Document: WT/DS241/R Page A-1 ANNEX A Brazil Contents Page Annex A-1 First Written Submission of Brazil A-2 Annex A-2 First Oral Statement of Brazil A-103 Annex A-3 Second Written Submission of Brazil A-115 Annex A-4 Replies of Brazil to Questions of the Panel – First Meeting A-143 Annex A-5 Second Oral Statement of Brazil A-173 Annex A-6 Replies of Brazil to Questions of the Panel – Second Meeting A-186 Annex A-7 Comments of Brazil on the Responses of Argentina to the Panel's and to Brazil's Questions – Second Meeting A-198
Document codes: WT/DS241/R
Complainant: Brazil
Respondent: Argentina
Third parties: Canada, Chile, EU, Guatemala, Paraguay, U.S.
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, Annex II  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

ANNEX A
Brazil
Contents Page
Annex A-1 First Written Submission of Brazil A-2
Annex A-2 First Oral Statement of Brazil A-103
Annex A-3 Second Written Submission of Brazil A-115
Annex A-4 Replies of Brazil to Questions of the Panel – First Meeting A-143
Annex A-5 Second Oral Statement of Brazil A-173
Annex A-6 Replies of Brazil to Questions of the Panel – Second Meeting A-186
Annex A-7 Comments of Brazil on the Responses of Argentina to the Panel's
and to Brazil's Questions – Second Meeting
A-198

I. INTRODUCTION
1. This submission sets forth Brazil’s challenge to the imposition by Argentina of definitive anti-
dumping measures on imports of poultry from Brazil, classified under Mercosul tariff line 0207.11.00
and 0207.12.00. Various actions related to the initiation, conduct and imposition of these definitive
measures are inconsistent with Argentina’s obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994
(“Anti-Dumping Agreement”).
2. The anti-dumping measures on poultry were imposed following an investigation and
determinations made by the Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior (“CNCE”) and the Dirección de
Competencia Desleal (“DCD”). These two agencies share the responsibility for administering the
anti-dumping law and investigation procedures in Argentina, with the DCD determining the existence
of dumping and calculating dumping margins and the CNCE determining whether the domestic
industry has been injured by the allegedly dumped imports.
3. The dumping investigation conducted by the DCD and the imposition of definitive measures
have violated Articles 2, 5, 6, 9, 12 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Brazil’s claims,
as set out in this submission, regarding the dumping investigation and the imposition of definitive
measures are summarized as follows:
- Petitioner’s application presented a calculation to adjust normal value in view of
alleged physical characteristic differences between poultry sold to Argentina and
poultry sold in Brazil. The application did not offer relevant evidence of such
differences contrary to the requirement set out in Article 5.2 (Claim 1). By accepting
petitioner’s adjustment calculation, Argentina failed to examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence presented in the application pursuant to Article 5.3 (Claim 2),
and to reject the application as provided in Article 5.8 (Claim 3).
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 (Claim 4) by establishing export prices
based only on export transactions with prices below normal value.
- Petitioner’s application presented export price and normal value data for different
periods. Specifically, the application presented normal value data for only one day in
1997 (30 June 1997), which cannot be considered relevant evidence to establish normal
value pursuant to Article 5.2 (Claim 5). By calculating a dumping margin by making a
comparison between export price and normal value in respect of sales that were not
made at as nearly as possible the same time and by establishing normal value for only
one day in 1997, Argentina failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application as required by Article 5.3 (Claim 6), and to reject
the application pursuant to Article 5.8 (Claim 7).
- By comparing different periods of data collected for dumping and injury, Argentina
incorrectly examined the evidence provided in the application, violating Article 5.3
(Claim 8).
- Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 5.7 (Claim 9) by not considering, in the
determination whether or not to initiate the investigation, the data collected for
dumping simultaneously with the data collected for injury.
- Argentina failed to notify seven Brazilian exporters when it was satisfied that there was
sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation. By not
notifying these exporters when the investigation was initiated, Argentina acted
inconsistently with Article 12.1 (Claim 10).

- Argentina failed to give the seven Brazilian exporters at least 30 days to reply to the
dumping questionnaires provided by the DCD in a prima facie violation of Article 6.1.1
(Claim 11). Moreover, the CNCE never notified these seven exporters and never
provided them with the injury questionnaire.
- Argentina also failed to promptly make available to the seven Brazilian exporters
evidence presented in writing by the other interested parties involved in the
investigation, in violation of Article 6.1.2 (Claim 12).
- By failing to give the seven exporters the required time to respond to the questionnaires
and not promptly making available to these exporters the evidence presented in writing
by the other interested parties involved in the investigation, Argentina did not give
these exporters full opportunity for the defense of their interests as required by
Article 6.2 (Claim 13).
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Articl e 6.1.3 (Claim 14) by not providing the text
of the written application to the Brazilian exporters and to the Government of Brazil as
soon as the investigation was initiated.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 15) by
disregarding the responses submitted by Brazilian exporters with respect to the
description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil, and resorting to the normal
value adjustment calculation provided by petitioner in the application.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 16) by failing to adequately
explain in the final determination its decision to disregard the information provided by
the exporters regarding the product description and to use instead the normal value
adjustment proposed by petitioner.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 17) by
disregarding the export price data provided by the Brazilian exporters, and resorting to
the export price information provided by the Argentinean agency the Dirección de
Ganaderia, Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesca y Alimentación (“Ganaderia”).
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 18) by failing to adequately
explain in the final determination its decision to disregard the export price data
provided by the Brazilian exporters, and to resort to the export price data provided by
the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Ar ticle 6.8 and Annex II (Claim 19) by
disregarding all normal value information submitted by two Brazilian exporters, and
resorting to the information provided by petitioner.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 20) by failing to adequately
explain in the final determination its decision to disregard all normal value information
submitted by two Brazilian exporters, and to resort to the information provided by
petitioner.
- Argentina failed to inform the Brazilian exporters of the essential facts under
consideration which formed the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures, thereby preventing the Brazilian exporters from adequately defending their
interests, contrary to the requirement set forth in Article 6.9 (Claim 21).

- Argentina failed to establish individual margins of dumping for two Brazilian
exporters, as required by Article 6.10 (Claim 22).
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 23) by not making due
allowance for differences in freight in the normal value established for two Brazilian
exporters.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 24) by not making due
allowance for differences in taxation, freight and financial cost in the normal value
established for all other exporters.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 25) by incorrectly making
allowances to normal value based on alleged physical characteristic differences
between the product sold in Brazil and to Argentina.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 (Claim 26) by imposing an
unreasonable burden of proof on three Brazilian exporters by not determining the
dumping period of investigation and, thus, allowing these exporters to submit dumping
information for the years 1996 through 1999, when the dumping period of investigation
was later determined as from January 1998 through January 1999.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 (Claim 27) by establishing a dumping
margin based on an incorrect comparison between the export price and the normal
value for two Brazilian exporters. Argentina established normal value based only on
internal market transactions for which invoices were presented, instead of determining
normal value based on all the reported transactions in the internal market for the period.
The DCD established the margins of dumping for these two Brazilian exporters on the
basis of a comparison of a weighted average statistical sample of normal value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions.
- Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 9.2 (Claim 28) and Article 9.3
(Claim 29) by imposing a variable anti-dum ping duty that can exceed the margin of
dumping established in the final determination.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 30) by failing to provide how
the “minimum export price” was established in the determination to impose definitive
anti-dumping duties.
4. The injury investigation and the final determination by the CNCE violated Articles 3, 4, 5 and
12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Brazil’s claims, as set out in this submission, regarding the
injury investigation and the imposition of definitive measures are summarized as follows:
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 (Claim 31) by failing to reject the
application and promptly terminate the inve stigation, as soon as the CNCE determined
in Acta No. 405 that there was insufficient evidence of injury or threat of injury to
justify the initiation of the investigation.
- By using different periods to evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices listed
in Article 3.4, Argentina failed to make a final injury determination based on positive
evidence and involving an objective examination as provided for in Article 3.1, 3.4 and
3.5 (Claim 32).

- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 33) by failing to explain in
the final determination why the CNCE examined the relevant economic factors and
indices listed in Article 3.4 based on different periods.
- The injury analysis in the final determin ation did not exclude the imports of two
Brazilian exporters, even though the DCD considered that these were not “dumped
imports”. By not excluding the imports of these two Brazilian exporters from the
“dumped imports”, the CNCE did not properly consider the volume of the “dumped
imports”, the effect of the “dumped imports” on prices, and the impact of the “dumped
imports” on the domestic industry, as provided for in Articles 3.2 (Claim 34) and 3.4
(Claim 36). The flawed evaluation of the “dumped imports” indicates that the final
injury determination was not based on positive evidence and did not involve an
objective examination as required by Article 3.1 (Claim 35).
- By not excluding the imports from these two Brazilian exporters from the “dumped
imports”, Argentina failed to properly consider injury as prescribed in Article 3.1, and,
consequently, did not properly demonstrate the causal link between the “dumped
imports” and the injury to the domestic industry as provided for in Article 3.5
(Claim 37).
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Articles 3.4 (Claim 38) and 3.1 (Claim 39) by
failing to evaluate all the relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4.
- Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 (Claim 40) by failing to adequately
provide and consider in the final determination the evaluation of all relevant economic
factors and indices listed in Article 3.4.
- Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 (Claim 41) by considering that 46
per cent constituted the major proportion of the total domestic production of poultry in
Argentina and, thus, qualified as the domestic industry.
5. By determining dumping, injury and causal link inconsistently with the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article VI of GATT 1994 and
Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
6. In light of these violations by Argentina, which Brazil will demonstrate in detail in this
submission, Brazil requests that the Panel issue the findings and recommendations set forth in Part IV
of this submission.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THIS CASE
7. On 7 November 2001, the Government of Brazil requested consultations with the
Government of Argentina pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), Article XXII of GATT 1994, Article 17 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, and Article 19 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT
1994 (“Agreement on Customs Valuation”), concerning the definitive anti-dumping measures on
imports of poultry from Brazil.
1
8. Consultations were held in Geneva on 10 December 2001. Even though consultations
allowed a better understanding of the issue, they did not lead to a mutually agreed solution.

1 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultr y from Brazil: Request for Consultations by
Brazil, WT/DS241/1 (12 Nov. 2001).

9. On 25 February 2002, the Government of Brazil requested the establishment of a panel
pursuant to Article XXII of GATT 1994, Article 6 of the DSU, and Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and requested that the panel have standard terms as provided for in Article 7 of the DSU.2
10. At its 17 April 2002 meeting, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) established a panel to
examine the complaints of the Government of Brazil. The Panel was composed on 27 June 2002.
3
11. The Panel’s terms of reference, pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU, were set as follows:
“To examine, in light of the relevant prov isions of the covered agreements cited by
Brazil in document WT/DS241/3, the matter referred by Brazil to the DSB in that
document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.”
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
12. On 2 September 1997, the Centro de Empresas Procesadoras Avícolas (“CEPA”) 4 filed an
application for an anti-dumping investigation with the Subsecretaria de Comercio Exterior (“SSCE”)
alleging that imports of poultry from Brazil were being exported to Argentina at dumped prices and
that these imports represented a threat of material injury to the domestic industry. 5 On 23 September
1997, the CNCE issued an opinion regarding the representativeness of the domestic industry and, on
21 October 1997, the SSCE accepted the application presented by CEPA.
13. On 7 January 1998, the Área de Prácticas Comerciales Desleales y Salvaguardias (“APCDS”)
concluded in its report regarding the viability of the initiation of the investigation that there was unfair
trade practice in the form of dumping into the Argentinean market of poultry from Brazil.
6
14. On 7 January 1998, the CNCE determined in Acta No. 405 that there was not sufficient
evidence of injury or threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation. In that determination,
the data considered was for the period January 1994 through June 1997, taking into account data for
the year 1993 as a reference year.7
15. More than one month after the CNCE determin ed that there was insufficient evidence of
injury or threat of injury to justify the in itiation of the investigation, CEPA presented on
17 February 1998 new and updated information to Secretaria de Industria Comercio y Minería
(“SICM”).
8 On 18 June 1998, the Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos (“DGAJ”) sent letter to
SSCE stating that the new and updated information presented by CEPA had not been examined when
CNCE issued its determination in Acta No. 405 and, thus, DGAJ requested that the CNCE take into
account the new information and provide a new determination.9
16. On 22 September 1998, the CNCE determined in Acta No. 464 that there was sufficient
evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation. The new injury determination

2 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil: Request for the Establishment of
a Panel by Brazil, WT/DS241/3 (26 Feb. 2002).
3 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Pou ltry from Brazil: Constitution of the Panel
Established at the Request of Brazil, WT/DS241/4 (5 Jul. 2002).
4 Throughout this submission CEPA is also referred to as the petitioner.
5 See, Exhibit BRA-1.
6 See, Exhibit BRA-2.
7 See, Exhibit BRA-3.
8 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
9 See, Exhibit BRA-5.

considered CEPA’s updated information for the period January 1994 through June 1998, taking into
account data for the year 1993 as a reference year.10
17. On 20 January 1999, the Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Serviços Publicos (“MEOSP”)
issued Resolution No. 11, a public notice announcing the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation
on imports of poultry from Brazil.
11
18. On 10 February 1999, the CNCE sent letters to the Brazilian exporters Sadia S.A. (“Sadia”),
Avipal S.A. Avicultura e Agropecuaria (“Avipal”), Frigorífico Nicolini Ltda. (“Nicolini”), Seara
Alimentos S.A. (“Seara”), and Frangosul S.A. Agro Avícola Industrial (“Frangosul”) communicating
of the initiation of the investigation and requesting that they provide responses to the questionnaires
sent by the CNCE, which is separate from the one sent by the SSCE. 12 On 16 February 1999, the
SSCE sent letters to the five Brazilian exporters inviting them to participate in a hearing on
25 February 1999 for consultations regarding the initiation of the dumping investigation and for
receipt of the questionnaires.13
19. On 28 June 1999, the CNCE issued a prelim inary affirmative injury determination. 14 O n
6 August 1999, the DCD issued a preliminary affirmative dumping determination. 15 On 20 August
1999, the SSCE issued a preliminary affirmative determination on causal link between the alleged
dumped imports and the injury caused by these imports on the domestic industry. 16 No provisional
measures were imposed.
20. On 15 September 1999, the DCD sent letters to seven Brazilian exporters: Cooperativa
Central de Laticínios do Paraná (“CCLP”), Cooperativa Central Oeste Catarinense Ltda.
(“Catarinense”),17 Chapecó Cia. Industrial (“Chapecó”), Cia. Minuano de Alimentos (“Minuano”),
Perdigão Agroindustrial (“Perdigão”), Comaves Industria e Comércio de Alimentos Ltda.
(“Comaves”), and Pena Branca S.A. (“Pena Branca”),18 that had not been notified of the investigation,
inviting them to provide responses to the questionnaire. 19 In this letter, the DCD established, for the
first time, the data collection period of the investigation from January 1998 through January 1999.
21. On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued a final affirmative injury determination. 20 S i x
months after the final injury determination was issued, the DCD issued a final affirmative dumping
determination on 23 June 2000.21 On 17 July 2000, the SSCE issued a final affirmative determination
of causal link between the alleged dumped imports and the injury caused by these imports on the
domestic industry.
22
22. Based upon the final dumping, injury and causal link determinations, the MEOSP issued
Resolution No. 574 of 21 July 2000, imposing definitive dumping measures on imports of poultry

10 See, Exhibit BRA-6.
11 See, Exhibit BRA-7.
12 See, Exhibit BRA-8.
13 See, Exhibit BRA-9. From the documents of the in vestigation to which Brazil had access to, Brazil
was not able to find the SSCE’s notification of 16 February 1999 to the Brazilian exporter Sadia.
14 See, Exhibit BRA-10.
15 See, Exhibit BRA-11.
16 See, Exhibit BRA-12.
17 Catarinense is also known as Aurora.
18 From the documents of the investigation to wh ich Brazil had access to, Brazil was not able to find
the DCD’s notification to the Brazilian exporter Pena Branca.
19 See, Exhibit BRA-13.
20 See, Exhibit BRA-14.
21 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
22 See, Exhibit BRA-16.

from Brazil for a period of three years.23 Such measures took the form of specific anti-dumping duties
to be collected as the absolute difference between the FOB price invoiced in any one shipment and a
designated “minimum export price” also fixed in FOB terms, to be applied whenever the former price
is lower than the latter. The “minimum export price” established for each exporter was US$ 0,92 per
kilogram for Sadia, US$ 0,98 per kilogram for Avipal, and US$ 0,98 per kilogram for all other
exporters. The Brazilian exporters Nicolini and Se ara did not have dumping measures applied since
they were found not to be exporting poultry at dumped prices. The public notice also set forth the
dumping margins found for Sadia (14.91 per cent), Avipal (15.48 per cent) and all other exporters
(8.19 per cent
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
23. The standard of review to be applied by a Panel in examining disputes arising under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is set forth in Article 17.6 of that Agreement. More specifically, Article 17.6
addresses issues relative to the assessment of facts in an investigation and issues relative to the
interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
24. With regard to factual issues, Article 17.6(i) provides that:
“in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;”
25. Article 17.6(i) addresses the Panel’s assessment of an authority’s establishment and
evaluation of the facts. It is a two part standard of review, instructing that the Panel: (1) determine
whether the authorities establishment of the facts was proper; and, (2) whether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective.
26. First, to assess whether the facts were properly established involves determining whether the
investigating authorities collected relevant and reliable information concerning the issue to be
decided. In this particular case, the Panel should first determine whether the Government of
Argentina collected, evaluated, and processed facts during the investigation in a manner consistent
with the rules provided under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and, thus, established the facts in a
“proper” manner.
27. Second, the Panel should determine whether the Government of Argentina evaluated those
facts in an unbiased and objective manner. In this regard, the Panel should consider whether based on
the evidence before the Argentinean investigating authorities at the time of the determination, an
unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence could have reached the
conclusions that the Argentinean investigating authorities reached on the matter in question. In that
context, the Panel should examine whether all th e evidence was considered, including facts which
might detract from the decision actually reached by the investigating authorities.
28. The Government of Brazil does not ask the Panel to determine whether another conclusion is
possible from the facts that were made available to the Argentinean authorities in the underlying
investigation. The factual arguments in this case go directly to the Argentinean Government’s
improper establishment of the facts and the non-objective and biased evaluation of the facts so as to

23 See, Exhibit BRA-17.

favor the interests of the domestic industry in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
29. With regard to issues of interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 17.6(ii)
provides that:
“the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the author ities’ measure to be in conformity with
the agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”
30. The first sentence of this provision instructs the Panel to “interpret the relevant provisions of
the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. The
Appellate Body has repeatedly instructed that Panels are to consider interpretation of the WTO
Agreements, including the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in accordance with the principles set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”). Thus, the Panel should first look
at the ordinary meaning of the provision in question, in its context, and in light of its object and
purpose. The Panel may consider, as supplementary means of interpretation, the preparatory work of
the provision, that is, the negotiating history. The Panel should then evaluate whether the
Argentinean interpretation is one that is “permissible” in light of the customary rules of interpretation
of international law. If that is not the case, the Panel should reject the interpretation, and the
challenged action should be considered inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
31. The Government of Brazil contends that the Argentinean measures challenged in this case are
not permissible under the interpretative rules of the Vienna Convention. The Government of
Argentina has completely ignored certain legal standards or provisions under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, or acted inconsistently with the relevant provisions beyond any permissible legal
interpretation. These aspects of Argentinean practice rest upon interpretation of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement that do not reflect good faith and cannot be considered as permissible interpretations.
B. INITIATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
1. Articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8
32. Ten claims follow from the facts described below and the legal text of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement:
Claim 1: Petitioner’s application presented a calculation to adjust normal value based on alleged
differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold to Argentina and poultry sold in Brazil.
According to petitioner, the poultry sold to Arge ntina do not include head and feet and the poultry
sold in Brazil include head and feet. As a consequence of this difference, petitioner alleged that the
yield rate of eviscerated poultry sold to Argentina is 80 per cent of the live poultry and the yield rate
of eviscerated poultry sold in Brazil is 88 per cent of the live poultry. Petitioner presented a
calculation where 9.09 per cent is to be applied to the normal value to compensate for the difference
between the two products.
Violation of Article 5.2 is based on the fact that the application submitted by petitioner
offered no evidence to support: (1) that the poultry sold in Brazil was physically different from the
product sold to Argentina; (2) that such alleged physical differences affected price comparability; and
(3) that the yield rate of poultry sold in Brazil and to Argentina, as alleged by petitioner in the
application, was correct.

Claim 2: By accepting petitioner’s calculation to adjust normal value, which was unsubstantiated by
relevant evidence, Argentina failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence presented
in the application and to determine that there was insufficient evidence to justify the initiation, as
required by Article 5.3.
Claim 3: Pursuant to claims 1 and 2, Argentina failed to reject the application based on insufficient
evidence of dumping to justify proceeding with the case, as provided in Article 5.8.
Claim 4: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 by establishing export prices based only on
export transactions with prices below normal value.
Claim 5: Petitioner’s application presented export price and normal value data based on different
periods. Specifically, the application presented normal value for only one day in the period, 30 June
1997. The export price data presented in the application was for January through May 1997 and
August 1997. The fact that the export price and normal value data presented in the application were
not for sales made at as nearly as possible the same time and that the normal value presented in the
application was for only one day in 1997 cannot be considered sufficient relevant evidence to meet
the requirements of Article 5.2.
Claim 6: By calculating a dumping margin by making a comparison between export price and normal
value in respect of sales that were not made at as nearly as possible the same time and by establishing
normal value for only one day in 1997, Argentina failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence presented in the application. Thus, Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 by
determining that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation.
Claim 7: Pursuant to claims 5 and 6, Argentina failed to reject the application based on insufficient
evidence of dumping to justify proceeding with the case, as provided in Article 5.8.
Claim 8: For purposes of initiation, the data collected for the dumping analysis was from January
through May 1997 and the data collected for the injury analysis was from January 1994 through June
1998. Argentina incorrectly examined the evidence pr ovided in the application by not examining the
additional dumping data submitted by petitioner for the period July 1997 through June 1998, and thus
violated Article 5.3.
Claim 9: Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 5.7 by not considering, in the determination
whether or not to initiate the investigation, the da ta collected for dumping simultaneously with the
data collected for injury.
Claim 31: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 by failing to reject the application and
promptly terminate the investigation, as soon as the CNCE determined in Acta No. 405 that there was
insufficient evidence of material injury or threat of material injury to justify the initiation of the
investigation.
(a) Facts
33. On 7 January 1998, the DCD issued a determination to initiate the dumping investigation on
imports of poultry from Brazil.
24 In that determination, the DCD established normal value and export
price as follows.

24 See, Exhibit BRA-2.

Normal Value
34. The DCD established normal value according to the information provided by petitioner in the
application. Petitioner established normal value based on prices published by the Brazilian company
JOX Assessoria Agropecuária S/C Ltda. (“JOX”) 25 on 30 June 1997, for chilled poultry, with head
and feet, for the São Paulo wholesale market. The normal value was, thus, established upon prices for
only one day in 1997, June 30.26
35. The prices published by JOX, and used by Petitioner to establish the normal value were for:
(1) fresh poultry sold in the São Paulo distribution market that varied from R$1,05 to R$1,12 (average
of R$1,085); (2) fresh poultry sold in the São Pa ulo wholesale market that varied from R$1,00 to
R$1,077 (average of R$1,0385); and, (3) fresh poultry sold in the São Paulo greater wholesale that
varied from R$0,98 to R$1,00 (average of R$0,99). The normal value was obtained by the simple
average of these prices (RS$ 1,0378), which was converted into US dollars (US$ 0,957).27
36. The table below indicates how the DCD established the normal value:
Product $Real US$
Fresh Poultry Distribution 1,085 1,00
Fresh Poultry Wholesale 1,0385 0,958
Fresh Poultry Greater Wholesale 0,990 0,913
Average 1,0378 0,957
Source: Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
Adjustment to Normal Value
37. Based on the price above, the DCD made an adjustment to normal value, proposed by
petitioner, to account for differences in the physical characteristics of the product sold in Brazil and to
Argentina.
38. According to the suggested adjustment, the average weight of the live poultry raised in Brazil
is 2.250 kgs. Petitioner alleged, without presenting any evidence, that the yield of the product in
Brazil is 88 per cent and, therefore, out of 1 kg of live poultry 880 gm of eviscerated poultry is
obtained, with giblets (heart, stomach, neck and liver), and with head and feet. Petitioner also alleged
that the yield of the product sold to Argentina differs from the yield obtained in Brazil. In Argentina
the yield of the product is 80 per cent, considering that head and feet are discarded. Petitioner’s
conclusion was that out of a live poultry weighing 2.250 kgs, for every 1kg, 800 gm of eviscerated
poultry is obtained that can actually be sold in th e Argentinean market. According to petitioner, the
yield rate difference occurs because poultry is sold to Argentina without head and feet while poultry is
sold in Brazil with head and feet.
28

25 JOX is a privately owned firm dedicated to providing support market information to the farming
industry. JOX produces reports that follow the behaviour of the following markets: eggs, poultry, swine, bovine
meat, soybean, and corn. The Brazilian Government and the Brazilian exporters subject to the investigation at
issue have no association or participation in JOX.
26 See, Pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit BRA-2.
27 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
28 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.

39. Petitioner presented the following adjustment based on this allegation:
Weight of
Live
Poultry
Yield in
Brazil
Eviscerated
Poultry sold in
Brazil
Yield in
Argentina
Eviscerated
Poultry Sold in
Argentina
Difference
(A) (B) (C)=(A) x (B) (D) (E)=(A) x (D) (F) = (C) - (E)
2.250 Kg 88% 1.980 Kg 80% 1.800 Kg 0.180 Kg
Source: Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
40. Petitioner alleged that this yield difference represents 9.09 per cent less poultry that can be
sold to Argentina and, therefore, an equivalent adjustment must be made to the normal value price.29
41. Petitioner’s calculation, which was accepted and used by the DCD, was the following:
Difference in Yield Eviscerated Poultry in Brazil Adjustment
(A) (B) (C) = (A) ÷ (B) x 100
0.180 Kg 1.980 Kg 9.09%
Source: Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
42. In order to compare the prices of poultry sold in Brazil (normal value) with the prices of
poultry sold to Argentina (export price), the DCD would have to add 9.09 per cent to the price of
poultry sold in Brazil to compensate for the fact that poultry in Argentina is sold without head and
feet, while poultry in Brazil is sold with head and feet. Petitioner presented no evidence to support
this allegation.
43. Based on the proposed adjustment calculation, the DCD established a normal value of
US$1.044 per kilogram according to the calculation below.
Normal Value of
Poultry US$/kg
Adjustment Adjustment to Normal
Value of Poultry US$/kg
Adjusted Normal Value
of Poultry US$/kg
(A) (B) (C) = (A) x (B) (D) = (A) + (C)
0.957 9.09% 0.087 1.044
Source: Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
Export Price
44. The DCD established the export price of the subject merchandise sold in Argentina based on
data offered by petitioner for the period of January through May 1997 and August 1997.30 The source
for the export price information submitted by CEPA came from Sysdec and was exclusively for
frozen poultry sold in Argentina, under Mercosul tariff line 0207.12.00,31 as shown in the table below:

29 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
30 See, Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2.
31 See, Exhibit BRA-1.

Period Volume of Imports – Ton Value of Imports – US$ Average US$/Ton
January 1997 1,688.01 1,856,202.30 1,099.64
February 1997 1,351.76 1,420,448.69 1,050.81
March 1997 2,091.13 2,220,081.50 1,061.67
April 1997 859.22 862,237.89 1,003.51
May 1997 40.00 40,600.00 1,015.00
Subtotal 6,030.12 6,399,570.38 1,061.27
August 1997 2,847.14 2,608,635.66 916.23
Total 8,877.26 9,008,206.04 1,014.75
Source: Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2.
45. Out of the information presented by petitioner, the DCD considered that a significant portion
of the imports of poultry from Brazil were entering at dumped prices, that is, at prices lower than the
price of eviscerated poultry sold in the domestic market of Brazil (normal value).32
46. The DCD considered that these export prices, below normal value, represented 34.24 per cent
of the total volume of imports from January through May 1997 and 28.86 per cent of the total value
for the same period.
33
47. Without justification, the DCD presented a table indicating the export price for the period
January through May 1997 for transactions for which the price was below the established normal
value.34
Period Volume – Tons Value – US$ Weighted Average
US$/Ton
January 1997 414.37 369,244.86 891.10
February 1997 376.99 307,233.77 814.97
March 1997 495.43 406,077.69 819.65
April 1997 738.21 723,892.40 980.60
May 1997 40.00 40,600.00 1,015.00
Total 2,065.00 1,847,048.72 894.45
Source: Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
48. In the determination, the DCD explained that of the export prices presented for the month of
August 1997, 97.97 per cent came into Argentina at prices below the normal value average.35
49. By adding the export transactions below normal value in the month of August 1997 to the
imports of poultry below normal value for the period January through May 1997, the DCD concluded
that 54.68 per cent of the volume (4,854.24 tons) and 48.74 per cent of the value (US$ 4,390,836.38)
of imports of poultry from Brazil were coming in at dumped prices.
36

32 See, Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2.
33 See, Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2.
34 See, Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
35 See, Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
36 See, Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.

Period Tons Portion of
Total Imports
US$ Portion of
Total Imports
Weighted
Average US$/Ton
(A) (B) (C)=(B)÷(A)
Jan-May &
Aug 1997
4,854.24 54.68% 4,390,836.38 48.74% 904.54
Source: Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
50. The DCD also used data provided by the Argentinean agency Delegación II – Unidad
Informatica (“DUI”) of the SSCE to establish the export price. The data provided by that agency was
for the period of August through October 1996.37
51. Once again, the DCD considered that a significant portion of the imports for that period were
entering at dumped prices, that is, at prices lower than the price of eviscerated poultry sold in the
domestic market of Brazil (normal value).
38
52. According to the DCD, 26.62 per cent of the volume and 23.47 per cent of the value of
eviscerated poultry imported from Brazil during the period of August through October 1996 was at
dumped prices.
39
Period Tons Portion of
Total Imports
US$ Portion of
Total Imports
Weighted Average
US$/Ton
Aug-Oct
1996
1,207.915 26.62% 1,162,809.10 23.47% 962.66
Source: Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
Dumping Margin
53. Based on the normal value presented by petitioner and the export price presented by petitioner
and by the DUI, the DCD calculated two dumping margins.
54. The first margin considered the normal value as the price of chilled poultry, with head and
feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market on 30 June 1997. The aforementioned adjustment
calculation, to account for the allegation that all poultry in Brazil was sold with head and feet, was
made to this normal value. This margin considered export prices to be the prices of imports below
normal value of frozen poultry from Brazil for the period of August through October 1996.40
Normal Value US$/Kg Average FOB Price US$/Kg Dumping Margin
(A) (B) (C)=(A)÷(B)
1.044 0.9627 8.45%
Source: Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
55. The second margin considered normal value to be the price of chilled poultry, with head and
feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market on 30 June 1997. Again, the aforementioned adjustment
calculation, to account for the allegation that all poultry in Brazil was sold with head and feet, was
made to this normal value. For the second margin, the DCD established the export price as the price

37 See, Pages 11 and 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
38 See, Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
39 See, Pages 11 and 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
40 See, Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.

of imports below normal value of frozen poultry from Brazil for the period of January through May
1997 and August 1997.41
Normal Value US$/Kg Average FOB Price US$/Kg Dumping Margin
(A) (B) (C)=(A)÷(B)
1.044 0.904536 15.42%
Source: Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
56. The determination to initiate the dumping investigation further provided other margin
calculations, without explanation or purpose. One considered the lowest FOB export price in
January 1997, as presented by petitioner, and the normal value established for 30 June 1997, as
indicated above.
42 The other, considered the lowest FOB export price in the months of August and
September 1996, as presented by the DUI, and the normal value established for 30 June 1997.43
Normal Value
US$/Kg
Lowest FOB Price
in Jan. 1997 US$/Kg
Dumping Margin
(A) (B) (C)=(A)÷(B)
1.044 0.76512 36.45%
Source: Page 13 of Exhibit BRA-2.
Normal Value
US$/Kg
Lowest FOB Price
in Aug/Sept 1996 US$/Kg
Dumping Margin
(A) (B) (C)=(A)÷(B)
1.044 0.880 18.64%
Source: Page 13 of Exhibit BRA-2.
Injury
57. On 7 January 1998, the CNCE determined in Acta No. 405 that there was not sufficient
evidence of injury or threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation.44 The data collection
period for the injury analysis was from January 1994 through June 1997, taking into account data for
the year 1993 as a reference year.45
58. On 17 February 1998, more than one month after the CNCE determined that there was
insufficient evidence of injury or threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, CEPA
presented new and updated injury information to SICM. 46 On 18 June 1998, the DGAJ sent a letter
addressed to the SSCE stating that the new and updated information presented by CEPA had not been
examined at the time the CNCE issued its dete rmination in Acta No. 405. The DGAJ requested and
directed the CNCE to take into account the new information and to provide a new determination.47
59. On 15 July 1998, the SSCE sent a letter addres sed to the CNCE for the agency to examine
and make a determination based on the new information presented by CEPA. 48 On 24 July 1998, the
CNCE requested update of the information presented on February 17 1998, setting a deadline to

41 See, Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
42 See, Pages 12 and 13 of Exhibit BRA-2.
43 See, Page 13 of Exhibit BRA-2.
44 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-3.
45 See, Page 5 of Exhibit BRA-3.
46 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
47 See, Exhibit BRA-5.
48 See, Exhibit BRA-18.

submit the updated information by 10 August 1998. 49 On 14 August 1998, the CNCE sent a letter to
CEPA granting an extension to present th e requested information until 20 August 1998. 50 O n
26 August 1998, the CNCE sent another letter to CEPA setting 2 September 1998 as the new deadline
to present the information requested on their 24 July 1998 letter. 51 On 1 September 1998, CEPA
presented the information requested by the CNCE.
60. On 22 September 1998, the CNCE determined in Acta No. 464 that there was sufficient
evidence of threat of injury to just ify the initiation of the investigation. 52 The data collection period
for the new injury analysis was from January 1994 through June 1998, taking into account data for the
year 1993 as a reference year.53
(i) Claim 1: Inconsistency with Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.2
61. Article 5.2 governs the contents of an application for initiation of an anti-dumping
investigation. The subsequent paragraphs of Article 5.2 list certain specific information regarding a
series of factors, which must be included in the application. The text of Article 5.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement provides in part that:
“An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury
within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and
(c) causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion,
unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the
requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is
reasonably available to the applicant on the following:

(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for
consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or export
(or, where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold from the
country or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on the
constructed value of the product) and information on export prices or, where
appropriate, on the prices at which the product is first resold to an independent buyer
in the territory of the importing Member;
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the
effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the
consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by
relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry,
such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 1
62. The chapeau of Article 5.2 requires that an application must include “evidence” of dumping,
injury, and the causal relationship between the two.

49 See, Exhibit BRA-18.
50 See, Exhibit BRA-18.
51 See, Exhibit BRA-18.
52 See, Exhibit BRA-6.
53 See, Page 8 of the “Actualización Informe Técnico Previo a la Apertura” in Exhibit BRA-6.

63. In order to evaluate what kind of information is considered as “evidence”, which must be
included in an application to init iate an investigation, we turn to the ordinary meaning of the term
“evidence”. “Evidence” is defined as “the available facts, circumstances, etc. supporting or otherwise
a belief, proposition, etc., or indicating whether or not a thing is true or valid”.54 More specifically, in
a legal context, “evidence” is the “information given personally or drawn from a document etc. and
tending to prove a fact or a proposition”.
55
64. From the above interpretation of the term, Brazil understands that an allegation or information
provided in the application, without supporting documentation, does not qualify as “evidence”. Our
understanding comes from the language in Article 5.2 that further qualifies the type of information
that is needed in an application. Article 5.2 provides that “simple assertion, unsubstantiated by
relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph”.
65. Thus, an assertion or allegation made by petitioner in the application does not meet the
requirement in Article 5.2 for a viable application. A proposition or allegation made by petitioner in
an application must be accompanied by supporting documentation or information in order to qualify
as “evidence”. More specifically, Brazil believes that information drawn from a document tending to
prove a fact or proposition is the type of information required in an application.
66. With respect to the dumping evidence, the application must include “evidence” on prices at
which the product in question is sold when destined for consumption in the domestic markets of the
country or countries of origin or export.
67. In the instant case, the application offered no “evidence” to support: (1) that the poultry sold
in Brazil was physically different from the poultry sold to Argentina; (2) that the alleged physical
characteristic differences affect price comparability; and, (3) the alleged yield rate difference
presented by petitioner between the poultry sold in Brazil and to Argentina.
68. In the application, petitioner alleged that the poultry sold in Brazil is physically different from
the poultry sold to Argentina. To support this allegation, petitioner attached a report by the Brazilian
company JOX, where prices of a kilogram of chilled poultry in São Paulo could be identified.
Petitioner further stated that these prices were in Real (Brazilian currency), occurred in three
alternatives, and corresponded to prices of “poultry with feet, head and giblets”, according to the fax
provided by JOX and attached to the application. 56 Then, petitioner affirmed that this difference
obligated a calculation to homogenize the comparisons between the prices of poultry sold to
Argentina and in Brazil and attached an adjustment calculation.
69. The JOX price report was for chilled poultry sold in São Paulo for 30 June 1997. The fax
provided by JOX contained the following explanation regarding its published price of poultry:
“Pursuant to your letter of 30 July 1997, we inform you that the poultry quotations in
our report refer to chilled poultry with head, feet and giblets.”57
70. The information provided by JOX referred exclusively to prices of chilled poultry, sold in São
Paulo, with head, feet and giblets, for one day in 1997. This information did not provide or affirm
that all poultry sold in Brazil contain head and feet. It simply stated that the prices published by JOX
are for chilled poultry with head and feet. Petitioner did not demonstrate or provide evidence that all
poultry sold in Brazil contains head, feet and giblets. Thus, the application did not include

54 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 467.
55 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 467.
56 See, Exhibit BRA-1.
57 See, Exhibit BRA-1.

information or evidence of prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for
consumption in Brazil.
71. In fact, JOX price publication referred only to chilled poultry and not to frozen poultry. The
normal value information provided by petitioner in the application was for chilled poultry, while the
information provided in the application to establish export price was for frozen poultry. Petitioner
provided no explanation or evidence that frozen poultry was not sold in Brazil and that, thus, the
prices for chilled poultry were the correct prices to be used in the establishment of normal value and
in the fair comparison analysis. It is clear that the normal value information provided in the
application lacked evidence as to the prices of frozen poultry in Brazil.
72. Furthermore and in accordance with petitioner’s reasoning for the adjustment calculation,
petitioner should have also suggested, and the investigating authority should have considered, an
adjustment to compensate for the fact that the price of poultry used to establish normal value was
different (chilled poultry) from the price of poultry used to establish the export price (frozen
 poultry).
No such adjustment was presented and the investigating authority did not inquire about such
differences.
73. Moreover, JOX price publication and its explanation of the prices published in its report did
not mention whether poultry sold with and poultry sold without head and feet present price
differences. No “evidence” was presented by petitioner to support that the alleged physical
characteristic difference affects price comparability and, therefore, would warrant an adjustment in
the price of poultry in Brazil (normal value). In the application, petitioner made a simple assertion,
unsubstantiated by any “evidence”, that the alleged physical characteristic differences affect price
comparability and that the normal value should, thus, be adjusted.
74. Furthermore, petitioner attached an adjustment calculation to compensate for differences in
the physical characteristics of the poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil, which assumed that the
yield rate of the eviscerated poultry sold in Brazil was 88 per cent of the live poultry and that the yield
rate of the eviscerated poultry sold to Argentina was 80 per cent of the live poultry. Petitioner based
its adjustment calculation on these figures without producing any “evidence” to support the alleged
yield rate differences.
(ii) Claim 2: Inconsistency with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.3
75. Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement imposes an obligation on the investigating
authority in initiating the investigation. Article 5.3 provides that:
“The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in
the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 2
76. Based on Article 5.3, the investigating authorities must examine the accuracy and adequacy of
the evidence provided in the application to determine whether that evidence is sufficient to justify the
initiation of an investigation.
77. As mentioned above, the information provided by JOX referred exclusively to prices of
chilled poultry, sold in São Paulo, with head, feet and giblets, for one day in 1997. Petitioner used
this information as evidence to establish normal value, as if this information represented the overall
price of poultry sold in Brazil. The information in the JOX price publication did not provide or affirm

that all poultry sold in Brazil contains head, feet and giblets. Thus, the evidence presented did not
correspond to prices at which the product in question was sold when destined for consumption in
Brazil. Brazil considers that the price information provided by JOX was not sufficient evidence to
make an adjustment to the price of poultry in Brazil and, thus, was not sufficient to justify the
initiation of the investigation.
78. With respect to what constitutes “sufficient evidence” to justify the initiation of an anti-
dumping investigation, Brazil agrees with the standard set by the Panel in Mexico – HFCS:
“With respect to the question of whether the evidence may be deemed sufficient
under the AD Agreement for purposes of initiation, we note the findings of the Panel
in Guatemala – Cement, which took into account the reasoning of the Panel in United
States – Softwood Lumber. We recognize that, because the Appellate Body reversed
the Guatemala – Cement Panel’s conclusion on the issue of whether the dispute was
properly before it, that Panel’s conclusions in this regard have no legal status.
However, the Panel’s report sets out a standard that we consider instructive in this
case:
“7.54. What constitutes “sufficient evidence” to justify the initiation
of an anti-dumping investigation is not defined in the ADP
Agreement. In this case, of course, we are bound by the
requirements of Article 17.6(i) of the ADP Agreement as the
standard of review applicable to our examination of the Ministry’s
decision to initiate. Article 17.6(i) provides:
“in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the
facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts
was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the
facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and
objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned”
7.55 The Panel in United States – Measures Affecting Imports of
Softwood Lumber From Canada considered much the same questions
as faces us here in a dispute challenging the self-initiation of a
countervailing duty investigation, on the basis, inter alia, of allegedly
insufficient evidence to warrant initiation. The Panel observed:
“In analyzing further what was meant by the term
“sufficient evidence”, the Panel noted that the quantum and
quality of evidence to be required of an investigating
authority prior to initiation of an investigation would
necessarily have to be less than that required of that
authority at the time of making a final determination. At
the same time, it appeared to the Panel that “sufficient
evidence” clearly had to mean more than mere allegation or
conjecture, and could not be taken to mean just “any
evidence”. In particular, there had to be factual basis to the
decision of the national investigative authorities and this
factual basis had to be susceptible to review under the
Agreement. Whereas the quantum and quality of evidence
required at the time of initiation was less than that required
to establish, pursuant to investigation, the required elements

of subsidy, subsidized imports, injury and causal link
between subsidized imports and injury, the Panel was of the
view that the evidence required at the time of initiation
nonetheless had to be relevant to establishing these same
Agreement elements." 58
79. Even though the quantum and quality of evidence to be required of an investigating authority
for purposes of initiating an investigation is less than that required of that authority to make a
preliminary or final determination, the “sufficient evidence” needed to justify the initiation of an
investigation has to be more than mere allegation.
80. In the present case, petitioner tried to make th e explanation presented by JOX, that the price
published in its report for chilled poultry with head and feet, into evidence that all poultry sold in
Brazil is chilled and includes head and feet. The investigating authority incorrectly accepted the
explanation provided by JOX as evidence that all poultry sold in Brazil is chilled and contains head
and feet.
81. Petitioner also alleged that it was necessary to compensate this difference in physical
characteristic and assumed such differences affect price comparability. The investigating authority
accepted petitioner’s allegation as true, even though no evidence was presented to support that the
alleged physical differences affect price comparability.
82. From the allegation that the physical differences affect price comparability, petitioner
presented a calculation to adjust normal value based on differences in yield rate of eviscerated poultry
sold in those markets. Petitioner alleged that the yield rate of eviscerated poultry sold in Brazil is
88 per cent of the live poultry and that the yield rate of eviscerated poultry sold to Argentina is
80 per cent of the live poultry. The investigating authority accepted petitioner’s calculation even
though no evidence was presented to support these yield rates.
83. In the instant case, Brazil does not request that the Panel evaluate anew the evidence and
information before the investigating authorities at the time it decided to initiate. Rather, we agree
with the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I that the Panel is to:
“(...) examine whether the evidence relied on by the Ministry was sufficient, that is,
whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence
could properly have determined that sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and
causal link existed to justify the initiation of an investigation.”
59 (emphasis added)
84. In this case, the insufficient evidence presente d or the lack of evidence thereof indicates that
an unbiased and objective investigating authority would have found that petitioner’s allegations in the
application were not supported by sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
85. The Panel in Guatemala – Cement I further stated that:

58 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States,
28 January 2000, WT/DS132/R, at para. 7.94 (adopted on 21 November 2001) (“ Mexico – HFCS ”). The
Panel’s findings on the Claim related to Article 5.3 were not appealed.
59 Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico , 19 June 1998,
WT/DS60/R, at para. 7.57 (adopted on 25 November 1998) (“ Guatemala – Cement I ”). The Appellate Body
reversed the Panel’s conclusion in Guatemala – Cement I on the issue of whether the dispute was properly
before it. Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico ,
2 November 1998, WT/DS60/AB/R, at para. 90 (adopted on 25 November 1998) (“ AB – Guatemala –
Cement I”).

“In our view, in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify
the initiation, an investigating authority may not ignore the provisions of Article 2 of
the ADP Agreement. Article 5.2 of the Ag reement requires an application to include
sufficient evidence of “dumping” and Article 5.3 requires a determination that there is
“sufficient” evidence to justify the initia tion. Article 2 of the ADP Agreement sets
forth the technical elements of a calcula tion of dumping, including the requirements
for determining normal value, export price, and adjustments required for a fair
comparison. In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a
reference to dumping as it is defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that
the evidence provided in the application must be of the quantity and quality that
would be necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping.
However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required in a case such as this
one where it is obvious on the face of the application that normal value and export
price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair
comparison. At a minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison
will require such adjustments”60 (emphasis added by the Panel)
86. In order for the DCD to have accepted that an adjustment to normal value was warranted, it
should have required that relevant evidence of the type of poultry sold in Brazil and to Argentina be
presented in the application. In that respect, we again cite the Panel in Guatemala – Cement I:
“(...)The subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that
needed to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the quality and
quantity is less. (...)”
61 (emphasis added by the Panel)
87. In the instant case, the JOX publication for prices of chilled poultry sold in São Paulo with
head, feet and giblets for 30 June 1997 was not representative of normal value prices of frozen poultry
sold in Brazil and, thus, did not qualify as the type of evidence needed to justify the initiation of an
investigation. Furthermore, petitioner presented no evidence to support that the normal value price of
poultry in Brazil was different from the export price of Brazilian poultry sold to Argentina.
Petitioner’s proposed adjustment to normal value price took into account a yield rate for eviscerated
poultry sold in those markets that was not supported by any evidence. Based on these facts,
Argentinean authorities failed to examine the accur acy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application when they decided that there was sufficient evidence of normal value in the application to
justify the initiation of an investigation.
88. In that sense, the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II provided an appropriate conclusion as to
the imposition of Article 5.3 on investigating authorities:
“We would like to emphasize that we do not expect investigating authorities at the
initiation phase to ferret out all possible differences that might affect the
comparability of prices in an application or perform or request complex adjustments
to them. We do however expect that, when from the face of an application it is
obvious that there are substantial questions of comparability between the export and
home market prices being compared, the investigating authority will at least
acknowledge that differences in the prices generate questions with regards to their
comparability, and either give some consideration as to the impact of those

differences on the sufficiency of the evidence of dumping or seek such further
evidence as might be necessary to do so.”62 (emphasis added)
89. In the present case, the investigating authority neither gave consideration as to the impact of
the possible differences on the sufficiency of the evidence presented nor did it seek further evidence
as it clearly was necessary to do so.
90. Furthermore, Article 5.3 requires that the in vestigating authority examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence that is, in fact, provided in the application. In the present case, no evidence
was presented by petitioner to support the allegation: (1) that the alleged physical characteristic
differences between the poultry sold to Argentina (without head and feet) and the poultry sold in
Brazil (with head and feet) affect price comparability that would warrant an adjustment in the price of
poultry in Brazil (normal value); and, (2) that the yield rate presented by petitioner and used to
calculate the adjustment to normal value was accurate.
(iii) Claim 3: Inconsistency with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.8
91. The relevant part of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth that:
“An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case
(...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 3
92. As stated under the legal arguments relative to claims 1 and 2, petitioner offered no
substantial evidence in the application to support the allegation: (1) that there exists physical
characteristic differences between the poultry sold to Argentina and the poultry sold in Brazil; (2) that
the alleged physical characteristic differences affect price comparability; and, (3) that the yield rate
difference alleged by petitioner to calculate the adjustment to normal value was accurate.
93. Petitioner based its allegation on the prices published by the Brazilian company JOX for
chilled poultry, with head and feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market. The DCD accepted
petitioner’s alleged adjustment to normal value without examining the adequacy and accuracy of the
evidence presented in the application. In fact, the investigating authority accepted petitioner’s
suggested calculation to normal value even though no evidence was presented to support the
allegation that the physical differences between the product sold in Brazil and to Argentina affect
price comparability and that the yield rate proposed by the petitioner and used in the adjustment
calculation was accurate.
94. Pursuant to claims 1 and 2, by not having rejected the application due to insufficient evidence
to justify proceeding with the case, Argentina has violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.

62 Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico , 24 October
2000, WT/DS156/R, at para. 8.40 (adopted on 17 November 2000) (“Guatemala – Cement II”).

(iv) Claim 4: Inconsistency with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.3
95. Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:
“The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence presented
in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 4
96. In the determination to initiate the dumping investigation, the DCD calculated export price
from the data offered by petitioner for the period of January through May 1997 and August 1997 and
the data provided by the DUI for the period of August through October 1996.
97. From that data, the DCD considered that a significant portion of the imports of poultry from
Brazil were entering at dumped prices, that is, at prices lower than the price of eviscerated poultry in
the domestic market of Brazil (normal value). Without justification, the DCD excluded the export
prices for the import transactions, which were above the normal value and established the export price
for purposes of initiation based only on the transactions, which were below the normal value.
98. By doing so, the DCD incorrectly established the export price and, consequently, made a
skewed comparison of the export price with the normal value, in establishing the margin of dumping.
99. According to Article 5.3, authorities must consider, based on the evidence presented in the
application, whether there is sufficient evidence that indicates the existence of dumping and injury to
the domestic industry that would justify the initiation of an investigation. Thus, to determine whether
there is an indication of dumping and injury, authorities must base their determination on the evidence
presented in the application.
100. By selecting certain export transactions from the total export transactions presented by
petitioner in the application, authorities failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of all the
evidence that was presented in the application, pursuant to Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
101. Article 5.3 specifically requires the investig ating authority to examine the “accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence presented in the application...”. In this claim, Brazil does not argue that
Argentina failed to “examine” evidence outside the scop e of the application. What is argued here is
that Argentina was obligated, consistent with the Agreement, to base its determination on its
assessment of the facts of the matter which were before it.
102. Furthermore, Article 5.3 requires authorities to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence in the application in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping,
injury and causal link to justify the initiation of an investigation. Examination of the dumping
evidence, as provided in Article 5.3, introduces the concept of “dumping” as defined in Article 2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
103. In particular, Article 2.4 establishes how a fair comparison between export price and normal
value is made and Article 2.4.2 provides for how margins of dumping must be established.
Article 2.4.2 states in part that:
“(...) the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall
normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal

value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions (...)”
(emphasis added)
104. Under this method, authorities are required to compare the weighted average normal value
with the weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions, and not only those export
transactions for which prices are below the normal value.
105. By excluding the export transactions, for which prices were at or above the normal value
price, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence of dumping, the investigating authority
adopted a method that would always result in a dumping margin. This method adopted by the
Argentinean authorities resulted in the establishmen t of an incorrect export price and in an unfair
comparison between the export price and the norma l value, contrary to the requirements in
Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2.
106. Our understanding of Article 2.4.2 comes from the following reasoning by the Appellate
Body in AB - EC – Bed Linen:
“(...) Here, we emphasize that Article 2.4.2 speaks of “all” comparable export
transactions. As explained above, when “zeroing”, the European Communities
counted as zero the “dumping margins” for those models where the “dumping
margin” was “negative”. As the Panel correctly noted, for those models, the
European Communities counted “the weighted average export price to be equal to the
weighted average normal value ... despite the fact that it was, in reality, higher than
the weighted average normal value.” By “zeroing” the “negative dumping margins”,
the European Communities, therefore, did not take fully into account the entirety of
the prices of some export transactions, namely, those export transactions involving
models of cotton-type bed linen where “the negative dumping margins” were found.
Instead, the European Communities treated those export prices as if they were less
than what they were. This, in turn, infl ated the result from the calculation of the
margin of dumping. Thus, the European Communities did not establish “the
existence of margins of dumping” for cotton-type bed linen on the basis of a
comparison of the weighted average normal value with the weighted average of
prices of all comparable export transactions – that is, for all transactions involving all
models or types of the product under investigation. Furthermore, we are also of the
view that a comparison between export price and normal value that does not take
fully into account the prices of all comparable export transactions – such as the
practice of “zeroing” at issue in this dispute – is not a “fair comparison” between
export price and normal value, as required by Article 2.4 and Article 2.4.2.” 63
(emphasis added)
107. Similar to what happened in that case, here the Argentinean authorities, by excluding the
export prices that were at or above the normal value, did not fully take into account the entirety of the
prices of the export transactions and treated the excluded transactions as if they were less than what
they really were. This method not only inflated the dumping margin but also disregarded the evidence
presented in the application.
108. Argentina’s decision to initiate the investigation pursuant to this method was based on a
biased and non-objective evaluation of the facts before it, inconsistent with the standard in
Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

63 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India ,
1 March 2001, WT/DS141/AB/R, at para. 55 (adopted on 12 March 2001) (“AB – EC – Bed Linen”).

109. Because the method adopted by the Argentinean authorities in the establishment of the export
price, the comparison between export price and normal value and in the establishment of a dumping
margin did not fully take into account the prices of all the comparable export transactions reported in
the application, Argentina violated Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(v) Claim 5: Inconsistency with Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.2
110. Pertinent language of Article 5.2 provides that:
“An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury
within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and
(c) causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion,
unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the
requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is
reasonably available to the applicant on the following: (...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 5
111. Petitioner presented in the application data with different periods for export price and normal
value. Normal value was based on the price of ch illed poultry, with head and feet, sold in the São
Paulo wholesale market for only one day in 1997, June 30. Export price was based on the export
price data from Sysdec statistics for the period January through May 1997 and August 1997. The data
presented by petitioner in the application, and used to calculate a dumping margin, was inconsistent
with Article 5.2 in at least two different ways.
112. First, because the normal value and export price information provided were for transactions
which were not made at as nearly as possible the same time, the application failed to include sufficient
evidence of “dumping” as required in Article 5.2.
113. Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an application to include sufficient
evidence of “dumping”. The reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” introduces the concept of
“dumping” as defined in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 2 is the provision that
sets forth the technical elements of a calculation of dumping, including the requirements for
determining normal value, export price, and adjustments required for a fair comparison. Article 2.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides the following definition of the term “dumping”:
“For the purposes of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped,
i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product destined for the
consumption in the exporting country”. (emphasis added)
114. The succeeding provisions in Article 2 set forth, in detail, information and methodologies to
be used in the determination of whether “dumping” exists. In particular, Article 2.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement sets out how a fair comparison between normal value and export price is to be
made. The chapeau of Article 2.4 provides in part that:
“A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. (...)”
(emphasis added)

115. Article 2.4 requires that a fair comparison be made “in respect of sales made at as nearly as
possible the same time.” From the language in Article 2.4 , it is clear that the timing of the sales
transactions may have implications in respect of the comparability of prices of export and home
market transactions.
116. In the instant case, the normal value presented in the application was for only one day in 1997
(June 30), while the export price data presented covered the prices of export transactions for a period
of six months in 1997 (January through May 1997 and August 1997). The establishment of normal
value based on one single day (30 June 1997) cannot be used as parameter for a fair comparison with
the export price determined for two periods of time with more than 30-days each (one for January
through May 1997 and the other for August 1997), none of which included the one day used to
establish the normal value.
117. Because prices can vary for a certain period, a comparison between an average of the export
prices for a much longer period with only one price for normal value cannot be considered a fair
comparison. According to Article 2.4, for a fair comparison to occur and for “dumping” to be
established, export price and normal value have to be compared “in respect of sales made at as nearly
as possible the same time”. In order to have complied with the “dumping” evidence requirement in
Article 5.2, petitioner should have presented normal value information for an equivalent period of
time as that presented for the export price data.
118. Furthermore, Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides the basis of comparison
between normal value and export price in establishing the existence of “dumping” margins. Relevant
part of Article 2.4.2 states that:
“(...) the existence of margins of dumping (...) shall normally be established on the
basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighed average of
prices of all comparable export transactions or by comparison of the normal value and
export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis”. (emphasis added)
119. In order to understand the meaning of Article 2.4.2, the term “comparable” has to be defined.
According to plain text interpretation, “comparable” means to “be able to be compared”, “fit to be
compared” or “worth comparing”.64 The term “compare” is defined as to “express similarities in”,
“estimate the similarity or dissimilarity of”, or “be equal or equivalent to”.65
120. Therefore, a fair comparison between export price and normal value must be made on the
basis of comparable transactions, that is, transactions that are fit to be compared or equivalent
transactions.
121. One cannot estimate similarity or dissimilarity or assess the relation between two elements if
one does not establish the basis for such comparison. That basis is established in Article 2.4, which
requires that the comparison be made “in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same
time”.
122. The determination of the normal value based on prices for one single day in 1997 cannot be
used as basis for a fair comparison in the establishment of whether or not there exists a dumping
margin.
123. Brazil understands that even though evidence provided in the application is not the same, in
terms of quantity and quality, as that necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of

64 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 269.
65 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 270.

dumping, evidence of the relevant type of information is required in a case where the normal value
presented in the application is based on a single price for the year.
124. Second, Article 5.2 requires that the application contain normal value and export price
information “as is reasonably available to the applicant”. In that regard, Brazil understands that
normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997 was reasonably available to the petitioner.
However, petitioner only provided in the application normal value information for one day in 1997
(June 30). Brazil believes petitioner had access to normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997
in view of the fact that petitioner provided on 26 July 1999 updated information on normal value for
the period 1998 through January 1999. That spreadsheet presented normal value price information for
three days in each of the twelve months of 1998 and two days in January 1999.
66 The normal value
information was accompanied by the respective daily JOX price publication.
125. This demonstrates that JOX poultry price publication was reasonably available to petitioner
and that normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997 could have been submitted in the
application, since that information too was reasonably available. However, petitioner decided to
include only normal value information for one day in 1997, June 30.
126. By not providing in the application information that was reasonably available to petitioner,
the requirement set forth in Article 5.2 was not satisfied.
(vi) Claim 6: Inconsistency with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.3
127. Article 5.3:
“The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in
the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 6
128. Regarding Claim 6, under Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel should first
consider the requirements of Article 5.2 concerning the evidence and information that must be
contained in the application for initiation of a dumping investigation.
129. As stated in Claim 5 of this submission, petitioner presented in the application data with
different periods for export price and normal value. Normal value was based on the price of chilled
poultry, with head and feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market for 30 June 1997, and export price
was established for the period January through May 1997 and August 1997.
130. In the determination to initiate the dumping investigation, the DCD established normal value
based on the normal value data presented in the application for chilled poultry, with head and feet,
sold in the São Paulo wholesale market for 30 June 1997. The DCD established export price based on
the data offered by petitioner for the period January through May 1997 and August 1997 and the
export data provided by the Argentinean agency DUI for the period August through October 1996.
131. The DCD failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application when it found that there was sufficient evidence to establish normal value and, thus, the
existence of dumping, to justify the initiation of the investigation.

66 See, Exhibit BRA-19.

132. First, in assessing whether there is sufficie nt evidence of “dumping” in the application to
justify the initiation, the investigating authority may not ignore the provisions of Article 2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which defines and provides for the determination of “dumping”. In particular,
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that a fair comparison be made between the
export price and the normal value in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time.
133. Had the DCD examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application, it would have realized that the normal value data in the application was for only one day
in 1997 (June 30) and that the export price data provided was for a period of six months in 1997
(January though May 1997 and August 1997). Because prices vary over a period of time, a fair
comparison must be made in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. The normal
value data submitted in the application was for a period that was not equivalent to the period of the
export price data provided in the application.
134. Furthermore, the authorities went beyond the scope of the data provided in the application and
extended the period for the export transactions, in order to establish the export price. In the
determination to initiate the investigation, the DCD established the export price based on data
covering a period of nine months (six months of data provided by petitioner and three months of data
provided by the DUI). Thus, the normal value wa s established in accordance with the information
presented in the application (price of chilled poultry on 30 June 1997) but the export price was
established based on the information presented by petitioner (January through May 1997 and August
1997) and the information provided by the DUI (August through October 1996). This clearly
indicates that the investigating authority did not rely on the information provided in the application to
determine that there was sufficient evidence of “dumping” to justify the initiation of the investigation.
135. In addition, the authority determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping based on
export price and normal value information in respect of sales that were not made at as nearly as
possible the same time.
136. Brazil understands that even though evidence provided in the application is not the same, in
terms of quantity and quality, as that necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of
dumping, evidence of the relevant type of information is required in a case where the normal value
presented in the application is based on a single price for the year. If authorities had examined the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application they would have required that
petitioner provide prices of poultry for the entire period under analysis in order to correctly make a
fair comparison with export prices for the same period.
137. Second, because petitioner presented normal value information for only one day in 1997, the
evidence in the application did not fulfill the requirement of Article 5.2 that petitioner include
information in the application that is reasonably available to it. As indicated in the arguments relative
to Claim 5, petitioner could have presented normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997 from
the available JOX publication. However, petitioner only presented normal value information for one
day in the period.
138. By not accurately examining the evidence in the application and by adding export price
information not provided in the application to de termine the initiation of the investigation, the DCD
acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(vii) Claim 7: Inconsistency with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.8
139. Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth that:

“An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case
(...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 7
140. Pursuant to claims 5 and 6 above, petitioner presented in the application insufficient evidence
to establish normal value. This evidence was necessary to indicate the existence of dumping. Based
on the insufficient normal value evidence presente d by petitioner, the DCD incorrectly decided to
initiate the investigation without examining the accu racy and adequacy of the evidence presented in
the application.
141. In view of the lack of evidence to support the normal value alleged by petitioner in the
application, the DCD failed to reject the application and, thus, violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
(viii) Claim 8: Inconsistency with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.3
142. Article 5.3:
“The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in
the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 8
143. The dumping found in the determination to initiate the investigation was based on: (1) the
price of poultry sold in Brazil on 30 June 1997 (normal value); and, (2) the price of imports of poultry
into Argentina from Brazil for the period August through October 1996, January through May 1997
and August 1997 (export price).
144. The injury found in the determination to init iate the investigation was based on data for the
period January 1994 through June 1998.
145. Regarding the data collection period for inju ry, the CNCE first exam ined injury in Acta
No. 405 based on the data collected for the period January 1994 through June 1997. Based on the
data for that period, Acta No. 405 did not find sufficient evidence of injury or threat of injury to the
domestic industry. When the CNCE rectified its determination in Acta No. 464, the data collection
period for the injury analysis was extended by one year and went from January 1994 through
June 1998. Acta No. 464 found sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of the
investigation.
146. In the causal link determination to initiate the investigation, the SICM explained that the
APCDS based its dumping determination on elements included in the application that originally
corresponded to information for the period of January through June 1997. 67 The SICM further
pointed out that subsequent to the dumping dete rmination, petitioner provided additional, updated
information including data for all of 1997 and the first semester of 1998. 68 However, the additional

67 See, Page 2 of Exhibit BRA-20.
68 See, Page 4 of Exhibit BRA-20.

data was submitted by petitioner 69 on 17 February 1998, more than one month after the APCDS
determined the existence of dumping on 7 January 1998. 70 The dumping determination to initiate the
investigation was never updated to take into account petitioner’s new information.
147. The different data collection periods for dumping and injury considered by the investigative
authorities in the decision to initiate indicate that the Argentinean authorities failed to examine the
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application in its determination that there was
sufficient evidence of causal link to justify the initiation of the investigation.
148. Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping agreement requires authorities to examine the accuracy and
adequacy of the evidence provided in the application, in order to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. Clearly, from the facts stated above, the APCDS
did not consider petitioner’s new information submitted on 17 February 1998 and, accordingly, did
not update its dumping determination to initiate the investigation. Thus, the investigative authorities
failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application.
149. Article 5.3 also refers to the sufficient “evidence” (in the application) that is needed to justify
the initiation of an investigation. The “evidence” mentioned in Article 5.3 is that provided in
Article 5.2, which states that:
“An application (...) shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury (...) and (c) a
causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. (...)” (emphasis
added)
150. Because the APCDS did not update its dumping determination to initiate the investigation
with the new information provided by petitioner on 17 February 1998, the SICM could not have found
that there was sufficient evidence of causal link between the dumped imports on June 1997 and the
threat of injury on June 1998.
151. In Acta No. 405, the CNCE did not find sufficient ev idence of injury or threat of injury to the
domestic industry for the period January 1994 through June 1997. Since Acta No. 405 found that
there was not sufficient evidence of injury or threat of injury, it is fair to assume that the dumping
found by the APCDS, for the period of January through June of 1997, was not causing injury or threat
of injury to the domestic industry on June 1997.
152. The new information provided by petitioner on 17 February 1998 was the basis for the
CNCE’s new injury determination in Acta No. 464. Based on the data collection period of January
1994 through June 1998, Acta No. 464 found sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the
initiation of the investigation. However, the dumping determination had not been updated with the
new information provided by petitioner.
153. By not considering the new information provided by petitioner in the dumping analysis, how
could the APCDS determine that, in fact, there was dumping? Furthermore, if the dumping found for
the period January through June 1997 was not causing injury or threat of injury to the domestic
industry on June 1997, how could the SICM determine that the dumping found for the period January
through June 1997 was causing threat of injury on June 1998?
154. In order to verify that there was threat of injury from the imports at dumped prices, the
dumping data collected and analyzed would also have to have been extended until June 1998. The
DCD did not examine whether there was dumping in the second semester of 1997 and/or the first
semester of 1998.

69 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
70 See, Exhibit BRA-2.

155. For that purpose, Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides a good basis for what
facts and circumstances are needed in regarding the existence of threat of material injury.
“A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely
on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which
would create a situation in which the dumpi ng would cause injury must be clearly
foreseen and imminent.”
156. More specifically, Article 3.7 indicates that the change in circumstances, which would create
a situation in which the dumping would cause injury, must be clearly foreseen and imminent.
Footnote 10 of Article 3.7 provides as example “convincing reason to believe that there will be in the
near future substantially increased importation of the product at dumped prices.”
157. In the present case, Acta No. 405 established that until June 1997 there was no sufficient
evidence of injury or threat of injury. From June 1997 until June 1998, there was no foreseen and
imminent change in circumstances that created a situation in which the dumped imports in June 1997
were causing threat of injury to the domestic industry in June 1998 (end of the data collection period
for the injury analysis).
158. Contrary to Article 5.3, the DCD and the SICM failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy
of the evidence provided in the application by not examining the additional dumping data submitted
by petitioner for the period July 1997 through June 1998. By comparing different periods for
dumping and injury, the SICM failed to make an accurate and adequate examination of the causal link
evidence provided in the application.
(ix) Claim 9: Inconsistency with Article 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.7
159. Articles 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth that:
“The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in
the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, and (b) thereafter, during the
course of the investigation, starting on a date no later than the earliest date on which
in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement provisional measures may be
applied.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 9
160. The data collection period for dumping was established by the DCD as 30 June 1997 for
normal value, and August through October 1996, January through May 1997 and August 1997 for
export price. The data collection period for injury was established by the CNCE from January 1994
through June 1998.
161. With respect to the data collection period for injury, the CNCE first ex amined injury in Acta
No. 405 based on the data collected for the period January 1994 through June 1997. Based on the
data for that period, Acta No. 405 did not find sufficient evidence of injury or threat of injury to the
domestic industry. When the CNCE rectified its determination in Acta No. 464, the data collection
period for the injury analysis was extended by one year and went from January 1994 through
June 1998. Acta No. 464 found sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an
investigation.

162. In the causal link determination to initiate the investigation, the SICM explained that the
APCDS based its dumping determination on elements included in the application that originally
corresponded to information for the period of January through June 1997. The SICM further pointed
out that subsequent to the dumping determination, petitioner provided additional, updated information
including data for all of 1997 and the first semester of 1998. However, the additional data was
submitted by petitioner on 17 February 1998, more than one month after the APCDS determined the
existence of dumping on 7 January 1998. The dumping determination to initiate the investigation was
never updated to take into account petitioner’s new information.
163. The different data collection periods for dumping and injury considered by the Argentinean
authorities in the decision to initiate the investigation was inconsistent with Article 5.7 in at least two
different ways.
164. First, and as shown above, the data collected for the dumping analysis went only until
June 1997. The CNCE determined that there was sufficient evidence of threat of injury from the
injury data collected until June 1998.
165. CNCE’s Acta No. 405 established that there was no material injury or threat of material
injury to the domestic industry for the period January 1994 through June 1997. Thus, the dumping
found on June 1997 was not causing injury or threat of injury on June 1997. In order to verify that
there was threat of injury on June 1998 from the imports at dumped prices, the data collection period
for the dumping analysis would also have to have been extended until June 1998.
166. The CNCE’s new injury determination in Acta No. 464 found threat of injury to the domestic
industry based on the new data presented by petitioner for the second semester of 1997 and the first
semester of 1998. The dumping period, which was examined by the DCD for purposes of the
initiation, did not consider petitioner’s new information provided on 17 February 1998 and only took
into account prices until June 1997.
167. From the facts above, how could the SICM have found threat of injury on June 1998 if the
dumped imports on June 1997 were not causing injury or threat of injury on June 1997? This could
only have happened if the APCDS had updated its dumping analysis to take into account petitioner’s
new information, which the APCDS did not.
168. The different periods examined by the DCD an d the CNCE in determining whether there was
sufficient evidence of dumping and injury, indicates that the dumping and injury evidence was not
considered simultaneously in the decision whether or not to initiate the investigation.
169. Second, Argentina failed to comply with Article 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by not
considering the evidence of both dumping and injury simultaneously in the same decision to initiate
the investigation.
170. According to the facts, the APCDS determined in its report of 7 January 1998 that there was
sufficient evidence of dumping in the export transactions of poultry from Brazil into Argentina. On
22 September 1998, the CNCE determined in Acta No. 464 that there was sufficient evidence of
threat of injury to justify the initiation of th e investigation. On 20 January 1999, the MEOSP issued
Resolution No. 11, a public notice announcing the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on
imports of poultry from Brazil.
171. As shown in the paragraph above, the evidence of dumping and injury were considered at
different times. Sufficient evidence of dumping was determined on 7 January 1998 and sufficient
evidence of threat of injury was determined on 22 September 1998, more than eight months after the
dumping consideration. To this regard, Article 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth that:

“The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in
the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation (...)”
172. Article 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement mandates that in the decision to
initiate an investigation, the investigating authority consider the evidence of dumping
and injury simultaneously. According to plain language interpretation, the term
“simultaneous” is defined as “occurring or operating at the same time”.71
173. In the present case, the authorities considered the evidence of injury more than eight months
after the dumping evidence was considered, which cannot be interpreted as being considered at the
same time.
174. Based on the arguments above, Argentina has violated Article 5.7 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by not considering the evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously in the decision to
initiate the investigation.
(x) Claim 31: Inconsistency with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 5.8
175. The relevant part of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth that:
“An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case
(...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 31
176. Article 5.8 requires the investigating authorities to reject the application as soon as the
investigating authorities are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping or injury.
177. According to the plain text meaning of the term “satisfied” and the interpretation of
Article 5.8, authorities shall reject an application when the evidence provided therein does not
“adequately meet, fulfill or comply with conditions”
72 that indicate that dumping or injury exist.
178. When the CNCE issued Acta No. 405, it had no doubt from the evidence presented in the
application that the there was no injury or threat of injury to justify the initiation. Acta No. 405
provided an examination and the reasoning why the conditions to meet the necessary injury standard
were not met.
179. Brazil affirms that the CNCE’s negative in jury determination in Acta No. 405 was the
moment which the CNCE was “satisfied” that there was not sufficient evidence of injury to justify
proceeding with the case and, therefore, the CNCE should have promptly rejected the application.
180. More specifically, we do not believe that Acta No. 405 was merely an opportunity given by
the Argentinean authority for petitioner to provide more information and amend the application. If
the CNCE wanted petitioner to provide more info rmation, the CNCE should have sent a letter,
requesting petitioner to do so, similarly to what it had previously done.
73 Instead, the CNCE issued a

71 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1294.
72 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1226.
73 See, Exhibit BRA-18.

determination based on the evidence presented in the application that the imports of poultry were not
injuring or threatening to injure the domestic industry.
181. From the moment the CNCE determined that there was insufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of the investigation, the CNCE should have rejected the application and waited for the
domestic industry to submit a new application with revised and updated information for both injury
and dumping.
182. Furthermore, Article 5.8 requires that the investigating authority reject the application
"promptly as soon as” it is satisfied that there is no t sufficient evidence to justify proceeding with the
case. In that respect, Article 5.8 requires that the rejection of the application be carried out or
performed without delay. However, instead of rejecting the application, as required by Article 5.8,
the CNCE was requested to examine the new information submitted by CEPA more than 30 days after
the negative injury determination was issued. As pr ovided in the facts related to this claim, Acta
No. 405 was issued on 7 January 1998 and petitioner presented new and updated information to SICM
on 17 February 1998, more than a month after the CNCE issued the negative injury determination to
initiate the investigation.
183. To this regard, we point out language found in the Argentinean Anti-Dumping Regulation
(Decree No.2121/94) that provides timeframes for the re jection of an application by the investigating
authorities:
“Art. 38 - The competent authority shall notify the petitioner of any error or omission
in the application within 30 business days of presentation of the application. The
petitioner shall have 15 business days from the date of the notification to provide the
corrections. If the petitioner does not provide the requested corrections within this
period, the application shall be rejected without any further proceedings.”
74
184. The Argentinean Anti-Dumping Regulation in effect during the investigation established that
if petitioner did not provide the requested corrections within the period of notification, the application
must be rejected without any further proceedings.
185. According to the facts related to these claims, the CNCE requested on 24 July 1998 that
CEPA update the information presented on 17 Fe bruary 1998. CEPA presented the requested
information on 2 September 1998, a period in excess of the 15-day requirement set out in Article 38
of the Decree No. 2121/94.
186. Brazil does not contend that Acta No. 405 was a notification or opportunity given to
petitioner to provide corrections to the application. Acta No. 405 was the moment that the CNCE
arrived at a decision or conclusion that the evidence in the application indicated that there was no
injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry. Once the CNCE was satisfied that there was not
sufficient evidence of injury to justify the initiati on of the investigation, it should have rejected the
application without delay as required in Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
187. If Argentina understands that Acta No. 405 was a notification or opportunity given to
petitioner to amend an error or omission in the application, then the Argentinean authorities did not
comply with the timeframe required in its own anti-dumping regulations to reject the application.

74 See, Exhibit BRA-21.

C. CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION – EVIDENTIARY AND
PUBLIC NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
1. Article 12.1
188. Claim 10: Argentina failed to notify seven Brazilian exporters when it was satisfied that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. By not notifying
these exporters when the investigation was initiated, Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(a) Facts
189. On 20 January 1999, the MEOSP issued Resolution No. 11/1999 announcing the initiation of
the anti-dumping investigation on imports of poultry from Brazil.
75 On 10 February 1999, the CNCE
sent letters to five Brazilian exporters Sadia, Avipal, Nicolini, Seara, and Frangosul communicating of
the initiation of the investigation and requesting that they provide responses to the questionnaires sent
by the CNCE. 76 On 16 February 1999, the SSCE sent letters to the same five Brazilian exporters
inviting them to participate in a hearing on 25 February 1999 for consultations regarding the initiation
of the dumping investigation and for receipt of the questionnaires.77
190. On 15 September 1999, the DCD sent letters to other Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense,
Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves, and Pena Branca notifying of the investigation and
requesting that they provide responses to the questionnaire.
78 The CNCE never notified nor provided
its questionnaire to these exporters.
(i) Claim 10: Inconsistency with Article 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.1
191. Article 12.1 provides as follows:
“When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be
notified and a public notice shall be given.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 10
192. Article 12.1 is a general provision that requires public notice and notification to interested
parties known to the investigating authorities.
193. The first part of Article 12.1 establishes a time reference for when the authorities should give
public notice and notify the Member and interested parties. This time reference is set for the moment
when the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the
investigation.

75 See, Exhibit BRA-7.
76 See, Exhibit BRA-8.
77 See, Exhibit BRA-9.
78 See, Exhibit BRA-13. From the documents of the investigation to which Brazil has access to, Brazil
was not able to find the DCD’s notification to the Brazilian exporter Pena Branca.

194. Brazil understands that a public notice was given when Resolution No. 11/99 was issued
announcing the initiation of the investigation. However, Article 12.1 requires that in addition to a
public notice, a notification be given when the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence
to justify the initiation of an investigation. Notification of the initiation of the investigation to the
Member the products of which are subject to such investigation was given on 10 February 1999, when
the CNCE sent the letter to the five Brazilian exporters and on 16 February 1999, when the SSCE sent
letters to the five Brazilian exporters.
195. However, the other seven exporters, that were also participating in the investigation, were
notified of the initiation and of the need to submit responses to the questionnaire eight months after
the investigation had been initiated. Notification occurred on 15 September 1999, when the DCD sent
letters to the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves and
Pena Branca requesting their responses to the questionnaire.
196. In light of this delay, Brazil believes that the notification to the seven exporters did not
comply with Article 12.1 because it was not made once the investigation was initiated.
197. The second part of Article 12.1 establishes who has to be notified: the Members of the
product of which are subject to the investigation and other interested parties known to the
investigating authorities to have an interest ther ein. According to Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, “interested parties” include:
“(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to
investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which
are producers, exporters or importers of such product;
(ii) the government of the exporting Member; and
(iii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business
association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the
territory of the importing member” (emphasis added)
198. Thus, the exporters or foreign producers of a product subject to investigation must be notified
of the initiation.
199. More specifically, the second part of Article 12.1 requires that the investigating authority
notify other known parties to have an interest in the initiation. Out of the seven exporters notified by
the DCD on 15 September 1999, at least five (Comaves, Catarinense, Minuano, Chapecó and
Perdigão) were known to the investigating authority at the time the investigation was initiated. Brazil
knows this to be a fact because on 7 January 1998, the APCDS concluded, in its report regarding the
viability of the initiation of the investigation, that there was dumping into the Argentinean market of
poultry exports from Brazil. This report listed ten Brazilian exporters, among them Comaves,
Catarinense, Minuano, Chapecó, and Perdigão, five of the seven Brazilian exporters that were notified
eight months after the investigation had initiated.
79
200. Furthermore, Argentinean authorities and Arge ntinean importers of poultry from Brazil, who
were also participating in the investigation, knew who the Brazilian exporters of poultry were for the
dumping period of investigation.
201. In view of the fact that the seven Brazilian exporters were notified of the investigation eight
months after it had been initiated and that these exporters were interested parties known to the

79 See, Page 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.

investigating authorities, Argentina has incurred in a prima facie violation of Article 12.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
2. Articles 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 6.2
202. The following four claims arise from the facts described below:
Claim 11: Argentina failed to give the seven Brazilian exporters at least 30 days to reply to the
dumping questionnaires provided by the DCD in a prima facie violation of Article 6.1.1. Moreover,
the CNCE never notified these seven exporters and never provided them with injury questionnaires.
Claim 12: Argentina also failed to promptly make available to the seven Brazilian exporters evidence
presented in writing by the other interested parties involved in the investigation, in violation of
Article 6.1.2.
Claim 13: By failing to give the seven exporters the required time to respond to the questionnaires
and not promptly making available to these exporters the evidence presented in writing by the other
interested parties involved in the investigation, Argentina did not give these exporters full opportunity
for the defense of their interests as required by Article 6.2.
Claim 14: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.3 by not providing the text of the written
application to the Brazilian exporters and to the Government of Brazil as soon as the investigation
was initiated.
(a) Facts
203. On 20 January 1999, the MEOSP issued Resolution No. 11/1999 announcing the initiation of
the anti-dumping investigation on imports of poultry from Brazil.
80 On 10 February 1999, the CNCE
sent letters to the Brazilian exporters Sadia, Avipal, Nicolini, Seara, and Frangosul communicating the
initiation of the investigation and requesting that they provide responses to the questionnaires sent by
the CNCE.
81 On 16 February 1999, the SSCE sent letters to the five Brazilian exporters inviting them
to participate in a hearing on 25 February 1999 for consultations regarding the initiation of the
dumping investigation and for receipt of the questionnaires. 82 The DCD and the CNCE never
provided the text of the written application to the five Brazilian exporters and to the Government of
Brazil as soon as the investigation was initiated.
204. On 28 June 1999, the CNCE issued in Acta No. 531 an affirmative preliminary injury
determination.83 On 6 August 1999, the DCD issued an affirmative preliminary dumping
determination.84 On 20 August 1999, the SSCE issued an affirmative preliminary determination of
causal link between dumping and the injury to the domestic industry.85
205. On 15 September 1999, eight months after the investigation was initiated, the DCD sent
letters to seven other Brazilian exporters: CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão,
Comaves, and Pena Branca, notifying of the investigation and requesting that they provide responses
to the questionnaire.
86 The letter sent by the DCD to the seven Brazilian exporters required that they
provide responses to the questionnaire for the period of January 1998 through January 1999 within

80 See, Exhibit BRA-7.
81 See, Exhibit BRA-8.
82 See, Exhibit BRA-9.
83 See, Exhibit BRA-10.
84 See, Exhibit BRA-11.
85 See, Exhibit BRA-12.
86 See, Exhibit BRA-13.

20 days from receipt of the notification.87 The CNCE never notified or provided injury questionnaires
to these seven exporters. Moreover, the DCD and the CNCE never provided the text of the written
application to these exporters.
(i) Claim 11: Inconsistency with Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.1.1
206. Article 6.1.1 provides that:
“Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an anti-dumping
investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply. Due consideration, should be
given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown,
such an extension should be granted whenever applicable.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 11
207. Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is the only evidentiary provision in the
Agreement that establishes a specific timeframe for the accomplishment of an obligation. The first
part of Article 6.1.1 requires that the investigating authority give at least 30 days for exporters or
foreign producers to respond to the questionnaires.
208. As explained before in this submission, two agencies share the responsibility for
administering the anti-dumping law and investigati on procedures in Argentina: the DCD is in charge
of the dumping investigation and the CNCE is in charge of the injury investigation.
209. The anti-dumping investigation was initiated on 20 January 1999, when the MEOSP issued
Resolution No. 11/1999. The anti-dumping investigation was on imports of poultry from Brazil and,
therefore, directed to all Brazilian producers and exporters of the subject merchandise. However, only
five Brazilian producers/exporters of the subject merchandise were notified of the initiation of the
investigation and the need to provide responses to questionnaires. These notifications to the five
Brazilian exporters were sent by the CNCE on 10 February 1999 and by the DCD on
16 February 1999.
210. On 15 September 1999, eight months after the investigation had been initiated, the DCD sent
notifications of the investigation and the need to respond to questionnaires to CCLP, Catarinense,
Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves, and Pena Branca, Brazilian producers/exporters of the
subject merchandise that were already included in the investigation without knowledge of the
investigation.
211. The DCD’s notification to these seven Brazilian exporters requested that they provide
responses to the questionnaire within 20 days from receipt of the notification. The timeframe required
by the DCD in the notification was on its face contrary to the 30-day period required for responses to
questionnaires, provided in the first part of Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
212. The CNCE never notified these seven exporters of the investigation and the need to provide
responses to the questionnaire. In fact, these seven exporters never received the injury questionnaire.
213. By not giving these seven Brazilian exporters at least 30 days to reply to the dumping
questionnaire and by not providing the injury questionnaire to these exporters to respond to, Argentina
failed to comply with Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

87 See, Exhibit BRA-13.

(ii) Claim 12: Inconsistency with Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.1.2
214. The text of Article 6.1.2 provides that:
“Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, evidence presented in
writing by one interested party shall be made available promptly to other interested
parties participating in the investigation.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 12
215. Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that evidence presented by one
interested party shall be “made available promptly” to other interested parties.
216. Without knowing, CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves, and
PenaBranca, participated in the investigation for eight months before they were notified of the
investigation and the need to provide responses to the questionnaire.
217. Because the DCD and the CNCE did not inform them of the investigation and of the need to
submit responses, these seven exporters did not have evidence that was presented in writing by other
interested party made promptly available to them.
218. With regards to the term “made available promptly”, we agree with the Panel’s interpretation
in Guatemala – Cement II that on its face, Article 6.1.2 does not necessarily require that one have
access to the file to comply with this provision. 88 The Panel in that case provided examples of how
evidence can be made available in an investigation without parties having access to the files. For
example, an investigating authority can require each interested party to serve its submissions on all
other interested parties; or, an investigating authority can undertake to provide copies of each
interested party’s submission to other interested parties.
219. However, because the seven exporters had not been notified of the initiation of the
investigation or given the questionnaires to respond, but were in any event included in the
investigation because they exported the subject merchandise to Argentina in the period of
investigation, they did not even know that evidence had been presented by the other interested parties
in the investigation, much less that they should, or could, have had access to that evidence.
220. Furthermore, Article 6.1.2 mandates the investigating authorities to make the evidence
available “promptly”. According to textual interpretation, the term “promptly” means “to make or do
readily or at once”.
89 Brazil considers that evidence could not be made readily or immediately
available to these exporters if they were notified to participate eight months after the investigation had
already initiated and a preliminary determination of dumping, injury and causal link had already been
made.
(iii) Claim 13: Inconsistency with Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.2
221. Relevant portion of Article 6.2 sets forth that:

89 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1096.

“Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full
opportunity for the defense of their interests (...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 13
222. Article 6.2 imposes a general duty on investigating authorities to ensure that interested parties
have a full opportunity throughout an anti-dumping investigation for the defense of their interests.
Even though Article 6.2 does not provide specific guidance as to what steps investigating authorities
must take in practice, Brazil considers that notification of the investigation and the request to submit
responses to the injury questionnaire eight months after the investigation has initiated is a violation of
Article 6.2.
223. First, the seven exporters were given a 20-day deadline to submit their responses to the
dumping questionnaire, contrary to the required 30-day deadline provided in Article 6.1.1.
224. Furthermore, the CNCE did not notify any of th e seven exporters of the investigation and did
not provide them with injury questionnaires. Therefore, these exporters did not have any opportunity
for the defense of their interests.
225. Second, because the seven Brazilian exporters were only notified of the investigation and the
need to present responses to the dumping questionnaires eight months after the investigation had been
initiated, the seven exporters did not have evidence presented by the other interested parties promptly
available to them.
226. These facts indicate that the seven Brazilian exporters did not have full opportunity to defend
their interests in a clear violation of Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iv) Claim 14: Inconsistency with Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Text of Article 6.1.3
227. Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for the evidentiary requirements in an
anti-dumping investigation. Specifically, Article 6.1.3 sets forth that:
“As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full
text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known
exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available,
upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the
requirement for the protection of confid ential information, as provided for in
paragraph 5.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 14
228. The language of Article 6.1.3 sets out a timeframe for authorities to provide the full text of the
written application to the known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member. Argentina
failed to meet this timeframe requirement by never providing the text of the application to the
exporters or to the Government of Brazil.
229. With respect to our understanding of Article 6.1.3, Brazil makes reference to the case
Guatemala – Cement II , where the Panel provided explanation of the purpose and function of
Article 6.1.3, by considering that:

“(...) Timely access to the application is important for the exporters to enable
preparation of the arguments in defense of their interests before the investigating
authorities.”90 (emphasis added)
That Panel further clarified that:
“(...) Since deadlines in the timetable of an investigation are counted from the date of
initiation it is critical that the investig ating authority provide the text of the
application “as soon as an investigation has been initiated”, for the exporter to be able
to devise a strategy to defend the allegations it is being confronted with.”91 (emphasis
added)
230. Regarding the instant claim, the Argentinean authorities never provided the text of the written
application to the Government of Brazil and the exporters, making it impossible for the exporters to
prepare arguments in the defense of their interests and to devise a strategy to defend the allegations
made by petitioner in the application.
231. During consultations, Brazil in its co mmunication of 5 December 2001 to Argentina
presented questions regarding the investigation. In particular, the following question regarding
Article 6.1.3 was presented:
Question 25:
Please explain why Authorities did not provide the full text of the written application to the
known exporters and the Brazilian authorities as soon as the investigation was initiated.
Argentina responded on 11 January 2002 by stating that:
“By means of note ex-SSCE No. 121 of 1 February 1999, notification of the initiation
of the investigation was made to the Head of the Brazilian Business in Argentina,
Ministro Conselheiro Pedro Motta, requesting cooperation in identifying the
interested producers/exporters in the investigation and delivery of the respective
questionnaires sent with that intent by the technical area (“área técnica”).
Notification of the initiation of the investigation was also sent to the Subsecretary of
American Economic Integration, Ambassador Alfredo Morelli by means of note ex-
SSCE No. 122/99 and the ex-Subsecretary of International Economic Negotiations,
Ambassador Eduardo Sadous, both notifications were sent on 1 February 1999.
Once the investigation was initiated, Argentina made available to the interested
parties, among them the exporters, the importers and the authorities of the country in
question, the proceedings that generated the investigation in question. At all times,
the interested parties had the opportunity to see the administrative file and to obtain a
copy of it, not only of the application but also of all the proceedings that make up the
investigation.” (emphasis added)
232. Based on the response provided by Argentina during consultations, the application was “made
available” to the interested parties once the investigation was initiated. Brazil understands that
Argentina’s response that it “made the application available” does not meet the requirement set forth
in Article 6.1.3, which requires the investigating authority “to provide” the application.

233. Article 6.1.3 mandates authorities “to provide” the full text of the written application. In this
context, the verb “to provide” is a synonym of the verb “to supply”. 92 It is our understanding that
Argentina was obligated to supply the Government of Brazil and the exporters with the full text of the
written application. Argentina’s position that the verb “to provide” could be understood to mean that
authorities were only required “to make available” the full text of the written application once the
investigation was initiated is incorrect. Article 6.1.3 carefully differentiates the obligation that the
investigating authorities have with the exporters and the exporting Member from the obligation the
investigating authorities have with other interested parties. In the first case, the investigating
authority must actively “provide” the full text of the written application to the exporting Member and
to the exporters involved in the investigation. In the second case, the investigating authorities must
“make available”, upon request, the full text of the written application to other interested parties.
Brazil believes that if the requirement imposed on the investigating authority was to be understood as
being the same for the exporters/exporting Member as that for the other interested parties, there would
be no need for the use of different language in Article 6.1.3
234. Furthermore and still based on Argentina’s response during consultations, even if the term “to
provide” could be understood by the Panel as a synonym of “to make available”, which in this case it
cannot, Argentina’s response that it notified Brazilian Authorities on 1 February 1999 of the initiation
of an investigation does not mean that Argentina made the full text of the written application
“available” at that time.
235. Even under the assumption that the notification to initiate contained language that the full text
of the written application was “available” for all interested parties, the notification of the initiation
still occurred on 1 February 1999, 12 days after the investigation was initiated, and not “as soon” as
the investigation was initiated, as required by Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
236. Our understanding of the timeframe provided by the term “as soon as” in Article 6.1.3 comes
from the conclusion by the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II. In that case, the Panel concluded that:
“(...) Having determined that Guatemala sent the full text of the application at the
earliest 8 days after initiation of the investigation. We are of the view that given the
nature of the obligation in Article 6.1.3 sending the application even 8 days after the
initiation of investigation is not adequate to fulfill the requirement that it be done “as
soon as an investigation has been initiated.”” 93 (emphasis added)
237. Brazil understands that if the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II concluded that 8 days after the
initiation was not adequate to fulfill the requirement in Article 6.1.3; in this case, a period of 12 days
after the initiation should also be considered not adequate to fulfill the requirement in Article 6.1.3 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
3. Articles 6.8, 6.10, 12.2.2 and Annex II
238. Seven claims arise from the facts described below and from the legal requirements of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement:
Claim 15: Argentina disregarded the responses submitted by Brazilian exporters with respect to the
description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil, and applied the normal value adjustment
provided by petitioner in the application. Argentina’s application of adverse facts available was
inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 3, 6 and 7 of Annex II.

92 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1102.

Claim 16: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to adequately explain in the
final determination its decision to disregard the information provided by the exporters regarding the
product description and to use, instead, the normal value adjustment proposed by petitioner.
Claim 17: Argentina disregarded all export price data provided by Brazilian exporters, and resorted to
the export price data provided by the Argentinean agency Ganaderia. Argentina’s application of
adverse facts available was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 3 and 5 of Annex II.
Claim 18: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to adequately explain in the
final determination its decision to disregard the export price data provided by the Brazilian exporters,
and to resort to the export price information provided by the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.
Claim 19: Argentina disregarded all normal value information submitted by Frangosul and
Catarinense, and resorted to the information provided by petitioner. Argentina’s application of
adverse facts available was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II.
Claim 20: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to adequately explain in the
final determination its decision to disregard all no rmal value information submitted by Frangosul and
Catarinense, and resort to the information provided by petitioner.
Claim 22: Argentina failed to establish individual margins of dumping for Frangosul and Catarinense,
as required by Article 6.10.
(a) Facts
Brazilian Exporters’ Response to the Questionnaire
239. On 7 January 1998, the DCD issued a determination to initiate the dumping investigation on
poultry from Brazil. 94 In that determination, the DCD established normal value according to the
information provided in the application and made an adjustment to normal value, proposed by
petitioner, to account for differences in the physical characteristics of the product sold in Brazil and to
Argentina.95
240. Petitioner alleged that an adjustment to normal value was warranted because in Brazil
eviscerated poultry is sold with giblets (heart, stomach, neck and liver), with head and feet, and in
Argentina eviscerated poultry is sold without head and feet.
96
241. Petitioner further alleged that to fairly compare the prices of poultry sold in Brazil (normal
value) to the prices of poultry sold in Argentina (export price), the DCD would have to add
9.09 per cent to the price of poultry sold in Brazil to compensate for the fact that poultry in Argentina
is sold without head and feet and poultry in Brazil is sold with head and feet. Petitioner’s normal
value adjustment was based on the prices published by the Brazilian company JOX on 30 June 1997,
for chilled poultry, with head and feet, for the São Paulo wholesale market.
97
242. Annex II of Section A of the dumping questionnaire for the producer/exporter, requested that
the exporters provide a complete product description with technical specifications for each
model/type/code for the merchandise sold in the internal market and for the merchandise exported to
Argentina.
98 Question 2 of Section B (sales to Argentina) of the questionnaire requested that the

94 See, Exhibit BRA-2.
95 See, Pages 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Exhibit BRA-2.
96 See, Pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit BRA-2.
97 See, Pages 8 and 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.
98 See, Exhibits BRA-22, 23, 24 and 25.

producer/exporter identify by model/type/code if the merchandise exported to Argentina was identical
or similar to the merchandise sold in the internal market. Question 2 further requested that, in the
event the merchandise was not identical, the producer/exporter identify the technical differences and
how these differences influence the export price.
Sadia
243. On 20 April 1999, Sadia submitted the questionnaire response, providing sales information
for the home market and for Argentina for the period 1996 through 1998 and January and February of
1999.99 In Annex II of Section A of the questionnaire , Sadia described the product as whole, frozen,
eviscerated poultry with giblets. 100 More specifically, Sadia reported the product for the internal
market as whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, with giblets, box of 18kg – individual weight of 1.750 to
2.750 kg; and the product for Argentina as whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, with giblets box of
18kg – individual weight of 1.700 to 2.700 kg.
101 According to Sadia’s response there were no
differences in the physical characteristics for the products sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
244. On 28 April 1999, Sadia submitted a supplemental response to the questionnaire. 102 In this
response, Sadia indicated in the supplemental information relative to Annex V of Section A, that
whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, without giblets, was sold to the internal market but not to
Argentina during the period of January 1996 through February 1999.
103 The DCD never requested
additional, specific information regarding the description of the product sold to Argentina and in
Brazil.
Avipal
245. On 21 April 1999, Avipal submitted a diskette with the questionnaire response, providing
sales information for the home market and for Argentina for the period 1996 through 1998 and
January and February of 1999.104
246. On 7 May 1999, Avipal submitted a hard copy of the non-confidential information in the
questionnaire response.
105 In Annex II of Section A of that questionnaire response, Avipal described
the product as whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry. Avipal further divided the product into two types:
(i) broiler (with giblets) containing a plastic package with neck without head, gizzard and liver; and,
(ii) griler (without giblets). 106 In Annex V of that response, Avipal reported that both broiler and
griler type poultry were sold to Argentina and Brazil. 107 According to Avipal’s response, there were
no differences in the physical characteristics for the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The
DCD never requested additional, specific information regarding the description of the product sold to
Argentina and in Brazil.
Frangosul
247. On 27 April 1999, Frangosul submitted the questionnaire response, providing sales
information for the home market and Argentina for the period 1996 through 1998 and January through
March of 1999.108 In Annex II of Section A of the questionnaire, Frangosul described the product as

99 See, Exhibit BRA-22.
100 See, Exhibit BRA-22.
101 See, Exhibit BRA-22.
102 See, Exhibit BRA-22.
103 See, Exhibit BRA-22.
104 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
105 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
106 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
107 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
108 See, Exhibit BRA-24.

whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, with giblets (broil er type), and whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry,
without giblets (griler type). 109 Both broiler and griler type poultry were sold to Argentina and in
Brazil.
248. On 19 August 1999, Frangosul also attached a product brochure to its response (in English
and Spanish), describing the types of products produced and sold. 110 According to the description in
the brochure, griler type poultry is fresh, frozen poultry, white or yellow skin, fully eviscerated,
headless and feetless, without giblets; and, broiler type poultry is fresh, frozen poultry, white skin,
fully eviscerated, headless and feetless, with giblets. 111 Based on Frangosul’s response, the exporter
did not sell poultry with head and feet and there were no differences in the physical characteristics for
the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The DCD never requested additional, specific
information regarding the description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
Catarinense
249. On 15 September 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Catarinense notifying of the investigation
and requesting that it provide responses to the questionnaire for the producer/exporter.112
250. On 20 October 1999, Catarinense requested an extension of the deadline to submit the
questionnaire response.
113 On 3 November 1999, Catarinense provided the questionnaire responses.114
In Annex II of Section A of the questionnaire, Ca tarinense described the product as whole, frozen
poultry with (broiler) and without giblets (griler). 115 For the export market, the broiler type poultry
(with giblets) contains liver, gizzard and neck. Fo r the internal market, the broiler type poultry (with
giblets) contains liver, gizzard, paws,116 head and neck. The griler type poultry sold to Argentina and
in Brazil do not contain giblets. 117 Catarinense reported that it sold broiler and griler type poultry in
the home market and that the broiler type poultry sold in the home market contained head but not
feet.118 The DCD never requested additional, specific information regarding the description of the
product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
Final Dumping Determination
251. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination.
119
Normal Value
252. In the final dumping determination, the DCD established the following non-adjusted normal
values for the Brazilian exporters: for Sadia, US$ 0,852; for Avipal, U$S 0,9988; and, for Frangosul
and Catarinense the same as that applied to all other exporters, U$S 0,9519. 120 To these values found
in the final dumping determination, the DCD made an adjustment of 9.09 per cent in order to find the
adjusted normal value to compensate for the alleged difference that poultry in Brazil is sold with head

109 See, Exhibit BRA-24.
110 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
111 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
112 See, Exhibit BRA-13.
113 See, Page 38 of Exhibit BRA-28.
114 See, Exhibit BRA-25.
115 See, Exhibit BRA-25.
116 The term “paw” is not the same as the term “feet”. In Spanish, “paw” is “garra” and the term “feet”
is “pata”. “Paws” are the lower extremity of poultry’s “feet”, not the “feet” themselves. See, Exhibit BRA-34.
117 See, Exhibit BRA-25.
118 See, Exhibit BRA-25.
119 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
120 See, Pages 55, 63, and 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.

and feet and poultry to Argentina is sold without head and feet. 121 The DCD followed petitioner’s
adjustment calculation as proposed in the application, which was unsubstantiated by relevant
evidence, and disregarded the responses of the exporters.
Export Price
253. The DCD established export price based on the import information from the Argentinean
agency Ganaderia and disregarded all export price data submitted by the Brazilian exporters.122
(i) Claim 15: Inconsistency with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.8 and Annex II
254. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement governs the use of “facts available” by an
investigating authority in an anti-dumping investigation. It allows investigating authorities to resort to
the use of “facts available” under specific circumstances. Article 6.8 provides:
“In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph.”
Annex II sets out additional conditions and considerations relevant to the application of facts
available in a particular case.
The relevant portion of Paragraph 3 of Annex II provides that:
“All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can
be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely
fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language
requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are
made. (...)”
Paragraph 6 of Annex II requires that the investig ating authority immediately inform the supplying
party of the reasons for not accepting evidence or information. Paragraph 6 requires that:
“If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed
forthwith of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further
explanations within a reasonable period due account being taken of the time-limits of
the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being
satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be
given in any published determinations.”
Paragraph 7 of Annex II establishes that:
“If authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in
the application for the initiation of the inve stigation, they should do so with special
circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price

121 See, Pages 55, 63, 65, 67 and 69 of Exhibit BRA-15.
122 See, Pages 76, 77 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained
from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld
from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favorable to the
party than if the party did cooperate.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 15
255. The conditions for applying “facts available” under Article 6.8 are straightforward. If an
interested party: (i) “refuses access to” necessary information within a reasonable period;
(ii) “otherwise does not provide” necessary information within a reasonable period; or
(iii) “significantly impedes the investigation”, the investigating authority may make determinations on
the basis of the facts available.
256. As shown in the facts related to these claims, the exporters Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul
reported that the poultry sold to Argentina was identical to the poultry sold in Brazil. The Brazilian
exporter Catarinense reported that from the two types of poultry sold (broiler and griler), there was a
difference in the broiler type poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The broiler type poultry sold to
Argentina did not contain head and feet, while the broiler type poultry sold in Brazil contained head
but not feet.
257. Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense did not refuse access or failed to make available
this information within a reasonable period, nor did these exporters significantly impede the
investigation. These responses were provided as responses to the DCD’s dumping questionnaire,
submitted within reasonable time for evaluation by the investigating authority.
258. The DCD failed to take into account these responses and applied the normal value adjustment
calculation even though, according to the exporters’ responses, this adjustment was not warranted.
259. In particular, Paragraph 3 of Annex II provides that all information which is subject to
verification, appropriately provided and done so in a timely fashion should be taken into account
when determinations are made.
260. In the present case, the product description information appropriately submitted by the
exporters, and in a timely fashion, was not taken into account in the final determination.
261. With respect to the application of facts available and Paragraph 3 of Annex II, Brazil agrees
with the reasoning set forth by the Panel in United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products, that:
“(...)The AD Agreement establishes that facts available may be used if necessary
information is not provided within a reasonable period. What is a “reasonable
period” will not, in all instances be commensurate with pre-established deadlines set
out in general regulations. We recognize that in the interest of orderly administration
investigating authorities do, and indeed must establish such deadlines. However, a
rigid adherence to such deadlines does not in all cases suffice as the basis for a
conclusion that information was not submitted within a reasonable period and
consequently that facts available may be applied.
In this regard, we note that paragraph 3 of Annex II, which provides, in pertinent part
“All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can
be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely
fashion, (...) should be taken into account when determinations are made.”
Particularly where information is actually submitted in time to be verified, and
actually could be verified, we consider that it should generally be accepted, unless to

do so would impede the ability of the investigating authority to complete the
investigation within the time limits established by the Agreement. Such might be the
case, for instance, if an entire questionnaire response were submitted only just before
the time scheduled for verification. However, in this case, it seems clear that the
information could have been verified and used, but was instead rejected as untimely.
One of the principle elements governing anti-dumping investigations that emerges
from the whole of the AD Agreement is the goal of ensuring objective decision-
making based on facts. Article 6.8 and Annex II advance that goal by ensuring that
even where the investigating authority is una ble to obtain the “first-best” information
as the basis of its decision, it will nonetheless base its decision on facts, albeit perhaps
“second-best” facts. This does not however, justify refusing to consider information
simply because it submitted outside a pre-determined time-period, if it is submitted
within a period that is reasonable under the circumstances – that is, a period that
allows the information to be verified and used in the determination, due account
being taken of the time limits in the AD Ag reement for completing the investigation
and the time needed for the investigating authority to do so. We consider it
significant, in this case, that the information submitted past the deadline, but before
verification, was not new information concerning such matters as prices, costs, or
adjustments that had never previously been provided, and which would require
extensive verification (...)”123(emphasis added)
262. In the instant case, Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul reported that there were no differences in the
physical characteristics of the poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. More specifically, these
responses were submitted in April of 1999, more than one year before the DCD issued its final
affirmative dumping determination, on 23 June 2000. The information provided by the exporters
could have been verified and used, since it was submitted within a reasonable period for the
investigating authority to do so.
263. Catarinense reported the difference in the broiler type poultry sold to Argentina and to Brazil
on 3 November 1999, approximately seven months prior to the final affirmative dumping
determination. Brazil recalls that Catarinense was only notified of the investigation on 15 September
1999, eight months after the investigation had been initiated.
264. With respect to Catarinense’s response, Brazil points out that the exporter reported that it sold
both griler (without giblets) and broiler (with giblets) type poultry to Argentina and in Brazil.
However, the DCD chose to apply the normal value ad justment to all of the poultry sales in Brazil
even though some of these sales did not warrant an adjustment because they were sales of griler type
poultry, that is, poultry sold without head and feet.
265. Furthermore, the DCD’s normal value adjustment took into account a yield rate of eviscerated
poultry based on the allegation that poultry in Brazil was sold with head and feet. According to the
information provided by Catarinense, the broiler type poultry sold in Brazil contained head but did not
contain feet. Thus, the yield rate proposed in the adjustment calculation presented by petitioner for
poultry sold in Brazil was inconsistent with the yield rate of poultry sold by Catarinense in Brazil. In
Catarinense’s case, the DCD should have considered these facts in establishing an adjustment to
normal value for the purpose of making a fair comparison.

123 United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan ,
28 February 2001, WT/DS184/R, at paras. 7.54 and 7.55 (“ United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products ”). The
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings with respect to the United States inconsistency with Article 6.8 and
Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its application of facts available. United States – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan , 24 July 2001, WT/DS184/AB/R, at para. 240
(adopted on 23 August 2001) (“AB - United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products”).

266. The DCD did not request further specific information from the exporters on the alleged
differences in the physical characteristics of the poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The DCD
simply rejected exporters’ information and used the adjustment proposed by petitioner in the
application.
267. In this respect, Brazil turns to the Panel’s consideration in Guatemala – Cement II on the
interpretation of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
“(...) We do not consider that a failure to cooperate necessarily constitutes significant
impediment of an investigation, since in our view the AD Agreement does not require
cooperation by interested parties at any cost. Although there are certain
consequences (under Article 6.8) for interested parties if they fail to cooperate with
an investigating authority, in our view such consequences only arise if the
investigating authority itself has acted in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner
(...)”
124(emphasis added)
268. Brazil believes that in the present case the DCD did not act in a reasonable, objective and
impartial manner. The DCD had access to the information provided by exporters regarding the
product description long before the final determination was issued. Had the DCD questions regarding
the exporters’ reported information it should have asked them during the investigation, but it did not.
The exporters did not refuse or did not fail to provide the necessary information for the DCD to
consider whether an adjustment to normal value was warranted. The DCD simply ignored and
disregarded the information reported by the exporters.
269. As provided in Paragraph 6 of Annex II, if evidence or information is not accepted the
investigating authority must inform the reasons why it has not been accepted and should give an
opportunity for the party to provide further explanations within a reasonable period. If the
explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of
the evidence or information provided should be given in any published determination.
270. That was not the case for Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense. The DCD never
requested specific information on the product description of the poultry sold in Brazil and to
Argentina. Had the DCD any questions or doubts regarding the information reported by these
exporters that would justify the rejection of this information, the DCD should have requested
clarifications on the issue and given the opportunity for exporters to provide explanations during the
investigation. The DCD did not do so.
271. Because Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense provided the necessary information for the
DCD to conclude that there was no need to adjust the normal value for these exporters, the DCD did
not have to base its finding of normal value on facts available, which in this case was the information
provided by petitioner in the application.
272. Even if the DCD had to base its finding with respect to normal value on information from a
secondary source, which is not the case, Paragraph 7 of Annex II instructs the investigating authority
to do so with special circumspection.
273. Brazil affirms that the DCD did not base its finding that normal value warranted adjustment
on special circumspection or careful consideration of the information supplied in the application. Had
it done so, the DCD would have requested additional information and clarification regarding the type
and physical characteristics of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil and would have checked
the information provided in the application with information from other independent sources. The
DCD never raised the issue during the investigation.

(ii) Claim 16: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
274. Article 12 governs the contents of public notices issued in the course of an anti-dumping
investigation. It provides, in pertinent part:
“12.2 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether
affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to
Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a
definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions
reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating
authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or the
Members the product of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and
to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.
12.2.1 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or
otherwise make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations
for the preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the
matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such
notice or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information, contain in particular:
(i) The names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying
countries involved;
(ii) A description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes;
(iii) The margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for
the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export
price and the normal value under Article 2.
(iv) Considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3;
(v) The main reasons leading to the determination.
12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of
an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 16
275. The question presented to the Panel is whether any reasoning has been provided in the final
determination, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement, explaining why the DCD did not use Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense’s
information on the description of the products sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
276. The questionnaire responses submitted by Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul indicated no
difference between the poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The Brazilian exporter Catarinense
reported that from the two types of poultry sold (broiler and griler), there was a difference in the
broiler type poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The broiler type poultry sold to Argentina did not
contain head and feet, while the broiler type poultry sold in Brazil contained head but not feet.
277. During the investigation, the DCD did not request further specific information as to the
physical characteristics of the product sold to Arge ntina and in Brazil, and whether such differences
affected price comparability between the poultry sold in those markets.
278. In the final determination, the DCD applied the adjustment calculation to normal value
provided by petitioner in the application, without providing explanation as to why the information
presented by the exporters on the description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil were not
accepted and, thus, disregarded.
279. In the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty,
Article 12.2.2. mandates that a public notice of conclusi on of the investigation contain, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and
reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures. Included as relevant information are the
established margins of dumping and a full explanation of the reasons for the methodology used in the
establishment and comparison of the export price and the normal value under Article 2.
280. According to the final dumping determination, the DCD adjusted normal value, to account for
alleged physical characteristic differences between the products sold to Argentina and in Brazil, in
order to make a fair comparison between the export price and normal value. The DCD provided no
explanation on why it did not consider exporters’ information on the product description that
indicated that no adjustment to normal value was needed to make a fair comparison between the
export price and the normal value. The DCD simply applied the normal value adjustment calculation
as proposed by petitioner in the application.
281. By not providing this information, Argentina has incurred in a prima facie violation of
Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Claim 17: Inconsistency with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.8
282. Article 6.8 provides that:
“In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph.”
The relevant provisions in Annex II are transcribed below.
Paragraph 3 of Annex II provides in part that:
“All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can
be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely

fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language
requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are
made. (...)”
Paragraph 5 of Annex II sets forth that:
“Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should
not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted
to the best of its ability.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 17
283. In the final determination, the DCD established export price for all Brazilian exporters based
on the import information from the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.
284. Sadia provided export price information of poultry sold to Argentina for the period 1996
through February 1999.125 Avipal provided export price information of poultry sold to Argentina for
the period 1996 through March 1999. 126 Frangosul provided export price information for individual
export transactions of poultry sold to Argentina from January 1996 through March 1999, with
respective invoices.
127 Catarinense provided export price information for individual transactions of
poultry sold to Argentina from January 1998 through January 1999, with respective invoices.128
285. As stated above, Article 6.8 limits the use of facts available to the following circumstances:
(i) cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary
information within a reasonable period, or (ii) cases in which any interested party significantly
impedes the investigation.
286. In this case, the exporters neither refused nor failed to provide the information on export price
within a reasonable period. Frangosul and Catarinense even provided the export price information for
individual export transactions to Argentina with the respective invoices.
287. Paragraph 3 of Annex II directs the authorities to consider, when determinations are made, all
information, which is verifiable and appropriately submitted. More importantly, Paragraph 5 of
Annex II explicitly provides that even though the information provided may not be ideal in all
respects, this should not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has
acted to the best of its ability.
288. In this respect, Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense have provided information to the
best of their abilities and have never refused to cooperate with the DCD. Moreover, the Panel should
take into account that the DCD only determined the period of investigation nine months after the
investigation had been initiated. During those nine months, Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul provided
information on normal value and export price in excess of the period of investigation,
129 which was
later defined as from January 1998 through January 1999.130 The DCD originally did not establish the
period of investigation for dumping purposes and exporters had to present export price and normal
value information for 1996, 1997, 1998 and the months where data was available for 1999.131

125 See, Exhibit BRA-22 and Pages 18 and 43 of Exhibit BRA-15.
126 See, Exhibit BRA-23 and Pages 22 and 45 of Exhibit BRA-15.
127 See, Exhibit BRA-24 and Pages 29 and 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
128 See, Exhibit BRA-25 and Pages 38 and 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
129 See, Exhibits BRA-22, 23 and 24.
130 See, Exhibits BRA-13 and 26.
131 See, Pages 18, 22 and 29 of Exhibit BRA-15.

289. The exporters never refused to provide such information even though the burden was
excessive. With that in mind, the responses may not have been submitted in exactly the form or with
the content expected, or desired, by the DCD, but they were nevertheless submitted. To that regard,
Brazil recalls that Paragraph 5 of Annex II provides that the mere fact that the information provided
may not be ideal in all respects, does not justify the authorities from disregarding it.
290. By completely disregarding all the export price information provided by the exporters and
applying, instead, the information from Ganaderia, Argentina has acted inconsistently with
Article 6.8 and Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iv) Claim 18: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
291. Article 12.2.2 provides for what information must be included in the public notice of
conclusion in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive
duty. It provides, in pertinent part:
“12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of
an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 18
292. The question presented to the Panel is whether any reasoning has been provided in the final
determination, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, regarding why the DCD did not use Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense’s export
price information.
293. In the final determination, the DCD established export price for all Brazilian exporters based
on the import information from the Argentinean agency Ganaderia and disregarded the export price
reported by Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense.
294. The DCD limited its explanation of the use of the export price information by stating that:
“For this stage of the proceeding and observant of the most complete and detailed
source of information, the DCD considers appropriate to use the FOB export value
derived from the Dirección de Ganaderia, Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesca
y Alimentación, listed for each company (...)”
132
295. No further explanation was given as to why the export price information reported by the
exporters was not accepted.
296. Article 12.2.2 specifically requires that the notice or report contain the information described
in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or

132 See, Pages 76 of Exhibit BRA-15.

claims made by the exporters and importers. Among the relevant information described in
Article 12.2.1 are the established margins of dumping and a full explanation of the reasons for the
methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the normal value.
297. Contrary to Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, no explanation was given as to
why the DCD did not establish the export price based on the information provided by exporters.
(v) Claim 19: Inconsistency with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.8
298. Article 6.8 provides that:
“In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes
the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may
be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph.”
Paragraph 3 of Annex II provides that:
“All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can
be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely
fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language
requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are
made. (...)”
Paragraph 5 of Annex II sets forth that:
“Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should
not justify the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted
to the best of its ability.”
Paragraph 7 of Annex II:
“If authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal
value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in
the application for the initiation of the inve stigation, they should do so with special
circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the
information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price
lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained
from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an
interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld
from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favorable to the
party than if the party did cooperate.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 19
299. Pursuant to the facts related to these claims, Frangosul submitted the questionnaire responses,
including normal value data on 27 April 1999. On 19 August 1999, Frangosul provided explanation
that the great volume of sales in the home market did not make it possible for it to provide copies of
invoices for each transaction. Frangosul in this response invited the DCD to verify in loco or to
choose a sample of the transactions, so that it could provide invoice copies of the selected

transactions.133 On 12 October 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Frangosul requesting a new list of
invoices for the period covering January 1998 through January 1999, so that the DCD could pick out
sample transactions it wanted documentation from. 134 On 30 December 1999, Frangosul presented
the list of invoices in diskette.135 On 5 January 2000, the DCD sent a letter to Frangosul informing of
the end of the stage to produce evidence. 136 The DCD never selected the transactions for which it
wanted Frangosul to provide invoice copies.
300. With respect to the responses provided by Catarinense, Brazil recalls that the DCD notified
the exporter of the investigation on 15 September 1999, eight months after the investigation initiated.
On 20 October 1999, Catarinense requested an extension of the deadline to submit the questionnaire
response. On 3 November 1999, Catarinense provided the questionnaire response with a list of the
transactions in the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999. On
8 November 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Catarinense granting the extension of the deadline until
8 November 1999.
137 Brazil observes that the DCD sent the letter granting Catarinense the extension
on the same day of the end of the deadline granted. After this date, the DCD did not request further
information from Catarinense.
301. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final dumping determination without taking into
account the normal value information provided by Frangosul and Catarinense in the investigation and,
thus, did not establish normal value for these two exporters. Instead, the DCD applied to Frangosul
and Catarinense the normal value assigned for all other exporters based on the information provided
by petitioner on 26 July 1999. 138 Petitioner presented a spreadsheet with an updated normal value
calculation for 1998 through 1999 based on prices published by JOX. Petitioner’s calculation used
prices from three reference dates for each month of the period January 1998 through January 1999.
The prices were for chilled poultry, with head and feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market.
302. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement limits the cases in which facts available may be
used. These cases occur when any interested party refuses access to or otherwise does not provide
necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation.
Throughout the entire investigation Frangosul and Catarinense cooperated with the DCD in providing
the information requested.
303. If the DCD considered that the normal value information was not submitted within the
deadlines established by the authority and, thus, was not submitted within a reasonable period, Brazil
recalls that a “reasonable period” will not, in all instances, be commensurate with the pre-established
deadlines set out in general regulations, particularly if the investigating authority has not acted in a
reasonable, objective, and impartial manner.
304. To that regard, Brazil recalls that Frangosul was subject to an excessive burden in presenting
dumping data from 1996 through 1999, a period outside the investigating period of January 1998
through January 1999. With respect to Catarinense’s response, the exporter submitted the information
requested by the DCD even though it was notified of the investigation eight months after the
investigation had been initiated. All of these actions by the investigating authority indicate that the
DCD did not act in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.
305. Furthermore, in the case of Frangosul, the e xporter invited the DCD to verify the information
provided in its response.

133 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
134 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
135 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
136 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
137 See, Exhibit BRA-27.
138 See, Pages 55 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

306. Paragraph 3 of Annex II provides that all information which is verifiable, which is
appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, and
which is supplied in a timely fashion, should be taken into account when determinations are made.
The fact that Frangosul submitted normal value inform ation in time to be verified, and actually could
be verified, indicates that the DCD should have considered and accepted the normal value
information.
307. Paragraph 5 of Annex II also instructs authorities that information provided may not always
be ideal in all respects and that this should not be the reason for disregarding the information if the
interested party has acted to the best of its ability.
308. As a final note, the DCD did not have to base its finding with respect to normal value for
Frangosul and Catarinense on information provided by petitioner, since it had available information
submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense. Petitioner’s normal value for all other exporters was
established based on prices published by JOX for chilled poultry, with head and feet , sold in the São
Paulo wholesale market. According to Frangosul and Catarinense’s responses, the normal value
reported was for frozen poultry, without head and feet.139 No doubt the normal value provided by the
two exporters was more accurate than the normal value provided by petitioner.
309. In that sense, Paragraph 7 of Annex II instructs the investigating authority to use information
from a secondary source, including information wi th respect to normal value, with special
circumspection.
310. Even though Frangosul and Catarinense had appropriately provided normal value
information, the DCD decided to use petitioner’s normal value information, which was based on the
price of poultry with different characteristics than th at reported by the two exporters. To that effect,
Brazil believes that the DCD failed to use special circumspection when it decided to apply the normal
value from a secondary source.
(vi) Claim 20: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
311. Article 12.2.2 provides that:
“12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of
an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 20
312. The question presented to the Panel is whether any reasoning has been provided in the final
determination, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping

139 See, Exhibits BRA-24 and 25. We observe that the Brazilian exporter Catarinense reported that the
broiler type poultry sold in the home market (Brazil) contained head but not feet.

Agreement, regarding why the DCD did not use Frangosul and Catarinense’s normal value
information.
313. In the final determination, the DCD did not establish normal value for Frangosul and
Catarinense. In fact, the DCD did not establis h an individual margin of dumping for these two
exporters, even though they provided information on normal value and export price.
314. The only explanation given by the DCD for not using the information provided by Frangosul
and Catarinense was that the authority did not count on additional information or sufficient supporting
documentation that would make it possible for it to proceed with a final determination of an
individual dumping margin.140
315. No further explanation was given to why the normal value information reported by the
exporters was not accepted.
316. Article 12.2.2 specifically requires that the notice or report contain the information described
in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or
claims made by the exporters and importers. Among the relevant information described in
Article 12.2.1 are the established margins of dumping and a full explanation of the reasons for the
methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the normal value.
317. Contrary to Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, no explanation was given for the
reasons why none of the normal value information provided Frangosul and Catarinense were used in
the establishment of the normal value.
(vii) Claim 22: Inconsistency with Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.10
318. Article 6.10 provides as follows:
“The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each
known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases
where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is
so large as to make such determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their
examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using
samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the
authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of
the exports from the country in questions which can reasonably be investigated.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 22
319. As demonstrated in the facts related to these claims, Frangosul and Catarinense were known
producers/exporters of the subject merchandise under investigation. Both Frangosul and Catarinense
submitted the requested information on normal value and export price, which was disregarded by the
DCD without explanation. Instead, the DCD deci ded to apply facts available and used the
information for normal value submitted by petitioner and the information for export price provided by
the Argentinean agency SENASA,
141 in order to establish the dumping margin for all other exporters.
The dumping margin applied to all other exporters was applied to Frangosul and Catarinense, even
though these exporters appropriately submitted normal value and export price data requested by the

140 See, Page 76 of Exhibit BRA-15.
141 See, Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

DCD within a reasonable period. Pursuant to these facts, the DCD was required to determine an
individual margin of dumping for Frangosul and Catarinense.
320. The first sentence of Article 6.10 sets forth a general rule that authorities must determine an
individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer of the product under investigation.
321. The second sentence of Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits an investigating
authority to deviate from the general rule, in cases where the number of exporters, producers,
importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such determination impracticable, by
allowing the investigating authorities to “limit their examination either to a reasonable number of
interested parties or products by using samples (...) or to the largest percentage of the volume of the
exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated”.
322. Brazil indicates that the second sentence of Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
which is the exception to the rule set on the first part of that Article, is only applicable when the
number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved in an investigation is so large
as to make an individual margin determination impracticable.
323. Brazil affirms that this was not the case at issue. The argument that the number of known
Brazilian producers and exporters of poultry involved in the investigation was so large as to make an
individual margin of dumping determination impracticable was never raised by the DCD during the
investigation. In that regard, subparagraph 1 of Article 6.10 provides that such selection “shall
preferably be chosen in consultations with and with the consent of the exporters, producers or
importers concerned”. The DCD did not at any time during the investigation indicate, consult with, or
request the consent of the Brazilian producers/exporters concerned that it would make a selection of
exporters in accordance with Article 6.10. In fact, the DCD sent dumping questionnaires for
Frangosul and Catarinense to respond to, in a clear indication that the investigating authority had the
intention of examining the information provided by these two exporters.
324. In addition, the DCD provided no explanation, either in the final determination or in any other
document on the record of the investigation, as to why, in this case, it was not possible to determine
an individual margin for Frangosul and Catarinense. The DCD failed to provide any evaluation of the
facts on the record that could have formed the ba sis for such a conclusion, indicating that the DCD
failed to perform an objective and an unbiased evaluation of the facts which, under the applicable
dumping standard of review, the Panel is requested to review.
325. By failing to determine an individual margin of dumping for Frangosul and Catarinense and
by applying, instead, the rate established for all other exporters, Argentina has acted inconsistently
with the general rule set forth in Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
4. Article 6.9
326. Claim 21: Argentina failed to inform the Brazilian exporters of the essential facts under
consideration which formed the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures, thereby
preventing the Brazilian exporters from adequately defending their interests, contrary to the
requirement in Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(a) Facts
327. On January 4, 2000, the DCD issued the memorandum Relevamiento de lo Actuado con
Anterioridad al Cierre de la Etapa Probatoria , the report prior to the end of the evidence-producing
stage of the dumping investigation.
142 In item VIII of such report, the DCD provided a technical

142 See, Exhibit BRA-28.

analysis of the information in the dumping investigation, including the elements for the determination
of normal value and elements for the definition of the export price. 143 All of which were facts under
consideration that would be used to form the ba sis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures.
Normal Value
Sadia
328. In the report prior to the final determination, the DCD stated that Sadia provided on
26 August 1999 lists of invoices issued from 1996 through February 1999 and a copy of one invoice
with the corresponding translation.144 Due to the extensive volume of invoices to be examined and for
which supporting documentation would have to be provided, the DCD made a statistic sample for the
period starting January 1998 through January 1999.
145 According to the DCD, the sample was done
randomly and considered 372 transactions. 146 The DCD then requested supporting documentation for
the sample it had made. According to the report, Sadia had not presented the referred documentation
up to that moment.147
329. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 148 I n t h e
determination, the DCD stated that on 13 January 2000, Sadia presented part of the supporting
documentation requested by the DCD (268 invoices). 149 The DCD calculated normal value for Sadia
based on the sample it chose, and for which Sadia presented supporting documentation.150
Avipal
330. The report prior to the final determination provided that on 12 August 1999, Avipal explained
that due to the great number of invoices (around 545 invoices a day and 196,200 invoices per year) it
would not be feasible to send copy of all invoices. 151 On 1 September 1999, Avipal submitted copies
of the translation of invoice forms. 152 On 21 December 1999, Avipal submitted diskette with the list
of the invoices and attached spreadsheets with deductions to be made to the referred list.153 The DCD
noted that the mentioned information had not yet been examined up to that moment.154
331. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 155 I n t h e
determination, the DCD explained that from the information submitted by Avipal on 12 August 1999,
the DCD made a calculation based on the transactions, for which Avipal submitted invoice copies
(25 invoices).156 The DCD further stated that the information submitted on 21 December 1999 was
not accompanied by supporting documentation and that the DCD only made discounts for which it

143 See, Page 50 of Exhibit BRA-28.
144 See, Pages 60 and 61 of Exhibit BRA-28.
145 See, Page 61 of Exhibit BRA-28.
146 See, Page 61 of Exhibit BRA-28.
147 See, Page 61 of Exhibit BRA-28.
148 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
149 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
150 See, Page 63 of Exhibit BRA-15.
151 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-28.
152 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-28.
153 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-28.
154 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-28.
155 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
156 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.

was able to corroborate. 157 The DCD calculated normal value for Avipal based only on the
information of transactions, for which Avipal submitted invoice copies.158
Frangosul
332. Oddly, the report issued by the DCD prior to the final determination made no reference to the
normal value information provided by Frangosul throughout the investigation. 159 In this regard, it is
important to note that Frangosul invited the DCD to verify in loco or to select a sample of the
transactions so that it could provide the corresponding invoices. 160 On 30 December 1999, Frangosul
presented a list of invoices for transactions in the home market for January 1998 through January
1999 in a diskette.161 The DCD never selected the transactions for which Frangosul was supposed to
provide invoice copies.
333. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 162 The DCD
applied to Frangosul the normal value found for all other exporters, which was based on information
presented by the petitioner on 26 August 1999.163
Catarinense
334. In the report prior to the final determination, the DCD stated that Catarinense submitted the
response to the dumping questionnaire on 3 November 1999. 164 It is important to note that
Catarinense was notified of the investigation and was requested to provide responses to the
questionnaire only on 15 September 1999. 165 The DCD report prior to the final determination
presented the following table based on the data submitted by Catarinense.
NORMAL VALUE REPORTED BY CATARINENSE
Year Total Kg. Total US$ Price Per Kg Normal Value
(+9,09%)
1998 52,528,211 47,068,340.55 0.8961 0.9775
1999* 43,475,875 24,424,618.28 0.5618 0.6129
Weighted Average 96,004,086 71,492,958.83 0.7447 0.8124
Source: Page 66 of Exhibit BRA-28.
335. The DCD indicated that the values in the table came from the aggregate data presented in
Annexes V and VI of the exporter’s questionnaire and corresponded to a period greater than the
period under investigation.
166
336. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 167 In the final
determination, the DCD provided that Catarinense did not present supporting documentation for the
listed home market sales and applied the normal value found for all other exporters, which was based
on information presented by the petitioner on 26 August 1999.
168

157 See, Pages 64 and 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.
158 See, Page 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.
159 See, Exhibit BRA-28.
160 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
161 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
162 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
163 See, Pages 54, 55, 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
164 See, Page 66 of Exhibit BRA-28.
165 See, Exhibit BRA-13.
166 See, Page 66 of Exhibit BRA-28.
167 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
168 See, Pages 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

Export Price
337. In the report prior to the final determination, the DCD provided that on 13 September 1999,
the Subdirector General de Operaciones Aduaneras del Interior submitted lists of import
transactions,
169 and that CEPA had also provided on 17 November and 16 December 1999
information regarding imports for the month of October and November 1999. 170 The exporters also
submitted lists of invoices for the sales transactions to Argentina throughout the investigation. The
report, however, did not mention the export price information submitted by the Brazilian exporters.
The information that was considered by the DCD as the most complete and detailed source of
information to establish the FOB export price was that provided by the agency Ganaderia.171
338. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 172 In the final
determination, the DCD established export price based on the import information from Ganaderia.173
For the export price established for all other expo rters, the DCD used the information provided by
SENASA.174
(i) Claim 21: Inconsistency with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 6.9
339. Article 6.9 provides as follows:
“The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 21
340. Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement mandates authorities to inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration that will form the basis for the decision whether to
apply definitive measures. Article 6.9 further provides that such disclosure of the essential facts take
place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests.
341. Information regarding normal value and export price, which are used to establish dumping
margins, are considered essential facts to be consid ered in the final determination. By not indicating
in the report prior to the final determination that the normal value and export price reported by the
exporters was not going to be used and by not giving the reasons why that information would be
disregarded, the DCD has not informed of the essential facts under consideration considered in the
decision whether to apply definitive measures and has not given the exporters the opportunity to
defend their interests.
342. In particular, the DCD report prior to the final determination did not indicate: (i) that the
information in the lists of invoices provided by Sadia that covered the extensive period of 1996
through February 1999 would not be used to establish normal value; (ii) that the only information
considered to establish normal value for Sadia in the final determination would correspond to the

169 See, Page 72 of Exhibit BRA-28.
170 See, Pages 72 and 73 of Exhibit BRA-28.
171 See, Page 72 of Exhibit BRA-28.
172 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
173 See, Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.
174 See, Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

information for the transactions chosen through th e sample made by the DCD, for which supporting
documentation was actually provided to the DCD; and, (iii) the reason why the DCD would not
consider the information provided by Sadia for all sales in the home market.
343. In addition, the report did not indicate that the only information that would be considered to
establish normal value for Avipal would be the information for the transactions, for which supporting
documentation was submitted to the DCD (25 invoices).
344. With respect to Frangosul and Catarinense, the DCD simply disregarded the information
submitted by the two exporters and applied the normal value found for all other exporters, based on
the information provided by petitioner.
345. Likewise, the report did not indicate why the information submitted by the exporters was not
considered for purposes of determining the FOB export price, nor did the DCD explain why it
considered the information provided by the agency Ganaderia more complete and, thus, denied the
exporters the right to defend their interests.
346. Our understanding of Article 6.9 comes from the Panel’s reasoning on Argentina – Ceramic
Floor Tiles:
“(...) the DCD relied primarily upon evidence submitted by petitioners and derived
from secondary sources, rather than upon information provided by the exporters, as
the factual basis for a determination of the existence of dumping. Thus, petitioner
and secondary source information, rather than exporters' information, represented
(with respect to the existence of dumping) the essential facts which formed the basis
for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. We therefore examined the
record in order to determine whether exporters were informed by the Argentine
authority, through access to the file, that it was on these facts that the authority would
primarily rely in its determination regarding the existence of dumping.” 175 (emphasis
added)
347. Furthermore, Brazil agrees with that Panel’s conclusion that exporters cannot be aware simply
by reviewing the record of the investigation that evidence submitted by petitioners and derived from
secondary sources, rather than facts submitted by the exporters, would form the primary basis for the
determination of the existence and extent of dumping. 176 Brazil agrees with that Panel’s conclusion
that:
“(...) The DCD thus failed to put the exporters on notice of an essential fact under
consideration. As a result, the exporters were unable to defend their interests within
the meaning of Article 6.9, for example, by giving reasons why their responses
should not be rejected and by suggesting alternative sources for facts available if their
responses were nonetheless disregarded. Under these circumstances, we find that the
DCD did not, by referring the exporters to the complete file of the investigation, fulfil
its obligation under Article 6.9 to inform the exporters of the “essential facts under
consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures.”
177(emphasis added)
348. Brazil believes that the analysis and conclusions of the Panel in Argentina - Ceramic Floor
Tiles apply to the present claim. The DCD failed to provide the exporters the essential facts, which

175 Argentina – Definitive Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy , 28 September 2001,
WT/DS189/R, at para. 6.127 (adopted on 5 November 2001) (“Argentina – Ceramic Floor Tiles” ).
176 Argentina – Ceramic Floor Tiles, at para. 6.129.
177 Argentina – Ceramic Floor Tiles, at para. 6.129.

would form the basis for the application of the definitive measures, and that the information submitted
by exporters was not to be used.
349. By not explaining the reasons why such information was rejected, the DCD denied the
exporters the opportunity to defend their interests within the meaning of Article 6.9. This constitutes
a prima facie violation of Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
350. Also, to the extent that Argentina, in order to justify its activities in the investigation, may
bring forth information or documents not disclosed to the exporters during the investigation
(particularly in regard to Claim 39), Brazil submits that such non-disclosure of essential facts should
also be considered a violation of Article 6.9.
D. CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION AND FINAL AFFIRMATIVE
DETERMINATION
1. Article 2.4 and 2.4.2
351. Five claims follow from the facts described below and the legal text of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement:
Claim 23: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 by not making due allowance for
differences in freight in the normal value established for Sadia and Avipal.
Claim 24: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 by not making due allowance for
differences in taxation, freight and financial cost in the normal value established for all other
exporters.
Claim 25: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 by incorrectly making due allowances to
normal value based on alleged physical characteristic differences between the product sold in Brazil
and to Argentina.
Claim 26: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 by imposing an unreasonable burden of
proof on Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul by not determining the period of investigation and by allowing
the exporters to submit dumping information for the years 1996 through 1999, when the dumping
period of investigation was later determined as from January 1998 through January 1999.
Claim 27: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 by incorrectly making a comparison
between the export price and the normal value for Sadia and Avipal based only on internal market
transactions for which invoices were presented, instead of determining normal value based on all the
transactions in the internal market for the period, listed and submitted to the DCD. The DCD
established the margins of dumping for Sadia and Avipal on the basis of a comparison of a weighted
average statistical sample of normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export
transactions.
(a) Facts
352. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 178 The export
price, normal value and the dumping margin calculation in the final determination were established as
follows.

178 See, Exhibit BRA-15.

Export Price
353. In the final dumping determination, the DCD established export price based on the import
information from Ganaderia.179 The DCD used a weighted average FOB export price for the period
January 1998 through January 1999 for each exporter. The table used by the DCD to establish export
price is the following:
Total By Producer US$ FOB Net Kgs US$/Kgs
Sadia S.A. 16216345 20049051 0.80883
Comaves 3015738 3380321 0.89215
Da Granja Agroi 1652300 1820106 0.90780
Sadia Concordia 1398960 1519560 0.92063
Minuano Alimentos 3139461 3390151 0.92605
Avipal 3554693 3767350 0.94355
Acaua Industria 39824 41920 0.95000
Felipe Avícola 306650 322000 0.95233
Nicolini – SIF 5172876 5397254 0.95843
Catarinense Ltd. 1163894 1158307 1.00482
Perdigão Agroin 1564110 1551753 1.00796
Seara Alimentos 11147872 11038851 1.00988
Ceval Alimentos 947993 917261 1.03350
Frangosul 2663240 2558914 1.04077
Veneto 67252 64050 1.04999
Chapecó CI 1445063 1363221 1.06004
Litoral Aliment 523440 482000 1.08598
TOTAL 54019711 58822070 0.91836
 Source: Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.
Export Price for All Other Exporters
354. In the final determination, the DCD calculated export price for all other exporters based on
the information provided by SENASA. 180 The following is the table used by the DCD to establish
that export price:
FOB EXPORT PRICE 1998 – January 1999
Producer US$/Kg Net Kg US$ FOB
Comaves 0.89215 3.380.321,00 3.015.738,00
Da Granja Agroi 0.90780 1.820.106,00 1.652.300,00
Sadia Concordia 0.92063 1.820.106,00 1.652.300,00
Minuano
Alimentos
0.92605 3.390.151,00 3.139.461,00
Acaua Industria 0.95000 41.920,00 39.824,00
Felipe Avicola 0.95233 322.000,00 306.650,00
Catarinense Ltd 1.00482 1.158.307,00 1.163.894,00
Perdigão Agroin 1.00796 1.551.753,00 1.564.110,00

179 See, Pages 76, 77, 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
180 See, Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

Producer US$/Kg Net Kg US$ FOB
Frangosul 1.04077 2.558.914,00 2.663.240,00
Veneto 1.04999 64.050,00 67.252,00
Chapecó CI 1.06004 1.363.221,00 1.445.063,00
Litoral Aliment 1.08598 482.000,00 523.440,00
TOTAL 0.95992 17.952.849,00 17.233.272,00
en la investigación” in Exhibit BRA-15.
Normal Value
Sadia
355. On 20 April 1999, Sadia submitted the questionnaire response, providing sales information
for the home market and for Argentina for the period 1996 through 1998 and January and February of
1999.181 On 26 August 1999, Sadia sent a letter to the DCD providing a list of the sales transactions
in the home market for 1996 through 1999 and explaining that the great volume of sales in the home
market made it impossible to provide an invoice copy for each transaction. In this letter, Sadia invited
the DCD to verify in loco the transactions listed or to select a sample of transactions so it could
provide the corresponding invoices.
182 On 3 December 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Sadia
requesting invoice copies of 372 selected sales transactions in the home market, establishing a 5-day
deadline to submit the invoice copies. 183 On January 4, 2000, the DCD issued the memorandum
Relevamiento de lo Actuado con Anterioridad al Cierre de la Etapa Probatoria, the report prior to the
end of the evidence-producing stage of the dumping investigation. 184 On 13 January 2000, Sadia
submitted copies of the invoices requested by the DCD.185 On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final
affirmative dumping determination.186
356. In its determination, the DCD explained how it established normal value for Sadia. From the
information submitted by Sadia on 26 August 1999, the DCD stated that due to the great volume of
information to be analyzed and for which supporting documentation was required, the DCD chose a
statistical sample for the period of January 1998 through 1999.
187 The DCD did not explain how this
sample was made. The only explanation given was that the DCD determined that the size of the
sample would be of 166, considering a tolerable error of 2 per cent and a trusted gap (“ intervalo de
confianza”) of 95 per cent.188 Without further explanation, the DCD stated that it decided to choose a
greater sample size for Sadia of 372 transactions.189
357. Based on that sample, the DCD requested Sadia to provide supporting documentation (copies
of invoices) for that sample. The DCD stated that Sadia requested an extension of the deadline, which
was granted, and that on 13 January 2000, Sadia presented part of the supporting documentation
requested (268 invoices).
190 The DCD further indicated that according to the memorandum prior to
the final determination of 4 January 2000, for purposes of the final determination, the investigating
authority would consider the information submitted until that date. 191 The DCD calculated normal

181 See, Pages 18 and 19 of Exhibit BRA-15 and Exhibit BRA-22.
182 See, Exhibit BRA-29.
183 See, Exhibit BRA-30.
184 See, Exhibit BRA-28.
185 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
186 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
187 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
188 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
189 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
190 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
191 See, Page 63 of Exhibit BRA-15.

value for Sadia based on the information provided by Sadia for the sample chosen by the DCD and for
which Sadia had presented supporting documentation. The normal calculation for Sadia was as
follows:
STATISTICAL SAMPLE
SADIA S.A.
Period Gross
Simple
Average
Price R$
Net
Simple
Average
Price R$
Gross
Simple
Average
Price US$
Net
Simple
Average
Price US$
Normal
Value +
9,09%
Gross
Weight
Average
Price US$
Net Weight
Average
Price US$
Normal
Value +
9,09%
Jan 98–
Jan 99
1,2409 1,1465 1,0527 0,9726 1,061 0,9222 0,852 0,9294
Source: Page 63 of Exhibit BRA-15.
Avipal
358. On 21 April 1999, Avipal submitted its questionnaire response. 192 On 7 May 1999, Avipal
submitted a hard copy of the response with the non-confidential information. 193 On 12 August 1999,
Avipal submitted a list of sales transactions in the home market for 1996 through 1999, with a sample
invoice for each month in 1997 and 1998, and explanation that the great volume of sales in the home
market made it impossible to provide an invoice copy for each transaction. In its letter dated
12 August 1999, Avipal invited the DCD to verify in loco the transactions listed or to select a sample
of transactions so it could provide the corresponding invoices. 194 On 1 September 1999, Avipal
provided translation of a standard invoice from Portuguese into Spanish. 195 On 21 December 1999,
Avipal submitted a diskette with a list of invoices for sales of poultry in the home market for the
period January 1998 through January 1999, including deductions and taxes. 196 The DCD never
selected the transactions for which Avipal offered to provide invoice copies. On January 4, 2000, the
DCD issued the memorandum Relevamiento de lo Actuado con Ante rioridad al Cierre de la Etapa
Probatoria, the report prior to the end of the evidence-producing stage of the dumping
investigation.
197 On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination.198
359. In the final dumping determination, the DCD explained how it established normal value for
Avipal. From the information submitted by Avipal on 12 August 1999, the DCD made a calculation
based on the transactions, for which Avipal sent invoice copies (25 invoices).199
INVOICES HOME MARKET
AVIPAL SA
Year # of Inv.
Presented
Total Kgs Gross
Simple
Average
Price
US$
Net
simple
Average
Price
US$
Normal
Value
+9,09%
Net
Weight
Average
Price R$
Gross
Weight
Average
price
US$
Net Weight
Average
Price US$
Normal
Value
+9,09%
1998 25 174.030,9 1,102 1,007 1,0985 1,2220 1,0806 1,0437 1,1385
Source: Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.

192 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
193 See, Exhibit BRA-23.
194 See, Exhibit BRA-31.
195 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.
196 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.
197 See, Exhibit BRA-28.
198 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
199 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.

360. The DCD further stated that on 1 September 1999, Avipal sent a translation of a standard
invoice. The DCD indicated that on 21 December 1999, Avipal sent a diskette with the list of
invoices and that spreadsheets were attached to the response with deductions to be made to the listed
figures.200 From the analysis of the submitted information, the DCD created the following table:
AVIPAL SA
List of sales in the Home Market
Period Total Kgs Gross Simple
Average Price
R$
Net Simple
Average Price
R$
Gross Weight
Average Price
US$
Net Weight
Average Price
US$
Normal
Value
+9,09%
Jan 98 –
Jan 99
126,828,110.36 1,2183 1,1358 1,011 0,9421 1,028
Source: Pages 64 and 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.
361. The DCD indicated that the information submitted on the 21 December 1999 did not present
supporting documentation and that the DCD only made discounts for which it was able to
corroborate.201
362. The DCD calculated normal value for Avipal based on the information of the transactions that
accompanied invoice copies. The normal value calculation for Avipal was as follows:
INVOICES HOME MARKET
AVIPAL SA
Year # of Inv.
Presented
Total Kgs Gross
Simple
Average
Price US$
Net
Simple
Average
Price
US$
Normal
Value
+9,09%
Net
Weight
Average
Price R$
Gross
Weight
Average
Price US$
Net
Weight
Average
Price US$
Normal
Value
+9,09%
1998 25 174.030,9 1,102 0,986 1,0756 1,1695 1,0806 0,9988 1,0896
Source: Page 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.
Frangosul
363. On 27 April 1999, Frangosul submitted its questionnaire response. 202 On 19 August 1999,
Frangosul provided translation of four invoices of sales to Argentina, translation of product brochure,
and explanation that the great volume of sales in the home market made it impossible to provide
invoice copies for each transaction. Frangosul in this response invited the DCD to verify in loco or to
select a sample of the transactions so that it could provide the corresponding invoices. 203 O n
30 December 1999, Frangosul presented a list of invoices for transactions in the internal market for
January 1998 through January 1999 in a diskette.
204 The DCD never selected the transactions for
which Frangosul offered to provide invoice copies. On 4 January 2000, the DCD issued the
memorandum Relevamiento de lo Actuado con Anterioridad al Cierre de la Etapa Probatoria , the
report prior to the end of the evidence-producing stage of the dumping investigation. 205 O n
23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination.206

200 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.
201 See, Page 65 of Exhibit BRA-15.
202 See, Exhibit BRA-24.
203 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
204 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
205 See, Exhibit BRA-28.
206 See, Exhibit BRA-15.

364. In the final determination, the DCD did not c onsider Frangosul’s response nor did it provide
an explanation for why the information provided was not used.207
Catarinense
365. On 15 September 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Catarinense notifying it of the investigation
and requesting it provide responses to the questionnaire. In this letter the DCD established, for the
first time, the period of investigation for data collection from January 1998 until January 1999. 208 On
13 October 1999, Catarinense requested an extension of 20 days to submit the responses. On
3 November 1999, Catarinense provided its questionnaire responses. For sales to Argentina,
Catarinense provided a list of invoices and copy of the invoices for 1998 and 1999. For sales in the
home market, Catarinense provided a list of sales transactions. 209 On 8 November 1999, in reference
to Catarinense’s request of 13 October 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Catarinense granting the
extension of the deadline until 8 November 1999.
210 After this date, the DCD did not request further
information from Catarinense. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping
determination, without taking into account the responses submitted by Catarinense in the
investigation.211
366. In the final determination, the DCD presented the following table from the information
submitted by Catarinense on 3 November 1999:
NORMAL VALUE REPORTED BY CATARINENSE
Year Total Kg. Total US$ Price Per Kg Normal Value
(+9,09%)
1998 52,528,211 47,068,340.55 0.8961 0.9775
1999* 43,475,875 24,424,618.28 0.5618 0.6129
Weighted
Average
96,004,086 71,492,958.83 0.7447 0.8124
Source: Pages 69 and 70 of Exhibit BRA-15.
367. In the final determination, the DCD indicated that the values in the table came from the
aggregate data presented in Annexes V and VI of Section A of Catarinense’s questionnaire response
and corresponded to a period greater than the period under investigation, and that the information
provided by Catarinense did not present supporting documentation.212
Normal Value for All Other Exporters
368. In the final determination, the DCD calculated the normal value for all other exporters based
on the information provided by petitioner on 26 July 1999. 213 Petitioner presented a spreadsheet with
the normal value calculation in the home market for the period 1998 through 1999 based on prices
published by JOX.214 Petitioner’s calculation used prices from three reference dates, for each month
of the period January 1998 – January 1999. 215 These prices were for chilled poultry, with head and
feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market. Petitioner’s calculation is as follows:

207 See, Pages 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
208 See, Exhibit BRA-13.
209 See, Pages 38 and 39 of Exhibit BRA-15 and Exhibit BRA-25.
210 See, Exhibit BRA-27.
211 See, Pages 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
212 See, Page 70 of Exhibit BRA-15.
213 See, Page 54 of Exhibit BRA-15.
214 See, Exhibit BRA-19.
215 See, Exhibit BRA-19.

NORMAL VALUE
SÃO PAULO – CHILLED POULTRY
Date Average R$ Exchange Rate Average US$ Adjustment 9,09%
5/01/98 1.175 1.1161 1.0528 1.1485
14/01/98 1.065 1.1195 0.9513 1.0378
30/01/98 1.167 1.123 1.0392 1.1336
January 1.107
10/02/98 1.217 1.1261 1.0807 1.1790
16/02/98 1.235 1.1281 1.0948 1.1943
27/02/98 1.215 1.1301 1.0751 1.1729
February 1.182
4/03/98 1.240 1.1311 1.0963 1.1959
17/03/98 1.203 1.1341 1.0608 1.1572
27/03/98 1.190 1.1361 1.0474 1.1427
March 1.165
8/04/98 1.212 1.1319 1.0708 1.1681
17/04/98 1.183 1.1409 1.0369 1.1312
30/04/98 1.187 1.144 1.0376 1.1319
April 1.144
6/05/98 1.187 1.1445 1.0371 1.1314
11/05/98 1.187 1.145 1.0367 1.1309
18/05/98 1.132 1.1465 0.9874 1.0771
May 1.113
4/06/98 1.017 1.1514 0.8833 0.9636
16/06/98 1.120 1.1538 0.9707 1.0589
24/06/98 1.032 1.1547 0.8937 0.9750
June 0.999
3/07/98 1.005 1.1566 0.8689 0.9479
14/07/98 1.078 1.1645 0.9257 1.0099
30/07/98 0.990 1.162 0.8520 0.9294
July 0.962
7/08/98 1.090 1.17 0.9316 1.0163
13/08/98 1.088 1.17 0.9299 1.0144
31/08/98 0.998 1.18 0.8458 0.9226
August 0.984
4/09/98 1.07 1.18 0.9068 0.9892
16/09/98 1.052 1.18 0.8915 0.9726
29/09/98 0.987 1.19 0.8294 0.9048
September 0.956
5/10/98 0.97 1.19 0.8151 0.8892
14/10/98 1.092 1.19 0.9176 1.0011
29/10/98 1.007 1.19 0.8462 0.9231
October 0.938
4/11/98 1.048 1.19 0.8807 0.9607
16/11/98 1.020 1.19 0.8571 0.9351
30/11/98 1.015 1.2 0.8458 0.9227

Date Average R$ Exchange Rate Average US$ Adjustment 9,09%
November 0.940
4/12/98 1.053 1.2 0.8775 0.9573
16/12/98 1.170 1.21 0.9669 1.0548
29/12/98 1.252 1.21 1.0347 1.1288
December 34.476 1.0470
Average 1998
NV
0.9577 1.0447
4/01/99 1.232 1.21 1.0182 1.1107
15/01/99 0.972 1.43 0.6797 0.7415
January 0.8490 0.9261
Total 98 and 99 36.174 39.4620
Average 98/99
NV
0.9519 1.0385
Source: Pages 54 and 55 of Exhibit BRA-15 and Exhibit BRA-19.
Dumping Margin
369. In the final determination, the DCD calculated the dumping margin based on the export price
and normal value explained above. The following tables indicate how the dumping margins were
calculated:
SADIA SA
Normal value US$/Kg
A
FOB Price Average US$/Kg
B
Dumping Margin %
(A-B)/B
0,9294 0,80883 14,91
Source: Page 102 of Exhibit BRA-15.
AVIPAL SA
Normal value US$/Kg
A
FOB Price Average US$/Kg
B
Dumping Margin %
(A-B)/B
1,0896 0,94355 15,48
Source: Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
ALL OTHER EXPORTERS
Normal value US$/Kg
A
FOB Price Average US$/Kg
B
Dumping Margin %
(A-B)/B
1,0385 0,95992 8,19
Source: Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
370. The DCD further indicated that for the companies Catarinense, Frangosul, Comaves, Da
Granja Agroi, Sadia Concordia, Minuano, Acaua, Felipe, Perdigão, Veneto, Chapecó and Litoral
Aliment, the investigating authority did not have sufficient additional information or supporting
documentation that would enable the final determination of an individual dumping margin.216

216 See, Pages 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

(i) Claim 23: Inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 2.4
371. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides how a fair comparison between the
export price and normal shall be made:
“A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value.
This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at ex-factory
level, in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance
shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels
of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability. In the cases referred to in paragraph 3,
allowances for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between the importation
and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made. If in these case price
comparability has been affected, the authorities shall establish the normal value at a
level f trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export price, or shall
make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall indicate
to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair, comparison
and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 23
372. On 20 April 1999, Sadia submitted the questionnaire response, providing sales information
for the home market and Argentina for the period 1996 through 1998 and January and February of
1999. In Annex VIII, Section C of its questionnaire response, Sadia reported internal freight costs for
sales in the internal market for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and for January and February 1999.
373. On 21 April 1999, Avipal submitted the questionnaire response. On 12 October 1999 the
DCD requested a list of invoices for all the sales of poultry in the home market for the period January
1998 through January 1999. The DCD did not provide a deadline for Avipal to submit this
information. On 21 December 1999, Avipal submitted a diskette with a list of invoices for sales of
poultry in the home market for the period January 1998 through January 1999, including a
spreadsheet with taxes (ICMS/PIS/COFINS), commi ssion, freight and financial costs included in the
normal value that should be deducted for an ex-factory comparison with the export price.
374. In its final dumping determination, the DCD calculated normal value for Sadia based on the
information provided by Sadia, which was accompanied by supporting documentation, for the sample
chosen by the DCD. In its normal value calculation, the DCD failed to make the freight deductions as
reported in Sadia’s 20 April 1999 response to the questionnaire.
375. Also in the final dumping determination, the DCD calculated normal value for Avipal based
on the transactions in the internal market for whic h Avipal provided copies of invoices. The DCD
failed to make the freight deductions as reported by Avipal on 21 December 1999.
376. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires due allowance to be made for
differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability.
377. The requirement to make due allowance for such differences means, at a minimum, that the
authority has to evaluate identified differences to see whether an adjustment is required to maintain
price comparability and to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and export price, pursuant

to Article 2.4. From the evaluation of the identified differences, the authorities must make
adjustments where necessary.
378. From the facts of this investigation, the DCD violated Article 2.4 by not making due
allowance for freight, as demonstrated by Sadia and Avipal in their responses submitted during the
investigation.
(ii) Claim 24: Inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 2.4
379. Article 2.4 provides in part that:
“(...) Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which
affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences
which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.(...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 24
380. On 25 June 1999, the DCD requested JOX to clarify the taxes included in the prices published
and used to determine normal value in the preliminary determination.
217 On 27 July 1999, the DCD
sent once again the request for clarification to JOX. 218 On 3 August 1999, JOX sent a letter to the
DCD explaining that the prices published by J OX include the following taxes: 12 per cent ICMS
(Value Added Tax) and 2.65 per cent PIS/COFINS (Social Contribution on Revenue). JOX further
explained that the prices published include: financial costs, depending on the sales term; sales
commission of 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent over the value of the sale; and, a variable freight for delivery,
depending on the geographic location of the seller and the buyer. 219 JOX provided these responses in
Portuguese.
381. According to the facts related to these claims , the DCD established normal value for all other
exporters based on the information provided by petitioner on 26 July 1999. This information included
a spreadsheet with the calculated normal value. Petitioner’s calculation used prices published by JOX
for three reference dates, for each month of the period January 1998 – January 1999. The published
prices were for chilled poultry, with head and feet, sold in the São Paulo wholesale market.
382. Even though the DCD decided to use JOX published prices of poultry to establish the normal
value for all other exporters, it did not make due allowance to account for taxes, financial costs, sales
commission and freight included in the published prices, as explained by JOX. The DCD simply
disregarded the information it had requested JOX and decided not to make any adjustment to the
normal value, which was demonstrated to affect price comparability.
383. In the final determination, the DCD simply stated that the information JOX provided was in
Portuguese.
220
384. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires due allowance to be made for
differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability. The DCD violated Article 2.4 by not making due

217 See, Exhibit BRA-32.
218 See, Exhibit BRA-32.
219 See, Exhibit BRA-32.
220 See, Page 56 of Exhibit BRA-15.

allowance for taxes and other differences that affect comparability (financial cost, sales commission,
and freight), as demonstrated by JOX in the letter sent to the DCD on 3 August 1999.
385. During the consultation stage of this dispute, Brazil presented on 5 December 2001 questions
to Argentina regarding the investigation. Specifically, Brazil requested the following explanations.
Question 39:
Please provide explanation why Authorities disregarded the information they requested of JOX
clarifying that the reference price published by them include taxes (ICMS and PIS/COFINS),
freight and financial cost.
Argentina responded on 11 January 2002 by stating that:
“With respect to the JOX publication, the authority requested through notification
DCD No. 273-000788/99 that JOX provide clarification regarding the taxes included
in the prices published, as well as the general conditions to which these prices are
subject. The request was repeated subsequently through another notification.
Finally, on 28 July 1999 and on 3 August 1999, JOX presented information in
Portuguese, which did not allow the authority to use the information once it did not
comply with the formal requirements requ ired by the laws and rules regarding the
administrative proceedings regime”
Question 40:
If authorities disregarded JOX’s explanation due to lack of translation, please provide whether
Authorities requested such translation and why Authorities, themselves, did not provide the
translation since they were the ones requesting the information.
Argentina responded on 11 January 2002 by stating that:
“We refer to the response provided in question 39. (...) It should be observed that the
proceedings of unfair trade practices are governed by the Law of Administrative
Proceedings that require that documentation presented be translated, a fact known to
the parties intervening in the proceedings”
386. Brazil recalls that the clarification provided by JOX was not requested by the Brazilian
exporters or CEPA, but by the authorities themselves. In fact, the JOX publication of chilled poultry
sold in São Paulo was not a source of information used by the Brazilian exporters. However, Brazil
believes that if the DCD decided to use JOX information to establish normal value for all other
exporters, it should also have taken into account JOX’s explanation on taxes, financial cost, sales
commission and freight for the published prices.
387. Brazil also recalls that JOX was not an interested party in this proceeding. To that regard,
“interested parties” are defined in Article 6.11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as:
“(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to
investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of
which are producers, exporters or importers of such product;
(ii) the government of the exporting Member; and

(iii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and
business association a majority of the members of which produce the like
product in the territory of the importing member” (emphasis added)
388. JOX is not included in the definition of “interested parties” as provided in the Agreement and,
thus, did not have to comply with the Law of Administrative Proceedings as indicated by Argentina.
389. Furthermore and as stated in footnote 25 of this submission, JOX is a private entity, not
related to the Brazilian government or any of the Brazilian exporters subject to the investigation, and
was, therefore, under no obligation to respond to the Argentinean authorities much less to provide a
translation of its response in Spanish. By responding to the DCD’s request, JOX was doing the
Argentinean authorities a favor.
390. Brazil understands that when Argentina requested JOX clarification regarding what was
included in the published prices, it was checking the data received from petitioner with the source of
that information. Thus, it was up to the DCD to have JOX’s explanation translated.
391. Furthermore, the DCD never requested a translation of the explanation from JOX, which
further indicates that the investigating authority was not unbiased and objective in evaluating the
normal value information provided in the investigation.
392. In addition, Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul, Nicolini and Seara presented on 26 August 1999
arguments with respect to the comparison between export price and normal value. 221 Among the
arguments presented was that out of the normal value price provided by CEPA, taxes, freight and
financial cost should be deducted.222 The exporters presented the following table to demonstrate what
should be the normal value price comparable to the ex-factory export price:
JOX PRICE
Jox Price US$ 0,920
Deductions
ICMS 12% 0,110
PIS/COFINS 2,65% /US$ 0,92 0,024
National Freight 0,055
Financial Cost 0,016
Total 0,715
Source: Exhibit BRA-33.
393. Even with the information provided by JOX and exporters requesting that due allowance be
made to account for these differences which affect the normal value price, the DCD did not comply
with the requirements set forth in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Claim 25: Inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 2.4
394. Article 2.4 provides in part that:
“(...) Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which
affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,

221 See, Exhibit BRA-33.
222 See, Exhibit BRA-33.

taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences
which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.(...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 25
395. On 7 January 1998, the DCD issued a notice to initiate the dumping investigation against
imports of poultry from Brazil. In that notice, the DCD decided to initiate the investigation based on
the normal value information provided by petitioner in the application, which took into account prices
published by the Brazilian company JOX on 30 June 1997, for chilled poultry, with head and feet, for
the São Paulo wholesale market. Based on the JOX published price, the DCD made an adjustment to
normal value, proposed by petitioner, to account for physical characteristic differences in the poultry
sold in Brazil and to Argentina.
396. According to the suggested adjustment, the aver age weight of the live poultry raised in Brazil
is 2.250 kgs. Petitioner alleged, without submitting any evidence, that the yield of the product in
Brazil is 88 per cent and, therefore, out of 1 kg of live poultry 880 gm of eviscerated poultry is
obtained, with giblets (heart, stomach, neck and liver), and with head and feet. Petitioner also alleged
that the yield of the product sold in Argentina differs from the yield obtained in Brazil. In Argentina,
the yield of the product is 80 per cent, considering that head and feet are discarded. Petitioner’s
conclusion was that out of a live poultry weighing 2.250 kgs, for every 1kg, 800 gm of eviscerated
poultry is obtained that can actually be sold in the Argentinean market.
397. Still according to petitioner, the yield rate difference occurs because poultry is sold to
Argentina without head and feet while poultry is sold in Brazil with head and feet. The DCD added
9.09 per cent to the price of poultry sold in Brazil to compensate for the allegation that poultry to
Argentina is sold without head and feet. No evidence was presented to support petitioner’s allegation
of physical characteristic differences.
398. Throughout the investigation, the exporters Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul reported that the
poultry sold to Argentina was identical to the poultry sold in Brazil. The Brazilian exporter
Catarinense reported that from the two types of poultry it sells (broiler and griler), there is a difference
in the broiler type poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The broiler type poultry sold to Argentina
did not contain head and feet, while the broiler type poultry sold to Brazil contained head but not feet.
399. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. In the fair
comparison made between the export price and the normal value, the DCD decided to make
allowance for the alleged difference in the physical characteristics of the poultry sold to Argentina and
in Brazil. The DCD made a 9.09 per cent adjustment to the normal value, even though the exporters
had reported in their responses that there were no differences in the physical characteristics of the
products sold to both markets.
400. Article 2.4 mandates that a fair comparison be made between the export price and the normal
value. In order to obtain a fair comparison between export price and normal value, Article 2.4 further
requires that due allowances be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price
comparability. Article 2.4 lists, but does not limit, these differences. They include differences in
conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any
other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.
401. In view of the fact that the Brazilian exporters submitted information providing that there
were no differences in physical characteristics between the poultry sold in Brazil and the poultry sold
to Argentina, there was no due allowance to be made by the DCD for differences related to physical
characteristics.

402. It is important to note that Article 2.4 requires due allowance to be made for differences,
which affect price comparability. The DCD adjusted normal value based on petitioner’s
unsubstantiated allegation that there were differences in physical characteristics between the poultry
sold to Argentina and in Brazil. Exporters submitted responses, and evidence, demonstrating that no
such differences existed. Furthermore, due allowance is only warranted for differences which affect
price comparability. Petitioner did not provide evidence nor demonstrate that the alleged differences
affected price comparability.
403. Based on exporters response to the questionnaire and the lack of evidence presented by
petitioner to prove the existence of differences in physical characteristics in the poultry sold to
Argentina and in Brazil, and that such differences affected price comparability, Brazil claims that
Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by incorrectly
making allowances to normal value.
(iv) Claim 26: Inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 2.4
404. Relevant part of Article 2.4 provides that:
“(...) The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is
necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of
proof on those parties.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 26
405. On 20 January 1999, the MEOSP issued a public notice announcing the initiation of the anti-
dumping investigation on imports of poultry from Brazil. In the public notice of initiation, Argentina
did not establish the period of data collection for the dumping investigation. On 16 February 1999,
the SSCE sent letters to Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul, Ni colini and Seara inviting them to participate in a
hearing on 25 February 1999 for consultations regarding the initiation of the dumping investigation
and to receive the dumping questionnaires.
406. The dumping questionnaires did not establish the period of data collection for the dumping
investigation. The five exporters presented normal value and export price information for the years
1996, 1997, 1998, and the available months in 1999. The DCD requested further information without
limiting the scope of the dumping period of investigation.
407. On 15 September 1999, the DCD sent letters to CCLP, Catarinense, Chapeco, Minuano,
Perdigão, Comaves and Pena Branca notifying of the investigation and inviting these exporters to
provide responses to the dumping questionnaire. In this letter, the DCD established for the first time
in the investigation that the period of data collection for dumping was from January 1998 through
January 1999.
408. On 12 October 1999, the DCD sent letters to Frangosul and Avipal requesting they provide
list of transaction and invoices for sales in the internal market from January 1998 through
January 1999. On 18 October 1999, the DCD sent letters to Sadia, Nicolini and Seara requesting they
provide list of transaction and invoices for sales in the internal market from January 1998 through
January 1999. Nine months after the investigation was initiated and after a preliminary determination
had been issued, the DCD chose to establish the data collection period for the dumping investigation.
409. Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the authorities indicate to the parties
in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison and further requires that
investigating authorities not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.

410. Export price and normal value data constitute necessary information needed in making a fair
comparison. However, a request that such information be provided for an undetermined period of
time is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 2.4. This provision establishes that
authorities must indicate what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison. Information for
one particular period may differ from the information for another period, therefore, defining the
period of investigation is essential for the exporter, who must know what information must be
provided to ensure a fair comparison.
411. The request by authorities that the exporters provide normal value and export price data for a
period exceeding that of the period of investigation is an unreasonable burden of proof imposed by the
authority on the exporters. By not clearly indicating to the five exporters the scope of the period of
data collection, the Brazilian exporters were imposed an excessive and unreasonable burden of proof
in presenting data for a period outside the data collection period of dumping. This unreasonable
burden of proof, which prevailed for nine months of the investigation, made it impossible for
exporters to provide complete, accurate and timely responses.
412. Brazil considers that the establishment of the data collection period nine months after the
initiation of the investigation and after a preliminary determination had been made does not comply
with Article 2.4.
413. Brazil also considers that the last part of Article 2.4 has been violated by the fact that
Argentina only established normal value (in the case of Sadia and Avipal) based on transactions in the
internal market for which exporters presented invoices.
414. As demonstrated throughout the investigation, the great volume of sales of poultry in Brazil
made it impossible for exporters to attach all invoices corresponding to those transactions. Exporters
invited the DCD to verify in loco the responses provided, so as to ascertain that the responses were
accurate and complete. The DCD chose not to verify these exporters, which does not mean that the
information provided by them was not verifiable.
415. Considering the great volume of sales transactio ns of poultry in Brazil and the fact that only
the sales transactions for which exporters presented invoices were considered in the establishment of
normal value, exporters were imposed with an unreasonable and impossible burden of proof, contrary
to the requirement in Article 2.4.
(v) Claim 27: Inconsistency with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 2.4.2
416. Pertinent language of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides as follows:
“Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis (...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 27
417. Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for how margins of dumping must be
established. The first part of this provision sets out the general rule that a comparison be made on the
basis of: (1) weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable
export transactions; or, (2) individual transactions of normal value and export prices.

418. In the final determination, the DCD established the margins of dumping for the exporters
Sadia and Avipal based on the normal value information for which invoices were presented, and not
based on all the sales transactions in the internal market reported for the period. The fact that the
DCD did not take into account all of the transactions in the internal market to establish the normal
value violated how Article 2.4.2. requires a comparison to be made for purposes of establishing the
existence of dumping margins.
419. In the final determination, the DCD established the margins of dumping for Sadia and Avipal
on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average statistical sample of normal value with a weighted
average of prices of all comparable export transactions.
420. Brazil understands that if the investigating authority had access to information regarding all
transactions in the internal market, even if invoices did not accompany these transactions, it could not
select through a sample, even if randomly, and use a limited portion of these transactions for purposes
of establishing normal value and for purposes of making the comparison for establishment of the
dumping margin. A weighted average of a statistical sample of normal value is not the same as a
weighted average of normal value of all transactions reported by the exporters.
421. As shown in the facts above, Sadia and Avipal reported that the sales transactions in the
internal market were too voluminous for the exporters to present an invoice for each sale transaction.
Sadia and Avipal presented a list of all the transactions in the internal market for the period. Invoices
were presented for only some transactions in orde r for the DCD to verify the accuracy of the data
submitted in the responses as a whole and not just those for which invoices were provided. Brazil
understands that the magnitude of the information submitted may mean that not all data will actually
be examined, however this does not exclude the validity of the data provided, particularly, if that data
could be verified.
422. Not only did Sadia and Avipal report their transactions for the period of investigation
(January 1998 – January 1999) but they also provided information on the sales transactions outside
the period of investigation (1996, 1997, 1998 and available data for 1999), which they also reported.
To have that burden imposed on exporters, and then for the investigating authority to use only some
of the transactions during 1998 and January 1999 is contrary to how a margin should be established
pursuant to Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
2. Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.2.2
423. The following two claims arise from the facts described below:
Claim 32: By using different periods to evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices listed in
Article 3.4, Argentina failed to make an injury determination based on positive evidence and
involving an objective examination as provided for in Article 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5.
Claim 33: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to explain in the final
determination why the CNCE examined the relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4
based on different periods.
(a) Facts
424. On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued the final affirmative injury determination.
223 In the
determination, the CNCE stated that the period of injury analysis was from January 1996 until

223 See, Exhibit BRA-14.

December 1998, taking into account data for the year 1995 as a reference year. 224 The CNCE further
explained that for some factors such as: output, prices, imports, exports, and apparent consumption,
the period of analysis was from January 1996 until June 1999; and that for the remaining factors the
period of analysis was from January 1996 until December 1998.225
(i) Claim 32: Inconsistency with Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.1
425. Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth the general requirements for a
determination of injury.
“A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based
on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of
the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 32
426. According to Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumpi ng Agreement, an injury determination must
involve an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports, the effect of the dumped
imports on prices in the domestic market, and the impact of the dumped imports on domestic
producers.
427. Based on textual interpretation, the term “objective” means that which is “not subjective”. 226
The term “subjective” refers to something that is “imaginary”, “partial” or “distorted”. 227 T h u s , i n
order for an objective examination to occur, the factors subject to examination must be evaluated
within the same parameters and not subject to different or distorted parameters. That said, Article 3.4
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides what economic factors must be evaluated in the
examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. For an objective
examination to occur, the economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 must be examined based
on the same parameters.
428. The fact that the CNCE evaluated data for output, prices, imports, exports, and apparent
consumption for the period January 1996 through June 1999; and, data for the remaining factors and
indices listed in Article 3.4 based on data for the period January 1996 through December 1998,
indicates that different parameters of evaluation were used. Thus, the examination of the impact of
the dumped imports on domestic producers was not objective and, therefore, contrary to Article 3.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
429. The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned
must be objective, since Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement imposes this obligation on all the
factors to be examined in an injury determination. Once the Panel establishes that the injury
determination was not based on an objective examination, the Panel must also establish that Argentina
violated Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
430. With respect to Article 3.5, some of the factors in the injury analysis were examined in a
period that went until June 1999. Since dumping wa s only ascertained for a period that went until

224 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-14.
225 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-14.
226 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 938.
227 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1387.

January 1999, there is no basis on which the authorities could attribute the June 1999 injury to the
January 1999 dumping. At the very least, some very convincing explanation on how this link existed
would be needed in the final determination on causal link.
(ii) Claim 33: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
431. Article 12.2.2 provides in part that:
“A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 33
432. The question presented to the Panel is whether any reasoning has been provided in the final
determination, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, regarding why the DCD used different periods to evaluate the relevant economic factors
and indices listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
433. In the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty,
Article 12.2.2. mandates that a public notice of conclusi on of the investigation contain, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and
reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures. In particular, the public notice of
conclusion must contain information described in subparagraph 2.1 of Article 12. Among the
information required in subparagraph 2.1 of Article 12 are considerations relevant to the injury
determination as set out in Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
434. As shown in the Claim above, the examinat ion by the CNCE of the economic factors and
indices listed in Article 3.4 was not objective because it used different parameters to evaluate the
factors. Some factors were evaluated taking into account the period from January 1996 through
June 1999 and other factors were evaluated taking into account the period from January 1996 through
December 1998.
435. In the final injury determination, the CNCE simply stated that the period under analysis
corresponded to January 1996 through December 1998. The CNCE further stated that for some
variables, such as national production, prices, imports, national exports and apparent consumption,
data for the first semester of 1999 was included.
436. No explanation or consideration was offered in the final determination as to why the CNCE
evaluated data for output, prices, imports, exports, and apparent consumption for the period January
1996 through June 1999, which was outside the injury period of investigation.
437. By not providing in the final determination considerations relevant to the injury determination
as set out in Article 3, Argentina violated Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3. Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5
438. The following four claims arise from the facts transcribed below:
Claim 34: The injury analysis in the final determination did not exclude Nicolini and Seara’s imports
even though the DCD considered that these were not “dumped imports”. By not excluding the
imports from Nicolini and Seara from the volu me of the “dumped imports”, the CNCE did not
properly consider whether there had been a significant increase in “dumped imports”, thereby
violating Article 3.2.
Claim 35: The flawed evaluation of the “dumped imports” indicates that the final injury
determination was not based on positive evidence and did not involve an objective examination as
required by Article 3.1.
Claim 36: By not excluding the imports from Nicolini and Seara from the volume of the “dumped
imports”, the CNCE failed to properly examine the impact of the “dumped imports” on the domestic
industry, as required by Article 3.4.
Claim 37: By not excluding the imports from Nicolini and Seara from the volume of the “dumped
imports”, the CNCE did not properly consider injury as prescribed in Article 3.1, and, consequently,
did not properly demonstrate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the
domestic industry, as required in Article 3.5.
(a) Facts
439. On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued the final affirmative injury determination.
228 O n
23 June 2000, the DCD issued the final affirmative dumping determination. 229 In the dumping
determination, the DCD determined that the Brazilian exporters Nicolini and Seara were not exporting
the subject merchandise at dumped prices and that poultry from Sadia, Avipal, and all other exporters
were being exported at dumped prices.
230
440. On 17 July 2000, the SSCE issued the final affirmative determination on causal link between
the allegedly dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.231
(i) Claim 34: Inconsistency with Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.2
441. Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides factors to be considered with regards to
the increase in the volume of “dumped imports”, which Article 3.1 requires to be examined. The
relevant portion of Article 3.2 sets forth that:
“With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall
consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.
(...)”

228 See, Exhibit BRA-14
229 See, Exhibit BRA-15.
230 See, Pages 102, 103 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
231 See, Exhibit BRA-16.

Legal Argument Relative to Claim 34
442. The language set out throughout Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is consistent, the
injury to the domestic industry must have been caused by “dumped imports”. Article 2.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement provides definition of what constitutes a product that is being dumped. In this
regard, Article 2.1 provides the definition as follows:
“For the purposes of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped,
i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined
for consumption in the exporting country”
443. From the language of Article 2.1, “imports ar e dumped” when a product is introduced into the
commerce of another country at a price that is less than the price of the like product in the exporting
country.
444. Brazil understands that the definition of the term “dumped imports”, as provided in
Article 2.1, is applicable to all articles under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
445. In the final dumping determination, the DCD determined that the Brazilian exporters Nicolini
and Seara were not exporting the subject merchandise at dumped prices.
446. As stated previously in this submission, the DCD established export price in the final
dumping determination based on the import information from Ganaderia. The DCD listed the net
volume of poultry imports in kilograms, the total FOB value of poultry imports in US dollars, and the
per unit FOB US dollar per kilogram price of the exports of each Brazilian exporter for the period
January 1998 through January 1999.
232
447. According to that list, for the period of January 1998 through January 1999, Nicolini exported
5,397,254 kilograms to Argentina of the product under investigation, Seara exported
11,038,851 kilograms to Argentina of the product under investigation, and the total volume of the
product exported by all Brazilian exporters was 58,822,070 kilograms.
448. Out of the total volume exported by the Brazilian exporters for the period of investigation,
Nicolini exported 9.18 per cent and Seara 18.77 per cent of the total volume.
Product Net Kgs Participation in Total %
Nicolini 5.397.254 9.18%
Seara 11.038.851 18.77%
Total 58.822.070 100%
Source: Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.
449. Together, Nicolini and Seara exported 27.95 per cent of total exports from Brazil of the
product under investigation, almost one third of total exports of poultry from Brazil for the period.
Brazil understands this to be a significant volume and a relevant factor in the injury analysis.
450. The injury analysis in the final injury determination, did not exclude the imports from
Nicolini and Seara from the “dumped imports” analyzed in the injury examination.

232 See, Page 76 of Exhibit BRA-15.

451. Brazil knows this to be fact, since the fina l injury determination, which was issued on
23 December 1999, preceded the final dumping determination, issued on 23 June 2000, by six
months.
452. Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authority to consider
whether there has been a significant increase in “dumped imports”, either in absolute terms or relative
to the production or consumption in the importing Member. Brazil affirms that the consideration by
the investigating authorities of whether there was a significant increase in the “dumped imports”
never occurred, since the significant volume of imports from Nicolini and Seara were not excluded
from the volume of the “dumped imports”.
453. By not excluding the imports from Nicolini and Seara from the total volume of “dumped
imports”, Argentina has failed to adequately consider whether there had been a significant increase in
the “dumped imports”, in violation of Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(ii) Claim 35: Inconsistency with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.1
454. Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth the general requirements for a
determination of injury.
“A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based
on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of
the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 35
455. Article 3.1 mandates that a determination of injury by the investigating authority be based
upon positive evidence and involve an objective examin ation of three factors: (1) the volume of the
“dumped imports”; (2) the effect of the “dumped imports” on prices in the domestic market for like
products; and, (3) the consequent impact of the “dumped imports” on domestic producers of such
products.
456. According to the facts above, Argentina has fa iled to base its final injury determination upon
positive evidence and make an objective examination of the factors set out in Article 3.1, by
incorrectly establishing “dumped imports”.
457. As demonstrated in the previous claim, Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement considers
a product as being dumped, when it is introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its
normal value.
458. Thus, “dumped imports” are those imports that are introduced into the commerce of another
country at a price lower than the normal value price. In the final dumping determination, the DCD
found that Nicolini and Seara’s imports of poultry into Argentina were not being dumped.
459. However, the final injury determination included the imports from Nicolini and Seara as part
of the “dumped imports” examined pursuant to Article 3.1.
460. Because the CNCE did not exclude the imports of poultry from Nicoli and Seara from the
total of the “dumped imports”, the injury examination, as set out in Article 3.1, cannot be considered
objective.

(iii) Claim 36: Inconsistency with Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.4
461. Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for the examination of the impact of the
“dumped imports” on the domestic industry. Article 3.4 sets forth that:
“The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization
of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 36
462. Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the examination of the impact of the
“dumped imports” on the domestic industry include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry. In particular, the examination to be
made is of the impact of the “dumped imports” on the domestic industry.
463. A textual interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.4 indicates that the investigating
authority must examine the impact in the domestic industry of the imports that are being dumped, and
not of all imports from a certain destination.
464. In the final dumping determination, a significant part (almost 30 per cent) of the imports of
poultry from Brazil were considered not to be “dumped imports”. However, for purposes of the
injury determination, these imports that were not considered as “dumped imports” were not excluded
from the injury analysis of “dumped imports”. By not excluding these imports from the total imports
of poultry, the CNCE made an incorrect examinat ion of the impact of the “dumped imports” on the
domestic industry.
465. A previous GATT Panel raised a similar issue in EC – Cotton Yarn:
“(...) the Panel noted that in responding to a question by the Panel the EC has stated
‘Regarding the volume to be considered for injury purposes, the Community took into
account all imports, whether dumped or non-dumped, for the reasons mentioned
above.’ Articles 3.2 and 3.4 of the Agreement required that the investigating
authorities examined the volume and effects of the “dumped imports”. The Panel
noted that the EC stated in its response that it had, for the purposes of its injury
analysis, taken into account the effects of all imports from Brazil, whether dumped or
non-dumped. As Brazil had not made a Claim that the EC had thereby acted
inconsistently with the Agreement, the Panel could not pronounce itself on any such
claim”
233 (emphasis added)

233 EC – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil , 4 July 1995,
ADP/137, at para. 525 (“EC – Cotton Yarn” ).

466. That Panel indicated that had Brazil made a Claim that the EC had acted inconsistently with
the Agreement by taking into account the effects of all imports from Brazil in the injury analysis, and
not only the imports that were being dumped, the Panel might have been able to rule on that claim.
467. Unlike the above-mentioned GATT panel proceeding, Brazil does Claim that Argentina’s
determination is inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
468. With respect to the Claim at issue, by no excluding the imports from Nicolini and Seara from
the total of “dumped imports”, Argentina has failed to correctly examine the impact of the “dumped
imports” on the domestic industry concerned, contrary to the provision in Article 3.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
(iv) Claim 37: Inconsistency with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.5
469. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes the requirements for the analysis of
the causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry:
“It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports at which at the same time are injuring
the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors may not be
attributed to the dumped imports. (...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 37
470. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies how the causal link between dumping
and injury to the domestic industry is to be established.
471. First, Article 3.5 requires that the demonstration of a causal relationship be based on the
examination of all relevant evidence. Second, Artic le 3.5 provides that the authorities shall examine
any known factors other than the “dumped imports”, which are at the same time injuring the domestic
industry. Third, the authorities are to make sure that injuries caused by these factors are not attributed
to the “dumped imports”.
472. The SSCE did not make a causal link analysis. The SSCE simply reproduced the margins of
dumping found in the final affirmative dumping determination, some of the factors examined in the
final affirmative injury determination, and conclu ded that there was causal link between the two,
without providing the reasons why they believed such link existed. No demonstration of causal link
between the two was made in the final affirmative determination of causal relationship.
473. Furthermore, Article 3.5 mandate authorities to determine that “dumped imports” are the
cause of injury to the domestic industry. As indicated above, the authorities knew before the causal
relationship determination was issued that the imports of Nicolini and Seara were not considered
“dumped imports”. However, the causal relationship determination failed to evaluate that factor and
exclude Nicolini and Seara’s imports from the total “dumped imports”.

474. Brazil considers that in the absence of a valid injury finding, which was flawed by the
inclusion of the imports from Nicolini and Seara in the total “dumped imports”, there was no basis for
a causal relationship finding.
4. Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 12.2.2
475. The following three claims arise follow from the facts described below and from the legal
requirements in the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
Claim 38: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 by failing to evaluate all the relevant
economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4.
Claim 39: By failing to evaluate all the relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 in
its final determination, Argentina’s injury determination was not based on positive evidence and did
not involve an objective evaluation, as required by Article 3.1.
Claim 40: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to adequately explain and
provide in its final determination an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices listed in
Article 3.4.
(a) Facts
476. On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued its final affirmative injury determination.
234 T h e
examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry did not contain an
evaluation of all the relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
industry. In particular, the CNCE did not evaluate the actual and potential decline in productivity;
factors affecting domestic price; the magnitude of the dumping margin; and, the actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or investments.
(i) Claim 38: Inconsistency with Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.4
477. Article 3.4 provides for the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry. The examination must include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, including:
“(...) actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 38
478. Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets specific requirements for examination of
factor (b) in Article 3.1. It mandates that in the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on
the domestic industry, the authorities evaluate all relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry. Article 3.4 includes, but does not limit, the factors that must be
evaluated by the investigating authority.
479. In its final injury determination, the CNCE fail ed to evaluate the actual and potential decline
in productivity; factors affecting domestic price; the magnitude of the dumping margin; and, the

234 See, Exhibit BRA-14.

actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or
investments. The CNCE did not refer to actual and potential decline in productivity for the period of
analysis nor did it evaluate the productivity of the domestic industry. Similarly, other factors
affecting domestic price were neither mentioned nor evaluated by the investigating authority. With
respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin, th e CNCE did not and could not have evaluated it,
since the final dumping determination with the dumping margin was issued on 23 June 2000, six
months after the final injury determination was issued. Specific data and analysis of actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or investments were not
included in the final injury determination either. All these are factors set out in Article 3.4 and should
have been examined.
480. This understanding that the list of factors set out in Article 3.4 is mandatory, and not
illustrative, derives from the language of Article 3.4, as well as from various Panel interpretations of
this provision.
481. The phrase in Article 3.4 that “the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the
domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors”, strongly
suggests that the evaluation of the listed factors in that provision is mandatory in all cases. Article 3.4
further provides that the evaluation of all relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of
the industry include the actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. The term “include” as set forth in
Article 3.4 simply indicates that there may be other relevant, additional economic factors to be
evaluated among all the factors that must be evaluated.
482. Furthermore, various WTO Panels have concl uded that the evaluation of the economic factors
and indices listed in Article 3.4 is mandatory. For example, the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams read the
Article 3.4 phrase “shall include and evaluation of all relevant factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the industry, including ...” as:
“(...) introducing a mandatory list of relevant factors which must be evaluated in
every case. We are of the view that the ch ange that occurred in the wording of the
relevant provision during the Uruguay Round (from “such as” to “including”) was
made for a reason and that it supports an interpretation of the current text of
Article 3.4 as setting forth a list that is not merely indicative or illustrative, but,
rather, mandatory. (...)"
235 (emphasis added)
483. That Panel further stated that:
“We are of the view that the language in Article 3.4 makes it clear that all of the listed
factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. The provision is specific and
mandatory in this regard.(...)”236 (emphasis added)
484. That Panel concluded by stating that:
“On the basis of a textual analysis of Article 3.4, we are therefore of the view that
each of the fifteen individual factors listed in the mandatory list of factors in

235 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-
Beams from Poland, 28 September 2000, WT/DS122/R, at para. 7.225 (“Thailand – H-Beams”).

Article 3.4 must be evaluated by the investigating authorities. (...)” 237 (emphasis
added)
485. The Appellate Body upheld that Panel’s findings with respect to the Panel’s interpretation that
Article 3.4 requires a mandatory evaluation of all the factors listed in that provision.238
486. Likewise, the Panel on Mexico – HFCS dealt with this specific issue by stating that:
“(...) The text of Article 3.4 is mandatory:
‘The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including ...’
In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be
considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the
circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required” 239
(emphasis added by the Panel)
487. That interpretation is also supported by the Panel in EC – Bed Linen, which concluded that:
“(...) each of the fifteen factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement must be
evaluated by the investigating authorities in each case in examining the impact of the
dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned.” 240 (emphasis added by the
Panel)
488. Furthermore, the nature of the evaluation of the factors listed in Article 3.4 cannot be limited
to a mere referral of the factors but must address the data provided, put it into context and analyze it.
An evaluation of the factors listed in Article 3.4 requires the investigating authority to determine the
significance and value of the information by careful appraisal and study.
489. This can be supported by the understanding of the Panel in United States – Hot-Rolled Steel
Products, that it would not be sufficient if the investigating authority merely mentioned data for
certain factors of Article 3.4 without undertaking an evaluation of that factor. According to that
Panel:
“(...) An evaluation of a factor implies putting data in context and assessing such data
both in their internal evolution and vis-à-vis other factors examined. Only on the
basis of the evaluation of data in the determination would a reviewing panel be able

238 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-
Beams from Poland , 12 March 2001, WT/DS122/AB/R, at para. 139 (adopted on 05 April 2001) (“ AB –
Thailand – H-Beams”).
239 Mexico – HFCS, at para. 7.128. The Appellate Body found that the Panel satisfied its duty under
Article 12.7 of the DSU to set out a “basic rationale behind [its] findings” with respect to Article 3.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the
United States , 22 October 2001, WT/DS132/AB/RW, at para. 135 (adopted on 21 November 2001) (“ AB –
Mexico - HFCS”).
240 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India ,
30 October 2000, WT/DS141/R, at para. 6.159 (adopted on 12 March 2001) (“ EC – Bed Linen ”). The Panel’s
findings on the Claim related to Article 3.4 were not appealed.

to access whether the conclusions drawn from the examination are those of an
unbiased and objective authority.”241 (emphasis added)
490. More support is found in Thailand – H-Beams, where the Panel presented the following view:
“(...) Therefore, in determining that Article 3.4 contains a mandatory list of fifteen
factors to be looked at, we do not mean to establish a mere “checklist approach” that
would consist of a mechanical exercise of merely ensuring that each listed factor is in
some way referred to by the investigating authority. (...) Rather, we are of the view
that Article 3.4 requires the authorities properly to establish whether a factual basis
exists to support a well-reasoned and meaningful analysis of the state of the industry
and a finding of injury. This analysis does not derive from a mere characterization of
the degree of “relevance or irrelevance” of each and every individual factor, but
rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry and, in light
of the last sentence of Article 3.4, must contain a persuasive explanation as to how
the evaluation of relevant factors led to the determination of injury.” 242 (emphasis
added)
491. Likewise, the Panel in EC – Bed Linen concluded that:
“Regarding the nature of the evaluation of each factor that is required, the panel
determined that while authorities may determine that some factors are not relevant or
do not weigh significantly in the decision, the authorities may not simply disregard
such factors, but must explain their conclusion as to the lack of relevance or
significance of such factors.”243 (emphasis added)
492. From the considerations above and from the final injury determination, the Panel will verify
not only that all the factors listed in Article 3.4 were not considered by the investigating authority, but
also that not all factors were properly evaluated, which constitutes a prima facie violation of
Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(ii) Claim 39: Inconsistency with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 3.1
493. Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth the overall structure of an authority’s
injury analysis:
“A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based
on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of
the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 39
494. Article 3.1 sets out the general requirements for a determination of injury based on
consideration of the volume, price and consequent impact of the “dumped imports” on the domestic
industry. The succeeding sections of Article 3 provide for more specific guidance for such
determinations. Article 3.4 sets forth factors to be considered in examining the impact of the dumped

241 United States – Hot-Rolled Steel Products, at para. 7.232.

imports on the domestic industry, as required by Article 3.1. This examination requires an evaluation
of all relevant economic factors and indices, listed in Article 3.4, which have a bearing on the
domestic industry.
495. To that regard, the requirement under Article 3.4 of an “evaluation of all relevant factors”
must be read in conjunction with the overreaching requirements imposed by Article 3.1 of “positive
evidence” and “objective examination” in determining the existence of injury.
496. In the final injury determination, the CNCE fail ed to evaluate the actual and potential decline
in productivity; factors affecting domestic price; the magnitude of the dumping margin; and, the
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or
investments. In order for the injury finding by the CNCE to have been based on positive evidence and
on an objective examination, the investigating aut horities would have had to explicitly state and
evaluate in the injury determination all the relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4. This was
not the case.
497. The CNCE did not refer to actual and potential decline in productivity for the period of
analysis nor did it evaluate the productivity of the domestic industry. Similarly, other factors
affecting domestic price were neither mentioned nor evaluated by the investigating authority. With
respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin, th e CNCE did not and could not have evaluated it,
since the final dumping determination with the dumping margin was issued on 23 June 2000, six
months after the final injury determination was issued. Specific data and analysis of actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or investments were not
included in the final injury determination either.
498. These factors are part of the mandatory list of factors that have to be evaluated in the
examination of the impact of the imports on the domestic industry. An objective examination based
on positive evidence of the impact of the dumped imports on domestic producers requires that all of
the listed factors in Article 3.4 be evaluated.
499. By failing to evaluate all of these factors, Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Claim 40: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
500. Article 12.2.2 provides in part that:
“A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”

Legal Argument Relative to Claim 40
501. The question before the Panel is whether the final determination listed and sufficiently
considered all the economic factors and indices in Article 3.4, to satisfy the requirements of
Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
502. In the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty,
Article 12.2.2. mandates that a public notice of conclusi on of the investigation contain, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and
reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures. In particular, the public notice of
conclusion must contain information described in subparagraph 2.1 of Article 12. Among the
information required in subparagraph 2.1 of Article 12 are considerations relevant to the injury
determination as set out in Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
503. Pursuant to claims 28 and 29, not all relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4, which
must be included in the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry,
were referred to or evaluated in the final injury determination.
504. In particular, the CNCE did not refer or evaluate the actual and potential decline in
productivity for the period; other factors affecting domestic price were neither mentioned nor
evaluated by the investigating authority; and, specific data and analysis of actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, growth and the abilit y to raise capital or investments were also not
included in the final injury determination. With respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin, the
CNCE did not, and could not, evaluate the magnitude of the margin of dumping because the final
dumping determination, establishing the dumpi ng margin, was issued only on 23 June 2000, six
months after the final injury determination was issued.
505. With respect to what has to be considered in the written final determination, Brazil refers to
the understanding of the Panel in Mexico – HFCS. That Panel confirmed that Article 3.4 requires
that:
“(...) the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final
determination of the investigating authority.”.244 (emphasis added)
506. Similarly, the Panel in EC – Bed Linen concluded that:
“(...) The nature of the consideration of each factor listed in Article 3.4, including
whether the investigating authority considered the factor relevant in its analysis of the
impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, must be apparent in the final
determination.”245 (emphasis added)
507. Because productivity; factors affecting domestic price; the magnitude of the dumping margin;
cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or investments were not referred to or considered in
the final determination, Brazil understands that Argentina incurred in a prima facie violation of
Article 12.2.2.
5. Article 4.1
508. Claim 41: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
by considering that 46 per cent constituted the major proportion of the total domestic production and,
thus, qualified as the domestic industry.

244 Mexico – HFCS, at para. 7.128.

(a) Facts
509. On 23 December 1999, the CNCE issued the final injury determination. 246 In that
determination, the CNCE stated that the Argent inean companies San Sebastian, Rasic Hnos, Granja
Tres Arroyos, Avicola Roque Perrez, Domvil, F.E.P.A.S.A, Frigorifico de Aves Soychu, Miralejos,
Las Camelias, Frigorifico Cumini, Industrial Avicola Cordobesa, Nestor Eggs, and Super had
formally adhered to the application presented by CEPA.
247 Out of the thirteen companies listed
above, ten responded to the injury questionnaires submitted by the CNCE to the national producer. 248
Out of the ten domestic producers that responded to CNCE’s injury questionnaire, responses of only
six domestic producers were verified.
249
510. Examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry was based on data
provided by the ten companies that responded to the questionnaires. These companies composed
45 per cent of the total domestic production of the like products during the period under analysis
(January 1996 through December 1998), and 46 per cent of the total production in 1998.
250
(i) Claim 41: Inconsistency with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 4.1
511. Relevant part of Article 4.1 states that:
“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be
interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to
those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion
of the total domestic production of those products”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 41
512. The issue before the Panel is whether 46 per cent of the total domestic production of poultry
in Argentina constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production.
513. The definition of “domestic industry” in Article 4.1 requires authorities to consider the
domestic industry taken as a whole or whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the
total domestic production, and not a segment of that industry. In order to examine the issue, the Panel
must interpret the meaning of the term “major proportion” in Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
514. According to ordinary meaning in terpretation, the term “major part”
251 is defined as “the
majority”.252 “Majority” is understood to mean “the greater number or part”. 253 From these

246 See, Exhibit BRA-14.
247 See, Page 61 of the “Informe Técnico Previo a La Determinación Final” in Exhibit BRA-14.
248 The national producers that responded to the CNCE’s questionnaire were: San Sebastian, Rasic
Hnos, Granja Tres Arroyos, Avicola Roque Perez, Domvil, F.E.P.A.S.A., Frigorifico de Aves Soychu,
Miralejos, Las Camelias, and Super. See, Page 61 of the “Informe Técnico Previo a La Determinación Final” in
Exhibit BRA-14.
249 The CNCE verified the responses to the injury questionnaires of: San Sebastian, Rasic, Granja Tres
Arroyos, Avicola Roque Perez, Frigorifico de Aves Soychu, and Las Camelias. See, Page 61 of the “Informe
Técnico Previo a La Determinación Final” in Exhibit BRA-14.
250 See, Page 62 of the “Informe Técnico Previo a La Determinación Final” in Exhibit BRA-14.
251 The terms “proportion” and “part” are viewed and used as synonyms. Concise Oxford Dictionary –
Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, pages 995 and 1098.
252 Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 822.

definitions, the phrase “major proportion” can be understood as the greater part in relation to the
whole. If the whole in question is 100 per cent of the total domestic production of the like product,
46 per cent cannot be considered as the greater part in relation to the whole.
515. As stated, Article 4.1 defines the “domestic industry” as the domestic producers representing
the whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.
516. Brazil understands Article 4.1 to provide that the domestic industry can either be represented
by 100 per cent of the producers of the like product or by those whose production, jointly considered,
constitutes more than half of the total domestic production. If the domestic producer’s output, jointly
considered, is less than 50 per cent of the total production, the domestic producers do not comply with
the definition of Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
517. The establishment of the domestic industry is important, particularly with respect to the injury
analysis. Because the injury examination takes into account the impact of the dumped imports on the
domestic industry, if the domestic industry is not properly constituted, the impact examination in the
injury analysis may be flawed.
518. Thus, the requirement to make a determination of injury to the domestic industry read in light
of the definition of the domestic industry of Article 4.1 implies that the injury must be analyzed with
regard to domestic producers as a whole of the like product or to those whose collective output
constitutes a major proportion, or the majority, of the total domestic production of those products.
Injury cannot be evaluated in respect to a segment or a part of the domestic industry.
519. The CNCE’s determination that 46 per cent of the total domestic production of the like
product constituted the major proportion of the collective output of the domestic producers is on its
face inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
E. IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AS A RESULT OF
THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
1. Articles 9.2, 9.3 and 12.2.2
520. The following three claims arise from the facts transcribed below and from the legal
requirements in the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
Claim 28: Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 9.2 by imposing a variable anti-dumping
duty that can be collected in an inappropriate amount.
Claim 29: Argentina has acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 by imposing a variable anti-dumping
duty that can exceed the margin of dumping established in the final determination.
Claim 30: Argentina acted inconsistently with Article 12.2.2 by failing to provide how the “minimum
export price” was established in the determination to impose definitive anti-dumping duties.
(a) Facts
521. On 23 June 2000, the DCD issued its final affirmative dumping determination.
254 I n i t s
determination, the DCD calculated and determined margins of dumping of 14,91 per cent for exports

253 Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 822.
254 See, Exhibit BRA-15.

of the subject merchandise from Sadia, 255 of 15,48 per cent for exports of the subject merchandise
from Avipal,256 and of 8,19 per cent for exports of the subject merchandise from all other exporters.257
The DCD determined that the Brazilian exporters Ni colini and Seara were not exporting the subject
merchandise at dumped prices.258 The dumping margins were calculated as follows:
SADIA S.A.
Normal value
US$/Kg
FOB Price Average
US$/Kg
Dumping Margin %
A B (A-B)/B
0,9294 0,80883 14,91
Source: Page 102 of Exhibit BRA-15.
AVIPAL S.A.
Normal value
US$/Kg
FOB Price Average
US$/Kg
Dumping Margin %
A B (A-B)/B
1,0896 0,94355 15,48
Source: Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
FRIGORÍFICO NICOLINI LTDA.
Normal value
US$/Kg
FOB Price Average
US$/Kg
Dumping Margin %
A B (A-B)/B
0,8027 0,95843 ----
Source: Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
SEARA ALIMENTOS S.A.
Normal value
US$/Kg
FOB Price Average
US$/Kg
Dumping Margin %
A B (A-B)/B
0,9104 1,00988 ----
Source: Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
ALL OTHER EXPORTERS
Normal value
US$/Kg
FOB Price Average
US$/Kg
Dumping Margin %
A B (A-B)/B
1,0385 0,95992 8,19
Source: Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
522. On 21 July 2000, based upon the final dumping, injury and causal link determinations, the
MEOSP issued Resolution No. 574/2000, imposing definitive dumping measures on imports of
poultry from Brazil for a period of three years.259

255 See, Page 102 of Exhibit BRA-15.
256 See, Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
257 See, Page 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
258 See, Page 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.
259 See, Exhibit BRA-17.

523. Such measures took the form of specific anti-dumping duties to be collected as the absolute
difference between the FOB price invoiced in an y one shipment and a designated “minimum export
price” also fixed in FOB terms, to be applied whenever the former price is lower than the latter. The
“minimum export price” established for each exporter was US$ 0,92 per kilogram for Sadia,
US$ 0,98 per kilogram for Avipal, and US$ 0,98 per kilogram for all other exporters.
260 The public
notice of the decision to impose the anti-dumping duties did not explain how the “minimum export
prices” were determined. The Brazilian exporters Nicolini and Seara did not have dumping measures
since they were found not to be exporting poultry at dumped prices.261 The public notice also set forth
the dumping margins found for Sadia (14.91 per cent), Avipal (15.48 per cent) and all other exporters
(8.19 per cent).262
(i) Claim 28: Inconsistency with Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 9.2
524. The relevant portion of Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:
“When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such an anti-
dumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped
and causing injury (...)”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 28
525. Brazil asserts that the variable anti-dumping duties imposed on imports of poultry from
Brazil, that is, the absolute difference between the FOB price invoiced in any one shipment and a
designated “minimum export price” also fixed in FOB terms, to be applied whenever the FOB export
price is lower than the designated “minimum e xport price”, can exceed the margin of dumping
established in the final determination, and thus can be collected in inappropriate amounts.
526. A hypothetical example of this circumstance is presented in the exercise below:
TABLE 1
Exporter “Minimum Export Price” in
Resolution No. 574
Ad Valorem Duty in Final
Determination
Sadia 0.92 US$/Kg 14.91%
Avipal 0.98 US$/Kg 15.48%
All Others 0.98 US$/Kg 8.19%

260 See, Exhibit BRA-17.
261 See, Exhibit BRA-17.
262 See, Exhibit BRA-17.

TABLE 2
Exporter “Minimum Export
Price”
Example of FOB
Export Price
Ad Valorem Dumping
Margin per cent
(A) (B) (A) – (B)/(B) x100%
Sadia 0.92 US$/Kg 0.75 US$/Kg 22.66%
Avipal 0.98 US$/Kg 0.75 US$/Kg 30.66%
All Others 0.98 US$/Kg 0.75 US$/Kg 30.66%
TABLE 3
Exporter Ad Valorem Duty in
Final Determination
Ad Valorem Duty in
Exercise
Difference
(A) (B) (B) – (A)
Sadia 14.91% 22.66% 7.75%
Avipal 15.48% 30.66% 15.18%
All Others 8.19% 30.66% 22.47%
527. In the above exercise, Brazil has simulated a dumping margin calculation, assuming that the
FOB price invoiced in a shipment is US$ 0.75 per kilogram and that the “minimum export price” is
the one determined in Resolution No. 574 for each company (Table 2 above).
528. In this hypothetical exercise, specific anti-dumping duties to be collected as the absolute
difference between the FOB price invoiced in th at shipment and the designated “minimum export
price” also fixed in FOB terms, result in the ad valorem duty of 22.66 per cent for Sadia,
30.66 per cent for Avipal and 30.66 per cent for all other exporters (Table 2 above).
529. If we compare the margins of dumping found in the DCD’s final affirmative dumping
determination with the margins found in the exercise above, the Panel will verify that the dumping
duty to be applied in the hypothetical case would greatly exceed the margin of dumping established in
the final determination (Table 3 above).
530. According to the exercise above, if the Brazilian exporters choose to export poultry into
Argentina at a determined lower price, they will be imposed anti-dumping duties to be collected at
inappropriate amounts, that is, in excess to the dumping margin found in the investigation and
provided in the final determination.
531. This situation would violate the requirement in Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
that an anti-dumping duty must be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case.
(ii) Claim 29: Inconsistency with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 9.3
532. Relevant portion of Article 9.3 sets forth that:
“The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.”

Legal Argument Relative to Claim 29
533. After Argentina imposed variable anti-dumping duties on imports of poultry from Brazil,
Brazilian exporters have not exported poultry into Argentina at less than the “minimum export price”
in order not to pay an amount of anti-dumping duty in excess of the margin established under
Article 2.
534. Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifically requires that the amount of the
antidumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. To that
effect, Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that the “existence of margins of
dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of
a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of all comparable export transactions or by
a comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis”.
535. In this case, the dumping margin as established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement is that established during the investigation phase, based on the normal value and export
price data collected from January 1998 through January 1999. The “minimum export price”
determined in Resolution No. 574 does not qualify as a dumping margin established under Article 2,
since it does not reflect the normal value and export price as provided by the exporters and examined
by the investigating authority.
536. Also, as provided in the hypothetical exercise presented in Claim 28 above, if the Brazilian
exporters choose to export poultry into Argentina at a determined lower price, they will be imposed
anti-dumping duties to be collected in excess of the dumping margin found in the final determination.
537. By establishing a variable anti-dumping m easure on imports of poultry from Brazil, which
can exceed the margin of dumping established under Article 2, Argentina has acted inconsistently
with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
(iii) Claim 30: Inconsistency with Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Text of Article 12.2.2
538. Article 12.2.2 provides in part that:
“A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of
confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the
information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and
the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.”
Legal Argument Relative to Claim 30
539. The question presented to the Panel is whether information has been provided in the final
determination, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, as to how the Argentinean authority calculated the “minimum export price” established in
Resolution No. 574/2000.

540. Resolution No. 574/2000 was the public notice of conclusion that provided for the imposition
of a definitive duty. Resolution No. 574/2000 imposed dumping measures in the form of specific
anti-dumping duties to be collected as the absolute difference between the FOB price invoiced in any
one shipment and a designated “minimum export price” also fixed in FOB terms, to be applied
whenever the former price is lower than the latter. No explanation was provided in Resolution
No. 574/2000 as to how Argentina calculated the “minimum export price”.
541. Article 12.2.2 requires that a public notice providing for the imposition of a definitive duty
contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters
of fact and law and reasons which have lead to the imposition of final measures.
542. Argentina did not provide relevant information as to why the margin established in the final
determination was not applied and how the “minimum export price” was calculated.
543. Brazil considers the application of the dumping measures to be relevant information that must
be included in the public notice providing for the imposition of a definitive duty. An exporter is
entitled to know how the information and ar guments presented during the investigation were
considered by the investigating authority and how th at information was used in arriving at a dumping
measure.
544. By not providing relevant information in the public notice as to how and why the
investigating authority established a “minimum e xport price”, Argentina has failed to comply with
Article 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
V. CONCLUSION AND REQUESTS
A. CONCLUSION
545. The claims set forth in Part III of this submission provide the facts and legal basis on which
Brazil believes that Argentina has acted inconsistently with GATT 1994 and the various provisions in
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Brazil believes that the anti-dumping proceeding that lead to the
application of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of poultry from Brazil should never have
been initiated (Part III.B of this submission – Initiation of the Anti-Dumping Investigation). Not only
did the application not provide relevant evidence to be considered sufficient to meet the requirements
of the necessary evidence in an application, but also the Argentinean authorities failed to examine the
accuracy and adequacy of that evidence in order to justify the initiation of the investigation. By
failing to do this, the Argentinean authorities failed to reject the application based on insufficient
evidence of dumping and injury.
546. After Argentina incorrectly initiated the investigation, the Argentinean authorities acted
inconsistently with the rules on notification, public notice, evidence and overall procedure set forth in
the Anti-Dumping Agreement (Part III.C of this submission – Conduct of the Anti-Dumping
Investigation – Evidentiary and Public Notice Requirements). The failure to comply with these
provisions of the Agreement has impaired the rights of the exporters for a ‘full opportunity’ to defend
their interests in the investigation at issue. Furthermore, the final determinations of dumping and
injury presented material errors regarding the establishment of normal value, adjustments to the
normal value, export price, fair comparison; the examination of injury, and its elements, and the
establishment of the domestic industry (Part III.D of this submission – Conduct of the Anti-Dumping
Investigation and Final Affirmative Determination).
547. When Argentina imposed definitive measures, it further tarnished the proceeding by imposing
duties that can exceed the margin of dumping found in the final determination and that, thus, can be
collected in inappropriate amounts (Part III.E of this submission – Imposition and Collection of Anti-
Dumping Duties as a Result of the Anti-Dumping Investigation).

548. As a final note, Brazil observes that under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is
infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima
facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of the benefits under that Agreement.
Accordingly and pursuant to the claims in this su bmission, to the extent that Argentina has acted
inconsistently with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Argentina has nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to Brazil under the Agreement.
B. REQUESTS
549. For the reasons shown above, Brazil respectfully requests the Panel to find that Argentina has
acted inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as per the claims above, which are
summarized as follows:
- The initiation of the anti-dumping proceedings against poultry from Brazil by
Argentina is inconsistent with Articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;
- The initiation and conduct of the anti-dumping investigation against poultry
from Brazil by Argentina was inconsiste nt with Article 12.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;
- The conduct of the anti-dumping investigation against poultry from Brazil by
Argentina was inconsistent with Articles 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.2, 6.8,
paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Annex II, Articles 6.9 and 6.10 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement;
- The final dumping determination by Argentina on poultry from Brazil is
inconsistent with Articles 2.4, 2.4.2 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;
- The final injury determination by Argentina on poultry from Brazil is
inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement;
- The final injury determination and the imposition of the definitive anti-
dumping measures by Argentina on poultry from Brazil is inconsistent with
Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and,
- The imposition of the definitive anti-dumping measures by Argentina on
poultry from Brazil is inconsistent with Articles 9.2, 9.3 and 12.2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
550. Accordingly, Brazil respectfully requests that the Panel:
- Recommend that the DSB request Argentina to bring these actions into
conformity with GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
- Use its right to make suggestions on ways which Argentina could implement
the Panel’s recommendations, as provided in Article 19.1 of the DSU; and,
- Suggest that, in light of the numerous outcome-decisive violations of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement that Argentina immediately repeal Resolution
No. 574/2000 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties.

ANNEX A-2
FIRST ORAL STATEMENT OF BRAZIL
(25 September 2002)
INTRODUCTION
1. Brazil appreciates the opportunity to appear before the Panel to explain its position in this
dispute. We would like to note our appreciation for the time and effort devoted by the Panel and the
secretariat to this matter.
2. In this statement, Brazil will not repeat the arguments already stated in its first submission
(BFS) and will simply address some of the central issues before the Panel in light of the arguments
raised by Argentina in its first submission (AFS).
3. However, before turning to the specific argu ments, we would first like to address an issues
raised in AFS. It relates to Argentina’s claim that the dispute before this Panel has already been
“debated and resolved” in a previous Mercosul Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal. Argentina suggests that,
for this reason, the Panel should dismiss Brazil’s complaint.
THE MERCOSUL AD HOC TRIBUNAL – Res Judicata
4. Although Argentina does not clearly state this in its first submission, it appears that Argentina
claims that the ruling by the Mercosul Tribunal on the dispute has the effect of res judicata.
1 Under
the principle of res judicata a final judgement rendered by a court or competent jurisdiction on the
merits of a case is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and as to these parties,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action. In other words, the principle of res judicata is only applied if the subsequent action involves
the same parties, the same measures and the same claims as the previous action.
5. Having said that, we underscore that although we have the same parties (Brazil and
Argentina) and the measure (Resolution No. 574/2000) before this Panel, the claims of the present
dispute are not the same.
6. Since Argentina has gone at length with this argument, we would like to explain that the
matter before the Mercosul Tribunal had to be decided according to Mercosul anti-dumping rules for
trade within the region. The Mercosul Tribunal, however, found that Mercosul anti-dumping rules for
trade within the region were not properly in force. Within that context, the Tribunal found that
Mercosul Member States were allowed to apply th eir domestic anti-dumping legislation with respect
to regional trade. The Tribunal also concluded that it did not have to decide on any of the substantive
issues concerning the investigation, such as the existence of dumping, injury to the domestic industry,
and causal link.

1 AFS, paragraph 17.

7. Brazil notes that the Mercosul arbitrators dealt with the dispute under the umbrella of the
Brasilia Protocol, the dispute settlement mechanism that applies strictly to the Mercosul legal texts,
that is, the Treaty of Asuncion and all other agreements and decisions that make up Mercosul’s legal
framework.
8. Brazil’s claims before this Panel are not related to the interpretation, application or non-
compliance with the provisions of any of the Mercosul texts. Brazil’s claims before this Panel relate
to the consistency of the Argentinean anti-dumping investigation and measure with the provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994, issues that were never addressed by the
Mercosul arbitrators.
9. We make special note that Paraguay also argues, in its third party submission that the ruling
by the Mercosul Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal has the effect of res judicata. 2 In developing its
arguments, Paraguay considers relevant to mention the Olivos Protocol. At this point, Brazil will
simply recall that the Olivos Protocol is not even in force yet.
10. At any rate, what Paraguay and Argentina bring before this Panel is a situation where
Mercosul Members potentially have divergent views on what their rights and obligations under the
Mercosul legal texts may be. Yet, Article 1 of the DSU confines the jurisdiction of this Panel to
disputes brought pursuant to the “covered agreements” (those listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU), the
“WTO Agreement”, and the DSU, taken in isolation or in combination with each other. The Brasilia
Protocol and the Olivos Protocol are not listed in Article 1 of the DSU.
11. In bringing this res judicata claim to the Panel, Argentina cites no provision of the WTO legal
texts to support its contention. It simply makes a reference to Article 3.2 of the DSU without clearly
indicating how that provision would support the res judicata argument. This is not surprising, for
Article 3.2 of the DSU deals exclusively with the clarification of the existing provisions of the WTO
Agreement and bears no relation whatsoever to the relationship between previous rulings by an
international tribunal and the rights and obligations of WTO Members under the “covered
agreements”, the “WTO Agreement” and the DSU.
12. What Article 3.2 of the DSU provides is that the WTO dispute settlement system “serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.” In fact, Article 3.2 affirms the right of Brazil to have the Panel hear its claims that
the Argentinean anti-dumping measure impairs Brazil’s WTO rights.
INITIATION OF THE DUMPING INVESTIGATION
(a) Article 5.2 – Evidence in the Application
13. Regarding the claims of violation of Article 5.2 of the ADA, Argentina claims that an
applicant is not obligated to prove without doubt the existence of dumping, but acknowledges that
simple assertion of the existence of dumping, injury, and causal link is not sufficient if that assertion
is not substantiated by relevant evidence. According to Argentina, an application substantiated by
relevant evidence is conditioned on what information is “reasonably available” to the applicant.
3
14. Argentina states that there are two levels of requirements regarding the quality and quantity of
evidence that should be submitted. The first level is the evidence presented in an application for
initiation, which according to the Agreement is that which is “reasonably available” to the applicant.

2 Paraguay’s submission, paragraph 5.
3 AFS, paragraph 34.

The second level is the evidence that should be submitted once the investigation has initiated. To that
regard, Argentina cites previous WTO Panel Reports that support the idea that the quantum and
quality of evidence required prior to initiation has to be necessarily less than that required for a final
determination.4
15. Brazil agrees. What Argentina fails to state, however, is that previous WTO Panels have also
found that the evidence required at the time of initiation nonetheless had to be relevant
 in
establishing the elements in the Agreement, and that the type of evidence needed to justify initiation
is the same as that needed to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the
quality and quantity is less.
16. The existence, in the application, of relevant evidence of the type necessary to conduct an
investigation is particularly important when it is obvious on the face of the application that
adjustments will unavoidably be made to normal value and export price data.
17. That said, Argentina has neither presented arguments nor indicated the evidence in the
application to support that: 1) poultry sold in Brazil was physically different from the poultry sold to
Argentina; 2) that the alleged differences in physical characteristics actually affect price
comparability; and, 3) that the yield rate difference alleged by petitioner was correct.
18. In Brazil’s submission, we have shown that the petitioner, in suggesting the calculation
adjustment to compensate the alleged difference between the poultry sold in Brazil and to Argentina,
provided no “evidence” – that is, no information drawn from a document tending to prove a fact or a
proposition – that would justify such an adjustme nt. Likewise, no evidence was presented showing
that price comparability would be affected or that the yield rate proposed by the petitioner was
justified.
19. Brazil has also shown that the normal value submitted in the application was for only one day
in 1997 (30 June 30), while export data covered a period of six months in 1997 (January through
May 1997 and August 1997). According to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a fair comparison must be
made in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. From the data provided in the
application, such a comparison would not be possible.
20. Argentina repeatedly makes the argument that an application substantiated by relevant
evidence is conditioned on what information is “reasonably available” to the applicant.
5 We have
indicated that normal value information for all of 1996 and 1997 was reasonably available to the
petitioner, even though the petitioner only presented normal value information for one day in 1997. 6
The petitioner could have attached prices on poultry published by JOX for all months of 1997.
Nonetheless, it chose to provide it for one single day in that year.
(b) Article 5.3 – Accuracy and Adequacy of the Evidence in the Application
21. Regarding the claims of violation of Article 5.3 of the ADA, Argentina again argues that the
level of evidence sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation is considerably inferior to that
required in a determination to apply a preliminary or definitive measure. Argentina cites selected
passages of previous WTO Panel Reports.
22. We repeat that we do not contest such standard. What Argentina again fails to state that those
same reports conclude that “when from the face of an application it is obvious that there are

4 AFS, paragraph 37.
5 AFS, paragraphs 31, 32 and 39.
6 BFS, paragraph 124.

substantial questions of comparability between the export price and home market prices being
compared, the investigating authority will at least acknowledge that differences in the prices generate
questions with regards to their comparability, and either give some consideration as to the impact of
those differences on the sufficiency of the evidence of dumping or seek further evidence as might be
necessary.”
23. In the present case, the investigating authority neither gave consideration to the impact of the
possible differences on the sufficiency of the evidence submitted in the application, nor did it seek
further evidence, which was clearly necessary.
24. Still under Article 5.3, Brazil showed in its first submission that Argentina established export
prices – and consequently the dumping margins – based only on export transactions below normal
value. We simply refer to Exhibit BRA-2. There, the Panel will verify that the investigating authority
considered, from the import data presented in the application, only the portion of the imports of the
product that entered Argentina at prices inferior to those for the product sold in Brazil.
7
25. By selecting certain export transactions, namely those below normal value, from the total
export transactions in the application, Argentina not only failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy
of all the evidence that was presented in the application but also inflated the dumping margin. It is
obvious that the adoption of this methodology would always result in a dumping margin.
26. In explaining the methodology used to establish the export price, Argentina provided in its
first submission a different explanation from that found in the decision to initiate the investigation. In
its first submission, Argentina states that the inve stigating authority examined the import transactions
“in an attempt to determine which of them corresponded closest to the product under investigation,
and it did so for the sole purpose of calculating the most appropriate and comparable export price
possible at this pre-initiation stage.” 8 Members of the Panel, this is a convoluted way of trying to
explain what in effect is the “zeroing” methodolo gy. We could not agree with the statement that a
more adjusted and comparable export price is that which is inferior to those prices for the product sold
in the domestic market.
27. Furthermore, had the investigating authority properly examined the accuracy and adequacy of
the evidence provided in the application, it would ha ve realized that the normal value data in the
application was for one single day in 1997 and that the export price data was for a period of six
months in 1997. Because prices vary over a period of time, a fair comparison must be made in respect
of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time, even for purposes of initiation of an
investigation. Obviously, it is insufficient or inadequate to compare normal value of a single day to
export prices covering six non-consecutive months.
CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION – EVIDENTIARY AND PUBLIC
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
(a) Article 12.1 – Notification and Public Notice of the Initiation
28. Regarding the claim of violation of Article 12.1 of the Agreement, Argentina argues that it
was impossible to notify the seven exporters, since the interest of these parties was unknown at the
time the investigating authority was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation
of the investigation.
9

7 Pages 10 and 11 of BRA-2.
8 AFS, paragraphs 78 and 79.
9 AFS, paragraph 110.

29. First, it is of the utmost importance to reaffirm that Article 12.1 mandates that the
investigating authorities notify “the Member … the products of which are subject to the investigation
and other interested parties known to the investigating authorities.” This obligation falls exclusively
upon the investigating authority. Argentina tries to share this obligation with Brazil when it states that
it notified Brazil of the initiation of the investigation and requested that it cooperate in identifying the
producers and exporters interested in the investigation.
10
30. Second, it is simply not true that Argentina di d not notify these seven exporters because it did
not know that these were parties with an interest in the investigation. As stated and proven in
paragraph 199 and Exhibit BRA-2 of Brazil’s first submission, out of the seven Brazilian exporters
that were not notified of the initiation, at least five of these exporters (Comaves, Catarinense,
Minuano, Chapecó and Perdigão) were listed as Brazilian exporters in the determination to initiate.11
31. Even though Argentina knew these seven exporters to be interested parties in the investigation
it only notified them eight months after the investigation had initiated.
(b) Article 6.1.1 – Deadlines for Responses
32. On the claim of violation of Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement, Argentina states that it provided a
period of more than 30 days for exporters to reply to the questionnaire.
33. This is not true. Brazil has provided as Exhibit BRA-13 the letters from the DCD to the seven
Brazilian exporters inviting them to provide questionnaire responses within a period no longer than 20
days from receipt of the mentioned letter. It is evident that the timeframe required by the DCD in
these letters was on its face contrary to the 30-day period required under Article 6.1.1 of the
Agreement.
34. In paragraph 133 of its first submission, Argentina confirms that it sent the questionnaires to
the Brazilian exporters Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves and Pena Branca on
15 September 1999. However, Argentina fails to inform the Panel that in that communication of
15 September, DCD allows a period “not long er than 20 days from the receipt of the
[communication]”.12
35. We also reaffirm that these seven exporters were never notified by the CNCE of the
investigation and of the need to provide responses to the injury questionnaire. In fact, these exporters
never even received such questionnaires. Argentina confirms that the CNCE only sent the injury
questionnaires to eight exporters – in fact only five exporters received them.
13 By not sending the
injury questionnaires to all exporters participating in the investigation, Argentina impaired their rights
for defence, again violating Article 6.1.1.
(c) Article 6.1.2 – Evidence Submitted … Shall be Made Available Promptly
36. With respect to the claim of violation of Article 6.1.2 of the Agreement, Brazil has already
established that Argentina knew these exporters to be interested parties in the investigation at the time
of initiation. We have also presented evidence to the effect that these exporters were notified of the
investigation and the need to participate eight months after the investigation had already been
initiated. Such evidence is in Exhibit BRA-13 of Brazil’s submission.

10 AFS, paragraphs 112 to 116.
11 Exhibit BRA-2, page 5.
12 Exhibit BRA-13.
13 AFS, para.135.

37. In that sense, how could evidence presented by the other interested parties in the investigation
be made “promptly” available, as required under Article 6.1.2, if these seven exporters were notified
to participate in the investigation eight months after the investigation had already initiated and a
preliminary determination of dumping, injury and causal link had already been issued?
(d) Article 6.1.3 – … Shall Provide the Full Text of the Written Application
38. On the claim of violation of Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement, Argentina first argues that in the
Spanish version of the Agreement the term “provide” is set forth as “facilitar”. Thus, based on the
Spanish version of the Agreement, Argentina claims that the investigating authorities have complied
with the requirement in Article 6.1.3 when they made the written application available to the
interested parties once the investigation was initiated.
39. In fact, any reasonable interpretation of Article 6.1.3 would conclude that Argentina was
obligated to supply the Government of Brazil and the exporters with the full text of the written
application. Argentina’s position that the verb “to provide” could be understood to mean that
authorities were only required to “make available” the full text of the written application is incorrect.
40. The first sentence of Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement states that “as soon as an investigation
has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full text of the written application received under
paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known exporters and to the authorities of the exporting Member and
shall make it available, upon request, to other interested parties involved.”
41. Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement carefully differentiates the obligation that the investigating
authorities have with the exporters and the expor ting Member from the obligation the investigating
authorities have with other interested parties. In the first case, the investigating authority must
actively “provide” the full text of the written application to the exporting Member and to the exporters
involved in the investigation. In the second case, the investigating authorities must “make available”,
upon request, the full text of the written application to other interested parties. Brazil believes that if
the requirement imposed on the investigation authority was to be understood as being the same for the
exporters and exporting Member as that for the other interested parties, there would be no need for the
use of different language in Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement.
42. The same reasoning applies to the text in Spanish. The requirement imposed on the
investigating authorities to provide, or “facilitar”, the full text of the written application to exporters
and the exporting Member is different from the requirement imposed on the authorities to “make
available”, or “pondrán a disposición”, the full text of the written application to other interested
parties. Finally, the dictionary of the Real Academia Española defines the word “facilitar” as
“proporcionar o entregar”, a definition entirely compatible with the word “provide”, used in the
English version.
(e) Article 6.8 – Facts Available
43. On the claims of incorrect use of facts available by Argentina, we note that the authority
disregarded the responses provided by the Brazilian exporters with respect to the description of the
product sold to Argentina and in Brazil. Instead, the authority applied the normal value adjustment
suggested in the application. Argentina claims that it was impossible to take into account the
allegations made by the exporters without supporting documentation that could be verified.
44. We have shown in Exhibits BRA-22, BRA-23, BRA-24 and BRA-26 that the exporters Sadia,
Avipal and Frangosul reported that the poultry sold to Argentina was identical to the poultry sold in
Brazil. We have also shown in Exhibit BRA-25 that the Brazilian exporter Catarinense reported that
from the two types of poultry sold (broiler and griler), there was a difference in the broiler type

poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil. The broiler type poultry sold by Catarinense to Argentina did
not contain head and feet, while the broiler type poultry sold in Brazil contained head but not feet.
45. Even though the exporters reported this important information within a reasonable period and
the authority did not question the exporters on such information – or require further clarifications –
the DCD still chose to apply the arbitrary normal va lue adjustment proposed by the petitioner in the
application.
46. Argentina claims that the information reported in the questionnaires was not accompanied by
supporting documentation that could be verified.
47. The Panel will note that not only did the questionnaire not specify that this information
required supporting documentation but also that the authority never, throughout the investigation,
requested any supporting documentation in order to verify the product description reported by these
exporters. The investigating authorities also neve r informed the exporters that their evidence and
information was not accepted, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Annex II.
48. Furthermore, the investigating authority decided that the information provided by the
petitioner in the application, without any supporting documentation, was more “accurate” and
“verifiable” than the precise information provided by the exporters with regard to their own product.
We recall that the information used by the petitioner in the application, to indicate that an adjustment
to normal value was necessary, was based on JOX information for chilled poultry, with head and feet,
for the São Paulo wholesale market. JOX information was for chilled poultry with head and feet, a
product that was different from the product under investigation, frozen poultry without head and feet.
49. We recall that these exporters invited the inve stigating authority to verify their responses in
loco, but the authorities decided not to carry out this verification visit. Brazil understands that, in this
case, even the information submitted without supporting documentation was still information that
could be verified. Argentina seems to confuse the meaning of “verifiable” information, that is,
information “that can be verified”, with information “that has not yet been verified”.
50. Moreover, paragraph 7 of Annex II instructs the investigating authority to use “special
circumspection” if the authority has to base its fi ndings, including with respect to normal value, on
information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application by the
petitioner. Argentina did not use “special circumspection” when it unjustifiably ignored the responses
provided by these exporters and decided to apply the arbitrary adjustment to normal value suggested
by the petitioner in the application.
CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION - FINAL AFFIRMATIVE
DETERMINATION
(a) Article 2.4 – Fair Comparison
51. On the claim that Argentina failed to make due allowance for freight in the normal value of
two exporters, Argentina claims that the investigating authority could not have made the freight
adjustment, even though Sadia reported that such adjustments were warranted, because these
deductions were not properly documented.
52. Even though Argentina considers this adjustment has “a decisive and significant impact on
price comparability”
14, it still considered that the investigating authority would have acted incorrectly

14 AFS, paragraph 211.

if it had made this specific discount. According to Argentina, no documented evidence was provided
and the freight information provided by the exporter was too general to be used.
53. Even though Argentina knows that this adjustment is warranted and that it is “decisive and
significant” for the price comparison it simply decided not to make it, instead of using a secondary
source of information to estimate such deduction, as it did with the normal value adjustment to
compensate the alleged characteristic differences between poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
54. Regarding Argentina’s failure to make due al lowance for differences in taxation, freight and
financial cost in the normal value established for all other exporters, it is important that the Panel not
be confused by Argentina’s hazy arguments.
55. During the investigation, the DCD requested that JOX clarify the taxes included in the prices
published and used to determine normal value in the preliminary determination.
15 I n t h e f i n a l
determination, the DCD simply stated that the information provided by JOX was in Portuguese.16 We
underline the fact that no further explanation by the authorities was provided in the final
determination except that the JOX information was in Portuguese.
56. During the consultation stage of this dispute, Brazil requested an explanation on why the
investigating authorities disregarded the information provided by JOX. Argentina responded that
JOX presented information in Portuguese, which did not comply with the formal requirements of the
Argentinean laws and regulations for administrative proceedings.
57. Now, in its first submission, Argentina provides an entirely different response. Argentina
argues that for the comparison to be fair it has to be made in the same level of trade, and that is why it
did not take into account the deductions informed by JOX, since that would be a comparison between
an ex-factory price for normal value and an FOB price for export price.
58. It is noteworthy that for all other purposes, including the normal value adjustment, Argentina
has used JOX information. With respect to the alleged differences in characteristics, the DCD did use
JOX information even though the exporters submitted information indicating and proving that there
were no such differences. With respect to normal value for all other exporters, the DCD also used all
other information provided by JOX in establishing the normal value.
59. An ex-factory price is the price with no charges included since this represents the price at the
factory. An FOB price includes inland freight to the port of exportation, inland insurance, handling
and loading charges. The FOB price does not include taxes and financial costs. That said and with
the information provided by JOX, the investigating authority should still have made deductions from
the normal value with respect to the taxes and financial costs included in the JOX published prices.
These deductions would have permitted a fair comparison on the same level of trade.
60. With respect to the claim that Argentina incorrectly made allowances to normal value based
on alleged differences in physical characteristics, the authorities again refused all information
submitted by the exporters alleging that no supporting documentation existed. The authorities never
asked for such documentation nor did they take the initiative to verify the information provided.
61. Still in its claims of violation of Article 2.4, Brazil asserts that Argentina has imposed an
unreasonable burden of proof on exporters Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul by allowing exporters to
submit normal value and export price information for the years 1996 – 1999, when the dumping
period of investigation was later fixed for January 1998 to January 1999.

15 Exhibit BRA-32.
16 Exhibit BRA-15.

62. Argentina admits that it did not define the dumping period of data collection on purpose. 17
Argentina tries to justify its action by stating that the Agreement does not define the period of data
collection. Argentina further affirms that the authority has the discretion to request the documentation
that it considers necessary in determining dumping and may request more information if needed to
ensure due process.
63. Brazil agrees that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not define or establish what the period
of data collection must be. However, the Agreement does provide in Article 2.4 that the investigating
authorities have the obligation of indicating to the parties what information is necessary to ensure a
fair comparison and cannot impose an unreasonable burden of proof on the parties.
64. The DCD only established that the dumping data collection period would be from
January 1998 through January 1999, on October of 1999, that is, nine months after the investigation
was initiated, after a preliminary determination had been issued, and after Sadia, Avipal, and
Frangosul had presented their questionnaire responses with normal value and export price information
for the years 1996 through 1999. The time and resource spent by these exporters in collecting normal
value and export price for the years 1996 through 1999 is an unreasonable burden of proof imposed
on these exporters.
65. Furthermore, an excessive burden of proof was also imposed on exporters Sadia, Avipal, and
Frangosul when the investigating authority required that these exporters provide an invoice copy for
all of the sales transactions in the home market in order to establish normal value and, consequently,
make a “fair comparison”.
66. These same exporters provided letters to the DCD stating that the great volume of sales of
poultry in Brazil made it impossible for exporters to attach all invoices corresponding to those
transactions. These exporters attached invoices for a few transactions as sample. The exporters also
invited the investigating authority to verify in loco the responses provided, so as to ascertain that they
were accurate and complete.
18 The DCD chose not to verify these exporters.
(b) Article 3 – Injury Determination
67. Brazil’s claims of violation of Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.2.2 of the Agreement, relate to the
use of different periods to evaluate the relevant economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4, and
the lack of explanation in the final determina tion on why the investigating authority decided to
examine the relevant economic factors and indices based on different periods.
68. Once again, Argentina tries to confuse the Panel by making the argument that in threat of
injury cases, international law and practice allows for the possibility of analysis of a period longer
than the period of investigation so as to verify whether or not there is a trend of increasing imports.19
69. We stress that this is not the issue before the Panel. We are not challenging whether in a
threat of injury case the investigating authority may or may not analyse data for a period longer than
that of the investigation. What we are challenging is that in the investigation at issue, the authority
considered a certain period of injury analysis for some factors and another period for other factors.
70. In the final determination, the CNCE stated that the period under analysis corresponded to
January 1996 through December 1998. However, only for some variables, such as national

17 AFS, paragraph 243.
18 Exhibits BRA-26, BRA-29 and BRA-31.
19 AFS, paragraphs 252 to 254.

production, prices, imports, exports, and apparent consumption did the authority include data
corresponding to the first semester of 1999.
71. To that regard, the US disagrees with Brazil’s contention that an analysis of differing time
periods cannot be objective and thus violates Articl e 3.1 of the Agreement. To support its view, the
US cites the Panel report in United States – Hot Rolled Steel . In that investigation, the US gathered
information on all factors over the entire three-year period of investigation, and it evaluated the
various factors, at various instances, over the three-year period.
72. We will not go further into the analysis of that Panel report because we believe that the facts
of that investigation and the claim of violation presented here by Brazil are very different from that
case. First, in the instant case, the investigating authority did not gather information on all factors
over the same period, that it is, from January 1996 through December 1998. For the factors national
production, prices, imports, exports, and apparent consumption the period of injury analysis was from
January 1996 through June 1999. Second, the Argentinean investigating authority did not evaluate all
the factors listed in Article 3.4 over the same period of injury analysis.
73. We believe that the US argument is that over one determined period of injury analysis, the
investigating authority can compare data for certain years without explicitly discussing data for other
years. However, all factors are analyzed under a certain, defined period of injury analysis. Here,
unlike the case cited by the US, the Argentinean authorities decided that for certain factors the injury
analysis period would be from January 1996 through December 1998 and for other factors the injury
analysis period would be from January 1996 through June 1999. What the investigating authorities
cannot do, and thus our claim of violation of Articl es 3.1 and 3.4 of the Agreement, is establish a
certain period of injury analysis for some factors and another period of injury analysis for other
factors.
74. Regarding the claim that the CNCE’s injury analysis in the final determination was flawed
because it did not exclude the imports of the Brazilian exporters Nicolini and Seara from the “dumped
imports” under analysis, Argentina argues that in the final causal link determination the authority took
into account the dumping determination that the imports from the Brazilian exporters Nicolini and
Seara were not being dumped.
20 This is not true.
75. First, the injury analysis in the final injury determination never mentioned the exclusion of the
imports from these two Brazilian exporters from the total “dumped imports” under analysis. The
Panel can verify this in Exhibit BRA-14. As stated in BFS paragraph 450, we know this to be a fact
because the final injury determination was issued on 23 December 1999, and preceded the final
dumping determination, issued on 23 June 2000, by six months. It was in the final dumping
determination that the investigating authority reached the conclusion that the exporters Nicolini and
Seara were not exporting the subject merchandise at dumped prices.
76. In its first submission, Argentina effectively admits that it did not exclude imports from
Nicolini and Seara from the injury examination. This, in itself, is a blatant violation of Articles 3.1,
3.2, and 3.4. It is, after all, in the injury determination, that the authorities must examine the volume,
the effect, and the impact of the dumped imports.
77. Argentina tries to remedy this situation claiming that it was in establishing the causal link that
it took into account the fact that those imports were not dumped.
21 However, the causal link
determination contains no indication whatsoever th at Nicolini and Seara’s imports were excluded

20 AFS, paragraph 266.
21 Id.

from the total “dumped imports”. The final causa l link determination simply restated what was
already provided in the final dumping determination.
78. On the claim of violation that Argentina failed to evaluate all the relevant economic factors
and indices listed in Article 3.4, Argentina tries to convince the Panel that these factors were
evaluated by citing various pages in the final injury determination where it claims such information
was provided. We will demonstrate that the investigating authority has not evaluated these factors.
79. With respect to the actual and potential decline in productivity, Argentina cites pages 12
through 14 and 20 in the final determination and pages 26 through 30 and 95 of the Technical Report
in an attempt to demonstrate that this factor was evaluated. We ask the Panel to check those pages
and verify that the factors evaluated in them refer to production, capacity, capacity utilization,
employment and wages, that is, other factors listed in Article 3.4 of the Agreement other than actual
and potential decline in productivity. Argentina also cites to Annexes 1, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the
Technical Report of the final determination. The Panel must be aware that these Annexes refer to
production, employment, wages, and cost structure but do not relate to the factor productivity.
80. Concerning factors affecting domestic prices, Argentina claims that it has analysed the
evolution of the price indices of substitute products, basically red meat, as well as the general level of
activity and price indices of the most important sectors.
22 We have not identified such evaluation.
Argentina further cites Table 16 of the Technical Report, which presents the average sales revenue by
kilogram of fresh or chilled poultry. Brazil fails to see how that relates to factors affecting the
domestic price.
81. With respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin, instead of citing the final
determination to demonstrate that the factor was evaluated, Argentina tries to evaluate this factor in its
submission. To this regard, we restate that the investigating authority did not and could not have
evaluated the magnitude of the dumping margin because the final dumping determination, with the
dumping margin, was issued on 23 June 2000, six m onths after the final injury determination was
issued.
82. With respect to remaining factors, regarding actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, growth, and the ability to raise capital or in vestments, Argentina admits that it made no cash
flow evaluation and claims that such an evaluati on would be impossible given some peculiarities of
the Argentinean market.
23 Brazil notes that no explanation of the kind offered in AFS is present in the
final determination, where this issue is not even mentioned. With respect to the other factors (growth,
and the ability to raise capital or investments), Argentina does not indicate, in its first submission, if
and where these factors were evaluated in the injury analysis contained in the final injury
determination.
83. We find it appropriate at this moment to address the US comment on these claims. First, the
US agrees that the Agreement requires an investig ating authority to evaluate each of the Article 3.4
factors. Second, the US disagrees that the failure to refer to a particular factor in the published
determination necessarily breaches Article 12.2.2. In arguing this position, the US states that
Article 12.2.2 requires only that the authorities set forth “in sufficient detail the findings and
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities”.
The US argues that while all enumerated factors must be evaluated, not all are necessarily material in
any particular case.

22 AFS, paragraph 292.
23 AFS, paragraphs 297 to 299.

84. We have demonstrated in our submission that Argentina has not even enumerated in the final
determination all the factors in Article 3.4, let alone evaluated them. Furthermore, it is not discernible
from the published determination that authorities have evaluated all of Article 3.4 factors. More
importantly, Brazil recalls that the evaluation of all Article 3.4 injury factors is mandatory and, as
such, an inherently material issue of fact and law. Even if a particular factor does not have a material
effect in the injury determination, its evaluation cannot be considered immaterial by the authorities.
The final determination, therefore, must necessarily indicate if and how all factors were evaluated in
the underlying investigation and, at a minimum, explain why a particular factor was considered
immaterial.
(c) Article 4.1 – Major Proportion
85. Regarding the claim of violation of Article 4.1 of the Agreement, we agree with Argentina
that the Agreement does not stipulate an exact percentage of what constitutes a “major proportion” of
the total domestic production. That is exactly the issue before the Panel, whether 46 per cent of the
total domestic production of poultry in Argentina constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic
production.
86. At this point in time, Brazil will simply reiterate the terms of its first submission. Brazil
however takes note of the arguments advanced by some of the Third Parties and submits that should
the Panel find that a “major proportion” could mean less than 50 per cent of national production, the
following considerations should apply.
87. First, contrary to what the EC suggests, nothing in Article 5.4 equates “producers expressly
supporting the application” to the “domestic industry”. Secondly, if the Agreement provides no
specific benchmark for what would constitute a major proportion of total domestic production, then
the investigating authorities are under the obliga tion to expressly elucidate how it found that a
percentage lower than 50 per cent could be considered a major proportion.
IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AS A RESULT OF THE
ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
88. Members of the Panel, regarding the claims of violation of Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the
Agreement, due to the imposition of anti-dumping duties pegged to minimum export prices, Brazil
takes note of the arguments raised by Argentina and some Third Parties. At this point in time, Brazil
would refrain from advancing any further arguments other than those set out in its first submission.
Brazil is still evaluating the new elements brought into this discussion and will provide a more
substantive and robust analysis of this issue in our second submission. Nonetheless, if necessary,
Brazil would endeavour to offer preliminary answers to any questions raised by the Panel in this
meeting.
89. Mr. Chairman, members of the Panel, this oral statement merely touches on some of the
issues raised in Brazil’s first submission. We tried to offer the Panel a fresh view on some of the core
issues and arguments of this case, bearing in mind some of the points raised by Argentina and the
Third Parties in their submissions. We did not intend to exhaust the arguments that could and will be
raised by Brazil in the following stages of these proceedings. Any omissions should not be construed
as lack of interest on the points not addressed, or that Brazil has given up any of the claims raised in
its first submission.
90. Let me thank you again for your time and attention.

INTRODUCTION
1. Brazil thanks the Panel for its continued attention and welcomes this opportunity to rebut the
arguments presented by Argentina in its first writte n submission and in its oral statements. Jointly
with the second submission, Brazil is also providing the written responses to the list of questions of
the Panel, provided on the first substantive meeting of 25 September 2002. In essence, the present
submission serves to further point out factual inconsistencies and mistaken interpretations of
provisions in the Agreement on the Implementa tion of Article VI of GATT 1994 (“Anti-Dumping
Agreement”), that have not been dealt with in Brazil’s first submission and in the written response to
the Panel’s questions.
2. In order to facilitate, Brazil has divided this rebuttal into 8 parts:
I. Article 18.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”);
II. Anti-Dumping Standard of Review;
III. Ruling by the Mercosul Ad Hoc Tribunal;
IV. Claims Related to the Initiation of the Anti-Dumping Investigation;
V. Claims Related to the Conduct of the Anti-Dumping Investigation - Evidentiary and
Public Notice Requirements;
VI. Claims Related to the Conduct of the Anti-Dumping Investigation and Final
Affirmative Determination;
VII. Claims Related to the Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties as a Result
of the Anti-Dumping Investigation; and,
VIII. Conclusion and Requests.
3. Before making considerations relative to the specific claims, Brazil would like to address
three issues raised by Argentina. The first issue relates to Argentina’s allegation that Brazil has acted
inconsistently with Article 18.2 of the DSU. The second relates to the standard of review in anti-
dumping cases as set out in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The third issue deals with
Argentina’s claim that the dispute before this Pane l has already been “discussed and settled” in a
previous ruling by a Mercosul Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal (“Mercosul Tribunal”).
I. ARTICLE 18.2 OF THE DSU
4. Brazil has characterized its first written submission as not having any confidential
information, with the exceptions of Exhibits. To that effect, Brazil has offered Argentina, as a
courtesy, the opportunity to identify any portion of Brazil’s first submission that Argentina might
view as confidential. Argentina has not identified any specific portion of that document as
confidential.
5. Argentina has claimed, however, that by classifying its whole first submission as non-
confidential, Brazil has acted contrary to Article 18.2 of the DSU and has “impaired” Argentina’s
rights under the DSU.
1

1 Argentina’s letter to the Panel, n° 220/02, dated 15 August 2002.

6. In Argentina’s view, the first sentence of Article 18.2 requires written submissions to always
be treated as confidential, regardless of the fact that written submissions may sometimes not include
confidential information. Argentina understands that the second sentence of Article 18.2 allows only
the public disclosure of a party’s “statements” of positions. Brazil understands that the DSU does not
limit the scope, form, length or content of a party’s “statements” and that, in this instance, Brazil’s
first submission, without the Exhibits, is identical to the “statements” provided in the second sentence
of Article 18.2.
7. This is in accordance with Rule 3 of the Work ing Procedures for this Panel, that provides the
following:
“(...)Where a party to a dispute submits a confidential version of its written
submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be
disclosed to the public.” (emphasis added)
8. In this case, there was no confidential version of Brazil’s written submission and, therefore,
Brazil was not required to provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its first
submission.
9. We recall that the purpose of Article 18.2 is to safeguard the protection of confidential
information. If no confidential information is includ ed in the first submission there is nothing to be
safeguarded and the submission may be disclosed to the public without restrictions.
10. As a final comment, we note that Argentina has failed to demonstrate how the disclosure of
any information contained in Brazil’s first submission “impairs” Argentina’s rights under the DSU.
II. ANTI-DUMPING STANDARD OF REVIEW
11. Regarding the anti-dumping standard of review , Argentina alleges that Brazil has put forward
a generic argument without identifying the instances in Argentina’s investigation in which it considers
that Argentina did not act in good faith.2 According to Argentina, “accusations of a generic nature are
out of place in a WTO proceeding in which, ultimately, the law must be applied to the identified facts
of the case”.3
12. The Panel should note that Argentina’s allegation is not correct. In its first submission, Brazil
has developed arguments that properly identify the various aspects in the Argentinean investigation
that were conducted contrary to the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Specifically, in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the first submission, Brazil has provided a summary of the 41 claims, identifying the specific actions
taken by the Argentinean authorities in the investigation. In paragraphs 11 through 544, Brazil has
also provided the specific claims, facts and legal arguments relative to each of the 41 claims. The
identification of these claims, the related facts and legal arguments are not general in nature and are
not without relevance in this WTO proceeding.
13. In addition, Argentina alleges that Brazil has not substantiated the arguments in any of the
paragraphs under the heading “Anti-Dumping Agreement Standard of Review”, and has merely set
forth allegations which it fails to develop.4

3 Id.

14. Brazil has indicated that the violation of each claim is demonstrated in detail throughout the
first submission.5 Accordingly, we have substantiated all our claims of violation and understand that
the Panel will carefully examine them in order to assess whether the Argentinean investigating
authorities properly established the facts and whether the evaluation of those facts was unbiased and
objective.
15. Contrary to what Argentina has provided, Brazil has never affirmed, nor implied, that the
language in Article 17.6(i) of the Agreement is addressed to the parties, rather than to the Panel. 6
Consequently, we have also never claimed in this dispute that Argentina has violated Article 17.6(i)
of the Agreement.
III. RULING BY THE MERCOSU L AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
16. In Section II.2 of Argentina’s first submission, Argentina claims that Brazil has not acted in
good faith by omitting reference to the ruling by the Mercosul Tribunal on the same dispute before the
Common Market of the South (“Mercosul”). 7 Argentina further provides that this case has already
been “discussed and settled” within Mercosul’s framework, and that by omitting such reference Brazil
has incurred in an abusive exercise of its rights under the WTO covered Agreements.
8
17. Furthermore, Argentina seems to conclude, that with the purpose of clarifying the scope of
the obligations at issue, the Panel should take into account in the instant case Mercosul’s legal
framework and the consequences of the application of the Brasília Protocol.9 Alternatively, Argentina
concludes that the principle of estoppel should be applied to this dispute, since, according to
Argentina, there has been a “consistent and unequivocal” behavior on behalf of Brazil that has created
a conviction in Argentina with respect to matter s involving trade dispute settlement between both
Members within Mercosul’s framework and with respect to the scope of rulings by a Tribunal.10
18. Even though Argentina has stated that it has not argued the application of res judicata11, from
the arguments presented in its first submission (case has already been “discussed and settled”), it
appears, in fact, that Argentina is suggesting that the ruling by the Mercosul Tribunal has the effect of
res judicata. In the event that Argentina is alleging the application of res judicata, we would like the
Panel to take into account the following considerations.
19. Res judicata is a “rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action”. 12 Thus, in
order for a ruling or a decision to have the effect of res judicata the claims brought in a new action
have to be the same as those in the previous action, where a final judgement has been rendered.
20. Regarding the applicability of res judicata in WTO dispute settlement, we refer to the Panel’s
reasoning in India-Autos. In that case, the Panel found it appropriate to first consider whether the
factual circumstances for the application of res judicata could be met in the circumstances of that case

12 Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition by the Publisher’s Editorial Staff, St. Paul, Minn., West
Publishing Co. 1990, at page 1305.

before ruling on its applicability as a doctrine. 13 In conducting this analysis, that Panel identified a
benchmark by which disputes might be seen as distinct or similar for the purposes of rejecting or
applying res judicata.14 The Panel established that benchmark as follows:
“In the context of WTO dispute settlement, the notion of “matter”, as referred to in
Article 7.1 of the DSU, determines the scope of what is submitted, and what can be
ruled upon, by a panel. As confirmed by the Appellate Body in the Guatemala –
Cement case, the matter referred to the DSB consists of two elements: the specific
measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the claims ). This appears
to the Panel to be the most appropriate minimal benchmark by which to assess
whether the conditions of res judicata could conceivably be met, if such notion was of
relevance.
The Panel therefore considers that for res judicata to have any possible role in WTO
dispute settlement, there should, at the very least, be in essence identity between the
matter previously ruled on and that submitted to the subsequent panel. This requires
identity between both the measures and the claims pertaining to them. There is also,
for the purposes of res judicata, a requirement of identity of parties (...)” 15 (emphasis
added)
21. Brazil agrees with that benchmark and believes that in this instance the Panel should also
apply this standard. To that regard, we re-state our position that although the parties and the measure
currently before this Panel are identical to the parties and measure before the Mercosul Tribunal, the
claims of the dispute before this Panel are not the same as the claims that were before the Mercosul
Tribunal.
22. In order for the Panel to verify this, we find it appropriate to provide background information
on the scope of application of the Mercosul dispute settlement system.
23. On 17 December 1991, the Member States of Mercosul approved the Brasília Protocol,
establishing Mercosul’s dispute settlement mechanism. The Protocol set forth the scope of the dispute
mechanism by providing that “disputes between Mercosul Member States regarding the interpretation,
application or non-compliance with provisions of the Treaty of Asunción and the agreements and
decisions integrated in its framework must be submitted to the dispute settlement procedure
established in the Protocol”. 16 According to the Protocol, the scope of application of the dispute
settlement mechanism relates to the interpretation, application or non-compliance with provisions of
the Treaty of Asunción and the agreements and decisions integrated in its framework.
17
24. It is important to note that the claims raised in Brazil’s request for the establishment of a
WTO panel are not related to the interpretation, application or non-compliance with the provisions of
the Treaty of Asunción and all other agreements and decisions that make up Mercosul’s legal
framework. The object of Brazil’s challenge in the WTO relates to Argentina’s non-compliance of its
obligations in the WTO, and in particular to the Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994.
18

13 India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, 21 December 2001, WT/DS146/R and
WT/DS175/R, at para. 7.60 (adopted on 05 April 2002) (“ India - Autos ”). The Panel’s findings related to the
principle of res judicata were not appealed.
14 India – Autos, at para. 7.61.
15 India – Autos, at paras. 7.65 and 7.66.
16 See, Article 1 of the Brasília Protocol.
17 Id.
18 See, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil: Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, WT/DS241/3 (26 Feb. 2002).

25. The Mercosul Tribunal dealt with the dispute based on the scope of application set forth in the
Protocol, that is, whether provisions that make up Mercosul’s framework were correctly interpreted,
applied or complied with in the anti-dumping investigation conducted by Argentina on imports of
poultry from Brazil. It was not before the Tribunal the examination and decision of whether
Argentina complied with its WTO obligations in the conduct and imposition of anti-dumping
measures on poultry from Brazil. Brazil believes that this Panel has the appropriate jurisdiction to
examine such claims.
26. In that regard, Article 23 of the DSU mandates exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the DSU for
WTO violations. Relevant part of Article 23 provides that:
“1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or impediment
to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse
to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that
benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements has been impeded, except through the recourse to dispute
settlement in accordance with rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall
make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or
Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under
the Understanding.(...)” (emphasis added).
27. Thus, the claims presented to the Panel on Argentina’s violation of its WTO obligations
entitles Brazil to trigger and use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, excluding thereby the
competence of any other mechanism to examine WTO law violation claims.
28. Argentina also makes the argument that the principle of estoppel should be applied to this
dispute, since there is a conviction on the part of Argentina, based on previous rulings of the Mercosul
Tribunal, that Brazil would relinquish its right to use WTO dispute settlement whenever a case is
decided by a Mercosul Tribunal. To that regard, Brazil once again affirms that the dispute before the
Mercosul Tribunal was grounded on a different legal basis from the dispute before this Panel.
29. Nevertheless, if the Panel considers the examination of this argument relevant, Brazil notes
that it is to interpret the principle of estoppel and whether it is applicable in WTO dispute settlement.
30. Estoppel means that “a party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to detriment
of other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.”19 As noted by the
European Communities (“EC”) in its third part submission, 20 the Panel in EC – Bananas I , correctly
concluded that “estoppel could only result from the express, or in exceptional cases implied, consent
of such parties or of the CONTRACTING PARTIES”.21 That Panel further considered that:

19 Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition by the Publisher’s Editorial Staff, St. Paul, Minn., West
Publishing Co. 1990, at page 551.
20 EC’s third party submission, at. Para. 16.
21 EEC – Member States’ Import Regimes for Bananas 3 June 1993, WT/DS32/R, at para. 361
(unadopted) (EC – Bananas I). The Panel’s conclusion related to the principle of estoppel was not appealed.

“(...) The decision of a contracting part y not to invoke a right vis-à-vis another
contracting party at a particular point in time can therefore, by itself, not reasonably
be assumed to be a decision to release that other contracting party from its
obligations under the General Agreement. The Panel noted in this context that
previous panels had based their findings on measures which had remained
unchallenged for long periods of time. The Panel therefore found that the mere fact
that the complaining parties had not invoked their rights under the General
Agreement in the past had not modified these rights and did not prevent them from
invoking these rights now.”
22 (emphasis added)
31. The same applies in the instant case. The simple fact that Brazil has brought a similar dispute
to the Mercosul Tribunal does not represent that Brazil has consented not to bring the current dispute
before the WTO. Specially when the dispute before this Panel is based on a different legal basis than
the dispute brought before the Mercosul Tribunal.
32. We also call to the Panel’s attention that the Mercosul Protocol of Olivos on Dispute
Settlement, signed on 18 February 2002, cannot be raised here as an implicit or express consent by
Brazil to refrain from bringing the present case to the WTO dispute settlement.
33. To that regard, we are aware that the Protocol of Olivos provides that “disputes within the
scope of application of the Protocol, that may also be submitted to the WTO dispute settlement
system, may be submitted to either one or the other forum, according to the choice made by the
complainant”.23 The Protocol further states that “once a dispute settlement has been initiated, neither
one of the parties may have recourse to other dispute settlement mechanisms in other forums with
respect to the same object as defined in Article 14 of the Protocol”.24
34. We note, and repeat, that the object before the Mercosul Tribunal is different from the object
before this Panel. Furthermore, the Protocol of Olivos has not yet entered into force, and even if it
had and the object of the dispute was the same, the Protocol of Olivos provides that “disputes
underway initiated in accordance with the Protocol of Brasília will continue to be exclusively
governed by that Protocol until the dispute has been concluded”. 25 Furthermore, the Protocol also
states that “while the disputes initiated under the regime of the Protocol of Brasília are not completely
concluded and until the proceedings under Article 49 are completed, the Protocol of Brasília will
continue to be applied”. 26 Therefore, the Protocol of Olivos does not apply to disputes that have
already been concluded under the Brasília Protocol.
35. Argentina also errs in its understanding that the existence of Mercosul’s legal framework and
adjudications of its dispute settlement mechanism must be taken into account by the Panel in fulfilling
its responsibilities in accordance with the DSU. 27 Argentina states that this in accordance with
Article 3.2 of the DSU, in respect to the clarification of the obligations of the Agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
28
36. We recall that Article 3.2 deals exclusively with the clarification of the existing provisions of
the WTO Agreement and does not provide that a previous ruling by an international tribunal
constrains a WTO Panel’s interpretation of a WTO Agreement.

23 See, Article 1.2 of the Protocol of Olivos.
24 Id.
25 See, Article 50 of the Protocol of Olivos.
26 See, Paragraph 2 of Article 55 of the Protocol of Olivos.
27 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 18.
28 Id.

37. What Article 3.2, in fact, provides is that:
“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. It serves to preserve the rights
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing
provisions of WTO Agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law.” (emphasis added)
38. Based on this provision, Brazil understands that the Panel must consider a claim brought by a
Member with respect to a violation of a covered agreement in order to preserve that Member’s rights
under that agreement.
39. As a final comment on this issue, Brazil notes that contrary to Argentina’s allegations, Brazil
has not incurred in an abusive exercise of its rights under the WTO Agreements,
29nor has its conduct
been contrary to good faith by not mentioning in the first submission the ruling by the Mercosul
Tribunal.30 Brazil has not made reference to that ruling simply because it believes that it has no
relevance to this case, since the claims currently before the Panel are not the same as the claims that
were before the Mercosul Tribunal.
IV. CLAIMS RELATED TO THE INITIATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING
INVESTIGATION
Article 5.3
Claim 4 – Export Price Below Normal Value
40. Argentina has affirmed that Brazil’s statement that, for the purpose of establishing the export
price, the selection of data was inappropriate and biased is untrue. 31 To prove that Brazil’s statement
is untrue, Argentina explained that “the implementing authority analyzed the import transactions in an
attempt to determine which of them corresponded closest to the product under investigation, and it did
so for the sole purpose of calculating the most appropriate and comparable export price possible at the
pre-initiation stage”.32 Argentina further provided that “it worked out an average of the appropriate
transactions, without in fact making any selection which might distort the difference between the
export value and the normal value”.33
41. Brazil cannot accept this response as an account of how the export price was established in
the initiation stage of the investigation. We have demonstrated in the first submission that the DCD
did make a selection of export transactions, namely those with prices below normal value, and this
selection did distort the difference between the export price and the normal value.
42. Brazil will once again show this to the Panel. The Table in Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2
provides the total export price information submitted by petitioner in the application. The average
export price found from that information was US$1,014/ton. From that information provided in the
application, the investigating authority considered that a significant portion of the product was being
imported into Argentina at dumping condition, that is, at prices inferior to those sold in the domestic

29 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 23.
30 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 16.
31 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 78.
32 Id.
33 Id.

market of Brazil.34 The DCD, then, considered only the prices of those export transactions that were
below the normal value.
43. The Table in Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2 shows the volume and value of the export
transactions below normal value for the period January through May of 1997. Specifically, the DCD
provided that the same selection was made for the month of August 1997 (exports transactions with
prices below the normal value).
35 Next, the authority added the export transactions below normal
value for August 1997 to the export transactions below normal value for the period January through
June 1997.36 This resulted in an amount of US$4,390,836.38 and a volume of 4,854.24 tons for the
exports of poultry from Brazil with prices inferior to the normal value for the period January through
August 1997.37 This resulted in the average f.o.b. export price of US$0.904536/kg used to initiate the
investigation, which appears on Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
44. Obviously, this method adopted by the DCD distorted (and decreased) the export price and,
consequently, distorted the dumping margin. Argentina has not only failed to examine the accuracy
and adequacy of all the evidence that was presented in the application but has also inflated the
dumping margin.
V. CLAIMS RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING
INVESTIGATION – EVIDENTIARY AND PUBLIC NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Articles 12.1, 6.1.1, 6.8, 6.9 and Annex II
Claim 10 - Failure to Notify Seven Brazilian Exporters
45. Regarding the claim of violation of Article 12.1 of the Agreement, Brazil has provided
documentation that supports the fact that the inves tigating authorities had recognized and identified
the Brazilian exporters Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó, Catarinense and Perdigão prior to the initiation
of the investigation.38
46. The authorities first became aware of the existence of these producers/exporters on
17 February 1998, when petitioner submitted additional information that included lists of imports of
poultry from Brazil broken down by producer and exporter. 39 The name of these Brazilian exporters
appeared in all lists submitted by petitioner. In fact, the information on these lists came from two
Argentinean agencies: SENASA – Direccíon Nacional de Fiscalizacíon Agroalimentaria (“SENASA”)
and the Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesc a y Alimentacíon Direccíon de Ganaderia
(“Ganaderia”). How, then, can Argentina allege that these exporters were unknown to them at the
time of initiation, when the identification of these Brazilian producers/exporters actually came from
two Argentinean agencies?
47. On 7 January 19998, at a second moment but still prior to initiation, the DCD issued the
report regarding the viability of the initiation of the dumping investigation, identifying once again
these same exporters.
40 This time, the identification of these exporters was made by the authorities
themselves.

34 See, Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2.
35 See, First paragraph of Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-2.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See, Annexes 1 and 2 of Exhibit BRA-4 and Pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.
39 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
40 See, Pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.

48. Brazil has also demonstrated that these five exporters were notified of the investigation and
the need to provide responses to the dumping questionnaire only on 15 September 1999, 41 almost
eight months after initiation and after a preliminary injury, dumping and causal link determination had
been issued.42
49. The timing of this notification to these exporters proves that the authorities did not comply
with the requirement in Article 12.1 of the Agreement.
50. It is interesting that Argentina tries to share the obligation under Article 12.1 with Brazil,
when it states that it requested Brazil’s cooperation in identifying the producers/exporters.
43 E v e n
though Argentina states this, Argentina never requested Brazil’s cooperation in providing the address
or contact information of these specific exporters, which it had already identified.
51. It is also curious how Argentina implicitly tries to equate the obligation of notification with
the obligation of publication. In particular, Argentina states that “the initiation of an investigation is a
general administrative procedure and published as such in the Official Journal, which constitutes
sufficient notification of a general scope”.44
52. We cannot agree with such statement, specially in light of the express distinction of
obligations set forth in Article 12.1. Relevant part of that Article provides:
“When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or
Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested
parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be
notified and a public notice shall be given” (emphasis added)
53. It is clear that Article 12.1 requires that in addition to a public notice, a notification be given
when the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation. Thus, the requirement of notification is not fulfilled simply by the issuance of the
public notice.
Claim 11 – Failure to Give 30-Day Deadline to Respond to Questionnaire
54. In its first submission, Argentina categorically states that it granted the seven Brazilian
exporters a period of more than 30 days to reply to the DCD’s questionnaire and also dully acceded
to their requests for extension.45
55. Brazil reaffirms that this is simply not true. The DCD’s notification of the investigation and
the need to provide responses to the questionnaires sent to the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense,
Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves and PenaBranca expressly indicated that these exporters had
no more than 20 days to respond to the questionnaire. 46 It is evident that the timeframe required by
the DCD in these letters was on its face contrary to the 30-day period required under Article 6.1.1 to
respond to questionnaires.

41 See, Exhibit BRA-13.
42 See, Exhibits BRA-10, BRA-11 and BRA-12.
43 Argentina’s first submission, paras. 112 – 116.
44 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 167.
45 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 126.
46 See, Exhibit BRA-13.

56. The requirement in Article 6.1.1 is of such importance that it is the only provision under
Article 6 that establishes a specific timeframe for the accomplishment of an obligation. It is simple, if
authorities do not provide at least 30 days for exporters or foreign producers to respond to the
questionnaires, authorities are in violation of Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement.
57. Under Article 6.1.1, it is not permissible for authorities to simply provide a lesser period for
response from the outset, just as long as the total period allowed for response (including extension) is
at least 30 days. That interpretation would render meaningless the obligation in Article 6.1.1 of the
Agreement:
“Exporters and foreign producers receiving the questionnaires used in an anti-
dumping investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply. Due consideration
should be given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period, and upon cause
shown, such an extension should be granted whenever practicable.” (emphasis
added)
58. Article 6.1.1 is divided into two sentences. The first sentence specifically relates to the
original deadline that authorities must give for exporters/producers to respond to the questionnaire.
The second sentence relates to extensions that authorities may give to such responses. The first
sentence is an obligation imposed on the authorities and must be read separately from the second
sentence, which is not an obligation. If authorities could simply give any period of time, inferior to
30 days, for exporters/producers to respond to the questionnaire and afterwards provide extensions for
a period that, in total, would make up the 30 days, there would be no need for the second sentence in
Article 6.1.1. We do not believe that to be the intention in Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement.
59. Furthermore, when exporters and producers receive a questionnaire they rely on that 30-day
period to plan and allocate the necessary resources in order to respond. The great volume of
information required in a questionnaire demands time and available personnel to collect and report
such information. If from the outset these exporters/producers receive a questionnaire with a deadline
for response inferior to 30 days, they will either not even try to respond to the questionnaire or
provide incomplete/insufficient responses. In a way, the opportunity to defend their interests is
impaired.
60. This is even more so, if the Panel considers that in this case these seven Brazilian exporters
were notified of the investigation almost eight months after initiation and after a preliminary injury,
dumping and causal link determination had been issued. These exporters had already had their right
of defense impaired. In addition, they were faced with having to respond the dumping questionnaire
in only 20 days.
61. As a final remark, the Panel should also note that Article 6.1.1 refers to responses to the
questionnaires. In this case, none of the seven exporters received the injury questionnaire and, thus,
were not even afforded the opportunity to respond.
Claim 15 – Disregard of Exporters’ Product Description
62. Brazil has demonstrated in Exhibits BRA-22, BRA-23, BRA-24 and BRA-26 that Sadia,
Avipal and Frangosul reported in their questionnaire responses that there were no physical
characteristic differences between poultry sold to Ar gentina and in Brazil. Even so, the investigating
authority disregarded that information and used the normal value adjustment proposed by petitioner in
the application.
63. Brazil has also demonstrated in Exhibit BRA-25 that Catarinense sold both griler (without
giblets) and broiler (with giblets) type poultry to Argentina and in Brazil. However, the investigating

authority chose to apply the normal value adjustment to all of the poultry sales in Brazil even though
some of these sales did not warrant an adjustment because they were sales of griler type poultry, that
is, poultry sold without head and feet.
64. In the first submission, Argentina seems to justify not using the product description
information reported by the Brazilian exporters in their questionnaire responses simply on the basis of
lack of supporting documentation. 47 We understand that in this case the DCD was not entitled to
resort to facts available.
65. Under Article 6.8, an investigating authority is only authorized to resort to facts available
where a party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information, or where a
party significantly impedes the investigation. In the evidence-producing stage of an investigation, it is
a basic obligation of the investigating authority to indicate the information that is required for the
investigation. In that respect, Article 6.1 of the Agreement sets forth that:
“All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of the
information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing
all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.”
(emphasis added)
66. Article 6.1 requires that authorities give notice of the information that is required. So, if an
investigating authority does not clearly specify what information is required, the investigating
authority cannot punish the interested party (use of facts available) for not submitting such
information.
67. Furthermore, Paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Agreement reaffirms the obligation under
Article 6.1, by stating that:
“As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating
authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested
party, and the manner in which that information should be structured by the
interested party in its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is
aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will
be free to make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those
contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic
industry” (emphasis added)
68. Paragraph 1 of Annex II requires investigating authorities to specify in detail the required
information. If that information is not provided within a reasonable period, the investigating
authorities must inform the interested party that a determination may be made on the basis of facts
available. Accordingly, investigating authorities are not entitled to resort to facts available if the
interested party did not provide certain informa tion because the investigating authority failed to
specifically indicate that it was required.
69. We find further support in Article 6.6 of the Agreement to our understanding that the DCD
was not entitled to resort to facts available in view of the lack of supporting documentation.
Article 6.6 states the following:
“Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 8, the authorities shall during
the course of the investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information

47 Argentina’s first submission, at paras. 176 – 185.

supplied by the interested parties upon which their findings are based.” (emphasis
added)
70. From the language in Article 6.6, unless the authorities specifically indicate, exporters are not
required to submit supporting documentation for all information submitted, in order to demonstrate
the accuracy of such information.
71. That was also the conclusion of the Panel in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles:
“(...) we conclude that an investigating authority may not disregard information and
resort to facts available under Article 6.8 on the grounds that a party has failed to
provide sufficient supporting documentation in respect of information provided
unless the investigating authority has clearly requested that the party provide such
supporting documentation.”48 (emphasis added)
72. To that regard, after Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense provided their product
description responses to the dumping questionnaire, the investigating authority did not, at any moment
during the course of the investigation, request specific information/clarification or supporting
documentation on the product description submitted by these exporters.
73. In fact, not even the dumping questionnaire specifically required that the exporters submit
supporting documentation for the product description. 49 In the section “Instructions for Completing
the Producer/Exporter Questionnaire”, under “Objective & Scope”, the questionnaire provides that the
producer/exporter shall respond to the questionnaire as precisely as possible, attaching supporting
documentation for its responses, or in case this is not possible, indicating the source of information.
50
Likewise, the “General Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire” section provides that the
producer/exporter is required to mention on each of the pages it presents, the case number, detailed
response to each question, information on the sources used, and attachment of corresponding
documentation, as a necessary condition to uphold the veracity of the source.
51
74. From the general instructions in the questionnaire regarding the need for supporting
documentation, we do not believe that the authority provided sufficient information on the precise
supporting documentation that was expected from the exporters.
75. We cannot reasonably assume that the questionnaire requested supporting documentation for
all the information provided by exporters in their responses. At a minimum, this would impose an
unreasonable burden on the exporters in responding to the questionnaire. Not to mention the fact that
it would be impossible for exporters to comply with the 30-day deadline to respond to questionnaires,
as provided in Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement.
76. The fact that the DCD never requested clarifications or supporting documentation for the
information reported by the exporters indicated that the information that had been submitted would be
accepted. In that sense, Paragraph 6 of Annex II provides that:
“If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed
forthwith of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further

48 Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy,
28 September 2001, WT/DS189/R, at para. 6.58 (adopted on 5 November 2001) (“ Argentina – Ceramic Floor
Tiles”)
49 See, Pages 19 and 21 of Exhibit BRA-22.
50 See, Page 19 of Exhibit BRA-22.
51 See, Page 21 of Exhibit BRA-22.

explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of
the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being
satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be
given in any published determinations.” (emphasis added)
77. As previously stated, the investigating authority never informed the exporters that the product
description information reported by them was insufficient or unacceptable. By doing so, the authority
acted inconsistently with Paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement.
78. Furthermore, Argentina confirms that the ad justment was based on the method of calculation
provided by petitioner in the application and that the validity of such method was confirmed by the
absence of any objection by exporters.52 To that regard, the following considerations should be taken
into account.
79. First, by submitting the precise product description information, exporters were already
indicating that the need for the adjustment proposed by petitioner was not warranted. In addition, the
Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires sent a letter prior to the final determination with its considerations
regarding the adjustment proposed by petitioner and that would be used by the authorities in the final
determination.
53 In that letter, the Brazilian Embassy pr ovided that the investigating authority, in
making a fair comparison, should observe for each exporter the characteristics of the product sold to
Argentina and in Brazil. 54 The Brazilian Embassy further stated that the 9.09 per cent adjustment
corresponding to head and feet was absurd, since there were exporters that sold in the internal market
the same poultry that was sold to Argentina. 55 Other considerations regarding the methodology used
in the adjustment calculation were also put forth by the Embassy, but were not taken into account by
the authority in the final determination.56
80. Second, petitioner did not submit, for purposes of initiation and during the investigation, any
supporting documentation that there existed physical characteristic differences between the poultry
sold to Argentina and in Brazil, that such alleged differences affect price comparability, and that the
yield rate difference presented was correct. Furthermore, the adjustment information used by
petitioner in the application was based on JOX information for chilled poultry, with head and feet, a
product different from the product under investigation, frozen poultry without head and feet. Even so,
the investigating authority considered JOX information as acceptable evidence that an adjustment was
warranted.
57
81. By considering petitioner’s information rather than exporters, the investigating authority
failed to use “special circumspection” in their normal value finding and, thus, also violated
Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement.
Claim 17 – Disregard of Exporters’ Export Price Information
82. With respect to the claim that Argentina disregarded the export price data provided by the
Brazilian exporters and resorted, instead, to the export price information provided by the Argentinean
agency the Ganaderia, we have shown that Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense submitted such
information during the investigation.

52 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 179.
53 See, Exhibit BRA-39.
54 See, Page 5 of Exhibit BRA-39.
55 Id.
56 See, Page 6 of Exhibit BRA-39.
57 See, Argentina’s first submission, at para. 50.

83. On 23 April 1999, Sadia provided export price information of poultry sold to Argentina for
the period 1996 through February 1999.58 On 7 May 1999, Avipal provided export price information
of poultry sold to Argentina for the period 1996 through March 1999.59
84. On 27 April 1999, Frangosul provided export price information for individual export
transactions of poultry sold to Argentina from January 1996 through March 1999, with supporting
documentation.
60 Even though Frangosul presented export price data for each sale transaction to
Argentina for the period 1996 through March 1999, with corresponding supporting documentation,
the investigating authority did not accept that information alleging that these invoices had not been
translated.61 We have provided in Exhibit BRA-26 that Frangosul submitted a few translated invoices
of sales to Argentina as sample of all invoices submitted. Furthermore, most of the information in the
invoices to Argentina were already in Spanish.
85. On 3 November 1999, Catarinense provided export price information for individual
transactions of poultry sold to Argentina from January 1998 through January 1999, with supporting
documentation.62 The DCD never requested translation of the supporting documentation provided for
the export price data. In addition, most of the information in the invoices to Argentina was already in
Spanish.
86. Here, not only did the authority require information in excess of the dumping period of data
collection (January 1998 through January 1999), but the authority also decided that the specific
information with supporting documentation submitted by exporters was not as complete and detailed
as the information from the Argentina agency the Ganaderia.
63 We fail to see how the authority could
have reached such conclusion. We also fail to see the grounds for the authority to have used best
information available as provided under Article 6.8 of the Agreement.
Claim 21 – Failure to Inform the Essential Facts Under Consideration
87. Brazil has provide in Exhibit BRA-28 the report prior to the end of the evidence-producing
stage of the dumping investigation (“ Relevamiento de lo Actuado com Anterioridad al Cierre de la
Etapa Probatoria”). In particular, Brazil has provide that this report did not indicate that:
(1) The normal value information in the list of invoices provided by Sadia, covering the
period January 1996 through February 1999, would not be used in establishing
Sadia’s normal value;
(2) That the only information considered to es tablish normal value for Sadia in the final
determination would correspond to the information for the transactions chosen
through the sample made by the DCD, and for which supporting documentation was
actually provided;
(3) The reason why the DCD would not consider the information provided by Sadia for
all reported sales in the home market;

58 See, Exhibit BRA-22 and Pages 18 and 43 of Exhibit BRA-15.
59 See, Exhibit BRA-23 and Pages 22 and 45 of Exhibit BRA-15.
60 See, Exhibit BRA-24 and Pages 29 and 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
61 See, Page 75 of Exhibit BRA-15.
62 See, Exhibit BRA-25 and Pages 38 and 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
63 See, Page 75 of Exhibit BRA-15.

(4) That the only information that would be considered to establish normal value for
Avipal would be the information for the transactions for which supporting
documentation was submitted;
(5) The reason why the DCD would not consider the information provided by Avipal for
all reported sales in the home market;
(6) That none of the normal value information submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense
would be considered in establishing the normal value and an individual margin of
dumping for these two exporters;
(7) The reason why the DCD would not consider the normal value information provided
by Frangosul and Catarinense;
(8) Why the information submitted by all Brazilian exporters would not be considered for
purposes of determining the f.o.b. export price; and,
(9) Why the product description provided by exporters in the investigation would not
considered in evaluating whether the normal value adjustment to account for
differences in physical characteristics was warranted.
88. Brazil reaffirms its position that exporters cannot be aware simply by reviewing the record of
the investigation that evidence submitted by petitioner and derived from secondary sources, rather
than facts submitted by the exporters, would be used as the primary basis for the determination of the
existence and the extent of dumping. By not explaining the reasons why such information was
rejected, the investigating authority denied the exporters the opportunity to defend their interests
within the meaning of Article 6.9 of the Agreement.
89. As stated in the first submission, in the event Argentina provides information or documents
not disclosed to exporters during the investigation as means of justification of its actions during the
investigation, Brazil submits that such non-disclosure of essential facts should also be considered a
violation of Article 6.9 of the Agreement.64
VI. CLAIMS RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING
INVESTIGATION AND FINAL AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION
Articles 2.4, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.2.2
Claim 26 – Unreasonable Burden on Exporters
90. The DCD has imposed an unreasonable burden on the Brazilian exporters Sadia, Avipal and
Frangosul by allowing exporters to submit normal value and export price information for the years
1996 through 1999, when the dumping period of investigation was later defined as January 1998
through January 1999. The investigating authority also imposed an excessive burden on Brazilian
exporters by requiring that they provide an invoice copy for all of the sales transactions in the home
market in order to consider all reported sales in the establishment of the normal value and,
consequently, make a “fair comparison”.
91. Argentina admits that it did not define the dumping period of data collection on purpose.
65 As
justification, Argentina states that the Agreement does not define the period for collecting information

64 Brazil’s first submission, at para. 350.
65 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 243.

or for the investigation itself, having the authority discretion to request documentation it deems
necessary in order to determine dumping, and may require further information when this is necessary
to guarantee due process to the interested parties.66
92. Brazil fails to see how normal value and export price information for January 1996 through
December 1997 was necessary to determine dumping for the period January 1998 through
January 1999. Likewise, Brazil fails to see how the normal value and export price information for
January 1996 through December 1997 was necessary to guarantee due process of any interested party
in the investigation.
93. Argentina tries to make the argument that Brazil’s claim is contradictory because at times it
alleges that the investigating authority did not request more information. 67 Argentina further states
that ‘whenever the implementing authority has soug ht further information for a particular purpose,
Brazil complains that the information requested represents an ‘unreasonable burden on exporters’ ”.68
94. There is an obvious difference between the relevant type of information that the investigating
authority must require in an investigation and information that is not relevant to the investigation.
95. For example, product description is the type of information that was relevant in this
investigation. The authorities were required under Article 2.4 of the Agreement to make adjustments
in the fair comparison between the export price and the normal value. If authorities were unsure
whether such adjustments should have been made, since there were exporters that reported no
differences between the product sold in Brazil and to Argentina, the investigating authority was
required to request more information. But they did not. The application of the head/feet adjustment
had a direct impact on the normal value and on the final dumping margin. This was the type of
information that was relevant in this investigation and which the authority was required to request.
96. However, information on normal value and export price for a period outside of the period of
investigation, which therefore was not even used in establishing the margin of dumping, was not the
type of information that was relevant to the investigation. Thus, requiring the submission of this
information, with supporting documentation, was an unreasonable burden on exporters.
97. Regarding this claim, the EC argues that Article 2.4 of the Agreement does not address the
issue raised by Brazil. 69 In doing so, the EC recalls the Panel report in Egypt – Steel Rebar , that
provides that Article 2.4 is concerned exclusively with the comparison between normal value and the
export price and that, therefore, it does not apply to the determination of normal value and export
price.70
98. Brazil considers that the interpretation of the term “unreasonable burden” in Article 2.4 made
in that report is incorrect in so far as that Panel found that the burden requirement applies only to
comparison of export price and normal value, through various adjustments as appropriate, and not to
the establishment of normal value.
99. Brazil understands Article 2.4 to provide for how a fair comparison is to be made between the
export price and the normal value. More specifically, the last sentence of Article 2.4 states that “the
authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair
comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.” That being so,

66 Id.
67 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 244.
68 Id.
69 EC third party submission, at para. 27.
70 Id.

normal value information is included in the information necessary to ensure a fair comparison. If
authorities do not indicate exactly what information is needed to establish normal value how can a fair
comparison be made?
100. In this particular case, normal value and export price information for the period January 1996
through December 1997 was not information that was necessary for a fair comparison to be made.
Thus, by requesting that information the investigating authority imposed an unreasonable burden on
exporters.
Claim 32 – Failure to Use the Same Period to Evaluate Article 3.4 Factors
101. Brazil has presented as Exhibit BRA-14 the final affirmative injury determination by the
CNCE. In that determination, the CNCE stated that the period of injury under analysis corresponded
to the period from January 1996 through December 1998. 71 However, only for some variables, such
as national production, prices, imports, exports, and apparent consumption, did the CNCE include
data in its analysis corresponding to the first semester of 1999.72
102. The fact that some of the factors under Article 3.4 were evaluated for a certain period while
other factors were evaluated for a different period, indicates that different parameters of evaluation
were used. This demonstrates that the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on domestic
producers was not objective and was, thus, inconsistent with the requirement in Article 3.1 of the
Agreement.
103. Argentina has argued that in threat of injury cases, such as this one, “international rules and
relevant practice” provide that it is possible to undertake an analysis beyond the period of
investigation in order to find out whether or not there is a growing trend in imports and, thus, give the
investigation a more substantial factual basis.73
104. This is not the issue presented before the Panel. Brazil is not challenging whether in a threat
of injury case the investigating authority may or may not analyze data for a period beyond the period
of investigation. What we are challenging is that in this investigation the CNCE considered a certain
period of injury analysis for some factors and consid ered another period of injury analysis for other
factors. Had the CNCE decided to analyze data for all factors under Article 3.4 for a period beyond
the period of investigation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on domestic
producers would have been, at least, objective within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Agreement.
That was not the case.
105. The injury analysis considered the data for the factors production, prices, imports, exports and
apparent consumption for the period 1996 through June of 1999. The Panel can verify this by looking
at the following pages of the injury analysis in the final determination : production (Page 9 and
Table 1 of Exhibit BRA-14); prices of product in the domestic market (Page 14 and Tables 15b –
16 of Exhibit BRA-14): volume and value of imports (Pages 15 - 16 and Tables 22 – 29 of
Exhibit BRA-14); exports (Page 10 and Table 5 of Exhibit BRA-14); and, apparent consumption
(Page 25 and Tables 30 and 31 of Exhibit BRA-14).
106. For all other factors under Article 3.4 of the Agreement, the CNCE considered data in its
analysis for the period January 1996 through December 1998.

71 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-14.
72 Id.
73 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 252.

107. In its third party submission, the United States (“US”) seems to disagree with Brazil’s
contention that an analysis of differing periods cannot be objective, and thus per se breaches
Article 3.1 of the Agreement.74
108. To supports it view, the US cites the Panel report in United States – Hot Rolled Steel
Products. In that investigation, Japan had alleged that the USITC focused on two years of the three-
year period of investigation. 75 We understand that in that investigation the US collected information
on all relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry over the
entire three-year period of investigation , and analyzed all those factors on the basis of data
covering that period. Also in that case, Japan acknowledged that the USITC gathered data for the
entire three-year period and that those data were mentioned in the USITC report in various tables and
annexes.76
109. The case mentioned by the US bears no relation to the case at issue. We believe that the facts
of that investigation and the facts and claim of violation presented here by Brazil are very different.
First, there was no discussion in that investigation on the period of investigation. Apparently, data
was collected and analyzed for the entire three-year period of investigation. In this instance, the
investigating authority did not gather information on all factors over the same period, that is, from
January 1996 through December 1998. As stated above, for the factors national production, prices,
imports, exports, and apparent consumption the period of injury analysis was from January 1996
through June 1999. Second, in that investigation the USITC analyzed all the relevant economic
factors for the entire three-year period of investigation. Here, the Argentinean investigating authority
did not evaluate all the factors listed in Article 3.4 over the same injury analysis period.
110. It seems that the US argues that over one determined period of injury analysis, the
investigating authority can compare data for certain years without explicitly discussing data for other
years. However, all factors are analyzed under a certain, determined period of injury analysis. Here,
unlike the case cited by the US, the Argentinean authorities decided that for certain factors the injury
analysis period would be from January 1996 through December 1998 and for other factors the injury
analysis period would be from January 1996 through June 1999.
111. If an investigating authority establishes a certain period of injury analysis for some factors
and another period of injury analysis for other factors, that authority has not made an objective
examination of the impact of dumped imports on domestic producers within the meaning of
Article 3.1 of the Agreement.
Claim 38 – Failure to Evaluate All Article 3.4 Factors
112. In examining the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry,
investigating authorities are obligated to evaluated all relevant economic factors and indices listed in
Article 3.4 of the Agreement. In the final injury determination, the CNCE failed to evaluate the
following relevant economic factors under Article 3.4: actual and potential decline in productivity;
factors affecting domestic price; the magnitude of the dumping margin; and, the actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, growth and the ability to raise capital or investments.

74 US third party submission, at para. 12.
75 United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
28 February 2001, WT/DS184/R, at para. 7.226 (“ US – Hot Rolled Steel Products ”). This issue was not
appealed. United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
24 July 2001, WT/DS184/AB/R, at para. 240 (adopted on 23 August 2001) (“ AB – United States – Hot Rolled
Steel Products”).
76 Id.

113. Argentina alleges that applicants submitted in formation on the “productivity situation” in the
sector during the course of the investigation. 77 Argentina claims that this information is reflected in
the final injury determination in Pages 12, 13, 14, 20 and in the Technical Report in Pages 26, 28, 29,
30 and 95. We ask the Panel to verify this information. Brazil has found that these pages present an
analysis of the following factors: production capacity; utilization of capacity; employment; wages;
cost structure; and, sales in the internal market, but do not present any data information for the period
under analysis or any evaluation for that period for the factor productivity.
114. For factors affecting the domestic price, Argentina also affirms that the CNCE has properly
considered all the factors which, in addition to imports, might have had an impact on the price of the
domestic product.
78 To support this statement, Argentina refers the Panel to Table 16 in the Technical
Report.79 Table 16 presents the average sales revenue by kilogram of fresh or chilled poultry. Brazil
does not see the connection between the information contained in Table 16 and factors affecting the
domestic price.
115. With respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin, Argentina proposes to make the
evaluation that was intended in the final injury determination in its first submission. 80 Accordingly,
Argentina fails to cite where in its final injury determination the authority evaluated the magnitude of
the dumping margin. Once again, we state that the authority did not and could not have evaluated the
magnitude of the dumping margin because the final dumping determination, with the dumping
margin, was issued on 23 June 2000, that is, six months after the final injury determination was
issued. Still, Argentina argues in the first submission that margins of 8 – 14 per cent are significant
and were evaluated by the authority because of their potential impact on Argentine production.
81
First, no such evaluation was made in the final in jury determination. Second, even if the CNCE had
considered, which it did not, margins of 8 – 14 per cent in the final injury determination, these
margins referred to the margins us ed to initiate the investigation82 and did not account for the normal
value or export price information presented during the investigation.
116. For the factor cash flow, Argentina states, for the first time, that the cash-flow analysis
requirement was not relevant and could not be met due to particular characteristics of the Argentinean
market.83 Brazil notes that no explanation of the kind was offered in the final injury determination,
where this factor is not even mentioned. For the factors growth and the ability to raise capital or
investments, Argentina makes no indication in its first submission where, and if, these factors were
evaluated in the injury analysis in the final determination.
Claim 40 – Failure to Provide Adequate Final Notice
117. The US seems to agree with Brazil that the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an
investigating authority to evaluate all of the factors listed in Article 3.4 of the Agreement.84 However,
the US has affirmed that the failure to refer to a particular factor in the published determination does
not necessarily breach Article 12.2.2 of the Agreement.85

77 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 275.
78 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 292.
79 Id.
80 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 294.
81 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 295.
82 See, Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.
83 Argentina’s first submission, at para. 299.
84 US third party submission, at para. 14.
85 US third party submission, at para. 15.

118. The US understands that Article 12.2 requires only that the authorities set forth “in sufficient
detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the
investigating authorities”.86 The US argues that while all enumerated factors must be evaluated, not
all factors are necessarily material in any particular case.87
119. Brazil has demonstrated that in the final injury determination Argentina has not even
enumerated all of Article 3.4 factors, let alone evaluated them. Brazil understands that if the Panel
finds that Argentina has failed to evaluate all the economic factors set forth in Article 3.4 of the
Agreement (Claim 38), then the Panel need not address Brazil’s claim with respect to the failure by
Argentina to give adequate explanation of the evaluation of those factors in the final notice
(Claim 40). We understand that a notice may adequately explain in the determination that was made,
but if the determination was substantively inconsistent with the requirements under the Agreement,
the adequacy of the notice is meaningless. Nevertheless, if the Panel does not find that Argentina has
failed to evaluate all Article 3.4 factors, the Pane l must address Brazil’s claim with respect to the
failure of adequate notice (Claim 40).
120. The US has also provided that it should, nonetheless, be discernible from the published
determination that the authorities have evaluated all of the factors in Article 3.4.
88 To that regard,
Brazil notes that the evaluation of all Article 3.4 injury factors is mandatory and, as such, this
evaluation is an inherently material issue of fact and law. Even if a particular factor does not have a
material effect in the injury determination, its evaluation cannot be considered immaterial by the
authorities and must be provided for in the fina l notice. Therefore, the final determination must
necessarily indicate if and how all factors were evaluated in the underlying investigation and, at a
minimum, explain why a particular factor was considered immaterial.
VII. CLAIMS RELATED TO THE IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF ANTI-
DUMPING DUTIES AS A RESULT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
Articles 9.2, 9.3 and 12.2.2
Claims 28 and 29 – Duty in Excess of the Dumping Margin
121. Regarding the claims of violation of Articl es 9.2, 9.3 and 12.2.2 of the Agreement, relative to
the specific anti-dumping duties to be collected as the absolute difference between the f.o.b. price
invoiced in any one shipment and a designated “minimum export price”, we have taken into
consideration the arguments raised by Argentina
89 and by the EC and Canada, in their third party
submissions,90 in preparing the following analysis of the issue.
122. We begin by examining the language in Article 9 of the Agreement, which provides for how
anti-dumping duties are to be imposed and collected. Specifically, relevant part of Article 9.2 of the
Agreement establishes that:
“When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping
duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped
and causing injury,(...)” (emphasis added)

86 Id.
87 Id.
88 US third party submission, at para. 16.
89 Argentina’s first submission, at paras. 305 – 321.
90 EC’s third party submission, at paras. 29 – 37; Canada’s third party submission, at paras. 1 – 18.

123. Article 9.3. of the Agreement further provides:
“The amount of the anti-dumping duty shal l not exceed the margin of dumping as
established under Article 2.” (emphasis added)
124. From the language of these two provisions, we understand the requirement under Article 9.2
(collection of anti-dumping duties in appropriate amounts) to be closely related to the requirement
under Article 9.3 of the Agreement (duties shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established
under Article 2). In other words, if the amount of an anti-dumping duty exceeds the margin as
established under Article 2, than the anti-dumping duty will consequently be collected in
inappropriate amounts. That being so, a violation of Article 9.2 is entirely dependent on a violation of
Article 9.3 of the Agreement.
125. Thus, we turn to a closer examination of Article 9.3 of the Agreement.
126. Article 9.3 of the Agreement imposes a limit on the amount of the anti-dumping duty. That
limit is the margin of dumping found in the investigation, as established under Article 2 of the
Agreement. Article 2 of the Agreement provides for the determination of dumping. We find that,
under Article 2, the only provision that defines how margins of dumping are to be established is
paragraph 4.2 of that Article. Relevant portion of Article 2.4.2 provides that:
“Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted
average of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value
and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis(...)” (emphasis added)
127. In the instant case, the dumping margin as established under Article 2 of the Agreement was
that established during the investigation phase. That is, the dumping margin based on the normal
value and export price data submitted by the exporters during the investigation, for the period
January 1998 through January 1999, and used by the authority in the final determination. 91 From the
moment the anti-dumping duty is imposed until a review of the imposition of that duty is made, the
only margin of dumping available, calculated pursuant to Article 2, is the margin assessed in the
investigation, found in the final determination, and informed to all interested parties through a public
notice, as provided in Article 12.2 of the Agreement. In that regard, Article 12.2.2 requires that the
public notice of a conclusion of an investigation contain the following information:
“(...) (iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons
for the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and
the normal value under Article 2;(...)” (emphasis added)
128. The “minimum export price” determined in Resolution No. 574/2000 does not qualify as a
dumping margin established under Article 2, since it does not reflect the normal value and export
price as provided by the exporters and examined by the investigating authority in the investigation.
129. In that regard, Canada has stated in its third party submission that Article 2.4.2 of the
Agreement does not appear immediately relevant to this case,
92 since in determining the “margin of
dumping” for purposes of Article 9.3, Article 2 should be examined in its entirety. 93 In doing so,

91 See, Pages 102 – 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.
92 Canada’s third party submission, at para. 11.
93 Canada’s third party submission, at para. 10.

Canada argues that the margin of dumping is simply the difference between the export price and “the
comparable prices ... in the exporting country”, as set out in Article 2.1.94
130. We remind the Panel that Article 2.1 does not define, or even refer to, how a margin of
dumping is to be established. Article 2.1 simply defines what dumping is. In fact, the only provision
in the Agreement that specifically explains how the dumping margin is to be established is
Article 2.4.2.
131. Both, Argentina and Canada, appear to have the same understanding that the margin of
dumping found in the course of the original investigation does not limit the amount of anti-dumping
duties that may be imposed when future imports take place.
95 Canada further provides that when such
future imports are dumped at a higher margin than that determined to exist at the time of the final
determination, the importing Member may impose anti-dumping measures equal to that margin.96
132. In making this statement, Canada does not take into account the fact that this alleged “higher
margin of dumping” caused by future imports, would only take into account the export prices of the
subject merchandise without considering any possible ch anges in the prices in the internal market. It
is not unlikely, that changes in market conditions or exporter’s improvement in productivity create a
situation where the price of the product, in the in ternal market and the export market, is reduced.
Apparently, Canada does not consider the possibility that such a situation could occur, since in
proposes that anti-dumping duties can change based only on future imports.
133. Furthermore, if we were to assume, based on Canada’s argument, that the “margin of
dumping” to be imposed and collected simply refers to the difference between the export price and the
comparable price in the exporting country for any given period , what would be the purpose of the
“margin of dumping” found in a final determination? Obviously, the dumping margin found in the
final determination of an investigation is that which is established on the basis of the normal value and
the export price provided during the investigation. In that sense, the dumping margin is that found in
the period of investigation.
134. Contrary to Canada’s position, we find that that Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement is extremely
relevant in interpreting the language of Article 9.3 of the Agreement.
135. The same reasoning applies to the EC’s arguments related to the interpretation of Article 9.3.
In particular, the EC states that “(...) from the fact that Article 2.4.2 applies to the investigation phase,
it does not follow that the application of all other provisions of Article 2 is also restricted to the
investigation phase”.97
136. We call the Panel’s attention to the fact that Brazil has never affirmed, or implied, that all
other provisions of Article 2 are restricted to the investigation phase. What we have argued is that the
margin of dumping is established based on the information collected and examined during the
investigation and, in that sense, dumping margins ar e restricted to the investigation period, as set out
in Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement.
137. Regarding this issue, a clarification is in order. Article 2.4 establishes how a fair comparison
between export price and normal value has to be made (same level of trade, sales made at as nearly as
possible the same time, possibility of allowances, etc). This provision is valid in making a fair
comparison under any proceeding, since Article 2.1 defines what dumping is for purposes of the

94 Id.
95 Argentina’s oral statement, at para. 60; Canada’s third party submission, at para. 17.
96 Canada’s third party submission, at para. 17.
97 EC’s third party submission, at para. 32.

Agreement, that is, in investigations and reviews. Likewise, the provisions under Article 2 regarding
normal value and export price are also applicable to any proceeding (investigations and reviews).
However, the methodology for the establishment of a dumping margin is provided under Article 2.4.2
and is limited to investigations.
138. The EC further provides that Brazil’s interpretation is contradicted by the immediate context
of Article 9.3.98 In making its argument, the EC states that “Article 9.3.1 envisages the possibility to
collect duties on a retrospective basis, which, by definition, presupposes the possibility to calculate
the dumping margins on the basis of data for individual shipments or for time-periods outside the
investigation period”.99 The EC also cites to Article 9.3.2 of the Agreement that provides that in cases
“where duties are assessed prospectively, the authorities shall refund the duties ‘paid in excess of the
dumping margin’”.100 According to the EC, that “dumping margin” is not the margin established for
the investigation period, but rather the margin established for individual shipments or time-periods
after the imposition of the duties.101 That also seems to be the understanding of Argentina in its first
submission.102
139. We cannot agree with this understanding.
140. Article 9.3.1 provides for duties assessed on a retrospective basis. In such cases, a positive
dumping margin, as a result of an investigation, not only allows the collection of duties but also serves
as basis for the establishment of the deposit made by importers, until that duty is effectively collected.
For purposes of collection, whenever requested, an administrative review is made to determine the
margin of dumping corresponding to a new period. For example, during the first year that the
dumping measure is in place, the importers deposit an amount equivalent to the dumping margin
assessed in the investigation for each transaction made (liability). In the end of that year, if requested,
an administrative review is initiated and will determine a normal value and export price corresponding
to that year. The comparison between this new normal value and export price will result in a dumping
margin that will serve as the basis for the duty to be effectively collected and for the new liability to
be established for the following year.
141. Article 9.3.2 provides for the assessment of duties on a prospective basis. In such cases, the
duty to be collected is established and may not exceed the margin of dumping found. This duty will
be the basis for collection until a new margin of dumping (through a review) is determined. Since the
duty is fixed, there is the possibility of collection in excess of the margin found for specific
transactions. For that reason, Article 9.3 provides for refunds. A refund, however, only occurs if an
importer requests it and does not imply modification of the duty. In order for the duty to be changed,
a new margin of dumping would have to be determined, which would take into account data provided
by the exporters (normal value and export price) for a different period than that considered in the
investigation.
142. Thus, in the prospective system, when the duty is imposed the only margin of dumping
available to be considered for the assessment of the duty to be collected is the margin of dumping
determined in the investigation, as established under Article 2.
143. Regarding refunds for duties paid in excess of the margin of dumping, the Panel should note
that such refunds do not imply that a Member has the discretion (or the right) to collect duties in any
given amount. It is also important to note that the importer has the burden of requesting such a

98 EC’s third party submission, at para. 33.
99 EC’s third party submission, at para. 33.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Argentina’s first submission, at paras. 309 – 316.

refund. The objective of the refund is to guarantee that the importer will not pay in excess of the
margin found in the investigation in cases where the dumping margin related to an importer’s specific
transaction is inferior to the dumping margin found in the investigation. We note that the refund
proceeding is not immediate since it requires a new calculation of the margin and the deadlines to
make such calculations are equivalent to the deadlines in an investigation.
144. Specifically with respect to the “minimum e xport prices” imposed by Argentina, there is no
limit in the amount of the duties to be collected and, thus, in essence, it is not in compliance with the
Agreement. As stated previously, we cannot agree that the reference to the dumping margin in
Article 9.3.2 of the Agreement does not relate to the dumping margin established for the investigation
period.
145. Furthermore, Article 9.3.2 does not provide for how the dumping margin is established but
rather for refund situations as explained above. We cannot presume that Article 9.3.2 allows for a
permanent review of the anti-dumping duty, where only the export price is reviewed and the normal
value remains unchanged (that is, the normal value found in the investigation). At a minimum, that
new margin of dumping would not be in accordance with Article 2.4 of the Agreement, in that the
comparison between the export price and the normal value would not be made in respect of sales
made at as nearly as possible the same time. A comparison between a current export price for a
specific transaction and an average normal value based on data for one year ago is not in conformity
with Articles 2.1 and 2.4 (prices must be comparable).
146. If Article 9.3.2 was to be understood that way, that would also mean that the exporters,
interested parties in the investigation that provided the export price and normal value data, would
have absolutely no right of defense with respect to this “review” in Article 9.3.2, since it is up to the
importer, and not the exporter, to request refunds under Article 9.3.2. We repeat, Article 9.3.2 of the
Agreement does not provide for a review of the margin of dumping found in the investigation .
If a review is warranted the Agreement provides for such a situation under Article 11. There, all
interested parties participate, including the exporter, and are able to submit new export price and
normal value information and to defend their interests.
147. Furthermore, when the EC affirms that Article 9.4 of the Agreement expressly contemplates
for “the collection of variable duties equal to the difference between the normal value established for
the investigation period and the export prices of the shipments made after the imposition of the
duties”,103 we can under no circumstance agree with that position.
148. In examining the EC’s argument, we turn to the relevant language in Article 9.4:
“When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second
sentence of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any anti-dumping duty applied to imports from
exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:
(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the
selected exporters or producer or,
(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the
basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted
average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export
prices of exporters or producers not individually examined , (...)” (emphasis
added)

103 EC’s third party submission, at para. 35.

149. Article 9.4 of the Agreement identifies a ceiling which investigating authorities shall not
exceed in establishing an “all others” rate. We understand that Article 9.4(i) refers to cases where the
anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis (Article 9.3.2), and Article 9.4(ii) refers to cases
where duties are assessed on a retrospective basis (Article 9.3.1). We know this to be true, since the
language in Article 9.4(i) expressly refers to the “margin of dumping”, that is, the “margin of
dumping” found in the investigation.
150. This interpretation is supported by the Appellate Body’s understanding in United States – Hot
Rolled Steel Products:
“Before focusing on the qualifying language in Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, we recall that the word “margins”, which appears in Article 2.4.2 of that
Agreement, has been interpreted in European Communities – Bed Linen. The Panel
found, in that dispute, and we agreed, that “margins” means the individual margin of
dumping determined for each of the investigated exporters and producers of the
product under investigation , for that particular product. This margin reflects a
comparison that is based upon examination of all of the relevant home market and
export market transactions . We see no reason, in Article 9.4, to interpret the word
“margins” differently from the meaning it has in Article 2.4.2,(...)” 104 (emphasis
added)
151. Because Article 9.4(ii) refers to the “liability for payment of anti-dumping duties”, we
understand that provision to refer to duties assessed on a retrospective basis, and not on a prospective
basis.
152. That said, Brazil has demonstrated in the first submission that Argentina has imposed a
variable anti-dumping duty that can exceed the margin of dumping found in the final determination
105
and, thus, can be collected in inappropriate amounts.
Claim 30 – Failure to Provide How “Minimum Export Prices” Were Established
153. As a final note, the EC has stated in its submission that the precise method followed by the
Argentinean authorities in order to calculate the “minimum export prices” is unclear.106 According to
the EC, it is unclear whether, and if so how, the “m inimum export prices” relate to the normal values
established during the investigation.107
154. It is also unclear for Brazil how the investigating authority established the “minimum export
prices”. That is precisely our claim of violation of Article 12.2.2 of the Agreement. In the final
determination and in Resolution No. 574/2000, no explanation was provided as to how Argentina
calculated the “minimum export prices”. We have alleged in our first submission that Argentina did
not provide relevant information as to why the margin established in the final determination was not
applied and how the “minimum export price” was calculated.
108 We consider the application of the
dumping measures to be relevant information that must be included in the public notice providing for
the imposition of a definitive duty. An exporter is entitled to know how the information and

104 United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
24 July 2001, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 118 (adopted on 23 August 2001) (“ AB – United States – Hot Rolled
Steel Products”).
105 Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 520 – 531.
106 EC’s third party submission, at para. 37.
107 Id.
108 Brazil’s first submission, at para. 542.

arguments presented during the investigation were considered by the investigating authority and how
that information was used in arriving at a dumping measure.
155. To that regard, even if the “minimum export price” are equivalent to or lower than the
relevant normal values established during the investigation, Argentina still failed to provide in the
final dumping determination, or in Resolution No. 574/2000, why the margin established in the final
determination was not applied and how the “minimum export prices” were calculated, as required
under Article 12.2.2 of the Agreement.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND REQUESTS
A. CONCLUSION
156. Brazil has raised 41 claims in this dispute. These claims have been presented in detail in
Brazil’s first submission, which also included 34 Exhibits that support Brazil’s various allegations.
Further evidence and arguments related to the 41 claims were raised and presented by Brazil in its
first oral statement, as well as in the present submission. Thus, any claims that have not been
addressed in the present submission should not be construed as claims which Brazil has renounced to.
157. Brazil believes to have covered all the points raised by the Panel, Argentina and Third Parties
in this dispute and understands that additional issues or considerations regarding the arguments here
presented may be forthcoming. In such instance, Brazil welcomes the opportunity to present its views
and arguments at that moment.
B. REQUESTS
158. For the reasons presented throughout this dispute, Brazil respectfully reiterates its request in
the first submission that the Panel find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement with respect to Articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.7, 5.8, 12.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.2, 6.8, paragraphs 3, 5,
6 and 7 of Annex II, 6.9, 6.10, 2.4, 2.4.2, 12.2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 9.2 and 9.3.
159. Accordingly, Brazil also reiterates its request that the Panel recommend that the DSB request
Argentina to bring these actions into conformity with GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and, in doing so, use its right to make suggestions on ways which Argentina could implement the
Panel’s recommendations, as provided in Article 19.1 of the DSU.
160. In light of the numerous outcome-decisive vi olations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we
request that the Panel suggest that Argentina immediately repeal Resolution No. 574/2000 imposing
definitive anti-dumping duties.

ANNEX A-4
REPLIES OF BRAZIL TO QUESTIONS
OF THE PANEL - FIRST MEETING
(25 September 2002)
Claim 1
To both parties
2. In the view of the parties, which are th e obligations under Article 5.2? In addition,
would the parties agree that Article 5.2 imposes obligations on the applicant and not on the
investigating authority as stated in Guatemala – Cement II ? Please explain. In the event of
agreement with the conclusions in Guatemala – Cement II, what recommendation should a panel
reach in case that a breach of Article 5.2 ADA is found? In particular, would a recommendation
that a Member bring the measure into conformity be appropriate?
Response
Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an application to include evidence of
dumping, injury and causal link. Specifically, the application must contain information required in
items (i) through (iv) of Article 5.2. We cannot presume from the language in Article 5.2 that these
obligations are imposed on the applicant. Relevant part of Article 5.2 provides that:
“(...) Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered
sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph.(...)”.(emphasis added)
The consideration of sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the paragraph in
Article 5.2 is made by the investigating authority and not by the applicant. After all, the applicant is
not the one to consider whether the evidence it submitted in the application is sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article 5.2.
Furthermore, the WTO and its Agreements provide for obligations and rights of Members of
the WTO. Consequently, the Anti-Dumping Agreement also imposes obligations on Members of the
WTO and not on specific interested parties in an investigation. We cannot, therefore, infer that the
obligations under Article 5.2 are obligations of the applicant and not the investigating authority.
Under Article 5.2 of the Agreement, the investigating authority must check the application to
see whether the information required by that Article is present in the application. In order for an
investigating authority to accept an application it must consider whether information and evidence in
the application is sufficient to meet the requirements set forth in items (i) through (iv) of Article 5.2.
At a subsequent stage, and once the application has be considered and accepted by the authority as
meeting the requirements in Article 5.2, Article 5.3 of the Agreement imposes another obligation on
the investigating authority. This obligation is the examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application to determine whether it is sufficient to justify the initiation of the
investigation.

To Brazil
3. Does Article 5.2 ADA require that the application contain reasonably available relevant
evidence on any adjustment to be made if such adjustment is required for applicant to allege
“dumping”. In this regard, should such evidence identify:
(a) that an adjustment is required;
(b) the nature and extent of the adjustment;
(c) the basis/methodology for making such adjustment?
Please explain.
Response
Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the application include evidence of
dumping. Pursuant to Article 2.1 of the Agreement, “dumping” is the introduction of a product into
the commerce of another country at an export price lower then the normal value (comparable price in
the exporting country’s market). To prove whether dumping exists, or whether there is an indication
of dumping, a comparison between the export price and the normal value must be made. In making
this comparison, adjustments are made for differences which affect price comparability. Thus, if an
applicant alleges that an adjustment is required in order for a fair comparison to be made, and for
there to be an indication of dumping, relevant evidence of such adjustment must be included in the
application.
In view of the above, we understand that Article 5.2 of the Agreement requires that the
application contain reasonably available relevant evidence on adjustments to be made, specially if that
adjustment is so important that without it the applicant could not have alleged the existence of
dumping. Obviously, not all adjustments have such an impact in determining whether dumping
exists. However, that is not the case here.
In the instant case, had the investigating au thority not accepted the adjustment to normal
value (9.09 per cent) as proposed by petitioner and considered the export price for all transactions,
and not only those with prices inferior to normal value, there would be no indication of the existence
of dumping and the investigation would not have been initiated.
To demonstrate this, we have simulated an exercise to show that there would be no indication
of dumping had the authorities considered:
1. The average f.o.b. price for all export transactions, and not only those at prices lower than the
normal value in the establishment of the export price; and,
2. That an adjustment to normal value was not warranted because petitioner did not present
relevant evidence to support such an adjustment.
For the normal value, we have used the JOX price published on 30 June 1997, as provided in
the application, without the 9.09 per cent adjustment to normal value. In this scenario, the normal
value would have been 0.957 US$/kg.
1

1 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-2.

For the export price, we have considered all the data offered by petitioner for the period
January through June and August of 1997, instead of considering only the export transactions at prices
below the price of eviscerated poultry in Brazil. Using this methodology, the export price for that
period would have been 1.014 US$/Kg.2
Still with respect to the export price, we have also considered all the export data provided by
the Argentinean agency Delegación II – Unidade de Informatica (“DUI”) for the period August
through October of 1996, instead of considering only the export transactions at prices below the price
of eviscerated poultry in Brazil. The export price for that period would have been 1.091 US$/Kg.3
In comparing the above export prices ( 1.014 US$/Kg or 1.091 US$/Kg) with the unadjusted
normal value (0.957 US$/kg), the Panel will be able to verify that the normal value was lower than the
export prices and, therefore, there was no indication that poultry from Brazil was entering the
Argentinean market at dumped prices.
This exercise serves to show the Panel how important it was for the investigating authority to
have considered and required that the relevant evidence in the application identify and indicate that:
1. An adjustment was required;
2. The nature and extent of that adjustment; and,
3. The basis/methodology for making such adjustment.
Brazil considers that evidence of the relevant type is required in a case where it is obvious
from the face of the application that normal value and export price alleged in the application will
require significant adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a minimum, the
investigating authorities in examining the applicat ion should have required relevant evidence to
support the allegation that an adjustment, with such an impact, was warranted. Relevant evidence,
that is, information drawn from a document tending to prove a fact or a proposition, must support the
need for an adjustment (specially whether the alleged physical characteristic differences that lead to
the adjustment affect price comparability) a nd the methodology adopted for making such an
adjustment.
4. Was information on the adjustments referred to in paras. 70 and 71 of Brazil's First
Written Submission ("FWS") 'reasonably available' to the applicant at the time of filing the
application? Please explain.
Response
Yes, we believe that information regarding poultry sold in Brazil (including physical
characteristics) was reasonably available to the applicant at the time the application was filed.
We do not propose here to indicate how and where the applicant should search for such
information in order to provide the evidence required in an application. Nevertheless, we have found
that there are several (national and regional) poultry associations and publications in Brazil, where the
applicant could have gathered the necessary evidence. In that regard, we cite to the Brazilian
publication presented by the importer Interamericana Comercial S.R.L. (“Interamericana”), the Folha

2 See, Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-2 and Annex to Exhibit BRA-2 with export data for the period January
through June and August 1997.
3 See, Last Page of Exhibit BRA-2 with export data for the period August through October 1996.

de Londrina/Folha do Paraná. 4 More specifically, the Brazilian exporters also presented during the
investigation price public ation from the Associação Nacional dos Abatedouros Avícolas (“ANAB”)
regarding frozen poultry sold in the internal market for all of 1997 and the first seven months of
1998.5
Claim 2
To Brazil
14. Is Brazil's claim under Article 5.3 regarding frozen / chilled adjustment dependent on a
finding by the Panel that Argentina was correct to make the head / feet adjustment at the time
of initiation? In other words, is Brazil arguing that if the need for a head / feet adjustment was
obvious from the face of the application, then so was the need for a frozen / chilled adjustment?
Response
Claim 2 in Brazil’s submission, relative to the violation of Article 5.3 of the Agreement, is not
whether the investigating authority should have made the frozen/chilled adjustment. The argument
presented in Claim 2 is that if the authorities considered from the information provided in the
application that an adjustment to compensate for the head/feet differences was required, then, at a
minimum, the investigating authorities should have also made an adjustment to compensate for the
differences between frozen/chilled poultry.
We recall that petitioner’s application is provided in Exhibit BRA-1. From that Exhibit, the
Panel will be able to verify that the export price data submitted by petitioner, and used by the
authority, referred to frozen poultry (Mercosul Common Nomenclature NCM 0207.12.00) 6, a product
different from that corresponding to the JOX pri ce publication used to establish the normal value,
which was for chilled poultry (NCM 0207.11.00).7 If Argentina found there to be sufficient evidence
to make the head and feet adjustment, Argentina should have also found, from the information
submitted in the application, that a frozen and chilled adjustment was also required.
That said, Brazil’s Claim 2 is that there was not sufficient evidence from the information
provided in the application for the Argentinean au thorities to have accepted that an adjustment to
normal value was needed to compensate for the alle ged physical characteristic differences (head/feet)
between the poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
The normal value information provided in th e application by petitioner was information
provided by JOX exclusively with regards to prices of chilled poultry, sold in São Paulo, with head,
feet and giblets for one day in 1997. The information in the JOX price publication did not provide or
affirm that all poultry sold in Brazil contained head, feet and giblets. The information presented did
not correspond to prices at which the product in question was sold when destined for consumption in
Brazil.
We understand that petitioner tried to make the JOX price published for chilled poultry with
head and feet into evidence that all poultry sold in Brazil is chilled and includes head and feet. That is
not true. However, the investigating authority in correctly accepted the JOX information as evidence
that all poultry sold in Brazil is chilled and contains head and feet.

4 See, Page 13 of Exhibit BRA-15.
5 See, Pages 16, 20 and 24 of Exhibit BRA-15.
6 See, Page 6 of Exhibit BRA-1.
7 See, Page 2 of Exhibit BRA-1.

Petitioner further alleged that it was necessary to compensate for these physical characteristic
differences and assumed that such differences affect price comparability. Again, no evidence was
presented in the application to support the allegation that these differences affect price comparability.
Petitioner, then, presented a calculation of compensation where the yield rate of eviscerate
poultry sold in Brazil is 88 per cent of the live poultry and that the yield rate of eviscerated poultry
sold in Argentina is 80 per cent of the live poultry. Nowhere in the application or in the determination
to initiate is there indication of a document supporting the allegation that the yield rate of poultry sold
in Brazil is 88 per cent and that in Argentina it is 80 per cent. This calculation and the yield rates
proposed were accepted by the investigating authority even though no supporting evidence was
presented in the application to sustain such allegations.
Claim 6
To Brazil
21. Para. 136 of Brazil's FWS reads in relevant part:
'if authorities had examined the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided
in the application they would have required that petitioner provide prices of
poultry for the entire period under analysis in order to correctly make a fair
comparison with export prices for the same period.'
In the view of Brazil, which is the 'entire period under analysis'?
Response
Brazil’s response to this question does not address whether we find the period under analysis
established by Argentina, prior to initiation, to be appropriate. Brazil will limit its response to what it
considers to be the entire period under analysis based on the normal value and export price data used
by the authority in the initiation.
In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping in the application to justify the
initiation, the investigating authority may not ignore the provisions of Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, which defines what dumping is. In particular, Article 2.4 of the Agreement requires a fair
comparison be made between the export price and the normal value in respect of sales made at as
nearly as possible the same time.
Taking into account that for purposes of initiation the data considered by the DCD in the
establishment of the export price was from August through October of 1996 and January through June
and August of 1997
8, we consider that for a fair comparison to have occurred the authority should
have, at least, considered normal value data for the same period, that is, from August through October
of 1996 and January through June and August of 1997. That was not the case.
Petitioner and the investigating authority considered normal value for purposes of initiation
based on only one day in 1997 (30 June). In that regard, we know from the information provided by
petitioner prior to initiation and during the investigation that normal value information for all of 1996
and 1997 was reasonably available.
On 17 February 1998, prior to initiation, petitioner submitted to the authority additional
information that included, among other information, JOX price publication for chilled poultry with

8 See, Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-2.

head and feet in the Brazilian market for July and December of 1997 and January and February of
1998.9 Even with this information, the authority chose to initiate the investigation based only on
normal value information for one day in 1997.
In addition, on 26 July 1999, during the investigation, petitioner once again submitted
updated information on normal value for three days in each of the twelve months of 1998 and two
days in January 1999.10
From the facts above, we have shown that th e JOX price publication was (and is) reasonably
available to petitioner for any desired period, and could have been submitted in the application.
Likewise, we have shown that the authorities did not examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application (or the ad ditional information provided by petitioner) to
determine whether it was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.
Claim 9
To both parties
22. In the present case, by virtue of which le gal instrument was the investigation initiated?
Response
Brazil understands that the investigation was initiated when the Ministerio de Economia y
Obras y Serviços Publicos (“MEOSP”) issued Re solution No. 11/1999, announcing the initiation of
the anti-dumping investigation on imports of poultry from Brazil.11
That said, the Panel should take account of the fact that the consideration of the dumping and
injury evidence, that lead to the decision to initiate the investigation, was not done simultaneously.
For the sake of clarification, we will present the sequence of facts related to this claim in order for the
Panel to verify what we have argued.
1. On 7 January 1998, the DCD issued a report regarding the viability of the initiation of the
dumping investigation, determining that there was sufficient evidence of dumping in the
export transactions of poultry from Brazil into Argentina.12
2. On 7 January 1998, the CNCE issued Acta No. 405, determining insufficient evidence of
injury to justify the initiation of the investigation.13
3. On 17 February 1998, after having access to Acta No. 405, petitioner submitted additional
information to the authority.14
4. On 22 September 1998, the CNCE issued Acta No. 464, determining sufficient evidence of
threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation.15

9 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
10 See, Exhibit BRA-19.
11 See, Exhibit BRA-7.
12 See, Exhibit BRA-2.
13 See, Exhibit BRA-3.
14 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
15 See, Exhibit BRA-6.

5. On 29 December 1999, the authority in charge of the causal link analysis issued the report on
causal link. In it, the authority stated that the DCD based its report on the elements that were
included in the original application that took into account the period January through June of
1997.16 The causal link determination also pointed out that petitioner submitted additional
updated information for all of 1997 and the first semester of 1998. 17 However, the DCD did
not make or issue a new dumping analysis, taking into account petitioner’s additional
information.
6. On 20 January 1999, the MEOSP issued Resolution No. 11/1999, announcing the initiation of
the anti-dumping investigation on imports of poultry from Brazil. 18 This Resolution was
published in the Argentinean Official Journal on 25 January 1999.
From the sequence of the facts related above, we can conclude that the evidence of dumping
and injury was considered at different times. The dumping evidence was considered on
7 January 1998, and the injury evidence on 22 September 1998, more than eight months after the
evidence of dumping was considered. If the term “simultaneously” is defined as “occurring or
operating at the same time”19 and the Panel understands that Article 5.7 require authorities to examine
evidence simultaneously rather than sequentially, how could the authority have simultaneously
considered the dumping and injury evidence if there was an eight-month gap between the two
considerations?
For Argentina to have met the requirement in Article 5.7, a new dumping consideration taking
into account the updated information presented by petitioner should have occurred on
22 September 1998, but that did not happen. In this case, the timing of the consideration of the
dumping and injury evidence was not simultaneous.
Therefore, even though we understand the MEOSP to be the authority that issued the decision
to initiate the investigation, that decision was based on the evidence of dumping considered by the
DCD on 7 January 1998 and on the evidence of injury considered by the CNCE on
22 September 1998.
23. What interpretation is given by the part ies to the following excerpt from the panel
report in Guatemala – Cement II : we are of the view that Article 5.7 requires the investigating
authority to examine the eviden ce before it on dumping and injury simultaneously, rather than
sequentially?
Response
First, we would like to indicate that we do not find it possible for an authority to consider
evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously if the evidence considered by the authorities
indisputably refers to non-related periods for dumping and injury.
The Panel will verify that the causal link analysis, prior to initiation, was issued on
29 December 1999, and in it the authority stated that the DCD made a dumping analysis based on the
elements that were included in the original application, which took into account the period January
through June of 1997. 20 The causal link determination also pointed out that petitioner submitted

16 See, Page 2 of Exhibit BRA-20.
17 See, Page 4 of Exhibit BRA-20.
18 See, Exhibit BRA-7.
19 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1294.
20 See, Page 2 of Exhibit BRA-20.

additional updated information for all of 1997 and the first semester of 1998. 21 However, the DCD
did not consider petitioner’s updated information and did not issue a new dumping analysis.
On the other hand, the first injury analysis, Acta No. 405, considered there to be insufficient
evidence of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation. The data collected for that injury
analysis went from January 1994 through June 1997. 22 Eight months after the dumping and the first
injury analysis had been made, the CNCE issued a second injury analysis, Acta No. 464, considering
there to be sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of the investigation. The
second injury analysis was based on the data collected for the period January 1994 through
June 1998.23
If the first injury analysis considered that the dumping found on June 1997 was not causing
injury or threat of injury on June 1997, how could Argentina have found threat of injury on June 1998
if the dumped imports on June 1997 were not causing injury on June 1997?
Second, even if the language in Article 5.7 of the Agreement could be interpreted in
accordance with the understanding of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II (simultaneous, rather than
sequential, examination of the dumping and injury evidence), in this case that also did not occur.
Our response to question 22 above presents the sequence of events that clearly indicate that
the evidence of injury was considered eight months after the evidence of dumping was considered.
An eight-month gap between these two considerations is not in accordance with the understanding of
the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II of the requirement in Article 5.7 of the Agreement.
Claim 10
To both parties
24. What are 'interested parties known to the in vestigating authorities to have an interest'
within the meaning of Article 12.1 ADA?
Response
The definition of “interested parties”, for the purposes of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, is
provided in Article 6.11 of the Agreement. It includes the exporter, the foreign producer and the
importer of a product subject to investigation; the government of the exporting Member; and, the
producer of the like product in the importing Member.
From that definition, we understand the phrase “interested parties known to the investigating
authorities to have an interest” to mean the interested parties, as defined by Article 6.11, recognized or
identified by the investigating authorities to have an interest in the investigation.
In that regard, we remind the Panel that prior to initiation, petitioner submitted on
17 February 1998 additional information, including lists of imports of poultry from Brazil, broken
down by producer and exporter. 24 These lists identified by name fifteen Brazilian producers of
poultry and twenty Brazilian exporters of poultry. These lists provided by petitioner were, in fact, a
document from two Argentinean agencies: SENASA – Dirección Nacional de Fiscalización
Agroalimentaria (“SENASA”) and the Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesca y Alimentación

21 See, Page 4 of Exhibit BRA-20.
22 See, Exhibit BRA-3.
23 See, Page 8 of the “Informe Técnico Prévio a la Apertura” in Exhibit BRA-6.
24 See, Exhibit BRA-4.

Dirección de Ganaderia (“ Ganaderia”).25 Identified in these two lists were five Brazilian
producers/exporters (Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó, Catarinense and Perdigão) of the seven
producers/exporters that were notified of the investigation almost eight months after it had been
initiated.26 We understand that at that moment, prior to initiation, petitioner had identified and
provided the names of the Brazilian producers/exporters of poultry to the investigating authority.
In addition, in the report regarding the viability of the initiation of the dumping investigation,
of 7 January 1998, the investigating authority identified ten Brazilian exporters of the subject
merchandise.27 The identification of these Brazilian exporters was made by the investigating
authorities, themselves, prior to the initiation of the investigation. These ten exporters were
“interested parties known to the investigating aut hority” within the meaning of Article 12.1 of the
Agreement. Among these ten exporters identified were five (Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó,
Catarinense and Perdigão) of the seven exporters that were notified of the investigation almost eight
months after it had been initiated, and after a preliminary injury, dumping and causal link
determination had been issued.
As a final comment, we find it quite evident that an exporter, that exports the product subject
to an investigation, will undoubtedly have an interest in the investigation. After all, the exports of
these companies might be subject, at the end of the investigation, to the imposition of anti-dumping
duties.
Thus, from the facts above, we have shown that these exporters were “interested parties
known to the investigating authorities” and should have been notified of the investigation as soon as it
was initiated.
25. When were each of the follow ing parties notified of the initiation of the investigation:
Government of Brazil, Avipal, Seara, Frigor ifico Nicolini, Sadia, Frangosul, Chapecó,
Minuano, Perdigão, Catarinense, CCLP, PenaBranca, and Comaves?
Response
The Government of Brazil was notified of the initiation of the investigation on
1 February 1999.28
The Brazilian exporters Avipal, Seara, Nicolini, Sadia and Frangosul were notified by the
DCD of the initiation and the need to provide responses to the dumping questionnaire on
10 February 1999.29 These same exporters were notified by the CNCE of the initiation and the need
to provide responses to the injury questionnaire on 16 February 1999.30
The Brazilian exporters Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Catarinense, CCLP, PenaBranca and
Comaves were notified by the DCD of the initiation of the investigation and the need to provide
responses to the dumping questionnaire on 15 September 1999 31, almost eight months after the
investigation had been initiated. These exporters were never notified nor did they receive an injury
questionnaire from the CNCE.

25 See, Annexes 1 and 2 of Exhibit BRA-4.
26 See, Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 192 – 201.
27 See, Pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.
28 See, Exhibit ARG-III.
29 See, Exhibit BRA-8.
30 See, Exhibit BRA-9.
31 See, Exhibit BRA-13.

In this regard, we refer to Argentina’s explanation that the injury questionnaire was only sent
to 8 exporters (when, in fact, was sent to only 5 exporters) because the injury analysis basically
considers the injury to the domestic industry and, therefore, there is no need for all exporters to
receive and respond to the injury questionnaire.
We call the attention of the Panel to the fact that an injury analysis takes into account not only
the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry (Article 3.4 of the Agreement) but also the
volume of the alleged dumped imports (Article 3.2 of the Agreement) and the effect of the dumped
imports on prices in the domestic market (Article 3.2 of the Agreement). Therefore, the information
on volume and price of imports provided by exporters is important and required in an injury analysis.
Furthermore, it was important and, in fact, a right of all exporters to receive the injury
questionnaire and have the opportunity to respond to the questions made by the CNCE. If other
exporters, and interested parties, had the opportunity to defend their interests by responding to the
injury questionnaire, these seven exporters should also have had that opportunity. Whether or not
these exporters would have responded to the injury questionnaire was a decision to be made by them
and not by the investigating authority.
Claim 11
To both parties
27. What is the meaning of the word 'questionnaires' in Article 6.1.1 ADA? In the view of
the parties, is the word 'questionnaires' confined to the questionnaires provided at the initial
stage of the investigation only?
Response
Brazil understands that the term “questionnaires” in Article 6.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement refers to the questionnaires provided at the initial stage of the investigation. Subsequently,
if the investigating authorities require additional, supplemental information or clarification of the
information provided (by exporters, importers or the domestic industry) in the response to the
questionnaires, the investigating authority will request such information.
In particular, the term “questionnaires” in Article 6.1.1, used in an anti-dumping
investigation, refers to the dumping questionnaire as well as the injury questionnaire. We understand
that some Members adopt a system where two agenci es share the responsibility for administering the
anti-dumping law and investigation procedures. One agency being responsible for determining the
existence of dumping and calculating the dumping margin and the other for determining whether the
domestic industry has been injured by the allegedly dumped imports. We understand that Argentina
adopts such a system.
Consequently, Argentina also failed to comply with Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement when it
did not send the injury questionnaire to the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó,
Catarinense, Perdigão and PenaBranca.

Claim 12
To both parties
32. What is the meaning of the word 'participating' in Article 6.1.2 ADA? Would the
parties consider that companies that are aware of an ongoing investigation but that do not show
an interest in it qualify as 'parties participating in the investigation'?
Response
To participate means to be a part or “an essential member or constituent of anything”. 32 A
producer or exporter of a product under investigation is an essential member or constituent of an
investigation.
Companies that are aware, that is, that have knowledge of an ongoing investigation, qualify
as “interested parties participating in the investigation”, even if they do not show an interest in the
investigation. The lack of interest of an interested party in an investigation does not exclude or
diminish the obligation of the investigating auth orities of “promptly” making available to them
evidence presented in writing by other interested parties. Interested parties that do not show an
interest in the investigation may still want to defend their rights in an investigation based on certain
allegations or evidence presented by other parties.
That said, Brazil reaffirms that the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó,
Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves and PenaBranca were not aware of the ongoing investigation until they
were notified by the authorities, eight months after it had been initiated.
33. What is the meaning of the word 'promptly' in Article 6.1.2 ADA?
Response
According to textual interpretation, the term “promptly” means “to make or do readily or at
once”.33 Brazil considers that evidence presented in writing by one interested party could not be made
readily or immediately available to the Brazilia n exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano,
Perdigão, Comaves and PenaBranca, if these exporters were notified of the investigation almost eight
months after it had been initiated.
We stress that these seven exporters had not been notified of the initiation or given the
questionnaires to respond during eight months of the investigation but were, in any event, included in
the investigation because they exported the subj ect merchandise to Argentina in the period of
investigation.
Any evidence that was presented during these eight months could not be understood as being
“promptly” available to these exporters if they were not aware of the existence of this investigation
and their need to participate.

32 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 995.
33 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1096.

Claim 14
To both parties
34. What are 'known exporters' within the meaning of Article 6.1.3 ADA? In particular,
would producers in the exporting country that have been identified as exporters of the product
concerned by the applicant in the application qualify as 'known exporters'?
Response
Brazil would first like to clarify that Argentina never provided the full text of the written
application to the Government of Brazil (authorities of the exporting Member) nor to any exporter
(known or allegedly unknown) of the product under investigation.
That said, we understand the phrase “known exporters” in Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement to
mean exporters that were recognized or identified by the investigating authorities. Information
submitted in Brazil’s Exhibits demonstrate that the investigating authorities knew, prior to the
initiation, of the existence of the Brazilian exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano,
Perdigão, Comaves and PenaBranca.
Prior to initiation, petitioner submitted on 17 February 1998 additional information, including
lists of imports of poultry from Brazil, broken down by producer and exporter.
34 These lists identified
by name fifteen Brazilian producers of poultry and tw enty Brazilian exporters of poultry. These lists
provided by petitioner were, in fact, a document from two Argentinean agencies: SENASA –
Dirección Nacional de Fiscalización Agroalimentaria (“SENASA”) and the Secretaria de Agricultura,
Ganaderia, Pesca y Alimentación Dirección de Ganaderia (“Ganaderia”).35 Identified in these two
lists were five Brazilian producers/exporters (Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó, Catarinense and
Perdigão) of the seven producers/exporters that were notified of the investigation almost eight months
after it had been initiated.
36 We understand that at that moment, prior to initiation, petitioner had
identified and provided the names of the Brazilian producers/exporters of poultry to the investigating
authority.
Still prior to initiation and in the report regarding the viability of the initiation of the dumping
investigation, of 7 January 1998, the investigating authority identified ten Brazilian exporters of the
subject merchandise.
37 We point out that here the identification of these Brazilian exporters was made
by the investigating authorities themselves. Among these ten exporters identified were five
(Comaves, Minuano, Chapecó, Catarinense and Perdigão) of the seven exporters that were notified of
the investigation almost eight months after it had been initiated, and after a preliminary injury,
dumping and causal link determination had been issued. These ten exporters were “known exporters”
within the meaning of Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement.
35. Would the parties agree with the finding of the panel Guatemala – Cement II that 'the
term "as soon as" conveys a sense of substantial urgency' and that "as soon as" and
"immediately" can be considered interchangeable terms? Please explain.

34 See, Exhibit BRA-4.
35 See, Annexes 1 and 2 of Exhibit BRA-4.
36 See, Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 192 – 201.
37 See, Pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.

Response
Brazil notes that the issue here is not so much related to the timing in Article 6.1.3 but to the
fact that the Argentinean authorities never provided the written application to the Government of
Brazil and the exporters.
That being so, Brazil agrees with the finding of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II that the
term “as soon as” conveys a sense of substantial urgency. In particular, we find the following
conclusion of that Panel to be relevant and applicable to this case:
“We note that Article 6.1.3 does not specify the number of days within which the text
of the application shall be provided. What it does specify is that the text of the
application be provided “as soon as” the investigation has been initiated. In this
regard, the term “as soon as” conveys a sense of substantial urgency. In fact, the
terms “immediately” and “as soon as” are considered to be interchangeable. We do
not consider that providing the text of the application 24 or 18 days after the date of
initiation fulfils the requirement of Article 6.1.3 that the text be provided “as soon as
an investigation has been initiated”38 (emphasis added)
Immediate access to the application is important for exporters to prepare their arguments in
defence of their interests and to devise a strategy to defend the allegations made by petitioner in the
application.
To Brazil
36. What is the meaning of the words 'as soon as an investigation has been initiated' in
Article 6.1.3 ADA? In the particular case at stake, when was the investigation initiated?
Response
Brazil once more makes note of the fact that the Argentinean authorities never provided the
text of the written application to the Government of Brazil and the exporters, as required under
Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We repeat, the Argentinean authorities never
provided the text of the application.
We understand that Argentina argues that in the Spanish version of the Agreement the term
“provide” is set forth as “facilitar” and that based on that meaning the Argentinean authorities
complied with the requirement in Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement when they made the written
application available to the interested parties once the investigation was initiated. 39 Argentina’s
position that the verb “to provide” could be understood to mean that authorities were only required to
“make available” the full text of the written application is incorrect.
We restate that Article 6.1.3 carefully differentiates the obligation that the investigating
authorities have with the exporters and the expor ting Member from the obligation the investigating
authorities have with other interested parties. In the first case, the investigating authority must
actively “provide” the full text of the written application to the exporting Member and to the exporters
involved in the investigation. In the second case , the investigating authority must “make available”,
upon request, the full text of the written application to other interested parties. Brazil believes that if
the requirement imposed on the investigating authority was to be understood as being the same for the

38 Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico,
24 October 2000, WT/DS156/R, at para. 8.101 (adopted on 17 November 2000) (“Guatemala – Cement II”).
39 See, Argentina’s first submission, at para. 164.

exporters and the exporting Member as that for the other interested parties, there would be no need for
the use of different language in Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement.
The same reasoning applies to the text in Spanish. The requirement imposed on the
investigating authorities to provide, or “facilitar”, the full text of the written application to exporters
and the exporting Member is different from the requirement imposed on the authorities to “make
available”, or “podrán a disposición”, the full text of the written application to other interested parties.
Furthermore, the verb “facilitar” is understood to mean “proporcionar o entregar”, a definition
entirely compatible with the verb “provide” used in the English version.40
That said, we return to the Panel’s question. The phrase “as soon as an investigation has been
initiated” in Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement means that the authority must actively provide the text of
the application immediately after the investigation is initiated. We note the urgency required in
Article 6.1.3. Brazil notes that the investigation was initiated when the MEOSP published, on
25 January 1999, Resolution No. 11/1999, of 20 Ja nuary 1999. Argentina notified (but did not
provide the application) the Government of Brazil of the initiation of the investigation on
1 February 199941, that is, seven days after the initiation had been published.
Claim 15
To Brazil
38. With regard to Exhibits BRA-22, 23, 24 and 26, please indicate precisely where
exporters reported that the poultry sold to Argentina was identical to the poultry sold in Brazil.
Response
Sadia
Exhibit BRA-22 includes Section A of Sa dia’s questionnaire response submitted on
20 April 1999, and Section A of Sadia’s supplemental response submitted on 28 April 1999. In
Annex II ( “Identificación del Produto Denunciado” ) of Section A, the questionnaire requests a
complete product description with technical specifications for each model/type/code for the
merchandise sold in the internal market and exported to Argentina.
42
In its response of 20 April 1999, Sadia described the product as whole, frozen, eviscerated
poultry with giblets. More specifically, for the in ternal market, Sadia reported the product as whole,
frozen, eviscerated poultry, with giblets, box of 18kg - individual weight of 1.750 to 2.750 kg. For
the Argentinean market, Sadia reported the product as whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, with giblets,
box of 18kg - individual weight of 1.700 to 2.700 kg.
43 In addition, Sadia submitted a detailed
description of the poultry produced by the company. In this description, Sadia reports that a bag of
giblets containing heart, liver, gizzard and neck, previously cleaned and chilled, is put into the
abdominal cavity of the animal.44 No mention is made to the head and feet of the poultry. According
to Sadia’s response there were no differences in the physical characteristics for the products sold to
Argentina and in Brazil.

40 Real Academia Española, Editorial Espasa Calpe, S.A, 2001.
41 See, Exhibit ARG-III.
42 See, Page 4 of Exhibit BRA-22.
43 See, Page 4 of Exhibit BRA-22.
44 See, Page 12 of Exhibit BRA-22.

In its supplemental response of 28 April 1999, Sadia indicated in Annex V of Section A, that
whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry, without giblets, was sold to the internal market but not to
Argentina during the period January 1996 through February 1999. 45 Thus, poultry without head and
feet was, in fact, sold in Brazil.
The DCD never requested additional information or clarification regarding the description of
the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
Avipal
Exhibit BRA-23 includes a letter from Avipal submitting the questionnaire in a diskette on
21 April 1999, and the non-confidential part of Section A of Avipal’s questionnaire response on 7
May April 1999. In Annex II ( “Identificación del Produto Denunciado” ) of Section A, the
questionnaire requests a complete product description with technical specifications for each
model/type/code for the merchandise sold in the internal market and exported to Argentina.
46
In its response, Avipal described the product as whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry. More
specifically, Avipal divided the product into two types: (i) broiler – whole, frozen eviscerated,
containing a plastic bag with neck without head, gizzard and liver; and, (ii) griler - whole, frozen
eviscerated without giblets.47 In Annex V of that response, Avipal reported that both broiler and griler
type poultry were sold to Argentina and Brazil. 48 According to Avipal’s response, there were no
differences in the physical characteristics of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
We also recall that throughout the investigation the DCD never requested additional
information or clarification regarding the description of the product.
Frangosul
Exhibit BRA-24 includes Section A of Frangosul’s questionnaire response submitted on
27 April 1999. Exhibit BRA-26 includes Frangosul’s response to the DCD with the translation of the
product brochure in Spanish submitted on 19 August 1999. In Annex II ( “Identificación del Produto
Denunciado”) of Section A, the questionnaire requests a complete product description with technical
specifications for each model/type/code for the merchandise sold in the internal market and exported
to Argentina.49
In its response of 27 April 1999, Frangosul described the product as whole, frozen,
eviscerated poultry with giblets ( broiler type) and whole, frozen, eviscerated poultry without giblets
(griler type).50 Both broiler and griler type poultry were sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
In its response of 19 August 1999, Frangosul attached a product brochure (in English and
Spanish), describing the types of products sold. According to the description on the product brochure,
griler type poultry is fresh, frozen poultry, white or yellow skin, fully eviscerated, headless and
footless, without giblets; and broiler type poultry is fresh, frozen poultry, white skin, fully eviscerated,
headless and footless, with giblets.51

45 See, Last page of Exhibit BRA-22.
46 See, Page 7 of Exhibit BRA-23.
47 See, Page 7 of Exhibit BRA-23.
48 See, Page 11 of Exhibit BRA-23.
49 See, Page 5 of Exhibit BRA-24.
50 See, Pages 5 and 6 of Exhibit BRA-24.
51 See, Page 8 of Exhibit BRA-26.

Once again, throughout the investigation the DCD never requested additional information or
clarification regarding the description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
Catarinense
Exhibit BRA-25 includes Section A of Catarinense’s questionnaire response submitted on
3 November 1999. In Annex II ( “Identificación del Produto Denunciado” ) of Section A, the
questionnaire requests a complete product description with technical specifications for each
model/type/code for the merchandise sold in the internal market and exported to Argentina.52
In its response, Catarinense described the product as whole, frozen poultry with giblets
(broiler type) and whole frozen poultry without giblets ( griler type).53 For the export market, the
broiler type poultry (with giblets) contains liver, gizzard and neck. 54 The griler type poultry sold to
Argentina and in Brazil do not contain giblets. 55 Catarinense reported that it sold both broiler and
griler type poultry in the home market.
The DCD never requested additional information or clarification regarding the description of
the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
Claim 19
To Brazil
41. Argentina asserts that Frangosul's normal value data was submitted out-of-time. Please
comment.
Response
In order to respond to this question, we find it necessary to provide and explain the
chronology of the responses submitted by Frangosul and the requests for extension to submit such
responses, as well as the requests by the DCD for information.
1. On 16 February 1999, the DCD notified Frangosul of the initiation of the investigation and
fixed a deadline of 29 March 1999 for Frangosul to respond to the dumping questionnaire.56
2. On 15 March 1999, Frangosul requested an extension of the deadline to submit the response
to the questionnaire by 20 April 1999.57
3. On 26 March 1999, the DCD granted the extension until 20 April 1999. 58
4. On 27 April 1999, Frangosul submitted the response to the dumping questionnaire. 59 I n
particular, Frangosul responded to Section C of the questionnaire regarding sales to the
domestic market. This information included sales of poultry made in Brazil (internal market)
corresponding to the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and the first three months of 1999, separated by

52 See, Page 8 of Exhibit BRA-25.
53 See, Page 8 of Exhibit BRA-25.
54 See, Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-25.
55 See, Pages 10 and 36 of Exhibit BRA-25.
56 See, Exhibit BRA-9.
57 See, Page 28 of Exhibit BRA-15.
58 See, Page 28 of Exhibit BRA-15.
59 See, Page 29 of Exhibit BRA-15.

month.60 We make special note that, subsequently, the authority requested supporting
documentation for all of the sales transactions in the internal market covering that period. 61
Even though Frangosul submitted this information seven days after the deadline of
20 April 1999, Frangosul still provided this information within a reasonable period for the
authority to consider that information, specia lly taking into account the volume of data
submitted for a period in excess of what was needed.
5. On 12 July 1999, the DCD requested that Frangosul provide additional information. This
information included translation of all supporting documentation corresponding to the export
transactions of the product under investigation (even though most of the information provided
in these invoices were already in Spanish); in formation on export transactions to the five
largest export markets (aside from Argentina) where the product was sold; translation of the
product brochure (even though the product brochure had already been provided in Spanish);
and, supporting documentation for all the sales transactions in the domestic market for the
period.
62 The DCD fixed a deadline of ten days for Frangosul to submit this information.
6. On 28 July 1999, Frangosul requested an extension of the deadline to submit the information
requested by the DCD.63
7. On 9 August 1999, the DCD granted the extension for Frangosul to submit the requested
information within fifteen days.64
8. On 19 August 1999, Frangosul provided a translation of invoices for a few export
transactions, as sample of all export transactions, which it had reported; information on the
export transactions to the five largest export markets for the period 1996 through 1999;
translation of the product brochure with the description of the product; and, an explanation
that the great volume of sales in the internal market did not make it possible for it to provide
copies of invoices for each transaction.
65 To support its explanation, Frangosul indicated that
more than 320,000 invoices are issued in one given year for sales transactions in the internal
market and that on 27 April 1999 it had submitted a list of invoices for the sales transactions
in the internal market. Frangosul further stat ed that the invoices were available to the
investigating authorities for a verification in loco or for a selection of such documents for
specific transactions to be used as sample.66
9. On 12 October 1999, the DCD requested a new list of invoices with the total transactions in
the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999, so that the DCD could
select a statistic sample and subsequently request the supporting documentation for that
sample.67 In this request, the DCD also informed, for the first time in the investigation, that
the list of invoices sent on 27 April 1999, did not include specific information necessary for
the authority’s analysis.
68 We also call to the Panel’s attention the fact that this was the first
time that the investigating authority informed Frangosul what the dumping period of data
collection was.

60 Id.
61 See, Pages 29 and 30of Exhibit BRA-15.
62 See, Page 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
63 See, Page 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
64 See, Page 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
65 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
66 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
67 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
68 Id.

10. On 18 November 1999, the DCD renewed its request for a list of invoices for the sales
transactions in the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999 and that
Frangosul submit this information in a diskette within 5 days. No mention is made to the
supporting documentation.69
11. On 30 December 1999, Frangosul presented in a diskette the list of invoices for the sales
transactions in the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999.70
12. On 4 January 2000, the DCD issued the report prior to the final determination (disclosure of
essential facts under consideration). This report does not mention the list of invoices
submitted by Frangosul.71
13. On 5 January 2000, the DCD notified Frangosul of the end of the evidence-producing stage of
the investigation.72
With respect to the sequence of events above, Brazil would like to make the following
considerations.
First, the Panel must not forget under what circumstances Article 6.8 of the Agreement allows
an investigating authority to resort to the use of facts available. According to Article 6.8 of the
Agreement, where interested parties do not “significantly impede” the investigation, recourse may be
had to facts available only if an interested party fails to submit necessary information “within a
reasonable period”. If information is, in fact, supplied “within a reasonable period”, the investigating
authority cannot use facts available and must use the information submitted by the interested party. In
the case at issue, Frangosul did not incur in any of the circumstances set forth in Article 6.8 of the
Agreement for the application of facts available.
Even though Frangosul responded to the questionnaire seven days after the deadline,
Frangosul still submitted responses “within a reasonable period”. To that regard, Brazil recalls that “a
reasonable period” will not necessarily be equivalent to the established deadlines set out by
investigating authorities. Our understanding of a “reasonable period” is aligned with the
understanding of the Panel in United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products:
“(...) The AD Agreement establishes that facts available may be used if necessary
information is not provided within a reasonable period. What is a “reasonable
period” will not, in all instances be commensurate with pre-established deadlines set
out in general regulations. We recognize that in the interest of orderly
administration investigating authorities do, and indeed must establish deadlines.
However, a rigid adherence to such deadlines does not in all cases suffice as the
basis for a conclusion that information was not submitted within a reasonable period
and consequently that facts available may be applied.”73 (emphasis added)

69 See, Exhibit ARG-XXVIII.
70 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
71 See, Exhibit BRA-28.
72 See, Exhibit BRA-26.
73 United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 28
February 2001, WT/DS184/R, at para. 7.54 (“ United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products ”). The Appellate Body
upheld the Panel’s findings with respect to the United States inconsistency with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement in its application of facts available. United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 24 July 2001, WT/DS184/AB/R, at para. 240 (adopted on 23
August 2001) (“AB – United States – Hot Rolled Steel Products”).

We do not propose to affirm or imply that Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement is a
license for interested parties to simply disregard the time-limits set out by investigating authorities.
However, we understand that the word “reasonable” in Article 6.8 suggests a degree of flexibility by
authorities that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case.
Second, Brazil understands that the application of Article 6.8 of the Agreement is also
dependent upon the actions of the investigating author ity in an investigation. If an investigating
authority does not act in a proper manner during the investigation, it cannot claim that the interested
party did not comply with the requirements of Article 6.8 and, thus, resort to the application of facts
available.
In this respect, Brazil turns to the Panel’s consideration in Guatemala – Cement II on the
interpretation of the application of Article 6.8 of the Agreement:
“(...) We do not consider that a failure to cooperate necessarily constitutes significant
impediment of an investigation, since in our view the AD Agreement does not require
cooperation by interested parties at any cost. Although there are certain
consequences (under Article 6.8) for interested parties if they fail to cooperate with
an investigating authority, in our view such consequences only arise if the
investigating authority itself has acted in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner(...)”74 (emphasis added)
The sequence of facts presented above demonstrate that the investigating authority in this case
did not acted in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. The fact that Frangosul was originally
required to submit normal value and export price information for an excessively long period
(January 1996 through March 1999) and that more than eight months after the initiation the authority
fixed a much smaller dumping period of data collection (January 1998 through January 1999)
indicates how unreasonable, non-objective and partial the authority was in this investigation.
Specially, if you consider that the authority, at a subsequent stage, requested supporting
documentation for all sales transactions in the internal market for the period January 1996 through
March 1999. In this regard, the Panel should understand that Frangosul spent a considerable amount
of time and resource collecting and reporting normal value and export price information for a period
in excess of three years. In particular, we recall that in Frangosul’s case there were over 320,000
transactions in the internal market for just one given year.
Third, it was not until 12 October 1999, that the DCD informed Frangosul that the
information submitted on 27 April 1999 was not sufficient to make a dumping analysis. It was also at
that moment that the DCD established the dumping data collection period. Thus, in accordance with
the authority’s instructions (more than eight months after initiation), Frangosul had to submit a new
and more specific set of normal value data for a new period. This meant that Frangosul had to go
back and collect specific information for the period January 1998 through January 1999, which
sometimes meant manually having to search the many invoices (over 320.000) to find the information
requested by the authority. Even though such information was submitted outside the deadline
established by the DCD, it was still provided prior to the disclosure of the essential facts under
consideration and the final determination.
Brazil considers that in light of the nature and quantity of the information submitted, the
unreasonable burden imposed by the authority throughout the investigation, and the fact that
Frangosul invited the authority to verify in its premises all documents of sales transactions (in the
internal market and to Argentina), the authority should have considered that the information was
submitted within a “reasonable period” and should have used it in the final determination.

Claim 19
To Brazil
46(a). Please provide a copy of Catarinense's questionnaire response of 3 November 1999.
Response
We have provided as Exhibit BRA-25 Catarinense’s response to Section A of the dumping
questionnaire. Catarinense’s complete dumping questionnaire response, with list of invoices for all
sales transactions to Argentina (Section B) with copies of invoices, list of invoices for all sales
transactions in the internal market (Section C), and cost breakdown (Section D), comprises over 1.500
pages. We believe that such volume of informa tion would not only be burdensome to collect and
copy but would also serve very little purpose, since we understand that the Panel’s objective is not
whether the authority wrongfully calculated the normal value and export price for Catarinense but that
it did not even consider any of the information submitted by the exporter.
We are, however, providing as Exhibit BRA-37 Catarinense’s response to Section B of the
questionnaire with a sample of the list of invoices of sales to Argentina for each month in 1998 and
January 1999, as well as a sample of invoices reported for sales in each month of 1998 and
January 1999; the response to Section C of the questionnaire with a sample of the list of invoices of
sales in the internal market for each month in 1998 and January 1999; and, the response to Section D
of the questionnaire.
If the Panel considers this information to be insufficient to examine the claims put forth by
Brazil, we will gladly provide the complete set of Catarinense’s response to the questionnaire.
46(b). Argentina asserts that Frangosul's normal value data was submitted out-of-time. Please
comment.
Response
Please see the response to question 41 above.
Claim 23
To Brazil
49. When did Avipal first request a normal va lue adjustment for freight charges? Did
Avipal provide supporting documentation with its request? If so, please provide a copy of that
supporting documentation.
Response
Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement imposes an obligation on the investigating
authority to make a fair comparison between the export price and the normal value. In making this
fair comparison, due allowances must be made for differences, which affect price comparability. We
understand freight charges to be included in such adjustments.
We note that the obligation in Article 2.4 of the Agreement is imposed on the investigating
authority and that the exporter does not have to request that such an adjustment be made.

Accordingly, in the course of the investigation, the DCD never requested supporting documentation
from Avipal for such freight charges.
That being so, we point out that on 20 April 1999, Avipal and other exporters submitted a
letter to the DCD that stated, among other things, that in order to compare the normal value proposed
by petitioner (JOX publication) to the ex factory export price certain adjustments had to be made.
Avipal provided a list with the value of such adjustments, including tax, national freight charges and
financial cost.75
On 12 October 1999, the DCD established and informed Avipal, for the first time in the
investigation, that the dumping period of data collection was from January 1998 through
January 1999.76 In this communication, the DCD also requested that Avipal present a list of invoices
for all sales of poultry in the internal market for that period. The DCD did not provide a deadline for
Avipal to submit this information.
On 21 December 1999, Avipal submitted a diskette with a list of invoices for sales of poultry
in the home market for the period January 1998 through January 1999, including a spreadsheet with
taxes (ICMS/PIS/COFINS), commission, freight and financial costs included in the normal value that
should be deducted from an ex factory comparison with the export price.77
We understand that Argentina considers freight adjustment to have “a decisive and significant
impact on price comparability”. 78 It is interesting, however, that even though Argentina knows this
adjustment is warranted and that it is “decisive and significant” for the price comparison, it simply
decided not to make it. Even if no supporting documentation was provided (when, in fact, it was not
even requested), Argentina still could have used a secondary source of information to estimate such
deduction, as it did with the normal value adjustment to compensate the alleged characteristic
differences between poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
In that sense, we remind the Panel that JOX provided a response to the investigating
authority’s request for clarification of what taxes and charges were included in the prices published
and used to determine normal value. 79 JOX letter to the DCD, of 3 August 1999, explained that the
prices published by JOX included taxes (12 per cent - ICMS; 2.65 per cent - PIS/COFINS); financial
costs; sales commission of 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent over the value of the sale; and, a variable freight
for delivery, depending on the geographic location of the seller and the buyer.80
Even with this explanation provided by JOX, the investigating authority still chose not to
make the freight adjustments to Avipal’s normal value, required in a fair comparison.
50. Is Brazil’s argument regarding the investig ating authority’s failure to use information
submitted by exporters limited to adjustments for the purpose of Article 2.4, or also to other
factors / claims?
Response
Brazil’s arguments regarding the investigatin g authority’s failure to use information
submitted by exporters is not limited to adjustments for purpose of Article 2.4 of the Agreement.

75 See, Exhibit BRA-35.
76 See, Page 44 of Exhibit BRA-15.
77 See, Exhibit BRA-36.
78 See, Argentina’s first submission, at para. 211.
79 See, Exhibit BRA-32.
80 See, Exhibit BRA-32.

Brazil has also argued failure of the investigating authority to use information submitted by exporters
in the following claims:
Claim 17 – Argentina disregarded the export price provided by the Brazilian exporters and
resorted, instead, to the export price information provided by the Argentinean agency Ganaderia;81
Claim 19 – Argentina disregarded all normal value information submitted by the Brazilian
exporters Frangosul and Catarinense and resorted, instead, to information provided by petitioner 82,
and,
Claim 27 – Argentina disregarded all listed and reported transactions in the internal market
for the Brazilian exporters Sadia and Avipal in establishing normal value and in making the fair
comparison and used, instead, only the internal market transactions for which invoices were
submitted.
83
Claims 23 – 27
To Brazil
51. Please explain precisely what evidence was in the record that you consider the
investigating authorities failed to use.
Response
We refer to the response to question 50 above.
Regarding Claim 17, Sadia provided export price information of poultry sold to Argentina for
the period 1996 through February 1999.84 Avipal provided export price information of poultry sold to
Argentina for the period 1996 through March 1999. 85 Frangosul provided export price information
for individual export transactions of poultry sold to Argentina from January 1996 through
March 1999, with respective supporting documentation. 86 Catarinesne provided export price
information for individual transactions of poultry sold to Argentina from January 1998 through
January 1999, with respective supporting documentation.87
In the final determination, the DCD established export price for all Brazilian exporters based
on the import information from the Argentinean agency Ganaderia and disregarded (without
justification) all export price data submitted by the Brazilian exporters.88
Regarding Claim 19 , please refer to the responses to question 41 (Frangosul) and
question 46(a) (Catarinense) above. Specifically, all normal value information submitted by these two
exporters was disregarded in the final determination and the DCD used, instead, the normal value
calculated for all other exporters. We note the fact that in the final determination the normal value
used by the authority for all other exporters was that submitted by petitioner based on JOX published
prices for chilled poultry with head and feet.

81 See, Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 282 - 290.
82 See, Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 298 - 310.
83 See, Brazil’s first submission, at paras. 416 - 422.
84 See, Exhibit BRA-22 and Pages 18 and 43 of Exhibit BRA-15.
85 See, Exhibit BRA-23 and Pages 22 and 45 of Exhibit BRA-15.
86 See, Exhibit BRA-24 and Pages 29 and 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
87 See, Exhibit BRA-25 and Pages 38 and 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
88 See, Pages 76, 77 and 104 of Exhibit BRA-15.

Regarding Claim 27, the following took place:
On 26 August 1999, Sadia sent a letter to the DCD with a list of invoices issued for the sales
transactions in the home market for 1996 through 1998, and January and February 1999. 89 In this
letter, Sadia explained that the great volume of sales in the home market made it impossible to
provide an invoice copy for each transaction and invited the DCD to verify in loco the transactions
listed or to select a sample of transactions so it could provide the corresponding invoices. 90 On
3 December 1999, the DCD sent a letter to Sadia requesting invoice copies of 372 selected sales
transactions in the home market, establishing a 5-day deadline to submit the invoice copies. 91 O n
13 January 2000, Sadia submitted copies of the invoices requested by the DCD.92
In the final determination, the DCD established normal value for Sadia based only on
information for which supporting documentation was provided and not for all reported internal market
transactions.93
On 12 August 1999, Avipal submitted a list of sales transactions in the home market for 1996
through 1999, with a sample invoice for each month in 1997 and 1998, and explanation that the great
volume of sales in the home market made it impossible to provide an invoice copy for each
transaction. In this letter, Avipal invited the DCD to verify in loco the transactions listed or to select a
sample of transactions so it could provide the corresponding invoices. 94 On 1 September 1999,
Avipal provided translation of a standard invoice from Portuguese into Spanish. 95 O n
21 December 1999, Avipal submitted a diskette with a list of invoices for sales of poultry in the home
market for the period January 1998 through January 1999, including deductions and taxes. 96 T h e
DCD never selected the transactions for which Avipal offered to provide invoice copies.
In the final determination, the DCD established normal value for Avipal based only on the
transactions for which Avipal had provided invoice copies and not on all reported transactions in the
internal market.97
As shown, Sadia and Avipal presented a list of all transactions in the internal market for the
period. Invoices were presented for only some transactions in order for the DCD to verify the
accuracy of the data submitted in the responses as a whole and not just those for which invoices were
provided. Brazil understands that the magnitude of the information submitted may mean that not all
data will accurately be examined, however, this does not exclude the validity of the data provided,
particularly if that data could be verified.
It is important to note that not only did Sadia and Avipal report transactions for the period of
investigation (January 1998 through January 1999) but they also provided information on the sales
transactions outside the period of investigation (1996, 1997, 1998 and available data in 1999). To
have that burden imposed on exporters and, then, for the investigating authority to use only some of
the transactions during 1998 and January 1999 is contrary to how a margin should be established
pursuant to Article 2.4 of the Agreement.

89 See, Exhibit BRA-29.
90 Id.
91 See, Exhibit BRA-30.
92 See, Page 62 of Exhibit BRA-15.
93 See, Pages 62 and 63 of Exhibit BRA-15.
94 See, Exhibit BRA-31.
95 See, Page 64 of Exhibit BRA-15.
96 Id.
97 Id.

Claim 25
To Brazil
54. Please provide all of the exporters' replies to Sections B.2 and C.1.1 of the DCD's
questionnaire (as set forth on "folios" 8 and 9 in Exhibit BRA-22).
Response
From the documents of the investigation to which Brazil had access to, Brazil was not able to
identify the responses to Sections B.2 and C.1.1 of the dumping questionnaire for the Brazil exporters
Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul.
If the Panel considers that the information on product description reported by the exporters in
the investigation and, thus far, presented by Brazil in this dispute is not sufficient to examine this
claim, we ask that the Panel request that Argentina provide the responses of these companies to
Sections B.2 and C.1.1 of the dumping questi onnaire. We understand that the Argentinean
investigating authority has all of the confidential and non-confidential responses of the exporters
submitted in the investigation and will be able to provide the requested information to the Panel.
We are providing, however, as Exhibit BRA-38 the injury questionnaire responses of the
Brazilian exporters Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul, that also contains information on the product
description. Also in Exhibit BRA-38, the Panel will find Catarinense’s response to Section B.2 and
Section C.1.1 of the dumping questionnaire.
Claim 34
To Brazil
61. If non-dumped imports are to be excluded for the purpose of an Article 3 injury
analysis, doesn't this suggest that the determination of dumping must precede the determination
of injury? If so, how is a Member to ensure that evidence of dumping and injury will be
considered simultaneously in conformity with Article 5.7?
Response
Article 3.1 of the Agreement requires a determination of injury to be based upon positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of the volume, the effect, and the impact of “ dumped
imports” on domestic producers. We understand that the injury analysis, as provided in Article 3 of
the Agreement, must exclude imports that are found not to be dumped from the total imports subject
to the investigation. To this regard, we find several indications in the provisions related to anti-
dumping investigations that support our understanding.
First, Article VI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (“GATT”)
provides that dumping occurs when the products of one country are introduced into the commerce of
another country at less than the normal value of the product. Thus, if certain products by one country
are not being entered into the commerce of another country at prices below normal value, dumping
does not occur. Consequently, those products from that country cannot be considered “dumped
imports”.
Likewise, Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that a product is to be
considered as being dumped if the export price of the product exported from one country to another

is less than the comparable price. The same reasoning applies, if the export price of a product
exported from one country is not inferior to the comparable price in the exporting country, then those
products cannot be considered as being dumped.
From the language of these provisions, it is clear that the definition of dumping is not related
to all exports of a certain country that enter the commerce of another but to the exports of the
products from a certain country, which enter the commerce of another at prices below the normal
value.
Second, all of Article 3, with the exception of Article 3.3, refers to “dumped imports” as
those imports that are found to be dumped. We find this to be true, since Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5,
3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 explicitly refer to “dumped imports”, and not to imports subject to an investigation.
Since the definition of “dumped imports” , in Article 2.1, is used for purposes of the
Agreement, and not only for purposes of that Article, we understand that the term in Article 3 conveys
the same meaning.
Specifically, Article 3.5 of the Agreement is where this is most evident. Article 3.5 requires
the demonstration that “dumped imports” are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury to the
domestic industry. Thus, the causal link analysis requires a demonstration that the imports with
“dumping effects” be the cause of injury to the domestic industry, and not all imports, which also
includes those imports found not to be dumped. Article 3.5 further requires that the demonstration of
causal link, between the “dumped imports” and the injury to the domestic industry, be based on
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. We find that evidence that imports from
certain producers/exporters are not found to be dumped to be relevant evidence before the authorities.
More importantly, Article 3.5 requires the investigating authority to examine any known factors
other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry. Imports
of the product found not to be dumped qualify as known factors other than the “dumped imports”.
Article 3.5 even exemplifies such factors which may be relevant in this respect, such as the volume
and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices. In this sense, the volume and value of the imports
from Nicolini and Seara was an important factor that should have been examined by the investigating
authority in the causal link analysis.
As mentioned above, Article 3.3 is an exception to Article 3 of the Agreement. Article 3.3
refers to cumulation cases, where the authority may cumulatively assess the effects of imports where
imports of more than one country are simultaneously subject to an anti-dumping investigation. It is
important to mention that not only is this not the case here, since only the imports of one country were
subject to the investigation, but also that Article 3.3 expressly refers to “imports of a product” rather
than to “dumped imports” , being understood that for reasons of cumulation all imports are
considered and not only the ones that are being dumped.
Third, further clarification is found when we look at the language in Article 9.2 of the
Agreement:
“When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping
duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, or in a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped
and causing injury.(...)” (emphasis added)
The language in this provision supports the idea that only imports of a product, which where
found to be dumped , from a certain producer/exporter may be considered as dumped imports.
Again, not all imports of the product are subject to anti-dumping duties, only those products from
producers/exporters that were found to be dumped.

This understanding is in agreement with the Panel’s understanding in EC – Bed Linen:
“(...) we consider that dumping is a determination made with reference to a product
from a particular producer/exporter , and not with reference to individual
transactions. That is, the determinat ion of dumping is made on the basis of
consideration of transactions involving a particular product from particular
producers/exporters. If the result of that consideration is a conclusion that the
product in question from particular producers/exporters is dumped , we are of the
view that the conclusion applies to all imports of the product from such source(s), at
least over the period for which dumping was considered. (...)”98 (emphasis added)
That Panel also found that:
“(...) It is possible that a calculation conducted consistently with the AD Agreement
would lead to the conclusion that one or another Indian producer should be
attributed a zero or de minimis margin of dumping. In such a case, it is our view that
the imports attributable to such a producer/exporter may not be considered as
“dumped” for purposes of the injury analysis. (...)”99 (emphasis added)
Likewise, in the present investigation, we believe that the Panel should come to the same
conclusion, that is, that only the total imports from any producer/exporter that was actually
found to be dumping be considered as “dumped imports” . Accordingly, The imports from
Nicolini and Seara should not be included in the “dumped imports” evaluated under Article 3 of the
Agreement.
That being said, we understand that the dumping analysis in an investigation should always
precede the injury analysis. It has to be this way in order for the provisions in the Agreement to make
sense.
For example, in Article 3.4 of the Agreement, one of the mandatory relevant economic factors
to be evaluated in the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry is
the magnitude of the dumping margin. If an injury analysis precedes the dumping analysis how can
the injury analysis evaluate the magnitude of the dumping margin?
Also, if the injury analysis precedes the dumping analysis, the “dumped imports” in the
injury analysis will always include the totality of the imports and not only those imports that the
dumping analysis found to be dumped. For the reasons indicated above, we do not believe that the
Agreement meant for imports found not to be dumped to be included in the term “dumped imports”
for purposes of the injury and causal link analysis.
The injury analysis depends upon the findings in the dumping analysis and cannot, therefore,
be subsequent to it.
In the response to question 23 above, we have provided our understanding of Article 5.7 of
the Agreement. There, we have stated that we do not find it possible for an authority to consider

98 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India,
30 October 2000, WT/DS141/R, at para. 6.136 (“ EC – Bed Linen ”). The EC did not appeal the Panel’s
understanding of “dumped imports” in Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. European
Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 1 March 2001,
WT/DS141/AB/R (adopted on 12 March 2001) (“AB – EC- Bed Linen”).

evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously if the evidence considered by the authorities
indisputably refers to non-related periods for dumping and injury. The different periods examined by
the DCD and the CNCE in determining whether there was sufficient evidence of dumping and injury,
indicates that the dumping and injury evidence was not considered simultaneously in the decision
whether or not to initiate the investigation. We understand that the dumping determination need not
consider trends over time, whereas the injury determination will normally require information
covering more than one year in order to evaluate volume and price changes. However, in order for an
authority to consider dumping and injury evidence simultaneously, the evidence of dumping and
injury should, at a minimum, relate to the same period, in order for that evidence to justify the
initiation of an investigation. We repeat, evidence of dumping and injury cannot be considered
simultaneously if such evidence relates to different periods.
To that regard, we turn to the considerations of the United States (“US”) regarding this claim.
The US affirms that the obligation in Article 5.7 of the Agreement is to consider the evidence of
dumping and injury simultaneously. 100 According to the US, the term “simultaneously” is linked to
the term “considered” and not to the term “evidence”. 101 The US provides as an example of
simultaneous consideration, consideration of dumping and injury evidence in “concurrent
investigations”.
102
Brazil does not understand “simultaneous consideration” to mean consideration of dumping
and evidence in concurrent investigations. Obviously, in all investigations evidence of dumping and
injury have to be considered in concurrent investigations, otherwise the requirements in Article 5.2
and 5.3 of the Agreement are not met. If evidence of injury is considered in a different investigation
than the investigation where evidence of dumping is considered, how could the requirement in
Article 5.2, that the application include evidence of dumping, injury and causal link, be met?
Likewise, how could the authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of evidence provided in the
application if dumping evidence is considered in a separate investigation from the injury evidence?
We do not consider that the term “simultaneously” in Article 5.7 of the Agreement refers to
consideration of dumping and injury evidence in concurrent investigations.
In addition, Brazil understands that the US Department of Commerce (“DOC”), responsible
for dumping investigations, and the US International Trade Commission (“USITC”), responsible for
injury investigations, do not issue their dumping and injury determination at the same time. In that
sense and according to the interpretation of the term “simultaneously” given by the Panel in
Guatemala – Cement II, the DOC and the ITC’s consideration of dumping and injury evidence is not
made simultaneously.
Even if Article 5.7 of the Agreement is to be understood as simultaneous consideration of
evidence of dumping and injury, rather than sequential consideration, that also did not occur in this
investigation. The Panel will be able to verify that the final affirmative injury determination was
issued on 23 December 1999
103 and the final dumping determination was issued on 23 June 2000 104,
exactly six months after the dumping evidence was considered. How could authorities have
simultaneously considered the dumping and injury evidence if there was a six-month gap between the
two considerations?

100 See, US third party submission, at para. 3.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See, Exhibit BRA-14.
104 See, Exhibit BRA-15.

Claim 41
To Brazil
65. Regarding para. 87 of its first oral statement, is Brazil alleging that Argentina’s failure
to explain why it considered a percentage lower than 50 per cent “a major proportion”
constitutes a violation of Article 4.1, or of some other provision of the AD Agreement? If so,
please explain how this claim falls within the Panel’s terms of reference.
Response
Brazil does not believe that CNCE’s determination that 46 per cent of the total domestic
production of the like product constituted the “major proportion” of the collective output of the
domestic producers is consistent with Article 4.1 of the Agreement. We remind the Panel that the
issue is exactly whether 46 per cent of the total domestic production of poultry in Argentina
constitutes a “major proportion” of the total domestic production.
We have provided our understanding of the term “major proportion” in our first submission
and, according to that interpretation, we understand Article 4.1 of the Agreement to provide that the
domestic industry can either be represented by 100 per cent of the producers of the like product or by
those whose production, jointly considered, constitutes more than half of the total domestic
production. We understand this to be an objective benchmark that leaves very little room for
confusion or abuse. There is no question that 51 per cent, 60 per cent, or 70 per cent of the total
domestic production constitutes a “major proportion” of the total (100 per cent) domestic production.
Here, we find it appropriate to consider the arguments presented by Third Parties in respect to
this claim.
First, Guatemala recognizes that the term “major” in the English version of the Agreement
could imply a higher level of requirement than the term “importante” in the Spanish version. 105
However, Guatemala incorrectly considers that the term “importante” could not, in any case , be
meant to constitute more than half of a whole, as provided by Brazil.106 We do not agree that the term
“importante” could not be understood in any case as more than half of the total production. If we
follow Guatemala’s reasoning, we could not consider the domestic industry as a “proporción
importante” in a case where the domestic industry represents 70 per cent of the total domestic
production, which is clearly the majority of the total production.
Second, the US provides as an initial matter that Article 4.1 of the Agreement is just a
definition and, as such, does not impose an independent obligation on WTO Members. 107 W e
respectfully disagree with that position. Article 4.1 of the Agreement requires that the term “domestic
industry” be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole or to those of them whose
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic industry. The
term “domestic industry” cannot be interpreted any other way than that provided in Article 4.1 of the
Agreement. If a Member’s investigating author ity does so, it is not in compliance with what is
required in Article 4.1 of the Agreement.

105 See, Guatemala third party submission, at para. 21.
106 Id.
107 See, US third party submission, at para. 8.

Furthermore, the US is mistaken when it states that the meaning of the term “major” cannot
connote to mean “the majority”. 108 We have provided in our fist submission that the term can have
that connotation.109
The US also argues that Brazil’s understanding that the term “major proportion” means
“majority” “directly conflicts with the fact that the drafters were quite explicit, elsewhere in the
Agreement, when they intended to impose a majo rity requirement for a particular obligation”. 110
According to the US, Article 5.4 clearly imposes a “majority” requirement, whereas Article 4.1
establishes a “major proportion” requirement, which is a different standard.111
We agree with the US that the standard under Article 5.4 is different from that under
Article 4.1 of the Agreement. In Article 5.4 of the Agreement, the requirement in order for an
application to be considered as made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, is that the application
be supported by those domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent
of the total production by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or
opposition to the application, as long as those producers that express support for the application
constitute at least 25 per cent of the total domestic production. Article 5.4 refers to the standing of
the producers supporting the application, while Article 4.1 refers to the definition of “domestic
industry”, with implications regarding the injury analysis. In fact, the threshold in Article 5.4 is lower
than in Article 4.1 of the Agreement, since they refer to different standards.
Third, unlike the US, the European Communities (“EC”) supports the position that the term
“domestic industry” has the same meaning throughout the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
112 Here, the EC
seems to imply that “major proportion” is defined by reference to the standing requirements of
Article 5.4 of the Agreement, that is, producers accounting for at least 25 per cent of the total
domestic production. We cannot agree that the term “major proportion” in Article 4.1, which is used
as an alternative to domestic producers as a whole (100 per cent), could mean 25 per cent of the total
domestic production. Nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides, or implies, that “producers
expressly supporting the application” is equivalent to the “domestic industry” in an investigation.
Our view is that the term “major proportion” in Article 4.1 allows for determinations to be
made in situations where the information for the industry as a whole is not available, so long as that
information relates to producers that constitute more than 50 per cent of the total domestic production.
However, if the Panel understands that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide a
specific benchmark for what constitutes a “major proportion” of the total domestic production, then
we believe that the investigating authority must elucidate how it found a percentage lower than 50 per
cent to be a “major proportion”. Otherwise, investigating authorities will have such wide discretion as
to consider 46 per cent, 25 per cent or 10 per cent of the total domestic production as sufficient to
constitute a “major proportion” of the total domestic industry. We cannot believe that this is the
intention of the Agreement.
It is in the Panel’s terms of reference to decide whether 46 per cent of the total domestic
production of poultry in Argentina constitutes a “major proportion” of the total domestic production.
In doing so, the Panel must consider the meaning of the term “major proportion”. Such consideration
must set forth what the investigating authority’s reasoning is (or should be) in determining “major
proportion” as a percentage lower than 50 per cent of total domestic production.

108 See, US third party submission, at para. 9.
109 See, Brazil’s first submission, at para. 514.
110 See, US third party submission, at para. 10.
111 Id.
112 See, EC third party submission, at para. 51.

We recall that in Argentina’s first submission, the only argument set forth was that Brazil’s
understanding of the term “major proportion” is subjective. 113 On the contrary, we understand that a
finding by an investigating authority that a perc entage lower than 50 per cent constitutes the “major
proportion” of the total domestic production to be subjective. Accordingly, we believe that
investigating authorities must elucidate how, in such instances, that proportion of the domestic
industry can be understood as constituting a “major proportion”.

113 See, Argentina’s first submission, at para. 302.

ANNEX A-5
SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF BRAZIL
(26 November 2002)
INTRODUCTION
1. Brazil welcomes the opportunity to once again appear before the Panel and to present its
positions on the dispute regarding Argentina’s imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on poultry
from Brazil. We would like to reiterate our appreciation for the time and effort devoted by the Panel
and the secretariat to this matter.
2. Similarly to what we have done in the first oral statement, Brazil will endeavour not to repeat
the arguments that have already been offered many times in this proceeding. Brazil will simply
address some of the main issues before the Panel in light of the arguments and responses provided by
Argentina in its second submission (ASS) and in its response to the Panel’s questions in the first
substantive meeting (AR).
3. Before turning to our specific arguments, we will briefly comment on Argentina’s position
regarding the ruling by the Mercosul Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal and the applicability of the principle
of good faith and estoppel to this case.
RULING BY THE MERCOSUL AD HOC TRIBUNAL
4. Argentina argues that Brazil’s conduct in brin ging the present dispute to the WTO is contrary
to the principle of good faith because a similar dispute has already been brought, discussed and settled
within Mercosul. According to Argentina, the present dispute before the Panel represents an exercise
of Brazil’s right that is contrary to the principle of good faith and, thus, the Panel should prevent
Brazil from invoking its rights under the WTO by applying the principle of estoppel.
1
5. Brazil strongly opposes Argentina’s allegation and affirms that the exercise of its rights under
the WTO is not contrary to the principle of good faith.
6. In that regard, we recall that the claims of the dispute before this Panel are not the same as the
claims that were before the Mercosul Tribunal. The Mercosul Tribunal dealt with the dispute based
on whether provisions that make up Mercosul’s framework were correctly interpreted, applied or
complied with in the anti-dumping investigation carried out by the Argentinean authorities. 2 T h e
claims raised in Brazil’s request for the establishment of a WTO Panel relate to Argentina’s non-
compliance of its obligations in the WTO, in particular under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.3

1 Argentina Second Submission (“ASS”), paragraph 6.
2 See, Article 1 of the Brasília Protocol.
3 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil: Request for the Establishment of
a Panel by Brazil, WT/DS241/3 (26 Feb. 2002).

7. Argentina’s allegation that Brazil has not acted in accordance with the principle of good faith
by first resorting to the Mercosul dispute settlement mechanism and then resorting to the WTO
dispute settlement system with respect to the same dispute 4 is not correct. We have shown that the
disputes are not the same.
8. Furthermore, the Mercosul Tribunal itself found that it did not have the appropriate
jurisdiction to examine claims of WTO violations. We recall that the Mercosul Tribunal found that
Mercosul anti-dumping rules for trade within the region were not properly in force5 and that Mercosul
Member States were allowed to apply their domestic anti-dumping legislation with respect to regional
trade.6
9. The Tribunal further established that the discrepancies related to the existence of
requirements for the application of anti-dumping duties, that is, whether there was dumping, injury
and causal link, were not aspects that were up to the Tribunal to clarify.
7 Thus, the Tribunal itself
recognized that its jurisdiction was limited.
10. Moreover, we understand that Article 23 of the DSU mandates exclusive jurisdiction in favor
of the DSU for WTO violations.
11. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WTO dispute settlement system “serves to preserve
the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements”. Accordingly, it is Brazil’s
right to have the Panel hear and decide its claims brought before it. To interpret otherwise would
diminish Brazil’s rights under the WTO covered agreements.
12. Regarding Argentina’s allegation that the principle of estoppel should be invoked in this
WTO dispute, we restate that simply because Brazil has brought a related – but different – dispute to
the Mercosul Tribunal does not mean that Brazil has accepted to relinquish its right to bring the
current dispute before the Panel. We accentuate the fact that the dispute before this Panel is based on
a different legal basis than the dispute brought before the Mercosul Tribunal.
13. Even by Argentina’s standard of what constitutes estoppel - a statement of fact which is clear,
unambiguous, voluntary, unconditional and authorized, which is relied upon in good faith
8 - the Panel
will verify that no such statement was made on behalf of Brazil renouncing its right to bring a dispute,
based on different claims, to the WTO.
14. Alternatively, Argentina appears to argue th at, in considering the claims brought forth by
Brazil in this dispute, the Panel cannot ignore the ruling by the Mercosul Tribunal in keeping with the
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, pursuant to Article 31.3(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), and as provided in Article 3.2
of the DSU.
9 Concerning this allegation, the following considerations are in order.
15. First, Argentina requests that the Panel consider the Mercosul rules used by the Mercosul
Tribunal in interpreting the current dispute before the Panel. 10 We cannot reasonably presume that a
ruling by the Mercosul Tribunal, which does not even address the Anti-Dumping Agreement, is to be

4 ASS, paragraph 10.
5 Award of the Fourth Mercosul Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal, 21 May 2001, at paragraph 131.
6 Id, paragraph 153.
7 Id, paragraph 214.
8 ASS, paragraph 13.
9 ASS, paragraph 7.
10 ASS, paragraph 29.

used in the interpretation of provisions of that Agreement, which binds over 140 WTO Members that
are not Members of Mercosul.
16. Second, Brazil reaffirms that Article 3.2 of the DSU deals exclusively with the clarification of
the existing provisions of the WTO Agreement. It is clear from the language in Article 3.2 that the
dispute settlement system “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
“covered agreements” and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements”.
17. Contrary to Argentina’s understanding, 11 Article 3.2 of the DSU is, in fact, limited to the rules
of interpretation used to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO Agreement and bears no
association to the relationship between previous rulings by an international tribunal and the rights and
obligations of WTO Members under the “covered agreements”.
INITIATION OF THE DUMPING INVESTIGATION
(a) Article 5.2 – Lack of Evidence in the Application
18. According to Argentina, the JOX publication of 30 June 1997, presented in the application,
contained information on “whole poultry”. Specifically, that publication provides the price of chilled
poultry with head, feet and giblets sold in São Paulo, Brazil. 12 Argentina has affirmed that this
“physical characteristic” difference affects prices and that the difference holds a value equivalent to
the demand in view of markets’ characteristics.13
19. Even though Argentina alleges that these differences affect prices, Argentina failed to show
where in the application or in the determination to initiate the investigation evidence was presented to
support this allegation. In fact, Argentina assumes that the alleged differences have such effects
solely based on the product description of the JOX publication.
20. Argentina has also stated that the evidence presented by petitioner to the authority contained
sufficient data, within the meaning of Article 5.2 of the Agreement, that: (1) there were physical
characteristic differences in the product used as basis to calculate normal value; (2) that in so far as
these differences affected the commercial yield of the products object of comparison, there
unquestionably was an impact in the price comparability; and, (3) that such differences merited an
adjustment that would allow, prior to initiation, a fair comparison, for which an adjustment
methodology was presented.14
21. Apparently, Argentina assumes that from the data provided in the JOX price publication an
investigating authority could infer that all poultry sold in Brazil contains head and feet; that such
differences affect price comparability; that an adjustment was, thus, warranted and that the
methodology presented by petitioner was justified. However, once again, Argentina does not indicate
the evidence presented in the application that would support the investigating authority’s conclusions
that petitioner’s adjustment, as proposed, was necessary for purposes of making a fair comparison
between export price and normal value.
22. Even though Argentina appears to agree with Brazil’s definition of “evidence” 15, Argentina
still fails to indicate what “information drawn from a document tending to prove a fact or

11 ASS, paragraph 23.
12 Argentina Response to the Panel’s Questions in the First Substantive Meeting (“AR”), question 5.
13 Id.
14 ASS, paragraph 36.
15 AR, question 6.

proposition”16 was used to support the allegation that these differences affect price comparability and
justify the methodology used for the normal value adjustment.
23. In responding to the Panel’s question as to whether Argentina considered that the JOX price
publication for only one day (30 June) was all the information “reasonably available to the applicant”
on normal value, Argentina replied that although petitioner submitted the value for one day, this value
indicated the trend of prices in the market as well as the causes of the existence of its variations.
17
24. Here, Brazil cannot agree that the JOX price published for only one day in 1997 could
reasonably indicate a trend of prices in the market for a six-month period.
25. In that regard, Argentina affirms that the “evidence provided [in the application] is a
representative value taken from a specialized publication for a given period.”18 When asked what the
term “given period” meant, Argentina categorica lly stated that even though the JOX publication
provides for the price in effect on 30 June 1997, one can see in the right margin of that publication
that the “production of the parallel market of São Paulo’s inland is clearly inferior, which has
maintained the price in solid ground”. 19 According to Argentina, this information reflects that the
price published by JOX did not vary considerably and has maintained its stability. 20 We understand
this to be Argentina’s reasoning for not providing JOX price publication for other months in 1997, in
the establishment of the normal value.
26. Here, we call the attention of the Panel to the fact that the information quoted by Argentina in
the JOX publication refers to the live poultry market and not to the frozen or chilled poultry market
(slaughtered poultry), a market, whose descript ion by the same publication, does not contain the
reference cited by Argentina. Thus, Argentina tries to use the explanation in the JOX publication for
a different product, live poultry, to justify not requesting, or using, prices for more than one day in
1997 for chilled poultry, a product that is completely different from live poultry. Brazil does not
accept this as a reasonable explanation for the establishment of normal value based on only one day in
1997.
27. Furthermore, the JOX price publication used by petitioner in the application is a daily
publication. Accordingly, Brazil has provided Exhibit BRA-19, which demonstrates that normal
value information for all of 1996 and 1997 was “reasonably available” to petitioner. This Exhibit
shows that petitioner could have attached information on prices of poultry published by JOX for all
months of 1997 but, instead, chose to provide it for one single day in that year.
28. According to Argentina’s own definition, the phrase “reasonably available evidence to the
applicant” in Article 5.2 is defined as evidence that may be obtained by an applicant without an
excessive burden of proof that would make the presentation of the application impossible.
21
29. Brazil understands that the JOX price publication for all months of 1997 was information that
could have been obtained by the applicant without an excessive burden of proof and would have made
the presentation of the application possible.
30. Argentina also affirms that the JOX price publication for 30 June 1997 was considered
normal value evidence submitted in the application and that the investigating authority did not require

16 Brazil First Submission (“BFS”), paragraph 63.
17 AR, question 7.
18 Argentina First Submission (“AFS”), paragraph 50.
19 AR, question 12.
20 Id.
21 AR, question 8.

additional information on it. 22 Argentina understands that the authority did not find it necessary to
request additional information with respect to the physical characteristic differences mentioned in the
application and the adjustment provided by the applicant, taking into account the standard of
information to be considered in that stage of the investigation (that is, prior to initiation).23
31. We find that this statement actually proves that the authority failed to examine the accuracy
and adequacy of the information provided in the application. This adjustment to normal value was so
important that without it the applicant could not have alleged the existence of dumping and, thus, the
investigation could not have been initiated. It was obvious from the information provided in the
application that the investigating authority, fully aware of the impact of the adjustment, should have
required, and used, additional information.
32. Accordingly, Brazil understands that Argentina neither gave consideration to the impact of
the possible differences on the sufficiency of the evidence submitted in the application, nor did it seek
further evidence, as confirmed by Argentina.
(b) Article 5.3 - Accuracy and Adequacy of the Evidence Provided in the Application
33. Brazil reaffirms its position that the method adopted by Argentina to establish the export
price, and consequently the dumping margin, was based only on export prices below the normal
value, which in turn would always result in a dumping margin.
24 Brazil has also affirmed that the
methodology adopted by the Argentinean authority is, in fact, the “zeroing” methodology.25
34. Argentina has confirmed our understanding that in establishing the dumping margin for
purposes of initiation, the investigating authority has taken all export transactions with prices below
normal value, excluding those transactions that would result in a negative dumping margin. 26
Therefore, there is no doubt that the Argentinean methodology inflated the dumping margin and made
sure that one existed.
CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION – EVIDENTIARY AND PUBLIC
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
(a) Article 12.1 – Notification and Public Notice of the Initiation
35. Regarding the claim of violation of Article 12.1 of the Agreement, Brazil has already
demonstrated that the investigating authority knew, prior to initiation, of the existence and interest of
at least five of the seven exporters that were not notified of the investigation almost eight months after
it had been initiated.27
36. Argentina seems to imply that the authority must notify only those parties that consider
themselves interested in the investigation, within the meaning of Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement.
28
Argentina’s reasoning is untenable; how can a party present itself as an interested party if it does not
even know that an investigation has been initiated? That is exactly why Article 12.1 requires the
authority to notify interested parties known to them.

22 AR, question 9.
23 AR, question 11.
24 Brazil First Oral Statement (“BFO”), paragraphs 24 and 25.
25 BFO, paragraph 26.
26 AR, question 11.b.
27 Brazil Second Submission (“BSS”), paragraphs 45 through 53.
28 AR, question 24.

37. In explaining how it reconciles the fact that five exporters were listed (and identified) in the
report initiating the investigation, but notified only eight months after initiation, Argentina confirms
that it “knew” these exporters but that this alone did not constitute an “identification” that would have
made it possible for the authority to send the corresponding questionnaires. 29 Presumably, Argentina
is claiming that it did not have the addresses of those companies.
38. Once again, Argentina tries to share the notification obligation imposed on the investigating
authority with Brazil, by stating that the authority requested the co-operation of the Brazilian
government in this identification.30 This is simply not true; Brazil never received any communication
from the Argentinean authorities requesting such information concerning those five specific exporters
identified in the report.
(b) Article 6.1.1 – Deadlines for Responses
39. In response to the panel’s question on the Article 6.1.1 issue, Argentina has explicitly stated
that it does not apply a system where a lesser period is provided at the outset, as long as the total
period, including extensions, is at least 30 days. 31 Argentina, in fact, confirms that the 30-day
deadline from the outset is applicable in all si tuations. Nonetheless, in Argentina’s Exhibits
ARG-XLVI through ARG-LIII, we verify that the deadline set forth by the authority for the
questionnaire responses was for a period no longer than 20 days from receipt of the mentioned
notification.
40. Taking into account the statement made by Argentina together with the fact that the deadline
provided by the DCD was for a period no longer than 20 days and that the CNCE never sent the injury
questionnaire to the seven exporters, it is clear that the investigating authorities were in violation of
Article 6.1.1 of the Agreement.
(c) Article 6.1.2 – Evidence Shall Be Made Available Promptly
41. Brazil has asserted that Argentina did not make promptly available the evidence presented by
the other interested parties in the investigation to the seven Brazilian exporters that were notified of
the investigation almost eight months after it had been initiated.32
42. Once again, Argentina confuses the requirement under Article 6.1.2 by explaining that
interested parties in the investigation are the parties that have qualified themselves in the investigation
as interested parties and have manifested an interest to participate in the investigation.
33
43. We do not agree with Argentina’s understanding of Article 6.1.2. First, a party cannot qualify
itself as an interested party in an investigation if it is not aware of the investigation. Second, a party
need not qualify itself in an investigation in order to be a part of it. Third, the lack of interest of a
party in an investigation does not exclude or diminish the obligation of the investigating authorities of
promptly making available to them evidence presented in writing by other interested parties.
44. Argentina seems to think that an interested pa rty is only included in an investigation once it
has requested to participate in that investigation.34 This reasoning simply does not make sense. There
is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement that requires parties to request participation in an

29 AR, question 26.
30 AR, question 26.
31 AR, question 31.
32 BFS, paragraphs 215 through 220.
33 AR, question 32.
34 ASS, paragraph 50 (last sentence).

investigation in order to be included in that investig ation. In order for a party to be included in an
investigation, the party must simply be a producer/exporter of the product subject to the investigation.
(d) Article 6.8 and Article 12.2.2 – Inappropriate Use of Facts Available
45. With respect to the authority’s disregard of the responses provided by the Brazilian exporters
on the description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil, Argentina has firmed its position
that only information provided by the exporters that was accompanied by supporting documentation
was used by the authority in establishing the normal value.35
46. In its second submission, Brazil has demonstrated that Argentina’s lack of supporting
documentation argument did not entitle the authority to resort to facts available.36 The Panel will note
that Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and Catarinense provided responses in the questionnaire regarding the
description of the product sold to Argentina and in Brazil. 37 The Panel will also note that the
questionnaires did not specify that the product description information required supporting
documentation. Furthermore, the investigating authority did not, at any moment during the course of
the investigation, request specific information, clarification or supporting documentation on the
product description responses submitted by these exporters.
47. In addition, the investigating authorities never informed these exporters that their information
would not be accepted and, thus, never provided the exporters an opportunity to provide explanations
or supplemental documentation, pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement.
48. Brazil understands that Article 6.1 of the Agreement requires authorities to give notice to all
interested parties of the information that is required. Consequently, if an investigating authority does
not clearly specify what information is required, the investigating authority cannot resort to facts
available and punish the interested party for not submitting such information. Likewise, Paragraph 1
of Annex II of the Agreement also requires authorities to specify in detail the information required
from any interested party.
49. Furthermore, the Brazilian Government specifically objected the authority’s adjustment
calculation. Nonetheless, the Argentinean authority still made the adjustment to normal value based
on the adjustment proposed in the application, even though petitioner did not provide supporting
documentation for its proposed adjustment.
50. In this regard, we understand that the authority failed to use “special circumspection”, within
the meaning of Paragraph 7 of Annex II, in applying the arbitrary adjustment to normal value as
suggested by petitioner in the application.
51. Still with respect to Article 6.8 of the Agreement, the authority also disregarded the export
price provided by all Brazilian exporters and, instead, established the export price based on the import
information from the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.
52. In particular, Argentina explains, for the first time, that the information provided by
Frangosul and Catarinense was not used simply because in Frangosul’s case the information
submitted was insufficient and outside the deadline, and in the case of Catarinense because the
information was considered insufficient.
38

35 ASS, paragraph 54.
36 BSS, paragraphs 62 through 81.
37 Exhibits BRA-22, BRA-23, BRA-24, BRA-25 and BRA-26.
38 ASS, paragraph 56.

53. This explanation seems to contradict Argentina’s own response that Frangosul provided
supporting documentation for the export prices reported in the investigation. 39 It is noteworthy that
Argentina does not respond to the Panel’s question on whether the DCD had sufficient export price
data for Frangosul and Catarinense. 40 The answer to that question would be that not only did
Frangosul and Catarinense provide all the export price data requested by the authority within a
reasonable period but they also provided the corresponding supporting documentation.
41
54. The Panel should also note that the Brazilian exporters Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul and
Catarinense provided export price information on poultry sold to Argentina for the period 1996
through 1999, as required by the authority.42
(e) Article 6.10 – Individual Margin of Dumping
55. On the claim of violation of Article 6.10, Argentina apparently seems to justify not
calculating individual margins for Frangosul and Catarinense based on the argument that the normal
value information provided by these companies was not accompanied by supporting documentation.43
56. We have already presented our views as to Argentina’s inappropriate use of facts available
based on lack of supporting documentation. In the case of Frangosul, the authority changed the scope
of the dumping period of data collection more than eight months after the investigation had initiated
and requested supporting documentation for all sales transactions in the internal market. By doing so,
the investigating authority did not act in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner and could not
have resorted to facts available.
44 In the case of Catarinense, the investigating authority never
requested supporting documentation for the sales transactions in the home market reported by the
company.45
57. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that both Frangosul and Catarinense provided the
required export price data with supporting documentation but the authority nonetheless disregarded
that information.
58. In that regard, we refer to Argentina’s explanation that it was evident that the investigating
authority did not count on the necessary elements to calculate the individual margins of dumping.
46
According to Argentina, this margin appears from the relationship between both values, the export
price and the normal value; no supporting documentation was provided for the latter.
47
59. We point out to the Panel that even though the investigating authority also disregarded the
export price information submitted by the exporters Sadia and Avipal, the investigating authority still
calculated the individual margins of dumping for those two companies. Brazil fails to see the reason
why the authority decided to proceed differently with respect to the information provided by
Frangosul and Catarinense.

39 AR, question 45.
40 AR, question 45.
41 Pages 29, 38, 39 and 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
42 Pages 18, 22, 29, 38, 39, 43, 45 and 49 of Exhibit BRA-15.
43 AR, questions 44 and 45.
44 Brazil’s Response to the Panel’s Questions in the First Substantive Meeting (“BR”), question 41.
45 BFS, paragraph 250.
46 AR, question 45.
47 AR, question 45.

CONDUCT OF THE ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION - FINAL AFFIRMATIVE
DETEMINATION
(a) Article 2.4 – Fair Comparison
60. On the claim that Argentina failed to make due allowance for freight in the normal value of
the exporters Sadia and Avipal, Argentina admits that Sadia presented in Annex VIII the internal
freight costs for sales in the internal market. 48 Argentina further explains that this adjustment should
have been made had Sadia presented supporting documentation.49
61. What Argentina fails to state is that after Sadia submitted the internal freight cost data in
Annex VIII of its questionnaire response, the investigating authority never requested additional
information, clarification or supporting documentation regarding internal freight costs.
50
62. Even though Argentina agrees that this adjustment has “a decisive and significant impact on
price comparability”,51 it still maintains that the investigating authority would have acted incorrectly if
it had made this specific discount.
63. We have already demonstrated that the authority could have used a secondary source of
information to estimate such deduction, as it did wi th the normal value adjustment to compensate the
alleged characteristic differences between poultry sold to Argentina and in Brazil, but it chose not
to.52
64. Furthermore, Exhibit ARG-LVI presents a letter from Sadia and Avipal’s attorney to the
investigating authority explicitly stating that the normal value established for Sadia and Avipal
incorrectly included internal freight costs.53 Even so, the investigating authority still did not make the
required freight adjustment to the normal value of these two companies.
65. On the claim relative to Argentina’s failure to make due allowance for differences in taxation,
freight and financial cost in the normal value established for all other exporters, if the authority found
that the JOX information was so reliable as to make adjustments concerning physical characteristics
that were not warranted, why did the authorities not consider the JOX information on taxation, freight
and financial cost adjustments reliable?
66. We underline that the JOX information on taxation, freight and financial cost adjustments was
provided as a result of a request made by the investigating authority and not by any interested party in
the investigation. If the JOX response was provided in Portuguese, the authorities themselves should
have either translated the information or requested that JOX provide a translation. Instead, the
investigating authority chose not to consider that information and not to make the required
adjustments.
67. Argentina argues that the JOX information was not taken into account because it would result
in an improper comparison between an ex factory price for the normal value and an FOB export price.
According to Argentina, there was no identical in formation on the deductions to be made from the
export values of the goods.
54

48 ASS, paragraph 71.
49 Id.
50 AR, question 47, Exhibit ARG-XLIV.
51 AFS, paragraph 211.
52 BFO, paragraph 53.
53 Exhibit ARG-LVI.
54 AFS, paragraph 229.

68. Brazil recalls that an FOB price includes inland freight to the port of exportation, inland
insurance, handling and loading charges. An FOB price, however, does not include taxes and
financial cost. Thus, there were no adjustments to be made to the FOB export price with respect to
taxes and financial cost. Because the FOB price does not include taxes and financial cost the
authority should have, at least, made an adjustment in the normal value to exclude taxes and financial
cost (included in JOX prices), in making a fair comparison . In doing so, the authority would still be
left with a normal value price that was not exactly ex factory – for it would still include internal
freight charges – but the comparison would be on a more similar level of trade. These deductions
would have permitted a fair comparison.
69. On the claim that the investigating authority imposed an “unreasonable burden” on exporters,
Brazil would merely like to clarify that Argentina’s statement that the investigating authority did not
request or require during the investigation that all invoices be presented is not true.
55
70. The investigating authority did, in fact, request supporting documentation for all of the sales
transactions in Brazil and to Argentina. The Panel will confirm this by looking at pages 18, 19, 22,
23, 27, 29 and 30 of Exhibit BRA-15. We recall that exporters Sadia, Avipal and Frangosul
complained that this requirement was excessive and impossible to meet due to the great volume of
sales in the home market.
56
(b) Article 3 – Injury Determination
71. Regarding the claims of violation on the use of different periods to evaluate the relevant
economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4, Argentina maintains that an authority is not
obligated to examine any of the factors outside the period of investigation.57
72. We agree with Argentina that an authority is not obligated to examine any Article 3.4 factor
outside the period of investigation. However, this is not the case at issue. In this investigation, the
Argentinean authority considered a certain period of injury analysis for the factors production, prices,
imports, exports and apparent consumption and considered another period of injury analysis for the
remaining Article 3.4 factors.
73. In explaining its position, Argentina provides that the authority considered some factors with
the purpose of ratifying the trend observed during the period of investigation.
58 I n t h a t s e n s e , t h e
investigating authority evaluates certain relevant factors for a given period outside the period of
investigation by way of reference.59
74. The Panel can verify that, in this investigation, that is not how the Argentinean authority
proceeded. Brazil believes that if the investigating authority had examined the factors production,
prices, imports, exports and apparent consumption for the first semester of 1999 by way of reference,
the authority would have stated so in the final injury determination just as it did with respect to the
data for the year 1995.
60
75. In the final injury determination, the authority explicitly stated that it took into account data
for the year 1995 as a reference year. Because the data collected for 1995 was used just as a reference

55 AR, question 52.
56 Exhibits BRA-29, BRA-31 and BRA-26.
57 AR, question 59.
58 AR, question 59.
59 AR, question 59.
60 Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-14.

and was not included in the authority’s examination, the investigating authority didn’t even mention
the year 1995 in its narrative evaluation of Article 3.4 factors. The Panel will note that for all factors
that were evaluated in the injury determination, the authority begins its evaluation with the year 1996.
Likewise, in the Tables attached to the final injury determination, the data for 1995 even appears in a
different shade from the rest of the data with an indication at the bottom of each Table that the year
1995 is used as a reference period.
76. Unlike the data for 1995, the investigating authority made a narrative evaluation for the
factors production, prices, imports, exports and apparent consumption, taking into account the first
semester of 1999.61 In the same manner, the data for the first semester of 1999 in the Tables relating
to the factors production, prices, imports, exports and apparent consumption appear in the same shade
as the data for the period January 1996 through December 1998, 62and there is no indication that the
data for the first semester of 1999 is used only by way of reference.63
77. Regarding the authority’s failure to exclude the imports of the Brazilian exporters Nicolini
and Seara from the “dumped imports” in the injury analysis, we must point out that instead of citing
the final determination to ensure that non-dumped imports were excluded for the purposes of the
injury analysis, Argentina tries in its first submission to explain that because “the average FOB prices
for the other imports investigated were lower than the prices of companies that did not practice
dumping, it follows that their sale on the domestic market would inevitably yield international prices
even lower than the prices determined by the CNCE in its final determination”.
64
78. We fail to see how this explanation proves that the imports from Nicolini and Seara were
effectively taken out of the total “dumped imports” in the injury analysis.
79. On the other hand, Brazil has shown that the in jury analysis in the final determination never
mentioned the exclusion of the imports from these two Brazilian exporters. 65 Brazil has found
additional support on the fact that the final injury determination was issued on 23 December 1999,
and preceded by six months the final dumping determination, which was issued on 23 June 2000.
80. Furthermore, Argentina states that the investigating authority took into account the
determination that there was no dumping by Nicolini and Seara, when analysing the causal link
relationship.66 This alone is a clear indication that in the injury analysis the authority did not exclude
the non-dumped imports. After all, it is in the inju ry determination that authorities must examine the
volume, the effect, and the impact of the “dumped imports”.
81. Even if we look at the causal link determination, we find no indication that Nicolini and
Seara’s imports were excluded from the total “dumped imports”. 67 We repeat, the final causal link
determination simply restated what was already provided in the final dumping determination.
82. Let’s now turn to Argentina’s allegation that the factor actual and potential decline in
productivity was specifically analysed in the final injury determination.68

61 Pages 9, 10, 14, 15, 16 and 25 of Exhibit BRA-14.
62 Tables 1, 5, 15b- 16, 22-29 and 30-31 of Exhibit BRA-14.
63 Id.
64 AFS, paragraph 269.
65 Exhibit BRA-14.
66 AFS, paragraph 266.
67 Exhibit BRA-16.
68 AR, question 59.

83. Brazil has not found in the final determination a specific analysis of the factor productivity
over the injury period of investigation. There is also no specific data in the final determination or in
the Tables attached to the determination that pres ent an explicit analysis of that factor. What
Argentina has presented is the evaluation by the authority of the factors production capacity,
utilization of capacity, employment, wages, cost structure and sales in the internal market, but not the
evaluation for the factor productivity.
84. To that effect, Argentina mentions that the de termination provided that “in general terms, the
relative stability of the number of employees in relation to the increase observed in the production,
would be indicating a greater physical productivity of labour, probably due to the incorporation of the
aforementioned technology”.69 We fail to see how that qualifies as a specific analysis of the factor
productivity for the injury period of investigation and where the data regarding productivity for that
period is indicated.
85. Furthermore, Argentina indicates that the inve stigating authority relied on a letter presented
by petitioner on 2 December 1999 to evaluate the factor productivity.
70 On this issue, Brazil makes
the following considerations.
86. First, the letter presented by petitioner contained no data, or supporting documentation,
regarding its allegation.71 Second, Argentina cites a passage in the final determination that refers to
the arguments by the parties and not to the authority’s evaluation of factors in the impact
examination.72 The authority simply restated in the final determination part of the letter presented by
petitioner and failed to evaluate and consider data for the factor productivity for the injury period of
investigation.73
87. Brazil also stresses the fact that Argentina has not indicated where in the final determination
the factor magnitude of the dumping margin was evaluated. In this respect, Argentina has not
responded to the Panel’s question to comment on paragraph 81 of Brazil’s first oral statement.
74 This
omission is not surprising. Brazil has already established that the investigating authority did not and
could not have evaluated this factor because th e final dumping determination, with the dumping
margin, was issued six months after the final injury determination was issued.
88. In addition, Argentina has also failed to indicate where in the final determination there is a
specific evaluation of data for the factors cash flow, growth and ability to raise capital and
investments for the injury period of investigation.
89. In examining claims 38 through 40, the Panel should keep in mind that even though some
factors may not have been relevant or weighed significantly in the decision of the investigating
authority, the authority was still obligated to expl ain its conclusion as to the lack of relevance or
significance of such factors and could not have simply disregarded them.
CONCLUSION
90. Members of the Panel, the purpose of this statement is merely to address some of the main or
new arguments raised by Argentina in its second written submission and in its response to the Panel’s
questions. We have tried not to repeat the arguments already set forth in previous stages of this

69 Page 13 of Exhibit BRA-14.
70 AFS, paragraph 279.
71 Exhibit ARG-LX.
72 Page 95 of Exhibit BRA-14.
73 Id.
74 AR, question 59.

proceeding and to offer additional clarification on the fundamental issues of this dispute. In this
statement, we did not mention claims where Ar gentina’s second submission and answers to the
Panel’s questions did not introduce any new or significant arguments.
91. In conclusion, we request that the Panel find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as provided in the 41 claims presented in Brazil’s first
submission. We thank you for your time and attention and will be pleased to answer any questions
you may have.

ANNEX A-6
REPLIES OF BRAZIL TO QUESTIONS OF THE PANEL –
SECOND MEETING
(28 November 2002)
Questions to Brazil
Claim 22
90. It is stated in para. 319 of Brazil's First Written Submission that 'Frangosul and
Catarinense submitted the requested information on normal value and export price, which was
disregarded by the DCD without explanation.' Would Brazil agree that, if the data submitted by
Frangosul and Catarinense had been disregarded in accordance with relevant provisions of the
ADA, the investigating authority would not have been required to calculate an individual
dumping margin for Frangosul and Catarinense? Please explain.
Response
Brazil would first like to clarify that Frangosul and Catarinense did, in fact, submit the
requested normal value and export price information and that, therefore, the investigating authority
could not have disregarded that information base d on the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Consequently, the Argentinean authority was, in fact, required to calculate an individual
dumping margin for Frangosul and Catarinense.
We understand that Argentina has alleged that the investigating authority could not calculate
an individual margin of dumping for these two companies because the normal value information
presented by them was not accompanied by supporting documentation. 1 In that regard, we present,
once again, the chronology of the normal value and export price information presented by these two
companies and the reasons why the DCD could have, and should have, calculated an individual
margin of dumping for them.
Frangosul’s Normal Value
Regarding the normal value data submitted by Frangosul, the Panel can verify that on
27 April 1999, Frangosul responded to Section C of the questionnaire regarding sales to the domestic
market. This information included sales of poultry in Brazil corresponding to the years 1996, 1997,
1998 and the first three months of 1999, separated by month.
2 The Panel will also note that,
subsequently, the Argentinean authority requested supporting documentation for all of the sales
transactions in the internal market covering that period.
3

1 Argentina Response to the Panel’s Questions in the First Substantive Meeting (“AR”), questions 44
and 45.
2 Page 29 of Exhibit BRA-15.
3 Pages 29 and 30 of Exhibit BRA-15.

On 19 August 1999 , Frangosul sent a letter to the DCD explaining that the great volume of
sales in the internal market did not make it possible for the company to provide copies of invoices for
each transaction. 4 In this letter, Frangosul indicated that over 320,000 invoices are issued in one
given year for sales transactions in the internal market and that the invoices were available to the
investigating authority for a verification in loco or for a selection of such documents for specific
transactions to be used as sample.5
On 12 October 1999, the DCD requested a new list of invoices with the total transactions in
the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999, so that the DCD could select a
sample and subsequently request the supporting documentation for that sample. 6 This was the first
time that the investigating authority informed Frangosul what the dumping period of data collection
was.
On 30 December 1999 , Frangosul presented a diskette with the list of invoices for the sales
transactions in the internal market for the period January 1998 through January 1999. 7 T h e
investigating authority never selected the specific transactions for which Frangosul was supposed to
present the supporting documentation.
On 5 January 2000, the DCD notified Frangosul of the end of the evidence-producing stage
of the investigation.8
Brazil understands that the application of Article 6.8 of the Agreement is also dependent upon
the actions of the authority in an investigation. If an investigating authority does not act in a proper
manner during the investigation, it cannot claim that the interested party did not comply with the
requirements of Article 6.8 and, thus, resort to the application of facts available. To support this
understanding, we have turned to the Panel’s consideration in Guatemala – Cement II on the
interpretation of the application of Article 6.8 of the Agreement:
“(...) We do not consider that a failure to cooperate necessarily constitutes significant
impediment of an investigation, since in our view the AD Agreement does not require
cooperation by interested parties at any cost. Although there are certain
consequences (under Article 6.8) for interested parties if they fail to cooperate with
an investigating authority, in our view such consequences only arise if the
investigating authority itself has acted in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner (...)”9 (emphasis added)
Because the Argentinean authority changed the scope of the dumping period of data
collection more than eight months after the investigation had initiated and, in the beginning of the
investigation, requested supporting documentation for al l sales transactions in the internal market for
a period over 3 years, we understand that the authority did not act in a reasonable, objective and
impartial manner and could not have resorted to the use of facts available.
Catarinense’s Normal Value

4 Exhibit BRA-26.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico,
24 October 2000, WT/DS156/R, at para. 8.251 (adopted on 17 November 2000) (“Guatemala – Cement II”).

With respect to the normal value data submitted by Catarinense, we observe that Catarinense
was notified of the investigation and the need to respond to the dumping questionnaire on
15 September 1999, almost eight months after the investigation had initiated. 10 In this notification,
the DCD established that the normal value and export price information to be provided was for the
period January 1998 through January 1999.
On 3 November 1999 , Catarinense provided the questionnaire response with information on
sales transactions to Argentina, disaggregated by transaction, with supporting documentation, as well
as the information on sales transactions in Brazil, disaggregated by transaction, without supporting
documentation.11 The Argentinean authority never requested the supporting documentation for
Catarinense’s sales transactions in the internal market, nor did it select specific transactions in the
internal market for Catarinense to provide the corresponding supporting documentation.
Even though the authority notified Catarinense almost eight months after the investigation
had initiated and after a preliminary dumping, injury and causal link determination had been issued,
Catarinense still submitted the requested information. Nonetheless, the DCD disregarded the normal
value information submitted by the exporter.
Frangosul and Catarinense’s Export Price
Regarding the export price submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense, the Panel will note that
both exporters reported the information, disaggregated by transaction, with the supporting
documentation.
12 Apparently, even Argentina concurs with this fact.13
Even though Frangosul and Catarinense submitted the requested export price information
with supporting documentation, the Argentinean authority still disregarded the export price data
provided by them and resorted to facts available.
Here, it is important to note that even though the Argentinean authority also disregarded the
export price data submitted by Sadia and Avipal, the authority still calculated the individual dumping
margins for those two companies. We do not agree with Argentina’s disregard of Sadia and Avipal’s
export price information, but we find it correct that the investigating authority still proceeded to
calculate an individual dumping margin for those companies. We do not understand why, and cannot
agree that, the investigating authority proceeded di fferently with respect to the information provided
by Frangosul and Catarinense. There simply was no reason under Article 6.8 of the Agreement for
the Argentinean authority to have disregarded the normal value and the export price (with supporting
documentation) provided by these two exporters.
With that in mind, we respond the Panel’s question by stating that there simply was no basis
in the Agreement for the Argentinean authority to disregard the information provided by the exporters
Frangosul and Catarinense.
We point out that even if the two exporters had not submitted the appropriate information and
the authority had correctly disregarded it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement,
the investigating authority was still required to calculate an individual dumping margin for the two
exporters, as provided under Article 6.10 of the Agreement. The fact that an exporter has not
submitted the relevant and appropriate information to establish normal value and export price does not
exclude the authority’s obligation under Article 6.10 to calculate an individual margin of dumping for

10 Exhibit BRA-13.
11 Page 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
12 Pages 29 and 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
13 AR, question 45.

that exporter. The Panel will find a more detailed response regarding the difference between the
obligation under Article 6.10 and the use of facts available under Article 6.8 in our response to
questions 97 and 98.
91. It is stated in para. 324 of Brazil's First Written Submission that 'the DCD provided no
explanation, either in the final determination or in any other document on the record of the
investigation, as to why, in this case, it was not possible to determine an individual margin for
Frangosul and Catarinense.' Would Brazil agree that, if the investigating authority had
disregarded the data submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense in accordance with relevant
provisions of the ADA, it would not have been required to explain in the final determination or
in any other document on the record of the in vestigation why an individual dumping of margin
for those exporters had not been calculated?
Response
We have provided in the response to question 90, that the investigating authority did not have
legal basis under the Agreement to disregard the normal value and the export price data submitted by
Frangosul and Catarinense and that, therefore, the authority was required to calculate an individual
dumping margin for the two exporters.
However, even if the Argentinean authority could have disregarded the data submitted by
Frangosul and Catarinense in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, that is Article 6.8, the
authority was still required to explain before the final determination and in the final determination
why an individual dumping margin for those exporters had not been calculated.
In that sense, Article 6.9 of the Agreement provides that:
“The authorities shall, before the final determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the
decision whether or not to apply definitive measure. Such disclosure should take
place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests” (emphasis added)
The calculation of the dumping margin is an essential fact under consideration as provided in
Article 6.9 of the Agreement. Accordingly, if an authority decides to calculate the dumping margin
for certain exporters based on information other than that provided by the exporters during the
investigation, that too is an essential fact that s hould be informed prior to the final determination so
that the parties can defend their interests. Even if the authority only provides that the information was
disregarded in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement but does not explain why the
information was disregarded and why an individual margin of dumping was not calculated, how can
the exporters defend their interests, as provided in Article 6.9?
Likewise, Article 12.2.2 requires that a public notice of conclusion with the imposition of a
definitive duty contain “all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which
have led to the imposition of final measures”. In particular, Article 12.2.2. provides that such notice
must contain:
“(...) (iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons
for the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and
the normal value under Article 2(...)” (emphasis added)
Brazil understands that included in the full explanation of the reasons for the methodology
used in the establishment of the export price and the normal value is the reason why the authority

disregarded the export price and normal value provided by the exporters and why an individual
margin of dumping for those exporters was not calculated.
Claim 23
92. Please comment on para. 210 of Argentina's first written submission.
Response
Argentina agrees that the investigating authority did not make the required freight reductions
to Sadia’s normal value. To justify the authority’s error, Argentina argues that the authority could not
have made the adjustment because it had not been properly documented. Argentina further argues
that in Annex VIII of Sadia’s questionnaire res ponse, the exporter provided a general estimate of
freight deductions. According to Argentina, the in formation used to calculate the normal value was
based on an analysis of all invoices provided by Sadia in accordance with the sample used by the
authority and that these invoices were not accompanied by any details concerning freight charges to
be deducted.
Concerning these allegations, the Panel should note the following considerations.
It is a fact that Sadia presented, in Annex VIII of its questionnaire response of 20 April 1999,
the costs of freight in the internal market.
14 If Argentina considers that the freight adjustment should
have been made if supporting documentation had been submitted, 15 why didn’t the Argentinean
authority specifically request that Sadia provide additional or supplemental information, clarification
or supporting documentation on the internal freight costs? Article 6.1 of the Agreement requires
authorities to give notice of the information, which interested parties are required to present.
Likewise, Paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Agreement expressly states that “investigating authorities
should specify in detail the information required from interested parties”. The Argentinean authority
should have specified that supporting documentation for freight deductions was the type of
information that Sadia was required to present. By not specifically indicating this to Sadia, there was
no way that the exporter could have known that the information reported in Annex VIII was not going
to be used.
Brazil is convinced that Argentina was fully aware of the need to make freight adjustments to
Sadia’s normal value. First, Sadia reported the freight cost in the internal market in Annex VIII of its
questionnaire response. Second, Exhibit BRA-32 provides a letter from JOX to the authority stating
that the quoted prices in its publication include taxation, freight and financial costs. Third, Exhibit
ARG-LVI presents a letter from Sadia and Avipal’s attorney to the investigating authority explicitly
stating that the normal value established for Sadia and Avipal incorrectly included internal freight
costs. Even though the Argentinean authority was aware that the adjustment was warranted, it still
did not request that Sadia provide such information.
We understand that if the freight costs reported by Sadia were not considered reliable, the
authority could have also used a secondary source of information to estimate such deduction, as it did
with the normal value to compen sate for the alleged characteristic differences between the poultry
sold to Argentina and in Brazil.
As a final observation, it is important that the Panel note that even though the authority knew,
and Argentina admits, that the freight adjustment has a “decisive and significant impact on price

15 Id.

comparability”,16 Argentina still considers that the investigating authority would have acted
incorrectly if it had made this specific discount. Here, we remind the Panel that Article 2.4 of the
Agreement requires authorities to make due allowance for any difference that affects price
comparability. In our view, the failure to make the freight adjustment to Sadia’s normal value was
contrary to the requirement under Article 2.4 of the Agreement.
Claim 24
93. Please comment on paras 77 – 79 of ASS.
Response
Exhibit BRA-32 provides the JOX letter to the investigating authority explaining that the
prices quoted in its publication, used by the authority to establish the normal value for all other
exporters, includes Value Added Tax (ICMS) of 12per cent; Social Contribution on Revenue
(PIS/COFINS) of 2.65per cent; financial cost, depending on the sales term; sales commission of 0.5 to
1per cent over the value of the sale; and, a variable freight for delivery, depending on the geographic
location of the seller and the buyer.
Article 2.4 of the Agreement provides that a fair comparison shall be made at the same level
of trade, normally at the ex-factory level. We have established, and Argentina apparently does not
dispute this, that an ex-factory price is the price with no charges included, since this represents the
price at the factory. In other words, the buyer bears all costs and risks involved in taking the goods
from the seller’s premises. We also believe that it is fair to state that the JOX price is not an ex-
factory price, since it includes taxes, freight and financial cost.
Argentina appears to agree with Brazil that an F.O.B. price includes inland freight to the port
of exportation, inland insurance, handling and loading charges.
17 Its is also safe to say that an f.o.b.
price does not include taxes and financial cost. Thus, there are no adjustments to be made to the f.o.b.
export price with respect to taxes and financial cost.
What we have argued is that because the f.o.b. export price does not include taxes and
financial cost, the authority should have, at a minimum, made an adjustment in the JOX price (normal
value), excluding the taxes and financial cost, when making a fair comparison. In doing so, the
authority would still be left with a normal value that was not ex-factory because it would still include
internal freight charges. We recall that Article 2.4 of the Agreement requires that the comparison be
made at the same level of trade, which is normally at ex-factory. However, if a comparison on an ex-
factory level is not possible, the comparison still has to be on the same level of trade. The deductions
of taxes and financial cost from the JOX price would have permitted a fair comparison on the same, or
at least a more similar, level of trade.
The Panel should note that the investigating auth ority, when calculating the normal value for
the exporters Sadia, Avipal, Nicolini and Seara, adjusted the normal value of these exporters by
excluding the Value Added Tax (ICMS) of 12per cent and the Social Contribution on Revenue
(PIS/COFINS) of 2.65per cent.
18 For Sadia and Avipal the investig ating authority also adjusted the
normal value by excluding the financial cost. 19 This adjusted normal value, without taxes and
financial cost, was used by the authority in making the fair comparison with the f.o.b. export price. 20

17 ASS, para. 77.
18 Annex to Exhibit BRA-15.
19 Id.
20 Pages 63, 65, 67, 69, 102 and 103 of Exhibit BRA-15.

We see no reason why the authority could not have made the same adjustment to the normal value
established for all other exporters. This adjustment would have allowed a fair comparison with the
f.o.b. export price.
Claim 27
94. Does Brazil consider that the investigating authority would have violated Article 2.4.2 if
the exporters had agreed that the investigating authority could calculate normal value on the
basis of those domestic transactions for which invoices had been requested?
Response
Brazil considers that the investigating authority would still have violated Article 2.4.2 even if
the exporters had agreed that the investigating authority could calculate normal value on the basis of
those domestic transactions for which invoices had been requested.
We remind the Panel that when the investigation was initiated and the authority sent the
dumping questionnaire to the exporters Sadia, Avipal, Frangosul, Nicolini and Seara, the authority
had required normal value and export price information for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and the
months where data was available in 1999. 21 Subsequently, the investigating authority required
supporting documentation for all sales transactions in Brazil and to Argentina for that same period. 22
Because of the enormous volume of sales transactions in the internal market, the exporters were
forced to send a letter to the authority explaining that it was impossible to provide an invoice for each
sale transaction in the internal market. 23 In this letter, the exporters recommended that the authority
either verify the transaction in loco or select a sample of transactions so that supporting
documentation could be presented.24
The idea behind the exporters' suggestion was to give the authority, through a sample, the
ability to verify the accuracy and veracity of the universe of normal value information reported in the
questionnaire response. The Panel must not forget that the exporters had already gone through the
burdensome task of collecting and reporting normal value and export price data for several years,
which was not used by the authority in the final determination. Brazil understands that the magnitude
of the information provided may mean that not all data will actually be examined, however, this does
not exclude the validity of all the data provided, particularly if that data could be verified.
Furthermore, we understand that the establishment of the period of data collection, for
dumping purposes, is intrinsically related to the dumping margin methodology under Article 2.4.2 of
the Agreement. Article 2.4.2 provides that the existence of margins of dumping “shall normally be
established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average
of prices of all comparable export transactions (...)”. Normally, the weighted average normal value is
compared to the weighted average export price for a comparable product sold during the period of
investigation. It is important to note that the weighted average prices are usually calculated for the
entire period of investigation. This comparison of prices for products sold during a certain period
ensures a more accurate picture of the price patterns to export and domestic markets. We understand
that this is one of the reasons why the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices has recommended that
the period of data collection for dumping investigations normally be 12 months and, in any case, no

21 Pages 18, 22, 23, 26, 27 and 29 of Exhibit BRA-15.
22 Pages 18, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29 and 30 of Exhibit BRA-15.
23 Exhibit BRA-26, Exhibit BRA-29 and Exhibit BRA-31.
24 Id.

less than 6 months. 25 A limited period of data collection also means limited transactions for
comparison and cannot substitute a comparison analysis based on all sales transactions for the entire
period.
Likewise, if an authority limits the transactions that are to be used in the comparison, be it
those transactions selected by the authority and for which invoices were presented, there is a risk that
the prices provided will not reflect the actual price patterns for the entire period.
Questions To Both Parties
Claim 21
95. What are 'essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decisions
whether to apply definitive measures' within the meaning of Article 6.9 ADA? In particular,
would 'essential facts' cover only facts or also reasoning supporting a certain conclusion?
Response
The term “essential” means “absolutely necessary; indispensable”.26 “Fact” is “a thing that is
known to have occurred, to exist, or to be true”. 27 Thus, “essential facts”, within the meaning of
Article 6.9 of the Agreement, are assertions of so mething existing or done, which are indispensable
for the authority’s consideration in forming the basis for the decision whether or not to apply
definitive measures. Information regarding the establishment of the normal value and the export
price, used to calculate the dumping margin, are essential facts to be considered in the final
determination.
It is important to note that the term “facts” is also present in Article 17.6(i) of the Agreement.
According to Article 17.6(i), “in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective (...)”. Under that Article, “facts” is not merely the data established
and evaluated by the authority but also the reasoning supporting a certain conclusion in establishing a
fact.
Accordingly, we understand that in Article 6.9 the phrase “essential facts” covers the data
collected and the reasoning supporting a certain conclusion made by an authority in establishing the
facts. The conclusion made by an authority relates to the authority’s establishment of the facts. For
example, it is not sufficient for an authority to simply state that it has disregarded the normal value
submitted by a certain exporter based on Article 6.8 of the Agreement. The authority must inform the
reasons why certain information was disregarded pursuant to Article 6.8.
This is our understanding of the phrase “essential facts” in Article 6.9 of the Agreement. We
note that the first sentence of Article 6.9 should be read and construed together with the second
sentence of Article 6.9, that is, that the disclosure of the “essential facts” should take place in
sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests . Within the meaning of Article 6.9, a party
needs to know the reasoning supporting a certain conclusion made by an authority in order to provide
arguments and reasons in its defense. If the phrase “essential facts” is interpreted otherwise, the
second sentence of Article 6.9 would be rendered meaningless.

25 Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices – Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data
Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations, adopted by the Committee on 5 May 2000 – G/ADP/6 –
16 May 2000.
26 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 461.
27 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 482.

96. At para. 8.229 of its report, the panel in Guatemala – Cement II found that:
'An interested party will not know whether a particular fact is "important" or
not unless the investigating authority has explicitly identified it as one of the
"essential facts" which form the basis of the authority's decision whether to
impose definitive measures.'
Would you agree with the above finding? Please explain.
Response
Brazil agrees with the Panel’s findings in Guatemala – Cement II that an interested party will
only know whether a particular fact is important if the authority explicitly identifies it as an “essential
fact” to be considered in forming the basis of the authority’s decision whether or not to impose
definitive measures. We emphasize that the obligation of the authority under Article 6.9 is not to
inform all interested parties of just any “fact”, but to inform interested parties of the “essential facts”.
In fact, the requirement under Article 6.9 is even more specific. Authorities are not only required to
inform the “essential facts”, but the “essential facts” that will form the basis for the decision whether
or not to apply definitive measures.
If an authority simply summarizes the vast amount of information that was submitted to the
files of the investigation without specifically indi cating what information is important in forming the
basis of the authority’s decision, how can an exporter know what “essential fact” will be used in the
authority’s decision whether or not to impose definitive measures? Likewise, how can an exporter
defend its interest?
For example, in the instant case, Frangosul and Catarinense submitted export price
information with supporting documentation. Even though the authority acknowledged this in the
report prior to the end of the evidence-producing stage of the dumping investigation,
28 the authority
still disregarded that export price information in the final determination. In the disclosure report prior
to the final determination, the authority neither indicated nor did it provide why that information
would be disregarded. The exporters had no reason to suspect that that information would not be
considered by the authority and, thus, were not able to defend their interests.
In that sense, we find it useful to also cite to another passage of the Panel’s findings in the
Guatemala – Cement II report:
“(...) The difficulty for an interested party with access to the file, however, is that it
will not know whether particular information in the file forms the basis of the
authority’s final determination. One purpose of Article 6.9 is to resolve this difficulty
for interested parties. This has been acknowledged by Guatemala, which has itself
asserted that “[t]he object and purpose of Article 6.9 is to allow exporters a fair
opportunity to comment on the important issu e in an investigation after the record is
closed to new facts”. An interested party will not know whether a particular fact is
“important” or not unless the investigating authority has explicitly identified it as
one of the “essential facts” which form the basis of the authority’s decision whether
to impose definitive measures.29 (emphasis added)

28 Pages 29 and 38 of Exhibit BRA-28.
29 Guatemala – Cement II, para. 8.229.

The purpose of Article 6.9 is exactly that, to provide interested parties the opportunity to
present arguments and to comment on the important issues in an investigation after the evidence-
producing stage is finished but prior to the final determination.
Claim 22
97. What do parties understand by the words "for each known exporter or producer
concerned of the product under investigation" contained in the first sentence of Article 6.10? In
the view of the parties, would the cited portion of the first sentence of Article 6.10 require the
calculation of an individual margin of dumpin g for each exporter known to the investigating
authority? Would that also be the case wh en a known exporter does not provide relevant
information requested by the investigating authority? Please explain.
Response
The first sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement requires authorities to determine an
individual margin of dumping for each known e xporter or producer concerned of the product under
investigation. Thus, if an exporter is known to the authority, the authority is required, and
Article 6.10 expressly states this as a rule, to calculate an individual dumping margin for that exporter.
If the known exporter provides the relevant information necessary to calculate the individual
margin of dumping, there is no question, the authority must do so. That was the case for Frangosul
and Catarinense. If the known exporter does not provide the relevant information necessary to
calculate the normal value and the export price, but the authority still has access to individual
information for that exporter, the investigating authority is still required to calculate the individual
margin of dumping.
It is important to note the difference between applying facts available, in accordance with
Article 6.8 of the Agreement, to a specific exporter and not calculating the individual margin of
dumping for that exporter. In cases where the authority does not have the relevant normal value or
export price information and the authority is entitled to resort to facts available, the facts available
applicable to a specific exporter may not be the same as the facts available applicable to another
exporter. Accordingly, the calculation of the individual dumping margins for those two exporters will
not be the same.
For instance, in the final determination the Argentinean authority disregarded the export price
submitted by the exporters Sadia, Avipal, Nicolini and Seara and applied the individual weighted
average export price for these exporters as provided by the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.
30
However, for Frangosul and Catarinense, the authority also disregarded the export price submitted by
these exporters but failed to use the individual weighted average export price as provided by the
Ganaderia.31 Because the authority did not calculate an individual margin of dumping for Frangosul
and Catarinense, the authority used as the export price for these two exporters a weighted average
f.o.b. export price of US$0,95992, that took into account the weighted average export price of all
other exporters with little or no participation in the investigation. 32 This export price of US$0,95992
was lower than the individual weighted average export price provided by the Ganaderia for Frangosul
(US$1,0407) and Catarinense (US$1,0048). 33 Had the authority used this individual weighted
average export price instead of the weighted average export price for all other exporters, there would
have been no dumping margin for Frangosul and a dumping margin of 3.35per cent for Catarinense.

30 Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.
31 Id.
32 Page 103 and the last page of Exhibit BRA-15.
33 Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.

We point out, however, that specifically in this case, Frangosul and Catarinense did provide
the required export price information with supporting documentation and the authority should have
used that information to calculate the individual dumping margin for the two exporters.
Thus, in the instant case, the authority not only incorrectly disregarded the information
submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense during the investigation, and thus erred in not calculating the
individual dumping margin, but the authority also had access to individual weighted average export
price for those two exporters as provided by the Ganaderia but decided to apply the weighted average
f.o.b. export price for all other exporters. Consequently, the authority incorrectly applied the dumping
margin for all others exporters to Frangosul and Catarinense.
98. In the view of the parties, would the fi ndings in paras. 6.86 to 6.101 (both included) of
the panel Argentina – Ceramic tiles be applicable to the facts in this dispute? In particular,
would the following finding of the panel be relevant to the current dispute: 'The basis of the
normal value determination has no bearing on the ability to calculate an individual dumping
margin for the producer whose normal value is in question.'? Would the lack of information on
normal value, export price or cost of producti on, automatically allow the non-calculation of an
individual dumping of margin in accordance with Article 6.10? Please explain, identifying and
providing relevant factual support to the Panel.
Response
Even though the facts of the case Argentina- Ceramic Tiles are somewhat different from the
facts in the instant case, the reasoning provided by that Panel regarding the interpretation of
Article 6.10 is still valid.
First, we agree with the Panel’s views in Argentina - Ceramic Tiles that Article 6.10 requires
that an individual margin of dumping has to be determined for each exporter with regard to the
product subject to investigation. Relevant part of that report provides that:
“While the second sentence of Article 6.10 allows an investigating authority to limit
its examination to certain exporters and producers, it does not provide for a deviation
from the general rule that individual margins be determined for those exporters or
producers that are examined. To the contrary, Article 9.4 provides that, where the
authorities limit their examination under Article 6.10, the anti-dumping duty for
exporters or producers that are not examined shall not exceed a level determined on
the basis of he results of the examination of those exporters or producers that were
examined. That Article 9.4 does not provide any methodology for determining the
level of duties applicable to exporters or producers that are examined in our view
confirms that the general rule requiring individual margins remains applicable to
those exporters or producers. We find further confirmation in Article 6.10.2, which
requires that, in general, an individual margin of dumping must be calculated even
for the producers/exporters not initially included in the sample, if they provide the
necessary information and if to do so is not unduly burdensome. If even producers
not included in the original sample are entitled to an individual margin calculation,
then it follows that producers that were included in the original sample are entitled
as well. Indeed, the parties appear to agree that Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement
requires that as a rule an individual margin of dumping has to be determined for

each exporter with regard to the product subject to investigation.” 34 (emphasis
added)
We point out the fact that in the instant case the authority did not limit their examination
pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement and the authority was, thus, required
to determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned.
Second, we have presented in the response to question 90 above that Frangosul and
Catarinense did submit the required normal value and export price information during the
investigation. In particular, these two exporters also submitted supporting documentation with the
export price information. Brazil fails to see the reason why the Argentinean authority did not use that
information to calculate the individual margin of dumping for Frangosul and Catarinense.
Third, we agree with the Panel’s finding in Argentina – Ceramic Tiles that “(...) the basis of
the normal value determination has no bearing on the ability to calculate an individual dumping
margin for the producer whose normal value is in question ”.35 We have provided in the response to
question 97 above, that there is a difference between applying facts available, based on Article 6.8 of
the Agreement, in order to establish normal value and export price for a specific exporter and not
calculating the individual margin of dumping for that exporter. In establishing the normal value or the
export price, the authority may be entitled to resort to facts available under specific circumstances.
However, that does not mean that the authority is not required to calculate an individual margin of
dumping.
For example, the facts available applied by an authority to determine an exporter’s normal
value may be different from the facts available applied by an authority to determine another exporter’s
normal value. Another example occurs when an authority applies facts available to determine an
exporter’s normal value but uses the export price reported by the exporter, while for another exporter
the authority applies facts available to determine the export price and uses the exporter’s reported
normal value. In such situations, the authority will still calculate an individual margin of dumping for
each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.
Thus, we do not agree that the lack of inform ation on normal value, export price or cost of
production automatically allows the non-calculation of an individual dumping margin. To accept
that as true would violate the requirement in the first sentence in Article 6.10 of the Agreement.

34 Argentina – Definitive Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy, 28 September 2001,
WT/DS189/R, at para. 6.90 (adopted on 5 November 2001) (“Argentina – Ceramic Tiles”).
35 Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.96.

ANNEX A-7
COMMENTS OF BRAZIL ON THE RESPONSES OF ARGENTINA
TO THE PANEL'S AND TO BRAZIL'S QUESTIONS –
SECOND MEETING
(28 November 2002)
Questions to Argentina
Preliminary issues
66. Regarding para. 13 of Argentina's second submission (“ASS”), what was the “statement
of fact” (point I) allegedly made by Brazil? Please explain how Argentina relied in good faith
upon that alleged statement (point III).
Response from Argentina
Firstly, Argentina considers that Brazil's conduct in successively filing its case and activating
dispute settlement proceedings in different fo ra, first in MERCOSUR and then in the WTO -
particularly in view of the precedents described in Argentina's first written submission 1, i.e. recourse
to the dispute settlement mechanism under the Protocol of Brasilia to settle conflicts with other
MERCOSUR States parties and compliance with the content and scope of the arbitral awards in all of
the disputes - provides statements of fact which meet the requirement of being clear, unambiguous,
voluntary, unconditional and authorized, the essential elements of estoppel under the definition
provided in paragraph 13 of Argentina's submission.
In paragraph 20 of its rebuttal submission
2, Argentina sets out the elements which are present
in the current dispute brought by Brazil before the WTO. Among these elements, the last sentence of
subparagraph (iii) of paragraph 20 states that: "Consequently Brazil's previous conduct with respect
to the acceptance of awards, confirmed by the signature of the Protocol of Olivos, invalidates the
complaint against Argentina that Brazil is now trying to substantiate on the basis of the DSU."
Moreover, the fact that Brazil signed the Prot ocol of Olivos on 18 February 2002 – by which
it expressly accepted the choice of forum clause – and then, seven days later, on 25 February 2002,
requested the establishment of a Panel in the curren t dispute, displays a clear contradiction in its
conduct, in which Argentina had had full confidence, both countries being member states of

1 First written submission of Argentina, 29 August 2002, paragraphs 18-22 and corresponding
footnotes.
2 Rebuttal submission of Argentina, 17 October 2002, paragraph 20.

MERCOSUR; and Argentina is now suffering the negative impact of this change of position. 3 This
fact was also raised in the submissions of the EC4 and Paraguay5 as third parties.
Brazil’s Comments
Brazil understands that the phrase “statement of fact” means “the act or an instance of stating
or being stated; expression in words” 6 of “a thing that is known to have occurred, to exist, or to be
true”.7 Within that meaning, Brazil reiterates that it has never declared that it would renounce its right
to bring a dispute, based on different claims, to the WTO because a similar dispute had been brought
to the Mercosul Tribunal.
We recall that the Mercosul Protocol of Olivos on Dispute Settlement cannot be raised here as
an implicit or express consent by Brazil to refrain from bringing the present case to the WTO dispute
settlement. First, we note that the object before the Mercosul Tribunal was different from the object
before this Panel. Second, The Protocol of Olivos has not yet entered into force, and even if it had
and the object of the dispute were the same, the Protocol of Olivos provides that “disputes underway
initiated in accordance with the Protocol of Brasília will continue to be exclusively governed by that
Protocol until the dispute has been concluded”.
8 The Protocol also states that “while the disputes
initiated under the regime of the Protocol of Brasília are not completely concluded and until the
proceedings under Article 49 are completed, the Protocol of Brasília will continue to be applied”. 9
Based on those provisions, it is fair to state that the Protocol of Olivos does not apply to disputes that
have already been concluded under the Brasília Protocol. Third, what Argentina brings before this
Panel is a situation where Mercosul Members potentially have divergent views on what their rights
and obligations are under Mercosul legal framework. We remind the Panel that Article 1 of the DSU
confines the jurisdiction of this Panel to disputes brought pursuant to the “covered agreements”, the
“WTO Agreement”, and the DSU, taken in isolation or in combination with each other. The
provisions of the Brasília Protocol and the Protocol of Olivos are not listed in Article 1 of the DSU.
Thus, the rules and procedures of the DSU do not apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes
concerning the rights and obligations of Mercosul Members under the Mercosul legal framework.
67. At para. 13 of ASS, Argentina asserts that th e principle of estoppel is a general principle
of international law. Is the principle of estoppel a “customary rule[] of interpretation of public
international law” within the meaning of Article 3.2 of the DSU? Please explain. Is a general
principle of international law the same as a rule of interpretation of international law? Please
explain.
Response from Argentina
The rules of interpretation of public international law to which Article 3.2 of the DSU refers
concern Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

3 In fact, Argentina has already approved the Protocol of Olivos. On 9 October 2002, the National
Congress adopted the Protocol of Olivos by Law 25.663, promulgated by the Executive through Decree 2091/02
of 18 October 2002 and published in Official Bulletin of the Republic of Argentina No. 30008 of
21 October 2002.
4 Third party submission of the European Communities, 9 September 2002, paragraph 17 and
footnote 17.
5 Third party submission of Paraguay, 9 September 2002, paragraph 8.
6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1361.
7 The Concise Oxford Dictionary – Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 482.
8 Article 50 of the Protocol of Olivos.
9 Paragraph 2 of Article 55 of the Protocol of Olivos.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention sets fort h the rules to be followed with respect to
interpretation; and the rules of interpretation are applied by the adjudicating body taking account, in
all cases, of the sources of law.
The sources that may be applied to interpretation are set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, which lists, as a principal source, treaties, international custom, and
the general principles of international law.
Consequently, Argentina understands the principle of estoppel, as a general principle of
international law, to constitute a legitimate source to which any international tribunal called upon to
settle a dispute may have recourse.
In the current dispute, it is in this light that Argentina considers that the principle of estoppel
argument should be taken into account by the Panel in carrying out its functions under the DSU. This
is in keeping with the obligation laid down in Article 3.2 of the DSU to clarify the existing provisions
of the agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Moreover, Argentina repeats what it stated in its second written submission 10, namely that
other panels have already examined the principle of estoppel in past disputes: " European
Communities – Asbestos"11 and "Guatemala – Cement"12.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
Claim 1
68. In reply to question 6, Argentina refers to the Aves & Ovos review. If the applicant
submitted more extracts from that review than are contained in Exhibit BRA-1, please provide
a copy of such additional extracts. Please explain precisely how information from the Aves &
Ovos review, as supplied by the applicant, supported the need for a 9.09 per cent adjustment to
normal value. Furthermore, on what basis did the investigating authority assign the same value
to the head and feet as to other parts of the chicken?
Response from Argentina
We stress that the review Aves & Ovos does not provide any information with respect to the
9.09 per cent adjustment carried out. The mention of the said review in Argentina's reply to
question 6 of the Panel following the first meeting was made in connection with the listing of
evidence provided by the applicant in its application. As regards the question concerning the basis on
which the investigating authority assigned the same va lue to the head and feet as to the other parts of
the chicken, we note once again that the head and feet were not considered to have the same value as
the other parts of the animal for the purposes of assessing the adjustment. On the contrary the
9.09 per cent adjustment is the result of an evaluation of the specific recovery of heads and feet.

10 Second written submission of Argentina, 17 October 2002, paragraphs 17, 18 and 19.
11 WT/DS135/R, European Communities – Measures Aff ecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Report adopted on 5 April 2001, paragraph 8.60.
12 WT/DS156/R, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from
Mexico, Report adopted on 17 November 2000, paragraph 8.23.

Brazil’s Comments
We point out that Argentina confirms that the investigating authority did not consider
whether the value of the head and feet was the same as the value of the other parts of the chicken for
the purpose of evaluating the necessary adjustments.13 Based on Exhibit BRA-1, the Panel can verify
that the application contained no evidence or indication that there were physical characteristic
differences in the product sold in Brazil and to Argentina, that such alleged differences affect price
comparability, that the yield rate as proposed by the applicant was appropriate, and that, therefore, the
adjustment methodology presented was justified.
Claim 2
69. Regarding Argentina's reply to question 12, the Panel notes that the extract from the
JOX document quoted by Argentina is included under the heading "Frango Vivo"? Is there a
similar statement for eviscerated poultry? What does it mean to say that "the price remains on
very firm ground"?
Response from Argentina
No, the JOX publication specifically refers to live poultry. Nevertheless, the reference to the
words "production on the parallel market within São Paulo is sharply lower, so that the price remains
on very firm ground" relates to the fact that live poultry is the fundamental and principle input for the
product under investigation. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable, at this stage prior to the opening of the
investigation, to deduce that if the price of the input remains essentially unaltered, the price of the
end-product – i.e. the product under investigation – will not vary substantially.
In other words, the phrase "so that the price remains on very firm ground" means that the
price would remain essentially unaltered, thus constituting an acceptable element at this stage prior to
the investigation.
Brazil’s Comments
Argentina confirms that the quoted extract from the JOX document refers to live poultry and
that there is no similar statement in the JOX publication for eviscerated poultry.14
We disagree with Argentina that the reference in the JOX publication for live poultry is
sufficient to establish the trend of normal value prices for eviscerated poultry (a different product),
because live poultry is the raw material of the product under investigation. 15 The Panel should note
that the extract from the JOX publication under heading “Frango Vivo” ( live poultry) monitors daily
changes in the market and cannot possibly be used to indicate price trends over a longer period of
time. Furthermore, the Panel should note that th ere is another heading in the JOX publication titled
“Frango Abatido” (slaughtered poultry). This heading provides that “the sales of slaughtered and cuts
of poultry at the end of the week have not demonstrated any recovery in volume. The cold storage
plants (freezers) continue trying to re-pass higher prices, without success, in view of the existing
surplus in offer. Even though the beginning of the month is near, it will be difficult to re-pass the
adjustments while the offer is still inadequate”.
16 Even though “frango abatido” (slaughtered poultry)
is also a product made from live poultry, the extract in the JOX publication for slaughtered poultry

13 Argentina Response to the Panel’s Questions in the Second Substantive Meeting (“ARS”),
question 68.
14 ARS, question 69.
15 Id.
16 Exhibit BRA-1

indicates the inability to raise prices because of the excess volume of poultry offered in the Brazilian
market.
It is also interesting that Argentina considers valid, in the initiation stage of the investigation,
that the authority consider as sufficient evidence to establish normal value the price of poultry for
only one day in 1997, when the export price was established based on a six-month period. We have
demonstrated that the JOX report used to establish the normal value is a daily publication, which was
reasonably available to the applicant. Accordingly, the applicant could, and should, have presented
the prices in the JOX publication for a period of at least six months in 1997, but chose not to.
Claim 3
70. When did the Secretary receive Act No. 405 from the CNCE (dated 7 January 1998)?
When did the Secretary receive the report from the APCDS (also dated 7 January 1998)?
Response from Argentina
The Secretary of Industry, Trade and Mining received Record No. 405 on 9 January 1998,
and the DCD Report on Dumping on 27 January 1998.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
71. Regarding the first sentence of the third paragraph of Argentina's reply to question 16,
what is meant by the phrase "in keeping wi th the requirements of the application on 17
February 1998"? What precisely are the "requirements of the application"?
Response from Argentina
The requirements of the application are those contained in form 349 provided in Annex
ARG-XXXIX. The meaning of the phrase is that on 17 February 1998, the applicants provided
updated information on the basis of what was requested in the mentioned form 349. This information,
on the basis of a legal finding by the relevant ministerial department and in conformity with Law
No. 19549 on Administrative Procedures, was transmitted to the CNCE with the instruction that it be
analysed. The analysis resulted in the issue by the CNCE of Record No. 464 and the corresponding
Technical Report.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
Claim 10
72. How and when did the Authority obtain the addresses of the Brazilian exporters which
were contacted in February 1999? If those add resses were obtained from a document on the
record of the investigation, please provide a copy of this document.
Response from Argentina
The addresses of the producers/exporters notified in February 1999 were provided by
telephone through the importers interested in the investigation. Having learned of the initiation of the

investigation through the Official Bulletin, they contacted the investigating authority and provided the
said addresses.
Brazil’s Comments
According to Argentina, the investigating auth ority obtained the addresses of the Brazilian
exporters, contacted on February 1999, through interested importers in the investigation. 17 Once the
initiation of the investigation was published, these importers contacted the investigating authority and
provided such information.18
Brazil recalls that the investigating authority kn ew, prior to initiation, of the existence and
interest of at least five of the seven Brazilian exporters that were only notified of the investigation on
15 September 1999.
19 If the investigating authority knew of the existence of these exporters prior to
initiation but did not have their contact information, why didn’t the authority inquire in February 1999
with the interested importers on the addresses of these Brazilian exporters? In particular, if the
investigating authority was only able to contact the seven Brazilian exporters after the importer
Interamericana Comercial (“Interamericana”) provided their addresses 20, why didn’t the authority
inquire in February 1999 with the importer Interamericana about the addresses of these seven
exporters? Likewise, the authority could have also requested that the Brazilian government provide
the contact information of those specific exporters identified in the report regarding the viability of
the investigation.
Still on Argentina’s response, Brazil wonders whether it is normal procedure for an
Argentinean authority to wait for importers to contac t them with addresses of exporters so that the
authority can then notify the interested exporters known to them. If that is the normal procedure, what
happens when interested importers do not contact the authority, providing the addresses of the known
exporters? In such cases, does it mean that the interested exporters known to the authorities are not
notified?
73. Please comment on para. 36 of Brazil's Second Oral Statement.
Response from Argentina
With respect to paragraph 36 of Brazil's Statement, we refer to what Argentina has already
stated in connection with Article 6.1.1, namely that the parties interested in the investigation were
given ample opportunity to participate, with due regard for the requests for extensions that were
submitted.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.

17 ARS, question 72.
18 Id.
19 Pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit BRA-2.
20 Argentina Response to the Panel’s Questions in the First Substantive Meeting (“AR”), questions 26
and 28.

Claim 11
74. Following on from Argentina's reply to question 29, was all of the information contained
in the application sent to both the DCD and the CNCE, or did they only receive those parts of
the application dealing with dumping and injury respectively?
Response from Argentina
Both entities received the same application, with the same information. Upon submitting an
application for the initiation of an investigation, the applicant had to complete the form approved by
Resolution No. 349 of the former Secretariat for Industry and Trade before the former
Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade (SSCE). In keeping with Articles 36 to 40 of Decree
No. 2121/94, the application was filed with the fo rmer SSCE, which transmitted a complete copy
thereof to the CNCE so that the latter could make an injury determination.
The CNCE received, on 9 September 1997, a copy of the application for the initiation of the
investigation filed by CEPA with the SSCE on 2 September 1997. The two submissions are identical,
and the submission transmitted to the CNCE can be found in Section I of file CNCE No. 43/1997
(folios 2 to 284). Thus, both entities had at their disposal complete copies of the application for
measures submitted by CEPA.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
Claim 15
75. Regarding the second sentence of Argentina's reply to question 39, what precisely is the
"procedure" (for supporting documentation) followed by the investigating authority? How was
an interested party to know what supporting documentation it was required to provide? Where
exactly has the "procedure" been specified? Where exactly is the request for supporting
documentation set forth? Please provide copies of the relevant sources.
Response from Argentina
Regarding the procedure followed by the in vestigating authority to obtain supporting
documentation, attached to the questionnaire are instructions explaining how it should be completed
and stating that it should be accompanied by supporting documentation. At the same time, the
instructions state that where it is not possible to provide supporting documentation, the source of the
information should be indicated. By supporting documentation, the authority means documentation
that backs the statements or arguments of the inte rested parties. For example, if the implementing
authority is expected to make an adjustment for fr eight, it would be helpful for the interested party to
attach the contract with the shipping company or any other documentation at its disposal which
records the value or percentage that should be discounted for freight.
These instructions can be found in the first part of the questionnaire to be completed by the
exporter.
A blank copy of the questionnaire for exporters is provided as Annex ARG-LXIII.

Brazil’s Comments
Article 6.1 and Paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Agreement require authorities to give notice
and specify in detail the information required from interested parties. We note that the dumping
questionnaire did not specifically require that the exporters submit supporting documentation for the
product description. The Panel should look at Pages 19 and 21 of Exhibit BRA-22, where the
instructions for completing the producer/exporter questionnaire are provided.
21 From these general
instructions, one can see that there was not sufficient information on the precise supporting
documentation that was expected from the exporters. Furthermore, the fact that the authority never
requested clarifications or supporting documentation for the information reported by the exporters
indicated that the information that had been submitted would be accepted. In that sense, the authority
never informed the exporters that the product description information reported by them was
insufficient or unacceptable. By doing so, the authority acted inconsistently with Paragraph 6 of
Annex II of the Agreement.
Claim 20
76. Regarding question 43, please indicate prec isely what normal value data Catarinense
was asked to provide. Please specify the document(s) in which the request was made.
Furthermore, for what period of time was Catarinense asked to provide the relevant normal
value data?
Response from Argentina
The information that the company Catarinense was asked to supply was the information
requested in Note DCD No. 273-001065/99, provided by Brazil in exhibit BRA-13, in which it can be
seen that the period for which the information was requested was 1998 – January 1999. We recall in
this connection that independently of the documentation requested, in the last note sent by the
implementing authority – Note DCD No. 273-001321/99 provided in exhibit BRA-27 - the companies
were reminded that they were to comply with the requirements of the National Law on Administrative
Procedures, particularly as regards certification of legal status, a basic prerequisite for a party to be
considered in an investigation.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
77. With regard to Catarinense's normal value data, Argentina asserts that those data were
submitted in an aggregate form. However, it is apparently stated in Section VII.3.2 of the Final
Dumping Determination that Catarinense had submitted information on sales made in the
domestic market corresponding to 1998 and January 1999 disaggregated by transaction. Please
comment?
Response from Argentina
As stated, in Section VII.3.2 of the Final Report on the Determination of the Margin of
Dumping there is a reference to Annex VIII: "Sales in the domestic market for 1998 and
January 1999, disaggregated by transaction" at folio 3023. That is, with respect to normal value for
the requested period, Catarinense submitted a list of domestic market sales transactions without
providing any supporting documentation and without any magnetic media. Finally, we repeat that

21 Brazil Second Written Submission, paragraph 73.

Catarinense at no time provided any certification of legal status although this had been requested in
Note DCD 273-001321/99.
Section VIII.1.3.3.5 of the Report on the Final Determination on the Margin of Dumping, at
folios 3053/3054, states that the values reproduced at folio 3054 were obtained from the information
from the exporting company in aggregate form in Annexes V and VI of the questionnaire for
exporters and that it covered a longer period than that requested by the implementing authority. Thus,
the processing of the information in Annexes V and VI yields the detailed values in the table
appearing at folio 3054. As indicated in the footnotes to Annexes V and VI, in the case of 1999 the
information was accumulated until September. We attach as Annex ARG-LXIV a copy of Annexes V
and VI, as submitted by Catarinense.
Brazil’s Comments
Argentina confirms that the Brazilian exporter Catarinense provided information on sales
made in the domestic market corresponding to 1998 and January 1999, disaggregated by transaction.22
We recall that Catarinense was notified of the investigation and the need to respond to the dumping
questionnaire only on 15 September 1999. 23 Even though Catarinense was notified of the
investigation almost eight months after it had initiated, Catarinense still provided the questionnaire
response with complete information on sales transactions to Argentina, disaggregated by transaction,
with supporting documentation, as well as complete information on sales transactions in Brazil,
disaggregated by transaction, without supporting documentation. 24 To that regard, the Argentinean
authority never requested the supporting documentation for Catarinense’s sales transactions in the
internal market, nor did it request that the information be provided in a diskette. Furthermore, the
authority never selected specific transactions in the internal market, as it did with other exporters, for
Catarinense to provide the corresponding supporting documentation.
During the investigation, Catarinense provided complete normal value and export price data
that should have been used by the authority in determining the exporter’s individual margin of
dumping.
78. Please comment on the first two sentences of para. 53 of Brazil's Second Oral Statement.
Response from Argentina
With respect to the first two sentences of paragraph 53, there is no contradiction whatsoever
as Brazil tries to suggest, since Argentina said that the export price information was indeed provided,
but since for the reasons already given the determination of normal value could not be made, the
notified export prices could not be considered. In this connection, Argentina had official information
on export prices for both companies which is the information that was used in the final determination.
Brazil’s Comments
Argentina confirms that the export price data submitted by the exporters Frangosul and
Catarinense was, in fact, accompanied by supporting documentation. 25 Nevertheless, Argentina
alleges that since it was not able to establish normal value for these two exporters, the authority was
not able to consider the export price data submitted by them. 26 We disagree with Argentina’s

22 ARS, question 77.
23 Exhibit BRA-13.
24 Page 39 of Exhibit BRA-15.
25 ARS, question 78.
26 Id.

position that the normal value information for Frangosul and Catarinense could not be established.
However, even if that were true, that does not exclude the fact that the authority could, and should,
have used Frangosul and Catarinense’s export price data and calculated an individual dumping margin
for the two exporters. In that sense, we remind the Panel that even though the Argentinean authority
disregarded the export price data submitted by th e exporters Sadia and Avipal, the authority still
calculated an individual dumping margin for those two companies. We understand that the
Argentinean authority should have proceeded accordingly with respect to Frangosul and Catarinense.
The fact that the authority does not have normal value or export price information for a certain
exporter does not exclude the authority’s obligation under Article 6.10 to calculate an individual
margin of dumping for that exporter.
It is true that Argentina had official information on the export price for Frangosul and
Catarinense.27 However, it is not true that the authority used that information in the final
determination. In the final determination, the Argentinean authority disregarded the export price
submitted by the exporters Sadia, Avipal, Nicolini and Seara and applied the individual weighted
average export price for these exporters as provided by the Argentinean agency Ganaderia.28
However, for Frangosul and Catarinense, the authority also disregarded the export price submitted by
these exporters but failed to use the individual weighted average export price as provided by the
Ganaderia.29 Because the authority did not calculate an individual margin of dumping for Frangosul
and Catarinense, the authority used as the export price for these two exporters a weighted average
f.o.b. export price of US$0,95992, that took into acc ount the weighted average export price of all
other exporters with little or no participation in the investigation. 30 This export price of US$0,95992
was lower than the individual weighted average export price provided by the Ganaderia for Frangosul
(US$1,0407) and Catarinense (US$1,0048). 31 Had the authority used this individual weighted
average export price instead of the weighted average export price for all other exporters, there would
have been a negative dumping margin for Frangosul and a dumping margin of 3.35 per cent for
Catarinense.
We emphasize, nevertheless, the fact that Frangosul and Catarinense did provide the required
export price information with supporting documentation and the authority should have used that
information to calculate the individual dumping margin for the two exporters.
Claim 21
79. It would seem from para. 185 of Argentina's First Written Submission that parties were
informed of the 'essential facts' through the Report on Action Taken of 4 January 2002. Could
Argentina confirm that this is the only instrume nt on the record of the investigation through
which the investigating authority informed interested parties of the 'essential facts'?
Response from Argentina
Yes, the Report on Action Taken is the document by which the investigating authority
informed the interested parties of the essential fact s. In this connection, Argentina reaffirms what it
stated in paragraph 185 of its first written submission.

27 Id.
28 Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.
29 Id.
30 Page 103 and the last page of Exhibit BRA-15.
31 Pages 76 and 77 of Exhibit BRA-15.

Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
80. The Panel notes Argentina's reply to question 47(a). As a follow-up question, the Panel
would appreciate it if Argentina could reply the following questions:
(1) In the investigation at stake, which we re the 'essential facts' informed by the
investigating authority to interested parties?
(2) Where, if at all, the information referred to in paras. 340-350 of Brazil's First Written
Submission and para. 87 of Brazil's Second Written Submission can be found?
In replying to these questions, Argentina is requested to point out with precision the
paragraph or page number where the information is contained on the record of the
investigation, if any, and to provide a copy of the relevant documents.
Response from Argentina
The essential facts are those which appear throughout the Report on Action Taken of
January 2000 (folio 2757).
However, to be more precise with respect to the normal value and the export price, we refer
by way of example to Section VIII.1 and VIII.1.3.3 of the said report, which explains the
methodology used by SADIA for the calculation of normal value. The same is done for AVIPAL SA
in Section VIII.1.3.3.2, which contains detailed information and a description of the methodology
applied to calculate normal value for that company. Corresponding information is also provided for
NICOLINI (folios 2819 and 2820) and for SEARA (folio 2821).
Consequently, what Brazil stated in paragraphs 340-350 of its first written submission does
not correspond to reality. Indeed, the interested parties were given ample opportunity to express their
views with respect to the essential facts that the authority considered for the calculation of normal
value and the export price.
Concerning the copy of the essential facts report, see EXHIBIT BRA-28.
Brazil’s Comments
Brazil understands that Argentina has failed to indicate, in its response to question 80(2),
precisely where in the report prior to the fina l determination (Exhibit BRA-28), the information
referred to in paras. 340-350 of Brazil’s First Written Submission and para. 87 of Brazil’s Second
Written Submission can be found.
Claim 23
81. At para. 73 of ASS, Argentina suggests that the exporter had ample opportunity to
inform the DCD of any adjustments that needed to be made when it submitted the invoices
requested by the DCD. Why should Sadia have requested an adjustment for freight costs when
submitting its invoices if it had already requested that adjustment in its questionnaire response?

Response from Argentina
Argentina reaffirms what it said in paragraphs 210 and 211 of its first written submission.
Indeed, SADIA replied to the questionnaire item con cerning internal freight, but never provided any
supporting documentation for that item. Nor do the invoices submitted provide any indication of the
percentage and/or amount of the adjustment to be made.
In other words, although in Annex X SADIA pr ovided a US$/Ton value to be discounted for
freight, and also did so in Annex VIII – Sales in the domestic market – these values were presented in
annualized form without any supporting documenta tion that would have enabled the authority to
verify whether they corresponded to the reality and hence carry out the said adjustment.
In this connection, a " nota fiscal " (tax receipt) from SADIA has been provided showing
clearly that the box corresponding to cost of freight does not contain any figure at all. And the box
corresponding to "frete por conta" contains the indication "1", which corresponds to "emitente".
The kind of supporting documentation to which we refer in this case would be, for example, a
contract between SADIA and a shipping compan y or any other documentation from the company
which clearly indicates the amount to be discounted for freight. We insist that the " notas fiscales",
which did not reveal the indicative amount of the requested adjustment, were the only documentation
on hand.
Attached hereto as Annex ARG-LXV is a pho tocopy of the invoice and a photocopy of
Annexes VIII and X of the Questionnaire for Exporters.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
82. Argentina has asserted that it did not grant Sadia's request for a freight cost adjustment
because Sadia failed to support its request with documentary evidence. Please indicate precisely
(page number, paragraph number, line number) where the investigating authority explained
the reason for rejecting Sadia's request in its final determination, or in any other document
prepared by the investigating authority at the time of its determination. If the Panel does not
already have a copy of the relevant document, please provide a copy thereof.
Response from Argentina
The relevant explanation can be found in Section VIII.1.3.3.1 of the Report on Action Taken.
In that report, the DCD identified the informati on that it would use for the determination of normal
value, which did not include any adjustment for freight.
Brazil’s Comments
We ask that the Panel examine Section VIII.1.3.3.1 of the report prior to the final
determination32 and Section VIII.1.3.3.1 of the dumping final determination, 33 in order to verify that
the investigating authority did not provide an explanation for rejecting Sadia’s freight cost
adjustment.

32 Pages 58 – 62 of Exhibit BRA-28.
33 Pages 59 – 63 of Exhibit BRA-15.

Claim 22
83. Please comment on para. 59 of Brazil's Second Oral Statement.
Response from Argentina
To begin with, it should be noted with respect to Brazil's question as to why the authority did
not proceed in the same manner with CATARINENSE and FRANGOSUL, that CATARINENSE
never provided certification of legal status, i.e. it did not comply with an essential requirement that
must be met by any interested party wishing to par ticipate in the investigation in accordance with the
National Law on Administrative Procedures (Law No. 19.49) which, pursuant to Article 76 of
Decree No. 2121/94, applies on a residual basis in investigation proceedings.
This law was duly notified to the WTO Anti-Dumping Committee, which is why the last note
sent to CATARINENSE, which appears in EXHIBIT BRA-27, states that it should comply with the
requirements of the National Law on Administrative Procedures. Instead, not only did Catarinense
persist in not making any submission, but as mentioned, it failed to provide certification of legal
status.
In the case of FRANGOSUL, in spite of the successive extensions granted and the numerous
requests for information from the implementing auth ority (see the summary table for the company in
question, which was transmitted to the Panel together with Argentina's replies to the questions posed
following the first meeting), no information was available in connection with domestic market sales
transactions, needed by the authority to determine the individual margin of dumping.
We recall in this connection that, as can be seen in the summary table for FRANGOSUL, by
Note DCD No. 272-001181/99 of 12 Octo ber 1999 and Note DCD No. 273-001412/99 of
18 November of 1999, the implementing authority asked FRANGOSUL for the last time to provide
lists of domestic market sales. In the second of these two notes, it granted a maximum of five days to
do so. The purpose of this time-limit was to ensu re that the implementing authority would have
sufficient time to analyse and process the requested information.
However, FRANGOSUL, once the time-limit for the submission for the information had
elapsed, provided, in magnetic form only (diskette), the list of notas fiscales. Indeed, FRANGOSUL
failed to provide a hard copy of the list as required under the National Law on Administrative
Procedures. This Law applies on a residual basis to anti-dumping proceedings pursuant to Article 76
of Decree No. 2121/94.
For the sake of clarity, we cite below Article 7 and 15 of Decree No. 1759/72 which regulates
the mentioned Law.
"Article 7 – The identification under which a record of proceedings is initiated shall be
retained throughout successive proceeding regardless of the bodies participating in them. All of the
units are under obligation to provide information from a file on the basis of its initial identification.
The title page shall indicate the body with primary responsibility for the proceedings and the
time-limit for its settlement."
"Article 15 – Documents shall be typed or legibly handwritten in ink, in the national
language". The top of the page shall contain a summary of the pleadings. They shall be signed by the
interested parties, or their legal representatives or attorneys. Each document, with the sole exception
of the document initiating the proceedings, shall be headed by the identification of the file to which it

corresponds, and where appropriate, shall contain a precise indication of the representation exercised
…."
Administrative proceedings in Argentina are written.
Once again, Argentina would like to draw the Panel's attention to the numerous requests by
the implementing authority to the exporting comp anies concerning documentation to be submitted,
and is ready to provide the Panel with any documents that it may consider relevant in this respect.
Brazil’s Comments
Regarding Argentina’s response, the following observation is in order. We believe that
Argentina has failed to respond to the Panel’s question, that is, to comment on para. 59 of Brazil’s
Second Oral Statement. Paragraph 59 provides that:
“We point out to the Panel that even though the investigating authority also
disregarded the export price information submitted by the exporters Sadia and
Avipal, the investigating authority still calculated the individual margins of dumping
for those two companies. Brazil fails to see the reason why the authority decided to
proceed differently with respect to th e information provided by Frangosul and
Catarinense.”
We have already established, and Argentina confirms, that the export price data submitted by
Frangosul and Catarinense was complete and accompanied by supporting documentation. The
authority could, and should, have used that inform ation to establish the export price data for the two
exporters. We believe that the authority should have also used the normal value information
submitted by Frangosul and Catarinense in the investigation. However, even if the authority was
entitled to disregard the normal value information of these two exporters, which it wasn’t, the
authority could have still determined an individua l dumping margin for them. That is exactly what
the authority did with respect to the exporters Sadia and Avipal. While the authority accepted the
normal value information and disregarded the export price data submitted by them, the authority still
went on to calculate the individual margins of dumping for Sadia and Avipal. Argentina has not
explained why the authority acted differently with respect to Frangosul and Catarinense.
The Panel should note that this is the first time in this proceeding that Argentina presents the
argument that the investigating authority did not accept the information submitted by Catarinense
because the company did not accredit representation. We point out that nowhere in the report prior to
the final determination34 or in the final determination35 does the authority offer that explanation as the
reason why the information submitted by Catarinense was disregarded.
Claim 24
84. In respect of claim 24, please indicate precisely (page number, paragraph number, line
number) where the investigating authority gave the reasons for not making the various
adjustments to the JOX domestic price data, either in the investigating authority's final
determination, or in any other document prepared by the investigating authority at the time of
its determination. If the Panel does not already have a copy of the relevant document, please
provide a copy thereof.

34 Exhibit BRA-28.
35 Exhibit BRA-15.

Response from Argentina
At folio 3040 of the Report on the Final Determination, Section VIII.1.3, there is an
explanation of the circumstances of the request fo r information by the implementing authority to the
President of the JOX publication.
Brazil’s Comments
In responding to the Panel’s question, Argentina refers to Section VIII.1.3 of the final
determination36, where supposedly the investigating authority gave the reasons for not making the
various adjustments to the JOX domestic price data. We note that the passage referred to by
Argentina simply provides that the Argentinean authority requested JOX, on 25 June 1999 and on
27 July 1999, to provide an explanation of the taxes included in the published prices, as well as the
general conditions to which the prices were subject to. That passage further provides that, on
28 July 1999 and on 3 August 1999, JOX submitted the requested information in Portuguese. The
Panel will note that in the final determination the investigating authority did not indicate that the
various adjustments reported by JOX would not be made to the domestic price data, nor did it provide
the reasons for not making such adjustments.
85. Did the investigating authority ask JOX to provide a Spanish translation of its letter of 3
August 1999 through which JOX had given informat ion in Portuguese? If so, please provide a
copy of the document containing that request.
Response from Argentina
The translation was not requested because it was assumed that the parties to the anti-dumping
proceedings, to which the National Law on Administrative Procedures applies on a residual basis,
would know what was required under that Law.
Brazil’s Comments
Argentina confirms that the investigating au thority did not ask JOX to provide a Spanish
translation of its 3 August 1999 letter. 37 Argentina justifies the authority’s failure to request the
translation by stating that the parties intervenin g in a dumping proceeding know the requirements for
submitting such information.38
Regarding Argentina’s justification, we remind the panel the following. First, the information
submitted by JOX was a result of a request made by the investigating authority and not by the
Brazilian exporters or petitioner. It is important that the Panel note that JOX is a private entity, not
related to the Brazilian government or any of th e Brazilian exporters subject to the investigation.
Thus, according to the definition of “interested parties” in Article 6.11 of the Agreement, JOX did not
qualify as an interested party in the investigation proceeding, and was under no obligation to respond
to the Argentinean authorities much less to provide a translation of its response in Spanish. Second,
even after JOX provided information on the various adjustments to its published domestic prices, the
authority still did not request the translation. We point out that the authority could, and should, have
requested the translation or translated the information themselves. Brazil believes that if the
Argentinean authority decided to use the JOX inform ation to establish the normal value for all other
exporters, it should have taken into account JOX’s explanation on taxes, financial discount, sales
commission and freight for the published prices. Third, under Article 2.4 of the Agreement due

36 Page 56 of Exhibit BRA-15.
37 ARS, question 85.
38 Id.

allowance in a fair comparison is an obligation of th e investigating authority. If the authority knows
that there are differences between the export price and the normal value, which affect price
comparability, the authority is required to make that adjustment. Once JOX provided that its
published domestic prices include taxes, financial cost, sales commission and freight, the authority
was obligated to make these adjustments.
86. Please comment on para. 68 of Brazil’s second oral statement.
Response from Argentina
We agree with Brazil in theory that to conduct a fair comparison, all of the appropriate
adjustments need to be made both to the normal value and the export price.
However, in the case at issue, with respect to the JOX publication the information that would
have made it possible to carry out some of the adjustments that Brazil mentions did not comply with
the requirements of the National Law on Administra tive Procedures (Law No. 19549) in that under
Article 28 of Decree No. 1759/72 regulating the said Law, documentation in a foreign language must
be translated into Spanish by a registered translator.
Brazil’s Comments
Apparently, Argentina agrees with Brazil that in order to make a fair comparison, all
necessary adjustments should be made to normal value and export price. 39 Argentina, however, fails
to comment on paragraph 68 of Brazil’s second oral statement, where we explain why the authority
should have, at least, made an adjustment in the normal value to exclude taxes and financial cost
included in the JOX prices, in order to make a fair comparison. A more detailed explanation on why
the authority should have excluded taxes and financial cost from the JOX published domestic prices is
provided in our response to the Panel’s questions in the second substantive meeting.
40
Claim 32
87. Please indicate precisely (page number, paragraph number, line number) where the
investigating authority explained why it looked at 1999 data for only certain injury factors and
not others, either in the investigating authority' s final determination, or in any other document
prepared by the investigating authority at the time of its determination. If the Panel does not
already have a copy of the relevant document, please provide a copy thereof.
Response from Argentina
Lines 1 to 6 in the second paragraph of Section V (State of the Domestic Industry) of Record
No. 576 of 23 December 1999, which appears in CNCE File No. 43/1997 (folio 7313), clearly state
that:
"The 'period under analysis' corresponds to the period from January 1996 to December 1998.
For certain variables, such as domestic production, prices, imports, national exports and
apparent consumption, data is included for the first half of 1999. Data for 1995 is provided
for reference purposes. Variations for the first half of 1999 are against the same period for
the previous year." (Emphasis added)

39 ARS, question 86.
40 Brazil Response to the Panel’s Questions in the Second Substantive Meeting (“BRS”), question 93.

Nevertheless, Argentina reiterates what it stated in its two previous submissions, and for a
better understanding of the overall context, we repeat our reply that:
"First of all, there is no obligation to analyse any indicator outside the period established by
the authorities as the investigation period.
In accordance with international practice in certain countries, Argentina considered a number
of variables accessible to the public in order to double check the trends observed during the
investigation period. If we were to insist on the constant updating of all indicators during the
investigation, as Brazil seems to suggest in this case, the investigation would be endless. We
repeat that this is not the objective of the AD Agreement, nor is it the practice of those
countries which, like Argentina, examine certain relevant indicators of reference data."
It should be noted that the determination of threat of injury was based on the period from
January 1996 to December 1998, and the other data, as stated in previous replies and in the Record in
question was used for reference purposes.
Brazil’s Comments
In responding to the Panel’s question, Argentina fails to provide where the investigating
authority explained why it looked at 1999 data for only certain injury factors and not others. The
passage referred to by Argentina clearly states that the data corresponding to the year 1995 is used by
way of reference.
41 However, that same passage does not provide that the data corresponding to the
first semester of 1999 is used by way of reference. What that passage provides is that the data for the
variables national production, prices, imports, national exports and apparent consumption
corresponding to the first semester of 1999 were included 42 in the period of injury analysis. Had the
authority intended to use the data for the first semester of 1999 merely as reference, the authority
would have clearly stated this in the final determinat ion, just as it did with the data for the year 1995.
In this investigation, the Argentinean authority considered a certain period of injury analysis for the
factors production, prices, imports, exports and apparent consumption and considered another period
of injury analysis for the remaining Article 3.4 factors.
Claim 38
88. Please explain precisely how Table 16 of Act No. 576 (para. 292 of Argentina's first
written submission) constitutes an evaluation of "factors affecting domestic prices" within the
meaning of Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. Please provide a more detailed explanation than
that set forth in paragraph 74 of Argentina's second oral statement.
Response from Argentina
Table No. 16, which belongs to Technical Report GEGE/1TDF No. 03/99 and is an integral
part of Record No. 576, provides the average sales revenue for one kilogram of eviscerated poultry,
fresh or chilled, and the relative prices of the comparable product, with regard to the price of
industrial goods taken as a whole and of bovine meat – represented respectively by the Wholesale
Industrial Price Index for Manufactured Goods and the simple average of the consumer price indices
for fresh bovine meat, front and hind cuts.

41 ARS, question 87 and Page 9 of Exhibit BRA-14.
42 Id.

The comparison made with respect to the Wholesale Industrial Price Index for Manufactured
Goods was based on the need to assess whether the price of the product in question was following the
same trend as the other manufactured goods.
With regard to the second index, Argentina has traditionally been a consumer of red meat, so
that it was considered appropriate to use this index to analyse the impact of variations in that product
on poultry meat as from a certain degree of substitution between bovine meat and poultry meat.
As can be seen from the table, the two relative prices analysed followed the same trend as
average sales revenue for the product in question, although in the case of the price in relation to the
simple average for bovine meat the annual variations reflected a stronger decrease in 1998 as a result
of the increase in the price of bovine meat recorded that year. Indeed, as indicated in the Market
Chapter of Technical Report GEGE/ITDF No. 03/99, Section VI.5 (Recent evolution of the market),
folio 7371, paragraph 3: during 1998 there was a further increase in the demand for poultry as a result
of the substitution effect following the sharp increases in the price of bovine meat, which reached its
peak in the middle of 1998. No decline in the consumption of poultry was recorded following the
subsequent fall in the price of bovine meat. This is because the market perception is that the price of
poultry is so low that it is even pushing the price of bovine meat downwards.
Consequently Article 3.4 was clearly taken into consideration where it provides that "[t]he
examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry,
including … factors affecting domestic prices …".
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
89. Regarding Argentina's reply to question 59 concerning paragraph 80 of Brazil's first
oral statement, please provide exact citations (e.g., page number, paragraph number, line
number) for the various extracts from Act No. 576.
Response from Argentina
Concerning the citations referred to in paragraph 80:
• The citation "An econometric exercise was conducted which showed that for the
period from January 1995 to June 1999, the price of the product on the domestic
market depended on the volume of imports for the previous month, the price of the
imported product and the price of bovine meat. The inclusion of the price of maize in
the mentioned model did not produce satisfactory results, indicating that the
considerable variability of the price of whole eviscerated poultry does not coincide
with the price of maize. Nevertheless, both variables showed similar patterns … "
can be found in Section VIII (Conditions of Competition between the Like Product
and the Imported Product), § 1, folio 7328, last paragraph, and folio 7329, first
paragraph.
• The citation according to which "[t]he economic recession did not particularly affect
the consumption of whole eviscerated poultry, which continued to increase (in 1998 it
increased by 14 per cent)" can be found in Section VIII (Conditions of Competition
between the Like Product and the Imported Product), § 1, folio 7329,
second paragraph.

• Finally, the citation "… with regard to th e price of industrial goods taken as a whole
and of bovine meat - represented respectively by the Wholesale Industrial Price Index
for Manufactured Goods and the simple average of the consumer price indices for
fresh bovine meat, front and hind cuts - followed the same trend as the sales revenue
described above, although in the case of bovine meat, the annual variations reflected a
stronger decrease in 1998 as a result of the increase in the price of bovine meat
recorded that year" can be found in Section V (State of the Domestic Industry), at
folio 7318, last paragraph.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
Questions to both parties
Claim 21
95. What are 'essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decisions
whether to apply definitive measures' within the meaning of Article 6.9 ADA? In particular,
would 'essential facts' cover only facts or also reasoning supporting a certain conclusion?
Response from Argentina
They are the facts upon which the implementing authority bases its conclusions.
Brazil’s Comments
No comments.
96. At para. 9.229 of its report, the panel in Guatemala – Cement II found that:
'An interested party will not know whether a particular fact is "important" or
not unless the investigating authority has explicitly identified it as one of the
"essential facts" which form the basis of the authority's decision whether to
impose definitive measures.'
Would you agree with the above finding? Please explain.
Response from Argentina
Argentina agrees with the position of the Panel in Guatemala – Cement II - indeed, all that is
reported in the Report on Action Taken makes up the facts which will form the basis of the authority's
decision, a circumstance of which the implementing authority informs the interested parties.
Brazil’s Comments
Argentina states that all information contained in the report prior to the final determination
(Exhibit BRA-28) make up the facts which form the basis of the authority’s decision whether to
impose definitive measures. 43 We do not agree with Argentina’s statement. The Panel should
carefully look at Exhibit BRA-28 in order to verify that the authority did not explicitly identify what
facts were considered “essential facts”, which would form the basis of the authority’s decision

43 ARS, question 96.

whether to impose definitive measures. In fact, wh at Exhibit BRA-28 presents is a summary of the
information submitted by the various interested parties in the files of the investigation. Without
explicitly indicating to the interested parties what the “essential facts” under consideration were, the
authority failed to provide the exporters with the opportunity to defend their interests.
Claim 22
97. What do parties understand by the words "for each known exporter or producer
concerned of the product under investigation" contained in the first sentence of Article 6.10? In
the view of the parties, would the cited portion of the first sentence of Article 6.10 require the
calculation of an individual margin of dumping for each exporter known to the investigating
authority? Would that also be the case wh en a known exporter does not provide relevant
information requested by the investigating authority? Please explain.
Response from Argentina
A condition for the determination of an individual margin of dumping for each exporter is that
the exporter should be known, and should supply the documentation needed to reach such a
determination.
Brazil’s Comments
According to Argentina, in order for the au thority to determine an individual margin of
dumping, two conditions are required: (1) that the exporter be known to the authority; and, (2) that
the exporter present the necessary documentation to enable the calculation of the individual margin.44
We must point out that nothing in Article 6.10 of the Agreement requires that the exporter
present the necessary documentation, as a condition for the authority to determine an individual
dumping margin. Under Article 6.10, the authority must determine an individual margin of dumping
for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In that regard, the
exporters Frangosul and Catarinenese were known exporters/producers of the product under
investigation. Both companies presented normal value and export price information during the
investigation, being that the export price data submitted by these exporters was accompanied by
supporting documentation. Accordingly, the authority was obligated to determine an individual
dumping margin for the two exporters.
We have, nonetheless, also provided that the fact that an exporter has not submitted the
relevant or appropriate information to establish normal value or export price does not exclude the
authority’s obligation under Article 6.10 to determine an individual margin of dumping for that
exporter.
45 If the known exporter does not provide the relevant information necessary to calculate
normal value or export price, but the authority still has access to individual information for that
exporter, the investigating authority is still required to calculate the individual margin of dumping.
We emphasize that there is a difference between applying facts available, as provided in Article 6.8 of
the Agreement, to a specific exporter and not calculating the individual dumping margin for that
exporter. In cases where the authority does not have the relevant normal value or export price data
and the authority is entitled to resort to facts av ailable, the facts available applicable to a specific
exporter may be different from the facts available applicable to another exporter. Accordingly, the
calculation of the individual margins for those two exporters will also be different.

44 ARS, question 97.
45 BRS, questions 90, 97 and 98.

98. In the view of the parties, would the fi ndings in paras. 6.86 to 6.101 (both included) of
the panel Argentina – Ceramic Tiles be applicable to the facts in this dispute? In particular,
would the following finding of the panel be relevant to the current dispute: 'The basis of the
normal value determination has no bearing on the ability to calculate an individual dumping
margin for the producer whose normal value is in question.'? Would the lack of information on
normal value, export price or cost of producti on, automatically allow the non-calculation of an
individual dumping of margin in accordance with Article 6.10? Please explain, identifying and
providing relevant factual support to the Panel.
Response from Argentina
It does not apply to the present case, since in the arguments of the Ceramic Tiles case, the
investigating authority, in calculating the margin of dumping, took account of circumstances relating
to "cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so
large as to make such a determination impracticable …". In other words, the considerations on which
the Panel relied were related to the fact that th e Argentine authority had decided to determine the
margin of dumping on the basis of "a reasonable number of interested parties … using samples which
are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the authorities at the time of the
selection, …". Thus, the findings are not applicable to this case.
Brazil’s Comments
Even though in Argentina - Ceramic Tiles the Argentinean authority calculated the dumping
margin based on the second sentence of Article 6.10, which limits the examination of the authority to
certain producers and exporters, the reasoning provided by that Panel with respect to the interpretation
of Article 6.10 is, nonetheless, correct and applicable to this case.
In particular, we cite to the following passage in that report:
“(...) Article 9.4 provides that, where the authorities limit their examination under
Article 6.10, the anti-dumping duty for exporters or producers that are not examined
shall not exceed a level determined on the basis of the results of the examination of
those exporters or producers that were examined. That Article 9.4 does not provide
any methodology for determining the level of duties applicable to exporters or
producers that are examined in our view confirms that the general rule requiring
individual margins remains applicable to those exporters or producers. We find
further confirmation in Article 6.10.2, which requires that, in general, an individual
margin of dumping must be calculated even for the producers/exporters not initially
included in the sample, if they provide the necessary information and if to do so is not
unduly burdensome. If even producers not included in the original sample are
entitled to an individual margin calculation, then it follows that producers that were
included in the original sample are entitled as well. Indeed, the parties appear to
agree that Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement requires that as a rule an individual
margin of dumping has to be determined for each exporter with regard to the product
subject to investigation.”
46 (emphasis added)
Thus, if that Panel found that producers included or not in a sample, in situations where a
sample was needed, were entitled to an individual margin calculation, then this Panel should also
conclude that in the instant case the producers that were examined, in situations where a sample was
not needed, were also entitled to an individual margin calculation.

46 Argentina – Definitive Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy , 28 September 2001,
WT/DS189/R, at para. 6.90 (adopted on 5 November 2001) (“Argentina – Ceramic Tiles”).

REPLIES BY ARGENTINA TO THE QUESTIONS OF BRAZIL
1 and 2. The Brazilian exporters were informed of the period of data collection at the
preliminary determination stage of the investigation.
As can be seen in the annexes to the Repo rt on the Preliminary Determination, the
implementing authority had already decided that the investigation period would be
January 1998 to January 1999.
All of the exporting companies could clearl y see what investigation period was being
examined by the authority. In the case of AVIPAL, SADIA and FRANGOSUL, the requests for
documentation by the DCD provided indications of what the investigation period to be
examined would be.
Likewise, we refer to the Summary Table attached as a supplement to Argentina's
replies to the questionnaire provided by the Pane l following the First Meeting of the Panel with
the Parties.
3. What basis did the investigating author ity use to select January 1998 through
January 1999 as the period of data collection for dumping purposes, as opposed to the period
1996 through 1998, indicated in the dumping questionnaires sent to Sadia, Avipal and
Frangosul?
Brazil’s Comments
The Panel should observe that the Argentinean investigating authority did not clearly and
specifically establish in the preliminary determination that the dumping period of data collection was
from January 1998 through January 1999.
47 It is also important to note that the investigating authority
sent a letter to petitioner on 1 June 1999, requesting that petitioner update the information regarding
normal value in Brazil for the period January 1998 through January 1999.48 No similar letter was sent
from the authority to the Brazilian exporters prior to the preliminary determination. In fact, the
investigating authority did not use any of the normal value and export price information submitted by
the Brazilian exporters for the years 1996 through 1999 in the preliminary dumping determination. It
was only on 12 October 1999 and on 18 October 1999, that the authority sent a letter to Avipal,
Frangosul, Sadia, Nicolini and Seara requesting that they provide a list of transactions and invoices
for sales in the internal market from January 1998 through January 1999. Nine months after the
investigation was initiated and after a preliminary determination had been issued, the authority chose
to establish and inform the Brazilian exporters of the data collection period for the dumping
investigation.
It was also only on 15 September 1999, that the authority sent a letter to the Brazilian
exporters CCLP, Catarinense, Chapecó, Minuano, Perdigão, Comaves and Pena Branca notifying
them of the investigation and inviting them to provide questionnaire responses.
49
On a final note, if the authority determined the period of investigation based on the
information corresponding to the period closest to initiation, why did the authority request normal
value and export price information for the years 1996 through 1999, and why didn’t the authority
establish the period of investigation as soon as the investigation was initiated?

47 Exhibit BRA-11
48 Page 10 of Exhibit BRA-11.
49 Exhibit BRA-13.