Document: WT/DS335/R Page C-1 ANNEX C SUBMISSIONS OF THIRD PARTIES Contents Page Annex C-1 Oral Statement of Brazil C-2
Document codes: WT/DS335/R
Complainant: Ecuador
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Brazil, Chile, China, EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Thailand
Dispute stage: Panel
Agreements cited: Art. 2.4.2  Anti-dumping

ANNEX C

SUBMISSIONS OF THIRD PARTIES

Contents Page
Annex C-1 Oral Statement of Brazil C-2
Annex C-2 Answer of Brazil to Question Posed by the Panel C-4
Annex C-3 Written Submission of Chile C-5
Annex C-4 Oral Statement of Chile C-6
Annex C-5 Answer of Chile to Question Posed by the Panel C-7
Annex C-6 Oral Statement of China C-8
Annex C-7 Written Submission of the European Communities C-9
Annex C-8 Answer of the Europ ean Communities to Question Posed
 by the Panel
C-11
Annex C-9 Oral Statement of India C-13
Annex C-10 Answer of India to Question Posed by the Panel C-14
Annex C-11 Oral Statement of Japan C-15
Annex C-12 Answer of Korea to Question Posed by the Panel C-16
Annex C-13 Written Submission of Mexico C-18
Annex C-14 Oral Statement of Mexico C-23
Annex C-15 Answer of Mexico to Question Posed by the Panel C-25
Annex C-16 Oral Statement of Thailand C-26

ANNEX C-1

ORAL STATEMENT OF BRAZIL

1. Brazil wishes to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to present our
considerations about the present dispute. Our deci sion to join as third party derives from both a
systemic and trade interest in the matter to be examined by you. "Zeroing" is an issue of great concern
for Brazil, as well as for all but one Members of the WTO. In addition, Brazilian exports of shrimp to
the US market are also affected by an anti-dum ping measure resulting from the same investigation
that Ecuador has decided to challenge.

2. Given the large and rich body of WTO decisi ons against "zeroing", Brazil could have opted to
address a series of issues the parties to the dis pute have chosen not to tackle, according to the
Agreement on Procedures .
1 Nonetheless, and in order not to o ffer an excuse for the United States to
depart from the bilateral commitment established therein, we will present only some general
comments on "zeroing" in the context of the so- called "weighted average-to-weighted average"
comparison at the original investigation stage.

3. In no way, though, Brazil's decision should be read as acquiescence to interpretations such as,
for instance, that the prohibition on "zeroing" wo uld result from, and be stifled by, a very narrow
reading of Article 2.4.2 and the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent as a whole. We reaffirm that it is clear
under the AD Agreement that "zeroing" is never
 permissible.

4. For Brazil, the issue at stake in this case is qu ite simple. In short, "zeroing inflates the margin
of dumping for the product as a whole" 2, "may lead to an affirmative determination that dumping
exists where no dumping would have been established in the absence of zeroing" 3 and, also in the
words of the Appellate Body, that methodology encloses an "inherent bias" 4 that, according to Brazil,
"taints", any investigation or review. "Zeroing" is, by definition, the denial of the parameters of
objectivity and fairness that permeate the whole AD Agreement and are expressly referred to in
Article 17.6. By resorting to "zeroing", an inves tigating authority's assessment of the facts cannot be
"unbiased and objective", thus rendering the results of the investigation inconsistent with the WTO
rules.

5. As mentioned before, there exists a str ong body of WTO decisions condemning "zeroing".
Not surprisingly, most of those decisions are dir ected at the United States, which remains the only
WTO Member to systematically use "zeroing" in its anti-dumping investigations and reviews. For
the moment, the Appellate Body has had three oppor tunities to reiterate the inherent illegality of
"zeroing" as practiced by the United States. I refe r the panel to the Appellate Body reports in US –
Softwood Lumber V (DS 264, original and compliance proceedings) and US – Zeroing (DS 294, at the
request of the EC). A fourth pronouncement by the Appellate Body – hopefully the last one – is
expected to be handed out early January.

1 Exhibit ECU-1 to Written Submission of Ecuador.
2 United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R,
adopted 31 August 2004.
3 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted on 9 January 2004, at para.135.
4 Idem, ibidem.

6. Despite this, the United States insists to pr olong litigation on a matter that should have been
out of the multilateral agenda since long ago. Today' s case is one more example of such tactics, but
the list would still enco mpass at least other three recent di sputes touching upon US "zeroing":
US – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (DS 350), US – Final Anti-
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (DS 344), and US – Measures relating to Shrimp
from Thailand (DS 343).

7. We are convinced that the option chosen by th e United States will even tually reveal – as it is
already doing – its absolute inad equacy to the objective pursued. We regret, however, that, at the
same time, such an option may pose considerable ri sks to the credibility of the multilateral system for
the resolution of disputes.

8. The fact that the United St ates has been able to sign the Agreement on Procedures with
Ecuador is a clear signal that not even the United States believes "zeroing" is permissible under the
AD Agreement. Why not end once and for all the a pplication of "zeroing" in its AD procedures,
instead of forcing other Members to engage in l itigation, albeit in an ap parently fastened and
simplified procedure? Also, why insist, on appeal , on the maintenance of decisions in frontal
opposition to previous reports of the Appellate Body, as illustrated by the compliance panel in
US – Softwood Lumber V and the panel in the dispute brought by Japan against "zeroing"? The US
decision to continue the disputes gives the strong impression that the United States may be
comfortable with such a high rate of risk to the security and predictability the WTO dispute settlement
system is supposed to provide.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Panel,

9. Let me conclude by saying that, given that the parties to the dispute have not revoked
Article 11 of the DSU, you are bound by the requirement of assessing objectively the facts of the case.
We believe that you are fully equipped to find that the AD measure applied against Ecuador's shrimp
exports to the United States constitutes a clear viol ation of the AD Agreement. Ecuador has made its
prima facie case. The respondent has not contested the accuracy of Ecuador's claims. On top of that,
the Appellate Body has undeniably made it clear that "zeroing" in the "weighted average-to-weighted
average" comparison of normal value and export pri ces during original investig ations is inconsistent
with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Simple as it may seem, your task is, in our view, of a
significant relevance. Brazil is confident that this Panel will provide us with a new and strong nail in
the US "zeroing"'s coffin.

Thank you, very much.

ANNEX C-2

ANSWER OF BRAZIL TO QUESTION
POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q1. What does your delegation consider is the ro le of a Panel in a case like this one, where
there is no substantive disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure with
one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to sanctioning the
mutual understanding of the parties, or must the Panel, on its own, determine whether the
measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?

Reply

 As Brazil pointed out in its Or al Statement of 3 November, the procedural agreement between
Ecuador and the United States – the so-called 'Agr eement on Procedures' (Exhibit ECU-1) – have not,
and could not have, revoked Article 11 of the DSU.
 In addition, solely from the text of that bila teral agreement, it does not appear to be possible
to necessarily conclude that there is no substantive dispute or disagreement between the parties. The
United States committed only to not contesting Ecuador 's (limited) claims. The text of the bilateral
agreement does not spell out any US assent on th e righteousness of Ecuador's claims, although a
decision not to contest the complainant's case would, in practice, seem very unlikely if the respondent
truly believes its measure is WTO-consistent.
 As an illustration of the US position, Brazil refers the Panel to the US Oral Statement, where it
is said that '[…] the submission of the European Communities ("EC") […] makes assertions that are
false. […] [T]he EC asserts that th e United States has rec ognized 'that zeroing is inconsistent with the
'Anti-Dumping Agreement' [footnote omitted], even though the EC know full well that a panel recently
agreed with the United States that 'zeroing' is not always WTO-inconsistent."
1
 Finally, the Panel's task derives from, and is limited by, the terms of reference established by the
DSB in accordance with Article 7 of the DSU, which were not modified by the 'Agreement on Procedures'.
 In light of the above, this Panel is, ther efore, bound by the duty to 'make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an obj ective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements'. In order to discharge its burde n, the Panel may even resort to Article 13 of the
DSU to seek relevant information, if it deems appropriate and necessary.
 If, however, this Panel considers that the bilate ral agreement reflects the absence of substantive
disagreement between the parties to the dispute and constitutes a mutually agreed solution, it should
follow Article 12.7 of the DSU, third sentence. Its report should, thus, be limited to 'a brief description
of the case and to reporting that a solution has b een reached'. For Brazil, echoing systemic concerns
expressed by other third parties to this proceeding, panels are not intended to simply homologate
bilateral agreements. In fact, by the very terms of Article 12.7, panels are not entitled to make findings
and recommendations in case a bilateral solution for the dispute has been found by the parties.

ANNEX C-3

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CHILE

30 October 2006

1. Chile thanks the panel for this opportunity to submit its point of views on this dispute. We
reserved our third party rights in view of our syst emic interest involved in the allegations made by
Ecuador. However, considering the understanding reached by Ecuador and the United States, we will
limit to express some general comments.

2. Chile regrets that the United States continues applying "zeroing" methodology despite that
reiterated reports by Panels and th e Appellate Body have concluded that the use of this methodology
in determining anti-dumping margins is inconsiste nt with Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (An ti-Dumping Agreement), even in cases against the
United States. Furthermore, we regret that this situation, until now, has not been enough to amend its
laws and administrative practices on the matter.

3. Chile expresses its satisfaction for the cons tructive manner through which both parties, but
particularly the United States, have faced this di spute and the situation arising from the lack of
legislative and administrative amendments to eliminate zeroing methodology. This bilateral
agreement shows that the Dispute Settlement U nderstanding provides for the necessary flexibilities
for parties in order to adjust the procedures in specific issues, bearing always in mind the main
objective of the system, namely the prompt and satis factory settlement of the matters raised under the
mechanism. Thus, examples as this , of an efficient handling of DSU's flexibilities, should make us
reflect carefully on some of the proposals presented during the DSU negotiations.

4. Notwithstanding the above, a bilateral solu tion such as the one reached in this case is
constrained by its own scope and involves high costs for the parties and the system, for instance, to
initiate a procedure knowing beforehand its outcome . Hence a definitive and multilateral solution
(erga omnes ) to the use of the zeroing methodology is required which implies, necessarily, the
amendment of the relevant laws and administrative practices of the Unites States.

5. We would like to end pointing out that we ar e pleased that the Department of Commerce has
initiated a public consultation pro cess in order to eliminate such methodology and we expect that the
conduct shown by the United States in this case reflect s a signal of a deep change that benefits all
WTO Members.

ANNEX C-4

ORAL STATEMENT OF CHILE

3 November 2006

1. I should like to thank you, Mr Chairman, and the members of the Panel for giving my country
the opportunity to express its views on this dispute. With regard to the understanding reached by
Ecuador and United States I shall limit my comments to the following points.
2. Chile regrets the fact that the United States is continuing to apply the methodology of zeroing,
despite the fact that a number of Panel and Appellate Body reports have concluded that the use of that
methodology for the determination of anti-dumping marg ins is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Furthermore, we deplore the fact that, despite such conclusions and the
express recognition by the United States in its wr itten submission that the methodology of zeroing is
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the United States has not amended its laws and
administrative practices in this field.
3. Without prejudice to the merits contained in bilateral understandings such as that reached by
Ecuador and United States, in general terms they are r estricted by their own scope of application, i.e.,
their effects only apply to the parties to the agreemen t, while what is required in this particular case is
a multilateral solution ( erga omnes). The amendment by the United States of the relevant laws and
administrative practices in such a way as to prohibi t the use of the methodology of zeroing by the
investigating authorities is the only definitive solu tion and the only means by which the United States
will be able to bring its laws and regulations into conformity with its WTO obligations.
4. Thank you very much.

ANNEX C-5

ANSWER OF CHILE TO QUESTION
POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q1. What does your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where
there is no substantive disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure
with one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to
sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parti es, or must the Panel, on its own, determine
whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?

1. Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understa nding (DSU) provides that panels should make
an objective assessment of the matter before them, including an objective assessment of the facts of
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.
2. Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the ro le of the Panel in the dispute in question,
given the agreement reached by the Parties, is to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case
on the basis of the submissions by Ecuador that are not contested by the United States. Subsequently,
it must carry out an objective assessment of the applicability of the covered agreements on the basis of
the submissions by Ecuador not contested by the Unit ed States (the law). Finally, it must objectively
assess the conformity of the measure with those agre ements, again on the basis of the submissions by
Ecuador not contested by the United States.
3. In particular, the Panel should review the pr ecedents in the matter (cited by Ecuador) which
corroborate that country's submissions and which were likewise not contested by the United States.
4. On the basis of the above-mentioned steps, th e Panel should conclude that the measure at
issue is inconsistent, as claimed by Ecuador (without this being contested by the United States).

ANNEX C-6

ORAL STATEMENT OF CHINA

3 November 2006

 Firstly, China wishes to thank you for giving us this opportunity to appear before you today
and make this statement.

 Secondly, China wishes to make several co mments on the procedural aspect of the present
dispute. Although WTO members still have divergent views on accelerated process of the panel and
appellate proceeding in the DSU negotiations con cerning disputes related to measures previously
found inconsistent, it is interesting to note the two pa rties have managed to put it into practice in this
case.

 Nevertheless, we believe that there are some important elements that the panel should not
neglect when dealing with the present dispute.

 Firstly, Article 12.7 of the DSU states: "Where a settlement of the matter among the parties
to the dispute has been found, the report of the pane l shall be confined to a brief description of the
case and to reporting that a solution has been reach ed". According to Article 12.7, the panel should
refrain itself from making a determination concerni ng the consistency of measures under review if
disputing parties have reached a solution. In the present case, it seems that the two parties have
reached agreement on how to settle the dispute. We al so note neither party in this dispute referred in
its first written submission to Articles 3.6, or 12.7 of the DSU. They choose not to settle the dispute
directly. Instead, the comp laining party requested the panel to conclude the measure in dispute was
inconsistent with relevant WTO rules, and the de fending party did not make any rebuttal. We have
concerns in this regard since this practice certainly will have systemic implications to future disputes.

 We are also concerned how the panel will di scharge its obligation of making an objective
assessment of the matter before it in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU. The parties are entitled
to request a panel to suspend its work or produ ce a brief description of the case under circumstance of
a mutually satisfactory solution in accordance with the DSU. Howeve r, can disputing parties ask a
panel to make an automatic finding following their b ilateral agreement, and, does this approach mean
that understanding reached by both parties may be auto matically translated into a finding of a panel
and the recommendation of the DSB? Apparently the DSU does not provide clear answers. We
believe the reflections of the panel will be helpful to all Members.

 It leads to the conclusion of China's oral stat ement and I wish to thank you for your patience.

ANNEX C-7

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

30 October 2006

1. The Parties mutually agreed an "Agreement on Procedures"1, 5 days after the Panel was
established, by which they agree :
• to co-operate and expedite the Panel pro ceedings, allowing for the adoption of a final
report by the DSB no later than 31 October 2006; that there should be working
procedures that provide for one written subm ission and at most one meeting; and the
exchange of draft submissions;
• the US will not contest Ecuador's claim that the measures identified in Ecuador's request for
the establishment of the Panel are inc onsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, on the grounds stated in the Appellate Body Report in US-Softwood Lumber V;
• Ecuador will not request that the Panel suggest, pursuant to Article 19.1, second sentence,
of the DSU, ways in which the US could implement the Panel's recommendations;
• a reasonable period of time within the meaning of Article 21.3(b) of the DSU of six
months, beginning on the date on which the DSB adopts the Panel Report;
• the US will recalculate the relevant margins of dumping to render them consistent with
the findings of the Panel, including the cash deposit rate, with prospective effect; and that
• certain matters will not be raised by Ecuador , such as consistency with other provisions
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ; the position with respect to Exportadora de
Alimentos S.A. and (by implication) the a pplication in time of the implementation and
(by implication) the method used for recalculation of the dumping margin.

2. The Agreement on Procedures thus contains paragraphs by which the Parties agree on the
procedures that are to govern certain aspects of the Pa nel proceedings. It also contains paragraphs by
which the Parties agree that the US will not contest the claim; Ecuador will not request the Panel to
suggest, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, ways in which the US could implement the Panel's
recommendations; and by which the manner and timi ng of implementation are agreed. Thus, in the
opinion of the EC, the Agreement on Procedures not only resolves certain procedural issues, it also
represents, at least in part, a resolution or solution of the dispute between the Parties.

3. Following the conclusion of the Agreement on Pr ocedures, the Panel was composed and issued
a timetable providing for the exchange of written and oral pleadings and the issuing of a Panel Report.

4. The Parties notified the Agreement on Procedures to the WTO on 25 October 2006.
2

1 Agreement on Procedures between Ecuador and the United States in the dispute United States – Anti-
Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador (WT/DS335), Exhibit Ecu-1 (the "Agreement on Procedures") to
Written Submission of Ecuador.
2 WT/DS335/8.

5. Neither Party refers in its fi rst written submission to Articles 3.6,
3 or 12.74 of the DSU.

6. It appears to the EC that what the Parties appear to have in mind is an innovative approach, rather
in the nature of a court sanctioned agreement between the Parties. In the opinion of the EC, the ability of
parties to a dispute to agree certain matters, and to then have such agreement translated into findings and
recommendations of a panel and eventually the DSB, of equal weight in practice vis a vis other WTO
Members as a "conventional" panel report, may not be unlimited. The EC believes that its concerns in this
respect may be shared by other Members of the WTO. A panel has a basic obligation under Article 11 of
the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case. Such assessment should include the facts, evidence and legal argument. In the opinion of
the EC, where certain matters are put to the Panel as agreed between the parties, that might consequently
have an effect on the precise terms of the findings that the panel can make, which findings are eventually
to be adopted by the DSB. A panel should therefore exercise particular care in this respect, particularly
where, as in this case, the dispute touches on matters that the complaining party does not pursue.

7. In the particular factual circumstances of the present case, the EC naturally welcomes the
resolution of the dispute, and do es not object to the manner of proceeding chosen by the Parties.
However, the EC wishes to emphasise that the ma nner of proceeding chosen by the Parties evidently
cannot affect the rights of WTO Members which ar e not parties to the Agreement on Procedures.
Similarly, the EC wishes to emphasise that, on the substance of the matter, nothing in the Agreement
on Procedures or the envisaged Panel Report can affect the rights of other WTO Members.

8. Finally, also on the substance of the matter, the EC welcomes the US recognition that zeroing is
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The EC hopes and trusts that the US will treat all WTO
Members in the same way when it comes to the quest ion of zeroing. Specifically, the EC recalls that
all Members, including the US, have affirmed their adherence to the principles for the management of
disputes; that the dispute settlement system is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trade system; that th e prompt settlement of disputes is essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintena nce of a proper balance between the rights and
obligations of the Members; that all Members have agreed to engage in DSU procedures in good faith
in an effort to resolve disputes; and that all Members undertake to accord sympathetic consideration to
representations made by any other Member.
5

9. In the light of such considerations, the EC trusts that the US will also not contest similar
zeroing claims with which it is currently confronted,6 or with which it will be confronted in the future.

10. Furthermore, the EC trusts that the US will forthwith take the necessary steps to terminate the
"as such" measures by which the US maintains its zeroing methodology.

3 "Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notifie d to the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees,
where any Member may raise any point relevant thereto."
4 "Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel
shall submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the report of a panel shall set
out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and
recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of the matter among the parties to the dispute has been
found, the report of the panel shall be confined to a br ief description of the case and to reporting that a solution
has been reached."
5 DSU, Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.10 and 4.2.
6 Such as, for example, DS322 United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews
(on appeal); DS350 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology ; DS344
United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico.

ANNEX C-8

ANSWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
TO QUESTION POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q1. What does your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where
there is no substantive disagreement between the Par ties as to the inconsistency of a measure with
one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement ? Can the Panel limit itself to sanctioning
the mutual understanding of the parties , or must the Panel, on its own , determine whether the
measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions ? (emphasis added)

2. The European Communities thanks the Panel for its question, and respectfully responds as
follows.

3. Article 11 of the DSU
1 is entitled "Function of Panels" (the term "function" having a similar
meaning to the term "role" used in the question). It provides as follows :

The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its res ponsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case
and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the
dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.

4. Thus, Article 11 of the DSU does not expressly refer to a panel "sanctioning the mutual
understanding of the parties". Rather it refers to a panel making an "objective assessment" and making
"findings". Such an "objective assessment" and such "findings" are always made by a panel "on its
own", in the sense that the panel takes sole responsibility for them, and is not compelled to follow the
opinion of one or both Parties.

5. An "objective assessment" of the matter includes an assessment of the facts and evidence
relating to the existence and precise content of the measure at issue; the interpretation of the relevant
legal provisions; and the consistency of the measure at issue with the relevant legal provisions. The
precise "findings" to be made by a panel may depend on all the circumstances of the case, and
particularly whether certain matters have been ad mitted by the Defending Party, or agreed between
the Parties.

6. We comment first on the position with respect to facts. There is a distinction between a panel
directly and autonomously finding the relevant f acts; and a panel finding that the Parties have agreed
the relevant facts. In the former case, the factual and evidential record placed before a panel allows
the panel to directly and autonomously find the facts, having regard to the burden of proof. The
admission or agreement of the Defending Party may be part of the evidence taken into consideration
by the panel. In the latter case, what a panel might objectively find is that the Complaining Party has
asserted and the Defending Party admitted certain facts, or that the Parties have agreed certain facts.
Whether the circumstances limit a panel's findings to the latter, or permit the former, depends on all
the facts of the case. In the presen t case, the European Communities believes that the Panel probably

1 EC third party written submission, para 6.

has sufficient basis on which to objectively make, directly and autonomously, the necessary findings
of fact.

7. We turn next to the question of eviden ce. A Complaining Party should normally adduce
evidence to support its factual assertions as part of its prima facie case. The documented agreement of
the Defending Party as to the facts may be releva nt evidence. A panel should make clear on what
evidence it bases whatever factual findings it make s. As indicated above, in the present case, the
European Communities believes that the Panel proba bly has sufficient evidentiary basis on which to
objectively make, directly and autonomously, the necessary findings of fact.

8. Next, we consider the question of the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions . The
European Communities believes that this is an area in which a panel needs to exercise particular care
to ensure that an agreement between the parties is not automatically presented in a final panel report
as an autonomous finding by the panel. Once ag ain, the European Communities would distinguish
between a panel directly and autonomously making th e relevant findings; and a panel finding that the
Parties have agreed the relevant legal interpretations. Wh ether the circumstances limit a panel's
findings to the latter, or permit the former, depends on all the facts of the case. In the present case, the
European Communities believes that the Panel probabl y has sufficient basis on which to objectively
make, directly and autonomously, the necessar y findings. However, the European Communities
observes that the Agreement on Procedures is in certain respects obviously laconic, since it refers only
to the Appellate Body Report in US-Softwood Lumber V, whereas, as is very well known, the zeroing
issue has since been the subject of other Appellate Body case law. In these circumstances, the
European Communities would expect any report drawn up by this Panel not to conflict with such case
law, and indeed to faithfully reflect it, as Mexico explains in its third party written submission.
2

9. Finally, we turn to the question of the consistency of the measure at issue with the relevant
provisions of the covered agreements. The European Communities considers that this may also be
delicate, although less so than the preceding issu e. Once again, the Eur opean Communities would
distinguish between a panel directly and autonomous ly making the relevant findings of inconsistency;
and a panel finding that the Parties have agreed that the measure at issue is inconsistent with a
provision of the covered agreements. Whether the ci rcumstances limit a panel's findings to the latter,
or permit the former, depends on all the facts of the case. In the present case, the European
Communities believes that the Panel probably has sufficient basis on which to objectively make,
directly and autonomously, the necessary findings. And in either case , the European Communities
believes that such finding would translate into a recommendation to the US that it bring the measure
at issue into conformity, thus effectively protecting Ecuador's rights under Article 21.5 of the DSU.

10. In summary, in the opinion of the European Co mmunities, the role (or function) of a panel in
a case like this one is to make an objective assessm ent of the matter placed before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts, evidence, and c onsistency with the cove red agreements, and to
make such findings as the facts, evidence and argum ent permit it to make. It would not fulfil this
function by simply "sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties".

2 Mexico third party written submission, paras 8 to 15.

ANNEX C-9

ORAL STATEMENT OF INDIA

3 November 2006

1. India thanks you for having provided us an o pportunity to present our views as a third party in
this dispute. The issue of zeroing is of extreme systemic importance to the multilateral trading
system. It is regrettable that the United States continues to apply the "zeroing" methodology for
determining anti-dumping margins despite the clear c onclusion reached in several reports of Panels
and the Appellate Body that use of this methodolog y is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Not only is the US continuing to use this methodology but has not yet taken
steps to amend its laws and administrative practices in the matter.

2. Mr. Chairman, we have noted that the US has agreed not to contest the claim of Ecuador in
this case. We have also noted their stated intentio n to initiate a public consu ltation process in order to
eliminate use of this methodology. We are, howev er, unaware as to how, whether and when this
process will lead to an actual elimination of their u se of the "zeroing" methodology. We are also
uncertain of the impact of this specific decision not to contest the claim of Ecuador on their continued
use of this methodology on a wide range of produc ts exported to them from several other countries,
whose trade flows into the US are unduly hampered. That the US continues to prefer the process of
litigation on this issue is evident from three other recent disputes dealing with their use of "zeroing".

3. Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that the US w ill eventually be forced to realise the futility of
pursuing the use of "zeroing". However, we remain d eeply concerned at the impact of their prolonged
use of this methodology on the credibility and pred ictability of the multilateral dispute settlement
system. The time has come, in our opinion, to send out a clear and unified signal on the
unacceptability of the use of "zeroing" by any WTO Member.

ANNEX C-10

ANSWER OF INDIA TO QUESTION
POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q.1 What does your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where
there is no substantive disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure
with one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to
sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parti es, or must the Panel, on its own, determine
whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?

Reply

 India believes that the parties in this case ha ve reached an agreement that is in substance
comparable to a mutually agreed solution. Howe ver, the Agreement on Procedures is not a mutually
agreed solution within the meaning of Article 3. 6 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "D SU"), such as was used, for example, in Japan – Import
Quotas on Dried Laver and Seasoned Laver (DS323).

 Accordingly, we consider that the pane l must comply with its obligation under DSU
Article 11 to make "an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements."

 In this case, the panel's obligation under Artic le 11 of the DSU to examine and resolve the
claim put forward by Ecuador is not affected by the fact that the United States has
indicated that it will not contest Ecuador's claim. Even though the United States is not contesting the
claim, the panel must still examine whether Ecuador has made a prima facie case that the use
of zeroing in the measure at issue was inconsiste nt with Article 2.4.2 and make a finding on that
issue.
1

1As the Appellate Body stated in the EC - Hormones dispute, at para. 104, "a prima facie case is one
which in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule
in favour of the complaining party."

ANNEX C-11

ORAL STATEMENT OF JAPAN

3 November 2006

 I do not have any prepared oral statement t oday but I would like to touch upon a few words
briefly.

 First, I am very curious to know what the pa rties expect from the Panel proceedings under the
circumstances of the almost mutually agreed solution, which is reflected in the document
WT/DS335/8. It seems to me that both parties ar e already in a position to submit the MAS (mutually
agreed) solution under 3.6 of the DSU.

 In substance, in the field of zeroing, we accep t the conclusion of the parties that the measures
are inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, first senten ce, on the grounds stated in the Softwood Lumber
Appellate Body Report, which said "dumping" a nd "margins of dumping" can only be established
for the product as a whole". This is in paragraph 99 . In this context, I would also like to draw the
attention of the Panel that the WTO dispute settlement has accumulated the important jurisprudence in
the field of zeroing since this Lumber Appellate Body Report, such as Softwood Lumber 21.5 and
EC-Zeroing. The Softwood Lumber 21.5 Appellate Body Report, paragraph 92, quoting the EC-
Zeroing Appellate Body Report, para graph 126, said: "The Appellate Body underscored that its
previous finding concerning the inconsistency of zeroing under the w-to-w methodology 'was based
not only on Article 2.4.2, first sentence, but also on the context found in Article 2.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement'." I expect that this Panel would take into account such jurisprudence for its
analysis in an appropriate manner.

 We welcome that the United States admitted the inconsistency of zeroing by w-to-w
comparison in investigations but, of course, this does not prejudge Japan's position on legal
interpretation about zeroing in a broader context at all.

 Finally, the EC third party submission touched upon the importance of the implementation.
Japan is of the same view as the EC on this point.

ANNEX C-12

ANSWER OF KOREA TO QUESTION
POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q1. What does your delegation consider to be th e role of a Panel in a case like this one,
where there is no substantive disagreement betw een the Parties as to the inconsistency of a
measure with one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to
sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parti es, or must the Panel, on its own, determine
whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?

1. Article 12.7 of the DSU makes a dichotomy of the situation where a panel shall submit its
report. One is where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution
and the other one is where a settlement of the matter among the parties to the dispute has been found.

2. In the latter situation, mutually agreed so lutions shall be notified to the DSB pursuant to
Article 3.6 of the DSU and the report of the panel sh all be confined to a brief description of the case
and to reporting that a solution has been reached, according to Article 12.7 of the DSU.

3. In the case at hand, the parties to the dispute have not yet notified mutually agreed solutions
to the DSB. Therefore, even if there is no s ubstantive disagreement between the parties as to the
inconsistency of the measure at issue with cited provisions of a covered agreement, a settlement of the
matter stipulated in Article 12.7 of the DSU has not yet been found among the parties to the dispute.
The United States only agreed not to contest the Ecuador's claim, which does not necessarily mean
that the US admitted the inconsistency of its me asure with relevant prov isions of the covered
agreement in question. In its first written su bmission, the US only acknowledges that Ecuador's
descriptions are accurate, and recognizes that the DS B ruled that the measure was inconsistent with
the relevant provisions in other case
1. Moreover, Ecuador still requests the panel to find that the
US acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2. of the Anti-Dumping Agreement2

4. Since there has been no notification of a mutu ally agreed solution and the complaining party
continues to request the findings of the panel, the panel shall discharge its responsibilities in
accordance with the panel's terms of reference. The function of the panel should be fulfilled as
requested in the relevant provisions of the DSU.

5. If the panel limits itself to sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties in a case like
this one, the following problems may arise:

• Under Article 12.7 of the DSU, where the partie s to the dispute have failed to develop a
mutually satisfactory solution, the report of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the
applicability of relevant provisions and th e basic rationale behind any findings and
recommendations that it makes. If the panel limits itself to sanctioning the mutual
understanding of the parties, it could not pr ovide in its report the above mandatory
elements, in particular, basic rationale of its findings, because a mere sanctioning could

2 Ecuador's first written submission para. 22.

not be accepted as a "rationale". A dictiona ry defines rationale as a "reasoned exposition,
esp. one defining the fundamental reasons for a course of action and behaviour"3.

• In accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, a panel should make an objective assessment
of the matter before it including the applicab ility of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreement. A mere sanctioning of th e mutual understanding of the parties is far
short of being objective assessment. The Appe llate Body expressed that they fail to see
how any panel could be expected to make an 'objective assessment of the matter', as
required by Article 11 of the DSU, if it c ould only refer in its reasoning to the specific
provisions cited by the parties in their claims 4. It was further noted that a panel's
interpretation of the text of a relevant WTO Agreement cannot be limited by the
particular arguments of the parties to a dispute5.

• In accordance with Article 7.1 of the DSU, the panel shall examine the matter referred to
the DSB in the light of relevant provisions. According to a dictionary, "examine" means
"to look at, inspect, or scrutinize carefully or in detail" 6. If the panel limits itself to
sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties, it is difficult to say that the matter in
question has been "examined" by the panel.

• In accordance with Article 7.2 of the DSU, th e panel shall address the relevant provisions
cited by the parties to the dispute. Korea is of the view that "address" requires a certain
level of analysis, reasoning and examination. It is questionable that mere sanctioning
could reach the minimum threshold to become "address".

• Article 3.2 of the DSU stipulates that the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a
central element in providing security and pred ictability to the multilateral trading system.
If a panel confines its role to sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties, it would
be difficult to maintain security and predicta bility to the multilateral trading system when
the parties to the other future dispute mutually understand differently on the
similar/identical measure. Furthermore, desp ite the mutual understanding of the parties
which is in line with the mutual understa nding made by other parties in the previous
disputes, if a panel determines differently on its own, the security and predictability
would be also difficult to be maintained.

6. Bearing in mind the above aspects, Korea belie ves that the panel must determine on its own
whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions, as long as there has been no
notification of a mutually agreed solution. Dis puting parties' understanding has no legal effect of
constraining the function of a panel until such under standing is converted into a mutually agreed
solution and notified to the DSB accordingly.

3 Collins English Dictionary 21st century edition (5th edition 2000)
4 Appellate Body Report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 74.
5 Panel Report on Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US), para. 6.19
6 Collins English Dictionary 21st century edition (5th edition 2000)

ANNEX C-13

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF MEXICO

30 October 2006

Page

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 19

 A. Model Zeroing is clearly prohibite d under Article 2.4.2............................................ 19
 B. This Panel should apply the correct legal reasoning set forth
by the Appellate Body, not the erroneous reasoning applied
by two recent panels .................................................................................................. 20
 C. United States' continued unwillingness to modify its WTO
inconsistent Zeroing Practice .................................................................................... 21

II. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 22

T
ABLE OF CASES

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
EC – Bed Linen Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton- Type Bed Linen from India ,
WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, DSR 2001:V, 2049
Japan– Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan– Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97.
US– OCTG (Argentina) Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil C ountry Tubular Goods from
Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004.
US – Softwood Lumber V Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada ,
WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004, DSR 2004:V, 1875
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS264/AB/RW,
adopted 1 September 2006
US – Softwood Lumber V
(Article 21.5)
Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Canada, WT/DS264/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, as
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS264/AB/RW
US – Zeroing (Japan) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/R, 20 September 2006 (currently
before Appellate Body)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") ,
WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 9 May 2006
US – Zeroing (EC I)
Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") ,
WT/DS294/R, adopted 9 May 2006, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS294/AB/R

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Government of Mexico appreciates this opportunity to present its views in this
proceeding. Mexico has entered this dispute as a Thir d Party because Mexican imports have been
harmed by the United States' systematic applicat ion of the identical WTO-inconsistent zeroing
methodology. This practice of the United States c ontravenes the United States obligations under the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("AD Agreement"). This case provides the opportuni ty to reaffirm these obligations and to
compliance by the United States.

2. Mexico welcomes the agreement reached by Ecuador and the United States with respect to
the course of this dispute. As Mexico understands it, pursuant to this agreement the United States will
not contest Ecuador's claim before the Panel. In ad dition, the United States has stated that if certain
findings are made by the Panel, it intends to revi se its anti-dumping determin ation to be consistent
with the Panel's ruling. Such redetermination by the United States' authorities will be conducted on
an expedited basis pursuant to the domestic Unite d States "Section 129" implementation procedures.
Mexico commends this procedural action and consider s that it should be followed in other disputes
involving this practice.

3. Given the circumstances, the outcome of this dispute is beyond doubt. In this context,
Mexico wishes to share several observations with th e Panel that Mexico believes are important to the
Panel's decision.

A. Model Zeroing is prohibited under Article 2.4.2

4. The model zeroing methodology at issue in Ecuador's claim is identical to the measure that
was before the Appellate Body in US-Softwood Lumber V and US – Zeroing (EC I) and found to be
inconsistent with the United States obligations under Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.

5. The Appellate Body and dispute settlemen t panels have, on more than one occasion,
thoroughly considered the consistency of the Unite d States' methodology with Article 2.4.2 of the
AD Agreement and have without exception found that it is inconsistent with the United States'
obligations under that provision.

6. Given the existence of a series of prior Pa nel and Appellate Body reports that support the
view that model zeroing is inconsistent with article 2.4.2, the value of such reports becomes a relevant
issue here. In this regard, Mexico would like to r ecall that while previous decisions "are not binding,
except with respect to resolving the particular dispute" those conclusions "create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members"
1 Mexico agrees, in this case, with the Appellate Body's
assertion to the effect that "following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier disputes is not only
appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same" 2 In
sum, in order to maintain the security and predicta bility of the multilateral trading system, aside from
the agreement reached between the United States and Ecuador, this Panel should likewise find that the
United States' model zeroing methodology applied in the case of Ecuador is inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.

7. By entering into such a procedural agreemen t, the United States effectively recognizes that its
model zeroing methodology is not consistent with ar ticle 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. Thus, as there
is no valid defense under any of the covered agreem ents against such practice, the United States has
chosen not to contest Ecuador's allegations in this sense.

1 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, page 15.
2 Appellate Body Report, US– OCTG (Argentina), para. 188.

B. This Panel should apply the correct legal reasoning set forth by the Appellate Body

8. Although there is unanimity in the rulings of prior panels and the Appellate Body with respect
to the conclusion that model zeroi ng is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, there have been some
differences in the legal reasoning that has been employed by panels in reaching that conclusion.

9. The Appellate Body has consis tently followed a coherent and textually-based interpretation of
the agreements. In contrast, WTO panels (the panels in US – Softwood Lumber V (21.5) and US –
Zeroing (Japan) ) have applied an incorrect reasoning that fails, in Mexico's view, to consider the
AD Agreement in its totality. This erroneous reasoning should be reject ed by this panel in favour of
the coherent textually-based interpretation of the AD Agreement set forth by the Appellate Body.

10. Mexico notes specifically that the panels in US-Softwood Lumber (Article 21.5) and, more
recently, in US – Zeroing (Japan) , erroneously sought to explain the inconsistency of model zeroing
with the terms of Article 2.4.2 as flowing solely fro m the unique textual reference that exists in the
first sentence of Article 2.4.2 to "all comparable export transactions." According to these panel
decisions, the requirement recognized by the Appellate Body to calculate a margin of dumping with
reference to the "product as a whole" is derived solely and exclusively from the "all comparable
export transactions" language of Article 2.4.2.
3

11. The Appellate Body's ruling in US-Softwood Lumber V demonstrates why the reasoning
utilized by these two Panels was not correct. The Appellate Body noted, and the United States
agreed, that "multiple averaging" by models is permitted under Article 2.4.2 and was not a matter in
contention.
4 What was under contention, however, was whether the results of such intermediate
comparisons are properly considered "margins of dumping" within the meaning of the AD Agreement
and for purposes of Article 2.4.2 in particular. Th e United States argued that such intermediate or
"sub-group level" comparison results are "margins of dumping."

12. In this sense, the Appellate Body found that th e interpretation of the United States lacks merit.
The Appellate Body began its analysis with the text of Article VI:1 of GATT 1994, which defines
"dumping" as occurring where "products
 of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than the normal value of the products " (emphasis added). This definition is reiterated
in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement, whic h likewise speaks in terms of a "product " being dumped
when the export price of the "product " is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like "product" when destined for consumption in the exporting country.

13. The Appellate Body also explained in US-Softwood Lumber V that its finding that "dumping"
and "margins of dumping" can only be established fo r the product under investigation "as a whole" is
"in consonance with the need for consistent treat ment of a product in antidumping investigation."
5 In
particular, the "product," as defined by the investigating authorities in the given case, must be treated
"as whole" for determining the volume of imports, in jury, causation, and calculation of the margin of
dumping. Thus, it is impermissible under the AD Agreement to treat some export transactions as

3See, e.g., Panel Report, US – Zeroing (Japan)(Panel) para. 7.82; Panel Report, US – Softwood
Lumber (21.5)(Panel) at para. 5.21
4 Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V , para. 80 ("We note that there is no disagreement
among the participants in this dispute as to the permissibility of "multiple averaging" under Article 2.4.2. All
participants agree that an investigating authority may choose to divide the product under investigation into
product types or models for purposes of calculating a weighted average normal value and a weighted average
export price for the tr ansactions involving each product type or model or sub-group of "comparable"
transactions.").
5 See id, para. 99.

"dumped" for certain purposes (such as injury de termination) and not dumped for other purposes
(such as calculating margins of dumping).

14. In sum, contrary to erroneous asser tions in certain recent panel decisions,
6 the Appellate
Body's reasoning with regard to the c oncept of the "product as a whole" in US – Softwood Lumber V ,
did not turn solely or principally, on the particul ar phrasing "all comparable export transactions" in
the first sentence of Article 2.4.2. Rather, the A ppellate Body correctly reasoned that "dumping" and
"margins of dumping" are concepts that find meani ng in the Agreement with reference to the product
under investigation taken as a whole. This concep t of "product as a whole" is itself fundamentally
derived from the textual references to the "product" under investigation in Article VI:1 and VI:2 of
GATT 1994, Article 2.1, and elsewhere in the Agreement (e.g., Articles 9.2 and 6.10).7

15. Finally, the reasoning adopted by the Panel in US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5) was flatly
rejected when the dispute reached the Appellate Body.
8 Mexico notes that the similar reasoning
employed by the Panel in US-Zeroing (Japan) is currently before the Appellate Body and a rejection
of this erroneous reasoning is again to be expected.

C. The United States' has not yet modifi ed its WTO-inconsistent Zeroing Practice

16. Mexico would like to draw the attention of the Panel to the unwillingness of the United States
to modify its WTO-inconsistent zeroing practice in response to the prior findings of the Appellate
Body.

17. Following the WTO Panel decision in US – Zeroing (EC I) , the United States initiated a
domestic legal process that purported to implement th e panel's findings with respect to model zeroing
applied in the original investigations.
9 However, to date, the United States continues to apply the
invalidated model-zeroing methodology in new or iginal investigations claiming that the
implementation process "has not run its course." 10 As USDOC argued in a recent anti-dumping
determination:

"[I]t is premature to determine precisely ho w the United States will implement the panel
recommendation. With respect to the recent Appellate Body Report in [US – Zeroing (EC I)],
the United States has not yet gone through the statutorily mandated process of determining
whether to implement the report. . . . As such , the WTO dispute settlement proceedings have
no bearing on whether the Department's denial of offsets in this investigation is consistent
with US law . . . Accordingly, the Department will continue in this investigation to deny
offsets to dumping based on export transactions that exceed normal value."
11

18. It is regrettable that Ecuador has also f ound it necessary to resolve this matter through the
WTO dispute settlement procedures despite the Appella te Body's multiple decisions that this practice
is WTO-inconsistent. Indeed, in view that there is no longer a defense against this practice, it seems
coherent to us that the United States had agreed in this proceeding not to contest Ecuador's claims.

6 See para. 9 supra.
7 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V at para. 99.
8 See, Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5) at paras. 92 (noting that "[t]he
Appellate Body underscored that its previous finding concerning the inconsistency of zeroing under the
weighted average-to-weighted average comparison methodology 'was based not only on Article 2.4.2, first
sentence, but also on the context found in Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.'").
9 See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumpi ng Margin During an
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 11189 (Dep't Commerce)(March 6, 2006).
10 See Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof from the People's Republic of China , 71 Fed.
Reg. 29,303 (Dep't Commerce) (22 May 2006)(final determination of sales at less than fair value).
11 Ibid.

II. CONCLUSION

19. Mexico respectfully requests that the Panel be mindful of this communication and of the
circumstances described above in formulating its r ecommendations at the conclusion of this dispute,
and appreciates the opportunity to participate in this proceeding as a Third Party and to submit its
views relating to United States' model zeroing methodology.

ANNEX C-14

ORAL STATEMENT OF MEXICO

3 November 2006

 Mexico is grateful for this opportunity to express its views on this dispute and, in order to
take full advantage of the opportunity, we should like, fi rst of all, to draw the Panel's attention to the
content of our written submission presented on 30 October and, secondly, to make the following
systemic comments on the nature and objectives of the WTO dispute settlement procedures.

1. We are in favour of the parties seeking creativ e alternatives so as to make efficient use of the
mechanism. Thus, we recognize that the DSU gi ves the parties flexibility to settle disputes.
This case is a clear example of that, which is why this factor should be taken into account
alongside the following comments.
2. The written submission of the United States a nd its participation in the agreement reached
with Ecuador represent in our opinion a positive move towards achieving the elimination of
the practice of zeroing, but we are dismayed that this effort does not extend to stopping the
United States from applying this practice in other circumstances. That would represent a
significant saving in resources for all the WT O Members who, like us, have suffered the
illegal application of this practice.
3. The European Communities draws attention in its third party submission to a Panel's
obligation to "make an objective assessment of th e matter before it" and we share the concern
to which this could give rise in the way in which it is presented by the European
Communities. However, we trust that by c oncentrating on the facts of this dispute,
particularly the existence of an agreement between the parties on the content of their
complaints and responses, this Panel will be able to carry out effectively its duties, without
producing precedents that might limit or jeopardize the rights of other Members or the
outcome of other decisions by other Panels.
4. From the agreement reached between Ecuador and the United States, Mexico infers that the
fact that the United States does not contest Ecuador's allegation that the measures identified in
these proceedings are inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement would mean, in the present case, that in principle there is no dispute per se. It is
our understanding that this shared interpretati on should not affect other proceedings or the
interpretation of Members' rights, particularly in the case of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5. Given the nature of this dispute, we believe that a preferable course of action by which the
parties might resolve their differences, would have been to act in accordance with Article 5 or
Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Since that has not been done, this
Panel should particularly bear in mind that an agreement between two parties on the
interpretation of a specific rule cannot, by virt ue of the rule of negative consensus, be a
substitute for the authoritative interpretation which only the Members as a whole can adopt
pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization).

6. Finally, with regard to the working procedur es adopted by the Panel, we understand that they
were adopted in conformity with Article 12. 1 of the DSU. We are concerned that the
agreement between the parties, which is now public, could send the wrong signal that it is the
parties in a dispute who determine the procedure that the Panel must follow. We would be
grateful if that were clarified in your report.

 With these comments we conclude our oral statement. Thank you very much.

ANNEX C-15

ANSWER OF MEXICO TO QUESTION
POSED BY THE PANEL

13 November 2006

Q1. "What does your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where
there is no substantive disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure
with one or more cited provisions of a covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to
sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parti es, or must the Panel, on its own, determine
whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?"

 By way of response to this question, Mexico would refer the Panel to the text of our oral
submission of 3 November last and welcomes th e opportunity to make the following additional
comments:

1. The idea of sanctioning the mutual understandi ng of the parties is a practice followed in
private commercial arbitration proceedings and othe r types of arbitration such as Investor-State
proceedings
1, under which an agreed settlement between the parties may be treated as equivalent to an
arbitral award. However, the effects of panel d ecisions may be very different from those obtained in
the sphere of private commercial law, mainly becau se, in the case of WTO proceedings, an agreement
between two parties on the interpretation of a specifi c rule cannot, by virtue of the rule of negative
consensus, be a substitute for the authoritative in terpretation which only the Members as a whole can
adopt pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreem ent (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization). Otherwise, there is a risk that interpretations agreed bilaterally by two parties,
with the approval of panels, might not be approved by the other Member s. In view of the foregoing,
and in addition to the views already expressed in our oral submission, Mexico considers that this
Panel should not limit itself to sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties.

1 See for example Rule 43 (Settlement and Discon tinuance) of the ICSID (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, and Article 26 (Award by
Consent) of the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) Arbitration Rules.

ANNEX C-16

ORAL STATEMENT OF THAILAND

3 November 2006

1. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Panel: Th ailand appreciates the opportunity to present its
views on this matter to the Panel today.

2. We reserved our third party rights under Artic le 10.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
because imports of Thai shrimp into the United Stat es are also subject to the US practice of zeroing
described by Ecuador in its first written submission.
1 Thailand firmly believes that this practice is
inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreemen t because it results in the imposition of an anti-
dumping duty greater than the actual margin of dum ping for the product concerned, and is currently
contesting the US application of zeroing to Thai shrimp imports in another dispute.

3. Therefore, Thailand generally welcomes that the United States does not contest the
inconsistency of its zeroing practice with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We view
this as a positive development, and urge the Unite d States to abandon the use of zeroing in all
instances in which it is applied as soon as possible.

4. Thailand also notes that the US Department of Commerce has recently declared its intention
to abandon the use of zeroing with average-to-avera ge comparisons in antidumping investigations.
We would appreciate further details from the United States on the execution of that intention in light
of this dispute.

5. Finally, Thailand will be happ y to respond to any questions th e Panel may have. Again, we
thank you for the opportunity to present our views today.