispute
Settlement Body request Guatemala to bring its action into conformity with its
obligations under Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement …" 416
6.419 Subsequently, when referring specifically to Guatemala's violations of Article 5.5 of the AD
Agreement, Mexico added the following:
6.420 As was duly shown in Mexico's first written submission 417, the Government of Guatemala
violated Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent by notifying the Government of Mexico only
11 days after initiating the investigation (i.e. publishing the public notice of initiation in the
Diario Oficial de Centro América ). However, in its first written submission the Government of

414 See the Report of the Panel in EEC Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas (DS32/R), Panel
Report not adopted, dated 3 June 1993, paragraph 362.
415 Contrary to what Guatemala asserts in paragraph 218 of its first written submission, there has never
been any case in the WTO nor in the GATT 1947 in which the concept of acquiescence and estoppel has been
applied. In the case of Canada - EEC Arbitration on the Ordinary Wheat Agreement cited by Guatemala in this
paragraph, the principles in question were not applied. See also the first submission by the EC, paragraph 22,
and the first submission by the United States, paragraphs 24-26.
416 See the Report of the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I, paragraph 8.4.
417 See paragraphs 178 et seq.

Guatemala appears not to take any notice of this violation since it does not refute the arguments or
evidence submitted by Mexico against it.418 These arguments are:
Resolution 2-95 of 15 December 1995 clearly stated that the date of initiation of the
investigation was the same as the date of publication of the public notice, i.e. 11 January
1996. Moreover, that Resolution ordered that Mexico be notified of the initiation.
In Resolution 000042 of 9 January 1996 , the Ministry of the Economy ordered that the
Government of Mexico should be expressly notified of the initiation of the investigation.
Moreover, it stated that the initiation of the investigation would take effect on the day
following the publication of the public notice of initiation.
The public notice of initiation of 11 January 1996 fixed a period of 30 days for the
interested parties to appear and submit their evidence and arguments. It must be stressed that
this time-period ran from the publication of the public notice of initiation.
In its letter of 26 July 1996 the Ministry of the Economy apologised to the Government of
Mexico for not having notified it before publishing the initiation resolution, arguing that it
was not familiar with the notification procedures.
In the preliminary determination published on 28 August 1996, it was decided to continue
the investigation initiated on 11 January of that year.
The final determination published on 30 January 1997 refers exclusively to the public
notice of initiation of the investigation, the date on which the Mexican Government was
notified having no importance for the purposes of the initiation of the investigation.
6.421 By failing to refute the arguments and evidence mentioned above, Guatemala has accepted
the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from them: Guatemala initiated the investigation on
11 January 1996 and notified the Mexican Government on 22 January 1996.419 Thus, the Government
of Guatemala violated Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.420
6.422 The arguments by which Guatemala tries to prove that it did not violate Article 5.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement circumvent Mexico's evidence by simply mentioning that "although the
resolution would establish a specific date for the initiation of the investigation, the Ministry was
obliged to postpone it until the working day follow the day on which the Government of Mexico was
notified of the decision to initiate an investigation".
421

418 The only direct evidence submitted by Guatemala to refute Mexico's arguments was the cover page
of Cruz Azul's reply to the questionnaire for exporting enterprises. The document is inoperative as far as
Article 5.5 is concerned, since that Article regulates the relationship between the Government of Guatemala and
the Government of Mexico without the involvement of Cruz Azul. Moreover, assuming for the sake of
argument that this piece of evidence were applicable to Article 5.5, it would not suffice to prove that the
investigation was initiated on 22 January 1996; i.e. the cover page in question cannot have a greater probative
value than Guatemala's acts at the time of initiation.
419 See, letter of notification by the Government of Guatemala to the Government of Mexico dated 22
January 1996.
420 To supplement the interpretation of Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement the Panel may
consult the recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices of 29 October 1998 (G/ADP/5).
421 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 203.

(i) Domestic legislation
6.423 Guatemala's argument concerning its domestic legislation is very basic: since it was obliged
under its constitution to provide notice before initiating any legal proceeding, Guatemala had to wait
to notify Mexico until it had effectively initiated the investigation.422
6.424 Mexico submits in this connection that Article 5 does not provide for a distinction between
"effective initiation" and "non-effective initiation". Article 5 expressly defines the concept of
initiation, and does not allow for far-fetched interpretations. The fact that the Guatemalan
Constitution obliges the authority to notify the inte rested parties before initiating a legal proceeding
does not mean that the moment of initiation of the investigation is thereby implicitly changed. The
only thing that this argument in fact reveals is that Guatemala also violated its constitutional
requirement to notify prior to initiating a legal proceeding.
6.425 Moreover, the legal instrument that applies to Guatemala's notification to Mexico is
Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, not th e legislation mentioned by Guatemala, and the
principle of international law pacta sunt servanda must be applied: i.e. the Anti-Dumping Agreement
is a treaty in force which is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.
423
6.426 That Guatemala should claim that compliance with its domestic legislation renders the
analysis of its failure to comply with Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement unnecessary is
contrary to international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was cited by
Guatemala, stipulates that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty.424 In other words, Guatemala cannot invoke its domestic legislation on
notifications to justify its failure to comply with Article 5.5.
6.427 Finally, we would like to stress that the sophism used by Guatemala does not show that it met
the requirement to notify Mexico prior to the initiation of the investigation, but is an attempt to
interpret the concept of "initiation of the investigation" to fit its domestic legislation. In other words,
Guatemala is attempting to justify its violation with post hoc arguments, an attempt which
cannot work.
6.428 Similarly, Guatemala's argument that Cruz Azul expressly recorded that the investigation was
initiated on 22 January 1996, apart from being deceptive, is irrelevant. The only thing this argument
reveals is that Guatemala would acknowledge that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are
subject to interpretation by Cruz Azul. If Guatemala had applied this to other stages of the
investigation, the result would surely have been different.
(ii) Acquiescence by the Government of Mexico
6.429 Guatemala argues that Mexico acquiesced in the violation, to its disadvantage, of Article 5.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Mexico's arguments in this respect can be found in the "General
Comments" section of this written submission. We would simply add that far from acquiescing in the
acts of the Guatemalan authority, Mexico has conducted two dispute settlement procedures in order to
ensure that Guatemala complies with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

422 Idem.
423 The pacta sunt servanda principle of international law is enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It should be mentioned that Guatemala has argued the application of this
Treaty in the present case – see paragraph 206 of Guatemala's first written submission.
424 See the Vienna Convention on the Law on the Law of Treaties, Article 27.

(iii) Harmless error and nullification or impairment
6.430 Guatemala invokes harmless error as a principle of public international law to justify its
failure to comply with Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Guatemala assures us that the
Panel must examine and decide whether to excuse the failure to comply with Article 5.5 on the basis
of the fact that it did not have any adverse effects on Mexico's rights. Mexico's arguments in this
respect are contained in the "General Comments" section of this rebuttal. Nevertheless, we would like
to add the following:
6.431 It is surprising that Guatemala should invoke harmless error as a principle of international
law
425 when it is the provisions of the WTO Agreement that form the primary source of international
law applicable to this case.
6.432 The arguments of the United States are particularly relevant in that they consider that when a
WTO obligation which is phrased as a categorical rule is violated, the fact that the violation was
merely a harmless error is irrelevant. 426 Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is a categorical
rule which protects the right of Members to be notified in due time and form. Thus, it is illogical to
try to justify non-compliance using the theory of harmless error.
6.433 For all of these reasons, it is clear that Guatemala did not refute the arguments submitted by
Mexico in its first written submission, but simply tried to confuse the Panel with syllogisms that are
devoid of any foundation, justification or applicability to the present case.
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.434 Guatemala responds to Mexico's rebuttal as follows:
(i) Under Guatemalan legislation, the investigation was not and could not have been initiated
until Mexico and Cruz Azul had received timely notice of the initiation of the investigation
6.435 In Guatemala's first written submission and during the first meeting, it was clearly established
that Guatemala provided Mexico with timely notice under Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement, and that
even if this were not the case, Mexico suffered no injury, and in fact acquiesced in the alleged breach
(i.e. the delay).427 We also showed that Guatemala provided Mexico and Cruz Azul with the full text
of the written application "as soon as" the investigation was initiated in accordance with Article 6.1.3
of the AD Agreement.
428 Finally, the weight of evidence shows that Guatemala complied with
Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when it provided timely notice of the initiation and
published an announcement in the Diario de Centro América which, together with certain reports that
were readily available to the public (Cruz Azul subsequently cited them), described, inter alia, the
basis on which dumping was alleged in the application and provided a summary of the factors on
which the allegation of threat of material injury was based.
429
6.436 Nevertheless, at the first hearing with the Panel Mexico continued to insist that Guatemala did
not comply with Article 5.5, inter alia . In support of its position, Mexico presented various

425 See written submission by the European Communities as a third party of 27 January 2000,
paragraph 20.
426 See written communication by the United States as a third party, 27 January 2000, paragraph 22.
427 See, for example, first written submission by Gu atemala, paragraphs 203, 221; oral submission by
Guatemala, paragraphs 48-59.
428 See, for example, first written submission by Gu atemala, paragraphs 231-235; oral submission by
Guatemala, paragraph 48.
429 See, for example, written submission by Guat emala, paragraphs 222-230; oral submission by
Guatemala, paragraph 48.

arguments which distorted the previous statements by Guatemala on the subject. As during the first
meeting430, Guatemala will once again clarify its position to ensure that in the future there is no
confusion or further opportunity to distort its words.
6.437 Firstly, Article 5.5 stipulates that "before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the
authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member concerned."431 Footnote 1 to the AD
Agreement defines the term "initiated" as "the procedural action by which a Member formally
commences an investigation as provided in Article 5." 432 According to the dictionary, the word
"commence" means "begin, initiate a thing." 433 and "formally" means "according to proper form" 434,
"with formality, expressly".435
6.438 "The procedural action" by which, in the present dispute, the challenged investigation was
initiated, took place on 11 January 1996. On that date, the ministry published the notice of initiation
in the Diario de Centro América . However, "the formal commencement" of the investigation did not
occur until Mexico and Cruz Azul received the notification of initiation of the investigation, which
occurred no later than 22 January 1996.
6.439 In developing its argument, Guatemala does not confuse, as Mexico persistently suggests, the
formal commencement of the investigation with the "actual" commencement of the investigation. 436
Nor are we trying to invoke Guatemalan law as an excuse for [ not] complying with Article 5.437 On
the contrary, we are trying to show that under Guatemalan law, in fact according to our Constitution,
the investigation did not begin until after Mexico and Cruz Azul had received notice in accordance
with Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement. As we explained in our first written submission
(paragraph 203), Article 12 of the Guatemalan Constitution states that notification is a sine qua non
requirement for the initiation of any legal procedure.
438 This requirement is reaffirmed in Article 66
of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure 439 and Article 45(e) of the Law on the Organization
of Justice. Moreover, under Article 26 of the Law on Administrative Appeals, those provisions apply
to administrative acts.
6.440 This evidence is fatal to Mexico's claim because it is an accepted principle of international
law that municipal law (and practice) is a fact which must be proven before an international dispute

430 See oral submission by Guatemala in English, paragraph 49 ("Despite our attempts to be as clear as
possible regarding Guatemala's position on these issues, th ere appears to be some confusion that I would like to
try to clarify today.")
431 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 5.5.
432 Idem, Article 1, footnote 1 (emphasis added).
433 See Diccionario de la Lengua Española, page364 (Real Academia Española) (Annex GUA-61).
434 Idem, page 696.
435 Idem.
436 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 126-127.
437 Idem, paragraph 129.
438 See, for example, Case 40-93 of the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, 3 August 1993 - Gaceta
Jurisprudencial No. 29 (The Constitution of the Republic states, in Article 12, that the defence of the person and
his rights are inviolable; the audiator inter partes guarantee is fulfilled with the notification which is the
procedural act whereby the judicial or administrative decision is authentically communicated to the persons
concerned in accordance with all of the formalities required by law; i.e. the notification must be fulfilled in fact
and in law for its procedural function to be fulfilled. The deprivation of a reasonable opportunity to be heard
violates the constitutional protection of the process)
439 See, for example, Case 80-88 of the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, 7 November 1988, Gaceta
Jurisprudencial No. 10 (With the notification stipulated in Article 66 of the Code of Civil and Commercial
Procedure in the form prescribed in Article 71 thereof, the guarantee of the right to be heard is fulfilled, and
ultimately, the right of defence is preserved; on the other hand, any other way of proceeding would surely result
in a violation of fundamental rights fully guaranteed under the Constitution of the Republic, causing uncertainty
in the legal and juridical system and, even worse, leaving the opposing party defenceless).

settlement body such as this Panel. 440 Guatemala has supplied evidence to show when an
anti-dumping investigation "formally commences" according to its law. Mexico has not refuted this
evidence. Under these circumstances and for all of the reasons set forth in Guatemala's first written
submission plus those presented during the first meeting, Mexico's complaint with respect to
Article 5.5 should be rejected.
(ii) Any alleged delay in notification under Article 5.5 was harmless under the generally accepted
principles of international law
6.441 In its first submission, Guatemala showed that any alleged delay in notification under
Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement (and Guatemala doe s not accept that there was a delay) did not
prejudice Mexico's rights in the procedure and constituted a harmless error under the generally
accepted principles of international law.
441 In response, Mexico argued during the first meeting that:
(1) violations of the AD Agreement give rise to the presumption of nullification or impairment under
Article 3.8 of the DSU442; and (2) Mexico "had the right to be notified".443
6.442 None of these replies satisfies Guatemala's argument. As we explained clearly in the first
meeting, the entire Guatemalan discussion proceeds from the assumptions (which we state solely for
the purposes of this analysis) that Mexico's right to be notified was violated and that this violation
gave rise to the presumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8.444 What we are trying to
say is that any alleged violation of Article 5.5 was harmless given the indisputable facts of this case.
Thus, the presumption contained in Article 3.8 has been refuted unless Mexico proves otherwise.
(iii) The Government of Mexico acquiesced in the alleged delay according to the generally
accepted principles of international law
6.443 Apart from the fact that any alleged delay in notification under Article 5.5 of the AD
Agreement (and once again, Guatemala does not accept that there was a delay) was harmless, in its
first submission Guatemala also showed that any alleged delay was acquiesced in by Mexico. 445 In
response, Mexico has presented three arguments which make little sense; (1) no provision of the AD
Agreement or the DSU imposes a time-limit for submitting complaints446; (2) the concept of estoppel
has no place in the AD Agreement 447; (3) Mexico challenged Guatemala's compliance with
Article 5.5 before the previous Panel which examined the Guatemala - Cement I case.448
6.444 Firstly, estoppel and acquiescence are legal concepts. The fact that they do not have direct
counterparts in the AD Agreement or the DSU is of no importance. What is really important is that
their application is not prohibited by any provision of the AD Agreement or the DSU. Secondly,
Guatemala cannot even begin to guess why Mexico thinks that the issuing of a provisional or
definitive measure would prevent a Member from challenging the initiation of an investigation. In
fact, as we said above, in certain circumstances such challenges are clearly permitted by the DSU and
the AD Agreement. Finally, the issue before this Panel is whether Mexico acquiesced in any alleged

440 See the Report of the Appellate Body in India - Patent Production for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products , WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted on 2 Septem ber 1998, paragraph 65, citing the case
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia , [1926], PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, page 19. See also I. Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law, 4th edition, (Clarendon Press, 1990, pages 40-42).
441 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 206-216.
442 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 136-137.
443 Idem, paragraph 138. See also Idem, paragraph 139 ("the obligation exists or does not exist").
444 Oral statement by Guatemala, paragraph 55-56.
445 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 217-219.
446 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 132. Mexico also states, without any explanation, that "there
are various precedents in this organization which point in a diametrically opposite direction". Idem
447 Idem, paragraph 133.
448 Idem, paragraph 134.

delay in the notification under Article 5.5 by not stating any objection until 6 June 1996, almost six
months after the date of publication of the notice of initiation. 449 The fact that a few months later
Mexico sought the establishment of a Panel on this subject is irrelevant.
6.445 In its oral submission at the second substantive meeting with the parties, Mexico made the
following comments:
6.446 As for the concept of the "harmless error" which Guatemala has repeatedly invoked and
described as a "generally accepted principle of international law", Mexico does not agree with the
Guatemalan statement that its violation did not prejudice Mexico's rights. If Mexico had the right to
be notified at a given moment and Guatemala did not do so, it is undeniable that Mexico's rights were
prejudiced. On the other hand, if the Guatemalan interpretation were to have any validity, how can
Members know which obligations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement give rise to harmless errors and
which ones do not? In fact, the sole effect of the Guatemalan interpretation would be that Members
would be able to violate provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or any other agreement and then
argue that the violations constituted harmless errors.
6.447 As for the concepts of estoppel and acquiescence, Mexico does not understand the logical
consequence of the fact that these concepts are not prohibited by the Anti-Dumping Agreement or the
Understanding. In the first place, the rules for in terpreting the WTO Agreements are contained in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, not the principles of civil law. Secondly, Mexico wonders
precisely what is implied by the fact that the concepts are not expressly prohibited. Does this mean
that Mexico, without knowing it, has waived its right to challenge the actions of Guatemala? No
permissible interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement can sustain this position.
6.448 Guatemala underestimates the violation it committed at the initiation of the investigation. In
fact, it disdained the fulfilment of the obligation imposed upon it by Article 5.5, stating that the lack
of notification was of no consequence
450 and was simply a harmless error. Mexico categorically
rejects this position.
6.449 Guatemala is trying to justify its non-fulfilment by impermissible interpretations of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the one hand, it argues that the initiation of the investigation occurred
on 11 January 1996, and on the other, that the formal commencement occurred on 22 January when
Mexico was notified. According to Guatemala, the initiation takes place in two acts, namely, "the
procedural action" on the one hand and the "formal commencement" on the other. However,
footnote 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is very clear: "the procedural action" by which an
investigation is initiated is a single action and the term "initiated" means "the procedural action by
which a Member formally commences an investigation." In this connection, Mexico has three
comments to make:
(a) Guatemala has accepted that the publication in the Diario de Centro América was the
procedural action that initiated the investigation, and Mexico does not deny this.
(b) According to Guatemala, "formally" means inter alia, "expressly". Nobody in this
room can deny that a publication in an official journal is something express.
(c) Now, if the publication in the Diario de Centro América was a "formal procedural
action", and complied with the requisites of footnote 1, how is it possible to fail to
recognize that the investigation was initiated on 11 January 1996, through the
publication of the notice of initiation in the Diario de Centro América?

449 See first [written] submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 217-219.
450 Guatemala maintains that the notification under Article 5.5 " … is the only notification rule that
could result in a prior notice of no consequence". See the first written submission by Guatemala, footnote 267.

6.450 The facts and evidence submitted 451 in these proceedings, inter alia , Resolutions 2-95 of
15 December 1995, and 000042 of 9 January 1996 and the public notice of initiation, demonstrate that
Guatemala formally initiated the investigation on 11 January 1996 452; at the same time, it was
recognized in the letter of 26 July 1996 and in the public notices of imposition of the provisional and
definitive measures that Guatemala had notified Mexico at a later date, namely, 22 January 1996. 453
Consequently, it is indisputable that Guatemala has violated Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
6.451 The above was clearly confirmed in the report of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I which,
after analysing the facts of the case, concluded that " … the act by which Guatemala 'formally
commenced the investigation' in this case was the publication of the notice of initiation of the
investigation".
454 and that " … Guatemala violated the provision of the ADP Agreement by failing to
notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to initiate, as required by Article 5.5".455
2. Claims Under Article 12 – Sufficiency of Evidence to Justify Initiation of Investigation
and Notification Of Initiation
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.452 Mexico claims that Guatemala breached various obligations contained in Article 12 of the AD
Agreement. Its arguments are as follows:
6.453 Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"12.1. When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be
notified and a public notice shall be given."
6.454 This Article obliges the investigating authority to notify the government of the exporting
Member and the other interested parties known when it is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to
justify initiation of an investigation.
6.455 In this case, Guatemala violated the AD Agreement in two ways:
(a) By publishing the public notice of initiation of the investigation without having first
satisfied itself that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation;
(b) by not notifying the Government of the exporting member or Cruz Azul when the
Ministry of the Economy had allegedly satisfied itself that there was sufficient
evidence to justify initiating an investigation.

451 See Resolution 2-95 of 15 December 1995, Resolution 000042 of 9 January 1996 (MEXICO-6),
public notice of initiation, letter of 26 July 1996, public notice of the imposition of the provisional anti-dumping
measure, public notice of the conclusion of the invest igation and Annex to the Commitment on the Protection of
Confidential Information.
452 For the Mexican analysis of the acts by Guatem ala, see the first written submission by Mexico,
paragraph 182 et seq. and the second written submission by Mexico paragraph 183 et seq..
453 See the first written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 203 and second written submission by
Guatemala, paragraph 52.
454 See Guatemala – Cement I, paragraph 7.39.
455 Ibid., paragraph 8.4.

6.456 The complaints regarding the former violation ar e set out in Section V.A.1(b) of this written
submission. Nevertheless, it is useful to add one further element, namely, in order to make the
relevant public notice, Guatemala should have ascertained that there was sufficient evidence to justify
initiating an anti-dumping investigation, but it did not do so. Although not legally entitled to do so,
the Ministry issued the public notice of initiation and initiated the investigation. In addition to failing
to comply with Article 5.3, Guatemala also violated Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement by publishing
the notice of initiation of the investigation.
6.457 With regard to the second obligation, according to the usual meaning of the terms in
Article 12.1, the Ministry of the Economy should have notified the Government of Mexico and Cruz
Azul when it had satisfied itself that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiating an anti-dumping
investigation. The violation of this Article is described below.
(i) On 15 December 1995, the Guatemalan authorities already considered that there was
sufficient evidence to justify initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.
6.458 In this particular case, there are at least two documents which indicate that the Ministry of the
Economy considered that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation:
(a) Resolution 2-95 of 15 December 1995 of the Directorate of Economic Integration of
the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy, which states that "as there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiating an investigat ion into dumping and threat of injury, the
notifications to the persons concerned should be made, as provided in Articles 6.11
and 12.1 of (the AD Agreement)".
(b) resolution 000042 of 9 January 1996 issued by the Ministry, containing the decision
to issue a public notice of initiation. In the preambular part of this resolution it is
stated that "there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation into
dumping and threats (sic) of injury to domestic industry, therefore, the notifications to
the persons concerned should be made, as provided in Articles 6.11 and 12.1 of (the
AD Agreement)".
(ii) The Guatemalan authorities did not notify the Government of Mexico or Cruz Azul when they
had satisfied themselves that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation, as provided in Article 5.
6.459 As already mentioned
456, the Government of Mexico was only notified of the initiation of the
investigation on 22 January 1996.
6.460 As far as Cruz Azul is concerned, the Guatemalan authorities only notified it on
20 January 1996.
6.461 The Guatemalan authorities had already considered that there was sufficient evidence to
justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on 15 December 1995 (or 9 January 1996). As
the Government of Mexico and Cruz Azul were only notified on 22 and 20 January respectively, it is
obvious that these notifications were not made when the authorities had allegedly satisfied themselves
that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation.
(iii) Guatemala violated Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.462 The obligation to notify the exporting Member and the other interested parties must be met
"When the authorities are satisfied that there is suff icient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-

456 Section V.A.1(e) of this submission.

dumping investigation". Guatemala did not do this and thus violated Article 12.2 of the AD
Agreement.
6.463 Guatemala was aware of its obligation to notify, as can be seen from the aforementioned
resolutions (2-95 and 000042). Both of these recognize the need to notify the interested parties.
6.464 Even more serious is the fact that the public notice was issued on 11 January 1996. It would
seem that the Ministry of the Economy exercised its right to initiate the investigation, but took the
"political" decision not to notify either the Government of Mexico or Cruz Azul until later.
6.465 Thus, Guatemala violated Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement:
(a) By publishing the public notice of initiation without having sufficient evidence to
justify the initiation of an investigation;
(b) by not notifying Cruz Azul nor the Gove rnment of Mexico when the authorities
considered that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation.
(iv) The public notice of initiation is inconsistent with Article 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement
6.466 The public notice of the initiation of an investigation into allegedly dumped imports of grey
Portland cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul published in the Diario Oficial de Centro América
of 11 January 1996 ("notice of initiation") 457 did not comply with the provisions of Article 12.1.1 of
the AD Agreement because it did not provide the necessary information on the basis for the allegation
of dumping in the application, nor the requisite information summarizing the factors on which the
allegation of threat of material injury was based.
6.467 Article 12.1.1 provides the following:
"12.1.1. A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or
otherwise make available through a separate report, adequate information on the
following:
(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved;
(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;
(iii) the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application;
(iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based;
(v) the address to which representations by interested parties should be directed;
(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known." (The
footnote has been omitted.)
6.468 Consequently, Article 12.1.1. requires that the public notice of initiation contain "adequate
information" on the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application inter alia
(subparagraph (iii)).

457 "Public notice of the initiation of the investigation pursuant to a complaint of dumping" (hereinafter
called the "notice of initiation").

6.469 However, irrespective of the violations in th e application with regard to information and
evidence proving dumping to which we have referred, it should be noted that the notice of initiation
published by the Ministry did not contain "adequate information" on the basis on which dumping was
alleged by Cementos Progreso in its application. On the contrary, in part 3 entitled "Legal basis of the
allegations of dumping stated in the application", there is simply a reference to Articles 7.2, 10.2 and
10.6 of the AD Agreement concerning the form and criteria for the application of anti-dumping duties.
As proof of this, we offer section 3 of the aforementioned notice of initiation:
"3. Legal basis of the allegations of dumping stated in the application:
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994; and the Central American Regulations on Unfair Business Practices and
Safeguard Clause (Government Agreement No.221-93).
Article 7.2 of the first above-mentioned legal basis provides that measures may take
the form of a provisional duty equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty
provisionally estimated, being not greater than the provisional estimated margin of
dumping. Similarly, Articles 10.2 and 10.6 of the same document stipulate that a
duty may be levied equivalent to the amount of a definitive anti-dumping duty levied
on products imported not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of
provisional measures, if allegations of discriminatory prices are substantiated."
6.470 As will be noted, none of this section of the notice of initiation can be deemed to contain
"adequate information" on the allegation of dumping in the application. Indeed, this text completely
omits any allegation of dumping that might have emerged from the application for initiation of an
investigation by Cementos Progreso. The text has no relevance whatsoever and is in no way related
to the requirements of Article 12.1.1. On the contrary, it simply refers to the bases laid down in
various provisions of the Agreement for the application of provisional and definitive anti-dumping
measures, thereby highlighting a clear violation of the AD Agreement because the notice of initiation
did not contain the adequate information called for by Article 12.1.1, subparagraph (iii).
6.471 In addition, as can be seen, Article 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement provides that the public
notice of initiation of an investigation shall contain "adequate information" inter alia on a summary of
the factors on which the allegation of injury is based (subparagraph iv).
6.472 It should be borne in mind that footnote 9 to the Agreement states the following:
"Under this Agreement the term ‘injury’ shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic
industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article."
6.473 The Ministry of the Economy decided to initiate an investigation into an alleged threat of
material injury, so the initiation notice published in the Diario Oficial de Centro América should have
contained "adequate information" summarizing the factors on which the allegation of threat of
material injury was based. Likewise, according to Article 3 and footnote 9 to the AD Agreement, the
summary referred to in Article 12.1.1(iv) should contain factors such as those indicated in paragraphs
1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 of Article 3 of the AD Agreement.
6.474 Nevertheless, and subject to the violations indicated concerning the information and
allegation of threat of injury in the application, the notice of initiation published by the Ministry did
not contain "adequate information" summarizing these factors either. As proof of this, we cite
section 4 entitled "Summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of injury is based":

"4. Summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of injury is based
Cementos Progreso S.A. appeared before this Ministry to lodge a complaint that
massive quantities of grey Portland cement produced by the Mexican company La
Cruz Azul, S.C.L. are being imported into Guatemala by land at a price less than the
normal value and are threatening injury to the domestic industry, the margin of
dumping being calculated at 77 per cent. These imports are adversely affecting
investment in improvements and expansions of the Guatemalan cement production
plant and, should they continue, would lead to the dismissal of a large number of
workers with all the resulting economic and social problems."
6.475 As can be seen from this excerpt, the notice of initiation published by the Ministry did not
contain "adequate information" summarizing the factors on which the allegation of injury was based
according to the applicable provisions of Article 3. In fact, in the notice, the Guatemalan authority
simply took over, in a very limited way, some of the allegations made by the applicant which once
again, as mentioned, were not substantiated by adequate evidence, although this is required by
Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. Section 4 of the notice of initiation cannot therefore, according to
any permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement, be considered a sufficiently adequate summary
in order to meet the standard of "adequate information" required by Article 12.1.1. for the content of
initiation notices in conformity with its subparagraph (iv).
6.476 To summarize, the notice of initiation did not meet the standard of "adequate information "
required by Article 12.1.1. for the content requirements laid down in subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) of
the Article because it did not contain adequate information on the basis on which dumping was
alleged in the application nor adequate information summarizing the factors on which the allegation
of injury, in this case threat of material injury, was based.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.477 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's claims that it breached its obligations
prescribed by Article 12 of the AD Agreement:
6.478 Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states that "when the authorities are satisfied
that there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the in itiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to
Article 5" the exporting Member and its known exporters "shall be notified and a public notice shall
be given". Mexico claims that Guatemala infringed Article 12.1 because it waited until
20 January 1996 to notify Cruz Azul of the investigation and because it waited until 22 January 1996
to notify Mexico of the investigation, although Guatemala had already decided that there was
sufficient evidence to justify initiation on 15 December or 9 January. The Mexican arguments are
mistaken.
(i) Article 12.1
6.479 Firstly, the "authorities" in charge of the investigation were the Ministry, not the Directorate
of Economic Integration which issued the ruling dated 15 December 1995. This is a subordinate
directorate and therefore the Ministry could have rejected its report of 15 December. Thus, the
competent "authorities", to which Article 12.1 refers, were not satisfied that there was sufficient
evidence until 9 January. After taking its decision, the Ministry promptly issued a public notice
within the next two days and quickly notified Mexico and Cruz Azul, within the next two weeks.
6.480 Secondly, the Mexican argument is based on a faulty interpretation of Article 12.1. Contrary
to what Mexico says, Article 12.1 does not oblige Guatemala to notify Mexico and Cruz Azul
immediately after Guatemala was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation. This
is not what Article 12.1 requires. Article 12.1 does not establish any time-limit for notification.

Guatemala certainly notified Mexico and Cruz Azul "when" it was satisfied that there was sufficient
evidence. Just as Article 5.5 does not specify any interval between notification and initiation,
Article 12.1 does not specify any interval between th e determination that there is sufficient evidence
and the notification of the parties and the giving of a public notice. By contrast, other provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement establish definite time limits for taking certain steps.458
6.481 Finally, as noted above in connection with the discussion of Mexico's argument that
Guatemala violated Article 5.5, the notifying of Me xico or Cruz Azul would not have affected the
course of the investigation. The alleged delay was harmless, Mexico demonstrated its acquiescence in
the alleged delay and the alleged delay did not nullify or impair Mexico's benefits under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
6.482 Guatemala's notification under Article 12.1 gave Mexico and Cruz Azul a timely and
appropriate opportunity to defend their interests when the investigation began to unfold on
23 January. Cruz Azul never complained that its notification under Article 12.1 was not given in
good time.459 For three and a half years Mexico acquiesced in the notification under Article 12.1
having been made in good time, until it submitted its request for the establishment of a panel on
20 July 1999.
460 Prior to that Mexico does not even mention Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
(ii) Article 12.1.1
6.483 Mexico next alleges that Guatemala's notice of initiation violated Article 12.1.1, because it
did not provide sufficient information on the factors on which the allegation of dumping and
consequent injury was based. However, the Mexican argument fails to acknowledge that according to
Article 12.1.1 this information is to be contained in a public notice or in a separate report available to
the public.
6.484 In Guatemala, all administrative investigation files are available to the public, because the
Constitution requires that administrative acts be published.
461 Thus, the report of the Directorate of
Economic Integration of 17 November 1995 was available to the public and that report contains
relevant information concerning the basis on which dumping was alleged in the application, as well as
a summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of material injury was based. In fact, in its
submission dated 9 May 1996, Cruz Azul referred to the report of 17 November 1995.
6.485 Moreover, as mentioned above in discussing Mexico's arguments concerning Guatemala's
alleged violation of Article 5.5, including more details in the public notice of initiation would not
have affected the course of the investigation. As already noted, Cruz Azul had ample access to the
report by the Directorate of Economic Integration of 17 November 1995. The alleged irrelevance of
the public notice (which Guatemala does not accept) was harmless; Mexico and Cruz Azul
acknowledge the relevance of the public notice during the course of the investigation; and the alleged
lack of relevance of the public notice does not constitute nullification or impairment of Mexico's
rights under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

458 See, for example, Articles 9.3.1 and 9.3.2.
459 The first time that Cruz Azul alleged that notification was not made in good time under Article 5.5
was in its communication dated 30 October 1996. However, the communication made no mention of
notification not being made in good time under the terms of Article 12.1.
460 WT/DS60/2.
461 See Article 30 of the Constitution (interested parties have the right to obtain the reports, copies and
certificates they may request and the disclosure of files, except … for information provided by individuals under
a guarantee of confidentiality) and Article 171 of the Guatemalan Law on the Organization of Justice which sets
out the requirements for requesting copies and certificates, including payment of the corresponding fees.

6.486 The report by the Directorate of Economic Integration, dated 17 November 1995, gave
Mexico and Cruz Azul a timely and adequate opportunity to defend their interests when the
investigation began to unfold on 23 January 1996. In its submissions dated 7 February 1996 and
9 May 1996, in which it objected to the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, Cruz Azul did not
object that the public notice of initiation required under the terms of Article 12.1.1 was not relevant.
Similarly, Cruz Azul did not raise this objection in its submission dated 30 October 1996. For three
and a half years Mexico acquiesced with regard to the relevance of the public notice under the terms
of Article 12.1.1, until it submitted its request for the establishment of a panel on 20 July 1999. In its
request for the establishment of a panel ( Guatemala - Cement I) dated 4 February 1997, Mexico did
not even mention Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.487 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's claims as follows:
6.488 Guatemala did not refute the arguments submitted by Mexico proving violation of
Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It only responded partially, evasively and without
presenting any solid counter-arguments.
6.489 Mexico bases its arguments on the provisions of Article 12.1, under which there was an
obligation to notify Mexico and Cruz Azul and to give public notice of the initiation as soon as the
authorities were satisfied that there was sufficient evidence:462
(i) Guatemala issued the public notice of initiation without first satisfying itself that
there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.463
(ii) Guatemala effected the notifications and issued the public notice of initiation 38, 36
and 27 days after allegedly satisfying itself that there was sufficient evidence.464
6.490 Guatemala's reply is essentially based on three elements: (i) the competence of the authority
to determine the alleged sufficiency of the evidence465; (ii) an alleged misinterpretation by Mexico466;
and (iii) justification of its violation on the grounds of harmless error and acquiescence.467
(i) Competent authority for the determination of the alleged sufficiency of the evidence
6.491 Guatemala asserts that the competent authority is the Ministry of the Economy, not the
Directorate of Economic Integration.468
6.492 As Mexico stated earlier, according to footnote 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the word
"authorities" should be interpreted as meaning authorities at an appropriate senior level. Merely
stating that the Directorate of Economic Integration was not competent to determine the alleged
sufficiency of evidence is not enough to prove that the said Directorate does not have "an appropriate
senior level". Guatemala merely mentioned that the Ministry of the Economy was hierarchically

462 See first written submission by Mexico, paragraph 201.
463 See the section on sufficiency of evidence in this second written submission by Mexico.
464 Guatemala allegedly satisfied itself that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation on
15 December 1995 and 9 January 1996 and issued the pub lic notice of initiation on 11 January 1996; and
disregarding these circumstances, Guatemala notified the Government of Mexico and Cruz Azul on the 22 and
20 January 1996 respectively. Finally, we stress the fact that Guatemala already knew of its obligation to notify
on 15 December 1995 and 9 January 1996.
465 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 223.
466 Ibid., paragraph 224.
467 Ibid., paragraphs 225 and 226.
468 Ibid., paragraph 223.

superior to the Directorate of Economic Integration, just as it could have said that the Ministry was
not competent to determine the sufficiency of evidence because the President of Guatemala was
hierarchically superior. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the footnote in question does not
specify the appropriate level for an authority to issue determinations.469
6.493 As stated earlier, the term "authorities" can va ry depending to the specific context. In this
particular case, "the authorities" that must be satisf ied that "there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation" are the Directorate of Economic Integration and not the
Ministry of the Economy, since the former is a technical body responsible for reviewing the
arguments and evidence submitted.470
6.494 Moreover, the actual wording of the resolution of the Directorate of Economic Integration
(which, incidentally, is under the authority of the Ministry of Economy) does not suggest that there
would be any ratification. Unlike the opinion referred to in paragraph 1 of the resolution, paragraph 4
orders that notification should be made to the parties concerned, paragraph 5 requires that a public
notice of initiation be given and paragraph 6 states that the investigation procedure should be
pursued.471
6.495 In fact, Guatemala argues that "the competent 'authorities' to which Article 12.1 refers, were
not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence until 9 January".472 It would be useful to have evidence
in support of Guatemala's argument; in particular , it would be useful to know what evidence was
submitted between 15 December and 9 January which satisfied the authorities.
6.496 However, supposing for the sake of argument that this Panel should determine that the
resolution of 15 December 1995 is not the document by which Guatemala determined the alleged
sufficiency of evidence, then it would be the resolution of 9 January 1996. Either of the two dates
considered would imply a violation of Article 12.1.
473
(ii) Alleged faulty interpretation by Mexico of Article 12.1
6.497 Guatemala contends that the Article at issue did not oblige it to notify Mexico and Cruz Azul
immediately after it was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation. Similarly, it
argues that the Article does not specify any interval between the determination of the alleged
sufficiency of evidence, the notification of the parties and the public notice of initiation.
474
6.498 Since the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not establish a precise interval or define the term
"when", under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the term must be interpreted in accordance with
its ordinary meaning, in its context and in the light of its object and purpose. The ordinary meaning of
the term " cuando" ("when") is " entiempo que " ("at which time"). 475 Now, we must consider that
"when" refers to the time at which the authorities satisfied themselves that there was sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation, the notification and the public
notice. In other words, at the time at which there is sufficient evidence, the notification and public
notice must be effected. While it will be argued that there are various permissible interpretations of
the term "when", in this context and in the light of its object and purpose, it is impossible to accept
that in notifying Mexico and Cruz Azul 38 and 36 days late respectively and publishing the public

469 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting with the parties, paragraphs 145 and
146.
470 Ibid., paragraph 147.
471 Ibid., paragraph 149.
472 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 223.
473 Oral submission by Mexico at the first substantive meeting with the parties, paragraph 149.
474 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 224.
475 Diccionario Larousse, 1987 Edition.

notice of initiation 27 days after the sufficiency of the evidence had been established, Guatemala had
fulfilled its obligations under Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Consequently,
Guatemala has not proven that it complied with that provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Harmless error and acquiescence
6.499 Please refer to the arguments set forth in the section on Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
6.500 On the basis of those arguments, Mexico states categorically that Guatemala has not refuted
the evidence of its violation of Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which Mexico has
established ever since its first written submission. It has simply tried to evade the conclusive
arguments against it.
(iv) Violations of Article 12.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
6.501 Guatemala argues that it fulfilled its obligation under Article 12.1.1 through the report of the
Directorate of Economic Integration of 17 November 1995, and that that report contained relevant
information concerning the basis on which dumping was alleged as well as a summary of the factors
on which the allegation of threat of material injury was based.476
6.502 Firstly, Guatemala recognizes that the public notice of initiation did not comply with the
requirements of Article 12.1.1, and now, using a post hoc argument, it contends that it complied with
its obligation under that Article by submitting a separate report prepared by the Directorate of
Economic Integration. Guatemala is trying to suggest, erroneously, that any document in the file can
constitute the separate report, an argument that cannot in any circumstances be accepted as validly
complying with the transparency requirements for determinations by the investigating authority.
6.503 The public notice of initiation does not even make any reference to the existence of a separate
report nor does it suggest that the notice was replaced or supplemented by a separate report which,
moreover, must be available to the interested parties in accordance with footnote 23 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 477 Guatemala's argument is entirely inconsistent with the purpose of
Article 12.1.1 of ensuring the transparency of the Ministry's initiation determination.
6.504 Secondly, not only is there no indication that the Ministry sought to comply with its
obligation under Article 12.1.1 through a separate report, but the report to which Guatemala refers
also fails to provide adequate information on the elements listed in Article 12.1.1(i) to (vi).478
6.505 Mexico submits that the separate report does not contain, inter alia, "adequate information"
concerning the allegation of dumping in the application or "adequate information" summarizing the
factors on which the allegation of material injury is based. Hence, the separate report does not contain
the sufficient grounds on which the Ministry initiated the investigation, and as a result of this

476 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 228.
477 In paragraph 228 of its first written submission, Guatemala tries to suggest that it complied with the
requirement to make the separate report available to the public because, in its submission dated 9 May 1996,
Cruz Azul referred to the report of 17 November 1995; however, this does not mean that we should accept that
it is a separate report which contains the required information and complies with the requirements of
Article 12.1.1.
478 Unlike the public notice of initiation, the separate report fails to indicate, inter alia, the address to
which representations by interested parties should be direct ed or the time limits allowed to interested parties for
making their views known.

omission Cruz Azul was in no position to assess either the quality or the sources of information relied
upon by the investigating authority for its initiation determination.479
6.506 Thus, for example, in referring to Cementos Prog reso's standing in its "Analysis" section, the
report refers to the firm as a producer of cement that is identical or similar to the imported cement
without anywhere referring to the product likeness analysis which, if it was actually conducted, was
simply omitted. At the same time, in referring to the evidence submitted in the application, it refers to
evidence concerning the export price and does not speak of the existence of evidence of the normal
value. In spite of this omission, the section "Estimation of the Margin of Dumping" presents a table
in four columns showing how the Ministry obt ained the margin of dumping without adequate
evidence. Consequently, it is impossible to cons ider that this complies with the purpose and
requirements of Article 12.1.1 - in other words, the separate report does not contain the "adequate
information" on which the allegation of dumping is based in the application.
6.507 Nor does the report provide a summary of the factors referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 7 of
Article 3 on which the allegation of injury, or in this case threat of injury, is based. The report merely
refers to simple allegations by the applicant and makes no reference to any relevant evidence. For
example, according to the report:
"The complainant states that the massive imports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico at less than their normal value cons titutes a threat of injury to the domestic
industry in that it would prejudice investment in improvements and expansion of the
Guatemalan cement industry. Furthermore, due to the extremely low prices at which
this product is imported from Mexico, the Guatemalan company would become an
importer and would be obliged to lay off 1,052 workers, with the consequent negative
impact on the level of employment in Guatemala and concomitant economic and
social problems".
6.508 Under no circumstances can the simple allegations by the applicant be considered as
"adequate information" constituting a summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of
injury was based in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 3. The lack of evidence
relating to the allegation of threat of injury pr evented the investigating authority from providing, in
the separate report, adequate information concerning the summary of factors on which the allegation
of threat of injury was based, while at the same time preventing Cruz Azul from assessing the quality
and sources of information taken into account by the Ministry in reaching its initiation determination -
indeed, the evidence relating to the allegation of threat of injury was non-existent.
6.509 Consequently, Mexico submits that Guatemala failed to comply with Article 12.1.1 in that
neither the public notice of initiation, nor the separate report, contained adequate information
concerning the basis on which dumping was alleged in the application, nor did they contain a
summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of material injury was based. Nor can
Guatemala's argument that the Ministry met its obligation under Article 12.1.1 by submitting a
separate report be accepted, since neither the public notice of initiation nor the file of the investigation
makes any such reference, besides which, not just any document from the file can be accepted as a
separate report.

479 In paragraph 30 of its third-party submission, the United States agrees that what is at issue is
whether the separate report mentioned by Guatemala contains adequate information and whether it is was
available to the public. It adds that the Panel should also be mindful of whether Article 12.1 has been complied
with, i.e. whether the investigating authority reveals the evidentiary basis for proceeding with the initiation of
the investigation. Where exporters are in no position to assess either the quality or the source of the information
relied upon by the investigating authority, the purpose of Article 12.1 has been subverted.

6.510 In the alternative, Guatemala points out that the irrelevance of the public notice was harmless
and does not constitute nullification or impairment of the rights accruing to Mexico under the AD
Agreement, adding that in any case Mexico acquiesced in respect of the relevance of the public notice
under the terms of Article 12.1.1.480
6.511 To avoid repetition, as the subjects of harmless error, nullification or impairment and
acquiescence have already been addressed in the "General Comments" section of Mexico's second
written submission, we shall not revert to them here.
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.512 Guatemala responds to Mexico's rebuttal by arguing that the public notice of initiation
complied with Article 12.1.1. It makes the following arguments:
6.513 In its first written submission, Guatemala showed that the public notice of initiation, including
the Report of the Directorate of Economic Integration of 17 November 1995, complied with
Article 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement. 481 Guatemala also stated that the report of 17 November was
available to Cruz Azul, and Cruz Azul cited it several times.482 Finally, Guatemala explained why any
alleged flaws in the notification (assuming there were any) were either harmless or acquiesced in by
Mexico, or both.
483
6.514 During the first meeting, Mexico adduced that neither the notice nor the report contained the
type of information or the level of detail required by Article 12.1.1. For example, Mexico asserted
that Guatemala was under the obligation to discuss its "analysis" of the like product and to show how
it calculated its margin of dumping.484
6.515 It is surprising indeed that Mexico should reso rt to this argument, because it conflicts with a
case which Mexico knows fairly well, Corn Syrup . In that case, the Panel refused to find that
Article 12.1.1 required notices of initiation to contain the level of detail which Mexico asks of
Guatemala. In particular, it submitted that the simple terms of Article 12.1.1 merely required, inter
alia, a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based". 485 The Panel expressly
rejected the argument presented by the United States in Corn Syrup and by Mexico in this case that
the authorities must summarize their "conclusions" and the factors underlying those conclusions.486
6.516 Thus, it is enough that Guatemala's notice and the separate report should contain "adequate
information" under the categories described in subparagraphs (i) to (vi). Guatemala was not required
to supply, inter alia, its "analysis" of the like product or its conclusions concerning the margin of
dumping.

480 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 229 and 230.
481 Idem, paragraphs 227-230.
482 Idem. See also (submission by Cruz Azul of 9 May 1996).
483 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 229-230.
484 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 155-159.
485 WT/DS132/R paragraph 7.87 citing Article 12.1.1 (iv) of the AD Agreement (emphasis added by
the Panel).
486 Idem.

3. Claim Under Article 6.1.3 – Provision of Full Text of Written Application by Guatemala
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.517 Mexico claims that Guatemala breached its obligation to provide the full text of the written
application "as soon as the investigation was initiated" as required by Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement. It makes the following arguments in this regard:
6.518 As already seen 487, the Ministry of the Economy initiated the investigation on
11 January 1996. It only notified Cruz Azul and the Government of Mexico, however, on 20 and
22 January respectively. These letters were the first official contact between the investigating
authority and the Government of Mexico, on the one hand, and Cruz Azul on the other.
Consequently, the fact that the full text of the written application was not provided as soon as the
investigation was initiated is sufficient proof that Guatemala violated Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement.
6.519 Article 6.1.3 provides the following:
"As soon as an investigation has been init iated, the authorities shall provide the full
text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known
exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available,
upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the
requirement for the protection of confid ential information, as provided for in
paragraph 5."
6.520 The authority’s violation is not, however, limited to the above. When Guatemala notified the
Government of Mexico and Cruz Azul of the initia tion of the investigation, it did not provide the text
of the application. In other words, Mexico did not receive the text of the application for initiation,
even when it received the tardy notification from the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations on
22 January 1996.
6.521 In addition, the Ministry of the Economy’s notification to Cruz Azul of 20 January 1996 did
not contain the full text of the application for initiation. As it did not have the full text of the
application for initiation of an investigation, Cruz Azul had to turn to the administrative file on the
case to find the application and be able to defend its interests. In other words, Cruz Azul only saw the
full text of the application for initiation of an in vestigation for the first time when it examined the
administrative file, since Guatemala had not provided it previously.
6.522 The foregoing is a serious procedural violation that mainly affected Cruz Azul and clearly
infringes Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement. In this particular case, the violation was to be of the
utmost importance. By not allowi ng Cruz Azul nor the Government of Mexico to know precisely
what was in the full text of the application, Guat emala did not give ample opportunity to the exporter
to defend its interests, and this alone impairs the rights of Mexico and Cruz Azul under Article 6.1 of
the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.523 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's claims under Article 6.1.3:
6.524 Mexico alleges that Guatemala violated Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by
omitting to provide Cruz Azul and the Mexican Government with the full text of the written
application as soon as the investigation was initiated. While Mexico is correct in saying that the

487 See Sections V.A.1(e) and V.A.1(f) of this submission.

purpose of Article 6.1.3 is to provide the exporter and its government with "ample opportunity to
defend their interests, "488 the rest of its argument is fallacious.
6.525 Firstly, Mexico is simply confusing the facts. On 22 January 1996, the Ministry sent Mexico
the full text of the application together with the notice of initiation. On 29 January 1996, the Ministry
provided Cruz Azul with the full text of the writ ten application together with the notice of initiation
and the questionnaire. In fact, Guatemala's procedural rules require that upon notification a copy of
the application be provided together with the corresponding transcription.489
6.526 Secondly, it is clear from the administrative file that Cruz Azul had the application and had
ample opportunity to defend its interests. For example, in its submissions of 7 February 1996 and
9 May 1996, Cruz Azul argued vigorously - before the preliminary determination was issued - that the
Ministry should not have initiated the investigation.
6.527 Finally, as mentioned above in discussing Mexico's argument concerning the alleged violation
of Article 5.5 by Guatemala, providing Mexico or Cruz Azul with the full text of the written
application would not have affected the course of the investigation. The alleged delay was harmless,
Mexico and Cruz Azul clearly acquiesced in the alleged delay and the alleged delay did not constitute
nullification or impairment of Mexico's rights under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.528 The fact that Guatemala supplied the full text of the application to Mexico and Cruz Azul
meant that they had ample and adequate opportunity to defend their interests when the investigation
began to unfold on 23 January 1996. In its submissions of 7 February 1996 and 9 May 1996, in which
it objected to the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation, Cruz Azul did not object to the alleged
delay in receiving the full text of the application under the terms of Article 6.1.3. Instead, Cruz Azul
waited until 30 October 1996, ten months after the beginning of the investigation, to complain about
not having received a full copy of the application as soon as the investigation began. By then Cruz
Azul had already had many opportunities to defend its interests in a timely fashion.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.529 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's arguments on the basis that Guatemala has not shown that it acted
in accordance with Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement when it failed to provide the full text of the
application to Cruz Azul and to the Government of Mexico as soon as the investigation was initiated.
Mexico makes the following submissions in this regard:
6.530 There are two disputed points concerning Article 6.1.3: (i) the provision of the full text of the
application to the Government of Mexico; (ii) the provision of the text to Cruz Azul. In neither of the
two cases did Guatemala manage to refute the argument that it had violated the said article.
6.531 Nevertheless, before turning to the specific arguments of the case, it is important once again
to highlight the contradiction in the arguments put forward by Guatemala. On the one hand
Guatemala acknowledges that "the purpose of Article 6.1.3 is to provide the exporter and its
government with 'ample opportunity to defend their interests,'"
490,491 while on the other hand, it
invokes once again its arguments concerning harmless error, acquiescence and absence of
nullification or impairment.
492 Once again, Mexico poses the question: if Guatemala recognizes the

488 See Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 227.
489 See Article 70 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (these provisions are applicable to
the proceedings of the executive branch, Article 26 of the Law on Administrative Appeals).
490 Ibid., paragraph 231.
491 Ibid., paragraph 231.
492 Ibid., paragraph 234.

right of defence while at the same time denying that there is any right of defence, which of its
arguments is the correct one?
(i) Provision of the full text of the application to the Government of Mexico
6.532 Firstly, Guatemala has not refuted Mexico's argument that it waited until at least 11 days after
the initiation of the investigation to allegedly supply the full text of the application. The only
arguments put forward by Guatemala with respect to this obligation are those concerning harmless
error, acquiescence and nullification or impairment, on the one hand, and the assertion that it provided
Mexico and Cruz Azul with "ample and adequate opportunity to defend their interests when the
investigation began to unfold on 23 January 1996".
6.533 Since it has been demonstrated that the concepts invoked by Guatemala are not applicable,
and that in addition, an assertion that it had provided ample opportunity does not constitute evidence,
Mexico notes that this argument has not been refuted by Guatemala at all.
6.534 Secondly, Guatemala tries to prove that it supplied the full text of the application with a
document attached by Mexico to its first written submission (the letter presented as Annex
MEXICO-12). As mentioned earlier, the letter in question does not prove that the full text of the
application was provided to the Government of Mexico. Guatemala did not provide the full text of
the application when it notified Mexico on 22 January 1996, and this letter does not prove the
contrary. Thus, Guatemala has been unable to refute Mexico's assertion that it violated Article 6.1.3.
(ii) Provision of the full text of the application to Cruz Azul
6.535 Firstly, Guatemala assures us that it supplied the full text of the application to Cruz Azul on
29 January 1996.
493 This points to the conclusion that if the application was indeed supplied on that
date and not at a later date, Guatemala supplied the full text of the application 18 days after the
initiation of the investigation. Since it initiated the investigation on 11 January 1996 and supplied the
text of the application to Cruz Azul on 29 Januar y 1996, it clearly took Guatemala 18 days to supply
the application for initiation of the investigation, and it did not do so "as soon as the investigation was
initiated". In other words, Guatemala is acknowledging that it did not comply with Article 6.1.3 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.536 Worse still, Guatemala submitted a copy of the air consignment note allegedly certifying that
it sent the text of the application for initiation to Cruz Azul, although the document does not provide
proper evidence that the full text was sent to Cruz Azul. Under the heading "date", the note contains
the inscription "04-02-96". At best for Guatemala, the note is dated 4 February 1996 although the
inscription could actually be understood to refer to the second day of the fourth month of 1996, that is
2 April 1996. Thus, if we follow Guatemala's logic, the complete text of the initiation application was
presumably supplied to Cruz Azul on 4 February 1996, i.e. 24 days after the initiation of the
investigation. Consequently, Guatemala is acknow ledging that it waited at least 24 days before
supplying the initiation application to Cruz Azul, thereby clearly violating Article 6.1.3.
6.537 As a second argument, Guatemala mentions Cruz Azul's communications of 7 February and
9 May 1996. These documents do not provide evidence that Guatemala supplied the full text of the
application. The fact that on those dates Cruz Az ul stated that the Ministry of the Economy should
not have initiated the investigation does not in any way constitute evidence that Guatemala provided
the full text of the application to Cruz Azul. In other words, it is not necessary to have the full text of
the application in order to argue that Guatemala should not have initiated the investigation.
Moreover, as already stated earlier, Cruz Azul had to consult the file in order to obtain the application
for initiation and thus be in a position to defend its interests.

493 Idem.

6.538 Thirdly, Guatemala argues that its procedural rules require that upon notification, a copy of
the full text of the application be provided. 494 As was the case with the violation of Article 5.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the only thing Guatemala shows through this argument is that it also
violated its domestic legislation. Thus, even if this is not a matter at issue, Guatemala also violated its
domestic legislation by not supplying the full text of the application.
6.539 Finally, Guatemala once again invokes acquiescence, estoppel, harmless error and
nullification or impairment. 495 And once again, Mexico refers to the corresponding sections in the
"General Comments" section and to its arguments concerning Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
6.540 Thus, Guatemala has not been able to refute Mexico's arguments that it violated Article 6.1.3
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by not supplying the full text of the application to the Government
of Mexico until 11 days after the initiation of the investigation. Moreover, and worse still, Guatemala
has not been able to prove that it supplied the full text to Mexico, even at the time of notification on
22 January 1996. At the same time, it has failed to prove that it provided Cruz Azul with the full text
of the application, even on 4 February 1996. In other words, there can no longer be any doubt that
Guatemala violated Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
D. G
UATEMALA'S APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MEASURE
1. Claims Under Articles 2.4 and 7.1 – Information Received and Used by Guatemala's
Investigating Authority
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.541 Mexico claims that by applying the provisional anti-dumping measure without properly
meeting the requirements for its imposition, Guatemala violated Articles 2 and 7 of the AD
Agreement. Further, the application of the provisional measure under these circumstances violates the
provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
6.542 Notwithstanding Guatemala's preliminary objections, Mexico claims that the Ministry did not
comply with the obligation set forth in subparagraph (i) of Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement as it
applied a provisional measure without having given Cruz Azul an adequate opportunity to comment
on the information provided to the Ministry in the reply to the questionnaire it had received. In this
regard Mexico makes the following arguments:
6.543 Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"Provisional measures may be applied only if:
(i) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5, a public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties
have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make
comments; …"
6.544 The Ministry calculated a dumping margin using information provided by Cruz Azul that was
unclear to it in certain respects and simply relied on assumptions concerning the way in which the
dumping margin should be calculated, without giving Cruz Azul a clear prior indication of the
deficiencies or inaccuracies in its reply to the questionnaire and requesting the relevant clarifications.

494 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 232.
495 Ibid., paragraph 234.

6.545 Moreover, the Ministry also violated the final part of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, which
provides the following:
"…The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is
necessary to ensure a fair comparison …".
6.546 After receiving the reply to the questionnaire for exporting firms, even though the Ministry
acknowledged that it had doubts about the information provided by Cruz Azul, it did not request the
exporter to supply additional information in order to clarify the inaccuracies and thus ensure that it
could make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price indicated by Cruz Azul,
thus violating Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.547 Guatemala responds to Mexico's claims under Articles 7.1 and 2.4 as follows:
6.548 Article 7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not lay down any particularly onerous
requirements for the application of provisional measures. According to Article 7.1, provisional
measures may be applied if:
(i) An investigation has been initiated in acco rdance with the provisions of Article 5, a
public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given
adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;
(ii) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent
injury to a domestic industry; and
(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being
caused during the investigation.
6.549 Thus, Article 7 clearly envisages a very limited preliminary investigation in which before
they can impose a provisional measure the investigating authorities are only required to provide
timely notification of the initiation of an investigation and to give interested parties adequate
opportunities to submit information and make comments so that they can be considered by the
authorities.
6.550 The limited nature of the preliminary investigation is further confirmed by the fact that,
despite Article 5.10 requiring the investigation to be concluded within one year after initiation (or
18 months in special circumstances), Article 7.3 states that "provisional measures shall not be applied
sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation". Thus, it is clearly permissible to
apply provisional measures as early as 60 days after the investigation was initiated. Since provisional
measures can be imposed so early in a 12 or 18 month investigation, it is clear that under the
Agreement the investigating authorities can impose such measures on the basis of a much less
exhaustive investigation (and with much less deta iled documentary evidence) than would be required
to justify the imposition of a definitive measure.
496
6.551 Another indication that the provisional measure is not subject to any particular requirements
is the fact that the Agreement does not impose definitive standards for the formulation of a

496 Article 7.4, which limits the application of provisional measures "to as short a period as possible",
normally not exceeding four months, also supports the co nclusion that the Agreement requires a less exhaustive
investigation for the preliminary than for the final phase of the process. This Article ensures that any
provisional measure based on documentary evidence less complete than that required for a definitive anti-
dumping duty will only have a limited duration.

preliminary determination by the investigating authority. Article 7.1(ii) only requires that an
preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury and
Article 7.1(iii) only requires that "the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent
injury being caused during the investigation." At the same time, the Article does not provide any
further guidance as to the nature of the decision which must be taken or as regards the adequacy or
quality of the evidence. The lack of definitive standards for making a preliminary determination in an
anti-dumping case contrasts sharply with the standard provided in Article 6 of the Agreement on
Safeguards: "… a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary
determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to
cause serious injury …". 497
6.552 The Panel in the dispute Brazil - Milk Powder 498, which dealt with the similar rules in
Article 5.1 of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, cl arified the necessary requirements for the
imposition of provisional measures. The Panel found that, in accordance with the Subsidies Code, a
preliminary affirmative determination should be preceded by an investigation, that is, "a preliminary
affirmative finding could be made only at some point in time after the initiation of an investigation,
when interested signatories and interested parties have been afforded an opportunity to submit their
views to the investigating authorities and to have access to the information used by the investigating
authorities".
499 Brazil failed to comply with these requirements by not giving interested parties
relevant and timely notice of the initiation of the investigation and not sending out the questionnaire
before making a preliminary determination. Thus, the parties had no way of making their views
known or providing information before Brazil applied provisional duties.500
6.553 Guatemala's anti-dumping investigation clearly exceeded the requirements laid down in
Article 7 for applying a provisional measure and far exceeded the action taken in the case Brazil -
Milk Powder. As the chronology of the investigation makes clear, the Ministry published its decision
to initiate an investigation on 11 January 1996. It then notified the Mexican Government, as required,
and provided it with a full copy of the application on 22 January 1996. Notification of the initiation
of an investigation, the full text of Cementos Pr ogreso's application and a questionnaire was sent by
the Ministry to Cruz Azul via DHL on 26 January 1996. Subsequently, Cruz Azul requested and was
granted an extension until 17 May 1996 to reply to the questionnaire. Cruz Azul gave a partial reply
to the questionnaire dated 9 May 1996, which accompanied a long submission bearing the same date;
both documents were lodged on 13 May 1996. The Mi nistry's preliminary determination was issued
on 16 August 1996 and the application of the provisional measure entered into effect with the
publication of the preliminary determination on 28 August 1996, long after the expiration of the
period of 60 days required by Article 7.3 for the application of provisional measures. The
determination establishing dumping and consequent injury was based on a careful and complete
examination of the evidence gathered during the pr eliminary investigation, including the information
submitted by Cruz Azul.
6.554 Mexico challenges the preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and consequent
injury on the grounds that the Ministry did not properly evaluate various pieces of evidence and thus
did not establish the facts correctly. However, the role of the panel is not to make an independent
evaluation of the evidence. On the contrary, Article 17.6(i) requires the panel to respect Guatemala's
sovereignty and the authority of the Ministry as the investigating agency responsible for evaluating
the relevant facts and drawing the appropriate conc lusions. Under Article 17.6(i) the panel may only
"determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation
of those facts was unbiased and objective." The text of this Article leaves no doubt that the panel can
only reject the factual findings made by the national authorities in special cases in which the

497 Agreement on Safeguards, Article 6 (emphasis added).
498 SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994.
499 Idem, paragraph 223.
500 Idem, paragraphs 251-53.

conclusions drawn by the authorities are simply not supported by the evidence or when there is clear
evidence of bias in their evaluation of the facts.
6.555 Quite inappropriately, Mexico suggests that the panel should carry out a new investigation
and make a new evaluation of the evidence instead of confining itself to determining "whether the
authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective".
501 The fact is that the Ministry carried out a careful and complete
examination of the evidence in accordance with the relevant criteria established in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Clearly, Mexico has not shown that the Ministry's establishment of the facts was not
proper or that its evaluation of those facts was biased.
6.556 Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Article 7.1 by not giving Cruz Azul an adequate
opportunity to comment on the information provided in the replies to the anti-dumping questionnaire
and therefore based its provisional calculation of the dumping margin on information from Cruz Azul
that was unclear in certain respects. The essence of the Mexican argument is that after the Ministry
received the replies to the questionnaire from Cruz Azul it should have asked Cruz Azul for
explanations and additional information before making a preliminary determination of dumping.
There is no support for Mexico's arguments in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.557 According to Article 7.1, provisional measures may only be applied if, inter alia, "interested
parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments".
Article 2.4 states, inter alia , that "the authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what
information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison …".
6.558 Guatemala complied with Article 7.1 by giving Cruz Azul the opportunity to submit
information and make comments before issuing a provisional determination. Guatemala complied
with Article 2.4 by providing Cruz Azul with a written anti-dumping questionnaire specifying the
information necessary to calculate the dumping margin. In fact, the Ministry used the same anti-
dumping questionnaire as the Mexican investigating authority, SECOFI, in its anti-dumping
investigations.
6.559 On 11 January 1996, a notice was published inviting all importers, exporters, representatives
of the Mexican Government and anyone who considered himself to have a legitimate interest in the
outcome of the investigation to appear and pres ent their views and any evidence they considered
relevant. As indicated in Section I.C. of the preliminary determination, entitled "Notification", a
number of interested parties, including Cruz Azul, responded to the notice of initiation. Cruz Azul
appeared on 7 February 1996 and requested a 30-day extension to reply to the anti-dumping
questionnaire. Subsequently, the Ministry extended the time-limit to 17 May 1996 for all the
interested parties in order that they might submit evidence and reply to the questionnaires. Cruz Azul
presented its written arguments on 9 May 1996 and on 13 May 1996 lodged a submission that
contained a partial reply to the anti-dumping questionnaire.
6.560 For calculating the preliminary dumping margin the Ministry used the information that Cruz
Azul had supplied in its reply to the questionnaire. The Ministry made adjustments for tariff
differences and freight costs requested by Cruz Azul . Cruz Azul's to the questionnaire was internally
inconsistent and confused, inter alia , with respect to the adjustments to the normal value which it
asked to have made for discounts for wholesalers and discounts for prompt payment.
502 However, the
Ministry also accepted these adjustments as valid on the basis of the discount procedure described by
Cruz Azul.

501 AD Agreement, Article 17.6(i).
502 For example, in some cases the total alleged discount exceeded the total for the corresponding sale.

6.561 In short, it is absurd for Mexico to argue that Guatemala did not comply with Articles 2.4 and
7.1, since the Ministry used the information submitted by Cruz Azul to determine the preliminary
dumping margin.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.562 Mexico, in rebuttal, argues that the imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure
violated Articles 2 and 7 of the AD Agreement. It submits as follows:
6.563 Here, Guatemala contends that it complied with Article 7.1 by giving Cruz Azul the
opportunity to submit information and make comments before issuing a provisional determination. It
adds that the Ministry made adjustments for tariff differences and freight costs, and in spite of the fact
that according Guatemala Cruz Azul's reply to the questionnaire was inconsistent and confused, it
accepted the validity of adjustments for wholesalers and discounts for prompt payment. In short, the
Ministry used the information submitted by Cruz Azul to determine the preliminary margin of
dumping.
503
6.564 Following the replies by Guatemala in its first written submission, Mexico will not pursue the
issue of the adjustments claimed by Cruz Azul. Nevertheless, Mexico repeats that Guatemala did not
properly interpret Article 7.1, and in fact violated that Article by not giving Cruz Azul a proper
opportunity to make comments after its reply to the investigation questionnaire and before Guatemala
issued its preliminary determination.
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.565 Guatemala responds by arguing that the preliminary determination of dumping complied
with Articles 2 and 7.1. It makes the following arguments in this regard:
6.566 As already mentioned, Guatemala is of the view that the provisional measure and the
complaints against that measure are not properly before the Panel. But even if Guatemala's
preliminary objection were to be rejected, it is clear that Mexico's arguments are without merit.
6.567 The gist of Mexico's argument is that after Guatemala had received Cruz Azul's reply to the
questionnaire, it was under an obligation to seek clarifications and additional information from Cruz
Azul before making a preliminary determination of injurious dumping. As we explained during the
first meeting, this argument is absurd.
6.568 Firstly, a preliminary determination, by its very nature, cannot be based on a complete factual
record. Thus, if Cruz Azul was concerned about the accuracy and completeness of the preliminary
determination, it should have provided complete and accurate answers to the questionnaire. Instead, it
provided a partial and confusing reply which in many respects was self-contradictory. For example,
Cruz Azul only provided pricing data on its sales of Type II and Type II Pz cement sold in Mexico.
Yet, in an annex to its reply (Annex 1), Cruz Azul indicated that all home market and export sales
were of Type I (PM) cement.
6.569 In short, if anyone is to blame for the preliminary determination, it is Cruz Azul. Guatemala
based its preliminary determination primarily from Cruz Azul's data. It gave Cruz Azul ample
opportunity, in accordance with Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement, to "submit information and make
comments". Indeed, it extended the deadline for submission of Cruz Azul's response by more than
60 days. Guatemala even used the same anti-dumping questionnaires as Mexico uses.

503 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 246, 248 and 249.

6.570 If anything, the preliminary determination under stated Cruz Azul's dumping margin. As we
explained in our first written submission, the Ministry made adjustments for taxation differences and
freight costs that lowered Cruz Azul's margin. 504 It also made adjustments favourable to Cruz Azul
for wholesaler and prompt payment discounts in spite of the fact that its reply to the questionnaire was
self contradictory and confusing on both these subjects. Most investigating authorities would not
have given Cruz Azul the benefit of the doubt on these issues.
6.571 These facts, which we developed in greater detail in our first written submission, support the
conclusion that Guatemala carried out a careful and complete examination of the evidence in
accordance with the relevant criteria provided in the AD Agreement. Mexico clearly has not
demonstrated either that Guatemala's establishment of the evidence in the file was improper or that
Guatemala's evaluation of the evidence was biased.
2. Claims Under Article 2.2 – Determination of Normal Value
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.572 Mexico claims that Guatemala violated Article 2.2 for the following reasons:
6.573 The Ministry never examined whether the product for consumption in Mexico like to that
exported to Guatemala was representative, thus violating Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement, notably
footnote 2, which reads as follows:
"Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the
exporting country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the
determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the
sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a
lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales
at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper
comparison."
6.574 The Ministry in fact inferred that the sales of Type I (PM) cement for domestic consumption
in Mexico were representative because the sales of Type I (PM) cement to Guatemala accounted for
4 per cent of sales destined for domestic consumption. It should be noted, however, that when
determining the normal value the Ministry used sales of Type II Pz cement, arguing that this was the
like product to that exported to Guatemala by Cruz Azul. This is why the file on the case does not
include any examination of the representativeness of the sales of Type II Pz cement for consumption
in Mexico.
6.575 The Ministry, therefore, never satisfied itself that the volume of sales on the Mexican
domestic market of the like product to that exported to Guatemala was of a sufficient magnitude to
provide for a proper comparison, thereby violating the provision in Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.576 Guatemala's arguments in response to Mexico's claims under Article 2.2 are as follows:
6.577 Mexico alleges that the Ministry did not make a valid determination of the normal value
because it used sales of Type II Pz cement made by Cruz Azul in Mexico instead of certain sales of
Type I (PM) cement. Again, Mexico's arguments are beside the point since the Ministry based its
calculation of the normal value on the sales of cement in Mexico which Cruz Azul reported in its
reply to the anti-dumping questionnaire.

504 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 248.

6.578 The anti-dumping questionnaire instructed Cruz Azul to draw up a list itemizing all its sales
of the commodity in question on the domestic market during the investigation period. It also
instructed Cruz Azul to provide information on each type of cement sold. As described in the
preliminary determination, Cruz Azul only provided selling price information relating to its sales of
Type II and Type II Pz cement in Mexico. The Ministry did not find any difference in the prices
reported for Type II and Type II Pz cement. Moreover, Cruz Azul did not provide any information on
domestic market prices for sales of Type I (PM) cement. However, in Annex 1 to its reply to the
questionnaire, Cruz Azul indicated that all the sales on the domestic market and export sales involved
of Type I (PM) cement. The volume of export sales reported was 61,279 tons while the volume sold
on the domestic market was reported as 1,538,962 tons. As explained in section VI.C of the
provisional determination, entitled "Procedure used to calculate the normal value", the Ministry used
only the selling prices of Type II cement with pozzolana sold to distributors in Mexico. Since the
Type I (PM) cement exported to Guatemala contained pozzolana, the Ministry considered that the
Type II cement with pozzolana sold in Mexico was the product most like to the product exported to
Guatemala.
6.579 In view of these facts, Mexico has no reason to complain that Guatemala used selling prices
for Type II cement with pozzolana for calculatin g the normal value. There was nothing in Cruz
Azul's questionnaire to suggest that the Ministry ought not to have used this information for
calculating the normal value. In fact, it was the company that provided the information.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.580 Mexico makes the following arguments in response to Guatemala's submissions:
(i) Product likeness
6.581 Regarding product likeness, Guatemala states in its first submission
505 that Cruz Azul only
provided price information concerning its sales of Type II and Type II Pz cement sold in Mexico, and
that it could find no difference between the prices reported for the two types. It adds that Cruz Azul
did not provide any information on domestic market prices for sales of Type I (PM) cement, which
corresponds to the product exported to Guatemala.
6.582 In spite of the differences between the products reported (Type II, Type II Pz and Type I PM),
the Ministry decided that since the Type I (PM) cement exported to Guatemala contained pozzolana,
the Type II cement with pozzolana sold in Mexico was the product most like to the product exported
to Guatemala. Mexico submits that the Ministry did not conduct a likeness analysis of the product to
support its preliminary affirmative determination.
(ii) "Representativeness" of the domestic market prices
6.583 In connection with the preliminary determination of the normal value, the Ministry used the
sales of Type II Pz cement, arguing that it was the "product most like to" the product exported by
Cruz Azul to Guatemala. However, there is no examination of the "representativeness" of the sales of
Type II Pz cement for consumption in Mexico in the file of the case.
6.584 Mexico repeats its argument that the Ministry never satisfied itself that the volume of sales in
the Mexican domestic market of the like product to that exported to Guatemala could be considered a
sufficient quantity (within the meaning of footnote 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement) to permit a
proper comparison, so that Guatemala violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

505 Ibid., paragraph 251.

3. Claims Under Article 3.7 and Related Provisions – Preliminary Determination of Threat
of Material Injury
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.585 Mexico argues that the Ministry of the Economy’s preliminary affirmative determination of
threat of material injury is contrary to the provisions in Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7, inter alia, of
the AD Agreement. Its various arguments in respect of its Article 3.7 claim are as follows:
6.586 Firstly, it should be noted that, in arriving at this determination, the Ministry did not evaluate
whether there had been a significant increase in imports in absolute terms or relative to domestic
production or consumption. It did not consider either whether the imports entered the Guatemalan
market at significantly undercut prices that had an impact on domestic prices by depressing them to a
significant degree or preventing their increase. The Ministry violated Article 3.2, in particular by not
considering whether there had been significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared
with the domestic price on the Guatemalan market. Instead of this, the Ministry simply confined itself
to mentioning in its preliminary affirmative determ ination of threat of material injury that the
domestic prices had fallen, without making the necessary comparison with the price of imports of
grey Portland cement.
6.587 In addition, according to Article 3.7
506 of the AD Agreement, a determination of threat of
material injury must be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility,
and it requires that, in reaching such a determination, a number of factors must be considered,
inter alia the following: a significant rate of increase of imports, the freely disposable capacity of the
exporter (taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional
exports), the effect of the exports on domestic prices, and the inventories of the product.
6.588 Nevertheless, an examination of the Ministry of the Economy’s preliminary determination
shows that the Ministry apparently limited itself to considering the factors enumerated in Article 3.7
of the AD Agreement, and we say apparently because there can be no doubt that the consideration of
these factors was inadequate and insufficient, as will be seen throughout this section. We must
submit, however, that the Ministry did not properly evaluate the factors enumerated in Article 3.7 in
order to arrive at a valid conclusion that, over the investigation period, there was a change in
circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumped imports of grey Portland cement
would cause material injury to the domestic industry.
6.589 In addition, it must be borne in mind that, even though the factors listed in Article 3.7 are
elements which the investigating authority must neces sarily consider in cases of threat of material

506 Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation,
conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the
dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. In making a determination regarding the
existence of a threat of material injury, the authorities should consider, inter alia, such factors as:
(i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of
substantially increased importation;
(ii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating
the likelihood of substantially increased dumped exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into
account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports;
(iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on
domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and
(iv) inventories of the product being investigated.
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors
considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless protective
action is taken, material injury would occur." (Emphasis added.)

injury, for such cases the AD Agreement requires an examination that goes beyond the consideration
of these factors. The last paragraph of Article 3.7 of the Agreement states that:
"No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the
totality of the factors considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped
exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would
occur."
6.590 This text, and particularly the words "material injury would occur", indicates that the
authority must evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry and
listed in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement when making a preliminary determination of threat of
material injury. This is also clear from Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. The Ministry of the
Economy should, therefore, have considered all the relevant factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD
Agreement
507 and not have based its determination on the trend in only one of them (volume of sales)
and on an incomplete and inadequate examination of the factors in Article 3.7, when examining the
possible impact of dumped imports on this industry.
6.591 One important conclusion which an investigating authority must reach when determining
threat of material injury is whether there has been any change in the circumstances of the domestic
industry that would lead to a situation in which dumping caused material injury. In order to be able to
reach such a conclusion, the Ministry of the Economy should not only have examined the trend in the
volume of imports and prices, but should also have obtained sufficient information on the state of the
domestic industry to be able to evaluate whether it was likely that the entry of new imports of the
product investigated would cause a change in this state and whether this change would cause material
injury to the domestic industry.
6.592 In this particular case, however, the investigating authority did not analyse the relevant factors
enumerated in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, for example, the profits of the domestic industry,
output, market share, productivity, return on investments or the utilization of the domestic producer’s
plant capacity, cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, the ability to raise capital or
investments, consequently the Ministry’s preliminary determination does not contain any findings on
the possible impact of future dumped imports on the domestic industry.
6.593 An examination of the administrative file on the investigation and the public notice of
imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure clearly shows that, with one exception, the
Ministry of the Economy did not evaluate the releva nt factors enumerated in Article 3.4 of the AD
Agreement and did not give proper consideration to the factors listed in Article 3.7 of the Agreement.
The Ministry’s evaluation could not therefore lead to a valid conclusion regarding the existence of a
threat of material injury to the industry manufacturing grey Portland cement.
6.594 In turn, these facts mean that the Ministry could not have established a causal relationship
between the dumped imports and the threat of injury claimed by the domestic producer. Furthermore,
the Ministry of the Economy’s determination was not based on positive evidence to substantiate
adequately a preliminary affirmative determination of threat of injury to the domestic industry.

507 Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement provides that, in order to determine the impact of the dumped
imports on the domestic industry, the investigating authority must evaluate "…all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits,
output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic
prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or
several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance."

6.595 The Ministry of the Economy thus made a preliminary affirmative determination of threat of
injury after inadequate and insufficient consideration of the following:
(a) An alleged increase in imports from Cruz Azul, without taking into account relevant
factors to prove this;
(b) the likelihood of an increase in Mexican exports to Guatemala as a result of plant
capacity at Cruz Azul, based on alleged surplus plant capacity at the exporting firm
and the demand situation on the Mexican market, without having undertaken a proper
analysis and without having relevant and sufficient evidence of the actual likelihood
that these exports would increase in the immediate future;508
(c) a decrease in the price of the domestic product in certain Guatemalan cities, without
proper comparison of prices;
(d) an accumulation of inventories based on a subjective and biased analysis that referred
to a product not under investigation;
(e) under-utilization of plant capacity;
(f) a decrease in sales by Cementos caused by other factors;
(g) loss of the applicant’s customers, without verifying their existence nor the
substitution effect.
6.596 The above clearly shows what has already been stated, namely, when adopting its preliminary
affirmative determination of a threat of material injury the Ministry of the Economy limited itself to
carrying out an inadequate and insufficient analysis of the factors enumerated in Article 3.7 of the AD
Agreement without taking into account the fact that the Agreement requires positive evidence and an
objective examination of the impact of the dump ed imports when determining threat of material
injury, evaluating not only the factors listed in Article 3.7 but also those set out in Article 3.2 and 3.4
of the AD Agreement, and certain other factors which simultaneously have an adverse effect on the
domestic industry, as provided in Article 3.5.
6.597 Mexico’s arguments are set out below and show in more detail that the alleged examination
carried out by the Ministry of the Economy (essentially of the factors in Article 3.7) was insufficient
and inadequate to substantiate its preliminary affirmative determination of threat of material injury.
(i) Increase in imports
6.598 In its preliminary determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that during the
investigation period (June to November 1995) exports from the Mexican firm increased significantly
and allegedly reached 23.54 per cent of domestic apparent consumption.
509 In this connection, certain
facts necessarily lead to the conclusion that the preliminary determination of threat of injury was
contrary to the AD Agreement and this must be considered:
6.599 The figures used by the Ministry of the Economy to determine the performance of imports
from Mexico are not accurate as they do not take account of the existence of types of cement other
than that investigated. There is an indication in the administrative file that products other than that
investigated were imported under the tariff heading 2523.29.00 of the Central American Tariff

508 Section F, part 2, points 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4-2.7 of the preliminary determination.
509 Point 2.1, Section F, of the preliminary determination.

System510, for example, white cement and grey cement. Consequently, the import figures for grey
Portland cement obtained by the Ministry of the Economy and attributed to the firm Cruz Azul are not
correct and cannot therefore substantiate the Ministry’s analysis and determination.
6.600 The conclusions concerning the volume of dumped imports on which the Ministry of the
Economy based its preliminary affirmative determination of material injury are inconsistent with the
criteria set out in Article 3.7(i) of the AD Agreement. The Ministry of the Economy violated this
Article by not taking into account whether or not there was a significant increase in imports and
confining itself to obtaining monthly import figures for the investigation period, without noting that a
determination of threat of injury requires the inve stigating authority to analyse the trend in imports in
relation to previous comparable periods in order to see whether the trend towards an increase in the
imports investigated persists and thus be able to estimate their future trend.
6.601 In addition, the figures included in the prelim inary determination by the Ministry of the
Economy on the alleged increase in the volume of imports of the product investigated are inaccurate
because the Ministry did not take into account the trend in imports over the investigation period (June
to November 1995) in comparison with the previous comparable period, which in this case would be
June to November 1994.
6.602 In its application for initiation of an investigation, the domestic producer Cementos Progreso
claimed that the exports from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul were threatening to cause it material injury.
Nevertheless, in the corresponding paragraph of the public notice of imposition of the provisional
anti-dumping measure, the Ministry of the Economy does not in any way refer to a rate of increase in
exports by the firm under investigation which would indicate the likelihood, based on facts rather than
simply on allegations, of a substantial increase in exports, as required by Article 3.7(i) of the AD
Agreement.
6.603 Thus, it can be seen that the analysis of imports by the Ministry of the Economy in the
preliminary determination of threat of material injury is not consistent with the provision in the AD
Agreement so it was not possible for the Ministry of the Economy to obtain a rate of increase in
dumped imports in the domestic market and therefore it could not have determined a causal link
between the alleged increase in dumped imports and the alleged threat of material injury to the
domestic industry in accordance with the provisions of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Surplus plant capacity and demand in Mexican Market
6.604 In order to make a preliminary affirmative determination of threat of injury
511, the Ministry
incorrectly assumed that the fact that Cruz Azul had alleged freely disposable capacity for cement
production of 360,000 tonnes, combined with negative growth in the Mexican economy and an
alleged decrease in demand on the Mexican market, according to its evaluation, indicated the
likelihood that the dumped exports would increase. It is important in this respect to stress the
following:
6.605 As far as Cruz Azul’s disposable capacity is concerned, the Ministry of the Economy ignored
the fact that the Mexican producer manufactured several types of cement, not only grey Portland
cement – a like product to that investigated. The alleged amount of freely disposable capacity taken
by the Ministry as a basis, therefore, cannot be considered accurate information or adequate for the
purposes of reaching an affirmative determination of threat of material injury.
6.606 Regarding the likelihood of increased exports by Cruz Azul in the future, it should be
emphasized that the preliminary determination shows that the Ministry of the Economy reached this

510 Imports of grey Portland cement, heading 25232900 for 1995.
511 Point 2.7, Section F, of the preliminary determination.

conclusion on the basis of mere conjecture because there is no indication that the investigating
authority carried out an analysis on the basis of evidence substantiating the actual likelihood that
exports from Cruz Azul would increase in the immediate future. It will be remembered that
Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement states that "The change in circumstances which would create a
situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent" and not be
based on "allegation, conjecture or remote possibility".
6.607 It can thus be concluded that the Ministry of the Economy’s determination regarding the
likelihood of a significant increase in exports from Cruz Azul to the Guatemalan market is a violation
of Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement.
(iii) Reduction in prices of domestic producer
6.608 In the preliminary determination, the investigating authority found that:
"As a result of dumped imports, there was a fall in the price of cement in those cities
where the product under investigation is sold, despite an increase in the cost of fuel,
which is the major cost element in cement production. This is demonstrated both by
the outcome of the investigation conducted by the Department for Consumer Welfare
(DIACO) and by information furnished by the complainant concerning prices
obtained in this segment of the Guatemalan market and the relationship between these
prices and those that might have been established in keeping with the Government
formula for setting a maximum sale price."
6.609 Pursuant to Article 3.7(iii) of the AD Agreement, in order to make an affirmative
determination of threat of injury, the investigating authority should have considered, inter alia ,
whether imports were at prices that would depr ess or significantly suppress domestic prices and
whether this would perhaps lead to increased demand for further imports. Instead, the Ministry of the
Economy quite simply asserted that "as a consequence of dumped imports, there was a fall in the price
of cement in those cities where it is sold". In orde r to reach this conclusion, the Ministry took as a
basis the DIACO investigation, the information supplied by the applicant and the relationship between
these prices and those that might have been establ ished in keeping with the Government formula for
setting a maximum selling price.
6.610 The conclusion of the Ministry of the Economy suffers from the following inconsistencies:
6.611 The preliminary determination does not explain the procedure (i.e. the methodological steps
and the circumstances) followed in establishing that the fall in prices was due to the allegedly dumped
imports, but simply asserts that this was so.
6.612 The conclusion and the study by DIACO refer only to some Guatemalan cities, as though the
anti-dumping investigation had been conducted on the basis of a regional investigation under
Article 4.2 of the AD Agreement, when in fact it involved the whole of the domestic industry.
6.613 The preliminary determination does not indicat e how the comparison was made between the
price of imported cement and the selling price of the domestic product, nor does it state whether the
prices were compared at the same level of trade, whether the transactions were on the same terms of
trade, whether the products were comparable, the dates of the comparisons, and whether the prices
were the result of simple or weighted, moving or progressive averages.
6.614 The comparison with the prices that might have been established in keeping with the formula
introduced by the Guatemalan Government in 1990 for setting the selling price ceiling could distort
the entire exercise in that the formula does not corr espond to the market prices that would result in a

situation of free competition. In any case, it is a theoretical price ceiling and not a price that must
necessarily be reached.
6.615 The conclusions concerning the trend in domestic prices used by the Ministry of the Economy
to reach a preliminary determination of threat of mate rial injury are inconsistent with the criteria laid
down in Article 3.7(iii) of the AD Agreement. The Ministry of the Economy therefore violated the
Article by not taking account of whether the price of imports of the product investigated had had the
effect of depressing domestic prices or suppressing them significantly, because in its preliminary
determination the Ministry confined itself to giving simplistic indications of the price trend with no
mention that the investigating authority had made the relevant calculations to show the trend in prices
of the imported product and domestic prices for comparable previous periods in order to determine
whether the trend in such prices might increase demand for further imports of the product
investigated.
6.616 In the administrative file on this case, there is no indication to show that, as required by
Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, the Ministry of the Economy considered whether there was
significant undercutting of the price of the imports investigated during the investigation period in
comparison with the price of the domestically manufactured product. The Ministry of the Economy
thus violated Article 3.2 by not making the corresponding evaluation. It could not therefore determine
that the situation envisaged in Article 3.7(iii) existed inasmuch as if there is no analysis of the trend in
import prices and domestic prices, it is impossible to make the estimates and forecasts needed to be
certain that this effect would occur in the future.
(iv) Accumulation of inventories and under-utilization of plant capacity
6.617 In its preliminary determination
512, the Ministry of the Economy indicates the following:
"As a result of the increase in cement imports, there was a build-up of clinker in the
complainant’s warehouses, and three kilns at its production plant therefore had to be
closed (two in the Pedrera Plant and one in the San Miguel Plant).
The shutdown of the kilns at the complainant’s production plant came at the time of
peak demand for the product, which is also the period of highest production, as
emerges from the analysis of sales and milling curves for the years 1993, 1994 and
1995, included in the file.
As regards the facts indicated, the Notary Jorge Edwin Rosales Pichardo certified the
existence of 76,252 tonnes (one day after the kilns were ordered closed) and the
Director of Economic Integration ascertained that the kilns had been stopped and that
there were 51,875 tonnes of material accumulated at the San Miguel plant. This final
figure indicated was derived from records kept by the production department of the
complainant and amounts to 65,665 tonnes of cement."
6.618 In this regard, the following facts should be highlighted:
6.619 The alleged increase in stocks of clinker
513 and the consequent shutdown of the kilns in which
this raw material is produced were recorded after the investigation period and, indeed, almost two
months after the initiation of the investigation. The investigation period fixed by the investigating

512 Point 2.2, Section F, of the preliminary determination.
513 Produced by incipient fusion of limestone, bauxite, hematite and silica at 1380ºC, and used in the
manufacture both of the product under investigation and of any other type of cement (grey, white or any other
hydraulic cement).

authority spanned June to November 1995, yet, the facts noted by the Ministry itself 514 and by a
notary515 concern events that took place subsequently.
6.620 In this connection, it must be pointed out that the analysis needed to determine threat of injury
was limited to the period fixed by the investigating authority for the determination, namely June-
November 1995. In other words, the events that occurred in 1996 cannot explain nor affect what
happened in the past. The evidence of alleged threat of injury claimed by the domestic producer
during the investigation period could not in any way be proved by events that would occur in the
future. The causal link between dumped imports and the alleged threat of injury must be verified over
the same period of time because the causal link is contemporaneous and not sequential.
6.621 Pursuant to Article 3.6 of the AD Agreement, the effect of imports is to be evaluated in
relation to domestic production of the like product when available data permit separate identification
on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producer’s sales and profits. Yet the Ministry
of the Economy attributed to the alleged imports in vestigated an impact on the inventory of a product
other than the one investigated. Indeed, a reading of the preliminary determination reveals that the
Ministry of the Economy determined that there was an accumulation of inventories of one of the raw
materials (clinker) used in the manufacture of the product under investigation (grey Portland cement).
The Ministry did not, however, mention in its determination that this input cannot only be used to
manufacture grey Portland cement but also any other type of cement, including those that not under
investigation. The investigating authority therefore erred in determining an increase in the inventory
of an input while forgetting that the inventory that should have been evaluated was that of the product
under investigation.
6.622 Moreover, there is no certainty that the material accumulated at the industrial plant of
Cementos Progreso actually was clinker as neither the Notary who certified the existence of the
material nor the Director of Economic Integration of the Ministry of the Economy who conducted the
on-the-spot investigation have the technical and scientific capacity to vouch that the material that they
observed was in fact clinker, and whether the prod uct in question would be used for the manufacture
of the product being investigated and not for some other type of cement.
6.623 As of the publication of the public notice of initiation (11 January 1996), imports from
Cruz Azul remained constant, a fact that was not analysed at any stage by the Ministry of the
Economy and in Mexico’s opinion this calls into question the causal link between the imports and the
closure of the kilns for a product other than that investigated, particularly when the Ministry of the
Economy itself during the consultations agreed that, even after the closure of the kilns supplying
clinker, Cementos Progreso continued to manufacture grey Portland cement.
6.624 In its preliminary determination, the Ministry of the Economy admitted as proof several
statements and documents that are not relevant for the purposes of demonstrating the existence of
stocks of grey Portland cement and the consequent shutdown of the kilns 516, for example, the
administrative inspection carried out by two officials of the Ministry of the Economy and the notarial
deed by Mr. Edwin Rosales, the eight colour pictures and graph showing the alleged inventories of
clinker and cement. These documents cannot be considered relevant since, in order to ascertain the

514 Document of the Ministry of the Economy to prove the accumulation of inventories of clinker and
the stoppage of the kilns producing clinker, dated 29 March 1996. Point 2.2 of section F of the preliminary
determination.
515 Notary’s Act (verification of stocks of clinker within Cementos Progreso’s plant, dated
29 February 1996).
516 Flow of the production process for the manufacture of cement contained in Cemontos Progreso's
reply of 17 May 1996 to the form.

existence of stocks and the shutdown of kilns, technical inspections need to be made and, as emerges
from the text of the resolution itself, these were not carried out.517
6.625 It is clear that the mere observation of heaps of material is not enough to prove either the
existence of stocks of clinker, their volume or the use to which they will be put, neither is it therefore
possible to deduce that the supposed accumulation of materials was the result of the allegedly dumped
imports from Cruz Azul.
6.626 To illustrate the flaws in the analysis made by the Ministry of the Economy, it must be
pointed out that in the cement industry the accumulation of clinker is not such an important fact in
itself since it may be attributable to a variety of reasons, as Cruz Azul told the Ministry of the
Economy in due course.
518 These reasons may include the following:
(a) Buffer stocks consisting of 14 days output from the principal kiln. Operation manual
II Cement. In Cement Review. Philippe A. Alsop;
(b) seasonal demand;
(c) imbalances within the production plant. Clinker vs. final milling;
(d) strikes, power cuts and lack of fuel;
(e) rain (climatic factors).
6.627 The Ministry of the Economy should have ascertained whether the alleged inventories were
related to any of the foregoing factors, or whether they were caused wholly or partly by imports of
cement from Cruz Azul.
6.628 Finally, it is noteworthy that the preliminary determination does not mention the under-
utilization of plant capacity, even though this is expressly included in the title of the corresponding
section.
6.629 The foregoing shows that the Ministry of the Economy violated Article 3.7(iv)of the AD
Agreement by conducting an incorrect, subjective and biased analysis of the inventories of the product
being investigated, which referred to a product that was not the product under investigation and was
based on evidence that could not be considered relevant. The Ministry also omitted important
elements that negate the causal relationship between the inventories of the product investigated and
the increase in imports investigated. The Ministry of the Economy thus violated Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement.
(v) Reduced sales
6.630 In its preliminary determination
519, the Ministry of the Economy states that, due to an increase
in the imports investigated, there was a reduction in sales by Cementos Progreso during the month of
September 1995 in comparison with sales during the preceding year, a situation that persisted
throughout the first three months of the following year. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that:
6.631 According to the preliminary determination, sa les by Cementos Progreso fell during the
month of September 1995. Nevertheless, as the determination itself recognizes, this fall could not be

517 The Ministry of the Economy does not explain how the shutdown of the kilns came to result from
alleged imports and how this effect came to be a case of threat of injury.
518 See Cruz Azul's hearing of 30 October 1996.
519 Point 2.4, section F, of the preliminary determination.

attributed to the imports investigated 520 as there was a fall in imports of 40.14 per cent during that
month and in September 1995 demand in the Guatemalan market fell in comparison with the
preceding month. It is obvious that the trend in sales of the domestic product on the domestic market
shadows the trend in the imports investigated in September 1995.
6.632 As regards the pattern of sales for the first quarter of 1996, the said sales do not fall within the
period of investigation and should therefore not be considered. What is more, the Ministry of the
Economy did not collect at this stage of the investigation information on the increase in imports,
which means that such information cannot justifiably be included in an examination of the
relationship between Cementos Progreso’s sales and the imports investigated.
6.633 It may be concluded from the foregoing that the determination of the alleged effect on
Cementos Progreso’s sales caused by the imports investigated was due to factors other than the import
of grey Portland cement from Mexico and this was even expressly recognized by the Ministry of the
Economy in its own preliminary determination. Therefore, the determination does not reflect an
objective and unbiased analysis of the factual elements available to the Guatemalan investigating
authority when issuing the preliminary determination, thus violating Guatemala’s obligations under
Article 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement.
(vi) Loss of customers
6.634 In its preliminary determination, the Ministry of the Economy considered that Cementos
Progreso had lost some of its customers, without having ascertained the truthfulness of the claim and
of the list of alleged customers submitted by the applicant.
6.635 Thus, the investigating authority in its preliminary determination accepted that the alleged
customers switched from domestically manufactured cement to imported grey Portland cement,
though it did not ascertain the existence of these clients and the effect of substitution of one product
by the other. The list in question shows only the names of alleged customers and no further data
bearing out the applicant’s affirmations.
6.636 The investigating authority should also have c onsidered that the list which was presented as
"proof" might also have contained "customers" who had been driven out of the applicant’s market as a
result of its own intimidatory, exclusive and monopolistic policy, as was found by the Ministry itself
through the DIACO studies of the market for the cement being investigated, which, by their very
nature, constitute irrefutable proof.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.637 Guatemala's response to Mexico's Article 3.7 arguments are as follows:
6.638 Contrary to Mexico's claims, the Ministry carefully and properly considered the factors
which, according to Article 3.7, can be used to dete rmine the existence of a threat of material injury.
The Ministry made an evaluation of the evidence as reflected in the report of the Directorate of
Economic Integration of 26 July 1996, in the Ministry's preliminary determination dated
16 August 1996, and in the public notice of the determination dated 28 August 1996. The report of 16
August and the public notice of 28 August 1996 are identical. The report of 26 July contains some
additional information which is summarised in the documents mentioned below.

520 Line 7 et seq of the third paragraph of point 2.1, section F, of the preliminary determination.

(i) Increased imports
6.639 The Ministry found that during the investigation period (June–November 1995) Cruz Azul
imports had increased in absolute and relative terms with respect to domestic production and apparent
consumption. During the period investigated Cruz Azul imports increased from 140 tons in
June 1995 to 25,740 tons in November 1995. Impor ts from Cruz Azul increased sharply from
0.15 per cent of domestic production in June to 32.65 per cent of domestic production in November.
Cruz Azul's market share increased from 0.15 in June to 23.54 per cent in November. This led to
Cementos Progreso's market share falling from 99.85 per cent in June to 75.42 per cent in November.
This significant rate of increase in dumped imports clearly indicated the likelihood that imports would
continue to increase and that Cementos Progreso's market share would be reduced.
6.640 Contrary to Mexico's unfounded allegations, the Ministry was not unaware of the existence of
other types of cement imported under tariff heading 2523.99.00. In its analysis the Ministry only
considered Cruz Azul imports.521 The Ministry noted that imports from Cruz Azul represented 91 per
cent of total Guatemalan grey cement imports during the period investigated. However, the Ministry
did not assume that all the imports under this tariff heading were from Cruz Azul.
6.641 Mexico has criticized the Ministry for not taking into account the level of imports during
June-November 1994. However, Mexico is well aware that Cruz Azul did not begin exporting cement
to Guatemala until 1995522, after the devaluation of the peso in December 1994, which led to a sharp
downturn in the construction industry and in the demand for cement in Mexico during the following
year. Comparing imports for June-November 1995 with those for June-November 1994 would only
have served to strengthen support for an preliminary affirmative determination.
(ii) Surplus plant capacity and demand in Mexico
6.642 The Ministry found that because of the high fixed costs involved in cement production the
cement producer's profitability depends on maintaining a high degree of utilization of capacity. If
there is a weakening of demand, new outlets must be found for the product. The Ministry found that,
following the devaluation of the peso in December 1994, the Mexican economy was experiencing
negative growth of at least 3 per cent and that spending in the construction sector had fallen by 22 per
cent. According to the consultancy firm Arthur D. Little Mexicana, Cruz Azul had 360,000 tons per
year of excess production capacity. The Ministry found that the evidence of excess production
capacity and depressed demand supported the conclusion that "dumped exports are likely to increase".
6.643 Mexico argues that the finding with respect to excess production capacity does not take into
account the fact that Cruz Azul is said to manufacture several types of cement different from grey
Portland cement. However, Mexico does not allege that the same plant cannot be used for producing
all types of cement. Thus, Mexico's unsupported argument to the effect that Cruz Azul can produce
different types of cement does not mean that Cruz Azul did not have 360,000 tons of excess
production capacity available for producing grey Portland cement. On the contrary, the company
could have used all this excess capacity for producing grey Portland cement for export to Guatemala.
(iii) Reduction in the prices of the domestic producer
6.644 The Ministry found that as a result of the dumped imports the price of domestic cement fell in
those cities in which Cruz Azul cement was being sold, despite the fact that Cementos Progreso's
production costs had increased. The Ministry referred to the findings of a study prepared by the
Directorate of Consumer Affairs (BIACO) whic h showed that the imported product consistently

521 Report of the Directorate of Economic Integration, dated 26 July 1996.
522 In its communication of 30 October 1996, Cruz Azul stated that it began to export to Guatemala
during the investigation period which began in June 1995.

undercut domestic prices. 523 The Ministry also referred to the evidence submitted by Cementos
Progreso concerning the widening of the gap between the maximum price fixed by the Government
and Cementos Progreso's actual prices. Once again, Mexico requests the Panel to conduct a de novo
review of this finding.
6.645 Firstly, Mexico maintains that the preliminary determination fails to explain the methodology
used to determine that prices were being depressed by dumped imports. Article 12.2.1 of the
Agreement, which describes the information that a public notice of the imposition of a provisional
measure must contain, does not require the investigating authority to describe the methodology used
to arrive at a factual conclusion. This Article only requires the notice to set forth findings and
conclusions and "sufficiently detailed explanations for the preliminary determinations…". In any
case, the methodology used is obvious from the determination itself. The Ministry found that
Cruz Azul imports were giving rise to undercut ting of Cementos Progreso's cement prices and thus
were obliging Cementos Progreso to reduce its prices in those cities in which Cruz Azul cement was
being sold.
524 The price undercutting and consequent fall in prices resulted in the widening of the gap
between the maximum prices authorized by the Government and Cementos Progreso's actual prices.
6.646 Secondly, Mexico argues that the DIACO reports cover only some Guatemalan cities, as if it
were a question of an investigation of a regional industry. Because of the low price/weight ratio and
high freight costs for cement, Cruz Azul concentrated its sales effort in the western part of Guatemala,
which lies closer to its plant in Lagunas, Oaxaca. Accordingly, DIACO directed its attention to the
cities closer to the Mexican frontier, where Cruz Azul sales were concentrated. The existence of
underpriced sales in the area of Guatemala most affected clearly pointed to a threat of injury to
Cementos Progreso. According to Cruz Azul 's submission dated 9 May 1996, Cruz Azul imports
caused prices in Guatemala to fall by between Q 6.00 and Q 8.00 per sack. Despite the fact that
initially Cruz Azul concentrated its sales effort in western Guatemala, the lower prices enabled it to
capture almost one-quarter of the total Guatemalan market in only six months.
6.647 Thirdly, Mexico claims that the prelimin ary determination does not show how price
comparisons were made between the imported and domestic products. The price comparison is
explained in detail in the DIACO reports. DIACO officials visited cement sales establishments in
many cities distinguishing those which were selling Cruz Azul cement from those which were selling
Cementos Progreso cement. This made possible a direct comparison of selling prices at the same
level of trade, under the same conditions, at the same time and with the same buyers. In almost all
cases Cruz Azul cement was being sold at prices that undercut those of Cementos Progreso cement.
Moreover, many of these establishments confirmed that Cruz Azul cement had caused a fall in the
price of cement in Guatemala.
6.648 Finally, Mexico argues that it was not appropriate to compare the prices made by Cementos
Progreso with the maximum prices it was entitled to charge under the formula imposed by the
Government. The evidence showed that before the influx of imports from Cruz Azul the prices made
by Cementos Progreso were generally as high as permitted by the Government formula. During the
period investigated, Cementos Progreso was not able to charge the maximum permissible price in
those cities where Cruz Azul cement was being sold, but was able to charge that price in cities further
from the Mexican frontier where Cruz Azul cement was not available. This is conclusive evidence
that Cruz Azul imports were entering at prices that were depressing the prices of the like domestic
product.

523 As described in Section IV.B.3 of the determination dated 16 August 1996, BIACO investigated the
prices, inventories and characteristics of the cement being sold in nine different Guatemalan departments.
524 The determination also referred to a newspaper Article published in La República on 22 August
1998 indicating that cement imports were causing prices to fall in Guatemala.

(iv) Accumulation of small inventories and under utilization of plant capacity
6.649 The Ministry found that increased Cruz Azul imports had led to an accumulation of the
domestic producer's clinker inventories, which had forced it to suspend the operation of three clinker
kilns (two at the La Pedrera plant and one at the San Miguel plant). On the basis of an analysis of the
sales and production figures for 1993-1995, the Ministry also found that the kilns were shut down
during a period of high demand for cement when production is also higher. A notary recorded clinker
stocks amounting to 76,252 tons on the day after the kilns were shut down. The Directorate of
Economic Integration verified the shutdown of the kilns and accumulated stocks of 51,875 tons of
clinker at the San Miguel plant. As the clinker is mixed with hydrated calcium sulphate and other
additives and then ground up to make the finished cement, the Ministry found that clinker stocks of
51,875 tons were equivalent to 65,665 tons of cement.
6.650 Firstly, Mexico claims that the evidence of excessive inventories and kiln shutdown during
the months of February to March 1996 is irrelevant since it post-dates the investigation period which
ran from June 1995 to November 1995. Mexico does not cite any provision of the Agreement
preventing an investigating authority from considering recent information. Article 3.7 does not
contain any such restriction. Guatemala respectfully maintains that it is particularly desirable for the
investigating authority to use as much of the recent information available as possible.
6.651 Secondly, Mexico argues that the Ministry should not have considered the accumulation of
clinker inventories since the product being investigated was cement. Moreover, Mexico alleges that
clinker can be used for making products other than grey cement. This is not true. As noted above,
clinker is a semi-finished product which is ground to produce cement in the last phase of the
production process. It can be stored outdoors in large quantities, whereas finished cement must be
stored in concrete silos. Thus, clinker inventories provide better evidence of inventory trends than the
cement inventories themselves. Likewise, the file shows that Cementos Progreso was only producing
grey Portland cement. Thus, the Ministry correctly established that 51,875 tons of clinker stocks were
equivalent to 65,665 tons of finished cement.
6.652 Thirdly, Mexico challenges the Ministry's f actual finding to the effect that the material
stocked was clinker. However, it does not suggest what alternative clinker-like material could have
been stocked in a plant devoted to producing cemen t. The preliminary determination notes that the
file contained eight colour photographs of clinker and a notarial deed certifying the clinker stored,
together with a graph showing Cementos Progreso's monthly inventories from June 1995 to
February 1996.
6.653 Fourthly, contrary to what Mexico says, Cruz Azul imports did not remain constant after
January 1996. The imports continued to increase, reaching 45,859 tons in March 1996.
6.654 Fifthly, Mexico denies that the inspection carried out by two officials from the Ministry, the
notarial deed and the colour photographs are valid evidence of clinker inventories. Guatemala would
respectfully maintain that it is not the function of the panel to evaluate the admissibility and value of
the evidence considered by the Ministry. Moreover, the Ministry confirmed that the increased clinker
inventories were the result of increased Cruz Azul imports and not the result of other factors such as
seasonal demand, strikes or rain.
6.655 Sixthly, curiously, Mexico points out that this part of the preliminary determination did not
refer to underutilization of installed capacity, even though this factor was included in the section title.
In Guatemala's view the underutilization of capacity is clearly demonstrated by the shutdown of three
kilns.

(v) Reduced sales
6.656 The Ministry found that in September 1995 and thereafter as a result of increased imports
sales of the like domestic product fell as compared with those recorded during the previous year.
Sales continued to decline during the first quarter of 1996. Mexico's objections to these findings are
unfounded.
6.657 Firstly, Mexico claims that the reduced sales were the result of a fall in demand in the month
of September rather than increased imports. Although there was in fact a fall in demand in September
1995, the Ministry found that there had been a continuous decline in sales from September 1995 to
March 1996 as compared with the previous year. Moreover, in challenging the preliminary
determination of reduced sales due to dumped imports, Mexico disregards the fact that in Guatemala
cement demand is seasonal. Demand is stronger during the dry season (October-May) than in the
rainy season (June-September). Thus, the Mini stry properly evaluated Cruz Azul's sales by
comparing them with the volume of sales in the sa me months of the previous year. This comparison
showed that Cementos Progreso's sales fell during the latter part of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996
as compared with the same months of the previous year.
6.658 Secondly, Mexico claims that the Ministry should not have considered sales during the first
quarter of 1996 since those sales fell outside the initial investigation period. The Agreement does not
prohibit the investigating authority from considering the most recent information available. In fact,
this is a better practice, especially where it is a question of analysing a threat of material injury.
(vi) Loss of customers
6.659 The Ministry found that despite the fact that Cementos Progreso reduced its prices to compete
with Cruz Azul it lost certain customers who were identified in the file. Mexico challenges this
finding on the grounds that the Ministry did not ascertain the truthfulness of the evidence submitted
by Cementos Progreso in support of its claim to have lost customers to Cruz Azul. It is an
indisputable fact that in only six months Cruz Azul increased its market share from 0.15 per cent to
23.54 per cent and that Cementos Progreso's mark et share fell from 99.85 per cent to 75.42 per cent
during the same period. DIACO based itself on the fact that cement from Cruz Azul was cheaper than
that from Cementos Progreso. Thus, it is logical to conclude that Cementos Progreso lost customers
to Cruz Azul. The evidence of loss of customer s submitted by Cementos Progreso is corroborated by
the shift of market share to Cruz Azul.
(vii) The Ministry also considered important factors contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of
Article 3
6.660 Mexico also argues that in making its preliminary determination Guatemala did not consider
the factors contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 5. Guatemala has stressed the factors listed in
paragraph 7 of Article 3, because those factors are relevant to the consideration of threat of injury and
not present injury. However, Mexico is wrong in suggesting that the Ministry did not consider other
factors.
6.661 Contrary to Mexico's assertion, the Ministry explicitly took into account the possibility of a
significant increase in imports, in accordance with Article 3.2. As the preliminary determination
states, imports increased dramatically in absolute and relative terms, in relation to both domestic
production and apparent consumption during the investigation period. It is ridiculous that Mexico
should suggest the contrary.
6.662 Contrary to what Mexico alleges, the Ministry explicitly considered whether significant price
undercutting was responsible for the fall in prices, under the terms of Article 3.2. It also referred to
the DIACO report and other evidence of price depression. In its submission of 9 May 1996,

Cruz Azul itself acknowledged that Cruz Azul imports had caused cement prices in Guatemala to fall
by Q 6.00 to Q 8.00 per sack.
6.663 Contrary to what Mexico says, the Ministry explicitly evaluated the impact of dumped
imports on the domestic industry, in accordance with Article 3.4. Among other things, the Ministry
explicitly considered the decline in sales, productivity, market share and utilization of capacity
suffered by Cementos Progreso and whether impor ts from Cruz Azul had had an adverse impact on
domestic prices and Cementos Progreso's inventories.
6.664 Moreover, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not oblige the investigating authorities to
provide details in writing of all the factors considered or make an explicit report on each of the factors
taken into account. The Ministry listed all the ev idence considered in its preliminary determination,
provided detailed explanations of the preliminary determination of dumping and injury and carefully
spelled out "the main reasons leading to the determination".
525 No more is required.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.665 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's submissions by maintaining that Guatemala's preliminary
determination of threat of injury is inconsistent with Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It
argues the following:
6.666 Mexico categorically rejects Guatemala's argument that the preliminary determination of
threat of material injury complied with Article 3 of the AD Agreement, and repeats that the
preliminary determination of the Ministry of th e Economy of threat of material injury to the
Guatemalan domestic industry was inconsistent with the provisions of Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.667 Specifically, Mexico begins by rejecting the argument by Guatemala that "[… ] the Ministry
carefully and properly considered the factors which, according to Article 3.7, can be used to
determine the existence of a threat of material injury […]¡",
526 and reiterates its position that in the
case at issue, the Ministry did not properly analyse the factors listed in Article 3.7 in reaching its
preliminary determination of threat of injury.
6.668 However, to avoid unnecessary repetition, we refer the Panel to the specific arguments made
by Mexico in this respect in its first written submission.527 In this section of our rebuttal, we shall refer
to the violations of Article 3.7 528 only in relation to other elements which demonstrate the
inconsistency of the Ministry's preliminary determination with Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and to the extent necessary to respond to Guatemala's arguments.

525 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 12.2.1.
526 Ibid., paragraph 253.
527 See parts B2a, B2b, B2c and B2d of Mexico's first written submission.
528 It is worth adding one small comment concerning an opinion expressed by the United States in
paragraph 15 of its oral submission as third party to these proceedings according to which the evaluation of
inventories of a semi-finished product can help an invest igating authority to obtain a clearer picture of the state
of the domestic industry. Mexico agrees with this opinion, provided the evaluation is indeed used to provide
supplementary assistance in determining more precisely the state of the industry. However, in this case, the
Ministry, in its preliminary determination, considered that the analysis of the inventories of one input
exclusively sufficed to infer the behaviour of the inventories of the investigated product. This is inconsistent
with Article 3.7(iv) of the AD Agreement, which expressly states that the authorities should consider, inter alia,
such factors as "inventories of the product being invest igated". Thus, it is unacceptable for an investigating
authority not to conduct an analysis of the inventories of the product under investigation, but rather, merely to
look at the behaviour of the inventories of one of the inputs used in manufacturing grey Portland cement and
simply to infer or deduce that the inventories of the investigated product would have behaved similarly to the
clinker inventory during the investigation period.

6.669 We begin by referring to paragraph 275 of Guatemala's first written submission which states
that:
"275. […] Guatemala has stressed the factors listed in paragraph 7 of Article 3,
because those factors are relevant to the consideration of threat of injury and not
present injury. However, Mexico is wrong in suggesting that the Ministry did not
consider other factors."
6.670 Thus, according to Guatemala the Ministry also considered important factors contained in
Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4.
6.671 However, the evidence in the administrative fi le of the investigation which Mexico supplied
to the Panel in various annexes clearly contradicts Guatemala's post hoc argument in paragraphs 275
to 279 of its first submission. Thus, contrary to what Guatemala has said, Mexico repeats that the
Ministry of the Economy did not properly and sufficiently examine the factors listed in Article 3.2 and
3.4 of the AD Agreement which should have been taken into account in examining the increase in
imports, their effect on domestic prices and their consequent impact on the domestic industry.
6.672 According to footnote 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the term "injury" also covers threat
of material injury:
"Under this Agreement the term 'injury' shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic
industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article". (Emphasis added)
6.673 Thus, while it is true that Article, 3.7 lists the specific factors to be considered in determining
a threat of injury, it is also true that Article 3.1 is a general provision which establishes that the
determination of 'injury' for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994, i.e. in the sense of material injury
and threat of material injury in accordance with the scope of footnote 9:
"shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of (a) the
volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these products on
domestic producers of such products."
6.674 In accordance with the requirements of Article 3.1, Article 3.2 establishes the factors which
need to be taken into consideration with regard to the volume of imports and their effect on the prices
which need to be examined, while Article 3.4 lists the factors to be taken into account in examining
the consequent impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.
6.675 Thus, Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes in a general way the elements
to be examined for a threat of injury determinat ion in accordance with an evaluation of the specific
factors indicated in Article 3.2 and 3.4.
6.676 This means that while it is true that Article 3.7 requires a prospective analysis of certain
specific factors to determine threat of injury, it is also true that threat of injury determinations made
by an investigating authority through insistent and exclusive analysis of the factors listed in
Article 3.7 would be based on an insufficient and illogical analysis if the investigating authority
failed, as it did in this case, to take proper account of the factors listed in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 as
stipulated in Article 3.1.
6.677 However, Guatemala seems to disregard these provisions and argues that on the basis of a
partial and inadequate analysis of some of the factors listed in Article 3.7 and 3.4 it was possible for

the Ministry to determine threat of material injury without taking account of the fact that the analysis
of the behaviour or the factors on which the preliminary determination was based is insufficient and is
closely related to the behaviour of other relevant factors which it failed to analyse in its determination.
In fact, as the Panel will be able to see, the Ministry's preliminary determination and the public notice
of imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure clearly show that the threat of injury analysis
was not based on positive evidence or on an objective and sufficient examination of the various
relevant factors listed in Article 3.2 and 3.4 such as:
A significant increase in imports relative to domestic production or consumption in
the importing Member;
the effect of dumped imports on domestic prices and a significant undercutting of
those prices by the dumped imports, or whether the effect of such imports is
otherwise to depress prices or prevent their increase to a significant degree;
actual or potential decline in profits, output or return on investments;
potential decline in sales, market share, productivity and utilization of installed capacity;
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital or investment.
(i) Violation of Article 3.2
6.678 In paragraph 276 of its first written submission, Guatemala states that:
"276. […] the Ministry explicitly took into account the possibility of a significant
increase in imports, in accordance with Article 3.2. As the preliminary determination
states, imports increased dramatically in absolute and relative terms, in relation to
both domestic production and apparent consumption during the investigation period."
6.679 Firstly, the fact that the preliminary determina tion "states" that imports increased in absolute
and relative terms is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Ministry actually evaluated whether there
had been a significant increase in imports in absolute terms or relative to domestic production or
consumption. On the contrary, the evidence would tend to indicate that in order to obtain figures
which favoured a positive determination of threat of injury, the Ministry blatantly made an improper
calculation, considering exclusively the share in dom estic consumption of imports registered in the
month of June 1995 in relation to their share in the month of November 1995.
6.680 This indicates that the Ministry's calculation was tendentiously manipulated, in that it did not
consider the variations in the share of imports during the entire period of investigation, and only
considered the extremes which were more convenient. For example, if the investigating authority had
considered in an unbiased and objective manner the sum of the allegedly dumped imports during the
period of investigation against the sum of domestic consumption in Guatemala during the same
period, it would have obtained a share of 10 per cent, which is considerably less than the 23 per cent it
in fact obtained. By failing to analyse the increase in imports during the entire investigation period
(June-November 1995) relative to production or domestic consumption during the same period, the
Guatemalan authority violated Article 3.2.
6.681 Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the Ministry was merely trying to reach the
conclusion required under Article 3.7(i) concerning the likelihood of substantially increased
importation of cement based on the increase in imports during the period investigated and Cruz Azul's
disposable capacity, the Ministry's preliminary determination contains no analysis based on facts of

the likely impact of further dumped imports on the domestic industry according to the examination of
the relevant factors listed in Article 3.4 In other words, there is no analysis to substantiate the
conclusion that the likelihood of a substantial increase in imports would cause an increase in the share
of imports in the Guatemalan market affecting, for example, Cementos Progreso's production, sales or
profits so as to cause material injury. However, we shall revert to this matter further on.
(ii) Effects of the imports on domestic prices
6.682 In paragraph 277 of its first written submission, Guatemala argues that:
"277. […] the Ministry explicitly considered whether significant price undercutting
was responsible for the fall in prices, under the terms of Article 3.2. It also referred
to the DIACO report and other evidence of price depression. […]"
6.683 Mexico categorically rejects Guatemala's assertion that it explicitly considered whether there
was a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the domestic prices of
the investigated product. Clearly, the Ministry did not even bother to obtain a figure indicating the
alleged price decrease of the investigated product manufactured by Cementos Progreso, let alone
compare the domestic prices with the price of imports under alleged conditions of price
discrimination.
6.684 In its preliminary determination, the Ministry simply states that:
"As a result of dumped imports, there was a fall in the price of cement in those cities
where the product under investigation is sold, despite an increase in the cost of fuel,
which is the major cost element in cement production. This is demonstrated both by
the outcome of the investigation conducted by the Department for Consumer Welfare
(DIACO) and by information furnished by the complainant concerning prices
obtained in this segment of the Guatemalan market and the relationship between these
prices and those that might have been established in keeping with the Government
formula for setting a maximum sale price."
6.685 As can be seen, the Ministry merely made a series of unsubstantiated statements which in no
way prove that the authority actually demonstrated or documented the behaviour of import prices and
domestic prices, let alone conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the effect
of such imports on domestic prices. The following points confirm this:
(a) There is no analysis or calculation suggesting a decrease in the price of the domestic
product; the Ministry simply considered that the mere mention of a price decrease
was sufficient to show that an objective examination had been conducted of the
behaviour of prices and the alleged effect of imports on domestic prices.
(b) Similarly, the Ministry limited itself to mentioning the decrease in the price of the
like product without even explaining the basis on which this alleged decrease was
determined. In particular, the Ministry makes no reference in any document to the
periods used in the comparison to determine the price behaviour of either the
imported product or the domestic product.
(c) Nor did the Ministry provide any explanation of the effect of the increase in the cost
of energy - according to Guatemala, the most significant factor in the cost of cement
production - on the behaviour of prices during the investigation period. In fact, the
file of the investigation does not contain any information on such increases which
presumably were also taken into account by the investigating authority in conducting
an objective examination of the effect of imports on the price of the domestic product.

(d) Guatemala asserts that "As a result of dumped imports, there was a fall in the price of
cement in those cities in which the product under investigation is sold". This
assertion contains elements which reflect an incorrect price analysis by the Ministry.
The alleged examination of the effects of imports on domestic prices by the Ministry
of the Economy during the preliminary stage of the investigation was based on:
(i) The report prepared by the Department for Consumer Welfare (DIACO),
which refers to the prices recorded exclusively in four "departments" of
Guatemala, whereas if it had considered the price of cement at the national
level, it would have analysed the prices in the 22 "departments" making up
the territory of Guatemala, and not only in a part of the country;
(ii) "information furnished by the complainant concerning prices obtained in this
segment of the Guatemalan market".
6.686 This shows that the Ministry conducted a regional price analysis, considering only the prices
reported in certain "departments" of Guatemala and equating the alleged behaviour of prices in part of
the Guatemalan market with the behaviour of prices at the national level. Moreover, it should be
borne in mind that the investigation conducted by DIACO was different fr om every point of view
from the kind of analysis of the effect of imports on domestic prices required under Article 3.2 of the
AD Agreement, particularly where the DIACO report makes a price comparison using the price of the
investigated product at the regional level and not the national level. Consequently, because the
Ministry's determination was based on this DIACO report, it could not reflect the effect that dumped
imports during the investigation period may have had on national prices of grey Portland cement.
6.687 In short, there is nothing to show that the Mi nistry's preliminary determination of threat of
injury was based on an objective examination of the effect of the imports on the prices in the domestic
market for like products as required by Article 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement. In fact, the
evidence shows the Ministry of the Economy reached the conclusion that the dumped imports had
depressed the prices of cement in a certain region of Guatemala without properly analysing the
behaviour of imported and domestic grey Portland cement prices during the investigation period,
i.e. without examining the price fluctuations of the cement or of the dumped imports showing that the
prices of the imported product actually had "caused prices" of cement to fall during the investigation
period.
6.688 Without this analysis, any conclusion which simply assumes that the dumped imports would
cause prices to fall in the future is purely spec ulative. One cannot, merely on the basis of the
likelihood that imports are at lower prices than the like domestic product, assume threat of injury to
the domestic industry. On the contrary, injury or threat of injury may be unlikely if the price level of
the like domestic product generated sufficient income and profits for the domestic industry. But no
such analysis (i.e. of fluctuations, behaviour and level of prices) was made by the Ministry, which
simply took as the relevant reference price the maximum price established by the Government itself.
6.689 Nor does the public notice or the alleged separate report provide sufficiently detailed
explanations concerning the examination of the effect of imports on domestic prices under Article 3.2
as a basis for the Ministry's preliminary determination of threat of injury. Besides which, under no
permissible interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement may the DIACO report be considered to
constitute a separate report within the meaning of Article 12.2.1 as Guatemala claims. It is the
Ministry of the Economy, as the Guatemalan anti- dumping authority, and not DIACO, as a consumer
authority, that is responsible for ensuring complia nce with the obligations arising from Article 12.2.1
of the AD Agreement. Nor can the letter or purpose of Article 12.2.1 be interpreted as permitting the
authority to issue a "separate report" as an alternative to the public notice, or as allowing Members to

present, as a "separate report" any document contained in the administrative file. This would be
contrary to the actual text of Article 12 and to its purpose of ensuring transparency and publicity
therein.529
6.690 For all of the above reasons, Mexico submits that the Ministry did not conduct an objective
examination based on positive evidence of the volume of imports or increase in imports and their
effect on the prices in the domestic market for the like product to support its preliminary
determination of threat of injury as stipulated in Article 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.691 At the same time, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Ministry had acted in
conformity with Article 3.2, and had properly concluded that the dumped imports were increasing and
would have adverse effects on domestic prices, it cannot be concluded ipso facto that there was a
threat of injury, i.e. that further imports would cause injury to the domestic industry. If the situation
of the domestic industry is favourable or if it is affected by factors other than the dumped imports, the
dumped imports may not represent a threat of injury. Consequently, in making a threat of injury
determination, the investigating authority must al so analyse the likely impact of further dumped
imports on the domestic industry, evaluating all of the relevant economic factors and indices listed in
Article 3.4. The Ministry of the Economy simply did not conduct this analysis. We shall revert
below this added aspect of the inconsistency of Guatemala's preliminary determination with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Violation of Article 3.4 and 3.7
6.692 It is indeed surprising that in an attempt to argue, now, before the Panel, that its preliminary
determination of threat of material injury was consistent with Article 3.4, Guatemala should dare to
state, in paragraph 278 of its first written submission, that:
"278 […] the Ministry explicitly evaluated the impact of dumped imports on
the domestic industry, in accordance with Article 3.4, Among other things, the
Ministry explicitly considered the decline in sales, productivity, market share and
utilization of capacity suffered by Cementos Progreso and whether imports from Cruz
Azul had had an adverse impact on dom estic prices and Cementos Progreso's
inventories."
6.693 Contrary to what Guatemala contends, Mexico submits that the Ministry of the Economy did
not properly and sufficiently evaluate the factors listed in Article 3.4 which should have been taken
into account in examining the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.
6.694 We have established that threat of injury determinations cannot be based solely on an
examination of the factors listed in Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
530, as Guatemala has
more or less done in this case, but also requires an evaluation of the impact of imports on the domestic
industry, which involves considering the relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4.
6.695 The requirement for a threat of injury determination to include a specific analysis of the
impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry flows from the text of Article 3.1 and 3.4 in
conjunction with footnote 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as from Article 3.7 itself.
Article 3.1 stipulates that a determination of "injury" shall involve an examination of the impact of
imports, and Article 3.4 expressly indicates the factors which must be considered relevant in
examining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. Both articles are applicable both to
material injury determinations and threat of material injury determinations in view of the scope of

529 Here, Mexico agrees with the opinion expressed by the United States in its third-party submission in
these proceedings.
530 Report of the Panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup, paragraphs 7.111 et seq.

footnote 9 of the AD Agreement. Article 3.7, for its part, requires that the investigating authority
determine whether, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur.
6.696 At the same time, to make a threat of mate rial injury determination in accordance with
Article 3.7, it is essential that the investigating authority evaluate whether there is a clearly foreseen
and imminent change in circumstances which woul d create a situation in which the dumping would
cause injury, and conclude that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless protective action
is taken, material injury would occur. The Ministry could not validly have reached either of these
conclusions given that it failed to examine the relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4.
6.697 Thus, for the authority to be in a position to conduct this evaluation, not only does it have to
assess the information concerning the likelihood of an increase in exports owing to the freely
disposable capacity of the exporter at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing
effect on domestic prices, and owing to the level of inventories of the product investigated, but it
would also have to have information on the state of the domestic industry during the period under
investigation. Only then would the investigating authority be in a position to evaluate whether further
imports would be likely to produce a change in the state of a domestic industry and whether that
change would cause material injury to the domestic industry.
6.698 In other words, for the Ministry to have been in a position to decide on the effect of the
likelihood of a substantial increase in dumped imports on the domestic industry, it would have had to
analyse the relevant factors listed in Article 3.4.
531 Its determination was therefore based on an

531 Concerning the nature of this type of analysis, see the report of the Panel in Korea – Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea – Dairy) , WT/DS/98/R, adopted on
12 January 2000, paragraphs 7.55 and 7.58.
"7.55 In conducting our review of Korea's serious injury determination we are mindful of the
obligations contained in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. This provision mandates that competent
authorities when performing a serious injury investigation:
… shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing
on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of
the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken
by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses, and employment.
This provision sets out the general principle regarding the economic factors which need to be
considered in a serious injury investigatio n, and provides a list of factors that are a priori considered to be
especially relevant and informative of the situation of the domestic industry. The use of the wording 'in
particular' makes it clear to us that, among 'all relevant factors' that the investigating authorities 'shall evaluate',
the consideration of the factors listed is always relevant and therefore required, even though the authority may
later dismiss some of them as not having a bearing on the situation of that industry. Under the applicable
standard of review, our function is to assess whether Korea (i) examined all relevant facts in its possession or
which it should have obtained in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards at the time of the
investigation; and (ii) provided an adequate explanation of how those facts as a whole supported the
determination made. Thus, we shall examine whether at the time of the determination all factors listed in
Article 4.2 were appropriately considered; whether the Korean authorities explained how each factor considered
supports (or detracts from) a finding of serious injury; and whether valid reasons have been put forward for
dismissing a considered factor as not being relevant to the serious injury determination in this case." (Emphasis
added)
"7.58 In our evaluation of Korea's serious injury determination there are three issues that we find
particularly troublesome. First, we find that there is a lack of consideration in the OAI Report of some of the
factors listed in Article 4.2. This is the case for instance for capacity utilization and productivity. In both cases
Korea offers explanations in its submissions to the Panel of why it considered these factors not to bear on the
situation of the domestic industry. While these explanations seem plausible, there is nothing in the OAI Report
which would indicate to the Panel that these factors were taken into consideration in the serious injury finding of
the Korean authorities . Second, as we noted above, the definition of the domestic industry in this case as
comprising two different segments of the dairy products market has consequences for the evaluation of the

improper and insufficient analysis: because it did not even familiarize itself with the situation
prevailing in the industry, it was impossible for the authority to project the effect of the increase in
dumped imports on the market under analysis, and still less to determine the effect of those imports on
domestic production indicators.
6.699 Thus, in the present case, having focused its analysis (also improper) almost exclusively on
the factors contained in Article 3.7, the Ministry did not show that the further imports could cause
injury within the meaning of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement, since it never established the current
condition of the industry which could have served as a basis for determining the likelihood of an
increase in further dumped imports and hence, the effect they could have on the domestic industry for
grey Portland cement.532
6.700 Even if we were to accept that the Ministry actually did evaluate the real decline in sales,
productivity, market share and utilization of installed capacity, it was not enough for the Ministry to
examine only those factors in Article 3.4 which supported a threat of material injury finding: it was
required to examine other relevant factors listed in Article 3.4 which were also necessary in order to
assess the situation of the industry, and which it failed to analyse, such as:
The actual and potential decline in profits, output, and return on investment;
the potential decline in sales, market share, productivity, and utilisation of installed capacity;
the actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital or investment.

situation of the industry. In assessing the serious injury to the whole domestic industry, we find that it is
acceptable to analyse distinct market segments but, as stated above, all factors listed in Article 4.2 must be
addressed. In considering each of the factors listed in Article 4.2, and any others found to be relevant by the
authority, the investigating authority has two options: fo r each factor, the investigatin g authority can consider it
either for all segments, or if it decides to examine it for only one or some segment(s), it must provide an
explanation of how the segment(s) chosen is (are) objectively representative of the whole industry. A lack of
consideration of all segments, without any explanation, is a flaw that we find present in Korea's analysis of the
domestic industries' profits and losses, prices, debt to equity ratio, capital depletion and production cost. How
Korea relates developments in one segment to its determination regarding the industry as a whole is for Korea to
decide in the first instance. Our point here is that an analysis of only a segment of the domestic industry,
without any explanation of its significance for the whole industry, will not satisfy the requirements of the
Agreement on Safeguards. Third, we find that for certain factors considered by Korea it has failed to provide
sufficient reasoning on some of the choices made in the analysis of such factors which may have affected the
result of the consideration. Also, there is a lack of reasoning in some cases on how the factor considered
supports (or detracts from) a finding of serious injury. This lack of explanation or reasoning is perceived in
Korea's consideration of market share, production, profits and losses, employment and inventory." (Emphasis
added)
532 In this connection, the Panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup stated, in paragraph 7.126 of its report:
"While an examination of the Article 3.7 factors is required in a threat of injury case,
that analysis alone is not a sufficient basis for a determination of threat of injury, because the
Article 3.7 factors do not relate to the consideration of the impact of the dumped imports on
the domestic industry. The Article 3.7 factors relate specifically to the questions of the
likelihood of increased imports (based on the rate of increase of imports, the capacity of
exporters to increase exports, and the availability of other export markets), the effects of
imports on future prices and likely future demand for imports, and inventories. They are not,
in themselves, relevant to a decision concerning what the 'consequent impact' of continued
dumped imports on the domestic industry is likely to be. However, it is precisely this latter
question – whether the 'consequent impact' of continued dumped imports is likely to be
material injury to the domestic industry - which must be answered in a threat of material
injury analysis. Thus, we conclude that an analysis of the 'consequent impact' of imports is
required in a threat of material injury determination".

6.701 In short, the preliminary determination of threat of material injury by the Ministry of the
Economy did not involve a proper and sufficient examination of the factors listed in Article 3.4
concerning the impact of dumped imports on the Guatemala industry. Without that analysis, the
Ministry's determination could not validly establish how the future imports of grey Portland cement
could affect the state of the domestic industry in a way that would imply material injury thereto.
Bearing in mind that for a threat of injury determ ination to be consistent with the provisions of
Article 3.1 and 3.7, the factors mentioned in Article 3.4 must be evaluated in examining the
consequent impact of the imports, we can only conc lude that the preliminary determination of threat
of injury made by the Ministry of the Economy is inconsistent with Article 3.1, 3.4 and 3.7 owing to
the Ministry's failure to carry out an objective examination of the impact of dumped imports on the
Guatemalan industry based on an analysis of the factors having a bearing on the state of the industry
during the period of investigation or on its state in the near future according to projections.
6.702 At the same time, Guatemala naively argues in paragraph 279 of its first submission that:
"Moreover, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not oblige the investigating
authorities to provide details in writing of all the factors considered or make an
explicit report on each of the factors taken into account. The Ministry listed all the
evidence considered in its preliminary determination, provided detailed explanations
of the preliminary determination of dumping and injury and carefully spelled out 'the
main reasons leading to the determination'.
533 No more is required."
6.703 Guatemala is mistaken in stating that th e Anti-Dumping Agreement does not oblige the
authorities to provide details in writing of the all the factors considered or make an explicit report on
each of the factors taken into account. Contrary to what it contends, it is not enough to list the
evidence and to explain the reasons taken into account in the determination, and it is essential that the
investigating authority should make it clear in the determination that it has considered each one of the
factors listed in Article 3.4 in making a preliminary affirmative determination of material injury.534
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.704 Guatemala responds by alleging that the preliminary determination of threat of material
injury complied with Article 3. It argues as follows:
6.705 During the first meeting, Mexico attacked the Ministry's preliminary determination of injury.
According to Mexico, the determination was flawed because it was based exclusively on the criteria
listed in Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement. Mexico adduces that it should have included an
examination of the factors contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 3.
535 This argument is
without merit for the following reasons.
6.706 Firstly, Guatemala emphasized the factors contained in Article 3.7 because those were the
most relevant factors in evaluating threat of injury, as opposed to actual injury. But this does mean
that the Ministry did not consider other factors. As we discussed at length in our first written

533 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 12.2.1.
534 In this connection, it is also necessary to cons ider Article 12.2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The mere recitation of data does not constitute explanation, or findings and conclusions, sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement. Although Guatemala also referred to certain documents in
the administrative file, such as an alleged separate report, unless the Ministry's determination or public notice
reflects the consideration of a particular factor, not just any document in the file can be taken into consideration.
See the report of the Panel Korea-Resins, paragraphs 210 and 212, and the report of the Panel in Argentina –
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, paragraph 8.126.
535 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 169-186.

submission, the Ministry did in fact examine whether there had been a significant increase in imports
within the meaning of Article 3.2. As explained in the determination, imports increased dramatically
both in absolute terms and relative to domestic production and apparent consumption during the
period of investigation. It is ridiculous for Mexico to suggest otherwise.
6.707 The Ministry also explicitly examined whether there had been any price undercutting causing
prices to be depressed within the meaning of Article 3.2. Reference was made to the DIACO report
and other evidence of price depression. In its submission of 9 May 1996, Cruz Azul stated that
imports of Cruz Azul cement had caused cement prices in Guatemala to fall by Q 6 to Q 8 per sack.
6.708 Contrary to what Mexico has said, the Ministry also explicitly evaluated the impact of
dumped imports on the domestic industry within the meaning of Article 3.4. Among other things, the
Ministry expressly considered the drop in sales, production, market share and utilization of installed
capacity suffered by Cementos Progreso and the ad verse impact of Cruz Azul imports on domestic
prices and Cementos Progreso's inventories.
6.709 Moreover, as we stated in our first submission, the AD Agreement does not oblige the
investigating authorities to provide details in writing of each factor considered or to make an explicit
report on each of the factors taken into account.
536 In this case, the Ministry listed all of the evidence
taken into account in its preliminary determination, provided detailed explanations for the preliminary
determinations on dumping and injury, and carefully listed the "main reasons leading to the
determination".537 Nothing more was required.
4. Claims Under Article 3.5 – Preliminary Determination of Causal Relationship
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.710 Mexico claims that the Ministry of the Economy violated Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement by
imposing a provisional anti-dumping measure without demonstrating the causal relationship between
the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged threat of injury to the Guatemalan domestic industry.
The following are Mexico's arguments in support of its claim under Article 3.5:
6.711 Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers ,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry." (Emphasis added.)
6.712 In its preliminary determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that during the
investigation period the imports from Mexico under in vestigation threatened to cause injury to the
domestic industry. The threat of injury to the domestic industry was determined on the basis of the

536 See first submission by Guatemala, paragraph 279.
537 AD Agreement, Article 12.2.1.

following effects: (i) an increase in imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico; (ii) the likelihood
of an increase in Mexican exports to Guatemala as a result of surplus plant capacity at the exporting
firm; (iii) depressed price of the domestic product in certain Guatemalan cities; (iv) accumulation of
inventories of the raw material used to manufacture the product investigated; (v) decline in domestic
sales of cement; (vi) under-utilization of the domestic producer’s plant capacity; and (vii) loss of
customers.
6.713 Reading Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement and the preliminary determination of threat of
injury made by the Ministry of the Economy show s that the investigating authority could not have
proved the existence of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged threat of
injury to the domestic industry producing grey Portland cement for the following reasons:
6.714 Firstly, the investigating authority did not evaluate whether the price of the allegedly dumped
imports was significantly undercutting the price of the like domestic product nor did the Ministry of
the Economy evaluate the trend in economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
domestic industry, as required by Article 3.2, 3.4 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement. The investigating
authority was therefore not in a position to determine the change in circumstances which would create
a situation in which the dumping would cause injury to the domestic industry. Consequently, in its
preliminary determination the Ministry could not have concluded that during the investigation period
the imports investigated threatened to cause material injury to the domestic industry.
6.715 Secondly, in the preliminary determination, the Ministry of the Economy did not establish the
causal relationship between the alleged dumping and th reat of injury, simply indicating that: "On the
basis of the facts indicated in the section on threat of injury, there is a causal relationship between the
imports dumped and the injury caused to the domestic industry …". 538 This statement highlights the
bias and lack of objectiveness with which the Ministry of the Economy made the preliminary
determination of threat of material injury because it did not make any specific reference to the form or
procedure followed by the investigating authority in order to show that the imports investigated were
the cause of the alleged threat of injury.
6.716 The investigating authority could not have established a causal relationship between the
imports of grey Portland cement and the alleged threat of injury to the domestic industry as required
by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement because it did not determine the existence of a threat of material
injury. The Ministry of the Economy therefore violated Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement by
imposing a provisional anti-dumping measure without proving the existence of a causal relationship
between the alleged dumping and the alleged threat of material injury.
6.717 To summarize, as the Panel will be able to see, the Ministry of the Economy’s preliminary
affirmative determination of a threat of material injury is contrary to Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6. 3.7
and 3.8 of the AD Agreement, for the following reasons inter alia:
(a) The Ministry of the Economy did not base its determination of threat of injury on
positive evidence nor on an objective examination of the volume of imports dumped,
their effect on prices of the like product on the Guatemalan market, and their
subsequent impact on the domestic industry, evaluating the factors enumerated in
paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 7 of Article 3 of the AD Agreement;
(b) the Ministry did not comply with the obligation that the determination must be based
on facts and not simply on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility, as required by
Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement;

538 Point 3, section G, of the preliminary determination.

(c) the causal relationship between the imports dumped and the threat of injury to the
domestic industry was not demonstrated, as required by Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement; and
(d) although it was a case of threat of injury, the Guatemalan authority failed to examine
with special care its decision to apply provisional anti-dumping measures, as required
by Article 3.8 of the AD Agreement.
6.718 Consequently, the Guatemalan authority could not have justifiably considered that the
provisional measures were necessary, in accordance with Article 7.1(iii) of the AD Agreement, to
prevent injury being caused to the Guatemalan domestic industry during the investigation
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.719 In response to Mexico's arguments regarding the demonstration of a causal relationship
between imports allegedly dumped and the alleged threat of injury, Guatemala makes the following
arguments:
6.720 Mexico maintains that the Ministry violated Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by
imposing a provisional measure without demonstrating a causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the threat of injury. Article 3.5 actually refers to causal relationships within the context
of the determination of present material injury. The Article establishes the factors which investigating
authorities must examine in assessing whether the dumped imports are currently causing injury to the
domestic industry. As the preliminary determinatio n showed that there was threat of injury, the
Ministry referred to causal relationship under Article 3.7.
6.721 Article 3.7 makes express reference to the questio n of causality in the event of injury. It
refers to the change in circumstances which woul d create a situation in which "the dumping would
cause injury…". 539 A provisional measure may be applied if the totality of the factors considered
leads to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is
taken, material injury would occur. In any event, in its final determination the Ministry considered
the causal relationship in accordance with Article 3.5, having established the existence of present
material injury. More specifically, in its final determination the Ministry found that the dumped
imports were causing material injury.
6.722 In any case, the Ministry clearly referred to the question of causality in Section VI.F of the
preliminary determination, entitled "Threat of injury to the domestic industry and the causal
relationship between dumping and the threat of injury". The Ministry found that Cruz Azul imports
had led to the domestic producer's losing a significant share of the market, to a decline in its sales, to
the loss of customers, to the accumulation of exce ssive inventories and the shutdown of its kilns, and
to a fall in prices. On the basis of these findings the Ministry concluded that the application of a
provisional measure was necessary to prevent greater injury being caused to the domestic industry.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the Ministry demonstrated a causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the threat of injury.
6.723 Contrary to Mexico's allegations, the Ministry determined significant price undercutting in
accordance with Article 3.2. This was confirmed by DIACO's investigation and other evidence in the
file.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.724 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's Article 3.5 arguments on the following grounds:

539 Idem, Article 3.7 (emphasis added).

6.725 To help refute Guatemala's arguments with re spect to the inconsistency of its preliminary
determination with Article 3.5, we cite below the relevant parts of paragraphs 280-282 in part E of
section V of its first written submission:
"E. THE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP COMPLIED
WITH ARTICLE 3.5540
"[ ... ] Article 3.5 actually refers to causal relationships within the context of the
determination of present material injury. The Article establishes the factors which
investigating authorities must examine in assessing whether the dumped imports are
currently causing injury to the domestic i ndustry. As the preliminary determination
showed that there was threat of injury, the Ministry referred to causal relationship
under Article 3.7."
541
"[ … ] In any event, in its final determination the Ministry considered the causal
relationship in accordance with Article 3.5, having established the existence of
present material injury. […]"
542
"In any case, the Ministry clearly referred to the question of causality in Section VI.F
of the preliminary determination, entitled 'Threat of injury to the domestic industry
and the causal relationship between dumping and the threat of injury'. (…)" 543
6.726 Firstly, from the outset Guatemala's position clearly contains a contradiction which brings to
light the inconsistency of its preliminary determination of threat of injury with Article 3.5. On the one
hand, in its heading, it states that "the preliminary determination of causal relationship complied with
Article 3.5", while on the other hand, it denies the applicability of Article 3.5 when the determination
is of threat of material injury, suggesting erroneous ly that in threat of in jury cases, the applicable
provision for the purposes of establishing a causal relationship is Article 3.7.
6.727 Secondly, Mexico rejects the impermissible interpretation that Guatemala tries to make of
Article 3.5 and 3.7 when it states that "Article 3.5 actually refers to causal relationships within the
context of the determination of present material injury" and that "as the preliminary determination
showed that there was threat of injury the Ministry referred to causal relationship under Article 3.7."
Guatemala's interpretation is impermissible in the light of both the text of Article 3.5 and its context,
which is Article 3, including footnote 9 and Article 3.7.
6.728 Article 3.5 expressly states that:
"It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. […]." (Emphasis added)
6.729 Footnote 9, in its turn, states that:
"Under this Agreement the term 'injury' shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic

540 Heading of part E of section V of Guatemala's first written submission.
541 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 280.
542 Ibid., paragraph 281.
543 Ibid., paragraph 282.

industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article." (Emphasis added)
6.730 Article 3.7, for its part, lays down the specific fa ctors to be considered in a threat of injury
analysis. But even if we were to suppose, for the sake of argument, that under Article 3.7 the Ministry
had reached a proper conclusion that there was "a clearly foreseen and imminent" "change in
circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury", that "further
dumped exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur",
this is no reason for assuming that the Ministry conducted an analysis and properly concluded that
there was a causal relationship under Article 3.5 enabling it to support its preliminary determination
of threat of injury. While it is true that these are the specific factors that the Ministry had to
demonstrate under Article 3.7 (and did not demonstrate) in order to make a threat of injury
determination, it cannot be accepted that by virtue of an analysis under Article 3.7, a preliminary
determination also complies with Article 3.5. Given the scope of footnote 9 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Article 3.5 requires an analysis and a separate conclusion, distinct from the analysis and
conclusions concerning the factors listed in Article 3.7, in order to establish the causal relationship on
which a determination of the threat of material in jury rests. This shows how flawed and mistaken
Guatemala's arguments with respect to causal relationship are.
6.731 Nor is it possible to accept from any point of view Guatemala's attempt to argue now that
because it conducted its (improper) analysis of the factors listed in Article 3.7, the Ministry
established a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the threat of injury, when as we
have shown, the Guatemalan authority did not make a proper and sufficient analysis covering the
evaluation of the factors listed in Article 3.2 and 3.4. Suffice it to look at the actual text of
Article 3.5. In particular, the investigating authority must examine in an unbiased and objective
manner the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, evaluating the factors listed in
Article 3.4, in order to be in a position, as we have said, to reach a conclusion concerning the
Article 3.7 factors and to determine, as well, the existence of a causal relationship under Article 3.5.
Consequently, in this case, even though Guatemala argues that the Ministry, in making its
determination of threat of material injury, established the causal relationship in accordance with
Article 3.7, there is no way of showing that the Ministry actually did establish a causal relationship if
in the analysis in connection with the preliminary determination of threat of injury the Ministry failed
to examine the relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry.
6.732 Finally, it should also be stressed that in order properly to establish all of the facts that an
authority must consider to determine the cause and effect relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury or, as in this case, threat of injury , Article 3.5 clearly stipulates that the investigating
authorities:
"[…] shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same
time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not
be attributed to the dumped imports. […]"
6.733 Nevertheless, in the case at issue, as stated in paragraph 294 of Mexico's first submission, in
its analysis in connection with its preliminary determination of threat of injury, the Ministry never
addressed factors other than the dumped imports, such as the volume and prices of the imports that
were not dumped, the effect on the state of the domestic industry of the increase in energy costs, and
the existence of a maximum price fixed by the Government of Guatemala for grey Portland cement as
well as restrictive trade practices on the part of the domestic producer.
6.734 With respect to this last point, it should be stressed that the Ministry disregarded one of the
substantial parts of the DIACO report of 17 May 1996 which states that the domestic producer

Cementos Progreso engaged in a series of restrictive practices in order to avoid fair competition from
the product imported under the brand name Cruz Azul:
"As an example, we were informed (sic) that the company Cementos Progreso S.A. set up
(sic) in the departmental capitals companies known as CEPESA which sell cement and other
building materials, and that this was considered unfair competition for local retailers; that
they were constantly subject to pressure and threats by Cementos Progreso to prevent them
from buying or selling Cruz Azul cement, failing which they would not be supplied with the
lime and other products they ordered, a situation which was creating a feeling of insecurity
among traders. […] Some of the persons surveyed were suspicious when asked for
information, hinting that among other things they had been visited by representatives of
Cementos Progreso who, after asking them a number of questions, informed them that they
should not buy Cruz Azul cement because if the import of that product were to be prohibited,
they would not sell them Cementos Progreso cement afterwards. […] Considering the result
of the visits, the statements made by certain pe rsons involved in the marketing of cement, the
opinion of consumers and the views we were able to gather, it would seem that the arrival of
Cruz Azul cement had revolutionized the obsolete market which for a long time had been a
monopoly that in no way benefited the Guatemalan population, which now had a better
quality, higher-yielding product."
6.735 The Ministry completely ignored these conclusions of the DIACO report, and made its
determination of threat of material injury without even bothering to examine the possible effect of
these restrictive practices by the domestic producer which DIACO brought to its attention. This
shows that the investigating authority did not make an unbiased and subjective evaluation of all of the
facts (factors other than dumped imports) that had to be established in order to make a preliminary
determination of the causal relationship between the likelihood of an increase in dumped imports and
the injury they could cause to the domestic industry.
6.736 On the contrary, it reveals more clearly than ever the bias and lack of objectivity with which
the Ministry made its preliminary determination of threat of injury to the domestic industry,
disregarding the fact that Article 3.5 requires the authority to examine any known factors other than
dumped imports. Thus, once again, Guatemala's ar gument that its Ministry of Economy made a
preliminary determination of causal relationship in conformity with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement is unacceptable.
6.737 In short, although Article 3.5 sets forth the requirements for the analysis of causal relationship
both for cases of material injury and for cases of threat of material injury, the Ministry simply
disregarded Article 3.5 and failed to conduct any analysis of factors other than dumped imports which
could have accounted for the threat of injury.
6.738 For all of these reasons, Mexico submits that the Panel should find that the preliminary
determination of threat of material injury by the Ministry of the Economy was inconsistent with
Guatemala's obligations under Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Moreover, Mexico repeats that by failing to take account of the likely impact of dumped imports on
the domestic industry affected in determining the existence of a threat of material injury, Guatemala
also violated paragraph 6(a) of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
5. Claims Under Article 12.2.1 – Public Notice of Imposition of Provisional Measure
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.739 Mexico makes the following arguments in support of its claim that Guatemala breached its
obligations regarding the public notice of the imposition of the provisional measure under
Article 12.1.1:

6.740 The public notice of imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure on allegedly
dumped imports of grey Portland cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul, published in the Diario
Oficial de Centro América on 28 August 1996 ("provisional notice") 544, did not comply with
Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement because it failed to include sufficiently detailed explanations of
the preliminary determination on dumping. In particular, it did not provide a full explanation of the
determination of likeness of the product sold in Mexico and that exported to Guatemala, thus affecting
the comparison of the normal value and the export price required under Article 2. The sufficiently
detailed explanations on the alleged threat of material injury required by Article 3 were not provided
either. Sufficiently detailed explanations of the causal relationship between the imports allegedly
dumped and the alleged threat of injury were not provided, although required by Article 3.5 of the AD
Agreement.
6.741 Article 12.2 provides that public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final
determination, whether affirmative or negative, and that each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on
all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities.
6.742 Article 12.2.1 provides the following with regard to the requirements to be met in public
notices of preliminary determinations:
"12.2.1. A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or
otherwise make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations
for the preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the
matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such
a notice or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information, contain in particular:
(i) The names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying countries
involved;
(ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes;
(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for the
methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the
normal value under Article 2;
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3;
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination."
6.743 The provisional notice published by the Ministry did not contain explanations, still less
sufficiently detailed explanations, on a number of aspects that must be clarified and examined during
the course of an investigation and must appear in the provisional notice of the preliminary affirmative
determination leading to the imposition of a provisional anti-dumping duty.
6.744 Firstly, the provisional notice did not contain sufficiently detailed explanations on the
authority’s examination of whether the products sold in Mexico by Cruz Azul were like products to
those exported by Cruz Azul to Guatemala during the investigation period, which means that the price
comparison between the normal value and the export price was not valid.
6.745 Without examining whether they were like products, the Ministry simply indicated that the
Type II Pz cement sold in Mexico and the Type I PM cement were like products within the meaning

544 "Public notice of imposition of the provisional measure" (hereinafter "provisional notice").

of Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement. This was set out in the provisional notice in
section "VI. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS", part "B. Price comparison" as follows:
"2.1.1. When submitting the information requested, the exporter only provided data
on its selling prices on the domestic market for type II cement and type II Pz cement
and not for type I (PM) cement which is under investigation. Annex I to the
questionnaire, which it requested should be considered a summary of information on
its sales in the domestic market, however, refers to type I (PM) cement, so it can be
assumed that the product investigated and that sold in Mexico (type II Pz) are like
products within the meaning of Article 2.6 of the WTO Agreement."
6.746 The Ministry did not examine the physical characteristics and chemical composition of Cruz
Azul products sold in Mexico and exported to Guatemala, limiting itself to indicating that:
"2.1.2. The exporter indicated the same international technical standard for
producing type I (PM) cement and type II Pz cement (ASTM-C-595 standard). This
standard contains the specifications for producing mixed hydraulic cements,
including type I (PM) cement but not type II Pz cement."
6.747 The above shows that the Ministry based itself on inferences or the straightforward exclusion
of one of the products and considered that both products – that sold in Mexico and that exported to
Guatemala by Cruz Azul – were like products.
6.748 The Ministry recognized that Type II Pz cement (mixed cement) has a higher clinker content
than Type II cement, and that its production accounts for the major part of the cost of producing
cement, thus making even more confusing the explanation on the assumption that Type I (PM) cement
and Type II (Pz) cement are like products. The following excerpt attests to this:
"2.1.4. In addition, based on the information supplied by the exporter, the Directorate
of Economic Integration considered that there was no price variation between type II
(unmixed cement) and type II Pz (mixed cement) products, even though type II
cement has a higher clinker content, whose production is the major cost element in
cement production."
6.749 The above excerpts from the provisional notice cannot in any way be considered sufficiently
detailed explanations within the meaning of Article 12.2.1 to show that the Cruz Azul products sold in
Mexico (Type II Pz) and those exported to Guatemala (Type I PM) are like products.
6.750 Secondly, when referring to the determination of threat of injury, the provisional notice does
not contain sufficiently detailed explanations of the examination and comparison made by the
Ministry, if applicable. The notice does not state what previous comparable periods were used as a
basis for the calculations nor the conclusions reached.
6.751 The lack of sufficiently detailed explanations on previous comparable periods can also be
seen in the provisional notice where it refers inter alia to the indices and factors on increase in
imports, accumulation of inventories, decline in sales, depressed prices of the domestic product and
loss of customers.
6.752 The provisional notice also fails to refer to Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement,
although, in the same way as Article 3.7, they are among the legal grounds and requirements that must
be met when examining and determining threat of material injury. In other words, there is no
reference to the questions of fact and law on which acceptance or rejection of the arguments
mentioned in Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement were based.

6.753 The explanations in the provisional notice do not refer to various factors and indices defined
in Article 3.4 concerning the state of the domestic industry. Not only are these not to be found in the
provisional notice but they were not examined by the Ministry either. These factors include profits,
productivity, actual and potential effects on cash flow, employment, wages, growth, the ability to raise
capital or investments, and the magnitude of the dumping margin.
6.754 The above shows that the provisional notice does not contain sufficiently detailed
explanations on the evaluation of all the relevant economic factors and indices that had a bearing on
the state of the domestic industry, as provided in Article 3.4, and does not refer either to the
acceptance or rejection of all the factors considered relevant by the Ministry and which affected the
state of the domestic industry.
6.755 In the case of inventories, the notice does not contain sufficiently detailed explanations on the
trend in inventories in previous comparable periods and, if applicable, the accumulation of grey
Portland cement in the applicant’s warehouses. Indicating the volume of clinker stocks does not
constitute a sufficiently detailed explanation on the inventories of the product investigated, as required
by Article 12.2.1. of the AD Agreement.
6.756 The provisional notice does not contain explanations either, still less sufficiently detailed
explanations, on the causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged threat of injury.
Section "VI. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS", part "F - Threat of injury to the domestic industry and
the causal relationship between the dumping and the threat of injury" is inadequate because nowhere
does it refer to a causal relationship, as required by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
6.757 In addition, where the provisional notice does refer to a causal relationship, it does so
confusedly. In other words, the preliminary determination concerns threat of material injury and, in
the final section, the notice only refers to a causa l relationship equivocally as "injury caused to the
domestic industry". As proof of this, the following is an excerpt from part "G. Provisional
measures":
"3. On the basis of the facts set out in the section on the threat of injury, which
show a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury caused to domestic
industry, as well as the opinion issued to this effect by the Directorate of Economic
Integration, the Ministry considers it appropriate to impose provisional measures in
order to prevent more serious damage to domestic industry while the investigation is
concluded."
6.758 The above clearly shows that the provisional notice does not contain explanations, still less
sufficiently detailed explanations, on the causal relationship that must exist between the allegedly
dumped imports and, in this case, the threat of material injury, in order to reach a preliminary
affirmative determination leading to the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties. The notice is
therefore inconsistent with Article 12.2.1.
6.759 In the light of the foregoing arguments, it can justifiably be considered that the public notice
imposing a provisional measure on allegedly dumped imports of grey Portland cement from the
Mexican firm Cruz Azul does not contain sufficiently detailed explanations on the determinations of
dumping and threat of material injury or on the causal relationship between the two. It does not refer
either to the issues of fact and law on which the acceptance or rejection of the arguments was based,
thus the notice is inconsistent with Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement.

(b) Response of Guatemala
6.760 Guatemala states that Mexico is wrong in arguing that the public notice of the preliminary
determination did not comply with the requirements of Article 12.2.1. Its arguments in support of this
response are as follows:
6.761 Article 12.2.1 requires the notice to contain the names of the suppliers, a description of the
product which is sufficient for customs purposes, the margins of dumping established and a full
explanation of the reasons for the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the
export price and the normal value under Article 2, considerations relevant to the injury determination
as set out in Article 3, and the main reasons leading to the determination. No reasonable person
reading the public notice could consider it deficient in any of these respects.
6.762 As Article 12.2.1 allows, the file also includes a separate report dated 26 July 1996 containing
further evidence which the Ministry also considered. This report was also used by Cruz Azul. The
file likewise includes the DIACO report and all the other evidence carefully identified in the public
notice. Cruz Azul had timely access to all this evidence.
6.763 The points made by Mexico in paragraphs 301 to 317 were previously mentioned in
Section E. Likewise, Guatemala noted that the ob ject and purpose of Article 12.2.1 did not oblige
investigating authorities to list every aspect of their deliberations in the conclusions. It would be
unduly burdensome and unreasonable to require an investigating authority to give a detailed
explanation of all the factors considered and quickly verify each of those factors. 545 I n f a c t , t h e
Article only requires the investigating authorities to provide "the main reasons leading to the
determination". Guatemala certainly complied with this requirement in the public notice of
preliminary determination.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.764 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's arguments on the following grounds:
6.765 Guatemala argues that its public notice of imposition of the provisional measure complied
with the requirements set forth in subparagraphs (i) to (v) of Article 12.2.1 in that it included,
inter alia, the names of the suppliers, a description of the product which is sufficient for customs
purposes, the margin of dumping, the methodology used, and the main reasons leading to the
determination. It adds that the file includes a separate report dated 26 July 1996 containing further
evidence which the Ministry also considered in its preliminary determination, and that the file
likewise includes the DIACO report and all the ot her evidence carefully identified in the public
notice.546
6.766 Once again, Guatemala has used post hoc arguments to try to cure the flaws that have
occurred, in this case in respect of the public notice and the fulfilment of its obligations under
Article 12.2.1. Guatemala erroneously suggests that any document contained in the file can constitute
the separate report, a claim which cannot be accepted as valid since it runs counter to the transparency
requirements for the determinations of the investigating authority.
6.767 The separate report argument is a post hoc argument, as shown by the simple fact that the
public notice does not refer to the existence of any separate report or suggest that the notice was

545 See Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States Department of Commerce, 699 F. Sup. 938, 947 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988) ("The fact that the Commission did not explicitly declare that the volume of imports was
significant is not fatal, for the Court may uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned").
546 Ibid., paragraphs 285 and 286.

replaced or supplemented by a separate report, and if so that that report was intended to fulfil the
transparency requirements for the preliminary determination and the obligations laid down in
Article 12.2.1.
6.768 Mexico submits that Guatemala not only failed to refer in its first submission to the provisions
of the first paragraph of Article 12.2.1, but that in fact it did not comply with the obligation laid down
in that paragraph, as we shall now show.
6.769 With the exception of certain changes in the wording and in the tables in certain sections
relating, inter alia, to adjustments to the normal value, determination of the export price, behaviour of
cement imports, share of imports in domestic production and apparent consumption, Opinion 002/96
of 26 July 1996, which Guatemala now claims to be the separate report, could reasonably be
described as identical to the public notice; it provides no explanations, let alone sufficiently detailed
explanations, concerning the aspects discussed below.
547
6.770 Mexico submits that Guatemala did not include either in its public notice or in its alleged
separate report explanations, let alone sufficiently detailed explanations, concerning a variety of
elements on which its preliminary determination was based. Thus, for example, neither the notice nor
the report contains sufficiently detailed explanations of the product likeness analysis which the
Ministry may or may not have made between the product sold in the domestic market and the
exported product, and which affected the price comparison between the normal value and the export
price pursuant to Article 2.
6.771 Nor did either the public notice or the separate report include any explanations concerning the
Ministry's threat of injury determination containing the elements referred in Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of
the AD Agreement, in particular the factors mentioned in Article 3.2 and 3.4. The fact is, no reference
is made at all to the factors considered by the Ministry as relevant and which affected the state of the
domestic industry.
548
6.772 Nor do either the public notice or the alleged separate report contain sufficiently detailed
explanations concerning the causal relationship between the dumped imports and the alleged threat of
injury referred to in Article 3.5.
6.773 At the same time, Guatemala's claim in paragraph 286 of its first written submission that a
report such as that prepared by DIACO, which does not form part of the anti-dumping investigating
authority and has separate functions and purposes549, can be considered as fulfilling the Article 12.2.1
obligation simply because it is included in the file of the investigation, cannot be accepted under any
circumstances.
6.774 Nor can it be accepted that Guatemala fulfilled its Article 12.2.1 obligations by stating that
the file likewise includes "all the other evidence carefully identified in the public notice" 550, simply
because all this evidence was accessible to Cruz Azul.
6.775 For the above reasons, Mexico submits that neither in the public notice of imposition of the
provisional anti-dumping measure, nor in Opinion 002/96 of 26 July 1996 (alleged separate report),
did Guatemala provide sufficiently detailed explanations concerning matters of fact and law relating

547 Mexico also maintains that Resolution 001215 of 16 August 1996 and the public notice of
imposition of the provisional measure are identical, so that neither the alleged separate report, nor the mentioned
resolution, nor the public notice enable Guatemala to comply with its obligations under Article 12.2.1 of the AD
Agreement, particularly in the areas mentioned by Mexico.
548 See report of the Panel in Korea – Dairy, paragraph 7.55 and 7.58.
549 Department for Consumer Welfare.
550 See the first written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 286.

to its preliminary determination, and that Guatemala therefore violated its obligations under
Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement.
E. CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION BY GUATEMALA
6.776 Mexico also claims that Guatemala committed several procedural violations under the AD
Agreement which had a direct impact on the outcome of the investigation and consequently on the
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping measure. Mexico's specific claims regarding procedural
violations and Guatemala's responses are set out below.
1. Claims Under Articles 6.1 and 6.2 – Establishment of Period for Acceptance and Receipt
of Evidence During Final Phase of Investigation
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.777 Mexico makes the following arguments in support of its claim that Guatemala violated
Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement:
6.778 The Ministry violated Article 6.1 and 6.2 of th e AD Agreement by not fixing a period for the
acceptance and receipt of evidence during the final phase of the investigation and accepting new
evidence from Cementos Progreso during the public hearing of the parties.
6.779 Article 6.1 and 6.2 provide the following concerning the opportunities to be given to the
parties during the investigation procedure:
"6.1 All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of
the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in
question.
…
6.2 Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defence of their interests…"
6.780 On the one hand, the Ministry fixed the time limit for Cruz Azul to reply to the questionnaire
for exporters and to respond to the request made on 14 October 1996. On the other, however, during
the final stage of the investigation the Ministry did not set a period for the parties interested in the
investigation to submit information, documents and evidence in defence of their interests.
6.781 The public notice of imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measure did not set a time
limit for the presentation of arguments and evidence by the parties in defence of their interests, which
was not the case at the initiation of the investigation when the public notice of initiation fixed a period
of 30 days for the interested parties to appear to defend their rights.
6.782 Section 5 of the notice of initiation entitled "Invitation to appear" states the following:
"… importers, exporters, representatives of the Government of Mexico and any
person claiming to have a legitimate interest in the outcome of this investigation, to
appear before the Ministry of the Economy (8a Avenida, 10-43 zona 1, Guatemala
City) to state their legal interest in the matter and to document same within 30 days as
from the publication of this notice. The same period is given to the interested parties
to submit any supplementary arguments and evidence that they may consider
relevant." (Emphasis added.)

6.783 In the notice imposing the provisional measure, the Ministry did not give Cruz Azul an
opportunity to present further evidence and subsequently, in October 1996, it requested information
from Cruz Azul, only allowing it to put forward its final pleadings at the public hearing, without being
able to submit further evidence.
6.784 The denial of Cruz Azul’s right of defence can be seen in the Ministry’s rejection of the
technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul on 18 December 1996 and the acceptance of
new evidence from Cementos Progreso during the public hearing between the Ministry and the
parties. According to the following rules of the hearing, this was also prohibited:
"Attach the above submission to the background information. In view of the request
from Cooperativa La Cruz Azul, S.C.L., the pa rties are informed that the hearing set
for 19 December 1996 will be subject to the following rules:
…
2. The hearing is not intended to be a debate among the parties and additional
evidence will not be taken into account or accepted; therefore, it will be restricted to
giving each of the parties an opportunity to present its conclusions on the facts
investigated and the investigating authority may not seek additional information."
(Emphasis added.)
6.785 This shows that the Ministry did not give Cruz Azul a further opportunity, although it
accepted arguments and new evidence from Cementos Progreso, thus violating Article 6.1 and 6.2 of
the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.786 Guatemala's response to Mexico's Article 6.1 and 6.2 arguments are set out below:
6.787 During the course of the investigation, the Ministry established specific periods for the
presentation of information, with a view to receiv ing information from all the interested parties in
time for it to be taken into consideration. For example, the Ministry fixed 17 May 1996 as the last
date for replying to the original questionnaire, 30 October 1996 for responding to the supplementary
questionnaire and 19 December 1996 for the final arguments. In some cases, the periods were
extended to give the parties more time to prepare their replies and defend their interests.
551 Thus, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 6.1 and 6.2, Cruz Azul was given notice of the information
which the authorities required and a full opportunity to present relevant evidence in defence of its
interests in each of the critical phases of the investigation.
6.788 Contrary to Mexico's allegation, the Ministry did set time limits for the interested parties to
submit information, documents and evidence in defence of their interests. On 14 October 1996, the
Ministry sent Cruz Azul and Cementos Progreso supplementary questionnaires and set a time-limit of
30 October 1996 for submitting the new information. Cruz Azul did not request an extension of that
time-limit. In fact, on 30 October 1996, Cruz Azul submitted an incomplete reply to the
supplementary questionnaire and presented new information, evidence and arguments. Mexico asked
the Ministry to "consider presented and accepted all of the arguments, evidence, reports and data
contained in this document and its annexes…". The Ministry agreed to this request. In short, Cruz
Azul was aware of the time-limit for presenting information and took advantage of the opportunity to
do so.

551 Cruz Azul was allowed a two month extension to reply to the original questionnaire.

6.789 Contrary to what is alleged by Mexico, the Ministry did not deny Cruz Azul its right of
defence by rejecting the technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul on 18 December 1996
and accepting new evidence from Cementos Progreso during the public hearing. As explained below
under Section G, the Ministry had the right to reject the technical accounting evidence submitted by
Cruz Azul. Cruz Azul pr evented the Ministry from making a verification visit and tried to substitute
its own verification. No investigating authority w ould permit the respondent to prevent verification.
Moreover, it is not true that the Ministry received new evidence from Cementos Progreso during the
public hearing. The Ministry received final arguments from both Cementos Progreso 552 and Cruz
Azul. This approach was consistent with the rules laid down for the public hearing.
6.790 It is significant that Mexico does not identify the evidence which Cruz Azul was not allowed
to present as not being the technical accounting evidence which the Ministry had the right to reject.
Similarly, Mexico does not identify any evidence presented by Cementos Progreso that the Ministry
should have rejected. In short, Mexico's claim that Cruz Azul was denied its right of defence is totally
unfounded.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.791 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's claim by arguing that Guatemala violated Article 6.1 and 6.2 of
the AD Agreement by admitting and receiving evidence during the final stage of the investigation. It
asserts as follows:
6.792 Guatemala argues that it established specific periods for the presentation of information with
a view to receiving information from all of the in terested parties in time for it to be taken into
consideration. It adds that in the supplementary questionnaire to Cementos Progreso and Cruz Azul, it
set a time-limit for replying.
6.793 Mexico contends that Guatemala did not set a time-period for admitting and receiving
evidence during the final stage of the investigation, i.e., it did not enable the parties to present
information and evidence once it had published the preliminary determination as it had done with the
public notice of initiation, in which it provided the interested parties with a period of 30 days.
6.794 In Mexico's view, the supplementary request sent by the Ministry to Cruz Azul was certainly
not a substitute for the opportunity that should have been granted to the exporter to defend its
interests, i.e., for the parties to be able to submit information and evidence in defense of their interests
without such information and evidence at any point being requested by the investigating authority.
6.795 For evidence of the lack of opportunity for the parties to submit information and evidence that
was not requested by the authority, we need only refer to the fact that the Ministry rejected the
technical accounting evidence even though it was submitted in a proper and timely manner by
Cruz Azul in defence of its interests. The decision by the Ministry to reject the technical accounting
evidence was not consistent with the acceptance by the Ministry during the public hearing of further
evidence from Cementos Progreso
553, thereby treating Cruz Azul unequally and unfairly.

552 Cementos Progreso's submission for the public hearing of 19 December 1996 summarises and
comments on evidence that already existed in the file.
553 During the public hearing held on 19 December 1996 the Ministry received from Cementos
Progreso further evidence which, inter alia, was referenced in its final pleadings in paragraphs 36, 46 and 54, as
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

2. Claims Under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.4 – Access to Administrative File
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.796 Mexico argues that the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy violated several provisions of
Article 6 of the AD Agreement. Its arguments are set out below:
(i) The Ministry did not promptly make evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso available to
Cruz Azul
6.797 Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"6.1.2. Subject to the requirement to pr otect confidential information, evidence
presented in writing by one interested party shall be made available promptly to other
parties participating in the investigation."
6.798 This Article shows that Guatemala was obliged to make available to Cruz Azul promptly any
evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso, subject to the provisions on confidential information.554
6.799 The provisions governing confidential information require that it be (i) confidential by nature;
or (ii) supplied on a confidential basis, provided th at the authorities consider that it should be treated
as such. Such information can, however, be disclosed with the specific permission of the party
submitting it. A party submitting confidential information must furnish a non-confidential summary
thereof, in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of its content.
6.800 In this case, the Ministry of the Economy failed to comply with the obligation to make the
evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso available promptly to Cruz Azul by (i) denying Cruz Azul
access to the administrative file on the investigation; and (ii) not providing Cruz Azul with a copy of
Cementos Progreso’s final pleadings made at the final hearing.
6.801 Regarding the first point, on a number of occasions, orally and in writing, Cruz Azul sought
access to the information and evidence put forward by Cementos Progreso, but on none of these
occasions did the Ministry make them available promptly. Cruz Azul encountered such problems that
it had to use the services of a notary to record the negative attitude of the Guatemalan authority. The
following documents are evidence of some of the attempts made by Cruz Azul to obtain the evidence
submitted by Cementos Progreso from the Ministry:
(a) Attestation of 4 November 1996, issued by the notary Luis Ernesto Rodriguez,
recording that the staff at the Ministry of the Economy refused access to the file on
the investigation, claiming that the only person authorized to allow this was not in
Guatemala and that, before providing the information, "the Ministry has to evaluate
and review the documents in it".
(b) document dated 13 November 1996 in which Cruz Azul requested "all the
information submitted by CEMENTOS PROGRESO S.A. and other interested
parties ..".

554 Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement defines confidential information as "Any information which is by
nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a
competitor or because its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the
information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or which is provided on a
confidential basis by parties to an investigation …".

6.802 The foregoing reflects the difficult situation faced by Cruz Azul because the Ministry of the
Economy did not promptly make available the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso, in violation
of Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.803 Concerning the second point, as evidenced by the record of the public hearing of
19 December 1996, at that time Cruz Azul requested access to the document supplied by Cementos
Progreso, but received the reply that "the copy would be transmitted when the necessary notifications
were made". On 20 December 1996, Cruz Azul vigorously protested at the Ministry of the
Economy’s refusal to allow it access to the document containing Cementos Progreso’s final pleadings
during the hearing. Cruz Azul did not in fact have access to this document until 8 January 1997 (less
than two weeks before the final determination).
(ii) The Guatemalan authorities did not provide Cruz Azul with a timely opportunity to examine
the information relevant to the presentation of its case
6.804 Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement states the following:
"6.4. The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all
interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their
cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the
authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis
of this information."
6.805 The facts set out in the preceding section show that Article 6.4 was violated for the following
reasons:
(a) On several occasions Cruz Azul contacte d the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy
in order to see the file, but it was repeatedly denied access;
(b) as confirmed in the record of the public hearing, despite a specific request for
Cementos Progreso’s letter, the Ministry refused to furnish it until 8 January of the
following year;
(c) furthermore, on 17 January 1997, Cruz Azul sent a further letter requesting two
certified copies of all the records in the file. In May 1997 (when the proceedings
before the WTO Panel were well under way
555), Cruz Azul had still not received the
whole file;
(d) lastly, Mexico wishes to mention the copy of the record of the public hearing held on
19 December 1996 furnished by the Ministry of the Economy. This copy bears the
numbers 02736 to 02739, but it is only part of the record of the public hearing. In
other words, the Ministry did not give Cruz Azul a full copy of the record of the
public hearing. This shows the lack of order in the Ministry of the Economy’s file
and the ease with which it could be modified to the prejudice of Cruz Azul.
(iii) Guatemala did not give Cruz Azul a full opportunity to defend its interests
6.806 Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"6.2. Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a
full opportunity for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on
request, provide opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with

555 See Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 4.384.

adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments
offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the need to preserve
confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation on
any party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that
party’s case. Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present
other information orally."
6.807 Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement gives the parties the right to defend their interests, but the
Ministry of the Economy violated this Article in the following manner:
(a) By not allowing access to the full administrative file throughout the course of the
investigation;
(b) by delaying communication of the evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso and the
other documents in the file;
(c) by not supplying Cruz Azul with the documentation requested, claiming that it might
contain confidential information;
(d) by delaying notification to Cruz Azul and the Government of Mexico;
(e) by failing to furnish the full text of the ap plication for initiation of an investigation
submitted by Cementos Progreso.
6.808 These arguments show that the Guatemalan investigating authority violated Article 6.1.2, 6.2
and 6.4 of the AD Agreement, without prejudice to other violations due to these acts or omissions.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.809 Guatemala responds to Mexico's claims under 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 as follows:
6.810 Guatemala complied with the provisions of Ar ticle 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 by affording Cruz Azul
and all the interested parties the opportunity to examine the information, arguments and evidence
presented during the course of the investigation. Mexico's complaints in this respect are groundless.
6.811 Firstly, during the investigation Cruz Azul was allowed timely access to the public
documents. It should be noted that in Guatemala neither the law nor administrative practice requires a
reason or justification to be given every time that the parties consult a specific document.
Accordingly, the Ministry did not monitor the consultations of the file by the parties. However,
Cruz Azul's numerous submissions in which it alludes to evidence in the file shows that it had full
access to the file and that it was given ample opportunity to examine the information, arguments and
relevant evidence during the various phases of the proceeding. In a resolution dated 6 December 1996
the Director of Economic Integration informed the interested parties that he was preparing a technical
study on the result of the investigation and that any of the parties could obtain, at their own expense,
copies of the documents and the file. In Guatemala, the acts of the administration are public and
interested parties have access to the administrative files.
556 Cruz Azul did not request a copy of any
document. Moreover, in its submission for the hearing on December 1996, Cruz Azul did not argue
that it had been denied access to any document in the file. On the contrary, Cruz Azul based its
arguments on the evidence that had been produced, which shows that Cruz Azul had access to all the
information it needed to defend its position. Finally, Mexico does not identify any specific evidence

556 (Article 30 of the Constitution: … Interested parties have the right to obtain, at any time, any
reports, copies, or certificates they may request and disclo sure of files they may wish to consult, except for …
data supplied by individuals who have been guaranteed confidentiality).

that was allegedly denied to Cruz Azul, still less show that such evidence had any effect on the result
of the investigation.
6.812 Secondly, Mexico claims that on 4 November 1996 Cruz Azul was denied access to the file.
It bases this claim on a notarial deed that was never submitted to the Ministry during the investigation.
Even if it were true, as Mexico would have it, that the Ministry was unable to make the file available
on the date indicated (which Guatemala does not accept), Cruz Azul had full access to the file on
many other occasions. As pointed out above, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee
concerning the publication of administrative acts, which is confirmed in the resolution of the
Directorate of Economic Integration of 6 December, Cr uz Azul had the right to request copies of any
document in the file not yet in its possession. Howe ver, Cruz Azul did not request that a copy of any
document be supplied at its expense. At this stage of the proceeding, Cruz Azul did not request
copies of any document because it had already examined the file on many occasions and had been
supplied with copies in the course of the investigation.
6.813 Thirdly, Mexico complains that at the public hearing held on 19 December 1996, the Ministry
unfairly denied Cruz Azul the opportunity to examine the written pleadings submitted by Cementos
Progreso at that time. Contrary to what Mexico says, the Ministry had a valid reason for not giving
Cruz Azul immediate access to this document. In fact, in the rules which the Ministry laid down for
the hearing in its Resolution of 6 December, it specified that "the hearing is not intended as a debate
between the parties nor will additional evidence be recognized or admitted; accordingly, each of the
parties will merely be given an opportunity to submit its arguments in relation to the facts
investigated, without the investigating authority re questing additional information". The instructions
also authorized the parties to make written submissions, but did not specify whether these submissions
should be part of the public record or whether they could include confidential information. However,
a written submission was the only means at the parties' disposal for presenting their final pleadings on
the basis of confidential information.
6.814 Consequently, it was reasonable for the Ministry to conclude that the lengthy written
submission of 19 December prepared by Cementos Progreso would contain confidential information
that ought not to be revealed to Cruz Azul. Howeve r, the fact that Cruz Azul did not have immediate
access to Cementos Progreso's written submission of 19 December did not deprive Cruz Azul of the
opportunity to give its view on the factual information in the file. As stated in the resolution of
6 December, which contains the rules for the hearing, the purpose of any written pleadings submitted
by the parties for the hearing was to sum up the arguments and not to provide new evidence.
Consequently, during the hearing the Ministry informed Cruz Azul that it would provide a copy of the
Cementos Progreso submission once it had been determined whether it contained confidential
information. Moreover, Cruz Azul did not have the right to refer to Cementos Progreso's final
pleadings in the public hearing. The hearing was not intended as a "debate between the parties".
Thus, in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Cruz Azul received a copy of Cementos
Progreso's final pleadings a week before the final determination was issued. Any rejoinder to the
pleadings that the parties submitted on 19 December would not have been taken into account in
presenting the corresponding technical study and, thus, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 6.4, no submission prepared in order to refute pleadings made at the hearing would have been
"practicable" in the context of the investigation. Moreover, as stated in Article 6.14, the procedures
set out in the previous paragraphs of Article 6 "are not intended to prevent the authorities of a
Member from proceeding expeditiously". The Ministry was not obliged to delay the conclusion of the
investigation in order to allow either of the parties to prepare rejoinders to the final submissions of
19 December 1996.
6.815 Fourthly, Mexico maintains that Cruz Azul was refused a complete copy of the file. During
the investigation the Ministry provided the interested parties with a copy of the documents in the file.
Prior to the date at which the parties had to submit their final pleadings and before the Directorate of

Economic Integration presented its final technical study, the parties were reminded that they had the
right to obtain, at their own expense, a copy of any document in the file. By 19 December 1996
Cruz Azul had not requested a copy of any document. The document in question, the pleadings which
Cementos Progreso submitted to the hearing on 19 December, was made available to Cruz Azul as
soon as the Ministry had verified that it did not contain confidential information. The Ministry did
not refuse Cruz Azul the certified copy of the whole file which it requested on 17 January 1997. A
copy was not issued on that occasion because, according to Guatemalan law, copies are issued at the
expense of the interested party and Cruz Azul had not paid the corresponding fee.
6.816 Finally, Mexico does not argue, still less prove that Cruz Azul was denied the right to submit
the evidence it wished to submit. The fact is that Cruz Azul refused to reply to the Ministry's requests
for information and refused to permit verification of the partial and incomplete information it had
submitted. Its unwillingness to cooperate obliged the Ministry to issue its final determination on the
basis of the information available.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.817 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's arguments by asserting that it has not shown that it gave Cruz
Azul the opportunity to examine the information used by the Ministry, and it has violated
Article 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement. Mexico expands on these arguments as follows:
6.818 Under Article 6.1.2 Guatemala was under an obligation to make any evidence submitted by
Cementos Progreso available promptly to Cruz Azul . Similarly, under Article 6.4 Cruz Azul had the
right to see any information relevant to the presentation of its case. Finally, under Article 6.2
Cruz Azul was entitled to an opportunity for the defense of its interests. However, Guatemala acted in
violation of these obligations on several occasions. Among the violations argued by Mexico in its
first written submission, Guatemala has not refuted, and has thus accepted, the following:
On 13 November 1996, Cruz Azul requested a copy of all of the information
submitted by Cementos Progreso, a request which was never complied with.
On 17 January 1997 Cruz Azul requested at its own expense two copies of the entire
file; six months later Cruz Azul had not received the requested copies.
The copy furnished to Cruz Azul of the record of the public hearing held on
19 December 1996 is incomplete. Even though the page numbers follow on, the
document was not supplied in full, i.e. the copy supplied by Guatemala to Cruz Azul
is incomplete.
The Ministry of the Economy did not provide Cruz Azul with the text of the
application filed by Cementos Progreso.
557
Guatemala was late in notifying the Government of Mexico and Cruz Azul.558
6.819 The fact that Guatemala did not refute the above-mentioned facts is enough to consider them
as having been accepted. Thus, Guatemala violated Article 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Nevertheless, we shall reply below to the weak arguments submitted by Guatemala.

557 See the section on Article 6.1.3 of this second written submission by Mexico.
558 See the arguments concerning Articles 5.5 and 12.1 in this second written submission by Mexico as
well as the relevant arguments in the "General Comments" section.

(i) Arguments by Guatemala concerning access to the file559
6.820 Firstly, Guatemala argues that it does not keep a record of access to the file. In this case, it is
up to Guatemala to prove a positive fact, since Mexico is at a disadvantage in having to prove a
negative fact; in other words, it is easier for Guatemala to prove that it granted Cruz Azul access to
the file than for Mexico to prove that it did not grant Cruz Azul such access. However, even if
Guatemala cannot prove that it provided access to the file because it does not keep a register, Mexico
does have evidence of the authority's refusal to grant access to the file (at least one case among many).
The notarial deed, which we shall discuss further on, provides public certification that the Ministry of
Economy denied Cruz Azul access to the file.
6.821 Secondly, Guatemala argues that there are various Cruz Azul documents which refer to
evidence in the files. This argument does not prove that Cruz Azul was given full access to the file.
Guatemala does not mention specific cases in which access was granted, let alone full access;
because it may have given such an opportunity on limited occasions does not mean that it complied
with its obligations under the cited Articles.
6.822 Guatemala then goes on to mention that the Director of Economic Integration decided, in a
resolution dated 6 December 1996, to prepare a technical study, announcing that it was possible to
request copies. To this, Mexico replies that it is not up to the Director of Economic Integration to
announce the opportunity of access to specific documents; access is a right of the parties which
should not be granted for certain documents, but should be granted for the entire file. Worse still, the
example cited by Guatemala shows that access to the documents was denied during the procedure;
this resolution of 6 December 1996 refers to the technical study which reportedly contained the
essential facts that would allegedly be furnished to Cruz Azul. However, Guatemala did not hand
over the technical study until 31 January 1997, i.e. the document mentioned by Guatemala as an
example of access to the information in the file was not transmitted to Cruz Azul until 1 day after the
publication of the public notice of conclusion of the investigation and of imposition of the definitive
anti-dumping duties.
6.823 Finally, Guatemala cites its domestic legislation, an argument that only serves to confirm that
Guatemala not only violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but also violated its domestic legislation.
(ii) Arguments by Guatemala concerning the notarial deed showing denial of access to the file560
6.824 On 4 November 1996, a notary public provided certification that the staff of the Ministry of
the Economy had denied Cruz Azul access to the file.
6.825 Guatemala's first argument against this evidence is that it was never submitted to the Ministry
of the Economy. We would like to stress that Guatemala is once again trying to justify its failure to
comply with the Anti-Dumping Agreement by invoking the theories of estoppel and acquiescence.
We have already sufficiently proven that these theories are inoperative in the present case.561
6.826 Guatemala then goes on to state that "even if it were true, as Mexico would have it, that the
Ministry was unable to make the file available on the date indicated (which Guatemala does not
accept) …" Here, we would like to stress that Guatemala is once again trying to justify its violation
through the alleged nullity of its acts, since it is not Mexico that is arguing, but Guatemala through its
notary public. Guatemala cannot argue that its own acts are invalid, and then use them at its
convenience in the present case.

559 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 293.
560 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 294.
561 See the relevant arguments in the "General Comments" section as well as the arguments concerning
Article 5.5 in this second written submission by Mexico.

6.827 Finally, Guatemala assures us that "at this stage of the proceeding [about 4 November 1996],
Cruz Azul did not request copies of any document ... ". Once again, Guatemala is using sophisms and
lies as a means of bending the facts to suit itself. Mexico did request copies of the documents
submitted by Cementos Progreso, since it did not have them at that time; for example, on
13 November 1996 Cruz Azul requested all of the information submitted by Cementos Progreso. The
request was not met.
(iii) Guatemala's arguments concerning the refusal to provide Cruz Azul with the document
submitted by Cementos Progreso during the public hearing
562
6.828 During the public hearing of 19 December 1996, Cruz Azul requested access to the document
submitted on the same day by Cementos Progreso. The Ministry of the Economy refused this access,
on the grounds that there were confidential elements. A copy of the document was provided to
Cruz Azul on 8 January 1997.
6.829 Firstly, Guatemala adduces that the public hearing was not intended to be a discussion; the
parties were only meant to present their conclusions (final pleadings). Mexico replies that the fact
that the public hearing was not a discussion does not authorize Guatemala to deny Cruz Azul access to
a document submitted by Cementos Progreso. Guatemala had an obligation to make every document
submitted by Cementos Progreso available to Cruz Azul. Thus, the justification put forward by
Guatemala does not constitute sufficient reason for violating the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.830 Secondly, Guatemala cannot conclude that a document contains confidential information
simply because it was lengthily written, as it states in paragraph 296 of its first submission. In that
case, Guatemala should have proceeded according to the confidential information provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. In this connection we refer to the arguments on confidential information
in this second written submission by Mexico.
6.831 Finally, Guatemala argues that Cruz Azul received the document submitted by Cementos
Progreso one week before issuing the final determination.
563 T h i s a r g u m e n t m e r e l y r e v e a l s y e t
another contradiction in Guatemala's reasoning. It cannot be argued that Cruz Azul was given the
opportunity to review the document in question when Guatemala submitted it one week before the
public notice of conclusion of the investigation and imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duties
was issued. This is one more example of Guatemala's denial of access to information submitted by
Cementos Progreso.
(iv) Arguments by Guatemala concerning the alleged accessibility to the file during the final stage
of the investigation
564
6.832 Guatemala argues that prior to the date at which the parties had to submit their final pleadings
and before the final technical study was presented, the parties were reminded that they had the right to
obtain any document in the file.
6.833 In this case, we would like to revert to Cruz Azul's request for copies of 13 November 1996.
Guatemala cannot support its claim that it offered certified copies when it did not provide Cruz Azul
with the copies requested on 13 November 1996. Moreover, Guatemala has not substantiated its
statement since it did not provide any document confirming this offer of copies. Finally, assuming for
the sake of argument that Guatemala did make this offer, this would not constitute sufficient evidence
that it respected the principle of accessibility for Cruz Azul to the copies during the course of the
investigation, since the alleged offer was only made at the end of the investigation. Thus, Mexico

562 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 295.
563 Ibid., paragraph 296.
564 Ibid., paragraph 297.

wonders why Guatemala does not substantiate its claim and explain what took place during the rest of
the investigation.
6.834 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Guatemala violated Article 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the one hand, Guatemala did not refute the evidence and the
arguments presented in the first part of this section, which in itself is sufficient confirmation that it
violated the said Articles. On the other hand, Guatemala's arguments, in addition to being weak, are
inoperative, as shown above.
3. Claims Under Article 6.6 and Paragraph 7 of Annex II – Accuracy of Information
Supplied by Cementos Progreso
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.835 The following are Mexico's arguments under Article 6.6 and paragraph 7 of Annex II
regarding the accuracy of information supplied by Cementos Progreso:
6.836 The Ministry violated Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement by not satisfying itself as to the
accuracy of the information supplied by Cementos Progreso and used by the Ministry for the purposes
of its final determination.
6.837 Article 6.6. obliges the authorities to satisfy them selves as to the accuracy of the information
received during the investigation, especially the information upon which their findings are based. The
Article states the following:
"6.6. Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 8, the authorities shall
during the course of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the
information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based."
(Emphasis added.)
6.838 The Ministry did not satisfy itself as to the information supplied by Cementos Progreso and
used as a basis for its final affirmative determination. On the one hand, the information it used to
determine the normal value is similar to that subm itted upon initiation of the investigation, i.e. four
alleged invoices, two of which served to initiate the investigation, which did not clearly specify or
identify the product sold.
6.839 The Ministry did not undertake any action that was clearly needed to satisfy itself as to the
accuracy of the information supplied by Cementos Progress to determine the normal value. Indeed,
bearing in mind that in its final determination th e Ministry took a decision according to the best
available information565 within the meaning of Article 6.8 and Annex II to the AD Agreement, the
Ministry violated paragraph 7 of Annex II, which pr ovides the following, by not acting with special
circumspection when determining the normal value:

565 The following appears in the Considerations section, part B. Determination of dumping, of the
notice of conclusion of the investigation, which determined the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties:
"6. … this Ministry considers that the information submitted by the exporter cannot be taken into
account when calculating the normal value of the product investigated because it could not be verified and the
technical evidence submitted by the exporter on 18 D ecember 1996 (confidential information) could not replace
verification of the information by the Guatemalan investig ating authority, as required by Article 6.6 of the Anti-
Dumping Code (sic)." (The footnote has been omitted.)
"7. Consequently, on the basis of Articles 6.6, 6.8 and Annex 2 of the Anti-Dumping Code (sic), this
Ministry considers that the normal value should be calcu lated on the basis of the invoices for purchases on the
Mexican market contained within the file, which are proof of transactions carried out in that market and are the
best available information contained in the file." (Emphasis added.)

"If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in
the application for the initiation of the inve stigation, they should do so with special
circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price
lists, import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from
other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld
from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to
the party than if the party did cooperate." (Emphasis added.)
6.840 As can be seen from the public notice of conclusion of the investigation, the Ministry did not
comply with its obligations, it simply did not check or ascertain the accuracy of the information
supplied by Cementos Progreso (two of the alleged invoices) and the other two alleged invoices,
whose source was neither justified nor explained, and did not consider them in the light of other
information from other independent sources.
6.841 The Ministry did not act with special circumspection either in its final determination, fully
aware that the type and amount of information (two alleged invoices) supplied by Cementos Progress
were neither sufficient nor precise enough to permit initiation of the investigation, and in the final
stage it considered accurate and adequate four alleged invoices, including the two original ones, when
such documentation was neither accurate nor representative of Cruz Azul’s sales on the domestic
market nor a sufficient basis for its findings in the final determination of the normal value.
6.842 In addition, the Panel should turn to section E.1 of this first written submission by Mexico,
which sets out the arguments on the inaccuracy of the documentation used by the Ministry for its final
determination of the normal value.
6.843 For the foregoing reasons, the Ministry of the Economy, by not checking the information
supplied during the investigation and by not acting with special circumspection in determining the
normal value, violated Article 6.6 and paragraph 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement.
6.844 With regard to the volume of allegedly dumped imports used as a basis for the affirmative
determination of injury, the Ministry did not satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information
supplied during the investigation, so it violated Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement by not considering
whether there had been a significant increase in imports in absolute terms as there is a marked
difference between growth in absolute terms and a ra te of growth, as indicated in Article 3.7(i) of the
Agreement.
6.845 The calculations made in order to obtain the increase in the volume of imports of grey
Portland cement from Mexico for the purposes of the final determination are not accurate, however,
and are even wrong because the Ministry confined itself to obtaining the maximum and minimum
amounts imported during the investigation period instead of the import trend in absolute terms or
relative to the previous comparable period, which in this case would be 1 June 1994 to 31 May 1995.
6.846 Moreover, the figures for imports obtained by the Ministry are not accurate and are indeed
wrong because tariff heading 2523.29.00 of the Central American Tariff System, which includes grey
Portland cement, also covers products other than that investigated. Nevertheless, the Ministry
improperly considered that all imports under this tariff heading corresponded to the product
investigated.
6.847 Even more serious is the fact that the Ministry considered that the total volume of imports
under the tariff heading over the period January-June 1996 corresponded to the product of Mexican

origin without taking account of the fact that imports of grey Portland cement from other sources
entered Guatemala during this period.
6.848 Consequently, the Ministry made its final determination without giving due consideration to
the information received during the investigation and without checking its accuracy in the light of the
claims made by Cementos Progreso, which led to an incorrect determination of the volume of imports
of grey Portland cement from Mexico inasmuch as it did not exclude imports from other sources nor
other types of cement, for example, grey cement or slow-setting cement imported under the same
tariff heading.
6.849 The Ministry did not satisfy itself either as to the accuracy of the information on clinker
inventories supplied by Cementos Progreso and accepted during the investigation, thus violating
Article 6.6.
6.850 In order to demonstrate the Ministry of the Economy’s non-compliance, it should be noted
that the Ministry did not examine the trend in inventories of grey Portland cement and instead limited
itself to indicating that clinker, an input used in cement production, accumulated from August 1995
onwards. The Ministry was therefore not in a position to determine that inventories of the like
domestic product might have been affected as a result of the imports from Mexico.
6.851 As a result of these arguments, it may justifiably be concluded that, by not satisfying itself as
to the accuracy of the information received during the investigation, the Ministry acted in a manner
inconsistent with Article 6.6 and paragraph 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.852 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments under Article 6.6 and paragraph 7 of Annex II to
the AD Agreement as follows:
6.853 Mexico alleges that the Ministry violated Article 6.6 by not satisfying itself as to the accuracy
of the four invoices submitted by Cementos Progreso which were used for calculating the normal
value in the final determination of dumping. There is no support for Mexico's allegation in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
6.854 Under Article 6.6, the Ministry was required to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the
information supplied by Cementos Progreso upon which its findings were based "except in
circumstances provided for in paragraph 8". Paragraph 8 was in fact applicable to the calculation of
the normal value because Cruz Azul had refused to provide necessary information and had
significantly impeded the investigation by refusing to permit verification of the information which
would have been used to establish the normal value. Thus, under Article 6.8, the Ministry was
authorized to calculate the normal value on the basis of the facts available. What is more, under
paragraph 7 of Annex II, since Cruz Azul did not cooperate and withheld relevant information from
the authorities, the Ministry was authorized to use th e facts available, even if that could have led to a
result less favourable to Cruz Azul than if that party had cooperated.
6.855 As stated in the case United States – DRAM:
"Article 6.6 simply requires Members to 'satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the
information'. In our view, Members could 'satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the
information' in a number of ways without proceeding to some type of formal verification,
including, for example, reliance on the reputation of the original source of the information.
Indeed, we consider that anti-dumping investigations would become totally unmanageable if

investigating authorities were required to actually verify the accuracy of all information relied
on."566
In the investigation in question, the Ministry did not use unfounded allegations of the
applicant as available facts for calculating the no rmal value. On the contrary, it used documentary
evidence – four invoices. During the course of the investigation, Mexico did not suggest that the
documents used by the Ministry were fraudulent. The Ministry used these documents instead of
relying on the information of Cruz Azul itself, as it did in the preliminary determination, because Cruz
Azul refused to supply the information requested and refused to permit a verification visit in the final
phase of the investigation. Accordingly, Mexico cannot complain that the Ministry used documentary
evidence as available information for computing the normal value.
6.856 Next, Mexico alleges that the Ministry did not satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the
information supplied during the investigation with regard to the volume of allegedly dumped imports.
In fact, as explained above, the Ministry used the information supplied by Cruz Azul itself for
calculating the volume of dumped imports. The Ministry did not take into account imports from other
countries or imports of other types of cement not subject to investigation. On the basis of Cruz Azul's
own information, the Directorate found that imports had increased from 140 tons in June 1995 to
25,079 tons in May 1996. The maximum volume of imports was recorded in May 1996 when it rose
to 45,859 tons. In the light of this irrefutable evidence Guatemala cannot understand why Mexico has
chosen to argue this point before the panel. As such, Guatemala complied with Article 6.6 in
establishing the volume of imports.
6.857 Mexico also claims that the Ministry did not confirm the authenticity of the information
supplied by Cementos Progreso with regard to its inventories. Specifically, Mexico again complains
that the Ministry relied on clinker inventories instead of cement inventories. As explained above,
clinker inventories are highly relevant for evaluating the performance of a cement producer. Clinker
is used only for making cement and can be stored in greater quantities than the finished cement. As
such, Guatemala complied with Article 6.6 in establishing Cementos Progreso's clinker inventories.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.858 Mexico makes the following rebuttals with respect to the accuracy of the information on
which the authority based its findings throughout the various stages of the investigation:
6.859 Guatemala argues that it was not required to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information
submitted by Cementos Progreso on which its findings were based
567 since Cruz Azul refused to
provide the information it required and refused to allo w the verification visit to take place, so that the
investigating authority proceeded in accordance with Article 6.8.
6.860 Mexico submits that Cruz Azul did not obstruct the verification for the reasons given in
Mexico's first written submission 568, in the Section concerning the on-the-spot investigation.
Similarly, Mexico submits that the Ministry was required to satisfy itself at the various stages of the
investigation (initiation, preliminary and final) as to the accuracy of the information, above all in view
of the differences and discrepancies in the information as indicated in the sections on dumping.
6.861 Regarding the final determination, if we assume that Guatemala acted in accordance with
Article 6.8, Mexico submits that Guatemala should have proceeded in conformity with Annex II,
paragraph 7 in determining the normal value, i.e. with special circumspection, since the information

566 United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
(DRAMS) of one Megabit or above from Korea. WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999, paragraph 6.78.
567 Ibid., paragraphs 300 and 301.
568 First written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 383 et seq.

on normal value, four alleged invoices, only certified the sale of one sack or load of cement each.
Moreover, the Ministry never justified or explained the origin of the two alleged invoices used in its
final determination, nor did it consider them in the light of other information from other independent
sources, as also provided for in paragraph 7 of Annex II.
6.862 With respect to the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, Guatemala asserts that the
Ministry did not take account of imports from other countries or imports of other types of cement not
subject to investigation.569 However, the Ministry improperly considered that all imports under tariff
heading 2523.29.00 corresponded to the product investigated, when in fact, products other than grey
Portland cement were being imported under the same tariff heading. 570 Nor did Guatemala satisfy
itself that the imports under that tariff heading during the period January-June 1996 did not also
correspond to grey Portland cement of other origins, not only Mexican.
6.863 At the same time, with respect to the clin ker inventories considered by the Ministry,
Guatemala asserts that they were highly relevant for evaluating the performance of a cement producer,
since clinker is used only for making cement and can be stored in greater quantities than finished
cement.
571
6.864 Mexico submits that the analysis of the inventories of clinker, an input used in manufacturing
cement, shows that the Ministry neither analysed nor ascertained the behaviour of grey Portland
cement inventories, nor was it in a position to determine whether these inventories might have been
affected as a result of the Mexican imports.572
6.865 Finally, Mexico submits that by failing to satisf y itself as to the accuracy of the information
which served as a basis for the findings of its final determination or, if applicable, by not acting with
special circumspection and checking the information from other independent sources, Guatemala
acted in violation of Article 6.6 and paragraph 7 of Annex II.
4. Claims Under Articles 6.1 and Paragraph 1 of Annex II – Guatemala's Extension of the
Investigation Period
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.866 Mexico argues that the Guatemalan Ministry extended the investigation period without any
legal justification and without consulting or prop erly notifying Cruz Azul. Its arguments are as
follows:
(i) Facts
6.867 On 17 November 1995, the Ministry of the Economy’s advisers recommended opening the
investigation procedure, considering that the inve stigation and examination of evidence should cover
the period 1 June to 30 November 1995. The questionn aire submitted by Cruz Azul also mentioned
this period. Subsequently, the preliminary determination of 28 August 1996 fixed the period
mentioned as the investigation period. The provisional duties were in fact imposed on the basis of the
evidence submitted for this period.
6.868 Nevertheless, on 4 October 1996, i.e. nine months after the public notice of initiation had
been published and three months prior to publication of the final determination, Guatemala issued an
official letter containing its decision to extend the original investigation period from 1 December 1995

569 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 302.
570 First written submission by Mexico, paragraph 349.
571 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 303.
572 First written submission by Mexico, paragraph 353.

to 31 May 1996, i.e. the period investigated was now to be 1 June 1995 to 31 May 1996. As a result,
on 14 October 1996, the Ministry requested Cruz Azul to supply information for the new investigation
period.
6.869 The Ministry of the Economy’s letter of 4 October 1996 itself shows that a request for
extension of the investigation period had been submitted by Cementos Progreso on 1 October that
year. The Ministry’s letter stated the following:
"… Regarding the extension of the investigation period, this cannot be accepted in the
form requested because the period must be continuous. This Department will
therefore extend the period from 1 December 1995 to 31 May 1996 in the request for
additional information."
6.870 The Ministry decided to extend the period without justification or any legal grounds, and
without consulting Cruz Azul. In its letters of 30 October and 13 November 1996, Cruz Azul stated
that Cementos Progreso had not provided any technical or legal grounds for extending the
investigation period, for which it should have presented evidence of dumping, injury and a causal
relationship, it also specifically requested that the extension of the investigation period be declared
without effect and that the period originally fixed be confirmed, but the Ministry disregarded this
request.
6.871 Finally, in a communication dated 2 December 1996, the Government of Mexico expressed
its disagreement with the extension of the investigation period.
(ii) Guatemala did not specify the information act ually required from Cruz Azul as soon as
possible after having initiated the investigation, in violation of paragraph 1 of Annex II to the
AD Agreement
6.872 Paragraph 1 of Annex II to the AD Agreement provides the following:
"1. As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating
authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested party,
and the manner in which that information should be structured by the interested party
in its response. The authorities should al so ensure that the party is aware that if
information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to
make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in
the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry."
6.873 As can be seen, Guatemala first sought information from Cruz Azul on the extended period in
its letter dated 14 October 1996, i.e. nine months after publication of the initiation decision and three
months prior to publishing the final determination.
6.874 This clearly shows that Guatemala did not specify in detail the information actually required
from Cruz Azul as soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation. It did so when the
investigation was already fairly advanced, when provisional anti-dumping duties had been applied for
over a month and a short time before the investigation ended. The extension of the investigation
period in itself is a violation of paragraph 1 of Annex II. Cruz Azul had already had several meetings
with the investigating authority and had transmitted information concerning the investigation.
6.875 This new requirement not only violates the letter of paragraph 1 of Annex II but is also
contrary to the logic of the structure of investigations. Changing the investigation period between the
preliminary and final decisions can completely distort the procedure because the bases used to
determine dumping, injury or threat of injury and the causal relationship between the dumping and the

injury or threat of injury will not be the same. Nevertheless, this is not the substantive problem in this
case.
6.876 The problem here goes beyond a straightforward modification of the investigation period
because the Guatemalan authority made a preliminary determination on the bases of biased data that
exceeded the investigation period it had itself established and went against the interests of the
exporter, without any substance or reason. As the determination shows, the only party that supplied
information concerning the extended period was the applicant, a fact that once again shows the
partiality with which the Ministry of the Economy conducted this investigation.
573
(iii) Guatemala did not notify Cruz Azul of the information required by the authorities or give it
ample opportunity to present in writing all the evidence it considered relevant, in violation of
Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement. Nor did it give Cruz Azul full opportunity for the defence of
its interests, in violation of Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement
6.877 Article 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD agreement provide the following:
"6.1. All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of
the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in
question.
…
6.2. Throughout the anti-dumping investigation, all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on
request, provide opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with
adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments
offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the need to preserve
confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation on
any party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that
party’s case. Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present
other information orally."
6.878 Whereas Article 6.1 gives interested parties the right to be notified of the information required
by the authorities and ample opportunity to be heard in connection with the investigation, Article 6.2
also gives the parties an opportunity to defend their interests during the proceedings. In other words,
the AD Agreement guarantees Cruz Azul’s right to be informed of the other party’s arguments and to
be heard by the authority in defence of its interests.
6.879 The Ministry’s decision extending the investigation period is so inadequate that Cruz Azul
could not have known the legal grounds nor the justification for which Cementos Progreso sought
extension of the investigation period, on the one hand, and why the Ministry decided in favour of
Cementos Progreso, on the other. Even more serious is the fact that the Ministry did not reply to the
requests from Cruz Azul for information on extensi on of the period or for confirmation of the period
fixed when the investigation was initiated. In fact, at no time was Cruz Azul given the opportunity to
make comments or provide evidence that would allow proper defence of its interests.

573 Despite not having reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping for the period
subsequent to the investigation, the attempt to attribute the alleged adverse effects on the domestic industry
violates Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.

6.880 Cruz Azul, being precluded from meeting the requirements relating to the new period,
responded fully concerning the period fixed at the initiation of the investigation, thus showing that it
was ready to cooperate provided that its rights were respected.
6.881 The fact that the investigating authority took such an important decision during the
investigation, modifying the investigation period without giving the exporting firm a proper
opportunity to present what, in its opinion, had been agreed before the decision to extend the
investigation period had been taken, is clearly a denial of the opportunity that Cruz Azul should have
been given to present the evidence it considered relevant and consequently to defend its interests.
6.882 Guatemala not only failed to give the exporter an opportunity to put forward arguments
against its decision but also sought full information concerning the extended period, imposing an
excessive and unreasonable burden on the exporter. As it had prepared information in response to the
original questionnaire, it is obvious that Cruz Azul’s involvement in the proceedings was solely based
on that information.
6.883 The fact that the Ministry of the Economy extended the investigation period in the form and
at the stage it did leads to the assumption that, when making its preliminary determination, it did not
have relevant and adequate evidence to determine threat of material injury, and in fact it did not have
such evidence. This is borne out by an examination of the inadequate preliminary determination of
threat of injury and the corresponding change in the final determination in which the Ministry
determines material injury without having adequate information and evidence to show that the
domestic industry was affected, even at the cost of violating the principles and precepts in Article 6.1
and 6.2, as well as paragraph 1 of Annex II to the AD Agreement.
6.884 If the foregoing does not suffice, the fact that the authority did not mention the justification or
the legal grounds on which it extended the investigation period is a clear demonstration of the
partiality of the Guatemalan investigating authority and the lack of objectiveness with which it
accepted the applicant’s request, possibly with the intention of defending the latter’s interests.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.885 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments regarding the alleged violations of Article 6.1
and 6.2 and paragraph 1 of Annex II as follows:
6.886 Mexico claims that Guatemala violated Article 6.1 and 6.2 and paragraph 1 of Annex II to the
Agreement by extending the investigation period by six months. There is no support for this
argument in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.887 Neither Article 6.1 nor Article 6.2 nor paragraph 1 of Annex II nor any other provision of the
Agreement imposes any requirement on the investigating authority with respect to the period to be
investigated. The investigation period will vary from case to case and its length is left to the
discretion of the investigating authority. Nor doe s the Agreement prohibit the investigating authority
from using different investigation periods for the preliminary and final determinations. Guatemala
understands that it is common practice for the invest igating authorities in other countries to gather
more information in the final phase of the investigation in order that the final determination may be
based on more up-to-date information. In fact, Article 76 of the Regulations implementing the
Mexican Foreign Trade Act states that "the period of investigation to which the foregoing paragraph
refers may be modified at the discretion of the Ministry to cover a period which includes imports
made subsequent to the commencement of the investigation". 574 Subsequently, Mexico confirmed

574 G/ADP/N/1MEX/1 (18 May 1995).

that "Article 76 of the Regulations empowers the in vestigating authority to extend the investigation
period, where necessary".575
6.888 In the present case, the Ministry initially established the investigation period as the period
from 1 June to 30 November 1995. In a submission dated 18 September 1996, Cementos Progreso
asked the Ministry to extend the investigation period for the final determination so as to include the
period from 1 January to 30 June 1996 in order that the final determination might be based on more
recent evidence of the existence of dumping and consequent injury. With respect to dumping,
Cementos Progreso submitted evidence showing th at the margin of dumping had increased since
November 1995, the period considered in the preliminary investigation. Specifically, during 1996,
prices in Mexico had increased substantially, whereas the prices of exports to Guatemala had
remained unchanged. With respect to consequent injury, Cementos Progreso indicated that massive
imports during 1996 – subsequent to the preliminary investigation period (June–November 1995) –
were causing it material injury. In other words, the threat of material injury identified in the
application had turned into actual material injury during 1996. Accordingly, the Ministry asked for
additional information for the period from 1 December 1995 to 31 May 1996, but not for the period
from January 1995 to June 1996, as Cementos Progreso had requested.
6.889 Mexico claims that the supplementary questionnaire requesting information for the extended
investigation period imposed an excessive and unreasonable burden on Cruz Azul. However, Cruz
Azul made no such claim at the time and did not request an extension of the period for replying to the
questionnaire. The panel will recall that the Ministry granted Cruz Azul, in accordance with its own
request, an extension of several months to reply to the original questionnaire. Far from seeking an
extension to complete the questionnaire, Cruz Azul simply objected to having to submit the
information requested.
6.890 Mexico alleges that the extension of the investigation period was in itself a violation of
paragraph 1 of Annex II, since the Ministry did not specify all the information required from Cruz
Azul as soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation. This is an absurd proposition.
According to Mexico, an investigating authority could never ask for information additional to that
required at the time of initiation of the investigation. Mexico would prevent the investigating
authority from gathering additional information during the final phase of the investigation.
6.891 If paragraph 1 of Annex II were understood to prevent the investigating authority from
gathering additional information, including information from the most recent period, other provisions
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement would be compromised, such as Articles 7.4 and 9.1 (information
necessary to determine whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to
remove injury) and Article 10.2 (post-provisional information necessary to determine the effect of the
imports).
576 Certainly, the implementation of these provisions would be more difficult, if not
impossible, if the investigating authorities were unable to seek additional information for making
these determinations. Moreover, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, particularly with respect to the threat
of injury, recognizes the importance of using as much up-to-date information as possible. An
interpretation of paragraph 1 of Annex II that made it impossible for the investigating authorities to
gather up-to-date information would certainly be inco mpatible with the spirit of the Agreement. In
the alternate, if the Agreement were interpreted as permitting the authorities to make only one request
for information, the investigating authorities wo uld make their requests for information excessively
long. Such an outcome would be of benefit to no one.

575 G/ADP/W/66 (25 October 1995).
576 As already noted on various occasions in the course of Guatemala's submission, in international law
it has been established that "an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole
clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility". Report of the Appellate Body, United States –
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, page 23.

6.892 Finally, contrary to what Mexico alleges, Guatemala notified Cruz Azul of the information
requested and granted Cruz Azul ample opportunity to submit in writing all the evidence it considered
appropriate. The Ministry issued a supplementary questionnaire and supplied it to Cruz Azul, which
obviously alerted it to the information that was being requested. The Ministry set 30 October 1996 as
the deadline for replying to the questionnaire and Cruz Azul did not ask for an extension of that
deadline. Moreover, on 30 October Cruz Azul lodg ed a voluminous submission containing pleadings
and evidence, together with its replies to the questionnaire. Thus, Cruz Azul had ample opportunity to
incorporate any information it chose in the investigation file. Instead, as described below, Cruz Azul
took the decision not to supply the information requested by the Ministry and not to cooperate with
the verification. Thus, the Ministry was obliged to use the facts available for its final determination.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.893 Mexico maintains that Guatemala has not refuted the argument that it violated Article 6.1 and
6.2, and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement by extending the period of investigation
without justification. It makes the following arguments in this regard:
6.894 Mexico's position, which has not been refuted by Guatemala, is based on two arguments:
577
Guatemala did not justify, either in fact or in law, its extension of the investigation
period; moreover, Guatemala failed to comply with paragraph 1 of Annex II. In this
case, the first request to Cruz Azul concerning the extended period was made on
14 October 1996.
As regards the decision to extend the investigation period, contrary to Article 6.1,
Guatemala did not grant Cruz Azul the right to receive notice of the information
which the authorities required or ample opportunity to present its evidence. Contrary
to Article 6.2 it also failed to give Cruz Azul a full opportunity for the defence of its
interests. In other words, Guatemala did not grant Cruz Azul the right to familiarize
itself with the arguments of the opposing party or to be heard by the authority in
defence of its interests in connection with the decision to extend the investigation
period. Thus Guatemala violated Article 61. and 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
6.895 We shall provide evidence below of the weakness of Guatemala's arguments in justifying its
violations it committed in extending the investigation period.
(i) Extension of the period of investigation
6.896 Guatemala argues that there is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement which imposes any
requirements with respect to the period to be investigated. The Anti-Dumping Agreement does not
prohibit the use of different investigation periods for the preliminary and final determination.
Furthermore, Mexico permits changes in the investigation period.
578 Mexico replies that the fact that
the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prohibit the kind of change in the investigation period made
by Guatemala does not necessarily mean that it permits such a change. The Ministry of the Economy,
as the investigating authority, has the obligation to justify its acts in fact and in law, on the basis of the
applicable legislation, in this case, the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Mexican legislation has nothing to
do with this case.

577 Ibid., paragraph 355 et seq.
578 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 305.

(ii) Guatemala violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 by extending the period of investigation
6.897 Cruz Azul was never acquainted with the lega l basis on which Cementos Progreso requested
an extension of the investigation period. Cementos Progreso's written request for an extension of the
period of investigation does not show cause, in fact or in law, for making the request. Worse still, the
Ministry of the Economy did not justify to Cruz Azul, either in fact or in law, its decision to extend
the investigation period. Accordingly, Cruz Azul was not afforded an opportunity to make
observations or submit evidence on the extension, since Cruz Azul could not defend itself against
something that was unknown to it. Hence, the procedural principles of equity and transparency were
violated. What is more, not only was Cruz Azul given no opportunity to present arguments against
the decision to extend the period but the Ministry of the Economy also placed an excessive and
unreasonable burden on it. Lastly, Guatemala cannot show cause for any act whereby it violated
transparency and equity to the detriment of Cruz Azul, and still less by merely submitting Annex
MEXICO-39 as evidence.
579
6.898 Actually, it may be inferred a posteriori that Guatemala extended the investigation period
because it did not have sufficient relevant evidence to determine the existence of a threat of material
injury. This is reflected in the faulty determination of threat of injury in the preliminary
determination, and in the change from a threat of injury to injury in the final determination.
Guatemala tried, though unsuccessfully, to find elem ents of injury at any cost and did not mind
violating Article 6.1 and 6.2 to the detriment of Cruz Azul.
6.899 Finally, Guatemala is again endeavouring to justify its violations by contending that Cruz
Azul did not challenge them when Guatemala committed them. Our repeated answer to Guatemala is
that the principles of acquiescence and estoppel do not apply in the present case.
580
6.900 Consequently, Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and paragraph 1 of Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the one hand, Guatemala was not entitled to extend the investigation
period, since it did not justify such a course either in fact or in law; on the other, in the determination
to extend the investigation period Guatemala did not afford Cruz Azul an opportunity to be heard or to
defend its interests, because Cruz Azul was unable even to find out the basis for extending the
investigation period.
5. Claims Under Article 2.1 and 2.2 – Guatemala's Request for Information on Production
Costs From Cruz Azul
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.901 Mexico argues that Guatemala's request for info rmation on production costs from Cruz Azul
violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD Agreement. The following are Mexico's arguments in support
of its claims:
6.902 During the final phase of the investigation, after having imposed a provisional anti-dumping
measure, the Ministry requested from Cruz Azul information, inter alia, on production costs for the
investigation period fixed upon initiation of the investigation and for the extended period, even though
the Ministry gave no justification or grounds for doing so.
6.903 On 14 October 1996, the Ministry made a request to the applicant and Cruz Azul for the
purpose of updating the information supplied to the Ministry and asking for information for the period

579 See Mexico's replies to Panel questions 4 and 14 of 18 February 2000.
580 See the arguments set out in the "General Comments" section as well as those concerning
Article 5.5 in this second written submission by Mexico.

1 December 1995 to 31 May 1996, covering the original period and the extended period. In its
request, the Ministry asked Cruz Azul to supply information on production costs:
"In order to pursue the investigation initiated on 11 January of this year:
Requires the firm Cooperativa La Cruz Azul, S.C.L., and the domestic producer to
update the information supplied to the Ministry of the Economy to include
information for the period 1 December 1995 to 31 May 1996.
In addition, requires the firm Cooperativa La Cruz Azul, S.C.L. to provide the
following information and documentation:
…
Production costs, per metric tonne, for Type II Pz and Type I PM cements, indicating
separately the cost of the raw materials and labour (variable costs). The report should
contain information for both plants: Hidalgo and Lagunas Oaxaca and show the
weighted average of the variable cost for both plants."
6.904 As can be seen from the above, there is no justification nor any grounds for the request to
Cruz Azul for information on production costs. However, even assuming that the extension of the
investigation period was acceptable, this argument in itself would not be sufficient to require
information on costs.
6.905 The request made to Cruz Azul is unjustified for the following reasons.
(i) The application for an investigation made by Cementos Progreso did not include a
claim of selling below cost. Implicitly, the applicant acknowledged the prices to be
valid because they were in the course of normal commercial transactions and it only
argued that the price at which the product investigated was exported to Guatemala
was lower than the price at which it was sold on the Mexican domestic market.
Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD Agreement set out the methodology to be used to
determine the alleged dumping and the information that has to be required:
2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as
being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one
country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country.
2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of
trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the
particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic
market of the exporting country, such sales do not permit a proper
comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with
a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third
country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost of
production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for
administrative, selling and general costs and for profits." (The footnote has
been omitted.)

(ii) Based on this, the Ministry only received information on prices from Cruz Azul so in
the administrative file on the case there is no information nor arguments justifying the
Ministry’s request to Cruz Azul for information on costs referred to in Article 2.2.1 of
the AD Agreement.
(iii) In the preliminary determination imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty, a
dumping margin has been calculated for Cruz Azul using price information specific
to the firm.
6.906 It is obvious that the Ministry decided to as k Cruz Azul for information on production costs
even though Cementos Progreso had not claimed that Cruz Azul’s sales on the Mexican domestic
market were below production costs. The Ministry had no grounds nor any basis to justify the request
to Cruz Azul for additional information.
6.907 The absence of claims by the applicant and justification or grounds by the Ministry can be
seen in the notice of conclusion of the investigat ion because in its final determination the Ministry
again utilizes information on prices to determine the dumping margin imposed on Cruz Azul in the
absence of any claim that sales were below cost or any information in this respect.
6.908 In the light of the above arguments, it may justifiably be considered that the Ministry of the
Economy’s action in requiring Cruz Azul to provide information on production costs for the original
and extended investigation periods was inconsistent with Article 2.1 and 2.2. of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.909 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 as follows:
6.910 Mexico alleges that the Ministry violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 in requesting information on
production costs from Cruz Azul. According to Mexico, the Ministry did not have the right to request
information on costs, because it was calculating the normal value on the basis of prices in Mexico,
because Cementos Progreso had not alleged that Cruz Azul selling prices were below production costs
and because the preliminary determination of normal value was based on price information.
However, Articles 2.1 and 2.2 clearly do not prevent an investigating authority from gathering cost
information.
6.911 In fact, under the criteria established in Article 2, Cruz Azul's production costs were
extremely relevant. Firstly, Article 2.2.1 provides that sales of the like product in the domestic market
of the exporting country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus
administrative, selling and general costs may be disregarded in determining normal value if they meet
certain requirements. Secondly, Article 2.4 states that in comparing the export price and the normal
value, due allowance shall be made for differences in physical characteristics that affect price
comparability. In the present investigation, Cruz Azul replied to the initial anti-dumping
questionnaire by providing a list of sales of Type II and Type II Pz cement on the domestic market
and export sales of Type 1 (PM) cement. It claimed that the cement sold in Mexico had a higher
production cost.
581 Consequently, as it was necessary, it was entirely appropriate for the Ministry to
seek to know the variable cost of producing the cement sold in Mexico and the cement sold in
Guatemala in order to make an adjustment for physical differences.
6.912 The Ministry requested information on product ion costs from Cruz Azul in Section C2,
Part 3.5 of the original questionnaire submitted on 26 January and in Section 2(f) of the
supplementary questionnaire submitted on 14 October. Cruz Azul failed to supply its production

581 However, in its reply to the supplementary questionnaire, Cruz Azul indicated that any differences
between the cement sold in Mexico and that exported to Guatemala were insignificant.

costs in replying to the original questionnaire. It gave only a partial reply (for one of two plants) to
the supplementary questionnaire.
6.913 Cruz Azul's reluctance to provide information on production costs for both plants prevented
the Ministry from determining whether Cruz Azul's sales were below cost and from calculating any
adjustment for the alleged difference in physical characteristics between the product sold in Mexico
and the product exported to Guatemala.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.914 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's arguments dealing with its claims under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 as
follows:
6.915 Guatemala states that Articles 2.1 and 2.2 do not prevent an authority from gathering
information on production costs and, as part of the same argument, asserts that pursuant to Article 2.4
allowance shall be made for differences in characteristics that have a bearing on the comparability of
export prices and the normal value. Guatemala says that Cruz Azul answered the questionnaire by
providing a list of sales of Type II and Type II Pz cement on the domestic market and export sales of
Type I (PM) cement, that Cruz Azul claimed the cement sold in Mexico had a higher production cost
and, accordingly, it was appropriate for the Ministry to find out the variable cost of producing cement
sold in Mexico and the cement sold in Guatemala in order to make an adjustment for physical
differences.
582
6.916 In this connection, Mexico reiterates that Cementos Progreso made no argument to the effect
that Cruz Azul's selling prices were below its production costs and that the preliminary determination
of normal value was based on price information; for these reasons, it is unjustified and inappropriate
for Guatemala to require Cruz Azul, in the final st age of the investigation, to provide information on
production costs, particularly when no arguments were advanced that the sales were not made in the
ordinary course of trade.
6.917 The argument whereby Guatemala seeks to justify requiring further cost information in order
to make an adjustment for physical differences is false, mistaken and flimsy if we bear in mind what
the Ministry decided in its preliminary determination and reproduced in the relevant public notice.
6.918 First, in that notice 583 the Ministry determined that there was no price variation between
Type II and Type II Pz cement products, even though Type II has a higher clinker content, wherein
lies the higher production costs of the cement, and second, the Ministry decided on the basis of the
information supplied to it by the interested parties that the product under investigation, Type I (PM)
cement, and the cement sold in Mexico (Type II Pz) are like products.584
6.919 Consequently, Mexico maintains that there was no justification whatsoever for Guatemala
subsequently to submit a request for supplementar y information (14 October 1996) from Cruz Azul,
information on costs whereby it rejected any differences between the product exported to Guatemala
and the product sold in Mexico, and furthermore, that it had no new arguments from Cementos
Progreso to warrant the request for information on production costs.585

582 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 311 and 312.
583 Public notice, section VI.B, "Price comparison".
584 Even though the Ministry did not conduct an examination to determine the likeness of the product
exported to Guatemala and the product sold in Mexico.
585 In any case, to make an adjustment for physical differences, the only thing needed was information
on variable production costs and not on production costs as a whole.

6.920 Despite the fact that Guatemala had no grounds to justify the supplementary request for
information on production costs, in its reply to that request Cruz Azul provided the cost information
from its plant at Lagunas, Oaxaca, because that was the only plant supplying the Guatemalan market,
something it made clear in its reply. 586 However, Guatemala wrongly interprets this by saying that
Cruz Azul provided a partial reply.587
6.921 Again, it is inconsistent for Guatemala to have tried in the verification visit (on-the-spot
investigation) to obtain production cost information at the plant that was not producing the product
under investigation and when it had no below-cost sales arguments and did not recognize in its
preliminary determination that there were physical differences between the products exported to
Guatemala and the one sold in Mexico.
6.922 In short, in the absence of below-cost sales arguments Guatemala did not have grounds to
require production cost information from Cruz Az ul; Guatemala therefore acted in violation of
Article 2.1 and 2.2.
6. Claims Under Article 6.7 and Paragraphs 2, 3, 7, and 8 of Annex I The Verification
Visit to Cruz Azul
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.923 Mexico argues that the Guatemalan Ministry intended to carry out a verification visit to Cruz
Azul in violation of various provisions containe d in Annex I to the AD Agreement, for example, by
not notifying the Government of Mexico of th e participation of non-governmental experts, by
verifying information that had not been supplied by Cruz Azul, and by the fact that the Ministry
intended to conduct the verification visit with the participation of non-governmental experts with an
obvious conflict of interest. Mexico claims that the Ministry’s actions violate Article 6.7 and
paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I to the AD Agreement. Its arguments in this regard are as follows:
6.924 It should be noted that, on 14 October 1996, th e Ministry requested from Cruz Azul certain
information on the original and extended investigation periods covering 1 December 1995 to
31 May 1996. For the reasons and arguments put forward by Cruz Azul in its reply of
30 October 1996 on the impropriety of the Ministry requesting information on a period other than that
originally fixed, Cruz Azul did not provide the Ministry with information on the extended period.
6.925 Subsequently, on 6 November 1996588, the Ministry of the Economy notified Cruz Azul of its
intention to carry out an on-the-spot verification visit, indicating that it would verify information both
for the original investigation period and the extended period.
6.926 On 7 November 1996, Cruz Azul informed the Ministry of its agreement to the verification
visit. Following a review and examination of the Ministry’s notification, however, on
25 November 1996, Cruz Azul sent an official letter stating the following inter alia:
(i) The Ministry could not and should not verify information that had not been supplied
by Cruz Azul for the extended period, in accordance with Article 6.7 and paragraph 7
of Annex I to the AD Agreement;

586 See, Submission by Cruz Azul of 30 October 1996, pp.36-37.
587 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 313.
588 Official letter from the Ministry of the Economy of 31 October 1996, which was notified to Cruz
Azul on 6 November the same year.

(ii) during the verification visit, the Ministry could not and should not be accompanied by
non-governmental experts with an obvious conflict of interest, for which Cruz Azul
submitted relevant proof.
6.927 Cruz Azul requested that, prior to the verification visit, the points mentioned above should be
clarified so as to permit the smooth conduct of the visit. The Ministry did not respond, however, and
did not clarify the essential points raised by Cruz Azul, which is an obvious violation of paragraph 8
of Annex I to the AD Agreement, which provides the following:
"Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and
essential to a successful on-the-spot investigation should, whenever possible, be
answered before the visit is made."
6.928 Even though it had not responded to Cruz Azul, the Ministry wished to carry out the visit to
verify information that had not been supplied by the exporter, with the participation of non-
governmental experts with an obvious conflict of interest and without having obtained the express
agreement of Cruz Azul to these terms, in viol ation of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex I to the AD
Agreement.
6.929 It should be pointed out that the purpose of the verification visit or on-the-spot investigation is
to confirm or verify that the information supplied to the investigating authority by the firm is reliable
and accurate, as is clearly stated in Article 6.7 of the AD Agreement, which provides the following:
"6.7. In order to verify information provided or to obtain further details, the
authorities may carry out investigations in the territory of other Members as required,
provided they obtain the agreement of the firms concerned and notify the
representatives of the government of the Member in question, and unless that
Member objects to the investigation. The procedures described in Annex I shall
apply to investigations carried out in the te rritory of other Members. Subject to the
requirement to protect confidential information, the authorities shall make the results
of any such investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to
paragraph 9, to the firms to which they pertain and may make such results available
to the applicant."
6.930 Paragraph 7 of Annex I confirms the purpose of the visit as set out above by providing that:
"7. … the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify information
provided or to obtain further details…" (Emphasis added.)
6.931 The intention was to conduct the verification visit on the terms indicated by the Ministry in
violation of Article 6.7 and paragraph 7 of Annex I because it would have included a review of
information not provided by Cruz Azul.
6.932 According to paragraph 7 of Annex I, what the Ministry should have verified in this case was
the information provided by Cruz Azul and it should have obtained further details concerning this
information, but under no circumstances was the Ministry entitled to require or review other or even
different information, as was intended in this case.
6.933 As we have already indicated, the purpose of the visit is solely to verify "information
provided" or to "obtain further details" thereon. The AD Agreement does not allow the investigation
to be extended to matters as fundamental as information not provided by the firm. This goes beyond
the obtaining of further details, which by definition concern information already provided and not new
information. A detail cannot go beyond the matter to which it relates.

6.934 On 26 November 1996, the Ministry notified the Government of Mexico of the verification
visit to Cruz Azul. This notification did not, how ever, inform Mexico that non-governmental experts
would participate in the visit, nor did it explain the exceptional circumstances that justified their
participation. This fact was not brought to the attention of Cruz Azul either, so that the Ministry
failed to comply with the obligations imposed by paragraph 2 of Annex I to the AD Agreement.
6.935 The above arguments and reasoning show that the Ministry of the Economy failed to comply
with a number of obligations laid down in the AD Agreement, and more precisely the Ministry’s
action violated Article 6.7 and paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I to the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.936 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to Mexico's claims regarding alleged
violations of the AD Agreement arising from the verification visit:
6.937 According to Mexico, Guatemala violated Article 6.7 and paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I
by not notifying the Government of Mexico of the participation of non-governmental experts, by
verifying information relating to Cruz Azul's production costs, which the latter had not supplied, and
by trying to conduct the verification visit with non-governmental experts subject to conflicts of
interest. These allegations are entirely without foundation.
6.938 Firstly, Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Article 6.7 and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Annex I
by trying to verify information that did not form part of Cruz Azul's reply to the questionnaire.
However, Article 6.7 is silent on the permissible scope of the verification and paragraphs 7 and 8 of
Annex I do not support the Mexican argument.
6.939 The basis of the Mexican argument is that the Ministry sought to verify information which
Cruz Azul had not supplied. Mexico omits to tell the panel that the Ministry had requested the
information in question and Cruz Azul had failed to supply it. Specifically, the Ministry requested
information from Cruz Azul on its production costs in Section C2, Part 3.5 of the original
questionnaire dated 26 January 1996 and in Section 2(f) of the supplementary questionnaire dated
14 October. In its reply to the original questionnai re, Cruz Azul failed to supply information on its
production costs. In its reply to the supplementary questionnaire, Cruz Azul failed to supply cost
information for its two plants. Cruz Azul also refused to provide any information on sales during the
period from 1 December 1995 to 30 May 1996, as requested in Section 2(g) of the supplementary
questionnaire.
6.940 Cruz Azul's reluctance to supply complete information on its production costs at both plants
prevented the Ministry from determining whether Cruz Azul's sales in Mexico were being made at
below cost and from calculating adjustments for differences in physical characteristics between the
product sold in Mexico (Type II PZ) and the product exported to Guatemala (Type I PM). Cruz
Azul's reluctance to supply information on its sales during the period from 1 December 1995 to
30 May 1996 prevented the Ministry from calculating a final margin of dumping based on the latest
information.
6.941 Cruz Azul's failure to provide the information requested would have justified the Ministry in
cancelling the verification visit and proceeding on the basis of the "facts available", in accordance
with Article 6.8. Instead, acting in good faith and allowing Cruz Azul a last chance, the Ministry
decided to obtain the missing information during the verification visit. Paragraph 7 of Annex I
expressly stipulates that prior to the visit the investigation authority should "advise the firms

concerned of the general nature of the information to be verified and of any further information which
needs to be provided".589
6.942 Mexico also claims that the Ministry never responded to the letter from Cruz Azul dated
25 November 1996 in which Cruz Azul set out its conditions for accepting the verification visit.
However, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Annex I, the Ministry replied on 26 November 1996 and,
as Cruz Azul requested, clarified its conditions for the verification visit.
6.943 Despite the fact that the Ministry acted in good faith and went as far as it could to
accommodate Cruz Azul, Cruz Azul refused to give the Ministry an opportunity to verify the
information it had in its possession. The result was that since that it was not possible to verify the
information in accordance with paragraph 3 of Anne x II and since Cruz Azul did not supply other
necessary information in accordance with Article 6.8, the Ministry used the facts available for
calculating the margin of dumping.
6.944 Secondly, the Ministry notified the Government of Mexico of its intention to be accompanied
by non-governmental experts. In a letter dated 26 November 1996, the Ministry advised Cruz Azul
and SECOFI who the non-governmental experts partic ipating in the verification would be. The letter
was addressed to Cruz Azul and indicated that a copy had been forwarded to SECOFI. In a document
attached to the letter, the Ministry informed Cruz Azul that the verification would take place from 3-6
December and stated that the purpose of the visit wo uld be to verify the information already provided
and to obtain further information, that the period to be verified was from 1 June 1995 to 31 May 1996,
that it was for the Ministry, as the investigating authority, to decide whether non-governmental
experts should be included and that if Cruz Azul refused to cooperate the Ministry would be obliged
to use the facts available. In the first paragraph of its letter to the Ministry dated 2 December 1996,
Mexico acknowledged having received this notification from the Ministry on 26 November.
6.945 In addition, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Guatemala was not obliged to explain the
exceptional circumstances which had made necessary the participation of non-governmental experts.
Article 6.2 does not refer to non-governmental experts. Paragraph 2 of Annex I simply requires that
the exporting firm and its government should be informed of the intention to include non-
governmental experts in the investigating team. This provision does not oblige the investigating
authority to inform the exporting country of the exceptional circumstances that justify the use of non-
governmental experts nor does it require the exporting member to have agreed to the use of such
experts. In any case, Mexico knew that this was Guatemala's first anti-dumping investigation. The
exceptional circumstance that made it necessary for Guatemala to resort to the assistance of anti-
dumping experts was the fact that the Ministry had never previously carried out a verification visit.
The experts were engaged to assist the Ministry to carry out the verification visit at Cruz Azul and to
coach the Ministry on how to conduct future verifications.
6.946 With regard to Mexico's contention that the non-governmental experts had a conflict of
interest, in its letter dated 26 November 1996 the Ministry specifically pointed out that the persons
who would act as non-governmental experts had sign ed an agreement to protect the confidentiality of
any information to which they had access. Moreover, the experts had signed confidentiality
agreements applicable to administrative reviews connected with the United States anti-dumping order
concerning cement from Mexico, in which they undertook not to divulge any information obtained in
those proceedings. Consequently, in carrying out the verification at Cruz Azul, the non-governmental
experts would not have been able to use any outside information obtained in the United States anti-
dumping case.
6.947 Furthermore, Cruz Azul was not an interested party in any of the administrative reviews in
which the non-governmental experts participated on behalf of the United States cement producers.

589 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Annex I, paragraph 7 (emphasis added).

Guatemala notes that Cruz Azul has made no claim to the effect that the United States clients of the
non-governmental experts had any interest in the results of the anti-dumping proceeding in
Guatemala. The Mexican claims regarding the existence of a conflict of interest are therefore without
foundation, and in any event the alleged conflict was irrelevant since Cruz Azul declined to allow the
Ministry to verify certain categories of information, with or without non-governmental experts.
6.948 Thus, in endeavouring to carry out the verification visit, Guatemala complied with Article 6.7
and paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.949 Mexico makes the argument that Guatemala has not disproved its violation of Article 6.7 and
paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I to the AD Agreement in respect of the verification visit. It makes
the following rebuttal arguments:
6.950 Guatemala claims that Cruz Azul's reluctance to supply full information on production costs
at both plants prevented the Ministry from determining whether Cruz Azul's sales in Mexico were
being made at below cost and from calculating adjustments for differences in physical characteristics
between the product sold in Mexico (Type II Pz) and the product exported to Guatemala (Type I
PM).
590
6.951 In this connection, Mexico reiterates that Cementos Progreso has not advanced any argument
that Cruz Azul's sales on Mexico's domestic mark et were being made at below production cost and
that, although the Ministry did not conduct an exam ination to determine the likeness of the product
exported to Guatemala and the product sold in Mexico, the Ministry, in both its preliminary and final
determinations, decided that they were like products. Hence, Guatemala's argument is completely
false and inconsistent, because the Ministry determined the likeness of the products and rejected
Cruz Azul's argument.
591
6.952 Guatemala says that, although Cruz Azul's reply to the additional request was inadequate,
which would have justified cancelling the verification and proceeding on the basis of the facts
available, the Ministry, acting in good faith, allowed Cruz Azul a last chance and, on the basis of
paragraph 7 of Annex I, indicated to the exportin g firm the further information which needed to be
provided.592
6.953 As already stated, the Ministry had the production cost information for the Cruz Azul plant at
Lagunas, Oaxaca, where the product exported to Guatemala was manufactured and the verification
should have been made in connection with this information, pursuant to Annex I, particularly,
paragraph 7 of the Annex.
6.954 In Mexico's opinion, which may be confirme d by the anti-dumping practices of other
Members, the information which can be verified is th at supplied by the interested parties, and before
the verification takes place. In fact, no Member agrees that an interested party should supply it with
further information which was not provided within the established time-limits; in other words, the

590 Ibid., paragraph 318.
591 The public notice of conclusion of the investigation, in the section on "Considerations"
Subsection B ("Determination of dumping"), states that according to the exporting firm, the difference between
the cement sold on the Mexican market and that exported to Guatemala was not significant. Conversely,
Cruz Azul, in its submission of 30 October 1996, p.19, accompanied by an Annex II, indicated the differences
between the two products.
592 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 319.

authority would in no way receive further information at the verification. The simple and logical
reason is that this would be information submitted outside the prescribed time-period.593
6.955 Furthermore, when paragraph 7 of Annex I says that it should be standard practice to advise
the firms concerned of the further information which needs to be provided, in Mexico's view it is
unquestionably referring to the accounting information and documentation that the party concerned
used in order to back up the veracity of the inform ation it has supplied to the investigating authority
before the verification is carried out.
6.956 As part of its argument, Mexico reiterates that the first part of the paragraph in question, like
Article 6.7, specifies that the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify the information
received by the authority, and when paragraph 7 of Annex I speaks of further information which
needs to be provided it is understood that it will be provided to the authority in order to demonstrate
the veracity of the information already supplied and even with further details on it, regardless of the
fact that, during the verification and in light of the information obtained, more details will be
requested.
6.957 It is apparent from the foregoing that Guatemala's interpretation of paragraph 7 of Annex I is
wrong and impermissible and that the Ministry's action regarding the so-called verification was
carried out in breach of the terms of Article 6.7 and paragraph 7 of Annex I of the AD Agreement.
(i) Essential questions
6.958 With reference to the essential questions raised by Cruz Azul regarding the verification,
which had to be resolved in order for the exporting firm to give its express consent and for the
verification to be conducted, Guatemala states that on 26 November 1996, it replied to the letter by
Cruz Azul, a document submitted as Annex GUA-57.
594
6.959 In this connection, it should be noted that, while the document was indeed prepared by a
Ministry official and addressed to Cruz Azul, this is not apparent from the document nor does any
attached document demonstrate that it was sent and delivered to Cruz Azul. Secondly, a perusal of
the document does not show that its purpose was to reply to Cruz Azul's letter of 25 November 1996.
In fact, it simply indicates which persons would be at the verification; in other words, its aim was not
to reply to the essential questions raised by Cruz Azul, under the terms of paragraph 8 of Annex I.
6.960 In addition, document GUA-57 does not make it clear to Cruz Azul what it wanted, let alone
request it to give its express consent for a verification to be conducted in accordance with Article 6.7
and paragraph 3 of Annex I. This is obvious and is corroborated by the facts, because at no time did
the Ministry seek to obtain Cruz Azul's express consent; what it did do was to turn up at the exporting
firm's plant in an attempt to conduct the verification.
6.961 From the foregoing it is plain to see that, by not replying to Cruz Azul on the essential
questions raised and not obtaining the exporting firm's express consent before finally arranging the
verification, Guatemala acted in violation of Article 6.7 and paragraphs 3 and 8 of Annex I.
(ii) Notification to the Government of Mexico
6.962 As to notifying the Government of Mexico, Guatemala says that, in a letter dated
26 November 1996, it notified Mexico of its intention for the Ministry to be accompanied by non-
governmental experts. It added that the letter was addressed to Cruz Azul and the letter said that a

593 In fact, if the authority accepted further information that was not reported within the specified time-
limits, it would be an incentive for the parties not to reply to the questionnaires or to do so inadequately.
594 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 320.

copy had been sent to SECOFI.595 To demonstrate this, Guatemala submitted the letter in question as
Annex GUA-57.
6.963 It should be pointed out that it cannot be inferred from the letter that it was sent by Guatemala
and received by the Government of Mexico; in other words, it is not enough for the letter to state that
a copy has been forwarded to the Secretary for Trade and Industrial Development to prove that
Guatemala did actually send it and that the Government of Mexico did receive it. In this regard,
Mexico maintains that it did not receive a copy of the letter by the Ministry identified as GUA-57,
dated 26 November 1996.
6.964 Guatemala also states that in a document attached to the letter (GUA-57), the Ministry
advised Cruz Azul of a number of matters pertaining to the verification. 596 It should be noted that no
document was attached to the letter submitted as GUA-57.
6.965 In addition, there is nothing in the letter or in any attached document to show that it was
delivered to Cruz Azul and still less that the Government of Mexico received a copy of it. On the
other hand, the Government of Mexico did receive the letter submitted as Annex MEXICO-27, also
dated 26 November 1996 and there is a record that it was actually sent by Guatemala and received by
the Government of Mexico; this is demonstrated both by the heading of the attached fax and the fact
that it records the date and time of receipt at the SECOFI offices.
597
6.966 Accordingly, when Mexico affirms in its submission of 2 December 1996 (MEXICO-29) that
it received the letter dated 26 November 1996, it is referring to Mexico's exhibit, MEXICO-27, and
not as Guatemala falsely implies by exhibiting Annex GUA-57.
6.967 Again, the letter that was indeed received by the Government of Mexico, identified as
MEXICO-27, fails to mention that the verification would be attended by non-governmental experts;
in other words, by not reporting the participation of those experts, Guatemala violated paragraph 2 of
Annex I.
(iii) Participation of non-governmental experts
6.968 Guatemala asserts that it is for the investigating authority to decide whether non-
governmental experts should be included and that paragraph 2 of Annex I does not require the
authorities to inform the exporting country of exceptional circumstances that justify the use of non-
governmental experts, nor does it require any consent from the exporting Member to use such
experts.
598
6.969 Mexico does not argue whether or not it was for Guatemala to decide on the participation of
non-governmental experts or to obtain the consent of the exporting Member to use such experts.
What is does claim is that, in its notification to the Government of Mexico, Guatemala did not
indicate the participation of non-governmental experts in the verification. In this regard, paragraph 2
of Annex I specifies that the authorities of th e exporting Member should be informed of the
participation of non-governmental experts, but this did not happen. Therefore, Guatemala violated
paragraph 2 of Annex I.

595 Ibid., paragraph 322.
596 Ibid., paragraph 332.
597 The documents demonstrating that they were received by Cruz Azul include Annex MEXICO-24
and the note of 6 February 1997 stating that the representative of Cruz Azul received a copy of the record of the
public hearing.
598 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 323.

6.970 Furthermore, in the matter of the conflict of interest of the non-governmental experts,
Guatemala contends that the persons who would act as such experts had signed an agreement to
protect the confidentiality of any information to which they had access, that the same had been done
in the proceedings in which they had participated in the United States and that, in any event, Cruz
Azul had not been an interested party in them.599
6.971 Mexico's argument concerning the obvious co nflict of interest of the non-governmental
experts lies in the fact that two of them, Daniel Joseph Cannistra and Joanna Schlesinger, were
advisors to United States cement firms that called for investigations against Mexican cement
exporters, and that those persons were still advisors to the firms in question when the Ministry sought
to conduct the verification. So, with the participation of those non-governmental experts, the
evaluation of the Cruz Azul information could prove flawed or biased.
600
6.972 In a letter dated 25 November 1996, Cruz Azul informed the Ministry of the conflict of
interest of the non-governmental experts the Ministry had appointed. To Cruz Azul's arguments the
Ministry simply replied that the non-governmental experts had signed confidentiality undertakings 601;
in other words, the Ministry did not resolve the essential issue raised by Cruz Azul that the experts'
work could prove biased towards Mexican cement exporting firms, including Cruz Azul. Nor did the
Ministry seek or try to obtain the express consent of Cruz Azul to conduct the verification, as required
under paragraph 3 of Annex I.
6.973 Moreover, the confidentiality agreements in question were not shown either to Cruz Azul or
to the Government of Mexico, as can be seen from documents such as MEXICO-24, or in the
communication sent to the Mexican Government, A nnex MEXICO-27, nor were they attached to the
letter Guatemala submitted as GUA-57 nor produced when the Ministry sought to conduct the
verification at the Cruz Azul plant.
6.974 Consequently, in the view of Cruz Azul's arguments about the participation of non-
governmental experts, an unbiased and objective authority should, pursuant to the terms of
paragraphs 3 and 8 of Annex I, have resolved the essential issue raised by Cruz Azul and have
obtained the exporter's express consent before making final arrangements for the verification.
However, Guatemala did not resolve the essential i ssues raised by Cruz Azul, nor did it obtain the
firm's express consent, for which reason the Ministry, in endeavouring to conduct the verification in
the way it did, acted in violation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex I.
6.975 Lastly, in view of the facts and the arguments adduced in connection with the failure to notify
the Government of Mexico about the participation of non-governmental experts, about additional
information not reported to the authority that the au thority was seeking to verify, by not resolving the
essential questions raised by Cruz Azul and not ob taining Cruz Azul's express consent to conduct the
verification and, as a result of the way and the terms in which Guatemala tried to conduct it,
Guatemala acted in violation of Article 6.7 and paragraphs 2, 3, 7 and 8 of Annex I of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

599 Ibid., paragraphs 324-325.
600 In addition, the document whereby the Ministry sought to conduct the verification evidenced the
attitude of the non-governmental experts when Mr. Daniel Joseph Cannistra said that opposition to him
participating in the verification would be penalized by "using the adverse information available".
601 It should be noted that Guatemala has not submitted anything to demonstrate that the
communication identified as GUA-57 was notified to Cruz Azul and still less to the Government of Mexico.
Nor can it be inferred from the content of the communication that the purpose was to resolve the issue of the
possible bias of the non-governmental experts in the verification, nor that it was intended as a reply to
Cruz Azul's letter of 25 November 1996.

7. Claims Under Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.8 and Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II – Rejection of
Technical Accounting Evidence on Normal Value and Export Price
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.976 Mexico claims that the Guatemalan Ministry rejected the technical accounting evidence
submitted by Cruz Azul on the normal value and the export price during the investigation period fixed
at the initiation of the investigation, by so doing the Guatemalan Ministry resultingly violated
Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II to the AD Agreement. Mexico's
arguments in this regard are as follows:
6.977 Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 provide the following in this respect:
"6.1. All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given … ample
opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect
of the investigation in question.
6.2 Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a
full opportunity for the defence of their interests. ...
6.8 In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph."
6.978 On 18 November 1996, Cruz Azul provided the Ministry with technical accounting evidence
so that the investigating authority would have objective and reasonable information on the normal
value and the export price in order to calculate the alleged dumping margin for transactions during the
investigation period fixed at the initiation of the investigation, namely 1 June to 30 November 1995.
6.979 In its letter, Cruz Azul explained the nature of the technical accounting evidence and its
importance for the investigation, as well as the objectiveness and impartiality with which it had been
prepared because its formulation had been entrusted to an external firm of accountants specialized in
the field and independent of Cruz Azul. Neverthe less, on 15 January 1997, in its technical report on
the final outcome of the anti-dumping investigation
602, the Ministry decided:
"… that the technical evidence submitted by the exporter on 18 December 1996
(confidential information) could not replace verification of the information by the
Guatemalan investigating authority, as required by Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Code (sic)."
6.980 As can be seen, the Ministry rejected the evidence without reviewing its content or its
relevance, thus violating Article 6.1 and 6.2 because the evidence was provided during the procedure
and Cruz Azul supplied it for the purpose of defending its interests. It is clear that the Ministry did
not give Cruz Azul ample and full opportunity to defend its interests, in violation of Article 6.1 and
6.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.981 It should be pointed out that, in view of the cancellation of the verification visit and in
pursuance of its right of defence, Cruz Azul submitted the technical accounting evidence in

602 "Technical report on the outcome of the anti-dumping investigation into imports of cement from
Mexico", preambular section, part "B. Determination of dumping", paragraph 6, page 16.

conformity with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II to the AD Agreement, which provide
the following:
"5. Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this
should not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party
has acted to the best of its ability.
6. If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed
forthwith of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further
explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of
the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being
satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be
given in any published determinations."
6.982 Indeed, even supposing that the information in the technical accounting evidence was not
ideal in all respects, this fact should not be sufficient to allow the Ministry to reject it, so that in doing
so it violated paragraph 5 of Annex II.
6.983 If there had been justification for rejecting the evidence, the Minister should have informed
Cruz Azul in due time during the procedure of the reasons why it did not accept the evidence. This
would have enabled Cruz Azul to put forward ex planations and arguments to defend its interests
within a reasonable period, as called for by paragr aph 6 of Annex II. The Ministry, however, denied
Cruz Azul an opportunity to exercise its right of defence, thereby violating paragraph 6 of Annex II of
the AD Agreement.
6.984 From the above arguments it is quite obvious that the Ministry’s action in rejecting the
technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul was inconsistent with Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8
and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II to the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.985 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.8 and
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II to the AD Agreement:
6.986 There is no basis for Mexico's contention that Guatemala acted in violation of Articles 6.1,
6.2 and 6.8 and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex II by rejecting the "self-verification" report that Cruz
Azul submitted after preventing the Ministry from carrying out a verification visit.
6.987 Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads as follows:
"In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide,
necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation,
preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the
facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this
paragraph."
6.988 According to paragraph 3 of Annex II:
"All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in
the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion … should
be taken into account when determinations are made." (Emphasis added)

6.989 Cruz Azul's "technical accounting evidence" was not verifiable, was not appropriately
introduced into the investigation and was not supplied in a timely fashion, as required by paragraph 3
of Annex II. According to the Mexican submi ssion, Cruz Azul supplied the Ministry with the
"technical accounting evidence" on 18 November 1996.603 However, the report was not prepared until
6 December 1996 and was not received by the Ministry until 18 December 1996, after the planned
verification visit and the day before the public hearing.
6.990 Nor was the technical accounting evidence "appropriately submitted". It was neither
requested by the Ministry nor supplied in a timely fashion. It was submitted one day before the date
on which the parties were to present their final arguments at the public hearing. In its notice of
6 December, the Ministry's Directorate of Economic Integration had already informed Cruz Azul that
the final determination would be made on the basis of the facts available in the file on that date. The
submission by Cruz Azul on the eve of the cut-off date of 19 December for the presentation of final
arguments effectively denied other interested parties the opportunity to express their views on the new
factual information. Under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the appropriate and timely juncture for the
presentation of evidence in support of the information submitted by Cruz Azul would have been
during the verification visit which the Ministry was prevented from carrying out. Consequently,
pursuant to Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of Annex II, the Ministry's decision not to accept the
"technical accounting evidence" of Cruz Azul was perfectly appropriate.
6.991 Paragraph 6 of Annex II stipulates that:
"If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith
of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations within
a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. If the
explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for
rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published
determinations."604
6.992 Because the submission by Cruz Azul was presented the day before the public hearing and in
view of the "time-limits of the investigation", the Ministry was unable to give the reasons for its
rejection, as required by paragraph 6 of Annex II. In its first written submission Mexico notes that
during the hearing on 19 December Cruz Azul "… explained the nature of the technical accounting
evidence and its importance for the investigation, …". 605 The explanations provided by Cruz Azul
were not considered satisfactory by the Ministry. Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Annex II,
the Ministry set out the grounds for its rejection of the explanations by Cruz Azul in the final
determination of 17 January 1997.
6.993 In the words of the duly published notice:
"… this Ministry considers that the information supplied by the exporting firm cannot be
taken into account for the calculation of the normal value of the product under investigation,
in view of the fact that the information could not be verified and that the technical evidence
submitted by the exporting firm on 18 December 1996 (confidential information) cannot be a
substitute for such verification of the informa tion by the Guatemalan investigating authority,
as indicated in Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement".
6.994 These were the grounds on which the Ministry rejected this evidence. The Ministry did not
allow Cruz Azul to take on the role of investigating authority and did not allow Cruz Azul to dictate to
it how the verification was to be carried out. When the Ministry was prevented from carrying out the

603 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 395.
604 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Annex II, paragraph 6 (emphasis added).
605 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 89.

verification, it did not accept the self-verification report by Cruz Azul. All these actions were
perfectly appropriate. It is absurd for Mexico to suggest that Cruz Azul had the right to tell the
Ministry how to conduct the investigation.
6.995 The disregarding of the "technical accounting evidence" is in keeping with Articles 6.1 and
6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In accordance with the terms of Article 6.1, Cruz Azul was
given "ample opportunity" throughout the investigation, to present evidence which it considered
relevant to the investigation. As provided by Article 6.2, Cruz Azul was given "a full opportunity for
the defence of its interests".
606 Consequently, the Panel should reject this claim.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.996 Mexico maintains that Guatemala has not disproved its violation of Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8
and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex I of the AD Agreement. It makes the following rebuttal of
Guatemala's arguments:
6.997 Guatemala claims that the Cruz Azul's technical accounting evidence was not verifiable, was
not appropriately introduced into the investigation and was not supplied in a timely fashion, as
required by paragraph 3 of Annex II. 607 On this point Mexico reiterates that the technical accounting
evidence was appropriately submitted by Cruz Azul to the Ministry on 18 December 1996 608, one day
before the hearing, within the time-limits established for the investigation, for which reason the
evidence was submitted on time, in the course of the proceedings and in order for the Ministry to have
true, accurate and relevant information on Cruz Azul's domestic sales and export sales during the
investigation period and for it to be considered by the Ministry in its final determination.
6.998 The technical accounting evidence was submitted appropriately and on time, because the
Ministry, in the decision of 6 December 1996, said that the hearing would be held on
19 December 1996 and that any request made after that date would not be taken into account by the
Ministry in its technical study on the result of the investigation. Accordingly, before the hearing the
interested parties could submit requests or documents, as did Cruz Azul in this case with the technical
accounting evidence. Guatemala's decision to reject the technical accounting evidence was
unwarranted.
6.999 Moreover, Guatemala affirms that, since the technical accounting evidence was submitted on
the day before the hearing and because of the time-limits established for the investigation, the
Ministry was unable to give the reasons for its rejection, as required by paragraph 6 of Annex II.
609
The Ministry could have reported on the rejection of the technical evidence during the hearing that
was held the day after the technical accounting evidence was submitted, or before the final
determination was issued, in other words, before 17 January 1997.
6.1000 Since the technical accounting evidence was presented on time and in the course of the
investigation, in no way is it possible to accept Guatemala's contention that it was unable to provide
the reasons for its rejection. Clearly, because of the Ministry's omissions in not informing Cruz Azul
of the reasons for not accepting the technical accounting evidence and in not granting the exporter an
opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, Guatemala violated
paragraph 6 of Annex II.

606 Guatemala invites the panel to take note th at, according to Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, "the authorities shall during the course of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of
the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based".
607 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 329.
608 First written submission by Mexico, paragraph 52.
609 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 332.

8. Claims Under Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.5 – Acceptance by the Guatemalan Authority
of Confidential Information
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1001 Mexico argues that several times during the investigation Guatemala failed to comply with
its obligations on confidential information as mandated by Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.5 of the AD
Agreement. Mexico highlights the following facts and makes the following submissions in support of
its claims:
6.1002 Firstly, the on-the-spot investigation at Cementos Progreso. As can be seen from the relevant
"Report on the Verification Visit", Cementos Progreso requested that the following information be
considered confidential:
(a) Technical information on the firm’s principal equipment;
(b) plans for a new mill;
(c) work sheets used to prepare information submitted to the Ministry of the Economy;
(d) list of customers with addresses and volume of sales made;
(e) expansion plans for the plant, Proyect 9636;
(f) contract between Cementos Progreso and F.L. Smith & Co.;
(g) tables used to prepare questionnaires and reconcile the cost structure calculated for
production of grey Portland cement with the accounting statements.
6.1003 Cementos Progreso requested that this information be considered confidential, but at no time
did it justify its request nor furnish non-confidential summaries thereof.
6.1004 In its letter of 13 November 1996, Cruz Azul asked for the public version of all the
information supplied by Cementos Progreso, but the Ministry never furnished the non-confidential
summaries of the confidential information provided.
6.1005 In addition, Cruz Azul brought this to the attention of the Ministry in its letter dated
27 December 1996
610, but the authority did not require Cementos Progreso to comply with this
provision and refused to agree not to take account of this information.611
6.1006 Secondly, as already indicated612, at the public hearing of 19 December 1996, the Government
of Guatemala refused to give Cruz Azul the do cument containing Cementos Progreso’s final
pleadings. Cruz Azul asked for access to the document at that time and the Ministry of the Economy
refused, arguing that "the copy would be transmitted when the necessary notifications were made".
6.1007 Thirdly, see the facts mentioned in sections V.A.1(e) and (f), V.A.2, V.B, V.C.3, V.D.1, 2, 4,
9 and 10, E.2 and 4.

610 It should be noted inter alia that Cruz Azul specifically requested the investigating authority not to
take this information into account, as provided in Article 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement.
611 It should be noted that, when responding to the first questionnaire from the investigating authority,
Cruz Azul supplied some confidential information and in dicated that Annex I to these replies was the relevant
non-confidential summary. As can be seen from the preliminary determination, however, the Ministry did not
accept this and requested the "non-confidential" version.
612 See Section V.D.2 of this written submission.

6.1008 Lastly, it will be recalled that Cruz Azul reque sted two certified copies of all the documents,
but these were not transmitted at any time during the investigation.
6.1009 Mexico further argues that Guatemala violated the provisions of the AD Agreement regarding
confidential information
6.1010 Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.5 of the AD Agreement provide the following:
"6.1. All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of
the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in
question.
6.2. Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on
request, provide opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with
adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments
offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the need to preserve
confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation on
any party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that
party’s case. Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present
other information orally.
6.3 Oral information provided under paragraph 2 shall be taken into account by
the authorities only in so far as it is subsequently reproduced in writing and made
available to other interested parties, as provided for in subparagraph 1.2.
6.5 Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its
disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because
its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the
information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or
which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon
good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not
be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it.
6.5.1 The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential
information to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be
in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may
indicate that such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional
circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be
provided.
6.5.2. If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if
the supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information public or
to authorize its disclosure in generaliz ed or summary form, the authorities may
disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to their satisfaction from
appropriate sources that the information is correct."
6.1011
The facts set out in the first paragraph of this section show the following violations of the AD
Agreement:
6.1012 Firstly (on-the-spot investigation at Cementos Progreso):

(a) By accepting Cementos Progreso’s request that the information mentioned should be
considered confidential, without justification for such a request, Guatemala violated
Article 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement;
(b) irrespective of the above, by not requiring Cementos Progreso to furnish non-
confidential summaries of the information or the reasons why it could not be made
public, Guatemala violated in particular Article 6.4, 6.5, subparagraphs 6.5.1. and
6.5.2;
(c) by not accepting Cruz Azul’s request that a non-confidential summary be required or
that the information not be taken into account, Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2
and 6.4 of the AD Agreement;
(d) alternatively, by accepting a verbal justification that the information in the letter be
considered confidential, Guatemala acted in violation of Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
6.1013 Secondly (public hearing of 19 December 1996):
(a) By not allowing proper access to the information submitted by Cementos Progreso at
this hearing, Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4;
(b) by denying access to this information, Guatemala on its own initiative granted the
documentation confidential status, in violation of Article 6.5 and its subparagraphs
6.5.1 and 6.5.2;
(c) alternatively, by accepting a verbal justification that the information contained in the
pleadings at the hearing should be considered confidential, Guatemala acted in
violation of Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
6.1014 Thirdly
(the facts mentioned in section V.A.1(c) and (f), V.A.2, V.B, V.C.3, V.D.1, 2, 4, 9
and 10, E.2 and 4)
6.1015 All these instances concern misleading information by Cementos Progreso, impairing the
rights of Cruz Azul. Each fact and each violation of specific Articles is mentioned in the
corresponding section. Nevertheless, all these violations imply the following breaches in relation to
confidentiality.
6.1016 By failing to fulfil these provisions, Guatemala:
(a) On its own initiative gave these documents confidential status, thereby violating
Article 6.5 and its subparagraphs 6.5.1 and 6.5.2;
(b) alternatively, by accepting a verbal justification that the information contained in the
application or any evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso and to be found in the
file should be considered confidential, Guatemala acted in violation of Article 6.1,
6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
6.1017 Guatemala was obliged to provide Cruz Azul pr omptly with all the investigation documents,
with the exception of the provisions on confidential ity. It decided not to do this, however, and also
decided not to respect the disciplines concerning confidential business information. If it had done so,
Cruz Azul would have had ample opportunity to present all relevant evidence in writing and would
have had full opportunity to defend its interests, therefore, these acts or omissions by Guatemala
nullify or impair the benefits accruing to Mexico under the AD Agreement.

(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1018 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments regarding confidential information as follows:
6.1019 Contrary to Mexico's allegations, in its handling of the information supplied by Cementos
Progreso Guatemala complied with Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. Specifically, Mexico claims that the
Ministry did not require Cementos Progreso to provide public versions of certain documents which
the Ministry had obtained from Cementos Progreso during the verification visit on
27-29 November 1996. An examination of the information set out in Mexico's first written
submission reveals that the documents obtained during the verification visit were clearly of a
confidential nature and could not be summarized in accordance with Article 6.5.1. In fact, Guatemala
understands that in other countries it is common practice for the investigating authorities not to
require public versions of confidential documents obtained during verification visits.
6.1020 Furthermore, contrary to Mexico's allegation in paragraph 405 of its first written submission,
Cruz Azul did not ask for the public version of this information in its letter of 13 November 1996. In
that letter, Cruz Azul requested the public versions of the documents provided on 30 October.
Mexico does not claim that Cruz Azul did not receive these public versions. Clearly, on 13 November
Cruz Azul could not have requested public versi ons of documents which the Ministry was not to
obtain until 27 November.
6.1021 In reply to Mexico's allegations to the effect that the Ministry failed to provide Cruz Azul
with the public version of Cementos Progreso's submission to the public hearing on
19 December 1996 and failed to supply Cruz Azul with certified copies of all the documents in the
administrative file, Guatemala refers to its replies to these same allegations in
paragraphs 292-298
above and respectfully requests that they be incorporated by reference.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1022 Mexico proved Guatemala's violation of Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the AD
Agreement613 and Guatemala did not rebut various arguments, including the following:
1. On 27 December 1996 Cruz Azul asked the Ministry of the Economy not to take
account of the Cementos Progreso information classified as confidential, since that
information was not justified as such, nor were non-confidential summaries provided.
By ignoring Cruz Azul's request, Guatem ala violated Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1
and 6.5.2.
2. Similarly, various acts by Guatemala also violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement in
connection with confidentiality. First, the Ministry of the Economy's action at the
time of notification and the failure to provide both Mexico and Cruz Azul with the
full text of the request is a violation of those provisions. Moreover, Guatemala did
not give Cruz Azul an opportunity to examine the information used by the Ministry in
the investigation, as well as that used to extend the investigation period and the period
for submitting evidence, thereby violating those provisions. It also violated the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by acting as it did with regard to essential
facts and the change from threat of injury to injury. Lastly, Guatemala again
committed those violations in issuing the public notices.
614

613 First written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 402 et seq.
614 In this case, see in this second written submission by Mexico the arguments concerning Articles 5.5,
12.1, 6.1.3, the public notices, the period of evidence, the information used by the Ministry, the investigation
period, the confidential information, the essential facts and change from threat of injury to injury.

6.1023 As for Guatemala's arguments concerning confidentiality, they were presented in a poor and,
in many cases, inconsistent fashion.
6.1024 Guatemala's arguments in this section are very limited, since Guatemala merely argues that it
did not violate Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Hence it accepts that it has
violated the other Articles. Furthermore, Guatemala simply develops four points: verification
(on-the-spot investigation) at Cementos Progreso, public hearing, communication of
13 November 1996 and the alleged issue of certified copies at the proper time.
6.1025 First, Mexico's arguments concerning the verification at Cementos Progreso are based on the
following violations:
615
(a) By accepting Cementos Progreso's request for confidentiality, without justification,
Guatemala breached Article 6.5.2.
(b) By not requiring Cementos Progreso to furnish non-confidential summaries, or the
reasons why it could not make such information public, Guatemala violated
Article 6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
(c) By not agreeing to Cruz Azul's request to require non-confidential summaries or to
disregard the information, Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4.
(d) By accepting any oral justification for confidentiality, Guatemala violated Article 6.1,
6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
6.1026 As to the verification, for its part Guatemala says Mexico's first written submission reveals
that the verification documents could not be summarized. In addition, other countries do not require
public versions of confidential documents obtained in verifications. 616 Consequently from its own
words it is clear that Guatemala does not in the slightest way rebut Mexico's arguments concerning
the verification at Cementos Progreso.
6.1027 In this connection, to Guatemala's flimsy argument Mexico replies that the first written
submission by Mexico is not the best means to reveal whether the verification documents are or are
not confidential. The Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates specific treatment for them and Guatemala
should have followed it at the time. In failing to do so, Guatemala violated the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Furthermore, the fact of mentioning that other countries violate the Anti-Dumping
Agreement is no justification for Guatemala doing so at Mexico's expense.
6.1028 Secondly, with regard to the hearing on 19 December 1996, Guatemala committed the
following violations.
(a) By not permitting timely access to the information supplied by Cementos Progreso,
Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4.
(b) By granting the information confidential status of its own accord, Guatemala violated
Article 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
(c) By accepting any oral justification for deeming the information confidential,
Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.

615 See the facts mentioned in paragraphs 403 and 404 of Mexico's first written submission.
616 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 336.

6.1029 For its part Guatemala again sidesteps Mexico's arguments, in this case by referring to another
section of its first written submission. Guatemala mentions that "… it was reasonable for the Ministry
to conclude that the lengthy written submission of 19 December prepared by Cementos Progreso
would contain confidential information that ought not to be revealed to Cruz Azul … Consequently,
during the hearing the Ministry informed Cruz Azul that it would provide a copy of the Cementos
Progreso submission once it had determined whether it contained confidential information."
617
Accordingly, it is plain that Guatemala expressly accepts that it did not follow the confidentiality
procedures stipulated in the Anti-Dumping Agreement; hence, it violated the confidentiality rules.
6.1030 Thirdly, Mexico argued that, on 13 November, Cruz Azul asked the Ministry of Economy for
the public version of all information supplied by Cementos Progreso, and the non-confidential
summaries were not supplied. Guatemala thereby violated Article 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
6.1031 For its part, very feebly Guatemala refers to paragraph 405 of Mexico's first written
submission and says that in the letter of 13 Nove mber 1996 "… Cruz Azul did not request the public
version of this information … " and moreover " … Mexico does not claim that Cruz Azul did not
receive these public versions …".
618 In paragraph 405 Mexico does expressly claim that Cruz Azul
did not receive the non-confidential summaries following the request on 13 November 1996. Hence,
Mexico did claim that Cruz Azul did not receive such versions. What is more, the fact that Cruz Azul
expressly requested the public versions of the documents is yet further evidence that Guatemala did
not comply with its confidentiality obligations.
6.1032 Lastly, Guatemala argues that the Ministry of the Economy provided Cruz Azul with certified
copies of all the documents in the administrative file. For this reason Mexico asks Guatemala whether
it has any acknowledgement of receipt of the alleged certified copies - since it has
Annex MEXICO-57
619 it should have some acknowledgement of receipt of the copies. We then refer
to the argument about access to the information used by the Ministry of the Economy in the
investigation that is developed in this second written submission by Mexico. The section in question
deals in greater detail with the repeated refusals by Guatemala to provide Cruz Azul with copies of the
file. Finally, it is not possible, as Guatemala claims, that Cruz Azul did not want to pay the fees for
certified copies when what was at stake was access to the Guatemalan market. Furthermore, Cruz
Azul asked for certified copies at its expense.
6.1033 Consequently, Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the one hand, the arguments not rebutted by Guatemala are enough
proof of the violation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the other, it has been demonstrated that
Guatemala's counter arguments have not disproved what was proved by Mexico, in other words, the
violation of the confidentiality requirements.
9. Claims Under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.9 of the AD Agreement – Essential Facts Taken
Into Account for Imposition of Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1034 Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Arti cles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement
because it did not inform Cruz Azul promptly of the essential facts that would form the basis for
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping measure and only informed Cruz Azul after making the
final determination. Mexico makes the following submissions with respect to this issue:

617 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 296.
618 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 337.
619 Annex MEXICO-57 contains the acknowledgement of receipt, one day after the publication of the
final notice, of the document containing the essential facts in the investigation.

6.1035 On at least three occasions, Cruz Azul asked to be informed of the essential facts. First of all,
in its letter of 30 October 1996, Cruz Azul asked the Ministry to inform it of the essential facts
considered that would form the basis for the final determination and to set a sufficient period of time
to allow the firm to defend its interests. Subsequently, on 4 December the same year, it reiterated its
request to the Guatemalan Ministry of the Ec onomy. Finally, Cruz Azul once again asked the
Ministry to inform it of the essential facts of the procedure at the public hearing held on
19 December 1996.
6.1036 On 6 December 1996, the Ministry responded to the repeated requests from Cruz Azul stating
that the essential facts would be set out in the technical report 620 on the case to be prepared, without
specifying when this would be made available to Cruz Azul.
6.1037 The technical report was made available to Cruz Azul on 31 January 1997, i.e. after the final
determination had been made.
6.1038 Mexico claims that by making such an om ission, Guatemala prevented Cruz Azul from
defending its interests and violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement
6.1039 Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"6.9. The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests."
6.1040 The final determination was made on 17 January 1997 and the Ministry sent the technical
report on the outcome of the anti-dumping investigation (essential facts which form the basis for the
decision to apply definitive measures) on 31 January that year. Consequently, the essential facts
cannot be deemed to have been given to Cruz Azul "in sufficient time for [it] to defend [its] interests".
Guatemala therefore acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement.
6.1041 In addition, by presenting the essential facts of the procedure after having made the final
determination, the Ministry denied Cruz Azul the opportunity to defend its interests by submitting the
evidence it considered relevant because it is not possible to defend oneself against something one does
not know. This again means that the Ministry acted in violation of Article 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD
Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1042 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to Mexico's claims under
Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9:
6.1043 Guatemala complied with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by "informing all
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration" which would form the basis for the
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties by Gu atemala. In a notice dated 6 December 1996, the
Ministry informed all the parties that its Directorate of Economic Integration would carry out a
technical study of the evidence in the file and that the file to be studied was itself available to the
parties for making copies. In other words, the essential facts on which the final determination was to
be based were those contained in the file as of 6 December, and the file was available for the parties to
examine and request copies. Moreover, the Ministry had already issued a detailed report setting out
its preliminary findings concerning the essential facts. The parties had the opportunity to present their

620 Technical report on the outcome of the anti-dumping investigation into imports of cement from
Mexico.

final arguments regarding these essential facts at the hearing on 19 December. Thus, Guatemala
complied with Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by informing the interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration in sufficient time for them to defend their interests.
6.1044 Moreover, under Article 6.14, Guatemala was authorized to proceed expeditiously with the
issuing of a final determination, rather than dela y the investigation in order to comply with Cruz
Azul's request to issue another description of the essential facts.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1045 Mexico rebuts these arguments by asserting that Guatemala did not prove that it had duly
reported the essential facts that would be taken into account in imposing the definitive anti-dumping
measure, and that it thereby violated Articles 6.1 , 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement. Its argument in
this regard are as follows:
6.1046 On the one hand, Cruz Azul asked Guatemala on three occasions to inform it of the essential
facts to be taken into account in imposing the definitive anti-dumping measure. The first two requests
were made in letters dated 30 October and 4 December 1996 and the third at the public hearing on
19 December 1996.621 On the other hand, Guatemala issued a decision on 6 December 1996 stating
that it would prepare a technical study setting out the essential facts. It is important to emphasize that
the technical study also specified the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties and, consequently,
Guatemala did not afford Cruz Azul opportunities to defend its interests.
6.1047 First, Guatemala provided Cruz Azul with the technical study in question only on
31 January 1997. In other words, the document was made available to Cruz Azul one day after
publication of the public notice of the conclusion of the investigation. Accordingly, there can be no
doubt about Guatemala's violation of Article 6.9. Second, Guatemala decided to inform Cruz Azul of
the essential facts at the same time as it reported the imposition of the definitive measure. Article 6.9
stipulates that "the authorities shall, before a final determination is made [or declared], inform all the
interested parties of the essential facts … which form the basis of the decision whether to apply
definitive measures …". Hence Guatemala cannot be deemed to have complied with Article 6.9
because it informed about the essential facts in the same document as the one in which it decided to
impose a definitive anti-dumping measure. The violation of Article 6.9 is therefore confirmed.
6.1048 For its part, Guatemala argues that the essential facts forming the basis for the final
determination were those contained in the file as at 6 December 1996, and they were available for the
parties to examine them and to request copies. Guatemala adds that, in conformity with Article 6.14,
the Ministry was authorized to proceed to issue a final determination, instead of delaying the
investigation to meet Cruz Azul's request concerning the description of the essential facts.
6.1049 Mexico's reply is that under the decision of 6 December, the essential facts were to be set out
in the technical study; and that because the file contains various facts it does not mean they are the
essential facts forming the basis for the authority to issue its final determination. In other words, the
facts contained in the file are not the same as the essential facts mentioned in Article 6.9. If there
were no difference between them, Article 6.9 would be pointless and it would not use the term
"essential facts".
6.1050 Again, Article 6.14 provides that the procedures set out in Article 6 cannot be used to prevent
the investigation from proceeding. At no time does this provision allow the investigating authority to
violate the rights of the parties, such as the right to notification of the essential facts, in a desire to
speed up the investigation. In other words, Guatemala cannot comply with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by violating Cruz Azul' s right to know the essential facts and claiming a need to proceed

621 First written submission by Mexico, paragraph 419.

with the investigation or to meet the investigation's time-limits to the detriment of Cruz Azul's right to
due process.
6.1051 What is more, not only did Guatemala not inform Cruz Azul of the essential facts that would
be taken into account by the Ministry in its final determination, but it also prevented Cruz Azul from
being able to defend its interests. Consequently, Guatemala also acted in violation of Article 6.1 and
6.2 of the AD Agreement.
6.1052 As a result, Guatemala violated Article 6.9 by not duly informing Cruz Azul of the essential
facts so as to enable it to defend its interests; in addition, it violated this provision by notifying the
final determination in the same document as the one in which it informed Cruz Azul of the essential
facts. In doing so it also violated Article 6.1 and 6.2 to the detriment of Cruz Azul.
10. Claims Under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.9 – Mexico's Allegation that Guatemala Prevented
Cruz Azul From Defending its Interests
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1053 Mexico claims that the Guatemalan Ministry acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 6.1,
6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement by changing its determination of threat of material injury to material
injury during the final stage of the investigation
622 without giving Cruz Azul full and ample
opportunity to defend itself. The following are Mexico's arguments in this regard:
6.1054 The extended application by Cementos Progreso indicated that the anti-dumping investigation
was being conducted into threat of injury and the Ministry decided to initiate the investigation on this
basis. For example, in subparagraph 4 of the notice of initiation of the investigation entitled
"Summary of the factors on which the allegation of threat of injury is based", it is stated that:
"Cementos Progreso S.A. appeared before this Ministry to lodge a complaint that
massive quantities of grey Portland cement produced by the Mexican company La
Cruz Azul, S.C.L. are being imported into Guatemala by land at a price less than the
normal value and are threatening injury to the domestic industry …"
6.1055 Subsequently, the Ministry made its preliminary affirmative determination of a threat of
material injury. See Section E of the public notice of imposition of the provisional anti-dumping
measure entitled "Threat of injury to the domes tic industry and the causal relationship between the
dumping and the threat of injury".
6.1056 During the course of the investigation and up until the public hearing which the Ministry held
with the parties, i.e. 11 months after the initiati on of the investigation, Cruz Azul did not know that
the Ministry had changed the examination and determination of threat of material injury.
6.1057 It should be pointed out that during the final stage of the investigation, in letters dated
30 October and 4 December 1996, Cruz Azul asked the Ministry to inform it of the essential facts that
would serve as a basis for the final determination so that it could defend its interests adequately, on
the basis of Article 6.9 of the ADP, which provides the following:
"6.9. The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests." (Emphasis added.)

622 This change was also dealt with in connection with Articles 3 and 12 of the AD Agreement in
section E of this first written submission.

6.1058 On 6 December 1996, the Ministry replied as follows to Cruz Azul stating that the Directorate
of Economic Integration would prepare a technical report on the outcome of the investigation and this
would set out the facts investigated and the evidence available:
"The technical report to be published by this Directorate will set out the facts
investigated and the evidence available, as well as the results of the verifications
conducted. These documents will be included in the file and the parties may obtain
copies at their own expense."
6.1059 The technical report was published on 15 January 1997 but was only made available to
Cruz Azul on 31 January, one day after publication of the notice of conclusion of the investigation.
At no time during the investigation was Cruz Azul informed that the authority had made a change in
the original examination and determination of threat of material injury with a view to a final
affirmative determination of material injury, so Cruz Azul was denied an opportunity to exercise the
right of defence given under Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9, including the opportunity to provide relevant
information and evidence that might have counteracted the determination of injury by the authority.
6.1060 It can thus justifiably be concluded that the Ministry failed to meet the obligations imposed by
Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement by not giving Cruz Azul ample and full opportunity to
defend its interests and by not furnishing the exporter with information in due time so that it could
defend its interests, particularly when the final determination changed the determination of threat of
material injury into one of material injury.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1061 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to Mexico's claims under
Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4:
6.1062 Mexico alleges that in changing the grounds for its affirmative determination of threat of
material injury in the preliminary determination to material injury in the final determination the
Ministry somehow violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Essentially,
Mexico is suggesting that an investigating authority must inform the exporter of its intention to base
its final determination on threat of injury or material injury in order that the exporter may have an
adequate opportunity to defend its interests. There is no support for this argument in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
6.1063 Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 contain nothing to suggest that an investigating authority must inform
an exporter of the legal basis for the final determination. Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
itself provides the legal basis for a final determina tion. This determination may be based either on
threat of injury or material injury. Thus, an e xporter defending an anti-dumping case knows, through
Article 5, that to escape unscathed he must show no threat of injury and no material injury. Cruz Azul
can only blame itself for having failed to mount a defence for material injury. However, the fact is
that Cruz Azul never tried to show either that it was not involved in dumping cement in Guatemala or
that the dumped imports had not caused a threat of injury or material injury to the domestic industry.
On the contrary, in its submissions dated 7 February 1996, 9 May 1996 and 30 October 1996, Cruz
Azul chose only to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence provided by the applicant and the
investigation proceedings. Cruz Azul never supplied evidence to show that it had not been engaged in
dumping and never supplied evidence that Cementos Progreso had not been exposed to threat of
material injury or had not been materially injured as a result of the dumped imports.
6.1064 Finally, it is significant that Mexico does not identify any particular evidence that Cruz Azul
would have supplied if it had known that the Ministry was going to consider material injury and not
threat of injury. As noted above, Cruz Azul never provided any evidence that it had not been engaged
in dumping or that Cementos Progreso had not been adversely affected by the dumped imports. Cruz

Azul merely objected to the procedures followed by the investigating authority. So far, Mexico has
not told the panel that Cruz Azul was not engage d in dumping or that Cementos Progreso was not
materially injured. All Mexico's arguments before the panel, like Cruz Azul's complaints to the
investigating authority, relate to procedural, not substantive issues.
6.1065 However, facts are facts. In August 1996, when the preliminary determination was issued it
was clear that Cementos Progreso was being threatened with material injury. By January 1997, when
the final determination was issued, the files showed that Cementos Progreso had already been injured.
The rapid increase in imports during the period initially investigated (June–November 1995)
continued during the rest of the final investigation period (June 1995–May 1996). During the first
part of 1996, the domestic industry's sales fell as compared with the first part of 1995, despite the fact
that the demand for cement was higher in the first part of 1996 than in the first part of 1995. During
the first part of 1996, domestic production fell by 14 per cent as compared with the same period in
1995. Similarly, the utilization of clinker capacity, the utilization of cement capacity and profitability
all declined during the first part of 1996 as compared with the previous year. Thus, at the time the
final determination was made, what had clearly been a threat of injury on the basis of the information
for June-November 1995 had become material injury on the basis of the information for
June 1995-May 1996. Cruz Azul does not dispute these facts.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1066 Mexico maintains that Guatemala violated Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 by not affording
opportunities for a defence in connection with its change from a determination of threat of material
injury to one of material injury. Its rebuttals to Guatemala's submissions on this point are as follows:
6.1067 Guatemala claims that Article 5 of the AD Agreement provides the legal basis for a final
determination, which may be based either on a threat of injury or material injury and that, under
Article 5, the exporter must show no threat of material injury and no material injury. Guatemala adds
that Cruz Azul has only itself to blame for failing to mount a defence for material injury.
623
6.1068 Mexico maintains that the analysis required of an authority in order to determine the existence
of a threat of material injury is different from the analysis needed to determine the existence of
material injury. In this respect, it should be reiterated that in its preliminary determination, the
Ministry concluded that threat of injury di d exist but its analysis did not include, inter alia , the
factors and indices set out in Article 3.4, which it is essential to analyse in order to reach a valid
determination of material injury.
6.1069 In this respect, there is no record after the preliminary determination of Cementos Progreso
having supplied further information and evidence to warrant changing the analysis from a threat of
material injury to material injury. Actually, at no time did the Ministry communicate to Cruz Azul or
advise it of this change and, in failing to do so, it affected Cruz Azul's rights and prevented the
exporter from preparing arguments in its own defence to demonstrate that the Guatemalan domestic
industry was not suffering material injury as a result of Mexican exports of the product under
investigation.
6.1070 Guatemala did not afford Cruz Azul ample and full opportunity to defend its interests despite
Cruz Azul's request for the Ministry to inform it of the essential facts that would form the basis of the
final determination.
624 In this connection, if the Ministry had information and evidence to support an

623 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 342.
624 Ibid., paragraph 425.

analysis of the existence of material injury, it should have advised Cruz Azul during the investigation
in order for the latter to prepare its defence.625
6.1071 It must be reiterated that Cementos Progreso's arguments in the investigation were of a threat
of material injury and the preliminary determination was made accordingly. Cruz Azul was unaware
that the Ministry had changed its analysis from a threat of material injury to one of material injury
and, as we have already pointed out, the two analys es are different. Mexico therefore maintains that
Cruz Azul should have been advised of the change in the analysis and the determination in order for it
to defend its interests. Consequently, the Ministry's omission prevented Cruz Azul from being able to
exercise its right to a defence. In other words, the absence of a defence by the exporter can be
ascribed to Guatemala because it did not inform Cruz Azul of the change of analysis. Guatemala's
omission constituted a violation of Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement.
F. G
UATEMALA'S FINAL AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION
6.1072 Mexico argues that by applying the definitive anti-dumping measure without duly fulfilling
the requirements for its imposition, Guatemala violated Articles, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12 and 18 of the AD
Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Mexico's arguments and Guatemala's responses on the
final affirmative determination are set out below:
1. Claims Under Articles 2, 5 and 6
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1073 Mexico makes the following arguments in support of its claim that Guatemala violated
Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the AD Agreement in making its final determination of dumping:
6.1074 In its final determination of dumping, the Ministry determined the normal value on the basis
of four alleged invoices dated 25 and 27 August 1995 626, 24 January and 17 February 1996, covering
the sale of one load of cement in Mexico. Th e invoices dated 25 August 1996 and 24 January 1996
were issued by the distributor Cruz Azul en Tapachula S.A. de C.V. The cement specified in both
invoices corresponds to one load of grey cement. The invoices dated 27 August 1995 and
17 February 1996 were issued by the distributors Proveedora de Láminas y Materiales Bonampak
S.A. de C.V. The cement indicated on both invoices allegedly corresponds to one sack or load of
Cruz Azul cement, without specifying the type of cement. It should be noted that during the
investigation period the three firms were distributors independent of Cruz Azul.
6.1075 In the final determination, the export price was calculated on the basis of the invoices covered
by import certificates for cement in August 1995 and January and February 1996. The export prices
were weighted by the volume of exports at the f.o.b. level It is important to underline that the
variation in volume of these exports for the months mentioned ranges from 60,000 to 2,640,000 kg.
627
(60 and 2,640 metric tonnes).

625 In referring to the essential facts the Ministry said that they would be set out in a technical study to
be prepared by the Directorate of Economic Integration. It was made available to Cruz Azul a day after the
public notice of conclusion of the investigation was published, for which reason the Ministry did not afford Cruz
Azul the opportunity to prepare its defence with respect to an evaluation and determination of material injury.
626 According to the information in the file on the case, the dates of these invoices were 26 and
25 August 1995, respectively.
627 Annex I to the "Full report for the determination of dumping of imports of grey Portland cement
from Mexico".

(i) Description of the cement considered for the normal value (Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement)
6.1076 With regard to the description or precise identification of the cement considered when
determining the normal value, the Ministry naively, non-objectively and even equivocally confirmed
the prices shown on the four alleged invoices for sales in the domestic market, without ascertaining
whether the type of cement covered by the documents actually corresponded to the like product
exported to the Guatemalan market. In fact, two of the four alleged invoices only described the
product as "grey cement", whereas the other two on ly mentioned "Cruz Azul cement", facts which
should have been investigated by the Ministry, particularly as the product investigated has several
characteristics that must be taken into account when comparing products, for example, its durability,
resistance, efficiency and adhesion.
6.1077 According to the aforementioned characteristics, Portland cement can be classified into
different types such as Type I, Type II and Type III. Other types of cement such as I A, II A and III A
contain an air-entraining agent. Portland cement can in turn be mixed with other components giving it
another classification, including blast-furnace slag Portland cement (Type I S), pozzolanic Portland
cement (Type I P and Type P), blast-furnace slag Portland cement (Type S), Portland cement
modified with pozzolana (Type I PM) and Portland cement modified with blast-furnace slag (Type I
SM). The product exported to Guatemala was Type I PM grey Portland cement.
628
6.1078 It should be noted that, with the information it had for the purposes of calculating the normal
value, the Ministry could not have identified the like product to that exported to Guatemala destined
for consumption in Mexico, and so use the right methodology to compare the normal value and the
export price in accordance with Article 2 of the AD Agreement.
6.1079 Consequently, the Ministry did not compare the export price with the comparable price of a
like product sold on the Mexican market, thus violating Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement.
(ii) Unrepresentative invoices (Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement)
6.1080 Concerning the representative nature of the sales, the Ministry violated Article 2.2 of the AD
Agreement by not considering whether the sales covered by the alleged invoices were representative
of the Mexican domestic market. In particular, the Ministry did not examine whether the prices
shown on the documents reflected the prices actually noted on the domestic market and were not
simply isolated examples of prices, especially as the volumes of the sales transactions indicated on the
alleged invoices corresponded to the lowest volume in which the product investigated could be
marketed, i.e. a load, bag or sack. The Ministry did not therefore ascertain whether the price
references used to determine the normal value allowed a proper comparison, as required by Article 2.2
of the AD Agreement.
(iii) Unfair comparison ( Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement)
6.1081 The above information shows that the Ministry violated Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement by
not making a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price and by not considering
the differences affecting price comparability.
6.1082 The four invoices used to determine the normal value show four retail sales of a sack, bag or
load of cement of unspecified weight, whereas th e information used to determine the export price

628 "Public notice of conclusion of the investigation which reached an affirmative determination on the
imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures" ("hereinafter notice of conclusion") published in the Diario
Oficial de Centro América of 30 January 1997, section on "Information regarding the product under
investigation", paragraph 3.

refers to import transactions at the wholesale level. It is obvious that these transactions involve
different volumes and levels of trade.
6.1083 By not taking into account such differences, the Ministry determined a low export price
because high volumes of sales at the wholesale level were involved, but a high normal value, because
low levels of retail sales were involved. Consequently, the dumping margin obtained was over-
estimated as a result of the effect on prices of the differences in the volumes sold and the levels of
trade.
6.1084 In addition, the Ministry did not satisfy itself as to the terms of sale for the prices on the
domestic market indicated on the alleged invoices and consequently did not take due account of the
differences that might have affected the comparability of the domestic prices and export prices used to
calculate the dumping margin. In particular, as the alleged invoices corresponded to sales made by
distributors independent of Cruz Azul, it is obvious that the selling prices shown on these documents
include as a minimum freight and insurance from Cr uz Azul’s plant to the independent distributor’s
warehouse. The export prices used in the calculation were shown ex-factory, so they did not include
the same selling costs as the domestic prices.
6.1085 The Ministry did not apply the necessary adjustments to the domestic price either in order to
ensure a fair comparison with the export price, which again led to an over-estimation of the dumping
margin calculated.
6.1086 This over-estimation of the dumping margin was recognized by the Guatemalan authority
itself in its "Full report for the determination of dumping of imports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico".
"The percentage difference calculated on the basis of the best available information in
the file was over-estimated as the evidence available did not allow adjustments to be
made for the level of trade, transport, commission or discounts. The evidence
available for the establishment of the normal value of the like product is not
statistically representative of the sales of the Mexican cement industry in this market
during the investigation period."
6.1087 According to the indications in the paragraph above, the Ministry violated Article 2.4 of the
AD Agreement by not taking into account the differences in the volumes of sales, the levels of trade
and the terms of sale in order to make a fair comparison of the prices.
(iv) Extension of the investigation period (Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement)
6.1088 The Ministry decided to extend the investigation period without substantiating or justifying its
decision. When the Ministry decided to extend the investigation period (from 1 December 1995 to
31 May 1996), there was already a preliminary affirmative determination on the basis of the
information supplied by Cruz Azul for the investigation period (1 June to 30 November 1995), which
the Ministry had fixed when the investigation was initiated. Extending the investigation period by six
months in the course of the final stage of investigation in practice amounted to initiating a new
investigation, thus imposing an extra and unjustified burden on the exporter.
6.1089 The extension of the investigation period was decided following a specific request
629 from the
applicant, although Cementos Progreso did not pr ovide any information to justify or support its
request. By accepting this extension, the Ministry violated Article 5.2 of the ADP, which provides the
following:

629 Letter from Cementos Progreso dated 18 September 1996, received by the Ministry of the Economy
on 1 October 1996.

"5.2 … Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered
sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph..."
6.1090 Cementos Progreso’s request did not only contain no information to support it, but also
referred to a split period compared with the original investigation period (1 January to 30 June 1996),
thus claiming isolated dumping practices and not discriminatory prices during an investigation period.
Although the Ministry did not specifically accede to the request, it agreed to extend the investigation
period630 by six months, thus violating Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement.
(v) The final determination of the Ministry of the Economy (Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement)
6.1091 As the notice of conclusion shows, the Ministry declined to use the information furnished by
Cruz Azul on the basis of Article 6.6 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
6.1092 In this connection, Article 6.8 provides that:
"In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph."
6.1093 The Ministry erred in basing its final determination on Article 6.8 as Cruz Azul never denied
access to the necessary information and did not significantly impede the investigation. According to
Cruz Azul’s letter to the Ministry after the verification visit, Cruz Azul simply declined to provide the
information for the extended investigation period unjustifiably requested by the Ministry and refused
the participation of non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest. It agreed, however, to
verification of all the other information, which had already been provided to the Ministry, and that
non-governmental experts who had no conflict of interest could take part in the verification.
6.1094 Supposing, without agreeing, that Cruz Azul s hould have been evaluated on the basis of the
facts available to the Ministry, as laid down in Article 6.8, the Ministry also violated Article 6.8 and
Annex II to the AD Agreement for the following reasons.
6.1095 Firstly, the Ministry did not comply with paragraph 3 of Annex II to the AD Agreement
because, when making its final determination, it should have taken account of all the verifiable
information properly presented. Cruz Azul properly presented the information requested by the
Ministry covering the original investigation period and agreed that the Ministry could verify this
information. However, the Ministry declined to ve rify the information or utilize it when calculating
the final dumping margin applicable to Cruz Azul.
6.1096 Secondly, the Ministry also violated paragraph 5 of Annex II, which states the following:
"5. Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this
should not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party
has acted to the best of its ability."
6.1097 Cruz Azul supplied the information on the normal value and the export price for the original
investigation period to the best of its ability, but the Ministry declined to use this information when
making the final affirmative determination imposing a definitive measure on Cruz Azul.

630 The Ministry’s agreement inter alia to extending the investigation period from 1 December 1995 to
31 May 1996.

6.1098 Thirdly, the Ministry did not comply with paragraph 7 of Annex II, which reads as follows:
"7. If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to
normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the information
supplied in the application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so
with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable,
check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as
published price lists, import statistics and customs returns, and from the information
obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however,
that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being
withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less
favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate."
6.1099 The Ministry did not act with the special circumspection prescribed by this provision. In
particular, it did not verify the information used to determine the normal value in the light of
information from other independent sources, but auto matically considered as reliable the information
on the four alleged invoices for the domestic market. In the administrative file on this case, there is
no verification of the information used in the final determination to calculate the normal value and
then to estimate the dumping margin.
6.1100 As already stated, Cruz Azul cooperated and transmitted to the Ministry the relevant
information requested in the questionnaire for exporters, but even so the Ministry’s final
determination concerning this firm was not more favourable to it than to those firms that did not
cooperate during the anti-dumping investigation.
(vi) Quality and quantity of information
6.1101 In determining the definitive measure, the Ministry repeated the same mistakes and violations
committed at the initiation of the investigation.
6.1102 In the initial determination, the Ministry used two alleged invoices for sales on the domestic
market covering an investigation period comprisi ng six months (1 June 1995 to 30 November 1995),
whereas for the final determination the period was extended by another six months (1 June 1995 to
30 May 1996), without any justification, and only two further invoices were added when determining
the normal value on the basis of the extended period.
6.1103 The Ministry failed to comply with the requirements of its own legislation by not seeking "a
legal permit"631, by taking into account the two latest in voices used to determine the normal value,
which was not done during the initiation of the investigation phase, and by not satisfying itself that the
cement sold by the independent distributors corresponded to the cement manufactured by the firm
Cruz Azul, so the nature of the evidence used to prove the normal value in the final determination is
questionable.
6.1104 As already stated, the quantity and quality of the evidence used to calculate the normal value
in the final determination are similar to those used to calculate the normal value at the beginning of
the investigation. If this eviden ce was insufficient for the purposes of initiating the investigation, it

631 On 12 February 1996, in decision no. 20/96, the Directorate of Economic Integration informed
Cooperativa La Cruz Azul S.C.L. that "Documents from abroad must be duly certified by the Ministry of
Foreign Relations in order to have effect in Guatemala …". In order to maintain a procedural balance between
the parties during the proceedings, the same requiremen t should apply to Cementos Progreso in respect of
documents from abroad.

was also clearly insufficient for determining a definitive measure. The conclusion reached by the
Panel which heard the case Guatemala – Cement is set out below.632
"7.79. In sum, in our view, based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the
evidence and information that was before it at the time of initiation in this case, the
Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of
dumping, threat of injury, and causal relationship to justify the initiation of the
investigation." Likewise, the Panel that heard the United States – Softwood Lumber
case noted that "the quantum and quality of evidence to be required of an
investigating authority prior to initiation of an investigation would necessarily have to
be less than that required of that authority at the time of making a final
determination."
633
6.1105 In other words, for a final determination, the quality and volume of evidence required must be
greater than that required by an authority in order to initiate an investigation. It is obvious that the
Ministry did not comply with this standard of evidence and established definitive anti-dumping
measures on the basis of the same level of information used to initiate the investigation.
6.1106 Moreover, the Ministry violated Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, which provides the
following:
"The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests."
6.1107 In this connection, the Ministry did not inform Cruz Azul of the essential facts to be
considered for its final determination. Furthermore, the Ministry neither justified nor explained the
origin of the two additional invoices issued by Cruz Azul in Tapachula, S.A. de C.V. and Materiales
Bonampak, S.A. de C.V., dated 24 January and 17 February 1996, and used to calculate the dumping
margin, nor did it indicate the stage of the investigation at which they were furnished.
(vii) Unjustified request for information on costs
6.1108 Concerning the methodology used to compare the normal value and the export price, it should
be pointed that Cementos Progreso’s application for an investigation did not contain any allegation of
sales below cost. Implicitly, the applicant accepted the prices and only claimed that the price at the
which the investigated product was exported to Guatemala was lower than the price at which it was
sold on the Mexican domestic market. For this reason, as from initiation of the investigation,
Cruz Azul only furnished the Ministry with informa tion on prices, so in the administrative file on the
case there is no information or claims to justify the Ministry’s request to Cruz Azul for information on
costs.
6.1109 In the preliminary determination imposing a pr ovisional anti-dumping duty, notice of which
was published in the Diario Oficial de Centro América on 28 August 1996, a dumping margin was
calculated for Cruz Azul using price information specific to this firm. Following publication of the
notice, the Ministry decided to request Cruz Azul for information on production costs, even though
Cementos Progreso had not alleged that Cruz Azul’s sales on the Mexican domestic market were
below its production costs and the Ministry did not explain the grounds for its request to Cruz Azul
for new information.

632 Guatemala – Cement, paragraph 7.76.
633 United States – Softwood Lumber, paragraph 332.

6.1110 The notice of conclusion of the investigation determining the imposition of definitive anti-
dumping duties does not contain any complaint about selling below cost or information of such nature
and in its final determination the Ministry again used price information in order to determine the
dumping margin attributed to Cruz Azul.
6.1111 For the above reasons, it can be concluded that the Ministry of the Economy did not make a
proper determination of the normal value or the export price and, consequently, the dumping margin,
so its action was inconsistent with Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1112 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to the Mexican claims regarding
Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the AD Agreement:
6.1113 Mexico alleges that the Ministry's dumping cal culations contained in the final determination
violated Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In particular, Mexico maintains that
(a) Guatemala failed to verify the accuracy and representativeness of the information it used as a basis
for calculating the normal value; (b) it failed to make certain adjustments, such as for alleged
differences in levels of trade in order to ensure "a fair comparison"; and (c) it improperly based its
determination on the facts available in accordance with Article 6.8.
634 Mexico also repeats various
assertions made in other parts of its submission. For example, it reiterates its claim that the Ministry:
(i) unjustifiably extended the investigation period; (ii) unjustifiably requested information on
production costs; and (iii) failed to inform Cruz Azul of the essential facts that would form the basis
for its final determination.635 Mexico does not challenge the calculation of the export price in the final
determination.
6.1114 Guatemala has already shown that it complied with the relevant provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement when it extended the investigation period. 636 Guatemala has also established
that it communicated to Cruz Azul the essential facts that were taken into consideration in formulating
the final determination 637, and that in requesting information about Cruz Azul's production costs it
acted reasonably and in keeping with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 638 There
would be no point in repeating our arguments here. Rather, in this section of Guatemala's first written
submission we will show that Mexico's remaining arguments are spurious and should be rejected by
the panel.
6.1115 Firstly, Mexico questions the accuracy of the Ministry's final calculation of the normal value.
According to Mexico, the Ministry should have "a scertained" that it was not comparing different

634 Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 433-48, 452-66.
635 Idem, paragraphs 449-51, 467-72.
636 See paragraphs 304-310 above. To add to Guatemala's previous comments on this question, it is
worth mentioning that Mexico is wrong in maintaining that the extension of the investigation period violated
Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Firstly, Article 5.2 establishes the requirements which must be
met by an "application". If what Mexico is suggesting is that Cementos Progreso's views on the investigation
period were fixed at the time of the application, that would be absurd. This approach finds no support in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement or in the ordinary practice of Members of the WTO. See, for example, Preliminary
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Circ ular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from Brazil , 57 Fed.
Reg. 24466 (1962). Secondly, if what Mexico is suggesting is that Cementos Progreso's application should have
been ignored because it was not supported by documentary evidence, it is again wrong. As Guatemala has
already noted, Article 5.2 does not distinguish between "evidence" and "information" and Cementos Progreso's
application certainly contained supporting information.
Section VI.D above sets out the information concerning
price increases in Mexico during 1996 which Cementos Progreso submitted as part of its application.
637 See paragraphs 339-340 above.
638 See paragraphs 311-314 above.

types of cement and, as regards prices, that they "were not simply isolated examples of prices". 639
This argument totally ignores the fact that Cruz Azul refused to provide the Ministry with precise and
complete information relating to its costs and sales. As Guatemala has made clear in the course of
this submission, Cruz Azul refused to supply the requested information on its production costs,
refused to supply the requested information concerning its sales between 1 December 1995 and
31 May 1996 and refused to cooperate with the Ministry during the on-the-spot verification.
640 I n
these circumstances, the Ministry had no alternative but to base its final determination on the "facts
available". The Ministry could not yield control of the investigation to Cruz Azul. Without a
complete file, including relevant cost information, the Ministry could not be certain, among other
things, that the prices on Cruz Azul's domestic market provided an appropriate basis for determining
the normal value.
641
6.1116 According to Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the authorities must "satisfy
themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties …". 642 However, an
exception to this requirement is made when one of the interested parties "refuses access to, or
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation".
643 In these circumstances, the authority does not have to satisfy itself as to the
accuracy of the information supplied. Instead, at its discretion, it may base its final determination on
the "facts available" 644, which may include those contained in the original application. 645
Furthermore, it is expressly understood that when an interested party has not cooperated "to the best
of its ability"646 the authority may use adverse inferences as facts available.647
6.1117 In the present dispute, Cruz Azul "significantly impeded" the Ministry's investigation. It is
also clear that Cruz Azul did not cooperate to the best of its ability. Accordingly, in its final
determination the Ministry concluded:
"… this Ministry considers that the information provided by the exporting firm cannot be
taken into account in calculating the normal value of the product investigated in view of the
fact that it could not be verified and the technical evidence submitted by the exporting firm on
18 December 1996 (confidential information) cannot replace such verification of the
information by the Guatemalan investigating authority, in accordance with Article 6.6 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement".
6.1118 If it had so wished, the Ministry would have been fully justified, given the facts, in basing its
calculation of the normal value on adverse inferences, including the highest normal value claimed in

639 Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 437-441.
640 In its first written submission, Mexico has wrongly stated that Cruz Azul only withheld the
information corresponding to the extended investigation period. (see Idem, paragraph 454). Guatemala has
already shown that this is untrue and that during the initiation of the investigation Cruz Azul withheld
information concerning its production prices. See, for example, paragraphs 311 to 314 above.
641 According to the Ministry's "Technical Report", with regard to dumping: "The lack of information
on the costs of Mexican manufacturers prevents us from confirming that the sales made on their market were at
prices above per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production …".
642 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 6.6 (emphasis added).
643 Idem, Article 6.8 (referred to in Article 6.6).
644 See, United States - Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, adopted 27 April 1994, paragraph 449
(discussing the "discretion" enjoyed by authorities in choosing the "facts available").
645 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II.
1.1 646 Anti-Dumping Agreement, paragraph 5 of Annex II. Mexico's first written submission,
paragraphs 456-58.
647 Anti-Dumping Agreement, paragraph 7 of Annex II.

the application.648 Instead, Guatemala was prudent and used a weighted average price derived from
Cruz Azul's four sales in Mexico.
6.1119 Even assuming, for argument's sake, that the Ministry was obliged to "verify" the accuracy of
its normal value calculations, Mexico has in no way fulfilled its obligation to demonstrate a violation
of the WTO Agreement. The Ministry based its determination of the normal value on the facts
available in four sales transactions, all supported by invoices, which in their turn reflected the sale of
Cruz Azul grey Portland cement during the investig ation period. There is nothing in the underlying
administrative file to suggest that the invoices were fraudulent or that the selling prices were not
accurate.
6.1120 In its first written submission, Mexico speculates that the "alleged invoices" might not have
been "representative".
649 However, at no point does Mexico explain why invoices which are
otherwise accurate and lawful should be disregarde d when an investigating authority calculates the
normal value – especially when the normal value is based on the facts available. Moreover, Mexico
never asserts that the calculation is wrong.
6.1121 Next, Mexico complains about the Ministry's reluctance to make certain adjustments under
Article 2.4 in order to make "a fair comparison". 650 Again, Mexico's argument totally disregards the
fact that the Ministry was prevented from making adjustments under Article 2.4 because Cruz Azul
refused to cooperate with the investigation. A ccordingly, in its final determination the Ministry
considered that:
"No evidence of these adjustments was provided that would prove the veracity of the
exporter's arguments, except for the packagings of the product distributed on the Mexican
market and a copy of the Law on Value Added Tax in force in the Republic of Mexico during
the investigation period (footnote omitted). Neither was it possible to verify the veracity of
the information provided by the exporter because it objected to the procedure, as noted in the
report on the verification visit …"
6.1122 Mexico also fails to show prima facie that any adjustment, apart from the two actually made
(that is, for the weight of the sacks and value-added tax), was justified. For example, Mexico says,
without offering any evidence in support, that the normal value was calculated at a different level of
trade from the export price.651 However, it does not provide any facts or evidence to support its claim,
since none exist. If Mexico were to submit this same argument to its own investigating authority,
SECOFI, it would be summarily dismissed. As note d above, SECOFI imposes the burden of proving
both a difference in the level of trade and an effect on price comparability. 652 Mexico did neither the
one nor the other. Instead, it supported its claim with nothing but conclusory arguments. According

648 In fact, Guatemala respectfully maintains that many investigating authorities, including some much
more experienced that Guatemala in the administration of anti-dumping legislation, might have responded to
this situation by assigning Cruz Azul a margin of dumping based on the adverse information available. See, for
example, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Certain Pasta from Italy , 61 Fed.
Reg. 30327-28 (1996); Final Determination on Exports of Polybutadylene Styrene (SBR Synthetic Rubber) from
the Federative Republic of Brazil, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Journal), 27 May 1996,
paragraph 104; Definitive Resolution on the Importation of Dinner Services and Loose Table and Kitchen Ware
Articles from the People's Republic of China, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Journal), 25 May 1992;
Decision amending the Final Decision of the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Investigations of Coiled Sheet
Imports from the Federative Republic of Brazil, Canada, Republic of Korea, United States of America, Republic
of South Africa and Republic of Venezuela. Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Journal),
29 February 1998, paragraph 39.
649 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 441.
650 Idem, paragraphs 442-48.
651 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 443.
652 See paragraph 162 above.

to the findings of the Panel in United States – DRAMS , conclusory arguments are not enough to
satisfy the burden of proof on the respondent.653
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1123 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's submissions as follows:
6.1124 Guatemala argues that at no point does Mexico explain why invoices which are otherwise
accurate and lawful should be disregarded when an investigating authority calculates the normal value
and that there is no evidence whatever in the file to suggest that the invoices were fraudulent or that
the selling prices were not accurate.654
6.1125 First, it should be pointed out that Mexico's argument is not that an authority should disregard
evidence but indeed that the Ministry had to verify its accuracy and so comply with Article 6.2.
Second, we must bear in mind that the Ministry, in a final determination based on the argument of the
best information available
655, used as evidence of the normal value four delivery notes (alleged
invoices656 for the reasons we have already stated in this submission), two of which were used for the
initial determination and the other two for transactions in January and February 1996 for a load of
cement in each case; in none of them is the type of cement specified or detailed.
6.1126 Guatemala argues that the four transactions are supported by invoices which reflect the sale of
Cruz Azul grey Portland cement. Guatemala's argument is false, on the one hand because not all the
evidence relates to grey cement, for the product is not identified and, even if it were, it is not the
product under investigation, and on the other hand, the firms from which the cement was brought
were distributors independent of Cruz Azul.657
6.1127 Mexico maintains that in its final determination Guatemala did not verify the accuracy of the
information and, as at the initiation of the investigation, did not examine the type of cement on the
four alleged invoices to satisfy itself whether they effectively corresponded to the like product
exported to Guatemala. Accordingly, yet again Gu atemala failed to comply with its multilateral
obligations by not verifying the accuracy of the evidence which was submitted to it by the parties and
which formed the basis for its conclusions; it thereby violated Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement.
6.1128 Guatemala also argues that in cases where an interested party denies access to the requisite
information or does not provide it within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, the authority need not verify the accuracy of the information furnished and, at its
discretion, may base its determination on the facts available to it. Even from this standpoint,
paragraph 7 of Annex II specifies that, if the authority has to base its findings on information from a
secondary source, it should do so with special circumspection and, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources. Paragraph 7 of Annex II establishes a standard that
Guatemala did not comply with either.
6.1129 Because the Ministry had not identified the like product to the exported product, the
information available to it to calculate the normal value did not meet the accuracy standard required

653 WT/DS99/R, paragraphs 6.69 and 6.73.
654 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 351-352.
655 Ibid., paragraph 347.
656 Only the evidence of the transaction concerning a load of cement on 17 February 1996 actually
constitutes an invoice. The document clearly indicates that it is invoice 15439 and on the lower left it bears the
fiscal stamp, just one of the requirements under Mexican law for it to be considered an invoice. In addition,
Annex MEXICO-62 gives a description of invoice requirements.
657 Independent distributors "Cruz Azul en Tapachula, S.A. de C.V." and "Proveedora de Láminas, y
Materiales Bonampak, S. A. de C.V." See Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 435.

by Article 6.6, a situation which affected the comparison of the export price with the comparable price
of a like product destined for consumption on the Mexican market, for which reason Guatemala also
violated Article 2.1.
6.1130 As to the lack of "representativeness" of the tr ansactions that formed the basis for calculating
the normal value, Guatemala argues that Mexico speculates that the alleged invoices could not have
been representative and that Mexico never asserts that the calculation is wrong.
658 In this connection,
Mexico maintains that Guatemala violated Article 2.2 by not evaluating, or if it did do so, incorrectly
evaluating whether sales under the alleged invoices were representative of the Mexican market. The
four alleged invoices pertained to the sale of a load or sack of cement in each case, in other words, the
lowest volume at which the product under investigation can be marketed. Clearly, the Ministry did
not make sure that the price references used for the normal value determination allowed for an
appropriate comparison.
6.1131 In addition, Guatemala pursues an absurd and simplistic argument when its states that Mexico
speculates that the alleged invoices might not be representative and that the calculation of the normal
value is wrong. It is more than plain that, if Guatemala did not review the accuracy of the evidence
furnished to show the normal value and did not exam ine the "representativeness" of the transactions,
and given the differences in volume, levels of trade and lack of identification of the product, it now
seeks to reverse the pattern of speculation that Guatemala itself followed in its determination of
normal value.
6.1132 As to the adjustments to be made for a fair comparison between the normal value and the
export price, Guatemala argues that Mexico does not provide either facts or evidence in support of its
claim and adds that the reason is that they do not exist. In principle, Mexico reiterates that the
evidence used for the normal value and the export price are clear proof that the transactions were
made for different amounts and at different levels of trade.
6.1133 Clearly, Guatemala did not make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export
price because it did not consider that the four alleged invoices used reflected retail sales and the
evidence used for the export price related to wholesale transactions.
6.1134 In addition, by not bearing in mind that the transactions were made for different amounts and
at different levels of trade, the Ministry determined a low export price because high volumes of sales
at the wholesale level were involved, and a high normal value because low volumes of sales at the
retail level were involved. Consequently, the margin of dumping obtained was overestimated because
of the effect of these differences, and for this reason Guatemala did not make a fair comparison,
thereby violating Article 2.4.
6.1135 Mexico also maintains that Guatemala made an unfair comparison because the Ministry did
not satisfy itself as to the terms and conditions of sale for the prices on the alleged invoices of sales on
the domestic market and did not take account of the differences that affect the comparability of
domestic prices and export prices. It is all too obvious that, in regard to domestic prices, the alleged
invoices included at least freight and insurance from the Cruz Azul plant to the warehouse of the
independent distributors and the export prices used in the calculation were at the ex–factory level and,
therefore, did not include the selling costs incurred in the case of domestic prices.
6.1136 Thus, by not considering the differences in the volumes of sales, the various levels of trade
and the terms and conditions of sale for calculating the normal value and the export price, Guatemala
did not make a fair price comparison and acted in violation of Article 2.4.

658 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 352.

6.1137 Guatemala also argues that the Ministry was unable to make adjustments under Article 2.4
because Cruz Azul refused to cooperate in the investigation. However, no arguments were needed
from the exporting firm to recognize the inaccuracy of the evidence submitted for the normal value
and the very obvious differences between the items of evidence for a fair comparison between the
normal value and the export price.
6.1138 With regard to cost information, Guatemala argues that, without a complete file, the Ministry
could not be certain, among other things, that the prices on Cruz Azul's domestic market provided an
appropriate basis for determining the normal value. 659 Mexico maintains that, in its reply to the
questionnaire, Cruz Azul did not furnish information on production costs because there was no
argument by the applicant that Cruz Azul's sales were below cost. Cementos Progreso's assertion was
that the price of the product under investigation exported to Guatemala was below the price at which
the product was sold on Mexico's domestic market. Nevertheless, in its reply to the request, Cruz
Azul supplied information on costs at one of its plants, the one producing the product actually
exported to Guatemala, for the original period of investigation.
6.1139 With reference to the use of the best information available, Guatemala argues that it based its
final determination on the facts available to it because Cruz Azul refused to supply the requested
information on its production costs, the information on its sales between 1 December 1995 and
31 May 1996, and refused to cooperate with the Ministry during the verification.
660 Mexico reiterates
that Cruz Azul did not receive a reply from the Ministry regarding essential questions which it had
raised before the verification visit (on-the-spot investigation) and which the Ministry should have
resolved beforehand so that Cruz Azul would agree to the verification under the terms of paragraphs 3
and 8 of Annex I. Similarly, the verification should have been confined to the information Cruz Azul
had supplied or to obtaining further details thereon, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Annex I.
6.1140 In spite of this, Guatemala proceeded with its final determination on the basis of the best
information available. In this connection, Mexico maintains that, in its normal value determination,
the Ministry violated paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for two reasons.
6.1141 The first is that the Ministry did not act with special circumspection in issuing its conclusions
on the calculation of the normal value, inter alia, by not satisfying itself as to the accuracy of the
evidence submitted to show the normal value, particularly with regard to the identification of the like
product, the lack of "representativeness" of the sales, by not taking account of the obvious differences
in volume, in the levels of trade at which the transactions took place and in the terms and conditions
of sale, which together reflected that the Ministry made an unfair comparison between the normal
value and the export price.
6.1142 The second reason is that Guatemala did not comp ly with paragraph 7 of Annex II. In other
words, the Ministry never checked the information used to calculate the normal value in the light of
information from other independent sources, among others, price lists, official import statistics and
customs returns, and there is no record in the file to show that such a check was made. If such a
check was not possible, the Ministry did not explain or justify, still less document, in any part of the
file, in its final report or in its notice of conclusion of the investigation, that it had not been possible to
make the check referred to in paragraph 7 of Annex II.
6.1143 In short, in its normal value determination Guatemala ignored the obvious anomalies and
differences mentioned above and, in its findings on normal value, the Ministry did not comply with
the minimum standard required for the use of the best information available established in Article 6.8
and in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.

659 Ibid., paragraph 347.
660 Idem.

6.1144 Indeed, Guatemala's incorrect interpretation of the relevant provisions on an authority issuing
its determinations on the basis of the best information available goes so far as to make Guatemala
argue that, when an interested party has not cooperated to the best of its ability, an authority may use
"adverse inferences" as facts available.661 This is what Guatemala actually did by grounding its final
determination on conclusions drawn from adverse inferences concerning Cruz Azul, on the basis of
what Guatemala calls the best information available. Mexico submits it is clear that neither
Article 6.8 nor Annex II confirms the interpretation Guatemala used to support its final determination.
For example, paragraph 7 of Annex II establishes th at, if an interested party does not cooperate and
thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result
which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.
6.1145 Guatemala ignored the quality and amount of the information that an authority should
consider in making a final determination. As we pointed out earlier, Guatemala's final determination
of the normal value was made from an analysis of four alleged invoices, two of which were taken into
account to initiate the investigation despite the fact that they were inaccurate and irrelevant and were
not enough for the initiation. Similar failings were repeated in the two other items of evidence
submitted to show the normal value in the extended period of investigation, and we have already
discussed them.
6.1146 In fact, on the basis of the conclusions of the Panels in the Guatemala – Cement and
United States – Softwood Lumber cases, Mexico maintains that for, the purposes of a final
determination, the evidence Guatemala should have taken into consideration should have been of a
higher quality and amount than those required to initiate the investigation. However, Guatemala did
not do this. It did not meet a higher standard of evidence, and the evidence used to determine the
normal value is proof of this.
6.1147 Mexico contends that, for a final determination, it is not enough, as Guatemala says, to have
made its determination by using a weighted aver age price from four Cruz Azul sales in Mexico
662,
when there are a large number of anomalies, imprecisions and differences which were not heeded and
resolved by Guatemala, nor did the Ministry's final determination comply with a standard of evidence
higher than that of the initiation.
6.1148 As to the extension of the period of investigatio n in the final stage, Mexico maintains that in
practice the extension constituted a new investigation and unjustifiably imposed an extra burden on
the exporter. In this connection, Mexico reiterates that the extension of the investigation period was
made at the request of Cementos Progreso but that the firm did not submit information or in any way
justify its request. Despite the lack of information and justification to extend the period, the Ministry
decided in favour of Cementos Progreso's request and extended the investigation period from
six months to one year, thereby failing to comply with the provisions of Article 5.2.
(d) Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1149 Guatemala makes the following response to Mexico's allegations that it: (a) failed to verify
the accuracy and representativeness of the information relied upon to calculate normal value; and, (b)
failed to make certain adjustments, such as for alleged differences in levels of trade, to ensure a "fair
comparison."
6.1150 Guatemala's position on these issues boils down to two basic points. Firstly, Mexico's
arguments do not take account of the fact that Cruz Azul refused to provide Guatemala with accurate
and complete information on its costs and sales. Specifically, it refused to provide essential
information that was requested in the original questionnaire and in the supplementary questionnaire.

661 Ibid., paragraph 348.
662 Ibid., paragraph 350.

It refused to cooperate with Guatemala's attempts to verify its information as provided for in
Article 6.7 and Annex I of the AD Agreement. In fact, with the backing of the Mexican Government,
Cruz Azul tried to usurp the role of the Ministry by deciding for itself what type of evidence was
relevant to the investigation. For example, after refusing to allow the verification to take place, Cruz
Azul provided Guatemala with a report containing its own on-the-spot verification conducted by a
firm hired and paid for by Cruz Azul. In these circumstances, the Ministry had no choice but to base
its final determination of dumping on the "facts available". It could not let Cruz Azul control the
investigation and determine what information it would (or would not) provide.
6.1151 In fact, given the statistical data in the record, Guatemala had no choice but to conclude
dumping and consequent injury in its final determination. Among other things, the record established
the following undisputed facts: first, that the volume of imports increased significantly, from 140 tons
in June 1995 to 25,079 tons in May 1996, with 45,859 tons imported during March 1996. Second,
that the dumped imports forced Cementos Progreso to reduce its prices significantly in order to
compete with Cruz Azul cement. Third, that Cement os Progreso's sales declined beginning with the
commencement of Cruz Azul's imports in mid-1995. Fourth, that Cementos Progreso's sales dropped
by 14 per cent from the first quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1996, notwithstanding a 15 per cent
increase in demand. Fifth, that domestic production began to decline in October 1995. Sixth, that
domestic production dropped by 14 per cent from the first quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1996.
Seventh, that Cementos Progreso's market share dropped by between 20 and 30 per cent. Eighth, that
Cementos Progreso under-utilized its installed cap acity for both clinker and finished cement between
June 1995 and May 1996. Ninth, that from June 1994-May 1995 to June 1995-May 1996, domestic
capacity utilization declined by 12 per cent for cement grinding and by 16 per cent for clinker. Tenth,
that Cementos Progreso suffered negative cash flows during the first months of 1996. Eleventh, that
starting in August 1995 Cementos Progreso began to accumulate excess inventories. Finally, that
deteriorating conditions of demand in Mexico and investments made to increase capacity in Mexico
forced the Mexican cement industry to increase its exports.
6.1152 The second point concerns the argument that in order to ensure a "fair comparison",
Guatemala should have made certain adjustments, such as for alleged differences in levels of trade.
During the substantive meeting with the Panel, Mexico said that the need for these adjustments was
"obvious" and did not depend on cooperation by Cruz Azul during the investigation.
663 However, as
we explained in our reply to question 19 of the Panel to Mexico, the only persons who normally have
information which would enable the authorities to ma ke adjustments to prices and costs in an anti-
dumping investigation are the exporters. 664 Thus, the authorities, such as the Guatemalan Ministry,
must be able to require the parties to justify their adjustments as long as the "burden of proof" is not
unreasonable.665
6.1153 In this case, Cruz Azul did not justify most of the adjustments it requested. In fact, as we
have explained throughout this dispute, Cruz Azul refused to cooperate in the Ministry's investigation.
Under these circumstances, the Ministry could not, however much it may have wanted to do so, make
the adjustments requested by Cruz Azul. For exam ple, the Ministry had no way of knowing whether
Cruz Azul's sales in its domestic market and its export sales had been made at two different levels of
trade, and if so, it did know the magnitude of the adjustment to be made. There is no evidence of this
kind in the record because Cruz Azul refused to provide it and refused to cooperate in the
investigation.
6.1154 In short, this was not even a close case. The margin of dumping was enormous, the increase
in imports was dramatic and the injurious effect was swift and severe.

663 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraph 231.
664 Appendix I, question 19 to Mexico.
665 AD Agreement, Article 2.4.

2. Claims Regarding the Guatemalan Ministry's Change of Determination of Threat of
Material Injury to Final Determination of Material Injury
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1155 Mexico claims that the Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy, without any justification,
changed its determination of threat of injury on which it based the initiation of the investigation and
imposed a provisional anti-dumping measure into a final affirmative determination of material injury,
which improperly served as a basis for imposing definitive anti-dumping duties. It advances the
following arguments in respect of this issue:
6.1156 As already explained, the absence of justification for this change constituted a serious
violation of Mexico’s right of defence under Article 6 of the AD Agreement. Likewise, the lack of
sufficiently detailed explanations in the public notice of imposition of the definitive anti-dumping
measure regarding the considerations of fact and law and the reasons used as a basis for this change
are also contrary to the requirements laid down in Article 12 of the AD Agreement. We shall refer to
these below. Nevertheless, we must point out that, in addition to these violations, the change was
made even though the Ministry had not carried out an objective examination based on positive and
sufficient evidence of either the threat of material injury or the material injury apparently attributed to
imports of grey Portland cement, as required by Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD
Agreement.
6.1157 As already stated, neither in the determination on initiation nor the preliminary determination
of the investigation did the Ministry of the Economy undertake an examination that included an
evaluation to show the existence of significant price undercutting by the imports investigated in
comparison with domestic prices for the like product, nor an evaluation of all the relevant factors and
indices affecting the state of the domestic industry.
6.1158 Furthermore, as the Ministry did not evaluate the factors indicated in Article 3.2 and 3.4 of
the AD Agreement in its determination on initiation and its preliminary determination, on the basis of
positive evidence and an objective examination, it could not have concluded that the entry of new
dumped imports would have an impact on the state of the domestic industry. In addition, bearing in
mind that, as shown above, these determinations were inconsistent with the examination required by
Article 3.7, when initiating and imposing the provisional measure, the Ministry could not have made a
proper determination of the existence of a threat of material injury to the domestic industry
manufacturing grey Portland cement.
6.1159 During the final stage of the investigation, moreover, the Ministry decided without any
justification to extend the investigation period by a further six months at the request of Cementos
Progreso
666, in other words the original investigation period fixed as June-November 1995 was
extended until May 1996 following a request by the domestic producer. An examination of the
information in the administrative file of the investigation clearly shows that the Ministry decided
arbitrarily and unjustifiably to extend the investigation period with the sole objective of utilizing the
new information to allow it to determine material injury in the absence of threat of material injury.
6.1160 In particular, consideration of the new information improperly added during the final stage of
the investigation as a result of the arbitrary and unjustifiable extension of the investigation period
allowed the investigating authority to manipulate the figures corresponding to the factors indicated in
Article 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement so that an evaluation of these factors would indicate the
existence of an alleged impact on the domestic industry apparently due to the entry of dumped
imports. Nevertheless, the results of this alleged analysis were statistically invalid
667, and moreover

666 See the Ministry of the Economy’s agreement of 4 October 1996.
667 See part E.2 of this first submission by Mexico.

the comparison of the factors by the Guatemalan authority did not correspond to the same extended
investigation period in relation to previous comparable periods. Consequently, the Ministry
illogically and inconsistently took a decision regarding the alleged impact of the economic factors and
indices on the domestic industry during the investigation period as a result of imports of grey Portland
cement from Mexico.
6.1161 As the Panel can see, this unjustified decision by the Ministry of the Economy to extend the
investigation period was made with the objective of seeking to manipulate the information available
for both periods so as to allow the investiga ting authority improperly to reach an affirmative
determination of material injury. It is also shown that the decision to extend the period was closely
related to the unjustified change in the determinati on of threat of injury (at the time of initiation and
imposition of the provisional measure) to determination of material injury (at the time of imposing the
definitive measure).
6.1162 In other words, according to no permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement can it be
considered that the Ministry made a substantiated and justified change from the initial and preliminary
determination of threat of material injury to a final determination of material injury because it was not
possible for the Ministry to determine threat of injury at the initiation of the investigation and in the
preliminary determination and then in the final dete rmination to try to substantiate an alleged impact
of the imports on the economic factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry on the
basis of unjustified extension of the investigation period. The above shows that the Ministry did not
have positive evidence, either in sufficient qu antum nor quality, in accordance with the standard
required at the various stages of the investigation, in order to substantiate its determinations, still less
to be able to determine a deterioration in the factors of the domestic industry producing grey Portland
cement as a result of dumped imports.
6.1163 As Mexico has already explained, the Ministry of the Economy violated Article 12.2 and
12.2.2 of the AD Agreement as neither the public notice of conclusion nor the full report on injury
contain or refer to sufficiently detailed explanations of the considerations and reasons for which the
Ministry decided: (i) to extend the investigation pe riod; and (ii) to change its determination of the
threat of injury according to which it initiated the investigation and imposed provisional duties to a
final affirmative determination of material injury under which it imposed definitive anti-dumping
duties, bearing in mind also that the Guatemalan authority initiated the investigation on the
assumption of the existence of a threat of injury wi thout being in possession of sufficient evidence to
substantiate this.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1164 Guatemala makes the following arguments in response to Mexico's claims regarding the
change of determination of threat of material injury to final determination of material injury:
6.1165 Guatemala states that the change from threat of injury to injury was fully justified by the
facts.
668 According to Mexico, the Ministry's final affirmative determination of injury was made
possible by the unjustified extension of the investigation period. 669 Both these arguments have been
dealt with by Guatemala in the course of this submission. 670 Accordingly, they are incorporated here
only by reference.

668 Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 473-80.
669 Idem, paragraphs 477-80.
670 See paragraphs 304-310, 341 and 344 above.

3. Claims under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1166 Mexico makes the following arguments that the final determination of material injury to the
domestic industry violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement:
6.1167 The final affirmative determination of material injury to the Guatemalan domestic industry
made by the Ministry of the Economy was not based on positive evidence nor did it include an
objective examination of the volume of dumped imports, their effect on prices of the like product on
the Guatemalan market and the consequent impact of the imports of grey Portland cement on the
domestic industry because it failed to evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry. Moreover, the Guatemalan authority did not establish a causal
relationship between the imports of grey Portland cement and the alleged material injury to the
domestic industry, as required by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
6.1168 The Ministry of the Economy’s final determination of material injury to the domestic industry
therefore violated Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement. The imposition of definitive
anti-dumping duties by the Ministry of the Economy under such circumstances also violated
paragraphs 1 and 6 of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
(i) The final determination of injury was not based on an objective examination of the volume of
dumped imports
6.1169 According to Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, when determining injury, the investigating
authority must consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped
imports, in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.
6.1170 Notwithstanding this, in its final affirmative determination of injury, the Ministry of the
Economy did not take into account Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement but reached the conclusion that
the imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico had shown a significant rate of increase during the
investigation period on the basis of the following considerations:
(i) The tariff heading for the imports of cement from Mexico is 2523.29.00 of the
Central American Tariff System;
(ii) in June 1995, there was a minimum volume of imports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico;
(iii) the Ministry of the Economy determined that in May 1996 the volume was
significantly larger than during first month of the extended investigation period
671;
(iv) in an intermediate month during the alleged investigation period, namely,
March 1996, the volume of imports was larger than that recorded for the other months
in its examination;
(v) the Ministry found that the trend in imports during the investigation period
(June 1995 to May 1996) showed a significant rate of increase in the volume of
imports.

671 It will be recalled that, on 4 October 1996, without any grounds and on the basis of a request from
Cementos Progreso, the Ministry of the Economy decided to extend the investigation period by a further
six months, i.e. the original period of June-November 1995 was extended until May 1996.

6.1171 Finally, Mexico does not deem it necessary to repeat its specific requests, since they have
been exhaustively set out. Nevertheless, it reiterates the importance of its request that the Panel
suggest that Guatemala should revoke the anti-dumping measure adopted against imports of grey
portland cement from Mexico and should refund the anti-dumping duties collected. As is known,
Guatemala has been collecting anti-dumping duties unduly since 28 August 1996 and Mexico has had
to suffer the problems of access to the Guatemalan market simply because the Appellate Body
interpreted the Mexican request in a specific way.
6.1172 Mexico hopes that all the time and resources invested in this procedure will be duly
considered and that the Panel will exercise its power to suggest the way in which Guatemala should
implement the recommendations contained in its report.
6.1173 We are aware of the fact that this power can be exercised only with great prudence, but we
consider that, in this particular case, given the background and considering the manifold violations
committed in the initiation, the Panel will recognize that Guatemala should never have initiated the
investigation and will be able to formulate its su ggestions with the strictest regard for the powers
entrusted to it by Article 19.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
6.1174 As can be seen, the Ministry’s reasoning concerning the volume of dumped imports used to
reach an affirmative determination of injury is not compatible with the criteria laid down in
Article 3.2. The Ministry of the Economy therefor e violated Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement by not
considering whether there had been a significant incr ease in imports in absolute terms. There is a
difference between growth in absolute terms, as specified in Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, and the
rate of increase referred to in Article 3.7(i), a nd the purpose of considering a rate of increase is to
examine the trends in the imports investigated.
6.1175 In addition, throughout the final determination there is no evaluation of the significant
increase in imports relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. This led the
Ministry of the Economy arbitrarily and unjustifiably to change its determination of threat of material
injury into a determination of material injury, without making the examination that might have
substantiated this change. Such an examination was necessary because what has to be determined in a
case of threat of injury is the likelihood of a substantial increase in imports, whereas in a case of
material injury the investigating authority must consider whether the increase has already occurred.
Consequently, it is obvious that in this case the Ministry did not consider that the change from a
threat of material injury to material injury woul d in any case require an evaluation of the imports in
accordance with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, which is quite different to that required under
Article 3.7(i) for cases of determination of threat of injury.
6.1176 Moreover, the calculations made to estimate the increase in the volume of imports of grey
Portland cement from Mexico are inaccurate because the Ministry of the Economy confined itself to
maximum and minimum volumes imported during the investigation period instead of the trend of
imports in absolute terms or relative to the previous comparable period, which in this case would be
June 1994 to May 1995, and relative to previous periods, in order to analyse long-term trends in
imports. Furthermore, the import figures obtained by the Ministry are also incorrect because the tariff
heading under which grey Portland cement is classified also covers products other than the one
investigated. Nevertheless, the Ministry improperly considered that all the imports under this tariff
heading corresponded to the product investigated and also considered that the total volume of imports
under this tariff heading during the months of January to June 1996 corresponded to the Mexican
product, without taking into account that Guatem ala imported grey Portland cement from other
sources during this period. Consequently, the Ministry of the Economy made an erroneous
determination of the volume of imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico by not excluding
imports from other sources and other types of cement, for example, grey cement or slow-setting
cement, which are imported under the same tariff heading.

6.1177 There is also information in the administrative file of the investigation that the firm Cementos
Progreso imported grey Portland cement from Mexico during the investigation period through a firm
called Materiales Industriales S.A. (hereinafter "MATINSA"). In this connection, when responding to
the request by the Ministry of the Economy, MATINSA stated that it had no direct commercial
relations with Cementos Progreso and that the volume imported during the investigation period was
79,426 tonnes of cement.
6.1178 Contrary to the above, in a full report on the determination of injury, the Ministry of the
Economy acknowledged the relationship between Cementos Progreso and MATINSA, but considered
that it did not impair the domestic producer’s right to complain of the injury caused by the grey
Portland cement because (i) the product imported by MATINSA was non-pozzolanic Portland cement
and was thus not within the definition of like product; (ii) imports of this cement only represented a
small proportion of the domestic production of Portland cement; and (iii) the cement imported by
MATINSA was sold on the Guatemalan market under the domestic producer’s label.
6.1179 Mexico expressly objected to the findings of the Ministry of the Economy regarding the effect
of the relationship between the importer MATINSA and the domestic cement producer on the anti-
dumping investigation. Firstly, because in the investigation’s final determination the Ministry of the
Economy determined that the product investigated was grey Portland cement, without making any
distinction giving the impression that the pozzolana content of the product investigated differed. In
fact, the Ministry of the Economy classified grey Portland cement into 14 sub-categories of cement
672,
including those that do not contain pozzolana such as the cement imported by MATINSA.
6.1180 Secondly, Mexico rejected the Ministry’s determination for the following reasons: (i) even
though the amount of the product imported by MATINSA was irrelevant in comparison with domestic
production of the product investigated, the volume of these imports was of particular importance in
comparison with the total volume of imports of grey Portland cement into Guatemala during the
investigation period, because they accounted for at least one third of total imports; (ii) by
disregarding the imports by MATINSA corresponding to the like product, the effect of imports of
Cruz Azul grey Portland cement on the domestic industry was magnified; (iii) by failing to consider
the volume and price of these imports not sold at dumping prices, the Ministry clearly failed to take
account of factors other than the dumped imports which also injured the domestic industry, as
required by Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
6.1181 Based on the foregoing, Mexico argues that the evaluation of imports by the Ministry of the
Economy in the final determination of injury is inconsistent with the provisions of the AD Agreement
because it is impossible to estimate the penetration of imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico
into the Guatemalan market on the basis of incorrect findings, inconsistent data and in the absence of
information. By making an inaccurate analysis of the penetration of imports, the Ministry of the
Economy compromised the rest of the investigation and could not have determined a causal
relationship between the allegedly dumped imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry in
accordance with Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
6.1182 Furthermore, the Ministry of the Economy’s evaluation of imports was also inconsistent with
the AD Agreement because in none of the Ministry’s determinations is there any indication that the
investigating authority considered the total imports of grey Portland cement into Guatemala, neither
for the investigation period nor for previous compar able periods. In other words, without knowing
and evaluating the trend in total imports irrespective of their country of origin, it is not possible for
any investigating authority to determine the significance of the volume of the alleged dumped imports
being investigated.

672 The Ministry of the Economy indicated that there were 14 types of grey Portland cement, namely:
Type I, Type I A, Type II, Type II A, Type III, Type III A, Type IV and Type V; if Portland cement is mixed
with other components, it is classified into Type I S, Type I P, Type P, Type S, Type I PM and Type I S.

(ii) The final determination of injury did not include an objective examination of the effect of the
imports on prices of the like product on the Guatemalan market
6.1183 According to Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, the investigating authority shall consider
whether there has been significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the
price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to
depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred
to a significant degree.
6.1184 In its final affirmative determination of injury, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that
imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico had exercised pressure on the prices of the domestic
industry. According to the Ministry, its conclusion was substantiated by the following:
(i) When Cruz Azul cement was first imported, the domestic producer significantly
lowered prices in order to be able to compete in each region;
(ii) the increases in the indices considered in the official formula for fixing the maximum
selling price did not lead to adjustments in the price of the domestic product;
(iii) during the investigation period (1 June 1995 to 31 May 1996), the domestic industry
undertook a significant number of transactions below the maximum authorized
selling price;
(iv) the domestic industry’s selling price in the border area suffered a greater impact as a
result of the dumped imports because prices had to be adjusted to add the relevant
transport costs.
6.1185 The Ministry of the Economy did not comply with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement because
in its final affirmative determination of injury it included a series of affirmations concerning the price
trend without having any elements to uphold the conclusion that the price of the grey Portland cement
imported from Mexico undercut the price of domestic grey Portland cement manufactured by
Cementos Progreso, or that the effect of the imports on the latter had led to a significant reduction or
prevented an increase or, if applicable, to substantiate the finding that the dumping, allegedly by the
imports, was the cause of any negative effect on domestic prices and not other elements, for example,
the loss of Cementos Progreso’s monopoly on the domestic market.
6.1186 In addition, in its examination of prices in th e final affirmative determination of injury, the
Ministry of the Economy did not indicate what me thodology was used to analyse prices nor how the
comparison between the price of imported cement and the selling price of cement by the domestic
industry was made. If this was done, it did not mention either at what level of trade the prices were
compared, if they were on the same terms of trade, what were the comparable periods in which the
prices were recorded, and whether the prices were the result of simple, weighted, moving or
progressive averages.
6.1187 In its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy mentioned that the domestic producer
of grey Portland cement lowered its prices during the investigation period without indicating in any
way the amount of the alleged reduction, thus showing that the investigating authority did not have
the necessary elements to determine the trend in domestic prices. Consequently, the Ministry of the
Economy could not have reached the conclusion that the price of the imports had a negative effect on
the domestic price of the like product. The final determination or the full report do not contain either
any examination of the price trend in imports for the investigation period, which obviously makes the
Ministry of the Economy’s findings on alleged price undercutting by the imported product as
compared to the price of the domestic product inconsistent with the AD Agreement because, as

shown, the investigating authority did not undertake the examination that would allow it to perceive
any undercutting.
6.1188 The Ministry of the Economy did not determine either the amount by which the price of the
domestic like product fell as compared to the price of the imports allegedly dumped. Because of this,
the Ministry did not have the elements to allow it to establish a causal relationship between the effect
on domestic cement prices and the level of prices at which Mexican imports were entering Guatemala.
This means that during the investigation period, the Ministry of the Economy sought to establish a fall
in domestic prices in certain regions of Guatemala without considering that these reductions, if they
occurred, were due to factors other than the entry of imports.
6.1189 In this connection, in its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy recognizes that in
1990 the Government of Guatemala developed a form ula for fixing the ceiling price for cement so
that the profits of the domestic producer would not be affected by increases in the various inputs used
to manufacture cement. In fact, in the final determination, the Ministry of the Economy stated that the
fixing of a maximum selling prices is a disadvantage for the domestic industry confronted by cement
imports from any source. The Ministry also declared that the price of imports of the product
investigated was based on a policy of shadowing the price in the Guatemalan domestic cement
industry, setting the price at a level slightly below that of the like domestic product.
6.1190 In the final affirmative determination, the Ministry of the Economy also stated the following:
" … that, although other factors may have contributed indirectly to the deterioration
in the domestic industry’s financial situation, for example, the emergence of a new
competitor in a market where there was only one rival, which necessarily has an
impact on prices, and the fact that energy and fuel costs constitute a disadvantage for
the domestic industry in comparison with the Mexican competition …"
6.1191 The above shows that the Ministry recognized that factors other than imports might have had
a negative impact on the Guatemalan industry manufacturing the product investigated.
6.1192 To summarize, Mexico argues that the price evaluation made by the Ministry of the Economy
was inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The final determination clearly shows that the investigating
authority did not have sufficient elements to determine undercutting, a significant depression of
domestic prices or an obstacle to their increase, as a result of imports of grey Portland cement from
Mexico. Consequently, the final determination is also contrary to the provisions of Article 3.2 of the
AD Agreement on the consideration to be given by the investigating authority to the effect on prices.
(iii) The final determination of injury was not based on positive evidence and did not include an
objective examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
6.1193 According to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, in order to determine the impact of the
dumped imports on the domestic industry, the investigating authority must evaluate:
" … economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry,
including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting
domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to
raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of
these factors necessarily give decisive guidance."
6.1194 Notwithstanding the above, the Ministry of th e Economy’s final determination of injury was
not based on positive evidence and did not include an objective evaluation of the impact of the

dumped imports on the domestic industry. On the contrary, in its final determination of injury the
Ministry confined itself to the following conclusi ons regarding the alleged impact of imports of grey
Portland cement from Cruz Azul on the domestic industry:
(i) Sales of the product investigated fell during the first half of 1996 in comparison with
the first half of 1995;
(ii) profits were lower in the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996;
(iii) output fell by 17 per cent in October and November 1995 and by 14 per cent in the
first half of 1996 in comparison with the previous period;
(iv) Cementos Progreso’s market share decreased by 20 to 30 per cent;
(v) "the capacity used to grind cement fell by 12 per cent in comparison with the period
June to May the previous year" and regarding capacity utilization for clinker, the
Ministry of the Economy indicated that "During the period June 1995 to May 1996,
utilized capacity fell by 16 per cent in comparison with the same period the previous
year";
(vi) during the first months of 1996, the domestic product had a negative operating cash
flow, which corresponded to the period during which imports of Mexican cement into
the Guatemalan market increased;
(vii) from August 1995 onwards there was an increase in clinker stocks;
(viii) the decrease in sales in 1996 did not have any impact on the number of employees.
The number of employees involved in production had remained relatively constant
since 1993, wages and salaries had remained steady in comparison with selling
prices;
(ix) concerning growth and investment, from 1993 to 1995 fixed assets increased, as a
result of expansion liabilities decreased and capital increased, thereby increasing the
risk for Cementos Progreso’s shareholders;
(x) magnitude of the margin of dumping. There may be other factors which may have
indirectly contributed to the deterioration in the financial situation. Nevertheless, the
magnitude of the dumping that existed – 89.54 per cent – leads to the conclusion that
the injury caused to the domestic industry is the result of the dumped imports.
6.1195 As the Panel can see, the alleged evaluation of injury by the Ministry of the Economy was not
based on statistically valid comparisons and did not properly evaluate the relevant economic factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry. By not basing its determination on
positive evidence and by failing to carry out an objective evaluation of the impact of the imports on
the Guatemalan domestic industry producing grey Portland cement, the Guatemalan authority violated
Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
6.1196 In particular, the investigating authority did not undertake a proper evaluation of the impact of
the dumped imports on the sales of the domestic industry because it tried to relate the trend in sales in
monetary terms to the trend in terms of volume (metric tonnes), indicating in the final determination
that:

"… Sales by the domestic industry varied in parallel with variations in demand,
except for the year 1995 when the growth in real sales compared with 1994 was 6.97
per cent, although demand rose by 31.89 per cent …"
6.1197 As can be seen, the Ministry of the Economy on the one hand used the words "real sales" to
show the growth in sales in monetary terms and, on the other, referred to the increase in demand
(apparent domestic consumption – ADC) expressed in terms of volume, thereby minimizing the
growing sales trend in value terms and showing hi gher growth in apparent domestic consumption in
terms of volume, which in any light is inconsistent and not comparable.
6.1198 In the part relating to profits in its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated
that Cementos Progreso’s financial situation deteriorated in the second half of 1995, a fact that is
inconsistent and cannot be substantiated, by stating that in 1995 domestic sales of grey Portland
cement showed growth in real terms of 7 per cent, while in the first half of 1996 they fell by 14 per
cent as compared to the same period in 1995. This shows that the Ministry of the Economy decided
to compare periods that are not comparable and have nothing to do with the period investigated.
Contrary to this statement, in the full report on determination of injury, the Ministry of the Economy
mentions that Cementos Progreso’s operating profits in 1995 were relatively high compared with the
comparable period the preceding year, which again is inconsistent with the statement that there was a
deterioration in finances that year and cannot be the case if the operating profits are higher as
compared to the previous period.
6.1199 In response to the request made by the investigating authority, Cementos Progreso furnished a
list of customers who allegedly stopped purcha sing Guatemalan cement and bought the imported
product under investigation. In the full report on the determination of injury, the Ministry of the
Economy stated in this connection that: "During the period investigated, a representative number of
customers of the domestic industry ceased to sell the domestic product and replaced their stocks with
the imported product". However, from the information in the administrative file, it is not possible for
the Ministry to substantiate its statement because in order to reach such a determination it would have
had to relate the volume purchased by Cementos Progreso’s customers to the volume of the imported
product purchased by the same customers during the investigation period, an exercise that was not
effected by the Ministry of the Economy, so it is not able to demonstrate that the domestic product
was replaced by the imported product of Mexican origin.
6.1200 To summarize, the Ministry of the Economy made an incorrect determination of the alleged
impact of the dumped imports on sales of grey Portland cement by the domestic industry because it
made inappropriate comparisons and lacked consistency with regard to the investigation period, the
list of customers and the increase in sales.
6.1201 The Ministry of the Economy also violated Arti cle 3.6 of the AD Agreement by assessing all
the profits earned by Cementos Progreso instead of assessing separately the profits earned from sales
of grey Portland cement and the extent to which they affected the total profits earned by the domestic
producer as a whole, as the Ministry had information on sales, costs and profits for the like product to
allow it to evaluate the profits in accordance with Article 3.6 of the AD Agreement.
6.1202 Mexico also considers that Cementos Progreso’s profits do not reflect profits for transactions
in the product investigated because there are other production lines that could affect the overall profits
of the domestic producer, a fact that was clearly not taken into account by the Ministry of the
Economy in its final determination. It should also be pointed out that at no time did the Ministry of
the Economy mention in its final affirmative determination of injury the trend in the domestic
producer’s profits for the investigation period (June 1995 to May 1996) and for the previous
comparable period (June 1994 to May 1995), so it could not have determined that the trend in profits
earned by the domestic industry had been affected by the declining sales.

6.1203 Moreover, in the final determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that domestic
production of grey Portland cement rose from 1993 to 1995 due to an increase in demand. On this
basis, the investigating authority arbitrarily decided to evaluate the trend in domestic production by
month and determined a series of decreases in production in October, November and December 1995,
as well as during the first half of 1996. The comparison made by the Ministry of the Economy is
improper, however, because in reflecting the trend in production the investigating authority left out
the months of June, July, August and September 1995 and added one month to the investigation
period, June 1996. The cumulative data therefore vary considerably and do not correspond to the
trend in production for the investigation period as compared to the previous comparable period.
6.1204 The Ministry of the Economy’s evaluation of the trend in production clearly violated
Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because when it perceived increases in production in annual
terms, it decided to change its evaluation so as to show decreases using monthly comparisons, and did
not take into account the investigation period. Consequently, the Ministry of the Economy could not
have been in a position to determine objectively that the imports might have had an impact on the
volume manufactured by the domestic producer.
6.1205 With regard to Cementos Progreso’s share of the domestic market, the Ministry of the
Economy incorrectly determined that it fell by between 20 to 30 per cent. In its final determination,
the Ministry mentioned a range for the share, clearly showing that the investigating authority did not
even take the trouble to evaluate and define a precise figure for the share, neither did it indicate what
periods the range covers. Furthermore, the Ministry did not evaluate the trend in the share in relation
to imports from Mexico, from other sources, and the like domestic product, so it could not have based
its determination on objective and consistent elements that could allow it to determine the impact of
the dumped imports on this factor.
6.1206 With regard to return on investments, the Ministry of the Economy once again violated
Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement by not making an adequate examination of the domestic producer’s
return on investments in its final determination and trying to reflect profitability using only one
indicator, because the final determination states that the operating margin in 1995 was 3.4 per cent.
This clearly shows that the Ministry of the Economy did not have sufficient elements to determine a
trend in this factor during the investigation period
6.1207 In its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy attributes the reduction in the
utilization of production capacity for grey Portland cement to the alleged accumulation of inventories
of clinker – which is the basic input used in cement production – without considering that the trend in
the utilization of plant capacity for manufacturing grey Portland cement cannot be determined by
wrongly looking at the accumulation of inventories of inputs because such a determination can lead to
equivocal findings, as happened to the Ministry of the Economy. For example, if we consider that a
manufacturer has no stocks of an input, according to the Ministry of the Economy’s logic, the
conclusion would certainly be that the producer was under-utilizing its production capacity for
manufacturing the final product because of the presence of imports on its market.
6.1208 Moreover, in the administrative file there are indications that the volume of clinker
inventories at the end of the period, in May 1996, was substantially less than in May 1995, and this
amount of stocks can barely be considered the minimum buffer stock needed when producing grey
Portland cement, so Cementos Progreso’s argument that the accumulation of clinker meant a
reduction in the utilization of plant capacity for producing cement is quite wrong and its acceptance
by the Ministry of the Economy is incorrect, tendentious and biased.
6.1209 The Ministry of the Economy also indicated that, in evaluating the utilization of plant
capacity for grey Portland cement, the months of June 1994 to May 1995 were compared with
June 1995 to May 1996 in order to obtain a better indicator of the seasonal nature of production and

sales, without justifying such a "methodology". Mexico considers in this connection that the latter
indication shows that, in its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy acted inconsistently and
in a biased and tendentious manner when determining the impact of the dumped imports because, as
Mexico shows in this submission, as far as the production and sales factors are concerned, the
Ministry of the Economy did not make a comparison with the same periods used to evaluate the
utilization of plant capacity. In other words, in a very simplistic way, it decided that the seasonal
effects of the market were not relevant for the statistical comparison of these variables, although they
were relevant when determining the utilization of plant capacity.
6.1210 Concerning cash flow, the Ministry of the Economy did not objectively determine the causes
of the negative trend in the domestic producer’s cash flow. It first stated that Cementos Progreso had
an outflow of cash to pay off liabilities and, second ly, as it did not determine the extent of the impact
of the like product on Cementos Progreso’s profits, the Ministry did not have elements that would
allow it to determine that the alleged deterioration in the domestic sales of the like product necessarily
had an effect on the operational cash flow.
6.1211 In the final determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that the decrease in sales of
the product investigated had not had an impact on the number of workers directly employed
 by the
firm Cementos Progreso. The investigating authority could not therefore have determined an effect as
a result of the dumped imports for this factor.
6.1212 The information in the administrative file does not contain any indication that the Ministry of
the Economy evaluated the ability of the domestic industry to raise capital, as required by Article 3.4
of the AD Agreement, because in order to make such an evaluation at the very least the investigating
authority would have to obtain the trend in Cementos Progreso’s state of solvency and leverage so the
Ministry did not reach a determination of the impact on this indicator, without having justified either
why it considered this factor not relevant for its determination.
6.1213 The Ministry of the Economy violated Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD because in its final
determination it did not evaluate the trend in inventories of grey Portland cement, but simply noted
that inventories of clinker, i.e. the input used in cement production, had accumulated from August
1995 onwards. Mexico considers that, as the Ministry of the Economy did not evaluate the trend in
inventories of grey Portland cement and did not justify either why it considered this factor irrelevant
to its determination, it was not in a position to determine that inventories of the like domestic product
could have been affected by the imports from Mexico.
6.1214 The Ministry of the Economy did not have information on the alleged investment plans of the
Guatemalan industry, in order to conclude that such projects in fact existed, that they were viable even
without the presence of imports, and that they had been affected by the imports of Mexican origin.
6.1215 It may thus justifiably be concluded that the Ministry of the Economy did not adequately
evaluate the possible impact of the imports on th e Guatemalan industry, nor the relevant economic
factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry so its action was inconsistent
with Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1216 Guatemala makes the following responding arguments to Mexico's various claims under
Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement:
6.1217 In accordance with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Ministry's final
determination of injury was based on "positive evidence" and on "an objective examination of: (a) the
volume of dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for
like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such

products". The Ministry's examination of the rele vant evidence in the file is contained in the
document entitled Supplemented Report for the Determination of Injury Caused by Dumped Imports
of Grey Portland Cement from Mexico of 15 January 1997, prepared by the Ministry's Directorate of
Economic Integration and in the final determination of 17 January 1997, which was published in the
Diario de Centro América on 30 January 1997.673
(i) Guatemala objectively examined the volume of dumped imports
6.1218 Article 3.2 allows the import volumes to be analysed in absolute or relative terms. If the
volumes are examined in relative terms, the comparison must be relative to "production or
consumption in the importing Member".674
6.1219 In the present dispute, the Guatemalan inves tigating authority examined positive evidence of
import volumes on many bases. Firstly, it established that Cruz Azul's dumped imports totalled
236,149.21 tons during the investigation period (June 1995 – May 1996). Secondly, the Ministry
determined, again based on positive evidence, that in absolute terms the increase in imports was
significant. Specifically, in accordance with Arti cle 3.2, the Ministry determined that during the
investigation period imports from Cruz Azul increased from 140 tons in June 1995 to 25,079 tons in
May 1996, with a maximum in March 1996 (45,859.31 tons).
6.1220 Next, the Ministry examined the import volumes in relative terms. Firstly, it compared
imports of the product under investigation with domestic production. The Ministry found that cement
from Cruz Azul jumped from 0.15 per cent of domestic production in June 1995 to 25.84 per cent in
May 1996. It then compared import volumes with domestic consumption. In just one year, after
having had less than one per cent of the Guatem alan market (in June 1995) Cruz Azul managed to
capture an absolute 21 per cent of the market (May 1996). In fact, in March 1996, Cruz Azul
controlled about 32 per cent of the Guatemalan cement market.
6.1221 Mexico tries in vain to lessen the impact of th ese figures. Firstly, it alleges that Guatemala
should not have considered the "rate" at which imports from Cruz Azul were increasing.
675 A p a r t
from its obvious absurdity, this argument contradicts the express wording of Article 3.2 which
requires the investigating authority to consider whether the "increase" in imports is significant.
"Increase" means the "growth or extension of a thing".
676 Thus, contrary to Mexico's assertion, in the
final determination of its anti-dumping investigation Guatemala properly examined the rate at which
import volumes were increasing.
6.1222 Secondly, Mexico tries to capitalize on the fact that the Ministry's final determination does
not appear to compare import volumes during the investigation period with import volumes during
previous periods.
677 In fact, there were no imports during the immediately preceding periods. Mexico
is aware that Cruz Azul did not begin to export cement to Guatemala until about June 1995. Mexico
is also aware that traditionally its producers have not exported cement to Guatemala. This changed
dramatically in 1995 when Mexico suffered a severe economic crisis largely due to the devaluation of
the Mexican peso. In short, a comparison of imports during periods prior to the investigation period
would only have served to strengthen support for the final affirmative determination of injury.

673 Final determination, DCA 77 2098.
674 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 3.2 (emphasis added)
675 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 486.
676 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, twenty-first edition 1992, page 162.
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, page 722 (Gramerc y Books 1994); See also The Compact Edition of the
Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, page 1409. ("To grow in size, quantity, duration or degree").
677 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 488.

6.1223 Contrary to Mexico's claims, Cementos Progreso did not import cement from Mexico.
Cementos Progreso did buy some cement from MATINSA which that firm was importing from a
company other than Cruz Azul. As described in the final determination, the Ministry decided not to
apply the anti-dumping measure to cement impor ted by MATINSA from other Mexican companies
because it had not been shown that MATINSA's imports had caused injury to the domestic industry
during the investigation period. For example, the cement which Cementos Progreso brought from
MATINSA did not cause injury because it was marketed under the Cementos Progreso label and
because it was a type of cement which Cementos Progreso was not manufacturing. Mexico can
hardly complain that the Ministry had excluded other Mexican cement producers from the scope of its
anti-dumping measure.
6.1224 Contrary to Mexico's unfounded allegations, MATINSA's imports did not represent a third of
all imports. The Ministry found that the volume imported by MATINSA was insignificant as
compared with the total volume of cement imported during June 1995 – May 1996. The Ministry also
found that during the investigation period MATINSA's imports decreased substantially relative to the
previous period.
6.1225 Contrary to Mexico's allegations, the Ministry did consider the MATINSA imports in
evaluating whether dumped imports from Cruz Azul had injured Cementos Progreso. The Ministry
concluded that taking MATINSA's imports into ac count did not weaken its determination of injury
caused by cement imports from Cruz Azul.
6.1226 Finally, contrary to Mexico's unfounded claim, the Ministry did not disregard the existence of
other types of cement, if any, imported under tariff heading 2523.29.00 In its analysis, the Ministry
only considered imports from Cruz Azul. The Ministry noted that imports from Cruz Azul
represented 91 per cent of total imports of grey cement into Guatemala during the investigation
period. The Ministry did not assume that all the imports under this tariff heading were from Cruz
Azul.
(ii) Guatemala objectively examined the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products.
6.1227 As pointed out above, Article 3.1 requires that the determination of injury be based, among
other things, on "an objective examination of … the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products …". Article 3.2 develops this requirement by specifying that the
investigating authorities must consider whether: (a) there has been "a significant price undercutting
by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member" or
(b) "the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price
increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree". Contrary to Mexico's
allegation, Guatemala conducted both types of analysis and based its final determination of injury on
an objective examination of positive evidence.
6.1228 Firstly, the Ministry examined information on prices at both wholesale and retail level in
Guatemala during the investigation period. This examination revealed significant price undercutting
by Cruz Azul at both levels. Next, the Ministry examined Cruz Azul's pricing policies in Guatemala.
Again, it found significant evidence of price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with
the price of the like product in Guatemala. In particular, the supplemented report for the
determination of injury prepared by the Ministry's Directorate of Economic Integration dealt with the
"policy of following the price set by the competition, situating prices at a level slightly below the
selling price of the domestic industry, thereby forcing the latter [(that is, Cementos Progreso)] to
lower its selling price".
6.1229 Secondly, the Ministry examined whether imports from Cruz Azul were depressing prices or
preventing price increases in Guatemala to a significant degree. Among other things, the Ministry

found that "(a) imports from Cruz Azul had an i mmediate and adverse effect on Cementos Progreso's
prices; (b) the dumped imports made a greater impact in the area adjacent to the Mexican frontier
(especially in the Departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu) where Cruz Azul
concentrated its sales; (c) despite increases in the maximum price for cement established by the
government during the investigation period, Cementos Progreso "undertook a significant number of
transactions at below the maximum selling price …"; and (d) if there had been no imports from Cruz
Azul, Cementos Progreso "would have been able to sell at the maximum prices established [by the
government]".
6.1230 Mexico is desperately trying to find some flaw in these conclusions. For example, it alleges
that the Ministry should have explained whether it was examining price undercutting or a reduction in
prices.
678 It also mentions Guatemala's alleged failure to explain whether its price comparisons were
the result of "simple, weighted, moving or progressive averages". 679 None of these arguments
deserves to be taken seriously.
6.1231 If Mexico had conducted this investigation, it might have proceeded differently or have
reached a different conclusion. 680 The only question is whether Guatemala established the facts
"properly" and if its evaluation of those facts was "unbiased and objective".681
6.1232 Mexico has not shown, as required by the standard of review applicable, that Guatemala's
factual findings were not properly established or were biased. In short, Mexico has only offered an
alternative interpretation of the evidence or, in so me cases, has merely suggested that an alternative
interpretation might be possible and not that the factual record should contain an alternative finding.
Accordingly, there is absolutely no basis for the pane l to substitute its interpretation of the facts for
that of the Guatemalan authorities and to proceed in this way would be to contravene the clearly
established standard of review applicable to anti-dumping disputes under Article 17.6(i).
(iii) Guatemala objectively examined the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
6.1233 In addition to examining import volumes and the effect on prices, Guatemala also examined,
in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the impact which dumped
imports from Cruz Azul were having on the Guat emalan cement industry. As already mentioned,
Article 3.1 stipulates that the investigating authorities must examine, among other things, the impact
the dumped imports were having on the domestic producers concerned. Article 3.4 develops this
requirement by specifying that:
"The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned
shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market
share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting
domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative
effects on cashflow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily
give decisive guidance."682
6.1234 In the present dispute, Guatemala based its final determination on positive evidence and an
objective examination of, inter alia , the consequent impact of Cruz Azul imports on the domestic

678 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 498.
679 Idem.
680 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 17.6(i).
681 Idem.
682 Idem, Article 3.4 (emphasis added).

industry, in accordance with Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Ministry's
examination revealed that, among other things, Cruz Azul imports had:
• Caused Cementos Progreso's sales to decline by 14 per cent between the first quarter
of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996. This decline coincided with Cruz Azul's entry
into the market;
• caused Cementos Progreso to lose customers;
• caused domestic cement production to record a reduction of 14 per cent between the
first quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996. This reduction began when Cruz
Azul started importing cement into Guatemala;
• caused a reduction of between 20 and 30 per cent in Cementos Progreso's share of the
domestic market;
• caused a decline in Cementos Progreso's capacity to utilize both clinker and finished
cement;
• caused a 12 per cent fall in domestic utilization of cement grinding capacity and a
16 per cent fall in domestic utilization of clinker production capacity;
• caused Cementos Progreso to experience negative cash flow during the first months
of 1996;
• caused Cementos Progreso to postpone investment plans which would have
modernized its plant and increased its production capacity; and
• caused Cementos Progreso to accumulate excessive inventories as from August 1995.
6.1235 Once again, Mexico is trying to find a possible flaw in the Ministry's analysis and
conclusions. Instead of referring to the correct standard of review, Mexico explains how it would
have conducted the investigation differently. For example, Mexico says that it would not have
compared sales trends (measured in monetary terms) with levels of consumption (measured in volume
terms).
683 It also alleges that the Ministry could have used annual rather than monthly domestic
production figures.684 As will be shown below, none of these claims is relevant to the settlement of
this dispute.
6.1236 First of all, there is no flaw in the Ministry's analysis of injury. For example, it is not wrong
for the authority to compare domestic sales during the investigation period with domestic sales during
the previous period. It is also consistent with Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that an
authority should make the same type of analysis for apparent domestic consumption and the relation
between consumption and sales. In fact, as part of a broader examination of the impact which the
dumped imports had on Guatemala's domestic industry, such an analysis is unquestionably logical and
reasonable.
6.1237 Secondly, in the course of its first written submission Mexico asserts that it would have acted
differently. It also expresses its displeasure with the facts revealed by the information examined by
Guatemala.
685 Unfortunately for Mexico, the facts do not lie. Moreover, although Mexico might have
proceeded differently if it had been the investigating authority, the fact is that this has no relevance to
the settlement of this dispute. As observed by the panel in the case EC - Cotton Yarn , the mere fact

683 Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 508-09.
684 Idem, paragraphs 515-516.
685 Idem, paragraphs 508-09.

that an authority has not selected a set of information rather than another different set of information
does not indicate, in the absence of other information, bias or lack of objectivity.686
6.1238 As we have been obliged to point out on several occasions, the issue before this panel is
whether the establishment of the facts by Guatemala was "proper" and whether its evaluation of those
facts was "unbiased and objective".687 Mexico has not shown Guatemala to have violated any of these
standards; therefore, Mexico being the complainant in this dispute, its arguments should fail.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1239 Mexico makes the following rebuttals to Guatemala's assertions under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
and 3.5 of the AD Agreement:
6.1240 Mexico reiterates and maintains what it said in its first submission about the final
determination of the existence of material injury reached by the Ministry, namely, the determination
was not based on positive evidence, nor did it involve an objective examination of the volume of the
dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices of the like product, and the
consequent impact of imports of grey Portland cement on the domestic industry, because it failed to
evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry,
required under Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agr eement. Similarly, the investigating authority
did not establish a causal relationship between the imports of cement and the alleged material injury
to the domestic industry, in accordance with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.1241 In particular, the Ministry's examination in arriving at an affirmative final determination of
material injury did not comply with the provisions of Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In its first submission, Guatemala mentions that, in accordance with Article 3.2, it
examined the increase in the volume of dumped imports.
688 However, for Mexico such an assertion is
unacceptable because, neither in the supplemented report on injury, nor in the final determination can
it be seen that the Ministry obtained the variations in the dumped imports factor. Article 3.2 states
that:
"With regard to the volume of the dumped impor ts, the investigating authority shall consider
whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member …" (Emphasis added)
6.1242 The fact is that the Ministry confined itself to specifying an alleged import volume in the
month of June 1995 and another in the month of May 1996, without at any time indicating the factor's
behaviour in absolute terms. In other words, the Ministry considered that simply by indicating the
import figures at both ends of the investigation period it was possible to infer the factor's behaviour,
without thereby demonstrating the absolute increase in dumped imports.
6.1243 Moreover, it is important to mention that, in keeping with Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement,
the investigating authority should evaluate, in addition to the dumped imports, imports which are not
dumped, such as imports of the investigated product from other sources. In this way, an impartial and
objective investigating authority is in a position to determine, on the one hand, total imports of the
investigated product entering its market and, on the other, it obtains a reliable figure for imports to be
included in apparent domestic consumption. However, the Ministry did not obtain either the volume
or the price of imports from other sources so as to establish the real penetration of the allegedly
dumped imports. This meant that the Ministry had a partial and unobjective view of the behaviour of
total imports and was ignorant of the real effect they might have on relevant domestic production.

686 ADP/137, adopted 30 October 1995, paragraphs 512-13.
687 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 17.6(i).
688 Ibid., paragraph 358.

6.1244 The Ministry's analysis of imports is incorrect because it did not identify the proportion of
imports of the investigated product (grey Portland cement) entering under tariff item 2523.29.00 in
total imports under that tariff heading. 689 Again, the Ministry should have identified total imports of
the investigated product, which of them were from Mexico, which from Honduras, which from
El Salvador, and so on. By not doing this, the Ministry could hardly have reached valid conclusions
on the behaviour of grey Portland cement imports on its market, as required under Article 3.2 and 3.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6.1245 Mexico also submits that, during the investigation period, Cementos Progreso imported
cement through a firm known as MATINSA and that the imports accounted for at least one third
 of
total imports of Mexican origin. Guatemala mentions in its first submission that Mexico makes
unfounded allegations that MATINSA imports represented a third of all imports and that the volume
of those imports is insignificant.690 In this connection, Mexico wishes to make it clear that in the final
determination the Ministry of the Economy said:
"The Directorate of Economic Integration also requested the Guatemalan company,
Guatemalteca Materiales Internacionales, S.A. (MATINSA), to provide information
on the value and volume of its cement imports during the period 1 June 1995 to
31 May 1996 … During the period investigated, imports amounted to 79,426 t onnes."
(Emphasis added)
"… During the period indicated, imports of grey Portland cement rose to
236,149.21 metric tonnes …" (Emphasis added)
6.1246 From these assertions it is not possible to agree with what the Ministry says. Obviously the
quotient of these two figures represents at least a third of all imports, for which reason Guatemala's
argument that MATINSA imports were insignificant is, in Mexico's opinion, impermissible.
6.1247 Accordingly, Mexico maintains that the Ministry's analysis of imports is inconsistent with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because it seeks to determine the penetration of dumped imports on the
Guatemalan market from incorrect data about the vo lume of total imports originating in Mexico, and
because this volume of imports by the MATINSA firm is not taken into account. What is said by the
Ministry in its final determination reveals how incorrect the analysis of imports is and also the lack of
information. Hence the Ministry did not validly establish its affirmative determination of injury.
6.1248 In addition, the Ministry is contradictory in regard to total cement imports by the domestic
industry when it says in its supplemented report
691 that the product imported by Cementos Progreso is
different from the one under investigation because it is a PSI 5000 cement not containing pozzolana,
and also, the Ministry's import statistics show va rious operations in which the description of the
cement imported by MATINSA is of TI cement with pozzolana. This indicates that the product
MATINSA imported during the investigation period is the same as the one Cruz Azul exported in that
period. Accordingly, the Ministry's imports analysis is wholly incorrect and biased and the import
figures can in no sense be regarded as reliable.

689 Mexico's understanding is that products other than the one under investigation (grey Portland
cement) fall under tariff heading 2523.29.00 of the 1993 Central American Tariff System.
690 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 363.
691 See MEXICO-43 (Section A, Annex II, p.2), which states:
"The second segment of domestic industry consists of the manufacture of other types of
cement. The most important is the one known as 5,000 PSI, a cement without pozzolana which up to
1995 had been imported for marketing under its own brand. There have been imports of this product
from Mexico. This product has characteristics different from those of Type I PM cement, which is a
pozzolana cement. At the present time, domestic production of non-pozzolana cement has increased.
The domestic industry's import strategy for this product was an evaluation of its market potential".

6.1249 Furthermore, in the final determination the Ministry says that MATINSA imported cement at
a price below that of the export firm, Cruz Azul, and that MATINSA's imports did not cause injury to
the domestic industry. Regarding this assertion, there is no evidence in the investigation file to show
that the Ministry made any comparison between the price of Cruz Azul exports and MATINSA
imports. This demonstrates that the Ministry made a number of assertions without corroborating the
facts and that the Ministry merely confined itself to copying out the arguments of the domestic
industry instead of examining the behaviour of imports in order to arrive at an objective and impartial
final determination of the existence of injury to the domestic industry producing grey Portland
cement.
6.1250 Another example of the inconsistency in Guatemala's analysis and of its erroneous, biased and
non-objective assessments is the assertion about imports undercutting domestic prices. There is in
fact a serious contradiction on Guatemala's part when it states:
"… This examination revealed significant price undercutting by Cruz Azul at both levels …
In particular, the supplemented report for the determination of injury prepared by the
Ministry's Directorate of Economic Integration dealt with the "policy of following the price
set by the competition, situating prices at a level slightly below the selling price of the
domestic industry …". 692 (Emphasis added)
6.1251 This confirms Mexico's contention in its first submission, namely that the Ministry's price
analysis was inconsistent with Article 3.2 693, for in order to determine the imported product's
undercutting of the prices of the domestic product the Ministry based itself on a series of statements
about price trends without anything to support the conclusion that undercutting existed during the
investigation period.
6.1252 Again, there is no analysis in the investigation file to support the Ministry's assertion that, in
the absence of imports under dumping conditions, the domestic industry would have been in a
position to sell at the maximum prices (theoretical price) established by the Government of
Guatemala. In other words, there is no evidence of the trend in cement prices in periods before the
imports were made, for which reason the Ministry mistakenly assumes that domestic cement prices
behaved in accordance with the maximum established price and that, when the allegedly dumped
imports came in, cement prices took a downturn. This shows that the Ministry, without any grounds,
established a causal relationship between import prices and the trend in domestic prices.
6.1253 What is more, in the final determination the Ministry said that the transactions which showed
the most marked differences between the real prices and the formula prices (formula used to establish
the maximum price) were found on the market in the west of the country. This demonstrates that the
Ministry confined itself to an analysis of regiona l prices, something which shows price trends in one
region of the country, and it cannot be inferred what the price trend was in the rest of the country.
Consequently, Mexico submits that the price analysis by the Ministry was not made in accordance
with Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because no reference was made in the final
determination to the impact that the entry of dumped imports during the investigation period would
have on the domestic prices of grey Portland cement.
6.1254 In addition, as stated by the Ministry in the course of the investigation, the price of cement in
Guatemala is subject to a formula that allows for increases in various inputs used in manufacturing the
product (Ministerial Decision 1-90 of the Ministry of Communications, Transport and Public Works).
In this connection, the investigation file does not contain any document reflecting increases in
transport, energy, fuel, etc. or the way in which these increases were absorbed by domestic grey
Portland cement prices. Hence the Ministry could not find out the real trend in the price of the

692 See first written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 367.
693 See first written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 496-497.

product under investigation and compare it with the price of the allegedly dumped imports.
Therefore, the Ministry's price analysis is completely wrong and is inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement because it does not make valid comparisons between domestic prices and
the prices of the imported product from which an impartial and objective investigating authority could
conclude that there was significant undercutting by import prices relative to the prices of the domestic
product.
6.1255 Mexico wholly rejects Guatemala's argument in its first submission that the analysis of the
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry was impartial and objective.
694 I n f a c t , i n
examining the impact of the imports the investig ating authority should have taken account of the
terms of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement:
" … economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including
actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on
investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of
the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance".
6.1256 To begin with, in its first submission Mexico said that the Ministry's examination did not
consider statistically valid information to enable it to reach proper conclusions on the degree of injury
allegedly suffered by the domestic industry.
695 In Mexico's view, the purpose of an evaluation of the
factors listed in Article 3.4 is not to reflect what those factors were at a particular point in time but to
find out the industry's situation by evaluating th e behaviour of those various factors throughout the
period, so as to be in a position to determine the fluctuations, both real and potential.
6.1257 As a result, and because it did not find out the behaviour of the factors indicated in
Article 3.4, the Ministry was unable to arrive at an analysis encompassing the interrelationships
between the trends in those factors. For example, from a decline in sales and an increase in
production of a good over a particular period it can be expected that inventories will rise. Therefore,
the Ministry could not make a positive final determin ation of the existence of material injury to the
domestic industry.
6.1258 Secondly, the investigation file does not contain an examination of the potential effect on the
domestic industry of dumped imports. In other words, the Ministry never sought to find out the
potential behaviour of the factors described in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement so as to determine
that the alleged dumped imports would have an adverse effect on domestic production of grey
Portland cement in the investigation period. In accordance with the last sentence of Article 3.4, the
investigating authority must bear in mind that the list of factors is not exhaustive, nor can one or
several of those factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
6.1259 Thirdly, the Ministry failed to evaluate the potential factors in the domestic industry, in
keeping with the requirements of Article 3.4, as well as evaluate the trend in such factors as cash flow,
wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments, since neither in the final examination nor in the
public notice nor in the supplemented report is there any document to conclude otherwise.
Consequently, it is not possible to determine the general state of the domestic industry with regard to
the factors listed in Article 3.4. Actually, without an evaluation of the state of the industry, it is
impossible for the Ministry to have reached a reasoned conclusion, based on an objective evaluation
of the facts, about the probable impact of the dumped imports in the investigation period.

694First written submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 372-373.
695 First written submission by Mexico, paragraphs 507-508.

6.1260 It should be noted that, under the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel in Korea – Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products696, said that the investigating authorities are
required to consider all factors relative to the dete rmination of injury that are included in the relevant

696 See report of the Panel in Korea – Dairy, Section G, which says:
"7.55. In conducting our review of Korea's serious injury determination we are mindful of the
obligations contained in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. This provisions
mandates that competent authorities when performing a serious injury investigation:
"… shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing
on the situation that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of
the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken
by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses and employment.
These provisions sets out the general principl e regarding the economic factors which need to
be considered in a serious injury investigation, and provides a list of factors that are a priori
considered to be especi ally relevant and informative of the situation of the domestic industry.
The use of the word "in particular" makes it clear to us that, "among all the relevant factors"
that the investigating authorities shall "evaluate", the consideration of the factors listed is
always relevant and therefore required, even though the authority may later dismiss some of
them as not having a bearing on the situation of that industry. Under the applicable standard
of review, our function is to assess whether Korea (i) examined all relevant facts in its
possession or which it should have obtained in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Agreement
on Safeguards at the time of the investigation; and (ii) provided an adequate explanation of
how those facts as a whole supported the determination made. Thus, we shall examine
whether at the time of the determination all factors listed in Article 4.2 were appropriately
considered; whether the Korean authorities explained how each factor considered supports (or
detracts from) a finding of serious injury; and whether valid reasons have been put forward
for dismissing a considered factor as not being relevant to the serious injury determination in
this case." (Emphasis added)
"7.58. In our evaluation of Korea's serious injury determination there are three issues that we
find particularly troublesome. First, we find that there is a lack of consideration in the OAI
report of some of the factors listed in Article 4.2. This is the case for instance for capacity
utilization and productivity. In both cases Korea offers explanations in its submissions to the
Panel of why it considered these factors not to bear on the situation of the domestic industry.
While these explanations seem plausible, there is nothing in the OAI report which would
indicate to the Panel that these factors were taken into consideration in the serious injury
finding of the Korean authorities. Second, as we noted above, the definition of the domestic
industry in this case as comprising two different segments of the dairy products market has
consequences for the evaluation of the situation of the industry. In assessing the serious injury
to the whole domestic industry, we find that it is acceptable to analyse distinct market
segments but, as stated above, all factors listed in Article 4.2 must be addressed. In
considering each of the factors liste d in Article 4.2, and any others found to be relevant by the
authority, the investigating authority has tw o options: for each factor the investigating
authority can consider it either for all segments, or if it decides to examine it for only one or
some segment(s), it must provide an explanation of how the segment(s) chosen is (are)
objectively representative of the whole industry. A lack of consideration of all segments,
without any explanation, is a flaw that we find present in Korea's analysis of the domestic
industry's profits and losses, prices, debts to equity ratio, capital depletion, and production
cost. How Korea relates developments in one segment to its determination regarding the
industry as a whole is for Korea to decide in the first instance. Our point here is that an
analysis of only a segment of the domestic industry, without any explanation of its
significance for the whole industry, will not satisfy the requirements of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Third, we find that for certain factors considered by Korea it has failed to provide
sufficient reasoning on some of the choices made in the analysis of such factors which may
have affected the result of the consideration. Also, there is a lack of reasoning in some cases
on how the factor considered supports (or detracts from) a finding of serious injury. This lack
of explanation or reasoning is perceived in Ko rea's consideration of market share, production,
profits and losses, employment and inventory." (Emphasis added)

provisions of the corresponding WTO Agreements, and that their determination should reflect
consideration of all those factors. In addition, the Panel reached the conclusion that, although the
investigating authorities may determine that some factors are not relevant to their decision or have no
crucial bearing on it, they cannot simply dismiss those factors and must explain in their conclusions
why they are not relevant or significant. It is important to emphasise that, in the present instance, the
Ministry's determination was made in the context of an anti-dumping investigation and not in a
safeguard context. Nevertheless, both Agreements provide for the same type of evaluation for the
determination of injury. In fact, Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes the
following:
"The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry …".
6.1261 Similarly, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards states the following:
"In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to
cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this Agreement, the competent
authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having
had a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the
increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the
domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production,
productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses and employment."
6.1262 It is worth noting that both Agreements say that the investigating authorities shall evaluate all
relevant factors, even some which the authority may subsequently dismiss because they have no
bearing on the situation of the domestic industry.
697
6.1263 Furthermore, the United States, as a third party in this proceeding, says that the evaluation of
inventories of a semi-finished product may help an investigating authority to obtain a clearer picture
of the situation of the domestic industry. 698 Mexico agrees with what the United States says,
provided the evaluation is an aid in determinin g more precisely the situation of the industry.
However, in its final determination the Ministry considered that exclusively analysing an input was
enough to point to the trend in inventories of the product under investigation. This is inconsistent
with the terms of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, wh ich states that the investigating authority shall
consider among other factors, inventories of the product under investigation. Accordingly, it is
inadmissible for an investigating authority to fa il to analyse inventories of the product under
investigation and merely find out the trend in inventories of one of the inputs used in the manufacture
of grey Portland cement and infer therefrom that the trend in the inventory of the product under
investigation was similar to that of the clinker inventory in the investigation period.
4. Claims Under Article 3.5 – Causal Relationship Between Dumped Imports and Injury
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1264 Mexico makes the following arguments in support of its claim that Guatemala did not
adequately demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship between allegedly dumped imports and
alleged injury:

697 See report of the Panel in "Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear"
(WT/DS121/R), adopted on 12 January 2000.
698 See oral statement by the United States of Am erica at the first substantive meeting, held on
16 February 2000, paragraph 15.

6.1265 Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement provides the following:
"3.5. It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry." (Emphasis added.)
6.1266 In its final determination, the Ministry of the Economy indicated that during the investigation
period imports of pozzolanic Portland cement from Mexico caused injury to the domestic industry. It
determined the injury to the domestic industry on the basis of the following effects: (i) reduced
volume and value of sales: (ii) pressure on selling prices; and (iii) resulting deterioration in the
domestic industry’s financial situation, which led to a loss of in market share and postponement of
investment decisions and the creation of new jobs.
6.1267 A reading of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement and the final affirmative determination reached
by the Ministry of the Economy shows that the investigating authority could not have demonstrated
the existence of a causal relationship between th e dumped imports and the alleged injury to the
domestic industry producing grey Portland cement for the following reasons:
6.1268 Firstly, the investigating authority did not evaluate the alleged impact of the imports
investigated on the value and volume of sales, pressure on selling prices, deterioration in the financial
situation, market share and employment, as required by Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Neither did
it make statistically valid comparisons to allow it to undertake an objective examination of the effect
of the imports allegedly dumped, as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.
6.1269 Secondly, in the final determination, the Ministry of the Economy recognized that the fixing
of a maximum selling price was a disadvantage for the domestic industry in comparison with products
imported from any country. In the full report on determination of injury, the Ministry gives more
precise indications, however, stating:
" … that, although other factors may have contributed indirectly to the deterioration
in the domestic industry’s financial situation, for example, the emergence of a new
competitor in an industry where there was only one rival, which necessarily has an
impact on prices, if demand remains steady larger supplies lower prices. Regarding
production and distribution costs, it should be noted that the relative importance of
energy and fuel costs places the domestic industry at a disadvantage in comparison
with Mexican competition …" (Emphasis added.)
6.1270 The above shows that the Ministry of the Economy did not evaluate the injury caused by
factors other than dumped imports because in its final determination the Ministry merely gave
simplistic indications of other factors of injury, w ithout showing how these affected the state of the
domestic industry. As it had not undertaken such an examination, it was not possible for the Ministry
of the Economy to satisfy itself of the extent to which the deterioration was attributable to the imports
allegedly dumped or to other factors.

6.1271 Thirdly, in its final determination the Ministry of the Economy could not have established a
causal relationship between the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged injury to the domestic
industry producing grey Portland cement as it indicated in the full report on determination of injury:
"The supply of grey Portland cement on the Guatemalan market has been met by the
domestic industry, subject to a price ceiling and a commitment to supply the State’s
requirements at a price lower than the selling price to the public." (Emphasis added.)
6.1272 The above statement highlights the Ministry of the Economy’s partiality and lack of
objectiveness when making the final determination of injury as it did not evaluate the impact of the
imports on the state of the domestic industry in the light of a commitment by the domestic producer to
the Guatemalan State according to which Cementos Progreso agreed to sell the product investigated to
the Guatemalan State at a price lower than the selling price to the public. Consequently, by omitting
this in its evaluation, the Ministry of the Economy violated Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD
Agreement. Contrary to Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement, the Ministry was not able either to
establish a causal relationship between the imports of grey Portland cement and the alleged injury to
the domestic industry because it had not determined the existence of material injury.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1273 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments regarding the final determination of injury under
Article 3.5 as follows:
6.1274 In accordance with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dum ping Agreement, the investigating authorities
must demonstrate that the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. The second
sentence of Article 3.5 requires the demonstration of a causal relationship to be "based on an
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities". In particular, the authorities must
examine:
"Any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the
dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume
and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the
patterns of consumption, trade-restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign
and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and
productivity of the domestic industry."
699
6.1275 Guatemala complied with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its determination of
the causal relationship between Cruz Azul's dumping and the material injury suffered by the domestic
industry. The Guatemalan investigating authority examined all the relevant evidence, including all
the factors listed in Article 3.4, in an unbiased and objective manner. Among other things, this
examination showed that:
• Cruz Azul's prices were significantly lower than the price of the like domestic
product, which obliged Cementos Progreso to sell at prices much lower than the
maximum price authorized by the government.
• The magnitude of the dumping by Cruz Azul was significant (that is, 89.54 per cent)
and was a source of injury for Cementos Progreso.
• The influx of dumped imports obliged Cementos Progreso to implement a new price
structure, in September 1995.

699 Article 3.5.

• The imported product and the like domestic product were marketed through the same
distribution channels and in the same geographical markets.
• Representative customers switched to Cruz Azul cement during the investigation
period.
• The impact of the loss of customers was greater in the border area to which Cruz
Azul had easier access.
• The imported product and the like domestic product were interchangeable and, from
the customer's point of view, there were no differences in the way they were used.
• As a result of declining sales, depressed prices and falling profits, Cementos Progreso
was obliged to postpone the investment decisions that would have enabled it to
modernize and extend its production plants.
6.1276 Mexico asserts that Guatemala did not evaluate the potential injury due to factors other than
dumped imports. 700 Mexico maintains that, as it did not make this evaluation, "in its final
determination the Ministry of the Economy could not have established a causal relationship between
the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged injury to the domestic industry".701 Mexico is wrong.
6.1277 The Ministry simply examined all the relevant evidence it had before it, including all the
known factors that suggested that the injury which the domestic producer was suffering might be
attributable to factors other than dumped imports. For example, the file clearly shows that the
Ministry examined whether the injury suffered by the domestic producer was attributable to a
contraction in demand. On finding that this was not the case, the Ministry stated:
"… according to official statistics, the construction sector has experienced growing demand
since 1985 … . Subsequently, growing demand in the construction sector remained constant,
even though in comparison with other countries per capita consumption appears low (footnote
omitted). This constant growth in the market prompted the domestic producer to carry out
feasibility studies with a view to expanding its production capacity … Consequently, this
Ministry considers that there has been no contraction in demand that could have affected the
domestic industry.
6.1278 In developing its point concerning the alleged failure to assess these "other factors", Mexico
alleges that in its final determination Guatemala attributed the injury caused by these factors to
imports from Cruz Azul.
702 The corresponding passage of the Ministry's final determination reads as
follows:
"… although other factors may have contributed indirectly to the deterioration in the domestic
industry's financial situation, for example, the emergence of a new competitor in the market
where there was only one rival, which necessarily has an impact on prices, and the fact that
energy and fuel costs constitute a disadvantage for the domestic industry …"
6.1279 What Mexico does not mention is that the Ministry took great care not to attribute the effect
of these other factors to Cruz Azul imports. Th e supplemented report on determination of injury
which, according to Mexico itself, is very accurate, reads as follows:
"Although the above-mentioned factors are affecting the deterioration of the situation of the
domestic industry, they do not affect the determination of injury caused by dumped imports,
nor are they the subject of analysis or quantification in the present report".

700 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 533.
701 Idem, paragraph 534 (original emphasis).
702 Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 532 – 33.

6.1280 In short, the Mexican arguments against the Ministry's final determination concerning causal
relationship lack merit. They are nothing other than conclusory arguments lacking any factual or
legal basis. Thus, Mexico has not satisfied the complainant's burden of proof. For the reasons
explained above, the Mexican arguments should be rejected and the final determination of injury
should be respected.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1281 Mexico rebuts Guatemala's submissions by asserting that the final determination of material
injury to the domestic industry infringed Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement by not establishing the
causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. It makes the
following rebuttal arguments:
6.1282 Guatemala's final determination on the causa l relationship between the allegedly dumped
imports and the alleged injury suffered by the domestic grey Portland cement industry did not comply
with the provisions of Article 3.5. Guatemala did not make appropriate comparisons of the trend in
the factors mentioned in Article 3.2 and 3.4 and, as a result its analysis did not have reliable figures to
reach proper conclusions about the existence of material injury to the domestic industry.
6.1283 Again, in no part of the final determination of material injury is there any element to imply
that in the course of the investigation Guatemala took up such aspects as an analysis of injury to the
domestic industry attributable to factors other than the dumped imports. In fact, there is in the file no
analysis of the trend in those factors which indicates the adverse effect that may have caused on the
performance of the domestic industry, as well as the alleged effect caused by the dumped imports.
6.1284 Neither in the final determination, nor in the supplemented report on the determination of
injury, does one find an analysis of investment programmes (economic feasibility studies) to enable
the Ministry to conduct any financial simulations in the course of the investigation and conclude that,
in the absence of dumped imports, the investment projects mentioned by Cementos Progreso were
viable and feasible. Since such analyses were not made, there is no way the Ministry, acting as an
impartial and objective authority, could satisfy itself as to the viability of the investment projects, in
the absence and in the presence of the dumped imports.
6.1285 What is more, the Ministry never saw fit to emphasize that Cementos Progreso is obliged to
sell cement to the Government of Guatemala at a price below the price at which it is sold to the public
(in accordance with Government Decision 517-90). In what way did the Ministry consider the injury
caused to the domestic cement industry as a result of the sales to the Government below the selling
price to the consumer? Did the Ministry not consider it relevant to attribute this injury to the someone
who really caused it and not to a cement exporter? The Ministry alone has answers to these questions
and it is therefore clear that the Ministry did not act as an impartial and objective authority and that it
acted in flagrant violation of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement by not considering in its analysis the
existence of this type of "pact" between the domestic cement industry and the Guatemalan
Government.
6.1286 Similarly, the Ministry did not analyse the effects during the investigation period of increases
in energy and fuel costs on the operating profits of the domestic producer of grey Portland cement:
"… although other factors may have contributed indirectly to the deterioration in the domestic
industry's financial situation, for example, the emergence of a new competitor in the market
where there was only one rival, which necessarily brings pressure to bear on prices, for with
constant demand greater supply brings down prices. As for the costs relating to production
and energy costs, attention should be paid to the relative importance of energy and fuel, which

placed the domestic industry at a disadvantage in regard to Mexican competition …"
(Emphasis added)
"Although the above-mentioned factors are effecting the deterioration of the situation of the
domestic industry, they do not effect the determination of injury caused by dumped imports,
nor are they the subject of analysis or quantification in the present report." (Emphasis added)
6.1287 Under the terms of Article 3.5 it is not enough, as did the Ministry, simply to mention in the
final determination the matters which might cause injury to the domestic industry and which are not
attributable to the dumped imports. In fact, Article 3.5 states the following:
"… The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports
which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these
other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports …".
6.1288 In other words, an impartial and objective investigating authority will make an analysis to
support its decision to set aside or even deny the potential impact on the domestic industry of factors
other than the dumped imports.
6.1289 Accordingly, Mexico confirms its argument rega rding the bias and lack of objectivity in the
Ministry's final determination of injury because it did not evaluate the impact of the dumped imports
on the state of the domestic industry and because it was unable to establish the causal relationship
between the imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry. The Ministry therefore acted in
violation of Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5. Claims Under Article 12.2 – Public Notice of Final Determination
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1290 Mexico argues that the public notice of conclusion of the investigation, which contained the
final affirmative determination on the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties, published in the
Diario Oficial de Centro América of 30 January 1997 ("notice of conclusion")703 did not comply with
the requirements in Article 12.2 and 12.2.2. of the AD Agreement. Its arguments on this issue are as
follows:
6.1291 The final determination did not contain all the relevant information on the issues of fact and
law nor did it include sufficiently detailed explanations of the reasons that led the Ministry to impose
the definitive anti-dumping measure nor several of its determinations, for example, the unjustified
extension of the investigation period from six months to one year and the equally unjustified change
from threat of material injury to material inju ry, which was made when imposing the definitive anti-
dumping measure.
6.1292 Article 12.2 provides the following with regard to the content of the public notice of the
preliminary and final determinations:
"12.2. Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether
affirmative or negative, … Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating
authorities…".

703 Public notice of conclusion of the investigation which reached an affirmative determination on the
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties (hereinafter also "notice of termination").

6.1293 In the case of public notice of conclusion of an investigation in particular, Article 12.2.2 lays
down the requirements to be met in the notice:
"12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of
an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6." (Emphasis
added.)
6.1294 The following are among the requirements in Article 12.2.1 referred to in the above
paragraphs:
"12.2.1 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or
otherwise make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations
for the preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the
matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such
a notice or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information, contain in particular:
…
(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for
the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the
normal value under Article 2;
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3;
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination." (Emphasis added.)
6.1295 In this particular case, the notice of conclusion published by the Ministry of the Economy did
not meet some of the requirements in the AD Agreement. In particular, it failed to provide a full
explanation of the reasons which at a particular time had justified the methodology used by the
Ministry to determine and compare the export price and the normal value and, as we have already
explained above, these comparisons and determinations were not consistent with Article 2.
6.1296 The notice also failed to provide explanations, still less sufficiently detailed explanations, on
some of the considerations related to the determin ation of injury in accordance with Article 3. One
very important element in this respect is the extension of the investigation period after imposition of
the provisional measure, without due justification, and without taking into account the opinion of the
exporter nor the impact on its right of defence.
6.1297 As we have already mentioned above, there were no grounds whatsoever for the extension of
the period, except that the Ministry sought to reach a determination of material injury instead of threat
of material injury, which had been the case at the initiation of the investigation and in the preliminary
determination. This change was not even mentioned in the notice of conclusion and still less were the
reasons explained.

6.1298 The importance of including in the notice of conclusion sufficiently detailed explanations of
the Ministry’s agreement to extension of the investigation period and the reasons therefor, as well as
the change from threat of material injury to materi al injury, is particularly significant if we consider
that the extension was made after the publication of the public notice of imposition of the provisional
anti-dumping measure (nine months after the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation and
three months prior to its conclusion).
6.1299 Thus, without any explanation in the notice of conclusion, not to mention sufficient
explanation, in other words in complete contravention of Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement, the
Ministry decided: (i) to extend the investigation period without explaining the reasons for doing so;
and (ii) to change the determination of threat of material injury to one of material injury.
6.1300 Another matter that was omitted from the notice of conclusion was any explanation of the
considerations or physical, chemical and qualitative aspects taken into account by the Ministry in
determining that the cement sold in Mexico (Type II Pz grey Portland cement) and the cement
exported to Guatemala by Cruz Azul (Type I PM grey Portland cement) were like products.
6.1301 In this connection, in the section of the notice of conclusion entitled "ARGUMENTS OF
THE PARTIES", point 1.4, it can be noted that Ceme ntos Progreso only put forward in its final
pleadings of 19 December 1996 (hearing of the pa rties) arguments that the products Type I PM
Portland cement and Type II Pz Portland cement were like products in the following terms:
"1.4 At the hearing for submission of the final pleadings (19 December 1996),
Cementos Progreso S.A. … also stated that chemical and physical tests carried out in
the complainant’s laboratory showed that there were no significant differences among
type II Pz, I PM and I P cements produced by Cooperativa La Cruz Azul S.C.L. and
that the three products were the same type of cement so the definitive measure should
apply to all grey Portland cement imported from the United Mexican States
regardless of its source and type specification …"
6.1302 Regarding these arguments put forward by the applicant, the "CONSIDERATIONS" section
of the notice of conclusion does not contain any evaluation or explanation for acceptance or rejection
of this argument.
6.1303 In addition, with regard to the change from a de termination of threat of material injury to a
definitive determination of material injury, th e "ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES" section in the
notice of conclusion indicates that the applicant first put forward a claim that the dumped imports of
cement had caused injury to the domestic industry during the course of the investigation (at the public
hearing of 19 December 1996).
6.1304 The letter drawn up by the applicant and submitted at the hearing of 19 December 1996 was
also confusing regarding the statement in the notice of conclusion on the change in evaluation from
threat of material injury to material injury, and to show this the following is an extract from the
relevant sections:
"THREAT OF INJURY AND INJURY
48. The injury or threat of injury expressed ( sic) in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the
WTO Agreement includes the premise of the existence of dumping. This assumption
has been proved during the investigation: there is dumping, so it is necessary to
consider the imports, their volume, their effects and their impact.

56. The purpose of the foregoing was to reiterate what has already been
demonstrated: the injury to the domestic industry caused by dumped imports of the
like product, and to warn of the possibility that it may recur…
COMPLAINTS
11. That due note be taken of the arguments, evidence, statistical and all
documentary information which, in the course of this investigation, has been provided
to substantiate the terms of its complaint of dumping, threat of injury and the
establishment of a causal link between the first two elements."
6.1305 Even assuming that there had in fact been a change in the applicant’s complaint from threat of
material injury to material injury, it should be made clear that this complaint was made by Cementos
Progreso eleven months after the initiation of the investigation and less than one before the
publication of the definitive determination. Even more serious is the fact that this claim was made at
a phase or procedural stage at which no new evidence could be allowed. The rules 704 governing the
hearing state the following:
"Attach to this background information the above submission. In view of the request
from Cooperativa La Cruz Azul, S.C.L., the pa rties are informed that the hearing set
for 19 December 1996 will be subject to the following rules:
…
2. The hearing is not intended to be a debate among the parties and additional
evidence will not be taken into account or accepted, therefore, it will be restricted to
giving each of the parties an opportunity to present its conclusions on the facts
investigated and the investigating authority may not seek additional information." 705
6.1306 Having clarified the above, we must point out that the notice of conclusion does not contain
any explanation of the acceptance or rejection of the pleadings presented by the applicant nor any
explanation of the determination reached by the Ministry in concluding the investigation and
imposing the definitive anti-dumping duties, i.e. for material injury instead of threat of material
injury.
6.1307 In addition, the final determination of material injury by the Ministry is not and cannot be
recognized as a determination based on positive evidence and an objective examination in accordance
with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement, for the reasons explained in part E.2 of this first written
submission by Mexico. This lack of evidence is no doubt the reason why the notice of conclusion
does not explain in sufficient detail the considerations relating to the determination. As proof of this,
we refer the Panel to the notice of conclusion, particularly the "CONSIDERATIONS" section, part C
"Injury caused to the domestic industry".
6.1308 As one example of the lack of sufficiently detailed and clear explanations in the notice of
conclusion, among other items we refer to subparagraph 4.5 of the aforementioned section C referring
to productivity. This subparagraph does not explain, and certainly not in sufficient detail, what was

704 The rules governing the hearing were issued in a document of 6 December 1996 by the Directorate
of Economic Integration.
705 This was reiterated by Licenciada Ileana Polanco Cordón, Director of Economic Integration at the
Guatemalan Ministry of the Economy, at the public hearing of the parties on 19 December 1996 in the following
terms: "Beforehand, Licenciada Polanco Cordón indicated that during the hearing evidence would not be
accepted and that explanations would solely be taken as such and not as evidence …" (Emphasis added.)

the effect on the productivity of the domestic industry. The explanation is not only insufficient but is
also confused, referring to the plant capacity factor without clearly defining the effect on productivity.
6.1309 The above clearly shows that the notice of conc lusion did not comply with the requirements
in Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 because it did not contain detailed explanations concerning the
determinations of dumping and material injury nor explanation of certain determinations regarding the
investigation made by the Ministry. There were no explanations inter alia on the extension of the
investigation period nor the change in the determin ation of threat of material injury into one of
material injury. In addition, the notice did not include sufficiently detailed explanations on the issues
of fact and law which formed the basis for accepting or rejecting various arguments put forward by
the parties during the investigation.
6.1310 To summarize, the public notice of conclusion of the anti-dumping investigation which
reached an affirmative determination on the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on allegedly
dumped imports of grey Portland cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul is inconsistent with
Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1311 The following are Guatemala's responding arguments to Mexico's claims regarding the
public notice of final determination under Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement:
6.1312 In accordance with the provisions of Article 12.2.2, the public notice of 30 January 1997
provided the names of the suppliers; a description of the product sufficient for customs purposes; the
margin of dumping and a full explanation of the methodology used in the establishment and
comparison of the export price and the normal value under Article 2; the considerations relevant to
the injury determination as set out in Article 3; and the main reasons leading to the determination.
The notice filled 38 single-spaced pages and was more than 15,000 words long. No reasonable person
could read the public notice and conclude that it was lacking in any respect.
6.1313 As Article 12.2.2 allows, the Ministry also issued a separate report (supplemented report on
dumping and injury prepared by the Ministry's Directorate of Economic Integration, dated
15 January 1997) which provided additional inform ation on the Ministry's findings and conclusions
on all the issues of fact and law. The report was issued in two parts, one for dumping and the other
for injury. The report runs to approximately 40 pages and more than 14,000 words. All this
information was made available to Cruz Azul in good time.
6.1314 Mexico objects to the notice on grounds that are irrelevant under Article 12. Instead of
focusing on the adequacy of the analysis and the transparency of the process, Mexico uses Article 12
as an opportunity to formulate new arguments relating to substantive provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. For example, it devotes several pages to its arguments concerning the extension of the
investigation period and the change in the Ministry's injury analysis.
6.1315 However, Article 12 does not deal with the content of the laws, regulations, decisions or
determinations of a Member. Instead, Article 12 is exclusively concerned with the interest shared by
all Members in the transparent application of anti-dumping measures. Thus, Article 12.2 requires the
publication of a notice that contains "sufficient detail" concerning "the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities". The
Article does not mention the substantive correction of the authorities' findings and conclusions, since
Article 12 is not concerned with these questions.
6.1316 Secondly, Mexico seems to believe that an authority's every thought and every finding that it
makes during the course of an investigation shou ld be incorporated in writing in the final
determination. Mexico disregards the Ministry's lengthy discussion of the important issues raised in

the underlying administrative file and, instead, concentrates on a few topics not mentioned in the
notice.706 According to Mexico, these omissions are somehow fatal.
6.1317 Clearly, this interpretation of Article 12 is absurd. If the investigating authorities had to put
down every thought and every decision on paper, they would never have the time nor the resources to
conduct an investigation and, even if they had, the notice would be a worthy rival for Tolstoy's War
and Peace. Judged by any reasonable standard, the public notice of Guatemala's final determination
complied with the requirements of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2.
(c) Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1318 Mexico makes the following rebuttal arguments on the subject of the public notice of final
determination:
6.1319 Guatemala wrongly asserts that a large number of pages and words is sufficient for a
reasonable person to read the public notice and to conclude that it was not lacking in any respect
under the terms of Article 12.2.2. 707 Guatemala also says that it issued a separate report
(supplemented report on dumping and injury prepared by the Ministry's Directorate of Economic
Integration) which provided additional information on the Ministry's findings and conclusions on all
matters of fact and law.
708 And misinterpreting the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Mexico's
arguments, Guatemala even manages to suggest, absurdly and rhetorically, that a public notice of
conclusion would then have to be as long as a book like Tolstoy's War and Peace.709
6.1320 Mexico submits that the volume or extent of a public notice of conclusion of an investigation
is not and cannot be enough to consider that the notice meets the requirements of Article 12.2 and
12.2.2. On the one hand, Article 12.2 specifies that "… the notice or separate report" shall set forth
"in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered
material by the investigating authorities", and in addition Article 12.2.2 establishes that the public
notice or the separate report shall contain or make available "… all relevant information on the
matters of fact and law and reasons that have led to the imposition of final measures … as well as the
reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and
importers …".
6.1321 In this connection, Mexico maintains that neither the public notice of conclusion of the
investigation nor the supplemented report
710, which Guatemala now claims to have prepared as a
separate report, sets out in detail the findings and conclusions reached by the authority, nor all the
relevant information and reasons which have led the authority to impose final anti-dumping measures,
nor the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of the exporter's arguments. For example, neither the
public notice nor the supplemented report sets forth in detail the relevant information, conclusions and
findings concerning the extension of the investigation period and the causes therefor, nor is any
reference made to the grounds on which the extension was accepted. Neither is any mention made of
the basis for the change in the final determination fr om threat of material injury to material injury,
particularly when, at the time the investigation was initiated, there was no evidence of a threat of
material injury and the Ministry's preliminary determination did not analyse the factors in Article 3.2
and 3.4 of the AD Agreement.

706 See Mexico's first written submission, paragraphs 540-54.
707 First written submission by Guatemala, paragraph 385.
708 Ibid., paragraph 386.
709 Ibid., paragraph 390.
710 In fact, these documents are annexes to the "Technical study of the result of the anti-dumping
investigation into imports of cement from Mexico", and neither they nor the technical study indicate that they
are designed to act as a separate report under the terms of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.

6.1322 In Mexico's view, the above-mentioned matters, because of their relationship with the
relevant facts or circumstances of the investigation and their impact on the final determination are
matters which, because of their "relevance", the Mini stry should have included in the public notice or
in the separate report. Even under the terms of Article 12.2.2, regardless of the validity of the final
determination challenged by Mexico, the public notice or separate report should have contained
matters pertaining to information, matters of fact and law, and the reasons for extending the period of
investigation, as well as the change in the determin ation from threat of material injury to injury, for
they led the Ministry to impose definitive anti-dumping measures. It should be added that:
6.1323 The investigation period was extended from six months to one year without Cementos
Progreso supplying in its request any further evidence to justify an extension
711, in its determination
on extending the investigation period the Ministry did not explain the bases or legal reason for the
extension, nor did it do so in the notice or in the supplemented report.
6.1324 As already pointed out, the public notice makes no reference to the change from threat of
material injury to material injury. It is relevant that the Ministry in its "Technical study of the result
of the anti-dumping investigation into cement imports from Mexico" stated:
"… in the present case, the domestic producer requested the initiation of the investigation,
indicating that massive imports of Portland cement under dumping conditions were
threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry. Later, in its final claim
[19 December 1996] it said that it had suffered injury to its production …"
6.1325 It may be inferred from the Ministry's assertion that, as from this statement made at the public
hearing, the Ministry proceeded to conduct a different analysis. In other words, instead of analysing
the existence of a threat of material injury, it conducted an analysis of material injury itself. However,
neither the public notice nor the supplemented report gives any explanations in this regard.
6.1326 In addition, how can Guatemala's argument that it complied with Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 by
means of a supplemented report be valid when the public notice gives no such indication, nor is the
purpose of the supplemented report in question intended to comply with the obligations set out in
those Articles? Quite simply, Guatemala does not meet the criterion of transparency
712 in the
determinations the authority adopts. Hence we emphasize that, with post hoc arguments Guatemala is
trying to make good its violations of Article 12.2 and 12.2.2. The result that it is not possible to
accept the validity of Guatemala's argument that it fulfilled its obligations by pointing out that it has a
report, when in fact that report does not meet the requirements of the articles mentioned.
6.1327 Again, it is inadmissible and unacceptable for Guatemala to suggest that any document
contained in the file can constitute the separate report referred to in Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2. To
accept this would be to violate the transparency essential to the authority's determinations. It should
be reiterated that, in the case at issue, no part of the public notice or the file or the supplemented
report establishes that the report constitutes the separate report referred to in the articles mentioned.
6.1328 For the reasons expressed above, Mexico maintains that, in connection with Guatemala's final
determination and despite Guatemala's extensive public notice or alleged separate report, Guatemala
did not comply with its obligations under Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.

711 See Mexico's reply to Panel question 14 of 18 February 2000 and the communication by Cementos
Progreso of 18 September 1996, submitted to the Ministry on 1 October.
712 Guatemala recognizes the transparency required in applying anti-dumping measures; see
Guatemala's first written submission, paragraph 388.

6. Claims Under Articles 1, 9, and 18 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994 –
Application of Anti-Dumping Measure
(a) Submissions of Mexico
6.1329 The following are Mexico's submissions regarding Guatemala's alleged violations of
Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994:
6.1330 Having demonstrated that neither on initiation of the investigation nor when imposing the
provisional and definitive measures did the Guatemalan authority make a valid determination of
dumping nor the alleged threat of injury nor the alleged injury, and also failed to demonstrate a causal
relationship between them, as required by Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement, and in view of the
violations of Article 5, 6, 7 and 12 of the Agreement committed when initiating the investigation and
during its course, the Panel can see that:
(i) Guatemala decided to establish definitive anti-dumping duties on grey Portland
cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul without having duly complied with all the
requirements for their establishment prescribed by Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement;
(ii) the application of the definitive anti-dumping measure under such circumstances is
contrary to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and in turn constitutes a
violation of Article 1 and 18 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Response of Guatemala
6.1331 Guatemala responds to Mexico's arguments advanced under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD
Agreement and Article VI of GATT as follows:
6.1332 Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement deals with two questions: the imposition of anti-
dumping duties and whether the amount of those duties should be equal to the full margin of
dumping. In both cases, Article 9.1 leaves the decision to the investigating authority where "all
requirements for the imposition [of duties] have been fulfilled".
713 Note that this provision does not
leave the decision to the authorities "if" all requirements for the imposition are fulfilled, but in cases
where all requirements "have been" fulfilled. In other words, Article 9.1 does not relate to and in no
way incorporates the substantive requirements for the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties
contained in other provisions of the Anti-Dump ing Agreement. Thus, Mexico's arguments under
Article 9.1 lack merit and should be rejected by the Panel.
6.1333 Finally, Mexico's arguments under Articles 1 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement lack
merit in that they are based on the premise that there have been violations of other provisions of the
Agreement (for example, Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 12), which is not the case. As has been shown in
the course of this first written submission, the investigation at issue complied fully with Article VI of
the GATT 1994 and the rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
G. A
RE ANY ERRORS GUATEMALA MIGHT BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE FORMULATION OF A RECOMMENDATION BY THE PANEL?
1. Submissions of Guatemala
6.1334 Guatemala advances the arguments that any error(s) it might be found to have committed
is/are insufficient to justify the formulation of a recommendation by the Panel. It advances the
following arguments in this regard:

713 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 9.1 (emphasis added).

6.1335 In its first written submission, Mexico asks the Panel to recommend that Guatemala "bring its
measure into conformity with the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement". 714 For the reasons set out
below, Guatemala maintains that this request should be rejected.
6.1336 Firstly, Guatemala has shown, without resorting to legal ruses, that its definitive anti-dumping
measure as well as the actions that preceded it were totally consistent with the GATT 1994 and all the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Secondly, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Guatemala has violated its obligations under the WTO, the panel should conclude that any error of a
technical nature which Guatemala may have committed during the course of the investigation does
not merit recommendations being made in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU.
6.1337 In the course of this submission, Guatemala has replied to a barrage of allegations intended to
challenge procedural or (technical) aspects of the Ministry's investigation. The actions challenged
include (a) Guatemala's timely notification under Article 5.5; (b) whether Guatemala complied in
good time with the provisions of Article 6.1.3; (c) whether its public notices were sufficiently
detailed in accordance with Article 12; (d) whether Guatemala established in a timely and reasonable
fashion the time-limits for the submission of information laid down in Article 6; (e) whether Cruz
Azul had timely and full access to the administrative file as required by Article 6; and (f) the handling
of confidential information in accordance with Article 6.
6.1338 As far as these arguments are concerned, Guatemala has shown that it duly complied with its
obligations under the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Moreover, Guatemala has
shown that neither Cruz Azul nor Mexico suffered any injury as a result of the actions to which these
complaints relate. We have shown, for example, that even if assuming that Guatemala's notification
under Article 5.5 had not been made in good time, the error was harmless.
715 Consequently, if the
panel were to conclude with respect to these complaints that Guatemala did in fact violate its
obligations under the WTO, it should not make any recommendation since Guatemala has rebutted
any assumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU.
6.1339 Guatemala has rebutted any presumption of nullification or impairment. Moreover,
Guatemala has shown that during the investigation both Cruz Azul and Mexico acquiesced in many of
these actions. For example, we have shown that even though the notification under Article 5.5 may
not have been made in good time, Mexico did not raise the question until 6 June 1996, almost six
months after the publication of the notice of initiation.
716 Therefore, in accordance with the principles
of international law, any injury that might have been caused is not legally worthy of consideration.
Consequently, any presumption of nullification or impairment derivable from Guatemala's actions has
been rebutted and there is no justification for issuing any recommendation.
6.1340 On the above grounds, Guatemala respectfully maintains that the panel should reject the
Mexican application and should not make any recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU.
6.1341 The alleged delay in giving notification under Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(which Guatemala does not accept) did not impair Mexico's rights in the proceeding and in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law was merely a harmless error.
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates that "the panel shall interpret the relevant
provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law". WTO panels have recognized that "the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law" are those incorporated in th e Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the
Vienna Convention).
717 Thus, the expression "customary rules of interpretation of public international

714 Mexico's first written submission, paragraph 556, Section VI(f)(b).
715 See paragraphs 206-216 above.
716 See paragraphs 217-219 above.
717 See, for example, Japan - Taxes on alcoholic beverages. WT/DS8/R, paragraph 6.7 (11 July 1996).

law" in Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also refers to the rules laid down in the
Vienna Convention.
6.1342 Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention establishes that, in addition to the text, consideration
must be given to "any relevant rules of internat ional law applicable in the relations between the
parties". Accordingly, in arriving at a decision, a WTO panel should apply the relevant rules of
international law.
6.1343 In accordance with Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
sources of international law include, inter alia, the "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations".
718 The principle of harmless error, which states that a party must show injury before
obtaining the right to be compensated for a procedural error, is a general principle of law recognized
by civilized nations. The response to the violation of a substantive rule is very direct; the national
measure is condemned and its withdrawal is requested. Violations of procedural rules may also be
condemned. However, the question is whether it can be said that a decision involving such a violation
is flawed. The retrospective rejection of administrative decisions can give rise to immense confusion
and to avoid this most national legal systems are prepared to accept that a minor procedural error does
not invalidate the decision.
6.1344 The Members of the WTO make extensive use of the doctrine of harmless error in connection
with infringements of procedural rules in civil and criminal proceedings. In Australia, for example,
the courts agreed that a delay in lodging an application, for the purpose of examining a report and
preliminary finding of the Australia Customs Service, was a harmless error since the delay was
unlikely to have prejudiced the respondent.
719 Similar decisions have been taken in the United States.
For example, in Intercargo Insurance company v. United States, the court applied the principle to
defective notices for extension of liquidation period sent by the customs service to an importer. 720 In
fact, the United States federal rules of civil procedure stipulate that "the court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties".721
6.1345 Expressions of this principle or its equivalent are also to be found in the criminal proceedings
of many WTO Members. In Namibia, for example, it has been held that when a verdict has not been
tainted by an irregularity committed during the trial, the verdict should stand. 722 A similar approach
has been adopted by the courts of Guatemala and other Member countries of the WTO such as Spain,
Canada, Australia and the United States.723

718 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 ICJ, Article 381.
719See, for example, C.A. Ford v. Comptroller General of Customs, Fed. 854 (D.N.S.W.
24 November 1993) (Australia) (the two-week delay was judged harmless because it was unlikely to prejudice
the respondents, the Australian industry or the importers).
720 83 F. 3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (United States).
721 Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
722See, for example, S.V. Shikunga, 1997 (9) B.C.L.R. 1321 (NmS).
723See, for example, Constitutional Court of Guatem ala, Gaceta Jurisprudencial, No. 12, Case 37-89,
Cons. II (the applicant drew attention to alleged irregularities, but these did not prevent him from learning of the
existence of an administrative proceeding that affected his interests and taking the necessary corrective action),
9 May 1989; Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, Hastings Int'l. and Comp. L. Rev., 241.349 No. 478
(Winter 1998) (referring to the application of the harmle ss error principle in Spanish criminal proceedings);
R.v. Bevan [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 (application of the harmless error principle by the Canadian Supreme Court);
Wilde v. The Queen (1988) 164 CLR.365, Slip op. (FC) (application of the principle in Australia); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(a) (United States) ("no error, defect, irregul arity or variation that does not affect substantial rights
should be taken into account").

6.1346 Harmless error is also accepted by international courts. For example, the International Court
of Justice recognizes the concept. 724 It is also recognized and applied by the European Court of
Justice where "an error of law made by the [court of first instance] will not suffice to quash its
decision if it was harmless and the same outcome could have been properly reached in the absence of
error."725 Moreover, when a WTO Member requests the Appellate Body to "reverse a panel's ruling
on matters of procedure it must demonstrate the prejudice generated by the legal ruling."726
6.1347 For its part, Mexico incorporated the harmless error concept in articles 237-238 of its Federal
Tax Code according to which an administrative deci sion by SECOFI in unfair trading cases will only
be illegal if the procedural error harms the individual.
6.1348 Within the context of the present dispute, th e application of the harmless error principle
means that the Panel should examine Guatemala's acts and decide whether the non-fulfilment of a
procedural obligation should be overlooked on the grounds that the omission did not prejudice the
rights of Mexico or Cruz Azul. A panel es tablished under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code
recognized the principle of harmless error but considered that it was inapplicable under the
circumstances of the case before it. 727 The case of Brazil – Milk Powder was certainly decided by the
panel in this way since the investigating authority had notified importers of the initiation of the
investigation 22 days after the public notice of initiation and 1 day before imposing a provisional
measure.728 Meanwhile, the exporting government was notified more than two months after
publication and one month after the provisional measure was imposed. 729 Accordingly, the panel did
not accept the argument that these delays constituted "harmless error" because it considered that they
had clearly prejudiced the defence of the interests of the interested parties.730
6.1349 As distinct from the circumstances of Brazil – Milk Powder , in Guatemala's case the alleged
delay in giving notification was only 11 days; between initiation and notification the investigating
authority did not engage in any investigation-related activity and all the interested parties had
sufficient time and opportunity to participate in the proceedings; the provisional measure was not
imposed until several months after receipt of the notification. Thus, the alleged delay in notifying
Mexico of the initiation of the investigation was a "harmless error", since it did not prejudice Mexico's
rights under the ADP Agreement.
6.1350 In fact, the alleged procedural error in not having given Mexico timely notice in accordance
with Article 5.5 had no effect on the development of the anti-dumping investigation. If Mexico had
been notified of the initiation of the investigation on 11 January, nothing would have happened
differently from then onwards, except that the init ial stages of the investigation might possibly have
been speeded up. Clearly, the ADP Agreement does not give Mexico any right to delay or impede the

724See, for example, Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the ICOA Council (India v. Pakistan), 1972
I.C.J. 46 (18 August) (Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard) ("it would appear that even if there were error, it was
harmless error").
725See Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Proced ure or Only a Two-Stage Process? A comparative
view of the Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 30 Law and Pol'y. Int'l. Bus.
193, 206 (1999).
726 See Report of the Appellate Body in EC - Hormones , WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted on
16 January 1998, paragraph 152; see also Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need
for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System , 14 Am. U. Int'l. Rev. 1173, 1219 (1999) (" it is evident
that the commission of what is known in the United States as harmless error will be insufficient to warrant the
reversal of a panel decision).
727See Brazil - Imposition of Provisional and Definiti ve Countervailing Duties on Milk Powder and
Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community (Brazil – Milk Powder ) SCM/179, para. 271
(adopted 28 April 1994).
728Idem, para. 240.
729Idem, para. 228.
730Idem, para 271.

initiation of an investigation or allow Mexico to make any kind of submission before the investigation
is initiated. Notification given on 11 January would not have given Mexico or Cruz Azul additional
time to defend their interests since under Guatemalan law grace periods are calculated from the date
of notification. Similarly, under Guatemalan legislation the period allowed for replying to a
questionnaire is also calculated from the date of receipt of that questionnaire. Furthermore, Cruz Azul
was granted 30 additional working days to reply to the questionnaire, which is not required by the
ADP Agreement. The Ministry also extended to 17 May the period granted to Cruz Azul for replying
to the questionnaire. Finally, instead of imposing the provisional measure within 60 days of the date
of initiation, Guatemala waited until 28 August before acting, that is, until eight months after
initiation. In view of all this, it is inconceivable that having notified Mexico on 11 January could
have had any effect on the course of the investigation.
6.1351 Consequently, in accordance with the general principles of international law recognized by
civilized nations, the Panel should apply the principle of "harmless error" to Guatemala's alleged
procedural delay under Article 5.5 of the ADP Agreement and reject the Mexican argument.
6.1352 In the alternate, Guatemala maintains that the alleged delay did not nullify or impair benefits
accruing to Mexico under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As noted above, Guatemala did not take
any step to begin the investigation until Mexico had been notified. Moreover, Guatemala granted
Cruz Azul a two-month extension to reply to the questionnaire. Thus, any putative delay in
notification under Article 5.5 did not prejudice Mexico's ability to defend its interests nor affect in any
other way Mexico's benefits under the Agreement.
6.1353 According to Article 3.8 of the DSU "There is normally a presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it
shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge". In the
present instance, Guatemala has amply rebutted any presumption of nullification or impairment of
Mexico's rights under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It should be stressed that the obligation alleged
to have been infringed in this case is a procedural and not a substantive obligation. Given that
Article 3.8 of the DSU clearly states that the presum ption of nullification or impairment is rebuttable
and taking into account the fact that the alleged violation is procedural, Guatemala maintains that it
has in fact rebutted the presumption. The Panel should therefore reject this argument.731
2. Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1354 Mexico rebuts Guatemalas arguments on "harmless error" and "nullification and impairment"
and "acquiescence" as follows:
6.1355 Guatemala's first written submission focuses on the assertion that, if Guatemala had met its
obligation, this would not have affected the course of the investigation. First, it states that this was a
"harmless error"732, then it mentions that Mexico acquiesced 733 and, lastly, Guatemala asserts that it
has demonstrated that there was no nullification or impairment. 734 These arguments can be found in

731 Guatemala points out that the notification under Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is
unique within the context of the WTO. This notification does not relate to the notification of laws under
covered agreements, the subject of most WTO notification rules. The notification in question applies only to an
isolated stage in an anti-dumping proceeding. Unlike Article 13.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (1994), the notification does not impose any obligation to hold post-notification
consultations. Finally, in accordance with the Agreement, it is the only notification rule that could result in a
prior notice of no consequence. For example, the invest igating authority could give notice to the representative
of the government of the exporting country under Article 5.5 and then, immediately afterwards, proceed to give
that representative notice of initiation.
732 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 206-216.
733 Ibid., paragraphs 217-219.
734 Ibid., paragraphs 220 and 221.

other parts of Guatemala's submission. 735 Nevertheless, as will be shown below, in this dispute the
principles of "harmless error" and "acquiescence" are not only inapplicable but are mutually exclusive
and as far as nullification or impairment is concerned, Guatemala did not prove anything.
6.1356 Guatemala puts forward the concepts of harmless error, acquiescence and nullification or
impairment in the context of its claim relating to Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement and repeats them in
other parts of its first written submission. Consequently, the arguments set out below should be seen
as supplementing those in the section concerning Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement, but also apply
when rejecting Guatemala's claims of "harmless error", "acquiescence" and "nullification or
impairment" in each context where these appear.
(a) Applicability of the concept of "harmless error"
6.1357 Regarding the concept of "harmless error", Guatemala asserts that its delay in notifying did
not prejudice Mexico's rights and that, according to the rules governing interpretation of public
international law, it is the responsibility of the Panel to "examine Guatemala's acts and decide whether
the non-fulfilment of a procedural obligation shoul d be overlooked on the grounds that the omission
did not prejudice the rights of Mexico or Cruz Azul".
736
6.1358 According to Guatemala, if it had notified Mexico of the initiation of the investigation on
11 January, nothing would have changed, because the AD Agreement does not give Mexico the right
to delay or prevent the initiation of an investigation or to put forward claims.
6.1359 In its oral submission to the Panel, Mexico (i) recalled that, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the
DSU, failure to comply with obligations leads to a presumption of nullification or impairment so
whether or not there was a harmless error has no meaning; (ii) added that it was Mexico's right to be
notified before the initiation of the investigation (in this case, publication of the relevant public
notice), irrespective of the action taken; (iii) emphasized that Guatemala was obliged to comply with
the provisions of the AD Agreement and non-compliance cannot be excused as a "harmless error";
and (iv) the Panel which examined Guatemala – Cement I found that harmless error did not apply in
this case.
737
6.1360 In addition to the arguments set out above, Mexico wishes to indicate the following:
6.1361 Guatemala states that harmless error does apply to this dispute because the concept can be
found in a number of domestic laws and has been recognized by the International Court of Justice. 738
Subsequently, it indicates that the Panel which heard the Brazil – Milk Powder case did not accept this
because "it considered that [these delays] had clearly prejudiced the defence of the interests of the
interested parties".739
6.1362 Mexico totally rejects the arguments outlined by Guatemala. Firstly, as the Panels have
clearly indicated, Guatemala did not even prove that its theory of "harmless error" constitutes a
principle of international law and, even if that were the case, the examples it mentions do not apply to
the present dispute. 740 Secondly, Guatemala's interpretations are unacceptable because they are
contrary to the provisions of Article 3.8 of the DSU. Thirdly, no panel has accepted such a theory. 741
In the Brazil – Milk Powder case, the Panel rejected Brazil's argument, not because a long time had

735 See, for example, Ibid., paragraph 226.
736 Ibid., paragraph 213.
737 Oral submission by Mexico, paragraphs 136-141.
738 First submission by Guatemala, paragraphs 208-212.
739 Ibid., paragraph 213.
740 See the first submission by the European Communities, 27 January 2000, paragraph 20.
741 See the first submission by the United States, 27 January 2000, paragraph 22.

elapsed after initiation of the investigation but, as will be seen below, because Brazil, like Guatemala,
tried to reverse the burden of proof in a manner contrary to Article 3.8 of the DSU:
"It was not incumbent upon a signatory whose procedural rights under Article 2 had
been infringed by another signatory to demonstrate the harm caused by such an
infringement. The Panel therefore rejected the position of Brazil that it was for the
EEC to demonstrate that the results of this investigation would have been different
had Brazil not committed its procedural errors."
742
6.1363 Furthermore, in another case in which the principle of harmless error was claimed, namely,
Guatemala – Cement I, the Panel, after having considered exactly the same facts as those now being
presented, rejected Guatemala's argument regarding "harmless error" stating the following:
"7.40 Guatemala argues that, even assuming there was a violation of Article 5.5,
the Panel should conclude that any delay in notification under Article 5.5 was without
adverse effects on Mexico's rights and thus constitutes harmless error under
customary rules of public international law. Guatemala further argues that the alleged
delay did not nullify or impair Mexico's rights under the AD Agreement.
7.41 We have concluded, as discussed above, that Guatemala failed to carry out its
obligation under Article 5.5 to notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate this investigation. Article 3.8 of the DSU provides that there is a presumption
that benefits are nullified or impaired when a Member fails to carry out an obligation
under a WTO Agreement:
'In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption
that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Member parties to
that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member
against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge'.
In other words, there is a presumption that a violation will entitle a Member to relief,
because that violation nullified or impaired a benefit accruing to the complaining
Member, that is, 'harmed' the complaining Member. Article 17 of the AD Agreement
entitles a Member to relief when benefits accruing to that Member under the AD
Agreement are nullified or impaired. Moreover, while Article 3.8 of the DSU
indicates that the presumption of nullification or impairment may be rebutted, GATT
panels have consistently found that the presumption is not rebutted simply because
the particular violation in question had no or insignificant adverse effects on trade.
743
This approach is supported by the Appellate Body's decision in Japan Alcohol , in

742 Report of the Panel in Brazil – Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on
Milk Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community (SCM/179), paragraph 271.
743 In United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , L/6175 (Adopted
17 June 1987), BISD 34S 136, 157-58, the Panel reviewed previous disputes in which parties had claimed that a
measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore did not nullify or impair
benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party that had brought the complaint. The
Panel concluded from its review that,
"while the CONTRACTING PARTIES had not explicitly decided whether the presumption that illegal
measures cause nullification or impairment could be rebutted, the presumption had in practice operated
as an irrefutable presumption".
Idem at paragraph 5.1.7

which it upheld the Panel's decision not to introduce a trade effects test into the first
sentence of Article III:2 of GATT 1994.744
7.42 In our view, having found that Guatemala failed to notify the Government of
Mexico in a timely fashion, we need not determine that the failure to carry out an
obligation had particular or demonstrable adverse trade effects in order to find that
the benefits accruing to Mexico under the AD Agreement were nullified or impaired.
Rather, to the extent that the presumption of nullification or impairment may be
rebutted in the case of the breach of a procedural obligation, it would be incumbent
on the Member that has breached the obligation to demonstrate that its failure to
respect the obligation could not have had any effect on the course of the investigation
in question. In this case, the procedural obligation breached was the requirement to
notify the exporting Member prior to proceeding to initiate an anti-dumping
investigation. A key function of the notification requirements of the AD Agreement
is to ensure that interested parties, including Members, are able to take whatever steps
they deem appropriate to defend their interests. Where a required notification is not
made in a timely fashion, the ability of the interested party to take such steps is
vitiated. We cannot now speculate on what steps Mexico might have taken had it
been timely notified, and how Guatemala might have responded to those steps.
745
Thus, while it is possible that the investigation would have proceeded in the same
manner had Guatemala timely notified Mexico before proceeding to initiate the
investigation, we cannot say with certainty that the course of the investigation would
not have been different. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Guatemala has rebutted the presumption that its failure to carry out its obligation
under Article 5.5 consistent with the AD Agreement nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to Mexico under that Agreement.
7.43 With respect to Guatemala's arguments regarding harmless error, the
precedents cited - assuming arguendo that they reflect customary rules of public
international law - relate to the consequences of a violation of a procedural rule,
rather than to the existence of a cause of action. Thus, we do not consider that the
assertion that an error is 'harmless' should prevent us from reaching the issue whether
a violation of a provision of the AD Agreement nullifies or impairs benefits under
that Agreement. However, we do not preclude that the notion of 'harmless error'
could be relevant to the question of what steps a Member should take in order to
implement the recommendation of a panel in a particular dispute. Since we do not
view the principle of harmless error as one which would prevent us from determining

744 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8, DS10, DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1997. We note
also the decision of the Panel in Brazil - Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on Milk
Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community , SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994
at paragraph 271:
"It was not incumbent upon a signatory whose procedural rights under Article 2 had been
infringed by another signatory to demonstrate the harm caused by such an infringement. The
Panel therefore rejected the position of Brazil that it was for the EEC to demonstrate that the
results of this investigation would have been different had Brazil not committed its procedural
errors. Without wishing to exclude that the con cept of 'harmless error' could be applicable in
dispute settlement proceedings under the Agreement, the Panel considered that this concept
was inapplicable under the circumstances of the case before it".
745 We note Guatemala's argument that, unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the AD Agreement does not require Members to afford an opportunity for consultations before
initiating an investigation, and that therefore there is no action which would take place after notification but
before initiation. Merely that the AD Agreement does not require some action following notification of the
exporting Member and before initiation does not mean that nothing useful can take place following a timely
notification, or that the exporting Member therefore has no interest in timely notification.

that there was a violation of the AD Agreement which nullified or impaired benefits
under that Agreement, we believe it would be improper for us to fail to make a
recommendation under Article 19.1. However, the effects of a particular error may,
we believe, be relevant in determining what remedial actions might be appropriate -
that is, what if any suggestions a panel might make as to how its recommendation
may be implemented."
6.1364 Lastly, Mexico simply wishes to recall that the nullification or impairment caused by non-
compliance with Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement do es not vanish because Mexico could have held
consultations or not. Guatemala violated one of Mexico's rights, irrespective of the action which
Mexico might have decided to take.
746
(b) Nullification or impairment
6.1365 Guatemala asserts that as it "did not take any step to begin the investigation until Mexico had
been notified … [it] did not prejudice Mexico's ability to defend its interests." 747 In Guatemala's
opinion, therefore, according to Article 3.8 of the DSU, the presumption of nullification or
impairment has been amply rebutted so the Panel should reject this argument. 748 Mexico wishes to
indicate the following in this regard:
(a) The only "evidence" put forward by Guatemala to rebut the presumption of
nullification or impairment is two assertions: (i) that Guatemala did not take any step
to begin the investigation until Mexico had been notified; and (ii) Guatemala granted
Cruz Azul a two-month extension to reply to the questionnaire.749
(b) Nevertheless, as pointed out in this rebuttal, the investigation began on 11 January,
while Mexico was notified after and not before the initiation so by then the violation
had been committed.
(c) Guatemala did not respect Mexico's right to be notified by Guatemala before the
investigation began and, therefore, Mexico's benefits were nullified or impaired.
(d) Guatemala cannot prove that, if there had been compliance with Article 5.5 "nothing
would have happened differently"
750, particularly since in another part of its
submission Guatemala itself indicates that "If Mexico had promptly entered an
objection in the administrative file with respect to the alleged violation of Article 5.5,
Guatemala would have reinitiated the investigation …". 751
(e) In fact, contrary to what Guatemala indicates 752, the Panel which examined the case
of Brazil – Milk Powder considered that the obligation to notify the initiation of an

746 See Brazil – Milk Powder , paragraph 232, which states: "The requirement to notify other
signatories and interested parties served the essential pur pose of enabling these signatories and interested parties
to effectively defend their interests by participating in the investigation." See also, Ibid., paragraph 264, which
states that the "offer of consultations made to the EEC on 27 February 1992, i.e., prior to the initiation of the
investigation, was immaterial to the issue of Brazil's compliance with its obligations under Article 2:5 of the
Agreement" (notification). See also the first submission by the United States, paragraph 26.
747 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 220.
748 Ibid., paragraph 221.
749 Ibid., paragraph 220.
750 Ibid., paragraph 215.
751 Ibid., paragraph 219.
752 See Guatemala's first submission, footnote 267, which asserts that Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement
is of no importance and, unlike Article 13.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, it
does not require the holding of consultations.

investigation was independent of the right to hold consultations.753 Consequently, the
fact that the AD Agreement does not provide for the holding of consultations before
initiating an investigation does not constitute grounds for excusing Guatemala's non-
compliance.
(f) The extension granted to Cruz Azul has nothing to do with the violation of
Article 5.5. Moreover, Guatemala was obliged to grant this extension, according to
Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
(g) In the GATT, there are no precedents for the successful rejection of the presumption
of nullification or impairment and, in the present case, Guatemala's assertions are
certainly not sufficient to rebut this presumption.754
(c) Acquiescence
6.1366 In its first written submission, Guatemala mentions that Mexico gave rise to estoppel by not
objecting to any putative delay in notification under Article 5.5. 755 Subsequently, it indicates that "If
Mexico had promptly entered an objection in the administrative file with respect to the alleged
violation of Article 5.5, Guatemala would have reinitiated the investigation."756
6.1367 Mexico asks itself: if Guatemala did not prejudice Mexico's rights by delaying notification 757
yet, on the other hand, asserts that, if Mexico had objected to the late notification, Guatemala would
have reinitiated the investigation758, does this not imply that Mexico would at least have had the right
to lodge an objection in the administrative file and that the matter is sufficiently serious for Guatemala
itself to recognize that its authorities would have had to reinitiate the investigation?
6.1368 In addition, the Appellate Body in Guatemala – Cement I determined that, pursuant to the AD
Agreement, only the definitive anti-dumping measure, the provisional anti-dumping measure and
price undertakings may be contested.
759 If a Member has to wait until one of these three measures is
applied, what can it do to see that the principle of estoppel is not applied?
6.1369 The above examples show the absurdity of Guatemala's reasoning regarding this concept.
According to its logic, Members will lose rights as time goes by and they do not object to violations
committed by other Members.
6.1370 As Mexico has already indicated, unlike other provisions, neither the AD Agreement nor the
DSU prescribe time-limits within which to contest a measure.760 Moreover, as will be seen below, the
legal practice in the GATT has shown the inapplicability of the concept put forward by Guatemala.
The Panel which heard the case Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from
Hong Kong761 found the following:
"28. … The Panel … recognized that restrictions had been in existence for a long time
without Article XXIII ever having been invoked by Hong Kong in regard to the products
concerned, but concluded that this did not alter the obligations which contracting parties had

753 See report of the Panel in "Brazil – Milk Powder", paragraph 264.
754 See first submission by the EC, paragraph 23.
755 First submission by Guatemala, paragraph 217.
756 Ibid., paragraph 219.
757 Ibid., paragraph 214.
758 Ibid., paragraph 219.
759 Report of the Appellate Body in Guatemala – Cement I, paragraph 79.
760 Oral submission at the first substantive meeting with the parties, paragraph 132.
761 See the Report of the Panel on EEC - Quantitative Restrictions A gainst Imports of Certain Products
from Hong Kong (L/5511 - 30S/129-140), adopted on 12 July 1998, paragraph 28.

accepted under GATT provisions. Furthermore, the Panel considered it would be erroneous
to interpret the fact that a measure had not been subject to Article XXIII over a number of
years, as tantamount to its tacit acceptance by contracting parties."
6.1371 In addition to the foregoing, in the case United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway 762, the Panel rejected an argument along
the same lines as that put forward by Guatemala. In that dispute, it was argued that "… the failure of
Norway or private Norwegian respondents to raise these issues before the investigating authorities
precluded Norway from raising them before the Panel". Later on in the same report, the Panel states
the following:
"349. … The Panel did not find in this provision any basis for it to refuse to consider a claim
by a Party in dispute settlement under the Agreement merely because the subject matter of the
claim had not been raised before the investigating authorities under domestic law."
6.1372 Furthermore, in EEC - Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas 763 an attempt was made
to apply the principle of acquiescence, but the Panel decided that it was inoperative as follows:
"362. The Panel considered that the decision of a contracting party not to invoke a right
under the General Agreement at a particular point in time could be due to circumstances that
change over time. For instance, a contracting party may not wish to invoke a right under the
General Agreement pending the outcome of a multilateral trade negotiation, such as the
Uruguay Round, or pending an assessment of the trade effects of a measure. The decision of
a contracting party not to invoke a right vis-à-vis another contracting party at a particular
point in time can therefore, by itself, not reasonably be assumed to be a decision to release
that other contracting party from its obligations under the General Agreement. The Panel
noted in this context that previous panels had based their findings on measures which had
remained unchallenged for long periods of time. The Panel therefore found that the mere fact
that the complaining parties had not invoked their rights under the General Agreement in the
past had not modified these rights and did not prevent them from invoking these rights now."
(Footnote omitted).
6.1373 In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that Mexico could have waited until Guatemala had
imposed a definitive anti-dumping measure and then objected to the violations of Article 5.5 of the
AD Agreement, without this being construed as Mexico acquiescing in the errors made by the
investigating authority. As seen above, since it is only possible to object to three measures in anti-
dumping disputes
764, it is even more obvious that the concept of estoppel does not apply in these
cases. Mexico could not have acquiesced in the violation of Article 5.5, as claimed by Guatemala.

762 See the Report of the Panel in United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (ADP/87), adopted on 30 November 1992, paragraphs 347-
351. See also the Report of the Panel in United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (SCM/153), adopted on 4 December 1992, paragraphs 216-
220.
763 See the Report of the Panel in EEC Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas (DS32/R), Panel
Report not adopted, dated 3 June 1993, paragraph 362.
764 Contrary to what Guatemala asserts in paragraph 218 of its first written submission, there has never
been any case in the WTO nor in the GATT 1947 in which the concept of acquiescence and estoppel has been
applied. In the case of Canada - EEC Arbitration on the Ordinary Wheat Agreement cited by Guatemala in this
paragraph, the principles in question were not applied. See also the first submission by the EC, paragraph 22,
and the first submission by the United States, paragraphs 24-26.

6.1374 In addition, in relation to Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement, Mexico's objection was such that
the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I decided against Guatemala. Paragraph 8.4 of the Panel's report
states the following:
"8.4 We have concluded in this case that Guatemala violated the provisions of the AD
Agreement by failing to notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate, as required by Article 5.5. We therefore recommend that the Dispute
Settlement Body request Guatemala to bring its action into conformity with its
obligations under Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement …"
765
3. Guatemala's Response to Rebuttal of Mexico
6.1375 In its second submissions, Guatemala expanded on its request for a finding that any technical
error which Guatemala may have committed is insufficient to justify the formulation of a
recommendation by the Panel. Its submissions in this regard are as follows:
6.1376 Even if the Panel were to find that Guatemala had violated some procedural requirement
during the course of the investigation, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that the challenged
measure (i.e., the definitive anti-dumping measure) is "inconsistent" (as that term is used in
Article 19.1 of the DSU) with the AD Agreement. As we explained at length during the first hearing,
claims directed at an anti-dumping investigation generally are not like claims directed at a quota, a
licensing scheme, a technical barrier, or a host of other measures that may be the subject of WTO
Dispute Settlement proceedings. When the Members challenge a quota or one of these other types of
measures, they will typically attack the measure itself. But when Members challenge an anti-dumping
duty measure, they often do so on the basis of clai ms directed at specific procedural requirements
which may number in the thousands over the course of an investigation that could take as long as
eighteen months.
6.1377 Nothing in the AD Agreement or the DSU mandates that every little procedural error that may
be committed during the course of an anti-dumping investigation renders the entire measure illegal.
For example, it would be absurd to suggest that an entire investigation resulting in the introduction of
a definitive anti-dumping measure should be declared "inconsistent" under Article 19.1 of the DSU if
the only error committed by the investigating authorit y were to fail to provide the exporter and the
exporting Member with a page of the application as provided for under Article 6.1.3 of the AD
Agreement.
6.1378 If the Member that has conducted the investigation can show that a particular error was
harmless, or otherwise did not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the complainant, no
recommendation should follow from Article 19.1 of the DSU. Otherwise, a Member whose exporters
have engaged in egregious, injurious dumping could be totally exonerated by an inconsequential
procedural violation that had no impact whatsoever on the course of the investigation. Such an
interpretation of the DSU and the AD Agreement would place form over substance and to make a
mockery of the importing Member's right to remedy injurious dumping.
H. S
HOULD THE PANEL DECLINE TO SUGGEST THAT GUATEMALA REVOKE THE DEFINITIVE
ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE OR REFUND THE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES COLLECTED?
1. Submissions of Guatemala
6.1379 Guatemala makes an alternative argument that the Panel should decline to suggest that
Guatemala revoke the definitive anti-dumping measure or refund the anti-dumping duties collected.
Its supporting arguments are as follows:

765 See the Report of the Panel in Guatemala-Cement I, paragraph 8.4.

6.1380 In its first written submission, Mexico reque sted that the panel suggest that Guatemala
"revoke the anti-dumping measure adopted against imports of Mexican cement and refund the anti-
dumping duties collected."766 In so doing, Mexico requested a specific remedy which is inconsistent
with established GATT/WTO practice. Thus, even should the panel agree with Mexico on the merits
of its argument, it should reject the remedy requested.
6.1381 The specific remedy767 requested by Mexico, namely that Guatemala revoke its measure, goes
far beyond the type of remedies recommended by the overwhelming preponderance of prior
GATT 1947 and WTO panels. In virtually every case in which a panel has found a measure to be
inconsistent with a GATT obligation, panels have confined themselves to issuing the general
recommendation that the country "bring its measures … into conformity with the General
Agreement"768, and have refrained from making a suggestion which would prejudice the respondent
Member's ability to apply the general recommendation.769 In addition to being true of GATT disputes
in general, this is especially applicable to the case of disputes relating to anti-dumping measures (and
countervailing duties).770
6.1382 In fact, in the second dispute examined under the WTO dispute settlement system, these
principles are carefully adhered to in the recommendation and suggestion formulated by the panel. In
United States - DRAMS , Korea requested the panel to suggest that the United States revoke its order
relating to DRAMS from Korea and eliminate a specific provision in its anti-dumping legislation. 771
In rejecting Korea's request, the panel made clear the general nature of its recommendation (that is,
"recommends that … request the United States to bring … [the measure] into conformity with its
obligations under … the Anti-Dumping Agreement") and added that "in light of the range of possible
ways in which we believe the United States could appropriately implement our recommendation, we
decline to make any suggestion in the present case".
772
6.1383 In fact, in general, a Member has many options for bringing a measure into conformity with
its obligations under the WTO. The panel cannot and should not prejudge the matter by making a
specific suggestion with regard to the solution which the parties to the dispute should reach once the
DSB has adopted the panel report.
6.1384 Moreover, the position that panels should refrain from making specific suggestions is
consistent with the nature of the function of the panel members, which is to interpret the agreements
covered. In general, panels are not well versed in the domestic legislation of the respondent
Member.773 Thus, although it is appropriate in a particular case for a panel to determine that a
Member's legislation was applied in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under a covered WTO

766 Mexico's first written submission, Section VI, paragraph (f)(b).
767 By "specific" remedy Guatemala means a remedy that requires a party to take a particular, specific
action in order to cure a WTO inconsistency found by a panel.
768 See, for example, the Panel report on Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon , L/6268, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/98, 115, paragraph 5.1. Guatemala will not
weary the panel by invoking at length all the other reports in which panels have made recommendations in
similar terms. There are more than 100 such reports.
769 See, for example, the panel report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, paragraph 8.2.
770 See, for example, the Panel report on Korea - Resins, ADP/92, paragraph 302. See also the Panel
report on United States - Imposition of C ountervailing Duties on Certain Hot- Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WP/DS138/R, circulat ed on 23 December 1999,
paragraph 8.2.
771 WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999, paragraph 7.3.
772 Idem, paragraph 7.4.
773 Indeed, Article 8.3 of the DSU stipulates that citizens of Members whose governments are parties to
the dispute should not normally serve on the panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties agree
otherwise.

agreement, in general it is not appropriate for the panel to prejudge, even by way of a suggestion,
which of the available options the party should adopt in order to bring its actions into conformity with
its international obligations.
6.1385 In short, it is contrary to established GATT/WTO practice for a panel to suggest specific
remedies. Therefore, regardless of what is decided in the present case, the Panel should reject
Mexico's request to the effect that the Panel suggest that Guatemala revoke its anti-dumping measure.
6.1386 Guatemala added simply in its second submission that like most Members of the WTO,
Guatemala has a variety of administrative or regulatory mechanisms at its disposal which could be
used to bring an offending anti-dumping measure into conformity with its obligations. Thus, if the
Panel were to find that the challenged measure was inconsistent with the AD Agreement, the
suggestion of a specific way of complying with that finding would be inappropriate.
VII. INTERIM REVIEW
7.1 On 11 September 2000 both parties submitted written requests for the Panel to review precise
aspects of the interim report. Neither party requested a further meeting with the Panel.
7.2 Guatemala notes that in paragraph 8.13 of the interim report the Panel misrepresents
Guatemala's position. Guatemala argues that it does not equate the value of the panel report in
Guatemala – Cement I to that of an unadopted panel report. In consequence, the Panel has decided to
strike out the third sentence of paragraph 8.13 of the interim report.
7.3 Guatemala also submits that in paragraph 8.17 of the interim report, the Panel misrepresents
Guatemala's position and that the second sentence of this paragraph contains a generalization which
does not properly reflect Guatemala's position. We consider that paragraph 8.17 contains an accurate,
although not exhaustive, summarization of the ar guments presented by Guatemala with respect to
Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement. We are of the view that the summary in paragraph 8.17 is
sufficient for purposes of the findings. Should the reader require a more thorough description of the
arguments presented by Guatemala on this matter the reader may refer to the section of the descriptive
part where these arguments have been reflected in full.
7.4 Guatemala requests that the findings of the Panel contain a separate section "setting forth
Guatemala's position according to which Mexico b ears the burden of proof of violation of a WTO
Agreement, and to that end, must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of the
AD Agreement or the GATT 1994, and that it must do so before passing on to Guatemala the burden
of proving compliance with the provision in question." We are of the view that the question of the
burden of proof as presented by Guatemala does not warrant a separate set of findings. Since,
Mexico has asserted that it does not deny that as a complainant in this dispute it bears the burden of
proof to show that there has been a violation of the AD Agreement by Guatemala
774.
7.5 Guatemala also requests that section VIII.B.5 titled "Guatemala's defence based on the
principle of harmless error, acquiescence or estoppel, and rebuttal of the presumption in Article 3.8",
should be relocated so as to follow the Panel's findings (in sections VIII.C.4, VIII.C.5 and VIII.C.6)
concerning Articles 5.5, 12.1.1 and 6.1.3. This Guatemala argues that such relocation would make it
clear that Guatemala's central argument is th at it did not violate the mentioned provisions
(Articles 5.5, 12.1.1 and 6.1.3), and that Guatemala's defence based on the principles of harmless
error, acquiescence or estoppel, and the rebuttal of the presumption in Article 3.8, is not their only
defence. In drafting our report we noticed that Guatemala's defence based on the principle of
harmless error, acquiescence or estoppel, and rebuttal of the presumption in Article 3.8 was made as a
subsidiary argument under several of the claims of violation made by Mexico. Thus, we decided to

774 Mexico second written submission, paragraph 13.

deal with such a defence up front as a preliminary issue. This decision regarding the structure of the
interim report was made in order to avoid repetition and improve its readability. We see no reason to
change the structure of the report at this stage.
7.6 Guatemala also requests that in addressing the subject of harmless error, the review of the
Panel should draw a distinction between cases involving measures and cases involving administrative
acts in the course of an investigation. We consider that this distinction is akin to the distinction
between substantive and procedural violations, this issue is dealt with in paragraph 8.111 of the
report.
7.7 Guatemala submits that paragraph 8.27 of the interim report should reflect the arguments
made in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its first written submission. Our findings merely contain a
summary of the parties' arguments. Our findings do not repeat fully the arguments of the parties, as
this is the function of the descriptive part. In this regard, the reader may refer to the descriptive part
for a full description of Guatemala's arguments on this matter. Moreover, the arguments presented by
Guatemala in the above-mentioned paragraphs pertain to the question of whether the application
contained such information as was reasonably available to the applicant (Article 5.2). We note that in
light of our findings under Article 5.3 we decided not to rule on claims regarding Article 5.2.
775
7.8 Guatemala also claims that the summary set forth in paragraph 8.30 concerning Guatemala's
position on the obligation to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence places Guatemala's
assertions out of context. To correct this situation Guatemala requests certain changes and additions
to paragraph 8.30. In order to accommodate Guatemala's concerns we have decided to make some
changes to that paragraph. In the first sentence of the paragraph the phrase "prior to initiation of the
investigation" will be added after the words "in th e application". With regard to the other changes
suggested by Guatemala, we consider that the summarization of the arguments is sufficient to present
an overview of Guatemala's position. Should the reader require more detail on the arguments they
can refer to the appropriate sections in the descriptive part.
7.9 Guatemala also claims that the summarization of its arguments presented in paragraph 8.34 of
the interim report is inaccurate in that the Panel's statement that Guatemala asserted that there was no
requirement to provide evidence on possible adjustments of an application is a generalization.
Guatemala never made such an assertion. Similarly, Guatemala claims the Panel's summary in that
paragraph of Guatemala's position with respect to the relationship of Articles 2 and 3 of the AD
Agreement with Article 5 is inaccurate 776, and in that Guatemala never argued that during the
initiation stage, Cruz Azul was required to prove that the difference in levels of trade in any way
affected price comparability. We disagree with Guatemala on this point. In our view the
summarization presented in the findings is sufficiently accurate, especially since the full extent of
Guatemala's arguments are reflected in the descriptive part of the report.
7.10 Guatemala claims that in the last sentence of paragraph 8.44, the Panel distorts Guatemala's
position as set forth in its various submissions by giving the impression that Guatemala refused to
collect the information from its Customs concerning the volume of imports. We disagree with
Guatemala on this point. In our view the summarization presented in the findings is sufficiently
accurate, especially since the full extent of Guatemala's arguments are reflected in the descriptive part
of the report.
7.11 Guatemala claims that in paragraph 8.49, the Panel makes its own evaluation of the facts and
assumes the Ministry's role by establishing what the imports from Mexico amounted to. With respect
to Guatemala's comments regarding paragraph 8.49 of the interim report, we wish to clarify that in our

775 See, infra paragraph 8.59.
776 Guatemala did, however, maintain that Article 5.8 was not applicable to the initiation stage.

findings the Panel does not attempt to substitute itself for the investigating authority. In paragraph
8.49 of the interim report we have examined to what extent the investigating authorities considered
the volume of imports relative to domestic production and consumption in Guatemala. In that
analysis we conclude that there is no evidence that at the time of investigation the Ministry possessed
the necessary information to appropriately consider the increase in the volume of imports relative to
domestic production and consumption in Guatemala. In an attempt to ascertain whether there was any
factual support for Guatemala's assertion that there was a "massive" increase in the volume of imports
relative to domestic production of Guatemalan Cement, taking evidence on the record before the
Panel, we put together the information available to the Ministry at the time of inititaion and performed
the calculation refered to in paragraph 8.49. We found that assertions that imports of Mexican cement
were "massive" did not find support in the data available to the Ministry at the time of initiation. The
calculation performed by us to verify support fo r Guatemala's claims of massive imports, does not
affect our findings that there is no evidence to suggest that, at the time of initiation, the Ministry
considered the volume of imports relative to domestic production.
7.12 Guatemala also complains that in paragraph 8.79 of the interim report, the Panel failed to
mention that Guatemala maintains that it complied with Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
for the reasons set forth in that paragraph and b ecause if it had proceeded with the investigation
without having previously notified Mexico and Cr uz Azul, either of them could have brought an
"amparo" action to annul the investigation, but neither Mexico nor Cruz Azul made use of that
remedy. We are of the view that the summary in paragraph 8.79 is sufficient for purposes of the
findings. Should the reader require a more thorough description of the arguments presented by
Guatemala on this matter the reader may refer to the section of the descriptive part where these
arguments have been reflected in full. Moreover, we have addressed this issue and draw Guatemala's
attention to our finding in paragraph 8.83 that "whether Mexico choose not to pursue its rights under
Guatemalan law is of no concern to us, as this would not affect its rights under the WTO
Agreements". With regard to Guatemala's comments on the Panel's treatment of its defence based on
the principle of harmless error, acquiescence or estoppel, and rebuttal of the presumption in
Article 3.8, we have already addressed this issue in paragraph 7.4 supra.
7.13 With regard to Guatemala's claim that the Panel misrepresents its position in paragraph 8.91
of the interim report by stating that Guatemala claimed that the public notice itself provided adequate
information, we have decided to change the first sentence of this paragraph. The first sentence of
paragraph 8.91 shall now read: "Guatemala responds that the public notice as supplemented by the
report of the Directorate of Economic Integration of 17 November 1995 is adequate to fulfill the
requirements of Article 12.1.1". Regarding Guatemala's comments on the Panel's treatment of its
defence based on the principle of harmless error, acquiescence or estoppel, and rebuttal of the
presumption in Article 3.8, we have already addressed this issue in paragraph 7.4 supra.
7.14 Guatemala requests changes to the summarization of the arguments in paragraph 8.123, as it
considers that the summarization does not record Guatemala's position in full. We are of the view that
the summary in paragraph 8.123 is sufficient for purposes of the findings. Should the reader require a
more thorough description of the arguments presented by Guatemala on this matter the reader may
refer to the section of the descriptive part where these arguments have been reflected in full.
Guatemala also points out a slight difference in the punctuation of the second sentence of
paragraph 8.123, between the Spanish and the English versions of the interim report. We have
changed the English version so it would read exactly as the Spanish.
7.15 Guatemala requests changes to paragraph 8.128 of the interim report consisting of a summary
of the arguments presented by Guatemala. We consider that the changes requested are not necessary
as the summary of Guatemala's arguments in paragraph 8.128 is sufficient for purposes of the
findings. Should the reader require a more thorough description of the arguments presented by the

parties it may refer to the section of the descriptive part where these arguments have been reflected in
full.
7.16 Guatemala has asked the Panel to include Guatemala's reply to Question 39 from Mexico
after paragraph 8.131 of the interim report. According to Guatemala, "[t]his reply provides evidence
concerning the probative value of the notarial deed of 4 November". We note that Question 39 from
Mexico concerns the status of notarial deeds in Guatemalan law. This is also the context for
Guatemala's reply to that question. Since the status , or "probative value", of a notarial deed under
Guatemalan law is not relevant to our findings, we decline to make the change requested by
Guatemala.
7.17 Guatemala maintains that our summarization of their arguments with respect to the alleged
violation of Article 6.1.2. is incomplete and inaccurate. Therefore, it requests the inclusion of a
reference to the rules laid down by the investigatin g authority for the public hearing. We are of the
view that the summary in paragraph 8.143 is sufficient for purposes of the findings. Should the reader
require a more thorough description of the arguments presented by Guatemala on this matter the
reader may refer to the section of the descriptive part where these arguments have been reflected in
full. Guatemala also requests that reference should be made to the fact that Article 6.5 distinguishes
between two types of confidential information. We wo uld like to point out that the issue of the types
of confidential information provided for in Article 6.5 is explored in depth in paragraph 8.219 of the
report.
7.18 Guatemala's requests an expansion of the quotation that appears in the last sentence of
paragraph 8.147 of the interim report, in order to make it a complete quotation of the sentence. We
wish to highlight that the quotation is made from the second to last sentence of paragraph 294 of
Guatemala's first submission and not to the last se ntence of that paragraph, as Guatemala seems to
believe. The sentence quoted by us in the findings does not contain the words that Guatemala
requests us to include, thus, we decline to make the change suggested by Guatemala. Guatemala also
requests the Panel to clarify, in paragraph 8.150, that on 17 January 1997 Cruz Azul requested two
copies. We would like to point out that the preceeding paragraph makes it clear that "On
17 January 1997, Cruz Azul requested that …". We believe that no further clarification is necessary.
7.19 With respect to the third sentence of paragraph 8.153 of the interim report, Guatemala has
asked the Panel to "also indicate that the text of the provision establishing the fee was attached". We
are uncertain whether Guatemala asserts that the relevant text was attached to Guatemala's
submissions to the Panel, or to the 6 December 1996 Resolution of the Directorate of Economic
Integration sent to Cruz Azul. If the former, we fail to see how the provision of the relevant text to
the Panel is relevant to our findings in the present dispute. If the latter, we note that Guatemala has
failed to adduce any proof that the relevant text was attached to its 6 December 1996 Resolution. In
particular, no such text was attached to the copy of the Resolution made available to the Panel during
the course of these proceedings (Annex Mexico-36). Nor, indeed, did the 6 December 1996
Resolution contain any reference to that text. Nor has Guatemala adduced any evidence that Cruz
Azul was otherwise provided with a copy of the relevant provision. For these reasons, we decline to
make the change requested by Guatemala.
7.20 Guatemala points to a typographical error in the second to last sentence of paragraph 8.211.
We have accepted the correction suggested by Guatemala and the word "not" has been added in
"information was not 'susceptible of summary'".
7.21 Mexico requests us to suggest, in the final report, that Guatemala should refund the anti-
dumping duties collected on imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico as a result of an anti-
dumping measure which was found to be in viol ation of the AD Agreement. We see no reason to
change our decision not to suggest repayment of the duties.

7.22 Mexico also requests certain changes due to typographical errors and inconsistencies between
the Spanish and English versions of the report. We have made the necessary corrections in
paragraphs 4.21, 4.97, 6.140, 6.445, 6.1071, 6.1111, 8.49, 8.94, 8.84 and 8.122.
VIII. FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
8.1 This dispute involves the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping measure by the Guatemalan
Ministry of Economy ("the Ministry") on imports of portland cement from Mexico. Mexico raises
claims concerning the initiation of the investigation, the conduct of the anti-dumping investigation,
the imposition of a provisional measure and the imposition of the definitive measure.
8.2 On 21 September 1995, Cementos Progreso S.A. ("Cementos Progreso"), the sole
Guatemalan producer of cement, filed a request for initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. A
supplementary request was filed on 9 October 1995. On 11 January 1996, the Ministry published a
notice of initiation of an anti-dumping investigation regarding allegedly dumped imports of grey
portland cement from Cooperativa la Cruz Azul, S.C.L. of Mexico ("Cruz Azul"). The Ministry
notified the Government of Mexico of the initiation of the investigation on 22 January 1996. The
Ministry requested certain import data from Guatemala's Directorate-General of Customs by letter
dated 23 January 1996.
8.3 Guatemala established as the period of investigation the period from 1 June 1995 to 30
November 1995. On 16 August 1996, Guatemala imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty of
38.72% on imports of type I (PM) grey portland cemen t from Cruz Azul of Mexico. The provisional
duty was imposed on the basis of a preliminary affirmative determination. On 14 October 1996
Guatemala extended the period of investigation, after the extension the period of investigation
covered the period 1 June 1995 to 31 May 1996. On that same date Guatemala provided an additional
questionnaire to the parties in the investigation to be responded by 30 October 1996.
8.4 After an exchange of letters between Guatemala, Mexico and Cruz Azul the date for the
verification at Cruz Azul was fixed for the week of 3-6 December 1996. The scheduled verification
did not take place due to Cruz Azul's objections to the Ministry's intent to: a) verify information
concerning the period of 1 December 1996 to 31 May 1996; b) verify information concerning Cruz
Azul's cost of production; and c) use certain non-governmental experts.
8.5 On 17 January 1997, Guatemala imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 89.54% on
imports of grey portland cement from Cruz Azul of Mexico.
8.6 On 15 October 1996, after the imposition of the provisional anti-dumping duty but before the
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, Mexico requested consultations with Guatemala under
Article 4 of the DSU and Article 17.3 of the AD Agreement. Consultations were concluded on
9 January 1997, before the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, but the parties failed to
reach a mutually satisfactory solution.
8.7 On 13 February 1997, after the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, Mexico
requested the establishment of a panel to examine the consistency of Guatemala's anti-dumping
investigation with its obligations under the AD Agreement. A first panel concerning this matter was
established by the DSB on 20 March 1997. The report of the panel was issued on 19 June 1998.
8.8 On 4 August 1998, Guatemala notified the DSB of its intention to appeal certain issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel, and filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Appella te Body. The Appellate Body issued its report on 2 November 1998. In its
report, the Appellate Body reversed: a) the panel's finding that Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement "provides for a coherent set of rules for dispute settlement specific to anti-dumping cases
… that replaces the more general approach of the DSU"; b) the panel's alternative finding in
paragraph 7.26 of the panel report relating to the term "measure"; and c) the panel's conclusion in
paragraph 7.27 of the panel report that "the matters referred to in Mexico's request for establishment
of a panel" were properly before it. The DSB adopted the report of the Appellate Body on 25
November 1998.
8.9 The Appellate Body's ruling did not concern th e substantive question of whether Guatemala's
investigation was consistent with the provisions of the AD Agreement. Consequently, on
5 January 1999, Mexico requested consultations with Guatemala under the DSU and the AD
Agreement regarding Guatemala's definitive anti-dumping measure on imports of grey portland
cement from Cruz Azul as well as the actions that preceded it. Mexico and Guatemala held
consultations on 23 February 1999, but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. On 26 July
1999, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel to examine the consistency of the definitive anti-
dumping measure, and the actions preceding that measure, with the provisions of the AD Agreement.
At its meeting on 22 September 1999, the DSB established a panel in accordance with Article 6 of the
DSU with standard terms of reference.
B. P
RELIMINARY ISSUES RAISED BY GUATEMALA
1. The Panel was improperly composed and is not competent to review the matter
8.10 Guatemala requests us to rule that the composition of this Panel is inconsistent with WTO and
international law principles, and that we therefore lack competence to review the matter before us.
Specifically, Guatemala considers that the presence on this Panel of a member who served on a
previous panel relating to the same matter (" Guatemala – Cement I "777) detracts from the objectivity
and independence that a panel should have when reviewing a matter brought before it. Mexico
requested us to reject Guatemala's preliminary objection, arguing that the Panel was composed in
conformity with the DSU, and that we have competence to examine the matter before us.
8.11 Prior to the first meeting of the Panel with th e parties, we issued the following preliminary
ruling on this issue through a communication addressed to the parties and third parties, dated 24
February 2000:
"1.4 In order to determine whether the substance of Guatemala's preliminary
objection is an issue that is susceptible of a ruling by the Panel, we have carefully
analysed the provisions of the DSU governing panel composition. It is clear that
Article 8.6 of the DSU imposes primary responsibility for panel composition on the
parties to the dispute. In cases where the parties are unable to agree on the
composition of a panel, such as this one, Article 8.7 of the DSU imposes
responsibility for panel composition on the Director General. According to Article 8
of the DSU, therefore, the composition of a panel is determined by the parties to the
dispute and, in certain circumstances, by the Director General. Neither Article 8 nor
any other provision of the DSU prescribes any role for the panel in the panel
composition process. For this reason, we find that we are unable to rule on the
substance of the issue raised by Guatemala.
1.5 Should Guatemala persist with its substantive concerns regarding the
composition of the Panel, Guatemala may avail itself of the procedure provided for in
the Rules of Conduct for the Understandin g on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes."

777 Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding portland Cement from Mexico, report of the
panel, WT/DS60/R, adopted as reversed on 25 November 1998.

8.12 We are not aware whether Guatemala has decided to avail itself of its right under
Article VIII:1 of the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes 778 to submit evidence of a violation of the obligations of independence or
impartiality by a panel member to the Chairman of the DSB. As we indicated in our preliminary
ruling, we conclude that this would have been the only proper way for Guatemala to raise the issue.
In light of this ruling, we also requested the parties not to submit any further arguments on this issue
in subsequent stages of the procedure.
2. The panel report from the previous case should not be used as precedent or in any way
constitute guidance for the present Panel
8.13 Guatemala requests us not to take into account in our decision the report of the panel in
Guatemala - Cement I. Guatemala argues that the report of the panel in Guatemala – Cement I has no
legal status and cannot constitute a valid precedent because the Appellate Body concluded that the
panel did not have the mandate to examine the complaints before it. Thus, Guatemala is of the view
that recourse to the report issued in Guatemala - Cement I as useful guidance in respect of any matter
being examined in the present dispute would be a violation of the decision of the Appellate Body.
Guatemala equates the value of the previous panel report to that of an unadopted panel report.
Guatemala requests that we not take into account in our decision the report of the panel in Guatemala
- Cement I. Guatemala argues that the previous panel lacked the mandate to review the case. Thus,
its opinion on this matter has no legal value as precedent or guidance.
8.14 Mexico considers that: (a) the arguments presented by it in the present dispute are put before
the Panel independently of their having been supported, or not, by a previous panel; (b) the panel
report in Guatemala-Cement I is an adopted panel report; (c) the panel report in Guatemala - Cement I
was an integral part of the request for establishment of this Panel and as such is part of its mandate;
and (d) assuming arguendo that the panel report in Guatemala-Cement I was not adopted, it
nevertheless contains useful guidance pertinent to the issues before us.
8.15 We note that the Appellate Body ruled in Guatemala – Cement I that "the dispute was not
properly before the Panel", and that it therefore could not consider any of the substantive issues raised
in the alternative by Guatemala.
779 In other words, the Appellate Body found that the panel in
Guatemala – Cement I should never have reached the substance of the dispute. We therefore consider
that the substantive findings of the panel in Guatemala – Cement I are in this respect similar to those
of unadopted panel reports, i.e., while they have no legal status, they may nevertheless provide useful
guidance to the extent that we consider them relevant and persuasive. 780 We recall in any event

778 Article VIII:1 of the Rules of Conduct provides:
"1. Any party to a dispute, conducted pursuant to the WTO Agreement, who possesses or
comes into possession of evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence,
impartiality or confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interest by covered
persons which may impair the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement
mechanism, shall at the earliest possible time and on a confidential basis, submit such evidence to
the Chair of the DSB, the Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body, as appropriate
according to the respective procedures detailed in paragraphs VIII:5 to VIII:17 below, in a written
statement specifying the relevant facts and circumstances. Other Members who possess or come
into possession of such evidence, may provide such evidence to the parties to the dispute in the
interest of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism.
(WT/DSB/RC/1)"
779 Guatemala – Cement I, Appellate Body report, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 89.
780 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, adopted on 1
November 1996 . This conclusion is consistent with that reached by the panel in Mexico – Anti-dumping
Investigation on High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States (Mexico – HFCS), WT/DS132/R, adopted on
24 February 2000, footnote 556.

Mexico's assertion that its arguments in this dispute are put before us independently of their having
been supported, or not, by a previous panel.
3. The Panel lacks an appropriate mandate to review the provisional measure
8.16 Guatemala requests us to rule that the provisional measure and any claims related to it fall
outside our terms of reference. In light of our decision to make no substantive rulings regarding the
claims relating to the provisional measure for reasons of judicial economy,
781 we consider that we
need not decide whether the provisional measure is properly before the Panel.
4. Standard of Review Under Article 17.6(I) of the AD Agreement
8.17 Guatemala argues that Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement requires the panel to "determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective." Guatemala contends that this provision precludes an independent
evaluation of the various pieces of evidence that the Ministry considered. In consequence, the Panel
may only reject the factual findings made by the national authorities in special cases, such as where
the conclusions drawn by the authorities were not supported by the evidence or where there was clear
evidence of bias in their evaluation of the facts.
8.18 Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement sets forth the standard of review to be applied by a panel
under the AD Agreement when considering issues of fact. That Article provides:
"(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether
the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;"
8.19 We consider that it is not our role to perform a de novo review of the evidence which was
before the investigating authority in this case. Rather, Article 17 makes it clear that our task is to
review the determination of the investigating authorities. Specifically, we must determine whether its
establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.
782

781 See, section VIII.F infra.
782 We note that, in the context of safeguard measures, the panel in Korea – Definitive Safeguard
Measure on imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea – Dairy Safeguard) , WT/DS98/R adopted on adopted 12
January 2000, said the following of the need for a panel to perform an objective assessment pursuant to
Article 11 of the DSU:
"7.30 We consider that for the Panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of
the national authorities could not ensure an "objective assessment" as foreseen by Article 11
of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have
dealt with this issue. However, we do not see our review as a substitute for the proceedings
conducted by national investigating authorities. Rather, we consider that the Panel's function
is to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this
case the KTC. For us, an objective assessment entails an examination of whether the KTC
had examined all facts in its possession or which it should have obtained in accordance with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards (including facts which might detract from an
affirmative determination in accordance with the last sentence of Article 4.2 of the Agreement
on Safeguards), whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole
supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was
consistent with the international obligations of Korea. Finally, we consider that the Panel
should examine the analysis performed by the national authorities at the time of the
investigation on the basis of the various national authorities' determinations and the evidence
it had collected. [Footnote deleted]"

In other words, we must determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority
evaluating the evidence before it at the time of the investigation could properly have made the
determinations made by Guatemala in this case. In our review of the investigating authorities'
evaluation of the facts, we will first need to examine evidence considered by the investigating
authority, and second, this examination is limited by Article 17.5(ii) to the facts before the
investigating authority. That is, we are not to examine any new evidence that was not part of the
record of the investigation.
783
5. Guatemala's defence based on the principle of harmless error, acquiescence or estoppel,
and rebuttal of the presumption in Article 3.8 of the DSU
8.20 As a defence common to Mexico's claims regarding the notification under Article 5.5, public
notice of initiation under Article 12.1.1 and the prov ision of the full text of the application under
Article 6.1.3, Guatemala submitted the following arguments. 784 Guatemala argues that, should we
find a violation of Articles 5.5, 12.1.1 and 6.1.3, such violations, that is, delay in notification under
Article 5.5, insufficient public notice of initiation or delay in the provision of the full text of the
application, did not affect the course of the investigation. Guatemala posits that (a) the alleged
violations of Article 5.5, 12.1.1 and 6.1.3 were not harmful to Mexico according to the principle of
harmless error, (b) Mexico "convalidated" the alleged violations by not objecting immediately after
their occurrence, and (c) the alleged violations did not cause nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing to Mexico under the AD Agreement.
8.21 Guatemala first argues that these alleged violations constituted harmless error. Guatemala
states that it is a general principle of law that in case of a violation of a procedural rule, prejudice must
be shown before a party obtains the right to be compensated for this procedural error. Guatemala
refers to certain Members' practice in civil and criminal proceedings in this regard. Guatemala asserts
that the International Court of Justice has recognized the concept of harmless error as well. On the
basis of this principle, Guatemala argues that the alleged violations of Articles 5.5, 6.1.3, 12.1.1 were
of a procedural nature, did not affect Mexico's rights in any way, and thus constituted harmless errors.
8.22 In our view, the GATT panel referred to by Guatemala in support of its position merely stated
that it did not wish "to exclude that the concept of harmless error could be applicable in dispute
settlement proceedings under the Agreement.
 "785 It therefore cannot be concluded that the GATT
panel referred to "recognized the principle of harmless error "as alleged by Guatemala. 786 We do not
consider that the concept of "harmless error" as presented by Guatemala has attained the status of a
general principle of public international law. In any event, we consider that our first task in this
dispute is to determine whether Guatemala has acted consistently with its obligations under the
relevant provisions of the AD Agreement. To the extent that Mexico can demonstrate that Guatemala
has not respected its obligations under the relevant provisions of that Agreement, we must next
consider arguments raised by Guatemala in respec t of the nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing to Mexico thereunder. 787 Thus, while arguments regarding the existence and extent of the

783 We note that this standard is consistent with the approach followed by the panel in Guatemala –
Cement I in para. 7.57 of its report. In that instance the panel was of the opinion that its role was:
"… to examine whether the evidence relied on by the Ministry was sufficient, that is, whether
an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence could properly have
determined that sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causal link existed to justify
initiating the investigation." (footnote deleted)
784 For a full description of the parties' arguments and the substantive findings of the Panel regarding
these claims please refer to sections VIII.C.4, VIII.C.5(b) and VIII.C.6 infra.
785 Brazil – Imposition of Provisional and Definiti ve Countervailing Duties on Milk Powder and
Certain types of Milk from the European Economic Community, SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994, para. 271.
786 Guatemala first submission, para.213.
787 See paras. 8.105- 8.112, infra.

possible harm suffered by Mexico may be relevant to the issue of nullification or impairment, 788 we
do not consider that an argument of harmless error represents a defence in itself to an alleged
infringement of a provision of the WTO Agreement.
8.23 A second argument raised by Guatemala is based on the lack of reaction from Mexico to the
alleged late notification, the alleged insufficient public notice and the alleged delay in providing the
full text of the application to Mexico and Cruz Az ul. Guatemala asserts that, by not reacting at the
earliest possible moment, Mexico waived its rights to object to the above-mentioned alleged
violations. Guatemala uses both the concepts of "acquiescence" and "estoppel" in support of this
argument. We note that "acquiescence" amounts to "qualified silence", whereby silence in the face of
events that call for a reaction of some sort may be interpreted as a presumed consent.
789 The concept
of estoppel, also relied on by Guatemala in support of its argument, is akin to that of acquiescence.
Estoppel is premised on the view that where one party has been induced to act in reliance on the
assurances of another party, in such a way that it would be prejudiced were the other party later to
change its position, such a change in position is "estopped", that is precluded.790
8.24 Regarding both arguments of acquiescence and es toppel we note that Mexico was under no
obligation to object immediately to the violations it now alleges before the Panel. 791 Mexico raised
claims concerning Articles 5.5, 12.1.1 and 6.1.3 at an appropriate moment under the dispute
settlement procedure envisaged by the AD Agreement and the DSU. Thus, Mexico cannot therefore
be considered as having acquiesced to belated notification by Guatemala, to insufficiency in the
public notice or to delay in providing the full text of the application, much less to have given
"assurances" to Guatemala that it would not later challenge these actions in WTO dispute settlement.
Since Mexico raised its claims at an appropriate moment under the WTO dispute settlement
procedures, Guatemala could not have reasonably re lied upon Mexico's alleged lack of protest to
conclude that Mexico would not bring a WTO complaint. In any event, Guatemala has not satisfied us
that, had Mexico complained after the fact, but during the course of the investigation, Guatemala
could or would have taken action to remedy the situation. Specifically, with respect to the delay in
the Article 5.5 notification, Guatemala asserts that had Mexico objected to the notification delay in a
timely manner, the Guatemalan authorities would have reinitiated the investigation after presenting
Mexico with the notification under Article 5.5. We are of the view that this argument presented by
Guatemala is highly speculative and notes that the Panel has been established to rule on the WTO
conformity of the actions by Guatemala and not on the WTO conformity of the actions Guatemala
alleges it could have taken. In any event, Guatemala states at para. 217 of its first written submission
that Mexico first raised the Article 5.5 issue on 6 June 1996, that is at a relatively early stage of the
Ministry's investigation, and precedes the Ministry's preliminary affirmative determination.
Nevertheless, Guatemala failed to take any steps to address the delayed Article 5.5 notification at that
time. Based on these considerations the Panel rejects Guatemala's defence that Mexico
"convalidated" the alleged violations of Articles 5.5, 6.1.3 and 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
8.25 Finally, Guatemala argues that the presumption of nullification or impairment of Article 3.8
DSU, if a violation is found, is rebuttable, and that none of the alleged violations nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to Mexico under the AD Agreement. As noted above, we will address the issue of
nullification or impairment after we have considered whether Guatemala has acted consistently with
its obligations under the AD Agreement. See paras. 8.105 - 8.112, infra.

788 Or in the event Article 22 is invoked, to the issues of compensation and/or suspension of equivalent
concessions.
789 V.D. Degan, Sources of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 348-349.
790 Brownlie, Principles of International Law, Clarendon Press, p. 640-642.
791 Regarding acquiescence we note that the precise scope and applicability of this concept is still a
matter of debate, and it is clear that not any silence can be considered to constitute consent.

C. CLAIMS BY MEXICO CONCERNING THE INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION
8.26 Mexico asserts that Guatemala's initiation of the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this
dispute was inconsistent with Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico considers that the
anti-dumping investigation should never have been initiated, and that its initiation and subsequent
conduct resulted in the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Mexico under the WTO and
in particular the AD Agreement. Mexico asserts that the Ministry's decision to initiate the
investigation is also inconsistent with Articles 2, 3 and 12 of the AD Agreement.
792
8.27 Guatemala considers that the initiation of the investigation was fully in accordance with the
requirements of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement, with respect to both the procedures and
the substance of the initiation determination. Guatemala also argues that, as a result of the scope of
application of Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement, an investigating authority's decision to initiate
an investigation cannot be found to be inconsistent with those provisions.
8.28 We note that Article 5.2 refers to the contents of the application by the domestic industry
requesting the initiation of an investigation, and establishes that the application must include inter alia
information on certain specific areas to the extent that it is "reasonably available" to the applicant. In
this regard, Article 5.2 states that "[s]imple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be
considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph". Article 5.3 requires the
investigating authorities to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. Thus, we
are confronted with two issues: whether the application contained such information as was reasonably
available to the applicant (Article 5.2), and whether the investigating authority examined the accuracy
and adequacy of the evidence to arrive at a justified determination that there was sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of the investigation (Artic le 5.3). We proceed by examining Mexico's claims
under Article 5.3 first.
1. Sufficiency of evidence to Justify Initiation of the Investigation – Article 5.3
8.29 Mexico argues that the Ministry based its initiation decision on insufficient evidence, in
violation of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico considers that an unbiased and objective
investigating authority examining the evidence that was before the Ministry could not have properly
determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, still less of the existence of a threat of
material injury, and of a causal link between the imports allegedly dumped and the alleged threat of
material injury to the Guatemalan domestic industry, to justify initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation. Mexico considers that, even if the information provided by Cementos Progreso in its
application constituted all the information reasonably available to it, Articles 5.2 and 5.3 cannot
acceptably be interpreted to mean that Article 5.3 au thorizes an investigating authority to initiate an
anti-dumping investigation solely because an application meets the requirements of Article 5.2. Thus,
even if one were to suppose that the information needed to be able to determine that there was
sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation was not reasonably available to the
applicant, this did not mean that there was sufficie nt evidence to justify initiation in accordance with
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico also argues that Guatemala failed to examine the adequacy
and accuracy of the evidence included in the application.
8.30 Guatemala argues that the authorities of the importing country must examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation, as set forth in Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement, but they are not required to

792 In its conclusions presented in Mexico's first submission (see, p. 96), Mexico also requests the Panel
to find that the initiation is inconsistent with Article 1 of the AD Agreement. However, since there is nothing in
Mexico's submissions to the Panel to substantiate this purported Article 1 claim, we do not consider it necessary
to consider this issue further.

carry out any investigation or confirm or verify the claims contained in the application. Referring to
the decision in Softwood Lumber, Guatemala asserts the we should consider whether "a reasonable,
unprejudiced person could have found … that sufficient evidence existed" to justify initiation, and
that the level of "sufficient" evidence to justify initiation is significantly lower than the level of
evidence required for a preliminary or final determination. Guatemala argues that the Ministry
properly examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted with the application, and that
we must accept the Ministry's establishment of the fact that there was sufficient evidence, reasonably
available to the applicant, to justify the initiation of the investigation. Otherwise, Guatemala asserts,
the Panel would be assuming the role of the investigating authority.
8.31 We recall that, in accordance with our standard of review, we must determine whether an
objective and unbiased investigating authority, looking at the facts before it, could properly have
determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation.
Article 5.3 requires the authority to examine, in making this determination, the accuracy and adequacy
of the evidence in the application. Clearly, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence is relevant to
the investigating authorities' determination whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation
of an investigation. It is however the sufficiency of the evidence, and not its adequacy and accuracy
per se, which represents the legal standard to be applied in the case of a determination whether to
initiate an investigation.
8.32 With these considerations in mind, we now turn to consider whether Guatemala acted
consistently with Article 5.3 in initiating the investigation. We will examine the determination with
respect to each of the elements of a dumping investigation, that is, dumping, injury and causation,
separately.
(a) Dumping
8.33 Mexico argues that the evidence before the Guatemalan authorities on the question of
dumping was insufficient for an initiation of an investigation. Mexico asserts that the only evidence
submitted with the application on the question of normal value consisted of two invoices, dated 25
and 26 August 1995, for one bag each of cement, and that the only evidence of export price was two
import certificates, dated 15 August 1995,
793 for 7,035 and 4,221 sacks of cement. In Mexico's view,
this evidence "cannot qualify as adequate and accurate evidence" of normal value and export price.
With respect to normal value, Mexico argues that the invoices do not sufficiently specify the product
in question, or the amounts or the source, the sales are not representative of sales over the period of
investigation, and the sales represent only an insignificant share of Cruz Azul's operations. With
respect to export price, Mexico argues that the import certificates are not representative of Mexico's
exports to the Guatemalan market, and that the imports occurred on only two days of the period of
investigation. Moreover, Mexico argues that the prices reflected in the documents were not
comparable within the meaning of Articles 2.1 an d 2.4 of the Agreement, and that the Guatemalan
authorities did not make any allowances for differences affecting price comparability. Mexico notes
that: a) there were differences in the description of product referred to in the invoices; b) the evidence
was not representative of the prices in the domestic and export markets; c) there were differences
between the volumes presented in the invoices and the export certificates; and d) the transactions
taken as evidence of the export price and the normal value were at different levels of trade. In these
circumstances, Mexico asserts that, no objective and unbiased authority could properly have
determined that the evidence before it was sufficient to justify initiation of an investigation.

793 Although the import certificates were both stamped on 15 August 1995, the certificate for 7,035
sacks of cement is also dated 14 August 1995. The Panel understands that it is for this reason that Mexico
subsequently referred to the Ministry considering the volume of imports on two days during the period of
investigation.

8.34 Guatemala argues that the evidence of normal value and export price before its investigating
authority was sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. Guatemala asserts that the AD
Agreement does not require that an application contain information on prices for a particular number
of transactions or a particular minimum value or volume of sales, and that there is no requirement to
provide evidence on possible adjustments, since the relevant information is not available to applicants.
In Guatemala's view, Articles 2.1 (defining dumping), 2.4 (requirement of a fair comparison), and 5.8
(rejection of application and termination of investigation for lack of sufficient evidence) are not
applicable to the decision to initiate. Guatemala asserts that it complied with Articles 5.1, (written
application), 5.2 (requirement of evidence in application), and 5.3 (examination of accuracy and
adequacy of evidence in application to determine su fficiency to initiate), which in its view are the
only provisions of the AD Agreement which apply at the initiation stage.
8.35 In light of Guatemala's arguments, we need to examine the relationship between the
requirements of Article 5.3 regarding sufficiency of evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation and the substantive provisions in Article 2 regarding dumping. In this respect, we first
observe that, although there is no express reference to evidence of dumping in Article 5.3, evidence
on the three elements necessary for the imposition of an anti-dumping measure may be inferred into
Article 5.3 by way of Article 5.2. In other words, Article 5.2 requires that the application contain
sufficient evidence on dumping, injury and causation, while Article 5.3 requires the investigating
authority to satisfy itself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to determine that it is
sufficient to justify initiation. Thus, reading Ar ticle 5.3 in the context of Article 5.2, the evidence
mentioned in Article 5.3 must be evidence of dumping, injury and causation. We further observe that
the only clarification of the term "dumping" in the AD Agreement is that contained in Article 2. In
consequence, in order to determine that there is sufficient evidence of dumping, the investigating
authority cannot entirely disregard the elements that configure the existence of this practice as
outlined in Article 2. This analysis is done not with a view to making a determination that Article 2
has been violated through the initiation of an investigation, but rather to provide guidance in our
review of the Ministry's determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to warrant an
investigation. We do not of course mean to suggest that an investigating authority must have before it
at the time it initiates an investigation evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 of the
quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination. An anti-
dumping investigation is a process where certainty on the existence of all the elements necessary in
order to adopt a measure is reached gradually as the investigation moves forward. However, the
evidence must be such that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could determine that
there was sufficient evidence of dumping within th e meaning of Article 2 to justify initiation of an
investigation.
794
8.36 We note that Article 2.1 states that a product is to be considered as dumped "if the export
price . . . is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country." (emphasis added). Other provisions of Article 2
that further elaborate on this basic definition include Article 2.4, which sets forth certain principles
regarding the comparability of export prices and normal value. In particular, Article 2.4 specifies that
comparisons between the export price and the normal value shall be made at the same level of trade,

794 On this question we concur fully with the reasoning of the Guatemala - Cement I panel when they
state that:
"In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to "dumping" must be read as a reference to dumping
as it is defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in the
application must be of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or
final determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required
in a case such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that the normal value
and export price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair
comparison. At a minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require
such adjustments.
 " Guatemala - Cement I, WT/DS60/R, para. 7.64

and that due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in level of trade and quantity. Consistent with our discussion
above, we consider that, although these provisions of Article 2 do not "apply" as such to initiation
determinations, they are certainly relevant to an in vestigating authorities' consideration as to whether
sufficient evidence of dumping exists to justify the initiation of an investigation. 795
8.37 Turning to the case at hand, the evidence on normal value relied on by the Ministry for
initiation consisted of two invoices from Mexican retailers for one sack of cement each, while the
evidence of the export price consisted of two import certificates for 7,035 and 4,221 bags of cement.
In our opinion, the evidence on normal value and export prices presents obvious differences with
regards to the quantities for the involved transactions and the level of trade of the sales. It is clear on
the face of these documents that the invoices reflecting prices in Mexico are for sales occurring at the
very end of the commercialisation chain and the import certificates reflect prices at the point of
importation which is the beginning of the commercialisation chain for Mexican cement in Guatemala.
The existence of these stark differences in quantity and in level of trade, differences of the kind that
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement recognizes may aff ect price comparability, should have triggered at
a minimum some reflection on the part of the investigating authorities as to the possible non-
comparability of the sales in question.
8.38 Guatemala argues that there was no indication that the sales were at different levels of trade,
nor that any difference in the level of trade affected price comparability. Additionally, Guatemala
argues that Cruz Azul never presented any evidence to support its argument that the sales in the
domestic market and export market had been conducted at different levels of trade and affected price
comparability. In our view, however, the fact that the sales in the Mexican and Guatemalan markets
were at different levels of trade was apparent from the application itself, and an unbiased and
objective investigating authority should have recognized this fact without the need for it to be pointed
out. Nor do we consider that an investigating authority can completely ignore obvious differences
that could affect the comparability of the prices cited in an application on the ground that the foreign
exporter has not demonstrated that they have affected price comparability. Moreover, at the point
where the investigating authority is considering wh ether there is sufficient evidence to initiate an
investigation, potentially affected exporters have not even been notified of the existence of an
application, much less been provided a copy thereof. Thus, the logical implication of Guatemala's
argument is that an investigating authority need ne ver take into account issues of price comparability
when considering whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to initiate an investigation. We
cannot agree with such an interpretation of the AD Agr eement, particularly in light of the criteria set
out in para. 8.36 above.
8.39 After a thorough review of all the actions by the Ministry leading up to the initiation of the
investigation, we find that no attempt was made to take into account glaring differences in the levels
of trade and sales quantities and their possible effects on price comparability. Under these
circumstances, an unbiased and objective inves tigating authority could not in our view have
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation.
8.40 We would like to emphasize that we do not expect investigating authorities at the initiation
phase to ferret out all possible differences that might affect the comparability of prices in an

795 We understand Guatemala to agree to our appro ach concerning the relationship between Article 2
and Article 5.3. At para. 136 of its first written submission, Guatemala asserted that it is "not suggesting that
Articles 2 and 3 are totally irrelevant during the initiation phase. Articles 2 and 3 contain definitions which give
meaning to the expressions 'dumping', 'injury' and 'causal link' used in Article 5.2. When the authorities
examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted in the application, those definitions help to
establish whether there is 'sufficient evidence' in the meaning of Article 5.3 to justify the initiation of the
investigation."

application and perform or request complex adjustments to them. We do however expect that, when
from the face of an application it is obvious that there are substantial questions of comparability
between the export and home market prices being compared, the investigating authority will at least
acknowledge that differences in the prices generate questions with regards to their comparability, and
either give some consideration as to the impact of those differences on the sufficiency of the evidence
of dumping or seek such further information as might be necessary to do so.
(b) Threat of material injury
8.41 We recall that the Ministry initiated its investigation into imports of cement from Mexico on
the basis of an alleged threat of material injury to the domestic industry.
8.42 Mexico argues that the Ministry did not have sufficient evidence of threat of material injury to
justify the initiation of an investigation. Mexico asserts that, in order to initiate an anti-dumping
investigation on the basis of a threat of injury, the existence of threat of injury must be demonstrated
on the basis of adequate evidence, and not merely on the basis of allegation, conjecture, or remote
possibility. In Mexico's view, this requires an appl icant alleging threat of injury to provide, at a
minimum, evidence with respect to the factors concerning threat of injury set forth in Article 3.7.
Mexico asserts that neither Cementos Progreso's original application, nor its supplementary
application, contained evidence on any of these factors. Mexico argues that the only evidence on
threat of injury was the two import certificates supplied by the domestic producer, which in its view is
entirely insufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
8.43 Mexico asserts that Guatemala admits that the Ministry "did not need complete information to
know that imports were rapidly increasing",
796 and argues that the Ministry just inferred that Mexican
cement producers had excess capacity on the basis of its "knowledge" that Mexico was undergoing a
"horrendous recession". Mexico adds that incomplete information and mere knowledge do not
constitute evidence, and may not be taken into consideration to arrive at a finding of sufficient
evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.
8.44 Guatemala argues that the allegation of threat of injury was substantiated by adequate
evidence. In Guatemala's view, Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement does not apply to an investigating
authority's determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation. Guatemala argues that Article 5.2(iv) of the Agreement requires that an application
contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the evolution of the volume of
imports, their effect on prices of the like product in the domestic market, and the consequent impact
on the domestic industry, and refers to Articles 3.2 and 3.4 (which address the factors concerning the
evaluation of the volume of imports, their effects on prices, and their impact on the domestic
industry), but does not refer to the threat of injury factors set forth in Article 3.7. Guatemala also
argues that information on the volume of imports is not available to private parties in Guatemala, and
that its authorities were not obliged to obtain information on the volume of imports from the
Directorate of Customs prior to initiation.
8.45 In order to review the Ministry's determination that there was sufficient evidence of threat of
injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, we must first consider the relationship between
Article 5.3 and Article 3. We recall our earlier analysis of the relationship between Article 5.3 and
Article 2, and consider that an identical approa ch should be taken to the relationship between
Article 5.3 and Article 3.
797 Thus, when considering whether there is sufficient evidence of threat of
injury to justify the initiation of an investigatio n, an investigating authority cannot totally disregard

796 Guatemala first submission para. 174.
797 See para. 8.35 above.

the elements that configure the existence of threat of injury outlined in Article 3. 798 We do not mean
to suggest that an investigating authority must have before it at the time it initiates an investigation
evidence of threat of material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the quantity and quality that
would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination of threat of injury. However, the
investigating authority must have before it eviden ce of threat of material injury, as defined in
Article 3, sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
8.46 Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement provides that a determination of injury, which is defined in
footnote 9 of the AD Agreement to include threat of material injury, "shall be based on positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the
effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products." In addition, Article 3.7
contains a number of factors specifically concerning threat of injury. We shall examine to what
extent, if any, the Ministry examined these Ar ticle 3 factors when determining that there was
sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.
8.47 Regarding the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement
provides that an investigating authority shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in
dumped imports, either in absolute terms "or relative to production or consumption in the importing
Member". Guatemala asserts in its submissions before us that there was a "massive" increase in the
volume of imports of cement prior to initiation. However, Guatemala has failed to demonstrate that
there was any evidence on the volume of imports in th e Ministry's file at the time of initiation other
than two import certificates for 7,035 and 4,221 bags of cement respectively. Both these importations
appear to have taken place on the same day, 15 August 1995, at the same (Tecún Umán) customs
post.
799 Other than these two import certificates, Cementos Progreso's application referred only to
unsubstantiated "suspicions" that Mexican cement imports may be entering Guatemalan territory
through other customs posts. 800 We fail to see how the data contained in the two aforementioned
import certificates, combined with Cementos Progreso's unsubstantiated "suspicions", could properly
support a finding by an objective and impartial investigating authority that there was sufficient
evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.
8.48 In support of its argument that the imports referred to in the above-mentioned import
certificates represented a "massive" increase in the volume of imports, Guatemala argues that since
there were no imports into Guatemala of Mexican cement prior to 1995, any increase in imports from
a level of zero would be qualified as "massive". However, there is nothing in Cementos Progreso's
application, or in the report to the Director of Economic Integration recommending initiation,
801 or in
the Ministry's resolution initiating the investigati on, to suggest that at the time of initiation the
Ministry had any information regarding the volume of imports of cement from Mexico prior to or
after 15 August 1995. Thus, we fail to see how the Ministry could have compared the volume of
imports on 15 August 1995 with the allegedly zero volume of imports prior to 1995. In these
circumstances, we consider Guatemala's argument that any increase in imports from a level of zero
would be "massive" to constitute ex post rationalization. Such ex post rationalization is irrelevant for

798 We recall that, at para. 136 of its first written submission, Guatemala asserted that it is "not
suggesting that Articles 2 and 3 are totally irrelevant during the initiation phase. Articles 2 and 3 contain
definitions which give meaning to the expressions 'dumping', 'injury' and 'causal link' used in Article 5.2. When
the authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted in the application, those
definitions help to establish whether there is 'sufficient evidence' in the meaning of Article 5.3 to justify the
initiation of the investigation."
799 Both import certificates were stamped on 15 August 1995. However, the certificate concerning
7,035 sacks of cement also contained a reference to 14 August 1995. We are proceeding on the basis of the date
on which the import certificates were stamped by the Guatemalan authorities.
800 Cementos Progreso's application, Annex Mexico-2, pg.4.
801 Annex Mexico-4

the purpose of determining whether, at the time of initiation, the Ministry acted consistent with
Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement.
8.49 Given our findings concerning the Ministry's consideration of the volume of imports in
absolute terms, we shall now consider to what extent, if any, the Ministry considered the volume of
imports relative to production or consumption in Guatemala. There is no evidence before us to
suggest that, at the time of initiation, the Ministry had any evidence that imports had increased
relative to domestic consumption. Indeed, there is no evidence before us to suggest that, at the time of
initiation, the Ministry had any information concerning domestic consumption per se. Nor is there
any evidence before us to suggest that, at the time of initiation, the Ministry considered the volume of
imports relative to domestic production of cement. Even if the Ministry had considered this at the
time of initiation, the only weighing of imports against domestic production that could have been
inferred from the evidence before the Ministry at the time of initiation derives from the statement in
Cementos Progreso's application that the industry was working at full capacity, and that capacity was
1.6 million metric tonnes. Based on this statement, and assuming that capacity utilization was the
same for the whole of 1995 and that production equalled capacity, the Ministry could at most have
concluded that the evidenced Mexican imports represented only 11 per cent of domestic production
for one day, or 0,03 per cent of domestic production for one year.
802 Thus, even if the Ministry had
considered this matter, the available evidence was hardly indicative of a "massive" increase in the
volume imports relative to domestic production of Guatemalan cement.
8.50 Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement provides that, with regard to the effect of dumped imports
on prices, the investigating authority shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the relevant imports, or whether the relevant imports have depressed domestic prices
to a significant degree, or prevented price increases that would otherwise have occurred. There is no
evidence before us to suggest that, at the time of initiation, the Ministry considered any of these
elements concerning the effect of the relevant im ports on Guatemalan cement prices. Even if the
Ministry had considered possible price undercutting, for example, the only prices available to the
Ministry were not comparable since they concerned transactions taking place at different levels of
trade. In this regard, the Ministry could have determined the price of imports of cement from Mexico
on the basis of the wholesale price reported in the two import certificates. The Ministry could have
determined the price of cement produced in Guatemala on the basis of the price cited in the report
recommending initiation
803 (i.e., Quetzals ("Q") 26.00). This price is presumably a retail price, given
its similarity to the retail prices reported in the application for the Guatemalan product ( i.e., Q 24 in
Guatemala City and Q 32 in the Department of El Petén). Thus, even if the Ministry had considered
whether there was significant price undercutting, it only had access to prices reported for different
levels of trade.
8.51 Similarly, there is no evidence before us to suggest that, at the time of initiation, the Ministry
considered all of the factors concerning the effect of dumped imports on the domestic industry
enumerated in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.
804 It would appear that, once again, the Ministry
relied solely on the limited information provided in the application. While the application contains
statements which may be relevant to some of the factors enumerated in Article 3.4 (such as

802 These calculations were also performed by the Guatemala – Cement I panel, which also found:
"There is simply no discernible basis that was before the Ministry at the time of its initiation determination on
which the volume of imports could properly have been characterized as 'massive'". Guatemala – Cement I,
WT/DS60/R, para. 7.72.
803 Recommendation presented to the Director of Economic Integration on 17 November 1995, Annex
Mexico-4
804 Article 3.4 identifies the following factors: actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output,
market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices;
the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments.

"employment" and "investments" for example), it contains no quantifiable information except for
some data on the expansion plan and the number of workers to be laid off in case of a shut down of
the Guatemalan cement industry. 805 We consider that statements and assertions unsubstantiated by
any evidence do not constitute sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an
investigation.
8.52 We also note that in this case the Guatemalan domestic industry claimed that there was a
threat of material injury caused by the allegedly dumped imports. Article 3.7 provides specific
guidance on the factors to be considered by an in vestigating authority when making a determination
of threat of injury. Although we do not necessarily believe that an investigating authority must have
before it information on all Article 3.7 factors in a case where initiation of an investigation is
requested on the basis of an alleged threat of injury, a consideration of those factors is certainly
pertinent to an evaluation of whether there was sufficient evidence of threat of material injury to
justify the initiation of an investigation. There is no evidence before us to suggest that, at the time of
initiation, the Ministry had information concerning any of the four factors listed in Article 3.7. In
particular, no such information was contained in the application, or in the aforementioned report to the
Director of Economic Integration recommending initiation, or in the Ministry's resolution initiating
the investigation. The Panel fails to see how an unbiased and objective investigating authority could
properly have found that there was sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an
investigation when no information concerning any of the factors listed in 3.7 was examined.
8.53 Additionally, Guatemala makes some general arguments concerning the evidence required in
an application that the Panel wishes to address. In its submissions, Guatemala seeks to characterize
Mexico's arguments with respect to the evidence in the application as being that Article 5.2 requires
that such evidence be supported by "documentary proof". In our view, however, Mexico is in fact
arguing that statements of conclusion unsubstantiated by facts cannot satisfy the requirement of
Article 5.3. We agree with Mexico that statements of conclusion unsubstantiated by facts do not
constitute evidence of the type required by Article 5.2, and which allows an objective examination of
its adequacy and accuracy by an investigating authority as provided in Article 5.3.
806

805 This was also noted by the Guatemala - Cement I panel in Para. 7.74.
806 Another argument by Guatemala was that there were certain facts that, even when there was no
evidence on them in the application, were "known" to the investigating authority. This same argument was also
made before the panel in Guatemala-Cement I, the Panel finds that in their comments contained footnote 242 of
the report the Guatemala – Cement I panel provides useful guidance on this issue:
"We note that Guatemala asserted that the Ministry "knew" certain information, such as
transport costs in Guatemala, information concerning Cementos Progreso and the market for
cement in Guatemala, that Mexico was going through a severe recession, particularly in the
construction sector, etc., and that such knowledg e was brought to bear on its evaluation of the
information in the application and together with that information constituted sufficient
evidence to justify initiation. Thus, for instance, Guatemala asserted before the Panel that
there was sufficient information to establish a presumption that there was excess capacity in
Mexico, and a decline in demand for cement in Mexico, which caused Cruz Azul to start
exporting to Guatemala in 1995, and indicated that exports would increase. While such facts
may have been known to the Ministry, there is no reference to them in the application, in the
evaluation prepared by the two advisors, or in the resolution itself. Indeed, there is no
reference whatsoever to excess capacity in Mexico, or to a likelihood that imports would
increase, in the resolution or the underlying r ecommendation. Thus, we cannot consider such
facts in evaluating whether the Ministry properly concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to justify initiation in this case."
According to the standard of review the Panel is to evaluate the considerations of the investigating
authority at the time it made its decision on the basis of its determinations and the evidence before it. It is not
appropriate for the Panel to take into consideration these facts that were allegedly "known" by the Ministry as it
is impossible to evaluate what role they played in their decision to initiate, since there is no mention of them in
any of the documentation preceding and supporting the initiation.

8.54 Based on all the considerations detailed above, the Panel is of the view that an objective and
unbiased investigating authority could not have properly determined that there was sufficient evidence
of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.
(c) Causation
8.55 Finally, Mexico argues that the Ministry did not have sufficient evidence of a causal link
between the alleged dumping and the alleged threat of injury to justify the initiation of the
investigation. In Mexico's view, since the application did not contain adequate evidence of dumping
or threat of injury, it follows that it did not demonstrate a causal link. Moreover, Mexico asserts that
the application and supplement did not contain any argument regarding the existence of a causal link.
Thus, Mexico maintains that the Guatemalan authorities did not have any evidence or arguments on
this aspect when the investigation was initiated.
8.56 Guatemala asserts that there was adequate evidence to support the claim of the existence of a
causal link. In Guatemala's view, Article 5.2 requires only evidence of the factors listed in
subparagraphs (iii) and (iv), that is, such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on
prices for the calculation of normal value and export price, and on the evolution of the volume of
imports, their effect on prices of the like product in the domestic market, and the consequent impact
on the domestic industry. It does not refer to Article 3.5, which Guatemala argues related to the
evidence of a causal link required for a preliminary or final determination.
8.57 We are of the view that, having determined that the Ministry did not have sufficient evidence
of dumping and injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, it follows logically that there was
also insufficient evidence of the causal link between the two to justify initiation.
(d) Conclusion
8.58 For the reasons set forth above, we find that the Ministry violated Article 5.3 of the AD
Agreement by determining that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, threat of injury, and causal
link, to justify the initiation of an investigation.
2. Sufficiency of the application – Article 5.2
8.59 In light of our finding that the Ministry's determination that it had sufficient evidence to
justify the initiation of an investigation was inconsistent with Article 5.3, we do not consider it
necessary to rule on Mexico's Article 5.2 claims regarding the sufficiency of Cementos Progreso's
application.
8.60 We would note, however, that for the purposes of our analysis of claims under Article 5.3, we
assumed that information in the application was, in fact, all that was reasonably available to the
applicant. We would like to make clear that this assumption has been made purely for the purpose of
analysis, and we are not at all convinced that the information presented in the application was all that
was reasonably available to the applicant, especially with regard to evidence of threat of injury.
8.61 Article 5.2(iv) of the AD Agreement provides that an application "shall contain such
information as is reasonably available to the applicant on … the effect of the allegedly dumped
imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market, and the consequent impact of allegedly
dumped imports on the domestic industry". Such in formation would normally be in the hands of the
domestic industry filing an application for anti-dumping relief. This is even more likely to be the case
when the company bringing the application is the sole producer of the domestic product, as in this
investigation. Of the specific elements for which information is required in Article 5.2(iv), Cementos
Progresos's application contained little evidence on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly
dumped imports. It might have been reasonable for the investigating authority not to expect the

applicant to provide information on the evolution of the volume of the imports, as a private company
might not have easy access to the import statistics kept by the national customs authority. However,
regarding the other factors in Article 5.2(iv), concerning information on the effect of the allegedly
dumped imports on prices of the domestic like product in the domestic market and consequent impact
of the imports on the domestic industry, Cementos Progreso merely makes some allegations. These
allegations are not supported by evidence, and in most cases are not quantified. Given that this
information should be readily available to the sole domestic producer composing the domestic
industry producing cement in Guatemala, this information should have been included in the
application.
8.62 It is evident to us that the Guatemalan aut horities relied on the same evidence that was
presented in the application for purposes of the initiation. We have expressed the view that Articles
5.2 and 5.3 contain different obligations. One of the consequences of this difference in obligations is
that investigating authorities need not content th emselves with the information provided in the
application but may gather information on their own in order to meet the standard of sufficient
evidence for initiation in Article 5.3. On this issu e we are in full agreement with the reasoning and
findings expressed in by the Guatemala-Cement I panel which made the following comments:
"7.53 We have concluded that the question whether there is "sufficient evidence" to
justify initiation is not answered by a determination that the application contains all
the information "reasonably available" to the applicant on the factors specified in
Article 5.2 (i) - (iv). This does not, however, mean that investigations may not be
initiated in cases where "sufficient evidence" is not "reasonably available" to the
applicant. In particular, there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent an investigating
authority from seeking evidence and information on its own, that would allow any
gaps in the evidence set forth in the application to be filled. We do not suggest that
such action by the investigating authority is in any case required by the ADP
Agreement. However, if, as in this case, an authority chooses to refrain from such
action, the “reasonably available” language in Article 5.2 does not permit the
initiation of an investigation based on evidence and information which, while all that
is "reasonably available" to the applicant is not, objectively judged, sufficient to
justify initiation. Indeed, in this case the applicant requested that the Ministry obtain
certain information on import volumes which it was unable to obtain itself. This the
Ministry did not do, however, until after it had initiated the investigation based on
the information in the application."
807
3. Simultaneous examination of the evidence and failure to reject the application
(a) Claim under Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement
8.63 Mexico claims that Guatemala violated Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement because, prior to
initiation, the Ministry failed to examine the evidence on dumping and injury simultaneously.
8.64 Guatemala argues that Mexico has not discharged its burden of proof as a complainant that
there was any violation of Article 5.7. Moreover, Guatemala asserts that the Ministry reviewed the
available evidence for both dumping and injury.
8.65 Article 5.7 reads:
"5.7 The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously
(a) in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, and (b) thereafter,
during the course of the investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date

807 Guatemala – Cement I, WT/DS60/R, para. 7.53.

on which in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement provisional measures
may be applied. "
8.66 We understand Mexico to argue that, because the application contained no evidence on injury
and inadequate evidence of dumping, there was no evidence of dumping and injury that could be
examined simultaneously by the Ministry at the time of initiation. In other words, we understand
Mexico to argue that the initiation of an investigati on in the absence of sufficient evidence to justify
initiation (contrary to Article 5.3) necessarily constitutes a violation of Article 5.7.
8.67 We do not share the interpretation of Article 5.7 implied in Mexico's argument. We are of the
view that Article 5.7 requires the investigating authority to examine the evidence before it on
dumping and injury simultaneously, rather than sequentially. We do not consider that the fulfilment
of this requirement is conditioned in any way on the substantive nature of that evidence.
8.68 As a result of the nature of its argument, Mexico has not demonstrated that in fact the
Ministry failed to examine the evidence on dumping and injury before it simultaneously. We
therefore reject Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated Article 5.7 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Claim under Article 5.8
8.69 Mexico also claims that Guatemala violated Article 5.8 by not rejecting the application made
by Cementos Progreso and by not refraining from initiating the investigation due to the lack of
sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of injury to justify initiation.
8.70 Guatemala argues that Mexico had failed to meet its burden to prove that there was a
violation. Guatemala also argues that Article 5.8 only applies after the initiation of an investigation
and that according to the applicable standard of review the Panel could not conclude that the
investigation was initiated without sufficient evidence. In support of this argument Guatemala
referred to the findings in the Mexico-HFCS report at para. 7.99.
8.71 The first question that we need to address on this issue regards the applicability of Article 5.8
before the initiation of an investigation. This Article provides in pertinent part:
"5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall
be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is
not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the
case."
8.72 We note that Article 5.8 makes specific reference to the rejection of an application as soon as
the authorities conclude that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping or injury to justify proceeding
with the case. This language on rejection of an application seems to be in contrast with Guatemala's
argument that Article 5.8 applies only after initiation. We are of the view that, if the drafters intended
that Article 5.8 apply only after initiation, the refe rence to promptly terminating an investigation
would have sufficed. By referring to the rejection of an application Article 5.8 addresses the situation
where an application has been received but an investigation has not yet been initiated. That the text of
Article 5.8 continues after the quoted section to describe situations in which an initiated investigation
should be terminated, does not support Guatemala's argument that the whole of Article 5.8 applies
only after the investigation has been initiated. On the contrary, the second sentence of Article 5.8, by
specifying that "there shall be immediate terminat ion in cases" confirms that the first sentence of
Article 5.8 expressly contemplates its application pre-initiation by including a reference to the
rejection of an application. Otherwise, mere reference to the termination of an investigation, as in the
second sentence of Article 5.8, would have been all that was needed in the first sentence to make it
clear that it applied once an investigation was underway.

8.73 In our view, the findings in Mexico-HFCS on this issue do not support the interpretation that
Article 5.8 applies only after an investigation has been initiated. Paragraph 7.99 of the panel report in
Mexico-HFCS, cited by Guatemala as supporting its views, reads:
"In our view, Article 5.8 does not impose additional substantive obligations beyond
those in Article 5.3 on the authority in connection with the initiation of an
investigation. That is, if there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation under
Article 5.3, there is no violation of Article 5.8 in not rejecting the application.
Having determined that the initiation of the investigation was not inconsistent with
the requirements of Article 5.3, we further conclude that there was no violation of
Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement."
808
8.74 The panel in Mexico-HFCS determined that there had not been a violation of Article 5.3 as
there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation. After having made that determination the Mexico–
HFCS panel proceeded to find that given that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation under
Article 5.3, there was no possible violation of Article 5.8. This in no way detracts from our position
that Article 5.8 applies pre-initiation. The Panel in Mexico - HFCS would not have even considered
the question of whether rejection of the application was warranted if it had not considered that
Article 5.8 applies before initiation.
8.75 Having concluded that Article 5.8 applies prior to initiation, we find that the Guatemalan
investigating authorities acted inconsistently with their obligations under Article 5.8 in failing to
reject the application in this case. The Panel is of the view that under the applicable standard of
review no objective and unbiased investigating authority would have found that there was sufficient
evidence to initiate and, in consequence, the Gu atemalan authorities should have rejected the
application.
4. Notification under Article 5.5
8.76 Mexico argues that Guatemala did not notify the Government of Mexico before proceeding to
initiate the investigation, despite being obliged to do so under Article 5.5 of the Agreement, and that
the official notification to the Government of Mexico occurred only on 22 January 1996, 11 days after
the publication of the notice of initiation of the investigation on 11 January 1996.
8.77 Mexico asserts that Guatemala acknowledged its failure to notify the Government of Mexico
prior to initiating, citing a communication from the Ministry to the Mexican Government, which
states:
"We sincerely regret that your country was not notified before the publication of the
resolution for the initiation of the investigation, and we offer our sincere apologies in
that regard. This was due to a slip on the part of the persons responsible for effecting
the notification, as they were not familiar with the provisions applicable to anti-
dumping investigation procedures. Once again, please accept our apologies."
809
8.78 Thus, Mexico claims that Guatemala clearly failed to comply with the requirements of the AD
Agreement under Article 5.5, and has admitted doing so prior to this dispute settlement proceeding.
8.79 Guatemala argues that the effective date of initiation of the investigation was not
11 January 1996 as Mexico alleged. Guatemala argues that according to its own Constitution and
legislation the Ministry could not have initiated the investigation until the Government of Mexico had

809 Annex Mexico-21

been officially notified. Guatemala also asserts in its defence that Mexico acknowledges in its
response to the questionnaire that the investigation was not initiated until 22 January 1996.810
8.80 Guatemala does not disagree that it was required by the AD Agreement to notify the
Government of Mexico before proceeding with the initiation of an investigation, or the timing of the
notification. Guatemala's arguments relate to the timing of the initiation of the investigation. Thus,
the first question for the Panel to resolve is, what was the actual date of initiation in this case?
8.81 Article 5.5 provides:
"5.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an
investigation, any publicizing of the applica tion for the initiation of an investigation.
However, after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to
initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting
Member concerned."
8.82 In our view, footnote 1 to the AD Agreement is useful in clarifying what is meant by the term
"initiated". Footnote 1 defines the term "initiated" as follows:
"The term "initiated" as used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which
a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 5".
Thus, the date of initiation is the date of the procedural action by which Guatemala formally
commenced the investigation. We are of the view that in the case before us the action by which the
investigation was formally commenced is the date of publication of the notice of initiation which
occurred on 11 January 1996. In this respect, we note that the 15 December 1995 decision of the
Director for Economic Integration underlying the Ministry's resolution to initiate the investigation
specifically states in paragraph 5 that: "The date of the initiation of the investigation shall be
considered to be the date on which such notice is published in the Official Journal".
811 Subsequently
the Ministry's 9 January 1996 resolution set forth its decision to "give public notice of said initiation,
which shall take effect as from the day on which the notice is published in the official journal".
Furthermore, deadlines for interested parties to respond to the initiation were activated on 11 January
1996 the investigation started running as of the publication of the notice, as the notice published on
that date invited interested parties to state their legal interest in the matter within 30 days of the date
of publication of that notice, and to submit any supplementary arguments and evidence within that
same period.
8.83 The argument that Guatemala could not have initiated the investigation until after it had
notified Mexico, pursuant to provisions of its own Constitution and laws, does not affect our
conclusion in this regard. In acceding to the WTO, Guatemala undertook to be bound by the rules
contained in the AD Agreement, and our mandate is to review Guatemala's compliance with those
rules. The fact that the Constitution of Guatemala mandates that the investigating authorities proceed
in a way which is consistent with its international obligations, does not validate the actions actually
carried out by those authorities if those actions violate Guatemala's commitments under the WTO.
Whether Mexico chose not to pursue its rights under Guatemalan law is of no concern to us, as this
would not affect its rights under the WTO Agreements. Guatemala also mentions that in some cases
Mexico has failed to notify the government of th e investigated exporters in a timely fashion under

810 Guatemala also argued that, assuming arguendo that it did not notify Mexico before the initiation
date of 11 January 1996, this delay in notification did not affect the course of the investigation. Guatemala
posits that (a) the alleged delay in notification was not harmful to Mexico (principle of "harmless error"), (b)
that Mexico "convalidated" the alleged delay by not objecting immediately after its occurrence, and (c) the
alleged delay in notification did not cause nullification or impairment.
811 Annex Mexico-5

Article 5.5. We are of the view that Mexico's actions regarding notifications is of no relevance to
issues before us in this case, which requires us to review the actions of the Guatemalan authorities.812
5. Public notice of initiation Claims under Articles 12.1 and 12.1.1
(a) Claims under Article 12.1
8.84 Mexico claims that Guatemala violated Art. 12.1 by (i) not satisfying itself as to the
sufficiency of the evidence before giving notice of the initiation and (ii) not publishing the notice of
initiation and notifying Mexico and Cruz Azul when it considered that it was satisfied that there was
sufficient evidence for initiation, an event which Mexico argues occurred as early as 15 December
1995. Mexico argued that notice should have been given immediately after 15 December 1995, the
date of the report from the Economic Integration Directorate to the Minister containing the
recommendation to initiate an investigation, as this constituted the moment when Guatemala had
satisfied itself of the sufficiency of the evidence. The public notice of the initiation of the
investigation was made on 11 January 1996, following the Minister's decision of 9 January 1996 to
initiate.
8.85 Guatemala asserts that the competent authority to decide on the initiation was the Ministry
and not the Economic Integration Directorate. The 15 December report issued by the Directorate
could have been rejected by the Ministry. Also Guatemala asserts that Art 12.1 does not mandate an
immediate notification and that it specifies no time periods for the notification to occur but for the
mention of "when" the authorities are satisfied.
8.86 We first address Mexico's claim that Guatemala breached Article 12.1 of the AD Agreement
by failing to publish a notice of initiation and notify Mexico and Cruz Azul when it was satisfied that
there was sufficient evidence of to justify initia tion of an investigation. Article 12.1 provides as
follows:
"12.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify
the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be
notified and a public notice shall be given.
8.87 In our view, this provision can most reasonably be read to require notification and public
notice once a Member has decided to initiate an investigation. This interpretation is confirmed by the
fact that the public notice to be provided is a "notice of initiation of an investigation". We can
conceive of no logical reason why the AD Agreement would require a Member to publish a notice of
the initiation of an investigation before the decision had been taken that such an investigation should
be initiated.
8.88 We accept that, the report from the Directorate does not constitute the act by which the
Government of Guatemala decided to initiate an inve stigation. In this respect, we note that the
Minister had the discretion not to act as recommended in the Directorate's report. Thus, the
Government of Guatemala cannot be considered to have decided to initiate an investigation until the
Minister has acted on the Directorate's recommendation.
813 Accordingly, the Panel rejects Mexico's

812 As for Guatemala's defences claiming acquiescence and estoppel, harmless error or lack of
nullification or impairment of a benefit, these issues are addressed in sections VIII.B.5 and VIII.C.7.
813 Guatemala specifically asserts in its first submission that "the "authorities" in charge of the
investigation were the Ministry, not the Directorate of Economic Integration … [t]his is a subordinate
directorate and therefore the Ministry could have rejected its report of 15 December".

claim of a violation of Article 12.1 regarding the timing of the notification and public notice of the
initiation of an investigation.
8.89 The Panel now turns to Mexico's claim that Guatemala did not satisfy itself as to the
sufficiency of the evidence before giving notice of the initiation. Given the function and context of
Article 12.1 in the AD Agreement, we interpret this provision as imposing a procedural obligation on
the investigating agency to publish a notice and notify interested parties after it has taken a decision
that there is sufficient evidence to proceed with an initiation. The Panel is of the view that
Article 12.1 is not concerned with the substance of the decision to initiate an investigation, which is
dealt with in Article 5.3. By issuing a public notice of initiation in the case before us, the Guatemalan
authorities complied with their procedural obligation under Article 12.1 to notify known interested
parties and publish a public notice after they had decided to initiate an investigation. Whether or not
Guatemala was justified in initiating an investigation on the basis of the evidence before it is an issue
governed by Article 5.3. Therefore the Panel re jects Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated
Article 12.1 in failing to satisfy itself as to the sufficiency of the evidence before it.
(b) Claim under Article 12.1.1
8.90 Mexico claims that Guatemala's notice of initiation did not meet the standard of "adequate
information" because it did not contain adequate information on the basis on which dumping was
alleged in the application nor adequate information summarizing the factors on which the allegation
of injury, in this case threat of material injury, was based, as required by Article 12.1.1
8.91 Guatemala responds that the public notice as supplemented by the report of the Directorate of
Economic Integration of 17 November 1995 is adequate to fulfill the requirements of Article 12.1.1.
Since the file was open to the public Guatemala considered that the report from the Economic
Integration Directorate was available to Mexico and contained the relevant information to comply
with Article 12.1.1.
814
8.92 Article 12.1.1 provides:
12.1.1 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, adequate information on the following:
(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the
product involved;
(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;
(iii) the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application;
(iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is
based;
(v) the address to which representations by interested parties
should be directed;
(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their
views known."

814 Moreover, Guatemala also asserted that any alleged deficiency in the public notice was a harmless
error, was acquiesced to by Mexico and therefore it is estopped to bring this claim, and did not cause Mexico
any nullification or impairment of its rights under the AD Agreement.

8.93 As a threshold matter, we must first consider whether the public notice in and of itself
complies with the requirements in 12.1.1. In order to do this it is necessary for the Panel to verify
whether all the elements listed in Article 12.1.1 have been included in the public notice. On the first
of the factors listed in Article 12.1.1, the notice contains information on the country and the product
involved. On the second factor, arguably it could be considered that the date of initiation is the date
of the public notice,
815 thus also providing the date for the initiation. Moving on to the third factor,
regarding whether the public notice contains the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application,
the Panel observes that in section 3 of the initiation notice Guatemala refers to the legal basis for the
investigation. However, there is nothing on the factual basis of dumping alleged in the application.
The Panel thus finds that the information provided in the public notice is not adequate to fulfill the
requirement contained in Article 12.1.1(iii).
8.94 Guatemala argues that whatever the insufficiencies of the public notice itself a separate report
was provided which satisfies the requirements of Article 12.1.1. Guatemala asserts that the 17
November 1995 technical report of the Directorate recommending the initiation of the investigation
constitutes the "separate report" which makes available the information required by Article 12.1.1.
8.95 The issue before us then is whether the public notice of initiation by Guatemala "makes
available" through a separate report the information required in Article 12.1.1. There is no reference
to a separate report in the public notice of initiation. Under Article 12.1.1, it is the "public notice",
and not the Member, that must "make available through a separate report", certain information. We
take this to mean that the public notice must at a minimum refer to a separate report. This conclusion
is logical in that the separate report is a substitute for certain elements of the public notice and thus
should perform a notice function comparable to that of the public notice itself. If there were no
reference to a separate report in the public noti ce, how would the public and the interested parties
concerned become aware of its existence? If the public and interested parties do not know of the
existence of the report, how can it be considered that the required information was properly made
available to them?
8.96 Our view on this issue is confirmed by Footnote 23 of the AD Agreement, which provides:
"23 Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of
this Article in a separate report, they shall ensure that such report is readily available
to the public."
It cannot be said that the separate report was "readily available" to the public, if the public is not
informed about where, when and how to have access to this report, leave alone if they were not even
publicly informed of its existence. In conclusion, the Panel is of the view that Guatemala's public
notice of initiation fails to meet the requirements under Article 12.1.1 by not providing adequate
information on the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application, or otherwise making this
information available in a separate report.
816
6. Failure to provide the full text of the application in a timely manner
8.97 Mexico claims that Guatemala failed to provide the full text of the application to either the
Mexican producer, or the Government of Mexico "in good time, i.e. as soon as the investigation had
been initiated" in violation of Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement. Mexico does not state precisely when,
if ever, the full text of the application was provided to the Mexican producer, Cruz Azul, and the
Government of Mexico.

815 The Panel recalls its findings on the claim brought by Mexico under Article 5.5, para. 8.82.
816 As for Guatemala's defences claiming acquiescence and estoppel, harmless error or lack of
nullification or impairment of a benefit, these issues are addressed in sections VIII.B.5 and VIII.C.7.

8.98 Guatemala asserts that Mexico is mistaken as to the facts. It contends that the Ministry sent
the full text of the application, together with th e notice of initiation of the investigation, to the
Government of Mexico on 22 January 1996. Guatemala further asserts that the full text of the
application and the notice of initiation of the investigation were sent to Cruz Azul together with the
questionnaires, which Guatemala asserts were received on 29 January. Guatemala provides a copy of
the courier invoice dated 4 February 1996 for the posting of the documents to Cruz Azul in support of
its assertion.
817 In any event, Guatemala argues that it is clear that Cruz Azul received the application
and had sufficient opportunity to defend its interests during the course of the investigation, as
evidenced by the arguments it submitted to the Guatemalan authorities.818
8.99 Mexico responds that, even if Guatemala's assertion that it provided the full text of the
application to Cruz Azul on 29 January 1996 was correct, this would still be 18 days after the
initiation of the investigation. Moreover, as the courier invoice indicates Guatemala did not send the
documents until 4 February 1996, that is 24 days after initiation. Concerning the provision of the
application to the Government, Mexico argues that the letter which Guatemala submits as evidence
that Mexico received the application on 22 January 1996, does not state that the application was
annexed to the letter. In any case, Mexico argues, provision of the application would still have been
done 11 days after the initiation.
8.100 Article 6.1.3 provides:
"6.1.3 As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide
the full text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the
known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it
available, upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid
to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, as provided for in
paragraph 5."
8.101 We note that Article 6.1.3 does not specify the number of days within which the text of the
application shall be provided. What it does specify is that the text of the application be provided "as
soon as" the investigation has been initiated. In this regard, the term "as soon as" conveys a sense of
substantial urgency. In fact, the terms "immediately" and "as soon as" are considered to be
interchangeable.
819 We do not consider that providing the text of the application 24 or even 18 days
after the date of initiation fulfils the requirement of Article 6.1.3 that the text be provided "as soon as
an investigation has been initiated."
8.102 We further consider that the timeliness of the provision of the text of the application should
be evaluated in the context of its purpose and function. Timely access to the application is important
for the exporters to enable preparation of the ar guments in defence of their interests before the
investigating authorities. Moreover, once the inve stigation has been initiated the timetable of the
investigation commences and the timing for many events in the proceeding are counted from initiation
including the 12 or 18 months total for completion of the investigation provide for in Article 5.10.
Since deadlines in the timetable of the investigation are counted from the date of initiation it is critical
that the investigating authority provide the text of the application "as soon as an investigation has
been initiated", for the exporter to be able to devise a strategy to defend the allegations it is being
confronted with. Also, Article 7.3 of the AD Ag reement allows a Member to impose provisional
measures as early as sixty days after the date of initiation of an investigation. Access to the text of the

817 Annex Guatemala-20
818 Moreover, Guatemala also asserted that any alleged deficiency in the public notice was a harmless
error, was acquiesced to by Mexico and therefore it is estopped to bring this claim, and did not cause Mexico
any nullification or impairment of its rights under the AD Agreement.
819 "Immediately: Without delay, at once, instantly. B conj. at the moment that, as soon as. The New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1993.

application is crucial for the exporter to prepare its defence, and even more so if the authorities are
likely to consider applying a provisional measure which may come as early as 60 days after
initiation.820
8.103 With respect to the provision of the application to the Government of Mexico, Guatemala
asserts that it provided the application as an an nex to a letter addressed to the Mexican Embassy in
Guatemala dated 19 January 1996 821 and received 22 January 1996. Mexico in turn asserts that the
letter does not prove that the full text of the application was delivered on that date. The text of the
letter refers to the fact that an application for an anti-dumping action against cement from Mexico's
Cruz Azul has been received by the Ministry of Economy and mentions that the "copy of the pertinent
documentation has been annexed". In our view, this reference to the "pertinent documentation" most
likely means the application by Cementos Progreso. Mexico has not offered any evidence that would
lead us to conclude otherwise. We shall therefore conclude that Guatemala sent the full text of the
application on 19 January 1996 and that Mexico received it on 22 January 1996. That is 8 and 11
days respectively after initiation of the investigation.
8.104 Having determined that Guatemala sent the full text of the application at the earliest 8 days
after initiation of the investigation. We are of the view that given the nature of the obligation in
Article 6.1.3 sending the of the application even 8 days after the initiation of investigation is not
adequate to fulfill the requirement that it be done "as soon as an investigation has been initiated".
Thus, we find that Guatemala acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 6.1.3, to provide
the full text of the application to Mexico as soon as an investigation was initiated.
822
7. Lack of nullification or impairment
8.105 Guatemala maintains that even if the Panel finds violations in the notification under
Article 5.5, the insufficient public notice of initiatio n and the delay in providing the full text of the
application, any such violations did not nullify or impair benefits accruing to Mexico under the AD
Agreement.
8.106 Mexico responds that if a violation of an obligation has been found there is a presumption of
nullification or impairment and Guatemala has simply not provided evidence to rebut the presumption
that there was nullification or impairment of Mexico's rights under the WTO Agreements.
8.107 On the Article 5.5 notification, Guatemala argues that it did not take any steps to begin the
investigation until Mexico had been notified, and that it granted Cruz Azul a two-month extension to
reply to the questionnaire. Thus, a delay in notification under Article 5.5 did not prejudice Mexico's
ability to defend its interests nor affect in any other way Mexico's benefits under the Agreement.
8.108 Article 3.8 of the DSU provides guidance with respect to the issue of nullification or
impairment. It provides that:
"In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on other Member parties to that covered agreement, and

820 On a similar issue the Korea-Dairy Safeguards panel found that a 14 day delay on notification to the
WTO Safeguards Committee as required by Article 12.1 of the Safeguards Agreement did not satisfy the
requirement that the notification be provided "immediately" after initiation. See, Korea-Dairy safeguards, para.
7.134.
821 This letter was provided by Mexico as Annex Mexico-12.
822 As for Guatemala's defences claiming acquiescence and estoppel, harmless error or lack of
nullification or impairment of a benefit, these issues are addressed in sections VIII.B.5 and VIII.C.7.

in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been
brought to rebut the charge".
Thus, there is a presumption that a violation nullified or impaired a benefit accruing to the
complaining Member. Article 17 of the AD Agreement entitles a Member to relief when benefits
accruing to that Member under the AD Agreement are nullified or impaired." Article 3.8 of the DSU
also provides for the possibility that the Member found to have violated a provision may rebut the
presumption.
8.109 This is what Guatemala argues that it has rebutted this presumption. Specifically, Guatemala
argues that in the case of the Article 5.5 notification it did not initiate the investigation until after
Mexico had been notified and that it granted Cruz Azul an extension to respond to the questionnaire
and thus Mexico was not impaired in the defence of its interests. We have already found that the
initiation date was 11 January 1996 and thus notification under Article 5.5 was not provided until after
initiation.
823 There is no way to ascertain what Mexico might have done if it had received a timely
notification. The extension of time for response to the questionnaire granted to Cruz Azul has no
bearing on the fact that Mexico was not informed in time. Thus, we do not consider that Guatemala
has rebutted the presumption of nullification or impairment with respect to violations of Article 5.5.
8.110 Regarding the violations we have found of Article 6.1.3 and 12.1 we have found that there is
no specific argumentation from Guatemala as to how it rebutted the presumption of nullification or
impairment. Therefore, we conclude that Guatemala has not rebutted the presumption of nullification
or impairment in this case.
8.111 Guatemala argues that the Panel should examine Guatemala's acts and decide whether the
non-fulfilment of a procedural obligation should be overlooked on the grounds that the omission did
not prejudice the rights of Mexico or Cruz Azul. We could find no basis for such a distinction in the
DSU, as suggested by Guatemala between substantive and "mere" procedural violations. There is no
reason to regard violations of procedural obligations differently than obligation of a substantial nature.
Compliance with the complete set of procedural rules relating to anti-dumping investigations,
including those concerning notification and enhanced transparency, is required. This obligation to
comply with all provisions, both procedural and substantive should not be taken lightly if one is not to
devoid of all meaning the AD Agreement itself. As detailed in sections 4, 5(b) and 6 above we have
found that Guatemala violated Articles 5.5, 6.1.3 and 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement by failing to timely
notify Mexico of the decision to initiate an investigation, to timely provide Mexico and Cruz Azul a
copy of the application, and to publish an adequate notice of initiation. We consider that a key
function of the transparency requirements of the AD Agreement is to ensure that interested parties,
including Members, are able to take whatever steps they deem appropriate to defend their interests.
Where a required notification is not made in a timely fashion, or the application is not provided in
time, or the public notice is inadequate the ability of the interested party to take such steps is vitiated.
It is not for us to now speculate on what steps Mexico might have taken had it been timely notified or
provided with the application, or had the public notice been adequate, and how Guatemala might have
responded to those steps. Thus, while there is a possibility that the investigation would have
proceeded in the same manner had Guatemala complied with its transparency obligations, we cannot
state with certainty that the course of the investigation would not have been different.
824
8.112 Thus, the Panel rejects Guatemala's defence that, concerning the violations of Articles 5.5,
6.1.3 and 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement, it has rebutted the presumption of nullification or impairment
established in Article 3.8 of the DSU.

823 See, para. 8.82.
824 Our finding on this issue is consistent with the view expressed by the panel in Guatemala – Cement
I, WT/DS60/R, para. 7.42.

D. ALLEGED PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION
8.113 Mexico has raised a number of claims concerning alleged procedural violations committed by
the Ministry during the course of its investigation. We shall address each of these claims in turn.
1. The submission of evidence
8.114 Mexico has raised claims concerning (a) the alleged failure by the Ministry to set time-limits
for the submission of evidence, and (b) the Ministry's treatment of technical accounting evidence
submitted by Cruz Azul.
(a) Time-limits for the submission of arguments and evidence
8.115 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.1 by failing to set a time-limit for the
presentation of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation. Mexico asserts
that the Ministry fixed a time-limit for the submission of arguments and evidence for the early part of
the investigation (in the public notice of initiation), but failed to do so for the latter stage of the
investigation (in the public notice of its preliminary determination).
8.116 Guatemala asserts that the Ministry did fix specific periods for the presentation of
information. For example, Guatemala claims that the Ministry fixed 17 May 1996 as the last date for
replying to the original questionnaire, 30 October 1996 for responding to the supplementary
questionnaire, and 19 December 1996 for the final arguments.
8.117 We shall begin by examining Mexico's claim under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.
Article 6.1 provides:
"All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of the
information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing
all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question."
8.118 We do not consider it necessary to determine whether, in fact, the Ministry did set periods for
the presentation of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation. This is because
we find Mexico's claim to be without merit as a matter of law. In our view, Article 6.1 of the AD
Agreement does not require investigating authorities to set time-limits for the presentation of
arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation. The only time-limit provided for
in Article 6.1 is that contained in Article 6.1.1, whereby exporters shall be given at least 30 days for
replying to questionnaires. Mexico does not allege that Cruz Azul was not provided the 30 days
provided for in Article 6.1.1.
8.119 Article 6.1 requires investigating authorities to provide interested parties "ample opportunity"
to present in writing certain evidence. Article 6.1 does not explicitly require an investigating
authority to set time limits for the submission of arguments and evidence during the final stage of an
investigation.
825 Article 6.1 simply requires that interested parties shall have "ample" opportunity to
present evidence and "full" opportunity to defend their interests. Interested parties may have such
opportunity without the investigating authority setting time limits for the submission of evidence. In
other words, these provisions impose substantive obligations, without requiring those obligations to
be met through any particular form (except as provided for in sub-paragraphs 1 through 3 of
Article 6.1). What counts is whether, in practice , sufficient opportunity was provided, not whether
time limits for the submission of evidence were set. Thus, even if the Ministry had failed to set time-

825 This does not, of course, preclude an authority from establishing such limits, so long as the basic
requirements (such as "ample opportunity", or 30 days in respect of questionnaire replies) are respected.

limits for the submission of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation, this
would not ipso facto constitute a violation of Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.
8.120 Mexico has argued that the Ministry's public notice of initiation granted interested parties 30
days in which to defend their interests, whereas no such time-limit was included in the public notice
concerning the imposition of a provisional measure. We would note that Article 12.1.1(vi) explicitly
provides that a public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall include adequate information on
the "time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known". No such obligation is
included in Article 12.2.1, concerning the contents of public notices on the imposition of provisional
measures. We consider that Article 12.2.1 constitutes useful context when examining Mexico's claim
under Article 6.1. In particular, the fact that there is no requirement for investigating authorities to
include time-limits for the submission of eviden ce in the public notice of their preliminary
determinations confirms the conclusion set forth in the preceding paragraph.
8.121 Mexico has also raised a claim (ostensibly in respect of the Ministry's failure to establish
time-limits) based on the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, which provides that
"[t]hroughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity for the
defence of their interests…". Upon closer examina tion of Mexico's Article 6.2 claim, we note that it
relates more to the Ministry's rejection of Cruz Azul's technical accounting evidence, than to the
Ministry's failure to set time-limits for the submission of evidence and arguments in the latter stages of
its investigation. In this regard, we note that Mexico's Article 6.2 claim is summarised in para. 325 of its
first written submission to the Panel:
"The denial of Cruz Azul's right of defence can be seen in the Ministry's rejection of
the technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul on 18 December 1996 and
the acceptance of new evidence from Cementos Progreso during the public hearing
between the Ministry and the parties. …"
(b) Refusal of "technical accounting evidence"
8.122 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.8, and Annex II (5) and (6) of the
AD Agreement by rejecting certain technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul on 18
December 1996, one day before the 19 December 1996 public hearing scheduled by the Ministry.
Mexico submits that the technical accounting evidence was prepared by an external accounting firm,
to confirm that the information submitted by Cruz Azul during the course of the investigation was
complete and taken from Cruz Azul's accounting records.
8.123 Guatemala asserts that the technical accounting evidence was rejected because it was not
"verifiable", or "appropriately submitted", within the meaning of Annex II(3). According to
Guatemala, the technical accounting evidence was not verifiable because the Ministry was required to
cancel the verification visit to Cruz Azul, and it was not appropriately submitted because it was
neither requested by the Ministry, nor supplied in a timely fashion. Guatemala asserts that the
deadline for the submission of new evidence was 6 December 1996, and that this deadline had
therefore expired when the technical accounting evidence was submitted on 18 December 1996.
Guatemala argues that the appropriate and timely juncture for submission of the technical accounting
evidence would have been the verification visit at Cruz Azul. According to Guatemala, therefore, the
Ministry's decision not to accept Cruz Azul's technical accounting evidence was consistent with
Article 6.8 and Annex II(3) of the AD Agreement.
8.124 The Ministry's failure to take into account Cruz Azul's technical accounting evidence was
clearly linked to the Ministry's cancellation of its verification visit to Cruz Azul. The Ministry stated
in its final determination that the technical accounting evidence "could not replace verification".
826

826 Section B.6, page 14, Annex Mexico-41

Furthermore, the technical accounting evidence was submitted by Cruz Azul in lieu of verification,
and would not have been submitted if the Ministry had not cancelled the verification. In our view, we
need only address Mexico's claim concerning the Ministry's failure to take into account Cruz Azul's
technical accounting evidence, if we find that the Ministry was entitled to cancel its verification visit
to Cruz Azul.
8.125 At para. 8.251 below, we state that we do not consider that an objective and impartial
investigating authority could properly have found that Cruz Azul significantly impeded its
investigation by objecting to the inclusion of conflicted non-governmental experts in its verification
team. Accordingly, the Ministry did not act in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner by
cancelling its verification visit to Cruz Azul. This is an important consideration for our conclusion
that the Ministry violated Article 6.8, read in light of Annex II(3), by having recourse to "best
information available" for the purpose of determinin g normal value. Inherent in this finding is the
fact that the Ministry reacted unreasonably to reasonable objections raised by Cruz Azul, in that such
reasonable objections did not entitle the Ministry to cancel its verification visit to Cruz Azul. In light
of these considerations, we do not consider it necessary to address Mexico's claims regarding the
Ministry's treatment of technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul as a result of the
cancellation of the verification visit.
2. Cruz Azul's access to evidence
8.126 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1.2, 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement by
(a) refusing Cruz Azul access to the file in November 1996, and (b) failing to promptly provide Cruz
Azul with a copy of a submission made by Ce mentos Progreso on 19 December 1996. Mexico also
claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.4 by (c) failing to provide Cruz Azul with copies of the file,
and (d) failing to provide Cruz Azul with a full record of the 19 December 1996 public hearing. We
shall now examine each of these claims.
(a) Alleged denial of access to the file
8.127 Mexico claims that the Ministry refused Cruz Azul access to the file on 4 November 1996.
Mexico has submitted a notarial deed to that effect, in support of its claim.
8.128 Guatemala argues that Cruz Azul was provided access to the file on 4 November 1996. In
this regard, Guatemala asserts that interested parties have a constitutional right (under Guatemalan
law) to access to the file in question. However, Guatemala could not prove that access to the file was
granted, because the Ministry did not keep a record of interested parties' access to the file. Guatemala
argues that the fact that Cruz Azul had timely access to the file is demonstrated by its numerous
submissions in which it alludes to evidence in the file. Guatemala also argues that the Ministry was
never shown a copy of the 4 November 1996 notarial deed.
8.129 Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement provides:
"Subject to the requirement to protect c onfidential information, evidence presented in
writing by one interested party shall be ma de available promptly to other interested
parties participating in the investigation."
8.130 Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement provides:
"The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all
interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases,
that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the authorities in
an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this
information."

8.131 Mexico has provided the Panel with a copy of a notarial deed dated 4 November 1996,
according to which Cruz Azul was denied access to the file on 4 November 1996. The circumstances
of the alleged denial of access to the file are set forth in that notarial deed:
"FIRST: [Cruz Azul's notary] went to the Department of Economic Integration of the
Ministry of the Economy, on the third floor of the Ministry building, and requested to
see file number one thousand two hundred a nd eighty one-ninety five (1281-95), and
was told by an official from that Department that the file was under the responsibility of
Ms. Edith de Molina, an advisor in that Ministry, on the sixth floor. [Cruz Azul's
notary] therefore went to the sixth floor and enquired after Ms. Edith de Molina. [Cruz
Azul's notary] was received by Ms. Gabriela Montenegro, also an advisor in the
Ministry, who confirmed to [him] that the file was indeed under the responsibility of
Ms. Edith de Molina, but that she was not currently in Guatemala, having left the
country for Mexico. SECOND: [Cruz Azul's notary] therefore asked Ms. Gabriela
Montenegro to allow [him] to see file one thousand two hundred and eighty one-ninety
five (1281-95). [Cruz Azul's notary] was to ld categorically that that would not be
possible, as the only person in the entire Ministry who could permit that was Ms. Edith
de Molina, and who was expected back in Guatemala on Thursday the seventh of
November of nineteen hundred and ninety six, and that [Cruz Azul's notary] had to
make a written request for any information whatsoever concerning the file in question.
[Cruz Azul's notary] therefore asked Ms. Montenegro whether, in view of the fact that
nobody could show [him] the file on that particular day, [he] could see it on Thursday
the seventh of November, when Ms. Edith de Molina was expected to be back in
Guatemala. She replied that even then it w ould not be possible to see the file, as the
Ministry first had to evaluate and review the documents in it."
8.132 Thus, it is alleged that the Ministry refused Cruz Azul access to the administrative file
because the person responsible for that file was out of the country. It is further alleged that Cruz Azul
was told that it could not have access to the file wh en the responsible person returned to the Ministry,
because the Ministry would first have to evaluate and review the documents contained therein.
8.133 Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement provides that evidence presented by one interested party
shall be "made available promptly" to other interested parties. Article 6.4 provides that an interested
party shall have "timely opportunities" to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of its
case. On their face, neither Article 6.1.2 nor Article 6.4 necessarily require access to the file. For
example, if an investigating authority required each interested party to serve its submissions on all
other interested parties, or if the investigating authority itself undertook to provide copies of each
interested party's submission to other interested parties, there may be no need for interested parties to
have access to the file. If, however, there is no service of evidence by interested parties, or no
provision of copies by the investigating authority, access to the file may be the only practical means
by which evidence presented by one interested party could be "made available promptly" to other
interested parties (consistent with Article 6.1.2), or by which interested parties could have "timely
opportunities" to see information relevant to the presentation of their cases (consistent with
Article 6.4). Assuming access to the file is the only practical means of complying with Articles 6.1.2
and 6.4, access to the file need not necessarily be unlimited. Nor need the file be made available on
demand. Provided access to the file is regular and routine, we consider that the requirements of
Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 would be satisfied.
8.134 There is no evidence to suggest that submissions made to the Ministry by one interested party
were "made available promptly" to other interested parties by virtue of intra-party service or the
provision of copies by the Ministry.
827 Nor has Guatemala argued that this was the case.

827 At para. 297, Guatemala asserts that "[d]uring the investigation the Ministry provided the interested
parties with a copy of the documents in the file". These "documents in the file" would presumably include [non-

Accordingly, if Cruz Azul wanted to review evidence submitted by Cementos Progreso, it would have
to have access to the file to do so. In these circumstances, regular and routine access to the file is
required by Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4.
8.135 In the factual circumstances set forth in the notarial deed of 4 November 1996, a denial of
access on 4 November 1996 because the relevant official is overseas, followed by a denial of access
during the following week because the investigatin g authority is working on the file, and in the
absence of any indication as to when access to the file would be granted, would not be consistent with
the need to ensure routine and regular access to th e file. We are of the view that these circumstances
are indicative of a pattern of behaviour which would prevent regular and routine access to the file, and
which would fail to ensure that evidence presented by one interested party would be "made available
promptly" to other interested parties (consistent with Article 6.1.2), and which would fail to ensure
that interested parties have "timely opportunities" to see information relevant to the presentation of
their cases (consistent with Article 6.4).
8.136 For all the above reasons, we find that the pattern of behaviour described in the 4 November
1996 notarial deed establishes a prima facie case that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 of
the AD Agreement by refusing Cruz Azul access to the file on 4 November 1996. In a bid to rebut
that prima facie case, Guatemala has asserted that access to the file was not refused on that date.
However, Guatemala has not been able to adduce any evidence to that effect. Guatemala has not
adduced an affidavit from any Ministry official to the effect that access was granted on 4 November
1996. Similarly, Guatemala has failed to establish that a Cruz Azul representative was granted access
to the Ministry building on that date. Guatemala claims that it cannot demonstrate when access to the
file was granted, because the Ministry does not keep the appropriate records. In our view, a Member's
failure to keep records of who was granted access to the file, and when, provides no basis on which to
rebut a prima facie case that access was denied on a particular date. Guatemala also seeks to rebut the
prima facie case by arguing that the fact that Cruz Azul had sufficient access to the file is
demonstrated by numerous submissions which refer to evidence in the file. However, the fact that
Cruz Azul may have had access to the file on certain occasions does not demonstrate that Cruz Azul
had regular and routine access to the file. We do not consider that we are compelled to adopt a
different approach simply because Cruz Azul may not have shown the Ministry a copy of the 4
November 1996 notarial deed. The notarial deed is simply a record of fact. Guatemala has adduced
no argument why Cruz Azul's record of fact should have been shown to the Ministry.
8.137 At the second substantive meeting with the parties, Guatemala asserted:
"[i]n order to meet its burden, Mexico must establish a prima facie case of
inconsistency with a provision of the AD Agreement or GATT 1994 that is within the
Panel’s terms of reference. In case all the evidence and arguments remain equal, the
Panel must give the benefit of the doubt to Guatemala, as the defending party."
828
This assertion appears to be based on the following statement by the panel in United States - Sections
301 - 310 of the Trade Act of 1974:
"Since, in this case, both parties have submitted extensive facts and arguments in
respect of the EC claims, our task will essentially be to balance all evidence on record
and decide whether the EC, as party bearing the original burden of proof, has

confidential versions of) submissions made by interested parties. However, Guatemala has adduced no evidence
to that effect. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Guatemala has demonstrated that copies of interested
parties' submissions were provided by the Ministry to Cruz Azul. Indeed, had that been the case, we wonder
why the Ministry offered copies of the file to interested parties (at their expense) in a communication dated 6
December 1996 (Annex Mexico-36).
828 Guatemala's second oral statement, para. 27.

convinced us of the validity of its claims. In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the
evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, we have to give the benefit of the doubt
to the US as defending party."
8.138 We make no finding as to whether or not there may be circumstances in which the benefit of
any doubt should go to the defending party if all the evidence and arguments "remain in equipoise", or
equal. This is because we do not consider that the evidence and arguments adduced by the parties in
the present case are equal. Guatemala has failed to adduce any evidence to the effect that Cruz Azul
was granted access to the file on 4 November 1996, or to dispute the other facts described in the
notarial deed of that date. Accordingly, there is no "benefit of the doubt" for us to give to Guatemala.
8.139 For these reasons, we find that the pattern of behaviour described in the notarial deed of 4
November 1996 constitutes a violation of Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement.
(b) Alleged failure to provide Cruz Azul with a copy of Cementos Progreso's submission of 19
December 1996
8.140 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 by failing to provide Cruz
Azul promptly with a copy of the submission ma de by Cementos Progreso at the 19 December 1996
public hearing as it was done only on 8 January 1997.
8.141 Guatemala asserts that the Ministry was justified in delaying Cruz Azul's access to Cementos
Progreso's submission at the December 1996 public hearing because of the possibility that the
submission contained confidential information. Furthermore, Guatemala asserts inter alia that any
submission prepared by Cruz Azul in response to Cementos Progreso's submission of 19 December
1996 would not have been "practicable", since it would have been submitted too late to be taken into
account by the investigating authority (because of the alleged closure of the Ministry's record prior to
that date).
(i) Article 6.1.2
8.142 Guatemala does not deny that Cementos Progreso's 19 December 1996 submission was not
made available to Cruz Azul until 8 January 1997. Thus, there is no dispute between the parties that
the Cementos Progreso submission was not made av ailable to Cruz Azul until 20 days after its
submission to the Ministry. In principle, we consider that a 20-day delay is inconsistent with the
Ministry's Article 6.1.2 obligation to make this submission available to Cruz Azul "promptly".
8.143 Guatemala asserts that "the Ministry had a valid reason for not giving Cruz Azul immediate
access to this document". 829 In particular, Guatemala argues that "it was reasonable for the Ministry
to conclude that the lengthy written submission of 19 December prepared by Cementos Progreso
would contain confidential information that "ought not to be revealed to Cruz Azul".830 In this regard,
we note that the obligation in Article 6.1.2 is qualified by the words "[s]ubject to the requirement to
protect confidential information". In principle, therefore, evidence presented by one interested party
need not be made available "promptly" to other interested parties if it is "confidential". However,
insofar as confidentiality is concerned, Article 6.1.2 must be read in the context of Article 6.5, which
governs the treatment of confidential information. We examine Article 6.5 in detail at paras 8.207 -
8.223 below. We have noted that Article 6.5 reserves special treatment for "confidential" information
only "upon good cause shown", and we have determined that the requisite "good cause" must be
shown by the interested party which submitted the information at issue. Guatemala has not
demonstrated, or even argued, that Cementos Progreso requested confidential treatment for its 19

829 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 295.
830 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 296.

December 1996 submission, or that "good cause" for confidential treatment was otherwise shown. 831
The Article 6.1.2 proviso regarding the "requirement to protect confidential information", when read
in the context of Article 6.5, cannot be interpreted to allow an investigating authority to delay making
available evidence submitted by one interested party to another interested party for 20 days simply
because of the possibility - which is unsubstantiated 832 by any request for confidential treatment from
the party submitting the evidence - that the evidence contains confidential information. We do not
believe that the specific requirement of Article 6.1.2 may be circumvented simply by an investigating
authority determining that there is a possibility that the evidence at issue contains confidential
information. Such an interpretation could undermine the purpose of Article 6.1.2, since in principle
there is a possibility that any evidence could contain confidential information (and therefore not be
"made available promptly" to interested parties). Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated
Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement by failing to make Cementos Progreso's 19 December 1996
submission available to Cruz Azul until 8 January 1997.
(ii) Article 6.4
8.144 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articl e 6.4 by failing to provide Cruz Azul with the
submission presented by Cementos Progreso at th e 19 December 1996 public hearing until 8 January
1997, only two weeks before the Ministry's final de termination. Guatemala claims that the Ministry
was not required to provide Cruz Azul with a c opy of Cementos Progreso's submission before 8
January 1997, since - because of the closure of the record before that date - it would not have been
"practicable" for Cruz Azul to respond to Cementos Progreso's submission. Guatemala also relies on
Article 6.14 of the AD Agreement to argue that the Ministry was not required to delay the conclusion
of the investigation in order to allow either party to prepare a rejoinder to the 19 December 1996 final
submissions of the other party.
8.145 Since we have already found that the facts giving rise to Mexico's Article 6.4 claim constitute
a violation of Article 6.1.2, we do not consider it necessary to consider whether those facts also
constitute a violation of Article 6.4.
(c) Alleged failure to provide copies of the file
8.146 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to
provide Cruz Azul with two copies of the file.

831 Even if Cementos Progreso had requested confidential treatment, the Ministry should (consistent
with 6.5.1) have required it to furnish a non-confidential version thereof which could have been made available
to Cruz Azul "promptly", or to provide "a statement of the reasons why [non-confidential] summarization is not
possible".
832 The Cementos Progreso submission at issue was made at a public hearing on 19 December 1996.
Guatemala argues that, although the Ministry authorized parties to make submissions in writing, the Ministry
had not specified whether such written submissions could contain confidential information or not. According to
Guatemala, this justified the Ministry in assuming that the Cementos Progreso submission may contain
confidential information. We are not at all convinced by this argument. The instructions issued by the Ministry
concerning the public hearing state that "[t]he hearing is being organized for the purpose of receiving the final
arguments of the parties, which may submit a written version thereof " (emphasis supplied). Thus, any written
submission was simply to be a written version of arguments presented orally. Arguments made by a party at a
public hearing will presumably not contain confidential information. Similarly, therefore , written versions of
arguments presented orally will also not contain information. Thus, to the extent that Cementos Progreso would
not have included confidential information in its oral presentation, similarly its written version of that oral
presentation also would not have included confidential info rmation. In these circumstances, we fail to see how
Cementos Progreso's written submission - which, consistent with the Ministry's instructions, was to be a written
version of its oral presentation - could have contained confidential information.

8.147 In response to a question from the Panel, Guatemala asserts that the relevant copies were not
provided because Cruz Azul did not pay the required fee, even though the Ministry's 6 December
1996 communication indicated that copies would be at the expense of the party requesting the copy.
In its first written submission, however, Guatemala asserts that "Cruz Azul did not request that a copy
of any document be supplied at its expense".833
8.148 We note that the Ministry's 6 December 1996 communication stated, inter alia, that:
"2. The technical study issued by this Directorate will record the facts
investigated and the evidence available as well as the results of verifications
conducted. These documents form part of the file, and the parties are free to obtain
copies at their own expense." (emphasis supplied)
8.149 On 17 January 1997, Cruz Azul requested that:
"in keeping with the appropriate legal procedures and at the expense of my principal,
the latter be issued with two attestations in regard to or certified copies of all the records
contained in the above-mentioned file. This request is based on the articles cited and
Articles 28 and 29 of the Political Constitu tion of the Republic of Guatemala. Five
copies of the present submission are included." (emphasis supplied)
8.150 Therefore, as a factual matter, we are in no doubt that Cruz Azul requested two copies of the
file. Despite Guatemala' assertion to the contrary (see para. 8.147 above), we are also in no doubt that
Cruz Azul offered to pay for those copies.
8.151 There are various ways in which an investigating authority could satisfy the Article 6.4
obligation to provide "whenever practicable … timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all
information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases …". In the present case, the Ministry
chose to offer interested parties copies of the file, against payment of a fee. Mexico does not
challenge the Ministry's decision to comply with its obligations under the AD Agreement by offering
copies of the file against payment of a fee. Rather, Mexico challenges the Ministry's failure to
provide the relevant copies, despite Cruz Azul's offer to pay the relevant fee.
8.152 In our view, the Ministry's reaction to Cruz Azul's request of 17 January 1997 did not
"provide timely opportunities for all interested partie s to see all information that is relevant to the
presentation of their cases". The Ministry could have reacted to Cruz Azul's request in a number of
ways.
834
8.153 However, there is nothing before the Panel to suggest that the Ministry responded in any way
to Cruz Azul's letter of 17 January 1997. There is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry even
informed Cruz Azul how much each copy of the file would cost. Guatemala has stated in these
proceedings that Cruz Azul would have had to pay the cost of reproducing the file, plus Q 0.30 per
page.
835 However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry informed Cruz Azul how much it
would cost to reproduce the file, or the number of pages in the file. Since Cruz Azul could not,
therefore, have known how much each copy of the file would cost (because it did not know the
number of pages in the file), we do not consider that an objective and impartial investigating authority

833 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 294.
834 For example, (a) it could have provided the requested copies, and invoiced Cruz Azul for the
relevant fee. Alternatively, (b) it could have informed Cruz Azul of the exact fee to be paid, and provided
details of the preferred method of payment. There again, (c) it could have arranged for Cruz Azul to collect the
copies from the Ministry, and to pay the relevant fee upon collection.
835 In doing so, Guatemala stated that the amount of the fee is regulated by Article 27(c) of Decree 111-
96 of the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala.

seeking to "provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant
to the presentation of their cases" would have failed to respond to Cruz Azul's request for two copies
simply because - in the words of Guatemala - "Cruz Azul did not pay the required fee". 836 An
investigating authority cannot "provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all
information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases" if it conditions the provision of copies
on the payment of a fee without at least informing the requesting party how much the fee would be, or
without at least providing the requesting party with the information it would need (e.g., the number of
pages in the file) to calculate the fee for itself.
8.154 In these circumstances, we consider that the Ministry did not comply with its Article 6.4
obligation to "provide timely opportunities for all in terested parties to see all information that is
relevant to the presentation of their cases". Since there is no evidence to suggest that it was not
"practicable" for the Ministry to do so, or that the relevant information was not "used" by the Ministry
in its investigation, we find that the Ministry violated Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to
provide the two copies of the file requested by Cruz Azul on 17 January 1997.
(d) Alleged failure to provide a full record of the public hearing
8.155 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement by failing to
provide Cruz Azul with a complete copy of the Ministry's record of the 19 December 1996 public
hearing. Guatemala does not admit that the copy of the record was incomplete. Even if it were
incomplete, Guatemala asserts that Cruz Azul could have requested a complete copy as soon as it
realized that there had been an omission. Guatemal a also argues that Cruz Azul did not bring this
matter to the attention of the Ministry during the investigation, and that this matter was only raised in
the present WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
8.156 Evidence before us demonstrates that the record of the 19 December 1996 public hearing
provided by the Ministry to Cruz Azul was incomplete. Although the sequential numbers stamped on
the pages of the document suggest that the document is complete, it is quite clear to us that at least
two pages are actually missing from the document. The words at the beginning of page 02737 do not
follow on from the phrase at the end of page 02376. This demonstrates that there is at least one page
missing between pages 02736 and 02737. Furthermore, page 02737 refers to a second point
("SEGUNDO"), without any first point identified in the preceding pages of the document. The first
point is presumably cited in the first missing page. There is also at least one page missing between
pages 02738 and 02739. Again, the wording at the end of page 02738 and at the beginning of page
02739 does not match. In addition, page 02739 refers to "CUARTO" and "QUINTO", while the third
point is not included in the document. This third point is presumably cited in the second missing
page.
8.157 Despite the factual accuracy of Mexico's argu ment, we do not consider that it amounts to a
violation of Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement, as Mexico has failed to adduce any evidence that the
Ministry's failure to provide a full copy of its record of the public hearing was anything other than
inadvertent. Although we consider that an interested party is entitled to see a full version of the
investigating authority's record of any public hearin g, it is not inconceivable that an investigating
authority which chooses to provide interested parties with a copy of the record could inadvertantly fail
to provide a complete copy. In our view, such an inadvertent omission on the part of an investigating
authority does not constitute a violation of Article 6.4. Although a violation could arise if an
investigating authority failed to correct its omission after having been informed of that omission by an
interested party, there is no evidence that Cruz Azul informed the Ministry of its omission in the
present case.

836 Guatemala's response to question 2 from the Panel.

8.158 In order to avoid any uncertainty, we wish to emphasize that we do not consider that the
inadvertent nature of the Ministry's omission renders that omission "harmless", in the sense of being a
defence to a violation of Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement (see para. 8.22). Our position is not that
there was a violation of Article 6.4, but that such violation should be disregarded because it was
"harmless". Rather, our position is that the factual circumstances before us do not amount to a
violation. The question of whether or not any violation is "harmless" therefore does not arise.
3. Interested party's right to defend its interests - Article 6.2
8.159 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement (a) by failing to
provide a complete copy of the Ministry's record of the public hearing to Cruz Azul, (b) by failing to
grant Cruz Azul access to the file on 4 November 1996, (c) by failing to provide Cruz Azul promptly
with a copy of Cementos Progreso's 19 December 1996 submission, (d) by failing to respond to Cruz
Azul's 13 November 1996 request for a non-confidenti al version of evidence submitted by Cementos
Progreso, (e) by failing to provide Cruz Azul with a non-confidential version of the information
submitted to the Ministry during its verification visit to Cementos Progreso, (f) by extending the
period of investigation, (g) by delaying notification of initiation to Cruz Azul and the Government of
Mexico; and (h) by failing to furnish the full text of Cementos Progreso's application for initiation.
8.160 Guatemala asserts that the Ministry complied with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement by
affording Cruz Azul and other interested parties the opportunity to examine the information,
arguments and evidence presented during the course of the investigation.
8.161 Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement provides in relevant part:
"Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defence of their interests…."
8.162 Whereas this provision clearly imposes a general duty on investigating authorities to ensure
that interested parties have a full opportunity throughout an anti-dumping investigation for the
defence of their interests, it provides no specific guidance as to what steps investigating authorities
must take in practice. By contrast, other more specific provisions apply to the facts at hand, in respect
of which Mexico has also made claims. Although there may be cases in which a panel will
nevertheless need to address claims under Article 6.2, we do not consider it necessary for us to do
when we have already made findings concerning the conduct allegedly violating Article 6.2 under
other, more specific provisions of the AD Agreement.
837
8.163 Accordingly, we shall only consider Mexico's claims under Article 6.2 to the extent that we
have not made findings regarding the factual situation at issue under another provision of the AD
Agreement which specifically addresses that situation.
8.164 For the most part, we have already made findings regarding the factual situations forming the
basis of Mexico's Article 6.2 claim under provisions of the AD Agreement which specifically address
those factual situations. Thus, we have made findings concerning item (a) under Article 6.4.
838 We

837 In this regard, we recall that the Appellate Body stated in European Communities - Bananas that
"[a]lthough Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement both apply, the Panel,
in our view, should have applied the Licensing Agreement first, since this agreement deals specifically, and in
detail, with the administration of import licensing procedures" (WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 204, adopted 25
September 1997). Furthermore, the panel in United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 stated that "[i]t is a
general principle of international law that, when applying a body of norms to a given factual situation, one
should consider that factual situation under the norm which most specifically addresses it" (WT/DS136/R,
circulated on 31 March 1996, under appeal) (footnote deleted).
838 See paras. 8.155-8.158 above.

have made findings concerning item (b) under Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4. 839 We have made findings
concerning item (c) under Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4.840 We have made findings concerning item (e) under
Article 6.5.1.841 We have made findings concerning item (f) under a number of provisions, including
Article 6.2.842 We have made findings concerning item (g) under Article 12. 843 We have made
findings concerning item (h) under Article 6.1.3. 844 It is only the factual situations identified under
item (d) which are not the subject of findings under provisions of the AD Agreement which
specifically address those situations.845
8.165 Mexico's claim under item (d) is based on a document dated 13 November 1996, in which
Cruz Azul requested "all the information submitted by CEMENTOS PROGRESO S.A. and other
interested parties …". 846 We are unable to make a finding that Cruz Azul's rights of defence were
violated simply on the basis of Cruz Azul's request for information. It is the Ministry's reaction to
Cruz Azul's request which is relevant to determ ining whether Cruz Azul's rights of defence were
violated. However, Mexico has not informed the Panel of how, if at all, the Ministry responded to
Cruz Azul's request. We therefore reject Mexico's Article 6.2 claim based on its request for
information dated 13 November 1996.
4. The Ministry's failure to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of information - Article 6.6 /
Annex II(7)
8.166 Mexico claims that the Ministry failed to satisfy itself of the accuracy of the information used
by the Ministry in its final determination, contrary to Article 6.6 and Annex II(7) of the AD
Agreement. Mexico claims that the Ministry's failure to satisfy itself of the accuracy of the
information used to determine normal value violat ed paragraph 7 of Annex II, since the Ministry
failed to act with "special circumspection" with re gard to the best information available used as a
basis for that determination. Mexico claims that the Ministry's failure to satisfy itself of the accuracy
of the information used to determine injury violat ed Article 6.6, because: (i) the Ministry examined
the maximum and minimum amounts of imports during the period of investigation ("POI"), rather
than comparing the trend in imports during the POI with the trend in the previous comparable period;
(ii) the import data concerning tariff heading 2523.29.00 used by the Ministry includes products other
than that under investigation; the import da ta concerning tariff heading 2523.29.00 includes non-
dumped imports from Mexico, and imports from countries other than Mexico.
847
8.167 With regard to the accuracy of the injury data, Guatemala replies that the Ministry used data
supplied by Cruz Azul for calculating the volume of imports. The Ministry therefore did not take into
account imports from other countries, or imports of other types of cement not subject to the
investigation. With regard to the accuracy of the information used to determine normal value,
Guatemala asserts that the Ministry was entitled to use the "best information available", consistent
with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement. As regards that "best information available", Guatemala
asserts that the Ministry used four invoices as the basis for its calculations. Furthermore, Mexico did
not suggest that those invoices were fraudulent during the course of the Ministry's investigation.

839 See paras. 8.140-8.145 above.
840 See paras. 8.155-8.158 above.
841 See paras. 8.209-8.215 below.
842 See paras. 8.175-8.179 below.
843 See paras. 8.84-8.96 above.
844 See paras. 8.97-8.104above.
845 Although we have made findings concerning item (f) under Article 6.1 and Annex II(1) of the AD
Agreement, we do not consider that those provisions specifically address the extension of the Ministry's period
of investigation.
846 This document was provided by Mexico in Annex Mexico-54.
847 Further details concerning this claim were provided in response to Mexico Question 3 from the
Panel.

8.168 Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement provides:
"Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 8, the authorities shall during the
course of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information
supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based."
8.169 Paragraph 7 of Annex II provides:
"If the authorities have to base their finding s, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in
the application for the initiation of the in vestigation, they should do so with special
circumspection. In such cases, the author ities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price
lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained
from other interested parties during the inves tigation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld
from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the
party than if the party did cooperate."
8.170 We shall examine Mexico's claims under Annex II(7) and Article 6.6 separately.
(a) Annex II(7)
8.171 Mexico's claim under Annex II(7) concerns the alleged failure by the Ministry to satisfy itself
as to the accuracy of certain information used to determine normal value. This claim is based on
paragraph 7 of Annex (II), because the information at issue constitutes "best information available",
which the Ministry considered itself entitled to use as a result of the cancelled verification visit to
Cruz Azul. We find at section E.1 para. 8.251 that the Ministry's recourse to "best information
available" was contrary to Article 6.8 of the AD Agr eement, read in light of Annex II(3). Since the
Ministry was not entitled to rely on the "best information available" in order to make a final
determination of normal value, we see no need to examine whether the Ministry did, or did not,
exercise "special circumspection" in respect of that information. Even if the Ministry had exercised
"special circumspection" in respect of the relevant "best information available", that would not change
the fact that the Ministry was not justified in us ing that "best information available". The issue of
whether or not the Ministry exercised the requisite "special circumspection" is therefore moot.
(b) Article 6.6
8.172 In our view, it is important to distinguish between the accuracy of information, and the
substantive relevance of such information. Once an investigating authority has determined what
information is of substantive relevance to its in vestigation, Article 6.6 requires the investigating
authority to satisfy itself (except when "best info rmation available" is used) that the substantively
relevant information is accurate. Thus, Article 6.6 applies once an initial determination has been
made that the information is of substantive relevance to the investigation. Article 6.6 provides no
guidance in respect of the initial determination of whether information is, or is not, of substantive
relevance to the investigation.
8.173 Whereas Mexico purports to raise issues concerning the accuracy of the import data used by
the Ministry, we consider that in fact Mexico is simply questioning the substantive relevance of that
data. Mexico argues that the Ministry should have used other data, since the data used by the
Ministry were not substantively relevant; Mexico does not argue that the data used by the Ministry
are factually inaccurate. For example, Mexico does not argue that the Ministry's data concerning the
maximum and minimum amounts of imports during the POI are inaccurate; Mexico simply asserts
that the Ministry should have used (what Mexico considers to be) more relevant data, i.e., data

concerning the import trend in absolute terms or relative to the previous comparable period.
Similarly, Mexico does not argue that the import data concerning tariff heading 2523.29.00 was
inaccurate; Mexico simply asserts that such data was not substantively relevant, because it included
non-dumped imports from Mexico, and imports from countries other than Mexico.
8.174 In focusing on the substantive relevance of injury data used by the Ministry, Mexico has not
demonstrated that the Ministry failed to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of that data. We therefore
reject Mexico's claim under Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement. Mexico's claims regarding the
substantive relevance of the import data relied on by the Ministry are more properly addressed under
the relevant substantive provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement.
5. Extension of the period of investigation - Articles 6.1, 6.2, Annex II(1)
8.175 Mexico challenges the Ministry's 4 October 1996 decision to extend the POI from 1 June
1995 - 30 November 1995 to include the period 1 December 1995 - 31 May 1996 as well, because it
claims that the extension was not justified in either fact or law. Mexico alleges in particular that Cruz
Azul did not know the legal grounds for the extension of the POI, and that the Ministry did not
respond to requests for information from Cruz Azul concerning the extension. Mexico claims that, as
a result, Cruz Azul was not able to defend its interests in respect of the extension of the POI, contrary
to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement. Mexico also asserts that the extension of the POI
imposed an excessive and unreasonable burden on the exporter. Mexico claims that, since the
investigating authority should specify in detail the information required from interested parties "as
soon as possible after the initiation of the investig ation" (Annex II(1)), inve stigating authorities are
effectively precluded from extending the POI during the course of the investigation. Mexico claims
that the extension of the POI during the course of an investigation, and after the imposition of
provisional measures, is contrary to the logic of the structure of investigations. Changing the POI
between the preliminary and final determinations can completely distort the investigation, because the
data used to determine dumping, injury or threat of injury, and causal link in each case will not be the
same.
8.176 Guatemala asserts that no provision of the AD Agreement imposes any requirements on the
investigating authority with respect to the POI. Gu atemala asserts that the investigating authority has
absolute discretion regarding the selection of the POI, which it claims will vary from case to case.
Concerning Mexico's claim that the extension imposed an excessive and unreasonable burden on Cruz
Azul, Guatemala notes that Cruz Azul did not request any extension of the time allowed for
responding to the supplementary questionnaire. Gu atemala also denies that Annex II(1) of the AD
Agreement prevents investigating authorities fr om extending the POI during the course of the
investigation. Guatemala argues that this is an unacceptable proposition, since it would prevent
investigating authorities from requesting information in addition to that requested at the time of
initiation. Guatemala asserts that such a proposition would render the implementation of Articles 7.4
and 9.1 (lesser duty rule) and 10.2 (post-provisional measure information necessary to determine the
effects of imports) more difficult, if not impossible. Guatemala also argues that the AD Agreement
recognizes the need to use as much up-to-date info rmation as possible, particularly with respect to
threat of injury. Furthermore, Guatemala assert s that the Ministry notified Cruz Azul of the
information requested and granted Cruz Azul ample opportunity to submit in writing all the evidence
it considered appropriate.
8.177 We are not persuaded that paragraph 1 of Annex II, or any other provision of the AD
Agreement, prevents an investigating authority from extending the POI during the course of an
investigation. We agree with Guatemala that there may be a number of circumstances in which the
investigating authority will need updated information during the course of its investigation. In this
regard, we would also note that the extension of a POI may in certain cases lead to negative findings
of dumping and/or injury, to the benefit of exporters. The fact that the POI may be extended after the

imposition of provisional measures is not necessarily problematic, since even without any extension
of the POI there is no guarantee that the factual basis for the preliminary determination will be the
same as that of the final determination. The factual basis may change, for example, if a preliminary
affirmative determination of injury is made on the basis of data provided by the complainant, and if
some (or all) of that data are shown to be erro neous during verification of the domestic industry.
Indeed, in such cases differences in the factual bases of the preliminary and final determinations
would normally be necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the investigation. Although Annex
II(1) provides that interested parties should be informed of the information required by the
investigating authority "as soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation", this does not
mean that information concerning a particular period of time may only be required if the request for
that information is made immediately after initiation. We interpret the first sentence of paragraph 1 of
Annex II to mean that any request for specific information should be communicated to interested
parties "as soon as possible". Since Mexico has not advanced any argument that it was possible for
the Ministry to have requested information concerning the extended POI before it actually did so, we
reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry's extensi on of the POI violated Guatemala's obligations under
paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.
8.178 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 by extending the POI, because
Cruz Azul was not informed of the reasons fo r the extension, and was not provided with an
opportunity to comment on that extension. In addressing Mexico's Article 6.1 claim first, we consider
that Mexico's interpretation of that provision is too expansive. The plain language of Article 6.1
merely requires that interested parties be given (1) notice of the information which the authorities
require, and (2) ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in
respect of the investigation. First, we note that Cruz Azul was given two weeks in which to present
data concerning the extended POI. Cruz Azul th erefore had two weeks' notice of the information
required by the Ministry in respect of the extended POI.
848 Second, Mexico has made no claim to the
effect that Cruz Azul was prevented from adducing written "evidence" concerning the extended POI.
Whereas Mexico claims that Cruz Azul was deni ed any opportunity to comment on the extension of
the POI per se , Article 6.1 does not explicitly require the provision of opportunities for interested
parties to comment on decisions taken by the inves tigating authority in respect of the information it
requires. We therefore reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry's extension of the POI violated
Guatemala's obligations under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.
8.179 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Ar ticle 6.2 because Cruz Azul was not given any
opportunity to comment on Cementos Progreso's request for extension of the POI. There is no
evidence before us to suggest that Cruz Azul even knew that Cementos Progreso had requested an
extension of the POI. We interpret the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement as a
fundamental due process provision. In our view, when a request for an extension of the POI comes
from one interested party, due process requires that the investigating authority seeks the views of
other interested parties before acting on that request. Failure to respect the requirements of due
process would conflict with the requirement to provide interested parties with "a full opportunity for
the defence of their interests", consistent with Article 6.2.
849 Clearly, an interested party is not able to

848 We note that Mexico has not alleged that a failure to provide Cruz Azul with at least 30 days to
respond to the Ministry's supplementary questionnaire (which required the provision of data for an additional
six-month POI) constitutes a violation of Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement. That being the case, we shall
refrain from making any findings on this matter.
849 We do not consider that the obligation in the first sentence of Article 6.2 is qualified by the second
sentence of that provision. Thus, we do not consider that the obligation in the first sentence of Article 6.2 is
concerned exclusively with "providing opportunities for all in terested parties to meet those parties with adverse
interests…". Although the words "[t]o this end" at the beginning of the second sentence suggest that such
meetings are one way in which the obligation of the first sentence can be fulfilled, it does not follow that such
meetings provide the only means by which the obligation of the first sentence may be fulfilled. If that were the
case, there would be no need for the first sentence of Article 6.2.

defend its interests if it is prevented from commenting on requests made by other interested parties in
pursuit of their interests. In the present case, Cementos Progreso's request for extension of the POI
was made on 1 October 1996. The Ministry's decision to extend the POI was made on 4 October
1996, only three days after Cementos Progreso's request. There is no evidence to suggest that the
Ministry sought the views of Cruz Azul, or other interested parties, before deciding to extend the POI.
Accordingly, we find that by extending the PO I pursuant to a request from Cementos Progreso
without seeking the views of other interested parties in respect of that request, the Ministry failed to
provide Cruz Azul with "a full opportunity for the defence of [its] interests", contrary to Guatemala's
obligations under Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
6. Request for cost data - Articles 2.1 and 2.2
8.180 Mexico claims that the Ministry's request for cost data violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD
Agreement. Mexico asserts that the request for cost data was not justified because Cementos
Progreso's application did not contain any allegati on that Cruz Azul was selling below cost, because
the Ministry had no information from Cruz Azul to suggest that it was selling below cost, and because
the Ministry had imposed a provisional measure on the basis of price data (i.e., on the assumption that
there were no sales below cost). Mexico asserts that the Ministry was not justified in requesting cost
data in order to make adjustments for differences in physical characteristics initially requested by
Cruz Azul, because the Ministry had already rejected those adjustments in its preliminary affirmative
determination of dumping.
8.181 Guatemala asserts that Articles 2.1 and 2.2 do not prevent an investigating authority from
gathering cost information. Furthermore, Guatemala asserts that cost data was necessary in order to
make an allowance for differences in physical characteristics between the cement sold in Mexico and
the cement sold in Guatemala, as requested by Cruz Azul.
8.182 Articles 2.1 and 2.2 provide:
"2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being
dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal
value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less
than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country.
2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in
the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular
market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the
exporting country
850, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of
dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like
product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is
representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits."
8.183 We are not persuaded that the Ministry violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD Agreement by
requesting cost data from Cruz Azul. 851 Nothing in those provisions prevents an investigating

 850Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country
shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute
5 per cent or more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a lower
ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless
of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper comparison.
851 According to Guatemala, the Ministry made two requests for cost data from Cruz Azul: one in its
original questionnaire to exporters, and another in its supplementary questionnaire. Although we agree that cost

authority from requesting cost information, even if the applicant does not allege sales below cost. We
therefore reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the AD Agreement
by requesting cost data from Cruz Azul.
7. Verification visit
8.184 Mexico claims that the Ministry's verification visit to Cruz Azul was inconsistent with
Article 6.7 and Annex I (2), (3), (7) and (8) of the AD Agreement because the Ministry intended to
conduct the verification visit with the participation of non-governmental experts with an obvious
conflict of interest, because the Ministry sought to proceed with the verification without the express
agreement of Cruz Azul to the terms of the verification, because the Ministry failed to notify the
Government of Mexico of the participation of non-governmental experts, and because the Ministry
sought to verify information that had not been submitted by Cruz Azul.
8.185 Guatemala asserts that Mexico's claims are wi thout foundation. First, Guatemala argues that
Article 6.7 is silent on the permissible scope of a verification, and Annex I(7 and 8) does not support
Mexico's position. Guatemala asserts that Cruz Azul's failure to provide the cost data requested by
the Ministry would have justified the Ministry in immediately applying the "best information
available" rule. Instead, Guatemala states that the Ministry acted in good faith, and provided Cruz
Azul with one last chance to supply the cost data during the verification. Guatemala notes that Annex
I(7) refers to "any further information which needs to be provided", interpreting this to mean that an
investigating authority may seek "further information" during the course of an investigation.
8.186 Second, Guatemala asserts that the Ministry notified the Government of Mexico of its
intention to include non-governmental experts in its verification team in a letter dated 26 November
1996 (addressed to Cruz Azul, but copied to the Go vernment of Mexico). According to Guatemala,
Mexico acknowledged having received a copy of its letter. Guatemala asserts that it was not required
to explain the exceptional circumstances which necessitated the inclusion of non-governmental
experts, and that in any event Mexico knew that non-governmental experts were required because this
was the Ministry's first investigation.
8.187 Third, Guatemala denies that the non-governmental experts had any conflict of interest,
because Cruz Azul was not an interested party in any of the US proceedings in which the non-
governmental experts at issue had participated. Guatemala also asserts that the conflict-of-interest
issue is in any event irrelevant, since Cruz Azul refused to allow any verification of cost data, whether
or not the verification team included non-governmental experts.
(a) Inclusion of non-governmental experts with an alleged conflict of interest in the verification
team
8.188 Mexico claims that the inclusion of non-gover nmental experts with an alleged conflict of
interest in the Ministry's verification team constitu tes a violation of Article 6.7 and Annex I (2), (3),
(7) and (8) of the AD Agreement. In a communication dated 31 October 1996, the Ministry informed
Cruz Azul of its intention to conduct a verifica tion visit at Cruz Azul from 18 - 22 November 1996.

data was requested in the supplementary questionnaire, there is no evidence that cost data was expressly
requested in the original questionnaire. Section C of the original questionnaire makes it clear that an exporter
need only complete the section on cost of production if the domestic producers' application alleges sales below
cost. Section C also states that exporters will be informed - in a notification accompanying the questionnaire -
whether the section on cost of production must be completed. In response to a question, Guatemala informed
the Panel that the notification accompanying the original questionnaire to Cruz Azul is missing from its file.
Thus, there is no evidence that the Ministry actually requested cost of production data from Cruz Azul. In these
circumstances, we consider that Cruz Azul would have been entitled to assume that it did not need to provide
cost data in response to the Ministry's original questionnaire.

The Ministry's communication informed Cruz Azul of the identities of three non-governmental
experts to be included in the verification team, and of the Ministry's intention to verify certain cost
and sales data. Cruz Azul initially responded to this communication on 7 November 1996, in which
response Cruz Azul requested rescheduling of the verification visit to 2 - 6 December 1996.
Subsequently, in a letter dated 25 November 1996, Cruz Azul objected to the participation of two of
the three proposed non-governmental experts, whom Cruz Azul considered to have a conflict of
interest as a result of their work as representatives of the US domestic cement industry in the context
of a US anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of cement from Mexico.
8.189 We find at para. 8.250 below that it was entirely reasonable for Cruz Azul to object to the
inclusion in the Ministry's verification team of two non-governmental experts who had a conflict of
interest. Although we are of the view that an impartial and objective investigating authority would
not include non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest in its verification team, none of the
provisions cited by Mexico explicitly prohibit such conduct. Accordingly, we are unable to find that
the Ministry violated Article 6.7 and Annex I (2), (3), (7) and (8) of the AD Agreement by including
non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest in its verification team.
(b) Alleged failure to notify Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental experts
8.190 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD Agreement by
failing to notify the Government of Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the
Ministry's verification team, and of the exceptional circumstances justifying their inclusion.
8.191 Guatemala asserts that the Ministry notified the Government of Mexico of its intention to
include non-governmental experts in its verification team in a letter dated 26 November 1996.
According to Guatemala, Mexico acknowledged having received a copy of its letter. Guatemala
asserts that it was not required to explain the exceptional circumstances which necessitated the
inclusion of non-governmental experts, and that in any event Mexico knew that non-governmental
experts were required because this was the Ministry's first investigation.
8.192 Paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD Agreement provides:
"If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non-governmental experts in
the investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should
be so informed. Such non-governmental experts should be subject to effective
sanctions for breach of confidentiality requirements."
8.193 According to this provision, therefore, the Ministry was obligated to inform the Mexican
authorities of is intention to include non-governmental experts in the verification team for the
Ministry's visit to Cruz Azul. The question before us is whether the Ministry did so.
8.194 The Ministry sent a letter to Cruz Azul on 26 November 1996.
852 The letter informed Cruz
Azul of the Ministry's intention to include non-governmental experts in its verification team. The
letter even identified those experts by name. The letter ends with the phrase "c.c. Secretaría de
Comercio y Fomento Industrial de México" (hereinafter "SECOFI"). In principle, therefore, a copy of
the 26 November 1996 letter to Cruz Azul was to have been communicated to SECOFI, and therefore
to the Mexican Government. However, Guatemala has not provided any proof that this letter was
actually sent, or faxed, to SECOFI. Guatemala asserts that receipt of this letter is demonstrated by the
first sentence of a letter from a SECOFI official to the Ministry dated 2 December 1996, in which
SECOFI refers to the Ministry's notification of a verification visit at Cruz Azul from 3 - December
1996. In response, Mexico asserts that the notification referred to in the 2 December 1996 letter was a
separate notification of 26 November 1996 addressed to Mexico's Ambassador to Guatemala (see

852 See Annex Guatemala-57.

Annex Mexico-27). We consider that Mexico's assertion is borne out by the reference in Mexico's 2
December 1996 letter to a "notification to the government of Mexico, through its Ambassador in
Guatemala". Furthermore, we note that the second paragraph of Mexico's 2 December 1996 letter
states that Cruz Azul provided SECOFI with a copy of the letter it received from the Ministry
concerning details of the verification and the names of the persons who would perform the
verification. Thus, far from confirming that SE COFI was notified by Guatemala's authorities on 26
November 1996 of the participation of non-governmen tal experts in the Ministry's verification team,
Mexico's letter of 2 December 1996 suggests that (1) it only learnt about the participation of non-
governmental experts through a copy of the Ministry's 26 November 1996 letter to Cruz Azul, sent to
SECOFI by Cruz Azul, and (2) the only letter dated 26 November 1996 that Mexico received from the
Ministry was that sent to Mexico's Ambassador to Guatemala, which did not refer to the participation
of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team.
8.195 We recall once again that the panel in United States - Sections 301 - 310 of the Trade Act of
1974 found that:
"Since, in this case, both parties have submitted extensive facts and arguments in
respect of the EC claims, our task will essentially be to balance all evidence on record
and decide whether the EC, as party bearing the original burden of proof, has
convinced us of the validity of its claims. In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the
evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, we have to give the benefit of the doubt
to the US as defending party."
8.196 In principle, Mexico bears the burden to prove that the Ministry failed to inform it of the
inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team. As a practical matter, this
burden is impossible for Mexico to meet: one simply cannot prove that one was not informed of
something. Although Mexico cannot establish definitively that it was not informed by the Ministry of
the Ministry's intention to include non-governmental experts in its verification team, there is sufficient
evidence before us to suggest strongly that it was not so informed. Although an investigating
authority should normally be able to demonstrate that it complied with a formal requirement to inform
the authorities of another Member, Guatemala has failed to rebut the strong suggestion that it failed to
do so. In fact, Guatemala has simply referred to the very letter which suggests strongly that Mexico
was not notified by Guatemala.
853 In these circumstances, we do not consider that the evidence and
arguments of the parties "remain in equipoise". Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated
paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD Agreement by failing to inform the Government of Mexico of the
inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team.
854

853 The fact that the Mexican authorities knew of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the
Ministry's verification team (by virtue of Cruz Azul sending SECOFI a copy of the 26 November 1996 letter
Cruz Azul had received from the Ministry) is not releva nt to Mexico's claim. This is because Annex I(2)
requires that the authorities of the exporting Member be "informed" of the inclusion of non-governmental
experts. In our view, the obligation to "inform" is clearly on the authorities of the investigating Member. Those
authorities cannot rely on exporters informing their own authorities of the inclusion of non-governmental
experts in order to establish compliance with Annex I(2).
854 Paragraph 2 of Annex I provides that exporting Members "should" be informed of the inclusion of
non-governmental experts in a verification team. It does not provide that exporting Members "shall" be so
informed. Although the word "should" is often used colloquially to imply an exhortation, it can also be used "to
express a duty [or] obligation" (See The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, 1995, page
1283). Since Article 6.7 provides in relevant part that the provisions of Annex I "shall" apply, we see no
reason why Annex I (2) should not be interpreted in the mandatory sense. In our view, a hortatory interpretation
of the provisions of Annex I would be inconsistent with Article 6.7. Furthermore, Guatemala has not argued
that paragraph 2 of Annex I is merely hortatory. A ccordingly, we proceed on the basis that paragraph 2 of
Annex I should be interpreted in a mandatory sense.

8.197 Mexico also claims that the Ministry violated Annex I(2) by failing to inform Mexico of the
exceptional circumstances which justified the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's
verification team. Guatemala asserts that Annex I(2) did not require the Ministry to inform Mexico of
the exceptional circumstances at issue.
8.198 We agree with Guatemala. Whereas paragraph 2 of Annex I requires the exporting Member
to be "so informed", the logical conclusion from the structure of that provision is that the exporting
Member need only be informed of the intention to include non-governmental experts in the
investigating team. If the intention of the drafters had been to impose an obligation on authorities to
inform exporting Members of the "exceptional circumstances" at issue, presumably the first sentence
of Annex I(2) would have been drafted in a manner that clearly provided for that obligation. We
therefore reject Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated Annex I(2) by the Ministry's failure to inform
Mexico of the exceptional circumstances justifying the need to include non-governmental experts in
the Ministry's verification team.
(c) Scope of the verification
8.199 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.7 and Annex I(7) of the AD Agreement by
seeking to verify certain information (concerning the extended period of investigation) not submitted
by Cruz Azul in its questionnaire responses. Mexico asserts that the Ministry should have limited
itself to verifying the information submitted by Cruz Azul, and obtaining further details concerning
this information. According to Mexico, under no circumstances was the Ministry entitled to require
or review additional information. Mexico notes that paragraph 7 of Annex I of the AD Agreement
provides in relevant part that "the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify
information provided or to seek further details". According to Mexico, the "further details" referred to
in that provision are details concerning information already "provided" in the questionnaire response.
8.200 Guatemala rejects the argument that a verification must be limited to information already
submitted by an exporter in its questionnaire response. Guatemala notes that Annex I(7) refers to
"any further information which needs to be provided", interpreting this to mean that an investigating
authority may seek "further information" during the course of an investigation.
8.201 In addressing Mexico's claim under Article 6 .7 and Annex I(7), we note that Article 6.7
provides that "[t]he procedures described in Annex I shall apply to investigations carried out in the
territory of other Members". When examining verification visits scheduled by investigating
authorities in the territory of other Members, therefore, it is important to read Article 6.7 and Annex I
as a whole.
8.202 We note that Mexico has referred to specific parts of paragraph 7 of Annex I of the AD
Agreement. In our view, however, it is important to examine the full text of that provision, which
provides:
"As the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify information
provided or to obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the
questionnaire has been received unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the
government of the exporting Member is informed by the investigating authorities of
the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard practice
prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information
to be verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this
should not preclude requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided
in the light of information obtained." (emphasis supplied)
8.203 Although Annex I(7) provides that the "main pur pose" of the verification visit is to verify
information already provided, or to obtain further details in respect of that information, it also

provides that an investigating authority may "prior to the visit … advise the firms concerned … of any
further information which needs to be provided". Since there would be little point in advising a firm
of "further information … to be provided" in advance of the verification visit if the investigating
authority were precluded from examining that "furth er information" during the visit, we consider that
the phrase "further information … to be provided" refers to information to be provided during the
course of the verification. Mexico's view that an investigating authority may only verify information
submitted prior to the verification visit is not consistent with this interpretation of Annex I(7).
8.204 In response to a question from the Panel, Mexico argues that the phrase "any further
information … to be provided" refers to accounting information to be provided by the verified
company during verification in order to substantiate the information previously supplied to the
investigating authority. We note, however, that the phrase does not read "any further accounting
information … to be provided". The term "informa tion" is not qualified in any way by the express
wording of Annex I(7), and there are no elements in the context which plead for such qualification.
8.205 Furthermore, we note that the last phrase of Annex I(7) refers to on-the-spot requests for
further details to be provided in light of "information obtained". Thus, although it should be "standard
practice" to advise firms of additional information to be provided in advance of the verification visit,
this does not preclude an investigating authority from requesting "further details" during the course of
the investigation, "in light of the information obtained". In our view, the reference to "information
obtained" cannot mean the information obtained from the exporter in advance of the verification visit,
since (consistent with "standard practice") requests regarding that information should be made prior to
the visit, and not during the course of the investigation. Accordingly, the "information obtained" must
refer to information obtained during the course of the verification visit, since it is only information
obtained during the course of a verification visit which may prompt a request for further details during
the course of the verification visit. The last phrase of Annex I(7) therefore confirms our
understanding that an investigating authority may seek new information during the course of the
verification visit.
8.206 We therefore reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry violated Article 6.7 and paragraph 7 of
Annex I of the AD Agreement by seeking to verify information not previously submitted in Cruz
Azul's questionnaire responses.
8. Confidential treatment - Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2
8.207 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the AD
Agreement in according confidential treatment to certain information submitted by Cementos
Progreso. Mexico's claims concern (1) information submitted during the verification visit at
Cementos Progreso, and (2) information submitted by Cementos Progreso at the 19 December 1996
public hearing.
855
8.208 Guatemala asserts that, in its handling of the information supplied by Cementos Progreso, the
Ministry complied with Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement. Guatemala asserts that the
documents submitted by Cementos Progreso were clearly of a confidential nature and could not be
summarized in accordance with Article 6.5.1. Guatemala understands that it is common practice for

855 In its second oral statement to the Panel (paras 32 -35), Mexico claimed th at the Ministry violated
Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement by handing Mr. Cannistra confidential information submitted by Cruz Azul,
without Cruz Azul's permission. This claim was not included in Mexico's request for establishment of this
Panel (WT/DS156/2 and WT/DS156/2/Corr.1). The only Article 6.5 claims included in Mexico's request for
establishment (at section D.8) concern the Ministry's treatment of "information from Cementos Progreso".
There is no reference to information submitted by Cruz Azul. Mexico's claim concerning the confidentiality of
information submitted to the Ministry by Cruz Azul therefore falls outside our terms of reference.

investigating authorities in other countries not to require public versions of confidential documents
obtained during verification visits.
(a) Information submitted during verification
8.209 First, Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.5.2 by accepting to provide
confidential treatment for certain information submitted during the verification visit at Cementos
Progreso, despite Cementos Progreso failing to justify its request for confidential treatment.
However, Article 6.5.2 does not require any justification to be provided by the interested party
requesting confidential treatment. If any such obligation exists, it derives from Article 6.5, not 6.5.2.
Mexico has not based this claim on Article 6.5. Article 6.5.2 speaks only to events when "the
authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted". Since there is nothing to suggest
that the Ministry found that Cementos Progreso's request for confidentiality of the relevant
information was not warranted, Article 6.5.2 would appear not to apply in the factual circumstances of
this case. We therefore reject Mexico's Article 6.5.2 claim.
8.210 Second, Mexico makes a series of claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of
the AD Agreement. Mexico's claims are all based on the fact that either (1) the Ministry failed to
require Cementos Progreso to provide non-confidential summaries of information that was
"susceptible of summary" (within the meaning of Article 6.5.1), or (2) the Ministry failed to require
Cementos Progreso to provide reasons why the information - if it was not "susceptible of summary" -
could not be made public.
8.211 Mexico's claims concern the following information submitted by Cementos Progreso during
the Ministry's verification visit to that company: technical information on the firm's principal
equipment; a contract between Cementos Progreso and F.L. Smith & Co.; and tables used to prepare
questionnaires and reconcile the cost structure calculated for production of grey portland cement with
the accounting statements. Although Mexico's claim is based in part on an implicit argument that the
abovementioned information was "susceptible of summary", Mexico has adduced no evidence to that
effect. Mexico has failed to demonstrate how information of the sort enumerated above could be
summarized "in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance" thereof. In
our view, information of that sort is not generall y capable of summarization "in sufficient detail to
permit a reasonable understanding of the substance". In our view, and in the absence of any evidence
or argument from Mexico to the contrary, we are not persuaded that an impartial and objective
investigating authority could not properly have concluded that the abovementioned information was
not "susceptible of summary". For this reason, we reject all of Mexico's claims that are based on
Mexico's understanding that the Ministry failed to require Cementos Progreso to provide non-
confidential summaries of information that was "susceptible of summary".
8.212 As for Mexico's claims that the Ministry failed to require Cementos Progreso to provide
reasons why the information - which was not "susceptible of summary" - could not be made public,
we note that Article 6.5.1 provides:
"The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to
furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient
detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information
submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that
such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a
statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided."
8.213 Thus, Article 6.5.1 generally obliges investigating authorities to require interested parties
providing confidential information to furnish non- confidential summaries thereof. However, such
non-confidential summaries need not be furnished when, "in exceptional circumstances", the
information "is not susceptible of summary". In such cases, "a statement of the reasons why

summarization is not possible must be provided". Although Article 6.5.1 does not explicitly provide
that "the authorities shall require" interested parties to provide a statement of the reasons why
summarization is not possible, any meaningful interpretation of Article 6.5.1 must impose such an
obligation on the investigating authorities. It is certainly not possible to conclude that the obligation
concerning the need to provide a statement of reasons is an obligation imposed exclusively on the
interested party submitting the information, and not the investigating authority, since the AD
Agreement is not addressed at interested parties. The AD Agreement imposes obligations on WTO
Members and their investigating authorities. Acco rdingly, in our view Article 6.5.1 imposes an
obligation on investigating authorities to require parties that indicate that information is not
susceptible of summary to provide a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible.
Guatemala has failed to adduce any evidence that the requisite statement of reasons was provided by
Cementos Progreso, or that the Ministry even required Cementos Progreso to provide such a statement
of reasons. We therefore find that the Ministry violated Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement by failing
to require Cementos Progreso to provide a statement of the reasons why summarization of the relevant
information was not possible. In making this finding, we attach no importance whatsoever to
Guatemala's assertions concerning the alleged treatment of similar information by other WTO
Members. Whether or not other WTO Members act in conformity with Article 6.5.1 is of no
relevance to the present dispute, which concerns the issue of whether or not the Ministry acted in
conformity with that provision.
8.214 Mexico has also made additional claims concerning the need for a statement of the reasons
why the information is not susceptible of summary on the basis of Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.5.2
of the AD Agreement. In our view, the need for a statement of the reasons why the information is not
susceptible of summary is specifically addressed by Article 6.5.1. It is not specifically addressed by
the other provisions cited by Mexico. Accordingly, having made a finding on the basis of
Article 6.5.1, we do not consider it necessary to make additional findings on the basis of Articles 6.1,
6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement.
8.215 Finally, and in the alternative, Mexico refers to the possibility that the Ministry accepted a
"verbal justification" from Cementos Progreso concerning the need for confidential treatment of the
information at issue. Mexico claims that such acceptance constitutes a violation of Articles 6.1, 6.2,
6.3 and 6.4. However, since there is no evidence before us to suggest that any such "verbal
justification" was provided, there is no factual basis for any examination of this claim by the Panel.
(b) Information submitted by Cementos Progreso at 19 December 1996 public hearing
8.216 First, Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement
by failing to allow Cruz Azul "proper access" to the information submitted by Cementos Progreso at
the 19 December 1996 public hearing. We recall that we have already addressed this issue in
previous sections of our report (see section 2(b)), where we found a violation of Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4
of the AD Agreement. Since we consider these to be the specific provisions of the AD Agreement
governing an interested party's right to information submitted by another interested party, we do not
consider it necessary to address Mexico's claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2. These provisions do not
specifically address an interested party's right of access to information submitted by another interested
party.
8.217 Second, Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the AD
Agreement by granting Cementos Progreso's 19 December 1996 submission confidential treatment on
its own initiative. We understand Mexico to claim that the Ministry violated Articles 6.5, 6.5.1 and
6.5.2 by providing confidential treatment without "good cause" having been shown by Cementos
Progreso.
8.218 Article 6.5 provides:

"Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure
would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its
disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the
information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or
which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon
good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not
be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it." (footnote
deleted)
8.219 The text of Article 6.5 distinguishes between two types of confidential information: (1)
"information which is by nature confidential", and (2) information "which is provided on a
confidential basis". Article 6.5 then provides that the provision of confidential treatment is
conditional on "good cause" being shown. Logically, one might expect that "good cause" for
confidential treatment of information which is "by nature confidential" could be presumed, and that
"good cause" need only be shown for information which is not "by nature confidential" (but for which
confidential treatment is nonetheless sought). It is presumably for this reason that, in rejecting
Mexico's claim, Guatemala argues that the relevant information was "clearly of a confidential nature".
While we have some sympathy for Guatemala's argument, given the logical appeal of such an
interpretation of Article 6.5, we note that Article 6.5 is not drafted in a way which suggests this
approach. Instead, the requirement to show "good cause" appears to apply for both types of
confidential information, such that even inform ation "which is by nature confidential" cannot be
afforded confidential treatment unless "good cause" has been shown.856
8.220 In our view, the requisite "good cause" must be shown by the interested party submitting the
confidential information at issue. We do not co nsider that Article 6.5 envisages "good cause" being
shown by the investigating authority itself, since - with respect to information that is not "by nature
confidential" in particular - the investigating authority may not even know whether or why there is
cause to provide confidential treatment.
8.221 As noted in para. 8.143 above, Guatemala has not demonstrated, or even argued, that
Cementos Progreso requested confidential treatment for its 19 December 1996 submission, let alone
that Cementos Progreso showed "good cause" for confidential treatment of that submission.
Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement by granting
Cementos Progreso's 19 December submission confidential treatment on its own initiative. We note
that Mexico has also alleged a violation of Ar ticles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement. Since
Article 6.5 specifically addresses the issue of whether or not an investigating authority may grant
confidential treatment on its own initiative, and since Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 do not, we do not
consider it necessary to address Mexico's claims under the latter provisions of the AD Agreement.
8.222 Third, and in the alternative, Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
and 6.4 of the AD Agreement by accepting a "verbal justification" that the information contained in
the submission made by Cementos Progreso at the 19 December 1996 public hearing should be
considered confidential. As noted above,
857 there is no evidence that any such "verbal justification"
was provided in the present case. It is therefore not necessary for us to address this claim.
8.223 At paras 414 - 416 of its first written submission, Mexico also alleges violation of Articles
6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 on the basis of "the facts mentioned in section V.A.1(e) and (f),
V.A.2, V.B, V.C.3, V.D.1, 2, 4, 9 and 10, E.2 and 4". Since Mexico has made absolutely no effort to
link those facts with the aforementioned provisions of the AD Agreement, we are in no position to
examine these claims.

856 Although we will now consider who must show "good cause", we make no findings as to how "good
cause" may be shown in respect of information which is "by nature" confidential.
857 See para. 8.215.

9. Essential facts
8.224 Mexico claims that the Ministry did not inform Cruz Azul promptly of the "essential facts
under consideration" that would be taken into account for the definitive anti-dumping measure,
contrary to Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9.
8.225 Guatemala asserts that the "essential facts under consideration" were disclosed to Cruz Azul.
Guatemala asserts that, in a notice dated 6 December 1996, interested parties were informed that the
Directorate of Economic Integration would make a technical study on the basis of the evidence in the
file, and that copies of the file were available. Guatemala therefore argues that the "essential facts"
were in the file, to which interested parties had access. In addition, Guatemala claims that the
"essential facts" were already disclosed in a detailed report setting out the factual basis for the
Ministry's preliminary determination, and that the parties could comment on these "essential facts" at
the 19 December 1996 public hearing. Guatemala argues that the Ministry was permitted to proceed
expeditiously under Article 6.14, rather than delaying the final determination in order to issue
"another description of the essential facts".
8.226 Article 6.9 provides:
"The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties
of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether
to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for
the parties to defend their interests."
8.227 We shall first examine Guatemala's argument that the "essential facts" were disclosed to
interested parties in a detailed report setting out the Ministry's preliminary findings. In doing so, we
note that Guatemala has sought to draw parallels between this alleged disclosure mechanism and that
employed by the United States.
858 We take no view on whether or not the procedure used by the
Ministry is similar in any way to that employed by the United States, or whether the US procedure is
in conformity with Article 6.9, since the conformity of the United States' procedure with Article 6.9 of
the AD Agreement is not at issue in the present dispute.
8.228 In our view, the alleged disclosure by the Ministry of the "essential facts" forming the basis of
the Ministry's preliminary determination does not meet the requirements of Article 6.9. Article 6.9
provides explicitly for disclosure of the "essential facts … which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures" (emphasis supplied). Disclosure of the "essential facts"
forming the basis of a preliminary determination is clearly inadequate in circumstances where the
factual basis of the provisional measure is significantly different from the factual basis of the
definitive measure. In the present case, the preliminary measure was based on a preliminary
determination of threat of material injury, whereas the final determination was based on actual
material injury. Furthermore, the Ministry's preliminary determination (16 August 1996) was based
on a POI different from that used for its final determination, since the POI was extended on 4 October
1996. Indeed, Guatemala has cited
859 the United States' assertion that "[i]n the course of an anti-
dumping investigation, the bulk of the evidence which forms the basis of the final determination is
generally gathered after the preliminary determination". 860 If the bulk of the evidence which forms
the basis of the final determination is generally gathered after the preliminary determination, we fail
to see how disclosure of the "essential facts" forming the basis of the preliminary determination could
amount to disclosure of the "essential facts" forming the basis of the final determination, since the
"bulk" of the "essential facts" underlying the final determination would not yet have been gathered.
In these circumstances, we do not consider that the Ministry could satisfy the Article 6.9 obligation to

858 Guatemala's first oral statement, para. 62.
859 Guatemala's second oral statement, para. 61.
860 United States' third party submission, para. 43.

"inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the
decision whether to apply definitive measures" by providing disclosure of the essential facts forming
the basis of its preliminary determination.
8.229 We now turn to Guatemala's argument that the Ministry disclosed the "essential facts" by
making copies of the file available to interested pa rties. We note that an investigating authority's file
is likely to contain vast amounts of information, some of which may not be relied on by the
investigating authority in making its decision whether to apply definitive measures. For example, the
file may contain information submitted by an inte rested party that was subsequently shown to be
inaccurate upon verification. Although that information will remain in the file, it would not form the
basis of the investigating authority's decision whether to apply definitive measures. The difficulty for
an interested party with access to the file, however, is that it will not know whether particular
information in the file forms the basis of the authority's final determination. One purpose of
Article 6.9 is to resolve this difficulty for inte rested parties. This has been acknowledged by
Guatemala, which has itself asserted that "[t]he object and purpose of Article 6.9 is to allow exporters
a fair opportunity to comment on the important issues in an investigation after the record is closed to
new facts".
861 An interested party will not know whether a particular fact is "important" or not unless
the investigating authority has explicitly identified it as one of the "essential facts" which form the
basis of the authority's decision whether to impose definitive measures.
8.230 Furthermore, if the disclosure of "essential facts" under Article 6.9 could be undertaken
simply by providing access to all information in the file, there would be little, if any, practical
difference between Article 6.9 and Article 6.4. Guatemala is effectively arguing that it complied with
Article 6.9 by complying with Article 6.4, i.e., by providing "timely opportunities for interested
parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases … and that is used by
the authorities …". We do not accept an interpretation of Article 6.9 that would effectively reduce its
substantive requirements to those of Article 6.4. In our view, an investigating authority must do more
than simply provide "timely opportunities for interest ed parties to see all information that is relevant
to the presentation of their cases … and that is used by the authorities …" in order to "inform all
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures". In light of these considerations, we do not consider that the
Ministry could comply with the requirement to "inform all interested parties of the essential facts
under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures"
simply by offering to provide interested parties with copies of all information in the file.
8.231 For the above reasons, we find that the Ministry violated Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement by
failing to "inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis
for the decision whether to apply definitive measures".
8.232 Mexico claims that the Ministry's failure to di sclose the "essential facts" forming the basis of
its final determination also constitutes a violation of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
Article 6.9 is the provision of the AD Agreement which specifically addresses the disclosure of
"essential facts". Since we have already found that the Ministry violated the specific obligation
provided for in Article 6.9, we do not need to consider whether the Ministry's failure to disclose
"essential facts" also constituted a violation of Articles 6.1 and 6.2.
10. Failure to inform cruz azul of changed injury determination
8.233 Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement by
changing its injury determination from a preliminary determination of threat of material injury to a
final determination of actual material injury during the course of the investigation, without informing
Cruz Azul of that change, and without giving Cruz Azul a full and ample opportunity to defend itself.

861 Guatemala's second oral statement, para. 63.

Mexico argues that during the course of the investigation and up until the public hearing which the
Ministry held with the parties, i.e. 11 months afte r the initiation of the investigation, Cruz Azul did
not know that the Ministry had changed the examination and determination of threat of material
injury. Mexico asserts that Cruz Azul was therefore denied an opportunity to exercise the right of
defence given under Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9, including the opportunity to provide relevant information
and evidence that might have counteracted the determination of injury by the authority.
8.234 According to Guatemala, Mexico is essentially suggesting that an investigating authority must
inform the exporter of its intention to base its final determination on threat of injury or material injury
in order that the exporter may have an adequate opportunity to defend its interests. Guatemala asserts
that there is no support for this argument in the AD Agreement. Article 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 contain
nothing to suggest that an investigating authority mu st inform an exporter of the legal basis for the
final determination prior to notice of that determination being given. According to Guatemala,
Article 5 of the AD Agreement itself provides the legal basis for a final determination, in that the final
determination may be based either on threat of material injury or actual material injury. Thus,
Guatemala asserts that an exporter defending an anti-dumping case knows, through Article 5, that to
escape unscathed he must show no threat of injury and no material injury. Guatemala submits that
Cruz Azul can only blame itself for having failed to mount a defence for material injury, and that it is
significant that Mexico does not identify any particular evidence that Cruz Azul would have supplied
if it had known that the Ministry was going to find material injury and not threat of injury. Guatemala
argues that Cruz Azul never provided any evidence that it had not been engaged in dumping or that
Cementos Progreso had not been adversely affected by the dumped imports, and that Mexico has not
informed the Panel that Cruz Azul was not engage d in dumping or that Cementos Progreso was not
materially injured. All Mexico's arguments before the panel, like Cruz Azul's complaints to the
investigating authority, relate to procedural, not substantive issues. According to Guatemala,
however, facts are facts: in August 1996, when the preliminary determination was issued it was clear
that Cementos Progreso was being threatened with material injury. By January 1997, when the final
determination was issued, the files showed that Cementos Progreso had already been injured.
8.235 Mexico does not question the right of an inves tigating authority to initiate an investigation
and make a preliminary affirmative determination on the basis of threat of material injury, and
subsequently issue a final determination on the basis of actual material injury. Rather, we understand
Mexico to claim that an investigating authorit y exercising that right should inform exporters
accordingly, and provide them with an opportunity to comment. In other words, an investigating
authority should inform interested parties when it changes its injury determination from a preliminary,
legal determination of threat of material injury to a final, legal determination of actual material injury.
8.236 In addressing this claim, we reject Guatemala's argument that, in order to "escape unscathed",
the onus is on the exporter to demonstrate that it has not caused injury through dumping. The onus is
not on the exporter to demonstrate a negative. Rather, the onus is on the investigating authority to
demonstrate affirmatively that the exporter has engaged in dumping which has caused injury to the
relevant domestic industry. Only if the affirmative case of dumping, injury and causal link is proven
may anti-dumping measures be imposed. We also attach no importance to Guatemala's assertion that
Mexico has failed to deny before the Panel that Cruz Azul had not dumped, and had not caused injury
to Cementos Progreso as a result of such dumping. The issue before us is not whether Cruz Azul
engaged in dumping which caused injury to Cementos Progreso. That assertion would involve us in a
de novo examination of the evidence before the Ministry, which we are not prepared to undertake.
Rather, the issue is whether the Ministry, in finding that Cruz Azul had engaged in dumping which
caused injury to Cementos Progreso, complied with its various obligations under the AD Agreement.
8.237 We do not consider that an investigating authority need inform interested parties in advance
when, having issued a preliminary affirmative determination on the basis of threat of material injury,
it subsequently makes a final determination of actual material injury. No provision of the AD

Agreement requires an investigating authority to info rm interested parties, during the course of the
investigation, that it has changed the legal basis for its injury determination. Investigating authorities
are instead required to forward to interested parties a public notice, or a separate report, setting forth
"in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered
material by the investigating authorities", consistent with Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement. If
decisions on issues of law had to be disclosed to interested parties during the course of the
investigation, there would be little need for interested parties to receive the notice provided for in
Article 12.2. Furthermore, to the extent that there is any difference between the preliminary
determination of injury and the final determination of injury, that change will be apparent to interested
parties comparing the public notice of the investigating authority's preliminary determination with the
public notice of its final determination.
8.238 Mexico's claim is based on Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 of the AD Agreement. We note that
Articles 6.1 and 6.9 impose certain obligations on investigating authorities in respect of
"information", "evidence" and "essential facts". However, Mexico's claim does not concern interested
parties' right to have access to certain factual information during the course of an investigation.
Mexico's claim concerns interested parties' alleged right to be informed of an investigating authority's
legal determinations during the course of an investigation. As for Article 6.2, we note that the first
sentence of that provision is very general in nature. We are unable to interpret such a general
sentence in a way that would impose a specific obligation on investigating authorities to inform
interested parties of the legal basis for its final determination on injury during the course of an
investigation, when the express wording of Article 12.2 only imposes such a specific obligation on
investigating authorities at the end of the investigation.
8.239 We therefore reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.9 by
changing its injury determination from a preliminary determination of threat of material injury to a
final determination of actual material injury during the course of the investigation, without informing
Cruz Azul of that change.
E. A
LLEGED VIOLATIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL DETERMINATION
1. Mexico's claims concerning the ministry's final determination of dumping
8.240 Mexico makes a number of allegations concerning the dumping analysis performed by the
Ministry in its final determination. Mexico's claims concern the Ministry's calculation of normal
value, of the export price, and its comparison of the two. The information used by the Ministry to
calculate normal value was the "best information available". Mexico claims that the Ministry's
recourse to the "best information available" was inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
We need only examine Mexico's additional claims regarding normal value and dumping, if the
Ministry's use of the "best information available" was consistent with Article 6.8. We shall therefore
examine this issue first.
8.241 Mexico claims that the Ministry's use of "best information available" was not justified in the
present case, since Cruz Azul did not deny access to the necessary information, nor significantly
impede the Ministry's investigation. Mexico also claims that the Ministry violated paragraphs 3, 5
and 7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement in its handling of the "best information available"
8.242 Guatemala asserts that the Ministry was justified in having recourse to the "best information
available" for the purpose of calculating normal value, because of Cruz Azul and Mexico's "refusal to
cooperate".
862 In this regard, Guatemala refers to Cruz Azul's refusal to provide cost data, to provide
sales data for the period 1 December 1995 - 31 May 1996, and to cooperate during the verification
visit.

862 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 106.

8.243 Article 6.8 provides:
"In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph."
8.244 Article 6.8 therefore permits the use of "best information available" if an interested party (1)
refuses access to necessary information, (2) otherwis e does not provide necessary information, or (3)
significantly impedes the investigation.
8.245 Before determining whether the Ministry was justified in having recourse to the "best
information available" for the purpose of calculating normal value, we note that Guatemala's
justification for the Ministry's use of "best information available" does not correspond to that provided
by the Ministry in its final Resolution of 17 January 1997. In that Resolution, the Ministry considered
that:
"the information submitted by the exporter cannot be taken into account when
calculating the normal value of the product investigated because it could not be
verified and the technical accounting evidence submitted by the exporter on 18
December 1996 (confidential information) could not replace verification of the
information by the Guatemalan investigating authority, as required by Article 6.6 of
the Anti-Dumping Code"
863 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
Thus, the Ministry clearly based its recourse to th e "best information available" on its inability to
verify the data submitted by Cruz Azul. The Ministry did not, according to its final Resolution, rely
on the "best information available" because of Cruz Azul's failure to provide certain sales and cost
data, as alleged by Guatemala in these Panel proceedings. Even if the additional factors identified by
Guatemala before the Panel could justify the use of "best information available", such ex post
justification by Guatemala should not form part of our assessment of the conduct of the Ministry
leading up to the imposition of the January 1997 definitive anti-dumping measure. The issue before
us is whether the Ministry complied with the AD Ag reement. In examining that issue, we shall
confine ourselves to the reasoning provided by the Ministry in its determinations. We note that this
approach is similar to that adopted by the panel in Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports
of Certain Dairy Products, which ignored explanatory statements made in Korea's first submission to
the panel that were not reflected in the Korean authorities' analysis at the time of the investigation.
864
8.246 Confining ourselves to the reasoning contained in the Ministry's determination, we shall
consider whether the Ministry's inability to verify certain data could properly have justified the
Ministry's recourse to the "best information available". In the context of Article 6.8, we must consider
whether the Ministry could properly have concluded that Cruz Azul "significantly impede[d] the
[Ministry's] investigation" by failing to cooperate with the Ministry's verification visit to its premises.
8.247 In a letter dated 31 October 1996, the Ministry informed Cruz Azul that its verification team
would include three non-governmental experts, whose names were also included in that letter. In a
letter dated 25 November 1996, Cruz Azul raised concerns regarding the inclusion in the verification
team of two of the three non-governmental experts identified by the Ministry. These concerns were
based on the fact that the two non-governmental experts at issue had represented the US domestic
industry in the context of US anti-dumping proceed ings concerning imports of cement from Mexico.

863 See section B.6, page 14, Annex Mexico-41 (translated).
864 See Korea - Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/R, para. 7.67.

Cruz Azul provided the Ministry with copies of the Administrative Protection Orders ("APOs")
signed by those individuals in the context of those US proceedings.
8.248 In a letter dated 26 November 1996, the Ministry informed Cruz Azul, inter alia, that the non-
governmental experts had signed an agreement to protect the confidentiality of all confidential
information. The Ministry also informed Cruz Azul that it was up to the investigating authority to
determine the composition of its verification team, and that the Ministry would have no choice but to
base its final determination on the best information available if Cruz Azul refused to cooperate.
8.249 The Ministry's verification team arrived at the offices of Cruz Azul on 3 December 1996.
Cruz Azul again claimed that two of the non-govern mental experts in the Ministry's verification team
had a conflict of interest, referring to their participation in a US anti-dumping investigation against
imports of cement from Mexico. Cruz Azul requested that the verification proceed without those two
particular non-governmental experts. The Ministry repeated that those experts had signed a
confidentiality agreement, and added that Cruz Azul had not been a party to the US anti-dumping
proceedings in which the experts had represented the US domestic industry. According to Guatemala,
the Ministry therefore had no choice but to inform Cruz Azul and the Mexican Government that their
refusal to cooperate would require the Ministry to base its final determination of dumping on the best
information available.
8.250 In our view, it was entirely reasonable for Cruz Azul to object to the inclusion in the
Ministry's verification team of two non-govern mental experts who had represented US cement
producers against Mexican cement producers in US anti-dumping proceedings. Although it is true, as
argued by Guatemala, that Cruz Azul was not an interested party in those US anti-dumping
proceedings, information gleaned by representatives of the US domestic industry could be used to
Cruz Azul's disadvantage in the Ministry's proceeding against it. We consider it unlikely that
individuals who had acted against Mexican cement producers in the context of the US proceeding
could completely detach themselves from their previous functions when conducting a verification at
Cruz Azul. In particular, there is no guarantee that the role of the two non-governmental experts in
the US proceedings ( i.e., to assist US domestic producers in their claims against Mexican cement
exporters) would not undermine their objectivity and impartiality during the verification visit to Cruz
Azul. The fact that steps may have been taken to ensure that the non-governmental experts did not
violate the confidentiality of Cruz Azul's data provides no guarantee that their role in the US
proceedings would not undermine their objectivity and impartiality during the verification visit to
Cruz Azul, since it is possible to be partial and non-objective while preserving confidentiality.
8.251 In light of these considerations, we do not consider that an objective and impartial
investigating authority could properly have found that Cruz Azul significantly impeded its
investigation by objecting to the inclusion of non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest in
its verification team. We do not consider that a failure to cooperate necessarily constitutes significant
impediment of an investigation, since in our view the AD Agreement does not require cooperation by
interested parties at any cost. Although there are certain consequences (under Article 6.8) for
interested parties if they fail to cooperate with an investigating authority, in our view such
consequences only arise if the investigating authority itself has acted in a reasonable, objective and
impartial manner. In light of the facts of this case, we find that the Ministry did not act in such a
manner.
8.252 Furthermore, Annex II(3) provides that all information which is "verifiable", and
"appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties", should
be taken into account by the investigating authority when determinations are made. In other words,
"best information available" should not be used when information is "verifiable", and when "it can be
used in the investigation without undue difficulties". In our view, the information submitted by Cruz
Azul was "verifiable". The fact that it was not actually verified as a result of the Ministry's response

to reasonable concerns raised by Cruz Azul does not change this. In addition, there is nothing in the
Ministry's final determination to suggest that the information submitted by Cruz Azul could not be
used in the investigation "without undue difficulties". Since the information was "verifiable", and
since the Ministry did not demonstrate that it could not be used "without undue difficulties", Annex
II(3) provides strong contextual support for the above conclusion that the Ministry violated Article 6.8
in using the "best information available" as a result of the cancelled verification visit.
8.253 Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated Article 6.8, read in light of paragraph 3 of
Annex II of the AD Agreement, in having recourse to the "best information available" for the purpose
of making its final dumping determination.
8.254 The above finding is based on the Ministry's own justification for recourse to the "best
information available" (i.e., that the information submitted by Cruz Azul could not be verified). We
do not consider it necessary to make findings on the basis of the ex post justification provided by
Guatemala in these proceedings ( i.e., Cruz Azul's failure to provide sales data for the extended POI,
and its failure to provide certain cost data). Even if we did so, however, a similar result would likely
ensue. With regard to Cruz Azul's failure to provide sales data for the extended POI, we have found
that the Ministry was entitled to extend the POI w ithout informing Cruz Azul of the reasons why it
did so. In such circumstances, the Ministry may have been entitled to use the "best information
available" for sales data which Cruz Azul failed to submit in respect of the extended POI. However,
the Ministry's use of the "best information available" was not restricted to the extended POI. The
Ministry also used "best information available" ( i.e., two invoices attached to Cementos Progreso's
application) concerning the original POI, even though neither the Ministry nor Guatemala has argued
that Cruz Azul failed to provide sales data for the original POI. An impartial and objective
investigating authority could not properly rely on "best information available" sales data for the
original POI, simply on the basis of Cruz Azul's failure to provide sales data for the extended POI.
Although we do not consider it necessary to make any finding in this regard, we do not consider that
an impartial and objective investigating authority could properly have had recourse to the "best
information available" for sales data for the original POI in these circumstances.
8.255 With regard to cost data, we note that the Ministry used "best information available" cost data
for the whole POI. However, there is evidence in the record that Cruz Azul submitted cost of
production data for its Lagunas plant for the year 1995 (see Annex Mexico-64) in its reply to the
Ministry's supplementary questionnaire. The year 1995 covers the original POI, and the first month
of the extended POI. Mexico asserts that only the Lagunas plant manufactured cement destined for
the Guatemalan market. Guatemala has not disputed that assertion, but has stated that the Ministry
required access to cost data from all of Cruz Azul's Mexican production facilities in order to calculate
normal value. However, Guatemala has failed to demonstrate that the information could not be used
in the investigation "without undue difficulties" , within the meaning of Annex II(3) of the AD
Agreement. There is no such explanation in the Ministry's January 1997 Resolution. Indeed, the fact
that Cruz Azul even submitted this information is not mentioned in the Ministry's final Resolution. It
is true that the cost data only covered the orig inal POI and part of the extended POI. Thus, the
Ministry may have been entitled to use "best information available" cost data for the remainder of the
extended POI. However, the Ministry used "best information available" cost data for the whole POI.
As discussed above, failure to provide data for part of the POI cannot justify recourse to "best
information available" for the wh ole POI. Although we do not consider it necessary to make any
finding in this regard, we do not consider that an impartial and objective investigating authority could
properly have had recourse to the "best information available" to ascertain costs for the whole of the
POI in these circumstances.
8.256 In light of our finding that the Ministry's recourse to the "best information available" violated
Article 6.8, read in light of paragraph 3 of Annex II, we need not examine Mexico's additional claims
concerning the dumping analysis performed by the Ministry.

2. Mexico's claims concerning the ministry's final determination of injury
(a) Change of threat of injury to material injury
8.257 Mexico claims that Guatemala's change of its injury finding from a preliminary determination
of threat of material injury to a final determination of material injury gave rise to violations of Articles
6, 12 as well as Article 3.
8.258 To the extent that this claim refers to the issue that Guatemala acted inconsistently with
Articles 6 in respect of its extension of the period of investigation and a change from a preliminary
determination of threat of material injury to a final determination of material injury, we have already
addressed these claims supra in sections D.5. and D.10.
8.259 To the extent that Mexico claims that the Mini stry's injury determinations were not based on
positive or sufficient evidence, contrary to Article 3, this matter is addressed in the following sections.
8.260 To the extent that Mexico claims that the notification under Article 12 of imposition of a
definitive anti-dumping measure was insufficient, we address this matter at para. 8.291 below.
(b) Volume of dumped imports
8.261 Mexico claims that the evaluation by Guatemala of the volume of dumped imports was not
consistent with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement for a number of reasons. First, Mexico asserts that
Guatemala confined itself to considering the maximum and minimum volumes imported during the
investigation period. Second, Guatemala used a data collection period of one year and failed to
compare the volume of dumped imports during that period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-
term trends in imports. Third, Guatemala erroneously determined the volume of imports of grey
portland cement from Mexico by including imports of the product under investigation from sources
other than Mexico and by including other types of cement not under investigation, for example, grey
cement or slow-setting cement, which are imported under the same tariff heading. In addition,
Mexico argues that Guatemala violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 by failing to take into account certain
imports of the product under investigation imported by MATINSA, an importer associated with the
petitioner, Cementos Progreso.
865
8.262 Guatemala asserts that it examined the volume of dumped imports both in absolute and in
relative terms. Guatemala found that during the investigation period imports from Cruz Azul
increased from 140 tons in June 1995 to 25,079 tons in May 1996, with a maximum in March 1996
(45,859.31 tons). Cruz Azul's share in domesti c consumption went from one per cent of the
Guatemalan market (in June 1995) to 21 per cent of the market (May 1996) with a high of 32 per cent
in March. Guatemala argues that it properly examined the rate at which import volumes were
increasing as required by Article 3.2. Guatemala asserts that there was no need to evaluate import
trends for periods prior to 1995 as there were simply no imports of Cruz Azul cement until June 1995.
Guatemala also argues that it took MATINSA's imports into account and concluded that they did not
weaken its determination of injury caused by cement imports from Cruz Azul. Guatemala also argues
that it did not disregard the existence of other types of cement, imported under tariff heading
2523.29.00. In its analysis, the Ministry only considered imports from Cruz Azul. The Ministry noted

865 Mexico also asserts that the Ministry did not co nsider that the change from a threat of material
injury to material injury would in any case require an evaluation of the volume of dumped imports in
accordance with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement, as opposed to the analysis of "a significant rate of increase of
dumped imports" under Article 3.7(i) carried out in the preliminary determination of threat of material injury.
We are of the view that our present task is to consider whether Guatemala's examination of the volume of
dumped imports complied with Article whether 3.2, not whether and how it differed from Guatemala's
examination of the volume of dumped imports for the purpose of the preliminary determination.

that imports from Cruz Azul represented 91 per cent of total imports of grey cement into Guatemala
during the investigation period. The Ministry did not assume that all the imports under this tariff
heading were from Cruz Azul.
8.263 Articles 3.2 provides that:
"3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the
investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of
the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress
prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily
give decisive guidance."
8.264 We have based our analysis of Guatemala's compliance with Article 3 on the Ministry's
resolution imposing the anti-dumping measure and the Extended Report on Injury
866 (hereinafter
"Injury Report").
8.265 We first examine Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a
significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala confined
itself to considering the maximum and minimum imports during the period of investigation. We note
that the Ministry did a month by month examination of the total volume of imports of grey portland
cement as well as of the volume of Mexican imports. 867 Although in the text of the resolution
Guatemala reported the end to end and highest and lowest point results of their analysis of the volume
of dumped imports, it is evident from Table 10 of the Injury Report that the authorities considered the
situation during each of the intervening months during the period they chose for data collection. The
Panel does not agree with Mexico's assertion that "Guatemala confined itself to maximum and
minimum volumes imported during the investigation period". Thus, we do not consider that
Guatemala acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 in this respect.
8.266 We next consider Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a
significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala used a
data collection period of one year and failed to compare the volume of dumped imports during that
period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-term trends in imports. In this regard, we recall that
Guatemala chose a period of data collection of one year from June 1995 to May 1996. A recent
recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices calls on Members to use a data
collection period of at least three years. This recommendation reflects the common practice of
Members.
868 That said, there is no provision in the Agreement which specifies the precise duration of
the period of data collection. Thus, it cannot be said a priori that the use of a one-year period of data

866 Annex Mexico-43
867 This can be evidenced in Table 10 of the Ministry's resolution imposing the definitive measure and
the extended report on injury.
868 The recommendation provides that:
"(c) the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should be at least three
years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser period, and
should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping investigation; "
(Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping
Investigations, adopted by the ADP Committee on 5 May 2000, G/ADP/6).
We note that this recommendation is a relevant, but non-binding, indication of the understanding of
Members as to appropriate implementation practice regarding the period of data collection for an anti-dumping
investigation.

collection would not be consistent with the requirement of Article 3.2 to consider whether there has
been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in the circumstances of a particular case.
In this case, Guatemala argues that the reason for the short period of data collection was that exports
by Cruz Azul did not become significant until 1995. The record of the investigation supports this
conclusion.869 Under these circumstances, while a longer data collection period might have been
preferable, we are unable to find that the use by Guatemala of a one-year data collection period was
inconsistent with Guatemala's obligation under Article 3.2 to consider whether there was a significant
increase in dumped imports.
8.267 We next turn to Mexico's argument that Guatemala made an erroneous determination of the
volume of imports of grey portland cement from Mexico by including imports from sources other than
Mexico, and by including types of cement other than the product under investigation, imported under
the same tariff heading. Although we note that Mexico has presented evidence indicating the
existence of imports of grey cement from sources other than Mexico and of products other than grey
portland cement during the period of investigation.
870 We do not consider that this evidence goes to
the question, presented in Mexico's claim, of whether there were any imports other than those of
Mexico or of the product under investigations which have been included in the column "Imports from
Mexico" in Table 10 of the Injury Report (Annex Mexico-43).
871 The evidence presented by Mexico
on this issue does not render the figures included in Table 10 of the Injury Report unreliable. The fact
that Mexico has shown that there were imports of grey cement from different sources and that there
were imports of other types of cement different from the product under investigation, does not show
that the Ministry has erred when calculating the total volume of imports of grey portland cement
figures that appear in Table 10 of the injury report. Thus, we find that Mexico has failed to make a
prima facie case that Guatemala's establishment of the facts was improper and violated Article 3.2 by
wrongly including as imports grey portland cement from Mexico, imports from sources other than
Mexico and imports of other types of cement not under investigation.
8.268 Finally, we turn to Mexico's claim that Gu atemala violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 by
failing to take into account certain undumped imports of the product under investigation imported by
an importer named MATINSA, which is associated with the petitioner, Cementos Progreso. Although
Mexico's arguments on this point are unclear, we understand Mexico to be arguing that Guatemala
considered MATINSA's imports to be of non-pozzolanic cement which differed from the like
domestic product and thus were not taken into consideration during the investigation. Mexico
considers however that the product imported by MATINSA was in fact the same product as that under
investigation. In Mexico's view, the failure by Guatemala to correctly characterise the imports by
MATINSA carried the following consequences (i) the resulting volume of total imports of the product
under investigation was lower; (ii) the share of allegedly dumped imports in total imports of the
product under investigation was artificially inflated; (iii) the consideration of a faulty and incomplete
figure for total imports of the product under investigation yielded a distorted figure for apparent
domestic consumption; (iv) because of this incorrect figure for apparent domestic consumption, the
relationship between the increase in dumped imports and consumption was ultimately incorrect; (v)
by considering that MATINSA's imports did not concern the product under investigation, the
investigating authority failed to assess other factor s which were injuring the domestic industry at the
same time, such as imports that were not sold at dumped prices.
8.269 The consequences listed as number (i) through (iv) above constitute a violation of Article 3.1
and 3.2 in that an exclusion of MATINSA's imports from the figures for domestic consumption of the
like product affects the comparison that is made with the figures for volume of dumped imports for
purposes of determining that there has been a significant increase in dumped imports relative to

869 See, Table 10 of the Injury Report
870 Annex Mexico-41.
871 We consider Table 10 of the Injury Report to be the basis for Guatemala's analysis under
Article 3.2.

domestic consumption in the importing Member. 872 Item (v) above constitutes a violation of
Article 3.5 in that this provision establishes:
"The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports
which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by
these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may
be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold
at dumping prices…"
Imports by MATINSA of grey portland cement woul d constitute the type of imports which are
recognized in the AD Agreement as a possible source of injury different from the dumped imports.
Thus, a failure to examine such imports as anothe r known factor causing injury would constitute a
violation of Article 3.5. We recognize the merit in Mexico's arguments on this issue and to the extent
that Mexico presents us with evidence to support the argument it has succeeded in establishing a
prima facie case that Guatemala has violated Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. It would be then for
Guatemala to rebut the existence of a violation under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. We shall now examine
whether it has succeeded in doing so.
8.270 Mexico's argument on this issue relies on two factual predicates. The first is that there were
imports by MATINSA during the period of investigation of the subject product. To this effect
Mexico has presented evidence that shows that during the period of investigation there were imports
by MATINSA classified as grey portland cement and type I pozzolanic cement.
873 Guatemala did not
challenge the validity of such evidence.
8.271 The second factual predicate relied on by Mexico is that Guatemala excluded all imports by
MATINSA from the total imports of the like product. On this predicate we note that the evidence is
unclear and there are several inconsistencies in Guatemala's argumentation. In its final
determination,874 injury report 875 and answer to question 63 from Mexico, Guatemala asserts that
imports by MATINSA were not of the like product. In order to clarify this issue the Panel asked
Guatemala whether it had included imports by producers other than Cruz Azul in the total volume of
Mexican imports shown in Table 10 of the Injury Report. Guatemala failed to directly answer our
question and asserts in their answer that:
"The file of the investigation also confirms that the cement investigated was produced
by Cruz Azul. The only evidence in the file that remotely suggests otherwise consists
of a few imports by the company MATINSA in 1995. However, these transactions
concern type I pozzolanic cement which was not produced by Cruz Azul, and
represent only 0.003 per cent of MATINSA's total imports, a negligible amount in
comparison to total imports from Cruz Azul (i.e. only 348.5 metric tonnes), as
Guatemala explained in its reply to quest ion 61 from Mexico following the second
substantive meeting. In its reply to question 63 from Mexico, Guatemala explained
that the rest of the cement imported by MATINSA was high-resistance cement type
5,000 PSI which was not under investigation by the Ministry of the Economy."

872 We note that Guatemala establishes that there was both an increase of the dumped imports in
absolute terms and also an increase relative to domestic consumption and production (see Injury Report Table
10 and Guatemala's first submission para. 359). Guatemala relied on both of these finding to determine that
there was material injury to the domestic industry. So, to the extent that one of the findings on the increased
volume of dumped imports was proved to be inappropriate Guatemala's determination under Articles 3.1 and 3.2
would be inconsistent with its obligations.
873 Annex Mexico-46. This annex consists of a list of import transactions of cement from the official
statistics by the Customs Authority of Guatemala.
874 Final Determination Section E.2 (Annex Mexico-10).
875 Injury Report p. 3 (Annex Mexico-43).

Thus, Guatemala does not deny that there were imports of the like product by MATINSA during the
period of investigation. However, this still leaves the issue of their treatment for purposes of the
injury determination unclear. Guatemala further argues that imports by MATINSA of the product
under investigation were insignificant as they represent only 0.003 per cent of MATINSA's total
imports.876 We find that there are inconsistencies in this assertion. First, we note that there is an
inconsistency as to the total volume of imports during the period of investigation by MATINSA.
Guatemala asserts in answer to question 60 from Mexico that total imports by MATINSA for the
period of investigation were 117,223.83 tons, while in the Final Determination the figure for total
imports by MATINSA is of 79,426 tons.877 Second, there is also an inconsistency as to the volume of
imports of MATINSA's imports of type I pozzolanic cement. Guatemala asserts that imports of type I
pozzolanic cement by MATINSA were 348.5 tons, while the evidence presented by Mexico indicates
that these imports were at least 16,766.71 tons during the period of investigation.
878 Third, even
assuming that Guatemala's figures for total imports and type I pozzolanic cement imports by
MATINSA were correct, there is also an inconsistency as to the calculation of the proportion of
imports of type I pozzolanic cement in MATINSA's total imports. Guatemala asserts that imports of
type I pozzolanic cement were 0.003 per cent of total imports by MATINSA. Even assuming that the
correct figure for total imports by MATINSA was the higher of the two reported (i.e. 117,223.83
tons), the 348.5 tons imports of type I pozzolanic cement by MATINSA would represent 0.297 per
cent of total imports by MATINSA not 0.003 per cent as alleged by Guatemala.
8.272 The issue of Guatemala's treatment of MATINSA's imports of the subject merchandise
remains obscure. However, In the face of the inconsistencies of Guatemala's argumentation and
taking into account the evidence presented by Mexico, we are of the view that Guatemala has failed to
rebut the prima facie case of violation of Article 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 established by Mexico. Thus, we
find that Guatemala has violated Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 as explained above in para. 8.269 by
wrongly characterizing some imports by MATINSA as not of the like product and failing to take into
account these imports in its determination of injury and causality.
(c) Price effects
8.273 Mexico claims that Guatemala did not comply with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement because
in its final affirmative determination of injury it included a series of assertions concerning the price
trends without having any elements to uphold its determination. Specifically Mexico argues
Guatemala lacked evidence to: i) support a determination that the price of the grey portland cement
imported from Mexico undercut the price of domestic grey portland cement manufactured by
Cementos Progreso; ii) substantiate a determination that the effect of the imports on the domestic
production had led to a significant reduction or prevented an increase, or; iii) support the finding that
the alleged dumping, was the cause of any negative effect on domestic prices and not other elements.
Mexico argues that this lack of support is eviden ced by the fact that Guatemala did not compare the
domestic like product prices for the period of investigation with the prices for the previous year to
establish that the dumped Mexican imports were causing the price depression.
8.274 Mexico also claims that the Ministry's analysis of the effect on the prices was erroneously
done at the regional level only, and not at the national level in violation of Article 3.2. Mexico bases
its claim on the statement in the final determination by Guatemala that the difference between the
prices actually charged for the domestic product and the ceiling price fixed by the government was
greater in the western region of Guatemala bordering with Mexico.

876 We note that the significance of the imports would be more appropriately measured with respect of
the total imports of the subject merchandise, not total imports by MATINSA.
877 Final Determination, Antecedentes para. 8. (Annex Mexico-10)
878 Annex Mexico-46

8.275 Guatemala asserts that it examined information on prices at both wholesale and retail level in
Guatemala during the investigation period. This examination revealed significant price undercutting
by Cruz Azul at both levels. Then it examined whether imports from Cruz Azul were depressing
prices or preventing price increases in Guatemala to a significant degree. Among other things, the
Ministry found that "(a) imports from Cruz Azul had an immediate and adverse effect on Cementos
Progreso's prices; (b) the dumped imports made a greater impact in the area adjacent to the Mexican
frontier (especially in the Departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu) where Cruz
Azul concentrated its sales; (c) despite increases in the maximum price for cement established by the
government during the investigation period, Cementos Progreso "undertook a significant number of
transactions at below the maximum selling price …"; and (d) if there had been no imports from Cruz
Azul, Cementos Progreso "would have been able to sell at the maximum prices established [by the
government]".
879 Guatemala also argues that Mexico has not shown, as required by the standard of
review applicable, that Guatemala's factual findings were not properly established or were biased.
Thus, the Panel has no basis to substitute its interpretation of the facts for that of the Guatemalan
authorities.
8.276 We shall first address Mexico's argument that Guatemala lacked the elements to support its
conclusion that there had been a negative price effect on the prices for the domestic like product by
the dumped imports. We note that Mexico's argume nt on the lack of support for Guatemala's finding
on price effect depends on Mexico's assertion that Guatemala should have done a comparison with the
prices that the domestic industry charged for a period prior to the period of investigation. We have
already found that Guatemala did not violate th e AD Agreement in establishing a period of data
collection of injury of only one year, 880 and consequently it was not obliged to review data outside
that period. Moreover, Guatemala submitted evidence 881 that was part of the record of the
investigation, and that supports the determination that: i) prices for the domestic industry declined
after the Mexican imports entered the market, configuring a situation of price depression; ii) that those
prices declined to a level below the maximum price authorized by the Government, and; iii) that
although the maximum price increased at the e nd of the period the domestic producer could not
increase its prices accordingly, configuring a situation of price suppression. 882 Based on the evidence
of declining prices and inability to achieve established price levels, coinciding with imports at lower
prices we find that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could have properly concluded
that the dumped imports were having a negative effect on the prices of the domestic industry.
Moreover, Mexico did not adduce any evidence to convince us otherwise. Thus, we reject Mexico's
claim of an improper and unsupported Article 3.2 analysis by Guatemala.
8.277 We shall now address Mexico's argument that Guatemala improperly conducted a regional
evaluation of the effect the dumped imports had on the prices of the domestic like product. The mere
fact that Guatemala mentions that the greatest differential between the government fixed ceiling price
and the actual price was felt in the Departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu does
not, in our view, mean that the analysis was limited to these regions alone, to the exclusion of
Guatemala as a whole. In fact, the mention that these were the departments with the greatest
differential indicates to us that other departments were analysed. Moreover, there is only one
producer of cement in Guatemala, thus, even if the negative effect of the dumped imports on the
prices of the domestic like product was only evidenced in the region bordering Mexico, this could still
be viewed as causing injury to Cementos Progreso. Based on these considerations we find that
Guatemala acted in accordance with its obligation under Article 3.2 to conduct an examination of the

879 Injury Report p. 18-20 (Annex Mexico-43).
880 See para. 8.266 supra.
881 Annex Guatemala-68
882 Guatemala presented evidence indicating that before the arrival of the imports prices were to the
level of the maximum price. We are of the view that as this price is calculated on the basis of costs and inflation
it constitutes a reasonable benchmark to establish th e price at which the domestic producer of cement in
Guatemala could have expected to increase its prices but for the competition from the dumped imports.

effect the dumped imports had on the domestic industry. Therefore, we reject Mexico's claim of
violation of Article 3.2 on the basis of an improper regional injury evaluation.
(d) Impact on the domestic industry
8.278 Mexico claims that Guatemala made an incorrect determination of the alleged impact of the
dumped imports on sales of grey portland cement by the domestic industry. Among other arguments
Mexico asserts that Guatemala has failed to consider whether the domestic industry experienced a
decline in their returns on investment and a negative effect on their ability to raise capital.
8.279 Other arguments by Mexico with respect to the adequacy of the examination of the impact of
the imports on the domestic industry include Guatemala's failure to consider the potential decline in
the factors listed in Article 3.4, as well as, inconsistent and inappropriate comparisons by Guatemala
between data pertaining to the period of investigation and data outside the period of investigation.
8.280 Guatemala asserts that it based its final determination on positive evidence and an objective
examination of, inter alia, the consequent impact of Cruz Azul imports on the domestic industry, in
accordance with Article 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Guatemala states that the
Ministry's examination revealed that, among other things, Cruz Azul imports had caused:
(i) Cementos Progreso's sales to decline by 14 per cent between the first quarter of 1995
and the first quarter of 1996. This decline coincided with Cruz Azul's entry into the
market;
(ii) Cementos Progreso to lose customers;
(iii) domestic cement production to a decline of 14 per cent between the first quarter of
1995 and the first quarter of 1996. This reduction began when Cruz Azul started
importing cement into Guatemala;
(iv) a decline of between 20 and 30 per cent in Cementos Progreso's share of the domestic
market;
(v) a decline in Cementos Progreso's capacity to utilise both clinker and finished cement;
(vi) a 12 per cent fall in domestic utilization of cement grinding capacity and a 16 per cent
fall in domestic utilization of clinker production capacity;
(vii) Cementos Progreso to experience negative cash flow during the first months of 1996;
(viii) Cementos Progreso to postpone investment plans to modernize its plant and increase
its production capacity; and
(ix) Cementos Progreso to accumulate excessive inventories as from August 1995.
8.281 Guatemala also argues that the issue before this Panel is whether the establishment of the
facts by the investigating authority was "proper" and whether its evaluation of those facts was
"unbiased and objective". Guatemala asserts that Mexico has not shown Guatemala to have violated
any of these standards.
8.282 Article 3.4 provides:
"3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential
decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin
of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance."

8.283 Before turning to Guatemala's analysis with respect to the factors in Article 3.4 we would like
to outline what is the task before us in this review. We note that Article 3.4 lists a series of factors
which it characterizes as relevant in an examination of whether the dumped imports had an impact on
the domestic industry. It also mentions that the list is non exhaustive, in other words, there may also
be other factors which although not listed may give guidance on the state of the industry. We also
note that Article 3.4 provides that the examination "shall include" all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry and specifies that among those factors which are
considered relevant are those which listed therein. Thus, it is essential, in order to satisfy the
requirements in Article 3.4, to examine each of the factors listed in that provision. In our view
Article 3.4 establishes a rebuttable presumption that those factors listed are relevant in giving
guidance on whether the dumped imports have had an effect on the domestic industry. It is only after
consideration of the listed factors that the investigating authority may dismiss some of them as not
being relevant for the particular industry, thus in effect rebutting the presumption established in
Article 3.4. We are also of the view that the consideration of the factors in Article 3.4 must be
apparent in the determination so the Panel may assess whether the authority acted in accordance with
Article 3.4 at the time of the investigation.
8.284 Our interpretation is supported by other panels which have expressed similar views. For
example the panel in Mexico – HFCS determined:
"In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be
considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the
circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required. In
a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD Agreement itself establishes that
consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But consideration of the
Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may lead
the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the
circumstances of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not
relevant to the actual determination. Moreover, the consideration of each of the
Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating
authority."
883 (Footnote omitted)884
8.285 As a first step in our examination of Guatemala's analysis of the impact of the dumped
imports on the domestic industry, we must evaluate whether all the factors listed in Article 3.4 have
been considered. In this regard, we note that Mexico argues that Guatemala has failed to consider
whether the domestic industry's experienced a decline in return on investment and a negative effect on
their ability to raise capital. Paragraph 4.9 of Guatemala's final determination, contains some

884 In the context of a safeguard investigation the Korea – Dairy Safeguard panel when considering
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which is very similar to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, made the
following remarks:
"among 'all relevant factors' that the investigating authorities 'shall evaluate', the consideration of
the factors listed is always relevant and therefore required, even though the authority may later
dismiss some of them as not having a bearing on the situation of that industry". ( Korea-Dairy
Safeguard, WT/DS98/R para. 7.55. See also Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear (Argentina-Footwear Safeguard) , WT/DS121/R adopted on 12 January 2000, para.
8.123.)
That panel also noted that in reviewing the serious injury determination made by the Korean
authorities, its task was to examine:
"whether at the time of the determination all factors listed in Article 4.2 were appropriately
considered; whether the Korean authorities explained how each factor considered supports (or
detracts from) a finding of serious injury; and whether valid reasons have been put forward for
dismissing a considered factor as not being relevant to the serious injury determination in this
case".(Korea-Dairy Safeguard, WT/DS98/R, para. 7.55.)

discussion concerning investment and the risks to investors for the period of investigation. However,
this paragraph is just a discussion of the operative balance of Cementos Progreso and does not pertain
to the specific factors of return on investment and ability to raise capital. With respect to factors of
return on investments and ability to raise capital, we can find no indication in the determination that
Guatemala considered these factors in the injury determination. Thus, we find that Guatemala has
acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 in its examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the
domestic industry, by failing to examine all relevant factors listed in Article 3.4.
8.286 Having found that Guatemala acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.4 in
failing to consider all of the relevant factors, we are of the view that it is neither necessary nor
appropriate for us to further examine the rest of the arguments put forward by Mexico with respect to
the adequacy of the consideration of each of the factors in Article 3.4.
3. Mexico's claims concerning the Ministry's final determination of the existence of a
causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.
8.287 Mexico claims that Guatemala could not have demonstrated the existence of a causal link in
compliance with Article 3.5, for the following reasons. First, the investigating authority did not
evaluate the alleged impact of the imports investigated on the value and volume of sales, pressure on
selling prices, deterioration in the financial situation, market share and employment, as required by
Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Neither did it ma ke statistically valid comparisons to allow it to
undertake an objective examination of the effect of the imports allegedly dumped, as required by
Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. Second, in the final determination, the Ministry recognized that the
fixing of a maximum selling price was a disadvantage for the domestic industry in comparison with
products imported from any country, but failed to consider fully the injury that may have been caused
by this other factor. Third, the Ministry did not evaluate the impact that a commitment by Cementos
Progreso to sell the product investigated to the Guatemalan State at a price lower than the selling price
to the public might have had on the status of the domestic industry.
8.288 Mexico also claims that the Ministry was not able to establish a causal relationship between
the imports of grey portland cement and the alleged injury to the domestic industry because it had not
properly determined the existence of material injury.
8.289 In our examination concerning the Ministry's evaluation of the volume of the dumped imports
we found that Guatemala acted in violation of Article 3.5 by failing to consider other factors known to
the investigating authority which may also be a cause of injury.
885 In light of that finding, we are of
the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to further consider Mexico's claims
concerning a violation of Article 3.5.
4. Claims by Mexico concerning the public notice of imposition of a definitive anti-
dumping measure
8.290 Mexico claims that the public notice of conclusion of the investigation, which contained the
final affirmative determination on the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties, published in the
Diario Oficial de Centro América of 30 January 1997
886 did not comply with the requirements in
Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement because it did not contain all the relevant information
on the issues of fact and law nor did it include sufficiently detailed explanations of the reasons that led
the Ministry to impose the definitive anti-dumping measure nor several of its determinations.
8.291 We are of view that the issue of Guatemala's' compliance with the transparency obligations
deriving from its decision to impose definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of cement from

885 See, supra para. 8.272.
886 Annex Mexico-11.

Mexico would only be relevant if the decision to impose the measure itself had been consistent with
the AD Agreement. Therefore, having found that Guatemala infringed the substantive provisions of
the AD Agreement in their decision to impose an anti-dumping measure in this case, we consider that
it is not necessary for us to rule on whether Guatemala complied with its transparency obligations
under Article 12.2 and 12.2.2 with respect to the imposition of a measure already found not to be
consistent with Guatemala's WTO obligations.
5. Claims by Mexico regarding the definitive measure's inconsistency with Articles 1, 9 and
18 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994
8.292 Throughout this dispute Mexico has claimed that Guatemala did not make a valid
determination of dumping or injury and also failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between them,
as required by Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico has also claimed that Guatemala
violated Articles 5, 6, 7 and 12 when initiating the investigation and during its course.
887 Therefore,
Mexico claims that Guatemala has also violated Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement and
Article VI of GATT 1994, in so far as:
(a) Guatemala decided to establish definitive anti-dumping duties on grey portland
cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul without having duly complied with all the
requirements for their establishment prescribed by Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement;
(b) the application of the definitive anti-dumping measure without a valid determination
of dumping injury and causal relationship between the two, is contrary to the
provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and in turn constitutes a violation of
Article 1 and 18 of the AD Agreement.
8.293 Guatemala argues that Article 9.1 does not relate to and in no way incorporates the
substantive requirements for the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties contained in other
provisions of the AD Agreement. With respect to claims of violations of Articles 1, and 18 of the AD
Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, Guatem ala responds that these claims are based on the
violation of other articles in the AD Agreement. Since Guatemala maintains that its investigation
complied with all the rules in the AD Agreement, therefore, Guatemala asserts these claims lack
merit.
8.294 Article 1 and Article 9.1 read:
"1. An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances
provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 an d pursuant to investigations initiated and
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The following
provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action is
taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations" (Footnote omitted)
"9.1 The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all
requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the
amount of the anti-dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or
less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is
desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the
duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury
to the domestic industry.

887 These claims the Panel has resolved supra in other sections of this report.

8.295 Although Mexico does not specify exactly which provisions of Article 18 are pertinent to
their claim, we believe that as it has been formulated, it can only refer to Article 18.1. This provisions
reads:
"18.1 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be
taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this
Agreement."
8.296 We note that Mexico's claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI
of GATT 1994, are dependent claims, in the sense that they depend entirely on findings that
Guatemala has violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. There would be no basis to Mexico's
claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreem ent, and Article VI of GATT 1994, if Guatemala
were not found to have violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. In light of the dependent
nature of Mexico's claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT
1994, we see no useful purpose to deciding them. In particular, deciding such dependent claims will
provide no additional guidance as to the steps to be undertaken by Guatemala in order to implement
our recommendation regarding the violations on which they are dependent.
F. C
LAIMS BY MEXICO CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE
8.297 Mexico has made various claims concerning Guatemala's imposition of a provisional
measure, specifically Mexico argues that :
(i) Guatemala was in breach of its obligations: under Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement,
to give Cruz Azul an adequate opportunity to comment on the information provided
to the Ministry in reply to a questionnaire it received; and, under Article 2.4 of the
AD Agreement, to request from Cruz Azul additional information in order to clarify
inaccuracies in Cruz Azul's reply to its questionnaire and to make a fair comparison
between normal value and export price.
(ii) Guatemala's investigating authority never satisfied itself that the volume of sales on
the Mexican domestic market of cement like that exported to Guatemala was of a
sufficient magnitude to provide for proper comparison with the export price, thus
violating Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement.
(iii) Guatemala's provisional anti-dumping measure was based on an affirmative
determination of threat of injury derived from an inadequate and insufficient analysis
of the factors in Article 3.7, as well as of the factors in Article 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5.
(iv) Guatemala violated Article 12.2.1 of the AD Agreement which sets out the
requirements to be met by parties in their public notices of preliminary
determinations.
8.298 We note that in response to a question from the Panel, Mexico confirms that it has not
requested any recommendation from the Panel concerning the provisional measure per se.
888 We also
note that Mexico's claims concerning the provisional measure are made in the context of the
provisional measure as "an action preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure",
889 and those claims
are made as a challenge to the definitive measure. Mexico therefore requests a ruling concerning the
definitive measure, on the basis of claims regarding the provisional measure. At most, Mexico's
claims concerning the provisional measure could only result in a ruling with respect to part of the
definitive measure insofar as it relates to retrospective collection of the provisional measure (i.e.,

888 Oral response provided at the second meeting of the panel with the parties.
889 Mexico oral statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, Para.39.

where it is mandated that the "provisional anti-dumping duties collected would remain in favor of the
treasury"890). Since we have already made findings that give rise to a recommendation concerning the
totality of the definitive measure, 891 we do not consider it necessary to further address claims (i.e.
concerning the provisional measure) that could only result in a ruling concerning only part of the
definitive measure. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to address Mexico's claims
regarding the consistency of Guatemala's provisional measure with the provisions of the AD
Agreement.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
9.1 In light of the findings above, we conclude that Guatemala's initiation of an investigation, the
conduct of the investigation and imposition of a definitive measure on imports of grey portland
cement from Mexico's Cruz Azul is inconsistent with the requirements in the AD Agreement in that:
(a) Guatemala's determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping and threat
of injury to initiate an investigation, is inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the AD
Agreement
(b) Guatemala's determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping and threat
of injury to initiate an investigation and consequent failure to reject the application
for anti-dumping duties by Cementos Progreso is inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the
AD Agreement.
(c) Guatemala's failure to timely notify Mexico under Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement is
inconsistent with that provision.
(d) Guatemala's failure to meet the requirements for a public notice of the initiation of an
investigation is inconsistent with Article 12.1.1 of the AD Agreement.
(e) Guatemala's failure to timely provide the full text of the application to Mexico and
Cruz Azul is inconsistent with Article 6.1.3 of the AD Agreement.
(f) Guatemala's failure to grant Mexico access to the file of the investigation is
inconsistent with Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement.
(g) Guatemala's failure to timely make Cementos Progreso's 19 December 1996
submission available to Cruz Azul until 8 January 1997 is inconsistent with
Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement.
(h) Guatemala's failure to provide two copies of the file of the investigation as requested
by Cruz Azul is inconsistent with Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement.
(i) Guatemala's extension of the period of investigation requested by Cementos Progreso
without providing Cruz Azul with a full oppo rtunity for the defence of its interest is
inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.
(j) Guatemala's failure to inform Mexico of the inclusion of non–governmental experts
in the verification team is inconsistent with paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD
Agreement.

890 Guatemala's Final Determination, (Annex Mexico-10).
891 See sections VIII.E.1 and VIII.E.2 above.

(k) Guatemala's failure to require Cementos Progreso's to provide a statement of the
reasons why summarization of the information submitted during verification was not
possible is inconsistent with Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement.
(l) Guatemala's decision to grant Cementos Progreso's 19 December submission
confidential treatment on its own initiative is inconsistent with Article 6.5 of the AD
Agreement.
(m) Guatemala's failure to "inform all interested parties of the essential facts under
consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures" is inconsistent with Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement.
(n) Guatemala's recourse to "best information available" for the purpose of making its
final dumping determination is inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
(o) Guatemala's failure to take into account imports by MATINSA in its determination of
injury and causality is inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the AD
Agreement.
(p) Guatemala's failure to evaluate all relevant factors for the examination of the impact
of the allegedly dumped imports on the domestic industry is inconsistent with
Article 3.4.
9.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Guatemala has argued before us that the violations it
committed under Articles 5.5, 6.1.3 and 12.1 did not cause nullification and impairment to Mexico.
We have addressed this issue in section VIII.C.7 of this report and found that Guatemala failed to
rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment in Article 3.8. As for the rest of the violations
incurred by Guatemala, we conclude that to the extent that Guatemala has acted inconsistently with
the provisions of the AD Agreement, as described in paragraph 9.1 supra, it has nullified or impaired
the benefits accruing to the Mexico under that agreement.
9.3 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request Guatemala to bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement.
9.4 Mexico requests us to make certain specific suggestions on ways in which Guatemala could
implement the Panel's recommendation. Specifically, Mexico asks us to suggest that Guatemala
"revoke the anti-dumping measure adopted against imports of Mexican cement and refund the anti-
dumping duties collected" pursuant to that measure.
892
9.5 In considering Mexico's request, we first recall that Article 19.1 of the DSU provides in
relevant part that:
"When a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned [footnote
omitted] bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.[footnote omitted].
In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in
which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations ".(emphasis
added).

892 Mexico first submission, p. 101.

Therefore, by virtue of Article 19.1 of the DSU, panels have discretion ("may") to suggest ways in
which a Member could implement the above recommendation. Clearly, however, a panel is not
required to make a suggestion should it not deem it appropriate to do so.
9.6 We have determined that Guatemala has acted inconsistently with its obligations under the
AD Agreement in its imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of grey portland cement from
Mexico. We have found these violations to be of a fundamental nature and pervasive. Indeed, in
general terms we have found that:
(a) An unbiased and objective investigating authority could not properly have
determined, based on the evidence and information available at the time of initiation,
that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of the anti-dumping
investigation;
(b) Guatemala conducted the anti-dumping investigation in a manner inconsistent with its
obligations under various provisions of the AD Agreement;
(c) An unbiased and objective investigating authority could not properly have determined
that the imports under investigation were being dumped, that the domestic producer
of cement in Guatemala was being injured and that the imports were the cause of that
injury.
In light of the nature and extent of the violations in this case, we do not perceive how Guatemala
could properly implement our recommendation without revoking the anti-dumping measure at issue in
this dispute. Accordingly, we suggest that Guatemala revoke its anti-dumping measure on imports of
grey portland cement from Mexico.
9.7 In respect of Mexico's request that we suggest that Guatemala refund the anti-dumping duties
collected, we note that Guatemala has now maintained a WTO-inconsistent anti-dumping measure in
place for a period of three and a half years. Thus, we fully understand Mexico's desire to see the anti-
dumping duties repaid and consider that repayment might be justifiable in circumstances such as
these. We recall however that suggestions under Article 19.1 relate to ways in which a Member could
implement a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with a covered agreement. Mexico's
request raises important systemic issues regarding the nature of the actions necessary to implement a
recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU, issu es which have not been fully explored in this
dispute. Thus, we decline Mexico's request to su ggest that Guatemala refund the anti-dumping duties
collected.